THE MYTH OF SELF-DETERMINATION:
HOW INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS DECIDE THE FATES OF SMALL
NATIONS;
CASE STUDIES FROM CENTRAL EUROPE

BY

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Abstract

The number of stateless ethno-national groups exceeds the number of groups that exercise sovereignty over the lands in which they live. The purpose of this thesis is to determine what makes one group more likely than another to attain statehood. The study begins with a review of literature that focuses on nationalism. From this literature review are derived three hypotheses as to how groups gain independence. Using comparative case studies from Central Europe, these hypotheses are tested against available evidence. The findings of these case studies suggest that certain institutional arrangements—namely, territorial autonomy within a federal system—allow independence movements to succeed. In light of the conclusions reached, this project ends with recommendations for future studies.
# Table of Contents

**Preface** x

**Chapter 1: Literature Review and Research Design** 1

**Literature Review** 1

- *Definitions: What is a nation? What is nationalism?* 1
- *Nationalist Mobilization* 5
- *Nationalism and Political Institutions* 8

**Research Design** 12

- *Hypotheses* 12
- *Methods* 13
- *Definitions and Variables* 14
- *Case Selection* 18
- *Limitations* 19

**Chapter 2: The Sorbs, A Vanishing Nation** 22

**Case I: The Sorbs in the Aftermath of World War I** 22

- *Background: Who are the Sorbs?* 22
- *Political Opportunity* 22
- *Identity (Ethnic, and Other)* 23
- *Leaders* 24
- *Organizations* 24
- *Program* 25
• Financial Resources 26
• Communications 26
• Symbols 27
• Results 27

Case II: The Sorbs in the Aftermath of World War II 28
• Political Opportunity 28
• Identity (Ethnic, and Other) 29
• Leaders 29
• Organizations 30
• Program 30
• Financial Resources 31
• Communications 32
• Symbols 32
• Results 33

Case III: The Sorbs and the Collapse of Communism 34
• Political Opportunity 34
• Identity (Ethnic, and Other) 35
• Leaders 35
• Organizations 36
• Program 36
• Financial Resources 37
Chapter 3: The Rusyns, A People Seeking Recognition 40

Case I: The Rusyns in the Aftermath of World War I 40

- Background: Who are the Rusyns? 40
- Political Opportunity 40
- Identity (Ethnic, and Other) 41
- Leaders 42
- Organizations 43
- Program 44
- Financial Resources 45
- Communications 45
- Symbols 47
- Results 47

Case II: The Rusyns in the Aftermath of World War II 48

- Political Opportunity 48
- Identity (Ethnic, and Other) 49
- Leaders 49
- Organizations 51
- Program 52
• Financial Resources 52
• Communications 53
• Symbols 53
• Results 54

Case III: The Rusyns and the Collapse of Communism 55
• Political Opportunity 55
• Identity (Ethnic, and Other) 56
• Leaders 57
• Organizations 58
• Program 58
• Financial Resources 59
• Communications 60
• Symbols 60
• Results 60

Chapter 4: The Slovenes, A Post-Communist Success Story 62

Case I: The Slovenes in the Aftermath of World War I 62
• Background: Who are the Slovenes? 62
• Political Opportunity 62
• Identity (Ethnic, and Other) 62
• Leaders 63
• Organizations 64
• Program 64
• Financial Resources 65
• Communications 66
• Symbols 67
• Results 68

Case II: The Slovenes in the Aftermath of World War II 69
• Political Opportunity 69
• Identity (Ethnic, and Other) 69
• Leaders 70
• Organizations 70
• Program 71
• Financial Resources 71
• Communications 72
• Symbols 72
• Results 73

Case III: The Slovenes and the Collapse of Communism 73
• Political Opportunity 73
• Identity (Ethnic, and Other) 73
• Leaders 74
• Organizations 75
• Program 75
• Financial Resources 76
Chapter 5: Concluding Remarks

Conclusions

• Applications

• Political Significance

• Limitations

• Suggestions for Further Study

Appendix

• Map I: Sorbian-speaking Areas

• Map II: Rusyn-inhabited Areas

• Map III: Central Europe

• Tables: Population Trends of Sorbs, Rusyns, and Slovenes

Bibliography
Preface

The number of nation-states in the world grew significantly over the course of the twentieth century. With the end of World War I came the end of several multiethnic empires that had spanned the Eurasian continent: Hohenzollern, Habsburg, Romanov, and Ottoman dynasties disintegrated, and in their wake emerged several new states. Decolonization in the 1950s and 1960s led to the independence of several nations in Asia and Africa. The end of the twentieth century saw the collapse of communism in Central and Eastern Europe and with it the collapse of several multiethnic states. Despite these developments, the number of ethnicities in the world far exceeds the number of states. In light of this observation, an obvious question to ask is what accounts for this: why are some ethnic groups politically marginalized while a select few are completely sovereign? The purpose of the current undertaking is to attempt to find an answer to this question.

This thesis is a study of nationalism, both failed and successful (“success” meaning statehood, “failure” being something less). The first chapter of this project provides a brief review of some seminal studies of ethnicity and/or nationalism and describes three hypotheses to be tested, outlines the methodology to be used, and introduces the cases to be analyzed. Chapters two, three, and four consist of case studies. The fifth and final chapter of the thesis offers some conclusions and suggestions for further research.
Chapter One: Literature Review and Research Design

Literature Review

A topic as broad as nationalism is bound to have a sizeable literature associated with it. A review of this literature might proceed in any number of ways, but some ways seem more fitting than others. Proceeding work by work in chronological order seems ill-advised: many of the most important works on nationalism appeared in rapid succession of one another in the 1980s and 1990s, and thus the likelihood is small that a gradual reworking of nationalist theory can be observed from one project to the next. Instead of chronologically, a review of the literature will be presented thusly: a necessary starting point is to determine what is meant by the terms “nation” and “nationalism.” Then, since much of the literature on this topic focuses on mobilization, the arguments made in studies of nationalist mobilization will be presented and critiqued. Next, because there is also a considerable amount of research examining relations between nations and states, key arguments found in this sort of literature will be introduced and called into question. Finally, because certain influential projects provide unique insights, brief summaries and critiques of these works will be offered.

Definitions: What is a nation? What is nationalism?

Benedict Anderson defines the nation as “an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign” (2006, 6). Nations are “imagined” in the sense that, although people claim some sort of belonging or attachment to particular nations, there is no way a person could know even a fraction
of the people with whom they are allegedly connected through shared nationality. Nations are thought of as limited, meaning no nation is so large as to include all members of the human species: national communities, even the largest, are bounded. Nations hope for sovereignty: statehood is thought to be the end to which all nations aspire to.

Anthony Smith (1996) defines the nation as “a named human population sharing a historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties.” A nation is similar to, but distinct from an ethnic community. Smith considers an ethnic community to be “a named human population of alleged common ancestry, shared memories and elements of a common culture with a link to a specific territory and a measure of solidarity” (1996, 447).

Karl Deutsch (1953) regards nationalities as distinct from nations. A nationality may be defined as “an alignment of large numbers of individuals from the middle and lower classes linked to regional centers and leading social groups by channels of social communication and economic intercourse, both indirectly from link to link and directly with the center” (Deutsch 1953, 75). What distinguishes a nationality from a nation is the presence or absence of group cohesion. A nationality is “a people pressing to acquire a measure of effective control over the behavior of its members.” Once such compulsive power is acquired, the group may be considered by itself and others to be a nation (Deutsch 1953, 78-79).
Miroslav Hroch offers this definition of a nation: a nation is “a large social group characterized by a combination of several kinds of relation (economic, territorial, political, religious, cultural, linguistic and so on) which arise on the one hand from the solution found to the fundamental antagonism between man and nature on a specific compact land-area, and on the other hand from the reflection of these relations in the consciousness of the people” (1985, 4-5). Nations, then, are social networks beneficial to their members and recognized as such. Ethnicity is not the sole criterion for nationhood.

Although Anderson (2006), Smith (1996), Deutsch (1953), Hroch (1985), and others attempt to define the nation, Eric Hobsbawm (1990) argues that defining the nation is problematic. Objective definitions of the nation fail because there are always exceptional cases: some group might meet all the criteria for nationhood, and yet not be regarded as a nation, while other groups may lack some of the credentials required and yet still be recognized as nations. Moreover, the criteria that one might include in an objective definition of the nation, such as ethnicity or language, are themselves “fuzzy” terms (Hobsbawm 1990, 5-6). Just as objective definitions of the nation fail, so too do subjective definitions. If nations are allowed to define themselves as such, then “all that is needed to be or to create or recreate a nation is the will to be one” (Hobsbawm 1990, 8). This would mean that any group wanting to be considered a nation would, in fact, be considered a nation. The problems with subjective definitions of nationhood, then, are implicit.
Rogers Brubaker (1996), if not suggesting that attempts to define the nation are futile, suggests questions better than “what is a nation” should be asked. For instance, one might ask how “nation” can be used for classificatory purposes. Or, one could ask why the particular designation of “nation” is more powerful for some groups than for others (Brubaker 1996, 16). Thus, Brubaker suggests nations should not be thought of as “substantial, enduring collectivities.” Rather, “we should focus on nation as a category of practice, nationhood as an institutionalized cultural and political form, and nationness as a contingent event or happening” (Brubaker 1996, 21).

With these varying conceptions of the nation in mind, defining nationalism seems pertinent. Michael Hechter regards nationalism as “collective action designed to render the boundaries of the nation congruent with those of its governance unit” (2000, 7) (emphasis Hechter’s). Stated differently, nations seek sovereignty – that, is nationalism. A nation that seeks less than sovereignty may quite rightly be considered less nationalistic.

As John Breuilly (1994) explains, nationalist movements have been categorized various ways. One might think of nationalist movements as liberal or romantic, ethnic or linguistic, or some amalgam combining elements of different perspectives. Or, one might use a different typology of nationalism. For instance, nationalist movements might be distinguished between elite or mass movements, violent or nonviolent nationalisms, or legal or unconstitutional nationalism (Breuilly 1994, 13).
Nationalist Mobilization

Many scholars of ethnicity and/or nationalism focus on mobilization. Joane Nagel (1994) is one such author who argues ethnicity can be used in mobilization efforts. The construction of a community—an ethnicity or a nation—brings people together, establishes criteria for membership, and suggests a common goal. Once groups are formed, their shared identity unites members and encourages those members to pursue their interests and air their grievances en bloc (Nagel 1994, 163). Why some ethnic groups seek autonomy or independence, while others request only equal rights, is a matter that perplexes Nagel, though, and is thus a question she feels worthy of further examination.

Anthony Smith (1991) seems to offer a partial answer to Nagel’s (1994) question: goals vary by region. In industrialized states, ethnic groups tend to seek greater autonomy rather than full-fledged independence (Smith 1991, 138). Groups inhabiting impoverished regions, however, are more likely to attempt secession. Smith notes that most secessionist attempts fail, and suggests a group’s having external support is the key to achieving its demands (1991, 135).

Charles Tilly (1994) also sees the mobilizing potential of ethnicity or nationality. Tilly claims that nationalism was not a mobilizing force until the late eighteenth century, but since then has been a visible phenomenon. He identifies two different types of nationalism, “state-led” nationalism and “state-seeking” nationalism (Tilly 1994, 133). State-led nationalism refers to the efforts of political entities to unify the citizenry and to encourage those citizens to subordinate their own interests
to the interests of the state. State-seeking nationalism, on the other hand, is the attempt of some population without political power to gain sovereignty.

Tilly (1994) notes that nationalist movements, at first, took the form of state-led movements. Over time, however, state-seeking nationalism became more common. Even as state-seeking nationalism became more prevalent, though, the number of nation-states has remained fairly small. Tilly suggests “in another fifty years, the era of nationalism –both state-led and state-seeking—could be ending” (1994, 144). However, he also admits the possibility of the balkanization of existing states. Thus, Tilly admits nationalism has been a mobilizing force in the past, but offers no real prediction as to the growth or decline of nationalist movements in the future.

Whereas Tilly (1994) suggests the force of nationalism may be waning, Anderson (2006) disputes this claim. New states are routinely admitted to the U.N., and even states that were thought to have crystallized are subjected to within-state border challenges (Anderson 2006, 3). Indeed, nationalism is so potent a force that many people are willing to die for the sakes of their nations. This willingness to sacrifice in the name of the nation is the “central problem posed by nationalism” (Anderson 2006, 7). Nationalist mobilization, whether “official” (state-led) or popular, is a comparatively new type of activity. Since its earliest manifestations, nationalism has been and remains a serious challenge, compelling large numbers of people to live and die for communities they “imagine” themselves to be part of.
Zoltan Barany (2005) argues the process of ethnic mobilization involves three stages. In the first stage, a group distinguishes itself from other groups: ethnic identity is formed and strengthened. The second stage sees the group securing the resources necessary for political action. In the final stage, the group engages in political activity, pursuing its own interests, whatever those might be. In his discussion of ethnic mobilization, Barany is concerned particularly with this second phase. Barany presents a “mobilizational prerequisites” model which suggests that, in order to mobilize successfully, ethnic groups must meet certain criteria. These criteria are: political opportunity, a “clearly formulated identity,” leaders, organizational capacity, a program, financial resources, communications, and symbols (Barany 2005, 80-89). According to Barany, of these eight prerequisites, the first four are vital. If these four prerequisites are not met, he claims, mobilization will not occur (2005, 89). The other prerequisites might make mobilization more likely, but they are not essential.

Whereas Nagel (1994), Smith (1991), Tilly (1994), Anderson (2006) and Barany (2005) see the potential for mobilization among ethnic groups, Crowley (2001) asks why ethnicity should be a particularly strong motivating force. Crowley admits that ethnic groups might mobilize with regard to a few issues. He asserts, though, that members of ethnic groups could possess varied political goals that do not unite them. Why would a person support a cause just because other members of his or her ethnic group do? Crowley’s argument seems reasonable. After all, people can identify with members of their religion, their class, or their region just as much as they do their ethnic community. Smith argues, however, that these different types of
identity often overlap, and that the result of such overlap can be a potent force (e.g., ethno-religious nationalism) (1991, 7-8).

There are multiple problems with the literature on ethno-national mobilization. One problem is that there exists little discussion of why groups with distinct identities fail to mobilize. A second problem is that few hypotheses have been advanced to explain why some cases of mobilization succeed while others fail. If strong group identity and mobilization were sufficient determinants of whether or not statehood would be achieved, the Basques and Chechens would have their own states. This last point is particularly troublesome: if mobilization matters, why does it matter more for some groups than others?

**Nationalism and Political Institutions**

In contrast with the many authors who suggest ethnic mobilization is highly important, several scholars suggest political institutions are of greater significance. Eric Hobsbawm, for instance, asserts “nations do not make states and nationalisms but the other way round” (1990, 10). Rarely, Hobsbawm insists, do nations emerge prior to achieving statehood. Usually, the state plays the principal role in shaping national identity. Thus, at the time of the French Revolution, only a minority of those living within France spoke French. It was up to the state, after the Revolution, to forge a French national identity. The same applies to Italy at the time of unification: only a fraction of the peninsula’s inhabitants spoke Italian, and thus the state embarked on a process of shaping a national consciousness (Hobsbawm 1990, 60). More recent examples of the state’s role in identity-building come from the Soviet
Union: “The idea of Soviet Republics based on Kazakh, Kirghiz, Uzbek, Tadjik and Turkmen ‘nations’ was a theoretical construct of Soviet intellectuals rather than a primordial aspiration of any of those central-Asian peoples” (Hobsbawm 1990, 166).

John Breuilly’s (1994) thesis reiterates some of Hobsbawm’s (1990) key ideas. Like Hobsbawm (1990), Breuilly argues “…it is rather state structures which shape nationalism than the other way around” (1994, 28). Mobilization, Breuilly insists, was not important for English national development, and popular support was not crucial for Italian or German unification. Nationalist movements in Italy and Germany were actually limited to elite participation (Breuilly 1994, 93-96). Thus, the state works to create a national identity. There are, however, minority groups that seek autonomy or separation from the state or dominant nation. Breuilly (1994) suggests that even the rise of these groups can be explained by the role of the state. Nationalist opposition arises in reaction to policies implemented by the state. More specifically, national groups mobilize when they view the modernizing state as threatening to their status or ways of life (Breuilly 1994, 147-148).

Rogers Brubaker (1996) agrees that political context and the role of the state are critical. Like Hobsbawm (1990), Brubaker argues that the Soviet Union suppressed nationalist activity, but institutionalized national identity (1996, 7-8). Brubaker suggests that as parts of the U.S.S.R, the territories that would become Soviet successor states “were defined as quasi-nation states, complete with their own territories, names, constitutions, legislatures, administrative staffs, cultural and scientific institutions, and so on” (1996, 17-18). The Yugoslav and Czechoslovak
states operated similarly: national republics were created, but these republics were granted only limited governing rights (Brubaker 1996, 104). However, not everywhere will sub-state ethnicity/nationality be institutionalized (or even acknowledged) by the state (Brubaker 1996, 27-28). As the recent examples of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia show, the extent to which a nation’s territorial boundaries were institutionalized seems to play a significant role in determining whether or not that nation achieved independence. Those groups who were granted even limited self-governing status as parts of federated states tended to achieve statehood after the collapse of communism, while groups not granted such autonomy failed to achieve independence. Michael Hechter (2000) and Valerie Bunce (1999) likewise recognize the pattern that federal states in the Communist Bloc disintegrated while unitary states remained territorially intact.

There are limits to arguments that institutional arrangements shape the courses of nationalist movements. First, if autonomy precedes independence, why do some autonomous regions remain only that, failing to achieve statehood? Second, how can it be that new states emerge from the collapse of federations, when not every currently independent state was a part of a multiethnic federation? Third, if nations exist because they are institutionalized, then what explains the persistence of nations that are not given autonomy (such as the Kurds in Turkey)?

Several of the aforementioned scholars have produced works that deserve special attention. Miroslav Hroch’s (1985) Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe is noteworthy for its use of the comparative method and its unique schema
of nationalist movements. According to Hroch, nationalism develops in phases: phase ‘A’ is a period of scholarly interest in the nation; phase ‘B,’ which is Hroch’s focus, is a time of patriotic activity; phase ‘C,’ in which a mass movement arises, may—but will not necessarily—follow phase ‘B’ (Hroch 1985, 23-24). Hroch’s comparison of different nineteenth-century European nationalist movements is unique, as is the conclusion that no particular class can be said to have dominated in the patriotic activities of these nations (1985, 129). Hroch’s Marxist analysis of national movements, though, does not ultimately explain why some nations gained statehood while others did not. This, however, is no criticism of Hroch, as the intent of his work was not to answer such a question.

Looking at nationalism in contemporary Europe, Rogers Brubaker’s (1996) *Nationalism Reframed* is particularly noteworthy because of its discussion of ‘triadic’ relationships. Brubaker suggests that nationalist activity in post-communist Europe is of three sorts: first, there is the activity of nationalizing states; second, there is the activity of “external national homelands;” third, there is the nationalism of minorities (Brubaker 1996, 4-5). Brubaker provides several historical examples of triadic relationships (e.g., Czechoslovakia as a nationalizing state, Germany as a homeland, and Germans within Czechoslovakia as a national minority). Brubaker suggests interwar Europe is analogous to contemporary Europe, in the sense that triadic relationships exist (e.g., Russians as a minority, Russia as a homeland, and various nationalizing states). This idea of triadic relationships is potentially helpful, but not for studies of stateless groups (e.g., the Roma).
Benedict Anderson’s (2006) *Imagined Communities* is often cited only for its definition of the nation. However, Anderson’s work is also important because it is an example of a non-Eurocentric treatment of nationalism. The work reminds readers that nationalism in Africa, Asia, or the Americas did not take the same shape as romantic nineteenth century European movements. As Anderson puts it, “since the end of the eighteenth century nationalism has undergone a process of modulation and adaptation, according to different eras, political regimes, economies and social structures” (2006, 157).

**Research Design**

The current undertaking will proceed as follows. First, hypotheses will be derived from the preceding literature review. Second, these hypotheses will be tested using qualitative research methods. More specifically, this work will use comparative case studies, with cases drawn from Central Europe. Finally, a summarization of conclusions will be offered, with a tentative answer to the question “why are some ethnic groups politically marginalized while a select few are completely sovereign?”

**Hypotheses**

From the foregoing review of the literature, three hypotheses can be discerned. The first hypothesis suggests that if a group meets certain criteria for mobilization (strong group identity, adept leaders, multiple organizations, a clearly defined program, financial resources, good communications, and inspiring symbols) then independence movements can succeed in unitary and federal states alike. Autonomy is not necessary, and mobilization is sufficient. That is, mobilization
matters, and independence movements are designed and implemented by ethnic
groups with varying degrees of success, with success or failure resting with the
mobilized group itself.

The second hypothesis suggests that if a group has an autonomous territory
within a federal system, then independence can be achieved regardless of whether
mobilizational prerequisites are met. Mobilizational prerequisites are not necessary,
and autonomous status is sufficient. Phrased differently, state action and institutional
arrangements determine whether or not a group can achieve independence.

The third hypothesis posits that if a group meets the mobilizational
prerequisites defined above and has autonomy, then independence will be achieved.
Mobilizational prerequisites and autonomous status are both necessary, and neither
alone is sufficient.

Methods

To test these hypotheses, comparative case studies will be presented. Among
Arend Lijphart’s suggestions for those researchers who plan to compare small
numbers of cases is that the cases actually be comparable (1971, 687). Lijphart asserts
that cases selected from the same geographic region are often more comparable than
are randomly selected cases (1971, 688).

With Lijphart’s (1971) comments on methodology in mind, this project will
employ the comparative method in order to arrive at some conclusions as to how and
why nations do or do not achieve statehood. According to Lijphart, there is a danger
inherent in comparative research of selecting too many variables to analyze. Instead,
Lijphart recommends comparative investigations should focus on key variables (1971, 690). This study will thus compare a select few variables.

Definitions and Variables

For the purposes of this project, nationalism will be conceived of as collective action taken on behalf of the nation. As Hroch (1985) suggests, nationalist activity often follows a pattern, beginning first with elite-level debates and interactions, and only later (if at all) evolving into mass movements. This study will focus on elite and mass participation alike.

Hobsbawm (1990) correctly asserts that both objective and subjective definitions of the nation have limitations. This study adopts Hobsbawm’s working understanding of a nation: “any sufficiently large body of people whose members regard themselves as members of a ‘nation’, will be treated as such” (1990, 8).

As the preface to this work suggests, the focus will be on ethnic nationalism. For the purposes of this investigation, the terms “ethnicity” or “ethnic group” will be used interchangeably with “nation” or “nationality.” Likewise, “nationalism” will be used synonymously with ethnic mobilization. This is not to suggest that all nations define themselves solely in ethnic terms or that nationalism always has its basis in ethnic activity. Indeed, as Hroch (1985), Breuilly (1994), and others suggest, there may be different components to nations and nationalisms: a nation may define itself in ethnic, religious, and other terms, and a nationalist movement might appeal to ethnic, linguistic, and other identities alike. Nevertheless, in this study, the cases selected are groups whose members recognize themselves (and are recognized by
others) as distinct ethnic groups. Where appropriate, the linguistic, religious, and other elements of the various national movements included in this study will be described. Thus, interchanging the terms “nation” and “ethnic group” should not be problematic.

In this study, the dependent variable is statehood for the ethno-national group. Statehood is conceived of as the internationally recognized sovereign control of a defined territory. Independent variables include the type of state (federal or unitary) in which an ethnic group is situated and the levels of decentralization and institutional support and cultural autonomy granted to the group (e.g., language rights).

Other independent variables considered in this investigation include the eight highlighted by Barany (2005): opportunity, identity, leadership, organizations, program, communications, finances, and symbols. These variables are chosen in part because there seems to be some consensus among scholars of nationalism that these variables are significant, if not for the mobilization of national/ethnic groups, then for the formation and maintenance of national/ethnic identity. Smith, for instance, recognizes the importance of symbols, organizations, and communications in nationalist movements, noting that most nationalist movements begin not with protests, but with the emergence of cultural journals, literary groups, and music celebrations (2001, 7). Hroch acknowledges the importance of leadership to national movements, suggesting that, whatever their origins or class backgrounds, leaders play a critical role (1985, 129). Varshney highlights identity as the critical prerequisite for mobilization, insisting that a strong group identity is all that is needed to explain the
genesis of ethnic mobilization and adding that mobilization can help strengthen the identities of those individuals not initially involved in the process (2003, 93).

Although parts of this study are based upon Barany’s (2005) mobilizational prerequisites model, the variables chosen may be operationalized somewhat differently from Barany’s own operations. Here, political opportunity will mean simply the possibility for the ethno-national group to organize (into cultural organizations, parties, etc.). Opportunity will judged “strong” when the government to which the national group is opposed is in flux (and thus less capable of employing repressive tactics) or is fairly conciliatory toward minority groups even in times of stability.

Many of the factors endogenous to the mobilized (or potentially mobilized) groups will be defined in relation to one another. For instance, presumably a group with a “strong” sense of identity will have organizations, symbols, etc. while a group with a weak sense of self will fail to organize or create and preserve cultural artifacts. While some individuals might propose that strength of identity be measured in terms of willingness to die for the national cause, this is not an appropriate measure of nationalist sentiment: few would argue that Scottish identity, although generally expressed more peacefully than Basque identity, is weaker. Thus, identity instead will be measured by the presence or absence of leaders, organizations, symbols, and the like. Identity will also be measured according to the ways in which a minority national group can distinguish itself from the majority population aside from ethnicity (e.g., linguistic, religious, etc.).
When talking about leaders, persons who can claim to speak on behalf of the masses will be considered. However, particular attention will be paid to those persons involved in expressly political (as opposed to merely literary or religious) purposes. Those persons who convene assemblies, form parties, head important organizations, publish works of political consequence, or otherwise play vital roles in the national movement will be considered leaders.

Any organization whose membership is limited to or intended for members of the national group will be considered potentially significant as an organization. While parties and assemblies may be the most outwardly political organizations, even recreational clubs will be treated as important organizations inasmuch as such clubs have the potential to be turned into resources for nationalist agitators.

The political programs of national groups can be established from resolutions made by prominent organizations and declarations made by national leaders. If a nation fails to achieve statehood, this failure may be explained by something as simple as national leaders and organizations not making such goals a part of their platforms.

Level of and possibility for communication will be assessed according to a number of considerations. First, whether all members speak the same language is significant: if members of the nation speak different languages or dialects, such differences may hinder the formulation of a coherent program. Second, the literacy rate is significant: important declarations, petitions, the text of speeches, etc. are meaningless if few people can understand the content of such print media. Third, the
number of scholarly journals, newspapers, and other publications suggests whether members of the nation are informed and committed to the national cause.

The financial situation of the nation will be measured in terms of whether members of the nation are employed in agricultural or other low-paying occupations at rates significantly higher than other members of the state. That is, level of industrialization is assumed to be an important aspect of a region’s financial well-being.

The existence of national emblems or flags, anthems or poems, folktales, holidays, etc. is what it means to possess national “symbols.” Symbols will be discussed in terms of whether or not they exist for the national group, and not in terms of how “weak” or “strong” those symbols are.

Case Selection

The particular cases selected are drawn from Central Europe for several reasons. The first reason is that Lijphart (1971) recommends area analysis when using the comparative method. Drawing cases from Central Europe allows for cases to be selected which are similar in many respects and yet may differ with respect to the aforementioned independent variables. The small nations of Europe were all part of multinational empires in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries: Hohenzollern, Hapsburg, Romanov, and Ottoman dynasties ruled all of the smaller nations. Most of these nations later experienced communism as parts of various multiethnic states. However, cases distinct from one another can be drawn from the region: that is to say, nations that developed independently of one another can be selected.
The second reason for focusing on Central Europe is that other possible independent variables can be controlled for by selecting the particular cases chosen. In addition to having similar histories, the nations in question are similar in size and ethnic and linguistic identity.

The particular cases selected for this study include two groups which have not achieved autonomy or statehood, the Sorbs and the Rusyns, and a successful case of nation-to-statehood, the Slovenes. Each of these groups developed independently of one another: Sorbian experiences in the Hohenzollern Empire did not thwart Rusyn chances for development in the Hungarian part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire or Slovenian experiences in the Austrian part of Austria-Hungary. Rusyn development did not hinder Sorbian or Slovenian growth. Slovenian development was not detrimental to the Rusyns or Sorbs. Moreover, each of these nations experienced communism as parts of different states.

Barbara Geddes (1990) suggests that one would be in error to compare only cases that share the same dependent variable. The cases selected for this study, however, differ with respect to the dependent variable.

**Limitations**

There are several limitations to the present study that must be acknowledged before proceeding. One problem regards the variables under investigation. As Hobsbawm (1990) suggests, many of the concepts found in discussions of nationalism are ambiguous. Particularly problematic in this study might be the independent variables “opportunity” and “identity.” As Gamson and Meyer note, the
concept of political opportunity is problematic: “It threatens to become an all-
encompassing fudge factor for all the conditions and circumstances that form the
context for collective action” (1996, 275). Goodwin and Jasper agree, pointing out the
fact that there is no common understanding as to just what “political opportunity”
means (1999, 31). Citing Sidney Tarrow, Barany describes opportunity as a “cluster”
of several variables (2005, 84).¹ This description, however, does not seem to alleviate
the problem of viewing “opportunity” as a catchall factor. The problems of using
“opportunity” as a variable might be mitigated in this study, though: one variable that
could fall into the opportunity “cluster,” institutional framework, is treated as a
separate variable, and “opportunity” is used solely to provide political context.

The other variable in this undertaking that may be problematic is identity:
what is it, and how is it measured? Brubaker and Cooper (2000), for instance, call
into question the utility of “identity” as a variable. This study recognizes that identity
is a nebulous concept, and that a person might have multiple identities (e.g., one
might align oneself not only with one’s ethnicity, but also with one’s co-religionists).
However, this investigation does not presuppose that ethnic identity is necessarily the
strongest sort of identity. Thus, when political leaders or the masses identify with
something other than their ethnicity, this will be noted.

Another risk associated with this study is that it might not be explanatory. The
findings of this study may only suggest that certain variables seem more important

¹ An important note should be made: Barany (2005) regards political opportunity as the most critical
criterion for mobilization and success. Thus, he would likely not endorse the hypothesis that factors
endogenous to groups alone can account for the success or failure of political movements.
than others. As is a danger with all small-n studies, the findings of this study may not be generalizable.

A further problem with this study relates to the sources consulted. This study makes do with secondary sources, while original research would surely be preferable. Moreover, some sources are used more than others. If there is a lack of variety in terms of sources utilized, the reason for this is a dearth of literature, and not an unwillingness to explore other avenues for information. Regrettably, the German and Sorbian-language sources available would not be understood by this researcher, nor would the Rusyn or Ukrainian, Slovenian or Serbo-Croatian sources. Thus, this study relies on what English-language material exists regarding the Sorbs, Rusyns, and Slovenes.

Some of the limitations to this study, having here been acknowledged, will be revisited in the concluding chapter of this work. The hope is, however, that despite these limitations this project will prove to be a fruitful endeavor that allows for some (if only tentative) important conclusions to be reached.
Chapter Two: The Sorbs, A Vanishing Nation

Case I: The Sorbs in the Aftermath of World War I

Background: Who are the Sorbs?

Known in English alternatively as Wends or Lusatians, the Sorbs are a Slavic group situated in Lusatia, a historic region of eastern Germany. This community, now concentrated primarily around the cities of Bautzen and Cottbus, is descended from not one, but several Slavic tribes whose territory once included most of the land between the Elbe/Saale and Oder rivers (Lindseth and Soldan 2000, 149). Numerically small today, the Sorbs may have numbered as many as 245,000 speakers at the beginning of the nineteenth century (Brock 1969, 26). More recent estimates put the number of Sorbs within the range of 60,000 (Barker 2000, 21).

Political Opportunity

The end of the First World War meant the demise of three major empires: the German, Austro-Hungarian, and Ottoman Empires. From these defeated empires arose countries proclaiming their independence for the first time (e.g., Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia) or reclaiming their independence (e.g., Poland). Stone (1972) notes that in this political atmosphere, the Sorbs, too hoped to gain their own independence. But was there opportunity? To a certain extent, there was opportunity. Germany was a defeated state, and the terms of defeat were to be drawn up at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. Moreover, the Sorbs had some foreign support for their goal of independence. The Czechs, for instance, backed Sorbian claims for an independent Lusatian state. The Czechs themselves, though, were a
newly-independent group and the major Western powers seem not to have given much consideration to the Sorbian case. Despite assurances that they would be granted some measure of religious, cultural, and educational autonomy, the Sorbs were not explicitly mentioned in the Peace Treaty (Stone 1972, 32). Thus, after World War I, the Sorbs had at least some political opportunity: although they did not have strong backing from the major powers of Europe or from the United States, the Sorbs were situated in a weakened German state and had the support of at least one foreign nation.

Identity

The Sorbian nation defines itself by ties to the Lusatian region, a common Slavic ethnicity and language, and a shared history. As an important part of Sorbian identity, the Sorbian language’s development and current status requires some explanation. Three strands of Sorbian speech emerged in the eighteenth century. These three variants were Lower Sorbian, a Protestant dialect of Upper Sorbian, and a Catholic dialect of Upper Sorbian. The variants in speech were reflected in the written language, as well. For linguists, there exists debate as to whether Upper and Lower Sorbian represent two distinct languages, or merely two dialects of the same language (Ermakova 1987, 62-63). Although this debate is perhaps of greater import to linguists, recognizing the murkiness of the language situation is potentially significant to the current discussion, as well.

While references to dialects as “Protestant” or “Catholic” may appear odd, this is how linguists demarcate the two variants of Upper Sorbian.
Leadership

The Sorbs were represented at the Paris Peace Conference by Arnošt Bart and Jan Bryl. Bryl was the secretary of the Sorbian National Committee, although his standing within the Sorbian community and his role at the Conference are unclear.

Bart’s influence, though, is more easily recognized. Bart led the National Committee and put forth the Sorbian case before the Conference (Stone 1972, 32). Bart (Ernst Barth in German) held a seat in the German Landtag and was employed as a journalist, farmer, and the mayor of a village outside of Bautzen (Ralston 1960, 252). Bart had also organized a peasants’ movement prior to his 1911 run for a position in the Saxon diet. In 1912, Bart and Pastor Bogumil Šwjela organized a convention at which delegates from thirty-one agrarian and cultural clubs met and founded the Domowina, an umbrella organization that united the disparate Sorbian groups (Kasper 1987, 17). Bart, thus, stands out as the most significant Sorbian leader of the first and second decades of the twentieth century.

The fact that nearly three-dozen groups had delegates at the founding of the Domowina, however, suggests that there existed a pool of available leaders aside from Bart. This coterie, if not extensive, was at least “persistent” (Kelly 2001, 17).

Organization

The Sorbs appear to have been highly organized by 1919. By the latter part of the nineteenth century, cooperatives, farming clubs, and savings and credit banks for farmers had formed and actively worked for the economic interests of Sorbian peasants. The cultural identity of the Sorbs was preserved by clubs that defended use
of the Sorbian language, dispersed Sorbian literature, staged plays in Sorbian, and promoted Sorbian music. By 1912, these clubs were brought together under the Domowina (Kasper 1987, 17).

As Barany (2005) notes, “the establishment of an umbrella organization or electoral coalition aiming to represent the entire ethnic community can be very effective in increasing the ethnic group’s political voice” (Barany 2005, 87). Indeed, the Domowina did serve as the channel through which the interests of the Sorbian population could be presented to the German government (Kasper 1987, 17).

In November 1918, the National Committee was founded (Stone 1972, 32). The following year, the Lusatian People’s Party was formed. The Party served as the vehicle through which the poor, rural Sorbian population made its collective voice heard and promoted the continued development of Sorbian culture. 1919 also saw the creation of a Sorbian financial institution, the Serbska ludowa banka (Kasper 1987, 17).

Program

Barany notes “a mobilizing ethnic group… might choose to concern itself primarily with cultural, economic, political, or other issues” (2005, 87). The Sorbian program has been defined, to a great extent, in the preceding descriptions of Sorbian organizations. Sorbian leaders sought to improve their economic situation, fought for greater language rights, and dreamed of an independent Lusatian state. Efforts to mobilize can be seen in the words of Arnošt Bart, expressed in the *Serbske Nowiny* (Sorbian News): “The German Empire has fallen in ruins… We must take action…
No oppressor strangles us any longer. Rise!... Join hands to realize and defend our ideals” (quoted in Ralston 1960, 252). The Sorbian nationalist movement, however, was somewhat limited: the masses remained, for the most part, unmoved (Kelly 2001, 21).

Financial Resources

As has been shown, multiple groups existed to pursue multiple goals in Lusatia. These goals included the improvement of Sorbian economic conditions. The Lusatian People’s Party, in fact, lobbied for something that had long been promised by the German government, namely the redistribution of lands held by large estates (Kasper 1987, 17). Land reform was of particular importance to the Sorbs, because their region was especially disadvantaged. As Peter Barker notes, “serfdom continued for longer in Lusatia than in most other parts of Germany. The majority of Sorbs, as landless labourers, were trapped by the feudal system in a situation of servitude until the early part of the nineteenth century” (Barker 2000, 16). The fact that the Lusatian People’s Party put such an emphasis on land reform suggests that the economic situation of the Sorbs had not been greatly improved by the twentieth century. In terms of financial resources, then, the Sorbs might not have had much funds to allocate to their program.

Communications

Barany stresses that the “mobilizing group must get its message out to the community” and adds “the population in question should have high literacy rates and share a common language” (2005, 88). Presumably, the Sorbian community was
fairly literate. In 1860, *Lužica*, the first Sorbian monthly review of belles-lettres, began to publish. By 1919, there were around ten journals in print as well as a daily newspaper, *Serbske Nowiny*. The Sorbs had their own publishing house, and after the First World War they created a bookselling firm (Kasper 1987, 17-18).

**Symbols**

Barany claims “shared symbols that are widely recognized and surrounded by the affection and loyalty of the community assist the mobilizing group. The flag, monuments, and public spaces endowed with historical meaning, poems, anthems, and anniversaries of historical events can all be meaningful tokens of the community’s commitment to collective action and can all be additional means of its cohesion” (2005, 88). For the Sorbs, the years just prior to World War I saw a marked increase in cultural activity (Stone 1972, 79). Literature continued to be published even during the war, and plays were performed during and just after the war (Stone 1972, 83).3

**Results**

Barany (2005) does not claim that because a group is capable of mobilization that it will necessarily achieve its goals. True enough, some Sorbs mobilized, but their efforts seem to have been in vain. Bart’s call for other Sorbs to “rise!” was shouted not to a completely disinterested audience – there were some eager supporters of the independence movement. Bart and Bryl may have been the primary participants at the Peace Conference in Paris, but those men had numerous supporters. Indeed, the

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3 See Chapters 4 and 5 in Stone (1972) for more on Sorbian folklore and music.
leaders brought with them to the Paris Peace Conference petitions signed by thousands of other Sorbs (Ralston 1960, 253). However, immediately after their return from the Paris Peace Conference, Bart and other leaders of the independence movement were imprisoned on charges of instigating treason.

Although the Weimar Republic made constitutional guarantees to the Sorbs, the Sorbian situation did not improve (Stone 1972, 32). Rather, the process of germanization carried on full-fledged. Sorbs remained poor and weak, continuing to live as peasants just as they had prior to the War.

The Nazi period, of course, was an even more unfortunate period for the Sorbs. From 1933 onward, Sorbian organizations were closed and publications banned one by one. The Domowina itself was shut down in 1937. Throughout the 1930s, Sorbs saw their literature destroyed, their property confiscated, and intellectuals arrested (Stone 1972, 35). Thus, in spite of attempts to mobilize, the Sorbs did not find themselves making any significant advances—cultural, legal, economic, or other—after World War I.

**Case II: The Sorbs in the Aftermath of World War II**

*Political Opportunity*

The situation for the Sorbs after the Second World War appeared promising. As was the case after the First World War, Germany emerged from the Second World War a defeated state, subject to decisions made by the victorious Allied powers. The German state was divided into four zones of occupation by the Allied forces. The borders of the country were re-drawn, with Germany losing territory to Poland.
Ethnic Germans outside of the state’s boundaries also suffered, as the Czechoslovaks under President Eduard Beneš expelled Germans from the Sudetenland. Germany after the war, then, was politically weak. The Sorbs recognized this weakness, and hoped that the presence of Russian, Ukrainian, and Polish occupiers (i.e., fellow Slavs) in Lusatia would enhance Sorbian political fortunes (Barker 2000, 26).

**Identity**

As will be shown, efforts to preserve Sorbian identity were made in the interwar and war years, despite the risks involved with such activity. There is little evidence to suggest, however, that Sorbian identity was stronger in the 1940s than it had been in 1919.

**Leadership**

Sorbian leaders met secretly during World War II to consider what actions they should take upon the war’s end. Following the war, these leaders acted promptly to get in touch with the victorious powers. On May 9, 1945, Dr. Jan Cyż and Jurij Cyż sought permission from the Soviets to re-establish the Domowina, the umbrella organization for various Sorb groups. Immediate approval was not granted, but the Domowina was nevertheless reconstituted that day by fifteen pre-1937 Domowina members, with Dr. Cyż acting as the interim president of the organization (Stone 1972, 37).

Aside from Dr. Cyż, Pawol Nedo stands out as an important Sorbian leader. Nedo’s authorship of works on Sorbian folk art and folklore represent significant contributions to the preservation of Sorbian culture. Committed to his people, Nedo
promoted their culture even under the repressive fascist regime (Jacobeit 1991, 86). Prior to the war and again from June 1945, Nedo served as the head of the Domowina (Barker 2000, 53).

**Organization**

Dr. Cyż and Pawol Nedo were not the only Sorbian leaders, and other Sorbs were carrying out various plans concurrent with Cyż’s efforts to set up the Domowina. On May 9, 1945, Sorbs who had recently returned from exile or who had been released from prisons and concentration camps convened in Prague and set up a National Committee (Barker 2000, 26). In July of that year, the Committee established an office in Bautzen, which became its headquarters in September (Barker 2000, 28). Also in September, the Domowina and the National Committee met and formed the Lusatian National Council, which was to serve as the executive organ for both groups. On October 22, the National Council adopted an official constitution (Barker 2000, 30). Below these major organizations were smaller village councils, ready to take political action (Stone 1972, 38).

**Program**

Leaders of the Domowina and the National Committee advanced several different ideas after the end of World War II. Between May 1945 and December 1947, Sorbian leaders telegrammed and dispatched memoranda to the Allied states and to the United Nations. The messages of these dispatches varied in content: some were pleas to allow for Lusatia’s incorporation into Poland or Czechoslovakia as a
protected region. Some were requests for independent statehood under the guarantee of the United Nations. Common to all of these proposals was a demand for greater autonomy. This demand is forcefully put in a memorandum sent by the Lusatian National Committee to Czechoslovak President Beneš and to Soviet leader Josef Stalin in June 1945: “For hundreds of years the Lusatian Serbs have seen nothing good from the Germans[…] It is no wonder, then, that the nation today has but one wish: that they should never again in the future be under the domination of the Germans who have shown nothing but enmity” (Quoted in Barker 2000, 27).

Aside from autonomy, the Sorbs sought the establishment of Sorbian schools, land reform, and the homecoming of Sorbs exiled by the Nazis (Stone 1972, 38). The Sorbs, then, had multiple goals as part of their program.

Financial Resources

The Sorbs had pushed for land reform for decades. Whereas the German states had been slow to move on reform, the Russians who controlled German territory after World War II were quick to take action. In 1945, a Russian plan for reform became law. According to this plan, “all farm land over 100 hectares, and land of war criminals and active Nazis, would be confiscated and divided up, by local committees no later than the end of October” (Peterson 1990, 261). As a result of this redistribution of land, the economic circumstances of nearly ten thousand Sorbian

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4 The Czechoslovak solution seems to have been the more seriously considered option, since Czech-Sorb relations were fairly well established. Sorbian territory had been a part of Bohemia in prior centuries, and the aftermath of World War II was not the first time the Sorbs had proposed autonomy within a Czechoslovak state: they proposed such a union, if they could not be granted independence, following the First World War, as well. See Kubů (2000) or, especially, Engerrand (1972) or Kelly (2001) for more information on Czech-Sorb relations.

5 The Sorbs refer to themselves as “Serbs” in their own language.
families improved drastically (Stone 1972, 38-39). Thus, whereas the Sorbs were particularly disadvantaged economically throughout their history, their lot seems to have improved by the middle of the twentieth century.

**Communications**

During the war, *The Sorb Herald*, an anti-Nazi journal was founded (Kelly 2001, 26). After the war, however, Sorbian communications abilities returned to their pre-war levels rather slowly. Not until June 1947 was the Domowina Printing Cooperative established. The weekly newspaper *Nowa doba* appeared in July of that year, but would not become a daily until 1955. *Rozhlad*, a journal of belles-lettres did not appear until 1950. It was, thus, several years beyond armistice that Sorbian communications abilities were as strong as they were prior to the war (Stone 1972, 39).

**Symbols**

Symbols were important to the Sorbs after WWII. Jurij Brězan “was the first poet to represent the bitter experience with Hitlerite fascism and the reality of the post-war period in the prism of his subjective feelings with pronounced socialist partisanship” (Heine 1987, 95). Brězan was not only a poet, but a dramatist as well. His plays were written “to fulfil [sic] a task of political agitation and mobilization at short notice” (Heine 1987, 96). Brězan’s works, whether poems or plays, were written to promote patriotism. One of Brězan’s novellas, *How Old Mrs. Janč Fought with the Authorities*, for instance, highlights Sorbian resistance to the Kaiserreich, the Weimar Republic, and the Third Reich (Stone 1972, 86).
In addition to Brězan, there was a Sorbian Circle of Writers, established in 1946. The group was responsible for a series of anthologies that recalled the war, but other writers treated that topic separately even before the group’s founding (Heine 1987, 96-97).

Moreover, the Sorbs had a particularly high number of songs per capita. These songs were of various themes: love, nature, etc. (Engerrand 1972, 58). The Sorbs also had their own flag, with a color scheme adopted by many Slavic groups: red, white, and blue (Engerrand 1972, 80).

**Results**

Following World War II, two Germanys came into existence – West and East. Sorbian-inhabited territory was located within East Germany (the German Democratic Republic, or GDR). In 1952, the GDR did away with the Länder system, and thereafter functioned as a centralized unitary state. The Sorbian homeland – Lusatia—was thus not granted any special territorial status.

The situation the Sorbs found themselves in after World War II, however, was an improvement. The German Democratic Republic developed a nationalities policy that was, in general, supportive of Sorbian rights. 1951 saw the creation of both the Sorbian Institute at the University of Leipzig and the Institute for Sorbian Ethnic Research in Bautzen. These academies allowed for the study of Sorbian culture and history, and for the publication of these studies. Although the published works were tinged with Marxist ideology, their publication was a step forward for the Sorbs.
(Barker 2000, 3-4). Moreover, the government of the GDR utilized “all incentives of the state to widen the functions of the literary languages” (Trofimovic 1987, 75).

Not every post-war development, though, was positive for the Sorbs. For starters, Sorbian hopes of independence were again quashed. The “Soviet Union, the most crucial ally” of the Sorbs in the aftermath of the war, “was not going to support Sorbian separatism” (Barker 2000, 27). The Soviet liberators supported the Sorbs, but only when Sorbian demands did not contradict Leninist ideology. The Soviets, thus, approved the re-establishment of the Domowina, but that institution was forced to operate along Marxist-Leninist lines. For an organization that had united groups of Catholics, Protestants, nationalists, and capitalists, this was a marked change indeed. The result of such reorganization of the Domowina was a decline in membership (Barker 2000, 53). Moreover, although Sorbian language rights were initially encouraged, the government of the GDR gradually grew less supportive. In 1962, for instance, the government decreed that all scientific subjects were to be taught in German. Sorbian schoolchildren, thus, received bilingual or German-only education (Barker 2000, 80).

**Case III: The Sorbs and the Collapse of Communism**

*Political Opportunity*

In 1989 the East German government collapsed. The Sorbs were situated in a poor region of East Germany, and East Germany as a whole compared with West Germany was economically disadvantaged. As far as costs go, it seems fair to suggest the Sorbs had nothing much to lose.
Identity

The stark decline in the number of Sorbian speakers from the late nineteenth to the late twentieth century suggests that germanization and demographic shifts have had their effect on Sorbian identity.

Leadership

Fred Oelßner was “an influential representative of Sorbian interests to the Politburo” in the 1950s (Cichon 2003, 9). He worked to improve the status of Sorbian culture and language within the GDR (Cichon 2003, 11). Jurij Brězan, mentioned previously as an important contributor to Sorbian literature, was in addition a notable critic of Communist cultural policy (Cichon 2003, 12). Other Sorbian leaders were detained by the Stasi, the German secret police, during the communist era (Cichon 2003, 16).

Post-communist leaders emerged from at least two camps. One camp was the Domowina, which, although it was allowed to operate in the GDR and did much to conserve Sorbian culture, was criticized by Sorbian non-Domowina-members for working too closely with the regime. From the Domowina’s ranks rose Jurij Grós, secretary of the group and Bjarnat Cyż, the head of the Domowina’s cultural department (Barker 2000, 123).

Another source of leadership was the churches. Jan Malink, a Lutheran priest who convened a Sorbian Round table in Bautzen in December 1989 is of particular note. Malink was to serve as a representative for Sorbian interests at the Berlin-based
Central Round Table. Malink was also a political opponent of Grós (Barker 2000, 122-123).

**Organization**

The 1950s saw the founding of the Sorbian Institute at Leipzig, the Institute for Sorbian Ethnic Research at Bautzen, the Sorbian Peoples’ Theater and the Sorbian State Ensemble for Music and Dance (Cichon 2003, 10). These institutions would play important functions by preserving Sorbian identity over the next decades.

When the Sorbian Round table convened in December 1989, representatives of the Domowina, the Sorbian National Assembly, the Protestant Church, and the Cyrill-Methodius-Association (a Catholic group) were present. The Sorbian National Assembly was created in opposition to the Domowina, to protest the latter’s collaboration with the Communists. However, as soon as the Domowina showed signs of reform, the Sorbian National Assembly’s objections were withdrawn, and the Domowina again became the umbrella organization that united the various Sorbian groups (Barker 2000, 121-122).

**Program**

Since World War II’s end, the Sorbs had complained about being split between two administrative units (Cichon 2003, 12). At the Extraordinary Congress of the Domowina on March 17, 1990, a new constitution was drawn up and the goals of the group were discussed. Seeing German unification as inevitable, the congress

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6 The Central Roundtable met more than a dozen times between December 1989 and 1990. These roundtables convened in East Germany and other transitioning countries of Central and East Europe (Welsh 1994, 385).
passed a resolution supporting unification on the condition that Sorbian rights would be protected under the reunited German state. Moreover, the Sorbs hoped that, since the Länder had been abolished in the GDR in 1952, the reintroduction of the Länder system would see new state boundaries drawn. Specifically, the Sorbs hoped for a Lusatian Land within a reunified Germany (Barker 2000, 122-123). When that goal seemed unlikely, the Sorbs proposed instead that the Saxon Land be enlarged, so that Sorbian speakers were not separated between Brandenburg and Saxony (Barker 2000, 128).

**Financial Resources**

The GDR pursued economic policies that were quite costly for the Sorbian population. Particularly devastating to Lusatia was the growth of the lignite coal industry. Between 1945 and 1989, seventy-two villages were destroyed to make room for mines, displacing more than twenty thousand individuals (Lindseth and Soldan 2000, 156). There is no evidence to suggest the exploitation of this natural resource benefited the Lusatian economy in any way. In an interview by Gregory Wolf in 2000, Jurij Bržan, the important Sorbian author noted previously, described Lusatia as a region that continues to remain impoverished (Wolf 2001, 48).

**Communications**

The introduction of the coal industry in Lusatia prompted demographic changes. As the industry began to take off, ethnic Germans came to the region to gain employment. The result of the influx of Germans to the region was increased heterogeneity, and pressure was put on the Sorbs to assimilate and speak German
(Lindseth and Soldan 2000, 156). This is not to say that Sorbian-language materials ceased to exist. Beginning in 1988, for instance, *Serbski student*, a journal at the Technical University in Dresden began publication, encouraging greater dialogue (Cichon 2003, 22)

**Symbols**

In addition to turning to the symbols of old, the collapse of Communism meant that the Sorbs could return to their religious traditions. That religious leaders became important speakers within the Domowina suggests the Sorbs did, in fact, return to their religious heritage.

**Results**

The Sorbs were organized and their leaders sent letters, memoranda, etc. to higher-ups in the East German government, expressing Sorbian interests with regards to German reunification. German reunification, however, allowed for neither the creation of a Lusatian Land nor the expansion of Saxony to include all Sorbian-speaking populations. The Unification Treaty did not even mention the Sorbs. In protest, the head of the Domowina sent letters to the governments in Bonn and Berlin, decrying the fact that Sorbian interests were neglected by the Treaty. The result of this protest was that German Basic Law now guarantees that Sorbian culture and traditions are to be maintained and developed, which obliges the state to preserve Sorbian heritage (Barker 2000, 126).

Since unification, Sorbian candidates have run for multiple offices, winning at the local and district levels. These candidates have run primarily as candidates of non-
Sorb parties (Barker 2000, 128-129). However, as of 2005, there is also a Wendish People’s Party working to promote Sorbian interests.\footnote{For further information, see the Party’s website at: http://www.wendische-volkspartei.de/. The Domowina’s website is: http://www.domowina.sorben.com/. The website for the Sorbian Institute can be accessed at http://www.serbski-institut.de/}

Unfortunately for the Sorbs, though, constitutional guarantees and the ability to participate in the democratic process may not be enough to preserve their culture. According to Brězan, “we have definitely not experienced a cultural renaissance [since German unification]; rather, the opposite is true. Our situation and problems are not the result of bureaucratic decrees and pressures, but quite simply a byproduct of the current economic realities” (quoted in Wolf 2001, 48). The situation Brězan describes is one in which younger Sorbs, seeking a better life outside of Lusatia, travel to the Western parts of Germany, never to return. The result, needless to say, is the gradual erosion of Sorbian identity.
Chapter Three: The Rusyns, A People Seeking Recognition

Case I: The Rusyns in the Aftermath of World War I

Background: Who are the Rusyns?

The Rusyns, also called Ruthenians or Ruthenes, are an East Slavic people concentrated primarily in the Prešov region of Slovakia and the Transcarpathian Oblast of Ukraine, although there are also small numbers in Poland, Hungary, Romania, and the former Yugoslavia. While the regions of Galicia, Bukovina, and the Vojvodina are of considerable importance to the Rusyns, this chapter is concerned principally with Rusyns living in Subcarpathian Ruthenia (or Subcarpathian Rus’), the region south of the Carpathian Mountains now split between Slovakia and Ukraine in which Rusyns have lived throughout their history. This region was a part of the Kingdom of Hungary for over one thousand years and was briefly incorporated into Czechoslovakia (from 1918 until 1939).

Political Opportunity

The collapse of empires in Central and Eastern Europe after World War I led to increased nationalist activity. Paul Magocsi notes that, just as Czechs, Slovaks, Serbs, Croats, and Romanians formed national councils to discuss their futures in the wake of Austria-Hungary’s disintegration, so too were the Rusyns organized to debate the possibility of autonomy, independence, or union with another state (1975, 360).

Following World War I, then, there was opportunity for the Rusyns to mobilize: Hungary had been on the losing side of the war, and the terms of defeat
were to be drawn up at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919-1920. Even prior to the Conference, however, Hungary had shown a willingness to make concessions to its non-Magyar population. Symbolic of Hungary’s post-war conciliatory attitude was the creation in December 1918 of Rus’ka Kraina, an autonomous province for the Rusyns (Magocsi 1978, 88).

**Identity**

Rusyn identity is complex, and cannot easily be explained. Inhabitants of the Hungarian Kingdom for more than one thousand years, Rusyns from at least the nineteenth century onward have debated their ethnicity. Michael Winch explains that in the nineteenth century activists of various orientations tried to define national identity for the people. Russophiles, for instance, advocated the view that the Rusyns were a part of greater Russia who spoke a dialect of Russian. Ukrainophiles professed the belief that Rusyns were in fact Ukrainians who spoke the Ukrainian language. Hungarians, meanwhile, afraid that the Russophile or Ukranophile movements could gain strength, propagated the idea that the Rusyns were a distinct Slavic group speaking a language all their own (Winch 1939, 8-9). As Magocsi (1978) and Rusinko (2003) make clear, the Rusyns began to take seriously the process of developing a distinct national consciousness after 1848, as did other Central and East European groups. Early successes at defining their identity, however, were followed by numerous setbacks, and the struggles Winch (1939) describes continued well into the twentieth century.⁸

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⁸ For a more detailed account of Rusyn ethnicity, see Chapter Five in Bonkáló (1990).
Leaders

The Rusyn intelligentsia was composed primarily of clergy, lawyers, and teachers (Magocsi 1978, 86). Coming from similar educational and occupational backgrounds, Rusyn leadership might be viewed as a fairly homogenous group. The lack of diversity among Rusyn leadership is reflected in another way: many of the leaders were related either through marriage or through blood. That Rusyn leaders possessed similar characteristics is not meant to imply uniformity in terms of beliefs. Indeed, political allegiances varied strongly even within families. For instance, the leaders Avhustyn Shtefan, Stefan Fentsik, and Hiiador Stryps’kyi were all related, yet each had different goals for their people. Shtefan was a Ukrainophile, Fentsik was a Russophile, and Stryps’kyi considered the Rusyns a separate nationality and favored Subcarpathia’s continued relationship with Hungary (Magocsi 1978, 18). Although each of these men was significant in his own right, the most prominent Rusyn leader was Avhustyn Voloshyn. Voloshyn was a professor at Uzhhorod Teacher’s College, a playwright, and an editor for several magazines and journals. Voloshyn’s importance, however, is not limited to his educational or literary activities: Voloshyn was also important as a political activist. At first pro-Hungarian, Voloshyn later adopted a pro-Czechoslovak stance, and as vice-chair of the Central National Council and chair of the Rus’kii Klub worked for Subcarpathia’s union with the new Czechoslovak state (Magocsi 1978, 332).
Organization

As was the case for other nationalities in the Habsburg Empire, 1848 was a critical year for the Rusyns, and several important organizations came into existence at or shortly after this time. Aleksander Dukhnovych, the most notable Rusyn national awakener of the nineteenth century, founded the Prešov Literary Society in 1849, and with the Society’s one hundred members provided the impetus for the development of a national literature (Rusinko 2003, 129). The Prešov Literary Society was banned by government decree in 1853, but in 1866, a new organization, the Society of St Basil the Great, came into existence. By 1870, the Society had seven hundred members committed to the religious (Greek Catholic), cultural, and general education of Rusyns in Prešov and Mukachevo (Rusinko 2003, 184). The Society of St Basil the Great was succeeded in 1902 by the Unio Publishing Company, which published multiple Rusyn-language books and journals for a mass audience (Rusinko 2003, 281).

By the early twentieth century, then, the Rusyns had a history of forming cultural and educational organizations. What the Rusyns lacked, however, was an overarching society to unite these disparate groups. When World War I ended there was no umbrella organization for the Rusyn intelligentsia to reconstruct and thus no singular group to educate or instruct the general population. Instead, from November 1918 to May 1919, national councils emerged, with each council’s interests reflecting the traditional allegiances of local leaders (i.e., pro-Ukrainian, pro-Rusyn, etc.) (Magocsi 1978, 76). In May 1919, however, delegates from the Uzhhorod, Prešov,
and Khust councils met and formed the Central Russian National Council (Magocsi 1978, 98). The platforms proposed by the various national councils and the final decision of the Central Council are described below.

**Program**

In the aftermath of World War I, the future of Subcarpathia came into question, and alternative visions of that future came to the fore. Although at times the national question was of concern only to the intelligentsia, following the war there was a marked upswing in interest among the general population. Serving with Czechs, Croats, and Serbs in the Austro-Hungarian army heightened a sense of Slavic identity among Rusyn soldiers, most of whom had never before encountered other Slavic groups (Magocsi 1978, 74). After the war, proud former soldiers and the Rusyn intelligentsia were roused. Priests, lawyers, and teachers in the cities of Prešov, Uzhhorod, Khust, and Iasynia advanced four objectives: those in Prešov favored autonomy within Czechoslovakia; Uzhhorod (and later Mukachevo) was the center for those who favored remaining a part of Hungary; those in Khust pushed for union with Ukrainians; and Iasynia sought complete independence (Magocsi 1978, 86). Of the four proposed solutions to the political crisis following WWI, the Czechoslovak and Ukrainian solutions gained the most support in early 1919 (Magocsi 1978, 91). In May of that year, a Central Russian National Council, with representatives from various national councils, convened and unanimously endorsed the decision “to unite

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9 Here, “Russian” means Rusyn.
with the Czecho-Slovak nation on the basis of full national autonomy” (cited in Magocsi 1978, 98).

**Financial Resources**

In 1910, nearly ninety percent of Rusyns were employed as shepherds, farmers, or woodcutters. Fewer than four percent worked as miners or in industry, and less than one percent worked as teachers, lawyers, or in the military (Magocsi 1978, 14-15). Judy Batt notes that, although Transcarpathia “underwent no fewer than 17 changes of political status” in the twentieth century, it “has always been the most remote, inaccessible, economically backward region of whatever state it has belonged to” (2002, 155-157). Alice Teichova supports this view (1988, 17). This backwardness is reflected in much of the Rusyn poetry of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries -- poetry in which poverty and the life of the peasant are recurrent themes (Rusinko 2002).

**Communications**

Following the Great War, the Rusyns certainly did not have the high literacy rates or common language Barany (2005) says are useful for a mobilizing group. In 1910, a time at which the average literacy rate for Magyars in Hungary was 67 percent, less than one quarter of Rusyns above the age of six were literate in their language (Magocsi 1978, 15).

For Rusyns in 1910, (as for Rusyns decades before and for decades after), there would be difficulty in saying what “their own language” even was. Whereas
other Slavic groups codified their languages in the nineteenth century, the Rusyns failed to do so (Rusinko 2003, 8).

In the latter half of the nineteenth century, Rusyn authors, self-taught in Russian, wrote in iazýchie – a hybrid of Russian or Old Church Slavonic that contained elements of the languages more familiar to the writers: German, Hungarian, or Latin (Rusinko 2003, 223 and 249). By the turn of the century, in response to pressures from the Hungarian government, the Rusyn intelligentsia had adopted Magyar as the literary language. Meetings of the St Basil Society were convened in Hungarian, and the most significant Rusyn periodical, Görögkatholikus Szemle, distributed between 1899 and 1918, was printed in Hungarian, as well (Rusinko 2003, 280).

Other publications, including the journal Nauka, were intended for a broader audience and were written in the Rusyn language (Rusinko 2003, 281). The Rusyn masses spoke “Rusyn,” as well, which, depending on one’s political-cultural orientation could be defined as a variation of Ukrainian or Russian or as a unique language. The language question, thus, was far from settled before or after World War I. In 1914, only thirty-four elementary schools offered some Rusyn-language instruction. Otherwise, Magyar was the sole language of instruction (Rusinko 2003, 279).

Communications on the eve of and at the conclusion of World War I were thus strained: literacy rates were low and the language of the intelligentsia was not the language used by the masses.
Symbols

By the end of World War I, Rusyns had a wealth of symbols to inspire them. As Rusinko explains, “from their position in the nineteenth century as survivors of ten centuries of oppression, Rusyn nationalists found the official versions of history inadequate to express their experience or explain their survival. Therefore, they turned to myths, legends, and superstitions and created a speculative history in which their own consciousness would dominate” (2003, 27). The most important of the national awakeners was Aleksander Dukhnovych, whose 1851 poem “Vruchanie” began with words that have been immortalized by later generations of Rusyn authors: “I was, I am, and I will be a Rusyn.” Indeed, “Duknovych’s poem was almost immediately set to music and became the unofficial Rusyn national hymn” (Rusinko 2003, 111).

Duknovych was certainly not the only Rusyn writer of note. Rusinko (2003) names and describes several key authors of poetry and prose, some politically-minded and some not, who, whether writing in some strand of the Rusyn dialect, iazychie or standard Russian, Hungarian, the Latin once favored by the Greek Catholic Church, or some other language, created an array of works important to the creation of a distinct Rusyn culture.

Results

The Treaty of Saint-Germaine-en-Laye, signed September 10, 1919, declared that “the Ruthene territory south of the Carpathians” would be united with Czechoslovakia and would be granted “the fullest degree of self-government
compatible with the unity of the Czecho-Slovak state” (cited in Magocsi 1978, 100).

It was not until October 11, 1938 (i.e., after the Munich Pact) that the region of Subcarpathian Rus’ received full autonomy (Magocsi 1978, 237). Nevertheless, union with Czechoslovakia was beneficial to the Rusyn nation.¹⁰

**Case II: The Rusyns in the Aftermath of World War II**

**Political Opportunity**

Hungary, which had reacquired Subcarpathia in the late 1930s, was aligned with Germany during World War II, and thus emerged from the war a defeated state. Whether the Rusyns had any “opportunity” to exploit, though, depends on which goals are considered. If ending the Hungarian occupation was the principal goal, then this was achieved. In October 1944, Soviet troops entered Subcarpathian Rus’, and gained control over the territory within days (Magocsi 1976, 253). If reunification with Czechoslovakia was the goal, then perhaps there was less opportunity. At the time the Soviets entered Subcarpathia, Czechoslovakia was still occupied by German and Hungarian forces (Magocsi 1976, 254). The Czech government-in-exile was, thus, politically impotent, and perhaps not in a position to negotiate for the return of that territory. Subcarpathian Rus’ accounted for a mere nine percent of interwar

¹⁰Rusinko notes: “Although their political demands were not immediately fulfilled, during the Czechoslovak years the inhabitants of Subcarpathian Rus’ acquired experience with democracy. The masses participated in fair elections, were represented in both houses of the Czechoslovak parliament, and were courted by newly established political parties. Even more significant for the development of national identity, Rusyns were designated the ‘state nationality’ in Subcarpathian Rus’, with their own national anthem… and an official coat of arms, which appeared on publications and governmental documents. The Rusyn language, never clearly defined, but in Cyrillic traditional orthography, appeared alongside Czech on all village, town, and streets in Subcarpathian Rus’, as well as on some denominations of Czechoslovak paper money. And for the first time in their history, the Rusyn intelligentsia were relatively free to work out their own national identity and develop an independent national culture” (2003, 298).
Czechoslovakia’s territory, and about five percent of the population (Teichova 1988, 3). This territory was thus not a priority for the Czechs. It was, however, likely seen by the Soviets as a strategic gateway to the West, much as Lusatia was regarded. Thus, if independence was a goal of the Rusyns, such a goal would not likely have been supported by the liberating Red Army.

Identity

Rusyn ethnic or national identification has been described previously as complex. Since much of this identity relates to linguistic and political orientations as well, Rusyn identity will be discussed in the context of the ideas promulgated by Rusyn leaders and organizations. As will become clear in forthcoming discussion, Rusyn identity remained as complex as it had been at any other time before World War II.

Leadership

One of the outstanding figures in the late 1930s and early 1940s was Ivan Haraida. Haraida authored a grammar of the Rusyn language, based on the vernacular spoken in Transcarpathia’s central lowlands. Haraida’s grammar was used as the basis for the language used in several literary outputs for the Rusyn community in the 1940s. As the editor of a series of children’s works, a monthly periodical for young Subcarpathians, and histories, short stories, and manuals for more mature audiences, Haraida was the dominant force in shaping 1940s Rusyn culture (Rusinko 2003, 426-427).
Despite Haraida’s efforts to turn Rusyn into a literary language, however, Rusyn leaders remained at odds with one another in terms of defining who the inhabitants of Subcarpathia were. According to Magocsi, the nationality question was still far from resolved as of 1944 (1978, 249). By the mid-1930s, many students and members of the intelligentsia favored a Ukrainian identity (Magocsi 1978, 221). The Ukrainophile orientation continued to grow in the late 1930s, but the Russophile and Rusynophile camps were not without leadership (Magocsi 1978, 245-246).

After the Munich Pact, Subcarpathian Rus’ was granted autonomous status as part of a federative Czecho-Slovak republic. The first government collapsed, however, when Andrii Brodii and Shtefan Fentsyk –two Russophile leaders—were accused of agitating for reunification with Hungary. The dissolved government was replaced with leaders of Ukrainophile orientation, appointed by Prague. A Greek Catholic priest, Avhustyn Voloshyn, was made prime minister of the region, and, as a sign of the pro-Ukraine stance of his regime, the autonomous government renamed the territory Carpatho-Ukraine. This autonomous government lasted a mere six months however, as Hitler granted Slovakia independence from the Czecho-Slovak federation and allowed Hungarian forces to enter Carpatho-Ukraine. On March 15, 1939, the parliament of Carpatho-Ukraine declared the independence of the Republic of Carpatho-Ukraine. This republic existed but briefly: on March 16, Hungarian troops entered the country, forcing leaders of the Carpatho-Ukrainian government to flee (Rusinko 2003, 408). Until June 1939, the region was governed by the Hungarian military. Thereafter, civil administrators appointed by Hungary controlled the
territory. The Rusyns were represented in the Budapest Parliament by Russophiles and Rusynophiles (but not Ukrainophiles). Influence in parliament or Subcarpathia was limited, however, since decisions for the region were ultimately determined by the central government (Magocsi 1978, 247-248). During the War years, thus, leaders of all three orientations –Rusynophile, Russophile, and Ukrainophile— remained active, with each orientation gaining and losing traction depending on which regime governed Subcarpathia.

**Organizations**

Rusyn organizations existed in three key locations during World War II: the United States, the Prešov region of Slovakia, and Subcarpathia. In the United States, the American Carpathian-Russian Central Conference was formed in March 1942 when the Pittsburgh-based American Carpathian-Russian Council merged with the Gary, Indiana-based Orthodox Carpathian-Russian Unity. This organization was headed by Gregory Zsatkovich, the former governor of Subcarpathian Rus’, and hosted Jan Masaryk (vice prime-minister of the Czechoslovak government-in-exile) at its first meeting (Magocsi 1978, 251).

In the Prešov region of Slovakia, the Greek Catholic Church played the dominant role in defending the national interests of the Rusyns. From 1940 onward, elementary school education was under the direction of the Church, thus allowing for the continued teaching of Rusyn. As the war continued, other Rusyn organizations formed, notably the Carpatho-Russian Autonomous Union for National Liberation in March 1944. Later still, in March 1945, came the creation of the Ukrainian National
Council of the Prešov Region, formed from village and town councils (Magocsi 1983, 46-47).

In Subcarpathia, local national councils formed throughout the region, with Communists and pro-Soviet leaders dominating. Six-hundred delegates from these local councils met in Mukachevo on November 25-26, 1944. These delegates in turn elected a seventeen-member Mukachevo National Council (Magocsi 1978, 253-254).

Program

Organizations in each of the three main regions under consideration advanced conflicting goals. The American Carpathian-Russian Council, in its publications, advocated the reconstitution of Czechoslovakia, with pre-Munich boundaries (Magocsi 1978, 251). The Prešov Region’s Carpatho-Russian Autonomous Union for National Liberation likewise supported the reconstitution of Czechoslovakia, with the stipulation that the “new republic must be… a fraternal republic of three equal nations – Czechs, Slovaks, and Carpatho-Rusyns” (cited in Magocsi 1983, 46). The six-hundred member delegation that met in Mukachevo, however, unanimously endorsed a “Manifesto… for the Reunification of Transcarpathian Ukraine with the Soviet Ukraine” (cited in Magocsi 1978, 253).

Financial Resources

Always a poor region, the economic hardships brought about by World War II only made Subcarpathia’s economic situation worse. The war, coupled with the Hungarian regime’s reversing land reforms introduced by Czechoslovakia, “made the economic situation in Subcarpathian Rus’ worse than ever” (Magocsi 1978, 249).
the Prešov Region, the war was less devastating. There, the population experienced economic growth. Moreover, some Rusyns supplemented their incomes by working in Germany. Others gained financially by obtaining control over formerly Jewish-held land and property when, between 1941 and 1944, over 100,000 Jews were deported from Slovakia (Magocsi 1983, 46).

**Communications**

During the Hungarian occupation, some Rusyn intellectuals aimed to standardize the Rusyn language and forge a Rusyn national identity (Rusinko 2003, 407). Although they lacked financial support and independent publishing houses, and, in spite of being censored, writers continued creating new works. Unable to form literary “circles” without governmental oversight, students and likeminded individuals formed literary “schools.” These schools were responsible for publishing almanacs, anthologies, periodicals, and newspapers (Rusinko 2003, 411).

**Symbols**

Reincorporation as part of Hungary was not an entirely negative experience for Subcarpathia. Indeed, in terms of literary output, the period of Hungarian occupation was “surprisingly productive.” The civil administration’s education department “issued five retrospective anthologies of Subcarpathian literature for use in schools.” These anthologies were generally pro-Russian, although the Hungarian government generally favored Rusynophilism (before becoming more assimilationist) (Rusinko 2003, 410-411). Other stances were also represented, and “regardless of
which language the poet used, there was a sense of creating an independent
Subcarpathian literature…” (Rusinko 2003, 413).

**Results**

On June 29, 1945, Czechoslovak and Soviet authorities signed a treaty
authorizing the transfer of Subcarpathian Rus’ from Czechoslovakia to the U.S.S.R.
The Rusyns, thus, were a part of a federal state under communism. However, they
were not granted their own status as a republic, but were instead a subordinated part
of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. This distinction is crucial: although
Subcarpathian territory was incorporated into a federal state, that state did not grant
the region autonomous status. Rusyn identity, thus, was not reinforced in the manner
that Brubaker (1996) says other groups had their identities strengthened by
institutional arrangements.

Indeed, far from strengthening Rusyn identity, the Soviets pursued policies
meant to weaken such an ethnic orientation. Upon Subcarpathia’s accession to the
U.S.S.R., the Soviets decreed that, henceforth, any person declaring Rusyn nationality
would be considered Ukrainian. Indeed, anyone who declared himself or herself to be
a Rusyn in the census of 1945 was listed simply as a Ukrainian (Magocsi 1978, 255-
256). Soviet authorities proceeded to rid traces of Rusyn identity through various
means, including policies affecting language, education, and religion (Rusinko 2003,
409). Use of the Rusyn language was forbidden in both printed materials and in
schools (Rusinko 2003, 444). Even the Rusyns’ name for their historic territory was
changed: although Rusyns referred to their homeland as Subcarpathian Rus’, the
territory came to be known as Transcarpathian Ukraine. This matter was political: Transcarpathia refers to the territory from the vantage point of Kiev – across the Carpathian Mountains. Subcarpathia refers to the territory from the perspective of those in the region – at the foothills of the Carpathians (Rusinko 2003, 8). The Rusyns, thus, experienced communism as part of a highly centralized Ukrainian Soviet Republic that did much to discourage Rusyn identification.

**Case III: The Rusyns and the Collapse of Communism**

**Political Opportunity**

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Transcarpathia became a part of independent Ukraine. The westernmost of Ukraine’s twenty-four oblasts, Transcarpathia, like the other Ukrainian regions, has been granted only limited autonomy (Jordan and Klemenčič 2003, 500). Kiev does not tolerate regionalism or manifestations of Rusyn nationalism (Jordan and Klemenčič 2003, 509).

If international recognition is an important component of political opportunity, though, the Rusyns had (and have) some reasons for optimism. In all of the countries in which they live, with the exception of Ukraine, the Rusyns are recognized as a distinct national minority (Rusinko 2003, 445). Moreover, United States intelligence officials recognize Rusyn activity. Several reports from the State Department note that “Rusyns (Ruthenians) continued to call for status as an official ethnic group in the country, noting that neighboring countries accept them as minorities” (Ukraine). Moreover, the Rusyns have a potential ally in U.S. Senator (and presidential candidate) John McCain, who wrote in a letter to Ukrainian President Viktor
Yushchenko that his constituents had informed him that “there is substantial scholarly support for the distinctiveness of the Rusyn people and language” and “various bodies dealing with human and minority rights have taken note of their aspirations to self-identity” (Pozun 2005, 3).

**Identity**

As has been described, the communist experience did much to weaken Rusyn identity. The Soviets pursued contradictory nationality policies in Ukraine: denationalization and Russification were the goals in Eastern Ukraine, but there were significant attempts to strengthen Ukrainian identity in Western Ukraine (Kuzio 2005, 8).

There are several reasons Rusyns *should* feel themselves to be distinct from Ukrainians. One reason is that Transcarpathia is separated geographically (by the Carpathian Mountains), historically, and ethnically from the rest of Ukraine, giving the region a “unique identity” (Jordan and Klemenčić 2003, 497). Moreover, Transcarpathia is one of only two Ukrainian regions to have experienced democracy and a market economy prior to the 1990s (Jordan and Klemenčić 2003, 508). In addition, the region is “firmly oriented to the West” (Jordan and Klemenčić 2003, 509). The Rusyns are “culturally shaped by their long political affiliation with Hungary, by their very distinct Ukrainian dialect (which some would consider an individual language), by a complex religious affiliation, and by their close connection with the mountains, where ‘they come from’” (Jordan and Klemenčić 2003, 501).
Whether the Rusyns do consider themselves unique is a different matter. Gauging the strength of Rusyn identity is difficult, since “not a single Western academic study has been undertaken of Transcarpathia using survey results or opinion polls” (Kuzio 2005, 1). Without this, defining the dominant nationality in the region is difficult (Kuzio 2005, 3). Thus, any statements about identity in Transcarpathia deserve scrutiny: persons with anti-Rusyn bias exist, as do persons with pro-Rusyn sentiments (Kuzio 2005, 12).

Although statements about Rusyn identity must be carefully considered, there is some evidence to suggest Rusyn self-awareness exists. Janusz Bugajski insists “since the collapse of communism a revival of Ruthenian consciousness has been visible throughout the Carpathian region of Central Europe” (1993, 89). When given a chance to select Ruthenian nationality rather than Ukrainian, people do. In Czechoslovakia’s 1991 census, nearly half of those who had declared themselves “Ukrainian” in prior censuses opted for Ruthenian identity (Bugajski 1993, 91).

Leadership

“Local intellectuals have condemned centuries of assimilation attempts by neighboring Slavic nations and sought to reconstruct and develop their Ruthenian heritage linguistically, culturally, and eventually politically.” This is true for both the Rusyns of Subcarpathia and their ethnic kin in Poland (Bugajski 1993, 89). However, given that they were not (and are not) allowed self-identification, strong political leaders are largely absent.
Organizations

There exist a variety of cultural organizations in Transcarpathia, and most fall under the auspices of the Carpatho-Rusyn Sojm (parliament), an umbrella organization (Pozun 2005, 2).

The Union of Ukrainians and Ruthenians in Czechoslovakia supported a continued federative state, and did not support Slovak separatism. Ruthenian Revival, a cultural organization, convened in March 1991 the First World Congress of Ruthenians (Bugajski 1993, 91).\(^\text{11}\)

Program

At the beginning of the 1990s, a Rusyn national revival developed. Rusyn organizations demanded, among other things, recognition as a national minority in Ukraine, autonomy for Transcarpathia, and a return of the historical name for the region, Subcarpathian Rus’ (Jordan and Klemenčić 2003, 501).

In 1991, the citizens of Ukraine voted for independence from the U.S.S.R. Voters in Transcarpathia took part in this referendum, and also voted on the issue of territorial autonomy. More than three-quarters of Transcarpathians expressed support for self-governing status within Ukraine (Rusinko 2003, 447).

In May 1993, Rusyn radicals established a “‘Provisional Government of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia’, appealed for Russian support, and declared their intention to join the Commonwealth of Independent States independently of Ukraine” (Batt 2002, \(^\text{11}\) The Carpatho-Rusyn Knowledge Base, located online at http://www.carpatho-rusyn.org/, provides links to numerous Rusyn organizations. One such organization is the Carpatho-Rusyn Society: http://www.carpathorusynsociety.org/. Another invaluable site is that of The World Academy of Rusyn Culture: http://www.rusyn.org/index.html.
However, the Ukrainian government began an anti-Rusyn propaganda campaign in 1996, and Rusyn separatist aims seem to have been tempered (Batt 2002, 163).

The Transcarpathian region as a whole has not expressed support for complete independence (Jordan and Klemenčić 2003, 503). Jordan and Klemenčić (2003) theorize that Rusyn nationalism can be either stoked or diminished, depending on Ukraine’s stance toward the East or West. If there is a “soft” Schengen border, and Ukraine is oriented toward the EU, then there is a likelihood that increased investment in Transcarpathia and relations between Ukraine’s western provinces and Western Europe will diminish Rusyn national demands. Rusyn nationalism could intensify, however, if Ukraine pursues an eastward-looking foreign policy (Jordan and Klemenčić 2003, 510-511).

**Finances**

Transcarpathia, despite its proximity to Western Europe, remains one of the least economically advanced regions of Ukraine. Industrial output and investment in the region, among other key economic variables, declined over the course of the 1990s. In general, the Transcarpathian economy is based more on agriculture and timber than is the Ukrainian economy generally (Jordan and Klemenčić 2003, 504).

Rusyns abroad play a key role in funding Rusyn activities and lobbying the Ukrainian government (Pozun 2005, 2-3).
Communications

Rusyn-language newspapers and magazines have low circulations, but do exist. Moreover, the Padjak publishing house produces approximately two dozen Transcarpathian-themed volumes per year. Rusyn is not taught in Ukrainian schools. However, some independent efforts to teach the Rusyn language have been made. For instance, a Sunday-school Rusyn language program in the town of Svaljava, funded with help from the Rusyn diaspora, had more than four hundred students in the 2004-2005 academic year (Pozun 2005, 2).

Symbols

Official non-recognition of the Rusyns of Ukraine has certainly hindered the ability to develop new symbols. However, Rusyn writers do publish. Two key figures are Ivan Petrovstii and Volodymyr Fedynyshynets’ (Rusinko 2003, 448). Fedynyshynets’ is the more moderate of the two authors, willing to write in Ukrainian (Rusinko 2003, 451). Petrovstii, however, came under attack from the Ukrainian government for his book of Rusyn folk-verse (Rusinko 2003, 448-449).

Results

Autonomy is a status that has been denied to Rusyns in Ukraine since communism’s collapse (Rusinko 2003, 447). Rusyn leaders lobbied the new Ukrainian government ushered in by 2004’s Orange Revolution. Yulia Tymoshenko, a leader of the revolution and eventual prime minister, responded with a personalized reply. Tymoshenko’s reply merely restated Kiev’s long-held position: Rusyns are Ukrainians, and should not expect to be treated as anything but Ukrainians (Pozun...
2005, 3). The party most supportive of the Rusyns is the Communist Party, but even Communists see Rusyns as regional Ukrainians (Kuzio 2005, 3).
Chapter Four: The Slovenes, A Post-Communist Success Story

Case I: The Slovenes in the Aftermath of World War I

Background: Who are the Slovenes?

The Slovenes have been described as “a small ethnic group on the margin of the Eastern Alps and the Northern Adriatic and at the junction of the Slavic, Germanic, and Romanic worlds…” (Prunk 1997, 22). They are a South Slavic people who inhabit the former Yugoslav republic, and now independent state, of Slovenia. Small numbers of Slovenes also live outside the borders of Slovenia, primarily in Italy and Austria.

Political Opportunity

While incorporated into the Habsburg Empire, Slovene lands did not comprise a distinct political entity. Rather, the Slovene-speaking population lived in six different territorial units (Cox 2005, 6). World War I and the collapse of the Empire marked the first time the Slovenes would have to unite their population. However, even granted this opportunity, one-third of the Slovene-speaking population was to remain outside the borders of what became Yugoslavia (Arnez 1958, 72).

Identity

The Slovenes were both one of the first and one of the smallest Slavic groups incorporated into the Habsburg Empire. Long exposed to Germanization, Slovenes were slow to develop a national consciousness and clear political demands (Cox 2005, 1). Indeed, “nationalist” sentiment, if it appeared at all, was relegated to linguistic or literary debates in the 1800s (Cox 2005, 9). Until the nineteenth century,
the Slovenes lacked names for both their homeland and their language. Only in 1844, when it was used officially in a periodical, did the toponym “Slovenija” enter the Slovene lexicon (Merchiers 2007, 79-80).

**Leadership**

The Slovenian intelligentsia during most of Habsburg rule consisted primarily of clergymen, who also served as educators (Arnez 1958, 27). Political leaders gained prominence after 1907, when the Austrian part of the Habsburg realm enacted universal male suffrage. From that point forward, Slovenes had representatives in the Vienna parliament (Cox 2005, 23).

Some Slovenian politicians supported the Habsburg Monarchy, even as World War I ran its course. These leaders included Ivan Šušteršič, the former head of the Slovenian People's Party, and Henrik Tuma, a leader of the Social Democrats (Arnez 1958, 65). Šušteršič, although supportive of Slovenia's allegiance to Austria, favored the idea of Trialism -- that instead of the Dual Monarchy, the South Slavs should be united as a third entity within the Habsburg Monarchy (Arnez 1958, 59).

Other leaders supported Slovenia's incorporation into a Yugoslav state apart from the Habsburg realm. The advocates of this vision of Yugoslavia included Janez Evangelist Krek and the chair of the Yugoslav Club, Anton Korošec (Arnez 1958, 62). Toward the War’s end, when the Habsburg Empire seemed doomed to collapse, Korošec was elected chair of the National Council for Slovenian lands and, later, chair of the National Council for all Slavs living within the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy (Arnez 1958, 65).
Organizations

The 1800s witnessed the formation of several types of organizations. Early organizations included the Carniolan Farm Society and the Carniolan Savings Bank (Kmecl 2005, 52). Later organizations included the Slovene Literary Society, founded in the 1860s, as well as societies for music, drama, and gymnastics (Kmecl 2005, 58). In 1884, the Society of Saints Cyril and Methodius formed. This organization would play an important role by sponsoring Slovene-language schools and cultural organizations (Cox 2005, 18).

Different Slovenian groups formed political parties in the 1890s. The strongest support was for a conservative Catholic party (Cox 2005, 23). In addition to this party, there was a Liberal Party, formed in 1891, and a Socialist Party, started in 1896 (Cox 2005, 23).

Important organizations formed during World War I included the Yugoslav Club (Arnez 1958, 62), the London-based Yugoslav National Committee, (Arnez 1958, 64), and the aforementioned National Council for Slovenian lands and National Council for all Slavs living within the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy (Arnez 1958, 65).

Program

In the nineteenth century, three general approaches to the Slovenian national question emerged. The first approach was Austro-Slavism, the idea that the Slavic nations of the Habsburg Empire should be united but should remain loyal to the Monarchy. The second movement was Illyrianism, which stressed greater ties
between Slovenes and Croats, specifically. The third platform argued that Slovenes constituted a unique group, thus de-emphasizing Slovenes' relations with others (Cox 2005, 9-11). This third approach was expressed by the United Slovenia program, which aimed for the reorganization of Habsburg lands such that each national group was united into a politically autonomous territory. This approach had support in the second half of the nineteenth century (Kmecl 2005, 56-57). By the twentieth century, however, Illyrianism had gained traction (Kmecl 2005, 66). The idea of a union of all South Slav groups was promoted by only a scattered number (Arnez 1958, 64).

Compared with other Slavs in the Habsburg Empire, Slovenes were quiet (Cox 2005, 14). For the most part, Slovenes remained loyal to the Habsburgs (Cox 2005, 24). However, by May 1917, all 33 parliamentarians in Vienna representing South Slavs signed a declaration calling for territorial unity and autonomy (Cox 2005, 27). On May 30, 1917, Slovenian and Croatian representatives in Vienna's Parliament insisted upon the union of South Slav lands within the Habsburg Empire: Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. When neither the Vienna nor Budapest governments acceded to this demand, Slovene and Croat leaders declared an independent State of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs on October 19, 1918 (Prunk 1997, 22). This state was not internationally recognized, and Italian forces invaded and occupied much of Slovene territory.

**Finances**

From the Middle Ages until the revolutionary year 1848, economic changes in Slovene-speaking territories were minimal. Population mobility was insignificant, and
there was little mineral wealth to be exploited (Thomas 1988, 227). The 1840s did bring changes to the region, however: feudalism was abolished in Austria, and construction on a railway --that was to link Slovenian lands with Europe-- began. From this period onwards, the proportion of the population engaged in non-agricultural jobs increased (Cox 2005, 15). Some industry developed in the last third of the nineteenth century, but this period was generally harsh economically, leading to migration (Prunk 1994, 40-41). Despite the developments in industry, as late as 1921, two thirds of Slovenia's population engaged in farming (Prunk 1997, 24). Well into the nineteenth century, German merchants remained the strongest presence within cities (Cox 2005, 6).

Communications

Lack of territorial unity made development of a standard Slovene language difficult. For centuries, the Slovene "language" was in actuality a series of dialects that varied greatly between districts and even from town to town (Lencek 1982, 122). In the eighteenth century, two standard literary languages emerged: Central and Eastern Slovenian (Jesenšek 2005, 15). By the 1860s, however, a common language was accepted by grammarians and writers (Lencek 1982, 266). Nevertheless, some regions continued to publish materials in local dialects well into the twentieth century, rather than utilize this standard (Lencek 1982, 271).

The first newspaper in the Slovenian language, the *Ljubljana News*, ran from 1797-1800 (Merchiers 2007, 81). By 1851, the Slovenes had a National Publisher (Kmecl 2005, 57). At the advent of World War I, there was a high literacy rate,
thanks in large part to efforts from the Catholic Church (Cox 2005, 16). Nevertheless, barriers to communication existed: many Slovene intellectuals conversed in German, not Slovene, during the nineteenth century (Cox 2005, 10). The Slovene masses—in spite of their high literacy rates—made due without Slovene-language schools, which were nonexistent at the start of the twentieth century (Kmecl 2005, 66). The first Slovene high school was established only in 1905 (Starc 2004, 104).

**Symbols**

Until the Reformation, few political or cultural developments were made in Slovenian lands. Any creativity associated with the Reformation was soon ended by the Counter-Reformation. Until the nineteenth century, there were only occasional works in Slovene or German about Slovenia (Cox 2005, 3). The Slovenes, however, did have an artistic movement, recognizable by the mid-to-late 1800s.

Žiga Zois (1747-1819) was an important patron of language and the arts (Cox 2005, 7). A part of Zois’ circle, Jernej Kopitar (1780-1844), played a vital role as a Slovenian philologist, collecting folk songs, promoting usage of Slovenian-language dictionaries and grammars, and supporting the distribution of educational materials (Merchiers 2007, 23). Josip Jurčič wrote *The Tenth Brother* (Kmecl 2005, 59). This, the first Slovene novel, was published in 1866. The novel depicted village life and incorporated folk motifs (Cox 2005, 19). Moreover, what would become independent Slovenia's official anthem, the poem "Zdravljica," was written in the 1800's by France Prešeren (Kmecl 2005, 50).
Results

The State of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs that had been declared on October 19, 1918 was promptly invaded by Italian forces (Dragnich 1983, 9). Pressure from the Serbs (Prunk 1994, 49) and fear of Italian designs led to the decision of this short-lived independent state to join with the Kingdom of Serbia (Prunk 1994, 18). On November 24, 1918, representatives of the State of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs voted for union with Serbia (Prunk 1997, 23). This new union, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, would be known after 1929 as the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (Dragnich 1983, 83).

The London Pact of 1915 was an agreement reached between the Allies and the Italians. In exchange for Italy’s joining Allied forces, Italy was awarded land inhabited by significant Slovene populations (Prunk 1994, 17). After World War I, large numbers of Slovenes were left outside of Yugoslavia’s borders.

Tensions between Serbs and Croats were particularly tense in Yugoslavia. As a result of these tensions, King Aleksandar declared self-rule on January 6, 1929. What had been a constitutional monarchy became a dictatorship when Yugoslavia’s constitution was invalidated (Dragnich 1983, 76). Yugoslavia was already a unitary state, but with Aleksandar’s imposition of self-rule, centralization intensified. An example of Aleksandar’s desire to foster Yugoslav sentiment, the king allowed only the Yugoslav flag to be flown (Dragnich 1983, 83). Moreover, the king banned political parties, which had been numerous (Gow and Carmichael 2000, 38-39). Even sokols (gymnastics groups) were banned in 1929 (Lampe 1996, 165).
Within the Yugoslav framework, the Slovenes were not granted their own territorial unit. In the 1920s, Yugoslavia consisted of thirty three provinces. Territorial fragmentation was lessened in the 1930s, when the number of provinces was reduced to nine (Cox 2005, 31).

The Slovenes, then, did not enjoy political autonomy during the Kingdom of Yugoslavia’s existence. Nevertheless, entry into Yugoslavia afforded the Slovenes to make some economic and cultural advances (Prunk 1994, 50). Several of these developments will be considered in the next section of this chapter.

**Case II: The Slovenes in the Aftermath of World War II**

**Political Opportunity**

The Kingdom of Yugoslavia’s existence was tumultuous, to say the least. Plagued with internal dissent, the Kingdom’s future was uncertain. Events during World War II would determine that future. Invaded by German, Italian, and Hungarian forces, Yugoslavia was carved up by occupiers. The Axis powers would eventually lose the Second World War, but the damage to Yugoslavia had already been done. What World War II and its aftermath meant in terms of political opportunity for the Slovenes will be more clearly spelled out in subsequent discussions of leaders, organizations, and programs.

**Identity**

The principal goal of the Slovenes during the First Yugoslavia was to attain greater autonomy (Prunk 1994, 49-50). Presumably, the desire for autonomy would be absent if the Slovenes had no sense of identity.
Leadership

During World War II, tens of thousands of intellectuals were uprooted -- forcibly removed, from Slovenia. These included most teachers and clergy (Kmecl 2005, 79; Prunk 1994, 19). Yugoslavia was engaged in not only a war for liberation, at the time, but a civil war, as well. Marko Natlačen, former governor of Slovenia and head of the Slovenian People's Party (Arnez 1958, 108-11) led the Slovenian National Council (Arnez 1958, 95). Franc Emer headed an underground nationalist group. Natlačen, Emer, and other nationalists, however, were assassinated by Communists for not supporting communist ideology (Arnez 1958, 110-111). Leaders of the partisans, who came to be dominated by the Communists, included Boris Kidrič (Kmecl 2005, 81) and Edvard Kardelj (Arnez 1958, 101).

Organization

The Slovenian National Council, which united several parties (excluding Communists) formed immediately after Axis attacks began, meeting for the first time on April 6, 1941. Weeks later, the Liberation Front formed (Arnez 1958, 95). The Communist Party itself played a critical role during WWII, leading in the resistance struggle against the German and Italian occupiers (Prunk 1994, 19). Indeed, the Communists became the most prominent left-leaning group when other left-leaning parties ceased political activity to support the Communist agenda (Arnez 1958, 99). A Communist-led Slovenian parliament met from October 1-3, 1943 (Arnez 1958, 107). This is not to suggest the Communists had no opposition. On May 3, 1945, the National Committee for Slovenia convened an underground parliament, with
members of all democratic groups represented (Arnez 1958, 117). By the Second World War's end, however, the Communists had made significant advances. When more than ten thousand civilians attempted to find refuge in British-occupied Austria, they were returned to Yugoslavia and promptly killed by the Communists for attempting to flee (Arnez 1958, 117).

**Program**

On Oct 29, 1944, some 300 Slovenian leaders signed a National Declaration. Post-war goals were named in this document. These hopes included: 1) that all Slovenian-inhabited territories be united into one state; 2) that this state might become part of a federal Yugoslavia; and 3) that the National Committee for Slovenia would act as the principal Slovenian authority until a permanent government was formed (Arnez 1958, 116).

The Yugoslav Communists emphasized Yugoslavism over other ideologies. Nevertheless, the idea of federalism, although deemed less significant than that of Yugoslavism, was supported (Lampe 1996, 232).

**Finances**

Slovenia's position in the First Yugoslavia was a boon to the economy. Slovenes went from being amongst the poorer Habsburg subjects to being the best-off part of the new South Slav state. The farming population, which was at 66% in 1921, had fallen to 53% by 1940 (Prunk 1997, 24). WWII, however, wrecked the Slovenian economy. The war was costly in terms of both human and material losses. Costs to defend the territory were sufficiently damaging, but added to these costs were the
resources used by ideologically splintered groups to combat each other (Hočevar 1965, 179).

Communications

Significant communications developments were made in the First Yugoslavia. The University of Ljubljana was founded in 1919, and had an enrollment of almost 2,000 students in 1938 (Hočevar 1965, 171-172). This important institution was followed by the creation of museums, a national gallery, a philharmonic, and (after 1927) a national radio (Kmecl 2005, 70-71). The number of periodicals nearly tripled between 1919 and 1938 (Hočevar 1965, 173).

However, while the interwar years allowed for the development of Slovenian communications, there were crucial impediments. First, although Slovene was spoken in interwar Slovenia, the official language was Serbo-Croatian (Starc 2004, 105). Second, many of the advances made during the interwar period were diminished by the Second World War. During the war, libraries were demolished and books burned (Kmecl 2005, 79). Moreover, the Slovene language was outlawed in school settings during the Axis occupation (Arnez 1958, 92). To compensate for these barriers to communication, though, Slovenes circulated illegal newspapers and poetry collections (Kmecl 2005, 80).

Symbols

As has been mentioned, Slovenes developed museums, galleries, and other institutions to promote cultural awareness during the interwar period. However, many Slovenian artists were killed during WWII (Kmecl 2005, 81). These deaths, needless
to say, meant potential new symbols were prevented from being created. However, the deaths of these artists (and many other Slovenes) can be regarded as symbolic events in and of themselves.

**Results**

After WWII, Slovenia became one of six constituent republics in a federated Yugoslavia. The civil war that had raged along with World War II was won by the Communists. Important developments for the Slovenes during the existence of this communist federation will be discussed below.

**Case III: The Slovenes and the Collapse of Communism**

**Political Opportunity**

In Yugoslavia, regime collapse and state collapse went hand in hand. That is, the collapse of communism was accompanied by the collapse of the federation. If there was opportunity for the Slovenes to secede from Yugoslavia, this opportunity was in important respects of their own creation. The Slovenes did not have strong international allies: the United States and most European powers assured Yugoslavia’s central government that Slovenia’s independence would not be supported. Slovenia’s strongest ally just prior to independence was Austria (Ramet 2006, 394). Particular steps the Slovenes took to make independence possible will be made clear shortly.

**Identity**

Slovenian identity remained fairly strong during the communist era. Noteworthy is the fact that the Slovenes, along with the Croats, were the first of the
Yugoslav nationalities to declare independence. Even Communist authorities in Slovenia favored increased cultural, economic, and political rights for their people. One might reasonably argue that the communist experience was a time of incubation for the Slovenes: a stronger nation emerged from the Second Yugoslavia than had entered the federation.

**Leadership**

Of particular importance to the Slovenian national program were several Communist Party leaders. One of the key players during much of the Second Yugoslavia’s existence was Edvard Kardelj, Tito’s heir apparent (Cox 2005, 49). As an influential part of Tito’s inner circle, Kardelj was responsible for two of the hallmarks of Yugoslav communism: workers’ self management and the foreign policy of non-alignment (Cox 2005, 93). Moreover, Kardelj was a strong advocate for both economic and political federalism (Cox 2005, 99). As will be argued, this decentralization would have a tremendous impact on Slovenian development and preparedness for independence.

A later political leader would also play a critical role in preparing Slovenia for independence: Milan Kučan. As Slovenia’s Communist Party Chair, Kučan stood against centralizing moves by the Belgrade-based Yugoslav government. Indeed, Kučan promoted the right of Slovenes to use their own language rather than Serbo-Croatian. Moreover, he decreed that, should the need arise, Slovenes had a constitutional right to secession (Ramet 2006, 316).
Aside from political leaders, there were also several leading cultural voices by the 1980s. These personalities included Tomaž Mastnak, a proponent of civil society, and Slavoj Žižek (Cox 2005, 63-64).

**Organizations**

During the Second Yugoslavia’s existence, the Communist Party was the primary organization of importance. However, by the 1980s, other organizations of note had emerged. These included economic interests, such as independent trade organizations (Cox 2005, 69) as well as culturally-minded groups, such as the Slovenian Writers Association (Ramet 2006, 364). In addition, new parties developed to challenge Communist supremacy in political affairs. These parties included the Greens, Christian Socialists, and others (Ramet 2006, 316). Also crucial were the Territorial Defense Forces. Originally, the defense forces represented a means by which the constituent Yugoslav republics could defend themselves against foreign aggression. However, Slovenia’s defense forces –the TO—came to represent a means by which the Slovenes could defend themselves from potential threats within Yugoslavia (i.e., the Serbs) (Cox 2005, 80).

**Program**

Right up until the very end of Yugoslavia’s existence, the majority of Slovenes hoped for Slovenia’s place in a loosely constituted state (Vodopivec 1994, 23). With that hope in mind, Slovenian leaders proposed a confederal solution (Ramet 2006, 375). This proposal was rejected by the other republics (aside from Croatia).
When greater autonomy was not willingly granted to the Slovenes, Slovenian leaders took measures to gain such autonomy. A July 1988 poll showed that sixty-three percent of Slovenes supported the idea of complete independence (Ramet 2006, 316). In 1989, Slovenia amended its constitution, granting itself rights and responsibilities that had been left to the central government (Prunk 1997, 28). The Slovenian Communists withdrew from the League of Communists of Yugoslavia in January of 1990, signaling further distancing from Belgrade. Later that year, Slovenia held its first democratic elections, in which the non-Communist Demos coalition captured the most votes. Along with this vote was a referendum on Slovenian independence, which was overwhelmingly supported (Prunk 1997, 29). On June 25, 1991, Slovenia declared its independence from the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

**Finances**

From the inception of the Federal Republic, Slovenia was the most developed part of the state, and the central government supported its continued industrialization (Lazarević 1994, 58). By 1991, only eight percent of Slovenes relied on agriculture for their livelihood. Making up a mere eight percent of Yugoslavia’s population, Slovenes contributed one quarter of the federation’s gross domestic product (Cox 2005, 66). Moreover, the Yugoslav government allowed for some private ownership. The agricultural class, for instance, were allowed private ownership of farm implements and machinery (Lazarević 1994, 64). The introduction of private
ownership undoubtedly contributed to Slovenia’s future success at easing into a market economy.

**Communications**

Communications networks were well-developed for the Slovenes just prior to independence. By the late 1980s, Slovenia had several literary outposts promoting debate (Cox 2005, 60). One such periodical was *Mladina* (Cox 2005, 61-62). Another outlet was *Nova Revija*, a magazine that first appeared in 1982 and that looked at controversial issues (Ramet 2006, 312). In addition to written communications, Slovenes had access to information via audio-visual conveyance: the Slovenes had a television network as of the 1960s. With the establishment of a second university in the 1970s, further education of the population was possible (Cox 2005, 65).

Despite these well-developed communications networks, problems did exist for the Slovenes. When confronted with war against Serbia, Slovenes were hindered by “poor” intelligence (Ramet 2006, 394). Moreover, although a standard Slovene literary language exists, this language is artificial and does not represent Slovene speech. Today Slovene has 45 dialects, divided into 7 dialect groups (Starc 2004, 106). Speakers of Slovene in one part of the country may not understand speakers in another part.

**Symbols**

The communist era proved fruitful for Slovenian literature and drama (Cox 2005, 58). In addition to mainstream endeavors, alternative media became significant. During Tito’s reign, a Museum of Modern Art opened in Ljubljana (Cox 2005, 65). In
later years, punk music came to the fore. Of particular note is the band Laibach, who deliberately sought to shock. The 1980s saw the rise of an Alternative Movement that went beyond art and literature: “a network of pacifist, environmentalist, feminist, gay rights, and other alternative groups… established a public presence” (Ramet 2006, 313)

Results

In 1991, Slovenia declared its independence from Yugoslavia. Slovenia was a periphery region, with Croatia providing a buffer between the Slovenes and Serbia. Like most states faced with secessionist movements, the Belgrade-based government wished to maintain the territorial integrity of the state. Geographic, ethnic, linguistic, and religious differences separated the Slovenes from their Yugoslav compatriots, however, and after a ten-day war following the declaration of independence, the Yugoslav government capitulated.

Slovenia, thus, had an institutional advantage before and following the collapse of communism. Being a part of a federal state meant that the Slovenes were given the chance to develop an infrastructure that made transitioning to independence fairly easy. Republican status, for instance, meant that the Slovenes had a recognized political-territorial boundary, a measure of economic self-sufficiency, and a coterie of leaders to guide the transition.
Chapter Five: Concluding Remarks

Conclusions

This work’s stated aim was to explain how nationalities evolve into independent states. Thus far, this project has provided in some detail the cultural and political histories of three small, Central European groups. To this point, questions of who, what, and when have been addressed: Who are these peoples? What have their experiences been? When have they advanced their goals and when have they suffered setbacks? These questions are certainly important, but they have been addressed only in the hopes that answering them could explain why: Why did one of these groups attain independent statehood, while the two others became marginalized? More importantly, why does any group achieve statehood, when so many others fail?

At the outset of this project, three hypotheses were advanced. The first hypothesis suggested that factors endogenous to mobilized groups (or potentially mobilized groups) are critical to the success or failure of nationalist movements. This hypothesis predicted that groups with strong senses of identity, competent leaders, myriad organizations, clearly defined programs, financial stability, good communications networks, and powerful symbols will be more likely to mobilize and achieve their aims than groups lacking in these criteria.

The second hypothesis suggested that factors exogenous to groups play a more important role than do any endogenous factors. More specifically, the hypothesis was that if groups are given territorial autonomy within federal states, then they are more likely to gain independence.
The third hypothesis posited that if a group meets the mobilizational prerequisites defined previously and has autonomy, then independence will be achieved. Given these three hypotheses, the task at hand is to weigh the evidence gleaned from the cases studied.

Of the selected cases, there is only one example of the successful transition from nation to statehood. The Slovenes, in the early 1990s, were able to achieve political independence for the first time in their history. Thus, determining how the Slovenes of the 1990s differed from the Slovenes of the post-WWI and post-WWII eras seems crucial. Determining, as well, why the Slovenes of the 1990s successfully attained statehood while two similar groups could not seems appropriate. Thus, both a within-group comparison and a cross-national comparison is needed.

With respect to endogenous factors, the Slovenes of the 1990s were better equipped than the Slovenes of previous eras. However, the Slovenes of prior eras do not seem to have been ill-prepared for independence, if these endogenous factors matter most. As early as the late 1800s, Slovenes had political parties, and thus party leaders. Slovenes have long had high literacy rates and effective communications. Light industry and economic development began in Slovenia prior to the First World War, thus making Slovenia’s finances, if not impressive, at least not completely undeveloped. If symbols are needed to inspire the masses, the same anthem that rouses today’s Slovenes existed in the nineteenth century. This is not to suggest that the differences between the Slovenes of the 1990s and Slovenes of times past are minor. Rather, it must be observed that Slovenes in the second Yugoslavia had things
that Slovenes of prior eras lacked: strong leaders with executive and not simply legislative experience, defense forces, and a measure of economic self-sufficiency.

The Slovenes left the Habsburg Empire, entered what became a highly centralized unitary state, and eventually entered a federal state. With each of these changes came stronger communications, finances, organizations, etc. There is considerable difficulty, then, suggesting that either endogenous factors or exogenous factors play a greater role in the Slovenian path to independence. Perhaps the challenge of determining whether endogenous factors (mobilizational prerequisites) or exogenous factors (state structure / territorial autonomy) are more significant is eased by moving from a within-nation comparison to a cross-national comparison.

Compared with other contemporary groups, late-twentieth century Slovenes seem better prepared for independence. Compared with the Rusyns, for instance, who were subjected to severe assimilatory pressures, the Slovenes undoubtedly had a stronger sense of self, a stronger communications network, etc. Compared with the Rusyns and Sorbs alike, the Slovenes had stronger, more experienced leaders, greater financial independence, and more diversified organizations. However, the Slovenes also had republic status in a federal state, whereas the Rusyns and Sorbs did not. Thus, again, to suggest that either endogenous factors or exogenous factors better equipped the Slovenes is not easy.

Any conclusion reached in this study will be tentative. One might suggest the third hypothesis, that endogenous and exogenous factors alike both matter to nationalist movements, should be adopted. This hypothesis seems reasonable, given
the evidence here presented, if not particularly daring. However, this study is not willing to endorse this conclusion. Rather, the position here advocated is this: for the European nations that gained independence in the late twentieth century, autonomy preceded independence.

A group is more likely to have a strong identity, experienced leaders, financial and other resources if that group exists in an autonomous territory. However, neither a strong identity nor a clearly articulated program nor strong financial standing seems necessary or sufficient to achieving independence. However, autonomous status in and of itself can be sufficient for attaining statehood.

The argument that autonomy precedes independence can shed light on the post-communist experiences of the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe. Homogenous Yugoslav and Soviet republics (e.g., Slovenia) and heterogenous republics (e.g., Estonia) became independent. Unhistoric nations (e.g., the Slovenes, the Moldavians, the Byelorussians) and historic nations (e.g., Serbia) acquired states. Economically undeveloped regions (e.g., Macedonia) and fairly industrialized territories (e.g., Slovenia) are now sovereign. Violent (Serbian and Croatian) and non-violent (Czech and Slovak) movements alike resulted in the formation of new states. The nation-states that emerged in Europe at the end of the twentieth century may well have had very different pasts, but those pasts do not seem to have mattered: republican status alone was enough to guarantee independence.

To be sure, not every democratizing country in Eastern Europe emerged from a disintegrating federation. Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria, for instance, were all
unitary states at the time of communism’s collapse. These states, thus, did not need to seek independence at the end of the twentieth century. Rather, these countries embarked “only” on the path of democratization. Interestingly, however, no new countries emerged from these unitary states. This does not mean that there are no separatist (or potentially separatist) groups in these countries. There are, for instance, organized Lemko, Kaszubian, and Silesian movements in Poland (Bugajski 1994, 359-397). In the 2002 census, the Silesian identity alone was declared by 173,000 persons (Kamusella 2005).

Also of note, not every identifiable group that existed in a federation achieved statehood when federations collapsed. In 1991, for instance, 1,359,432 persons declared Moravian identity in the Czechoslovak census (Bugajski 1994, 293). Moravian and Slovakian nationalist movements emerged, with each led by competent leaders invoking past glory and symbols. Ultimately, however, the Moravian movement came to naught while the Slovak movement paved the way for Czechoslovakia’s disintegration (Jenne 2007, 125-158). Something more than coincidence seems to explain why the states to emerge from Czechoslovakia’s collapse were the Czech and Slovak Republics: these two units were the constituent republics of federative Czechoslovakia.

The autonomy-precedes-independence argument does not conflict with any of the evidence gleaned from this work’s case studies. In fact, this project lends support to this argument. The Rusyns, Sorbs, and Slovenes of the nineteenth century found themselves in similar situations: all were unhistorical peoples, all were in poor parts
of multinational empires, and all were engaged in linguistic, cultural, and political debates. As has been shown, the interwar period offered both the Rusyns and Slovenes the opportunity to develop further as part of new states; the Sorbs were less fortunate. However, the Rusyns and Slovenes took divergent paths after World War II: the Rusyns became a submerged part of the Ukrainian Socialist Republic, while the Slovenes themselves were granted republican status in the reconstituted Yugoslavia.

The fates of the Sorbs, Rusyns, and Slovenes thus seem to have been sealed decades ago. For the Sorbs, 1918 seems to have been the decisive year, with failure to secede from Germany. For the Rusyns, 1945 and incorporation into Ukraine must be considered a critical point. For the Slovenes, 1918 and 1945 were both important years, with admission into the First and Second Yugoslavias. A strong argument can be made that both those Sorbian and Rusyn groups and leaders who sought union with Czechoslovakia during and after World War I pursued the most appropriate course of action (if independence truly is the aim of all nations). True, interwar Czechoslovakia was Prague-centric. However, if both the Sorbs and Rusyns --in addition to the Czechs and Slovaks-- had been a part of Czechoslovakia, perhaps the country would have been re-organized along national lines (resembling a more northerly Yugoslavia). Had such reorganization occurred, there might very well be four Czechoslovak successor states instead of two.
Applications

This study’s focus was on Central European groups. However, there is no reason that the conclusion reached --that autonomy makes independence more likely-- should not be generalizable. That is, a group inhabiting an autonomous region of a federal state in Africa or Asia, for instance, is more likely to become independent than is a group situated in a unitary state in either continent. This conclusion suggests that independence movements are in some ways predictable. The prediction is not that every autonomous territory is destined for independence. Nor is the prediction that every federation will eventually disintegrate. When federal states do collapse, though, they are more likely to fracture along lines/borders that have already been institutionalized. Government collapse in a unitary state, however, is less likely to lead to border changes, and non-dominant groups in such states are unlikely to secede.

The significance of this conclusion should be plain to see: given the large number of ethnicities in the world, determining which groups are likely to attain statehood and which are likely to assimilate is useful -- for foreign relations, for potential investors, etc. This study offers no predictions as to when or where separatist movements will appear or when they will be violent. However, once movements become recognizable, this study suggests that determining the likelihood of success or failure is possible. Thus, for instance, the observation can be made that the Kurds of Iraq, with their autonomous region, are more likely to attain a state for themselves than are Kurds in Turkey or Iran, where autonomous status has not been
granted. Of course, independence for the Kurds would be far more likely if their territory was not split across multiple states and if members of the Kurdish community had a common platform (i.e., if there was an agreed-upon government-type in mind).

**Political Significance:**

Presumably, every regime is interested in preserving the territorial integrity of the state it governs. If this is so, then there is a danger in granting regional autonomy by means of a federalist structure. Bunce notes that three federations in Eastern Europe dissolved into more than twenty successor states. Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and the U.S.S.R. disintegrated, while other countries in the region remained intact (1999, 79).

Hechter recognizes this pattern, as well, and asks “Does federation reinforce nationalism by empowering national leaders, and whetting their appetites for even greater powers or privileges?” (2000, 140). He notes that considerable autonomy arrangements have been made with the Quebecois and Basques, but that such arrangements have not diminished the desire of these groups to separate their territories from the federations in which they reside (Hechter 2000, 142).

Henry Hale, however, argues that not all federations are doomed to fall apart. Ethnofederations --federations in which “at least one constituent territorial governance unit is intentionally associated with a specific ethnic-category”—will, however, fall apart if there is a “core ethnic group” in the federation (Hale 2000, 166-167). In Czechoslovakia, Czechs and the Czech lands were dominant. In Yugoslavia,
Serbs and Serbia dominated. In the Soviet Union, Russians were the most numerous and influential group and Russia the core region. Thus, federations with core ethnic groups collapsed. Conversely, Hale finds that thirteen ethnofederal states which lacked core ethnic groups did not collapse. These states include Canada, Switzerland, India (from 1956 onwards), and Spain (Hale 2000, 179-181). Thus, while Hechter (2000) notes that federalism has not mitigated separatist tendencies in Canada or Spain, Hale (2000) argues these separatist groups will not likely succeed.

The political implications of this thesis (and the theories that it supports) are clear for both central governments and stateless groups alike. For governments, if there is a desire to prevent separatism, then granting territorial autonomy to a minority population should be avoided. This does not mean federalism is unviable as a political system. Rather, the implication is that the borders of sub-national governments should not coincide with the ethnic map of the state. For groups preparing for future independence, the implication of this study is that they should seek territorial autonomy agreements as a bridge between marginalization and full sovereignty.

**Limitations**

The introductory chapter of this thesis highlighted several limitations, not all of which will be reiterated here. However, there is one limitation that deserves special notice, namely the sources used in this project. Much of the information presented in the third chapter of this thesis, on the Rusyns, is gathered from works by Paul Magocsi. Taras Kuzio, although not himself overly critical of Magocsi, notes that it is
“difficult to see where to draw the line between impartial scholarship and direct and high level involvement in politics and nation-building.” Magocsi he notes, has “been accused of instigating the Rusyn revival” that began in the late twentieth century (Kuzio 2005, 4-5). Martin Ziac (2001), as well, notes Magocsi’s role in contemporary Rusyn affairs. Despite these criticisms, this study is confident of Magocsi’s scholarship. Works by Magocsi used in this study are primarily historical, and Magocsi’s histories make painstakingly clear that Rusyn identity is complex, changing, and not universally agreed upon.

There is another limitation that must be addressed. This is a problem not with the research design, but with a major argument reached. This study argues that territorial autonomy tends to precede independence. However, the argument may be a “chicken or egg” type problem of which came first: does territorial autonomy lead to independence, and groups with strong identities, leaders, organizations, etc.? Or do groups with strong identities and leaders gain autonomy and then independence (ultimately tracing statehood back to mobilization and qualities endogenous to mobilized groups)?

**Suggestions for Further Study**

The first suggestion for further research is to investigate more fully the chicken and egg problem presented above. Is it usually the case that states *grant* territorial autonomy to minority populations? Or do these groups *win* autonomy? That is, why do ethnofederations, present and past, take on the particular shapes they do?
The second suggestion is to utilize Barany’s (2005) mobilizational prerequisites model with a greater number of cases. The present study has suggested that the Moravian movement failed not because of any factors endogenous to that group, but because of exogenous factors (the institutional framework of Czechoslovakia). This claim deserves investigation, and the Moravian and Slovak cases should be compared.

Anderson (2006) suggests research on nationalism ought to be less Eurocentric. Thus, a worthy project would be to investigate the autonomy-precedes-independence argument with respect to cases outside of Europe.

A final suggestion is to study in greater depth the role of the diaspora in politics. Although this topic was not central to the current undertaking, it did come up several times during the research stages of the project. University of Toronto Professor Paul Magocsi’s role in contemporary Rusyn-nation building has been mentioned. Also of note is that the first governor of Subcarpathian Rus’, Gregory Zsatkovich, was from Philadelphia. How important is the diaspora in ethnopolitics, and what roles does it typically play?
Appendix

Map I: Sorbian-speaking Areas

Bautzen (in Saxony) is the center of Upper Lusatia, and is called Budyšin in Upper Sorbian. Cottbus (in Brandenburg) is the center of Lower Lusatia, where it is known by the Sorbs as Chóšebruż.

Map Created using Online Map Creation: http://www.aquarius.ifm-geomar.de/
Map II: Rusyn-inhabited Areas

Image Copyright: Paul Robert Magocsi
Map III: Central Europe

Map Created using Online Map Creation: http://www.aquarius.ifm-geomar.de/
Table I: Sorbian Population Estimates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>c. 1800</td>
<td>245,000</td>
<td>Brock (1969, 26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. 1880s</td>
<td>160,000</td>
<td>Barker (2000, 20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950s</td>
<td>81,000</td>
<td>Barker (2000, 21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>67,000</td>
<td>Barker (2000, 21)</td>
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</table>

Table II: Rusyn Population Estimates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1840</td>
<td>442,903</td>
<td>Magocsi (1978, 354)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td>344,063</td>
<td>Magocsi (1978, 354)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>447,566</td>
<td>Magocsi (1978, 354)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959-60</td>
<td>721,899</td>
<td>Magocsi (1978, 354)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present day</td>
<td>600,000-800,000 (in Ukraine alone)</td>
<td>Rusinko (2003, 447)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table III: Slovene Population Estimates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td>1,172,359</td>
<td>Hočevar (1965, 259)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>1,316,943</td>
<td>Hočevar (1965, 259)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>1,503,595</td>
<td>Hočevar (1965, 259)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Present day</td>
<td>1,964,036</td>
<td>Cox (2005, 115)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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