

ON SOME OVERT BEHAVIORAL CORRELATES OF SELF-ACCEPTANCE
IN ONE KIND OF INTERPERSONAL RELATIONSHIP

by

Edward T. Weston
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Advisory Committee:

Redacted Signature

Redacted Signature

Redacted Signature

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I. Introduction

In recent years a rather large number of studies have been made in which the concept of self-acceptance has been involved. In a general way these studies can be grouped into two rather broad categories, those having to do with self-acceptance as a process, and those having to do with self-acceptance as a condition, a way of functioning. In the former category would be those studies which have attempted to show the intra-individual changes that occur as the person, a patient, goes from a point at which he might be considered to be not accepting of himself, rejecting of himself, to a point at which he might be considered accepting of himself. In the latter group would be those studies that have attempted to show that there exist certain specific correlates of the condition of being self-accepting. In particular these latter ones have dealt with correlates of physiological, attitudinal, and behavioral nature.

Almost without exception studies performed in the two categories have been predicated upon the theoretical formulations of Carl Rogers (22,23,24), whose "Theory of Personality and Behavior" (22) makes of the self a central concept, and makes of self-acceptance a major dimension along which to measure the self-concept.

With very few exceptions the studies performed have made use of methodologies that have at their base a fundamental similarity which consists of the use of a subject's reports about himself as data upon which to frame inferences concerning the subject's self-concept; i.e., his self-acceptance or the lack of it. Such reports of the subject about himself have been obtained by, a) interviews, therapeutic or otherwise

(1, 8, 13, 25, 26, 28, 33); b) use of a test in which the subject rated statements as true or false of him, where these statements consisted of ones descriptive of personality, (3,4,19); c) use of a special technique known as the "Q-sort method", devised by Stephenson (29), and requiring that the subject rank a series of statements descriptive of personality in order of their relevance to him (10). In some studies projective tests, chiefly the Rorschach and Thematic Apperception Test, have been employed. Yet even here self-reports play a dominant role, since the tests are administered to the individuals who are known to be either self-accepting or not on the basis of self-reports obtained prior to the testing (14,19,21).

While the studies cited above reveal a high degree of consistency in their results when these are compared one with another and with the theory by which they are explained, it nevertheless appears to this experimenter that a reasonable doubt may be entertained about them. This doubt pertains not to the validity of the respective studies, but rather to the conclusiveness of the results. The doubt arises from the extensive use of self-reports as data for inference.

As Hilgard (11), Cattell (6), and others have pointed out, such reports tend to be somewhat less than satisfactory for the purposes of making scientific inferences about the subject, chiefly because the factors of self-deception and self-defense are difficult, if not impossible, to control. These factors, operating with or without the subject's awareness of their operation, tend to distort the data that is presented, and to yield a picture whose degree of accuracy is open to question and difficult to appraise.

Therefore, the view is held here that there exists a need for a more rigorous approach to the study of self-acceptance and its

significance for some of the correlates ascribed to it, here specifically those pertaining to behavior. Of the possible ways to achieve greater rigor, the one chosen attempts to distinguish a self-accepting group and a non-self-accepting group out of a more general population by means of a test that taps the subject's perceptions and cognitions; i.e., from the manner in which the subject perceives and cognitively structures a given situation, a judgment will be made concerning his self-acceptance. The test is to be objective in the sense that an examiner is able to score the test and achieve results that correlate highly with those of another examiner scoring the test by following the same rules. This test, too, tends to be less vulnerable to the distortion caused by self-deception and self-defense, since clinical experience indicates that in general a person tends to be less aware of the revealing nature of his perceptions and cognitions than of statements made that have direct bearing on himself. That is, there is apt to be less distortion of the kind mentioned when a person asserts that he perceives a given situation in a certain way than when he asserts that he does or does not possess a given characteristic.

When, on the basis of the test, two groups have been achieved it will be possible to bring individuals together in pairs, one member from each group, and require that they work on a series of tasks that require their joint effort. In so far as the experimental design permits, certain aspects of overt behavior will be measured. By the use of an experimental design that permits this, use of verbal or written reports of the subject about his interpersonal relations will be circumvented;

i. e., what the subject does rather than what he says he does while working with another person will be the object of study.

II Theoretical Considerations

Prior to the discussion of the test that will be used in the first phase of the experimental procedure, it is necessary to consider the theory of personality upon which it is predicated. This means that the definition of self-acceptance and the theory of which it is a part, as both definition and theory have been developed by Carl Rogers, need to be considered, since this study, though of a somewhat different order, yet aims at being comparable to those other studies already mentioned.

In the Rogerian system, "Acceptance of self, operationally defined, means that the client tends:

- a) To perceive himself as a person of worth, worthy of respect rather than condemnation.
- b) To perceive his standards as being based upon his own experiences, rather than upon the attitudes or desires of others.
- c) To perceive his own feelings, motives, social and personal experiences, without distortion of the basic sensory data."

(23,315)

Implicit in the above definition is also the definition of a person who might be called non-self-accepting. He would be one who tends to perceive himself as unworthy, who judges himself quite largely in terms of standards set by others, and who tends to distort basic sensory data in the perception of his own motives.

In order to understand the distinctions made between a person called self-accepting and one called non-self-accepting, and to understand the significance of the distinctions for behavior, it is necessary to be clear with respect to what appears to be one of the major, unique

characteristics of the Rogerian system.

In this system the self is not identical with the person, but rather is a part of the person. It is a part that exists in the consciousness of the person. In relation to the person the self stands as a perceptual object, to be perceived by the person and appraised or evaluated positively or negatively, and reported upon when the person is required to do so.

Using terms somewhat loosely, the self may be thought of as all the things the person consciously thinks he is. Rogers' more exact definition of the self asserts, "The self-structure is an organized configuration of perceptions of the self which are admissible to awareness. It is composed of such elements as the perceptions of one's characteristics and abilities; the percepts and concepts of the self in relation to others and to the environment; the value qualities which are perceived as associated with experiences and objects; the goals and ideals which are perceived as having positive or negative valence. It is, then, the organized picture, existing in awareness either as figure or ground, of the self and the self-in-relationship, together with the positive or negative values which are associated with those qualities and relationships, as they are perceived as existing in the past, present, or future." (22,501)

The self as defined above stands in yet another relationship to the person. Behavior adopted by the person must be consistent with his concept of himself. Rogers asserts, "The only channels by which needs may be satisfied are those which are consistent with the organized concept of self." (22,508) In this light the self stands as a regulator of the behavior of the person. As examples of this relationship Rogers cites the following: "The mother who sees herself as responsible for

her adolescent daughter cannot go to sleep until the click of the door latch and the footsteps in the hall indicate that her daughter is home. It would be inconsistent with her concept of self to fall asleep. Likewise, the man who regards himself as a conscientious and responsible individual awakens from sleep at an early hour when his responsibilities demand that he do so, regardless of his organic need for sleep." (22,509)

A third relationship between the self and the person is that in the self are symbolized only some of the experiences that go on in the person. In the Rogerian system it is the person who has experiences, not the self. This means that an event can occur in the person without some corresponding event occurring in the self. In order for the experience to be attributed to the self—which in turn implies that it is conscious—it is necessary that the organismic event occurring in the person be raised to a symbolic level, which is the only level at which events may be perceived as part of self.

It is to be noted that only some of the experiences occurring in the organism achieve symbolization, and hence a kind of acknowledgement by the self. Conversely, some experiences that the person undergoes are kept out of awareness. Whether the self does acknowledge the experience depends on a number of factors, chiefly, the nature of the experience undergone by the person and the nature of the self-concept. For an experience occurring in the organism to be acknowledged as an attribute of the self the symbolization of that experience must be consistent with other symbols which go to make up the self-concept. Just as behavior is consistent with the self-concept, so must symbolizations of organismic experiences be similiarly consistent.

The expression "organismic experiences" requires clarification before proceeding further.* In the Rogerian system the expression is used in two distinct ways. Used one way it refers to an experience such as anger or fear; used another way it refers to "needs" experienced by the organism in conjunction with such other experiences as anger or fear. In the theory what might be called the basic experience is always associated with an accompanying need of the organism to do something about the basic experience. In a sense, needs are the motives of the individual for they are considered to be the springboards for action. (22, 491, 509) Because of the relatedness of needs and experiences (the experience of fear and the associated experience of a need to escape is an example) the one cannot be symbolized without the other. The following, taken from Rogers, is an illustration of this.

"For example, a pilot who conceives of himself as a brave and relatively fearless individual is assigned to a mission which involves great risk. Physiologically he experiences fear and a need to escape from this danger. These reactions cannot be symbolized into consciousness, since they would be too contradictory to his concept of self. The organic need, however, persists. He can perceive that 'the engine is not running quite properly,' or that 'I am ill and have an upset digestive system,' and on these grounds excuse himself from the mission. In this example, as in many others which could be cited, the organic needs exist

*From this point on, until stated otherwise, there will be given what is believed to be an accurate picture of the Rogerian system as it pertains to the relationship of the self to the person. Terminology in the Rogerian system, as will be demonstrated, is often ambiguous and unclear. In this interpretation sections paraphrased will be referred to in parentheses.

but cannot be admitted into consciousness. The behavior which is adopted is such that it satisfies the organic need, but it takes channels which are consistent with the concept of self." (22,508)

The above illustration, in addition to showing that an experience can occur in the person without an accompanying, accurate representation of the experience occurring in the self, shows also that the behavior that does result in such circumstances—non-accurate symbolization—is an organismic event. In the Rogerian system, behavior is always an organismic event whether there occurs an accurate symbolization of the organic experience or not. When accurate symbolization does occur, for example, the resulting behavior is not related to it in any 1:1 fashion, rather several factors must be taken into account as determiners of the final behavior. Of these factors, the chief ones are the nature of the experience and the need undergone by the organism, and the nature of the self-concept. When both experience and need occur in the person, the person takes into account the nature of his self-concept; i.e., the value attached to experiences and needs, the values attached to concepts of self-in-relation to the environment, broadly defined, and the goals and aims of the organism. (22,508) Thus, the person may experience anger and experience also the need to assault his opponent, yet not do so because the possible gain from such expression would be less than the possible loss, where both gain and loss have reference to the enhancement of the organism.

Where experiences and needs are not symbolized, the behavior is also organismic; the person attempts to satisfy his needs as best he can in terms of the existing self-concept, and his perception of the existing

situation.

It will be noted that the expression "...his perception of the existing situation.." is used. This is done because in the Rogerian system reality for the individual is his perception of it. This implies that actually the system talks about two kinds of reality. This is so. On the one hand there is external reality, that which can be supported by consensual validation, and on the other hand there is the person's highly unique and idiosyncratic perception of this reality. The two need not necessarily be congruent. In the case of the pilot the external situation need not have been dangerous in terms of its objective properties (i.e., one might die on this mission); the important consideration is that the pilot considers it dangerous for him. Whether in terms of objective reality the mission was or was not dangerous is a secondary consideration; the situation as perceived by the person is what he responds to. (22,497; 498-503; 491)

The distinction between what might be called personal reality and objective reality is an important one in the Rogerian system. As will be pointed out shortly, when the discrepancy between the two is very great, the person cannot possibly function efficiently; i.e., meet the basic need of the organism to "...actualize, maintain, and enhance..." itself. (22,487). Phenomenally this lowered efficiency is experienced as tension, discomfort, and dissatisfaction. (22,141) In the extreme it is experienced as ill health. (22,510) Conversely, when the discrepancy between the two is small, the person does actualize himself, and experiences this as comfort and well being, and is said to be healthy. (22,513)

A question might now be raised concerning the discrepancy between personal reality and external reality: How does the discrepancy come

about? The following is an illustration of this:

Suppose an individual, A, does something; i.e., performs some act of overt behavior. According to Rogers' system, this act would be accompanied by certain organismic experiences which could be evaluated by the organism as either positive or negative, where positive or negative have reference to the maintenance, enhancement, or actualization of the organism. This is roughly equivalent to saying that the person really knows what is best for him.

Suppose now that an individual B comes upon the scene and observing. A criticises him for the manner in which he behaved, asserting that A, in his (B's) opinion is "bad" for having performed the act. A, according to Rogers, is now in a position where one of two things can happen to him, where these two things have relevance for the manner in which A symbolizes the event which here includes the act, the organismic experience, and B's criticism. According to Rogers, A can symbolize the event, in so far as it pertains to the criticism, by the formula: "I perceive that this behavior is dissatisfying to B"; or, "I perceive this behavior as dissatisfying to me." The former is an "accurate symbolization of B's actions; the latter is a distortion. (22,498-503)

What follows from the first symbolization, the accurate one, is a reconsideration of the behavior and of the corresponding experience. In this reconsideration, A tends to take into account all relevant factors: the satisfaction arising for the organism, the satisfaction arising for the self, the relationship of B to A and conversely, the nature of the situation, and so forth. On the basis of a careful weighting of all factors a re-evaluation occurs. An organismic valuing process, having

as its aim the striving of the organism as already referred to, provides the re-evaluation. Whatever the result, whether the experience (internal event plus behavior) comes to be considered plus or minus, the person will have made an organismic judgment. It is axiomatic in the Rogerian system that given all the relevant facts in consciousness the person tends to make decisions for and about himself that are in the direction of growth, differentiation, and maturity. (22,522-524;501-503)

Suppose now that A had made the second reaction: "I perceive this behavior as dissatisfying to me." In this case there would have been an immediate denial of any satisfactions that had been experienced, the experience would have been considered minus, and hence denied a place on a symbolic level in consciousness in the self-concept. Furthermore, and this Rogers considers of maximum importance, the attitudes of the other person (B) would be introjected by A and experienced not as the attitudes of another person, "...but in a distorted fashion, as if based on the evidence of one's own ...(organismic)...equipment." (22,500)

Continuing, Rogers asserts, "In this way the values which the infant attaches to experience become divorced from his own organismic functioning, and experience is valued in terms of the attitudes held by his parents, or by others who are in intimate association with him. These values come to be accepted as being just as "real" as the values which are connected with direct experience. (Note: direct experience is that predicated upon what has been called in the foregoing, "an accurate symbolization.") The "self" which is formed on this basis of distorting the sensory and visceral evidence to fit the already present structure acquires an organization and integration which the individual endeavors

to preserve. Behavior is regarded as enhancing this self when no such value is apprehended through sensory or visceral reactions; behavior is regarded as opposed to the maintenance or enhancement of the self when there is no negative sensory or visceral reaction." (22,500-501) (Italics mine.)

At this juncture an important point need be made. In the first instance making an accurate symbolization leads to an event that is in the best interests of the person considered as a whole; a person who has a conscious concept of himself. In the second instance making a distorted symbolization leads to an event that is in the best interests of the conscious concept of the self, though not necessarily in the best interests of the person as a whole.

If the internal experience were one of anger, and the overt behavior one of aggression, the totality consisting of experience and behavior could be satisfying to the person. However, if his conscious self-concept were such that conscious recognition of the internal experience and overt behavior was impossible, there would follow denial of course, but there would also follow "... immediate and short-termed satisfaction of being protected..." (22,523) Moreover, so long as the environment is congenial to the false picture acquired by the person of his self; i.e., so long as he is not confronted with discrepancies between the self-picture and organismic experience; the denial will continue and the false picture persist. Thus, as has been already pointed out, the values existent in the

*Rogers' terminology tends to be somewhat confusing. Sensory is used with reference to "anger", "perception of self as ugly" (24,379) and "experience of succeeding with difficult mechanical operation." (22,527) In the quotation "sensory and visceral" are organismic responses roughly translatable to "way person really feels."

self may be served by these means though the values existent in the person because of the person's natural tendency to move toward actualization, may not be. (23,321-322)

In another way, too, the best interests of the organism need not be served by activity that does serve the values existent in the self. According to the theory, denied experiences need to be guarded against. "Threat occurs when experiences are perceived or anticipated as incongruent with the structure of the self... Defense is a sequence of behavior in response to threat... Defense increases susceptibility to threat... Threat and defense tend to occur in sequence again and again; as this sequence progresses attention is removed farther and farther from the original threat, but more experience is distorted and susceptible to threat." (22,516) This process, if continued unchecked, would proceed to maladjustment and eventual breakdown of organismic functioning.

A question may now be asked concerning the meaning of self-acceptance in the Rogerian theory. Does it mean that the person accepts himself, or does it mean that a person accepts his "self"?

In terms of the theory as outlined and in terms of the operational definition of self-acceptance quoted at the beginning of this section, it would appear that it cannot mean the latter, unless the latter follows from the former. Stated somewhat differently, it would appear to be the case that the latter (i.e., acceptance of his "self") is a necessary condition for self-acceptance, though it is by itself not a sufficient condition. The former (i.e., the person accepts himself) would appear to be both a necessary and a sufficient condition for self-acceptance.

The distinction between the two conditions referred to above is apparent when it is noted that though a self-concept is built up largely upon introjected values rather than upon organismic functioning, it does not follow immediately that the person is maladjusted. There must be a perception of an experience whose expression would be inconsistent with the self-structure, in order for there to be threat-defensive reactions. "As long as the self-Gestalt is firmly organized and no contradictory material is even dimly perceived, then positive self-feelings may exist, the self may be seen as worthy and acceptable, and conscious tension minimal. Behavior is consistent with the organized hypotheses and concepts of self-structure. An individual in whom such conditions exist would perceive himself as functioning adequately." (23,321)

It would appear clear that such a person as Rogers describes would be accepting of his "self." Yet he could not be thought of as self-accepting, since the latter, for this person, would involve "...more accurate symbolizations of a much wider variety of sensory and visceral experience. It involves a reorganization of values, with the organism's own experiences clearly recognized as providing evidence for the valuations. There slowly begins to emerge a new self, which to the client seems to be much more his "real" self, because it is based to a much greater extent upon all of his experience, perceived without distortion." (23,323)

In this latter instance the person would be accepting of himself, and accepting of his "self." This individual would thus tend to a) experience himself as worthwhile and perceive himself as worthwhile; b) act in terms of his own experiences rather than in terms of the wishes and desires of others; c) honestly face his own motives.

The other individual, the one accepting of his "self" but not of himself, would tend not to do any of the three things indicated. With respect to b. and c. this would appear to be quite clear. It is also clear with respect to a. for in the system, "... a negative feeling about the self exists when the organization of self is threatened by experiences which are vaguely or clearly seen as inconsistent with that structure." (24,380)

For the person to be accepting of himself means then that the person accepts his own organismic experiences and either does or can give symbolization to these experiences. The self-concept built upon these symbolizations is felt to be real and satisfying. For the person to be accepting of his "self" means that the person is satisfied with his self structure, which could be one built upon introjected values rather than experienced ones. In a "friendly" environment this self structure could be satisfying, but the individual would be restricted in the sense that in a less friendly environment, where his introjected values did not hold, he would feel the discrepancy between what he thinks he is and what others think he is. Eventually, as this discrepancy increases, he would either have to leave the environment or begin the slow, often painful process of abandoning introjected values and discovering his own organismic ones. Only when values are based upon organismic functioning is the person really self-accepting.

To summarize:

1. Self is a part of, but not coexistent with the organism.
2. Self develops out of the organism through experiences, either direct or distorted.

3. Direct experience is an organismic event and is evaluated by organism in relation to its significance for the natural proclivity of the organism to move in the direction of growth, differentiation, and maturity.
4. Distorted experience involves no organismic evaluation, but rather consists of the introjection of the values of others, which are acted upon as if attained through direct experience.
5. Discrepancy between values relevant to the self-structure and values relevant to the organism results from distorted experience.
6. Person in whom such discrepancy exists is a potentially threatened one because of the need to keep on guard against the symbolization of the denied experiences of the organism, and the need to maintain the existing self-structure.
7. Threat can be really done away with by a reorganization of the self-concept to include values based on organismic functioning rather than upon introjections.
8. When this reorganization occurs there follows acceptance of self that includes, and is prior to, acceptance of the "self."

III Current Research--Approach Used Here

In theory a person who is accepting of himself has many distinguishing characteristics. Among others, Rogers cites the following:

1. There is less potential tension or anxiety, less vulnerability.
2. There is a lessened possibility of threat because the structure of the self has become more inclusive, more flexible, and more discriminating. There is, therefore, less likelihood of defensiveness.
3. Adaptation of any life situation will be improved because the behavior will be guided by a more complete knowledge of the relevant sensory data, there being fewer experiences distorted and fewer denied.
4. Interpersonal relations will necessarily improve because of a greater understanding and acceptance of others. (22,522;531)

The characteristics indicated follow from the theory in the following manner:

1. The person who denies some experiences must continually defend himself against the symbolization of those experiences.
2. As a consequence, all experiences are viewed defensively as potential threats, rather than for what they really are.
3. Thus in interpersonal relationships, words or behaviors are experienced and perceived as threatening which were not so intended.
4. Also, words and behaviors in others are attacked because they represent or resemble the feared experiences.
5. There is no real understanding of the other as a separate

person since he is perceived mostly in terms of threat or non-threat to the self.

6. When all experiences are available to consciousness and are integrated, then defensiveness is minimized. When there is no need to defend, there is no need to attack.
7. When there is no need to attack, the other person is perceived for what he really is, a separate individual, operating in terms of his own meanings, based on his own perceptual field. (22,520-521)

The characteristics cited, it is true, are based on theory which in turn is based almost exclusively upon the clinical observations of patients, or clients as Rogers prefers to call them. However, the Rogers group, and others, have performed a considerable number of research projects which almost without exception have tended to support the theoretical conclusions. Rogers cites the following results of research performed by his group.

1. A decrease in psychological tension as verbally expressed. (1,25,33)
2. A decrease in objectively measured physiological tensions in frustrating situation. (32)
3. A decrease in current defensive behavior, operationally defined, and objectively measured in the interview. (8,12)
4. A decrease in negatively toned attitudes toward others. (28)
5. An increase in attitudes of acceptance of and respect for others. (26)
6. An increase in the maturity of reported behavior. (12)
7. Alteration in personality structure as measured by projective and objective tests, this change being in the direction of lessened anxiety, greater personal integration, greater

emotional stability and control, increased adaptability, lessened neurotic and introvertive tendencies, increased sociability and self-confidence. (5,14,19,21)

More recently, individuals not a part of what has been here called "the Rogers group" have performed experiments concerning the self-concept, paying special attention to self-acceptance. Berger (3), Brownfain (4) and Taylor and Snygg (31) are among such individuals. The experiment of Brownfain is of interest because of its direct relevance to Rogers' theoretical considerations as given in this section, and the experiments reported to support them. Brownfain reported that individuals who are characterized by having stable self-concepts tend, in contrast to those whose concepts of self are unstable, to:

1. Be better liked and considered more popular by the group.
2. Be freer of inferiority feelings and nervousness.
3. Have a higher level of self-esteem.
4. See themselves more as they believe others see them.
5. Show less evidence of compensatory behavior of a defensive kind.

(Taken from 4, 17-18)

It is to be observed, referring to the studies cited, that with the exception of those making use of tests of either a psychological or physiological nature, heavy reliance has been placed upon the subject's reports about himself as a source of data for making inferences. Such reliance has not been without its complications.

Consider the work performed by Brownfain (4). "The primary data of this investigation consist of several series of self-ratings on twenty-five personality variables, obtained successively under different instructions... Under one set of instructions the subject gave himself the

the benefit of any realistic doubt he had about his standing on each inventory item, thus yielding a 'positive' self-concept. Under another set of instructions the subject denied himself the benefit of such doubt, thus yielding a 'negative' self-concept. The absolute differences between these positively and negatively slanted self-ratings on each item, summed over all the items of the inventory, was the operational measure of stability. The larger this discrepancy the more unstable the self-concept is assumed to be... (However)... it was assumed that stability reflects an integrative function rather than rigidity of personality. Therefore, the fifteen subjects whose stability was considered to be of a defensive nature expressing their intolerance of ambiguity about the self, were eliminated... The instrument used to measure such pseudo-stability, or rigidity, was the F (Predisposition for Fascism) Scale, an attitude scale developed by Frenkel-Brunswick and her associates in their research on authoritarian personality." (4,17)

It will be noted that in the study, Brownfain encountered a difficulty in his use of self-ratings, a difficulty that required the use of an additional instrument in order to resolve. This is not to point up a criticism of the Brownfain work, but rather to illustrate the occurrence of an event that might have been predicted from the theory.

In the previous section it was pointed out that in the theory, acceptance of himself is not identical to acceptance of "his self." It was indicated that there might be some superficial similarities between the person who was accepting of himself and the person who was accepting of "his self." Among such similarities, it was indicated that one could be found in the presence of positively toned self-attitudes. Brownfain's work indicates that another exists in terms of stability of the self-concept;

that both the person who is accepting of himself and the person who is accepting of "his self" may have what appear to be "stable self-concepts." Yet, despite a superficial similarity, in the person who is only accepting of "his self" what might pass for stability is actually rigidity.

The point that is being made here is that when one uses a subject's reports about himself, the difficulty encountered by Brownfain is almost inevitable.

Consider a recent work by Hartley (10).

In Hartley's work, the "Q-sort" technique devised by Stephenson (29) is employed. In this technique the subject is required to rank a series of statements descriptive of personality in the order in which they apply to him. When he has completed this task, he is required to rank the statements a second time, only now to rank them according to the way in which he would like them to apply to him. From the first sort there is obtained, "... a complex but statistically manipulable report of the person's self perception..." (23,317)* From the second there arises what "... we might call his self-ideal." (23,318)

The two sorts thus obtained may then be correlated. The resulting coefficient of correlation (product-moment r) would be an index of the amount of agreement between the way the person perceives himself and the way in which he would like to perceive himself.

As used by Hartley with patients in therapy, results indicate that

*In the actual task the subject is required to sort the statements into a stated number of piles, from those most applicable to those least applicable to him. Further, the number in each pile must be such that the whole forms a normal distribution. This is for ease of statistical manipulation rather than for mathematical reasons. The number in each pile is determined by a binomial expansion.

prior to the start of therapy the correlation between self and ideal is low. In the case quoted by Rogers (23,319) the correlation is .15. After therapy the correlation is .81. The conclusion is drawn that in the course of becoming more accepting of one's self there is movement toward greater agreement between the self and the ideal-self. (23,320)

There would appear to be two comments that can be made about the Hartley study. First, concerning the use of patients, it is not immediately clear that the correlation reflects increased acceptance of one's self as therapy progresses. It might, but it is not conclusively shown, in this experimenter's opinion, that it does. In giving additional data on the case, Rogers quotes the following from Hartley's work:

1. The correlation between the two self-pictures, before and after therapy, is .15.
2. The correlation between the two self-ideal pictures, before and after therapy, is .71.

In the light of these correlations it would appear to be the case that the self-ideal picture is a more stable one than the self-picture, since it undergoes less change than does the self-picture. In the light of the statements that the subject is required to rank, statements which in this experimenter's opinion appear to be strongly positive and strongly negative*, it would appear reasonable to infer that prior to therapy the patient ranked negative statements high on the sorting when giving his self-picture, ranking positive statements low; and that he would do the

*Examples of the statements, taken from (23,316-317) are the following: "I don't see how anybody could love me"; "I only sort of half believe in myself"; "I feel sexually inadequate"; "I really feel insecure"; "I seem to have a real inner strength in handling things. I'm on a pretty solid foundation and it makes me pretty sure of myself"; "To me life is interesting, rich, and colorful"; "I feel I ought to be in a sanitarium"; "I like to be independent"; "I've gotten so that I'm afraid to try things, because I just know...I'm not going to be able to do them.

reverse when giving his self-ideal picture. This could explain the presence of the low correlation between self and ideal before therapy. If in the course of therapy, the patient came to think more highly of himself, it would also appear reasonable to expect that negative statements would tend to drop, that positive statements would tend to rise, and that as a consequence the correlation between the two self-pictures, before and after therapy, would be low, but that the post-therapy self and ideal would tend to be much alike.

It would appear to be the case that the observed correlations could be accounted for by the movement of the negative statements and their position in the rank ordering. This could be indicative of increased self-acceptance, but it need not necessarily be so, for the movement of the negative characteristics could arise through increased capacity for denial, which clearly would not be in keeping with the considerations pertaining to acceptance of one's self advanced in the previous section.

It has been said above that the correlations could be taken to reflect self-acceptance; however, because of the nature of the statements the subject is made to work with, an additional doubt may be raised that they do. This doubt arises because the statements manipulated by the subject have no qualifying statements attached to indicate what the subject really thinks of the trait or characteristic being ranked. That is, when a trait or characteristic is ranked there is nothing to indicate whether the subject is expressing satisfaction with the self or acceptance of the self; dissatisfaction with the self or rejection of the self. Satisfaction is not to be equated with acceptance nor dissatisfaction with rejection, according to theory, yet in current techniques it is not always clear what it is that the subject is expressing. In

short, in the ranking of statements in the "Q-sort" method the subject may very well be stating whether he likes himself or not, rather than whether he accepts himself or not.

Here then, as in the Brownfain work, an additional test would appear to be needed to distinguish genuine self-acceptance from some other perhaps superficially similar though basically different phenomena.

It would appear, too, that were one to use normal subjects the need for an additional test would be all the greater. In the case of patients in a clinic it would appear that it is always possible to make checks on the validity of self-reports either implicitly or explicitly. In the case of normals such clinical testing would appear to be very difficult, if not actually impossible. Yet clearly such checks would appear necessary, especially after the recent work of Taylor and Snygg (31) in which it was demonstrated that individuals considered to be not accepting of themselves tended to be less willing to admit negative statements about themselves than those considered to be accepting of themselves.

Because of what appear to be "complications" that arise when a subject's reports about himself are used as data for making inferences—possibility of self-deception, volitional or otherwise; possibility of confusing self-acceptance with acceptance of one's self-concept—another approach, one not making use of a subject's reports about himself, will be utilized here.

In this thesis a subject's perceptions and cognitions will be used as the basis upon which to draw inferences concerning his degree of self-acceptance. This approach would appear to offer several advantages for experimentation:

1. A person, in general, tends not to be aware of the significance of his perceptions and cognitions. Thus, using perceptions and cognitions could reduce inaccuracies attributable to self-deception and self-defense.
2. The use of the person's perceptions and cognitions would tend to be closer to the real meaning of self-acceptance than is use of his self-reports. According to theory, it is the organism that perceives not the self-structure; that the perceptions of the organism take into account the nature of the self-concept; i.e., whether it is based upon organismic evidence or introjected evidence. According to theory, the organism knows by the process of "subception"* whether or not a certain stimulus is apt to give rise to experiences whose symbolization would be threatening to the self-structure. Therefore, it would appear as if the use of perceptions and cognitions, potentially at least, offered an opportunity to discriminate between those who only accept the self, though not themselves, since the former would be most apt to subceive threat.
3. By relating the subject's perceptions and cognitions to the actual definition of self-acceptance there would appear to arise a more direct method of deciding upon the person's degree of self-acceptance.
4. The results achieved thereby would yet be comparable to current studies.

*Subceive - a term borrowed from McCleary and Lazarus whose experiments seem to demonstrate that a person can respond to a threatening stimulus even when that stimulus is below the person's threshold for response. The person thus does not perceive threat, he subceives it.

The manner in which the person's perceptions and cognitions are used in order to make a decision concerning his degree of self-acceptance will be described fully in the next section. Here it may be stated that a test was constructed to tap the person's perceptions and cognitions; i.e., test items are such that more than one answer is possible, with the answer arrived at being a function of idiosyncratic perception and cognition.

By the use of such a test it is hoped that an approach to the problem of differentiating the most from the least self-accepting, without using the subject's reports about himself, can be attained. However, in yet another respect self-acceptance was studied without using such self-reports. This respect pertains to some of the behavioral correlates of self-acceptance. Here overt behavior was observed. This was accomplished in the following manner:

On the basis of test results, two groups of individuals are discriminated from a larger population. The one group contains individuals whose degree of self-acceptance is significantly greater than that of the individuals of the second group. The individuals then are paired, one from each group, and brought together to work on a series of tasks that require their joint effort.

The tasks are verbal. They require that the two individuals express opinions and resolve differences of opinion when they appear. This is managed by having each of the tasks consist of a set of 10 items which must be ranked in some order of merit by means of the pair's joint effort; i.e., the pair must agree between them on what the rank order ought to be.

There are 4 such lists. The lists tend to vary in their emotion evoking properties; i.e., the items to be ranked on the first list are such that differences of opinion can be easily resolved without much emotion being aroused in the two individuals, while the items on the fourth list are such that differences of opinion tend to be accompanied by much emotion.

The experimental design is such that it is possible to measure certain aspects of the behavior of each one of the pair as they go about the solution of the joint task.

It is believed that a situation involving the give and take that arises in the course of the resolution of differences of opinion can reasonably be considered an "approximation to a real life situation," and that it will be enabled thereby to afford interesting data concerning actual behavior, which heretofore has been largely inferred from the self-reports of the subjects involved.

IV Hypothesis to be tested

On the basis of what has been said thus far in the previous two sections, it would appear reasonable to entertain the following hypotheses with respect to the interpersonal behavior of the self-accepting and non-self-accepting groups respectively:

The self-accepting group will tend to differ from the non-self-accepting group in the following respects:

1. The self-accepting will tend to be more realistic in their appraisal of the non-self-accepting than the latter will of the former. Specifically, the self-accepting will have a more accurate knowledge of the involvement - its place of occurrence and its degree - of the non-self-accepting, than the latter will of the former's involvement. This would tend to follow from the assertion in the previous section that self-accepting people, being the less threatened, will tend to be less concerned with themselves and will, therefore tend to be more concerned with the "outside world" than will the non-self-accepting who, by definition, are threatened individuals. Too, the self-accepting will tend to be more accepting of others, accepting them as they really are without distorting the significance of the others behavior.
2. The self-accepting will tend to differ from the non-self-accepting in kind of behavior exhibited in the course of the joint effort procedure. Chiefly the difference will tend to be that the self-accepting will exhibit behavior that reflects an acceptance of the influence of the joint effort procedure, while the non-self-accepting persons will exhibit behavior that reflects a non-acceptance of the

influence of the joint effort procedure.

Specifically, the joint effort procedure - the ranking of lists of items where both members of a pair have to agree on what the rankings ought to be - is such that the members of the pair are exposed to two kinds of influence: 1) Each member can adopt the original opinions of the other to a greater or lesser extent, or, 2) each can adopt the opinions that occur in the course of the joint effort, where these opinions are different from those held by either member prior to the joint effort. Thus, the hypothesis asserts that the self-accepting person will be more amenable to such influence than will the non-self-accepting person. One of the assumptions being made here is that tasks - the ranking of items - will call forth opinions which, though having a value for the person, are nonetheless alterable. Thus, in some ways, being accepting of the influence of the joint effort is related to being group oriented rather than being self-oriented, and being essentially cooperative rather than uncooperative.

As a corollary to the above hypothesis, the following is asserted:

a) The self-accepting person will tend to be accepting of the influence of the joint effort, as defined, whether he is a leader or a follower in the joint effort procedure, or whether the tasks tend to be evoking of much emotion or little. Conversely, the non-self-accepting person will tend not to be accepting of influence in general, and specifically when not leading (i.e.: being a leader in the joint effort procedure) and/or when the emotion evoking characteristics of the task are relatively strong.

It need be emphasized that being accepting of the joint effort influence is not identical with being passively compliant. Two distinctions can be made: 1) Being accepting of influence implies accepting some of the partner's original opinions when these opinions are taken over directly; 2) Being accepting of influence can occur whether the person is a leader or a follower. Being passively compliant implies accepting many (or nearly all) of the partner's original opinions when these are expressed, and implies too that the person is a follower.

The hypothesis and the corollary would appear to follow from the theory in the following manner:

1. Being self-accepting implies acceptance of others, which implies further a willingness to grant to others freedom of expression of opinion, and a willingness to genuinely consider the merits of such expressed opinion.

2. Being self-accepting implies being relatively unthreatened, flexible, and feeling one's self to be an evaluator of experience rather than feeling one's self to be evaluated by experience.

3. Because of these implications of being self-accepting it would follow that the person who is self-accepting would not be unduly concerned with the question of "giving in" when the partner's opinions appeared convincing. Too, acceptance of such opinions would appear to be facilitated by the characteristics associated with being self-accepting.

4. Hence, not being concerned too much with "giving in", and being capable of acceptance of the opinions of others, could make for greater readiness for group oriented behavior.

5. Further, being a well integrated person, the self-accepting person would be expected to maintain group oriented behavior with out recourse to

such special conditions like being a leader or having the emotion evoking tendency of a task minimal.

6. The non-self-accepting person on the contrary, not having the characteristics indicated above to the extent that the self-accepting person does, and being in addition a person who is much concerned with himself, would tend not to be group oriented.

7. Too, being a person who is much concerned with external appearances, he would tend to avoid situations in which he appeared to be "giving in." Being a leader in a situation tends to make "giving in" less compromising, and hence one might expect that the non-self-accepting person would tend to attempt to be a leader.

8. Under such circumstances, he might be considered to be relatively less threatened than otherwise, and hence amenable to the influence of the joint effort procedure; at least more amenable than when not leading.

9. However, even in situations where he is relatively unthreatened, the non-self-accepting person is yet the less well integrated person. One of the implications of this is that he is the less well controlled emotionally.

10. One would expect that in situations where he had the comparative "safety" of leading, he would still be susceptible to threat due to the presence of emotion evoking stimuli.

11. Thus, in such situations, though he may be a leader, one would expect less amenability to the influence of the joint effort than when in situations where the emotion evoking tendency of the task is less.

12. Thus, when he is either not leading, or when he is in a situation that tends to be emotion evoking, one might expect that the non-self-accepting person would be less amenable to influence than when leading and in a less emotion evoking situation.

V Construction of the Test

The task in this section is to construct a test on the basis of which responses it is possible to discriminate between those persons who are most self-accepting and those who are least. This test is objective in the sense that it can be scored in terms of an external criteria by more than one person with a high degree of agreement between scorers. This objective test must pertain to the criteria given for self-acceptance, and do so by tapping the subject's perceptions and cognitions. By tapping these functions the way is cleared for an experiment tapping overt behavior. In sum, the program now is to discriminate on the basis of perceptions and cognitions in terms of the three criteria given in the definition of self-acceptance, and then check on the significance of self-acceptance in terms of overt behavior.

One of the ways the test taps perceptions and cognitions is that it consists of a series of descriptive statements—statements that describe various situations which, though clear enough, still leave room for the idiosyncratic cognitive structuring which is essential in this case.

The test that was constructed, therefore, uses items of the type found in the Comprehension subtest of the Wechsler-Bellevue Intelligence Scale, items which begin with the phrase, "What is the thing to do if...?" with the rest of the sentence consisting of a description of a situation that the subject is left free to structure. This can be accomplished by having as situations ones in which there is no one thing to do; ones in which there are indeed several things that might be done, with what actually should be done being a function of the manner in which the

subject perceives and cognitively structures the situation. In short, the situations are such that the thing to do in them depends on the significance of the situation to the subject. On the basis of the structuring used by the subject a decision is made concerning the degree of self-acceptance reflected in it.

In order to have an objective basis on which to make a decision, the described situations are so chosen that it is possible to state a priori what the perceptions and cognitions ought to be were the subject a self-accepting person. This means that each situation is treated as if it was an ideal case, with perceptions and cognitions given as they might be by the ideally self-accepting person. What these perceptions and cognitions ought to be is inferable from the characteristics attributed to the self-accepting persons on both theoretical and experimental grounds. For example, given that one of the characteristics of the self-accepting person is that he feels worthwhile, it would follow that in situations where it is possible to feel either worthwhile or not, he would be characterized by the former.

With reference to the three criteria, the test that was constructed utilized five test situations for each, making the test fifteen items in length. For the first group of five items the question was asked, "How would a person structure this particular situation if he had no doubts about his personal worth"; for the second group, "How would a person structure this particular situation if he were one who acted in accordance with his own experience rather than in accordance with the experience of others;" for the third group, "How would a person structure this particular situation if he were one who honestly accepted his own motives, social and personal."

In the Appendix II will be found the complete test with instructions as given to the subjects. Here the items are treated in groups of five with demonstration of their relation to the criteria to which they pertain, and the manner in which they were scored in terms of self-acceptance.

Criteria A: This has to do with the manner in which the subject considers himself; it has to do with whether he tends to consider himself essentially a person of worth, worthy of peoples' respect and merit as a person, or whether he tends to consider himself as a person of relatively little worth.

In order to get an answer to the question raised with respect to this criteria, "How would the person structure this situation were he to have no doubts about his personal worth?" it appeared consistent with the general development that has thus far occurred to attempt an answer through the person's expectations. That is, on the basis of clinical observation it would appear to be the case that a person who tends to doubt his own personal worth would tend also to enter various situations with expectations that were essentially negative and unrealistic. This would be reflected in blaming the self when actually either no reason for blame exists, or when someone else with equal or greater justification ought to be blamed; in rejecting the self when others ought to be rejected, or when no one ought to be rejected; in anticipating criticism when none is intended; in expecting unduly harsh evaluation from someone when this expectation cannot be substantiated in reality.

Though the above might be the chief way in which doubts of a

person's worth might be reflected, there is another way also, that is, by having positive expectations with respect to the self that cannot be substantiated in reality. This would be reflected, for example, in expecting that one's wishes would be gratified because they are one's wishes. Clinical evidence seems to indicate that excessive over-evaluation of the self often masks an underlying under-evaluation. The clue to this state of affairs appears to rest with the reality considerations of the self-evaluation.

Where either of the above two kinds of expectations is revealed in the manner in which the subject cognitively structures a situation, the score will be minus indicating that with respect to the item in question the subject tends to be minimally self-accepting.

There are two kinds of expectations which would rate a plus score, indicating tendencies toward maximal self-acceptance. In the first of these the expectation would be positive with respect to the self, and realistic. This would be seen, for example, in instances where the minimally self-accepting person blames himself unjustly, the maximally self-accepting person would either not blame himself, or would put the blame where it belonged in terms of the reality of the situation. The second kind of expectation would be negative with respect to the self, and reality-oriented. This would be seen, for example, in instances in which it was known that a critic was unduly harsh and unfair. It will be noted again that there is a qualitative difference between the negative expectations of the maximally self-accepting person and the minimally self-accepting person. In the scoring of the test items the discrimination was made chiefly in terms of the reality orientation of the negative expectations.

Reality orientation, reality consideration, reality—these terms as used here make the following assumptions:

1. There is a real world external to the individual.
2. This world can be better apprehended by the self-accepting than by the non-self-accepting. This would appear to follow from the characteristics attributed to the self-accepting person; i.e., being more accepting of his own experiences, feeling himself as an evaluator rather than being evaluated, feeling worthwhile. He would, it seems reasonable to conclude, be less concerned with himself and more concerned with the external world, and hence be in a better position to respond to it than the less self-accepting person. A rather subtle paradox is involved here: the more one consciously attempts to gain approval by attempting to be what others want him to, the less likely is he to be successful; while the less one consciously attempts to gain approval by these means, the more likely he is to do so. Why this should be is not exactly clear, though that the latter would be a more genuine person (a characteristic of one who is self-accepting) might be one answer.

The way this was dealt with in terms of the actual responses received will now be illustrated. Given below are the actual test items, after each appearing the a priori expectation. After this is given actual responses as received from subjects and the score assigned. In giving the theoretical expectations and the actual observations, they apply to the headings that appear before them.

Item #1. What is the thing to do if, having received an invitation to a social gathering, you are informed that there will be present several individuals who are considered very important in the

field you hope to enter. You are told they may want to look
you over.

plus exp realistic	plus exp unrealistic	minus exp realistic	minus exp. unrealistic
may or may not be looked over; if former, process polite & friend- ly.	expect to "bowl 'em over", praise for ability, offer of high position	individuals known to have peculiar- ities, and pre- parations made accordingly.	feeling "on the spot" anticipating test or cross examination. Special study or dress exceed what is reason- able.
"Just go... Give best impression you can. All you can do.	(None encountered)	"Depends--if these people are pretty serious & really would give you going over, might study up. Otherwise act as you always would."	"First of all study up on who people are, find out their special in- terests, special areas of study and so on. Then I'd study up so that when they ask me questions I wouldn't appear too dumb. And of course, dress up in your very best."

Item #2: What is the thing to do if, having borrowed something from a
friend for a few days, it becomes slightly damaged immediately
after you get it. (Small dent on a car fender; ink stain on a
book, etc.)

Event one that could happen to anyone, & not so serious that it is unpardonable.	event one that friend couldn't possibly complain about since after all he(borrower) is known to be careful with the property of other people.	event could have repercussions if friend is known to have strong views on damage; preparations made accordingly.	serious event has occurred in which he will be severely castigated, & hence event is to be gotten out of in some way. (Blame-avoidance & self-reproach.)
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"Tell the person what happened & offer to pay for repairs or for replacing article."	"Keep the thing until you're finished with it, then give it back without saying anything. He probably won't either."	"Depends on the friend. If he's touchy about such things, damage I mean, have to tell him but wouldn't be too happy about it."	"Well, feel badly about doing such a stupid thing. If there was some way of repairing or fixing it so that he wouldn't find out, that would be the thing to do."
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Item #3: What is the thing to do if at a party at which games are being played, the host (or hostess) urges you to participate in a game and you know you are no good at it.

Parties are events at which you relax and have fun; competitiveness in usual sense absent and shortcomings not crucial.	parties are events at which you show your superiority--no point to a thing unless you can do so.	parties are events which could be serious depending on people involved & type of game being played.	parties are events which are highly competitive, and where failure is cause for embarrassment & loss of prestige.
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"Take part anyway, the idea of the thing is to have a good time. Can enjoy it without having to be good at it."	"Well, if you were no good at it, try and get out of it somehow--say you can't."	"Depends - if it is something they all take pretty seriously, like bridge or some card game, and you can't play, just say so."	"Try to get out of it somehow. No point in being made to look foolish."
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Item #4: What is the thing to do if as a club member you are anxious to be appointed to a certain committee, and the president (who knows of your wishes) appoints someone else.

wish was expressed but not gratified, which is all right since president has final decision to make.	wish was expressed and not gratified, which is not all right because a personal slight was incurred, by person who knows he could do. A-l job.	wish was expressed but was not gratified, and so perhaps there is a need to work harder and merit next appointment.	wish was expressed but was not gratified because of very obvious shortcomings, which can be remedied only through a personal improvement.
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"Do nothing. It's his business to make appointments."	"Get pretty sore about it. Try & find out why he thought you were not good enough."	"Not much to do. Maybe work harder and show them that you have more than a wish to offer."	"Shows what they think of you, and what you maybe should have thought of yourself if you had thought about it at all. What to do-- improve yourself some way so that people like you more."
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Item #5: What is the thing to do if, at a social gathering, you go into the room where coats are stacked to get something, and as you enter you discover a couple behaving intimately.

a legitimate reason exists for entering; couple ought perhaps to be embarrassed.	couple behaving wrongly and ought to be dealt with accordingly.	a legitimate reason for entering does exist, but much depends on how intimately they were behaving.	no legitimate reason for entering exists; self-castigation for interruption.
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"Go ahead & get what you came for and leave."	"Be pretty embarrassing to get in on something like that. Report them so that they would have to leave."	"Depends on how intimate is intimate. If you mean 'going all the way' leave and maybe go back later. If just necking, why go ahead & get what you came for."	"Back away quickly. Pretend you didn't notice, and don't let them know that you were even there."
.	.	.	.

Criteria B: This has to do with the manner in which the subject appraises situations, with whether he tends to appraise them in terms of his own experience, or whether he tends to appraise them in terms of the experiences of others.

As stated above it is actually impossible to construct test items that will directly get at the question of whether in a situation the person is acting in terms of his own experience or in terms of the experience of someone else, treated as if it were his own. However, it

is possible to construct items of the type thus far used that will get at the question in a less direct, but no less valid, manner. This can be accomplished by taking into account one of the prime characteristics of the person who acts on the basis of his own experience, namely, that in a situation in which he is doing something that he has a perfect right to do, he will tend to continue doing it when an obstacle is introduced, where this obstacle consists of someone's contrary opinion. Thus, if the test items are ones in which someone is doing something and an obstacle is introduced, and if the weight to be assigned to the obstacle is a function of one's self-acceptance, then the items will be consistent with ones already constructed.

For the five items constructed to pertain to this criteria, the theoretical expectations are almost identical. Therefore, following the plan for criteria A, the four kinds of expectations will be given; however, here they will precede the actual test items. After the expectations will follow the actual items, each of which in turn will be followed by actual responses pertaining to the item in terms of the four kinds of expectations.

situation one in which he has right to pursue own desires, beliefs, opinions etc., & act on them.	.situation one in which he doesn't have such right, and must concur in the opinions of others to further his own ends.	.situation one in which he does have such right, but corresponding expression & act are dependent upon the known characteristics of others involved.	.situation one in which he doesn't have such right; situation one of potential danger to the self which can be warded off by complete subservience.
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Item #1: What is the thing to do if while hurrying to a class session you want to attend, a professor in whose class you are in

danger of flunking stops you, and asks you to help him
carry some lab equipment from one end of the building to
another.

"Toll the profes- sor that while you might like to help him you can- not do so because you are hurrying to a class."	."Tell the profes- sor that you will be glad to help him 'cause in that way you might keep from being flunked."	."Depends on the kind of profes- sor he is. If he has reputation for unfairness & flunking kids he doesn't like-- don't know--be kinda hard to re- fuse even though you could I sup- pose."	."By all means help the professor. No telling how he will take it if you don't. Besides you ought always to help a professor if he asks for it; put yourself second."
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Item #2: What is the thing to do if having planned to see a play, a
friend tells you that the play is immoral, and that anyone
who goes to see it must have a "dirty mind."

"With morals it's pretty much up to the person him- self to decide what is good and what is bad. Friend is en- titled to his own opinion just as you are. Go see the play if that is what you in- tended."	."Give the friend a dressing down for implying that you have a dirty mind cause you want to see the play. And give him a lect- ure on what con- stitutes immoral plays. Wouldn't have anything to do with him."	."Depends on a lot of things; who the friend is, how much you value his judg- ment and so on. After listening to him, you may be able to make up your mind better. Still go if you want. If you were a Catholic you probably would not."	."I don't think you ought to go. If a play is immoral you would not want to be caught attend- it."
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Item #3: What is the thing to do if being engaged in something which
as far as you can see is not bad, you learn that some people
are criticising you for it.

<p>"Keep doing it if you are really convinced that it is not bad.</p>	<p>"Find out what the criticisms are and find out their reasons for making them. Then show them you are not as bad as they may think."</p>	<p>"Depends on the reasons these people have. Might examine them and then re-examine your own, and then continue or not."</p>	<p>"Stop what you are doing, and do something for which they could not criticize you."</p>
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Item #4: What is the thing to do if at a conference (of which you are a member) and on an important issue, you discover that your views are entirely different from those held by others.

<p>"I don't see the problem. If you have something to add, why not say it?"</p>	<p>"Depends on the kind of people there & whether you wanted them to accept you. Probably best to keep quiet."</p>	<p>"Depends on the issues involved. If you felt real strong about one speak your piece otherwise might go along with majority."</p>	<p>"If all the others have already made up their minds, no point in starting an argument. Go along with majority."</p>
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Item #5: What is the thing to do if having planned on contributing only a small amount to charity because it was all you could conveniently afford, you learn that the list of contributors (with amount contributed) is to be published.

<p>"Give what you had originally planned because that was all you could afford."</p>	<p>"Since you do not want people to think badly of you, you'd better step up the contribution somehow."</p>	<p>"Be awfully hard not to increase your contribution; some people do judge you from it. But if it really was all you could afford, that's the answer."</p>	<p>"Increase your contribution by all means. If you can't then don't give anything."</p>
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Criteria C: This has to do with the manner in which the subject considers his own motives, social and personal; it has to do with whether he honestly acknowledges feelings and ideas as they are called forth in him, or whether he tends to deny them, perhaps substituting others in their place.

To ascertain the subject's position along the self-acceptance continuum with respect to this criteria it is necessary that the test items be of a certain kind; that is, that they describe situations in which it would be reasonable for the person involved to have certain feelings in varying degrees of strength. This could be brought about by having as situations ones in which the person involved is slighted, or unduly inconvenienced, or made angry or embarrassed by someone. Consistent with the idea that the self-accepting person will experience feelings where they ought to exist is the contrary idea that he ought not to experience feelings where they would be inappropriate.

Unlike the items under criteria B, where one set of theoretical expectations served to guide the scoring of the responses, here two distinct sets will be employed. One for two items, and another for the other three. Following then, will be the two items after which will be found the theoretical expectations. Following the single set of expectations will be two sets of answers, one for each of the test items, and relevant to a particular kind of expectation.

Item #1: What is the thing to do if a friend, having promised to appear in the afternoon to help you study for an important exam, fails to appear, and then in the evening phones and explains that he has been ill. He sounds intoxicated.

Item #2. What is the thing to do if having invited a person you know to look over your new house, and hearing him praise it lavishly, you learn that he is now telling people that the house is terrible and that you have poor taste.

feelings of having been let down, treated poorly in figure, with feel- ings of caution in future in ground.	feelings of having been person- ally wounded, with anger and caution in figure.	feelings of hav- ing been let down in figure, but treated as function of person as known.	.no feelings of having been let down; justifica- tion of other's behavior, chiefly in terms of own defects.
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(For Item #1)

"Not much you can do with that. Study on your own or call someone else. A person who would do that to you is not the kind you'd depend on very much."	"This would be a pretty kettle of fish! Tell him off good next time we met. And definitely never call on him again!"	"Well, if there were unusual cir- cumstances--like being unable to get away from a party--even then he should not have lied. Kinda mad about that."	"Whether your friend was drunk or not it would make no difference cause he is a sick person and needs psychiatric help. When he called you should have offered to help him in some way."
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(For Item #2)

"Do nothing. But that would be the last time he would be invited to my house."	"Look the guy up either in person or by telephone and ask him ex- actly what he means by these statements. Have it out with him good and proper."	"Be kinda funny for a person to do a thing like that, but if he did, that would be the end of him with me."	"Be your own fault for having invited such a person to look at your house in the first place. No one but your- self to blame."
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Item #3: What is the thing to do if on entering a room where small groups of people you know are standing around chatting, the conversation ceases in the group you approach.

Item #4: What is the thing to do if upon returning to a clerk in a store to complain that you have been short-changed by a small amount, you notice that a customer is giving her a hard time, and she (the clerk) looks cross and angry.

Item #5: What is the thing to do if while watching a movie a woman wearing a large hat sits directly in front of you, and shows no indication of removing her hat.

no particular feelings in figure.	.feelings reflecting degree of personal involvement, anger.	no particular feelings in figure, unless based on person or situation as known.	.feelings reflecting degree of personal involvement; embarrassment, not being in the right.
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(For item #3)

"Approach the group as you planned. Why shouldn't you?"	.Well, this was a pretty rude thing to do. If you felt strongly about it, you could go to another group where you would be welcome."	"Approach the group as you had planned. They are supposed to be people you know, so maybe they weren't talking about you."	"This would be very embarrassing. Couldn't join 'em now. Pretend not to notice them and go on to another group."
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(For item #4)

"If you really think you have been short changed go up to the clerk and politely tell her your version of the story."	.Go up and demand that she give you back the rest of your money, and if she doesn't go call the manager."	.Well---it would depend. If she created a scene with the customer who was with her might be best to wait until she cooled off."	"Turn around and go home. Or if you didn't have carfare and needed the money she short changed you, you might go directly to the manager and let him handle it."
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(For item #5)

"Tap the woman on the shoulder, and ask her kindly to remove her hat."	.You might cough a little and mutter something about not being able to see. If she still didn't take the hint, insist that she take it off."	.Well, if the movie was crowded and removing the hat would cause a commotion, might move. If there were no seats around, just ask her if she'd mind removing the hat."	"First move to another seat if there was one. If not, just grin and bear it. These things happen all the time."
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VI Subjects

The items, as listed in Appendix II and scored in terms of the criteria for plus and minus as given in the last section, were administered to 63 "normal" individuals. Here, by normal is meant that the subjects said that they had not been under the care of a physician for at least a year and now felt under no particular need to be under one's care. None felt that they had ever needed to go to a psychiatrist. In addition, the supervisors or teachers of the subjects were questioned regarding the relative work or study efficiency of the subjects they knew. The subjects, all over 21, were either employees of the Veterans Administration Regional Office at Kansas City, Missouri, or advanced students (juniors, seniors, graduate students) at the University of Kansas City, Kansas City, Missouri.

In obtaining subjects from the university candidates for the experiment were told that there was much work involved, but that they would be compensated for their time, provided that they saw the experiment through to the end. There were many reasons for employing this procedure, though the chief one was to guard against getting as subjects individuals who needed to meet a requirement for participation in an experiment and who might enter to do so, and thus not really participate; i.e., the formula of some of these students is to get a disagreeable task over with as quickly as possible.


Employees of the V.A. were, in general, an older group. The experiment was accomplished on V.A. property during V.A. time, hence, no remuneration was offered the V.A. employees.

Of the 63 individuals who were administered the test, 61 turned in

protocols that were scorable by this experimenter. Two individuals failed to answer the five questions that appear on the second page of the test folder.

Scoring an item "plus" if it reflected self-acceptance, and "minus" if it did not, yielded a range of scores from 0 to 15. The actual distribution of scores is given below.

Chart I



It will be observed that the distribution is distinctly bimodal. This fact suggests that the self-accepting and non-self-accepting do not come from the same population, and that the attribute of self-acceptance tends to be distributed in a plus-minus fashion, rather than being distributed in the form of a graduated normal curve.

As a check upon the scoring, all of which was done by this experimenter, a random sample of 15 protocols was selected from the total of 61. These protocols, along with the scoring key and a brief discussion on the meanings of terms, were given to two disinterested individuals (psychiatric social workers) with instructions to score the papers, and rank order the individuals in terms of score achieved. These two rankings, along with that of this experimenter, were then used to calculate Kendall's W , or coefficient of

the essential agreement among raters. (15)

In this instance, $W = .71$

Testing this coefficient for significance by the Chi-squared method provided by Kendall resulted in a P-value of .01. The coefficient was then regarded as significant and taken to mean that objectivity in the scoring was possible.

As a concluding note on the test itself, it ought to be pointed out that on the surface it would appear to be the case that the three criteria on which the test is based overlap to some extent; that is, they are not uncorrelated criteria. As a consequence of this, some of the test items appear to overlap and reflect some degree of correlation. That there actually was some degree of correlation was shown by the product-moment r 's calculated between test items pertaining to the criteria. Letting a, b, and c, represent the three criteria worth, experience, motives respectively, the three product-moment r 's are:

$$r_{ab} = .32$$

$$r_{ac} = .39$$

$$r_{bc} = .25$$

These three coefficients of correlation are significantly different from zero at the .01 level of confidence.

That correlations of such significance should exist among the three criteria is not in the least surprising, since in the theoretical picture that was drawn, the three appear to be highly inter-correlated. For example, it is difficult to see how a person could honestly appraise his own motives (criteria three) if he were not (also) a person who tended to act in terms of his own experience (criteria two); it is difficult to see how he could act in terms of his own experience if he did not (also) tend

to think of himself as essentially a worthwhile person, (criteria one).

On the basis of the distribution of test scores it was decided to pair subjects from among those who score 8 or less or 11 or more. There were 32 individuals in the former group, 21 in the latter. From this group of 53 individuals, 30 were finally selected for participation in the final experiment. Of these 30, 16 (or 8 pairs) were employees of the Veterans Administration; 14 (or 7 pairs) were students of the University of Kansas City. Essentials of the process by which 15 least self-accepting persons were paired with 15 most self-accepting persons is given below:

TABLE I

		Most self- Accepting	Least self- Accepting
Education	V.A.	13.5	13.0
	K.C.U.	15.0	15.6
	Total	14.3	14.3
Age	V.A.	32.25	28.75
	K.C.U.	24.88	28.75
	Total	28.56	26.25
Test Scores	V.A.	12.12	7.75
	K.C.U.	12.43	7.00
	Total	12.28	7.38

In addition to the above, the following is pertinent to the pairing:

No V.A. person was paired with a non-V.A. person; no K.C.U. person was paired with a non-K.C.U. person.

No male was paired with a female.

No supervisor was paired with a subordinate.

No two friends were paired.

The fifteen pairs of subjects were then ready for the experiment.

VII The Experiment

In an earlier section it has been stated that the actual experiment would consist of a ranking process involving four lists, each of which would contain 10 items, and that the four lists would vary along an emotional continuum. Here this will be dealt with in detail, beginning with the construction of the four lists.

In order that the lists might properly be considered to be emotion evoking it was decided that in some way the content of the lists, the actual items in them, should pertain to values which a person might reasonably be expected to hold. It is thought that where the content is such that personal values are not involved, relatively little emotion will be evoked; that is, that the person can discuss the items in the list with another person, exchange ideas and resolve differences without becoming unduly emotional. By an extension of the above thinking, it is believed that where personal values are involved, the exchange of ideas and the resolution of differences can be accompanied by relatively more emotion. The implication here is that the emotion evoking properties of the lists are a function of the nature of the lists themselves.

Accordingly, four lists have been constructed in the following manner:

List 1: To consist of 10 cities, all of which are presumed to be known by name, though not too well known with respect to characteristics. To achieve this aim, the cities selected are those in the 100,000 to 200,000 population range. The subject was required to rank order the cities in terms of population by guessing.

List 2: To consist of 10 jobs, all of which are presumed to be familiar to the subjects, but not so familiar that they would be expected to have a special interest in them. The subject was required to rank order the jobs in terms of salary he would pay to people holding the jobs, had he the power to do so.

List 3: To consist of 10 crimes, all of which are presumed to be known to the subject. However, none of the crimes are such that it might be thought to draw out any special interest in the subject; that is, none of the crimes are those which might be called "tragic," "sensational", or "spectacular." The crimes are fairly common ones of neither overly serious or bizarre nature. The requirement here was for the subject to rank order these crimes in terms of the severity of the punishment that ought to be dealt out to offenders, had the subject the power to hand out such punishment.

List 4: To consist of 10 different groups of people who are presumed to be familiar to the subject. These people are such that all might be considered "socially objectionable" in one way or another in terms of the prevailing social mores. The requirement here was for the subject to rank order these groups in terms of their relative acceptability into his home on a social basis.

The complete listing of the four lists as they were presented to the subjects in the experiment, along with the instructions that were given, is found in Appendix III.

To illustrate the rationale that went into the construction of the lists one might say that it was expected by this experimenter that two people would be able to discuss the relative sizes of Tacoma, Washington,

and Norfolk, Virginia, without undue emotion, but that a similar discussion involving the priority for social visits to be assigned to atheists as against narcotics addicts would evoke considerable emotion. Similarly, a discussion of the crimes would evoke more emotion than a discussion of jobs, but less than a discussion of people.

To check on the validity of the reasoning involved the subjects were asked in the course of the experiment to state on which of the lists they felt most involved, where by involvement was meant personal involvement attributable to the content of the lists. (See Appendix IV for the questionnaire that was used.)

It was assumed that where the subject felt most involved he would also have experienced most emotion. Thus, if 15 pairs of people were asked to rank order the lists in order of involvement, one would expect, if the reasoning that went into the construction of the lists were correct, that the highest mean position, indicating least involvement, would fall to the list of cities; the next highest to jobs; next to crimes; and lowest to people. The mean ranks assigned to the four lists, based on the rankings of all 30 subjects, follows:

Table 2

List 1 (cities)	List 2 (jobs)	List 3 (crimes)	List 4 (people)
3.43	2.90	1.75	1.77

At first glance it would appear that while there is a trend in the direction expected, still it is not as clear cut especially with regard to Lists 3 and 4 as one would like. The reason for this lack of desired clarity, however, appears to be found in the difference in rankings between those considered self-accepting and those considered not. Consider

the following:

Table 3

	List 1	List 2	List 3	List 4
Self-accepting	3.73	2.93	2.00	1.30
Non-self-accepting	3.13	2.87	1.50	2.23

It is clear from the above table that while the self-accepting people tend to follow the anticipated trend, the non-self-accepting people do not. In the case of the non-self-accepting people the locus of greatest involvement is List 3, with List 4 indicated as the locus of second greatest involvement. Why this difference should exist is not exactly clear and would need to be studied further. Suffice to say that a difference is observed in the relative degree of involvement on different lists, and that this is taken into account in the treatment of the data.

In the actual experiment the procedure was as follows:

1. The subjects, working alone, not as members of a pair, were given the four lists to rank order.

2. Within a day or two after the lists had been returned to the experimenter, pairs of subjects were brought together. Working with one pair of subjects at a time in a closed room, the procedure was as follows:

a. The subjects were seated together at a small table. They were presented with a single copy of the four lists. They were told that the lists were to be ranked again, only this time they had to agree between them on what the ranking ought to be. In other words, the two subjects working together had to produce one ranking of each of the four lists.

Usually at this juncture two questions were asked by the subjects.

1. "Suppose we can't agree on what the ranking ought to be? Suppose my partner has one idea about where a thing ought to go, and I another. What then?" The answer was given that it was to be expected that differences of opinion would arise in the course of deciding the ranks to be assigned to items, but that these differences, when they appeared, had to be resolved. Further, that in the resolution of differences they were free to employ any means they desired so long as it did not include chance. That is to say, differences of opinion were not to be resolved by flipping a coin, for example. This admonition was given in order to make sure that what they produced represented a real joint effort, and not a chance solution.

The second question frequently asked was, "What is this all about?" The answer was given that this was an experiment that had to do with opinions. Usually no further explanation was needed.

After the questions had been answered, the two subjects were told that as they worked their verbalizations would be taken down. Stenotype records or tape recordings were made of all transactions. In addition, the two subjects were told that though the examiner would be in the vicinity he would be unavailable for anything once the work got underway. When the subjects indicated that there were no further questions, they were told to begin the work, and the examiner retired to a small table near by. When tape recordings were being made, the examiner operated the machine on the adjacent small table. When stenotype records were made, a stenotypist sat with the examiner at the small table.

3. When the last of the four lists had been ranked in this joint procedure, the lists were removed and the subjects separated. Each was seated

at his own small table. Each was then presented with a short questionnaire. This is the questionnaire already mentioned, a copy of which has been included in Appendix IV. When the questionnaire had been filled out as required, the subjects were each presented with "fresh" copies of the four lists. They were instructed to rank order the lists again, alone. When this ranking had been completed, the experiment had ended.

This procedure produced the following data for analysis, for from each subject there had been obtained:

- a. A ranking of the lists which had been done privately, prior to the joint effort.
- b. A ranking of the same lists done in partnership with another person.
- c. A ranking of the same lists done privately, following the joint effort.
- d. A completed questionnaire.

The data provided by the ranking procedure and the questionnaire will be used to test the hypotheses with which this thesis is concerned. The data provided by the questionnaire will be used to test hypothesis a., while that provided by the ranking procedure will be used to test hypothesis b.

Since the manner in which the ranking procedure provides data for testing a hypothesis having to do with leading, following, exerting influence and being influenced is somewhat complicated, it will be dealt with here in considerable detail.

First, consider that each individual rank ordered a given list three times: once, alone; once, with a partner; once again, alone. Thus, in the case of a given list it is possible to calculate 10 coefficients of correlation based on the work of two individuals working on a list three times as indicated.

To show of what these correlations consist, the following notations will be employed:

P and O will represent two individuals in a pair.

P(1) will represent P's first, or pre-joint effort ranking of a given list.

P(2) will represent P's third, or post joint effort ranking of the given list.

O(1) will represent O's first, or pre-joint effort ranking of the given list.

O(2) will represent O's third, or post joint effort ranking of the given list.

J.E. or simply J will represent the ranking of the given list achieved by P and O in the joint effort.

The 10 coefficients of correlation - rank order coefficients*- are obtained in the following manner:

1. Correlate P(1) with P(2).
2. " P(1) " O(1).
3. " P(1) " O(2).
4. " P(1) " J.
5. " P(2) " O(1).
6. " P(2) " O(2).
7. " P(2) " J.
8. " O(1) " O(2).

* It will be brought out shortly that some partial coefficients of correlation need be calculated. For this reason Kendall's Tau rather than Rho is the coefficient used.

9. Correlate O(1) with J.

10. " O(2) " J.

These 10 correlations exhaust the possibilities for correlations obtained by pairing each person's ranking of a given list with all other rankings in which he or his partner participated either singly or jointly.

To each of the 10 correlations a psychological meaning can be applied. These meanings are indicated in the chart below.

Chart III

<u>Correlation</u>	<u>How Calculated</u>	<u>Significance</u>
1. P(1)P(2)	P's pre-joint effort ranking and his post-joint effort ranking of a given list.	Reflects the amount of agreement between P's pre- and post-joint effort rankings. When this agreement is high* the inference will be made that P's views had not changed much for having been in the joint effort; when the agreement is low, the inference will be made that his views had changed.
2. P(1)O(1)	P's pre-joint effort ranking and O's pre-joint effort ranking of a given list.	Reflects the amount of agreement between P's pre-joint effort ranking and O's pre-joint effort ranking of a given list. When this agreement is high the inference will be made that to some extent they had similar views prior to the joint effort with respect to the items in the given list; when this agreement is low the inference will be made that their views were dissimilar.
3. P(1)O(2)	P's <u>pre-joint effort ranking</u> and O's <u>post-joint effort ranking</u> of a given list.	Reflects the amount of agreement between P's <u>pre-joint effort ranking</u> and O's <u>post-joint effort ranking</u> of a given list. When this agreement is high the inference will be made that O accepted some of P's expressed original views in the joint effort. When this

* A high correlation is one whose magnitude is equal to or greater than .44. Correlations whose magnitude is less than .44 are to be considered low. The selection of .44 as a cut off point is based on the fact that a correlation of this magnitude (or greater) can occur by chance 10 times in 100. A .10 level of confidence is believed adequate for the use to which the individual correlations were put.

<u>Correlation</u>	<u>How Calculated</u>	<u>Significance</u>
3.		agreement is low, however, immediate inference is not possible, for it is not given whether P expressed his views and O rejected them, or P simply did not express his original views in the joint effort. When patterns of correlations are taken up, this problem will be dealt with further.
4. P(1)J	P's pre-joint effort ranking of a list and the ranking of the same list in the joint effort.	Reflects the amount of agreement between P's pre-joint effort ranking and the joint effort ranking in which he participated. When this agreement is high the inference will be made that exerted some influence in the determination of the joint effort ranking; when this agreement is low the inference will be made that P exerted little influence in the determination of the joint effort ranking.
5. P(2)O(1)	Same as # 3, above, -P(1)O(2)- with P and O interchanged.	Same as # 3 above with P and O interchanged.
6. P(2)O(2)	P's post-joint effort ranking of a list and O's post-joint effort ranking of the same list.	Reflects the amount of agreement between P's post-joint effort ranking and O's post-joint effort ranking of the same list. When this agreement is high the inference will be made that to some extent they shared similar views following the joint effort; when this agreement is low the inference will be made that following the joint effort their views were dissimilar.
7. P(2)J	P's post-joint effort ranking of a given list and the ranking of the same list in the joint effort.	Reflects the amount of agreement between P's post-joint effort ranking of a given list and the joint effort ranking of the same list in which he participated. When this agreement is high the inference will be made that P was influenced by the joint effort; when this agreement is low the inference will be made that P was not influenced.
8. O(1)O(2)	Same as # 1 - P(1)P(2)- except for O instead of P	

<u>Correlation</u>	<u>How Calculated</u>	<u>Significance</u>
9. O(1)J	Same as # 4 -P(1)J- except for O in- stead of P.	
10. O(2)J	Same as # 7 -P(2)J- except for O in- stead of P.	

To summarize what has been said concerning the psychological meaning of the various correlations, the following chart is offered. To find the meaning of any pair of correlations, all one need do is go down the column and across the row; the cell formed by the column and row will contain the meaning to be attributed to the pair of correlations forming the column and row.

Chart 3

	<u>O(1)</u>	<u>O(2)</u>	<u>J</u>	<u>P(1)</u>
<u>P(1)</u>	tells how much the two were a- like prior to the joint effort.	tells how much of P's original views O accept- ed.*	tells how much P influenced the joint effort.	
<u>P(2)</u>	tells how much of O's original views P accept- ed.*	tells how much the two were a- like following the joint effort.	tells how much P was influen- ced by the joint effort.	tells how much P was still in agreement with himself follow- ing joint effort.
<u>J</u>	tells how much O influenced the joint effort	tells how much O was influen- ced by the joint effort		
<u>O(1)</u>		tells how much O was still in agreement with himself follow- ing joint effort		

* In so far as this can be determined in view of the limitations imposed upon this correlation already mentioned.

It needs to be pointed out at this juncture that in the presentation of the correlation coefficients above, the symbols P and O were used without reference to the concept of self-acceptance. Thus the symbols, and hence the discussion of the psychological significance of the correlations, have general meaning in the sense that what has been said about the correlations could apply to either the self-accepting member of the experimental pair, or the non-self-accepting member. This means that the meaning of the correlations is independent of the person producing them. Their meaning is, rather, dependent upon the manner in which they are derived.

To relate this meaning to either the self-accepting person or the non-self-accepting person, one might count up the number of times the correlation $P(2)J$ (accepting of influence), say, is high for the self-accepting group on a particular list and compare this number with that obtained by counting up the number of times $O(2)J$ is high for the non-self-accepting group. It would then be possible to test a null hypothesis with respect to the difference in frequency observed ($P(2)J$ minus $O(2)J$) and conclude that the self-accepting do or do not differ significantly from the non-self-accepting with respect to the characteristic, accepting of influence, on the particular list.

However, this would be a very crude test indeed, for to use the correlations $P(2)J$ and $O(2)J$ without considering other factors is actually misleading. It is true that the two correlations do reflect the extent to which the person was influenced by the joint effort, however, from the correlations alone it is not clear whose influence the person accepted, his own or that of the partner.

In the interpersonal situation defined by the experiment it is quite

possible for one individual in the pair to dominate the scene; i.e.: have his views prevail in the joint effort to the extent that the joint effort ranking resembles his original ranking to a high degree. One would expect then, that this person would rank order the list following the joint effort much in the same manner that he had ranked it prior to the joint effort, and much in the manner that it had been ranked in the joint effort, since all three rankings represent views held by him. One would expect further that this person would not have changed his original opinions much for having been in the joint effort.

In terms of correlations, the picture described above can be given in the following manner:

1. P(1)J
high - exerted much influence in the determination of the joint effort.
2. P(2)J
high - accepted much influence from the joint effort.
3. P(1)P(2)
high - remained relatively unchanged for having been in the joint effort.
4. P(2)O(1)
low - accepted few of the partner's original views as these were expressed in the joint effort.

In terms of the patterning of four correlations, considering each to be either high or low, it appears clear that while the person did accept influence from the joint effort, the influence that was accepted was that largely exerted by him. That is, put somewhat crudely, the person got a lot out of the joint effort because he put a lot into it.

By way of contrast, consider the following which also illustrates accepting influence from the joint effort, but of a qualitatively different kind.

1. O(1)J low - exerted little influence in the determination of the joint effort.
2. O(2)J high - accepted much influence from the joint effort.
3. O(1)O(2)- changed from his original views for having been in the low joint effort.
4. O(2)P(1)- did accept some of his partner's original views as these high were expressed in the course of the joint effort.

It is to be observed that in the above pattern of high and low correlations, the behavior reflected is that of a person who accepted influence from the joint effort and also retreated from his own original position. Acceptance of influence in this sense is much closer to what is meant in the hypothesis by the term, than is the acceptance of influence illustrated by the pattern shown on the previous page. In that previous pattern, the influence accepted was that exerted by the person himself; in the pattern shown above, the influence accepted is that exerted by the partner. Presently in this section, it will be shown that this is but one pattern of high and low correlations that reflects acceptance of influence as this term is defined in the hypothesis. It will be shown too that this kind of acceptance of influence is not identical with passive compliance, since this kind of acceptance of influence can occur with O(1)J high, and not only with O(1)J low as indicated above.

From the two patterns presented, several points need be emphasized:

1. In both patterns the correlations P(2)J and O(2) are high, reflecting an acceptance of influence from the joint effort, but the kind of influence being accepted is different in the case of the two individuals involved. In only one of these two instances does the acceptance mean acceptance of the influence of the partner.

2. Therefore, with respect to questions of acceptance of influence, patterns are more precise and meaningful than are individual correlations.

3. The patterns arrived at by calling correlations either high or low need be concerned with only 4 correlations for each individual: P(1)J, P(2)J, P(1)P(2), and P(2)O(1), for the one person, and O(1)J, O(2)J, O(1)O(2), and O(2)P(1) for the other, the partner.* These correlations reflect inter-personal behavior of a kind relevant for the hypothesis, behavior that occurs in the course of the joint effort. In the case of the two examples given, it need be pointed out, that the two patterns "go together" in the sense that each could have been given one member of a pair and the combination of the two patterns would be psychologically meaningful: the one person exerted strong influence in the joint effort and the other person was accepting of it. (Two correlations, P(1)O(1) and P(2)O(2), do not have direct relevance for the hypothesis and, hence, need not be considered in the discussion of patterns to be taken up shortly.) As will be pointed out presently, other patterns that "go together" also exist and can be used for the purpose of making inferences concerning the nature of the activity of the joint effort as this activity pertains to the hypothesis being tested.

4. The patterns have relevance for leading and following as well as for questions of influence. In the two patterns given as examples, it is possible to infer that person P was a leader in the joint effort in which he and O appeared, and that person O was a follower, since P(1)J high must be higher than O(1)J low.

* This statement is not exactly true since the correlations P(1)J and O(1)J as well as the correlations P(2)O(1) and O(2)P(1) can be influenced by the magnitude of the correlation P(1)O(1) which reflects the extent to which the pair was in agreement prior to the joint effort. Therefore, for a more accurate picture in the case of these four correlations, extent of initial agreement would need to be partialled out. In speaking of these correlations, henceforth, it is to be understood that a partial rather than full correlation is intended.

5. It is true that it is possible for two individuals to present patterns in which both correlations are high, or both low. When both are considered high or both low, in terms of the definition of high and low as given, the one higher than the other might be taken as evidence for leading, under certain conditions which will be described later.

6. As in the case of the individual correlations, the patterns are general in the sense that they might be given by either the self-accepting or non-self-accepting member of a pair. Therefore, because of their general nature the patterns can have relevance for either self-acceptance or the lack of it only through frequency of association with either the self-accepting or non-self-accepting. That is, if a pattern denoting, say, acceptance of influence and leading occurs more frequently in the one group than in the other, the inference can be made that the group tends to be characterized by the pattern, and hence by the behavior implicit in the pattern.

It has been pointed out that patterns of correlations are formed by considering some high and some low. In the case of a single person the four correlations, assuming that each can be either high or low, can give rise to 16 patterns ($2^4 = 16$). However, though a single person produces the 4 correlations, he cannot produce all 16 patterns. The reason for this is twofold; 1) The 16 patterns are possible mathematically though not psychologically. As will be pointed out shortly, some patterns possible mathematically would be interpreted psychologically to mean that the person simultaneously was accepting and rejecting influence. Psychological impossibility then, sharply reduces the number of patterns that can actually occur. 2) The nature of the experimental design reduces the number further. As will be pointed out shortly, the experimental design is such that the likelihood of


some correlations being high, and others low, is increased.

To illustrate these patterns, and point out possible reasons for their actual occurrence and non-occurrence, diagrams will be used. As has been pointed out previously, the four correlations that go to make up a pattern are the same for the two individuals concerned. Thus, in the diagrams to be given, only the four correlations of a single person will be treated. It is to be understood therefore, that the patterns (in so far as they can actually occur) are applicable to either individual in the pair.

The four correlations that go to make up the patterns are:

1. $P(1)J$ - index of influence exerted in the joint effort.
2. $P(2)J$ - index of acceptance of influence of the joint effort.
3. $P(1)P(2)$ - index of change of one's original views.
4. $P(2)O(1)$ - index of acceptance of other's original views as expressed.


In the diagrams then, one will need the symbols $P(1)$, $P(2)$, J , and $O(1)$. A correlation between two rankings can be represented by a line joining two points, where the points are labeled with the appropriate symbols. However, to distinguish between high and low correlations, a solid line will be drawn to indicate a high correlation, and a broken line to indicate a low correlation. The following example will clarify what is meant.



Solid lines joining $P(1)$ and J , $P(2)$ and J , and $P(1)$ and $P(2)$ mean that in this pattern the correlations $P(1)J$, $P(2)J$, and $P(1)P(2)$ are to be considered high; a broken line joining $P(2)$ and $O(1)$ means that the correlation $P(2)O(1)$ is to be considered low. It is to be recalled that

this pattern is the one used earlier to illustrate the activity of the person who dominated the situation.

Presented in groups based on the presence of common denominators within each of the groups, the following are the mathematically possible patterns, including both the psychologically possible and impossible.



It is to be observed that the four patterns given above have the following in common:

1. In each $P(1)J$ is high.
2. In each $P(2)J$ is low.


Therefore the following may be said of the four: The person exerted influence in the determination of the joint effort product (high $P(1)J$), yet was not accepting of the influence of the joint effort (low $P(2)J$). Psychologically it is somewhat difficult to see how this could come about, since the implication of a high $P(1)J$ and a low $P(2)J$ is that the person was not accepting of some of the influence he himself exerted.

It is also difficult to see how this could come about when one considers the manner in which the experiment was carried out. That is, following P's first ranking of a list, a ranking which he accomplished working alone, a day or two elapsed before he had to rank the same list again in the joint effort. Therefore, if the joint effort ranking of the list resembled the first ranking performed alone to the extent that a high correlation resulted between the two, one would suspect that the feelings the person had about the ranking of the items was of some strength; at least enough to persist for a day or two.

Consider too, that following the joint effort usually only a quarter of an hour or less elapsed before the subject was required to rank the same list again, alone. It would be very difficult therefore to explain the sudden dissipation of the strength of feeling held by the person, since such dissipation is implicit in the low P(2)J following the high P(1)J.

Such an event would appear to be a very atypical one. It is not impossible of course; i.e.: a confused period following the joint effort might account for it. However, considering that the subjects were normal individuals, as defined, a period of confusion of such proportions would appear to be highly unlikely. That it is an atypical event is attested to by the fact that in the experiment it never occurred.

Consider the following two patterns:




The following is common to the two patterns:

1. In each P(2)J is low.
2. In each P(2)O(1) is high.

Therefore the following may be said of the pair: The person accepted little influence from the joint effort, yet did accept some of the partner's original views. One might wonder here how the person could accept some of his partner's original views without also accepting influence from the joint effort, at least to the extent of making this correlation high also. It is not impossible for it to occur, of course. For example, if the partner asserted some of his original views but the pair decided not to use them in the determination of the joint effort ranking, but afterward

the person P decided that the partner's original views were, after all worthy of merit. Because of the time factor, however, it is not likely that P had time enough to make such reconsiderations; i.e.: only a quarter of an hour elapsed between the performance of the joint effort ranking and the second individual ranking. Too, the quarter hour was spent filling out a questionnaire. Thus, though the pattern is possible, it must be considered somewhat improbable in the experiment as it was carried out. Neither of the patterns was actually observed.

Consider the following four patterns:



Since these patterns have no single common denominator, they will not be treated as a group.

Consider the first: All correlations are low. The person exerted little influence, accepted little influence either from the joint effort process itself or from the partner's original views as expressed, and following the joint effort was not much in agreement with his own original position. There would appear to be two possible interpretations of this pattern: 1) The person had little or no interest in the proceedings, or, 2) The subject did have interests but they were subject to sudden shifts. The first possibility is somewhat unlikely considering that the subjects were all volunteers who were being paid for their services either in actual money or in paid time off from regular duties. The second possibility has two aspects: 1) Either the person is subject to shifting interests, or, 2) The lists are such that shifting interest is encouraged; i.e.: it is difficult to get set ideas with respect to the ranking of items in the lists.

The first possibility is not likely in the case of normal subjects. Clinically, the shifting of interest as described, would be taken as an indicator of pathology and maladjustment. The second possibility is somewhat more likely, unless it can be shown that the contrary is true: that the lists are such that individuals do tend to have more or less stable opinions concerning the ranking of items; that the items consist of things about which people have interest, and that therefore the placing of an item in a rank order position has a certain "value" for the person.


It is to be recalled that the construction of the lists was predicated upon the notion that the items would be such that the person would have interest in the ranking of the items. This, however, is not proof that the items do in fact stimulate interest. Ideally such a proof would consist of a control group to rank order the lists upon two different occasions without an intervening joint effort procedure. Presumably, if the correlations were high - correlating the first effort with the second - the inference could be made that the items were such that interest in them did exist.

Unfortunately, such a test of the interest potential of the items was not made. However, some evidence does exist that the items do indeed evoke interest. The evidence consists of the observation that the pattern with all four correlations low, did not occur once in the experiment. Thus if the pattern represents lack of interest in the experiment for whatever reason, and the experiment is such that it stimulates, or at least does not discourage interest, its non-occurrence would be expected.

The three remaining patterns of the four given do have a common denominator: in all three a high $P(2)J$ is accompanied by a high $P(1)P(2)$. This means that the person did accept influence from the joint effort, yet at the same time

managed to retain enough of his original views to obtain a high correlation between the two rankings done alone. This state of affairs is psychologically meaningful, and could indeed be expected to occur in the experiment. Yet in the form of the patterns given it did not occur.

Below are reproduced the three patterns with the common denominator $P(2)J$ high, and $P(1)P(2)$ high. Below them are reproduced three patterns which are similar though not identical, and which did occur in the experiment.



With respect to the first two patterns in each line, it can be seen that the essential difference is that in the one the acceptance of influence from either the joint effort or from the other individual directly is accompanied by the retention of one's own views to the extent that a high correlation results between the pre- and post-joint effort rankings. In the other the acceptance of influence is accompanied by less retention of one's own original ideas. The difference then between these two sets of correlation is to be found in the magnitude of the pre and post joint effort correlations; the extent to which the person retained his own original ideas.




However, it need be pointed out that calling a correlation high or low depends upon whether it is greater than or equal to .44, or whether it is less than .44. This means that it is possible for a correlation called high not to

differ significantly in a statistical sense from one called low. One might conclude therefore, that in a statistical sense, the difference between the first two correlations on the first line, and the corresponding two on the second line, is not significant, or rather need not be significant.

However, in the experiment only those on the second line are observed; those on the first line are not. Why this difference should occur so consistently in the same direction is not at all clear. The fact of the matter is that in the experiment, when $P(1)J$ is low, either $P(2)J$ (or $P(2)O(1)$) is high or $P(1)P(2)$ is high, but not both. This could mean that in the experiment, when a person was not influencing, but was accepting of influence, he tended to depart from his original position to a greater extent than would be necessary psychologically. This could argue for the position that in the experiment when a person was convinced, his conviction tended to be such that a high correlation between pre and post joint effort ranking became unlikely. It could not argue for a lack of interest in the original ranking since, as has already been mentioned, this would tend to be reflected in four low correlations, a pattern which never did occur.

Considering the third set of correlations on the previous page, the essential difference is that in the one - the one on the first line - $P(2)O(1)$ is high, indicating that the person accepted some of the partner's original ideas, and in the other $P(2)O(1)$ is low indicating that he did not. Though both patterns are psychologically meaningful, only the one on the second line occurs. Why this should be is not clear, unless, in the experiment, when a person dominates the scene as much as is implicit in a high $P(1)J$, high $P(2)J$, and high $P(1)P(2)$, the tendency is for the person not to accept many of the other person's ideas. This point will be taken up again.




Consider the following sets of three patterns which did occur in the experiment:






The first two patterns support some of the statements just made, namely, that when a person is accepting of influence of the other person, either directly, (when $P(2)O(1)$ is high) or indirectly (when $P(2)J$ but not $P(2)O(1)$ is high), he tends to abandon his own original position. It need be pointed out here that in certain respects the difference between the first two patterns is not great. In the first there is acceptance of the partner's original views as these were expressed in the course of the joint effort, with accompanying alteration in one's own original views. In the second there is acceptance of views expressed or evolved in the course of the joint effort procedure which are not necessarily those of the partner. This implies that the person's own views were altered in a direction away from his first position, though not in a direction toward the first position of the partner. Both patterns would then have the common denominator of reflecting acceptance of influence emanating from the joint effort.

The meaning of the third pattern would appear to be all but self-evident: the person neither exerts nor accepts influence, but rather adheres to his own original views.

Of the 16 possible patterns then, only the following six actually appear in the experiment:





For the sake of convenience these patterns can be given names. Consider # 1: This could be a pattern reflecting behavior of a dominating character; that is, it could be taken to mean that the person exerted strong influence in the determination of the joint effort without accepting that influence exerted by the partner, directly or indirectly. In this failure to accept the influence of the partner the pattern would differ from P-3 and P-5, which also reflect exerting strong influence but with the concomitant acceptance of some of the partner's influence, at least to the extent of departing sufficiently from the person's original position to yield a correlation $P(1)P(2)$ that is called low. Considered with reference to the hypothesis being tested, the important characteristics of the pattern are that it reflects leading and non-acceptance of the influence of the partner. Here leading means exerting strong influence in the determination of the joint effort ranking. Leading also assumes that $P(1)J$ (in pattern #1) is greater than $O(1)J$ in the partner's corresponding pattern whatever it may be. While there is no theoretical reason for making this assumption, in the experiment, whenever this pattern was given, $P(1)J$ was always higher than the partner's corresponding $O(1)J$. This pattern then will be called one of leading and non-acceptance of influence (of the partner).

It need be pointed out that it is not given why the pattern arises. It can arise because of the personal characteristics of the person giving it; i.e.: the person has the characteristic of being dominating; or it can arise out of the characteristics of the interpersonal situation; i.e.: the partner withdrew, leaving the person no alternative but to lead and be non-accepting of influence,

seemingly. To some extent a differentiation with respect to the whys can be made on the basis of the behavior of the partner when this pattern appears. If in a group (of either the self-accepting or non-self-accepting) the pattern appears regardless of the patterns exhibited by the partners involved, some grounds will be had for asserting that the pattern is a function of the person rather than of the situation.

#2. In some respects this pattern might be thought of as the complement of number 1., for in this pattern following and non-acceptance of influence of the partner is indicated: low P(1)J, P(2)J, P(2)O(1), and high P(1)P(2). As in the case of number 1., the question of whether the pattern is a function of the person giving it or of the situation in which it occurs can to some extent be determined in terms of the patterns presented by the various partners. The pattern will be called one of following and non-acceptance of influence.

#3 and #4. These patterns can be considered together, for the essential characteristic of each is the acceptance of influence emanating in the joint effort with accompanying departure from the original position held. This influence, as has been pointed out, is attributable not directly to the partner in the sense of accepting his ideas per se, but is attributable to him in the sense that in the process of working with him, P obtained points of view which were different from those he held originally, and which he accepted to replace those originally held. The chief distinction between #3 and #4 is that in the former the person lead, and in the latter he followed.

#5 and #6. A condition similar to that described for #3 and #4 above obtains here. In both #5 and #6 influence of the partner is accepted, though somewhat more directly than in the case of #3 and #4. In so far as all four patterns reflect acceptance of influence of the partner they are the same.

With respect to # 5 and #6, the chief difference consists of the difference between leading and following, with the former condition characterizing #5, and the latter # 6.

Patterns #3 and #5 will be called leading and accepting of the joint effort; #4 and #6 will be called following and accepting the influence of the joint effort.

As in the discussion of pattern #1, here too leading is in part a function of $P(1)J$ being greater than $O(1)J$. Therefore, in the discussion of the results of the experiment in the next section, when an event such as one in which P gives pattern #4 and O gives, say, #6 arises, some modification of the above descriptive titles will be made.

Something of the course of subsequent discussion is indicated by the present discussion. That is, since the correlations are general, and the patterns are also general in meaning, a testing of the hypotheses will involve a comparison of the frequencies with which various correlations and patterns of correlations are found in the self-accepting and non-self-accepting groups. This comparison is twofold: in one the factor of leading and following in relation to acceptance of influence is considered; in the other the factor of the emotion evoking properties of the lists in relation to acceptance of influence is considered.

All tabulations made in the next section are based upon the data as given in Appendix I.

VIII Results and Discussion

The hypotheses with which this thesis is concerned will be tested in the order in which they were presented in Section IV, pages 29-31.

The first hypothesis asserted that the self-accepting would be more realistic in their appraisal of the involvements of the non-self-accepting than the latter would be of the involvements of the former. The second hypothesis asserted that the self-accepting would be more accepting of the influence of the joint effort whether leading or not in the discussion, and whether the tasks were or were not emotion evoking.

In order to test number 1. above, the information provided by the short questionnaire, which was filled out by the subjects immediately following the joint effort, was used. The questionnaire is given in Appendix IV.

The manner in which number 1. was tested, follows:

When a subject - P - indicated that he was most involved on say, List 4, and his partner - O - indicated that in his opinion P was most involved on List 4, a score of "plus" was given O for having correctly appraised P's involvement. Similarly with respect to place of least involvement: If there existed a correspondence between P's stated place of least involvement and O's appraisal of P's place of least involvement, a score of "plus" was given O. The same procedure was then followed with respect to O's stated places of most and least involvement, and P's appraisal of them.

To test the hypothesis, then, it was necessary to note the frequency with which the self-accepting correctly appraised the involvements of the non-self-accepting and conversely. To this end, the following tables

were constructed:

Table 5*

	N's appraisal	
	Correct	Incorrect
S most involved	8	7
S least involved	9	6

	S's appraisal	
	Correct	Incorrect
N most involved	13	2
N least involved	14	1

The above table would appear to indicate that S is superior to N in the appraisal of both places of most involvement and least involvement of the partner. To test whether differences in frequency of correct appraisals was significant, the following table was constructed:

Table 6

	Appraisals of Most involvement	
	Correct	Incorrect
S	13	2
N	8	7

Chi-squared calculated for the above table is 4.0 which has a corresponding P-value of .05. The observed differences in frequency of correct appraisals of place of greatest involvement will hence be regarded as significant.

The conclusion would be drawn then that the self-accepting are superior to the non-self-accepting in appraising the involvement of the partner, where this involvement is greatest.

* In this table, and all those to follow, S will always represent a self-accepting person; N will always represent a non-self-accepting person.

Constructing a table with respect to appraisals of place of least involvement, yielded the following:

Table 7

	Appraisals of Least Involvement	
	Correct	Incorrect
S	14	1
N	9	6

The chi-squared value for the above table is 4.6, and the corresponding P-value is less than .05. Hence the observed difference in frequency of correctness of appraisal of place of least involvement is to be regarded as significant.

From the above tables it would appear that the conclusion is warranted that the self-accepting do tend to be more realistic in their appraisal of the other person's involvements. The hypothesis would thus tend to be supported.

The second hypothesis asserts that the self-accepting will differ from the non-self-accepting in terms of acceptance of influence. That is, that the self-accepting person would tend to exhibit patterns of behavior that could be called "accepting of influence of the joint effort" whether leading or following, and whether the task was evoking of much emotion or little; whereas the non-self-accepting person would tend to exhibit such patterns chiefly when leading but not when following, and where emotion tended to be evoked to a minimal extent.

Patterns reflecting acceptance of influence were discussed in the previous section. It will be recalled that such patterns are characterized by the following: influence emanating from the joint effort tends to be accepted; original views held by the person tend to be altered. It will

be recalled further that the influence emanating from the joint effort can be of two kinds; 1) that derived from the partner directly, as this is reflected in the acceptance of the original views held by the partner, as these views were expressed; 2) that derived from the joint effort discussion in which the person's views were altered though not in the direction of the partner's original views.

Patterns taken to mean that the person was not accepting of influence were also discussed. It will be recalled that the prime characteristic of such patterns is that the person giving them did not alter original views much.

Leading, it was pointed out, is inferred from the magnitudes of the correlations $P(1)J$ and $O(1)J$. That is, when $P(1)J$ is larger than $O(1)J$ the inference is made that in the determination of the joint effort ranking P was the leader and O the follower.

Therefore, to test the hypothesis, it is necessary to show that the condition leading - following is or is not related to the condition acceptance - non-acceptance of influence, for the two groups. Accordingly, the following table was constructed:

Table 8

	Non-acceptance of influence	Acceptance of influence	
S leads	1	5	
S follows	0	9	P = .40

List 1

N leads	1	8	
N follows	4	2	P = .05

The first part of the above table is interpreted to mean that in six instances, out of 15, the correlation $P(1)J$ for S was greater than the correlation $O(1)J$ for N, and that in those six instances, only once was

the pattern, in which the high $P(1)J$ was found, indicative of non-acceptance of influence. In the remaining five instances high $P(1)J$ was accompanied by patterns indicative of an acceptance of influence.

In the nine instances in which S followed (exhibited a pattern in which $P(1)J$ was low), he also exhibited patterns indicative of an acceptance of influence.

In the case of N, the second part of the table indicates that when leading he tends to accept influence, but when following does not in four of the six instances in which he followed.

When Chi-squared is calculated for each of the 2×2 tables, the resulting P-values are .40 for the self-accepting, and .05 for the non-self-accepting.* This indicates that in the case of the self-accepting, there is no significant relationship between leading and following on the one hand, and accepting and not accepting influence on the other. In the case of the non-self-accepting however, there is a significant relationship between leading and following, and accepting and not accepting influence. In the case of the non-self-accepting, the trend is to accept influence when leading but not when following. This is the trend predicted in the hypothesis.

Constructing similar tables for the other three lists, yields the

* P-values are calculated by the "Exact Method" as given by Kendall(15) and Edwards (7). The basic idea in the calculation is that the probability of obtaining the observed set of frequencies in the cells of the 2×2 table can be obtained by taking the product of the factorials of the four marginal totals, divided by the product of the factorial of the grand total and the factorials of the four cell entries. The desired probability involves not only the observed cell entries but all others which are more extreme, with the marginal totals remaining the same. This method of calculating a P-value will always be used when the grand total is equal to 15, a total which yields theoretical cell entries that are too small for the ordinary methods of calculating Chi-squared and its corresponding P-value.

Table 9

	Non-acceptance of Influence	Acceptance of Influence	
S leads	1	4	
S follows	2	8	P = .76

List 2

N leads	1	9	
N follows	4	1	P = .02

Table 10

	Non-acceptance of Influence	Acceptance of Influence	
S leads	5	5	
S follows	2	3	P = .49

List 3

N leads	3	2	
N follows	10	0	P = .09

Table 11

	Non-acceptance of Influence	Acceptance of Influence	
S leads	10	2	
S follows	0	3	P = .02

List 4

N leads	0	3	
N follows	11	1	P = .01

With respect to the work on List 2, Table 9 above, it would appear that the trend observed is consistent with what has already been observed for List 1, Table 8. That is, that for the non-self-accepting people there is a relationship between leading and following on the one hand, and accepting and not accepting influence on the other; that where the non-self-accepting person tends to lead, he also tends to be amenable to influence. In the case of the self-accepting person, on the other hand, no such relationship exists; i.e.: whether leading or following, he tends

to be amenable to influence.

With respect to Lists 3 and 4, Tables 10 and 11, the trend mentioned as characteristic of the non-self-accepting person on Lists 1 and 2 is continued. On List 3 the trend is not as strong as on List 4 and the first two, but is in a direction that makes for a consistent overall trend.

With respect to the self-accepting person, the trends evidenced on the first three lists tend to continue through to the fourth list, but on the fourth list a deviation is observed. Here, as in the case of the non-self-accepting person, the self-accepting person tends to reveal a significant relationship between leading and following and accepting and non-accepting of influence.

Why this deviation should exist is somewhat difficult to understand in terms of the available data. However, though available data seems to provide no direct answer concerning the existence of the deviation, it does provide (in this experimenter's opinion) information that points to where one might look for an answer. In this light the following information seems pertinent:

There appears to be an overall trend for both groups to be more non-accepting of influence as degree of involvement increases. Consider the following table:

Table 12

Degree of involvement of S	Frequency of non-acceptance of influence	Degree of involvement of N	Frequency of non-acceptance of influence
1	1	1	5
2	3	2	5
3	7	3	11
4	10	4	13

And conversely, as involvement increases, there appears to be a trend for both groups to be less accepting of influence. Consider the following table:

Table 13

Degree of involvement of S	Frequency of acceptance of influence	Degrée of involvement of N	Frequency of acceptance of influence
1	14	1	10
2	12	2	10
3	8	3	4
4	5	4	2

Though both tables reflect rather clear cut trends, it ought to be noted that the trend is always strongest for the non-self-accepting group than for the self-accepting group. This might indicate that while both groups find it more difficult to accept influence and easier to reject influence, as involvement increases, the non-self-accepting are characterized by these tendencies to a greater extent than are the self-accepting. This suggests being involved would reduce cooperative tendencies, as these have been defined, to a greater extent in the non-self-accepting than in the self-accepting.

Support for this suggestion is to be found in a closer analysis of the work done by both groups on Lists 3 and 4. The former list is the locus of the non-self-accepting group's greatest involvement, while the latter is the locus of the self-accepting group's greatest involvement.

With reference to Table 10, it will be observed that the non-self-accepting group tends to be non-accepting of influence a total of 13 times. The factor leading-following, though doubtlessly active here, does not appear as strong a factor as it does elsewhere. The relationship between

leading and following and accepting and not accepting influence is significant at only the .09 level of confidence. Too, it appears that the not accepting behavior exhibited by the non-self-accepting people is not to be understood as a reaction to dominating behavior of the self-accepting people. While it is true that during the working of List 3 the self-accepting people tended to lead more often than the non-self-accepting people, 10 as contrasted to 5, the data in the appendix denotes the fact that of the 10 times the self-accepting do lead, only 5 times do they do it in a manner that might be considered domineering; i.e.: exhibit high P(1)J, high P(2)J, and high P(1)P(2). Thus the domination tendencies, if indeed they are such, could not explain the 13 instances in which the non-self-accepting people are not accepting of influence.

The frequency with which they do not accept influence would appear to be sufficiently large to discriminate between the two groups. To test whether it is or not, the following table was constructed:

Table 14

		Non-acceptance of influence	Acceptance of influence	
	S	7	8	
<u>List 3</u>	N	13	2	P = .02

From the above table, therefore, the conclusion is drawn that the observed difference in frequency of non-acceptance of influence is significant. And since this is the locus of the non-self-accepting person's greatest involvement, the further conclusion is drawn that where they are most involved they tend to be not accepting of influence with a frequency that distinguishes them from the self-accepting group.

By way of contrast, the following table is constructed on the basis of work done on List 4, the locus of greatest involvement of the self-accepting group.

Table 15

		Non-acceptance of influence	Acceptance of influence	
	S	10	5	
List 4	N	11	4	P = .28

From the above table the conclusion is drawn that in the case of the self-accepting group, frequency of non-acceptance of influence where most involved does not distinguish them from the non-self-accepting group.

On the basis of what has been said thus far - Tables 8 through 15 - the following conclusions appear warranted:

1. In the case of the non-self-accepting people there does appear to be an overall relationship between leading and following, and accepting and not accepting influence, with the general trend being accepting of influence when leading but not when following.

2. In the case of the self-accepting people a trend exists for there to be no such relationship, until the locus of greatest involvement is reached. At this point there does appear to be a relationship.

3. The reason for the relationship at this point is not clear from the data available, though the data that is available suggests that degree of personal involvement is a factor.

4. With respect to the factor of personal involvement, the data indicates that it appears to be a stronger factor in the case of the non-self-accepting group than in the self-accepting group; i.e., where the former are most involved, they tend to be not accepting of influence with a frequency that distinguishes them from the self-accepting; where the latter are most involved this is not true.

Since, in the hypothesis it was stated that acceptance of influence

was related to cooperativeness, the following is offered:

If cooperativeness can be defined in terms of matching patterns reflecting acceptance of influence, and failing to match patterns reflecting non-acceptance of influence, then the following test is possible:

Let A represent patterns reflecting acceptance of influence; R represent patterns reflecting non-acceptance of influence.

Table 16

	S uses		N uses		N uses		S uses		S's%	N's %
	A	R	A	R	A	R	A	R	A for N's A	A for S's A
List 1	14	4	10	4	10	0	1.00	0	1.00	0.71
List 2	12	4	8	4	10	2	.80	2	.80	0.67
List 3	8	6	2	6	2	0	1.00	0	1.00	0.25
List 4	5	1	4	1	4	0	1.00	0	1.00	0.80

It is to be observed that S consistently matches N's use of patterns of acceptance of influence, but that N does not match S's use of such patterns with equal consistency. This would tend to support the assertion that self-accepting people tend to be more cooperative than non-self-accepting people; i.e.: if patterns of accepting influence are related to cooperativeness, and such patterns appear under a wider variety of circumstances - leading or following, where involved and where not - in the case of the self-accepting people, one would expect that by some other test of cooperativeness, the self-accepting people would tend to be distinguishable from the non-self-accepting. Table 16 is offered as part of such a test.

Another part of the test, however, would have to be concerned with matching patterns of non-acceptance of influence. One would expect here

that the self-accepting would match such patterns of the non-self-accepting less frequently than would the latter match the former's.

Table 17

	S uses			N uses			S's %	N's %
	R	R	A	R	R	A	R for N's R	R for S's R
List 1	1	1	0	5	1	4	0.20	1.00
List 2	3	1	2	5	1	4	0.20	0.33
List 3	7	7	0	13	7	6	0.54	1.00
List 4	10	10	0	11	10	1	0.91	1.00

The above table bears out expectations: the self-accepting do tend to match the non-self-accepting people's patterns of non-acceptance of influence less frequently than do the latter match these same patterns when given by the former.

To sum up, the following seems warranted:

Self-accepting people tend to be more realistic in their appraisal of the non-self-accepting person's involvements than the latter do of the former's involvements.

Self-accepting people tend to be more accepting of the influence of the joint effort, where such influence is defined in terms of an acceptance of the partner's ideas directly, or an acceptance of ideas arising in the course of the joint effort which are different from those held previously by either partner, than do the non-self-accepting. Further, the self-accepting tend to be accepting of influence, as defined, whether leading or following, whereas the non-self-accepting tend to be accepting of influence chiefly when leading but not when following.

For the non-self-accepting person the relationship between the condition leading - following appears related to accepting-not accepting influence throughout all four degrees of personal involvement; for the self-accepting person there appears no such relationship until the highest degree of involvement is reached. At this point both groups tend strongly not to be accepting of influence, though the tendency to be not accepting of influence is stronger in the case of the non-self-accepting than in the case of the self-accepting.

The question of personal involvement would appear to demand further study for the current project does not permit the making of adequate enough inferences to explain the effect of this factor. A study that might yield interesting data upon the question might be one in which the current study was repeated though in a somewhat different way. That is, if the current study were repeated as given here, and in addition two self-accepting people were matched, and two non-self-accepting people were matched, the effect of personal involvement might be more clearly seen. For example, in the current study, it is not clear what actually occurred during the working of List 4: That is, was it the case that the non-self-accepting person withdrew from the situation and offered no influence for the self-accepting person to either accept or reject, thus giving rise to the condition whereby he was relatively unchanged for having been in the joint effort; or was it the case that the self-accepting person, being the most highly involved here, dominated the situation to the extent that the non-self-accepting person was permitted no opportunity to exert influence?

Were it true that the non-self-accepting person withdrew, then when two self-accepting persons are matched, one might expect that they would continue

being accepting of influence through List 4, while non-self-accepting people when matched, might be expected to be rejecting of each other's influence through Lists 3 and 4. Were such expectations to materialize, the results of the study would be consistent with those reported here.

Such an experiment, too, might yield data on yet another question raised by this thesis. In this study it has been demonstrated that self-accepting people tend to be accepting of influence whether leading or following, but that non-self-accepting people tend to be accepting of influence chiefly when leading but not when following. In the hypothesis the assertion was made that this state of affairs might be expected because of the non-self-accepting person's reluctance to "give in" during a discussion involving differing points of views. This is equivalent to asserting that in some way "giving in" tends to be perceived by the non-self-accepting person as an act that is not self-enhancing, and hence to be avoided. By implication, "not giving in" might be perceived as self-enhancing, as might also "making the other fellow give in."

This, however, is theoretical and speculative. The significance of self-enhancing acts for the non-self-accepting person would need to be studied further. One way in which this could be done would be to incorporate into the study proposed above, lists which contain items which pertain more directly to self-enhancement than the ones used here. That is, the lists might be such that in the case of some items in a single list, there was definite self-enhancement involved when the person determined the ranking of the item in the joint effort, and little or no self-enhancement to be obtained when the person determined the ranking of other items in the joint effort.

Were such lists to be constructed, it would be possible to observe more closely than was possible in the current study, the behavior of the non-self-accepting group when dealing with the self-enhancing and non-self-enhancing items. Further, a comparison could then be made between the two groups with respect to treatment afforded the self-enhancing and non-self-enhancing items.

What is being proposed in the above is a repetition of the current study, a repetition that would consist of a larger number of subjects, with two additional pairings, working on lists that aim more directly to get at the question of self-enhancement. Such a study, in addition to casting light upon issues raised here, would be more supporting of the Rogerian theories than the current study.

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Note to Appendix I

On the following five pages will be found the basic data of the experiment. The data is presented in the form of diagrams. These diagrams follow the principles already set forth in the section having to do with a discussion of patterns: a broken line between two points, say P(1) and P(2) indicates that the correlation P(1)P(2) is considered low in terms of the criteria for high and low correlations.


The diagrams on the following pages differ from those presented earlier in that all ten coefficients of correlation produced by a pair of subjects is given. In addition, the actual correlations as obtained from the rankings presented by the subjects are given. The numbers representing the actual correlations are placed adjacent to the line joining the two rankings which were correlated, where the rankings are represented by the points P(1), P(2), O(1), O(2), and J. For the correlations P(1)J, O(1)J, P(2)O(1) and O(2)P(1), the numbers given represent partials. From each of these four correlations, the relationship of the two rankings involved to the amount of initial agreement present, has been partialled out.

Under each of the diagrams is the classification of the pattern yielded by each of the members of the pair. The following abbreviations are used:


Acc Inf (L) - accepts influence and leads	N-Acc Inf (L) - does not accept influence and leads
Acc Inf (F) - accepts influence and follows	N-Acc Inf (F) - does not accept influence and follows.

All diagrams in the first column pertain to work on List 1; all in the second column to List 2, and so forth. The top line represents rankings of self-accepting people, bottom line the non-self-accepting people.


APPENDIX I




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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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S - N-Acc Inf (F)
N - Acc Inf (L)



S - N-Acc Inf (L)
N - N-Acc Inf (F)



S - Acc Inf (L)
N - Acc Inf (F)

APPENDIX II

INSTRUCTIONS

On the following pages you will find 15 questions. Answer these questions to the best of your ability, making sure that the answer reflects what you honestly think is correct.

State your answers as explicitly as possible. Do not give single sentence answers if you can avoid it. Make sure your answer leaves no doubt as to what you think. If telling why you think as you do will clarify your answer, then tell why.

If you find that a question cannot be answered in the form given, supply what you think is needed and go ahead and answer it. That is, if in answering a question you say to yourself, "Well, it all depends...", supply what you think it depends on and go ahead.

Answer all the questions.

Return the questions with your answers as quickly as possible in the envelope enclosed for that purpose.

Be sure to fill out and return the attached information blank.

1. What is the thing to do if, having received an invitation to a social gathering, you are informed that there will be present several individuals who are considered very important in the field you hope to enter. You are told they may want to "look you over."
2. What is the thing to do if a friend, having promised to appear in the afternoon to help you study for an important exam, fails to appear, and then in the evening phones and explains that he has been ill. He sounds intoxicated.
3. What is the thing to do if while hurrying to a class session you want to attend, a professor in whose class you are in danger of flunking stops you, and asks you to help him carry some lab equipment from one end of the building to another.
4. What is the thing to do if, having been intending to see a play, a friend tells you that the play is immoral, and that anyone who goes to see it must have a "dirty minds."
5. What is the thing to do if on entering a room where small groups of people you know are standing around chatting, the conversation ceases in the group you approach.
6. What is the thing to do if, having borrowed something from a friend for a few days, it becomes damaged slightly immediately after you get it. (Small dent on a car fender; ink stain on a book, etc.)
7. What is the thing to do if, being engaged in something which as far as you can see is not bad, you learn that some people are criticising you for it.
8. What is the thing to do if, upon returning to a clerk in a store to complain that you have been shortchanged by a small amount, you notice that a customer is giving her a hard time, and she (the clerk) looks cross and angry.
9. What is the thing to do if, having invited a person you know to look over your new house, and hearing him praise it lavishly, you learn that he is now telling people that the house is terrible and that you have poor taste.
10. What is the thing to do if at a party at which games are being played, the host (or hostess) urges you to participate in a game and you know you are no good at it.

11. What is the thing to do if as a club member, you are anxious to be appointed to a certain committee, and the president (who knows of your wishes) appoints someone else.
12. What is the thing to do if, while watching a movie, a woman wearing a large hat sits directly in front of you and shows no indication of removing the hat.
13. What is the thing to do if at a conference (of which you are a member) and on an important issue, you discover that your views are entirely different from those held by others.
14. What is the thing to do if, having planned on contributing only a small sum to charity because it was all you could conveniently afford, you learn that the list of contributors (with amount contributed) is to be published.
15. What is the thing to do if, at a social gathering, you go to the room where the coats are stacked to get something, and as you enter you discover a couple behaving intimately.

APPENDIX III

List 1. Consider the following list of cities. Rank them in what you believe to be the right order of population. Place a 1 in the parentheses beside that city which you believe to be the largest; place a 2 in the parentheses beside that city you believe to be the next largest, and so on. Continue on through the list until you have placed a 10 beside that city which you believe to be the smallest. (Do not look up the correct order; you are to guess.)

- | | | | |
|---------------------|-----|---------------------|-----|
| 1. Tacoma, Wash. | () | 6. Knoxville, Tenn. | () |
| 2. New Haven, Conn. | () | 7. Scranton, Pa. | () |
| 3. Gary, Ind. | () | 8. Norfolk, Va. | () |
| 4. Camden, N. J. | () | 9. Raleigh, N. C. | () |
| 5. Albany, N. Y. | () | 10. Reno, Neb. | () |

List 2. Consider the occupations listed below. Suppose you have it in your power to decide how much money people in each of the occupations should earn. Place a 1 in the parentheses beside that occupation to which you would assign the highest wage; place a 2 in the parentheses beside that occupation to which you would assign the next highest wage, and so on. Continue on through the list until you have placed a 10 beside that occupation to which you would assign the smallest wage.

- | | | | |
|---------------------------------------|-----|---------------------------|-----|
| 1. Chef in large hotel | () | 6. News reporter on radio | () |
| 2. Diamond cutter | () | 7. Mortician | () |
| 3. Office manager | () | 8. Forest ranger | () |
| 4. Weather forecaster | () | 9. Deep sea diver | () |
| 5. Material inspector in
a factory | () | 10. Lighthouse keeper | () |

List 3. Consider the following crimes. Suppose you have it in your power to decide on penalties for each of the crimes. Place a 1 in the parentheses beside that crime for which you would make the penalty most severe; place a 2 in the parentheses beside that crime for which you would make the penalty next most severe, and so on. Continue on through the list until you have placed a 10 beside that crime for which you would make the penalty least severe.

- | | | | |
|----------------|-----|--------------------------------------|-----|
| 1. Forgery | () | 6. Indecent exposure | () |
| 2. Vandalism | () | 7. Physical assault | () |
| 3. Theft | () | 8. Slander | () |
| 4. Perjury | () | 9. Abandonment | () |
| 5. Tax evasion | () | 10. Deceit with intent to
defraud | () |

List 4. Consider the following list of people. Rank them in the order in which you would be willing to accept them socially into your home. Place a 1 in the parentheses beside that group you would be most willing to accept socially; place a 2 in the parentheses beside that group you would be next most willing, and so on. Continue on through the list until you have placed a 10 beside that group you would be least willing to accept.

1. People who make a living gambling on sports. ()
2. People who practice nudism. ()
3. People who advocate communism. ()
4. People who practice atheism. ()
5. People who work as burlesque performers. ()
6. People who are paroled convicts. ()
7. People who practice "free love." ()
8. People who are mental patients. ()
9. People who publish and sell pornographic material. ()
10. People who use narcotics. ()

APPENDIX IV

ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS BY UNDERLINING THE APPROPRIATE NUMBER.

1. On which of the lists was agreement most difficult to achieve?
1, 2, 3, 4.
2. On which of the lists was agreement next most difficult to achieve?
1, 2, 3, 4.
3. On which of the lists was agreement easiest to achieve?
1, 2, 3, 4.
4. On which of the lists did you personally feel most involved?
1, 2, 3, 4.
5. On which of the lists did you personally feel next most involved?
1, 2, 3, 4.
6. On which of the lists did you personally feel least involved?
1, 2, 3, 4.
7. On which of the lists did you feel that your partner was most involved?
1, 2, 3, 4.
8. On which of the lists did you feel that your partner was least involved?
1, 2, 3, 4.

YOUR NAME: _____