

The Differential Devolution of Scotland and Wales: Historical Underpinnings and  
Contemporary European Context of Nationalistic Expression

BY

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## Chapter 1: Introduction

At the beginning of the twentieth century, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland ruled an empire that covered one-fifth of the world's landmass and governed one quarter of its people. The start of the twenty-first century has the United Kingdom reduced to a few minor colonial holdings and an expansive but tenuous commonwealth. More dramatically, the dynamic of the four “core nations” has altered tremendously, ranging from a complete separation from the state and commonwealth (Ireland, minus six counties), to legislative devolution with significant power (Scotland), through to a regional assembly with mostly *pro forma* abilities (Wales).<sup>1</sup> Nationalist expression and movements towards independence became commonplace in the post-colonial world after World War II. The question is why one of the largest colonial powers experienced not only a colonial devolution but also core devolution, and why the routes and speed toward that core devolution varied so greatly. A concomitant line of inquiry is whether the different paths of devolution are variations of nationalism, or whether the differences might be attributable to different degrees of nationalism.

Ireland won its independence in a bloody revolt followed by a civil war—a time-honored and tested method for doing so. More interesting are Scotland and Wales, pursuing the relatively new and novel method of legislating independence through popular referenda. From a modern perspective of the four “home countries” of Britain, Wales and Scotland would seem to be coequal as constituent members of the same polity,

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<sup>1</sup> This is not intended to ignore the six counties of Ulster that comprise Northern Ireland, but a recognition that its particular situation is so complex and unique as to preclude it from even this most cursory examination.

but when one considers the speed to which each is moving toward devolution it becomes obvious that there must be fundamental differences. With review, it becomes clear that this modern conception of the home countries is a creature of modern thought and fails to account for deep, meaningful, and underlying differences in the cases. This review is intended to bring those differences to light to demonstrate how they account for the differential devolution of Scotland and Wales both in an historical context and in terms of modern Europe.

Wales *qua* Wales has never existed as a singular political entity prior to modern times. Prior to the arrival of the Roman Empire, Wales was like much of tribal Europe, organized into small kingdoms based on clan or tribal structure. When the Romans came to the island of Great Britain, they administered the areas we now know as England and Wales as the single unit of Britannia (later divided into Superior and Inferior by Severus). When the Romans left the island Wales was culturally and ethnically indistinguishable from any bordering lands, and was in no way unified. When the Angles, Saxons, and Jutes swept into the island they were unable or unwilling to extend their control into what is now known as Wales, providing the first distinctions between those who lived there in the west and their neighbors under the control of new lords. While Wales was now culturally distinct it was not in any way politically unified, remaining seven distinct polities until another group of invaders came in the persons of the Normans.

Edward I would simultaneously unify and subjugate Wales, establishing it as a singular feudal holding of the King of England. The sporadic rebellions engendered by this would cease and the Welsh would accept the King of England as their lord when a half-Welsh monarch ascended the throne in the person of Henry VII. Henry and his

descendants would bind Wales ever closer to England, until the Laws in Wales Acts of the 16<sup>th</sup> century formally declared that Wales and England would always be—and had always been—one and inseparable. It was the necessity of administering Wales equally that would leave it some vestiges of distinction, most particularly with the translation of the Bible into Welsh in order to promulgate the English Reformation. But Wales remained a backwater in an increasingly cosmopolitan England, and the separation between east and west would lead to new differences that would provide the impetus for national movements.

The divide between English and Welsh speakers was very real, with the majority of the Welsh population illiterate and uneducated. Some of those concerned began teaching in Welsh, and the newly (if only barely) literate population began to come up with new ideas about theology and religion, precipitating the Welsh Methodist Revival of the 18<sup>th</sup> century. This same period saw the beginning of the Industrial Revolution, a period that would scar and change Wales forever, perhaps precluding it from ever having an effective expression of nationality. Resource-rich Wales became home to the problems attendant with dangerous mining operations and absentee owners. The industry ensured that workers from other parts of the archipelago came to Wales looking for work, strengthening labor but diluting Welsh traditions and the population. This heritage would ensure that Wales remained first solidly Liberal and then later Labour and therefore benefited when Labour returned to office in 1997, but also ensured that a unified feeling of nationality would be impossible to obtain.

Scotland provides a distinct contrast to Wales in many areas, beginning with the Roman occupation of the south that never reached into most of what is modern day

Scotland. While there were a few incursions of limited success, Caledonia remained distinct from Britannia in the south. Moreover, there were many cultural contacts between Scotland and Ireland, an island that never had anything but the remotest Roman contact. The Angle, Saxon, and Jute invaders made it far enough into the borderlands to leave an indelible linguistic impression, but they did not effect a significant cultural change. The Kingdom of Scotland was generally established as a singular entity prior to the Norman invasion, but Edward the I's influence over Scottish history is as strong as in Wales, as he claimed and imposed feudal overlordship in Scotland, too.

Unlike Wales, Scotland was sufficiently strong and unified to wage a successful war for independence, and Scotland would become an independent kingdom the equal of England over the next few centuries. Scotland was often at odds with England during the latter's internecine squabbles with France, but the dynastic maneuvering and intermarriage would bring the two countries' ruling families into close relation. With the extinction of the Tudor line on the English throne, the Stuart family that ruled Scotland became the rulers of both. The countries remained distinct and independent however, with the kingship of both countries unified in an individual and not in the crown. This would prove problematic however, as the Stuarts who now ruled the reformed south remained primarily Catholic. Several constitutional crises were precipitated by the resulting tensions, something that the English Parliament sought to avoid in the future by the Acts of Union in 1707 that formally united the crowns.

Entering union as an equal left Scotland in a much different position than Wales, and the marginalization of the latter did not occur to nearly the same degree in Scotland. Scotland retained many unique institutions such as its church, legal and educational

systems. During the Industrial Revolution Scotland was better positioned as a manufacturing and banking center, becoming as important and influential as anywhere in England outside of London. Not everyone benefited to the same degree though, and the many immigrants who left Scotland between the 18<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries would prove instrumental in keeping alive a nationalist vision for Scotland. The industrial nature of Scotland's economy would ensure that it was similar to Wales in its support first for the Liberal Party and then the Labour party, a fact that would position it similarly when New Labour came to power in 1997.

The differences between Wales and Scotland are striking and quite illuminating when considering the question of why the two are devolving at different rates. Geographically, there is no real natural delineation between Wales and England, while the marshes that stretch between the Firth of Clyde and the Firth of Forth provide most of Scotland with a formidable natural barrier. This in part explains why Wales and England were unified under Roman rule and then again under the Normans, while Scotland remained outside of Roman control and only temporarily under the Norman kings of England. Wales was formally subsumed into England in the 16<sup>th</sup> century but had been practically controlled for much longer, while Scotland remained independent until the 18<sup>th</sup> century.

The fact that Wales was subsumed into England at the time of the Reformation also explains why Wales shed Catholicism at the same time as England, while independent Scotland remained Catholic for longer before eventually adopting its own unique form of Protestantism. Wales would eventually develop its own brand of Protestantism, but not for several centuries. It can be argued that this was for Wales'

eventual benefit however, as Elizabeth I helped preserve the Welsh language in her attempts to promulgate the Anglican Church. Scotland was able to retain several of its native languages and dialects independent of official institutional help, no doubt due to its more mature independence.

The last two variables considered in this study are economic and institutional differences that either support or inhibit national expression. Already mentioned in passing, Wales was a primary producer of raw materials for the Industrial Revolution, with most of its wealth extracted and sent elsewhere, and most of the wealth accruing outside its borders. As a secondary producer of goods and services, Scotland was much better positioned to reap the benefits of industrialization, and never became economically dependent upon England in the way the Wales did. Finally, Scotland retained ancient and venerable institutions that bolstered ideas of *difference* so necessary to nationalistic expression, while Wales had few and was forced to interpret the past through modern invention.

Nationalism is a concept much contested in the modern era, as few subjects are as fraught with meaning and emotion as sovereignty and the idea of who should be ruled by whom. Some modern scholars cast nationalism as a modern invention, others as a modern imagining, and yet others as a more ancient and fundamental part of human culture. Without digressing into that debate, this study will look at the concept of nationalism as manifested in Europe from the 17<sup>th</sup> century onward and in particular the English strain which would become so much a part of Scotland and Wales' devolutions. It is perhaps ironic that nationalism in a European context might be traced to the English Parliament's successful attempt to depose the Stuart dynasty from the English and Scottish thrones,

leading first to the two countries' unification and now to their apparently impending separation.

The need to justify the deposition of a monarch was precipitated by the Glorious Revolution of 1688 wherein James II was deposed in favor of William and Mary of Orange. Royalists supporting James claimed that the power of a monarch was divinely ordained and derived from an original grant of political authority by God to Adam. One of the most popular tracts espousing this position was *Patriarcha* by Robert Filmer, a tract that had to be countered by the Whig politicians pushing to depose James. To this end a Whig politician by the name of John Locke wrote *Two Treatises of Government*, arguing that the right of rule was granted by the citizens of a nation in compact, and could be revoked if a monarch violated that compact. Of course, James was seen to have done so, and his eventual defeat at the Battle of the Boyne validated the whiggish position. Though certainly intended to validate the Parliament against the monarch and not the people as a whole, the Glorious Revolution would provide the justification for revolutions a century later.

In 1776 the American colonies invoked the right to separate from an unjust monarch in their successful bid for independence from Great Britain. This ideology spread to France, where the French Revolution proceeded nominally from the same principles. With its initial success, small pockets of rebellion began arising in areas of British control, most spectacularly in the failed uprising in Ireland in 1798. This series of events planted the seeds that led to today's movements in Wales and Scotland, though their manifestation was slow at times. The 19<sup>th</sup> century was relatively quiet in the new state of the United Kingdom, and nationalist movements throughout Europe began to

shift from military to political expressions. In the UK this shift eventually led to the introduction of Home Rule bills for Scotland and Ireland toward the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, and eventually apparent passage in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century before WWI broke out.

Irish rebels were not content to wait for the cessation of the war, and the disapprobation the general public of the UK felt at those events led to the stalling of nationalist sentiments in Scotland and Wales following the Irish rebellion. Movements in the two areas were just starting to revive during the Depression when the disturbing specter of National Socialism in continental Europe caused them to stall again for fear of being associated with those movements' excesses. It was not until after WWII, and particularly after the end of the post-war economic slump, that nationalistic expressions in Scotland and Wales could again readily be countenanced.

The Labour government in power in 1978 moved to allow Scotland and Wales to vote on devolution in regional referenda. In Wales the idea was resoundingly defeated, indicating a lack of national identity, keeping with its lengthy union to England and its lack of unique structures. Scotland conversely returned a favorable result for devolution, which was denied only because of an unusual Parliamentary insertion into the referendum's provision. This result was also unsurprising, considering the great number of unique structures in Scotland and the concomitant expression of national identity. The fallout from the technically failed referendum in Scotland led to the dissolution of the Labour government and ushered in 17 years of Conservative rule. When Labour returned to office in 1997, referenda for the devolution were once again on the table.

In the referenda of 1997, both Scottish and Welsh voters approved the measures put before them, but to very different degrees. In Wales the measure passed by the tiniest

of margins with very low turnout, and survey results indicate that the majority of the population was actually against the proposal. Conversely, in Scotland a large portion of the electorate turned out and overwhelmingly approved the provisions for a separate Parliament and the ability to vary taxes. It has been suggested that Welsh turnout was so low because similar powers were not on offer for the Welsh Assembly. While that may have been a factor, demographic data and public opinion suggest that provisions for Welsh devolution would have been unpopular with the majority of the electorate no matter what was on offer.

Finally, this survey considers the impact of first the European Community and then the European Union on nationalist expressions in Wales and Scotland. It was the author's belief initially that the evolution and growth of the EU would be a profound factor in explaining the different outcomes of the 1979 and 1997 referenda, but this was not the case. Still, the growth of the EU is considered as it no doubt has some influence on events within its member states. Further, attempts by Scottish and Welsh nationalist parties to use EU institutions are considered, as well as efforts by non-nationalist governing parties to cast the futures of Wales and Scotland in European terms.

Within the modern political discourse of the United Kingdom the devolutions of Scotland and Wales are always linked, but this survey sets out to show that this is clearly a fallacious coupling. At the end it will be clear that Scotland possesses full-blown nationalist positions and aspirations, and will likely achieve complete independence from England in the next decade or two, though perhaps retaining a shared head of state and probably remaining part of the commonwealth. It will be seen that Wales can at best be described as having an aspiration to nationalism, and some almost insurmountable

obstacles to any expression of that aspiration. Long after Scotland has separated itself entirely from the Parliament at Westminster, Wales will be intimately tied to England. Whether Wales will ever be able to come into its own enough to sever those ties completely remains an open question, but it is very unlikely to occur in the foreseeable future.

## **Chapter 2: Wales from antiquity to the 20<sup>th</sup> century.**

The physical area now known as Wales has been intermittently inhabited since c27,000 BCE and continuously inhabited since the end of the last ice age, c8,000 BCE. The material culture of the successive populations is inconclusive, but it appears that the majority of the population prior to the Iron Age was Beaker peoples. The expansion of the iron-wielding Celts outward from Hallstatt between 800 and 500 BCE certainly influenced the population of the British archipelago, but it remains an open question whether significant population migration took place or if only the elites at the top of the social structure were supplanted by incoming Celts. Whichever the case, the Celts brought some innovative social structures and ideas (e.g. socially and politically empowered women) along with their iron weapons and martial philosophies. For this consideration, one of the most important and lasting Celtic importations was their language. (J. Davies, 1993; N. Davies, 1999; Pittock, 1999)

While the Celts were not a literate people, their Roman contemporaries noted and commented enough that primary historical sources date from before the beginning of the common era. It is none other than Julius Caesar who first takes Roman troops into the isles, an undertaking repeated with varying degrees of success by successive Roman emperors. While suffering some setbacks, the Romans were finally able to establish military and political control throughout Wales by the end of Vespasian's reign (79 CE). Most of the people probably remained thoroughly Gaelic, but a Roman civil structure and administration was set up which would continue to have ramifications. The Romans advanced northward on the big isle briefly as far as the Antonine wall, but were generally limited to the even more southerly Hadrian wall. No Roman foot is thought to have ever

touched Ireland. The areas that would become Wales and England shared a civic structure exclusive of the rest of the isles, comprising as they did the province Britannia Superior.

(J. Davies, 1993; N. Davies, 1999)

One practical and lasting effect of Roman control of Wales was the introduction of Christianity after the emperor Constantine adopted it as the official religion of the empire. Adherence to Christianity receded with the empire, but not before two very different but equally important traditions were established. Firstly in Wales and England, Christianity was linked strongly if not *quite* inextricably to the state. This tradition will come to have a profound influence not only on the nature of worship, but even the very survival of the Welsh as a language. Secondly, the slaving raids by Irish pirates emboldened in the wake of Roman withdrawal had the unintended effect of introducing a much different flavor of Christianity in Ireland, and from there eventually to Scotland. The raids that enslaved a young boy named Patrick introduced a devout but decentralized belief structure that would manifest as monasticism, setting up a conflict that would fester and flare into modern times. (J. Davies, 1993; N. Davies, 1999)

Following the dissolution of the western Roman Empire (which abandoned Britannia in 410), the period of mass population migrations known as the *Völkerwanderung* brought several different Germanic groups into the isles, primarily in the area of what is now England. The Angles, Saxons, and Jutes are generally referred to singularly as Anglo-Saxon, and while that simplification overlooks strife and differences between the groups, the implied social, cultural, and linguistic continuity is accurate enough to fulfill the purposes of this examination. As with the Celts, an open question remains whether there was a wholesale subjugation of the extant populace by a limited

number of the elite and warrior class or if whole populations moved in and lived in parallel communities. What is not disputed is that England rather quickly lost much of its Gaelic character, and many Gaels in the west were pushed into Welsh kingdoms. Here then was the beginning of differentiation between the lands that would come to be Wales and England. (J. Davies, 1993; N. Davies, 1999)

Roman entry into Wales had been facilitated by the fact there is no natural physical boundary between the areas. In the south, geographical continuity stretches across modern polities, and while the north is hillier it is hardly mountainous in anything but relative terms, with only fourteen peaks exceeding 3000 ft. For some reason, the Anglo-Saxon king of Mercia chose not to emulate the Romans, but to instead construct the barrier that nature had neglected to provide. Probably with the help of the several Welsh kingdoms he bordered, the Mercian king Offa constructed a dike in places measuring eight ft. tall and 65 ft. wide (with the accompanying ditches). This dike expanded the much more limited Wat's Dike built by a previous ruler, and became the basic delineation between Wales and England that exists to this day. The area to the east was Germanic speaking with continental customs, while to the west traditional practices remained and Gaelic predominated. (J. Davies, 1993; N. Davies, 1999)

Christianity receded in Welsh areas—though there was something of a limited monastic tradition on a smaller scale than Ireland and Scotland—and all but disappeared from areas under Anglo-Saxon control. Christianity was reintroduced into Anglo-Saxon areas by Augustine of Canterbury beginning in 597, this time with a very Roman and institutional church-centered aspect. The differentiation of religious tradition led the Venerable Bede in 731 to firmly delineate between the “English Peoples” who lived in an

Episcopal system and the “British” who did not. This distinction was instructive for other parts of the isles, but less so for the kingdoms that would become Wales. As Wales did not have the same sort of independent monastic tradition that Scotland and Ireland did—coupled with a tradition of state and church intertwinement from the Roman era—the adoption of orthodox Catholic practices proceeded more quickly there than in Scotland or Ireland. This tradition may have been instrumental in delaying in Wales the Dissent which so quickly pervaded Scotland. (J. Davies, 1993; N. Davies, 1999)

It is important to emphasize that none of the Welsh entities discussed here was a singular political entity yet, but instead several polities which shared a common cultural bond. While various kings and war-leaders would bring rather less or more of the respective areas under control, several factors prevented this control from becoming anything resembling institutional. One factor is that treaties and vassalage were Gaelic in nature, and relied heavily on interpersonal relationships. A more important factor is that traditional inheritance patterns mandated that property be divided between all sons, including those who were considered illegitimate. Thus, the period after the Roman withdrawal saw a number of rulers (particularly of Powys or Gwynedd) assert control over considerable areas west of the dike, only to have their conquests revert into the traditional kingdoms at their deaths or defeats. Apart from slight raiding by the Vikings, Wales retained this pattern until the Norman Conquest. (J. Davies, 1993; N. Davies, 1999)

The Norman Conquest of 1066 afforded Welsh rulers several opportunities to expand and consolidate power, but eventually led to the subjugation of the territory. After successful initial incursions, civil revolts drove Norman lords from much of Wales in the

11<sup>th</sup> and 12<sup>th</sup> centuries. Different generations of Welsh leaders were even able to use the political upheaval in the east to exert control over areas traditionally regarded as English. An agreement between The Lord Rhys and Henry II in 1171 secured some stability, and the Treaty of Montgomery in 1267 even established Llywelyn the Last as the singular Prince of Wales (though he still owed homage to the King of England). Edward I refused to recognize the treaty upon his ascension to the throne however, and after successfully quelling several insurrections and removing any remaining threats by execution he incorporated Wales into England with the Statute of Rhuddlan in 1284. Wales became a single political entity for the first time at the same time it lost its independence. (Bartlett, 2003; J. Davies, 1993; N. Davies, 1999; R. R. Davies, 1987)

Shortly after the statute, Edward bestowed the title of “Prince of Wales” onto his heir Edward, and the title has designated the heir to the English throne ever since. The contrast will become clearer with the analysis of Scotland, but it is important to note the ascription of principality to Wales. While the original Welsh title in use in the 12<sup>th</sup> century was directly translated as “leader”, the use of “prince” was probably an intentional effort by the Norman kings of England to minimize the importance of the position in order to create a perception of inferiority. It is difficult to gauge how this intentional diminution translated across generations and into the collective consciousness, but it is worth noting that the civil unrest of the 17<sup>th</sup> century that enveloped the entirety of the isles is sometimes known as “The War of the Three Kingdoms” (referring to Ireland, Scotland, and England). Given that modern definitions of the United Kingdom in a historical context describe it as having four constituent nations, the dissonance is jarring. (Bartlett, 2003; J. Davies, 1993; N. Davies, 1999; R. R. Davies, 1987)

The idea of Wales and England as inseparable did not take hold immediately, and the two centuries following Edward's conquest contained a number of revolts and insurrections. The most successful of these was led in 1400 by Owain Glyndŵr against Henry IV, and resulted in the control of most of Wales and a (very) brief establishment of a Welsh parliament (something alien to their indigenous legal system). Though he was never captured personally, Owain's rebellion was quickly staunch, and—establishing a pattern it would return to time and again for other rebellious holdings—England imposed a series of Penal Laws that restricted the civil liberties of the native Welsh. While the Penal Laws were never enforced very harshly in the first place, the civil discord that necessitated them would give way to something else entirely. The next step would be the full and whole-hearted integration of Wales into the Kingdom of England, precipitated by the events on the field at Bosworth in 1485. (J. Davies, 1993; N. Davies, 1999; R. R. Davies, 1987)

Owain ap Meredith ap Tudwr was a direct descendent of The Lord Rhys who changed his name to the more Anglican Owen Tudor, and who later may have married Catherine, widow of Henry V. Whether a legal marriage ever took place is unclear, but the two certainly had a son Edmund who in turn fathered Henry Tudor. Born at Pembroke castle in Wales two months after the opening maneuvers of the War of the Roses took Edmund's life, Henry was a quarter Welsh and spent the first thirteen years of his life in Wales. Events in the war caused him to flee to France where he spent fourteen years, but the failure of several relatives to secure the throne and their subsequent deaths elevated Henry to the foremost Lancastrian contender for the throne. Rebuffed in his first attempt, Henry managed to land a force in England and then defeat Richard III at Bosworth.

Though probably illegitimate through both lineages, no other contender with a better claim was left alive. (J. Davies, 1993; N. Davies, 1999; R. R. Davies, 1987; G. Williams, 1987)

Henry Tudor was crowned Henry VII, and established a dynasty that would last through six monarchs until the ascension of the Scottish Stewarts. The effect upon the populace of Wales was profound, as they perceived in Henry a Welsh monarch descended from a veritable historical lord. This perception was eagerly perpetuated by Henry, who was more fluent in Welsh and French than in English. He played up his Welsh heritage, seeking to secure as many sections of his realm as possible in a kingdom still reeling from the protracted conflict and overrun with a great number of semi-autonomous and powerful private lords. The emotional unification of Wales to the throne furthered the legal annexation initiated by Edward I. Henry's two successors—Henry VIII and Elizabeth I—would bind Wales even more firmly to England as a core element and not just a constituent state in a larger polity. They may also be the ones responsible for inadvertently ensuring the survival of a separate Welsh identity. (J. Davies, 1993; N. Davies, 1999; G. Williams, 1987)

Henry VIII caused Parliament to pass a series of laws collectively known as the Laws in Wales Acts 1535-1542. Prior to the Acts, Wales was legally a personal fief of the Monarch, and thus outside the purview of English law. The actual political administration of the province was undertaken locally by the courts of each feudal jurisdiction, often relying on ancient Welsh legal systems. The Acts caused Wales to be formally, legally, and politically annexed into the political state of England, instead of the personal holdings of the King of England as had been the case. The Acts extended Parliamentary

representation to Welshmen, and erased any legal distinction between English and Welsh. Additionally, Wales was reorganized on the county level, and standard governmental offices such as Sheriff were established. The Acts also established English as the official language, and mandated that any office holder must use English alone in the course of his duties. The Acts also asserted what may be read as an intention to destroy any traces of Welsh culture, and homogenize Welsh and English culture. While some modern scholars have suspicions about the popularity of the Acts among the common population, nothing is more than conjecture as all extant material indicates that the Welsh exuberantly embraced the laws' passages. The singular "Kingdom of England and Wales" was born. (J. Davies, 1993; N. Davies, 1999; G. Williams, 1987)

Henry VIII is also responsible for bringing the Magisterial Reformation to England, and it turned out that the need to promulgate the Anglican Church took precedence over cultural integration. Following the country's brief reversion to Catholicism by Mary, Elizabeth went about solidifying the new Anglican rites in both England and Wales. Since one common element of Reform movements was the use of vernacular in religious services, new translations of the Bible had to be undertaken. Mindful that other than perhaps the tiniest bit of liturgical Latin many Welsh peasants spoke nothing other than Welsh, Elizabeth assented to having both the Bible and the Book of Common Prayer translated into Welsh. This had the twofold effect of fixing the language into the state it largely remains in today, and assuring that whatever other laws on were on the books, Welsh would continue to be learned and used by large swaths of the population. While Welsh did suffer through serious declines later, the balance of

probability is that without Elizabeth's concessions Welsh would be a dead language.<sup>2</sup> (J. Davies, 1993; N. Davies, 1999; G. Williams, 1987)

The 18<sup>th</sup> century was as quiet politically in Wales as it was noisy in the rest of the isles—but the same is not true with education and religion. With most of the population within the Anglican fold at the beginning of the century, many people continued to speak nothing but Welsh. Instruction in schools was solely in English however, leading to a crisis in education. Traveling schools were established which instructed in Welsh, and if their three-month stay in a given location offered little more than the rudiments, some quarter of a million Welsh speakers did at least gain basic literacy. This basic literacy allowed a large portion of the population to read the Bible in Welsh instead of just hearing sermons, and is why some consider the circulating schools to be the first step in the Welsh Methodist Revival. The Revival introduced to Wales the Dissent so common in Scotland since the previous century, and led to a general ascendance of disestablishment thought. (J. Davies, 1993; N. Davies, 1999; R. Davies, 2005; G. H. Jenkins, 1987; Pittock, 1997; D. Smith, 1980)

The Welsh Methodist Revival began in the first half of the 18<sup>th</sup> century and quickly gained influence throughout the area, with some 400 fellowships present in Wales by 1750. As with the Wesleyan Methodist movement in England, the formation of these fellowships took place within the context of the Anglican Church, and those participating early on perceived their actions as falling within the established church's framework. By 1811 however, the revivalists had seceded from the established church

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<sup>2</sup> Its sister language Cornish—into which translation of the Bible and Book of Common Prayer were denied—saw its last monolingual speaker pass in the 17<sup>th</sup> century and last native bilingual speaker pass in the 18<sup>th</sup>. Though recently resurrected from glosses and texts by Cornish nationalists, “modern” Cornish relies upon phonological guesses that are heavily disputed.

and by 1823 had formally established the Presbyterian Church of Wales. The Welsh revivalists had parted ways with Wesley on some theological points, and the church's Methodism was infused strongly with Calvinistic thinking instead of Wesley's interpretation of Arminian theology. Welsh Methodism departed from English Methodism on a number of points, but primarily on whether the elect were pre-determined (Welsh: yes; English: no) and whether apostasy was possible once saved (Welsh: no; English: yes). Beyond the founding of the church, the revival increased the profile of other extant dissenting groups, and by the early 19<sup>th</sup> century nonconformist Christians outnumbered membership of the Church in Wales. The continual decline would lead to the Church in Wales' formal disestablishment a century later. (J. Davies, 1993; N. Davies, 1999; R. Davies, 2005; G. H. Jenkins, 1987; Pittock, 1997; D. Smith, 1980)

The Industrial Revolution wrought many changes in Wales in both economic and social terms. Always a mineral rich area, there is evidence for mining of ore in Wales as far back as the Bronze Age, with copper from the Great Orme region found in deposits throughout much of continental Europe. With the renewed need for metals and the new need for coal, in which Wales was also abundant, industry and mining operations sprouted up in the area. The produce of these mining operations was enough to drive increasing expansion, resulting in Cardiff becoming the largest coal exporting port in the world by the early 20<sup>th</sup> century. The increased demand for workers for the mines led to several effects that would have long-term impact on Wales, as would the inequality of the economic situation engendered. (J. Davies, 1993; N. Davies, 1999; R. Davies, 2005; K. O. Morgan, 1998; P. Morgan, 1981; D. Smith, 1980)

The need for workers for the mines had several effects that still reverberate today. First, it completely reoriented the Welsh economy away from its agricultural base as many moved off of farms into mining settlements, so much so that a demographic reversal was precipitated wherein 80% of the population was urban, whereas before it had been 80% rural. Secondly, the easy availability of jobs led many to immigrate to Wales from other parts of the United Kingdom. The first immigration was a massive influx of English working class, turning some areas essentially English in culture. Second was a wave of Irish workers forced from Ireland by the Great Famine of 1845-1849, when a potato blight either killed or caused to emigrate one-quarter of Ireland's population. In fact, Wales was second only to the United States in the number of immigrants received in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Of course the immigrants were often of the poorest working classes, and so it is unsurprising that wealth created by the Industrial Revolution in Wales was disproportionately distributed. (J. Davies, 1993; N. Davies, 1999; R. Davies, 2005; Macdonald & Thomas, 1997; K. O. Morgan, 1998; D. Smith, 1980)

The capitalist class in Welsh industry was comprised of English business men, many of whom rarely visited their Welsh holdings at all. Miners and factory workers were paid a pittance (as were the workers of the Industrial Revolution the world over), and exploited in dangerous conditions in order to maximize the profits of the absent owners. A series of strikes and other unrests caused the British government to open an enquiry which—relying primarily on Anglican witnesses—concluded that the labor strife was due to Welsh laziness and immorality that resulted from their language and nonconformity (religiously). The results of this enquiry provoked a furious backlash and came to be known as the “Treachery of the Blue Books”. Practically, the public outcry

moved the population to the left and many embraced Socialism, a legacy still present today in the wide disparity in support for the Labour and Conservative parties. The report also caused a renewed push for the disestablishment of the Anglican Church, as the majority of the population was nonconformist. This renewed vigor led eventually to the Welsh Church Act 1914, which simultaneously split the Church in Wales from the Church of England and disestablished it. (J. Davies, 1993; N. Davies, 1999; R. Davies, 2005; Macdonald & Thomas, 1997; K. O. Morgan, 1998; D. Smith, 1980)

### **Chapter 3: Scotland from antiquity to the 20<sup>th</sup> century.**

Scotland provided a more inhospitable climate for early humanity than did Wales, and there is no evidence of even intermittent habitation prior to the end of the last major ice age c8,000 BCE. Tool remains indicate that the first permanent settlers to Scotland date to the late Mesolithic, but Neolithic settlements with their concomitant horticulture soon made an appearance. The exact ethnic make-up of Scotland's early inhabitants remains problematic in much the same way as Wales', as it is unknown whether there were massive population migrations that were displaced successively (as Ireland's Book of Invasions seems to suggest), or if populations remained relatively stable and adopted new technologies and traditions through cultural diffusion. As with the rest of the isles, the influence of Celtic culture was certainly profound for a wide range of practices, from the introduction of iron tools and weapons to the introduction of the Brythonic language that formed the basis for Gaelic. (N. Davies, 1999; Pittock, 2003)

As with the rest of the isles, recorded history for the region really begins with the Roman occupation of Britannia, and remains somewhat suspect inasmuch the writers were commenting on a strange and alien people outside their control. Britannia's northern boundary was generally demarcated by Hadrian's Wall stretching eastward from Solway Firth, though for brief periods from 144-164 CE and starting in 208 for a few years Rome pushed the border northward to the Antonine Wall which stretched between the Firth of Clyde and the Firth of Forth. After permanent withdrawal to Hadrian's Wall, the Romans seem to have cultivated the intervening natives as a buffer against those farther to the North. Instructively, the Antonine Wall followed the marshland between the Clyde and the Forth that would become the *de facto* border with England through the Middle Ages,

and that the modern political boundary between Scotland and England divides the area between the two horizontal walls diagonally from Solway to the river Tweed. (N. Davies, 1999; Pittock, 2003)

While formal Roman control of Scotland was limited to a very brief duration and the small area south of the Antonine Wall, their influence was nevertheless exceptionally important in a couple ways. First, the Roman cultivation of the border tribes led to a basic division of the native population into two broad peoples, the Roman-influenced Britons south of the Forth and Clyde and the Picts to the north of the same. Both groups probably spoke Brythonic and may have been Celtic in origin, but the presence of Britannia laid the foundation for differentiation that would persist well into the modern era between “Lowland” and “Highland”. Secondly, the Roman Christian mission of St. Ninian converted many to Christianity, and while the faith appears to have disappeared after his leaving, it certainly left fertile ground for the monasticism that made its way to Scotland from Wales via Ireland and the good offices of St. Columba and the Scots-Irish kingdom Dál Riata. (N. Davies, 1999; Pittock, 2003)

*Scotti* was the name given by the Romans to the inhabitants of Ireland, and the fact that the appellation became the root for the name of Scotland indicates the connections between the two landmasses. Given that the Irish Sea is as narrow as 12-13 miles in places between Ireland and Scotland, it is not surprising that both small and large movements of people occurred in both directions. The origin and composition of Dál Riata’s population has become contested ground in debates about contemporary Ulster, but what can be said for certain is that a political entity spanned from County Antrim in Ireland across the sea to much of Scotland’s western seaboard. Also certain is that the

Irish monk Columcille founded a monastery on the island of Iona in 563 to facilitate a Christianizing mission to the Picts. It was from Iona that the Irish-born St. Aidan was sent to found the monastery at Lindisfarne, bringing with him the Celtic-infused Christianity that would pit Irish and Scottish traditions against the Roman mission in the south. (N. Davies, 1999; Pittock, 2003)

Differences between the Roman and Celtic missions centered on a few key differences in practice, some rather minor and some at the very heart of the faith. One difference that appears minor to modern eyes is the style of tonsure a monk would wear—the Celtic practice of shaving everything forward of a line from ear to ear differed from the Roman tonsure resembling a halo or crown. More significantly, the Roman church was modeled on the administrative units of the Roman Empire called dioceses and represented a top-down organizational structure, while the Celtic church embraced a diffuse monasticism headed by abbots. Another significant difference between the two was the difference in calculating Easter, the Celtic Church relying on an older system that the Roman Church had long rejected. The Celtic Church was brought into line in all of these facets, but the institutional memory of the churches and monasteries helped foster an idea of north/south divide in religion on the island. (N. Davies, 1999; Pittock, 2003)

In addition to the Scots of Ulster, two other ethnic groups would encroach into Scotland to some degree in the first millennium of the Common Era. In the sixth and seventh centuries, the Anglo-Saxons who conquered Britannia in the south pushed northward far enough that the kingdom of Northumbria encompassed what are now the Lothian and Borders areas of Scotland. One legacy of this incursion was the introduction of the Germanic language that would become the basis for the Scots dialect, related but

distinct from the English that would evolve in the south. Beginning then at the end of the eighth century, Viking raiders and then colonists came in ever greater numbers. Some expeditions led to permanent and prolonged occupations, as when Vikings settled the isles north and west of Scotland where they would remain for hundreds of years. Military expeditions ravaged monastic holdings and decimated the Pictish aristocracy and kingdom, leading to a political amalgamation that became Scotland. (N. Davies, 1999; Pittock, 2003)

The origins of Scotland as a singular political and cultural entity are difficult to unravel, and remain hotly contested not least because of the implications for nationalism. The kingdom of Northumbria had switched between northern and southern dynasties, but power eventually settled in the north along the Scottish borderlands. The Britonic kingdom of Strathclyde located in the southwest had withstood a number of incursions and absorbed as many cultural inclusions. The Pictish Kingdom remained politically dominant, but its overlordship of the Scots and inheritance model allowed the ascension of Scots to prominence. The kingdom of Dál Riata had been subordinate on land but supreme on the sea until Viking raids broke their power, severing ties between the kingdoms' halves and forcing the eastern Scots to turn their attention from west to east and seek power there. The third Scottish king to ascend to the Pictish throne was Kenneth Mac Alpin, who introduced a hereditary rule over both Picts and Scots that meant that theretofore the ruler of one would be the ruler of both. While Kenneth was not called such before his death in 858, by the end of that century his grandson Donald II was known by the appellation *rí Alban*, or King of Alba (Scotland). Another grandson and

Donald's successor, Constantine II, was responsible for much of the kingdom's consolidation. (N. Davies, 1999; Pittock, 2003)

While the consolidation of Scotland was a multiple century affair, its disposition in the High Middle Ages can be broadly delineated into two parts: before the Norman Conquest when rulers considered themselves Gaelic, and after when French language and culture pervaded the court and provided ties between Scotland and England. The Gaelic kings of the 10<sup>th</sup> and 11<sup>th</sup> centuries expanded their control into Edinburgh and the kingdom of Strathclyde, though they were bedeviled and sometimes deposed by various kings of Moray (one example is Mac Bethad mac Findláich, immortalized and vilified by Shakespeare as Macbeth). Rather than expanding the territory of Scotland significantly, it appears the Gaelic kings' most profound accomplishments were relegating Viking influence to the northern and eastern isles, and solidifying dynastic control. It was Macbeth's slayer and successor Malcolm III who raided England with the intention of staking dynastic claims there, and in doing so invited the attention of the Normans. (N. Davies, 1999; Pittock, 2003)

As in Wales, the Norman Conquest of England initially afforded the rulers of Scotland opportunities to expand their scope and influence, but ultimately led to at least a partial subjugation. Expanding their own interests while siding in internecine Scottish dynastic squabbles, the new Norman rulers of England imported cultural and political realities to the still-unifying Scotland. David I, taken with continental customs, invited a number of Norman nobles into the Scottish aristocracy and accepted lands in fee south of the border, making him at least nominally subordinate to the English king (though whether as an individual or as a monarch remained a sticky question). Noble

intermarriage led Scottish aristocracy to perceive themselves as French, and the Gaelic population appears to have been relegated to a servile class. Moreover, this perception of Frenchness caused William I to see himself an equal claimant with Henry II, which led to the insistence that William acknowledge Henry as his feudal superior in the Treaty of Falaise following the former's defeat in the Revolt of 1173-74. Revolts led by slighted Gaelic nobles coupled with the enmeshment of Norman politics into Scottish affairs led to eventual disarray in the descent of the Scottish crown, and it was into this confusion that Edward I stepped to adroitly continue his attempts to consolidate the whole of the island. (N. Davies, 1999; Harris & MacDonald, 2006; Pittock, 2003)

With the death of Alexander III there remained no male claimant to the throne of Scotland, and the crown went to Margaret, the Maid of Norway. As Margaret was only three at the time, several "Guardians of Scotland" were appointed to act as *de facto* rulers in her stead. These Guardians concluded the Treaty of Birgham with the English king Edward, providing for the marriage of Margaret and the future Edward II and stipulating that any offspring from the marriage would hold the crown of both England and Scotland. Margaret died en route to Scotland to fulfill the treaty, and with her death there was no clear successor to the Scottish throne. When the competing claims of Robert Bruce and John Balliol threatened to spill into civil war, the Guardians invited Edward to adjudicate. Edward insisted that he be recognized by the claimants as Lord Paramount of Scotland before he would convene a court, and since many of the claimants held English estates they otherwise risked losing, they acceded. Edward gave his decision in favor of John Balliol. (N. Davies, 1999; Harris & MacDonald, 2006; Pittock, 2003)

Edward soon pressed John for troops and funds to carry out his planned invasion of France, leading John to negotiate secretly with France to establish what became known as the “Auld Alliance”. Learning of the Scots’ plans to invade England when Edward invaded France, Edward moved northward and deposed John, precipitating the first Scottish War of Independence. Edward died halfway through the twenty year conflict, and the eventually victorious Scots under Robert Bruce were able to appeal to Pope John XXII to invalidate any acts of submission made to English kings. The first Parliament of Scotland met in 1326 and Edward III of England recognized Scottish independence in the Treaty of Northampton in 1328. Robert Bruce died the next year however, and England supported the claim of Edward Balliol (son of the deposed John), precipitating a second War of Independence. After some initial successes, the tide turned against England and Edward III turned the majority of his attention to the Hundred Years War. (N. Davies, 1999; Harris & MacDonald, 2006; Pittock, 2003)

With the second War of Independence sputtering to an ambivalent conclusion, events were set in motion that would lead to the fulfillment of Edward I’s dream of unifying the two kingdoms under one rule. David II succeeded Robert, but was forced to flee to France during the strife, leaving his realm in the care of his nephew Robert the High Steward of Scotland. Robert ascended the throne on David’s death, and established the Steward/Stewart/Stuart dynasty. Throughout the 15<sup>th</sup> century the Stuarts consolidated power, weakening the nobility and bringing the last of the island outliers (Shetland and Orkney) under control. In 1503 James IV married Margaret Tudor, setting up the conditions that would unify the crowns a century later. Before then however, claims made against the Auld Alliance cast Scotland and England into direct contention on a

number of occasions, causing Scottish monarchs to spend considerable time in France and leaving regents ruling the country. The tensions caused by the demands of the Alliance were exacerbated by the fact that England had Reformed under Henry VIII while Scotland (and France) remained officially Catholic. As Protestantism grew in Scotland, the nobles saw their coreligionists in England as natural allies and Parliament drafted the Treaty of Edinburgh, permanently severing the Auld Alliance. (N. Davies, 1999; Harris & MacDonald, 2006; McCrone, Kendrick, & Straw, 1989; Pittock, 2003)

The Reformation of the Scottish Kirk was a slow and contentious process, fully intertwined with the political machinations of Scotland, England, and France. While elements were present from shortly after Luther's activities in Germany, the movement was really precipitated by three events in quick succession. In 1558 the Protestant Elizabeth took the place of Catholic Mary Tudor on the throne of England, in 1559 John Knox returned from Geneva to Scotland, and in 1560 the disparate movements coalesced by his return led to the Reformation Parliament of Scotland. With the populace of Scotland turning away from the French Catholic regent Mary of Guise (Mary, Queen of Scots' dowager mother) and toward the English Elizabeth, the Parliament adopted the Scots Confession, reorganizing the Kirk along reform lines. While the church ultimately organized in Presbyterian fashion, for the first century there were substantial movements towards episcopacy, not least by the monarch who would finally unify the crowns. (N. Davies, 1999; Harris & MacDonald, 2006; Pittock, 1991, 2003)

James VI of Scotland ascended the English throne upon the death of Elizabeth in 1603, becoming James I in the southern realm and embodying the Union of the Crowns that would be formally legislated in 1707. James wished for a true political union of the

two countries instead of simply a dynastic claim on two separate crowns, but most of his attempts were foiled by long-standing suspicions and stereotypes prevalent between two populations that had been at odds for so long. This was further complicated by the still seething religious tensions on the island which would come to plague all of James' successors. The century between James' ascension and the Act of Union would see the English Civil War, the rise of Dissent (and Scotland's adoption of the Westminster Confession), and all of the events bound up in the War of the Three Kingdoms (otherwise known as the Glorious Revolution). Nevertheless, Queen Anne was still a Stuart on the throne when the Acts of Union were completed in 1707. (N. Davies, 1999; Harris & MacDonald, 2006; McCrone et al., 1989; Pittock, 1991, 2003)

The Acts of Union were two parallel acts, one passed by the Parliament of Scotland and the other by the Parliament of England, which provided for the full political integration of the two nations. While heavily contested by certain factions on both sides of the border, the English position was driven by the desire to ensure that a Catholic did not ascend the Scottish throne (now prohibited in England) and result in a division of the crowns wherein Scotland might once again ally with English enemies. The Scottish position remains a matter of some debate—tied as it is to modern expressions of nationalism—but the support of the nobility and the clergy was secured, the latter by official establishment of the Kirk along Presbyterian lines by statute. In addition to the church, the Acts also guaranteed the continued independence of Scottish Law and the Scottish Court of Session. The parliaments of England and Scotland were abolished, and the Parliament of Great Britain established to take their place. (N. Davies, 1999; Harris & MacDonald, 2006; Pittock, 1991, 2003; Whatley & Patrick, 2006)

The first years after union were lean in Scotland and saw a resurgence of Jacobite rebellions, but by the latter half of the century several simultaneous developments changed the landscape considerably. First, the economic changes of the union began to benefit Scotland's development, particularly within the context of the burgeoning Industrial Revolution. Dovetailing, the draconian Highland Clearances fundamentally altered concepts of property ownership while providing a dispossessed labor force for the aforementioned Revolution. This press into the lowlands led to the Scottish Agricultural Revolution, as well as to mass emigrations by the surfeit of workers in the cities. This same migration into urban centers stimulated an explosion of talent and thinking, much as similar compressions have done elsewhere in history. The Scottish Renaissance of the latter half of the 18<sup>th</sup> and first half of the 19<sup>th</sup> centuries had reverberations throughout the modern period. (Cooke, Donnachie, MacSween, & Whatley, 1998; N. Davies, 1999; Harvie, 2004; McCrone et al., 1989; Pittock, 1991, 2003)

The Industrial Revolution reached Scotland rather earlier than Wales, and impacted it in a substantially different manner. While Wales provided many of the raw materials for industry through mining, Scotland became more of a center for heavy industry and manufacture. One very significant industry for Scotland was shipbuilding, an industry that is international by its nature. The attendant urbanization mixed with the international flavor of the industries turned Scottish cities into international cities in their own right. By the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century Glasgow manufactured most of the world's ships and locomotives and was known as the Second City of the Empire; Edinburgh was one of Europe's banking centers. Of course the benefits did not extend to everyone, and those cleared from the Highlands who did not or could not succeed often chose to

emigrate, many to the U.S., Canada, and Australia. Between 1841 and 1931, two and three-quarter millions of Scots emigrated from Scotland. The effects of this emigration would profoundly affect Scotland's future and were one of the most distinguishing features between it and Wales, as discussed below. (Checkland & Checkland, 1989; Cooke et al., 1998; N. Davies, 1999; Harvie, 2004; Pittock, 1991, 2003)

While those who stayed in Scotland generally fared better than their Welsh counterparts, the majority of the capital remained in English aristocratic hands and strife between labor and management was not uncommon. As in Wales, much of the populace was influenced by Socialism and trade union movements. With the three Representation of the People Act(s) that passed Parliament in the 19<sup>th</sup> century (1832, 1867, and 1884), the franchise was extended to roughly 60% of the adult male population, and in Scotland many of those newly enfranchised joined the Liberal Party that succeeded the Whigs. The Liberal Party would give way to the Labour Party established in 1900, and the Labour Party would count both Scotland and Wales as bastions of support for most of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. While the Labour party was broadly unionist in its philosophy, it did support devolution and was able to carry through on a campaign promise for referenda in the wake of the 1997 elections (see chapter 6). (Cooke et al., 1998; N. Davies, 1999; Harvie, 2004; Pittock, 1991, 2003)

#### **Chapter 4: Summary of differences between Scotland and Wales in context.**

With a brief account of the two areas' histories now given, a consideration may be made of the factors that contribute to nationalistic expression in Scotland and Wales. The focus of this consideration will be the following: geographical continuity of each with England, the amount of time spent unified into the "core" of England/Britain, independent language traditions, religious traditions, economic independence or dependence, separate institutional integrity, and degree of diaspora. With these topics in place, it will become evident that Scotland in many respects maintains a distinct national identity, accounting for its recent strong steps toward devolution and (possibly) independence. Conversely, Wales is struggling to define itself in a meaningful way and has taken only the most tentative steps towards devolution, while independence seems very unlikely for the foreseeable future.

There is no doubt that geographic realities played a large role in the establishment of the entities as we know them today. As with the other factors considered, the degree of geophysical continuity directly affected the delineation of kingdoms as well as the degree of autonomy they retained. The traditional barrier of Offa's Dike was a transient expression of division that fostered an insular Celtic identity within Wales but lacked any real force of delineation in military or transport terms, leading in later eras to free movement of people and goods between England and Wales and reinforcing economic interdependence. This allowed for a cultural distinction that was to complicate relations in the future, but provided nothing of the real physical separation that aided Scotland in both military and political terms (N. Davies, 1999). Scotland was geographically contiguous with England in the narrow sense that no body of water or impassible

mountain range separated them. However, there was still a formidable barrier, with the River Forth and the River Clyde making the Uplands and Highlands of Scotland “virtually another island” according to Agricola’s account (Pittock, 2003). The marshes around this narrow isthmus were not drained until almost one hundred years after Union, and were the reason that the bridge at Stirling held such military importance to Scotland’s integrity. This is the line along which the Antonine Wall was built, and the one that separated the continually contested Lowlands from the long-sovereign North (Pittock, 2003). So the differences in these situations are glaring: Wales was created by a manufactured delineation that allowed some cultural insularity but no real physical separation, while Scotland was joined to England but was protected by a significant physical barrier that served at necessary times in its history.

Union should be considered in two lights for Scotland and Wales—the degree of unification within the country prior to political union with England, and the duration of that political union with England. Wales never existed as a unified kingdom prior to assimilation in England—brief personal overlordships never outlasted the individuals who forged them—so a unified historical identity must be created, not resurrected. Political union with England in some ways predates the existence of either country as Wales hosted an extensive Roman presence much as England and both areas were administered as Britannia. Since Roman imposition the ties between England and Wales have never ceased, though they have fluctuated in degree and extent. The official Act of Union with Wales in 1536 noted that “the Dominion, Principality, and Country of Wales, justly and righteously is, and *ever hath been* incorporated, annexed, united and subject to and under the imperial crown of this realm as a very member and joint of the same...

(emphasis added)” The Act goes on to note that while England and Wales were politically contiguous the crown wished to formalize connection in order to standardize language, law, and custom (N. Davies, 1999). The Act seems almost superfluous when considered in light of the Tudor dynasty—a half-Welsh King was a fully legitimate ruler to the Welsh (P. N. Williams). The unequal status was further reinforced by the omission of the Welsh red dragon from the flag of the United Kingdom, the 1654 flag incorporating St. George’s Cross, St. Andrew’s Cross, and the Irish Harp (N. Davies, 1999). The Union Jack used after the Act of Union with Scotland replaced the Irish Harp with St. Patrick’s saltire, conflating it with the flags of England and Scotland. Scotland was a unified political entity for hundreds of years before union with England. It remained relatively free of Roman influence, a very small part contained within the bounds of Hadrian’s Wall, and a slightly larger piece within the very short-lived Antonine Wall (Pittock, 2003). Successive Kings of England had attempted to extend dominion over parts of modern-day Scotland with variable but always limited success—the Scots were aided tremendously by the natural geography of the land (see above). With the ascension of the Stuart dynasty to the throne of England in the person of James VI, I & I, Scotland’s king also ruled over Ireland and England (with Wales) as individual kingdoms until the Act of Union in 1707. When Scotland and England joined to form Great Britain they were at least nominally equal, a fact reflected in the composition of the Union flag.

Language is a powerful cultural force, providing a common framework for interpretation and analysis of the world in which one lives. A powerful anthropological theory (the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis) even holds that the language of a speaker defines the

world in which one lives—that language shapes one’s very perception (McGee & Warms, 1996). It is therefore instructive to look at the linguistic permutations of the British Isles, as the relative languages and language groups are certain to have had a profound effect on conceptions of identity and nationality. Welsh is a branch of P-Gaelic, the same branch that houses Cornish, Manx, and the language of Brittany in France. A sharp divide exists in Wales today between those who are native Welsh speakers and those who are not, and this difference often translates into nationalist positions. Native Welsh speakers are much more likely to espouse a separatist ideology, and the national language has proven a most effective tool of nationalist reinvention and reinterpretation in modern Wales<sup>3</sup> (Taylor & Thomson, 1999). However, Welsh is not widely spoken, and as recently as the 1950’s there were credible fears of its extinction. Scotland has an amalgamation of Gaelic and English as a language. Scots-Gaelic was a branch of Q-Gaelic, an earlier derivative than the P-Gaelic languages. Gaelic is still spoken in regions of the Highlands, and in the Lowlands a distinct dialect arose called Scots or Lallans (Pittock, 2001). Lallans can properly be classed as a dialect as it is not unintelligible to the English speaker, but it is certainly different enough to cause a reader to toil for interpretation<sup>4</sup>. Many Scottish nationalists utilize Lallans as a defining feature of identity, and some of Scotland’s most notable literary nationalists (e.g. Robert Burns and Hugh MacDiarmid) have used the dialect to that end (MacCormick, 1970).

Religion is another area where the degree of connectedness between England and the subject country is directly inverse to the speed and degree of devolution, though the

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<sup>4</sup> There is significant contemporary dispute (most very recent) about whether Scots should be considered a distinct branch of Germanic language from English. Languages tend to be more advantageous to nationalists than dialects.

real differences of past centuries evolved in the 20<sup>th</sup> century into formal institutional disparity. The Romans brought Christianity with them to the islands, and it soon spread through the areas that were never under the Roman's direct control. As Wales was considered part of the kingdom of England it never had an established church separate from the Anglican institution. When the Church in Wales was established (as an entity) in 1919 it was simultaneously disestablished (as a state institution). With her attempt to promulgate the Protestant Reformation, Queen Elizabeth I assented to the publication in Welsh of the Bible. It was this act that is probably solely responsible for the survival of the Welsh language to the modern day, though the difference between the sacred and secular languages mitigated any formation of an inclusive Welsh identity. Still, Dissent found voice within Wales and historically the country has a strong Methodist tradition (Robbins, 1998). Scotland had a long tradition of religious piety before the Reformation. As one of the first outposts in the tradition of Irish monasticism, the country soon played pivotal roles in ecclesiastical debates (such as the Easter controversy) and perpetuated the monastic tradition (N. Davies, 1999). Scotland was still a separate kingdom at the time of Henry's split, so by the time an independent Church of Scotland was established the Church reflected the Presbyterian nature of the Scottish populace. As one of three institutions left intact after union with England (along with the legal system and schools), the Church of Scotland may be seen as instrumental to the maintenance of a distinct national identity, even though strong religious affiliation has declined. Indeed, religion has become *pro forma* to the large majority of the United Kingdom citizenry. In total, about 10% of the population attends an established church, with minimal variation between regions. As of 1996, 14% of the Scots, 12% of the Welsh, and 9% of the

English attended church. Where religion was once a state matter exacerbating tensions between countries with different religious affiliations, it now is a matter of internalized and individual attention (Morley & Robins, 2001). Religion ceased to be a primary source of antagonism between regions and evolved into an institutional—and primarily historical—expression of nationalism.

Wales existed in the economic periphery of England until the Industrial Revolution, when the metals and coal needed for production were found in abundance (N. Davies, 1999). The concentration of the mining industry effectively divided Wales into three distinct regions, and the immigration of English workers into the industrial regions further exacerbated the differences so that identity remains split even today (Osmond, 1988). The mining industry has suffered a sharp decline and its detritus still scars the Welsh landscape in many places, but Wales has not been very effective luring post-industrial investment into its borders (Macdonald & Thomas, 1997). Moreover, the historic patterns of settlement and industry retard a unified Welsh expression (Taylor & Thomson, 1999).

Scotland existed on the production end of industrialization rather than the resource end as Wales had. Its economy was integrally tied to the Union, but regionally the economic forms were holistic for the most part. That is to say, “in 1931 and 1951, Scotland remained the region with the industrial structure closest to the British mean, and in 1961 and 1971, only north-west England was closer” (McCrone, 2001, pp.73-74). When the shipbuilding sector started shedding jobs in the ‘70s Scotland was able to attract newer industries that served the international sphere, with significant labor employed in manufacturing integrated circuits and personal computers (Macdonald &

Thomas, 1997). The trend towards service and technical industries led at least one writer to describe Glasgow as a “technopolis” (Harvie, 1998, p.221). It is evident that the economic situation of Wales not only reinforced its second-tier status to England but also enabled the divisions of identity that so far have precluded an effective expression of nationality. Conversely, Scotland was able to act without regional infighting and seems to have successfully translated its production into an international market, allowing expression in regional terms within the EU instead of in terms bound by the traditional state.

The survival of traditional institutions or traditions may provide powerful cultural links that can be used for nationalist expression. Within the islands there seems a correlation between the longevity of some important cultural establishments and later nationalism. In some regions there were also efforts to recapture or recreate conceptions of the past, most of these stemming from the Romantic period’s fascination with the past and especially idealized conceptions of Celticism (Pittock, 1999). Wales had few if any unique institutions to call its own other than its language. Though the language was granted a reprieve by the needs of the Reformation, its laws and customs were not so fortunate, displaced largely by English jurisprudence (J. Davies, 1993). In later eras there were revivals of certain traditions (especially literary), but many were patently manufactured and had no true historic pedigree, or were the “best guess” about long abandoned traditions<sup>5</sup> (P. Morgan, 1981). One of the most enduring of these was the Eisteddfod, traditionally dated to the 12<sup>th</sup> century but dormant for several centuries until

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<sup>5</sup> Perhaps the most famous of these are the poetic and bardic forgeries of Edward Williams, better known to history as Iolo Morganwg.

(re)created during the mid 18<sup>th</sup> century. While that was no impediment to these traditions becoming effective means of cultural expression, they fell short of nationalist translation.

Conversely, Scotland kept three very significant institutions separate from English hegemony after joining the union. Having these three institutions allowed a limited preservation of the sense of “Other” necessary for effective expression of national identity (McCrone, 2001). The Kirk of Scotland was a new institution based upon Presbyterian expression, contrasted with the Church of England that displaced the Catholic Church and incorporated its existing structure after the Reformation. Where England usurped Catholicism, Scotland created a new institution that competed directly with Catholicism, sometimes violently (Pittock, 2003). Scholars also commonly list the educational system and the separate code of laws as bulwarks of national identity in Scotland (Harvie, 2004). Some of the traditions and institutions noted originated historically and some have been created in modern times. The antiquity of a cultural tradition is not directly associated with its effectiveness in inspiring fervor, but the created forms may consolidate cultural identity without necessarily translating that culture into a nationalist tool. Wales has very little antiquity for many common expressions of Welshness, so the people’s identity coalesces around the forms but for the majority is an additive component of identity instead of an effective expression of otherness. Scotland’s institutions are venerable and provide the formalistic framework to translate cultural identity into a nationalistic political expression.

In a recent article one of the foremost scholars of Scottish nationalism, David McCrone—joined by Ross Bond and Alice Brown—formulated national identity as concomitant to economic development and argued that such processes could be cast

alliteratively as reiteration, recapture, reinterpretation, and repudiation (2003). All four of these processes are pitched to both external and internal audiences, but reinterpretation—“presentation of historically negative features of identity as contemporary advantages, or... as largely neutral”—is especially dependent upon a nation's past *diaspora*, or the degree of emigration away from the nation to other countries (Bond, McCrone, & Brown, 2003, pp.381-385). Wales has no appreciable degree of diaspora. Certainly there was a degree of emigration to the new world, and enough people to keep some claimed sense of history, but they were far too few to keep a separate sense of identity. Instead, modern Welsh nationalists trumpet the culturally significant but numerically minute settlement in Patagonia (numbering less than 200 to start and almost crippled by the later emigration of 234 members to Saskatchewan), or the more impressive claim of 30,000 Welsh living in Australia. Even this later claim is mitigated by the fact that the majority of the Welsh living in Australia emigrated after WWII (P. N. Williams). Most migration patterns concerning Wales are the reverse of the other regions considered, with Wales second only to the United States in the number of immigrants to its shores. (Macdonald & Thomas, 1997) This influx cannot be underestimated when considering the disparity of identity today.

Emigration from Scotland is a story of different magnitude. Between 1841 and 1931 2.75 million Scots emigrated all over the world, landing in every part of Britain's then empire. At least 300,000 went to the United States, and 320,000 to Canada. Further, when emigration is considered in a more modern perspective it becomes daunting—between 1911 and 1980 fully 23% of those born in Scotland emigrated elsewhere (Pittock, 2003). It is these very emigrants, argue Bond *et al*, who have been vital to

sustaining national identity by recasting the hard Highlands in terms of tourism and environmental beauty instead of economic meagerness. The post-war generations have also been able to negate the remoteness of the region through technology, physical distances no longer the impediment they once were, and the expatriate community and their offspring have served in recent decades to alter the landscapes of Scotland's economy and nationality.

## **Chapter 5: The Origins of Nationalism and its Context in the United Kingdom.**

The origins of nationalism remain a source of considerable debate among theorists of identity, regarding both its nature and time. There are some who consider nationalism to be an outgrowth of ethnic identity and thus tied up with considerations of ethnogenesis, as Anthony Smith argues (2000). There are others who argue that nationalism is an intentional invention of elites within a society for purposes of social control, as Marxist theorist Eric Hobsbawm would have it (1992). Others, like Benedict Anderson, maintain that nationalism is a system of imagined communities, which while recent in formulation does not have the intentional machinations of the elite behind it (1991). Whether nationalism is an organic outgrowth of human identification or a recent reification (intentional or not), it remains uncontested that nationalism is a real force in contemporary politics and in the political identities of the four “home countries” of the United Kingdom, including Scotland and Wales.

A few definitions are in order to properly delimit the scope of this inquiry and to provide a usable framework. First, a state is defined as a “centralized political entity with the power to coerce,” generally set within fixed geographic boundaries. A nation is a “community of people who see themselves as ‘one people’ on the basis of common ancestry, history, society, institutions, ideology, language, and/or religion *who express sovereign aspirations*” (Haviland, 1999, pp.353-354). The italicized clause follows Anderson’s definition in part, as a definition of nationalism without sovereign reality or aspiration becomes almost indistinguishable from the concept of *ethnicity*, and thus heuristically useless (1991). A nation-state then is a state wherein the political boundary

matches ethnic identity with no significant internal outgroups (multi-national state) or significant external communities of the state's ethnicity (multi-state nation). Whether any nation-states actually exist or only appear as paradigmatic models remains debatable.

The political philosophy that eventually led to modern conceptions of nationalism—and thereby precipitated the current devolutions of Great Britain's core nations—ironically enough arose from England's own struggles with monarchical government. A brief look at the trajectory of this thinking might begin with the various Reformation movements in Europe, in particular the different iterations of the Magisterial Reformation in different parts of Europe. The English Reformation was the product of the internal political situation and the dynastic concerns of the then-monarch, King Henry VIII. Given the vagaries of that dynastic succession however, the next several monarchs would vary between Catholicism and Protestantism, the monarchs favoring those of their religious community and persecuting the other. By the time of the succession of the Catholic Stuarts, the English aristocracy was firmly Protestant and the Church of England was thoroughly established.

It was this tension between the Catholic monarchs and the Protestant country (particularly the aristocracy) that would help precipitate the Civil War of 1642-49 and the protectorate of Oliver Cromwell between 1649 and 1660, and then the Exclusion Crisis at the restoration of the Stuart dynasty. It is the latter of these events which gave rise to a relatively new strain of political philosophy that vested original sovereignty in the people of a nation and not the monarch. When the overtly Catholic James II ascended the thrones of England, Scotland, and Ireland in 1685, tension caused by his pro-Catholic policies led to the Glorious Revolution of 1688, wherein James was deposed and Parliament offered

the throne of England to William and Mary. Monarchist thinkers published tracts arguing for the absolute authority of a monarch deriving from Adam; one of the most notable of these from a few years before the crisis was *Patriarcha* by Sir Robert Filmer (1691). With the Glorious Revolution, those supporting the ouster of James II had to counter theories of divine right, and in this pursuit a Whig politician named John Locke published his *Two Treatises of Government*.

Locke's first treatise was an express refutation of Filmer's work, denying any original grant of government to Adam by God. The *Second Treatise of Government* set out an affirmative case for the origins of government in light of the refutation of the doctrine of Divine Right. Searching for the origin of government, Locke argued that people in a (hypothetical) state of nature possessed sovereignty in themselves. He further posited that when entering into the social compact of government for their mutual benefit, people ceded only certain rights that were inherently theirs. By setting up this framework, Locke was able to argue that a monarch was chosen by the community to fulfill certain duties, and that it was the people who were truly sovereign. This allowed a nation to depose a monarch (like James II) without running afoul of divine mandate. Most importantly, it argued that legitimate government was a bottom-up construction from the will of the people, and not a top-down imposition. (Locke, 1988)

England's exchange of one monarch for another and the political theories marshaled in support of the action had implications far beyond the 17<sup>th</sup> century. The next series of episodes that would have a profound impact on popular notions of sovereignty began with the American Revolution from 1775-1783.. As with the Glorious Revolution, many of the political struggles magnified by the event were actually played out in Great

Britain's Parliament between the monarchist Tories and the opposing Whigs. One of the most eloquent defenders of the American Revolution within the British Parliament was Edmund Burke, a Whig who characterized the conflict as a conservative revolution in line with anciently held principles in Britain. Some within Britain were excited by the prospects brought about by the French Revolution in 1789 and expected Burke to support that as well, but much to their disappointment he excoriated the event and those within Britain who supported it. (Burke, 2001)

Much to the dismay of those expecting him to be an ally, Burke published his seminal *Reflections on the Revolution in France* as a refutation of the founding principles of the French Revolution encompassed in the "Declaration of the Rights of Man and of Citizens." Rather than the conservative principles he saw in action in the American Revolution, Burke conceived of the French Revolution as predicated upon dangerous and unsubstantiated principles that would lead to ruin. Burke's book prompted a response from an aggravated Thomas Paine in *Rights of Man Part I* and *Rights of Man part the Second*, wherein the radical republican theorist expanded on Locke's principles of sovereignty inherent to the individual. Paine moved far beyond Locke however, jettisoning Locke's concept of limited monarchy in favor of representative government derived from the will of the people, and including the even more radical idea that a nation could oust a government and reform its constitution at will. While Paine was one of the most radical theorists of his time, many of his core ideas were not too far removed from others (for instance, Richard Price, the Welsh clergyman who was one of Burke's primary targets), and the cachet he had garnered with *Common Sense* meant that his

writings carried a weight perhaps disproportionate to the soundness of his ideas. (Paine, 1995)

While the new American Republic and its promulgation of Enlightenment ideals was watched closely in Europe, it remained a new system of government in what was considered a new part of the world. It was not until the initial successes of the French Revolution that reformers in other European countries felt any confidence that long-existing European countries might effect similar changes. The ideas of republicanism spread quickly to other countries and into what was historically considered one of Britain's "core" countries in Ireland. With the assistance of French forces, the Irish Protestant Theobald Wolfe Tone fomented a republican rebellion with his "Society of the United Irishmen". Though the Irish Rebellion of 1798 was ultimately unsuccessful and Wolfe Tone committed suicide after receiving a death sentence, the abortive events became a touchstone for revolutionary republicanism in Ireland in particular and in Great Britain in general. Moreover, the Act of Union of 1800 that formally integrated the Irish crown into the British set off a series of rebellions and uprisings that would eventually lead to the formation of the Republic of Ireland while providing inspiration for separatists in Scotland and Wales. (Moody & Martin, 1995)

Most of the 19<sup>th</sup> century is relatively quiet with regard to overt moves towards independence or devolution in any of the four "core nations" of the United Kingdom. This may have been the result of several different factors operating simultaneously. The Industrial Revolution and the expanded franchise (see Ch. 3) caused many political reverberations, with the dissolution of old political parties and the influx of so many voters. Expressions of nationalism changed with these processes to become more

political, unlike the violent rebellions and wars of the 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> centuries. The British Empire was ever-expanding, and the power it wielded on the world stage provided many with a sense of British identity stronger than in earlier eras. Moreover, the marginalized of the respective regions were more likely to emigrate in this era than before or after, reducing the numbers of those who might in other times agitate for change. It is those very émigrés, however, who would eventually be one of the strongest factors pushing for change. (Bond, McCrone, & Brown, 2003; Macdonald & Thomas, 1997; Pittock, 2003)

Devolution for Scotland was historically closely associated with similar demands in Ireland, though not also to Scotland's benefit. Irish expatriates in the U.S. began to send substantial amounts of money to Ireland in the latter half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, and there were renewed calls for home rule, if not abolition of the Act of Union 1800. The movement for home rule was taken up by popular Liberal Prime Minister William Gladstone, a populist politician who directed his message to the many newly enfranchised. He publicly stated that movements towards home rule for Ireland should be accompanied by the same for Scotland. Though Gladstone was not successful in passing such bills before his death, enough of a movement had begun that Home Rule bills for Scotland and Ireland were on their apparently successful way through Parliament in 1913 and 1914 before they were interrupted by the outbreak of World War I. (N. Davies, 1999; Moody & Martin, 1995; Pittock, 2003)

In Ireland, the Easter Rebellion of 1916 was prosecuted by nationalists who were both antagonized by the stalling of home rule, and felt that the measure didn't go far enough. Much of the population of the U.K. felt that the Irish rebels' actions were treasonous, made more-so by the fact the country was in the middle of a war. While the

IRA (with money, arms, and expertise from North America) would be successful in securing 26 of Ireland's 32 counties as a "free state" by 1921, residual feelings of betrayal by people in the U.K. led most of those pushing for home rule in other areas to distance themselves from the actions in Ireland. Home Rule was not taken up again by the British Parliament, but the issue remained alive in Scotland, and began to come to the fore in Wales. The '20s and '30s would see the establishment of political parties in both countries that still wield significant influence today. (Coogan, 2001; Moody & Martin, 1995)

The Scots National League—formed in 1921—merged with several other movements to form the National Party of Scotland in 1928. Though the party contested several elections, it never managed to win one. In 1932 the Scottish Party formed, and in 1934 the two merged to form the Scottish Nationalist Party (SNP). In Wales, Plaid Cymru formed in 1925 and contested its first election in 1929. Originally formed primarily for the support of the Welsh language, it had added self-government to its platform by the early 1930's. The Great Depression and the hardship it caused led to a resurgence of nationalist feelings in many, but both Plaid Cymru and the SNP were relatively quiet during the 30's, wishing to avoid being associated with the fascist and National Socialist parties arising elsewhere in Europe. Both parties remained marginalized through World War II, and were minimal political players for the rest of the 40's and most of the 50's. (Cooke et al., 1998; Evans, 2000)

While the SNP and Plaid Cymru were not the only parties with nationalistic leanings in their respective areas, they were the most visible and took the lead on issues important to nationalist elements of their constituencies. Both Scotland and Wales

suffered through post-war declines, and the economic hardships led some to believe that independence from Britain was in their interest. In response to plans to flood some Welsh villages to form reservoirs, Plaid Cymru's election returns reached the 5% mark in the 50's, and fears about the possible extinction of Welsh pushed its returns to 10% by 1970. In Scotland the SNP fared even better, with its numbers boosted by the discovery of oil in the North Sea in the 1970's, leading many Scots to believe that Scotland could be economically viable as an independent entity. By 1974 the SNP was polling around 30% of the Scottish electorate, and making serious inroads into Labour's support in the country. This no doubt pushed the Labour government then in power to seek referenda on devolution in Scotland and Wales, seeking to regain some of their lost support. (Cooke et al., 1998; Davidson, 2000; Evans, 2000)

## **Chapter 6: The Referenda of 1979 and 1997.**

The first modern attempt towards devolution came in 1979, a result of many factors but not least the burgeoning support for nationalist parties in both Wales and Scotland. The Kilbrandon Commission, set up under a Labour government in 1969, had finished reporting by 1973, recommending some degree of devolution for Scotland and Wales. In 1976 the Scotland and Wales Bill was introduced but could not get through Parliament, finally being withdrawn in February 1977. In November of the same year two separate bills were introduced, known as the Scotland Act 1978 and the Wales Act 1978. The separation of the bills garnered support from some MPs who had opposed the first bill on the grounds that Wales did not really want to devolve, a position vindicated by subsequent results. Though opposed by the government, a provision was inserted into the debate that stipulated that 40% of the respective region's electorate approve of the devolution referendum for it to have any effect. Failure to reach this benchmark would require the automatic repeal of the relevant act<sup>6</sup>. (Evans, 2000; Harvie, 2004; K. O. Morgan, 1998; "Scottish & Welsh Referendums 1997," 1997; D. Smith, 1980)

The two referenda were held on March 1, 1979, and the outcomes were widely divergent. As indicated in the following charts, the "yes" response in Scotland garnered a majority of the vote, while in Wales the "yes" position barely pulled 20% of those voting.

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<sup>6</sup> It is perhaps ironic that this insertion by a Labour Party "backbencher" was by a Scotsman (George Cunningham) representing an English constituency (Islington South and Finsbury). See note 7.

### 1979 referendum results

| <b>Scotland</b>   |           |         |
|---|-----------|---------|
| <i>Do you want the provisions of the Scotland Act 1978 to be put into effect?</i> |           |         |
| Yes   | 1,230,937 | (51.6%) |
| No  | 1,153,502 | (48.4%) |
| Turnout   | 63.6%     |         |
| <b>Wales</b>  |           |         |
| <i>Do you want the provisions of the Wales Act 1978 to be put into effect?</i>    |           |         |
| Yes   | 243,048   | (20.3%) |
| No  | 956,330   | (79.7%) |
| Turnout   | 58.8%     |         |

Obviously support for devolution was much greater in Scotland than in Wales. Despite the majority vote in favor of devolution in Scotland however, the threshold of 40% of the electorate established by the inserted provision was not met. This table quantifies the voting with respect to the entirety of the electorate:

### 1979 referendum results (total electorate)

| <b>Scotland</b>   |       |
|---|-------|
| <i>Do you want the provisions of the Scotland Act 1978 to be put into effect?</i> |       |
| Yes   | 32.9% |
| No  | 30.8% |
| Did not vote  | 36.4% |
| <b>Wales</b>  |       |
| <i>Do you want the provisions of the Wales Act 1978 to be put into effect?</i>    |       |
| Yes   | 11.9% |
| No  | 46.9% |
| Did not vote  | 41.2% |

The failure to attain 40% of the electorate required the Labour government to seek repeal of Scotland Act 1978, as mandated by the inserted provision. This caused the pro-devolution SNP to withdraw its support from the Labour government, and a vote of no confidence was carried by one vote against the government on March 28. This forced the government to dissolve and call new elections, which swept the Conservatives to power under Margaret Thatcher. The Conservative party was firmly arrayed against devolution,

and the Scotland Act 1978 was repealed on July 26, 1979. (Evans, 2000; Harvie, 2004; K. O. Morgan, 1998; "Scottish & Welsh Referendums 1997," 1997; D. Smith, 1980)

Many in Scotland felt betrayed by the referendum process in 1979, especially as a majority of the voters supported the proposition, and the measure only fell short because of Parliamentary maneuvering coupled with electoral apathy. The proposed Parliament for Scotland would have had severely limited powers, which has led to speculation that the limited power on offer restricted turnout (just as it would for the Welsh referendum in 1997). Nevertheless, following the result there was a widespread "Scotland said Yes!" campaign, but it was unable to make any headway with the Conservatives in power. This intransigence led to diminished support for the Conservative party in Scotland, and an increase in support for both Labour and the SNP. The issue would not be revisited while Conservatives were in power, a period that stretched eighteen years from 1979 to 1997. When Labour did finally win power again, it picked up right away the issue that had led to its last ouster from office. (Pittock, 2003; Taylor & Thomson, 1999)

"New Labour" under Tony Blair swept to power in the 1997 elections, in part due its promise to consider devolution for Scotland and Wales again. The general election that brought Labour to power was on May 1, 1997, and the referendum for Scottish devolution was held on September 11 of the same year, with the referendum for Wales held a week later on September 18. In Scotland the result was resounding, with 60% of the electorate turning out and almost three quarters voting in favor of devolution. Moreover, those polled of the electorate who did not vote in the referendum also favored devolution by more than three to one, reaffirming the proportion of the populace expressed by referendum results. Wales, conversely, turned out half of the electorate and

the outcome of the referendum was not known until the very last district reported, so slim was the “yes” vote. Perhaps more telling is that a poll of the non-voting electorate returned results indicating a two to one margin *against* devolution. It can safely be said then that a minority of those living in Wales actually favored devolution. These results are quantified in the following charts. ("Scottish & Welsh Referendums 1997," 1997; Taylor & Thomson, 1999)

#### 1997 referendum results

| <b>Scotland</b>  |           |         |
|--|-----------|---------|
| <i>(a) on principle of Scottish parliament</i>                             |           |         |
| I agree that there should be a Scottish parliament                         | 1,775,045 | (74.3%) |
| I do not agree that there should be a Scottish parliament.                 | 614,000   | (25.7%) |
| <i>(b) on tax-varying powers</i>   |           |         |
| I agree that the Scottish parliament should have tax-varying powers        | 1,512,889 | (63.5%) |
| I do not agree that the Scottish parliament should have tax-varying powers | 870,263   | (36.5%) |
| Turnout  | 60.4%     |         |
| <b>Wales</b>   |           |         |
| I agree that there should be a Welsh assembly                              | 559,419   | (50.3%) |
| I do not agree that there should be a Welsh assembly                       | 552,698   | (49.7%) |

#### Referendum preferences of non-voters in Scotland and Wales

|                | Scotland (%) | Wales (%)  |
|----------------|--------------|------------|
| Yes            | 64           | 24         |
| No             | 20           | 41         |
| Don't know     | 10           | 20         |
| Would not vote | 6            | 15         |
| <i>N</i>       | <i>172</i>   | <i>263</i> |

An argument may be advanced that the difference in turnout between Scotland and Wales is explicable due to the powers available for devolved control. The very significant power to tax was not on offer for Wales, and may have convinced some supporters of devolution that the referendum would have little effect and was therefore

not worth the effort. While this may be true, it would be still truer for the anti-devolution forces if they felt that little was at stake other than a symbolic gesture. When polled whether their vote meant something and would have a tangible effect, respondents in Wales were much more cynical about the referendum than about general elections, with more than 80% believing that a general election has at least some effect while just over half felt the referendum would have commensurate reverberations. Scottish voters' perceptions were quite different, with essentially the same proportion of voters feeling that the referendum would have at least as significant an impact as a general election. ("Scottish & Welsh Referendums 1997," 1997; Taylor & Thomson, 1999)

**How much difference the general election/referendum will make, Scotland and Wales**

| How much difference: | Scotland (%)     |            | Wales (%)        |            |
|----------------------|------------------|------------|------------------|------------|
|                      | General Election | Referendum | General Election | Referendum |
| a great deal         | 29.9             | 30.0       | 25.1             | 12.3       |
| quite a lot          | 34.9             | 35.4       | 31.6             | 22.9       |
| Some                 | 18.3             | 16.9       | 24.7             | 19.5       |
| not very much        | 11.4             | 8.0        | 13.2             | 21.8       |
| none at all          | 2.3              | 1.3        | 1.6              | 6.4        |
| don't know           | 3.2              | 8.5        | 3.8              | 17.1       |
| <i>N</i>             | 676              | 676        | 686              | 686        |

It is instructive to note that on the question of referendum almost two-thirds of Scottish respondents fell into the top two categories, feeling that the referendum was important irrespective of the individual voter's position on the questions. Welsh responses more closely resemble a traditional bell curve, with just over a third reporting in the same top two categories the Scots so favored. Moreover, the apathetic end of the Welsh response clarifies why turnout for that referendum was so low. Almost half (45%) of the respondents fell into the "not very much", "none at all", or "don't know"

categories, contrasting the less than 18% of Scottish voters who felt similarly. Pro-devolution feelings were obviously felt much more strongly in Scotland than in Wales, and the measure of support was quite possibly due to the national identity of the respondents. (Taylor & Thomson, 1999)

In addition to the referenda, people of both regions were consulted about their conceptions of identity. This self-reporting of identification by those who voted is instructive. The members of the various electorates were asked the Moreno question: “Which, if any, of the following best describes how you see yourself?” and could select from “Scottish/Welsh not British”, “More Scottish/Welsh than British”, “ Equally Scottish/Welsh and British”, “More British than Scottish/Welsh”, “British not Scottish/Welsh”, or “Other”. The table following quantifies how responses to the Moreno question correlate to the two options presented Scottish voters (the first response in the leftmost column is the parliament question and the second taxation).

**National identity and Scottish referendum vote**

|          | Scottish not<br>British<br>(%) | More Scottish<br>than British<br>(%) | Equally<br>Scottish and<br>British (%) | More British<br>than Scottish<br>(%) | British not<br>Scottish<br>(%) |
|----------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------------|--|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| Yes, yes | 80                             | 78                                   | 46                                     | 27                                   | 29                             |
| Yes, no  | 12                             | 8                                    | 10                                     | 27                                   | 7                              |
| No, no   | 7                              | 14                                   | 42                                     | 47                                   | 64                             |
| No, yes  | -                              | -                                    | 1                                      | -                                    | -                              |
| <i>N</i> | <i>157</i>                     | <i>148</i>                           | <i>139</i>                             | <i>16</i>                            | <i>17</i>                      |

There is some obvious correlation between nationality and devolution preferences, but it is not absolute. While the ability to tax was supported only by those whose Scottish identity outweighed the British, the support for a devolved parliament garnered a

majority even with those who identified as more British than Scottish.(Taylor & Thomson, 1999)

A breakdown of Welsh identity and voting correlations displays a much less enthusiastic response across all measures of identity.

**National identity and Welsh referendum vote**

|              | Welsh not<br>British (%) | More Welsh<br>than British<br>(%) | Equally Welsh<br>and British (%) | More British<br>than Welsh (%) | British not<br>Welsh (%) |
|--------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------|
| Yes          | 43                       | 43                                | 25                               | 16                             | 13                       |
| No           | 23                       | 25                                | 34                               | 37                             | 45                       |
| Did not vote | 34                       | 31                                | 41                               | 46                             | 42                       |
| <i>N</i>     | <i>113</i>               | <i>166</i>                        | <i>225</i>                       | <i>67</i>                      | <i>82</i>                |

Displayed in this way it becomes apparent that support for devolution was a minority position in Wales, with the majority of even those who denied British identification wholly either voting “no” or not considering the question worth turning out for. Also instructive is the response of those who felt equally British and Welsh in their identity, with more casting against the assembly than for, and even more not bothering to vote at all. (Taylor & Thomson, 1999)

Now that the referendum results and the voting patterns have been situated with respect to national identification there remains one further measure needed to allow full analysis, and that is the proportion of each electorate that identifies with a particular description. This first table represents the proportional responses to the Moreno question:

### Scottish and Welsh national identity

|                                    | Scotland % | Wales % |
|------------------------------------|------------|---------|
| Scottish/Welsh, not British        | 33         | 17      |
| More Scottish/Welsh than British   | 33         | 26      |
| Equally Scottish/Welsh and British | 29         | 34      |
| More British than Scottish/Welsh   | 3          | 10      |
| British, not Scottish/Welsh        | 3          | 12      |
| <i>N</i>                           | 653        | 659     |

The near bell curve response of Welsh voting patterns is replicated in personal identification with the largest category the equal division of Welsh and British components. The responses are weighted somewhat more to the Welsh end of the spectrum, but not nearly so much so as the Scottish response which identified 66% of the population as at least more Scottish than British. (Taylor & Thomson, 1999)

Another more malleable selection of identity wherein a respondent could select multiple answers and then narrow the response to that which “best” applied provides a modified response, not least because it removes the fence-sitting option of “equally X and Y”:

#### Alternative measure of Scottish and Welsh national identity (Taylor & Thomson, 1999)

|                                    | Scotland % | Wales % |
|------------------------------------|------------|---------|
| Scottish/Welsh only                | 45         | 27      |
| Scottish/Welsh more than British   | 40         | 36      |
| British more than Scottish/Welsh   | 14         | 32      |
| British only                       | 1          | 3       |
| Neither British nor Scottish/Welsh | 1          | 3       |
| <i>N</i>                           | 670        | 684     |

In this estimation it becomes clear that Wales does indeed possess some degree of ethnic identification but that a significant minority (one third) still identify more strongly with British identity than Welsh. Scotland’s national identity is strongly reinforced by these same results. (Taylor & Thomson, 1999)

The fortunes of the areas' nationalist parties since the 1997 referenda reinforce the conclusion that nationalism is a mature force in Scotland but not in Wales. After a decade in power, the Labour Party's fortunes have declined, as most parties' in power do. In Scotland this has directly benefited the SNP, which—despite some ups and downs in returns and the emergence of two other parties with nationalist platform planks (the Scottish Socialist Party and the Scottish Green Party)—secured the largest number of seats in the Scottish Parliament in May 2007 elections, displacing Labour. For the decade prior the SNP had served as the opposition party, opposing Labour as the party with the second largest representation. In Wales, Plaid Cymru has polled 10-15% in general elections and 20-29% in Assembly elections since 1997. Even those numbers are a bit misleading, as the party polled very well in the original Assembly elections in 1999 but numbers have declined since then. Currently, Plaid Cymru holds 15 of 60 seats (25%) in the Welsh Assembly, while the SNP holds 47 of 129 seats (36%) in the Scottish Parliament and runs a minority government. (*National Assembly for Wales elections: 3 May 2007, 2007; Scottish Parliament Elections: 1 May 2003, 2003; Scottish Parliament elections: 3 May 2007, 2007; Scottish Parliament Elections: 6 May 1999, 1999; Welsh Assembly Elections: 1 May 2003, 2003; Welsh Assembly Elections: 6 May 1999, 1999*)

## **Chapter 7: Wales and Scotland in a European Context**

The primary impetus for the devolution of Scotland and Wales from the United Kingdom is found in the historical circumstances of their respective integrations, but some attention must also be paid to regionalizing and globalizing forces at work in the contemporary world. Obviously international factors have always played a part in the affairs of the areas—witness the Auld Alliance—but the advent of the European Union has greatly increased the international scope of nationalist expression. It is tempting to assign a causal relationship between European integration and the successful referenda to devolve, but this chapter will illustrate that the relationship is more properly coincidental. However, it must also be acknowledged that political elites in both Scotland and Wales seek to cast their futures in a pan-European mould, and that the relatively young Executives of the Scottish Parliament and the National Assembly of Wales have established long-term plans in that context.

The precursors to the European Union (EU) were established in the '40s and '50s to facilitate international cooperation and control in vital areas of interest, but the nascent community didn't begin to impact events in the Isles until the United Kingdom's inclusion in the European Community in 1973. The 1970's were a period of vigorous activity within the Community as it consolidated its functions, defined its areas of "competencies", and began to be accessible to the citizens of its member states instead of just the governments. In 1979 the first European Parliament (EP) was elected through universal suffrage in the member states, though many in the UK and other countries doubted the body had much significance. Though turnout was low (see below), the nationalist SNP and Plaid Cymru returned respectable results in both initial and

subsequent elections, which would presage future attempts to garner public support by operating in a European context. (Dinan, 2005; Nelson & Stubb, 2003)

The ascension of the Conservative Party to power in the UK contributed to the doldrums of the European Community in the 1980's as Conservatism in general—and Margaret Thatcher in particular—was skeptical of European integration<sup>7</sup>, but the early 1990's brought reinvigorated efforts to advance the community. The Treaty on European Union (informally the Maastricht Treaty) formally created the EU in 1993, and the 1990's saw both an increased enthusiasm for the experiment and the expansion of its membership to 15 states. Though the EU has suffered setbacks since—most prominently in the failure of the European Constitution in 2005—it continues to expand both its competencies and its membership (now 27, with two more slated to join in 2008). It is in this context that the devolution referenda of 1997 occurred, and in which nationalist elements within Wales and Scotland look toward their future. (Dinan, 2005; Nelson & Stubb, 2003)

The ascendance of the EU in economic and political terms has certainly influenced attitudes towards national identity in Scotland and Wales in several ways. While many EU supporters argue that integration will eventually lead to the decline of national identities in favor of a “European identity”, there is significant evidence that the reverse is true. Instead of fostering a single pan-continental identity, the structures of the EU have allowed for economic viability in regions that were previously on the economic periphery. On a state level this has allowed countries like Ireland to experience

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<sup>7</sup> It is interesting to consider that a single Labour Party “backbencher” may have caused all of European integration to grind to a halt (see note 6). The angry withdrawal of the SNP from Labour's ruling coalition brought Conservatives to power, who generally opposed European integration.

unprecedented prosperity. On a sub-state level, it has weakened traditional arguments that areas which are ethnically distinct remain incapable of national autonomy because of the restricted economy of the region. Far from supplanting national identities, the EU has ironically allowed for fuller expression of sub-state nationalisms with realistic expectations of viability. (Guibernau, 2006; Hargreaves, 1998; Hutchinson, 2004; Kaldor, 2004; Maiz, 2003; Ozkirimli, 2003; Tonnesson, 2004)

Most of the top-level politics of the EU take place in the context of member states and their representation, a level not easily accessible to either Wales or Scotland as constituencies within the United Kingdom. Nationalists within both have therefore devoted their attention to two particular bodies that are more accessible—the European Parliament and the Committee of the Regions (CoR). The EP is the longer extant of the two bodies and the one that exercises more direct power. Though originally it was little more than a talk-shop, the introduction of codecision in the last decade has expanded its power and influence so that it is the one body where regional considerations might influence the top-most levels of EU decision making. Negative perceptions of the EP’s abilities have driven down participation in elections, but there is some evidence that this trend may be reversing in the UK at least (see table below). As one of the largest member states within the EU, the United Kingdom’s delegation has 72 seats, second only to Germany and on par with Italy and France. (*Elections to the European Parliament - June 1999*, 1999; *European Parliament elections 2004*, 2004; *European Parliament Elections - 1979 to 1994*, 1999)

In the four elections between 1979 and 1994 that used a “first-past-the-post” system, the SNP increased its proportion of the electoral vote for the EP fairly

consistently. Scotland as a region elected 8 of the UK's 81 (at the time) Members of European Parliament (MEPs)<sup>8</sup>.

**SNP performance in EP elections 1979-1994**

| Year | % of Vote | # MEPs |
|------|-----------|--------|
| 1979 | 19.4      | 1      |
| 1984 | 17.9      | 1      |
| 1989 | 25.6      | 1      |
| 1994 | 32.6      | 2      |

For the 1999 and 2004 elections the allocation was changed from first-past-the-post to the d'Hondt method of proportional representation, which also led to Scotland losing one seat overall to total 7 for the 2004 elections.

**SNP performance in EP elections 1999-2004**

| Year | % of Vote | # MEPs |
|------|-----------|--------|
| 1999 | 27.2      | 2      |
| 2004 | 19.7      | 2      |

From 1989 on the SNP has polled second only to Labour, coming within 1.5% of a plurality in 1999. The change in system has led to a decline in the SNP's electoral percentage as minor parties now poll an increasing number, but the same loss has been suffered by Labour and the Conservative Party as well, making it essentially a wash. (*Elections to the European Parliament - June 1999, 1999; European Parliament elections 2004, 2004; European Parliament Elections - 1979 to 1994, 1999*)

Plaid Cymru also increased its percentage of the electorate polled between 1979 and 1994, though very slowly at first and not in the same degree as the SNP in Scotland.

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<sup>8</sup> This number was increased to 87 for the 1994 election.

As a region, Wales elected 4 MEPs from 1979 through 1989, and then 5 from 1994-1999. With the 2004 elections, the number of MEPs for Wales was again reduced to 4.

**Plaid Cymru performance in EP elections 1979-1994**

| Year | % of Vote | # MEPs |
|------|-----------|--------|
| 1979 | 11.7      | 0      |
| 1984 | 12.2      | 0      |
| 1989 | 12.9      | 0      |
| 1994 | 17.1      | 0      |

After Welsh devolution Plaid Cymru experienced a significant initial upsurge in support, and this is reflected in the polling in European elections.

**Plaid Cymru performance in EP elections 1999-2004**

| Year | % of Vote | # MEPs |
|------|-----------|--------|
| 1999 | 29.6      | 2      |
| 2004 | 17.2      | 1      |

In 1999 Plaid Cymru surpassed the Conservative Party to take second overall, though it slipped to third behind the Conservatives once again with the 2004 elections. Still, its allotment of 2 seats in 5 (40%) and then 1 in 4 (25%) compares favorably with the SNPs of 2 in 8 (25%) and 2 in 7 (28.5%). (*Elections to the European Parliament - June 1999, 1999; European Parliament elections 2004, 2004; European Parliament Elections - 1979 to 1994, 1999*)

The United Kingdom as a whole remains relatively euro-skeptical, and an open question is how much importance the electorate places on European elections. The rest of the EU seems to be moving towards the UK's skepticism, as turnout has steadily declined

across the whole of Europe. In the 2004 elections, only Ireland, Italy, Cyprus, and Malta of 22 countries that do not have mandatory voting had a turnout above 50%<sup>9</sup>

**Electoral turnout as % of population for EU elections, EU and UK**

| Year | UK   | EU   |
|------|------|------|
| 1979 | 32.2 | 63.0 |
| 1984 | 31.8 | 61.0 |
| 1989 | 36.6 | 58.5 |
| 1994 | 36.4 | 56.8 |
| 1999 | 24.0 | 49.4 |
| 2004 | 38.9 | 45.5 |

Given these numbers it remains a valid concern whether or not the parties elected to the EP represent proportional support within their populations. It is generally thought that the negative perception of European institutions ensures that only voters dedicated to a particular cause will reliably turnout, which would of course cause nationalist parties to be disproportionately represented. Still, the almost 15% jump in UK electorate participation at the last election will be encouraging if sustained in next cycle. (*Elections to the European Parliament - June 1999, 1999; European Parliament elections 2004, 2004; European Parliament Elections - 1979 to 1994, 1999*)

Beyond the European Parliament, the other body that is the focus of nationalistic supporters in Wales and Scotland is the Committee of the Regions. The CoR was established by the Maastricht Treaty to increase participation at the local and regional level, based upon the understanding that many EU policies had their primary effects at those levels. The CoR is a consultative body only, and is consulted by the Commission on issues relating to economic and social cohesion, education and youth, culture, public

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<sup>9</sup> Belgium, Greece, and Luxembourg have mandatory voting, and turned out 90.8%, 62.8%, and 90% respectively.

health, Trans-European networks, transportation, employment, social affairs, environment, the European Social Fund, and vocational training. As with the EP, seats on this Committee are allocated by country, with each country deciding how to apportion representation. The UK, as one of the largest countries in the EU, has 24 seats on the Committee (as do France, Germany, and Italy) and 24 alternates. As of 2007, CoR representation totals 344 seats and the same number of alternates. (Dinan, 2005; Nelson & Stubb, 2003; *The Selection Process of CoR Members: Procedures in the Member States*, 2004)

The UK currently apportions representation to the CoR based upon local council office and the devolved authorities of Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland, and London. The UK's 24 seats are divided into 16 for England, 4 for Scotland, and 2 each for Wales and Northern Ireland. Each seat has a corresponding alternate, and the government in office in the UK issues final approval. Of Scotland's four seats, one is nominated by the executive, one by the Parliament, and 2 by the Convention of Scottish Local Authorities. Each of these picks a commensurate number of alternates. In Wales the Assembly makes one nomination and the Welsh Local Government Association makes the other, with each of these also picking an alternate. Given the political structure of the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly at the time of the most recent appointments (2006), the party in power picked the seated representative while the second party (in both cases the areas' respective nationalist parties) selected the alternate. In the current CoR a Labour appointee represents the Welsh National Assembly and both the Scottish Executive and Parliament. The SNP appointment is as the alternate for the Scottish Parliament (a Liberal Democrat serves as alternate for the Executive), and the Plaid Cymru representative is the

Welsh Assembly alternate. ("Local Government Association: UK Members," 2007; "The Scottish Parliament: - External Liaison," 2007; *The Selection Process of CoR Members: Procedures in the Member States*, 2004)

The appointment process utilized in the UK requires that a party control government in a devolved region for it to make the most effective appointments to the CoR. Since CoR members are selected every four years, the SNP stands a very good chance of selecting a full member on the next go around if it does not lose its minority government before the next cycle. In Wales, Plaid Cymru has joined with Labour to form a government after securing certain concessions, but it will not likely be in a position strong enough to get its candidate onto the CoR as a full member. Recent developments in government coalition in both Scotland and Wales increase the likelihood of further referenda for greater devolution before the end of the current decade, and the outcome of those referenda will undoubtedly influence how the respective parties fare in subsequent elections. ("Labour-Plaid coalition is sealed," 2007; Peev, 2007)

This is not to suggest that only nationalist parties have an interest in maximizing their respective region's role within the European and global community. Indeed, both the Scottish Executive and the National Assembly of Wales controlled by other parties have published agendas outlining their goals with respect to the EU. Though the UK's formal representation in the EU is facilitated through the United Kingdom Permanent Representation to the EU (UKRep), both the Welsh Assembly Government and the Scottish Executive maintain permanent diplomatic delegations at Brussels. In their respective interactions each seeks out regions that have similar degrees of autonomy and nationalist manifestation. Scotland works closely with Bavaria and Catalonia on many

issues, while Wales has signed Memoranda of Understanding with regions like Silesia (Poland) and Brittany (France). A different Memoranda of Understanding between the government of the UK and the devolved governments of Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland delineates how each functions in a European context:

The three Acts of Parliament dealing with devolution - the Scotland Act 1998, the Government of Wales Act 1998 and the Northern Ireland Act 1998 - define the respective functions of the UK Government and the devolved administrations in different ways. This Memorandum simply uses the terms 'devolved' and 'non-devolved'. 'Devolved' means in the Scottish context any function not reserved to the UK Government or Parliament under Schedule 5 of the Scotland Act or transferred to the Scottish Ministers under other legislation; in the Welsh context, any function transferred or conferred on the Assembly by Order or by primary legislation; and in the Northern Ireland context, any function which is not an excepted or reserved matter under Schedules 2 and 3 of the Northern Ireland Act. 'Non-devolved' means anything else. (*Memorandum of Understanding and Supplementary Agreements Between the United Kingdom Government Scottish ministers, the Cabinet of the National Assembly for Wales and the northern Ireland Executive Committee.*, 2001)

As indicated, there is a considerably different scope available to each devolved government. For Scotland, anything not expressly reserved to the Parliament at Westminster is appropriate for their consideration, while for Wales an express grant of authority by Westminster is required. (Keating, 2003; *Memorandum of Understanding and Supplementary Agreements Between the United Kingdom Government Scottish ministers, the Cabinet of the National Assembly for Wales and the northern Ireland Executive Committee.*, 2001; *Wales, A World Nation--A Strategic Framework*, 2004)

At first glance it would perhaps seem obvious that there is a correlation between increasing European unity and the different outcomes of the 1979 and 1997 referenda, but that is not necessarily the case. The 1979 referenda were held six years after the UK acceded to a European Community, and the 1997 referenda four years after the creation of the EU. Despite the incredible changes wrought on a continental scale, the outcomes of the referenda of 1997 were not very different than those of 1979. In Scotland, a greater proportion of the electorate voted for devolution, but it would have passed in 1979 was it

not for the inserted provision. In Wales, the barest majority of those who turned out in 1997 approved devolution, while the majority of the population agreed with the 1979 results that there should not be an Assembly. It might be concluded therefore that the increasing degree of European integration may have led to a slight intensification of sentiment already present, but it did not affect a substantial change in political opinion.

In sum, it would seem that the advent of the European Union had the same effect as internal factors within Scotland and Wales in their respective movements towards devolution. The economic benefits brought about by common economic policy and the free movement of goods and services bolster regions that have strong nationalistic structure and underpinning in place from before the EU, while allowing only the most tentative of steps for regions deficient in such structures. While the European Parliament and Committee of Regions perhaps offer a larger stage for voices that might otherwise not be heard, the effectiveness of those institutions is tied into both perceptions of the EU's efficacy as a whole and the political structures of its constituent nations. Nationalist movements in Scotland and Wales exemplify the adage that all politics is local, and the two countries in a European context remain very much the same as they were in the context of the United Kingdom.

## Chapter 8: Conclusion

After a review of the history of Scotland and Wales it becomes apparent that Scotland and Wales are not in similar positions concerning national aspirations, and for a great number of reasons. These include factors that stretch back two thousand years to the Roman Empire, and will not be surmounted in the brief span of a generation or two. Scotland has a long tradition of independence as a singular and unified entity, something that it is moving towards once again. Wales has no similar tradition, and its timorous movements are towards something completely new and unprecedented in its history. This is not to pass judgment on the “validity” of either of these nationalist feelings, but a rather a look at the bases for them, both real and imagined.

Wales and England have been tied at various times since the Roman occupation of Britain, and prior to its final unification was never a singular entity. The only border between the two was an artificially created one, meaning people, goods, and culture moved easily between Wales and England. At the very time that it was unified beyond the reign of a single individual it was made a holding of the English king. Soon after this was done, a half-Welsh family ascended the throne of England, emotionally tying the Welsh to the English monarchy. There could have been very little of the “us/them” conception required for a group to retain and foster a separate sense of identity—little distinction between the core and the periphery.

But there were some differences that precluded the complete integration of Wales into England. The two that were most important were the remnants of Celtic culture spared when the Anglo-Saxons did not decide to press beyond the kingdom of Mercia—though that culture is as much a modern reinvention as an ancient remembering, if not

moreso—and the distinct language saved from extinction be the needs of the Anglican Reformation. As powerful as these things have the potential to be, they are shared by a minority population in Wales, precluding them from manifesting as the strong examples of difference their practitioners might wish. Beyond these two, there are some distinct Welsh manifestations in religion that help set it apart from the rest of England, but there is really little else.

It is not surprising then that Wales was a latecomer to the description of the “core countries” of the United Kingdom, and to the first stirrings of nationalism. From the ascription of the “War of the Three Kingdoms” to the omission of any Welsh representation on the flag of the United Kingdom, Wales was never considered a member of the United Kingdom on par with Ireland, Scotland, and England. And this feeling was not limited to areas outside Wales, as the referenda of 1979 and 1997 demonstrate. That a majority of those living in Wales did not favor devolution, and that less than half the population identifies more strongly with Welshness than Britishness cannot be comforting thoughts for those who aspire to Welsh independence. Nationalists within Wales have had some success in seeking positions within EU institutions, but they will have to master the political process at home to make any significant progress in the European context.

Scotland’s manifestations of nationalism are of a different order of magnitude than Wales’. Blessed with a natural border and long extant institutions prior to its unification with England, Scotland retained a great many of the underpinnings of nationalism. With separate religious, education, and legal institutions, as well more than one distinct language/dialect, Scots did not have to look for distinction from the English.

The sense of otherness could be maintained by the economic independence that Scotland's industry provided. And while the thrones of England and Scotland were untied in the persons of a Scottish dynasty, the political machinations prior to the Stuart ascension and the differences of religion prevented the emotional feeling of union felt by many Welsh.

Scotland entered union with England as an equal, and it is likely that it will leave that union soon in with the same status. Except for a Parliamentary maneuver Scotland would have devolved almost 30 years ago instead of 10, and might have already moved to full independence and membership in the European Union. The betrayal felt by many Scots after 1979 only reinforced nationalist expressions and increased both turnout and support for the 1997 referendum. Counter to the situation in Wales, two-thirds of Scots feel at least more Scottish than British, and only 6% feel at least more British. With the returns of the May 2007 elections for the Scottish Parliament, the SNP is poised to move for another referendum—this time on full Scottish independence—before the next elections in 2011. If the SNP can hold onto its minority government for that long, it is very likely to see its legislative wishes fulfilled.

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