The Alliance Framework: A Micro-level Approach to Diagnose Protracted Conflict in South Central Somalia

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**ABBREVIATIONS & ACRONYMS**

*Clan/subclan based opposition groups*

<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SDM</td>
<td>Somali Democratic Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNM</td>
<td>Somali National Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPM</td>
<td>Somali Patriotic Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSDF</td>
<td>Somali Salvation Democratic Front</td>
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<td>USC</td>
<td>United Somali Congress</td>
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*Alliances transcending clan/subclan*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARS</td>
<td>Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARPCT</td>
<td>Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICU</td>
<td>Islamic Court Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSSP</td>
<td>Mogadishu Security and Stabilization Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSRC</td>
<td>Somalia Reconciliation and Restoration Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFG</td>
<td>Transitional Federal Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TNG</td>
<td>Transitional National Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USC/SNA</td>
<td>United Somali Congress/Somali Salvation Alliance</td>
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<td>USC/SSA</td>
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Somalia has been in conflict since January 1991. The approach to explaining the conflict has generally followed the Hobbesian and Schmittian dichotomy with little discussion of institutional failure as a contributing factor. I argue the conflict in South Central Somalia is not among clans. There are three key factors explaining the protraction of South Central conflict. First, the power-sharing model that has been applied in Somali reconciliation conferences since 1991 assumes that the conflict is among clans who are unitary actors; thus, giving all major clans a stake in “an-all-inclusive” transitional governments is thought to be the solution to the conflict. Power-sharing agreements, however, have intensified intraclan struggle for power. Second, the losers of power-sharing agreements have formed alliances of convenience that transcend clans to undermine reconciliation conferences or transitional government that is formed. Third, traditional leaders and informal rules have not been a factor in the success of Somaliland and Puntland, the two most stable regions in Somalia. Rather, their success was the result of the emergence of a dominant group that completed the “state-making” process (Tilly 1980). Hence, I argue, the dominant group model is a better alternative to the power-sharing model to explain stability (Puntland and Somaliland) and persistent conflict (South Central Somalia).
CHAPTER I

DIAGNOSING PROTRACTED CONFLICT IN SOUTH CENTRAL SOMALIA

INTRODUCTION

*Map: Three regions Somaliland (red), Puntland (pink), and South Central Somalia (purple)*

The central question of this thesis is: why have South Central conflicts within Somalia been protracted?¹ Protracted conflicts are bloody, encompass a number of armed factions, lack cohesive organizations, and generate mistrust and resistance to negotiations (Crighton and MacIver 1991). Somalia has been without a functioning government since January 1991. After a complete state collapse, anarchy, and a security vacuum that internally displaced approximately 1,000,000 people within Somalia and forced over 600,000 others to flee to neighboring or far distant countries, Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was formed in 2004.² The last government Census on Somalia was conducted in 1975; the Somali population was estimated between 7-8 million.

In 2007, three years after the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) came to power, close to 7,000 people died in the Mogadishu conflict between the TFG and its Ethiopian allies on one side, and an amalgamation of opposition groups on the other side. The fighting between government and opposition wreaked havoc in Mogadishu, which experienced the worst fighting in 17 years. Human Rights Watch estimates that the conflicts in Mogadishu have displaced nearly 400,000 (in addition to those who were already displaced) people between February and May 2007 (“Shell-Shocked: Civilians under Siege in Mogadishu” 2007). TFG is weak and lacks legitimacy from

¹ South Central Somalia is the largest of the three regions and the only one with constant anarchy since the collapse of Somali state in January 1991. For discussion on the selection and description of the region, see methodology section.

the population it claims to represent, and the TFG has faced opposition from political entrepreneurs – I use this term rather than commonly used warlord because political entrepreneurs include former politicians, former military, warlords, business-lords, and religious-lords, and pseudo-traditional leaders – who feel that they did not get high enough positions in the transitional administrations. Since the collapse of the military regime in 1991, political entrepreneurs in South Central Somalia have attempted to create a “vampire state”, to borrow Dr. George B. N. Ayittey’s phrase, to enrich those who are in power. Like previous transitional governments (there were two others since 1991, see page 12), the political entrepreneurs who failed to capture a position of power in the TFG have formed alliances of convenience to topple it. We will come back to the final chapter.

The control of access and opportunity used for personal gain to the detriment of general welfare is what “rent-seeking”, which William Baumol (2008) calls the sixth entrepreneurial activity, is all about. Rent-seeking creates an incentive system that reduces the efficiency of the private sector and overall welfare, while transferring income to those are successfully rent seekers from the rest of society. The quest to influence the composition of transitional governments since the collapse of the military regime and to capture the highest posts (Presidency, Prime Minister, and Speaker of the Parliament) has been indicative of the length that political

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entrepreneurs will go to obtain rents. This competition over rents has kept Somalia in a “conflict trap”.

Collier et. al., (2003, 53) define the conflict trap as the “forces generated once violence has started and that tend to perpetuate it.” After internal conflict begins in a country, the “perpetuating forces” prolong it. The average civil war duration, Collier et. al., (2003) report, is around seven years. Even when peace is achieved, it is often ephemeral. A post-conflict country “…faces around a 44 percent risk of returning to conflict within five years” (Collier et al., 2003, 83) because war intensifies group hatred and contributes to the risk of returning to war. The breakdown of peace-time social values and atrocities committed during the war further polarize groups; in the Somali case the polarization has led to the disintegration of clans in to sub-sub-sub clans. The mistrust among warring parties contributes to conflict protraction.

Barbara Walters (1997) explains the genesis of this mistrust by the fact that a country cannot have two (or more) standing armies. There are two perpetuating forces that sustain Somali’s conflict trap. The first one is power-sharing and the second is alliances of convenience; while the former is exogenous, the latter is indigenous.
Figure 1 – the power-sharing versus the dominant group model

- **The power-sharing model**
  - Phase I
    - Democratic
    - Unstable
    - Weak Center
  - Phase II
    - Alliance of convenience
    - Breakdown
    - e.g., South Central Somalia

- **The dominant group model**
  - Phase I
    - Non-Democratic
    - Stable
    - Strong Center
  - Phase II
    - Consolidation of power
    - Institutionalization
    - e.g., Somaliland & Puntland

- Anarchy

Source: By author
The power sharing model is exogenous in the sense that it is international and regional actors’ who have attempted to form power-sharing transitional governments. The idea of power-sharing is giving all the major actors a stake in future government, so they have interest in supporting the peace process because when all parties have something to loose in spoiling the peace, they are more likely to abide by the agreements. In Somalia, a 4/5 power-sharing formula has been adopted. The quest for an-all-inclusive government has, thus far, eluded international and regional actors as is evidenced by the failure of thirteen reconciliation conference, and the persistent lack of a functioning government.

The endogenous element is the formation and reformation of alliances of convenience, which political entrepreneurs utilize, not to share power, but to undermine power-sharing agreements. The alternative is the emergence of a dominant group. I argue that the emergence of a dominant group is more conducive to ending the conflict trap than the power-sharing model. Richard K Betts (2005) argues wars do not occur by accident but rather wars are mechanisms to decide “who rules” present or future governments. Only a dominant group can complete the processes of “state-making”, to borrow Charles Tilly’s (1980) term, by neutralizing or eliminating their opponents. Although I don’t develop the dominant group model (DGM) in this

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To create inclusive government, the Somali government in the 1960s adopted a 4/5 power sharing model where the four largest clan families each receives 60 seats in the parliament while minority clans called the “others” share the remaining 30 seats. This model was also used in the last two Somali national reconciliation conferences: Arte (2000) and Mbghati (2002-2004). The model, however, has not reduced the fear and insecurity of individual actors from some clan families who continue to compete at KP5, KP4, and KP3.
thesis, I lay out the grounds for it by showing that evidence from Somalia illustrates that the power-sharing model has failed to end protracted conflict in South Central Somalia.

I argue that macro-level (national conflict among clans) accounts and assumptions of conflict among clans directed from a unified center overlook “interactions between various central and local actors with distinct identities, motivations, and interests” (2003, 476). I adopt Stathis N. Kalyvas’s, a political science professor at Yale University, alliance framework because it “allows for multiple rather than unitary actors, agency located in both center and periphery rather than only in either one, and a variety of preferences and identities as opposed to a common and overarching one” (2003, 486, italics in the original). The alliance model forms the theoretical underpinning for my argument that the macro-level (national conflict among clans) approach misdiagnoses the protraction of conflict in South Central Somalia. The alliance framework illustrates that identity is not static based primordial cleavage (clan).
Contrary to the assumed unitary actors united under a clan banner, we observe imperfect solidarity within subclans as a result of tension between individual and collective interests.\(^5\) I use Somali society’s kinship pyramid to show a relationship hierarchy based on ancestors.\(^6\) The pyramid reveals fluid relationships within and


\(^6\) The Somali kinship system is based on two foundations: (i) *Xigaalo* (common ancestors) and (ii) *Xidid* (marriage alliances). While the former is vertical and is based on perceived blood relations, the latter is horizontal. The following pyramid was derived from Mohamed Abdi Mohamed’s “Somalia: Kinship and Relationship Derived from it” in *Mending Rips in the Sky:*
among the hierarchy, but more importantly, it illustrates that clan is but one of the seven hierarchy-levels that make up the Somali people. Although group loyalty to kin is thought to be at the top of the pyramid, that has not been the case. Contrary to Fearon and Laitin’s (1996) proposition, intra-group cooperation has not been more common than inter-group cooperation in Somalia. In fact, I argue that conflict has been most intense in the middle of the pyramid KP4 and KP5 (subclan and clan) while most often it is generally argued that the Somali conflict has been fought at KP6 (clan families).

I take a micro-level (regional) approach that disaggregates the conflict in South Central Somalia, and focuses on identities, actions, and interests of actors in the conflicts. Changing the unit of analysis allows us to understand the alliances of convenience, which is at the core of the conflict protraction in South Central Somalia, and this change has implications for solving the conflict, as it illustrates the failure of the power-sharing model.

The thesis proceeds as follows: in chapter one I provide background on the 1991 collapse of the Somali state, evaluate theoretical explanations for civil wars and critique their application to the Somali conflict, and outline the research design. In chapter two, I test the three hypotheses I propose in the research design and demonstrate that findings falsify H1 (Credibility) and H2 (Informal rules). In the final
chapter, I illustrate how the alliance framework aptly explains the conflict in South Central Somalia more accurately than either Hobbesian or Schmittian explanations.

BACKGROUND

The history of Somalia has periods of both dominant groups and power-sharing. In pre-colonial times, Somalis lived in independent groups. Each subclan lived in a known geographical area, although no marked borders existed. Abdi Kusow (1994) observes that “Somali nomads never came under the control of a single political authority” (38). Ali K. Galaydh (1990) agrees with Kusow that pre-colonial Somalia was not conducive to state formation. Although geographically separated and lacking a shared administration, Somali nomads have interacted through marriage, shared pasture and water, and traded with each other and with coastal dwellers (Cassanelli 1982). Pre-colonial South Central Somalia experienced periods of dominant groups like the Ajuuraan, Geledi, and Abgal, all subclans, to mention but three (Cassanelli 1982).

During the formal colonial era (1880s – 1960), Somalia was divided among three powers: Italy in the south, the United Kingdom in the north and in the Northern Frontier District (NFD) of what became part of Kenya, and France, in present-day Djibouti. Many Somalis were also under the control of the Ethiopian empire who with tacit approval of the British annexed the Ogaden region in late 1950 (Fitzgibbon 1982). Colonial control was limited, however, to the major urban centers; the nomadic groups continued on much as before in most areas of present-day Somalia.
Although different colonial powers acted differently, for the most part, they did not attempt to centralize power in a colonial administration, adopting instead a “divide and rule” tactic. To run this urban centered administration, colonialists created a new elite class who challenged the power and status of traditional leadership. As more aspiring actors sought positions in the colonial administrations, clan was introduced as a means to secure favors with colonial powers. The challenge to traditional leadership, political competition, and use of clan undermined xeer (informal rules or unwritten traditional norms that ordered social interactions). The colonial era was a dominant group period although limited to urban areas.

After World War II, the United Nations established a Trusteeship Authority tasked to build a foundation for a future Somali state; Italy administrated the Trusteeship. In its ten year mandate; the Italian administrators did not build institutional capacity and the human capital necessary for a modern state. The Somali Parliament, for example, was filled with illiterate members recruited on a kinship basis. Many parliamentarians could not sign their names on the registrar. Training civil servants was no more successful (Omar 1993). Somali leaders attached little or no premium to state building; rather, they placed a unique premium on rent-seeking. Institution building was of no concern to Somali leader; their aim was pilfering state coffers, i.e., extracting resources from the general public via the state (Terrence and Samatar 1995). The Trusteeship was the first power-sharing period, it was supposedly an-all-inclusive administration, ushering in the era of unruly political competition.
Somalia gained its independence on July 1, 1960. Initially, the Somali people enjoyed a transitory peace under a fragile democracy. The 1967 presidential election was fraught with corruption and fraud, and development money was diverted to fund campaigns to buy votes for parliamentarians who were fighting tooth and nail.

SOMALIA has had three pre-conflict governments: (i) Aden Abdulla Osman, the first President of the Somali Republic (1961-67); (ii) Abdirashid Ali Sharmake, the second President of the Somali Republic (1967-1969); and (iii) General Mohamed Siad Bare, the third President of Somali “Democratic” Republic (1969-1991). Since the collapse of Bare’s regime, Somalia has had three transitional governments formed under national reconciliation conferences: (i) Ali Mahdi Mohamed, the President of the first interim government (1991-1995); (ii) Abdiqasim Salad Hassan, the President of the Transitional Federal Government (2000-2004); and (iii) Abdulahi Yusuf Ahmed, the President of the Transitional Federal Government (2004-Present). General Mohamed Farah Aidid formed a government of what he called the grand coalition in Mogadishu and his supporters declared him President (1995-1996). After his death, his son, Hussein Mohamed Farah Aidid, succeeded him (1995-1997). After the 1997 Cairo conference where about 25 factional leaders (claiming to represent their clans though many were from same clans) met, there was no claim of presidency by any of the major factional leaders. While Mahdi, Salad, and Yusuf’s government enjoyed some international and regional recognition, Aidid’s government lacked both. Madi, Abdiqasim, and Yusuf were supported by Djibouti and Italy, Djibouti and several Arab states, and Ethiopia, respectively. Refer to figure 3 above.
to cling to seats because of perks – villas, cars, and a luxurious life style. President Sharmake, who won the fraudulent 1967 elections, was assassinated on October 15, 1969. A bloodless coup followed the assassination. A military junta led by Mohamed Siad Bare, who declared himself President, ruled the country for the next twenty-one years. The nine years of post-independence until Bare was when power-sharing was formalized by introducing the 4.5 formula.

After taking power, Bare arrested most of the major politicians whom he deemed a threat to his power, and he executed some of his coup allies like General Salad Gabayre, who was a key leader in the coup. The dominant group era returned under Bare. He consolidated power in his first ten years (1969-1979), and he instituted a communist style party system to complete his power consolidation. In 1978, the government foiled a coup plot, and executed some of the coup plotters. Other surviving coup plot leaders fled the country and established opposition groups: the Somali National Movement (SNM), the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) and the United Somali Congress (USC), in 1981, 1981, and 1989,

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8 A number of anecdotal stories indicate that recruiters had difficulty in convincing clans to send delegates to represent them in the parliament. It is said that those who accepted did so reluctantly. Yet, when the government attempted the same process (4.5 formula) in the 1967 elections, sub-clans began to fight about who would be their next representative in parliament because those recruited to participate in the 1961 parliament elections came back to their respective subclans with wealth; hence, enticing their kin to want a chance at that wealth (stories told to the author in research trips to Mogadishu on December 2004 and July-October 2005).

9 Although the election was tainted, President Aden Abdulla Osman, the first Somali President, to his credit, ceded power peacefully after losing the election by two votes in the parliament who elected the President. There were 123 MP seats in the Somali Republic (1960-69). No President was installed after the assassination of President Sharmake, and the military took advantage of the chaos. See figure 2 in the appendix for pre-conflicts governments and transitional governments formed since the fall of the military regime.
respectively. In his last decade, Bare symbolized the typical “Big Man” in Africa. Like other Big Men, Bare concentrated all power in his hands; the regime became predatory, blurring the line between private and public treasure; and Bare ran the country through patronage and rent-seeking become prevalent. Bare achieved phase I (strong center, stable, and non-democratic) of the dominant group model, but failed to transition to phase II (consolidation of power and institutionalization). Other countries in Africa, Kenya, Ghana, and Uganda, have successfully, albeit at different times, transitioned to phase II.

The opposition groups continued to challenge Bare’s regime; however, they lacked a unified front (Compagnon 1990). Each decided to face Bare in its clan stronghold (this was going back to the geographical separation of clans before colonialism). This decision most likely prolonged the life of Bare’s regime, and it introduced alliances of convenience. In the last stand, the battle of Mogadishu, it was the United Somali Congress (USC) that overthrew Bare. Although the opposition groups claimed that their aim was to depose Bare and institute a power-sharing government in Somalia, individual actors had private interests – capturing the presidency. The competing private interests led to conflict between two leading figures in the USC: Ali Mahdi Mohamed and the late General Mohamed Farah Aidid. The personal leadership struggle between Mahdi and Aidid to capture the presidency and the benefits that come with it was not the only motive, however. A territorial conflict between their subclans (Haber Gidir and Abgal), and different national

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10 For a description of African Big Men see (Moss 2007).
support groups were also factors; Aidid was supported by former military personnel while Mahdi was supported by former politicians, and they formed USC/SNA (Somali National Alliance) and USC/SSA (Somali Salvation Alliance), respectively. Several other alliances succeeded USC/SNA and USC/SSA as will be seen in the final chapter. Since 1991 anarchy has dominated South Central Somalia. The rift between Aid and Mahdi had both Hobbesian and Schmittian elements.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The common explanation for the conflict among political entrepreneur follows the dichotomy between Hobbesian and Schmittian theories. The first posits that civil war is the result of competing private interests motivated by greed in a self-help environment. The second conceives that civil war is due to political incompatibility motivated by group loyalty (Kalyvas 2003, 475). The literature on the Somali conflict(s) can be divided into those works whose arguments are institutional and those that emphasize Hobbesian and Schmittian. Both of these strains take a macro-level approach and assume that a master clan cleavage is the driving force of the conflict. The power-sharing approach has been widely discussed in the literature on the Somali conflict, while the dominant group has been overlooked.

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11 Professor Kalyvas (2003) critiques Thomas Hobbes’ and Carl Schmitt’s explanation of conflict, which recently have been framed in the dichotomy between greed and grievance (Collier and Hoeffler 2002; Berdal and Malone 2000).
**Structuralism**

Donald Rothchild posits that ethnic conflicts in Africa are the result of a breakdown of “regularized patterns of relations” due to institutional failure (1997). While the colonial powers undermined informal rules in urban areas, they did not develop formal rules to replace them. For example, by creating courts without the necessary technical knowledge and institutional support, colonial administrations weakened traditional systems of jurisprudence. Therefore, at the time of independence, Somalia, like other African states, embarked on state building with weak or non-existing institutions. Writing in 1968, Samuel P. Huntington cautioned that without institutional capacity newly independent states faced high risks when opening up political participation. The post-independence Somali government took this risk as 80 political parties competed for power in the 1961 and 1967 elections without institutional capacity (Omar 1993).

Lyons and Samatar (1995) suggest that Somali traditional norms were weakened by a change of the mode of production from family based subsistence to a market economy. They add that urban development caused the decay and transformation of “kinship” because the individual did not need to rely on his/her kin in the post-colonial era. This, however, was only in major urban areas. And the

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12 Before the advent of the colonial powers, a murder was solved by the traditional leaders of the victim and killer. The victim’s kin could demand to execute the murderer or accept diya (material reward mostly in camels – 100 camels for male or 50 camels for female – or other type of asset). Whatever agreement the two groups reached on any given case, like the murder in our example, set precedents for future cases between the two groups. The verdict became xeer. It was satisfactory for both groups. It also strengthened in-group policing because each group was liable for the wrongdoings of its members, so it was also a powerful deterrent.
changes affected mostly agriculture (all of which is in South Central Somalia), while nomadic life has not changed much, economically or socially. Lyons and Samatar’s observation is in line with North’s (1990) and Knight’s (1992) explanations that informal rules weaken as society develops economically, information about the informal rules diminish, and enforcement weakens/fails. Ahmed I. Samatar (1988) posits that without that basic norm, kinship transformed into a decayed form – “clannishness” – that lacks the restraints that ordered clans and maintains internal cohesion and external peace with neighbors (in Doornbos and Markakis 1994).

Doornbos and Markakis (1994) suggest there are two schools of thought explaining the role of clans (and informal rules clans lived by) in Somalia. The first school views clans as a menace and characterizes them as: “institutionalized instability” (Said Samatar 1990); “nomadic mentality” (Osman Rabeh 1988, and this is a common view among Somalis); “lineage ideology” (Ali Glaydh 1990); or “politicizing tribalism” (Abdi Samatar 1989; Yousuf S. A. Duhul 1993). The second school, a minority, characterizes clans as “trade unions” (Hussein M Adam 1992). The result was a divisive politics fueling intensive elite competition for power and control of rents.

**Hobbesian and Schmittian**

Hobbesian literature, as applied to Somalia, argues that the zero-sum competition to capture the state and gain control over its resources led to insecurity
among leaders and state collapse in Somalia. Elite-driven explanations of conflict have been documented elsewhere (Sambanis 2003). Sambanis notes that De Figueiredo and Weingast (1999) suggest that elites manipulate the public because the public lacks information about threats from other groups, which elites propagate.

In the Schmittian literature, Rasmussen posits that the failure of a government to heed the demands of groups that feel deprived of socio-economic resources leads to conflicts (in Zartman and Rasmussen 2003). Mohamed Siad Bare’s brutal repression culminating in collective punishment against the Majerteen clan and egregious clan cleansing against Isaaq (Terrence and Samatar 1995) is oft-cited as evidence that the Somali conflict directly correlates with political repression, a feeling of deprivation, and alienation of groups from the state.

Paul Collier (2007) argues that evidence on the role of grievances in igniting conflicts is weak, while political repression (Jim Fearon and David Laitin cited in Collier 2007) and income inequality show no direct correlation with the start of conflict. Rather he argues, “[a] flagrant grievance is to a rebel movement what an image is to a business” (24). Collier has a point, in that grievances do not always provoke rebellion and that those suffering most do not have the means to rebel. This has been the case with the Banadiri and Bantu clans in Somalia who have suffered

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13 State collapse is defined as “a situation where structure, authority, law, and political order [within a state] have fallen apart and must be reconstructed in some form, old or new” (I. William Zartman 1995, I quoted in Taras and Ganguly, 23-4).

14 Gudrun Ostby (2006) finds a correlation between horizontal inequalities and the advent of civil wars.
both under the military government and political entrepreneurs, although more severely under the latter, but have not rebelled.

In the Somali case a number of authors adopt Hobbesian or Schmittian explanations, (see for instance, Doornbos and Markakis 1994; Menkhaus 2003, 2007; Mohamed 1993; Marchal 2006; Andrea 2002; Lyons and Samatar 1995; and Bakonyi and Stuvoy 2005). Some authors have argued that institutional failure – the deterioration of traditional norms and weak formal institutions – contributed to the conflict’s onset and protraction (see, for instance, Lyons and Samatar 1995; Adam 1997; Mohamed-Abdi 1997; Ceshekter 1997; and Menkhaus 2003). These studies, for the most part, diagnose the “Somali” conflict as a binary conflict – two groups against each other – led by unitary actors (i.e., political entrepreneurs) who generate and direct demands along a “master” clan cleavage. This explanation takes a macro-level (national) approach ignores dynamic interactions between identities, actions, and interests (Kalyvas 2003), and it fails to explain why conflict has not been protracted in other regions of Somalia but has persisted in the South Central region particularly in Mogadishu, the Somali capital, which has erroneously come to be synonymous with Somalia (Brydon 1999). Green and Seher (2002, as cited in Sambanis 2003) point out that the ethnic conflict literature suffers from analyzing macro-historical and political data without due attention to the individual and group levels. In this regard, the literature on Somalia is no different. It attempts to reduce the ambiguity of the conflict to discernible cleavages, traditionally between clans, and now involving religion, since the sudden rise and fall of the Islamic Courts Union in 2006.
The Puzzle

This seemingly clear line of analysis – degeneration of the clan system and informal rules, competition over resources, concern for individual and group survival, and grievances of the vanquished – has glaring shortcomings, however. First, macro-level analyses of the “Somali” conflict assume a driving master cleavage and frame the conflict in binary terms (i.e., one clan against another). Therefore, the power-sharing model assumes that conflict is among clans; thus, the model does not take into account the role of alliance of convenience, which transcends clans and subverts transitional governments.

Second, private interests and political goals interact. The political entrepreneurs act with the blessing of their supporters, who actively back them to gain power. In return, the supporters expect to benefit from their man’s reign. This challenges the notion of “elite manipulation” of the public (De Figueiredo and Weingast 1999, cited in Sambanis 2003). The masses (from armed clans/subclans) are also “instigators” (Kalyvas 2003) as we will discuss below.

Finally, alliances of convenience among actors in South Central Somalia are not well studied. A systematic review illustrates that alliances of convenience have undermined power-sharing agreements. As the final chapter illustrates identity is not static based on primordial ties (clan); rather, identity is fluid and transcends any master cleavage (e.g. clan, religion or any other). The actors at the center (Mogadishu) influence their allies in the periphery (other regions in South Central
Somalia). The periphery actors in South Central Somalia use their alliance with the center to gain power in their locales and advance local issues, sometimes, at the expense of national issues that the center wants to promote. The central actors use their alliance with periphery actors to extend the territory under their control and augment their bargaining power.

The alliances of convenience explain why the South Central conflict is protracted and why the power-sharing model fails to end conflicts in South Central Somalia. These alliances breakdown once their aim is achieved. The alternative to the power-sharing model is therefore the dominant group model.

**RESEARCH DESIGN**

Why have South Central conflicts within Somalia been protracted? My initial theory (explanation) was that informal rules (*xeer*) and traditional leaders play a role in conflict resolution even if the traditional rules are formalized (as in Somaliland). In fact, no formal rules can be established unless socially accepted informal are adopted (see North, 1990, Chapters 5 & 6). However, in the absence of traditional rules and actors, mutual trust and cooperation breakdown and conflict resolution is more difficult to achieve. There are three factors (hypotheses) that may influence conflict resolution: (i) individual credibility of sub-clan elders, (ii) the accepted informal rules beyond any specific individual and (iii) political entrepreneur, non-elder sub-clan leaders who ignore the informal rules.

H1 (*Credibility Hypothesis*): Conflict resolution is more feasible in regions
where sub-clan elders are credible and have bargaining power. Conflicts outside South Central Somalia are resolved through sub-clan elders with a strong reputation, respect and significant bargaining power.

**H2 (Informal Rule Hypothesis):** There is successful conflict resolution in regions where the informal rules (xeer) are generally accepted by all factions (sub-clans). Beyond the individual reputation of sub-clan elders, the rules shape behavior.

**H3 (Political Entrepreneur Hypothesis):** Conflict continues in regions where individual, non-elder sub-clan leaders (political entrepreneurs) subvert weak sub-clan elders and ignore weak informal rules.

**Methodology and limitations**

Before the collapse Somalia was divided into 18 regions. Most current studies (e.g., World Bank 2005), however, divide the country into three regions: (i) Somaliland (the northern territory within the territory of the former Republic of Somalia that declared its independence in 1991 and has remained functional despite the lack of international recognition); (ii) Puntland (northwestern territory that established a functioning administration but does not claim independence); and (iii) South Central Somalia which “… stretches from South Galka’ayo [small town bordering Puntland] to Liboye town, a border town between Kenya and Somalia.” There are 12 regions and 56 districts in South Central Somalia, it is endowed with fertile agricultural land, and the two rivers, Jubba and Shebelle, run through South Central Somalia (Center for Research and Dialogue (CRD) 2004).
Pinpointing the locus of protracted conflict in South Central Somalia is not easy. Contrary to my initial argument that the “Mogadishu” conflict has been protracted while other conflicts (both in South Central and other regions) have not been, Mogadishu conflicts have not been fought in a vacuum. Undoubtedly, Mogadishu as the capital city of Somalia where both power and resources are concentrated, has influenced the protraction of conflict in the rest of South Central Somalia. Equally important, South Central regions outside of Mogadishu have influenced and shaped the trajectory of conflicts in Mogadishu.

There are some limitations, however, to this regional approach. First, there is the difficulty of comparing South Central to Puntland and Somaliland, both of which are smaller in population and territory, and have much less resources. All the major resources (rivers, agricultural land, and economic infrastructure like ports, airports, and large markets, see CRD 2004 conflict mapping in the appendix) are located in South Central Somalia. South Central has been the traditional seat of government based in Mogadishu including transitional governments established since the collapse of the military regime in 1991. South Central, specifically Benadir region, attracts the largest population in Somalia making South Central region demographically more heterogeneous (all clan families are found in South Central) as a result of systematic resettlements.

The Italians resettled Majerteen in Benadir region from what has now become Puntland, Mohamed Siad Bare resettled Ogaden from Ogaden territories in northwest Somalia to Upper Jubba near Kismayo, and Habargidir and other Hawiye subclans.
resettled in Benadir, Lower/Upper Jubba and Shebelle regions after the fall of Bare.

Second, not all regions of South Central have been in constant conflict. Some regions have been at peace, others at war while others oscillated between minor and intermediate conflicts with lulls in between. Finally, both USC/SSA and USC/SNA supported allies in Puntland and Somaliland, but Abdulahi Yusuf Ahmed and Mohamed Ibrahim Igal defeated their opponents and emerged as the dominant leaders – the Presidents – Puntland and Somaliland, respectively; however, no dominant leader emerged in South Central Somalia. To account for these regional differences and in line with my micro-level approach, I have focused on identities, actions, and interests within South Central Somalia, and I accomplish this using the alliance framework.

The study is cross-sectional and uses qualitative data. It relied on secondary data and reports. I reviewed some primary documents – signed agreements, conference papers, communiqués, press releases, and news report.

The aim of this thesis is to diagnose why conflict in South Central Somalia has been protracted. If we can figure out what factors play a role in conflict resolution outside South Central, then we can examine whether or not these factors exist or can be introduced in South Central. For example, if individual reputation of sub-clan

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15 A minor conflict is a conflict where at least 25 people died in battle-related deaths in each year of the conflict, but less than 1000 died during the entire conflict. See the Uppsala Conflict Data Program concept definitions: http://www.pcr.uu.se/database/definitions_all. Mogadishu conflict has varied. It was a civil war in 1991, 1992, and 1993 but later has become more of an intermediate war. The Somali conflict does not conform to Uppsala’s definition of conflict as a situation in which one of the parties is a government because no functioning government has existed in Somalia since the collapse of the military regime in January 1991.
elders is the key factor in regional conflict resolution, then it may be the absence of strong clan elders that prevents conflict resolution in Mogadishu. Also, we know that we need to disaggregate the level of analysis to look at group relations below the assumed master clan. The kinship pyramid helps us to disentangle clan hierarchy and specify the level of conflict, so we can tailor solutions appropriate to that level.

**Thesis Map**

Chapter two defines the role of traditional leaders in conflict resolution and explains how they gain respect and credibility. With examples from Moqokori, a city in Hiraan region of South Central Somalia, the chapter elaborates where traditional leaders can be a potent force for conflict resolution and it tests H1 (credibility hypothesis). Second, the chapter defines informal rules; examines how they develop, their resurgences in some areas, and their limitation and it tests H2 (informal rules hypothesis). Third, the chapter defines political entrepreneurs and explores their influence on the conflict, and test H3 (political entrepreneur hypothesis).

The final chapter examines how the alliance framework better explains the conflict drivers in South Central Somalia. It closely follows Kalyvas’s examinations of the interaction between political interests and private actions, how individual actors gain and maintain support from their kin (community) for their personal goals, and the role of public in the conflict. Next, the chapter examines the symbiotic-parasatic relationship between the center and periphery actors. In the following section, the chapter explains the failures of power-sharing agreements and illustrates how
alliances of convenience undermined past agreements. The chapter concludes with the proposition of an alternative to the power-sharing model – the dominant group model.
CHAPTER II

EVALUATING HYPOTHESES

THE EROSION OF TRADITIONAL LEADERSHIP

The traditional leaders are (s)elected representative of their sub-clan. Each clan leader is chosen depending on: his “integrity, honesty, truthfulness, justice, love for his people and be already known for his capacity and good conduct, not only by his clan but also by other clans” (Mathews 1993, 3). In addition to oratory skills, knowledge of xeer (informal rules) and Islamic religious principles are basic requirements. Traditional leaders also delegate power to other elders in the community, so traditional leaders rule by consensus (Lewis 1988).

Bargaining power is the “relative ability to force others to act in ways contrary to their unconstrained preferences” (Knight 1992, 127). The assumption is that some actors are more powerful than others. Powerful actors constrain the weaker actors’ choices; the weaker actors respect institutional rules because they don’t have relative bargaining power to change institutional rules. Once actors establish a new equilibrium, change occurs slowly. Any actor(s) thinking about changing the equilibrium must consider his relative bargaining power and the feasibility that another or other actors will achieve a favorable outcome after a change. According to

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16 Only males have been selected as traditional leaders in Somalia. There have not been in Somali’s history any female warlords or politicians. The Somali political scene is men. So I continuously use the pronoun he to denote that Somali politics and traditional roles are male dominated.
Knight, successful bargaining depends on the “fundamental relationship between resource asymmetries, on one hand, and credibility, risk, and time preference, on the other” (1992 129, italics in the original). For an actor to influence others, he/she must be credible.

Credibility is determined by the resources available to the actor, such as intelligence, previous experiences, and/or threats of retaliation. The rigorous selection process, shared decision making, and open debates give credibility and significant bargaining power to traditional leaders in each community. In addition, traditional leaders have the ability to provide rewards and/or impose sanctions. These give traditional leaders an immense influence and leverage over their subclan.

As briefly discussed in the background section of the previous chapter, colonialists disrupted the power equilibrium by empowering a younger generation of leaders who did not rise through the normal ranks that brought traditional leaders to power. The new leadership, in return, challenged the position of the traditional leaders and competed against them, on behalf of their colonial masters, for the loyalty of their subclans. The struggle further intensified when aspiring actors challenged the new elite. Many of these groups were those seeking independence; some of which were former administrators or security guards for the colonial administrations. During the nine years of post-independence civilian government, the political competition become hostile as actors competed to capture rents. The rampant corruption demoralized the Somali public, who lost confidence in the government. To the
dismay of the public, the military junta did not bring lasting relief, but it was not the last disappointment, as the end of the military regime brought even worse catastrophes. Therefore, since the colonial powers disrupted the balance and the process of power, Somalis never recovered from it. This is not to blame the colonial regimes for the ills that Somalis brought on themselves, but it is to point that Somalis left their “ways”, to borrow Confucius’s word, they failed to form institutions and enact policies conducive to state development. The traditional leaders lost their credibility to political entrepreneurs.

Findings

Political entrepreneurs have more credibility – resources and influence - than traditional leaders. Therefore, political entrepreneurs have broken agreements that traditional leaders have made. In the post-colonial era, political entrepreneurs politicized clans in order to capture power and wealth. Finally, Bare formalized clannish politics by heavily relying upon his clan, his wife’s clan, and his mother’s clan. The increased power, wealth, and status of political entrepreneurs has eroded the bargaining power of traditional leaders and their influence over the subclan. Rather than earning the loyalty of their kin, political entrepreneurs pay for it. Patronage has been the preferred currency of political elites to reward and punish their kin, so patronage has been a very potent weapon upon which many political entrepreneurs have built their careers since independence.
The political entrepreneurs have undermined the attempts of traditional leaders to mediate conflicts in Somalia. For example, when traditional leaders attempted to mediate between Murursade and Abgal subclans, both members of the Hawiye clan family (KP6), conflict political entrepreneurs reignited the fight. This phenomenon – undercutting traditional leaders – is not unique to Mogadishu. In the Galgudud, a region of South Central Somalia bordering Puntland, conflict between Sa’ad and Saleeban, both subclans of Habargidir (KP4), traditional leaders efforts were undercut by political entrepreneur who were funneling ammunition, money, and moral support (CRD unpublished).17

The intra-subclan struggle for power has eroded not only the credibility of traditional leaders but also inter-subclan solidarity. Unity has given way to fragmentation precipitated by competition over subclan loyalty (see disintegration of United Somali Congress (USC) in the final chapter). As new actors emerge within a subclan and challenge the establishment elite who resist sharing power and status, often violent struggles ensue. The disintegration of subclan unity as a result of internal subclan power struggles erodes the influence of traditional leaders. If a traditional leader sides with one side, he loses moral authority over the subclan. If, on the other hand, he attempts to be neutral, he loses practical authority and is perceived to be irrelevant. For example, Hiraab traditional leaders failed to reconcile the late General Mohamed Farah Aidid and Ali Mahdi Mohamed, Habargidir traditional leaders.

17 The author was also present in consultation conducted in Mogadishu August-Sept 2005 where traditional leaders in the meeting directly confronted their kin in the room and accused of dabhuris, (“fanning the fires”).
leaders failed to prevent or resolve the Aidid and Osman Ali Ato break up, while Abgal traditional leaders failed to stop the bloodshed between Muse Sudi Yallahow and Omar Mohamed Finish (see figure 4).

This is not to suggest that traditional leaders are no longer relevant in Somalia. But it is to say that traditional leaders – both in urban and rural areas – are viable only when they address issues other than competition over power and rents. Traditional leaders do still have influence over issues like marriage and diya (“blood-wealth”).

Case study

Moqokori is a Somali village situated in the Hiraan region, part of South Central Somalia. It is close to the Middle-Shabeele region, so it straddles the Abgal and Hawadle subclan territories. The conflict on which the report used in this case study is based took place between October 7 and 13, 2007. According to the Center for Research and Dialogue (CRD) report, the “causes of the conflict in the area were mainly camels rustling and land [this was very small and mostly arid] grabbing” (CRD, unpublished report). Because it involved traditional wedge issues, traditional leaders intervened. The Ugaas “chief” Abdirahman of Hawadle and Imam “chief” Mohamud Imaam Omar of Abgal led their respective delegations. After weeks of deliberation, they selected a committee of 40 representatives who agreed on compensation to be paid by each subclan to the other. Moreover, they agreed to enact

18 I am grateful to CRD assistant researcher, Sadia who, provided me with copy of the draft report after reading about Moqokori reconciliations on www.hiiraan.com.

19 Different Somali subclans have different titles for their chiefs; other subclans for example use: Boqor, Malaq, and so on.
new xeer, although it was put off because previous xeer required that new xeer cannot be established “when there are … pending issue or unfinished business such as unpaid Diyya (sic) compensation or a claim that has not been accepted yet” (CRD, unpublished report).

While traditional leaders have succeeded in Moqokori, their failure in Galgudud, Bay and Bakool, Lower and Upper Shabeele, and Benaadir (all part of South Central) regions illustrates the erosion of traditional leaders’ bargaining and enforcement power on the most contested issues of power and rents.

Traditional leaders are only relevant where dominant leaders emerge and internal challengers are neutralized. In these environments, as was the case in Somaliland and Puntland, traditional leaders can rubberstamp the wishes of the victor and lend moral support to consolidate power. To make other groups (losers) feel included in the process, a dominant leader can concede some leverage to traditional leaders as they don’t challenge his political power. Without the emergence of dominant leaders, traditional leaders are relegated to irrelevancy on reconciling power, resources, and territory struggles because there are too many political entrepreneurs contesting to represent the subclan.

The findings falsify H1 (the credibility hypothesis). The traditional leaders are credible only pertaining to issues that don’t deal directly with power struggle and rents. They also have less bargaining power than political entrepreneurs. Conflicts outside South Central are not resolved through subclan elders with a strong
reputation, respect, and significant bargaining power; rather, it is the emergence of a dominant leader that ended conflicts in Somaliland, Puntland, and South Central Somalia (briefly), when the Islamic Court Union (ICU) consolidated power.

INFORMAL RULES

The conception of norms varies, and I adopt Jean Ensminger and Jack Knight’s (1997, 2) definition that “…social norms are informal rules that structure behavior in ways that allow individuals to gain the benefits of collective action.” Informal rules order the society, clarify ambiguity, and define the roles of each member, because “the threat of violence is a continuous force for preserving order” (North 1990, 47). Informal rules are internally enforced standards of conduct by individuals, and they continue to function without an external enforcement mechanism.

The degree of strength or weakness of the informal rules differs among regions in Somalia. The survival of informal rules outside of urban areas is due to a “dense social network [that leads] to the development of informal structures with substantial stability” (North 1992, 47). Directly, colonial, post-colonial, military, and post-military elite manipulation and attempts to exogenously formalize informal rules without institutional capacity weakened them. Indirectly, informal rules in urban areas in general and Mogadishu in particular have undergone evolutionary changes.

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20 For further discussion on conceptualization see Ensminger and Knight’s account on the difference between Bailey (1969), Berth (1981); and Bourdieu (1977).
Two reasons cause the change of informal rules: (i) the diminishing information about the rules, and (ii) diminishing incentives to comply with informal rules. Information diminishes due to the growth of the population and/or the ambiguity of interpretation. In addition, the move from smaller (rural) communities to larger (urban) communities broadens social interactions. As the community expands the interaction between individual members decreases and information about rules diminishes. Anonymity weakens informal rules in Mogadishu due to limited interactions among the same individuals and lack of information and credible punishment, leading to “opportunism” (Knight 1992; North 1990; Fearon and Laitin 1996).²¹ As discussed above, the changes of power symmetry between traditional leaders and political entrepreneurs has contributed to the decline of informal rules.

**Resurgence of Informal Rules**

Terrence and Samatar’s (1995) assertion that the “old Somali social order based on kinship [xeer], and Islam failed” does not explain the survival of traditional norms in some parts of the country and their resurgence after the fall of the military regime. Menkhaus writes, the “…informal system of governance can insure rule of law and exceptionally high level of personal security” (2003, 411). Groups (subclans) have provided a sense of security and trust through informal rules that create certainty between members to pursue economic and political gains (Bakonyi & Stuvo 2005, 465).

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²¹ Fearon and Laitin define opportunism as “self-interested behavior that has socially harmful consequences”. They list examples: “cheating, shirking, malfeasance, fraud, exploitation, embezzlement, extortion, robbery, and rape” (717).
Mohamed-Abdi Mohamed asserts that “the modern state formulated its own laws, but time proved that its real influence was limited to the cities. Outside the cities, people have preserved their traditional system of government” (1997, 151). The preservation of xeer in rural areas proved to be wise because people rediscovered “the value and utility of” xeer (Adam 1997, 115). When formal institutions become “haphazard, weak and corrupt”, informal rules solve the dilemma (Fearon and Laitin 1996, 718). As result of state collapse, Somalis resurrected informal rules in some parts of the country (Adam 1997, 110). In particular, after the breakdown of the center (Mogadishu), some of the peripheries reverted back to informal rule (Ceshekter 1997, 76-77; Menkhaus 2003, 407).

Menkhaus (2003) observes that local administration emerges even in the most precarious situations and orders society by providing certainty and constraining actors under shared norms. For example, after the collapse of the military regime, many neighborhood watches sprung up because residents wanted to fend off militias. Some neighborhoods protected only their kin. In Bermuda, a small neighborhood, in the center of Mogadishu, all the roof tops of houses belonging to non-Abgal subclans were looted. Other area neighborhood watches protected their immediate neighbors regardless of clan (author’s experience in Mogadishu, 1991-1996, and again on trips in December 2004 and July-October 2005).

It is, thus, essential to differentiate between the degeneration of informal rules in the center (Mogadishu) and their survival in the periphery, or the rest of the
country. I argue that the farther away from Mogadishu the population resides, the stronger the kinship system and informal rules remain. Traditional actors have enforcement mechanisms in rural areas based on their subclan authority. Informal rules solve similar issues that they have solved in the past. Similarly, informal rules are limited to geographically separate areas in which subclans lived prior to the advent of colonialism.

In a recent example, traditional leaders in Kismayo, a southern Somali city, agreed that if a member of a subclan murders a member of another subclan, the murderer must be executed before sunset. It is the obligation of the murderer’s kin to hand the murderer over to the victim’s kin. This is what Fearon and Laitin (1996) call “in-group policing”. In Kismayo the agreement has been publically applied so far in one case where the murderer was handed over and executed as agreed. There were other agreements (see Moqokori example above) where informal rules helped to solve a conflict. Although informal rules survived in some areas, their effectiveness was limited.

*Limitations of informal rules*

Although the informal rules filled the vacuum in solving minor apolitical issues, they were not capable of solving political issues. Informal rules did not develop the capacity to mediate among clans/subclans. In the pre-colonial era, informal rules were confined to small groups of people, the resources were in the hands of traditional leaders, and no challengers emerged in groups unless one rose
through the ranks as he aged, accrued respect, and proved his worthy in the community. Colonialists introduced new forms of rules that were alien to Somalis and used their new elite to carry them out. As result, informal rules never developed mechanisms to cross over and apply beyond one particular group. In other words, colonial intervention, corruption during 1960-1969, 21 years of military dictatorship, and 17 years of chaos in South Central Somalia undermined the transformation process of informal rules.

The attempt of the Somali post-independence government to hastily transform the society by imposing alien, incomplete, and centralized formal rules without institutional capacity to implement weakened further informal rules. In addition, the military dictator, Mohamed Siad Bare, like the colonial and post-independence administrations before him, continued to undermine informal rules and replaced them with patron-client relations. After the fall of Bare’s regime and without rules to order elite interaction, self-help became the order of the day in South Central Somalia, where only a hegemon (whether colonial rule or Bare) had constrained competing elites and held the city together through use of force.

Contrary to my initial hunch that informal rules played a critical role in solving conflicts in Puntland and Somaliland, it was the consolidation of power that led to the stability in the two regions. The findings illustrate that informal rules and informal institutions are not effective under anarchy, and their utility is very limited.
POLITICAL ENTREPRENEURS

Political entrepreneurs are self-styled “leaders” who have no permanent loyalty to subclan. Although they derive their support from their kin, the kin circle has narrowed as result of internal struggles within subclans. There are several types of political entrepreneurs. One consists of former politicians. They participated in the democratically elected post-independence governments (1960-69). Many of these, although their number are decreasing due to age, are wealthy and command the respect of their subclan, gained from politics of patronage. Although they remain influential in South Central Somalia politics, they were not as prominent after the Bare military regime took power. The second group of political entrepreneurs is made-up of former military personal. Most of them were members of Bare’s clique to the end of his regime while some of them defected and established opposition groups. A third group of political entrepreneurs is the warlords – a mix of former politicians (e.g., Mahdi, a parliamentarian in the Aden government), former military (e.g., Aidid, who was also a diplomat), businessmen (e.g., Ato), and religious leaders (e.g., Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, who is also former military and most recently one of the two top leader so the Islamic Court Union).

A common trait of all these groups is that they continuously have shifted alliances and have been on more than one side of the conflict. The last group of political entrepreneurs is the so-called nabadoon – pseudo-traditional leaders who dwell in the cities. They are intermediaries between political elites and their kin. The
nabadoon was originally created by Mohamed Siad Bare’s military regime to diminish the influence of the traditional leaders. While there is one traditional leader at the subclan level, there are a number of nabadoons in each subclan.

With respect to the Entrepreneur Hypothesis (H3), we find that conflict continues in South Central regions. First, political entrepreneurs have more credibility, financial resource, militia, and external support (regional and international like Ethiopia) than traditional leaders, so the political entrepreneurs have higher bargaining power than traditional leaders. The entrepreneurs subvert weak subclan traditional leaders and ignore weak informal rules. Second, as discussed above, the traditional leaders’ bargaining power has decreased over time beginning with the advent of colonialism and culminating with Mohamed Siad Bare’s systematic weakening of their authority by replacing the traditional leaders with Nabadoo. Finally, the competition and internal struggles within subclans further eroded traditional leaders’ moral and practical authority over their kin.
CHAPTER III

EVIDENCE FOR THE ALLIANCE FRAMEWORK THEORY

Introduction

In a briefing to the United Nations Security Council, UN Special envoy for Somalia Ahmedou Ould Abdallah states:

[The Somali conflict] is neither a liberation struggle, nor an ethnic or religious war. It is not only a struggle for power among the clans as many believe. The frequently shifting allegiances between and within clans demonstrate that other factors are also responsible for the continued instability of the country. Within Somalia, warlords, activists, and their private militias have perpetuated the chaos and violence for their own benefit. Overall, a small group drawn from various backgrounds and driven by lust for money and power, is fighting to fill the political vacuum. (December 17, 2007; emphasis added)

Ambassador Abdallah’s analysis that conflict is not a clan conflict and that alliances of convenience is a driving force perpetuating the conflict are in line with my analysis. His suggestions, however, that few groups “driven by lust for money and power” is only partially correct, as I demonstrate below the public plays a role in the conflict. In addition, Ambassador Abdallah’s analysis contradicts the power-sharing model that his employer, the UN, and other regional and international actors have promoted in the quest for forming a Somali state.

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As I argue below, the few political entrepreneurs have the backing of the general public, and both groups are seeking to capture rents. The interactions among private interests and political and ideological goals explain conflict in Somalia, in general, and the South Central region in particular. This chapter illustrates that the Somali conflict combines Hobbesian and Schmittian elements: private interests and political goals interact. Thus, the alliance framework is best suited to explain the failure of power-sharing agreements and the protraction of conflict in South Central Somalia with Mogadishu at the center.

There are three key components of the alliance framework. The first is the “interaction between political and private identities and interests” (Kalyvas 2003, 475) where identities and actions are fluid and not demarcated by a master cleavage (Kalyvas 2003). The second is the disjunction between center and periphery; Mogadishu influences and is influenced by local issues in other South Central regions as well as other regions. The third is the formation of alliances of convenience across clan lines and regions in South Central Somalia. Somali political entrepreneurs have used alliances to undermine power-sharing agreements in South Central Somalia. In addition, alliances hinder the emergence of a dominant group. The chapter proceeds as follows: first it examines the Hobbesian and Schmittian theories in the Somali context; next it explains the center-periphery relations and their effects; third it briefly looks at the results of power-sharing agreements and how alliances of convenience have undermined them; and it concludes with evidence that shows the success of the dominant group model in Somalia.
HOBESIAN & SCHMITTIAN THEORIES

Rather than being an either/or situation, the South Central Somalia conflict combines elements from what Kalyvas (2003) calls Hobbesian and Schmittian models of conflict – a dichotomy that is currently presented as greed and grievance motives of conflicts. On one hand, there are individual political entrepreneurs who pursue private interest; on the other, they rely on the support of their kin and claim to be promoting political goals of their kin. Political entrepreneurs seek to gain power (means) to capture rents (an end goal) through clan/subclan identity (tool). The three reinforce each other. The political entrepreneurs pursue their private interests at the expense of the general welfare, but the general public is a willing culprit. The public provides material and spiritual support, and militias to political entrepreneurs. In return, the public expects that the political entrepreneurs will share future rents with them. Therefore, the protracted conflict in South Central Somalia is the result of interaction between private interests and political goals.

Power as Means

A political entrepreneur seeks to capture power. Vying for power predated Somalia’s independence. In the preparation for independence about eighty political parties were established along subclan lines; individual leaders established parties to boost their chance in gaining access to government (Omar 1993). The government is the gateway to opportunities and access to upward mobility; hence, every aspiring leader seeks to capture government levers. This struggle intensified under Mohamed
Siad Bare’s regime. His selective reward and punishment of certain clans/subclans made obvious what was at stake – survival of groups (clans/subclans), and a political elite is mindful what his/her fate will be if one is to become the loser. “The historical predatory state apparatus, the misuses and the abuses of state power and the lingering mistrust and prejudice among clans [it is more apt to say among political entrepreneurs] and communities created endless competition over the top leadership of the state” (CRD 2004, 25). The competition among political entrepreneurs in South Central Somali resembles Hirshleifer’s (2001) Machiavelli theorem – “whereby no advantageous opportunity to exploit someone will be missed” (as cited in Collier et. al., 2003, 54).

Rent-seeking as the Goal

One of the drivers of these competitions is rent-seeking – pilfering resources from the general public, via the state when it existed, and directly in the conflict years from the public. In the first, rent-seeking redistributes and does not produce any value. It creates incentives for all ambitious entrepreneurs to apply their skills in search of capturing the state. It also creates disincentives in pursuing other productive entrepreneurial activities. It becomes destructive because it creates intensive competition over capturing states, because, like Roma and China of the past (see Baumol 2008), in Somalia prestige and wealth were garnered through the state (1960-1991). During the anarchy (1991-present), political entrepreneurs have been trying to create a vampire state to accrue prestige and wealth.
The political entrepreneurs are the wealthiest people in Somalia.\(^\text{23}\) To amass such wealth, the Members of Parliament both in the Transitional National Government (TNG) and Transitional Federal Government (TFG) (created in Arte Djibouti in 2002 and in Mbagati, Kenya in 2004, respectively) joined the parliaments to gain access to rents (Andre Le Sage 2002, 35). The parliament seats were distributed based on clan/subclans.

**Clans as Tools**

Clans/subclans serve as *tools* for political entrepreneurs to capture power and control rents. “Since the clan structure is in many cases used to defend individual clan members and their property, the then emerging politicians capitalized on the clan sentiments by appealing to their respective clans for protection and support in the pursuit of individual political ends” (CRD 2004, 21). So while pursuing a private goal, political entrepreneurs marry their goals with clan/subclan interests, so the private interests become communal interests because “in the struggle for positions in the state of the future – this is what internecine struggle is about – the clan is the invariable controlling element” (Doornbos and Markakis 1994, 86). The interaction between the private interests of political entrepreneurs and clans/subclans’ goals led Bakonyi and Stuvoy (2005, 373) to conclude that “the whole system of warlordism is embedded in local society… [they] have ties to the local and regional social structure”, and so the political entrepreneur exists on the support from their kin.

The private interests

In the struggle against Mohamed Siad Bare’s military regime, the opposition leaders (most of them former government members) had private grudges against the regime. Some were former politicians under the brief democratic government while others were former members of the military regime who fell out of favor with Bare’s clique. The opposition leaders disguised their private interests as political goals of their clan/subclan.

An extreme case of personal loss becoming a group and national grievance was the formation of the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) in 1989, after the Minister of Defense General Gabyo, from Ogaden lineage, was demoted from his position and arrested (Lyons and Samatar 1995). Similarly, Majerteen and Isaaq leaders, most of them former government officials who were purged, rallied their subclans against the military government. In 1978, the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) led by Abdulahi Yusuf Ahmed began a rebellion against Bare, who responded with brute force and exacted collective punishments against the Majerteen for their “support” for the rebellion (Afyare and Barise 2006).24 In 1988, the Somali National Movement (SNM) surprised the regime by taking over Hargeisa, a northern Somali town and stronghold of the Isaaq clan (KP5). Bare responded with fierce military might, and over 60,000 civilians were killed while hundreds of thousands fled across the border to Ethiopia (Afyare and Barise 2006). Elite conflict of interest

continued to plague the prospect of reconciliation within clans and subclans after the fall of Bare.

While Isaaq leaders had private grudges against the military dictator, Mohamed Siad Bare, they also had communal justifications for their grievances. For example, Charles Ceshekter writes that the Isaaq subclan, who were 35% of the total population, received only 3% of aid in 1985-1990 (1997, 79). So the Isaaq subclan members supported the Somali National Movement (SNM) against Bare’s regime. Hence, an oft-overlooked phenomenon in the conflict literature is role the general public play in instigating and sustaining civil wars.

*The general public: victims or instigators?*

Clans/subclans legitimize the claims of political entrepreneurs and provide a base of support, thus making the conflict impersonal – for example political entrepreneurs are able to disguise their personal interests as communal interests. Moreover, clans/subclans actively aid their individual actor(s) to capture power and rents.

There is a symbiotic relationship between political entrepreneurs and their subclan base of support. Individual subclan members are expected to amass wealth while they have power and are required to share that wealth with the rest of the kin (CRD 2004, 26). Political actors share the spoils of office with their kin in return for protection and legitimacy. The kin, therefore, are active and willing participants rather than victims manipulated by their leaders, as Kalyvas (2003) argues. It can be
argued that political entrepreneurs may be at the mercy of their subclan base, because if the former does not provide the expected benefits, their survival is at stake.

During Mohamed Siad Bare’s military regime, his Marehan subclan members had unrestricted access to rents, and other clans/subclans have long resented Bare’s patronage – legalized rent-seeking. After the fall of the military regime, rampant cleansing of Marehan subclan and the Darood clan families, Mohamed Siad Bare’s kin, from Mogadishu took place as revenge for preferential treatments the Marehan in particular and some Darood in general have received under Bare. In an instant, anyone who was not Hawiye fled Mogadishu.

Strong clans confiscated fertile land and forced population displacements. It has become a common tactic for political entrepreneurs to annex productive land. The resettling of one’s kin in valuable areas increases that leader’s bargaining power. While the leader gains his kin’s support, the kin benefits from the resources and new status gained under their leader. Many new subclans have resettled in fertile lands between rivers since the fall of the Somali state. This has displaced unarmed groups and changed the demographic in central-southern Somalia in favor of armed groups who benefited from the state collapse (World Bank 2005 and CRD 2004).

The Somali people inhabiting the central regions of the country, here termed as pastoralists, have directly inherited the legacy of Somalia’s past political grievances, and during the civil war, this legacy could be observed as a cornerstone of the present socio-political conflict in the region. The pastoralists migrated to the southern fertile agricultural lands after 1991, and occupied both the public and private agricultural plantations and other facilities in the agriculturally rich fertile lands of the region. They also occupied the urban cities i.e. public and private buildings and, as a result, have
also dominated parts of the economic sector, many of them as employees to
the armed patrons of their kinship, and most importantly, for political reasons -
as many of the pastoral groups are heavily armed (whole groups of people
take over rather than one person). This conflict between the pastoralists and
agriculturalists is creating new social relations within and between clans. This
new trend is based on new hierarchy of power, new legitimizing ideologies
and new forms of clan and regional power structure. (CRD 2004, 19)

The population in general is not passive participants but “instigators” as well
(Kalyvas 2003). Subclans support their leaders willingly. As discussed previously,
they provide fighting forces and legitimize their leader’s claims to power. For
example, although women have suffered in the protracted conflict in Somalia, they
have also contributed to conflict protraction. Naima Abdi Hashi, a Mogadishu
University student participating in a joint course with the University of Kansas, writes
women supported militias and political entrepreneurs by providing spiritual and
financial support. Some women even sold their valuables to raise funds for war
because the women believe they will be secure under their kin.

The most important support that clans/subclans can give to their political
entrepreneur is manpower, a role that clan militia play. *Mooryaan*\(^{25}\) (militias) form
along the kinship pyramid hierarchy. They operate under a subclan’s banner. In
“peace time” they provide security for their kinship because, without a strong militia,

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\(^{25}\) CRD May 2004 divides the militias into five groups: “functional, business, Islamic Sharia, freelance,
and private Guard”. Each groups has overlapping allegiances depending on which subclan is
highest when subclan is in conflict. Each militia group has its own interest and agenda; some
are brutal – freelance and functional – while others are more organized – Islamic sharia,
business and private guards. All have committed some degree of human rights violations (P.
40).
a kinship group will fall prey to other militias. Andrew Le Sage writes that the only
time militias respond to traditional leaders is when the latter pleads with the former to
defend a subclan (2002, 135). Even when militias respond to the elders’ call to take-
up arms, it is not an altruistic response; rather, militias are enticed by the possible
plunder to be had while at the same time defending their subclan’s interest. Charles
Ceshekter writes that the mooryaan who assisted in overthrowing the military regime
in Somalia had “no program, no ideology, and no hope of taking over the country”
(1997, 88). The aim of most mooryaan is to gain power and control over resources
(World Bank 2005 and Roland 1996). Pillaging was a form of payment for militias
who laid claim to property left behind by the regime and the Darood KP6 (clan families) who hastily fled Mogadishu. Motivation to fight, however, was initially
based on “clan affiliation”, so passion and insecurity played a role.

The clan/subclan as a “unit of survival” is a double-edged sword. The public
and political entrepreneur symbiotic relations can strengthen clan/subclan, but it can
also lead to fragmentation as clan/subclan internal power struggle intensifies. The
support for individual actors results in the disintegration of subclans. When a
challenger emerges in a subclan, he needs a base of support in his kin. To achieve
this, an actor needs to divide his kin and appeal to those closest to him on the kinship
pyramid. So, if the challenger is challenging someone say at KP5 (clan), he will
appeal to KP4 (subclan), and so on. The fragmentation erodes loyalty to the larger kin

26 Warlords have three types of militias: paid permanent militia, temporary hires when conflicts erupt,
and free subclan militias when there is medium/major conflict with other subclans.
as actors appeal to a narrower and narrower kin base, down to the level of KP2 (extended families). Internal power struggle led to the disintegration of the United Somali Congress (USC), the Hawiye opposition group that toppled Bare’s regime.

Figure 4 – the disintegration of the United Somali Congress (1991-2000)

Source: By author

USC/SSA versus USC/SNA

The personal struggle between Ali Mahdi Mohamed and the late General Mohamed Farah Aideed – both men were from Hiraab, one of the Hawiye clan families, led to disintegration of the USC and ushered in alliances of convenience.
Mahdi and Aidid wanted to capture the presidency of a future Somali state after they defeated Mohamed Siad Bare. After the fragmentation of USC, each man formed an alliance of convenience. After Mahdi’s proclamation of presidency of the first transitional government, Aidid rejected it, and conflict erupted engulfing Mogadishu.

Aidid formed the USC/SNA (Somali National Alliance) while Mahdi formed USC/SSA (Somali Salvation Alliance). Each sponsored national reconciliation conferences and announced the creation of administrations. Each man rallied his subclan, further deepening suspicion and hatred among subclans. Related to the conflict over power, Mahdi and Aidid clashed over territory and resources like aid and ports.27 The Abgal KP4 (subclan) saw the Habargidir KP4 (subclan) as illegal and illegitimate occupiers and sought to evict them from Mogadishu. Marchal (1996, 218) writes, Mahdi “asked the Haber Gidir (sic) to return to their homeland in Galgudud and Mudug.” Although some Habargidir lived in Mogadishu before the war, the majority of them were “soo galooti”, or newcomers who arrived after the fall of the military regime. The perception that Habargidir nomads were going to replace the Daroood as the beneficiaries of foreign aid – potentially the biggest source of rents – was not limited to Abgal suspicions (Marchal 2006).

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27 The fertile agricultural land in Jubba and Shebelle was highly contested as political entrepreneurs competed to control banana exports as well as other agricultural goods. The “banana wars” were intense in the early 1990s. For further discussions see Hansen, Stig Jarle. "Civil War Economies, the Hunt for Profit and the Incentive for Peace: The Case of Somalia." The University of Bath, 2007.
USC/SNA: Aidid versus Ato

The struggle over the presidency further fragmented the USC/SNA alliance creating two factions one led by the late General Aidid and the other by his former financier and Lieutenant Osman Hassan Ali Ato. While both belong to the Habargidir KP4 (subclan) of Sa’ad KP3 (number of extended families), Aidid is Reer Jalaf KP2 (extended families) and Ato is Reer Hilowle KP2. Ato broke away from Aidid after he felt that Aidid did not give him a high enough profile position in the government Aidid formed in 1995. Ato felt betrayed after being loyal to Aidid. Ato and Aidid fought one of the bitterest conflicts in Mogadishu from 1995 to Aidid’s death.

To counterbalance Aidid’s military might, Ato formed an alliance of convenience with the USC/SSA side. With Mahdi’s blessings, Muse Sudi Yallahow, at the time USC/SSA deputy chairman, provided a safe heaven for Ato. Ato and Mahdi were further angered when Aidid ordered the disarming of militias in Mogadishu, and they scolded him for the illegal confiscation of weapons. When Aidid tried to levy taxes on banana imports in November 1995, “[his] two main rivals, Mahdi and Ato, responded by denying banana-exporting companies access to Somali ports (Indian Ocean Newsletter 7 Oct. 1995, 4; United Nations 19 Jan. 1996, 3; USAID 29 Nov. 1995, 1; Voice of Somali Pacification 1 Oct. 1995; Reuters 17

28 Ibid.

Aidid and his opponents Ato and Mahdi remained bitter rivals until Aidid’s death in August 1996 (Aidid was mortally wounded in a fight against Ato and Sudi forces in the Medina district of southern Mogadishu; Aidid died few days later). Aidid’s successor, his son and a former U.S. Marine, Hussein Mohamed Farah Aidid, continued the rivalry and vowed to “‘eliminate his domestic and foreign adversaries’” after his father passed away (IPS 9 Aug. 1996; Journal de Genève et Gazette de Lausanne 24 Aug. 1996). After the remarks, Ato and Mahdi were quick to condemn him. 31

**USC/SSA: Mahdi versus Sudi**

Mahdi’s USC/SSA suffered a breakdown of its own. Muse Sudi Yalahow broke ranks after Mahdi, Hussein Aidid, and Mohamed Qanyare Afrah, a political entrepreneur from Murursade subclan of Hawiye set up a joint administration in August 1998. Mahdi and Muse were from Abgal KP4 (subclan). Between 1998 and 2001, Mahdi and Muse supporters fought a number of times. For example, in late March 1999, when Muse attempted to levy taxes in Karan district in northern Mogadishu, Mahdi’s stronghold, Sudi clashed with Mahdi supporters. Mahdi and Sudi belligerency continued although their conflict was not as fierce as that of Aidid and Ato or even Muse and Finish as we discuss next.

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31 Ibid.
USC/SSA: Sudi versus Finnish

Sudi’s USC/SSA broke down when he fought his former lieutenant Omar Mohamed Finish for control of Medina district in southern Mogadishu. Sudi and Omar Finish, were both members of the Da’ud KP3 (number of extended families) of the Abgal subclan. Their hostilities further intensified after Finish joined the Transitional National Government (TNG), which Sudi as a founding member of Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SSRC) opposed it. The two fought a fierce battle in the Medina district of southern Mogadishu destroying a district that for the most part survived most of clashes between Aidid and Ato.

The disintegration of USC illustrates that intra-subclan has been more intense than inter-subclan conflict. Second, it shows that power-sharing agreements have intensified intra-subclan struggle as aspiring leaders (former lieutenants and deputies) challenged their superiors and sought to become leaders. This phenomenon is not unique to Somalia, as recent power struggles in Darfur (Sudan) evidences. Alliances of convenience have allowed weaker actors to survive and challenge more powerful actors as the alliances dilute power symmetry. The alliances also transcend clan and regions.

32 The two fought in Mogadishu over control of the Medina district and a makeshift airport. Later, Finish joined TNG and Muse joined SSRC, and this fueled their conflict.
Symbiotic Relations

Like symbiotic relations between political entrepreneurs and the public, there is similar a symbiotic relation between local and central actors (this is not only confined to physical location but also along the kinship pyramid). A review of the relationship between political entrepreneurs in Mogadishu and those in other parts of South Central Somalia as well as other regions illustrates that local and central issues are intertwined. These relationships transcend master cleavages. Contrary to the assumption that the Somali conflict is between clans, it has been rarely been so. After the fall of Bare and breakdown of the United Somali Congress (USC), there has not been conflict at KP6 (clan families). Major conflict between Darood and Hawiye, the two major clan families, ended after the Hawiye aborted Bare’s attempted comeback to retake Mogadishu. The lack of conflict among clan families is not by a chance, but it is the result of alliances of convenience that transcends clans.

Bay and Bakool

One periphery conflict in which USC/SNA and USC/SSA got involved was in Bay and Bakool region. Aidid and Mahdi supported the Somali Democratic Movement/Somali Salvation Alliance (SDM/SSA) and the Somali Democratic Movement/Somali National Alliance (SDM/SNA), respectively. When the Digil and Mirifle subclans in the Bay region of southern Somalia proclaimed the formation of an administration, the USC/SNA rejected it and attempted to assert control. On the
other hand, USC/SSA supported Rahanweyn Resistance Army (RAA), the armed
group for Digil and Mirifle, against USC/SNA in Bay and Bakool regions. After
“Aidid capture[d] the town of Baidoa in southwest Somalia [,] his rival, Ali Mahdi,
threaten[ed] to declare 'all-out war' on him if he does not withdraw from the town
within the next 24 hours.”

On their side, SDM used their alliances with USC/SSA and USC/SNA at the
center. In the end, however, local, private issues trumped Aidid’s and Mahdi’s
centralist goals, and SDM/SSA and SDM/SNA “decide[d] to work together to counter
the violence perpetrated by General Aidid's faction.” SDM leaders used their
alliance with both USC/SNA and USC/SSA until the alliance no longer served SDM
purposes.

**Kismayo**

Another periphery-center conflict was in Kismayo, a southern city and home
to one of the three major sea ports in Somalia. USC/SSA supported former General
Mohamed Said Hersi Morgan, a son-in-law of Mohamed Siad Bare and former
minister of defense of Bare’s military regime, in Kismayo against former Colonel
Mohamed Omar Jess backed by USC/SNA. While Somali factions met in Ethiopia
for a reconciliation conference in March 15, 1993, Morgan captured Kismayo. This

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33 As cited in (IRB), The Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. "Issue Paper Somalia
Chronology of Events June 1994- April 1995 (Supplement to Chronology of Events

34 Ibid.
angered Aidid who suspected that the UN, which had presence, in Kismayo at the time gave Morgan tacit approval (Lyons and Samatar 1995). The conflict in Kismayo thwarted national reconciliation as Aidid withdrew from the conference, so local conflict between Morgan and Jess trumped the central interest. Similar to Baidoa and Kismayo, USC/SSA supported resistance fighter in the capital city of the Hiiraan region, Beletweyne, against USA/SNA and its allies in the region.35

Parasitic Relations

The local actors subvert central goals in pursuit of local agendas. First, Mooryaan undermined United Somali Congress’ ideological goals. After the United Somali Congress (USC) drove Mohamed Siad Bare out of Mogadishu, USC leadership was unable to control the unruly groups of mooryaan.36 Although mooryaan were theoretically under the control of the clan/subclan, in reality, they were not accountable to the clan/subclan leadership. The mooryaan gained the upper hand by their control over combat material, making them relatively immune to reprisals. Charles Ceshekter writes that the ransacking of Mogadishu was revenge for the exclusion and deprivation that many clan militias felt; everything that belonged to government was seen as liable to looting because it was viewed as stolen property (1997, 87). Marchal (2006) suggests that lack of control over mooryaan contributed

35 Ibid.

36 There were a number of mooryaan formed under subclans (and sometimes several militias in one subclan). These militias worked independent of any political entrepreneur for the most part unless they were paid security guards for a particular political entrepreneur. The number of militias in South Central Somalia is not known but I estimate to be in tens of thousands.
to the failure of South Central Somalia to achieve peace. *Mooryaan* hijacked any ideological struggle that USC leadership claimed to represent.

Second, before the UN withdrawal, the late General Aidid and Mahdi agreed on a joint administration composed of six men selected by each to run Mogadishu’s port and seaport. This was an attempt to prevent chaos as well as to extract rents. Fearing that he did not gain from their cooperation, “Mohamed Qanyare Afrah, head of the Murursade faction in Mogadishu, denied[d] he existence of this joint Ali Mahdi-Aidid committee and further claim[ed] that only militia loyal to Aidid control[ed] the airport and seaport.”37 Qanyare was Mahdi’s ally before he defected to Aidid, so his intention was to undermine the cooperation. He succeeded in this, as the agreement did not hold after UN left. 38

Third, even when major factional leaders reach agreement, other groups who feel their interest has been left out gear up to undermine it. For example, in July 30, 1998, Ali Mahdi Mohamed, Hussein Aideed, and Mohamed Qanyare agreed “to form a joint provincial administration” based in their respective Mogadishu enclaves. “However, this agreement did not lead to a more permanent settlement. Nominal supporters of both Aideed and Ali Mahdi objected to the agreement, generally on grounds of *personal self-interest or the interests of their clan*. In one brief instance,

37 Ibid.

38 Italics are mine, this illustrates how local issues subvert national or group goals. In this case both Aidid and Mahdi wanted to establish joint administration, but their allies did not see the process as beneficial to them, so they thwarted it.

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/somalia-south.htm
an opponent of the agreement launched a violent attack to undermine one of the agreement's key elements, the reopening of Mogadishu harbor”. Sudi and Ato, among others objected to it. CRD succinctly summarizes the marriage of convenience between private interests and political goals:

The current armed political factions are the main political protagonists in South Central Somalia whose primary interest is focused on extending their power base beyond the clan boundaries through shifting alliances with other factions in the region. This type of narrow interest and its propagation is linked with other secondary interests that are prerequisites for the realization of their primary interest. Managing the grey area (the overlap) between the interests (political power, institutional dominance of one clan/ethnic group over the other) amalgamated with hidden opportunistic interests creates a contentious environment that has many times triggered conflict. (2004, 29)

Fourth, after the Islamic Court Unions (ICU) defeated Mogadishu’s powerful political entrepreneurs, in the summer of 2006, the hardliners in the ICU overpowered the moderate wing. In the end, this led to the defeat of the ICU (Menkhaus 2007). Thus, the hardliners subverted ICU interests because they confirmed the fear of the United States that Somalia might become a safe heaven for terrorism. In the process, the belligerent rhetoric of the ICU gave the TFG and its Ethiopian allies an excuse for invading Somalia with the tacit approval of the international community. Moreover, the ICU regrouped in Asmara, Eretria and joined Alliance for Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS), which includes parliament members who have left Transitional Federal Government (TFG), and members of the Diaspora.

Fifth, ARS’ central goal, however, has been undermined by Al-Shabab, the military wing of the ICU, which includes most former hardliners in the ICU. Al-Shabab militias carry out daily, Iraqi-style insurgent attacks against TFG and Ethiopian forces.

There have been a number of belligerent exchanges through the media between the ARS leadership in Asmara, Eritrea and Al-Shabab, who vow to drive Ethiopia out by force. The chasm between Al-Shabab and the ARS has widened, and the leaders of the former publicly denounced the ARS’ attempt to negotiate with the Transitional Federal Government. Al-Shabab leaders even have vowed to undermine any attempt to seek political solution. In a 2008 article, Voice of America summarized the conflict between Al-Shabab and ARS:

…while the Islamist insurgents may share the same short-term goal of defeating Ethiopia and bringing down the interim government, extensive interviews with more than a dozen people reveal the insurgency is actually being waged by two distinct Islamist groups - fervent nationalists loyal to the Islamic Courts Union on one side, and religious zealots belonging to the home-grown, ultra-radical Shabab group on the other.40

THE FAILURE OF THE POWER-SHARING MODEL

Previous internationally-sponsored Somali reconciliation initiatives have focused on KP6 (Clan Families) in an effort to achieve KP7 (i.e., a nation). The

40 VOA new on April 3, 2008.  
http://www.hiiraan.com/print2_news/2008/Apr/divide_widens_between_insurgent_groups_in_somalia.aspx
international and regional efforts to create a power-sharing centralized national
government have repeatedly failed to revive the state in Somalia. Only two of the
thirteen failed national reconciliation conferences formed a transitional government:
(1) the government of Djibouti with the help of Italy and Egypt among others held
two conferences in June and July 1991 that resulted in the formation of the first
transitional government led by Ali Mahdi Mohamed and (2) the government of
Djibouti hosted another national reconciliation conference in 2000 that formed the
Transitional National Government (TNG) led by Abdiqasim Salad Hassan, the
predecessor the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). The fourteenth conference
resulted in the formation of TFG, but despite of international diplomatic, financial,
and military support, it is unable to consolidate power.

The power-sharing model allows for continued fighting among political
entrepreneurs across Kingship Pyramid levels, and the model prevents the
consolidation of power by creating a weak center (transitional government) with little
ability to make policies and mechanisms to enforce them. Political entrepreneurs who
feel that they did not get a high enough positions in the transitional government have
continuously formed alliance of convenience to undermine power-sharing agreements
and transitional governments that result from it (see figure 5). The idea of power-
sharing is that it allows antagonists to cooperate and gives all the major actors a stake
in future government. Cooperation, however, is much different under anarchy.
According to Robert Axelrod (1984, 6), individual cooperate to “pursue their own self-interest without aid of central authority to force them to cooperate with each other.” Cooperation takes place under the shadow of the future; therefore, “…the use of reciprocity can be enough to make defection unproductive” (174). Axelrod’s (1984) assertion that cooperation emerges under anarchy and leads to the formation of institutions has not held in the South Central Somalia example: cooperation between political entrepreneurs has been temporary, intended not to form institutions but to undermine them. Cooperation takes place when political entrepreneurs want to undermine power-sharing agreements during the reconciliation processes or after a transitional government is formed. In addition, cooperation is transient and breaks down when it achieves its purpose. Furthermore, defections in Somalia have not prevented future cooperation.

As Kenneth Waltz argues in *A Theory of International Relations*, there is no cooperation under anarchy (1979). Intraclan anarchy resembles interstate anarchy “because [political entrepreneurs] coexist in a self-help system, they may, however, have to concern themselves not with maximizing collective gain [as power-sharing assumes] but with lessening, preserving, or widening the gap in welfare and strength between themselves and others. The contours of the future's shadow look different in hierarchic and anarchic systems. The shadow may facilitate cooperation in the former; it works against it in the latter. Worries about the future do not make cooperation and institution building among [political entrepreneurs] impossible; they do strongly condition their operation and limit their accomplishment” (Waltz 2000,
21). Waltz’s description of states in the international system of anarchy aptly captures the formation and reformation of alliances of convenience in South Central Somalia.

**ALLIANCE OF CONVENIENCE: HINDERING POWER-SHARING**

The alliance of convenience completes our three key components of the alliance framework; the first two being the interaction of private and political interests and center and periphery relations. Coalition building allowed USC/SSA and USC/SNA to expand territories under their control. The competition between the USC/SSA and USC/SNA to create local alliances ignited dormant conflicts and exacerbated existing conflicts in Baidoa, Kismayo, and Hiiraan, as discussed above. USC/SSA and USC/SNA provided military and financial support and legitimization to any local leader who challenged a dominant leader that their opponent supported. The result was the explosion of the number of factional leaders in South Central Somalia. Due to their dynamic interests, individual actors in both camps continuously changed sides; both camps were quick to welcome defectors from the opponent’s side. The ease of defection allowed weaker actors to survive, preventing the process of state-making (Tilly 1980).
Explosion of Political Entrepreneurs in South Central Somalia

2.1 The fragmentation of armed factions in Mogadishu

![Graph showing the number of armed factions from 1989 to 2007.]


In 1991, there were two major leaders in Mogadishu: the late General Mohamed Farah Aidid and his opponent Ali Mahdi Mohamed and by 2006 there were about a dozen political entrepreneurs in Mogadishu. In the larger South Central Somalia, there were a number of armed political entrepreneurs: General Mohamed Said Hersi Morgan, Colonel Mohamed Omar Jess, and Bare Adan Shire hiiraale, Yusuf Mohamed Said “Inda’ade”, Hasan Mohamed Nur Shatigadud, just to mention few.
Inter-subclan alliance building is more common than intra-subclan alliance building. This is the result of the interaction between private and communal interests, and periphery and center interplay. Alliances of convenience have been formed after/during reconciliation conferences. The purposes of these alliances have been to undermine power-sharing agreements before they materialize, as happened in 1997 Cairo Conference, among others and to undermine if a transitional government is formed as happened after the formation of Transitional National Government (TNG).
SSRC (2001-2004)

USC/SSA and USC/SNA were the first alliances of convenience in South Central Somalia. In keeping with this tradition, political entrepreneurs have formed a number of alliances of convenience. One such alliance was the Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SSRC). After the Transitional National Government (TNG), which was backed by the Arab states, financially and diplomatically was established in (Arte Djibouti, 2000-2004); most of the major political entrepreneurs who were excluded opposed it even before the TNG reconciliation process was complete. Major political entrepreneurs – Hussein Aidid, Saïd Hersi Morgan, Abdulahi Yusuf Ahmed, Hassan Mohamed Nur Shatigadud, and Muse Sudi Yallahow, among others – backed
by Ethiopia – created another alliance of convenience: the Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC).

SSRC leaders’ only agreement was to topple the Transitional National Government (Menkhaus 2007). Each warlord had his own private interest while all claimed they wanted to safeguard their “subclans” interests and that of the nation. For example TNG and SSRC met in Nakuru, Kenya in 2002 and “agreed to the establishment of "an all-inclusive government" to ensure equitable power-sharing among all Somali clans” (IRIN, November 27, 2002). Political entrepreneurs also opposed it for personal reasons. Hussein Aidid opposed the TNG because it was dominated by Ayr, a subclan of Habargidir, replacing his Sa’ad subclan who hitherto dominated Habargidir politics. Hussein Aidid said, “We knew how the Somali problem could be solved, because we had been the leaders on the ground for the last 10 years. We were the ones who had participated or really understood the problem, or solutions, ever since UNOSOM left.” Aideed and his allies also mistrusted TNG’s leadership for the preferential treatment it gave to some of its business supporters,

An interesting fact about SSRC alliance that drives home the point of convenient alliances is the composition of SSRC. Two of SSRC leaders, Hussein Aidid and Shatigadud, fought fierce battles in the control for Bay and Bakool region as discussed above. Yet the bad blood between them did not prevent their union. Another leader was Mohamed Omar Habe (Dhere), the current Mogadishu Mayor and Governor of Benadir region. See figure 3 above. For further discussion on Shatigadud stand before joining SSRC see his interview with IRIN http://www.irinnews.org/InDepthMain.aspx?InDepthId=54&ReportId=72094&country=yes.

See the full interview with IRIN at http://www.irinnews.org/InDepthMain.aspx?InDepthId=54&ReportId=72076&country=yes.
such as when it shared 15 million dollars with them that it had received from Saudi Arabia (Sage 2002, 137). Hasan Mohamed Nur Shatigadud initially opposed to the creation of SSRC because he was on the TNG side; however, after he lost a bit to become the Speaker of the Parliament, he joined SSRC. SSRC leaders supported Ethiopia’s bid to form transitional government. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) with Ethiopia in the lead called for a national reconciliation conference in Eldoret, Kenya, but was later moved to Mbghati, Kenya. The reconciliation process lasted for two years and October 2004 Abdulahi Yusuf Ahmed was selected President. The political entrepreneurs who felt that they did not high positions formed another alliance of convenience, which we turn to next.

MSSP (2005-2006)

After “armed ministers”, Mogadishu-based political entrepreneurs, left the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), they formed alliance, Security and Stabilization Plan (MSSP). Some these political entrepreneurs, for example, Muse Sudi Yallahow, were members of SSRC that helped to bring down the TNG and form TFG. Now MSSP group were seeking to bring down the TFG. The MSSP also included some Islamists who opposed the TFG. As the TFG weakened (2005-2006), writes professor Menkhaus (2007, 367), the MSSP alliance broke down as the result of a power struggle among its members, and Islamists and political entrepreneurs faced off.
ARPCT (February-June 2006)

Some of the political entrepreneurs in Mogadishu formed the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism, (ARPCT). It is reported that the United States covertly supported ARPCT, which was supposed to balance power against emerging Islamic courts. These courts were initially formed along subclan lines, and they provided security within subclan and some social services. The courts gradually challenged the power of Mogadishu political entrepreneurs who cantonized the city into small fiefdoms. The rift between the political entrepreneurs and Islamist reached its apex during the summer of 2006 when the Islamists created the Islamic Courts Union (Menkhaus 2007, 369).

ICU (Summer-December 2006)

In the summer of 2006, the Islamic Court Union (ICU) surprisingly defeated ARPCT. The political entrepreneurs who formed ARPCT controlled small fiefdoms in Mogadishu from 1991-2006. ARPCT leadership went into exile in their subclan territories in the rural areas outside of Mogadishu. Initially, the TFG welcomed the defeat of APRCT alliance and hailed the ICU. The ICU began to expand and capture town after town in South Central Somalia. For the first time, since the collapse of the military regime, South Central Somalia was under the control of a dominant group, the ICU. The ICU leadership brought security, opened Mogadishu airport and seaport, removed all road blocks and stabilize South Central Somalia, all tasks that previous power-sharing failed to achieve.

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43 See John Prendergast’s piece on the Washington Post, accessed through http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4164&l=1
Internal struggle within ICU moderate and hard-line wings led to the victory for the hardliners in formation of administration. While the ICU won victory inside Somalia, they failed to ally the fears of international and regional actors, the U.S. and Ethiopia being the most concerned about ICU’s dominance in South Central Somalia and feared that ICU might establish an Islamic state in Somalia. In addition, the ICU and the TFG after several meetings in Yemen and Sudan failed to reach a political deal. The political impasse between the TFG and ICU, belligerent rhetoric between ICU and TFG leaders, and the fear of TFG that ICU will run over TFG, which was isolated in Baidoa, southern Somali town, led to TFG’s invitation of Ethiopian troops. Ethiopian troops defeated ICU militia, and TFG leadership including President, Abdulahi Yusuf Ahmed, finally arrive Mogadishu.

**ARS (2007-present)**

Remnants of ICU, members of parliament who either left TFG or were sacked from formed the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS). ARS and TFG have made several failed attempts to reach political agreement. Therefore, conflict rages in Mogadishu between TFG and ARS. Although the result of TFG and ARS struggle is beyond this thesis, based on the history of alliances of convenience in Somalia, it could be expected that if ARS topples the TFG, the ARS alliance will cease to exist and another competition will ensue. On the other hand, if TFG is able to withstand ARS and survive, a split within TFG is a high probability, as was the case between President Abdulahi Yusuf Ahmed and his former Prime Minister, Ali Mohamed Gedi who was ousted as result of a rift between the two men. Their struggle almost ended
the prospect of TFG. Another struggle with in the TFG is not far fudged as Yusuf and his current Prime Minister, Nur Hassan Hussein "Nur Adde" differ in how to pursue negations with the ARS.

The alternative to power-sharing and alliance of convenience is the emergence of a dominant group. This line of thinking may not satisfy those who fear another dictator; however, evidence from Somalia and elsewhere suggests that consolidation of power by one group has been the key to stability and institutionalization.

THE DOMINANT GROUP MODEL

The past power-sharing agreements and transitional governments that were formed to create a Somali state have failed. First, power-sharing assumes that conflict is among clans, and it is not. Second, power-sharing assumes that political entrepreneurs cooperate to for collective gain, but cooperation under anarchy is transient, and its intention is to ensure relative gain vis-à-vis other actors. Finally, power-sharing assumes that all actors can be given a stake in the process, but Somali experience illustrates that there are always losers, and they form alliances of conveniences to ensure that their relative bargaining power is intact.

While exogenous attempts to form power-sharing agreements have failed, endogenous attempts to consolidate power have succeeded. For example, the two stable regions of contemporary Somalia – Puntland, in the northwest, and Somaliland, in the north, – achieved stability without any power-sharing agreements. In
Somaliland late President Mohammed Ibrahim Igal and former Prime Minister of the Somali Republic (1967-1969) defeated his predecessor and former Somali National Movement Chairman Abdirahman Ahmed Ali Tuor. Similarly, in Puntland Abdulahi Yusuf Ahmed, the current Transitional Federal Government President and former Puntland regional President defeated General Mohamed Abshir, former chief of Somali police academy and long time politician. The success of Puntland and Somaliland as self-governing territories within what was the Somali Republic indicates the emergence of a dominant group was the key to their stability.

It is equally important that the only time period when South Central Somalia was stable since 1991 was the six months between June and December 2006 when a dominant group, the Islamic Court Union (ICU), ruled South Central Somalia. The ICU consolidated power by defeating their opponents on the battle ground. The ICU also brought a level of certainty and a sense of stability to the region within a short period of time. The battle ground victories gave ICU legitimacy and most Somalis, regardless of clan, accepted them. On the other hand, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) failed to win legitimacy because most Somalis consider that the TFG won victory with their “virtue”, to use Machiavelli’s term. Rather, the TFG is seen as a puppet of Ethiopia and the United States.

The dominant group model has been vital to consolidating power and stabilizing conflict prone countries like Uganda, Rwanda, Angola, and Sierra Leone.

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(without side military support), just to mention but four countries. In each, one group neutralized or eliminated their enemies, and then they co-opted some of them in their administrations. In Somalia, Somaliland, Puntland, and South Central under the brief reign of the Islamic Court Union, fit in the dominant model. Future research will show that dominant group model is more conducive to getting countries out of conflict trap than power-sharing model that has been prominent hitherto.
CONCLUSION

The power-sharing model and alliance of convenience, which reinforce each other, have hindered the prospects for Somalia to get out of the conflict trap. The solution for Somalia lies in the emergence of a dominant group.

Although traditional norms (informal rules) survived the colonial powers, military dictatorship, and anarchy in Somalia, they lacked the robustness needed to mediate the multiple protracted conflicts in Somalia. Their utility was largely limited to mediating apolitical conflicts within the (“diya-paying”) group.

The international and regional attempts to created power-sharing, inclusive government has led to formation of transitional vampire governments. The ramifications of these transitional governments have been ever more intensive power struggle to capture transitional governments and extract rents.

Hence, Somali conflicts in South Central region are not clan conflicts; clans are only (tools). The drivers of the conflicts are power (means), and resources and territory (an end goal). It is apt to argue that politics is a means of securing economic opportunities for one’s self and his kin (KP2, i.e., extended families). Since the conflict in South Central Somalia is not between clans, no power-sharing agreement will mollify the fear of those who perceive that they have been excluded from the levers of a future state. Politics are a “zero-sum game”, and no power-sharing scheme is enough to satisfy all the major political entrepreneurs who are concerned not with collective but relative individual gains.
Finally, when we examine conflict in South Central Somalia, we discover that power-sharing agreements have failed because losers form alliance of convenience to undermine them. First, alliance building across the kinship pyramid prolongs war because it delays the “ripening” of the war.⁴⁵ Contrary to the general explanation that Somali’s conflict is a clan conflict, the alliances in USC/SSA, USC/SNA, SRRC, MSSP, ARPCT, ICU, and ARS derived their support across the kinship pyramid. Each group was a reshuffling of former enemies who conveniently allied only to backstab each other later. The continuous defections in South Central Somalia helped the weaker actors and delayed the completion of state-making processes.

Second, alliance formation and re-formation was intense not because of clan or religion but because of the private interests of political entrepreneurs, symbiotic relations between political entrepreneurs and their support base, and periphery and center interplay.

Third, South Central conflict has been protracted because of failure of any dominant group to emerge and secure power in the region. The interplay between periphery and center further contributes to the protraction of the conflict. The gap in research thus far has been the lack of micro-level analysis – analysis identity, actors, and interests and lack of any discussion about the role of dominant group. This thesis fills this gap and illustrates that the alliance framework that Kalyvas (2003) proposed

explains the protraction in South Central Somali conflict. The alliance framework illustrates how political entrepreneurs undermine power-sharing arrangements. Moreover, the evidence in Somalia suggest that the power-sharing model that has been applied to Somalia since the independence has not led to stability and development of institutions while tentative evidence suggest the dominant leader model helped Somaliland and Puntland to become stable and began institutionalization processes. Future research will evidence that the dominant group model is the key path from anarchy to stability and institutionalization both of which are key to long term political and economic development.
## Appendix

### Conflict Mapping

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Main Social Groups/Clans</th>
<th>Resources</th>
<th>Conflicts and disputes</th>
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| Banadir        | - Metropolitan city, mixed Somalis (clans and sub-clans) **Hawiyeh**: Abgal, Murusade, Reer Xamar, Habargidir, Jareer (Bantu) and Darod, Dir etc. (*The Abgal, Murusade and Reer Hamar claim they are the predominant clans*). | - National Public Institutions i.e. seaport, airport etc.  
- Major commercial enterprises i.e. real estate | - property ownership  
- Control of the capital city  
- Access to public facilities  
- Political and land dispute: occupation of non-Hawiyeh real estate |
| Lower Shabeelle| - **Digil**: Geledi, Begedi, Tunni, Jiddo, Garre, Shanta-alen.  
- **Hawiyeh**: Murusade, Abgal, Wa’dan, Wadallan, Habargidir  
- **Dir**: Biyomaal  
- Reer Xamar, Jareer (Bantu) | - Agriculture fertile lands: Banana, Maize, Sugar-cane, horticulture etc.  
- Rich grazing lands and Shabelle river  
- State-owned plantation  
- Foreign owned plantation i.e. Italian, Libyan, UAE  
- Private owned plantation  
- Livestock: Cattle, Camel and Goats & Sheep. | - Property & Land dispute  
- Forceful occupation of public/private property  
- Political control: pastoral versus indigenous  
- Sharia Islam versus secular  
- Access to water resources  
- Forced labour |
| Middle Juba    | - **Jareer** (Bantu)  
- **Hawiyeh**  
- **Sheikhal**  
- Darod: Ogaadeen  
- **Digil**: Garre and Tunni  
- Gibil-ad  
- Makanne  
- Dir | - Agriculture: Mango, Grape fruits, Maize, Sorghum, sugar-cane  
- Livestock: Camel, Cattle, Goats & Sheep  
- State-owned | - Land & Property dispute  
- Deforestation (charcoal)  
- Appropriation of private property  
- Access to the Juba river (water resources) |
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</tbody>
</table>

“Note: The two terms of water shortage and access to water resources are not interchangeable terms. Water shortage means: Galgudud and Mudug regions there is shortage of water whereas in Lower Shabelle and the Juba regions, there is water but access to it is very difficult and it often causes conflict.” Adapted by author from CRD 2004.
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