

The Evolution of Political Islam in Turkey:
Comparing Party Programs of 'Islamic' Parties in Government

By

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Submitted to the graduate degree program in International Studies
and the Graduate Faculty of the University of Kansas
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts.

Chairperson

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Date defended: _____

The Thesis Committee for Sumeyye Pakdil Kesgin certifies
that this is the approved Version of the following thesis:

The Evolution of Political Islam in Turkey:
Comparing Party Programs of 'Islamic' Parties in Government

Committee:

Chairperson

Date approved: _____

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My deepest appreciation is to Dr. Juliet Kaarbo, my major advisor. With her guidance, help, patience and understanding, I was able to finish this work.

I am deeply grateful to Dr. Naima B. Omar who has been a mentor to me and supports me all time to do my best. I feel very lucky to meet Dr. Omar.

I also thank to Dr. Phil Schrodtt for serving on my thesis committee and also giving me the opportunity to work with him.

I would like to thank to Nihan Tekguven, and Omur Yilmaz. I was fortunate that they were always ready to help me and supported me while I was working on my thesis. In addition, I thank Lynne Yengulalp for her help.

To my family, I owe a lot for their support, and mere presence: my mother and father, Selma and Nevzat Pakdil, my brother, Mehmet Tahir Pakdil, and my husband, my love and always my support, Baris Kesgin. I am blessed to have them and it would all be impossible without their love and support. Baris was always there and with me and without him, the world would be meaningless.

ABSTRACT

Political Islam is a concept that draws attention in political science and international relations. Turkey is a unique model of the various usages of political Islam in a secular state. Moreover, unlike other Muslim countries, Turkey has a comparatively long history since the beginning of the Republic of Turkey. In this respect, the paper will analyze Turkish politics and parties from a historical perspective. I investigate the Democrat, Welfare, and Justice and Development Parties to understand political Islam in Turkey. I ask if these parties had an Islamist agenda and if they exploited Islam for political reasons. In order to find out which objectives of theirs have links to political Islam; I will examine party programs and policy implications of these three parties. Then, I will compare their agendas and try to find evidence of uses of Islam in foreign, education, and economic policies and religious&moral values in their agendas. After analyzing the parties, I will categorize them using the classification of Daniel Brumberg. I expect that this study will show differences among parties and the evolution of political Islam in Turkey over the decades. Also, this study can help by showing Turkey's sui generis characteristics; other Muslim countries can not be compared with Turkish experience with Islam.

INTRODUCTION

The relationship between religion and politics has been one of the most important topics in human history. All religions have connected themselves with politics in different patterns. As Ayoob (2008:14) says, “politics and religion can be a heady mixture; this is demonstrated in all religious traditions, not merely in Islam.” Islam, as one of the largest religions in the world, has long been part of the research agenda in political science and international relations at different times and for different countries. Since the last quarter of the twentieth century, the impacts of Islam and its relations with politics have become much more observable in politics and society in the Muslim world. However, in spite of all these different countries and their experiences with Islam in politics, there is a tendency to label each of them with the same classifications, such as fundamentalist vs. reformist, or Islamist vs. Islamic.

Yavuz and Esposito (2003:xvii) argue that “there is no single pattern of interaction between religion and politics in Islam, but rather several competing ones.” Moreover, among the varying patterns, there are dissimilarities in the distribution of power, functions, and relations among institutions according to each country’s specific history and politics. In this regard, Turkey is an interesting and important example in terms of its relations with Islam as a strict secular nation-state.

According to Gozaydin (Jung&Raudvere (eds.), 2008:160), “political Islam, a modern ideology rooted in the nineteenth century, has become more and more visible in the political arena in Turkey.” It should be noted that, the importance of religion and tradition in Turkey has always been there but it has been paid more attention in recent decades as a result of a resurgence of Islam in the world and the Middle East. In this study, I will show the evolution of political Islam in Turkey since the 1950s until today. While I study the impact of political Islam in Turkey, I will focus on three Turkish political parties, namely the Democrat Party (DP-Demokrat Parti), the Welfare Party (RP-Refah Partisi), and the Justice and Development Party (AK Parti-Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi), all of which were in government at different times.

The purpose of this study is to categorize the three parties under the term of political Islam. Specifically, I will look at the party programs and policy implementations in order to find out if and how these parties politicized Islam. I use a different categorization which is more detailed than such classic definitions as fundamentalist vs. reformist.

This introduction is followed by a literature review, which includes a definition of political Islam, and its classification. Then, in Chapter 2, I continue with a detailed discussion about the evolution of Turkish political Islam and the backgrounds of the three parties. Next, I present my research design. Later, I categorize the three parties according to the classification of political Islam that is

introduced earlier. Lastly, I end with some concluding remarks about the differences and similarities among the three parties.

POLITICAL ISLAM

Introduction

People within otherwise diverse cultures often try to combine their religions with their political ideologies in order to give meanings to their lives. Throughout the human history, the relationship between religion and politics has been one of the most complex forces shaping the world order. As Fuller (2003, xiii) argues, “when religion is linked with politics, two of the most vital elements of human concern come together. This conjunction can be for better or for worse: both religion and politics have consistently exploited each other across the web of history.”

As such, religion is an important and popular phenomenon throughout history, because “it encompasses our values, aspirations, and vision of life, our quest to find meaning in our existence, our concerns for what is right and wrong in this world” (Fuller, 2003, xiii). In the contemporary world, religion is on the rise once again (Moussali 1991); Islam has become particularly visible both domestically/regionally (Hamas and Hezbollah) and internationally (Al-Qaeda).

In this chapter, I first discuss Islam and its relationship with politics. Then, I define what political Islam is, its history, and some basic characteristics of political Islam as an ideological tool. Finally, I discuss various classifications of Islamist ideology in politics and try to present one of them as the most explanatory power in

terms of Turkish political features. In the following chapters, I ultimately apply this classification to the Islamic political movements in Turkey.

Islam and Politics

Islam is one of the largest religions in the world. Although Islam is seen by most observers as merely a religious doctrine, it is rather a complete system that gives general clues to its believers how to construct social as well as political aspects of life. As Wright (1992: 3) aptly puts “Islam is the only major monotheistic religion that offers not only a set of spiritual beliefs but a set of rules by which to govern society.” Similarly Fuller (2003: 17) also argues that “Islam is a sense of inspiration, explanation, guidance, solace, and fulfillment for life in this world and beyond.” In other words, one can argue that Islam, as a religion, has a direct relationship with culture, politics, economics, and social relationship. As such, Islam inarguably has a civilizational aspect to it; Islam “means the whole civilization that has grown up under the aegis of that religion” (Lewis, 1996: 53).

For some, Islam has been so influential that it led to important revolutions in the world. For instance, according to Wright (1996: 65), “Islam preaches equality, justice, and human dignity-ideals that played a role in developments as diverse as Christian reformation of the sixteenth century, the American and French Revolutions of the eighteenth century, and even the ‘liberation theology’ of the twentieth century.”

This impact of Islam, however, has not been imposed by force, because Islam indeed welcomes diversity and calls for coexistence with other cultures (Wright, 1996: 75).

Others argued that Islam's emphasis on social and communal identity is the reason for its social and political impact in people's lives (Gulalp, 2003: 382). Thus, while discussing Islam's role in a society, I argue that it is useful to think about the leaders and rulers who use their versions of Islam to exploit their societies economically, politically, and culturally. Furthermore, Islam might adopt different meanings depending on who interprets and implements it. In other words, as Sadowski argues (2006: 216), "Islam is a world of many histories, many peoples, many languages, traditions, schools of interpretations, proliferating developments, disputations, cultures, and countries." Interpretations and implementations may create differences in the depiction of Islam, as Cinar says (2008: 17), "as anti-modern, anti-democratic, and mostly violent political movements based primarily on the portrayal of Islam as an essential dysfunctional religion for both modernity and democracy."

There are many reasons why societies want to be ruled by Islamic rules or Sharia, which means the way of Islamic law based on the Quran¹ and Sunnah². According to Fuller (2003: 56), "Sharia means 'way' or 'path'. It states the path

¹ Quran is "the book revealed to the Prophet Muhammad as a Divine instruction to all mankind" (Choudhury and Malik, 1992:2).

² Sunnah are "the sayings, practices, traditions and exegesis of the Quran by the Prophet Muhammad" (Choudhury and Malik, 1992:2).

toward understanding God.” As Moussalli argues (1999: 19), “the legitimacy of an Islamic state is rooted in a general philosophy of life and a particular moral and political philosophy.” To put it in another way, Islamic state and Islamic law aim to lead and rule society with a political and moral understanding of the Quran and Hadith³. On the other hand, many believe that there are many different ways or paths to understand God, which means everyone can find and build his or her own Sharia in order to access to God. These paths will be discussed later; here first I define political Islam for the purposes of this study.

There is actually no ambiguity at all when we talk about political Islam as a political regime. As such, political Islam can be defined as “the belief that the Koran and the Hadith have something important to say about the way society and government should be ordered” (Fuller, 2002: 49). For Hermann (2003: 266), “there is an agreement in the West that ‘political Islam’ stands for an ideology derived from theology, for politics derived from faith, for shaping society according to the values and rules of Islam, even imposing them on the public.” However, sometimes political Islam is called “Islamization” which means “the method by which more Islamically oriented states are to be implemented” (Esposito, 1998: 342). Overall, there is an agreement that political Islam is an attempt and specific way to rule and organize society with the Quran and Hadith. Political Islam is a political activity in the name of Islam. One can argue that there is not a difference between Islam and political Islam

³ Hadith are the sayings of the Prophet Muhammad.

in the sense that they both say something about lives of people. But there is a big difference between Islam as a religion and Islam as a political ideology. According to Esposito (Khan (ed.), 2007:29), the difference between divine laws and principles and human interpretations should be emphasized. The former is duties to God that can not be changed, and the latter is a set of regulations for society that can be changed as time changes.

However, political Islam is, as Ayoob argues (2008:15), “despite some similarities in objectives and even in the rhetoric they employ”, something that changes “by the political activities undertaken by Islamists are largely determined by the context within which they operate.”

It is important to emphasize that political Islam is not a static phenomenon. Because Islam has something to say about political and social order, and their change, political Islam is something that grows, expands, evolves, and diversifies according to people who use it (Fuller, 2003: 14). In addition, the definition of political Islam is not as important as its implications and actors who use them in purpose. Therefore, political Islam is a political system that can be changed in its nature and capacity by time, actor, country, and subject. Similarly, Cinar and Duran (2008) note that although the process of reading Islamic text and tradition has been constant, Islamic political thoughts are shaped and transformed by cultural factors, economic structures, and political institutions in which they operate. For Yavuz (2003, p. 23),

this can be observed in the way “Islamic movements seek to reconstitute identities, institutional structures, ways of life, and the moral code of society through participating, influencing, or controlling cultural, educational, and economic spheres.” For this reason, I try to explain Turkish political Islam by using the three Turkish political parties: the Democrat Party, the Welfare Party, and the Justice and Development Party.

There is an agreement regarding the features of an Islamic state or a state that can be called “state of political Islam.” In this study, it is important to establish certain features of “state of political Islam” in order to compare the three different Turkish political parties to see whether it would be any proof that these three political parties have used Islam in their policies and policy implications. According to Esposito (1998: 323), there are seven common characteristics of an Islamic state which are; 1) The state is the means by which an Islamic order or way of life is fostered and regulated. 2) The Islamic state is primarily a community of believers bound by a common faith and commitment to their divinely mandated mission to obey God and spread God’s just rule and governance throughout the world. 3) The consensus of the community is the source of authority regarding the particular form of Islamic government as well as the selection and removal of the head of state. 4) The state is based upon Quranic prescription and early Islamic practice. 5) The ruler is to govern according to and assure implementation of the Shariah. 6) The ruler is required to consult with representatives of the people. But, the ruler is not bound to

follow their advice. 7) The checks on the ruler's power are the limits of the Shariah. By checking these basic principles of political Islam, it might be easier to make a comment about countries' government types. Also, in order to understand and compare the process of political Islam in Turkey, the principles might be more helpful and rational.

The Revival of Political Islam in the 20th Century

There is a consensus in the literature that the nineteenth century was the beginning of revival of Islam as a political ideology (Sadowski, 2006). Specifically, Cinar and Duran (2008:18) argue that this emergence occurred “as an attempt to rebuild the great civilization of Islam in the face of increasing Western-cum-Christian dominance and colonialism.” Likewise, Dagi (2005: 22) says, “by the nineteenth century, the West had penetrated the Islamic lands politically, militarily, and economically. Thus the question of how to stop the advancement of the West was a practical and political issue. Secondly, the growing superiority of the West put the “Islamic civilization” in question. By the nineteenth century, the Islamic (Sunni and Shia) world shared “a similar negative view of the West as soulless, godless, materialistic, mechanical, corrupt, greedy, selfish,...,secularist” (Cinar and Duran, 2008: 19). The awakening of Islam as a political, social, and cultural project against the West can be called reconstruction of Islamic identity in modern world.

While the reconstruction process began in the 19th century, Islam as a political ideology has been rather more visible in the world arena in the 20th century, especially in its last quarter. For Gulalp (2001) this relates to a global decline in the power and influence of nation-states. He argues that especially with the difficulties nation-states faced in regulating their national economies, there was an increase in sub-national separatist movements (Gulalp, 2001: 435). This trend definitely worked to the advantage of religious movements around the world and particularly in the Muslim world. For instance, Hamas's challenge to the Palestinian Liberation Organization and its ultimate accession to power can be attributed to such a process by attracting the Palestinians with the social services that it provided to many impoverished Palestinians. Therefore, as a result of these tendencies, in Muslim countries, Islam has been reconstructed as a revivalist ideology against the domination of Western world.

The rise of political Islam has been an important and powerful movement in the world and the Middle East; political Islam gained even more power in the 1980s. As mentioned above, the economy has a lot to do with this process because the neo-liberal restructuring of national economies have created both winners and losers. It would not be surprising that this process has made religion more attractive – particularly, to the losers. Indeed, Onis (2001: 282) claims that “political Islam, in much of the Middle East, can be regarded as a regional manifestation representing the interests of losers, groups that are excluded from material benefits of globalization.”

This does not mean that all Muslims were losers; although many Muslim societies benefited from globalization, some are still excluded from political and economic power. As a result, it made sense for these people to search for new meanings that are hidden in their own heritages.

Esposito (1998) highlights the increased impact of Islam in the Muslim world in the last quarter of the twentieth century. Esposito (1998) also recognizes the increased importance of Islam in the Muslim world; he argues that “religion did not recede in the Muslim world but rather emerged in the politics of countries” (158). Likewise Filali-Ansary says (1996: 76), “Islam, one of the major world religions, may be living through a turning point in its history, one that will bring it face-to-face with the challenges of the human condition at the end of the twentieth century.” The twentieth century is the time of “reasons for the new preference for ballots over bullets (Wright, 1992: 2).”

For Islam the twentieth century was the time for reevaluation and reconstruction; Esposito (1998: 159) summarizes the realization of Islam as a life saver for Muslim countries;

“In Islamic countries, Islam’s glorious political and cultural past had been reversed by European colonial rule; political independence had not significantly improved the political and socioeconomic condition of Muslim countries. Most continued to be subservient to the West both politically and culturally. European colonialism was replaced by American neocolonialism. Moreover, political leaders failed to establish a legitimate, effective public order and to address adequately the profound socioeconomic disparities in wealth and class in most Muslim countries. This was

reflected in Muslim literature in the late 1960's, in its growing criticism of the West and its concern to reclaim historical and cultural identity.”

It is arguable that some developments in the 1970s (such as the Egyptian victory over Israel in 1973, the Arab oil embargo, and the Islamic revolution in Iran) gave some more confidence to the Muslim world against Western superiority. These events can be considered as precursors to later developments. In that respect, like many others do, Wright (1992) too focuses on the late 1980s as he discusses the revival of Islam. He argues that “After centuries marked mainly by dormancy, colonialism, and failed experiments with Western ideologies, many Islamists feel they have a mandate to create constructive alternatives” (1). The Islamic world has needed a new acceleration in order to catch up with the new century. As a result, a growing number of Islamists attempted to combine moral and religious values with modern life, political competition, and free markets and the spread of democracy. As Takeyh (2001: 68) argues, “political Islam as a viable reform movement might have petered out were it not for one minor detail: The rest of the world was changing.”

Overall, some common themes emerge in the explanations of the revival of political Islam. For Esposito (1998: 160-161), these are (1) the failure of the West and the need to throw off Western political and cultural domination, which fosters secularism, materialism, and spiritual bankruptcy; (2) the need to “return to Islam” in order to restore a lost identity, moral purpose, and character; (3) an emphasis on the

unity and totality of Islam, tawhid⁴; (4) a call for the reintroduction of Shariah law for establishing a more Islamic state and society.”

In conclusion, globalization, the intrusion of Western culture into Muslim societies, and the neo-liberal economic policies and their consequences on Muslim countries were the reasons for the rise of political Islam in the 20th century. The idea that Islamization could be a solution for creating a new generation with an identity-constituting orientation was the beginning of re-exploring Islam in order to reconstruct Islamic civilization. It is, however, essential to reiterate that in this process Islam as a political ideology revived in various forms. As argued above, this had to do with the fact that Islam as a political tool makes different promises to different people.

It is crucial to explain and classify the degree of the usage of Islamic law/ideology in politics. As Wittes says (2008: 7), there is a definitional minimalism in the literature of political Islam. Using and applying different descriptions and tags for different types of Islamic law/ideology for diverse groups and religious interpretations make more meaningful and easier to understand different political perspectives in political Islam. Moreover, As Ayoob (2008) points out, even within the same country uses and implications of political Islam can vary. Therefore, it is not logical to try to find common grounds for political Islam for different countries. If it

⁴ Tawhid refers to the unity and oneness of God.

can be done, the appearances of political Islam in politics will be clearer and it provides a clear understanding of the degree of usage of political Islam.

Classifications of Political Islam

There are a number of different terms (which occasionally overlap) that describe Islamic political movements (Fuller, 2003: 47). However, various descriptions of political Islam (such as Islamist, Islamic, reformist, fundamentalist radical, liberal) “refer to the discourse and activities that give Islam a central role and rebuild society according to what are believed to be Islamic principles” (Celik, 2003: 61). An accurate classification of political Islam is indeed the key to understanding its different forms. With respect to this research, an accurate classification is critical, in that it would help distinguish variances among different political parties in Turkey. As Kubba (2003: 45) argues, to find and examine different political prospects under different names prevent tendency to conflate and equate such a diverse attributes, practices, and institutions. In other words, “for an academic as well as strategic purpose, it is absolutely necessary to distinguish different Islamic Shariah and not to paint with a broad brush, which will inevitably lead to bad analysis and bad policy” (Khan (ed.), 2007:4).

The range of political Islam is broad, and not a single force (Wright, 1996: 65-66). According to Wright (1996), degrees of Islamic law or Sharia can be classified into two main groups: fundamentalists and Islamists. The former group can be

described with violence and aggressiveness against change. Fundamentalists “are motivated by political or economic insecurity, questions of identity, or territorial disputes” (66). The term Islamist, on the other hand, “allows for the forward-looking, interpretive, and often innovative and desire for change” (66). Islamists are also called Islamic reformers who shape thought about long-term issues. The goal of the Islamists is to modernize and democratize the existing political and economical systems with a combination of Islam.

While such a simple distinction between fundamentalists and reformists “can be confusing, since Islamic doctrine allows for different interpretations and therefore different opinions on Sharia and its principles” (Abootalebi, 1999: 2), it is definitely a crucial first step to approach political Islam. Indeed, various other similar classifications exist that distinguish between fundamentalist/radical/Islamists on the one hand and reformist/modernist/liberal/Islamic on the other. Now I discuss these two groups and the various ways used to describe them.

Fundamentalists

According to Lewis (1996: 54), “fundamentalists are who introduce ideas unknown alike to the Koran, the hadith, or the classical doctrines of the faith.” In other words, it “may be seen as a manifestation of the mass social movements articulating religious and civilizational aspirations and questioning issues surrounding the morality of technology, the capitalist mode of distribution” (Moussalli, 1999: 2).

Fundamentalists generally oppose the Western world and economic, political, and social institutions that are created by the West. Fundamentalism is a kind of reaction to the West because according to the fundamentalists the sovereignty belongs only to God, in contrast to the Western ideology in which an individual is at the center. According to the fundamentalist ideology, Western civilization violates God's order and divinity. Indeed, fundamentalists criticize not only the Western world but also other Muslims for imitating Western civilization. Yet, fundamentalists also "incorporate a great deal of modernity and innovation" (Abootalebi, 1999: 1). As much as they reject the Western type of lifestyle, political and economical systems, fundamentalists accept science and technology to use in their own developments.

Sometimes fundamentalists are considered as traditionalists, or are described as radicals. Therefore, there exists an ambiguity in the usage of fundamentalist. There are, however, certain differences among the three terms. First, I discuss the distinctions between fundamentalists and traditionalists. According to Fuller (2003: 48), traditionalists "have no specific agenda of political change, do not seek to shake up the system, and are generally accepting of existing political authority as a reality of life." Fundamentalists, on the other hand, are uncomfortable with living in modern ages and try to live by what the Quran says originally (literal interpretation), without any interpretations, critiques, etc. Hence, fundamentalists have problems with secularism and democracy, and aim to get rid of the Western influences on a society by reestablishing Islam in its original form. Likewise, Traditional Islam, for Pipes

(1997), means a desire to go back to the pure and simple ways of Prophet Muhammad. Traditional Islam gives importance to the relation between God and man, not God and the state. However, for fundamentalists, the relation between the creator and the state is at the center, so they do not see themselves as traditional “but as engaged in a highly novel enterprise” (Pipes, 2007:55). Islam therefore becomes a way to power for fundamentalists. As Roy says, for Islamists, Islam is an ideological tool to maintain political power.

Fundamentalists and radicals also differ from each other. The distinction, according to Fuller (2003: 51-52), lies in the degrees of violence used by the two groups. First, it is essential to describe what radicals defend. Radicals do not oppose only Western world but also see Muslim countries that use Western political systems as their enemies. In addition to these, radicals do not think that there is a chance for reconciliation within the Muslim world. They symbolize a political breakaway, and therefore use the term “revolution” in order to define themselves. Radicals do want political revolution to transform society immediately. In other words, theoretically, they do not wait for a long cultural and social transformation, they believe in the urgency of revolution. That said, as Fuller (2003) puts it, radicals “accept narrow, literal, and intolerant interpretations of Islam but most go an extra step in either promoting utopian visions of a pan-Islamic state or advocating violent action.” Consequently, distinct from fundamentalists, radicals resort to terrorist tactics.

Reformists

For this category of political Islam, one can find labels as “reformed Islam, modern Islam, positive Islam, the Islam of modernity, enlightened Islam” (Filali-Ansary, 2003: 19). The most significant difference between reformists and fundamentalists is derived from their world views. In other words, reformists want change and modernity instead of tradition, and seek progress and development against stagnation. As Fuller argues (2003: 54), although “both fundamentalism and modernism are going back to roots in their insistence on change of understanding of Islam, the methodologies and conclusions are vastly different.” To put it in other words, while change means going back to the 7th century for fundamentalists, it is about a redefinition of Islam with words of new world for reformists. This is because, “the reformers contend that human understanding of Islam is flexible, and that Islam’s tenets can be interpreted to accommodate and even encourage pluralism. Reformists disagree with those who argue Islam has a single, definitive essence that admits of no change in the face of time, space, or experience” (Wright, 1996: 67). Significantly different from fundamentalists, for reformists, while the religion itself is important, the capacity of the ideology “to deliver tangible economic goods and basic political rights” (Abootalebi, 1999: 3) is also important. In other words, as Fuller(2003: 54) says, “modernists accept the near-universal values of democracy, human rights, pluralism, and vibrant civil society as fully compatible with Islam and inherent in Islam’s own original multiculturalism.”

As mentioned above, there are many definitions for actors that use political Islam as an alternative way of politics. However, all these definitions overlap in somewhere and are defined by different words, such as Islamist and Islamic. These two are also worth explaining because it is one of the most common ways to understand differences among actors that rule with political Islam. As Cayir (2008:64) says, “what differentiated Islamism from Islam, and Islamist from a Muslim was that former categories referred to a new consciousness and new agencies involving a desire to reshape the modern world according to Islamic principles, while the latter signified a more passive historical and cultural stance on the part of the religion and its believers.” In addition to this, as Roy (1994) argues, Islamist ideology aims to create a new society, a new state as an alternative to Western democracy and communism. It means that an Islamist has a dream to build a new society with the religion in all terms. On the other hand, the term “Islamic” means “anything Muslim or relating to the religion of Islam.” As such, Schwedler (1998: 29) aptly puts that “all Islamists are therefore Muslims; not all Muslims are Islamists.” Schwedler too notes that the term “Islamist” describes “the subset of Muslims (followers of the Islamic faith) who seek to promote an Islamic agenda for social, political and economic reform.”

Gole (1997:47) explains Islamism as an indication of “the reappropriation of a Muslim identity and values as a basis for an alternative social and political agenda”, which means it is a kind of mixture of tradition and modernity, religion and

secularism, community and religion. To be Islamic is an attempt to give Muslim people changes and guidance to be more liberal, educated, modern, and urban.

However, Islamists, as Roy (1994) and Fuller (2003) define, as a group of people see religion as a political ideology and use it for the reconstruction of all aspects of society and politics with Islamic rules. Therefore, it can be summarized that the term Islamic can be used instead of reformist/modernist or liberal Islam; and Islamist can be used instead fundamentalist.

In other words, to be an Islamist is an indicator of usage of political Islam. In other words, to use Islam in politics to reshape every aspect of public and private life refers to people, groups, or movements called as an Islamist.

Overall, given these differences both within and between fundamentalists/ Islamists and reformist/Islamic, I argue that a classification of political Islam should reflect more than a simple dichotomization. Thus, I find Brumberg's (1997) classification a valid approach. For Brumberg, there are four types of Islamist rhetoric:

- 1) *Reformist fundamentalism* can be characterized as utilitarian. Because reformist fundamentalists see politics "as a vehicle for realizing the collective moral view" or to establish the ethical state with God's commandments" (1997:17). According to them, state is "only the political expression of an Islamic society." Their long-term goal is to create a unified ethical order. Generally they use reformist vision to get allies within regimes and society. According to Onis (2001:283), "their claims are not compatible with the

democratic game and norms of power sharing, except over a certain transition period.” Their ultimate aim is to replace secular constitutional norms with the Sharia. This group composes the biggest class in political Islam.

- 2) *Militant or Radical fundamentalism* “rejects the notion of gradualism and demands the forced imposition of an Islamic state (1997:17).” Thus, they use violence as a threat to democratic order.
- 3) *Strategic modernism* advances a liberal democratic vision of the state. Onis (2001) calls them as Islamic liberals. Their aim is a transformation towards democracy. They believe that states should exist in order to protect the rights of people to express their vision freely. They are not aiming to create an Islamic civilization as an alternative to the Western one; rather they seek to create a religious freedom in a democratic and secular environment. This group is quite rare in the Islamic world.
- 4) *Tactical modernism* entails the selective use of modernist themes to advance a fundamentalist agenda. It is used to get and maintain support of social groups. Reformist fundamentalism and tactical modernism are closely linked with each other. The former tries to make allies from different professional classes, so it uses modern terms, symbols, and rhetoric often. However, it is all related with Islamic law, society, and unity. They do not support revolution as a way of promoting Islam; instead they choose gradual improvement in the society.

Conclusion

After looking at different categorizations of political Islam such as fundamentalist vs. reformist or Islamist vs. Islamic, there is a need for a new and detailed explanation. Therefore, I will apply Brumberg's classification in order to understand various appearances of political Islam in party programs of the three parties selected from Turkey. I contend that the three Turkish parties studied here differ among each other and can not be simply grouped into one, single political Islam—as is often done. In contrast to such simplistic labels as Islamist, Islamic, fundamentalist, here I provide a detailed and comparative description of these parties. For instance, the Economist labeled the Welfare Party as “Turkey's new Islamist party” (May 28, 1998), and later described the JDP as “mildly Islamist” (July 17, 2008). Notwithstanding these, I argue that there exist differences among the DP, the WP, and the JDP.

TURKISH ISLAMISM & HISTORY OF POLITICAL ISLAM IN TURKEY

Religion has been used as a political tool for many centuries, to such an extent that religion and politics have become different parts of the same puzzle. In addition, both religion and politics have been a crucial part of human history, they have shaped the world and conversely have been shaped by the world. As Vertigans (2003: 5) says “religion is most tangible within politics.” Turkey has a similar story but in a different script. As Yavuz (2003:7) puts it “while the politicization of Islamic identity is by no means unique to Turkey, the Turkish case is a particular importance for understanding this phenomenon.”

In Turkish politics, using Islam as a political instrument is not a recent phenomenon as religion has always attracted the Turkish voters. From the Democratic Party (DP) in the 1950’s to the AK Party (JDP) today, the exploitation of religion in Turkish politics has taken different shapes. However, as Vertigans (2003: 5) argues “all the parties have to varying degrees courted religious support, but ultimately none have made fundamental concessions against secularization.”

Religion, according to Yildiz (2008:41), “is in the fabric of Turkish society, and it continues to be one of the determinants of Turkish politics, introducing some changes into society while it itself undergoes an evolution of its own.” Indeed, the role of Islam in the roots of Turkish politics can be traced back to the 1850s.

Specifically, the struggle between state and religion in Turkey has lasted since early years of nineteenth century when the Ottoman Empire started the reform movements. During the Ottoman Empire era, religion was at the center of the state and society. However, by the early 19th century, following the rapid changes in the Western world, the Empire had started to reform and secularize the state. That was the beginning of the fight between secularists and Islamic traditionalists.

In this chapter, I first discuss the relationship between Islam and politics in Turkey from historical and political perspectives. Then, I discuss the histories of the three political parties and their relations with the religion.

The Relationship of Turkish Politics with Islam

Turkish Islam derives from the fact that Islam's hegemony was spread by the Ottoman bureaucracy with kind of a positivist thought which is the knowledge that is based on scientific methods and experiments. Islam had not been an ideology until the late nineteenth century. Although the Ottoman Empire was an Islamic state and Sharia was the foundation of its legal system, in practice the implication of Sharia was very limited to the realm of private law that encompassed family law and contract law (Today's Zaman, January 27, 2008). With the establishment of the Republic, Turkish nationalism de-emphasized Islam as part of the Turkish identity. As Cinar and Duran (Cizre (ed.), 2008:21) say "no other Muslim country in the

Middle East or the North Africa has disassociated its regime from Islam in the same thorough way as Kemalism⁵ did.”

The competition between state and religion in Turkey has been continuing since before the formation of Turkish Republic and specifically since the nineteenth century of the Ottoman Empire (Turam, 2007). As a result of the rapid changes in the Western world in military, technology, economics, politics, etc. the Empire had to take some serious and immediate precautions in order to compete with Western rivals on the same track. That was the beginning of the reform and secularization process in the Ottoman Empire. As Yilmaz (Today's Zaman, January 27, 2008) says, “during the 1850's and 1860's, secularization acquired a legal and institutional face through the introduction of new, European-inspired codes, such as the criminal code and the commercial code...” All of these reforms have started a new conflict between secularists and traditionalists. The fight has flared after the establishment of the secular Turkish state. Since then, the main target of the republic was to create a homogeneous society without any differences until the multi-party system was introduced in 1946.

⁵ “Kemalism can be defined as an anti-political and state-centered paradigm that claims that the Turkish society and public sphere is homogenous and that displays distaste for political representation of differences” (Cinar and Duran, 2008:26). Kemalism is the Turkish foundational ideology. It aims for a controlled-modernization project by its own understanding of modernism. Thus means that Kemalism has both Westernism and anti-Westernism, liberalism and national unity, and democracy and secularism.

Opposition to the radical secularization policies of the westernizers in republican Turkey played a central role in the construction of an Islamic political identity. “The westernization process and policies of the republican period (Kemalist design to reform society and politics along a secularist line) resulted in the exclusion of Islamic leaders, groups, and thought from the centers of power, eliminating appearances of Islam in the public sphere” (Dagi, 2005:23). Likewise, as Gole (1997) argues, the Turkish experience of political Islam has been a kind of conflict between secularists and Islamists. Since the 19th century, all of the modernizing and secularizing processes in social, political, economic, and military areas of life were done by the Turkish elites. While the Turkish secular Kemalists have taken the secularism process as a social engineering project which was to re-shape the whole Turkish society in terms of secular rules, the parties of the Turkish political Islamic movement have been a big challenge for the process of Kemalism.

The relationship between the ruling class and society in the Turkish republic can be defined as a center-periphery relation (Mardin, 1973). According to this definition, Kemalism represented the center, and the periphery was the people who have been distant or opposed to the Kemalist state and suffered political, economic, and ideological exclusion. Therefore, Turkish political Islam can be described “as a movement of the ‘counter-elites’ who are aiming for upward mobility in opposition to the secularist social actors privileged by their proximity to the Kemalist state and ideology” (Gulalp, 2001:434). As a result of this struggle, “Islam [has been]

integrated into Turkish political arena as oppositional forces” (Cinar and Duran, 2008:19).

As such, the history of political Islam in Turkey can be characterized as a struggle of the periphery (the counter elite) against the center (that was occupied by the Republican elites) for taking a part in the state⁶. For instance, it can be said that the Welfare Party (WP) tagged itself as the periphery against the center. The party might be the beginning of the history of political Islam in Turkey. The party “fit the classic definition of a ‘populist’ movement as the mobilization of the urban poor by the minority segments of the upper and middle classes into action against the status quo” (Gulalp, 2001:435).

Turkey’s experience with political Islam is a result of these ups and downs. To clarify, socio-economic and political developments (such as, high inflation and unemployment, urbanization, emergence of various ideologies and new social classes) in Turkey are reflected in, and complicated by, many ideological battles among multiple competing political parties. As these transformations relate to the issue of political Islam, Mecham (2004: 354) claims that “moderating changes in Turkey’s political Islam movement took place over a series of parties and over an extensive period of political learning.” As Grigoriadis (2007) argues, although the

⁶ According to Tepe (Yavuz (ed.), 2006:110), “the secular elite has traditionally represented state-created bourgeoisie, namely military and civil servants, while the counter-elite has represented petite bourgeoisie, the urban poor, and rural sectors.”

reform process of political Islam in Turkey is not completed yet, it seems promising that a Muslim society can be ruled by Western style liberal democracy. This is why “Turkish political Islam chose to participate in the electoral process, hoping to affect change within the existing political culture. Therefore, it kept itself away from the use of violence and terrorism” (Cinar and Duran, 2008:23). This is why Turkish Islamism has never felt the need to explain what Sharia or an Islamic order entails. Also, Turkey has never been formally colonized like other Muslim countries. Hence the hatred against the West is not as strong as in other Muslim countries. On the contrary, Turkey has a strong orientation towards the West. With the establishment of the Turkish Republic, the “Westernization Process” of the society, state, army, which had been started in the Ottoman Empire era, has gained acceleration.

Islamist political movements are not about individual liberties, but are about national liberation; they are not interested in participation but power and mass mobilization, moreover, their motivations are not for democracy, but anger and authenticity (Kramer 1997:163). When these explanations are considered, in Turkish politics, there are not those kinds of Islamist political movements. Thus, the Democratic Party, Welfare Party, and Justice and Development Party have to be classified into a totally different category of political Islam. In addition, as discussed above, if the term Islamist-Islamic or fundamentalist-reformist connotes such a strong meaning, is it possible that all of the parties in Turkey shared the same aspirations and a desire to establish a religious order? Or, is it likely that these parties were labeled as

Islamist parties without paying attention to their policies? I discuss these questions in the following pages.

The Democrat Party (DP)

The Democrat Party was founded in 1946 in opposition to the Republican People's Party (RPP) which was Ataturk's party and proclaimed itself protector of secularism in Turkey. Before the multi-party system, there was an authoritarian RPP rule that reshaped the whole Turkish society with its secularist policies. Moreover, the RPP era aimed to create a homogenous nation under the name of 'Turk' and "deemphasized Islam as part of the Turkish identity" (Cinar and Duran, 2008:21). Therefore, "the depiction of Islam as 'the other' or as the symbol of 'non-modern orientalism' has always constituted the essential substance of the secular state's legitimacy itself" (Cizre, 2008:1).

Following "the 27 years of etatism and a patriarchal regime, the people had opted for a more liberal regime as promised by the DP" (Geyikdagi, 1984:73). The success of the DP was in its reaction against "complete banishment of religion from public life" (Grigoriadis, 2007:22) by secularist policies after the establishment of the Turkish Republic. The DP's role is also important because it was the first time in Turkey that the government was led by a party that was called Islamist. Moreover, the accession of the DP to power marked the beginning of the multi-party system in Turkey.

The DP certainly used religion as a political tool, for instance by allowing the call to prayer to be in Arabic instead of Turkish or by introducing religious courses in intermediate schools. Yet, while religion played an important role in the party's agenda, it was not by any means the only reason behind the party's success (Geyikdagi, 1984: 5). Some scholars claim that until the National Outlook Movement in 1967, there was not a real Islamist movement in Turkey. Instead, the reason for the DP's main success was the integration of "marginalized social forces into the system" (Turam, 2007: 44).

The DP succeeded in more important policies such as "improving communications and political participation led to increased levels of social interactions between formerly isolated rural areas, towns, and cities" (Vertigans, 2002: 50). As Geyikdagi (1984) says, after the Turkish republic was founded the RPP governments neglected the rural areas and gave more importance to industrial development than agricultural one. Moreover, the conflict between big businessmen, who were considered as secularists; and small business, and craftsmen, who were considered rural and religious, was another reason that the DP was supported by more religious and traditionalist people. This led conservative Anatolian (rural) people to become visible and more confident in political and social life. "The introduction of multi-party democracy in 1946 provided politicians with an incentive to court the rural conservative vote. The first to do so was the DP of Adnan Menderes, prime

minister from 1950 to 1960” (Jenkins, 2003:48). As Mecham (2004:341) says, “the centrist political parties of the late 1940s and 1950s sought to attract religiously conservative voters by incorporating Islamic language into their appeals. This strategy was initially used in the DP’s challenge to the secular nationalist tradition of the RPP.”

The party’s attitude towards religion was another significant reason that the DP was labeled as an Islamist party. However, what the DP did was to be more sensitive toward religious sentiments which meant getting rid of rigid policies against the religion and softening the debate between secularism and Islam. Indeed, when the Democrat Party was established under the leadership of Celal Bayar, President Ismet Inonu wanted the party to be sensitive on three points: “preservation of the secular character of the state, foreign policy, and the campaign to spread primary education” (Ozbudun, 2001:15). The establishment of the DP got support and a good reputation from Inonu and the RPP (Republican People’s Party). This was not surprising because the administrative cadres of the DP came from RPP background and hence the Kemalist tradition. There was no huge ideological difference between the two parties, but “they differed mostly in their attitudes toward the proper role of the state, bureaucracy, private enterprise, and local initiative, as well as toward peasant participation in politics” (Ozbudun, 2001:30).

The rule of the Democrat Party in Turkey symbolizes an upward mobility. As Gulalp (2001) argues, the upward mobilization of ‘poor and ignorant’ villagers who live in an ‘uncultured’ manner, the thought that those people were still under the influence of ‘tradition’, and that they would live in big cities were ideas completely unacceptable for an urbanized and upwardly mobile individual. In other words, it was undesirable to say ‘welcome’ to those immigrants who “have non-modern tastes and pursue a traditional lifestyle, including the overt display of Islamic identity whether in clothing or in the public performance of religious rituals” (Gulalp, 2001:389). Therefore, in Turkey, it might be said that the traditional-modern dichotomy has transformed into secular-Islamist and urban-rural. Also, in Turkey, to be a “Muslim is evidently a social identity conferred upon the Turkish people by the secular state” (Gulalp, 2001:394). In other words, the limits of being a Muslim in Turkey has been generated by the Turkish secular state, and the DP had freed the limits and made the religion free. As Turam (2007) emphasizes, the main success of the DP was the integration of excluded parts of society into the system. Besides the economic booms in the 1950s and 1960s, its tolerance toward religion was another reason of the DP’s popularity. This can be called “the first time attempt to bridge state and dissenting social forces” (Turam, 2007:44).

The Welfare Party (WP)

The Welfare Party is the reflection of a political movement which has been called the ‘National Outlook Movement’ (NOM). The NOM was formed in the 1970’s in order

to inspire both spiritual and material development in Turkey. The movement “addresses mainly socioeconomic problems by employing an Islamic language and by offering an Islamic morality as a panacea to them” (Cinar and Duran, 2008:29). The NOM as an Islamic political movement, had a strong anti-Western/European stance by several political parties such as the National Order Party, the National Salvation Party, and the Welfare Party that represented the ideology of the NOM. For instance, “in the name of Islamic universality rivaling that of the Western one, the WP’s rhetoric sought to provincialize and particularize the claims of the West and thus of the Kemalist project in Turkey” (Cizre (ed.), 2008:62). Overall, as one can derive from the aim of the movement, it “had both national and religious connotations” (Cizre (ed.), 2008:48).

The movement, as Dagi (2005) notes, was the first political expression of political Islam under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan, in the reconstruction process of Turkey after the 1960 military intervention. The National Outlook Movement’s first impression was the National Order Party that was founded in 1970 by Necmettin Erbakan, the leader of the NOM. The party was closed by military intervention in 1971. The second party was the National Salvation Party which was established in 1972 and later closed along with all other political parties following the 1980 coup d’état. The third party of this lineage was the Welfare Party (1983-1996), which “maintained this secular emphasis on the problems of daily life and decided to broaden its support base beyond the ’mosque mass.’ It was during the WP period that

political Islam became a major player in Turkish politics” (Cinar and Duran, 2008:29).

In 1995, for the first time in the republican history of Turkey, an Islamist party came to power as a major force with 21 percent of the vote in the 1995 parliamentary elections. Once the WP agreed on the terms of a coalition government with the True Path Party, Necmettin Erbakan became the prime minister in 1995. The reason for the popularity and success of the WP can not be attributed just to the Islamic and conservative ideology of the party. Rather, it had to do with the fact that the Turkish electorate favored a relatively inexperienced and new political party for political office. Except for the WP, the parties seemed to be involved directly or indirectly in some form of corrupt dealing while in power. As Yavuz (1997) argues, the result of the 1995 elections were affected by services of local governments under the WP administration. The municipalities “reduced corruption and nepotism in their municipalities” (Yavuz, 1997:72). That gave power to the WP, being an ‘uncorrupted’ party in Turkish politics.

However, as the WP won the election, its political agenda had not been prepared to take an action for the country’s economic, political, and social problems (Dagi 2005). Moreover, the party’s ideology and some of its specific actions provoked reactions from the secularist/Kemalist side. As a result of all these, “on

February 28, 1997, the National Security Council⁷ (NSC) took a number of decisions to ‘reinforce the secular character of the Turkish state’ threatened by the Islamists” (Dagi, 2005:25). This date was later dubbed as a ‘soft coup’ in Turkey, because after these decisions, the WP government had to step down in July 1997. After the intervention of the NSC (i.e. the military), the WP prime minister was forced to resign.

In January 1998, the WP was closed by the Constitutional Court since allegedly it had become the center of anti-secularist activities. As Mecham (2004) argues, during the WP rule, the initial expansion of Islamic identity and symbolism in the public sphere, and some religious appointments in the Turkish bureaucracy changed Turkish politics surprisingly.

The main agenda of the WP was built on the idea (and slogan) of ‘Just Order⁸’. The idea had huge importance in itself because it is a mixture of “the free market capitalism of the West and the state controlled socialism of the former Eastern

⁷ The NSC is set up as an advisory organ which gives advice about national security policies of the Turkish state. It has been created by the 1961 constitution and was made more powerful by the 1982 constitution after the military coup in 1980. As Ayoob (2008:105) argues, the NSC is “the primary instrument for military’s involvement in politics.” It consists from Chief of General Staff, four main commanders of the Turkish Armed Forces, selected ministers, prime minister, and the president as a chair. As a result of the EU membership process, impact of the NSC has been reduced significantly. Although the NSC has limited authority since the EU reform process, the military is still a protector against security issues which include political Islam and Islamic reaction in Turkey.

⁸ “According to this interpretation, the West might have attained wealth and military power, but it suffered from acute moral and spiritual deficit which led to injustice in Western societies and thus to their eventual decline and fall. The “just order” aimed to lay the groundwork for a value-based social order dominated by the principles of Islamic law (Sharia)” (Grigoriadis, 2007:23).

Block” (Onis, 1997:54). The motto of “Just Order” also contains some religious aspects such as interest-free banking and a re-establishment of nationality against pro-Western policies of the Turkish republic. Within the “Just Order” agenda, the WP condemned the West with its culture, economics, and politics which led to injustice, moral and spiritual degeneration, and materialism. According to WP, all of these negativities could be overcome with Islam and Islamic civilization, and “Just Order” was exactly what people needed. As Choudhury and Malik (1992:1) explain:

“The main objective of laws (also economic laws) in Sharia is to establish social justice through the process of managing and allocating physical and human resources in a way that harmonizes the objective goals of distributive equity and economic efficiency. The supremacy of the Godly Laws is maintained because of the Islamic claim of their serene perfection in the realm of social justice, which transcends the political vagaries of the laws legislated by human institutions.”

This is exactly what the WP argued with the ‘just order’ agenda. They believe that the God-made laws were applicable for all times and people and it has a universal applicability.

The WP experience showed that the Islamists had problems with power-sharing when they came to power. Moreover, having the True Path Party as junior partner of secularist political actor in the coalition made the WP slow in its actions. As Cinar and Duran (2008:12) say, what the WP did “disregarding the plural patterns of ideas, beliefs, and lifestyles in society by attributing an Islamic essence to them and by insisting that every nominal Muslim should practice Islam in the way that the WP defined.” Turkey has seen Islamic reformation remain in power since 2002.

Turkish political Islam and politics are owing to the WP because it has learned greatly from the WP experience. This indeed will be the focus in the remaining pages of this chapter; the emergence of the Justice and Development Party as a political organization and its ascendance to power in November 2002.

The Justice and Development Party (JDP)

In the process of the closure of the WP, “within Welfare, two separate generations with divergent agendas began to emerge over the leadership issue” (Mecham, 2004:345). The younger reformist group demanded more democracy and a new party, while the traditionalists showed their loyalty to Erbakan. After the establishment of the Virtue Party (VP), the reformists started to fight for the leadership of the party. In May 2000, a group of reformists, led by Abdullah Gul, an economist educated in Britain, openly challenged the traditionalists for the leadership of the new party. In the elections for the party leadership, “Gul lost by 521 votes to traditionalists’ 631” (Jenkins, 2003:53). While the result in the party convention favored the traditionalists, the reformist group proved that it had the power to initiate change within the NOM. This was the beginning of a new era for the reformists themselves, but also for Turkish political Islam, and Turkey.

The breakaway from the NOM had started in May 2000 in the VP congress. Cook (2007) describes the emergence of the JDP as a result of an historic split within Turkish politics, because it symbolized an implementation of a new ideology by a

new class of politicians, entrepreneurs, and activists. For some, it was not simply a race for leadership but rather an “outbreak of differing views about the leadership, ideology and direction of the party” (Dagi, 2005: 29).

The breakaway party emerged under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdogan and was named Justice and Development Party on August 14, 2001. Just after two years from the declaration of the JDP, the party won a huge victory in the general elections on November 2002, receiving 34 percent of the votes. For the first time in 15 years, a party won the majority of seats of the Turkish Parliament. What was the reason for the JDP victory? It was not about the religion of its members. As Meham (2004:340) claims, the dissatisfaction with Turkish politics and concerns about the Turkish economy helped the JDP to get the victory.

According to Dagi (2005:30), the 2002 election meant an end to political Islam in Turkey. This is because improving western style of democracy and liberal discourse has made the Islamists in Turkey weaker and has damaged their Islamic political identity in favor of democracy, human rights, and globalization. The JDP cadres realize that the ideology of 1990s (that of the WP) did not help anyone in Turkey; in contrast, the WP was banned from politics and the military intervened in politics. Therefore, the new party thought of religion in a social and individual basis. In other words, as Cinar and Duran (2008:21) argue, the reform process (of the JDP) has a “more realistic and potentially more successful future through democratic

politics.” By the JDP’s reform policies, “Islamism has passed into a post-Islamist stage in which Islamism is losing its political and revolutionary fervor but is steadily infiltrating social and cultural everyday practices” (Cinar and Duran, 2008:21).

On the other hand, as Mecham (2004:339) argues, “the JDP emerged from a tradition of Islamically oriented political parties that have challenged the religious policies of the Turkish state.” Previous Islamically tilting parties were banned from politics, and then re-emerged with a new name but with the same ideologies. The JDP, however, went a step further than its predecessors, dramatically highlighting a process of institutional change and ideological moderation that has occurred in Turkish political Islam. The JDP indeed had to go further since the time when the JDP established was the time to get “unusual reforms of political Islam in Turkey” (Grigoriadis, 2007:25).

In one regard, these reforms are all related to internal politics and the EU accession process that makes it difficult to establish an Islamist state in Turkey. Moreover, the ‘soft coup’ in 1997 and the closure of the WP were other reasons for the JDP to change dramatically. The JDP placed an emphasis on reducing the power of traditional centers of power, spearheaded by the military.

The most significant and unusual characteristic of the JDP is its “combination of Islam-friendly feature with a ‘genuine-sounding democracy program” (Cizre,

2008:1). The JDP has tried to engage the Turkish political system with the universal values of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. The JDP has adopted a moderate and non-religious discourse. The JDP realized that repudiating the WP legacy is not a solution for renewal; it has needed more than that. This realization has created a big transformation in Turkey's political system towards being more democratic and respectful to human rights and laws. Cizre (2008:5) defines the transformation process as an alteration of "Islamists from collective activity to a Muslim subjectivity" after the realization of "the shrinkage of opportunity spaces for the Islamic actors" after the WP's closure. The JDP has found out what Roy (2006) argues "the Islamist ideology is not simply working. It is not the Islamists that are not working, however. It is the ideology that is not functioning. Because it did not provide the basis to create a new society, a new state, or offer an alternative to the two paths of western democracy and communism." Unlike the WP, the JDP has known that "Islamization is not to be achieved through the state. The state is important only in opening new spaces for individuals and society as a whole by assuring basic rights and liberties. The state should not impose its ideology on society" (Yildiz, 2008:46).

The JDP describes itself as a "conservative democrat"⁹ party, and refuses any Islamist labeling. According to some scholars to be a 'conservative democrat' can

⁹ According to the JDP, 'conservative democrat' means a gradualist approach to change; an understanding of politics as an art of compromise rather than conflict; recognition of the national will as the source of political legitimacy; a conception of the state as arbitrator; and support for pluralism and rule of law.

mean to be a Christian democrat¹⁰ of the West. As Grigoriadis (2007) says, according to such a perspective, religion is not excluded completely from politics, but it does not represent the main agenda of a party or as an alternative political way. Thus does not totally fit with the JDP idea, because the party does exclude religion from politics, but it emphasizes the importance of religion for an individual and a society.

The JDP repeatedly declared that it is different from the other NOM parties although they were once members of the NOM. Instead, they argued that they have changed their image, discourse, and ideology. However, it does not mean that the JDP changed their religious identity. The JDP leadership cadre understood that using religion in politics did not bring about any political gains; instead it prevented progress of democracy in Turkey. Therefore, the JDP claim to be conservative democrat in their political agenda, not an Islamic one. In other words, they have been saying that the JDP is not the continuation of any party. In summary, as Grigoriadis (2007:22) aptly puts it, “since the JDP joined government and the ideal of an Islamic state largely lost its appeal in Turkey, the party has abandoned its Islamist rhetoric and has taken to pursuing a pragmatic, moderate course in its core policies.”

Since 1950, the Turkish Republic has seen different types of political parties, all of which have been described as the face of political Islam in Turkey. From the

¹⁰ Christian democracy is a political ideology that has dominated the politics of Western Europe for more than a century. Although they are secular, they are products of state-church conflicts. (see Kalyvas, 1996.)

DP to the JDP, Turkish politics witnessed different policies and policy implementations under different governments with different circumstances. As Sadowski (2006:219) argues, “political Islam, like other varieties, takes very different forms at distinct places and times.” Thus, in exactly the same manner, Turkish political Islam should be analyzed for different times, for different political parties and ideologies, and for different meanings. Therefore, the next chapter will be an evaluation of three political parties which are *sui generis* in terms of political Islam.

RESEARCH DESIGN

My research question is: What are the changes in the Islamist spectrum in Turkish politics since the 1950's? Specifically, I expect to find differences among the following Turkish political parties which are the Democrat Party, the Welfare Party, and the Justice and Development Party, each of which was called Islamic/Islamist.

In this research I study the uses and evolution of Islam in Turkish politics. As introduced in the preceding chapters, I will study three political parties in Turkey from a historical perspective. In order to depict the evolution of political Islam in Turkish politics, I compared the party programs and policy implications for the Democrat, Welfare, and Justice and Development Parties. Specifically, I studied the programs and policy implications for three different issue areas: foreign, education, and economic policies. However, my unit analysis was not only specific words, but also themes, meaning, and usages.

I employed content analysis in this study. According to Manheim et.al (2006: 169), "content analysis is the systematic counting, assessing, and interpreting of the form and substance of communication." In other words, this method is used to assess written or textual information that political actors generate.

Today, the importance and effects of using symbols and giving messages through different messengers is significant. It is important to understand what political actors mean in order to say something about their intentions. As Krippendorff (2003:xviii) puts it, “content analysts examine data, printed matter, images, or sounds-texts-in order to understand what they mean to people, what they enable or prevent, and what the information conveyed by them does.” Therefore, content analysis is a method to examine the idea of message and the idea of the messenger.

Since I will be dealing with the party programs of three political parties mentioned above, I chose the content analysis method in order to trace the various ways Turkish political parties used religion in their party agendas.

In this respect, examinations of different communication types, such as web pages, transcripts of meetings or proceedings, government documents, political advertisements, speeches, programs or agendas, may provide us with an understanding of relations among political actors within political systems. Hence, content analysis can make it easier to analyze and understand political discourses of political actors.

In this research, the three allegedly Islamic political parties in Turkey that occupied the government are the population of the study. The word is the unit of analysis, which is “the particular element or characteristic of a given communication that we shall examine, count, or assess” (Manheim et.al, 2006: 171). As such, I searched for the occurrences of words like Islam, Prophet Mohammed, and Muslim for specific references to religion in the party programs. In addition, I also sought references to such concepts as tradition, ethics, and customs. I reported references to these two separate sets of words separately in my discussion. While analyzing the term, in order to prevent biases, I interpreted the content of the programs in the context of the parties’ apparent purpose (Manheim et.al, 2006: 178).

The party programs of Justice and Development Party are found on the party’s web pages. For the Democrat and Welfare parties, because these documents are not accessible online, I obtained them from the library of the Turkish Grand National Assembly.

I analyzed party programs specifically for three issue areas: foreign policy/affairs, education issues, and economic policies. In addition, I attempted to display overt references to Islam and the ways these parties differed from each other in their uses of Islam regarding these issue areas. While doing this, my aim was to show the differentiations in political Islam in Turkish politics throughout the years by comparing the party programs.

Foreign policy/affairs: Theoretically, Islamists are devoted to a clear pan-Islamist outlook and they support all Muslims (Fuller, 2003: 41). In other words, for an Islamist party, religion comes first in shaping relations with another country. In general, in the Muslim world, “the supremacy of the Muslim *ummah*¹¹ (community)” (Moussalli, 1999:6) is one of the major determinants of foreign policy. Moreover, *ummah* with the ideology of *tawhid*¹² are fundamental components of making policy in Islam. In addition, opposition to the West and Western ideologies is a common theme within political Islam. Because of the opposition to the Western world and its values, creation of an Islamic union against western countries and especially Israel, recreation of foreign policy with other Muslim countries, supporting Muslims in Palestine and Afghanistan could be examples of Islamization in foreign policy. Therefore, I expect that the ideology of both will be easily detectable in foreign policies of Islamic parties. In these cases I expect that the Welfare Party is the only one which supported religious ideology in foreign policy. Thus, I expect that WP will openly state religious affiliation as a defining feature of its foreign policy orientation.

¹¹ “This concept lies a proper realization of many phenomena of the Muslim world. The believers are members of the Ummah, bound together in community by ties, not of kinship or race, but of religion: the acknowledgment of one God and the apostolic mission of his Prophet Mohammad” (Hassan, 1981, 83).

¹² “Tawhid is the worldview of Islam. It is, as fundamental component of Islam, not only a religious principle; more important, it requires eliminating independent earthly human systems opposed to hakimiyya (sovereignty of God) and human transformation” (Moussalli, 1999:27).

Education policies: In Islam, “education helps in the complete growth of an individual’s personality whereas instruction merely trains an individual or a group to do some task efficiently” (Al-Attas, 1977: ix). This means that in Islamic thought education serves to reconstruct the whole society, preserve culture and religion, and prevent degeneration of culture and religion. According to Islamic education, the Western style and secularist education causes corruption in society and personal development. Another characteristic of Islamic education is, as Ba-Yunus (1981:86) argues, “Islamic education should aim at creating voluntary attitudes among the learners to develop a certain society” which is purified from sin, injustice, materialism. Instead, it should be full with recognition, acknowledgement, and perfection.

As Halstead (2004:520) argues, basically there are three sources of Islamic education. The first one is the Qur’an that says pursuit of knowledge is a religious duty. Secondly, it is the traditions of the Prophet Muhammad which provides further insight into Islamic education. The last one is writings by Islamic philosophers in the high period of Islamic civilization about educational issues in general. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, Islamic education has three important aims that are different from the Western type of education. According to Halstead, development of individual potential from childhood to adulthood which means in Arabic *tarbiya* is the first step. The second one to be achieved is the process of character development and learning moral and social behavior and to be responsible within the community and society

which is *ta'dip*. The third one is *ta'lim* which is imparting and receiving knowledge through training, instruction or other forms of education. Additionally, these three steps have their own places in Islamic education as El-Tom argues (Khan (ed.), 1981:34, 35, 36). The family is the source of *tarbiya*, *ta'dip* comes with the mosque, and finally the school is the starting place of *ta'lim*.

Islamic education should not contain secularist items in it. In the purist form of Islamic education there is no aspect that would be identified with secularism. As Halstead argues (2004:521), “modern Western knowledge is infused with western secular values and is inappropriate for Muslims because of its secular associations.” It is because, as Al-Attas (1977) emphasizes, the secularist ideology can not overlap with Islam; and some Muslim countries open their educational systems to secularism and they spiritually lost their identities. Islamists are favor of Sharia rules or Islamization of the education system, although it is not easy in countries which have strict secular rules in education, such as in Turkey.

In that respect, I expect to find direct references to Koranic schools, reforms in the education system as hiring teachers with specific religious backgrounds, opening mosques, new religious schools, and divinity colleges. Also, since family education is one of the most essential and important parts of educational system for children, encouraging young people to be married in order to protect family would be another form of supporting traditional and religious education.

Economic policies: The guiding principles of economic policies in Islam are the Islamic laws (Sharia). Although the degree of following the Islamic teachings in economy varies, and “there is no Muslim society, at present, which can be called as Islamic economy” (Metwally, 1997:941), there are many important economic principles in Islamic teachings. As Choudhury and Malik (1992:1) put, “the main objective of these laws is to establish social justice.” According to them, distributive equity and economic efficiency are crucial to achieve social justice in society. Moreover, according to Islamic principles, people can not claim an absolute ownership, because the God is the ultimate owner of everything. This is the idea that “the gifts of God which have been delivered as a trust into the hands of the human being to produce the maximum output and to fulfill God’s plan of establishing prosperity on earth” (Metwally, 1997:942). Moreover, “profit sharing under economic cooperation, abolition of interest, payment of wealth tax, and abolition of waste in consumption and production” (Choudury, 1992:26) are the basic principles and goals of Islamic economy.

Although Islamist parties do not support state intervention in the markets, some (if not all) seek changes in free market economies. Specifically, some Islamist parties are against the use of interest, and they expect more social services from the state. In addition to these, according to Islamic economic principles, there is a collective participation of individuals, rather than individuals as an actor by

themselves. This is because private ownership, although Islam recognizes it, should be secondary and a subsidiary to that of the community as a whole (Metwally, 1997: 942). Here I will trace any economic policies of the political parties (as they are explained in the party programs) that are consistent with economic principles of Islam.

I found these policies in the Welfare Party, but not in the party programs of the Democratic Party and the Justice and Development Party. Therefore, I also looked at actual policies and writings of scholars about the DP and the JDP. I categorized the parties according to Daniel Brumber's classification which are explained in Chapter 1. In that chapter, there are other widely used categorizations which are fundamentalist vs. reformist and Islamist vs. Islamic. But, I did not use this category to explain the parties' positions because of their lack of depth.

COMPARING TURKISH POLITICAL ISLAMISMS

In this chapter, I will look at the party programs and policies beginning with the Democrat Party, then the Welfare Party and lastly the Justice and Development Party. Then I categorize these parties in accordance with Brumberg's (Kramer (ed.), 1997: 16-18) classification of political Islam; specifically I study the foreign, education, and economical policies of the Democrat Party, Welfare Party, and Justice and Development Party.

These three parties can be considered as part of a long transformational process in Turkish politics. This process can be traced back to the 1950s and the DP's emergence and its accession to power. In the context of WP's emergence, Narli (1999:1) describes this process as "a confrontation between provincial/traditional and urban/modern cultures, new social classes, and the fragmentation of the conservative electorate." The peak point of this confrontation was with the WP government, which is called 'the first Islamist government of Turkey', under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan. However, according to Nasr (2005), since the early 1990's the process that has been experienced in Turkey under the name of political Islam, is non-Islamist but Islamic-oriented.

It may be tempting to label all center-right parties in Turkey as Islamist, because as Cizre and Cinar (2003) argue these parties have all got their popular

support from ‘genuinely devout Muslims.’ However, in the election of 2007, the JDP got 47 percent of the vote from different social and economical classes as a center-right party does. In Turkey the center-right parties oppose both politicized Islam and radicalized secularism. As such, it is argued that Turkish center-right parties have been trying “to integrate of Muslim values and moderate Islamic politics into broader right-of-center platforms that goes beyond exclusively religious concerns” (Nasr, 2005:14). Since the 1950s, this process ultimately/ gradually changed the political landscape. According to Yavuz (1997:73), “Islam has not become the language of modern Turkish politics, Turkey’s political language has been Islamicized” by different political actors and the military.

The years that the WP was in the government and was finally closed down by the constitutional court is usually referred to as the February 28 Process¹³. The February 28 Process is a major turning point in Turkish political life and in the progression of political Islam in Turkey. During and after the February 28 Process, Islamists realized that to re-built a state and society with Sharia rules was impossible in Turkey. According to Dagi (2008), Islamists then accepted the failure of the idea of an Islamic state. Moreover, this marked the beginning of a re-adaptation process of religion in Turkish politics.

¹³ The February 28 Process was an attempt and reaction of the Turkish military on 28 February 1997 in order to restore the Kemalist and secular aspects of Turkey which were thought to be damaged by the Welfare Party. In other words, as Cizre (Cizre (ed.), 2008:164) argues, “it describes the military’s plan to refashion Turkey’s political landscape along Republican secular lines without actually having to take power directly.”

After the split in the Virtue Party, which was the successor of the WP, the dissidents declared a new party. The JDP has confirmed that ideologically it has changed and it is not pursuing and will not pursue the ideology and policies of the traditional National Outlook Movement. It is noteworthy that this split from the VP happened after February 28. This was a significant development in that February 28 “has profoundly altered the formulation of public policy and the relation between state and society” (Cizre&Cinar, 2003:310). The February 28 Process has been a very important date to understand political Islam in Turkey.

In the February 28 Process, Turkish Armed Forces was the main actor. Cinar (Cizre (ed.), 2008:110) argues that the process was initiated by the Turkish military in order to secure secularist Turkey and “the military held the whole political class and even ordinary citizens responsible for the growth of Islamist reactionism.” Therefore, the role of the military in the evolution of political Islam in Turkey should be emphasized. Although the military’s role can be seen as a step back from democracy, in the Turkish experience, as Nasr (2005:17) argues, the military’s involvement limits the Islamists’s room to maneuver and it makes Islamist parties shift to new political formulas such as coalition governments with secular parties in order to get legitimacy.

During the 1990’s, the WP failed to make policies with reference to religious issues, underestimated the importance of communicating with other parts of the

society rather than conservative people, and undermine to get broader support from different ideologies. In this respect, the military's reaction on February 28 can be considered within this context. On the other hand, the emergence of the JDP and its consolidation of power represented a much different approach.

As a result of this study and analysis, I find the Welfare Party as a tactical modernist which selects use of modernist themes in order to create an Islamist state, and the Justice and Development Party as a strategic modernist which has a liberal democratic vision without any intention to create an Islamist state. However, I do not expect to put the Democrat Party in any of the four categories of Brumberg because generally the DP should not be called as an 'Islamist' and/or 'Islamic' party. But, because of some outsiders that have called the Democrat Party as an Islamist, the party's ideology should be examined in terms of political Islam.

The Democrat Party

The policies of building a new Turkish nation and the rigid interpretation of secularism in the Ataturk's Republic did not necessarily "take into account that Turks are religious beings and that Islamic mores are the building blocks of their personal evolution and everyday life" (Khan (ed.), 2007:124). This however changed significantly as a result of the multi-party experience in Turkey. Religiously oriented people found a legitimate way to express their political views and ideologies (Yildiz,

2008). Specifically, as the Republican People's Party was faced with competition and new parties emerged in the 1940's, religious groups were able to openly or secretly associate themselves with these new parties that tried to get rid of strict regulations on the religion (Narli, 1999:1).

Before the establishment of the DP, there were discussions about how the new political party would be. As Eroglu (Schick&Tonak (eds.), 1987:104) says, the only legitimate opposition party should have been a semi-liberal rightist one with ideology no different from the RPP. It would be called 'loyal opposition' because it was established after detailed research. The agreement on an opposition party took 18 months of debate within the RPP (Cook, 2007:97). In terms of religion and secular ideology, according to Geyikdagi (1984:75), "the difference in religious policy formulation between the RPP and the DP was relative rather than absolute. There did not seem to be much difference between them. It was the implementation of the policy, rather than its formulation, which made the difference." As a result of all debates and agreement to create a new party, "modern Turkish history from 1950 on has demonstrated a gradual process of redressing Kemalist ideological excesses and returning to a more comfortable and 'normal' relations with" Turkish culture and historical past (Fuller, 2008:17).

The foreign policy of the DP administration would rely on the traditional alliances with Western countries, primarily with France, Great Britain and the USA.

However, the DP government, as Erogul (Schick&Tonak (eds.), 1987:109) argues, “took this policy to its logical extreme” by sending 4.500 Turkish troops to the Korean War in alliance with the US. This was ultimately rewarded by Turkey’s membership to NATO in 1952. Similar policies friendly to the West were pursued during the DP government. For instance, the DP government took a side on Yugoslavia’s support against Russia in accordance with the US. During the DP government, Turkey also continued its ‘pro-Western’ foreign policies in the Middle East while signing the Baghdad Pact against the Soviet Union.

For Geyikdagi (1984) there is not much difference between the DP and the RPP in terms of domestic and international policies. According to Fuller (2008), the foreign policy of Turkey in the 1950s and the 1960s was very Westernized and limited in the Middle East. For Fuller (2008:34), “from 1957 to 1967, during the period of Turkey’s first democratically elected government under Adnan Menderes, Turkey’s foreign policy was almost completely aligned with Western interests.” Others argued that the foreign policy of the DP was a strategic choice in order to protect Turkey from the Soviet threat during the Cold War. This relationship between the West and Turkey was thus shaped by the realities of the Cold War. Hence, Turkey was reclassified in Washington as ‘part of Europe’” (Fuller, 2008:33). Likewise, this relationship necessitated that the DP government, in order to get support of the US for its political and economical requests, cooperates with Israel (Bishku, 2006:181).

Distinct from the RPP, the economic policies of the DP would be more liberal instead of than strict and statist. The DP governments lowered interest rates and encouraged foreign investment. Moreover, the state monopoly on certain goods was to be removed. Overall, the DP's economic promise was to make Turkey 'a little America' (Timur, 1987:21). The government's plan was to use Western aid and credit in order to achieve that promise.

Keyder (Schick&Tonak (eds.), 1987:39) argues that, "the DP promised to curtail state intervention in the economy, transfer state-owned enterprises to the private sector, and ensure full recompense for the peasant's toil." As Keyder adds, the economic policies of the DP were the result of two basic complaints of the society: one of them is religious freedom, and the other one is oppressive control of state over economy. Almost all policies of the DP were shaped by these two essential complaints. However, without any overall economic plan, the economic policies of the DP collapsed because of the high inflation rate and a foreign currency bottleneck resulting in goods shortages (Aksin, 2007:255).

Before the DP took the power, there were already signs of a religious revival in Turkey. The RPP was aware of this revival as well; indeed, in order to gain the people's support, RPP governments made concessions to religious groups during the 1940s. By the mid 1940s, the number of religious magazines were increasing and many mosques were being built. One of the first actions of Ataturk's successor Ismet

Inonu was the publication of the Encyclopedia of Islam in Turkish. The controversial Imam-Hatip¹⁴ schools were introduced at this time by the RPP governments.

Before coming to power in 1950, the DP party program stated in Article 14 that, “the party rejected the erroneous interpretation of secularism that lead to a hostile attitude against religion, and advocated a clearer separation between religion and public affairs so that government would not interfere in religious activities” (Geyikdagi, 1984:69). Yet, once in power, the DP too made concessions to the religious sentiments of the Turkish people. Examples abound; the call to prayer in Arabic instead of Turkish; the broadcast of Koran recitations on the radio during Ramadan for 10 minutes; introducing compulsory religious courses in intermediary schools and the reopening of an Institute of Islamic Studies. While the conventional thinking is that these were products of the DP governments, the role of the RPP should be noted for an accurate evaluation of this process that goes back to the late 1940s. Moreover, all these policies should be considered under the specific social and economical situation which occurred just after the long single party government with strict secular ideology.

In order to understand the DP era and the religious revival in Turkey, I argue that the social context should be emphasized. Whereas one can not ignore the DP’s role in this process, such developments as urbanization and economic liberalization

¹⁴ Literally Imam-Hatips are Prayer Leader and Preacher Schools. Howard A.Reed, 1955. “Turkey’s New Imam-Hatip Schools”. *Die Welt des Islam*, New Series, Vol. 4, Issue 2/3, pp. 150-163.

must be placed in context as well. As Vertigans (2003:50) says, at this time “improved communications and political participation led to increased levels of social interactions between formerly isolated rural areas, towns, and cities.” Moreover, “in the city, where life-styles are more fluid, where tradition is not part of everyday life as in the village, Muslims begin to wear Islam as a ‘badge’ and become dependent upon religion for a definition of their identity” (Mardin, 1989:179).

As Geyikdayi argues (1984:78), “it is a well-accepted fact that the DP governments directly or indirectly encouraged private initiatives favoring religion such as the building of mosques and the setting up of centers of religious instruction by private funds or communal donations.” Moreover, it is a social fact that after the DP administration, the appearance of religion in public spaces increased. The same argument can be made later for the WP and the JDP; however, it should not mean that this represents political Islam. On the contrary it is one of sociological improvement and urbanization process. It was in this context of change that religion became more visible in public life. This gave way to opposition groups blaming the DP for using religion as a tool in politics. As Karpat (1972:355) argues that, as a result of passing political power to rural people, “the upper economic and landed families, which had joined the Republican Party during its one-party rule and benefited from its statist policies, began to accuse the rising groups of corruption, political opportunism, and naturally, religious reaction.”

The Welfare Party

After the 1980 coup, Turkey entered a new political era with a new constitution. The introduction of a new constitution also had ramifications for the role of religion in Turkish political and public lives. Indeed, religion was used as a glue by “the leaders of the coup employed an ideology known as Turkish-Islamic synthesis, which was constructed by a group of conservative” in order to abolish “ideological polarization and strife-ridden communal violence in Turkey” (Yavuz, 1997:67). In that environment, political Islam in Turkey and the WP (re)emerged as a consequence of this Turkish Islam. WP’s accession to power after the 1995 parliamentary elections took place in this environment. After the 1995 election, the WP formed a coalition government with the True Path Party in July 1996 which lasted a year. With the WP in government, Turkish politics was faced with a different ideology than the state ideology. The ideology of the WP was in stark contrast to the Turkish political establishment “where the whole legal system is geared to secularism” (Aksin, 2007:303).

The WP’s and its leader’s ideology were closer to the Islamist ideology than the state ideology of Turkey. As Fuller (2008:41) argues, “Erbakan’s rhetorical calls reflected many of the classical themes of the main-stream Islamists in other parts of the world.” Indeed, for Yavuz (1997:65) the party of Necmettin Erbakan “is not only a party but also a larger Islamic social movement that seeks to reconstruct many traditional aspects of society from cuisine to political exchange.”

The WP continued the ideology of the National Order Party and the National Salvation Party although it was not as powerful as those. The party opposed the imperial character of the West, Turkey's accession process to the EU, and the membership of Turkey in NATO "which 'created' the state of Israel" (Bishku, 2006:179). Criticizing relations with Israel and its regional politics and supporting Palestine against Israel were the main foreign policies of the WP. However, as Bishku (2006:190) argues "while Erdogan had campaigned on a platform to cut ties with Israel, as prime minister he proved both unable and unwilling to do anything about it." This was mainly due to the fact that the Foreign Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister and more importantly the National Security Council continued Turkey's traditionally Western oriented foreign policies. Moreover, Erdogan "demonstrated a deep suspicion of US strategic intentions toward Turkey and consistently urged greater Turkish independence of action in foreign policies" (Fuller, 2008:42). In the election manifesto of the WP (1991:56), it was clearly indicated that the previous Turkish governments were all affected and controlled by Western countries and especially by the US.

Prime Minister Erdogan made his first official visits not to Europe or the US but to Iran and Libya. While in office, Erdogan also wished to re-build relations with Egypt, Malaysia, Pakistan, Indonesia, and Nigeria. The motivation behind these visits

was to establish a Developing 8 (D-8) organization, “a pointedly Muslim parallel to the Group of Seven (G-7) of the West” (Fuller, 2008:43).

In general, the WP’s foreign policy was primarily based on religion and Islamic nationalism, *ummah*. For instance, in one of his speech in Istanbul during the 1995 election campaign, Erbakan promised that he would liberate Bosnia, Azerbaijan, Chechnya, and Jerusalem (New York Times, 30 June 1996). Creation of an Islamic United Nations, an Islamic common market, custom agreements with other Muslim countries rather than the European countries (The WP election manifesto: p. 166) chaired by Turkey and D-8 countries were all illustrations of such an approach to foreign policy. For the WP, the EU was a Christian club and hence the party was against any relationship with the EU.

Besides the foreign policy issue, the WP and Erbakan were criticized for some specific actions. As Onis (2001:286) argues the WP’s most criticized actions were in the cultural realm, such as plans to build a mosque in Taksim Square in Istanbul and changing work hours for government employees during the Islamic month of Ramadan. One of the most troubling acts of Erbakan was his Ramadan dinner with leaders of various religious sects at the Prime Minister’s residence.

According to the WP policies, to be Western and to be modern are totally different. Instead of becoming Western, Erbakan hoped for ‘a great Turkey’ that

would return to its Islamic cultural and moral roots” (Bishku, 2006:179). According to this logic, by keeping Turkish-Islamic identity, Turkey could be modern in terms of technology and industry. This kind of ideology is not rare in political parties that have powerful Islamist ideology in their political agendas, like the WP, and they claim “to represent the ‘national view’ and criticize Westernization as a betrayal of traditional, national, and spiritual values” (Dagi, 2008:26).

The well-publicized ‘Just Order’ was at the center of the WP’s economic policy. While the WP did not oppose the principles of liberal economy, the party aimed for what it called a ‘genuine capitalist system’ with social justice, and the rhetoric of self-sufficiency (Cook, 2007:109); but its economic plan was state-centric. With the idea of God’s ownership of everything, the WP’s goal was to recreate economic equality. Although the leaders of the party were in favor of some application of Islamic economic principles such as an interest-free financial system, it would be difficult to implement all of the Islamic principles (Metwally, 1997:957). The WP was against the capitalist system and its institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the Common Market. In an attempt to disassociate Turkey from the Western economies, Erbakan also wanted to establish economic ties with Islamic countries. As much as this was a foreign policy for Erbakan, it was also an economic issue. For instance, during the WP government, Erbakan signed a \$23 billion agreement with Iran, which supplied Iranian natural gas

to Turkey for 23 years. Also, Erbakan wished to create an Islamic development bank and Islamic currency to be used in trade between Muslim countries.

The education policy of the WP was also based on 'just order.' According to the party program, the WP attached more importance to moral and spiritual education and development. Thus, for the party, moral and spiritual development of human beings is the central feature of school education. Therefore, the WP promised in its program (p. 99, 100), to open Quran courses, Imam Hatip schools, religious and divinity faculties in universities, and mosques.

The Justice and Development Party

One of the realities about the JDP is that the party did not emerge out of the blue. The main cadres of the JDP grew mainly from movements and parties that were called 'Islamist'. The significance of the JDP is that it was "the first party to break free of the more traditional Islamist influence of Necmettin Erbakan, who led four successive Islamist parties from 1970 to 1997" (Fuller, 2008:49). The JDP has been successful by learning to be democratic, professional and moderate unlike the earlier Islamist parties.

As Dagi (2008:25) emphasizes that the JDP is an Islamic entity. The party ideology grew into "the first political representative of Islamism in Turkish politics, known as NOM." However, when we look at "the JDP's public statements, social

base program, and behavior over more than five years as Turkey's ruling party, the JDP appears to be not an outright Islamist movement, but rather a 'conservative' one within the tradition of Turkish center-right politics" (Dagi, 2008:26).

In July 2001, there was a division in the NOM for the first time in its history. The split of the JDP from the NOM and specifically from the Virtue Party was not only political, but also and more importantly, ideological (Cizre, 2003; Dagi, 2008). The split, the dissidents of the VP who later established the JDP indicated that ideologically the two parties were totally different and the new party was formed to represent the center-right in Turkish politics, similar to the DP and the Motherland Party.

One of the differences between the JDP and the NOM is in the vision of religion in political and social life. In the JDP's agenda, "Islam in Turkey operates as a source of social stability as a motivational force rather than as a radical political project" (Yavuz&Esposito (ed.), 2003:12). As such, with the JDP "the idea of 'social' rather than 'political' Islam gained ground. The party's leader remains individually committed to Islam as a religion, but refrain from developing an Islamist agenda" (Dagi, 2008:27, 29).

The JDP's Middle East policy has been notable because "from the founding of the modern Turkish Republic in 1923, its relations with the former Muslim regions of

the Ottoman Empire have been limited and strained” (Fuller, 2008:4). With its accession to power, JDP made significant changes to Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East. Since the Middle East is a region that faces chaos at various times, and given its proximity to Turkey, JDP government has played an active role in the region. Indeed, as Fuller (2008:5) argues, Turkey, for the first time in its Republican period, “is becoming a major player in Middle East Politics.” Although the foreign policy of the JDP towards the Middle East might be seemed as an example of Islamist agenda, it will be the first time because there is a sharp policy change in Turkish foreign affairs after the long Kemalist- oriented foreign relations that have made people biased about the Middle East. However, the foreign policy toward the Middle East might still be thought of and qualified as an expression of the Islamic agenda.

Since 2002, the JDP governments have changed many elements of in Turkish foreign policy. Renewed efforts to initiate EU reforms and a new formulation of Turkey’s Cyprus policy are two major examples of these changes. According to Fuller (2008), what the JDP government has been doing since 2002 is trying to harmonize Kemalism, as an inevitable feature of the Turkish Republic, and the Westernization process of Turkey with the Turkish culture with its Islamic norms and values.

Since 1963, the EU membership has been one of the most important targets for Turkey. Under the administration of the JDP, Turkey’s EU reforms have been

accelerated. According to Dagi (2008:28), “for the AKP in particular, the language of human rights and democracy and the goal of EU membership opened up the possibility of building a liberal-democratic coalition with modern and secular sectors at home and abroad.” Cohen (Khan (ed.), 2007:18) says that as Turkey is integrated into the EU, there will gradually emerge clear distinctions between the mosque and the state like those between the church and the state in Western democracies. As such, in a way, the EU membership process limits Islamic legislation and religious expression in state policies which in turn makes Turkey more secular and democratic (Nasr, 2005).

Turkey’s Cyprus policy since the JDP assumed power in November 2002 also has undergone significant changes. According to Dagi (2008:28) “the JDP’s willingness to work with the UN on solving the Cyprus question despite the resistance of Turkey’s state bureaucracy” was a totally different foreign policy than previous ones. In contrast to the policies pursued by the JDP, previous Turkish foreign policy in Cyprus was based on strict nationalist principles. In its program, the JDP promises to follow a proactive diplomacy on the Cyprus issue. This has been the case with the reformulation of Turkish foreign policy in Cyprus and then with the JDP governments active promotion of the Annan Plan.

The economic policy of the JDP has also important differences with Islamist parties. As Dagi emphasizes (2008), policies of engagement with the global markets

and the global economy, pursuing the relations with the IMF, a successful privatization program, the encouragement of foreign investment in Turkey, and more involvement in the global economy indicate that the JDP is not on the path of Islamization, but globalization. One of the main economic policies of the JDP is the withdrawal of the state from commodity and service markets. Overall these show that the economic policy of the party is close to liberal economic principles, which suggest fewer roles for the state in the economy and integration with the global economy.

Dagi (2008:30) says “looking at the AKP’s platform, its public discourse, its social base, and all its record in government, one does not see an Islamist faction, but rather a globalist, market-oriented, pro-Western, and populist political party.”

What the JDP is trying to do is to “transform the unsecular tendencies of Muslim Democracy into long-term commitment to democratic values (Nasr, 2005:15)” like those held in Europe. However, according to Tibi (2008:46), “the AKP is an Islamist party, and not an Islamic conservative party. The AKP is intolerant, not only towards secularists, but also toward ethnic and religious minorities as the Kurds and the Alevis.” Like Tibi, Fuller (2008:52, 53) classifies the JDP as one form of an Islamist party. Yet in one of his earlier studies, Fuller (2005) argues that the JDP can not be considered as an Islamist party because all it wants is freedom and rights. Hence, there is not a consensus or even consistency on this matter.

The education policy of the JDP is secular and gives easy access to religious education within the secular limits of the state. In terms of education, the party program says that, except for required religious education in elementary and intermediate levels, , students can take religious courses as elective courses with permission of their guardians. With this policy, they have opened up religious education a little bit more. Moreover, the Ministry of Education under the JDP administration has started a campaign that aims to increase number of girls, who are educated especially those who live in South and South East regions of Turkey. In this case, the JDP's encouragement of girls' education has modern and secular ideology rather than Islamist ideology.

However, the JDP might behave more religiously in order to protect the family structure both in the religion and Turkish culture. In 2004, the party tried to introduce adultery as a crime in the new Turkish Penalty Code. But, after harsh criticisms from the opposition parties and the EU, the JDP had to withdraw this proposal.

Conclusion

Owing to its secular foundations, the differences of the Turkish case from that of other Islamic countries creates a new form of political Islam which is called 'Turkish Islam' which tries to push Islamic influences on governance away and put religion in the private sphere. The process is not over yet; Turkish politics has been

experimenting to find new and workable ways to live with democracy, Kemalism, secularism, and the religion as “a personal belief and code of action” (Fuller, 2008:55).

When we look at the WP, the result is different from the JDP and DP since the overall goals were “externalization of Islamic identity in the public domain and the construction of a moral and virtuous community” (Yavuz, 1997:80). In contrast, in terms of religion, the main goal of both the DP and JDP, which are considered as center-right parties (Mert, 2007), is free religious activities within the limits of democracy and secular ideology.

According to Nasr (2005:18) “the success of the AKP’s Muslim Democratic platform is less a triumph of religious piety over Kemalist secularism than of an independent bourgeoisie over a centralizing state.” We can generalize this for the DP government and the WP government as well. However, as Yavuz argues (1997), the success of the WP was the product of post-1980 political and economic settings that were created by the military and state.

According to Yavuz (Khan (ed.), 2007:126), the JDP can not be labeled as an Islamist party and it is not an Islamic party any more, because the JDP does not “seek legitimacy on Islamic ground. In Turkey the understanding of politics and governing

has changed. In other words, in Turkey, there is “the process of post-Islamism or the shift from the politics of identity to the politics of services.”

According to Fuller (2008:52), the JDP is a moderate Islamist party because it tries “to remove an explicitly religious agenda from its political program but does not remove the inherent values of Islam for it.” Likewise, Introvigne (Yavuz (ed.), 2006:41) says, the JDP, although it has an expression of political Islam, can be considered a religious party that rejects the brotherhood model. Instead it takes the new title of ‘conservative democrat’ for itself.

The answer to the question of whether the JDP is an Islamist party or not came from the EU on October 2005 with its decision to begin the accession talks with Turkey. As Dagi (2008) argues, this was in essence an approval of the democratization and Europeanization of JDP’s policies. In other words, the EU policy pursued by the JDP has been a clear proof of the identity of the JDP as a political party not to be an Islamist.

As Yildiz (Cizre (ed.), 2008:48) argues, in contrast with Erbakan and NOM ideology, “the JDP has adopted a posture of compromise, used a secular political jargon, accepted religious visibility only in individual and social realms, highlighted its non-Islamism, and declared the headscarf an issue of minor importance.”

The education policies of the JDP and the WP have significant differences. For instance, in the WP program, the party promises to open Quran courses in every village, to open Prayer Leader and Preacher School in every town, and Divinity Schools in every city. On the other hand, the JDP promises easy access to religious education such as “allowing parents some discretion in their choice of primary and secondary schools, securing equality of opportunity for the graduates of religious schools in the highly competitive university entrance examination” (Yildiz, 2008). Moreover, the Ministry of Education under the JDP government has started a campaign which has aimed to increase number of girl students especially in East and South East region of Turkey. In this regard, the JDP has given different meanings to education than the WP. Likewise, the DP education policy differs from the WP’s but comes closer to the JDP approach that aims to increase easy access to religious education without exploitation of religion.

Furthermore, nationality has big impact on the WP’s foreign, education, and economic policies. The party, in its program, calls nationality as an essence and combines it with religion. In the program of the WP, nationality is combined with religion, ethnicity, and regionalism and the Ottoman-Islamic past although it “paid lip service to Ataturk nationalism” (Yildiz, 2008: 54). That kind of combination might be done not to emphasize religion too much and to get different types of people’s attention. In terms of nationality, the DP and the JDP differ from the WP. However,

the DP and the JDP have preferred to use nationalism in citizenship, civic and territorial elements of consciousness, as Yildiz (2008) says.

As a result of all these comparisons, the WP can be categorized as tactical modernist in terms of using modernist themes to advance a fundamentalist agenda and change. The DP, I argue that, can not be categorized as an Islamist party, because its cadre and leadership came out from the RPP's secular ideology. Also, the social and economic conditions of Turkey when the DP came to power have many impacts on the policies of the party. However, if the practical implications of DP policies are considered, one can argue that the DP can be tagged as strategic modernist. Lastly, the JDP, although some scholars such as Mert (2007) call it center-right party with its policies in the government, might be tagged as strategic modernist because their aim is a transformation towards democracy in a secular environment.

In conclusion, I ended up classifying the three parties, using all the evidence as follows;

- 1) The Democratic Party's agenda did not have anything to do with political Islam. Moreover, in the Turkish politics, the DP generally fits into a center-right party position. However, if the policy implications are used to decide the categorization, the DP can be called as a *strategic modernist*.

- 2) The Welfare Party was the most radical of the three in both religion and policy. Although the party gained power with policies that made religion more visible in state and public after the 1980 coup, the party can be tagged as a *tactical modernist* in terms of using modernist themes to advance its agenda.
- 3) The Justice and Development Party, in spite of Islamic features of its leadership cadres, can be a model for *strategic modernism*. This is demonstrated by the party's liberal and democratic vision of transforming Turkey into a democratic government by using a democratic and secular environment.

CONCLUSION

This study started with a goal to explain the evolution of process of political Islam in Turkish politics. In order to understand different stages of political Islam in Turkey, I chose three Turkish parties which are the Democrat Party (DP), the Welfare Party (WP), and the Justice and Development Party (JDP) and looked at their party programs and policy implications in terms of political Islam. In the first chapter, the definition of political Islam in general is explained. Although there are common features of political Islam in different countries, there should be noted that every country's version has its unique characteristics. Even in a country, political Islam and its meaning might differ from one political actor to another that use it in policies.

In the second chapter, I gave a brief history about the DP, the WP, and the JDP in order to understand the political environment at those times. In the last chapter, I try to categorize the parties in the classification of political Islam by using their political programs and policy implications. To use the definition of political Islam and its main features, I make a unique label for Turkish political life.

Political Islam arguably is one political school of thought that uses the Holy book of Islam, the Quran, and the sayings of Prophet Muhammad, Hadith, in order to establish a new order under the name of Islam. Although both Islam and political Islam have regulations for cultural, political, economical, and social life, Islam has

nothing to say about the construction of a state system. It is the Islamic scholars who interpret the Quran in order to create the regulations of a society. As a result of different interpretations, in many Muslim countries, there are political institutions that are called 'Islamist', although there is much dissimilarity among them. In order to avoid any overlap and confusion by considering many cases, I specifically studied the Turkish experience of political Islam.

In Turkey, since the multi-party system began in 1946, conservative and religious thought have had a huge impact on political and social life. In spite of the Welfare Party's clear impact on the process of political Islam in Turkey, as Lombardi (1997:196) argues, "whatever the reasons for Refah's [Welfare's] success, it was the secularists who first opened the door to Islamic organizations." The process began in the 1950s with the huge traditional Muslim support for Adnan Menderes. However, with the WP, political Islam achieved electoral success with "an institutional expression of a modern social movement that strives to redefine sociocultural and economic relations through political meaning" (Yavuz, 1997:66). Actually, Islam in politics was also seen in the 1980s after the military takeover. As Cook (2007:106) says, "the military junta of 1980-83 saw Islam as an instrument to counter the growing power of the Left." So, the junta used Islam as an answer to the communist threat and depoliticization of the people. As a result, "Refah and its leaders were unintended beneficiaries of these policies" (Cook, 2007:107).

The JDP, on the other hand, did not appear in the Turkish political life suddenly. It is a fact that the leadership cadres of the party came mainly from the Welfare Party, which can be considered as an example of political Islam in Turkish political life. However, at the end of this study, I realize that except for the role of Islam in their private lives, the leadership cadres of the JDP can be considered as a center-right party. As Mert (Radikal, June 16, 2007) argues, it has more commonalities than differences when compared with other center-parties in Turkey. However, unlike the Democrat Party, True Path or Motherland Party which are center-right parties in Turkish politics, JDP leaders are the first to come from an Islamic background.

I studied Turkish political Islam by looking at party programs and the policy implications of the three Turkish political parties which have existed in different time periods of Turkey and I categorized these parties. I used Daniel Brumberg's classification which is more specific and more capable of differentiating among the three parties' use of Islam as a political tool. In my classification, the Democrat Party and the Justice and Development Party can be called strategic modernists, whereas the Welfare Party can be tagged as tactical modernist.

	THE DEMOCRAT PARTY	THE WELFARE PARTY	THE JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT PARTY
ECONOMIC POLICY & ROLE OF THE STATE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Liberal economy - Private sector ownership - Foreign loans & credits from IMF, WB - Open economy - Foreign investment 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - State-led economy under 'just order' - Against capitalist system, IMF, WB - Interest free economic system - Create Islamic common market, custom union, currency for Muslim countries 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Liberal market economy - Privatization - Foreign investment - Integration to global markets - Cooperation with the IMF, WB
FOREIGN POLICY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Western oriented - Against communism & Soviet Union - 1952 NATO membership - Completely aligned with western interests 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Religiously oriented - Against the US, EU - Anti-Israel, Anti-Zionist - Create Islamic United Nations, Islamic NATO 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Integration to the EU - Become major player in the Middle East - Pro-Western - Strategic relations with the US, Israel
EDUCATION POLICY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Open Imam-Hatip schools - Reopen of Institute of Islamic Studies - Introduce religious courses in intermediate schools 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Religiously oriented - Open new Imam-Hatips in every county; Quran courses & mosques in every village - Education system based on spirituality and science 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Increase education of girls, especially in east and south east regions of Turkey - No emphasis on religion in education - Increase access to religious education - Equality of graduates of religious schools in university exam - Reiterate the constitutional position of obligatory lessons on religion and ethics
RELIGION & MORAL VALUES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Call to prayer in Arabic again - Broadcast Quran recitations in Ramadan for 10 minutes 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Reopen Hagia Sophia for praying - Dinner with leaders of regional sects in Ramadan - Build a mosque in Taksim square 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Call adultery a crime under the Penalty Code
CLASSIFICATION	Center-right Strategic Modernist	Tactical Modernist	Center-right Strategic modernist

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