component of the political process and that the feudal mode of production
was built into the very essence of Malay society.

In chapter two, Hua explores how the growth of British penetration
(begning with the influence of Francis Light in 1786) laid the foundations
for communalism in multiracial Malaysia. The evidence presented is elaborate
but also overlapping at times. The primary argument begins with the insight
that to preserve their presence, the British adopted the “divide and
rule” strategy. The introduction of capitalism and a division of labor along
racial lines prevented any form of unity among the peasants and also led
to the grooming of a bourgeoisie class including Malays, Chinese and Indians.
Hua sees this as a necessary strategy if the extraction of surplus from the
peninsula was to continue. Most importantly, the British masqueraded their
political and administrative control through the use of Malay puppet rulers.

Chapters three through five assess the events leading to anti-colonial
movements and the transfer of power to the local ruling class. Hua illustrates
the major institutional changes that followed the struggle for independence
and offers an impressive list of evidence to support his description of the
current class structure in Malaysia. While discussing the dependent nature
of Malaysian society in relation to the metropolis, he points out that “the
local ruling class continues to be dominated, because the pursuit of their
own interests is circumscribed by the imperialist interest they serve. And
while the neo-colonial situation exists, it is the workers and peasants who
are exploited by the local and metropolitan ruling class” (111).

The division of the masses through communalism has prolonged the
deprivation of democratic rights. The last part of the book focuses on this
issue. Hua asserts that the New Economic Policy that was first promulgated
in 1970, is another indication of the “institutionalization of communalism
by the Malaysian state.” Other indicators are the imposition of the Amended
Internal Security Act authorizing arrests and detention without trial; the
Printing Press Ordinance of 1971; and anti-labor legislation.

Class and Communalism in Malaysia is an excellent analysis of the socio-
economic situation in that country. It sheds much needed light on the com-
plex relationship between the domestic class structure and neocolonialism.
On a much broader scale, it raises fundamental concerns about the nature
of the international economic order.

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Sumil Kukreja


Wagner’s contribution to the Heritage Sociology series, edited by Morris
Janowitz, was published in paperback this year (1986). The book is a short-
ened version of the original “personal and intellectual biography” compos-
ed between 1974 and 1979, of which “about 20 percent” remains (xl). Even
so, it is quite comprehensive, first tracing Schutz’s life in broad overview,
then focusing on details of the personal and intellectual relationships that
he had with other scholars, and finally exploring the relationship of his
work to that of Leibniz, Bergson, and especially Husserl. This comprehen-
siveness is the strength of the book. Nothing comparable has been provided
anywhere else. I doubt, however, that any but the most committed social
theorists and Schutzians have an interest in exploring the details. The most
interesting parts of the book, the first on Schutz’s life and the last on his
uses of Leibniz, Bergson, and Husserl, will be of interest to those who only
want a general knowledge of Schutz’s work. The middle section, dealing
with many predecessors, contemporaries, and successors of Schutz, drags.
Its usefulness as an introduction to the American phenomenological dialogue
has to be balanced against the repetition of its seemingly endless listing of
names. Yet, on the whole, Schutz’s criticism of objectivist sociology shines
through the text.

The first part — “A Life of Intellectual Devotion” — explores Schutz’s
life course, dividing it into fourteen different stages. Wagner is not the first
to note that Schutz’s intellectual “life-plan” was designed and fulfilled with
a very high degree of consistency. The “one single, ultimate, theoretical-
philosophical purpose” informing his intellectual life was “the creation of
a radically subjective sociology of understanding” (pp. 16, 115). This was
so from his first synthesis of Husserl, Bergson, and Weber in Der sinnhafte
Aufbau der Sozialen Welt (1932, translated in an English edition as The
Phenomenology of the Social World, 1967), until his dying efforts to produce
the outline of his philosophy that has been gathered into The Structure of
the Life-World (Schutz and Luckmann, 1973).

The young Schutz attempted a clarification of Weber’s methodological
tenets for an “interpretive” sociology through the phenomenologies of
Bergson and Husserl. His later intellectual projects were primarily concerned
with using the insights of diverse philosophers and sociologists to extend
and modify the original presentation of his ideas. In his busy and some-
times tumultuous life, Schutz started major projects (after completing Der
sinnhafte Aufbau) but was only able to complete his many papers, journal articles, and lectures.

According to Wagner, Schutz compartmentalized his life into four distinct "spheres of relevances:" one of family and friendship concerns, another oriented to business (international banking), a third concerned the pursuit of scholarly theoretical/philosophical goals, and the fourth revolved around his love for music (17). Though (or because) divided, the different spheres intruded upon each other as demands for his time and energy.

Wagner also suggests that Schutz's life as a young man laid an experiential foundation for his theoretical distinctions (10). After fulfilling his military duties in World War I, Schutz experienced the estrangement in Austrian society of "compulsory roles" in the public world from the "life of meaning" characterizing family and cultural pursuits. For Wagner, this experience was a "bridge" to the neo-Weberian emphasis on scientific detachment. The "compulsory" world required an impersonal explanation. On the other hand, Schutz's longing for personal closeness in friendship and family relations was probably a "bridge" to his theoretical concern for intersubjectivity. Certainly, his description of the we-relationship has little to do with compulsory action. I cannot judge the validity of Wagner's assertions, but he has isolated the fundamental tension in Schutz's work — that between the emphasis on subjective dynamism in social life and the definition of science as a rational, impersonal "objective context of knowledge."

Like a host of his intellectual peers, Schutz emigrated from Europe (living for a while in Paris) to America during the rise of Nazism in Germany. This unhappy circumstance was the context in which Schutz expanded his knowledge of and acquaintanceship with many of Europe's and America's most important intellectuals (he already knew Husserl). The second part of the book — "An Ongoing Community of Scholars" — discusses in more detail some of the major currents of thought that influenced his work and specific intellectuals he mentioned in his work and/or knew personally. Philosophers and sociologist, ranging from Simmel to Merleau-Ponty to Parsons, are discussed in relation to Schutz. Voegelin, a phenomenologist of history, and Gurwitch, a phenomenological psychologist, merit a chapter each. In perhaps the most interesting section, the influence of American pragmatists and early sociologists is noted.

Part two indicates the breadth, but not depth, of Schutz's thought. It seemed to me to take a long time to read, probably due to the lack of a central argument to tie all the threads together. It does, however, familiarize the reader with the philosophical discourse that Schutz had entered.

Part three — "Before and Beyond the Sociology of the Life-World" — dealing with Leibniz, Bergson, and Husserl, is the most interesting part of the book. It first indicates Schutz's indebtedness to Leibniz's monadology and to Bergson's phenomenology of inner time consciousness for many of his core concepts. While never accepting either philosophy as a whole, it is demonstrated that he borrowed extensively from them in defining his own project.

Next, Wagner points out that Schutz borrowed most extensively from Husserl, and this was a source of many doubts and apprehensions, especially toward the end of his life. Schutz's core concepts — "natural attitude," "intersubjectivity," and "typification" — were lifted from Husserl. However, two types of criticisms served to undermine Schutz's faith in Husserl's delineation of these concepts (307-324). To begin with, Schutz never had much faith in Husserl's transcendental solution to the problem of intersubjectivity. He finally, in 1957, expanded these doubts into an extensive criticism of Husserl's solutions to the problems. For Schutz, taking the standpoint of the Transcendental Ego to demonstrate the nature of intersubjectivity involved the attempt to pluralize a term that could only be singular, and therefore failed.

The other problem with Husserl's phenomenology dealt with its clarity as a philosophy. At the same 1957 conference where Schutz presented his criticisms of transcendental phenomenology, Fink criticized Husserl's philosophy for never passing from an "operational" to a "thematic" stage. Operational concepts are not clarified, but are used in an initial stage of clarifying concepts that will be used as tools in the thematic stage of building a philosophy. Schutz even doubted that the concept of typicality had ever passed the operational stage (323).

Wagner concludes by describing Schutz as a "critical phenomenologist" (327) who wanted to build a systematic phenomenological base guiding theory building in the social sciences. In doing so Schutz could not overlook the problems internal to phenomenology itself. And, his brand of sociology remains internal to phenomenology. Wagner's accurate depiction of Schutz also points to his limitation: the singular concern with "radical subjectivity." I think that sociologists have to question whether this concern is adequate to resolve contemporary sociological problems. Can it, for instance, be the basis for an adequate historical sociology? Can we grasp contemporary relations of power, authority, and stratification from this perspective?

Schutz mastered phenomenological philosophy and demonstrated its relevance for a neo-Weberian, interpretive sociology. As Wagner points out,
his work is a "mandate" (329) calling for critical philosophical and phenomenological inspection of problems of social science methodology. Even if Schutz's own conclusions about methodology do not adequately address the full spectrum of sociological problems, the critical philosophical stance characterizing his intellectual life is an excellent mandate for sociology.

University of Kansas

Christopher Bohling

BOOKS FOR REVIEW

This list represents all the books that MARS has for review. Anyone interested in reviewing one of these, or in submitting a review of another book for consideration, should write:

Travis Patton
Book Review Editor
Mid-American Review of Sociology
Dept. of Sociology
University of Kansas
Lawrence, KS 66045

Abels, Paul and Michael J. Murphy

Bagby, Wesley M.

Berkowitz, William R.

Brody, Ralph.

Dillard, John M.

Dougherty, Flavian, (ed.).

Epstein, Gerald, M.D.

Fardan, Dorothy Blake.

Fields, Rona M.