

JAPAN'S RENUCIATION OF WAR CLAUSE-ARTICLE 9
A case study of Japan's journey towards 'a normal nation'

by

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JAPAN'S RENUCIATION OF WAR CLAUSE, ARTICLE 9, AND MUTUAL
SECURITY TREATY WITH THE UNITED STATES:
A case study of Japan's journey towards 'an honorable place'

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Abstract

Japan has struggled with the decision to either revise or to reinterpret the renunciation of war clause, Chapter 2, Article 9, in the Japanese Constitution. This debate is significant because the outcome of this decision will have a direct impact of Japan's defense policies, its security arrangement with the United States, and its involvement in international politics. In order to reach a definite decision, on this issue, the majority of Japanese politicians and the public will need to agree on one approach, which they have not been able to do. This paper will analyze the historic events and policies that have shaped this debate and public opinion. Essentially, this paper argues that the public opinion regarding whether Article 9 should be revised is a result of traditional norms and feudal policies, the diminished public trust in the government following WWII, and the public's awareness of the policies and provisions of the Japanese Constitution.

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Dedication Page

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President Truman stated, “[Japan’s] ultimate position in the world depends upon themselves...”¹ To me, this statement implies that Japan’s international position was and is not only a result of national policy provisions but also a product of the Japanese people. This perspective is illustrated by the significant impact that the people’s support, cooperation, and later opinion had on Japan’s ability to position itself as a world power or “normal nation’ equal to some Western states. Specifically, there are two periods where this perspective is most observable, the end of Japan’s feudal period in 1868 and the period following the end of WWII and the creation of the Peace Constitution of 1946. Essentially, ending feudalism and the creation of the Peace Constitution were pivotal events where Japan redefined itself in an effort to gain equality and honor among other world powers. Although the type and degree of influence that the people had on government policy differed during these two periods, it is clear that despite the differences in how the people influenced policy decisions the position of Japan in the world during these two periods was dependent upon the Japanese people.

During Japan’s first attempt to reposition itself as a world power the support and cooperation of the people was vital while the opinions of the people were

¹ Papers of Harry S. Truman: White House Central Files, the White House, Washington, D.C. “How Shall We Deal with Japan after the War to Win the Peace?” Documentary History of the Truman Presidency: Creating a Pluralistic Democracy in Japan: The Occupation Government, 1945-1953. Volume 5, *University Publications of America, An imprint of CIS*, 1996, p. 14-17.

² Morton, W. Scott, and Olenik, J. Kenneth. Japan, Its History and Culture. McGraw Hill (Fourth Edition) 2005, p. 147-190.

insignificant.² This can be attributed to the fact that Japan's post-feudal government excluded popular sovereignty but sought after the approval of local leaders.

However, the post-feudal government was wise enough to cultivate the loyalty and cooperation of the general population by reinforcing traditional norms and policies that would yield this social outcome. As a result, at this time Japan successfully implemented the necessary policy which elevated Japan into a powerful international position equal to that of some Western states.

Unlike the post-feudal era, following WWII and the establishment of popular sovereignty under the new Peace Constitution, not only did Japan need the support and cooperation of the people to rebuild the nation but it also needed the approval of the majority of the people in order to regain a 'normal nation' status. However, following Japan's successful post WWII recovery its ability to regain its 'normal nation' status was blocked by the Peace Constitution's renunciation of war clause, Chapter 2 Article 9, the lack of majority approval by the public to amend the article. Essentially, it was the social norms of policies that invoked a sense of obligation and cooperation of the people that allowed the new post-feudal government to reach its national goals. However, given the policies established during the US occupation of Japan and the growth of a predominately pacifist public, Japan's post WWII period was unable to regain a 'normal nation' status, which demonstrates the significant implications of President Truman's statement that the position of the country is determined by the Japanese themselves.

In order to best evaluate Japan's journey towards a 'normal nation' status and analyze the key factors that determine this position, it is necessary to also understand the norms and policy that is at the core of Japan's inability to attain a 'normal nation' position following WWII. Essentially, the Peace Constitution of 1946 brought a variety of new democratic provision that have impacted Japan's political, economic and social system. However, the policy that has had a direct impact on Japan's position in the world is Chapter 2, Article 9- the renunciation of war clause, which will also be referred to as Article 9. Article 9 hinders Japan's national autonomy by prohibiting Japan from using force as a means for settling international disputes, from maintaining an army, navy or air force, and from participating in collective defense, which in turn ultimately prevents Japan from becoming a member of the United Nations Security Council.³ In other words, following WWII the policy provision that directly prevented Japan from regain its 'normal nation' status was Article 9.

As a result, Article 9 has been the central focus of Japan's debate over its commitments overseas and its growing national defense concerns related to the Korean threat and the growing power of China. Essentially, following WWII reconstruction, Article 9 was a source of Japan's soft power. It was a tool that allowed Japan to focus the majority of resources on its economic recovery while the United States and its Allies attended to the security needs of Japan and the Far East region.⁴ However, once Japan's economy recovered from the war so did its

³ Samuels, Richard J. "Constitutional Revision in Japan: The Future of Article 9." The Brookings Institution-Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies Roundtable Discussion (December 2004), p. 1-20.

⁴ Morton, W. Scott, and Olenik, J. Kenneth. Japan, Its History and Culture. McGraw Hill (Fourth Edition) 2005, p. 147-190.

responsibilities for its own national defense and to international collective security operations. However, despite the successful changes in Japan's economy, social and political system and the renewed desire to join the UN Security Council, the wording of Article 9 remained unchanged. This is the result of a split between in both the government and public regarding whether or not Japan ought to revise Article 9. As a result, unlike the post feudalism era where modernization and public cooperation were the key factors to Japan's world position, the central factor of the post-WWII era's journey towards a 'normal nation' status is the people decision to approve or oppose amending Article 9.

If a revision of Article 9 is not approved by the people, the alternative will be a reinterpretation of Article 9. The reinterpretation of Article 9 would allow Japan to better address its national defense needs and collective security obligations without changing the wording of Article 9. In turn, Article 9 would be even more irrelevant to the security needs and obligations of Japan. In addition, by not amending Article 9, it will continue to be a source of embarrassment, and an obstacle for Japanese membership in the UN Security Council. The proposed amendments to Article 9 would change the wording to allow for a self-defense force and Japan's participation in collective defense. However, by changing the wording of Article 9 there is a potential threat of generating a public and regional backlash against possible Japanese remilitarization. With the leading political party in favor of revision, the ultimate decision rest in the hands of the public. It is this reason why an analysis of the public opinion regarding whether Article 9 should be revised is such a relevant and timely topic to investigate. According to the Japanese constitution, policy revision not only

requires a 2/3rd majority vote in the government but also the approval of the majority of the people. In 2007, both the lower and upper house of the Diet, Japan's legislature, passed a bill outlining a referendum to amend the constitution's Article 9, however the public will not vote on the amendment until 2010.⁵ In the meantime, 'the government is simultaneously preparing a revised interpretation of the Article 9 in order to make room for security cooperation with the United States and others in limited contexts...[where] the scope of collective defense [that] the current government is willing to support is of limited nature – far from making Japan a 'normal military power.'"⁶ According to a survey conducted by the *Asahi Shimbun* in May of 2007, "78% of voters said the Constitution's war-renouncing Article 9—which Prime Minister *Shinzo Abe* wants to revise – has helped to maintain peace in Japan."⁷ "Only 18% of the respondents in the May 2007 survey said the Self-Defense Forces should be turned into a 'self-defense military,' showing a wide gap between public opinion and the direction of the revisions being pushed by the ruling Liberal Democratic Party."⁸ As this survey illustrates, despite the interest of government in revising Article 9, there is a large percentage of the public that supports Article 9 in its current state and attributes Japan's peace to this amendment. To best analyze the current public's opinion regarding the Article 9, an understanding of the core factors that shaped the Japanese perspective towards Japanese policy making and war is

⁵ "Japan's 'Group 13' Seeks Article 9 Loopholes-Legislators seek Clarity on Permitted Use of Force." (5/28/07). <<http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=2780394&C=asiapac>> (16 January 2008).

⁶ "Japan's 'Group 13' Seeks Article 9 Loopholes-Legislators seek Clarity on Permitted Use of Force." (5/28/07). <<http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=2780394&C=asiapac>> (16 January 2008).

⁷ "78% say Article 9 has helped keep Japan peace" *Asahi Shimbun* (May 3, 2007) <<http://www.asahi.com/english/Herald-asahi/TKY200705030084.html>. (9 October 2007).

⁸ "78% say Article 9 has helped keep Japan peace" *Asahi Shimbun* (May 3, 2007) <<http://www.asahi.com/english/Herald-asahi/TKY200705030084.html>. (9 October 2007).

needed. To accomplish this task, I will present the argument that the public opinion regarding a revision of Article 9 is a result of historical norms and policies, the diminished public trust in the government following WWII, and the public's awareness of policies and provisions of the Japanese Constitution and their impact on Japan's international reputation. Furthermore, it is my position that the factor that had the largest impact on public opinion is the change in public awareness of policies and provisions specific to Article 9 and their impact on Japan's international reputation. In order to best illustrate this perspective, I will present an historical survey of Japan's journey towards a 'normal nation' status and a discussion of these three core factors that shaped the public's opinion regarding the Article 9 debate.

Historical Overview-Feudalism and the Meiji Restoration:

The first factor that influenced the opinions of the people is Japan's historical norms and policies. Specifically, the traditional social system and the method of how national policies were enforced can be shown to have had a direct impact of the perspective of the public and their opinion of Japan's national status and Article 9. Specifically, Japan has a long history of hereditary autocracy and a lack of democratic rights of the people. As a result, Japan developed a tradition where the leadership established and enforced national policies with little to no public involvement. In fact, the public was not encouraged to express their opinions but rather only their support.⁹ This is one of the social and policy norms that have been present within Japan's feudal and post feudal period as well as during the first 20 years following WWII which has also shaped the attitude of the public towards Japan's position in the world.¹⁰ To begin analyzing the norms and policies that have shaped the public opinion towards the Article 9 debate I will start with a survey of Japan's history.

Maintaining centralized governmental control over the public and the local leaders was a challenge for Japan. When Japan initially brought all of the separate providence under the control of one centralized government its primary challenge was maintaining public support and diminishing tax revenues. In order to overcome these challenges, Japan used adopted the Chinese faith of Buddhism, the Chinese philosophy of Confucianism, and then further shaped the Shinto religion to establish

⁹ Morton, W. Scott, and Olenik, J. Kenneth. Japan, Its History and Culture. McGraw Hill (Fourth Edition) 2005, p. 4-146.

¹⁰ Morton, W. Scott, and Olenik, J. Kenneth. Japan, Its History and Culture. McGraw Hill (Fourth Edition) 2005, p. 4-146

the right of the emperor to rule. These three faiths shaped the class and etiquette structure that governed both the family and political spheres.¹¹ An example of this is illustrated by the word for “religious affairs,” *matusrigoto*, which is also the Japanese word for ‘government.’¹² By intertwining faith and government, Japan was able to establish the authority of the ruling powers and shape the individual attitude towards order, obligation, and duty. After applying a feudal system that established a hereditary and class structure, the government then had to address the loss of financial revenue that went to landlords but was needed by the government in order to maintain centralized governmental control. This fiscal dilemma was addressed by keeping more accurate records of taxes owed, established under the *Taika* Reform and *Taiho* Code of 702 A.D., where the tax exemptions was now limited to estates held by governmental or religious institutions. As a result of the increased governmental revenue generated under the *Taika* Reform & *Taiho* Code, the authority of the emperor was increased thus strengthening the power of the government. With the new feudal social and fiscal policies in place, the feudal system was able to indoctrinated the social and policy norms of obligation, obedience and the policy of hereditary rule which are the core norms and policies that have persisted throughout the majority of Japan’s history and shaped the attitudes of Japanese today.

From approximately 700-1868 AD, Japan was governed by a feudal system where power was hereditary. The leaders of the system included *daimyos* (territorial

¹¹ Morton, W. Scott, and Olenik, J. Kenneth. Japan, Its History and Culture. McGraw Hill (Fourth Edition) 2005, p. 16-52.

¹² Morton, W. Scott, and Olenik, J. Kenneth. Japan, Its History and Culture. McGraw Hill (Fourth Edition) 2005, p. 16-52.

lord), who were lesser hereditary aristocrats, *sessho* (regents), who were spokespersons and interim rulers when an emperor happened to be a child, and a government that was operated by appointed persons under the control of the *shogun* (Supreme Military Commander of the government), who were hereditary aristocratic family that became the ruling family and official spokesperson of the emperor. The *shogun's* power was rooted in two historical events when the emperor's office was conferred to a military deputy commander and a regent for a specific time period. The first situation occurred during the *Taika* Reforms, where in 783-803 a *bakufu*, a "tent government" or military rule, was set up where the emperor conferred his office to the deputy commander *Sakanouye Tamura Maro*.¹³ During *Sakanouye's* control, he achieved much success in enforcing the *Taika* Reforms he was awarded the title *sei-i taishogun*, "barbarian-subduing generalissimo."¹⁴ For the next 10 centuries, following the creation of the new title bestowed on *Sakanouye*, *Sei-i Taishogun* became a title that most military men desired. The second event occurred when a new emperor was still a child, 9 years of age. Given the age of the new emperor, a regent, *Fujiwara*, gained control over the government becoming the spokesperson for the Emperor. During this time *Fujiwara* believed that it was his and later his descendants' right to rule. He strategically presented his daughters as wives or concubines for the emperors making himself the father-in-law and/or grandfather of future emperors, which in turn secured his and his descendants' position as regent.

¹³ Morton, W. Scott, and Olenik, J. Kenneth. *Japan, Its History and Culture*. McGraw Hill (Fourth Edition) 2005, p. 37, 68-80.

¹⁴ Morton, W. Scott, and Olenik, J. Kenneth. *Japan, Its History and Culture*. McGraw Hill (Fourth Edition) 2005, p. 37.

However given *Fujiwara*'s belief that he and his decedents should rule the country, he took on the military title *shogunate*, establishing him and his family as the ruling family who spoke on behalf of the emperor. Following the creation of *shogun* as the governmental leader and spokesperson of the emperor, the position of *shogun* became a hereditary post. In order to secure the power of the government that the *Fujiwara Shogun* took over he used the emperor to legitimize his authority and public discussions became highly discouraged.¹⁵

However, during the feudal era even the power of the ruling *shogun* was limited. To the detriment of the *shogun*'s power, the *daimyo* controlled the production and revenue of the land that they ruled over, which limited the income of the state.¹⁶ An example of this multileveled ruling system was illustrated best when efforts by the emperor to implement land reform or tighter centralized governmental control were blocked by the autocrats. The only way the emperor was able to successfully challenge a policy, accomplished by Emperor *Shirakawa* after retiring in 1886, was to work through lesser aristocrats.¹⁷ Eventually, in the mid 1800s, this feudal system grew incapable of addressing the rising unemployed and peasant protests, the rise in the merchant class, and the influx of Western knowledge and

¹⁵ Rhoads Murphey. *A History of Asia*. Harper Collins College Publishers, (Second Edition) 1996, 138.

¹⁶ Morton, W. Scott, and Olenik, J. Kenneth. *Japan, Its History and Culture*. McGraw Hill (Fourth Edition) 2005, p. 134-167.

¹⁷ Rhoads Murphey. *A History of Asia*. Harper Collins College Publishers, (Second Edition) 1996, p. 138.

techniques.¹⁸ Under these challenging conditions the power of the *shogun* was fatally weakened.

In 1853, after two centuries of successfully deflecting various attempts by Western nations to engage Japan in trade, the *Tokugawa Shogun*, who's family held power from 1600- 1867, was unable to defend against the American threat led by Commodore Matthew C. Perry.¹⁹ Commodore Perry and his steam frigates, referred to as the "Black ships," were commanded by US President Fillmore to broker a treaty with Japan that would address both the needs of the distressed US mariners in the waters surrounding Japan along with US trade interests in the East.²⁰ Commodore Perry presented a written document that outlined the American intentions and demands to the *Tokugawa Shogun*. According to the document, Japan was given one year to consider opening up its ports to the Americans. *Tokugawa* was also told in the document that Commodore Perry's return, in 1854, will be accompanied by a larger show of force.

The *Tokugawa Shogun* consulted with some *daimyo* (local leaders) and the emperor's court regarding the treaty proposal. The majority of these advisors were

¹⁸ Morton, W. Scott, and Olenik, J. Kenneth. Japan, Its History and Culture. McGraw Hill (Fourth Edition) 2005, p. 137.

¹⁹ Historically – "Japan decided neither to admit foreigners to free and open trading nor to continue the overseas trade ventures to Southeast Asia which Japan itself had undertaken with considerable success in the sixteenth century. By this decision for retreat and isolation Japan gained stability and internal solidarity at a time when these factors were urgently needed in its society. But there was a certain irony in the fact that this closing down and sealing off took place just when the rest of the world was being opened up to an interchange of goods and ideas." Morton, W. Scott, and Olenik, J. Kenneth. Japan, Its History and Culture. McGraw Hill (Fourth Edition) 2005, p. 123.

²⁰ Morton, W. Scott, and Olenik, J. Kenneth. Japan, Its History and Culture. McGraw Hill (Fourth Edition) 2005, p. 137.

against the unfair trade treaty proposal presented by United States.²¹ However, given the show of force that accompanied Perry's 1854 return, the *Tokugawa Shogun* was unable to honor the *daimyo*'s opinions; he was forced by the overwhelming American threat of force to concede to the treaty terms of the United States.²² As a result, the Treaty of *Kanagawa* was created, also referred to as the "unfair trade treaty."

This event was an eye-opener for both the Japanese people and aristocratic powers. The country opposed the inferior trade position that Japan was forced into by the *Tokugawa Shogunate*. And they also gained an awareness of their military and technological inferiority relative to the West. Given the growing public unrest and embarrassment, this situation made Japan susceptible to a revolution. However, given Japan's unique social system, unlike most revolutions, the peasants or general population were not the ones who actively participated in the revolution. Instead, the 1868 revolt, called the *Meiji* Restoration, was led by modest rank *samurai* with the support of a few prominent *daimyo*, and experienced very little opposition and was considered a bloodless revolution.²³ The lack of public opposition can be attributed to the traditional structure where the social hierarchal system that discouraged the public from questioning and discussing national policies implemented by the higher

²¹ Morton, W. Scott, and Olenik, J. Kenneth. *Japan, Its History and Culture*. McGraw Hill (Fourth Edition) 2005, p. p.134-146.

²² Morton, W. Scott, and Olenik, J. Kenneth. *Japan, Its History and Culture*. McGraw Hill (Fourth Edition) 2005, p. 134-167.

²³ Morton, W. Scott, and Olenik, J. Kenneth. *Japan, Its History and Culture*. McGraw Hill (Fourth Edition) 2005, p. 134-167.

ranked government.²⁴ Under the *Meiji* Restoration, the power of Emperor *Meiji* was restored, the *Tokugawa Shogun* was removed from power, the capital was moved to *Edo* – present day *Tokyo*, and the new leaders sought to eliminate all feudal institutions and embraced western technology and knowledge in order to improve their economic and military status. For the *Meiji* Restoration leaders their objective was to modernize Japan in order to gain equality with Western powers. In order to accomplish this goal they needed the cooperation public and the support of the local leaders and the public. This was why it was important for the emperor to be restored to power. Using the emperor as a tool to rally the public, the *Meiji* Restoration leaders knew that the beliefs and traditions associated with the divinity of the emperor would translate into public obedience and cooperation during the transition of governments.

During *Meiji* Restoration, Japan grafted their traditional imperial system with the British parliamentary system. Policies that were implemented had the appearance of the beginning stages of democracy; however, similar to the former Japanese feudal system the public opinion did not directly influence national policy. In fact, because many of the fractional party leaders were made up of former *daimyo* and/or *samurai* the traditional method of implementing policies without public discussion remained a norm within the new government. However, the *Meiji* Restoration leaders took steps to ensure that the challenges that the *daimyo* and *samurai* posed to the feudal system did not undermine the success of the new government. As a result, “in 1887 the

²⁴ Morton, W. Scott, and Olenik, J. Kenneth. Japan, Its History and Culture. McGraw Hill (Fourth Edition) 2005, p. 16-51; 134-167.

Emperor announced, on behalf of the government, the abolition of all domains.”²⁵ Although this news was shocking to the *daimyo* and public there was no major opposition to the change. According to Morton and Olenik in the book, Japan its History and Culture, one reason for the lack of opposition to the *Meiji* reforms was both the historical tradition of loyalty to the government as well as the presence of Westerners throughout Japan.²⁶ At this time, the *Meiji* era looked again for public support not public opinion. For example, the new system did not create new democratic liberties for the general public but the government wanted to give the former *daimyo* the feeling of being a part of creating national policies. As a result, the *Meiji* Restorations Chapter Oath, Article 1 stated, “Deliberative assemblies shall be widely established and all matters decided by public discussion.”²⁷

Ultimately, the *Meiji* restoration sought to “strengthen and modernize” and “win equality with other nations.”²⁸ The strategy for reaching these goals involved both modernizing the military and institutional structures along with governmental reform. The method used to accomplish these goals included borrowing knowledge from abroad and adapting the new knowledge to the Japanese culture. For example, under the *Meiji* restoration, Japan established a parliamentary system that was governed by an Imperial Constitution, a strong navy and army modeled after Western

²⁵ Morton, W. Scott, and Olenik, J. Kenneth. Japan, Its History and Culture. McGraw Hill (Fourth Edition) 2005, p. 150.

²⁶ Morton, W. Scott, and Olenik, J. Kenneth. Japan, Its History and Culture. McGraw Hill (Fourth Edition) 2005, p. 147-167.

²⁷ Morton, W. Scott, and Olenik, J. Kenneth. Japan, Its History and Culture. McGraw Hill (Fourth Edition) 2005, p. 147-167.

²⁸ Rhoads Murphey. A History of Asia. Harper: Collins College Publishers (Second Edition) 1996, p. 299.

military forces, and formally sanctioned Westernization of Japan under the slogan “Eastern ethics and Western science.”²⁹ This approach not only rapidly modernized Japan but it also proved that Japan was a “civilized” and powerful country.³⁰ However, it must be noted that Japan was able to successfully implement these changes because the Japanese population believed in putting the good of the nation above the interests of the individual. In other words, it was the patriotism of the Japanese people and Western technology that led to Japan’s rapid rise to power.³¹

Following the *Meiji* era (1868-1912) Japan became a world power.³² In 1899, Britain relinquished the unequal clauses in its treaty with Japan and “other nations soon followed suit.”³³ Given Japan’s new powerful position within the world community, Japan began to also imitate the Western imperialistic behavior. At this time Japan was the recipient of Western support. In fact, Japan’s decision to go to war with Russia was “supported by the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Alliance and Friendship signed in 1902. Unlike the initial unequal trade treaty with the United States, this new US-Japan arrangement was welcomed in Japan because it served as a symbol to Japan that they had reached international equality with Western powers.”³⁴ From 1902 until the most influential time of Japanese militarism at the onset of WWII,

²⁹ Morton, W. Scott, and Olenik, J. Kenneth. Japan, Its History and Culture. McGraw Hill (Fourth Edition) 2005, p. 148.

³⁰ Rhoads Murphey. A History of Asia. Harper. Collins College Publishers (Second Edition) 1996, p. 290.

³¹ Morton, W. Scott, and Olenik, J. Kenneth. Japan, Its History and Culture. McGraw Hill (Fourth Edition) 2005, p. 148.

³² Google. “Timeline of Japanese History.” <<http://www.askasia.org/frclasm/readings/t000013.htm>> (22 March 2004).

³³ Rhoads Murphey. A History of Asia. Harper. Collins College Publishers (Second Edition) 1996, p. 300.

³⁴ Rhoads Murphey. A History of Asia. Harper. Collins College Publishers (Second Edition) 1996, p. 301.

Japan's position in the world was 'normal' – equal to that of some western states. This position included (1) being an economic and military world power equal with other imperial powers within the international community, (2) being in good relations with the US, and (3) being in an unthreatening position to Western interests in the Far East.³⁵

Despite the strategic importance of the Anglo-Japan Treaty of Alliance and Friendship, the economic relationship between Japan and the United States remained insignificant at that time, limited to only US export of oil and kerosene.³⁶ Essentially, the alliance was aimed at long-term goals. It served to ensure future access to the Far East Asian region for the West and as a political tool for trade equality and a deterrent against foreign threats for Japan. As the Japanese saw it, "in their determination to remain free, the Japanese government adopted one of two extreme positions. They either retired within themselves in the attempt to deal with a hostile world by excluding it, or they wholeheartedly accepted the comity of nations and tried to integrate themselves fully within it in the hope that cooperation would ensure their independence."³⁷ The government was able to successfully accomplish the latter option by promoting "spiritual mobilization," where the people were united under the Shinto faith of emperor worship, and a sense of purpose and social obligation to the emperor and state. Essentially, Japan's social and political system has a history of

³⁵ Rhoads Murphey. *A History of Asia*, Harper: Collins College Publishers (Second Edition) 1996, p. 303.

³⁶ Rhoads Murphey. *A History of Asia*, Harper: Collins College Publishers (Second Edition) 1996, p. 303.

³⁷ Bamba, Nobuya and Howes, John F. "Pacifism in Japan: The Christian and Socialist Tradition." *University of British Columbia*, 1978, p2.

being governed by a system of hierarchy, duty and obligations, called *giri*. For example, the Confucian ethics of the *samurai*, loyalty to one's lord took precedence over all other considerations, even over the family loyalty and filial piety which was such a feature of the Confucianism of China was absorbed into Japanese society.³⁸ This was the first key factor that shaped the attitude of the Japanese people towards policy making and change. Essentially, the people trusted the government to act benevolently towards them in exchange for their unconditional trust, sacrifice, and obedience for the good of the nation.

Rise of Militarism & WWII

In addition to the traditional norms and policies that has shaped the public opinion of amending Article 9, the second key factor that has had a major impact on the Japanese was their loss of trust in the Japanese government. This occurred when Japan sacrificed its benevolent policy in exchange for the opportunity to build a Japanese Empire. The time period that this occurred in was between WWI and the end of WWII. Prior to WWI, Japan enjoyed a short period of economic success and even joined the Allies in WWI as an equal partner. At that time, Japan did not fight in Europe along with the other Allies, but they did provide a few naval destroyers to assist the British Mediterranean fleet.³⁹ For Japan the focus during this time was gaining power in the East. As a result, at the end of WWI, Japan seized the

³⁸ Morton, W. Scott, and Olenik, J. Kenneth. Japan, Its History and Culture. McGraw Hill (Fourth Edition) 2005, p. 124.

³⁹ Rhoads Murphey. A History of Asia. Harper: Collins College Publishers (Second Edition) 1996, p. 301.

opportunity to “take over the German concession areas in China, centered in the province of Shantung in eastern north China.

In 1915 Japan presented a list of Twenty-One Demands which included the stationing of troops and of Japanese “advisers” to the Chinese government that would have made China in effect a Japanese colony.”⁴⁰ This act infuriated the Chinese and fueled the Japanese imperialist ideas. However, the economic success of the *Meiji* Restoration quickly reversed course when the Great Depression became a worldwide phenomenon that even Japan was not immune to.

“[Japan’s] exports declined by 50 percent in the two years following 1929. The greatest suffering was felt by the farmers and peasants, when the silk cocoon prices dropping 65 percent in one year, in 1929-1930. The real incomes of industrial workers suffered as it went from an index of 100 in 1926 to 69 in 1931; but the corresponding figures for rural incomes went from 100 to 33. As a result, peasants were forced to eat the bark of trees and sold their daughters to city brothels.⁴¹ In the turn, the people directed their anger against the *zaibatsu*, the “large business interests;” identified with the landlords in the popular mind.”⁴² However, unlike both the public and the civilian politicians, the military officers directed the blame on Japan’s dependent position within the international community and the imperialist

⁴⁰ Rhoads Murphey. *A History of Asia*. Harper: Collins College Publishers (Second Edition) 1996, p. 301.

⁴¹ Morton, W. Scott, and Olenik, J. Kenneth. *Japan, Its History and Culture*. McGraw Hill (Fourth Edition) 2005, p. 176-177.

⁴² Morton, W. Scott, and Olenik, J. Kenneth. *Japan, Its History and Culture*. McGraw Hill (Fourth Edition) 2005, p. 176-177.

foreign policies of Britain and America that shaped the economic system.⁴³ Given the turmoil of the Great Depression, the military politicians used their higher rank over civilian politicians to implement a new order that favored their perspective. As a result, the government, which at this time was seeing more military influence on decision making, made a dramatic change to overcome the effects of their dependence on the system; they took Japan off the gold standard. Quickly “Japan’s exports rose sharply, and Japan began to recover more quickly than any other industrial country; but an irreversible trend towards militarism had already set in.”⁴⁴

Many military officers – whose positions were viewed as more superior to the civilian government, were originally from rural farms that were hit hardest by the depression. Given the pervasive impact of the depression on Japan, a number of military officers believed that the ethics and ideas of the military would better shape Japan’s foreign and domestic policies to protect Japan from international instabilities such as the depression.⁴⁵ As a result, the military assumed more decision making authority within the government. In fact, given the traditional norms and social hierarchy system in Japan, the military felt entitled to act on behalf of the emperor in order to protect Japan. For example, despite the growing opposition to militarism by the pro-democracy fractions, the military made it difficult for anyone to oppose their choices for the highest post by invoking the name of the emperor. If this method was

⁴³ McClain, James L. A Modern History-Japan. W.W. Norton & Company (2002), p. 419. And, Morton, W. Scott, and Olenik, J. Kenneth. Japan, Its History and Culture. McGraw Hill (Fourth Edition) 2005, p. 176-177.

⁴⁴ Morton, W. Scott, and Olenik, J. Kenneth. Japan, Its History and Culture. McGraw Hill (Fourth Edition) 2005, p. 177.

⁴⁵ Morton, W. Scott, and Olenik, J. Kenneth. Japan, Its History and Culture. McGraw Hill (Fourth Edition) 2005, p. 147-177.

unsuccessful, then they would use other strategies to interfere with the agenda of oppositional fractions. For instance, “if a civilian premier was unacceptable to the dominant forces in the army, the nomination of an officer to the post of army minister was delayed and thus the formation of the cabinet could be hung up indefinitely...as a result, the Diet was becoming less and less effective.”⁴⁶ In the end, under the authority of General *Toji* the country came under the control of a “coalition of military and compliant civilian officials.”⁴⁷

When Japanese militarism was at its peak, in the 1930s, Japan began to ally itself with Germany and started to separate itself from the Allied forces and initiated more grand imperialist ventures.⁴⁸ In 1931, Japan occupied Korea and set up a puppet state, *Manchuria*. On March 27, 1933, Japan formally withdrew from the League of Nations, and systematically abrogated the numerous international agreements it signed at the Washington Conference in the previous decade.⁴⁹ This was a result of the militarist belief that Japan’s survival depended on the creation of hegemony in Asian where the perceived external enemy was the “decadent democracies.”⁵⁰ As a result, Japanese imperialism grew stronger with the new order goal of becoming the dominate power in the East. Essentially, a co-prosperity sphere

⁴⁶ Morton, W. Scott, and Olenik, J. Kenneth. Japan, Its History and Culture. McGraw Hill (Fourth Edition) 2005, p. 147-177.

⁴⁷ Murphey, Rhoads. A History of Asia. HarperCollins College Publishers (Second Edition) 1996, 345-349.

⁴⁸ Murphey, Rhoads. A History of Asia. HarperCollins College Publishers (Second Edition) 1996, 345-349.

⁴⁹ McClain, James L. A Modern History-Japan. W.W. Norton & Company (2002), p. 419.

⁵⁰ McClain, James L. A Modern History-Japan. W.W. Norton & Company (2002), p. 419. And, Morton, W. Scott, and Olenik, J. Kenneth. Japan, Its History and Culture. McGraw Hill (Fourth Edition) 2005, p. 176-177.

would be created where Germany would be the dominate power in the West and Japan would be the dominate power in the East.

In order to implement this objective, civil opposition to the new order was highly discouraged. The government declared that the “liberal democracy was outmoded in the rapidly changing world of the 1930s, and it was argued that “Japan ought to impose fascism ‘from above.’”⁵¹ In order to prepare the public for the governmental and economic changes that Japan was undergoing, a booklet was published which outlined a two-ten program: to develop Japan’s colonies as a “resource base,” a mission that *Ishiwara* and the *Kwantung* Army took up in 1931, and to centralize government control over the domestic economy to ensure that the army was capable of responding immediately and effectively should they go to war.⁵² In addition, the government “campaigned to cleanse the nation of ‘dangerous thoughts.” The government indicted, executed and/or assassinated liberals who opposed the new order and denounced the changes as being ‘totalitarian politics’ in the late 1930s. The government also issued new textbooks to schoolchildren in order to “develop a new Japan by virtue of the Way of the Empire which stands firm throughout the ages at home and abroad, and thereby more than ever to guard and maintain the prosperity of the Imperial Throne which is coeval with heaven and earth.”⁵³ The process of “spiritual mobilization” was an easy initiative for the military to carry through because Japan had a traditional norm and policies that

⁵¹ McClain, James L. [A Modern History-Japan](#). W.W. Norton & Company (2002), p. 452-453.

⁵² McClain, James L. [A Modern History-Japan](#). W.W. Norton & Company (2002), p. 456-457.

⁵³ McClain, James L. [A Modern History-Japan](#). W.W. Norton & Company (2002), p. 460-481.

conditioned the people to be “disciplined and dedicated to the service of the emperor and the country.”⁵⁴

With the mandatory cooperation and obedience of the people and the civilian politicians in place, by 1936, the military had a stronger hold within the Japanese government. As a result, “The emperor’s was positioned as head of the armed services, and the General Staff was placed directly responsible to the emperor as well as having a place in the cabinet which was chaired by the premier. The service ministers’ direct responsibility to the emperor and their right of access to him gave them a measure of control over the cabinet and the civilian ministers... In 1936 the rule that the service ministers had to be serving officers on the active list was revived. This in turn placed these ministers under the control of army and navy opinion, and made it impossible in effect for anyone to hold those officers who did not enjoy the confidence of the main body of the officers.”⁵⁵ By 1937, Japan set its imperialist goals on China with the objective to later go after Southeast Asia, Australia, and India.⁵⁶ Japan began a step by step encroachment into northern China by first attempting maneuvers in the Beijing area. However, China lunched a defensive battle

⁵⁴ Morton, W. Scott, and Olenik, J. Kenneth. Japan, Its History and Culture. McGraw Hill (Fourth Edition) 2005, p. 180.

⁵⁵ Morton, W. Scott, and Olenik, J. Kenneth. Japan, Its History and Culture. McGraw Hill (Fourth Edition) 2005, p.182.

⁵⁶ Morton, W. Scott, and Olenik, J. Kenneth. Japan, Its History and Culture. McGraw Hill (Fourth Edition) 2005, p. 182.

against the imperialist Japanese at Marco Polo Bridge.⁵⁷ This marked the beginning of Japan's entry into WWII.

By September 1940, Japan signed a tripartite pact with Germany and Italy. And, "in April 1941, the Japanese negotiated a pact of neutrality with the Soviet Union."⁵⁸ Japan then turned its attention towards to the United States, its former strategic ally. After the U.S. oil embargo crippled the Japanese, in 1941, Japan attacked Pearl Harbor.⁵⁹ When Japan's resources ran low, the Japanese military then turned to the Japanese people, whose patriotism and faith were the foundation of the success of the *Meiji* restoration, to sacrifice their lives as war resources. Young men were trained as *Kamikaze* pilots ("wind of the gods"). The *Kamikaze* pilots "flew planes to destruction, aiming their bomb or torpedo loads directly at the target and perishing in the explosion."⁶⁰ In the end, Japan not only lost the war, in 1945, but also experienced the loss of lives by the hand of the ir own government and foreigners. As a result, the patriotism and faith of the people that once propelled Japan into a position of international power comparable to other world powers, now turned against the militaristic government.⁶¹ In fact, following the war the people blamed the military led government for destroying the national honor and

⁵⁷ Morton, W. Scott, and Olenik, J. Kenneth. Japan, Its History and Culture. McGraw Hill (Fourth Edition) 2005, p. 180-183.

⁵⁸ Murphey, Rhoads. A History of Asia. Harper Collins College Publishers (Second Edition) 1996, p. 345-349.

⁵⁹ Murphey, Rhoads. A History of Asia. Harper Collins College Publishers (Second Edition) 1996, p. 345-349.

⁶⁰ Morton, W. Scott, and Olenik, J. Kenneth. Japan, Its History and Culture. McGraw Hill (Fourth Edition) 2005, p. 188.

⁶¹ Kiichi, Fujiwara. "Memory as Deterrence: The Moralization of International Politics." *Japan Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 16, No. 1, (Spring 2002), 46-60.

accomplishments made under the *Meiji* Restoration policies.⁶² This loss of trust was the second key factor that shaped the attitude of the Japanese people and is one of the key arguments why the people have failed to support any policies that could result in a possible remilitarized government.



Figure 1: Representatives of Japan stand aboard the [USS Missouri](#) prior to signing of the Instrument of Surrender.⁶³

Occupation and Peace Constitution

The third factor that has contributed greatly to the shaping of the Japanese public's attitude towards Article 9 is the public's awareness of constitutional policies and provisions and their impact on Japan's international reputation. Traditionally, Japan created and enforced policies from the top down. The public involvement in policy decision making was minimum at best. Immediately following the end of WWII this lack of public involvement did not change. In fact, the majority of the immediate post-WWII changes were fashioned by the US led occupation and was a reflection of the US foreign policy in the Far East. Once a policy was established it then became the responsibility of the Japanese government to implement and enforce

⁶² Morton, W. Scott, and Olenik, J. Kenneth. "Japan, Its History and Culture, Fourth Edition." McGraw Hill 2005, p. 190.

⁶³ Photo from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Occupied_Japan

the new policy. As a result, the public was not involved in the designing of the new governmental system, national or foreign policy.

The reason why the democratic occupiers choose to manage the occupational reforms in the manner was due the US perspective of the threat that the Japanese still posed to the Allies. Specifically, the US Office of War Information stated that Japan would be dangerous to the US if the US victory was not complete because, (1) “her ruling group is committed to a long range policy of ruthless expansion; (2) her regimented society and her national cult of Emperor-worship give these rulers total control of the Japanese people whom they can use as instruments for their imperialist adventures; (3) Japan is a highly industrialized country, whose productive capacity, natural resources, population, etc., provide her rulers with the material power to make war.”⁶⁴ From 1945-1952, for the first time in Japanese history, Japan was occupied by foreigner powers. The Allied occupation of Japan was managed by the Truman Administration and General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander of Allied Powers (SCAP).⁶⁵ The objective of this occupation was to reshape Japan in the image of the democratic West in order to prevent Japan from becoming a potential future threat to US interests and to use Japan to advance US interests in the Far Eastern region. In order to implement the occupation reforms, the US and SCAP had

⁶⁴ Document 1, Papers of Harry S. Truman: White House Central Files-Official File, Office of War Information, Domestic Radio Bureau, Washington, D.C. “Japan’s Unconditional Surrender.” Documentary History of the Truman Presidency: Creating a Pluralistic Democracy in Japan: The Occupation Government, 1945-1952. Volume 5, University Publications of America, An imprint of CIS, 1996, p. 4.

⁶⁵ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. “Surrender by Japan; Terms between the United States of America and the Other Allied Powers and Japan.” *Department of State Publication 2504, Executive Agreement Series 493*. <<http://tawandocuments.org/postdam.htm>> (19, January 2007).

to rely on the history of Japan to shape its future. The key factor that contributed most significant impact on the success of the occupation was the use of the Japanese tradition of top down state management and the emperor worship. However, by using the traditional approaches to managing the State that was endemic of Japan, the public was excluded from the state building processes and thus unaware of the decisions being made until well after a national policy was established. As a result, although it was believed that Japan's ultimate position was dependent upon "themselves" the people were not allowed to participate in the post-WWII positioning.



Figure 2: Douglas MacArthur and Emperor *Hirohito*.⁶⁶

Essentially, the post-WWII recovery was based on the US's foreign policy towards Japan. Specifically, according to the Truman Administration, for the greatest good and security of us all... the ten recommended measures [towards Japan] are: ^{67*}

1. "Complete and total military defeat until every last person in Japan's armed forces and every civilian at home knows it from personal experience.

⁶⁶ Photo from - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Occupied_Japan

⁶⁷ ***Lengthy quote used to provide the most accurate attitude of the Truman Administration towards Japan.** Papers of Harry S. Truman, White House Central Files-Official File. "How Shall We Deal With Japan after the War to Win the Peace?" Documentary History of the Truman Presidency: Creating a Pluralistic Democracy in Japan: The Occupation Government, 1945-1952. Volume 5, University Publications of America, An imprint of CIS, 1996, p. 14-17.

2. Removal from Japan's control of all territories she has seized- Formosa, Korea, Manchuria, the Mandated Islands. Without them she could not have become strong enough to wage the present war. Without them she cannot start another.
3. Occupation and control by a joint United Nations force. It must be brought home to the Japanese once and for all that they are being defeated, disarmed and occupied, not because of any one nation's designs on them, but because by their own lawlessness they have outraged world opinion. That occupation should be terminated as soon as possible, but her isolation continue until her own people clean house and set up a government that demonstrates it will cooperate loyally with the other nations of the world.
4. Japan must be totally disarmed: -her Navy, Air-force, artillery and tanks surrendered; her arsenals, naval bases, ship yards and military installations dismantled or destroyed. Her disarmament must be rigidly supervised for at least two generations.
5. To insure further against Japan's rearming we should limit her imports of certain critical minerals. Japan has entirely inadequate amounts of iron ore, coking coal, and the various alloys, which are indispensable in the manufacture of modern armaments. Withholding the raw materials of steel beyond the amounts required for the approximately 2 million tons needed in her peacetime industry, would make it absolutely impossible for Japan to rearm.
6. We must also try to disarm Japan psychologically, -- a much more difficult task. There is no way the common people of Japan can escape suffering for the errors and crimes of the government they chose or tolerated. But just to defeat and disarm them and do nothing to develop different leadership and attitudes is not a solution [to] the problem, -- for them or for us. It is utterly unrealistic to imagine that we can keep 75 million people permanently discontented, sullen and rebellious without our whole Pacific relations being constantly poisoned from the festering sore...the only alternative is to try to get them to see that their future lies in emerging from medieval feudalism and modernizing their thinking and social system as they have learned to modernize their machinery. There is [a] real advantage to the United Nations in allowing the Japanese to preserve as much as they wish of those institutions in Japan which are uniting and steadying and hope-giving to them and are not vicious or trouble-making or hostile to other nations. It would seem to me very unwise for us to demand, for example, that the Japanese overthrow their emperor worship system. You can destroy a man's machine gun by force, but you cannot destroy by compulsion an idea in his mind or a loyalty in his heart. It is certain that, after defeat the disillusioned Japanese intellectuals, the embittered workers and peasants will be in despair-and probably in

revolution. It will be most advantageous for all concerned if we can guide that revolution so that it is against the real cause of Japan's trouble, medieval militaristic feudalism. I do not believe the Japanese will revolt against their Imperial House, or that we should try by derogatory insults to turn them against the throne which has been the center of their national life for 26 centuries, and which can be most valuable to us as a unifying and steadying focus of loyalty during the period when they are being forced by crushing defeat to reconstruct their whole national thinking. When it is driven home relentlessly to the Japanese people that it is their own military which has betrayed their Emperor, has brought him not respect and prestige and honor as it promised, but instead disrespect, dishonor and disaster, I believe they can be brought to throw out not the Imperial House, but [rather] the military clique and its [belief that they have the right and privilege] of being sole interpreter of what is the true way to serve the throne.

7. While withholding war materials so that there is no possibility of Japan's rearming, we should permit her to recover economically, by giving her access to food supplies, to material necessary for production of consumer goods and rebuilding of light industries, to markets where she can sell the things she produces in order to pay for the things she needs to buy.
8. We should take every proper means to develop China as the great stabilizing Bulwark in Asia. Japan can never seriously threaten us as long as in her rear is a strong, independent China, friendly to the democracies.
9. We should at once resume cultural and educational and missionary activities in Japan. A wise observer at the turn of the century warned that Japan was then in the valley of decision, and that if we did not send 10 thousand Christian missionaries quickly, we would eventually have to send 100 thousand bayonets. Well, we are having to send the bayonets. I believe our very best hope of helping the Japanese develop a willingness to play with the world team instead of against it is through the thousands of Japanese Christians who have not bowed their hearts to militarism, nor broken their ties with fellow-Christians around the world.
10. The United Nations must succeed in [creating] some system of organized security for the world. Let the Japanese realize that they are being excluded from the family of nations, not because of their race or their nationality, but because of their country's behavior. They cannot change their race. They can change their behavior. And they, like other people, will if there is adequate incentive. That incentive can come only from assurance that their ultimate position in the world depends upon themselves, that there is an honorable place for them when they prove themselves honorable, that there is more for them to

gain in the long run by joining the world than by trying to conquer it.”^{68*}

Essentially, the United States learned that in order to most effectively implement their occupational reforms they must intertwine democracy with traditional Japanese norms and its political system in order to manage the county and implement psychological reform. As a result, a document was created to govern the occupation called “Initial Post-Surrender Policies for Japan,” which was the decision “to work through the Japanese government and not to replace it [or the Emperor].”⁶⁹ Using the historic examples set by the former *shogun(s)* and the *Meiji* Restoration leaders, the United States used the emperor as a tool to gain public support and cooperation for the occupation’s reform efforts which they implemented using the traditional top down strategy. To the United States’ surprise, although there was some political opposition to the occupation, the Japanese population exhibited a unique tolerance towards the occupation. As Morton and Olenik stated in Japan, Its History and Culture, “the mood and reaction of the Japanese people toward the occupation went through the phases of fear, relief, gratitude, boredom, and finally a predictable but tolerably mild resentment.”⁷⁰

This unique tolerance was attributed to the assumption that the Japanese people did not blame Japan’s “defeat and occupation...on the American forces but

⁶⁸ Papers of Harry S. Truman, White House Central Files-Official File. “How Shall We Deal With Japan after the War to Win the Peace?” Documentary History of the Truman Presidency: Creating a Pluralistic Democracy in Japan: The Occupation Government, 1945-1952. Volume 5, University Publications of America, An imprint of CIS, 1996, p. 14-17.

⁶⁹ Morton, W. Scott, and Olenik, J. Kenneth. Japan, Its History and Culture. McGraw Hill (Fourth Edition) 2005, p. 191.

⁷⁰ Morton, W. Scott, and Olenik, J. Kenneth. Japan, Its History and Culture. McGraw Hill (Fourth Edition) 2005, p. 191.

rather the Japanese military leaders who dragged Japan into the war.”⁷¹ Therefore, it was both Japan’s aggressive military activities that lead up to their involvement and defeat in WWII and the use of the A-bomb by the United States that resulted in the Japanese people’s complete revulsion against war and the use of force.⁷² In fact, many of the people were not in favor of allowing former government officials tried as war criminals to return to power as permitted by the Charter Oath, Article 1. In the end, militarism in Japan not only led to the losing of the war but also the loss of public confidence.

Given the public mistrust of the former Japanese government, one would assume that the implementation of democracy would have empowered the people to actively participate in policy making decisions. However, this did not happen immediately. It is my opinion that the long history of discouraging public discussion limited the flow of information to the masses. However, despite the obstacles to gaining a better awareness of the policies and provisions being established during the occupation of Japan, there were some, primarily the educated, whose learning curve was much shorter. This can be viewed by the correlation between time and the changes in public opinion trends. (See Appendix II on page 71.) For example, in the 1950s and 1960s, “the number of [Japanese people who] felt that the politics should not be left entirely in the hands of politicians, however able they might be, but should

⁷¹ BBC News. “Diplomat’s deaths shock pacifist Japan.”
<<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/from...>> (6 December 2003.)

⁷² Morton, W. Scott, and Olenik, J. Kenneth. “Japan, Its History and Culture, Fourth Edition.” McGraw Hill 2005, p. 190.

also be actively discussed by the people, began to increase.⁷³ As the national survey below demonstrates, with time the values of democracy and popular sovereignty slowly reshaped the traditional culture of leaving everything in the hands of the politicians. (See also Appendix IV on page 75). However, as the table also demonstrates, it actually took 18 years before there was a large drop in the percentage of the public that supported the traditional top down governmental decision making process.

Figure 3: Survey of public attitude toward national policy decisions.⁷⁴

The Leave -Everything-to-the -Politicians Attitude					
<i>If outstanding politicians are available, it is better to leave everything in their hands than for the people to debate about affairs of public interest.</i>					
	1953	1958	1963	1968	1973
For	43%	35%	29%	30%	23%
Against	38	44	47	51	51
Depends on the time and person	9	10	12	10	15

SOURCE: Institute of Statistical Mathematics.

In addition, the national surveys also illustrate that not only was there a slow movement away from the culture of discouraging public debate but that the Japanese also had a difficult transition away from their traditional culture of emperor worship. Specifically, the national survey in the table below shows that during the initial 20 years after the US occupation of Japan a majority of the public still believed in the

⁷³ Kojima, Kazuto. "Public Opinion Trends in Japan." *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 41, No. 2. (Summer, 1977), p. 211.

⁷⁴ Kojima, Kazuto. "Public Opinion Trends in Japan." *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 41, No.2. (Summer, 1977), pp. 206-216.

benevolence of the government and felt that the government policies were reflective of the public opinion. (See also Appendix VI).

Figure 4: Survey of public attitude toward national policy decisions - Continued.⁷⁵

Reflection of Public Opinion in Politics					
	<i>1968</i>	<i>1969</i>	<i>1970</i>	<i>1971</i>	<i>1973</i>
Reflected	39%	40%	38%	16%	22%
Not reflected	37	39	54	68	72

SOURCES: 1968—Prime Minister's Office; 1969, 1973—Japan Broadcasting Corporation; 1970—Mainichi Shinbun; 1971—Komei Senkyo Renmei.

For this reason, the US was correct in its belief that Japan's traditional values would make it possible to reshape the psychology of the people. However, these were not the only two factors that contributed to the public attitude towards amending Article 9. In addition, to the traditional norms and policies of Japan, and the mistrust of the government, there was a learning curve that required time for the public to adapt to the new democratic policies and procedures and to understand the impact of those policies on Japan's reputation abroad.

In essence, like any major transformation there are learning curves that exist that contributed to the opinion trend of the Japanese. For the Japanese, not only did they require time to adapt to rapid political and economic reforms but they also needed time to transition from an inward looking culture to a culture that sees

⁷⁵ Kojima, Kazuto. "Public Opinion Trends in Japan." *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 41, No.2. (Summer, 1977), pp. 206-216.

themselves as a member of the global community. As the previous sections of this paper demonstrated, a large part of Japan's history was spent adapting foreign ideas to suit their specific needs and not the other way around. The *Meiji* Restoration understood the need to move away from this one directional perspective and attempted to embrace a position with the world as a member of the international community. However, this objective was stopped short during the rise of militarism in Japan. Following the occupation this task was the third factor that significantly impacted the perspective of the public especially with regards to policies and provisions specific to Article 9 and their impact on Japan's international reputation.

For example, the national survey that obtained public opinion of the security arrangement between Japan and the US, located in Appendix II, demonstrated the progressive learning trend over time by also tracking the number of "don't know" responses from respondents. For example, as Appendix II shows, between 1966 and 1968 the respondents' responses of "don't know" dropped from 56% to 42%. For this reason, it is my contention that the final key factor that has shaped the attitude of the public toward whether or not Article 9 should be revised is the public's awareness of policies and provisions specific to Japan's security and their impact on Japan. Specifically, as the culture of public discussion evolved and the people grew more aware of the impact that Japan's national and security policies had on other countries and their own reputation the public opinion of Article 9 began to change. To best demonstrate this last argument it is necessary to have an understanding of the Peace Constitution, the security arrangement, and current debates regarding Article 9.

Peace Constitution:

In the beginning of the Allied occupation of Japan, General Douglas McArthur (SCAP) and the General Headquarters of the Allied Powers (GHQ) created two special committees within the Japanese Diet to amend the 1889 *Meiji* Constitution to better suit the spirit of the occupation's goals outlined by the Truman Administration.⁷⁶ However, one committee was not able to produce any drafts, and the draft that the second committee produced was rejected by the GHQ and SCAP because it did not successfully contain the factors needed to implement a democratic system.⁷⁷ On February 4, 1946, SCAP brought together a group of 24 American lawyers, headed up by Charles Louis Kades, to draft a sample constitution for Japan, modeled after the American Constitution.⁷⁸ Five days later*, the draft was completed and given to the Japanese for review. After making only minor changes to the American draft a new Japanese Constitution was adopted, also referred to as the Peace Constitution.⁷⁹ The establishment of the new Japanese constitution was followed by endless attempts to attribute the authorship to the Japanese by both Americans and the Prime Minister of Japan. However currently, this matter is no

⁷⁶ "Japanese Constitution." (November 10, 2001) <www.everything2.com/index.pl?node_id=124 > (24 February 2006).

⁷⁷ Kress, Claus. "Renunciation of War as a Universal Principle of Mankind-A Look at the Gulf War and the Japanese Constitution." *International and comparative Law Quarterly* [Vol. 44], p. 429.

⁷⁸ "Japanese Constitution." (November 10, 2001) <www.everything2.com/index.pl?node_id=124 > (24 February 2006). *Some sources state that the creation of the American draft took 7 days. Wikipedia, "Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution." <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Article_9_of_the_Constitution_of_Japan> (29 October 2007).

⁷⁹ "Japanese Constitution." (November 10, 2001) <www.everything2.com/index.pl?node_id=124 > (24 February 2006).

longer of importance but is rather an issue used to justify debates surrounding constitutional revision.⁸⁰

The final draft was approved on November 3, 1946, one year and three months after the Allied forces occupied Japan. Initially the “spirit of peace” was incorporated in the Preamble to the Japanese Constitution. But in the final draft the “spirit of peace” became the “renunciation of war” clauses outlined in Chapter 2, Article 9, also referred to as Article 9.⁸¹ Article 9 aimed to abolish war as a sovereign right. Specifically, Article 9 states:

“Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.”

As the wording implies, under this article Japan lost its right to use the threat of war or the act of an invasive war to settle disputes in addition to the rights to bear

⁸⁰ Robert E. Ward, “The Constitution and Current Japanese Politics,” *Far Eastern Survey*, American Institute of Pacific Relations, April 1956, vol. XXV, No. 4, pg. 49.

⁸¹ “Also called the *Ashida* amendment. Mr. *Ashida* was a member of the House of Representative and later became Prime minister.

arms. However, the article intentionally did not address the defense rights of Japan.⁸² The strategic ambiguousness of this section was to allow for a broad degree of interpretation. However, this also led to bitter debates which have continued into the 21st century concerning Japan's national defense rights and Article 9. Despite these debates, there were only two efforts to revise Article 9.

The first case was the *Sunakawa* case of 1959. This case addressed whether the US military forces based in Japan violated the prohibition of "war potential" in Article 9.⁸³ The *Tokyo* District Court held that the accused, US military forces based in Japan, were in violation of the Article 9 prohibition; and that Japan did not have the right to arm itself with war potential even for self-defense under Article 9.⁸⁴

"The Supreme Court overruled the judgment of the district court. It stated that Article 9 was a product of the Postdam Declaration and was a reflection of the errors of the [Japan] prior to militaristic activities. It held that Article 9 reflected the spirit of international co-operation and was 'an embodiment of the concept of

⁸² "Article 96, paragraph 1 states: 'Amendments to the Constitution shall be initiated by the Diet, through a concurring vote of two-thirds or more of all the members of each House and shall thereupon be submitted to the people for ratification, which shall require the affirmative vote of the majority of all votes cast thereupon, at a special referendum or at such election as the Diet shall specify.' Article 61 provides: 'The second paragraph of the preceding article applies also to the Diet approval required for the conclusion of treaties' and Article 60, paragraph 2 that: 'Upon consideration of the budget, when the House of Councillors makes a decision different from that of the House of Representatives, and when no agreement can be reached even through a joint committee of both Houses, provided for by law, or in the case of failure by the House of Councillors to take final action within thirty days, the period of recess excluded, after the receipt of the budget passed by the House of Representatives, the decision of the House of Representatives shall be the decision of the Diet.' Article 56, paragraph 2 that: 'All matters shall be decided, in each House, by a majority of those present...'" Kress, Claus. "Renunciation of War as a Universal Principle of Mankind-A Look at the Gulf War and the Japanese Constitution." *International and comparative Law Quarterly* [Vol. 44], p. 438.

⁸³ Kress, Claus. "Renunciation of War as a Universal Principle of Mankind-A Look at the Gulf War and the Japanese Constitution." *International and comparative Law Quarterly* [Vol. 44], p. 434-436.

⁸⁴ Kress, Claus. "Renunciation of War as a Universal Principle of Mankind-A Look at the Gulf War and the Japanese Constitution." *International and comparative Law Quarterly* [Vol. 44], p. 434-436.

pacifism which characterized the Japanese Constitution.’ ...the Supreme Court found nothing in the Article that denied Japan the inherent right of self-defense. It further stated that the pacifism advocated in the Japanese Constitution was not intended to render Japan defenseless or incapable of resistance, as a nation, in the exercise of its inherent powers, had the right to maintain whatever measures it deemed necessary for self-defense. Its resources were not limited to such military security measures as may be undertaken by an organ of the United Nations, and it was entitled to choose whatever method or means it deemed appropriate to accomplish its objectives in the light of the international situation. As such, the Supreme Court held that Article 9 did not prohibit Japan from seeking a guarantee of security from another country, in this case the United States.’⁸⁵

As a result, although Article 9 states it prohibits the establishment of armed forces, because states have the inherent right of self-defense, Article 9 does not prohibit a defensive force or the use of a security arrangement for the purpose of defense. In the end, the creation of the Self Defense Force, and the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, which will be discussed further in the next section, was not in violation of the Article 9 prohibitions.

The second case was the *Naganuma* case, first presented on September 7, 1973, which challenged the constitutionality of creating a Self-Defense Force, in 1954, and the use of a judicial review-a procedure established under Article 81 of the

⁸⁵ Kress, Claus. “Renunciation of War as a Universal Principle of Mankind-A Look at the Gulf War and the Japanese Constitution.” *International and comparative Law Quarterly* [Vol. 44], p. 434-436.

Peace Constitution.⁸⁶ Essentially, because the constitution was translated from English into Japanese, “they were able to leave gaps in the language which subsequently politicians have been able to reinterpret, and so instead of constitution revision per se, what you have is revision through reinterpretation.”⁸⁷ In its entirety, the constitution contains 103 articles or clauses. As the *Naganuma* case highlighted, because revision through reinterpretation was an available option for the Japanese government the wording of Article 9 has never been changed since the final draft of the Peace Constitution was passed in 1946 and took effect in May 1947, only re-interpreted.⁸⁸

In addition to the renunciation of war clause, in my opinion, there are two other significant features of the Peace Constitution that should be highlighted in this paper, the establishment of popular sovereignty and fundamental human rights. Chapter 1, Article 1 establishes that the Emperor is a symbol of the nation who derives his position from the will of the people who have sovereign power; and Articles 11 – 40 outline all of the basic human rights that bare a close similarity to human rights afforded under the American Constitution.⁸⁹

The formation of the people’s sovereignty and the fundamental human rights encouraged a relationship between the Post-WWII Japanese government and the

⁸⁶ Kress, Claus. “Renunciation of War as a Universal Principle of Mankind-A Look at the Gulf War and the Japanese Constitution.” *International and comparative Law Quarterly* [Vol. 44], p. 434

⁸⁷ Hogg, Chris. “Revising Japan’s ‘ambiguous’ constitution.” BBC (July 9, 2007).

⁸⁸ Hogg, Chris. “Revising Japan’s ‘ambiguous’ constitution.” BBC (July 9, 2007).

⁸⁹ Bernson, Mary Hammon and Wojtan, Linda S. “Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution.” National Clearinghouse for U.S.-Japan Studies. <<http://www.indiana.edu/~japan/LP/:s36.html>> (19 January 2004); Google, “Politics and The Constitution,” <<http://jinjapan.org/kidsweb/japan/j.html>> (19 January 2004).

Japanese people that allowed the opinions of the people to have a more direct impact on politicians. Unlike the *Meiji* Constitution, where public support rather than public opinion was valued, the Peace Constitution was designed where “Japanese public opinion may not exert decisive influence on ... foreign policy, but the political system in Japan assures greater democratic controls.”⁹⁰ According to the former Ambassador to Japan, Edwin Reischauer, “in a democracy... government decisions will on the whole mirror public opinion...”⁹¹ For Japan, although this principle was written into the Peace Constitution surveys show that in the 1960s and 1970s public opinion did not support many of the key foreign policies.⁹² As a result, between 1970s-1990s Japanese politicians chose to table the debate regarding a revision of Article 9 or reinterpret of Article 9. For example, in the national survey titled “Opinion on the Security Treaty and American bases in Japan,” found in Appendix II on page 71, 45% of the 1966 respondents and 61% of the 1968 respondents felt that the American Bases were bad for Japan. However, despite these opinions the foreign policy towards the US usage of Japanese territory as bases did not change. As a result, in the national survey, titled “Reflection of Public Opinion in Politics” found in Appendix IV-Table 4, in 1971, 1972, and 1973, 54%, 68%, and 72% of the respondents, respectively, felt that the government’s policies did not reflect the public opinion. In short, in order to implement both democracy and demilitarize there were

⁹⁰ Mendel, Douglas H. Jr. “Japanese Opinion on Key Foreign Policy Issues.” *Asian Survey*, vol. 9, No. 8. (Aug., 1969), p. 625.

⁹¹ Mendel, Douglas H. Jr. “Japanese Opinion on Key Foreign Policy Issues.” *Asian Survey*, vol. 9, No. 8. (Aug., 1969), p. 625.

⁹² Mendel, Douglas H. Jr. “Japanese Opinion on Key Foreign Policy Issues.” *Asian Survey*, Vol. 9, No. 8 (Aug., 1969), p. 625-639.

concessions that had to be made with regards to both of these two goals.⁹³ The area where democracy did succeed for the people was with regards to remilitarization. Following the return of former politician, who later made up a number of the leading political party – Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) members, the mission to revise the constitution to more closely reflect the pre-WWII system was not supported by the public opinion.⁹⁴ With Japan unprotected by its own defense force, Japan had a need for implementing a collective security under a security arrangement in Japan.

Mutual Security Treaty & Self Defense Force

At the end of WWII, it was a common practice in Japan to put the good of the nation before their individual interests. It was also traditional for the citizens to remain uninvolved in national policy decision making. However, as Japan's economy started to improve and the people realized the Allied occupation was going to peaceful, the demands and expectations of the general population, under their newly acquired human rights and popular sovereignty, grew. For example, "the labor legislation, between 1945 and 1947, granted rights to organize unions, to bargain collectively, and to strike."⁹⁵ However, as commercial empires, called *zaibatsu*, redeveloped Japan faced bitter labor disputes. In order to control public protests and

⁹³ Mendel, Douglas H. Jr. "Japanese Opinion on Key Foreign Policy Issues." *Asian Survey*, Vol. 9, No. 8 (Aug., 1969), p. 625-639

⁹⁴ At the same time, both parties [LDP and DPJ] have advocated the revision of Article 9 by adding an extra clause explicitly authorizing the use of force for the purpose of self-defense against aggression directed against the Japanese nation." The Japanese Communist Party (JCP) considers the JSDF [Japanese Self Defense Force] unconstitutional and has called for reorganization of Japanese defense policy to feature an armed militia." "Foreign policy of Japan." P. 1-7. <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_policy_of_Japan> (19 April 2006).

⁹⁵ Morton, W. Scott & Olenik, J. Kenneth. "Japan, Its History and Culture." McGraw Hill, (Fourth Edition) 2005, p. 190-230

strikes, labor demonstrations had to be suppressed by the US.⁹⁶ This surprising act from a democratic nation was used because of the growing instability in the region due to the Cold War and the start of Korean War.⁹⁷ The United States had to maintain stability in Japan in order for Japan to aid the US in its efforts to maintain stability in the region. Therefore, the occupational focus shifted by the 1950s from demilitarization and democratization to defense and rapid recovery.⁹⁸ The United States began to pressure Japan to assist the US with stopping the spread of communism and the defense of Japan.

The public and government saw the US reverse course and some economic policies of the US as cynical and opportunistic.⁹⁹ Resentment began to grow among the Japanese population that further compelled the US to pressure Japan to grow its policing measures to include land, air, and sea territories. However, within the government the parties were split regarding Japan's rights of self-defense by use of military forces and its new national policy of pacifism. Without an agreement from the Japanese to rearm for defensive purposes, on September 8, 1951, during the San Francisco Peace Conference, the United States established a treaty that would address Japan's security dilemma and the US needs – called the Japan-American Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security (MST), scheduled to be effective on April 28,

⁹⁶ Morton, W. Scott & Olenik, J. Kenneth. "Japan, Its History and Culture." McGraw Hill, (Fourth Edition) 2005, p. 190-230.

⁹⁷ Morton, W. Scott & Olenik, J. Kenneth. "Japan, Its History and Culture." McGraw Hill, (Fourth Edition) 2005, p. 190-230.

⁹⁸ Morton, W. Scott & Olenik, J. Kenneth. "Japan, Its History and Culture." McGraw Hill, (Fourth Edition) 2005, p. 190-230.

⁹⁹ Morton, W. Scott & Olenik, J. Kenneth. "Japan, Its History and Culture." McGraw Hill, (Fourth Edition) 2005, p. 190-230.

1952.¹⁰⁰ On the same day, the United States, Japan, and 46 other nation-states signed the San Francisco Peace Conference Treaty, which gave Japan back its sovereignty and ended the US-led occupation.¹⁰¹

Figure 5: The signing of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty (1951)



Bettman/CORBIS/Corbis Japan¹⁰²

Figure 6: The signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty (1951)



Bettmann/CORBIS/Corbis Japan¹⁰³

The 1951 security arrangement established provisions for the stationing of United States forces in and around Japan for the purposes of the internal and external security of the country.¹⁰⁴ In addition to aiding in the defense of Japan, the MST of 1952 included a military aid program that granted Japan the ability to acquire material, acquisition funds, and services necessary for Japan's defense.¹⁰⁵ The 1952 version of the MST also included the assertion that the MST would be revisited in the

¹⁰⁰ "Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America - January 19, 1960." < <http://133.12.178.4/Faculty/Devine/documents/security60.html> > (19 May 2000).

¹⁰¹ Sakurada, Daizo. "For Mutual Benefit: The Japan-US Security Treaty: From a Japanese Perspective." *Centre for Strategic Studies*, (July 1997)

<http://www.vuw.ac.nz/css/docs/working_papers/WP07.html> (20 February 2003).

¹⁰² Photo from, Embassy of Japan - <http://www.us.emb-japan.go.jp/english/html/japanus/japanusoverview.htm>

¹⁰³ Photo from, Embassy of Japan - <http://www.us.emb-japan.go.jp/english/html/japanus/japanusoverview.htm>

¹⁰⁴ "Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan." < http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/House_of_Representatives_of_Japan > (18 March 2006).

¹⁰⁵ "Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan." < http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/House_of_Representatives_of_Japan > (18 March 2006).

near future once a mutually acceptable alternative agreement is adopted.¹⁰⁶ For the US this security arrangement also permitted “for the US military intervention, at the request from *Tokyo*, in suppressing ‘large-scale internal riots and disturbances in Japan caused through instigation or intervention by outside Power or Powers (Article I).’”¹⁰⁷ Essentially this initial draft of the treaty undermined Japan’s newly acquired sovereignty under the San Francisco Peace Conference Treaty by proclaiming that the U.S. was permitted intervene in domestic affairs. In addition, the 1952 treaty did not provide the US with much receptacle compensation for the task of securing Japan.

Essentially, the unfair elements in the 1952 MST were a result of the United States’ foreign policy towards the East. At this time, the United States’ foreign policy was not “based on a concern for, or understanding of the peoples and culture of East Asia...[But rather] a pragmatic consideration of strategic and economic interests of the United States.” For example, Article 9’s prohibitions initially meet the ally’s occupation goals; however once the Cold War and the Korean War began the US was forced to reverse course with its policy of disarming Japan. It took Japan two years of debating before they reached a compromise that met some of the demands of the US, which resulted in the creation of the Self-Defense Force (SDF) in 1954. By 1956, Japan signed an agreement with Russia to resume diplomatic relations and Japan was then admitted into the United Nations.

¹⁰⁶ “A Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security with Japan: Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate-Eighty-sixth congress second session on Ex. E, 86th =congress, 2D Session, June 7, 1960.” United States Government Printing Office Washington (1960), p. 2-3.

¹⁰⁷ Sakurada, Daizo. “For Mutual Benefit: The Japan-US Security Treaty: From a Japanese Perspective.” *Centre for Strategic Studies*, (July 1997)

<http://www.vuw.ac.nz/css/docs/working_papers/WP07.html> (20 February 2003).

However, as the threat of Communism continued to escalate in the East, Japan became the United States' most important ally in the region. As a result, it became imperative that the MST be revised in order to foster a more equal and mutually beneficial arrangement that would create an indestructible partnership between the US and Japan.¹⁰⁸ However, after the revised treaty was passed, on January 19, 1960, violent opposition erupted among both politicians and some citizens.¹⁰⁹ The reason why only some of the citizens were involved in the protests was because a large majority of the population was unfamiliar with the provisions of the constitution and the security arrangement. According to newspaper and Japanese Government surveys on the constitution, at this time about 50% of the general population was ignorant of the constitution's contents, and a similar percentage did not know of any of the provisions contained within the revised Security Treaty.¹¹⁰ The largest disagreement was focused on how the treaty was passed, not just the provisions of the treaty that violated the provisions of Article 9. Specifically, the Japan Socialist Party, one of the leftist political parties, attempted to prevent the LDP, the most powerful political party in Japan at that time, from entering into the lower house chambers for voting.¹¹¹ Once the police ended the boycott the revised MST was passed by a default. The public backlash from this event forced the

¹⁰⁸ United States Government Printing Office, Washington. "A Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security with Japan: Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate-Eighty-Sixth Congress Second Session on Ex. E, 86th =congress, 2D Session, June 7, 1960." 1960, p. 2.

¹⁰⁹ "Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the Untied States and Japan." <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/House_of_Representatives_of_Japan > (18 March 2006).

¹¹⁰ Mendel, Douglas H. Jr. "Japanese Views of Sato's Foreign Policy: The Credibility Gap." *Asian Survey*, Vol. 7, No. 7 (Jul., 1967), p. 444-456.

¹¹¹ "Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the Untied States and Japan." <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/House_of_Representatives_of_Japan > (18 March 2006).

cancellation of the US President Eisenhower's scheduled visit to Japan and prompted the Japanese Prime Minister *Kishi Nobusuke*'s resignation.¹¹²

Despite the opposition to the revised security treaty, the revised treaty was much more mutually beneficial than the previous version. The MST of 1960 outlined provisions regarding the further development of international cooperation and future economic cooperation.¹¹³ Under Article 1 of the MST both the US and Japan are instructed to seek peaceful resolutions to international conflict and to work with other peace-seeking nations to strengthen the United Nations (UN).¹¹⁴ Articles 2 and 4, of the MST, state that both member states must engage in economic and military collaborations for the purpose of promoting stability and well-being.¹¹⁵ However, Article 3 states that as a result of Japan's renunciation of war clause they are not obligated to provide military aid in the defense of the United States or their peacekeeping or peacemaking initiatives. However, Article 3 stresses that both Japan and the United States, "individually and in cooperation with each other, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop subject to their constitutional provisions, their capacities to resist armed attack."¹¹⁶ And

¹¹² "Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan." <
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/House_of_Representatives_of_Japan > (18 March 2006).

¹¹³ "Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States." <
http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Mutual_Cooperation_and_Security_between_Japan_and_the_United_States_of_America > (22 March 2006).

¹¹⁴ "Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States." <
http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Mutual_Cooperation_and_Security_between_Japan_and_the_United_States_of_America > (22 March 2006).

¹¹⁵ "Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States." <
http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Mutual_Cooperation_and_Security_between_Japan_and_the_United_States_of_America > (22 March 2006).

¹¹⁶ Larson, Thomas D. and Skidmore, David. International Political Economy: The Struggle for Power and Wealth. Wadsworth (Third Edition) 2003, p. 452-454.

under Article 10, Japan or the United States were permitted to terminate the MST anytime after 1970, which neither state has done.

Essentially, the MST imposes the United States' desire that Japan grows its Self-Defense Force to improve its defense capabilities and that Japan should support UN peacekeeping operations (UNPKO). In fact, the United States has been pressuring Japan since the start of the Korean War to expand its defensive capabilities to better support the US efforts to maintain stability in the region. Because a large number of the politicians holding power in the new government were former politicians from the pre-WWII government, Article 9 was a safety valve against militarism for many of the fractional parties who opposed the revisionist goals of the majority party and the US. Without a consensus in the government or support by the public, Japan adapted the interpretation of Article 9 to allow Japan to meet some of the American demands.¹¹⁷ The non-decision of the government to revise Article 9 can be attributed to the traditional method of policy decision making. The Japanese has a traditional culture of making decisions by consensus. Because the public was historically uninvolved with policy decision making, the debates regarding policy remained primarily among politicians. In turn, the task of obtaining a consensus among both politicians and now the public was overwhelmingly difficult. For this

¹¹⁷ “The LDP government has interpreted Article 9 as renouncing the use of warfare in international disputes but not in internal use of force for the purpose of maintaining law and order. The main opposition party, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) tends to concur with the government’s interpretation. At the same time, both parties have advocated the revision of Article 9 by adding an extra clause explicitly authorizing the use of force for the purpose of self-defense against aggression directed against the Japanese nation.” The oppositional parties “consider the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) as unconstitutional and advocated the full implementation of Article 9 through the demilitarization of Japan...The Japanese Communist Party (JCP) considers the JSDF unconstitutional and has called for reorganization of Japanese defense policy to feature an armed militia.” (Wikipedia, 2007: 3).

reason, for the next 20 years after the occupation of Japan, the government tabled the subject of revising Article 9. However, as public discussions began to expand there was a corresponding shift in the number of people who favored a possible revision. As a result of the changing tide in the culture of public discussion, there has been a very aggressive attempt by the Prime Minister and the government to amend Article 9 and to continue to stretch the interpretation of Article 9 to include participating in collective defense. For example, the below Table illustrates the public opinion trends between 2001-2005. (See also, Appendix IV on page 76). As the table shows, there have been aggressive policies undertaken by the government that have been pushing Japan closer towards increasing its self-defense capabilities and allowing the defense force to participate in collective defensive operations.

Figure 7: 2001-2005 Public Opinion Trends¹¹⁸

Summary of Case Studies

Case	LDP-CGP Bargain	LDP-DPJ Bargain	Public Opinion	Passage
Antiterror Legislation 2001	Yes. LDP concession on legislation.	No	Pro	Yes
Emergency Measures Law 2002	No	No	Mixed	No
Emergency Measures Law 2003	No	Yes	Mixed	Yes
Self-Defense Forces dispatch to Iraq 2004 (passed 2003)	Yes. LDP-CGP logroll.	No	Con	Yes
Constitutional revision 2005?	Likely	Almost certain	Pro	?

¹¹⁸ Pekkanen, Robert and Krauss, Ellis S. "Japan's 'Coalition of the Willing' on Security Policies." Elsevier Limited on behalf of Foreign Policy Research Institute (Summer 2005), p. 429-444.

For Japan the MST was vital to its security and gave Japan the freedom to focus its resources on its economy. However the MST has also contributed to the growing division between the pacifists and pro-revisionist Japanese government and public. As the economy improved, so did the desire to regain its honorable place in the world community and possibly become a “normal nation.” This growing desire was also reflected in the public opinion towards Americans, which shifted to a more neutral position. (See Appendix IV, Survey of Pro- and Anti- American feelings (1960-1975), on page 77.) However, the public still passionately opposed the possibility of remilitarization.¹¹⁹

Current Debate

Prior to the Gulf War and the transformation of the prime minister’s role, in the 1980s, “most Japanese in the post-World War II period have been unconcerned with international crises, and have behaved as if the Korean War, the Taiwan Strait’s crisis, the Chinese nuclear weapon program, the Vietnam War and the Indo-Pakistani war had nothing to do with Japan’s security.”¹²⁰ However, at the end of Gulf War I and the growing North Korean nuclear threat, Japanese public opinion and the government began to show signs of growing closer together. (See Appendix IV- public opinion trend). The small improvement in the consensus gap was a result of

¹¹⁹ Mendel, Douglas H. Jr. “Japanese Views of Sato’s Foreign Policy: The Credibility Gap.” *Asian Survey*, Vol. 7, No. 7 (Jul., 1967), p. 444-456.

¹²⁰ Konmi, Kazumi. “The Future of Japan in Terms of National Security.” *Asian Survey*, Vol. 14, No. 4. (Apr., 1974), p. 365-374.

an electoral reform, a stronger role of the prime minister, and the growing public realization that Japan's foreign policy, constrained by Article 9, is damaging to its ability to meet their obligations under the MST and as a UN member. According to Robert Pekkanen and Ellis Krauss, author of "Japan's 'Coalition of the Willing' on Security Policies," the electoral reform of 1994 introduced a new, hybrid mixed-member electoral system similar to some European democracies where voters would get two ballots: "one for an individual in the single member district and one for the party in the proportional-representation regional constituencies, with the candidates elected based on their pre-election party-list ranking. This provided the strong link to constituents afforded by single-member districts and also proportional-representation legislators..."¹²¹ Under this electoral system, the long standing party leader, LDP, who favored a revisionist policy, did not do as well. In fact for the first time since 1955, the party lost the majority of seats.

In addition to electoral reforms, the transformation of the prime minister's influence, over national policies, also had a great impact on the public opinion. This change started with Prime Minister *Yasuhiro Nakasone* (1982-1987), who used the media to gain more influence on policies and elections.¹²² Essentially, the prime ministers during the 80s into the present began to carve out a role for their position that was independent of their party. As a result, during this transformation, "unprecedented defense and security measures, such as extending the Self-Defense

¹²¹ Pekkanen, Robert and Krauss, Ellis S. "Japan's "Coalition of the Willing" on Security Policies." *Orbis*, Elsevier Limited on behalf of Foreign Policy Research Institute (Summer 2005), p. 435.

¹²² Pekkanen, Robert and Krauss, Ellis S. "Japan's "Coalition of the Willing" on Security Policies." *Orbis*, Elsevier Limited on behalf of Foreign Policy Research Institute (Summer 2005), p. 435.

Forces' protection of Japan's sea lanes and concluding a military technology transfer agreement with the United States," were implemented.¹²³

Essentially, the prime ministers took a more central role in security and crisis policymaking. Under this transformation of the prime ministers, Japan moved from using just "checkbook diplomacy," where they only supplied financial support to UN peace keeping operations (UNPKO), to sending troops abroad to assist logistically in peace keeping operation and to assist in national disaster emergencies. By using the media to gain more power and public support for implementing these defense and foreign policy strategies, the public gained more access to policymaking decisions and the provisions. Basically, the prime ministers used "policymaking commissions, participation in overseas meetings, and the hosting of foreign guests, for "photo ops" opportunities, with the goal that by increasing their visibility they would inadvertently increase the power of the prime minister.¹²⁴ This is the third factor that has contributed to the trend towards a revision consensus between the public population and the government. The learning curve for acquiring an increase awareness of public policies and provisions specific to Article 9 as well as their impact on Japan's reputation abroad is one of the primary factors that contribute to the public opinion perspective that opposed revision of Article 9.

¹²³ Pekkanen, Robert and Krauss, Ellis S. "Japan's "Coalition of the Willing" on Security Policies." *Orbis*, Elsevier Limited on behalf of Foreign Policy Research Institute (Summer 2005), p. 435.

¹²⁴ Shinn, Rinn-Sup. "Japanese Participation in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations." *Foreign Affairs Analyst Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division*, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress (August, 24, 1992) p. 1-7.

Historically, the Japanese people were excluded from national policy making and therefore unaware of governmental policies and provisions. However, as argued by *Setsu Kobayashi*, a constitutional professor at *Tokyo's Keio University*, “currently, the government discloses information that is beneficial to bureaucrats and hides what is not.”¹²⁵ This lack of information, along with the Japanese history and the memory of WWII, has contributed to the public’s pacifist attitude towards Japan’s defense policies.¹²⁶ As a result, Japan’s ability to meet its alliance and national obligations are limited. According to professor *Nakamura*, without full transparency of government information, the government is able to stretch the meaning of Article 9 even further.¹²⁷ This method of reinterpretation is acceptable by the people at this time, because “despite the realization that Japan’s traditional defense [status] may have serious weaknesses, very few people think that Japan should abandon its traditional pacifist security [position]. Rather they want to find a way to modify it. The goal is to modify the security poster in response to the new reality of the post-9/11 world without changing the main structure of the policy, according to Professor *Kamiya*.”¹²⁸

In addition, the more media coverage that the prime minister had, the more his is able to improve the exposure that the public has regarding how interconnected

¹²⁵ Nakamura, Akemi. “Modify Constitution for modern world, scholar urges.” *The Japan Times* (May 5, 2007), p. 1-4.

¹²⁶ Nakamura, Akemi. “Modify Constitution for modern world, scholar urges.” *The Japan Times* (May 5, 2007), p. 1-4.

¹²⁷ Nakamura, Akemi. “Modify Constitution for modern world, scholar urges.” *The Japan Times* (May 5, 2007), p. 1-4.

¹²⁸ Nakamura, Akemi. “Modify Constitution for modern world, scholar urges.” *The Japan Times* (May 5, 2007), p. 1-4.

Japan's security and business interest have become during the new era of anti-terrorism. As professor Fukushima stated in the article "changing US-Japan Security Relations," the Japanese "took on a 'passive pacifist' role in order not to repeat WWII mistakes. But after the Gulf War, Japan realized that it needed to change the nature of pacifism from passive to pro-active by showing the world that it has the willingness to do what is necessary to protect peace in the international community.¹²⁹ As a result, several provisions were made to greatly strengthen the Japan-American relationship under the MST and better prepare Japan for crisis and to improve its role in the world.¹³⁰

The strategy for implementing these goals includes strengthening and redefining the MST. By improving this relationship, Japan positioned itself into a more demanding role with the US and subsequently the United Nations (UN). Given's Japan's obligations under the MST, during the end of the Cold War, rising threats from North Korea, and the onset of anti-terrorism measures, Japan has been grossly criticized for its passive pacifist role that it took during various US and UN peacekeeping operations.¹³¹ For example, "Japan's failure to do more than provide money to aid the coalition's cause in the Gulf War had subjected [Japan] to scathing criticism as practicing only "checkbook diplomacy" while other countries sent their

¹²⁹ Nakamura, Akemi. "Modify Constitution for modern world, scholar urges." *The Japan Times* (May 5, 2007), p. 1-4.

¹³⁰ Pekkanen, Robert and Krauss, Ellis S. "Japan's 'Coalition of the Willing' on Security Policies." *Orbis*, Elsevier Limited on behalf of Foreign Policy Research Institute (Summer 2005), p. 429-444.

¹³¹ Green, Michael J. and Cronin, Patrick M. eds. "The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Past, Present, and Future." New York: *Council on Foreign Relations Press*, 1999, p. 322.

young men to die for Kuwait's freedom.”¹³² In short, by improving Japan's relationship with the US under the MST it obligated itself to taking a more active role in peacekeeping operations under Article 1. By not actively participating in peacekeeping activities beyond financial and/or logistical support, Japan was forced, through international criticism, to realize that the current prohibitions of Article 9 were undermining its efforts to regain a 'normal nation' position in the world community.

It was this national attention that improved the public discussion of security in Japan. Given the criticism of Japan after Persian Gulf War, and subsequent demands for Japanese aid beyond fiscal support, the public was no longer reluctant to review and debate Japan's security dilemma. Essentially, public debates served to improve the public's awareness of the policies and procedures directly related to and impacted by Article 9. Given this phenomenon, as the amount of information that the public receives increases there has also been an increase in public support for an Article 9 revision. Overall, international and regional crises have made the “Japanese citizens aware of the need for and the cost of Japanese peace, security, and safety... In fact, in 1977... it was argued that such a bill [which would establish laws regarding Japan's response to armed attack] would lead to remilitarization of Japan. [As a result], the public was strongly reluctant to even debate or discuss these possibilities and these possibilities and these bills. [However], the North Korean nuclear crisis in 1993 and

¹³² Pekkanen, Robert and Krauss, Ellis S. “Japan's “Coalition of the Willing” on Security Policies.” *Orbis*, Elsevier Limited on behalf of Foreign Policy Research Institute (Summer 2005), p. 429-444

in 1994 led to their acceptance of a stronger alliance with the United States.¹³³ According to an opinion poll conducted by Japan's largest newspaper, *Yomiuri shinbun*, in March 2000, 60% of those polled supported the idea of revising Article 9.¹³⁴ The most common reasons given in this survey for this revisionist perspective were that they wanted to "enable Japan to actively participate in UNPKO" and the "political interpretation and practice of Article 9 caused ambiguity and confusion."¹³⁵

Although a trend demonstrates that a movement towards greater public discussion is demonstrated in Appendix 2, given the lack of consensus within government regarding this topic and as well as within the public, the wording of Article 9 will remain the status quo even while Japan continues to strengthen its security arrangement with the US. However, a change in the public perception through an influx of criticism and access to more government information is making the possibility of revision more real.

¹³³ Fukushima, Akiko. "Popular Perceptions of Japan's New Security Role." *Asian Perspective Seminar*, (November 20, 2003), Washington D.C., p. 1-18.

¹³⁴ Itoh, Mayumi. "Japanese Constitutional Revision: A Neo-Liberal Proposal for Article 9 in Comparative Perspective." *Asian Survey*, Vol. 41, NO. 2. (Mar.-Apr., 2001), pp. 310-327.

¹³⁵ Itoh, Mayumi. "Japanese Constitutional Revision: A Neo-Liberal Proposal for Article 9 in Comparative Perspective." *Asian Survey*, Vol. 41, NO. 2. (Mar.-Apr., 2001), pp. 310-327.

Conclusions

Although Article 9 and the MST have contributed to the peace of Japan, Article 9 and the MST have also constrained Japan's ability to regain "an honorable place" in the world community. Essentially, Article 9 supported by the MST's Article 3, limits Japan's role in its national defense and international peacekeeping operations under the UN. As a result, the debate that was tabled by politicians during the Cold War, if Japan should revise Chapter 2, Article 9 has regained momentum as international crisis and threats from North Korea have begun to change the public attitude towards Japan's previous passive pacifist policy. The arguments for revision include, "the fact that the constitution was written by Americans and allegedly imposed upon the Japanese Government by SCAP," the fact that Article 9 is ambiguous and does not explicitly allow for a Self-Defense Force or include provisions for national emergencies, and Japan's inability under the status quo to meet its obligations to UN and MST.

Given the above debate, it is believed that the only way Article 9 will be revised is if there is a consensus between the public and the government regarding the changes. However, this consensus has not been reached. In fact, there has been a sizeable gap between public opinion and national policy. This gap is a result of Japan's historical norms and traditional policy making procedures, the public's loss of trust in the government, and the lack of information regarding policies and provisions of the Peace Constitutions and MST. However, as these three areas have undergone significant transformations, there has been a trend towards a change in public opinion regarding a possible revision of Article 9. Despite this progress, there are sizeable

gaps between proponents for a revision of Article 9 in government and within the general population. In addition, there is not an agreed consensus on specifically what would be changed if Article 9 is revised. As a result, it is less likely that a revision of Article 9 will be implemented in the immediate future. However, given the public option trend towards revision of Article 9, it is possible that a revision will be implemented in an effort to address the core arguments in this debate.

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61. Yoshiyuki Motomura. "Permanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations." *At the Meeting of the Security Council on Threats to International Peace and Security Caused by Terrorist Act* (4 April 2003) <<http://www.un.int/japan/statements/motomura030404.html>> (12 November 2003).

Interviews:

1. David Albrecht, Executive Assistant to Consulate General of Japan. Interviewed by Lakisha Mitchell. Notes only. Japanese Consulate of Kansas City, 12 November 2002.
2. Takao Shibata, Consulate General of Japan. Interviewed by Lakisha Mitchell. Notes and tape recording. Japanese Consulate of Kansas City, 19 November 2002.

Appendix

I. Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of

America¹³⁶

ARTICLE I

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. The Parties will endeavor in concert with other peace-loving countries to strengthen the United Nations so that its mission of maintaining international peace and security may be discharged more effectively.

ARTICLE II

The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between them.

ARTICLE III

The Parties, individually and in cooperation with each other, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop, subject to their constitutional provisions, their capacities to resist armed attack.

ARTICLE IV

The Parties will consult together from time to time regarding the implementation of this Treaty, and, at the request of either Party, whenever the security of Japan or international peace and security in the Far East is threatened.

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<http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Mutual_Cooperation_and_Security_between_Japan_and_the_United_States_of_America > (22 March 2006).

ARTICLE V

Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

ARTICLE VI

For the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East, the United States of America is granted the use by its land, air and naval forces of facilities and areas in Japan. The use of these facilities and areas as well as the status of United States armed forces in Japan shall be governed by a separate agreement, replacing the Administrative Agreement under Article III of the Security Treaty between Japan and the United States of America, signed at Tokyo on February 28, 1952, as amended, and by such other arrangements as may be agreed upon.

ARTICLE VII

This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

ARTICLE VIII

This Treaty shall be ratified by Japan and the United States of America in accordance with their respective constitutional processes and will enter into force on the date on which the instruments of ratification thereof have been exchanged by them in Tokyo.

ARTICLE IX

The Security Treaty between Japan and the United States of America signed at the city of San Francisco on September 8, 1951 shall expire upon the entering into force of this Treaty.

ARTICLE X

This Treaty shall remain in force until in the opinion of the Governments of Japan and the United States of America there shall have come into force such United Nations arrangements as will satisfactorily provide for the maintenance of international peace and security in the Japan area. However, after the Treaty has been in force for ten years, either Party may give notice to the other Party of its intention to terminate the Treaty, in which case the Treaty shall terminate one year after such notice has been given.

In witness whereof the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.

Done in duplicate at Washington in the Japanese and English languages, both equally authentic, this 19th day of January, 1960. For Japan:

Nobusuke Kishi

Aiichiro Fujiyama

Mitsujiro Ishii

Tadashi Adachi

Koichiro Asakai

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

Christian A. Herter

Douglas MacArthur 2nd

J. Graham Parsons

II. Public opinion survey of Japanese attitude towards US bases

Opinion on the Security Treaty and American Bases in Japan*

(in percent)

(1) "Should the US-Japan Security Treaty be continued beyond 1970 or cancelled by Japan?"

	Con- tinued	Can- celled	Don't know	Total	Plurality index ^a	(Number of cases)
National sample (Nov. 1966) ^b	19	25	56	100	- 6	2,258
National sample (Dec. 1968)	37	21	42	100	+16	2,445
<u>1968 Subgroups</u>						
Males	48	27	25	100	+21	1,095
Females	28	16	56	100	+12	1,350
Age 20-29	34	29	37	100	+ 5	579
Age 60 and over	35	12	53	100	+23	348
Primary education	29	14	57	100	+15	299
University education	41	37	22	100	+ 4	191
Lib-Dem voters	54	11	35	100	+43	936
Socialist voters	25	41	34	100	-16	462
<u>Pro-treaty Plurality Indices of Selected Groups</u>						
Male Lib-Dems	+53				Fear future Peking attack	+41
Male opposition voters	-23				Don't fear Peking attack	+ 6
Younger Lib-Dems (to 40)	+34				US should defend Formosa	+60
Younger opposition (to 40)	-17				US shouldn't defend Formosa	+ 6
Univ. educ. Lib-Dems	+48				Nuclear arms good for Japan	+40
Univ. educ. opposition voters	-27				Nuclear arms bad for Japan	+ 8

	Con- tinued	Can- celled	Don't know	Total	Plurality index ^a	(Number of cases)
National sample (Nov. 1966) ^b	19	25	56	100	- 6	2,258
National sample (Dec. 1968)	37	21	42	100	+16	2,445
<u>1968 Subgroups</u>						
Males	48	27	25	100	+21	1,095
Females	28	16	56	100	+12	1,350

(2) "What do you think of American bases in Japan? Are the military bases good or bad for Japan?"

	Good	Bad	Don't know	Total	Plurality index	Plurality (Number of cases)
National sample (1966)	18	45	37	100	-27	(as above)
National sample (1968)	14	61	25	100	-46	"
<u>1968 Subgroups</u>						
Males	21	61	18	100	-40	"
Females	9	61	30	100	-52	"
Age 20-29	9	72	19	100	-63	"
Primary education	13	44	43	100	-31	"
University education	15	70	15	100	-55	"
Farmers and fishermen	19	50	31	100	-31	504
Office workers	15	72	13	100	-57	338
Factory workers	11	69	20	100	-58	350

Anti-base Plurality Indices of Selected Groups

Male Lib-Dems	-17	Oppose nuclear weapons	-58
Male opposition voters	-69	Favor bases in Okinawa	+15
Younger Lib-Dems	-50	Oppose bases in Okinawa	-72
Younger opposition voters	-75	Fear Peking attack	-26
University-educ. Lib-Dems	-18	Don't fear Peking	-53
University-educ. opposition	-85	Pro-Formosa defense	-10
Pro-Security Treaty	-22	Anti-Formosa defense	-61
Anti-Security Treaty	-85	"Get out of Vietnam"	-65
Favor nuclear weapons	-26	"Stay in So. Vietnam"	-16

III. Public Opinion Survey of Reversion of Okinawa and Retention of US Bases

*Opinion on Reversion of Okinawa and Retention of US Military Bases**
(in per cent)

(1) "Should America return Okinawa to Japan immediately, or in 1970, or unavoidably after 1970?"

	Immedi- ately	After 1970	After 1970	Don't know	Total	Pre-1971 Plurality ^a	Number of cases
National	41	16	19	24	100	+28	(same
Males	44	19	25	12	100	+38	as
Females	39	14	15	32	100	+38	table 1)
Age 20-29	43	18	21	18	100	+40	
Age 60 and over	34	11	17	38	100	+28	
Primary education	32	8	15	45	100	+25	
University education	45	27	24	14	100	+38	
Farmers and fishermen	43	13	18	26	100	+38	
Merchants; professionals	41	18	27	14	100	+32	
Office workers	48	23	20	9	100	+51	
Factory workers	46	19	20	15	100	+45	

Pro-reversion Indices of Selected Groups

All Lib-Dem voters	+41	Anti-Japan US bases	+43
Socialist voters	+51	Pro-US bases in Okinawa	+40
Younger Lib-Dem voters	+35	Anti-US bases in Okinawa	+49
Younger opposition voters	+50	Fear Peking attack	+45
University-educ. Lib-Dems	+32	Don't fear Peking	+31

^aYara was opposed by the mayor of Naha, leader of the Okinawan LDP, who favored a more gradual, conditional approach to reversion.

⁷No real surveys were conducted on the reversion issue in Okinawa until 1967, when a Tokyo University group made a small study followed by more elaborate surveys by both Okinawan newspapers (the *Okinawa Times*, 1968, and the *Ryukyu Shimpo*, 1967-1968—three surveys). For the *Okinawa Times*' results, see the *Weekly Okinawa Times*, August 31, 1968 or the daily edition of August 28, 1968. The *Shimpo* poll was reported in three separate booklets published by that newspaper on August 20, 1967, February 25, 1968, and June 10, 1968, all under the title "*Okinawa no Yoron*" ("Okinawan Opinion"). In December 1966 and December 1967 the Tokyo University Sociology Research Room conducted field surveys, the results of which were summarized by the Research and Evaluation Division, Public Affairs Department, USCAR (Naha), April 1968. See also the *Asahi* (Tokyo), October 17, 1967 (report on its Okinawa/Japan survey of the previous month); *Mainichi* (Tokyo), October 3, 1967 (results of its September survey); the *Jiji* Press poll in Okinawa, reported March 29, 1968 by USCAR; and the reversion survey by the Okinawan Reversion Problem Study Council, May 1968, translated by USCAR in August 1968.

Pro-reversion Indices of Selected Groups			
University-educ. opposition	+55	Defend Formosa	+25
Pro-Security treaty	+30	Don't defend Formosa	+50
Anti-Security treaty	+60	Get out of Vietnam	+48
Pro-Japan US bases	+20	Stay in So. Vietnam	+35

(2) "After America returns Okinawa to Japan, should American military bases remain there or not?"

	Remain	No	Don't know	Total	Plurality	(Number of cases)
National sample (1966)	10	57	33	100	-47	(same as table 1)
National sample (1968)	18	62	20	100	-44	
(1968) Males	28	62	10	100	-44	
Females	11	61	28	100	-50	
Age 20 to 29	15	71	14	100	-56	
Age 60 and over	22	44	34	100	-22	
Primary education	27	56	17	100	-29	
University education	23	73	4	100	-50	
Farmers and fishermen	22	55	23	100	-33	
Merchants and profess.	27	58	15	100	-31	
Office workers	22	69	9	100	-47	
Factory workers	19	69	12	100	-50	

Anti-base Indices of Selected Groups 1968

Lib-Dem voters	-41	Favor bases in Japan	+33
Socialist voters	-51	Oppose bases in Japan	-70
Younger Lib-Dems (to 40)	-43	Fear Peking attack	-17
Younger opposition voters	-67	Don't fear Peking	-59
Pro-Security treaty	-12	"Get out of Vietnam"	-61
Anti-Security treaty	-78	"Stay in So. Vietnam"	-7

*Data from the writer's December 1968 Japan national survey conducted by Central Research Services.

^aIndex derived by subtracting "After 1970" from percentages favoring quicker reversion in Q. 1, and by subtracting percentage opposed to base retention from that favoring it in Q. 2.

IV. 2001-2005 Public Opinion Trend¹³⁷

Summary of Case Studies

Case	LDP-CGP Bargain	LDP-DPJ Bargain	Public Opinion	Passage
Antiterror Legislation 2001	Yes. LDP concession on legislation.	No	Pro	Yes
Emergency Measures Law 2002	No	No	Mixed	No
Emergency Measures Law 2003	No	Yes	Mixed	Yes
Self-Defense Forces dispatch to Iraq 2004 (passed 2003)	Yes. LDP-CGP logroll.	No	Con	Yes
Constitutional revision 2005?	Likely	Almost certain	Pro	?

¹³⁷ Pekkanen, Robert and Krauss, Ellis S. "Japan's 'Coalition of the Willing' on Security Policies." Elsevier Limited on behalf of Foreign Policy Research Institute (Summer 2005), p. 429-444.

PUBLIC OPINION IN JAPAN		
Pro- and Anti-American Feelings		
	<i>For</i>	<i>Against</i>
1960	47%	6%
1961	48	6
1962	44	6
1963	47	5
1964	49	4
1965	41	7
1966	39	8
1967	36	8
1968	31	11
1969	34	8
1970	33	8
1971	26	11
1972	23	11
1973	18	13
1974	18	10
1975	22	8

SOURCE: Jiji Press. Annual average except 1975, which is an average for January-August period.

1966-1969: The greatest postwar investment boom took place, and there was general contentment with the present and a bright outlook for the future.

1970- : The end of rapid economic growth brought increasing pessimism regarding the future of daily life and society.

These changes in Japanese opinion correspond closely to fluctuations in the economy, suggesting that economic changes had a great influence on the trend of opinion. In view of limitations of space, we shall deal here primarily with parts 2 and 3 rather than elaborate on the entire results of the study.

TRENDS IN FEELINGS TOWARDS FOREIGN COUNTRIES

Shortly after the war, the percentage of pro-American Japanese was 66 percent (1950) and 64 percent (1951), indicating that national sentiment towards the United States promptly turned for the better with the end of the war. The percentages began to dwindle after that, however, falling to the 40-30 percent level in the 1960s and as low as 20 percent in the 1970s (see Table 1).

This sharp decrease in the ratio of pro-American Japanese does not necessarily mean a corresponding increase in the number of anti-Americans, however. Rather, it reflects an increase in the number of neutrals who profess to neither like nor dislike Americans. There are various fac-

¹³⁸ Kojima, Kazuto. "Public Opinion Trends in Japan." *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 41, No.2. (Summer, 1977), pp. 206-216.

VI. Survey of public attitude toward national policy decisions.¹³⁹

Relative Merits of the Japanese and Westerners

	1951	1953	1963	1968	1973
The Japanese are superior	28%	20%	33%	47%	39%
The Japanese are inferior	47	28	14	11%	9
No difference	—	14	16	12	18

SOURCE: 1951—Yomiuri Shinbun; 1953-1973—Institute of Statistical Mathematics.

The Leave-Everything-to-the-Politicians Attitude

If outstanding politicians are available, it is better to leave everything in their hands than for the people to debate about affairs of public interest.

	1953	1958	1963	1968	1973
For	43%	35%	29%	30%	23%
Against	38	44	47	51	51
Depends on the time and person	9	10	12	10	15

SOURCE: Institute of Statistical Mathematics.

Reflection of Public Opinion in Politics

	1968	1969	1970	1971	1973
Reflected	39%	40%	38%	16%	22%
Not reflected	37	39	54	68	72

SOURCES: 1968—Prime Minister's Office; 1969, 1973—Japan Broadcasting Corporation; 1970—Mainichi Shinbun; 1971—Komei Senkyo Renmei.

¹³⁹ Kojima, Kazuto. "Public Opinion Trends in Japan." *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 41, No.2. (Summer, 1977), pp. 206-216.

No Political Party Allegiance (by Age)

	<i>1953</i>	<i>1963</i>	<i>1973</i>
Whole nation	19%	22%	33%
Age			
20-29	20	25	46
30-39	20	23	30
40-49	16	19	25
50-59	22	23	24
60-	19	21	24


SOURCE: Institute of Statistical Mathematics.

VII. Change in nationalism, democratic tendencies and precedence of private life

Preferred Way of Living					
	<i>1953</i>	<i>1958</i>	<i>1963</i>	<i>1968</i>	<i>1973</i>
For self-fulfillment: to live according to one's liking without regard for money or honor	21%	27%	30%	32%	39%
For comfort: to live a life of ease without worries	11	18	19	20	23
For wealth: to work hard in order to become rich	15	17	17	17	14
For integrity: to live honestly and uprightly, working against injustice in the world	29	23	18	17	11
For society: to sacrifice one's life in the service of society	10	6	6	6	5
For honor: to study hard in order to become famous	6	3	4	3	3

SOURCE: Institute of Statistical Mathematics.

VIII: Survey-“What would be the way to ensure Japan’s security?” (1969-2003)¹⁴⁰



- **Maintain Existing Japan-US Security Framework and Self-Defense Forces**
- **Scrap Japan-US Security Treaty and enhance Self-Defense Forces to achieve security independently**
- **Scrap Japan-US Security Treaty and cut back or abolish Self-Defense Forces**

¹⁴⁰ Fukushima, Akiko. “Popular Perceptions of Japan’s New Security Role.” *Asian Perspective*

Seminar, (November 20, 2003), Washington D.C., p. 14.