The Soldier and the Citizen:

Examining the U.S. Military's Non-partisan Norms

By

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Abstract

This dissertation improves our understanding of non-partisan norms in the U.S. military. These norms are an essential part of American civil-military relations because they help ensure the military does not use its latent political power to influence domestic politics or become aligned with a political party. Despite the importance of these norms, we have a limited understanding of them and how they influence U.S. military servicemembers' political attitudes and behavior. Research in the last few decades suggests that non-partisan norms may be eroding. This research, along with increasing political polarization in America, raises questions about whether the military can remain a non-partisan institution. This dissertation aims to answer some of these questions by improving our understanding of military non-partisan norms. It explores the relationship between U.S. military servicemembers' non-partisan norms, partisan identities, and political attitudes and behavior. First, it examines recent trends in servicemembers' partisan affiliation and political activism. Next, it investigates how non-partisan norms influence servicemembers' political decision-making. Finally, it analyzes the extent and consequences of partisan social conflict among servicemembers. This dissertation finds that military servicemembers are both soldiers and citizens. On the one hand, servicemembers are similar to the American public. They identify as partisans, have partisan biases, and experience social conflict with opposing partisans. On the other hand, servicemembers adhere to military non-partisan norms that, when activated, can reduce bias and partisan conflict. These findings advance our knowledge of American civil-military relations and servicemembers' political behavior. They also have important implications for civil-military relations theory, scholarship, and practice.

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Do or do not. There is no try.

—Yoda

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—*George Washington, 1775*

Chapter 1

Why Partisanship in the U.S. Military Matters

The problem this dissertation investigates is our limited understanding of non-partisan norms in the U.S. military.[1] These norms are a key aspect of American civil-military relations (the interactive relationships between the U.S. government, the U.S. military, and the American people) (Bacevich and Kohn 1997; Brooks 2013; Huntington 1957; Janowitz 1960; Kohn 2002; Liebert and Golby 2017; Blankshain 2020; Brooks 2019). Even though non-partisan norms are important, we do not know much about the relationship between these norms and what they are meant to influence—the political attitudes of U.S. military servicemembers. This study improves our understanding of this relationship, and more broadly, our understanding of American civil-military relations.

Military non-partisan norms help manage the central paradox of civil-military relations (Feaver 1996). America maintains a powerful military to preserve its security. The more powerful the military becomes, the better it can defend the state. Paradoxically, however, increasing military power also increases the military's ability to threaten the state's domestic political order. Thus, the problem for America is maintaining a military that is strong enough to defend the state but loyal enough not to coerce the state it is supposed to defend.

A solution to this problem is a theory of civil-military relations called *objective civilian control* (Huntington 1957). Objective civilian control is essentially a bargain in which the political and military institutions agree to separate political and military spheres. The civilian

[1] Throughout this essay, "military" refers to the U.S. Armed Forces and "servicemembers" refers to its members.

government grants the military significant autonomy in military affairs. In exchange, the military willingly stays out of political matters and subordinates itself to civilian control. According to the theory, this arrangement resolves the civil-military paradox by maximizing the military's fighting power while minimizing its political power, and by extension, the risk to the state.

A key aspect of objective civilian control's separate spheres is a non-partisan military. The theory emphasizes that the military must be politically neutral—unaligned with any political group or policy (Huntington 1957, 71–76). Political neutrality ensures that the military loyally executes the policies of "any civilian group which secures legitimate authority within the state" (Huntington 1957, 84). Since political parties are the chief competitors in American politics, political neutrality means the military must avoid partisan politics (Bacevich and Kohn 1997; Golby, Dropp, and Feaver 2012, 2013; Kohn 2002; Liebert and Golby 2017; Owens 2015).

Military non-partisanship precludes even the *appearance* of partisan alignment. Objective civilian control requires that civilian leaders and the American public view the military "not simply as nonpartisan, but as 'un-partisan': above, beyond, and oblivious to partisan politics" (Kohn 2009, 278). Public discourse on the military's non-partisan reputation focuses on high-profile events involving senior officers.[2] However, as I will discuss later in this chapter, military non-partisanship includes all aspects of the military's interaction with partisan politics that could affect how civilian leaders and the public view the military. Examples of these interactions include the relationships between presidents and generals (Feaver 2003), veterans' political candidate endorsements (Golby, Dropp, and Feaver 2012), and servicemembers' political speech on social media (Urben 2017).

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[2] A recent example is General Mark Milley accompanying President Donald Trump in Lafayette Square during protests against police violence (Cooper 2020).

The U.S. military has adopted objective civilian control as its guiding civil-military framework (Nielsen and Snider 2009b) and committed itself to a high standard of non-partisanship. To achieve this standard, the military limits servicemembers' political speech through rules and regulations (Department of Defense 2008; US Government 2016, A2–29). However, legal and practical limits constrain the military's ability to curb servicemembers' political speech through regulations. These limits are what make *non-partisan norms* necessary.

Non-partisan norms bridge the gap between objective civilian control's high standard of non-partisanship and the military's limited ability to achieve non-partisanship through regulations. Non-partisan norms discourage servicemembers from affiliating with any political party and saying or doing anything that might give the impression of political affiliation or partiality (Kohn 2002, 27). The norms comprise servicemembers' shared beliefs and values, or "what constitutes morally approved and disapproved conduct" (Cialdini, Reno, and Kallgren 1990, 1015), regarding partisan politics. Ideally, non-partisan norms constrain servicemembers' political speech such that they voluntarily choose not to do anything—even if allowed by regulations—that might damage the military's non-partisan reputation.

This discussion brings us to the problem this dissertation investigates—our limited understanding of non-partisan norms. These norms are central to objective civilian control, and thus to American civil-military relations. Nevertheless, we do not know much about how they influence servicemembers' political attitudes. While some research suggests non-partisan norms are weakening, the limitations of this literature preclude drawing definitive conclusions. (Bacevich and Kohn 1997; Betros 2001; J. K. Dempsey 2009; Dowd 2001; Feaver, Kohn, and Kohn 2001; Holsti 1998, 2001; Kohn 2002; Liebert and Golby 2017; Urben 2013, 2014, 2017). Most of these studies examine military subgroups (e.g., only officers) and rely on observational

data to measure *descriptive* norms—what most people do—while neglecting *injunctive* norms—shared expectations about what people *should* do (Bicchieri 2006; Cialdini, Reno, and Kallgren 1990).

Another reason we need a better understanding of norms is the growing influence of partisanship in American politics. Partisanship is an emotional attachment to a political party and a powerful driver of political behavior (Bartels 2000; Dalton 2016). Partisanship is also a source of social conflict (Abramowitz and Webster 2016; Iyengar et al. 2019) that can spill over into nonpolitical situations (Gift and Gift 2015; Iyengar and Westwood 2015; McConnell et al. 2018). Nine in ten servicemembers identify as partisans (as I will show in Chapter 2), which means that most people in the military face conflicting pressures on their political attitudes. Non-partisan norms discourage partisan involvement while partisan attachment encourages it. Moreover, if partisanship engenders social conflict in the military as it does among other Americans, military cohesion and teamwork could suffer.

In sum, our limited understanding of non-partisan norms is a problem for three reasons. First, norms are central to objective civilian control and American civil-military relations. Second, research suggests non-partisan norms are weakening, but more research is needed to settle this debate. Third, partisanship creates pressures that oppose non-partisan norms, and partisan social conflict could negatively affect military cohesion. These issues underscore the need to better understand non-partisan norms. More broadly, these issues raise questions about whether objective civilian control is a sound foundation for American civil-military relations.

Research Question

This dissertation aims to improve our understanding of non-partisan norms in the U.S. military by answering this research question: *What is the relationship between U.S. military*

servicemembers' non-partisan norms, partisan identities, and political attitudes and behavior? This study answers the research question by accomplishing three aims. First, it explores servicemembers' partisan identification and levels of political activism. Second, it examines how servicemembers' partisanship and non-partisan norms affect their political decision-making. Third, it explores the extent and consequences of partisan conflict in the military. These three goals correspond to three secondary research questions:

1. How partisan are servicemembers, and are their non-partisan norms eroding?
2. How does partisanship affect servicemembers' political decision-making?
3. What are the extent and consequences of partisan social conflict among servicemembers?

This dissertation's findings have important implications for civil-military theory, scholarship, and practice. First, this work improves our understanding of military non-partisan norms, the health of the U.S. military's non-partisan ethos, and our understanding of objective civilian control as the dominant pattern of American civil-military relations. Second, this study examines injunctive non-partisan norms and their consequences for servicemembers' political behavior. Finally, this study is among the first to explore partisan social conflict in the military—that is, the degree to which servicemembers dislike and distrust other servicemembers who are opposing partisans (e.g., Iyengar et al. 2019).

Background

What is Civil-Military Relations?

Civil-military relations is the study of the interactive relationships between a state's government, its people, and its military (Blankshain 2020; Brooks 2019). Civil-military relations scholarship assumes that militaries are different from other government bureaucracies. Militaries have coercive power that can influence a state's international and domestic politics in ways other

government institutions cannot (Brooks 2019). Consequently, the militaries' relationships with civilian governments and publics merit focused study and require unique theories and empirical analyses.

Although civil-military relations is a relatively new field of scholarly research, civil-military relationships are not. Military and political theorists have long been concerned with the relationship between the military and politics, and more broadly, between violence and the state. In the influential text *The Art of War* ([4BC] 1971), Chinese military historian and theorist Sun Tzu recognized that war serves political goals, and he wrestled with the question of how much involvement political leaders should have in military operations (81-83) (a debate that continues in contemporary civil-military relations scholarship (e.g., Huntington 1957; Feaver 2003; E. A. Cohen 2003; McMaster 1998)). In *Leviathan*, Thomas Hobbes argued that centralizing coercive power in a strong state is necessary to overcome inherently conflictual human nature ([1651] 1904). Immanuel Kant likewise argued for a political monopoly on violence, albeit in a democratic state that would use violence sparingly ([1795] 2003). And in *Politics as a Vocation*, Max Weber contended that establishing a monopoly on violence is the defining feature of the modern state ([1919] 2021).

However, the strongest theoretical influence on American civil-military relations comes from Prussian theorist Carl von Clausewitz's theory of war (Owens 2011; Johnson and Metz 1995). In *On War*, Clausewitz argued that war comprises three elements: a state's government, military, and people ([1832] 1989). Clausewitz's theory is notable for including the state's people—not just the government and the military—and reflects his experience as a Prussian officer in the Napoleonic Wars.

Writing in the wake of Prussia's 1806 defeat at the hands of Napoleon Bonaparte, Clausewitz believed that Prussia's failure was not military, but political (Palmer 1986; Stoker 2014). Napoleon's brand of revolutionary war unleashed the nationalistic fervor of the French people (Stoker 2014). France's 1793 *levée en masse* mobilized the entire nation—every man, woman, child, and resource of the state—to support the martial enterprise. Clausewitz believed Prussia was stuck in the pre-Napoleonic paradigm of limited war where kings and armies were central, but people played only a minor role. Having failed to mobilize the nation, Prussia was no match for France (Paret 1986).

Although Clausewitz was not concerned with civil-military relations per se, his tripartite theory of war, shown in Figure 1, underpins the institutional approach to civil-military relations favored by American scholars and practitioners. (Owens 2011; Blankshain 2020; but see Schiff 1995, 2008 for a critique). The institutional approach assumes that the interactive relationships between the government, the military, and the public have important implications for national security and domestic politics.

Figure 1. The Clausewitzian institutional approach to civil-military relations



Although American civil-military relations is concerned with all three sides of the tripartite institutional model, most scholars focus on the relationship between the military and the government (Brooks 2019). The primary question in military-government relations is civilian control of the military—the degree to which the military remains subordinate to civilian authority through institutional and normative mechanisms (Perlmutter and LeoGrande 1982; Brooks 2019). Civilian control is important because of the paradoxical problem introduced at the beginning of this chapter (Feaver 1996). States need militaries for security, but strong militaries can threaten the domestic politics of the states they are meant to secure. Civilian control manages this problem by ensuring that the military uses its coercive power only at the behest of civilian political leaders, and only to protect the state rather than destroy it (Huntington 1957; Brooks 2019; Blankshain 2020).

This is not to say, however, that civilian control is only concerned with preventing a military *coup d'état.* Civilian control also describes a situation where civilian leaders can formulate policy without undue military influence, and the military executes policy even if military leaders disagree with it (Feaver and Kohn 2021; Cohn 2011; Owens 2018). Effective civilian control also means that military wartime operations support political aims (e.g., E. A. Cohen 2003).

A second area of study in American civil-military relations is the relationship between the American people and the military and the degree of integration between the two (Shields 2020; Brooks 2019). In the last few decades, scholarship in this area focused on the "civil-military gap" (Brooks 2019), and scholars find meaningful cultural and partisan differences between civilians and servicemembers that have significant implications for civil-military relations and military effectiveness. (Feaver and Gelpi 2011; Feaver, Kohn, and Kohn 2001; J.

K. Dempsey 2009; Urben 2013; Schake and Mattis 2016; Liebert and Golby 2017; Burbach 2019).

The third relationship in the institutional model concerns the people and the government. A central question in this area is how the public influences the government and holds political leaders accountable for foreign policy and military operations. Early studies argued that public opinion on foreign affairs is incoherent, unstructured, and has little effect on policy, i.e., the Almond-Lippman consensus (Lippmann 1922; [1925] 1925; Almond 1950). After the Vietnam War, however, revisionists argued that public opinion is structured and stable, that it shifts in response to international events (Verba et al. 1967; Shapiro and Page 1988; Page and Shapiro 1992; Aldrich, Sullivan, and Borgida 1989), and that it influenced the Johnson and Nixon administrations' Vietnam policies (Sobel 2001; Holsti 2004b). More recent studies explore how military casualties affect public support for combat operations (Mueller 1973; Holsti 2004b; Gelpi and Mueller 2006; Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler 2006).

Civil-military research is not limited to empirical studies of institutional relationships. Scholars have also developed specialized civil-military theories (Owens 2011, 19). Like theories in other fields, civil-military theories aim to explain meaningful relationships and generate hypotheses about what is likely to happen under certain conditions. In addition, many civil-military theories are normative. They describe what states should do to maintain healthy civil-military relations. The theory this dissertation tests—Huntington's theory of objective civilian control (1957)—is one of these.

History of American Civil-Military Relations

Huntington's theory of objective civilian control (1957) is the product of a unique moment in American history—the dawn of the Cold War. To understand the theory, it is

necessary to understand its historical context. This section describes the evolution of American civil-military relations from the Revolution to the Cold War and the unique Cold War conditions that inspired Huntington's theory.

I focus much of this section on the U.S. Army because the problem of civilian control is most acute with armies. Naval warfare theorist Julian Corbett remarked, "Since [people] live upon the land and not upon the sea, great issues between nations at war have always been decided…either by what armies can do against your enemy's territory and national life, or else by fear of what the fleet makes it possible for your army to do" (1918, 12). Corbett's observation underscores that armies exist to impose one state's political will upon another by seizing key political targets and controlling populations. These capabilities make armies a much more significant threat than navies to domestic politics (Ferguson 1987, 52; Luttwak 2016).

American civil-military relations predate the U.S. Constitution. Mere days after the Continental Congress established the U.S. Army in 1775, the New York Legislature wrote General George Washington to inquire what would become of the Army at the end of the Revolutionary War:

> Confiding in you Sir, and in the worthy Generals immediately under your Command, We have the most flattering Hopes of Success in the glorious Struggle for American Liberty; and the fullest Assurances that whenever this important Contest shall be decided, by that fondest Wish of each American Soul; an Accommodation with our Mother Country; You will cheerfully resign the important Deposit committed unto Your Hands, and reassume the Character of our worthiest Citizen (New York Provincial Congress 1775).

In reply, Washington promised to disband the Army once the war was won:

> When we assumed the Soldier, we did not lay aside the Citizen; and we shall most sincerely rejoice with you in that happy hour when the establishment of American Liberty, upon the most firm and solid foundations, shall enable us to return to our Private Stations in the bosom of a free, peaceful and happy Country (Washington 1775).

This early civil-military exchange shows that as long as there has been an American Army, civilians have been concerned about maintaining control of it.

The Framers of the Constitution had similar concerns. Many believed a powerful peacetime army would become an instrument of tyranny (Maslowski 1994, 212; Madison [1787] 1987, 214). Nevertheless, they could not avoid the civil-military dilemma—America needed military power to deter threats from the Spanish, British, and others (Johnson and Metz 1995). The Framers attempted to resolve the dilemma by placing institutional constraints on military power—particularly the Army—in the U.S. Constitution. They divided power over the military between Congress and the executive. Although the president is commander in chief, the Senate must approve commissioning and promotion of military officers, and the Congress retains the power to declare war. The Framers also sought to avoid a large peacetime army. The Constitution gives Congress the power to raise an army but limits appropriations for that purpose to two years.

The Constitution's civil-military framework has been successful in that America has never experienced a serious attempted military *coup d'état*. Still, the framework has a weakness. It is silent on the degree to which the military should be separate from politics. This omission has allowed minor civil-military crises to arise that, while not threatening military *coup d'état*, have challenged civilian leaders' ability to make national security policy that the military dutifully implements (Feaver and Kohn 2021; Cohn 2011; Owens 2018).

The first of these crises was General Winfield Scott's 1852 presidential candidacy (Eisenhower 1999). Scott was not the first American general to try and parlay military success into political office. He was, however, the first officer to run for president while commanding the

Army.[3] Scott's candidacy put him in the tenuous position of taking political positions against the sitting commander-in-chief. Future president James Buchanan warned that Scott's candidacy was dangerous for both the military and the country:

> What fatal effects would it not have on the discipline and efficiency of the Army to have aspirants for the presidency among its principal officers? How many military cliques would be formed? …In times of war and danger what fatal consequences might result to the country from the fact that the President and the commanding general of the Army are rival and hostile candidates for the presidency? (Curtis 1883, 48)

Scott lost the 1852 election, but his candidacy inaugurated the political heyday of American generals. Army officers freely sought political office and readily mixed military duty and politics (Eisenhower 1999). Political connections often enhanced the prospects for military promotion. A decade later, however, the dangers of mixing military affairs with partisan politics would become apparent during the American Civil War.

After war broke out in 1861, military-political complications plagued President Abraham Lincoln's early efforts to put down the southern insurrection. Lincoln needed the political support of key constituencies, which obliged him to appoint several politically-connected men as generals in the Federal army (Simpson 2000). Unfortunately, many of these officers proved to be incompetent battlefield commanders. To make matters worse, there was a near repeat of the Winfield Scott affair in 1864 when General George B. McClellan, whom Lincoln had removed from command in 1862 for lack of aggression, ran against Lincoln for president while still on active duty (Sears 1988).

Lincoln eventually stabilized his relationship with the military by appointing General Ulysses S. Grant as the Army's commander (Weigley 1993). Before Grant, Lincoln had sacked

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[3] Zachary Taylor successfully ran for president in 1848 as an active-duty U.S. Army major general (Eisenhower 2008, 77–90). But as commander of the Western Division, Taylor's candidacy was arguably less problematic than Scott's 1852 effort.

several generals who did not share his strategic vision. However, in Grant he found a commander who accepted civilian supremacy and harmonized military strategy with Lincoln's political objectives.

Grant's appointment launched a new era in civil-military relations characterized by military subordination to civilian control and avoidance of partisan politics (Weigley 1993; Huntington 1957). But the person responsible for inculcating these new norms into military culture was not Grant (who successfully campaigned for president in 1868). Instead, it was Grant's former subordinate, General William T. Sherman. After taking office, President Grant appointed Sherman commander of the Army (Broadwater 2013).

Sherman ushered in an era of military professionalization (Huntington 1957; Weigley 1993). Sherman's approach to civil-military relations reflected a disdain of politics ("partisanship is a curse," he once wrote(Broadwater 2013, 117)) and a conviction that military and political affairs should be separate (Huntington 1957, 230–37). As the Army's top officer from 1869 to 1883, Sherman's professional ethos molded an entire generation of soldiers and created a legacy that lasted through the Second World War. Although military veterans continued to seek the presidency (Somit 1948), later presidential elections were free of the military-political tensions that characterized 1852 to 1880.

The Second World War was a defining moment in American civil-military relations for two reasons. The first was the appointment of General George C. Marshall as Army Chief of Staff. Marshall, like Sherman, had a generational influence on the military's professional norms (Cray 2000; Betros 2001; Uldrich 2005). He continued Grant's tradition of adherence to civilian control and Sherman's tradition of avoiding partisan politics (Betros 2001). Marshall's principled approach enabled the U.S. to mobilize a massive army without civilian control ever coming into

question (Gilbert 2004). Although Marshall and other military leaders sometimes disagreed with President Franklin Roosevelt on strategy, Marshall ensured Roosevelt had the final say, and the military executed the President's orders (Weigley 1993).

The second reason the War was an inflection point for American civil-military relations is because the U.S. military did not demobilize. The U.S. military—especially the Army—had historically been small and weak in peacetime growing only when needed for war (Allison, Grey, and Valentine 2020). In the late 1940s, however, American leaders determined that a powerful standing military would be necessary to deter the Soviet Union in the nascent Cold War (Gaddis 2006). This policy departed from America's demobilization tradition by creating a large peacetime Army and a politically powerful defense establishment.

Cold War civil-military relations got off to an inauspicious start with two civil-military crises arising from interservice rivalries, disagreements over strategy, and resource competition (Bacevich 1997; Toprani 2019). The Truman and Eisenhower administrations sought to reduce military spending by making the U.S. Air Force and strategic nuclear weapons the centerpiece of national defense (Gaddis 2006). The strategy demanded deep budget cuts from the Navy and Army. Leaders of both services resisted. In 1949, several active duty and retired Navy officers tried to undercut the Truman administration in what became known as The Revolt of the Admirals (Toprani 2019). A similar episode occurred in 1953-55 when Army Chief of Staff General Matthew Ridgway openly challenged the Eisenhower administration's massive retaliation strategy that relegated the Army to a post-conflict constabulary force (Bacevich 1997).

By the mid-1950s, it was clear that American civil-military relations needed reexamining. The massive Cold War defense establishment—especially a large standing Army—challenged

the Constitutional checks on military power. Elite civil-military relations were strained. The foundations of civilian control, while perhaps not cracking, were stressed. How could America preserve civilian control in this new era of American militarization?

Theory of Objective Civilian Control

In this early Cold War context, and in response to the question above, Samuel Huntington developed his theory of objective civilian control as articulated in his 1957 book *The Soldier and the State*. Objective civilian control has since become the most influential theory in American civil-military relations (Nielsen and Snider 2009b; Owens 2011). Although scholars have challenged the theory on various grounds (e.g., Janowitz 1960; Feaver 2003; E. A. Cohen 2003), objective civilian control continues to influence scholarship and frames how military professionals view civil-military relations (Feaver and Kohn 2021; Blankshain 2020; Brooks 2019, 2020; Owens 2011; Davidson 2013).

As noted above, objective civilian control is a theory of civil-military relations aimed at minimizing the military's political power while maximizing its fighting power (Huntington 1957). The theory achieves this aim by striking a civil-military bargain in which the political and military institutions agree to a clear separation of spheres. The military agrees to stay out of the political sphere and accept civilian control. In exchange, the civilian government grants the military significant autonomy in military affairs. Although political leaders dictate policy objectives, they leave it up to military commanders to decide how to achieve them. The result is that the military willingly executes the policies of "any civilian group which secures legitimate authority within the state" (Huntington 1957, 84).

To maintain separate spheres, the military must stay out of politics. Huntington writes, "The antithesis of objective civilian control is military participation in politics: civilian control

decreases as the military become progressively involved in institutional, class, and constitutional politics"(1957, 83). For Huntington, the key mechanism that keeps the military out of politics is a strong non-partisan ethos:

> The military officer must remain neutral politically … Politics is beyond the scope of military competence, and the participation of military officers in politics undermines their professionalism …The military profession exists to serve the state … The superior political wisdom of the statesman must be accepted as a fact (1957, 71, 73, 76).

Objective civilian control is thus a normative theory that prescribes what the military *should* do, not necessarily what happens (Owens 2011, 22–23).

Several authors challenge Huntington's theory by arguing that separating the military from politics is neither practical nor effective (Owens 2011, 23–36). Janowitz (1960) contends that the military cannot be disconnected from politics because military professionalism is not a fixed ideal. Instead, it is connected to and evolves in response to civilian society. For Janowitz, civil-military relations must acknowledge the overlap between the military and civilian spheres. Military leaders must be cognizant of political affairs, and political leaders must exercise military oversight.

Another challenge comes from Cohen (2003). Echoing Clausewitz's view that war is a political instrument ([1832] 1989), Cohen argues that political leaders must insert themselves in military affairs to ensure military operations advance political aims. Cohen supports his claim with four civil-military case studies: Abraham Lincoln, Georges Clemenceau, Winston Churchill, and David Ben-Gurion. He contends that not only did these statesmen deny their militaries operational autonomy by exercising intrusive oversight, but that doing so is what made them successful wartime leaders.

Feaver (2003), like Janowitz and Cohen, maintains that functional civil-military relations require more civilian involvement than Huntington's theory of separate spheres allows. Using

the lens of principal-agent theory, Feaver argues that the military is an agent that executes policy on behalf of its civilian government principal. The military agent chooses to do what the principal wants (work) or what it prefers (shirk). Because the military may shirk, the civilian principal must decide whether to exercise intrusive oversight (monitor) and whether to punish the agent if shirking occurs. Feaver further contends that whether the military works or shirks is not solely a function of professionalism (as in Huntington's theory). Instead, what the military does depends on whether there is alignment between military and civilian preferences, how much oversight civilians apply, and civilians' willingness to punish. Feaver argues that Huntington (1957) assumes a high degree of alignment between military and civilian preferences but that such alignment is historically rare. Feaver's (2003) conclusion aligns with those of Cohen (2003) and Janowitz (1960): successful civil-military relations require a healthy dose of civilian oversight.

Despite these and other challenges (e.g., Desch 2008; Avant 1994; Langston 2003; Schiff 1995, 2008), objective civilian control still dominates civil-military relations practice and scholarship (Nielsen and Snider 2009b; Owens 2011; Blankshain 2020). Huntington's ideas strongly shape how military professionals view civil-military relations. According to Army General William Rapp, "*The Soldier and the State* has defined civil-military relations for generations of military professionals. Soldiers have been raised on Huntingtonian logic and the separation of spheres of influence since their time as junior lieutenants."(2015, 1). Civil-military scholars, however, continue to debate objective civilian control and whether the military can or should be as disconnected from politics as Huntington requires (e.g., Bacevich and Kohn 1997; Nielsen and Snider 2009a; Davidson 2013; Brooks 2020).

Yet, despite scholars' skepticism about whether objective civilian control is a practical civil-military framework, they nevertheless agree that military non-partisanship is normatively desirable (Bacevich and Kohn 1997; Golby, Dropp, and Feaver 2012, 2013; Kohn 2002; Liebert and Golby 2017; Owens 2015). These scholars argue that all servicemembers—senior leaders, rank-and-file servicemembers, and even former servicemembers (veterans)—should avoid overt partisanship for reasons beyond objective civilian control. I discuss three of these reasons below.

First, non-partisanship preserves the American public's trust in the military. Although people from both political parties trust the military on balance (Pew Research Center 2018b, 2019), overt servicemember partisanship could erode that trust if the public comes to see the military as a political interest group (Cooper 2018; Carter 2012; Garamone 2012, 2016; Golby, Dropp, and Feaver 2012; Harkins 2019; Liebert and Golby 2017; Urben 2017). And with the advent of social media, servicemembers of all ranks can make their political views public (e.g., Urben 2017)

Second, non-partisanship helps foster professional and capable senior military leaders. The military promotes from within. A strong non-partisan ethos among lower-ranking soldiers makes it more likely that those promoted to senior rank will support civilian control. Non-partisanship also helps ensure promotions reflect professional competence rather than political loyalty (Huntington 1957). Ultimately, non-partisanship helps produce senior officers that political leaders can rely on for sound military advice free of partisan bias or agendas (Betts 2009; E. A. Cohen 2003).

A third reason non-partisanship is important is to promote good order and discipline in military units. American politics have become conflictual (Iyengar et al. 2019), and partisan animosity often spills over into nonpolitical situations (Gift and Gift 2015; Iyengar and

Westwood 2015; McConnell et al. 2018). Scholars have only begun to examine if partisan conflict is a problem in the military (e.g., Mullinix and Lythgoe 2022). However, increased political conflict in the American public combined with weakening non-partisanship could lead to increased partisan conflict in the ranks, and military unit morale, discipline, and teamwork could suffer.

Institutionalizing Non-partisanship

Because it has embraced objective civilian control as its guiding civil-military framework, the U.S. military has institutionalized non-partisanship through formal and informal means. Formal means include Department of Defense (DoD) regulatory and legal restrictions on servicemembers' political speech and activity (Department of Defense 2008; US Government 2016, A2–29). However, as the next section shows, there are legal and practical limits to these formal restrictions. Consequently, the military has sought to maintain a normative commitment to non-partisanship in the tradition of Sherman and Marshall. This tradition consists of non-partisan norms that encourage servicemembers to go beyond regulations by willingly avoiding "partisanship in word or deed, activity, or affiliation" (Kohn 2002, 27).

Non-partisan Rules and Regulations

The U.S. Army has restricted soldiers' political speech for nearly its entire history. Restrictions first appeared in the 1776 version of the *Articles of War* (a revision of the original *Articles* adopted in 1775 by the Continental Congress) which prohibited "traitorous or disrespectful words against the authority of the United States in Congress assembled, or the legislature of any of the United States in which he may be quartered"(Continental Congress 1776, sec. II article 1). The 1806 revision to the *Articles of War* additionally prohibited "contemptuous or disrespectful words" against the President and Vice President of the United

States (9th Congress 1806, article 5). More prohibitions appeared in regulations in the late 1800s—coinciding with Sherman's professionalization efforts and those of Secretary of War and noted reformer Elihu Root (e.g., Yarrison n.d.; Jessup 1938). The 1895 *Regulations for the Army of the United States* prohibited any effort to "influence legislation affecting the Army" (War Department 1899, 1), and this provision remained in *Regulations* through 1917 (War Department 1917).

Formal restrictions on servicemembers' political speech remained unchanged and unchallenged from the First World War until the middle of the 20th century (e.g., Vagts 1957; Castle 1988; Brown 1969; Sherman 1970; Carr 1998; Kester 1967). In 1951, the prohibition on contemptuous speech moved from service regulations to a new military legal code, the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) as Article 88—Contempt Towards Officials (Department of Defense 1951, 318–19).

Around the same time the new UCMJ took effect, a debate emerged about balancing servicemembers' right to free speech with military needs. Legal challenges tested the military's ability to regulate servicemembers' speech. In 1953, the U.S. Supreme Court in *Orloff v. Willoughby* established the Orloff Rule by declaring *military necessity* the legal standard for free speech restrictions (1953). *Orloff* gave the military substantial but still limited power to restrict political speech. Chief Justice Earl Warren cautioned that "our citizens in uniform may not be stripped of basic rights simply because they have doffed their civilian clothes" (1962, 11).

The military speech debate persisted into the 1960s when some servicemembers spoke out against the Vietnam War (Hayes 1990). In 1969, DoD issued directive 1325.6, "Guidelines for Handling Dissident and Protest Activities Among Members of the Armed Forces." The directive's language reflects an attempt to balance political speech with military necessity:

> The service member's right of expression should be preserved to the maximum extent possible, consistent with good order and discipline and the national security. On the other hand, no Commander should be indifferent to conduct which, if allowed to proceed unchecked, would destroy the effectiveness of his unit. The proper balancing of these interests will depend largely upon the calm and prudent judgment of the responsible Commander (Department of Defense 1969).

DoD's restrained approach reflects both the legal and practical limitations of severe restrictions. The practical limitations of such restrictions are evident in a 1969 memorandum from the Army Adjutant General to commanding generals entitled "Guidance on Dissent." It advises commander that "Severe disciplinary action in response to a relatively insignificant manifestation of dissent can have a counterproductive effect on other members of the command…thus, rather than serving as a deterrent, such disproportionate actions may stimulate further breaches of discipline."(Wickham 1969; quoted in Currin 2015, 138). Although courts continued to side with the military in Vietnam-era legal challenges to political speech restrictions (see Beaumont 2009 for a summary), military regulations remained restrained.

The modern framework of political speech regulation in the U.S. military comprises three documents. The first is the UCMJ (US Government 2016, A2–29). The second is directive 1325.6, which DoD reissued in 2021 as Instruction 1325.06 "Handling Protest, Extremist, and Criminal Gang Activities Among Members of the Armed Forces" (Department of Defense 2021). The third document is DoD Directive 1344.10, "Political Activities by Members of the Armed Forces," originally published in 1986, which codifies permitted and prohibited political activities (Department of Defense 1990, 2008).

These regulations sustain the restrained approach that characterized earlier restrictions. To be sure, these regulations unambiguously prohibit some political speech. For example, service members may not participate in political fundraising, speak at a partisan gathering, or appear at a partisan event wearing a military uniform. However, there are many political

activities that, although permitted by regulations, could undermine objective civilian control by creating an impression that the military prefers one party over another (Department of Defense 2008). For example, servicemembers can join partisan clubs, display partisan bumper stickers, attend partisan rallies, and write about partisan political topics on social media. Thus, the military's restrained approach creates a gap between what servicemembers *can* do legally and what they *should* do to preserve the military's non-partisan standing consistent with the demands of objective civilian control.

Non-partisan Norms

To close the gap between what servicemembers can do and what they should do, the military relies on a longstanding tradition of non-partisan norms that encourage servicemembers to voluntarily curtail their political speech (Betros 2001; Brooks 2013, 2019; Golby, Dropp, and Feaver 2012; Holsti 2001, 2004; Kohn 2002; Liebert and Golby 2017). These norms admonish servicemembers to avoid partisanship in "word or deed, activity, or affiliation" (Kohn 2002, 27). The goal is for civilian leaders and the American public to see the military as "politically neutral and blind to partisan considerations" (McCaffery 2009, xiv–xv). Military leaders cultivate and reinforce these non-partisan norms. For example, recent Secretaries of Defense Carter (2012) and Shanahan (2019) issued memorandums urging servicemembers to uphold DoD's non-partisan tradition. Likewise, senior military generals have admonished servicemembers to stay out of partisan politics (Garamone 2012, 2016; Harkins 2019; Shelbourne 2016).

Although non-partisan norms are central to objective civilian control, we have a limited understanding of how they shape servicemembers' political attitudes and behavior. Recent research suggests these norms are weakening (Bacevich and Kohn 1997; Betros 2001; J. K. Dempsey 2009; Dowd 2001; Feaver, Kohn, and Kohn 2001; Holsti 1998, 2001; Kohn 2002;

Liebert and Golby 2017; Urben 2013, 2014, 2017). These studies, however, have limitations. Most rely on samples from select military subgroups (primarily officers), few measure how non-partisan norms have changed over time, and all measure descriptive norms, e.g., partisan affiliation and political activism. These limitations notwithstanding, authors argue that if norms weaken, it could harm the military's reputation as a non-partisan institution (Bacevich and Kohn 1997; Betros 2001; Golby, Dropp, and Feaver 2012, 2013; Kohn 2002; Liebert and Golby 2017; Owens 2015).

In addition to eroding norms, another trend working against objective civilian control is strengthening partisanship. Over the last few decades, partisanship has become an increasingly potent influence on political attitudes and behavior in American politics (Bartels 2000, 2002; Campbell et al. 1960; G. L. Cohen 2003; Dalton 2016; Fiorina 2002; D. Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002; Huddy, Mason, and Aarøe 2015; Jacoby 1988; Nicholson 2012; Popkin 1994). Moreover, partisanship often dominates other considerations regarding political decision-making (Bolsen, Druckman, and Cook 2014; G. L. Cohen 2003; Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus 2013; Mullinix 2018). As a result, it can distort information processing and reasoning (Bolsen, Druckman, and Cook 2014; Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus 2013; Taber, Cann, and Kucsova 2009; Taber and Lodge 2006) and affect normative judgments about right and wrong (Anduiza, Gallego, and Muñoz 2013; Beaulieu 2014; Cortina and Rottinghaus 2017; Walter and Redlawsk 2019). Moreover, partisanship has become an intense emotional divide for many Americans who dislike and distrust people from the "other" party (Iyengar et al. 2019). These developments likely affect servicemembers' political attitudes as well—potentially to the detriment of civil-military norms, servicemember morale, and military unit effectiveness.

In sum, the U.S. military's preferred civil-military pattern—objective civilian control—requires non-partisan norms to bridge the gap between what regulations allow and what the theory requires. Nevertheless, we do not know enough about these norms. Moreover, rising partisanship and partisan conflict among the American public raise questions about whether military servicemembers can be as non-partisan as objective civilian control demands. Finally, non-partisan norms and partisanship predict different outcomes for servicemembers' political attitudes, activism, and decision-making.

Plan of the Dissertation

In the chapters that follow, this dissertation tests Huntington's theory of objective civilian control (1957) by examining the influence of non-partisan norms and partisanship on U.S. military servicemembers' political attitudes, activism, and decision-making. Put another way, this study tests whether non-partisan norms or partisanship is the stronger influence on military servicemembers. If non-partisan norms dominate, servicemembers should be weaker partisans and less politically active than the American public. Non-partisan norms should also make servicemembers more likely to make objective political decisions, less likely to use partisan-motivated reasoning, and less hostile toward opposing partisans. If, however, partisan identities dominate, then servicemembers will not be significantly different from the American public and will exhibit similar biases, distortions, and hostilities as their fellow partisans.

Chapters 2, 3, and 4 examine different aspects of the issues raised above by answering the secondary research questions discussed earlier in this chapter. Chapter 2 examines the question of *how partisan are servicemembers, and are their non-partisan norms eroding?* Scholars argue that over the last few decades, the military's non-partisan norms have weakened (Betros 2001; J. K. Dempsey 2009; Feaver, Kohn, and Kohn 2001; Holsti 1998, 2001; Urben

2014, 2014, 2017). Evidence for this "eroding norms" hypothesis, however, rests on findings from a limited number of studies that examine only subgroups within the military. Chapter 2 overcomes these limitations by analyzing military norms using repeated cross-sectional survey data from a nationally representative survey (Cooperative Congressional Election Study 2020). It examines whether servicemembers' partisanship, partisan strength, and level of political activism are different from civilians' and whether these norms have weakened from 2008 to 2018.

Chapter 3 asks *how does partisanship affect servicemembers' political decision-making?* According to objective civilian control, non-partisan norms should guide servicemembers' political decision-making (Kohn 2002). Yet, Americans' political decision-making is often distorted by partisan bias (Bolsen, Druckman, and Cook 2014; G. L. Cohen 2003; Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus 2013; Mullinix 2018). Partisan bias leads people to make political decisions that favor their preferred party and defend their partisan identities. This tendency conflicts with non-partisan norms. When servicemembers make political decisions, non-partisan norms may dictate one choice and partisan preferences another. Using an original survey experiment, Chapter 3 analyzes whether non-partisan norms or partisanship is the stronger influence on servicemembers' decisions about partisan politics.

Chapter 4 examines the final secondary research question, *what is the extent and consequences of partisan social conflict among servicemembers?* In the last few decades, American politics has become conflictual (Iyengar et al. 2019), and this partisan hostility has spilled over into non-political contexts (Gift and Gift 2015; Iyengar and Westwood 2015; McConnell et al. 2018). Partisan conflict could have deleterious consequences for military teamwork and morale. Once again using data from an original survey experiment, Chapter 4

analyzes partisan hostility among servicemembers and whether non-partisan norms reduce that hostility.

The final chapter discusses the substantive findings, considers their limitations and implications, and draws together the broader conclusions of this study. It concludes that the relationship between U.S. military servicemembers' non-partisan norms, partisan identities, and political attitudes and behavior is complex. In many ways, servicemembers are like other Americans. They identify as Republicans or Democrats, and they have the same biases and hostilities as other Americans. However, servicemembers are different from civilians in that they adhere to military non-partisan norms. These norms, when activated, reduce some of partisanship's negative effects.

This dissertation makes three main contributions to political science and civil-military relations scholarship. First, it narrows our knowledge gap concerning the political attitudes of military servicemembers and improves our understanding of the military's non-partisan ethos. Second, it develops a novel model of non-partisan norms and uses it to show how norms impact servicemembers' decision-making. Third, it is one of the first studies to examine the prevalence and impact of partisan social conflict in the military. These advances provide important new insights for civil-military relations scholars and military practitioners.

Chapter 2

Are the U.S. Military's Non-partisan Norms Eroding?[4]

This chapter examines the U.S. military's non-partisan norms in greater depth, discusses existing research on these norms, and analyzes the claim that these norms have been weakening over the last few years. As Chapter 1 makes clear, non-partisan norms are an essential part of healthy American civil-military relations. Over the last few decades, however, many studies suggest these norms are weakening (Bacevich and Kohn 1997; Betros 2001; J. K. Dempsey 2009; Dowd 2001; Feaver, Kohn, and Kohn 2001; Holsti 2001, 1998; Kohn 2002; Liebert and Golby 2017; Urben 2017, 2014, 2013). Yet, these studies have limitations. Most use samples of military subgroups, and few measure how non-partisan norms have changed over time. The analysis in this chapter overcomes these limitations by investigating U.S. military servicemembers' partisanship and political activism using repeated cross-sectional election-year survey data (Cooperative Congressional Election Study 2020).

The analysis finds mixed evidence for eroding non-partisan norms. Since 2008, servicemembers have become more likely to identify as partisans, although not stronger partisans. And while servicemembers are more politically active than civilians, it is because of decreasing political activism among civilians rather than increasing activism among servicemembers. An additional finding is that servicemembers with more time in the military are less partisan and politically active than younger servicemembers. Surprisingly, however, younger servicemembers are more partisan and politically active than civilians of the same age. These

[4] A version of this chapter was published previously (Lythgoe 2022).

findings provide some support to previous researchers' claims that non-partisan norms are weakening and suggest that more research is needed to understand the consequences of that change. For military practitioners, these findings highlight the importance of socializing non-partisan norms, especially since the analysis in this chapter finds that new servicemembers have stronger political attitudes than civilians of the same age.

Measuring Non-partisan Norms

The military's non-partisan norms are servicemembers' shared beliefs and values concerning partisan politics. Like other norms, the military's non-partisan norms refer to "rules or beliefs as to what constitutes morally approved and disapproved conduct" (Cialdini, Reno, and Kallgren 1990, 1015). As noted in Chapter 1, non-partisan norms are intended to discourage behavior that may be detrimental to healthy civil-military relations.

While there is no universal agreement to what extent non-partisan norms constrain servicemembers' attitudes and behavior, Kohn (2002) argues that non-partisan norms admonish servicemembers to avoid political partisanship in "word or deed, activity, or affiliation" (27). Retired Army General Barry McCaffery argues that servicemembers exhibit non-partisan norms when they "adamantly manifest non-partisan behavior and attitudes" and are "viewed by the public and senior civilian leaders as politically neutral and blind to partisan considerations" (2009, xiv–xv). Research on non-partisan norms comports with these characterizations. Early studies of norms focused on voting abstention, although as I will discuss below, this measure is no longer appropriate. Later studies measure norms by party affiliation, partisan identity strength, and political activism. The idea is that non-partisan norms make servicemembers less likely to identify as partisans (or if they do, only weakly) and less politically active than civilians.

An early but now unreliable measure of non-partisan norms strength is voting abstention. Following the example of George C. Marshall, many Cold War-era military officers signaled their political neutrality by refusing to vote (Betros 2001; Holsti 2001; Van Riper and Unwalla 1965; Uldrich 2005). In later years, however, the norm of voting abstention disappeared. Cold War-era reforms made it easier for servicemembers to vote (Coleman 2015), and by 1984, servicemembers voted at higher rates than civilians (Betros 2001). Even military officers, many of whom previously held to Marshall's norm of abstention (Van Riper and Unwalla 1965), now vote at higher rates than enlisted servicemembers and the public (J. K. Dempsey 2009; Dowd 2001; Urben 2014).[5] Today, DoD encourages servicemember voting through the Federal Voting Assistance Program (Department of Defense n.d.). Hence, voting abstention is no longer a non-partisan norm.

In the last few decades, scholars turned to party identification to assess non-partisan norms (Davis 2001; J. K. Dempsey 2009; Holsti 1998, 2001; Inbody 2009; Liebert and Golby 2017; Segal et al. 2001; Urben 2010, 2013, 2017). The strongest evidence for eroding norms comes from these studies which collectively suggest that officers have become more likely to identify as partisans (Bacevich and Kohn 1997; Davis 2001; Holsti 1998, 2001). In 1976, 46% of military officers identified as Independents. By 1999, that number dropped to 17% (Holsti 2001), and remained roughly the same through the 2000s (J. K. Dempsey 2009; Liebert and Golby 2017; Urben 2010, 2013, 2017). Less is known about the trajectory of enlisted servicemembers' partisanship. The few studies that examine this group find enlisted members are more Independent than the American public (J. K. Dempsey 2009; Inbody 2009; Segal et al. 2001).

[5] Importantly, U.S. military officers are not demographically representative of the American public and have different political attitudes than the enlisted force and civilians (Maury et al. 2018)

A measure related to party identification is partisan identity strength. Even if servicemembers identify as partisans, non-partisan norms may constrain them from identifying as strong partisans. Urben (2010) shows that although military officers have become more likely to identify as Democrats or Republicans, they also tend to be weak partisans. While few studies examine servicemembers' partisan identity strength, it is an important variable because it correlates with political activism and emotion (Huddy, Mason, and Aarøe 2015).

A final measure of non-partisan norms strength is political activism. Dempsey (2009) and Urben (2010, 2014) find that servicemembers are less politically active than civilians, but officers tend to be more active than enlisted. These authors use different measures of political activism. Urben (2014) considers donating to a candidate, displaying a campaign button or sign, encouraging other servicemembers to vote, attending political club meetings, expressing personal political opinions to others, and going to a political fund-raiser or rally. Dempsey (2009), in contrast, does not separate voting from other political activities. His measure includes registering to vote, voting, donating money, and displaying a campaign button, sticker, or sign.

The Eroding Norms Hypothesis

Taken together, the studies reviewed above suggest non-partisan norms may be eroding. By eroding, I mean a gradual weakening of normative constraints on servicemembers' political affiliations and behaviors relative to civilians'. However, convincing evidence for this claim is lacking due to four limitations in extant research.

First, these studies examine only military subgroups, e.g., officers from a single service branch. Second, few studies use multi-year data making comparisons over time difficult. While the overall trend in the literature suggests weakening norms, drawing conclusions from multiple studies that use different samples and measures is problematic at best. Third, few studies

compare servicemembers' affiliations and behaviors with civilians'. While comparing servicemembers over time is informative, the critical measure of non-partisan norms is whether servicemembers have different attitudes and behaviors than civilians. Finally, the measurement of dependent variables is unclear or inconsistent. Some studies measure partisan identification with three categories (Republican, Independent, Democrat), while others use the more common seven-category measure: strong, weak, and leaning partisans. And, as noted previously, researchers use disparate political activism measures.

This study overcomes these limitations using data from the 2008-2018 Cooperative Congressional Election Surveys (CCES). The nationally representative CCES allows an analysis of servicemembers' affiliations and behaviors over time, and a comparison with civilians', using repeated cross-sectional data.

The scholarship reviewed above suggests three hypotheses associated with eroding norms. Evidence of strong norms would be servicemembers less likely to identify as partisans, identifying as weaker partisans, and being less politically active than civilians. Conversely, evidence of weak norms would be servicemembers with partisan identification, identity strength, and political activism levels similar to civilians'. Finally, eroding norms would be indicated by a transition from strong norms to weaker norms between 2008 and 2018.

Hypothesis 1 (H1): Military servicemembers are becoming more likely to identify as partisans.

Hypothesis 2 (H2): Military servicemembers' partisan identities are becoming stronger.

Hypothesis 3 (H3): Military servicemembers are becoming more politically active.

Methods

Data

The data are from the 2008-2018 CCES, a nationally stratified sample survey administered by YouGov in election years that includes military and civilian respondents. The CCES uses a two-stage matching process and sample weighting to produce a representative sample. CCES surveys before 2008 did not measure all the variables of interest, so 2008 is the start point for this analysis.

Although the CCES aims for a sample representative of the U.S. adult population, it is large enough to capture a representative sample of the U.S. military population. Table 1 compares the CCES military subsample with the non-military sample and U.S. military population demographics. The comparison shows that the CCES military subsample is a good demographic match to the U.S. military population. Like the military itself, the CCES subsample is younger and more male than the U.S. population. Race and education demographics are also reasonably good matches.

Table 1. Comparison of CCES military sample and US military population

	CCES Civilian Sample	CCES Military Sample	2018 Military Population
Gender			
Male	48.0	78.2	82.1
Female	52.0	21.8	17.9
Race			
White	72.9	63.0	70.8
Non-White	27.1	37.0	29.2
Education			
No Degree	73.2	72.8	75.5
College Degree	26.8	27.2	24.5
Age			
25 years or younger	15.1	33.0	40.7
26 to 30 years	9.7	21.6	20.4
31 to 25 years	8.1	16.8	15.3
36 to 40 years	7.9	11.8	11.3
41 years or older	59.2	16.9	12.3

Note: CCES samples calculated using survey sample weights.
Sources: CCES common content, 2008-2018; DoD (2018)

I also compared servicemembers' and civilians' partisan identification (Figure 2). The comparison is consistent with previous studies, which show that servicemembers are more Republican than the American public (Holsti 2001; J. K. Dempsey 2009; Urben 2010, 2013, 2014). Since 2008, however, the asymmetry has lessened.

Figure 2. Party identification of servicemembers and civilians, 2008-2018.



Note: Percentages calculated using sample weights.
Source: CCES common content, 2008-2018.

Methods

I test these hypotheses using multiple regression. To determine whether non-partisan norms have eroded, I first need to determine if military service is a significant predictor of partisanship, partisan strength, and political activism while controlling for political and

demographic factors. To accomplish this, I regress military service on the dependent and control variables (described below) using a regression method appropriate for the dependent variable in each hypothesis: logistic regressions for H1 (dichotomous), ordered logistic regressions for H2 (ordinal), and negative binomial regressions for H3 (count). If military service negatively predicts the dependent variables, it indicates strong non-partisan norms.

I also need to determine if the relationships between military service and the norms measures have changed over time—that is, if norms have eroded. Consequently, I interact the military service indicator variable with cross-section time period indicator variables. In each regression model, the military service coefficient shows its conditional effect on the dependent variables in 2008. The interaction terms show whether the influence of military service changes in subsequent years. Significant interaction terms are evidence of changing norms.

In addition to the main analyses, I test if military rank and years of military service moderate non-partisan norms strength. Previous studies find that officers and enlisted servicemembers have different political attitudes and behaviors (J. K. Dempsey 2009; Inbody 2009; Segal et al. 2001). And, intuitively, people who spend more time in the military likely have stronger non-partisan norms due to regular socialization. The CCES does not ask military respondents about their military rank or length of service, so I use proxy variables that likely correlate with the unobserved variables of interest.[6] For military rank, my proxy is education. Most (84.8%) officers have a bachelor's degree or higher, while few (8.4%) enlisted

[6] While using proxy variables can introduce error-in-variables problems, analysts must balance this risk against that of omitted variable bias if significant predictors are absent from the analysis (Clinton 2003). Investigations of this tradeoff find that using proxy variables is generally better than omitting them (e.g., Bekker and Wansbeek 1996; Kinal and Lahiri 1983).

servicemembers do (Department of Defense 2018). For years of military service, my proxy is age since older servicemembers are likely to have more years of service.

Dependent Variables

Partisan (H1) is a dichotomous indicator for identification with a political party derived from a standard 7-point partisanship measure. Respondents were asked, "Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Democrat, Republican, Independent, or Other?" Democrats and Republicans were further asked whether they are strong or not very strong partisans, and Independents were further asked whether they lean toward the Democrat or Republican party. The resulting variable ranges from 1=Strong Democrat to 7=Strong Republican. I use this 7-point measure to create the dichotomous variable for H1 by coding strong, weak, and leaning partisans=1 and pure Independents=0 (M=3.73, SD=2.21). I count leaning Independents as partisans since they tend to have attitudes closer to partisans than true Independents. (Petrocik 2009; Theodoridis 2017).

Partisan strength (H2) is an ordinal variable measuring partisan identity strength that is also derived from the 7-point partisanship measure described above. I code pure Independents=0, leaning partisans=1, weak partisans=2, and strong partisans=3. When used as the H2 dependent variable, I omit pure Independents to keep the H1 and H2 analyses independent. In the H2 analysis, this variable ranges from 1 to 3 (M=2.25, SD=0.82). When used as a control variable in the H3 analysis, I include pure Independents, so the variable ranges from 0 to 3 (M=1.94, SD=1.09).

Activism (H3) measures each respondent's level of political activism. It is a count of political activities the respondent participated in during the year before the election.[7] Respondents were asked, "During the past year did you ... (Check all that apply); Attend local political meetings; Put up a political sign; Work for a candidate or campaign; Donate money to a candidate, campaign, or political organization." I total the "yes" responses to create a count measure that ranges from 0 to 4 (M=0.68, SD=1.04).

Independent Variables

Military is a dichotomous indicator for people currently serving in the military. Respondents were asked, "We'd like to know whether you or someone in your immediate family is currently serving or has ever served in the U.S. military…Please check all boxes that apply." Respondents who selected "I am currently serving in the U.S. military" I code 1; all others I code 0. The resulting military subsamples for cross-sections range from 254 to 703 (Table 2). This variable does not capture differences between military subgroups such as branch of service and component (active duty or reserve). I discuss this limitation further in the conclusion.

Age (a proxy for years of military service) is the respondent's age in years calculated by subtracting reported birth year from the survey year (M=48.79, SD=16.61).

College degree (a proxy for military rank) is a dichotomous indicator for respondents with at least a 4-year degree. Respondents were asked "What is the highest level of education you have completed?" Respondents who indicated having a 4-year or graduate degree I code 1, and those with a 2-year degree or less I code 0. (M=.37, SD=.48).

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[7] The types of political activities the CCES asks about changes from year to year. I restrict my analysis to questions that were asked each year from 2008 to 2018.

Table 2. CCES military and civilian survey respondents, 2008-2018.

	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018
Civilian	32541 (99.21)	55074 (99.41)	54281 (99.53)	55771 (99.24)	63897 (98.91)	59632 (99.39)
Military	259 (0.79)	326 (0.59)	254 (0.47)	429 (0.76)	703 (1.09)	368 (0.61)
Total	32,800 (100)	55,400 (100)	54,535 (100)	56,200 (100)	64,600 (100)	60,000 (100)

Note: Unweighted frequencies.
Source: CCES common content, 2008-2018.

Control Variables

My analyses control for differences between servicemembers and civilians as well as established predictors of political affiliation and activism. Detailed descriptions of these variables are in the appendix (p. 123). *Gender* is a dichotomous indicator coded 0=male and 1=female. *Race* is dichotomous and coded 0=white and 1=nonwhite. *Ideology* is a 5-point measure from 1=very liberal to 5=very conservative. *Ideology strength* is a 3-point measure coded 0=moderate, 1=weak liberal or conservative, and 2=strong liberal or conservative. *Political interest* is a 4-point measure ranging from 1=very low to 4= high. *Political knowledge* is a continuous measure ranging from 0=low to 1=high. *Income* is annual income category ranging from 1= less than $10,000 to 16=$500,000 or more. *Religiosity* measures the importance of religion and church attendance. Since the CCES religion questions have different response scales, I use predicted factor scores to build an index variable ranging from -1.87 to 1.48. Table 3 shows the summary statistics for the dependent and control variables.

Table 3. Dependent and control variables summary statistics

	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Partisan	311680	.86	.35	0	1
Partisan strength	311680	1.94	1.09	0	3
Political activism	272283	.68	1.04	0	4
Partisanship	311680	3.73	2.21	1	7
Ideology	299264	3.12	1.16	1	5
Ideology strength	299264	.90	.74	0	2
Political interest	314556	3.3	.91	1	4
Political knowledge	321999	.67	.43	0	1
Age	323535	48.79	16.61	17	99
Gender	235335	1.54	.50	1	2
Race	323535	.25	.44	0	1
Education	323535	.37	.48	0	1
Income	288910	6.78	3.46	1	16
Religiosity	322791	0	1	-1.87	1.48

Source: CCES common content, 2008-2018.

All regressions use sample weights and control for age, gender, race, income, religiosity, ideology, ideology strength, political interest, and political knowledge. The H2 analysis also controls for party identification using the 7-point measure. The H3 analysis adds controls for party identification and partisan identity strength.

Results

I show only the coefficients of interest in the regression tables below to enhance readability. The complete regression tables are in the appendix.

Hypothesis 1: Partisan Identification

H1, which predicts that eroding non-partisan norms will be associated with servicemembers becoming more likely to identify as partisans, is supported. Between 2008 and 2018, servicemembers became more likely to identify as Democrats or Republicans (from 84% in 2008 to 90% in 2018), while partisanship among civilians remained relatively unchanged (Figure 3). Logistic regressions confirm that the change in servicemembers' partisanship is statistically significant (Table 4). The conditional effect of military service on partisanship in

2008 is negative and significant ($p < 0.01$) in the base model (column 1), although the effect disappears in models with the age interaction (columns 3 and 4). In all models, the military and year indicator interaction terms in 2010 to 2018 are positive, significant ($p < 0.05$), and trend higher. Although partisanship was already relatively high in 2008, these models show an unambiguous weakening of the norm of avoiding partisan affiliation.

Figure 3. Percent of servicemembers and civilians identifying as partisans, 2008-2018.



Source: CCES common content, 2008-2018.

Table 4. Predictors of partisanship (Hypothesis 1)

	1 Base Model	2 Education Interaction	3 Age Interaction	4 Full Model
Military	-0.582**	-0.461*	0.297	0.294
	(0.223)	(0.234)	(0.358)	(0.362)
Military*2010	0.909*	0.912*	0.899*	0.901*
	(0.364)	(0.360)	(0.359)	(0.357)
Military*2012	1.318**	1.307**	1.276**	1.274**
	(0.409)	(0.408)	(0.408)	(0.406)
Military*2014	0.987**	1.002**	0.938**	0.949**
	(0.329)	(0.324)	(0.323)	(0.319)
Military*2016	0.949**	0.975**	0.860**	0.887**
	(0.332)	(0.334)	(0.325)	(0.330)
Military*2018	1.114**	1.127***	1.066**	1.079**
	(0.346)	(0.340)	(0.333)	(0.330)
College degree	-0.017	-0.013	-0.016	-0.013
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Military*College degree		-0.445*		-0.320
		(0.212)		(0.206)
Age	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Military*Age			-0.027***	-0.024**
			(0.008)	(0.008)
Constant	0.865***	0.864***	0.861***	0.861***
	(0.074)	(0.074)	(0.074)	(0.074)
Observations	259,070	259,070	259,070	259,070

Notes. Logistic regression coefficients with linearized standard errors to account for survey design. Two-tailed tests significant at ***$p<0.001$, **$p<0.01$, *$p<0.05$. Year indicator and control variables are included but not shown. See Table A1 for the complete model.
Source: CCES common content, 2008-2018.

The H1 analysis also shows that more years of military service is associated with a stronger norm against partisan affiliation. The military and age interaction term in Table 4 column 4 is significant and negative ($p<0.01$). The longer servicemembers are in the military, the less likely they are to identify as partisans. This result suggests that socialization plays an important role in developing non-partisan norms in the military.

A surprising finding is the difference in partisanship between young servicemembers and young civilians (Figure 4). Intuitively, I expected the two groups to be equally likely to identify

as partisans. However, younger servicemembers are more likely to identify as partisans than civilians of the same age. As we shall see below, political activism (H3) follows the same pattern. I consider the implications of this result in the discussion section.

Figure 4. Marginal effect of age on servicemember and civilian partisanship, 2008-2018.



Note: Graph based on Table 4 column 4. Shown with 95% confidence intervals.
Source: CCES common content, 2008-2018.

Hypothesis 2: Partisan Identity Strength

H2, which predicts that eroding norms will result in stronger servicemember partisan identities, is not supported. Servicemembers' partisan identity strength is not significantly different from civilians' and has not changed much since 2008 (Figure 5). Ordered logistic regressions likewise do not support H2 (Table 5). Military service is not a significant predictor of partisan strength in 2008, and there are no significant differences in subsequent years except for 2016 ($p < 0.05$). The age and education interactions are not significant.

Figure 5. Mean partisan strength of servicemembers and civilians, 2008-2018.



Source: CCES common content, 2008-2018.

Table 5. Predictors of Partisan Identity Strength (Hypothesis 2)

	1 Base Model	2 Education Interaction	3 Age Interaction	4 Full Model
Military	0.153	0.197	0.357	0.349
	(0.174)	(0.180)	(0.297)	(0.297)
Military*2010	0.186	0.187	0.190	0.191
	(0.278)	(0.277)	(0.275)	(0.275)
Military*2012	0.124	0.124	0.120	0.121
	(0.286)	(0.289)	(0.287)	(0.289)
Military*2014	0.155	0.169	0.153	0.165
	(0.306)	(0.308)	(0.305)	(0.307)
Military*2016	0.481*	0.490*	0.470*	0.479*
	(0.229)	(0.229)	(0.227)	(0.228)
Military*2018	0.254	0.265	0.254	0.263
	(0.241)	(0.241)	(0.240)	(0.241)
College degree	-0.117***	-0.116***	-0.117***	-0.116***
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Military*College degree		-0.165		-0.139
		(0.147)		(0.144)
Age	0.007***	0.007***	0.007***	0.007***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Military*Age			-0.006	-0.005
			(0.007)	(0.007)
τ1	-0.181***	-0.180***	-0.180***	-0.179***
	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.042)
τ2	1.145***	1.146***	1.146***	1.147***
	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)
Observations	228,723	228,723	228,723	228,723

Note. Ordered logistic regression coefficients with linearized standard errors to account for survey design. Two-tailed tests significant at ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05. Year indicator and control variables are included but not shown. See Table A2 for the complete model.
Source: CCES common content, 2008-2018.

Hypothesis 3: Political Activism

H3, which predicts that eroding non-partisan norms will be associated with increased servicemember political activism, is supported. However, this result reflects decreasing political activism among civilians rather than increasing activism among servicemembers. Figure 6 illustrates these trends. Negative binomial regression (Table 6, column 4) shows that the difference between servicemember and civilian political activism becomes significant (p< 0.01)

beginning in 2014.[8] However, Wald tests confirm the trends shown in Figure 6—declining activism among civilians. From 2014 to 2018, civilians report a significantly lower mean number of political activities than servicemembers (p<0.01, Wald test results in Table A6). I return to this finding in the discussion.

Figure 6. Mean political activism of servicemembers and civilians, 2008-2018.



Source: CCES common content, 2008-2018.

[8] The H3 dependent variable is over-dispersed (M=0.68, S^2=1.08) and right truncated, so I use negative binomial regression with a right-truncated distribution (Hilbe and Hardin 2015). To ensure these results are robust, I fit several additional models including a zero-inflated model. See appendix (p.67) for a detailed discussion.

Table 6. Predictors of political activism (Hypothesis 3)

	1 Base Model	2 Education Interaction	3 Age Interaction	4 Full Model
Military	0.092	0.114	0.646*	0.646*
	(0.231)	(0.233)	(0.321)	(0.320)
Military*2010	0.135	0.138	0.151	0.152
	(0.317)	(0.312)	(0.289)	(0.288)
Military*2012	0.176	0.179	0.166	0.167
	(0.326)	(0.321)	(0.298)	(0.298)
Military*2014	0.549	0.562	0.533	0.536
	(0.300)	(0.297)	(0.273)	(0.275)
Military*2016	0.723*	0.734*	0.700**	0.704**
	(0.288)	(0.285)	(0.262)	(0.264)
Military*2018	1.064**	1.076**	1.136***	1.138***
	(0.355)	(0.348)	(0.327)	(0.325)
College degree	0.258***	0.258***	0.258***	0.258***
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Military*College degree		-0.095		-0.025
		(0.164)		(0.159)
Age	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Military*Age			-0.017**	-0.017**
			(0.006)	(0.006)
Log α	-0.212***	-0.212***	-0.213***	-0.213***
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Constant	-3.417***	-3.417***	-3.420***	-3.420***
	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.053)
Observations	221,485	221,485	221,485	221,485

Note. Negative binomial regression coefficients using sample weights with robust standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests significant at ***$p<0.001$, **$p<0.01$, *$p<0.05$. Year indicator and control variables are included but not shown. See Table A3 for the complete model.
Source: CCES common content, 2008-2018.

An additional finding is that the relationship between age and political activism is similar to that of age and partisanship found in the H1 analysis. The interaction between military and age is significant ($p<0.05$) and negative in column 4. The marginal effect of age shows that older servicemembers are less politically active than younger servicemembers. This finding supports

the idea that socialization strengthens non-partisan norms (Figure 7). It also shows that younger servicemembers are more politically active than civilians of the same age.

Figure 7. Marginal effect of age on political activism, 2008-2018.



Note: Graph based on Table 6, column 4. Shown with 95% confidence intervals.
Source: CCES common content, 2008-2018.

Discussion

This chapter examines whether the U.S. military's non-partisan norms are eroding by analyzing military servicemembers' political affiliations and activism levels from 2008 to 2018. The results of the analysis are mixed. The strongest evidence for eroding norms is that military servicemembers have become more partisan since 2008. However, servicemembers' partisan identity strength has not changed and is not significantly different from civilians'. Furthermore,

although servicemembers have been more politically active than civilians since 2014, the difference stems from declining civilian political activism.

In addition to the main results, there are two supplementary findings. First, servicemembers with more time in the military are less partisan and less politically active than newer servicemembers, while military rank does not affect either partisan affiliation or political activity. Although previous studies find political differences between officers and enlisted (J. K. Dempsey 2009; Inbody 2009; Segal et al. 2001), those findings may reflect differences in average time in service between the two groups. Enlisted servicemembers are younger than officers on average (Department of Defense 2018) and thus more likely to have less time in service.

The second supplementary finding is that younger servicemembers are more partisan and politically active than civilians of the same age. Although the reasons for this phenomenon are beyond the scope of this study, a plausible explanation is that young Americans with strong political attitudes are attracted to military service. If supported, it would help explain why servicemembers have become more partisan, and their political activism has not declined like civilians.

Although this analysis overcomes the limitations of earlier work, it has limitations of its own. First, the CCES data do not distinguish between military subgroups that may have significant differences in non-partisan norms. For example, norms may be stronger among full-time active-duty servicemembers than part-time reservists. Second, the proxy variables for military service years (age) and rank (education), like all proxy variables, are imperfect. An original survey with direct measures of these variables would enable more robust inferences. Finally, this study examines only three ways non-partisan norms may be influential. Although

norms have limited influence on partisan identification, identity strength, and political activism, they may be influential in other ways.

This chapter illuminates important aspects of the military's non-partisan norms. It makes a substantive empirical contribution to the ongoing debate on whether the U.S. military's norms are eroding. It also provides evidence that socialization plays a key role in establishing and maintaining non-partisan norms in the military, and it sheds light on the surprisingly strong political attitudes of younger servicemembers. Although these results suggest non-partisan norms have minimal effects on servicemembers' partisan identification and political activism, norms may nevertheless influence servicemembers' attitudes and behavior in other ways. The next two chapters explore this question by examining how non-partisan norms influence servicemembers' decision-making and attitudes toward other partisan servicemembers.

Chapter 3

Partisanship, Non-partisan Norms, and Political Decision-making

Although the analysis in Chapter 2 finds evidence for eroding non-partisan norms in the U.S. military, these findings are only part of the story. Chapter 2 examines *descriptive* norms—what is normal or what most people do (Cialdini, Reno, and Kallgren 1990). But non-partisan norms are also *injunctive* norms—shared expectations about what people *should* do. This chapter examines the injunctive side of non-partisan norms—the underlying beliefs and social expectations that support non-partisan behavior among servicemembers. Drawing on social norms theory (Bicchieri 2006; Cialdini, Reno, and Kallgren 1990), I build a model of injunctive norms using a content analysis of military leaders' statements about military non-partisanship. The model describes the normative beliefs and social expectations regarding servicemembers' role in partisan politics. I then test the influence of injunctive norms by analyzing data from a survey experiment to see if injunctive norms reduce partisan bias (e.g., Bolsen, Druckman, and Cook 2014; G. L. Cohen 2003; Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus 2013; Mullinix 2018).

The results show that although servicemembers can be biased in their political decision-making, non-partisan norms reduce the bias. Servicemembers who were given an experimental treatment to increase the salience of injunctive non-partisan norms were significantly less biased in their political judgments compared to a control group who did not receive the treatment. These findings suggest that although descriptive norms may be eroding (e.g., Chapter 2), the military's injunctive non-partisan norms still influence servicemembers' political decision-making.

Injunctive Norms

As discussed in the first two chapters, research on the military's non-partisan norms focuses on servicemembers' observed behavior—what most servicemembers are doing concerning partisanship and political activism. These are descriptive norms that refer to what is normal or what most people do. (Cialdini, Reno, and Kallgren 1990). There is, however, a second type of norms called injunctive norms. These norms *enjoin* behavior rather than simply describing it. They are based on "shared expectations about what should/should not be done in different types of social situations" (Bicchieri 2006, 10). While descriptive norms refer to what *is* done, injunctive norms refer to what *ought* to be done.

Injunctive norms comprise two dimensions: personal normative beliefs and social expectations (Bicchieri 2006). Personal normative beliefs are what people believe they should do because it is right or moral. Social expectations are shared beliefs about what people expect of others and what people believe others expect of them (Young 2015, 360) and may include legitimate sanctions for violations (Horne and Mollborn 2020). Importantly, social expectations are different from laws, rules, and regulations. States and organizations enforce formal codes; social groups enforce injunctive social expectations.

Injunctive norms influence a wide range of behaviors. Social expectations, for example, affect recycling (Schultz 1999), littering (Kallgren, Reno, and Cialdini 2000), and college students' alcohol consumption (Miller and Prentice 2016). Injunctive norms may or may not align with rules and laws. Although littering is against the law, whether people litter or not is influenced by what they believe others expect them to do (Cialdini, Reno, and Kallgren 1990). Injunctive norms can also affect behavior in the absence of rules. One study found that United Nations diplomats from countries with strong rule-of-law norms are more likely to observe

parking rules even though diplomatic immunity protects them from enforcement (Fisman and Miguel 2007).

Constructing Non-partisan Norms

Civil-military scholars have paid little attention to injunctive non-partisan norms. Although authors make theoretical arguments about what non-partisan injunctive norms should be (e.g., Kohn 2002; Huntington 1957), the literature's focus on descriptive norms has left the injunctive aspects of non-partisanship largely unexamined. Fortunately, the framework discussed above—normative beliefs and social expectations—provides a suitable basis for constructing a model. That is, injunctive non-partisan norms consist of servicemembers' normative beliefs about what is right and wrong and their beliefs about what others expect of them regarding partisan politics.

To infer the substance of injunctive non-partisan norms, I performed a content analysis of statements from senior DoD leaders about the military and partisan politics. Content analysis is a qualitative research method "for making replicable and valid inferences from texts (or other meaningful matter) to the contexts of their use" (Krippendorff 2004, 18). Content analysis assumes that texts have meaning for those who produce them and for audiences. Texts are normally written material, but they can also be other "meaningful matter," e.g., maps, sounds, or works of art (Krippendorff 2004, 18–19). Content analysis is a valuable tool for studying political norms (e.g., Mutz 2015; Turcotte 2015; Chouliaraki and Zaborowski 2017; Woolley, Limperos, and Oliver 2010; Zulli 2019). Given the dearth of empirical research on injunctive non-partisan norms, content analysis is an appropriate starting point for the present analysis.

Data and Method

I derived the textual data from a sample of DoD documents and media reports containing senior DoD leaders' statements. Senior leaders' statements are a good data source for a few reasons. First, as discussed in Chapter 1, military leaders (e.g., William T. Sherman and George C. Marshall) powerfully influence military culture and norms. Second, contemporary research reinforces the notion that leaders shape norms in teams and organizations (Taggar and Ellis 2007; Thomas et al. 2004)

I used two criteria to select the texts. First, I sampled texts dated within ten years of the analysis (2011-2020) to ensure that the content reflected contemporary military norms. Second, I limited my sample to texts authored by a senior military leader and reputable media reports that directly quote a senior leader. The resulting sample consisted of eight texts (Shanahan 2019; Garamone 2016, 2012; M. E. Dempsey 2012b, 2012a; Shelbourne 2016; Carter 2012; Cooper 2018).

To infer the content of injunctive non-partisan norms, I analyzed the textual data using *statements* as the unit of analysis and three levels of abstraction: codes, categories, and themes. I first coded statements that expressed what servicemembers do or should believe about partisan politics. Next, I grouped the coded statements into two categories: normative beliefs or social expectations. The normative belief category includes statements that address how the military's traditions, values, and ethics should influence servicemembers' political behavior. The social expectations category includes statements that focus on others' expectations and the social consequences of violating those expectations. Table 7 shows examples of statements in each category. The analysis found 21 statements related to injunctive non-partisan norms; 15 connected to normative beliefs, and 6 connected to social expectations (see appendix Table A7

for complete analysis). The final step was to use the statements to derive the common themes in each category. These themes represent the content of injunctive non-partisan norms.

Table 7. Content analysis categorization examples.

	Category	
	Normative Beliefs	Social Expectations
Statements	"…in the U.S. military we are proudly apolitical. By that, I mean that in our duties, we were brought up to obey the elected commander in chief, whoever that is." —Secretary of Defense James Mattis (Cooper 2018)	"The American people don't want us to become another special interest group." —Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey (Garamone 2012).
	"…the DoD must be the epitome of American values and ethics. Our mission, to protect and defend the nation, is apolitical." —Acting Secretary of Defense Patrick M. Shanahan (2019)	"Importantly, as an institution, the American people cannot be looking at us as a special-interest group or a partisan organization." —Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Joe Dunford (Garamone 2016)

Results

The content analysis finds that, as expected, the military's non-partisan norms map onto normative beliefs and social expectations. Normative beliefs admonish servicemembers to avoid partisan politics, emphasize an obligation to defend the Constitution, and obey elected leaders' orders regardless of which political party holds power. This finding is unsurprising because it reflects the normative arguments for objective civilian control (Huntington 1957). Social expectations refer to the relationship between servicemembers and the American public—that the American people expect servicemembers to stay out of partisan politics, and should servicemembers fail to do so, the American people would lose trust in the military.

The Power of Partisanship

The above analysis describes injunctive non-partisan norms that should pressure servicemembers to behave politically in certain ways. Yet, there are reasons to believe that these norms may struggle to overcome the influence of partisanship. Nine in ten servicemembers identify as Republicans or Democrats (Chapter 2, Figure 3). While non-partisan norms may push servicemembers away from partisan politics, a considerable body of research suggests their partisan identities pressure them in the opposite direction.

Partisanship is a "long-term, affective, psychological identification with one's preferred political party" (Dalton 2016, 2). Partisanship's potent effects on voting behavior was first documented by Angus Campbell and colleagues in their landmark study *The American Voter* (Campbell et al. 1960). Over the ensuing seven decades, political science has established that partisanship is among the most powerful influences on not just voting but also a broad swath of political attitudes and behavior (e.g., Bartels 2000, 2002; D. Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002; Huddy, Mason, and Aarøe 2015; Popkin 1994; Dalton 2016; Lavine, Johnston, and Steenbergen 2012)

Partisanship is powerful because it is not just a set of policy preferences. Instead, partisanship is a social group identity (Huddy and Bankert 2017; Huddy 2001). A social identity is a person's perceived membership in and emotional attachment to a social group (Tajfel and Turner 1979). Social identities are an important source of self-esteem and belonging. However, social group attachments can also produce conflict by stimulating competition with other groups (Tajfel and Turner 1979), polarizing the attitudes of individuals in different groups (Mackie and Cooper 1984), and generating ingroup bias (Huddy 2001). Social groups develop their unique

group norms (Kalin and Sambanis 2018). People internalize and conform to these norms to avoid social sanctions and maintain their psychological self-image as a group member.

The social identity aspects of partisanship influence how partisans make political decisions. The desire to defend one's partisan identity can distort information processing through partisan-motivated reasoning (Bolsen, Druckman, and Cook 2014; Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus 2013; Taber, Cann, and Kucsova 2009; Taber and Lodge 2006). Partisan-motivated reasoning is a type of directional reasoning (e.g., Kunda 1990) in which partisans seek to reach conclusions that support their existing partisan views instead of conclusions that are accurate. Partisans reason directionally by searching for and accepting evidence that confirms existing positive beliefs about their party (or negative beliefs about the other party). At the same time, partisans undervalue or ignore evidence that contradicts their partisan beliefs (Taber, Cann, and Kucsova 2009; Taber and Lodge 2006) or selectively interpret evidence to fit their existing partisan opinions (Bisgaard 2019).

In addition to distorting perceptions of evidence and facts, partisan-motivated reasoning can influence normative judgments. For example, partisans are less concerned about voter fraud when it helps co-partisan candidates (Beaulieu 2014) and they are more likely to forgive political corruption if the culprits are co-partisans (Anduiza, Gallego, and Muñoz 2013). Further, partisans are forgiving of moral violations (Walter and Redlawsk 2019) and illegal acts (Cortina and Rottinghaus 2017) committed by co-partisan politicians.

Partisanship versus Non-partisan Norms

Thus far, this chapter has discussed two opposing influences on servicemembers' political behavior. One influence is injunctive non-partisan norms that admonish servicemembers to avoid taking sides in partisan politics. The other influence is servicemembers' partisan social

identities that oblige them to improve their party's standing by defending their partisan identity and their fellow partisans. Which of these forces is most influential in servicemembers' political decision-making?

One way to answer this question is to test if servicemembers exhibit partisan bias when evaluating the appropriateness of certain political activities where one party stands to benefit. If non-partisan norms are stronger than partisanship, there should be little or no bias in servicemembers' evaluations. The party that stands to benefit from the activity should not affect how appropriate servicemembers deem that activity to be. If, however, partisanship is stronger than non-partisan norms, there should be significant partisan bias in servicemembers' evaluations. They will find the same activity more appropriate if it benefits their party (the in-party) but less appropriate if it benefits the other party (out-party).

The above discussion suggests two hypotheses. First, servicemembers' judgments about the appropriateness of political activity should reflect their partisan biases. The effect will be greater among strong partisans as they are more likely to directionally reason consistent with their partisan identity (Bullock 2011; Cohen 2003; Lavine et al. 2012).

> **Hypothesis 4a (H4a).** Military servicemembers will judge partisan activities that benefit their preferred party as more appropriate and will judge activities that benefit the opposing party as less appropriate.
>
> **Hypothesis 4b (H4b).** Military servicemembers who are strong partisans will exhibit stronger partisan bias when judging the appropriateness of partisan activities.

Second, non-partisan norms should attenuate partisan-biased judgments. Since norms are most influential when they are salient (Cialdini, Reno, and Kallgren 1990; Bicchieri 2006), giving

servicemembers a psychological prime to heighten the salience of non-partisan norms should reduce partisan bias.

> **Hypothesis 5 (H5).** Priming non-partisan norms will reduce servicemembers' partisan bias when judging the appropriateness of partisan activities.

Methods

I test these hypotheses using an original survey experiment that analyzes whether servicemembers exhibit partisan bias in their evaluation of political activities and whether non-partisan norms attenuate this bias.

Participants

The survey experiment was fielded by a contracted firm from January 17-29, 2020. The firm contacted 2,535 current and former U.S. military servicemembers, and 1069 (42%) completed the survey. Of those, 362 were randomly assigned to a different experiment, and 707 were assigned to this study. The sample was gathered using a quota system to reflect the U.S. military population demographically and politically while including enough respondents from underrepresented groups to test for heterogeneous treatment effects. Race and gender quotas were based on 2018 DoD demographics data (Department of Defense 2018), and partisanship quotas were based on the 2018 CCES (Schaffner, Ansolabehere, and Luks 2019). The resulting sample, like the military population, skews male and Republican (Table 8).[9]

[9] See appendix page 149 for a discussion of outlying observations.

Table 8. Sample summary statistics

	Obs	Mean	Std. dev.	Min	Max
Partisan identification (D→R)	707	3.82	2.12	1	6
Partisan strength (L→W→S)	707	2.50	0.76	1	3
Ideology (L→C)	707	3.95	2.02	1	7
Political knowledge	707	2.50	1.28	0	4
Education	707	4.30	1.37	1	6
Age	707	42.15	16.38	18	81
Gender (1=female)	707	0.23	0.42	0	1
Race (1=nonwhite)	707	0.41	0.49	0	1

The sample consists of roughly equal numbers of current and former servicemembers (veterans) (Table 9). Although I am primarily interested in current servicemembers, including former servicemembers allows me to test whether non-partisan norms persist after servicemembers leave the military. This test is interesting for a few reasons. First, research finds that social norms are persistent and difficult to change (e.g., Young 2015). Analyzing veterans allows me to determine if this is true for non-partisan norms. Second, scholars argue that political activism by veterans—particularly retired senior officers—may affect public perceptions of the military (Becker 2001; Cook 2008; Golby, Dropp, and Feaver 2012, 2013). Thus, veterans' political attitudes are important to civil-military relations. And, if non-partisan norms influence former servicemembers, it may suggest new research avenues on veterans' political activism.

Table 9. Sample duty status and military rank

	Rank		
Military Status	Enlisted	Officer	Total
Active	186	153	339
	26.31	21.64	48
Veteran	271	97	368
	38.33	13.72	52
Total	457	250	707
	64.64	35.36	100

Procedure and Treatments

After consenting to take the survey, participants answered questions about their military service and party identification. Next, they received two experimental treatments. First, participants were randomly assigned to one of two psychological prime conditions (control or non-partisan norms). Second, participants were further randomly assigned to one of three party cue conditions. The result is a 2 x 3 factorial design (Table 10). After the treatments, respondents answered questions to measure the dependent variables.

Table 10. Sample sizes by experimental condition

	Party Cue		
Psychological Prime	Neutral	In-Party	Out-Party
Control	136	121	108
Non-partisan Norms	121	106	115

Non-partisan Norms Treatment

The psychological prime is designed to elevate the salience of non-partisan norms. Participants in the non-partisan norms treatment group were asked to read a simulated news article emphasizing the military's tradition of avoiding partisan politics. It includes quotes from well-known military leaders and historians, and it emphasizes both normative beliefs and social expectations consistent with the content analysis described previously (the full text of the

treatments are in the appendix, page 138). After being presented the article, participants were asked to write a short commentary about why it is important for the military to be politically neutral. Participants in the control group were asked to read a simulated non-political news article and write a short commentary about a non-political topic.

To ensure the non-partisan norms treatment would elevate the salience of non-partisan norms, I pretested it with a convenience sample of 95 current and former servicemembers. Respondents read the treatment then answered questions about it. Most respondents (92.6%) said the treatment would make servicemembers more aware of the issue of political neutrality. Additionally, 72.6% said that using the names of well-known military leaders and historians in the treatment increased its persuasiveness (see appendix, page 132 for full pretest questionnaire and results). Overall, the pretest results indicated that the treatment would effectively elevate the salience of non-partisan norms.

Party Cue Treatment

The second experimental treatment is a party cue designed to trigger partisan-biased judgments. After receiving the non-partisan norms or control prime described above, participants were randomly assigned to one of three party cue conditions—neutral, in-party, or out-party. Participants in all three conditions were asked to evaluate how appropriate it is for military service members to participate in four partisan political activities. The difference between the conditions was which political party would benefit from those activities. In the neutral condition, the benefitting party was not specified. In the in-party condition, the participants' own party would benefit. In the out-party condition, the opposing party would benefit.

Measures

The dependent variable is *appropriateness* which measures respondents' evaluations of how appropriate it is for service members to participate in partisan political activities. Respondents were asked to judge the appropriateness of four activities: *Express* personal opinions on a political candidate on social media; *Attend* a political campaign event as a spectator in civilian clothes; Express *support* for a political party to others in their unit; *Encourage* others in their unit to vote for a political candidate. The responses range from -2=very inappropriate to 2=very appropriate with a neutral midpoint at 0. *Appropriateness* is the mean of the four responses (α=0.976). Table 11 shows the summary statistics for the four individual measures and the index measure.

Table 11. Dependent variables summary

	Obs	Mean	Std. dev.	Min	Max
Express	707	-0.06	1.38	-2	2
Attend	707	0.55	1.27	-2	2
Support	706	0.13	1.28	-2	2
Encourage	707	-0.03	1.36	-2	2
Appropriateness	707	0.15	1.08	-2	2

Manipulation Check

Before examining the effect of the treatments on partisan bias, I need to confirm that the non-partisan norms treatment had the intended effect of activating the norms. To accomplish this, I assessed respondents' nonpartisan norms strength using a four-question index measure. I derived the questions from the content analysis described earlier. Two questions asked respondents about their normative beliefs, and two asked about social expectations (see appendix p.148 for questions and Table A10 for summary statistics). The respondents answered these four questions after the dependent variables. A factor analysis finds only one Eigenvalue > 1.00, and all four questions sufficiently load on a single factor ($\geq$ 0.73). I use predicted factor scores to

create a continuous index measure of norms strength rescaled to range from 0 to 1 (M=0.72, SD=0.21), with higher values indicating stronger non-partisan norms.

Finally, I regressed the norms strength measure on the treatment indicator (appendix Table A12). Although the respondents already had strong non-partisan norms on average, the treatment still produced a modest but significant ($p < 0.01$) increase in norms strength (Figure 8).

Figure 8. Non-partisan norms treatment manipulation check



Note: Figure based on OLS regression coefficients with 95% confidence intervals. See appendix Table A12, model 1.

Results

Having confirmed the norms treatment was effective, I move on to the main question: How do partisanship and nonpartisan norms affect servicemembers' decisions about partisan political activities? My analysis, which I discuss in detail below, shows that servicemembers can be biased against the "other" party, but non-partisan norms can reduce the bias. The control

group's judgments about political activities are biased against the out-party, but the bias disappears in the treatment group. Thus, both partisanship and nonpartisan norms can influence servicemembers' decision-making.

Hypotheses 4a and 5: Partisan Biased Judgments and Norms

The results for H4a and H5 are shown in Table 12 and Figure 9 below. The left side of Figure 9 shows the results for H4a, and the right side shows them for H5.

The left side of Figure 9 shows a negative out-party bias which partially supports H4a. When servicemembers in the control group are told the activities benefit the in-party, their appropriateness evaluations are not different from the neutral condition. However, when the political activities benefit the out-party, servicemembers judge them significantly ($p<0.01$) less appropriate. The effect remains significant ($p<0.05$) in regressions with military and demographic controls (appendix Table A13). Thus, servicemembers show negative bias against the out-party but not positive bias for the in-party.

The control group shows that partisanship can bias servicemembers' judgments, but can nonpartisan norms reduce the bias? The results for H5 suggest the answer is yes. The right side of Figure 9 shows the effect of the non-partisan norms treatment on the appropriateness judgments. There is no significant difference between in-party, out-party, and neutral party cues.

As hypothesized, the non-partisan norms treatment shifts servicemembers' evaluations enough to eliminate the partisan bias.[10]

Table 12. Predictors of appropriateness judgments

	(1)
In-party cue	0.108
	(0.132)
Out-party cue	-0.359**
	(0.132)
Norms treatment	-0.186
	(0.134)
Norms treatment* In-party cue	-0.0283
	(0.194)
Norms treatment*Out-party cue	0.304
	(0.198)
Constant	2.268***
	(0.0936)
Observations	707
R-squared	0.020

Note: OLS regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests significant at *** $p<0.001$, ** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$. Base conditions are neutral party cue and control treatment.

[10] I also tested H4a and H5 using a modified version of the appropriateness measure as the dependent variable. One of the dependent variable measures asked respondents to evaluate the appropriateness of expressing "personal opinions on a [Democrat/Republican/political] candidate on social media." The question did not specify whether the opinions are positive or negative which leaves room for divergent interpretations by respondents. To ensure the robustness of the results, I constructed a second appropriateness index measure that omits the responses from the *express* question (M=2.21, SD=1.10). I repeated the H4a and H5 analysis described in the main text using the modified appropriateness measure as the dependent variable (appendix, Table A14. Main experiment with controls and modified appropriateness measure). The results do not change to the inferences.

Figure 9. Marginal effects of party cues and norms treatment on appropriateness evaluations



Note: Figure based on OLS regression (Table 12) with 95% confidence intervals. The dashed line is the neutral midpoint of the dependent variable *appropriateness.*

Hypothesis 4b: Partisan Identity Strength

The results for H4a above establish that servicemembers can be biased against the out-party. However, is the bias stronger among strong partisans as H4b predicts? The results below suggest the answer is no.

Figure 10 shows the results for H4b. There are no significant differences in appropriateness judgments based on partisan identity strength. This is true in all three party cue conditions. I test H4b using the control group and regressing *appropriateness* on *party cue*, *partisan strength*, and the interaction term *party cue*partisan strength* (appendix, Table A15). None of the interaction term coefficients are significant. In short, strong partisan servicemembers are not more biased in their appropriateness evaluations than leaning and weak partisans.

Figure 10. Effect of partisan identity strength on appropriateness evaluations



Note: Figure based on OLS regression (appendix Table A15) with 95% confidence intervals. The dashed line is the neutral midpoint of the dependent variable *appropriateness.*

Additional Analyses

In addition to testing the hypotheses described above, I perform three additional analyses. First, I test for heterogeneous treatment effect to determine if the effect of the norms treatment varies by political or military subgroup. Second, I examine whether the non-partisan norms treatment affects servicemembers' willingness to criticize President Trump. Third, I examine whether non-partisan norms are stronger or weaker among military subgroups.

Heterogeneous Treatment Effects

The manipulation check confirmed that the non-partisan norms treatment raised the salience of the norms. But did the treatment vary by military or political demographic? I conduct

two analyses to answer this question—one for military demographics and a second for political demographics. The dependent variable in both analyses is the norms strength measure I use in the manipulation check. In each analysis, I interact the norms treatment variable with the military or political demographics of interest. Significant interaction term coefficients indicate heterogeneous treatment effects.

The results of both analyses indicate no heterogeneous treatment effects. The military analysis shows no significant interactions between the norms treatment and duty status (active or veteran), rank (officer or enlisted), and years of military service (Table A16). Notably, there is no significant difference between current and former servicemembers even though it seems intuitive that current servicemembers might be more responsive to the treatment.

The political analysis likewise shows no significant differences in treatment effects. It includes interactions between the norms treatment and party identification, partisan identity strength, and ideology (Table A17). This result also answers a lingering question from the main analysis. Recall that the H4b analysis is limited to the control group which leaves open the question of whether partisan strength makes a difference in the non-partisan norms treatment group. This result suggests it does not.

In sum, the treatment raises the salience of non-partisan norms on average for all military and political subgroups.

Criticizing President Trump

Although the main results are based on servicemembers' appropriateness judgments of four political activities, the survey asked them about a fifth judgment: the appropriateness of criticizing President Trump on social media. Servicemembers' willingness to criticize the

commander-in-chief is important for military non-partisanship. However, I analyze it separately because it cannot be manipulated with a party cue, unlike the other appropriateness measures.

A few things are noteworthy about this analysis. First, the survey for this study was fielded during Trump's first impeachment—after the House had impeached, but the Senate had yet to acquit. Consequently, partisan animosity may have been elevated. Second, Trump's presidency and his impact on the political environment are historically unprecedented (e.g., Jacobson 2019). For these reasons, I am reluctant to generalize servicemembers' willingness to criticize Trump to a broader finding of their willingness to criticize any president. Even so, understanding how norms shape attitudes toward disparaging the sitting commander-in-chief, even one as unique as Trump, is informative.

The dependent variable for this analysis is *criticize*. After receiving the treatments described earlier, respondents were asked how appropriate it is for servicemembers to criticize President Trump on social media using a 5-point Likert scale from -2=very inappropriate to 2=very appropriate (M=-0.39, SD=1.50).

The results show that the non-partisan norms treatment does not influence servicemembers' willingness to criticize Trump on social media. I estimate an ordered logistic regression with the norms treatment indicator, a dichotomous party identification variable (0=Democrat, 1=Republican), and an interaction between the two (Table 13). As expected, there is a significant ($p < 0.001$) difference between Democrats and Republicans. However, the conditional effect of the norms treatment is not significant for either Democrats or Republicans. from both parties. Regressions with controls (Table A18) do not change these inferences. Unlike the other appropriateness measures discussed earlier, the non-partisan norms treatment does not influence servicemembers' attitudes toward criticizing Trump.

Table 13. Appropriateness evaluations of criticizing President Trump on social media

VARIABLES	(1) No Controls
Norms Treatment	-0.255
	(0.189)
Republican	-0.715***
	(0.186)
Norms Treatment*Republican	0.0992
	(0.269)
τ1	-1.147***
	(0.138)
τ2	-0.373**
	(0.130)
τ3	0.350**
	(0.130)
τ4	1.112***
	(0.141)
Observations	707

Note: Ordered logistic regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests significant at *** $p<0.001$, ** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$. Base conditions are control treatment and Democrat.

Predictors of Non-partisan Norms

The final analysis in this chapter explores if military demographics predict stronger or weaker non-partisan norms. This analysis is interesting for a few reasons. First, as discussed in Chapter 1, most research on military norms focuses on officers. The survey data allow me to explore norms among all ranks. Second, the survey data allow me to explore the relationship between years of military service and norms strength more directly. Recall that the Chapter 2 analysis finds that servicemembers who have been in the military longer are less likely to identify as partisans and less politically active. However, that analysis uses age as a proxy for service years. The survey data allow me to reexamine this relationship without relying on a proxy.

Once again, the dependent variable is the norms strength measure I used in the manipulation check. I test whether three military variables are significant predictors of norms strength—duty status, rank, and years of military service—while controlling for demographics and the effect of the norms treatment. The coefficients of interest are shown in Table 14, and the marginal effects are shown in Figure 11, Figure 13, and Figure 12.

Table 14. Military predictors of non-partisan norms strength

VARIABLES	(1) Base Model	(2) Duty Status Subgroups	(3) Rank Subgroups
Norms treatment	0.0515***	0.0490***	0.0491***
	(0.0142)	(0.0142)	(0.0142)
Veteran	-0.0272	-0.0419*	-0.0414*
	(0.0193)	(0.0201)	(0.0202)
Guard/reserve		-0.0631*	-0.0614*
		(0.0274)	(0.0275)
Officer	-0.0441**	-0.0443**	
	(0.0165)	(0.0165)	
Non-commissioned officers			0.0279
			(0.0186)
Warrant officers			-0.0384
			(0.0234)
Junior officers			-0.00175
			(0.0320)
Senior officers			-0.0283
			(0.0259)
Years of military service	0.00334***	0.00318**	0.00276*
	(0.000988)	(0.000998)	(0.00108)
Observations	707	707	707
R-squared	0.214	0.221	0.224

Note: OLS regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests significant at *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. All models include political and demographic control that are not shown. See Table A19 for full regression results.

First, I find significant differences in norms strength by duty status. I tested duty status using two different measures—dichotomous (military or veteran) in model 1, and a three-level categorical measure (active duty, National Guard/reserve, and veteran) in models 2 and 3. The

results from the three-level measure are shown in Figure 11. Servicemembers on full-time active duty have stronger norms compared to those on part-time duty in the National Guard or reserve and veterans. Surprisingly, the weakest norms are in the National Guard and reserve group.

Figure 11. Predicted non-partisan norms strength by military duty status



Note: Figure based on OLS regression (Figure 11 model 3) with 95% confidence intervals.

Second, I also find significant differences in norms by rank. I used two different measures for rank: a dichotomous measure (enlisted/officer) in models 1 and 2, and a five-level categorical measure (from junior enlisted to senior officer) in model 3. In models 1 and 2, the dichotomous measure shows that officers have significantly (p<0.01) weaker norms than enlisted servicemembers. In contrast, the five-level measure in model 3 shows no significant coefficients using the five-level measure. The marginal effects of the five-level measure are shown in Figure 12 and reveal an interesting pattern. Warrant officers have the weakest norms on average (the coefficient approaches but does not exceed statistical significance (p= 0.092)). I have no

theoretical reason why warrant officers might have weaker norms. Although warrant officers comprise a small percentage of total U.S. military personnel (Department of Defense 2020), this finding is something unusual that warrants additional research.

Figure 12. Predicted non-partisan norms strength by military rank



Note: Figure based on OLS regression (appendix Table A19) with 95% confidence intervals.

The analysis of the last variable—years of military service—shows that it is positively associated with norms strength. This result bolsters the findings from Chapter 2, which used age as a proxy. Here, after controlling for age, more years of military service is still associated with stronger norms ($p<0.05$). Figure 13 shows the marginal effect of service years on norms strength.

Figure 13. Predicted non-partisan norms strength by years of military service



Note: Figure based on OLS regression (Figure 11 model 3) with 95% confidence intervals.

These results provide additional support to the idea proposed in Chapter 2 that non-partisan norms strengthen through socialization. Full-time servicemembers are exposed to the norms more often than part-time servicemembers, and exposure increases with more years of military service.

At the same time, these additional analyses find two puzzles. First, part-time servicemembers appear to have weaker norms than active duty and veteran servicemembers. Second, warrant officers appear to have weaker norms than enlisted servicemembers and other officers. Both are unexpected findings that could be explored in future research.

Discussion

This chapter asks if there is partisan bias in servicemembers' political decision-making and whether heightening the salience of non-partisan norms reduces it. Analysis of a survey experiment suggests the answers to both questions are yes. Servicemembers show negative bias against the out-party when making judgments about the appropriateness of political activities. However, this bias disappears when servicemembers are given a treatment that activates the military's non-partisan norms. Like other social norms, the military's non-partisan norms are most influential when they are salient (e.g., Cialdini, Reno, and Kallgren 1990). These findings paint a more optimistic picture of military non-partisan norms than the previous chapter.

This chapter also supports the idea that socialization strengthens non-partisan norms. Like Chapter 2, this chapter finds that longer-serving servicemembers have stronger non-partisan norms compared to those with fewer years of military service.

Notably, however, non-partisan norms do not completely erase partisan bias. The norms treatment did not shift servicemembers' willingness to criticize President Trump on social media. However, given the unique nature of Trump's presidency and the limitations of these data, it is impossible to determine to what extent this result is unique to Trump rather than a general weakness in servicemembers' norms.

Chapter 4

Non-partisan Norms and Affective Polarization[11]

If this dissertation's findings so far can be summarized in a single idea, it is that U.S. military servicemembers are not very different politically from their fellow Americans. To be sure, servicemembers have unique norms. Still, many servicemembers identify as Democrats or Republicans, are active in partisan politics, and have partisan biases. The notion that servicemembers are politically similar to civilians raises an important question. Is there partisan social conflict in the military? If there is, what are the consequences? And importantly, can non-partisan norms lessen partisan conflict?

This chapter aims to answer these questions by examining the extent and consequences of affective polarization among servicemembers. It is well-established that Americans have become affectively polarized (Iyengar et al. 2019). They dislike and distrust the "other" party, and this partisan hostility has spilled over into non-political situations (Gift and Gift 2015; Iyengar and Westwood 2015; McConnell et al. 2018). This chapter explores whether servicemembers are as affectively polarized as the broader public, if partisan hostility spills over into the military workplace, and if non-partisan norms moderate these effects.

Like those in the previous chapter, this chapter's findings offer cautious optimism for the power of non-partisan norms to reduce partisanship's adverse effects. Although servicemembers are affectively polarized, non-partisan norms can reduce partisan animus. The findings also show that affective polarization spills over into the military workplace, but non-partisan norms reduce

[11] Some elements of this chapter were published previously (Mullinix and Lythgoe 2022).

these effects. These findings, together with those in Chapter 3, offer an optimistic counterpoint to the eroding norms hypothesis advanced in Chapter 2 and the broader civil-military relations literature.

Affective Polarization

Americans are more politically polarized now than in the last half-century (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2016). From members of Congress to regular voters, Democrats and Republicans can rarely agree on anything (Desilver 2014; Hetherington and Rudolph 2015; Pew Research Center 2017). In recent years, however, partisan differences have given rise to social conflict. Democrats and Republicans not only disagree with each other, but they dislike each other as well. Scholars call this *affective polarization*—"the tendency of people identifying as Republicans or Democrats to view opposing partisans negatively and co-partisans positively" (Iyengar and Westwood 2015, 691).

Affective polarization in America has increased over the last few decades (Iyengar et al. 2019). This trend is obvious in American National Election Studies (ANES) surveys (Figure 14). These surveys ask people to rate their feelings toward the other party using a feeling thermometer where 50 to 100 degrees indicates warm (favorable) feelings, and 0-50 degrees indicates cold (unfavorable) feelings. Figure 14 shows that over the last 40 years, people's feelings toward the opposing party have become considerably colder.

Figure 14. Affective polarization in the U.S., 1978-2020



Note: Calculated using sample weights. Affective polarization is the difference between in-party and out-party ratings.
Source: ANES (2021)

Although scholars debate the causes of affective polarization (Abramowitz 2014; Webster and Abramowitz 2017; Rogowski and Sutherland 2016; Fiorina and Abrams 2008; Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 2008; Iyengar et al. 2019), there is strong evidence that it is linked to social group conflict (Iyengar et al. 2019; Mason 2016). As discussed in the previous chapter, partisanship is a social identity associated with an emotional attachment to a social group (Huddy and Bankert 2017; Iyengar and Krupenkin 2018; Campbell et al. 1960; Dalton 2016; Greene 1999). Like any other social identity, membership can produce competition and conflict between in-groups and out-groups (e.g., Tajfel and Turner 1979). In politics, the out-group is opposing partisans.

Affective polarization arising from social group conflict is amplified by social sorting (Mason 2018). People have many social identities which are more or less salient in different social contexts (Hogg and Turner 1987; Oakes, Turner, and Haslam 1991). Social sorting occurs when peoples' various social identities become linked to their partisan identity (Mason 2016, 352). In the U.S., women, racial minorities, college graduates, urban voters, and younger voters tend to identify as Democrats, while men, White voters, voters without a college degree, rural voters, and older voters tend to identify as Republicans (Pew Research Center 2018a). When people sort into partisan camps, partisanship becomes a "mega-identity" that symbolizes religion, economic class, race, and more (Mason 2018, 14). Sorting makes party identity a salient part of social relationships, accentuates the differences between partisans, and intensifies the resulting negative emotions (Mason 2018).

Affective Polarization Among Servicemembers

Since ordinary Americans are affectively polarized, it is likely that servicemembers are as well. A recent *Military Times* opinion poll finds that roughly three in four servicemembers believe the military community has become more polarized (Shane 2018). ANES data suggests the *Military Times* poll is correct—servicemembers are affectively polarized. Figure 15 compares servicemembers' and civilians' mean feeling thermometer ratings from 2004 to 2020. The pattern is unambiguous—the ratings of both groups are nearly identical.

Figure 15. Comparison of servicemember and civilian affective polarization, 2004-2020



Note: Calculated using sample weights. Includes current and former servicemembers.
Source: ANES (2021)

Another question is whether there are differences between current and former servicemembers. While not all ANES surveys distinguish between the two, the 2020 survey does. Figure 16 shows that mean in-party and out-party thermometer ratings are roughly the same for civilians, current servicemembers, and veterans.

Figure 16. Feeling thermometers by military affiliation in 2020



Note: Calculated using sample weights. Sample sizes: Civilian *n*=7,338; Military *n*=74; Veteran *n*=868.
Source: ANES (2021)

The Social Consequences of Affective Polarization

Since servicemembers are affectively polarized, an important question is how this might affect military unit cohesion. Affective polarization has political and social consequences (Iyengar et al. 2019). The social consequences, which include dislike, distrust, and discrimination, are most concerning for the military, where teamwork and trust are critical to organizational effectiveness.

One social consequence of affective polarization is that partisans are less comfortable having social relationships with people from the out-party. From 1960 to 2010, the percentage of Americans who would be unhappy if their child married an opposing partisan increased from 4% to 20% for Democrats and 5% to 27% for Republicans (Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012).

Americans are more likely to reach out to co-partisans in online dating communities (Huber and Malhotra 2017). Consumers prefer to do business with co-partisans, and employees are willing to accept lower wages to work for a co-partisan (McConnell et al. 2018). And in 2016, Thanksgiving dinners involving mixed partisan families were fifty minutes shorter on average (Chen and Rohla 2018).

A concerning consequence of affective polarization is discrimination against opposing partisans. People have few reservations about partisan discrimination because political affiliation is not a protected class like race or gender, and there are no social norms that dissuade partisan intolerance (Iyengar and Westwood 2015). Job seekers are less likely to receive callbacks in heavily partisan areas when their resume identifies them as a minority partisan (Gift and Gift 2015). Partisans are more likely to award a hypothetical scholarship to a co-partisan student even when an opposing partisan student has stronger academic credentials (Iyengar and Westwood 2015). Some landlords and tenants attach political conditions to their rentals, such as "Trump supporters need not apply" (The Associated Press 2016; Rogers 2017).

The behaviors described above could be ruinous in a military setting. A positive environment and esprit de corps are essential for military team effectiveness (Department of the Army 2019, 6–6 thru 6–7). Cohesive teams—those with strong bonds between members—perform better than non-cohesive teams (Goodwin, Blacksmith, and Coats 2018, 329). Military teams are more effective when team members like each other (Boies and Howell 2009). Furthermore, preventing and managing conflict is an important component of military team success (Shuffler, Pavlas, and Salas 2012, 286). In short, the distrust and discrimination associated with affective polarization are directly at odds with the drivers of effective military teamwork.

Non-partisan Norms as Civic Norms

Given the potentially negative impacts of partisan hostility on military teams, can affective polarization be reduced? Scholars have explored strategies to do so, but these efforts have had mixed success (Ahler and Sood 2018; Levendusky 2018a, 2018b; Wojcieszak, Winter, and Yu 2020). For example, Levendusky (2018a) finds that heightening people's national identity—getting them to think of themselves as Americans instead of partisans—reduces affective polarization. Yet, Levendusky (2018b) also finds that heightening partisan ambivalence and using self-affirmation techniques are only marginally effective for ideological moderates, and they backfire by increasing polarization among those at the ideological extremes.

Despite the uneven success of depolarization strategies, there are two reasons to believe that non-partisan norms can reduce affective polarization among servicemembers. The first reason is that non-partisan norms are akin to *civic norms* that impose upon servicemembers an *obligation* to the American people. Civic norms are expectations people have of themselves and others relative to democratic politics (Dalton 2008). Research finds that making civic norms salient can influence people to be more open-minded (Kam 2007), update their partisan identities in response to new information (Groenendyk 2013), and be more willing to discuss politics with opposing partisans (Mullinix 2018). Both Kam and Mullinix argue that civic norms are associated with an *obligation to others* which is linked to accountability and cognitive effort in decision-making (e.g., Tetlock 1983).[12]

The military's non-partisan norms map onto the key elements of civic norms in terms of expectations of and obligations to others. Recall from Chapter 3 that injunctive non-partisan norms are linked to social expectations of the American public. The American people expect

[12] Mullinix and Lythgoe (2022) develop this theory in depth.

servicemembers to stay out of partisan politics and that servicemembers have an obligation to do so. This notion of *obligation* suggests that making non-partisan norms salient may have the same effect as making other civic norms salient—increasing servicemembers' sense of accountability and open-mindedness.

The second reason that strong non-partisan norms might reduce affective polarization is that they pressure servicemembers to avoid partisan prejudice. Prejudice is a "negative evaluation of a group or individual based on group membership" (Crandall, Eshleman, and O'Brien 2002, 359). A robust psychology literature establishes that social norms influence prejudice toward outgroups (Monteith, Deneen, and Tooman 1996; Paluck 2009; Stangor, Sechrist, and Jost 2001; Paluck et al. 2021). Since affective polarization is rooted in social identity and out-group dislike (opposing partisans), it seems likely that non--partisan norms would reduce out-party prejudice and animus.

Putting these ideas together, I hypothesize that making non-partisan norms salient will reduce affective polarization by invoking an awareness of servicemembers' obligation to other Americans—including opposing partisans—and reducing out-party prejudice.

> **Hypothesis 6 (H6).** Priming non-partisan norms will reduce affective polarization among military servicemembers.

Methods

I test this hypothesis using data from the survey experiment described in Chapter 3. After receiving either the control or non-partisan norms treatment, respondents were asked questions about their feelings toward opposing partisans. I analyze the responses to test the above hypothesis.

Measures

The dependent variables are three established measures of affective polarization: feeling thermometers, trait ratings, and social distance (e.g., Druckman and Levendusky 2019) (see appendix page 134 for survey questions).

Feeling thermometers range from 0 to 100 and measure favorable or unfavorable feelings toward respondents' in-party (M=78.22, SD=21.93), out-party (M=33.73, SD=29.67), and the difference between the two (M=44.49, SD=38.85). Respondents were asked to rate their feelings toward Republicans and Democrats with 51 to 100 degrees indicating favorable and warm feelings, 0 to 49 degrees indicating unfavorable and cold feelings, and 50 degrees indicating neither warm nor cold feelings. I recoded responses based on respondents' reported partisan identification to reflect feelings toward the in-party and out-party.

Trait ratings measure how well respondents think positive and negative traits describe opposing partisans. Respondents were shown a list of eight traits: five positive (American, intelligent, honest, open-minded, and generous) and three negative (hypocritical, selfish, and mean). Respondents were then asked to indicate how well the traits described opposing partisans from 0=not well at all to 4=extremely well. I used these responses to create three index measures. Mean positive trait rating (M=1.82, SD=1.19) and mean negative trait rating (M=2.54, SD=1.06) range from 0 to 4. The third measure is trait distance which is the difference between the average positive and negative traits ranging from 0 to 8 (M=4.73, SD=1.73).

Finally, *social distance* measures how comfortable respondents are having social relationships with opposing partisans. Respondents were asked three social distance questions: How comfortable they are having close personal friends who are opposing partisans (0=not at all comfortable to 4=extremely comfortable), how comfortable they are having neighbors on their

street who are opposing partisans (0=not at all comfortable to 4=extremely comfortable), and how they would feel if their son or daughter married a supporter of the out-party (0=not at all upset to 4=extremely upset). I recoded the first two responses so that higher values indicate greater social distance for all three measures, then averaged the responses to produce an index measure of social distance ranging from 0 to 4 (M=1.02, SD=0.73).[13]

Results

The results support the hypothesis that non-partisan norms reduce affective polarization among servicemembers. The non-partisan norms treatment shifts the feeling thermometers and trait ratings as hypothesized. However, it does not reduce social distance. I examine these findings further in the discussion section at the end of the chapter.

Feeling Thermometers

Servicemembers who receive the norms treatment express warmer feelings toward the opposing party compared to the control group. Figure 17 plots the results of three regressions that measure the effect of the norms treatment on thermometer ratings (appendix, Table A21). Although the treatment has no significant effect on in-party ratings, it shifts out-party evaluations about five points warmer ($p<0.05$) and reduces the difference between in-party and out-party ratings by about seven points—a modest (~15%) but significant ($p<0.05$) reduction in affective polarization.

[13] See Klar, Krupnikov, and Ryan (2018) for a critique of social distance measures of affective polarization.

Figure 17. Effect of non-partisan norms treatment on feeling thermometer ratings



Note: Plots are OLS regression coefficients with robust standard errors. Each plot is the coefficient for the norm treatment's effect on the indicated dependent variable. The dashed line is the base (control) condition. Two-tailed tests significant at *** $p<0.001$, ** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$. See appendix Table A21 for complete results.

Trait Ratings

The trait ratings analysis likewise supports H6. As shown in Figure 18, servicemembers who receive the norms treatment are more willing to attribute positive traits to out-partisans ($p<0.01$). Although the treatment does not significantly shift respondents' willingness to attribute negative traits to the other party, it significantly reduces the net distance between positive and negative trait ratings ($p<0.05$).

Figure 18. Effect of non-partisan norms treatment on out-party trait ratings



Note: Plots are OLS regression coefficients with robust standard errors. Each plot is the coefficient for the norm treatment's effect on the indicated dependent variable. The dashed line is the control treatment base condition. Two-tailed tests significant at *** $p<0.001$, ** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$. See appendix Table A23 for complete results.

Social Distance

In contrast to the feeling thermometer and trait ratings, the norms treatment does not shift social distance measures (appendix Table A25). The regression coefficients are shown in Figure 19. An OLS regression of the social distance index measure on the norms treatment shows no significant change. Likewise, ordered logistic regressions for each of the three measures that comprise the social distance index— comfort with out-partisan as neighbors, friends, and son- or daughter-in-law—yields no significant effects.

Figure 19. Effect of non-partisan norms treatment on out-party social distance



Note: Plots 1 thru 3 are ordered logistic regression coefficients, and plot 4 is an OLS regression coefficient. All plots use robust standard errors. Each plot is the coefficient for the norms treatment effect on the indicated dependent variable. The dashed line is the control treatment base condition in each regression. Two-tailed tests significant at *** $p<0.001$, ** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$. See appendix Table A25 for complete results.

Additional Analyses

I conduct three additional analyses. As in the last chapter, I test for heterogeneous treatments effects—whether the non-partisan norms treatment's effect varies based on the partisanship or partisan identity strength. I also examine if the norms treatment influences servicemembers' feelings toward President Trump. Finally, I explore how affective polarization and the norms treatment affect military working relationships.

Heterogeneous Treatment Effects

My first analysis shows that the treatment has the same average effect on Democrats and Republicans, as well as on leaning, weak, and strong partisans. To test for heterogeneous treatment effects by partisanship and partisan identity strength, I repeat the regressions for all three dependent variables—feeling thermometers, trait ratings, and social distance—but with interactions between the norms treatment indicator and the moderator variables of interest. Regressions with a *Norms treatment*Partisanship* interaction show that the norms treatment does not affect Republicans and Democrats differently (Table A26, Table A27, and Table A28). Regressions with a *Norms treatment* Partisan identity strength* interaction likewise show null results (Table A29, Table A30, and Table A31).

Feelings Toward President Trump

Next, I test whether the non-partisan norms treatment affects servicemembers' feelings toward Donald Trump. The dependent variable is respondents' feelings toward Trump. One of the post-treatment questions asked respondents to rate their feelings toward Trump using the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer described above (M= 57.24, SD=38.95).

Although the non-partisan norms treatment shifts feelings toward out-partisans in the main analysis, it does not alter feelings toward Trump. The regressions in Table 15 show that, as expected, Republicans feel much warmer toward Trump than do Democrats (model 2) However, the norms treatment coefficient is not significant in either model. As noted in the previous chapter, I am cautious about generalizing these conclusions because of the uniqueness of Trump and his presidency.

Table 15. Effect of non-partisan norms prime on Trump thermometer ratings

VARIABLES	(1) Base Model	(2) Partisan Interaction
Norms treatment	-2.601	-0.0503
	(2.930)	(5.308)
Party ID		12.39***
		(0.723)
Norms treatment*Party ID		-0.905
		(1.061)
Constant	58.50***	11.59**
	(2.051)	(3.698)
Observations	707	707
R-squared	0.001	0.425

Note: OLS regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests significant at *** $p<0.001$, ** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$.

Consequences for Military Working Relationships

The final analysis in this chapter examines if affective polarization affects military working relationships and if the non-partisan norms treatment moderates those effects. As discussed earlier in the chapter, affective polarization can spill over into nonpolitical contexts (Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012; Huber and Malhotra 2017; McConnell et al. 2018; Gift and Gift 2015; Chen and Rohla 2018; Iyengar and Westwood 2015; The Associated Press 2016). If partisan animus spills over into military working contexts, it could negatively affect unit cohesion and morale.

To explore this possibility, I leverage a party cue experiment embedded in the survey. After the experimental treatments and affective polarization measures, respondents were randomly assigned to either the Democrat or Republican condition. Respondents were asked, "How difficult would it be for you to work closely in a military unit with someone who is a strong [Democrat/Republican]?" and "How difficult would it be for you to serve under a military

commander who is a strong [Democrat/Republican]?" Responses range from 1=not at all difficult to 5=extremely difficult for both questions. The only difference between the conditions was party identification of the target of both questions. Depending on the partisanship of the respondent, the target was a member of the in-party or out-party. The result is a 2 x 2 factorial design (Table 16)

Table 16. Experimental treatment conditions

	Question target	
Treatment	In-party	Out-party
Control	191	174
Norms treatment	156	186

Respondents' answers to the two questions described above are the dependent variables. *Work* measures respondents' reported difficulty working with a strong partisan (M=2.10, SD=1.25). *Command* measures their reported difficulty working under the command of a strong partisan (M=2.12, SD=1.26). The results are shown in Table 17 and graphically in Figure 20.

The experiment reveals that partisanship and non-partisan norms can affect military working relationships. I begin with servicemembers who were asked about serving with a strong partisan from the opposing party—depicted by the red plots in Figure 20. Servicemembers in the control group express significantly ($p<0.001$) more difficulty than those asked about serving with a strong in-partisan. However, the nonpartisan norms treatment reduces ($p<0.05$) the reported difficulty among those who received the out-party cue.

I turn now to servicemembers who were asked about serving with a strong partisan from the same party—depicted by the green plots in Figure 20. The results show that the norms treatment *increases* ($p<0.05$) the reported difficulty of serving with a strong in-partisan. The base condition in Table 17 is the in-party cue, so the *Norms treatment* coefficient is the conditional effect of the treatment in the in-party condition. Figure 20 shows the effect clearly. For both

dependent variables, the norms treatment shifts reported difficulty downward in the out-party condition and upward in the in-party condition. Thus, the norms treatment not only made servicemembers more tolerant of out-partisans, but also *less* tolerant of *in-partisans.*

Table 17. Effect of non-partisan norms on military working relationships

	(1) Partisan colleague	(2) Partisan commander
Norms treatment	0.267*	0.358**
	(0.133)	(0.128)
Out-party	0.669***	0.840***
	(0.124)	(0.120)
Norms treatment*Out-party	-0.406*	-0.519**
	(0.188)	(0.185)
Constant	1.733***	1.654***
	(0.0826)	(0.0756)
Observations	707	707
R-squared	0.043	0.068

Note: OLS regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests significant at *** $p<0.001$, ** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$.

Figure 20. Effects of non-partisan norms treatment on military working relationships



Note: Figure based on OLS regressions from Table 17 (model 1 in the left panel and model 2 in the right panel) shown with 95% confidence intervals. The dashed line is the conditional effect of the norms treatment in the control/in-party condition.

The party cue experiment shows that partisanship can affect military working relationships. However, it does not directly test if affective polarization influences those relationships. Consequently, I estimate an additional set of regression models with affective polarization and party cue condition as independent variables, as well as an interaction between them. I measure affective polarization by calculating the difference between respondents' out-party and in-party feeling thermometers (M=44.49, SD=38.85). I estimate four models—one for each experimental condition. Table 18 shows the results.

Table 18. Effect of affective polarization on military working relationships

VARIABLES	(1) Colleague Control	(2) Colleague Norms treatment	(3) Commander Control	(4) Commander Norms treatment
Affective polarization	-0.0111***	-0.00755**	-0.00878***	-0.00966***
	(0.00242)	(0.00286)	(0.00210)	(0.00276)
Out-party	0.152	0.0971	0.408	-0.0819
	(0.224)	(0.221)	(0.217)	(0.217)
Affective polarization*Out-party	0.0108**	0.00526	0.00901**	0.0109**
	(0.00369)	(0.00376)	(0.00346)	(0.00367)
Constant	2.264***	2.270***	2.076***	2.358***
	(0.156)	(0.154)	(0.142)	(0.154)
Observations	365	342	365	342
R-squared	0.127	0.036	0.154	0.054

Note: OLS regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests significant at *** $p<0.001$, ** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$.

The four models show the same pattern—affective polarization is associated with in-party bias, and the norms treatment reduces the bias. Figure 21 depicts the pattern graphically. The two panels in the left column show that in the control condition, servicemembers who are more affectively polarized are more comfortable working with strong in-partisans. The plots in the right column show that the non-partisan norms treatment reduces the in-party bias. The gap in predicted difficulty between the out-party and in-party is visibly smaller in the treatment conditions.

Figure 21. Effect of affective polarization on military working relationships



Note: Figure based on OLS regressions from Table 18 (models 1 to 4 clockwise beginning in the upper left panel) shown with 95% confidence intervals.

Discussion

This chapter has examined affective polarization among U.S. military servicemembers. ANES survey data shows that servicemembers, like civilians, are affectively polarized. While this result is unsurprising, the bigger question is whether non-partisan norms reduce affective

polarization. The findings in this chapter suggest norms can reduce, but not eliminate, partisan animus.

Analysis of a survey experiment shows that making non-partisan norms salient can reduce affective polarization. Servicemembers who received a treatment designed to elevate the salience of non-partisan norms reported warmer feelings toward the opposing party and were more willing to attribute positive traits to opposing partisans than servicemembers in a control group. The effect, however, is modest and does not shift attitudes in other measures. The treatment did not decrease the social distance between servicemembers and did not affect their feelings toward Donald Trump.

This chapter also examined whether affective polarization spills over into military working relationships. Analysis of a second experiment shows that affectively polarized servicemembers find it easier to work with strong partisan colleagues and commanders from their own party compared to strong partisans from the other party. The non-partisan norms treatment reduces, but does not completely close, these gaps.

Like Chapter 3, this chapter paints a cautiously optimistic picture of the state of the military's non-partisan norms. Making the norms salient reduces—albeit modestly—some hostile attitudes toward servicemembers from the opposing party. Taken together, Chapters 3 and 4 provide a powerful counterpoint to the "eroding norms" hypothesis discussed in Chapter 2. When we dig deeper into the U.S. military's non-partisan tradition, we find that injunctive norms are alive and well. The last chapter discusses the implications of this idea.

Chapter 5

Conclusion

I began this dissertation by asking, *what is the relationship between U.S. military servicemembers' non-partisan norms, partisan identities, and political attitudes and behavior?* The title of this dissertation foreshadows the answer to this question. Servicemembers are both citizens and soldiers. On the one hand, servicemembers are similar to their fellow American citizens. Many identify as Republicans or Democrats, are politically active, have partisan biases, and have negative views of opposing partisans. On the other hand, servicemembers adhere to military non-partisan norms that can reduce partisan bias and conflict. However, these norms are not always influential. Like other norms, they are most effective when activated (e.g., Kallgren, Reno, and Cialdini 2000).

This dissertation also examined three secondary research questions. Chapter 2 asks *how partisan are servicemembers, and are their non-partisan norms eroding?* An analysis of CCES survey data from 2008 to 2018 finds some evidence for eroding norms. Since 2008, servicemembers have become more likely to identify as Democrats or Republicans. They are also more politically active than civilians since 2014. However, this difference is because civilians' political activism has decreased while servicemembers' is relatively unchanged. Chapter 2 also finds that older servicemembers have stronger norms than younger servicemembers. Surprisingly, younger servicemembers are more likely to identify as partisans and are more politically active than civilians of the same age.

Although Chapter 2 finds little evidence for strong non-partisan norms, chapters 3 and 4 are more optimistic. Chapter 3 asks *how does partisanship affect servicemembers' political*

decision-making? A survey experiment shows that partisanship affects servicemembers' decision-making the same way it does other Americans'—it stimulates partisan bias. When asked to judge the appropriateness of political activities, servicemembers exhibit negative bias toward the out-party in their judgments. However, partisan norms can reduce bias. Servicemembers who received an experimental treatment to activate non-partisan norms showed no significant partisan bias in their decision-making.

Chapter 4 examined the final secondary research question, *what is the extent and consequences of partisan social conflict among servicemembers?* It finds that servicemembers, like civilians, are affectively polarized. However, servicemembers who received the non-partisan norms treatment were less affectively polarized than a control group. This chapter also finds that servicemembers say they would find it more difficult to work with a strong opposing partisan compared to someone from the same party. However, the non-partisan norm treatment reduces this gap.

Limitations

Although this study overcomes many of the limitations of previous civil-military scholarship, it does have limitations of its own. First, this study does not account for potential differences in norms between military subgroups. The CCES data analyzed in Chapter 2 do not distinguish servicemembers by key subgroups, e.g., active-duty versus National Guard and Reserve. The survey experiment analyzed in chapters 3 and 4 partially overcomes this limitation, but the sample may still not be big enough to capture significant differences. Moreover, none of the data in this dissertation distinguish servicemembers by service branch (Army, Navy, Air Force, etc.). Service branches may vary in the emphasis they place on non-partisan social norms. Consequently, the dependent variables this dissertation examines may vary as well.

Another limitation is that the survey experiment in chapters 3 and 4 provides respondents only a single piece of information—partisanship—in party cue experiments. While this technique is common in experimental research, it assumes that the manipulation does not alter other beliefs about the background scenario (Dafoe, Zhang, and Caughey 2018). It is possible that providing respondents additional information (e.g., demographic data) could reinforce or reduce the effects of the party cue.

A third limitation concerns the injunctive norms model developed in Chapter 3. This study assumes the injunctive norms derived from senior leaders' statements accurately reflect what most servicemembers believe about partisan politics. This assumption is plausible for the reasons discussed in the text (leaders shape organizational norms) and because the norms treatment—which is built using the norms model—shifted attitudes as hypothesized. Nevertheless, a large-*n* study of servicemembers' normative beliefs and social expectations regarding partisan politics could confirm (or not) the model proposed here. Such a survey could also further develop the content of injunctive norms which is likely to be more complex than the simple model developed in this study.

Implications

This dissertation's findings have implications for civil-military theory, scholarship, and practice. From a theory perspective, this study shows that servicemembers are not as strictly apolitical as Huntington's objective civilian control theory intends (1957). This finding is unsurprising in that people who join the military are a cross-section of American citizens who bring their many social identities, including partisanship. This study supports Huntington's critics (e.g., Janowitz 1960; Feaver 2003; E. A. Cohen 2003) who question whether the military can achieve Huntington's apolitical ideal. Civil-military relations theory must acknowledge that

servicemembers are also political citizens. Rather than reaching for an unattainable apolitical ideal, civil-military relations theory should be concerned with how to maintain a healthy civil-military relationship despite partisans in the ranks.

From a civil-military scholarship perspective, these findings support existing hypotheses and highlight their limitations. Over the last few decades, the eroding norms hypothesis has been prominent in civil-military integration literature. Chapter 2 of this dissertation supports this hypothesis by finding little evidence that servicemembers are different from civilians regarding the descriptive norms surrounding partisan affiliation and political activism. It shows that the lofty standard for descriptive non-partisanship—that servicemembers "avoid any political partisanship in word or deed, activity, or affiliation" (Kohn 2002, 27)—is one that servicemembers do not meet.

Yet, this dissertation also shows the limitations of the eroding norms literature. Examining non-partisan norms by measuring descriptive norms provides a limited view of the military's relationship with politics. While these measures tell us what most servicemembers are doing, they tell us little about how servicemembers' normative beliefs and social expectations influence their political attitudes and behavior. Consequently, civil-military scholars' pessimistic assessment of the military's non-partisan ethos, based on the weakening of descriptive norms, is incomplete.

This study moves beyond the limitations of descriptive non-partisan norms by examining the content and influence of injunctive norms. These norms urge servicemembers to avoid partisan politics. They emphasize that servicemembers are obligated to defend the Constitution and obey the orders of elected leaders regardless of partisanship. Military leaders remind

servicemembers that the American people expect them to avoid partisan politics, and should servicemembers fail those expectations, the American people would lose trust in them.

Injunctive non-partisan norms, when activated, significantly influence servicemembers' political attitudes and behavior. Servicemembers, like many Americans, make partisan-biased judgments and dislike opposing partisans. However, when non-partisan norms are made salient, bias and out-party dislike are reduced. These results suggest cautious optimism concerning the health of the military's non-partisan ethos.

This study speaks to researchers studying the U.S. military and those studying the military veteran population. In recent years, several scholars have argued that political activism among veterans—particularly retired officers—threatens to erode public trust in the military (e.g., Becker 2001; Cook 2008; Golby, Dropp, and Feaver 2012, 2013). This study suggests that appealing to non-partisan norms could be an effective way to dissuade veterans from risking the military's reputation for partisan gain.

Finally, this dissertation's findings provide insights for military leaders seeking to strengthen civil-military relations. On the one hand, leaders have cause for concern. Today's military comprises both Democrats and Republicans who are politically active—particularly younger servicemembers. These facts, combined with increasing polarization in the broader American citizenry, suggest the military must take deliberate measures to avoid overt politicization.

On the other hand, this study shows that non-partisan norms are far from dead. When activated, non-partisan norms reduce partisan bias and social conflict. The key, however, is that they are activated. This study suggests that norms become stronger throughout servicemembers' careers. However, given the surprisingly strong political attitudes of younger servicemembers,

passive socialization may not be enough to prevent the adverse effects of partisanship in the ranks. Military leaders may have to take a more active role in educating servicemembers about the importance of non-partisan norms and reinforce those norms often.

Closing Thoughts

The United States will, for the foreseeable future, maintain a powerful standing military. As a result, the question of how to maintain civilian control of that institution—the same question that motivated Samuel Huntington in 1957—continues to be salient. Civilian control depends on military servicemembers with a strong professional ethos that places the needs of the Nation first. Political partisanship is an ever-present danger to military professionalism because it threatens to substitute loyalty to the Constitution with loyalty to a political party. While the U.S. military can never avoid partisan politics altogether, it must nevertheless be non-partisan enough to maintain internal cohesion and the trust of political leaders and the American people.

Civilian control of the military is never completely guaranteed. However, striving for an apolitical military is an unachievable goal. A more realistic aim is to keep the worst effects of partisanship out of the military by engendering a strong commitment to non-partisan norms. Of course, military leaders cannot eliminate partisanship in the ranks. However, military leaders can cultivate a strong non-partisan ethos that ensures servicemembers are committed first and foremost to the Constitution and the American people.

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Appendix

Chapter 2 Supplementary Material

Variables Descriptions and Summary

The variables in Chapter 2 are from the 2008-2018 CCES (Cooperative Congressional Election Study 2020). *Gender* is a dichotomous variable. Respondents were asked, "Are you male or female?" I coded the responses 0=male and 1=female. *Race* is dichotomous variable. Respondents were asked, "What racial or ethnic group best describes you?" I coded the responses 0=White and 1=Nonwhite (all responses other than White). *Ideology* is a 5-point ordinal measure. Respondents were asked, "In general, how would you describe your own political viewpoint?" I coded responses 1=very liberal, 2=liberal, 3-moderate, 4=conservative, and 5=very conservative. Respondents indicating not sure are omitted. *Ideology strength* is a 3-point ordinal measure. I recoded the responses from the ideology question (above) to 0=moderate, 1=weak (respondents who indicated they are liberal or conservative), and 2=strong (respondents who indicated they are very liberal or very conservative). *Political interest* is a 4-point measure ordinal measure. Respondents were asked, "Some people seem to follow what's going on in government and public affairs most of the time, whether there's an election going on or not. Others aren't that interested. Would you say you follow what's going on in government and public affairs ?" Available responses were: Most of the time; Some of the time, Only now and then, Hardly at all; Don't know. ranging from 1=very low to 4= high. Respondents were asked whether they follow news about government and public affairs most of the time, some of the time, only now and then, or hardly at all. *Income* is annual income category ranging from 1= less than $10,000 to 16=$500,000 or more. (Note: The income categories in 2008-2010 are

different than 2012-2018. Thus, the income variable indicates income relative other respondents in the same year but should not be used for comparisons between years. *Religiosity* combines two measures: importance of religion (1=very important to 4=not at all important) and church attendance (1=more than once a week to 6=never). Responses are inverted so that higher scores indicate more stronger religiosity. Since these questions are scaled differently, predicted factor scores are used to create an index measure.

Full Regression Tables

Table A1. Predictors of Partisanship (Hypothesis 1)

	1 Base Model	2 Education Interaction	3 Age Interaction	4 Full Model
Military	-0.582**	-0.461*	0.297	0.294
	(0.223)	(0.234)	(0.358)	(0.362)
2010	-0.264***	-0.264***	-0.264***	-0.264***
	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)
2012	-0.073	-0.072	-0.072	-0.072
	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)
2014	-0.219***	-0.219***	-0.219***	-0.219***
	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.036)
2016	-0.389***	-0.389***	-0.389***	-0.389***
	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)
2018	-0.236***	-0.236***	-0.237***	-0.237***
	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.036)
Military*2010	0.909*	0.912*	0.899*	0.901*
	(0.364)	(0.360)	(0.359)	(0.357)
Military*2012	1.318**	1.307**	1.276**	1.274**
	(0.409)	(0.408)	(0.408)	(0.406)
Military*2014	0.987**	1.002**	0.938**	0.949**
	(0.329)	(0.324)	(0.323)	(0.319)
Military*2016	0.949**	0.975**	0.860**	0.887**
	(0.332)	(0.334)	(0.325)	(0.330)
Military*2018	1.114**	1.127***	1.066**	1.079**
	(0.346)	(0.340)	(0.333)	(0.330)
College degree	-0.017	-0.013	-0.016	-0.013
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Military*College degree		-0.445*		-0.320
		(0.212)		(0.206)
Age	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Military*Age			-0.027***	-0.024**
			(0.008)	(0.008)
Ideology	-0.170***	-0.170***	-0.170***	-0.170***
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Ideology strength	0.805***	0.805***	0.805***	0.805***
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)

Political interest	0.183***	0.183***	0.183***	0.183***
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Political knowledge	0.452***	0.452***	0.452***	0.452***
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Gender	0.378***	0.378***	0.378***	0.378***
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Race	0.100***	0.100***	0.100***	0.100***
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Income	0.038***	0.038***	0.038***	0.038***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Religiosity	0.184***	0.184***	0.183***	0.183***
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Constant	0.865***	0.864***	0.861***	0.861***
	(0.074)	(0.074)	(0.074)	(0.074)
Observations	259,070	259,070	259,070	259,070

Notes. Logistic regression coefficients with linearized standard errors to account for survey design. Two-tailed tests significant at ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05.
Source: CCES common content, 2008-2018.

Table A2. Predictors of Partisan Identity Strength (Hypothesis 2)

	1 Base Model	2 Education Interaction	3 Age Interaction	4 Full Model
Military	0.153	0.197	0.357	0.349
	(0.174)	(0.180)	(0.297)	(0.297)
2010	-0.302***	-0.302***	-0.302***	-0.302***
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)
2012	-0.370***	-0.370***	-0.370***	-0.370***
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)
2014	-0.174***	-0.174***	-0.174***	-0.174***
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)
2016	-0.179***	-0.179***	-0.179***	-0.179***
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)
2018	-0.179***	-0.179***	-0.179***	-0.179***
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Military*2010	0.186	0.187	0.190	0.191
	(0.278)	(0.277)	(0.275)	(0.275)
Military*2012	0.124	0.124	0.120	0.121
	(0.286)	(0.289)	(0.287)	(0.289)
Military*2014	0.155	0.169	0.153	0.165
	(0.306)	(0.308)	(0.305)	(0.307)
Military*2016	0.481*	0.490*	0.470*	0.479*
	(0.229)	(0.229)	(0.227)	(0.228)
Military*2018	0.254	0.265	0.254	0.263
	(0.241)	(0.241)	(0.240)	(0.241)
College degree	-0.117***	-0.116***	-0.117***	-0.116***
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Military*College degree		-0.165		-0.139
		(0.147)		(0.144)
Age	0.007***	0.007***	0.007***	0.007***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Military*Age			-0.006	-0.005
			(0.007)	(0.007)

Partisanship	-0.119***	-0.119***	-0.119***	-0.119***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Ideology	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Ideology strength	0.868***	0.868***	0.868***	0.868***
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Political interest	0.151***	0.151***	0.151***	0.151***
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Political knowledge	-0.052**	-0.052**	-0.051**	-0.052**
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Gender	0.269***	0.269***	0.269***	0.269***
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Race	0.255***	0.255***	0.255***	0.255***
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Income	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Religiosity	0.214***	0.214***	0.214***	0.214***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
τ1	-0.181***	-0.180***	-0.180***	-0.179***
	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.042)
τ2	1.145***	1.146***	1.146***	1.147***
	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)
Observations	228,723	228,723	228,723	228,723

Note. Negative binomial regression coefficients with linearized standard errors to account for survey design. Two-tailed tests significant at ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05.
Source: CCES common content, 2008-2018.

Table A3. Predictors of Political Activism (Hypothesis 3)

	1 Base Model	2 Education Interaction	3 Age Interaction	4 Full Model
Military	0.092	0.114	0.646*	0.646*
	(0.231)	(0.233)	(0.321)	(0.320)
2010	-0.528***	-0.528***	-0.528***	-0.528***
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)
2012	-0.301***	-0.301***	-0.301***	-0.301***
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)
2014	-0.671***	-0.671***	-0.671***	-0.671***
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)
2016	-0.596***	-0.596***	-0.596***	-0.596***
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)
2018	-0.944***	-0.944***	-0.944***	-0.944***
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Military*2010	0.135	0.138	0.151	0.152
	(0.317)	(0.312)	(0.289)	(0.288)
Military*2012	0.176	0.179	0.166	0.167
	(0.326)	(0.321)	(0.298)	(0.298)
Military*2014	0.549	0.562	0.533	0.536
	(0.300)	(0.297)	(0.273)	(0.275)
Military*2016	0.723*	0.734*	0.700**	0.704**
	(0.288)	(0.285)	(0.262)	(0.264)
Military*2018	1.064**	1.076**	1.136***	1.138***
	(0.355)	(0.348)	(0.327)	(0.325)

College degree	0.258***	0.258***	0.258***	0.258***
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Military*College degree		-0.095		-0.025
		(0.164)		(0.159)
Age	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Military*Age			-0.017**	-0.017**
			(0.006)	(0.006)
Partisanship	-0.042***	-0.042***	-0.042***	-0.042***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Partisan strength	0.109***	0.109***	0.109***	0.109***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Ideology	-0.122***	-0.122***	-0.122***	-0.122***
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Ideology strength	0.224***	0.224***	0.224***	0.224***
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Political interest	0.769***	0.768***	0.768***	0.768***
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Political knowledge	0.563***	0.563***	0.564***	0.564***
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Gender	-0.106***	-0.106***	-0.106***	-0.106***
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Race	0.010	0.010	0.010	0.010
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Income	0.065***	0.065***	0.065***	0.065***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Religiosity	0.123***	0.123***	0.123***	0.123***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Log α	-0.212***	-0.212***	-0.213***	-0.213***
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Constant	-3.417***	-3.417***	-3.420***	-3.420***
	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.053)
Observations	221,485	221,485	221,485	221,485

Note. Negative binomial regression coefficients using sample weights with robust standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests significant at ***$p<0.001$, **$p<0.01$, *$p<0.05$.
Source: CCES common content, 2008-2018.

Count Model Comparison

The dependent variable for Hypothesis 3 is a count of political activities ranging from 0 to 4 (Figure A1) and is over-dispersed (M=0.68, S^2=1.08). Consequently, I test H3 with a negative binomial (NB) regression adjusted for right-truncated data using the *truncregress* function in Stata (Hilbe and Hardin 2015). Since this type of analysis is uncommon, I fit several additional models to ensure the robustness of my results. The results, presented in Table A6 below, show that my results are robust to model selection. In the first column, I show the

truncated NB model from the main text for ease of comparison. Model 2 is a NB model without the right-truncated adjustment. Model 3 shows a zero-inflated negative binomial (ZINB) model using a dichotomous political interest variable as the inflation variable (more on this model below). Models 4 and 5 show results from ordinary least squares and ordinal logistic regressions.

To test for zero inflation, I use Stata's *countfit* model comparison function (Long and Freese 2006). This function compares NB and ZINB models and indicates which one is preferred. I use *political interest* as the ZINB inflation variable. It is plausible that some people do not participate in politics simply because they are not interested, while others may be interested but do not participate for other reasons (e.g., military non-partisan norms). Thus my inflation variable is a dichotomous measure of political interest coded 0 for those who follow politics "hardly at all" or "only now and then" and 1 for those who follow politics "some of the time" or "most of the time."

The results of the NB/ZINB comparison and Vuong test, shown in Table A6 below prefer ZINB to NB. However, these results should be interpreted with caution. First, the Vuong test is no longer recommended to test for zero-inflation (Wilson 2015) . Second the *countfit* function allows only unweighted data and has no option to specify a right-truncated distribution. Still, these results suggest the possibility that a ZINB model with a right-truncated distribution may be a marginally better approach for testing H3. However, I am unaware of a software implementation for such a model. Moreover, given the robustness of the results across all models tested here, it seems unlikely the substantive inferences would be different.

Figure A1. Distribution of Hypothesis 3 dependent variable



Table A4. Tests and fit statistics for count model comparison

	Negative Binomial	Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial	Difference	Prefer
AIC	480953.834	471219.828	9734.006	ZINB $p = 0.000$
BIC	481222.083	471508.470	9713.613	
Vuong		45.635		ZINB $p = 0.000$

Note. Results from the Stata *countfit* function (Long and Freese 2006) using unweighted data.

Table A5. Comparison of Hypothesis 3 count models

VARIABLES	1 Truncated Negative Binomial	2 Negative Binomial	3 Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial	4 Ordinary Least Squares	5 Ordered Logistic
Zero Inflation					
Political interest (dichotomous)			-2.369***		
			(0.050)		
Constant			0.880***		
			(0.037)		
Variables					
Military	0.646*	0.467*	0.546*	0.257	0.666*
	(0.320)	(0.208)	(0.215)	(0.175)	(0.316)

2010	-0.528***	-0.346***	-0.320***	-0.277***	-0.605***
	(0.021)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.021)
2012	-0.301***	-0.177***	-0.142***	-0.183***	-0.329***
	(0.022)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.022)
2014	-0.671***	-0.472***	-0.432***	-0.359***	-0.777***
	(0.022)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.011)	(0.023)
2016	-0.596***	-0.408***	-0.353***	-0.326***	-0.669***
	(0.021)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.010)	(0.021)
2018	-0.944***	-0.684***	-0.662***	-0.473***	-1.109***
	(0.022)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.010)	(0.022)
Military*2010	0.152	0.141	0.043	0.028	0.154
	(0.288)	(0.185)	(0.194)	(0.140)	(0.266)
Military*2012	0.167	0.187	0.141	0.155	0.279
	(0.298)	(0.185)	(0.193)	(0.165)	(0.317)
Military*2014	0.536	0.423**	0.370*	0.299*	0.631*
	(0.275)	(0.163)	(0.167)	(0.142)	(0.259)
Military*2016	0.704**	0.512***	0.490**	0.464**	0.848***
	(0.264)	(0.147)	(0.153)	(0.151)	(0.256)
Military*2018	1.138***	0.763***	0.729***	0.514***	1.138***
	(0.325)	(0.164)	(0.163)	(0.145)	(0.245)
College degree	0.258***	0.189***	0.214***	0.149***	0.264***
	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.013)
Military*College degree	-0.025	-0.112	-0.171	-0.040	-0.137
	(0.159)	(0.092)	(0.090)	(0.085)	(0.153)
Age	-0.000	0.000	0.002***	0.001***	0.002**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Military*Age	-0.017**	-0.012**	-0.012**	-0.007*	-0.018**
	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.007)
Partisanship	-0.042***	-0.033***	-0.033***	-0.020***	-0.046***
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.004)
Partisan strength	0.109***	0.084***	0.086***	0.046***	0.127***
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.007)
Ideology	-0.122***	-0.082***	-0.076***	-0.065***	-0.134***
	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.009)
Ideology strength	0.224***	0.162***	0.193***	0.117***	0.252***
	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.010)
Political interest	0.768***	0.686***	—	0.235***	0.822***
	(0.012)	(0.010)	—	(0.003)	(0.013)
Political knowledge	0.564***	0.478***	0.682***	0.209***	0.613***
	(0.020)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.007)	(0.021)
Gender	-0.106***	-0.066***	-0.099***	-0.053***	-0.101***
	(0.013)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.014)
Race	0.010	0.007	-0.033**	-0.024***	-0.008
	(0.017)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.007)	(0.018)
Income	0.065***	0.049***	0.051***	0.032***	0.075***
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Religiosity	0.123***	0.092***	0.088***	0.050***	0.134***
	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.007)
τ1					3.740***
					(0.057)
τ2					5.007***
					(0.057)
τ3					6.097***
					(0.058)
τ4					7.190***
					(0.060)

Log α		-0.827***	-1.709***		
		(0.022)	(0.074)		
Constant	-3.420***	-3.312***	-0.911***	-0.207***	
	(0.053)	(0.044)	(0.033)	(0.018)	
Observations	221,485	221,626	221,626	221,626	221,626
R-squared				0.163	

Note. Regression type shown in column headers. All models use sample weights. Standard errors in parentheses are linearized/robust. Two-tailed tests significant at ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05.
Source: CCES common content, 2008-2018.

Table A6. Adjusted Wald tests of military and civilian mean number of political activities

Year	Population	Mean	Std. Err.	95% Conf.	Interval	Test Statistic
2008	Military	0.94	0.09	0.76	1.12	F (1, 27020) =0.48
	Civilian	0.88	0.01	0.86	0.89	Prob > F =0.4867
2010	Military	0.68	0.10	0.48	0.88	F (1, 46683) =0.54
	Civilian	0.61	0.01	0.59	0.62	Prob > F =0.4618
2012	Military	0.80	0.13	0.55	1.05	F (1, 45017) =1.70
	Civilian	0.63	0.01	0.62	0.65	Prob > F =0.1928
2014	Military	0.84	0.10	0.65	1.04	F (1, 48852) =12.70
	Civilian	0.49	0.01	0.48	0.50	Prob > F =0.0004
2016	Military	1.09	0.11	0.87	1.32	F (1, 52898) =22.92
	Civilian	0.54	0.01	0.53	0.55	Prob > F =0.0000
2018	Military	0.98	0.10	0.78	1.18	F (1, 51807) =28.20
	Civilian	0.45	0.00	0.44	0.46	Prob > F =0.0000

Note: Wald tests using weighted survey data with linearized standard errors.
Source: CCES common content, 2008-2018.

Chapter 3 Supplementary Material

Injunctive Norms Content Analysis

Table A7. Content analysis coding and categorization

Text	Page	Condensed Statement	Code	Category
Carter 2012	1	Avoid appearance of partisanship	Public perception	SE
	4	Military reputation depends on non-partisanship	Public perception, Public trust	SE
Cooper 2018	1	Apolitical military	Non-partisan value	NB
	1	Obey elected leaders	Obey leaders	NB
Dempsey 2012a	4	Nation expects ideals	Public reputation	SE
	4	Serve apolitically	Obey leaders	NB
	4	Political neutrality core value	Non-partisan value	NB
	4	Separation from politics	Non-partisan value	NB
	5	Impartial to partisanship	Obey leaders	NB
	5	Partisanship undermines public trust	Public trust	SE
Dempsey 2012b	1	Earn public trust by avoiding partisanship	Public trust	SE
	1	Political neutrality core value	Non-partisan value	NB
Garamone 2012	1	Professionalism is apolitical	Non-partisan value	NB
	1	Political neutrality core value	Non-partisan value	NB
Garamone 2016	1	Military loyal to elected leaders	Obey leaders	NB
	1	American people can't view military as interest group	Public perception	SE
	1	Important to be apolitical	Non-partisan value	NB
	1	Do not reveal partisan preferences	Non-partisan value	NB
Shanahan 2019	1	Military mission is apolitical	Non-partisan value	NB
	1	Apolitical nature of the military	Non-partisan value	NB
Shelbourne 2016	1	General Petraeus apolitical, nonpolitical	Non-partisan value	NB
Total	Statements = 21 (SE=6, NB=15)			

Treatment Pretest Results

Table A8. Pretest summary

	Military Status	**N**	**%**	
1	Active Duty	35	36.8	
2	Nat'l Guard or Reserve	21	22.1	
3	Previous Active Duty	24	25.3	
4	Previous Nat'l Guard or Reserve	15	15.8	
		95	**100**	
	Rank			
1	Enlisted	45	47.4	
2	Warrant Officer	3	3.2	
3	Officer	46	48.4	
99	No Answer	1	1.1	
		95	**100**	
	Compared to before reading the essay, do you feel more aware of the issue of military political neutrality?			
3	Much more	3	3.2	
2	Moderately more	9	9.5	35.8
1	Slightly more	22	23.2	
0	About the same	61	64.2	
-1	Slightly less	0	0.0	
-2	Moderately less	0	0.0	
-3	Much less	0	0.0	
		95	**100**	
	In your opinion, would reading this essay be effective in making the average military service member more aware of the issue of political neutrality?			
4	Extremely Effective	5	5.3	
3	Very Effective	32	33.7	92.6
2	Moderately Effective	39	41.1	
1	Slightly Effective	12	12.6	
0	Not effective at all	7	7.4	
		95	**100**	
	Compared to before reading the essay, has your attitude toward military political neutrality changed?			
2	Yes. I now feel it's much more important for the military to be politically neutral.	9	9.5	

1	Yes. I now feel it's somewhat more important for the military to be politically neutral	16	16.8	26.3
0	No. My feelings haven't changed one way or the other	68	71.6	
-1	Yes. I now feel it's somewhat less important for the military to be politically neutral	2	2.1	
-2	Yes. I now feel it's not important at all for the military to be politically neutral	0	0.0	
		95	**100**	

In your opinion, does including the names of well-known military leaders and historians (e.g. Richard Kohn, George Marshall, Joe Dunford, and James Mattis) increase the persuasiveness of the essay?

2	Definitely yes	30	31.6	
1	Probably yes	39	41.1	72.6
0	Might or might not	9	9.5	
-1	Probably not	12	12.6	
-2	Definitely not	5	5.3	17.9
		95	**100**	

Survey Experiment Questionnaire

Q1 CONSENT This project is studying people's social and political attitudes. Your participation in this research project is completely voluntary. Time varies between respondents, but for most people, participation will take about 15 minutes to complete. You will be asked to do the following procedures: read a few paragraphs of information and answer survey questions regarding demographics and political attitudes. The content of the survey should cause no more risk or discomfort than you would experience in your everyday life. The Department of Political Science at the University of Kansas supports the practice of protection for human subjects participating in research. We are conducting this online survey to better understand the attitudes of people who have served or who currently serve in the United States military.

Your participation is solicited, although strictly voluntary. Your name will not be associated in any way with the research findings. It is possible, however, with internet communications, that through intent or accident someone other than the intended recipient may see your response. If you would like additional information concerning this study before or after it is completed, please feel free to contact us by phone or mail.

Selecting "I Agree" below indicates your willingness to take part in this study and that you are at least 18 years old. If you have any additional questions about your rights as a research participant, you may call (785) 864-7429 or write the Human Research Protection Program (HRPP), University of Kansas, 2385 Irving Hill Road, Lawrence, Kansas 66045-7563, email irb@ku.edu. This project is coordinated by Dr. Kevin Mullinix, Assistant Professor at the University of Kansas (785-864-3523).

Do you agree to participate in this survey?
o I have read this form and I AGREE to participate in the study (1)
o I do NOT agree to participate in the study (2)

Q2 Are you Spanish, Hispanic, Latino, or none of these?
o Yes (1)
o None of these (0)

Q3 Choose one or more races that you consider yourself to be. Check all that apply.
▢ White (1)
▢ Black or African American (2)
▢ American Indian or Alaskan Native (3)
▢ Asian (4)
▢ Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander (5)
▢ Other (please specify) (6) _____

Q4 What is your gender?
o Male (1)
o Female (2)
o Other (3) _____

Q5 We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. Here is a scale on which the political views that people might hold are arranged from extremely liberal to extremely conservative. Where would you put yourself on this scale?
o Extremely liberal (1)
o Liberal (2)
o Somewhat liberal (3)
o Moderate, middle of the road (4)
o Somewhat conservative (5)
o Conservative (6)
o Extremely conservative (7)

Q6 Are you now serving, have previously served, or have never served in the U.S. armed forces? Select all that apply.
▢ Now serving on active duty in the U.S. Air Force, Army, Coast Guard, Marine Corps, or Navy (1)
▢ Now serving in the National Guard or Reserve (2)
▢ Previously served on active duty in the U.S. Air Force, Army, Coast Guard, Marine Corps, or Navy (3)
▢ Previously served in the National Guard or Reserve (4)
▢ ⊗I have never served in the U.S. military (5)

If Are you now serving, have previously served, or have never served in the U.S. armed forces? Selec... = Now serving on active duty in the U.S. Air Force, Army, Coast Guard, Marine Corps, or Navy

Q7 About how many years have you been on active duty?
o Less than 1 (1)…50 or more (50)

If Are you now serving, have previously served, or have never served in the U.S. armed forces? Selec... = Now serving in the National Guard or Reserve

Q8 About how many years have you been in the National Guard or Reserve?
o Less than 1 (1)…50 or more (50

If Are you now serving, have previously served, or have never served in the U.S. armed forces? Selec... = Previously served on active duty in the U.S. Air Force, Army, Coast Guard, Marine Corps, or Navy

Q9 What year did you leave active duty military service?
o 1920 (1)…2020 (101)

If Are you now serving, have previously served, or have never served in the U.S. armed forces? Selec... = Previously served on active duty in the U.S. Air Force, Army, Coast Guard, Marine Corps, or Navy

Q10 About how many years were you on active duty?
o Less than 1 (1)…
o 50 or more (50)

If Are you now serving, have previously served, or have never served in the U.S. armed forces? Selec... = Previously served in the National Guard or Reserve

Q11 What year did you leave the National Guard or Reserve?
o 1920 (1)…2020 (101)

Display This Question:
If Are you now serving, have previously served, or have never served in the U.S. armed forces? Selec... = Previously served in the National Guard or Reserve

Q12 About how many years were you in the National Guard or Reserve?
o Less than 1 (1)…50 or more (50)

Q13 What is your rank? If you are no longer serving in the military, mark your rank when you left the service.
o Enlisted (E-1 thru E-9) (1)
o Warrant Officer (W-1 thru W-5) (2)
o Officer (O-1 thru O-10) (3)

If What is your rank? If you are no longer serving in the military, mark your rank when you left the... = Enlisted (E-1 thru E-9)

Q14 What is (or was) your pay grade?
o E-1 (1)
o E-2 (2)
o E-3 (3)
o E-4 (4)
o E-5 (5)
o E-6 (6)
o E-7 (7)
o E-8 (8)
o E-9 (9)

If What is your rank? If you are no longer serving in the military, mark your rank when you left the... = Warrant Officer (W-1 thru W-5)

Q15 What is (or was) your pay grade?
o W-1 (1)
o W-2 (2)
o W-3 (3)
o W-4 (4)
o W-5 (5)

If What is your rank? If you are no longer serving in the military, mark your rank when you left the... = Officer (O-1 thru O-10)

Q16 What is (or was) your pay grade?
o O-1 (1)
o O-2 (2)
o O-3 (3)
o O-4 (4)
o O-5 (5)
o O-6 (6)
o O-7 thru O-10 (7)

Q17 Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Republican, Democrat, or Independent?
o Republican (1)
o Democrat (2)
o Independent (3)

If Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Republican, Democrat, or Independent? = Democrat

Q18 Would you call yourself a strong Democrat or not a very strong Democrat?
o Strong Democrat (1)
o Not very strong Democrat (2)

If Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Republican, Democrat, or Independent? = Republican

Q19 Would you call yourself a strong Republican or not a very strong Republican?
o Strong Republican (1)
o Not very strong Republican (2)

If Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Republican, Democrat, or Independent? = Independent

Q20 Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican Party or the Democratic Party?
o Closer to the Republican Party (1)
o Closer to the Democratic Party (3)

Treatments

Control
Q21 Now, we'd like you to read a brief article that recently appeared in the news. Please read it carefully, and then we'll ask you a few questions about it.

Q22 New Mexico Cat Library Allows Office Workers to Check Out Kittens If you work in an office building, you've probably wanted an escape from time to time. The Doña Ana County Office in Las Cruces, New Mexico, has devised a genius solution to this sort of office ennui: a cat library. Since 2012, employees have been able to check kittens out of a Kitty Kondo and then return to work with the company of a furry, mewling buddy. Document technician Martha Lopez told the Las Cruces Sun-News that the program was more than just entertainment for her and her coworkers. "People should consider them as therapeutic help instead of just pets," Lopez said. Speaking to CBS News, which profiled the program last week, community planner Angela Roberson sang its praises. "It definitely relieves stress," Roberson said. "I mean how can it not when you have a little fuzzy thing that you can take back to your office?" And that's not the only purpose the Kitty Kondo serves. Since being implemented by the Doña Ana County Coalition for Pets and People, the program has resulted in the adoption of 100 cats, because all the Kondo inhabitants are rescues in need of homes.

Q23 Timing

Q24 Think about the next place you would like to go on vacation. Where would you like to go and why? You don't need to write much, just a brief comment.
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____

Q26 thru Q29 are not related to this study.

Non-partisan Norms Treatment

Q30 Maintaining Neutrality: A Duty to Keep Politics out of the Military

There's a lot of talk these days about America being a politically divided nation. However, there is one group which believes staying above the political fray is the right thing to do; the U.S. military.

Political neutrality is an important tradition in the American military. According to military historian Richard H. Kohn, this apolitical tradition is attributable to generations of military officers who believed that "the military, as the neutral servant of the state, stood above the dirty business of politics." These officers believed that the norms of military professionalism "dictated faith and loyalty not just in deed but in spirit to whoever held the reins of power under the constitutional system."

Political neutrality is, in part, why the military is among the most trusted institutions in America. Military service members swear an oath to support and defend the Constitution of the United States. In doing so, they agree to obey the lawful orders of civilian authorities regardless of which political party holds power. General George C. Marshall, an American military leader in World War II, said, "[The American Armed Forces] have a great asset, and that is that our people, our countrymen, do not distrust us and do not fear us. They don't harbor any ideas that we intend to alter the government of our country or the nature of this government in any way. This is a sacred trust."

Amidst all the talk of a divided America, U.S. military leaders have recently sought to reinforce the military's apolitical norms. Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Marine Corps General Joseph Dunford, told reporters, "The American people cannot be looking at us as a special-interest group or a partisan organization. They have to look at us as an apolitical organization that swears an oath to the Constitution of the United States – not an individual, not a party, not a branch of government – the Constitution of the United States."

Retired United States Marine Corps general and former Secretary of Defense, James Mattis, recently emphasized the tradition of military service members being "apolitical." When asked about his partisanship, he stated, "When I was 18, I joined the Marine Corps, and in the U.S. military we are proudly apolitical. By that, I mean that in our duties, we were brought up to obey the elected commander in chief, whoever that is." He made clear that he never registered with a political party.

Although military political neutrality is largely a tradition, there are rules that govern service members' political behavior. The Hatch Act of 1939, which prohibits certain federal employees from engaging in some partisan activities, applies to U.S. military service members. DoD Directive 1344.10, "Political Activities by Members of the Armed Forces," encourages everyone in uniform "to carry out the obligations of citizenship," however, it prohibits military service members from overt partisanship while acting in an official capacity. Additionally, each military service has its own policies and regulations which restrict service members from engaging in some political activities.

In the end, the U.S. military is obligated to defend all Americans regardless of their political beliefs. This obligation requires U.S. military members to guard against allowing the institution to become politicized, or even perceived as being politicized, by conducting themselves appropriately in public and on social media. Service members can and should exercise their rights of citizenship including discussing and debating policy issues and voting for their candidates of choice. However, they must also abide by the guidance and regulations governing individual political participation. By upholding the principle of political neutrality, U.S. military service members honor the traditions of the service and preserve the trust of the American people.

Q31 Timing

Q32 The article you just read gave a number of reasons why many people believe that it is important for U.S. military service members to be apolitical and uphold norms of neutrality. Now we'd like to know what you think. What do you think is the most important reason people in the U.S. military should be apolitical and neutral? You don't need to write much but you should try your best to be thorough and convincing, because we want to use these answers to explain to people who are unfamiliar with these norms and expectations surrounding the U.S. military. Please take your time and do not rush.

_____
_____
_____
_____
_____

Q33 Timing

Affective Polarization Dependent Variables

Q34 We'd like to get your feelings toward some groups or individuals who are in the news these days. Below, you'll see the name of a group/individual next to a feeling thermometer.
Ratings between 51 and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorable and warm toward that group (with 100 being the most favorable/warmest)
Ratings between 0 and 49 degrees mean that you feel unfavorable and cold toward that group (with 0 being the most unfavorable/coldest)
You would rate the person at the 50 degree mark if you don't feel particularly warm or cold toward the group.
Please use the feeling thermometer to indicate your feeling toward the following:
0 100

The Democratic Party ()
The Republican Party ()
President Donald Trump ()

If Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Republican, Democrat, or Independent? = Republican
Or Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican Party or the Democratic Party? = Closer to the Republican Party

Q35 Now we'd like to know what you think about Democrats. Below, is a list of words that some people might use to describe Democrats. For each item, please indicate how well you think it applies to them.

	Not well at all (1)	Not too well (2)	Somewhat well (3)	Very well (4)	Extremely well (5)
American (1)					
Intelligent (2)					
Honest (3)					
Open-minded (4)					
Generous (5)					
Hypocritical (6)					
Selfish (7)					
Mean (8)					

Display This Question:
If Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Republican, Democrat, or Independent? = Democrat
Or Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican Party or the Democratic Party? = Closer to the Democratic Party

Q36 Now we'd like to know what you think about Republicans. Below, is a list of words that some people might use to describe Republicans. For each item, please indicate how well you think it applies to them.

	Not well at all (1)	Not too well (2)	Somewhat well (3)	Very well (4)	Extremely well (5)
American (1)					
Intelligent (2)					
Honest (3)					
Open-minded (4)					
Generous (5)					
Hypocritical (6)					
Selfish (7)					
Mean (8)					

If Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Republican, Democrat, or Independent? = Republican
Or Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican Party or the Democratic Party? = Closer to the Republican Party

Q37 How comfortable are you having close personal friends who are Democrats?
o Not at all comfortable (1)

o Not too comfortable (2)
o Somewhat comfortable (3)
o Extremely comfortable (4)

Display This Question:
If Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Republican, Democrat, or Independent? = Democrat
Or Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican Party or the Democratic Party? = Closer to the Democratic Party

Q38 How comfortable are you having close personal friends who are Republicans?
o Not at all comfortable (1)
o Not too comfortable (2)
o Somewhat comfortable (3)
o Extremely comfortable (4)

Display This Question:
If Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Republican, Democrat, or Independent? = Republican
Or Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican Party or the Democratic Party? = Closer to the Republican Party

Q39 How comfortable are you having neighbors on your street who are Democrats?
o Not at all comfortable (1)
o Not too comfortable (2)
o Somewhat comfortable (3)
o Extremely comfortable (4)

If Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Republican, Democrat, or Independent? = Democrat
Or Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican Party or the Democratic Party? = Closer to the Democratic Party

Q40 How comfortable are you having neighbors on your street who are Republicans?
o Not at all comfortable (1)
o Not too comfortable (2)
o Somewhat comfortable (3)
o Extremely comfortable (4)

Display This Question:
If Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Republican, Democrat, or Independent? = Republican
Or Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican Party or the Democratic Party? = Closer to the Republican Party

Q41 Suppose a son or daughter of yours was getting married. How would you feel if he or she married a supporter of the Democratic Party?
o Not at all upset (1)
o Not too upset (2)
o Somewhat upset (3)
o Extremely upset (4)

Display This Question:
If Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Republican, Democrat, or Independent? = Democrat
Or Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican Party or the Democratic Party? = Closer to the Democratic Party

Q42 Suppose a son or daughter of yours was getting married. How would you feel if he or she married a supporter of the Republican Party?
o Not at all upset (1)
o Not too upset (2)
o Somewhat upset (3)
o Extremely upset (4)

Party Trust

Q43 How much of the time do you think you can trust the Republican Party to do what is right for the country?
o Almost never (1)
o Once in a while (2)
o About half the time (3)
o Most of the time (4)
o Almost always (5)

Q44 How much of the time do you think you can trust the Democratic Party to do what is right for the country?
o Almost never (1)
o Once in a while (2)
o About half the time (3)
o Most of the time (4)
o Almost always (5)

Display This Question:
If Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Republican, Democrat, or Independent? = Republican
Or Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican Party or the Democratic Party? = Closer to the Republican Party

Q45 Some people say that the Democratic party's policies are so misguided that they constitute a threat to the nation. To what extent do you agree or disagree?

- o Strongly disagree (1)
- o Somewhat disagree (2)
- o Neither agree nor disagree (3)
- o Somewhat agree (4)
- o Strongly agree (5)

Display This Question:
If Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Republican, Democrat, or Independent? = Democrat
Or Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican Party or the Democratic Party? = Closer to the Democratic Party

Q46 Some people say that the Republican party's policies are so misguided that they constitute a threat to the nation. To what extent do you agree or disagree?
- o Strongly disagree (1)
- o Somewhat disagree (2)
- o Neither agree nor disagree (3)
- o Somewhat agree (4)
- o Strongly agree (5)

Q47 In the future, if you were to discuss politics in a group with other people, what kind of group would you be most interested in joining?
- o A group of all Democrats (1)
- o A group of mostly Democrats (2)
- o A group with slightly more Democrats (3)
- o A group with an equal number of Democrats and Republicans (4)
- o A group with slightly more Republicans (5)
- o A group of mostly Republicans (6)
- o A group of all Republicans (7)

Q48 We are now going to ask you about some current events.

Q49 To what extent do you think the number of immigrants from foreign countries who are permitted to come to the United States to live should be increased, decreased, or kept the same as it is now?
- o Decreased a lot (1)
- o Decreased a moderate amount (2)
- o Decreased a little (3)
- o Kept the same as it is now (4)
- o Increased a little (5)
- o Increased a moderate amount (6)
- o Increased a lot (7)

Q50 Do you think that increasing the number of people of different races, ethnic groups and nationalities in the United States makes this country a better place to live, a worse place to live, or does it make no difference?

o A lot better (1)
o Moderately better (2)
o A little better (3)
o No difference (4)
o A little worse (5)
o Moderately worse (6)
o A lot worse (7)

Trump Attitudes

Q51 As you may know, the House of Representatives recently impeached President Trump. Which of the following comes closest to your opinion on this issue?
o President Trump should NOT have been impeached (1)
o President Trump should have been impeached (2)
o Don't know/not sure (3)

Q52 What best describes your opinion about the appropriate way for the U.S. to handle Iranian hostilities in the Middle East? The U.S. should…
o Declare war on Iran (1)
o Conduct limited military strikes (2)
o Seek a negotiated solution (3)
o Do nothing (4)
o Not sure (5)

Q53 How confident are you that President Trump can handle the situation with Iran?
o Not at all confident (1)
o Not too confident (3)
o Somewhat confident (4)
o Very confident (5)

Party Cue Appropriateness

Q72 How appropriate or inappropriate is it for military service members to engage in the following political activities?

	Very inappropriate (1)	Inappropriate (2)	Neither appropriate nor inappropriate (3)	Appropriate (4)	Very appropriate (5)
Express personal opinions on a political candidate on social media (1)					
Attend a political campaign event as a spectator in civilian clothes (2)					
Express support for a political party to others in their unit (3)					
Encourage others in their unit to vote for a political candidate (4)					
Criticize President Trump on social media (5)					

Start of Block: Cue Dem

Q73 How appropriate or inappropriate is it for military service members to engage in the following political activities?

	Very inappropriate (1)	Inappropriate (2)	Neither appropriate nor inappropriate (3)	Appropriate (4)	Very appropriate (5)
Express personal opinions on a Democratic candidate on social media (1)					
Attend a Democratic political campaign event as a spectator in civilian clothes (2)					
Express support for the Democratic party to others in their unit (3					
Encourage others in their unit to vote for a Democratic candidate (4)					
Criticize President Trump on social media (5)					

Start of Block: CueRep

Q74 How appropriate or inappropriate is it for military service members to engage in the following political activities?

	Very inappropriate (1)	Inappropriate (2)	Neither appropriate nor inappropriate (3)	Appropriate (4)	Very appropriate (5)
Express personal opinions on a Republican candidate on social media (1)					
Attend a Republican political campaign event as a spectator in civilian clothes (2)					
Express support for the Republican party to others in their unit (3)					
Encourage others in their unit to vote for a Republican candidate (4)					
Criticize President Trump on social media (5)					

Party Cue Military Service

Q75 How difficult would it be for you to work closely in a military unit with someone who is a strong Democrat?

- o Not at all difficult (1)
- o Not too difficult (2)
- o Somewhat difficult (3)
- o Very difficult (4)
- o Extremely difficult (5)

Q76 How difficult would it be for you to serve under a military commander who is a strong Democrat?

- o Not at all difficult (1)
- o Not too difficult (2)
- o Somewhat difficult (3)
- o Very difficult (4)
- o Extremely difficult (5)

Start of Block: Cue2Rep

Q77 How difficult would it be for you to work closely in a military unit with someone who is a strong Republican?

- o Not at all difficult (1)
- o Not too difficult (2)

o Somewhat difficult (3)
o Very difficult (4)
o Extremely difficult (5)

Q78 How difficult would it be for you to serve under a military commander who is a strong Republican?
o Not at all difficult (1)
o Not too difficult (2)
o Somewhat difficult (3)
o Very difficult (4)
o Extremely difficult (5)

Demographics / Controls

Q79 How much of a majority is required for the U.S. Senate and House to override a presidential veto?
o One-half plus one vote (1)
o Three-fifths (2)
o Two-thirds (3)
o Three-fourths (4)

Q80 What job or political office does Mitch McConnell now hold?
o Senate Majority Leader (1)
o House Minority Leader (2)
o Treasury Secretary (3)
o Chairman of the Federal Reserve (4)

Q81 Who is the Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court?
o Clarence Thomas (1)
o John Roberts (2)
o Anthony Kennedy (3)
o Ruth Bader Ginsburg (4)

Q82 Which political party currently has the most Members in the U.S. House of Representatives?
o Republican Party (1)
o Democratic Party (2)

Q83 What is the highest level of education you have completed?
o Less than a high school degree (1)
o High school degree or equivalent (ex. GED) (2)
o Some college, but no degree (3)
o Associate's degree (4)
o Bachelor's degree (5)
o Graduate degree (ex. Master's, PhD, MD, etc.) (6)

Q84 What is your age?
- o Younger than 18 (999)
- o 18 (18)…80 (80)
- o Older than 80 (81)

Q85 What is your estimate of your annual household income (before taxes)?
- o Less than $10,000 (1)
- o $10,000 to $19,999 (2)
- o $20,000 to $29,999 (3)
- o $30,000 to $39,999 (4)
- o $40,000 to $49,999 (5)
- o $50,000 to $59,999 (6)
- o $60,000 to $69,999 (7)
- o $70,000 to $79,999 (8)
- o $80,000 - $89,999 (9)
- o $90,000 - $99,999 (10)
- o $100,000 - $149,999 (11)
- o More than $150,000 (12)

Non-partisan Norms Measures

Q86 How important is it for the U.S. military to stay out of politics?
- o Not at all important (1)
- o Slightly important (2)
- o Moderately important (3)
- o Very important (4)
- o Extremely important (5)

Q87 To what extent do you agree or disagree that the American people trust the U.S. military because it is above partisan politics?
- o Strongly disagree (1)
- o Disagree (2)
- o Somewhat disagree (3)
- o Neither agree nor disagree (4)
- o Somewhat agree (5)
- o Agree (6)
- o Strongly agree (7)

Q88 To what extent do you agree or disagree that U.S. military service members should comply with the lawful orders of elected leaders regardless of whether those leaders are Democrats or Republicans?
- o Strongly disagree (1)
- o Disagree (2)
- o Somewhat disagree (3)
- o Neither agree nor disagree (4)

o Somewhat agree (5)
o Agree (6)
o Strongly agree (7)

Q89 To what extent do you agree or disagree that U.S. military service members have an obligation to the American people to stay out of politics?
o Strongly disagree (1)
o Disagree (2)
o Somewhat disagree (3)
o Neither agree nor disagree (4)
o Somewhat agree (5)
o Agree (6)
o Strongly agree (7)

Q90 How strongly do you identify as an American?
o Not at all strongly (1)
o Not too strongly (2)
o Somewhat strongly (3)
o Very strongly (4)
o Extremely strongly (5)

Q91 How important is being an American to you?
o Not at all important (1)
o Not too important (2)
o Somewhat important (3)
o Very important (4)
o Extremely important (5)

Q92 When talking about Americans how often do you say "we" instead of "they"?
o Never (1)
o Not too often (2)
o Sometimes (3)
o Most of the time (4)
o Always (5)

Q93 Disclosure Not all respondents received the same news articles and survey questions. The article you read for this study was created for research purposes. It was not real. Thank you for taking time to participate in this study.

END

Outliers

The data obtained from the survey experiment described above include outlying observations with respect to age and military years of service. Federal law limits (with some exceptions) both the number of years one can service in the military and the maximum age at which one can serve (RAND Corporation n.d.). It is possible but rare for servicemembers to remain in the military past the age of 62 or beyond 45 years of service. To account for the potential influence of these outlying observations on the analyses, I created indicator variables for military service years and age outliers. The military service years outlier is coded 1 for respondents who indicated they were still actively serving in the military and were over the age of 62; all others were coded 0. There were two such observations. The age outlier is coded 1 for any respondent—current or former servicemember—who indicated having more than 45 years of total military service; all others are coded 0. There are four such observations. The summary statistics for both age and service years outliers are shown in Table A9. Each regression analysis in chapters 3 and 4 include supplemental regressions in the appendix which estimate the models with the outlier indicators included.

Table A9. Summary of outlier observations

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. dev.	Min	Max
Age Outlier	2	74.5	9.19	68	81
Military Service Years Outlier	4	56.5	14.34	49	78

Norms Manipulation Check

Table A10. Non-partisan norms measures

Dimension	Questions
Personal Normative Beliefs	How important is it for the U.S. military to stay out of politics? To what extent do you agree or disagree that U.S. military service members should comply with the lawful orders of elected leaders regardless of whether those leaders are Democrats or Republicans?
Social Expectations	To what extent do you agree or disagree that the American people trust the U.S. military because it is above partisan politics? To what extent do you agree or disagree that U.S. military service members have an obligation to the American people to stay out of politics?

Table A11. Non-partisan norms measures summary statistics

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. dev.	Min	Max
Individual norms					
Obey	707	5.77	1.51	1	7
Obligation	707	5.22	1.75	1	7
Stay out	707	3.70	1.28	1	5
Trust	707	5.36	1.56	1	7
Index measures					
Personal Normative Beliefs	707	0.74	0.23	0	1
Social Expectations	707	0.72	0.23	0	1
Norms strength	707	0.73	0.21	0	1

Table A12. Treatment manipulation check

VARIABLES	(1) No Controls	(2) + Military Controls	(3) + Demographic Controls	(4) + Outlier Controls
Norms treatment	0.0472**	0.0537***	0.0522***	0.0513***
	(0.0157)	(0.0153)	(0.0142)	(0.0142)
Officer		-0.0485**	-0.0456**	-0.0441**
		(0.0165)	(0.0164)	(0.0166)
Veteran		0.00412	-0.0250	-0.0278
		(0.0157)	(0.0189)	(0.0192)
Years of military service		0.00521***	0.00288**	0.00333***
		(0.00104)	(0.000940)	(0.000987)
Party ID			0.00751	0.00734
			(0.00458)	(0.00460)
Strong Partisan			0.00512	0.00441
			(0.0145)	(0.0144)
Ideology			-0.00312	-0.00304
			(0.00457)	(0.00458)
Political knowledge			0.0217***	0.0212***
			(0.00610)	(0.00611)
Non-White			-0.0101	-0.00918
			(0.0176)	(0.0177)
Female			-0.0332	-0.0311
			(0.0187)	(0.0188)
Age			0.00259***	0.00269***
			(0.000522)	(0.000533)
Income			0.00766**	0.00766**
			(0.00267)	(0.00266)
Education			0.0217**	0.0211**
			(0.00709)	(0.00698)
Service Years Outlier Indicator				-0.0835
				(0.129)
Age Outlier Indicator				-0.150
				(0.156)
Constant	0.705***	0.674***	0.387***	0.385***
	(0.0108)	(0.0181)	(0.0453)	(0.0450)
Observations	707	707	707	707
R-squared	0.013	0.060	0.212	0.214

Note: OLS regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests significant at *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.

Main Results

Table A13. Main experiment with controls

VARIABLES	(1) No Controls	(2) + Military Controls	(3) + Demog. Controls	(4) + Outlier Controls
In-party cue	0.108	0.103	0.109	0.109
	(0.132)	(0.131)	(0.133)	(0.133)
Out-party cue	-0.359**	-0.324*	-0.311*	-0.312*
	(0.132)	(0.128)	(0.128)	(0.127)
Norms treatment	-0.186	-0.219	-0.206	-0.203
	(0.134)	(0.132)	(0.132)	(0.131)
Norms treatment*In-party cue	-0.0283	0.000637	-0.0233	-0.0393
	(0.194)	(0.193)	(0.195)	(0.194)
Norms treatment*Out-party cue	0.304	0.306	0.287	0.279
	(0.198)	(0.193)	(0.195)	(0.195)
Veteran		-0.278***	-0.321**	-0.332**
		(0.0827)	(0.100)	(0.102)
Officer		0.0443	0.0516	0.0568
		(0.0850)	(0.0931)	(0.0940)
Years of military service		-0.0212***	-0.0241***	-0.0189**
		(0.00536)	(0.00554)	(0.00658)
Party ID			-0.00972	-0.0112
			(0.0263)	(0.0261)
Partisan Strength			0.0512	0.0494
			(0.0496)	(0.0497)
Political knowledge			0.00311	-0.000435
			(0.0341)	(0.0343)
Ideology			-0.0214	-0.0219
			(0.0278)	(0.0278)
Non-White			0.0220	0.0244
			(0.0989)	(0.0985)
Female			-0.169	-0.162
			(0.101)	(0.102)
Age			0.00497	0.00524
			(0.00300)	(0.00311)
Income			0.00244	0.00292
			(0.0130)	(0.0131)
Education			0.0162	0.0102
			(0.0361)	(0.0365)
Service Years Outlier Indicator				-1.078*
				(0.480)
Age Outlier Indicator				-0.686*
				(0.267)
Constant	2.268***	2.576***	2.333***	2.333***
	(0.0936)	(0.117)	(0.283)	(0.284)
Observations	707	707	707	707
R-squared	0.020	0.056	0.069	0.075

Note: OLS regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests significant at *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.

Table A14. Main experiment with controls and modified appropriateness measure

VARIABLES	(1) No Controls	(2) + Military Controls	(3) + Demog. Controls	(4) + Outlier Controls
In-party cue	0.176	0.171	0.185	0.184
	(0.134)	(0.133)	(0.135)	(0.135)
Out-party cue	-0.315*	-0.283*	-0.269*	-0.270*
	(0.133)	(0.129)	(0.129)	(0.129)
Norms treatment	-0.119	-0.151	-0.135	-0.132
	(0.137)	(0.137)	(0.137)	(0.136)
Norms treatment* In-party cue	-0.0768	-0.0483	-0.0754	-0.0901
	(0.199)	(0.199)	(0.201)	(0.201)
Norms treatment*Out-party cue	0.233	0.234	0.214	0.207
	(0.201)	(0.196)	(0.199)	(0.199)
Veteran		-0.243**	-0.304**	-0.315**
		(0.0836)	(0.102)	(0.104)
Officer		0.0450	0.0609	0.0661
		(0.0858)	(0.0950)	(0.0960)
Years of military service		-0.0201***	-0.0227***	-0.0178**
		(0.00541)	(0.00562)	(0.00662)
Party ID			-0.00876	-0.0101
			(0.0267)	(0.0265)
Partisan Strength			0.0580	0.0563
			(0.0509)	(0.0510)
Political knowledge			0.00596	0.00263
			(0.0356)	(0.0358)
Ideology			-0.0211	-0.0215
			(0.0279)	(0.0279)
Non-White			-0.00104	0.00143
			(0.102)	(0.102)
Female			-0.100	-0.0933
			(0.104)	(0.106)
Age			0.00562	0.00591
			(0.00309)	(0.00321)
Income			-0.00129	-0.000861
			(0.0134)	(0.0135)
Education			0.0190	0.0133
			(0.0370)	(0.0375)
Service Years Outlier Indicator				-0.997
				(0.548)
Age Outlier Indicator				-0.668*
				(0.290)
Constant	2.287***	2.568***	2.277***	2.276***
	(0.0940)	(0.117)	(0.286)	(0.288)
Observations	707	707	707	707
R-squared	0.020	0.050	0.061	0.065

Note: OLS regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests significant at *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.

Table A15. Predictors of appropriateness evaluations

VARIABLES	(1) No Controls	(2) + Military Controls	(3) + Demog. Controls	(4) + Outlier Controls
In-party cue	0.324	0.319	0.239	0.252
	(0.267)	(0.264)	(0.282)	(0.283)
Out-party cue	-0.190	-0.0986	-0.0465	-0.0144
	(0.254)	(0.251)	(0.251)	(0.250)
Weak partisan	-0.0620	-0.0806	-0.0343	-0.0319
	(0.288)	(0.291)	(0.292)	(0.292)
Strong partisans	0.279	0.259	0.241	0.248
	(0.228)	(0.223)	(0.223)	(0.224)
In-party cue*Weak partisan	-0.249	-0.255	-0.165	-0.166
	(0.373)	(0.369)	(0.387)	(0.388)
In-party cue*Strong partisan	-0.235	-0.232	-0.135	-0.155
	(0.319)	(0.317)	(0.335)	(0.337)
Out-party cue*Weak partisan	0.201	0.143	0.0207	-0.00228
	(0.388)	(0.384)	(0.383)	(0.383)
Out-party cue*Strong partisan	-0.301	-0.369	-0.389	-0.429
	(0.307)	(0.300)	(0.298)	(0.298)
Veteran		-0.247*	-0.308*	-0.336*
		(0.113)	(0.136)	(0.142)
Officer		0.0180	0.0254	0.0385
		(0.114)	(0.122)	(0.124)
Years of military service		-0.0242***	-0.0287***	-0.0255**
		(0.00660)	(0.00702)	(0.00911)
Party ID			0.0367	0.0358
			(0.0357)	(0.0356)
Ideology			-0.0651	-0.0636
			(0.0364)	(0.0365)
Political knowledge			0.0612	0.0592
			(0.0466)	(0.0469)
Non-White			0.118	0.127
			(0.133)	(0.133)
Female			-0.224	-0.208
			(0.140)	(0.144)
Age			0.00623	0.00706
			(0.00376)	(0.00402)
Income			0.00149	0.00150
			(0.0179)	(0.0181)
Education			0.0593	0.0534
			(0.0489)	(0.0499)
Service Years Outlier Indicator				-0.461
				(0.787)
Age Outlier Indicator				-0.649
				(0.414)
Constant	2.087***	2.429***	1.938***	1.907***
	(0.194)	(0.210)	(0.367)	(0.372)
Observations	365	365	365	365
R-squared	0.048	0.098	0.138	0.141

Note: OLS regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests significant at *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.

Additional Analyses

Table A16. Heterogeneous treatment effects of military variables

VARIABLES	(1) Duty Status	(2) Rank	(3) Years of Service
Norms treatment	0.0283	0.0662***	0.0491*
	(0.0214)	(0.0176)	(0.0206)
Veteran	-0.0497*	-0.0268	-0.0270
	(0.0244)	(0.0193)	(0.0194)
Norms treatment*Veteran	0.0444		
	(0.0287)		
Norms treatment*Officer		-0.0418	
		(0.0302)	
Norms treatment*Military service years			0.000291
			(0.00162)
Officer	-0.0435**	-0.0235	-0.0441**
	(0.0165)	(0.0226)	(0.0166)
Years of military service	0.00342***	0.00335***	0.00322*
	(0.000992)	(0.000985)	(0.00125)
Party ID	0.00720	0.00758	0.00737
	(0.00460)	(0.00461)	(0.00460)
Partisan Strength	0.00482	0.00479	0.00495
	(0.00879)	(0.00876)	(0.00878)
Ideology	-0.00308	-0.00339	-0.00304
	(0.00458)	(0.00460)	(0.00458)
Political knowledge	0.0214***	0.0214***	0.0212***
	(0.00611)	(0.00608)	(0.00610)
Non-White	-0.00917	-0.00909	-0.00866
	(0.0178)	(0.0177)	(0.0178)
Female	-0.0303	-0.0325	-0.0310
	(0.0188)	(0.0188)	(0.0188)
Age	0.00273***	0.00265***	0.00268***
	(0.000536)	(0.000535)	(0.000534)
Income	0.00747**	0.00762**	0.00763**
	(0.00268)	(0.00266)	(0.00266)
Education	0.0212**	0.0210**	0.0211**
	(0.00701)	(0.00696)	(0.00700)
Service Years Outlier Indicator	-0.0927	-0.0924	-0.0814
	(0.131)	(0.130)	(0.128)
Age Outlier Indicator	-0.164	-0.159	-0.146
	(0.159)	(0.158)	(0.157)
Constant	0.386***	0.371***	0.376***
	(0.0491)	(0.0491)	(0.0492)
Observations	707	707	707
R-squared	0.217	0.216	0.214

Note: OLS regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests significant at *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.

Table A17. Heterogeneous treatment effects of political variables

VARIABLES	(1) Party Identification	(2) Party Identification Strength	(3) Ideology
Norms treatment	0.0633*	0.0813	0.00508
	(0.0303)	(0.0429)	(0.0334)
Party ID	0.00889	0.00732	0.00770
	(0.00578)	(0.00460)	(0.00455)
Norms treatment*Party ID	-0.00309		
	(0.00695)		
Norms treatment*Partisan strength		-0.0119	
		(0.0171)	
Norms treatment*Ideology			0.0117
			(0.00732)
Veteran	-0.0270	-0.0270	-0.0267
	(0.0193)	(0.0193)	(0.0193)
Officer	-0.0439**	-0.0442**	-0.0432**
	(0.0166)	(0.0165)	(0.0166)
Years of military service	0.00333***	0.00333***	0.00331***
	(0.000989)	(0.000991)	(0.000983)
Partisan Strength	0.00505	0.0110	0.00426
	(0.00877)	(0.0121)	(0.00884)
Ideology	-0.00315	-0.00298	-0.00893
	(0.00455)	(0.00458)	(0.00580)
Political knowledge	0.0212***	0.0214***	0.0215***
	(0.00609)	(0.00608)	(0.00611)
Non-White	-0.00858	-0.00879	-0.0102
	(0.0178)	(0.0178)	(0.0178)
Female	-0.0307	-0.0318	-0.0316
	(0.0188)	(0.0187)	(0.0188)
Age	0.00269***	0.00267***	0.00265***
	(0.000534)	(0.000537)	(0.000540)
Income	0.00763**	0.00761**	0.00758**
	(0.00266)	(0.00266)	(0.00265)
Education	0.0211**	0.0211**	0.0213**
	(0.00699)	(0.00698)	(0.00698)
Service Years Outlier Indicator	-0.0860	-0.0833	-0.0820
	(0.129)	(0.129)	(0.132)
Age Outlier Indicator	-0.147	-0.144	-0.142
	(0.156)	(0.162)	(0.163)
Constant	0.369***	0.360***	0.399***
	(0.0522)	(0.0527)	(0.0528)
Observations	707	707	707
R-squared	0.214	0.214	0.217

Note: OLS regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests significant at *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.

Table A18. Evaluations of the appropriateness of criticizing President Trump on social media

VARIABLES	(1) No Controls	(2) + Military Controls	(3) + Demog. Controls	(4) + Outlier Controls
Norms treatment	-0.255	-0.323	-0.303	-0.297
	(0.189)	(0.197)	(0.203)	(0.202)
Republican	-0.715***	-0.737***	-0.500*	-0.512*
	(0.186)	(0.191)	(0.212)	(0.212)
Norms treatment*Republican	0.0992	0.117	0.0759	0.0798
	(0.269)	(0.272)	(0.274)	(0.274)
Veteran		-0.672***	-0.529**	-0.497**
		(0.142)	(0.168)	(0.171)
Officer		0.376**	0.273	0.251
		(0.141)	(0.155)	(0.157)
Years of military service		-0.0200*	-0.0257**	-0.0223*
		(0.00884)	(0.00949)	(0.0108)
Partisan Strength			-0.0352	-0.0284
			(0.0819)	(0.0825)
Ideology			-0.0803	-0.0830
			(0.0432)	(0.0435)
Political knowledge			-0.163**	-0.164**
			(0.0601)	(0.0605)
Non-White			0.356*	0.342*
			(0.170)	(0.171)
Female			-0.299	-0.328
			(0.176)	(0.178)
Age			0.000950	-0.000693
			(0.00538)	(0.00562)
Income			0.0176	0.0188
			(0.0229)	(0.0231)
Education			0.0159	0.0129
			(0.0634)	(0.0647)
Service Years Outlier Indicator				-0.846
				(1.019)
Age Outlier Indicator				1.434
				(1.129)
/cut1	-1.147***	-1.594***	-1.990***	-2.040***
	(0.138)	(0.207)	(0.456)	(0.460)
/cut2	-0.373**	-0.785***	-1.162**	-1.212**
	(0.130)	(0.199)	(0.448)	(0.451)
/cut3	0.350**	-0.0319	-0.396	-0.445
	(0.130)	(0.194)	(0.443)	(0.446)
/cut4	1.112***	0.750***	0.397	0.350
	(0.141)	(0.196)	(0.444)	(0.448)
Observations	707	707	707	707

Note: Ordinal logistic regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests significant at *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.

Table A19. Predictors of non-partisan norms strength

VARIABLES	(1) Base Model	(2) Duty Status Subgroups	(3) Rank Subgroups
Norms treatment	0.0515***	0.0490***	0.0491***
	(0.0142)	(0.0142)	(0.0142)
Veteran	-0.0272		
	(0.0193)		
Guard/reserve		-0.0631*	-0.0614*
		(0.0274)	(0.0275)
Veteran		-0.0419*	-0.0414*
		(0.0201)	(0.0202)
Officer	-0.0441**	-0.0443**	
	(0.0165)	(0.0165)	
Non-commissioned officers			0.0279
			(0.0186)
Warrant officers			-0.0384
			(0.0234)
Junior officers			-0.00175
			(0.0320)
Senior officers			-0.0283
			(0.0259)
Years of military service	0.00334***	0.00318**	0.00276*
	(0.000988)	(0.000998)	(0.00108)
Party ID	0.00733	0.00712	0.00763
	(0.00460)	(0.00461)	(0.00459)
Partisan Strength	0.00492	0.00493	0.00520
	(0.00876)	(0.00869)	(0.00877)
Ideology	-0.00303	-0.00291	-0.00369
	(0.00458)	(0.00457)	(0.00455)
Political knowledge	0.0212***	0.0216***	0.0207***
	(0.00610)	(0.00608)	(0.00618)
Non-White	-0.00873	-0.00463	-0.00282
	(0.0178)	(0.0177)	(0.0177)
Female	-0.0310	-0.0306	-0.0295
	(0.0188)	(0.0186)	(0.0188)
Age	0.00269***	0.00266***	0.00271***
	(0.000534)	(0.000530)	(0.000532)
Income	0.00763**	0.00726**	0.00715**
	(0.00266)	(0.00264)	(0.00265)
Education	0.0211**	0.0203**	0.0197**
	(0.00699)	(0.00701)	(0.00704)
Service Years Outlier Indicator	-0.0841	-0.0888	-0.0652
	(0.129)	(0.131)	(0.134)
Age Outlier Indicator	-0.148	-0.131	-0.138
	(0.158)	(0.134)	(0.143)
Constant	0.375***	0.397***	0.389***
	(0.0489)	(0.0504)	(0.0515)
Observations	707	707	707
R-squared	0.214	0.221	0.224

Note: OLS regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests significant at *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.

Chapter 4 Supplementary Material

Affective polarization measures summary statistics

Table A20. Affective polarization measures summary statistics

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. dev.	Min	Max
Feeling thermometers					
In-party feeling thermometer	707	78.22	21.93	0	100
Out-party feeling thermometer	707	33.73	29.67	0	100
Feeling thermometer difference	707	44.49	38.85	-100	100
Trait ratings					
Out-party positive traits	707	1.82	1.19	0	4
Out-party negative traits	707	2.54	1.06	0	4
Traits difference	707	4.73	1.73	0	8
Social distance					
Social distance index	707	1.02	0.73	0	3

Main Results

Table A21. Effect of non-partisan norms treatment on feeling thermometer ratings

	(1) In-party FT	(2) Out-party FT	(3) FT difference
Norms treatment	-1.990	5.156*	-7.147*
	(1.655)	(2.231)	(2.921)
Constant	79.19***	31.24***	47.95***
	(1.092)	(1.498)	(1.938)
Observations	707	707	707
R-squared	0.002	0.008	0.008

Note: OLS regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests significant at *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.

Table A22. Effect of non-partisan norms treatment on feeling thermometer ratings

VARIABLES	(1) In-party feeling thermometer	(2) Out-party feeling thermometer	(3) Feeling thermometer difference
Norms treatment	-1.331	5.583**	-6.914**
	(1.461)	(2.021)	(2.660)
Veteran	-3.187	-2.987	-0.200
	(1.853)	(2.670)	(3.405)
Officer	-1.841	1.431	-3.272
	(1.686)	(2.384)	(3.017)
Years of military service	0.0119	0.117	-0.105
	(0.101)	(0.145)	(0.183)
Party ID	-0.524	0.482	-1.005
	(0.396)	(0.630)	(0.781)
Partisan Strength	12.62***	-2.380	15.00***
	(1.081)	(1.238)	(1.649)
Ideology	0.169	-2.768***	2.936***
	(0.398)	(0.658)	(0.775)
Political knowledge	0.476	-4.044***	4.520***
	(0.590)	(0.901)	(1.083)
Non-White	-2.541	3.831	-6.371
	(1.823)	(2.488)	(3.319)
Female	4.018*	-10.52***	14.54***
	(1.930)	(2.614)	(3.421)
Age	0.0102	-0.201**	0.211*
	(0.0601)	(0.0739)	(0.103)
Income	1.027***	0.594	0.433
	(0.272)	(0.358)	(0.491)
Education	-1.645**	2.990**	-4.635***
	(0.608)	(0.907)	(1.132)
Service Years Outlier Indicator	10.58	38.66***	-28.08*
	(7.321)	(7.167)	(11.14)
Age Outlier Indicator	-20.66**	23.04	-43.70
	(7.921)	(30.51)	(37.45)
Constant	48.79***	48.09***	0.696
	(5.066)	(6.608)	(8.716)
Observations	707	707	707
R-squared	0.248	0.225	0.219

Note: OLS regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests significant at *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.

Table A23. Effect of non-partisan norms treatment on out-party trait ratings

VARIABLES	(1) Positive traits	(2) Negative traits	(3) Traits difference
Norms treatment	0.238**	-0.0628	-0.301*
	(0.0892)	(0.0798)	(0.130)
Constant	1.701***	2.574***	4.873***
	(0.0591)	(0.0547)	(0.0886)
Observations	707	707	707
R-squared	0.010	0.001	0.008

Note: OLS regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests significant at *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.

Table A24. Effect of non-partisan norms treatment on out-party trait ratings

VARIABLES	(1) Positive traits	(2) Negative traits	(3) Traits difference
Norms treatment	0.254**	-0.0501	-0.304*
	(0.0771)	(0.0795)	(0.120)
Veteran	-0.237*	-0.00705	0.229
	(0.104)	(0.101)	(0.153)
Officer	0.0193	-0.192*	-0.211
	(0.0912)	(0.0906)	(0.136)
Years of military service	0.00101	0.000979	-3.21e-05
	(0.00557)	(0.00635)	(0.00838)
Party ID	0.0202	0.00876	-0.0114
	(0.0243)	(0.0234)	(0.0342)
Partisan Strength	0.00566	0.0957	0.0900
	(0.0495)	(0.0525)	(0.0811)
Ideology	-0.112***	0.0384	0.150***
	(0.0257)	(0.0235)	(0.0336)
Political knowledge	-0.172***	0.00525	0.177***
	(0.0320)	(0.0335)	(0.0496)
Non-White	0.108	-0.0326	-0.141
	(0.0953)	(0.0938)	(0.148)
Female	-0.310**	0.0900	0.400**
	(0.0996)	(0.101)	(0.152)
Age	-0.00967**	0.00621	0.0159**
	(0.00309)	(0.00323)	(0.00508)
Income	0.0576***	0.00964	-0.0480*
	(0.0136)	(0.0135)	(0.0195)
Education	0.119**	0.00596	-0.113*
	(0.0371)	(0.0355)	(0.0533)
Service Years Outlier Indicator	0.629	0.652	0.0229
	(0.357)	(0.533)	(0.598)
Age Outlier Indicator	0.392	-0.661**	-1.053**
	(0.316)	(0.226)	(0.401)
Constant	2.073***	1.825***	3.752***
	(0.261)	(0.262)	(0.411)
Observations	707	707	707
R-squared	0.286	0.042	0.191

Note: OLS regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests significant at *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.

Table A25. Effect of non-partisan norms treatment on out-party social distance

VARIABLES	(1) Social distance index	(2) Out-party neighbor	(3) Out-party friend	(4) Out-party marry
Norms treatment	-0.0373	-0.177	-0.225	0.0258
	(0.0552)	(0.140)	(0.140)	(0.137)
/cut1		-0.639***	-0.718***	-0.724***
		(0.100)	(0.101)	(0.0995)
/cut2		1.141***	1.064***	0.536***
		(0.106)	(0.105)	(0.0977)
/cut3		2.353***	2.371***	2.114***
		(0.146)	(0.148)	(0.134)
Constant	1.039***			
	(0.0375)			
Observations	707	707	707	707
R-squared	0.001			

Note: Column 1 is OLS regression coefficients; columns 2, 3, and 4 are ordinal logistic regression coefficients. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests significant at *** $p<0.001$, ** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$.

Additional Analyses

Heterogeneous Treatment Effects by Party

Table A26. Effect of norms treatment and partisanship on feeling thermometers

VARIABLES	(1) In-party FT	(2) Out-party FT	(3) FT difference
Norms treatment	-2.885	4.394	-7.278
	(2.617)	(3.383)	(4.617)
Republican	0.154	-3.548	3.702
	(2.188)	(3.018)	(3.926)
Norms treatment*Republican	1.540	1.423	0.117
	(3.382)	(4.500)	(5.958)
Constant	79.10***	33.23***	45.87***
	(1.598)	(2.264)	(2.994)
Observations	707	707	707
R-squared	0.003	0.010	0.011

Note: OLS regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests significant at *** $p<0.001$, ** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$.

Table A27. Effect of norms treatment and partisanship on trait ratings

VARIABLES	(1) Positive traits	(2) Negative traits	(3) Traits difference
Norms treatment	0.298*	-0.148	-0.446*
	(0.128)	(0.121)	(0.197)
Republican	-0.00966	0.0975	0.107
	(0.118)	(0.110)	(0.178)
Norms treatment*Republican	-0.104	0.145	0.249
	(0.178)	(0.161)	(0.262)
Constant	1.706***	2.519***	4.813***
	(0.0844)	(0.0815)	(0.133)
Observations	707	707	707
R-squared	0.011	0.008	0.013

Note: OLS regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests significant at *** $p<0.001$, ** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$.

Table A28. Effect of norms treatment and partisanship on social distance

VARIABLES	(1) Social distance index
Norms treatment	-0.0907
	(0.0851)
Republican	-0.182*
	(0.0758)
Norms treatment*Republican	0.0977
	(0.111)
Constant	1.142***
	(0.0584)
Observations	707
R-squared	0.010

Note: OLS regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests significant at *** $p<0.001$, ** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$.

Heterogeneous Treatment Effects by Partisan Identity Strength

Table A29. Effect of norms treatment and partisanship on feeling thermometers

VARIABLES	(1) In-party FT	(2) Out-party FT	(3) FT difference
Norms treatment	0.156	8.296	-8.141
	(4.261)	(4.448)	(5.816)
Weak partisan	14.18***	3.281	10.90
	(3.991)	(4.153)	(6.057)
Strong partisan	25.59***	0.658	24.93***
	(3.282)	(3.488)	(5.113)
Norms treatment*Weak partisan	-10.02	-5.360	-4.662
	(5.697)	(6.360)	(8.728)
Norms treatment*Strong partisan	0.101	-3.331	3.432
	(4.579)	(5.339)	(6.853)
Constant	59.44***	30.20***	29.24***
	(3.093)	(2.868)	(4.525)
Observations	707	707	707
R-squared	0.223	0.009	0.086

Note: OLS regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests significant at *** $p<0.001$, ** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$.

Table A30. Effect of norms treatment and partisanship on trait ratings

VARIABLES	(1) Positive traits	(2) Negative traits	(3) Traits difference
Norms treatment	0.301	0.0309	-0.270
	(0.175)	(0.184)	(0.290)
Weak partisan	0.238	-0.333*	-0.571*
	(0.143)	(0.169)	(0.277)
Strong partisan	0.252	0.162	-0.0891
	(0.131)	(0.147)	(0.242)
Norms treatment*Weak partisan	-0.127	0.0170	0.144
	(0.234)	(0.246)	(0.393)
Norms treatment*Strong partisan	-0.0540	-0.151	-0.0966
	(0.212)	(0.210)	(0.336)
Constant	1.489***	2.525***	5.036***
	(0.103)	(0.130)	(0.214)
Observations	707	707	707
R-squared	0.015	0.024	0.017

Note: OLS regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests significant at *** $p<0.001$, ** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$.

Table A31. Effect of norms treatment and partisanship on social distance

VARIABLES	(1) Social distance index
Norms treatment	0.143
	(0.124)
Weak partisan	0.0976
	(0.122)
Strong partisan	0.336**
	(0.104)
Norms treatment*Weak partisan	-0.346*
	(0.169)
Norms treatment*Strong partisan	-0.177
	(0.142)
Constant	0.796***
	(0.0930)
Observations	707
R-squared	0.039

Note: OLS regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests significant at *** $p<0.001$, ** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$.

Effect of Non-partisan Norms on Working Relationships

Table A32. Effect of norms treatment on military working relationships

VARIABLES	(1) Partisan colleague	(2) Partisan commander
Prime = 1, Norms treatment	0.274*	0.372**
	(0.123)	(0.118)
cue2 = 1, Out-party	0.687***	0.867***
	(0.115)	(0.112)
1.prime#1.cue2	-0.385*	-0.512**
	(0.175)	(0.174)
Military Status = 1, Veteran	-0.223	-0.221
	(0.115)	(0.113)
Rank = 1, Officer	-0.0612	-0.0586
	(0.105)	(0.104)
Years of military service	-0.00163	-0.00182
	(0.00680)	(0.00704)
Party ID	0.0480	0.0391
	(0.0282)	(0.0271)
Partisan Strength	0.105	0.0635
	(0.0553)	(0.0546)
Ideology	-0.0971**	-0.105***
	(0.0307)	(0.0304)
Political knowledge	-0.182***	-0.148***
	(0.0385)	(0.0376)
Non-White	0.126	0.0551
	(0.108)	(0.104)
Female	-0.120	-0.0186
	(0.109)	(0.110)
Age	-0.00738*	-0.00525
	(0.00313)	(0.00317)
Income	-0.00135	0.0126
	(0.0152)	(0.0152)
Education	0.111**	0.0973*
	(0.0423)	(0.0413)
Service Years Outlier Indicator	0.382	0.705
	(1.050)	(0.924)
Age Outlier Indicator	1.619***	1.030***
	(0.325)	(0.272)
Constant	2.074***	1.943***
	(0.287)	(0.286)
Observations	707	707
R-squared	0.193	0.193

Note: OLS regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed tests significant at *** $p<0.001$, ** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$.