If It Bleeds, It Leads: Accessing the Impact of Media Coverage of Human Rights Violations on Future Terrorism.

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Abstract

Previous studies of terrorism have addressed the impact of human rights abuses on future terrorist activity and the role of mass media has played shaping public perceptions of terrorism and terrorist activity, yet little research has examined the relationship between the media's publicity of human rights abuses that occurred due to a state's counterterrorism policy and future terrorist attacks. This dissertation sought to close this gap. Focusing on the media's publicity of the U.S.'s usage of torture, extraordinary rendition, extra-judicial killings (drone strikes) and indefinite detention of suspected terrorists during its post-9/11 "War on Terror", it aims to answer the following question: What impact does media coverage of human rights abuses that occur due to a state's counterterrorism policies and how they frame them in published articles have on the propensity for future terrorist activity?

This dissertation examined the conceptual literature on terrorist mobilization at the micro and macro levels. In addition, personal and informational frames and their locations were identified from published articles that concerned the U.S.'s 'War on Terror' from Nexis Uni and ProQuest and their frequency of usage was combined with data from the Global Terrorism Database to analyze both quantitatively and qualitatively to determine if their usage positively influenced future terrorist actions. The quantitative results of the research indicate that media reports on the human right issues of America's use of torture and extrajudicial killings had the most positive influence on future terrorist actions and that these influences did not significantly change when the data was delineated between Muslim and non-Muslim states. Personal frames located in the headline and the lead were more influential than informational frames. Personal frames located in the headline and lead locations in Muslim states are twice as influential on future terrorism as in non-Muslim states. Qualitatively, anecdotal evidence tying media framing of human rights abuses to future terrorism was plentiful because most of the 'lone-wolf'

terrorists at some point attempted to defend their actions as a justifiable response to America's 'War on Terror.' However, actual cause and effect evidence of trends of media reporting on these abuses directly leading to terrorism generally lacks concrete support.

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Chapter 1: Introduction and Conceptual Definitions

The July 2016 issue of ISIS magazine, Dabiq, featured a lengthy essay justifying a campaign of terrorist violence against the West. Titled, "Why We Hate You & Why We Fight You," the article invoked many religious and moral themes, but also stated bluntly, "We hate you for your crimes against the Muslims; your drones and fighter jets bomb, kill, and maim our people around the world… As such, we fight you to stop you from killing our men, women, and children, to liberate those of them whom you imprison and torture, and to take revenge for the countless Muslims who've suffered as a result of your deeds" (Dabiq 2016, 32). This passage is representative of a broader trend in the terrorist propaganda that appeals to the crimes of their adversaries as a justification for violent campaigns. These crimes that ISIS highlights are largely communicated globally by the international media as human rights abuses.

While previous studies of terrorism have addressed the impact of human rights abuses on future terrorist activity and the role of mass media in shaping public perceptions of terrorism and terrorist activity, little research has examined the relationship between the media's publicity of human rights abuses that occurred due to a state's counterterrorism policy and future terrorist attacks. This dissertation seeks to close this gap. Focusing on the media's publicity of the U.S. deployment of torture, extraordinary rendition, extra-judicial killings, and the indefinite detention of suspected terrorists during its post-9/11 'War on Terror,' it aims to answer the following question: What impact does international media coverage of human rights abuses that occur due to a state's counterterrorism policies have on the propensity for future terrorist activity?

The purpose of this chapter is to first provide a conceptual understanding of the issues surrounding the defining of terrorism. For starters, there will be a discussion of the cross-national

differences between how the U.S. and the international community views and defines terrorism. The differences exist not only in a legal sense but in an academic one as well. Next, the conceptual issues surrounding differentiating domestic terrorism versus international terrorism will be explored. This will be followed by an exploration of the differing conceptions or models of counter or anti-terrorism. Lastly, an examination of those human rights abuses that have been found to have the most impact on terrorist activities will be performed and the manner in which the media frames are utilized to explain them will be analyzed. These examinations will provide a foundation for a conceptual understanding of the phenomenon, its attributes, and those aspects of society that influence such activity. Furthermore, as an illustration of how these concepts are reflected in current events, America's 'War on Terror' and the subsequent human rights violations that have occurred will be briefly discussed to anchor this examination.

Defining Terrorism

Conceptually, terrorism in its modern usage has proven difficult to find a consensus both cross-nationally and in the academia. It is not an ideology nor is it a philosophy. It is merely a tool, a tactic, and in essence terrorism, "differs from war in means …but not in aims" (Shughart 2006, 13). In its broadest sense, it is "the use or threatened use of force designed to bring about political change" (White 2003, 8). However, this definition could necessarily include all forms of coercion: those utilized by state actors and non-state actors alike. Compounding this issue is the adage that "One man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter," often blurs the distinction between the two and equates the difference to one of perspective (Seymour 1975, 62). From a state's view, all resistance to its authority is a threat that must be opposed and by classifying any dissent as terrorism aides the state by delegitimizing it in the eyes of the public and the world. The dissenter's view of their movement, however, is the polar opposite: the state is the terrorist

and their struggle is not only legitimate but heroic. Each dyad must thus define the other in derogatory terms to justify its opposing actions. This propaganda struggle transcends individual state conflicts and extends into the international scene. Nowhere is this more evident than in the inability of the international community, specifically the United Nations, to clearly define terrorism and separate it from legitimate forms of collective dissent.

A resolution in the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1996 described terrorism as "criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes" (A/RES/51/210; 17 December 1996). Later in 2004, the Security Council adopted more specific language in its definition to include the consequences of terrorist actions (i.e. death, serious bodily injury, or hostage taking); terrorist target information (i.e. civilian, general public, government, or international organization); and the terrorist ultimate purpose (provoke terror, intimidate, or coerce) (Resolution 1566; 2004). However, two months later the U.N.'s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change issued a report to the General Assembly that raised the problematic issue of clearly defining terrorist activities. The report noted that the "United Nations ability to develop a comprehensive strategy has been constrained by the inability of Member States to agree on an anti-terrorism convention including a definition of terrorism" (A/59/565; 4:157; 2004). Furthermore, the panel iterated that it is "not so much a legal question as a political one. Legally, virtually all forms of terrorism are prohibited by one of 12 international counterterrorism conventions, international customary law, the Geneva Conventions or the Rome Statutes" (A/59/565; 4:159; 2004). The lack of consensus at the U.N. on reaching an agreed upon definition hinges on two issues: some states want to include state sanctioned violence against civilians in the definition and other states stress that "peoples under foreign occupation have a right to resistance and a definition of

terrorism should not override this right" (A/59/565; 4:160; 2004). The panel proposed the defining terrorism as "any action, in addition to actions already specified by the existing conventions on aspects of terrorism, the Geneva Conventions and Security Council resolution 1566 (2004), that is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants, when the purpose of such an act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act" (A59/565; 4:164d; 2004).

The above international definitions conspicuously leave out the overall political, ideological, or religious purpose of terrorism and this encapsulates the problem with attaining any international consensus on the issue. Some states might agree with the 'aim' of certain terrorist groups but cannot publically support the 'means' by which they seek to achieve them. Since virtually all forms of terrorist violence are already covered under previous conventions and treaties, the problem is one of applying them uniformly. Merely defining terrorist actions is not the issue that prevents an international consensus on a definition. It is one of political will and the ability to distinguish between 'terrorist' or 'freedom fighters.'

Domestically, most states do not have the same consensus issues as the U.N. in defining terrorism. Many of the actions of terrorists are already illegal under existing domestic laws and the task is merely to define their motivations and purpose. For instance, Title 22, Chapter 38 of the United States Code states that terrorist actions are "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents" (2656f(d:2). However, the term 'subnational groups' implies an actor that is below the national level, i.e., a group that acts outside of a state's authority for purposes of its own, and without a clearer definition it often, "leaves much latitude for disagreement" (Krueger and Maleckova

2002, 3). It is much the same with the term 'clandestine agent.' Title 18 of the United States Code omits these ambiguities in defining domestic terrorism and clearly states that these acts are already violations of the criminal statutes. Furthermore, the code delves into the motivations and purposes of terrorism by noting that these actions "appear to be intended- to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping" (2331(5)). The U.S. Code of Federal Regulations stipulates that terrorism is "the unlawful use of force" for the "furtherance of political or social objectives" (28 C.F.R. Section 0.85.l). The most expansive American explanation of terrorisms motives, however, comes from the U.S. Department of Defense which defines it as "motivated by religious, political, or other ideological beliefs and committed in the pursuit of goals that are usually political" (Joint Pub 3-07.2, I-1; 2010).

Academically, a consensus on the definition of terrorism remains as elusive as in the international arena. As was discussed earlier, the term suffers from both negative political connotations as well as bordering issues such as differentiating between terrorist actions and legitimate political violence. These two factors are also exacerbated by stretching and traveling problems of the term as in the labeling of groups or actions as 'narco-terrorist' or 'cyber-terrorism' (Weinberg, et al, 2004, 779). Alex Schmid surveyed scholars in 1992 and his results produced 109 separate definitions which when analyzed produced a consensus definition:

> "Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi) clandestine individual, group, or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal, or political reasons, whereby—in contrast to assassination—the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target

> population, and serve as message generators. Threat—and violence—based communication processes between terrorist (organization), (imperiled) victims, and main target (audiences(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought" (Weinberg, et al, 2004, 780).

Condensing the definition into its barest form, one is left with a definition of the action as an "anxiety-inspiring method" of violence against "randomly (or) selectively" chosen targets to "serve as message generators" for the purpose of "intimidation, coercion, or propaganda" that includes state-level actors. If one removes the "repeated violent action" from the definition then the definition can necessarily include a multitude of state or group activities so much so as to make it unworkable as a basis for research. Weinberg, Pedahzur, and Hirsh-Hoefler reviewed academic journals of terrorism and yielded 73 definitions which when compared to Schmid's 109 resulted in the following: "terrorism is a politically motivated tactic involving the threat or use of force or violence in which the pursuit of publicity plays a significant role" (Weinberg, et al, 2004, 782). However, while this definition is more succinct it suffers from the same defects as Schmid's, namely that it encompasses behaviors that can be applied to a wide variety of actors.

In simplistic terms those who use terrorism seek to achieve their aims through the use of selective attacks on soft non-military targets in a sensational manner to attract publicity to their cause. This is done not to achieve a decisive military victory, but to mold public opinion psychologically with the threat of future attacks. The morale of the public is its principle target, "by disrupting daily life and creating a sense of insecurity amongst ordinary people, intentionally generating 'massive fear'" (Crenshaw 2000, 406, Cooper 2001, 883). For the purposes of this examination the following definition from START's Global Terrorism Database (GTD) will be

utilized. From the GTD, terrorism is defined as "the threatened use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation" (GTD Codebook 2012, 6). Along with this definition, START further stipulated that the act, "must be intentional… must entail some level of violence or threat of violence…(and) the perpetrators of the incidents must be sub-national actors" (GTD Codebook 2012, 6). Together with these criteria's, at least two of the following must be present: "The act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal; There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) other than the immediate victims; and the action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare activities" (GTD codebook 2012, 6). This definition is both inclusive in that it incorporates motive, target, and purpose of the terrorist activity, yet it is exclusive in that it insists the action is performed by a sub-national actor outside of legitimate warfare activities.

The next distinction that needs to be made is the difference between international terrorism and domestic terrorism. In most definitions, domestic terrorism entails when both the terrorists and victims are of the same nationality and the attacks are confined to that particular state. Transnational or international terrorism differs in that the terrorists and victims are from, "two or more countries" and the attacks are carried out in the, "territory of more than one country" (Enders and Sandler 2006, 4; Krueger and Maleckova 2002, 3). This differentiation, however, severely truncates and biases most data on the phenomenon because the instances of international terrorism are dwarfed in number by domestic terrorist events (Sanchez-Cuenca and de la Calle 2009, 32, 37; Asal and Rethemeyer 2008). Sanchez-Cuenca and de la Calle questioned, "why the nationality of the victim or the location of the attack constitute a relevant theoretical category for the analysis of terrorism" (2009, 36). Their argument rests on the

assumption that it is not the nationality or territory of the terrorists and their targets that matters, but it is the constraints that these groups face in carrying out their attacks (2009, 37). Terrorists face fewer obstacles in conducting operations on their home territory than they do in a foreign land. Yet, while domestic attacks might generate media attention locally and achieve their purpose, the international variety of attacks generates significantly more attention from the media and governmental actors. Secondary to constraints, is the terrorist political goal, or in other words what the terrorists hope to achieve with their attacks. If the purpose is merely to communicate a message through the media, a terrorist attack that targets foreigners, either at home or abroad, will be more effective than one that targets citizens of the terrorist's nationality. This analysis will include both types of terrorism, domestic and international, in its examination.

Defining Counterterrorism

Just as the concept of terrorism defies a single all-inclusive definition, so too does the means that various actors utilize to oppose it. Counterterrorism in its most basic sense can be visualized as a "mix of public and foreign policies designed to limit the actions of terrorist groups and individuals associated with terrorist organizations in an attempt to protect the general public from terrorist violence" (Omelicheva 1). Some scholars delineate counterterrorism policies as either reactive or proactive, but in the most basic sense they are all reactive: without the threat of some form of terrorist violence there would be no need for counterterrorism measures. Leaving this observation aside, the proactive and reactive measures a state can take are multi-faceted and do not fit easily into a single category. For instance, under the reactive typology, states generally have multiple public and foreign policy options to counter terrorism; however, the main emphasis is on deterrence, which is sometimes characterized as defensive in nature (Arce and Sandler 2005, 183, Sandler 2011, 227). The most visible deterrence

counterterrorism policies are passive in nature in that they are designed to prevent or mitigate terrorist attacks (Crelinsten 2014, 7). Typical defensive measures fall under the preventative model that includes increased security or target hardening by erecting barriers limiting access to potential targets, expanding the zone of security to include a state's critical infrastructure (i.e. public water supply, etc.), and by increasing surveillance and/or "regulating the flow of people, money, goods, and services" (Crelinsten 2014, 7). Purely defensive policies are much easier to define and categorize than deterrence policies.

Deterrence measures aim to make any terrorist action on the particular target more difficult and increase the "likely negative consequences to the perpetrator" (Arce and Sandler 2005, 184). As a strategic interaction between a state and a terrorist group, deterrence seeks to influence these groups' perceptions of the costs or benefits of terrorist violence (Kroenig and Pavel 2012, 22). This is done in two ways: deterrence-by-denial or deterrence-by-retaliation (Kroenig and Pavel 2012, 22-23). Deterrence-by-denial seeks to negate the terrorist groups expected benefits from an action or to threaten failure for their objectives (Kroenig and Pavel 2012, 22-23). The difference between deterrence-by-denial and defensive measures can be somewhat ambiguous because "defensive postures can have can have deterrent effects and deterrent capabilities can aid in a defensive operation" (Kroenig and Pavel 2012, 23). The distinction between the two resides in the fact defensive policies are created to "fend off" attacks while deterrence ones are "intended to convince an adversary not to attack in the first place (Kroenig and Pavel 2012, 23). Deterrence-by-retaliation advances the perception that a state will respond to terrorist actions by imposing a level of costs that are unacceptable to the group (Kroenig and Pavel 2012, 22).

Deterrence-by-retaliation or deterrence-by-denial strategies can be both reactive and proactive depending upon how the state utilizes them. Proactive counterterrorism policies are direct response strategies that seek to ultimately deter terrorism by forceful offensive measures (Kroenig and Pavel 2012, 25). A proactive policy by definition is one that attempts to act in anticipation of future terrorist actions and develop measures to counter or stop them entirely. This is where the concept of preemption becomes associated with proactive policies because "Preemption is the quintessential proactive policy in which terrorists and their assets are attacked to ***curb*** subsequent terrorist campaigns" (Arce and Sandler 2005, 185, emphasis mine). Proactive policies can range anywhere from targeting terrorist training camps for destruction, retaliation against a state-sponsor, infiltration and gathering intelligence on the group, and freezing or denying them the usage of their monetary assets (Arce and Sandler 2005, 184).

These types of counterterrorism policies rely largely on the coercive powers of the state, i.e. its monopoly on the usage of violence, to achieve its counterterrorism aims. Since counterterrorism essentially exists "on a continuum between warfare and crime control" this coercive perspective gives rise to two models: the criminal justice model and the war model (Rascoff 2014, 831; Crelinsten 2014, 3). The criminal justice model treats the problem of terrorism as a crime that needs to be dealt with much in the same manner as other heinous criminal acts are: arrest of the offenders, judicial proceedings to judge their guilt or innocence, and incarceration or other punishment if found guilty (Crelinsten 2014, 3). In treating terrorism as merely one crime among many the state removes any ideological or political significance from act and this can have a "delegitimizing effect on terrorists" (Crelinsten 2014, 3). The war model treats terrorism as an "act of war or insurgency" and includes such measures as utilizing military forces against the terrorists in their territory or against their state sponsors (Crelinsten 2014, 3).

The advantages of this model is that it is not hampered by domestic rules of law that specifically outlines the procedures, scope, and most importantly the limitations on state action. Treating counterterrorism operations like a war removes prohibitions on the usage of deadly force and violations of civil liberties. However, the war model does not operate in a moral and legal vacuum as there are numerous international treaties that outline the state's obligations during a state of war. While international human rights laws such as UDHR, ICESCR, and ICCPR are said to exist at all times there are limitation clauses within these treaties that allows states to suspend certain human rights during times of emergencies. During times of war, however, it is the Hague Conventions of 1899, and 1907, and the Four Geneva Conventions of 1949, that become the standard international law governing a state's methods of conducting hostilities and occupations. These conventions stress three broad principles of military action: necessity, distinction, and proportionality. In counterinsurgent and counterterrorist campaigns, these principles can be sorely tested by the state because of the difficulty in distinguishing the enemy from innocent civilians. And even when this distinction is correctly made, state action against terrorist suspects within the war model is restrained by norms of human rights protocols and international law.

Most states choose to enact deterrence policies not because they are more effective or less costly but because they generate less long-term controversy. There is the added benefit that deterrence measures do not possess the uncertainty of unintended consequences that often plague proactive policies. Moreover, defensive measures are visible to the public and enhances the perception that the state is responding properly to the threat by 'doing something.' However, as Hoffman once observed terrorist groups are the "archetypical shark in the water. It must constantly move forward to survive and indeed to succeed" (2002, 313). Necessity in the form of

a state's counterterrorist measures prompts terrorist groups to constantly change tactics and targets in order to stay one-step ahead of their adversary (Hoffman 2002, 313). The imperative to survive thus forces these groups to respond to deterrence by displacement: the terrorist will seek targets that are not as heavily guarded and therefore will "impose public costs" (Drakos and Kutan 2003, Enders and Sandler 1993, Sandler and Enders 2004, Arce and Sandler 2005, 184). Arce and Sandler (2005) argued that states more often elect to employ deterrence polices at the expense of preemption, yet proactive measures provide more "public benefits" overall (Arce and Sandler 2005, 183).

Media and Human Rights Frames

The relationship between the news media and terrorist groups has been characterized as a "symbiotic" one in that terrorism as a "psychological weapon…depends upon communicating a threat to a wider society" and the media is critical in this endeavor (Wilkinson 2000, 177). For the terrorist group, the communication of its message by the media benefits them by not only providing a platform for their message and instilling a level of fear within larger population, but it also aids in recruiting potential followers and sympathizers (Wilkinson, 1997; Pries-Shimsh, 2005; Frey et al., 2007; Walsh, 2010). The media's role in this communication has been likened to that of "accomplices" or "best friend" to the terrorists in that "without the media's coverage the act's impact is arguably wasted" and limited in scope to the immediate victims of the attack (Schmid 1989, 540; Hoffman 2006, 183, 174). For the media's part, its role or business is to report the news and terrorist attacks clearly are news and they fit the old adage that 'if it bleed's, it leads.' However, the media are not merely neutral or passive in their communication of these attacks in that aspects of the event can be magnified, minimized, included, excluded and, in essence, the media acts as gatekeepers for the information conveyed (Nacos 2003, 4). In this role

as gatekeepers, the media relies on narrative frames that are influenced by a variety of factors to present the information to the public.

A frame is a conscious decision by the communicator "to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient" (Entman 1993, 52). Frames, by forming the narrative structure that prioritizes certain explanations, can define the issue, diagnose its causes, make moral or ethical judgments, and suggest solutions to the problem (Gamson and Modigliani 1989; Entman 1993; Nelson and Kinder 1996). Research has demonstrated that insignificant modifications in the wording of the frames can elicit "significant shifts of preference" and how the frame is presented, i.e. its context, also influences how it is perceived (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981; 457; Bless, Betsch, and Franzen 1998; 288, Druckman 2004, 683). The existence of a frame, however, does not automatically guarantee influence over the receiver (Entman 1993, 53). This influence depends upon preexisting knowledge of the issue in that frames appear to "activate existing beliefs and cognitions" and their greatest influence arises when the receiver's prior predispositions or beliefs about the issue are consistent with the frame (Nelson et al 1997, 235; Haider-Markel and Joslyn 2001, 536; Druckman 2001a, 228). With the existence of competing frames, however, individuals often turn to what they consider to be trustworthy sources for assistance in assessing the two and this competition can cause the framing effect to vanish because receivers tended to "revert back to the prior underlying principles" (Druckman 2001a, 244).

The frames that the media utilizes can have important implications for how the public perceives issues because scholars have noted that public opinion often remains either ambivalent or unstable on contentious issues until the media frames are communicated and that these "frames are never neutral" (Papacharissi and Oliveira 2008, 54; Nelson et al 1997; 569-570;

Berinsky and Kinder 2006, 641). The frames utilized by the media to describe terrorism, continuously reinforced through repeated coverage, has been found to be positively associated with the "perceived risk of terrorism" overall and can induce and individual psychosocial problems (Nellis and Savage 2012, 749; Bleich, Gelkopf, & Solomon, 2003). Perhaps more troubling is that research has found that a "domestic homegrown terror" frame can influence the public to support greater restrictions of civil liberties of the perpetrators ethnic group and reinforce negative stereotypes of them (Huddy, Feldman, Taber, & Lahav, 2005; Brinson and Stohl 2012, 270). This is especially relevant when the terrorist is perceived as an 'other' (i.e. Muslim) and the frame contributes to a public "climate of fear" that is used by the state to pursue prejudicial domestic policies coupled with foreign interventions such as former President Bush's "War on Terror" (Freedman and Thussu, 2012, 2).

Human rights organizations (HRO) are also dependent on media coverage of state human rights abuses to broadcast its message and to effect a change in state behavior. Likewise, a state that experiences significant terrorism generally receives extensive media coverage and this in turn leads to more attention of HROs to highlight state sanctioned human rights abuses (Asal et al 2016). Journalists utilize the multiple frames constructed by HROs in their coverage and the three most prevalent are: (1) informational frames; (2) personal frames; and (3) motivational frames (McEntire et al 2015b, 409). Informational frames place the issue within the larger context of the situation occurring in the state or states to inform and educate the reader about the abuses. Personal frames seek to connect the reader emotionally to an individual who has been abused that reflects a larger trend in the state, while motivational frames seek to increase the reader's sense of efficacy to effect change (McEntire et al 2015b, 409). The media will often utilize a mixture of all three types of these frames in its reporting on human rights abuses, yet

within the context of terrorism and the state's counterterrorist response the first two are the most relevant. The human rights frames types and how they are related to the research question will be explored in Chapter 3.

America's War on Terror

The symbiotic nature of the relationship between the media and terrorism is well established normatively: simply put, terrorist create news and the media reports it. However, what is not well established or is too difficult to determine is what influence that the media's coverage of terrorism has on the terrorist group's sympathizers or potential recruits. Does the media's coverage of the state's overreaction in the form of human rights abuses influence future terrorism? To examine this question, the primary focus of this study will be on the Unites States' 'War on Terror' that occurred directly after the attacks of 9/11 until 2016. The U.S. case provides ample data on the confluence of terrorism and the extensive media coverage of the human rights abuses that transpired during this period. The primary examples of abuses of physical integrity rights that occurred during the so-called 'War on Terror' that received media coverage are the usage of rendition, torture, the abuse of detainees, and the extra-judicial killing of suspected terrorists. Rendition involves the clandestine removal or transferring of suspected terrorists without any judicial proceeding from a state to another state that has a good working relationship with the C.I.A. This is done with the intention of the foreign state interrogating the prisoner utilizing tactics that are only illegal in the United States and that U.S. personnel are barred from utilizing. These renditions also transfer prisoners to what is termed 'black sites' by the C.I.A. with the intention of isolating them from any sort of legal remedies to their detentions. The media began reporting on this practice in 2002, with a story by Chandrasekaran and Finn of the *Washington Post* that revealed the rendition of Muhammad Saad Iqbal from Indonesia to

Egypt at the request of the U.S. Other articles appeared that year and the next, but the issue did not reach a critical juncture until 2004-2005, with a series of articles by Dana Priest of the *Washington Post* that fully detailed how widespread the practice had become.

Within these media accounts, rendition and the usage of torture on suspected terrorists are often intertwined. In early 2002, the Bush administration developed legal memorandums justifying the use of enhanced interrogation techniques and furthermore argued that the Geneva Convention protections did not apply to captured terrorists. This story broke in the summer of 2004, shortly after the revelations of prisoner abuse at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. One of the legal memos was leaked to the press and shortly afterwards the other memos were declassified and released. The 'torture' memorandums exploited the ambiguities in international law to justify enhanced interrogations that were widely condemned as violating international norms, laws, and barely legally skirted both international treaties and U.S. federal law. The Bush administration claimed that these interrogation practices were limited and used only in the most extreme cases, yet subsequent media coverage exposed many instances where this was not the case. The legal rationale and the usage of enhanced interrogation techniques (i.e. torture) received extensive international and domestic media coverage, which in turn prompted legal challenges to the practices and eventual Congressional action banning its usage. It is a widely held belief that America's usage of torture on suspected terrorists in violation of international norms not only blackened its reputation and cost it international support in the 'War on Terror' but it handed terrorist groups a propaganda coup, which subsequently led to increased recruiting and an increase in terrorist attacks.

The practice of extrajudicial killing, or drone strikes on suspected terrorists overseas, was not as firmly linked to the Obama administration as the use of torture was to the Bush

administration probably because it was merely a continuation of existing practice. However, the practice did increase significantly during the latter's administration. In these instances, the international norm against extrajudicial killings was not blatantly violated as its usage was considered in the context of a sanctioned 'conflict' and most of the international media's criticism focused on innocent civilian deaths. Even after Obama's Department of Justice's legal rationale for lethal action against an American citizen overseas who were deemed terrorist leaked to the press, it did not create the level of controversy as the torture memos did. A majority of these actions were viewed internationally as legitimate under the laws of warfare and they did not generate significant international or domestic pressure to change the policy. However, as the number of drone-strikes increased along with the number of civilian casualties associated with these strikes, the international media began to publically question and criticize the U.S. policy. Similar to the usage of torture, drone-strikes had the propensity to hand terrorist groups further propaganda advantages.

It is important to note in this study the distinction between the actual human rights violation, the media's coverage of these events, and their influence on future terrorist actions. For instance, it is impossible to gauge the influence of a drone strike that killed civilians in Pakistan on a potential terrorist sympathizer in New York without considering the role of the media in communicating these events. Was it the actual human rights violation or the media's type of coverage that influenced future terrorism? This dissertation, while recognizing that the actual human rights violations can have an impact on future terrorism, if these violations were not communicated to a larger audience in some fashion then their influence would be severely blunted. This dissertation's quantitative results indicate that America's human rights abuses of torture and extrajudicial killings and the subsequent media coverage on these issues had the most

positive influence on future terrorist actions. These influences did not significantly change when the data was delineated between Muslim and non-Muslim states. Media reports on rendition and detention (or a combination of issues), however, had no real influence on terrorism in any of the models. When the media reports on the human rights violations were divided into personal versus informational frames and their location within the article were examined the results were not surprising. Personal frames in the headline outperformed informational frames no matter where they were located, but both frames had the almost the same influence in the lead of the article. The real differences between the two frames and their locations become apparent when they are separated between Muslim and non-Muslim majority states. Personal frames located in the headline and lead locations in Muslim states are twice as influential on future terrorism as in non-Muslim states. Conversely, informational frames are significant in the lead location in only non-Muslim states while the body location is influential in Muslim states. On the qualitative side, anecdotal evidence tying media framing of human rights abuses to future terrorism was plentiful because most of the 'lone-wolf' terrorists at some point attempted to defend their actions as a justifiable response to America's 'War on Terror.' However, actual cause and effect evidence of trends of media reporting on these abuses directly leading to terrorism generally lacks in concrete influence.

Chapter 2: Theoretical Causes of Terrorism, the Connection to Human Rights Violations, and the Role of the Media

Micro Theories of Terrorism

The various explanations for terrorist activity have generally focused on individual (micro) or state (macro) level causes. The public often possesses the common misperception that individual terrorists are abnormal in some way. Yet, from the individual psychological perspective, current research has yielded little in the way of a "specific psychopathology of terrorism" and some scholars conclude that a generic "terrorist personality probably does not exist" (Crenshaw 2000, 407; Victoroff 2005, 31). While most terrorists do not usually suffer from psychiatric disorders, the perception that terrorists are abnormal persists in large part due to an "attribution bias" of the researchers themselves (Victoroff 2005, 12; Silke 1998, 67). Within the micro level explanations, the first question that arises is the rationality of terrorism itself. Rational agents are typically assumed to possess stable and constant goals, they calculate the likely costs and benefits of their actions, and then they choose the action that best meets their optimal expected utility (Abrahms 80, 2008). Rational choice theorists posit that individual terrorists and terrorist groups are rational actors who make a conscious and calculated decision to employ terrorism as the optimum strategy to achieve their goals (Sandler, Tschirhart, and Cauley 1983; Sandler and Lapan 1988). The assumption of rationality by scholars allows them to examine a variety of issues that arise due to terrorist activity. For instance, Sandler, Tschirhart, and Cauley (1983) presented a rational actor model that examined the interactions between terrorist groups and the government during the hostage negotiation process. Their results indicated that strategies to reduce this type of behavior ultimately depend upon "the risk attitudes and constraints of both the terrorists and the policymakers" (77). Furthermore, Sandler and

Lapan (1988) examined the spill-over or displacement effect of terrorist groups preferring to attack less defended targets. Their conclusion demonstrated that governments sharing information on a terrorist's groups target selection actually "exacerbates inefficiency" when these efforts are not coupled with adequate deterrence coordination between the two states (259).

The rational actor perspective has been expounded upon in three other notable studies. Pape (2003), utilizing examples of suicide terrorist campaigns against third-party occupying forces, demonstrated that the tactic has utility in producing the desired result, namely the removal of the occupying forces. Pape argued that suicide terrorism "follows a strategic logic" and that while the actual perpetrators may be "irrational or fanatical, the leadership groups that recruit and direct them are not" (2003, 344). Pape advanced five key findings: suicide terrorism is strategic, it is most effective when employed against democracies, the tactic has achieved positive results in that "moderate suicide terrorism led to moderate sessions," while "ambitious suicide terrorist campaigns" were not likely to succeed, and finally, the best counterterrorism policy is to "reduce terrorist confidence in their ability to carry out such attacks in the target society" (2003, 344). Suicide terrorism is an effective strategy against democratic societies because it "enhances in the public mind the expectation of future damage" and public pressure on elected officials can lead to concessions (2003, 346). The incidences of suicide terrorism only account for 3% of the total events, yet, they comprise 40% of the fatalities (2003, 344-345). To support his argument, Pape examined the historical record of these types of sustained campaigns from 1982 to 2001, (excluding 9/11) and noted that in each instance the terrorist groups main goal was to coerce "a foreign government that has military forces in what they see as their homeland to take those forces out" (2003, 348). In the examples that he studied all of foreign governments were democracies and this factor led the terrorists to assume a muted response to

their provocations (2003, 350). A crucial historical example that demonstrated the effectiveness of suicide campaign attacks was when Hezbollah targeted US and French forces in Beirut in the early 1980s and later targeted Israeli forces in Lebanon causing all three democratic states to withdrawal their military forces (2003, 357). Hoffman and McCormick (2004) approached the rationality of suicide terrorism by likening it to a "signaling game" that communicates the group's capabilities and resolve to accomplish their goals through violence (244). These signaling strategies are based on deception, because while the terrorists must show "strength and determination" to the audience and the state, but at the same time they must not jeopardize their overall security (2004, 247). The decision to use this tactic, even though it might jeopardize their security is an example of the "logic consequences…(that) assumes decision-makers have an established and stable set of preferences…and select the operational alternative that offers the highest expected return" (2004, 248). Hoffman and McCormick noted a couple of reasons why groups use suicide attacks: they are cheaper and inflict more damage than regular operations; the influence on the public's perceptions is greater than with regular attacks; it builds solidarity and motivation within the group; and it can deflect moral outrage by the public against the group (2004; 249-251). Rationalism as defined by Caplan (2006) in its thin sense, is that "all action is rational by definition. If you use means to achieve ends, you are rational" (93). However, the thicker definition includes three standards: responsiveness to incentives, narrow selfishness, and rational expectations (Caplan 2006, 93). Responsiveness to incentives details if the price terroristic activity fell considerably, then sympathizers "could kill hated enemies at no risk to themselves" and they would mobilize, however, risk in clandestine activities is always a distinct possibility (Caplan 2006, 94). Terrorist groups are typically smaller and less militarily capable than the state they target and so they must focus on strategies and tactics that have the lowest

costs but return the highest expected gain (Caplan 2006, 94). Narrow selfishness is harder to conceptualize with suicide terrorism, yet Caplan noted that only a small number of terrorist groups use this tactic and even within these groups, "the number called upon to die is very small compared to the total number" of members (Caplan 2006, 95). Rational expectations require an unbiased belief that an action will produce the desired result on the terrorist part (Caplan 2006, 97). Caplan assumes that "agents estimate the costs and benefits without bias. In equilibrium, they may hold many irrational beliefs; but the choice to be irrational reflects a rational estimate of the price" (Caplan 2006, 99). If the price of irrationality increases, then at some point a rational reassessment must occur. Irrationality has the advantage of allowing people to preserve their, "preferred beliefs despite logic and evidence," but once the price for this irrationality spikes, for instance volunteering for suicide missions, "far fewer hands go up than you might think" (Caplan 2006, 98,100).

The assumption of terrorists' rationality, however, has been disputed by a variety of scholars (Abrahms 2006, 2008; Crenshaw 2000). If one were to judge the rationality of the tactic in lieu of its success rates in achieving its stated goals, then as Abrahms noted, these groups are not very rational (2006, 2012). However, the paramount problem with judging terrorist success by their stated goals is basically one of credibility. As Abrahms himself described, terrorist goals are often protean and as such are sometimes ambiguous, amorphous, and grandiose (2008, 82). They are essentially political statements designed specifically for public consumption to justify the group's violent actions and they should be given the same scrutiny that all political statements receive. Abrahms also disputed the notions that terrorist are "political utility maximizers" and are thus rational within this context (2008, 78). The strategic model assumes that terrorist organizations are driven by "relatively stable and consistent political preferences"

and that they "evaluate the expected political payoffs" (Abrahms 2008, 79). Furthermore, in this model these groups only resort to terrorism "when the expected political return is superior to those of alternative options" (Abrahms 2008, 79). Abrahms compared these three assumptions with what he identified as the "seven common tendencies" of all terrorist organizations to contradict the strategic model (Abrahms 2008, 79). These tendencies are manifold: terrorist groups rarely attain the goals they set out to achieve; terrorism is often the first choice of some groups; they rarely compromise; their goals are not stable and change quite often; the occurrence of anonymous terrorist attacks; the high incidence of "wars of annihilation" against other groups; and the fact terrorist groups almost never willingly abandon violence (Abrahms 2008, 82, 84, 85, 87, 89, 90). It is Abrahms conclusion that since terrorist groups do not cleanly fit into the strategic model then their actions by its definition are not rational. Crenshaw (2000) simply noted that terrorist group's political goals are almost never achieved and that these failures cast doubt on an overarching rationalist theory of terrorism. Furthermore, rational choice theory does little to explain why so few people out of the millions who share the same experiences as the terrorist do resort to such violence (Victoroff 2005, 17).

Macro Theories of Terrorism

Macro state level explanations for terrorism have had greater utility in attempting to explain the phenomenon of terrorism. These explanations have been informed by the theories that sought to explain the intricate problems of collective action and the underlying causes of why people engage in dissent and revolutions. The work of Davies (1962) and Gurr (1970) focused on the deprived actor model in which the deprivation of economic and political rights served as the foci point for collective dissent. Davies hypothesized that "revolutions are most likely to occur when a prolonged period of objective economic and social development is

followed by a short period of sharp reversal" (Davies 1962, 6). The rising levels of achievement subsequently increases an individual's expectations of the future and when this diverges from reality, i.e., with a sharp economic or political downturn, the fissure between the two, often referred to as the 'J-curve,' creates a sense of 'relative deprivation' or resentment against the powers that be that can lead to political violence (Mason 2004, 33). Ted Gurr enhanced Davies theories by incorporating different aspects of deprivation, namely decremental and aspirational, which delineated the gap between expectations, achievements, and a constant (Mason 2004, 33). He also introduced the term coercive balance, the variable that defines the relationship between a government's capabilities to enforce its dictates versus a dissident population's ability to challenge them (Mason 2004, 33). Likewise, Gurr's theory postulated that "the widespread perception of relative deprivation leads to discontent, which tends to lead to politicization of discontent, which leads to political violence" (Gurr 1970, 12-13). Thus, both theories rest on the perception of economic or political deprivation rather than reality.

Previous research has included a host of economic variables that lead to an increase in terrorism. For Blomberg, Hess, and Weerpana (2004) it is economic contractions in high income democratic states that fosters this sense of relative deprivation and can lead to political violence within them (463). These scholars, along with Drakos and Gofas (2004), demonstrated that economic contractions have been shown to be, "positively correlated with increased terrorist violence" (Mesquita 2005a, 516). On the other hand, Krueger and Laitin (2008) determined that economics matters only in target determination; it is political oppression that creates the conditions ripe for terrorism and Tavares (2004) found that higher income states were more likely to suffer attacks. Several other studies have included GDP and GDP per capita as a determinant for terrorist activity and have had negative results. Abadie (2006) failed to find any

significant correlation between economic variables and terrorism once specific state-level characteristics were controlled for (55). Berman and Laitin's (2008) examination focused on suicide terrorism and found that GDP and GDP per capita "predicts a small and statistically insignificant" variation in annual terrorist attacks (1949). Continuing with the economic determinants, Feldmann and Perälä (2004) found no significant correlation between inflation or economic performance and terrorism, yet, along with Goldstein (2005) they determined that there was a statistically significant association between unemployment rates and incidences of terrorism. Piazza (2006) concluded that there is no significant relationship between economic development and terrorism, however, there are variables that do contribute to the problem such as ethnic and religious diversity, state repression, and most importantly the structure of the state's political system (159). The author highlighted the social cleavage theory of political systems that noted that "more diverse societies, in terms of ethnic and religious demography and political systems with large, complex, multiparty systems" are more likely to experience terrorism (Piazza 2006, 171). Krueger and Maleckova (2002) basically echo Piazza by stating that, "Any connection between poverty, education, and terrorism is indirect, complicated, and probably quite weak" (1).

Researchers have examined a host of macro level state variables to establish a correlation with terrorism. These include: poverty indices (Kurrild-Klitgaard et al. 2006); literacy and school attendance rates (Blomberg and Hess 2008a; Krueger and Maleckova 2003; Kurrild-Klitgaard et al. 2006); mortality rates of infants and overall population life expectancy (Drakos and Gofas 2006a; Kurrild-Klitgaard et al. 2006); inequality (Abadie 2006; Piazza 2006); extensive state social safety nets and redistributive policies and the level of international aid (Azam and Delacroix 2006; Azam and Thelen 2008; Burgoon 2006; Crenshaw et al. 2007; Robison et al.

2006); economic regulation that protects domestic interests (Basuchoudhary and Shughart 2010; Kurrild-Klitgaard et al. 2006; Piazza 2008b); globalization (Blomberg and Hess 2008b; Blomberg and Rosendorff 2009; Li and Schaub 2004); and natural resources (Sambanis 2008; Tavares 2004). However, of the above hypothesized causes of terrorism only a few explanations have been supported by the data and other studies have found no significant relationship between economic development and terrorism (Gassebener and Luechinger 2011, 238; Piazza 2006, 159). These contradicting findings are reconciled by noting that while terrorists are generally not poor or uneducated it is the perception of relative deprivation that exists within a society that increases potential terrorist activity.

Another state level factor that may influence terrorist activity that has been studied is the relationship between terrorism and democracies (Crenshaw 1981; Sandler 1995; Enders and Sandler 2006). It is hypothesized that democracies with their emphasis on an open and free society that respects the civil liberties of its citizens actually enables terrorist groups to form and to survive (Frey and Luechinger 2003; Eubank and Weinberg 1994). To examine this influence, most research incorporates various measures of democracy (Blomberg and Hess 2008b; Blomberg and Rosendorff 2009; Drakos and Gofas 2006b; Eyerman 1998; Li 2005; Piazza 2008b); political rights (Abadie 2006); and/or civil liberties (Krueger and Laitin 2008; Krueger and Maleckova 2003). In essence, democratic states seem to be more susceptible to terrorism if the study focuses on the location of the incident and less so if the focus is on the nationality of the terrorist (Eubank and Weinberg 2001; Weinberg and Eubank 1998). However, there has been other research that has demonstrated a curvilinear relationship between political participation rights and terrorist related activity (Abadie 2006, Kurrild-Klitgaard et al 2006).

Human Rights Violations and Terrorism

The relationship between democracy and terrorism has been contested by other research that examined discriminatory political practices and human rights abuses by the state. Regimes that oppress their citizens politically, especially ethnic minorities within the state, coupled with the structure of the governing system, a fragile civil rights record, government instability, and weak political institutions have all been demonstrated to be positively associated with increased terrorist activity (Crenshaw 1981; Piazza 2006; Krueger and Maleckova 2003; Krueger 2007; Krueger and Laitin 2008). This research is further buttressed by others that demonstrated those states that protect civil liberties, such as freedom of expression, association, and personal autonomy, have less terrorism (Abrahms 2007). In particular, Piazza and Walsh (2010), validated that abuses of physical integrity rights can actually increase terrorist activity (553). The rationale behind this assertion is that these abuses alienate segments of the population that are crucial in intelligence gathering on terrorist activity, that abuses could create political schisms within the state damaging counterterrorist efforts, and ultimately damaging the state's ability to cooperate internationally in combating the threat (Piazza and Walsh 2010, 552).

Continuing with Piazza and Walsh's theme, the causes of terrorism, both micro and macro, are therefore linked with the reaction of the state to the violence and its responses to prevent it. Terrorism has the propensity to affect human rights in two principle ways: the first is the obvious effect on the victim's right to life, and the second involves the states reaction to the act which oftentimes leads to the interference of human rights of its citizens (Eicke 2003, 452). States are faced with the dual problem of protecting its citizens from these acts, yet at the same time "not interfering disproportionately or at all with the human rights of those within their jurisdiction" (Eicke 2003, 455). This delicate balance is often disrupted when the state overreacts to acts of terrorism with harsh indiscriminate crackdowns (Stewart 2005, 685). These domestic

counterterrorism policies have become substantial and more comprehensive as the threats grow and additively human rights concerns have paralleled their growth (Stewart 2005, 692). The state is faced with an almost unresolvable dilemma in that "Human rights norms constrain state responses to terrorism more clearly and directly than they govern the conduct of terrorists" (Stewart 2005, 687, quoting Fitzpatrick). How the state reacts to terrorism can have consequences in that if it abuses the human rights of its citizens it "makes it more likely that terrorists organizations will find it easier to recruit" (Hoffman 2004, 935). The main problem with the existing research lies in the fact that terrorist mobilization is largely hidden from view and it is often measured simply by the observing the relationship between the relevant casual factors believed to contribute to the phenomena and the number and intensity of the terrorist events. Human rights abuses, on the other hand, are measured much more stringently and publicized in an attempt to pressure states to meet their obligations on these rights under international law. States are truly faced with a dilemma. The assumption that governmental oppression gives rise to the mobilization of terrorism is often too simplistic of an answer. Not every oppressed person becomes a terrorist, if so, logic would dictate that there would be vast numbers of them overwhelming states around the globe.

The Media and Terrorism

In reviewing the literature on the micro and micro determinants of terrorism we concluded with the observation that states that violate the human rights of its citizens have the propensity to experience more of this type of violence. Yet something is still missing. Both terrorism and human rights violations are used to communicate a message. These messages need a medium: the media. Research on the media and terrorism generally focuses on three aspects: the relationship between the media and terrorist groups, how the media portrays or frames

terrorism, and the consequences of the type of coverage. The relationship between the news media and terror groups has been characterized as a "symbiotic" one in that terrorism as a "psychological weapon…depends upon communicating a threat to a wider society" and the media is critical in this endeavor (Wilkinson 2000, 177). For the terror group, the communication of its message by the media benefits them by not only disseminating their message and instilling a level of fear within larger population, but it also aids in recruiting potential followers and sympathizers (Wilkinson, 1997; Pries-Shimsh, 2005; Frey et al., 2007; Walsh, 2010).

The media exists primarily as a commercial entity whose purpose is to generate revenue, i.e. they are in the business of reporting the news and terrorist attacks obviously count as such. Yet, often in their reporting the media does not do so passively. They adopt certain tones, narrative structures, and magnify or minimize some aspects of the event to, in essence, editorialize the news. The core essence of a frame is its "central organizing idea or storyline that provides meaning to an unfolding strip of events, leaving a connection among them. The frame suggests what the controversy is about, the essence of the issue" (Gamson and Modigliani 1989, 143). It has been asserted that media frames power lies in their ability to accentuate certain "values, facts, or other considerations, endowing them with greater apparent relevance to the issue than they might do appear to have under an alternative frame" (Nelson et al.1997). When important controversies arise, public opinions often remain either ambivalent or unstable until the influential media frames are communicated (Nelson et al.1997). Media's frames are largely dependent on the victims of terrorist attacks, "proximity of political values," or similarity between the reporting media's state and the victim state, and greater emphasis on the event itself rather than the context of the larger political environment (Yarchi et al 2013, 275, 266). In the case of the American media, coverage and types of frames used depend upon the victim states

proximity to and affinity with the U.S. along with the scale of the attack (Sui et al 2017). The consequences of the relationship between the media and terrorism is reflected in studies that have shown that significant media coverage of terrorism increases the fear of the act itself that has no relation to the statistical probability of becoming a victim of an attack (Slone, 2000; Forest et al., 2012; Nellis and Savage 2012; Schneier 2003; Jackson 2005). This factor, coupled with the trend of Muslims as a whole being negatively framed and Islam being portrayed as a violent religion because of the actions of a few terrorist group, can have potentially negative consequences (Ahmed and Matthes 2017).

Anti-Americanism and Terrorism

How the media frames terrorism, however, is only part of the picture. What is just as significant is how the media frames the state response to terrorism. Yet, these frames are not consistent throughout the various international media outlets and are dependent on a few factors. For starters, is there true freedom of the press in the media accounts of the state response frame or is it merely reflecting the governments preferred frame? Another question to ask, are there any inherent biases at work within either the media or the governments frame? It is far easier to measure freedom of the press as a quantifiable score than it is to measure or identify bias within the international media. Bias within the media can have an influence how they frame their reporting on terrorism and the states response to the violence. For the purposes of this study it is therefore relevant to examine anti-Americanism sentiments internationally and how these can influence the various media frames.

Anti-Americanism has been defined as “any hostile act or expression that becomes part and parcel of an undifferentiated attack on the foreign policy, society, culture, and values of the United States” and more broadly as “a psychological tendency to hold negative views of the

United States and of American society in general" (Rubinstein and Smith 1988, 36; Katzenstein and Keohane 2007, 12). There are two theories that attempt to explain anti-Americanism globally. The scapegoating theory basically encompasses a states elites blaming America for domestic problems if it helps them electorally and resistance theory is that anti-Americanism is a "realist response to protect the interests of a nation from U.S. influence" (Jhee 2008, 303). Both theories share a belief that individual opinions are influenced by what the U.S. does, as in foreign policy or what the U.S. is culturally. Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. has been perceived globally as the foremost military superpower and this perception, perhaps, helps to explain why anti-Americanism sentiment fluctuates as much as it does (Katzenstein and Keohane 2007, 2). Anti-Americanism, for the most part, is "closely tied to U.S. policy" and as it changes, so too does international opinion (Katzenstein and Keohane 2007, 10, 20).

And herein resides the crux of anti-Americanism sentiments: these frames are ultimately communicated by the elites of a state and through the media. These two have the most influence on shaping individual perceptions because significant changes in U.S. foreign policy are not experienced by most people personally but are simply based on these communications. The success of communicating anti-American frames depends upon a variety of factors: personal qualities of the frame recipient, such as knowledge of the subject being framed and/or political or partisan predisposition (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Entman 1989; Jarvis and Petty 1996; Haider-Markel and Joslyn 2001; Druckman and Nelson 2003; Nelson et al 1997, 235), the content of the message, such as does the message conflict with prior beliefs or does it add new information (Smith and Petty 1996; Druckman 2001a, 2004), and the identity of the messenger because "highly credible sources are more persuasive than ones of low credibility" and are more likely to be accepted (Dholakia and Sternthal 1977; Lupia 2000; Druckman 2001b). Media

reports and elite communications are often the only information that a greater part of the international community has access to and these communications are then "filtered through their own prevailing schemas about the U.S." (Katzenstein and Keohane 2007, 25). So in essence, if the recipient is already biased against American foreign policy, a biased and anti-American message from a trusted source will be readily accepted.

Nowhere is anti-American sentiment more evident than in the Muslim world and this is chiefly fueled by American foreign policy, namely the 'War on Terror' (Chiozza 2007, 97, 106;). Similar to a majority of the people in the world, "Muslims are open to persuasion on the issue of anti-Americanism and susceptible to elite influence through mass media" (Lynch 2007; Nisbet and Myers 2011). In communicating these frames, Muslim elites have an intermediate role in that they regulate what information the public hears, how it is perceived, and how the public incorporates it into their political belief system (Blaydes and Linzer 2012, 225). Therefore, the scapegoating and resistance theories of anti-Americanism are exacerbated because of the intensity of domestic political competition between Islamists and secular parties that encompass much of the Muslim world (Blaydes and Linzer 2012, 225-226). What compounds these sentiments is the firmly established narrative within the Muslim world that America generally acts in a "hostile, aggressive, and untrustworthy" fashion that is "grounded in historical memories of specific US policies and fueled by ongoing grievances with those policies" (Lynch 2007, 197). Yet, there exists varieties of these sentiments in the Muslim public discourse because the general anti-Americanism of the jihadist is completely different than the mainstream politically motivated resentment (Lynch 2007, 198).

This difference of opinion between the two sections is reinforced by the factor that "one cannot always assume a positive relationship between anti-American sentiments and support for

terrorist organizations" and that making Muslims angry does not necessarily "turn them into terrorist(s)" (Ciftcil, O'Donnell, and Tanner 2017, 492; Lynch 2007, 198). Yet, what is troubling, is the existing narrative that all American foreign policy actions are perceived as threatening to the rest of the world. This narrative is present not only in the Muslim media but within the international media as well and this "media routinely frames US actions and policies in ways that cast doubt on US intentions or presents them as actively inimical" (Lynch 2007, 202).

Chapter 3: Theorizing the Connection: The Media, Human Rights Violations, and Future Terrorism.

The first chapter offered a conceptual definition of terrorism and the second chapter explored the literature of the macro and micro causes of terrorism. To fully understand how the media's presentations of human rights abuses that occur due to a state's counterterrorism policies influence future terrorist activity, in this chapter I link the individual level explanations of terrorism with the framing perspective that is widely used in studies of media influence. The macro theories of terrorism posit that there are links between the larger scale aspects of society, such as economic forces or variations in political rights that can influence the advent of terrorism. Yet this reasoning ignores a crucial link between the macro and the micro: communication of information. All of the micro-level explanations for terrorism, both rational choice and psychological, agree that information is critical to the decision-making process. Some rational choice perspectives also recognize the limitations of human mind to process the available information without bias and acknowledge that deviations from the pure rational choice logic are frequent (Crenshaw 2000; Caplan 2006, 97; Victoroff 2005, 17). In other words, individuals' dispositions, their backgrounds, and their perceptions vary widely and more often than not, "Passion often trumps rationality" (Victoroff 2005, 17).

Theory Building Process

In order to begin examining the causal effect of media frames of human rights abuses on future terrorism, one must first discuss theories and their components. In its simplest form, a theory is merely a "set of related statements explaining some series of events" (Beauchamp 1972, 16). These related statements help to organize the subject matter in such a manner as to make them more comprehensible. Waltz likened a theory to a mental picture that is a "depiction

of the organization of a domain and the connections among its parts" that is formed by "envisioning a pattern where none is visible to the naked eye" (2010, 8, 10). Theories are different than laws. Whereas laws are "facts of observation," theories are "speculative processes introduced to explain them" (Waltz 2010, 6). In other words, while "laws identify invariant or probable associations" theories attempt to explain why those associations exist (Waltz 2010, 5).

Theories help simplify reality for the purposes of determining cause and effect relationships. To accomplish this, theories isolate and stress that "some factors are more important than others" (Waltz 2010, 8). In this isolation, Waltz furthermore stressed that the theories importance lies not in "whether the isolation of the realm is realistic, but whether it is useful" and that this "usefulness is judged by the explanatory and predictive powers of the theory" (Waltz 2010, 8)

A theory essentially consists of four parts. First, there are the definitions of the basic elements of the theory. At one end of the spectrum these definitions (or variables) merely describe the components of the theory and at the other end they relate the theory to the observations (Carter 2017, 55). The second element of the theory is the relationship that the defined variables have to one another and the phenomenon that they are attempting to describe (Wacker 1998, 363). Within this second component, are theoretical assumptions that describe the functional relationship between the concepts of the theory itself. These assumptions allow for the creation of hypotheses that are utilized to test the validity of the overall theory. The third and fourth elements of the theory consist of the scope of the theory, and the explicit predictions that the theory makes (Wacker 1998, 363).

Media and Human Rights Framing Model

This theoretical account begins with the assumption that the existence of unfavorable economic and political conditions may not be enough to push individuals toward terrorist violence. What may be necessary is to strengthen individuals' 'motive' or increase their 'incentive' to participate in terrorist violence. This theory asserts that it is not simply the factor that human rights abuses occurred during states counterterrorist efforts, but the manner in which this information is communicated to the public that can become a precipitant that can push individuals over the edge. Why? First, research has shown that individuals who commit terrorist acts believe that their actions are not only moral and good, but justified in violently resisting the perceived oppression of the state (Crenshaw 2011). Terror groups adopt the role of "righteous avengers" for the people, and when the state sanctioned human rights violations occur, it not only lowers the threshold for acceptable violent response, but it also increasingly validates terrorist sympathizer's perceptions of the state (Crenshaw 2011; Mesquita 2005a, 520). In effect, harsh and indiscriminate counterterrorism reprisals by governmental forces positively influence recruiting efforts of terrorist groups by increasing among the population its "ideological anger against the government" (Mesquita 2005a, 520; Hoffman 2004, 935). Terror groups seek to lower the costs for their sympathizers by taking actions that goad the government into retaliating with harsh countermeasures where "the risk of inaction outweigh(s) the risk of revolt" for the potential terrorist (Lichbach 1994:13). These harsh counterterrorism measures can often change the type of public good for people and since they are "often more sensitive to losses than gains," any negative economic consequences can further arose opposition to the government (Quattrone and Tversky 1988; Lichbach 1994, 14-15). Harsh counterterrorist policies can also be exploited by many terrorist groups through the adroit use of propaganda, ideological and religious

manipulation, and selective targeting of attacks to encourage these reprisals all in the hopes of furthering their political goals (Crenshaw 1981, 383-384; Mesquita 2005a, 517).

Second, perpetrators of terrorism often identity with the perceived victims of social and political injustice they claim to be fighting for. When the state responds to terrorist activity with harsh counterterrorist policies that abuse the human rights of this group, it can further alienate this core population and "makes it more likely that terrorist organizations will find it easier to recruit" (Hoffman 2004, 935). In particular, Piazza and Walsh noted that abuses of physical integrity rights of a population can actually increase terrorist activity (Piazza and Walsh 2010, 553). And lastly, individual perpetrators of terrorist violence often share feelings of anger, alienation, and/or disenfranchisement that stems from an association with a disaffected larger group. While the terrorist or the sympathizer might not have suffered personally, insults and abuse of the larger group will trigger a sense of moral outrage and anger (McCauley 2006; 17). The media is critical to this theory for one primary reason: it communicates information on both the terrorist events and the subsequent human rights abuses by the state. The symbiotic relationship between the media and terrorism is aptly demonstrated in the fact that journalists are in the business of selling stories and the terrorist are in the business of creating them to advance their various causes (Dowling 1986; Laqueur 1976; Weimann and Winn 1994). In the modern sense, terrorism relies on the media to spread its message through relating the events that it perpetrated (Nacos 1996, 2007; Paletz and Schmid 1992; Schmid and de Graaf 1982).

As mentioned previously, the media is in the business of reporting current events and terrorist attacks certainty demand their attention, however, the government's counterterrorist response also merits considerable media attention. How the media frames the government's response is essential because they are emphasizing some aspects of the story to "make them

more salient" and in this instance it is the human rights abuses committed by the government (Entman 1993, 52). Often, what prompted these abuses is forgotten. It should be noted that media's framing of these abuses does not automatically guarantee acceptance by the receiver of this information (Entman 1993, 53). The influence of the frame is contingent upon the receiver already possessing a bias against the frames target that "activate(s) existing beliefs" and reinforces their prior predispositions (Nelson et al 1997, 235; Haider-Markel and Joslyn 2001, 536; Druckman 2001a, 228). How the media frames its reporting on human rights abuses committed by the government in response to terrorist attacks has important implications for how the public perceives these events because public opinion will often remain ambivalent to human rights abuses, especially after recent terrorist attacks (Papacharissi and Oliveira 2008, 54; Nelson et al 1997; 569-570). In essence, the media's framing of these abuses is never neutral, the government committing human rights violations can never be portrayed as anything other than the villain (Berinsky and Kinder 2006, 641).

Terrorism attracts media coverage and so too do human rights violations. States that experiences significant amounts of terrorist attacks will often receive extensive media coverage and this in turn will lead to more attention from human rights organizations (HRO) that will highlight the state sanctioned human rights abuses (Asal et al 2016). In their reporting on human rights violations committed by a government, journalists will often utilize the multiple types of frames that were constructed by HROs in their coverage. The most prevalent are: informational frames; personal frames; and motivational frames (McEntire et al 2015b, 409). Informational frames describe the abuses within the larger context of the events occurring and seek to educate the receiver on the raw number and instances of abuse. These frames are largely unemotional. Personal frames, on the other hand, seek to connect the reader emotionally to an individual who

has been abused and then tie the abuse to a larger trend of abuse, while motivational frames seek to increase the reader's sense of efficacy to effect change (McEntire et al 2015b, 409). The media will often utilize a mixture of all three types of these frames in its reporting on human rights abuses, yet within the context of terrorism and the state's counterterrorist response the first two are the most relevant.

Hypotheses

The crux of the theory is that it is not merely human rights violations alone that influence future terrorism. While these abuses can by themselves be the precipitant for terrorism, this theory asserts that it is the extensive media coverage of these abuses and how they are framed that will further influence those individuals who were initially neutral, apathetic, or even slightly sympathetic to the terrorists cause. The media's amplified coverage of human rights violations will increase the likelihood that these sympathetic individuals will become further radicalized and join in terror activity (Piazza and Walsh 2010; Mesquita 2005a; Hoffman 2004). The frequency of media coverage of human rights abuses by a state and how these violations are framed are important and will have an influence on how these events will be perceived by the public. These assertion's leads to the following hypotheses:

> *Hypothesis 1a*: The frequency of media coverage of human rights abuses due to the U.S.'s counterterrorism policies will be positively associated with an increase in the frequency of terrorism. (Model 1a)

The freedom of the press from state control is essential to conveying information detailing the human rights abuses of the U.S.'s counterterrorism policies. The more freedom the media enjoys will equal more exposure to counterterrorism's human rights abuses. Therefore:

Hypothesis 1b: The frequency of media coverage of human rights abuses due to the U.S.'s counterterrorism policies will be positively associated with an increase in the frequency of terrorism only in those states with a free or partial free press. (Models 1b,1c 1d)

The current emphasis of the U.S.'s counterterrorism policies focus largely on Al-Qaeda and ISIS and other associated Islamic extremist groups that are based largely in Muslim majority states. Therefore:

Hypothesis 2: The frequency of media coverage of human rights abuses due to the U.S.'s counterterrorism policies will be positively associated with an increase in the frequency of terrorism in Muslim majority states. (Model 2a & 2b)

Personal frames evoke more emotion in the reader because they personalize the abuses and provoke a sense of outrage. The location of the personal frame is also important. Frames that are prominently displayed in the headline or the lead paragraph grab the readers' attention more than those that are in the body or dispersed in the article. Therefore:

Hypothesis 3a: The frequency of media coverage that contains personal frames of U.S.'s counterterrorism's human rights abuses that are in the headline or lead paragraph will be positively associated with an increase in the frequency of terrorism. (Model 3a)

Hypothesis 3b: The frequency of media coverage that contains personal frames of human rights abuses due to the U.S.'s counterterrorism policies will be positively associated with an increase in the frequency of terrorism only in those states with a free or partial free press. (Models 3b, 3c, & 3d)

Hypothesis 4: The frequency of media coverage of human rights abuses that contains personal frames due to the U.S.'s counterterrorism policies will be positively associated

with an increase in the frequency of terrorism in Muslim majority states. (Models 4a & 4b)

Hypothesis 5a: The frequency of media coverage that contains informational frames of U.S.'s counterterrorism's human rights abuses that are in the headline or lead paragraph will be positively associated with an increase in the frequency of terrorism. (Model 5a)

Hypothesis 5b: The frequency of media coverage that contains informational frames of human rights abuses due to the U.S.'s counterterrorism policies will be positively associated with an increase in the frequency of terrorism only in those states with a free or partial free press. (Model 5b, 5c, & 5d)

Hypothesis 6: The frequency of media coverage of human rights abuses that contains informational frames due to the U.S.'s counterterrorism policies will be positively associated with an increase in the frequency of terrorism in Muslim majority states. (Models 6a & 6b)

Chapter 4: Abuses in the U.S. War on Terror

The abuses that occurred during America's counterterrorism efforts were not publicly revealed by the media all at once. Some of the abuses took years of investigative media reporting before the full scope was revealed. And even then, some abuses were given priority in the media over others and the type of reporting differed depending on the nationality of the media. U.S. media tended to utilize a national legal or political frame, while the international media focused on aspects of the abuses that had direct relevance to its audience. This included reports about local citizens detained or local victims of drone attacks, for example. What follows is a review of news media's reporting on each scandal involving the U.S. personnel and human rights abuses. This review is not a comprehensive review but focuses on the themes that appeared in the initial reporting on these abuses: when the news about these abuses first broke out.

Rendition and Torture

Extraordinary rendition is loosely defined as a U.S. government program that allowed for the capture of suspected terrorists in one country (other than the U.S.) and their subsequent transfer to another country for the purpose of interrogation and detention, thereby avoiding legal protections to the suspects afforded by the U.S. Constitution and its laws. The practice began with the Presidential Decision Directive 39 (June 1995) and 62 (May 1998), that allowed intelligence services to utilize rendition of suspected terrorists to third party states (Clinton PPD 1995). Although the practice was used intermittently by the Clinton administration, it was expanded exponentially after the terrorist attacks on September 11th when President Bush signed secret directives on September 17, 2001, which authorized the CIA to engage in what was termed as 'extraordinary rendition' (Johnson 2009). Extraordinary rendition policies led to the

abduction and transferring of hundreds of foreign nationals with suspected terrorism ties to either locations controlled by the CIA, known as 'black sites,' or locations operated by foreign agents. In both instances, the aim was to use interrogation methods that were against the U.S. or internationally recognized standards. These locations included facilities in Jordan, Iraq, Egypt, Diego Garcia, Afghanistan, Guantánamo, and other locations in Europe (ACLU 2018). The Bush Administrations rationale for the policy argued that stateless terrorists' groups and the threat that they posed warranted the new tougher rules (Mayer 2005). In the words of former CIA agent Robert Baer, "If you want a serious interrogation, you send a prisoner to Jordan. If you want them to be tortured, you send them to Syria. If you want someone to disappear -- never to see them again -- you send them to Egypt" (Guardian 2011).

Masood Anwar, a Pakistani journalist, in October, 2001, heard about the abduction of a Yemeni student and his rendition flight out of Pakistan. Masood published the tail number of the plane, N379P and the plane was soon connected to another rendition in Indonesia (Hasan 2017). The first media account with a detailed story was published by the *Washington Post* by its correspondents Rajiv Chandrasekaran and Peter Finn in Jakarta in March of 2002. The article put forth that the two main purposes of extraordinary rendition was to one, bypass "extradition procedures and legal formalities" and two, to take the suspects to states that had a close relationship with the CIA where they could be interrogated with tactics that are illegal in most countries (Chandrasekaran and Finn 2002). Later that year, two other *Washington Post* reporters, Dana Priest and Barton Gellman, produced an article on the treatment and abuses of suspected terrorists in detention centers controlled by the U.S. Although rendition was only incidentally mentioned, the connection between rendition and torture was established firmly. The report stated that those detainees who did not cooperate were often sent to third-party countries that had

a known history of utilizing torture as a means to extract information (Priest and Gellman 2002). The most telling quote from the article from an official directly involved with the renditions was, "We don't kick the [expletive] out of them. We send them to other countries so they can kick the [expletive] out of them" (Priest and Gellman 2002). The publication in the original article by Anwar led to reporters all over Europe to start digging into flight logs and their findings led to human rights groups to begin pressuring their governments on data from these flights. By the end of 2004, the proverbial cat was out of the bag on renditions. So much so that Dana Priest of *The Washington Post* titled her article outlining the practice as, "Jet is an open secret in terror war" (Priest 2004).

The rendition stories all contained allegations of abuse and torture. However, since the implication in the stories was that it was done by third-party states with a history of such practices, the U.S. was perceived as being only guilty of facilitating the abuses not actually participating in it. This "brass-knuckled quest for information" by the CIA began soon after 9/11 and was aided by a culture in the intelligence agency that believed that "If you don't violate someone's human rights some of the time, you probably aren't doing your job" (Priest and Gellman 2002). The administration began going down this road in early February 2002, when Bush issued an executive order "denying Taliban and Al Qaeda detainees the protections afforded under the Geneva Conventions" (Lowrey 2009). This decision was followed by a series of memos authored by John Yoo, the Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Office of Legal Counsel, and Jay S. Bybee, with the Office of Legal Counsel in the Justice Department, that ultimately "provided a rationale for using torture to extract information from Qaeda operatives" without running afoul of U.S. or international laws prohibiting the practice (*New York Times* 2018). The last memo essentially defined torture in such a manner that allowed interrogators to

use harsh interrogation tactics, such as waterboarding, because it did not rise to the level of torture as there was no intent to cause severe pain (Cohen 2012). Regardless of the Bush Administrations legal rationale for these practices, the media and the public regarded these actions as torture when evidence began to appear in mainstream news sources.

In the beginning, media reports on the allegations of abuse were sparse. In early 2002, the *Washington Post* published an article in which some American allies and human rights groups questioned the treatment of detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Since no specific allegations of abuse had been proven, U.S. officials generally rejected these criticisms. In fact, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld stated that, "I do not feel even the slightest concern about their treatment. They are being treated vastly better than they treated anybody else" (Reid 2002). However, this statement would continuously be challenged over the course of the next two years as multiple media reports were published detailing that abuses had in fact occurred under U.S. auspices. In 2003, administration officials admitted to the *New York Times* to utilizing harsh interrogation techniques on high ranking Al Qaeda terrorists, yet stopped short of admitting to "physical torture" (Bonner et al 2003). Later that year, the *Associated Press* published an article about conditions at the American run prisons camp in Iraq, but it generated little attention (Hanley 2003). Media reports continued to trickle out detailing the abuses, but it was not until April 2004, when the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse story and pictures were publicized on *60 Minutes* and by Seymour Hersch in the *New Yorker* did the scandal gain wide attention. Both reports utilized an internal investigation of the prison by Major General Antonio M. Taguba who provided a highly critical report on the "collective wrongdoing and the failure of Army leadership at the highest levels" (Hersh 2004). The Abu Ghraib scandal produced a wide range consequence: a flood of media reports, multiple internal military investigations, and

congressional committee investigations. The Bush Administrations first response was to blame the individual soldiers implicated in the immediate scandal. However, this became increasingly difficult with the media's revelations of the memos that sought to justify torture. The spokesman from the Department of Defense attempted to deflect the impact of the memos by characterizing them as "a scholarly effort to define the perimeters of the law" and added "What is legal and what is put into practice is a different story" (Priest and Smith 2004). However, in light of the abuses documented previously, the media and the public remained skeptical. With the scandal of Abu Ghraib still fresh and revelations that the CIA had destroyed video tapes of the interrogations that included the use of waterboarding on detainees Abu Zubaydah and Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, the Senate Intelligence Committee opened an investigation into the CIA's detention and interrogation programs. The Senate's report was concluded in 2012 and ultimately was a damning indictment of the CIA's interrogation practices and it produced significant global media attention and condemnation.

Detention

In early 2002, the Bush administration began transporting prisoners captured mainly in the Afghanistan theater to Camp X-Ray in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Within a short time, the prisoner population expanded to almost 700. The initial media reports focused upon the administration's designations of the detainees as 'unlawful enemy combatants' who were not subject to the protections of the Geneva Conventions (Human Rights Watch 2003). In normal circumstances, soldiers of a declared enemy captured during a conflict are designated as lawful combatants with full Geneva protections. Anyone else captured who does not fit into that category is considered a criminal suspect. A third category, unlawful enemy combatant, was created with the German saboteur case *Ex Parte Quirin* in 1942. President Bush, using the

language of the court's decision, issued a military order on the "Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism" (Bush 2001). The order essentially denied captured terrorists prisoner-of-war (POW) status with any protections under international law and it denied the U.S. courts jurisdiction over these detainees (Bracknell 2017). The order also permitted indefinite detention and trials by military commissions (Bracknell 2017). This designation was widely criticized as a major breach of international law by all major human rights organizations including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch (Amnesty International 2020). The International Committee of the Red Cross put it most clearly when they stated,

> "Every person in enemy hands must have some status under international law: he is either a prisoner of war and, as such, covered by the Third Convention, a civilian covered by the Fourth Convention, [or] a member of the medical personnel of the armed forces who is covered by the First Convention. There is no intermediate status; nobody in enemy hands can fall outside the law" (ICRC 2020).

Furthermore, the International Committee of the Red Cross inspected the facilities at Guantanamo Bay in 2004, and produced a confidential report that was promptly leaked to the *New York Times*. In this report, the Red Cross detailed disturbing reports of detainee abuse such as utilizing "humiliating acts, solitary confinement, temperature extremes, and use of forced position" (Lewis 2004). The conclusion of the report characterized that Camp X-Ray's purpose "cannot be considered other than an intentional system of cruel, unusual and degrading treatment and a form of torture" (Lewis 2004). This was not the only allegations of abuse to surface in the media. Once prisoners began to be released, many of them detailed the abuse that they had suffered. These allegations included physical abuse, sleep deprivation, and other physical and

psychological mistreatment (Lewis 2005). In 2005, the *New York Times* disclosed that a military investigation was conducted into accusations of abuse that was prompted by F.B.I. agents who witnessed several forms of abuse (Lewis and Schmitt 2005).

Other aspects of the Guantanamo Bay prisoner scandal that garnered significant media attention was the Supreme Court's rulings on the Bush administrations detention policies. In 2004, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in *Rasul v. Bush* that the courts had jurisdiction to hear *habeas* petitions from the detainees and that they did have the right to challenge their detention (*Rasul v. Bush*). In another decision that same year, *Hamdi v. Rumsfeld*, the court ruled that a U.S. citizen designated as an enemy combatant could be detained, but they did not lose their right to challenge their detentions in court. More importantly, the decision established the courts jurisdiction "to consider enemy aliens' challenges to the legality of their detention at Guantanamo as unlawful enemy combatants" (*Hamdi v. Rumsfeld*). Two years later in 2006, the Supreme Court in *Hamdam v. Rumsfeld* ruled that the military commissions set up by the administration to try terrorist suspects violated both the U.S. Code of Military Justice and the Geneva Conventions and were not authorized per any congressional statute (*Hamdan v. Rumsfeld* 2006). Congress responded to this decision by passing the Military Commissions Act that authorized the "trial by military commission for violations of the law of war, and for other purposes" (Congress 2006). However, in 2008 the Supreme Court in *Boumediene v. Bush* ruled that the act was unconstitutional because the detainees had a *habeas corpus* right to challenge their detentions (*Boumediene, et al. v. Bush et al.* 2008). Guantanamo Bay prison and the Bush administrations detainee policies violated more than the U.S. constitution, as many international human rights experts called it a violation of international law. United Nations' officials and many human rights groups repeatedly accused the U.S. of violating the Geneva Conventions and

the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights because of the structure of the military commissions. Furthermore, in the 2005 Amnesty International report, Guantanamo Bay was characterized as the "Gulag of our times" (Khan 2005).

Extra-Judicial Killing (Drone Strikes)

Extra-judicial killings, or drone strikes, did not emerge as a scandal during the Bush administration for the simple fact that the practice was only used sporadically. However, within the first year of the Obama administration, it became clear that the program had expanded greatly. President Obama authorized a total of 193 drone strikes in 2009, which was "more then four times the number that Bush authorized during his two terms" (McKelvey 2011). President Obama later claimed that this increase was due to the "technology really began to take off right at the beginning of my presidency" (Friedersdorf 2016). Three days into his new presidency, Obama sanctioned two drone strikes in Pakistan one of which hit the wrong objective: the house of a village elder that was killed along with his family (Swain and Schwarz 2019). This mishap did not slow the escalating program: Obama "authorized as many CIA drone attacks during his initial nine and a half months in office as Bush did in his final three years" (Swain and Schwarz 2019). During the course of his two terms in office, President Obama would authorize a total of 563 strikes "compared to 57 strikes under Bush" (Purkiss and Serle 2017).

The question of the legality of drone strikes is a subject of much debate. For instance, strikes carried out in Afghanistan by the U.S. military are conducted under the laws of armed conflict that includes the Geneva Conventions, other treaties, and customary laws that apply to the conduct of war (Martin 2016). These military operations were specifically conducted under the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) that Congress passed after 9/11. Under the normal conduct of war laws, strikes such as these must meet the following criteria: they must be

a military necessity; they should not inflict unnecessary harm; there must be a lawful target; and proportionality or "the anticipated collateral damage of an attack not be excessive in relation to the anticipated concrete and direct military advantage from the attack"(Martin 2016). It is those drone strikes outside of the theater of military operations in Afghanistan or Iraq that have generated the most confusion and attention. There have been strikes in Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, and Libya. The two questions that were raised subsequently are: Are these strikes carried out under the authority of the AUMF and do they follow the laws of armed conflict? The answer to the first question, per the Obama Administration, was that "all of the drone strikes since 2009 have been authorized and conducted as part of the armed conflict with Al Qaeda and associated forces pursuant to the 2001 AUMF" (Martin 2016). As for the laws of conflict, all of the strikes outside of Afghanistan have apparently been conducted by the CIA which is not constrained by the laws of conflict (The Bureau of Investigative Journalism 2017). As part of an effort to reform the drone program and limit civilian casualties, President Obama issued his May 2013, Presidential Policy Guidance, or PPG, which outlined the much more stringent criteria in which these strikes could be carried out. Yet, the Obama administration only released a redacted synopsis of the PPG and it "offers little clarity on how its standards relate to or replace LOAC rules" (Martin 2016).

Probably the most contentious issue with drone strikes is the reported civilian casualties. Initially, the Obama administration claimed that there were no civilian casualties in a year of drone strikes (Friedersdorf 2016). What accounted for this extraordinarily low number of collateral deaths? Essentially, it was the method that they utilized to count civilian deaths in that "all military-age males in a strike zone as combatants, unless there is explicit intelligence posthumously proving them innocent" (Friedersdorf 2016). Eventually, with increased media

attention this fiction had to be abandoned. Official government numbers calculated that from 2009 to the end of 2015, 2436 people were killed in Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, and Libya (Swain and Schwarz 2019). The Obama administration estimated that between 64 to 116 civilians were victims of these drone strikes (Swain and Schwarz 2019). Other observers, namely the Bureau of Investigative Journalism, arrived at a much higher number of 2,753 people in which they claimed the number of civilians was six times higher (Swain and Schwarz 2019).

What particularly stunted media reporting on the issue of drone strikes was the level of secrecy that the program was shrouded in. A majority of the questionable strikes were conducted by the CIA under its covert actions programs and whenever they were questioned, "directly and on the record about its role, it denies having one" (McKelvey 2011). Part of the reason for this secrecy, was duplicitous nature of the Pakistani government whom supported the strikes privately but preferred to "mislead the Pakistani public about its acquiescence to the US drone strikes" (McKelvey 2011). However, Pakistan was not the only state where these strikes occurred and the Obama administration was able to keep a tight lid on any significant information leaking to the media except in certain, tightly controlled circumstances (Jaffer 2016). In those instances where the drone strikes lacked high-value targets and the administration was unwilling to discuss them, the media reports lacked the kind of substance that would generate significant concern with the public (Friedersdorf 2016). However, when high-value targets were hit, *Washington Post's* op-ed columnist David Ignatius noted that, "These rules about covert activities can be bent when it becomes politically advantageous. When it suits them, you get quite a detailed readout" (McKelvey 2011). *Columbia Journalism Review* surveyed selected international media sources and concluded that those strikes that hit high-valued targets generated sixty-eight percent more coverage than those that did not (McKelvey 2011).

International reporting on drone strikes, particularly Pakistan, is decidedly different in tone than the U.S. media. The reported number of civilians and low-level militants killed in these strikes was decidedly higher in published accounts in the Pakistani media and were framed in a much more negative manner (McKelvey 2011).

Eventually, the Obama Administration confirmed that the casualties from drone strikes were higher than they had originally presented to the public and began to implement more stringent policies guiding the usage of these types of strikes to minimize civilian deaths. But, there were no Congressional investigations, legislative pushback, or judicial decisions to limit the president's ability to utilize drone strikes at a time and place of their own choosing. And the American public remained largely unconcerned with the issue. Charles Dunlap, executive director of Duke University's Center on Law, Ethics and National Security explained that the American public "are less concerned about the technical legal basis as they are about success against authentic threats. Moreover, Americans are largely unmoved by foreign disapproval - even from allies - where they perceive the Nation's security to be threatened" (Williams 2017). Ultimately, drone strikes were supported by most of the American public and Congress while they were opposed throughout much of the world (Zenko 2016).

The two figures on the following pages totaled all media reporting that contained human right frames from the first quarter of 2002 to the fourth quarter of 2016. They are divided into U.S. and international media. The first apparent observation was that there were considerably more international media reports that contained these types of frames. When we examine each issue separately and its timeline, the first significant reporting from the media on the practice of rendition was published in the first quarter of 2002. The practice did not generate much attention from the media or public outrage in the U.S. or internationally. International media's attention

focused on those local aspects of the practice such as their countries citizens being rendered, the presence of CIA 'black sites' in their countries, and the acquiesce of local governments in facilitating these renditions.

While rendition did not generate much outrage in the public and media, a more significant factor was that the practice was tied to a much more contentious issue: torture. Directly after the attacks on 9/11, *Gallup/CNN* conducted a poll which found that "45% were willing to have the government torture known terrorists if they knew details about future terrorist attacks in the US; 53% were not" (Roper Center 2011). In 2004, after the Abu Ghraib scandal broke, an *ABC News/Washington Post* poll showed that only 18% responded that these actions were "justified and understandable because we are at war against terrorists," while 72% stated that it was "always wrong, even in the case of war against terrorists" (Roper Center 2011). The Pew Research Center has included questions on the usage of torture in its polling since 2004, and in 2011, found that the "responses show that between 24 and 32 percent say it should never been used, while at the other end of the spectrum, 12 to 19 percent say it can often be justified to gain information" (Bowman 2014). On December 11th, 2014, the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence released its report on the U.S.'s interrogation program and this brought another spate of articles on torture. However, subsequent polling reflected a partisan divide on the report and as late as 2017, polling reflected that the American public was evenly divided on the subject of torture (Dugan 2011, Tyson 2017). Internationally, public opinion was "divided about whether government-sponsored torture can ever be justified as part of efforts to prevent terrorist attacks" (Wike 2016; Amnesty International 2014).



Figure 1: International Articles with HR Frames



Figure 2: US Articles with HR Frames

The differences between how the U.S. media and the international media presented the articles with the human rights abuse frames on torture were myriad. For instance, the U.S. media typically focused on the political or legal aspects of the torture scandal. To illustrate, when Alberto Gonzalez was nominated for the Attorney-General position his role in authorizing legal opinions on the Bush administrations interrogation programs caused a spike in reporting on the issue. The same was true when the administration gave press conferences defending its policies in the 'War on Terror' or when Congress passed a bill banning certain interrogation techniques. On the other hand, international media articles that contained human rights abuse frames did not focus solely on torture but typically included rendition and detention. There was a significantly high level of articles published internationally beginning in the 4th quarter of 2005, until the 2nd quarter of 2007. Generally, the international media focused on aspects of the abuses that were specific to that country. For instance, the United Kingdom's media published a significant number of articles on the abuse and detention of the U.K. citizen Moazzam Begg who was detained at Guantanamo Bay for three years and was eventually released without any charges. Likewise, Australia's media focused a significant number of articles on one of its citizens, David Hicks, who was detained for five years. The U.S. the media reports largely focused on the legality of the detentions with the main focus being on the Supreme Court decisions such as the first one, *Rasal v Bush* in 2004.

International media going into the beginning of the Obama's administration tended to focus on the promise of closing Guantanamo Bay detention center and reversing other Bush administration policies related to the war on terror. These stories followed an ebb and flow as President Obama met with little success throughout his two terms in closing the detention center. Other subjects, such as ending the interrogation policies and holding people accountable for the

torture of suspected terrorists were prominent in the international media during this period. A significant change in tone occurred in the international media's coverage of the Obama administration anti-terrorism efforts once the drone program became more significant. A large portion of the international media's attention became focused on two aspects: the legality of the drone strikes and civilian casualties. These international concerns were not shared by the American public as a plurality supported the drone strikes in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia (Macdonald and Schneider 2016). The only instances where support decreased were in instances of confirmed civilian casualties (Macdonald and Schneider 2016).

Chapter 5: Quantitative Analysis

Data and Measurement

To study the relationship between media's presentation of human rights abuses due to U.S. counterterrorism measures and terrorism, I rely on a mixed-method research design combining content-analyses of the news coverage to identify specific frames utilized by the media and terrorism data in a quantitative analysis to determine their influence. The news media in the current age has a wide-ranging presence on the Internet that includes the transmission of newswire services, press releases, aggregate news sources, newspapers, and web-based publications. Also, the news that is broadcasted or that appears in print eventually ends up on the Internet. Wire services gather news reports and press releases globally and provide a single comprehensive news feed for distribution to their subscribers such as print newspapers or news aggregation sources. The press releases are written or in some instances spoken communications by an organization that reports specific and brief information about a particular topic or issue to the media for distribution. An aggregate news source gathers material from a wide variety of sources such as the above news wires and displays them in a single location or web-site. Increasingly, there are media outlets that have eschewed the broadcast or printed formats and have become exclusively web-based. With all of this information digitally stored on the Internet, scholars can perform an extensive search of media content on terrorism, counterterrorism, and human rights abuses. Specifically, the Nexis Uni platform, which replaced LexisNexis Academic in 2017, was utilized to conduct this research of the media coverage of human rights abuses. It is an online academic research database that contains comprehensive and authoritative media content that includes archival material dating back to 1973 along with current up-to date

coverage. The Nexis Uni database includes over 300 web-based news sites, 3000 newspapers globally, 2000 magazines, journals, and newsletters, broadcast transcripts from a variety of sources, and newswire services that are updated in real-time. Results are presented predominately in English. To search the media coverage in Nexis Uni of the selected human rights violations, specifically extra-judicial killings, rendition and torture, and indefinite detentions that occurred during the U.S. 'War on Terror' (Jan. 2002 to Jan. 2016), I developed a search algorithm that allows me to identify and analyze all news pertaining to these topics. The algorithm was general to capture all of the relevant material (see Table 1).

Table 1: Nexis Uni International Search

United States OR U.S. OR America AND counterterror! OR "war on terror" AND extra-judicial killing OR drone strike OR torture OR rendition OR Abu Ghraib OR Guantanamo Bay
Narrow Search Terms
Date: Jan. 1, 2002 to Dec. 31, 2016
Sort by: "oldest to newest"
Publication Type: Newspapers
Location: International
Europe (UK)
Middle East & Asia (ME_AS)
Africa (AF)
A&O (AO)

Upon review, it was determined that Nexis Uni domestic searches did not include any of the top newspapers in the U.S., i.e. *The New York Times*, etc. Another news data base was utilized, ProQuest Global Newsstream, which contains the full text of 2,069 publications world-wide including those mentioned above. The domestic search was limited to the top five newspapers in the U.S. (*The Wall Street Journal, The New York Times, Chicago Tribune, New York Post, and The Los Angeles Times*) spanning from January 1, 2002, to December 31, 2016. The algorithm was general to capture all of the relevant material (see Table 2). The search results from both

databases produced a total of 8,312 articles from the states listed in Table 3. The following returns from both datasets were deleted: political speeches (State of the Union or campaign speeches); duplicate articles; entertainment pieces (movies, art, television, and museum articles); letters to the editor; those results that dealt with the lead-up and justifications for the war in Iraq; and generally any articles that had nothing to do with the U.S. "War on Terror."[1]

Table 2: ProQuest Global Newsstream U.S. Search

Advanced search
Insert search terms (see below) -searching "in" document text-FT; separated by AND
Date: Jan. 1, 2002 to Dec. 31, 2016
Source type: Newspapers
Limit to "Full Text"
Publication Title: Limit to top 5 U.S. Papers
Sort oldest first
US OR America AND counterterrorism OR "war on terror" AND extra-judicial killing OR drone strike
United States OR America AND counterterrorism OR "war on terror" AND rendition
United States OR America AND counterterrorism OR "war on terror" AND torture
US OR America AND counterterrorism OR "war on terror" AND Abu Ghraib OR Guantanamo Bay AND abuse

The search was specifically based on the Human Rights Issue (HRI), i.e. rendition, extrajudicial killings, torture, and indefinite detentions, that were the result of America's counterterrorism policies and from these results the primary HRI frames coded as either personal or informational.

[1] Articles that dealt with the human rights practices of America allies in the "War on Terror" were kept.

Table 3: State Results

State Name	***obs***
Australia	741
Bahrain	10
Bangladesh	48
China	63
Egypt	68
Georgia	33
India	537
Iran	25
Israel	16
Japan	10
Jordan	88
Kenya	29
Lebanon	171
Malaysia	28
Nepal	21
New Zealand	142
Nigeria	47
Oman	32
Pakistan	1563
Philippines	30
Qatar	15
Saudi Arabia	18
Singapore	58
South Africa	233
South Korea	33
Thailand	370
Turkey	18
United Kingdom	2860
United States	859
United Arab Emirates	95
Yemen	51
Total obs	***8312***

Variable Description

A primary personal frame (*pfr*) was identified and coded if an article met the following conditions:

1. The article has a specific victim description (i.e. name, gender, nationality, ethnicity, and adjectives describing their disposition: innocent, alleged, etc.) and/or a description of the events leading up to the incident.
2. The human rights abuse that occurred is prominently described within the article.
3. Often to give further emphasis to the human rights abuse, human rights groups or other government actors are quoted about the incidents.

The first two elements must be present within 2-3 sentences of each other or in essence grouped and the third can be present anywhere in the article.

Example 1: In this example from *The Western Mail* (United Kingdom) on February 24, 2009, in an article by Mike Gibson, the headline contains a personal frame on torture:

> "I was ***abducted*** ... and ***tortured in medieval ways***; ***Guantanamo Bay prisoner*** is released on his return to Britain"

Later in the article there are various quotes from Foreign Secretary David Miliband, Prime Minister Gordon Brown, and Kate Allen, director of Amnesty International UK.[2]

Example 2: In another example of a personal frame on drone strikes from *The Statesman* (Pakistan) on January 27, 2016, in an article titled,

> "The ***Pakistani victim*** of Obama's first-ever drone strike."
>
> "The ***survivor*** of Obama's first-ever drone strike in January 2009 has opened up out about life after the strike that changed his life irrevocably. Faheem Qureshi, almost ***14 years old*** at the time, was celebrating the return of his uncle from United Arab Emirates (UAE) at his home in Ziraki village, North Waziristan, ***when a missile hit his house***. ***His body on fire, Qureshi ran out of the house, wanting to throw water on his burning eyes***.
>
> As far as Qureshi is concerned, all he knows about Obama "is what he has done to me and the people in Waziristan, and ***that is an act of tyranny***. If there is a list of tyrants in

[2] https://advance.lexis.com/document?crid=2987f8ae-e4c5-43c0-81d8-f8146d9d113d&pddocfullpath=%2Fshared%2Fdocument%2Fnews%2Furn%3AcontentItem%3A7V36-KGM1-2SCD-G1V8-00000-00&pdcontentcomponentid=244366&pdmfid=1516831&pdisurlapi=true

> the world, to me, Obama will be put on that list by his drone programme," Qureshi said while speaking to Guardian from Islamabad.
>
> The strike, ordered by Obama on the third day of his presidency, reportedly did not hit the Taliban but caused the ***hidden civilian damage*** of a counterterrorism tactic employed by the US."

Later in the article the authors quoted the Bureau of Investigative Journalism

> "Since Obama took office, 371 drone strikes in tribal areas of Pakistan have killed between 256 and 633 civilians."[3]

The primary informational frame (*ifr*) was identified and coded if the following conditions existed in the article:

1. The human rights issue is prominently mentioned but focuses on numbers and incidents rather than on individuals.
2. The victims are mentioned only in passing and the focus is on the human rights issue.
3. Often to give further emphasis to the human rights abuse, human rights groups or other government actors are quoted about the incidents.

The first two elements must be present within 2-3 sentences of each other or in essence grouped and the third can be anywhere in the article.

Example 3: This example of an informational frame was taken from *The Daily Star* (Lebanon) on July 7, 2008. The title begins:

"End the scandal of Guantanamo prison."

> "The recent US Supreme Court ruling that recognizes the rights of Guantanamo detainees to challenge their ***detention*** in US civilian courts - possibly paving the way for a permanent closure of the facility - is a serious rebuke to the controversial detention policies of the administration of President George W. Bush. However, it is also an

[3] https://advance.lexis.com/document?crid=13dcc210-e1a3-44c4-b33c-45e1c98693d3&pddocfullpath=%2Fshared%2Fdocument%2Fnews%2Furn%3AcontentItem%3A5HY9-FCX1-JD09-30BT-00000-00&pdcontentcomponentid=381881&pdmfid=1516831&pdisurlapi=true

> excellent opportunity for the current administration to demonstrate its commitment to American security while simultaneously beginning to heal one of the rifts that has harmed the global standing of the United States, particularly in the Muslim world.
>
> America's image has taken a beating since evidence of ***torture*** and ***abuse at Guantanamo***, as well as the ***Abu Ghraib prison*** in Iraq, was first publicized. These facilities have housed terrorism suspects rounded up since 9/11, and while US officials say many are guilty, ***human rights activists*** ask how they can be so certain given the lack of specific charges and legal protocol.
>
> Most of the approximately 270 prisoners still at Guantanamo have been in US custody for more than six years without ever being charged, according to the June 2008 ***Human Rights Watch*** report, "Locked up Alone: Detention Conditions and Mental Health at Guantanamo." The suspects held there have been detained in conditions which amount to ***cruel and inhumane punishment***, marking serious breaches of the prisoners' basic human and health rights. Practices used against the prisoners have included ***forced feedings of hunger strikers, jabbing food tubes through their noses, and keeping them in prolonged isolation.***
>
> The ***International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)*** says these practices amount to ***torture***."[4]

The strength of the frame was determined by the location of the frame.

1. Headline (*_loc1*): If the victim, human rights issue, human rights authority, or political actor quote is prominently displayed in the article headline.
2. Lead (*_loc2*): If the above frame elements are located in the first couple of sentences of the article.
3. Body (*_loc3*) : If the above frame elements are located in the main body after the lead in the article.
4. Dispersed (*_loc4*): The frame terms are present in the article but one or more are not within the 2-3 sentences or are dispersed. Frame type and location were combined into one single variable and summed per state per quarter.[5]

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[4] https://advance.lexis.com/document?crid=8e2b2a5f-dfdd-41b9-bc7f-1615dac2ed20&pddocfullpath=%2Fshared%2Fdocument%2Fnews%2Furn%3AcontentItem%3A4TRS-C640-TYC1-G04X-00000-00&pdcontentcomponentid=335154&pdmfid=1516831&pdisurlapi=true

[5] For a more comprehensive description of the codes, frequencies, and coding procedures, see Appendix B and C.

Data on terrorist activity was taken from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) maintained by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) based at the University of Maryland. The Global Terrorism Database's definition of terrorism is consistent with the consensual definition of terrorism in the literature. GTD defines terrorism as "the threatened use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation" (GTD Codebook 2012, 6). Furthermore, the dataset contains information on the nationality of the target, the type of target, number of casualties, whether the casualties were U.S. citizens, and the type of attack. GTD also distinguishes between domestic and international terrorist events. The data will be limited to those states that are returned from the Nexus Uni and ProQuest Global Newsstream article searches. The key variable from the GTD data that are used in the statistical analyses are the total terrorist attacks per quarter and state (*tna*).

Control variables include those most commonly utilized in terrorism research, i.e. GDP per capita, population, unemployment rates, and physical integrity rights scores. These variables were taken from the World Development Index numbers from the Quality of Government 2020 dataset. GDP per capita logged (*gdppc_lg*) in current US dollars is measured as the:

> "gross domestic product divided by midyear population. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources" (QoG 2020, 650).

Population logged numbers (*pop_lg*) are "based on the de facto definition of population, which counts all residents regardless of legal status or citizenship" and unemployment numbers

(*unemp*) are the total percentage of the work force looking for work (QoG 2020, 681, 697). The Physical Integrity Rights scores (*ciri0-8*) are from the Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) measures for human rights that align with a state's counterterrorism policies and is an additive "index constructed from the Torture, Extrajudicial Killing, Political Imprisonment, and Disappearance indicators. It ranges from 0 (no government respect for these four rights) to 8 (full government respect for these four rights)" (QoG 2020, 161). Rounding out these control variables is the data taken from Freedom Houses survey of each states freedom of the press levels (*fotp*) which ranges from 0: free; 1: partially free; and 2: not free.

Table 4: Variable Summary Statistics

var	*obs*	*mean*	*std.dev*	*min*	*max*
tna	1685	25.23145	64.5792	0	712
hri1(REN)	1685	0.0130564	0.1135498	0	1
hri2(TOR)	1685	0.2445104	0.8626802	0	10
hri3(EJK)	1685	0.2735905	1.05064	0	13
hri4(DET)	1685	0.1299703	0.6272402	0	14
hri5(COMBO)	1685	0.3637982	1.288537	0	16
pfr_loc1	1685	0.0605341	0.4162848	0	7
pfr_loc2	1685	0.1335312	0.6836031	0	18
pfr_loc3	1685	0.0830861	0.3886513	0	6
pfr_loc4	1685	0.0077151	0.1114035	0	3
ifr_loc1	1685	0.095549	0.5097719	0	7
ifr_loc2	1685	0.2937685	1.139755	0	15
ifr_loc3	1685	0.4682493	1.510366	0	18
ifr_loc4	1685	0.0391691	0.252558	0	3
m_maj	1685	0.4507837	0.4977279	0	1
fotp	1685	1.149555	0.8009467	0	2
gdppc_lg	1685	8.750656	1.522494	5.500118	11.3513
pop_lg	1685	17.42284	1.72946	13.37058	21.04438
wdi_unemp	1685	6.660179	5.515336	0.14	33.473
ciri (0-8)	1685	3.52019	2.462592	0	8

To test the various hypotheses a negative binomial model was utilized due to the over dispersion of the dependent variable total terror attacks per quarter (tna). Multiple models were constructed

and analyzed that ranged from a simple base model to more complex multivariate models. These models along with the results are as follows:

Analysis and Discussion

Model 1a

$$\ln(tna_{t+1}) = \alpha + \beta_1 hri1 + \beta_2 hri2 + \beta_3 hri3 + \beta_4 hri4 + \beta_5 GDPpc + \beta_6\, pop + \beta_7 unemp + \beta_8 ciriphys + \epsilon$$

In Model 1a the dependent variable, total number of terrorist attacks per quarter lagged forward one quarter (*tna*), examined the media's frequency of publishing articles dealing with the human rights issues that had arisen from the U.S.'s counterterrorism policies and their influence on future terrorist attacks (see Table 5). Included in the model were articles that were published during the quarter that dealt with rendition, torture, extrajudicial killings, and detentions. The control variables that were included were the state's GDP per capita logged, population logged, unemployment percentages, and the CIRI physical integrity scores. The frequency of articles about rendition, detention, and a combination of human rights issues in the articles were not statistically significant. In the base model (1a), the two human rights issues appearing in the media reports that were the most significant were torture (*hri2*) and extra-judicial killings (*hri3*). The higher frequency of media reporting on the U.S.'s usage of torture during its counterterrorism efforts was positively associated with an increase in the frequency of terror attacks in the following quarter. Holding all the other variables constant, a one unit increase in torture related media articles that were published corresponded to a 0.25 increase in terrorist attacks occurring in the following quarter. The higher frequency of media reports on extra-judicial killings was even more statistically significant at the $p<0.001$ level. Extra-judicial

Table 5: Human Rights Issue-Freedom of the Press

var	*Model 1a*	*Model 1b: Free Press*	*Model 1c: Partial Free Press*	*Model 1d: Not Free Press*
hri1(REN)	-0.84	0.50	-0.22	-1.66***
	(0.40)	*(0.38)*	*(0.39)*	*(0.28)*
hri2(TOR)	0.25***	0.19**	0.17	0.52**
	(0.07)	*(0.07)*	*(0.15)*	*(0.20)*
hri3(EJK)	0.37***	0.30***	0.16*	0.37***
	(0.05)	*(0.07)*	*(0.07)*	*(0.06)*
hri4(DET)	0.07	0.09	0.13	0.30
	(0.10)	*(0.11)*	*(0.30)*	*(0.23)*
hri5(COMBO)	0.08	0.09	-0.02	-0.07
	(0.05)	*(0.05)*	*(0.08)*	*(0.09)*
cons	-1.19	-12.2	-6.74	2.42
	(0.82)	*(2.34)*	*(1.28)*	*(1.77)*
obs	1654	425	559	670
Pseudo R2	0.0732	0.1000	0.0748	0.0987

*p<0.001*** p<0.010** p<0.050**

killings, or drone strike media reports, were positively associated with an increase in the frequency terrorist attacks in the following quarter. Holding all other variables constant, a one unit increase in published media reports on extra-judicial killings corresponded to a 0.37 increase in the frequency in terrorism the following quarter. Most of the control's variables acted in the expected direction: a higher GDP per capita had a negative influence on terrorism, a higher population had a positive influence on terrorism, but unexpectedly, a higher unemployment percentage had a negative influence on terrorism. All of these control variables were statistically significant in Model 1a. The Cingranelli-Richards physical integrity scores demonstrated that a state that respects these rights had less terrorism. Once the ordinal variable reached the 4th score it achieved statistical significance, had a negative influence on future terrorism, and the variables influence increased steadily as the score rose. In the discussion of the rest of the models, I will be

only discussing the main variables of interest. The complete models along with the control variables are posted in Appendix A.

Model 1b/c/d

$$\ln(tna_{t+1}) = (\alpha + \beta_1 hri1 + \beta_2 hri2 + \beta_3 hri3 + \beta_4 hri4 + \beta_5 GDPpc + \beta_6\, pop + \beta_7 unemp + \beta_8 ciriphys + \epsilon)\; if\; fotp = (0,1,2)$$

Models 1b, 1c & 1d included the same variables as the base model, however, the three models were regressed with a subset of states that were categorized by their level of freedom of the press (see Table 5). Model 1b examined the subset of states that possess a free press. The human rights issues of torture (*hri2*) and extra-judicial killings (*hri3*) were both statistically significant and had a positive influence on the incidents of terrorism. The higher frequency of media reporting on the U.S.'s usage of torture during its counterterrorism efforts was positively associated with an increase in the expected log count of terror attacks in the following quarter. Holding all the other variables constant, a one unit increase in torture related media articles that are published corresponded to a 0.19 increase in the expected log count of terrorist attacks in the following quarter. The higher frequency of media reports on extra-judicial killings are even more statistically significant at the $p<0.001$ level. Extra-judicial killings media reports were positively associated with an increase in the expected log count of terrorist attacks in the following quarter. Holding all other variables constant, a one unit increase in published media accounts on extra-judicial killing corresponded to a 0.30 increase in the expected log count of terrorism the following quarter. Model 1b was very similar to the base model. In states with a free press, the human rights issues that the media published that had the most influence future acts of terrorism were torture and extra-judicial killings, however, their coefficients were slightly lower than the base model.

Model 1c examined those subsets of states that possess a partially free press. In this model the only human rights issue that was statistically significant was extra-judicial killings (*hri3*) at the $p<0.05$ level. Holding all other variables constant, a one unit increase in published media accounts of extra-judicial killings corresponded to a 0.16 increase in the expected log count of terrorism in the following quarter. Model 1d examined those subsets of states with an unfree press. Restrictions on the freedom of the press in these states produced some interesting results. In this model for the first-time media reports on rendition (*hri1*) became statistically significant at the $p<0.001$ level, yet its influence on the expected log count of future terrorism in the next quarter was negative. A one unit increase in media reports on rendition, holding all other variables constant, reduced the expected log count of terrorism by 1.66 in the following quarter. Similar to the previous two models, in Model 1d, the human rights issues of torture (*hri2*) and extra-judicial killings (*hri3*) achieved statistical significance again and retained their positive influence on the incidents of terrorism. Holding all the other variables constant, a one unit increase in media reports on torture corresponded to a 0.52 increase in the expected log count of terrorism the following quarter. This coefficient was the largest among the four models. Similarly, extra-judicial killings (*hri3*) were statistically significant and were positively associated with an increase in the expected log count of terrorist attacks in the following quarter. Holding all other variables constant, a one unit increase in media reports on extra-judicial killings corresponded to a 0.37 increase in the expected log count in terrorism the following quarter.

In conclusion, *Hypothesis 1a* is conditionally accepted. Media reporting on the human rights issues of torture and extra-judicial killings were the only two that were statistically significant and positively influenced the future incidence of terrorism in all the sample states.

Rendition, detention, or a combination of the human rights issues in media reports were not significant factors influencing terrorism. There was not enough statistical support with the data on hand to support *Hypothesis 1b*. Media reports on the U.S.'s usage of torture and extra-judicial killings were significant and positive in both the free press and not free press models.

Model 2a/b

$$\ln(tna_{t+1}) = (\alpha + \beta_1 hri1 + \beta_2 hri2 + \beta_3 hri3 + \beta_4 hri4 + \beta_5 GDPpc + \beta_6\, pop + \beta_7 unemp + \beta_8 ciriphys + \epsilon)\; if\; m\; maj = (0,1)$$

Models 2a and 2b tested the idea that published media reports in Muslim majority states will have a greater emphasis on these types of human rights issues because the 'War on Terror' was largely perceived to be aimed at those of the Islamic faith (see Table 6). Model 2a, examining the non-Muslim states, demonstrated that torture (*hri2*) and extra-judicial killings (*hri3*) were positive and statistically significant. Model 2b, examining Muslim majority states, produced similar results in that both torture (*hri2*) and extra-judicial killings (*hri3*) were positive

Table 6: Human Rights Issue-Non-Muslim Majority vs. Muslim Majority

var	***Model 2a: Non-Muslim Majority***	***Model 2b: Muslim Majority***
hri1(REN)	0.19	-1.82**
	(0.35)	*(0.59)*
hri2(TOR)	0.25**	0.28*
	(0.08)	*(0.13)*
hri3(EJK)	0.38***	0.33***
	(0.06)	*(0.08)*
hri4(DET)	0.01	0.16
	(0.10)	*(0.18)*
hri5(COMBO)	0.09	0.06
	(0.05)	*(0.12)*
cons	1.14	-5.71
	(1.19)	*(1.61)*
obs	861	706
Pseudo R2	0.0812	0.0994

*p<0.001*** p<0.010** p<0.050**

and statistically significant. The only real difference between the two models was on the subject of rendition (*hri1*) which was significant in Muslim majority states and had a negative influence on the expected log count of future terrorism. *Hypothesis 2* failed to find supporting evidence in the available data.

Model 3a

$$\ln(tna_{t+1}) = \alpha + \beta_1 prf\ loc1 + \beta_2 prf\ loc2 + \beta_3 pfr\ loc3 + \beta_4 pfr\ loc4 + \beta_5 GDPpc + \beta_6\ pop + \beta_7 unemp + \beta_8 ciriphys + \epsilon$$

Model 3b/c/d

$$\ln(tna_{t+1}) = (\alpha + \beta_1 pfr\ loc1 + \beta_2 pfr\ loc2 + \beta_3 pfr\ loc3 + \beta_4 pfr\ loc4 + \beta_5 GDPpc + \beta_6\ pop + \beta_7 unemp + \beta_8 ciriphys + \epsilon)\ if\ fotp = (0,1,2)$$

Models 3a, 3b, 3c, and 3d, examined the influence of personal frames and their location (*pfr_loc*) within the published media articles on future terrorist attacks (see Table 7). In Model 3a, the base model, personal frames located in the headline (*pfr_loc1*) and the lead (*pfr_loc2*) were statistically significant at the $p<0.001$ level and had a positive influence on the expected log count of future terrorist attacks. For every one-unit increase in the personal frames located in the headline, holding all other variables constant, the expected log count of future terrorism increased by 0.70 per quarter. A one-unit increase in personal frames located in the lead, again holding all other variables constant, the expected log count of future terrorist acts increased by 0.41. Personal frames that were dispersed (*pfr_loc4*) in the article were statistically significant, but they had a negative influence on the expected log count of terrorism. In conclusion, *Hypothesis 3a* was accepted in that the headline and the lead were significant indicators of future terrorist acts. Model 3b examined the influence of personal frames and their locations in a subset of states that possess a free press. Personal frames in the headline (*pfr_loc1*) and lead (*pfr_loc2*) were statistically significant and had a positive influence on the expected log count of future

Table 7: Personal Frame & Location-Freedom of the Press

var	*Model 3a Base*	*Model 3b: Free Press*	*Model 3c: Partial Free Press*	*Model 3d: Not Free Press*
pfr_loc1	0.70***	0.49***	0.61*	1.08
	(0.16)	*(0.13)*	*(0.30)*	*(0.60)*
pfr_loc2	0.41***	0.24*	0.08	0.89***
	(0.10)	*(0.11)*	*(0.16)*	*(0.22)*
pfr_loc3	-0.03	-0.49**	0.03	0.27
	(0.11)	*(0.16)*	*(0.14)*	*(0.21)*
pfr_loc4	-1.31*	-0.91	-1.73*	-
	(0.53)	*(0.48)*	*(0.71)*	-
cons	-1.84	-14.74	-7.38	3.21
	(0.78)	*(2.25)*	*(1.19)*	*(2.06)*
obs	1654	425	559	670
Pseudo R2	0.0684	0.1013	0.0741	0.0929

*p<0.001*** p<0.010** p<0.050**

terrorism. Holding all other variables at their constant, with a one-unit increase in personal frames located in the headline, the expected log count of future terrorism increased by 0.49 per quarter. Personal frames located in the lead had just half of this influence at 0.24. Personal frames located in the body (*pfr_loc3*) of the article were statistically significant but their influence was negative on the expected log count of future terrorist attacks.

In Model 3c with a partially free press, demonstrated that only the headline (*pfr_loc1*) and dispersed (*pfr_loc4*) locations were significant at the p<0.05 level. However, their influence went in opposite directions: the headline was positive while dispersed was negative. The next model, 3d examined the influence of personal frames in a subset of states where the press was not free. The lead (*pfr_loc2*) was the only significant location for a personal frame. Looking at the table and following the progression from free to not free press, the headline became less significant as the freedoms of the press were restricted. The lead location with a personal frame achieves its greatest influence and became significant in the most restrictive media environment, whereas, the body location was only significant with a free press state. *Hypothesis 3b* was

conditionally accepted as the level of the freedom of the press did have an influence on the significance of the personal frame and its location.

Model 4a/b

$$\ln(tna_{t+1}) = (\alpha + \beta_1 pfr\ loc + \beta_2 pfr\ loc2 + \beta_3 pfr\ loc3 + \beta_4 pfr\ loc4 + \beta_5 GDPpc + \beta_6\ pop + \beta_7 unemp + \beta_8 ciriphys + \epsilon)\ if\ m\ maj = (0,1)$$

Models 4a and 4b examined the media's usage of personal frames and their locations in Muslim majority states and non-Muslim majority states (see Table 8). In the non-Muslim majority states both the headline (*pfr_loc1*) and the lead (*pfr_loc2*) variables were statistically significant. Holding all the other variables constant, a one-unit increase in the personal frames located in the headline resulted in a 0.52 increase in the expected log count of future terrorist acts. A one-unit increase in personal frames located in the lead, again holding all other variables constant, resulted in a 0.29 increase in the expected log count of future terrorism. However, the dispersed personal frames (*pfr_loc4*) were also significant but their influence was negative.

Table 8: Personal Frame & Location: Non-Muslim Majority vs. Muslim Majority

var	***Model 4a: Non-Muslim Majority***	***Model 4b: Muslim Majority***
pfr_loc1	0.52***	0.97*
	(0.14)	*(0.39)*
pfr_loc2	0.29**	0.46**
	(0.11)	*(0.16)*
pfr_loc3	-0.02	0.09
	(0.16)	*(0.16)*
pfr_loc4	-0.94*	-
	(0.45)	-
cons	-0.61	-4.87
	(1.19)	*(1.69)*
obs	861	706
Pseudo R2	0.0753	0.0929

*p<0.001*** p<0.010** p<0.050**

In Muslim majority states both the headline (*pfr_loc1*) and lead (*pfr_loc2*) locations were significant, however the statistical significance of the headline location was not as high as the non-Muslim states. The lead location's significance was the same in both models, p<0.010 but the coefficient in Muslim states was larger. Holding all other variables constant, a one-unit increase in personal frames located in the lead resulted in a 0.46 increase in the expected log count of future terrorism in Muslim majority states, but only a 0.29 increase in non-Muslim states. While the influence of Muslim states personal frames locations was a little higher than non-Muslim states, *Hypothesis 4* ultimately failed to be supported by the data available.

Model 5a

$$\ln(tna_{t+1}) = \alpha + \beta_1 irf\ loc1 + \beta_2 irf\ loc2 + \beta_3 ifr\ loc3 + \beta_4 ifr\ loc4 + \beta_5 GDPpc + \beta_6\ pop + \beta_7 unemp + \beta_8 ciriphys + \epsilon$$

Model 5b/c/d

$$\ln(tna_{t+1}) = (\alpha + \beta_1 ifr\ loc1 + \beta_2 ifr\ loc2 + \beta_3 ifr\ loc3 + \beta_4 ifr\ loc4 + \beta_5 GDPpc + \beta_6\ pop + \beta_7 unemp + \beta_8 ciriphys + \epsilon)\ if\ fotp = (0,1,2)$$

Models 5a, 5b, 5c, and 5d, examined the influence of informational frames and their location within the published media articles on future terrorist attacks. (see Table 9) In Model 5a, the base model, informational frames that were located in the lead (*ifr_loc2*) and the body (*ifr_loc3*) locations were statistically significant at the p<0.001 level and had a positive influence on the expected log count of future terrorist attacks. For every one-unit increase in the informational frames located in the lead, holding all other variables constant, the expected log count of future terrorism increased by 0.36 per quarter. A one-unit increase in informational frames located in the body, again holding all other variables constant, the expected log count of future terrorist acts increased by 0.13. Informational frames that were dispersed (*ifr_loc4*) in the

Table 9: Informational Frame & Location-Freedom of the Press

var	*Model 5a: Base*	*Model 5b: Free Press*	*Model 5c: Partial Free Press*	*Model 5d: Not Free Press*
ifr_loc1	0.01	0.002	-0.71***	0.08
	(0.09)	*(0.08)*	*(0.20)*	*(0.24)*
ifr_loc2	0.36***	0.30***	0.03	0.09
	(0.06)	*(0.06)*	*(0.09)*	*(0.10)*
ifr_loc3	0.13***	-0.10*	0.23**	0.24***
	(0.03)	*(0.04)*	*(0.07)*	*(0.06)*
ifr_loc4	-0.99***	-0.90**	-0.58**	-0.81**
	(0.14)	*(0.28)*	*(0.21)*	*(0.27)*
cons	-1.54	-13.96	-7.11	2.39
	(0.80)	*(2.20)*	*(1.20)*	*(1.90)*
obs	1654	425	559	670
Pseudo R2	0.0720	0.1087	0.0771	0.0959

*p<0.001*** p<0.010** p<0.050**

article are also statistically significant, but they had a negative influence on the expected log count of terrorism. In conclusion, *Hypothesis 5a* is conditionally accepted in that the lead and body locations only were significant indicators of future terrorist acts. Model 5b examined the influence of informational frames and their locations in a subset of states that possess a free press. Informational frames in the lead (*ifr_loc2*) and body (*ifr_loc3*) were statistically significant, however, only the lead was positive and had a positive influence on the expected log count of future terrorism. The body location had a negative influence on the expected log count of future terrorism. Holding all other variables at their constant, a one-unit increase in informational frames located in the lead, the expected log count of future terrorism increased by 0.30 per quarter. On the other hand, informational frames located in the body, holding all other variables at their constant, the expected log count of future terrorist act decreased by 0.10 per quarter. Model 5c examined the influence of informational frames in a subset of states with a partially free press and found that the headline (*ifr_loc1*), body (*ifr_loc3*), and dispersed (*ifr_loc4*) locations were statistically significant. However, their influence went in opposite directions: the headline and dispersed locations were negative positive while the body was

positive. The next model, 5d examined the influence of informational frames in a subset of states where the press was not free. The body (*ifr_loc3*) and dispersed (*ifr_loc4*) locations were statistically significant but their influence on the expected log counts of future terrorism went in opposite directions. A one-unit increase in informational frames located in the body, holding all other variables constant, the expected log count of future terrorist acts increased by 0.24, while in the dispersed location it decreased by 0.81. *Hypothesis 5b* failed to find supporting evidence in the available data due to the erratic influence of the levels of the freedom of the press in the subset of states.

Model 6a/b

$$\ln(tna_{t+1}) = (\alpha + \beta_1 ifr\ loc + \beta_2 ifr\ loc2 + \beta_3 ifr\ loc3 + \beta_4 ifr\ loc4 + \beta_5 GDPpc + \beta_6\ pop + \beta_7 unemp + \beta_8 ciriphys + \epsilon)\ if\ m\ maj = (0,1)$$

Models 6a and 6b examined the medias usage of informational frames and their locations in Muslim majority states and non-Muslim majority states (see Table 10). In the non-Muslims majority states, the lead and dispersed variables were statistically significant. Holding all the other variables constant, a one-unit increase in the informational frames located in the lead resulted in a 0.37 increase in the expected log count of future terrorist acts. However, a one-unit increase in informational frames located in the dispersed, again holding all other variables constant, resulted in a 0.44 decrease in the expected log count of future terrorism. In Muslim majority states the body and the dispersed locations were significant, but their influence was in opposite directions. *Hypothesis 6* ultimately failed to be supported by the data available.

In conclusion, when examining all the media reports on human rights abuses committed by the U.S. during its 'War on Terror,' the only issues that had a significantly positive influence on future terrorism were torture and extra-judicial killings. Renditions, detentions, or combinations of the issues did not have much of an influence. The freedom of the press levels

Table 10: Informational Frame & Location-Non-Muslim Majority vs. Muslim Majority

var	***Model 6a: Non-Muslim Majority***	***Model 6b: Muslim Majority***
ifr_loc1	-0.02	-0.36
	(0.09)	*(0.21)*
ifr_loc2	0.37***	0.13
	(0.05)	*(0.15)*
ifr_loc3	0.07	0.27***
	(0.05)	*(0.07)*
ifr_loc4	-0.44*	-0.90**
	(0.18)	*(0.30)*
cons	0.35	-5.65
	(1.17)	*(1.62)*
obs	861	706
Pseudo R2	0.0787	0.0991

*p<0.001*** p<0.010** p<0.050**

only made a difference in those states with both a free and not free press and once again it was torture and extra-judicial killings that had an influence on future terrorism. The idea that published media reports dealing with human rights abuses in Muslim majority states would have a greater influence on future terrorism was largely discounted. In both non-Muslim states and Muslim majority states, torture and extra-judicial killings had a positive influence on future terrorism. The only real difference between the two types of states was on the subject of rendition which was significant in Muslim majority states and had a negative influence on future terrorism. Personal frames were only influential when they were located in the headline and the lead locations in the article. This was true in states that possessed a free press and only significant in not free press states in the lead location. Personal frames in the headline and lead had the same influence in non-Muslim and Muslim majority states. Informational frames that were located in the lead and the body locations were statistically significant and had a positive influence on future terrorist attacks. It became more confusing once the additional variables were added. States with a free press showed that the lead and body were statistically significant,

however, only the lead location had a positive influence on future terrorism. The body location had a negative influence on the future terrorism. In partially free press states, the headline, body, and dispersed locations were statistically significant. However, their influence went in opposite directions: the headline and dispersed locations were negative while the body was positive. Informational frames in a subset of states where the press was not free was also confusing. The body and dispersed locations were statistically significant but their influence on future terrorism went in opposite directions.

Chapter 6: Qualitative Analysis

This chapter explores the relationship between media's presentation of human rights abuses due to U.S. counterterrorism measures and terrorism using qualitative tools. It compliments and expands on the previous quantitative chapter which established a correlation between the volume of articles on human rights abuses committed by the US and the type of media frames utilized in these articles. The overall theory that was presented in chapter three will be examined in detail: the crux of the theory is that extensive coverage of these human rights abuses and how they are framed will influence those individuals who were initially neutral, apathetic, or even slightly sympathetic to the terrorists cause will increase the likelihood that they will become further radicalized and join in terror activity. This will be accomplished by utilizing historical media accounts of 'lone-wolf' terrorist's attacks and then examining the volume of reporting on America's counterterrorism efforts that resulted in human rights violations and the type of media frames utilized. The general idea is to demonstrate the plausibility of the casual mechanism, the intensity or frequency of media coverage of human rights abuses due to the U.S.'s counterterrorism policies, will be positively associated with an increase in the frequency of terrorism.

The data that will be utilized in this examination is the same that was employed in Chapter 5, specifically the Nexis Uni and ProQuest platform results of the human rights violations of extra-judicial killings, rendition and torture, and indefinite detainment of suspected terrorist that occurred during the America's 'War on Terror' from Jan. 2002, to Jan. 2016. Utilizing the same algorithm, some of the results were discarded because they were irrelevant (i.e. political speeches; duplicate articles; entertainment pieces; letters to the editor; articles that concerned the war in Iraq; and any articles that were returned that had nothing to do with the

U.S. 'War on Terror' (i.e. there were a significant number of articles on the television series '24.' The algorithm was general to capture all of the relevant material.[6] The same frame coding process as detailed at length in Chapter 5 will be utilized.

Concepts and Definitions: 'Lone Wolf' Terrorism and the Radicalization Process

In order to determine how a terrorist sympathizer could transition to an actual terrorist it is necessary to examine two related phenomena: lone wolf terrorism and the radicalization process. The combination of these two provide a mechanism to explore how media frames of America's human rights abuses could lead to further terrorism. The definition of terrorism was covered extensively in Chapter 1 and the lone wolf terrorist definition differs from it in only one aspect. A report by the Georgetown University Security Studies Program in 2015 provided a definition for the phenomenon. Specifically, it defined it as "the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or threat of violence committed by a *single actor* who pursues political change linked to a formulated ideology, whether his own or that of a larger organization, and *who does not receive orders, direction, or material support from outside sources*" (Beydoun 2018, 1219-1220, emphasis mine). These lone wolf's act on their own without orders, directions, and in many cases without any prior connections to terrorist organizations (Stewart and Burton 2008). The lone wolf terrorist is "a standalone operative who

[6] The search was conducted with these limits: Advanced search; Insert search terms (see below) -searching "in" document text-FT; separated by AND; Date: Jan. 1, 2002 to Dec. 31, 2016; Source type: Newspapers; Limit to "Full Text"; Publication Title: Limit to top 5 U.S. Papers; Sort oldest first; US OR America AND counterterrorism OR "war on terror" AND extra-judicial killing OR drone strike; United States OR America AND counterterrorism OR "war on terror" AND rendition; United States OR America AND counterterrorism OR "war on terror" AND torture; US OR America AND counterterrorism OR "war on terror" AND Abu Ghraib OR Guantanamo Bay AND abuse. (See Table 2)

by his very nature is embedded in the targeted society and is capable of self-activation at any time" (Stewart and Burton 2008).

As detailed by the William H. Webster Commission that investigated the Ft. Hood attack, the process of radicalization is dynamic and multilayered. For the most part, lone wolf terrorists are psychologically normal individuals who nevertheless feel that they belong to a collective identity (Webster Commission 2012). Leaders are deemed essential to radicalization in that they "draw together alienated, discontented, and isolated followers who are prone to or ready to accept a collective identity… and leaders identify a shared enemy as a target for violent behavior" (Webster Commission 2012). Radicalization is not an impulsive action, but a slow process with "many way stations" and the FBI described four incremental stages of development: preradicalization, identification, indoctrination, and action (Webster Commission 2012). Preradicalization typically involves the individual's motivation, stimuli, and opportunity. An individual's motivation can vary in response to stimuli provided by leaders whose rhetoric or actions inspire them, while "opportunity involves exposure to the commitment of others to the leader or the cause" (Webster Commission 2012). The identification phase of radicalization is manifested by an acceptance of and devotion to the cause and finally, the indoctrination phase involves a realization that the cause requires violent action (Webster Commission 2012). It is important to note that the FBI further states that these lone wolf's "can pass through the four stages of radicalization with little or no personal contact with a leader or another violent radical" (Webster Commission 2012). Furthermore, the report stressed, "Evolving communications technologies - most notably, the Internet -play an increasingly weighty role in the phenomenon of the lone actor" (Webster Commission 2012). It is this link, the 'evolving communication

technologies,' specifically media frames of human rights abuses that we will be examining further with the following examples

Examples of 'Lone Wolf' Terrorist Attacks

On 3 March 2006, Mohammed Reza Taheri-azar, an Iranian-American, drove his car into a crowd of students at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and injured nine people (Nesbit 2013). After turning himself in to local authorities, he confessed that the attack was to "avenge the deaths of Muslims worldwide" and to "punish" the United States government (Johnson 2016). Taheri-azar's expounded on his rationale for the attack by noting that "people all over the world are being killed in war and now it is the people in the United States['] turn to be killed" (Rocha et al 2006). By all the media and investigators accounts, Taheri-azar clearly "matched the modern profile of the unaffiliated, lone-wolf terrorist" (Nesbitt 2013).

On November 5, 2009, US Army Major Nidal Malik Hasan, an Army Medical Corps psychiatrist, entered the Soldier Readiness Center of Fort Hood, TX., reportedly shouted "Allah Akbar!" and opened fire with a 5.7mm semi-automatic pistol. Before he was subdued and apprehended by base personnel, Hasan had killed 13 soldiers and wounded over 30 others. It was the worst mass shooting to have occurred on an American military installation. What were his motivations? Hasan was a deeply religious Muslim who had no reported foreign travel, and "he had no known contact and no known relationships with criminal elements, agents of foreign powers, or potential terrorists" (Webster Commission 2012). What appeared to be the main precipitant for the attack was that he was upset about deploying to Afghanistan and told a friend that, "Muslims shouldn't be in the U.S. military, because obviously Muslims shouldn't kill Muslims" (Drogin and Fiore 2009). It was later revealed that Hasan had sent eighteen emails to

Anwar al-Aulaqi, a Yemen-American Iman and a member of al-Qaeda. In some of these exchanges, Hasan focused mainly on the conflict between Hamas and Israel and noted that "Even if the Palestinians did forgive and forget the atrocities of the unjust killings of innocent men, women, and children, Israel would continue its transgressing oppression," and that "Israel was and continues to indiscriminately kill and hurt civilians and commit other atrocities in the Gaza territory" (Webster Commission 2012). From these missives a theme emerged, Hasan believed that Israel was committing atrocities in Gaza by killing innocent Muslim men, women, and children. It would not be too much a stretch to speculate that he believed that these atrocities were being committed by American troops on innocent Iraq and Afghanistan's civilians. Hasan, later admitted to the shootings at his court-martial in August 2013 but offered a 'defense of others' strategy in that he was seeking to protect the Taliban leadership, including Mullah Omar (Christianson 2013).

On April 15, 2013, at the finish line of the Boston Marathon two brothers, Dzhokhar and Tamerlan Tsarnaev, detonated two pressure cooker bombs killing three people and wounding over 260 others. During the manhunt to capture the bombers, the older brother, Tamerlan, was killed while Dzhokhar was wounded but apprehended alive. The subsequent investigation and questioning of Dzhokhar revealed that the two brothers were self-radicalized over the internet and were motivated by their extremist Islamic beliefs (Cooper et al 2013). More specifically, the impetus for the attack was the American wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (Wilson et al 2013).

On May 22, 2013, a British Army soldier, Fusilier Lee Rigby of the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers, was attacked and killed by Michael Adebolajo and Michael Adebowale near the Royal Artillery Barracks in Woolwich, southeast London. The two men ran down Rigby with their car and then proceeded to stab him with knives and a cleaver until he was dead. Rather than

attempting to flee after the fact, Adebolajo and Adebowale, calmly waited for police to arrive. The men told the gathering crowd that they had "killed a soldier to avenge the killing of Muslims by the British armed forces" (BBC 2013). Subsequent media video shows one of the perpetrators stating, "We must fight them as they fight us. An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth. I apologize that women have had to witness this today, but in our land our women have to see the same" (BBC 2013). Adebolajo's defense at his trial was simply that he had "no choice…as a soldier of Allah," and "It is a war between Islam and those militaries that intervene in Muslim lands. 'Operation Shock and Awe' -- I saw it unfold on BBC and CNN what not, and I was disgusted, you know. It was reported as if it was praiseworthy," he said. "I knew that every one of those bombs was killing someone. I was disgusted" (Smith-Spark and Morgan 2013).

On November 4, 2015, Faisal Mohammed attacked four people with a hunting knife at the University of California campus in Merced, California. He was subsequently shot by university police and died from his wounds. Later investigations by the FBI noted that Faisal had visited websites for ISIS, downloaded their propaganda, and even had an ISIS flag on his backpack (Pearson 2016). Investigators speculated that he had "self-radicalized" and that every "indication is that Mohammad acted on his own; however, it may never be possible to definitively determine why he chose to attack people on the UC Merced campus" (Pearson 2016).

On 2 December 2015, a married couple, Rizwan Farook and Tashfeen Malik, attacked the San Bernardino County Department of Public Health holiday party killing fourteen people and wounding twenty-two others before they were killed by responding police officers. The attack was classified as terrorism after it emerged that the husband had pledged his and his wife's allegiance to ISIS on Facebook (Berman 2016). Although investigators stated that the couple had

been radicalized for some time and showed a “long-standing interest in political violence” they did not believe that the couple were being directed by terrorist groups overseas (Berman 2016).

On June 12, 2016, Omar Mateen, a Muslim American of Afghan descent, opened fire with multiple weapons at a night club in Orlando, Florida, ultimately killing forty-nine people and wounded fifty-three others before he was killed by the SWAT team (Tsukayama et al 2016). During the attack, Mateen called News 13 of Orlando and stated, “I'm the shooter. It's me. I am the shooter” and then noted that he was carrying out the shooting on the behalf of ISIL (Miller 2016). Later during negotiations with the police, Mateen claimed the attack was in response to the US bombing in Iraq that killed Abu Wahib, an ISIL military commander earlier in May (Doornbos 2016). Mateen also told the negotiator, “You have to tell America to stop bombing Syria and Iraq. They are killing a lot of innocent people... A lot of innocent women and children are getting killed in Syria and Iraq and Afghanistan, okay. You see, now you feel, now you feel how it is, now you feel how it is” (Doornbos 2016).

These examples demonstrate that these ‘lone-wolf’ terrorists were distinctly familiar with the prevailing human rights abuse frames that were prevalent in the media. What is unclear, however, is they merely repeated these frames to somehow give some sort of moral equivalence or justification for their actions.

Drone Strikes and Their Influence

As was related in Chapter 4, extra-judicial killings via drone strikes have not received the same type of international media scrutiny that other human rights abuses that have occurred on America’s ‘War on Terror.’ Since 2004, the Pakistani ISI and the CIA have cooperated in targeting and eliminating hundreds of militants and terrorists including a number of their leaders in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (Qazi 2012). These attacks had been successful in

eliminating terrorists but they had increasingly inflamed the Pakistani public and press who believed that they "kill mostly civilians" and they are routinely denounced by Pakistani politicians in the National Assembly (Bergen, Tiedeman 2011). Notwithstanding these protests, Pakistan's president at the time, Asif Ali Zardari, once told U.S. officials to, "Kill the seniors, collateral damage worries you Americans. It does not worry me" (Bergen, Tiedeman 2011, 16).

However, it had been suggested by multiple sources that these drone strikes were used by terrorist groups as recruitment tools because they caused significant "backlash -- both in terms of anti-U.S. opinion and violence" (Abbas 2103). This backlash often focused first on those targets that were close at hand, namely Pakistan's security forces (Abbas 2103). However, sometimes the targets were closer to home. Faisal Shahzad, a Pakistani-American citizen, was arrested for the attempted May 1, 2010, Times Square car bombing. After his arrest and during his interrogation he told investigators that "that he acted out of anger over the CIA's Predator strikes in Pakistan, especially a drone attack that took place while he was visiting the country" (Gerges 2013). During the following court proceedings in which he pleaded guilty, he told the judge he wanted "to plead guilty 100 times because unless the United States pulls out of Afghanistan and Iraq, until they stop drone strikes in Somalia, Pakistan and Yemen and stop attacking Muslim lands" (Gerges 2013). When pressed by the judge over whether he considered that innocents might have been among his victims had he succeeded, he replied, "They don't see the drones killing children in Afghanistan," he said. "It's a war and I'm a part of it" (Gerges 2013). Numerous media outlets have noted that American drone attacks that kill civilians worked to the advantage of terrorist groups as they are able to exploit the "local appetite for revenge and justice in their recruitment efforts" (Manna 2016). It was not just anecdotal evidence that drone strikes have had a counter-productive effect. Drone strike data in Pakistan from 2006 to 2012, along

with the Global Terrorism Database was examined by researchers and it was determined that "there is a statistically significant rise in the number of terrorist attacks occurring after the U.S. drone program begins targeting a given province. This effect is significant both immediately and one month after the drone strikes begin" (Manna 2016).

Analysis and Discussion

The themes that were generally shared by the lone-wolf terrorist who survived was one of a Muslim avenger who was fighting back to punish Americans for the atrocities that they felt were committed during the 'War on Terror.' The presence of American soldiers in Muslim lands, the subsequent bombing of suspected enemy combatants, and the deaths of civilians was a primary motivation for these individuals to self-radicalize. This motivation or stimuli was further facilitated by portions of the Koran. The Koran symbolizes the literal word of God as it was revealed to Muhammad and it details the rights, responsibilities, and rules for the Muslim faithful to follow. The Koran divides the world into two dichotomous geographies: the land of Islam, *dar-al-Islam*, and the land of warfare, *dar-al-harb* (Esposito 2002, 21). Central to this division is the concept of *jihad* or the Koran's explicit, "command to struggle, the literal meaning of the word jihad" (Esposito 2002, 27). The Koranic verses that expound on *jihad* divide it into two general types: defensive in protecting Muslim lands from aggression and offensive to spread the power and reach of Islam (Esposito 2002, 65). When potential sympathizers absorb the media's coverage of America's 'War on Terror' it was not too much of a stretch of the imagination to believe that *dar-al-Islam* is under attack and that all the faithful must respond.

In Figure 3, the total number of media articles that contained human right frames related to America's 'War on Terror' from 2002 to 2016 is displayed. The number of articles per quarter



Figure 3: Total Human Rights Frames

tended to range from 5 to 20 until late 2005, when they increased substantially to about 30 to 60 per quarter. This time-frame generally coincides with the rise of the insurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan. Two of the largest spikes occurred in the first quarter of 2009 and 2013. The first can be explained by the election of President Obama and his administrations reversal of the previous administrations controversial policies that had led to human rights violations such as enhanced interrogations, detention programs, and rendition. The second spike likewise coincides with President Obama's second inauguration, however, not in positive manner. Many articles note that Guantanamo Bay prison facility was still open despite Obama's promise to close it, but a majority of the articles ultimately focused on the controversial drone program led by the CIA. The dates on the table represent the incidents of 'lone-wolf' terrorist attacks previously mentioned. The only pattern that they demonstrate was up until 2015-2016, lone-wolf attacks generally followed periods of increased media reports on human rights violations.

Figure 4 notes the total number of articles that contained torture frames since that frame was one of the largest predictors of future terrorist attacks in the previous chapter. Between 2004 and 2008, the number of media reports on torture averaged 7.5 per quarter but spiked in the 1st quarter of 2009. This increase can be attributed to the new Obama administration releasing the Bush-era interrogation memos and his promise to close Guantanamo Bay that had been closely associated with prisoner abuse. The spike in the 3rd quarter of 2014 can be attributed to the director of the CIA, John Brennan, defending the agencies past interrogation policies and the president's admission that American officials had committed torture on some terrorist suspects. Once again, the dates on the table represent the 'lone-wolf' terrorist acts mentioned earlier. For the most part, the attacks follow the increased reporting on the human rights violation of torture.



Figure 4: Total Torture Frames



Figure 5: Total Extrajudicial Killing Frames

Figure 5 details the media reports on drone strikes and it was relatively quiet until late 2009 when the instances of published articles began to steadily climb. Reporting on drones and their collateral damage peaked in the 1st and 2nd quarter of 2013, and this was largely attributed to the coverage in Pakistani press. The lone-wolf terrorist attacks do not follow any perceptible pattern when they are compared to media reports on drone strikes.

Rather than focusing solely in the number of articles containing human rights frames over time, lets consider the number of human rights issue frames, whether they were personal or informational frames, and their location in the article before a specific attack. Three of these lone-wolf attacks will be examined: Nidal Malik Hasan's attack at Fort Hood, TX; the murder of Lee Rigby by Michael Adebolajo and Michael Adebowale; and the Pakistani drone strikes. In the U.S. media coverage of human rights abuses due to the 'War on Terror' up to the Ft. Hood shooting the single human rights issue that was most often reported was 'torture' (81), followed by 'detentions' (26), and a combination of multiple human rights issues (53) (See Table 11).

Table 9: Human Rights Issue and Location Before Lone Wolf Attacks

Human Rights Issue	***US***	***UK***	***Pak***
Rendition	5	8	1
Torture	81	104	29
Extra-judicial Killings	3	67	121
Detention	26	44	9
Combination	53	196	45
Personal Frames	**43**	**135**	**40**
Headline	6	68	2
Lead	13	67	22
Body	24	0	16
Dispersed	0	0	0
Informational Frames	**159**	**313**	**256**
Headline	22	92	8
Lead	23	221	58
Body	113	0	186
Dispersed	1	0	4

Renditions and extra-judicial killings were barely mentioned by themselves. Further analysis on the frame types reveal that the prominent media frame of these human rights issues was the informational frame (159) located primarily in the body of the article (113). While there were personal frames (43) located mainly in the body of the article (24), they were not as numerous as the informational frame. In the U. K's media coverage of human rights abuses due to the American 'War on Terror' up to the killing of Lee Rigby, once again the single human rights issue that was most often reported was torture (104), followed by extra-judicial killings, or drones (67), and a combination of multiple human rights issues (196). Detentions (44) were mentioned almost twice as often in the U.K. than in the U.S. while renditions (8) were barely mentioned by themselves. Further analysis on the frame types reveal that the prominent media frame of these human rights issues was the once again the informational frame (313) located primarily in the lead of the article (221) followed by the headline (92). The key difference between US and the UK on the placement of the frame within the article was that in the UK media ALL of the frames are in the headline and the lead locations. Pakistan's media reporting on human rights abuses due to the U.S. counterterrorism was focused primarily on extra-judicial killings. Examining the media frames present in the selected articles since the drone program was accelerated in 2009, the single human rights issue that was most prevalent was extrajudicial killings (121) followed by a combination of human rights issues (45) and torture (29). Detention (9) and rendition (1) were barely mentioned. Examining the detected media frames reveal that the informational frames were the most prevalent at 256 instances. Informational frames locations within the articles were in primarily in the body (186), followed by the lead (58), with

the headline (8), and those that were dispersed (4) barely being utilized. Personal frames were only present 40 times with over half of them being located in the lead.

In conclusion, the qualitative analysis sought to establish a relationship between the media's presentation and frequency of reporting of human rights abuses due to America's 'War on Terror' and future terrorist attacks. By examining specific 'lone-wolf' terrorist attacks and their motivations and comparing these to the frequency and type of frame the media utilized in its reporting, I sought to establish the plausibility of a correlation between the two. Before discussing the overall results, perhaps it is appropriate to return to the radicalization process. The Webster Commission that investigated the Ft. Hood shootings stressed the importance of leaders in the radicalization process because they facilitate in identifying "a shared enemy" (2012). However, later in the report the FBI stated that a 'lone-wolf' can pass through the four stages of radicalization without any personal contact with leaders (Webster Commission 2012). This begs to question, then what is the stimuli that propels a sympathizer through the radicalization process?

The most readily available source for information was the daily media reports on America's 'War on Terror' especially when these accounts concern human rights violations. The central theme that most of these 'lone-wolf' terrorists have espoused was that their purpose was to avenge and punish all Americans for what they perceived as atrocities committed against innocent Muslim men, women, and children. When one compares these 'lone-wolf' terrorist attacks against the frequency of media reports that contain human rights frames there was generally a correlation. Looking at all of the media's articles that contained human rights frames from the last quarter of 2005 to the last quarter of 2014, each quarter averaged a little over 40 articles. This increase in the frequency of media human rights frames corresponds to the 'lone-

wolf' terrorist attacks with the exception of the last three attacks in 2015-2016. Isolating just the media frames that dealt with torture and drone strikes there was a similar drop in the later part of 2015 through 2016. These reductions in media frames dealing with human rights abuses could possibly be accounted for the American reduction of its forces in Iraq or the subsequent rise of ISIS in northern Iraq and Syria. In fact, the last three 'lone-wolf' terrorists specifically mentioned their allegiance to the terrorist group during their attacks.

Chapter 7: Conclusion, Implications, and Future Studies

This dissertation sought to go beyond previous studies that have asserted that human rights violations increase the propensity for terrorism by positing that it is the manner in which these abuses are communicated by the media to the larger public that is the mechanism that increases the chance of radicalism. This examination focused on the extensive media attention that the American 'War on Terror' received and the subsequent revelations of torture, extraordinary rendition, extra-judicial killings, and the indefinite imprisonment of suspected terrorists. This dissertation aimed to answer the following question: What impact does the media's coverage of the human rights abuses that occur due to a state's counterterrorism policies have on the propensity for future terrorist activities?

This research is important because no casual mechanism between the media's reporting and terrorism has been established beyond anecdotal observations. Previous studies of terrorism have addressed the influence of human rights abuses on future terrorist activity such as Piazza and Walsh's (2010) conclusion that respecting physical integrity rights reduces terrorism. Harsh crack downs by the government that abuse the human rights of its citizens can consequently cause terrorist recruitment to rise (Hoffman 2004, 935). These studies assume a few factors: one, that the human rights violations are known to the larger public, two, that the media reports them in a neutral fashion, and three, that these reports influence the public in the same manner. Other studies have focused on the role of the mass media in shaping public perceptions of terrorist groups and their actions. Yet, little research has examined the relationship between the media's publicity of human rights abuses that occurred due to a state's counterterrorism policy and future terrorist attacks. Is the rise in terrorist activity caused by the human rights violations themselves or, perhaps, by how the media framed these events? The media reports on all aspects of the

terrorist actions, from its initial attacks, to its evolution over time, and then details the government's response. If media can shape public perceptions because of the manner of its reporting on other aspects of terrorism, then it can obviously influence those potential terrorist sympathizers in the same fashion.

It is well documented that some type of 'leader' is essential in the radicalization process to in effect, lead the sympathizer onto the radical path. However, it must be noted that individuals do not arrive at this stage overnight; it is often a slow process. The leader might further guide the individual down that path, but the idea of the path has already been visualized by the individual. The leader merely crystalizes and focuses the potential sympathizers already formed preconceived biases against the target. It would be beyond the scope of this dissertation to fully document all of the potential sources of these biases, i.e. family, friends, or life-experiences, however, it would be a mistake to discount the pervasive influence that the media has in transmitting ideas that can form the basis of a narrative that could excuse terrorist actions. The media's frequency of reporting on abuses that occurred during counterterrorism activities and the types of frames that they utilize can influence those with such proclivities to support terrorist actions.

The symbiotic relationship between terrorist groups and the news media has been noted myriad times, yet another relationship exists that is often overlooked: the media and human rights groups. Human rights organizations depend upon media coverage of human rights violations to disseminate their message and to attempt to influence countries to respect these rights. HRO's are aided in this respect because states that experience significant amounts of terrorist events will also receive more than normal media coverage and this extra attention will often shed light on any state sanctioned human rights abuses (Asal et al 2016). Human Rights

Organizations will also utilize frames in their press releases that the media will convey with their added perspectives. These frames form the narrative structure that is utilized by the media to convey the information on these types of abuses. The two most prevalent frames utilized in reporting on human rights violations that have occurred during America's counterterrorism efforts are informational frames and personal frames (McEntire et al 2015b, 409). Informational frames attempt to merely inform or educate the reader of the human rights violations that occurred over time during the state's counterterrorism efforts. Informational frames largely lack the emotive language of the personal frames that attempt to link the reader emotionally to an abused individual or other minority group at the beginning of the article in an attempt to highlight larger trends of human rights violations (McEntire et al 2015b, 409).

This examination began with the theoretical assumption that the existence of negative economic and/or discriminatory political conditions by themselves are not completely responsible for pushing individuals toward terrorist violence. What is necessary is to increase their motive or incentives to participate in this type of violence. The main precipitant that this dissertation focused on was information conveyed by the media concerning a state's human rights violations that occurred during its counterterrorism operations. The media is critical to this theory for one primary reason: it communicates information on both the terrorist events and the subsequent human rights abuses by the state and it utilizes both personal and informational frames in doing so.

First, I examined the frequency of all media articles that contained human rights violations during America's 'War on Terror' to examine their influence on all terrorists' attacks. The two human rights issues appearing in the media reports that had the most impact were torture and extra-judicial killings. The higher frequency of media reporting on the U.S.'s usage

of torture and extra-judicial killings, or drone strikes, during its counterterrorism efforts were positively associated with increases in the frequency of terror attacks in the following quarter. The media reporting on the practices of rendition and the detention of terrorist suspects were not significantly influential on terrorist activities. When examining whether the level of press freedoms in a state influences the significance of media reports on human rights violations on future terrorism it was demonstrated that in the states with a free press and an unfree press media reports of torture and extra-judicial killings had a positive and significant influence on the incidents of terrorism. Notably in those states with an unfree press, torture saw the most significant increase of more than double the influence on future terrorist events than in free press countries. It was only unfree press states did rendition matter, but in this instance, it had a negative influence on future terrorists' events. Those states with a partially free press the only human rights issue that was statistically significant was extra-judicial killings. Rendition, detention, or a combination of the human rights issues in media reports were not significant factors influencing terrorism. There was almost no difference between Muslim and non-Muslim majority states in the influence of these human rights abuses on future terrorist actions.

The distinction on the location of personal and informational frames were examined and the results were not surprising. Personal frames had their greatest influence on future terrorist attacks when they were placed in the headline or lead of the article in the base model. These are the most visible locations for the reader and often the only part of the article that is read fully. In states with a free press, the results remained largely the same, however, the effects were less than the base model and personal frames in the body of the article the effect actually became negative on future terrorist attacks. In partially free press states the influence of the headline is significant; however, no other location was influential. The lead location achieved its greatest influence in

the most restrictive media environment. In the informational frames the headline was no longer significant and the lead location had a positive influence only in the base and free press models. The body of the article was significant in all the models but gained in influence as the press became less free. Informational frames that were dispersed had a negative influence in all the models. As to the differences between Muslim and non-Muslim states and the influence of personal and informational frames within the model that contained all of the human right issues, the two were almost identical with the lead and the body being influential. Personal frames in the headline and lead were significantly higher in Muslim states than non-Muslim, with almost double the influence on future terrorist attacks. Informational frames, on the other hand, were different between the two types of states. In non-Muslim states the lead location was significant while in Muslim states the body was more influential. The dispersed locations had a negative influence in both models.

Upon examining the relationship between the media and the manner in which it framed human rights abuses that occurred during America's 'War on Terror' from a qualitative perspective, anecdotal evidence connecting the two was not too difficult to find. This was especially true from the media articles on the 'lone-wolf' terrorist's attacks. Mohammed Reza Taheri-azar, stated that he wanted to "avenge the deaths of Muslims worldwide" while Omar Mateen exclaimed that, "They (Americans) are killing a lot of innocent people" (Johnson 2016; Doornbos 2016). In another instance, Faisal Shahzad claimed that, "They (Americans) don't see the drones killing children in Afghanistan," he said. "It's a war and I'm a part of it" (Gerges 2013). In most of the instances where the lone-wolf terrorist survived they sought to justify their actions by characterizing them as direct response to U.S. human rights violations. And these violations were amplified, framed, and disseminated by both the U.S. and international media.

When the ‘lone-wolf’ attacks were compared to the frequency of media reporting on all of the U.S.’s human rights violations, the overall trend was that the attacks tended to follow increased media attention. The same holds true with media reports on America’s use of torture, yet with drone strikes there was no perceptible pattern to lone-wolf terrorist attacks after significant media reports on the practice.

By examining the numbers of media reports on specific human rights violations that occurred before a particular lone-wolf attack a few constancies were noted. In both the U.S. and the U.K., the issue that was reported with the most frequency was torture utilizing an informational frame. The difference between the two was merely the frames location: the predominant location of the frame in the U.S. media was in the body, while in the U.K. the frame was principally located in the lead of the article. In Pakistan, the media focused on primarily the extra-judicial killings conducted by the CIA’s drone program and similar to the US, informational frames located in the body of the article were the most prevalent.

The overall implications of this research is that sensational reporting on human rights abuses that occurred during America’s ‘War on Terror,’ specifically those that utilized a personal frame in the headline and lead of the articles that specifically dealt with torture and extrajudicial killings, have a positive influence on future terrorist attacks. While the media is merely reporting events in a manner that maximizes their profitability, it cannot be overlooked that their medium is one of the primary mechanisms that conveys the information necessary for terrorist groups to recruit those who are sympathetic to their cause. However, it must be noted that this examination was limited to traditional newspaper articles that were dependent upon Nexis Uni’s database which did not include publications that were not translated into English. Furthermore, this dissertation did not include broadcast media or social media. Future research should incorporate

both and seek to overcome the language barrier to arrive at a fuller and more complete picture of all of the media's influence on terrorism as a whole.

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Appendix A: Complete Models Tables

Table 5: Human Rights Issue-Freedom of the Press

var	*Model 1a: Base*	*Model 1b: Free Press*	*Model 1c: Partial Free Press*	*Model 1d: Not Free Press*
hri1	-0.84	0.50	-0.22	-1.66***
	(0.40)	*(0.38)*	*(0.39)*	*(0.28)*
hri2	0.25***	0.19**	0.17	0.52**
	(0.07)	*(0.07)*	*(0.15)*	*(0.20)*
hri3	0.37***	0.30***	0.16*	0.37***
	(0.05)	*(0.07)*	*(0.07)*	*(0.06)*
hri4	0.07	0.09	0.13	0.30
	(0.10)	*(0.11)*	*(0.30)*	*(0.23)*
hri5	0.08	0.09	-0.02	-0.07
	(0.05)	*(0.05)*	*(0.08)*	*(0.09)*
gdppc_lg	-0.11*	0.39*	0.41***	-0.16
	(0.52)	*(0.17)*	*(0.09)*	*(0.11)*
pop_lg	0.31***	0.76***	0.40***	0.110628
	(0.04)	*(0.10)*	*(0.06)*	*(0.08)*
unemp	-0.03**	-0.14***	-0.11***	0.004
	(0.01)	*(0.04)*	*(0.01)*	*(0.02)*
ciri0	0.30	-	0.0.56**	0.28
	(0.18)	-	*(0.17)*	*(0.44)*
ciri1	0.11	-1.68**	0.49*	-0.44
	(0.19)	*(0.62)*	*(0.17)*	*(0.46)*
ciri3	-0.35	-0.15	-0.09	-0.38
	(0.19)	*(0.42)*	*(0.20)*	*(0.41)*
ciri4	-1.16***	-4.58***	-2.33	-1.39**
	(0.22)	*(0.53)*	*(0.24)*	*(0.42)*
ciri5	-1.33***	-4.88***	-0.003	-2.95***
	(0.23)	*(0.53)*	*(0.27)*	*(0.40)*
ciri6	-2.23***	-4.79***	-0.57	-5.02***
	(0.23)	*(0.42)*	*(0.37)*	*(0.55)*
ciri7	-2.96***	-4.33***	-	-5.96***
	(0.25)	*(0.36)*	-	*(1.07)*
ciri8	-2.22***	-3.24***	-	-22.8***
	(0.31)	*(0.38)*	-	*(0.47)*
cons	-1.19	-12.26	-6.74	2.43
	(0.82)	*(2.35)*	*(1.21)*	*(1.76)*
obs	1654	425	559	670
Pseudo R2	0.0732	0.1000	0.0748	0.0987

*p<0.001*** p<0.010** p<0.050**

Table 6: Human Rights Issue-Muslim Majority vs. Non-Muslim Majority

var	*Model 2a: Non-Muslim Majority*	*Model 2b: Muslim Majority*
hri1	0.19	-1.82**
	(0.35)	*(0.59)*
hri2	0.25**	0.28*
	(0.08)	*(0.13)*
hri3	0.38***	0.33***
	(0.06)	*(0.08)*
hri4	0.01	0.16
	(0.10)	*(0.18)*
hri5	0.09	0.06
	(0.05)	*(0.12)*
gdppc_lg	-0.44***	0.19*
	(0.07)	*(0.09)*
pop_lg	0.36***	0.36***
	(0.06)	*(0.06)*
unemp	-0.11***	0.08***
	(0.01)	*(0.02)*
ciri0	-0.53*	1.49***
	(0.25)	*(0.20)*
ciri1	-0.36	0.85***
	(0.23)	*(0.27)*
ciri3	-0.07	-0.46
	(0.21)	*(0.30)*
ciri4	-0.51	-1.46***
	(0.26)	*(0.27)*
ciri5	-.0.94*	-0.97**
	(0.40)	*(0.28)*
ciri6	-1.13**	-1.72***
	(0.35)	*(0.34)*
ciri7	-1.65***	-4.57***
	(0.33)	*(1.14)*
ciri8	-0.71	-24.13***
	(0.34)	*(0.38)*
cons	1.14	-5.72
	(1.19)	*(1.62)*
obs	816	706
Pseudo R2	0.0812	0.0994

*p<0.001*** p<0.010** p<0.050**

Table 7: Personal Frame & Location-Freedom of the Press

var	*Model 3a: Base*	*Model 3b: Free Press*	*Model 3c: Partial Free Press*	*Model 3d: Not Free Press*
pfr_loc1	0.70***	0.49***	0.61*	1.08
	(0.16)	*(0.13)*	*(0.30)*	*(0.60)*
pfr_loc2	0.41***	0.24*	0.08	0.89***
	(0.10)	*(0.11)*	*(0.16)*	*(0.22)*
pfr_loc3	-0.03	-0.49**	0.03	0.27
	(0.11)	*(0.16)*	*(0.14)*	*(0.21)*
pfr_loc4	-1.31*	-0.91	-1.73*	-
	(0.53)	*(0.48)*	*(0.71)*	-
gdppc_lg	-0.11**	0.49**	0.42***	-0.27*
	(0.05)	*(0.15)*	*(0.09)*	*(0.12)*
pop_lg	0.35***	0.83***	0.43***	0.15
	(0.04)	*(0.10)*	*(0.06)*	*(0.08)*
unemp	-0.05***	-0.11***	-0.11***	-0.04*
	(0.01)	*(0.03)*	*(0.01)*	*(0.02)*
ciri0	0.55**	-	0.59***	0.30
	(0.18)	-	*(0.17)*	*(0.47)*
ciri1	0.19	-1.42*	0.53**	-0.40
	(0.19)	*(0.57)*	*(0.20)*	*(0.49)*
ciri3	-0.30	-0.13	-0.09	-0.51
	(0.19)	*(0.41)*	*(0.21)*	*(0.42)*
ciri4	-1.15***	-4.29***	-0.17	-1.52***
	(0.21)	*(0.48)*	*(0.24)*	*(0.41)*
ciri5	-1.01***	-4.66***	-0.14	-3.06***
	(0.24)	*(0.49)*	*(0.27)*	*(0.40)*
ciri6	-2.13***	-4.52***	-0.53	-5.12***
	(0.29)	*(0.41)*	*(0.39)*	*(0.56)*
ciri7	-3.00***	-4.23***	-	-5.94***
	(0.25)	*(0.33)*	-	*(1.03)*
ciri8	-1.83***	-2.81***	-	-27.08
	(0.32)	*(0.33)*	-	*(0.40)*
cons	-1.84	-14.74	-7.38	3.21
	(0.78)	*(2.25)*	*(1.19)*	*(2.06)*
obs	1654	425	559	670
Pseudo R2	0.0684	0.1013	0.0741	0.0929

*p<0.001*** p<0.010** p<0.050**

Table 8: Personal Frame & Location-Muslim Majority vs. Non-Muslim Majority

var	*Model 4a: Non-Muslim Majority*	*Model 4b: Muslim Majority*
pfr_loc1	0.52***	0.97*
	(0.14)	*(0.39)*
pfr_loc2	0.29**	0.46**
	(0.11)	*(0.16)*
pfr_loc3	-0.02	0.09
	(0.16)	*(0.16)*
pfr_loc4	-0.94*	-
	(0.45)	-
gdppc_lg	-0.38***	0.13
	(0.08)	*(0.10)*
pop_lg	0.41***	0.35***
	(0.06)	*(0.06)*
unemp	-0.11***	0.07**
	(0.01)	*(0.02)*
ciri0	-0.52*	1.92***
	(0.24)	*(0.22)*
ciri1	-0.40	0.95***
	(0.22)	*(0.24)*
ciri3	-0.04	-0.40
	(0.21)	*(0.30)*
ciri4	-0.49*	-1.42***
	(0.24)	*(0.28)*
ciri5	-0.57	-0.74*
	(0.35)	*(0.31)*
ciri6	-1.15**	-1.77***
	(0.36)	*(0.34)*
ciri7	-1.79***	-4.47***
	(0.35)	*(1.08)*
ciri8	-0.36	-20.60***
	(0.38)	*(0.38)*
cons	-0.61	-4.87
	(1.19)	*(1.69)*
obs	861	706
Pseudo R2	0.0753	0.0929

*p<0.001*** p<0.010** p<0.050**

Table 9: Informational Frame & Location-Freedom of the Press

var	*Model 5a: Base*	*Model 5b: Free Press*	*Model 5c: Partial Free Press*	*Model 5d: Not Free Press*
ifr_loc1	0.01	0.002	-0.71***	0.08
	(0.09)	*(0.08)*	*(0.20)*	*(0.24)*
ifr_loc2	0.36***	0.30***	0.03	0.09
	(0.06)	*(0.06)*	*(0.09)*	*(0.10)*
ifr_loc3	0.13***	-0.10*	0.23**	0.24***
	(0.03)	*(0.04)*	*(0.07)*	*(0.06)*
ifr_loc4	-0.99***	-0.90**	-0.58**	-0.81**
	(0.14)	*(0.28)*	*(0.21)*	*(0.27)*
gdppc_lg	-0.11*	0.42**	0.41***	-0.17
	(0.05)	*(0.14)*	*(0.09)*	*(0.11)*
pop_lg	0.33***	0.82***	0.42***	0.13
	(0.04)	*(0.09)*	*(0.06)*	*(0.08)*
unemp	-0.03**	-0.10***	-0.10***	-0.005
	(0.01)	*(0.03)*	*(0.01)*	*(0.02)*
ciri0	0.35	-1.50*	0.59**	0.23
	(0.18)	*(0.59)*	*(0.17)*	*(0.44)*
ciri1	0.18	-1.637901*	0.49**	-0.32
	(0.19)	*(0.65)*	*(0.21)*	*(0.46)*
ciri3	-0.36	0.10	-0.08	-0.41
	(0.19)	*(0.41)*	*(0.20)*	*(0.40)*
ciri4	-1.15***	-4.17***	-0.14	-1.46***
	(0.21)	*(0.45)*	*(0.24)*	*(0.41)*
ciri5	-1.28***	-4.78***	-0.01	-3.02***
	(0.23)	*(0.45)*	*(0.29)*	*(0.39)*
ciri6	-2.21***	-4.48***	-0.52	-5.07***
	(0.23)	*(0.38)*	*(0.37)*	*(0.55)*
ciri7	-2.99***	-4.16***	-	-5.95***
	(0.24)	*(0.30)*	-	*(1.04)*
ciri8	-1.79***	-2.81***	-	-25.18***
	(0.31)	*(0.32)*	-	*(0.39)*
cons	-1.54	-13.96	-7.11	2.39
	(0.80)	*(2.20)*	*(1.20)*	*(1.90)*
obs	1654	425	559	670
Pseudo R2	0.0720	0.1087	0.0771	0.0959

*p<0.001*** p<0.010** p<0.050**

Table 10: Informational Frame & Location- Muslim Majority vs. Non-Muslim Majority

var	*Model 6a: Non-Muslim Majority*	*Model 6b: Muslim Majority*
ifr_loc1	-0.02	-0.36
	(0.09)	*(0.21)*
ifr_loc2	0.37***	0.13
	(0.05)	*(0.15)*
ifr_loc3	0.07	0.27***
	(0.05)	*(0.07)*
ifr_loc4	-0.44*	-0.90**
	(0.18)	*(0.30)*
gdppc_lg	-0.41***	0.19*
	(0.08)	*(0.09)*
pop_lg	0.37***	0.35***
	(0.06)	*(0.06)*
unemp	-0.11***	0.09***
	(0.01)	*(0.02)*
ciri0	-0.55*	1.50***
	(0.25)	*(0.20)*
ciri1	-0.36	0.89***
	(0.22)	*(0.22)*
ciri3	-0.10	-0.50
	(0.21)	*(0.30)*
ciri4	-0.50*	-1.49***
	(0.25)	*(0.27)*
ciri5	-0.83*	-0.98***
	(0.37)	*(0.28)*
ciri6	-1.19**	-1.73***
	(0.35)	*(0.33)*
ciri7	-1.82***	-4.60***
	(0.33)	*(1.15)*
ciri8	-0.43	-21.71***
	(0.33)	*(0.39)*
cons	0.35	-5.65
	(1.17)	*(1.62)*
obs	861	706
Pseudo R2	0.0787	0.0991

*p<0.001*** p<0.010** p<0.050**

Appendix B: Frame Codes and Frequencies

Term	***code***	***freq***
Human Rights Authority (yellow)		
United Nations	HR_UN	2122
Geneva Conventions	HR_GC	969
International Law	HR_int	766
Amnesty International	HR_ain	716
Human Rights Watch	HR_hrw	596
human rights groups	HR_hrg	496
Red Cross	HR_cro	310
Human Rights First	HR_hrf	145
International Criminal Court	HR_ICC	141
Freedom House	HR_fho	61
Detention (blue)	DET	4205
Abu Ghraib	DS_abu	1270
Guantanamo Bay	DS_gub	3997
black site	DS_bls	368
illegal detention	DS_ill	85
Prison (Africa)	DS_AF	545
Prison (Australia & Oceania)	DS_AO	1300
Prison (US)	DS_US	2359
Prison (Middle East, part1)	DS_ME1	894
Prison (Middle East, part2)	DS_ME2	443
Prison (Middle East, part3)	DS_ME3	641
Prison (Middle East, part4)	DS_ME4	593
Prison (European Union, part1)	DS_EU1	1626
Prison (European Union, part2)	DS_EU2	1438
Prison (European Union, part3)	DS_EU3	916
Prison (European Union, part4)	DS_EU4	944
gulag	DA_gul	133
Extrajudicial Killings (blue)	EJK	95
drone strike	ES_dro	7235
air strike	ES_air	429
targeted killing	ES_tar	526
assassination	ES_ass	842
murder	ES_mur	2133
execution	ES_exe	851
indiscriminate	EA_ind	232
collateral damage	EA_col	398
civilian casualties	EA_civ	737

disproportionate	EA_dis	115
Torture (blue)	TOR	11566
abuse	TS_abu	3186
beat	TS_bea	1225
injure	TS_inj	690
maim	TS_mai	123
mistreat	TS_mis	555
torment	TS_tor	106
enhanced interrogation	TS_int	554
mutilate	TS_mut	175
wound	TS_wou	915
punish	TS_pun	868
violate	TS_vio	891
Rendition (blue)	REN	2366
kidnap	RS_kid	1062
abduct	RS_abd	591
spirit	RS_spi	520
capture	RS_cap	2686
disappear	RS_dis	864
extradite	RS_ex1	588
grab	RS_gra	265
seize	RS_sei	725
snatch	RS_sna	131
extraordinary	RA_ex2	1144
Victim Description (red)	VICTIM	2335
resident	VD_res	346
suspect	VD_sus	6775
reputed	VD_rep	43
innocent	VD_inn	2413
combatant	VD_com	1240
citizen	VD_cit	3886
Muslim	VD_mus	7045
Moslem	VD_mos	21
Islamic	VD_isl	3992
Human Rights Abuse Description (green)		
human rights abuse	HS_abu	359
human rights violation	HS_vio	373
war crime	HS_war	833
criminal	HS_cri	1794
illegal	HA_ill	1741

cruel	HA_cru	687
inhumane	HA_inh	230
atrocious	HA_atr	37
foul	HA_fou	80
vicious	HA_vic	206
brutal	HA_bru	1414
evil	HA_evi	1045
horrible	HA_hor	122
fiendish	HA_fie	8
hideous	HA_hid	43

Appendix C: Coding Procedures

Atlas.ti Coding:

- Human rights issues along with their most common synonyms were auto-coded and highlighted in BLUE.
- Human rights abuses adjectives were auto-coded and highlighted in GREEN.
- Victim descriptions along with their most common synonyms were auto-coded and highlighted in RED.
- Human rights authority (HRO's) were auto-coded and highlighted in YELLOW.

Personal frame (*pfr*):

1. The article has a specific victim description (RED), and a description of the events leading up to the incident (BLUE/GREEN).
2. The human rights abuse is prominently described within the article.
3. Conditional: Human rights groups or authorities are quoted about the incidents (YELLOW).

    1 & 2 must be present within 2-3 sentences of each other (grouped) and 3 can be present anywhere in the article.



Informational frame (ifr):

1. The human rights issue is prominently mentioned but focuses on numbers and incidents.
2. The victims are mentioned only in passing and the focus is on the human rights issue.
3. Human rights groups or other government actors are quoted about the incidents.

1 & 2 must be present within 2-3 sentences of each other and 3 can be anywhere in the article.