

The Merits of Military Aid

An Examination of the Interactions between US Military Aid and Terrorism in the East African Community

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Abstract

Over the past twenty years, the United States has been increasingly involved in combatting terrorism across the globe. To combat terrorism, the United States has made billions of dollars in disbursements of both developmental and military aid to foreign states. Extant literature suggests that there is a strong interaction between, developmental aid and terrorist incidences, where increased levels of developmental aid disbursements, reduce the number of terrorism incidences. However, the potential relationship between military aid disbursements and the frequency of terrorism incidences is less understood.

Therefore, this article seeks to further nuance our understanding of this potential relationship, by analyzing the potential impacts that United States military aid disbursement has had on the frequency of terrorist attacks in East African Community (EAC) member-states. During the twenty years between 1998 and 2018, the United States disbursed over one billion dollars of military aid to the East African Community member states. Members of this bloc including Kenya and Uganda have also become key partners in the United States in combatting terrorism in Africa. Moreover, this regional bloc has endured over 2,6000 terrorist attacks during the same twenty-year period. As such key insights into the relationship between US military aid disbursements and terrorist incidences can be gained by analyzing the available data about disbursements and terrorist incidences in the East African Community during this period. As such the EAC is an ideal unit of analysis to track this potential relationship because member states of this political union have a long-shared history and have seen different levels of terrorist events and US military aid disbursements during this period.

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Introduction

Are United States military aid disbursements to foreign countries affecting the incidence rate of terrorist activities in aid-receiving countries? As a result of the United States' global war on terrorism, a once periphery focus of the United States' international diplomacy has been reprioritized and the effort to arm the United States' foreign allies with the capacity and competency to protect themselves from state-level and substate actors, has greatly increased. Theoretically, these changes in available funding and equipment should allow aid-receiving states increased ability to train troops, purchase armaments and conduct counterterrorism activities. However, it seems that even with additional aid disbursements, aid-receiving states were still greatly affected by terrorism. Hence, there has been increasing scrutiny of the merits and effectiveness of the United States' strategy of using military aid disbursements to support foreign states' securitization operations (Omelicheva et al. 2017, 119-121, Heinrich et al 2017, Savun and Tirone 2017, Boutton 2019).

This paper seeks to understand how rates of terrorism, in a politically, and economically intertwined, a bloc of states, have been affected by increased levels of United States Military aid disbursements. The East African Community (EAC) is a longstanding intergovernmental organization comprised of the states of Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi, Rwanda, South Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The EAC is an ideal unit to explore this potential relationship because each EAC member-states received high levels of military aid disbursements and endured a high number of terrorist events, over the 20 years from 1998 to 2018. One of the most significant attacks during this period, the 1998 United States Embassy Bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, profoundly impacted the United States' foreign policy in Africa.

On August 7th of 1998, saw Al-Qaeda terrorists detonated trucks laden with explosives at the US embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. These joint attacks wounded over 4,500 people and killed 236 others (Hills 2006, Ploch 2011, Mogire and Agade 2011). Before these attacks, the United States intelligence community had paid little attention to terrorist organizations on the African Continent (Ploch 2011, Mogire and Agade 2011). But following these attacks and the September 11th Terrorist Attacks, a mere three years later, there was a significant evolution in how the United States deployed aid to African states (Miles 2012). This change can be captured by looking at the dramatic changes in military aid flows to the region. Figure 1 depicts all US military aid disbursements to EAC member-states in the twenty-year periods from 1977 to 1997, and from 1998 to 2018. In almost every case, US military aid disbursements increased dramatically, during the latter period.

Table 1: US Military Aid Disbursed to East African Community Countries

	Military Aid 1977 – 1997	Military Aid 1998 -2018	Growth (%)
Burundi	\$ 4,000,000.00	\$ 54,000,000.00	1250%
DRC	\$ 290,000,000.00	\$ 103,000,000.00	-64%
Kenya	\$ 425,000,000.00	\$ 530,000,000.00	25%
Rwanda	\$ 9,000,000.00	\$ 21,000,000.00	133%
South Sudan	NA	\$ 271,000,000.00	NA
Tanzania	\$ 2,000,000.00	\$ 45,000,000.00	2150%
Uganda	\$ 17,000,000.00	\$ 282,000,000.00	1559%
EAC Bloc	\$ 747,000,000.00	\$ 1,306,000,000.00	75%

1. All values reported in 2019 US Constant Dollar

2. All values rounded to the nearest whole million dollars.

3. South Sudan was not an internationally recognized state until 2011.

The countries of Uganda, Tanzania, and Burundi saw exponential growth in the amount of US military aid disbursements that they received, while Kenya and Rwanda saw more modest growth in the amount of US military aid dollars they received. The Democratic Republic of the Congo, which only recently became a member of the EAC, was the only state to see its share of US military aid disbursements reduced during the period between 1998 and 2018.

These additional resources should have influenced reducing terrorism incidences overall, but as the data suggests; even with the influx of aid funds available the threats posed by domestic and transnational terrorist groups remained high throughout the region. Each state in this bloc has experienced varying levels of terrorism incidences and casualty rates from terrorist attacks. In the same twenty-year span from 1998 to 2018, current EAC member-states, experienced over 2,600 terrorist events, perpetrated by terrorist organizations including *Al-Qaeda*, the *Islamic State of Iraq and Syria* (ISIS), and *Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen* (Al-Shabaab). Therefore, by using this bloc, we can then make comparisons between member-states of this bloc, which can allow for additional avenues of analysis and discussion.

Figure 1





Figure 2



The next section introduces the concept of foreign aid and its different classifications. The following section discusses recent trends in terrorist organization strategy and terrorism research. While the third section introduces the foreign aid – terrorism nexus, which to this point has largely focused on the impact that developmental aid has on mitigating terrorist activities. While the fourth section fosters a discussion about the history of the East African Community and furthers the argument that the EAC is an ideal bloc of countries to examine the relationships between foreign aid and terrorism. In the fifth section, this study’s research design, hypotheses, and the dataset created to carry out this analysis will be introduced. Then this piece will proceed with an analysis of the results of the models used in this study. Before concluding with a brief discussion about the significance of these findings and the potential research avenues that have yet to be explored in the aid-terrorism nexus research area.

International Aid and its classifications

Before proceeding, it is important to define *aid*. As defined by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), international aid is, “... assistance for foreign countries, international organizations, and other foreign entities, which may include, but is not limited to, funds, goods, services, and technical assistance” (USAID 2022). Aid-granting states may give aid for any number of reasons and to accomplish any number of goals, but there are three major categories of aid: *humanitarian aid*, *developmental aid*, and *military aid*.

Humanitarian aid, which is usually disbursed following natural disasters or other crises, is a type of aid that is usually delivered in the form of a grant. The state receiving the aid gets a sum of money to help in recovery efforts after a disaster (Moyo 2009, p 7). States rarely attach conditionalities to this type of aid disbursement and the aid-receiving state has a large degree of

autonomy in determining how to spend the money it receives, which can help to speed up recovery efforts. Humanitarian aid is less common than other types of aid, as natural disasters and humanitarian crises are inherently uncommon, but this form of international aid is perhaps the most prominent and most visible form of aid (Moyo 2009, p. 7).

Developmental aid is an umbrella term for a variety of aid programs, usually disbursed as concessional loans, to target certain areas of development (Moyo 2009, 8). Developmental aid usually comes with conditionalities and strict instructions as to when the loan should be paid back; how the loan should be paid back; and how the money provided by the loan can be utilized by the recipient state (Moyo 2009, 8-9 and 38-39). This type of aid disbursement could be intended to support projects of various scales, such as small, focused, projects that affect single townships, or large projects that could affect an entire nation or region. Overall, by disbursing developmental aid, aid-granting countries can increase the ability of aid-receiving states to provide public goods to their people. In turn, states that receive developmental aid should want to continue to receive developmental aid from the international community. This system encourages aid-receiving states to be transparent in their reports and earnest in their efforts to achieve the conditionalities attached to a developmental aid package (Li 2005). However, this type of aid disbursement may be preventing states from achieving organic growth in domestic industries and leading to increasing rates of corruption in public institutions (Moyo 2009).

Military aid differs from humanitarian aid and developmental aid, in the sense that these funding pools are concerned with achieving explicit, security-focused, objectives. Military aid disbursements could facilitate the purchasing of weapons systems, the training of military personnel, and the purchasing of armaments. Military aid disbursements can come in the form of either grants or loans towards aid receiving states, or these disbursements can come in the form

of direct sales or transfers of military equipment from one state to another (Omelicheva et al. 2017). The primary goal of this type of aid disbursement is to support the aid-receiving state in creating competent security forces that are willing and able to defend their territories and their people (Omelicheva et al. 2017, Boutton 2019) However, military aid has the potential to be abused as increases in security resources can be used by repressive regimes, to commit atrocities, squash political dissent and preempt democratic processes (Presholdt 2011, Omelicheva et al. 2017, Boutton 2019).

It suffices to say that international aid of any kind is not a panacea, which would cure all the ails problems that an aid-receiving state faces. Rather, international aid disbursements are resources that states can rely on to accomplish specific goals, for either humanitarian, developmental, or military purposes. The effectiveness of aid is determined in large part, by the political institutions in a state and the leaders involved in overseeing the use of those funds (Moyo 2009, Omelicheva et al. 2017). Consequently, this study is interested in uncovering how military aid flows of any kind may be influencing terrorism and terrorist events, in a region of the world that receives high levels of aid flow and experiences high levels of terrorist activity.

Terrorism

Terrorism, as a concept has many competing definitions and conceptualizations. One of the most comprehensive definitions, of terrorism comes from work by Todd Sandler and Walter Enders (2008), who defined terrorism as "... the premeditated use or threat to use violence by individuals or subnational groups to obtain a political or social objective through the intimidation of a large audience beyond that of the immediate victims". This conceptualization of terrorism

allows us to understand that terrorist organizations are goal-driven and seek to accomplish their goals by any means necessary.

Terrorists typically use violence against civilians to extract concessions from the states they target in political, cultural, or economic areas (Efobi and Asongu 2015). Today Islamist terrorist organizations like Al-Qaeda, Al-Shabaab, and Boko Haram, are some of the most dangerous groups on the African continent (Hoffman 2006, Abrahms 2012, Efobi and Asongu 2015, Heinrich et al. 2017). These organizations exemplify the securitization challenges as these groups routinely attack, marketplaces, businesses, malls, schools, military installations, and government buildings to send costly messages to the states where the attacks occur (Abrahms 2012, Lutz and Lutz 2014). The motivations behind each terrorist organization and each terrorist actor, are unique, however, there seems to be an increasing trend that terrorist activities are being carried out to send messages, not only to the state where the attack occurred but also to a global audience.

Globalization and Terrorism

Through the process of globalization, states have become more politically and economically integrated, however, this is a multifaceted and complex process that has wrought different outcomes for all states in the international system (Zimmerman 2011, Lutz and Lutz 2014). The outcomes of globalization are myriad, although, states typically see increased levels of foreign direct investment, increased trade, shared securitization, and migration because of this process (Li and Schaub 2005, Zimmerman 2011, Lutz and Lutz 2014, Asongu and Biekpe 2018). As a result of globalization, citizens may be exposed to new technologies, new ideas, new political values, and new cultures (Asongu and Biekpe 2018,). Some forms of economic globalization,

through foreign direct investment and disbursements of developmental aid, may even have a stabilizing effect on state regime, which can play a role in availing social cleavages, increasing democratization, and ultimately reducing rates of political violence e.g., terrorism (Li and Schaub 2004, Savun and Tirone 2017, Asongu and Biekpe 2018).

While there is great potential for globalization to bring economic and ideological goods to states, efforts by states to further integrate into the global community may be impeded by terrorism. Terrorists may be aggravated by any number of issues from increased global trade and interconnectivity. Accordingly, extant research in this area has sought to understand how economic globalization, social globalization, and security globalization have been impacted by terrorist activities.

Terrorism as a reaction to economic globalization may be scaring away new investors and motivating capital flights, away from states that see high levels of terrorist activities, to states that are 'safer' (Efobi and Asongu 2015). As can be seen in the changes in capital investment flows in African states because of terrorist events (Efobi and Asongu 2015).

Other forms of globalization such as social globalization, can aggravate existing social cleavages and increase the propensity for political violence such as terrorism in each state (Lutz and Lutz 2014). Social globalization refers to the exchange of intellectual ideas, information, and people, across borders (Asongu and Biekpe 2018). The spread of new ideas can directly threaten marginalized groups, who often established interpretations of how life should be and what values are acceptable. In some cases, marginalized groups may resort to political violence to defend their worldview. The Nigerian terrorist organization Boko Haram ("Western Civilization is Forbidden") one of the deadliest terrorist groups in Africa, was formed to organize violent

resistance against Western ideas, Western values, and involvement with the “West” (Lutz and Lutz 2014, Asongu and Biekpe 2018).

Additionally, because of globalization and the further integration of states into international treaties, trade pacts, and securitization agreements, i.e., NATO, terrorists have seen a bevy of targets available to them that would have otherwise not been available to them. Rather than directly attacking a geographically inaccessible country, e.g., the United States, terrorist organizations may be targeting geographically proximate targets that are representative or aligned with the United States (Savun and Phillips 2009). This phenomenon is particularly strong when soldiers from the United States have been deployed to a state to support their foreign partners’ offensive military operations or peace-keeping operations (Braithwaite 2015, p. 371-374). This suggests that the globalization of securitization, vis-à-vis troop deployments may be motivating terrorist organizations to ramp up their activities to counter the increased presence of foreign soldiers and foreigners in their home state.

Overall, globalization has had mixed effects on terrorist incidences and additional scholarship is needed to further nuance these complex interactions. The next section discusses the ongoing attempts to weave the threads of foreign aid, terrorism, and globalization, into one comprehensive research agenda.

Aid-Terrorism Nexus

The emerging aid-terrorism nexus research paradigm attempts to weave together the diverse threads discussed in this literature review. At the time of writing, most of the research in this area has focused on the relationship between developmental aid disbursements and terrorist attack rates. This literature postulates that developmental aid may have pacifying effects that can mitigate potential terrorist events.

Developmental aid is often awarded to help spread democratic norms and to support economic growth in the aid-receiving state (Savun and Phillips 2009, Savun and Tirone 2017). Often, aid-granting states will earmark aid packages to support democratic normalization in aid-receiving states, and these packages often have conditions attached to them, which can promote the rights of minorities, press freedoms, and election reforms (Li 2005, Sobek and Braithwaite 2005, Chenoweth 2010). The promotion of democratic norms, in turn, drives down the motivations for disadvantaged groups to protest the ruling regime, and by proxy, they are less likely to be engaged with terrorist groups (Findley et al. 2011). These factors, working in concert, are thought to mitigate potential grievances that individuals would have against a state government, and, by the very virtue of there being a strong civil society, democratic norms and economic opportunities preempt the emergence of social cleavages that could lead citizens towards terrorism (Abrahms 2006). While there have been plenty of pages, devoted to exploring the relationship between development aid and terrorism there have been far fewer studies published that focus on the effects that military aid has had on terrorism events. However, this is becoming an increased area of interest in the research paradigm.

In recent years military aid has been featured in several articles that have sought to understand to what degree military aid can enhance securitization operations and counterterrorism activities in developing states (Heinrich et al. 2017, Jowell 2017 Omelicheva et al 2017, Boutton 2019). This literature is evolving as the levels of military aid disbursed by the United States, the world's largest disburser of military aid, have decreased from pre-2013 levels (Omelicheva et al 2017).

One of the key early findings of the terrorism-military aid, linkage can be found, in the strategic alignment arguments that suggest when a state's foreign policy is aligned with a great

power's foreign policy positions, terrorist groups with grievances against the great power may target supporting states to send messages to both entities (Sobek and Braithwaite 2005, Abrahms 2006, Neumayer and Plümper 2011). The state as a victim of terrorist attacks is threatened into stopping strategic alignment with the hegemonic state, whereas the hegemonic state is sent a message to remove itself from the supporting state's affairs or else violence will continue (Sobek and Braithwaite 2005). However, despite the actions of the terrorists to dissuade future engagement by increasing their efforts to punish a domestic state for accepting foreign aid, this may lead to increased commitments from the foreign entity. As Heinrich et. al (2017) find increases in terrorist attacks by Al-Qaeda and its affiliate organizations, promote further investment by the United States vis-à-vis military aid disbursements to Sub-Saharan African countries.

Other findings of the effects that military aid has on terrorism incidences suggest, that imperfect officials and imperfect institutions may be a major limiting factor in the effectiveness of aid in effectively combatting terrorism. Vast influxes of developmental, humanitarian, and military aid, to African states, have resulted in high rates of corruption and clientelism, which have perhaps limited the effects that aid can have on accomplishing specific goals (Moyo 2009, Jowell 2017). Moreover, aid dollars can support weak regimes, by giving leaders expanded resources to support their security apparatus which can be used and abused in a variety of ways (Omelicheva et. al 2017, Boutton 2019). Kenya has routinely been accused of using counterterrorism aid, over-police, and violating the human rights of Somali refugees and Somali-Kenyans throughout the state (Prestholdt 2011, Samora 2013). As such exploring this potential relationship between US military aid disbursements, and terrorist events in the East African

Community, may yield results that can help further our understanding of these dynamics and the aid-terrorism nexus.

A brief history of the EAC and terrorism in the EAC

Since the early post-colonial period, states in the East African Community have been calling for regional integration into a single political bloc (Nye 1965). The first iteration of the EAC was founded in 1967 and lasted for 10 years before dissolving in 1977. However, since its reestablishment in 2000, this bloc has made great strides to integrate economically, with Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda forming a market in 2005 (EAC). Rwanda and Burundi were the next to join the economic bloc in 2010, with South Sudan joining later in 2016. These states then began the process toward full regional integration in 2017, by forming a political confederation as a precursor to a single federal state (EAC).

At the time of this writing, the East African Community is in the process of drafting a constitution for the proposed East African Federation (EAF). The founding of the EAF would usher in a new era of integration for EAC states; the member states of Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi, and South Sudan would have a common passport, a common currency, and free trade between member states (Havyarimana 2020) It is currently anticipated that the EAF will be formally established and implemented by 2023 (Havyarimana 2020). However, that projection may be delayed as the Democratic Republic of the Congo has recently joined the East African Community on April 8th of 2022. Despite the additional time that may be added to the constitution-writing process, the EAF is becoming an increasingly realistic and tangible political entity that would become the world's eighth-largest state by population and seventh-largest by total area (Ang'ani Omuchesi 2022).

Over the past twenty years, this bloc of nations has been working to increase their level of integration and cooperation and as these states progress, they will have to further harmonize their agendas and policies, particularly in the realm of security and counterterrorism. In the twenty years between 1998 and 2018, there have been disparate outcomes in the levels of aid received and the number of terrorist incidences in these states in the period, as demonstrated in Table 2 and Table 3.

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Terrorist Attacks in EAC member states, 1998 -2018

	All Terrorist Attacks	Transnational Terrorist Attacks	Unknown Terrorist Attacks	Domestic Terrorist Attacks
Burundi	401	66	285	50
DRC	937	470	170	297
Kenya	658	461	176	21
Rwanda	45	14	24	7
South Sudan	290	175	103	12
Tanzania	56	6	45	5
Uganda	230	65	71	94
EAC Bloc	2617	1257	874	486

Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of Terrorist events and US military aid obligations and disbursements, to the East African Community.

Country	Number of Terrorist Events	Number of Victims killed	Number of Victims wounded	Number of Terrorists killed	Number of Terrorists wounded	US Military Aid Obligations	US Military Aid Disbursements
Burundi	401	1458	1223	421	3	\$53,598,250.00	\$53,598,250.00
DRC	937	5054	1640	678	55	\$177,273,701.00	\$102,653,643.00
Kenya	658	1724	6075	130	11	\$552,886,126.00	\$530,257,585.0
Rwanda	46	180	377	0	10	\$59,579,537.00	\$20,599,857.00
South Sudan	290	2730	1371	1144	2	\$337,459,923.00	\$270,545,443.0
Tanzania	56	79	233	1	0	\$59,475,720.00	\$45,352,246.00
Uganda	230	1483	732	156	1	\$307,620,271.00	\$281,623,186.00
EAC Bloc	2,618	12,708	11,651	2,530	82	\$1,547,893,528.00	\$1,304,630,210.00

The cases of Kenya and South Sudan are particularly complex and warrant further discussion of the unique security concerns of each state. These complexities suggest that there are a variety of factors, outside of military aid and terrorism that can be impacting the security realities of each state. Between 1998 to 2018, Kenya received over 530,000,000.00 dollars' worth of US military aid disbursements while the state endured 658 terrorist attacks, which claimed the lives of nearly 2,000 people. These new aid dollars challenged Kenya's ability to provide services to its large refugee population (Hills 2006, Otiso 2009, Lind and Howell 2011). As much of the military aid provided to Kenya during this time was meant to increase counterterrorism and policing capabilities. However, the new resources available in policing and counter-terrorism monitoring, are perceived to have had limited success in reducing terrorist activities, in the Kenyan state.

Instead, several studies suggest that the inflows of military aid to Kenya, were only effective in the increasing corruption and criminalization of Kenya's Somali refugee and Somali-Kenyan populations (Prestholdt 2011, Samora 2013, Jowell 2017, Mwangi 2017). Throughout Kenya's history, its police forces have been repeatedly accused of using brutal tactics and coercing false confessions to crimes. These existing abuses were only exacerbated as the police forces in major cities like Nairobi, would routinely harass Somali-Kenyans, after major terrorist events (Prestholdt 2011, Samora 2013). These increases in the securitization of the Kenyan state, have created strife that may have also aggravated existing social cleavages and encouraged terrorist networks like Al-Shabaab to launch significant and deadly terrorist attacks in Kenya (Mwangi 2017). Additionally, there is evidence that other facets of Kenya's securitization agenda, have created a system of peacekeeping training centers that are nepotistic in their recruitment and management, and that these centers are ineffective in providing sufficient military training to peacekeeping forces (Jowell 2017).

South Sudan presents another unique challenge to the securitization efforts of the potential East African Federation, as this state has had a turbulent history since its formation in 2011. During this time as a transitional democracy, South Sudan may have been more vulnerable to terrorist attacks than established democracies or autocracies (Savun and Phillips 2009). Moreover, from 2013 to 2020 South Sudan was embroiled in a civil war. Which compounded the challenges that the South Sudanese state had to face as it contended with threats from various rebel groups and terrorist groups. To meet these security concerns the South Sudanese state relied heavily on United States military aid disbursements. In the period between 2011 and 2018, the United States sent over 270,000,000 dollars in military aid to the state. Most of these funds were used to help South Sudan build its formal military apparatus. Before 2011,

South Sudan had no formal military and the disbursements of military aid sent to South Sudan by the United States were meant to facilitate the “...*transformation of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLA) to a professional, conventional force (through infrastructure support, equipment, and training), in support of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in Sudan*” (FA Data).

Because the level of support that, Kenya and South Sudan received from the United States in the form of military aid disbursements are different, this may serve as an indication that these states are strategically aligned with the United States, more so than other states in the EAC. This may also suggest that some states are less reliant on the United States military aid dollars and that they either have their means of procuring and paying for defense projects or that they may rely on other states, besides the United States, for support in accomplishing security sector objectives.

However, there are some insights to be gleaned by examining countries where this potential strategic alignment may be weaker. Rwanda is one such case that presents these characteristics of weak strategic alignment with the United States. Rwanda, throughout its history, has relied heavily on military assistance from France (Vasset 1997). This relationship has even seen the French state loan military commanders in official and unofficial capacities to the Rwandan, state where they helped to coordinate troop movements and training, which has transformed Rwanda’s military into one of the best-equipped military forces in the African continent (Beswick 2014). This deep history of cooperation and coordination between these two states, suggests that Rwanda may receive more military assistance from France, than military assistance from the United States.

The unique security realities that affect states like Kenya, South Sudan, and Rwanda, are representative of some of the trends throughout the EAC. Further analysis of this bloc should yield interesting insights into the interactions between military aid and terrorist attacks, as the unique security concerns of each state, may have profound impacts on each state's ability to combat terrorism.

Research Design

In this study, I test the relationship between military aid disbursements from the United States to the East African Community (EAC) member countries of Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kenya, South Sudan, Rwanda Tanzania, and Uganda. This bloc has seen massive increases in the number of US Foreign aid dollars disbursed to member-states during the 20-year -period between 1998 and 2018, yet these states still saw high levels of terrorist incidences during this period.

Dataset Design

To examine military aid and its potential relationship with terrorist events, this dataset will include information about aid disbursements obtained from the United States Department of State's Foreign Assistance (FA) database, information about terrorist events from the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism's, Global Terrorism Database (GTD), along with information about population, economic conditions and military personnel, in the East African Community member-states from the World Bank's Open Data, Databank.

The Foreign Assistance database provides verifiable and full accountability of all, non-confidential, transactions between the governmental agencies in the United States and aid-receiving states for each fiscal year between 1946 and 2019. This accountability includes information on both obligations and disbursements of foreign aid. In the FA database, *obligations* are defined as “A definite commitment that creates a legal liability of the government for the payment of goods and services ordered or received” (FA Methodology). In addition to data about foreign aid obligations, foreign aid *disbursements* are also accounted for. In the FA database disbursements are defined as “Disbursements are the funds paid/outlaid by U.S. government agencies, by cash or cash equivalent, during the fiscal year to liquidate government obligations” (FA Methodology). Further, this database sorts disbursements and obligations by program objective into either military aid, economic aid, or other aid categories. Accordingly, this study utilizes *military aid*, or the sum of all monies granted, loaned, or otherwise obligated for the achievement of specific security sector objectives, which is disclosed by the United States Foreign Assistance database to understand what affects this type of aid disbursement has had on terrorism incidences in East Africa.

Information about terrorist attacks in East Africa during this period was collected from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), which is an open-source database including information on terrorist events around the world since 1970 and is currently updated through 2019. For most terrorist events recorded in the GTD, there is information available on the date and location of the incident, the weapons used and nature of the target, the number of casualties, and - when identifiable - the identities of the perpetrating group.

Additionally, the GTD codes each terrorist attack based on the potential ideological motivation of the perpetrating actors, which can be communicated by looking at official

statements from terrorist organizations e.g., claiming responsibility for an attack, or by looking at the targets of the attack e.g., foreign embassies. This variable is based on a comparison between the nationality of the perpetrator group and the nationality of the target(s)/victim(s) (GTD Codebook, p. 57). It also indicates whether a perpetrator group attacked a target of a different nationality. The inclusion of this measure allows researchers to segregate terrorist events into distinct categories such as *transnational* terrorist attacks, *unknown* terrorist attacks, and *domestic* terrorist attacks.

Table 4: National identity and terrorism attack type classification example matrix.

National Identity	Transnational	Unknown	Domestic
Perpetrator	Somali	Kenyan	Kenyan
Victim	Kenyan	Kenyan, American	Kenyan

According to the GTD, there were 2,618 terrorist attacks in EAC countries during the period between 1998 and 2018. The countries of Rwanda and Tanzania saw the lowest level of terrorist activities, whereas the DRC and Kenya saw the highest number of terrorist incidences. Out of all these terrorist attacks in the East African Community from 1998 to 2018, 1,257 terrorist events were coded as transnational terrorist events, 874 were coded as unknown terrorist events and the remaining 486 terrorist events were recorded as domestic terrorism events. Which provides a strong pool of data, that I use to see how the relationship between US military aid is affected by attack type.

To capture an insight into how the conditions in each state may affect the potential relationship between US military aid disbursements and terrorism in the EAC, I have used data

from the World Bank's Databank, OpenData to collect information about the economic conditions, population, and armed forces personnel within each state. The usage of these variables as control measures is consistent with extant literature and should help to limit any endogenous factors that this research design cannot fully capture.

Method

The estimation technique used in this study is Poisson generalized linear regression modeling. This is one methodological tool that can be used when dealing with variables that are *count data* or “discrete data with non-negative integer values that count something” (Jabeen 2019). Terrorist events are an example of count data, as terrorist events, unlike population growth are not constants and there are years when countries do not see any terrorist events take place. By using Poisson regression, one can model event data using count data, such as terrorist events, to explain how other variables like population and gross domestic product (GDP) affect the count data (Jabeen 2019). Poisson modeling is also commonly used in extant terrorism literature and helps to model variables with a large number of zero values (Carter and Ying 2021).

In this study, I created a series of Poisson generalized linear regression models. These models tested the relationship between military aid and terrorist events in each of the seven EAC member states. I included several of these descriptive measures, about the terrorist events analyzed, into my full regression models as well. The included variables were, the number of victims killed in terrorist attacks, the number of victims wounded, the number of terrorists killed, the number of terrorists wounded, the number of US victims killed, and the number of US victims wounded. I also created a pooled model, which uses combined aggregated data from

each EAC member state into one model. Using these models, I was able to run regressions to test for the relationship between military aid and terrorist events, at 4 different levels.

Additionally, I applied a logarithmic transformation to several variables, including, population size, military personnel count, and gross domestic product to help control for potential skewness and heteroskedasticity in my modeling. This is consistent with established methodological conventions used in the extant literature on the relationship between foreign aid and terrorism, notably Carter and Ying (2021), Heinrich et al (2017), and others.

Using these models, I was able to better understand the potential relationship between the key variables of US military aid disbursements, the number of terrorist activities in a calendar year, terrorist event casualties, and terrorist event fatalities. I used the following directional hypotheses to test the potential relationship, between US military aid and terrorist activities in the EAC.

Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1 (H₁): As the number of terrorist attacks in an East African Community member-state increases, the US military aid disbursements that the state receives will increase.

As military aid disbursements to EAC member-states, change each year, the states' capacity to combat terrorist actors should gradually increase. These new resources would theoretically allow a country to be more effective in its securitization operations, as military aid, provide states with increased capacity to train soldiers, purchase additional arms and armaments, and increase their gathering intelligence-gathering capabilities (Omelicheva et al. 2017). Consequently, the availability of additional aid dollars would increase the power asymmetry

between the state and terrorist groups active within, and outside of, their borders. This asymmetry may also encourage terrorist organizations to carry out more frequent attacks in years following increases in military aid disbursements, than in previous years, to prevent the power asymmetry between the state and terrorist organizations from growing even larger as argued by Neumayer and Plümper (2011). Given these considerations, I expect that when the number of terrorist attacks increases, states should receive additional military aid dollars from the United States government.

Hypothesis 2 (H₂): As East African Countries receive more US military aid dollars, the number of casualties from terrorist attacks will increase in these countries.

This hypothesis follows similar logic to H₁, if an EAC country was to receive additional military funding then terrorist organizations may be more willing to carry out deadlier attacks to respond to the shifted balance of power. The key dependent variable of this hypothesis is the number of victim casualties or all people who were wounded or killed in terrorist attacks.

By turning to more lethal means terrorist organizations may dissuade international entities from continuing to support the state in which the terror attacks occur (Sobek and Braithwaite 2005). This strategy of employing more lethal means may also discourage citizens of the United States from supporting policies that would invest more in states that see high levels of terrorist activities (Efobi and Asongu 2015). If this is the case, then as military aid dollars increase, we should expect to see casualties rise as well, however, this may be a potentially endogenous interaction. If this is an endogenous interaction, then military aid flows may not cause an increase in the number of casualties that a state endures. To account for this possibility, I test this hypothesis will be tested a separate set of models using two-stage ordinary least

squares regression. In doing so I will be testing the strength of the relationship between military aid disbursements, and casualty rates from terrorist attacks, with a series of instrumental control variables.

Analysis and Discussion

Tables 5, 6, 7, and 8 present the results from my models testing the relationship between US military aid disbursement and terrorist events in the East African Community and my first hypothesis (H1). Functionally, Tables 3,4, 5, and 6 are identical; all of these models use the same dependent and control variables, and the only change between models is the independent variable of terrorist attack type. The change in independent variables between models was intended to see if the GTD's coding of the type of terrorist attack mattered, as this may have affected the strength, of the potential relationship between US military aid and terrorist events. This approach is also consistent with other extant literature on terrorism, as the motivations driving targets to claim credit for attacks, or to target certain targets, are affected by the goals of the terrorist organization and the terrorist actor (Abrahms 2008, Efobi and Asongu 2015). Therefore, Table 5 details the relationship between all terrorist attacks and US military aid disbursements, while the latter tables segregate terrorist attacks into one of three categories of terrorist attacks, either *transnational*, *unknown*, or *domestic*, terrorist attacks.

Table 5: Impacts of All Terrorist Attacks on US Military Aid Disbursements to the East African Community

	Burundi	DRC	Kenya	Rwanda	South Sudan	Tanzania	Uganda	EAC Bloc
US Military Aid Disbursements	0.187 (0.117)	1.35e-06 *** (0.128)	0.195 (0.095) *	0.817 (0.075) *	1.000 -	0.158 (0.563)	0.006 *** (0.002) ***	0.003 *** 0.251
US Military Aid Obligations	-	2.93e-09 *** (0.001) ***	0.049 ** (0.266)	0.731 ($< 2.2e-16$) ***	1.000 -	0.479 (0.384)	0.007 *** (0.002) ***	5.58e-04 *** (0.149)
Casualties	9.21e-13 *** (8.98e-16) ***	0.001 *** (0.472)	0.006 *** (0.858)	0.003 *** (4.88e-04) ***	1.000 -	0.486 (0.002) ***	0.146 (0.842)	0.265 (0.312)
Number of victims killed	0.434 (0.052) **	1.32e-04 *** (0.755)	(0.430) (0.119)	0.804 (0.435)	1.000 -	1.7e-05 *** (0.329)	0.115 (0.463)	1.01e-13 *** (0.267)
Number of terrorists killed	9.15e-11 *** (2.37e-06) ***	0.066 * (1.02e-04) ***	1.28e-04 *** (0.121)	-	1.000 -	0.076 * ($< 2.2e-16$) ***	0.093 * (9.46e-06) ***	0.218 (0.897)
Number of terrorists wounded	0.053 * (0.002) ***	0.026 ** (0.002) ***	0.055 (0.887)	-	-	-	0.004 *** (9.91e-06) ***	0.606 (0.874)
Number of US citizens killed	-	0.309 (0.720)	0.003 *** (0.748)	0.041 ** (0.007) ***	-	-	0.001 *** 0.046 **	0.398 0.730
Number of US citizens wounded	-	-	0.071 * (0.530)	-	-	-	-	0.014 ** (0.64)
Number of Military Personnel (log)	0.132 (0.015) **	0.038 (0.440)	0.499 (0.890)	0.948 (0.770)	-	0.473 (0.819)	0.055 * (0.083) *	4.46e-06 *** (0.157)
Unemployment %	0.015 ** (0.916)	0.003 *** (0.012) **	0.667 (0.555)	0.999 (0.38)	-	0.009 *** (0.018)	0.183 (0.060) *	0.006 *** (0.074) *
Population Size (log)	0.141 (0.987)	0.825 (0.084) *	0.020 ** (0.293)	0.384 (0.781)	-	0.088 * (0.525)	2.13e-08 *** (2.34e-04) ***	0.016 ** (0.631)
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (log)	0.234 (0.805)	0.001 *** (0.005) ***	0.008 *** (0.216)	0.501 (0.918)	-	0.067 * (0.492)	1.39e-09 *** (3.53e-04) ***	0.209 (0.905)

1. All values represent Pearson's R measurements $Pr(>|z|)$

2. Values in parens represent Robust Pearson's R measurement $Pr(>|z|)$. Obtained from Wald test of estimate coefficients, using 'coefest' in R.

3. South Sudan is included in this table, even though the results are computationally singular, because its data is included in the pooled EAC Bloc model.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < .10$.

Table 6: Impacts of Transnational Terrorist Attacks on US Military Aid Disbursements to the East African Community

	Burundi	DRC	Kenya	Rwanda	South Sudan	Tanzania	Uganda	EAC Bloc
US Military Aid Disbursements	0.048 ** ($< 2.2e-16$) ***	0.018 ** (0.179)	0.007 ** (0.004) ***	1.000 1.000	1.000 -	0.794 (0.573)	0.837 (0.872)	0.041 ** (0.075) *
US Military Aid Obligations	-	4.86e-13 ** (0.002) ***	2.09e-04 *** (0.018) **	1.000 1.000	1.000 -	0.665 (0.374)	0.847 (0.88)	0.033 ** (0.050) *
Casualties	0.232 (6.96e-05) ***	0.01 ** (0.226)	1.29e-04 *** (0.016) **	1.000 1.000	1.000 -	0.263 (0.006) ***	0.478 (0.615)	0.011 ** (0.009) ***
Number of victims killed	0.122 (6.39e-09) ***	3.47e-04 ** (0.110)	0.001 *** (0.016) **	1.000 1.000	1.000 -	0.92 (0.868)	0.769 (0.842)	2.11e-13 *** (6.461e-07) ***
Number of terrorists killed	0.003 ** ($< 2.2e-16$) ***	0.003 ** (0.038) **	2.34e-05 *** (0.016) **	-	1.000 -	0.844 (0.527)	0.386 (0.495)	0.059 * (0.151)
Number of terrorists wounded	0.999 (1.47e-04) ***	0.142 (0.152)	2.01e-04 *** (0.015) **	-	-	-	0.693 (0.727)	0.164 (0.255)
Number of US citizens killed	1.000	0.022 ** (0.006) **	1.06e-04 *** (0.021) **	1.000 1.000	-	-	0.511 (0.603)	0.272 (0.167)
Number of US citizens wounded	-	-	2.37e-04 *** (0.019) **	-	-	-	-	0.013 ** (0.058) *
Number of Military Personnel (log)	0.1419 (1.06e-12) ***	0.002 ** (0.264)	0.236 (0.195)	1.000 1.000	-	0.468 (0.051) *	0.006 *** (0.009) ***	0.001 *** (0.026) **
Unemployment %	0.019 ** ($< 2.2e-16$) ***	8.82e-09 ** (0.007) ***	0.021 ** (0.160)	1.000 1.000	-	0.838 (0.707)	0.007 *** (0.062) *	0.060 * (0.0380) **
Population Size (log)	0.097 * (7.19e-13) ***	0.438 (0.669)	0.405 (0.422)	1.000 1.000	-	0.289 (0.066)	0.002 *** (0.040) **	7.39e-07 *** (0.001) ***
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (log)	0.110 (4.44e-11) ***	1.18e-06 ** (0.014) *	0.376 (0.389)	1.000 1.000	-	0.29 (0.062) *	0.002 *** (0.042) **	3.99e-06 *** (0.004) ***

1. All values represent Pearson's R measurements $Pr(>|z|)$

2. Values in parens represent Robust Pearson's R measurement $Pr(>|z|)$. Obtained from Wald test of estimate coefficients, using 'coefest' in R.

3. South Sudan is included in this table, even though the results are computationally singular, because its data is included in the pooled EAC Bloc model.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < .10$.

Table 7: Impacts of Unknown Terrorist Attacks on US Military Aid Disbursements to the East African Community

	Burundi	DRC	Kenya	Rwanda	South Sudan	Tanzania	Uganda	EAC Bloc
US Military Aid Disbursements	0.142 (0.117)	0.271 (0.128)	0.334 (0.095) *	0.998 (0.075) *	1.000 -	0.478 (0.563)	4.65e-04 *** (0.002) ***	0.013 ** (0.251)
US Military Aid Obligations	-	0.059 * (0.001) ***	0.384 (0.266)	0.998 ($< 2.2e-16$) ***	1.000 -	0.449 (0.384)	5.37e-04 *** (0.002) ***	0.005 *** (0.149)
Casualties	7.65e-14 *** (8.98e-16) ***	0.43 (0.472)	0.78 (0.858)	0.008 *** (4.88e-04) ***	1.000 -	0.002 *** (0.002) ***	0.845 (0.842)	0.054 * (0.312)
Number of victims killed	0.037 ** (0.052) **	0.711 (0.755)	0.032 ** (0.119)	0.562 (0.435)	1.000 -	0.287 (0.330)	0.541 (0.463)	0.001 *** (0.267)
Number of terrorists killed	6.21e-07 *** (2.37e-06) ***	0.012 ** (1.02e-04) ***	0.048 ** (0.121)	-	1.000 -	0.995 ($< 2.2e-16$) ***	0.007 *** (9.46e-06) ***	0.774 (0.897)
Number of terrorists wounded	0.003 *** (0.002) ***	0.025 ** (0.002) ***	0.839 (0.887)	-	-	-	6.16e-05 *** (9.91e-06) ***	0.754 (0.874)
Number of US citizens killed	-	0.856 (0.72)	0.608 (0.748)	0.034 ** (0.007) ***	-	-	0.011 ** (0.046) **	0.484 (0.730)
Number of US citizens wounded	-	-	0.341 (0.530)	-	-	-	-	0.300 (0.640)
Number of Military Personnel (log)	0.013 ** (0.015) **	0.151 (0.440)	0.788 (0.890)	0.832 (0.770)	-	0.789 (0.819)	0.058 * (0.083) *	1.67e-05 *** (0.157)
Unemployment %	0.912 (0.916)	0.003 *** (0.012) **	0.34 (0.555)	0.471 (0.380)	-	0.022 ** (0.018) **	0.043 ** (0.060) **	1.52e-05 *** (0.074) *
Population Size (log)	0.982 (0.987)	0.111 (0.084) *	0.038 ** (0.293)	0.815 (0.781)	-	0.46 (0.525)	4.75e-05 *** (2.34e-04) ***	0.101 (0.631)
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (log)	0.724 (0.805)	0.041 ** (0.005) ***	0.028 ** (0.216)	0.932 (0.918)	-	0.423 (0.492)	5.92e-05 *** (3.53e-04) ***	0.656 (0.905)

1. All values represent Pearson's R measurements $Pr(>|z|)$.

2. Values in parens represent Robust Pearson's R measurement $Pr(>|z|)$. Obtained from Wald test of estimate coefficients, using 'coefest' in R.

3. South Sudan is included in this table, even though the results are computationally singular, because its data is included in the pooled EAC Bloc model.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < .10$.

Table 8: Impacts of Domestic Terrorist Attacks on US Military Aid Disbursements to the East African Community

	Burundi	DRC	Kenya	Rwanda	South Sudan	Tanzania	Uganda	EAC Bloc
US Military Aid Disbursements	0.002 *** (0.054) *	2.26e-04 *** (2.46e-05) ***	0.805 (0.700)	1.000 ($< 2.2e-16$) ***	1.000 -	1.000 (0.107)	0.755 (0.817)	0.722 (0.932)
US Military Aid Obligations	-	0.155 (0.004) ***	0.567 (0.339)	1.000 ($< 2.2e-16$) ***	1.000 -	1.000 (0.231)	0.658 (0.759)	0.829 (0.956)
Casualties	0.841 (0.944)	0.256 (0.197)	0.080 * (0.205)	1.000 ($< 2.2e-16$) ***	1.000 -	1.000 ($< 2.2e-16$) ***	0.004 *** (0.122)	0.014 ** (0.331)
Number of victims killed	0.106 (0.339)	0.313 (0.235)	0.011 (0.169)	1.000 (0.001) ***	1.000 -	1.000 ($< 2.2e-16$) ***	0.003 *** (0.114)	0.898 (0.964)
Number of terrorists killed	0.004 *** (0.302)	0.082 * (0.003) ***	0.662 (0.589)	-	-	1.000 ($< 2.2e-16$) ***	0.573 (0.646)	0.848 (0.956)
Number of terrorists wounded	0.993 ($< 2.2e-16$) ***	0.891 (0.834)	0.158 (0.174)	-	1.000 -	-	0.208 (0.434)	0.665 (0.912)
Number of US citizens killed	-	0.015 ** (3.13e-07) ***	0.980 (0.302)	1.000 ($< 2.2e-16$) ***	-	-	0.996 (6.21e-06) ***	0.006 *** (0.309)
Number of US citizens wounded	-	-	0.054 * (0.179)	-	-	-	-	0.273 (0.792)
Number of Military Personnel (log)	0.404 (0.592)	0.181 (0.114)	0.191 (0.514)	1.000 (6.705e-11) ***	-	1.000 ($< 2.2e-16$) ***	2.07e-04 *** (0.112)	0.278 (0.802)
Unemployment %	2.03e-04 *** (0.171)	0.617 (0.239)	0.081 * (0.364)	1.000 (2.16e-08) ***	-	1.000 ($< 2.2e-16$) ***	0.005 *** (0.223)	0.087 * (0.6307)
Population Size (log)	0.001 *** (0.448)	0.176 (0.173)	0.010 * (0.369)	1.000 (1.48e-05) ***	-	1.000 (0.234)	0.296 (0.646)	3.77e-06 *** (0.108)
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (log)	4.69e-05 *** (0.344)	0.078 * (0.061) *	0.006 ** (0.356)	1.000 (0.002) ***	-	1.000 (0.032) **	0.470 (0.761)	1.64e-06 *** (0.121)

1. All values represent Pearson's R measurements $Pr(>|z|)$.

2. Values in parens represent Robust Pearson's R measurement $Pr(>|z|)$. Obtained from Wald test of estimate coefficients, using 'coefest' in R.

3. South Sudan is included in this table, even though the results are computationally singular, because its data is included in the pooled EAC Bloc model.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < .10$.

As can be seen, by the results of these tables, the strength of the relationship between terrorist attacks and military aid disbursements varies between states and by attack types. For example, there is a statistically significant relationship ($p < 0.05$) between transnational terrorist attacks, unknown terrorist attacks, and US Military aid disbursements made to Burundi throughout the period from 1998 to 2018. Whereas there is not a significant relationship between unknown terrorist attacks or domestic terrorist attacks and US foreign aid disbursements in the case of Burundi. This trend in data can be seen at the bloc level as well, as there is a strong statistically significant relationship ($p < 0.01$) between all terrorist events and aid US military aid disbursements, as well as statistically significant relationships ($p < 0.05$) between transnational terrorist attacks, unknown terrorist attacks and US military aid disbursements

However, despite the initial promise that these results yielded, some issues suggested these findings may not have been robust. The primary indicator that these findings may not have been robust, was that the regression estimates and standard errors, produced by the regression models, were small exponential values that were near 0.00. There were also several cases, where data could not be fitted to the modeling tools I used, potentially due to the low rate of observations and sparseness of data, which resulted in computational singularities. Notably, the regression results for South Sudan seen in Tables 5,6,7, and 8, demonstrate this issue. As the South Sudanese state, only gained its political autonomy a mere eleven years ago, there were only seven relevant years available to analyze, as only the years between 2011 and 2018, had available statistics about US military aid disbursements and terrorist attacks in South Sudan. This may also be why singularities occurred in the results of domestic and transnational terrorist attacks in Rwanda and Tanzania, respectively. Overall, Rwanda and Tanzania saw the lowest

rates of domestic and transnational terrorists in the bloc, and this small number of cases may again be the cause of the singularities produced in my regression models.

Because of the issues that may have been affecting my regression models, I ran a series of robustness tests on my models, using the *coefest* function in R, to ensure that the results of my analysis were not computational anomalies. The results of these robustness checks can be seen in the parentheses of Tables 5, 6, 7, and 8. The robustness checks, help to rectify some of the singularity issues that were present and revealed that some of the relationships were stronger between certain variables. Notably, the Pearson's R measurements for the relationship between unknown terrorist attacks and US military disbursements to Rwanda changed dramatically, from a score of 0.998 to 0.075. These robustness checks also helped to confirm that there were strong statistically significant relationships ($p < 0.01$) between transnational terrorism and US military aid at the bloc level.

Given the variance, of the results from the baseline models to the robustness test results, the data may be insufficient to make a causal argument or to definitively say if my first hypothesis is confirmed. Nonetheless, the strength of these relationships at the bloc level and the state level, are encouraging and suggest that a larger pool of data or more advanced estimation techniques may be better suited to model this relationship between terrorist events and US military aid disbursements.

Tables 9, 10, 11, and 12 show the results for a two-stage least squares regression, testing my second hypothesis (H2). This regression modeling helps to deal with potential endogeneity problems that may occur. In the context of this study, these models were used to test the relationship between casualties and military aid flows, as there may be a situation where terrorist

actors raise the stakes of violence, in response to increases in the state's power (Sobek and Braithwaite 2005). The same approach, in segmenting the analysis by attack type was used in

Table 9: Effects of Casualties from Terrorist Attacks on US Military Aid Disbursements to the East African Community

	Burundi	DRC	Kenya	Rwanda	South Sudan	Tanzania	Uganda	EAC Bloc
US Military Aid Disbursements	0.098 *	0.276	0.627	0.482	0.040 **	0.931	0.145	0.344
All Terrorist Attacks	0.005 ***	6.1e-05 ***	0.681	8.19e-05 ***	0.296	0.614	0.011 **	0.001 ***
Instruments (Aid Disbursements)	0.248	1.17e-04 ***	7.98e-06 ***	0.425	0.287	.358e-05 ***	0.005 ***	1.48e-07 ***
Instruments (Attacks)	0.571	5.49e-07 ***	1.49e-05 ***	3.26e-04 ***	0.046	0.042 **	1.05e-07 ***	4.58e-07 ***
Wu-Hausman	0.012 **	0.973	0.634	0.059 *	0.069 *	0.392	0.017 **	0.847
Sargan	0.013 **	0.170	0.032 **	0.210	0.402	0.317	0.774	0.121

1. All values represent Pearson's R measurements Pr (>|t|)

*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < .10.

Table 10: Effects of Casualties from Transnational Terrorist Attacks on US Military Aid Disbursements to the East African Community

	Burundi	DRC	Kenya	Rwanda	South Sudan	Tanzania	Uganda	EAC Bloc
US Military Aid Disbursements	0.775	0.448	0.567	0.337	0.029 **	0.871	0.076 *	0.292
Transnational Terrorist Attacks	0.551	0.003 ***	0.541	4.97e-05 ***	0.285	0.136	0.705	0.001 ***
Instruments (Aid Disbursements)	0.248	1.17e-04 ***	7.98e-06 ***	0.425	0.287	.358e-05 ***	0.005 ***	1.48e-07 ***
Instruments (Transnational Attacks)	0.003 ***	0.001 ***	2.30e-06 ***	2.44e-04 ***	0.083 *	0.383	0.003 ***	9.11e 07 ***
Wu-Hausman	0.982	0.347	0.791	0.119	0.081 *	0.917	0.019 **	0.790
Sargan	0.035 **	0.429	0.781	0.532	0.335	0.273	0.077 *	0.121

1. All values represent Pearson's R measurements Pr (>|t|)

*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < .10.

Table 11: Effects of Casualties from Unknown Terrorist Attacks on US Military Aid Disbursements to the East African Community

	Burundi	DRC	Kenya	Rwanda	South Sudan	Tanzania	Uganda	EAC Bloc
US Military Aid Disbursements	0.068 *	0.408	0.78	0.455	0.079 *	0.901	0.045 **	0.355
Unknown Terrorist Attacks	0.082 *	0.001 ***	0.768	0.205	0.308	0.609	0.337	0.023 **
Instruments (Aid Disbursements)	0.248	1.17e-04 ***	7.98e-06 ***	0.425	0.287	.358e-05 ***	0.005 ***	1.48e-07 ***
Instruments (Unknown Attacks)	0.460	0.010 **	0.007 ***	0.093 *	0.008 ***	0.044 **	0.021 **	4.77e-07 ***
Wu-Hausman	0.002 ***	0.012 **	0.823	0.588	0.052 *	0.554	0.002 ***	0.404
Sargan	0.013 **	0.234	0.017 **	0.013 **	0.525	0.332	0.617	0.308

1. All values represent Pearson's R measurements Pr (>|t|)

*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < .10.

Table 12: Effects of Casualties from Domestic Terrorist Attacks on US Military Aid Disbursements to the East African Community

	Burundi	DRC	Kenya	Rwanda	South Sudan	Tanzania	Uganda	EAC Bloc
US Military Aid Disbursements	0.798	0.188	-	0.505	0.026 **	0.773	0.165	0.516
Domestic Terrorist Attacks	0.458	0.004 ***	-	0.972	0.280	0.916	0.005 ***	0.895
Instruments (Aid Disbursements)	0.248	1.17e-04 ***	-	0.425	0.287	3.58e-05 ***	0.005 ***	1.48e-07 ***
Instruments (Domestic Attacks)	0.903	0.003 ***	-	0.088	0.037 **	0.510	0.002 ***	0.001 ***
Wu-Hausman	0.117	0.303	-	0.505	0.051 *	0.872	0.098 *	0.520
Sargan	0.837	0.261	-	0.029	0.433	0.354	0.353	0.056 *

1. All values represent Pearson's R measurements Pr (>|t|)

*** p < .05, ** p < 0.05, * p < .10.

these models as well.

As can be seen, by the results of these tables there are a few statistically significant relationships between casualty rates and US military aid disbursements. Which suggests that this

is an endogenous relationship. However, there are a few cases where there was a statistically significant relationship, and the relationship passed the Wu-Hausman test. A Wu-Hausman test measures the consistency of the OLS estimates and if passed, suggests that endogeneity is not a large issue in the estimation (Sundstrom 2016). If you fail to pass the Wu-Hausman test in a least-squares regression model, you cannot reject the null hypothesis (Sundstrom 2016). Because the majority of cases fail to pass the Wu-Hausman test, I subsequently fail to reject the null hypothesis, which suggests that the relationship between casualties and US military aid is endogenous.

Conclusion

Are disbursements of United States military aid to foreign countries having an effect on impeding terrorist activities? To this point, the specific interaction between military aid flows and terrorism events is poorly understood. Extant literature on the aid-terrorism nexus has primarily focused on the effects that developmental aid and foreign direct investment can have in reducing terrorist events. But the relationship between military aid and terrorist events is less clear.

This study tried to aid in advancing this emergent area of research interest, by analyzing the potential relationship between US military aid disbursements and terrorist events in a small number of states, bound together by a common political and economic bloc. A small bloc especially a bloc that is so politically and economically intertwined as the EAC should be an ideal unit of analysis for these relationships as researchers could compare the state-level variables against the bloc to achieve better insights into these potential relationships. To a degree, this study was effective in that goal, as this study found indications that there are some

statistically significant relationships between terrorist events and US military aid disbursements to East African Community member states and that these relationships vary across states. This study also revealed that there may also be some statistically significant relationships between casualties from terrorist events and US military aid disbursements. However, the trends in data were not strong enough to conclude that these relationships were significant and this study was unable to uncover any significant insights into the potential relationships under analysis.

The failure to reject the null hypothesis may be in part due to the small number of observations available, as this study was looking only looking at twenty years of observable data. Ergo, the impact factor of any missing data was much higher than, it would have been in the pool of available data was larger. Or it may be due to model fit errors as there were small, near-zero, exponential standard errors produced by this regression analysis. More advanced modeling tools better fit for time series analysis, with small pools of available data; may be more appropriate to capture these trends and uncover insights into the potential relationships, than the Poisson regression models used in this study.

Despite the limitations of the findings of this study, it is possible that one could use this framework to analyze similar blocs of nations, such as ECOWAS states in West Africa, to see how the relationships between US military aid disbursements and terrorist events present themselves in that bloc of nations. It would also be appropriate to scaffold this framework to analyze how military aid granted by states, like France, the United Kingdom, and China may affect terrorist events in the countries that they support with military aid disbursements. Another interesting direction that one could apply this framework to is to see how offensive counterterrorism operations outside of the state's borders, such as Kenya's Operation Linda Nchi into Somalia have affected military aid flows to the Kenyan state following the operation.

In all, this study is a necessary first step towards further exploring these ideas. There is fertile ground here to make a significant impact on the emergent discussions about the aid-terrorism nexus, while also gaining important insights into how US military aid and other major aid-disbursing countries, are affecting terrorist activities in aid-recipient states. In turn, further research in this area could give us a better insight into what factors affect these relationships and insight into how effective military aid disbursements are in mitigating terrorism incidences across the globe.

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