

ASSESSING THE BARGAINING MODEL OF WAR TERMINATION: AN
EXAMINATION OF THE PHILIPPINE-AMERICAN WAR, 1899-1902

BY

C2008
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Submitted to the graduate degree program in Political Science and the
Graduate Faculty of the University of Kansas
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master's of Arts.

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Abstract

Through a detailed case study of the Philippine-American War (1899-1902), this thesis presents a test of the bargaining model of war termination. The study begins with a review of the war termination theory literature, tracing the currently dominant bargaining model's development. Also reviewed are theoretical challenges to the bargaining model drawn from constructivism, critical theory, organization theory, domestic politics and decision-making approaches, as well as political psychology. Hypotheses derived from both the bargaining model and the alternative theoretical perspectives are tested against the empirical evidence of the case study. The findings of this study demonstrate that the bargaining model's hypotheses and underlying assumptions are called into question. Doubt cast on the bargaining model is found both in empirical disconfirmations of the model itself and in support for the model's theoretical challengers.

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Preface

The subject and purpose of this thesis have been greatly influenced by world events unfolding at the time of its writing. Primarily, at this time in the fall of 2007, the United States and its allies are facing protracted war in Iraq and Afghanistan. Many in the US and elsewhere are calling for an end to the war. Many are also asking: will the war end? Meanwhile, policymakers in the US are asking: can we win? This thesis has not been driven by the question of how the wars can be won, but rather how the current war in Iraq and Afghanistan, like past wars, may be brought to an end. International ethics scholarship has already begun to address issues of *jus post bellum* prescribing the means by which war, including those in Iraq and Afghanistan, *should be* terminated.¹ Unfortunately international relations scholarship has yet to provide clear answers regarding *how wars are* terminated and has not specifically considered war termination in the current Iraq and Afghan conflicts. My work will not directly address issues of war termination in the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Instead, this thesis looks at past wars in an effort to understand more generally how wars end.

International relations scholar Fred Iklé has noted that “every war must end.”² Thus, the question to ask is not whether a war will end but how a war will end. More specifically, the question to answer is what determines the end of a war and how belligerents may bring wars to conclusion. The purpose of my thesis is to examine the processes by which wars end in order to contribute to both the scholarly and

¹ See Brian Orend, “Justice after War,” *Ethics & International Affairs* 16.1 (2002): 43-56.

² Fred Ikle, *Every War Must End*. Rev. ed. (New York: Columbia UP, 1991).

policymaking discourse that has coalesced around this question: how do belligerents end their wars? Perhaps a better understanding of *how* belligerents end their wars will compliment the work already done by international ethicists to explain normatively how belligerents *should* end their wars.

My examination of the processes by which wars end is guided by a subset of international relations scholarship known as war termination theory. In the first chapter, I trace through past literature the development of war termination theory. In the review of the war termination literature I delineate the theory's explanations and predictions about how and when wars end. I highlight the dominant school of thought in war termination theory: the bargaining model. Then, using critiques from scholars of war termination as well as other theoretical orientations, I appraise the strengths and weaknesses of the bargaining model and assess the potential of my contribution to further the study of war termination.

The second chapter sets out the framework for my study. I describe the hypotheses to be tested, the methodology that is used, and introduce the case selected for study. The criteria for case selection are described as is the justification for the case included in this thesis. Chapter three contains a detailed case study, presenting an account of the selected war from the perspective of the bargaining model. Chapter four offers alternative perspectives on the selected war based on theoretical critiques of the bargaining model. Specifically in fourth chapter, the theoretical challenges to the bargaining model are used to test for weaknesses in the model. Chapter five

concludes the thesis with a discussion of the findings of the case study chapters and the implications of these findings for the bargaining model.

Chapter 1: War Termination Theory and Literature

War occurs “when political units abandon a nonviolent mode of interaction for a violent one” and war termination occurs “when they return to nonviolent interaction”.¹ The political units engaged in the violent interaction that is war are known as belligerents. In the war termination literature, belligerents are typically states. Scholars studying this resumption of nonviolent interaction ending war have traced as far back as Carl von Clausewitz, Coleman Phillipson, and H.A. Calahan to indicate their pedigree.² Despite the claim that war termination is a long-lived subject of study, war termination scholars generally bemoan a neglect of their subject especially when viewed in relation to the volume of study devoted to war initiation.³ Michael I. Handel appears to dissent from this view and argues that the literature on war termination “is prodigious, if not overwhelming.” However, Handel offers a qualification by explaining that war termination has often been poorly defined and thus, had been considered indistinguishable from peace studies and conflict

1 Paul Kecskemeti, “Political Rationality in Ending War.” *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 392 (1970): 105-115.

2 Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*. Trans. James J. Graham. (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Truebner & Co., 1908); Coleman Phillipson, *Termination of War and Treaties of Peace*. (London: Fisher Unwin, 1916); H.A. Calahan, *What Makes War End?* (New York: Vanguard, 1944); see also Kecskemeti, “Political Rationality in Ending War.”; Michael I. Handel, *War Termination – A Critical Survey*, (Jerusalem: Alpha Press, 1978); Sydney D. Bailey, “The United Nations and the Termination of Armed Conflict, 1946-64.” *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* 58.3 (1982): 465-475; Dan Reiter, “Exploring the Bargaining Model of War.” *Perspectives on Politics* 1.1(2003): 27-43.

3 See for example Berenice A. Carroll, “War Termination and Conflict Theory.” *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences* 392 (1970): 14-29; Wallace J. Thies, “Searching for Peace: Vietnam and the Question of How Wars End.” *Polity* 7.3(1975): 304-333; Donald Wittman, “How Wars End: a Rational Model Approach.” *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 23.4(1979): 743-763; Tansa G. Massoud, “War Termination.” *Journal of Peace Research* 33.4(1996): 491-496; H.E. Goemans, “Fighting for Survival: the Fate of Leaders and the Duration of War.” *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 44.5(2000): 555-579.

resolution.⁴ Handel also notes that war termination studies may generally be further distinguished by two approaches: broad and narrow.⁵ Broad approaches treat war as part of a long process without clear beginning or end points. The narrow approach focuses on when and why a war ends and if the specific point of at which a war is terminated can be predicted.⁶ Literature pertaining to the narrow approach will be the subject of this chapter.⁷

This chapter reviews the literature on the termination of interstate wars beginning with the 1960s as those years have been cited as the formative decade for war termination study as it is, more or less, now known.⁸ After a discussion of early works, I turn to the development of war termination theories and the growth of the currently dominant theory of war termination: the bargaining model.

War Termination in the Nuclear Age

Berenice A. Carroll has explained that in the 1960s the development of war termination research was delayed because conflict theorists and peace researchers, fearing nuclear war, were focused on avoiding wars through “deterrence and

4 Handel, *War Termination – A Critical Survey*. 9-10; see also Massoud, “War Termination.”

5 Handel, 10-15. Handel further divides the broad and narrow approaches into five groups of research. The literature considered here deals with Handel’s fifth category: international relations studies of war termination.

6 Handel, 10; see also Berenice A Carroll, “How Wars End: an Analysis of Some Current Hypotheses.” *Journal of Peace Research* 6.4(1969): 295-321; Massoud.

7 I will not treat here the subject of terminating nuclear wars because such studies form a body of literature distinct from the war termination scholarship dealt with here. See for example Herman Kahn, “Issues of Thermonuclear War Termination.” *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 392(1970): 133-172; Klaus Knorr, “Controlling Nuclear War.” *International Security* 9.4(1985): 79-98; Stephen J Cimbala and Joseph D. Douglass Jr., eds., *Ending a Nuclear War: are the Superpowers Prepared?* (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey, 1988); Stephen J. Cimbala, *Nuclear Endings: Stopping War on Time*. (New York: Praeger, 1989).

8 Carroll, “How Wars End: an Analysis of Some Current Hypotheses”; Carroll, “War Termination and Conflict Theory”; Massoud.

pacification.”⁹ However, the occurrence of limited wars involving great powers demonstrates a need for research into terminating wars that *did* occur.¹⁰ The same fears of nuclear war that led theorists to seek means of preventing war motivated theorists to devise ways in which wars could be terminated before escalating to nuclear war.¹¹ It is to these early theories that I now turn.

The studies of Lewis A. Coser and Frank L. Klingberg have been credited with helping to open the study of war termination in the 1960s.¹² Klingberg posits that certain levels of casualties in battle and losses in relation to total population would lead to war termination.¹³ However, Carroll labels his work a failure and faults Klingberg’s study, and others before it, for treating the course of war as predetermined and without strategizing or calculating by the belligerents, ending only at a certain point of losses and deprivation for the defeated belligerent.¹⁴

Coser theorizes that war is a means of measuring the relative power - and thus relative bargaining position in negotiations - of the belligerents and that certain symbolic military outcomes, such as the seizure of one belligerent’s capital city, would indicate to that belligerent that they had lost the war and must therefore accept

9 Carroll, “War Termination”; see also Thies, “Searching for Peace: Vietnam and the Question of How Wars End.”

10 Carroll, “War Termination”; see also William Fox, “The Causes of Peace and Conditions of War.” *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 392(1970): 1-13.

11 Carroll, “War Termination,” 17.

12 Lewis A. Coser, “The Termination of Conflict.” *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 5.4(1961): 347-353; Frank L. Klingberg, “Predicting the Termination of War: Battle Casualties and Population Losses.” *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 10.2(1966): 129-171; Carroll, “How Wars”; Carroll, “War Termination.”

13 Klingberg, “Predicting the Termination of War: Battle Casualties and Population Losses.”

14 Carroll, “How Wars,” 301; Carroll, “War Termination,” 19-20.

defeat.¹⁵ Carroll notes Coser's conception of war termination as part of a negotiated compromise or bargain, but criticizes Coser and scholars such as Klingberg for treating war termination as resulting in a clear "winner-loser, victory-defeat" relationship between belligerents.¹⁶

It Takes Two to Terminate

During the remainder of the 1960s, concerns over a "protracted series of 'local' wars with great power involvement" grew and scholars begin to add on to the works produced earlier in the decade.¹⁷ In 1970, "How Wars End," a special issue of the *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences*, addresses these contributions, clarifies what knowledge had been generated, and offers suggestions for future studies.

Negotiation and the Termination of War

Whereas Coser notes that, though it takes negotiation between both sides to terminate a war, the responsibility for making peace lay with the defeated side, the scholars writing for this special issue recognize that, except for situations in which one belligerent side stops fighting or surrenders unconditionally, *war termination requires an agreement by both sides to end the war.*¹⁸ Thus, war termination began to be seen as the outcome of negotiations that took place during the fighting between

15 Coser, "The Termination of Conflict."

16 Carroll, "How Wars," 306-307; see also Thies.

17 Carroll, "War Termination"; see also Fox, "The Causes of Peace and Conditions of War."

18 Coser; Fox, 5; Morton H. Halperin, "War Termination as a Problem in Civil-Military Relations." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 392(1970): 86-95; Keckemeti, 107.

belligerent sides.¹⁹ Paul Kecskemeti refines Coser's concept of war as a means to measure relative power by explicitly stating that war results from the failure of nonviolent bargaining between rational political units and that war serves to modify or clarify the "bargaining strength relationship between the parties."²⁰ Furthermore, bargaining positions are not only determined by the revelation of relative power through military outcomes but also by the belligerents' calculations of the probable costs of continued conflict as well as the calculation of "the political stake" or "the magnitude of the political gains and losses accruing to the opponents in case of an asymmetrical outcome (i.e. relative victory or defeat)."²¹ William T.R. Fox, Kecskemeti, and George H. Quester also contribute the idea that trust and perceived durability of any settlement terms are important in negotiations for war termination.²²

The Advent of the 'Rational Models'

Kecskemeti's attribution of rationality to the belligerents in a war is important.²³ However, Quester, writing for the same special issue, treats war and war termination negotiation as a Prisoners' Dilemma game, and therefore also assumes rational actors. Quester argues that wars continue because each belligerent side underestimates "the other's desire for peace." Underestimation of the other side's "desire for peace" results from misinterpretation of the settlement terms offered which, in turn can be the result of one belligerent overestimating "the clarity of their

19 Fox.

20 Kecskemeti, 106.

21 Ibid., 107-109.

22 Fox, 9-13; Kecskemeti; George H. Quester, "Wars Prolonged by Misunderstood Signals." *Annals of the American Academy of Social Science* 392(1970): 30-39.

23 Kecskemeti.

own signals” or intentionally misinterpreting offered terms for such reasons as hoping to elicit lowered demands from the opposing belligerent.²⁴

Critiques of Early ‘Rational Models’

Carroll also points to prior works based on the assumption of rationality and the Prisoners’ Dilemma. Carroll notes the arrival in the late 1960s of “gamelike” theories based on concepts such as the Prisoners’ Dilemma. She notes that these “gamelike” theories grew out of conflict theories and are thus flawed in their applicability to war termination by the assumption in the ‘games’ that both belligerents share, as their most important interest, an interest ending the war. Carroll faults the early game theories for treating conflict only as a behavior while failing to consider “what the conflict (war) is about.”²⁵ Additionally, the game theories derived from conflict theory assumed that belligerents’ war fighting capabilities were symmetrical.²⁶ Making matters worse, Carroll criticizes some early rational models for being “too static” in that the models did not adequately address communication between belligerents or the belligerents’ abilities to appraise the probabilities of future outcomes from continued battle. Carroll offers a new formula that could account for changes resulting from updated beliefs or communication between

24 Quester, “Wars Prolonged by Misunderstood Signals,” 32-36; see also Fred C. Ikle, *Every War Must End*. (New York: Columbia UP, 1991), Ch. 5.

25 Carroll “War Termination,” 21-25; see also Thies. It appears that Quester’s work might be subject to this criticism as he too assumes that both belligerents desire peace and that war termination fails to occur because each side underestimates the level of this desire in their enemy. However, Quester does note on page 36 that some wars may be fought over intractable issues, which suggests that peace may not always be an actor’s first preference.

26 Carroll, “War Termination,” 25-27.

belligerents, but notes that even improved formulae cannot completely overcome the difficulty of rational models because of difficulty in measuring variables.²⁷

Morton H. Halperin, also writing in the special issue, points out a further potential weakness in rationality based models of war termination. Halperin, writing from the perspective of the bureaucratic politics literature, argues that any agreement to terminate war between two belligerents will also rely on war termination being agreed upon within the government of each belligerent. Military interests vary among three levels in the military bureaucracy: field commanders who are likely to see success as possible if only they are given the resources required to win; senior military officers in each service (i.e. army or navy) who, being concerned with maintaining their budget and autonomy, will compete with other services; the general staff who mediate between military interests and those of civilian political leaders. Civilian leaders' interests will be concerned with domestic constraints such as public opinion and electoral success; civilian diplomats will be concerned with the effect of settlement terms on post-war diplomacy. Based on the different and often contradictory interests among intra-government organizations, war termination requires a group "strongly committed" to terminating the war.²⁸ Halperin notes that the crucial group may be the general staff due to the role they play as mediator between military and civilian interests as well as the support they are able to provide to civilian leaders advocating war termination. Realizing that the government of each

27 Carroll, "How Wars," 307-316.

28 Halperin, "War Termination as a Problem of Civil-Military Relations," 87; see also Handel; Ikle, *Every War Must End*, Ch. 4-5.

belligerent may be far from unitary casts some doubt upon theories assuming that the belligerents are capable of rational calculations and actions.²⁹

As a general appraisal of the above works, Carroll's words are again instructive. Carroll states that for any rationality based models (or theories in general) to be more than "essentially speculative," historical research is needed to provide data. As a concluding statement, Carroll describes the field of war termination theory as "new and undeveloped" and "far from providing us with sound guidance toward policies."³⁰

Growth, Refinement, and Continued Interest Arising from Limited Wars

The persistence of limited wars in the 1970s spurs continued interest in war termination.³¹ Scholars further refine rational choice models to account for expected future values as well as communication and negotiation between belligerents.³² Yet, despite the growth of war termination studies ranging from game theory to historical case studies, complaints of neglect and the failure of scholars to relate their work to that of other scholars continued.³³ During this time, concerns about the unitary rational actors assumed by rational choice models of war termination are also voiced.³⁴

29 Halperin, 87-95.

30 Carroll, "How Wars," 313-316; Carroll, "War Termination," 29.

31 Thies; Handel; Bailey, "The United Nations and the Termination of Armed Conflict, 1946-64."

32 Wittman, "How a War Ends: a Rational Model Approach."

33 Thies, 304-406; Handel, 11; Wittman, 750.

34 Handel; C.R. Mitchell and Michael Nicholson, "Rational Models and the Ending of Wars." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 27.3(1983): 495-520.

Michael I. Handel, voicing such concerns, argues the need for war termination theories to take into account the three levels of analysis present in international relations theories: the international system, domestic politics, and the role of individual leaders. Handel points out, at the international level of analysis, the dominance of rational choice models in theorists' efforts to explain belligerents' interactions and notes the reliance of those models on assumptions of unitary rational decision-making belligerents (or states).³⁵ Handel, along with C.R. Mitchell and Michael Nicholson, highlights domestic politics as a challenge to rational choice models by echoing many of Halperin's arguments about the role of competing interests within the governments of the belligerents and again emphasizes that competing interests within belligerents may delay war termination.³⁶ Handel adds that public opinion in democracies may exert pressures to shorten war while authoritarian regimes may be insulated from such pressures. Also noted is the need to understand the role of domestic stability/instability in war termination decisions.³⁷ Handel further argues that the decisions of individual leaders matter and theories assuming belligerent states to be unitary rational actors making cost/benefit

35 Handel, 28-30. In addition, and similar to others discussed above, Handel points out as challenges to rational models of war termination problems such as difficulty in finding measurements for variables and the inability of either belligerent to have "all the necessary information" for calculating relative power.

36 Handel, 38-39. Mitchell and Nicholson. As an example of non-unitary belligerent actors, Mitchell and Nicholson use the case of the Boer Wars to illustrate how allied belligerents may hold different preference orderings and thus possess different levels of willingness to settle a war on a given set of terms.

37 Handel, 22-27; Mitchell and Nicholson, "Rational Models and the Ending of Wars." Handel concludes that domestic level factors have not been studied systematically and are not ready for integration into a general theory of war termination.

calculations should be tempered with considerations of “non-rational elements” in individuals’ decision making.³⁸

In spite of doubts in rational choice models, Handel argues that such models are “indispensable” when applied to the bargaining process and that bargaining theory is, in turn, a “great help” for understanding war termination negotiations.³⁹

Contemporary with Handel’s argument, Wallace J. Thies makes an early, direct call for the use of a bargaining approach to war termination.⁴⁰ Thies argues for a bargaining approach that treats war termination as the result of decisions based on settlement terms, anticipated costs of continued fighting, current and projected battlefield situation, and beliefs about the other belligerent’s resolve.⁴¹ The work of Handel, Nicholson, Mitchell, and Thies allows one to see war as a bargaining process and to conceive of the bargaining process dynamics at each level of analysis. In addition, the open and direct advocacy of Thies and Handel for studying war termination through a bargaining approach marks a crucial point in the development of war termination theory: the advent of the bargaining model.

The Development of the Bargaining Approach to War Termination Studies

Paul R. Pillar’s *Negotiating Peace* has been recognized as the pioneering study of war termination (and war) as a bargaining process.⁴² Pillar contributes

38 Handel, 15-21. Using as examples US President Woodrow Wilson and German dictator Adolph Hitler, Handel shows both that individual leaders matter and that those individual leaders can be influenced by “non-rational elements.”

39 Handel, 38-39.

40 However, elements of suggestions for a bargaining approach can be discerned as early as Coser and Fox

41 Thies, 307-311.

42 Paul R. Pillar, *Negotiating Peace: War Termination as a Bargaining Process*. (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1983); see Branislav L. Slantchev, “How Initiators End Their Wars: the Duration of Warfare and the Terms of Peace.” *American Journal of Political*

findings and ideas which have become enshrined in the bargaining approach to war termination. First, Pillar points out that negotiations occur while the war continues, but that negotiations may be delayed until the military outcomes of battles have made the likely outcome of the war more predictable. Second, and a related point, Pillar argues that military outcomes during the war reveal private information (information not known prior to war) about each belligerent's relative capabilities to fight a war. The revelation of relative war-fighting capabilities affects the strength of each belligerent's bargaining positions in peace (war termination) negotiations. Importantly, Pillar also notes that offers to negotiate and offers of concessions may convey to the enemy side an impression of weakness. Regardless of the fact that advocacy for a bargaining approach can be found in earlier works, it appears that Pillar's research marked a watershed moment for the development of bargaining models and approaches.⁴³

Afterwards, scholars begin to focus on the settlement terms between belligerents involved in negotiated termination of war.⁴⁴ Two perspectives are offered on the origin of settlement terms.⁴⁵ One perspective treats settlement terms

Science 48.4(2004): 813-829. However, Carl von Clausewitz, Geoffrey Blainey, and others have sometimes been credited with conceptualizing war as a bargaining process. See for example R.H. Wagner, "Bargaining and War." *American Journal of Political Science* 44.3(2000): 469-484; Dan Reiter, "Exploring the Bargaining Model of War." *Perspectives on Politics* 1.1(2003): 27-43. It should also be noted that Fox and Kecskemeti, and even Coser, offered some ideas similar to those for which Pillar is given so much credit. This failure to effectively link war termination scholarship and build upon earlier works conjures up Handel's complaints that war termination scholars have failed to connect their works to those of others.

43 Pillar, *Negotiating Peace: War Termination as a Bargaining Process*, Ch. 2-4.

44 Massoud 1996; Suzanne Werner, "Negotiating the Terms of Settlement: War Aims and Bargaining Leverage." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42.3(1998): 321-343. Werner on page 322 defines settlement terms as the "explicit and implicit agreements that arise or exist as consequence of the war's ending."

45 Werner, "Negotiating the Terms of Settlement: War Aims and Bargaining Leverage," 322.

simply as the original war aims of the belligerents, in other words, settlement terms are “exogenous to the conflict.”⁴⁶ Exogenous settlement terms appear to be characteristic of early rational models of war termination.⁴⁷ The other perspective - and the perspective adopted by bargaining approaches - holds that settlement terms are formed during war termination negotiations and, thus “endogenous” to the conflict.⁴⁸ In sum, “original aims and the bargaining leverage of the belligerents” affect each other as negotiations for war termination progress to produce the final settlement terms.⁴⁹

The bargaining leverage or “the ability to demand more favorable terms,” which bargaining approaches purport to shape the settlement terms between belligerent sides derives from multiple sources which can generally be thought of in two categories: military capabilities and resolve.⁵⁰ First, military capabilities are the ability to impose costs on the enemy and serve as a source of bargaining leverage.⁵¹ Battles fought between the belligerents serve the purpose of revealing the relative military capabilities of each side and clarify each belligerent’s ability to impose costs on the other.⁵²

46 Werner, 322; Slantchev “How Initiators End Their Wars: The Duration of Warfare and the Terms of Peace,” 813.

47 See for example Carroll, “How Wars.”

48 Werner, 322; see also Slantchev, “How Initiators.”

49 Werner, 322; see also Slantchev, “How Initiators.”

50 Werner, 328; see also Wagner, “Bargaining and War”; H.E. Goemans, “War and Punishment”: the Causes of War Termination and the First World War. (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2000); Darren Filson and Suzanne Werner, “A Bargaining Model of War and Peace: Anticipating the Onset, Duration, and Outcome of War.” *American Journal of Political Science* 46.4(2002): 819-837; Reiter; Slantchev, “How Initiators.”

51 Werner; Wagner; Reiter; Slantchev, “How Initiators.”

52 Wagner; Filson and Werner, “A Bargaining Model of War and Peace: Anticipating the Onset, Duration, and Outcome of War”; Reiter, “Exploring the Bargaining Model of War”; Slantchev, “How Initiators.”

The second source of bargaining leverage is resolve, defined as the preference of one belligerent for continued war over the terms of settlement offered by the other belligerent.⁵³ Branislav Slantchev posits that resolve may be an artifact of a belligerent's belief, based on observable capabilities, that there is parity between itself and its opponent (or that it at least possesses the forces necessary to justify its proposed settlement terms).⁵⁴ However, resolve may also be influenced by factors other than a belligerent's beliefs about its military capabilities relative to those of its adversary.

Several scholars note that resolve may reflect the stakes for which a belligerent goes to war. Stakes may be defined as "the magnitude of the political gains and losses accruing to the opponents in case of an asymmetrical outcome (i.e. relative victory or defeat)."⁵⁵ In some cases, a belligerent may be at war over an issue of little saliency such as an isolated punitive war against a weaker belligerent. Other wars may involve both belligerent sides fighting "over territory or state integrity" and may therefore be more salient to the belligerents. Still other wars may involve a belligerent whose "national existence is at stake." According to this line of thought, the belligerent for whom the issue of the war is of lower salience has less at stake in the war. The less is at stake, the lower is the payoff of victory and thus, greater are the incentives for the belligerent to end the war early. As a result, the belligerent may

53 Wagner; Filson and Werner, "A Bargaining Model."

54 Filson and Werner "A Bargaining"; Slantchev, "The Principle"; "How Initiators". It is important to note that the term "belief" in bargaining model theory is treated as a rational calculation or assessment based on available information. Thus, the term "belief" is distinct from the term "belief" or "perception" as used in other approaches such as cognitive psychology.

55 Paul Kecskemeti, "Political Rationality in Ending War." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 392(1970): 105-115.

be willing to accept less favorable settlement terms in order to end the war. On the other hand, the more salient the issue to a belligerent, the higher is the payoff of victory and the lower the incentives to end the war soon. Thus, when the issue is more salient to a belligerent and the stakes of the war are higher, a belligerent will have a higher level of resolve and “fight longer, even under worse circumstances.”⁵⁶

Resolve can be influenced by domestic political issues.⁵⁷ The government and leaders of a belligerent state may be eager or hesitant to terminate a war depending on the opinion of the leadership’s constituency.⁵⁸ Public opinion has been identified by numerous scholars as an important factor for democratic belligerents. Democratic belligerents are more sensitive to the costs of war because their publics tend to be less tolerant of battlefield losses (i.e. body counts and expended funds). A well known example is the body-bag hypothesis which suggests that public opinion will turn against wars as the belligerent’s casualty counts increase.⁵⁹ Due to cost sensitivity, democratic belligerents are claimed *ceteris paribus* to have weaker resolve than non-democratic belligerents. Furthermore, the efforts of democratic

56 Keckskemeti, 109; Andrew Mack, “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict.” *World Politics* 27.2(1975): 175-200; Slantchev, “How Initiators,” 817. Notably, Keckskemeti points out that the stakes of a war may fluctuate during the course of the conflict but bargaining model theorists have thus far not included stake fluctuation in their models of war termination.

57 Werner; H.E. Goemans, “Fighting for Survival: the Fate of Leaders and the Duration of War.” *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 44.5(2000): 555-579; H.E. Goemans, “War and Punishment”: the Causes of War Termination and the First World War; Wagner; Reiter; Darren Filson and Suzanne Werner, “Bargaining and Fighting: The Impact of Regime Type on War Onset, Duration, and Outcomes.” *American Journal of Political Science* 48.2(2004): 296-313; Bahar Leventoğlu and Branislav Slantchev, “The Armed Peace: A Punctuated Equilibrium Theory of War.” *American Journal of Political Science* 51.4(2007): 755-771.

58 Werner; Reiter; Darren Filson and Suzanne Werner, “Bargaining and Fighting: The Impact of Regime Type on War Onset, Duration, and Outcomes;” Bahar Leventoğlu and Branislav Slantchev, “The Armed Peace: A Punctuated Equilibrium Theory of War.”

59 See for example John E. Mueller, *War, Presidents, and Public Opinion*. (New York: Wiley, 1973).

belligerents to exhibit resolve may be less credible compared to the effort non-democratic belligerents. In sum, sensitivity to the costs of war and the tendency toward weaker resolve are suggested to lead democratic belligerents to avoid prolonging war by accepting less favorable terms of settlement.⁶⁰

A belligerent's regime type may also influence leaders' negotiations for war termination by affecting the costs of settlement faced directly by the leaders.⁶¹ For example, H.E. Goemans argues that leaders negotiating the end of a war consider the potential loss of power as well as other penalties such as exile or death that may result. As a more specific instance, leaders of regimes which exclude much of the populace from access to the policy process and use moderate repression are more likely to experience severe penalties from even minor defeat in war and therefore, *ceteris paribus* will prolong a losing war and "gamble for resurrection" rather than end a war on moderately unfavorable terms of settlement.⁶² Thus, a belligerent state led by a ruler fearing harsh penalties from losing a war may exhibit a high level of resolve. Having discussed settlement terms and the means by which belligerents' original war aims are affected by the bargaining leverage each belligerent side brings to the negotiating table, it is now necessary to explain the bargaining model within which war aims, bargaining leverage, and original aims interact.

60 Andrew Mack, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict."; Goemans, "Fighting for Survival: the Fate of Leaders and the Duration of War"; Goemans, "War and Punishment"; Ivan Arreguin-Toft, "How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict." *International Security* 26.1(2001): 93-128; Filson and Werner, "A Bargaining"; Reiter; Filson and Werner "Bargaining and Fighting."; Leventoglu and Slantchev, 769.

61 Goemans, "Fighting for Survival: the Fate of Leaders and the Duration of War"; Goemans, "War and Punishment"; Filson and Werner, "Bargaining and Fighting"; Reiter.

62 Goemans, "War and Punishment,"; Goemans, "Fighting for Survival," 577.

Bargaining approaches characteristic of recent studies have relied on formal, mathematical modeling.⁶³ However, generalizing the essence of the bargaining model can be accomplished in non-formal terms. According to the bargaining model of war termination, war begins when states turn to warfare to reach settlement of an issue or issues under dispute.⁶⁴ At the onset of war each belligerent possesses information about its opponent and also possesses information about its own military capabilities and resolve that is unknown (or private) to the other belligerent.⁶⁵ This private information about relative military capabilities and resolve is revealed over the course of the war through both battle and negotiation outcomes.⁶⁶

Negotiations reveal the relative resolve of the belligerents and may also reveal the relative strength of the belligerents.⁶⁷ For instance, one belligerent's rejection of the settlement terms offered by the other may indicate a strong resolve of the rejecting side.⁶⁸ Darren Filson and Suzanne Werner point out that a rejection of settlement terms by one belligerent may also indicate to the other belligerent that their opponent has strong military capabilities with which to compliment their strong resolve.⁶⁹ However, Slantchev argues that negotiations are subject to strategic behavior and thus, "highly manipulable." According to Slantchev's argument, belligerent A may

63 Werner; Wagner; Filson and Werner "A Bargaining"; Reiter 2003; Slantchev, "How Initiators."

64 Reiter.

65 Goemans, "Fighting for Survival"; Goemans, "War and Punishment"; Wagner 2000; Filson and Werner, "A Bargaining"; Reiter; Slantchev, "How Initiators."

66 Goemans, "Fighting for Survival"; Goemans, "War and Punishment"; Wagner 2000; Filson and Werner, "A Bargaining"; Reiter; Branislav Slantchev, "The Principle of Convergence in Wartime Negotiations." *American Political Science Review* 97.4(2003): 621-632; Slantchev, "How Initiators End Their Wars."

67 Filson and Werner "A Bargaining"; Branislav Slantchev, "The Principle of Convergence in Wartime Negotiations."

68 Ibid.

69 Filson and Werner, "A Bargaining."

reject terms offered by belligerent B or deliberately offer unacceptable terms to belligerent B in order to signal strong military capabilities, whether or not the strength signaled by belligerent A is reflected in actual military capabilities. However, because the “fog of war” makes battle information “noisy” Slantchev claims that negotiations remain an important source of information.⁷⁰

Battle between belligerent sides reveals the true balance of military capabilities through victory, defeat, or stalemate between the opposing sides.⁷¹ In contrast to the high manipulability of negotiation, information from battle is non-manipulable (though battlefield information may be garbled by the “fog of war”).⁷² In other words, belligerent A may manipulate belligerent B’s beliefs about belligerent A’s capabilities by rejecting settlement terms offered by belligerent B. However, if belligerent A loses a series of battles to belligerent B, then belligerent A cannot manipulate the information obtained by belligerent B about belligerent A’s military capabilities. Slantchev states that absolute loss (i.e. casualties, destroyed materiel, *etc.*) levels may not be an accurate indicator of battlefield success or failure. Instead, belligerents will base their assessment of battle outcomes on their rate of loss relative to that of the opposing belligerent.⁷³ In other words, belligerents will not simply look at their own ‘butcher’s bill’ in judging battle outcomes, but will also compare their own losses to those inflicted on their adversary. Importantly, a belligerent with

70 Slantchev, “The Principle,” 624, 627, 628.

71 Goemans, “Fighting for Survival”; Goemans, “War and Punishment”; Wagner 2000; Filson and Werner, “A Bargaining”; Reiter; Slantchev, “How Initiators.”

72 Slantchev, “The Principle,” 624; Slantchev, “How Initiators,” 817.

73 Slantchev, “How Initiators,” 817.

greater reserves (than its adversary) may be slower to utilize battlefield information to update its beliefs about the military capabilities of its opponent. However, relative loss rates are argued to have significantly more weight in belligerents' calculations than relative reserve levels.⁷⁴

It is important to note that while information derived from battle outcomes is non-manipulable, belligerents can manipulate their military capabilities during the course of a war. A belligerent may adopt innovations such as new military technology or altered military strategies. Such innovations may make a belligerent's military capabilities stronger than they were at the outset of the war.⁷⁵ For example, Ivan Arreguin-Toft argues that adopting a strategy of guerrilla warfare (i.e. hit and run ambushes) allows a weaker belligerent to enhance its limited military capabilities and extract more favorable settlement terms from a much stronger belligerent using conventional warfare strategies (i.e. taking, holding, and fortifying territory). However, if the stronger belligerent adapts to the guerrilla warfare strategies of the weaker belligerent by adopting a strategy of "barbarism" (i.e. using forced concentration of the population, torture, or summary execution), then the stronger belligerent can minimize the effectiveness of guerrilla warfare and impose harsher terms on the weaker belligerent.⁷⁶ In short, battle between belligerents reveals non-

74 Ibid., 817, 824.

75 Reiter, 34-35; Slantchev, "The Principle," 629.

76 Ivan Arreguin-Toft, "How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict.," see esp. 101, 102. According to Arreguin-Toft, 101, 102, "[b]arbarism is the systematic violation of the laws of war in the pursuit of a military or political objective." Arreguin-Toft further explains that "this definition includes the use of prohibited weapons such as chemical and biological agents, [but that] its most important element is depredations against noncombatants (viz. rape, murder, and torture)."

manipulable information about their relative capabilities but, over the course of the war, belligerents may manipulate the strategies they employ on the battlefield in ways that increase their capabilities.

According to bargaining model theorists, the information revealed during negotiations and battle (even considering the effects of reserves on belief updating and the possibilities for innovation) is more accurate than information held prior to the onset of war and negotiations.⁷⁷ Information revealed during fighting and negotiation reduces the uncertainty belligerents have regarding one another's relative capabilities and resolve.⁷⁸ Reduced uncertainty allows the belligerent sides to effectively and accurately update their beliefs about the other's relative capabilities and resolve.⁷⁹ Uncertainty is continually reduced over the course of the war and the war will be terminated when belligerents' updated beliefs about relative power and resolve "converge sufficiently" for mutually acceptable terms to be made.⁸⁰ An important aspect of the bargaining model's propositions is that the belligerents' beliefs do not have to converge on which belligerent will win. Instead, belligerents' beliefs must only converge in terms of "their expectations about what each is prepared to concede" based on "the relative likelihood of various outcomes" resulting

Such depredations, which can also include strategic bombing of non-military targets and "reprisals against noncombatants" are intended "to destroy an adversary's will and capacity to fight."

77 Goemans, "Fighting for Survival"; Goemans, "War and Punishment"; Wagner 2000; Filson and Werner, "A Bargaining"; Reiter; Slantchev, "The Principle"; Slantchev, "How Initiators, see especially 817."

78 Ibid.

79 Ibid.

80 Filson and Werner, "A Bargaining," 832; Slantchev, "The Principle"; Slantchev, "How Initiators," 815; see also Goemans, "Fighting for Survival"; Goemans, "War and Punishment"; Wagner; Reiter.

from continued fighting.⁸¹ In sum, acceptable settlement terms are the condition necessary for war termination and those settlement terms reflect the revealed relative balance of power and resolve between the belligerent sides.⁸²

Conclusion: Confidence and Caution for the Future of the Bargaining Approach

New Cause for Confidence

Supporters of “endogenous war termination theory,” or the bargaining model approach, have claimed that it “is a worthwhile research agenda that deserves further scrutiny.”⁸³ Indeed, the bargaining model is currently the dominant approach to theories of war termination. The bargaining model also appears to have claims to merit other than its recent dominance. Unlike the rational models Carroll criticized, the bargaining model includes communication between belligerents and the ability for belligerents’ assessments of future prospects to be updated during the war.⁸⁴

Bargaining model proponents have also taken strides to incorporate some domestic level influences into their theories.⁸⁵ Additionally, by translating domestic level influences into costs for the leaders and decision-makers in the war and negotiations, bargaining model theorists have worked to meet Handel’s call for integration of the domestic and individual levels of analyses into war termination theories.⁸⁶

Furthermore, proponents of the bargaining model have overcome the problem of

81 Slantchev, “The Principle,” 621-622.

82 Filson and Werner, “A Bargaining”; see also Goemans “Fighting for Survival”; Goemans, “War and Punishment”; Wagner; Reiter; Slantchev, “The Principle;” Slantchev, “How Initiators.”

83 Slantchev, “How Initiators,” 823.

84 See Carroll “How Wars.”

85 See for example Werner; Goemans, “Fighting for Survival”; Goemans, “War and Punishment”.

86 Handel, 15-39.

assuming that a terminated war must result in a ‘winner’ and a ‘loser’ by illustrating that settlement terms represent a convergence of beliefs between belligerent sides about relative capabilities and expected outcomes of continued warfare.⁸⁷ Lastly, Slantchev has argued that the bargaining model has “progressed sufficiently to generate testable hypotheses” and thus has moved the field beyond Carroll’s appraisal that war termination theory was “essentially speculative.”⁸⁸

Major Critiques and Hermeneutic Challenges

Despite the strengths of the bargaining approach to war termination theory, weaknesses and challenges still persist. While supporters of the bargaining model have worked to incorporate domestic and individual level variables, Dan Reiter argues that in addition to a need to further address domestic political influences, challenges to the bargaining approach are posed by constructivist approaches, cognitive-psychological theory, and organization theory.⁸⁹ These challenges question the core assumptions of the bargaining model and its predictions about the mechanisms by which wars are terminated. If correct, domestic politics approaches, constructivism, cognitive-psychological theory, and organization theory may undermine the theoretical foundations of the bargaining model.

Challenges from Constructivism and Critical Theory

87 See Carroll, “How Wars”; Thies; Filson and Werner “A Bargaining Model of War and Peace;” Slantchev, “The Principle;” Slantchev, “How Initiators.”

88 Carroll, “How Wars,” 327; Slantchev, “How Initiators,” 813-816. Another benefit of recent work is that scholars have begun to relate their work to that of other scholars studying war termination.

89 Reiter; see also Wagner.

Constructivist approaches and critical theory offer perspectives that challenge the rationalist underpinnings of the bargaining model. Reiter points out that constructivism, which emphasizes the role of “intersubjective social factors in determining critical phenomena such as identity and interests, claims that war is best understood as a social convention determined and shaped by norms and culture, not as a rationalist choice reflecting costs and benefits.”⁹⁰ Similarly, Friedrich Kratochwil warns against “mistaking capabilities for power” and argues that power is not a possession independent of the social context in which it is wielded. Hence, Kratochwil doubts the use of rationalist techniques such as using “marginal utility calculations derived from body counts” to predict a war’s outcome.⁹¹ In line with Kratochwil’s doubts about the usefulness of applying rationalist assumptions to war termination studies, the constructivist approach suggests that what a belligerent believes to be acceptable settlement terms will not just be based upon calculations of the probable outcomes of continued battle. Instead, what terms are perceived to be acceptable may be shaped by “the practice of violence” which may lead belligerents to demand harsher settlement terms from an enemy perceived to be “an intractably hostile barbarian.”⁹²

However, “the practice of violence” over the course of a war may not be necessary for a belligerent to perceive its opponent as “an intractably hostile

90 Reiter, 36.

91 Friedrich Kratochwil, “Looking back from somewhere: reflections on what remains ‘critical’ in critical theory,” *Review of International Studies* 33(2007): 25-45, see 29. Kratochwil also points out that Clausewitz – the scholar often cited as the progenitor of the idea of war-as-bargaining – himself warned about applying generalizations and theory-oriented approaches to the study (and likely, the practice) of war.

92 Reiter, 36.

barbarian.”⁹³ David Campbell argues that in order to justify the existence of states and hence state governments, the governments of states foster national identities in terms of a self-other conception.⁹⁴ The identity of a national ‘self’ is dependent on treating foreign ‘others’ as inherently threatening. Campbell notes that this is done by casting the self identity of a nation as “healthy” and “civilized” while portraying a foreign other as “sick” or a barbarian standing “in opposition to the ‘civilized’ self.” In Campbell’s argument, the “conduct of war” is shaped by the dichotomies of self-other, health-disease, civilization-barbarism. The dichotomous conceptions of identity remove gray areas around the meaning of a foreign other’s threatening actions and likewise any doubts that war is the appropriate response. Thus, war may serve the purpose of generating the self identity of a belligerent through conflict with a belligerent other and continued war may have some intrinsic value as a force to further reify self identity.⁹⁵ During wars, belligerent states’ leaders may mobilize domestic support for continued war by emphasizing dichotomous identities of self and other.

Critiques from Psychological Theory

93 Ibid.

94 David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*. Rev. ed. (Minneapolis: Minnesota UP, 1998), Introduction, Ch. 4, 3, 9, 11, 75-88; Reiter, 36; see also Iver B. Neumann, “Identity and Security,” *Journal of Peace Research* 29.2(1992): 221-226.

95 David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*, Introduction, Ch. 4, 3, 9, 11, 75-88; Reiter, 36. Campbell’s usage of “barbarian” and “barbarism” is distinct from the meaning of “barbarism” in Arreguin-Toft’s “How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict.” For Arreguin-Toft, p. 101, 102, barbarism refers to a belligerent’s actions in war that violate “the laws of war.” In contrast to Arreguin-Toft’s definition of barbarism as an action, for Campbell, barbarism refers to a belligerent’s status or identity - from the perspective of an opposing belligerent - as a barbarian irrespective of its actions in a war.

Psychological theory offers a critique of the bargaining model that shares some commonalities with the critique from critical theory and the constructivist approach. However, important differences exist between constructivism/critical theory and psychological theory in both assumptions regarding underlying mechanisms and explanations of political behavior. Constructivism and critical theory emphasize “intersubjective social factors” such as culture and norms and therefore focuses on the groups of actors among which intersubjective understandings are formed and shared.⁹⁶ Psychological theory (especially cognitive psychology), on the other hand, focuses more on the mental processes and biases of individual actors and decision-makers.⁹⁷ According to psychological approaches to international relations and particularly foreign policy analysis, the mental processes and cognitive biases of policymakers lead to decisions and behaviors that are not well explained by rational choice theory (upon which the bargaining model of war termination is built).⁹⁸

Cognitive-psychological approaches to foreign policy analysis generally assume that individuals are “more receptive to information that is consistent with

96 Reiter, 36.

97 Jack S. Levy, “Political Psychology and Foreign Policy.” in David O. Sears, Leonie Huddy, and Robert Jervis, eds. *Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology*. (New York: Oxford UP, 2003), 253-84. However, Levy also points out that psychological approaches to the study of international relations can also address psychological factors at the group, organization, and societal levels.

98 Jack S. Levy, “Misperception and the Causes of War: Theoretical Linkages and Analytical Problems,” *World Politics* 36.1(1983): 76-99. Jack S. Levy, “Political Psychology and Foreign Policy.” Jack S. Levy, “Loss Aversion, Framing Effects, and International Conflict: Perspectives from Prospect Theory.” in Manus I. Midlarsky, ed. *Handbook of War Studies II*. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000), 193-221.

their prior beliefs than to information that runs counter to those beliefs.”⁹⁹

Furthermore, beliefs may not quickly converge with new information, because individuals stop searching for information once they have sufficient knowledge to support prior beliefs. Additionally, individuals’ beliefs are resistant to change even in the face of disconfirming evidence.¹⁰⁰ Therefore, cognitive-psychology challenges the bargaining model assumption that belligerents’ beliefs converge with new information received during war.¹⁰¹ In turn, cognitive-psychology offers explanations and predictions about war termination running counter to those of the bargaining model.

Cognitive biases are argued to cause decision-makers to suffer misperceptions. The class of cognitive biases known as attribution errors will be discussed first, followed by a description of other cognitive biases. Among attribution errors, dispositional, fundamental, and situational attributions are claimed to be particularly important in international conflict.¹⁰² In the case of dispositional attribution errors, decision-makers perceive that an opposing belligerent’s disposition is inherently aggressive or hostile. Similarly, fundamental attribution errors lead decision-makers to “interpret others’ undesirable behavior in terms of dispositional

99 Levy, “Political Psychology,” 264.

100 Ibid., 264-265.

101 See Reiter, 34.

102 Levy, “Political Psychology,” 264-265; see also Jack Snyder. *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition*. (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1991), Ch. 2. In “Misperception and the Causes of War,” Jack Levy (p. 79) defines misperceptions as “a discrepancy between the psychological environment of the decision makers and the operational environment of the ‘real’ world.”

factors, as opposed to environmental constraints.”¹⁰³ Scholars applying cognitive-psychology to foreign policy claim that in international conflict, dispositional and fundamental attribution errors may be compounded by situational attribution errors. On one hand, a belligerent’s decision-makers will likely perceive that their own refusal to concede to an adversary’s settlement terms is due to external circumstances.¹⁰⁴ For example, decision-makers may argue that they cannot concede because the concessions would diminish their long term security. On the other hand, if belligerent A’s opponent behaves in a conciliatory manner, belligerent A’s decision-makers will likely perceive the opponent’s conciliation to be a result of belligerent A’s resolve rather than a change in the adversary’s disposition.¹⁰⁵

According to cognitive-psychological approaches to foreign policy analysis, the above attribution errors “can lead to missed opportunities for conflict resolution.”¹⁰⁶ In terms of the bargaining model, attribution errors question the model’s assumption that negotiations are an important source of information. Instead, an opponent’s intransigence over settlement terms will likely be perceived as a reflection of hostility rather than military strength. Furthermore, belligerent A’s decision-makers are likely to overestimate the extent to which belligerent B’s concessions reflect belligerent B’s recognition of belligerent A’s superior military capabilities or resolve. In short, cognitive-psychological theory suggests attribution

103 Jack Snyder, *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition*, 29; Levy, “Political Psychology,” 264-266.

104 Snyder, 29; Levy, “Political Psychology,” 264-266.

105 *Ibid.*

106 Levy, “Political Psychology,” 264-266

errors will render negotiations unlikely as an accurate or important source of information for belligerents.

In addition to attribution errors, scholars applying cognitive-psychological theory to studies of foreign policy claim that other forms of biases lead to misperceptions by decision-makers.¹⁰⁷ Importantly, decision-makers faced with complex and uncertain situations may draw upon past events and historical analogies as simplifying heuristics to aid in the formation of current decisions. Unfortunately for decision-makers, such “lessons of the past” are often misleading and result in inappropriate decisions.¹⁰⁸ For example, Yuen Foong Khong argues that policymakers may inaccurately use previous wars as analogies from which to draw strategies in an ongoing war. Once policymakers have viewed an ongoing conflict through the lens of analogies drawn from other wars, their perception of the present war may be resistant to change even in light of disconfirming evidence. One consequence may be that policymakers continue to fight a war and do so using strategies that may be ineffective despite information that suggests a different course of action (i.e. changing strategies or agreeing to settlement terms).¹⁰⁹

Another important bias found in political psychology is the “wishful thinking” bias. When actors suffer from the wishful thinking bias “desirable outcomes are seen

107 Reiter, 33-34.

108 Levy, “Political Psychology,” 267; see also Halperin, 89.

109 Yuen Foong Khong, “Seduction by Analogy in Vietnam: the Malaya and Korean Analogies.” In Kenneth W. Thompson, ed. *Institutions and Leadership: Prospects for the Future*. (New York: University Press of America, 1987), 65-77; Yuen Foong Khong, *Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965*. (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1992).

as more likely to occur while undesirable outcomes are seen as less likely.”¹¹⁰ In particular, Jack Levy argues that there is a “tendency for military organizations ‘to see the necessary as possible’ despite objective circumstances.”¹¹¹ In the wishful thinking bias the utility of a potential outcome affects perceptions about the probability of the possible outcome.

The interaction of utilities and estimated probabilities challenges the rationalist under-girding of the bargaining model by violating the assumption that decision-makers rationally estimate probabilities separately from calculations of expected utility.¹¹² Moreover, wishful thinking may lead a belligerent’s decision-makers and/or military organizations to push for continued fighting even when military success is (perhaps highly) improbable. Therefore, a militarily unsuccessful belligerent may persist in war until the point at which objective information from the battlefield forces decision-makers and military leaders to alter their beliefs and accept that their military situation cannot be reversed. Levy suggests that such strong and overwhelming evidence as near complete military collapse can lead individuals to update deeply held beliefs and biases. However, he states that “a major change in personnel or regime” may be necessary in order for changed beliefs to enter into the decision-making apparatus of a belligerent.¹¹³ This prediction counters the

110 Levy, “Political Psychology,” 268, 269.

111 Ibid., 268.

112 Ibid.

113 Ibid., 265, 266.

bargaining model prediction that belligerents will cease fighting and agree to settlement terms before there is agreement on which belligerent will win.¹¹⁴

In addition to misperception caused by biases, psychology also offers prospect theory as an alternative “behavioral decision” theory to rational choice.¹¹⁵ The basic assumption of prospect theory is that individuals establish a status quo reference point in regards to “assets” and frame problems they face in terms of deviations from that reference point. Deviations can take the form of losses or gains. According to prospect theory individuals “overvalue losses relative to comparable gains.” In other words, people are more concerned about losses than gains.¹¹⁶ Consequently, actors will be “risk-acceptant” in avoidance of losses and “risk-averse” in pursuit of gains. As a related point, decision-makers will exhibit “concession aversion” by resisting concessions resulting in loss more than concessions resulting in diminished gains. Additionally, actors will be “risk-seeking” in attempts to reverse losses that have been inflicted.¹¹⁷ A final and important point is prospect theory’s proposition that, after achieving gains, actors quickly renormalize on a new status quo that incorporates those gains. If the gains are subsequently lost, the actor will perceive the loss not as a diminution of its gains but rather as an absolute loss.¹¹⁸

Four major implications for war termination may be drawn from the assumptions of prospect theory. First, decision-makers of belligerents facing losses

114 Slantchev, “The Principle,” 621-623.

115 Levy, “Loss Aversion, Framing Effects, and International Conflict: Perspectives from Prospect Theory,” 194.

116 Levy, “Loss Aversion,” 194; Levy, “Political Psychology,” 268, 269.

117 Levy, “Loss Aversion,” 197-210; Levy, “Political Psychology,” 268, 269.

118 Levy, “Loss Aversion,” 197.

are expected to be more risk-acceptant and resolute while decision-makers of belligerents fighting for gains are expected to be risk-averse and less resolute. Second, decision-makers of belligerents who have suffered losses (such as lost territory) will gamble to recover what was lost. Third, decision-makers will view the costs of war (i.e. casualties) as “sunk costs,” or “certain loss(es) in the absence of further action.” Sunk costs will pressure decision-makers to persist in war.¹¹⁹ Lastly, for a belligerent, a loss of recent gains will be perceived by a belligerent’s decision-makers as an absolute loss.¹²⁰ These assumptions and implications stand in contrast to the rationalist-based bargaining model. In sum, psychological theory poses numerous challenges to the rationalist-based assumptions, explanations, and predictions of the bargaining model of war termination.

Domestic Politics and Organization Theory: Opening the ‘Black Boxed’ Belligerent

The above discussion of constructivism/critical theory and psychological theory serves primarily to challenge the rationalist foundations of the bargaining model. However, the unitary actor assumption of the bargaining model must also be directly addressed. Despite some allowance for regime-type effects, bargaining models of war termination still generally assume belligerents are unitary actors with exogenously given preferences.¹²¹ The following discussion of domestic politics approaches and organization theory will complement the above challenges to the

119 Levy, “Loss Aversion,” 197-210; Levy, “Political Psychology,” 268-270.

120 Levy, “Loss Aversion,” 197.

121 See for example the discussion in Filson and Werner, “Bargaining and Fighting,” 311.

bargaining model by also questioning the model's unitary actor assumptions.

Domestic politics will be considered first and organization theory, second.

Joe D. Hagan has argued that across “the full variety of political systems,” domestic politics and political opposition influences foreign policy decision-making.¹²² Hagan further claims that a state's decision-making structures are not necessarily determined by regime type. Moreover, decision-making structures may vary among states with the same regime type.¹²³ These arguments suggest that domestic political support for – or opposition to – continued war may influence war termination decisions with little regard for a belligerent's regime type. What is argued to be more important than regime type is the positioning of moderates and hard-liners in the decision-making structures of a state. Moderates are those actors who, for reasons such as aversion to the risks/costs of war, pacifist ideology, or isolationist views, prefer “diplomatic accommodation” to war. In contrast, hard-liners are those who, for reasons such as nationalism or militarism, prefer “sustained confrontation.”¹²⁴

Because decision-making dynamics may be variable within a single regime type, or even a single regime, war termination decisions may be dependent on changes in the relative influence or control wielded by either moderates or hard-

122 Joe D. Hagan. *Political Opposition and Foreign Policy in Comparative Perspective*. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1993), Ch. 2, see 58. See also Jack Snyder. *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition*. (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1991), Ch. 2; Helen Milner, “Resisting the protectionist temptation: industry and the making of trade policy in France and the United States during the 1970s,” *International Organization* 41.4(1987): 639-665.

123 Joe D. Hagan, “Does Decision Making Matter? Systemic Assumptions vs. Historical Reality in International Relations Theory,” *International Studies Review* 3.2(2001): 5-46. See especially 34, 35.

124 Joe D. Hagan, “Does Decision Making Matter? Systemic Assumptions vs. Historical Reality in International Relations Theory,” 12, 27.

liners.¹²⁵ For example, if moderates gain the upper hand in a belligerent's decision-making structures, the belligerent may make concessions or reduce demands in spite of military success on the battlefield. Thus, regime type distinctions now accounted for in the bargaining model may miss important variations in decision-making across different belligerents.

In addition to domestic politics and political opposition, a belligerent's military bureaucracies may influence war termination decisions. Organization theory and bureaucratic politics models suggest that military bureaucracies will likely fail to communicate effectively with civilian leaders. Militaries may distort information because field commanders – the most important source of battlefield data – are likely to view their theater of a war optimistically. This optimism may prevent recognition of declining relative capabilities or a failing strategy. For instance, a field commander may believe that a currently failing strategy is sound but requires more resources (i.e. soldiers, armor, or air support) to be successful.¹²⁶ According to organization theory and bureaucratic politics approaches, the problems of distorted battlefield information are exacerbated by the high value civilian decision-makers usually assign to field commanders' assessments.¹²⁷ Consequently, field commanders' assessments may prevent the accurate updating of beliefs about the relative balance of military capabilities.

125 See Ibid. 34, 35. See also Snyder, Ch. 2 for a discussion of different political structures that may exist within similar regime types.

126 Halperin, 86-95; Reiter, 34, 35. Optimistic views among field commanders may stem from the previously discussed wishful thinking bias. See Levy, "Political Psychology," 268.

127 Halperin, 93.

Importantly, Halperin distinguishes between the role of field commanders and top military leaders (such as a General Staff or High Command) in war termination decision-making. He claims that top military leaders both understand and mediate between the interests of the military bureaucracies and civilian leaders. Furthermore, as the heads of the military bureaucracies, the influence of a belligerent state's chief military leaders is argued to be particularly strong during wartime.¹²⁸ As a result, a belligerent's decision-makers may persist in war or make concessions based upon the assessments and views of top military leaders.¹²⁹ This depiction suggests that, contrary to the bargaining model's unitary actor assumption, the views of a belligerent's ranking military leadership will have greater weight during war than the perspectives of other decision-makers (such as diplomats involved in negotiations).

Organization theory and the bureaucratic politics model also warn that different belligerents – and different bureaucracies within belligerents – may use different measures to assess relative success or failure in war. Reiter argues that two belligerents may “observe the same battle outcome with both concluding that they were successful, coming no closer to agreement on the eventual outcome of the war.” A poignant example is Napoleon Bonaparte's capture of Moscow in 1812. The French leader perceived the capture of Moscow as bringing closer the defeat of Russia. In contrast, Russian General Mikhail Kutuzov viewed the French seizure of Moscow as an overextension of Napoleon's power that would bring about the defeat

128 Halperin, 90; Christopher M. Jones, “Toward a Third Generation Model: Rethinking Governmental Politics and Foreign Policy Analysis.” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Chicago, February 28-March 3, see 31, 32.

129 Ibid., 90.

of the French forces. Reiter further points out that the bureaucracies within a belligerent's government may judge success or failure by different rubrics. For example, armies may focus on territory gained while navies focus on enemy ships sunk. The use of different measures of success and failure may make problematic the bargaining model assumptions about calculations of relative capabilities and resolve.¹³⁰

In sum, the constructivist approach, psychological theory, domestic politics approach, and organization theory suggest that the unitary rational actor assumption which under-girds the bargaining model may be a source of weakness rather than strength. According to organization theory, a belligerent's decision-making is affected by different subunits within the belligerent's government and cannot accurately be conceived of as unitary. Constructivism and psychological theory both argue that unitary or not, a belligerent's decision-making process is unlikely to equate with 'rationality' as assumed by the bargaining model. For constructivism, issues of belligerent identity and the social context of war are the challenges to rational choice, while for psychological theory, rationality is limited by mental processes, biases and misperceptions. In any case, belligerents may not be unitary actors and may be unable to make rational calculations in the process of war and settlement negotiations. In their challenges to the bargaining model, these approaches may help us see variables and mechanisms in war termination that the bargaining model does not allow. These alternative perspectives may make intelligible counterintuitive events

¹³⁰ Reiter, 35.

and outcomes in war and war termination that the bargaining model can neither explain nor predict.

In addition to the above challenges, difficulties in measuring and assigning values to variables continue to be a problem for the formal models utilized by bargaining approach theorists.¹³¹ Clearly, Carroll's call for more historical research is still valid today.¹³² Moreover war termination scholars have suggested that the challenges to the bargaining model approach may be ameliorated by performing case studies and collection of event level data.¹³³ Slantchev argues that whatever the challenges, the bargaining approach to war termination theory "is a worthwhile research agenda" even if it requires "further scrutiny."¹³⁴ My work will provide the called-for historical case studies and offer further scrutiny of the war termination research agenda. Such scrutiny focused on the bargaining model will help reveal whether the model's predictions and explanations are sound or in need of revision. Furthermore, this thesis will also allow assessment of the challenges to the bargaining model and whether they may point to the need only for alterations of the bargaining model or an altogether thorough rethinking of war termination.

131 Werner.

132 Carroll, "How Wars"; See also Reiter; Slantchev, "How Initiators."

133 Reiter; Slantchev, "How Initiators."

134 Slantchev, "How Initiators," 828.

Chapter 2: Research Design

The bargaining model has become the dominant approach to war termination theory. Therefore, this thesis, with the purpose of understanding the processes by which wars end, is guided by a framework and set of hypotheses derived from the bargaining model. However, as noted in the previous chapter, critiques of the bargaining model pose fundamental challenges to the model's assumptions, explanations, and predictions. This thesis will juxtapose the bargaining model account of war termination with potential insights from alternative perspectives.

Definitions

Though definitions have been provided for much of the terminology used in this study, it is necessary before proceeding to reiterate the most important definitions. First, *war is a violent mode of interaction between political units*.¹ According to bargaining model theorists, war is also defined as a means “to secure political objectives by force.”² Second, a *belligerent is a political unit engaged in war with another political unit*. In war termination studies, belligerents are generally assumed to be states.³ Third, *war termination is the resumption of a nonviolent mode of interaction between political units*.⁴ Fourth, *settlement terms are the explicit and implicit agreements that, if accepted by each belligerent, terminate a*

1 Paul Kecskemeti, “Political Rationality in Ending War.” *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 392 (1970): 105-115. One should note, however, that nonviolent modes of interaction such as negotiation may accompany the violent interaction on the battlefield.

2 Branislav Slantchev, “The Principle of Convergence in Wartime Negotiations.” *American Political Science Review* 97.4(2003):621-632, see esp. 626.

3 However, other political units, such as an alliance of two or more states, sub-national secessionist forces or guerrilla bands under the command of a warlord, might also conceivably be considered belligerents.

4 Paul Kecskemeti, “Political Rationality in Ending War.”

war.⁵ Settlement terms are assumed to be formulated in *negotiations, or the diplomatic bargaining between belligerents*. *Bargaining leverage* is defined as *the ability of a belligerent to demand more favorable settlement terms*.⁶ In the bargaining model literature, bargaining leverage is related to military capabilities and resolve. *Military capabilities* are *the ability of one belligerent to impose costs (i.e. killed/captured soldiers or destroyed materiel) on another belligerent*.⁷ *Resolve* is *a belligerent's preference for continued battle over the settlement terms offered by an opposing belligerent*.⁸

In addition to the definitions at the core of the bargaining model, five other definitions merit mention. First, *battle strategy* refers to *the tactics or strategies with which the belligerents employ their military capabilities*.⁹ Second, *reserves* are *the additional resources that a belligerent may mobilize for war*.¹⁰ Third, the *relative loss rate* is *a belligerent's losses (i.e. casualties and lost materiel) in relation to the losses of the opposing belligerent*. Fourth the *costs* in terms of a belligerent's leadership are defined as *the penalties faced by leaders in the event of relative*

5 See Suzanne Werner, "Negotiating the Terms of Settlement: War Aims and Bargaining Leverage." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42.3(1998): 321-343.

6 Suzanne Werner, "Negotiating the Terms of Settlement: War Aims and Bargaining Leverage." Werner on page 322 defines settlement terms as the "explicit and implicit agreements that arise or exist as consequence of the war's ending."

7 Werner; R.H. Wagner, "Bargaining and War." *American Journal of Political Science* 44.3(2000): 469-484; Dan Reiter, "Exploring the Bargaining Model of War." *Perspectives on Politics* 1.1(2003): 27-43; Slantchev, "How Initiators End Their Wars: the Duration of Warfare and the Terms of Peace." *American Journal of Political Science* 48.4(2004): 813-829."

8 Wagner; Darren Filson and Suzanne Werner, "A Bargaining Model of War and Peace: Anticipating the Onset, Duration, and Outcome of War." *American Journal of Political Science* 46.4(2002): 819-837

9 Ivan Arreguin-Toft, "How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict." *International Security* 26.1(2001): 93-128;

10 Slantchev, "How Initiators End Their Wars: the Duration of Warfare and the Terms of Peace," 817.

defeat.¹¹ Lastly, *stakes are “the magnitude of the political gains and losses accruing to the opponents in case of an asymmetrical outcome (i.e. relative victory or defeat).”*¹² Equipped with the above definitions, a discussion of the variables, expected observations, and hypotheses is now more easily undertaken.

Variables

Drawing upon the bargaining model, the major *dependent variable (DV1)* to be explained in this thesis is the settlement terms agreed upon at the termination of the war.¹³ *Independent variable one (IV1)* is the bargaining leverage of each belligerent in the negotiations of settlement terms.¹⁴ The war termination literature suggests that bargaining leverage is also a dependent variable (*DV2*) affected by other independent variables.

One main category of independent variables presumed to affect bargaining leverage is comprised of variables related to a belligerent’s relative military capabilities.¹⁵ The first is *independent variable two (IV2)*, a belligerent’s level of

11 Werner; H.E. Goemans, “Fighting for Survival: the Fate of Leaders and the Duration of War.” *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 44.5(2000): 555-579; H.E. Goemans, “War and Punishment”: *The Causes of War Termination and the First World War*. (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2000); Wagner; Reiter; Darren Filson and Suzanne Werner, “Bargaining and Fighting: The Impact of Regime Type on War Onset, Duration, and Outcomes.” *American Journal of Political Science* 48.2(2004): 296-313. Bahar Leventoglu and Branislav Slantchev, “The Armed Peace: A Punctuated Equilibrium Theory of War.” *American Journal of Political Science* 51.4(2007): 755-771.

12 Kecskemeti, 109.

13 Werner; Slantchev, “How Initiators.”

14 Werner, 328; R.H. Wagner, “Bargaining and War”; Goemans, “Fighting for Survival: the Fate of Leaders and the Duration of War”; H.E. Goemans, “War and Punishment”: *The Causes of War Termination and the First World War*; Darren Filson and Suzanne Werner, “A Bargaining Model of War and Peace: Anticipating the Onset, Duration, and Outcome of War.” *American Journal of Political Science* 46.4(2002): 819-837; Reiter, “Exploring the Bargaining Model of War”; Slantchev, “How Initiators End Their Wars: the Duration of Warfare and the Terms of Peace.”

15 Werner; Wagner; Reiter; Slantchev, “How Initiators.”

reserves relative to its opponent.¹⁶ The second is *independent variable three (IV3)*, the battle strategy or strategies with which the belligerents employ their soldiers and weapons. For specifying battle strategy, Ivan Arreguin-Toft's typology of strategies is used. Belligerents may pursue a "direct" strategy of conventional warfare in which military forces are used to capture, fortify, and/or hold territory. Belligerents may also use "indirect" strategies. For a weak belligerent (i.e. a belligerent with relatively few resources in terms of manpower, armor, artillery, naval forces or air forces) guerrilla warfare is a likely indirect strategy. For a strong belligerent (i.e. a belligerent with relatively plentiful resources in terms of manpower, armor, artillery, naval forces or air forces) an indirect strategy is "barbarism" the use of concentration camps, torture, or summary executions of insurgents and/or sympathizers.¹⁷ The final variable in this category is *independent variable four (IV4)*, a belligerent's rate of loss relative to the rate of loss suffered by its adversary. However, **IV4** is assumed to be dependent on which battle strategies (**IV3**) the belligerents employ. Therefore, **IV4** may also be *dependent variable three (DV3)*. Slantchev suggests that relative rates of loss are the criterion by which belligerents assess whether they are 'winning' or 'losing' in battle.¹⁸ Thus, in this thesis, battle outcomes will be measured by this rubric.

The other category of independent variables argued to affect bargaining leverage is comprised of variables related to a belligerent's relative level of resolve.

16 Slantchev, "How Initiators."

17 Ivan Arreguin-Toft, "How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict."

18 Slantchev, "How Initiators."

Resolve may be expressed when belligerent A rejects terms offered by belligerent B or when belligerent A knowingly offers terms that will be found unacceptable to belligerent B.¹⁹ For example, one belligerent's rejection of moderated terms offered by the other belligerent would indicate to the offering belligerent, that its opponent had high resolve.²⁰ According to the war termination literature, three independent variables populate the resolve category. First, *independent variable five (IV5)* is a belligerent's belief about the relative balance of military capabilities between the belligerents.²¹ The second of these, *independent variable six (IV6)*, is the costs leaders face in the event of relative defeat.²² Third, *independent variable seven (IV7)*, is the saliency of the issue over which the war is initiated and the consequent stakes a belligerent has in the war.²³ *IV7* has been assigned three values in previous bargaining model literature. High stakes wars include those fought for "regime/state survival, national liberation, or autonomy." Medium stakes war are those fought for "territory, integrity of state, or honor/ideology." Low stakes wars involve issues such

19 Wagner; Darren Filson and Suzanne Werner, "A Bargaining Model of War and Peace: Anticipating the Onset, Duration, and Outcome of War." *American Journal of Political Science* 46.4(2002): 819-837.

20 Werner; Goemans, "Fighting for Survival"; Goemans, "War and Punishment"; Wagner,; Filson and Werner, "A Bargaining"; Reiter; Slantchev, "How Initiators."

21 Filson and Werner, "A Bargaining"; Branislav Slantchev, "The Principle of Convergence in Wartime Negotiations." *American Political Science Review* 97.4(2003): 621-632; Slantchev, "How Initiators."

22 Werner; Goemans, "Fighting for Survival"; Goemans, "War and Punishment"; Wagner; Reiter; Darren Filson and Suzanne Werner, "Bargaining and Fighting: The Impact of Regime Type on War Onset, Duration, and Outcomes." *American Journal of Political Science* 48.2(2004): 296-313. Bahar Leventoglu and Branislav Slantchev, "The Armed Peace: A Punctuated Equilibrium Theory of War." *American Journal of Political Science* 51.4(2007): 755-771.

23 Keckskemeti; Andrew Mack, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict." *World Politics* 27.2(1975): 175-200; Slantchev, "How Initiators," 817.

as empire maintenance and economic disputes.²⁴ The interactions between and among the variables described above can be seen in Figure 1. The interactions are also discussed below both in terms of observations expected to be evident in the cases studied in this thesis, and in terms of the hypotheses of the bargaining model to be tested.

Hypotheses and Expected Observations

Bargaining Model Hypotheses and Expected Observations²⁵

Expected observation one (O1) is that belligerents will negotiate settlement terms for war termination with one another during the war. This expectation must be qualified by the possibility that the onset of negotiations does not occur until belligerents have fought one or more battles. Only after belligerents have fought one another will the likely outcomes of continued war become more predictable.²⁶ **O1** is the lynchpin of the bargaining model and this thesis. Without the occurrence of negotiations, the bargaining model is without the forum for belligerent bargaining that the model treats as necessary for the validity of its other propositions.


Expected observation two (O2) is that the settlement terms demanded by each belligerent will not only reflect each belligerent's original war aims but will fluctuate

24 Slantchev, "How Initiators," 819. One should be aware that though resolve is affected by IV4 – IV7, there is the possibility that belligerents will strategically manipulate their behavior in negotiations in order to feign stronger military capabilities. For this argument see Slantchev, "The Principle of Convergence in Wartime Negotiations," 624, 628.

25 The term "expected observation" refers to predicted events, actor behaviors, and outcomes that should be empirically supported given that the theory/hypothesis being tested is correct. Expected observations differ from hypotheses in that they are not formulated as "if, then" statements. Instead, they are general statements about what one should observe in reality if a theory's explanations or predictions are correct. I have adapted this term from Stephen Van Evera. See Stephen Van Evera, *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science*, (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1997), see 56.

26 Paul R. Pillar, *Negotiating Peace: War Termination as a Bargaining Process*. (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1983), Ch. 2-4.

as continued battle and negotiation reveal the relative military capabilities and resolve of each belligerent.²⁷ Put more simply, **O2** leads one to expect that the settlement terms a belligerent requires to cease fighting will be shaped by the shifting fortunes of war. **O2** is derived from the bargaining model’s assumption that settlement terms are “endogenous to the conflict.”²⁸



Several hypotheses stem from **O2** and the military capabilities category of independent variables. **Hypothesis one (H1)** states that if belligerent A has more reserves (a higher value for **IV2**) relative to belligerent B, then *ceteris paribus* belligerent A will demand more favorable settlement terms than belligerent B.²⁹

²⁷ Pillar, Negotiating Peace: War Termination as a Bargaining Process; Werner; Goemans, “Fighting for Survival”; Goemans, “War and Punishment”; Wagner; Filson and Werner, “A Bargaining Model of War and Peace: Anticipating the Onset, Duration, and Outcome of War”; Reiter; Slantchev, “How Initiators.”

²⁸ Werner, 322; Slantchev, “How Initiators.”

²⁹ Ibid.

However, the strategy with which military forces are employed should also impact bargaining leverage. The effect of strategy suggests several hypotheses. First, *hypothesis two (H2)*: if the belligerent with more powerful military resources employs a direct strategy against a belligerent with less powerful military resources also employing a direct strategy, then the belligerent with less powerful military resources will suffer higher relative rates of loss in battle. Second, *hypothesis three (H3)*: if the belligerent with more powerful military resources employs a direct strategy against a belligerent with less powerful military resources employing an indirect strategy, then the belligerent with more powerful military resources will suffer higher relative rates of loss in battle. Third, *hypothesis four (H4)*: if the belligerent with more powerful military resources employs an indirect strategy against a belligerent with less powerful military resources employing a direct strategy, then the belligerent with more powerful military resources will suffer higher relative rates of loss in battle. Fourth, *hypothesis five (H5)*: if the belligerent with more powerful military capabilities employs an indirect strategy against a belligerent with less powerful military capabilities also employing an indirect strategy, then the belligerent with less powerful military capabilities will suffer higher relative rates of loss in battle.³⁰

Slantchev argues that a belligerent with greater reserves relative to its adversary will demand more favorable settlement terms than its adversary. However, Slantchev claims that relative rates of loss are more important than relative reserves

³⁰ Arreguin-Toft. See also Slantchev, "How Initiators" for Slantchev's use of relative loss rates as a measure for military success in battle.

in a belligerent's calculations of relative military capabilities. This argument gives rise to two hypotheses. **Hypothesis six (H6)** states that if belligerent A suffers losses at a greater rate than belligerent B, then *ceteris paribus* belligerent A will moderate its settlement terms (i.e. decrease its demands or make concessions).³¹ On the other hand, **hypothesis seven (H7)** states that if belligerent A suffers losses at a lesser rate than belligerent B, then *ceteris paribus* belligerent A will not moderate its settlement terms (i.e. maintain or perhaps increase its demands).³²

Also stemming from **O2** is the expectation that settlement terms will reflect in part the balance of resolve. This expectation gives rise to **hypothesis eight (H8)**. **H8** states that if belligerent A exhibits resolve by refusing to moderate (either by decreasing demands or increasing concessions) its settlement terms, then *ceteris paribus* belligerent B will moderate its settlement terms.³³ However, as noted above, several variables may affect a belligerent's resolve. Therefore, additional hypotheses must be considered.³⁴

Resolve may be affected by a belligerent's beliefs about its military capabilities relative to those of its opponent. Slantchev's argument regarding the effect of relative loss rates is instructive in this regard. Because relative loss rates are

31 Slantchev, "How Initiators," 817.

32 See Ibid. Slantchev does not state this hypothesis himself but it is a reasonable corollary to H6.

33 See Filson and Werner, "A Bargaining"; Goemans, "Fighting for Survival"; Goemans, "War and Punishment"; Wagner; Slantchev, "The Principle." This hypothesis has not been directly stated by bargaining model theorists but is suggested by the informational effects attributed to negotiation. See Filson and Werner "A Bargaining"; Branislav Slantchev, "The Principle."

34 Filson and Werner, "A Bargaining"; Goemans, "Fighting for Survival"; Goemans, "War and Punishment"; Wagner; Branislav Slantchev, "The Principle of Convergence in Wartime Negotiations"; Slantchev, "How Initiators."

considered to be the most important source of information about relative military capabilities, a belligerent's appraisal of relative military capabilities should be primarily affected by relative loss rates. However, the balance of reserves between belligerents is suggested to provide a baseline for a belligerent's assessment of relative military capabilities.³⁵ Thus, hypotheses **H1**, **H6**, and **H7** capture this component of a belligerent's resolve.

Before proceeding, the effects of a belligerent's beliefs about the balance of military capabilities must be distinguished from other factors assumed to affect resolve. Taken by itself, the influence of beliefs about relative military capabilities should result in the fluctuation of a belligerent's resolve in accord with the shifting tides of battle.³⁶ However, the bargaining model literature suggests that other factors (i.e. regime-type and the stakes of the war) influence a belligerent's resolve *in spite* of its beliefs about the balance of forces or the prospects of continued war.³⁷

The first of these other factors, a belligerent's regime type, may have an important impact on its resolve. Three regime types have been considered in the bargaining model literature and three hypotheses have been suggested. First, ***hypothesis nine (H9)***: if a belligerent is led by a mixed authoritarian regime, then it will refuse to moderate its settlement terms even if it faces outright military defeat in continued battle. Mixed authoritarian regimes are described by Goemans as those that

35 Slantchev, "How Initiators"; see also Filson and Werner, "A Bargaining"; Slantchev, "The Principle."

36 See especially, Slantchev, "How Initiators."

37 See Goemans, "Fighting for Survival"; Goemans, "War and Punishment"; Slantchev, "How Initiators."

“use repression and exclude a significant proportion of their populace from access [to the] policy-making process.” Goemans states that leaders of mixed authoritarian regimes show high levels of resolve because they lack the repressive capabilities of dictatorships and “suffer severe penalties (costs [IV6]) above and beyond the loss of power even if they lose the war only moderately.” The penalties faced may include imprisonment or death and lead those in charge of mixed regimes to reject unfavorable settlement terms, and instead continue to fight even a losing war in hopes of winning a “gamble for resurrection” rather than accept defeat.³⁸

The second hypothesis related to regime type is *hypothesis ten (H10)*. **H10** states that if a belligerent is led by a dictatorial regime, then it will moderate its settlement terms when experiencing a higher rate of losses in battle than its adversary. According to Goemans, the lower resolve of dictators is due to the higher costs such leaders face for a disastrous loss than a moderate loss. Additionally, Goemans argues that dictators are better able to weather moderate than severe defeats because they typically have a repressive apparatus to facilitate their continued hold on power.³⁹

The third hypothesis related to regime type is *hypothesis eleven (H11)*. **H11** states that if a belligerent is led by a democratic regime, then it will moderate its settlement terms when experiencing a higher rate of losses in battle than its

38 Goemans, “Fighting for Survival,” see especially 577; Goemans, “War and Punishment”; Darren Filson and Suzanne Werner, “Bargaining and Fighting: The Impact of Regime Type on War Onset, Duration, and Outcomes.” *American Journal of Political Science* 48.2(2004): 296-313, see 558. See also Slantchev, “How Initiators” for a discussion of relative loss rates.

39 Ibid. See also Slantchev, “How Initiators” for a discussion of relative loss rates.

adversary.⁴⁰ The low resolve of democratic belligerents is hypothesized to stem from the higher costs elected leaders face for a disastrous as opposed to moderate loss. Consequently, democratic belligerents are more sensitive to the costs of war and are less likely to continue fighting in hopes of making fewer concessions in an unsuccessful war. Additionally, Darren Filson and Suzanne Werner suggest *expected observation three (O3)*: when experiencing battlefield success, democratic belligerents will not increase their demands. Democratic belligerents will not exploit military success by increasing demands because they prefer to end the war rather than continue fighting to gain a more favorable outcome.⁴¹ In sum, one should see differences in resolve across different regime types reflected in the negotiation of settlement terms.

In addition to regime type, resolve may also be a partial expression of the stakes for which a belligerent goes to war.⁴² Slantchev defines three levels for the stakes of a war: high, medium, and low. Unfortunately, Slantchev does not explicitly specify what negotiating behavior should be exhibited by belligerents for a given level of stakes in a war.⁴³ Therefore, I will extrapolate from Slantchev's anecdotal evidence and Goemans' propositions regarding the effects of regime type on resolve.⁴⁴

40 Goemans, "Fighting for Survival"; Goemans, "War and Punishment"; Filson and Werner, "Bargaining and Fighting: The Impact of Regime Type on War Onset, Duration, and Outcomes." See also Slantchev, "How Initiators" for a discussion of relative loss rates.

41 Goemans, "Fighting for Survival," 555-559; Filson and Werner, "Bargaining and Fighting."

42 See Kecskemeti; Slantchev, "How Initiators," 817.

43 Slantchev, "How Initiators," 817, 819.

44 Goemans, "Fighting for Survival"; Goemans, "War and Punishment"; Slantchev, "How Initiators."

In high stakes wars a belligerent is fighting for “regime/state survival, national liberation, or autonomy” and one can expect that a belligerent will behave in a way analogous to Goemans’ mixed authoritarian regime.⁴⁵ Thus, *hypothesis twelve* (**H12**): if for a given belligerent the stakes of the war are high, then *ceteris paribus* the belligerent will refuse to moderate its settlement terms even if it faces outright military defeat in continued battle.⁴⁶

Though the bargaining model literature is least clear about belligerent behavior in medium stakes wars, one may form some expectations about belligerent behavior. Recall that medium stakes wars are fought over “territory, integrity of state, or honor/ideology.”⁴⁷ *Hypothesis thirteen* (**H13**) is formulated based on the work of Slantchev and Goemans. **H13** states that if for a given belligerent the stakes of the war are medium, then *ceteris paribus* the belligerent will moderate its settlement terms when incurring greater rates of losses than its adversary but will persist in war in order to achieve some its most salient aims.⁴⁸ However, a caveat is that a belligerent fighting a medium stakes war should agree to terms before it faces a military situation that cannot reasonably be reversed in its favor.⁴⁹

Fortunately, the literature is more instructive in regards to low stakes wars – wars fought over “maintaining an empire, commercial disputes, or policy.” Evidence utilized by Slantchev suggests that belligerent resolve in a low stakes war will be

45 Goemans, “Fighting for Survival”; Goemans, “War and Punishment”; Slantchev, “How Initiators,” 819.

46 Ibid.

47 Slantchev, “How Initiators,” 819.

48 Goemans, “Fighting for Survival”; Goemans, “War and Punishment”; Slantchev, “How Initiators,” 819. How long or under what circumstances a belligerent will continue to fight is not clear for this level of stakes.

49 This is my own assumption for medium stakes wars but it has been based on the above cited work of Paul Kecskemeti.

even less than that exhibited in Goemans' depiction of democratic regimes. Thus, *hypothesis fourteen* (**H14**): if for a given belligerent the stakes of the war are low, then *ceteris paribus* the belligerent will dramatically moderate or forsake its settlement terms when experiencing a higher rate of losses in battle than its adversary.⁵⁰

The fourteen hypotheses outlined directly above present a complicated set of hypotheses through which the bargaining model attempts to explain and predict war termination. However we may categorize the hypotheses in a manner that makes them more readily comprehensible. The hypotheses may be separated into four categories: *material*, *regime*, *negotiation effects* and *stakes*. Material hypotheses comprise **H1- H7** and are labeled 'material' due to their focus on belligerents' material (e.g. military) capabilities and the strategies through which those capabilities are employed. **H8** captures the bargaining model's predictions regarding the effects of negotiation. Regime hypotheses comprise **H9 – H11** (see also **O3**) and are classified as 'regime' hypotheses because of their emphasis on the effects of a belligerents' regime type on its resolve. Stakes hypotheses (**H12-H14**), capture the expected relationship between the stakes of a war and a belligerent's resolve. For a summary of the hypotheses specified above and their categorization, see Table 1 in the Appendix.

50 Goemans, "Fighting for Survival"; Goemans, "War and Punishment"; Filson and Werner, "Bargaining and Fighting: The Impact of Regime Type on War Onset, Duration, and Outcomes." Slantchev, "How Initiators," 819; Keckskemeti, 109. As pointed out in the first chapter of this thesis, only Keckskemeti addresses intra-war changes in the stakes of a conflict. Bargaining model theorists have not addressed stake fluctuation. However, Keckskemeti does not elaborate on the causes behind fluctuation in the stakes of the war.

Alternative Hypotheses and Expected Observations

The hypotheses derived from the bargaining model, despite the allowance for belligerents with different regimes to behave differently, rest upon the assumption that the belligerents involved in war termination negotiations are unitary actors making rational calculations concerning whether to accept settlement terms or continue fighting.⁵¹ However, other factors such as the social context of war, non-rationality of leaders, domestic politics, organizational competition, and differing interests among a belligerent's allies have been argued to prevent belligerents from behaving as unitary rational actors.⁵² Furthermore, psychological theory suggests that even if belligerents were unitary actors, it is unlikely that they would make the rational calculations assumed by the bargaining model.⁵³

The above arguments and theoretical viewpoints have been cited as challenges to the bargaining model's ability to explain and predict the processes and outcomes of war termination.⁵⁴ Beyond questioning the bargaining model, constructivism, critical theory, political psychology approaches, domestic politics approaches, and

51 See Wagner; Reiter; Slantchev, "How Initiators."

52 Morton H. Halperin, "War Termination as a Problem in Civil-Military Relations." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 392.Nov (1970): 86-95. Michael I. Handel, *War Termination - a Critical Survey*. (Jerusalem: Alpha P, 1978). C R Mitchell and Michael Nicholson. "Rational Models and the Ending of Wars." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 27.3 (1983): 495-520. Wallace J. Thies, "Searching for Peace: Vietnam and the Question of How Wars End." *Polity* 7.3 (1975): 304-333; Yuen Foong Khong, "Seduction by Analogy in Vietnam: the Malaya and Korean Analogies." in Kenneth W. Thompson, ed. *Institutions and Leadership: Prospects for the Future*. (New York: University Press of America, 1987), 65-77; Yuen Foong Khong, *Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965*. (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1992); David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*. Rev. ed. (Minneapolis: Minnesota UP, 1988); Friedrich Kratochwil, "Looking back from somewhere: reflections on what remains 'critical' in critical theory." *Review of International Studies* 33(2007): 25-45, see 29; Reiter, "Exploring the Bargaining Model of War."

53 Quester.

54 Reiter; Wagner.

organization theory offer alternative explanations and predictions about the processes and outcomes of war termination. The alternative hypotheses and expected observations derived from the above approaches/theories will be discussed in the order of their listing. As will become evident, a very different portrayal of war is offered by these alternative perspectives.

Critical theory suggests that the leaders of belligerent states will justify wars and seek to obtain public support by portraying their own “healthy” and “civilized” state as engaged in a war with a “sick” or barbaric opponent.⁵⁵ Thus, *alternative expected observation one (AO1)*: a belligerent’s leader will rally public support by exploiting dichotomous images of the state as opposed to the adversary.

Complementing critical theory, constructivism suggests that as the duration of a war increases, the “practice of violence” will lead opposing belligerents to view the other “as an intractably hostile barbarian.”⁵⁶ From this observation can be derived *alternative hypothesis one (AH1)*: as the duration of a war increases, *ceteris paribus* the more concessions in the settlement terms a belligerent will demand from its opponent.⁵⁷

Political psychology approaches offer alternative hypotheses and expected observations that directly challenge the hypotheses derived the rationalist bargaining model. First, the dispositional, fundamental attribution, and situational attribution

55 Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*, Introduction, Ch. 4, 3, 9, 11, 75-88

56 Reiter, 36.

57 Reiter, 36; see also Iver B. Neumann, “Identity and Security,” *Journal of Peace Research* 29.2(1992): 221-226; Campbell, Introduction, Ch. 4, 3, 9, 11, 75-88; Friedrich Kratochwil, “Looking back from somewhere: reflections on what remains ‘critical’ in critical theory.”

errors discussed in the previous chapter question the bargaining model assumption that negotiations provide accurate information to a belligerent about their opponent's resolve or military capabilities.⁵⁸ Political psychology approaches give rise to an expectation that a belligerent's refusal to moderate its settlement terms will not be perceived by its opponent as a sign of strength or resolve. Instead the refusal will be seen as an artifact of the adversary's hostility.⁵⁹ This suggests *alternative hypothesis two (AH2)*: if belligerent A exhibits resolve by refusing to moderate (either by decreasing demands or increasing concessions) its settlement terms, then *ceteris paribus* belligerent B will not moderate its settlement terms. On the other hand, political psychology approaches lead one to expect that belligerent A will perceive belligerent B's moderation of settlement terms as a result of belligerent A's resolve or military strength.⁶⁰ Therefore, in instances in which one belligerent makes concessions to its opponent, political psychology does not predict an outcome different from that predicted by the bargaining model.⁶¹

Second, foreign policy analysts applying political psychology in their studies have argued that decision-makers and military leaders draw upon "lessons of the past" and historical analogies in order to form current policy decisions.⁶² The

58 Jack S. Levy, "Political Psychology and Foreign Policy." in David O. Sears, Leonie Huddy, and Robert Jervis, eds. Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology. (New York: Oxford UP, 2003), 253-84; Jack Snyder. Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition. (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1991), Ch. 2.

59 Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition, 29; Levy, "Political Psychology," 264-266.

60 Ibid.

61 However, the mechanisms assumed to underlie belligerent behaviors do differ.

62 Yuen Foong Khong, "Seduction by Analogy in Vietnam: the Malaya and Korean Analogies," 65-77; Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965; Levy, "Political Psychology," 267; see also Halperin, 89.

tendency for decision-makers and military leaders to rely on such simplifying heuristic leads to *alternative expected observation two* (AO2): decision-makers will use historical analogies in the formation of war and war termination decisions. Unfortunately for decision-makers, historical analogies are often poor guides for current action. Yet, because cognitive-psychology suggests that decision-makers' beliefs will resist change, a belligerent may continue to act in accord with the past lessons even if such actions are unsuccessful.⁶³ Thus, AO2 lends itself to *alternative hypothesis three* (AH3): if a belligerent's decision-makers and/or military leaders employ inappropriate historical analogies in the formation of strategy during war, then *ceteris paribus* the belligerent will suffer higher rates of losses than its opponent.⁶⁴

Note that AH3 potentially presents a problem of circular reasoning. Indeed, Yuen Foong Khong points out scholars studying the use of historical analogies in foreign policy decision-making at least implicitly infer inappropriate analogy use from poor policy outcomes. However, Khong defends this practice, stating: "If there were no positive relationship between poor use and bad policy outcomes, it would not be very interesting to document poor use." Moreover, Khong claims that "the vast majority" of studies support a view that inappropriate use of historical analogies is the

63 Yuen Foong Khong, "Seduction by Analogy in Vietnam: the Malaya and Korean Analogies"; Yuen Foong Khong, *Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965*; Levy, "Political Psychology," 267.

64 Khong, "Seduction by Analogy," 65-77; Khong, "Analogies at War"; Levy, "Political Psychology," 267.

norm rather than the exception.⁶⁵ Thus, while testing of **AH3** is possible, one should be cognizant of the potential for circular reasoning.

Third, proponents of political psychology approaches have also presented the “wishful thinking” bias as an explanation of belligerents’ behavior. If suffering from the wishful thinking bias, a belligerent’s decision-makers and military leaders are likely to persist in war even when the probability of military success is (very) low. Levy also argues that only very strong objective information from battle (such as near complete military collapse) may force decision-makers and military leaders to abandon their wishful thinking. Moreover, major personnel or even regime change may be necessary in order to bring changed beliefs into a belligerent’s decision-making structure.⁶⁶ The wishful thinking bias suggests *alternative hypothesis four (AH4)*. **AH4** states that if a belligerent’s decision-makers suffer from the wishful thinking bias, then the decision-makers will refuse to moderate settlement terms even if facing outright military defeat in continued battle. Jack Levy claims that, though other decision-makers are susceptible, military organizations are particularly prone to the wishful thinking bias.⁶⁷ *Alternative expected observation three (AO3)* is derived from the wishful thinking bias and the propensity for militaries to suffer from its

65 Khong, “Analogies at War,” 30, 31, see footnote 34.

66 Jack S. Levy, “Loss Aversion, Framing Effects, and International Conflict: Perspectives from Prospect Theory.” in Manus I. Midlarsky, ed. *Handbook of War Studies II*. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000), 193-221; Levy, “Political Psychology,” 265-269.

67 Jack S. Levy, “Loss Aversion, Framing Effects, and International Conflict: Perspectives from Prospect Theory.” in Manus I. Midlarsky, ed. *Handbook of War Studies II*. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000), 193-221; Levy, “Political Psychology,” 265-269.

effects. **AO3** states that military organizations (particularly field commanders) will distort battlefield information by overestimating the probability of military success.⁶⁸

In addition to the above alternative hypotheses and expected observations derived from psychology, prospect theory suggests two hypotheses about war termination.⁶⁹ *Alternative hypothesis five (AH5)* states that if a belligerent's decision-makers frame the war as an effort to avoid losses (i.e. a loss of "sunk costs," territory, a colonial possession, *etcetera*), then the decision-makers will refuse to moderate settlement terms even if facing outright military defeat in continued battle.⁷⁰ On the other hand is *alternative hypothesis six (AH6)*: if a belligerent's decision-makers frame the war as an effort to achieve gains (i.e. additional territory or a new colonial possession), then the decision-makers will moderate settlement terms when experiencing a higher rate of losses in battle than the adversary.⁷¹ However, having achieved gains in a war, a belligerent is likely to quickly renormalize a new status quo that includes those gains. Therefore, prospect theory provides *alternative expected observation four (AO4)*: for a belligerent's decision-makers, the loss of recent gains will not be framed as diminished gains but as an absolute loss.⁷² In sum, the hypotheses derived from prospect theory and psychology offer clear, testable alternatives to the bargaining model hypotheses.

68 Halperin, 86-95; Levy, "Political Psychology," 265-269.

69 See Chapter 1 for a more detailed discussion of prospect theory.

70 Jack S. Levy, "Loss Aversion, Framing Effects, and International Conflict: Perspectives from Prospect Theory"; Levy, "Political Psychology," 268-270.

71 Jack S. Levy, "Loss Aversion, Framing Effects, and International Conflict: Perspectives from Prospect Theory"; Levy, "Political Psychology," 268-270.

72 Levy, "Loss Aversion," 197.

Organizational theory and domestic politics approaches to foreign policy analysis provide alternative hypotheses and expected observations that add to and complement those offered by critical theory, constructivism, and political psychology. The first two of these stem from Joe D. Hagan's domestic politics argument regarding domestic opposition and the role moderate and hard-line decision-makers play in a state's foreign policy. On one hand is *alternative hypothesis seven (AH7)*: if moderate actors are able to dominate a belligerent's decision-making apparatus, then the belligerent will moderate its settlement terms. On the other hand is *alternative hypothesis eight (AH8)*: if hard-line actors are able to dominate a belligerent's decision-making apparatus, then the belligerent will refuse to moderate its settlement terms even if it faces outright military defeat in continued battle.⁷³

Additionally, organization theory offers two hypotheses and an expected observation. First, *alternative expected observation five (AO5)*: belligerents and separate bureaucracies within each belligerent's government will use unique measures of success and failure and will view the same outcome (i.e. of a battle) in different ways. Different perceptions of the same outcome may make problematic the updating of beliefs about the relative balance of military capabilities between belligerents. Second, organization theory suggests (similar to the wishful thinking bias above) that a belligerent's field commanders will view optimistically their own theatre of operations. Therefore **AO3** may also be considered to fall within

73 Joe D. Hagan. *Political Opposition and Foreign Policy in Comparative Perspective*. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1993), Ch. 2; Joe D. Hagan, "Does Decision Making Matter? Systemic Assumptions vs. Historical Reality in International Relations Theory." *International Studies Review* 3.2(2001): 105-115. See especially 12, 27, 34, 35.

organization theory. Lastly, Morton H. Halperin claims that a belligerent's chief military leaders (e.g. Chiefs of Staff or High Command) will be particularly influential in war termination decision-making. Thus, *alternative hypothesis nine* (**AH9**): if a belligerent's chief military leaders support moderating settlement terms, then settlement terms will be moderated. In contrast, *alternative hypothesis ten* (**AH10**) states that if a belligerent's chief military leaders oppose moderating settlement terms, then settlement terms will not be moderated.⁷⁴ In short, domestic politics approaches and organization theory challenge the bargaining model by arguing that military field commanders and top leaders will have greater influence on war termination decisions than other actors such as the diplomats involved in negotiations.⁷⁵

The above alternatives to the bargaining model's predictions/explanations of war termination allow a contrast in predictions and explanations that facilitates testing of the bargaining model against empirical evidence. The alternative hypotheses and expected observations are grouped according to the theory/approach from which they were derived. **AH1** and **AO1** are drawn from constructivism and critical theory. Psychological theory provides **AH2**, **AH3**, **AH4**, **AH5**, **AH6**, **AO2**, **AO3**, and **AO4**. Domestic politics approaches and organization theory offer **AH7**, **AH8**, **AH9**, **H10** and **AO5**. For a summary of the alternative hypotheses and expected observations, please see Table 2 in the Appendix.

74 Halperin, 87-95; Reiter, 34-35.

75 Halperin, 87-95; Christopher M. Jones, "Toward a Third Generation Model: Rethinking Governmental Politics and Foreign Policy Analysis." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Chicago, February 28-March 3, see 31, 32.

Methodology

The variables, expected observations, and hypotheses discussed above pose difficult challenges to researchers. In spite of a heavy sprinkling of the “*ceteris paribus* clause” in the single hypotheses above, when the hypotheses and expected observations are taken together, it is highly improbable that all other things are ever equal. The resultant interactions of variables and predictions/explanations of the separate hypotheses leave the researcher with important questions. What is the causal impact of a particular variable? When is its causal impact greater or weaker? Which hypothesis has the greatest predictive/explanatory power? When does a particular hypothesis have greater predictive/explanatory ability than other hypotheses? When is it overshadowed by the predictions and/or explanations of other hypotheses?

For example, is the prediction of **H8** – that belligerent B will moderate its settlement terms if belligerent A refuses to moderate – better able to predict final settlement terms than **H6**’s prediction that belligerent B will moderate its settlement terms if it suffers battle losses at a greater rate than belligerent A? Or, consider other hypotheses regarding resolve. Do the stakes of the war matter more than a belligerent’s regime type? An objective of this study is to shed some light on these questions and offer directions by which further study can begin to offer answers. Achieving this objective will require a method that is able to address both interactions between the variables and overlapping predictions and explanations of the hypotheses.

The method chosen to confront the above challenges is the version of the case study method formulated by Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett.⁷⁶ The case study method of George and Bennett “attempts to identify the intervening causal process – the causal chain and causal mechanism – between an independent variable (variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable.”⁷⁷ Put more simply, process-tracing involves exploration of “the chain of events or the decision-making process by which initial case conditions are translated into case outcomes.”⁷⁸ The empirical exploration involved in process-tracing requires that a researcher dissect the causal link between an independent variable (variables) and a dependent variable or outcome by breaking a single event into “temporal and possibly causal sequences of events.”⁷⁹ Once a single event has been broken down into a series of steps, a researcher looks for evidence that the hypothesized relationship(s) between independent variables and the dependent variable is empirically supported at each step of the process by which initial conditions are transformed into outcomes.⁸⁰

This method was chosen for several reasons. First, Stephen Van Evera claims that one strength of process-tracing is its ability to allow researchers to explain *how* an independent variable or variables (X or Xs) affect(s) the dependent variable (Y).

76 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004).

77 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, see 206.

78 Stephen Van Evera, *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science*, (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1997), see 64.

79 Stephen Van Evera, *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science*, 64; Andrew Bennett and Alexander L. George, “Case Studies in Process Tracing in History and Political Science: Similar Strokes for Different Foci.” in Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman eds., *Bridges and Boundaries: Historians, Political Scientists and the Study of International Relations*, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001), see 144.

80 *Ibid.*

Van Evera argues that large-*n* statistical hypothesis tests can establish that X affects Y and the direction of the relationship but cannot offer insight into the causal process to the extent that process-tracing is able.⁸¹ Additionally, Bennett and George argue that process-tracing produces less measurement error than quantitative analysis “because it can intensively assess a few variables along several qualitative dimensions, rather than having to quantify variables across many cases.”⁸² Despite these strengths of process-tracing when compared to large-*n* statistical studies, one potential weakness is that the very small number of case studies in this thesis limits what can be inferred from the evidence. However, Bennett and George explain that by breaking a case into several sequential steps or events (observations) and determining whether a hypothesis is supported by each step in the process leading to an outcome, inference is possible within even a single case.⁸³

Another reason for employing process-tracing is the method’s ability to analyze complex events in which interaction among multiple variables occurs. Many phenomena studied in the field of international relations involve relationships that are characterized by complex (i.e. flowing from the convergence of severable variables),

81 Van Evera, 54.

82 George and Bennett, 222; Andrew Bennett and Alexander L. George, “Case Studies in Process Tracing in History and Political Science: Similar Strokes for Different Foci.” in Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman eds., *Bridges and Boundaries: Historians, Political Scientists and the Study of International Relations*, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001), see 153.

83 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, 28-30. Van Evera does not share the confidence of Bennett and George in single-case analyses. Instead, he argues that a study of three or more cases is necessary for inference and generalization. See Van Evera, 53. However, the purpose of this thesis is to test the bargaining model of war termination and hypotheses derived from it. Therefore, even if generalization is not well served in a two-case analysis, the inference allowed by process tracing is sufficient for the hypothesis testing purposes of this thesis.

rather than linear, causality.⁸⁴ War termination theory and the bargaining model are also characterized by complex causality and therefore are well served by studies using process-tracing. Furthermore, the expected observations and hypotheses generated by the bargaining model are not only subject to complex causality in which the effects of variables converge, but also involve *interaction* between the causal impacts of the variables.⁸⁵

Take, for example, the interactions among **IV5**, **IV6**, **IV7**, bargaining leverage (**DV2/IV1**), and settlement terms (**DV1**). The effects of independent variables **IV5**, **IV6**, **IV7** are all aspects of a belligerent's resolve and are presumed to affect the belligerent's bargaining leverage (**DV2**). Bargaining leverage, in turn, is an independent variable (**IV1**) affecting settlement terms (**DV1**). This example illustrates the presence of complex and interactive causality in the bargaining model. Process-tracing will allow testing of the bargaining model despite the challenges of complexity and interaction.

Compounding the issues of complex causality and interactions among independent variables is the potential for equifinality. Equifinality refers to the fact that in different cases, with different sets of independent variables, the same type of outcome can arise. George and Bennett argue that just as complex causality and interactive effects are often present in social phenomena, so too is equifinality.⁸⁶

Process-tracing requires researchers to be cognizant of equifinality and allows them

84 George and Bennett, 212; Andrew Bennet and Alexander L. George, "Case Studies in Process Tracing in History and Political Science: Similar Strokes for Different Foci." see 138.

85 Ibid.

86 Bennett and George, 138; George and Bennett, 157.

to map different causal paths of independent variables by which the same outcome could have occurred. This ability of process-tracing allows researchers to determine what different conditions may lead causal paths of different independent variables to result in the same outcome.⁸⁷ Thus, process-tracing is particularly useful for testing the bargaining model's hypotheses in which warring belligerents led by different types of regimes, with different levels of military capabilities, using different strategies may lead to the same type of outcome. George and Bennett argue that process-tracing not only makes possible theory testing in cases subject to equifinality, but also is useful for building typological theories. Typological theories are "contingent generalizations under which the same value of an independent variable can have different effects (multifinality), or different mixes of variables can have the same effect (equifinality)."⁸⁸ Such theories, built using process-tracing methods in case studies, may prove to be practical for war termination studies.

Case Selection

The case selected is the Philippines War, 1899-1902. This case is selected based on several criteria. First, Van Evera suggests selection of cases with "data richness" when process-tracing is to be utilized.⁸⁹ Data richness refers to the availability of archival data, individuals for interviewing, or data assembled by other scholars. In this study, I have selected a case for which historians have done the

87 Bennett and George, 138, 157; George and Bennett, 157, 207.

88 Bennett and George, 138, 157; see also George and Bennett, 207.

89 Van Evera, 79.

archival “legwork” and produced narratives of the events studied here.⁹⁰ However, using historical narratives poses some challenges to political science research. Before proceeding to the other criteria of case selection, it is necessary to discuss the use of historians’ work as sources for empirical evidence.

Ian Lustick warns that “unself-conscious” selection of historical monographs creates selection bias in the research based on the monographs.⁹¹ Lustick states that historians do not write theory-free narratives and different historians may offer different accounts of the same event based on the (often implicit) theories or conceptual frameworks that guide their analysis. Political scientists often allow their own theory and hypotheses to lead them only to historical sources that will provide confirmation.⁹² The main solution to this form of selection bias is not for political scientists to engage in primary research, but rather for political scientists to systematically and self-consciously select source material.⁹³ Where possible, I have selected sources by using book reviews (two per source) from academic journals to find histories approved by other historians as accurate in terms of both archival work and interpretation of the primary source material. While even this method of screening sources is imperfect, Lustick argues that so long as the limits of using historical narratives are recognized, the sources may be regarded as accounts “of what

90 Ibid.

91 Ian Lustick, “History, Historiography, and Political Science: Multiple Historical Records and the Problem of Selection Bias.” *The American Political Science Review* 90.3(1996): 605-618.

92 Ian Lustick, “History, Historiography, and Political Science: Multiple Historical Records and the Problem of Selection Bias,” 605-608.

93 Ibid., 614.

actually occurred in the past.”⁹⁴ Hence, I do recognize that no historical account is a perfect representation of a past reality but, in this thesis, the sources used are treated as accounts of what actually happened.

Having addressed the issue of using historical narratives, the discussion of case selection criteria may be resumed. The second criterion in case selection is that the war must be dyadic. A dyadic war is selected in order to facilitate a simpler test of the hypotheses suggested by the bargaining model of war termination. Mitchell and Nicholson’s work illustrates the difficulty of studying war termination in cases with multiple belligerents.⁹⁵ While the examination of only a dyadic war may diminish any claim that this thesis provides a hard test of the bargaining model, simple tests are needed to assess the basic validity of the model before more complicated tests are attempted.

Third, this case is selected such that the regime types expected to have the highest and lowest resolve are represented in the belligerents. This criterion was used to allow testing of the hypotheses: **H9** and **H11**. The Philippine-American War is an example of a war between a mixed-authoritarian regime (Philippine Republic) and a democracy (United States).⁹⁶ A larger study, with more cases, would likely be able to offer instances of dictatorships at war with democracies and other combinations of regime types at war with one another. However, by including the regime types

94 Lustick, 615.

95 Mitchell and Nicholson, “Rational Models and the Ending of Wars.”

96 One might consider the Philippines to have been a dictatorship at the time of the Philippine-American War. However, as will be seen in chapter three, the Philippines’ regime was a dictatorship in name but in practice had the attributes of a mixed-authoritarian regime.

predicted to have the highest (Philippines) and weakest (US) resolve, the case selected allows a sufficient level of variance to adequately test the hypotheses regarding the effects of regime type on war termination. In the selection of this case, Goemans' basic proposition – that the fate of the belligerent state's leaders affects war termination – is taken into careful consideration.⁹⁷

Fourth, in the case selection for this study, variation in the stakes over which belligerents initiated war has been taken into account.⁹⁸ Selecting the case based on the stakes of the war permits testing of hypotheses **H12** and **H14**. Cases testing **H13** are avoided because the unclear prediction regarding belligerent behavior in medium stakes wars makes testing of **H13** problematic. In the case of the Philippine-American War, the Philippine Republic is fighting for its independence and the survival of the Filipino regime while the US fought a war of “empire maintenance.”⁹⁹ Thus, the case included in this study offers significant variation in the belligerents' stakes in the outcome of the war.

Fifth, a case of asymmetric war has been chosen. The case involves one militarily stronger power (United States) and one militarily weaker power (the Philippines). Asymmetric wars inherently involve one belligerent with a greater level of reserves than the other and therefore are a fertile testing ground for hypotheses **H1**, **H6**, **H7**. Because of the power differential, asymmetric wars are also well-suited to testing of the hypotheses related to the strategies used by belligerents (**H2-H5**). I

97 Goemans, “Fighting for Survival”; Goemans, “War and Punishment”.

98 See Slantchev, “How Initiators,” 819.

99 Ibid.

also have chosen this case based on an *a priori* assumption that in cases of asymmetric war, the resolve of the smaller power will be an important factor in war termination and any negotiation of settlement terms. Taking into account resolve provides the opportunity to test hypothesis **H8**'s prediction that the negotiating behavior of belligerents will affect settlement terms.

The case of the Philippine-American War has been selected for this study based on the above criteria. The selection criteria are not formulated based on the alternative hypotheses suggested by domestic politics approaches, organizational theory, psychological theory, constructivism, or critical theory. I recognize the limitations of my research design and argue that this investigation, as formulated, provides a sufficiently hard test of the bargaining model. Should the bargaining model find support in this thesis, further study will be necessary to assess the breadth and depth of the model's validity.

The Remainder of the Thesis

The first case study chapter (Chapter 3) is an account of the war as seen through the theoretical lenses of the bargaining model. The bargaining model account begins by identifying the belligerents along the dimensions of war aims, regime type, the stakes of the war, and the relative balance of military capabilities between belligerents. A brief description of any negotiations or military posturing directly antecedent to the outbreak of war follows. Next is an examination of the episodes of battle and negotiation throughout the course of the war. In accordance with the bargaining model, the accounts of battle and negotiation utilize evidence

emphasized by the model's hypotheses and expected observations. Additionally, in the bargaining model chapter, belligerents are treated as unitary actors. At the end of this first section, the explanatory and predictive power of the bargaining model is assessed against the evidence from the war.

The second case study (Chapter 4) is offered from the perspective of the alternative hypotheses and expectations. This account is provided using evidence emphasized by the alternative hypotheses or expected observations. This chapter is subdivided into portions corresponding with constructivism/critical theory, political psychology, domestic politics, and organization theory. The bargaining model account is not reiterated in this chapter but rather any new details are pointed out. The goal is to uncover any gaps in the bargaining model account and if gaps are found, to offer new insight into the events and outcomes of the war. Following the alternative perspectives chapter, this thesis is concluded with an assessment of the bargaining model in light of any insights provided by the alternative perspectives.

Chapter 3: The Philippine-American War, 1899-1902

Introduction

In 2003, just over a century after the termination of the Philippine-American War, the United States begins fighting a war in Iraq with striking similarities to the earlier Philippines war. As one may find in reading this chapter, there are clear parallels between the Philippine-American War and the 2003 Iraq War. Like the Philippine-American War, the war in Iraq begins with conventional warfare but later transitions into guerrilla warfare and terrorism. Also like the Philippines, Iraq is a state with numerous ethnic divisions. Although there are further instances of similarities, one may also see in the case of the Philippine-American War that there are differences between the two conflicts. Despite the differences, the commonalities between these two wars may make more important an understanding of the process by which the Philippine-American War was ended. In better understanding the causes and processes of war termination in the case of the Philippines, one might better answer the question being asked around the world at the time of this writing: “When will the Iraq war end?”

The study in this chapter analyzes the case of the Philippine-American War, 1899-1902. The hypotheses and expected observations generated by the bargaining model of war termination are tested for validity. In addition to hypothesis testing, the study in this chapter aims to capture the interaction effects between and among independent variables. The evidence is also examined in order to gauge the predictive and explanatory power of a single hypothesis relative to the other

hypotheses. To undertake these examinations and tests the process-tracing methods described in the second chapter are employed.

The Bargaining Model Account

Initial Status

The relationship between the United States and the Philippines grew in importance with the Spanish-American War of 1898. The United States victory over the Spanish navy near Manila, the Philippine's capital, put the US in a position to wrest the Philippine archipelago from Spain.¹ However, Filipino revolutionaries had taken advantage of US assistance and the Spanish-American War, expanded occupation of interior areas of the Philippines, and seized weapons from abandoned Spanish garrisons as they went.

Regime Type

On 23 May 1898, General Emilio Aguinaldo declared himself dictator of the independent Philippine Republic.² Despite Aguinaldo's claim to the title of dictator, the title was an inaccurate representation of Aguinaldo's actual control in the Philippines. Aguinaldo exercised power through a government was limited to the Filipino elite.³ Given, his incomplete control over the tools of state coercion and the

1 John M. Gates, *Schoolbooks and Krags*, (London: Greenwood P, Inc., 1973), 4; Brian M. Linn, *The Philippine War, 1899-1902*, (Lawrence: Kansas UP, 2000), 3-5.

2 Gates, *Schoolbooks and Krags*, 15-18; Linn, *The Philippine War, 1899-1902*, 21, 22.

3 Linn, "The Philippine," 34, 35. While the Filipino government had a constitution establishing some democratic institutions, both the limiting of participation to the elite and Aguinaldo's dictatorial rule by decree support classification of the Philippine Republic as a mixed authoritarian regime rather either a democracy or dictatorship. See James Lee Ray, *Democracy and International Conflict: An Evaluation of the Democratic Peace Proposition*, (Columbia: South Carolina UP, 1995), 115.

exclusion from the policymaking process of all but the Filipino elite, Aguinaldo's regime more closely fit the description of mixed authoritarian.⁴

In contrast to the qualification required to classify the Filipino regime, categorizing the US regime was much clearer. The US was a consolidated democratic regime. Specifically, throughout the war the US government was headed by William McKinley's administration.⁵

War Aims and Stakes of the War

The war aims of the US included occupation of the entire archipelago and recognition of US sovereignty over the Philippines.⁶ In exchange for recognition of US sovereignty, the Americans offered to protect the individual and property rights of the Filipinos.⁷ As a war for a colonial possession, the bargaining model points out that the stakes of the war were low for the US.⁸

The Philippine Republic's war aims were simple: US recognition of an independent and sovereign Philippine Republic.⁹ According to the bargaining model, the Philippines' stakes were also very stark. As a belligerent led by a mixed authoritarian regime fighting for both national independence and regime survival, the stakes of the war were high.

Balance of Military Capabilities

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid., 7, 42.

6 Gates, "Schoolbooks," 21, 34; Glenn A. May, "Why the United States Won the Philippine-American War, 1899-1902" *The Pacific Historical Review* 52.4 (1983), 355; Linn, "The Philippine," 30, 36.

7 Gates, "Schoolbooks," 25, 55-62.

8 Branislav L. Slantchev, "How Initiators End Their Wars: the Duration of Warfare and the Terms of Peace." *American Journal of Political Science* 48.4(2004): 813-829.

9 Gates, "Schoolbooks," 22-23. Linn, "The Philippine," 36.

Estimates regarding the initial strength of the Philippine Republic's "Army of Liberation" range from as few as 15,000 to as many as 30,000 or 40,000 regular soldiers.¹⁰ The Army of Liberation was tough, mobile, and its main force of soldiers had been largely well armed with captured Mauser rifles. Furthermore, many of the Filipino soldiers had been veterans of the revolutionary efforts against Spain. In addition to the regular forces in the Army of Liberation, the Filipino forces included armed and organized militias.¹¹

Despite the ostensible strength of the Filipino forces an important caveat must be noted. Even though Filipino forces had occupied interior portions of the archipelago, the quality arms, veteran status, toughness, and mobility that characterized part of the Army of Liberation were not representative of the entire Filipino force. Lack of training, quality weaponry, and weak command and control afflicted some segments of the Filipino forces (especially the militias).¹²

To counter Filipino forces in the ensuing war were US forces consisting of 19,000 troops referred to as the 8th Corps with support of modern naval warships.¹³ The 8th Corps benefited from new technology and doctrine. Technology had provided modern bolt-action, repeating rifles (.30 caliber Krag-Jorgensen), machine guns, and field artillery. Innovations in doctrine came from Civil and Indian War experiences which inspired pacification doctrine (General Order 100) and called for benevolence to peaceful segments of an occupied territory but harsh treatment for hostile groups

10Gates, "Schoolbooks", 4; Linn, "The Philippine", 1899-1902, 61-62.

11 Linn, "The Philippine", 42, 61-62.

12 Ibid., 34, 35.

13 Ibid., 7, 42.

and individuals. Frontier fighting and the Indian Wars also bequeathed to the Regulars efficient small-unit tactics well suited to irregular war. However, the US forces were hampered by a lack of prior planning for occupation of the Philippines and were therefore poorly prepared and subject to lacking intelligence capabilities in the Philippines.¹⁴

In addition to the forces already marshalled by both belligerents at the onset of war, it is important to consider the balance of reserves. In this regard, the US clearly had the advantage. As a populous and industrializing state with superiority in quantity of human, natural, and technological resources, the US possessed more potential to mobilize additional resources for war.¹⁵

Expected Processes and Outcomes

If the expected observations and hypotheses of the bargaining model are correct, then there are general observations of processes and outcomes that should be evident in the case of the Philippine-American War. First, if *expected observation one (O1)* is correct, then there will be (possibly delayed) negotiations between the Philippine and US governments during the war. *Expected observation two (O2)* suggests that the US and Philippines may alter their demanded settlement terms if they are successful or unsuccessful in battle and/or negotiation and the final settlement terms will reflect the balance of military capabilities and resolve.

¹⁴ Ibid., 8-12.

¹⁵ This description of reserves is not derived from the sources used in this case study. However, as a depiction of the balance of reserves between the US and Philippines, the description is reasonable. Additionally, the historical source materials corroborate a conclusion that the US had greater reserves. See Gates, "Schoolbooks."; Linn, "The Philippine."

The balance of military capabilities between the US and Philippine forces requires some explanation before related expected observations and hypotheses can be discussed. Though the Army of Liberation's manpower may have initially exceeded that of the US Army, the US Army was generally better armed, trained and commanded. Furthermore, the military forces of the US were supplemented by naval power. One must also consider the fact that, in part through superior reserves, the US had the ability to re-supply and replenish its forces while the Filipinos were effectively prevented from acquiring outside resources.¹⁶ Considering the ostensibly more powerful military capabilities of the US (especially a more favorable balance of reserves), *hypothesis one (H1)* predicts that the US will consistently demand more favorable settlement terms than the Philippines during and at the conclusion of the war.

However, the strategies employed by the US and Filipino militaries should affect the efficacy of each belligerent's military capabilities. According to *hypothesis two (H2)*, if both the US and Philippine militaries fight using direct strategies, then the Philippine Republic will suffer higher relative rates of loss in battle. If, however, the Filipinos adopt an indirect strategy and the US forces fight using a direct strategy, then *hypothesis three (H3)* predicts that the US will suffer higher relative rates of loss in battle. Still another possibility is predicted by *hypothesis four (H4)*: if the US employs an indirect strategy and the Filipinos use a direct strategy, then the US will suffer higher relative rates of loss in battle. On the other hand, *hypothesis five (H5)*

¹⁶ See Gates, "Schoolbooks"; Linn, "The Philippine."

predicts that if the US and Philippine militaries both confront each other using indirect strategies, then the Philippines will suffer higher relative rates of loss in battle.

The outcomes of battles should also have an observable effect on the belligerents' settlement terms. Based on *hypothesis six (H6)*, one might expect that if either the US or Philippine Republic forces suffers a higher relative loss rate than the other, the 'losing' belligerent will moderate its settlement terms. In contrast, *hypothesis seven (H7)* predicts that the 'winning' belligerent will not moderate its settlement terms and may even increase its demands.

In addition to the expectations derived from **H1**, **H6**, and **H7**, belligerents' negotiating behavior should also impact settlement terms. Therefore *hypothesis eight (H8)* predicts that if in negotiations the Philippine Republic (or US) refuses to moderate its settlement terms, then the US (or Philippine Republic) will moderate its own settlement terms. However, several factors should affect the resolve of the US and Philippines in negotiations. First, given mixed authoritarian regime leading the Philippine Republic, *hypotheses nine* and *eleven (H9 and H11)* lead to the expectation that the Philippines will exhibit a higher level of resolve than the democratic US. **H9** gives rise to the expectation that the Philippines will refuse to moderate its settlement terms even if it faces outright military defeat. Given that **H11** is correct, the US will moderate its terms if it suffers a higher rate of battle losses than the Philippines. If, however, the US inflicts higher rates of battle losses on the

Philippine Republic, then **O3** predicts that, in order to more quickly end the war, the US will not increase its demands.¹⁷

The stakes of the war for the Philippines and US should also affect the resolve of the belligerents. The stakes discussed above offer other expectations about what should be observed in the case study. Because for the Philippine Republic, the stakes of the war are high, *hypothesis twelve (H12)* suggests that the Philippines will refuse to moderate its settlement terms even if it faces outright military defeat in prolonged fighting. Given the low stakes of the war for the US, **H14** predicts that the US will dramatically moderate or forsake its settlement terms if it suffers higher rates of battle losses than the Philippine Republic. These predictions about the Philippine-American War will be tested against the evidence.

One must reiterate that there are challenging questions presented by the hypotheses of the bargaining model. Among the challenges briefly discussed in the second chapter, the hypotheses do not specify whether or when the causal impact of the resolve variables is greater than, less than, or equal to the causal impact of military capabilities variables. The hypotheses also do not specify the relative impact on resolve of regime type, the stakes of the war, *etcetera*. Perhaps in the case study, tentative answers to these challenging questions will be provided. The case study

¹⁷ Darren Filson and Suzanne Werner argue that because resolve and military capabilities are both components of bargaining leverage, win or lose, democratic belligerents will receive less favorable settlement terms than would a belligerent of a different regime type in the same circumstances. This is due to the cost sensitivity of democracies. Rather than continuing to fight in hopes of gain more favorable concessions in a war, democratic belligerents, Filson and Werner argue the democracies will accept less favorable terms in order to avoid continued war. See Darren Filson and Suzanne Werner, "Bargaining and Fighting: The Impact of Regime Type on War Onset, Duration, and Outcomes." *American Journal of Political Science* 48.2(2004): 296-313.

begins with the pre-war negotiations between the US and the Philippines and progresses through each stage of the war to the final agreement terminating the war.

Preliminary Negotiations

When the US defeated the Spanish navy at Manila, the Philippine Republic expected US support for the Filipino revolutionaries. Conversely, the US government expected Filipino allegiance and support. Both Filipino and American forces took action to occupy the capital city of Manila and the US ordered that America would not tolerate a joint Filipino-American occupation of Manila. On 12 August 1898 the US 8th Corps took possession of the city while the Philippine Republic's Army of Liberation surrounded Manila.¹⁸ Tensions grew despite negotiations. Filipino and American forces shored up their positions in and around Manila in preparation for war. Six more negotiation meetings occurred in January 1899, but neither side moderated its settlement terms and, as a result, negotiations remained at an impasse.¹⁹

In short, negotiation was made a dead letter by the inability of the Philippine Republic and the United States to reach a compromise settlement between the Filipino demand for independence and the US demand that its sovereignty in the Philippines be recognized. Thus, the stage had been set for the outbreak of the Philippine-American War.²⁰

The Conventional War Period

Battle for Manila

18 Gates, "Schoolbooks," 19-42; Linn, "The Philippine," 21, Ch. 2.

19 Gates, "Schoolbooks," 33-42.

20 Gates, "Schoolbooks, 4-7, 16-42; Linn, "The Philippine," 3-7, 21, Ch. 2.

In the Battle for Manila, on the 4th and 5th of February 1899, the US Army, with assistance in the form of naval bombardment, extended the American-controlled territory around Manila. This was the largest single battle of the war. The US forces suffered approximately 200 wounded and between 44 and 59 killed while the Filipino Army of Liberation had taken 4,000 casualties with between 500 and 700 killed; a further 500 Filipino soldiers were captured. The battle was a decisive victory for the Americans and the Philippine Republic suffered a much greater rate of loss relative to the US.²¹

Fighting continued during the remainder of February 1899. The US continuously defeated Filipinos in engagements with regular troops.²² The battle for Manila had occurred at the peak of Aguinaldo's military power.²³ The results of Aguinaldo's defeat included the loss of "irreplaceable rifles, cannon, ammunition, and supplies" and led the Philippines' chief general Antonio Luna to remark, "Our enemies are too strong and superior in means."²⁴ As Aguinaldo's top general, Luna's remark is important in demonstrating support for the bargaining model's assumption that battle provides accurate information with which belligerents update their beliefs about relative military capabilities. The battles during February also provide confirmation for **H2**'s prediction that when a militarily weaker belligerent using a direct strategy confronts a strong belligerent using a direct strategy, the weaker belligerent will suffer higher relative rates of loss.

21 Gates, "Schoolbooks," 76-78; Linn, "The Philippine," 42-56.

22 Gates, "Schoolbooks," 79; Linn, "The Philippine," 55-64.

23 Linn, "The Philippine," 61-62.

24 Ibid., 61-63.

War across the Archipelago

Soon after the battles for Manila, the US ratified the treaty ending the war with Spain, and as a result, some units within the 8th Corps were to be sent back to the United States. This was soon to reduce the US forces to only 11,000 combat-ready troops. However, some of the soldiers in the units returning to the US offered to remain until their replacements arrived. Meanwhile the Army of Liberation had a growing force of 30,000 regulars and an unknown number of militia, with the troops and arms concentrated mostly on Luzon. However, the Filipino forces were only armed with a total of between 25,000 and 35,000 firearms and also had shortages in ammunition and artillery. As a consequence of this power balance on the archipelago, the US ability to go on the offensive was limited, but its defensive capability was sufficient to keep Aguinaldo's forces confined to the interior areas of the Philippine islands.²⁵

Despite limited offensive capabilities, the US 8th Corps undertook operations both to disrupt the Army of Liberation and to gain footholds in other parts of the Philippines.²⁶ On 16 March 1899, 1,000 Filipino soldiers attacked Iloilo, a city recently captured by US forces. While suffering one soldier killed and fourteen wounded, the Americans killed between 50 and 200 of the 1,000 attacking Filipinos. The battle at Iloilo again supports the prediction of **H2** that the Filipino forces would suffer higher relative rates of loss as long as both sides used direct strategies.

The Conventional War on Luzon

²⁵ Gates, "Schoolbooks," 78-80.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 79.

US forces had fought to gain more footholds by occupying key ports in other parts of the Philippines. Filipino forces responded by occupying interior areas and surrounding the positions held by the American forces garrisoning the ports.²⁷ The US realized that it would be necessary to achieve victory in Luzon, the location of the bulk of the Army of Liberation's forces and the site of the Philippine Republic capital city, Malolos.²⁸

Northern Luzon

In the spring of 1899, US forces began a campaign to trap and defeat the Army of Liberation in northern Luzon and capture the Philippine Republic capital of Malolos.²⁹ The offensive into northern Luzon began 25 March 1899. The US failed to trap the Army of Liberation or capture the Philippine Republic government, but succeeded in inflicting upon the Philippines the loss of experienced soldiers, irreplaceable Mausers, precious ammunition, supplies, and money.³⁰

From the spring to fall of 1899, US reinforcements began arriving and, by the fall of 1899, 70,000 US soldiers were in the Philippines. The US took advantage of the enlarged 8th Corps and launched another attempt to capture the Army of Liberation. On 11 April, in anticipation of another US campaign, and in hopes of dampening the US offensive capability, the Filipino forces attacked US garrisons on Luzon. In spite of the Filipino attacks, the offensive began on 23 April. The main battle of the second US offensive in northern Luzon occurred at Calumpit. The Army

27 Gates, "Schoolbooks," 79, 80.

28 Linn, "The Philippine," 88.

29 Ibid., 88-93.

30 Gates, "Schoolbooks," 110-112; Linn, "The Philippine," 95-100.

of Liberation benefited from natural and manmade defensive positions in addition to having a large force of 7,000 soldiers. However, when the US army attacked the Army of Liberation at Calumpit, the Filipino defenses failed and within three days the Americans had defeated the Filipino forces.³¹ Yet again, the battles between the Army of Liberation and the reinforced US Army support the prediction of **H2** that the Filipinos would suffer higher rates of losses than the Americans as long as both sides employed direct strategies.³²

First Round Intra-War Negotiations

On 28 April, in the aftermath of defeat, the Philippine Republic requested “a three-week armistice to...discuss terms.”³³ The US rejected the Philippines’ request, and refused a truce until the Army of Liberation had disarmed. On 2 May, the Philippine Republic offered a three month cease-fire with a subtle stipulation that the United States recognize Philippine independence. The US again rejected the Filipino offer and this time made a counteroffer that the Philippine Republic accept Filipino civil government under US sovereignty and the US policy of benevolent assimilation. However, the Philippine Republic rejected the US terms. Consequently, negotiations collapsed and the US offensive resumed.³⁴

The inter-belligerent communications and negotiations following the defeat of the Philippine Republic’s Army of Liberation by the US military are quite instructive.

31 Gates, “Schoolbooks,” 110-112; Linn, “The Philippine,” 90-109.

32 Though body counts and tabulations of lost/destroyed materiel are not complete enough to provide a clear ratio of losses, the above account clearly shows that the US was inflicting losses on the Philippine Republic at a greater rate than were being suffered by the Americans.

33 Linn, “The Philippine,” 109.

34 Gates, “Schoolbooks,” 92, 93; Linn, “The Philippine,” 109.

The evidence offers both confirmation and disconfirmation of the bargaining model. Generally supported hypotheses/expected observations will be discussed before disconfirmed hypotheses.

First, **O1** is supported: negotiations occur during the course of the war but are delayed until after a series of battles had been fought. Second, **H1** also finds confirmation. The belligerent with greater reserves, the US, demands more favorable terms than the Philippine Republic. The Philippine Republic demands only that it be granted recognition as an independent state. The Philippines makes no demands that would ask the US to do anything more than cede its control over a recently obtained colonial possession. In contrast, the US is demanding the Philippine Republic cede both independence and at least some measure of the regime's control over its own state/territory.

Third, the US rejection of any offer to negotiate that did not include disarmament of the Philippine military reflects what **H7** predicted would result if the US inflicted on the Philippine Republic a higher relative rate of losses.³⁵ However, contra **H7** the US moderates its settlement terms by allowing a measure of self-governance for the Philippines. Recall that the original settlement terms only communicated to the Filipinos that they must accept US sovereignty over the archipelago. Though this moderation runs counter to **H7**, such moderation is in line with the prediction of **O3** that even when militarily successful, the democratic US

³⁵ Again, though body counts and tabulations of lost/destroyed materiel are not complete enough to provide a clear ratio of losses, the above account clearly shows that the US was inflicting losses on the Philippine Republic at a greater rate than were being suffered by the Americans.

would moderate its settlement terms in order to end a war rather than fight on for higher gains. The fluctuation of settlement terms during these negotiations also provides confirmation of *expected observation two* (O2).

Fourth, regarding the effects of regime type and the stakes of the war, **H9** and **H12** are confirmed. The unwillingness of the mixed authoritarian Philippine Republic to moderate its demands or accept the unfavorable terms offered by the US supports **H9**. In turn, **H12** is supported by the Philippines' refusal to moderate its demands by disarming or abandoning its demand for independence (despite incurring a higher rate of losses relative to the US, the Philippine Republic was steadfast in its demands.)

Despite support for some hypotheses, **H6** and **H8** are challenged by the evidence (though **H8** is only partially questioned). **H6** predicts that because the Philippine Republic was suffering losses at a greater rate than US, the Philippines would moderate its settlement terms. Yet, in spite of its military defeats, the Philippines refused to moderate its terms. However, the disconfirmation of **H6** is explained by the confirmation of **H9**. Given that the government of the Philippine Republic is a mixed authoritarian regime, **H9** is shown to have more predictive power than **H6** in regards to the behavior of the Philippines.

In considering **H8**, it is important to note two events. In the first instance, when the US rejected the Philippines' armistice offer, the Philippine Republic countered with an altered, but not necessarily moderated, offer. This may provide a challenge to **H8**. However, Philippine Republic mixed authoritarian regime may also

account for this challenge to **H8**. In the second instance, the US rejected the unmoderated Filipino counteroffer but indicated a new allowance for Filipino self-government that had not been part of previous settlement terms. This second negotiation event appears to support **H8**. In sum, **H6** receives disconfirmation while **H8** receives a mix of confirmation *and* disconfirmation.

Resumption of Battle

Returning to the case, one finds that the renewed US offensive reduced the Army of Liberation to small disorganized units capable only of harassment against American forces. The Filipinos lost scarce firearms and their relocated capital at San Isidro was captured.³⁶ The Filipino forces had suffered “a series of smashing blows” but the Philippine Republic’s forces had not been totally destroyed.³⁷ Though the Philippine military was not completely defeated, the outcome of resumed battle between the US and Philippines serves to again reinforce the confirmation of **H2**. **H2**’s prediction that the US would inflict higher relative rates of loss on the Philippines as long as both the American and Filipino forces fought using direct strategies is clearly borne out by the evidence.

Southern Luzon

While some US forces were engaged in the campaigns of northern Luzon, other US soldiers were undertaking operations in Luzon’s south. In early April 1899, US forces captured a major Filipino supply center. The attack on the supply center resulted in 93 Filipino soldiers killed at a cost to the US forces of 1 soldier killed and

³⁶ Linn, “The Philippine,” 109-116.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 116.

9 wounded. In other campaigns taking place into the summer of 1899, the US secured more extensive lines and strategic points and forced the Philippines to divert much needed forces from northern Luzon.³⁸ Once more, **H2** is confirmed by the continued US victories and favorable loss rates in the battles fought using conventional (direct) warfare strategies.

Fall Offensive of 1899

Reinforcements for the 8th Corps were arriving from the United States and the US naval blockade of the Philippines had managed to isolate Filipino forces on each island and prevent communications, supply efforts, and troop movements.³⁹ At the same time US power in the Philippines was in the ascendant, the Philippine Republic continued to experience a decline in power. Among its political woes, the Philippine Republic had been forced to continually move its capital. One consequence of the Philippines' political trouble was that only "confused efforts to resume peace negotiations" with the US occurred.⁴⁰ The military decline of the Philippine Republic also continued. Logistical constraints had reduced the Army of Liberation to 4,000 soldiers and command and control problems further exacerbated the decline in troop strength.⁴¹

From a position of strength in the fall of 1899, the US launched another offensive in an attempt to capture the Army of Liberation and quash resistance on Luzon. America's stated goal of the fall offensive was to capture the Army of

38 Ibid., 101-103.

39 Ibid., 122-131.

40Gates, "Schoolbooks," 81-100; Linn, "The Philippine," 136.

41 Linn, "The Philippine," 136-138.

Liberation in order to prevent it from beginning a guerrilla war. The US army failed to capture the Army of Liberation but the American forces killed and captured hundreds of Filipino soldiers. Perhaps even more importantly, US soldiers seized artillery, captured vast amounts of supplies, and in one case, destroyed an irreplaceable arsenal containing 200 rifles and 60,000 rounds of ammunition.⁴² Again, **H2** is supported by the higher rates of loss inflicted by the US on the Philippines during the conventional phase of the war.

Making matters worse, the Army of Liberation began losing forces through the surrender or desertion of high-ranking officers and soldiers.⁴³ In the process, some surrendered themselves along with scarce ammunition and irreplaceable rifles to the US forces. At least some of the motivation for surrender can be discerned as a belief that US military capabilities were superior to those of the Philippine Republic. For example, Brian Linn states that Filipino General Daniel Tirona “decided resistance was futile, and on 11 December he surrendered 1,200 precious rifles and all the forces in Isabella and Cagayan Provinces.”⁴⁴ This lends support to the bargaining model assumption that battle outcomes lead to belief updating.

The Guerrilla War Period

As a result of the offensives into northern Luzon, the Army of Liberation was no longer capable of continuing a conventional war. On 13 November 1899, the Army of Liberation disbanded and the practice of guerrilla warfare was officially

42 Ibid., 139-159.

43 Gates, “Schoolbooks,” 110-112, 144-148; Linn, “The Philippine,” 139-159, see esp. 153, 154.

44 Gates, “Schoolbooks,” 110-112, 144-148; Linn, “The Philippine,” 139-159, see esp. 153, 154.

adopted. For its part, the US capitalized on its victory and expanded the areas under American occupation.⁴⁵ The US continued to capture rifles and proportionally large quantities of ammunition totaling over 10,000 rounds. American forces kept up pressure on the Filipino forces and dispersed them as the US continually expanded its area of control.⁴⁶

The Early Stages

Generals of the Philippine Republic's Army of Liberation assumed control of guerrilla districts and used tactics of harassment, ambushes, traps, and sabotage to increase the cost of American occupation and wear down the US forces.⁴⁷ The Filipino's adoption of guerrilla warfare met with early success. American soldiers were forced to respond to guerrilla efforts.⁴⁸ The guerrilla war had soon inflicted more casualties than the previous conventional war.⁴⁹ The success of the Filipino forces employing an indirect (guerrilla) strategy against the US military's direct (conventional) strategy supports the prediction derived from **H3**: the militarily weaker belligerent using an indirect strategy should inflict higher relative loss rates on a militarily stronger belligerent employing a direct strategy. Admittedly, it is not entirely clear that the Philippine forces actually did inflict more losses than they suffered. Nevertheless, the evidence does suggest that the US was suffering a greater

45 Gates, "Schoolbooks," 110-112; Linn, "The Philippine," 139-159.

46 Linn, "The Philippine," 160-180.

47 Ibid.

48 Linn, "Provincial," 62-66; Linn "The Philippine," 187-191

49 Gates, "Schoolbooks," 171; Linn, "The Philippine," 209.

rate of loss than the Philippines.⁵⁰ The success of guerrilla warfare peaked in 1900. During the early guerrilla phase, the Philippine Republic inflicted heavy casualties on US forces. However, the US military soon responded to the Filipino guerrillas with a counter-guerrilla campaign.⁵¹

US persistence, despite suffering greater losses compared to those of the Filipino guerillas, challenges **H6**'s prediction that the US would moderate its settlement terms if experiencing a higher rate of losses than the Philippines. Furthermore, continued fighting by the US with no moderation of settlement terms disconfirms **H11** and **H14**. As a democratic state fighting a low stakes war, the US should have attempted to exit the war by dramatically moderating or perhaps forsaking its demands after the early success of the Filipino guerilla war. Additionally, contrary to **H7**'s predictions, the Philippine Republic did not capitalize on its successful guerilla strategy by seeking more favorable terms from the US. In fact, despite the bargaining model expectation that belligerents will negotiate (**O1**), negotiations between the Philippine Republic and the US were notably absent during the guerrilla war.

The Later Stages

In mid-November and December 1900, the US adopted a much harsher strategy of pacification designed to retaliate against the Filipino resistance and, more importantly, to separate the guerrillas from their support base in the Filipino

50 See Gates, "Schoolbooks," 171; Linn, "The Philippine," 209.

51 Gates, "Schoolbooks," 173-175; Linn, "The Philippine," 213-215.

population.⁵² The changed American approach to making war on the Filipino guerrillas included several new tactics. US forces began to consider many of the guerrillas to be irregular combatants that did not have to be treated as prisoners of war. This change in the official status regarded to Filipino guerrillas allowed policies such as holding prisoners for a ransom of weapons and information or even executing Filipino prisoners. Guerrilla supporters and sympathizers were also arrested. Furthermore, when American forces captured civil and military leaders of the Philippine Republic, the leaders were deported to Guam.⁵³ Another tactic was to pay Filipino informants “liberally” for any intelligence provided to the US forces. The resulting improvement in intelligence gathering led to many arrests, including those of resistance officers.⁵⁴ In addition to buying information, the US also reformed its intelligence gathering apparatus and was able to identify guerrillas when they entered populated areas and forced the Filipino resistance into isolation.⁵⁵ The shift in US strategies is one of an abandonment of a direct, conventional strategy in favor of an indirect, counterinsurgency strategy.⁵⁶

In addition to adopting improved and harsher means of waging the war, the US also exerted pressure on the guerrillas simply by increasing their presence across the Philippines. The number of garrisons was increased from 400 to 502; this allowed the US to occupy every important locality and strategic location, and to block

52 Gates, “Schoolbooks,” 187-200.

53 Ibid., 205-208.

54 Ibid., 208, 209.

55 Ibid., 211

56 Aspects of this strategy would meet the criteria of a barbaric strategy in the terminology of Ivan Arreguin-Toft. See Ivan Arreguin-Toft, “How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict.” *International Security* 26.1(2001): 93-128

access to the trails utilized by guerrillas.⁵⁷ American soldiers used their increased presence to launch offensive operations that prevented guerrillas from resting or regrouping. American soldiers also initiated round-ups in which Filipino males of military age were detained to prevent their participation in guerrilla activities. US operations also destroyed the food and supplies in the interior areas of the Philippines and thereby deprived the guerrillas of the basic means to live much less wage war.⁵⁸

In some cases, the US forces concentrated civilians in US occupied towns or protected zones. Filipinos found outside of the occupied towns were treated as enemies to the American forces. The concentration of the population served purposes valuable to the US military. First, the tactic of concentration prevented the guerrillas from obtaining food, aid, or intelligence. Second, it aided American soldiers in locating Filipino guerrillas.⁵⁹ The success of the indirect strategy employed by the militarily more powerful US to counter the indirect strategy utilized by the militarily less powerful Philippines provides support for **H5**. The US had clearly reversed the early trend of the initial phase of the guerrilla war. Again, though exact figures are unavailable, the evidence suggests that the Philippines' forces were suffering more losses than they were inflicting on the Americans.

Toward Termination of the War

Cut off from their support base, and continually pursued by US forces, the guerrillas found themselves without rest, weapons, and food. The Filipino guerrillas

57 Gates, "Schoolbooks," 209; Linn, "The Philippine," 235.

58 Gates, "Schoolbooks," Ch. 7; Linn, "The Philippine," 197-224, Ch. 10-13.

59 Gates, "Schoolbooks," 209-210; Birtle, 255-282; Linn, "Provincial," 62-66; Linn, "The Philippine," 214, 215, Ch. 10-13.

were also continually being dispersed into smaller and smaller units. The thorough and harsh new strategy of the US forces eliminated the guerrillas as an effective military force, and reduced their activities to very limited forms of terrorism. Furthermore, as US control solidified, even terrorism became an ineffective tool with which to continue resistance. Under these conditions, Filipino commanders, officers, and rank-and-file soldiers increasingly surrendered or simply ceased fighting.⁶⁰

In addition to the combination of US military operations, which had left the guerrillas isolated, hungry, and often unarmed, war termination was brought closer after Aguinaldo was captured on 14 March 1901. Shortly after his capture, Aguinaldo called for all remaining Filipino forces to surrender and accept US sovereignty. More Filipino soldiers and leaders answered his call by surrendering to US forces.⁶¹ Some guerrilla leaders and their units continued to fight after Aguinaldo's capture, but the continued use of proven counter-guerrilla tactics led to the capture or surrender of the last major guerrilla units by 16 April 1902 and the subsequent surrender of the last organized resistance.⁶² On 4 July 1902, President Theodore Roosevelt declared the war to be over and transferred the US territory of the Philippines from military to civilian control.⁶³

The fact that the Philippine Republic abandoned its demands only after the capture of Aguinaldo supports **H9**. **H9** predicts that the Philippine Republic would refuse to moderate its settlement terms even if it faced outright military defeat in

60Gates, "Schoolbooks," 210; Birtle, 255-282; Linn, "Provincial," 62-66; Linn, "The Philippine," 214, 215, Ch. 10-13.

61 Gates, "Schoolbooks," 218, 219, 229, 230, 233-235; Linn, "The Philippine," 215-224, Ch. 10-13.

62 Gates, "Schoolbooks," 236-242, Ch. 9; Linn, "The Philippine," 219, Ch. 10-14.

63 Linn, "The Philippine," 219.

continued battle. Thus, **H9** is confirmed because the Philippine Republic acceded to US demands only after the capture of Aguinaldo and actual defeat of remaining hold-out forces. The manner of the war's termination also adds further support for **O3**. Despite the clear military victory by American forces, the US did not increase its demands by means such as adding punitive measures.

Analysis

An appraisal of the hypotheses and expected observations

In examining the case of the Philippine-American War, the pertinent predictions and hypotheses derived from the bargaining model of war termination find a mixture of confirmation and disconfirmation. First, the prediction of *expected observation one (O1)*, that belligerents negotiate settlement terms for war termination during the war, finds support.⁶⁴ However, one should note that negotiations between the belligerents were markedly absent during the guerrilla war period. Second, *expected observation two (O2)* finds confirmation in the fluctuation of settlement terms during negotiations following the Filipino defeat in battle at Calumpit.⁶⁵

Material Hypotheses

Linked to the confirmation of **O2** is support for the first material hypothesis, **H1**. As predicted by **H1**, the belligerent with greater levels of reserves, the US demanded more favorable settlement terms than the Philippine Republic. In addition, clear confirmation was found for hypotheses **H2**, **H3**, and **H5** (**H4** was not applicable to this case). When both the US and Philippine militaries fought using a direct

64 Gates, "Schoolbooks," 236-242, Ch. 9; Linn, "The Philippine," 154, 219, Ch. 10-14.

65 Gates, "Schoolbooks," 92, 93; Linn, "The Philippine," 109.

strategy, as predicted by **H2**, the Philippine Republic suffered higher relative rates of loss in battle. However, after the Filipinos adopted an indirect strategy and the US forces continued to fight using a direct strategy, the fact that the Filipino army was able to have military success offers support for **H3**. In turn, **H5** is confirmed by the battle successes achieved by the US after employing an indirect strategy to counter the Filipinos' use of an indirect strategy.

In contrast to the clear confirmation of hypotheses **H1**, **H2**, **H3**, and **H5**, disconfirmation is doubly found for **H6** while **H7** receives mixed support. **H6** is first disconfirmed by the Philippine Republic's refusal to moderate its terms during the negotiations after the battle at Calumpit. Further disconfirming evidence is found in the refusal of the US to moderate its settlement terms after it experienced higher relative rates of loss during the initial period of guerrilla warfare. On the other hand, **H7** finds some support in the American rejection of the Philippine Republic's offer during negotiations following the battle of Calumpit. Yet, in the same period, the US moderates its demands despite having inflicted more losses on the Philippines than the Philippines had inflicted on the US. Thus, the negotiation behavior of the US offers evidence that both supports and challenges **H7**. Lastly, **H7** is challenged by the absence of a Filipino attempt to exploit the Philippine Republic's successful guerilla strategy by seeking moderated terms from the US.

Negotiation Effects Hypothesis

H8 captures the effects of negotiation by predicting that if one belligerent exhibits resolve by refusing to moderate its settlement terms, then the opposing

belligerent will moderate its own terms. This hypothesis finds mixed support. On the one hand, **H8** is questioned by the US rejection of the Philippines' terms and the Philippine Republic response of a reformulated, but unmoderated, offer. On the other hand, **H8** receives some support when the US rejected the Philippines' unmoderated counterproposal but moderated American demands by offering a new allowance some for Filipino self-government. In short, the effects of negotiation behavior on settlement terms are not clear.

Regime Hypotheses

Of the regime hypotheses, only **H9** and **H11** are applicable to this case. **H9** predicts that as a belligerent led by a mixed authoritarian regime, the Philippines would refuse to moderate its settlement terms even if faced with outright military defeat in continued battle. **H9** finds clear support. In the negotiations following the battle at Calumpit, the Philippine Republic exhibited high resolve by refusing to moderate its settlement terms despite battlefield defeats at the hands of the US. Moreover, the Philippine Republic did not accept the American settlement terms until Aguinaldo was captured and the Philippines had been soundly defeated militarily.

Contrary to the support found for **H9**, the evidence from the Philippine-American war disconfirms **H11**. According to **H11**, the US, in an effort to extricate itself from the war, should have moderated its demands after the Philippine Republic's military successes during the early period of the guerrilla war. However, contra the prediction of **H11**, the US did not lessen its demands following the initial losses inflicted by the Filipino forces' guerrilla strategy. In sum, **H9** receives clear

confirmation while **H11** receives clear disconfirmation. However, **H11**'s corollary, **O3** is supported by US moderation at the negotiations following the Calumpit battle despite the previous military successes of the American forces.

Stakes Hypotheses

Stakes hypotheses **H12** and **H14** are tested in this case and while **H12** is confirmed, **H14** is disconfirmed. For the Philippine Republic, fighting for its independence and the survival of its regime, the stakes of the war are high. **H12** predicts that the Philippines would refuse to moderate its settlement terms even in the face of outright military defeat. Therefore, **H12** is supported by the Philippine Republic's refusal to accept US settlement terms until Aguinaldo's capture and the near total defeat of the Filipino military.

Given the low stakes of the war, the US should have exhibited weak resolve. **H14** predicts that the US would dramatically moderate or abandon its demands if it suffered a higher rate of loss relative to the Philippine Republic. **H14** is not confirmed by the evidence in this case study. Despite the higher relative rate of loss incurred by the American forces, the US showed no sign of further moderating, much less forsaking, its demands on the Philippines. Please see Table 3 in the Appendix for a summary assessment of the hypotheses tested in this case.

An overall assessment of the bargaining model

Only nine of the fourteen hypotheses/expected observations applicable to Philippine-American War are confirmed. Of the five remaining hypotheses, two

receive mixed support and three are disconfirmed. What is to be made of the bargaining model based on these findings?

To begin, it appears that as a measure of military capabilities, a belligerent's reserves relative to those of its adversary are a sound predictor of which belligerent will demand more favorable terms. Furthermore, the strategies employed by belligerents are found to be a strong predictor of battle outcomes. However, the disconfirmation of **H6** and mixed findings for **H7** cast doubt on the bargaining model's assumption that belligerents update their beliefs and alter their settlement terms based on information received from battle outcomes. Moreover, the mixed support for **H8** questions the bargaining model's assertion that information received at the bargaining table impacts belligerents' beliefs and shapes their settlement terms.

The bargaining model may be able to answer some of these challenges. First, part of the disconfirming evidence found for **H6** and **H8** can be accounted for by the predictions of **H9** and **H12** that the Philippine Republic would be unwilling to moderate its settlement terms even if continued war was likely to result in the Philippines' outright military defeat. Based on **H9** and **H12**, it is no surprise that the Philippine Republic stood firm despite defeats in battle and US demands in negotiation. Furthermore, US moderation at the post-Calumpit negotiations (which disconfirms **H7**) is explained by **O3**'s prediction that, in order to end war more quickly, democracies would be moderate even after military success.

However, some of the disconfirmation of **H6** is not readily explained by the bargaining model. Indeed, some disconfirmation of **H6** makes the disconfirmation of

H11 and **H14** all the more troubling for the model. A lack of settlement term moderation by the US after the early Filipino success in guerilla war questions the predictions of **H6** and **H11**. Moreover, failure by the US to moderate at that point is quite disconfirming of **H14**. According to **H14**, the US should have backed down in its settlement terms perhaps to the point of dropping its demands. Therefore, revision is needed to address the bargaining model's incorrect predictions about the behavior of democratic belligerents and belligerents fighting low stakes wars.

In sum, this account of the Philippine-American War has cast doubt on both the predictions of the bargaining model and the assumptions underlying its explanations of war termination. In the following chapter, the black boxing of the unitary actor assumption is abandoned. By removing the black box, the alternative perspectives of constructivism, critical theory, political psychology, and domestic politics can be applied to the Philippine-American War. These alternative perspectives may shed analytical light on the shortcomings of the bargaining model's predictions/explanations. Perhaps they will highlight important variables and causal pathways in war termination processes that are missed by the bargaining model.

Chapter 4: Breaking Open the “Black Box” and Bounding the Rationality of the Bargaining Model

Introduction

The bargaining model account of the Philippine-American War leaves one with an empirical puzzle. In the first place, why did battle outcomes and negotiation not have the predicted effects? While, as discussed in the previous chapter, the bargaining model can account for some of these empirical failings, other shortcomings are left unexplained. Most apparent, a democratic belligerent – fighting a low stakes war and experiencing higher relative rates of loss – behaved in an unexpected manner by not making concessions or dropping demands in order to exit the war. These empirical challenges to the bargaining model of war termination raise important questions about the validity of the model’s predictions.

In this chapter, the unitary rational actor assumptions of the bargaining model are set aside. Instead, the alternative perspectives from constructivism, critical theory, political psychology, domestic politics/decision-making approaches, and organization theory are applied to the Philippine-American War. The alternative hypotheses and expected observations suggested by these theories/approaches will be tested against the evidence. Any evidence found in support of the alternative hypotheses/expected observations will be used to provide the missing pieces to the empirical puzzle left by the bargaining model account of the war. In particular, the alternative hypotheses/expected observations will be employed in an effort to explain why some of the bargaining model hypotheses are disconfirmed.

Explanations provided by the alternative perspectives may offer insight into the questions about the Philippine-American War left unanswered by the bargaining model. However, the alternative perspectives may do more than explain what the bargaining model does not. Recall that the alternative hypotheses/expected observations examined in this chapter are derived from theories and approaches that stand in stark contrast to the bargaining model's unitary rational actor. Consequently, one should not expect that the alternative perspectives will simply complement the bargaining model by filling in the empirical gaps or serving as residual explanations. Support found for the alternative hypotheses/expected observations may well undermine even the confirmed bargaining model hypotheses. In the worst case for the bargaining model, the alternative perspectives may challenge the model's core assumptions and causal mechanisms.

Domestic Politics: Influence and Decision-making

Before proceeding to any of the other alternative perspectives, the insights from domestic politics must first be discussed. In considering the domestic politics of the Philippines and the US during the war, the unitary actor assumptions of the bargaining model become apparently problematic. In both the US and the Philippine Republic, moderate and hard-liner elites and decision-makers engaged in competition for the levers of policy-making. Arguably, the outcomes of the competition in the two belligerents played a significant role in the process of the war's termination. One should also note that including domestic political factors into a theoretical understanding of war termination makes the concept of a war's 'stakes' much more

clouded. Therefore the following discussion of domestic political factors will focus on two themes: moderate – hard-liner dynamics and the stakes of the war for different groups within the belligerent states.

For the Philippine Republic, the nature of Filipino society and the divisions between moderates and hard-liners made the stakes of the war unclear. In the case of the Philippine Republic's dictator, the stakes were indeed high. Emilio Aguinaldo had, during the revolutionary war against Spain (beginning in 1896), declared himself president of an independent Philippines but after losing a conventional (direct strategy) war had fled into exile. His exile lasted until the US returned him to the Philippines during the Spanish-American War.¹ Aguinaldo's experience was that losing wars for independence resulted in loss of power and perhaps, exile.²

In order to comprehend the stakes of the war for the Philippine Republic, one must also realize that Aguinaldo's government was limited to the Filipino elite.³ Furthermore, even among the elites who participated in Aguinaldo's regime the stakes were not entirely clear. Along the lines of Joe D. Hagan's arguments, moderate Filipino elites in Aguinaldo's government wanted to seek terms with the US while hard-liners in the Philippine Republic government opposed terms with the US and instead sought a strong army for the new Philippine Republic.⁴ For moderates who were already desirous of terms with the US, the stakes of the war were likely

1 John M. Gates, *Schoolbooks and Krags*, (London: Greenwood P, Inc., 1973), 11-15; Brian M. Linn, *The Philippine War, 1899-1902*, (Lawrence: Kansas UP, 2000), 18, 19.

2 John M. Gates, *Schoolbooks and Krags*, "Schoolbooks," 7-12; Brian M. Linn, *The Philippine War*, 15-17.

3 Linn, "The Philippine," 34, 35.

4 Gates, "Schoolbooks," 7-12; Linn, "The Philippine," 15-17; Joe D. Hagan, "Does Decision Making Matter? Systemic Assumptions vs. Historical Reality in International Relations Theory." *International Studies Review* 3.2(2001): 5-46.

lower.⁵ On the other hand, the stakes for the hard-liners were likely high; there would be little use for Filipino elites wedded to plans for a strong military if terms were agreed to with the US.

Shifting the focus to the Philippines as a whole, the stakes of the war become even more clouded. First, in 1899 it would have been inaccurate to consider the Philippines as an intelligible whole. The Philippines was geographically, ethnically, linguistically, and tribally diverse. By the 1890s a national consciousness was forming as economic and social changes cut across the traditional pluralistic lines. Also, elites had been working to foster a culture built on a Filipino-Hispanic identity which contributed to growing Filipino nationalism.⁶ Despite these developments, Aguinaldo could claim to lead a Filipino state, but a Filipino nation with a cohesive Filipino national identity was yet to coalesce.⁷ The result is that the Filipino war against the US was not a war for the independence of the Filipino nation but rather a war for the independence of the Philippine Republic prosecuted by Aguinaldo and the hard-line elements of his regime with support from certain ethnic groups, notably the Tagalogs.⁸ As a consequence, the stakes of the war were not as high as they might

5 For example, in some areas of the Philippines, specifically in Negros where the promise of property rights under American rule was more appealing than joining the Philippine Republic, US occupation was requested. See Gates, "Schoolbooks," 78-82; Linn, "The Philippine," 65-85.

6 Gates, "Schoolbooks," 7-12; Linn, "The Philippine," 15-17.

7 Gates, "Schoolbooks," 7. Gates describes the progress of the development towards a Filipino nation as being in a "state of civilization." The implication is that the Philippines, as a diverse and pluralistic society, was undergoing the process of becoming a more cohesive 'Filipino' society but at the time of the war, still lacked the characteristics of a nation. The label 'Filipino' could be used to describe a citizen of the Philippines but the Filipinos themselves may have self-identified as Filipino.

8 See Gates, "Schoolbooks;" Linn, "The Philippine."

ostensibly appear if one considers the Philippine-American War to truly be a Filipino war for national liberation.

The stakes of the war for the US also become more convoluted once the influence of domestic politics enters the picture. In US domestic politics, the role of moderates was played by anti-imperialists and anti-expansionist groups. Politically, anti-imperialist moderates were found primarily in the Democrat Party, but some were also represented in the Republican Party. For these groups, there was more to be gained politically from American defeat than victory.⁹

Hard-liners were represented most importantly by President William McKinley though other pro-annexation individuals and groups (such as certain news presses) were also present. As president, McKinley's hard-line views were dominant in US foreign policy decision-making. For McKinley, the US would become the "laughing stock of the world" if the Philippines were lost.¹⁰ Therefore, McKinley perceived that the stakes of the war were US prestige. If the bargaining model did not assume rational unitary actors, and instead allowed for the role of individuals (and their perceptions), it might have been better able to identify the 'actual' stakes for the US as seen by its Commander-in-Chief. For McKinley, the bargaining model classification would likely label the stakes of the war as "medium" and could perhaps

9 Robert C. Hilderbrand, *Power and the People: Executive Management of Public Opinion in Foreign Affairs, 1897-1921*. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1981), 41-44.

10 Robert C. Hilderbrand, *Power and the People: Executive Management of Public Opinion in Foreign Affairs, 1897-1921*, 44-51.

have better accounted for the higher-than-predicted US resolve.¹¹ Indeed, as will become more apparent below, McKinley's perception that American "national credit and national honor" was tied to possession of the Philippines, may explain why **H11** is disconfirmed.

The case of the Philippine-American War also reveals another group with a stake in the conflict. American farmers had a tangible stake in the war. Hemp from the Philippines was important to US agriculture and farmers' concern about the hemp supply should not be considered trivial. Demand for hemp by US farmers resulted in political pressure on McKinley that the hemp supply be secured. This led the top US military officer in the Philippines, General Elwell Otis, to alter the allocation of US forces so that the hemp regions and ports would be secure.¹² In sum, when one looks inside the black box, the United States' stakes in the war become much more complex.

Beyond understanding the stakes of the war, the roles played by moderates and hard-liners in both belligerents' decision-making structures are important for comprehending the course of the war and its termination. First, during the negotiations directly preceding the outbreak of the war, there was a division in Aguinaldo's government between moderates seeking terms with the US and hard-

11 Branislav L. Slantchev, "How Initiators End Their Wars: the Duration of Warfare and the Terms of Peace." *American Journal of Political Science* 48.4(2004): 813-829.

12 Linn, "The Phillipine," 160-180. The US efforts to secure the hemp regions and ports were generally successful despite the fact that the 8th Corps had not prepared plans for such a campaign. Securing the hemp ports had another consequence in that it deprived the Philippine Republic of funds it managed to derive from taxes on hemp. However, domestic forces in the US rather than military considerations appear as the dominant factor in the decision to secure the hemp supply. See Linn, "The Phillipine," 174-180.

liners more disposed to military means in dealing with the US. Between the two groups, the hard-liners had the strongest influence on Aguinaldo's decision-making.¹³

Second, in the negotiations after the April 1899 battle at Calumpit, the moderate – hard-line division again appeared in the Philippine Republic's government. Though the bargaining model account of these negotiations only leads one to consider the interaction between belligerents, the interactions within the Filipino government were crucial. At the post-Calumpit negotiations, after General Otis rejected the Filipino counteroffer and responded with another US proposal, Filipino moderates were prepared to accept the US terms. Moderates in Aguinaldo's government ousted the hard-liners, and the Filipino government sent the delegates to further discuss surrender. However, Aguinaldo's top general Antonio Luna intercepted the Filipino peace delegates and instead sent hard-line delegates. Luna then removed moderate elements from the government of Aguinaldo's Philippine Republic and reestablished hard-liner dominance. Consequently, negotiations collapsed and Otis resumed the US offensive.¹⁴ In this instance, it is possible that the end or continuation of the Philippine-American War was contingent upon (at most with the aid of other hard-liners) Luna's actions. Though an exercise in counterfactual, it is conceivable that the war may have ended in late spring 1899 rather than July of 1902 if only Luna had allowed the peace delegates to take their seats at the negotiating table.

¹³ Gates, "Schoolbooks," 4-7, 16-42; Linn, "The Philippine," 3-7, 21,34, 37-41, Ch.2.

¹⁴ Gates, "Schoolbooks," 92, 93, 110-112; Linn, "The Philippine," 90-109.

The above examples of hard-liner dominance in the Philippine Republic's decision-making confirm **AH8**. Despite a series of battles in which the US inflicted on the Philippines a higher relative rate of losses, the hard-liners in Aguinaldo's regime refused to moderate Filipino settlement terms. Therefore, support for **AH8** explains the ostensible disconfirmation of **H8**. The Filipino delegates at the post-Calumpit negotiations *were* prepared to accept American terms after the Philippines' terms were rejected. However, Filipino hard-liners blocked the moderate effort to settle with the US. Unfortunately, the bargaining model's unitary actor assumption does not account for this type of internal dynamics. Confirmation of **AH8** may also offer an explanation of **H6**'s disconfirmation. As **H6** suggests, Filipino moderates were willing to accept the US offer after the Army of Liberation had suffered a series of defeats but Filipino hard-liners prevented an agreement.

Another example of moderate – hard-line factionalization in the Philippine Republic is seen in the fall of 1899. In spite of Luna's purge of moderates, the Filipino government again became divided into peace and hard-line camps. Consequently, despite a string of American victories between the spring and fall of 1899, the Philippines made only "confused efforts to resume peace negotiations" with the US.¹⁵

Intra-governmental and domestic competition between moderates and hard-liners was not limited only to the Philippine Republic. During the autumn of 1900, moderates and hard-liners in the US were competing for control of the presidency.

¹⁵ Gates, "Schoolbooks," 81-100; Linn, "The Philippine," 136.

Moderates stood to benefit from the early success of the Filipino guerrilla war. By fall of 1900, the American public had discovered that through General Otis, McKinley had been censoring reports from the Philippines in order to conceal US casualty numbers.¹⁶ Now, the knowledge of mounting casualties had begun to turn public opinion against a continued US presence in the Philippines. Furthermore, public debate revealed that even people located between the moderate and hard-line poles wanted to withdraw the American soldiers.¹⁷ Making matters even worse for the American hard-liners, in the fall of 1900, Aguinaldo called for a pre-election offensive in hopes of swinging the US Presidential election to anti-imperialist (moderate) William Jennings Bryan.¹⁸ The shifting public opinion in the US does support the bargaining model's general proposition that democratic belligerents are more sensitive to the costs of war.¹⁹ However, the bargaining model does not appear to account for these domestic dynamics.

Despite Filipino efforts, the knowledge of McKinley's censorship, and the campaigning of anti-imperialists in the US, McKinley was reelected and a moderate presidential candidate was prevented from occupying the presidency. Following the reelection of McKinley, the US military responded to the Filipino guerrillas with a

¹⁶ Hilderbrand, 48-50.

¹⁷ Gates, "Schoolbooks," 172, 173.

¹⁸ Gates, "Schoolbooks," 162, 163; Norman G. Owen, "Winding down the War in Albay, 1900-1903." *The Pacific Historical Review* 48.4 (1979): 557-589; Andrew J. Birtle, "The U.S. Army's Pacification of Marinduque, Philippine Islands, April 1900-April 1901." *The Journal of Military History* 61.2 (1997): 255-282; Linn, "The Philippine," 210.

¹⁹ See Filson and Werner, "Bargaining and Fighting: The Impact of Regime Type on War Onset, Duration, and Outcomes." *American Journal of Political Science* 48.2 (2004): 296-313.

counter-guerrilla campaign.²⁰ The reinvigorated military effort by the US following McKinley's reelection provides further confirmation of **AH8**. As a hard-liner, McKinley was able to use his powerful position in US decision-making to continue the war despite the losses inflicted on the American forces by Filipino guerillas. The disconfirmation of **H6** is also partially accounted for by McKinley's prominent role in US decision-making during the war. American public opinion may have favored abandoning the Philippines after the Filipino guerrilla strategy increased US casualties but McKinley was able to prevent any such withdrawal. Once again one can see that the positioning of moderates and hard-liners in a belligerent's government is important in understanding war termination.²¹

A final example of the role played by the balance of influence between moderates and hard-liners is found during the final period of the Philippine-American War. The American counter-guerrilla campaign had brought about the rapid disintegration of the Philippine Republic's guerrilla forces. The precipitous decline of the guerrilla threat allowed a new moderate organization, the Federal Party, to form.

The rise of the moderate Federal Party may also have formed as a result of the American forces' "benevolent" policies. The benevolent policies including sanitation, vaccination, provision of educational opportunities, allowance of local self-government, anti-corruption reforms and road building signaled the Filipino

20 Gates, "Schoolbooks," 173-175; Hilderbrand, 48-51; Linn, "The Philippine," 213-215.

21 See Joe D. Hagan, "Does Decision Making Matter? Systemic Assumptions vs. Historical Reality in International Relations Theory."

populace that acceptance of US sovereignty over the Philippines would likely have some positive implications.²² Also, the US military made it a point to punish American soldiers for abuses against Filipinos in order to dispel Philippine Republic propaganda which demonized the US forces.²³ In contrast to American policies of benevolence, abuses such as robberies, murders, and rapes by the Philippine army led some Filipinos to oppose Aguinaldo's regime.²⁴ Therefore it is possible that in addition to reducing the influence of the hard-liners through military means, the US also took actions to increase the numbers and influence of moderates in Filipino domestic politics.

Using its powerful membership (150,000 members) and widespread support, the Federal Party called for recognition of US sovereignty over the Philippines and urged the leaders of the Filipino resistance to surrender.²⁵ The shift in popular support in favor of accepting US sovereignty, the actions of the Federal Party, and the promise of benevolent treatment for peaceable Filipinos all worked to bring about the increasingly successful negotiations for the surrender of guerrilla units and leaders.²⁶ Notably, the success of the Federal Party and the increasing number of surrenders both occurred prior to Aguinaldo's capture. Thus, the actions of Filipino moderates and the consequences of those actions lend some support to **AH7**. As moderates came to wield influence in the Philippines (politically, if not directly in decision-

22 Gates, "Schoolbooks," 55-70, 81-100, 128-149, 214, 215.

23 Ibid., 83.

24 Ibid., 92, 93.

25 Gates, "Schoolbooks," 218-220, 229; Linn; 215, 216.

26 Gates, "Schoolbooks," 218, 219, 229, 230, 233-235; Linn; "The Philippine," 215-224, Ch. 10-13.

making), the Philippines moderated and moved closer to accepting the United States' settlement terms. In sum, one can see in the processes of war and war termination the important roles played by moderates and hard-liners in both domestic politics and decision-making.

Constructivism/Critical Theory

Though the constructivist hypothesis (**AH1**) is disconfirmed, critical theory may add an important insight into the disconfirmation of bargaining model hypotheses **H11** and **H14**. First, **AH1** predicts that the violent interactions between the Philippine Republic and the US would lead both belligerents to demand more concessions from each other as the duration of the war increased. This hypothesis is disconfirmed by the Philippine-American War. Not only did the Philippines eventually accept the American settlement terms, but also the US did not increase its demands on the Philippines even after it had achieved the nearly complete defeat of the Filipino forces. Therefore, in this instance, constructivism does not offer a better understanding of the Philippine-American War.

However, the case study does confirm critical theory's prediction that the leaders of a belligerent state will rally public support by exploiting dichotomous images of the state as opposed to the adversary (**AO1**). In the case of the US, Robert C. Hilderbrand argues that President William McKinley influenced American public opinion in order to gain support for the war in the Philippines. President McKinley used a close relationship with key news sources to present a message to the American public that the US was the "world's best civilization" and "rescuer" of the

Philippines.²⁷ From what the US was rescuing the Philippines, McKinley argued, was “savage indolence and habits.”²⁸ McKinley contrasted the humanitarian purposes of the US occupation with the Philippine Republic’s dictator Emilio Aguinaldo and other “cruel leaders.” Hilderbrand argues that through tailored rhetoric and a strong relationship with the press, McKinley was able to maintain public support for the war. Particularly strong evidence for the effect of McKinley’s use of discourse is found in the warm response and popular support that McKinley’s policy toward the Philippines received in the heavily Democrat American South.²⁹

While McKinley’s use of dichotomous images to foster public support for the war against the Philippine Republic clearly supports **AO1**, it may also offer some explanation for the disconfirmation of **H11** and **H14**. The success of the president in gaining public support may explain why the US, a democracy fighting a low stakes war, refused to further moderate or abandon its settlement terms even when facing a higher relative rate of losses during the early guerrilla war period.

Whether the Philippine Republic utilized dichotomous images to gain mass support is unclear. The evidence does indicate that Aguinaldo’s government waged a propaganda campaign against the US.³⁰ However, what is known about the content of this campaign or its effects does not provide enough evidence for the testing of **AO1**.

Political Psychology Approaches

27 Hilderbrand, 44, 45.

28 Ibid.

29 Ibid., 42-51.

30 Gates, “Schoolbooks,” 83.

The alternative hypotheses and expected observations derived from political psychology approaches find a mix of confirmation and disconfirmation. However, the confirmed hypotheses and expectations help in furthering an understanding of the challenges to the bargaining model. To begin, **AH2** predicts that, as a consequence of attribution errors, neither the US nor the Philippine Republic would moderate its settlement terms if the other exhibited resolve (either by refusing to decrease demands or increase concessions) in negotiations. **AH2** is a direct challenge to **H8**'s prediction that bargaining behavior in negotiations will influence belligerents' settlement terms. Evidence from the only instance of formal negotiations during the war disconfirms **AH2**. At the negotiations following the battle at Calumpit, the US top military official slightly moderated American settlement terms after the initial US proposal was rejected. Then, after receiving the US counteroffer that (though moderated) retained a demand for the acceptance of American sovereignty over the Philippines, the Filipino delegation relented in the face of US resolve and accepted the settlement terms.³¹ However, one should note that disconfirmation of **AH2** is only possible by dropping the unitary actor assumption and examining the internal decision-making of the Philippine Republic.

The predictions of political psychology about decision-makers' use of historical analogies and past lessons are better supported. Though neither the Filipino or American military leaders or decision-makers specifically referenced historical

31 Gates, "Schoolbooks," 92, 93, 110-112; Linn, "The Philippine," 90-109.

analogies to the war in the Philippines, US strategy in the war clearly appears to have been guided by the lessons of previous military successes.

The American military leaders drew on pacification doctrine developed during the Civil and Indian Wars. This doctrine (especially General Order 100) called for benevolence to peaceful segments of an occupied territory but harsh treatment for hostile groups and individuals. Frontier fighting and the Indian Wars also bequeathed to the Regulars efficient small-unit tactics well suited to irregular war.³² The use of past experiences supports **AO2**. The lessons drawn from previous pacification campaigns were quite successful throughout the anti-guerrilla campaign in the Philippines and therefore do not permit testing of **AH3**.³³

This case provides no direct evidence with which to test **AH4**'s prediction based on the wishful thinking bias. In regard to **AO3**, there is insufficient evidence to clearly support or challenge the prediction that military organizations will overestimate the probability of military success. On one hand, the surrender of one Filipino general poses a challenge for the wishful thinking bias underlying **AO3**. Brian Linn states that in December of 1899 (well before the end of the war in 1902), Filipino General Daniel Tirona, "decided resistance was futile." Recognizing the futility of continued fighting, Tirona "surrendered 1,200 precious rifles and all the

³² Linn, "The Philippine," 8-12.

³³ Alternative hypothesis three (AH3) states that if a belligerent's decision-makers and/or military leaders employ inappropriate historical analogies in the formation of strategy during war, then *ceteris paribus* the belligerent will suffer higher rates of losses than its opponent. Please see Chapter 2 for a discussion of the potential problem of circular reasoning inherent in AH3. For details on the success of the US counter-guerrilla strategy see Gates, "Schoolbooks," 110-112, 144-148, 187-211, Ch. 7; Birtle, 255-282; Brian M. Linn, "Provincial Pacification in the Philippines, 1900-1901: The First District Department of Northern Luzon." *Military Affairs* 51.2 (1987): 62-66.; Linn, "The Philippine," 136-159, 197-224, 235, Ch. 10-13.

forces in Isabella and Cagayan Provinces.”³⁴ While only a single example, Tirona’s early surrender suggests that he did not overestimate the probability of Filipino military success. On the other hand, after the Battle of Manila and a string of battlefield defeats inflicted by the US,³⁵ General Antonio Luna remarked, “Our enemies are too strong and superior in means.”³⁶ Yet, it was Luna who after further Filipino defeats (including the loss at Calumpit) prevented the moderate delegates from reaching a peace agreement with the US, thereby leading to a resumption of battle.

The remaining hypotheses and expected observation drawn from prospect theory are confirmed and offer yet further explanation for the disconfirmation of **H11** and **H14**. Moreover, the confirmation for prospect theory may explain why the evidence is so unclear regarding **AO3**. First, **AH5** is confirmed in regard to both the Philippine Republic and the US but an important caveat must be noted. **AH5** predicts that if either Filipino or American decision-makers framed the war as an effort to avoid losses, then the decision-makers would refuse to moderate settlement terms even if facing outright military defeat in continued battle. The domestic politics perspective has shown that for most of the war, hard-liners were the dominant decision-makers in both belligerents. Thus, one must understand how hard-liners in the Philippine Republic and US framed the war. The historical sources used provide no evidence in the form of statements by hard-line Filipino leaders that they framed

34 Gates, “Schoolbooks,” 110-112, 144-148; Linn, “The Philippine,” 154.

35 Gates, “Schoolbooks,” 79; Linn, “The Philippine,” 55-64.

36 Linn, “The Philippine,” 61-63.

the war as an effort to avoid losses. However, one may reasonably assume that the Filipino hard-liners perceived the war as just such an effort. If explored, this may provide a psychological mechanism underlying the high resolve of the hard-liners in the Filipino government.

For the US, the evidence is clear that President McKinley framed the war not as the pursuit of gains but rather a fight to keep its recent colonial acquisition. Moreover, McKinley framed any potential loss of the Philippines as a concomitant loss of US prestige.³⁷ In this light, the disconfirmation of **H11** and **H14** may be explainable from another perspective. Perhaps McKinley's framing of the war for the Philippines as an effort to avoid losses explains the higher-than-predicted resolve exhibited by the US. McKinley's framing of the war also confirms **AO4**. The President quickly renormalized on a new status quo that included the recently gained Philippines and perceived any potential loss of the Philippines not as a diminished gain but as an absolute loss.³⁸

The confirmation of prospect theory's hypothesis (**AH5**) may also help explain the lack of clear evidence regarding the wishful thinking bias under-girding **AO3**. The actions of the US may have allowed some Filipino soldiers and even high-ranking officers to frame acceptance of US settlement terms as something other than a loss. For example, the US forces offered pardons, amnesty, and money for surrendered arms as conciliation to Filipino soldiers and officers who capitulated.³⁹

37 Hilderbrand, 41-51.

38 See Levy, "Loss Aversion," 197.

39 Gates, "Schoolbooks," 144-149, 217, 218; Linn, "The Philippine," 154.

A more striking example of the US conciliation policy is General Daniel Tirona's surrender. General Tirona was willing to surrender to the US not only because he viewed continued fighting to be futile, but also because the US was willing to appoint him governor of the same area he had previously controlled as a general officer in the Filipino military.⁴⁰ Therefore, Tirona may have been able to frame surrender to the US as resulting in a gain (which might support **AH6**). By explaining this aspect of Tirona's surrender, it becomes possible to understand his actions without reference to the wishful thinking bias. Additionally, the conciliation offered to other Filipino soldiers and officers may explain their surrenders as well.

Organization Theory

Organization theory presents an alternative hypothesis (**AH10**) and an alternative expected observation (**AO5**) applicable to the Philippine-American War.⁴¹ **AO5** is supported by the premature view of US officials that the war was over by the final months of 1899. At that time, American officials in the Philippines were convinced that the "war had ended in an American victory." General Otis informed the US government that the "claim to government by insurgents can be made no longer under any fiction." Among Otis' subordinates, General Arthur MacArthur remarked that the Philippine military presented "no organized insurgent force left to strike at." Furthermore, some official US proclamations in the Philippines declared

40 Gates, "Schoolbooks," 144-149, 217, 218; Linn, "The Philippine," 154.

41 The evidence did not indicate a major role for top American military leaders in decisions regarding continuance of the war.

the war to be over.⁴² However, what US leaders had perceived as the end of the war was actually just a shift in tactics from conventional to guerrilla warfare.⁴³

This mistaken belief that the war was over, and that the Filipino forces had been definitively beaten, offers support for **AO5**'s prediction that different belligerents will view the same battle outcomes differently. Following an overall successful battle to prevent the adoption of guerrilla warfare by the Filipino military, what the US believed to be the end of the war was actually the transition period during which the Filipino forces switched from conventional to guerrilla warfare. It should be noted that the military outcome of the US fall offensive was a defeat for the Philippines. The caveat is that the US perceived it to be *the* defeat of the Philippines whereas for the Filipinos, the offensive resulted in only *a* defeat.⁴⁴

The support for **AO5** may point out additional problems with the rational-choice assumptions of the bargaining model, but the confirmation found for **AH10** is more crucial to an understanding of the Philippine-American War. **AH10** predicts that a belligerent's settlement terms will not be moderated if top military leaders oppose moderation. Confirmation of this hypothesis is found in the post-Calumpit negotiations. During the negotiation process, the Philippine Republic's top general, Luna, preempted the moderates' attempt to accept the US settlement terms and instead substituted hard-line delegates. This is perhaps an extreme example of a top military leader's influence on decision-making, but it clearly demonstrates the

42 Gates, "Schoolbooks," 112-114.

43 Ibid.

44 Ibid., 160-163.

powerful role that such leaders may play. The support for **AH10** offers still another explanation for the disconfirmation of **H6**. Luna preferred to continue fighting despite the higher rate of losses suffered by the Army of Liberation relative to US forces. As a consequence of his influence, the Filipino regime rejected the US settlement offer. For a summary of the findings regarding the alternative hypotheses/expected observations, please see Table 4 in the Appendix.

Analysis

An appraisal of the alternative hypotheses and expected observations

In the case of the Philippine-American War, the pertinent alternative hypotheses/expected observations find confirmation at a higher rate than the bargaining model hypotheses and expected observations. Only two hypotheses, **AH1** and **AH2** are found to be disconfirmed. Of the ten remaining alternative hypotheses/expected observations, seven are confirmed and the other three are not testable due to insufficient evidence. In sum, seven of nine tested alternative hypotheses/expected observations are confirmed.

The evidence supporting the alternative perspectives provided by constructivism, critical theory, political psychology, domestic politics, and organization theory clearly sheds light on the bargaining model's weaknesses. The most glaring of these weaknesses appears to be the bargaining model's unitary rational actor assumption which obscures within a black box the internal dynamics and bounded rationality of decision-making. In the case of the Philippine-American War, internal decision-making dynamics are shown to be too important to ignore.

However, the alternative perspectives discussed in this chapter are only used to point out gaps and weaknesses in the bargaining model and do not offer a single coherent account of the war. Nevertheless, the evidence does suggest that the hypotheses regarding the roles of top military leaders (**AH10**) and moderates/hard-liners (**AH7** and **AH8**) have the most explanatory power. Other variables (and related alternative hypotheses/expected observations) appear to enter into the causal pathways largely via top military leaders, hard-liners, and moderates. For example, McKinley, a hard-liner and top US decision-maker, framed the war an effort to avoid losing (see **AH5** and **AO4**) both the Philippines and American prestige. McKinley then used dichotomous images of the US as ‘civilized’ and the Philippines as ‘savage’ (see **AO2**) in order to rally public support for the war. Thus, the case of the Philippine-American War suggests that a further understanding of top military leaders, hard-liners, and moderates – and the factors that affect their behavior – is necessary for understanding war termination decisions and outcomes.

The findings in this chapter clearly challenge the bargaining model of war termination. However, the state of the bargaining model must be examined in light of the support found for the alternative perspectives. In the next and final chapter, I discuss what implications for the bargaining model arise from the alternative perspectives considered above.

Chapter 5: Conclusions and Implications for the Bargaining Model

The evidence presented in the previous chapter generally supports the alternative perspectives and casts doubt on the bargaining model and its assumptions. Primarily, the bargaining model's unitary rational actor assumption is shown to be problematic. First, the unitary actor assumption misses the presence of actors with different preferences over war and wartime options. In both belligerents, there were moderates who likely would have produced different outcomes had they been able to more strongly influence foreign policy decision-making. Moderates in both belligerents preferred a peace agreement and cessation of fighting to continued war in the defense of demands and settlement terms. However, for the bulk of the war, Filipino and American decision-making was dominated by hard-liners who preferred continued war over moderation of settlement terms.

The presence of hard-liners and moderates suggests a need for revision of the bargaining model's hypotheses regarding regime type (**H9-H11**) and the stakes of a war (**H12-H14**). In line with Joe D. Hagan's arguments, a belligerent's regime type seems to be less important in determining resolve than the positioning of moderates and hard-liners within its decision-making apparatus.¹ Also, the stakes of a war may depend on whether hard-liners or moderates are at the helm of decision-making structures when the potential or actual outbreak of war confronts a state. The disconfirmation of **H11** and **H14** shows the benefits of considering the US not as a democracy engaged in a low stakes war, but as a belligerent in which decision-

¹ Joe D. Hagan, "Does Decision Making Matter? Systemic Assumptions vs. Historical Reality in International Relations Theory." *International Studies Review* 3.2(2001): 5-46.

making was dominated by a hard-liner who viewed more to be at stake in the war than the bargaining model predicted.² The case further suggests that moderate and hard-liner competition in domestic politics may affect the relative influence of moderates and hard-liners in decision-making. For example, the 1900 US election had the potential of replacing a hard-line president with a moderate.

Perhaps of equal importance, the confirmation of **H9** and **H12** should be reconsidered. The Philippine Republic, while led by a mixed authoritarian regime fighting for its continued rule, looks very different when examined from the vantage point of organization theory and domestic politics approaches. Had moderates held sway over Aguinaldo during the prewar negotiations, or had Luna (both a hard-liner and the Philippines' top general) not intercepted the Filipino peace delegates during the post-Calumpit negotiations, the Philippine Republic would likely not have exhibited the high resolve predicted by **H9** and **H12**. That the Philippine Republic *did* exhibit such resolve should not be taken as confirmation of those hypotheses. The Philippine Republic's decision-making was far too contingent on the actions of (sometimes a very few) hard-liners and the military leadership for its war time policy to be accepted at face value.

Having reconsidered the confirmation of **H9** and **H12**, it is important to consider the implications for **H6** and **H8**. The bargaining model explains away the disconfirming actions of the Philippine Republic by pointing to the effects of regime type and the stakes of the war. Yet, this explanation becomes impoverished when one

² See Branislav L. Slantchev, "How Initiators End Their Wars: the Duration of Warfare and the Terms of Peace." *American Journal of Political Science* 48.4(2004): 813-829, see especially 819.

is able to see the conflict between Filipino moderates and hard-liners during the post-Calumpit negotiations. Thus, the role of belief updating, as a result of battle and negotiation, must be reconsidered.

Examining the decision-making dynamics and domestic politics of the belligerents also provides a second category of insights. By incorporating the role of domestic politics, decision-makers and other individual actors, one may apply political psychology to war termination decision. Political psychology permits consideration of the role that biases and perceptions play in war termination decision-making. Though the evidence is inconclusive regarding the wishful thinking bias, support is found for prospect theory's predictions.

In particular, the role of framing demonstrates the variables missed by the bargaining model's assumptions of unitary and rational belligerents. The Philippine Republic's hard-liners presumably framed the war as an effort to avoid losses and McKinley certainly used such frames in his characterization of the war. Perhaps most critical in this case, McKinley's framing of the war raised the stakes above the level assigned by the bargaining model. Framing effects suggest that it matters not just over what a war is fought, but also whether a belligerent's decision-makers frame the war aims as achievement of gains or avoidance of losses. For example, decision-makers in a belligerent fighting to gain a colonial possession may indeed exhibit low resolve. However, decision-makers in a belligerent fighting to hold a colony may be

expected to exhibit high resolve. In short, McKinley's framing may explain why US actions disconfirmed bargaining model hypotheses **H6**, **H11**, and **H14**.³

Framing is also important in another sense. As critical theory predicted, McKinley rallied public support by exploiting a dichotomous image of a 'civilized' US rescuing the Filipino 'savage.' This frame seems to have been effective in gaining public support for the war and may offer still another reason that US resolve exceeded that predicted by **H11** and **H14**.

Given the above case study and discussion, what can be said of the bargaining model? In short, the bargaining model needs significant revision. Of the eleven bargaining model hypotheses tested in the first section of this chapter, only **H1**, **H2**, **H3**, and **H5** have remained unchallenged by the alternative explanations and empirical evidence. Furthermore, **H1** does not emerge unquestioned when scrutinized through the lenses of the alternative theories/approaches. Consider what might have happened had anti-imperialist William Jennings Bryan defeated William McKinley in the 1900 US presidential election. Though counterfactual, it is possible that the US would have relented in the Philippines despite the fact that America would still have possessed superior reserves. Thus, only the confirmation of **H2**, **H3**, and **H5** remains undisputed. Notably, the focus of these three hypotheses is limited to the effect of military strategies on battle outcomes. Therefore, their unquestioned confirmation is not a critical vindication of the model.

³ However, one should keep in mind the above discussion of H6.

Yet, findings from this thesis do not warrant discarding the bargaining model. In the first place, the conclusions drawn from a single war can be no more than tentative. However, given the multiple observations and perspectives provided in this study, the Philippine-American War may be seen not as one case but as a number of cases within a larger episode. Therefore, the challenges to the bargaining model found in this study should also not be understated. Still, despite Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett's claims that inference from a single case is possible, the bargaining model is not wholly discredited by this thesis' examination of the Philippine-American War.⁴ Perhaps the bargaining model is not suited to wars in which one or both belligerents are led by a recently formed regime. Or, the bargaining model may be less applicable to wars that might be classified as counterinsurgencies (as the Philippine-American War might be labeled). Still another possibility is that the Philippine-American war is simply an outlier. Additional research will be needed to further scrutinize the bargaining model and alternative perspectives.

The limitations of a single case study are not the only reasons to caution against abandoning the bargaining model. After all, the most basic expectations of the bargaining model – intra-war negotiation (**O1**) and settlement term endogeneity (**O2**) – remain confirmed. Despite the warnings of political psychology (see **AH2**), attribution errors do not seem to preclude the informational role of negotiations during war. Furthermore, other factors such as differing perceptions of battle

⁴ Andrew Bennet and Alexander L. George, "Case Studies in Process Tracing in History and Political Science: Similar Strokes for Different Foci." in Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman eds., *Bridges and Boundaries: Historians, Political Scientists and the Study of International Relations*, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001); Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004), see 28-30.

outcomes or decision-makers' use of historical analogies do not apparently present insurmountable impediments to belief updating based on battlefield information.⁵

Thus, modeling war as a bargaining process is not necessarily inappropriate.

Drawing on the lessons of this case, it appears that most of the bargaining model's shortcomings may be resolved by discarding the unitary rational actor assumption.

Taking into account the roles played by domestic politics and decision-makers in the bargaining process may allow insight into the social and psychological factors that delineate the possibilities and limits of bargaining.

Again, further research is clearly needed in order to determine whether the findings of this thesis are only exceptions to the bargaining model. In future work, I plan to examine wars from different periods in the modern era as well as wars with different combinations of regime types, points of conflict, and balances of military capabilities between belligerents. I also intend to research wars in which intra-belligerent shifts occurred with regard to the relative influence of moderates and hard-liners at the levels of domestic politics and decision-making.

The findings of this thesis have strongly suggested that answers to two questions may be important for explaining war termination. Do the beliefs of moderates or hard-liners change as a result of information received in negotiation and battle? Or, does the balance of influence between moderates and hard-liners shift as a result of battle and/or negotiation outcomes? By scrutinizing domestic politics

⁵ For example, despite believing that the war was over, once the Filipino guerrilla campaign began inflicting heavy losses, the US was able to recognize and successfully counter the new Filipino strategy. See Gates, "Schoolbooks," 110-210; Linn, "The Philippine," 139-235, Ch. 10-13.

variables and the social and psychological contexts of wartime decision-making, progress may be made in war termination theory. Given the basic finding that negotiations do occur and that settlement terms have at least some measure of endogeneity, it is possible that through further research, the bargaining model will be improved by the alternative perspectives that have so clearly challenged it in this thesis.

Appendix

Table 1: Bargaining Model Hypotheses

Material Hypotheses

H1: if belligerent A has more reserves than belligerent B, then *ceteris paribus* belligerent A will demand more favorable settlement terms than belligerent B.

H2: if the stronger belligerent employs a direct strategy against a weaker belligerent also employing a direct strategy, then the weaker belligerent will suffer higher relative rates of loss in battle.

H3: if the stronger belligerent employs a direct strategy against a weaker belligerent employing an indirect strategy, then the stronger belligerent will suffer higher relative rates of loss in battle.

H4: if the stronger belligerent employs an indirect strategy against a weaker belligerent employing a direct strategy, then the stronger belligerent will suffer higher relative rates of loss in battle.

H5: if the stronger belligerent employs an indirect strategy against a weaker belligerent also employing an indirect strategy, then the weaker belligerent will suffer higher relative rates of loss in battle.

H6: if belligerent A suffers losses at a greater rate than belligerent B, then *ceteris paribus* belligerent A will moderate its settlement terms.

H7: if belligerent A suffers losses at a lesser rate than belligerent B, then *ceteris paribus* belligerent A will not moderate its settlement terms.

Negotiation Effects Hypothesis

H8: if belligerent A refuses to moderate its settlement terms, then *ceteris paribus* belligerent B will moderate its settlement terms.

Regime Hypotheses

H9: if a belligerent is led by a mixed authoritarian regime, then it will refuse to moderate its settlement terms even if it faces outright military defeat in continued battle.

H10: if a belligerent is led by a dictatorial regime, then it will moderate its settlement terms when experiencing a higher rate of losses in battle than its adversary.

H11: if a belligerent is led by a democratic regime, then it will moderate its settlement terms when experiencing a higher rate of losses in battle than its adversary.

Stakes Hypotheses

H12: if the stakes of a war are high, then *ceteris paribus* a belligerent will refuse to moderate its settlement terms even if it faces outright military defeat in continued battle.

H13: if the stakes of a war are medium, then *ceteris paribus* a belligerent will moderate its settlement terms when incurring greater rates of losses than its adversary but will persist in war in order to achieve some of its aims.

H14: if the stakes of a war are low, then *ceteris paribus* a belligerent will dramatically moderate or forsake its settlement terms when experiencing a higher rate of losses in battle than its adversary.

Table 2: Alternative Hypotheses and Expected Observations

Constructivism/Critical Theory

AH1: as the duration of a war increases, then *ceteris paribus* the more concessions in the settlement terms a belligerent will demand from its opponent.

AO1: a belligerent's leader will rally public support by exploiting dichotomous images of the state as opposed to the adversary.

Psychological Theory

AH2: if belligerent A refuses to moderate its settlement terms, then *ceteris paribus* belligerent B will not moderate its settlement terms.

AH3: if decision-makers and/or military leaders employ inappropriate historical analogies to form strategy, then *ceteris paribus* the belligerent will suffer higher rates of losses than its opponent.

AH4: states that if a belligerent's decision-makers suffer from the wishful thinking bias, then the decision-makers will refuse to moderate settlement terms even if facing outright military defeat in continued battle.

AH5: if a belligerent's decision-makers frame the war as an effort to avoid losses, then the decision-makers will refuse to moderate settlement terms even if facing outright military defeat in continued battle.

AH6: if a belligerent's decision-makers frame the war as an effort to achieve gains, then the decision-makers will moderate settlement terms when experiencing a higher rate of losses in battle than its adversary.

AO2: decision-makers will use historical analogies as heuristic aids in policy formation.

AO3: military organizations will distort battlefield information by overestimating the probability of military success.

AO4: for a belligerent, any reversal that results in a loss of recent gains will be perceived as an absolute loss.

Domestic Politics/Organization Theory

AH7: if moderates dominate a belligerent's decision-making apparatus, then the belligerent will moderate its settlement terms.

AH8: if hard-liners dominate a belligerent's decision-making apparatus, then the belligerent will refuse to moderate its settlement terms even if it faces outright military defeat in continued battle.

AH9: if a belligerent's chief military leaders support moderating settlement terms, then settlement terms will be moderated.

AH10: if a belligerent's chief military leaders oppose moderating settlement terms, then settlement terms will not be moderated.

AO5: different belligerents and separate bureaucracies within each belligerent's government will use unique measures of success and failure and therefore view the same outcome differently.

Table 3: Assessment of Hypotheses/Expected Observations Tested in the Philippine-American War	Confirmed	Mixed	Disconfirmed
Expected Observation 1	X		
Expected Observation 2	X		
<i>Material Hypotheses</i>			
Hypothesis 1	X		
Hypothesis 2	X		
Hypothesis 3	X		
Hypothesis 5	X		
Hypothesis 6			X
Hypothesis 7		X	
<i>Negotiation Effects Hypothesis</i>			
Hypothesis 8		X	
<i>Regime Hypotheses</i>			
Hypothesis 9	X		
Hypothesis 11			X
Expected Observation 3	X		
<i>Stakes Hypotheses</i>			
Hypothesis 12	X		
Hypothesis 14			X

Table 4: Alternative Hypotheses/Expected Observations Tested in the Philippine-American War	Confirmed	Mixed	Dis-confirmed	Insufficient Evidence
<i>Constructivism/Critical Theory</i>				
Alternative Hypothesis 1			X	
Alternative Expected Observation 1	X			
<i>Political Psychology</i>				
Alternative Hypothesis 2			X	
Alternative Hypothesis 4				X
Alternative Hypothesis 5	X			
Alternative Hypothesis 6				X
Alternative Expected Observation 2	X			
Alternative Expected Observation 3				X
Alternative Expected Observation 4	X			
<i>Domestic Politics/Decision-Making</i>				
Alternative Hypothesis 7	X			
<i>Organization Theory</i>				
Alternative Hypothesis 10	X			
Alternative Expected Observation 5	X			

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