

Land and Life (1963). These and other works by a host of distinguished and thoughtful scholars are central to any balanced and representative review of geographers' contributions to the study of human-environment interactions.

Attending to landmarks and other major sources is not Maxwell's style. While misunderstanding Amos Rapoport's *House Form and Culture* (1969), he completely omits (both from text and bibliography) any account of Rapoport's *Australia as a Human Setting* (1972), *The Mutual Interaction of People and their Built Environment: A Cross-Cultural Perspective* (1976), or *Human Aspects of Urban Form: Towards a Man-Environment Approach to Urban Form and Design* (1977). Since Rapoport is an anthropologist as well as an architect and is one of the leading theorists in human-environment relations—he is a recipient of the Environmental Design Research Association (EDRA) Award for his theoretical contributions—these are not small omissions.

Anthropologists and communication scientists alike will also wonder how it is possible to include what purports to be a full-blown exposition of proxemic behavior and non-verbal communication without even citing (either in text or bibliography) the works of Ray Birdwhistle, *Introduction to Kinesics: An Annotation System for Analysis of Body Motion and Gesture* (1952) and *Kinesics and Context: Essays on Body Motion Communication* (1970). Readers ready for an up-to-date consideration of these and related issues may want to look at Amos Rapoport's *The Meaning of the Built Environment: A Nonverbal Communication Approach* (1982).

Maxwell also overlooks the annual yearbooks of the Environmental Design Research Association as well as almost all the work reported in the pages of *Environment and Behavior*, *Environment and Planning*, and *Man-Environment Systems* (just to name a few of the central journals in human-environment relations research).

In addition to the above cited journals, however, there is now a solid review series of human-environment research to which the interested reader (if not Maxwell) is directed. The title of the useful series is: *Human Behavior and Environment: Advances in Theory and Research* and is under the general editorship of Irwin Altman and Joachim F. Wohlwill. The first volume was published by Plenum in 1976 and one thus wonders why Maxwell missed these significant and intellectually engaging volumes. Fortunately, they provide us with a much more current and responsible introduction to the complexities of the contexts of human behavior.

Karl Mannheim, *Structures of Thinking*. Edited by David Kettler, Volker Meja, and Nico Stehr. Translated by Jeremy J. Shapiro and Shierry Weber Nicholsen. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982. 292 pp. \$30.00 (cloth).

Structures of Thinking consists of two previously unpublished manuscripts—"The Distinctive Character of Cultural-Sociological Knowledge," and "A Sociological Theory of Culture and Its Knowability (Conjunctive and Communicative Thinking)"—written by Mannheim in 1922 and 1924 respectively. As the titles of these two manuscripts indicate, Mannheim is wrestling with the issues of relativism and positivist reductionism in order to reconstruct social sciences. Of course these issues are also present in Mannheim's other works of his German period, e.g., *Ideology and Utopia*, "Historicism," "Conservative Thought," and "On the Interpretation of *Weltanschauung*."

Although these manuscripts are unfinished—and best described by the editors as "methodical, systematized notes" (1)—they are important because they reveal Mannheim's attempt to map sociological territory. This book reveals Mannheim explicitly reflecting on the contributions of Alfred and Max Weber, Marx, Dilthey, Durkheim, Tönnies, Hegel, Troeltsch, Simmel, Scheler, Husserl and Lukacs in order to define his own sociological approach. In a sense, *Structures of Thinking* is the link which unites the other writings of his German period into a coherent whole. Here we see at its clearest the philosophical foundations and structure of Mannheim's own thinking.

In "The Distinctive Character of Cultural-Sociological Knowledge," Mannheim attempts "to shed light on the problem of what it may mean to subject culture to sociological investigation" (37). He classifies different orientations to knowledge and analyzes the prospects for each type to illuminate cultural objects. Mannheim draws a distinction between "immanent" and "non-immanent" considerations of cultural phenomena. Immanent approaches, as described by the editors, "address the explicit or implicit claim of the object to be 'valid'" (16). In contrast, non-immanent approaches ignore questions of validity and attempt to place the cultural object under consideration into a context other than that indicated by its manifest meaning, e.g., interpreting a piece of art as a function of a Romantic worldview; or demonstrating the social determination of *Weltanschauungen*. For Mannheim's reconstruction of the social sciences, it is

non-immanent approaches that are sociological and crucial for proper interpretations.

Later in the essay Mannheim shifts classification schemes and delineates three major "varieties of sociology" (98-130) and their prospects for illuminating cultural phenomena. "Pure sociology" for Mannheim is rooted in a Kantian orientation that reveals a "concealed longing for the *a priori*" (106), that is to be achieved by stripping the spatial and temporal differences of cultural phenomena away thereby revealing the "inner kernel" or essential forms of culture. Simmel, Tönnies and the phenomenological school are all examples of "pure sociology."

"General sociology is a science of facts, a discipline proceeding inductively. It grasps the forms of the social . . . as they have really been formed, existing in just this specific way" (111). Thus, general sociology records empirical facts and draws generalizations from these facts thereby revealing "the patterns which recur in the world of appearances" (112). General sociology is rooted in positivism and is searching for the general "laws" and regularities of society.

For Mannheim, both of these approaches are limited by their neglect of the qualitative, historical and subjective factors of social existence. "Dynamic sociology," according to Mannheim, holds the greatest potential for analyzing cultural phenomena because it takes historical location into account. It is rooted in the philosophy of history but discards the metaphysical assumptions which prescribe a "basic design and ultimate goal" for historical development (116). It retains, however, the notion of structural stages of historical development. Thus, dynamic sociology analyzes cultural phenomena against a background of historical structures that allows the qualitative, situation bound features of cultural phenomena to remain in focus.

In this first section Mannheim draws many speculative distinctions and classifications which reveal his struggling to develop a new method. In each case though, the distinctions offered by Mannheim give a clear view of his intellectual foundations. So, while it is not always clear why Mannheim makes a distinction at a specific point in his argument, it does reveal the parameters of his thinking. This is the advantage of getting a look at Mannheim's notes instead of a finished essay, for if the essay were finished, Mannheim would have edited out many of these speculative classifications.

In "A Sociological Theory of Culture and Its Knowability" Mannheim delineates two types of knowledge or structures of thinking—conjunctive and communicative thinking—and elaborates their

socio-historical determination. Conjunctive thinking is "pre-theoretical, everyday thinking" that emerges from interaction in a shared socio-historical context. It is subjective, qualitative, relative and perspectivist. In contrast, communicative thinking is quantitative, objective, absolute and timeless and takes the structure of thinking found in the natural sciences as its model. The bulk of this section is devoted to delineating the nature of everyday, conjunctive thinking and demonstrating that it is a valid form of knowledge that can be employed as a foundation for the interpretation of cultural objects and society. Mannheim's extended treatment of conjunctive knowledge is part of his attempt to transcend positivism's inability to interpret society and its cultural objects.

Mannheim also presents an analysis of the socio-historical determinants of these knowledge types or structures of thinking. Conjunctive knowledge is associated with "community" and communicative knowledge with "society" (Tönnies influence is obvious here). Not surprisingly, Mannheim in the sociology of knowledge tradition, links the development of communicative knowledge to the ascending bourgeoisie and the social relations of capitalism. Abstract and fragmented market and social relations require an abstract form of knowledge that is not bound by socio-historical location or perspective, e.g., quantitative knowledge as found in the natural sciences. The problem, according to Mannheim, is that the qualitative aspects of society and social existence are ignored in this type of thinking. Therefore, our understanding of society and our ability to direct its development is thwarted. It is against this background that Mannheim claims that there is a "recurrent demand for a *novum organon* in the humanistic sciences" (150), and that a recognition and analysis of conjunctive thinking is the place to start.

Structures of Thinking is an important book, for it reveals more clearly than any other work, the structure of Mannheim's own thinking and sheds light on many of the issues that have been previously misunderstood. For example, in his discussion of conjunctive thinking Mannheim speaks of "the unavoidable perspectivity of historical-sociological concept formation" (247), which should deflate (finally) the distorted but common criticism that he claimed that the "socially unattached intelligentsia" was not subject to the limitations of "social standpoint." But beyond clarifying problematic issues of his other works, readers will encounter again Mannheim's keen sense for the dialectical movement of history and thought that made his sociology

of knowledge and *Ideology and Utopia* so popular. This is a book rich with sociological insights that no scholar interested in Mannheim, the sociology of knowledge or the development of social thought should ignore. Kettler, Meja and Stehr provide an excellent introduction, note on the translation describing the difficulties of translating German into English, and index, which greatly facilitate full comprehension of Mannheim's "notes." This book is worth your time and probably your money.

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Bernard L. Bloom and Shirley J. Asher, eds., *Psychiatric Patient Rights and Patient Advocacy: Issues and Evidence*, New York: Human Sciences Press, 1982. 287 pp. \$29.95 (cloth).

This collection of eleven essays by anthropologists; psychologists, psychiatrists, sociologists, social workers, and legal practitioners is truly an interdisciplinary effort of ambitious scope. The essays cover most of the topics one would expect from such a volume: the controversies surrounding involuntary treatment, the stigma attached to accepting the role of mental patient, the adjustment problems of former patients, the confidentiality of the client/therapist relationship, and the efficacy of community-based treatments. But the real strength of the volume is not the scope of the topics covered, but the novel and creative ways in which the topics are approached.

In one of the more thought-provoking essays, sociologist Henry Steadman reminds us of the tendency on the part of mental health professionals to greatly overestimate the potential for violence of persons receiving psychiatric care. From this admittedly well-tread ground Steadman emerges with a novel construction of the problem—should there not be, he argues, an affirmative right to “not be a false positive” p. 129)?¹

Richard and Mark Pasewark (clinician and attorney, respectively) deal with the disproportionate amount of societal concern surrounding the insanity defense, a defense rarely invoked and more often than not unsuccessful when invoked. The Pasewarks' unique contribution is in the form of a challenge. After reviewing the various tests that have been used over the years to define legal insanity (e.g., the Durham rule, the American Lawyers Index guidelines, as well as the older McNaughton test), the authors ask us to ponder why we demand linguistic precision in an area that rarely impinges upon the criminal justice system, yet feel oddly complacent with such vague constructions as “beyond a reasonable doubt” that are of relevance to virtually *all* criminal actions?

The Barrow and Gutwirth piece on the efficacy of community treatment also poses a question worth pondering. After lamenting the contaminating influence of the “attention placebo effect” upon empirical data in this field, they suggest that perhaps we should see the effect as a blessing and not a curse. If our data indicate that switching from treatment X to treatment Y produces positive results, why waste much time and energy trying to discover whether the true