VIETNAM AND THE RHETORIC OF WAR:
A STUDY IN GENERIC CRITICISM

by

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DEDICATED TO

TEXAS

AND

"THE JERSEY LILY"

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CHAPTER I

A SYMBOLIC OF WAR

How can man die better
Than facing fearful odds,
For the ashes of his fathers
And the Temples of his gods?
Tomas Macaulay[1]

The Vietnam war has been an epochal event in the history of American domestic and foreign policy. It has generated a vast reassessment both of the conceptual foundations of that policy and of America's image of the world in which that policy has functioned. Most students of foreign policy agree that "it has forced the United States to re-evaluate its national priorities and to probe the probable consequences which any redefinition of national interest would engender."[2] This rebirth of value, as Gregg and Kregley observe, was actualized by a long and violent debate that ultimately questioned all aspects of American belief. This thesis is an attempt to study the Vietnamese debate as a special case of war rhetoric. Specifically we shall attempt to place the rhetoric surrounding the Vietnam war within the context of a genre of discourse usually known as the rhetoric of war and peace.

The Vietnam war certainly presents an analogical relationship to many wars in which the political leaders took a rhetorical stance which prepared their country for war, sustained the effort and

ultimately offered vindication of the act. Though the student of conflict may appropriately observed that the specific nations, reasons and tactics of fighting are different, Vietnam confronts all Americans with a rhetoric "ancient beyond reckoning which," as Richard Weaver observes, "has involved man's being in numberless ways."[3]

"Each war," admonishes Edward Leroy Long, "poses old moral questions in new ways."[4] Certainly all generations of men have had to answer the vexing problem of war. As Kenneth Boulding notes, "the instability of peace, and the cyclical stability of war compose the constant theme of the whole age of civilization from 3000 B. C. to the present time."[5]

War has always been considered "wrong" but "just shift the rhetorical framework a little bit and it becomes right and it holds out tantalizing opportunities."[6] Numerous thinkers have thus observed that for a large portion of mankind the decision to go to war has always been torn between love and hate, "between fascination with it as a game and a challenge and revulsion from its consequences."[7] This agonistic decision of whether or not to wage war will predictably continue into the future.

In regards to such an assertion George Savile, Lord Halifax, responded that the best qualification of a prophet is to have a good memory.[8] Indeed, the understanding of why we wage war must begin with an examination of our own history. As Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. states: "We like to think of ourselves as a peaceful, tolerant, benign people, who have always lived under a government of laws and

not of men. Yet this is by no means the only strain in our tradition. For we have also been a violent people."[9] This study is an attempt to explore the darker vision of the American dream, a dream that is often made all too real in the nightmare of war. Hopefully this study can contribute to the understanding of the rhetoric that leads us to the judgment to make war and through this understanding ad bellum purificandum.

War Rhetoric: Preliminary Study

Dr. Louis Fredrick Fieser, the primary inventor of napalm, refused to comment on the social ramifications of his work and told a reporter for the New York Times: "It's not my business to deal with political or moral questions."[10] Such denial of societal obligation and concomitant refusal to accept moral culpability is rare in the study of war rhetoric. Indeed, the decision to support a nation at war, to fight for country, to kill an enemy, forces every individual into a position where he must make a judgment -- a position, as Martin Luther King notes, where "silence is betrayal."[11]

Much modern research into the nature of warfare has either declared it inevitable or a product of social conditioning. Anthropologists such as Margaret Mead have observed that the nature of aggression in man will always be displayed ultimately in war. The reason:

> Warfare depends upon mutually exclusive identities and loyalties, today represented by national boundaries. As long as there exists the permanent definition of one's own group within which to kill is murder as opposed to groups who it may be virtuous to risk one's life to kill, warfare can easily be invoked.[12]

Social researchers such as Martin Deutsch argue that war is not inherent because men have various other ways of manifesting aggression. To Deutsch, war is simply a unique product of cultural conditioning. He draws attention to "the military toys children are given to play with, the identification of heroism and bravery with war in so many novels, T.V. dramas and films that we are exposed to."[13] The important implication of such studies is that choices to go to war, to maintain the effort and finally to achieve peace must always be made. Historically these decisions have been made in remarkably similar fashions.

Commenting on the reasons for war, the German writer Theodore Meyer, S. J. propounded that "objectively speaking, war cannot be formally and materially just on both sides."[14] Philosophically it is obvious to him that both sides of a dispute cannot be defending the right. One side must be violating rights, the other defending rights.[15] This concept of waging war for just reasons harkens back to St. Thomas and St. Augustine. These noble clerics held that "the morally responsible person as a citizen of the state, should fight to establish the cause of justice and to destroy an injustice that threatens the social good."[16] Although it is recognized presumably by all men that killing and destruction of property is not desirable, there are differing degrees of evil. Jess Yoder, a modern student of the just war argues:

> A lesser evil is committed when the just destroy the unjust rather than the other way around. The righteous must of course, be on the side of the lesser evil. In words, killing is a dirty business that

> unfortunately good people must do when conditions make it necessary: the cause must be just, motives be proper (not economic gain, prestige, etc.), the innocent must be declared by proper civil authority, there must be a reasonable hope that the original injustice will be corrected without greater harm to the common good, and war must be used as a last result.[17]

Such a defense of "right reasons" for waging war is echoed by statesmen and warriors throughout history. They believed that war may be a smaller "evil" than its alternative when it is clear that one of the contestants may be either wholly right or mainly right, whereas the other may be wholly wrong or mainly wrong. "Clearly," Ryan states, "that party, that state is justified in making war even aiming at some minor unworthy ends in addition to the principal good end."[18]

Literary critic and doctor of culture Richard Weaver considers the application of the just war doctrine. He observes that it was no accident that in medieval times the battle cry of the crusaders was "Deus Vult." For in that era warfare was the final resort, the "ultima ratio." It was what a nation fell back on when all other means of settlement had failed. Implied was a moral imperative which, given denial by another country, could only be defended by tests of arms. Weaver writes:

> The history of civilized warfare reflects the rationale for war. The rationale assumes an arbiter of the destiny of nations. The arbiter has often been referred to as God, but even where the idea of supernatural deity was absent there was some concept of overarching reason which could be depended upon to decide in favor of one party or other. When a nation had done its best, when it had

> exerted its maximum lawful strength, it accepted the arbitrament of the sword, whether that was given for it or against it.[19]

The nation going to war and maintaining the struggle was betting that it was right. The rhetoric generated in such a conflict appealed to "those forces which, in a morally conceived universe, give strength to the right."[20]

Thus the rhetoric of war is concerned with the justification of a cause. This justification occurs primarily by a rhetor placing the nation on the right side of a superordinate value system. The form of exhortation is typical of many speeches attacking and defending the decision to wage war.

As every schoolboy remembers, Patrick Henry was supposed to have made such an appeal prior to the Revolutionary War. His primary rhetorical device was a call to a superordinate destiny that would empower a tiny group of colonies to defy an empire. Specifically in answer to the question of whether or not to wage a war against so great odds, William Wirt, Henry's biographer, has the Virginian reply in ringing prose:

> Sir, we are not weak, if we make a proper use of those means which the God of nature hath placed in our power. Three millions of people armed in the hold cause of liberty in such a country as that which we possess, are invincible by any force which our enemy can send against us. Besides sire, we shall not fight our battles alone. There is a just God who presides over the destinies of nations, and who will raise up friends to fight our battles for us. The battle, sir, is not to the strong alone; it is to the vigilant, the active, the brave. Besides, sir, we have no election. If we were base enough to desire it, it is now too late to retire from the contest.

> There is no retreat, but in submission and slavery! Our chains are forged! Their clanking may be heard on the plains of Boston! The war is inevitable -- an let it come![21]

In this particular passage, the patriot argued that his cause was not only just in that it was ordained by the right of democracy -- an ultimate good in his moral universe -- but that the same justness would give a power to his side which insured victory.

Equal fervor has been utilized by rhetoricians opposing specific wars because they are unjust. Harry Emerson Fosdick, himself an army chaplain during World War I, preached a sermon at the Riverside church of New York in 1934. This sermon reflected the popular feeling that the "Great War" had been unjust. He begins his speech by acknowledging that he has a debt to settle with the "Unknown Soldier."

> Do I not have an account to settle between my soul and him? They take men like me into the camps to awaken his idealism. Oh War, I hate you most of all for this, that you do lay your hands on the noblest elements in the human character, with which we might make a heaven on earth, and you make a hell on earth instead. You take even out science, the fruit of our dedicated intelligence, by means of which we might build here the city of God and using it, you fill the earth instead with new ways of slaughtering men. You take our loyalty, our unselfishness, with which we might make the earth beautiful, and using these our finest qualities, you make death fall from the sky and burst up from the sea, hurtle from unseen ambuscades 60 miles away; you blast fathers in the trenches with gas while you are starving their children at home with blockades; and you so bedevil the world that 15 years after the armistice we cannot be sure who won the war...If war were fought simply with evil things, like hate, it would be bad enough, but, when one

> sees the deeds of war done with the loveliest faculties of the human spirit, he looks into the very pit of hell.[22]

Fosdick in arguing the then popular proposition to keep America from entanglements in foreign strife indicts war as profaning the advance of social progress, hence breaking the boundaries of a moral universe.

Fosdick presents a concern for a phenomenon unique so far to this century -- the threat of total war. The war is an abbrogation of the ability for a nation to wage war for right reasons. In a nuclear age little moral vindication, even by those who acknowledge the "mystic imperative" to war, can be found for total destruction. Students of foreign policy in the 1950's and early 1960's believed that this ability would lead to a stalemate in which neither the Russians or the people of the United States would dare risk outright confrontation. This theory of the cold war has proved correct in that both sides have not waged war across borders, but have primarily engaged in other tactics of confrontation including decisions to "aid" third world powers in their struggle to maintain their current forms of government. Only if this "aid" was successful in preventing the allies of the United States from adopting Communism could the balance of power be maintained, war averted, and the United States become the winner of the cold war.[23]

The cold war thus became a symbolic clash in that two competing ideologies were maneuvering to achieve superior power position by manipulating symbolic elements. The gains were made by influencing the adoption and strengthening of political and

economic ideologies. In reviewing the rhetoric of the cold war, Wayne Brockriede and Robert Scott conclude that "this war has been so much a battle of words -- violent propaganda, treaties, conferences, ultimatums and tours...that the student of the Cold War may well have to consider the forms battles have taken."[24] The "cold war" was not a war at all in the sense of the medieval term. There was of course a texture of conflict in which symbolic confrontation occurred. This confrontation foreshadowed a nearing of recourse to war. Yet war could not become the ultima ratio for its completion left only the alternative of oblivion for both sides.

With the international arena forcing competing ideologies from the alternative of total war, yet with domestic pressures demanding confrontation on the largest scale possible, the concept of limited war did not take long to re-emerge. In the past two decades the United States has instituted a policy of intervention into countries threatened by "communist overthrow." Once more Americans are called upon to make judgments as to which conflict should elicit a military response, for reason and influence can no longer prevail. Such a decision is the Vietnam conflict.

Though the soldier in Vietnam used entirely different weapons, he has been trained under quite different conditions and thinks of his task with different imagery than did the medieval knight on a crusade in the Holy Land, nevertheless he employed some of the same moral reasoning in defense of what he did as did his counterpart in shining armor.[25]

Scholars of international relations have attempted to

delineate the factors that influence this judgment to go to war. Though the critic may well argue that the nature of judgment differs between the early concept of a just war and the contemporary call for a just intervention, we may well retort that the basic form remains the same. When the early justifications for war were posited, they were stipulated in defense of an abstraction which was necessary to be defended because its defense meant national survival. These justifications ranged anywhere from religious impulse to principles of balanced alliances. Analogically, the justification offered in America's contemporary cause is in the form of an abstract principle that is crucial to the maintenance of national interest and ultimate survival, the balance of power. Hence, both judgments must rest on "reasons" provided in defense of a principle which must be physically defended because all other recourses have failed. Modern assessments of what principles are crucial may, of course, differ from ancient ones.

Typical of modern assessments of criteria for a justified war are those offered by Graham T. Allison, Ernest R. May and Adam Yarmolinsky. They provide a "checklist of factors" with which "any responsible observer" may determine the necessity of intervention.

> _The American sense of commitment_. Commitment can be based on formal treaties, letters exchanged between chiefs of state...historical ties, past blood shed in defense of common goals and the like. _The American sense of interest_. Since this interest is no longer a function primarily of trading opportunities, territorial ambitions or imperialist pretensions, it is to be measured largely in terms of the sense of danger to the delicate equilibrium between the major world powers.

> Some situations will inevitably seem more dangerous than others, either because of possible effects on expectations or leader in either hostile or friendly states. National interest is also a function of substantive domestic pressures as with the fate of Israel etc.
> The estimated probability of success, at various levels of cost and risk. The most attractive situation to decision makers -- and to the American public -- will be one that offers a high probability of success at a relatively low level of risk.[26]

Though these scholars are able to set forth the basis for the "just" intervention, they recognize that "each of these factors involves judgment on the basis of uncertain estimates. Differences among reasonable men, especially over future dangers of failing to act are inevitable."[27] Because of these uncertainties, there are a large number of cases in which it is difficult to predict whether the United States ought to intervene. It is in this area of uncertain judgment that the rhetoric of war plays a crucial role. Advocates and opponents of a specific case of intervention call all Americans to decide on the validity of the Vietnam war.

The Vietnamese conflict offers the critic an opportunity to study the full panorama of war rhetoric. Unlike World Wars I and II, Vietnam is not a question of immediate national survival where native soil may be invaded (although some of its rhetoricians would have contested this point). It is a question of long range interest and maintenance of an abstract principle, the balance of power. The war thus lends itself to deliberation about the justification or lack of justification for conflict. This study will attempt to define those rhetorical arguments which were dominant in the Vietnam debate.

Scope, Organization and Limitations of Study

The object of this, as we have indicated before, is to analyze the rhetoric of the Vietnam debate as a special instance of the rhetoric of war and peace. In order to accomplish this task we shall (1) explicate the rhetorical context from which the Vietnam debate sprang -- the rhetoric of the cold war; (2) define the rhetorical position of the majority opinion favoring American involvement in Vietnam as espoused by the then Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara; (3) define the rhetorical position of the minority opinion favoring no American involvement in the war as espoused by a United States Senator, Wayne Morse; (4) examine a third alternative which allowed, if not rapprochement between the two sides, at least the movement of opinion as presented by J. William Fulbright, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; and, (5) present implications for further study of the rhetoric of the Vietnam debate. In this manner we may further understand the rhetoric of war.

These sections will include the following materials.

THE RHETORICAL CONTEXT OF THE COLD WAR. In this section, we will examine the nature of cold war rhetoric from the dimensions of language and predominant issues. In addition, we will posit a new treatment of rhetoric which has heretofore been placed under the metaphorical representation of "courtship" or "identification." This chapter will also further examine the relationship between the "just war" doctrine and the rhetoric of limited war as utilized by the speakers of this era.

IN SUPPORT OF INTERVENTION. In this section, we will be concerned with the "reasons" in support of the war as embodied in Defense Secretary McNamara's address describing the United States' role -- past, present, and future -- in support of the South Vietnamese. Special attention will be given to the enthymematic relationship between this address and the popular beliefs forwarded by a generation of cold war rhetoricians.

IN OPPOSITION TO INTERVENTION. In this section, we will be concerned with the attacks on the policy of supporting the South Vietnamese war whether through sending arms and advisors or escalating the fighting. Specifically, we shall examine the minority position as espoused by Senator Wayne Morse in his early opposition to the war. Special attention will be given to his arguments as premises for the arguments later to become accepted by many and used by the war opponents.

THE RECONSTITUTION OF VALUE. In this portion of the study, we will investigate the stance taken by J. William Fulbright in his speech "Old Myth's and New Realities" as it presents rhetorical ground for a third alternative which allowed not only Fulbright's opinion on the war to change, but also provided sufficient latitude of opinion change for a great number of Americans -- in the majority of cases without resort to violent confrontation.

ON THE NATURE OF WAR RHETORIC. In the final chapter of this study, we will analyze the rhetorical genesis of the Vietnam debate as it was to be reflected in many issues throughout the war.

We shall also analyze the Vietnam debate as an overall model of war rhetoric; that is to say, we will explore the possibility of

a genre of discourse based on the Aristotelian category of war and peace.

Writing a comprehensive description of the entire rhetoric of the Vietnam debate is a task similar to fighting the mythic Hydra. Inevitably certain issues arise that must be slighted in favor of accomplishing the primary objective of the thesis -- an understanding of the nature of war rhetoric. Such limitations should be set forth.

First, this study is not an attempt to cover all of the multiple forms of persuasion employed by participants in the drama. Journalist Dan Wakefield recounts the numerous manifestations of protest against the Vietnam war. These took the forms of "cocktail parties, rock music, psychedelic light shows, dancing, banjo trios and comic piano players." Other more staid forms of protest included "lectures, debates, panel discussions, teach-ins, poetry readings and rituals in which 'Angry Artists' burned their own paintings in an ultimate act of defiance."[28]

Rhetorical critics Benson and Johnson demonstrate the importance of "body rhetoric" by the Johnson administration. Such rhetoric took the form of deployment of troops to demonstrate order. In other cases photographs depicting protesters as just "dirty hippies" were shown.[29] Though such attempts at delineating rhetorical positions have a great deal of value, they are beyond the scope of this thesis. Rather than focusing on the means of expression, i.e., spilling blood on draft records, burning draft cards, displaying martial power, this study will attempt to discern those ideas which propel the rhetoric.

This approach seems consistent with our primary quest to establish the rhetoric of this war as part of a body of rhetoric called the rhetoric of war and peace. Although the temporary manifestations offer the allure of studying the unorthodox, we believe it to be of more concern to this study to investigate those issues that are relatively timeless -- those issues which may have concerned men in the decision to wage every war.

The second limitation is that this study does not encompass the entire Vietnam debate. A great number of speeches were delivered in sustaining a particular side of an issue. Though such rhetoric is valuable in studying the development of particular issues, this is beyond the scope of the study. This thesis, as previously indicated, is directed at the critical judgment to wage or not to wage war. Although subsequent rhetorical strategies may have been employed to reinforce those judgments, to a large extent they reflect the symbols at the beginning of the war.

The final limitation of the study is that all issues concerning the war are not explicated. The student of the war realized that there are a plethora of subissues provided by proponents and opponents of the war. This study is directed at laying out the nature of the central judgment and its justification.

The Nature of the Problem, Argument, and Method of Study: A Symbolic of War

The difficulty in studying the nature of war rhetoric is demonstrated by communication theorists. For many years war rhetoric has been categorized as "propaganda" a term denoting

insidious manipulation of half-truths or falsehoods for the purpose of furthering clandestine motives. Yet men have constantly marched to war for right reasons for generations. An understanding of war rhetoric must, therefore emerge from an understanding of its symbolic nature rather than from a prejudgment by external criteria. Perhaps an early account of war's symbolic nature may give us some insight.

Thucydides, an acute observer and critic of war tells us of how in the city of Ocanyra a bitter internecine war broke out. As the fighting proceeded, each side tried to out do the other in committing atrocities and acts of violence. This conflict was made particularly bitter as father fought against son and brother against brother. One of the results was a breakdown of community; "words ceased to have their old meanings and in many cases were applied to things whose previous meanings were opposite."[30] He describes the fate of language during the war.

> Words had to change their ordinary meaning to take that which was now given them. Reckless audacity came to be considered the courage of a loyal ally; moderation was held to be a cloak for unmanliness; ability to see all sides of a question inaptness to act on any. Frantic violence became attribute of manliness; continuous plotting a justifiable means of self-defense. The advocate of extreme measures was always trustworthy; his opponent a man to be suspected. To succeed in a plot, still shrewder; but to try to provide against having to do either was to break up your party and to be afraid of your adversaries. In fine, to forestall an intending criminal, or to suggest the idea of a crime where it was wanting, was equally commended, until even blood became a weaker tied than party, from the superior readiness of those united by the latter to dare everything without reserve; for such associations

> had not in view the blessings derivable from established institution but were formed by the ambition for their overthrow.
>
> Thus every form of inequity took root in the Hellenic world by reason of these troubles. The ancient simplicity into which honor had so largely entered was laughed down and disappeared; and society became divided into camps in which no man trusted his fellow.[31]

Thucydides recognized that in time of war, the symbols of the society undergo radical change -- change which ultimately divides the social fabric of community. Chaim Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca note this tendency in the language of a country. They argue that "language is part of the traditions of a community, and, it only undergoes revolutionary modification where there is a radical failure to adapt to a new situation."[32] War presents such a nexus of language and demand for radical change. The term "slaughter" is pitted against "duty," "murder" against "survival," "waste" against "security," "honor" against "horror," "war" against "peace." When considering a specific decision to make war these terms may become interchangeable with each side (proponents and opponents of the war or indeed the warring nations themselves) claiming the right of the just. This breakdown of language which brings with it a concomitant breakdown in social order reflects some kind of disturbance in the consciousness of societal mind. Weaver observes this and records that "the value attachments of a people may become so confuted or subverted that words become born or loosened from their previously agreed upon referents and are willfully attached to others."[33] Whereas in times of peace, "speech," according to Weaver, "is the vehicle of order, and those who command it are regarded as having superior insight...into

the necessary relationship of things;" in times of war speech can give no insight to the warring nations.

For example, even in World War II where the threat of survival was considered a necessary mandate for war the effects of such a decision for many radically and unalterably changed fundamental beliefs and therefore transformed the rhetoric. The rhetoric of the cold war, which we shall see was the rhetoric which emerged from this war; however, even at the time the decision to wage war was being made many realized that this decision would have profound effects on American value and belief. Professor of international politics, Edward Carr wrote:

> Our conscious thought has begun to reject the abstract ideas which characterized the past 200 years of history - the belief that progress is infinite, that morality and interest coincide, and that society rests on a natural and universal harmony of interest between men and nations.[34]

We may observe that when the threat is less immediate and the society is split as to whether war should be waged the rhetoric of that society undergoes a turbulent change. Thus the Vietnam debate offers the critic an excellent opportunity to study the full panorama of war rhetoric.

Given that all war rhetoric must cope with a traumatic reconstitution of symbols and recognizing that in time of a controversial war such transformation occurs even more traumatically with rhetoricians continually arguing in front of the public eye, how does the critic approach the rhetoric of war?

Before considering the alternative contemporary approaches to

criticism, we should consider the nature of "symbolic movement" *per se*. How men, through symbolic movement create a dramatistic act is the subject of Robert S. Cathcart's theory of movement. Starting from the observation that the Burkeian ratios of agency-scene and agency-act are essential to movement, he states:

> On the one hand, for a movement to come into being there must be one or more actors who, perceiving that the 'good order' (the established system) is in reality a faulty order full of absurdity and injustice, cry out through various symbolic acts that true communion, justice, salvation cannot be achieved unless there is an immediate corrective applied to the established order. On the other hand there must be a reciprocating act from the establishment or counter rhetors which perceives the demands of the agitator rhetors, not as calls for correction or re-righting the prevailing order, but attacks on the foundations of the established order. It is this reciprocity or dialectical enjoinment in the moral arena which defines movements and distinguishes them from other dramatistic forms.[35]

The essential attribute of a symbolic movement is the creation of a dialectical tension growing out of a moral conflict. This offers a contribution to our understanding of what happens to the rhetoric of movement and countermovement. In addition, it provides the groundwork to define war rhetoric as a classic paradigm of moral opposition and movement.

Although this gives us a direction, it does not nearly spell out the full panorama of symbolic change that is instigated by war; nor does it provide a direction for distinquishing war rhetoric from movement rhetoric in general. Although we have found a general direction, we must look elsewhere for the flowering of the genre.

The term "war" itself offers a further direction for the criticism of war rhetoric. No other term so aptly lays bare the juncture of symbol and physical motion that allows knowledge of the act as does the term war. Though it may well be true that "there is more in killing than commentary," killing without "commentary" becomes only murder. War, on the other hand, is the symbolic act which focuses and resolves ideological and material controversy. Its participants, nations, utilize its battlefields as tribunals of final appeal -- the just side always prevailing.

The decision to wage war, to continue warring and finally to accept the consequences is quite complex. Approaches that have been utilized in analyzing this , ancient and contemporary, leave the critic with less than satisfactory choices.

First, the critic could view only part of the act. Most pundits of the communication field have taken this approach. Thomas Benson and Bonnie Johnson have viewed the Vietnam war through the rhetoric of the protesters who marched on Washington in October of 1967.[36] Marie Rosenwasser pursued the speech making of six senate critics over a limited number of years.[37] Jess Yoder attempted to explicate the protest of the American clergy in opposition to the War in Vietnam.[38] A few critics have attempted to analyze Nixon's war rhetoric and his justification of domestic policy.[39] Though such attempts are laudable, they can at best only partially embrace the many rubrics of argument concerning the war. Though a partisan insight into the war may be quite valuable, it does not reveal the confrontation of the overarching ideas.

A second alternative which attempts to define war rhetoric is the movement study. Leland M. Griffin, the pioneer in the "rhetoric of historical movements," argues that "the student's task is to isolate the rhetorical movement within the matrix of the historical movement."[40] To accomplish this end, Griffin isolates three techniques. (1) The critic must identify "agressor orators and journalists who attempt, in the pro-movement to establish and in the anti-movement, to defend institutions."[41] (2) The critic must identify three periods within the movement:

> 1. a period of inception, a time when the roots of a pre-existing sentiment, nourished by interested rhetoricians, begins to flower into public notice... 2. a period of rhetorical crisis, a time when one of the opposing groups of rhetoricians succeeds in irrevocably disturbing that balance between the groups which had existed in the mind of the collective audience; and 3. a period of consumation, a time when the great proportion of aggressor rhetoricians abandon their efforts, either because they are convinced that opinion has been satisfactorily developed and the cause won, or because they are convinced that perseverance is uselesss, or merely because they meet the press of new interests.[42]

(3) The critic must find the god terms and devil terms of both sides. Such terminology establishes a key chain of symbols which allow us to understand the movement. If the critic follows faithfully this formula he will be able to "notethe crystallization of fundamental issues, the successive emergence of argument, appeal, counter-argument, and counter-appeal, and the sanctions invoked by rhetoricians of both sides."[43]

Though this method unquestionably proves a useful critical

tool in pursuing the rhetoric of opposing forces, a crucial element in the study of war rhetoric, it is only of limited value for several reasons. First, the Vietnam war saw many competing rhetorical groups. To begin with, the basic division between national and international peace and war groups existed. Certainly all the participants, the North Vietnamese, the South Vietnamese, the allies of the United States and of the Communist power produced major rhetorical sub-movements in the overall movement. Within these major groupings are competing factions, each vying for a voice in the international and domestic arena. Americans generally view the rhetoric in terms of Doves and Hawks, as designating pro or anti war factions; however, within these groups on a given side there are differences in aims, motivation, significance, social and historical roles. Such a large non-homogeneous number of active groups leaves the critic with a large amount of work indeed.

Second, the Vietnam war covers the time span of over two decades. During this time the war took on many different faces -- changing from colonial war to civil war to intervention to overt warfare. Similarly the tactics of war changed from banditry, to terrorism, to guerilla warfare, to conventional combat.[44] Thus, in order to place the rhetoric of war in the historical movement context, the critic must analyze a number of periods of inception, a number of crises and several periods of partial consummation.

In order to examine the rhetoric of war as an historical study, the critic must become involved with the minutae of historical detail. Although such a study may indeed be valuable, it is beyond

the scope of our examination. While it offers the advantage of comprehensiveness, it is the work of many volumes and may offer the disadvantage of excessive detail.

We have thus specified the nature of the problem: How can the critic approach the rhetoric of the Vietnam war without viewing it partially or in too much detail? In short, how can the critic grasp the overreaching arches which encompass war as a symbolic act?

Such a dilemma requires a different approach than has been used to study the war rhetoric. Such a theory may well reside in the direction of psycho-linguistic techniques provided by Kenneth Burke and I. A. Richards as well as the critical method provided by Richard Weaver.

Burke argues that the language expressed by a society is inherently symbolic and must contain within itself motives which can be loosely viewed as attitudes and values.[45] The very expression of words as a naming device creates reality as well as reflects it. Thus language is poetically described as the "dancing of an attitude"; in sociological terms it is described as "incipient act."[46] These "associational clusters" of symbols form discourse with the purpose of answering questions "posed by a situation." The terms are not stagnant; that is they do not maintain a one-to-one relationship with objective reality. Nor are they entirely arbitrary. They are, rather, social reality which is continued and changed, created and destroyed by men.

Richards propounds a similar construct in the "interanimation of words."[47] Richards argues that words may substitute for contexts

taken from past experiences. Words substitute, then, for reality even as they take on a reality of their own.[48] They achieve meaning only in the mesh of societal interrelation. The individual always has a psychological reaction to discourse as determined by both past experiences and present circumstances.[49] For Richards, as for Burke, words -- and we may assume symbols -- "pass from context to context" and change in many different ways.[50]

The symbolic world and its effect on men is as critical as material considerations. The creation, change or destruction of symbolic meaning, influences both understanding as well as evaluation. To understand whether a war was indeed just or unjust, the individual must be aware of the symbolic framework that places man in the socio-historical context. Such a placement is both revealed and created by the use of major god and devil terms.

Richard Weaver uses this concept to explain the nature of stable social order. He writes that "all metaphysical community depends on the ability of men to understand one another."[51] This metaphysical community or culture is held together by the stable relationship of its language. Weaver observes that:

> If we are to avoid confusion, the name-maker who is the lawgiver cannot proceed without dialectic: 'And the work of the legislator is to give names, and the dialectician must be his director if the names are to be rightly given.' Plato sees here that name-giving and lawgiving are related means of effecting order. Actually stable laws require a stable vocabulary, for a principal part of every judicial process is definition, or decision about the correct name of an action. Thus the magistrates of a state have a duty to see that names are not irresponsibly changed.[52]

Thus language, appropriately used, achieves the status of an existential claim to the extent that it reflects the metaphysical underpinnings of community.

Yet as we have observed, war explodes the usually stable texture of symbolic societal fabric. It severs for many the relationship between symbol and substance. Words no longer enjoy the right to existential claim. They are attached tenuously by speakers who support or oppose the war. It is only in this manner that we may account for word clusters appearing as absolute truth to one side of opinion about the war and absolute phantasy to the other side.

Such seeming chaos offers a direction for the student of this peculiar type of rhetoric. The critic must confront the opposing universes of discourse and the movement of public opinion from one position to the other rather than dismissing all war rhetoric as mere propaganda. Such symbolic confrontation most clearly occurs in the Vietnam war just prior to its major escalation in the fall of 1964. After this year the issues of the war rippled through all aspects of American value for such is the tendency of war rhetoric.

The method of criticism that suggests itself from such an understanding of the symbolic nature of war is taken from an extrapolation of a critical approach employed by Richard Weaver.[53] He wrote several "paired-person" or analog criticisms. Unlike other critics who wrote simply to compare similar speakers -- in that they shared similar roles, styles, issues, etc. -- Weaver's criticism of the speakers transcends the specific rhetorical act. The rhetoricians

always support positions in dialectical opposition. In this manner they interplay two sides of the conflict between pre-civil war North and South into something of a coherent act. Thus the analysis of two diarists, Mather and Byrd, two statesmen, Webster and Hayne, two authors, Weems and Stowe, achieve a greater stature than criticisms designed to compare and contrast individuals on random criteria. Weaver's criticisms seek out the idea of conflict. They grasp and illuminate the conflicting universes of discourse out of which the opponents argued.

As history tragically records the inability to broach the opposition of the Northern and Southern view of life was only resolved in the bitter internecine struggle of the civil war. The support and opposition for the war in Vietnam, although reflecting different views of life, was conducted without the resort to such conflagration -- in part, due to a third alternative which allowed a reconstitution of value.

Though borrowing and adopting critical methodology may indeed be hazardous work, it may also be rewarding. For our purposes, we will attempt to define the scope of the act by viewing critical judgments at the beginning of the Vietnam debate as advocated in dialectical opposition. We will review the universes of discourse as constructed by the early rhetoricians who were in favor of war and those who were opposed. Finally, we will specify a third position which ultimately allowed a movement in public opinion from support to opposition to the war and thus allowed a reconstitution of value. Though it may be true that there was much actual violence

surrounding the Vietnam debate, history will no doubt render this amount of violence relatively small as compared to other situations where the reconstitution of value could not take place without internal war -- for example the French Revolution.

In this manner we can best accomplish the goal of placing the rhetoric of Vietnam in a holistic perspective without attempting the minutiae of a complete historical analysis of movement.

Since the study of form transcends the study of the individual act, this method of criticism may give us some insight into a genre of discourse based on the Aristotelian category of war and peace or defense because the decisions to wage war by McNamara and to oppose war by Morse are decisions which must be made by all men.

Thus the recurrent nature of war rhetoric is so prevelant in symbolic discourse as to be one of those "situations typical and recurrent enough for men to feel the need of having a name for them."[54] The call to arms and the subsequent considerations as developed during a war creates as Kenneth Burke argues, "an appetite in the mind of the auditor."[55] The fulfillment of war rhetoric from the prefiguring of the conflict to the rebirth of foreign policy creates "the adequate satisfying of that appetite."[56]

This study should hopefully increase our knowledge about the rhetoric of all wars as seen through the eyes of contemporary man. The study of the symbolic nature of war as manifested in the Vietnam debate should provide us with insights into the genre of discourse the rhetoric of war and peace. Perhaps Roger Hilsman best explains the importance of this inquiry:

In the end, any study of war must strive to deal with gods and devils in the form of man. It is recorded in the holy scriptures that there was once war in heaven, and neither regions are still supposed to be the scene of incessant strife. Interpreted symbolically, this must mean that the final secrets of why men fight must be sought beyond the human, in the nature of being itself.[57]

Footnotes

[1]As cited in "The Unknown Soldier - Tribute by Harry Emmerson Fosdick," Congressional Record L (June 16, 1934), p. 11972.

[2]W. Gregg and Charles W. Kregley, Jr., After Vietnam: The Future of American Foreign Policy, (Garden City: Doubleday, 1972), p. 2.

[3]Richard Weaver, Visions of Order: The Cultural Crisis of Our Time, (Baton Rouge: L.S.U. Press, 1964), p. 105.

[4]Edward Leroy Long, War and Conscience in America, (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1969), p. 3.

[5]Kenneth Boulding, The Meaning of the 20th Century: The Great Transition, (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), p. 84.

[6]Weaver, p. 105.

[7]Ibid.

[8]Gregg and Kregley, p. 6.

[9]Violence: America in the Sixties, (New York: The New American Library, Signet Broadside Publication, 1968), pp. 30-31. For a bibliography of modern articles on the nature of warfare as related to moral responsibility see Robert Pickus and Robert Woito, To End War, (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), pp. 124-136. Lynn H. Miller, "The Contemporary Significance of the Doctrine of Just War," World Politics, XVI (January, 1964), pp. 254-268. Brian Bond, "Just War in Historical Perspective," History Today, XVI (Febrary, 1966), pp. 111-119, 141.

[10]Louis Fredrick Fieser, New York Times, (June 7, 1967), p. 1.

[11]Martin Luther King, "Declaration of Independence from the War in Vietnam," The Vietnam War: Christian Perspectives, Michael P. Hamilton, ed., (America: Eerdimans Publisher, 1967), p. 115.

[12]Margaret Mead, "War: The Anthropology of Armed Conflict and Aggression," Natural History, XL (December 1, 1967), p. 70.

[13]Arthur Herzog, The War-Peace Establishment, (New York: Harper and Row, 1948), p. 187.

[14]As cited in John A. Ryan, "The Right and Wrong of War," Defense for America, W. A. White, ed., (New York: MacMillan, 1940), p. 92. See also Gerald Draper, "The Idea of the Just War," The Listener, LX (August 14, 1958), p. 222. George Scelle, "LiAggression et la letitime defense dans les rapports internationaux," L'Esprit International, XVI (1936), pp. 389-390.

[15]On the other hand both parties may be acting wrongfully, Ibid.

[16]H. Bainton, p. 20.

[17]Jess Yoder, "The Protest of the American Clergy in Opposition to the War in Vietnam," XVII Today's Speech, (Spring, 1968), p. 54.

[18]Ryan, pp. 92-93.

[19]Weaver, p. 100.

[20]Weaver, p. 105.

[21]Patrick Henry, "Liberty or Death," American Speeches, Maxfield Parrish and Marie Hocmuth Nichols, eds., (New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1954), p. 94.

[22]Fosdick, pp. 11972-11973.

[23]For a more complete account of the development of just war doctrine, see especially Joachim von Elbe, "The Evolution of the Concept of the Just War in International Law," American Journal of International Law, XXXIII (October, 1939), pp. 665-88. Another valuable, although briefer, account is Morton A. Kaplan and Nicholas de B. Katzenbach, The Political Foundations of International Law (New York 1961), pp. 201-17. Lothar Kotzsch, The Concept of War in Contemporary History and International Law (Geneva 1956), ch. I, discusses the origins of the doctrine in the pre-Augustinian period. The influence of both Luther and Calvin upon the doctrine's development is discussed by Paul Ramsey, War and the Christian Conscience (Durham, N.C., 1961), pp. 114-33; and a somewhat different emphasis is to be found in Arthur Nussbaum's article, "Just War -- A Legal Concept?" Michigan Law Review, XLII (December, 1943), pp. 453-79. An interesting sociological interpretation is J. T. Delos, "The Sociology of Modern War and the Theory of Just War," Cross Currents, VIII (Summer, 1958), pp. 248-66.

[24]Wayne Brochriede and Robert L. Scott, Moments in the Rhetoric of the Cold War, (New York: Random House, 1970), p. 5.

[25]De Long, p. 3.

[26]Graham T. Allison, Ernest R. May and Adam Yarmolinsky, "Limits to Intervention," After Vietnam, pp. 51-52.

[27]Ibid.

[28]Dan Wakefield, Supernation at Peace and War, (New York: Bantam Press, 1968), p. 22.

[29]Bonnie Johnson and John Benson, "The Rhetoric of Resistance," Today's Speech, XVI (Fall, 1968), pp. 35-42.

[30]Weaver, "The Strategy of Words," unpublished essay, (195-), p. 2.

[31]Ibid.

[32]Chaim Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation, John Wilkinson and Purcell Weaver trans. (London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1969), p. 169.

[33]"The ultimate reason why this happens may be as mysterious as sin, but there cannot be any doubt about the confusion and turmoil that follows. I have already emphasized the fact that a word is not tied to its object by a string. It is tied by the mind. If words are given their meanings by the dialectical operation of the mind, then any confusion that happens is that order of meanings is traceable to the mind." Weaver, "The Strategy of Words," p. 3. Thus, Weaver demonstrates that the war of words effects the decision of warring for society -- both soldiers and policy makers. Because referents are not implacable and do change, the decision to attach certain linguistic symbols to actions depends not on any objective criteria alone, but primarily on the perception of the mind. Thus in war the value judgments made by the mind in respect to the justification of war determines the position that will be accepted as well as changes the traditional referent for the word. In some instances this transformation is made more easily within the society (if the threat is great enough); however, the effect of waging war always brings about a profound transference in "metaphysical dream" that has led the nation to war.

[34]Edward Carr, Conditions of Peace, (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1943), p. 111.

[35]Robert Cathcart, "New Approaches to the Study of Movements: Defining Movements Rhetorically," Western Speech, XXXXVI (Spring, 1972), p. 87.

[36]Benson and Johnson, pp. 35-42.

[37]Marie Rosenwasser, "Six Senate War Critics and Their Appeals for Gaining Audience Response," Today's Speech, XVII (Spring, 1968), pp. 43-50.

[38]Jess Yoder, p. 54.

[39]Karlyn Khors Campbell, Critiques of Contemporary Rhetoric, (California: Wordsworth, 1972), pp. 50-57. Robert P. Newman, "Under the Veneer: Nixon's Vietnam Speech of November 3, 1969," Quarterly Journal of Speech, LVI (April, 1970), pp. 168-178.

[40]Leeland M. Griffin, "The Rhetoric of Historical Movements," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XXXVIII (April, 1952), p. 185.

[41]Ibid., pp. 185-186.

[42] Ibid., p. 185.

[43] Ibid. See for example "The Rhetorical Structure of the New Left Movement," Quarterly Journal of Speech, L (April, 1964), p. 115.

[44] Chester L. Cooper, The Lost Crusade, (New York: Fawcett and Company, 1972). David Schoenbrun, Vietnam, (New York: Antheneum, 1968). Franz Scumann, The Politics of Escalation in Vietnam, (New York: Fawcett and Company, 1966).

[45] Kenneth Burke, The Philosophy of Literary Form, (New York: Vintage, 1941), p. 1.

[46] Ibid., pp. 9-18.

[47] I. A. Richards, The Philosophy of Rhetoric, (New York: Harcourt and Brace, 1936), p. 47.

[48] Ibid., p. 244.

[49] I. A. Richards, The Meaning of Meaning, (New York: Harcourt and Brace, 1923), p. 244.

[50] Richards, The Philosophy of Rhetoric, p. 11.

[51] Richard Weaver, Ideas Have Consequences, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), p. 148.

[52] Ibid., p. 168.

[53] Weaver never formally set this method of criticism down and unfortunately we possess only a few examples. See "Two Types of American Individualism," Modern Age, L (Spring, 1970), pp. 80-90.

[54] Kenneth Burke, p. 4.

[55] Kenneth Burke, Counter-Statement, (Berkely: University of California Press, 1968), p. 31.

[56] Ibid.

[57] J. Glenn Gray, The Warriors: Reflections on Men in Battle, (New York: Harper and Row, 1959), p. 222.

CHAPTER II

A RHETORIC OF WAR

In this chapter we are concerned with delineating the rhetorical context of the Vietnam debate. We propose not to focus on the historical development of the American commitment to Vietnam, i.e., the history of the Geneva accords, the Eisenhower commitment of foreign aid, the Kennedy policy of armed advisors; rather we are concerned with delineating the origins of rhetorical issues and language which were to become prevalent during the mid and latter 1960s.

This context for the debate resides in the rhetoric of the cold war. This predominantly symbolic conflict originated in response to the need for a stable and consistent policy in regards to communist strategies in the late 1940s. American counter-strategy for this struggle was based around John Foster Dulles concept of "balance of power," and "communist containment."[1] This doctrine, implemented in the form of the Marshall plan, increased stockpiles of nuclear armaments to prevent attack. In addition to aiding our allies through supplying arms and weapons, the theory of containment sanctioned a large number of small interventions which were intended to stop communism by increasing western hegemony. By maintaining this system of balanced alliances against Russia and her allies, the risk of outright nuclear confrontation would be avoided.[2] Though this constitutes the origin of the context for the symbolic universe known as the cold war, it does not offer a starting point for the beginnings of debate. This policy was held in such repute

during the entire decade of the 1950s as to be virtually unquestionable.[3]

In order to discover the first major contribution to the debate which ultimately questioned the rhetoric of the cold war, we must turn to the early 1960s. History may record that the supreme irony of that decade which was to become known for strange twists of fate is that the genesis of strenuous debate over American foreign policy -- and ultimately over all aspects of American values -- was largely instigated by a former military leader, a general who deftly guided the United States through a world war. In President Dwight Eisenhower's farewell address to the nation, a strident note of forewarning was left to those who would fight the battles of the cold war. In an address to "any who would pursue the weapons of war" he councils:

> Each proposal must be weighted in the light of a broader consideration: the need to maintain balance in and among national programs -- balance between private and public economy, balance between cost and hoped for advantage, balance between the clearly necessary and the comfortably desireable, balance between our essential requirements as a nation and the duties imposed by the Nations upon the individual, balance between actions of the moment and the national welfare of the future.[4]

To those who make the decisions to support military endeavors, he urges:

> In the councils of government we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence whether sought or unsought, by the military industrial complex. The potential for disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.[5]

Finally, to all Americans who must make the decision to wage war or peace he warns:

> This world of ours [is] ever growing smaller, [we] must avoid becoming a community of dreadful

> fear and hate and be, instead, a proud confederation of mutual trust and respect....[The Conference] table, though scarred by many past frustrations, cannot be abandoned for the certain agony of the battlefield.[6]

In these three arguments, (1) that the risks of foreign policy should always be considered vis-a-vis the costs of domestic policy, (2) that foreign policy controlled by the military establishment is dangerous, and (3) that the negotiation table is preferable to war, the former general heralds much of the protest to the Vietnam war.

The irony is completed only when we contrast this posture to the inaugural address of President Kennedy -- a leader who offered hope of "The New Frontier" which was to bring about domestic reform. The thesis of the address is clearly a forewarning to Russia and her satelite nations. Kennedy reminds the nation of the traditional values held sacred by all Americans and their concomitant sacred duty to defend these values.

> We dare not forget today that we are the heirs of that first revolution. Let the word go forth from this time and place, to friend and foe alike, that the torch has been passed to a new generation of Americans -- born in this century, tempered by war, disciplined by a hard and bitter peace, proud of our ancient heritage -- and unwilling to witness or permit the slow undoing of those human rights to which this nation has always been committed, and to which we are committed today, at home and around the world.
>
> Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend or oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty.[7]

The President addresses both the confrontation between the two major powers in the above selection of his address. In addition, he addresses

the struggle that the "third world" was waging. Toward the conclusion of his speech he urges:

> Now the trumpet summons us again -- not as a call to bear arms, though arms we need -- not as a call to battle, though embattled we are -- but a call to bear the burden of a long twilight struggle, year in and year out 'rejoicing in hope, patient in tribulation' -- a struggle against the common enemies of man: tyranny, poverty, disease and war itself.
>
> Can we forge against these enemies a grand and global alliance, North and Soutn, that can assure a more fruitful life for all mankind? Will you join in that historic effort?[8]

Though Kennedy does not necessarily call for increasing hostility, the imagery of America at war is hard to ignore. He tells all Americans that "in the long history of the world, only a few generations have been granted the role of defending freedom in its hour of maximum danger."[9] This is a call to arms -- an awareness of danger.

Thus we can observe and focus on the 1960s as the beginning of the debate about Vietnam and the cold war. The speeches of Eisenhower and Kennedy delivered only a few days apart circumspectly foreshadow the dialectical enjoinment of the Vietnam debate.

In this chapter, we are concerned with the rhetorical context developed by a generation of speakers arguing within the framework of cold war rhetoric. This fabric of rhetoric championed by President Kennedy among many others was woven so tightly around American beliefs and perceptions as to constitute a "universe of discourse." In an attempt to understand the nature of this symbolic of war, we shall (1) examine the language of the cold war; (2) examine the issues that

were widely held to be fundamental truths; (3) analyze some of the implications of this "universe of discourse" as a rhetorical framework from which the Vietnam debate emerged; and (4) specify the nature of cold war rhetoric as a representative rhetorical paradigm.

Cold War Rhetoric: Linguistic Context

If one examines the language employed by speakers of this period, three characteristics become apparent. First, and probably most prominent, is that the language is permeated with terms that allow no room for compromise. Such bi-polarity, of course, leaves little room for a middle ground. After an extensive examination of the rhetoric of war and peace, Donal Zacharias concludes:

> Policies are considered capable of bringing only 'victory' or 'defeat' to the West. Our weapons are 'defensive,' but our enemy's weapons are always 'offensive.' Military forces are judged according to their 'preparedness' or 'unpreparedness.' The major countries in the world must either be 'armed' or 'disarmed.' Perhaps the most revealing bipolar division is the tendency to speak only of 'communist' and 'noncommunist' countries.[10]

It is interesting to note that all of these bipolar terms may all be arranged in a hierarchy with the ultimate term "peace." This word, Zacharias observes, is placed in a "semantic jungle." It is hunted by all parties in the cold war dispute. For example the motto of the Strategic Air Command -- perhaps the most potentially devastating military force known to man -- is "Peace is Our Profession."

If we carefully analyze the ways in which men define "peace", we may discern to opposing views. Peace may be considered as either an active instrument to guide foreign policy or as a passive goal to be sustained. President Kennedy in his American University speech called

this term "a process -- a way of solving problems," which is based "on a series of concrete actions and effective agreements which are in the interests of all concerned."[11] Arthur I. Waskow, noted analyst of domestic and international affairs, presents an example of the latter definition and calls it "a situation in which war -- organized violence between nations -- is extremely unlikely or impossible, and in which the values and liberties that Americans cherish are being protected and advanced."[12]

Thus the language of the cold war claimed to achieve "peace"; but the methods of achieving that peace were at odds because the word itself was placed in two opposing contexts. In the first instance, peace was a goal which the United States must strive to achieve and maintain by limited use of arms if necessary. Any other course would bring disaster in terms of piecemeal conquest which could ultimately lead to nuclear war. In the second instance, peace was a goal which occurred in the complete absence of war and could only be maintained by self-denial of aggressive tendencies. Any other course could lead to escalation of conflict and ultimately nuclear war. From the contradictory nature of the term "peace" all terms arranged in the conflicting hierarchies were at odds with one another.

The second characteristic of the language of the cold war is expressed best by Wayne Brockriede and Robert L Scott who observe that the language of the cold war often acted as a surrogate for individual fighting or massive battles. They conclude that:

> Words have often been substitutes for action and, as surrogates, have been shaped by the actions for which they substitute. Angry words accompany and extend angry actions; calm words project actions designed to smooth troubled

> affairs. Although such common-sense consistency is often evident in the rhetoric that conveyed the policies of the Cold War, sometimes words compensated for actions not performed -- for actions could not or did not wish to perform.[13]

Such "overstatement" interacted with the bipolarity of language to severely limit the rhetoricians choice in language. The intensity of the language served to remind the nation that the United States was for all purposes at war -- even if at that moment there was no actual blood shed. Though the rhetoricians choice was limited, the rhetorical appeals were powerful precisely because they limited the choices of the listener and thus more tightly welded the tenets of his symbolic universe. For example, "President Truman won acceptance of the limited containment policy by enunciating a rationale (inflexible principle) now known as the Truman doctrine -- that unleashed the global cold war against communism."[14]

Utilizing language as a replacement for actual combat necessarily led to the resolution that the war must be fought on the battlefields of men's psyche. Not only was communism a physical threat, but in many cases it was most importantly a symbolic threat. As a symbolic threat it was a struggle for the hearts and minds of men and must be combatted as a threat to American philosophy, ideals, morals.

The third characteristic is an interesting but complex phenomenon. The language of the cold war rhetoric was such that it was either extremely abstract or extremely concrete, but rarely were the two substantially linked together. For example in one of the few anti-war speeches given during the 1950s extremely concrete language is used. Robert B. Cumler and Fred B. Homberg in a joint sermon to the members of Christ Church

in Kennebunk, Maine describe what a statue commemorating a war would look like -- if a soldier had built it.

> It would be a little plot of ground in the middle of the main drag, fenced in by barbed wire, and in the center of it there would be a drainage ditch dug with a pole over it and a crudely lettered sign saying 'Latrine,' and all the Joes would come and urinate in it and empty their bowels in it and throw garbage in it and fill it with red liquid that looks like blood. And people would watch it flowing like a public fountain and they would smell it and they would be reminded of war.[15]

Such earthy imagery and language stands in stark contrast to the universe of discourse constructed by the cold war rhetoricians who talked about war in relatively "clean" terms. Discussions in the 1950s were filled with abstract imagery and language like "clean weapons," fail safe," "fire storm," "overkill," commitment," "escalation," and "balance of power."[16]

To a greater or lesser extent the levels of abstraction were manipulated on both sides of the cold war debate; however, rarely was a linguistic link from abstract term to concrete reality held to be inviolate. The language, ultimately, did not form a cohesive universe of discourse for all Americans.

We may note, however, that during the middle and late 1950s, America achieved maximum concord between abstract terms and concrete terms. This cohesion, welded by a history of relatively successful foreign policy, in that decade was to become increasingly tenuous as the Vietnam war progressed. The reason for this shift will be more fully explored in a later chapter.

In summary we may note that the language of the cold war had

three reenforcing characteristics. It was largely bipolar as dictated by conflicting interpretations of the word "Peace" and the concomitant terms arranged within the hierarchy. Its functions were a surrogate for physical battle as dictated by the absurdity of nuclear war. Finally, the relation between abstract and concrete terms, though stable for a period of time, was to envolve constant turmoil. Examination of the rhetorical issues -- those points where the language divisions were brought into sharp focus -- will further illustrate the characteristics of language that we have discerned as well as provide us with a prefiguring of many of the issues that formed the rhetorical context of the Vietnam debate.

Rhetorical Issues of the Cold War

The rhetoric of the Vietnam war cannot, of course, be set apart from the rhetoric of the cold war. In this section, we intend to illuminate the major rhetorical issues which constituted the accepted feeling of most Americans about foreign policy prior to the Vietnam debate. These issues were urged by many spokesmen for a generation; hence, constituted a relatively stable -- if not always consistent -- "reality" for many Americans concerning the necessary course in the conduct of foreign affairs.[17]

As we indicated in the previous chapter, the most beneficial way to study the rhetoric of war is through the perspective of the "just war." This concept of war as a conjunction of physical and symbolic action is ingrained in the tradition of Western man's thinking about and conduct of war.[18]

The criteria for the just war include: (1) the enemy must

present a severe threat both physically and morally; (2) the enemy must have provided no other recourse than war; (3) the war cannot be for personal gain; and (4) the "good" of waging the war must outweigh the "bad" incurred in the pursuit of victory. Many rhetoricians spoke vigorously not so much to prove that these claims were true in regards to the United States against Russia for indeed they were self-evident to the speakers and listeners, but to reinforce beliefs and make Americans aware of the immediacy of the danger. An examination of the rhetorical support presented in proving each of these contentions illustrates the urgency felt by many speakers as well as clarifies the reasoning behind the issues in the rhetorical context of the cold war.

COMMUNISM: A PHYSICAL AND MORAL THREAT. As a physical threat the mennace of nuclear confrontation was always prominent. The threat of an "arms gap" or a lag in technology spawned the race to achieve superiority in arms and prevent a first strike nuclear attack. For instance, Hale Boggs, the late Senator from Louisianna argued before the legislature that "today in Washington the question of military commitment occupies the center of the stage [for] defense is the <u>sine qua non</u> of our national survival. Our wisest military heads in and out of the Pentagon have counseled that we are lagging dangerously."[19] The underlying premise of this argument is that if the Russians could, they would destroy the United States with nuclear missles This would occur only if the Russians could launch a nuclear attack without the concomitant danger of retaliation. Thus, it was reasoned, Russia posed a threat that could only be countered by being eternally vigilant

and always prepared.

In addition the threat of physical violence was extended to incorporate additional arguments. The threat of communist expansion (and this was almost always linked to Russian or Chinese rule) to other countries was indirectly an attack on the security of the United States because it jeapordized the balance of power and therefore made nuclear war a greater possibility. Anthony Trawick Bouscaren, a professor of political science, argued that the nature of this type of threat is indeed severe before a "Seminar for Survival" in 1962.

> The Communist doctrine of protracted conflict...includes psychological warfare, diplomacy and trade -- conceived as weapons of war, assanations, guerilla warfare, and even localized conventional war. Examples are Korea, Quemoy, Laos, perhaps even Berlin. Each one of these challenges found the Free World divided and confused....The measure of success of communist protracted conflict principles is that the communists have gained control of regions heretofore firmly held by the Western powers without provoking a counter-attack by the Free World.[20]

The physical threat was also portrayed indirectly by using examples of life in communist countries. Speakers urged identification with the Hungarians who had died fighting overwhelming odds in order to achieve their freedom.

The physical threat was thus presented on three levels. First, the country must beware of nuclear confrontation and respond by maintaining superiority in the race for more and better arms. Secondly, the country must form a system of alliances that are entrenched against encroaching communism because the balance of power may otherwise be upset. Finally, nations of the world that are under the communist rule are identified with this country as livid examples of the nature of the physical threat.

If the physical threat was portrayed as preeminent, the moral threat was equally as severe. Communist ideology was construed as the antithesis of every value, tradition and belief held by all Americans. Edmund Opitz in an address to the Middlesex Conservative Club exemplifies this reasoning.

> Communism is an evil thing which wars against the best in human nature. It is evil because it devotees are led to invent a new code of morality which elevates lying, murder and treason into primary virtues -- whenever these practices are thought to further the goal of Communist domination. Communism denies our religion. It tramples on our hard won political liberties and stratifies society into an elite of brutality riding hered on the rest of the nation. It puts our economic activities in a strait jacket -- a sure way of lowering living standards and distribute poverty. Communism to bring the matter down to our own country is at odds with the American way of life at every level; religious, social, political and economic.[21]

Some rhetoricians felt that this threat was more imminent than others. A few argued that the danger of communism lies in the "field of espionage and the possibility of infiltration and penetration of concealed Communist agents in the Government, labor unions, student associations, and other private bodies."[22]

In any case, on a moral level there was no level of compromise with Communist's ideology. This moral opposition was constantly the substance of appeals used by the cold war rhetoricians. Charles Nutter speaking before the English Speaking Union in Kansas City, Missouri eloquently argued that:

> It is a desperate war with the dark forces of Communism against freedom, liberty, independence and human dignity which will dissappear from the face of the earth if this conflict is lost.... There is no middle way because the communists are committed to the

> permanent revolution and the domination of the world. Nothing swerves them from this goal and nothing will except defeat.[23]

Again and again rhetoricians argue that there is no room for compromise because the moral threat is so pervasive. Charles E. Bohen, special assistant to the Secretary of State sees the cold war as "the age-old struggle in a most dangerous form between freedom and tyranny."[24] Opitz argues that Communism "is a kind of blasphemous religion which is a standing threat to our whole way of life."[25] "Unless Communism is destroyed," admonishes Nutter, "freedom will die."[26]

Though it may be asserted that many Americans did not perceive the threat to be as salient as did others, it cannot be denied that most foreign policy for the years we have stipulated was based on the premise that communism posed both a moral and a physical threat to the American way of life. The first justification for war is preeminent in the arguments of the "cold war" rhetoricians. It clearly projects a vision of an embattled America.

COMMUNISM: A THREAT THAT LEAVES NO RECOURSE BUT WAR. As we noted earlier, in order to wage a just war -- even it is largely a symbolic one as Brockriede and Scott characterized the cold war -- the country who has justification must have exausted all other alternatives to war. The rhetoricians of the cold war were successful in proving that all attempts at peaceful resolution of differences were futile and America had no choice but to make war. The proof which they used was lodged in a number of arguments designed to make Americans aware that conflict was inevitable. These arguments included: (1) the philosophy

of the communist state, (2) the history of Soviet foreign policy, (3) the threats that Russian officials had made against the people of the Free World, and (4) the inevitability of clash given two different and diametrically opposed ways of life.

As a philosophy Communism is not amenable to compromise. Rhetoricians argued that peaceful coexistence -- the alternative to war -- was a luxury that would bring about the victory of Communism. Often they quoted Lenin who claims that peaceful coexistence consists in "delaying our war with the capitalistic countries, a war which is inevitable but which can be delayed either until colonial revolutions come to a head" or we become more powerful.[27] For the 22nd Congress of the Russian Proletariat, the role of peaceful coexistence was to afford "more favorable opportunities for the struggle of the working class in the capitalist countries," and facilitate "the struggle of the peoples of the colonial and dependent countries for their liberation."[28] For Khruschev the term meant "whether or not the West resists."[29] Thus Communist philosophy was pictured to operate as an "inverted Golden Rule" which stated "prevent others from doing unto you what you want to do unto them."[30]

For many speakers, the policy of the Soviet state was "what it has always been: the extension of socialism, and the corresponding defeat of capitalism."[31] Hence, compromise or any other alternative could only be described as a "complete snare and delusion and an opiate designed to lull the non-communist world without committing the communists to anything."[32]

As a reenforcement to the philosophical argument, rhetoricians argued that historically Russia has left no other choice but war.

For some the nature of the threat was disclosed in the imperio-colonial system of Russian foreign policy. Lev E. Dobriansky observed that this has been the Russian way for over "five-hundred years of empire-building."[33] Henry Kissinger considered the history of 20th century Soviet foreign policy writing for the New York Times in 1969.

> The cold war is not the result of a misunderstanding between our leaders and those of the Soviet Union. It is the product of a conscious Soviet policy which includes the suppression of freedom in Europe, the Soviet refusal to accept schemes for the control of arms, communist pressure on all peripheral areas of which Laos is only the most recent example and the unprovoked threat in Berlin.[34]

Again and again anti-communist speakers paraded examples of Russian aggression before the American people. This strategy was designed to leave the single impression that Russua, if permitted, would conquer the Free World. Examples of post-World War II Communist expansion, wars of national liberation and Soviet bad faith in keeping solemn treaties were often used as self-evident proof that the history of communism in foreign policy left only one interpretation. History "proved" that Communism was our mortal enemy.

As support and extension of the previous two positions, speakers of this era constantly refered to exhortations delivered by leaders of the communist party. These calls for members of the third world to join the revolution demonstrated that the power in the communist governments were committed to war. For example, Nutter argues that "Premier Khrushchev himself has said that peaceful coexistence is a Trojan horse tactic and in no way indicates an end of the class struggle which is Communist lingo for red imperialism."[35] These observations by communist

"proved" that the threat, both real and imminent, left only one response, war.

Finally, speakers saw the conflict between the United States and Russia as inevitable because the two cultures were diametrically opposed. Though this assumption is implicit in the first three arguments, here we are concentrating on the perceived "inevitability" of conflict. For proof concerning this issue speakers often cited the French philosopher, Alexis de Tocqueville, who after visiting in the United States in 1835 published "Democracy in America." In this book, de Tocqueville records what cold war rhetoricians refer to as "a most prophetic observation."

> There are at the present time two great nations in the world, which started from different points, but seem to tend toward the same end.
>
> I allude to the Russians and the Americans.... All other nations seem to have nearly reached their limits, and they have only to maintain their power; but these are still in the act of growth. All the others have stopped, or continue to advance with extreme difficulty; these alone are proceeding with ease and celerity along a path to which no limit can be perceived. The American struggles against the obstacles that nature opposes to him: the adversaries of the Russian are men. The former combats the wilderness and savage life; the latter civilization with all its arms. The conquests of the American are therefore gained by the plowshare; those of the Russian by the sword.
>
> The Anglo-American relies upon personal interest to accomplish his ends and gives free scope to the unguided strength and common sense of the people; the Russian centers all the authority of society in a single arm. The principle instrument of the former is freedom; of the latter, servitude. Their starting point is different and their courses are not the same; yet each of them seems marked out by the will of Heaven to sway the destinies of half the globe.[36]

The totality of life styles were pictured as being opposed. Thus, it is of little wonder that rhetoricians could feel that "the plain truth [of the matter] is that we can no more live with present day international imperialistic communism bent on world domination than we can live with cancer."[37] Indeed, there is no living with the devil.

The anti-communist forces constructed an extremely strong battery of arguments to establish that the conflict with communism as an ideology or as the extension of Russia's foreign policy allowed no other alternative than war. The Communist philosophy was committed to world domination; the history of Communist nations was a history of aggression; the leaders of the Communist governments continued threatening the free world with domination; many philosophers predicted the inevitability of conflict between two opposing life forces. What other course than a defensive war would not leave the world free from the encroaching threat?

COMMUNISM: THE OPPORTUNITY FOR AN AMERICAN CRUSADE. If a nation is to fight a just war, not only must there be a physical and moral threat, and not only must no other recourse be available, but also the war must be fought for a proper motive. It is not permissable to wage war in order to increase territory, incorporate economic resources or take vengeance. The rhetors who argued that the United States ought to wage war asserted that "our" reasons for war were not for these things, but were lodged in the purist of motives -- the sacred defense of the right.

This argument, though complex, may be reduced to the understanding that if the Communists present a serious moral and physical threat, and if the Communists will not or cannot choose any other recourse than to

conquer, then doubtlessly they have perpetrated great wrongs on other countries -- nations less strong, less vigilant than ourselves. Thus, it is only from the noblest of motives that we engage in war to preserve an ally from falling to the foe.

With this reasoning in mind the anti-communist speakers were able to accuse the communist world of perpetrating a litany of atrocities. Typical of these lists is Nutter's claims that:

> Communism is an international conspiracy which has restored slavery to the world after man's ceaseless struggle of centuries to abolish the enslavement of humans.
>
> It has captured, enslaved and exploited a billion people against their will, and plans to capture the remaining two billion people of earth.
>
> It has destroyed freedom, liberty, independence, human rights and dignity wherever possible.
>
> It has established deceit, dishonor, destruction death and disaster as recognized, accepted, and necessary insturments of an international policy.
>
> It has destroyed the sanctity and usefulness of solemn international aggreements and treaties by deliberately scrapping these at will when it served their purpose.
>
> It has spread communist imperialism throughout the world, creating millions of lackeys of this red imperialism.
>
> It has made man the 'producing animal' which Karl Marx labeled him.
>
> It has starved, murdered or otherwise at least a hundred million human beings to advance false economic and political doctrines repugnant to man.
>
> It has glorified inhuman bestiality, corrupted human beings throughout the world, destroyed integrity, dignity, self-respect and truth.[38]

The list of "crimes" committed against other nations is long and grim. The rhetorician is able to argue that intervention, therefore, is not for personal gain on the part of the United States, but to save the country in question from the powers of evil.

Clearly, then, the United States was well within her rights to fight a war. Communism posed a severe moral and physical threat which was

not amenable to any sort of compromise. The reason for the defense of other countries was not so much for self gain (although the defense does imply the necessity of mutual alliance for self survival) as for defense against willful aggression.

COMMUNISM: THE COSTS OF WAR. As we have noted earlier, in order for a war to be justfied four factors must be present. The rhetoricians of the cold war could easily justify the first three factors for waging war. Noam Chomsky observes that "the ideology of anti-Communism served as a highly effective technique of popular mobilization."[39] He argues that "the threat of war, the constant 'danger' of domestic insurgency in many parts of the world helped maintain the appropriate psychological climate" for the conduct of war.[40]

In order to justify a war, however, the gain to the society in waging the war must always outweigh the costs of the war. All out war demanding nuclear confrontation was thus obviously out of the question. In fact much of the argument for a detente with the Russians turned on that very point supporting nuclear arms limitations. Though eventually the United States and Russia made concrete gains from a treaty with regards to testing and proliferating nuclear weapons, this compromise did not substantively reflect a shift in overall foreign policy.[41] The policy makers still desired a vehicle to counter the subversive war -- a technique of indirect aggression by the Communists. As we have noted before, the most attractive policy to the decision makers and to the American public is one that "offers a high probability of success at a relatively low level of risk."[42]

The policy of intervention became this instrument. Because

the United States was engaging the enemy indirectly, there was little risk of a local spat escalating into a major war. Still there was much to be gained. In an intervention the United States would "prove" that it had the superior strategic and tactical strength. This proof was for the benefit of both allies (demonstrating that their faith in American policy was justified)and enemies (demonstrating that an aggressive policy towards the United States was unwise). Thus intervention became a viable tool of foreign policy.

Though a review of all post-war interventions is clearly a worthwhile undertaking, it is clearly beyond the scope of our present efforts. A brief review of the "unqualified successes" claimed for a few interventions and one rationalized failure is necessary to set the scene for involvement in the Vietnam war.[43]

Greece, the first major intervention by the United States was was a response to an attempted communist overthrow. The United States supplied arms and advisors. Herbert S. Dinerstein a member of the influential Washington Center for Foreign Policy Research claimed that:

> The commitment to the defense of Greece heartened the Greeks, even though the contribution of advisers and material was modest and fairly slow in arriving. It contributed to the break between Yugolslavia and the Soviet Union and removed the main base of support for the Greek Communist guerillas.[44]

Spokesmen such as Hubert Humphery took the success in this intervention and applied an analogy to the Vietnamese situation. Humphrey stated: "Without massive American aid to the Greek government after the war Communists would have taken over that country."[45] They would have done so according to the then vice-president "even though they were a small minority."[46] Indeed it appeared that the intervention in Greece was the

turning point that marked the end of further Russian "conquest" in Europe. The United States had helped to bring about this with the cost of few men and supplies.

The next intervention was to become known as the Korean war. Though this war presents a complex rhetorical transaction, we are concerned primarily with the major contribution to the rhetorical environment of the Vietnam war. As such, the Korean war presents the strengthening of the premise that intervention is a viable tool to stop communist aggression.

Its effects were to be refered to in the Vietnam debate; however, at this point we must simply note that the Korean war affirmed a view of the monolithic nature of the communist threat. The rhetoric of the Korean war led to "an explicit, public acceptance of world communism as the antagonist against whom the mission of world leadership must be conducted."[47] Due to this rhetorical posture, claim Brockriede and Scott, "most Americans soon took up the spirit of anticommunism with zest, and no term describes the appeal that overrode all objections better than anticommunism."[48]

Advocates of Vietnam intervention also construed the Korean intervention as a successful endeavor in the war against communist aggression. Although this intervention was was a great deal more expensive than the intervention in Greece, still -- at least to many advocates -- the Korean war was a success. Roger Hilsman claimed that "an overt aggression was stopped and the Communists brought to discipline their ambitions by a limited use of force which confined the war and prevented its spiraling to engulf the whole world."[49]

There was, however, an additional lesson to be learned from the

bloody Korean war -- a lesson forgotten by many and resurrected in the later stages of the Vietnam debate. The cost of the war had simply been too great. Some were to recognize that:

> The Korean War was a frustrating humiliation. The American Army had been fought to a standstill by Asians, and by Asians whose arms and equipment were somewhat primitive by American standards. Air power, though freely used on the supply lines between the Yalu and the thirty-eighth parallel, had not succeeded in stopping the flow of men and equipment.... Attitudes formed and hardened, and by 1961 it was a shibboleth among the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the United States ought never again to fight a limited war on the ground in Asia.[50]

The spectre of the endless Asian land war was to again haunt many who had vowed to never again become involved.

All of the other interventions, however, were unqualified successes. The Guatemalan intervention, though not as spectacular as Korea, was successful at a reasonably cheap price. In 1954, the United States government viewed with increasing alarm the leftist leaning of the Arbenz government. Particularly distressing was the expropriation of thousands of acres of land belonging to the United States citizens by the Arbenz regime. The United States citizens under the cover of C.I.A. sponsorship armed a rebel army under the command of Colonel Castille Armas. Though the ultimate overthrow was staged by one of Arbenz's own generals, it was argued that the United States had applied sufficient pressure to stem a communist take over.[51]

The intervention by President Eisenhower in Lebanon in 1958 met with similar success. Lebanon was one of the few arab countries that signaled support for the "Eisenhower Doctrine" -- a proclamation of western hegemony. The parliamentry debate in Lebanon over this doctrine

signaled bitter internal conflict. Alleged communist subversives and Syrian infiltrators were thought to be responsible for much of the strife. On July 14, 1958 in response to an urgent telegram from Lebanon's President Chamoun requesting the landing of United States troops in this country, President Eisenhower dispatched 14,000 Marines to the tiny nation, a force twice the size of the Lebanese Army. By October of the same year the troops had been withdrawn virtually without firing a shot.[52] This movement was acclaimed by many as meeting with wide success. It prevented the "collapse of Jordan and the Lebanese Republic" according to L. T. Kiebner. In addition if these republics would have collapsed there "would have been large-scale warfare in the whole Middle East."[53] Once again an intervention could be viewed as a successful policy in that it had not only beaten enemy insurgency but it had prevented a wider war.

The next major intervention occurred under the Kennedy administration.[54] The disastrous story of the Bay of Pigs invasion hardly needs recounting. An American sponsored refugee invasion force was thoroughly defeated by Castro's forces. This defeat, however, was rationalized by many Americans. Perhaps the journalists of U.S. News and World Report capture the sentiment best when they argue that:

> Disaster at the Bay of Pigs was due directly to failure to destroy or to counter Castro's air forces. With adequate air support the invasion could have succeeded and Castro style communism could have been removed from the western hemisphere.[55]

The policy of intervention could have been successful. It was not only because the United States did not provide a limited amount of air support. This mistake not only left a communist regime no more than a few miles

off the coast of America, but also was to lead to a direct confrontation between the United States and Russia.

Though the landing of troops in the Dominican Republic has been the subject of some controversy, still in terms of loss of American lives and treasure the intervention may be viewed as a success. A dual rationale was employed for intervention -- first and foremost was the saving of American lives. A department of state memorandum told members of Congress:

> The factual circumstances of the breakdown of order in the Dominican Republic were such that the landing could not have been delayed beyond the time it actually took place without the needless sacrifice of lives.[56]

The second objective of the intervention was the forestalling of communist takeover. Stanley Ross, an expert in Latin American affairs, claimed in front of an investigating Congressional Subcommittee that "the President's sending the troops to the Dominican Republic showed the Latin American communists what was in store for them and...forestalled these other revolutions."[57] He refers to insurrections that might have occurred in Guatemala, Columbia, Peru, Bolivia, Haiti, and Venezuela. In addition to forestalling other possible communist insurrections, the intervention possibly prohibited a communist domination of the Dominican Republic. Seymon Brown as well as many other students of foreign policy argued that:

> If events in Santo Domingo were allowed to take their course during April and may of 1965, without significant U.S. military intervention, the probability was very high that a communist regime would quickly gain control of the Dominican Republic.[58]

Once again, the United States had intervened into the affairs of a third world power and had ment with relative success.

Thus we have reviewed a majority of the post-world war interventions.[59] We have undertaken this rather laborious task in order to understand that interventions was considered a viable tool in foreign policy. This is not to argue that interventions have always been deemed successful. In fact, as the Vietnam war continued students of foreign policy as well as more common speakers became increasingly disatisfied with the policy of intervention. In fact, many decided that the interventions in Guatemala,[60] Lebanon,[61] the Dominican Republic,[62] actually were harmful. For much of the cold war, however, intervention was a decidedly successful policy. It had cost relatively little money and lives and it was living proof of the security of the Free World for since the adoption of this policy not a single major country had fallen to the communists. Unless, of course, Cuba could be considered such a loss and in that case we simply did not intervene quickly or far enough.[63]

The only intervention which could be considered in any sense a hardship was Korea. This action, as we have seen, could be rationalized in that the intervention was not a success because the Chinese took part and, in addition, we were prohibited from bombing supply lines in the enemy's home country.

Any scenario will reveal that the policy of intervention to stop communist aggression or subversion was viewed until the latter half of the 1960s as a successful and totally necessary method of combatting the enemy threat. The primary reason for construing this policy as a success was that the costs of most interventions were relatively small while the gains were very substantial in that it provided security in the atomic age.

In addition to the cash value of lives saved and territory preserved, the policy of intervention also served as an important symbol to the free world. Through intervening, the United States proved that the claims of the thetoric of the cold war had "cash" value and thus forestalled not only increasing Communist encroachment, but also the nuclear confrontation that would have occured if the balance of power had not been maintained. The policy of intervention was also a symbol disigned to keep the public ever alert to the "fact" that they were at war. Justified interventions visibly demonstrated via mass media that the Communists' threats were not empty but actual, that the cold war had not thawed but was continued by the enemy, and that the nation was engaged in all encompassing struggle for survival. This was the rhetorical context of the cold war.

Vietnam was a special instance of the policy of intervention. The Vietnam debate began by questioning whether it was a useful intervention and then spread to the question of whether intervention *per se* was a useful tool of foreign policy and, finally, to the question of whether the cold war was a justified policy. This progression of issues ultimately expanded to encompass almost all aspects of American belief and value.

David Little recourts the intial doubt as to whether the Vietaam war did indeed constitute a just war.

> The whole reason for the great uncertainty over our policy is precisely the difficulty one has in convincing himself that the benefits are worth the costs in suffering to the people of Vietnam as well as costs in energy, money and resources to the people of the United States.[64]

It is ultimately in this area of argument that the rationale for the war opponents exists.

A Paradigm for War Rhetoric

The critic who is interested in discovering the rhetorical context of the cold war must of necessity deal with both the language and the issues as they merge to form the metaphorical expressions which compose the ever changing mesh of rhetorical reality that is the Vietnam war. This nexus of ideology and battle, of idea and expression, of thought and persuasion is a vortex of rhetoric which is particulary unstable, rending the usual orderly social fabric from which speakers typically draw enthymematic arguments in shreds.

In regards to the importance of metaphor in any movement, Arthur Smith argues that this is the only critical device that offers a fairly complete understanding of the numerous rhetorical transactions.

> Metaphors are the primary rhetorical indicators of a movement. A specific metaphor indicates the movement's treatment of its opposition, definition of the issues and summary statement of its aspirations.[65]

Smith argues that there are two kinds of metaphors in any movement: (1) the traditional or minor metaphor and (2) the principle metaphor. He states that "the latter constitutes the fundament of the movement."[66] It is the verbal emblem, the identifying badge. Reification is the primary basis for treating abstractions as though they were things. Thus, the principle metaphor is dependent upon reification for its translation as a political or ideological symbol. In essence, then, the principle metaphor sustains movement; the minor metaphor fills out the movement through pointing to specific symbols which constitute points of common agreement. Smith concludes that "we are apt to learn much by attending to the metaphors of a movement, the symbols which say much more than they seem to say on the surface

to votarist and opponent alike."[67]

As we have indicated before, the decision to wage war transcends all individual group movement and as such radically reshapes the rhetorical universe of all speakers. Thus, the critic must not only seek the minor metaphors which serve to represent the major issues at stake in a particular war; and he must not only seek the major metaphor or cause de celebre; but the critic must trace the metaphor to its primary root. As we have indicated the root for the term "war" is in the primary nature of man's being. Concomitantly the nature of war rhetoric is rooted in man's use of language as division and strife.

An ancient physician, philosopher and statesman, near blind, exiled to the shores of the Hellespont, records that:

> These two forces, Strife and Love, existed in the past and will exist in the future; nor will boundless time, I believe, ever be empty of the pair. Now one prevails, now the other, each on its own course. These alone truly are but interpenetrating one another they become men and tribes of beasts. At one time they are brought together by Love to form a single order, at another they are carried off in different directions by repellant force of Strife; then in course of time their enmity is subdued and they all come into harmony once more. Thus in the respect that by nature they grow out of many into one, then and their life is not lasting, but in respect of their perpetual cycle of change they are unalterable and eternal.[68]

Of late, it has been in vogue to argue that the root metaphor of persuasion is love; that is to say, the rhetorician is akin to a linguistic Don Juan courting, seducing or raping the object of his rhetoric into a mutual union. With the rhetoric (the tool of the lover) comes its counterpart -- society and order -- through the creation

of identification or union.[69] Though this paradigm is worthy of consideration, we should not forget that the rhetorician can and often does engage in verbal warfare as well as love. With persuasion (the weapon of the warrior) comes its counterpart in society, war and strife, through the creation of identification and union.

Although in arguing that "love" is a paradigm for persuasion, such critics as Burke and Weaver, realize that there is strife between men, that there are substantial differences which separate all men, both critics consider that rhetoric is ultimately a means of all men entering into mutual union. The devil terms used by men at war are considered a sort of anti-rhetoric filled with perverse shibboleths that are misusing rhetoric's proper office the union of all men and their beliefs.

For example, Weaver argues that the nineteenth century was characterized by a rhetoric that was based on social order -- the manifestation of love. He observes that the orator of that age, as a logician, believed in the proof of deduction -- a term, though not empirically derived, that was believed because society believed in certain principles that created a mutually acceptable order. On the other end of the continuum, we may focus on the rhetoric of the cold war that has largely been divisive. The rhetoric of the cold war presupposes that rhetoric is an actual substitute for battle and thus constitutes the ultimate in strife.

Though some critics may observe that the rhetoric of war may be designed to create support and identification within the warring nation, this self-love may hardly be interpreted as the same rhetorical motive residing within the aegis of rhetoric as love.

Instead, we must posit that love does not subsume strife. In other words, the root metaphor for a rhetoric of war is strife. It is distinct from rhetoric viewed as ultimately subsumed under love because the ultimate purpose of the persuasion is division among men. It allows for commonality only to the extent of a single nation's perspective about the war. If indeed the nation is divided on the very question of war, then the rhetoric of strife becomes pervasive within that nation. The Vietnam debate is a specific instance of the rhetoric of war and the strife it engenders within the social order.

Summary and Implications for Study

In this chapter we have examined the language of the cold war and have found three reenforcing characteristics: (1) it is bipolar; (2) it acts as a surrogate for action; (3) it provides relatively little stability between abstract and concrete realities. We have also examined the issues of primary importance in the cold war in the perspective of the "just war" criteria. The selection of rhetoric that we considered indicated that all criteria were fulfilled. (1) The Communists were perceived to present a clear moral and physical threat to America and the Free World. (2) The Communist ideology was interpreted to place the Russians and her allies always at odds with "our" side; thus, allowing for no recourse short of war. (3) The motives for the war were above reproach. They were for the most noble of causes. (4) The war necessarily remained limited. An all out conflict would be suicidal and thereby outweigh any possible gain. Limited intervention, on the other hand, had met with success at relatively small costs -- almost in every case. It was certainly less costly in all cases than the grim alternative of nuclear war.

Though we cannot claim that the rhetoric of the cold war was a "causal" factor of the Vietnam war, it did nevertheless provide sufficient rhetorical force to create a strongly held "universe of discourse." And it was this discourse that provided the rhetorical context for the Vietnam debate.

Finally, we have suggested that the root metaphor of the rhetoric of war is strife. This posits a relatively unique view of rhetoric in that many studies of this subject have assumed that the root metaphor of persuasion is love. Whereas the latter view of rhetoric calls men to act in mutual union through identification with the good and right in all men, the rhetoric of war and its concomitant rubrics thrives on separation, lauds disorder, and calls men to act because of separation of a special group who alone have access to the good and right that ought to be exercised by all men.

Footnotes

[1]Dean Rusk, "Our Foreign Policy Commitments To Assure a Peaceful Future," The Department of State Bulletin, LVI (June 12, 1967), p. 874.

[2]President Lyndon Johnson, "The Defense of Viet-Nam: Key to the Future of Free Asia," The Department of State Bulletin, LVI (April 3, 1967), p. 534.

[3]William P. Bundy, "Seventeen Years in East Asia," The Department of State Bulletin, LVI (May 22, 1967), p. 790.

[4]Dwight Eisenhower, "President Eisenhower's Farewell to the Nation," Department of State Bulletin, XLIV (February 6, 1961), p. 180.

[5]Ibid.

[6]Ibid., p. 181.

[7]John F. Kennedy, "Inagural Address," Contemporary Forum Ernest J. Wrage and Barnet Baskerville, eds., (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1962), p. 318.

[8]Ibid., pp. 319-320.

[9]Ibid., p. 320.

[10]Donald Zacharias, In Pursuit of Peace: Speeches of the Sixties, (New York: University of Texas, 1970), p. 4.

[11]John F. Kennedy, "The Strategy of Peace," Vital Speeches of the Day, XXIX (July 1, 1963), p. 559.

[12]Arthur I. Waskow, The Worried Man's Guide to World Peace, (New York: Anchor Books, 1963), p. xv.

[13]Brockriede and Scott, p. 118.

[14]Ibid., p. 119.

[15]Robert B. Cumler and Fred B. Homberg, "Blood Without Change," Congressional Record, CVI (February 24, 1960), p. 3326.

[16]Donald Kaplan and Armand Schwerner, Doomsday Dictionary, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1963).

[17]Again, we must warn the reader that this is not a history of the cold war. We realize that the cold war was not a war which was waged at a single level of intensity. There were moments when the relationship came close to detente -- Krushchev's visit to the United States in 1959 and the Russian grain deals in the early 1960s and there were times of great tension -- the Cuban missle crisis and the Berlin crisis -- however, in all cases the underlying premises of American foreign policy were "essentially" the same.

[18]Gerald Draper, "The Idea of the Just War," The Listener, LX (August 14, 1958), p. 222.

[19]Address by Hon. Hale Boggs, "Women's National Democratic Club," Congressional Record, CVI (February 24, 1960), p. 3324.

[20]Anthony Trawick Bouscaren, "The Soviet Challenge and Our Response," Vital Speeches of the Day, XXVIII (April 15, 1962), p. 398.

[21]Edmond Opitz, "The Real Danger of Communism: Not a Foreign Army But an Alien Philosophy," Vital Speeches of the Day, XXVII (April 1, 1961), p. 364.

[22]Charles E. Bohlen, "Key Characteristics of the Communist Threat," Department of State Bulletin, XLIII (October 24, 19 p. 635.

[23]Charles Nutter, "The Communist Threat," Vital Speeches of the Day, XXVII (April 1, 1961), p. 655.

[24]Bohlen, p. 640.

[25]Opitz, p. 364.

[26]Nutter, p. 655.

[27]Bouscaren, p. 399.

[28]Ibid.

[29]Ibid.

[30]Ibid.

[31]Ibid., p. 399.

[32]Charles Nutter, p. 655.

[33]Lev. E. Dobriansky, "A History of Communist Aggression," Vital Speeches of the Day XXVII (September 15, 1961), p. 722.

[34]Anthony Trawick Bouscaren, p. 398.

[35]Charles Nutter, p. 655.

[36]As cited in Hale Boggs, "Address," p. 3323.

[37]Charles Nutter, p. 656.

[38]Charles Nutter, "The Communist Threat," p. 655.

[39]Noam Chompsky, At War With Asia, (New York: Random House, 1970), p. 9.

[40]Ibid., p. 25.

[41]"The treaty will slow this spiral /the nuclear arms race/, without damage to our relative strength. Second, the treaty will help contain the spread of nuclear weapons. .While this does not guarantee that they will even become nuclear powers, their renunciation of atmospheric testing will act as a deterrent. . .Third, the treaty will reduce the radioactive pollution of the planet." Dean Rusk, "Nuclear Test Ban Treaty," Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, 88th Congress, 1st Session (August 12, 1963), p. 19.

[42]See rf. 13.

[43]"On the average of once every 18 months U.S. military forces or covert paramilitary forces have directly intervened in civil conflicts in the non-industrialized world." Richard J. Barnett, "Intervention Averages Every 18 Months," Proceedings of the American Society of International Law (1967), p. 70.

[44]Herbert S. Dinerstein, Intervention Against Communism, (New York: Antheum, 1967), p. 10.

[45]Hubert H. Humphrey, "Address," Department of State Bulletin LIV (April 4, 1966), p. 254.

[46]Ibid.

[47]Brockriede and Scott, p. 37.

[48]Ibid.

[49]Roger Hilsman, To Move A Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy, (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1967), p. 128.

[50]Ibid.

[51]Richard W. Cottam, Competitive Interference in the 20th Century, (New York: Antheum, 1967), p. 31. "By early 1954 the urgency of the Guatemalan situation could no longer be denied. Communist influence in government, labor and the countryside was steadily increasing

and the liklihood that Guatemala would soon be a major center of communist subversion in Latin America was a very real one."

[52]Richard J. Barnett, Proceedings, p. 70.

[53]L. T. Kiebner, Imperialism, (New York: Antheum, 1964), p. 334.

[54]The intervention in the Pescadores was primarily diplomatic in origin and naval in execution as was the Dominican Republican Intervention in 1960.

[55]U. S. News and World Report, L (February 4, 1963), p. 30.

[56]Congressional Record, L (May 20, 1965), p. 10734.

[57]Stanley Ross, "Red Chinese Infiltration into Latin America," Hearings Before the United States Senate Judiciary Committee 89th Congress, 1st Session (August 4, 1965), p. 29.

[58]Seymon Brown, The Faces of Power, (New York: Antheum, 1968), p. 359.

[59]The Congo was not considered because it was a minor intervention largely undertaken under the authority of the U.N. This too was considered a success. "The Congo Rescue mission was undertaken only because there the rebels had left open no other way to save the lives of innocent divilians of at least 18 nationalities." "Department of State Memorandum," Department of State Bulletin, L (August 1, 1964), p. 846.

[60]Theodore Draper, No More Vietnams, (New York: Antheum, 1968), p. 153. Herbert S. Dinerstein, Intervention Against Communism, p. 70.

[61]William C. Carleton, The Revolution in American Foreign Policy, (New York: Antheum, 1964), p. 333. John W. Spanier, American Foreign Policy Since World War II, (New York: Antheum, 1968), p. 140.

[62]Edmund Stillman and William Pfaff, Power and Impotence, (New York: Antheum, 1966), p. 162. Stanley Hoffman, Gulliver's Troubles, (New York: McGraw- Hill, 1968), p. 129.

[63]This is made even more prominent since "in the majority of countries the social and economic conditions /are/ potentially supportive of revolutionary war." David N. Burks, "Insurgency in Latin America," Senate Foreign Relation Committee Hearings, (January 15, 1968), p. 2.

[64]David Little, "Is the War in Vietnam Just," Moral Argument and the Vietnam War, Paul T. Menzel, ed., (Nashville: Aurora Publishers Incorporated, 1971), p. 12.

[65]Arthur Smith, "Historical and Social Movements: A Search for Boundaries," an unpublished Convention Paper delivered at the Speech Communication Association Convention, (December, 1972), p. 4.

[66]Ibid., p. 7.

[67]Ibid., p. 8.

[68]Empedocles, Fragmente der Vosokratkder, as cited in The Presocratics, Phillip Wheelwright, ed., (New York: Oddesy Press, 1966), p. 131.

[69]The major exponents of this interpretation are Richard Weaver, The Ethics of Rhetoric, (new York: Henry Regnery, 1970), pp. 3-26, 164-185. Wayne Brockriede, "Argument as Love," Journal of Rhetoric and Philosophy, (Fall, 1972).

CHAPTER III

IN SUPPORT OF THE VIETNAM WAR

On March 16, 1964, Senator Church, later to become a bitter opponent of the war, was recorded as stating that "if we continue to hold to our present policy, then I would not anticipate an extended debate over Vietnam soon taking place."[1] At that time the United States was investing only a few hundred millions of dollars in Vietnam and only 16,000 advisors were present in the land.[2]

In that same month, Robert S. McNamara, then Secretary of Defense delivered a speech entitled "South Vietnam: The United States Policy" before the National Security Industrial Association. In that instance, Sweezy observes, McNamara was "in every way an exemplary leader and spokesman for this /the middle/ class. Possessed of a brilliant intellect, trained in the country's most prestigious educational institutions, a proven success in dealing with military affairs, he was also a near perfect embodiment of the values and aspirations of a 'liberal' society."[3] These beliefs and values placed in support of the American policy with regards to aiding the South Vietnamese by McNamara in this particular address share a strong enthymematic relationship with the rhetoric of the cold war.

As we have seen, the rhetoric of the cold war constructed a stable "universe of discourse" which is to say, Communism was "known" to "be" a strong, unnegotiable, evil threat to the American way of life and intervention was a necessary means of self-defense.

In this speech the Secretary of Defense establishes the need to support the Vietnamese effort as a special instance of intervention. This imperative is couched in three appeals: (1) the argument from historical narration, (2) the argument from principle or strategic doctrine, and (3) the argument from definition. These appeals represent an attempt by McNamara to establish a cause-effect relationship between Vietnam remaining a free country and the world remaining at peace, between American support of the Vietnamese and resisting outside aggression. Such a cause-effect relationship presumes a belief in the basic propositions espoused by cold war rhetoricians and to a certain extent determines the rhetorical strategies and appeals used by the Secretary. Before examining these appeals in detail, however, we must set the specific rhetorical context and occassion for the address.

The Status of the War: 1964

Though it is well known that the United States commitment began in the early 1950s -- 1954 is the accepted date by most experts -- it was in 1964 that America's commitment expanded and the nature of involvement became that of warfare.

Throughout most of the Kennedy administration Vietnam remained an area of secondary importance to the United States. "It was a problem that worried President Kennedy, but one to which he never devoted his full attention."[4] His administration, like Eisenhower's, always based its policy "upon the maintenance of a separate state in South Vietnam."[5] According to historians Kahin and Lewis, this position was to allow the basic theme of the advocates of the war to blossom. "By postulating that the land south of the 17th parallel constituted a separate state, any Northern support of the insurgency in the South could be viewed as

external aggression."[6] While the President and a number of advisors saw the insurgency as a civil war, his Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, developed a theme of "aggression from the North."[7] As early as 1961 Rusk was speaking of "the determined and ruthless campaign of propaganda, infiltration, and subversion by the Communist regime in North Viet-Nam to destroy the Republic of Viet-Nam."[8] Thus, the Kennedy years witnessed increasing support in terms of arms and advisors to the beleaguered Republic of Vietnam.

This aid was definitely not designed to draw the United States into a shooting war. Kahin and Lewis argued that "haunted by the memory of the French debacle of 1954, Kennedy had tried to draw a line of distinction between tactful assistance that could strengthen the Saigon government's self reliance and direct military and political intervention."[9] President Kennedy best summarizes the nature of American commitment to that policy in a speech recorded in the Department of State Bulletin.

> In the final analysis, it is their war. They are the ones who have to win it or lose it. We can help them, we can give them equipment, we can send out men out there as advisers but they have to win it -- the people of Viet-Nam against the Communists.... All we can do is help, and we are making it very clear. But I don't agree with those who say we should withdraw. That would be a great mistake.[10]

Events toward the end of 1963, however, witnessed that the Saigon regime was steadily loosing ground.[11] On October 2, 1963 the White House approved a policy statement formulated largely from the reports of Robert S. McNamara and General Maxwell D. Taylor.[12] The position taken in this statement is a good deal more bellicose. Briefly the White Paper claimed that (1) "The security of South Viet-Nam is a major interest of

the United States as other free nations."[13] It especially stipulated that the United States would continue working with the people of South Vietnam until they could defeat the aggression of North Vietnam. (2) "The military program in South Viet-Nam has made progress and is sound in principle, though improvements are being energetically sought."[14] (3) Major U.S. assistance in support of this military effort is needed only until the insurgency has been suppressed or until the national security forces of the government of South Viet-Nam are capable of suppressing it. (4) "The political situation in South Viet-Nam remains deeply serious."[15] (5) "It remains the policy of the United States, in South Viet-Nam as in other parts of the world to support the efforts of the people of that country to defeat aggression and to build a peaceful and free society."[16]

With increasing pressure on the non-Communist government in Saigon, we can only speculate what the policy of Kennedy might have been had he lived to complete his term of office.

The assassinations of Presidents Diem and Kennedy left United States policy with regards to Vietnam in a state of limbo. President Johnson was primarily concerned with domestic policy and reassuring the country of peaceful continuity of government; therefore, he left the architecture of Vietnam policy to his Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara.

Niel Sheehan reports that "Mr. Johnson's thoughts and motivations during the months between the Kennedy assassination and the Gulf of Tonkin resolution indicate a President who was, on the one hand, pushing his Administration to plan energetically for escalation while, on the other, continually hesitating to translate these plans into military action."[17] He did not wish to lead the nation into a dubious land war in Asia, but he

also did not wish to give the communists control of South Vietnam.

In order to maintain an accurate estimation of the situation in South Vietnam, several prominent Americans including General Maxwell D. Taylor, Robert McNamara, Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, and General Paul D. Harkins conferred with general Khan. McNamara made several trips to Vietnam.

In October of 1963, the Secretary characterized the situation in Vietnam as "deeply serious."[18] In December McNamara stated that "we observe the results of the very substantial increase in the Vietcong activity, an increase that began shortly after the new government was formed."[19] Finally, in January, McNamara found that "the situation there continues [to be] very grave."[20]

The Rhetorical Occassion

In early March, the Secretary undertook another trip to South Vietnam with the announced purpose "to discuss with Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge and General Paul D. Harkins and with General Nguyen Khanh and members of his government the effectiveness of U.S. training and logistical support for the South Vietnamese in their resistance to the Communist-dominated Vietcong."[21] Only a few days after his return from this sojourn, he delivered an address at the James Forrestal Memorial Awards Dinner of the National Security Industrial Association. This major policy statement was reprinted in many newspapers as well as cited by pro and anti-war advocates throughout the year of 1964.

The selection of this particular speech was a difficult task. In searching for a speech that would both reflect the dominant themes as well as foreshadow the future themes of the Vietnam war, the critic

has a wide variety of choices. Several speeches were considered; but, McNamara's speech seemed to fit our interests best.[22] The Secretary of Defense played an integral part in the formulation of American assistance policy. Through his reporting trips abroad, he influenced the perception of the national decision makers. Through his role as administration spokesman, he influenced the perception of Americans about the nature of the struggle. Through his rhetoric, in this particular address, he set forth almost all of the major issues and considerations which would become hotly contested in the later years of the Vietnam debate.

This is not to argue that the speech has completely unique significance. Certainly this is only part of McNamara's campaign to persuade the American people of the justness of aiding the South Vietnamese. It is rather to claim that in few other speeches is the reader provided with the scope and breadth of argument that is contained in this relatively short speech.

During McNamara's trip to South East Asia with General Taylor, there can be little doubt that the Secretary received a dim impression of the status of American interests in South Vietnam. He reported to the National Security Council that "the Viet Cong have taken maximum advantage of two changes of government, and of more long-standing difficulties, including a serious weakness and overextension which had developed in the basically sound hamlet program."[23] He believed that "supply of arms and cadres from the north [had] continued."[24] He also saw that the threat "centered in Hanoi" and it was "clear and unmistakeable."[25] Given this situation, McNamara probably believed that new measures were needed in order to bolster the South Vietnamese.

In traditional times, such signs of conflict were pronounced by the war rhetorician with the clarion call for battle and conflict; but, as we have noted, the Johnson administration was not yet ready to commit the United States to a major war. Thus, McNamara had to elicit strong support for action while, at the same time, he was denied most of the traditional forms of calling the country to total war. The arguments and strategies that he implemented in this speech reflect the attempt to elicit support for an ally at war without the necessity of committing the American people to total war.

The speech begins:

> This evening I want to discuss South Viet-Nam with you. In South Viet-Nam, as you well know, the independence of a nation and the freedom of its people are being threatened by Communist aggression and terrorism. In response to requests from the Government of South Vietnam, the United States since 1954 has been providing assistance to the Vietnamese in their struggle to maintain their independence.[26]

From this simple statement Robert McNamara builds a speech which he asserts has three objectives: first, "to explain our stake and objectives in South Vietnam;" second, to "review for you the current situation there as General Taylor and I found it on our recent trip;" and finally, "to outline in broad terms the plans which have been worked out with General Khanh for achieving our mutual objectives in South Vietnam."[27]

The style at the beginning of the speech is almost "clinical." It is almost in the form of a brief where the speaker is delivering a lecture concerning some mechanistic or biological phenomena. This style, largely maintained throughout the speech, is certainly not in the traditional form of the American call to arms. Perhaps this was a

deliberate device to offset the strength of the arguments that he employs because these are far from clinical or objective. The style and language offsets the strong call to arms which we shall consider.

The Call to War

McNamara argues that the United States ought to "aid" the South Vietnamese. He supports his claim with three different forms of argument. The first argument, a plea for mutual identification through historical narration, takes the largest proportion of the speech. The second argument, a plea for considerations of principle, is developed towards the latter half of the speech. The third argument, an attempt to define the nature of the Vietnam war, follows from the first two arguments and operates from a strong enthymematic relationship with the rhetoric of the cold war. The conclusion, a call for increased support, is developed in the last few paragraphs of the speech and receives little attention. It assumes a cause-effect relationship between American involvement, military success and national security. In order to understand the scope of issues we must consider each argument in turn as it is developed. We must also consider how these arguments are related to the call for increased arms and advisors and, ultimately, American intervention.

THE FIRST APPEAL: ARGUMENT FROM HISTORICAL NARRATION. As long as man has had the ability to tell tales while huddled around the camp fire, the story which is always told and retold is that of a people at war. The yearning to hear stories filled with the depth of horror and agony as well as the heighth of valor and courage has always struck a resonant chord in the human heart. This interest is evident across classes, ages, and cultures. Whether the listener is hearing the classic story of Homer's Illiad or merely viewing "The

Sands of Iwo Jima," the heat of battle warms the attention and chills the imagination.

As we have noted, McNamara's style was certainly not that of a Tennyson recounting the glories of war; however, his primary argument was fitted in a business-like, detached, scientific analytical style. Yet, the primary appeal of this speech was lodged in a narration that possessed the universal interest of a nation defending its homeland. Intertwined in this narration were many arguments designed not only to justify support of this nation but also to enhance the image of Vietnam as a young Republic fighting for its freedom -- a replica of our nation's early history. As we examine the argument of this portion of the speech, we will attempt to demonstrate how these appeals fitted with other speaker's arguments in justifying United States aid.

McNamara begins the historical narrative with a description of South Vietnam. In this description, he uses two strategies which not only familiarize the listener with the physical importance of Vietnam, but also, leads the listener to an identification with the land.

The first strategy is to place the country in an increasing perspective of importance. Vietnam is first described as "that narrow strip of rich coastal mountain and delta lands running 900 miles in the tropics along the South China Sea to the Gulf of Siam."[28] It is then placed in the area which formerly comprised French Indochina. The Southeast Asian peninsula, "a richly endowed land area of over 800,000 square miles," is then placed as a key stone to the control of the East. McNamara observes that:

> Immediately beyond [the South East Asian peninsula] to the East are the Philippines, not far to the west is India, to the north

> is Communist China, and to the South is what the Chinese Communists may consider the greatest prize of all -- Indonesia's resources territory, and the world's fifth largest population, whose strategic location straddles and dominates the gateway to the Indian Ocean.[29]

The small country of Vietnam is thus identified as a link in a chain. More than that it becomes a keystone in the perimeter arch of defense. Though the balance of power doctrine is not overtly advocated at this point, there can be little doubt that this is what the Secretary strongly implied when setting Vietnam in the center of a circle of countries with ever widening importance.

McNamara uses a second strategy in describing the geography of Vietnam. He identifies the land with familiar landmarks of the United States. The population is "almost that of California."[30] The area is "slightly larger than England and Whales."[31] The Southeast Asian land mass is "roughly the size of the United States east of the Mississippi."[32]

These themes which are amplified and supported throughout the speech are initiated in a simple geographical explanation. McNamara makes it subtly clear that Vietnam is not simply another backwards Asian nation; rather, it is a country of significance which is closely identified with United States security.

The Secretary then moves into the proper section of historical narration. He covers two thousand years of Vietnamese history in a single paragraph. Clearly, he is interested only in that portion of history which is illustrative of the South's fight against the North. Thus, the Secretary elaborates on Vietnamese history beginning in the year 1954 -- the year that witnessed the fall of Dienbienphu in May,

and the signing of the Geneva accords in June. Now the saga begins.[33]

McNamara notes that under the Geneva agreements, "it was hoped that South Vietnam would have an opportunity to build a free nation in peace -- unaligned, and set apart from the global power struggle."[34] He observes, however, that the people of South Vietnam faced a great struggle against poverty, civil chaos and an external enemy -- the traditional foes of all government. The language at this juncture of the speech, while still retaining the form of an historical narrative, crosses the bridge to emotional appeal. McNamara exhorts:

> The problems confronting the new Government were staggering: 900,000 refugees who had fled their homes in the north at the time of partition in order to escape Communist rule; a long-term military threat from the north, which had emerged from the war with large military forces; a Government nearly paralyzed by eight years of war and lacking sufficient trained officials for effective self-government; acute economic dislocation and lack of Government revenues and persisting pockets of southern territory that had long been held by Communists and other dissident groups.[35]

The Secretary of Defense cannot resist at this point an allusion to American history when he remarks that "in face of such problems, hopes were not high for the survival of the fledgling republic."[36]

In face of these monumental problems the people of South Vietnam "hit the come-back trail." With our support, committed by President Eisenhower, "the brave, sustained efforts of the South Vietnamese people, in the five years from 1954 to 1959 gave concrete evidence that South Vietnam was becoming a success story."[37] At this point in the speech, McNamara spends some time recounting the "successes" of the Vietnamese.

> By the end of this period, 140,000 landless peasant families had been given land under an

> agrarian refore program; the transportation system had been almost entirely rebuilt; rice production had reached the pre-war annual average of 3.5 million metric tons - and leaped to over 5 million in 1960; rubber production had exceeded pre-war totals, and construction was underway on several medium-size manufacturing plants, thus beginning the development of the base for industrial growth.
>
> In addition to such economic progress, school enrollments had tripled. The number of primary school teachers had increased from 30,000 to 90,000 and almost 3,000 medical aid stations and maternity clinics had been established throughout the country.
>
> And the South Vietnamese Government had gone far towards creating an effective apparatus for the administration of the nation.[38]

Indeed, South Vietnam had progressed in establishing viable economic, educational, medical and civil institutions in only four years. These institutions are thought to be the hallmarks of social progress -- especially to the group of businessmen in front of which the Secretary was speaking.

This argument was certainly not unique to McNamara's speech. In fact, it was used by many speakers who demonstrated that the South Vietnamese people were worthy of support. For example, Under Secretary of State, George W. Ball, repeatedly argued that "Vietnam effectively integrated this vast flood of refugees; a major agrarian reform plan was carried out; the elementary school population was almost quadrupled; food production per capita was increased by 20 per cent; and in general the South was forging ahead at a rate that would have been impressive even for a peaceful land."[39] "Those who predicted doom were confounded," Roger Hilsman was proud to proclaim, "a unified army was developed. Steps were taken to develop a civil bureaucracy adequate for the needs of the new Viet-Nam. Social and economic programs began

to be implemented."[40] Thus, the years between 1956 and 1960 were pictured as a compressed analogy of United States history. A young republic in the face of overwhelming odds had undergone, primarily through the energy of its people, industrial revolution and agricultural reform, creation of a viable government and civil reform, expanded social programs and societal rejuvenation. The Secretary of Defense reducted the argument to a single metaphor. He states that "for South Vietnam the horizon was bright."[41]

At this juncture, McNamara brings to a hiatus the strict historical development. He proceeds to compare the development in North and South Vietnam and let the listener draw the conclusion as to the reason for war. The Secretary spends some amount of time placing the Communst regime in the light of an inherent evil for the people of Asia. This is not to argue that the Secretary makes an overt attempt to describe the North Vietnamese as Red dogs out to enslave all of Asia and maybe Southern California. The Communists, however, do fail to meet any of the criteria for social progress -- even with a larger industrial base to generate production -- and hence are an evil in the sense that there method of government abridges the sacred goal of social progress.

McNamara observes that despite a vastly larger industrial plant inherited by Hanoi, the gross national product of the South is considerably larger. Per capita food production in the North is substantially lower. The social services in the North remained primitive. As for the people of the North, McNamara observes that under the quota system and strict government management "they appear to be generally apathetic to what the party considers the needs of the

state, and the peasantry has shown considerable ingenuity in frustrating the policies of the Government."[42]

Again, McNamara contrast this situation with the advances of the South. He notes that up to 1960 the South had "significant production increases in rice, rubber, sugar, textiles and electric power, a 20 per cent rise in per capita income; three-fold expansion of schools and restoration of the transportation system."[43] He concludes that these facts demonstrate the innate superiority of a free people.

> One cannot but conclude that given stability and lack of subversive disruption, South Vietnam would dramatically outstrip its norther neighbor and could become a peaceful and prosperous contributor to the well being of the Far East as a whole.[44]

Thus, the motive for war is supplied, "because South Vietnam is not theirs," the Communists, "are out to deny any such bright prospects."[45] As we have demonstrated before the worst of all possible motives for war is jealousy or personal greed. To damn the North as a greedy neighbor is to strip them of any claims to legitimate ends in the struggle.

At this time, McNamara resorts again to historical narrative. The history of the war suddenly is brought to the foreground. He begins with the Geneva accords and observes that "the Communists in North Vietnam gave first priority to building armed forces far larger than those of any other Southeast Asian Country."[46] This clearly establishes the intent to make war with the added duplicity of pretending peace.

In 1959, the Secretary continues, the Communists "realized that they were losing the game," and intensified their subversive attack which they had been supporting all along.[47] McNamara is careful

to document this fact with unbiased evidence, specifically a report issued by the International Control Commission.[48]

The period from 1961 to the date of the speech has been characterized with an increase of belligerency.

> The illegal campaign of terror, violence and subversion conducted by the Vietcong and directed and supported from the North has greatly expanded. Military men, specialists and secret agents continue to infiltrate into South Vietnam both directly from the North and through Laos and Cambodia.[49]

As proof of this position, McNamara pays special attention to many Chinese made weapons that have been captured.[50] This new indication of aggression he finds lamentable. He recalls that in the first part of the decade President Kennedy had honored Diem's requests for assistance and "the spearpoint of aggression had been blunted in South Vietnam."[51] The Communists, however, have unfairly increased the war through turning to outside alien sources for aid.

Now we are carried to the events of the past few months prior to the speech -- the fall of Diem and concomitant political turmoil. McNamara recounts the fall and rise of the new government. He acknowledges that the resulting political confusion shook the confidence of the people of South Vietnam. He does not, however, explain why the coup occurred. He argues, instead, that the Communists maximized the confusion. In this period of time, Vietcong incidents "more than tripled from 316, peaking at 1,021 per week, while Government casualties rose from 367 to 928."[52] It was in this period of time that many overextended hamlets were overrun or severely damaged. It was in this period of time that Hanoi demonstrated that it would uphold the proclamation of the Third National Congress of

the Lao Dong and "embark upon a program of wholesale violations of the Geneva agreements in order to wrest control of South Vietnam from its legitimate government."[53]

Though this barrage of argument does not account for the political turmoil, it does leave the reader with the impression that at least if the Communists did not cause the coup, they were doing their chtonic best to exploit it. Thus he bypasses a knotty question by shifting primary blame to the Communist insurgents.

In doing this, he abandons the plain style and pleads the cause of the cause of the South Vietnamese.

> To the Communists 'liberation' meant sabotage, terror, and assassination; attacks on innocent hamlets and villages and the coldblooded murder of thousands of school-teachers, health workers and local officials who had the misfortune to oppose the Communist version of 'liberation'.
>
> In 1960 and 1961, almost 3,000 South Vietnamese civilians were assassinated and another 2,500 kidnapped. The Communists even assassinated the colonel who served as liason officer to the International Control Commission.[54]

The most damning fact of all is that "this aggression against South Vietnam was a major Communist effort, meticulously planned and controlled, and relentlessly pursued by the Government in Hanoi."[55] At this point, McNamara proceeds into the strategic arguments for aiding South Vietnam.[56]

Before we progress to the strategic consideration, we must consider the impact of the original arguments in light of other arguments that were current. If we are willing to generalize into broad categories we find two essential and appealing arguments (given the universe of discourse from which McNamara was operating). First the South Vietnamese

are a worthy people. The want to defend themselves and their way of life. Alexis Johnson argues that this "has been amply demonstrated by the more than 5,000 men killed in action during the past year."[57] Theodore J. Hearner argues that "The Vietnamese are an ancient people, with more than 2,000 years of history behind them." This is a history marked by "frequent struggles to maintain...treasured independence."[58] Dr. Tom Dooley observed that "Americans never fail to like the Vietnamese when they get to know them. It is impossible not to respect their driving compulsion for freedom."[59]

In many speeches the South Vietnamese are pictured as a people who "not only have a long and proud history of fighting to maintain their independence, but [a people who] still fiercely are determined to maintain it in the face of Communist attack."[60] Thus, the link is forged at the level of "fundamental human values that transcend geography, race, culture, and religion."[61]

In this particular speech McNamara takes recourse to this image by citing the tremendous social progress made under democratic government. Perhaps this strategy was employed to influence the businessmen whom he addressed. In any case, it is certainly part of an attempt to identify the people of South Vietnam with the values held by most Americans.

The second broad argument is an outgrowth of the first. The people of South Vietnam are not only virtuous in that they strive towards peaceful progress, but they are beleagured by an evil enemy, an enemy that represents the antithesis of progress and freedom. This theme is reflected in many speeches supporting aid to Vietnam.

Alexis Johnson is appalled to find that "kidnapping, assassination,

torture and terrorism, economic sabotage, disruption of communications, are all part of the Communist weaponry."[62] For example, the Viet Cong harassed the efforts of the South Vietnamese people to eradicate malaria. This resulted in the murder of many members of the insect spraying teams and the kidnapping of others. Roger Hilsman found that "a program of violence was begun which steadily increased in savagery. Keeping in mind Mao Tse-tung's dictum that 'political power grows out the barrel of a gun,' the Viet Cong began a campaign of extraordinary inhuman terrorism."[63] Though Hilsman gives many examples of murder and terror, especially noticeable is the fate of government workers -- the people attempting to bring social progress to South Vietnam

> The teachers, health workers, malaria control teams, the village and district chiefs who were bringing the government's program for the people to the people [were attacked]. Hundreds of these civil servants, often working alone and virtually unprotected in the countryside, have been murdered by Viet Cong. Their sacrifice must not be forgotten for it was made for all free men.[64]

Perhaps the most eloquent voice raised in protest of the tactics employed by the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong was that of Ambassador Adlai Stevenson. In response to the charge brought before the United Nations that South Vietnamese troops had crossed into Cambodia he indignantly responded:

> The chosen military objectives of the Vietcong for gunfire, or arson or pillage, have been hospitals, schoolhouses, agricultural stations and various improvement projects by which the Government of Vietnam for many years has been raising the living standards of the people.
>
> The Government and the people of Vietnam have been struggling for survival -- struggling for years -- in a war which has

> been as wicked, as wanton and as dirty as any waged against an innocent and peaceful people in the whole cruel history of warfare.
>
> It seems to me that there is something grotesque and ironic in the fact that the victims of this incessant terror are the accused before this Council and are defending themselves in daylight, while terrorists perform their dark and dirty work by night throughout the land.[65]

Newsreels, speakers, journal and popular magazine articles were geared to portray the image of the Viet Cong as terrorists from hell.

In conclusion to this portion of the chapter, we may note that through the device of historical narration, McNamara utilized a classic theme of war rhetoric. His persuasive appeal is similar to one used by Winston Churchill who when speaking to the House of Commons said:

> The whole fury and might of the enemy must very soon be turned on us. Hitler knows that he will have to break us in this island or lose the war. It we can stand up to him, all Europe may be free and the life of the world may move forward into broad sunlit uplands. But if we fail, then the whole world, including the United States of America, including all that we have known and cared for, will sink into the abyss of a new Dark Age made more sinister, and perhaps more protracted, by the lights of perverted science.[66]

In both instances the victory of the ally ensures progress and happiness; the victory of the enemy forbodes stagnation and evil, as we have noted in the previous chapter, the rhetoric of the war tends to polarize so that there is no middle ground of blame or consequence. The images created in the first portion of McNamara's speech surely hold true to this law. The Vietnamese people represent virtue -- a reflection of American values. The enemy from the North represent evil -- a reflection of Communist values.

THE SECOND APPEAL: ARGUMENT FROM PRINCIPLE. Though it may seem that the primary argument is sufficient to justify war, one must remember that the "just" war must not only rest on a just cause but must also provide for the defense of a country. For this reason, McNamara argues from principle which takes the form of argument from strategic doctrine. He stipulates that "the United States has no designs whatever on the resources or territory of the area."[67] Our interest, he asserts, resides in three areas.

The first area is in support of the doctrine of "Self-Determination" -- a doctrine that states that America will help South Vietnam because it is a member of the free world family is striving to maintain her independence against communist attack. McNamara explains the importance of the doctrine briefly. He argues that every country ought to be able to determine its own government and that its freedom enhances our own.

> For basic to the principles of freedom and self-determination which have sustained our country for almost two centuries is the right of peoples everywhere to live and develop in peace. Our own security is strengthened by the determination of others to remain free and our commitment to assist them.[68]

Though the Secretary does not make an extended argument from this position, in other speeches of this time period it was a popular argument. Speakers would note that not only has overt aggression been deterred but subversion had been defeated in Malaya, Burma, and the Phillipines through encouraging self-determination.[69]

The second area of doctrine concerns the concept of balance of power. Although McNamara does not label it as such, this is clearly

present in his argument that "Southeast Asia has great strategic significance in the forward defense of the United States."[70] He briefly argues that Southeast Asia is important strategically to the defense of the free world and in order "to defend Southeast Asia we must meet the challenge in South Vietnam."[71] This, too, was a popular belief among savants of foreign policy. It is explainéd more precisely by Roger Hilsman.

> The immediate goal of the Communists is, of course, to capture the in between nations, those smaller and weaker nations which today are struggling against odds to remain independent. If the Communists can capture such free nations, turning them against the United States and making them feel that it is the U.S. which poses the danger or forms the obstacle to their goals, then the Communists could win without using military power.[72]

The third argument is distinct from, yet related to, the prior doctrines. McNamara argues that "South Vietnam is a test case for the new Communist strategy."[73] This strategy he traces back to a statement made by Chairman Khruschev in January of 1961. In this speech Khruschev ruled out world wars and local wars as being too dangerous in a world of nuclear weapons. "But with regard to what he called 'liberation wars,' he referred specifically to Vietnam. He said, 'It is a sacred war.'"[74] McNamara also looks to the East and cites Mao's acknowledged mastery of the art of insurrection as Mao interpreted Lenin's original works.

By defining the nature of the war as a test case for an overall Communist struggle, McNamara elevates the importance and thus changes the nature of the conflict. He continually reminds the audience that "we are not dealing with factional disputes."[75] He argues

that "Peiping thus appears to feel that it has a large stake in demonstrating the new strategy, using Vietnam as a test case."[76]

This position was vigorously defended by the advocates of arms and aid to Vietnam. Theo Hearner states:

> You can think of South Viet-Nam as a test case; there is a good reason to believe that this is the view of the Communist bloc. In Viet-Nam we are determining whether or not the free world can help a nation defend itself against the subversion and guerilla warfare which makes up national liberation tactics.[77]

The ultimate threat of all the speakers would not only be a Chinese hegemony over the two Vietnams and Southeast Asia, but a rash of wars of liberation throughout the world.

Thus, we have found three reinforcing principles that project the United States "stake" in Vietnam as critical to national survival. (1) Self-determination creates allies of the West and must be guarded for all nations. (2) The balance of power is upset and America defeated when small nations begin to ally themselves with the Communist bloc. (3) The test case for subverting small countries (violating their right to self-determination) is Vietnam. Therefore, unless victory is won in Vietnam, the United States will lose the cold war.

THE THIRD APPEAL: ARGUMENT FROM DEFINITION. McNamara concludes his portion of the speech on strategic doctrine by stating the role of the United States. The role is first, to answer the call of the South Vietnamese to help them save their country for themselves; second, to help prevent the strategic danger which would exist if the Communism absorbed Southeast Asia's people and resources; and third, to prove in the Vietnamese test case that the free world can cope with Communist "wars of liberation" as we have coped with the aggression at other levels.

In order to implement this role, McNamara must argue for a feasible plan of action. He engages this plan of action by defining the nature of the war and offering the solution vis-a-vis the possible action of the United States. He begins by defining the current situation.

The core of the war is conducted by band of only 20,000 to 25,000 guerillas. They recruit an irregular force of from 60,000 to 80,000 "mainly by coercion." McNamara observes that:

> Clearly, the disciplined leadership, direction and support from North Vietnam is a critical factor in the strength of the Vietcong movement. But the large indigenous support that the Vietcong receives means that solution must be political and economic as well as military.
>
> The people of South Vietnam prefer independence and freedom. But they will not exercise their choice for freedom and commit themselves to it in the face of the high personal risk of Communist retaliation.[78]

Thus, the war is as much a battle for men's minds as it is for the occupation of territory. McNamara notes that the current government of General Khanh is "vigorously" pursuing plans to combat the Vietcong on these levels.

Now at the close of the speech, McNamara considers the possibilities for United States action. The first is to abandon Vietnam. This is unacceptable in light of his earlier arguments. The second alternative is to "neutralize" Vietnam. This is unacceptable because the Communists have repeatedly violated the Geneva accords. It would be a sell out. The third alternative is to increase arms and advisors which will foment reform and progress within the borders of South Vietnam. This, of course, is the conclusion that he argues the administration should and in fact

is going to pursue.

There is one other alternative that is never mentioned, the involvement of United States fighting men. At this time such an imposition was not popular. Although McNamara did no mention this possibility per se, his tacit rejection of all other approaches to the war other than increasing aid indicated that that course of action would be pursued if necessary.

That McNamara did not dwell on the argument from definition is an indication of two important things. (1) As we have indicated, the Secretary was speaking from a universe of discourse that was well established. It was not necessary to elaborate on the role of United States in the fight. It was presumed that, if necessary, we would intervene, and that, like our past interventions, this one would be successful. The important part of the speech was lodged in demonstrating that Vietnam was a true instance of cold war strategy. (2) The Secretary may not have been sure about the needed course of action in Vietnam. He probably hoped that the Khanh government could fight the threat with little assistance, but he did not want the possibility of intervention completely withheld.

Summary

In this chapter, we have analyzed a call to arms. Operating out of the rehtorical context of cold war rhetoric, Secretary of Defense McNamara argued for increasing aid and support to South Vietnam. His two main arguments were intended to demonstrate that Vietnam was a special case of the unceasing struggle of the cold war. His final argument established the role of the United States in that struggle. These arguments well supported and believed at this time were to come into

question by those opposed to the Vietnam war.

Footnotes

[1]"Statement," Congressional Record, L (March 16, 1964), p. 5402.

[2]Robert Shaplen, The Lost Revolution, (New York: Harper, 1966), pp. 313-349.

[3]Paul M. Sweezy, et. al., Vietnam: The Endless War, (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970), p. 101.

[4]Arthur M. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House (Boston: Houghton Nifflin, 1965), p. 997.

[5]Kahin and Lewis, p. 127.

[6]Ibid.

[7]Ibid.

[8]Secretary Rusk's News Conference on November 17, 1961. Reported in U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Background Information Relating to Southeast Asia and Vietnam, 2nd rev. ed., 89th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966), p. 87. As cited in Kahin and Lewis, p. 127.

[9]Kahin and Lewis, The United States in Vietnam, p. 146.

[10]Department of State Bulletin, (September 30, 1963), pp. 498-499.

[11]Whether the defeats were due to the assistance of the North Vietnamese or to the victories of indigenous Viet Nihn over a corrupt government is a point still under contention.

[12]This report was prompted by a fact-finding mission to South Vietnam. McNamara during the years 1963, 1964, and 1965 often journeyed to "eye-ball" the situation.

[13]"White House Statement: U.S. Policy on Viet-Nam (October 2, 1963)," The Viet-Nam Reader, Marcus G. Raskin and Bernard R. Fall, eds, (New York: Random House, 1965), p. 128.

[14]Ibid.

[15]Ibid., pp. 128-129.

[16]Ibid., p. 129.

[17]"The Covert War and Tonkin Gulf: February-August, 1964," The Pentagon Papers, (New York: Bantan Books, 1971), p. 245.

[18]"McNamara News Conference Excerpts," New York Times, (March 6, 1964), as reprinted in the Congressional Record, (March 10, 1964), p. 4794.

[19]Ibid., p. 245.

[20]Ibid., p. 244.

[21]Ibid., p. 255. "Any attempt to negotiate a compromise political settlement of the war between the Vietnamese themselves was to be avoided because it would result in a Communist take-over and the destruction of the American position in South Vietnam." Niel Sheehan, The Pentagon Papers, p. 243.

[22]Other speeches considered for this selection included: Dean Rusk, "International Agreements: Leave Your Neighbor Alone," delivered before the American Law Institute May 22, 1964; Adlai Stevenson, "Southeast Asia: The Threat to Peace and Security," delivered before the United Nations, May 21, 1964; Roger H. Hilsman, "The Challenge to Freedom in Asia," delivered at the Conference on Cold War Education at Tampa, Florida, June 14, 1963.

[23]Robert McNamara, "Text of the March 17 White House Statement on the National Security Council Meeting on Viet Nam," Congressional Quarterly, XXII (March 20, 1964), p. 13.

[24]Ibid.

[25]Ibid.

[26]Robert S. McNamara, "South Vietnam: The United States Policy," Vital Speeches, XXX, (April 15, 1964), p. 324.

[27]Ibid.

[28]Ibid., p. 394.

[29]Ibid.

[30]Ibid.

[31]Ibid.

[32]Ibid.

[33]The role of the United States: Although it was not a party to those Geneva agreements, the United States unilaterally declared that it would not violate them and that it would regard any violation .a serious threat to international peace.

[34]Robert McNamara, p. 395.

[35]*Ibid*., p. 395.

[36]*Ibid*.

[37]*Ibid*. The involvement of the United States in the fight of the Vietnamese people is a minor theme that runs throughout this speech. The development is not overt, rather a gradual picture of this country as a helping, protecting friend is constructed.

[38]McNamara, "South Vietnam," p. 395. America's direct contribution to this rebirth is never clearly stated. We may conjecture that it was purposively made ambiguous so that the audience could read into the situation a larger or smaller role depending on the position of the critic.

[39]Alexis Johnson, "The United States and Southeast Asia," *The Department of State Bulletin*, XLVIII (April 29, 1963), p. 640.

[40]Roger Hilsman, "The Challenge to Freedom in Asia," *The Department of State Bulletin*, XLIX (July 8, 1963), p. 47.

[41]McNamara, p. 395. Though the attempt to identify the United States with Vietnam recurs in various places throughout the speech, it is mainly developed in this particular passage and therefore will only be considered here.

[42]*Ibid*., p. 395.

[43]*Ibid*.

[44]*Ibid*.

[45]*Ibid*.

[46]*Ibid*.

[47]The argument goes that during the times of the accords the North Vietnamese "left behind cadres of men and large caches of Weapons for later use." *Ibid*.

[48]The Commission was under commission fo the Geneva Court of World Law.

[49]McNamara, p. 396.

[50]Perhaps this attention was special to increase the interests of the arms manufacturers.

[51]*Ibid*.

[52]*Ibid*.

[53] Ibid.

[54] Ibid.

[55] Ibid.

[56] Ibid.

[57] U. Alexis Johnson, "U.S. Foreign Policy in the Far East," Department of State Bulletin, XLIX (July 15, 1963), p. 81.

[58] Theodore J. Hearner, "The Vietnam Situation," Department of State Bulletin, XLIX (September 9, 1963), p. 393.

[59] Ibid., p. 394.

[60] Hearner, p. 394.

[61] Alexis Johnson, p. 82.

[62] U. Alexis Johnson, "The Emerging Nations of Asia," The Department of State Bulletin, XLVI (January 8, 1962), p. 54.

[63] Roger Hilsman, "The Challenge to Freedom in Asia," p. 47.

[64] Ibid.

[65] Adlai Stevenson, "Southeast Asia: The Threat to Peace and Security," Vital Speeches of the Day, XXX (June 1, 1964), p. 494.

[66] Winston Churchill, A Man of Destiny Winston S. Churchill, Arthur J. Schmid Jr., ed., (Wisconsin: Country Beautiful, 1965), p. 55.

[67] McNamara, "South Vietnam," p. 396.

[68] McNamara, p. 396.

[69] Alexis Johnson, "The Emerging Nations," p. 638.

[70] McNamara, p. 396.

[71] Ibid.

[72] Roger Hilsman, p. 44.

[73] McNamara, p. 396.

[74] Ibid., p. 397.

[75] Ibid., p. 397.

[76]*Ibid*.

[77]Theodore Hearner, p. 398.

[78]McNamara, "South Vietnam," p. 398.

CHAPTER IV

IN OPPOSITION TO THE VIETNAM WAR

Frank Church, Democratic Senator from Idaho and outspoken critic of the Vietnam war, voiced his frustration in formulating foreign policy. He stated that "the pendulum of our foreign policy can swing from one extreme to the other. Once we thought that anything which happened abroad was none of our buisness; now we evidently think that everything which happens abroad has become our business."[1] Recounting the errors of foreign policy in the past few decades, he observed that "in the span of 30 years, an excess of isolationism has transformed itself into an excess of interventionism."[2]

In this chapter we shall examine the opposition to the war in Vietnam -- the point towards the other end of the pendulum's swing -- as foreshadowed by Wayne Morse in his address "Foreign Policy Under the New President." This speech delivered April 1, 1964, at the University of Kansas sets forth nearly all of the major arguments against conducting the war in Vietnam.[3]

The Focus of Analysis

Most studies of the dissent in the early part of the Vietnam war encompass the time period of 1964 to 1966. These studies include such speakers as Ernest Gruening, Gaylord Nelson, Albert Gore, Frank Church, George McGovern, Vance Hartke, John Sherman Cooper and Joseph S. Clark, as well as Eugene McCarthy, Robert F. Kennedy, and Mark

Hatfield.

Marie E. J. Rosenwasser summarized the "appeals" of these speakers as directed at soliciting sympathy and support from their audiences. These included:

> 1. defending the public's right to more information while emphasizing the Administrations failure to seek the consent of the people, 2. emphasizing their confidence in the American people's ability to judge and to act wisely, 3. illustrating public support for their position, 4. praising other war critics by defending freedom of speech, and 5. proposing ways to continue rational, purposeful dissent.[4]

Although these appeals were apparently strong and although they were put constantly before the public eye, public opinion remained largely in support of the Vietnam war.[5]

Clearly, then, the value of the early war rhetoric is not necessarily in its persuasive impact _per se_; rather the value may reside in the appeals as points to which many Americans were persuaded. As such, appeals in these years were in their embryonic state; they become the basis for the more sophisticated appeals developed during the opposition to the war in the latter part of the 1960s.

As Rosenwasser indicates, foremost among those who spoke against the war both in terms of frequency and numbers of appeals was the Senator from Oregon Wayne Morse. Unlike many other anti-war speakers, Morse began his attack on the war makers in late 1963 and early 1964. He was one of the only two Senators to vote against the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution which authorized the escalation of the war.

Senator Morse's position in his address of April 1, 1964, clearly indicates unalterable opposition to the United States

participation in the Vietnamese or any other intervention into political affairs of other nations. Although the Senator does not use arguments that reach some of the extremist positions of later anti-war opponents, his arguments clearly provide the premises upon which most of the anti-war rhetoric was developed and upon which "extremists" could extend. As such, it constitutes an important document in tracing the rhetorical genesis of the Vietnam debate. The focus of our analysis in this chapter, then, will center upon the Senator's address as the beginnings of opposition to the war in Vietnam. We shall analyze the "universe of discourse" that he develops as it is expanded and shaped by later arguments of the war opponents.

The Nature of the Text

This particular address was not nearly as difficult to select as was the McNamara speech for several important reasons. In 1964 there were not a large number of rhetoricians favoring cessation of United States commitment to South Vietnam. In addition, the rhetoric of the cold war, as developed during the preceding four presidential administrations, still held a strong enthymematic relationship with people of the United States; therefore, a dissenter was relatively rare and his speeches were well publicized.

The second reason for selection of this text resides in the nature of Senator Morse's protest. Apparently the Senator felt quite strongly about "McNamara's war", as he called it, and delivered a large number of anti-war speeches.[6] The speeches, however, were usually fragmented and incomplete. All of them used the same tone and language style. Many of them used the same arguments. Some of them

were more complete than others. None of them, however, seem to argue a cogent and complete statement. This could be accounted for by two important factors. First, Morse was attempting to keep the issue alive. Many of his speeches are sandwiched in between the debates concerning the Civil Rights Act. The speeches could have been ad hoc presentations designed to keep the congress aware and informed as to the "deteriorating progress" of the war. Second, Morse's position concerning the war was not complete at this time. Whereas McNamara's speech comes at the virtual zenith of cold war rhetoric and is a complete and cogent argument developed over a generation of foreign policy, Morse is literally "groping in the dark". It should not be expected that an early speaker be able to deliver a completed argument.

What is amazing is that this speaker is able to hit upon many of the arguments that would be articulated by later anti-war speakers. He gives some light to an alternate universe of discourse.

The speech drawn upon for this particular analysis is certainly his most complete statement of thought on the subject of Vietnam in the context of cold war foreign policy. To the extent he elaborates upon these ideas in his other addresses of this immediate period, we shall include these statements also within the purview of our consideration.[7]

The Rhetorical Context

Senator Morse delivered the address, "Foreign Policy Under the New President," the evening of April 1, 1964. The specific occasion for the address was a request by the University of Kansas Student Council. The speech was delivered before 1,200 Kansas

University students and faculty. Unlike many of the war protest speeches that were to follow, Morse's speech lacked the trappings of the soon popularized student demonstration; and, though the speech was reportedly well received, there was not the violent emotion and vituperation that were later to characterize the Vietnam debate.

There was, however, in this speech as well as others he delivered in the month of April a rhetorical context which prefigured this rhetoric of violent opposition. Specifically, this position Morse created attacked the assumed rhetorical position of the pro-war advocates.

As we have noted before, the cold war rhetoricians had created a relatively stable hierarchy of belief structure about foreign policy, which allowed the war advocates a certain amount of stable relationship between their language and the policy of the cold war. When terms were invoked, their cash value was not substantially doubted. Morse attacked this presumption *per se* and the *right* to the presumption through indicting the language used by the cold war rhetoricians as interpreted by men like McNamara in regards to the Vietnamese policy.

Morse makes his most blunt attack in his April 9 address. He states: "Sometimes it seems that the only foreign policy the United States can have is a complicated gobbledygook program for which we need a half dozen interpreters to try to figure out its semantic meaning."[8] He asserts that the language "is designed to conceal simple principles that usually describe what is right."[9] Thus, instead of a rhetoric which ought to be accepted by the American people because its principles presuppose a necessary course for national survival

(therefore justifiably making demands on resources and allegiance), the rhetoric is a perverted attempt to fool the people and hide the motives of the "few" men that are committed to it. Such a position is a direct attack at the citadel of the belief in cold war rhetoric. The growing cynicsm of the American people evidenced that this onslaught was to be effective.[10]

The attack is advanced by renaming the policies of the pro-war advocates and renaming the source of the policies themselves. For example, the principles that the Vietnam war is being waged are no longer "making the free world safe for democracy," "helping an ally," or even maintaining the "balance of power." These policies are renamed as "fear to admit a mistake," "United States imperialism," and "aggression." Those who make the policy are no longer "patriots," carrying forth the will of the American people; instead, they are labeled as "warmongers" who are out to wage a personal Quixotic vendetta (hence, Morse continually refers to Vietnam as McNamara's War). The issues at stake are renamed. They are no longer considered as "survival," and "democracy" but as "prestige" and "image" projection.

The renaming carries over to the Vietnamese people. Instead of "defending democracy," pro-war advocates are supporting a "facist-dictator" and creating a "puppet state."

Finally, the naming effects the individual action of the warrior. No longer is he "patriotic," "self-sacrificing," and in the "American tradition." Instead, he becomes a person who participates in "attrocities"; who makes a war on a people who have done him or his country no wrong; an unthinking "dupe" trapped by the "system."

Through his speeches of that spring, Morse uses all of these terms in his attempt to create an alternate universe of discourse. To rename is to take away the power of definition, the legitimacy of principle, and the inoxerability of historical trend. Yet, as we have indicated, the renaming becomes more prominent as the war continues and the anti-war speakers gain support.[11]

Morse's speeches are an excellent example of language used in the rhetoric of war -- as established in our paradigm in Chapter Two. (1) The language is extremely bipolar. If an individual considers the war justified, then the language constructs the event as an entirely different act than if the individual considers the act to be unjust. Conversely, the individual who considers the war to be unjust uses language which structures the event as an entirely different reality than the person who sees the war as justified. This bi-polarity leaves little room for compromise because both the war advocates and the war oppositionists are operating out of two mutually exclusive universes of discourse. (2) The language in the general society in regards to war operates out of no stable social fabric; therefore, the rhetoric offers no stable residence for belief. Both sides charge each other with either foul or stupid motives; both sides declare that they are right and the other side is either phantasizing, deluded or worse. There is little belief in "right reasons" unless, of course, the individual has made up his mind about the justness of the war. (3) Finally, the hierarchy of terms are rent in disarray. There is little stable relationship between the abstract and concrete terms for either side. As arguments develop to forge and explain events, the

imperfections of the language are revealed in that anomolies occur within the explanations of events by both sides. With the lack of order comes the inevitability of social conflict.

This is not to argue that Morse's attack in this particular speech was constituted of violent language; indeed, compared to many forthcoming attacks his speech may be deemed stylistically moderate. Yet, the conclusion is inescapable that the renaming and the attack upon those who had heretofore assumed the presumption of naming for the American people clearly foreshadowed the language of those who spoke in opposition to the war.

Rhetorical Framework

Morse organizes the speech around two broad attacks upon the Johnson administration's foreign policy. He begins with an attack upon the general tenets of the balance of power theory as manifested in the specific policy of foreign aid. This attack establishes a world view within which the Vietnam policy may be pictured. The second attack is specifically directed at the conduct of the Vietnam war. This is treated as a special instance of the incorrectness of United States policy. In our analysis of his rhetorical position we will set forth the general attacks that Morse levels at the treatment of third world allies; however, this will only be brief. The more important portion of the speech is the attack on Vietnamese policy because it is herein we discover the focal point of the anti-war rhetoricians.

We will consider Morse's embryonic universe of discourse as he develops it's historical vision, fundamental principles, and finally, its definition. In addition, we will attempt to demonstrate

that many of these positions developed into prominent anti-war arguments.

The Opposition to the Cold War

Senator Morse begins his address by sighting the objectives of foreign policy as set forth by President Johnson in his remarks of March 24, 1964 to a labor organization in Washington, D. C. Apparently Morse thinks this to be an important statement as he devotes almost one fifth of his text to sighting Johnson's objectives. He reports Johnson's concluding statement:

> 'We, the most powerful nation in the world, can afford to be patient. Our ultimate strength is clear and it's well known to those who would be our adversaries. But let's be reminded that power brings obligations.
>
> The people in this country have more blessed hopes than bitter victories. The people of this country and the world expect more from their leaders than just a show of brute force. And so our hope and our purpose is to employ reasoned agreement instead of ready aggression, to preserve our honor without a world in ruins, to substitute if we can understanding for retaliation.
>
> My most fervent prayer is to be a President who can make it possible for every boy in this land to grow to manhood by loving his country -- instead of dying for it.'[12]

To Morse, such words stand in naked contrast to the realities perpetrated in the name of peace. He argues that Johnson, "despite obvious changes in style," has a foreign policy like all previous presidents in the cold war era.[13] In fact, he asserts that "there is hardly an area in the world or an issue in the world, that is not being handled by the United States along the lines laid down in the decade of the 1950's by President Eisenhower and his Secretary of

State, John Foster Dulles."[14] This position he regards as untenable in light of what the situation really is.

Morse defines the current state of world affairs as "normalcy." He observes that Americans have long been afraid to use the word because it has had ugly implications of a retreat from world events and responsibilities. But, he notes, "we are finding that there is such a thing as normalcy in world affairs in that a nation cannot remain permanently on a moral and material basis of war, near war, and preparation for war."[15] And "neither can the world."[16] Morse dates the Soviet acceptance of that policy from the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. He argues that they have shown a willingness to avoid nuclear war.

Unfortunately this definition is left completely undeveloped. There is little relationship established between the definition of "normalcy" and the principles of foreign policy that it implies. Instead of searching out a complete definition and its concomitant principles, the Senator chooses to attack those principles established by the cold war rhetoricians.

Morse briefly explains that United States "third world" policy has been predicated on the success of the Marshall Plan in rebuilding Europe after World War II. Since that time, he asserts, aid programs have had "little definition or direction."[17] The result has been at best an ineffectual foreign policy, at worst a harmful foreign policy. He argues that instead of assuming the general role of protectors of the free world, the United States should realize the fundamental principle of international relations, "all countries pursue their own

interests, not ours."[18] Therefore, all of the countries of the world, friend and foe alike, "are using our aid for their nationalistic purposes not ours."[19]

The Senator argues this principle with the support of historical examples. First, he argues that it is not the armies that we have aided that form the "defense perimeter against communism," rather it is the power of the United States Army in Europe and the Seventh Fleet in Asia. If the foreign troops were really protecting our national interest, then why must we keep so many troops on the alert?

Second, he argues that there is much mismanagement of foreign aid. Much of our resources are used to support dictatorships and much of our money finds its way into personal bank accounts. This is carefully documented by findings from the Comptroller General.

Third, he observes that the military aid we give simply improves the ability of our allies to make war on one another. For example Greece and Turkey, both NATO allies, had massive military buildups and almost went to war in the early 1950s over Cyprus. In both countries there were anti-American riots because of aid. The military assistance we gave to Pakistan and India was used in a border dispute over Kasmir. Morse concludes sardonically that "if any of that military force in Pakistan is ever used, it will be used against India and not against Russia or China at all."[20]

The thrust of his position is that the problems of the third world military and otherwise "are never going to be harnessed by the United States from 7 to 8,000 miles away, no matter how much money we spend in the effort to do so."[21] Thus any foreign policy that is

predicated on the balance of power maintained by our "allies" is doomed to fail; and, given that the position of the United States vis-a-vis Russia is one of "normalcy", any attempt at increasing aid is doubly absurd.

Though this position is not extensively developed and though, at this point, Senator Morse skirts the main arm of United States policy, intervention, we must note that Morse's attack is in the right direction. Vietnam is placed with the "new" context of the cold war; and, it therefore must be analyzed from a new perspective of foreign policy in order to pose an effective argument against it. Unfortunately, Morse does not capialize on this opportunity and he only superficially analyzes the problems with foreign aid.

The Opposition to the Vietnam War

The Senator predicts that "the United States will undergo many embarrassing and even frightening foreign policy reversals until we overhaul both our attitudes and our policies."[22] Further, Morse claims that "no single example of this need [to completely reset the course pursued in foreign affairs] exists than that of South Vietnam."[23]

Like McNamara, Morse argues from three essential positions: (1) argument from historical narration, (2) argument from doctrine or principle, and (3) argument from definition. Although there is no clear organizational pattern in Morse's indictment of Vietnam policy, this division assures us a clear contrast to McNamara's universe of discourse without distorting the arguments propounded in the speech. In addition, we shall draw materials from the speeches immediately

surrounding the Kansas address as they serve to illuminate the issues at hand.

ARGUMENT FROM HISTORICAL NARRATION. Morse argues from a dual position in regards to the implications of history for waging the Vietnam war. He observes that not only does history give the United States no legitimate commitment to the country, but also history gives us no indication that such a war may be waged with any degree of success.

Morse finds no historical commitment to the war for three independent reasons. Probably the most important reason is that the Vietnamese government is not the citadel of democracy that McNamara claims it to be; instead, he argues that the government is corrupt, Facist and not concerned with freedom or defense against Communism. Unlike McNamara who concentrates on explaining the plight of the Vietnamese people, Morse concentrates his efforts on indicting the Vietnamese government. He notes that

> The South Vietnamese Government is a puppet of the United States. It was brought into being primarily through the influence and power of the United States. We set up the Diem government - a tyrannical, Facists type of government, in which human rights were nonexistent - which remained totalitarian throughout the existence of the Diem Government.[24]

If the Diem government was bad, the Kahn government is far worse. Morse calls Kahn "this tinhorn soldier tyrant in South Vietnam - a straight dictator."[25] Again and again the Senator passionately states that "we are not supporting freedom in South Vietnam with American blood; we are supporting totalitiarianism."[26]

Now, as to the plight of the people of South Vietnam, Morse declares that "the overwhelming majority of them would not know the difference between communism and democracy if we tried to explain it to them -- and they could not care less."[27]

This is not because they are "evil"; it is merely due to the fact that the South Vietnamese are not the crusaders in defense of their homeland but largely rural peasants. Although this condition might be regrettable, it does mandate support for the particular government of South Vietnam. Morse concludes that "under a military Facist rule there is no more freedom for the individual South Vietnamese than there is under Communist rule. They are equally bad and equally intolerable."[28]

Thus, the pictures of the South Vietnames people and government as painted by the two rhetoricians stand in stark contrast. In the first instance, the people are important. They are progressive, freedom loving, courageous, fiercely independent and determined to be a vital ally of the United States. In the latter case the people are ruled by a facist, corrupt, tyrannical, self-serving government because they are largely apathetic and would only wish to remain at peace.

The second argument from historical precedent is that there is no international commitment to wage war in South Vietnam; in fact the United States has made a commitment not to interfere. Morse recalls that after France "gave up the ghost" in 1954 "the peace was arranged at Geneva, Switzerland, in what has come to be called the Geneva Accords. The United States was not party, nor signatory to those accords. But we said we would recognize them as international

treaties and would consider their violation to be a threat to international peace."[29] Instead of honoring our true commitment and pledge, the United States under the Eisenhower administration decided to support the old French-supported ruler, Bao Dai, who in turn selected Ngo Dinh Diem to head the government of South Vietnam. Because he was pro-western, "the United States moved to back him heavily with both financial and military aid."[30] The unmistakable conclusion is that because the United States did not allow the "free" elections to occur, there is simply no legal commitment.

McNamara's position is, of course, in contrast to this one. It was the North Vietnamese, he asserts, who would not allow "free" elections. Because they left large numbers of supplies and guerillas in the south, it was impossible to conduct these elections and the United States must remain until such a time when the country can conduct a peaceful election. Morse denies this categorically. To him, this interpretation is a false pretext to cover up the reality that history clearly indicates no commitment to that area.

The third argument from history indicating no commitment is drawn from the "fact" that there is no national commitment to the war in Vietnam. Morse looks at each presidential administration from Eisenhower to Johnson and asserts that in no instance have these presidents received anything resembling a Congressional mandate to aid the South Vietnamese in fighting. To the contrary, the commitment is simply something that has been handed over from president to president.

Presently the mandate is even less clear. Morse is concerned that one man, Secretary McNamara is committing the nation to

a war that it does not want. He notes that:

> The escalation of American aid and American participation in the war has been steadily and continuous since Secretary McNamara became Secretary of Defense. He is the one who now speaks for and represents the United States in South Vietnam. It was he who campaigned so arduously around the countryside on behalf of its current junta boss - General Kahan - more arduously than he ever campaigned for any American head of government.
>
> It was Secretary McNamara who undertook to promise aid 'forever' to the Kahan regime, or whoever follows Kahan as head of the junta.[31]

McNamara, of course, argues that there is a strong national commitment appropriately decreed by a long list of appropriate executive agreements. These commitments represent the will of the American people. He, personally, has no self-interest in the war in Vietnem.

In summary, we may conclude that Morse attempts to counter the pro-war speakers' presumption for aid by arguing that history demonstrates no legitimate commitment to the South Vietnam government. This government has been characterized traditionally by politically and militaristic mechanations that pose no legitimate moral commitment to its defense. There is no legitimate international commitment, indeed the United States is violating its own position by intervention. Finally, there is no legitimate national commitment; there is only piecemeal entanglement and the ambitions of one man.

In addition to observing that history gives no legitimate commitment to support the war, Morse also uses a second broad argument. Equally important is the fact that history indicates no possibility of

success in fighting this war. For proof, Morse turns to two categories of examples.

(1) The Senator places the Vietnamese war in the context of the imperialist adventures of Great Britain and France. He states that:

> The white man is never going to be able to prevail in Asia. . .the day of the white man in Asia is over.
>
> Great Britain discovered it. France discovered it after killing thousands of the flower of its manhood in Indochina, even though, interestingly enough, we made available to France about a billion and a half dollars to help France conduct the war in Indochina. France was whipped. France was driven out. The people of France brought down a government in protests against the slaughter of the flower of French manhood in Indochina.[32]

Clearly, then, the rise of nationalistic spirit in this century has precluded "imperialist" wars to settle disputes. Morse observes that "military victories seldom produce permanent peace"; because "military victories only entrench hatred," and "sooner or later, like a volcano, that human hatred erupts."[33] Historical precedent indicates that wars in the third world are no longer a viable instrument of policy.

(2) As a specific analog to this general conclusion Morse believes that the Vietnam war is similar to the intervention of the French in Algeria and the United States in Korea, and the French in Indochina. In Algeria, the war was a guerilla conflict where foreign troops sought to put down an uprising of indigenous forces. The effort proved both costly and futile. In Korea, the United States met

with escalation of a local war into a costly and bloody conflict. To Morse, this is particularly critical because at that time the United States was only one member of the United Nations; now the United States is fighting alone. Finally, the French experience in Indochina indicated that the war could not be won then and presently the Communists have grown in strength and resolve.

In summary, Morse sees a clear mandate from history not to engage in an Asian war. He pleads with the people of the United States:

> Let us not make the mistake of Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and other great colonial powers made for centuries. They lost their colonial power. Great Britain went broke. France went into a great economic decline. Fianlly the people of Great Britain and of France made it clear to their governments that they wanted an end to colonial powers and policies.[34]

Morse believes that history clearly indicates that "America's military might is no substitute for right."[35] Because "no matter how powerful we are at the present time; we had better recognize that in generations gone by other nations that substituted military might for right fell; and so we fall if we continue to follow this course of action."[36]

McNamara, of course, makes no truce with this theory. Since he is operating from the rhetorical context of the cold war beliefs, intervention is assumed to be a relatively successful policy and thus, history clearly and implicitly, dictates that intervention is a viable tool to defend democracy.

ARGUMENT FROM PRINCIPLE. Morse considers the so called principles that justify the United States intervention into the

affairs of South Vietnam and labels them as false principles. He also turns to an alternate set of principles and labels these the true, guiding laws of international relations. This argument is derived from the different universe of discourse that Morse is operating from. Because it is different, the principles causing the intervention are not principles at all but false pretexts. The "real" guiding laws would reveal no "reason" to intervene.

The two guiding reasons that the United States has intervened are drawn directly from McNamara. The first is the "domino theory." The second is that the Vietnamese war is a "test case" of wars for liberation by the communists. Morse considers these in turn.

In regard to the domino theory he asserts that this is only a policy implemented a long time ago. Supposedly "South Vietnam was the first 'domino' in line. Next to it was Cambodia and Laos, then Thailand and Burma. Below Thailand stretches the Malaysian Federation, and beyond that, Indonesia."[37] If Vietnam were to go Communist, then the rest of these nations would fall. Morse finds that the actual political situation in anomoly with the theory.

> North Vietnam has always been outside the scope of American influence. Laos was neutralized by agreement, Cambodia has recently ousted all American aid missions and declared herself neutral, and Burma long ago put herself outside the circle of American military protection. Indonesia certainly is neutral insofar as her sympathies and policies toward America and China are concerned.
>
> The only countries left in the row of dominoes as we originally conceived it are South Vietnam, Thailand, and Malaysia. Yet none of the rest, except North Vietnam

> has become a Communist state. Undemocratic and totalitarian, yes, but so are South Vietnam and Thailand.[38]

This theory simply does not hold up.

The second principle is also declared false. As the reader will recall, McNamara reasoned that if the Communists were successful in waging a guerilla war in South Vietnam, then similar wars would be waged throughout the underdeveloped world. Thus, the escalation of conflict and the loss of the balance of power would be the disastrous result.

It is self-evident, Morse asserts, that this principle is not true. If it were, then the allies would be more interested in aiding the United States in the fighting -- especially the members of the SEATO organization.[39] As it is, however, we have no allied support in South Vietnam and are not likely to get any. Therefore, the situation cannot be as important as McNamara describes it. This argument in conjunction with a preceeding argument -- that nationalism will ensure that no foreign power can control an area for long -- assures Morse that the Vietnam situation is not critical to the defense of the free world. Besides, Morse operates from the assumption developed in the first portion of his speech that it is the power of the United States that prevents real Communist aggression.

What, then, are these so-called principles? Morse labels them as simply concerns for prestige. He states:

> We took a tiger by the tail 10 years ago and no one in high office knows how to let go of it. So we call that a "commitment". What is really meant is face and prestige. We have backed a puppet there 10 years ago, and we are

> afraid the world will laugh at us if we recognize that it has been a flop.[40]

Even our prestige can be saved, however, if we admit that Vietnam is a mistake. For example, France after withdrawing in defeat from Indochina now enjoys much prestige and is a leader of negotiations for that area.

Morse urges that the United States follow a principle that it has "always followed" and is committed to at the present. "The basic tenet of foreign policy," as Morse labels it, is that "the jungle law of military force" is no substitute for the "law of reason encompassed in the rule of law under international law."[41] He urges that every time the opportunity comes to us to use the rule of reason as a substitute for the "jungle law" of force, we should do so.

Unfortunately, Vietnam cuts off our recourse to the guiding principle of settling disputes peacefully through the United Nations or negotiations. The consequences of this violation of guiding principle are severe. As Morse reasons and as many of the anti-war rhetoricians would state:

> At one time the United States pledged itself to seek to preserve the peace; yet tonight the United States is conducting an illegal war in South Vietnam. It is a war clearly outside the United Nations. The United States is acting clearly as an aggressor nation, clearly in violation of the Geneva accords. Yet the United States is trying to alibi and rationalize its outlawry in South Vietnam.[42]

Because the United States has resorted to unilateral action instead of operating through our avowed treaty commitments; because the United States is waging war instead of seeking a peaceful settlement; because

the United States has succumbed to policy by force instead of policy by reason; therefore, we have lost the moral claim of superiority that we have maintained during the cold war. In short, we are no better than the Russians.

Morse turns the accusations of a generation of cold war rhetoricians back upon the source.

> What do we say about Russian military forces being in the countries of Eastern Europe? We say that they are Russian puppets. Russia has always extended its shocking and unconscionable course of action in Hungary, and elsewhere in Eastern Europe on the ground that it is in there because those governments want it there. That is as much nonsense as the excuse the United States gives for going in South Vietnam. The reasons given are phony. They are intellectually dishonest reasons.[43]

The Senator angrily takes issue with McNamara's claim that we are in South Vietnam because the people invited us there. "We are there, we say, at the invitation of the South Vietnamese government. But that government is our own creature. We know it and the world knows it. One might as well try to claim that the Soviet army is in East Germany only on the invitation of the East German government."[44]

Finally we may observe that Morse's argument from principle are in extreme opposition to McNamara's interpretation of the Vietnam situation. As a result Morse accuses those who uphold the contrary position of "subterfuge," "indirection," "alibis," and "rationalization." The members of congress who vote for the funding of this war have no right "to send boys to their death in South Vietnam in the absence of a declaration of war" -- a declaration which is, of course, completely

antithetical to the rule of law to which the United States is and ought to be committed.

On the other hand those who oppose the war are in the right and are the true American patriots. Morse symbolizes the perpetraters of the evil as men who would wave the flag until it is in tatters.

ARGUMENT FROM DEFINITION. Morse is ultimately seeking a redefinition of the war and in doing so he uses both arguments from historical interpretation and principle as well as arguments "from the nature of the thing" to define what the war really is. This tactic is extremely important because it establishes a base from which further arguments may be developed.

McNamara, on the other hand, spends little time in naming the war. Instead of a strategic definition, McNamara is concerned primarily with the tactics of fighting the war. This is due to the fact that he was operating out of a generally accepted universe of discourse constructed by accepted definition.

From Morse's point of view the war is by definition an unjust war in any and every perspective. From Morse's early observations as to the nature of the war, we may trace many counter-causes which constitute prominent arguments for the anti-war rhetoricians.

First because there is no threat to the United States, Vietnam is at best an <u>unnecessary</u> war and at worst a <u>counter-productive</u> war.

Without question the premier issue of the Vietnam debate concerned the necessity of the war. Pro-war advocates primarily relied upon the reasoning that the war was a test case for wars of

national liberation, and as such only victory in this war could assure international stability and the maintenance of the free world. Leonard Unger, administration spokesman, stated in 1965 that "if this technique adopted by Hanoi should be allowed to succeed in Vietnam, we would be affirming Peking's contention that militant revolution is more productive than peaceful coexistence."[45] The administration solicited agreement from allies on this point. For example Manlio Brosio, then Secretary General of NATO, stated that "an American retreat or humiliating compromise in Vietnam far from ending U.S. commitments in Asia, would extend them on an even greater scale."[46] This argument continued to be urged even at the height of the protest against the war. Walt W. Rostow stated in 1967 that "As General Giap made clear: South Vietnam is the model of the national liberation movement in our time; if the special warfare that the United States imperialists are testing in South Vietnam is overcome, this means that it can be defeated everywhere in the world."[47] The repurcussions of increased warfare would be felt throughout the freeworld and, the pro-war advocates argued, it might end the detente.[48] This would probably mean the loss of all of South East Asia and it would certainly mean a concomitant increase in world tensions.[49]

Morse's contention the war is an unnecessary war because there is no threat to the United States in Vietnam certainly strikes at the heart of this contention. The primary premise behind this assertion is contained in the nature of the cold war and that is: it is United States power, not the aid of allies that keep the Communists at bay; therefore, if any country goes to the Communist camp (which

is unlikely because of the nationalistic spirit prevalent in the third world) then they do not constitute a threat to the United States *per se*.

Thus the question of commitment is not one of survival and immediate threat but simply prestige (which is not a viable criteria for a necessary war).

Morse is not satisfied with labeling the war as unnecessary. He develeps the extension of this argument in that it is not only an unnecessary war but it is a counterproductive war as well. This is true for numerous reasons.

The war is counterproductive because the United States is causing the fighting in South Vietnam. Morse specifically labels the role of the United States as "provacateur." Morse believes that:

> The Vietnamese would settle their differences /if the United States withdrew its troops from the country/. Those people are not militant. They do not want to fight. The people of Southeast Asia are the most peaceable, lovable, happy-go-lucky, cheerful live-by-the-day people in the world.[50]

Senator McClellan pointedly asked Morse: Is your charge that "the presence of our personnel over there is sustaining and prolonging the conflict?" Morse's response "I so charge; and history will so record -- to the shocking disgrace of the United States of America."[51]

Morse argues that what heretofore has been a civil war on the verge of settlement will become a long drawn out international war because the United States is increasing the importance of the situation far and above what it ought to be. This is clearly

counterproductive to the achievement of peace.

The Senator also argues that the war is counterproductive to our own security. Because there is no threat, the Vietnam intervention may be interpreted as an "aggressive" war by the rest of the third world. As Morse notes that in this action "we are making more Communists around the world than we have any reasonable hope of defeating in South Vietnam."[52]

This position was to develop into a very important counter argument. By picturing the United States as an aggressive threat, China (the real threat to America) could create hegemony among the nations of Asia whereas none naturally existed. Whereas independent small Communist nations are no threat to the United States, a determined single block may well be such a threat.[53] In addition, whereas mutual animosity between the Soviet Union and Communist China was developing, Vietnam offered a point of symbolic union against the "aggression" of the United States.

Finally, the war was counterproductive because it proved that wars of national liberation were, indeed a successful strategy, since they were able to draw in a major power into an endless struggle. Even Ambassador Lodge was forced to admit that: "It's a very cheap war for the Communists. It's a very difficult place for us, but it's a very easy place for them to fight. It costs them practically nothing."[54] As long as the United States could not win the war or if the United States had massively to increase its commitment to the war, then the Communists had a *de facto* victory in that they were spending relatively little

resources whereas the United States had to commit a large amount of blood and treasure.

In any case, the war was portrayed as hurting the United States international position. Howard Zinn, in his book The Logic of Withdrawal recorded in 1967 that "as the war in Vietnam has continued, the prestige of the United States in Japan, its most important ally in Asia, and in England, France, and West Germany, its most important allies in Europe, has seriously declined."[55] Another report in that same period reported that "the consequences of the Vietnamese adventure already have included serious strains within our European alliance, a halting of progress toward achieving a political settlement with the Soviets in Central Europe, and a maldeployment of United States armed forces."[56] The claims of counterproductivity were used by many anti-war rhetoricians as important reasons in claiming that the Vietnam war was not justified.

Second because there are other alternatives open to the United States, Vietnam is an immoral war. In order for a war to be considered just for any country, there must be no other option left open. Morse discovers four other options each of which are progressively less desirable but all of which are more preferable to current status of the war.

The first option, is of course, not to wage war at all. Morse finds a great deal of support for this position in that the Vietnam conflict is a civil war and thus, there is no direct involvement mandated by the United States.

The second option, is to take the matter before the United

Nations. This would be in accordance with international law which the United States is and should be committed to.

The third option is to act in a multilateral effort with the signatory nations of the SEATO alliance who -- together with the United States -- have declared Vietnam to be a nation of joint concern.

The fourth and last alternative should be implemented only if we are unjustifiably meddling, violating international law and disregarding our obligations to our allies. We must at least have a declaration of war -- a legitimate commitment by our own people.

Since the administration has not "seriously" considered any of these alternatives, then the war is immoral and as such an unconscionable obligation to its citizens.

Although McNamara spent little time in exploring these options (presumably because he was operating from an enthymematic relationship with the cold war rhetoric which dictated that the Communist "aggression" must be met and stopped wherever and how ever necessary), the administration was forced to claim that either it was seeking agreement using these channels and the progress was too slow to allow salvation of the war or that these options were completely ineffective.

The first option -- staying out of a civil war -- was of course dependent on proving that the war was inspired and supported from the North. Many spokesmen referred to the Communist violation of the Geneva accords, Communist (especially Chinese and North

Vietnamese) weapons and supplies in the hands of the guerillas and North Vietnamese troops in the South.[57] Opponents argued that this situation occurred because the United States escalated the war and thus the justification for increasing intervention is circular.[58]

The second option -- taking the matter before international law -- was out of the question. The Communists in the past had demonstrated bad faith and will not keep agreements. In addition, the North Vietnamese themselves were blocking progress in negotiations.[59] Opponents charged that it was the United States which was blocking progress in negotiations and who would not keep international agreements, primarily because the administration was afraid that the settlement might declare the present war efforts illicit.[60]

The third option -- working through the SEATO organization -- was co-opted by the administration. We may speculate that administration policy planners realized that Morse's charge rang true (if the threat is so imminent, why are not our allies concerned). Thus, throughout the war the administration claimed that there was substantial allied support for the war.[61] Opponents claimed that the allied support was at best a token, reluctant support as demonstrated by the few foreign troops in the engagement as well as by the fact that the support was elicited by negotiations for foreign assistance and trade aggrements.[62] The organization that was supposed to handle the problem, SEATO, gave no real support or aid.

The final option -- a declaration of war -- must be taken if all others fail. The administration, of course, never declared war. Again, we must speculate as to the reasons. First, if the administration

had declared war, then the other options would be closed off for the most part and thus a consistent position -- we are keeping all options open, it is the Communists who are closing them off -- could not be maintained. Secondly, if the administration had declared war this would represent an unlimited commitment (as we have seen that war implies in the era prior to the cold war). Though Vietnam was important, it was not important enought to risk the absurdity of all out war.

Still, this position left the administration on dubious rhetorical grounds. Never before, the opponents were quick to note, had United States citizens been asked to die without prior declaration of war by the people. Morse demands repeatedly:

> Bring back the boys that had nothing to say about going into South Vietnam to die in a war that we should not be fighting. Mr. President you have no moral or legal right to kill them. Let us be brutally frank about this. You will have to assume the responsibility for their killing because you, Mr. President are ordering them to their deaths.[63]

The Senator argues that the people who had no say as to whether they ought to go to war would be home, and "the warmongers should volunteer to go over there."[64]

Thus the claimed illegitimacy of the administration made the war immoral and unconscionable. This simple position led directly to a violent and bitter debate that constituted massive social upheaval, for if the above premise is true, then there is not only no moral obligation to serve the country, but those who do are committing acts of atrocities in the name of false freedom -- the worst of all possible crimes. The debate over the drafting

of citizens is too vast and complex to analyze here. We may simply note that Morse's position directly enjoined this great controversy.

In addition, the concern for the legitimacy of the war also led to a great controversy in regards to the techniques of killing. Morse, at this point, charges that CIA agents are leading groups to fire bomb North Vietnamese industrial plants. These "incidents" are translated into violent symbolic eruptions as to the legitimacy of our warfare throughout the war. Such questions of controversy as the use of napalm and chemical warfare, the use of bombing, the Calley trial and the treatment of North Vietnamese people constantly called into question the legitimacy of settling a political dispute through military means and ultimately led to the search for other options.

Third because the war is the creation of a few men, it is a war for personal gain. As we have seen the war waged with the motive of personal gain is the most odius of all wars. For McNamara, as well as other pro-war spokesmen, this was out of the question. To them, the war was ultimately only a question of long term survival.

It was equally clear to the war opponents that Vietnam was not being fought for the wealth and the land space of that small country; however, the war was being fought for a more insidious type of personal motive.

Morse is aware of this when attacks those "few men" who are responsible for the war and their spurious attempts to persuade the American people that the Vietnam war is just. Morse warns the American people to "watch out for the semantics of this administration."[65]

Specifically he attacks McNamara's March 24th speech. He states that "it is clever, but it is a ducking speech. It is not a forthright speech. It is full of one escape hatch after another."[66] The Senator continually characterizes the pro-war advocates as rhetoricans who are stealthily attempting to maneuver America into a war that it does not want. Their motives, to Morse, are simply those of commitment to a mistake.

Now as the war continued the same suspicion remained as to what was the real reason these men wanted war. The motives, however, became increasingly sinister. In the late 1960s a host of anti-war speakers and writers attributed the intervention to the efforts of the "military-industrial complex" -- a joint coalition of the military and the defense industries which held vast amounts of lobbying influence.[67] It was in their interests, so the argument goes, to keep the nation on the brink of war so that they could maintain control over political affairs within the country. By "scaring" the people of the United States, they could augment their power by increased appropriations for defense. Vietnam was a specific instance perpetrated by their men with the hopes of intensifying the cold war.

Morse almost reaches this conclusion when he argues that the war efforts are only favored by a few "super-patriots". These deluded men have an almost paranoic view of the Communist threat as mandated by their upper echelon military training.

The pro-war advocates countered this assertion with attributing the most damning of all motives to the anti-war

speakers. They were the conspirators undermining the true survival of the Free World. They did this either because they were enemies of the country or worse, they were cowards.

This attribution of motives led to a bitter debate, for both sides could not be right and the one which was not right was the "true" enemy of the people.

Fourth because the Vietnam war cannot be won without massive escalation, Vietnam is a dangerous and wasteful war. As we have seen, in order for a war to be just, the gains from upholding the right reasons must not outweigh the costs of waging the war. If they do not, then the war is not justified.

Morse claims that the costs to the Vietnamese are without limit, because we cannot win the war and attempting to do so will simply lead to increased escalation without any concomitant chance of victory. Morse claims that "we can never win in South Vietnam. In the situation which exists there, we cannot win. The internal situation there must be settled by the South Vietnamese, among themselves."[68]

Early anti-war speakers were concerned with the ability to combat guerilla activities given that the government in Saigon was unstable. As the war continued, opponents became increasingly concerned with whether or not the United States could win a war that had such strong indigenous support.[69]

To counter these assertions administration spokesmen argued that the reason a great amount of progress was not being made was because the North Vietnamese were supporting the war from the

privileged sanctuary of the North and the sure way to win was to cut off the supply lines.[70] Morse considers this claim and still maintains that the Vietnam war cannot be ended by any amount of escalation.

> One old familiar cliche that has also been trotted out in this election year is the call for expanding the war into "privileged sanctuary" to which American airpower should carry the war.
>
> But that is no prescription for settling the conflict. That is no defending of peace or freedom; that is nothing more nor less than creating more war, more destruction, and less freedom in a land already bleeding and exhausted.
>
> Dick Nixon and Barry Goldwater are "pushing" that prescription. It calls for making war in order to reach the goal of peace. It assumes that there are finite limits to the geography and to the resources against which we would be fighting.
>
> But that was assumed in Korea, too. We found out the hard way that pressing any military effort toward the borders of China is inviting disaster not victory.[71]

Escalation cannot stop the war. It can only lead to a more and increasingly dangerous war.

The question of escalation ultimately became "the bombing issue." Opponents of the war such as McGovern claimed that "bombing attacks in the north will not solve the guerilla struggles in the south."[72] The best it could accomplish was to increase the resolve of the Communist forces fighting in the south. The worst it could do was to lead to further escalation of the war.

Many war opponents were afraid that this escalation could lead to a world disaster. Senator Gruening of Alaska stated that "now on the horizon appear the 'hawks,' urging the United States take over the actual fighting in South Vietnam; even if it means

taking on in ground battle the fighting forces of North Vietnam, Red China, and Russia; even if it means risking the last world war -- a thermonuclear war destroying civilization."[73] Bombing so near to the Chinese Communist borders in addition to escalating troop commitments, offered too great a risk to be worth countering the small actual threat involved.[74] As Morse, among others was to claim, "American involvement in southeast Asia is the real threat to our security."[75]

Now, given that the Vietnam war could not be won militarily within the borders of South Vietnam and given that escalation could not win the war but would only bring the threat of limitless commitment, then it follows that the Vietnam war is a wasteful war. All of the resources that we are spending in defense of this country are doing no good.

Thus, the concern of the anti-war speakers turned increasingly inward. For example a report of a group known as the "Foreign Policy Association" reported that "Our huge expenditure on the war is depriving our critical domestic problems -- urban decay, poverty, racial unrest -- of essential federal funds and energies."[76] It was widely recorded that expenditures of upwards to $30 billion a year left little room for social progress.[77] As Michael Donivan claimed: "the Great Society was the first victim of the war in Vietnam."[78]

More importantly, the lives of Americans were being needlessly wasted in a "quagmire" war. Perhaps no more effective of an argument was ever raised than the tacit argument created by the unjaundiced eye of the television camera as it daily pictured the

needless death and suffering with no end in sight.

To counter this argument, pro-war students of foreign policy argued that if the Communists are successful in waging this war, then there will be more costly violence. For example Charles Wolf, a respected member of the RAND corporation argued that:

> The effect on Western Europe and Japan themselves of such a detachment of Southeast Asia might be very substantial and a progressive erosion of the free world a genuine possibility. One effect of such a withdrawal would certainly be to raise the United States defense budget and to lower somewhat our real national product as well as our growth rate.[79]

Yet, this assertion could only be true if the United States could "win" the war in South Vietnam. And though there were quite a few claims that the winning was just around the corner the administration's position became progressively weaker as the war continued without demonstrable success.[80]

Because the Vietnam war could not be won without too great a cost and too great a risk to the survival of not only America but also the world, then the war was considered by its opponents to be unjustified in that no success was possible. Given this premise, then the effort and sacrifice could only be considered as defining the Vietnam conflict as a dangerous and wasteful war.

Summary of the Chapter

In this portion of the thesis we have examined the rhetoric in opposition to the Vietnam war as foreshadowed by Senator Wayne Morse and as extended by many opponents to the war.

Like McNamara, Morse was speaking from a "universe of discourse"

which allowed no compromise with those opposing his view of the war. Like McNamara, he employed argument from historical interpretation, principle or doctrine and definition. The primary differences reside in the fact that (1) Morse's arguments were incomplete because he was among the first to develop the opposition to the war whereas McNamara's arguments are operating at the zenith of cold war rhetoric; (2) Morse is attempting to establish a new universe of discourse whereas McNamara is operating from a strong emthymematic relationship with the rhetoric of the cold war and therefore is immediately more successful than Morse; (3) the primary value in studying Morse's speech is from a perspective of premises carried through and developed by anti-war rhetoricians, whereas the primary value of studying McNamara's speech is in understanding how it operates within the context of the cold war rhetoric.

We have discovered that Morse's argument from history indicates that there is no legitimate commitment to the struggle and that there is no probability of success. Morse's argument from principle indicates that not only are the cold war principles as implemented by a policy of intervention false, but that they violate the true principles of law and reason which should and ought to govern foreign policy. Finally, we have observed Morse's definition of the Vietnam war as it served as premises for future arguments. This included:

(1) Because there is no threat to the United States, Vietnam is at best an unnecessary war and at worst a counterproductive war.
(2) Because there are other alternatives open to the United States, Vietnam is an immoral war.
(3) Because the war is the creation of a few men, it is a war for personal gain.

(4) Because the Vietnam war cannot be won without massive escalation, it is a dangerous and wasteful war.

Now that we have explored both the pro- and anti-war position, one final question remains: How did the movement by the public take place from one position to the other? For both McNamara and Morse, there could be no movement because the universe of discourse from which both men were operating was mutually exclusive. One side is right and the other is wrong. How then, can the critic account for a shift in support for the war since McNamara's position was so widely held by Americans at the beginning of the war? Such a question must be answered in seeking an alternative approach to the rhetoric of war.

Footnotes

[1]Frank Church, Congressional Digest, 144 (April, 1965), p. 115.

[2]Ibid.

[3]"Remarks of Senator Wayne Morse," Unpublished Manuscript, University of Kansas Archives (April 1, 1964), pp. 1-16.

[4]Rosenwaser, p. 47.

Senator	No. of Speeches	No. Speeches Appeals used	No. Times Used	Avg. # Appeals
Church	10	6	10	16-N=6
Fulbright	14	11	35	32-N=11
Gruening	17	11	22	20-N=11
McCarthy	12	11	27	25-N=11
McGovern	10	8	16	20-N=8
Morse	20	17	80	47-N=17

[5]Opinion Polls 1964, 1965, 1966.

[6]For the late spring of 1964 these speeches include: "McNamara's War in South Vietnam," Congressional Record, L (March 30, 1964) pp. 6574-6578. "McNamara's War in Vietnam," Congressional Record, CX (April 9, 1964), pp. 7432-7435. "McNamara's War in South Vietnam," Congressional Record, CX (April 20, 1964) pp. 8474-8478. "McNamara's War in South Vietnam," Congressional Record, CX (May 20, 1964) pp. 11531-11533.

[7]The text seems to be a composite writing by Morse. In the first portion of the text (pp. 1-9) Morse explains foreign policy as it relates to foreign aid and intervention. The second portion is on a different typerwriter (pp. 9a-16) and contains many of his previously stated Vietnam arguments.

[8]Morse, p. 7430.

[9]Ibid.

[10]Perhaps the cynicism was most widely reflected in the so called "credibility gap" and the resulting demonstrations at the 1968 Democratic Convention.

[11]Any analysis of the terms used by the mass media from the early 1960s to the early 1970s will reflect a gradual but steady shift in the "names" given to the policies in relation to the Vietnamese conflict.

[12]Morse, Kansas Address, pp. 2-3.

[13]Ibid., p. 3.

[14]*Ibid.*, p. 4.

[15]*Ibid.*, pp. 4-5.

[16]*Ibid.*, p. 5.

[17]*Ibid.*, p. 5.

[18]*Ibid.*, p. 6.

[19]*Ibid.*, p. 9.

[20]*Ibid.*, p. 8.

[21]*Ibid.*, p. 7.

[22]*Ibid.*, p. 9A.

[23]*Ibid.*

[24]Morse, March 30 Address, p. 6576.

[25]Morse, April 2 Address, p. 6794.

[26]*Ibid.*

[27]Morse, March 30 Address, p. 6577.

[28]Morse, April 9 Address, p. 7430.

[29]Morse, Kansas Address, p. 10.

[30]*Ibid.*

[31]Morse, April 20 Address, p. 8474.

[32]Morse, April 2 Address, p. 6795.

[33]*Ibid.*

[34]Morse, March 30 Address, p. 6576.

[35]Morse, May 20 Address, p. 11532.

[36]*Ibid.*

[37]Morse, Kansas Address, p. 12.

[38]*Ibid.*, pp. 12-13.

[39]*Ibid.*, p. 15. Also March 20 Address p. 6575.

[40]Ibid.

[41]Morse, April 2 Address, p. 6795.

[42]Morse, May 20 Address, p. 11531.

[43]Morse, May 20 Address, p. 11531.

[44]Morse, Kansas Address, pp. 11-12.

[45]Leonard J. Unger, "Statement," Department of State Bulletin, L (May 10, 1965), p. 713.

[46]Manlio Brosio, Atlantic Community Quarterly, LI (Winter, 1966), p. 444.

[47]Walt W. Rostow, Department of State Bulletin, (March 27, 1967), p. 494.

[48]William P. Bundy, Department of State Bulletin, (February 5, 1968), p. 177. A Communist victory would "undo the more promising trends that have developed in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe."

[49]Dr. Harold Hinton, Senate China Hearings, (1966), p. 413. "There is practically no chance of saving Laos and Cambodia if we surrender Vietnam."

[50]Morse, April 9 Address, p. 7426.

[51]Ibid.

[52]"Senate Address," (january 6, 1965) as cited in "Should the U.S. Continue Its Present Policy in Vietnam," Congressional Digest L (1966), p. 113.

[53]Senator Church, Ibid., p. 117.

[54]U.S. News and World Report, Interview, pp. 2-7.

[55]Howard Zinn, Vietnam, the Logic of Withdrawal, (New York: Harpers, 1967), p. 108.

[56]Edmund Stillman and William Pfaff, Power and Impotence, (New York: Harpers, 1966), pp. 142-143. See also James P. Warburg, Western Intruders: America's Role in the Far East, (New York: Harpers, 1966), p. 211. Theodore Draper, The Abuse of Power, (New York: Harpers, 1967), p. 133.

[57]Walter Robertson, "United States Policy Toward Asia, House Asia Hearings (1966), p. 339. David Wurfel, Natural Law Forum (1967), p. 211. New York Times, (June 25, 1968), p. 3.

[58]George McGovern, "Senate Address," Congressional Digest, p. 123.

[59]McTurnan Kahin and John Lewis, p. 288. James Thompson, The Nature of Revolution, (New York: Harpers, 1968), p. 82. U.S. News and World Report, L (September 23, 1968), p. 33.

[60]Donald Zagoria, New York Times Magazine, (April 21, 1968), p. 62.

[61]Dean Rusk, Department of State Bulletin, LVIII (April 22, 1968), p. 516. Edwin Reichauer, Beyond Vietnam, (New York: Vintage Books, 1967), p. 192.

[62]James P. Warburg, Western Intruders: America's Role in the Far East, (New York: Harpers, 1966), p. 210.

[63]Morse, May 20 Address, p. 11533.

[64]Ibid., pp. 11533-11534.

[65]Ibid., p. 11433.

[66]Morse, March 30 Address, p. 6578.

[67]Erwin Knoll and Judith N. McFadden, American Militarism 1970, (New York: Viking, 1969).

[68]Morse, April 9 Address, p. 7429.

[69]G. C. Reinhardt, America's Cross Roads -- Vietnam, (California: Rand Corporation Documents, 1967), p. 17. SAmuel P. Huntington, Foreign Affairs L (July, 1968), p. 647. Charles Wolf, United States Policy and the Third World, (California: Rand Corporation Documents, 1967), p. 166.

[70]"Go On Fighting in Vietnam?: Interview With Henry Cabot Lodge," U.S. News and World Report L (February 15, 1965), p. 63. Senator Richard B. Russel, "What It Will Take To Win In Vietnam?" U.S. News and World Report, (September 6, 1965), p. 56.

[71]Morse, May 20 Address, p. 11531.

[72]McGovern, Congressional Digest, p. 123. Robert M. Kennedy, "Alfred M. Landon Lecture," University of Kansas (March 18, 1968).

[73]Gruening, Congressional Digest, p. 121.

[74]As the war continued and there was no escalation to a war with Communist China or American ground troops in North Vietnam, the argument changed. The rationale to halt the bombing was found in that

it was (1) doing no demonstrable good and (2) that it was uncivilized in that it rather randomly killed North Vietnamese citizens and thus hurt not only America's image but also America's moral structure.

[75]Morse, April 20 Address, p. 8476.

[76]Foreign Policy Association, Headline Series, (April, 1968), p. 44.

[77]William J. Fulbright, "The Cold War and Its Effects on American Life," Vital Speeches L (April, 1964).

[78]J. C. Donovan, The Politics of Poverty, (New York: Pegasus, 1967), p. 116. Mike Mansfield, "Assessment in Vietnam," Representative American Speeches 67-68, "Guns and Butter," Wayne Morse, Vital Speeches (September 15, 1967), pp. 714-17. William J. Fulbright, "The Price of Empire," Vital Speeches (September 1, 1967).

[79]Charles Wolf, Southeast Asia, (California: Rand Corporation Document, 1963), p. 40.

[80]Until in 1968 the United States became commited to "ending" the war.

CHAPTER V

"Old Myths and New Realities": The Reconstitution of Value

J. William Fulbright, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and senior Senator from Arkansas, delivered an address before an almost empty session of Congress in the late spring of 1964. This address, entitled "Old Myths and New Realities," would at first seem to pose little special interest to the critic interested in the rhetorical movement engendered by the Vietnam debate. The speech did not speak to a crisis or an overwhelming exigence. The immediate audience was composed of only six fellow senators. The speech had few, if any, statements that could be interpreted as anti-war proposals. In fact, the speaker advocated maintenance of the currect policy in supporting the South Vietnamese government.

Despite these signs, this speech constitutes an important starting point for the student of rhetoric who is seeking the nature of rhetorical movement in the Vietnam debate. For even at this time, before the ominous clouds of massive dissent over the war were on the public horizon, critics felt that these remarks heralded the beginnings of a great dispute over the conduct of the cold war. As columnist Marquis Childs wrote, the Senator's speech enjoins the United States in "a great debate on foreign policy."[1]

Although there had been many public critics of foreign policy conducted in Vietnam prior to this speech they had made little headway

in convincing the public that they ought to keep clear from military involvements in Asia. Within a year after this speech, inroads were being made into the popular support for the war in Vietnam. This is not to claim that this particular speech was the sole factor responsible for the shift in commitment; indeed the Vietnam debate is too vast and complex to attribute change to a simple cause. This particular speech did, however, provide sufficient rhetorical groundwork for those who were opposed to the war to constitute a shift in the type of rhetoric and generate a response atypical of public speaking during most American wars.

Senator Fulbright: The Beginnings of Dissent

Although there were many early anti-war speakers before America ever significantly escalated her commitment these men made little impression on the mass public because they simply argued a counter refutation to administration policy.[2] Given that the image of the cold war was predominantly that of a moral clash between two ways of life, the defense of all countries became a moral responsibility of the people of the United States. Given the doctrine of the balance of power, any limited war -- no matter how horrible or unjustified -- was better than the grim alternative of atomic annihalation. Only an attack on these fundamental presumptions of the cold war rhetoric could allow room for dialectical movement to a new position.

Senator J. William Fulbright was in such a unique position to bring about an attack on the rhetoric of the cold war. His intellectual outlook, his position as Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and his role as public prophet provided a unique

mix so that he was able to initiate a devastating attack on this moralistic rhetoric.

Intellectual Outlook

J. William Fulbright is so widely known that his background hardly needs recounting. He is a former Rhodes scholar and received his training in law which he taught for several years before he became president of the University of Arkansas. He was elected to Congress in 1943 and has been a member of the Senate since 1945. Senator Paul H. Douglas of Illinois has said of the Senator, "He's a child of the eighteenth century, a throw-back to that age of enlightenment, trust in reason, temperate argument, and slightly aristocratic tendencies."[3] Karl E. Meyer, an anthologizer of the Senator's speeches, finds that Fulbright resembles a famous statesman of that era.

> It is no accident [Meyer writes] that he most frequently quotes Alexis de Tocqueville, the cool-headed French nobleman whose praise of free government was tempered by distrust of the tyranny of the majority. Fulbright has a comparable distaste for mass-produced opinions, for the phony art of image projection, and for the persuasion by wind machine.
>
> He believes that the leadership in a democracy has a very special obligation to resist the clamor of conventional opinion. He sought for twenty years to speak candidly about unswerving realities.[4]

Fulbright's assessment of the role of a statesman is not to follow the opinion which is in vogue, but to rationally explore by the weighing all of the evidence in each critical decision.

Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee

As chairman of this prestigious body, Fulbright is able to

amass a great deal of information about foreign affairs without the concomitant onus of having to follow the course of the executive administration's rhetoric. The position as Congress's leading spokesman on foreign affairs also gives him an excellent rhetorical platform and an extensive audience. Tristram Coffin recognizes this vantage point:

> The Foreign Relations Committee is an eternal seminar; here he can be inquisitive to his heart's content. The Senate floor is a lecture platform from which he can speak as he pleases on foreign affairs without having to check with Johnson or the State Department. He has independence, and a critic's seat on the aisle.[5]

Although there may have been only a few senators who listened to the speech in its original presentation, Fulbright's position as Chairman of the committee guaranteed that his thought would be carried by the mass media and surveyed by many influential men within and outside of government.

Fulbright as Public Prophet

The importance of his impartial outlook and his role as Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee become readily apparent when we analyze Fulbright's role as public prophet. Coffin places Fulbright in this important role:

> Any change in American foreign policy goes through several stages. First, world events - Hitler's tanks carrying his venom across Europe, the threat of Soviet westward expansion, the nationalist revolutions of Africa and Asia, the hydrogen bomb and the ICBM - stir anxiety within what has become a secure and isolated society. A

> variety of ideas, some of them sheer panic reactions, become matters of public discussion. A loose mass of public opinion forms around several easily understood ideas. At this point a democratic society vitally needs a prophet.
>
> He must have the authority to command public respect; he must possess a simplicity of expression; he must be wise and courageous. The prophet leads and directs public opinion to a point where it is sage for an administration to formally adopt a new policy.[6]

Fulbright's past record of achievement in shaping successful foreign policies could not have been questioned. As a young congressman from Arkansas, he introduced the Fulbright Resolution which eventually - in conjunction with the Conally resolution - led Congress to declare that the United States would join the United Nations. He was among the first to propose that America participate in the Marshall Plan. He was also one of the first to argue against the doctrine of "massive retaliation," in Eisenhower's "New Look" program. He was the only member of the Senate who dared to vote against the appropriations for McCarthy's witch hunts.[7] Although when Fulbright first espoused his position on foreign policy, it is not always popular, Walter Lippman observes that "with such a record of prescience and courage, . . .it is not surprising that many people believe /him/ though few people find it expedient to say."[8]

There can be little doubt that this role is accidental or that Fulbright is not aware of it. Andrew Kopkind perceives that "his speeches. . .are addressed to Posterity as much as to the Chair."[9] Richard H. Rovere, writing in the New Yorker, argues that people will

listen to his position because in the past his "dissenting opinions have become the views of majorities."[10]

We may conclude, then, that Fulbright was in a strategically sound position when he delivered the speech "Old Myths and New Realities." He had the intellectual predisposition to analyze the problems of foreign policy on their own terms. His position as chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee afforded him both a dialectical access to inquiry as well as a rhetorical platform. Finally, he had been right on many previous occasions as to the course American policy ought to take, thereby insuring himself a continuing role as public prophet.

"Old Myths and New Realities": The Scene

One writer describes the circumstances and delivery of the speech as being singularly unspectacular. There were no cheering galleries. There was no moment of crucial decision making. There was no flamboyant style or mannerisms. Instead, the speech was delivered in a rather subdued manner. The emotion laden, vigorous style that was to characterize, indeed dominate, most of the future war rhetoric was absent. "The tall scholarly Senator from Arkansas thrust his hands into his pockets and spoke in soft, measured tones."[11]

The address may be divided into two distinct sections. In the first portion of the speech, Fulbright delineates an attack on the current premises of foreign policy as it has been expressed in the rhetoric of the cold war. In the second portion of the address, Fulbright discusses examples where policy decisions probably should be changed from current positions to new ones in the light of a new resolve to view

foreign policy not in the shadow of old myths but in the light of new realities.

Exploding the Old Myths

Fulbright begins the speech by setting forth his major premises.

> Mr. President, there is an inevitable divergence, attributable to the imperfections of the human mind, between the world as it is and the world as men perceive it. As long as our perceptions are reasonably close to objective reality, it is possible for us to act upon our problems in a rational and appropriate manner. But when our perceptions fail to keep pace with events, when we refuse to believe something because it displeases or frightens us, or because it is simply startlingly unfamiliar, then the gap between fact and perception becomes a chasm, and action becomes irrelevant and irrational.[12]

In this opening statement, the Senator provides the basis for thought and action in foreign affairs which is developed throughout the address. His first sentence reveals the pivotal axis for his new vision of foreign policy; that is, Americans tend to react to the image of a world which is created by reflections on foreign policies of the past. Because this action is out of sorts with the world continually in change and motion, the policy inevitable becomes more inappropriate. The old perception, now a myth, prohibits effective policy decisions which are mandated in light of new realities.

Fulbright argues this conception from signs that the nature of the cold war is radically changing.[13] Whereas in the immediate past the United States has operated out of a single perspective regarding Communist nations, current signs of "peaceful coexistence"

ought to lead the student of foreign policy to realize that the world is no longer divided into two unalterably opposed camps. Fulbright sights several examples of this change including the Cuban Missile Crisis that indicated that the Soviets have backed down from a policy of naked aggression; the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty which indicated that the Russians were willing to live in a world where the United States maintained the lead in armaments; and the implicit repudiation by both sides of a policy of total victory which indicated a willingness to live in peace if not total harmony. These composite signs, Fulbright argues, lead to a conclusion that there is a growing divergence between the way things are and the way we see them. Instead of a monolithic threat which regards all Communist states as enemies, he sees a polycentric world in which threats vary to a significant degree.

Thus, the student of foreign relations must recognize that Communism is a general ideology which is only a banner for a diverse number of countries - each of which represent a different degree of threat to the United States. In addition, the polycentric nature of the world has accelerated strife and squabbling within the domain of both the free world and the Communist countries. In fact, "the ideological thunderbolts between Washington and Moscow which until a few years ago seemed a permanent part of our daily lives have become a pale shadow of their former selves."[14]

Now, because the nature of the cold war has changed, the moralistic view of foreign policy has led to a means/ends confusion which is dangerous to the actual interests of the United States. As Fulbright explicitly notes: "We are inclined to confuse freedom and democracy,

which we regard as moral principles, with the way in which they are practiced."[15] Thus, the principle of fighting the Communists to make the world safe for democracy has been elevated the means - maintenance of the balance of power - to a level of moral principle which it was never intended to be. In fact, treating the Communists as if they were a single threat is likely to damage United States interest because it creates hegemony where strife will naturally occur.

Fulbright uses invective on those who continue to espouse old myths.

> It has become one of the self-evident truths of the postwar era that just as the President resides in Washington and the Pope in Rome, the Devil resides immutable in Moscow. We have come to regard the Kremlin as the permanent seat of his power and we have grown almost comfortable with a menace which though unspeakable evil, has had the redeeming virtues of constancy, predictability, and familiarity. Now the Devil has betrayed us by traveling abroad and worse still, by dispersing himself, turning up now here, now there, and in many places at once, with a devilish disregard for the laboriously constructed frontiers of ideology.[16]

Despite his satire, Fulbright is deeply concerned with the implications of this world view. Again and again he warns that "we are confronted with a complex and fluid world situation and we are not adapting ourselves to it."[17] This problem is amplified by the fact that when we confront new shifts in foreign affairs we seek to escape the contradictions by narrowing the permissible bounds of public discussion, by relegating "an increasing number of ideas and viewpoints to a growing category of 'unthinkable'."[18]

Some critics argue that this portion of the speech was merely a rhetorical strategy for increasing his ethos. For example, William V. Shannon believes that this framework was merely a strategic device. "Instead of merely analyzing the world situation," Shannon writes, "he pictured himself as a man willing to puncture 'old myths,' think 'unthinkable things,' and speak boldly about new realities." In addition "where others are hidebound, tied to the dead past, rigid, he proposed to be flexible, venturesome, creative."[19] There can be little doubt that Fulbright, a veteran of many floor fights, could have used such a strategy simply for persuasive effect. If we explore the remainder of the speech, however, this theme of exploding old myths is so recurrent that even the most severe critic would probably acknowledge that, indeed, there is a call for new thought and consequently a new rhetoric of foreign policy.

This new world should be antithetical to the old moralistic universe of the cold war; that is to say, we should view foreign policy empirically according to the evidence produced in each situation. This view argues that there is no such thing as a uniform Communist threat; rather, there is only Communist dogma and Communist action. As Richard Bailey notes, Fulbright believes, behavior is considered a more consistent criteria for dealing with the Communists than reflecting on their ideology.[20] There is no such thing as good and evil power; there is only power which dictates its own use.

Towards a New Reality

In order to demonstrate the efficacy of his thesis, Fulbright considers some major problems of foreign policy - each within its own

specific context.

Fulbright begins by examining the Communist nations of Eastern Europe. He reenforces his major theme by indicting the master myth of the cold war - "that the Communist bloc is a monolith composed of governments which are not governments at all but organized conspiracies . . .all equally resolute and implacable in their determination to destroy the free world."[21] Fulbright discerns great variation in both the intensity and character of those threatening nations.

He carries this theme to a brief analysis of the policy of the Soviet State. Again he reminds the auditor that "the gods and doctrines that it worships are matters for the Soviet Union to determine."[22] Thus, Americans must learn to separate the long term rhetoric of conquest from the realistic options demonstrated in their foreign policy.

In addition to these arguments Fulbright urges that we place policy considerations with these nations on a costs versus gains criteria. He argues that the cost of treating all Communist nations alike are manifested in increasing world tensions, increasing Russian hegemony, and a loss of advantageous trade negotiations. Trade becomes especially important in light of the fact that our allies - the very nations that are living under the shadow of the terrible threat - are making money by trading with the Communists.

The Senator concludes his plea for a rational approach to the Eastern European situation by arguing that there is very little in history to justify the expectation that we can either win the cold war or end it immediately and completely. He pleads that "we must disabuse ourselves of them [myths] and come to terms, at last with the

realities of a world in which neither good nor evil is absolute and in which those who move events and make history are those who have understood not how much but how little it is within our power to change."[23]

When Fulbright considers the Latin American situation, he relates the problems of Communism to the Cuban situation. Unlike many cold war rhetoricians who saw Castro as only a menace to the stability of the Western hemisphere, the Senator considers multiple policy options.

The first option, invasion, is clearly not worth the risks. A half-hearted attempt called the Bay of Pigs operation was easily repulsed. A full scale invasion would, in all probability, bring censure from the United Nations, alienate our allies and increase world tensions bringing the United States closer to the brink of nuclear war.

The second alternative, economic boycott, is supposed to isolate Cuba politically and economically. Fulbright admits that this policy may be desirable, but he argues that it is completely impracticable. Not only do all of our allies trade with Cuba, but we have no real sanction to stop that trade. Given that it is impossible to do away with Cuban Communism through moderate measures and given that it is undersirable to use extreme measures, there is no other alternative than to realize the belief that Castroism will end is a myth.

Fulbright argues that instead we should accept the third alternative and realize that we must live with the Cuban regime. He makes the point with humor and invective. Though some rhetoricians argue that Cuba is a prime example of Communist conspiracy, Fulbright

dismisses the entire situation by stating that "we have flattered a noisy but minor demagogue by treating him as if he were a Napoleonic menace."[24] In addition to invective, he uses examples to back his claim. Venezuela, a prime target for Communist overthrow, was able to thwart the Cuban aided guerillas fairly easily.

The importance of this position in relation to Cuba becomes apparent at once when Fulbright considers the totality of our foreign policy in Latin America. He argues that we should not automatically assume a "reactionary role" when revolutions take place. He notes that we should try to urge peaceful social revolution, but where this fails "violent social convulsions may occur."[25] If we treat all revolutions alike as manifestations of the Communist menace, then, the United States is likely to drive them towards the Communist ideology.

The final area which the Senator considers is South East Asia. Again, he argues that American foreign policy is replete with old myths; specifically those concerning the treatment of China. The situation in Asia, like the other parts of the world is subject to rapid change in that hostility can give way in astonishingly short time to close friendship and "in our relations with China, the reverse can occur with equal speed."[26] Yet, the United States has maintained a policy which has remained unchanged since the early 1950s. It is time for a change, but Fulbright admits that he is not sure at this point where and how the change ought to occur. Instead of defining solutions, he argues that French negotiations offer some possibility of adjustment because they open new options which the United States, accustomed to a way of viewing the Chinese situation, may not be open

to us yet.

The last example Fulbright considers is the Vietnamese conflict. Although he states that this situation demands an extremely pressing need for re-evaluation, he spends little time in analyzing the situation. To begin with, he rules out withdrawal a priori and considers several policy options. These alternatives include: ending the war through negotiations, continuance of the present policy of sending arms and advisors, and expansion of the war. He argues that the first alternative of negotiation is infeasible because the bargaining position of the United States is a weak one; that is to say, until the power of the South Vietnamese government has been increased there is no negotiating lever.

A negotiated peace is also deemed undersirable in that the country would probably fall under the influence of the Communists. Thus, the only alternatives which are deemed feasible are those which continue to aid the Vietnamese government. Fulbright is not very clear on this point. In fact he admits that the policy options themselves are not clear. For this reason he urges a full scale investigation of the various options.

In conclusion, Fulbright's analysis of these diverse situations indicates a cluster of criteria that may be invoked according to the individual demands of the situation. In the case of the Eastern European situation Fulbright invokes a cost versus gains analysis and a consideration of the policy position of our enemies as well as our allies. In the case of the Latin American situation he invokes an analysis of multiple options on the criterion of costs, feasibility,

and degree of threat. In addition, he compares the Cuban situation to the totality of our foreign policy in Latin America. Finally, in the case of South East Asia, he calls for additional analysis and investigation into the options and criteria that must be developed in order to meet the changing demands of that area.

Responses to the Address

The chief purpose of the speech, as Fulbright reported it, "was to spark. . .a nationwide debate."[27] The New York Times observed that although the speech was delivered to a near empty Senate chamber, it was expected to have a major impact.[28] Several days after the initial assessment of the speech by the Times, the same paper was able to report, "In Washington and the nation at large there appears to be beginning a deep re-examination of U.S. foreign policy and a great debate over that policy."[29]

One indication of an aroused interest among American people in the foreign policy debate was the volume of Senator Fulbright's mail. As the editors of Senior Scholastic reported: "Just a week after the speech, a member of Fulbright's staff reported that the Senator had received 5,000 letters - and that the mail was running about three to one in the Senator's favor."[30] The Nation updated this report and recorded that the "subsequent mail has been holding to a five to one ratio in favor of the Senator's position."[31]

The reaction was not confined to the people of the United States; foreign governments were influenced by the speech. The New York Times of March 28 reporded: "The impact was great and immediate particularly among the foreign embassies and legations in

Washington."[32] "In a roundup of press reaction to the Fulbright speech throughout the world," by the Congressional Weekly, European diplomats have concluded that "the Senator took the words right out of their mouths," everywhere the roundup indicated, "his speech has stimulated keen interest."[33] Even Pravada, a Soviet publication usually showing great antipathy to any American position, was recorded as printing: "The speech was 'lightning' which has lit up a new realistic tendency in Washington political thinking. It was a call for common sense which has provoked strong opposition from warlike reactionaries."[34]

We may conclude that Fulbright was extremely successful in his attempt to touch off a controversy about foreign policy. The immediate response indicated that many people had been touched by the "heretical" position of a man so high in office, so knowledgable in foreign affairs, so right about the course of foreign policy in the past. As the editors of Senior Scholastic were to report after examining a wide variety of responses to the speech: "It was Fulbright's speech in the Senate which seemed to jolt the largest number of people and touch off a wide debate on current United States foreign policy."[35] An examination of some of the responses to the speech may help us achieve better insight into the nature of the Senator's address in relationship to the rhetoric of the cold war (and its ultimate shift through the Vietnam debate).

CON RESPONSES. The reaction of many of the nations political leaders was largely negative. Republican National Chairman, William Miller stated that "the course Senator Fulbright advocates is the same road which /British Prime Minister/ Neville Chamberlain traveled

in the 1930s."[36] Using the same analogy, Republican Senator Barry Goldwater argued that "Fulbright was advocating 'the reality of a Munich'."[37]

Others compared Fulbright's action with the post-World War II debacle in Eastern Europe. "It doesn't make any sense to me," said Russell Long, "I don't agree with the general thesis. Taking the soft line, we might as well just surrender now."[38] Representative Louis C. Wyman called Fulbright's proposals simply "surrender on the installment plan."[39]

In addition, many statesmen believed that such a criticism of American policy would hurt the United States in its struggle against Communism. Representative Steven B. Derounian of New York stated that "the oracle who made what he thought was a world shaking pronouncement is probably getting a medal cast for him by Castro in Cuba today."[40] Senator George A. Smathers while calling the speech "monumentally naive and unrealistic" reported that he could not "think of a policy statement that would please the Communists more."[41]

Since the nation was at war, Fulbright's speech could do nothing but hurt the effort by bringing disunity - so it was argued by Armistead I. Selden, the Democratic Representative from Alabama. He stated:

> Criticism and debate of issues, domestic and foreign, are fundamental to our system. But when rear-guard attacks are launched by high-ranking spokesmen against our own Government's tough foreign policy positions, a false and potentially dangerous picture of national division is conveyed throughout the world.[42]

Some believed that the division between the will of the people and the

will of high ranking officials would carry to the upper echelons of Democratic leadership. Ironically, William E. Miller called the speech a "trial balloon which the Johnson Administration is sending up to prepare public opinion for the acceptance of a foreign policy that could lead only to disaster for the United States and other free nations."[43]

Though there was some reported Congressional praise for Fulbright's position, it was "confined almost entirely to private comments," perhaps "reflecting the hesitation of most legislators to support an unpopular viewpoint in an election year," the New York Times reported.[44] The speech did not gain wide spread acceptance or even great approval by the members of Congress precisely because the rhetoric of the cold war had become a construction of reality - or a constraint on viewing reality according to Fulbright.

"Most high office holders in the United States," noted Arthur Krock editorialist for the New York Times, "are deeply committed to the foundational myths of American foreign policy which Fulbright is seeking to dispel."[45] This commitment limited the acceptable perspectives in regards to foreign policy. Eugene Lyons in a series of articles for the Reader's Digest attacked Fulbright bitterly. He wrote that "virtually all the things the Senator assigns to the limbo of mythology others believe to be the essence of current reality."[46] The simple truth of the matter was that "Communism is a conspiracy against mankind."[47] William Shannon spoke for many when he stated that "in my view, this is not a 'myth'. This is a reasonably accurate description of reality."[48] George Meany in a speech opposing Fulbright's position

summed it up: "The overriding issue of our times is between Communist tyranny and democracy."[49]

Thus the rhetoric of the cold war had placed the nation in a position of commitment to fight the enemy. Any opposing view by men responsible in public office was unacceptable to the purveyors of the "myth" as well as to many Americans. Richard H. Rovere, a journalist for the New Yorker, provided an insightful comment into this situation.

> If the 'monolith' theory and its corollaries have not in recent years been the foundation for strategy /as indicated primarily by the Russian grain deals and arms ban/, they remain durable, and in some ways indispensable parts of official dogma. Millions of Americans and hundreds of their congressmen accept this dogma unquestioningly. The President may not be unduly confined by it, but he must appear to uphold it against such assaults as that by Senator Fulbright. For the dogma is, in fact, the basis for popular and Congressional assent, and if Senator Fulbright or anyone else were to disabuse the public altogether of the 'old myths' that blind it to the 'new realities' the consequences might well be the withdrawal of assent from almost the whole of current American foreign policy.[50]

This comment proved to be prophetic since the questioning of the rationale for the Vietnam war ultimately led to a questioning of the entire rationale behind the cold war.

In order to counter this attack upon the tenets of cold war rhetoric, speakers and writers argued the "inherent" and "long term" nature of the Communist threat. William Shannon observed that "Communism structures the thinking of the rulers of Russia and China. All of the power of these two nations is harnessed in the

service of these evil doctrines."[51] Whereas Fulbright argued that we can make a distinction between beliefs and practices, Shannon argued that "very few human beings make a neat division between their 'interests' and 'beliefs'. The two are intertwined and function simultaneously."[52] The outcome of this confluence of dogma and policy is reflected in a statement by George Meany. "The totalitarian dogmas and deeds on the Soviet domestic front are integrally bound up with and reflected in the unswerving Soviet foreign policy for fomenting, financing and directing," subversive wars.[53] This position makes the war long term and inherent. As such, it is evil personified. Lyons wrote that "The Communist drive has messianic motivations. Moral issues and ideal cannot be ruled out. They do exist. Trite as it may sound, those who accept the cynical Fulbright line should be reminded that Chamberlain thought himself a supreme realist when he submitted to Hitler in Munich. The champions of coldblooded realism may be more romantic than the moralists whom Fulbright despises."[54]

Because Communism is an evil threat that will not be conquered by "wishful thinking", the signs of foreign policy indicate not peaceful co-existence but intensified Communist aggression. George Meany attacked Fulbright on this point.

> Surely Senator Fulbright knows that it was not the President of the United States who ordered the construction of the shameful wall which divides Berlin. It was not the Pope's divisions that drenched the streets of Budapest with the blood of the workers and students who wanted nothing more than to live in peace and freedom. Only a devil could perpetrate these and other terrible crimes. And this devil 'resides immutably in Moscow.' In 1964, as in 1939,

> appeasement of dictators bent on world domination cannot lead to peace, regardless of the profoundest wishful thinking.[55]

Eugene Lyons noted that:

> A bloody war against Communist guerillas is underway in South Vietnam. The ramshackle neutralist regime we imposed on Laos is in collapse. Cambodia is well inside the Red orbit. With Indonesia and Ghana more and more overtly Soviet oriented, with Zanzibar shaping up as a Red Cuba off the African coast, with Moscow exploiting the Cyprus bloodletting, with the Soviets defaulting on their obligations to Laos, with communism now the strongest single force in Italy - to mention just a few distressing recent events - it becomes more difficult to wish away the Communist menace as an outlived myth.[56]

Hence the pro-war speakers believed that "the conciliatory co-existence approach has been open to grave doubts by stepped up Communist activities."[57] The evidence is especially clear in both Latin America[58] and Asia.[59]

Thus, to the cold war rhetoricians, Fulbright's speech was considered an anathema to good sense; and Fulbright himself an apostate to his own kind. The true American would be courageous, fearless, and committed to his ideals; Fulbright was considered to be an appeaser, a false and dangerous prophet, a profligate preaching the corrupting doctrine of dissent.

PRO RESPONSE. Public approval of the speech came largely from some few Senators and from a number of journalists. This approval largely recognized the importance of Fulbright's attack on the cold war rhetoric.

Richard H. Rovere writing in the New Yorker made perhaps the most perceptive statement as to the value of Fulbright's speech.

> The time may be almost upon us when the rhetoric will prove a serious hindrance to the framing and execution of rational policies. Thus far, only certain amount of dialectical resourcefulness has been required to related development in the real world to the dogmas of the early postwar years; before very long, no amount of skill at this sort of thing may suffice. If this turns out to be true, exercises like that of Senator Fulbright. . .will be essential.[60]

Thus some men agreed (and many more were to agree later) that "the cold war mentality and the popular view of the struggle as one between good and evil [was] hardening into a mythical structure that will prevent the very steps that need to be taken in the interest of peace."[61]

As the critics of the address had turned to history to prove the Communist threat, the rhetoricians who favored the position of the address turned to history to prove that the foreign policy of the United States has not always kept up with the times. An editorial in Commonweal read:

> In 1914, the French were ready for the Franco-Prussian War; in 1940 they were ready for World War I. In the pre-Pearl Harbor days, Americans were too committed to peace to prepare for war; in 1945 we were too committed to war to prepare for peace, and the result was a disastrous unconditional surrender policy. . .Now the tendency is to try to treat Khrushchev as we treated Hitler, though the bomb has made it impossible, or to view the pluralistic Communist world of 1964 as if it were the monolithic world of Stalin.[62]

The value of Fulbright's speech, many argued, was that it made the public more aware that much of the time American policy was out of step with the march of world events. "It is of first importance that in a time of such extraordinary fluidity we keep our foreign policy under a continuous re-examination," a Washington Post editorial read.[63] An editorial in The Nation heralded the speech as a real service to the United States in that it put into words what every politically intelligent American knows "that in its foreign policy the United States is not keeping up with the times, that we see the world as it no longer is, that new, bold concepts are needed as never before."[64] Walter Lippman, a supporter of dissent in foreign policy, made a most incisive comment.

> My own feeling is that on this occasion, though Senator Fulbright is, as so often before, ahead of the times and alone, he is not so far ahead or so much alone as he has often been before. For there are altogether too many people who are thinking as he is talking. And, now that free discussion is not only legal but respectable, more and more people will say what they think.[65]

Lippman concludes that "free speech has to be exercised if it is to be healthy. And on the various questions he dealt with - the cold war, the Soviet Union, Red China, Cuba, Panama, South Vietnam - there has been among important public men little genuine public debate and an unhealthy avoidance of the facts."[66] Thus in initiating a true public debate, Fulbright was offering a great service to the American people.

Even some of the speech's most ardent supporters realized that the implications of the address may well be more than even Senator Fulbright bargained for. Richard Rovere wrote that "if

the myths were destroyed, it might be very difficult to confront the realities, for almost everything that we do in the mid-sixties - from dispatching helicopters to South Vietnam to dispatching space vehicles to distant parts of the cosmos - must somehow be justified with the rhetoric of the lat 1940s."[67] Destroying this rhetorical foundation and substituting a different one could only be attained (as it was to be subsequently proven) by violent social upheaval. Such was the Vietnam debate: the blossoming of Fulbright's seeds of dissent.

Contributions of the Address to the Rhetoric of War

It is the opinion of this critic that the Senator's speech marked the opening of the Vietnam debate because it argued for a radically new view of foreign policy. Whereas the rhetoric of the cold war was predominantly operating from a single universe of discourse, Fulbright called for a case by case consideration. This is not to argue that those who opposed the war were any more "rational" than those who supported it. Certainly towards the end of the Vietnam debate increasing numbers of anti-war speakers adopted a universe of discourse which argued that Vietnam, as well as any other intervention or war, was unjustified. The significance of the speech, however, was that it provided a pivot or axis that allowed a large amount of public opinion to shift without bringing the country to civil war - which has happened when two sides have argued out of two mutually universes of discourse. Fulbright's approach to the rhetoric of war is relatively unique in that it transcends the normal justificatory war rhetoric and places it entirely on a oost versus gains or empirical analysis. Now, many people cannot hold this objectivity for long. As we have indicated the war

context forces every man to make a decision. It does, however, provide the intellectual mechanism for change in the light of "objective" realities.

Writing in the Southern Speech Journal rhetorical critic Richard E. Bailey argues that the chief contribution of Fulbright's speech is that it offers a universe of discourse" which is designed to structure its citizens' perceptions and provide them with means of interpreting and responding to the events it selects for their consideration.[68] In addition, Bailey observes that the new policy is "firmly grounded in a world of cause and effect."[69] Fulbright's contribution to the rhetoric of war is precisely the opposite.

Instead of arguing from or for a single "universe of discourse" which, as we have seen, was the peculiar providence of the pro and anti-war speakers, Fulbright argues that it is the obligation of each citizen to view foreign policy as logically as possible - always remembering that complete anlaysis of cause and effect is impossible. Given that foreign policy is placed not in the realm of superordinate laws but in the realm of individual decisions regarding changing situations, the importance of the rhetoric is to help create and discover various - even contradictory - alternatives. Thus, the dominant virtues of all Americans is no longer the ability to adhere with fortitude, vigilance and sacrifice to a single view of foreign policy, but to assess the situation in the most complete manner possible.

Though the world may be governed by cause and effect, because the perceptions of men are incomplete, no one man can present all of

the correct answers; hence, it becomes imperative that there be dissenting voices and that we listen to all of them. Thus all men should argue from signs and probabilities - not cause and effect - for no perfect solution may be found. At best we must attempt to weigh the costs of the policy and it's potential gains.

As we have discovered those who undertook the task of dissent prior to this view of foreign policy made little headway primarily because there was only one universe of discourse which mandated a concomitant moralistic approach to decision making. The importance of Fulbright's address is that it offers a rationale to incorporate multiple views of the world situation and that it provided the pivotal swing towards the opposing view of foreign policy. For Fulbright, as for many others, no longer is the world to be viewed as two armed camps struggling in a morally just cause. Instead, he argues that it is "this excessive moralism which binds us to old myths and blinds us to new realities and, worse still, leads us to regard new and unfamiliar ideas with fear and mistrust."[70]

Larry Bradshaw argues that Fulbright's dissent began with the Dominican Republic incident in 1965 and then turned towards the struggle in Vietnam.[71] The rhetorical framework in this speech, however, reveals that the true beginnings of dissent reside in the presentation of a new "multiple" or "rational view of foreign policy." For Fulbright, as for many Americans, dissent was unthinkable given mortal combat with a determined enemy; however, when the framework is shifted to the realization that the cold war is no longer this immediate, monolithic, pervasive struggle, then foreign policy can be placed on alternative

bases. Given this position, dissent is a critical instrument of policy in that it assures that all Americans will continually pursue the changing realities. It is only in this perspective, that we can understand the acceptance of Fulbright's plea by a generation of Americans. "We must dare to think about the unthinkable things," he says, "because when things become 'unthinkable,' thinking stops and action becomes mindless."[72] For the Senator himself, as well as for many Americans, the beginnings of dissent reside in such a consideration of the rationale for war.

Footnotes

[1]"Myths and Realities: The Debate Over U.S. Foreign Policy," Senior Scholastic, LXXXIV (May 8, 1964), p. 8.

[2]Morse, better than any other speakers attempts to get at these presumptions, but he falls short because he does not push the administration back to its ultimate presuppositions.

[3]Karl E. Meyer, Fulbright of Arkansas: The Public Position of a Private Thinker, (Washington, D.C.: Robert B. Luce, Inc., 1963), p. xviii. See also: Charles B. Seib and Alan L. Otten, "Fulbright: Arkansas Paradox," Harper's (June, 1956). Berverly Smith, Jr., "Egghead from the Ozarks," Saturday Evening Post, (May 2, 1959); E. W. Kenworthy, "Fulbright Becomes a National Issue," New York Times Magazine, (October 1, 1961); Sidney Human, "Fulbright: The Wedding of Arkansas and the World," New Republic, (May 14, 1962).

[4]Meyer, p. xxxiii.

[5]Tristram Coffin, "Senator Fulbright," Holiday, (September, 1964), p. 94.

[6]Coffin, p. 35.

[7]Walter Lippmann, "A Senator Speaks Out," Newsweek, LXIII (April 13, 1964), p. 19.

[8]Ibid.

[9]"The Speechmaker: Senator Fulbright as Arkansas de Tocqueville," The New Republic, MLIII (October 5, 1965), p. 18.

[10]"Letter from Washington," The New Yorker, XL (April 11, 1964), p. 155.

[11]Senior Scholastic, p. 8.

[12]William J. Fulbright, "Old Myths and New Realities," Congressional Record, L (March 31, 1964), p. 6227.

[13]Ibid., p. 6228.

[14]Ibid., p. 6227.

[15]Ibid., p. 6229.

[16]Ibid., p. 6628.

[17]Ibid., p. 6632.

[18]Ibid., p. 6631.

[19]"New Myths for Old," The Commonweal, LXXX (April 17, 1964), p. 102.

[20]Richard E. Bailey, "Fulbright's Universe of Discourse," The Southern Speech Journal, XXXVI (Fall, 1970), p. 35.

[21]Fulbright, p. 6629.

[22]Ibid.

[23]Ibid., p. 6321.

[24]Ibid., p. 6230.

[25]Ibid., p. 6231.

[26]Ibid., p. 6231.

[27]Senior Scholastic, p. 11.

[28]New York Times, (March 26, 1964), p. 1.

[29]New York Times, (March 28, 1964), Section 4, p. 1.

[30]Senior Scholastic, p. 11.

[31]The Nation, p. 21.

[32]New York Times, (March 28, 1964), Section 4, p. 1.

[33]"Reaction to Speech," Congressional Weekly, XXII (March 27, 1964), p. 665.

[34]Ibid.

[35]Senior Scholastic, p. 9. For example, Morse immediately took issue with Fulbright on the question of Vietnam. See Senator Wayne Morse, "Remarks," Congressional Record, 110 (March 25, 1964), pp. 6238-6245.

[36]Senior Scholastic, p. 8.

[37]Congressional Weekly, p. 664.

[38]Ibid.

[39]Ibid.

[40]Ibid., p. 665.

[41]New York Times, (March 27, 1964), p. 4.

[42]Congressional Weekly, p. 664.

[43]Ibid.

[44]New York Times, (March 27, 1964), p. 4.

[45]Arthur Krock's Column, New York Times, (March 31, 1964), Section 4, p. 1.

[46]Eugene Lyons, "Communism and the Myth Makers," Congressional Record, 110 (July 1, 1964), p. 12272.

[47]Ibid.

[48]William V. Shannon, "New Myths for Old," The Commonweal LXXX (April 17, 1964), p. 102.

[49]George Meany, "A Return to Appeasement," Congressional Record, 110 (May 8, 1964), p. 10438.

[50]Richard H. Rovere, "Letter from Washington," The New Yorker, 40 (April 11, 1964), p. 149.

[51]William Shannon, Senior Scholastic, p. 9.

[52]Ibid.

[53]Meany, p. 10439.

[54]Lyons, p. 12273.

[55]Meany, p. 10439.

[56]Lyons, p. 12272.

[57]Ibid.

[58]Frank Conniff, The New York Journal American, p. 8.

[59]Theodore Draper, Senior Scholastic, p. 10.

[60]Rovere, p. 150.

[61]"Fulbright and Myths," The Commonweal, LXXX (April 17, 1964), p. 102.

[62]"Fulbright and Myths," p. 101.

[63] Senior Scholastic, p. 9.

[64] "Editorial," The Nation, 198 (April 13, 1964), p. 357.

[65] Walter Lippman, "A Senator Speaks Out," Newsweek, 63 (April 13, 1964), p. 19.

[66] Ibid.

[67] Rovere, p. 149.

[68] Bailey, p. 33.

[69] Ibid., p. 36.

[70] Fulbright, p. 6632.

[71] Larry L. Bradshaw, "Genesis of Dissent," Southern Speech Journal, XXXVIII (Winter, 1972), p. 142.

[72] Fulbright, p. 6632.

CHAPTER VI

A GENRE OF DISCOURSE BASED ON THE RHETORIC OF WAR

"From Roman times to the present age of American dominance," writes Brian Bond, "philosophers, jurists and men of state have tried to answer the question: 'When is a war just?'"[1] Sometimes their answers have averted the tragedy of war -- more often they have failed. In any case, the issue of war cannot remain silent. The answers to this most agonizing of questions have formed a large corpus of rhetorical acts which have been transmitted to us by speeches, plays, essays, edicts, novels -- indeed, in every and any way man can communicate his personal agony suffered in that most awesome of decisions.

In times when warfare is only a question of immediate survival, deliberation may indeed be futile. The there is no time for questions and answers for only the sound of the drums may be heard. For 20th century America, however, the choice is infinitely more complex. Fortress America surrounded by great oceans and armed with devastating weapons has never seriously feared conquering armies. Yet, we have repeatedly marched to battle in support of justified wars. Gerald Draper separates this idea from other concepts of war when he writes that the just war is distinguished by the assumption that the use of force is clearly governed by universally valid moral and legal standards.[2] He notes that this theory stretches back through Roosevelt, Stimson, and Wilson and surges forward through

Truman, Acheson, Eisenhower and Dulles. We may add, after analyzing the Vietnam conflict, also Kennedy, Johnson, McNamara, Rusk, Fulbright -- indeed, all the rhetoricians of the Vietnam debate.

Throughout this study is the implicit plea that the most fruitful analysis of the rhetoric of war would be to understand such persuasion within the context of the just war concept. We have noted that this idea is not peculiar to the United States, but nevertheless the rhetoric which has been generated to instill belief in a cause has largely been in terms of the "just war doctrine." This is not to argue that conflict may simply be understood in terms of a few simple equations. Indeed, we have discovered that the reasons for war are always quite complex and the immediate situations are always different to some degree. The symbolic nature of war, especially in a nuclear age, however will operate according to deeply imbedded traditions held within the symbols of American society.

The method of criticism that is most illustrative of this peculiar type of symbolic action should be generated from a knowledge of the internal workings of war rhetoric. Most studies have taken precisely the opposite approach. Some have judged war rhetoric against the rhetoric of peace time and have labeled it propaganda.[3] Others have judged the war rhetoric by a critical method which puts individual speeches under the lens with disputable results.[4] Although both may be valuable exercises, the do not penetrate the symbolic reality created by the rhetoric of war. At best, they tell us that the rhetoric of war does not fit randomly applied standards and refuses to bend to less than internal symbolic analysis.

The unkind reader of this thesis may well respond that we have not

accomplished this task either. In self-defense and by way of forecasting this chapter, let us consider the following response.

There is more to accomplish in this last chapter than summing up. Though the study of the rhetoric of the Vietnam conflict may have given some insight into the nature of the war's rhetoric, so far we have refrained from making generalizations to the genre of discourse, war rhetoric. In part, this seeming ommission is due to the nature of the study. There is not a great deal of direct research into the nature of war rhetoric as symbolic movement. Although there is a great deal of information about the history of the Vietnam war, for example, and though there are a number of criticisms of individual speeches, there is little that attempts to put the war rhetoric into manageable perspective. Perhaps this is the case because such an undertaking has been considered too difficult. Indeed, there is much that we have had to eliminate from the study as well as much that warrants further study. A complete definitive statement at this time, before all of the fighting is over, cannot be made. This is not to argue that we have not established a firm direction for study. The analysis certainly indicates at least a beginning to understanding the nature of such symbolic action.

We must then gather the findings that we have made and frame them as cogent arguments in the interest of drawing some clear directions for further inquiry. The reader, therefore, should not take this chapter as completed doctrine. This chapter is written in the spirit of inquiry -- a starting point for future consideration of the rhetoric of war.

In order that the concluding hypotheses be framed in a cogen-fashion

the chapter has been divided into the follwing five sections: (1) general criteria for the determinations of a rhetorical genre; (2) characteristics of a genre of discourse based on war rhetoric; (3) characteristics of a genre of criticism based on the rhetoric of war; (4) the rhetoric of the Vietnam debate; and (5) implications for the further study of war rhetoric. Hopefully, this ambitious final chapter will be able to tie up some of the loose ends of the study and place our earlier considerations within the frame of a rhetorical theory.

General Criteria for the Determination of a Rhetorical Genre

Although the subject of genres could well be the matter for a study within this one, at this point we will only give a brief sketch of the general nature of a genre and make the claim that war rhetoric meets such criteria. As we indicated at the beginning of the study, we feel that a genre of discourse should operate such that it is a traditional form of appeal used by men. The specific content of the appeals will, of course, differ, but the form will not substantially vary across time and culture.

The specific criteria for the formation and discovery of a rhetorical genre have not been clarified to the date of this study. Perhaps, Karlyn Khors Campbell most clearly sets forth the nature of genre as it emerges from the symbolic interactionist position. She writes:

> Rhetoric, says Burke, is 'rooted in an essential function of language itself, ...the use of language as a symbolic means of inducing cooperations in beings that by nature respond to symbols.
>
> The critic who selects this rhetorical system analyzes and describes the rhetorician's strategies in his attempts to create identification between himself and the audience and among memebers of the audience. Both the

> rhetorician and the audience create the 'truths' that emerge from the rhetorical interaction in a particular situation or cultural context. Consequently the critic tends toward the criticism of genres because in this system of [symbolic action] discourses are part of an ongoing dialogue influenced by persuasive forces that include other discourses, persistent social conflicts, and cultural values. Such genres tend to share both stylistic and philosophical similarities.[5]

A recurrent symbolic context is thus bound to engender responses that have similar "philosophical and stylistic similarities."

This still leaves the nature of a genre on a somewhat ambiguous level. For our purposes, we have constructed some criteria which both incorporate and extend Campbell's assumptions. The rhetoric of war fulfils these criteria.

A RHETORICAL GENRE SHOULD HAVE A SUBSTANTIAL BODY OF DISCOURSE. Edwin Black asserts that the first thing the student of rhetoric should search for in establishing a rhetorical genre is a "recognized...congregation of discourse, bearing certain characteristics in common."[6] Certainly his assertions is correct. If the critic claims to have discovered a genre of discourse and there is not a substantial body of material or if that material is not related by significant characteristics, then he probably has hit upon an insignificant form of speech.

War rhetoric certainly meets this criteria. Even a brief investigation of collected speech anthologies will reveal that there are significant numbers of war addresses. Whether these be addresses that concern the wars of the ancients, the American revolution, the British colonial wars, or the wars of the 20th century, they are all collected and left to posterity for close examination. Beyond the obvious, we may examine other rhetorical artifacts. The war novel, war journalism, war

films, and even war toys all concern the symbolic context of war. There is certainly a wealth of material for the individual who is interested in investigating this subject.[7]

A RHETORICAL GENRE SHOULD HAVE A SIGNIFICANT SYMBOLIC CONTEXT. Lloyd Bitzer argues that the speech is always responding to an exigence created by the rhetorical context.[8] As we have see, Burke argues that the context is largely symbolic. He believes that there are traditional contexts, symbolically constructed, that men must always respond to. Though the speaker still has many options open to him within a given rhetorical act, still the occasion demands response and, therefore, to some extent limits the appropriateness of response.

War rhetoric is certainly a response to a significant symbolic context. The physical action of killing becomes only murder when it is not in the context of war. In this context, killing becomes a symbolic act of state. The killing is done for a reason and thus assumes the status of symbolic ritual.[9] The rhetoric of war as it prefigures proclaims and vindicates the killing, forms a significant and timely symbolic context for all men. It has done so with methodic regularity in the past and will probably continue into the future. As Kenneth Boulding observed, the whole of man's history from 3000 B. C. to the present date has been a recurrent cycle of such symbolic contexts.[10]

A RHETORICAL GENRE SHOULD HAVE A UNIQUE ROOT METAPHOR. As Kenneth Burke notes, all terms are hierarchically related; that is to say, all terms may be traced back to a single term from which the others flow. Only in this manner, can we understand the true essence or nature of a symbolic context. In establishing a unique genre of discourse, we

may search out that essential term which governs all others. For example, a brilliant study by Professors Linkugel and Ware have characterized the genre of discourse concerned with the actions of those who are speaking in defense of themselves. The root metaphor for this genre is *apologia*.[11] Others have attempted the same task with less evidence of success.[12] For example, Campbell blaims that the rhetoric of women's liberations forms a unique body of discourse because the unique root metaphor is "paradox." Yet, conflicting value structures could hardly be said to be unique to women -- no matter how problematic their plight. What Campbell has discoverd is probably a sub-genre.[13]

War rhetoric fulfills this criteria well. As we have indicated, the primary metaphor for this peculiar form of rhetoric is "strife." The ultimate aim of war rhetoric is division. It creates union only in so far as this union furthers the division. Rather than appealing along the lines of identification among all men, this form of rhetoric places a part of those men as keepers of the truth and, as such, above others who are either ignorant of that truth or simply for evil motives aligned against the truth. Further analysis of this metaphor will be conducted in the next section.

A RHETORICAL GENRE SHOULD HAVE UNIQUE STYLISTIC FEATURES. We may consider this the weakest of all criteria because different cultures will always express their discourse with the different stylistic features. Style, therefore, does not define a genre of discourse *per se*. It does, however, in combination with these other characteristics help to distinquish a genre. Since men have created a substantial body of discourse in answer to a significant symbolic context which is ultimately governed by a root metaphor or term, then it stands to reason that many of these

answers will have the same structural features. This assertions is amply proven when we review the long tradition of war rhetoric. Traditionally the "martial spirit" has been accompanied by such stylistic flourishes as flags and banners, marching troops, parades of weapons and public demonstrations of loyalty. Traditionally, dissenters have answered these demonstrations with rhetorical acts which include usually a burleque immitation of the stylistic features of the war advocates. For example, Vietnam protests were famous for spilling blood on draft files, waving enemy flags and holding mock funerals. These stylistic features considered in toto certainly indicate that the rhetoric of war is an independent genre.

Although a great deal more time can and should be spent discerning the unique criteria for a rhetorical genre, to do so at this time is extraneous to the primary thrust of our thesis. We must not dwell too much on the obvious; which is to say, the rhetoric of war must certainly be considered a rhetorical genre if indeed such a beast exists. To spend additional time asserting such a claim is unnecessary.

The question of what specific characteristics are incorporated in such a genre is of more importance. In the next section we shall explore some assumptions about the symbolic action inherent to the rhetoric of war.

Some Characteristics of a Genre of Discourse Based on War Rhetoric

Many historians have attempted to prove that the real "reasons" for a specific war were those other than uttered by the leading spokesmen of the times. For example, World War I was caused by the war munitions manufacturers. World War II was caused by the personal ambitions of Hitler.[14] Though history may indicate that there were clandestine causes to a war or even

that the war was made inevitable by the inexorable force of economic conditions, when the war is being fought and the nation is committed to battle, those reasons propounded by the rhetoricians of the time become "real reasons" which lead to action by those persuaded to participate in that particular war. To reduce history to a single formula of a cause and an effect provides little understanding of the true nature of war. In order to understand why men men accept the idea and act of killing, we must study the nature of persuasion that leads them to and from those struggles.

This persuasion can best be understood from the vantage point of observing universes of discourse in opposition -- the fundamental guiding principles of one society as they are viewed to be incompatible with those of another. Though this concept may seem elementary, in actuality it involves a vast rhetorical transaction which evolves over a period of many years. For example, the conflict between Russia and the United States becomes a competition of exclusive universes of discourse governed by the terms "Communism" and "Democracy."

The symbolic act of war always brings with it a transformation in the universes of discourse in opposition. For both the victor and the conquered the effects are almost always traumatic.[15] In some cases war affirmst the <u>ultima ratio</u> in that victory demonstrates that the guiding principles of one side were true and the guiding principles of the other side were false and probably criminal. When this occurs the values of the conquering nation are reaffirmed. In most cases, this result is not so simple because war brings about the transformation of principles even within the victorious nation.[16]

We must remember that within the nation at war, there will always

be a struggle between those committed to war and those opposed to it. Depending both on the degree of threat and the success of the war, the nation will become either more resolute and, hence, adhere to a tighter universe of discoure or more divided and, hence, submit to a chaotic rhetoric. In either case, war always engenders to some extent the death and rebirth of a nation's symbolic structure.[17]

At this point, we may note that not all war rhetoric results in war. Sometimes there is a third alternative which prevents war. Within the nation engaged in struggle and between warring nations, the only alternative from war is in the joining by a third perspective -- an evaluation from "the things in themselves." Whereas war may be viewed as a symbol system arising from an exclusive world view as opposed to another symbol system's world view, a counter-rhetoric would join these universes of discourse -- for a brief period of time -- in the mutual effort to examine a particular event which may "cause" the war. Thus, viewing the importance of the thing in itself versus the potential mutual devastation of a war may reveal that actual battle is not desirable. For example, the Vietnam war might have been avoided if both the United States and the North Vietnamese could have placed the Gulf of Tonkin incident within this minimization perspective. The attack upon the United States ship <u>Maddox</u> was certainly not a "real" threat to United States security. As this incident indicates, such a perspective is difficult to establish and even more difficult to maintain.

Thus, we have summarized the nature of war rhetoric. It is a symbolic event existing when a universe of discourse is placed in direct and mutually exclusive opposition to another universe of discourse. The rhetoric effects the symbolic context from which it is born. The event

transforms the society and its values -- no matter if the country be the victor or the conquered. Words may divide a country violently or it may unite a country (or countries) and subsume important differences. In any case, the only alternative for nation who so wish to avoid war is to construe specific irritating events, not as examples related in the hierarchy of symbolic universes, but as carefully weighed indications of war.

Characteristics of a Genre of Criticism Based on the Rhetoric of War

In this portion of the chapter, we are concerned with specifying a critical tool in order that the critic may understand the rhetoric of a particular war. In the past, critics have substantially treated the rhetoric of war as any other rhetoric and, hence, the contributions may only be marginal. On the other hand many have classed war rhetoric under the special category of propaganda. To dismiss all war rhetoric as propaganda, is to place such thinkers as Tolstoy and Machiavelli in the same class as Curtis LeMay. General propaganda analysis may be too gross a distinction; in addition, it may place too much emphasis on style while excluding the nature of symbolic action. Hopefully the following indicators will help the critic view the internal workings of war rhetoric.

THE GENRE IS KNOWN BY THE "MORAL" ENJOINMENT OF DIALECTICAL OPPOSITION. "Speech," writes Weaver, "is the vehicle of order, and those who command it are regarded as having superior insight, which must be into the necessary relationship of things. Such is the meaning of great myths."[18] The relationship of language to motives both reveals and creates the social order. A view from the perspective of one man's insight

into language, however, gives us only a partisan knowledge of the social order. Although a view from differing perspectives gives us additional insight, it is still only a fragmented view. The question of war rhetoric must be placed in direct dialectical opposition -- those advocating the war confronting those opposing the war. Speakers who represent the symbolic order can be most fully understood only when their perspectives are considered in direct opposition. This is true when we study the rhetoric of nations opposing one another or when we study the rhetoric of factions within a country advocating or opposing war. In this way, the critic may explore the nature of the opposition, and intelligently probe the universes of discoure in opposition.

THE GENRE IS KNOWN BY DEFINING UNIVERSES OF DISCOURSE. As we have indicated, the critic must look beyond the views of the speaker's immediate situation. The rhetoric must be understood as it represents the universe of discourse from which it is launched. Senator Fulbright observes that:

> Mankind is poisoned by fear of the stranger. It's a primitive animal instinct, and I suppose a hundred thousand years ago it was part of the struggle for survival. The cave man feared the stranger, who might steal his food and mate. This fear has been enlarged and turned into terrifying myths about man's superior imagination. There is no other creature that kills and destroys for such illusory reasons as man does. We have wars and massacres, injustices against minorities. It is a pretty bad record and a universal one, nation against nation, race against race, tribe against tribe.[19]

Fulbright's rather pessimistic observation is a good one. Man has characteristically responded to the other with fear. To modern times, this perception has placed state against state and men against men. The Rhetoric of War should be studied as it builds and destroys the universes

which are designed to deal with the other.

THE GENRE IS KNOWN BY THE ABSTRACT PRINCIPLES IT INTENDS TO ATTACK OR DEFEND. T. E. Hulme speculates on the nature of societal principles and the reasons for war. He argues that:

> There are certain doctrines which for a particular period seem not doctrines, but inevitable categories of human mind. Men do not look on them merely as correct opinions, for they have become so much a part of mind, and lie so far back, that they are never really conscious of them at all. They do not see them, but they see other things through them. It is these abstract ideas at the center, the things which they take for granted, that characterize a period. The uprooting of these abstract ideas at the center and their replacement by the new ones constitutes a fundamental revolution in thought.[20]

The critic of war rhetoric must be able to grab hold of the symbolic web of society in these vital parts in order to ascertain the nature of the conflict. Only by discovering the abstract principles that guide each country to war and exposing their use by the rhetoricians of that society can we hope to understand the nature of war rhetoric.

THE GENRE IS KNOWN BY THE INTENSITY OF LANGUAGE POLARIZATION, INSTABILITY, AND THE DEGREE IT IS A SURROGATE FOR ACTION. As we have seen, the rhetoric of war is manifested in a complex symbolic interchange. The manner in which the critic discerns the nature of the symbolic action and the ideas which guide, form and destroy it, is through analyzing the language used by the war rhetoricians. All war rhetoric deals with the polarization of language to some degree. To the extent that language becomes increasingly polarized and resides at that level of use, the war becomes more intense at the symbolic level. To the extent that the war rhetoric places the rationale for war on an increasingly abstract level, war may become easier to accept than if the speaker describes

graphically the results of battle. To the extent that symbolic war becomes a surrogate for physical combat, the war may be forestalled but increasingly the rhetorician's choice of language is limited and combat becomes more inevitable.

A study of the language used by war rhetoricians is certainly critical to the determination of symbolic action and concomitant understanding of the effects of the war on pre and post-conflict society.

THE GENRE IS KNOWN BY EXAMINATION OF THE DEATH AND REBIRTH OF VALUE THAT TAKES PLACE PRIOR TO AND AFTER THE WAR. This hypothesis indicates that the scope of the war must be studied as well as the particular symbolic action in which the speaker responds. Only by analyzing the conflict as it originated and as it was terminated can the full panorama and importance of the rhetorical event be located. For example, the particular speech in question may be given at a particular juncture in the war; however, for the critic to realize its full importance he must be able to place the ideas of that address within the fabric of symbolic change. This is precisely what we attempted to accomplish in the comparison of the addresses by McNamara and Morse. Though they were not important speeches in and of themselves, when viewed in the full symbolic framework, they become important ways of discerning the symbolic action of the war. McNamara becomes a vehicle for studying the universe of discourse that represented the pro-war advocates which was largely held before the Vietnam debate. Morse becomes a way for analyzing the universe of discourse created by the anti-war speakers which was largely held toward the end of the war. In any case, the critic must attempt to understand the full scope and extension of argument. Those speeches are best for study which most clearly demonstrate

the opposition at a point in the conflict when the opposing arguments are strong.

Thus, we have presented five premises through which the rhetorical critic may examine the rhetoric of war. According to this theory, he should always look for rhetorical transactions that are in opposition. He must understand the essence of the universes of discourse from which they emerge. His specific critical indicator is the use of symbols as the language of offense and defense. He must look for those terms that are most sacred and most maligned -- terms that represent the fundamental principles held by each society. Finally, he should endeavor to study those rhetorical transactions that come at critical moments of decision making, keeping in mind the scope of the rhetorical transaction and placing it vis-a-vis the death and rebirth of value that accompanys any war.

In summary, we have not provided an orginazational schema for criticizing war rhetoric. In fact such a "cookie-cutter" approach would not be in the interest of good criticism. We have suggested, however, that in order to understand the rhetoric of a particular war -- or of a particular speaker addressing the symbolic context of war -- that there are certain aspects of this symbolic transformation that must be explained. These include:

(1) The study of opposing sides (within or between countries) as they are made manifest in the moral enjoinment of dialectical opposition.

(2) The study of the internal universe of discourse as it exhibits its own view of the war as well as selects, reflects and deflects the view of the enemy.

(3) The study of the conflicting "principles" which guide the response to the war as well as construct the opposing universes of discourse.

(4) The study of symbolic behavior as it occurs during times of war -- specifically the nature of symbolic operation in war rhetoric as opposed to the nature of symbolic operation of peace rhetoric.

(5) The study of placement for a specific rhetorical act within the scope of symbolic transformation engendered by the war.

Only in the manner stipulated may we come to "know" the rhetoric of war. Only in this fashion can we generate a relatively complete criticism that gives us insight not into the history of the war, or into the inapplicability of external criticisms to war rhetoric, but insight into the nature of the beast itself.

The Rhetoric of the Vietnam War

Hopefully, the reader will recognize the method of criticism that we have set out as the perspective that we have taken in this brief study of the Vietnam war. At this point, we may briefly review the major conclusions of the specific study.

The concept of the "just war" is an extremely ancient one. It presumed, as we have seen, valid laws for the instigation and conduct of conflict. This concept was discarded when such thinkers as Machiavelli, Castiglione, and Thomas Moore popularized the concept of war for "reasons of state" and thus abridged any need for universal validation of conflict. A state needed to survive and that was enough. This led to the emphasis of war as an "all or nothing" proposition which was manifested in the struggles of the 18th and 19th centuries. Scientific advancement led to the culmination of the "total war" concept in this century when individual nations came to possess the potential of destroying the world in order to insure their own survival. This last statement may seem logically contradictory, but such is the peculiar

logic of war.

This situation led to the current war which is clearly riddled through and through with this paradox. Although the world was considered to be in a state of "total war," at least according to the rhetoric of Russia, China and the United States, physical battle could not occur because the alternative was oblivion for all sides. Thus, because "the bomb" brought with it the threat of international suicide, the concept of the total war as it was known to previous centuries was radically changed.

The concept of the just war emerged once again. A small or limited war was justified for the United States because it was part of the overall struggle. The balance of power doctrine "proved" that such wars were necessary because if they did not occur then the probability of nuclear confrontation would be increased dramatically.[21]

Vietnam is a special instance of this symbolic context. Externally, the rhetoric of the Vietnam war emerged from the concept of intervention in the cold war -- a war which placed the United States in dialectical opposition to the Communist powers. Intervention or limited war was the specific manifestation of the defense of necessary principles (the just war). As such it met the criteria for the just war that we have examined throughout the thesis.

In the initial phase of the Vietnam debate, speakers operated from completely imcompatible opposing universes of discourse which led, in many cases, to violent opposition. This debate was not the classic form of argument which entails a dialogue of give and take, but each side demanded acceptance of its position -- the other being stupidly, immorally and wholly wrong.

This confrontation could have developed into an internal war. As we have argued, this is what happens externally when universes of discourse are in direct opposition. That it did not, was due to several factors. First, althought the "metaphysical" fabric of the community was substantially torn, the basic symbolic structure which holds a society together was still held by many who were not actively involved in the war dispute, and thus the intensity of the confrontation was reduced. Second, because these views were not held intensly, individuals could adopt a third alternative to evaluate the war on its own merits -- an approximation of direct costs versus gains. Finally, as the war progressed and no visible progress was perceived, this allowed room for further opinion change and the movement from one universe of discourse to another. Such movement occurred gradually, but that is necessary if confrontation is to be avoided.

The implications of this movement are still being felt and only history may judge the breadth of change brought about by the effects of the war. It is true, however, that American life will never again be the same. This is the mythopoeic reality of a culture shaped by the symbolic nature of war.

Future Study of War Rhetoric

Our purpose has been to broadly define the rhetoric of the Vietnam war as a special case of the rhetoric of war and, as such, we have not fully explored the entire panorama of war rhetoric. Since we have concentrated at grasping the idea of the war (at the expense of a thorough analysis of the important minor metaphors), future studies could well explore the important moments in conducting all wars. They might include: (1) a prelude to conflict; (2) the call to arms;

(3) the escalation of the conflict; (4) conscription of fighting manpower; (5) the strain on domestic life and (6) the end of the war. These moments could be related to the Vietnam war -- perhaps in the following manner.

ARMS AND ADVISORS: THE DAWN OF COMMITMENT. This study would present an analysis of the prefiguring of conflict. It is derived from the historical notice that prior to every war the United States spends some time choosing up sides. For every armed struggle since the Revolutionary War, the country ahs always been "forced" to fight. This study could consider the ideological and material context that precluded other alternatives of settlement to the Vietnam situation.

THE GULF OF TONKIN: A QUESTION OF DUTY, HONOR AND COUNTRY. This essay could analyze the call to arms. In every war the United States is catapulted into the situation through a series of events which either actually touches off the conflict -- the attack on Fort Sumpter, the attack on Pearl Harbor, and the croosing of the 36th parallel by the North Koreans -- or becomes a symbolic torch which ignites the conflict -- the sinking of the Maine and the Lusitania. The alleged attack on the Maddox by the North Vietnamese torpedo boats was such a symbolic attack on American sovereignty and peace.

Although many fine studies have been undertaken in this area, none place the event within the context of the entire war, nor do any place the protest speakers in opposition to the president.[22] Such a study should give additional insight into the scope of war rhetoric.

ESCALATION: A QUESTION OF TOTAL WAR. In this essay the critic might attempt to explicate the rhetorical struggle in defining the nature of the Vietnam war. The "bombing issue," perhaps more than any other,

sparked a wide degree of controversy.[23] Proponents of the war argued that victory should be achieved even if the war had to be escalated indefinitely. Opponents argued that there were several moral and strategic dangers in escalation. The implications of the particular question were to be felt throughout the war.

CONSCRIPTION: A QUESTION OF MORAL CHOICE. Even for a society that prides itself on the efficiency of battles that can be fought on electronic boards, the decision to wage war must be accompanied by many personal commitments. The large draft controversy has been left relatively unexplored. It has largely been subsumed under the rhetoric of the new left.[24] Placing this movement within the symbolic framework of the Vietnam war should give the critic additional insights.

DOMESTIC RESOURCES: A QUESTION OF PRIORITIES. Though Vietnam directly presented material for the major debate of the 1960s, the demand to meet social needs was accompanied by a vast rhetorical debate. As the war consumed more money, men and material, advocates of domestic reform became increasingly alarmed at the nature of the war. The confrontation between those concerned with the domestic crisis and those concerned with the international crisis spreads from a question of the Vietnam engagement to an attack upon the entire military-industrial complex.

This shift in concern can and should be studied as a major component of the Vietnam debate. It is at this juncture that the effects of the war are felt by the widest portion of society.

CEASE FIRE: THE TWILIGHT OF HONOR. The presidential election of 1968 marked a turning point in the war. America became committed to withdrawing from the conflict. Yet for four more years the country still remained in the bloody war. At this point, the confrontation

between pro and anti-war forces takes a different form -- many of the old issues persist but they are presented in new ways. The transformation is a painful one. The critic must discern the end of the war and the rebirth of foreign policy. For example, a critic might study the prisoner of war as a rhetorical symbol. In addition, he could place the new foreign policy which is largely conciliatory in juxtaposition to the old.

These are just a few suggestions for analyzing the critical moments of the Vietnam debate. Within these moments, the possibilities for pairs of rhetorical events are endless. For example, the critic could pair speeches by Kennedy and Rusk, Hearshy and Hoffman, Nixon and Humphrey, Laird and McGovern, Johson and Gruening. He may even examine less known speakers as they, too, participate in the rhetoric of war. The critic might also examine non-traditional forms of rhetorical discourse such as novels, songs, books and movies. All of these rhetorical devices participate in some portion of the symbolic context that was the Vietnam debate. As such, they present an excellent opportunity for further research.

The Rhetoric of War and Peace

At the heigth of the Vietnam debate, many people surveyed the effects of the cold war on the American way of life; among them, Richard Barnet, director of the Institute for Policy Studies. The findings were horrifying.

> Since 1946, [Barnet writes,] the taxpayers have been asked to contribute more than one trillion dollars for national security. Each year the federal government spends more than 70 cents of every budget dollar on past, present, and future wars. The American people are devoting more resources to the war machine than is spent by all federal, state, and local governments on health and hospitals, education, old-age and retirement

> benefits, public assistance and relief, unemployment and social security, housing and community development, and the support of agriculture. Out of every tax dollar there is about 11 cents left to build American society.
>
> Nations, like families, reveal themselves through budgets. No personal document tells more about a man's values or his hopes and fears than the family budget. Similarly, the war to size up a nation is to examine the national budget. But the real cost of America's search for security through armaments cannot be adequately measured in money. To comprehend the magnitude of our investment in killing power, we need to look at what we have sacrificed for it. The economy of life in America has been starved to feed the Economy of Death.[25]

Since that time in 1969, the priorities of all Americans seem to have reversed. The military budget has been lowered, the number of troops have been drastically reduced, the draft has been ended, American involvement in the Vietnam war has been terminated, the president has made peace visits to China and Moscow, new talks on arms limitations are progressing. Certainly, it has been this generation that has, through its suffering and self-denial, learned the lesson of war -- that no man is the victor. Certainly, it has been our generation that has chained the dogs of war for a thousand years.

As I write this final chapter, the war for the South Vietnamese knows no end. The newspaper still chronicles the war, but, somehow, it is a more distant war -- the sound of the trumpet is muted by more pressing concerns. An account of the war, now placed in back of the comic section, tells of impending losses for the South Vietnamese. Associated Press writer and Nobel prize winner Peter Arnett concludes that in this tiny land where the "war has raged for three decades, and where troops from six foreign nations have gambled with death" the "war is still on."[26]

Arnett does not see a bright hope for victory. Though the men of the South fight valiantly for their homeland, Communist troops indoctrinated and supplied by the North are threatening to topple the government. The problem, as Arnett sees it, is that the generals are all in Saigon and not in the field. Since American advisers cannot help because they are limited to the Saigon area, the men of the South are leaderless. Perhaps if we just sent in a few more men and supplies -- nothing that would truly commit us -- then we could begin to see the light at the end of the tunnel; we could end this mess once and for all.

Footnotes

[1]Bond, p. 112.

[2]Draper, p. 222.

[3]Although we are aware of some enlightened treatments of "propaganda analysis," by in large most have not significantly advanced from the initial World War II studies.

[4]The critic may note at this point especially the four way battle over the correct method of interpreting Nixon's "November 3rd" Address. These disputants, referenced in prior chapters, include such noted names as Karlyn Campbell, Larence Rosenfield and C. S. Hill. We feel that the most successful application of criticism to war rhetoric may be "The Rhetoric of Hitler's 'Battle.'" This true Burkean criticism approaches war from a symbolic perspective, and, as such provides eloquent testimony to the power of the word in war time society. In a personal conversation with Burke, I discovered that although Burke believes that war is not inevitable he recognizes that it is a perpetual temptation.

[5]Campbell, p. 19.

[6]Edwin Black, "The Genre of Argumentation," Rhetorical Criticism: A Study in Method, (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1965), pp. 148-177.

[7]Almost in any bin that the critic dares to look, he will find the touch of war rhetoric. Perhaps there is no more "being" a man can give to his words than to lay his life in jeapordy for them. Thus, men find it essential to record these agonizing moments of both themselves and their enemies.

[8]Lloyd Bitzer, "The Rhetorical Situation," Journal of Philosophy and Rhetoric, 1 (January, 1968), p. 2.

[9]Susanne Langer, Philosophy in a New Key, (New York: The New American Library, 1942), pp. 148-173.

[10]Boulding, p. 84.

[11]B. L. Ware, Jr. and Wil Linkugel, "They Spoke in Defense of Themselves: On the Advisability of Generic Criticism," Quarterly Journal of Speech, (Fall, 1973), in press.

[12]Lawrence Rosenfield, "A Case Study in Speech Criticism: The Nixon-Truman Analog," Speech Monographs, 35 (November, 1968), p. 538. Bower Aly, "The Gallows Speech: A Lost Genre," Southern Speech Journal, 34 (Spring, 1969), pp. 204-213. Gayle Edward Wilson, "Genre and Rhetoric in Dryden'ts 'Upon the Death of the Lord Hastings,'" Southern Speech Journal, 35 (Spring, 1970), pp. 256-266. Herman G. Stelzner, "The Quest

Story and Nixon's November 3, 1969 Address," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 57 (April, 1971), pp. 163-172. Theodore Otto Windt, Jr., "The Diatribe: Last Resort for Protest," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 58 (February, 1972).

[13]Karlyn Khors Camp-ell, "The Rhetoric of Women's Liberation: An Oxymoron," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 59 (February, 1973), pp. 74-86.

[14]The areas can be known, however, through rhetorical forms. Kathleen Jamieson writes that "perception of the proper response to an unprecedented rhetorical situation grows not merely from the situation but from antecedent rhetorical forms," primarily, "because a long lived institution initiates a great body of rhetoric, a set of standardized forms for its rhetoric tend to emerge." Journal of Philosophy and Rhetoric, 6 (Summer, 1973), pp. 162-169.

[15]We might consider the westernization of Japan as an example of this type of symbolic transformation.

[16]A comparison of the New Deal to the post World War II rhetoric would reveal a substantial shift in outlook in foreign policy.

[17]Even though the United States remains in the "Cold War," the nature of this war has substantially changed and, with it, the rhetoric of war.

[18]Weaver, Ideas Have Consequences, p. 146.

[19]Fulbright, The New Yorker, p. 149.

[20]Hulme, p. 242.

[21]Henry A. Kissinger, "The Challengerof the Nuclear Age," Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, (New York: Doubleday, 1957), pp. 1-16.

[22]Donald Van Eynde, "A Comparison of the Effects on Public Opinion of Persuasive Rhetoric Utilized in Selected Presidential War Crisis Addresses," (Unpublished M. A. Thesis: University of Kansas, 1972.

[23]This area of study proves of special importance because of the intensity of the confrontations during the escalation of the war.

[24]It seems that many critics were absorbed into the new left studies and claimed that here was a "new rhetoric" connected with protest but "caused" by a distinct group. With the fading of the war, however, the new left rhetoric almost vanished. Certainly this demonstrates that this "new left" rhetoric is part of war rhetoric.

[25]Peter Arnett, "Associated Press Release," (July, 1973).

Appendix A

"South Vietnam: The United States Policy"
A Speech by Robert S. McNamara
James Forrestal Memorial Awards Dinner
Washington, D. C., March 26, 1964[1]

This evening I want to discuss South Vietnam with you. In South Vietnam, as you well know, the independence of a nation and the freedom of its people are being threatened by Communist aggression and terrorism. In response to requests from the Government of South Vietnam, the United States since 1954 has been providing assistance to the Vietnamese in their struggle to maintain their independence.

My purpose this evening is three-fold. After recalling some facts about Vietnam and its history, I want: first, to explain our stake and objectives in South Vietnam, second, to review for you the current situation there as General Taylor and I found it on our recent trip and, finally, to outline in broad terms the plans which have been worked out with General Khanh for achieving our mutual objectives in South Vietnam.

Let me begin by reminding you of some details about South Vietnam -- that narrow strip of rich coastal mountain and delta lands running 900 miles in the tropics along the South China Sea to the Gulf of Siam.

It contains the mouth of the Mekong River, the main artery of Southeast Asia. It has a population of about 14 million -- almost that of California -- in an area slightly larger than England and Wales.

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[1]Copy of the manuscript from Vital Speeches, XXX (April 15, 1964), pp. 393-399.

South Vietnam does not exist by itself. Mainland Southeast Asia includes Laos, Cambodia and the two Vietnams, together comprising former French Indochina. It also includes Thialand, Burma and part of Malaysia.

The Southeast Asia peninsula is richly endowed land area of over 800,000 square miles -- roughly the size of the United States east of the Mississippi -- and containing almost 100 million people. And immediately beyond to the East are the Philippines, nor far to the west is India, to the north is Communist China, and the is what the Chinese Communists may consider the greatest prize of all -- Indonesia's resources, territory, and the world's fifth largest population, whose strategic location straddles adn dominates the gateway to the Indian Ocean.

The Vietnamese lost the independence they had enjoyed since the 15th century when, 100 years ago the French assumed control in what is now Vietnam. A quarter century ago, during the Second World War, the Vichy regime yielded French Indochina to the Japanese. In the power vacuum of the war's end, the Communist Vietminh moved rapidly to enhance their position and to build their bases for a power grab in North Vietnam.

The attempt by the French, following World War II, to restore their rule -- to buck the rend toward independence as shown in Burma, India and the Philippines -- failed. The returning French encountered a strong military resistance movement which gradually fell more and more under Communist control.

For eight years France sought to control the country while at the

same time gradually granting increasing autonomy to non-Communist Vietnamese. Such actions, however, were not enough. In 1954, after the fall of the French stronghold at Dienbienphu on May 7, the Geneva agreements of July 20 were signed ending the hostilities and ending French rule in Indochina. The country was roughly cut in half at the 17th Parallel, creating the Communist regime of Ho Chi Minh in the north and the anti-Communist state in the south. Although the United States was not a party to those Geneva agreements the United States unilaterally declared that it would not violate them and that it would regard any violation by other parties as a serious threat to international peace and security.

Under the Geneva agreements, it was hoped that Shouth Vietnam would have an opportunity to build a free nation in peace -- unaligned, and set apart from the global power struggle.

But the problems confronting the new Government were staggering: 900,000 refugees who fled their homes in the north at the time of partition in order to escape Communist rule; a long term military threat from the north, which had emerged from the war with large military forces; a Government nearly paralyzed by eight years of war and lacing sufficient trained officials for effective self-government; acute economic dislocation and lack of Government revenues and persisting pockets of southern territory that had long been held by Communists and other dissident groups.

In the face of such problems, hopes were not high for the survival of the fledging republic.

The autumn, a decade ago, President Ngo Dinh Diem of the Republic

of South Vietnam turned to the United States for economic assistance. President Eisenhower understood the gravity of the situation, and he determined to give direct American aid to the new Government to enable its survival.

He wrote to President Diem on October 25, 1954: "The purpose of this offer is to assist the Government of Vietnam in developing and maintaining a strong, viable state, capable of resisting attempted subversion or aggression through military means." The United States therefore provided help -- largely economic.

On the basis of this assistance and the brave, sustained efforts of the South Vietnamese people, the five years from 1954 to 1959 gave concrete evidence that South Vietnam was becomming a success story.

By the end of this period, 140,000 landless peasant families had been given land under an agrarian reform program; the transportation system had been almost entirely rebuilt; rice production had reached the pre-war annual average of 3.5 million metric tons -- and leaped to over 5 million in 1960; rubber production had exceeded pre-war totals, and construction was underway on several medium-size manufacturing plants, thus beginning the development of a base for industrial growth.

In addition to such economic progress, school enrollments had tripled. The number of primary school teachers had increased from 30,000 to 90,000 and almost 3,000 medical aid stations and maternity clinics had been established throughout the country.

And the South Vietnamese Government had gone far towards creating an effective apparatus for the administration of the nation. A national institute of Administration had been established with our

technical and financial assistance -- a center for the training of a new generation of civil servants oriented towards careers of public service as opposed to the colonial concept of public rule.

For South Vietnam the horizon was bright.

Its success stood in marked contrast to development in the north. Despite the vastly larger industrial plant inherited by Hanoi when Vietnam was partitioned, gross national product was considerably larger in the south -- estimated at $110 per person in the south and $70 in the north.

While per capita food production in the north was 10 per cent lower in 1960 than it has been in 1956, it was 20 per cent higher in the south.

It is ironical that free Vietnam's very achievements in these five years brough severe new problems. For the Communists in North Vietnam, like many others, had believed that South Vietnam would ultimately collapse and fall under Hanoi's control like ripe fruit from a tree.

But by the end of 1959, South Vietnam was succeeding, despite all predictions; and the Communist leaders evidently concluded that they would have to increase pressure on the south to make the fruit fall.

The so-called "Democratic Republic of Vietnam," with a greater population than the south and only a marginally smaller area, appears to be beset by a variety of weaknesses, the most prominent of which is its agricultural failure. Mismanagement, some poor weather, and a lack of fertilizers and insecticides have hed to a serious rice shortage,

The 1963 per capita output of rice was about 20 per cent lower than 1960. Before the June, 1964, harvests, living standards will probably decline further in the cities, and critical food shortages may appear in some of the villages. Furthermore, prospects for the June rice crops are not bright.

The internal transportation system remains primitive, and Hanoi has not met the quotas established for heavy industry. As for the people, they appear to be generally apathetic to what the party considers the needs of the state, and the peasantry has shown considerable ingenity in frustrating the policies of the Government.

In contrast, in the Republic of South Vietnam, despite Communist attempts to control or inhibit every aspect of the domestic economy, output continued to rise. In 1963, South Vietnam was once more able to export some 300,000 tons of rice. Add ot this the pre-1960 record; up to 1960, significant production increases in rice, rubber, sugar, textiles and electric power, a 20 per cent rise in percapita income: three-fold expansion of schools and restoration of the transportation system.

One cannot but conclude that given stability and lack of subversive disruption, South Vietnam would dramatically outstrip its northern neighbor and could become a peaceful and prosperous contributor to the well being of the Far East as a whole.

But as we have seen, the Communists -- because South Vietnam is not theirs -- are out to deny any such bright prospects.

In the years immediately following the signing of the 1954

Geneva accords, the Communists in North Vietnam gave first priority to building armed forces far larger than those of any other southeast Asian country.

They did this to establish iron control over thier own population and to insure a secure base for subversion in South Vietnam and Laos. In South Vietnam, instead of withdrawing fully, the Communists maintained a holding guerilla operation, and they left behind cadres of men and large caches of weapons for later use.

Beginning in 1959, as we have seen, the Communists realized that they were losing the game and intensified their subversive attack. In June 1962, a special report on Vietnam was issued by the International Control Commission, a unit created by the Geneva conference and composed of a Canadian, an Indian, and a Pole.

Though it received little publicity at the time, this report presented evidence of Hanoi's subversive activities in South Vietnam, and specifically found Hanoi guilty of violating the Geneva accords.

Since then, the illegal campaign of terror, violence and subversion conducted by the Vietcong and directed and supported from the north has greatly expanded. Military men, specialists, and secret agents continue to infiltrate into South Vietnam both directly from the north and through Laos and Cambodia.

The flow of Communist-supplied weapons, particularly those of large caliber, has increased. These include Chinese 75-mm. recoilless rifles and heavy machine guns. Tons of explosive producing chemicals smuggled in for use by the Vietcong have been intercepted along with many munitions manufactured in Red China and, to a lesser, extent, elsewhere

in the Communist bloc

In December, 1963, a Government force attacked a Vietcong stronghold in Dinh Tuong Province and seized a large cache of equipment, some of which was of Chinese Communist manufacture. The chinese equipment included a 90-mm. rocket launcher, 60-mm. mortars, carbines, TNT, and hundreds of thousands of rounds of various kinds of ammunition. Some of the ammunition was manufactured as recently as 1962.

When President Kennedy was able to report to the nation that "the spearpoint of aggression had been blunted in South Vietnam." It was evident that the Government had seized the initiative in most areas from the insurgents.

But this progress was interrupted in 1963 by the political crises arising from troubles between the Government and the Buddhist students, and other non-Communist oppositionists.

President Diem lost the confidence and loyalty of his people; there were accusations of maladministration and injustice. There were two changes of government within three months. The fabric of government was torn. The political control structure extending from Saigon down into the hamlets virtually disappeared.

Of the 41 incumbent province chiefs on November 1 of last year, 35 were replaced. Nine provinces had three chiefs in three months; one province had four. Scores of lesser officials were replaced. Almost all major military commands changed hands twice.

The confidence of the peasants was inevitably shaken by the dis-

ruptions in leadership and the loss of physical security. Army and paramilitary desertion rates increased, and the morale of the hamlet militia -- the "minutemen" -- fell. In many areas, power vacuums developed causing confusion among the people and a rising rate of rural disorders.

The Vietcong fully exploited the resultant organizational turmoil and regained the initiative in the struggle. For example, in the second week following the November coup, Vietcong incidents more than tripled from 316, peaking at 1,021 per week, while Government casualities rose from 367 to 928. Many overextended hamlets have been overrun or severely damaged. The January change in Government produced a similar reaction.

At the Third National Congress of the Lao Dong (Communist) party in Hanoi, September 1960, North Vietnam's belligerency was made explicit. Ho Chi Minh stated, "The north is becoming more and more consolidated and transformed into a firm base for the struggle for national reunification."

At the same congress it was announced that the party's new task was to "liberate the south from the atrocious rule of the United States imperialists and their henchment." In brief. Hanoi was about to embark upon a program of wholesale violations of the Geneva agreements in order to wrest control of South Vietnam from its legitimate government.

To the Communists, "liberation" meant sabotage, terror, and assassination; attacks on innocent hamlets and villages and the cold-blooded murder of thousands of school teachers, health workers and local officials who had the misfortune to oppose the Communist version of "liberation."

In 1960 and 1961, almost 3,000 South Vietnamese civilians in and out of Government were assassinated and another 2,500 were kidnapped. The Communists even assassinated the colonel who served as liason officer to the International Control Commission.

This aggression against South Vietnam was a major Communist effort, meticulously planned and controlled, and relentlessly pursued by the Government in Hanoi. In 1961 the Republic of South Vietnam, unable to contain the menace by itself, appealed to the United States to honor its unilateral declaration of 1954. President Kennedy responded promptly and affirmatively by sending to that country additional American advisers, arms and aid.

The United States has no designs whatever on the resources or territory of the area. Our national interests do not require that South Vietnam serve as a Western base or as a member of a Western alliance.

Our concern is threefold.

First, and most important, is the simple fact that South Vietnam, a member of the free world family, is striving to preserve its independence from Communist attack. The Vietnamese have asked our help. We have given it. We shall continue to give it.

We do so in their interest; and we do so in our own clear self-interest. For basic to the principles of freedom and self-determination which have sustained our country for almost two centuries is the right of peoples everywhere to live and develop in peace.

Our own security is strengthened by the determination of others to remain free, and by our commitment to assist them. We will not let this member of our family down, regardless of its distance from our

shores.

The ultimate goal of the United States in Southeast Asia, as in the rest of the world, is to help maintain free and independent nations which can develop politically, economically and socially, and which can be responsible members of the world community.

In this region and elsewhere, many peoples share our sense of the value of such freedom and independence. They have taken the risks and made the sacrifices linked to the commitment to membership in the family of the free world.

They have done this in the belief that we would back up our pledges to help defend them. It is not right or even expedient -- nor is it in our nature -- to abandon them when the going is difficult.

Second, Southeast Asia has great strategic significance in the forward defense of the United States. Its location across east-west air and sea lanes flanks the Indian subcontinent on one side and Australia, New Zealand and the Philippines on the other, and dominates the gateway between the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

In Communist hands this area would pose a most serious threat to the security of the United States and to the family of free world nations to which we belong. To defend Southeast Asia we must meet the challenge in South Vietnam.

And third, South Vietnam is a test case for the new Communist strategy. Let me examine for a moment the nature of this strategy.

As the Kennedy Administration was coming into office in January, 1961, Chairman Khrushchev made one of the most important speeches on Communist strategy of recent decades. In his report on a party conference

entitled "For New Victories of the World Communist Movement" Khrushchev stated: "In modern conditions, the following categories of wars should be distinguished: world wars, local wars, liberation wars and popular uprisings."

He ruled out what he called "world wars" and "local wars" as being too dangerous for profitable indulgence in a world of nuclear weapons. But with regard to what he called "liberations wars," he referred specifically to Vietnam. He said, "It is a sacred war. We recognize such wars."

I have pointed out on other occasions the enormous strategic nuclear power which the United States has developed to cope with the first of Mr. Khrushchev's types of wars; deterrence of deliberate, calculated nuclear attack seems as assured as it can be.

With respect to our general purpose forces designed especially for local wars, within the past three years we have increased the number of our combat-ready army divisions by about 45 per cent, tactical air squadrons by 30 per cent, airlift capabilities by 75 per cent, with a 100 per cent increase in ship construction and conversion.

In conjunction with the forces of our allies, our global posture for deterrence and defense is still not all that it should be, but it is good.

President Kennedy and President Johnson have recognized, however, that our forces for the first two types of wars might not be applicable or effective against what the Communists call "wars of liberation," or what is properly called covert aggression or insurgency.

We have therefore undertaken and continue to press a variety of

programs to develop skilled specialists, equipment and techniques to enable us to help our allies counter the threat of insurgency.

Communist interest in insurgency techniques did not begin with Khrushchev, nor for that matter with Stalin. Lenin's works are full of tactical instructions, which were adapted very successfully by Mao Tse-tung, whose many writings on guerillla warfare have become classic references.

Indeed, Mao claims to be the true heir of Lenin's original prescriptions for the worldwide victory of Communism. The North Vietnamese have taken a leaf or two from Mao's book -- as well as Moscow's -- and added some of their won.

Thus today in Vietnam we are not dealing with factional disputes or the remnants of a colonial struggle against the French, but rather with a major test case of Communism's new strategy. That strategy has so far been pursued in Cuba, may be beginning in Africa, and failed in Malaya and the Philipines only because of a long and arduous struggle by the people of these countries with assistance provided by the British and the United States,

In Southeast Asia the Communists have taken full advantage of geography -- the proximity to the Communist base of operations and the rugged, remote and heavily foliated character of the border regions.

They have utilized the diverse ethnic, religious and tribal groupings, and exploited factionalism and legitimate aspirations wherever possible. And, as I said earlier, they have resorted to sabotage, terrorism and assassination on an unprecedented scale.

Who is the responsible party -- the prime aggressor? First and foremost, without doubt, the prime aggressor is North Vietnam, whose leadership has explicitly undertaken to destroy the independence of the south. To be sure, Hanoi is encouraged on its aggressive course by Communist China. But Peiping's interest is hardly the same as that of Hanoi.

For Hanoi the immediate-objective is limited: conquest of the south and national unification, perhaps coupled with control of Laos. For Peiping, however, Hanoi's victory would be only a first step toward eventual Chinese hegemony over the two Vietnams and Southeast Asia, and toward exploitation of the new strategy in other parts of the world.

Communist China's interests are clear; it has publicly castigated Moscow for betraying the revolutionary cause whenever the Soviètes have sounded a cautionary note. It has characterized the United States as a paper tiger and has insisted that the revolutionary struggle for "liberation and unification" of Vietnam could be conducted without risks, by in effect, crawling under the nuclear and the conventional defense of the free world.

Peiping thus appears to feel that it has a large stake in demonstrating the new strategy, using Vietnam as a test case. Success in Vietnam would be regarded by Peiping as vindication for China's views in the worldwide ideological struggle.

Taking into account the relationship of Vietnam to Indochina -- and to Southeast Asia, the Far East and the free world as a whole -- five United States Presidents have acted to preserve free world strategic

interests in the area.

President Roosevelt opposed Japanese penetration in Indochina; President Truman resisted Communist aggression in Korea; President Eisenhower backed Diem's efforts to save South Vietnam and undertook to defend Taiwan; President Kennedy stepped up our counterinsurgency effort in Vietnam and President Johnson, in addition to reaffirming last week that the United States will furnish assistance and support to South Vietnam for as long as it is required to bring Communist aggression and terrorism under control, has approved the program that I shall describe in a few minutes.

The United States role in South Vietnam, then, is: First, to answer the call of the South Vietnamese, a member of our free world family, to help them save their country for themselves; second, to help prevent the strategic danger which would exist if Communism absorbed Southeast Asia's people and resources, and third, to prove in the Vietnamese test case that the free world can cope with Communist "wars of liberation" as we have coped with aggression at other levels.

I referred earlier to the progress in South Vietnam during 1954-1959. In our concern over the seriousness of the Vietcong insurgency, we sometimes overllok the fact that a favorable comparison still exists between progress in the south -- notwithstanding nearly 15 years of bitter warfare -- and the relative stagnation in North Vietnam. In short, the situation in South Vietnam has unquestionably worsened, at least since last fall.

The picture is admittedly not an easy one to evaluate and, given the kind of terrain and the kind of war, information is not always

available or reliable. The areas under Communist control vary from daytime to nighttime, from one week to another, according to seasonal and weather factors. And, of course, in various areas the degree and importance of control differ.

Although we estimate that in South Vietnam's 14 million population there are only 20,000 to 25,000 "hard core" Vietcong guerrillas, they have been able to recruit from among the South Vietnamese an irregular force of from 60,000 to 80,000 -- mainly by coercion and "bandwagon" effect, but also by promising material and political rewards.

The loyalties of the hard core have been cemented by years of fighting, first against the Japanese, then against the French, and, since 1954, against the fledgling Government of South Vietnam.

The young men joining them have been attracted by the exciement [sic] of guerrilla life and then held by bonds of loyalty their new comrades-in-arms, in a nation where loyalty is only beginning to extend beyond the family or the clan. These loyalties are reinforced both by systematic indoctrination and by the example of what happens to informers and deserters.

Clearly, the disciplined leadership, direction and support from North Vietnam is a critical factor in the strength of the Vietcong movement. But the large indigenous support that the Vietcong receives means that solutions must be as political and economic as military. Indeed, there can be no such thing as a purely "military" solution of the war in South Vietnam.

The people of South Vietnam prefer independence and freedom. But

they will not exercise their choice for freedom and commit themselves to it in face of the high personal risk of Communist retaliation -- a kidnapped son, a burned home, a ravaged crop -- unless they can have confidence in the ultimate outcome.

Much therefore depends on the new Government under General Khanh, for which we have high hopes.

Today the Government of General Khanh is vigorously rebuilding the machinery of adminsitration and reshaping plans to carry the war to the Vietcong. He is an able and energetic leader. He has demonstrated his grasp of the basic elements -- political, economic and psychological, as well as military -- required to defeat the Vietcong. He is planning a program of economic and social advances for the welfare of his people.

He has brought into support of the Government representatives of key groups previously excluded. He and his colleagues have developed plans for systematic liberation of areas now submissive to Vietcong duress and for mobilization of all available Vietnamese resources in the defense of the homeland.

At the same time, General Khanh has understood the need to improve South Vietnam's relations with its neighbors, Cambodia and Laos; he has taken steps towards conciliation, and he has been quick and forthright in expressing his Government's regret over the recent Vietnamese violation of Cambodia's borders.

In short, he demonstrated the energy, comprehension, and decision required by the difficult circumstances that he faces.

Before describing the means by which we hope to assist the South

Vietnamese to succeed in their undertaking, let me point out the options that President Johnson had before him when he received General Taylor's and my report last week.

Some critics of our present policy have suggested one option -- that we simply withdraw. This the United States totally rejects for reasons I have stated.

Other critics have called for a second and similar option -- a "neutralization" of Vietnam. This, however, is the game of "What's mine is mine and what's yours is negotiable." No one seriously believes the Communists would agree to "neutralization" of North Vietnam.

And, so far as South Vietnam is concerned, we have learned from the past that the Communists rarely honor the kind of treaty that runs counter to their compulsion to expand.

Under the shadow of Communist power, "neutralization" would in reality be an interim device to permit Communist consolidation and eventual takeover. When General Taylor and I were in Hue, at the north end of South Vietnam, two weeks ago, several Vietnamese students carried posters which showed their recognition of the reality of "neutralization." The sign read: "Neutralize today, Communize tomorrow."

"Neutralization" of South Vietnam, which is today under unprovoked subversive attack, would not be in any sense an achievement of the objectives I have outlined. As we tried to convey in Laos, we have no objection in principle to neutrality in the sense of nonalignment. But even there we are learning lessons.

Communist abuse of the Geneva accords, by treating the Laos corridor as a sanctuary for infiltration, constantly threatens the precarious

neutrality. "Neutralization of South Vietnam" -- an ambiguous phrase at best -- was therefore rejected.

The third option before the President was initiation of military actions outside South Vietnam, particularly against North Vietnam, in order to supplement the counterinsurgency program in South Vietnam.

This course of action -- its implications and ways of carring it out -- has been carefully studied.

Whatever ultimate course of action may be forced upon us by the other side, it is clear that actions under this option would be only a supplement to, not a substitute for, progress within South Vietnam's own borders.

The fourth course of action was to concentrate on helping the South Vietnamese with the battle in their own country. This, all agree, is essential no matter what else is done.

The President therefore approved the 12 recommendations that General Taylor and I made relating to this option.

We have reaffirmed United States support for South Vietnam's Government and pledged economic assistance and military training and logistical support for as long as it takes to bring the insurgency under control.

We will support the Government of South Vietnam in carrying out its anti-insurgency plan. Under that plan, Prime Minister Khanh intends to implement a national mobilization program to mobilize all national resources in the struggle.

This means improving the quality of the strategic hamlets, building them systematically outward from secure areas, and correcting

previous overextension.

The security forces of Vietnam will be increased by at least 50,000 men. They will be consolidated, and their effectiveness and conditions of service will be improved. They will press the campaign with increased intensity. We will provide required additional material.

This will include strengthening of the Vietnamese Air Force with better aircraft and improving the mobility of the ground forces.

A broad national program is to be carried out, giving top priority to rural needs. The program includes land reform, loans to tenant farmers, health and welfare measures, economic development, and improved status for ethnic minorities and paramilitary troops.

A civil administrative corps will be established to bring better public services to the people. This will include teachers, health technicians, agricultural workers, and other technicians.

The initial goal during 1964 will be at least 7,500 additional persons; ultimately there will be at least 40,000 men for more than 8,000 hamlets, in 2,500 villages and 43 provinces.

Farm productivity will be increased through doubled use of fertilizers to provide immediate and direct benefits to peasants in secure areas and to increase both their earnings and the nation's export earnings.

We have learned that in Vietnam, political and economic progress are the sine qua non of military success, and that military security is equally a prerequisite of internal progress. Our future joint efforts with the Vietnamese are going to apply these lessons.

To conclude: let me reiterate that our goal is peace and stability, both in Vietnam and Southeast Asia. But we have learned that "peace at

any price" is not practical in the long run, and that the cost of defending freedom must be borne if we are to have it at all.

The road ahead in Vietnam is going to be long, difficult and frustrating. It will take work, courage, imagination and -- perhaps more than anything else -- patience to bear the burden of what President Kennedy called a "long twilight struggle."

In Vietnam, it has not been finished in the first hundred days of President Johnson's Administration, and it may not be finished in the first 1,000 days; but, in cooperation with General Khanh's Government, we have made a beginning.

When the day comes that we can safely withdraw, we expect to leave an independent and stable South Vietnam, rich with resources and bright with prospects for contributing to the peace and prosperity of Southeast Asia and of the world.

Appendix B

"Foreign Policy Under The New President"
Remarks of Senator Wayne Morse
University of Kansas
April 1, 1964[1]

Perhaps the ablest and best statement of the foreign policy objectives and principles of President Johnson was made by the President himself in his remarks on March 24 to a labor organization in Washington, D. C.

In it, he departed from his written text to deliver some heartfelt ideas which he was seeking to put into practice in our international relations. I quote in full the foreign policy paragraphs of that speech:

"And before I conclude, for a moment, if I may, I would just like to simply talk to you about your family and mine, about their future and their country.

"Last Sunday -- Palm Sunday -- as I sat in church I thought about all the problems that face this world -- ancient feuds and recent quarrels that have disturbed widely separated parts of the earth.

"You have seen five or six different wars appearing on the front page of your morning newspaper and you've heard about our foreign policy.

"The world has changed and so has the method of dealing

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[1]Copy of the original manuscript, "Foreign Policy Under the New President," University of Kansas Archives, (April 1, 1964), pp. 1-14.

with disruptions of the peace.

"There may have been a time when a commander in chief would order soldiers to march the very moment a disturbance occurred, although restraint and fairness are not new to the American tradition.

"As a matter of fact, some people urged me to hurry in the Marines when the air became a little hot on a particular occasion recently.

"But the world as it was and the world as it is are not the same any more. Once -- once upon a time even large-scale wars could be waged without risking the end of civilization. But what was once upon a time is no longer so, because general war is impossible. In a matter of moments you can wipe out from 50 to 100 million of our adversaries or they can, in the same amount of time, wipe out 50 to 100 million of our people, taking half of our land, half of our population in a matter of an hour.

"So general war is impossible and some alternatives are essential.

"The people of the world, I think, prefer reasoned agreement to ready attack. And that is why we must follow the Prophet Isaiah many, many times before we send the Marines, and say, "Come now and let us reason together.

The Quest for Peace

"And this is our objective -- the quest for peace and not the quarrels of war.

"In this nuclear world -- in this world of 100 new nations

-- we must offer the outstretched arm that tries to help instead of an arm-length sword that helps to kill.

"In every trouble spot in the world this hope for reasoned agreement instead of rash retaliation can bear fruit. Agreement is being sought and we hope and believe will soon be worked out with our Panamanian friends.

"The United Nations peacekeeping machinery is already on its merciful mission in Cyprus and a mediator is being selected.

"The water problem that disturbed us at Guantanamo is solved not by a battalion of marines, bayonetting in to turn on the water, but we sent a single admiral over to cut it off.

"And I can say to you that our base is self-sufficient in lean readiness and a source of danger and disagreement has been removed.

"In Vietnam divergent voices cry out with suggestions, some for a larger scale war, some for more appeasement, some even for a retreat. We do not criticize or demean them. We consider carefully their suggestions. But today finds us where President Eisenhower found himself 10 years ago. The position he took with Vietnam then in a letter he sent to the then President is one that I could take in complete honesty today. And that is that we stand ready to help the Vietnamese preserve their independence and retain their freedom and keep from being enveloped by Communism.

"We, the most powerful nation in the world, can afford to be patient. Our ultimate strength is clear and it's well known to those who would be our adversaries. But let's be reminded that power brings obligations.

"The people in this country have more blessed hopes than bitter victories. The people of this country and the world expect more from their leaders than just a show of brute force. And so our hope and our purpose is to employ reasoned agreement instead of ready aggression, to preserve our honor without a world in ruins, to substitute if we can understanding for retaliation.

"My most fervent prayer is to be a President who can make it possible for every boy in this land to grow to manhood by loving his country -- instead of dying for it."

Yet despite the obvious changes in style from that of his predecessor, the policies of Lyndon Johnson are really much the same as those of John Kennedy, just as it was essentially style that differentiated the foreign policies of John Kennedy from those of President Eisenhower before him.

There is hardly an area in the world, or an issue in the world, that is not being handled by the United States along the lines laid down in the decade of the 1950's by President Eisenhower and his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles.

This is undoubtedly the reason why the foreign aid debate in the Senate last year, which attacked some of these favorite ingrained habits of American policy, and the recent speech of Chairman Fulbright of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, had such a noticeable impact upon official Washington and in the press.

Americans have long been afraid to use the word "normalcy." It has ugly implications of a retreat from world events and responsibilities. But we are finding that there _is_ such a thing as normalcy in world

affairs in that a nation cannot remain permanently on a moral and material basis of war, near war, and preparation for war. Neither can the world.

When the Soviet Union and the United States backed off from the nuclear show-down of October, 1962, they in effect accepted a state of normalcy as the alternative to mutual destruction. Since that time, both the Communist and non-Communist blocs have been pulling and hauling and shaking down into a normalcy of international relations in which all-out nuclear war against each other is tacitly shelved as a method of pursuing national aims.

Yet President Johnson is finding, as President Kennedy was beginning to find, that the policies of the Cold War are inadequate to the problems of normalizing relations with countries toward which we had long practiced nuclear confrontation. So we find ourselves with huge anomalies, like selling wheat to Russia and underwriting its short-term credit terms, while at the same time we try to enforce an all-nation embargo against Cuba and strenuously oppose Britain's plans to extend and underwrite long-term credit for Russia.

We find ourselves pursuing a foreign aid program in under-developed countries like Pakistan and Iran on the same basis as the one which succeeded so miraculously in industrial Europe. Having re-armed Europe against an aggression by Soviet armies, and having rebuilt what was a destroyed economic structure, we have merely gone on to the next countries on the map and tried to do exactly the same things. But the probability and even the possibility of an all-out Soviet attact on her weak and undeveloped neighbors is more remote than

was the possibility of such an attack on Europe; and the economies of these countries were never industrial at all. We are not rebuilding them; we are trying to bring them out of feudalism. But that takes capital in amounts vastly beyond the capacity of this country to provide; and more important, it takes institutions of law, property rights, education, and social incentives that require generations to develop.

In 1947, President Truman proposed a 15-month program of U.S. aid to Greece and Turkey.

I was among the first in the Senate to endorse and support the Truman Doctrine. So did I later support and vote for the magnificent Marshall Plan. Under the same circumstances, I would support both programs again. But I cannot support today's foreign aid program under today's circumstances.

To a large extent, when these original programs had accomplished their objectives, foreign aid became an end in itself. As the Communist threat to Greece and Turkey receded, we sent them greatly increased aid for different reasons.

Similarly, the Marshall Plan accomplished its purpose of restoring the industrial plant of Europe destroyed by the war. But unlike the Marshall Plan, our current aid programs have little definition or direction.

The theory that sending aid to a string of countries bordering the Communist bloc makes them a bulwark against aggression is the weakest justification for the program. It is related to the argument that it is cheaper to put one Turk or Pakistani in the field than to

put one U.S. soldier in the field.

But we end up putting them all in the field. A look at where U.S. military forces are stationed overseas makes it obvious that these nations cannot and do not defend themselves. The South Korean army of 600,000 costs us an average of around $330 million a year, but it does not defend Korea. Our own 50,000 troops there do. The large army of Chinese that we maintain on Taiwan at a cost in economic and military aid of around $160 million a year, does not defend the island from invasion by Red China. The U.S. Seventh Fleet does.

The government we helped creat in South Vietnam in 1954 and which we now maintain at a cost of $1 million a day in a country of 14.5 million people is not protecting Vietnam from the Viet Cong. We still have to send 15,000 Americans to do it.

In case these forces on the spot are not enough, we also keep around 100,000 men in nearby Japan, Okinawa, and the Philippines for use where they may be needed.

In each of these countries, and elsewhere on the Communist perimeter, if real aggression develops, it will be the might of Uncle Sam that will defend them. The aid we send to maintain their bloated military establishments is largely wasted.

On the other fallacies of foreign aid is the assumption that recipients will really line up against Communism. Far from it. If a nation's interests are opposed to Communism it will line up against it with or without our aid. If its interests coincide with Communism, all the aid we send them will not make much difference.

Delusion of Grandeur

Essentially, all countries pursue their own interests, not ours. Yugoslavia broke with Russia in 1948 because Tito refused to make his country the economic vassal of Russia. It was after the break that we began sending aid, including military aid, and it finally totaled over $2 billion. But as soon as Tito could renew ties with Russia on his own terms, he quickly did so, U.S. aid or not. Aid was then cut off. But that has not broken up Tito's friendship with Russia. The theory that U.S. aid woos nations away from friendship with the Soviet bloc does not explain relations between Russia and Yugoslavia, much less between Russia and Red China.

Pakistan is another example. It has received military aid to what has been called the saturation point. Its economic aid in 1962 alone was over $400 million; it has totaled around $2 billion.

But when Pakistan found an opportunity to advance its national interests against India, we found that her anti-Communist resolve did not extend to Red China. Pakistan has opened the Asian door to Red China, and her ministers brag of her new friendship with the Communist regime.

Throughout the history of the foreign aid program, it has been characterized by what I can only call lax administration that has resulted in report after report by the General Accounting Office citing wasteful management.

The most recent one is dated February, 1964. It deals with funds disbursed under the foreign aid program for development projects in countries party to the Central Treaty Organization. This group of

Middle East nations calls the treaty organization CENTO. Its members are Turkey, Pakistan, Iran, and the United Kingdom.

The General Accounting Office noted that certain earmarked funds are appropriated for projects that will aid the development of this regional group. Hence, they must be spent for projects that will be of benefit to two or more members.

I quote the findings of the Comptroller General from its inquiry into four CENTO development projects:

"Because the availability of local resources was not adequately explored, grant and loan funds aggregating more than $8 million were used for purposes other than those for which they were initially obligated and for financing imports which were not needed or could be produced in the recipient country. Furthermore, the economic feasibility of the three projects for which the funds were obligated was dubious and, as conditions existed at the time of our review, there was no assurance that two of the three projects involved would ever be completed."

Elsewhere in his report the Comptroller General stated:

"A further consideration is that in all of these instances the purposes for which the funds were finally authorized did not appear to be of a regional character as defined by the Agency, but seemed merely to augment the levels of aid of the respective countries beyond the levels programmed and reported by the Agency."

Remember that aid to joint CENTO projects comes under the heading of "Regional aid," and is in addition to the much larger sums programmed specifically for Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan.

The General Accounting Office is responsible for seeing to it that funds are spent in accordance with the law. In this case, its primary case against the administration of the AID was that these particular projects did not partake of the regional quality they are required to have.

But these shortcomings in foreign aid are those that are found to occur in almost every agency of the government. They are serious, just as it is serious when fraud is found, say, in a federal grain storage program.

What is really the waste of foreign aid, however, is the political policy use it is put to that is beyond the jurisdiction of the General Accounting Office. My basic challenge goes to the policy for which we lay out anywhere from $3 to $5 billion a year to promote.

I have not even mentioned that the United States is not formally a member of CENTO at all. We only engage in certain conversations with its council of ministers. Yet we have backed this paper organization and its individual members with tens of billions of dollars in the hope of propping up their semi-feudal regimes against the inroads of Communism.

This policy is not only doomed to failure. It is creating trouble for the United States that has nothing to do with Communism.

No better examples could be mentioned than two CENTO members -- Turkey and Pakistan. In addition to their common membership in CENTO, Turkey shares membership with us in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Pakistan shares membership with us in the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO).

Today Turkey is close to war. But it is not war with Russia, for which we gave Turkey billions of dollars. If it comes, her war will be with Greece, and possibly Cyprus. Yet our aid to Greece has been only slightly less than our aid to Turkey, and the military forces of both countries are armed and clothed almost entirely by the American taxpayers. Their military build-ups over the Cyprus issue are costing their governments heavily at a time when we are putting in capital in the effort to develop their limited and backward economies.

Of course, we have tried to intercede in this blood feud between Greek and Turk. We have even undertaken to help pay for the peacekeeping force on Cyprus. But our harvest has been the bitter animosity of both Turks and Greeks. Anti-American riots have taken place in Athens and the statue of President Truman, erected in honor of the Truman Doctrine that saved Greece from Communism, has frequently been defaced.

Two other very large beneficiaries of U.S. foreign aid have been Pakistan and India. Pakistan borders China and is very close to Russia. India has been considered important to the stability of Asia because she is the most populous non-Communist country in that part of the world.

But if our interest in both of them is one of anti-Communism, their greatest interest in each other is the disputed province of Kashmir. And it is an interest of mutual hatred that dates back as far as Moslems and Hindus date back.

Here, too, the United States has tried to intercede in a blood

feud by trying to propose settlements of the Kashmir dispute. I am satisfied that Pakistan has belonged to CENTO and SEATO for one reason only -- for the money she could get from us and the military equipment she got from us on the basis of her treaty membership. But if any of that military force in Pakistan is ever used, it will be used against India and not against Russia or China at all.

Since the 1962 attack by China against the borders of India, we have compounded our mistaken involvement there by undertaking a big new military aid program to India. It is a mistake equalled only by our mistaken and misguided aid to Pakistan.

Out of both countries are coming increasing reports of anti-Americanism generated by the aid we give the other.

The United States has not yet faced the reality that all these countries, and many I have not mentioned, are using our aid for their nationalistic purposes, not ours. Many of them have ancient rivalries that predate by far the very existence of the United States. Their problems of population growth, economic development, nationalistic and religious animosities are never going to be harnessed by the United States from 7 to 8,000 miles away, no matter how much money we spend in the effort to do so.

This is not to say that I expect President Johnson to begin at once to update our outworn aid and other foreign policies to fit the needs of today.

In 1954, the French suffered their worst and final defeat in Indochina. After four years of fighting to retain this hugh colonial holding in the Far East, they had suffered hundreds of thousands of

casualties. The United States had shouldered more than half the cost of that war, giving France close to $1.5 billion to carry it on.

But she gave up the ghost. The peace was arranged at Geneva, Switzerland, in what has come to be called the Geneva Accords. The United States was not party, nor signatory, to those accords. But we said we would recognize them as international treaties and would consider their violation to be a threat to international peace.

Indo-china was partitioned into four countries. The eastern half became North and South Vietnam and the western half became Laos and Cambodia. It was late 1954 and early 1955 that the United States began to pick up the pieces dropped by the French in South Vietnam. The old French-supported ruler, Bao Dai, selected Ngo Dinh Diem to head the government of South Vietnam. He was pro-western. The United States moved to back him heavily, with both financial and military aid.

The President said that today finds us just where we were 10 years ago in South Vietnam. But that is not quite true. We are $2 billion poorer for the economic aid we have put into that area of 14 million people, and we are an unknown amount poorer for the military aid we have put in. We have added 15,000 U.S. troops to the ante since 1954.

Even so, the military and political situation in South Vietnam has deteriorated since 1954. That is, in fact, why we have stepped up our rate of financial aid and our rate of military participation. Our rate of aid is apparently well over the mark of half a billion dollars a year. In a population of 14 million, about 20,000 to

25,000 are "hard-core" anti-government guerrillas. But the Viet Cong can muster forces of 60,000 to 80,000. Against them, the South Vietnamese have an army of 400,000, supported, guided, and directed by 15,500 Americans. Moreover, South Vietnam will soon, and for the first time, undertake military conscription to raise its forces to 450,000.

Despite American aid to this area that has totaled about $5.5 billion since the French first began their war in Indochina, the position of pro-western forces there has steadily deteriorated. By 1961, it required direct U.S. military participation. In the fall of 1963, it was worsened by the political upheaval. In March of 1964, Secretary McNamara reports that the situation has "unquestionably worsened" since last fall.

But certain other factors have changed even more. First, the local government we have been supporting there has changed hands not once, but twice. The faction that has held power in South Vietnam has, ever since 1954, done so only through American financial and military support. But the faction that holds power now cannot be described as anything but an American puppet.

The pretense of regional security has been dropped long since. The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization has dropped out of the picture, although it was on the basis of our membership in that organization that we went into South Vietnam in 1954.

There is no multi-lateral policy of SEATO signatories, there is no multi-lateral action being taken by SEATO to deal with the civil war in Vietnam.

Rather, we are there, we say, at the invitation of the South

Vietnamese government. But that government is our own creature. We know it and the world knows it. One might as well try to claim that the Soviet army is in East Germany only on the invitation of the East German government. A puppet is a puppet, and South Vietnam has not had more than a U.S. puppet government in its 10 years of existence.

Freedom in South Vietnam? I do not believe that more than the tiny fraction of its 14 million people who have benefited and prospered from American assistance can be considered to be "free" in any sense that Americans understand the word. Let us keep in mind when we hear that the United States is fighting for "freedom" in South Vietnam that what is really meant is that we are trying to preempt the area from what we fear may be Communism.

We think we are keeping Communists out. That is why we are in South Vietnam.

But look at something else that has changed drastically since 1954. Ten years ago we heard about the "domino" theory. South Vietnam was the first "domino" in the line. Next to it was Cambodia and Laos, then Thailand and Burma. Below Thailand stretches the Malaysian Federation, and behond that, Indonesia.

There were the row of "dominoes" all of which were expected to drop into the lap of Communism if South Vietnam did so.

One of the greatest fallacies of the "domino" theory was that any country not in the western camp was considered to be in the Communist camp. That was where the theory began to lead us astray. We convinced ourselves that any nation not imbedded with American economic and military aid programs, and all their attendant advisers, was as

good as Communist.

But what has happened to the row of dominoes since 1954? North Vietnam has always been outside the scope of American influence. Laos was neutralized by agreement, Cambodia has recently ousted all American aid missions and declared herself neutral, and Burma long ago put herself outside the circle of American military protection. Indonesia certainly is neutral insofar as her sympathies and policies toward America and China are concerned.

The only countries left in the row of dominoes as we originally conceived it are South Vietnam, Thailand, and Malaysia. Yet none of the rest, except North Vietnam which was never in the row, has become a Communist state. Undemocratic and totalitarian, yes, but so are South Vietnam and Thailand.

Perhaps one can say that as South Vietnam goes, so goes Thailand; but it cannot be said that as South Vietnam goes, so goes Southeast Asia. And South Vietnam and Thailand are already separated by the neutralist states of Laos and Cambodia.

If any slogan is useful in this part of the world, it would be that as the rest of Southeast Asia goes, South Vietnam will go that way, too, no matter how much American treasure and blood are spent to prevent it. The dominoes are taking themselves out of the western line-up. We cannot preserve even South Vietnam as an American puppet for long.

The most optimistic American forecast for South Vietnam was made by the Secretary of Defense when he said we would aid the country "forever." That is our outlook and our prospect. "Forever." As

much as she needs as long as she needs it. If that is the policy of the Johnson Administration in South Vietnam, then every President 10 years, 20 years, 50 years fron now will find himself where Eisenhower and Johnson found themselves. But the price will go up every decade just to keep the United States in the same place.

President Johnson is proud, and rightfully so, that the United States has not hastened to send Marines into Cuba. He rightfully points to the activities of the United Nations to keep the peace in Cyprus, however belated was our support for taking that issue to the U.N.

Why, then, does the President believe it necessary or desirable to send our Special Forces to South Vietnam? What American vital interest in South Vietnam deserves the presense of American men in uniform?

Why, too, is not the United Nations the place for the South Vietnam issue, just as it is the place for the Cyprus issue? Why, indeed, does not the President apply his prescription for "reasoned agreement" and understanding to South Vietnam?

Neither the President's remarks nor the speech of the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee gives any explanation of why this country has not used the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization or the United Nations for the South Vietnam issue. Those countries party to SEATO with us are Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, Philippines, Pakistan, France and Great Britain. It was created to deal with threats to the peace in Southeast Asia, and an amendment specifically described South Vietnam as an area of concern and mutual interest to

the parties about which they would consult in case of any threat to the peace.

But they are not with us in Vietnam. Is it because none of our treaty partners thinks we are right in trying to hold it as a U.S. area of influence? Is it because the Asiatic members of SEATO do not want to associate themselves with the United States in its campaign to stay in Asia? Is it because France, Britain, Australia, and New Zealand know that the white man is being thrown out of non-white countries and that the effort to stay will be increasingly costly?

Why is there no joint SEATO action in South Vietnam? It is an area of mutual interest to all SEATO partners under the protocol to the SEATO treaty. Why are we acting unilaterally there? The Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee declares that "it should be clear to all concerned that the United States will continue to meet its obligations and fulfill its commitments with respect to Vietnam." What obligations and commitments do we have toward Vietnam that are any more or any less than those of every other SEATO member?

None. But we have mistakenly built up many emotional commitments to ourselves. We took a tiger by the tail 10 years ago and no one in high office knows how to let go of it. So we call that a "commitment". What is really meant is face and prestige. We backed a puppet there 10 years ago, and we are afraid the world will laugh at us if we recognize that it has been a flop. The government to which we gave the backing in 1954 is gone, and the United States Government was glad to see it go.

I say that we have a greater commitment to SEATO, to the United Nations, and to world peace than we ever had to any government of South Vietnam, whichever one it may be at the moment. When are we going to begin honoring <u>those</u> obligations?

As long as the United States maintains a unilateral intervention in South Vietnam it is going to cost ever more American money and American blood. There are no Chinese soldiers fighting in South Vietnam; there are no Russian soldiers. The only foreign troops are Americans.

There are no Thais, or Australians, or French, or Pakistanis, of Filipinos fighting in South Vietnam. Why not?

France gave up a hopeless struggle 10 years ago. Yet today it is France that is offering political leadership to this same part of the world. Our military and economic leadership, to which Senator Fulbright and others give so much credit, has not kept Cambodia, Burma, Laos, or Indonesia from neutralizing themselves. It is time we provided some up-to-date political leadership, too, and that means a drastic change from the 10-year old failure known as the domino policy.

"The people of the world, I think, prefer reasoned agreement to ready attack," said President Johnson, "And that is why we must follow Prophet Isiah many many times before we send the marines, and say, 'Come now and let us reason together.'"

The Johnson Administration will be in office five years from now, and probably 9 years from now. But before it leaves, it is going to have to apply those words to Vietnam, or face permanent and perpetual war in Asia, alone, without allies, without United Nations

backing, and with only the precedents of failure of France, Britain, and the Netherlands to maintain their footholds on the Asian mainland.

If I am critical of this aspect of the foreign policy of the Johnson Administration, it is only because I was critical of the same mistaken and fruitless policy when it was undertaken by President Eisenhower. It is symptomatic of the many challenges President Lyndon Johnson will face because it will be in his Administration that the United States will have to face, finally, the changes rendered in the world by the breakup of the two power block systems for which nearly all our present foreign policies were devised.

Appendix C

Foreign Policy - Old Myths and New Realities

Mr. Fulbright. Mr. President, there is an inevitable divergence, attributable to the imperfections of the human mind, between the world as it is and the world as men perceive it. As long as our perceptions are reasonably close to objective reality, it is possible for us to act upon our problems in a rational and appropriate manner. But when our perceptions fail to keep pace with events, when we refuse to believe something because it displeases or frightens us, or because it is simply startlingly unfamiliar, then the gap between fact and perception becomes a chasm, and action becomes irrelevant and irrational.

There has always - and inevitably - been some divergence between the realities of foreign policy and our ideas about it. This divergence has in certain respects been growing, rather than narrowing; and we are handicapped, accordingly, by policies based on old myths, rather than current realities. This divergence is, in my opinion, dangerous and unnecessary - dangerous, because it can reduce foreign policy to a fraudulent game of imagery and appearances; unnecessary, because it can be overcome by the determination of men in high office to dispel prevailing misconceptions by the candid dissemination of unpleasant, but inescapable, facts.

Before commenting on some of the specific areas where I believe our policies are at least partially based on cherished myths,

rather than objective facts, I should like to suggest two possible reasons for the growing divergence between the realities and our perceptions of current world politics. The first is the radical change in relations between and within the Communist and the free world; and the second is the tendency of too many of us to confuse means with ends and, accordingly, to adhere to prevailing practices with a fervor befitting immutable principles.

Although it is too soon to render a definitive judgment, there is mounting evidence that events of recent years have wrought profound changes in the character of East-West relations. In the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962, the United States proved to the Soviet Union that a policy of aggression and adventure involved unacceptable risks. In the signing of the test ban treaty, each side in effect assured the other that it was prepared to forego, at least for the present, any bid for a decisive military or political breakthrough. These occurrences, it should be added, took place against the background of the clearly understood strategic superiority - but not supremacy - of the United States.

It seems reasonable, therefore, to suggest that the character of the cold war has, for the present, at least, been profoundly altered: by the drawing back of the Soviet Union from extremely aggressive policies; by the implicit repudiation by both sides of a policy of "total victory"; and by the establishment of an American strategic superiority which the Soviet Union appears to have tacitly accepted because it has been accompanied by assurances that it will be exercised by the United States with responsibility and restraint.

These enormously important changes may come to be regarded by historians as the foremost achievements of the Kennedy administration in the field of foreign policy. Their effect has been to commit us to a foreign policy which can accurately - though perhaps not prudently - be defined as one of "peaceful coexistence."

Another of the results of the lowering of tensions between East and West is that each is now free to enjoy the luxury of accelerated strife and squabbling within its own domain. The ideological thunderbolts between Washington and Moscow which until a few years ago seemed a permanent part of our daily lives have become a pale shadow of their former selves. Now, instead, the United States waits in fascinated apprehension for the Olympian pronouncements that issue from Paris at 6-month intervals while the Russians respond to the crude epithets of Peiping with almost plaintive rejoinders about "those who want to start a war against everybody."

These astonishing changes in the configuration of the postwar world have had an unsettling effect on both public and official opinion in the United States. One reason for this, I believe, lies in the fact that we are a people used to looking at the world, and indeed at ourselves, in moralistic rather than empirical terms. We are predisposed to regard any conflict as a clash between good and evil rather than as simply a clash between conflicting interests. We are inclined to confuse freedom and democracy, which we regard as moral principles, with the way in which they are practiced in America - with capitalism, federalism, and the two-party system, which are not moral principles but simply the preferred and accepted practices of the American people. There is much cant in American moralism and

not a little inconsistency. It resembles in some ways the religious faith of the many respectable people who, in Samuel Butler's words, "would be equally horrified to hear the Christian religion doubted or to see it practiced."

Our national vocabulary is full of "self-evident truths" not only about "life, liberty, and happiness," but about a vast number of personal and public issues, including the cold war. It has become one of the "self-evident truths" of the postwar era that just as the President resides in Washington and the Pope in Rome, the Devil resides immutably in Moscow. We have come to regard the Kremlin as the permanent seat of his power and we have grown almost comfortable with a menace which, though unspeakably evil, has had the redeeming virtues of constancy, predictability, and familiarity. Now the Devil has betrayed us by traveling abroad and worse still, by dispersing himself, turning up now here, now there, and in many places at once, with a develish disregard for the laboriously constructed frontiers of ideology.

We are confronted with a complex and fluid world situation and we are not adapting ourselves to it. We are clinging to old myths in the face of new realities and we are seeking to escape the contradictions by narrowing the permissible bounds of public discussion, by relegating an increasing number of ideas and viewpoints to a growing category of "unthinkable thoughts." I believe that this tendency can and should be reversed, that it is within our ability, and unquestionably in our interests, to cut loose from established myths and to start thinking some "unthinkable thoughts" - about the

cold war and East-West relations, about the underdeveloped countries and particularly those in Latin America, about the changing nature of the Chinese Communist threat in Asia and about the festering war in Vietnam.

The master myth of the cold war is that the Communist bloc is a monolith composed of governments which are not really governments at all but organized conspiracies divided among themselves perhaps in certain matters of tactics, but all equally resolute and implacable in their determination to destroy the free world.

I believe that the Communist world is indeed hostile to the free world in its general and long-term intentions but that the existence of this animosity in principle is far less important for our foreign policy than the great variations in its intensity and character both in time and among the individual members of the Communist bloc. Only if we recognize these variations, ranging from China, which poses immediate threats to the free world, to Poland and Yugoslavia, which pose none, can we hope to act effectively upon the bloc and to turn its internal differences to our own advantage and to the advantage of those bloc countries which wish to maximize their independence. It is the responsiblity of our national leaders, both in the executive branch and in Congress, to acknowledge and act upon these realities, even at the cost of saying things which will not win immediate widespread enthusiasm.

For a start, we can acknowledge the fact that the Soviet Union, though still a most formidable adversary, has ceased to be totally and implacably hostile to the West. It has shown a new willingness to enter mutually advantageous arrangements with the West

and, thus far at least, to honor them. It has, therefore, become possible to divert some of our energies from the prosecution of the cold war to the relaxation of the cold war and to deal with the Soviet Union, for certain purposes, as a normal state with normal and traditional interests.

If we are to do these things effectively, we must distinguish between communism as an ideology and the power and policy of the Soviet state. It is not communism as a doctrine, or communism as it is practices within the Soviet Union or within any other country, that threatens us. How the Soviet Union organizes its internal life, the gods and doctrines that it worships, are matters for the Soviet Union to determine. It is not Communist dogma as espoused within Russia but Communist imperialism that threatens us and other peoples of the non-Communist world. Insofar as a great nation mobilizes its power and resources for aggressive purposes, that nation, regardless of ideology, makes itself our enemy. Insofar as a nation is content to practice its doctrines within its own frontiers, that nation, however repugnant its ideology, is one with which we have no proper quarrel. We must deal with the Soviet Union as a great power, quite apart from differences of ideology. To the extent that the Soviet leaders abandon the global ambitions of Marxist ideology, in fact if not in words, it becomes possible for us to engage in normal relations which probably cannot be close or trusting for many years to come but which can be gradually freed of the terror and the tensions of the cold war.

In our relations with the Russians, and indeed in our relations

with all nations, we would do well to remember, and to act upon, the words of Pope John in the great Encyclical, Pacem in Terris:

> "It must be borne in mind," said Pope John, "that to preceed gradually is the law of life in all its expressions, therefore, in human institutions, too, it is not possible to renovate for the better except by working from within them, gradually. Violence has always achieved only destruction, not construction, the kindling of passions, not their pacification, the accumulation of hate and ruin, not the reconcilation of the contending parties. And it has reduced men and parties to the difficult task of rebuilding, after sad experience, on the ruins of discord."

Important opportunities have been created for Western policy by the development of "polycentrism" in the Communist bloc. The Communist nations, as George Kennan has pointed out, are like the Western nations, currently caught up in a crisis of indecision about their relations with countries outside their own ideological bloc. The choices open to the satellite states are limited but by no means insignificant. They can adhere slavishly to Soviet preferences or they can strike out on their own, within limits, to enter into mutually advantageous relations with the West.

Whether they do so, and to what extent, is to some extent at least within the power of the West to determine. If we persist in the view that all Communist regimes are equally hostile and equally threatening to the West, and that we have no policy toward the captive nations except the eventual overthrow of their Communist regimes, then the West may enforce upon the Communist bloc a degree of unity which the Soviet Union has shown itself to be quite incapable of imposing -- just as Stalin in the early postwar years frightened the West into a degree of unity

that it almost certainly could not have attained by its own unaided efforts. If, on the other hand, we are willing to reexamine the view that all Communist regimes are alike in the threat which they pose for the West -- a view which had a certain validity in Stalin's time -- then we may be able to exert an important influence on the course of events within a divided Communist world.

We are to a great extent the victims, and the Soviets the beneficiaries, of our own ideological convictions, and of the curious contradictions which they involve. We consider it a form of subversion of the free world, for example, when the Russians enter trade relations or conclude a consular convention or establish airline connections with a free country in Asia, Africa, or Latin America -- and to a certain extent we are right. On the other hand, when it is proposed that we adopt the same strategy in reverse -- by extending commerical credits to Poland or Yugoslavia, or by exchanging Ambassadors with a Hungarian regime which has changed considerably in character since the revolution of 1956 -- then the same patriots who are so alarmed by Soviet activities in the free world charge our policymakers with "giving aid and comfort to the emeny" and with innumerable other categories of idiocy and immorality.

It is time that we resolved this contradiction and separated myth from reality. The myth is that every Communist state is an unmitigated evil and a relentless enemy of the free world; the reality it that some Communist regimes pose a threat to the free world while others pose little or none, and that if we will recognize these distinctions, we ourselves will be able to influence events in the Communist bloc in a way favorable to the security of the free world.

It could well be argued * * * --

Writes George Kennan --

> That if the major Western Powers had full freedom of movement in devising their own policies, it would be within their power to determine whether the Chinese view, or the Soviet view, or perhaps a view more liberal than either would ultimately prevail within the Communist camp. George Kennan, "Polycentrism and Western Policy," Foreign Affairs, January 1964, page 178.

There are numerous areas in which we can seek to reduce the tensions of the cold war and to bring a degree of normalcy into our relations with the Soviet Union and other Communist countries -- once we have resolved that it is safe and wise to do so. We have already taken important steps in this direction: the Antarctic and Austrian treaties and the nuclear test ban treaty, the broadening of East-West cultural and educational relations, and the expansion of trade.

On the basis of recent experience and present economic needs, there seems little likelihood of a spectacular increase in trade between Communist and Western countries, even if existing restrictions were to be relaxed. Free world trade with Communist countries have been increasing at a steady but unspectacular rate, and it seems unlikely to be greatly accelerated because of the limited ability of the Communist countries to pay for increased imports. A modest increase in East-West trade may nonetheless serve as a modest instrument of East-West detente -- provided that we are able to overcome the myth that trade with Communist countries is a compact with the Devil and to recognize that, on the contrary, trade can serve as an effective and honorable means of advancing both peace and human welfare.

Whether we are able to make these philosophic adjustments or not, we cannot escape the fact that our efforts to devise a common Western trade policy are a palpable failure and that our allies are going to trade with the Communist bloc whether we like it or not. The world's major exporting nations are slowly but steadily increasing their trade with the Communist bloc and the bloc countries are showing themselves to be reliable customers. Since 1958 Western Europe has been increasing its exports to the East at the rate of about 7 percent a year, which is nearly the same rate at which is overall world sales have been increasing.

West Germany -- one of our close friends -- is by far the leading Western nation in trade with the Sino-Soviet bloc. West German exports to bloc countries in 1962 were valued at $749.9 million. Britain was in second place -- although not a close second -- with exports to Communist countries amounting to $393 million in 1962. France followed with exports worth $313.4 million, and the figure for the United States -- consisting largely of surplus food sales to Poland under Public Law 480 -- stood far below at $125.1 million.

Our allies have made it plain that they propose to expand this trade, in non-strategic goods, wherever possible. West Germany, in the last 16 months, has exchanged or agreed to exchange trade missions with every country in Eastern Europe except Albania. Britain has indicated that she will soon extend long-term credits to Communist countries, breaching the 5-year limit which the Western allies have hitherto observed. In the light of these facts, it is difficult to see what effect the tight American trade restrictions have other than to deny the United States a substantial share of a profitable market.

The inability of the United States to prevent its partners from trading extensively with the Communist bloc is one good reason for relaxing our own restrictions, but there is a better reason: the potential value of trade -- a moderate volume of trade in nonstrategic items -- as an instrument for reducing world tensions and strengthening the foundations of peace. I do not think that trade or the nuclear test ban, or any other prospective East-West accommodation, will lead to a grand reconciliation that will end the cold war and usher in the brotherhood of man. At the most, the cumulative effect of all the agreements that are likely to be attainable in the foreseeable future will be the alleviation of the extreme tensions and animosities that threaten the world with nuclear devastation and the gradual conversion of the struggle between communism and the free world into a safer and more tolerable international rivalry, one which may be with us for years and decades to come but which need not be so terrifying and so costly as to distract the nations of the world from the creative pursuits of civilized societies.

There is little in history to justify the expectation that we can either win the cold war or end it immediately and completely. These are favored myths, respectively, of the American right and of the American left. They are, I believe, equal in their unreality and in their disregard for the feasibilities of history. We must disabuse ourselves of them and come to terms, at last, with the realities of a world in which neither good nor evil is absolute and in which those who move events and make history are those who have understood not how much but how little it is within our power to change.

Mr. President, in an address on February 18 at Bad Godesburg, the

U. S. Ambassador to Germany, Mr. George McGhee, spoke eloquently and wisely about the character and prospects of relations between the Communist and the free worlds. I ask unanimous consent that Ambassador McGhee's address, "East-West Relations Today," be inserted in the Record at the end of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Kennedy in the chair). Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. Fulbright. Latin America is one of the areas of the world in which American policy is weakened by a growing divergency between old myths and new realities.

The crisis over the Panama Canal has been unnecessarily protracted for reasons of domestic politics and national pride and sensitivity on both sides -- for reasons, that is, of only marginal relevance to the merits of the dispute. I think the Panamanians have unquestionably been more emotional about the dispute than has the United States. I also think that there is less reason for emotionalism on the part of the United States than on the part of Panama. It is important for us to remember that the issue over the canal is only one of a great many in which the United States is involved, and by no means the most important. For Panama, on the other hand, a small nation with a weak economy and an unstable government, the canal is the preeminent factor in the nation's economy and in its foreign relations. Surely in a confrontation so unequal, it is not unreasonable to expect the United States to go a little farther than halfway in the search for a fair settlement.

We Americans would do well, for a start, to divest ourselves of the

silly notion that the issue with Panama is a test of our courage and resolve. I believe that the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, involving a confrontation with nuclear weapons and intercontinental missiles, was indeed a test of our courage, and we acquitted ourselves extremely well in that instance. I am unable to understand how a controversy with a small and poor country, with virtually no military capacity, can possibility be regarded as a test of our bravery and will to defend our interests. It takes stubbornness but not courage to reject the entreaties of the weak. The real test in Panama is not of our valor but of our wisdom and judgment and commonsense.

We would also do well to disabuse ourselves of the myth that there is something morally sacred about the treaty of 1903. The fact of the matter is that the treaty was concluded under circumstances that reflect little credit on the United States. It was made possible by Panama's separation from Colombia, which probably could not have occurred at that time without the dispatch of U. S. warships to prevent the landing of Colombian troops on the isthmus to put down the Panamanian rebellion. The United States not only intervened in Colombia's internal affairs but did so in violation of a treaty concluded in 1846 under which the United States had guaranteed Colombian sovereignty over the isthmus. President Theodore Roosevelt, as he boasted, "took Panama," and proceeded to negotiate the canal treaty with a compliant Panamanian regime. Panamanians contend that they were "shotgunned" into the treaty of 1903 as the price of U. S. protection against a possible effort by Colombia to recover the isthmus. The contention is not without substance.

It is not my purpose here to relate the events of 60 years ago

but only to suggest that there is little basis for a posture of injured innocence and self-righteousness by either side and that we would do much better to resolve the issue on the basis of present realities rather than old myths.

The central reality is that the treaty of 1903 is in certain respects obsolete. The treaty has been revised only twice, in 1936 when the annual rental was raised from $250,000 to $430,000 and other modifications were made, and in 1955 when further changes were made, including an increase in the annual rental to $1.9 million, where it now stands. The canal, of course, contributes far more to the Panamanian economy in the form of wages paid to Panamanian workers and purchases made in Panama. The fact remains, nonetheless, that the annual rental of $1.9 million is a modest sum and should probably be increased. There are other issues, relating to hiring policies for Panamanian workers in the zone, the flying of flags, and other symbols of national pride and sovereignty. The basic problem about the treaty, however, is the exercise of American control over a part of the territory of Panama in this age of intense nationalist and anticolonialist feeling. Justly or not, the Panamanians feel that they are being treated as a colony, or a quasi-colony, of the United States, and this feeling is accentuated by the contrast between the standard of living of the Panamanians, with a per capita income of about $429 a year, and that of the Americans living in the Canal Zone -- immediately adjacent to Panama, of course, and within it -- with a per capita income of $4,228 a year. That is approximately 10 times greater. It is the profound social and economic

alienation between Panama and the Canal Zone, and its impact on the national feeling of the Panamanians, that underlies the current crisis.

Under these circumstances, it seems to me entirely proper and necessary for the United States to take the initiative in proposeing new arrangements that would redress some of Panama's grievances against the treaty as it now stands. I see no reason -- certainly no reason of "weakness" or "dishonor" -- why the United States cannot put an end to the semantic debate over whether treaty revisions are to be "negotiated" or "discussed" by stating positively and clearly that it is prepared to negotiate revisions in the canal treaty and to submit such changes as are made to the Senate for its advice and consent.

I think it is necessary for the United States to do this even though a commitment to revise the treaty may be widely criticized at home. It is the responsibility of the President and his advisers, in situations of this sort, to exercise their own best judgment as to where the national interest lies even though this may necessitate unpopular decisions.

An agreement to "negotiate" revisions is not an agreement to negotiate any particular revision. It would leave us completely free to determine what revisions, and how many revisions, we would be willing to accept. If there is any doubt about this, one can find ample reassurance in the proceedings at Geneva, where several years of "negotiations" for "general and complete disarmament" still leave us with the greatest arsenal of weapons in the history of the world.

The problem of Cuba is more difficult than that of Panama, and far more heavily burdened with the deadweight of old myths and prohibitions

against "unthinkable thoughts." I think the time is overdue for a candid reevaluation of our Cuban policy even though it may lead to distasteful conslusions.

There are and have been three options open to the United States with respect to Cuba: First, the removal of the Castro regime by invading and occupying the island; second, an effort to weaken and ultimately bring down the regime by a policy of political and economic boycott; and finally, acceptance of the Communist regime as a disagreeable reality and annoyance but one which is not likely to be removed in the near future because of the unavailability of acceptable means of removing it.

The first option, invasion, has been tried in a halfhearted way and found wanting. It is generally acknowledged that the invasion and occupation of Cuba, besides violating our obligations as a member of the United Nations and of the Organization of American States, would have explosive consequences in Latin America and elsewhere and might precipitate a global nuclear war. I know of no responsible statesman who advocates this approach. It has been rejected by our Government and by public opinion and I think that, barring some grave provocation, it can be ruled out as a feasible policy for the United States.

The approach which we have adopted has been the second of those mentioned, an effort to weaken and eventually bring down the Castro regime by a policy of political and economic boycott. This policy has taken the form of extensive restrictions against trade with Cuba by United States citizens, of the exclusion of Cuba from the inter-American system and efforts to secure Latin American support in isolating Cuba politically and economically, and of diplomatic efforts, backed by certain trade and aid

sanctions, to persuade other free world countries to maintain economic boycotts against Cuba.

This policy, it now seems clear, has been a failure, and there is no reason to believe that it will succeed in the future. Our efforts to persuade our allies to terminate their trade with Cuba have been generally rebuffed. The prevailing attitude was perhaps best expressed by a British manufacturer who, in response to American criticisms of the sale of British buses to Cuba, said: "If America has a surplus of wheat, we have a surplus of buses."

In cutting off military assistance to Great Britain, France, and Yugoslavia under the provisions of section 620 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1963, the United States has wielded a stuffed club. The amounts of aid involved are infinitesimal; the chances of gaining compliance with our boycott policy are nil; and the annoyance of the countries concerned may be considerable. What we terminated with respect to Britain and France, in fact, can hardly be called aid; it was more of a sales promotion program under which British and French military leaders were brought to the United States to see -- and to buy -- advanced American weapons. Terminating this program was in itself of little importance; Britain and France do not need our assistance. But terminating the program as a sanction against their trade with Cuba can have no real effect other than to create an illusory image of "toughness" for the benefit of our own people.

Free world exports to Cuba have, on the whole, been declining over recent years, but overall imports have been rising since 1961.

Mr. President, I ask unamious consent that there be inserted in the Record at the conslusion of my remarks two tables provided by the

Department of State showing the trade of selected free world countries with Cuba from 1958 to 1963.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 2).

Mr. Fulbright. Mr. President, the figures shown in these tables provide little basis for expecting the early termination of free world trade with Cuba. The export table shows U. S. exports to Cuba in both 1962 and 1963 exceeding those of any other free world country. These American exports considted almost entirely of ransom payments for the Bay of Pigs prisoners and should not be confused with normal trade.

There is an interesting feature to this table, which may not be well known. It is that the exports from Cuba to various allies of ours, particularly Japan, the United Kingdom, Morocco, and others, have been going up, and have been very substantial. This reflects, I believe, the importation from Cuba of sugar to a great extent, and also accounts for the accumulation of Cuba of substantial foreign aid as a result of the dramatic increase in the price of sugar during the past couple of years.

The exports from the free world to Cuba have been going up in similar instances, in the case of Japan, but generally speaking they have not been increasing. Of course, since 1958, when we accounted for more than half of Cuba's exports, they have gone down rather dramatically. In any case, the tables will speak for themselves.

I should like to make it very clear that I am not arguing against the desirability of an economic boycott against the Castro regime but against its feasibility. The effort has been made and all the fulminations

we can utter about sanctions and retaliation against free world countries that trade with Cuba cannot long conceal the fact that the boycott policy is a failure.

The boycott policy has not failed because of any "weakness" or "timidity" on the part of our Government. This charge, so frequently heard, is one of the most pernicious myths to have been inflicted on the American people. The boycott policy has failed because the United States is not omnipotent and cannot be. The basic reality to be faced is that it is simply not within our power to compel our allies to cut off their trade with Cuba, unless we are prepared to take drastic sanctions against them, such as closing our own markets to any foreign company that does business in Cuba, as proposed by Mr. Nixon. We can do this, of course, but if we do, we ought first to be very sure, as apparently Mr. Nixon is, that the Cuban boycott is more important than good relations with our closes allies. In fact, even the most drastic sanctions are as likely to be rewarded with defiance as with compliance. For practical purposes, all we can do is to ask other countries to take the measures with respect to Cuba which we recommend. We have done so and in some areas have been successful. In other areas, notably that of the economic boycott, we have asked for the full cooperation of other free world countries and it has been largely denied. It remains for us to decide whether we will respond with a sustained outburst of hollow and ill-tempered threats, all the while comforting ourselves with the myth that we can get anything we want if we only try hard enough -- or, in this case, shout loud enough -- or we can acknowledge the failure of our efforts and proceed, coolly and rationally, to reexamine the policies

which we now pursue in relation to the interests they are intended to serve.

The prospects of bringing down the Castro regime by political and economic boycott have never been very good. Even if a general free world boycott were successfully applied against Cuba, it is unlikely that the Russians would refuse to carry the extra financial burden and thereby permit the only Communist regime in the Western Hemisphere to collapse. We are thus compelled to recognize that there is probably no way of bringing down the Castro regime by means of economic pressures unless we are prepared to impose a blockade against nonmilitary shipments from the Soviet Union. Exactly such a policy has been recommended by some of our more reckless politicians, but the preponderance of informed opinion is that a blockade against Soviet shipments of nonmilitary supplies to Cuba would be extravagantly dangerous, carrying the strong possibility of a confrontation that could explode into nuclear war.

Having ruled out military invasion and blockade, and recognizing the failure of the boycott policy, we are compelled to consider the third of the three options open to us with respect to Cuba: the acceptance of the continued existence of the Castro regime as a distasteful nuisance but not an intolerable danger so long as the nations of the hemisphere are prepared to meet their obligations of collective defense under the Rio Treaty.

In recent years we have become transfixed with Cuba, making it far more important in both our foreign relations and in our domestic life than its size and influence warrant. We have flattered a noisy but minor demogog by treating him as if he were a Napoleonic menance.

Communist Cuba has been a disruptive and subversive influence in Venezuela and other countries of the hemisphere, and there is no doubt that both we and our Latin American partners would be better off if the Castro regime did not exist. But it is important to bear in mind that, despite their best efforts, the Cuban Communists have not succeeded in subverting the hemisphere and that in Venezuela, for example, where communism has made a major effort to gain power through terrorism, it has been repudiated by a people who in a free election have committed themselves to the course of liberal democracy. It is necessary to weigh the desirability of an objective against the feasibility of its attainment, and when we do this with respect to Cuba, I think we are bound to conclude that Castro is a nuisance but not a grave threat to the United States, and that he cannot be gotten rid of exportionate to the objective. Cuban communism does pose a grave threat to other Latin American countries but this threat can be dealt with by prompt and vigorous use of the established procedures of the inter-American system against any act of aggression.

I think that we must abandon the myth that Cuban communism is a transitory menace that is going to collapse or disappear in the immediate future and face up to two basic realities about Cuba: first, that the Castro regime is not on the verge of collapse and is not likely to be overthrown by any policies which we are now pursuing or can reasonably undertake; and second, that the continued existence of the Castro regime, though inimical to our interests and policies, is not an insuperable obstacle to the attainment of our objectives, unless we make it so by permitting it to poison our politics at home and to divert us from more

important tasks in the hemisphere.

The policy of the United States with respect to Latin America as a whole is predicated on the assumption that social revolution can be accomplished without violent upheaval. This is the guiding principle of the Alliance for Progress and it may in time be vindicated. We are entitled to hope so and it is wise and necessary for us to do all that we can to advance the prospects of peaceful and orderly reform.

At the same time, we must be under no illusions as to the extreme difficulty of uprooting long-established ruling oligarchies without disruptions involving lesser or greater degrees of violence. The historical odds are probably against the prospects of peaceful social revolution. There are places, of course, where it has occurred and others where it seems likely to occur. In Latin America, the chances for such basic change by peaceful means seem bright in Colombia and Venezuela and certain other countries; in Mexico, many basic changes have been made by peaceful means, but these came in the wake of a violent revolution. In other Latin American countries, the power of ruling oligarchies is so solidly established and their ignorance so great that there seems little prospect of accomplishing economic growth or social reform by means short of the forcible overthrow of established authorities.

I am not predicting violent revolutions in Latin America or elsewhere. Still less am I advocating them, I wish only to suggest that violent social revolutions are a possibility in countries where feudal oligarchies resist all meaningful change by peaceful means. We must not, in our preference for the democratic procedures envisioned by the Charter of Punta del Este, close our minds to the

possibility that democratic procedures may fail in certain countreis and that where democracy does fail violent social convulsions may occur.

We would do well, while continuing our efforts to promote peaceful change through the Alliance for Progress, to consider what our reactions might be in the event of the outbreak of genuine social revoultion in one or more Latin American countries. Such a revolution did occur in Bolivia, and we accepted it calmly and sensibly. But what if a violent social revolution were to break out in one of the larger Latin American countries? Would we feel certain that it was Cuban or Soviet inspired? Would we wish to intervene on the side of established authority? Or would we be willing to tolerate or even support a revolution if it was seen to be not Communist but similar in nature to the Mexican revolution or the Nasser revolution in Egypt?

These are hypothetical questions and there is no readily available set of answers to them. But they are questions which we should be thinking about because they have to do with problems that could become real and urgent with great suddenness. We should be considering, for example, what groups in particular countries might conceivably lead revolutionary movements, and if we can identify them, we should be considering how we might communicate with them and influence them in suc ha way that their movements, if successful, will not pursue courses detrimental to our security and our interests.

The Far East is another area of the world in which American policy is handicapped by the divergence of old myths and new realities. Particularly with respect to China, an elaborate vocabulary of make-believe has become complusory in both official and public discussion.

We are committed, with respect to China and other areas in Asia, to inflexible policies of long standing from which we hesitate to depart because of the attribution to these policies of an aura of mystical sanctity. It may be that a thorough reevaluation of our Far Eastern policies would lead us to the conclusion that they are sound and wise, or at least that they represent the best available options. It may be, on the other hand, that a reevaluation would point up the need for greater or lesser changes in our policies. The point is that, whatever the outcome of a rethinking of policy might be, we have been unwilling to undertake it because of the fear of many Government officials, undoubtedly well founded, that even the suggestion of new policies toward China or Vietnam would provoke a vehement public outcry.

I do not think the United States can, or should, recognize Communist China, or acquiesce in its admission to the United Nations under present circumstances. It would be unwise to do so, because there is nothing to be gained by it so long as the Peiping regime maintains its attitude of implacable hostility toward the United States. I do not believe, however, that this state of affairs is necessarily permanent. As we have seen in our relations with Germany and Japan, hostility can give way in an astonishingly short time to close friendship; and, as we have seen in our relations with China, the reverse can occur with equal speed. It is not impossible that in time our relations with China will change again -- if not to friendship, then perhaps to "competitive coexistence." It would therefore be extremely useful if we could introduce an element of flexibility, or, more precisely, of the capacity to be flexible, into our relations with Communist China.

We would do well, as former Assistant Secretary Hilsman has recommended, to maintain an "open door" to the possibility of improved relations with Communist China in the Future. For a start, we must jar open our minds to certain realities about China, of which the foremost is that there really are not "two Chinas," but only one -- mainland China; and that it is ruled by Communists, and is likely to remain so for the indefinite future. Once we accept this fact, it becomes possible to reflect on the conditions under which it might be possible for us to enter into relatively normal relations with mainland China. One condition, of course, must be the abandonment by the Chinese Communists, tacitly, if not explicitly, of their intention to conquer and incorporate Taiwan. This seems unlikely now; but far more surprising changes have occurred in politics, and it is quite possible that a new generation of leaders in Peiping and Taipei may put a quiet end to the Chinese civil war, thus opening the possibility of entirely new patterns of international relations in the Far East.

Should such changes occur, they will open important opportunities for American policy; and it is to be hoped that we shall be able and willing to take advantage of them. It seems possible, for instance, that an atmosphere of reduced tensions in the Far East might make it psosible to strengthen world peace by drawing mainland China into existing East-West agreements in such fields as disarmament, trade, and educational exchange.

These are long-range prospects, which may or may not materialize. In the immediate future, we are confronted with possible changes in the Far East resulting from recent French diplomacy.

French recognition of Communist China, although untimely and carried out in a way that can hardly be considered friendly to the United States, may nonetheless serve a constructive long-term purpose, by unfreezing a situation in which many countries, none more than the United States, are committed to inflexible policies by long-established commitments and the pressures of domestic public opinion. One way or another, the French initiative may help generate a new situation in which the United States, as well as other countries, will find it possible to reevaluate its basic policies in the Far East.

The situation in Vietnam poses a far more pressing need for a reevaluation of American policy. Other than withdrawal, which I do not think can be realistically considered under present circumstances, three options are open to us in Vietnam: First, continuation of the antiguerrilla war within South Vietnam, along with renewed American efforts to increase the military effectiveness of the South Vietnamese Army and the political effectiveness of the South Vietnamese Government; second, an attempt to end the war, through negotiations for the neutralization of South Vietnam, or of both North and South Vietnam; and finally, the expansion of the scale of the war, either by the direct commitment of large numbers of American troops or by equipping the South Vietnamese Army to attack North Vietnamese territory, possibly by means of commando-type operations from the sea or the air.

It is difficult to see how a negotiation, under present military circumstances, could lead to termination of the war under conditions that would preserve the freedom of South Vietnam. It is extremely difficult for a party to a negotiation to achieve by diplomacy

objectives which it has conspicuously failed to win by warfare. The hard fact of the matter is that our bargaining position is at present a weak one; and until the equation of advantages between the two sides has been substantially altered in our favor, there can be little prospect of a negotiated settlement which would secure the independence of a non-Communist South Vietnam.

Recent initiatives by France, calling for the neutralization of Vietnam, have tended to confuse the situation, without altering it in any fundamental way. France could, perhaps, play a constructive mediating role if she were willing to consult and cooperate with the United States. For somewhat obscure reasons, however, France has chosen to take an independent initiative. This is puzzling to Americans, who recall that the United States contributed $1.2 billion to France's war in Indochina of a decade ago -- which was 70 percent of the total cost of the conflict. Whatever its motivation, the problem posed by French intervention in southeast Asia is that while France may set off an unforeseeable chain of events, she is neither a major military force nor a major economic force in the Far East, and is therefore unlikely to be able to control or greatly influence the events which her initiative may precipitate.

It seems clear that only two realistic options are open to us in Vietnam in the immediate future: the expansion of the conflict in one way or another, or a renewed effort to bolster the capacity of the South Vietnamese to prosecute the war successfully on its present scale. The matter calls for thorough examination by responsible officials in the executive branch; and until they have had an opportunity to evaluate the contingencies and feasibilities of the options open to us, it seems to me that we have no choice but to support the South

Vietnamese Government and Army by the most effective means available. Whatever specific policy decisions are made, it should be clear to all concerned that the United States will continue to meet its obligations and fulfill its commitments with respect to Vietnam.

These, I believe, are some, although by no means all, of the issues of foreign policy in which it is essential to reevaluate longstanding ideas and commitments in the light of new and changing realities. In all the issues which I have discussed, American policy has to one degree or another been less effective than it might have been because of our national tendency to equate means with ends and therefore to attach a mythological sanctity to policies and practices which in themselves have no moral content or value except insofar as they contribute to the achievement of some valid national objective. I believe that we must try to overcome this excessive moralism, which binds us to old myths, and blinds us to new realities and, worse still, leads us to regard new and unfamiliar ideas with fear and mistrust.

We must dare to think about "unthinkable" things. We must learn to explore all of the options and possibilities that confront us in a complex and rapidly changing world. We must learn to welcome rather than fear the voices of dissent and not to recoil in horror whenever some heretic suggests that Castro may survive or that Khrushchev is not as bad a fellow as Stalin was. We must overcome our susceptibility to "shock" -- a word which I wish could be banned from our newspapers and magazines and especially from the Congressional Record.

If Congress and public opinion are unduly susceptible to "shock," the executive branch, and particularly the Department of State, is subject

to the malady of chronic and excessive caution. An effective foreign policy is one which concerns itself more with innovation abroad than with conciliation at home. A creative foreign policy -- as President Truman, for one, knew -- is not necessarily one which wins immediate general approval. It is sometimes necessary for leaders to do unpleasant and unpopular things, because as Burke pointed out, the duty of the democratic politician to his constituents is not to comply with their every wish and preference but to give them the benefit of and to be held responsible for, the exercise of his own best judgment.

We must dare to think about "unthinkable things," because when things become "unthinkable," thinking stops and action becomes mindless. If we are to diabuse ourselves of old myths and to act wisely and creatively upon the new realities of our time, we must think and talk about our problems with perfect freedom, remembering, as Woodrow Wilson said, that "The greatest freedom of speech is the greatest safety because if a man is a fool, the best thing to do to encourage him to advertise the fault by speaking."

Appendix D

THE CAUSES OF WAR: AN ESSAY IN ONE SENTENCE
By Richard M. Weaver

Two countries lie side by side, and the first goes to war against the second because the first is growing in population; now this first country has convinced itself that growth is the law of life, for in this world of flux there is no such thing as standing still, it being an inexorable law that one must either wax or wane; those nations which show by their birthrate that they are innately healthy cannot be denied a place in the sun by decadent political entities clinging to a moribund existence; all history proves, the people are told, that only those nations survive which have preserved an _elan vital_ among their masses; indeed the entire human race benefits by the fact that all life is a struggle, for this results in the survival of the fittest and so produces a higher type of man; doctrinaires may preach, but experience proves that nations will ask in vain for rights they have not the power to seize, and the will to live carries with it a right; therefore this country proceeds with full confidence that it is carrying out nature's plan; but it may be that the second country, having failed in its attempts to contain the first, decides to strike the opening blow for strategic reasons; it points to the alarming expansionist tendencies of the first country, and wonders how a people of such gross tendencies and animal-like fecundity has been suffered to grow into a menace to the peace-loving portion of mankind; it announces that there can never be

stability in the world as long as one nation is permitted to make its need an excuse for taking what belongs to others; after all, the aim of civilization is to do away with the law of the jungle, and there is no prospect of anything that chaos if mere biological energy is allowed to run wild and subvert established rights; it points out that when the barbarians submerged Rome, they brought a thousand years of darkness, and the world should have learned from this great tragedy what ensues when the refinements of culture and civilization are not protected from primitive hordes; it draws comparison with the Huns and proclaims to the world that it is undertaking this task in the common interest, and that it intends to render forever powerless this people who have so criminally disturbed the peace and concord of nations; or, it may be that the first country looks upon the second and sees that its government is internally weak; the second has, in fact, so far failed to guarantee stability that outside capital has been afraid to risk investment in its resources and consequently the world has been denied some badly needed raw materials; now it is a grave question whether backwardness of this kind should be allowed to retard the economic progress of mankind; moreover this internal weakness is a great potential danger, for such a government not only fails to protect foreign nationals within its borders, but it also fails to keep its own citizens under firm control, and as a result there exists the constant danger of incursions across the border which are likely to have serious complications; the right to sovereignty carries with it certain responsibilities which in this instance are

not being fulfilled; furthermore a government of this description is an easy prey to scheming foreign nations, which may use it to further their own aggressive designs against the first nation, and it is therefore good national insurance to invade this country and straighten it out and make it genuinely able to play its part in the community of nations; but the second country looks upon the first and sees that its people suffer cruelly from centralization and regimentation, which are obviously in the interest of a few; the internal order which it maintains is in reality a state of organization for conquest - a perpetual mobilization, as it were; it sees that this nation diminishes individual liberty so that it may move quickly and effectively as a belligerent; it is indisputable that in that country the individual is being sacrificed to the aims of statism; now since all humanity is one and liberty is indivisible, any tyrannical government is a threat to all the freedom-loving people of the globe; in fact this country is seen to be constantly looking about for foreign issues in order to quite the restiveness of its citizens under the restrictions they endure; its leaders are ever ready, it is pointed out, to busy giddy minds with foreign quarrels, and manifestly this kind of conduct is going to end in international conflict; the second country therefore decides to act while there is time and defeat the first before it can perfect its organization to a point where it can impose a similar yoke on its neighbors; or, it may be that the first and second countries were originally one country, but the first country was a conscious minority, and thinking of the many slights,

to say nothing of injustices in the form of taxes and tariffs, which it has suffered at the hands of the majority, it decides to declare its independence and to invoke arms, if necessary, in defense of the sacred right of self-determination of peoples; its leaders recall that national liberators stand high on the list of the benefactors of mankind; they point to certain inalienable rights of man which no earthly power can violate without breaking the contract upon which all government rests; they remind their people that peace comes too high at the price of chains and slavery, and that it is better to die upon one's feet than to live upon one's knees, and they point to examples from history of heroic resistance to oppression; there is no ground, they say, upon which sovereignty can be denied to a distinct people, and having endured a long train of abuses and having exhausted every honorable means of securing redress, they now appeal to the dread arbitrament, confident that He who wields the destinies of men will not consign them to slavery; and this war is fought with great stubborness because the leaders of the first country know that unless they make good their bid for independence, they will be treated as rebels; but the second country is appalled by this wicked act of insurrection; it can scarcely find words to describe the infamy of those who would thus tear the nation to pieces; it points out that every existing government has the duty of self-preservation, that to deny this would be to admit the principle of anarchism; moreover it tells its rebellious minority that they have for many years reaped benefits from the union and that they have no right to withdraw

now because they are called upon to bear a part of the expense; it really suspects this disafflicted minority of wishing to preserve certain peculiar institutions which the nation as a whole has come strongly to disfavor and which are rightfully matters for national and not local referendum; it sees in this movement a desperate shift by a few leaders to preserve and extend their privileges; but this union represents a perpetual pledge of indivisibility; all must remain in it and take what fortune may come; finally they remind themselves that this sort of thing once started is never ended; other parts would soon follow a successful example and seek to break off too, which process would reduce the first country to a nonentity among the nations of the earth; or, it may be that the first country has made a cult of efficiency; it has learned to use the machine and is applying the scientific method even to the problem of living; it is proud of its plain, forthright ways, which it regards as a proof of honesty and of democratic spirit; its soul is vexed when it looks abroad and sees its neighbor the second country proceeding with a indifference to these things, which in its eyes is little better than moral turpitude, and it suspects that at the root of the difference there lies some perverse scale of values which sooner or later is going to provoke trouble, for after all how can one rely on the promises of a people who take life in such a fashion; it has even heard that this country is unhygienic, with an unbelievable lack of bathtubs and plumbing facilities, and anyone who goes there can see that its inhabitants spend their whole day sitting in cafes and gossiping about art and

politics, which is hardly the occupation of a progressive people; it interprets the refined manners of its neighbor as a sign of affectation and insolence; it is certain that a people who are so little appreciative of the cardinal virtues of thrift and industry, and plainness are out of step with the times and it is eager for an opportunity to prove its superiority over them; but the second country looks across the border and is horrified to see a land filled with mechanized barbarians; this country has always prided itself on its deep aesthetic sensibility and a gracious way of life, both of which it holds to be incompatible with machine efficiency; it has triumphs in art to prove its claim to a first place among the civilized nations, and it asks to know what the mass production of gadgets counts for in comparison with a single masterpiece of painting or music; it is convinced that the first country has perverted its intelligence by becoming immersed in means long after it has forgotten what the general aim is; it notes moreover that great potentials of power are potentials of aggression, and it trembles lest one of those misunderstandings which are inevitable between a people so differently oriented result in an invasion which it will have difficulty in repelling because of its very devotion to humane living; filled with increasing apprehension, it determines to seize time by the forelock and strike first while there is still a chance to save the civilized way of life; or, it may be that the first country attacks the second because the second has been at peace for a long time, which is viewed as a suspicious circumstance, indicating as it does a decay of martial valor; its lack of aggressiveness

is interpreted as a recognition of its own weakness; it is rumored that the citizens of this country have turned to indulgence and are living soft lives on what their more virile ancestors won for them, yet what weighs heaviest in this decision to attack is a principle of Realpolitik, since in their secret sessions the ministers of the first country have reminded one another that the political world abhors a vacuum, and it behooves them to seize this opportunity and step in before some other nation sees the chance and tips the balance of power against them; but it may be that the second country decides to attack the first, not because the first is at peace but because it is already embroiled in war; the leaders of the second have discussed with one another that axiom from the statecraft of Machiavelli that neutrality is the most dangerous of all policies, for, they demonstrate, if two countries are at war and ours remains neutral, it must incur the enmity of both and may itself be attacked by the victor in the struggle because its failure to render assistance has been interpreted as a sign of unfriendliness; on the other hand, the reasoning goes, if one takes part in the struggle, he is entitled to a share in the spoils, and if the victorious neighbor is badly weakened by its war effort, it may be possible to turn upon this neighbor after pretending to quarrel about the settlement and to overthrow it, and then one has two rivals out of the way and a double share of spoils; or, it may be that the first country moves against the second because the first regards itself as the source of the world's great moral ideas; it places its faith in the existence of certain

transcendental principles which its philosophers have made into an unassailable system, and since nothing can finally bring one satisfaction but the triumph of his principles, it is eager for opportunities to proselytize; it points out that there is a selfish kind of nation which asks, "Am I my brother's keeper?" but this attitude is an evasion of responsibility; it is, in fact, isolationism; there is ample Scriptural authority for compelling the evildoer to reform and even for compelling the slave to accept freedom; it is therefore in the spirit of duty and self-sacrifice that the first nation wages this war; it of course expects nothing from the sacrifice but a demonstration of the invincibility of the right philosophy of life, and those who fall in this war will be offering themselves up on the altar of a lofty ideal and will show themselves scornful of low-minded considerations of prosperity and ease; but the people of the second country pride themselves upon their freedom from obsession; upon their willingness to be practical and to compromise differences; they abhor all systems and look upon their policy of muddling through as the highest expression of political maturity; now this second country decides to take the initiative on the ground that there are in the world certain focal centers of dangerous nonsense; there are nations which have devised false and perverted philosophies which distort the nature of reality and even lead their citizens to suppose that they are not as other men; it points out to the world that the first country has always been addicted to absolutism in its thinking, than which nothing can be more pernicious for human relationships; the one thing that

can be depended on to preserve world peace is common sense and the spirit of live and let live; wherever in the world one of these ugly philosophies is engendered, it produces only delusions of grandeur and ruthlessness of conduct; it is well, therefore, to subdue this evil before it can spread; it may even prove necessary to revise the educational system of the offending country to see that the empirical method is taught and thus to make certain that this people shall not again become demented with abstract notions; or, it may be that the first and second countries have a dispute over a piece of territory lying between them; now the second country has a superior legal title, but this territory has become largely populated with people from the first, and the first country is very impatient with the arguments of its opponents because it feels that it has the valid moral claim; it points out that in every issue where legal and moral rights appear in conflict, the conscience of mankind demands that the moral cause shall triumph; after all, it is impossible that a past age should legislate for the present; the law is all too often a sort of mortmain, restricting and even ruining the lives of men of flesh and blood whose only offense is that they were born late, and it does not propose to see a people with whom it has ties of kinship crucified upon a cross of legalistic interpretation; the clergy of this country cite the Bible to show that the second country "frameth iniquity according to law"; and the politicians quote Tom Pains to show that no parliament can bind unborn generations; wherever there is a contest between the law and the prophets, the prophets must win because they are of the future, and

the law is nothing but a convention adjusted to past situations; if mankind had allowed itself to be bound by legal straightjackets all progress would have ceased long ago; in brief, it proposes to go to war rather than be bound by such an absurdity as a treaty made a century ago amid conditions which have long ceased to exist; but the second country is incensed by this threat of aggression; it points out that its legal position is unimpeachable, being distinctly affirmed in two treaties and three protocols, and that it will accept war rather than yield one jot or tittle to external pressure; its statesmen and philosophers have shown that the idea of law of basic to all civilization, and that although a strict observance of legal provision sometimes results in minor inequities, this is as nothing compared with the good which proceeds from the knowledge that a law exists and that its stipulations will be carried out; for every disadvantage that results from the rigidity of a legal convention, a thousand advantages accrue, and therefore whoever strikes at the principle of law strikes at the foundation of all civil society; in view of these considerations it would be a traitor not only to its own people but to the entire civilized world if it allowed cowardice or sloth to deter it from enforcing that to which it has affixed its hand and seal; moreover, it reminds its people, one capitulation of this kind only paves the way for another, and if a nation has to undergo the sacrifice of war, there is no nobler cause than the defense of the principle of law; it proclaims to the world that it is undertaking this task in the common interest, and that it intends to render forever powerless this people who have so criminally

disturbed the peace and concord of nations.

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