

The Structure of Political Ideology, and Its Influence on Voter Turnout:  
An Analysis of the 2000 and 2004 Presidential Elections

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that this is the approved version of the following thesis:

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**THE STRUCTURE OF POLITICAL IDEOLOGY, AND ITS INFLUENCE ON  
VOTER TURNOUT:  
AN ANALYSIS OF THE 2000 AND 2004 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS**

**ABSTRACT**

This article uses data from the 2000 and 2004 waves of the American National Election Survey to examine the influence of the ideological dimensions of moral-traditionalism and market-fundamentalism on voter turnout. The majority of the literature on voting behavior utilizes a single-dimensional measure of “ideology,” however, literature focused on the structure and organization of “ideology” suggests that it is multi-dimensional. Studies using a multi-dimensional approach only rarely apply the framework to questions of civic and political participation. In this paper, I seek to place these two disparate literatures in dialogue, by applying a dual-dimensional ideological framework to the question of voter turnout. My findings strongly support a dual-dimension conceptualization, in contrast to the single-dimensional approach commonly utilized. I find that nearly half of the population has a distinct political leaning on one dimension, while trending toward the center on the other. I also find that each dimension’s influence on the decision to vote is independent of the other. While both dimensions are organized within liberal-conservative frameworks, each dimension is distinct, and both should *not* be combined into a single liberal/conservative ideological framework.

## ***INTRODUCTION***

Citizen participation in the election process is essential to democracy, and it is beyond contestation that attitudes and values matter in the decision to vote. However, the structure and organization of attitudes and values that influence voter turnout remain largely unsettled. This paper focuses on the structure of political attitudes and values in the United States population, and how this structure influences presidential voter turnout. To account for the influence of attitudes, studies commonly place individuals along a single liberal-conservative “ideological” dimension (Abramowitz and Saunders 2006; Lacy and Burden 1999; Lavine 2001; Lavine and Gschwend 2007; Saunders and Abramowitz 2004). In this single-dimensional model, progressive beliefs place an individual closer to the Democratic Party, conservative beliefs place individuals closer to the Republicans and beliefs in the middle place individuals in a “moderate” category. The problematic assumption of a single-dimension conceptualization of ideology is that it *presumes* the host of beliefs and values held by an individual are organized around a single ideological dimension independent of subject matter. Moreover, the single continuum ignores the rather basic distinction between the value constellations of market-fundamentalism and moral-traditionalism, which, I argue, is critical in understanding voter turnout.

A single-dimension conceptualization of “ideology” may not empirically be supported. Thomas Frank has argued that the working class votes Republican primarily because of moral issues, while the upper class votes Republican due to economic concerns (Frank 2004). Frank adds that the working class is generally


progressive on economic issues, but since the working class sees “Democrats [as] no longer speak[ing] to people on the losing end of a free market system,” many have moved to the Republican ranks (Frank 2004:245). Frank’s key insight is that working class individuals simultaneously hold seemingly opposing value positions. Frank’s argument echoes a classic finding by Lipset (1983), nearly 48 years prior, claiming that the working class in the United States holds socially conservative and economically progressive values. Additionally, Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope (2005) argue that presidential candidates themselves must be placed on a two-dimensional ideological schema if we are to truly understand voting patterns in the 2000 presidential election. By separating economic and moral/traditionalist values into a two-dimensional framework, Frank, (2004) Lipset, (1983) and Fiorina et al. (2005) call into question the common liberal/conservative single-dimensional organization of political attitudes and values.

The structure of political attitudes in the population is organized along a moral-traditionalist dimension and a market-fundamentalist dimension, both of which are organized within liberal/conservative frameworks. More importantly, this distinction has significant ramifications for understanding voter turnout. Conceptualizing political attitudes within a two-dimensional framework provides a deeper understanding of the values motivating the decision to vote. In general, previous literature on voting behavior primarily depends on a single-dimension “think of self as liberal or conservative” variable to control or account for “ideology” (e.g., Lacy and Burden 1999; Lacy and Monson 2002; Lavine 2001; Lavine and Gschwend

2007). But the literature focusing on multiple attitudinal and value dimensions only rarely addresses actual political action (e.g., Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 2006; Lipset 1983). In this paper, I seek to place these two literatures in dialogue, by analyzing the 2000 and 2004 U.S. Presidential elections. The two-dimensional approach I employ illuminates the distribution of market-fundamentalist and moral-traditionalist values amongst social classes, and how this influences their voting behavior. To empirically justify the “two-dimension” argument, I use least squares regression to test the existence of market-fundamentalism and moral-traditionalism in the population and map their distribution by race/ethnicity and class. I then utilize multinomial logistic regression to evaluate several unified vote choice models, showing that a two-dimensional approach allows for a better understanding of voter turnout than single-dimension perspectives. Individuals have complex attitudinal profiles that motivate their voting behavior, and understanding the organization of their constellations of values furthers our knowledge of why people vote and for whom.

***THE ORGANIZATION AND STRUCTURE OF ATTITUDES AND VALUES IN THE UNITED STATES***

“Ideological voting” is defined as a process where by individuals arrive at a decision to vote based on their political opinions, which are derived deductively from their principles and values (Dalton 2006; Lavine and Gschwend 2007) (for a critique see Moskowitz and Jenkins 2004). Figure 1 outlines two competing theoretical processes for “ideological voting.” The single ideological dimension is the most common perspective used in studies of voter turnout.



**FIGURE 1. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS OF IDEOLOGICAL VOTING BEHAVIOR**

But how attitudes and values influence voter turnout depends on their organization and structure as well as their distribution in the population. The term “ideology” is widely viewed in political science as a “set of beliefs about the role of government that shapes responses to a wide range of policy issues” (Abramowitz and Saunders 2006:177). These beliefs are best described as values or principles that provide a foundation for opinions on specific political issues (Dalton 2006). In the single-dimension “ideological” framework, ideologically sophisticated individuals are assumed to organize their views and feelings concerning moral-traditionalism and market-fundamentalism on a single liberal/conservative ideological continuum. From this “ideological” position they deductively arrive at issue positions, and choose candidates that promote policy positions consistent with these issue positions (Dalton 2006; Lavine 2001; Lavine and Gschwend 2007; Saunders and Abramowitz 2004;

Saunders, Abramowitz, and Williamson 2005; Teixeira 1992). Commonly operationalized using a single item “think of self as liberal or conservative” scale, the single-dimension perspective *assumes* that progressive moral-traditionalist and pro-welfare-state views tend to covary while market-fundamentalist and conservative moral-traditionalist values also tend to covary strongly within the population (Abramowitz and Saunders 1998; Abramowitz and Saunders 2006; Jacoby 1995; Lacy and Monson 2002; Lavine 2001; Lavine and Gschwend 2007; Saunders and Abramowitz 2004)<sup>1</sup>.

Many other studies have found multiple distinct ideological or value dimensions that drive voting behavior. Studies testing for multiple ideological dimensions conclude that most people use the liberal/conservative framework as a basic structuring principle to organize their political thinking (Conover and Feldman 1981; Conover and Feldman 1984; Jennings 1990; Kerlinger 1984; Moskowitz and Jenkins 2004). Several of these studies also find multiple ideological dimensions organized within liberal/conservative frameworks (Kerlinger 1984; Moskowitz and Jenkins 2004). Using data from 1988, Moskowitz and Jenkins (2004) find evidence of three distinct ideological dimensions, which they label social liberalism, economic liberalism, and racial liberalism. Alternatively, multi-dimensional studies argue for a social and an economic dimension, treating racial issues either as a subset of the social, or as parts of the social and economic dimensions (Fleishman 1988; Lipset

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<sup>1</sup> Abramowitz and Saunders (2006) also use an additive scale that combines social and economic attitude items into one dimension. While an improvement over the classic single-dimensional construct, placing them on one dimension still creates many of the same weaknesses as the single variable operationalization.

1983; Lipset 1996). Using a two-dimension approach, Lipset (1983) argues that those who are less educated and have less economic and personal security are more likely to be socially conservative or authoritarian, while remaining economically progressive. Houtman (2003) adds nuance to Lipset's (1983) findings showing that moral-traditionalist values flow from cultural capital and one's education, while market-fundamentalist values tend to depend on one's labor market position.<sup>2</sup> From a multi-dimensional perspective an individual's political ideology consists of their positions on a constellation of value dimensions, each organized within a liberal/conservative framework.

Though the number of dimensions is contested, the evidence for more than one dimension demands a reinterpretation of previous single-continuum research. For example, using the single-dimension approach, liberal-conservative self identification is highly correlated with partisanship, party affiliation, vote choice, and voter turnout (Abramowitz and Saunders 1998; Abramowitz and Saunders 2006; Lacy and Burden 1999; Saunders and Abramowitz 2004). Further, many studies using the single-continuum approach also argue that the U.S. population has substantially increased its ideological sophistication over the last 30 years, and that the political parties have been moving to ideologically distinct positions (Abramowitz and Saunders 1998; Abramowitz and Saunders 2006; Saunders and Abramowitz

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<sup>2</sup> The most common labels in the literature for the two major ideological dimensions are "social conservatism" and "economic conservatism." Lipset (1983, 1996, 1988) also uses the terms "egalitarianism" and "anti-statism." While the labels differ in the literature, the variables used to tap the economic and social dimensions are nearly identical. However, given the rich tradition of research from political psychology that characterizes conservatism as a psychological syndrome, and in an effort to be as accurate as possible, I use the labels "moral-traditionalism" and "market-fundamentalism" to reference the economic and social value dimensions.

2004). Lacy and Burden (1999) even show that self-identified liberals and conservatives vote more often, and more consistently, than self-identified moderates. Traditionally, these findings are viewed as support for a single-dimensional ideological framework. However, from a multi-dimensional perspective these findings only imply that the U.S. population increasingly uses the left/right continuum as a basic structuring principle to organize political information, and these single-dimension studies have not tested multiple models to discover if this is indeed the case.

On the other hand, multi-dimensional studies of ideology have only scantily addressed the issue of voting behavior and other types of political action. For example, Fiorina et al. (2006) utilizes the multi-dimensional approach to show that economic ideology has not become less important over time, but the importance of a moral ideological dimension has also become politically salient. Many other studies have also shown that moral traditionalist and market-fundamentalist values are disproportionately distributed among social classes (Brooks and Manza 1997a; Brooks and Manza 1997b; Brooks and Manza 1997c; Frank 2004; Houtman 2003; Lipset 1983). But, studies applying a multi-dimensional ideological framework to any type of political action, let alone voter turnout, are the exception. While the number of dimensions is still a matter of debate, there is substantial agreement that a moral-traditionalist dimension and a market-fundamentalist dimension exist (Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 2006; Fleishman 1988; Moskowitz and Jenkins 2004). As such,

the systematic application of a dual-dimensional ideological framework to the voting turnout question within a sociological model represents the next intellectual step.

In applying a dual-dimensional framework to the voting question, I look to demonstrate the substantive nuances missed by a single-dimension framework. A low correlation between the separate moral-traditionalist and market-fundamentalist dimensions would indicate ideological inconsistency with a single-dimensional framework. Because the two major parties each have ideological platforms that currently fit the single-dimension framework (Gelman and Park 2008), a low correlation would potentially indicate considerable differences between the ideological position of the parties and the population at large. The differences in ideological layout between the population and parties themselves are important for understanding voting behavior because they directly impact each party's ability to build electoral bases large enough to win elections. Simply put, an empirically supported dual-dimension ideological framework suggests that parties rely on electoral coalitions as the foundation of electoral success, not electoral bases.

Alternatively, there may be a negative correlation between the two dimensions. Lipset (1983) and Frank (2004) argue that working class individuals are more moral traditionalist and less market-fundamentalist than the general population, while Brooks and Manza (1997a, 1997b, 1997c) argue that professionals tend to be slightly more market-fundamentalist than the general population, but much less moral traditionalist. These findings imply a negative correlation between the moral-traditionalist and market-fundamentalist dimensions by class, depending largely on

how class is operationalized (Houtman 2003). To further understand the distribution of the ideological bases of the major political parties, I examine the distribution of moral-traditionalism and market-fundamentalism within the population, utilizing a composite operationalization of class (income, occupation, and education). If Lipset (1983) and Frank (2004) are correct, then the working class should have significantly higher mean scores on my moral-traditionalism scale and significantly lower mean scores on my market-fundamentalism scale when compared to the rest of the population. Similarly, professionals should have significantly lower mean scores on my moral-traditionalism scale and significantly higher scores on my market-fundamentalism scale. I also examine mean differences of managers and the self-employed. Mapping the electorate in this way not only shows the ideological tendencies of class groupings, but also shows contradictions and patterns that would be missed if a single-dimensional approach were used. These ideological subtleties between the moral-traditionalist and market-fundamentalist dimensions link the organization of political values and attitudes to the voting act, and their influences are obscured by a single-dimension framework.

After clarifying the ideological landscape, I compare four models of voting behavior to test the fit of the dual-dimensional models in relation to single dimension approaches. Lacy and Burden (1999) found that ideology is the single largest predictor of vote choice and voter turnout utilizing a single-dimension measure. If Lacy and Burden's finding holds utilizing a dual-dimensional approach, then the ideological variation in the population takes on added importance. For example, what

are the implications for turnout for those who are located in the ideological middle on one dimension, but have a pronounced position on the other? Are the influences of each ideological dimension on voting behavior independent, or do they each influence the other dimension's effects on voting behavior? I test for this possibility by including a model with an interaction effect between both ideological dimensions. By mapping the U.S. population by class and ideological outlook within a dual-dimensional framework and applying it to the voter turnout question, I show that the ideological layout of the population has implications for the voting act that a single-dimensional framework is incapable of illuminating. Let us now turn to a discussion of my data and methodology.

#### ***DATA AND METHODS***

I compare competing models of voting behavior using a multinomial logistic regression of the 2000 and 2004 *American National Election Surveys* (ANES) pre and post election samples. To make my analysis more comparable to the general body of research on mass belief systems, I specifically test the traditional single dimensional ideological framework against a dual-dimensional framework with a moral-traditionalist dimension and a market-fundamentalist dimension, and then discuss its implications in the conclusion (Abramowitz and Saunders 1998; Abramowitz and Saunders 2006; Barker and Tinnick 2006; Basinger and Lavine 2005; Kerlinger 1984; Moskowitz and Jenkins 2004). Abramowitz and Saunders (2006:178) make the case that over the past 40 years, “a substantial increase in the ability of citizens to apply ideological labels to the political parties, an increase in the coherence of citizens'

views across different issues, and a growing connection between the ideological labels that citizens choose and their positions on a wide range of domestic and foreign policy issues.” I utilize the 2000 and 2004 ANES because, aside from its contemporary relevance, it should present the most ideologically sophisticated population in recent U.S. history (Abramowitz and Saunders 2006; Saunders and Abramowitz 2004). Lavine and Gschwend (2007) find that ideological voting demands ideological ability and high motivation, while non-ideological voters rely on non-trivial character issues such as perceived leadership ability. The increasing ideological sophistication of the population makes ideological motivations more relevant for understanding the 2000 and 2004 Presidential elections, and as such, increases the importance of understanding the organization of ideology in the population. If the dual-dimension framework provides a deeper understanding of voter behavior than the traditional single dimension approach, I will test for three or more dimensions over time in further research.

#### ***VOTER TURNOUT, CHOICE, AND MULTINOMIAL LOGISTIC REGRESSION***

The key dependent variable in this study is a trichotomous measure of voter turnout consisting of “did not vote,” “voted Democrat,” and “voted Republican.” Although multinomial logistic regression (MNL) is capable of analyzing more than three categories, third parties were excluded because of a lack of sufficient cases. MNL and a trichotomous measure of voter turnout were chosen because the decision to vote and the decision of whom to vote for are closely connected. Lacy and Burden (1999) show that variables influencing turnout do so differently based on

the partisanship of the candidate, and factors that raise turnout for one candidate may lower or have no effect on turnout for the other. For this reason, an aggregated turnout variable that combines everyone who voted into one category is inappropriate. Multiple studies have shown that ideology influences vote choice among voters (Abramowitz and Saunders 1998; Abramowitz and Saunders 2006; Basinger and Lavine 2005; Brooks and Manza 1997a; Brooks and Manza 1997b; Brooks and Manza 1997c; Dow and Endersby 2004; Kimmelmeier 2004; Lavine 2001; Lavine and Gschwend 2007). However, the primary interest of this paper seeks to link a dual-dimensional structure of ideology to voter turnout as well. Ideology is hypothesized to raise the probability of voting for one candidate while simultaneously lowering the probability of voting for the other. As such, a trichotomous measure of voting behavior and the application of MNL is appropriate.<sup>3</sup>

I evaluate which ideological framework is a better indicator of voting behavior by comparing the goodness of fit of several models using the BIC statistic (which penalizes models with additional variables that only marginally improve explanatory power).<sup>4</sup> In general, the smaller the BIC statistic the better the model fit. Having determined the best model, I then utilize predicted probability and multiple coefficient test procedures provided by *STATA* and *SPost* (a suite of programs for

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<sup>3</sup> The inclusion of abstention creates potential problems involving the *independence of irrelevant alternatives* (IIA), an assumption that is built into the framework of multinomial logit models. It would be preferable to model the unified voting process as constituting the three separate alternatives (did not vote, voted Republican, and voted Democrat) with *correlated* errors. However, while multinomial probit models for three alternatives that do not impose the IIA assumption are available, reliable statistical software is only available for multinomial models which assume uncorrelated errors, such as the one considered here. It is important to note however, that the differences between MNL and MNP are negligible (allowing correlated errors) if utilizing a fully specified dependent variable in which all the actual categories are accounted (See Dow and Endersby 2004).

<sup>4</sup> All analyses were conducted using STATA 10 and data management was done using SPSS 13.

analyzing categorical data by Long and Freese (2006) in *STATA*) to test the substantive importance of ideology in understanding voter turnout.

#### ***MEASURING IDEOLOGY AND CLASS***

The ANES data sets provide a large number of questions focusing on moral-traditionalism and market-fundamentalism, as well as a measure intended to capture a single-dimension ideological construct. To measure ideology in a single dimension framework I use the liberal/conservative self identification question in the ANES. With a range of one to seven, this question is commonly used in studies on voting behavior as the measure of an assumed single dimensional ideological construct (Lacy and Burden 1999; Lacy and Monson 2002; Lavine 2001; Lavine and Gschwend 2007). The mean and standard deviation are indicated in Table 1. To measure the moral-traditionalist and market-fundamentalist value structures, I use 22 core questions that have been used extensively in previous studies (Abramowitz and Saunders 1998; Abramowitz and Saunders 2006; Moskowitz and Jenkins 2004; Saunders and Abramowitz 2004). The moral-traditionalism items focus on open-mindedness, women's rights, moral rigidity, homosexuality, abortion, and interpretation of the Bible. Wording for the questions the moral-traditionalism scale is shown in Appendix A. The moral-traditionalism scale has an adjusted Cronbach's  $\alpha=.742$  and a mean inter-item correlation of .207, meeting currently accepted statistical standards. The market-fundamentalism scale focuses on the role of government in relation to ensuring economic welfare and military spending. Specifically, the questions addressed funding for public schools, border security, aid

to the poor, social security, foreign aid, and the general role of the government in providing services and a basic standard of living. The specific questions are outlined in Appendix B. The market-fundamentalism scale has an adjusted Cronbach's  $\alpha = .744$  and a mean inter-item correlation of .209, also meeting currently accepted statistical standards. Items from both scales were recoded so that the most liberal response was 1 and the most conservative response was 5.<sup>5</sup> Following Abramowitz and Saunders (2006) I recoded "don't knows" in the middle category (3) of each subscale. The moral-traditionalism and market-fundamentalism scales consist of the summed scores, with values ranging from a minimum of 11 to a maximum of 55. The sample is comprised of 2,190 cases with non-missing values on the key measures of interest. Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 1.

To test the Lipset (1983) and Frank (2004) arguments that the working class tend to be more moral-traditionalist and less market-fundamentalist, I use a composite measure of class. The class measure was constructed from the income, education, and occupation variables in the ANES dataset. Some studies of voting behavior have repeatedly used occupation as the primary measure of class, while others focus on education and income (Bartels 2006; Brooks and Manza 1997a; Brooks and Manza 1997b; Brooks and Manza 1997c; Manza, Hout, and Brooks 1995). I combined the

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<sup>5</sup> Both scales were reduced to three factors using Varimax rotation with Kaiser Normalization. The criteria for items remaining in each scale were as follows. The loading had to be over .400 and had to be in a factor with at least one other item over .400. The goal was to find the major content themes of the moral-traditionalist and market-fundamentalist ideological dimensions, and as such, a uni-factorial outcome was neither expected nor necessary. Craig and Martinez (2005) suggest that even psychometric properties are rarely, if ever, uni-factorial and that working toward such a goal is problematic, as individuals are extremely complex and not driven by single motivational syndromes.

Brooks and Manza occupation measure with the Bartels income and education approaches. Education and income were each recoded into two categories and combined creating four categories: less than a bachelor's degree and less than 60,000 dollars a year, more than a bachelor's degree and less than 60,000 a year, less than a bachelor's degree, more than 60,000 dollars a year, and finally more than a bachelor's degree and more than 60,000 a year. These categories were then applied to the 7 point measure of occupation used by Brooks and Manza (1997a, 1997b, 1997c). The categories that did not have enough N to analyze were put into a missing category along with the cases which had missing data in the income variable. To evaluate the Lipset (1983) and Frank (2004) arguments that the working class tends to be more moral-traditionalist and less market-fundamentalist, I effect coded the composite class measure, and separately regressed the measure of class on each ideological scale. While effect coding utilizes an omitted category similar to dummy coding, the reference value is the grand sample mean. The Lipset (1983) and Frank (2004) conclusions are based on comparisons to the rest of the population and not between class groups themselves. As such, the use of effect coding is more appropriate than dummy coding in this case. The omitted category used was the missing category, and the descriptive statistics are shown in Table 1.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> I also regress an effect coded measure of race/ethnicity on both scales to determine patterns of ideological organization. For that analysis, the omitted category is also the "missing" category. However, the reference groups shown in Table 1 indicate the reference and omitted variable for the dummy coded variables used in the main multinomial logistic regression.

**Table 1.**  
**Sample Means for Variables in the Analysis**

| Variable Coding                 | Mean/<br>Proportion<br>(Std. Deviation) | Variable Coding                | Mean/<br>Proportion<br>(Std. Deviation) |
|---------------------------------|---|--------------------------------|---|
| <b>Unified Vote Voter</b>       |   |                                |   |
| <b>Turnout/Choice</b>           | (ref.)                                  | <b>Sex:</b>                    |   |
| <b>Did Not Vote</b>             |   | Male                           | (ref.)                                  |
| <b>Voted Democrat</b>           | .3840                                   | Female                         | .5429                                   |
| <b>Voted Republican</b>         | .3877                                   | <b>Age</b>                     | 47.62                                   |
| <b>Moral-Traditionalism</b>     | 33.871                                  |                                | (17.1)                                  |
| <b>Scale</b>                    | (8.219)                                 | <b>Year:</b>                   |   |
|                                 |   | 2000                           | (ref.)                                  |
| <b>Market-Fundamentalism</b>    | 31.020                                  | 2004                           | .4466                                   |
| <b>Scale</b>                    | (7.318)                                 | <b>Composite Measure of</b>    |   |
|                                 |   | <b>Class</b>                   |   |
| <b>Single Dimension Lib/Con</b> | 4.37                                    | <b>Self-Employed</b>           |   |
| <b>Scale</b>                    | (2.353)                                 | Less Than a Bachelor's         | 4.0                                     |
| <b>Occupation:</b>              |   | Degree/Less than 60K           |   |
| Non-Fulltime-Labor              | (ref.)                                  | More than a Bachelor's         | 1.1                                     |
| Self-Employed                   | .0922                                   | Degree/Less than 60K           |   |
| Management/                     | .0767                                   | Less Than a Bachelor's         | 1.2                                     |
| Supervisors                     |   | Degree/More than 60K           |   |
| Professionals                   | .1420                                   | More than a Bachelor's         | 1.7                                     |
| Skilled Workers                 | .0995                                   | Degree/More than 60K           |   |
| Routine White Collar            | .1580                                   | <b>Management/Supervisors</b>  |   |
| Workers                         |   | Less Than a Bachelor's         | 2.7                                     |
| Semi/Un-Skilled                 | .1027                                   | Degree/Less than 60K           |   |
| Workers                         |   | More than a Bachelor's         | 2.4                                     |
| <b>Education:</b>               |   | Degree/Less than 60K           |   |
| Less Than High School           | (ref.)                                  | More than a Bachelor's         | 1.6                                     |
| High School                     | .2863                                   | Degree/More than 60K           |   |
| Some College                    | .3110                                   | <b>Professionals</b>           |   |
| Bachelor's Degree               | .2059                                   | Less Than a Bachelor's         | 3.0                                     |
| Advanced Degree                 | .1110                                   | Degree/Less than 60K           |   |
| <b>Race and Ethnicity:</b>      |   | More than a Bachelor's         | 7.2                                     |
| White                           | (ref.)                                  | Degree/Less than 60K           |   |
| Black                           | .1174                                   | More than a Bachelor's         | 3.0                                     |
| Asian                           | .0169                                   | Degree/More than 60K           |   |
| Native American                 | .0119                                   | <b>Skilled Workers</b>         |   |
| Hispanic                        | .0543                                   | Less Than a Bachelor's         | 7.4                                     |
| Missing                         | .0178                                   | Degree/Less than 60K           |   |
| <b>Religion:</b>                |   | <b>Routine White Collar</b>    |   |
| Protestant                      | .3795                                   | <b>Workers</b>                 |   |
| Catholic                        | .2598                                   | Less Than a Bachelor's         | 11.2                                    |
| Jewish                          | .0251                                   | Degree/Less than 60K           |   |
| Missing                         | .1434                                   | More than a Bachelor's         | 2.3                                     |
| Other                           | (ref.)                                  | Degree/Less than 60K           |   |
| <b>Interest in Politics:</b>    |   | More than a Bachelor's         | 1.1                                     |
| Not Much Interested             | (ref.)                                  | Degree/More than 60K           |   |
| Somewhat Interested             | .4352                                   | <b>Semi/Un-Skilled Workers</b> |   |
| Very Interested                 | .4151                                   | Less Than a Bachelor's         | 8.8                                     |
| <b>Income:</b>                  |   | Degree/Less than 60K           |   |
| Less than \$2999.00             | (ref.)                                  | <b>Non-Fulltime</b>            |   |
| \$3,000-\$19,999                | .2164                                   | Less Than a Bachelor's         | 21.0                                    |
| \$20,000-\$39,999               | .2826                                   | Degree/Less than 60K           |   |
| \$40,000-\$59,999               | .1886                                   | More than a bachelor's         | 5.3                                     |
| \$60,000-\$79,999               | .0484                                   | Degree/Less than 60K           |   |
| \$80,000-\$119,999              | .0580                                   | More than a bachelor's         | 1.6                                     |
| \$120,000-And Above             | .0288                                   | Degree/More than 60K           |   |
| Missing                         | .0831                                   | <b>Missing</b>                 | 13.3                                    |

Source: American National Election Survey (2000 and 2004).

### ***THE CONTROL VARIABLES***

Because a unified vote choice model combines turnout and choice it is necessary to control for the traditional indicators of both. Income, education, political interest, race/ethnicity, sex, and age have all been shown to be significant and substantively important predictors of voter turnout (Brady, Verba, and Schlozman 1995; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Wolfinger 1980) while religion, race/ethnicity, sex, income, and occupation have been shown to be substantively significant indicators of vote choice (Brooks and Manza 1997a; Brooks and Manza 1997b; Brooks and Manza 1997c; Brooks and Manza 2004; Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 2006; Greenberg 2005; Houtman 2003; Lipset 1983). Ideological voting is not the only type of voting that occurs (Lavine 2001; Lavine and Gschwend 2007). Political activity is limited by available resources and class interest (Brooks and Manza 1997a; Brooks and Manza 1997b; Brooks and Manza 1997c; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). The inclusion of these controls provides a more rigorous test of the differences between the single and dual ideological constructs. The descriptive statistics and operationalizations for each control variable are outlined in Table 1.

### ***RESULTS***

#### ***MORAL-TRADITIONALISM AND MARKET-FUNDAMENTALISM IN THE POPULATION***

I examine the correlation between the moral-traditionalist and market-fundamentalist dimensions to assess whether these were independent or associated in the population. A single-dimension approach assumes that those with strong market-fundamentalist feelings should also hold strong moral-traditionalist feelings implying

a high correlation between the moral-traditionalist and market-fundamentalist value dimensions. The two dimensions may be largely independent; those individuals who have pronounced feelings on one dimension may hold an array of positions on the other. The correlation coefficient between the moral-traditionalism scale and market-fundamentalism scale is .386 ( $p < .001$ ), suggesting a weak association between moral-traditionalist and market-fundamentalist positions. The low correlation between these domains indicates differences between the ideological structure of population and the platforms and policies promoted by the major parties. The ideological gap between the parties and the layout of the population is important because it forces hard choices by those who do not have views that are progressive on both dimensions or conservative on both dimensions when it comes to election season. Thus, the organization of ideology in the population is linked to whether it empowers individuals to vote or acts as a constraining force to democracy. The low correlation only indicates that such differences exist, but does not illustrate patterns of association in detail. Ultimately, these bring the electoral coalitions of each party into sharper focus.

Examination of racial/ethnic groups in the data indicates a distinct pattern underlying the low correlation between the moral-traditionalist and market-fundamentalist dimensions. OLS regression indicates that blacks are significantly less market-fundamentalist than the rest of the population by just over three points ( $p < .001$ ) on the market-fundamentalism scale, but do not differ from the population mean on the moral-traditionalism scale. Asians, in contrast, score significantly lower

( $p < .001$ ) on the moral-traditionalism scale than the rest of the population by 4.568 points, but are not significantly different from the rest of the population in terms of market-fundamentalism. Whites were the only category to register a significantly higher ( $p < .05$ ) mean from the general population mean on the moral-traditionalism scale and also have a significantly higher market-fundamentalism scale score ( $p < .001$ ). However, the mean difference in moral-traditionalism score from the general population was not substantively large with a value of 1.056. Whites were, on the other hand, substantively larger on the market-fundamentalism scale than the general population with a value 2.812. So, while the white category does have significantly higher scores on both scales, Whites still generally conform to the pattern of having a distinct ideological trend on one dimension while trending toward the center on the other. These findings support the conclusion that there are at least two distinct ideological dimensions within the population, and that they are relatively independent of each other. These patterns could be limited to racial/ethnic divisions. The Lipset (1983) and Frank (2004) arguments suggest that the working class should have higher than average moral-traditionalism scores and lower than average market-fundamentalism scores. Yet, if the composite measure of class provides evidence that class groups trend toward the center on one dimension while having pronounced feelings on the other, then the layout of the population suggest that there are six relatively distinct ideological bases that are split between the Republicans and the Democrats; those who are progressive on both dimensions, those who are

conservative on both dimensions, social progressives, economic progressives, social conservatives, and economic conservatives, with little overlap between the six groups.

Table 2 shows the coefficients from the separate OLS regressions of the moral-traditionalism and market-fundamentalism scales on my composite measure of class, to test the Lipset (1983) and Frank (2004) conclusions that the working class is more conservative in terms of moral-traditionalism while at the same time being more progressive in terms of market-fundamentalism. If the working class have significantly higher mean scores on the moral-traditionalism scale compared to the general population, but have significantly lower scores on the market-fundamentalism scale, then the Lipset (1983) and Frank (2004) arguments have empirical support. In general, the working class has statistically distinct ideological positions which are more moral-traditionalist and less market-fundamentalist than the rest of the population. But in many cases, the level of ideological commitment is not as strong as the Lipset (1983) and Frank (2004) arguments would suggest. Skilled workers who have less than a bachelor's degree and make less than 60,000 dollars a year, for example, are much more moral-traditionalist than the general population. Yet, while they are statistically more liberal in terms of their market-fundamentalist values with a mean difference of -1.149 ( $p < .05$ ), this difference is not substantively engaging. The skilled working class follows a pattern of having a distinct ideological moral-traditionalist position, but trends toward the center on the market-fundamentalist dimension.

**Table 2.**  
**Difference from the Grand Mean of Moral-Traditionalism and Market-Fundamentalism**  
**On a Composite Measure of Class**  
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)

|   | <b>Moral-<br/>Traditionalism Scale<br/>Grand Mean=33.871</b> | <b>Market-Fundamentalism<br/>Scale<br/>Grand Mean=31.020</b> |
|---|--|--|
| <b>Self-Employed</b>                        |  |  |
| Less Than a Bachelor's Degree/Less than 60K | 3.254***<br>(.843)   | .689<br>(.759)   |
| More than a Bachelor's Degree/Less than 60K | -1.072<br>(1.526)  | 1.514<br>(1.374)   |
| Less Than a Bachelor's Degree/More than 60K | 2.844<br>(1.470)   | 3.929**<br>(1.324)   |
| More than a Bachelor's Degree/More than 60K | .937<br>(1.262)  | 4.709***<br>(1.136)  |
| <b>Management/Supervisors</b>               |  |  |
| Less Than a Bachelor's Degree/Less than 60K | .121<br>(1.002)  | -1.419<br>(.903)   |
| More than a Bachelor's Degree/Less than 60K | -2.020<br>(1.072)  | -.924<br>(.966)  |
| More than a Bachelor's Degree/More than 60K | -2.798*<br>(1.296)   | -.143<br>(1.167)   |
| <b>Professionals</b>                        |  |  |
| Less Than a Bachelor's Degree/Less than 60K | .349<br>(.959)   | -2.840***<br>(.863)  |
| More than a Bachelor's Degree/Less than 60K | -2.674***<br>(.647)  | -1.892***<br>(.582)  |
| More than a Bachelor's Degree/More than 60K | -4.666***<br>(.965)  | -.947<br>(.869)  |
| <b>Skilled Workers</b>                      |  |  |
| Less Than a Bachelor's Degree/Less than 60K | 3.024***<br>(.638)   | -1.149*<br>(.575)  |
| <b>Routine White Collar Workers</b>         |  |  |
| Less Than a Bachelor's Degree/Less than 60K | 1.560**<br>(.538)  | -1.170*<br>(.485)  |
| More than a Bachelor's Degree/Less than 60K | -.292<br>(1.093)   | -1.966*<br>(.984)  |
| More than a Bachelor's Degree/More than 60K | -2.232<br>(1.526)  | 5.434***<br>(1.374)  |
| <b>Semi/Un-Skilled Workers</b>              |  |  |
| Less Than a Bachelor's Degree/Less than 60K | 1.252*<br>(.595)   | -2.833***<br>(.536)  |
| <b>Non-Fulltime Workers</b>                 |  |  |
| Less Than a Bachelor's Degree/Less than 60K | 3.008***<br>(.427)   | -1.703***<br>(.384)  |
| More than a Bachelor's Degree/Less than 60K | .305<br>(.743)   | -.538<br>(.669)  |
| More than a Bachelor's Degree/More than 60K | -3.369**<br>(1.296)  | .486<br>(1.167)  |

Note: p<.05, \*\* p<.01, \*\*\* p<.001

Semi and unskilled workers in the lowest education and income categories are much less market-fundamentalist than the general population by 2.833 points ( $p < .001$ ) but differ only slightly on the moral-traditionalism dimension by 1.252 points ( $p < .05$ ). Non-fulltime workers in the lowest income and education category have almost identical mean differences to the skilled worker category. And routine white collar workers in the lowest income and education categories are not substantively different than the general population. While the lowest income and education group in each of the working class categories statistically conformed to the hypothesis that each should be more moral-traditionalist and less market-fundamentalist, the substantive size of the mean differences indicate that the working class is, for the most part, strong position on one dimension and centrist on the other. More importantly, however, the pattern is strikingly consistent across classes.

In nearly every class category, the ideological pattern demonstrates that a distinct position by a group on one dimension is likely to correspond to a centrist position on the other dimension, and this has substantial implications for voting turnout. It is important to note that with the exception of professionals with more than a bachelor's degree who make more than 60,000 dollars a year, all class and race/ethnicity categories are roughly normally distributed around their mean points on both scales.<sup>7</sup> The relatively normal distribution of the moral-traditionalism and market-fundamentalism scales on each class and race/ethnicity category indicates that

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<sup>7</sup> Professionals with more than a bachelor's degree who make more than 60,000 dollars a year are normally distributed on the market-fundamentalism scale, but have a bimodal distribution on the moral-traditionalism scale. One modal response is just above the grand mean and the other is well below. In general, most professionals located in the highest category fall well below the grand mean.

while these groups have ideological trends, there are a fair number in each category that fall far below and above each group’s mean. As such, there are also a small amount of individuals with conservative moral-traditionalists who are also conservative market-fundamentalists, as well as a number of individuals who are progressive on both scales. These types of individuals are relatively rare (9.27 percent is low on both scales, and 11.46 percent is high on both) and are far too small to represent the electoral bases of the major parties. The low correlation between the moral-traditionalist and market-fundamentalist dimensions, the pattern of having a distinct position on one dimension while trending toward the center on the other, and the normal distributions of these populations along each dimension together show that the electoral bases of each party are more like ideological coalitions. Table 3 indicates those occupying the center 50 percent of both scales simultaneously only represent 29.09 percent of the population. Low-centrists make up nearly 22 percent of the population, while high-centrists comprise 23.7 percent.

**Table 3.**  
**Cross-tabulation of Moral-Traditionalism Scale Score by**  
**Market-Fundamentalism Scale Score**  
**(N=2190)**

|                                    |                    | <b>Moral-Traditionalism Score</b> |                    |                 |
|------------------------------------|--------------------|-----------------------------------|--------------------|-----------------|
|                                    |                    | Low<br>0-25%                      | Centrist<br>26-75% | High<br>76-100% |
| <b>Market-Fundamentalism Score</b> | Low<br>0-25%       | 203<br>(9.27)                     | 249<br>(11.37)     | 67<br>(3.06)    |
|                                    | Centrist<br>26-75% | 227<br>(10.37)                    | 637<br>(29.09)     | 281<br>(12.83)  |
|                                    | High<br>76-100%    | 60<br>(2.74)                      | 238<br>(10.87)     | 251<br>(11.46)  |

Note: Parentheses indicate total percents.

The ideological pattern found in the population suggests that the influences of the moral-traditionalist and market-fundamentalist dimensions on voter behavior are relatively independent of each other, and raise questions about the strength of a single ideology as a motivating force for voter turnout. Lacy and Burden (1999) that liberals and conservatives vote more than moderates, using a single ideological measure, but such a finding raises the question: why? (see also Lacy and Monson 2002) A dual-dimensional framework does not suffer from this problem. Mapping the population on two dimensions clearly illustrates the ideological coalitions which the parties struggle to keep together. To demonstrate the importance of the ideological patterns found in the population for understanding voting behavior, I turn to an analysis utilizing competing multinomial logistic regression models.

#### **THE STRUCTURE OF IDEOLOGY AND VOTER TURNOUT**

If the population has a mass belief system that is two-dimensional and ideological stance has a strong impact on voter turnout, then my model of voting behavior utilizing two dimensions should be statically stronger and substantively more informative than a single-dimension model. The use of two dimensions raises questions about what kind of influence each dimension will have on the other's effects on voting behavior. For example, does being strong on one dimension lessen the impact of the other's influence on the voting act? Similarly, does being moderate, apathetic, or ambivalent on one dimension, influence the impact of the other on the

voting act?<sup>8</sup> To address all these questions I compare four nested competing unified vote choice models. Model 1 contains the classic sociological predictors of vote choice and voter turnout such as sex, race/ethnicity, income, religion, occupation, political interest, and education. Because the data are pooled cross sectional samples, I include year as a control variable as well. Model 2 adds the commonly used, seven point “think of self as liberal or conservative” scale to measure ideology within a single-dimension framework. In model 3, the single-dimension measure is replaced by the moral-traditionalism and market-fundamentalism scales. Model 4 adds the interaction between the moral-traditionalism and market-fundamentalism measures. To evaluate model fit across specifications, I compare BIC statistics presented in Table 4.<sup>9</sup>

**Table 4.**  
**Competing Unified Vote Choice Models**

|   | LR $\chi^2$ | p-value | df | BIC      |
|---|-------------|---------|----|----------|
| Model 1 No Ideological Measure                    | 794.42      | 0.001   | 62 | 4393.697 |
| Model 2 Single-Dimensional Measure                | 1149.16     | 0.001   | 64 | 4054.338 |
| Model 3 Dual-Dimensional Measure                  | 1407.34     | 0.001   | 66 | 3811.549 |
| Model 4 Dual-Dimensional Measure with Interaction | 1410.92     | 0.001   | 68 | 3823.346 |

The findings in Table 4 provide compelling support for the dual-dimensional model, and indicate that ideology is important to understanding voter turnout. The

<sup>8</sup> Ambivalence is a psychological syndrome, which individuals in the center may or may not have. I use the term moderate to refer to those individuals who are in the center of each dimension, yet are neither ambivalent nor apathetic.

<sup>9</sup> To evaluate these models, I follow Long and Freese (2004) and compare BIC statistics using Raftery’s (1995) interpretation index. In general, lower BIC statistics indicate greater model fit, but the difference in size does matter. On the other hand, any increase in the BIC statistic is considered very strong evidence for the model with the lower figure.

sociological model with no measure of ideology is the weakest by BIC statistic, and models 2 through 4 are all statistically superior in comparison to model 1. However, model 3 is the strongest; there is no improvement of fit with the inclusion of the interaction. Thus, using the moral-traditionalist and market-fundamentalist dimensions to understand voting behavior should be preferred to single-dimension measures of ideology. The influence of each dimension on voting behavior is relatively independent of the other, owing to no sign of interaction. The finding of independence of effect between the two dimensions is important because it indicates that apathy, moderation or ambivalence on one dimension does not change the effect produced by a stronger position on the other dimension. Given the ideological layout of the population, the relative importance of this finding lies in the substantive size of the influence each dimension has on voting behavior. If the effect size is large, then ideological variations between classes take on added importance. To better understand the extent to which ideology influences voter behavior and compare it to the classic sociological indicators, I use the results of model 3's odds ratios for voting Republican or Democrat versus not voting. Odds ratios and their 95 percent confidence intervals for model 3 are shown in Table 5.

The moral-traditionalism and market-fundamentalism scales are the two most powerful influences on voting behavior in model 3, and both scale are significant ( $p < .001$ ) in both equations. The odds ratios are in the hypothesized direction; higher scores leading to support for the Republicans and lower scores leading to support for the Democrats. The odds ratios look smaller than many other variables because of

the scale of the measures; however, converting odds ratios to predicted probabilities highlights the substantive impact on voting.

**Table 5.**  
**Competing Unified Vote Choice Models**  
**MNL of Unified Vote Choice on Ideology, and Controls**  
**Exp(B) and 95% Confidence Intervals**

| Variable                            | Model 3                              |  |
|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|--|
|                                     | Probability of<br>Voting<br>Democrat | Probability of<br>Voting<br>Republican |
| Moral-Traditionalism                | .9316***<br>[.9122, .9514]           | 1.0673***<br>[1.0449, 1.0902]          |
| Market-Fundamentalism               | .9592***<br>[.9361, .9829]           | 1.1155***<br>[1.089, 1.1430]           |
| <b>Class:</b>                       |                                      |  |
| Non-Fulltime-Labor<br>Self-Employed | (ref.)<br>1.2322<br>[.6893, 2.2026]  | (ref.)<br>1.5968<br>[.9132, 2.7920]    |
| Management/<br>Supervisors          | 1.2867<br>[.7036, 2.3530]            | 1.3531<br>[.7272, 2.5175]              |
| Professionals                       | 1.9798*<br>[1.1331, 3.4591]          | 1.5363<br>[.8524, 2.7694]              |
| Skilled Workers                     | 1.4868<br>[.8915, 2.4798]            | .9633<br>[.5620, 1.6512]               |
| Routine White<br>Collar Workers     | 1.1501<br>[.7339, 1.8025]            | 1.5420<br>[.9771, 2.433]               |
| Semi/Un-Skilled<br>Workers          | .9247<br>[.5802, 1.4737]             | 1.0231<br>[.6220, 1.6831]              |
| <b>Education:</b>                   |                                      |  |
| Less Than High School               | (ref.)                               | (ref.)                                 |
| High School                         | 1.7485*<br>[1.1190, 2.7321]          | 2.6657***<br>[1.5783, 4.5023]          |
| Some College                        | 2.1606***<br>[1.3477, 3.4640]        | 3.9952***<br>[2.3229, 6.8718]          |
| Bachelor's Degree                   | 3.8964***<br>[2.1919, 6.9266]        | 8.8382***<br>[4.7029, 16.6096]         |
| Advanced Degree                     | 3.5209***<br>[1.6578, 7.4778]        | 8.5449***<br>[3.8243, 19.0926]         |
| <b>Race and Ethnicity:</b>          |                                      |  |
| White                               | (ref.)                               | (ref.)                                 |
| Black                               | 2.4527***<br>[1.6556, 3.6335]        | .2969***<br>[.1648, .5347]             |
| Asian                               | .6224<br>[.2397, 1.6164]             | .8775<br>[.3177, 2.4238]               |
| Native American                     | .2014*<br>[.0553, .7332]             | .5179<br>[.1834, 1.4621]               |
| Hispanic                            | .8351<br>[.4865, 1.4333]             | .6525<br>[.3630, 1.1727]               |
| Missing                             | 2.2480<br>[.8953, 5.6442]            | .7860<br>[.2644, 2.3367]               |
| <b>Religion:</b>                    |                                      |  |
| Other                               | (ref.)                               | (ref.)                                 |
| Protestant                          | .9987<br>[.6917, 1.4418]             | 1.2272<br>[.8345, 1.8048]              |
| Catholic                            | 1.2689<br>[.8501, 1.8938]            | 1.484<br>[.9813, 2.2444]               |
| Jewish                              | 1.8943<br>[.6067, 5.9142]            | .4701<br>[.1216, 1.8175]               |

|  |                                 |                               |
|--|---------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| Missing                                | .6920<br>[.4404, 1.0873]        | 1.024<br>[.6313, 1.6590]      |
| <b>Interest in Politics:</b>           |                                 |                               |
| <b>Not Much Interested</b>             | (ref.)                          | (ref.)                        |
| <b>Somewhat Interested</b>             | 4.0168***<br>[2.8093, 5.7437]   | 3.0078***<br>[2.1025, 4.3027] |
| <b>Very Interested</b>                 | 10.3481***<br>[6.8828, 15.6810] | 5.9083***<br>[3.9000, 8.9508] |
| <b>Income:</b>                         |                                 |                               |
| <b>Less than \$2999.00</b>             | (ref.)                          | (ref.)                        |
| <b>\$3,000-\$19,999</b>                | 1.8242*<br>[1.143, 2.9157]      | 1.2109<br>[.7276, 2.0152]     |
| <b>\$20,000-\$39,999</b>               | 1.7953*<br>[1.0974, 2.9371]     | 1.6854*<br>[1.0038, 2.8298]   |
| <b>\$40,000-\$59,999</b>               | 1.9384*<br>[1.1002, 3.4150]     | 1.2263<br>[.6771, 2.2211]     |
| <b>\$60,000-\$79,999</b>               | 2.6112*<br>[1.0332, 6.5988]     | 2.8145*<br>[1.1000, 7.2010]   |
| <b>\$80,000-\$119,999</b>              | 1.8621<br>[.7590, 4.5688]       | 2.3474<br>[.9598, 5.7408]     |
| <b>\$120,000-And Above</b>             | 1.5103<br>[.4753, 4.7996]       | 1.5623<br>[.5236, 4.6620]     |
| <b>Missing</b>                         | 1.5391<br>[.8100, 2.9246]       | 1.7950<br>[.9318, 3.4578]     |
| <b>Sex:</b>                            |                                 |                               |
| <b>Male</b>                            | (ref.)                          | (ref.)                        |
| <b>Female</b>                          | 1.2905<br>[.9671, 1.7220]       | 1.1642<br>[.8617, 1.5730]     |
| <b>Age</b>                             | 1.0283***<br>[1.0182, 1.0384]   | 1.0097<br>[.9996, 1.0200]     |
| <b>Year:</b>                           |                                 |                               |
| <b>2000</b>                            | (ref.)                          | (ref.)                        |
| <b>2004</b>                            | .6794**<br>[.5140, .8980]       | 1.1877<br>[.8922, 1.5809]     |
| <b>Intercept</b>                       | -.2604388                       | -8.900409                     |
| <b>N</b>                               | 2190                            | 2190                          |
| <b>Nagelkerke Pseudo R<sup>2</sup></b> |                                 | .537                          |
| <b>Log Likelihood</b>                  |                                 | 1644.258                      |
| <b>BIC</b>                             |                                 | 3811.549                      |

Brackets indicate 95% Confidence Intervals.

p<.05, \*\* p<.01, \*\*\* p<.001

Odds Ratios of 1 indicate no effect, less than 1 indicate a negative effect, more than 1 indicates a positive effect.

As reported in Tables 6 and 7, the education and race/ethnicity variables are also significant indicators of voting behavior in model 3, and Tables 6 and 7 illustrate the predicted probabilities for the different education and race/ethnicity categories. Tables 6 and 7 also show that education and race/ethnicity provide a sociological foundation, or starting point, in the decision to vote. Both scales are normally distributed around each racial/ethnic category. Table 6 indicates that Blacks at the median of the moral-traditionalism scale have a 73.48 percent chance of voting

Democrat versus not voting, and only a 9.43 percent chance of voting Republican. Whites in the same category only have a 38.01 percent chance of voting Democrat. In Table 7, the predicted probabilities are similar to those in Table 6, showing that Blacks at the median of the market-fundamentalism scale have a 68.33 percent for voting Democrat and 13.31 percent chance of voting Republican versus not voting.

**Table 6.**

**Voting Probability Among Social Groups by Moral-Traditionalism Holding Market-Fundamentalism Constant**

| Group              | Democrat                       |                                |                                | Republican                     |                                |                                |
|--------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|
|                    | 10 <sup>th</sup><br>Percentile | 50 <sup>th</sup><br>Percentile | 90 <sup>th</sup><br>Percentile | 10 <sup>th</sup><br>Percentile | 50 <sup>th</sup><br>Percentile | 90 <sup>th</sup><br>Percentile |
| General Population | 86.84                          | 42.72                          | 5.07                           | 3.56                           | 34.84                          | 82.28                          |
| Occupation         |                                |                                |                                |                                |                                |                                |
| Professionals      | 90.98*                         | 51.28*                         | 6.65*                          | 2.88                           | 32.28                          | 83.24                          |
| †Non-Labor         | 85.15                          | 40.89                          | 4.96                           | 3.47                           | 33.17                          | 80.09                          |
| Education          |                                |                                |                                |                                |                                |                                |
| High School        | 84.86*                         | 42.05*                         | 5.52*                          | 2.98***                        | 29.30***                       | 76.60***                       |
| Some College       | 86.31***                       | 41.73***                       | 4.89***                        | 3.67***                        | 35.26***                       | 82.29***                       |
| Bachelor's         | 89.57***                       | 42.96***                       | 4.33***                        | 4.67***                        | 44.26***                       | 89.38***                       |
| Adv. Degree        | 88.73***                       | 40.86***                       | 4.05***                        | 4.95***                        | 45.32***                       | 89.44***                       |
| †Less Than HS      | 78.5                           | 37.76                          | 6.35                           | 1.8                            | 17.25                          | 57.73                          |
| Race/Ethnicity     |                                |                                |                                |                                |                                |                                |
| Black              | 94.75***                       | 73.48***                       | 21.46***                       | .61***                         | 9.43***                        | 54.83***                       |
| Native Amer.       | 57.69*                         | 15.25*                         | 1.46*                          | 7.91                           | 41.57                          | 78.97                          |
| †White             | 85.22                          | 38.01                          | 4.03                           | 4.54                           | 40.31                          | 85.05                          |

†=Reference group in model

\*=p<.05, \*\*=p<.01, \*\*\*=p<.001

Only significant differences are shown.

The influence of race/ethnicity on voting is second only to the influence of both ideological scales. The influence of race/ethnicity is so large that the predicted probability of a black individual who was in the 90<sup>th</sup> percentile on the market-fundamentalism scale but at the median on the moral-traditionalism scale is only

54.83 percent. These predicted probabilities show the powerful link both ideological dimensions have to voting behavior. Only Blacks have an influence on their voting behavior that is capable of counteracting the effects of a strong ideological stance.

**Table 7.**

**Voting Probability Among Social Groups by Market-Fundamentalism  
Holding Moral-Traditionalism Constant**

| Group              | Democrat                       |                                |                                | Republican                     |                                |                                |
|--------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|
|                    | 10 <sup>th</sup><br>Percentile | 50 <sup>th</sup><br>Percentile | 90 <sup>th</sup><br>Percentile | 10 <sup>th</sup><br>Percentile | 50 <sup>th</sup><br>Percentile | 90 <sup>th</sup><br>Percentile |
| General Population | 77.68                          | 35.16                          | 2.72                           | 3.47                           | 43.51                          | 93.16                          |
| Occupation         |                                |                                |                                |                                |                                |                                |
| Professionals      | 84.56*                         | 43.00*                         | 3.52*                          | 2.92                           | 41.08                          | 93.21                          |
| †Non-Labor         | 74.76                          | 33.71                          | 2.71                           | 3.32                           | 41.53                          | 92.33                          |
| Education          |                                |                                |                                |                                |                                |                                |
| High School        | 73.91*                         | 35.15*                         | 3.10*                          | 2.82***                        | 37.18***                       | 90.79***                       |
| Some College       | 76.86***                       | 34.25***                       | 2.62***                        | 3.56***                        | 43.93***                       | 93.19***                       |
| Bachelor's         | 83.47***                       | 34.17***                       | 2.20***                        | 4.74***                        | 53.76***                       | 95.86***                       |
| Adv. Degree        | 82.16***                       | 32.53***                       | 2.06***                        | 5.00***                        | 54.76***                       | 95.93***                       |
| †Less Than HS      | 63.47                          | 32.57                          | 4.23                           | 1.59                           | 22.6                           | 81.21                          |
| Race/Ethnicity     |                                |                                |                                |                                |                                |                                |
| Black              | 89.72***                       | 68.33***                       | 14.15***                       | .63***                         | 13.31***                       | 76.33***                       |
| Native Amer.       | 40.68*                         | 11.89*                         | .81*                           | 6.08                           | 49.21                          | 92.58                          |
| †White             | 75.66                          | 30.59                          | 2.12                           | 4.4                            | 49.25                          | 64.39                          |

†=Reference group in model

\*=p<.05, \*\*=p<.01, \*\*\*=p<.001

Only significant differences are shown.

Viewing the education categories reveals that the large increase in turnout due to education happens between the categories of “less than high school” and “high school or greater,” but this difference is substantively minor at 5.2 percent. Occupation also only has marginal influence on voting behavior, and only between professionals and those not in the labor force.

When it comes to telling the story about voting behavior, my findings indicate that most of the story lies with ideology. Race/ethnicity also has a large role to play

in understanding voting behavior, but the value dimensions of moral-traditionalism and market-fundamentalism truly dominate compared to the other influences. This is not to say that the traditional sociological indicators are not substantively important. Rather, the distinction between one and two dimensions is important because it highlights how the organization of ideology influences voter turnout, and how the single-dimension conceptualizations of ideology mislabels moderates, the ideologically ambivalent, and the ideologically apathetic. Because a majority of the population is located on the center of one dimension while having a pronounced position on the other, a single-dimensional operationalization forces them into categories that make them seem to be very conservative, very liberal, or simply “moderate.” These three categories are nondescript and fail to define what being a “liberal” or “conservative” means. Given the ideological layout of the population, and the independent power of each dimension, however, my findings indicate that most individuals should be considered high (or low) –centers on either moral-traditionalist or market-fundamentalist dimensions. For those with who *do* fit the single-dimension framework, and are strongly liberal on both dimensions or strongly conservative on both dimensions, there is little chance that they will not vote along traditional party lines. However, these individuals are relatively rare in the general population (9.27 percent progressive-progressive and 11.46 percent conservative-conservative). Likewise, those who would be considered high on one dimension and low on the other are even rarer (5.8 percent total). My findings indicate that individuals only need to be pulled to the polls by one of the two ideological

dimensions to raise their turnout for one party while lowering it for the other, and that apathy, moderation, or ambivalence (i.e. middle scale scores) on the other dimension do not considerably hinder their probability of voting.

Most of the population is high or low on one dimension while trending toward the center on the other (45.44 percent of the population). As such, the independence of the two ideological dimensions is critical to understanding voter turnout because it means that “ideological voting” is a plausible mechanism for a much greater segment of the population than the single-dimension approach would estimate. Further, the two-dimension approach illustrates the value dimensions that are important to voters in the different blocks of each party’s electoral coalitions, while a single-dimension schema simply hides their existence. Insofar as the positions held by an individual do not contradict each other in relation to the ideological positions of the parties themselves, a strong position on one dimension is sufficient to substantially raise the probability of voting for the appropriate party, thus creating electoral coalitions, not bases. Both the progressive moral-traditionalists and progressive market-fundamentalists that trend toward the center on the other respective dimension make up the majority of the Democratic Party electoral coalition (21.74 percent of the population), with the individuals who are progressive on both making up the third portion (9.27 percent). The Republican Party is similarly based on a coalition made up of conservative moral-traditionalists and market-fundamentalists that trend toward the center on the other dimension (23.7 percent) with those who are conservative on both dimensions rounding out the coalition (11.47 percent of the population). If those

who are progressive on both dimensions and those who are conservative on both dimensions are added to the appropriate coalitions, then 31.01 percent of the population falls in the ideological coalition of the Democrats and 35.46 percent of the population falls within the Republican ideological coalition. Each electoral coalition is thus made up of three distinct ideological groups. Both political parties take positions that are far more liberal and conservative than most of the population (Gelman and Park 2008). My findings indicate that such stances are possible because the influence of each dimension on voting behavior is independent, allowing the parties to build their ideological electoral coalitions without losing too many voters due to their relatively extreme positions. It is not simply that ideology directly influences the decisions of whether to vote and for whom, but also that the structure of ideology has important impacts as well. A single-dimension perspective is neither accurate nor useful in illuminating these details.

### ***CONCLUSION***

My analysis stresses the importance of using a dual-dimensional ideological framework to better understand voter turnout. In contrast to single-dimension ideological conceptualizations, a dual-dimensional approach provides a more accurate portrait of the ideological influences that drive voting behavior. Traditional single-dimension ideological conceptualizations assume that moral-traditionalist and market-fundamentalist values covary, such that those who are more moral-traditionalist are also more market-fundamentalist and vice versa. On this foundation, single-dimension studies of voter behavior have shown that ideology is a major

predictor of voting turnout indicating that liberals and conservatives vote more often and more consistently than moderates (Lacy and Burden 1999). Traditional single-dimension studies, however, leave unaddressed the question: how much of the population plausibly uses ideological motivation to strongly influence their voting decisions? And understanding this question requires a more accurate portrait of organization of ideology in the population. My findings suggest that ideology should be treated within a dual-dimensional framework. While my findings do support the conclusion that individuals who hold consistent extreme values along both of my two dimensions vote more than individuals who were in the middle of both dimensions, my analysis finds that they are relatively rare (20.73 percent of the population combined). Rather, I find that most individuals hold distinct views on one dimension while trending toward the center on the other (45.44 percent of the population), and that the effects of moral-traditionalism and market-fundamentalism on voting behavior are independent of one another. As such, the single-dimension framework is also inadequate because it forces individuals into categories that make them seem to be more extreme than they may actually be or it places them in a “moderate” category which may only be partially accurate. The size of the population that is truly moderate on both the moral-traditionalist and market-fundamentalist ideological dimensions is only 29.09 percent of the population, and is relatively small compared to the other six ideological voting blocks (66.17 percent of the population).

Single-dimension conceptualizations show this point, but hide the important details that ultimately contribute to electoral success below these broad strokes. The independence of effect between each dimension, when combined with the pattern that individuals tend to hold distinct views on one dimension while trending toward the center on the other, indicates that the Republicans and Democrats each have three relatively distinct ideological bases that form their electoral coalitions. The Democrats depend on one group who is more moral-traditionalist than the general population, but trends toward the center on the market-fundamentalist dimension. Another group that is much less market-fundamentalist than the general population, but trends toward the center on the moral-traditionalist dimension. And finally a group that is progressive on both dimensions. Likewise, the Republicans depend on support from three groups as well. Republicans depend on those who are more moral-traditionalist, but trends toward the center on the market-fundamentalist dimension. A second group, that are more market-fundamentalist, yet trend toward the center on the moral-traditionalist dimension. And finally, the third group, that is conservative on both dimensions. Each of these bases vote more often and more consistently than those who are moderate on both dimensions, and those who are high on one dimension but low on the other, and vice versa. Utilizing a single-dimension approach obscures how the structure of ideology influences voter turnout and vote choice, but a dual-dimensional approach highlights the ideological coalitions from which each party draws their support. Just as importantly, the multi-dimensional approach shows that these coalitions are possible because the influences of each

dimension on voting behavior are independent of the other. This last point is a distinction that single-dimension approaches obscure, and yet another reason why the two-dimension approach should be utilized to study political action.

While there is a vast literature on the dual-dimensionality of political ideology, studies applying a dual-dimensional framework to political action are all too rare. This study furthers research on the dual-dimensional nature of ideology by showing that understanding the structure of ideology is paramount to understanding voter turnout. However, in this study, I only addressed U.S. presidential elections. Motivations for voting in local, state, and even congressional elections likely differ from presidential elections. My findings concerning the strength of ideology on voter turnout show it to be the single largest factor in the decision process. Further research should examine the extent to which, moral-traditionalism and market-fundamentalism influence smaller elections, and how their effects, if any, are different from presidential election patterns. Additionally, further research should examine other avenues of civic participation. Motivations for volunteering time to political campaigns and making monetary donations are just a few of the types of participation that a multi-dimensional perspective could shed further light on.

My focus on moral-traditionalism and market-fundamentalism may also require further examination or expansion. It is probable that there are more than two distinct ideological dimensions that are arranged within left-right frameworks, and while the addition of a third racial-ideological dimension is unlikely to substantively change my findings (see Moskowitz and Jenkins 2004), its existence would add an

important nuance because of the power of the race/ethnicity variable in my analysis. It would be interesting to see if the commitment of the black community to the Democrats, and their rejection of the Republicans is related to the Moskowitz and Jenkins (2004) ideological dimension they call “racial liberalism.” Further, it is plausible that while the effects of moral-traditionalism and market-fundamentalism are independent, their effects on voting behavior may not be independent of other ideological dimensions. Given Moskowitz and Jenkins’ (2004) finding of three correlated dimensions (social, economic, and racial) in the 1988 data, and the current candidacy of Barack Obama, the question of a third racial ideological dimension in the U.S. population is truly a contemporary issue deserving of further inquiry.

The application of a dual-dimensional ideological approach to the question of polarization would also be fruitful. Ideological polarization has been a question that has been operationalized in many ways. Many studies only find limited support for polarization when examining individual issue opinions (DiMaggio, Evans, and Bryson 1996; Evans, Bryson, and DiMaggio 2001; Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 2006). With the exception of Fiorina et al. (2006), these studies treat ideology as single-dimensional. The nuances and details of the ideological layout of the population raise two questions concerning polarization. First, within the dimension of moral-traditionalism, is the U.S. population more polarized today than in the past, and has a similar shift occurred within the market-fundamentalist dimension? And second, is my finding of four relatively distinct ideological bases evidence for a type of inter-dimension polarization? Research on these questions is important because they

would provide a temporal context to my analysis of the 2000 and 2004 data.

Abramowitz and Saunders (2006) also claim that the ideological sophistication of the population has increased substantially over the past thirty years utilizing a single-dimensional framework. Further research should examine the extent to which this finding holds within a multi-dimensional framework.

Applying a dual-dimensional ideological framework to the study of ambivalence would also be a useful endeavor. The independence of effect on voting behavior between the moral-traditionalist and market-fundamentalist dimensions indicates that ambivalence, apathy, or moderation on one dimension does not hinder the impact of the other dimension on voting behavior. Further research should examine those at the middle of each dimension to determine whether they are primarily ambivalent toward the values of moral-traditionalism and market-fundamentalism, apathetic or have some other type of “middleness” in their political opinions. Additionally, many studies examine ambivalence toward the parties and candidates themselves, yet utilize a single-dimension ideological approach (Basinger and Lavine 2005; Lavine 2001; Lavine and Gschwend 2007). A reoccurring theme is the occurrence of ideological voting in relation to partisan ambivalence, and depends on interactions between ideology and measures of ambivalence. In view of the fact that my findings indicate that single-dimensional conceptualizations of ideology obscure important ideological divisions in the population, some of the literature on ambivalence and ideology needs to be reconsidered. Given the independence of effect on voting behavior between moral-traditionalism and market-fundamentalism,

it is possible that ambivalent partisan attitudes could interact with each ideological dimension differently. Since my findings indicate that the majority of the population fits the pattern of having a distinct ideological position on one dimension while trending toward the center on the other, exploring the relationship between the multiple dimensions of ideology and different areas of political ambivalence, including ideological ambivalence, represents an important avenue for further research.

Voting is the most basic form of civic participation, and grappling with the structure of ideology is important to understanding motivations for voter turnout. Contrary to studies using a single-dimension ideological framework that show the majority of the population in the ideological middle, my findings show that most people have distinct ideological reasons to participate from one dimension while trending toward the center on the other dimension. Because of the power of ideology to the voting act, individuals need not be extreme in their ideological outlook to act on these motivations. The independence of effect on voting behavior from the ideological dimensions of moral-traditionalism and market-fundamentalism is central to this point. Moderation, apathy, or ambivalence, on one dimension does not influence the other dimension's effect on voting behavior, and that means that a great deal of the population, while being quite centrist on one dimension, is sufficiently ideologically charged on the other dimension to participate. The liberal/conservative framework represents an organizing principle, and both the moral-traditionalist and market-fundamentalist dimensions are organized accordingly. But each dimension is

distinct, has independent effects on voter behavior, and both should *not* be combined into a single liberal/conservative ideological framework.

## APPENDIX A

### ANES Moral-Traditionalism Scale Items

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1. The world is always changing and we should adjust our view of moral behavior to those changes.
  2. The newer lifestyles are contributing to the breakdown of our society.
  3. Some people feel that women should have an equal role with men in running business, industry, and government. Others feel that a woman's place is in the home.
  4. Which of these statements comes closest to describing your feelings about the Bible?
    - 1. The Bible is a book written by men and is not the word of God.
    - 3. The Bible is the word of God, but not everything in it should be taken literally, word for word.
    - 5. The Bible is the actual word of God and is to be taken literally, word for word.
  5. This country would have many fewer problems if there were more emphasis on traditional family ties.
  6. We should be more tolerant of people who choose to live according to their own moral standards, even if they are very different from our own.
  7. Do you think gay or lesbian couples, in other words, homosexual couples, should be legally permitted to adopt children?
  8. Do you FAVOR or OPPOSE laws to protect homosexuals against job discrimination?
  9. Which one of the opinions on this page best agrees with your view?
    - 1. By law, abortion should never be permitted.
    - 2. The law should permit abortion only in case of rape, incest, or when the woman's life is in danger.
    - 3. Don't Know
    - 4. The law should permit abortion for reasons other than rape, incest, or danger to the woman's life, but only after need for the abortion has been clearly established.
    - 5. By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an abortion as a matter of personal choice.
  10. Do you favor or oppose the death penalty for persons convicted of murder?
  11. Do you think the number of immigrants from foreign countries who are permitted to come to the United States to live should be
    - 1. Increased a lot
    - 2. Increased a little
    - 3. Left the same/Don't Know
    - 4. Decreased a little
    - 5. Decreased a lot?
-

## APPENDIX B

### ANES Market-Fundamentalism Scale Items

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Where would you place yourself on this scale or haven't you thought about it.

1. 1=Government should decrease defense spending / 7=Government should increase defense spending.
2. 1=Government insurance plan / 7=Private insurance plan.
3. 1=Government should see to jobs and standard of living / 7=Government should let each person get ahead on their own.
4. 1=Government should provide many more services / 7=Government should provide many fewer services.

The following questions were recoded so that the conservative response was coded 5, the middle response was coded 3, and the liberal response was coded 1.

5. Should federal spending on Social Security be increased, decreased or kept about the same?
  6. Should federal spending on Public Schools be increased, decreased, or kept about the same?
  7. Should federal spending on Child Care be increased, decreased, or kept about the same?
  8. Should federal spending on Aid to Poor People be increased, decreased, or kept about the same?
  9. Should federal spending on Tightening Border Security to Prevent Illegal Immigration be increased, decreased, or kept about the same?
  10. Should federal spending on Welfare Programs be increased, decreased, or kept about the same?
  11. Should federal spending on Foreign Aid be increased, decreased, or kept about the same?
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