

A HISTORY OF AMERICA'S PHILIPPINE POLICY

1897-1941

by

Garel A. Grunder

A.B., University of Kansas, 1933

A.M., University of Kansas, 1936

Submitted to the Department of
History and the Faculty of the
Graduate School of the Univer-
sity of Kansas in partial ful-
fillment of the degree of Doctor
of Philosophy.

Diss
1942
Grunder
c. 2

Advisory Committee:

May, 1942

The destiny of the Philippine Islands is not to be a State or territory in the United States of America, but a daughter republic of ours- a new birth of liberty on the other side of the Pacific, which shall animate and energize those lovely islands of the tropical seas, and, rearing its head aloft, stand as a monument of progress and a beacon of hope to all the oppressed and benighted millions of the Asiatic continent.

Jacob Gould Schurman

This work is a study of the origin and evolution of policy by the United States concerning the Philippines. It is not a study of conditions in the Philippines except in so far as those conditions directly affected Executive and Congressional activity. The activities of the executive branch of government, indicated through public and private communications, and the acceptance or rejection of these suggestions by the legislature have been discussed with reasonable fullness. I have emphasized the evolution of policy with special attention to the independence question, the evolution of political institutions, and economic relationships.

I have been the recipient of many courtesies in the preparation of this work. The staff of the library of the University of Kansas has been uniformly helpful. Miss Bessie Wilder, Document Librarian, deserves special mention in this regard. Thanks are also due the John Crerar Library, the Libraries of the Universities of Chicago and Michigan, The Kansas City (Mo.) Public Library, The Bureau of Insular Affairs, the Division of Territories and Island Possessions of the Department of the Interior, Senator Tydings, Chairman, Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs, and Representative Doughton, Chairman, Committee on Ways and Means for the loan of various materials used in the preparation of this work. Professor W. W. Davis has been very helpful in the planning and preparation of this work. His timely suggestions have added materially to its tone. His spirit of confidence and cooperation has been a constant stimulus to me. To my mother special thanks are due for long and laborous reading of the manuscript and for assistance in the preparation of the maps.

G. A. G.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER		PAGE
I	The Capture of Manila	1
II	The McKinley Philippine Policy at Home	13
III	The Senate and the Treaty of Paris	33
IV	Military Government of the Philippines	55
V	The Spooner Amendment	84
VI	Establishing Relationships	101
VII	Governing the Philippines	124
VIII	Modifying the Tariff	150
IX	Philippine Transportation Problems	170
X	The Friar Lands	185
XI	The Moros	208
XII	The Democrats Control the Philippines	221
XIII	The Reversal of Policy Toward the Philippines	258
XIV	Receding Philippine Independence	293
XV	The Revival of the Independence Movement	318
XVI	The Hawes-Cutting-Hare Independence Bill, 1931-1933	338
XVII	The Hawes-Cutting-Hare Act: Provisions and Motives	379
XVIII	Impending Independence Through Commonwealth Status	395
XIX	The Workings of a Policy	426
	Annotated Bibliography	430

MAP

FOLLOWING PAGE

1	Senate vote, including pairs, on Vest amendment to Treaty of Paris, February 6, 1899.	48
2	Senate vote on Bacon amendment to McEnery resolution, February 14, 1899.	51
3	Senate sentiment on imperialism as indicated by votes on Spooner amendment and its amendments, February, 1901	100
4	House vote on concurring in Senate (Spooner) amendments to Army Appropriation bill, March 1, 1901.	100
5	Senate vote on Lodge bill (S. 2295) providing for civil government for the Philippines, June 3, 1902.	109
6	House vote on minority substitute for H. R. 13445 (Cooper bill) to provide qualified independent government, June 26, 1902.	111
7	Senate vote on Foraker amendment to Philippine revenue bill (H. R. 5833), February 24, 1902.	120
8	House vote on H. R. 14623 authorizing guarantee of interest on railroad construction in Philippines, etc., April 14, 1904.	129
9	House vote on S. 6249 to authorize an agricultural bank in Philippines, March 3, 1907.	134
10	House vote on Richardson's motion to recommit H. R. 15702 with instructions to report a free trade bill, December 18, 1902.	151
11	Senate vote on Lodge amendment (50% duties) to H. R. 15702, February 14, 1903.	153
12	House vote on William's free trade substitute for H. R. 3, January 16, 1906.	162
13	House vote on passage of H. R. 3, January 16, 1906.	162
14	House vote on H. R. 21449 (placing certain goods on Philippine free list or low duty list.) April 30, 1908.	165
15	Senate vote on LaFollette cigar amendment, June 15, 1909.	166

MAP

FOLLOWING PAGE

16	Senate vote on Fletcher amendment to Payne-Aldrich bill to continue existing rates of duty, June 16, 1909.	166
17	House vote on Spight amendment to Birdsall amendment to S. 2259, April 8, 1904.	173
18	House vote on preamble to Jones bill, October 14, 1914.	233
19	Senate vote on Hitchcock amendment to Gronna amendment extending prohibition to the Philippines January 18, 1916.	239
20	Senate vote on Gronna amendment as amended, Jan. 18, 1916.	240
21	Senate vote on motion to strike out guarantee of Philippine independence in Clarke amendment, February 2, 1916.	243
22	Senate vote on Clarke amendment, February 2, 1916.	244
23	Senate vote on passage of bill, February 4, 1916.	245
24	House vote on motion to strike out Clarke amendment, May 1, 1916.	248
25	Senate vote on King substitute for Broussard amendment, October 9, 1929.	322
26	Senate vote on Shortridge amendment to establish a quota on Filipinos coming to the United States, April 23, 1930.	326
27	House vote and pairs on motion to suspend rules and pass H. R. 7233, April 4, 1932.	353
28	Senate vote on Hawes motion to exempt Philippine coconut oil from tax proposed by Shipstead to H. R. 10236, May 25, 1932.	356
29	Senate vote on Dickinson amendment to Broussard amendment, December 14, 1932.	363
30	Senate vote on Broussard amendment for independence in eight years (First vote), December 14, 1932.	364

MAP

FOLLOWING PAGE

31	Senate vote on Broussard amendment (Second vote), December 16, 1932.	366
32	Senate vote on Byrnes proposal to eliminate plebiscite, December 16, 1932.	367
33	Senate vote on Byrnes "compromise" plebiscite amendment, December 17, 1942.	368
34	Senate vote on Dickinson amendment for annual reductions in free duty Philippine sugar, December 17, 1932.	369
35	House vote on passage of H. R. 7233 over veto of Hoover, January 13, 1933.	376
36	Senate vote on passage of H. R. 7233 over veto of Hoover, January 17, 1933.	377
37	Senate vote on Dickinson's motion to change ten years to five years in Tydings-McDuffie bill, March 21, 1934.	400
38	Senate vote on Vandenberg substitute for Tydings- McDuffie bill, March 22, 1934.	402
39	Senate vote on King substitute for Tydings-McDuffie bill, March 22, 1934.	402
40	Senate vote on Harrison's motion to exempt Philippine coconut oil from excise tax.	405

CHAPTER I

THE CAPTURE OF MANILA

American interest in the Philippines was slow to start. Rouseville Wildman, the American Consul at Hongkong, on November 3, 1897 communicated to our Secretary of State, Mr. William R. Day, the following message:

Mr. Agoncilla offers on behalf of his government alliance offensive and defensive with the United States when the United States declares war on Spain, which, in Mr. Agoncilla's judgment, will be very soon.¹

Mr. Thomas W. Cridler, third assistant Secretary of State replied on December 15, 1897 to Mr. Wildman as follows:

You may briefly advise Mr. Agoncilla, in case he should call upon you, that the Government of the United States does not negotiate such treaties

You should not encourage any advances on the part of Mr. Agoncilla, and should courteously decline to communicate with the Department further regarding his alleged mission.²

Affairs seemed to die down, but not for very long. During a temporary absence from the Department of the Navy by John D. Long, the Secretary, Theodore Roosevelt, then Assistant Secretary, on February 25, 1898 sent the following message to George Dewey in command of the Asiatic squadron which Dewey had only recently moved to Hongkong:

Order the squadron to Hongkong. Keep full of coal. In the event of declaration of war Spain your duty will be to see that the Spanish squadron does not leave the Asiatic coast, and then

-
1. Senate Document 62, pt. 2, 55 Cong., 2 sess., (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1899), p. 333.
 2. Ibid., p. 333-334.

offensive operations in Philippine Islands.¹

Then came the American ultimatum on April 21, and the definite complete declaration of war by April 25, John D. Long, Secretary of the Navy instructed Commodore Dewey as follows:

War has commenced between United States and Spain. Proceed at once to Philippine Islands. Commence operations particularly² against the Spanish fleet. You must capture vessels or destroy.

The Spanish fleet was destroyed in Manila Bay May 1, 1898.

An Englishman named H. W. Bray arranged an interview between W. Spencer Pratt, United States Consul-General at Singapore and Mr. Emilio Aguinaldo, leader of the insurgent forces in the Philippines for the evening of Saturday, April 23, 1898. Another interview took place the next morning, Sunday, April 24. In communicating with Secretary Day, Pratt said of these interviews:

I took it upon myself, whilst explaining that I had no authority to speak for the Government to point out the danger of continuing independent action at this stage; and, having convinced him of the expediency of cooperating with our fleet, then at Hongkong, and obtained the assurance of his willingness to proceed thither and confer with Commodore Dewey to that end, should the latter so desire, I telegraphed the Commodore the same day as follows, through our consul-general at Hongkong:

"Aguinaldo, insurgent leader, here. Will come Hongkong arrange with Commodore for general co-operation insurgents Manila if desired. Telegraph. Pratt."

The Commodore's reply reading thus:

"Tell Aguinaldo come soon as possible. Dewey."³

-
1. Rhodes, James Ford, The McKinley and Roosevelt Administrations (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1922), p. 70.
 2. Autobiography of George Dewey, (New York: C. Scribners Sons, 1913), p. 311.
 3. Senate Document 62, op. cit., p. 341-2.

Pratt stated that he communicated with Aguinaldo and arranged for him to go to Hongkong after which he had another and last interview. Pratt states in regard to this last interview that "The general [Aguinaldo] further stated that he hoped the United States would assume protection of the Philippines for at least long enough to allow the inhabitants to establish a government of their own, in the organization of which he would desire American advice and assistance.

"These questions I told him I had no authority to discuss." ¹

Aguinaldo then left for Hongkong, arriving there after the departure of Dewey. He was eventually carried to Manila on board the McCulloch, the dispatch boat of Admiral Dewey, arriving there May 19.

Admiral Dewey says that he entered into no negotiations with Aguinaldo - that they merely agreed to co-operate against a common foe.

May 26, John D. Long, Secretary of the Navy, sent a telegram to Dewey expressing confidence in his discretion and concluded by saying,

It is desirable, as far as possible, and consistent for your safety and success, not to have political alliances with the insurgents or any faction in the islands that would incur liability to maintain their cause in the future. ²

Dewey replied to this message June 3 by saying, " . . . I have entered no alliance with the insurgents or with any faction" ³

This seemed to have been a nervous time for the administration as Long sent another message to Dewey, June 14, saying, "Report fully any

1. Ibid., p. 342-3. Dispatch No. 213.

2. Dewey, op. cit., p. 311.

3. Loc. cit.

conferences, relations or cooperations, military or otherwise, which you have had with Aguinaldo and keep informed the Department in that respect." ¹

Dewey settled the matter as far as he is concerned by a message to Long, June 27, 1898, saying, in part, "The United States has not been bound in any way to assist insurgents by any acts or promises, and he [Aguinaldo] is not, to my knowledge committed to assist us" Dewey concluded by saying that the Filipinos "are far superior in their intelligence and more capable of self-government than the natives of Cuba....." ²

Unquestionably part of the nervousness of the administration as evidenced in these dispatches from Long to Dewey was occasioned by the type of messages coming from Pratt at Singapore.

At a celebration of good feeling between the Filipinos resident in Singapore and Pratt, several speeches were made. The celebration occurred June 9, 1898 and was reported by the Straits Times and the Singapore Free Press. Pratt concluded his message by saying, "from which [papers] you will note that I have avoided touching upon the question of our future policy in the Philippines." ³ But Dr. Santos, speaking for the Filipinos, said that the activities were "to secure to us our independence under the protection of the United States." ⁴

Upon receiving Pratt's dispatches regarding his discussions with

1. Loc. cit.

2. Loc. cit.

3. Senate Document 62, op. cit., p. 350.

4. Ibid., p. 353.

Aguinaldo, Secretary Day sent a telegram to Pratt, June 16, saying, "Avoid unauthorized negotiations with Philippine insurgents,"¹ and followed with a dispatch dated the same day, sent by mail, saying that Pratt had no authority to speak for the United States; and "that you did not attempt to commit this government to any alliance with the Philippine insurgents." Day hoped further that Aguinaldo "was not induced to form hopes which it might not be practicable to gratify."

Further on he says,

If, in the course of your conferences with General Aguinaldo, you acted upon the assumption that this Government would co-operate with him for the furtherance of any plan of his own, or that in accepting his cooperation, it would consider itself pledged to recognize any political claim which he put forward, your action was unauthorized and can not be approved.²

Mr. Pratt replied to the telegram on June 16, saying that he had not negotiated, that he had been merely an intermediary to bring Aguinaldo and Dewey together, as he thought Aguinaldo would be helpful.

Day, July 20, 1898, commented on the address delivered by Pratt at Singapore saying "the extracts . . . from the Straits Times of the 9th of June has occasioned a feeling of disquietude and a doubt as to whether some of your acts may not have borne a significance and produced an impression which this government would be compelled to regret." The message mentions several points which "may have laid the ground of future misunderstanding and complications." Further the message says that

1. Ibid., p. 354.

2. Ibid., p. 354. Dispatch No. 78.

the article "might seem to lend a sanction to views the expression of which it [the Department] has not authorized." ¹

May 19, 1898 McKinley sent the following letter to Russell A. Alger, Secretary of War. It contained the same instructions issued for Cuba & Porto Rico. It said, in part,

The destruction of the Spanish fleet at Manila, followed by the taking of the naval station at Cavite, the patrolling of the garrisons, and acquisition of the control of the bay, have rendered it necessary, in the future prosecution of the measures adopted by this Government for the purpose of bringing about an honorable and durable peace with Spain, to send an army of occupation to the Philippines for the two fold purpose of completing the reduction of the Spanish power in that quarter and of giving order and security to the islands while in the possession of the United States. . . .

The first effect of the military occupation of the enemy's territory is the severance of the former political relations of the inhabitants and the establishment of a new political power. Under the changed condition of things the inhabitants so long as they perform their duties, are entitled to security in their persons and property and in all their private rights and relations. It is my desire that the people of the Philippines should be acquainted with the purpose of the United States to discharge to the fullest extent its obligations in this regard. . . . we come, not to make war upon the people of the Philippines nor upon any party or faction among them, but to protect them in their homes, in their employments, and in their personal and religious rights. . . . Our occupation will be as free from severity as possible. . . . ²

Oscar F. Williams, United States Consul at Manila, wrote to Day on June 16, 1898, saying,

For future advantage I am maintaining cordial relations with General Aguinaldo . . . Last Sunday, 12th, they held a council to form a provisional government. I was urged to attend but I thought best to decline. A form of government was adopted, but

1. Ibid., p. 356-7. Dispatch No. 87.

2. House Miscellaneous Document 210, pt. 10, 53 Cong., 2 sess., (Washington: Government Printing office, 1899), p. 208-211.

General Aguinaldo told me that his friends all hoped that the Philippines would be held as a colony of the United States of America.

It has been my effort to maintain harmony with insurgents in order to exercise greater influence hereafter when we re-organize government.¹

Thomas H. Cridler, third assistant secretary, replied to this message on August 4 by saying, ". . . your course, while maintaining amicable relations with the insurgents, in abstaining from any participation in the adoption of their so-called provisional government is approved."²

After the organization of the provisional government, Thomas M. Anderson, Brig. Gen., commander of our forces at Manila, sent a message to the Adjutant General, dated July 18, 1898, saying,

Since reading the president's instructions to Gen. Merritt, I think I should state to you that the establishment of a provisional government on our part will probably bring us in conflict with insurgents, now in active hostility to Spain.

The insurgent chief, Aguinaldo, has declared himself dictator and self-appointed president. He has declared martial law and promulgated a minute method of rule and administration under it.³

Three days later, Anderson wrote,

His assumption of civil authority I have ignored, and let him know verbally that I could and would not recognize it, while I did recognize him as a military leader.

It may seem strange that I have made no formal protest against his proclamation as dictator, his declaration of martial law, and

1. Senate Document 62, op. cit., p. 329.

2. Ibid., p. 330.

3. Senate Document 208, 56 Cong., 1 sess., (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1900), p. 8.

publication and execution of a despotic form of government. I wrote such a protest, but did not publish it, at Admiral Dewey's request and also for fear of wounding the susceptibilities of Major General Merritt, but I have let it be known in every other way that we do not recognize the dictatorship. ¹

The next day, July 22, Anderson wrote to Aguinaldo, concluding with this statement:

I observe that your excellency has announced yourself as a dictator and proclaimed martial law. As I am here simply in a military capacity, I have no authority to recognize this assumption. I have no orders from my government on the subject, and so far as I can ascertain, your independent status has not been recognized by any foreign power. Your fine intellect must perceive that, happy as I am to see you fighting so bravely against a common enemy, I can not, without orders, recognize your civil authority. ²

Relations between Aguinaldo and the American officials were not too good during this period. The Americans were asking for and then demanding vehicles for movement of supplies and later the right to replace the Filipinos in some of the trenches surrounding Manila. The Filipinos had the Spaniards surrounded in Manila by this time. Aguinaldo seemed to be using passive resistance to the increasing demands of the Americans. A personal letter written by Rouseville Wildman to Emilio Aguinaldo on July 25 explains some of this trouble. Wildman says, in part,

Do not forget that the United States undertook this war for the sole purpose of relieving the Cubans from the cruelties under which they are suffering, and not for the love of conquest or the hope of gain. Whatever the final disposition of the conquered territory may be you can trust the United States that justice and honor will control all their dealings with you. The first thing is to throw off the Spanish yoke. Do not let anything interfere with this. ³

-
1. Correspondence relating to the War with Spain, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1902), Vol. 2, p. 809.
 2. Ibid., p. 810.
 3. Senate Document 62, op cit., p. 338-340.

The publication of this letter, although it was private, gave the State Department another bad scare when they found it in the newspapers. As a result, Moore telegraphed Wildman, August 6, 1898, saying, "If you wrote Aguinaldo, as reported Hongkong correspondent Daily Mail, your action is disapproved, and you are forbidden to make pledges or discuss policy."¹

August 8, Wildman replied to Moore saying,

Never made pledges or discussed policy further than to try to hold him [Aguinaldo] to promises made before Dewey took him [to] Cavite, believing it my duty, it being understood that my influence is good. If report contrary, I disavow it.²

Troops from the United States were being transported to Manila as rapidly as possible. Dewey said he could capture the city at any time but troops were needed to preserve order. The city was captured August 13. The peace protocol was signed August 12 but due to the cut cable news of it did not reach Manila until Aug. 16. The protocol said, in regard to the Philippines, "The United States will occupy and hold the city, bay, and harbor of Manila pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace which shall determine the control, disposition and government of the Philippines."³

Aguinaldo requested joint occupation of Manila by American and Filipino forces. Merritt & Dewey requested information about governmental policy regarding such joint occupation and President McKinley replied, August 17. "There must be no joint occupation with

1. Ibid., p. 338.

2. Loc. cit.

3. Foreign Relations, 1898, (Washington: Government Printing office, (1901), p. 824-5.

insurgents." The United States was to protect persons and property in the region. The message said further,

The insurgents and all others must recognize the military occupation and authority of the United States and the cessation of hostilities proclaimed by the President. Use whatever means in your judgment are necessary to this end. All law abiding people must be treated alike. ¹

A period of uncertainty then ensued in the Philippines. The status of none of those concerned was definite. The United States had neither decided to take the Philippines nor not to take them. That decision was to be worked out by McKinley in the United States with the aid of his commissioners to Paris.

Much controversy has been aroused over the question whether the United States or any of its agents promised independence for the Philippines to Aguinaldo, or to any of his subordinate officials. Pratt, Consul at Singapore, at the time of his conference reported that he had told Aguinaldo that he had no authority to discuss political relationships. Dewey, in a statement to the Philippine Commission, said,

I never, directly or indirectly, promised the Filipinos independence. I never received Aguinaldo with military honors or saluted the so-called Filipino flag. I never considered him as an ally, although I did make use of him and the natives to assist me in my operations against the Spaniards. ²

Pratt and Dewey were the two men most directly connected with Aguinaldo. The fact of mutual co-operation of two peoples against a common enemy does not mean that one recognizes the political entity of the other. In the American Revolution, Spain and the American

-
1. Correspondence relating to War with Spain, op cit., p. 754.
 2. Report of Philippine Commission to President, Jan. 31, 1900, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1900), Vol. 1, p. 121.

colonies both fought against England. If Spain had defeated England, that would not have prevented her from assuming sovereignty over the United States as part of the peace settlement.

A further weakness of the claim by Aguinaldo that independence had been promised is the lack of contemporary statement of the claim, that is from April 23 to August 1. During this period Aguinaldo made no claim that the United States had promised independence. The claim was made later, perhaps to gain popular support.

Furthermore, even Pratt and Dewey could not have bound the United States to a grant of Philippine independence, except from a moral and good faith standpoint. Consul Pratt was an official of the United States, but not a member of the Diplomatic Corps. Dewey was the Commander of a Naval squadron. Neither had been granted any more diplomatic power than any other member of the military or civilian officialdom of the United States. The United States can be bound in three ways: (1) By amending the constitution which will be enforced negatively by the Supreme Court and positively by Act of Congress; (2) By passage of a joint resolution or legislative act by both houses of Congress and signed by the President; and (3) By a treaty negotiated by the President, or his agents, and consented to by a two-thirds majority of the Senate. None of these methods was used.

Blount¹ merely reiterated the position of some of the Democratic and Populist Senators who also contended that the United States was

1. James H. Blount, The American Occupation of the Philippines, (New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1912).

bound by the act of Pratt. These same Senators, in many cases, attempted to prevent the going into effect of an agreement negotiated by Commissioners appointed by the President for a definite purpose and negotiated according to instructions given to them by the President. This was in the opposition to the treaty of Paris, with Spain, to which the Senate consented by a very narrow margin.

CHAPTER II

THE MCKINLEY PHILIPPINE POLICY AT HOME

The Philippine problem became a factor in the foreign relations of the United States soon after the declaration of war. In response to an inquiry by Joseph Chamberlain, May 7, 1898, as to whether the evacuation of Cuba was the sole condition of peace, John Hay, the United States Ambassador at the Court of St. James, sent an inquiry to William R. Day, the American Secretary of State, asking for terms. Secretary Day stated in a telegram, dated June 3, that the Philippines were "to be allowed to remain with Spain, except a port and necessary appurtenances, to be selected by the United States, shall be ceded to the United States." At the end of the instructions Day added, "These terms will be acceptable to the President at the present juncture, saving further loss of life. Prolongation of war may change this materially."¹ The message was transmitted to Lord Salisbury June 6 but no results were obtained.

We can see that in the mind of the administration nothing had been definitely decided at this time. This was confirmed by a telegram from Secretary Day to Ambassador Hay dated June 14, 1898. In this telegram Day said:

Since my telegram to you third instant conditions have so changed that paragraph three (as to the Philippines) will probably have to be modified. The insurgents have become an

1. Tyler Dennett, John Hay (New York: Dodd, Mead, & Co., 1933), p. 190.

important factor in the situation and must have just consideration in any terms of settlement. It is most difficult without fuller knowledge to determine as to disposition of the Philippine Islands. ¹

There seems to have been no further attempt to negotiate for peace for over a month. However the war was going against Spain so disastrously that the Government of the Queen Regent through the Duc d'Almodovar Del Rio, Ministre D'Etat transmitted a request July 22, 1898 through the French Ambassador, Mr. J. Cambon,

to learn from the President of the United States upon which basis might be established a political status in Cuba and might be terminated a strife which would continue without reason should both Governments agree upon the means of pacifying the island. ²

After receiving this note the President called the cabinet together to discuss peace terms. The discussion, according to Olcott, lasted several days. A draft of a protocol was submitted by Day, July 24, and this protocol proposed to relinquish all the Philippines except sufficient ground for a coaling station. The cabinet was about evenly divided on this question and in view of the lack of adequate information it was decided "that the report of Admiral Dewey and his advice should be obtained before final action is taken." ³

At first the President felt a natural revulsion against the acquisition of a vast unknown territory thousands of miles away. He did not want the islands, but, once in our possession, he felt that the people would never be satisfied if they were given back to Spain.⁴

1. Ibid., p. 191.

2. Foreign Relations, 1898, op. cit., p. 819-820.

3. Charles S. Olcott, The Life of William McKinley (Boston & New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1916), Vol. 2, p. 62.

4. Loc. cit.

The Cabinet was divided at this time on the question of the acquisition of the Philippines. Olcott states that

Secretary Wilson was strong for evangelizing the islands and favored keeping the whole group Secretary Bliss saw great commercial opportunities and favored taking the entire group as did Attorney-General Griggs. Secretaries Gage, Long, and Day stood out for a naval base only, though Mr. Gage later changed his mind, 1

The attitude of Long, the Secretary of the Navy, is illustrated in a letter written July 27. He said,

You will read also the blessed news that Spain has suggested peace Confidentially the general terms which we shall insist upon will be . . .

Third: The more difficult and complicated disposition of our conquest in the Philippines; and I trust that this will simplify itself into the possession of Guajan [Guam] . . . and a port on the great island of Luzon. 2

The next day Ambassador Hay in England sent a telegram to Day marked personal and confidential in which he said,

I still think terms of June 3rd equally generous and wise To the third clause I have to suggest the addition of strong guarantee of fair treatment of natives, or prohibition of lease or alienation of any portion of the islands without our approval I may add that British Government prefer to have us retain Philippine Islands or failing that, insist on option in case of future sale. 3

The views of the President did not change in regard to the peace proposals if one takes the diary of George B. Cortelyou as an authority, for in the entry for Sunday, July 31, 1898, it is stated that a rough draft "made on the day of the receipt of the Spanish note, or at about that time" the terms "were exactly those which were finally transmitted

1. Ibid., p. 62-3.

2. Lawrence Shaw Mayo, ed., American of Yesterday, the Diary of John D. Long (Boston: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1923), p. 210.

3. Alfred Lewis Pinneo Dennis, Adventures in American Diplomacy (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1928), p. 99.

to the Spanish minister through the Ambassador of France." 1

These terms were, in regard to the Philippine Islands,

Third, . . . the United States is entitled to occupy and will hold the city, bay and harbor of Manila pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace which shall determine the control, disposition, and government of the Philippines. 2

This note was replied to August 7, 1898 by the Duke of Almodovar del Rio with the following very true comment:

The terms relating to the Philippines seem to our understanding to be quite indefinite. On the one hand, the ground on which the United States believe themselves entitled to occupy the bay, harbor, and city of Manila, pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace, can not be that of conquest since in spite of the blockade maintained on sea by the American fleet, in spite of the siege established on land by a native supported and provided for by the American admiral, Manila still holds its own, . . . On the other hand, the whole archipelago of the Philippines is in the power and under the sovereignty of Spain. Therefore the Government of Spain thinks that the temporary occupation of Manila shall constitute a guaranty. It is stated that the treaty of peace shall determine the control, disposition, and government of the Philippines; but as the intentions of the Federal Government by regression remain veiled, therefore the Spanish Government must declare that, while accepting the third condition, they do not a priori renounce the sovereignty of Spain over the archipelago, leaving it to the negotiators to agree as to such reforms which the condition of these possessions and the level of culture of their natives render desirable. 3

Secretary Day seemed to be nervous about the different interpretations which might be placed upon these two notes, so he suggested getting the matter down in black and white. A tactful note and a draft of a protocol was sent to the French Ambassador, Mr. Cambon, on August 10. The provision relating to the Philippines stated that "The United States will occupy and hold the city, bay, and harbor of Manila pending the conclusion

1. Olcott, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 67.
 2. Foreign Relations, op. cit., p. 820-1.
 3. Ibid., p. 822-3.

of a treaty of peace which shall determine the control, disposition, and government of the Philippines." ¹

The protocol was signed in English and in French by Mr. Day and Mr. Cambon in Washington, August 12, 1898.

The President immediately proclaimed a cessation of hostilities but news of this did not reach Manila until the afternoon of August 16. The surrender of Manila occurred on the 14th. The attack had been begun a few hours, actual time, after signing of the protocol. The cable between Manila and Hongkong had been cut by Dewey, delaying the transmission of the message.

The peace commissioners appointed for the United States were William R. Day, Secretary of State, Chairman; Cushman K. Davis, Senator and Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations; George Gray, Senator and member of the Committee on Foreign Relations; William D. Frye, Senator and member of the Committee on Foreign Relations; and Whitelaw Reid, lately envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of the United States to France. John Bassett Moore was selected as secretary and counsel.

The peace commissioners for Spain were Don Eugenio Montero Rios, President of the Senate, Chairman; Don Buenaventura Abarzuza, Senator of the Kingdom and ex-minister of the Crown; Don Jose de Garnica, deputy to the Cortes and Associate Justice of the Supreme Court; Don Wenceslao Ramirez de Villa-Urrutia, Envoy extraordinary and minister

1. Ibid., p. 824-5.

plenipotentiary at Brussels; and Don Rafael Cerero, General of Division. Don Elilio de Ojeda was appointed secretary.

In the discussions held by the President with the peace commissioners, Whitelaw Reid stated the position which was later to be taken by the President in his final instructions regarding the disposition of the Philippines. Cortissoz says of Reid at this time that

He spoke then of the difficulty, morally, of taking one part of the Philippines and abandoning the rest to Spain, and of the political difficulties flowing from the same policy The Philippines were ours by right of conquest, and gave us a commercial advantage in the Pacific which we had no right to throw away He was for the retention of the Philippines en bloc. 1

In a letter to George W. Smalley, April 18, 1911, from England, Whitelaw Reid said regarding this same meeting and his part in the early deliberations,

The fact is, I was committed to the retention of the territory we had taken before my appointment, an article on that subject . . . having been printed before we assembled . . . for our first official meeting with the President and ostensibly to receive his instructions. As a matter of fact he was not ready to give instructions, but wanted our opinions. Day, who was then Secretary of State and who became our Chairman, was strongly against the retention of anything in the Philippines unless possibly a coaling station, and on even that he had his doubts. Gray was even stronger than Day. Senator Davis of Minnesota, to our surprise, declared himself in favor of retaining the northern part of the archipelago and giving away Mindanao and the whole southern part to Holland. Failing that he wanted to trade them to some other European power for something that would be of more use to us. Senator Frye did not express himself very distinctly against this proposal; in fact, seemed to think the northern part of the archipelago the essential part and was not even sure such a trade as Senator Davis recommended might not be desirable. He dwelt on the fact that some opposition to our holding the islands had developed in New England and promised to grow. I spoke after most of them and reiterated the position I had taken in the "Century"

1. Royal Cortissoz, Life of Whitelaw Reid (New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1921), Vol. 2, p. 246.

article, dwelling particularly on my declaration that having broken down the power in control of them, we could not honorably desert them and should be extremely unwise to turn the task of controlling them to some other power. 1

At the end of the discussions the President gave his instructions to the peace commissioners, September 16, 1898. McKinley then said, respecting the Philippines, that

. . . Before notice [of suspension of hostilities] could reach the commanders of . . . forces of United States in the Philippines they captured and took possession by conquest of the city of Manila and its suburbs, which are therefore held by the United States by conquest as well as by virtue of the protocol Before giving you specific instructions on this subject it is my desire to present certain general considerations Our aim in the adjustment of peace should be directed to lasting results and the achievement of the common good under the demands of civilization, rather than to ambitious designs

. . . It is none the less true that, without any original thought of complete or even partial acquisition, the presence and success of our arms at Manila imposes upon us obligations which we can not disregard Avowing unreservedly the purpose which has animated all our efforts, and still solicitous to adhere to it, we can not be unmindful that, without any desire on our part, the war has brought us new duties and responsibilities which we must meet and discharge as becomes a great nation on whose career and growth from the beginning the Ruler of Nations has plainly written the high command and pledge of civilization.

Incidental to our tenure in the Philippines is the commercial opportunity to which American statesmanship can not be indifferent. . . .

It is believed that in the practical application of these guiding principles, the interests of our country and the proper measure of its duty, its welfare in the future, and the consideration of its exemption from unknown perils will be found in full accord with the just, moral and humane purpose which was invoked as our justification in accepting the war.

1. Ibid., Vol. 2, p. 247-8.

In view of what has been stated, the United States can not accept less than the cession in full right and sovereignty of the island of Luzon 1

Reid continued his attempt to gain the support of the administration for his policy of acquiring all the Philippines. In October while the conference was still struggling with Cuban affairs, he wrote to Hay adjuring him not to encourage the theory of dividing the Philippines. Hay was then Secretary of State, having succeeded Day. Reid wrote,

All the expert testimony is against it, both because it tends to destroy the value of what we do take and because it is a sure way to organize troubles first for ourselves and then for the whole world beside The military and naval testimony here is clear and precise, to the effect that we can govern and defend the whole as easily as, if not more easily than, a part. 2

At the same time that Reid was sending his message, President McKinley was coming to the same conclusion. He made a trip to the middle west in October. At Omaha October 12, he said,

The war so speedily closed will bring us blessings now beyond calculation, and also burdens, but Americans never shirk responsibility, and will never unload a burden that carries forward civilization. Our achievements on land and sea are unparalleled and add new honors to American valor, but the real honor is the substantial gain to humanity. We accepted the war for humanity; we can accept no terms of peace which will not be of interest to humanity. We have a good national conscience and the courage of destiny. 3a

At Chicago, October 16, McKinley said,

The war with Spain was undertaken, not that the United States should increase its territory but that oppression at our very doors should be stopped. This noble sentiment must continue to

-
1. Foreign Relations, op. cit., p. 904-8.
 2. Cortissoz, op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 246-7.
 - 3a. Senate Document 95, 55 Cong., 3 sess. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1899), p. 4.

animate us and we must give to the world the full demonstration of the sincerity of our purpose. 1b

Opinions differ as to whether McKinley was converted to the idea of taking the Philippines by the enthusiasm for expansion he found on this trip or whether the trip was undertaken after McKinley had made up his mind about the Philippines and was designed to obtain popular support for that policy.

The negotiations in Paris had progressed to such a stage that both the President and the Commissioners in Paris desired the views of the other about keeping the Philippines.

October 25, President McKinley wrote Day a personal and unofficial letter in which he asked to be advised privately as to the sentiment of the commission in regard to the Philippines.

There is a very general feeling that the United States, whatever it might prefer as to the Philippines, is in a situation where it cannot let go. The interdependency of the several islands, their close relations with Luzon, the very grave problem of what will become of the part we do not take, are receiving the thoughtful consideration of the people, and it is my judgment that the well-considered opinion of the majority would be that duty requires we should take the archipelago 2

The peace commissioners in Paris also felt the need for instructions and, on the same day, a telegram was sent from Day to Hay asking for immediate definite instructions concerning the Philippines. In the message he transmitted the differing views of the peace commissioners. The first opinion was the one drafted by Reid and signed by Davis and Frye. The views of these three men were

-
- 1 . House Report 606, 62 Cong., 2 sess. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1912), p. 10.
 2. Olcott, op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 107-8.

That information gained by the commission in Paris leads to the conviction that it would be naval, political, and commercial mistake to divide the archipelago As instructions provide for retention at least of Luzon, we do not consider question of remaining in Philippine Islands at all as properly before us. We therefore ask for extension of instructions.

In their argument for retention they cite the homogeneity of the islands, the simplification of administration possible with all of the islands and the elimination of the danger of embroilment with other countries if we take all of the islands. They continue, saying,

Commercially, the division of the archipelago would ^{not} only needlessly establish dangerous rivals at our door, but would impair value of part we kept

The moral obligation not to return Manila and Luzon to the oppressive power from which we have relieved them applies also to the rest of the archipelago We believe public opinion in Europe, including that of Rome, expects us to retain whole of the Philippines, and would prefer that to any other solution save the impossible one of restoration of Spanish power over the islands.

A possible division of the islands was suggested if the President decided to take only part of the islands. The United States would retain Luzon, Mindoro, and Palawan, with the small islands adjacent. This would control the China Sea and give excellent ports of call along the whole line from Borneo to Hongkong. But it would throw away the Visayan group, including the best hemp, sugar, and tobacco islands. These islands trade with Manila and contribute largely to her commercial importance, said these three commissioners. "We are convinced," they added, "that much injustice has been done inhabitants in published accounts of their character"

More moderate in demands and using different interpretations of the subject was the statement of Mr. Day. He said,

I am unable to agree that we should preemptorily demand the entire Philippine group. In the spirit of our instructions, and bearing in mind the often declared disinterestedness of purpose and freedom from designs of conquest with which the war was undertaken, we should be consistent in our demands in making peace. Territory permanently held must be taken as war indemnity, and with due regard to our responsibility because of the conduct of our military and naval authorities in dealing with the insurgents. . . . We can not leave the insurgents to mere treaty stipulations or to their own unaided resources, either to form a government or to battle against a foe which, unequal to us, might readily overcome them. On all hands it is agreed that the inhabitants are unfit for self-government. This is particularly true of Mindanao and the Sulu group.

Only experience can determine the success of colonial expansion upon which the United States is entering. It may prove expensive . . . It should therefore be kept within bounds.

The boundary suggested by Reid as the minimum demand was urged by Day as the proper boundary. The United States can prevent the alienation of territory by proper treaty stipulations.

This gives us practical control of the situation with a base for the navy and commerce in the East, and responsibility for the people to whom we owe obligation and those most likely to become fit for self-government It does not leave us open to the implication of following agreement to negotiate with the demand for the whole subject-matter of discussion ourselves.

The position of Gray was more opposed to retaining the Philippines than that of Day. He said that he could "not agree that it was wise to take the Philippines in whole or in part. To do so would reverse accepted continental policy of country declared and acted upon throughout our history." Gray further said that the proposed policy would embroil us in European politics, require a larger burden of taxation for the army and navy, and bring us no compensating advantages. In the latter part of his statement Gray said;

Undersigned cannot agree that any obligation incurred to insurgents is paramount to our manifest interests But even conceding all the benefits claimed for annexation we thereby abandon the infinitely greater benefit to accrue from acting the part of a great, powerful, and Christian nation. We exchange the moral grandeur and strength to be gained by keeping our word to the nations of the world and exhibiting a magnanimity and moderation in the hour of victory that becomes an advanced civilization we claim, for doubtful material advantages and shameful stepping down from high moral position boastfully assumed. . . . Now, let us simply keep our word. Third article of protocol leaves everything concerning control of Philippines to negotiation between the parties. It is absurd now to say that we will not negotiate, but will appropriate whole subject-matter of negotiation. At the very least, let us adhere to President's instructions 1

Reid won. The desires of the President were transmitted the next day, October 26, by Secretary Hay to Mr. Day. The instructions were specific. They said:

The information which has come to the President since your departure convinces him that the acceptance of the cession of Luzon alone, leaving the rest of the islands subject to Spanish rule, can not be justified on political, commercial, or humanitarian grounds. The cession must be of the whole archipelago or none. The latter is wholly inadmissible, and the former must therefore be required. The President reaches this conclusion after most thorough consideration of the whole subject, and is deeply sensible of the grave responsibilities it will impose, believing that this course will entail less trouble than any other, and besides will best subserve the interests of the people involved for whose welfare we can not escape responsibility. 2

Explaining further our high and noble aim in demanding all of the Philippines we have an illustrative telegram from Hay to Day, dated October 28, in which Hay says,

It is imperative upon us that as victors we should be governed only by motives which will exalt our nation It is undisputed that Spain's authority is permanently destroyed in every part of the Philippines. To leave any part in her feeble control

-
1. Foreign Relations, op. cit., p. 932-5.
 2. Ibid., p. 935.

now would increase our difficulties and be opposed to the interests of humanity. Sentiment in the United States is almost universal that people of the Philippines must be liberated from Spanish dominion. In this sentiment the President fully concurs. No other nation can have any of them.

. . . the President can see but one plain path of duty - the acceptance of the archipelago. Greater difficulties and more serious complications, administrative and international would follow any other course He [the President] has been 1
influenced by the single consideration of duty and humanity

In another message the same day Hay told Day that "The instructions sent today about the Philippines has the cordial concurrence of the seven members of the Cabinet now in Washington, Long being absent in Massachusetts." 2

Throughout the period of the negotiations there recurs the continual fear that the American commissioners will have to return to America without a treaty. October 30, Senator Frye sent a telegram to Mr. Adee, the Second Assistant Secretary of State, for the President, in which he suggests paying Spain for a treaty. It would be cheaper, he says, to pay Spain than to have the war renewed.

Hay replied to Senator Frye by saying that the President "desires the commissioners to be generous in all matters which do not require a disregard of principle or duty" The President would be willing to make reasonable concessions as to internal improvements, and leave many of these matters to the discretion of the commissioners. 3

The attitude of President McKinley is illustrated in a letter written by John D. Long, Secretary of the Navy, to one of his neighbors

1. Ibid., p. 937-8.

2. Ibid., p. 938.

3. Ibid., p. 939.

in Hingham, Massachusetts. Long said,

I think perhaps you expect too much of the President. He can hardly make any positive declaration with regard to his policy about the Philippines until something more definite results from the action of the peace commission which is now sitting at Paris.

Long states that he would like to keep the United States small, that he does not want to expand. He continues,

If I would have my personal preference, I would . . . be rid of the Philippines and of everything else except our own country

. . . You and I don't want the Philippines; but it's no use disguising the fact that an overwhelming majority of the people do, and among them is a vast number of most intelligent men and women . . . Nor is there much question that under American institutions - while there will be political pulling and hauling and fraud and greed and meanness, just as there are all these in the best state in the Union - there will come also the rapidly developing influences of Christian civilization and American enterprise and growth.¹

Deliberations regarding the disposition of the Philippines reached a virtual impasse during the next ten days. The Americans and Spanish commissioners submitted proposals, counter proposals, and arguments. The American commissioners, believing that a treaty under their present instructions was improbable, asked, November 11, for "definite instructions as to the Philippine Islands as soon as practicable." They also sent their individual views upon the subject in the same message. Day "would minimize our holdings there to the lowest extent consistent with our obligations." However, since the whole group is to be taken, he would pay fifteen million dollars for them. Frye favored "taking the entire group and paying \$10,000,000 in gold, a fair estimate of debt properly chargeable to the Philippine Islands." George Gray did not want the

1. Mayo, op. cit., p. 213-5.

islands but would take them and "make such reasonable concessions as would comport with the magnanimity of a great nation dealing with a weak and prostrate foe." Reid opposed the return to Spain of any territory in which we have broken down her rule. He also mentioned the right of the United States to have indemnity for her losses in the war. As a final means of getting a treaty he would pay from twelve to fifteen million dollars and take either the whole Philippine archipelago or the archipelago without Mindanao and Sulu and the addition of the Carolines and the Ladrones. Davis favored sending an ultimatum to the Spanish Commissioners demanding the entire Philippine archipelago, accepting none of the colonial debt, and paying them no money. He concludes, "I do not believe we shall ever get a treaty except as a result of such
1
an unyielding ultimatum."

In reply to the request for further instructions, Hay replied that "a treaty of peace is of the highest importance to the United States if it can be had without the sacrifice of plain duty." The resumption of war was undesirable.

You are therefore instructed to insist upon the cession of the whole of the Philippines, and, if necessary, pay to Spain \$10,000,000 to \$20,000,000 The President can not believe any division of the archipelago can bring us anything but embarrassment in the future. The trade and commercial side, as well as the indemnity for the cost of the war, are questions we might yield. They might be waived or compromised, but the questions of duty and humanity appeal to the President so strongly that he can find no appropriate answer but the one he has here marked out.²

On November 15, Moore sent a telegram to Hay in which he stated the

-
1. Foreign Relations, op. cit., p. 945-8.
 2. Ibid., p. 948-9.

proposition which he intended to submit to the Spanish Commissioners as embodying the final position of the United States Government. In these terms the United States demanded all the Philippines and would pay \$20,000,000 for a treaty. Commercial advantages and certain other rather unimportant concessions were to be offered to Spain.

The next day, November 16, Hay telegraphed to Day, "The course¹ proposed is approved."

The proposal, sent to the State Department November 16, was presented to the Spanish Commission November 21 and a reply was requested by November 28.

The Spanish Commissioners continually attempted to secure somewhat better terms or some concessions, due especially to the shaky condition of the cabinet in Spain, whose political fortunes were connected with their own success or failure. On November 24, 1898 the President of the United States Commission received from the President of the Spanish Commission a communication proposing in lieu of the final proposition of the American Commissioners any one of three alternate propositions, which, as to the Philippine Islands, provided for: (1) Relinquishment of all the Philippine archipelago and payment by the United States of \$100,000,000. (2) Spain cede Kusaie in Carolines and Philippine Islands except Mindanao and Sulu. The United States to pay \$50,000,000. (3) Spain cede Philippine Islands except Mindanao and Sulu gratuitously and leave to an arbitral tribunal the decision as to colonial debts.

On these propositions the Commissioners hold the following views: Messrs. Day, Davis, and Reid think we are committed to our final proposition of last Monday; Commissioners Frye and Gray

1. Ibid., p. 951.

favor submitting a proposal to leave to Spain Mindanao and the Sulu group and take instead Ulan or Strong Island in the Carolines, paying only \$20,000,000. Mr. Day would favor this if it were an original proposition Commissioner Gray prefers above all acceptance of third proposition. 1

The propositions were submitted to Hay November 26.

In a separate telegram, Davis expressed the opinion that the Spanish offer was to protract the negotiations. Gray, also in a separate telegram, said,

Our having submitted an ultimatum does not in my opinion preclude us from adopting a course that will prove more advantageous to our country. My reasons for accepting third proposition . . . are, briefly, that in paying twenty millions we do not prevent the raising hereafter of the question of the liability of the sovereign of the relinquished and ceded territory for some part of the so-called colonial debts By adopting this course we settle instead of postpone the question of liability and carry the principle of arbitration with us into the new century. 2

The President considered these proposals and rejected them November 26.

November 29, 1898, the Spanish Commissioners accepted the ultimatum of the United States Commissioners and the message was transmitted to the President who replied and expressed his thanks to the commissioners the same day.

The next few days were spent in negotiations relating to other matters, as the negotiations relating to the Philippines were completed. The final treaty was signed December 10, 1898.

In the treaty Spain ceded to the United States "the archipelago known as the Philippine Islands"

1. Ibid., p. 958-9.

2. Ibid., p. 960.

The United States will pay Spain the sum of twenty million dollars (\$20,000,000) within three months after the exchange of ratifications of the present treaty.

Article IX. The United States will, for the term of ten years from the date of the exchange of ratifications of the present treaty, admit Spanish ships and merchandise to the Ports of the Philippine Islands on the same terms as ships and merchandise to the United States.¹

The treaty was submitted to the President January 3, 1899 by John Hay, Secretary of State. The next day, January 4, President McKinley transmitted the treaty to the Senate with a view to its ratification.

What caused McKinley to decide to take the Philippines? McKinley's statement as to his reasons is given in a statement made to a committee representing the General Missionary Committee of the Methodist Episcopal Church, November 21, 1898.

... Before you go I would like to say just a word about the Philippine business. I have been criticized a good deal about the Philippines, but don't deserve it. The truth is I didn't want the Philippines, and when they came to us, as a gift from the gods, I did not know what to do with them. When the war broke out, Dewey was in Hongkong and I ordered him to go to Manila and to capture and destroy the Spanish fleet, and he had to; because, if defeated he had no place to refit on that side of the globe, and if the Dons were victorious they would likely cross the Pacific and ravage our Oregon and California coasts. And so he had to destroy the Spanish fleet, and did it! But that was as far as I thought then.

When next I realized that the Philippines had dropped into our laps I confess that I did not know what to do with them. I sought counsel from all sides--Democrats as well as Republicans--but got little help. I thought first we would take only Manila; then Luzon; then other islands, perhaps, also. I walked the floor of the White House night after

1. Ibid., P. 831-840

night until midnight, and I am not ashamed to tell you gentlemen, that I went down on my knees and prayed Almighty God for light and guidance more than one night. And one night late it came to me this way--I don't know how it was, but it came; (1) That we could not give them back to Spain--that would be cowardly and dishonorable; (2) that we could not turn them over to France or Germany--our commercial rivals in the Orient--that would be bad business and discreditable; (3) that we could not leave them to themselves--they were unfit for self-government--and they would soon have anarchy and misrule over there worse than Spain's was; and (4) there was nothing left for us to do but to take them all, and to educate the Filipinos, and uplift and Christianize them, and by God's grace to do the best we could for them, as our fellow men for whom Christ also died. And then I went to bed, and went to sleep, and slept soundly, and the next morning I sent for the chief engineer of the War Department (our map-maker), and I told him to put the Philippines on the map of the United States (pointing to a large map on the wall of his office), and there they are and there they will stay while I am President!

In commenting on the policy of McKinley, Olcott says that the "President had reached his decision because he knew better . . . what were the conditions in the Philippines," in Spain and in the United States,

Russell in his book, "The Outlook for the Philippines," states that he thinks McKinley was influenced by his position as leader of the Republican party, interested in the success of his party, and to be guided in his policy by the party leaders. There was, specifically, the influence of Cardinal Gibbons and Archbishop Ireland, two prominent Catholic officials, who were also prominent Republicans. Ireland "had contributed much to triumph of his party" in 1896.

1. Olcott, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 109-111.

2. Ibid., p. 137.

3. Charles E. Russell, The Outlook for the Philippines (New York: The Century Co., 1922), p. 84.

Dunn brings out the idea of popular enthusiasm and its influence on McKinley. He says,

President McKinley went to the exposition at Omaha while the commissioners were negotiating at Paris. He made speeches in which he delicately felt out the sentiment of the people on the subject of the Philippines, as the question of keeping them or holding them was then a topic of discussion. He touched lightly at first upon a topic of the flag floating over distant territory, and soon saw that the crowds who listened to him desired to retain the territory where Americans had shed their blood. As he journeyed homeward he stopped at different points and made speeches, and every time he spoke more strongly in favor of keeping the flag afloat in lands rightfully taken by our brave soldiers and sailors, the cheers of the crowd grew more vociferous, and when he asked if they would "scuttle," the thunders in the negative seemed to express the will of the people.

.....

Then began the pressure of the Churches. . . . The Catholic prelates believed that their people would receive better treatment under United States rule than under Spain. They also believed that education would be introduced in the islands, and that was one motive that actuated Archbishop Ireland in favoring acquisition. The Protestants believed there was an excellent opportunity for missionary work in the islands;

Mark Hanna's influence was secured by the element in business that believed there was a great field for exploitation. They saw new opportunities for development of large properties that might be easily acquired.¹

The problem of convincing McKinley that we ought to acquire the Philippines was simple compared to the difficulty to convincing the United States Senate.

The tides of oratory and denunciation were to obtain full sway before the Senate consented to the ratification of the treaty.

1. Dunn, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 278-281.

Ch. III. THE SENATE AND THE TREATY OF PARIS

The fight that was opened up in the United States Senate by the Treaty of Paris, which provided for the acquisition of the Phillipines, was of great intensity. President McKinley received the treaty from John Hay, Secretary of State, on January 3, 1899 and the next day transmitted it to the Senate.

The Senators did not wait for the transmittal of the treaty to begin discussing the general proposition of imperialist expansion. Two points were of the greatest importance in the ensuing discussion: (1) did the United States have the constitutional power to acquire territories for colonies and (2) what were the advantages and disadvantages of such acquisition? The treaty was discussed in secret executive session so none of the debates on the treaty itself are available. However, the Senators, mainly the eponents of the treaty, discussed quite fully the constitutional question and to some extent the matter of colonial policy.

December 6, 1898, Senator Vest of Missouri introduced S. R. 191, the first of several Senate Resolutions bearing on territorial expansion. It read as follows:

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That under the Constitution of the United States no power is given to the Federal Government to acquire territory to be held and governed permanently as colonies.

The colonial system of European nations cannot be established under our present constitution, but all territory acquired by the Government, except such small amount as may be necessary for coaling stations, corrections of boundaries, and similar governmental purposes, must be acquired and governed with the purpose of ultimately organizing such territory into States suitable for admission into the Union.¹

¹. Congressional Record, 55th Congress, 3rd session (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1899) p. 20.

Six days later Senator Vest gave a prepared speech and, after citing numerous constitutional authorities and Supreme Court decisions states,

... I have not controverted and do not propose to controvert the power of the Federal Government to acquire and govern territory, but I do deny that territory can be acquired to be held as colonies, peopled by millions of subjects not citizens, with no hope or prospect of it ever becoming a State of the Union. . .¹

Senator Platt of Connecticut, December 19, spoke in support of the right of the Federal Government to acquire territory. He said there was no limit to the power to acquire territory, this power coming from the power as sovereign. There was no requirement that these territories be incorporated into the union or admitted as states. He cited New Mexico as an example saying it had been promised eventual statehood for 51 years. Platt said Gouverneur Morris thought that territory to be acquired could not be made into states.²

The next day Senator Teller of Colorado said that Congress had the power to acquire territory and that there was in some cases a moral duty to admit this territory as states. There was no force to compel such admission however. Teller said we should rule the Philippines for the benefit of the islands, should educate them for self-government. They should not be made into a state.³

The transmittal of the treaty to Congress by McKinley on January 4, 1899 gave a more definite and intensive tone to the discussions. Two days after this, Senator Caffery of Louisiana indicated his views about acquiring the Philippines. He argued that

1. Ibid., p. 96

2. Ibid., p. 297-297

3. Ibid., p. 325-330

1. Government of United States being "of the people, by the people, and for the people, " is inhibited from acquiring territory for purpose of incorporating it and its people into the Union against their will or without their consent.

2. That if a territory is acquired by the United States, and its condition . . . fit it for statehood, Congress can only govern it . . . with a view to its becoming a state as early as possible.

3. That if people of a territory proposed to be annexed are incapable of self-government, we cannot incorporate them into the Union nor hold them as dependencies to be governed despotically by Congress.

4. . . . if too far distant from the United States with different laws, religions, customs . . . it is impolitic, unwise, and dangerous to incorporate them into the Union.

5. That wherever any territory is acquired by the United States in full sovereignty the citizens thereof become citizens of the United States, with the privilege of removal if they object to the sway of the United States and that taxes, duties, and imposts shall be uniform throughout the United States including all territories.¹

He added that the only way that permanent sway may be had over colored races in the tropics was by unlimited cruel despotism. He asks if we owe any other duty to mankind than to alleviate his condition of hardship, to inspire him with the love of free institutions, and by our example to teach him to follow those institutions. He said that tropical nations export more than they import.² This latter idea was to be found true and was to provoke much resentment. Support for Philippine independence, at a later time was to come from this situation.

The next day Senator Mason of Illinois introduced the first of the policy resolutions regarding the Philippines. His resolution stated:

1. Ibid., p. 433

2. Ibid., p. 433-439

Whereas all just powers of government are derived from the consent of the governed:

Therefore be it

Resolved by the Senate of the United States, That the Government of the United States of America will not attempt to govern the people of any other country in the world without the consent of the people themselves, or subject them by force to our domination against their will.¹

The speech of Senator George Frisbie Hear of Massachusetts, a Republican, was probably the outstanding speech in opposition to the acquisition of the Philippines. He said there was danger to states from the love of empire and that republics rule acquired territory selfishly and oppressively. Senator Hear said that the constitution could not be extended to those not citizens. He asks if Congress may "conquer, control, and govern this people (Philippines) not for the general welfare . . . but for some real or fancied benefit to be conferred against their will upon the people so governed . . ."

The friends of imperialism contend that the flag once put up must never be taken down. He mentions that the slave owner said he owned slaves for their own good and then adds that Senator Platt of Connecticut would own nations for their own good. The doctrine of conquest was foreign to the Declaration of Independence. He asks if the philippine Islands have less right to be free than Cuba.²

Pratt replies that the same reasons that would prevent expansion of the United States to the Philippines would have prevented expansion over the territorial United States.³

-
1. Ibid., p. 466
 2. Ibid., p. 493-502
 3. Ibid., p. 502

Hear replied,

I claim that under the Declaration of Independence you ^{no} can govern a foreign territory, a foreign people, another people than your own, that you can not subjugate them or govern them against their will, because you think it is for their good, when they do not; because you think you are going to give them the blessings of liberty. You have no right at the cannon's mouth to impose on an unwilling people your Declaration of Independence and your constitution and your notions of freedom and notions of what is good.¹

The policy resolution which most nearly represented the views of the opponents of the treaty was S. R. 211, introduced January 11 by Senator Bacon of Georgia. It read,

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, First that the Government and people of the United States have not waged the recent war with Spain for conquest or for acquisition of foreign territory, but solely for purposes set forth in resolutions of Congress making the declaration of said war, the acquisition of such small tracts of land or harbors as may be necessary for governmental purposes being not deemed inconsistent with the same.

Second. That in demanding and in receiving cession of the Philippine Islands it is not the purpose of the Government of the United States to secure and maintain dominion over the same as a part of the territory of the United States, or to incorporate the inhabitants thereof as citizens of the United States, or to hold said inhabitants as vassals or subjects of this government.

Third. That whereas at the time of the declaration of war by the United States against Spain and prior thereto the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands were actively engaged in a war with Spain to achieve their independence, and whereas said purpose and the military operations thereunder have not been abandoned, but are still being actively prosecuted thereunder, therefore, in recognition of and in obedience to the vital principle announced in the great declaration that governments derive "their just powers from the consent of the governed," the Government of the United States recognizes that the people of the Philippine Islands of right ought to be free and independent; that with this view and to give effect to the same, the Government of the United States has required the Government of Spain to relinquish its authority and government in the Philippine Islands and to withdraw its land and naval forces from the Philippine Islands and from the waters thereof.

1. Ibid., p. 502-503

Fourth. That the United States hereby disclaim any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said islands, and assert their determination, when an independent government shall have been duly erected therein entitled to recognition as such, transfer to said government, upon terms which shall be reasonable and just, all rights secured under cession by Spain, and to thereupon leave the government and control of the islands to their people.¹

January 13, Senator McLaurin of South Carolina announced his views on the treaty. He linked the Filipino in culture with the negroes, whom he placed on a very low level. He said the constitution confers power to annex territory conditional upon it being admitted as a state. He said that the constitution was supposed to establish liberty, that the Philippine Islands could never be Americanised, and that imperialism meant staining distant lands and seas with American blood.²

There are three fundamental principles upon which this government is founded:

1. Citizenship, universal and coextensive with the country.
2. Local self-government.
3. Freedom to travel, to labor and to engage in business in any part of the country.³

The fact that England had given home rule only to colonies inhabited by Englishmen was mentioned also.⁴

McLaurin concludes,

Better than wealth, better than "an empire upon which the sun never sets" is the transmission to our children of a Republic built upon the indestructible rock of constitutional government.⁵

Senator Bacon, speaking January 18, said he was opposed to acquiring territory out of the sphere of influence of the United States and more

1. Ibid., p. 561
 2. Ibid., p. 638-641
 3. Ibid., p. 641
 4. Ibid., p. 642
 5. Ibid., p. 642

especially of territory peopled by an alien race. We should not annex territory against the will of the people concerned. We were under no obligation at the time of the declaration of war to free Spanish possessions in every part of the world and are under no obligation to furnish the Philippines with a stable government or to protect them from other peoples. Senator Bacon saw the need for a large army and navy to retain the Philippines and the possibility of semi-continuous wars because of commitments there.¹

Two days later, Senator Nelson of Minnesota said the people of no previously annexed territory, except Texas and Hawaii, were consulted and that fitness for statehood is not an essential prerequisite to acquisition. Some of our treaties of annexation have promised it while others have not done so. Senator Nelson added, "We must breathe into their nostrils the principles of law, order, and good government." The Filipino people are not fitted for self-government.² Senator Tillman of South Carolina retorted that the slaves of the south were given self-government but the peoples of the Philippines were not to be given it.³

The outstanding speech for the treaty was given by Senator Lodge of Massachusetts on January 24, 1899. He said, in part,

We must either ratify the treaty or reject it Let us look, then, at the two alternatives. Suppose we ratify the treaty. The islands pass from the possession of Spain into our possession without committing us to any policy. I believe we can be trusted as a people to deal honestly and justly with the islands and their inhabitants thus given to our care. What our precise policy shall be I do not know, because I for one am not sufficiently informed as to the conditions there to be able to say what it will be best to do, nor, I may add, do I think anyone is. But I believe that we shall have the wisdom not to attempt to incorporate those islands with our body politic, or make their inhabitants part of our citizenship. . . .

-
1. Ibid., p. 733-738
 2. Ibid., p. 831-837
 3. Ibid., p. 837

Take now the other alternative. Suppose we reject the treaty or strike out the clause relating to the Philippines. That will hand the islands back to Spain; and I can not conceive that any American should be willing to do that. Suppose we reject the treaty; what follows? . . . We continue the state of war . . . At the same time we repudiate the President and his action before the whole world, and the repudiation of the President in such a matter as this is, to my mind, the humiliation of the United States in the eyes of civilized mankind and brands us as a people incapable of great affairs or of taking rank where we belong, as one of the greatest of the great world powers.

.

Therefore, by rejecting the treaty we renew the war. The President as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy is then in charge. The treaty commits the disposition of the Philippine Islands to Congress and to the ways and practices of peace. Its rejection leaves them in the sole power of the President, subject to the usages and practices of war alone.¹

Two days later Senator Mallory of Florida commented that the United States was worried by the possible emigration of 10,000 Japanese to Hawaii when it seemed to want seven to ten million of savages ([Filipinos], who would either be allowed to come here or to send the products of their labor here.²

Senator Carter of Montana said, January 30, that the resolutions voiced a want of faith in the integrity of the American people. We should determine the utility of the country for purposes of trade and commerce before we decide what we intend to do with them. We should conquer the islands rather than stop the rebellion by the kind of promise embodied in these resolutions as we can not afford to have it understood that the army of the United States has been expelled from the Philippines.

1. Ibid., p. 959

2. Ibid., p. 1067-1071

Senator Carter wanted it understood that where an American citizen was engaged in a lawful pursuit and his rights were being invaded, he had 75,000,000 people behind him with all their resources.¹

Senator Rawlins of Utah, February 1, asked what we wanted the Philippines for. "For homes for our people? No! . . . to use them like we used the American Indian?" For commerce and trade - with the administration already trying to devise methods of preventing that trade. "Do we want them in order to send carpetbaggers to eat their substance?" Rawlins said we needed to ratify the treaty so that then we can go to war with the Filipinos. "Is the ratification of the treaty to end one war to be the inception of another . . . and against people who are absolutely guiltless in sin against us . . ." ²

Senator Spooner of Wisconsin was not an imperialist. He represented the view of the opponents of expansion who see no better solution of the problem than the ratification of the treaty. He mentions that the consent of the governed has never been absolutely used in our government. Also the pledge not to take Cuba did not apply to Porto Rico and the Philippines as they could be considered war indemnities. Congress had the power, he thought, to acquire territory. We had done so. The idea that we can acquire territory which we can not govern would be rejected by anyone.³ He adds,

I am a commercial expansionist. I believe in building up the trade of the United States

We have been growing rapidly in our trade without territorial expansion . . .

1. Ibid., p. 1242-1244
 2. Ibid., p. 1347
 3. Ibid., p. 1376-1385

Permanent dominion over the Philippines by the United States as a part of this country means to me an endless and vast burden upon the industries of our people . . .¹

I think I can see a valid distinction between the acquisition of territory continuous to our own country, in our own climate . . . and peoples of another race, alien to our associations and our blood living under a tropical sky, and laboring under different conditions. I can not say, in view of the history of the country, that time may not change my views, but I must say that, as I now feel, if the ratification of this treaty involved permanent dominion by the United States over the archipelago and its people as a Territory of the United States, irrevocably committed us to the policy of territorial expansion, I could not give it my vote.

Spöner said that we did not want the Philippines (which might have been true) and we did not want Spain to have them (this certainly was true). He mentions the bad effects, including possible renewal of the war, which might come from failure to ratify the treaty.

Let us ratify this treaty and bring peace to the country. Let us take this sovereignty and title and then do with it what is right, leaving to the people to determine hereafter what the permanent policy of this government with reference to it is to be.³

During the course of the speech, in a discussion with Senator Tillman about the merits of the government of Aguinaldo, the character of the Filipino leaders, and similar points, Senator Spooner had referred to Tillman as the Senator from Aguinaldo. At the end of Spooner's speech, Tillman said,

All I desire at this time . . . will be to say that coming not as a "Senator from Aguinaldo," but as a Senator from Africa, if you please, South Carolina, with 750,000 colored population and only 500,000 whites, I realize what you are doing while you do not; and I would save this country from the injection into it of another race question which can only breed

-
1. Ibid., p. 1385
 2. Ibid., p. 1386
 3. Ibid., p. 1388

bloodshed and a costly war and the loss of the lives of our brave soldiers. I would save the country the disgrace of having our flag float over a battlefield drenched with the blood of patriots fighting for liberty and self-government shed by American soldiers.¹

The occasional inconsistency of Congressmen was illustrated in this debate when Senator Bacon admitted to Spooner that the public safety and interest suspended the Declaration of Independence and its "consent of the governed" in regard to Porto Rico.²

February 3, Senator Money of Mississippi said,

. . . If the Filipinos are not fit for self-government, then they are not fit for citizens of the United States. If they are not fit for self-government or independent government, then it is our duty to let them take care of themselves in the way best suited to their intellectual, their moral, and material development.

While I would do anything that would be proper to advance the trade of the United States, yet it has not been proved that the extension of our commerce is dependent upon our possession of the Philippines, but, on the contrary, we are outstripping our competitors. The commerce of the United States . . . has been founded more wisely upon the superior skill of its artisans; and in this, as in the public defense, it is the workingman who is the solid foundation of our prosperity and greatness. Superior excellence has carried our wares into the shops in all the cities of Europe.³

Senator Money's speech was followed by one by Senator Daniel of Virginia. Daniel reiterated Jefferson's statement that we wanted no annexation that required a navy to defend. The Philippine treaty and a large standing army would walk into Congress hand in hand. We owe a debt of friendship to the Filipinos. "Is annexation of them against their will friendship?"⁴

-
1. Ibid., p. 1389
 2. Ibid., p. 1384
 3. Ibid., p. 1417
 4. Ibid., p. 1422-32

Senator Wolcott of Colorado said, February 4, that we must stand by the action of our peace commissioners. We must wait until after the ratification of the treaty before settling the Philippine problem.¹

On Saturday evening, February 4, 1899, the first clash between American and Filipino troops occurred. It is improbable that there was any relationship between the time of the clash and the date of ratifying the treaty although it was suggested by both opponents and supporters of the treaty that such might be the case.

As already mentioned, President McKinley had sent the Treaty with Spain to the Senate, January 4, 1899. It had been referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.²

One week later the treaty was reported favorably without amendment by the Committee on Foreign Affairs. Senator Berry of Arkansas moved to consider the treaty in open session.³

The motion of Senator Berry was disagreed to January 24.⁴ The motion of Senator Davis, Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs in the Senate and one of the Peace Treaty Commissioners, that the Senate vote on the treaty on Monday, February 6 at 3 o'clock and that the Senate should go into executive session at 2 p.m. each day was agreed to by unanimous consent the next day, January 25.⁵ The Senate considered the treaty every day in

1. Ibid., p. 1450-1

2. Journal of the Executive Proceedings of the Senate of the United States of America, 55th Congress, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1909), p. 1161

3. Ibid., p. 1183

4. Ibid., p. 1234

5. Ibid., p. 1234

secret executive session until it was finally disposed of February 6, 1899.

The only one of the policy resolutions destined to be voted on by the Senate was introduced by Senator McEnery of Louisiana the morning of February 6. This resolution states,

Resolved, That by the ratification of the pending treaty of peace with Spain it is not intended to incorporate the inhabitants of said island into citizenship of the United States, nor is it intended to permanently annex said islands as an integral part of the territory of the United States; but it is the intention of the United States to establish on said islands a government suitable to the wants and conditions of the inhabitants of said island, to prepare them for local self-government, and in due time to make such disposition of said islands as will best promote the interests of the citizens of the United States and the inhabitants of said islands.¹

It was agreed to vote on this resolution following the vote on the treaty.

There were three final speeches on the treaty February 6: one by the Nebraska Populist Allen; one by Clay of Georgia, a Bryan Democrat; and the last by Gorman of Maryland, a Conservative Democrat. The influence of William Jennings Bryan, who had come out for ratification of the treaty and a decision at a later time on Philippine policy, is seen in the statements of the two senators first mentioned.

Senator Allen said the whole question is within our jurisdiction after the ratification of the treaty. He said that it is as much the right of a Filipino to govern himself if he is capable of doing so as it is the right of an American citizen to do so. The effect of the outbreak of hostilities is seen in his statement that the Filipinos must be taught that as long as

1. Congressional Record, op. cit., p. 1479

we deal with them that submission to constituted authority is the first duty of the citizen.¹

Senator Clay made the following statement,

I shall vote now and at all other times hereafter when I have the opportunity against the permanent retention of those islands and against our Government undertaking to establish a colonial government against the will of the people of those islands. But duty to myself, to my State and country will not permit me to go further and cast my vote against ratification of the peace treaty.²

Senator Gorman said there would have been no revolt if there had been a declaration of policy in regard to the Philippines as there was for Cuba. If the treaty was ratified, a bloody and costly war would result with greatly increased cost of the army. The door to Oriental, chiefly Chinese, immigration would also be opened.³

Following this speech, the Senate went into secret executive session for the consideration of the Treaty with Spain. Senator Gorman, acting for Senator Vest, proposed amendments to Article III which would have Spain "relinquish all claim of sovereignty over and title to" the Philippines rather than ceding them to the United States and would add at the end of Article III the following:

The United States, desiring that the people of the archipelago shall be enabled to establish a form of free government suitable to their condition and securing the rights of life, liberty, and property and the preservation of order and equal rights therein, assumes for the time being and to the end aforesaid the control of the archipelago so far as such control shall be needful for purposes above stated, and will provide that privileges according to Spain by Articles IV and V of this treaty shall be enjoyed.

1. Ibid., p. 1480-1484
2. Ibid., p. 1484
3. Ibid., p. 1485-1487

Other amendments were included merely to correct the phraseology, in line with these principles. The amendment failed by a vote of Yeas - 30, Nays - 53. The 30 voting yea were made up of 24 Democrats, (Bacon of Ga., Bate of Tenn., Berry of Ark., Caffery of La., Chilton of Texas, Clay of Ga., Cockrell of Mo., Daniel of Va., Gorman of Md., Jones of Ark., Kenney of Del., McLaurin of S. C., Martin of Va., Mills of Texas, Mitchell of Wis., Money of Miss., Murphy of N. Y., Pasco of Fla., Rawlins of Utah, Reach of N. Dak., Smith of N. J., Tillman of S. C., Turley of Tenn., and Vest of Mo.); 2 Republicans (Hale of Me. and Hear of Mass.); 2 Populists (Heitfeld of Idaho and Turner of Wash.); and 2 Silverites (Jones of Nev. and Pettigrew of S. Dak.).

The 53 voting nay were made up of 39 Republicans (Aldrich of R. I., Allison of Iowa, Baker of Kan., Burrows of Mich., Carter of Mont., Chandler of N. H., Clark of Wyo., Cullem of Ill., Davis of Minn., Debee of Ky., Elkins of W. Va., Fairbanks of Ind., Feraker of Ohio, Frye of Maine, Gallinger of N. H., Gear of Iowa, Hanna of Ohio, Hansbrough of N. Dak., Hawley of Conn., Lodge of Mass., McBride of Oreg., McMillan of Mich., Mason of Ill., Nelson of Minn., Penrose of Pa., Perkins of Calif., Platt of Conn., Platt of N. Y., Pritchard of N. C., Quay of Pa., Ross of Vt., Sewell of N. Y., Shoup of Idaho, Simon of Oreg., Spooner of Wis., Thurston of Neb., Warren of Wyo., Wellington of Md., and Wolcott of Colo.); 7 Democrats (Faulkner of W. Va., Gray of Del., Lindsay of Ky., McEnery of La., Morgan and Pettus of Ala., and Sullivan of Miss.); 3 Populists (Allen of Neb., Butler of N. C., and Harris of Kan.); 2 Silverites (Stewart of Nev., and Teller of Colo.); and 1 Independent (Kyle of S. Dak.).

Paired for the amendment were Mallory of Fla., Turpie of Ind., and White of Calif. Paired against the amendment were Proctor of Vt., Wilson of Wash., and Cannon of Utah.¹ The position of Wetmore of R. I. was not stated.

The geographic division, including pairs, is shown on map No. 1.

The vote on consenting to the ratification of the treaty was Yeas - 57, Nays - 27. The opponents of the Vest-Gorman amendments voted for the treaty with the addition of Clay of Georgia, Jones of Nevada, Kenney of Delaware, and McLaurin of South Carolina. In general, the supporters of the Vest-Gorman amendments opposed the treaty. They lost the votes however of Clay, Jones of Nev., Kenney, and McLaurin. They gained the vote of Mallory of Florida who had been paired for the Vest-Gorman amendments.²

The Senate returned to open session and began consideration of S. R. 240, the resolution of McNery of Louisiana.

An amendment by Senator Hear to require government with the consent of the governed was laid on the table by a vote of 45 to 34.³

Another amendment to prevent forcing a government on the Filipinos against their will was tabled by a vote of 46 to 30.⁴

An amendment proposed by Senator Bacon stated,

Resolved further, That the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise permanent sovereignty,


1. Journal, op. cit., p. 1282-1283

2. Ibid., p. 1284

3. Congressional Record, op. cit., p. 1487-8

4. Ibid., p. 1488

Map No. 1. Senate vote, including pairs, on Vest amendment to Treaty of Paris, February 6, 1899.



jurisdiction, or control over said islands, and assert their determination, when a stable and independent government shall have been erected therein entitled in the judgment of the Government of the United States to recognition as such, to transfer to said government, upon terms which shall be reasonable and just, all rights secured under the cession by Spain, and to thereupon leave the government and control of the islands to their people.¹

In explaining his amendment Senator Bacon said the issue could be stated under two heads: (1) we do not intend unnecessarily to complicate ourselves with this distant territory either by way of annexation or by permanent control of any kind; (2) we do not intend in anything that we do to deny those people the right of self-government.²

Senator Gray of Delaware said we were asked to make promises to rebels in arms against the United States.

I am not in favor now of making any concessions to them while they are shooting down on their own soil Americans who have stood by them and have given them the hope for this great boon of liberty and of decent, orderly government there.³

Senator Lindsay thought the McEnery resolution did for the Philippines what the Teller amendment did for Cuba.⁴

Senator Caffery disagreed. He said the McEnery resolution gave the United States the power to alienate, sell, or dispose of the Philippines in any manner, shape, or form that suits the prevailing majority in Congress. The resolution merely guarantees them local self-government at some time in the future.⁵

-
1. Ibid., p. 1489
 2. Ibid., p. 1489
 3. Ibid., p. 1490
 4. Ibid., p. 1490
 5. Ibid., p. 1490-92

The next day Senator Tillman said the resolution is "an assertion of power and of right on part of this government to buy and sell these islands for our own interest . . ."¹ "If we are to pass any resolution at all . . . I think that resolution ought to be one that will pave the way to peace in the Philippines, rather than one which will be an aggravation of the war which began there." This resolution declares "that we will deal with this question . . . regardless of the rights and wishes of those 10,000,000 Asiatics who had come under our sway." The unusual circumstance of a transfer of territory between two powers while the residents of the territory were in revolt was mentioned.²

Senator Mason obtained unanimous consent for a vote on the McEnery resolution for February 14, 1899.

The vote on the pending amendment, the Bacon amendment, failed February 14 on the casting vote of the vice-president, Mr. Garret Hobart of New Jersey.

The vote in the senate was 29 yea and 29 nay. The 29 yeas consisted of 20 Democrats (Bacon of Ga., Bate of Tenn., Berry of Ark., Caffery of La., Chilton of Texas, Clay of Ga., Cockrell of Mo., Faulkner of W. Va., Gorman of Md., Gray of Del., Jones of Ark., Lindsay of Ky., McLaurin of S. C., Martin of Va., Money of Miss., Murphy of N. Y., Pettus of Ala., Rawlins of Utah, Smith of N. J., and Tillman of S. C.); 4 Republicans (Hear of Mass., Hale of Maine, Perkins of Calif., and Quay of Pa.); 3 Populists (Harris of Kansas, Heitfeld of Idaho, and Turner of Wash.); and 2 Silverites (Jones of Nev., and Pettigrew of S. D.).

1. Ibid., p. 1529

2. Ibid., p. 1530

The 29 nays consisted of 23 Republicans (Allison of Iowa, Burrows of Mich., Carter of Mont., Chandler of N. H., Deboe of Ky., Fairbanks of Ind., Frye of Maine, Gear of Iowa, Hanna of Ohio, Hawley of Conn., Lodge of Mass., McBride of Oreg., McMillan of Mich., Nelson of Minn., Penrose of Pa., Platt of Conn., Platt of N. Y., Pritchard of N. C., Ross of Vt., Shoup of Idaho, Simon of Oreg., Warren of Wyo., and Wolcott of Colo.); 2 Democrats (McEnery of La., and Morgan of Ala.); 3 Silverites (Mantle of Mont., Stewart of Nev., and Teller of Colo.); and 1 Independent, (Kyle of S. Dak.).

It was announced that the following would have voted yea if either not paired or if they had been present: Allen of Neb., Butler of N. C., Cannon of Utah, Mallory of Fla., Pasco of Fla., Mitchell of Wis., Vest of Mo., and White of Calif. The following would have voted nay: Clark of Wyo., Davis of Minn., Gallinger of N. H., Hansbrough of N. Dak., and Spooner of Wis.¹


The geographic division on this vote is shown on map No. 2.

The McEnery resolution was then passed by a vote of 26 yeas to 22 nays, 42 senators not voting. Two senators were announced as being in favor of the amendment if they had been present or not paired and five were announced as opposed to the amendment.² The vote was of no particular significance as the resolution was vague in meaning and was passed by administration supporters and moderates with the opponents being both vigorous imperialists like Platt and Hawley of Connecticut, Carter of Montana, and Ross of Vermont and vigorous opponents of

1. Ibid., p. 1845.

2. Ibid., p. 1845

Map No. 2. Senate vote on Bacon amendment to McNary resolution, February 14, 1899.



imperialism like Hoar of Mass., Bacon of Georgia, and Tillman of South Carolina.

Why was the treaty ratified? Arthur P. Dunn quotes Senator Gorman of Maryland as saying,

It's an outrage the way Hanna and his friends are working this treaty through the Senate. If an honest vote could be taken I doubt whether there is a bare majority for the treaty; but all the railroad influence, which is being worked through Elkins, all the commercial interests and every other interest which can be reached are bringing pressure on Senators in the most shameful manner. Some of the things they are doing transcend the bounds of decency.¹

Gorman, incidentally, was a conservative Democrat. According to Dunn some of the things done were that

. . . McEnery . . . was promised the appointment of a United States Judge of his choice. McLaurin of South Carolina was won over by being allowed to name postmasters in that state. Kenney of Delaware was squeezed by some sort of court proceeding in his state and had to vote for the treaty.²

Success was not attending the efforts of the administration however, until the arrival of William Jennings Bryan in Washington. He urged Democrat Senators to vote for the treaty. He "preferred any treaty to the resumption of the war."³ He said to ratify the treaty and make the matter of imperialism the issue in the next presidential election - in 1900.

Bryan's plan to make the issue of imperialism the main issue in the presidential election of 1900 was successful. The opportunity for

-
1. Dunn, Arthur P., From Harrison to Harding (New York; G. P. Putnam's sons, 1922), Vol. 1, p. 282 .
 2. Loc. cit.
 3. Olcott, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 139.

defeating imperialist expansion had passed however with the failure to defeat the ratification of the treaty of Paris. The idea of imperialism had become popular throughout the country. The United States was to keep the Philippines for thirty-five years before a movement for independence was to be successful.

One can see several shades of sentiment regarding our Philippine policy in the votes on the Vest amendments to the Treaty with Spain, the unamended Treaty, on the Bacon amendment to the McEnery resolution, and finally on the unamended McEnery resolution.

Twenty-nine senators indicate by their votes their opposition to territorial expansion.

Of these twenty-nine, fourteen voted for the Vest amendments to the treaty, against the treaty, for the Bacon amendment, and then against the McEnery resolution.

Nine other senators followed the above described course of action except for failure to vote on the McEnery resolution.

Five senators voted for the Vest amendments and against the treaty. They did not vote on the policy resolutions.

One senator voted against the unamended treaty and for both the Bacon amendment and the McEnery resolution.

These senators were definitely uninterested in territorial expansion into far corners of the world and did not want to get involved under any circumstances.

We next have a group of sixteen moderates whose views are more difficult to catalogue. Four senators voted for the Vest amendments, then for

the unamended treaty. One did not vote on the policy resolutions but the other three voted for the Bacon amendment. One of these three senators did not vote on the McEnery resolution, one voted for it, and the last voted against it. One senator voted against the Vest amendment, for the treaty, for the Bacon amendment, and against the McEnery resolution.

All the remaining senators voted against the Vest amendments to the treaty and then for the unamended treaty, but even here there is a difference of opinion.

Three senators voted for the Bacon amendment but did not vote on the McEnery resolution due perhaps to lack of interest in such a meaningless declaration. Eight senators voted for both the Bacon amendment and the McEnery resolution.

Thirty-four Senators can be placed in the imperialist group.

Eleven senators did not want any statement of policy toward the Philippines, voting against both the Bacon amendment and the McEnery resolution.

Eighteen senators, mostly administration stalwarts, voted against the Bacon amendment and then for the McEnery resolution.

Five senators voted against the Bacon amendment but did not vote on the McEnery resolution thus placing themselves in one of the two groups just mentioned.

Finally there were eleven senators who voted against the Vest amendments and then for the unamended treaty but did not vote on either of the policy resolutions. They would be either moderates or imperialists.

Ch. IV. Military Government of the Philippines

As Senator Tillman pointed out, our possession of the Philippines was unparalleled in history. We had acquired a territory and a revolution. The revolt that the Filipinos had started against Spain was inherited by us.

By the peace protocol of August 12, "the United States will occupy and hold the city, harbor, and bay of Manila pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace which shall determine the control, disposition, and government of the Philippines." To complicate the matter we acquired by conquest, subsequent to the peace protocol, the city of Manila. It was unquestioned that we had no legal rights beyond Manila until the exchange of ratifications of the treaty. This did not occur until April 11, 1899.

What rights did Spain have in the islands? She was the legal sovereign in all parts of the Islands except Manila. By August, the insurgents had practically ended her control outside Manila. After the armistice, Spain requested the right to send men and equipment to the Philippines to restore her control in those regions outside Manila. The United States refused. American policy in the Philippines had not been decided; but a possible enemy in case war was renewed was not desired. McKinley's administration did not want to antagonize the Filipinos, as this would have done, who, while not allies, had "cooperated with us against a common foe." With this situation existing, the Filipino insurgents rapidly expanded their control in the islands.

The fact that America was so slow in making up her mind concerning the Philippines made her position difficult. The decision to take all the Philippines came only in November, three months after the signing

of the armistice; the United States was to obtain legal rights five months later.

The period before the armistice was one of unfortunate misunderstandings and indecisive policy combined with opportunistic political maneuvering by some of our consuls who were trying to enhance their reputations. The period after the Armistice is one of indecision by the administration in Washington and of doubt of intentions and linguistic difficulties in the Philippines.

The government inaugurated in Manila, August 13, 1898, was entirely military. It was extended to other parts of the islands as rapidly as possible, in view of the armistice with Spain and the military situation. The powers of the military governor were gradually reduced until July 4, 1901 at which time William Howard Taft was inaugurated as civil governor and the position of military governor was abolished.

The telegrams between Manila and Washington after the capture of Manila, August 13, 1898, indicated that the Filipinos neither in Washington nor in Manila were considered as allies, they had merely "cooperated against a common enemy," an enemy who had disappeared from the picture with the capture of the Spanish forces in Manila.

The American forces had replaced the Spanish troops in the fortifications of the city of Manila. The Filipinos continued in the situation of passive besiegers - that is passive until February 4, 1899. It was a situation fraught with danger. At any time armed patrols might clash opening up military activities. The territory under the temporary control of each party was very uncertain.

Admiral Dewey states this problem very well in a telegram to John

D. Long, the Secretary of the Navy, which was received about October

14. He says,

It is important that the disposition of the Philippines should be decided as soon as possible and a strong government established. Spanish authority has been completely destroyed in Luzon, and general anarchy prevails without the limits of the city and bay of Manila.¹

After the agreement in Paris between the Spanish and American Commissioners, a message was sent by Adjutant-General Corbin to General Otis at Manila, dated December 4, 1898, which said,

The President desires that Admiral Dewey and General Otis shall have an early conference and advise him what force and equipment will be necessary in the Philippine Islands. The President would be glad to have suggestions from these commanders as to the government of the islands, which of necessity must be by the Army and the Navy for some time to come. When these islands shall be ceded to us, it is his desire that peace and tranquility shall be restored and as kind and beneficent a government as possible given to the people, that they may be encouraged in their industries and made secure in life and property. The fullest suggestions are invited.²

December 21, Adjutant-General Corbin sent another message to General Otis in which, after mentioning the destruction of the fleet, the capture of the city, and the acquisition of control through the treaty of peace signed December 10, he says,

. . . In the fulfillment of the rights of sovereignty thus acquired and the responsible obligations of government thus assumed, the actual occupation and administration of the entire group of Philippine Islands becomes immediately

1. Foreign Relations, op. cit., p. 928

2. House Miscellaneous Document 210, pt. 10, Op. cit., p. 218

necessary, and the military government heretofore maintained by the United States in the city, harbor, and bay of Manila is to be extended with all possible dispatch to the whole of the ceded territory.

In performing this duty the military commander of the United States is enjoined to make known to the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands that in succeeding to the sovereignty of Spain, in severing the former political relations of the inhabitants and in establishing a new political power, the authority of the United States is to be exerted for the securing of the persons and property of the people of the islands and for the confirmation of all their private rights and interests. It will be the duty of the commander of the forces of occupation to announce and proclaim in the most public manner that we come not as invaders or conquerors, but as friends, to protect the natives in their homes, in their employments, and in their personal rights. . . .

Finally, it should be the earnest and paramount aim of the military administration to win the confidence, respect, and affection of the inhabitants of the Philippines by assuring them in every possible way that full measure of individual rights and liberties which is the heritage of free peoples, and by proving to them that the mission of the United States is one of benevolent assimilation, substituting the mild sway of justice and right for arbitrary rule. In the fulfillment of this high mission, supporting the temperate administration of affairs for the greatest good of the governed, there must be sedulously maintained the strong arm of authority, to repress disturbance and to overcome all obstacles to the bestowal of the blessings of good and stable government upon the people of the Philippine Islands under the free flag of the United States. ¹

Admiral Dewey says in his Autobiography that as a result of the continued disturbed condition of affairs

I cabled on January 7, 1899 stating that affairs were very disturbed and that a small civilian commission composed of men skilled in diplomacy and statesmanship should be sent to adjust differences.^{1" 2}

McKinley was also considering civilian commissioners for January

-
1. Senate Document 208, 56 Cong., 1st sess., op. cit., p. 82-83
 2. Autobiography of George Dewey, op. cit., p. 285

8, 1899, he had Corbin cable Otis as follows:

~~Am most desirous that conflict be avoided . . .~~ They will come to see our benevolent purpose and recognize that before we can give their people good government our sovereignty must be complete and unquestioned. Tact and kindness most essential just now. Am sure you both having full knowledge of situation can be trusted to accomplish purposes of this government with the least discord and friction. We accepted the Philippines from high duty in the interest of their inhabitants and for humanity and civilization. Our sacrifices were with this high motive. We want to improve the condition of the inhabitants, securing them peace, liberty, and the pursuit of their highest good. Glad you have conferred with them in their unofficial capacity. Will send commissioners if you think desirable, to cooperate with you both in your delicate task.¹

It was decided to send commissioners, for the situation was certainly delicate. Otis considered McKinley's message of December 21 quite explosive and published a selected version of it with all reference to sovereignty and control by the United States eliminated. The original proclamation was then sent to the United States commander at Iloilo who inadvertently published it. The disparity of the Otis text and the text of the original document caused tension in the Philippines, according to Otis, when the disparity was discovered.

Meanwhile, McKinley had been engaged in the selection of the commission which was to go to the islands. Jacob Gould Schurman says that he was summoned to Washington and after discussing with him the names of a large number of possible members, McKinley offered him the presidency of the Commission. Schurman says further,

I replied that I feared it would be difficult, perhaps impracticable, for me to get away from Cornell University, and that in any event I could not stay away beyond the

1. Correspondence relating to War with Spain, op. cit.,
Vol. 2, p. 873.

opening of the next academic year. But even if a leave of temporary absence could be secured (and the President said he would send a message to the Board of Trustees), there was, I observed, another obstacle that might prove irremovable. "To be plain, Mr. President," I continued, "I am opposed to your Philippine policy; I never wanted the Philippine Islands." "Oh," replied the President, "that need not trouble you; I didn't want the Philippine Islands, either; and in the protocol to the treaty I left myself free not to take them; but--in the end there was no alternative." ¹

In addition to Schurman, who was President of Cornell University, McKinley appointed Admiral George Dewey, Major-General Elwell S. Otis, Charles Denby, and Dean C. Worcester.

The instructions to the commissioners, drafted by Elihu Root, Secretary of War, stated, in part,

. . . the commissioners are enjoined to meet at the earliest possible day in the city of Manila, and to announce by a public proclamation their presence and the mission intrusted to them, carefully setting forth that, while the military government already proclaimed is to be maintained and continued so long as necessity may require, efforts will be made to alleviate the burdens of taxation, to establish industrial and commercial prosperity, and to provide for the safety of persons and of property by such means as may be found conducive to these ends.

The commissioners will endeavor, without interference with the military authorities of the United States now in control of the Philippines, to ascertain what amelioration in the condition of the inhabitants and what improvements in public order will be practicable, and for this purpose they will study attentively the existing social and political state of the various populations, particularly as regards the forms of local government, the administration of justice, the collection of customs and other taxes, the means of transportation, and the need of public improvements. They will report through the Department of State . . . the results of their observations and reflections, and will recommend such Executive action as may from time to time seem to them wise and useful.

.

1. Jacob Gould Schurman, Philippine Affairs, A Retrospect and Outlook, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1902), p. 2.

The temporary government of the islands is intrusted to the military authorities, as already provided for by my instructions to the Secretary of War of December 21, 1898, and will continue until Congress shall determine otherwise. The commission may render valuable services by examining with special care the legislative needs of the various groups of inhabitants, and by reporting, with recommendations, the measures which should be instituted for the maintenance of order, peace, and public welfare, either as temporary steps to be taken immediately for the perfection of present administration, or as suggestions for future legislation.

.....

It is my desire that in all their relations with the inhabitants of the islands, the commissioners exercise due respect for all the ideals, customs, and institutions of the tribes and races which compose the population, emphasizing upon all occasions the just and beneficent intentions of the Government of the United States. It is also my wish and expectation that the commissioners may be received in a manner due to the honored and authorized representatives of the American Republic, duly commissioned on account of their knowledge, skill, and integrity as bearers of the good will, the protection, and the richest blessings of a liberating rather than a conquering nation.¹

Before the arrival of the commissioners, hostilities broke out between the Filipino and American soldiers on February 4, 1899. It seems to have been unexpected and unintentional on both sides although inevitable in view of the political position of the two groups.

An American sentry challenged a Filipino patrol ordering them to halt. The Filipino failed to halt. It might have been due either to lack of understanding of the American or to a desire to force the American lines back into the city. There had been a number of similar episodes in the six months since the capture of Manila. The shot fired

1. Senate Document 208, 56 Congress, 1 session, op. cit., p. 149-150.

by the American soldier resulted in general shooting all along the line. The fighting thus started was to continue for two years on a large scale and with intermittent manifestations until 1904.

There seems to have been no connection between the date of the outbreak and the date set for ratifying the treaty. Aguinaldo was planning to try to drive the Americans out of the islands just as he had tried to drive the Spanish out. He was not able to distinguish between nice statements about future good government by Spain and the same kind of statements by Americans. McKinley had asked how many troops were necessary to enable us to extend our control over [conquer] the Philippines. Conflict was thus inevitable. ?

Schurman and Worcester heard of the outbreak of hostilities when they arrived in Japan. Charles Denby was not able to go with Schurman and Worcester so the Proclamation by the Commission setting forth its purposes was not issued until April 4, 1899. It states,

To the people of the Philippine Islands:

The treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, ratified several weeks ago by the former, having on March 20 been ratified by the latter, the cession to the United States, as stipulated by the treaty, of the sovereignty which Spain possessed and exercised over the Philippine Islands has now, in accordance with the laws of nations, received a complete and indefeasible consummation.

.....

His Excellency the President of the United States believes that this felicity and perfection of the Philippine people is to be brought about by the assurance of peace and order; by the guaranty of civil and religious liberty; by the establishment of justice; . . . and, in a word, by the uninterrupted devotion of the people to the pursuit of those useful objects and the realization of those noble ideals which constitute the highest civilisation of mankind.

.....

And why these hostilities? What do the best Filipinos desire? Can it be more than the United States is ready to give? They are patriots and want liberty, it is said. The Commission emphatically asserts that the United States is not only willing, but anxious, to establish in the Philippine Islands an enlightened system of government under which the Philippine people may enjoy the largest measure of home rule and the amplest liberty consonant with the supreme ends of government and compatible with those obligations which the United States has assumed toward the civilized nations of the world.

With the United States striving earnestly for the welfare and advancement of the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands, there can be no real conflict between American sovereignty and the rights and liberties of the Philippine people. For, just as the United States stands ready to furnish armies, navies, and all the infinite resources of a great and powerful nation to maintain and support its rightful supremacy over the Philippine Islands, so it is even more solicitous to spread peace and happiness among the Philippine people; to guarantee them a rightful freedom; to protect them in their just privileges and immunities; to accustom them to free self-government in an ever-increasing measure; and to encourage them in those democratic aspirations, sentiments, and ideals which are the promise and potency of a fruitful rational development.¹

The commissioners said of the proclamation,

Translations of this proclamation were made into Spanish and into Tagalog and other dialects They [insurgents and their sympathizers] soon set to work systematically to efface and to destroy the proclamation wherever posted. In spite of this, it had a wide and continuing influence. It served as a basis for this part of the commission's work. It told the Philippine people what they were in need of knowing. . . .²

Four days later Schurman wrote to the Secretary of State saying, in part,

-
1. Senate document 138, 56 Congress, 1st session, (Washington: Government Printing office, 1900), p. 3-4.
 2. Ibid., p. 6.

What result the proclamation will produce among the insurgents it is yet too early to tell. Here in Manila . . . it seems to have cleared the air to a considerable extent and to have ended certain doubts that existed in the native and foreign mind.

It has left no uncertainty as to the assumption of sovereignty by the United States over the islands . . . At the same time it has inspired on the part of some a confidence that the United States sincerely proposes to inaugurate needed reforms, to grant all reasonable liberties, and to establish an honest government in which the natives shall take part as far as they are able.¹

In April, Colonel Arguelles came from the insurgents to discuss peace terms. Several plans of government were discussed. After conferring with Aguinaldo, Arguelles with a Captain Zialcita returned to Manila.

. . . They were told that, after careful consideration and study, it was the opinion of the Commission that the Philippine people were not capable of independent self-government, and that independence, for which some of them said they were fighting, was, in the opinion of the commission an ideal at present impossible, not only because of their unfitness for it, but because of their inability to preserve it among the nations even if it were granted. Arguelles said they were beginning to realize this fact; that, moreover, no nation had been willing to recognize them as independent or as belligerent; and thereupon he stated that he was authorized to say, on behalf of Aguinaldo, that they were not fighting for the sovereignty of the islands, but for the honor of the army. Being asked, "You accept, then, the sovereignty of the United States?" he replied, "Yes, we do." Being asked if he was duly authorized to make that statement also, he replied that he was.

Arguelles asked for a clearer statement of the form of government designed for the islands. Tentative plans were discussed which he could report to his superiors. The Commission communicated with the

1. Senate document 208, 56 Congress, 1st session, op. cit., p. 154.

Secretary of State and the President concerning the plan. Hay replied, May 5, 1899:

"Yours 4th received. You are authorized to propose that under the military powers of the President, pending action of Congress, government of the Philippine Islands shall consist of a Governor-General appointed by the President; cabinet appointed by Governor-General; a general advisory council elected by the people; the qualifications of electors to be carefully considered and determined; and the governor-general to have absolute veto. Judiciary strong and independent; principal judges appointed by the President. The cabinet and judges to be chosen from natives or Americans, or both, having regard to fitness. The President earnestly desires the cessation of bloodshed, and that the people of the Philippine Islands at an early date shall have the largest measure of local self-government consistent with peace and good order."

Emissaries from Aguinaldo returned May 19 without Arguelles. This cablegram and the proclamation were gone over very carefully with the new emissaries. Finally the emissaries asked about the army being incorporated into the United States forces. The answer was that some regiments might be but certainly not the whole army. The Commission expressed a desire to talk things over with Aguinaldo. The insurgents promised to consider these matters and to return in three weeks; "but they never returned."¹

This ended the hope for a negotiated peace. In the meantime the United States army had been operating against the Filipinos with very disastrous results for the latter. After a few positional battles which were won easily by the United States troops, the insurgents decided, at least partly from necessity, to change to guerrilla warfare. The American troops had much greater difficulties against this type of resistance. It was very hard to tell a Filipino guerrilla from a Filipino civilian laborer. There was a considerable degree of success in operations

1. Ibid., p. 6-10

against insurgents by the army and pacification of civilians by the commissions before the capture of Aguinaldo, which occurred March 23, 1901. When Aguinaldo took the oath of allegiance April 19, 1901, the morale of the remaining insurgent leaders was very much weakened.

In its preliminary report, dated November 2, 1899, the Commission said further,

. . . Their [the Filipinos] lack of education and political experience, combined with their racial and linguistic diversities, disqualify them, in spite of their mental gifts and domestic virtues to undertake the task of governing the archipelago at the present time. The most that can be expected of them is to cooperate with the Americans in the administration of general affairs, from Manila as a center, and to undertake, subject to American control or guidance (as may be found necessary), the administration of provincial and municipal affairs. Fortunately, there are educated Filipinos, though they do not constitute a large proportion of the entire population, and their support and services will be of incalculable value in inaugurating and maintaining the new government. As education advances and experience ripens, the natives may be entrusted with a larger and more independent share of government - self-government, as the American ideal, being constantly kept in view as the goal. In this way American sovereignty over the archipelago will prove a great political boon to the people.

Should our power by any fatality be withdrawn, the commission believe that the government of the Philippines would speedily lapse into anarchy, which would excuse, if it did not necessitate, the intervention of other powers and the eventual division of the islands among them. Only through American occupation, therefore, is the idea of a free, self-governing, and united Philippine commonwealth at all conceivable. And the indispensable need from the Filipino point of view of maintaining American sovereignty over the archipelago is recognized by all intelligent Filipinos and even by those insurgents who desire an American protectorate. The latter, it is true, would take the revenues and leave us the responsibilities. Nevertheless, they recognize the indubitable fact that the Filipinos can not stand alone. Thus the welfare of the Filipinos coincides with the dictates of national honor in forbidding our abandonment of the archipelago. We can not from any point of view escape the responsibilities of government which

our sovereignty entails; and the commission is strongly persuaded that the performance of our national duty will prove the greatest blessing to the peoples of the Philippine Islands. ¹

The comment of the Commission on the value of the islands is equally important and enlightening. It throws light on the hopeful and expanding economic imperialism of that day--an imperialism gilded over with the pale cast of goodwill and patriotism. The report states,

Rich in agricultural and forest products, as well as in mineral wealth, commanding in geographical position, the Philippine Islands should soon become one of the great trade centers of the East. New steamship lines, established since the American occupation, already connect Manila with Australia, India, and Japan. She will become the natural terminus of many other lines when a ship canal connects the Atlantic and the Pacific, and yet others will inevitably be attracted by the development of the Philippine coal deposits. The building of a short railway has recently doubled the rice crop of the archipelago. It can not be doubted that under an efficient administration of domestic affairs, commerce will greatly increase, and the United States will reap a large share in this increment. Manila, with the immunity which it has thus far enjoyed from that terrible pest, the bubonic plague, should become a distributing center for China, Siam, the Straits Settlements, Tonquin, Annam, and Australia.

Our control means to the inhabitants of the Philippines internal peace and order, a guaranty against foreign aggression and against the dismemberment of their country, commercial and industrial prosperity, and as large a share in the affairs of government as they shall prove fit to take. When peace and prosperity shall have been established throughout the archipelago, when education shall have become general, then, in the language of a leading Filipino, his people will, under our guidance, "become more American than the Americans themselves."²

1. Ibid., p. 183

2. Ibid., p. 184

A month later President McKinley, in his annual message to Congress, December 5, 1899, said,

Everything indicated that with the speedy suppression of the Tagalo rebellion life in the archipelago will soon resume its ordinary course under the protection of our sovereignty, and the people of those favored islands will enjoy a prosperity and freedom which they have never before known. . . . The earnest and unremitting endeavors of the Commission and the Admiral and Major-General Commanding the Department of the Pacific to assure the people of the beneficent intention of this Government have had their legitimate effect in convincing the great mass of them that peace and safety and prosperity and stable government can only be found in a loyal acceptance of the authority of the United States.

The future government of the Philippines rests with the Congress of the United States. Few graver responsibilities have ever been confided to us. If we accept them in a spirit worthy of our race and our traditions, a great opportunity comes with them. The islands lie under the shelter of our flag. They are ours by every title of law and equity. They can not be abandoned. If we desert them we leave them at once to anarchy and finally to barbarism. We fling them, a golden apple of discord, among the rival powers, no one of which could permit another to seize them unquestioned. Their rich plains and valleys would be the scene of endless strife and bloodshed. The advent of Dewey's fleet in Manila Bay instead of being, as we hope, the dawn of a new day of freedom and progress, will have been the beginning of an era of misery and violence worse than any which has darkened their unhappy past. The suggestion has been made that we could renounce our authority over the islands and, giving them independence, could retain a protectorate over them. This proposition will not be found, I am sure, worthy of your serious attention. Such an arrangement would involve at the outset a cruel breach of faith. It would place the peaceable and loyal majority, who ask nothing better than to accept our authority, at the mercy of the minority of armed insurgents. It would make us responsible for the acts of the insurgent leaders and give us no power to control them. It would charge us with the task of protecting them against each other and defending them against any foreign power with which they chose to quarrel. In short, it would take from the Congress of the United States the power of declaring war and vest that tremendous prerogative in the Tagal leader of the hour.

It does not seem desirable that I should recommend at this time a specific and final form of government for these islands. . . . As long as the insurrection continues, the military arm must necessarily be supreme. But there is no reason why steps should not be taken from time to time to inaugurate governments essentially popular in their form as fast as territory is held and controlled by our troops. To this end I am considering the advisability of the return of the Commission . . . to aid the existing authorities and facilitate this work throughout the islands . . .

No effort will be spared to build up the waste places desolated by war and by long years of misgovernment. We shall not wait for the end of strife to begin the beneficent work. We shall continue, as we have begun, to open the schools and the churches, to set the courts in operation, to foster industry and trade and agriculture, and in every way in our power to make these people whom Providence has brought within our jurisdiction feel that it is their liberty and not our power, their welfare and not our gain, we are seeking to enhance. Our flag has never waved over any community but in blessing. I believe the Filipinos will soon recognize the fact that it has not lost its gift of benediction in its world-wide journey to their shores.¹

The Final report of the Philippine Commission headed by Mr. Schurman was dated January 31, 1900. The sections relating to the Government of the island were written by the Chairman. The degree to which the detailed recommendations of this Commission have been followed by later administrators is astonishing. The report, commenting on the governmental reforms desired by the Filipinos, stated,

The subject is one of the most vital significance, for the United States can succeed in governing the Philippines only by understanding the character and circumstances of the people and realizing sympathetically their aspirations and ideals. A government to stand must be firmly rooted in the needs, interests, judgment, and devotion of the people, and this support is secured by the adaptation of government to the character and possibilities of the governed - what they are, what they have it in them to become, what they want, and, not least, what they think they are entitled to have and enjoy.

1. House Document 1, 56 Congress, 1 session, (Washington: Government Printing office, 1900), p. L-III

. . . While the peoples of the Philippine Islands ardently desire a full measure of rights and liberties, they do not, in the opinion of the Commission, generally desire independence. Hundreds of witnesses testified on this subject . . . --they were uniform in their testimony that in view of the ignorance and political inexperience of the masses of the people, the multiplicity of languages, . . . an independent sovereign Philippine state was at the present time neither possible nor desirable, even if its poverty and internal weakness and lack of coherence would not invite, and the dissatisfaction of aliens entail, the intervention of foreign powers with the inevitable result of the division of the archipelago among them and the disappearance forever of the dream and hope of a united and self-governing Philippine Commonwealth. The Philippine Islands, even the most patriotic declare, can not at the present time stand alone. They need the tutelage and protection of the United States. . . It would be a misrepresentation of facts not to report that ultimate independence--independence after an undefined period of American training--is the aspiration and goal of the intelligent Filipinos who to-day so strenuously oppose the suggestion of independence at the present time.

The insurrection was an inheritance from Spain with the selfish ambitions of Tagalog leaders combining with suspicions of the white man to cause the continuation of the revolt, so the commission said. There was persistent misrepresentation of the purposes of the United States. The original rebellion had grown "out of definite grievances and sought redress for definite wrongs. . . ."¹

The Commission quotes a printed proclamation which had been widely circulated in 1897 to indicate the reforms desired by the Filipinos. It demanded:

1. Expulsion of the friars and restitution to the townships of lands which the friars have appropriated, dividing the incumbencies held by them, as well as the episcopal sees, equally between peninsular and insular secular priests.

2. Spain must concede to us, as she has to Cuba parliamentary representation, freedom of the press, toleration

1. Senate Document 138, 56 Congress, 1 session, op. cit., p. 82-83

of all religious sects, laws common with hers and administrative and economic autonomy.

3. Equality in treatment and pay between peninsular and insular civil servants.

4. Restitution of all lands appropriated by the friars to the townships, or to the original owners, or in default of finding such owners, the state is to put them up to public auction in small lots of a value within the reach of all and payable within four years, the same as the present state lands.

5. Abolition of the Governmental authorities' power to banish citizens, as well as unjust measures against Filipinos; legal equality for all persons, whether peninsular or insular, under the civil as well as the penal code.¹

Commenting on this proclamation, the Commission said,

"This certainly is no scheme of independence. . . ." ²

The report then says,

The more one studies the recent history of the Philippines and the more one strives by conversation and intercourse with the Filipinos to understand and appreciate their political aims and ideas, the more profound becomes one's conviction that what the people want above every other thing, is a guaranty of those fundamental human rights which Americans hold to be the natural and inalienable birthright of the individual but which under Spanish dominion in the Philippines were shamefully invaded and ruthlessly trampled upon. . . .

Speaking of the number of Americans needed for the government of the Philippines, the commission after citing figures on the number of British officials in Burma, Ceylon, and British India states,

. . . The conclusion is irresistible that only a small number of Americans are needed as the organizing and directing brain of the civil administration of the Philippines; but

1. Ibid., p. 84.
 2. Loc. cit.
 3. Loc. cit.

these should be men of the very highest qualifications, and to secure them, and at the same time good government, it is indispensable that they shall be offered high compensation and appointments during good behavior and efficiency. On them, and practically on them alone, will devolve the fulfillment of our high obligations in the Philippines.¹

The Commission outlined the following financial relationship between the United States and the Philippines:

It has been the practice hitherto to assimilate the customs duties of new territories to those of the United States . . . , it is not a requirement of the constitution, which calls only for uniformity of duties, imposts, and excises throughout the States. The commission has, however, carefully considered the feasibility of assimilating the tariff of the Philippines to that of the United States. The differences, however, appear to be fundamental and irreconcilable; the tariffs are as far apart as the corresponding economic, industrial, and social conditions of the two countries. . .

. . . so long as the existing chasm remains between the economic and social conditions of the Philippines and those of the United States, so long will it remain impracticable to identify their tariffs. . .

There are two fundamental principles on which a successful administration of the finances of dependent territories must rest. First, their finances must be managed, not for the advantage of the sovereign power, but for the benefit of the people and the development of the country whose destinies have been committed to its supreme control. . . There is no instance in history of the successful government of a colony where profit to the parent state or its citizens has been a leading consideration.

The second vital principle . . . is that they should be made self-supporting; and to accomplish that object should be the principal aim of the United States in the financial administration of the Philippines--and to accomplish it while developing the resources of the country and making public improvements. . . .

1. Ibid., p. 116

From all that has been said, and especially in view of the separate system of customs duties and internal-revenue taxes, it is obvious that the finances of the Philippines must be kept separate from those of the United States. All duties and taxes collected in the Philippines must be deposited in the Philippine treasury, and that treasury must bear the cost of the entire administration of the archipelago.¹

The Commission recommended that civil government be extended immediately to the pacified regions of the islands.

Considering the varieties of the people and the friendliness of most of them to the United States, it would be both unjust and impolitic to treat them all alike as unworthy of civil government; and looking to the pacification of those still hostile, the Commission believes that no instrumentality would be so effective to that end as the establishment of civil government in the communities which are already friendly.²

There were some encouraging prospects for the government of the Philippines. The report says,

The commission, while not underrating the difficulty of governing the Philippines is disposed to believe the task easier than is generally supposed. For this confidence it has the following among other grounds: First. The study by educated Filipinos of the various examples of constitutional government has resulted in their selection, as best adapted to the conditions and character of the various people inhabiting the archipelago, of almost precisely the political institutions and arrangements which have been worked out in practice by the American people. . . Secondly. In addition to the adaptation of the American form of government to the Filipinos, the Filipinos themselves are of unusually promising material. They possess admirable domestic and personal virtues. . . Thirdly. Though the majority of the inhabitants are uneducated, they evince a strong desire to be instructed. . . Fourthly. The educated Filipino, though constituting a minority are far more numerous than is generally supposed and are scattered all over the archipelago; and the commission

1. Ibid., p. 116-118
 2. Ibid., p. 118-119

desires to bear the strongest testimony to the high range of their intelligence. . . . It is scarcely an exaggeration to say that these picked Filipinos will be of infinite value to the United States in the work of establishing and maintaining civil government throughout the archipelago. . . . And it has been a leading motive with the commission in devising a form of government for the Philippines to frame one which, to the utmost extent possible, shall satisfy the views and aspirations of educated Filipinos. They believe that the territorial system . . . will accomplish that object, and this is the fifth and most important reason for the conviction that the administration of the government will, in the proper hands, not be attended with insuperable or even extraordinary difficulties.¹

The Commission reached the following conclusions regarding the matter of the government of the Philippines:

1. The United States can not withdraw from the Philippines. We are there and duty binds us to remain. There is no escape from our responsibility to the Filipinos and to mankind for the government of the archipelago and the amelioration of the condition of its inhabitants.

2. The Filipinos are wholly unprepared for independence, and if independence were given to them they could not maintain it.

.

4. There being no Philippine nation, but only a collection of different peoples, there is no general public opinion in the archipelago; but the men of property and education, who alone interest themselves in public affairs, in general recognize as indispensable American authority, guidance, and protection.

5. Congress should at the earliest practicable time, provide for the Philippines the form of government herein recommended or another equally liberal and beneficent.

6. Pending any action on the part of Congress, the Commission recommends that the President put in operation this scheme of civil government in such parts of the archipelago as are at peace.

7. So far as the finances of the Philippines permit, public education should be promptly established, and when

1. Ibid., p. 119-120

established made free to all.

8. The greatest care should be taken in the selection of officials for administration. They should be men of the highest character and fitness, and partisan politics should be entirely separated from the government of the Philippines.¹

Major-General Otis, the military governor, provided for a system of municipal government in General Orders No. 40, dated at Manila, March 29, 1900. These orders, drafted by Pedro de Tavera, provided for the establishment of democratically elected municipal governments in the Philippines. There was a restricted suffrage. One must have been an office holder under the Spanish regime or be able to pass the literacy test. An oath of allegiance to the United States was also required. The officials elected were to manage the affairs of the town.²

Only one member of the Schurman Philippine Commission showed any interest in returning to the islands when McKinley finally decided to send another Commission. That was Dean C. Worcester. It then became necessary to select other members.

William Howard Taft, United States Circuit Judge, was called to Washington late in January, 1900, by McKinley. When he arrived at the White House he found Elihu Root and John D. Long were present. McKinley told Taft that he was going to name a new commission to the Philippines and wanted him to be a member. "It was intimated that he might be its president."³ McKinley said Schurman could not return to the islands

1. Ibid., p. 121

2. House Document 652, 56 Cong., 1 sess., (Washington: Government Printing office, 1900), p.

3. Henry F. Pringle, The Life and Times of William Howard Taft, (New York: Farrar & Rinehart, Inc., 1939) Vol. 1, p. 159.

and asked Taft's views on the Philippine problem. In a letter to brothers Horace and Henry, dated January 28, Taft gives his reply.

I told him I was very much opposed to taking them, that I did not favor expansion but that now that we were there we were under the most sacred duty to give them a good form of government, that I did not agree with Senator Hear and his followers, that the Philippines were capable of self-government or that we were violating any principles of our government or the Declaration of Independence so far as they were concerned, that I thought we were doing them great good, but that I deprecated our taking the Philippines because of the assumption of a burden by us contrary to our traditions and at a time when we had quite enough to do at home; but being there we must exert ourselves to construct a government which should be adapted to the needs of the people so that they might be developed into a self-governing people.¹

Pringle says of Taft's position,

Judge Taft at first deprecated, too, the unexpected proposal that he was the man to go as head of the commission. . . . Two arguments convinced him that he must accept. The first was that it was his duty. The second was that the Philippine Commission was only temporary and would, in the long run, advance his judicial career. . . .²

Pringle says there is only one logical explanation for the appointment of Taft.

. . . Taft was named to the Philippine Commission because a man of high integrity was needed and because he was eligible for favors from a Republican administration. At that, it was not a major favor. The appointment was to have been brief. It was far more likely to lead to disillusionment and grief than to honor and renown; such had been the story of the Philippine Islands.³

1. Ibid., p. 160

2. Loc. cit.

3. Ibid., p. 162

The other commissioners selected were Dean C. Worcester, Luke E. Wright, a Tennessee judge; Henry C. Ide, a lawyer from Vermont; and Bernard Moses, professor of Latin American History at the University of California.

The instructions to the Commission were drafted by Elihu Root with the help of Taft. McKinley made some minor changes in them and then, April 7, 1900, issued them as Instructions from the President to the Secretary of war for the guidance of the Philippine Commission. The instructions said, in part,

Beginning with the first day of September, 1900, the authority to exercise, subject to my approval, through the Secretary of War, that part of the power of Government in the Philippine Islands, which is of a legislative nature, is to be transferred from the military governor of the islands to this Commission, to be thereafter exercised by them in the place and stead of the military governor, under such rules and regulations as you [i.e., Secretary of War] shall prescribe, until the establishment of the civil central government for the islands. . . or until Congress shall otherwise provide. . . .

. . . Until the complete transfer of control the military governor will remain the chief executive . . . subject, however, to the rules and orders enacted by the Commission in the exercise of the legislative powers conferred upon them. . . .

In all the forms of government and administrative provisions which they are authorized to prescribe, the commission should bear in mind that the government which they are establishing is designed, not for our satisfaction or for the expression of our theoretical views, but for the happiness, peace, and prosperity of the people of the Philippine Islands, and the measures adopted should be made to conform to their customs, their habits, and even their prejudices, to the fullest extent consistent with the accomplishment of the indispensable requisites of just and effective government.

At the same time the commission should bear in mind, and the people of the islands should be made plainly to understand, that there are certain great principles of

government which have been made the basis of our governmental system which we deem essential to the rule of law and the maintenance of individual freedom. . . and that these principles and these rules of government must be established and maintained in their islands for the sake of their liberty and happiness, however much they may conflict with the customs or laws of procedure with which they are familiar.

. . . Upon every division and branch of the government of the Philippines, therefore, must be imposed these inviolable rules:

That no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation; that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial . . . [Other guarantees of the constitution are also recited.]

It will be the duty of the commission to promote and extend, and as they find occasion, to improve, the system of education already inaugurated by the military authorities . . .

The main body of the laws which regulate the rights and obligations of the people should be maintained with as little interference as possible. . . .

Upon all officers and employees of the United States, both civil and military, should be impressed a sense of the duty to observe not merely the material but the personal and social rights of the people of the islands, and to treat them with the same courtesy and respect for their personal dignity which the people of the United States are accustomed to require from each other.¹

With these instructions the Taft Commission, as it came to be called sailed on board the transport Hancock arriving in Manila Bay the morning of June 3, 1900. Pringle says of the arrival:

Taft, with his fellow commissioners, did not go ashore at once and Professor Worcester . . . noted a "certain frigidity in the air" despite the heat. He knew what this meant, and so did Taft. It was the resentment of

1. House Document 1, 56 Cong., 1 sess., (Washington: Government Printing office, 1900), p. xxxv-xxxix.

General Arthur MacArthur who had been appointed military governor just a month before. The general was a military man and so, of course, were the members of his staff. They were utterly cynical regarding their brown brothers--cynical and convinced that civilisation could be brought to the Philippines by the Krag and the bayonet alone. The general brooded at his desk in the city and did not come to the Hancock to extend a greeting to the commission. The arrival of these civilians would upset all his plans. They would interfere with his subjugation of the Filipinos.

Taft was to fight MacArthur long and stubbornly. He was to send innumerable letters of complaint to Secretary of War Root. The lawyer was, in the end to strip the military governor of most of his powers; the bayonets were to be sheathed and the Krags stacked in the armories.

It was discouraging to the commission, though, to learn thus at the start that friction was inescapable. . . .

The landing (June 4) was made with appropriate ceremonies . . .

"The populace that we expected to meet us was not there," Taft recalled, "and I cannot describe the coldness of the army officers and army men who received us any better than by saying that it somewhat exceeded the coldness of the populace."

Iceicles dripped from the hand of General MacArthur as he arose to greet Taft, Wright, Worcester, Moses, & Ide. . . . The civilian commission, said the general, was "an injection into an otherwise normal situation." He said with military candor that the Filipinos would need bayonet treatment for at least a decade. Taft attempted to smooth the ruffled eagle feathers. . . he pointed out the general would still be in supreme command of the military and would have great power.

"That would be all right," MacArthur answered, "if I had not been exercising so much more power before you came."¹

Upon their arrival in Manila the Commission issued an announcement to the public press saying, in part,

Representing the sovereignty of the United States in these islands, which it is the purpose of our Government

¹. Pringle, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 168-170

to maintain, we are here to do justice to the Philippine people, and to secure to them the best government in our power, and such a measure of popular control as will be consistent with stability and the security of law, order, and property.

We are civil officers. We are men of peace. The field of our work must, of course, be confined to regions in which the armed enemy has ceased operations. We can not deal with men in arms. They are to be dealt with by the United States Army and the general commanding. When those now in arms shall have laid them down, relying, as they certainly may, on the justice, generosity, and clemency of the United States, we shall give to them as full a hearing upon the policy to be pursued and the reforms to be begun as to anyone having an interest in the matter.¹

Meanwhile General MacArthur, feeling that the time was ripe for such action, sent the following message to Washington, received there June 5, 1900:

Propose immediate amnesty offering complete immunity for past and liberty for future to all who have not violated laws of war and who will renounce insurrection and accept sovereignty of United States. . . .²

He received the following reply, dated June 6, "Proposal approved by President. Proclamation to be sent to Washington for revision."³

The proclamation, as approved in Washington June 15 stated,

By direction of the President of the United States, the undersigned, announces amnesty with complete immunity for the past, and absolute liberty of action for the future, to all persons who are now or at any time since February 4, 1899 have been in insurrection against the United States in either a military or a civil capacity, and who shall within a period of 90 days from the date hereof formally renounce all connection with such insurrection, and subscribe to a declaration acknowledging and accepting the sovereignty

-
1. Senate Document 112, 56 Cong., 2 sess., (Washington: Government Printing office, 1901), p. 119.
 2. Correspondence relating to the War with Spain, op. cit. Vol. 2, p.1175.
 3. Loc. Cit.

of the United States in the Philippine Islands. The privilege herewith published is extended to all concerned without any reservation whatsoever, excepting that persons who have violated the laws of war during the period of active hostilities are not embraced within the scope of this amnesty. . . . In order to mitigate . . . consequences resulting from the various disturbances which since 1896 have succeeded each other so rapidly, and to provide in some measure for destitute Philippine soldiers . . . the military authorities of the United States will pay 30 pesos to each man who presents a rifle in good condition.¹

The results of this proclamation were not as good as were expected.

While a considerable number of prominent leaders in the insurrection took the oath of allegiance, the rank and file of soldiers did not do so. A rather gratifying number of rifles were brought in and the American soldiers were led to caches of others by Filipinos. While not spectacular, the results of the proclamation were, however, substantial.

In accordance with the instructions of the President, the Taft commission assumed the legislative powers for the Philippines on September 1. Since their arrival they had been familiarizing themselves with the situation through both public and private hearings and conferences, travel over the region which they would soon control, study of the existing situation, etc.

Their report, dated November 30, 1900, suggested the need for discontinuing the expenditure of the public civil funds for purely military or naval purposes when there was going to be such need for money when a satisfactory school system was inaugurated.² The Commission also recommended action by Congress to make possible the grant of the public

1. Ibid., p. 1179

2. Senate Document 112, 56 Cong., 2 sess., op. cit., p. 36-37

lands in the Philippines. This was needed so as to assist in the development of the islands and to increase their prosperity.¹

Elihu Root in transmitting the message to the President said,

I wish to call attention to some conditions existing in the Philippine Islands which indicate that the development of that country along the lines of peaceful industrial progress now requires the exercise of powers of civil government not vested in this Department or in you as military commander, but requiring a grant of authority from Congress. . . .²

He includes a telegram from the Taft Commission which stated,

Passage of Spooner bill at present session greatly needed to secure best result from improving conditions. Until its passage no purely central civil government can be established, no public franchise of any kind granted, and no substantial investment of private capital in internal improvements possible. All are needed as most important step in complete pacification. Strong peace party . . . expect civil government and relief from inevitable but annoying restraints of military rule long before subject can be taken up by new Congress. . .

Sale of public lands and allowance of mining claims impossible until Spooner bill. Hundreds of American miners on ground awaiting law to perfect claims. . . Urgently recommend amendment Spooner Bill so that its operation be not postponed until complete suppression of all insurrection, but only until in President's judgment civil government may be safely established. Conditions rapidly improving to point where civil government with aid of army will be more efficient to secure peace than military control. . . .³

January 9, Taft wrote to his brother Charles,

Things are certainly coming our way and if we could only have a civil government supreme here with an efficient police force. . . the situation in the islands would change marvelously.⁴

-
1. Ibid., p. 34
 2. Ibid., p. 5
 3. Ibid., p. 5-6
 4. Pringle, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 198

Taft believed that American troops were not suited to the final pacification of the island. He felt, and the success of the Philippine constabulary established by him proved his point, that American troops were too conspicuous--that Filipino forces, acting as police rather than as an army, would antagonize the populace less and would be able to obtain information from and about Filipinos easier. The higher officers were originally Americans in order to train the Constabulary. As in all other branches of the Philippine service there was a gradual Filipinization of the Constabulary when Filipinos with the necessary training were available.

The insurrection had moved from the stage of active resistance through that of guerrilla warfare and brigandage into that of ladronism--organized bands of thieves, living in the mountains, and usually posing as patriots. Their suppression was a matter for the civil government. The time for the establishment of such a government had arrived.

June 21, 1901, President McKinley issued an order for the inauguration of William Howard Taft as civil governor of the Philippine Islands on July 4. The end of the period of military government for the Philippines had arrived.

Ch. V. The Spooner Amendment

The ratification of the Treaty of Paris was not an act of strictly partisan politics. While, in general, the Republicans favored the treaty and imperial expansion and the Democrats opposed these policies, there were many members of each party who dissented with a greater or lesser degree of enthusiasm. As time moved along, however, the dissenters in each party were generally converted to the party position, or eliminated from Congress, so that our Philippine policy rapidly became involved in strictly partisan politics, a condition from which, as we have seen, it was never free.

The Republicans were weaker, numerically, in the Congress which ratified the treaty of peace than they were to be for several succeeding Congresses. Thus we find that suggestions for Philippine independence were defeated by much wider margins after 1899.

The discussion of Philippine policy throughout our control of these islands has taken place largely in the Senate. Here we see indicated in the fifty-sixth congress quite definite lines of cleavage regarding future policy. We have the first definite statements indicating the hope that the United States will stay in the Philippines indefinitely. In general, those Senators who had earlier said to ratify the treaty and leave the decision on retention of the Philippines to a future congress now said to stay in the Philippines.

That part of the work of the fifty-sixth congress which relates to the Philippines can be divided into three parts: (1) attempts by some senators to obtain certain information concerning the relations, conversations, negotiations, etc. between American officials and insurgents

in the hope of getting information with which to embarrass the administration; (2) discussion of the policy which the United States should follow; and (3) consideration of the Spooner bill and Spooner amendment to the Army Appropriation Bill relating to the government of the Philippines.

The leaders of the group seeking information about the Philippine situation, which might perhaps be used to embarrass the administration, were Pettigrew of South Dakota and Hear of Massachusetts. A resolution introduced by Pettigrew for information from the Secretary of War concerning reported conversations between General Otis and an insurgent named Torres,¹ who had presumably sought to arrange an armistice between the insurgent and American forces after the accidental opening of hostilities on February 4, an offer which had been rejected by Otis, was rephrased by Lodge in less offensive terms to read that,

President be requested to send to Senate all reports and dispatches relating to insurrection in Philippines, and especially any information as to communications with insurgents from January 1, 1898 on part of any officer in military, naval, consular, or diplomatic service of the United States.²

Pettigrew objected. He wanted specific information on this Otis matter. He did not object to the other information but emphasized his desire for this information so it could be given to the American people.³

-
1. Congressional Record, 56 Congress, 1st session, (Washington: Government Printing office, 1900), p. 632.
 2. Ibid., p. 764
 3. Ibid., p. 766-767

The resolution was placed on the calendar and eventually agreed to April 28, 1900.¹ Senator Hoar introduced a resolution requesting all civil and military communications from Aguinaldo or other persons undertaking to represent the Philippine insurgents to any United States officials and the answers to these communications. He also wanted all constitutions, forms of government, and proclamations issued by the insurgents.² Senator Lodge suggested, Jan. 16, an amendment to include other material which was accepted by Senator Hoar as part of the original resolution.³ The amendment of Pettigrew asking for the diplomatic correspondence between the President and the peace commissioners at Paris was laid on the table by a vote of 41 to 20.⁴ The Hoar resolution was agreed to the next day.⁵

The second phase of the work of Congress on the Philippines was that of consideration, if not determination, of present and future policy.

Resolutions on policy were introduced by Senators Hoar, Bacon with an amendment proposed by Morgan of Alabama, Ross of Vermont, Tillman, Beveridge of Indiana, Wellington of Maryland, and Scott of West Virginia and Representatives Williams of Mississippi, DeArmond of Missouri, Gibson of Tennessee, Taylor of Ohio, and Payne of New York.

None of the House resolutions were either debated or acted upon. Of the Senate resolutions, the one of Senator Beveridge (S.R. 53) was

1. Ibid., p. 4794
 2. Ibid., p. 702.
 3. Ibid., p. 852
 4. Ibid., p. 853-854.
 5. Ibid., p. 894.

reputed to represent the policy of the administration. It read as follows:

Be it resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Philippine Islands are territory belonging to the United States; that it is the intention of the United States to retain them as such and to establish and maintain such governmental control throughout the archipelago as the situation may demand.¹

Speaking on this resolution, Beveridge, January 9, 1900, gave probably the outstanding speech for imperialism, with special reference to retaining the Philippines, ever given in Congress. Most of our imperialists have been content to remain silent or to cloud the issue with sentiments about humanitarianism, but not Beveridge. He had been to the Philippines the previous year and wanted to keep them. He said, in part,

. . . The Philippines are ours forever, "territory belonging to the United States," as the Constitution calls them. And just beyond the Philippines are China's illimitable markets. We will not retreat from either. We will not repudiate our duty in the archipelago. We will not abandon our opportunity in the Orient. We will not renounce our part in the mission of our race, trustee, under God, of the civilization of the world. And we will move forward to our work, not howling out regrets like slaves whipped to their burdens, but with gratitude for a task worthy of our strength, and thanksgiving to Almighty God that He has marked us as His chosen people, henceforth to lead in the regeneration of the world.

This island empire is the last land left in all the oceans. If it should prove a mistake to abandon it, the blunder once made would be irretrievable. If it proves a mistake to hold it, the error can be corrected when we will. Every other progressive nation stands ready to relieve us.

But to hold it will be no mistake. Our largest trade henceforth must be with Asia. The Pacific is our ocean. . . The Philippines will give us a base at the door of all the East.

. . . They [the Philippine Islands] are a self-supporting, dividend-paying fleet, permanently anchored at a spot

1. Ibid., p. 644

selected by the strategy of Providence, commanding the Pacific. . . The power that rules the Pacific is the power that rules the world. And with the Philippines, that power is and will forever be the American Republic.

China's trade is the mightiest commercial fact in our future . . .

. . . That statesman commits a crime against American trade -- against the American grower of cotton and wheat and tobacco, the American manufacturer of machinery and clothing -- who fails to put America where she may command that trade

No land in America surpasses in fertility the plains and valleys of Luzon. Rice and coffee, sugar and coconuts, hemp and tobacco, and many products of the temperate zone as well as the tropic zone grow in various sections of the archipelago. . . The wood of the Philippines can supply the furniture of the world for a century to come. . . Forty miles of Cebu's mountain chain are practically mountains of coal. . . .

I have a nugget of pure gold picked up in its present form on the banks of a Philippine creek . . . In one of the islands great deposits of copper exist untouched. . .

And the wood, hemp, copra, and other products of the Philippines supply what we need and can not ourselves produce.¹

.

Mr. President, reluctantly and only from a sense of duty am I forced to say that American opposition to the war has been the chief factor in prolonging it. . . .

But Senators, it would be better to abandon this combined burden and Gibraltar of the Pacific, and count our blood and treasure already spent a profitable loss, than to apply any academic arrangement of self-government to these children. They are not capable of self-government. How could they be? They are not of a self-governing race. . . .²

1. Ibid., p. 704-5
2. Ibid., p. 708

.

. . . In Paluan, Sulu, and Mindanao the strictest military government is necessary indefinitely. The inhabitants can never be made to work, can never be civilized. . . .¹

.

The Declaration of Independence does not forbid us to do our part in the regeneration of the world. . . It was written by self-governing men for self-governing men.

What shall history say of us? Shall it say that we renounced that holy trust, left the savage in his base condition, the wilderness to the reign of waste, deserted duty, abandoned glory, forget our sordid profit even, because we feared our strength. . . Our fathers would not have it so. . . They established no reactionary nation. They unfurled no retreating flag.

That flag has never paused in its onward march. Who dares halt it now. . . .²

In conclusion, Beveridge remarks,

Mr. President and Senators, adopt the resolution offered, that peace may quickly come and that we may begin our saving, regenerating and uplifting work. Adopt it, and this bloodshed will cease when these deluded children of our islands learn that this is the final word of the representatives of the American people in Congress assembled. Reject it, and the world, history, and the American people will know where to forever fix the awful responsibility for the consequences that will surely follow such failure to do our manifest duty. How dare we delay when our soldiers' blood is flowing?³

In a brief reply immediately following this speech, Senator Hear said,

. . . I have listened . . . to the eloquence of my honorable friend from Indiana. . . Yet as I heard his

-
1. Ibid., p. 709
 2. Ibid., p. 710-711
 3. Ibid., p. 712

eloquent description of wealth and glory and commerce and trade, I listened in vain for those words which the American people have been wont to take upon their lips in every solemn crisis of their history. I heard much calculated to excite the imagination of the youth seeking wealth or the youth charmed by the dream of empire. But the words Right, Justice, Duty, Freedom were absent . . . from that eloquent speech. . . .¹

In reply to the imputation by Beveridge that the Senators who opposed the treaty were responsible for continuing the war, Hear said that there was peace in the Philippines until the publication of McKinley's message to General Otis. He quotes from Otis' report to prove this. Otis thought this message (of December 21, 1898) would inflame the Filipinos.²

Senator Berry on January 15 stated that the power given by the Beveridge resolution would be more absolute than that exercised by the Czar of Russia or Louis XIV of France. He said that two reasons were given for the acquisition of territory: (1) that it is the will of the Lord that certain peoples should supervise the activities of others and (2) that wealth will be brought into the nation by this action. Berry said that the people chosen by the Lord to carry on his work were usually self-appointed and that the wealth to come from imperial expansion would go to a few syndicates and individuals.³

Senator Wellington after introducing a resolution (S.R. 65), which states, in part,

That the present war is not for conquest but for restoration of order and the United States will allow people to establish a republic under United States protection when order is restored,⁴

1. loc. cit.

2. Id., p. 712-5.

3. Id., p. 802-04.

4. Id., p. 852.

stated that he felt there was a lack of tangible results from the fighting that had gone on thus far. He said "There can be no 'benevolent assimilation, there should be no tyrannical absorption.'" He thought that despotic government is productive of every species of depravity. His resolution would end the war, he believed.¹

Senator Turner said the President had broken faith in his changed attitude. While knowing that nothing less than independence was ever expected by the Filipinos, we desired and obtained their friendly cooperation as long as possible, while, at the same time, disavowing the actions of our agents who had made offers and representations to the Filipinos. Then we stepped into the shoes of the Spanish.²

Tillman also had some comments on the Philippines. He showed how our commerce went to Europe rather than Asia. To make a profit from the Philippines we would have either to exploit them like England does British India or would have to exclude their products from our markets while forcing ours on them. He disliked both possibilities. He comments sarcastically on the position of the Republicans. Are they going to desert the things for which they fought in the Civil War - self-government for inferior colored races? He mentions that since tobacco is raised in both Puerto Rico and Connecticut, that the Constitution does not extend to Puerto Rico.³

On February 20, Kenney of Delaware expressed his regret for having voted for the treaty. He says he voted for the treaty in order to get

1. Ibid., p. 937-940

2. Ibid., p. 1038-1043

3. Ibid., p. 1256-1263

peace. Thus the treaty would not have been ratified if he had known that war would have been waged. The war and its evils are chargeable to the greed of those who set self above honor and country; those who for wealth and power will use the miseries and misfortunes of others.¹

Legislation to regularize the government of the Philippines was the third phase of the work of this Congress. The President, as has been seen, was governing the Philippines through his power as commander-in-chief of the army and navy. There were many limitations on the power of the president acting in that capacity, thus we have the movement to establish the power on a Congressional basis. As seen in the preceding chapter, Taft telegraphed to Root (January 2, 1901) suggesting the desirability, in fact urgency, of this legislation.

One year before the Taft telegram, however, Spooner of Wisconsin (January 11, 1900) had introduced S. 2355 which was

A bill in relation to suppression of insurrection in and to government of, the Philippine Islands, ceded by Spain to the United States by a treaty concluded at Paris on the 10th day of December, 1898.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of United States of America in Congress assembled, That when all insurrection against the sovereignty and authority of the United States in the Philippine Islands, acquired from Spain by treaty concluded at Paris on the 10th day of December, 1898 shall have been completely suppressed by the military and naval forces of the United States, all military, civil, and judicial powers necessary to govern the said islands shall, until otherwise provided by Congress, be vested in such person and persons and shall be exercised in such manner as the President of the United States shall direct for maintaining and protecting the inhabitants of said islands in the free enjoyment of their liberty, property, and religion.²

1. Ibid., p. 1968-1971.

2. Ibid., p. 763.

The bill was referred to the Committee on the Philippines on January 29¹ and reported by Lodge without amendment on March 5.²

Two days later Lodge said the resolution, which he said was of the traditional type in matters of this kind, meets the needs of the present situation which requires above all a firm attitude. He opposes making a promise to the Philippine Islands as to the future. He suggests that conditions in the islands will be improved through the United States. We have not robbed the Filipinos of liberty for they never had any. He mentions the historical fact that the Declaration of Independence with its idea of the "consent of the governed" was drafted by men elected by the free, white, males, who were citizens and could qualify to vote at the time of the American Revolution. He says the form of government natural to the Oriental has been a despotism. Lodge suggests that we develop the country and stimulate foreign commerce.³

May 28, Spooner said that while we would not have accepted the Philippines from Spain before the war if she had offered them to us that the fortunes of war had changed that. He said the United States could not have withdrawn from them at any time since.⁴

The attempt of Lodge to get the bill voted on by the Senate was not successful. It was made the unfinished business April 3, 1900 but

-
1. Ibid., p. 1263
 2. Ibid., p. 2522.
 3. Ibid., p. 2616-31.
 4. Ibid., p. 5843-45.

even that did not help matters. A presidential election was to intervene and different tactics were to be used before Spooner's ideas were to be enacted into law.

During the controversy over ratification of the treaty William Jennings Bryan indicated that he wished to make imperialism the campaign issue in 1900. By that time sentiment was very strong for expansion and Bryan was to be defeated on this issue of his own choosing.

Henry Cabot Lodge in his keynote address was to emphasize Beveridge's ideas. He said, concerning the Philippines,

We make no hypocritical pretense of being interested in the Philippines solely on account of others. We believe in trade expansion.¹

The Republican platform, for popular consumption, said,

. . . the American people. . . have conducted and in victory concluded a war for liberty and human rights. No thought of national aggrandisement tarnished the high purpose with which American standards were unfurled. It was a war unsought and patiently resisted, but when it came the American Government was ready . . . To 10,000,000 of the human race there was given "a new birth of freedom" and to the American people a new and noble responsibility.

.

In accepting by the treaty of Paris the just responsibility of our victories in the Spanish War, the President and Senate won the undoubted approval of the American people. No other course was possible than to destroy Spain's sovereignty throughout the West Indies and in the Philippine Islands. That course created our responsibility before the world, and with the unorganized population whom our intervention had freed from Spain, to provide for the maintenance of law and order, and for the establishment of good government, and for the performance of international obligations. Our authority could not be less than our

1. James C. Blount, American Occupation of the Philippines, p. 275.

responsibility, and wherever sovereign rights were extended, it became the high duty of the Government to maintain its authority, to put down armed insurrection, and to confer the blessings of liberty and civilization upon all the rescued people.

The largest measure of self-government consistent with their welfare and our duties shall be secured to them by law. . . .¹

The Democrat platform said,

We condemn and denounce the Philippine policy of the present administration. It has involved the Republic in an unnecessary war, sacrificed the lives of many of our noblest sons, and placed the United States, previously known and applauded throughout the world as the champion of freedom, in the false and unAmerican position of crushing with military force the efforts of our former allies to achieve liberty and self-government. The Filipinos can not be citizens without endangering our civilization; they can not be subjects without imperiling our form of government; and as we are not willing to surrender our civilization nor to convert the Republic into an empire, we favor an immediate declaration of the nation's purpose to give the Filipinos, first, a stable form of government; second, independence; and third, protection from outside interference, such as has been given for nearly a century to the republics of Central and South America.

The greedy commercialism which dictated the Philippine policy of the Republican administration attempts to justify it with the plea that it will pay; but even this sordid and unworthy plea fails when brought to the test of facts. The war of criminal aggression against the Filipinos, entailing an annual expense of many millions, has already cost more than any possible profit that could accrue from the entire Philippine trade for years to come. Furthermore, when trade is extended at the expense of liberty, the price is always too high.²

The Democrats named William Jennings Bryan and Adlai Stephenson as their candidates while the Republicans were nominating McKinley and Theodore Roosevelt.

-
1. Congressional Record, 71 Cong., 2 sess., (Washington: Government Printing office, 1930), p. 1023.
 2. Loc. cit.

In his letter accepting the Republican nomination, dated September 8, 1900, McKinley said,

No government can so certainly preserve the peace, restore public order, establish law, justice, and stable conditions as ours. Neither Congress nor the Executive can establish a stable government in these islands except under our right of sovereignty, our authority and our flag. And this we are doing.

We could not do it as a protectorate power so completely or so successfully as we are doing it now. As the sovereign power we can initiate action and shape means to ends, and guide the Filipinos to self-development and self-government. As a protectorate power we could not initiate action, but would be compelled to follow and uphold a people with no capacity yet to go alone. In one case we can protect both ourselves and the Filipinos from being involved in dangerous complications; in the other we could not protect even the Filipino until after the trouble had come. Besides, if we cannot establish any government of our own without the consent of the governed, as our opponents contend, then we could not establish a stable government for them or make ours a protectorate without the like consent, and neither a majority of the people nor a minority of the people have invited us to assume it. We could not maintain a protectorate even with the consent of the governed without giving provocation for conflicts and possibly costly wars. Our rights in the Philippines are now free from outside interference and will continue so in our present relation. They would not be thus free in any other relation. We will not give up our own to guarantee another sovereignty.¹

The result of the election was a Republican triumph, a victory which further reduced the ranks of the anti-imperialists in Congress and demoralized many others of them. Bryan in the election had gained popular but not electoral votes in the East but had lost both popular and electoral votes in the Middle West.

The ideas of Spooner were to be put into effect very easily in the Congressional session following the election. The procedure was to

1. Olcott, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 189-190.

attach the Spooner bill as a rider or amendment to the Army Appropriation bill. This rider stated,

All military, civil, and judicial powers necessary to govern the Philippine Islands . . . shall, unless otherwise provided by Congress, be vested in such person or persons and shall be exercised in such manner as the President of the United States shall direct for the establishment of civil government and for maintaining and protecting the inhabitants of said islands in the free enjoyment of their liberty, property and religion: Provided, That all franchises granted under the authority hereof shall contain a reservation of the right to alter, amend, or repeal the same.

The Senate, February 25, 1901, voted yeas - 39, nays - 23, that the amendment was in order when a point of order on it not being pertinent was raised.²

An amendment was proposed by Lodge and accepted by unanimous consent. It stated,

Until a permanent government shall have been established in said archipelago full reports shall be made to Congress on or before the first day of each regular session of all legislative acts and proceedings of the temporary government instituted under the provisions hereof; and full reports of the acts and doings of said government, and as to the condition of the archipelago and of its people, shall be made to the President, including all information which may be useful to the Congress in providing for a more permanent government.³

An amendment was proposed by Vest of Missouri which said,

Provided, That no judgment, order nor act by any of said officials so appointed shall conflict with the constitution and laws of the United States.⁴

The amendment was rejected February 27 by a vote of 25 yeas to 45 nays.⁵

-
1. Congressional Record, 56-2, op. cit., p. 2955
 2. Loc. cit.
 3. Ibid., p.
 4. Ibid., p. 2956
 5. Ibid., p. 3136-37

An amendment proposed by Hear was accepted by the Committee on the Philippines without a vote. This amendment stated:

Provided, That no sale, or lease, or other disposition of the public lands, or the timber thereon, or the mining rights therein shall be made; And provided further, That no franchise shall be granted which is not approved by the President of the United States, and is not in his judgment clearly necessary for the immediate government of the islands and indispensable for the interest of the people thereof, and which can not, without great mischief, be postponed until the establishment of permanent civil government; and all such franchises shall terminate one year after the establishment of such permanent civil government.¹

An amendment proposed by Rawlins was rejected 24 to 45. The amendment read,

Provided further, That the Government of the United States declares that it is its purpose and intention not to ~~retain or exercise permanent sovereignty over the~~ Philippine Islands but only to the extent necessary to secure their pacification and the establishment of a stable government therein by their people; and upon the accomplishment of these ends, and after securing by amicable arrangement suitable naval, military, and coaling stations, and proper guaranties for the safety of those who have adhered to the United States and for the performance of the treaty obligations of the United States to other nations, the Government of the United States intends to withdraw from said islands and leave the government and control thereof to their own people, and the powers hereinbefore conferred upon the President and persons selected by him are to be exercised to ends herein provided.²

An amendment by Bacon to limit the application of the Spooner amendment to March 4, 1903 was rejected 26 to 43.³

An amendment proposed by Teller of Colorado was rejected 23 to 39. It would add "and secure to them such participation in the affairs

1. Ibid., p. 3026
 2. Ibid., p. 3137
 3. Ibid., p. 3138

of the civil government so to be established as shall be consistent with the safety of the government.¹

Another amendment by Teller was rejected 23 to 41. It was taken from the act establishing the Missouri territory. It stated,

All persons shall be bailable except for capital offenses where the proof shall be evident or the presumption great. All fines shall be moderate, and no cruel or unusual punishment shall be inflicted. No man shall be deprived of his life, liberty or property but by the judgment of his peers and the law of the land. If the public exigencies make it necessary for the common protection to take the property of any person, or to demand his particular services, full compensation shall be made for the same. No ex post facto law or law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be made. No law shall be made which shall lay any person under restraint, burden, or disability on account of his religious opinions, professions, or mode of worship, in all which he shall be free to maintain his own and not be burdened for those of another.²

Another amendment by Hoar was rejected 26 to 43. It stated,

In the government of the Philippine Islands no person vested with legislative powers shall ever exercise the executive or judicial powers, or either of them; no person vested with executive powers shall ever exercise the legislative or judicial powers, or either of them; no person vested with judicial powers shall ever exercise the legislative or executive powers, or either of them; to the end that it may be a government of laws and not of men.³

The vote on the Spooner amendment to the Army Appropriation Bill, with the Lodge and Hoar amendments added, was 45 to 27, ⁴ with 43 Republicans (Aldrich and Wetmore of R. I., Allison and Dolliver of Iowa, Bard and Perkins of Cal., Beveridge and Fairbanks of Ind.,

1. Leo. cit.

2. Ibid., p. 3139

3. Ibid., p. 3144-45


4. Ibid., p. 3145

Barrows and McMillan of Mich., Carter of Mont., Chandler and Gallinger of N. H., Clark and Warren of Wyo., Cullen of Ill., Deboe of Ky., Dillingham and Proctor of Vt., Foraker and Hanna of Ohio, Foster of Wash., Hale of Me., Hansbrough and McCumber of N. Dak., Hawley and Platt of Conn., Kean and Sewell of N. J., Kearns of Utah, Kyle of S. Dak., Lodge of Mass., McComas of Md., Nelson of Minn., Depew of N. Y., Pritchard of N. C., Quarles and Spooner of Wis., Scott and Elkins of W. Va., Shoup of Idaho, Simon of Ore., and Thurston of Neb.), 1 Democrat (McLaurin of S. C.), and 1 Silverite (Stewart of Nev.) voting for the amendment and 19 Democrats (Bate and Turley of Tenn., Bacon and Clay of Ga., Berry and Jones of Ark., Caffery and McEnery of La., Chilton and Culberson of Tex., Cockrell of Mo., Kenney of Del., Lindsay of Ky., Tillman of S. C., Mallory and Taliaferro of Fla., Martin of Va., Pettus of Ala., and Rawlins of Utah), 4 Populists (Allen of Neb., Butler of N. C., Harris of Kans., and Turner of Wash.), 2 Silverites (Jones of Nev. and Pettigrew of S. Dak.), 1 Republican (Hoar of Mass.), and 1 Silver Republican (Teller of Col.) voting against the amendment. The geographic division of sentiment, based on the question of the Spooner amendment being in order, the Vest amendment, and the vote on final passage of the Spooner amendment, is shown on map no. 3.


The House of Representatives, March 1, agreed to the Senate amendment by a vote of 161 yeas, 137 nays, 4 present, and 51 not voting.¹ The 161 yeas consisted of 159 Republicans and 2 Democrats. The 137 nays consisted of 3 Republicans, 131 Democrats, 3 Populists, and 2 Silverites. The geographic division of the vote is shown on map no. 4.

1. Ibid., p. 3384

February, 1901.



Map No. 4. House vote on concurring in Senate (Spooner) amendments to Army Appropriation bill, March 1, 1901.



Ch. VI. Establishing Relationships.

Four years were to elapse between the destruction of the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay by Dewey and the passage by Congress of a bill providing for a system of civil government. Even after that date there were constant readjustments with constant proposals for further readjustments. The United States in 1898 was totally unprepared for undertaking a colonizing venture.

Experience was gained by the trial and error method and this method was disruptive of stability in our relations with the islands. There was a lack of definite statement as to future policy. No one in an authoritative position ever said either that U. S. was going to stay there forever or that she was going to leave in a stated period of time. The United States would leave when the Filipinos were capable of self-government, it was said.

Of greater seriousness than this, however, was the uncertain term of the governor of the islands. There were three military ^{governors} *between July 25, 1898 and July 4, 1901. There were eleven civil gov-* ernors and four acting governors in the next thirty-four years. The third High Commissioner since the inauguration of the Commonwealth Government was in office at the outbreak of war with Japan. Four acting governor-generals have been in charge for a total of about two years. Francis Burton Harrison was governor-general for about seven and one-half years and Leonard Wood for almost six years. This leaves an average term of about two years for the remaining nine

executives, a term which is generally recognized as being too short for any accomplishments of value.

When Theodore Roosevelt and Elihu Root decided upon the inauguration of civil government in 1901, the whole system of Philippine-American relationships had yet to be established. Peace was generally prevalent over the islands, the Spooner amendment had been passed giving legislative sanction to the actions of the President in his government of the Philippines, and the Insular cases, which would form the basis for Congressional action, were soon to be decided.

There was considerable doubt and uncertainty as to the exact position in the Federal System of the newly acquired territories of Porto Rico and the Philippine Islands, this uncertainty even extending to the members of the Supreme Court. The Insular cases clarified this situation to a certain extent. By a vote of 5 to 4 the Court decided in the cases of *DeLima v. Bidwell*, and *Fourteen Diamond Rings*,¹ that the tariff laws of the United States did not apply to Porto Rico and the Philippine Islands since they were not foreign territory within the meaning of the constitution. In the case of *Downes v. Bidwell*, the four minority judges in the above mentioned decision joined one of the majority judges to hold, again by a 5 to 4 decision, that a Congressional enactment was valid which provided for a tariff on goods going from Porto Rico to the United States. The effect of the first decision was to make necessary Congressional action to prevent the shipping of products from Porto Rico and the Philippines to the

1. 1822 U. S. Supreme Court reports, (1901), P.1 et seq.
 2. Ibid., p.244

United States. The effect of the second decision was to allow Congress to legislate for these territories without respect to the provisions of the Constitution. In other words the Philippine Islands were under the complete control of Congress, unrestrained by the Constitution except in the case of "natural" rights such as habeas corpus, the right to life, liberty, & property, etc., which extended themselves to all territory without requiring legislative action. "Formal" rights, on the other hand, required Congressional action to be extended to a territory. The effects of these decisions were to be seen in the Congressional legislation of this period.

The executive was thus presented with the problem of recommending and Congress with the problem of enacting laws which would establish these new relations. Among the problems requiring solution were trade and tariff regulations, organization of a government for the islands, regulation of the granting of franchises, public lands, etc., establishment of shipping regulations, providing a currency system, and numerous other matters which would come up in establishing a system of government in a new territory.

A suggestion as to the course of action comes in the first report of the Taft Commission, dated October 15, 1901. It states that

the only possible method of instructing the Filipino people in methods of free institutions and self-government is to make a government partly of Americans and partly of Filipinos As the government progresses this association in actual government will certainly form a nucleus of Filipinos, earnest, intelligent, patriotic, who will become familiar with practical free government and civil liberty. This saving remnant will grow

as the years go on and it will be the hope of the people.

How long, it is asked, must this education be continued before real results will be accomplished? Of course it is impossible to tell. Certainly a generation--perhaps two generations--will be needed, though a thorough system of public education, the introduction of railways and intercommunication of all sorts and the rapid material development of the country. . . will greatly assist in this instruction.¹

Two acts of the most fundamental importance were passed by the fifty-seventh Congress at its first session. The titles describe them rather well. The first is "An Act Temporarily to provide Revenue for the Philippine Islands, and for other purposes"² approved March 8, 1902. The second is "An Act Temporarily to provide for the Administration of the Affairs of civil Government in the Philippine Islands, and for other purposes,"³ approved July 1, 1902.

The bill to provide for civil government in the Philippine Islands was drafted very largely by Taft with the assistance of Elihu Root. It was introduced in the Senate as S. 2295 by Senator Lodge of Massachusetts⁴ and into the House of Representatives as H. R. 13445 by Cooper of Wisconsin.⁵

-
1. House document 2, part 8, 57 Congress, 1st session, (Washington: Government Printing office, 1902), p. 19-22.
 2. U. S. Statutes at Large, 57 Cong., Part 1, (Washington: Government Printing office, 1903), p. 54-55.
 3. *Ibid.*, p. 691-712.
 4. Congressional Record, 57 Cong., 1 sess., (Washington: Government Printing office, 1902), p.474.
 5. *Ibid.*, p. 3868.

In a series of extensive hearings by the Senate Committee on the Philippines there is much testimony by Taft as to desirable policies. In speaking of the Federal party of the Philippines urging statehood, Taft, Feb. 15, 1902, said,

A government ought to be established under American guidance which shall form a stable government, by which and under which the Filipinos shall gradually improve their knowledge of what is individual liberty and what is constitutional government, and subsequently the time will come when the United States and the Filipino people together can agree upon what their relations shall be. Whether a colony--I mean a quasi-independent colony as Australia and Canada are to England--an independent State, or a State of the Union, is a question too far in the future, dependent upon the success of the operation of the stable government, that I have not myself reached a conclusion on the subject.¹

Senator Carmack of Tennessee then asked,

You think, then, it is an open question whether the people of the Philippine Islands . . . should be admitted to the full rights of American citizenship or whether or not an archipelago so populated should be admitted to statehood in the Union?².....

To this question, Taft replied,

I think it is a question that I would not answer two or three generations before it will arise. I think that the great evil today is the discussion of something that is utterly impossible of settlement today. The thing the Filipino people need today is a stable government under the guidance of American control, teaching them what individual liberty is and training them to a knowledge of self-government, and when they have that the question of what relations shall then exist between the islands and this country may be settled between them and the citizens of the United States.

1. Senate document 331, pt. 1, 57 Congress, 1st session, (Washington: Government Printing office, 1902), p. 322.

2. Loc. cit.

But to attempt to decide in advance something that it is utterly impossible wisely to decide now, it seems to me, with deference to those who differ with me, is very unreasonable.¹

Two days later in reply to a question by Senator Rawlins of Utah about announcing a definite policy, Taft said,

My own judgment is that the best policy, if a policy is to be declared at all, is to declare the intention of the United States to hold the islands indefinitely, until the people shall show themselves fit for self-government, under a gradually increasing popular government, when their relation to the United States, either of statehood or of quasi-independence . . . can be declared after mutual conference.²

Appearing before the House Committee on Insular Affairs, Taft said, February 27,

With respect to the extension of the Constitution to those islands which they (the Federal party) ask, I do not hesitate to say that I think that would be a great mistake. It would be a great mistake, first, because if the Constitution is extended to those islands you will extend the provisions of the Dingley bill to every part of those islands, and will build a tariff wall around those islands against the countries with which those islands do most business, and will so reduce the income now received there . . . so that it will be impossible to give them a good government except by enormously increasing the direct taxation. . . .

In other words, if the Constitution is extended to those islands the uniformity clause of the Constitution necessarily applies, and you cannot have any other law than the law which you have in the United States with reference to the importation of goods. That being the case, by extending the constitution you violate your treaty with Spain, because you cannot allow her to import free into the Philippines and require duty on her importations

1. Loc. cit.

2. Ibid., p. 339.

into the United States, unless you are willing to extend to Spain the same privilege with respect to the United States that under the treaty she has with respect to those islands. Of course you can break that treaty and if you pass such a law it does break it.¹

The next day he added,

We (the Commission) concur in asking, on the lines suggested by the Federal Party, that a popular assembly be constituted, to consist of thirty or forty members elected by the qualified electors of the island, to constitute a popular assembly, that there should be an appointive upper house, and that the governor should have the qualified veto power; that in case the lower house refused to vote supplies, there should be the power in the appointed house to continue the supplies until the end of the next session, or something equivalent to that.

We also recommend that the popular assembly be given an opportunity to select delegates to come here. We think that those two features of the government which are recommended will greatly please the people, especially the educated part of them, and that they will be the means of educating the educated people by practice in self-government.²

Lodge reported the civil government bill, S. 2295, with some suggested amendments on March 31, 1902.³ It was made the unfinished business April 16.⁴ June 3, Senator Quay of Pennsylvania proposed an amendment that provided that duties on products of the Philippine Islands

1. Committee Reports, hearings, & Acts of Congress corresponding thereto, Committee on Insular Affairs, 57 Congress, 1st & 2nd sessions, 1901-1903, (Washington: Government Printing office, 190), p.120.

2. Ibid., p. 122

3. Congressional Record, 57 Cong., 1st sess., op. cit., p. 3446.

4. Ibid., p. 4252.

should not exceed 50% of duties imposed or collected on similar imports from foreign countries.¹¹

The amendment was rejected yeas 19, nays 56.¹² A number of other amendments designed to clarify the position of the United States either by extending constitutional guarantees, by promising them independence soon, by stating that there was no intention of admitting the Philippines as a state or states, or by denying the intention to ever confer citizenship were rejected.¹³

The substitute motion of Rawlins which provided for civil government with independence to be conferred within four years was rejected by a vote of 28 to 48. (The other amendments just mentioned were systematically rejected by practically this same vote.) The 28 yeas were made up of 24 Democrats (Bacon of Ga., Bailey of Texas, Bate of Tenn., Berry of Ark., Blackburn of Ky., Carmack of Tenn., Clark of Mont., Clay of Ga., Cockrell of Mo., Culbertson of Texas, Dubois of Idaho, McEnery of La., McLaurin of Miss., Mallory of Fla., Martin of Va., Money of Miss., Patterson of Colo., Simmons of N. C., Taliaferro of Fla., Tillman of S. C., and Vest of Mo.); 2 Republicans (Noar of Mass. and Wellington of Md.); 1 Silver Republican (Teller of Colo.) and 1 Populist (Harris of Kansas).

The 48 nays were made up of 46 Republicans (Allison of Iowa, Bard of Cal., Beveridge of Ind., Burnham of N. H., Burrows of Mich., Burton of Kan., Clapp of Minn., Clark of Wyo., Gullon of Ill., Deboe of Ky., Dietrich of Nebr., Dillingham of Vt., Dolliver of Iowa, Elkins

11. Ibid., p. 6228-6229

12. Ibid., p. 6228-6229

13. Ibid., p. 6228-6229

of W. Va., Fairbanks of Ind., Foraker of Ohio, Foster of Wash., Frye of Mo., Gallinger of N. H., Gamble of S. Dak., Hanna of Ohio, Hawley of Conn., Kean of N. J., Kearns of Utah, Kittredge of S. Dak., Lodge of Mass., McComas of Md., McCumber of N. Dak., McMillen of Mich., Millard of Nebr., Mitchell of Oreg., Nelson of Minn., Penrose of Pa., Perkins of Cal., Platt of Conn., Platt of N. Y., Pritchard of N. C., Proctor of Vt., Quarles of Wis., Quay of Pa., Simon of Oreg., Spooner of Wis., Stewart of Nev., Warren of Wyo., and Wetmore of R.I.); and 2 Democrats (McLaurin of S. C. and Morgan of Ala.).

On final passage June 3, the bill received 48 yeas and 30 nays.¹¹ The yeas were those who had voted nay on the Rawlins substitute with the addition of Jones of Nev., Republican, and the loss of Morgan of Ala., Democrat. The nay votes came from the supporters of the Rawlins substitute with the addition of Mason of Ill., Republican, and of Morgan of Ala., Democrat.


The geographic distribution of this vote is shown on map no. 5.

Meanwhile the House Committee on Insular Affairs had favorably reported the bill introduced by Cooper (H. R. 13445). The report, dated April 10, 1902, explained the terms of the bill as reported. The bill gives

the approval of Congress to the action of President McKinley in creating the existing Philippine government, and authorizing it to exercise the powers set forth in his instructions to the Philippine Commission, dated April 7, 1900, and in the two Executive orders dated, respectively, June 21 and September 6, 1901.

11. Ibid., p. 6231.

Map No. 5. Senate vote on Lodge bill (S. 2295) providing for civil government for the Philippines,
June 3, 1902.



Yeas 48 (47 R, 1 D)
 Nays 30 (3 R, 25 D, 1 SR, 1 P)
 Not voting.

The next succeeding sections make provision for the creation, under certain conditions, of a legislature to consist of two houses, the Philippine Commission and the Philippine assembly, the latter body to be a popular assembly of delegates chosen at a general election by the people of the Philippine Islands; and for the transfer to such legislature of all the legislative power heretofore conferred on the Philippine Commission

. . . Your committee. . . has deemed it wise not to fix this transfer for any definite date, but to make it depend primarily upon the suppression of the existing insurrection and the restoration of a general and complete peace throughout the archipelago. The bill provides that when such condition of complete peace shall be established and the fact shall be certified to the President by the Commission, the President, upon being satisfied thereof, shall authorize the Commission to call a general election for the choice of delegates to a popular assembly of the people of the islands.¹³

The six members of the minority said in their report,

The undersigned members . . . are constrained by what they regard as a just and proper sense of public duty to withhold their assent from the report accompanying said bill.

The chief question involved is whether, under the guise of the forms of civil government, a policy unjust and cruel to the people of the Philippine Islands, and injurious and dishonoring to American citizenship, shall be indefinitely, if not perpetually, continued, or that there shall be substituted in its stead a more righteous and humane policy, the intent and purpose of which is to confer upon that people, within the shortest practicable period, and upon certain reasonable and proper terms and concessions, an autonomous system of free self-government, based upon the principle of an independence, modified as to their foreign affairs, which modified independence, after the lapse of a reasonable period (affording that practical training and actual experience in the art of self-government so necessary to fit them for its ultimate exercise and full enjoyment), shall eventuate into an unqualified and absolute independence.

.

13. House Report 1540, 57 Congress, 1 session, (Washington: Government Printing office, 1902), p. 1-2.

Recognizing that three centuries of Spanish dominion have destroyed all self-government in the Philippine Islands, and that its people at this time are unprepared for its exercise, the theory upon which this substitute measure is framed is that there should be conferred upon them for a period of eight years the largest possible share in the government of themselves and in the conduct of their affairs consistent with our safety and best interests and our duty and obligations to the nations of the world, in order to fit them for that absolute independence and self-government to which the minority believe them entitled.

Such a course as this involves a protectorate on the part of the United States of only eight years, and will, it is confidently believed, demonstrate that the Filipinos are capable of self-government and result in a firmly established and stable government for them.¹¹

The bill passed by the Senate was referred to the House Committee on Insular Affairs June 4, 1902¹² and reported back with H. R. 13445, the House bill, as a substitute on June 14.¹³

The substitute of the minority, which provided for the establishment of a qualified independent government from July 4, 1903 to July 4, 1911 and of an absolutely independent government after July 4, 1911¹⁴ was rejected yeas 97, nays 137, answered "present" 7, not voting 110.¹⁵ The 97 yeas consisted of 95 Democrats, 1 Populist, and 1 Silverite. The 137 nays consisted of 136 Republicans and 1 Democrat. The geographic distribution is shown on map no. 6.

The House then agreed to the bill as recommended by the Committee of Whole House by a vote of 140 to 97.¹⁶

11. Ibid., p. 14-15

12. Congressional Record, 57 Congress, 1 session, op. cit., p. 6305.


13. Ibid., p. 6835.

14. House report 1540, 57 Cong., 1 sess., op. cit., p. 15 et seq.

15. Congressional Record, 57 Cong., 2 sess., op. cit., p. 7486.

16. Ibid., p. 7487.

May No. 6. House vote on minority substitute for H. R. 13445 (Cooper bill) to provide qualified independent government, June 26, 1902.



The Senate refused to agree to the substitute bill of the House.²¹ There were three important points of disagreement. The Conference Committees agreed to a legislature, when peace was established, a census was to be taken, followed, two years after the publication of the information obtained by it, if peace was maintained, by the President issuing an order to the Philippine Commission to call a general election to select delegates to a popular assembly. The Senate agreed to the reduction in the amount of land a corporation might hold from 2000 hectares to 1024 hectares. A bill of rights, as in the House bill, was to be included.²²

The House of Representatives agreed to the report by a vote of 148 to 94 on June 30.²³ The Senate agreed the next day without a record vote²⁴ and the President signed the bill the same day.²⁵

The act "Temporarily to provide for the administration of the affairs of civil government in the Philippine Islands" was destined to continue without substantial modification as the fundamental instrument of government for the Philippines until the Jones act went into effect in 1916. Its provisions are quite important.

The actions of the President in creating and organizing the Philippine Commission and in authorizing it to do the work it was doing was approved and confirmed. The act stated that all persons

21. Ibid., p. 7490.

22. Ibid., p. 7607.

23. Ibid., p. 7703.

24. Ibid., p. 7739.

25. Ibid., p. 7704.

who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899 "shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the United States," except those who retained their Spanish citizenship. A rather extensive declaration of rights is then included. The provision for a census and an elective assembly, as described in the conference report, was included. Two resident commissioners were to be elected by the Philippine legislature to the United States" to be entitled to recognition as such by all departments." The judiciary established in the islands is confirmed subject to such alteration as may be provided by law. The right of appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States from the supreme court of the Philippine Islands is granted when the "Constitution, or any statute, treaty, right, or privilege of the United States is involved or in causes in which the value in controversy" exceeds \$25,000. The government of the Philippine Islands was to classify and "make rules and regulations for the lease, sale or other disposition of the public lands other than timber and mineral lands" subject to the requirement that these rules must be approved by the President and by him submitted to Congress. They shall go into effect if Congress shall not have disapproved them by the end of the session. Provision was made for acquisition of title to land by squatters, homesteaders, and purchasers. No individual could acquire title to more than 16 hectares nor any corporation more than 1024 hectares of public lands by the above mentioned methods. A hectare is approximately $2\frac{1}{2}$ acres. Regulations re-

garding location and filing of mineral claims, etc. are described in Sections 20 to 62 inc. The government of the Philippine Islands was authorized to purchase the lands of religious orders (so-called friar lands) and others needed for public purposes and to issue bonds to pay for them. The matter of the friar lands, one of the most troublesome problems presented to Taft, is discussed later. Regulations for the issuance of municipal bonds for public improvements were provided. The government of the Philippine Islands was authorized to grant franchises "including the authority to exercise the right of eminent domain for the construction and operation of works of public utility and service" subject to a number of limiting provisions the most important of which was;

That no corporation shall be authorized . . . or permitted to hold or own real estate except such as may be reasonably necessary to enable it to carry out the purpose for which it was created, and every corporation authorized to engage in agriculture shall by its charter be restricted to the ownership and control of not to exceed 1024 hectares of land; and it shall be unlawful for any member of a corporation engaged in agriculture or mining . . . to be in any wise interested in any other corporation engaged in agriculture or mining. . .

Provisions regarding coinage were included as well as those covering a number of other miscellaneous subjects. The final section (Sec. 87) continued the Division of Insular Affairs, renaming it the Bureau of Insular Affairs of the War Department, with its duties embracing "all matters pertaining to civil government in the island possessions of the United States subject to the jurisdiction of the War Department" The detail by the Secretary of War of a well qualified army

officer, to have the rank, pay, and allowances of a colonel, as chief of this Bureau was authorized.²⁰

This last section was to continue in effect longer than any other part of the bill. The Schurman Commission had reported to the Secretary of State. It was logical that the Taft Commission should operate under and report to the Secretary of War since their closest contact was with the officer commanding the Philippine Department. The purposes of harmony would be best served by having these two agencies subject to the same cabinet offices, thus preventing cabinet squabbles. When peace and order were established, it seems that a transfer of supervision over the Philippines to some other department would have been desirable. Roosevelt and Taft talked in 1903 of creating a separate agency to administer all the overseas possessions but public order in the Philippines was such at that time as to make this undesirable. The Commonwealth of the Philippines was to be established before Insular Affairs were removed from the jurisdiction of the War Department.

The second phase of Philippine-American relations to be legislated upon at this session of Congress related to trade relations between the United States and the Philippine Islands. The treaty with Spain had provided:

Art. IV. The United States will, for the term of ten years from the date of exchange of ratifications of the present treaty, admit Spanish ships and merchandise to the ports and places of the Philippine Islands on the same terms as ships and merchandise of the United States.²¹

-
1. U. S. Statutes at Large, 57th Congress, op. cit., p. 691-712.
 2. U. S. Statutes at Large, 55 Congress, (Washington: Government Printing office, 1899), p. 1756.

This provision of the treaty was to greatly hamper the United States in regulating her trade with the Philippines for the ten year period from April 11, 1909, when those trade provisions expired. The provisions did not prevent the United States from reducing the tariff on Philippine goods coming to the United States but did, for practical purposes, prevent a reduction of the duty charged in the Philippines on goods from the United States since the same duty must be charged Spain. The Philippines could not stand the loss of revenue involved in the abolition of tariff duties. Any concession on American goods going to the Philippines must be extended to Spain, and by operation of the most-favored-nation treaties, to all other nations which had signed such treaties with the United States. The best thing that could be done for the American exporter was to apply discriminatory classification in goods and provide for low tariff rates on goods produced primarily by the United States. This was to be done.

The Philippine tariff early engaged the attention to the administration. After some preliminary discussion, a board of tariff revision, composed of army officers, was appointed by MacArthur on June 9, 1900.⁸¹ They made their report August 25. The report was passed on to the Taft Commission August 29,⁸² inasmuch as the Commission was to assume legislative power over the Philippines on September 1.

-
81. Senate document 134, 57 Cong., 1 sess., (Washington: Government Printing office, 1902), p. 4.
 82. Senate document 171, 57 Cong., 1 sess., (Washington: Government Printing office, 1902), p. 3.

Taft received a cablegram from Elihu Root, dated Oct. 13, 1900, which said,

Former experience in Cuban tariff indicates importance to give American exporters opportunity for hearing on provisions affecting their interest especially as compared with other countries, before final action. It will not be practicable for concerns here to be fully represented before you in Manila. When you have completed the tariff bill I think it best that you should send it here, and we will give it to the newspapers and trade journals as a proposed measure, and get the benefits of any objections which will be made. This particular law should have my approval before you promulgate it, in order that business interests may treat it as a finality and promptly accommodate themselves to it, and in order that it may appear on its face to be a military act. There are some diplomatic questions which make this expedient.⁸¹

In accordance with these instructions the tariff bill, after hearings had been held in the Philippines, was transmitted to Root in Washington on December 29, 1900.⁸² There it was printed and distributed to interested parties with a request for suggestions and criticisms until April 15, 1901.⁸³ After revision by the War Department it was sent to the Philippines with W. Morgan Shuster, the new collector of customs there, who arrived in Manila September 6. The War Department was informed, September 16, by Taft that the tariff would be enacted September 17 to be operative November 15, 1901.⁸⁴

The decision of the Supreme Court in the Insular cases made the validity of this enactment uncertain and made necessary, considering

81. Loc. cit.

82. Senate document 134, 57 Cong., 1 sess., op. cit., p. 5-7.

83. Ibid., p. 7-9.

84. Ibid., p. 10.

the views of Congress on the matter, the enactment of a tariff on Philippine products coming to the United States.

This was accomplished by a bill introduced by Serano Payne of New York (H. R. 5833).³¹ In reporting the bill from the Committee on Ways and Means, Representative Payne said,

This bill is designed to raise revenue for the government and benefit of the Philippine archipelago. It is intended to restore the status which existed prior to the late decision of the Supreme Court in the case of the "diamond rings". . . .³²

Richardson of Tennessee moved to recommit the bill to the Committee on Ways and Means with the following instructions:

To report a bill reducing the tariff laws and internal-revenue laws now in force in other portions of the United States to a revenue basis and apply the same to all portions of the United States including the Philippine Islands, to be in effect in said islands until order has been restored there and the Filipinos permitted, with the aid of the United States, to establish a stable and independent government.³³

His motion was rejected 121 to 173.³⁴ The bill was then passed by a vote of 167 to 128.³⁵

The bill was sent to the Senate and referred to the Committee on the Philippines, which, January 20, 1902, reported the bill with two important amendments. The first reduced the tariff rates on products

31. Congressional Record, 57 Cong., 1 sess., op. cit., p. 286.

32. House report 4, 57 Cong., 1 sess., (Washington: Government Printing office, 1902), p. 1.

33. Congressional Record, 57 Cong., 1 sess., op. cit., p. 425.

34. Ibid., p. 426.

35. Ibid., p. 426-427.

from the Philippines to 75% of the Dingley rates and refunded duties collected on these products to the Philippine treasury. The second refunded the export duties levied in the Philippines on goods coming to the United States.¹ This latter provision was of great advantage to United States cordage producers for they thus obtained an advantage of about \$6 to \$8 per ton in producing cordage. Needless to say it did not aid the Filipino producer of hamp at all.

When the bill came up for consideration on February 24, 1902, an amendment which changed the provision regarding the application of the United States coasting trade laws from "until otherwise provided by law" to "until July 1, 1904" was agreed to without a vote.² An amendment by Patterson of Colorado was rejected 26 to 47. It provided:

That the Constitution and all laws of the United States which are not locally inapplicable shall have the same force and effect within the said Philippine archipelago as elsewhere in the United States.³

An amendment proposed by Hear was accepted 69 to 0. It stated:

No person in the Philippine Islands shall, under the authority of the United States, be convicted of treason by any tribunal, civil or military, unless on the testimony of 2 witnesses to the same overt act, or on confession in open court.⁴

The proposal of Foraker of Ohio to reduce the tariff rate on Philippine products from 75% to 50% of the regular rate was defeated by a vote of 29 to 43.⁵ The 29 yeas consisted of 23 Republicans

1. Ibid., p. 750.

2. Ibid., p. 2123.

3. Ibid., p. 2131.

4. Ibid., p. 2131-32.

5. Ibid., p. 2132.


(Burnham of N. H., Burton of Kans., Clapp of Minn., Clark of Wyo., Cullem of Ill., Dryden of N. J., Fairbanks of Ind., Foraker of Ohio, Foster of Wash., Gallinger of N. H., Gamble of S. Dak., Hansbrough of N. Dak., Kearns of Utah, Mason of Ill., Millard of Nebr., Mitchell of Oreg., Nelson of Minn., Penrose of Pa., Platt of N. Y., Quarles of Wis., Scott of W. Va., Stewart of Nev., and Wellington of Md.) and 6 Democrats (Bacon and Clay of Ga., Berry of Ark., Cockrell of Mo., Gibson of Mont., and Pettus of Ala.). The 45 nays consisted of 25 Republicans (Aldrich of R. I., Allison of Iowa, Bard of Cal., Burrows of Mich., Deboe of Ky., Dietrich of Nebr., Dolliver of Iowa, Elkins of W. Va., Frye of Mo., Hanna of Ohio, Hawley of Conn., Hoar of Mass., Jones of Nev., Kean of N. J., Kittredge of S. Dak., Lodge of Mass., McCumber of N. Dak., Perkins of Cal., Platt of Conn., Pritchard of N. C., Proctor of Vt., Simon of Oreg., Spooner of Wis., Warren of Wyo., and Wetmore of R. I.); 16 Democrats (Bailey of Texas, Bate of Tenn., Clark of Mont., Gulberson of Texas, Dubois and Heitfeld of Idaho, Foster of La., Martin of Va., McLaurin and Money of Miss., Mallory and Taliaferro of Fla., Patterson of Colo., Rawlins of Utah, Simmons of N. C., and Vest of Mo.); 1 Silver Republican (Teller of Colo.); and 1 Populist (Turner of Wash.).

The geographic division is shown on map no. 7.

The substitute proposed by Rawlins for the minority of the committee stated:

Be it enacted . . . That, subject to the provisions hereinafter set forth, the United States of America hereby relinquish all claim of sovereignty over and title to the Archipelago known as the Philippine Islands.

Map No. 7. Senate vote on Foraker amendment to Philippine revenue bill (H. R. 5833), February 24, 1902.



That from and after the passage of this Act said archipelago shall be foreign territory, and all goods entering the United States therefrom shall be subject to the same duties, customs, and imposts as are now, or may hereafter be, prescribed by law for goods entered from other foreign countries; Provided, That during the temporary occupation of said islands, ~~as~~ hereinafter provided, all trade between the same and the United States shall be free.

That the United States shall continue to occupy and govern said archipelago until the people thereof have established a stable government, and until sufficient guaranties have been obtained for the performance of our treaty obligations with Spain for the safety of those inhabitants who have adhered to the United States and for the maintenance and protection of all rights which have accrued under their authority.

That as soon as these results have been accomplished, it is declared to be the purpose of the United States, which the President is directed to carry into effect, to withdraw from said islands and leave the government, control, and sovereignty thereof to the inhabitants of the same, retaining only such military, naval and coaling stations as may be designated by the Government of the United States.

That until the people of the islands shall establish a government, as hereinbefore provided, all laws, rules and regulations now in force for the government of the islands and the raising of revenue therefore shall be in force, except as the same may be in conflict with this act.¹

It was rejected by a vote of 25 to 46,² The bill was then passed by a vote of 45 to 28.³ These votes were all straight party votes except that Turner of Wash., the Fusionist-Populist, and Teller of Colo., a Silver Republican who changed his political designation the next Congress to Democrat, voted with the Democrats.

1. Ibid., p. 750. (Also in Senate report 181, 57 Cong., 1st sess., (Washington: Government printing office, 1902), p.45.)

2. Ibid., p. 2133.

3. Ibid., p. 2134.

In the House during consideration of the Senate amendments, McClellan of New York proposed to reduce the tariff rate on products from the Philippines from 75% to 25% of the Dingley rates. The motion was rejected 84 to 107.¹ A motion by Richardson of Tennessee for no duty on goods from the Philippines coming to the United States was rejected 95 to 109.² President Roosevelt signed H. R. 5833 March 8, 1902.³

The bill as passed confirmed the tariff laws enacted by the Philippine Commission, provided that goods the product of the Philippine Islands should pay 75% of the regular tariff duties, exempted articles on the United States free list from Philippine export duties, delayed until July 1, 1904 the application of the coasting trade regulations to trade with the Philippines, and provided that duties and taxes collected under this act in the Philippines and all duties and taxes collected in the United States on articles from the Philippines should go to the Philippine treasury rather than to the United States treasury. In administering United States revenue taxes and regulations on drawbacks, the Philippines were to be treated as foreign territory. The final provision was the amendment of Hear discussed above,⁴

1. Ibid., p. 2186.

2. Ibid., p. 2190-91.

3. Ibid., p. 2600.

4. U. S. Statutes at Large, 57 Congress, op. cit., p. 54-55.

No provision of this bill was of very great immediate benefit to the Philippines. The provision for refunding to the Philippines the duties and taxes collected in the United States on goods coming from the Philippines was of no immediate importance since 75% of the Dingley rates on sugar and tobacco, the chief exports of the Philippines which were dutiable in the United States, was a prohibitive rate. This principle has been continued until the present time and has become much more important as time went along. The loss of revenue from the abolition of export taxes (on hemp and coconuts) when the goods came to the United States was very serious. It is an instance of gearing the market, not for the benefit, of the Philippines but for that of certain interests in the United States, namely the cordage manufacturers, many of whom were then and still are located in Massachusetts.

These two pieces of legislation were to form the fundamental basis for future administrative and legislative policy in the Philippines. While the civil government act was to continue for a number of years without substantial modification or even proposals for modification, that was not to be the case with the bill establishing tariff and shipping regulations with the Philippines. Congress was to spend many hours considering modifications in the tariff in the succeeding years.

Ch. VII. Governing the Philippines, 1902-1913.

Two laws passed by Congress during the first session of the fifty-seventh Congress were to be modified in the next decade with respect to franchise regulation, tariff relations between the United States and the Philippines, and shipping regulations. The friar land controversy was to be settled and then to blossom forth in a grand investigation. The Philippine assembly was to be opened and the business of governing the Philippines carried along without any apparent interest in the subject by the people of the United States.

The business of governing the Philippines, making minor adjustments in the civil government act, and sending investigating groups or individuals to the Philippines was to be the most important, certainly the most continuing type of activity the United States was to pursue not only in the period from 1902 to 1913 but throughout the whole period of American sovereignty.

The Philippines were gradually being pacified and Elihu Root, in his annual report for 1902 made the following suggestion as to the causes of this much desired event.

I described in my last report the important bearing which the continuous offer and bestowal of civil rights and local self-government as the result of pacification had upon the attitude of the people toward the insurrection. It is evident that the insurrection has been brought to an end both by making the war distressing and hopeless on the one hand, and by making peace attractive, through immediate and present demonstration of the sincerity of our purpose to give the people just and free government on the other.¹

1. House document 2, Vol. 1, 57 Congress, 2 session, (Washington: Government Printing office, 1903), p. 12-12.

Theodore Roosevelt in his annual message to Congress dated Dec. 2, 1902, was to comment on the Philippines as follows:

We have not gone too far in granting these rights of liberty and self-government; but we have certainly gone to the limit that in the interests of the Philippine people themselves it was wise or just to go No policy ever entered into by the American people has vindicated itself in more signal manner than the policy of holding the Philippines 1

One year later the Philippine Commission was, in their annual report dated December 23, 1903, to present to the President and Congress a group of recommendations upon which Congress was to devote much time during the following years before they were finally enacted into law.

These recommendations were:

First. Legislation which shall reduce the tariff on sugar and tobacco imported from the Philippine Islands to not more than 25 per cent of the present Dingley rates on tobacco and sugar imported from foreign countries.

Second. Legislation authorizing the Philippine Commission, with the approval of the President and the Secretary of War, to issue bonds from time to time, which shall not in the aggregate sum exceed \$5,000,000, for the making of future permanent improvements.

Third. An amendment to section 66 of an act entitled "An act temporarily to provide for the administration of the affairs of civil government in the Philippine Islands, and for other purposes," by which the consent of Congress to issue the bonds therein provided for may not be required.

Fourth. Legislation providing that all bonds authorized to be issued by the Philippine government or any provincial or municipal government thereof by act of Congress shall

1. Works of Theodore Roosevelt, ed. by Hermann Hagedorn, National edition, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1926), Vol. 15, p. 155.

be made exempt not only from Federal and Philippine taxation, but from State, county, and municipal taxation in the United States.

Fifth. That control over the shipping in the trade between the islands shall be left wholly to the discretion of the Philippine Commission, subject to the approval of the President and the Secretary of War.

Sixth. That the application of the United States coastwise navigation laws to the trade between the Philippine Islands and the mainland of the United States be postponed by Congressional action until July 1, 1909; or, in the alternative, that the coastwise laws of the United States be not made applicable to the trade between the islands and the mainland of the United States except with a proviso or condition that the rates upon imports from the Philippine Islands into the United States shall not pay duty in excess of 25% of the rates on such merchandise imposed by the Dingley tariff.

Seventh. That authority be given by Congressional act to the Philippine Commission, with the approval of the President and the Secretary of War, to encourage the investment of capital in the construction of railroads for the Philippine Islands by accompanying the grant of franchises to build railroads, in cases where it is deemed necessary, with a guaranty by the Philippine government of income of the amount of the investment to be fixed in advance in the act of guaranty, and the amount of income guaranteed not to exceed annually 4% of the fixed capital.

Eighth. That the amount of land which may be acquired, owned, and used for agricultural purposes in the Philippines by any individual or corporation shall be extended to 25,000 acres.

Ninth. That the clause which forbids the filing of more than one mining claim by the same individual or association upon a lode or deposit be repealed.¹

The attention of Congress during the remainder of this first period of Republican administration of the islands (1903-1913) was to be

1. House document 2, Vol. 5, 58 Cong., 2 sess., (Washington: Government Printing office, 1904), p. 9-10.

centered, insofar as Philippine legislation was concerned, on enacting or considering proposals to enact bills embodying these recommendations.

A bill (H. R. 14623) which embodied the recommendations relating to the guarantee of interest on railroads, the exemption from taxation in the United States of bonds issued by the Philippine government, and the authorization of a bond issue by Congress was introduced by Cooper of Wisconsin on March 31, 1904 and referred to the Committee on Insular Affairs.¹ The committee reported the bill and submitted a report² which was practically the statement of Secretary Taft in favor of the bill. By exempting the bonds of the Philippine government from taxation, a wider market for them would open since persons and groups whose securities are open to public inspection would buy them. This would result in a lower interest rate. The requirements that the consent of Congress should be obtained before each issue of bonds by municipalities was cumbersome and time consuming. By restricting the issuance of bonds to not over 5% of the assessed valuation of property in the municipality and requiring the approval of the President of the United States, excessive or improper issue of bonds for municipal improvement would be prevented. In speaking of the provision for a guarantee of interest on bonds for railroad construction, the committee said,

-
1. Congressional Record, 58 Cong., 2 sess., (Washington: Government Printing office, 1904), p. 4078.
 2. Ibid., p. 4277.

Your committee believe that the building of railroads is the most important improvement possible for the Philippine Islands . . . More than all other influences combined, a comprehensive railroad system will do away with the embarrassing variety of dialects and tribes in the islands and bring about an early unification of the inhabitants - a condition absolutely essential to their highest prosperity and development. Railroads would greatly enhance the value of the lands and other property in the islands, enlarge their trade, and increase the intelligence of their people.

The history of railroads in the English and Spanish possessions shows clearly that capital will not be invested in their construction without some special inducement in the way of a guaranteed income

The Secretary gives it as his opinion . . . that in order to secure the construction of railroads in the islands, the provisions of the present section must be enacted into law, or else that the government of the Philippine Islands itself must be authorized to undertake their construction

The bill as a whole has the cordial indorsement of the Secretary of War, and is in accordance with the desires and recommendations of the Philippine government. . . .¹

The six minority members of the committee dissented from the action proposed by this bill as "one calculated to further bind the United States to an unwise, impolitic, and unpatriotic scheme of colonization" They dissented especially from the provision by which the Philippine government guaranteed an income of not exceeding 5% on capital invested. The minority said of this railroad venture,

It is a last and desperate resort to vindicate the predictions and promises of the Republican party that capital would be attracted to the Philippine Islands, and that an era of railroad construction and improvement would set in, and that the development of the islands would be rapid resulting in benefit to the people and advantage to the home government.

The minority stated further that since these predictions had failed, the American government of the islands asked Congress to

1. House report 2227, 58 Congress, 2 session, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1904), p. 7-13.


guarantee the money of the Filipinos to pay interest on the bonds. This legislation should be delayed at least until the Filipinos have something to say about their government. The minority also disliked the idea of a large bonded indebtedness for the Philippines. If a guarantee of interest was possible for any road, no railroad would be built until it had received its guarantee. This guarantee would create "a moral, if not a legal, liability upon the United States Government to see that this guarantee is paid." In conclusion, the minority said,

In our opinion the first step toward the betterment of conditions in the Philippine Islands is that which justice, honor and sound public policy would dictate, and that is to give the people of the islands free trade relations with the United States. Unless built by Government aid railroads are far more likely to follow than to precede free trade. 1

The Committee on Rules, April 13, 1904, brought in a resolution determining the procedure to be followed in discussing the bill. The motion for the previous question on the resolution was passed by a vote of 133 to 114.² The resolution was agreed to 137 to 113.³ The bill was passed by the House the next day by a vote of 138 to 123.⁴ The 138 yeas were all Republicans. The 123 nays consisted of 119 Democrats, 2 Republicans, and 2 Union Labor Democrats (from California). The geographic distribution of the vote is shown on map No. 8. Meanwhile the Senate had been considering the matters embodied in this bill. Lodge had introduced a bill (S.5328), March 31, which was

-
1. House Report 2227, pt. 2, 58 Congress, 2 session, op. cit.
 2. Congressional Record, 58 Cong., 2 sess., op. cit., p. 4768-9.
 3. Ibid., p. 4771-72.
 4. Ibid., p. 4818-19.

Map No. 8. House vote on H. R. 14623 authorizing guarantee of interest on railroad construction in Philippines, etc., April 14, 1904.



referred to the Committee on the Philippines.¹ Lodge reported the bill from committee on April 4,² and the bill (H. R. 14623) which had just passed the House was substituted for it April 15.³ The consideration of the measure was not pressed at that session of Congress.

Lodge lost no time in getting to work on the bill when Congress met for the short session in December, 1904. The bill was called up for consideration on Dec. 7.⁴ Unanimous consent was asked and received for a vote on the bill on Saturday, December 16.⁵ Culberson of Texas proposed an amendment reducing the guaranteed rate of interest on the bonds from 4% to 3%.⁶ It was rejected 35 to 37. Culberson proposed to strike out the section guaranteeing interest on railway investment. The proposal was rejected 32 to 39.⁷ The bill was then passed 44 to 23.⁸ It was a straight party vote except for McCumber, Republican of North Dakota, who voted against the passage of the bill.

House and Senate conferees agreed on a bill which was signed by the President February 6, 1905.⁹

This bill provided that the bonds of the Philippine government

1. Ibid., p. 4027.

2. Ibid., p. 4210.

3. Ibid., p. 4852.

4. Congressional Record, 58 Cong., 3 sess., (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1905). p. 51.

5. Ibid., p. 55

6. Ibid., p. 360.

7. Ibid., p. 362.

8. Ibid., p. 362-63.

9. Ibid., p. 2008.

should be exempt from taxation in the Philippines and in the United States, that bonds for constructing ports and harbor works, roads, etc., could be issued by the Philippine government up to five million dollars, that municipal bonds for public improvements could be issued up to five per cent of the property valuation when current taxation was inadequate to raise the necessary money, that the Philippine government could guarantee interest not exceeding four per centum on first lien bonds of any railroads constructed with the approval of the Philippine government and that the civil governor should hereafter be known as the governor-general. The law regarding the filing of mineral claims as well as the coinage act passed for the Philippines were also amended.¹

Meanwhile a presidential election was held. The Republicans nominated Theodore Roosevelt and said in respect to the Philippines,

In the Philippines we have suppressed insurrection, established order, and given to life and property a security never known there before. We have organized civil government, made it effective and strong in administration, and have conferred upon the people of those islands the largest civil liberty they have ever enjoyed.

By our possession of the Philippines we were enabled to take prompt and effective action in the relief of the legations at Peking and a decisive part in preventing the partition and preserving the integrity of China.²

The Democrats nominated Alvin B. Parker, a Conservative, hoping to attract some Wall Street backing with money. In commenting on the

-
1. U. S. Statutes at Large, 58th Congress, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1905), p. 689-698.
 2. W. Cameron Forbes, The Philippine Islands, (New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1928), Vol. 2, p. 567.

Philippines, they said,

Wherever there may exist a people incapable of being governed under the American laws, in consonance with the American Constitution, the territory of that people ought not to be part of the American domain. We insist that we ought to do for the Filipinos what we have done already for the Cubans, and it is our duty to make that promise now, and upon suitable guaranties of protection to the citizens of our own and other countries resident there at the time of our withdrawal, to set the Filipino people upon their feet, free and independent, to work out their own destiny.

The endeavor of the Secretary of War, by pledging the government's indorsement for "promoters" in the Philippine Islands to make the United States a partner in speculative exploitation of the archipelago, which was only temporarily held up by the opposition of Democratic Senators in the last session, will, if successful, lead to entanglements from which it will be difficult to escape. 1

An interesting comment on the difference between the Democrat and the Republican position, which was shown to be true when the former came to power, is contained in a letter from John Hay, Secretary of State, to Andrew Carnegie, a vigorous anti-imperialist. Hay wrote, August 3, 1904,

I cannot think there is so much difference as you appear to assume between your view and T ____'s [Taft]; certainly there is no variance between him and R ____ [Roosevelt] and R ____ [Root]. They all agree in the desire to do our whole duty by the Philippines and to discharge ourselves of the heavy task of governing them as fast and as thoroughly as possible. If Mr. P ____ [Parker] is elected next fall, it will not be in his power to accomplish that desirably end one hour sooner than the Republicans will do it. The only difference between us and the opposition is that we, being responsible, must measure our words, and they can indulge in the cheap luxury of unlimited declamation . . . 2

Roosevelt was reelected by a quite decisive margin. In his annual

-
1. Ibid., p. 567-68.
 2. Letters of John Hay and extracts from diary. (Washington: 1908), Vol. 3, p. 304-305. (Printed but not published).

message to Congress, dated December 6, 1904, he said,

At present they (the Philippine people) are utterly incapable of existing in independence at all or of building up a civilization of their own. I firmly believe that we can help them to rise higher and higher in the scale of civilization and of capacity for self-government, and I most earnestly hope that in the end they will be able to stand, if not entirely alone, yet in some such relation to the United States as Cuba now stands. This end is not yet in sight, and it may be indefinitely postponed if our people are foolish enough to turn the attention of the Filipinos away from the problems of achieving moral and material prosperity, of working for a stable, orderly, and just government, and toward foolish and dangerous intrigues for a complete independence for which they are as yet totally unfit.

On the other hand, our people must keep steadily before their minds the fact that the justification for our stay in the Philippines must ultimately rest chiefly upon the good we are able to do in the islands. 1

In his message a year later he was to say,

Cavite and Samar are instances of reposing too much confidence in the self-governing power of the people The incident is another proof of the fact that if there has been any error as regards giving self-government in the Philippines it has been in the direction of giving it too quickly, not too slowly. 2

In order to break the hold of the money lenders in the Philippines who were charging usurious rates of interest, the Philippine Commission, in their report dated September 15, 1906, recommended that the Philippine government be authorized to establish an agricultural bank in the Philippines using private capital which would be guaranteed as to principal and four per cent interest for not over 25 years. 3

1. Works of Theodore Roosevelt, op. cit., Vol. 15.

2. Ibid., p. 331-332.

3. House document 2, V. VII, pt. 1, 58 Cong., 2 sess., (Washington: Government Printing office, 1906), p. 73.

The recommendation was enacted into law. Lodge introduced a bill (S. 6249) May 22, 1906¹ and it was reported from Committee the next session, February 2, 1907.² After several amendments were rejected,³ it was passed by a vote of 43 to 12.⁴ In the House it was referred, February 26, to the Committee on Insular Affairs⁵ which reported it the next day.⁶ The motion March 3, 1907 to suspend the rules and pass the bill carried 188 to 69,⁷ with 174 Republicans and 14 Democrats voting for the bill and 2 Republicans and 67 Democrats voting against the bill. The geographic distribution is shown on map No. 9.

The Senate concurred in the House amendments the same day⁸ and the President signed the bill March 4, 1907.⁹ This bill provided for the guaranty of 4% interest on the paid in capital of an agricultural bank to be located in Manila for the purpose of furnishing small loans of money for farmers in the Philippines at rates of interest not exceeding 10% per annum.¹⁰ The need for a bank which would encourage production in the islands and would prevent usurious rates of interest, with all that is implied in the way of opportunity for advancement by the tenant farmer in the island, was mentioned in the House report.

1. Congressional Record, 59 Cong., 1 sess., (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1906), p. 7210.

2. Congressional Record, 59 Cong., 2 sess., (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1907), p. 2143.

3. Ibid., p. 3894-96.

4. Ibid., p. 3897.

5. Ibid., p. 4063.

6. Ibid., p. 4211.


7. Ibid., p. 4587-88.

8. Ibid., p. 4551.

9. Ibid., p. 4656.

10. U. S. Statutes at Large, 59 Congress, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1907), p. 1282-1283.

Map No. 9. House vote on S. 6249 to authorize an agricultural bank in Philippines, March 3, 1907.



on the bill.¹

The civil government act of July 1, 1902 had provided for an assembly if peace was established and maintained for two years after the census was completed and published.

The completion of these successive stages is shown in the report of the Chief of the Bureau of Insular Affairs, dated October 13, 1907. The report states,

The census . . . was completed and published on March 27, 1905, whereupon the Secretary of War directed the governor-general of the Philippine Islands to make due proclamation of this fact and to announce that, subject to the provisions of the act of Congress referred to, a general election for the choice of delegates to a popular assembly of the people of said territory would be held two years thereafter. Proclamation was duly made as directed.

On March 28, 1907, the Philippine Commission certified to the President of the United States that for a period of two years after the completion and publication of the census a condition of general and complete peace, with recognition of the authority of the United States had continued to exist in the islands, whereupon the President, on the same date, issued an Executive order calling a general election.

In January, 1907, the Philippine Commission passed the Philippine election law

The first election under this law was held on July 30, 1907, and on the 16th of the present month the first Philippine assembly was opened by the Secretary of War.²

Referring to this approaching event in his message to Congress, dated December 3, 1906, President Roosevelt said,

We are constantly increasing the measure of liberty accorded the islanders, and next spring, if conditions warrant, we shall

-
1. House report 8115, 59 Congress, 2 session, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1907), p. 2-3.
 2. House document 2, Vol. 7, 60 Cong., 1 sess., (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1907), p. 5-6.

take a great stride forward in testing their capacity for self-government by summoning the first Filipino legislative assembly; and the way in which they stand this test will largely determine whether the self-government thus granted will be increased or decreased; for if we have erred at all in the Philippines it has been in proceeding too rapidly in the direction of granting a large measure of self-government. ¹

William Howard Taft, the Secretary of War, was to go to Manila to open this assembly. In preparing for this trip, President Roosevelt wrote Taft the following letter, dated August 21, 1907,

The Philippine Islands form our "Heel of Achilles." They are all that makes the present situation with Japan dangerous. I think that in some way and with some phraseology that you think wise, you should state to them that if they handle themselves wisely in their legislative assembly we shall at the earliest moment give them a nearly complete independence I think that to have some pretty clear avowal of our intention not to permanently keep them and to give them independence would remove a temptation from Japan's way and would render our task easier . . .

Personally I should be glad to see the Islands made independent, with perhaps some kind of international guarantee for the preservation of order, or with some warning on our part that if they did not keep order we would have to interfere again; this among other reasons because I would rather see this nation fight all her life than to see her give them up to Japan or any other nation under duress. ²

Taft stopped in Japan and found the situation there not as bad as it had seemed in America. His talks quieted his fears and those of the administration in Washington. He thus did not find it necessary to mention the possibility of nearby independence.

In addressing the opening of the Philippine assembly, Oct. 16, 1908

1. Works of Theodore Roosevelt, op. cit., p. 381-382.

2. Henry F. Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1931), p. 408-409.

Taft said,

The policy [of the United States] looks to the improvement of the people, both industrially and in self-governing capacity. As the policy of extending control continues, it must logically reduce and finally end the sovereignty of the United States in the Islands, unless it shall seem wise to the American and Filipino peoples, on account of mutually beneficial trade relations and possible advantages to the Islands in their foreign relations, that the bond shall not be completely severed. 1

Continuing, he said the difficulties of the task of the United States in the Philippine Islands arose from the "novelty of the task for the United States," "the lack . . . of a trained body of colonial administrators," "the reluctance of capitalists to invest money here" thus slowing up economic development without which political privileges would be useless. "The constant agitation for independence in the islands" has discouraged capital. "Failure of Congress to open the markets of the United States to the free admission of Philippine sugar and tobacco" has hampered the return of prosperity. The most serious difficulty in the islands came from the rinderpest

which carried away from 75 to 80 per cent of the cattle that were absolutely indispensable in cultivating, reaping, and disposing of the agricultural products upon which the islands are wholly dependent 2

Taft said progress had been made in bringing peace and tranquility to the islands, in the spread of general education, establishment of health and sanitation, establishment of an independent judiciary,

-
1. House Document 2, Vol. 7, 60 Cong., 1 sess., (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1908), p. 216.
 2. Ibid., p. 217-18.

building of harbor works, roads, railroads, streets, and public utilities, inaugurating a civil service law, establishing a land system with "provision for homestead settlement, for free patents, and for perfecting of imperfect titles by land registration." 1

In concluding, Taft said,

As you shall conduct your proceedings and shape your legislation on patriotic, intelligent, conservative, and useful lines, you will show more emphatically than in any other way your right and capacity to take part in the government and the wisdom of granting to your assembly and to the people that elected you more power Will this Assembly and its successors manifest such an interest in the welfare of the people and such clear-headed comprehension of their sworn duty as to call for a greater extension of political power to this body and to the people whose representative it is? Or shall it, by neglect, obstruction, and absence of useful service, make it necessary to take away its existing powers on the ground that they have been prematurely granted? Upon you falls this heavy responsibility. I am assured that you will meet it with earnestness, courage, and credit. 2

Renewed interest in the question of independence had resulted from the victory of the Nationalist candidates in the election for the Philippine Assembly. The Nationalist party was committed to the idea of immediate independence as contrasted with the Progressive party which favored independence when they were capable of managing their own affairs. Since few people liked to admit their incapacity for managing their own affairs, the victory of Nationalist party was inevitable. The Progressive party was the successor of the Federal party, which had been organized in 1900 by a group of Filipinos with open American encouragement. The platform of the Federal party had

1. Ibid., p. 219-222.

2. Ibid., p. 226.

called for peace, perpetual fealty to the United States, and ultimate admission into the Union as a state. Taft actively supported this group and in 1902 refused to allow a group of distinguished Filipinos to organize a party which declined to admit eternal subservience to the United States. Forbes thought that by this action Taft played into the hands of the radicals who demanded immediate independence. ¹

After returning to Washington, Taft made a report to President Roosevelt, dated January 23, 1908, in which he said,

The policy of the United States toward the Philippines is, of course, ultimately for Congress to determine, and it is difficult to see how one Congress could bind another Congress, should the second conclude to change the policy declared by the first

. . . Congress closely followed, in the so-called organic act, your recommendations as to provisions for a future change in the Philippine government. The national policy may therefore be found in the course pursued and declarations made by the Chief Executives in Congressional messages and other state papers which have met the approval of Congress.

Shortly stated, the national policy is to govern the Philippine Islands for the benefit and welfare and uplifting of the people of the Islands and gradually to extend to them, as they shall show themselves fit to exercise it, a greater and greater measure of popular self-government. One of the corollaries to this proposition is that the United States in its government of the Islands will use every effort to increase political power, both by general education of the densely ignorant masses and by actual practice, in partial self-government, of those whose political capacity is such that practice can benefit it without too great injury to the efficiency of government. What should be emphasized in the statement of our national policy is that we wish to prepare the Filipinos for popular self-government. This is plain from

1. of Henry F. Pringle, W. H. Taft, op cit., Vol. 1, p. 205-6 and W. Cameron Forbes, The Philippine Islands, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 146, Vol. II, P. 101-103.

Mr. McKinley's letter of instructions and all of his utterances. It was not at all within his purpose or that of the Congress which made his letter part of the law of the land that we were merely to await the organization of a Philippine oligarchy or aristocracy competent to administer the government and then to turn the Islands over to it. On the contrary, it is plain, from all of Mr. McKinley's utterances and your own, in interpretation of our national purpose, that we are the trustees and guardians of the whole Filipino people, and peculiarly of the ignorant masses, and that our trust is not discharged until those masses are given education sufficient to know their civil rights and maintain them against a more powerful class and safely to exercise the political franchise. This is important, in view of the claim, to which I shall hereafter refer, made by certain Filipino advocates of immediate independence under the auspices of the Boston anti-imperialists, that a satisfactory independent Philippine government could be established under a governing class of 10% and a serving and obedient class of 90%. 1

Taft mentioned that the political capacity required was not that of Anglo-Saxon nations and that the determination as to when political capacity was achieved was in the hands of Congress and not in those of the Filipino electorate. 2 In speaking of the political future of the islands, Taft said,

There are in the Philippines many who wish that the government shall declare a definite policy in respect to the islands so that they may know what that policy is. I do not see how any more definite policy can be declared than was declared by President McKinley in his instructions to Secretary Root for the guidance of the Philippine Commission . . . That policy is declared to be the extension of self-government to the Philippine Islands by gradual steps from time to time as the people of the islands shall show themselves fit to receive the additional responsibility, and that policy has been consistently adhered to in the last seven years now succeeding the establishment of civil government.

. . . I believe it to be true that the conditions in the islands today vindicate and justify that policy

Any attempt to fix the time in which complete self-government

-
1. Senate document 200, 60 Congress, 1 session, (Washington: Government Printing office, 1908), p. 7-8.
 2. Ibid., p. 8.

may be conferred upon the Filipinos in their own interest, is, I think, most unwise. The key of the whole policy outlined by President McKinley and adopted by Congress was that of the education of the masses of the people and the leading them out of the dense ignorance in which they are now, with a view to enabling them intelligently to exercise the force of public opinion without which a popular self-government is impossible.

It seems to me reasonable to say that such condition can not be reached until at least one generation shall have been subjected to the process of primary and industrial education, and that when it is considered that the people are divided into groups speaking from 10 to 15 different dialects, and that they must acquire a common medium of communication, and that one of the civilized languages, it is not unreasonable to extend the necessary period beyond a generation. By that time . . . a great majority . . . will be affected by the knowledge of free institutions and will be able to understand their rights as members of the community and to seek to enforce them against the pernicious system of caciquism and local bossism, which I have attempted in this report to describe . . . But the mere fact that a majority of all the people are in favor of immediate independence is not a reason why they should be granted, if we assume at all the correctness of the statement, which impartial observers can not but fail to acquiesce in, to wit: that the Filipinos are not now fit for self-government.

The policy of the United States is not to establish an oligarchy but a popular self-government in the Philippines. . . . many of those most emphatic and urgent in seeking independence in the islands have no thought of a popular government at all. They are in favor of a close government in which they, the leaders of a particular class, shall exercise control of the rest of the people. Their views are thus wholly at variance with the policy of the United States in the islands.

. . . If the American government can only remain in the islands long enough to educate the entire people, to give them a language which enables them to come into contact with modern civilization, and to extend to them from time to time additional political rights so that by the exercise of them they shall learn the use and responsibilities necessary to their proper exercise, independence can be granted with entire safety to the people. I have an abiding conviction that the Filipino people are capable of being taught self-government in the process of their development, that in carrying out this policy they will be improved physically and mentally, and that, as they acquire more rights, their power to exercise moral restraints upon themselves will be strengthened and improved. Meantime they will be able to see, and the American

public will come to see the enormous material benefits to both arising from the maintenance of some sort of a bond between the two countries which shall preserve their mutually beneficial business relations. 1

Taft concludes by saying that the occupation of the Philippines will make an outpost for trade for United States merchants. ~~While he refrains from making this the chief reason for~~ retaining the Philippines since that "lies in the obligation of the United States to make this people fit for self-government and then to turn the government over to them." He does not think it improper to mention the possibility of trade in order to gain support for his policy however. 2

During this session of Congress a bill (H. R. 17518) to increase the membership of the Philippine Commission from eight to nine and to empower the president to create another executive department ³ was passed by Congress. ⁴ President Roosevelt signed the bill May 11, 1908. ⁵

After being reelected President in 1904, Roosevelt had renounced further ambitions for the presidency. With the approach of the presidential election of 1908, William Howard Taft was finally persuaded by President Roosevelt and Mrs. Taft to run for President.

1. Ibid., p. 73-76.

2. Ibid., p. 76.

3. United States Statutes at Large, 60th Congress, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 19), p. 125.

4. Congressional Record, 60 Cong., 1 sess., (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1907), p. 5610 & 5668-69.

5. Ibid., p. 6088.

James S. Sherman of New York was selected as his running mate. The Republican plank on the Philippines said,

The American government, in Republican hands, has freed Cuba, given peace and protection in Porto Rico and the Philippines under our flag, and begun the construction of the Panama Canal.

In the Philippines insurrection has been suppressed, law is established, and life and property made secure. Education and practical experience are there advancing the capacity of the people for self-government, and the policies of McKinley and Roosevelt are leading the inhabitants step by step to an ever-increasing measure of home rule.¹

The Democrats nominated William Jennings Bryan for the third time with John W. Kern of Indiana as his running mate. Their platform said,

We condemn the experiment in imperialism as an inexcusable blunder which has involved us in enormous expense, brought us weakness instead of strength, and laid our nation open to the charge of abandoning a fundamental doctrine of self-government. We favor an immediate declaration of the nation's purpose to recognize the independence of the Philippine Islands as soon as a stable government can be established, such independence to be guaranteed by us as we guarantee the independence of Cuba, until the neutralization of the islands can be secured by treaty with other powers. In recognizing the independence of the Philippines our Government should retain such land as may be necessary for coaling stations and naval bases.²

The Philippine problem was to be of little significance in this election. The country was under the spell of Roosevelt and Taft was successful in the election.

1. W. Cameron Forbes, The Philippine Islands, op. cit., p. 568.

2. Loc. cit.

In his last annual message to Congress, dated Dec. 8, 1908, President Roosevelt said,

Real progress toward self-government is being made in the Philippine Islands . . . The Filipino people, through their officials, are making real steps in the direction of self-government. I hope and believe that these steps mark the beginning of a course which will continue till the Filipinos become fit to decide for themselves whether they desire to be an independent nation. But it is well for them (and well also for those Americans who during the past decade have done so much damage to the Filipinos by agitating for an immediate independence for which they were totally unfit) to remember that self-government depends, and must depend, upon the Filipinos themselves. . . . I trust that within a generation the time will arrive when the Philippines can decide for themselves whether it is well for them to become independent, or to continue under the protection of a strong and disinterested power, able to guarantee to the islands order at home and protection from foreign invasion. But no one can prophesy the exact date when it will be wise to consider independence as a fixed and definite policy. It would be worse than folly to try to set down such a date in advance, for it must depend upon the way in which the Philippine people themselves develop the power of self-mastery.¹

This statement was to be the final pronouncement by Roosevelt on the Philippines while he was President. In a certain sense, Roosevelt was of little importance in the solution of the Philippine problem. He inherited a well established policy and two very capable men, Elihu Root and William Howard Taft, who were in efficient charge of it. He had the good judgment to continue both of these men in office, and even promoted each.

1. Works of Theodore Roosevelt, op. cit., p. 537.

To a very considerable extent the policy of the Republicans during all of this period is that of Taft. McKinley had decided to take the Philippines but seems to have very largely dropped out of the picture at that point, leaving the determination of administrative policy to his Secretary of War, Elihu Root. It was a fortunate choice. From the time that Taft was appointed as President of the Philippine Commission, his influence on Philippine policy grew. His recommendations on policy were generally accepted by Root, and by McKinley and Roosevelt. His success in the Philippines was so marked that before McKinley's assassination, he was talked of as a possible successor to him in 1905. After that there was talk of Taft as a successor to Roosevelt. Roosevelt's chances for the nomination in 1904 were not looked on too favorably as at that time no vice-president in succeeding to the presidency on the death of his chief had ever been elected in his own right. The reputation Taft made in the Philippines and later as Secretary of War was to carry him, with Roosevelt's blessing, into the White House in 1909.

Aside from the tariff legislation discussed in a later chapter, the period of the Taft administration was not productive of much legislation for the Philippines. One bill (S. 7400), introduced by Lodge¹ which provided for an increase in the limit on indebtedness of the Philippine

1. Congressional Record, 61 Cong., 2 sess., (Washington: Government Printing office, 1910), p. 3739.

government' passed the Senate April 4, 1910¹ but consideration of the bill was objected to in the House of Representatives by Francis Burton Harrison,² later governor-general of the Philippines under Wilson. The next session a motion to suspend the rules and pass the bill failed with the vote yeas 63 and noes 44 since two-thirds failed to vote in favor of the bill.³

During the summer, the Secretary of War, J. M. Dickinson, made a trip to the islands. This was the last trip made to the islands by a Secretary of War for 20 years. Taft, as Secretary of War, had taken a party of Congressmen for a short visit to the islands in 1905. He had returned in 1907^{708?} to open the Philippine assembly. Dickinson's trip in 1910 was followed by that of Patrick Hurley in 1931. George Dern went to the islands in 1935 to inaugurate the government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines. Thus four Secretaries of War, the cabinet officer in charge of Philippine affairs, have made five trips to the islands in the course of 40 years of supervision of the affairs of the islands. It seems rather inadequate for the best understanding of the problems existing there. Secretary Dickinson made a report to Taft when he returned. It is dated Nov. 23, 1910. After quoting from Taft's report on the requirements which the Filipinos should meet before being given independence, Dickinson said,

1. *Ibid.*, p. 4209.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 4914.

3. *Congressional record*, 61 Cong., 3 sess., (Washington: Government Printing office, 1911), p. 2104.

By the standard thus laid down, the Filipino people are substantially in the same attitude as when you visited them in 1907. Training in administrative work and education is doing much, but they have affected such a small percentage of the population that the change is hardly sensible.

The results will manifest themselves in a rapidly increasing ratio when those who are now being educated reach an age when their influence can be felt in public life.

Those who are intelligent do not expect immediate independence, even if their views should be acceded to on the part of the American people, but rather that steps should be taken as early as practicable which will result in the near future in turning over to the Philippine people the administration of their own affairs. While, as stated, these are the only views publicly expressed, I became convinced from reliable evidence that many of the most substantial men, while not openly opposing the demands publicly voiced, would regard such a consummation with consternation. They realize that the government would fall into the hands of a few who would dominate the masses, that the administration, even without outside interference, could not be successfully carried on, that there would be internal dissensions and probably civil war, and that if the United States did not interfere they would fall an easy prey to some foreign power.¹

Due in part to the Payne-Aldrich tariff bill, but not to the sections relating to the Philippines, the Democrats gained control of the House of Representatives in 1911. They then passed or began consideration of a number of bills which would embarrass the administration (Taft's) and also define the Democratic position on various legislative matters for the coming presidential election. The election of 1912, since it resulted in Democratic success, is like these actions of

1. House document 1261, 61 Cong., 3 sess., (Washington: Government Printing office, 1910), p.6.

the Democratic House of Representatives, part of Democratic Policy, and will receive consideration as such in the discussion of Democrat Philippine policy.

The final official statement of Republican policy in the Philippines for this first period of control by the Republican party comes in Taft's final annual message to Congress, dated December 6, 1912. In this message he said,

A bill is pending in Congress which revolutionizes the carefully worked out scheme of government under which the Philippine Islands are now governed and which proposes to render them virtually autonomous at once and absolutely independent in 8 years. Such a proposal can only be founded on the assumption that we have now discharged our trusteeship to the Filipino people and our responsibility for them to the world, and that they are now prepared for self-government as well as national sovereignty. A thorough and unbiased knowledge of the facts clearly shows that these assumptions are absolutely without justification. As to this, I believe that there is no substantial difference of opinion among any of those who have had the responsibility of facing Philippine problems in the administration of the islands and I believe that no one to whom the future of this people is a responsible concern can countenance a policy fraught with the direst consequence to those on whose behalf it is ostensibly urged.

In the Philippine Islands we have embarked upon an experiment in dealing with dependent peoples
 . . . To confer independence upon the Filipinos now is, therefore, to subject the great mass of their people to the dominance of an oligarchical and, probably, exploiting minority. Such a course will be as cruel to those people as it would be shameful to us.

Our true course is to pursue steadily and courageously the path we have thus far followed; to guide the Filipinos into self-sustaining pursuits; to continue the cultivation of sound political habits through education and political practice; to encourage the diversification of industries; and to realize the advantages

of their industrial education by conservatively approved cooperative methods, at once checking the dangers of concentrated wealth and building up a sturdy, independent citizenship. We should do all this with a disinterested endeavor to secure for the Filipinos economic independence and to fit them for complete self-government, with the power to decide eventually, according to their own largest good, whether such self-government shall be accompanied by independence. A present declaration even of future independence would retard progress by the dissension and disorder it would arouse. On our part it would be a disingenuous attempt, under the guise of conferring a benefit on them, to relieve ourselves from the heavy and difficult burden which thus far we have been bravely and consistently sustaining. It would be a disguised policy of scuttle. It would make the helpless Filipino the foot-ball of Oriental politics, under the protection of a guaranty of their independence which we would be powerless to enforce.¹

However sound the advice of Taft may have been, and he certainly knew more about the Philippines than any other President or cabinet officer we have ever had, his power to control United States Philippine policy was seriously diminished. The control of Philippine policy was placed in other hands which promised a different policy even though the Philippine issue had played little if any part in determining the winner in the election of 1912.

1. House document 1067, 62 Cong., 3 sess., (Washington: Government Printing office, 1912), p. 12-14.

Ch. VIII. Modifying the Tariff

The tariff bill passed by the Republicans in 1902 was not destined to exist very long without criticism and attempts at modification--attempts which were regularly successful when it came to modifying the Philippine tariff and regularly unsuccessful, until 1909, when it came to modifying the United States tariff on Philippine goods.

The inadequacy of the existing tariff legislation to bring prosperity to the Philippines was recognized by the Philippine Commission at an early date. They had favored a greater reduction than that of 25% which had been provided for in the act of March 8, 1902. In their annual report, dated November 1, 1902, they recommended, in part

The reduction of at least 75% of the Dingley rates of duties upon goods imported into the United States from the Philippine Islands.¹

The session of Congress following this recommendation, the second session of the 57th Congress, saw the first attempt to carry this recommendation into effect.

Cooper of Wisconsin introduced a bill (H. R. 15702), December 5, 1902, which provided that products of the Philippines should pay 25% of the regular duties. It was referred to the Committee on Ways and Means.² Payne reported the bill from that Committee with a report on

-
1. House document 2, Vol. 10, part 1, 57 Cong., 2 sess., (Washington: Government printing office, 1903), p. 9.
 2. Congressional Record, 57 Cong., 2 sess., (Washington: Government Printing office, 1902), p. 73.

on December 17.¹ The report said the bill would increase the revenue of the Philippines and stimulate industry there. No change in the rates on goods from the United States to the Philippines was included because of the provisions of the treaty with Spain.² The bill was considered in the House the next day. Richardson of Tennessee moved to recommit the bill to the Ways and Means Committee with instructions to report a bill providing for free trade both ways. It failed by a vote of 94 to 122.³ The 94 yeas consisted of 90 Democrats, 3 Republicans, and 1 Populist. The 122 nays were all Republicans. The geographic divisions is shown on map no. 10.

The bill was then passed without a record vote⁴ both Democrats and Republicans favoring the reduction in duties. We thus see the policy of the Republicans favoring the reduction in duties. We thus see the policy of the Republican party changing between the first and second sessions of the 57th Congress.

The bill (H. R. 15702) was referred, December 20, to the Committee on the Philippines in the Senate⁵ and reported by Lodge with certain amendments on January 22.⁶ The amendments proposed were to admit

1. Ibid., p. 421.

2. H. Rept. 2907, 57-2, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1902)


3. Congressional Record, 57 Cong., 2 sess., op. cit., p. 432.

4. Ibid., p. 433.

5. Ibid., p. 468.

6. Ibid., p. 1062.

Map No. 10. House vote on Richardson's motion to recommit H. R. 15702 with instructions to report a free trade bill, December 18, 1902.



Yeas 94 (3 R, 90 D, 1 P)
Nays 122 (all R)
Not voting.

Philippine products free except for sugar and tobacco upon which a duty of 50% of the regular duty would be imposed. Materials for the construction and equipment of railroads would be admitted to the Philippines free of duty.¹

To the statement of some Senators that they preferred the duty of 25% to the Committee amendment of 50%, Lodge expressed his agreement. He said, however, that getting a vote on the bill with the 25% rate would be very difficult and he preferred the reduction of 50% rather than no reduction. The amendment of the Committee to change the rate in the bill from 25% to 50% was agreed to 20 to 19.² Twenty-five Republicans (Aldrich and Wetmore of R. I., Alger of Mich., Bard and Perkins of Cal., Beveridge and Fairbanks of Ind., Burnham of N. H., Clark and Warren of Wyo., Deboe of Ky., Depew of N. Y., Dietrich of Nebr., Dillingham of Vt., Dryden and Kean of N. J., Frye of Me., Gamble and Kittredge of S. Dak., Hanna of Ohio, Hansbrough of N. Dak., Lodge of Mass., Penrose of Pa., Platt of Conn., and Spooner of Wis.), 3 Democrats (McEwen and Foster of La. and Patterson of Colo.) and 1 Silver Republican who soon became a Democrat (Teller of Colo.) voted for the amendment. Eleven Democrats (Bacon of Ga., Bate and Carmack of Tenn., Blackburn of Ky., Cockrell of Mo., Daniel of Va., Mallory and Taliaferro of Fla., Pettus of Ala., Simmons of N. C. and Tillman of S. C.), and 8 Republicans (Clapp and Nelson of Minn., Foraker of Ohio,

1. Senate reprot 2586, 57 Congress, 2 session, (Washington: Government Printing office, 1903).

2. Congressional Record, 57 Cong., 2 sess., op. cit., p. 3000.

Wellington of Md., Quarles of Wis., Quay of Pa., Stewart of Nev., and Gallinger of N. H.) voted against the amendment. The geographic division of the vote is shown on map no. 11. This is not a true picture of the sentiment of the Senate on the measure because many senators voted for the amendment since they believed it would be impossible to get a vote on the bill without that amendment. It was impossible even to get a vote on the bill with the 50% provision during this session of Congress. In fact the Senate was not to vote on a bill reducing the duties on Philippine products until 1909 due largely to opposition of senators from sugar states.

The Philippine Commission in its report for 1903 was again to recommend

Legislation which shall reduce the tariff on sugar and tobacco imported from the Philippine Islands to not more than 25% per centum of the present Dingley rates on tobacco and sugar imported from foreign countries.¹

Congress did not undertake consideration of this recommendation until the last session of Congress when two measures affecting United States tariff relations with the Philippines were considered.


Sereno Payne of New York introduced, January 23, 1895, a bill (H. R. 18195) to modify the Philippine tariff and it was referred to the Committee on Ways and Means.² February 12, Payne reported H. R. 18965 as a substitute for H. R. 18195.³

1. House document 2, Vol. 5, 58 Cong., 2 sess., (Washington: Government Printing office, 1903), p. 9.

2. Congressional record, 58 Cong., 3 sess., (Washington: Government Printing office, 1905), p. 1274.

3. Ibid., p. 2508.

Map No. 11. Senate vote on Lodge amendment (50% duties) to H. R. 15702, February 14, 1903.



The report which accompanied the bill stated, in part,

The general purpose of this bill . . . is to give the United States what benefits there are arising from classifications of goods. There is no preference in rates given to goods coming from the United States for the reason that by the terms of the treaty of Paris Spain would have the same right to a similar preference on goods imported from Spain to the Philippine Islands until January, 1909.

.

The most important changes in schedules are as follows: Duties on manufactured tobacco are decreased one-half. . . On agricultural machinery, electrical machinery, and other machinery used largely in the islands, which can be produced in the United States, the duty is a nominal one, being 5% ad valorem 1

Payne was able to obtain consideration for his measure when he explained that it was a revenue measure applicable only to imports into the Philippines and having nothing to do with Philippine sugar coming to the United States.² A motion by Cooper of Texas to recommit the bill with instructions to give free trade privileges in the Philippine Islands for United States iron, cotton goods, leather, wheat, rice, meats, and fish failed by a vote of 84 to 109. The bill then passed without a vote.³ In the Senate the bill was referred to the committee on the Philippines on February 22⁴ reported by Lodge the next day,⁵ and passed March 1 with an amendment prohibiting

-
1. House report 4600, 58 Cong., 3 sess., (Washington: Government Printing office, 1905), p. 1-2.
 2. Congressional record, 58 Cong. 3 sess., op. cit., 2993.
 3. Ibid., p. 3005.
 4. Ibid., p. 3022.
 5. Ibid., p. 3131.

the sale of opium except for medicinal purposes.¹ The House agreed to this amendment the same day² and the President signed the bill March 3, 1905.³

The last measure considered by Congress was not to become law. January 14, 1905, Charles Curtis of Kansas introduced a bill (H. R. 17752) which was referred to the Committee on Ways and Means.⁴ Rather extensive hearings were held on this bill, the first of three such hearings on the subject of duties on Philippine products held during the year. In August, Secretary Taft took a party of Congressmen to the Philippines where hearings were held and in December further hearings were held in Washington. These hearings represent an all out attempt by the administration to reduce the duties on Philippine products imported into the United States. At the hearing held on H. R. 17752 in Washington, Col. George R. Colton, Collector of Customs for the Philippine government at Iloilo, said,

The Philippines are so situated geographically and the market conditions such that China will continue to buy the island sugar without competition and, therefore, at such ruinous prices that the industry must be wiped out unless relief is given. The Philippine planters, in requesting the removal of the tariff against their sugar, ask, in effect, that the home Government assist them by

-
1. Ibid., p. 3714.
 2. Ibid., p. 3786.
 3. Ibid., p. 4033.
 4. Ibid., p. 890.

that means to obtain a fair price for their product from their present consumers, the Chinese, and the assistance will be none the less appreciated because it costs nothing.

Any fear that the removal of the tariff will endanger the sugar industry in the United States appears at once ridiculous when the facts are known. In their most prosperous year, the Philippines produced but 7% of the quantity imported into the United States last year, and the crop of that year would be an insignificant quantity in comparison with the American imports for any year of the last half century.

.....

It has been suggested, however, that if the tariff were removed the production might be enormously increased at once, and the whole lot exported to the United States. The first possibility is disposed of by the well-settled fact that Philippine sugar will go to China in preference to either Europe or America at the same or a slightly lower price. China must now have the sugar and will pay what competition forces, but no more.

The possibility of an increase in the production over the crops of former years, when the industry was on a paying basis, is exceedingly remote, for the reason that neither labor nor work animals are available. It is with the greatest difficulty that planters obtain sufficient labor to work the diminished crops now grown, and can often only do so by paying a large share of the season's wages in advance, which often results in loss.

.....

From personal observation of the conditions and a careful study of the people engaged in producing sugar in the Philippines during a residence there covering the period of American occupation, I am firmly of the opinion, as all agree who have studied the question on the ground, that an increased price for the produce, which might be brought about by the competition that would be furnished by a removal of the customs tax in this country, would only result in a return to the normal production attained in years past when the market conditions have been favorable. Further extension of the industry can only occur very gradually through an increase in the population of the sugar-producing islands or the importation of coolie labor, which is prohibited.

Thus free trade in sugar with the United States would benefit our people to the extent of the present tariff, less the freight to New York; enable the employment of our available labor in the remunerative production of sugar; bring back prosperity to our impoverished islands, and with it contentment and appreciation on the part of these loyal people, while not adding materially to the exports from the islands to the United States and in no way competing with the beet-sugar growers of America. New York would still fix the market price which the Chinese merchants would have to pay for our crops, as it does to-day, the difference being that such market price would be natural and untrammelled, and the American people would be extending a helping hand to the most industrious and loyal inhabitants of their oriental possessions without disadvantage to themselves.¹

Of the two main predictions of Colton, and the ideas put forth by Colton were to be advanced at practically every hearing on the Philippine tariff until the removal of the duties of 1909, the first was later shown to be not true, however, reasonable it may have seemed at the time. Philippine sugar did not continue to go to China at the higher prices occasioned by the American tariff but instead began to go to the United States almost exclusively after 1909. The other suggestion, that the production of sugar would not increase very rapidly, was fully borne out. In spite of the stimulus which came from free access to the United States market and the World War sugar shortage, and with increased production due to better yielding varieties of cane and improved refining methods through modern sugar centrals which extracted more of the sugar from the cane than the

1. Duties on Philippine products, Hearings on H. R. 17752 before House Ways and Means Committee, (Washington: Government Printing office, 1905), p. 170-172.

old muscovado mills did, the production of sugar did not reach the level of the pre-American production until the 1920's, almost 20 years after Colton made his statement.

Later the same day we have the following colloquy between Representative Hill of Connecticut and Mr. Colton:

Mr. Hill. Before these hearings began, I said to my tobacco growers in Connecticut that from personal observation I thought . . . that there was no occasion to fear Philippine competition on tobacco, because I thought that with freer trade between the Philippines and the United States Connecticut tobacco-wrapper growers would sell to the Philippine Islands a great deal of tobacco in the form of wrappers to wrap their cigars.

In your judgment, was I wholly wrong or partially right?

Colonel Colton. I think you were probably correct.

Mr. Hill. Then you think that the opportunity for the trade in the Orient, a better trade and better commercial relations, would tend to increase the trade in that direction rather than in this?

Colonel Colton. Yes, sir.¹

The domestic beet and cane sugar interests, many growers of cigar wrappers, and the cigar makers appeared in opposition to a reduction of duty on Philippine products. These persons did not make a very favorable impression on the committee.

The report of the majority stated,

The only logical result from our possession of the Philippine Islands is free trade between the islands and the rest of the United States. It is definitely settled

1. Ibid., p. 174.

that we retain them until the people are prepared for self-government It is now as much our "plain duty" to give them free trade as soon as practicable as it was in the case of Porto Rico.

It would be manifestly unjust, however, to give them free access to our markets while they collect the same rate of duty upon articles imported from the States that they do upon articles coming from the rest of the world. The free entry of our products into the Philippine Islands is impractical at the present time. The treaty of Paris provides that Spain shall have the same advantage in tariff duties on exports to the Philippine Islands that the United States receives for a period of ten years. This treaty stipulation expires by its own limitation in January, 1900. Until that time we can not give our products free entry into the Philippine Islands without giving the same privilege to Spain. Such a measure would greatly cripple the revenues of the Philippine Islands.

.

By the terms of the Philippine tariff bill . . . imports into the Philippine Islands from the United States which are dutiable will pay an average rate of about 20%. It is but fair that a like duty should be levied and collected upon goods imported into the United States from the Philippine Islands. All the duty collected under this act goes without rebate into the Philippine treasury by force of existing law. Whatever revenue results from this bill will therefore be added to the Philippine government

When the treaty clause expires, if the revenues are otherwise sufficient, there will no longer exist any reason for a duty on imports either way, and the Philippine Islands will take their place with Hawaii and Porto Rico, so far as revenue laws are concerned, while that territory belongs to the United States.¹

The minority (Democrats) then said,

. . . . the minority of the committee believe that the anomalous and preposterous status of the Philippine Islands--by which they are treated as American territory for certain

1. House report 4867, 58 Cong., 3 sess., (Washington: Government Printing office, 1905), p. 1-2.

purposes and foreign or semiforeign territory for certain other purposes--can not be long maintained and should be immediately terminated.

.....
 So long as we retain them we favor the establishment and maintenance of free trade betwixt them and the United States.

An amendment which would abolish tariff duties both ways and export duties on goods from the Philippine Islands to the United States was described. The report concludes,

If the substitute herein proposed is voted down we will support H. R. 17752, on the principle that it is a step in the right direction.¹

This proposed legislation was not acted upon by the House of Representatives. In these last two measures we can see the difference in attitude of Congress toward Philippine duties on United States products and the United States duties on Philippine products. The bill modifying the Philippine tariff bill for the benefit of United States exporters had been introduced January 23 and was signed by President ^{the} March 3. The bill modifying United States duties on Philippine products was introduced January 14 and was not even acted on by the House of Representatives.

The 59th Congress treated the Philippines in many ways just as the 58th Congress had done. Payne again introduced a bill (H. R. 3) to amend the Philippine Islands revenue act of March 8, 1902 and it was

1. Ibid., p. 5.

referred to the Committee on Ways and Means.¹ The bill was reported back from Committee Dec. 20² with a report which reprinted the report on H. R. 17752 of the previous Congress and made some additional comments of no particular importance. The minority again wanted immediate free trade. They thought that dissatisfaction with economic relations might cause some groups to cooperate with them in plans for Philippine independence.³ The bill came before the House of Representatives for a vote on January 16, 1906. A motion by William Alden Smith of Michigan to change the rate of tariff on sugar and tobacco from 25% to 60% was defeated 73 to 197.⁴ An amendment by McCall of Massachusetts indicating that it was not the intention of the United States to hold the Philippine Islands permanently but to leave the government to the people of the islands when they were capable of exercising self-government was held by the chair to be not germane after a point of order was made on it. The chair was upheld by the house by a vote of 198 to 123.⁵

An amendment by Fordney of Michigan requiring all sugar imported from the Philippine Islands in excess of 200,000 tons a year to pay the

-
1. Congressional record, 59 Congress, 1 session, (Washington: Government Printing office, 1905), p. 45.
 2. Ibid., p. 636.
 3. House report 20, 59 Cong., 1 sess., (Washington: Government Printing office, 1905), 2 parts.
 4. Congressional Record, op. cit., p. 1140.
 5. Ibid., p. 1146.

regular duty and to provide a sliding scale of duties on tobacco depending on the quantity imported failed by a vote of 66 to 126.¹ A motion of Pujo of Louisiana to place Philippine rice on the 25% list was passed 64 to 50.²

The minority proposed, as a substitute for H. R. 3, a bill (H. R. 406) for free trade introduced by Williams of Mississippi. The substitute was rejected 106 to 232.³ The 106 yeas were all Democrats. The 232 nays consisted of 221 Republicans and 11 Democrats. The geographic distribution is shown on map no. 12.


On the passage of the bill the vote was yeas 259 and nays 71.⁴ The 259 yeas consisted of 161 Republicans and 98 Democrats. The geographic division is shown on map no. 13. Independence was to come when these anti-free trade areas, with a few others added, joined the Democrats in advocating independence.

The bill in the Senate was referred to the Committee on the Philippines⁵ from which it never emerged.

A bill to modify the Philippine tariff was to receive different treatment. Payne introduced a bill (H. R. 9978) for this purpose on December 21, 1905, the bill being referred to the Committee on Ways


-
1. Ibid., p. 1146.
 2. Ibid., p. 1149.
 3. Ibid., p. 1162-63.
 4. Ibid., p. 1163-64.
 5. Ibid., p. 1173.

Map No. 12. House vote on William's free trade substitute for H. R. 3, January 16, 1906.



Yeas 106 (all D)
Nays 232 (11 D, 221 R)
Not voting.

Map No. 13. House vote on passage of H. R. 3, January 16, 1906.



and Means.¹ Four days later he reported a substitute bill (H. R. 13104).² The bill passed the House February 9, 1906,³ was referred to the Senate Committee on the Philippines February 12,⁴ passed the Senate with no objection on February 22,⁵ and was signed by the President, February 26, 1906.⁶ This bill, said the Senate Committee on the Philippines, embodied the classification of cotton goods recommended by the Philippine Tariff committee of the Merchants' association of New York. The new classification would give the narrow looms of the United States an advantage in Philippine tariff rates over the double width looms in Europe.⁷

That fall the Philippine Commission, in their annual report dated September 15, 1906, was to make the following recommendations, in part,

First. Legislation which shall reduce the duties on sugar and tobacco exported from the Philippine Islands into the United States to not more than 25% of the present rates fixed by what is known as the "Dingley tariff law."

.....

Fifth. That that portion of section two of the Act of Congress approved March 8, 1902 . . . which requires that all export

1. Ibid., p. 672.

2. Ibid., p. 1588.

3. Ibid., p. 2391.

4. Ibid., p. 2424.

5. Ibid., p. 2835.

6. Ibid., p. 3069.

7. Senate report 1178, 59 Congress, 1 session, (Washington: Government Printing office, 1906).

duties upon articles exported from the Philippine Islands and consumed in the United States shall be refunded, be repealed.¹

In his annual report, Taft also was to emphasize the unfairness of refunding these export duties when the goods were shipped to the United States. He said,

I concur in the recommendation of the Commission that that provision of the Act of Congress which takes out of the Philippine treasury the export tax which it collects on exports of hemp, if the hemp is conveyed directly to an American port, be repealed. This is a discrimination in favor of a special interest in America, is a selfish exploitation of the hemp industry in the islands, gives proper cause to the English and the French to complain, and deprives the treasury of the islands of a part of its income without just cause.²

One might add that it deprived both the Philippine treasury and the producers of hemp of the Philippine Islands of money without any compensating advantages to either, such as might have occurred through abolishing the United States duty on sugar, tobacco, etc.

The last tariff legislation considered by Congress while Theodore Roosevelt was President was a bill (H. R. 21449) to modify the Philippine tariff law. It was introduced by Payne on April 30, 1908³ and was passed by the House May 27 by a vote of 174 to 41.⁴ The 174 yeas consisted of 130 Republicans and 44 Democrats. The 41 nays consisted of 39 Democrats and 2 Republicans. The geographic

1. House document 2, Vol. VII, part 1, 59 Congress, 1 session, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1906), p. 72-73.

2. Ibid., Vol. I, p. 87.

3. Congressional record, 60 Cong., 1 sess., (Washington: Government Printing office, 1908), p. 5509.

4. Ibid., p. 7097.

distribution is shown on map No. 14. The bill as passed by the House of Representatives placed agricultural machinery and implements, machinery and apparatus for repairing roads, and steam and other motive plows on the Philippine free list. There were a few other unimportant changes suggested for the existing Philippine tariff act.¹ The bill died in the Senate Committee on the Philippines to which it was referred May 28, 1908.²

One of the planks of the platform on which Taft was elected was tariff "revision." He considered that statement a mandate for immediate action and after his inauguration in 1909 immediately convened Congress in special session.

Out of the 1st session of the 61st Congress came two pieces of legislation bearing on the Philippines. The first was the Payne-Aldrich bill (H. R. 1438) modifying the tariff of the United States. The second was a bill (H. R. 9135) again revising the Philippine tariff law.

March 18, 1909, Payne reported H. R. 1438 from the Committee on Ways and Means.³ April 8, a motion requiring rice from the Philippines to pay the same duty as rice from any foreign country was agreed to by the House of Representatives by a vote of 123 to 75.⁴


1. Ibid., p. 1093.

2. Ibid., p. 7104.

3. Congressional record, 61 Cong., 1 sess., (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1909), p.

4. Ibid., p. 1226-28.

Map No. 14. House vote on H. R. 21449 (placing certain goods on Philippine free list or low duty list.)
April 30, 1908.



After being passed by the House, the bill was referred to the Senate. An amendment by Stone of Missouri which provided for no permanent sovereignty but for authority over the Philippine Islands for not over 15 years in order for them to organize and establish a native government and to negotiate international agreements for the independence of the islands was rejected 18 to 44.¹ The 18 yeas were all Democrats. The 44 nays were all Republicans except for Chamberlain, Democrat from Oregon.


An amendment proposed by LaFollette which would have reduced from 150,000,000 to 60,000,000 the number of cigars to be admitted free of duty was rejected 27 to 38.² The 27 yeas consisted of 19 Democrats and 8 Republicans. The 38 nays were all Republicans. The geographic division is shown on map No. 15.

Fletcher of Florida proposed an amendment to continue the rates of duty paid on Philippine goods by existing law. It was rejected 26 to 43,³ the 26 yeas consisting of 21 Democrats and 5 Republicans and the 43 nays being all Republicans. Borah of Idaho, Bristow of Kan., Clapp of Minn., Dixon of Mont., and LaFollette of Wis. joined the Democrats to vote for the existing rates of duty. The geographic division is shown on map No. 16.

The act was approved by President Taft August 5, 1909.


-
1. Ibid., p. 3211.
 2. Ibid., p. 3251.
 3. Ibid., p. 3325.

Map No. 15. Senate vote on LaFollette cigar amendment, June 15, 1909.



■ Yeas 27 (19 D, 8 R)
■ Nays 38 (all R)
■ Not voting

Map No. 16. Senate vote on Fletcher amendment to Payne-Aldrich bill to continue existing rates of duty,
June 16, 1909.



Section 5 related to the Philippines and it provided,

All articles, the growth or product of or manufactured in the Philippine Islands from materials the growth and product of the Philippine Islands or of the United States, or of both, or which do not contain foreign materials to the value of more than twenty percentum of their total value, upon which no drawback of customs duties has been allowed therein, coming into the United States from the Philippine Islands shall hereafter be admitted free of duty, except rice, and except in any fiscal year, sugar in excess of three hundred thousand gross tons, wrapper tobacco and filler tobacco when mixed or packed with more than fifteen percentum of wrapper tobacco in excess of three hundred thousand pounds, filler tobacco in excess of one million pounds, and cigars in excess of one hundred and fifty million cigars . . . and Provided further . . . that all articles the growth, product, or manufacture of the United States, upon which no drawback of customs duties has been allowed therein, shall be admitted to the Philippine Islands free of duty . . . And provided further, That all articles . . . admitted to the ports of the United States free of duty . . . shall be hereafter exempt from the payment of any export duties imposed in the Philippine Islands . . .

Articles coming from the Philippine Islands upon which the United States imposes an internal revenue tax shall pay an equal tax and goods going from either the United States or foreign countries to the Philippine Islands shall pay a tax equal to the Philippine internal-revenue tax, with all money collected under these provisions going to the Philippine government.¹

The bill (H. R. 9135) revising the Philippine tariff law was introduced by Payne May 3, 1909 and referred to the Committee on Ways and Means.² It was reported back by Payne May 10³ and passed by the House on May 24 by a vote of 139 to 68.⁴ The next day it was

-
1. U. S. Statutes at Large, 61 Congress, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1911), p. 84-86.
 2. Congressional Record, op. cit., p. 1689.
 3. Ibid., p. 1891.
 4. Ibid., p. 2338.

referred to the Committee on the Philippines in the Senate. ¹ It was reported back on July 2, 1909² and passed the Senate with amendments, July 9, 1909.³ The conference committee report was accepted by both the House and Senate and the bill was signed by the President, August 5, 1909.⁴ The bill was a comprehensive tariff bill for the Philippines and has never been systematically revised since that date. It stated the duties to be levied on all goods imported into the Philippine Islands. The following exceptions to the tariff law were made:

Sec. 12. All articles, except rice, the growth, product, or manufacture of the United States or its possessions to which the customs tariff in force in the United States is applied and upon which no drawback of customs duties has been allowed therein, going into the Philippine Islands shall hereafter be admitted free of duty

Sec. 13 All articles the growth and product of the Philippine Islands coming directly from said islands to the United States or any of its possessions for use and consumption therein, shall be exempt from any export duty imposed in the Philippine Islands. 5

These two laws thus establish the free trade relationship between the United States and the Philippine Islands, except for rice, and except for quotas on sugar and tobacco. These quotas were greater than the existing exportation of these products.

In 1913, the Democrats were in control of the Presidency, the

1. Ibid., p. 2352.

2. Ibid., p. 4020.

3. Ibid., p. 4337.

4. Ibid., p. 5096.

5. U. S. Statutes at Large, 61 Congress; op. cit., p. 173-174.

Senate, and the House of Representatives. The Underwood-Simmons tariff bill (H. R. 3321) was signed by President Wilson October 3, 1913. Section IV C relates to the Philippines and reproduces the Philippine section of the Payne-Aldrich bill except that there are no quotas on the duty-free importation of sugar and tobacco.¹

Complete free trade thus became the established policy of the United States in its relationship with the Philippines, a trade relationship that was to continue without modification until 1934 when the Tydings-McDuffie act established a new set of trade regulations.

1. U. S. Statutes at Large, 63 Cong., (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1915), p. 192-193.

CHAPTER IX

PHILIPPINE TRANSPORTATION PROBLEMS

In no field of endeavor was greater disappointment to come to the United States in her relation to the Philippines than in the field of transportation and communication. The failure of the merchant marine to grow, even after the acquisition of the Philippines, was a constant disappointment to many people in the United States.

The failure of railroad development in the Philippines could not be explained on the basis of incompetency, such as was often stated to be the cause of failure of the merchant marine to develop. The United States had just emerged from a period of rapid construction of an extraordinarily successful system of railroads. The construction of railroads into new parts of the United States had been immediately followed by the rapid development of those regions. This hopeful attitude was to be carried to the Philippines where disappointment was to be the lot of those who carried such dreams. The development of the unsettled parts of the islands did not follow the construction of railroads. Much legislation, however, was to be enacted and discussed designed to correct the twin difficulties of inadequate railroad and steamship facilities in and with the Philippines.

The legislation enacted during the fifty-seventh Congress had

deferred until July 1, 1904 the application of the United States coastwise shipping regulations to trade with the Philippine Islands.

The Philippine Commission had recommended in their report, dated December 23, 1903, that control over interisland shipping be given to the Commission and that the application of the coastwise shipping regulations be deferred until July 1, 1909 or in the alternative that the application of the coastwise shipping regulations to the Philippine Islands be coupled with the reduction of duties on Philippine products to 25% of the Dingley tariff rates.¹

A bill (S. 2259) to give the Philippine Commission jurisdiction over interisland shipping had been introduced by Frye of Maine and referred to the Committee on the Philippines on December 8, 1903,² before the report of the Philippine Commission was published. Lodge reported it back from the Committee on the Philippines December 17.³ An amendment by Carmack of Tennessee to change from July 1, 1904 to July 1, 1909 the date when the coastwise shipping laws of the United States would be extended to the Philippines was rejected 13 to 33.⁴ Lodge proposed to change the date for the application of the above mentioned laws from 1904 to 1905. Carmack proposed to amend Lodge's amendment by changing 1905 to 1906 and, on motion of Lodge, Carmack's amendment was tabled by a vote of 37 to 15.⁵ Lodge's

-
1. House document 2, Vol. V, 58 Cong., 2 sess., op. cit., p. 9-10.
 2. Congressional record, 58 Cong., 2 sess., op. cit., p. 32.
 3. Ibid., p. 313.
 4. Ibid., p. 2600.
 5. Ibid., p. 2660.

amendment was then agreed to.¹ The bill passed the Senate March 9, 1904 without a roll call.² It was referred to the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries March 10.³ Taft, who had just recently been promoted from the position of civil governor of the Philippines to Secretary of War, issued a statement to the Associated Press March 22 which is made part of the report of the Committee. The Associated Press story stated, in part,

The Secretary explained that the bill as it passed the Senate was the result of a compromise between Senators Lodge and Allison, to which he had assented, by means of which two things were accomplished: First, that complete freedom of action on the part of the Philippine Commission in respect to interisland shipping is secured; and, second, the application of the coastwise shipping laws to the trans-Pacific trade is postponed for a year, so as to give time to impress Congress with the justice and necessity of reducing the Dingley tariffs on sugar and tobacco to 25% or to a much smaller figure.

The Secretary said that he is not opposed to making the coastwise shipping laws applicable to the trans-Pacific and Atlantic trade if the Philippines have the advantage of the American markets, because he thought in that way American capital would be attracted to the islands and to the development of their business. 4

The Committee reported the bill without amendments on March 25.⁵ April 8, Birdsall of Iowa moved to substitute 1906 for 1905 in the bill.⁶ Spight of Mississippi then moved to amend the amendment by inserting 1909 in lieu of 1906. The motion was rejected 123 to 126.⁷

1. Loc. cit.

2. Ibid., p. 3038.

3. Ibid., p. 3095.

4. House report 1904, 58 Cong., 2 sess., (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1904), p. 11.

5. Congressional Record, op. cit., p. 3732.

6. Ibid., p. 4500.

7. Loc. cit.

The 123 yeas were made up of 106 Democrats and 17 Republicans. The 126 nays were made up of 123 Republicans, 1 Democrat, and the 2 Union Labor Democrats in this Congress. The geographic distribution is shown on map no. 17. Birdsell's amendment was then agreed to without a division.¹

The House amendments were agreed to in the Senate the next day.² The bill was signed by the President April 15, 1904.³

The act prohibited in section 1, the carrying of goods, except for supplies for the Army and Navy, between ports of the United States and of the Philippine archipelago after July 1, 1906 except in vessels of the United States. Penalty for violation of this order was forfeiture of the goods. Section 2 placed a penalty of \$200 on carrying of each passenger between ports of the United States and of the Philippine Islands. Section 3 allowed the government of the Philippines to regulate interisland shipping. By Section 6, the tonnage tax on foreign vessels was to be the same when they came from the Philippine Islands as when they came from foreign countries. Spain's rights were not to be considered impaired by any provision of this act according to Sec. 7.⁴

The coastwise shipping laws were destined never to be applied to trade between the United States and the Philippine Islands.


1. Ibid., p. 4501.

2. Ibid., p. 4551.

3. Ibid., p.

4. U. S. Statutes at Large, 58 Congress, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1905), part 1, p. 181-182.

Map No. 17. House vote on Spight amendment to Birdall amendment to S. 2259, April 8, 1904.



Congress was to delay the application of these laws twice in the succeeding five years and was to again explore the possibility of applying them in the 1920's.

The first of these actions was begun April 11, 1906 when Crumpacker of Indiana introduced a bill (H. R. 18025) delaying coastwise shipping laws to the Philippine Islands. The bill was referred to the Committee on Insular Affairs¹ which reported it without amendment two days later.² On April 16, a motion to suspend the rules and pass the bill carried by a vote of 217 to 27.³ The bill was referred in the Senate the next day to the Committee on the Philippines⁴ which reported it out April 18.⁵ The bill was passed without amendment by the Senate on April 24. Senators Frye of Maine, Galliger of N. H., and Lodge of Mass. expressed a desire for the house to pass the ship subsidy bill. They would have liked to have held out on this bill if there had not been such a short time before the act would expire.⁶ The president signed the bill April 30, 1906.⁷

Further action on the application of the coastwise shipping laws came two years later when another bill to postpone the application of these laws was proposed. Lodge introduced a bill (S. 5262) on

1. Congressional Record, 59 Cong., 1 sess., (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1906), p. 5108.

2. Ibid., p. 5253.

3. Ibid., p. 5335-42.

4. Ibid., p. 5375.

5. Ibid., p. 5513.

6. Ibid., p. 5778.

7. Ibid., p. 6464.

February 12, 1908 which was referred to the Committee on the Philippines.¹ This committee reported the bill back with Amendments on February 28.² The amendments were agreed to and the bill passed the Senate on March 24.³ The next day, in the House, it was referred to the Committee on Insular Affairs,⁴ which reported it back to the House April 21.⁵ The committee was unanimous in reporting the bill. They said American shipping companies had had ample notice to provide the necessary ships and had neglected to do so. If the coastwise shipping regulations were applied to the Philippines, freight rates between the Philippine Islands and the United States would rise and the trade of the Philippines would go to other countries.⁶ The motion to suspend the rules and pass the bill carried by a vote of 221 to 4.⁷ The president signed the bill April 30.⁸ This act provided that vessels owned in the Philippine Islands were to be regulated by the government of the Philippine Islands until action was taken by Congress, that tonnage taxes collected on foreign vessels

-
1. Congressional Record, 60 Cong., 1 sess., (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1908), p. 1888.
 2. Ibid., p. 2635.
 3. Ibid., p. 3789.
 4. Ibid., p. 3934.
 5. Ibid., p. 5045.
 6. House report 1475, 60 Cong., 1 sess., (Washington: Government Printing office, 1908).
 7. Congressional Record, op. cit., p. 5083-84.
 8. Ibid., p.

from foreign countries should be paid on foreign vessels from the Philippines, that the application of the coastwise shipping laws of the United States to Philippines should be suspended until Congress acted upon it, that the government of the Philippines should enforce the United States shipping regulations in the islands, and that the act to regulate shipping, passed April 30, 1906,¹ be repealed.

Twelve years and a great war were to go by before there was a renewal of agitation for the extension of United States coastwise shipping laws to the Philippines. By that time the United States had on hand the large fleet bought and built by the United States Shipping Board. Congress, due to the shipping^{shortage} during the war, was again interested in building up and maintaining a merchant fleet. A simple bill (H. R. 10378) was introduced by Green of Massachusetts on November 5, 1919 and referred to the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries,² reported by that Committee the next day,³ and passed by the House November 8, 1919 by a vote of 240 to 8.⁴ It contained no provisions relating to the Philippines. In the Senate the bill was referred to the Committee on Commerce on November 11, 1919.⁵ When

1. U. S. Statutes at Large, 60th Congress, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 19), p. 70.

2. Congressional Record, 66 Cong., 1 sess., (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1919), p. 7998.

3. Ibid., p. 8052-53.

4. Ibid., p. 8173.

5. Ibid., p. 8267.

reported from Committee by Jones of Washington, May 4, 1920,¹ many far-reaching amendments had been included. These amendments, added by the Commerce committee, first make the bill of importance to the Philippines. The amendment which related to the Philippines provided for the extension of "The coastwise laws of the United States . . . to the island Territories and possessions . . . not now covered thereby" one year after the enactment of the act. *The* Shipping Board ^{was} directed to establish service to the Philippines and the President was empowered to extend the period allowed the Shipping Board to establish service.²

In the Senate this action provoked some discussion. Senator Nelson of Minnesota said on May 10, 1920,

There are one or two other items in the bill to which I want to call attention. One is placing the Philippine Islands under the coastwise-trade provision. I regard that as the most wicked and cruel provision of the bill. Those islands are more than 10,000 miles from our shore; their products are shipped all over the world. By putting them under the coastwise trade you practically say that none of the products of the Philippine Islands shall come to America except in American ships under the American flag

Nearly all of the products of the Philippine Islands which have come to this country during the recent war have come to us, not in American ships, but in foreign ships. What will be the result if we adopted the proposed policy? It would be a death blow to the commerce and trade of the Philippine Islands, because they will not be able to ship any of their goods to America; the American market will be cut off from them unless ships flying

-
1. Congressional Record, 66 Cong., 2 sess., (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1920), p. 6494.
 2. Senate report 573, 66 Cong., 2 sess., (Washington: Government Printing office, 1920), p. 16.

the American flag are furnished for the transportation of their products. 1

In reply Senator Jones of Washington said,

. . . If we are going to have an American merchant marine, we shall have to take advantage of every opportunity we have to get it

Mr. President, the trade of the Philippines, between those Islands and this country, is ours if we see fit to take it, and why should we not take it? Why should we not have it as long as we retain the Philippine Islands? When the opportunity is at hand for us to say that the traffic between those islands and the United States shall be transported in American ships, and thereby build up that much trade for American shipping, encourage the building of American ships, and the establishment of American lines across the Pacific, where we need them so badly, why should we not do it? 2

On May 19, during the consideration of the Philippine section of the bill, Senator Jones offered a perfecting amendment which would allow the Government of the Philippine Islands to adopt regulations regarding interisland trade and shipping. The amendment was agreed to without a vote. 3

During conference committee deliberations on the bill, two changes were made in the Senate version of the bill which affected the Philippines. The section relating to the Philippines was to go into effect by February 1, 1922 rather than "within a year" of the passage of the act. The second change was to amend the section by adding at the end the following statement,

-
1. Congressional Record, op. cit., p. 6810.
 2. Ibid., p. 6811.
 3. Ibid., p. 7296.

. . . the foregoing provisions of this section shall not take effect with reference to the Philippine Islands until the President of the United States after a full investigation of the local needs and conditions shall, by proclamation declare that an adequate shipping service has been established as herein provided and fix a date for the going into effect of the same. 1

The bill was eventually passed and signed by the President June 5, 1920 without further changes in the section relating to the Philippines.

The President did not see fit to apply the coastwise shipping regulations to the Philippines so in the fall of 1929, Congress took the matter up again. The Committee on Commerce in the Senate appointed a sub-committee to conduct hearings at which Henry L. Stimson, then Secretary of State and just previously Governor-General of the Philippines, testified and ended that suggestion of extending the shipping laws to the Philippines. Stimson traced the historical development of restrictions of colonial and other shipping. He mentioned especially the hard struggle the United States had in persuading Great Britain to open her colonial ports to United States ships and how beneficial it was to the countries and their shipping when all restrictions on trade between the mother country and the colonies were removed. He mentioned that many countries allowed foreign shipping to trade between their colonies and the home country on condition that reciprocal rights should be extended to their shipping. Holland was one of the countries that had such a provision of law, so if the United States coastwise laws

1. House report 1095, 66 Cong., 2 sess., (Washington: Government Printing office, 1920), p. 9.

were extended to the Philippines, United States ships would be excluded from the Netherlands East Indies. England had considered discrimination, Stimson said, when proposals for extending the coastwise shipping laws to the islands were considered in 1920. The disadvantages to Philippine economy of extending these laws was also mentioned.¹ As a result further consideration of extending the laws was suspended. Agitation for Philippine independence was to suspend consideration of all other policies affecting the Philippines.

The United States was to make a greater impress on the Philippines through railroad construction than she had done in the matter of ocean transportation.

When the United States acquired the Philippines, there was just one short railroad in the islands--a line running from Manila northward for about 120 miles to Dagupan on Lingayan Gulf. The Commissioners felt that railroads would be of great benefit to the country by opening up new territory, breaking down linguistic barriers and performing other "civilizing" activities, and by promotion of general peace and prosperity. They felt that many new railroads would either immediately return a profit on investment or would do so very soon. The commission had authorized the construction of a branch to Antipolo of 16 miles

1. U. S. Congress. Senate Committee on Commerce. Hearing on S. J. Res 130, 71-2, (Washington: Government Printing office) 1930, p. 838-9.

and one from Guiguinto through San Isidro to Cabanatuan in Nueva Ecija acting under the authority to grant franchises contained in the organic act of July 1, 1902. Taft thought the following additional lines were needed in North Luzon: a road from Dagupan north to Laoag, one from Cabanatuan through Caraballa pass and down the Cagayan river to Aparri, and one from Dagupan to Baguio, the prospective (at that time) summer resort. In southern Luzon a line was needed from Manila to Santa Cruz, another from Manila through Calamba to Batanges, and another at the southern tip of Luzon from Pasacao on the west coast of Camarines through Ligao to Legaspi tapping the richest hemp region. In the Visayan islands a line was needed from Capi to Iloilo on the island of Panay, one from Escalante down the west coast of Occidental Negros, and one from Tacloban down the east coast of Leyte. One or two short lines in Mindanao were also needed.¹

Capital could be interested in Philippine railroad construction only by a guarantee of interest on capital invested. The Philippine Commission appeared before Congress and obtained the passage of the necessary legislation, as discussed above, the act being approved by the President on February 6, 1905. Negotiations for railway concessions were thereafter soon completed. The government was to have supervisory powers over routes and construction expense.

1. Committee reports, hearings, and acts of Congress corresponding thereto. Committee on Insular Affairs. 58 Congress, 1903-5, (Washington: Government Printing office, 1905), p. 115.

Concessions were granted to two companies. The Philippines Railroad Company was to construct about 300 miles of railroad on the islands of Panay, Cebu, and Negros in the Visayan Islands. This grant "involved the guaranty by the Philippine government . . . of the payment of 4% interest, for thirty years, upon 95% of the ascertained cost of the railroads to be constructed." The Manila railroad Company received a concessionary grant without guarantee of interest for 425 miles of new construction on the island of Luzon.¹

Within a year actual construction work was undertaken on these roads with some track being laid.² Rather rapid progress was made at the first with a seeming tendency to slow up after the first 4 or 5 years of construction.³

On December 31, 1908, the Secretary of War signed a contract with representatives of the Manila Railroad Company for the construction of a new port connection at Manila (3 miles), the Baguio extension (22 miles), and a line from Lucena to Nueva Caceres, the latter of which would connect the line from Manila to Lucena with the line in Ambos Camarines and Albay. The government guaranteed 4% interest on bonds issued by the company for the construction of these lines.⁴

-
1. House document 2, vol. 1, 59 Cong., 2 sess., (Washington: Government Printing office, 1908), p. 82-82.
 2. Report of Chief of Bureau of Insular Affairs, (Washington: Government Printing office, 1908), p. 6-8.
 3. of. Report of Chief of Bureau of Insular affairs, Report of Philippine Commission, or Report of Supervising Railway Expert in Philippine Commission Report for progress of construction for the years from 1907 to 1919.
 4. Report of Chief, Bureau of Insular Affairs for year ending June 30, 1909, (Washington: Government Printing office, 1909), p. 8.

The line on the island of Panay was placed in construction operation on August 28, 1910 and the line on the island of Cebu was in full commercial operation at least by November 30, 1910. The low financial returns which accompanied the construction of these lines in the Visayan islands resulted in a suspension of work on the proposed line on the island of Negros.¹ This line was never built.

Construction of railroads in the islands continued at a very slow rate after the original stimulus furnished by the interest guarantee. In 1917, the government bought the Manila Railroad which at that time had branches from the original main line to San Fernando in La Union province, and to Tayug, La Paz, Magalang, Florida Blanca, Arayat, Montalbon, and Cabanatuan along the northern lines and to Nais, Bantangas, Parsanjan, and Lucena on the southern lines, and from Nueva Caceras to Legaspi and Tobacco. At this time the Philippine Railroad Company had lines from Danao to Argao in Cebu and from Iloilo to Capiz in Panay but they were never to be commercially successful. The guarantee of interest had to be paid constantly and when the period of guaranteed interest expired, the government took them over as had been provided in the terms of the guarantee. The stockholders, of course, had the option of repaying the guaranteed interest and retaining control of the road but evidently felt it was not desirable to do so.

1. Report of Chief, Bureau of Insular Affairs for year ended June 30, 1910, (Washington, Government Printing office, 1910), p. 6-8.

Railroads did not fulfill the expectation of their advocates in the Philippines. Many lines seem to have been poorly located, especially those which had to compete with a nearby water route. Also railroads were being confronted with a new type of competition, namely the motor vehicle. The money spent on railroads might better have been spent on the construction of motor roads and providing vehicles to carry products. The high hopes of many persons for great profit to be made in the Philippines were not fulfilled in the case of railroads just as they were not to be fulfilled in many other lines of economic activity. The Philippines did not seem to be a region where quick, or even certain, profits were to be gained.

Ch. X. The Friar Lands

When the United States acquired the Philippines they acquired a land problem which was complicated with a problem of ecclesiastical administration.

Under the Spanish system in the Philippines, church and state were very closely bound together with church officials performing many governmental functions. Three religious orders also owned large amounts of agricultural land which was farmed by native tenants. Native Filipinos were excluded from the priesthood also. From these causes, among others, developed the insurrections of 1896 and 1898. The importance of church and land troubles in the rebellion is shown in a proclamation which, according to the Schurman commission, was widely circulated in the islands and seemed to represent their views. The proclamation stated as the end of the insurgent activity:

1. Expulsion of the friars and restitution to the townships of lands which the friars have appropriated, dividing the incumbencies held by them, as well as the episcopal sees, equally between peninsular and insular secular priests.

2. Spain must concede to us, as she has to Cuba, parliamentary representation, freedom of the press, toleration of all religious sects, laws common with hers and administrative and economic autonomy.

3. Equality in treatment and pay between peninsular and insular civil servants.

4. Restitution of all lands appropriated by the friars to the townships, or to the original owners, or in default of finding such owners, the state is to put them up to public auction in small lots of a value within the reach of all and payable within four years, the same as the present state lands.

5. Abolition of the Governmental authorities' power to banish citizens, as well as unjust measures against Filipinos; legal equality for all persons, whether peninsular or insular, under the civil as well as the penal code.¹

During the course of the insurrection as the Filipinos extended the territorial area under their control, the friars that were captured were treated rather harshly--treated as agents of the enemy. Some of them were killed, others escaped to Manila where first the Spanish and later the Americans protected them, and the remainder were confined in places where they could not act as spies for the Spanish government or as counter-revolutionaries against the Filipino insurgents. Meanwhile the Malolos government of the Filipino insurgents had confiscated the Friar lands.

This was the situation which existed February 4, 1899. With the rapid extension of American control after that date, many friars were released from detention by the Filipinos and some sought or expressed a desire to return to their parishes.

As the United States was bound by the treaty of peace, as well as by the Constitution, to protect life and property, a difficult problem was presented to the American administrators. It was almost universally recognized that a return of the friars to their parishes would result in trouble. A partial and inadequate attempt to meet this situation, as well as related difficulties of adjusting the Spanish system of church-state union to the American system of church and state separation was made in a proclamation which Arthur MacArthur, Military Governor of the Philippines, issued July 2, 1900. MacArthur after restating certain guarantees of the constitution said,

1. Senate document 138, 56 Cong., 1 sess., op. cit., p. 84.

10. As under the Constitution of the United States complete religious freedom is guaranteed, and no minister of religion can be interfered with or molested in following his calling in a peaceful or lawful manner, and there must be complete separation of church and state, so here the civil government of these islands hereafter to be established will give the same security to the citizens thereof and guarantee that no form of religion shall be forced by the government upon any community or upon any citizen of the islands; that no minister of religion in following his calling in a peaceful and lawful manner shall be interfered with by the government or by any person; that no public funds shall be used for the support of religious organizations or any member thereof; that no official process shall be used to collect contributions from the people for the support of any church, priest, or religious order; that no minister of religion by virtue of his being a minister shall exercise any public or governmental office or authority, and that the separation of church and state must be complete and entire.¹

Every report on the Philippines had spoken of the friar troubles.

When the Taft Commission arrived in the Philippines, Taft assigned himself the problem of the friar lands. In the first report of the Commission, dated Manila, November 30, 1900, Taft summarizes the existing situation and suggests a remedy. After mentioning the feeling of hostility which the Filipino people held for the friars, he says,

It is to be found in the fact that to the Filipinos the government of these islands under Spain was the government of the friars. Every abuse of the many which finally led to the two revolutions of 1896 and 1898 was charged by the people to the friars. Whether they were in fact to blame is perhaps aside from our purpose, but it can not admit of contradiction that the autocratic power which each friar curate exercised over the people and civil officials of his parish gave them a more plausible ground for the belief that nothing of injustice, of cruelty, or oppression, of narrowing restraint of liberty was imposed on them for which the friar was not entirely responsible. . . All the evidence derived from every source, but the friars themselves, shows clearly that the feeling of hatred for the friars is well-nigh universal and permeates all classes.

1. Senate document 187, 57 Cong., 1 sess., (Washington: Government Printing office, 1902), p. 12-13.

In the provinces of Cavite, Laguna, and Bulacan, as well as in the country districts of Manila, the political feeling against the friars has in it also an element of agrarianism. . . It is significant that it was in Cavite that the two revolutions broke out, and that each in its beginnings was merely a protest against the aggressions of the friars.

In the light of these considerations it is not wonderful that the people should regard the return of the friars to their parishes as a return to the condition before the revolution. The common people are utterly unable to appreciate that under the sovereignty of the United States the position of the friar as curate would be different from that under Spain. . . .

The depth of their feeling against the friars may be measured by the fact that it exists against those who, until two years ago, administered the sacraments of the church upon which they feel so great dependence and for which they have so profound a respect. . . .

Those who are charged with the duty of pacifying these islands may, therefore, properly have the liveliest concern in a matter which, though on its surface only ecclesiastical, is, in the most important phase of it, political and fraught with the most critical consequences to the peace and good order of the country in which it is their duty to set up civil government. We are convinced that a return of the friars to their parishes will lead to lawless violence and murder, and that the people will charge the course taken to the American Government, thus turning against it the resentment felt toward the friars. It is to be remembered that the Filipinos who are in sympathy with the American cause in these islands are as bitterly opposed to the friars as the most irreconcilable insurgents, and they look with the greatest anxiety to the course to be taken in the matter

. . . We earnestly hope that those who control the policy of the Catholic Church in these islands. . . will see that it would be most unfortunate for the Philippine Islands, for the Catholic Church, and for the American Government to attempt to send back the friars, and that some other solution of the difficulties should be found. . . .

The friars have large property interests in these islands which the United States is bound . . . to protect. It is natural and proper that the friars should feel a

desire to remain where so much of their treasure is. . . . It would avoid some very troublesome agrarian disturbances between the friars and their quondam tenants if the insular government could buy these large haciendas of the friars and sell them out in small holdings to the present tenants. . . . With the many other calls upon the insular treasury, a large financial operation like this could probably not be conducted to a successful issue without the aid of the United States Government, either by a direct loan or by a guaranty of bonds to be issued for that purpose. . . .

. . . If an agreement could not be reached, it is probable, though upon this we wish to express no definite opinion, that there would be ground in the circumstances for a resort to condemnation proceedings.¹

A more definite and complete statement of friar land policy is enunciated a year later by Elihu Root in his report to the President dated November 27, 1901. He says,

Three religious orders, the Dominicans, Augustinians, and Recolletos, who were established under Spanish rule, had at the time of American occupation about 408,000 acres of agricultural lands. These lands are occupied by a native tenantry intensely hostile to the friars, and that hostility is unquestionably shared by the vast majority of the people of the islands. The relation of these landlords to their tenants and to the entire people was one of the chief causes of irritation and rebellion under the Spanish Government.

The new conditions make it manifestly for the interest of the religious orders that they should convert into money this property, which they can manifestly no longer peacefully enjoy or practically make useful. At the same time the peace and order of the community, the good will of the people toward the Government of the United States, and the interest of an effective settlement and disposition of all questions arising between the church and state in the islands, make it equally desirable that these lands should be purchased by the state and that title upon proper and reasonable terms should be offered to the tenants or to the other people of the islands. For this purpose it will be necessary that money should be obtained from other sources than the ordinary revenues

1. Senate document 112, 56 Congress, 2 session, op. cit., p. 29-33.

of the Philippine government. The receipts from sales of the lands to natives can be devoted to the payment of any bonds issued to raise money for the purchase.¹

Taft had found it desirable to return to the United States for his health, and combined official duties with that purpose by appearing before the Senate Committee on the Philippines which was to hold hearings on the conduct of affairs in the islands.²

The bill establishing civil government in the Philippine Islands was drafted at this time, passed by Congress, and signed by the President July 1, 1902. It contained provisions authorizing the purchase of the friar lands and the issuance of bonds to pay for these lands. Sec. 65 of the act provides:

That all lands acquired by virtue of the preceding section shall constitute a part and portion of the public property of the government of the Philippine Islands, and may be held, sold, and conveyed, or leased temporarily for a period not exceeding three years after their acquisition by said government on such terms and conditions as it may prescribe, subject to the limitations and conditions provided for in this Act. . . . Actual settlers and occupants at the time said lands are acquired by the government shall have the preference over all others to lease, purchase, or acquire their holdings within such reasonable time as may be determined by said government.³

In the meantime Roosevelt, Root, and Taft decided that the latter should return to the Philippines by way of Rome. Negotiations which Taft had conducted in Manila with Archbishop Chapelle, charge' d'affaires on behalf of the Vatican in the Philippine Islands, had accomplished practically nothing toward solving the most important problems requiring adjustment, namely, getting rid of the friars and of purchasing the

-
1. House document 2, Vol. 1, 57 Cong., 1 sess., (Washington: Government Printing office, 1902), p. 84.
 2. Senate document 331, 3 parts, 57 Cong., 1 sess., (Washington: Government Printing office, 1902).
 3. U. S. Statutes at Large, 57 Cong., op. cit., p. 706-707

friar lands. Some of the land owned by the religious corporations in the Philippines had been transferred to development companies on terms which made it impossible for Taft to determine the actual ownership. The heads of the friar orders in the islands were not anxious to sell their lands since they felt the money would not go to them. These reasons were the most important in causing the administration to open negotiations directly with the Pope.

Elihu Root in his instructions to Taft, dated May 9, 1902, said that, in spite of the failure of Congress to act on the friar land matters, Taft should go to Rome on the return trip to Manila and should see the ecclesiastical authorities there since agreement with the friars in the Philippines seemed impossible. Taft should find out who had authority to negotiate concerning the friar lands. He should always bear in mind and should state frankly "to the other side of the negotiations" the following fundamental propositions:

1. That separation of church and state is one of the fundamental and imperative provisions of our government. "No modification or shading thereof can be a subject of discussion."
2. There was need to adjust relations of church and state from one of close union to one of complete independence.
3. Because of the separation, "the religious orders can no longer perform in behalf of the state the duties in relation to public instruction and public charity formerly resting upon them." They find their tenants and parishioners so hostile "that they are no longer capable of serving any useful purpose for the church." The only way the friars can be restored is by action of the civil government.

It is manifest that under these conditions it is for the interest of the church, as well as of the state, that the landed proprietorship of the religious orders in the

Phillipine Islands should cease, and that if the church wishes, as of course it does wish, to continue its ministrations among the people of the islands, . . . it should send other agents therefor.

4. It is the wish of our government, in case Congress shall grant authority, that the titles of the religious orders to the large tracts of agricultural land which they now hold shall be extinguished, but that full and fair compensation shall be made therefor.

5. The money derived from the sale of this land should not be "used for the attempted restoration of the friars to the parishes from which they are now separated with the consequent disturbance of law and order."¹

Taft then crossed the ocean and had an audience with the Pope, delivering the above instructions. June 22, Cardinal Rampolla, Papal Secretary of State, sent a message in which he said the Holy See had decided to withdraw the regular priests from temporal affairs.

It is also the intention of the Holy See to introduce in the Philippine Islands religious of other nationalities; and, so far as possible, from the United States, and to intrust to them, when sufficiently instructed in the local dialects, the spiritual care of the faithful. . . .

The Holy See likewise recognizes that in order to reconcile more fully the feelings of the Filipinos to the religious possessing landed estates the sale of the same is conducive thereto. Therefore it adheres in principle to the request made by the American Government saving the right of property of the legitimate possessor and an estimate of the value of the lands conformable with the principles of justice and equity. . . .²

As already mentioned the civil government bill was signed by Roosevelt July 1. It authorized the purchase of the friar lands by the Philippine government and the issuance of bonds to pay for the lands.

-
1. House document 2, Vol. 1, 57 Cong., 2 sess., (Washington: Government Printing office, 1903), p. 233-35.
 2. Ibid., p. 241-42.

July 3, Taft suggested the determination of the value of the land by a five man commission, two appointed by the Philippine government, two by the Pope, and one "by an indifferent, like the governor-general of India." This idea to be included in a signed agreement.¹

Cardinal Rampolla suggested, July 9, that the fifth man be selected by the other four, or by agreement between the Pope and the United States President.²

In a telegram, dated July 14, Root suggested that the price should be determined by negotiation between the parties.³

The negotiations in Rome were discontinued at this point. They had started with an indication of successful termination but as they continued, they became more hopeless. Taft was to say of them in the report of the Philippine Commission, dated November 1, 1902,

. . . I have only to say . . . that I believe they will tend to bring about a much earlier and a more satisfactory solution of the difficult questions at issue between the roman Catholic Church and the Government of the United States in these islands than if the visit had not been made and the conference had not been had.⁴

Jean Baptiste Guidi, Archbishop of Staurepoli, was sent by the Pope to Manila as the apostolic delegate. The Philippine Commission appointed Jean Villegas to survey and appraise the friar lands which he did except for the Isabella and Mindoro estates. On the basis of this work, Taft offered \$6,043,219.07 for all the friar lands. The

-
1. Ibid., p. 244
 2. Ibid., p. 254.
 3. Ibid., p. 257-58.
 4. Ibid., Vol. 10, pt. 1, p. 24-25

representatives of all the orders rejected this offer. They would sell for \$10,500,000 gold. Taft rejected this suggestion and said it was so far out of reason that there was no further need to negotiate on such a basis. An agent of one of the development companies which held some of this land then suggested that the sale could be accomplished for \$8,500,000. Taft increased his offer by \$1,500,000 and an agreement was reached on that basis. Ten thousand acres of the lands had already been sold so 410,000 acres of land were bought for \$7,259,000 gold. The bonds issued to raise the money bore interest at 4% and sold in the United States at \$107.577 per hundred.¹

Thus the friar lands were finally purchased. The next job was the administrative job of getting them into the hands of the persons who had been farming them and obtaining enough money for them to take care of the bonds when they came due. While Taft had said that he felt the lands should be purchased even if the Philippine government lost money on them, there was no desire to make this contribution by the Philippine government any greater than was imperatively necessary. The lands had to be surveyed, values assigned, purchasers or lessees found, and either collection of rent or of interest and principal made. In some cases the government had to farm the land. Many tenants refused to admit the legal title of the government to the land, just as they had refused to admit the legal title of the friar orders during the insurrection. The desire of the Philippine government to reduce the

1. of. House document 2, Vol. 5, 58th Cong., 2 sess., (Washington: Government Printing office, 1905), p. 39-43 & Senate document 304, 58 Cong., 2 sess., (Washington: Government Printing office, 1905), p. 29.

loss on the friar land purchase eventually led indirectly to a Congressional investigation.

Two of the estates, one in Isabella province and the other on the island of Mindoro, were unoccupied. Their sale thus presented great difficulties to the Philippine Commission, as there were large quantities of equally good public land available for purchase.

This situation led to the passage by the Philippine Assembly and Commission of a law amending the Philippine land law. Dean C. Worcester, Secretary of the Interior in the Philippines, in his report dated September 1, 1908, says, that while the old act had restricted the sale of friar lands to the provisions of the public land act thus "would in very many cases have defeated the obvious intention of the act to allow tenants to secure their actual holdings, and would have delayed for many years the sale of large tracts" the law as amended placed "no limit as to the amount of land which may be purchased."¹

On the basis of this act, passed by the Philippine government, the director of lands sought to interest E. L. Poole and P. A. Prentiss in the Mindoro estate when they called at the Bureau of Lands in Manila on October 12, 1909 and "informed him they were contemplating the purchase of certain private lands on the island of Mindoro for the purpose of embarking in the sugar business." The director of lands "obtained the opinion of the law-officer of his bureau" and

1. House document 1042, Vol. 8, part 1, 60 Cong., 2 sess., (Washington: Government Printing office, 1908), p. 48.

requested also the opinion of the Attorney General of the Philippine Islands as to the authority to sell vacant and unoccupied friar lands to an individual without restriction as to purchase. Both of these decided in favor of the power to sell.

Poole decided to purchase the San Jose estate on Mindoro and terms had been arranged when the Secretary of War stopped the sale.¹ The Secretary of War, J. M. Dickinson, consulted the United States Attorney-General, Mr. George Wickersham, who rendered an opinion, December 18, 1909, in which he held that the limitations of the public land act did not apply in regard to friar lands.² The Secretary of War then approved the sale. Of the 22,484 hectares of land, 200 hectares were assigned to the Mindoro Development Company by Mr. Poole. March 9, 1910, Poole "executed a deed of trust, setting forth that . . . he was acting as the agent of Horace Havemeyer, Charles J. Welch, and Charles H. Senff."³ The Mindoro Development Company obtained a foreshore lease for 99 years on Mangarin Bay, the only available harbor in the region, which was about 12 miles from the nearest point of the San Jose estate. Three agricultural companies were organized at San Francisco under the laws of California. Relatives and employees were the incorporators of these companies which applied for and received grants of land connecting the San Jose estate with Mangarin Bay. Subsequently a railroad was built across this land.⁴

-
1. House report 2289, 61 Cong., 3 sess., (Washington: Government Printing office, 1911), p. 7.
 2. House document 911, 61 Cong., 2 sess., (Washington: Government Printing office, 1910), p. 4-5.
 3. House report 2289, op. cit., p. 8-9.
 4. Ibid., part 2, p. 11-12.

When news of these events was heard in the United States, action was immediately forthcoming. Representative Martin of the beet sugar state of Colorado introduced House Resolution 795 which was adopted June 25, 1910. This resolution directed the House Committee on Insular Affairs

to make a complete and thorough investigation of the interior department of the Philippine Government touching the administration of Philippine lands and all matters of fact and law pertaining thereto . . . and to report to the House . . . all the evidence taken and their findings and recommendations thereon

The committee was to have all the power and money necessary to carry out these instructions.¹

Four reports were presented by the Committee on Insular Affairs when their report was submitted March 3, 1911. The report of the Committee (majority report) was signed by Representatives Olmsted of Pa., Crumpacker of Ind., Hamilton of Mich., Fuller of Ill., Graham of Pa., Parsons of N. Y., McKinley of Ill., Douglas of Ohio, and Farnes of N. Y. All these men but Farnes were Republicans. Rucker of Mo., Democrat, concurred in this report and added a few remarks of his own. Hubbard of Iowa, Davis of Minn., and Madison of Kansas, all Republicans, submitted a subreport to the majority report. The minority report was submitted by Jones of Va., Page of N. C., Garrett of Tenn., Denver of Ohio, and Helm of Ky., all Democrats.²

The majority report said the lands in the Philippine Islands might, for the purposes of this report, be divided into three classes:

-
1. Ibid (majority report), p. 1.
 2. House Report 2289 including part 2.

1. Private lands.--Lands which . . . are in the private ownership of individuals and corporations as distinguished from Government ownership of any kind. They are estimated at 7,000,000 acres.

2. Public lands.--These are lands which belonged to the Spanish Crown, and by the treaty of Paris became the property of the United States. They are estimated to contain 60,000,000 acres.

3. Friar lands.--These were at the time of the passage of the organic act in the private ownership of certain religious orders, from whom, under authority of the said act (the organic act), they were subsequently purchased by the Philippine Government. They cover about 400,000 acres. They cost the Philippine government, in round numbers, \$7,000,000, and bonds to that amount were issued to provide the funds for their purchase.¹

Section 75 of the organic act restricted permanent land-owning (for over 5 years) by corporations to agricultural corporations and contained the following provision,

And it shall be unlawful for any member of a corporation engaged in agriculture or in mining . . . to be in anywise interested in any other corporation engaged in agriculture or in mining.

Corporations are restricted to ownership of 1024 hectares of land which restriction "applies equally to private lands, public lands and friar lands.

"There is no limit to the amount of private lands which may be acquired or owned by natural persons."²

Public lands acquired by the United States under treaty of peace with Spain may not be sold . . . in quantities exceeding 16 hectares to one person or 1,024 hectares to any corporation or association of persons³

"This law has not been violated in a single instance."⁴

1. House Report 2289, op. cit., p. 2
 2. Ibid., p. 2.
 3. Ibid., p. 3.
 4. Loc. cit.

The report mentions that there had been 8393 sales of friar lands. "Of these sales 82 involve amounts in excess of 16 hectares, or 40 acres each."¹

Of the 82 persons who have thus purchased more than 16 hectares each of friar lands, 78 are Filipinos and 4 are Americans.

There are 492 leases of more than 16 hectares, of which Filipinos hold 475, Americans 15, and Englishmen 2.

If any of these sales or leases in excess of 16 hectares to one person were illegal, they were all illegal whether the purchasers were Filipinos or Americans.

The principal sale of friar lands, the one which has attracted the most attention, and the one which led to the introduction and passage of this resolution of inquiry was the sale to E. L. Poole of the San Jose estate, on the island of Mindoro, comprising 22,484 hectares.²

. . . when Mr. Poole visited the estate in the interest of the intended purchasers he found upon the entire 56,000 acres only one occupant. . .³

Later the report says,

. . . in view of the fact that their [the friar lands] total constitutes so small a portion of the total acreage of the islands which is subject to limited sales only, it may be urged that the sale of these remaining friar lands in larger quantities could not be considered as establishing or favoring a policy for the acquisition of the islands, or any considerable portion thereof, by a few corporations, trusts, or individuals. . .⁴

The report then cites the organic act to show how the friar lands were not included in the clause relating to the sale of public lands and that various clauses in that act were inapplicable to the

-
1. Loc. cit.
 2. Ibid., p. 4.
 3. Ibid., p. 10-11.
 4. Ibid., p. 12.

friar lands, such as those relating to mortgaging their property, the matter of continued occupancy, etc. In the sections relating to the friar lands, they were never spoken of as the public domain either.¹

It is quite within the power of the Philippine legislature to limit the amount of friar lands which may be sold to a single noncorporate purchaser, but it has not done so and Congress has not done so.²

The Committee said later,

A careful study of the organic act in all its parts, taking into account the history of the times and the objects sought to be accomplished, leads to the conclusion that the homestead provisions of sections 12 to 17 relating to public lands of the Philippine Islands were not intended to apply to friar lands acquired and sold under the provisions of section 65, and that the act fixes no limit to the quantity of friar lands which may be sold to purchasers other than corporations. . . .³

The lease to Frank W. Carpenter, the Executive Secretary, is mentioned. He had leased from 12,000 to 13,000 acres of the Tala estate near Manila. If anyone else desired to lease or purchase any of these lands he would execute such a lease to them. He had "preference right to lease lands on such estate now occupied or leased which in future may be abandoned or vacated by the present occupants thereof." The work of Carpenter on this estate showed the value of the land.

It encouraged the Filipinos to such an extent that they applied for the opportunity to acquire portions of the land covered by his agreement . . . He now holds under the agreement only about 4,000 acres. . . The net result of the Carpenter agreement has been that a large amount of vacant land on the Tala estate, which had long lain idle and profitless, has been sold at an advance upon the price paid by the government. . . .

-
1. Ibid., p. 15-15.
 2. Ibid., p. 19.
 3. Ibid., p. 22.

No criticism of this lease was heard in the Philippines.¹

In speaking of the three California corporations organized under the stimulus of Charles J. Welch, the report says,

Each of these corporations is authorized by its charter to engage in agriculture, and each one complied with the legal requirements and obtained a license to do business in the Philippine Islands.²

In summary, the report of the majority says,

We find that the administration of lands in the Philippine Islands has been fairly and honestly conducted, and that the charges and insinuations to the contrary which have been made against the officials charged with the execution of the laws in relation thereto . . . are unwarranted and unjust. . . .

No corporation can lawfully hold more than 1,024 hectares (2,500 acres) of any kind of land in the Philippine Islands, and no corporation has been permitted to purchase more than that amount of either public lands or friar lands since the passage of the act of 1902.

.

Sections 13, 14, 15, & 16 of the organic act do not apply to the sale and disposition of friar lands.

Citizens of the United States, as well as citizens of the Philippine Islands, are clearly authorized . . . to purchase valuable mineral lands and vacant coal lands forming part of the public domain. . . Congress should . . . more clearly express its intention, whether individual citizens of the United States are to be included or excluded as purchasers of agricultural land of the United States in the Philippine Islands.

. . . we advise against speculation in public lands by public officials, and are pleased to note that the members of the Philippine Commission have refrained therefrom.

There are about 60,000,000 acres of public land in the Philippines, the sale of which is restricted by law to 40

1. Ibid., p. 25-27.

2. Ibid., p. 29.

acres to a natural person or 2,500 acres to a corporation, each sale being conditioned upon actual occupancy and cultivation of the lands for at least five years, during which the purchaser may neither sell nor encumber them. There are only about 123,000 acres of unoccupied and vacant friar lands remaining. These can not be sold in such small tracts, and subject to such burdensome conditions, at prices which will enable the Philippine government to reimburse itself and pay off the bonds issued for their purchase. If that is to be accomplished, they will have to be sold in larger tracts than those permitted for public lands, and without the substantially prohibitive condition of nonalienation or encumbrance. We feel that the sale of such a comparatively small amount of land in somewhat larger tracts than 40 acres, and without the conditions mentioned, would not be injurious to the best interests of the islands and could not be considered as evidencing a policy or intention to permit their exploitation.

At present corporations are limited to 2,500 acres each. There is no limitation at all to the quantity of friar lands that may be acquired by noncorporate purchasers. The advisability of enacting reasonable limitations respecting the quantity of friar lands that may hereafter be acquired, either by individuals or corporations, is respectfully commended to the consideration of Congress.¹

Representative Rucker concurred completely in the foregoing report but thought the land laws should be liberalised.²

Representatives Hubbard, Davis, and Madison in their report said,

. . . we concur in the findings of the foregoing that there has been no sales of Philippine lands in violation of law, and that the officials having in charge the execution of the land laws of the Philippines have been honest and conscientious. They are not, in our judgment, subject to censure. . . .

We do not believe leases should be made of public lands for long terms. The law . . . permits a lease of public lands for 25 years, with the privilege of renewal for 25

1. Ibid., p. 30-31.
 2. Ibid., p. 31-32.

years additional. . . The acquisition by them [Americans] of leases to large and productive tracts for the period of a half century will not tend to the peace and welfare of the people of the islands. . . We believe such leases should be limited to 10 years, with option to renew for a like term. . .¹

. . . We believe that the amount that can be secured as a homestead should be increased to 100 acres and that citizens of the United States not in the Philippine service should be qualified entrymen. . . It is not alone necessary that our officials there should be just, honest, and disinterested, but also that everything should be avoided that could be made the basis of a suspicion that they are not and give rise to criticism and political agitation. . .²

While recognizing that there was nothing in the law to prevent acquisition of large tracts of friar land by individuals, these three representatives were very much opposed to such a policy and felt that Congress should act to prevent further sales in such large tracts. The Philippine government felt that the example set by the establishment of such a firm as the Mindoro Development Company would be of real educational value to the Filipinos by showing them improved agricultural methods and techniques.³

If the balance of the unoccupied friar lands. . . is permitted to go in large tracts into the hands of American capitalists, that will . . . amount to practically one-half of them being acquired by large landowners . . . and it may be but the commencement of a system of absentee landlordism that might develop into a system equally as obnoxious as the old one under the friars. The reason for purchasing the friar lands was . . . to get rid of a class that disturbed political conditions. That object has been attained. . .⁴

-
1. Ibid., p. 33.
 2. Ibid., p. 35 .
 3. Ibid., p. 36-37.
 4. Ibid., p. 37.

Representative Jones submitted the views of the minority of the committee. They dissented vigorously from the contention that the regulations regarding disposal of the public domain did not apply to friar lands. The minority suggested that actual settlers could lease or buy their holdings without respect to the provisions of the land law and that all others would have to meet the terms of the public land acts as to occupancy, improvement, cultivation, etc. There was no expectation that the friar lands would be sold at a profit. "Their acquisition was justified solely upon the ground of political necessity." The minority said they disregarded the various land acts passed by the Philippine government since they were based on the act of July 1, 1902.¹

Nothing that has been developed in this investigation goes to show that those charged with the responsibility of administering the land laws of the Philippine Islands have been guilty of any wrong doing.²

After speaking of the purchase of the San Jose estate on Mindoro, the organization of the Mindoro Development Co., and the California companies organized under the stimulus of Mr. Welch, the report says, "It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the land laws of the Philippines are being evaded in the most shameless manner, even if we can be mistaken in our construction of those laws."³

In speaking of sales and leases to governmental officials and employees, the report said:

The testimony shows that the practice obtains of selling and leasing public and friar lands to officials of the

1. Ibid., part 2, p. 6-10.

2. Ibid., p. 10.

3. Ibid., p. 10-12.

Philippine Government . . . A large number of corporations composed of Government officials and employees have acquired public lands or portions of the friar estates.¹

The minority report then concludes,

We wish to emphasize what has hereinbefore been said . . . in regard to the sale and other disposition of the vast public domain of those islands, whether these lands be known as public lands or friar lands. They are the property of the people of the Philippines, and should be administered and disposed of solely in their interest and for their benefit. They are thoroughly united in their opposition to the policy of exploitation to which the bureau of public lands seems to be so resolutely committed. . . . That the officials whose duty and responsibility it is to administer the public-land laws have, at least until recently, entertained doubts as to the legality of the policy pursued by them is evident from the fact that they have so frequently sought and obtained legal opinions with which to fortify their position. In our opinion these doubts should have been resolved in the interest of the citizens of the islands rather than in that of the aliens, whose purpose it was to exploit the islands. To our minds, the law governing the disposition of these lands is so clear that there is no need for any resort to the courts in respect to it. If the policy laid down in the act of Congress of July 1, 1902 is a narrow and mistaken one, then Congress should change it. It alone is clothed with the power to do so.²

These reports indicate the different attitudes concerning the development of the Philippines, and in the Philippines^{this} meant agricultural development. How were the resources of the islands to be used so as to bring the greatest amount of actual continuing prosperity to the islands? How could development without exploitation be brought about? The leaders of the anti-imperialists did not want American capitalists exploiting the Filipinos. The domestic and Cuban sugar producers and refiners were opposed, not to exploitation as one can see by looking at the operation

1. Ibid., p. 12.

2. Ibid., p. 14.

of those industries, but to the production in the Philippines of any sugar which might compete with their production. These groups formed a strange alliance to keep capital out of the Philippines. The third group opposed to capital going to the islands were those Filipinos who feared that American capital if invested in the islands would be able to agitate successfully in opposition to independence.

The standard of living in the Philippines is quite low in comparison with that of the United States. It has risen during the period of United States control but much more might have been accomplished if conditions had been made more attractive for capital. The thousands of Filipinos who migrated to Hawaii and the continental United States to work might have found a good opportunity to develop their own land had the investment of United States capital in agriculture been encouraged. The Philippine government could not provide education, public works, etc. for its people because of insufficient revenue. The Filipino laborer or tenant farmer could not homestead because he could not save enough money to get started. Both the government and the individual needed knowledge of new agricultural methods and processes. Since only about 7,500,000 acres of land in the islands was farmed and there was 60,000,000 acres of public land of which about one-third has been estimated to be of an agricultural character, it would seem that there would have been no danger of a land monopoly if a certain amount of the land had been leased for a reasonable time under conditions which would have prevented exploitation.

Independence might perhaps have come more quickly had large areas suitable for the production of sugar been made available for that purpose.

This would have resulted in the United States sugar industry becoming concerned at an earlier time over the actuality, not the threat, of Philippine competition in sugar. They might have given vigorous, rather than apathetic, support to the movement for Philippine independence. However all suggestions for the modification of the land laws failed. Throughout the period of American sovereignty, the individual could acquire a maximum of 16 hectares and the corporation a maximum of 1024 hectares of public land by purchase or lease.

Ch. XI. The Moros

Before the advent of the Spaniard, followers of Mohammed had arrived in the Philippines to engage successfully in missionary activities. The most serious resistance to Spain had been furnished in the early period as well as later by the Mohammedans who seem at that time to have been expanding their control northward over the Visayan islands and Southern Luzon.

Spain quickly conquered the Philippine Islands except for the heart of the Mohammedan Country in Mindanao and Sulu where their control at all times seems to have been rather doubtful. She obtained recognition of her sovereignty by many Mohammedan leaders and by foreign nations but never extended her actual control over large parts of the region.

By the treaty of December 10, 1898, the United States succeeded to Spain's rights. In the northern part of the Philippine Islands, Spain had had control and had lost it. The United States then had to reestablish control. In the Mohammedan region, Spain had never had actual control so the United States started in virgin territory.

The Moros were in no sense united. There were five major groups of them, according to Forbes,

The Maguindanaos in the Cotabato Valley, the Maranaos in the Lake Lanao region, the Yakans on the island of Basilan, the Samals on the coast of the peninsula of Zamboanga and throughout the island to the southward of Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago, and the Sulus, or 'Joleanos,' who are the ruling class generally in the Sulu Archipelago and in northeastern Borneo and southern Palawan.¹

1. W. Cameron Forbes, The Philippine Islands, (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1928), Vol. II, p. 11.

The United States had relations of a more or less important character with three of these groups: treaty negotiations with the Sulus and fighting relations with those in the Cotabato valley and around Lake Lanao.

The Moro has probably received too much attention in many discussions of the Philippines, perhaps due to the picturesque nature of his life. This is also true of the pagan tribes. Like the pagan tribes, the Moro represents about 4% of the total population of the Philippines. Unlike the pagans, who live in the interior of the various islands and probably represent races which have been driven back into the interior by succeeding waves of new settlers, the Moros are of the same racial stock as the Christian Filipinos. The chief differences between the two groups are religious and cultural, the Moros not having advanced as far in culture as the Christian Filipinos.

Probably in order to reduce the number of military activities in which she was engaged, the United States sent Brigadier-General John C. Bates to negotiate an agreement with the Sultan of Sulu. The agreement was signed between Bates, representing the United States, and the Sultan of Jolo and four of his Datus or chiefs on August 20, 1899. The agreement was to be in full force

only when approved by the governor general of the Philippine Islands and confirmed by the President of the United States and will be subject to future modification by the mutual consent of the parties in interest.

The text of the treaty reads as follows:

Article I. The sovereignty of the United States over the whole archipelago of Jolo and its dependencies is declared and acknowledged.

Article II. The United States flag will be used in the archipelago of Jolo and its dependencies, on land and sea.

Article III. The rights and dignities of His Highness the Sultan and his datos shall be fully respected; the Moros shall not be interfered with on account of their religion; all their religious customs shall be respected, and no one shall be persecuted on account of his religion.

Article IV. While the United States may occupy and control such points in the archipelago of Jolo as public interests seem to demand, encroachment will not be made upon the lands immediately about the residence of His Highness the Sultan, unless military necessity requires such occupation in case of war with a foreign power; and where the property of individuals is taken, due compensation will be made in each case.

Any person can purchase land in the Archipelago of Jolo and hold the same by obtaining the consent of the Sultan and coming to a satisfactory agreement with the owner of the land; and such purchase shall immediately be registered in the proper office of the United States Government.

Article V. All trade in domestic products of the Archipelago of Jolo, when carried on by the Sultan or his people with any part of the Philippine Islands, and when conducted under the American flag, shall be free, unlimited, and undutiable.

Article VI. The Sultan of Jolo shall be allowed to communicate direct with the governor-general of the Philippine Islands in making complaint against the commanding officer of Jolo or against any naval commander.

Article VII. The introduction of firearms and war material is forbidden, except under the specific authority of the governor-general of the Philippine Islands.

Article VIII. Piracy must be suppressed, and the Sultan and his datos agree to heartily cooperate with the United States authorities to that end, and to make every possible effort to arrest and bring to justice all persons engaged in piracy.

Article IX. Where crimes and offenses are committed by Moros against Moros, the government of the Sultan will bring to trial and punishment the criminals and offenders, who will be delivered to the government of the Sultan by the United States authorities if in their possession. In all other cases persons charged with crimes or offenses will be delivered to the United States authorities for trial and punishment.

Article X. Any slave in the Archipelago of Jolo shall have the right to purchase freedom by paying to the master the usual market value..

Article XI. In case of any trouble with subjects of the Sultan the American authorities in the islands will be instructed to make careful investigation before resorting to harsh measures, as in most cases serious trouble can thus be avoided.

Article XII. At present, Americans and foreigners wishing to go into the country should state their wishes to the Moro authorities and ask for an escort, but it is hoped that this will become unnecessary as we know each other better.

Article XIII. The United States will give full protection to the Sultan and his subjects in case any foreign nation shall attempt to impose upon them.

Article XIV. The United States will not sell the island of Jolo or any other island of the Jolo Archipelago to any foreign nation without the consent of the Sultan of Jolo.

Article XV provided for a scale of salaries to be paid the Sultan and his more important datos.¹

The money provided for was paid from the Philippine treasury rather than from that of the United States, thus Senate confirmation of the "treaty" or agreement was made unnecessary.

This "treaty" has been much misunderstood. It was not a "treaty" in the usual sense since it, by its own terms, did not require ratification by the Senate. The Sultan of Sulu, in spite of his imposing title,

1. Senate document 136, 56 Cong., 1 sess., (Washington: Government Printing office, 1900), p. 26-27.

was not a very important individual. He, and the dates who signed the treaty with him, represented merely one of the five important groups of Moros in the southern Philippines. His control, even over his own people, does not seem to have been too effective.

October 27, 1899, Elihu Root wrote to Elwell S. Otis as follows:

The President instructs me to advise you that the agreement signed August 21, 1899 . . . is confirmed and approved, subject to . . . that clause of the treaty of peace . . . which provides "The civil rights and the political status of the native inhabitants shall be determined by Congress," and with the understanding and reservation, which should be distinctly communicated to the Sultan of Jolo, that this agreement is not to be deemed in any way to authorize or give the consent of the United States to the existence of slavery. . . . The President desires that you should make inquiry as to the number of persons held in slavery in the Archipelago, and what arrangement it may be practicable to make for their emancipation. It is assumed that the market price referred to in the agreement is not very high at present, and it may be that a comparatively moderate sum, which Congress might be willing to appropriate for that purpose, would suffice to secure freedom for the whole number.¹

Bates communicated this information to the signatories of the treaty in a letter dated April 4, 1900.²

Brigadier-General George W. Davis was appointed military governor of Mindanao on August 31, 1901³ and two months later, October 24, in his report made the following recommendations:

1. That the "Bates agreement" be abrogated and set aside.
2. That no sultan or king over all the Moros of any religion or over any other dates be recognized.

.

So far our policy seems to have been based on opportunism.

1. *Ibid.*, p. 109

2. Senate document 331, part 3, 57 Cong., 1 sess., (Washington: Government Printing office, 1902), p. 2141.

3. Forbes, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

The Moro datus are constantly asking for information as to our policy for the future, but the army can only say "keep quiet," but they will not do this always. . . .

I can not too strongly recommend that the policy of the United States with respect to the Moros be decided on without delay, and that it be announced and enforced at whatever cost. When these born pirates feel the weight of our power they will believe we are in earnest and respect us, but until then they will despise us and hate us. . . .¹

Dean C. Worcester, Secretary of the Interior in the Philippines concurred, December 7, 1901, with the suggestion of Davis that the Sultan ought to be reduced to the status of a datto or at least that all his pretensions to sovereign rights should be quieted. He added that the difficulties between the Moros and the insular government tended to increase due to the lack of a definite understanding.²

In July, 1903, Major-General Leonard Wood became the first civil governor of the Moro province. He was responsible to the civil governor of the Philippines for civil administration and to the division commander at Manila for the conduct of military affairs in his department.³

In describing the Sultan of Sulu to Taft, Wood wrote on September 5, 1903,

The Sultan possesses little, or no authority; his influence is not equal to that of any of the more prominent dattos. . . . He has not maintained the semblance of a government, nor could I find that he has observed, in good faith, the terms of the so-called Bates agreement. . . . The principal dattos of the island ridicule the idea that the Sultan is in any way their master, or that he has the power to compel them to do anything they do not want to do.⁴

1. Senate document 331, op. cit., p. 2128.

2. Ibid., p. 2122.

3. Forbes, op. cit., p. 18.

4. Herman Hagedorn, Leonard Wood, (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1903), Vol. II, p. 13.

To President Roosevelt, Wood wrote on September 20,

The Sultan is a . . . little oriental . . . with half a dozen wives and no children; a state of affairs I am sure you thoroughly disapprove.¹

December 16, 1903, Wood wrote to Taft saying, in respect to the Moro problem,

The people of this island are Mohammedans. Their faith teaches them that it is no sin to kill Christians, and they are taught by the Priest to believe that it is commendable. They are nothing more nor less than an unimportant collection of pirates and highwaymen, living under laws which are intolerable, and there is no reason, in view of the numerous acts of bad faith on their part, why the so-called Bates Agreement should be longer continued, involving as it does the payment of salaries to a number of people who have never been loyal to the United States, and who in their ignorance and conceit interpret this agreement as indicating that they are a people of great importance and that we are willing to pay them to be good.²

This unanimous insistence on the abrogation of the Bates Agreement was soon to result in action. Taft became Secretary of War February 1, 1904. Nine days later, testifying before the House Committee on Insular Affairs, Taft said,

When General Wood came out to the Philippines, we had a number of conferences with respect to the Bates treaty, and we agreed that the thing to do was to get it out of the way, and I suggested to General Wood, as governor of the province, that he prepare a report showing in how many respects the datos and the sultan had violated the terms of the agreement and the conditions which they were to perform in order that we might formally declare it at an end. That he has done in a report to me as the civil governor of the islands, and I have transmitted it to the Secretary of War, recommending that by Executive action, because it was a treaty entered into by the Executive, it be formally abrogated.³

1. Loc. cit.

2. Ibid., p. 37.

3. Committee Reports, Hearings, and Acts of Congress corresponding thereto. Committee on Insular Affairs, House of Representatives. Fifty-eighth Congress, 1903-05, (Washington Government Printing office, 1905), p. 13.

Decisive action was taken by Taft, March 2, 1904, when he telegraphed Governor Wright at Manila as follows:

By order of the President you are directed to notify Sultan of Sulu and the datus who signed the so-called Bates treaty of August 20, 1899 . . . that in view of the failure on the part of the Sultan and the signing datus to discharge the duties and fulfill the conditions imposed on them by said agreement they have forfeited all right to the annuities therein stipulated to be paid. . .; that the treaty is abrogated . . . and that as residents of the Moro Province . . . they are subject to the laws enacted therein under the sovereignty of the United States¹

Speaking of this action before the Committee on Insular Affairs, mentioned above, Taft, March 14, 1904, said,

The disturbances in the island of Jolo had become so frequent that after talking with the President I concluded that we ought to take decided action. Without that action subsidies would be due, and the evidence contained in our report shows quite conclusively that the Sultan and all the datus were either engaged in the disturbances which had taken place there or failed to suppress them, as was their duty, and that they violated the terms of the agreement of the *modus vivendi*, and therefore it seemed wise to act at once.²

General Wood notified the Sultan that the Bates treaty was abrogated on March 21, 1904.³

Later in the year the Philippine Commission appropriated money to the Sultan and seven of his datus with the understanding that they "would aid the government in every way possible when called on."⁴

The undetermined status of the Sultan of Sulu, who claimed that the abrogation of the Bates agreement in 1904 had restored the situation

1. *Ibid.*, p. 27.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 27-28.

3. *Report of Philippine Commission, 1904*, (Washington: Government Printing office, 1905), part 1, p. 11.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 13.

existing during the Spanish regime, during which time he had exercised sovereign powers at least over internal affairs,¹ led to the conclusion of another agreement in 1915. This memorandum agreement, signed by Frank W. Carpenter, Governor of Mindanao and Sulu acting for the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, and the Sultan of Sulu was signed March 22, 1915. It provided:

Whereas the Sultan of Sulu is the titular spiritual head of the Mohammedan Church in the Sulu Archipelago, with all the rights and privileges which under the Government of the United States of America may be exercised by such an ecclesiastical authority, and subject to the same limitations which apply to the supreme spiritual heads of all other religions existing in American territory, including the right to solicit and receive voluntary popular contributions for the support of the clergy, rites, and other necessary lawful expenses of an ecclesiastical character,

The Sultan of Sulu, on his own account and in behalf of his adherents and people in the Sulu Archipelago and elsewhere within American territory, without any reservation or limitation whatsoever, ratifies and confirms his recognition of the sovereignty of the United States of America, and the exercise by His Excellency the Governor General and the representatives of that Government in Mindanao and Sulu of all the attributes of sovereign government that are exercised elsewhere in American territory and dependencies, including the adjudication by government courts or its other duly authorized officers of all civil and criminal causes falling within the laws and orders of the Government.

The Sultan of Sulu and his adherents and people of the Mohammedan faith shall have the same religious freedom had by the adherents of all other religious creeds, the practice of which is not in violation of the basic principles of the laws of the United States of America.²

The relations of the United States and the other Moros were not so peacefully settled. The most troublesome groups were those in the

1. Forbes, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 472-473.

Cotabato region and around Lake Lanao. In describing the problem presented by the Moros to the American administrators, Forbes says,

Left to themselves, the Moros would unquestionably have maintained a system purely feudal in its essence. The privileges claimed by the datus and other chiefs were such as could not be tolerated under the American flag. There is no question but that the action of the American authorities in breaking up these practices brought about the dissatisfaction and armed resistance with which the administration of the Mohammedan territory has been marked. Whether this could have been done with similar effectiveness, but without bloodshed, by administrators trained to deal with these people by years of experience and with complete knowledge of their language, is problematical; at any rate, no such administrators were available.¹

Due to this situation, conflict broke out. One needs to remember that there was no accepted hierarchy of officials among the Moros. Just as the Sultan of Sulu claimed control over the Sulu Archipelago, a claim which was denied by his powerful datus, so there were Moros in the Lake Lanao and Cotabato valley who claimed, but were unable to exercise, control over these regions. For practical purposes, every petty dato had to be treated separately. Civil administration of these regions would have been much easier had there been some form of hierarchy or confederation. However it was much easier to carry military activities through to a successful conclusion against a few dattes operating independently of the great mass of Moros than it would have been to have done so against a united Moroland.

In a report of an expedition against the Moros in the Taraco region of Lake Lanao, General Wood writes, April 15, 1904,

There is only one way to deal with these people, and that is to be absolutely just and absolutely firm. When a crime is committed the offender must be surrendered or punishment must be promptly applied. The Moros of this

1. Ibid., p. 21.

section are as a class a treacherous unreliable lot of slave hunters and land pirates. Our conciliatory and good-natured policy with them resulted in the establishment among them of the firm conviction that we were both cowardly and weak and out of this conviction grew an absolute contempt for our authority. Firmness and the prompt application of disciplinary measures will maintain order, prevent loss of life and property and permit good government and prosperity among these people. Dilatory tactics, indecision, and lack of firmness will result in a carnival of crime and an absolute contempt for all authority in this region.¹

Military operations against the Moros were often sanguinary.

Superior forces did not bother them, especially when their opponents were Christians. They would retreat with their women and children into a barricaded area at the top of a hill or in an extinct volcano where they would resist, women as well as men, until they were all killed.

The continuation of lawlessness by the Moros with many murders of Americans and foreigners resulted in the decision of Governor-General Forbes to take away their guns. A formal order to that effect was issued September 8, 1911 by General Pershing, Governor of the Moro province. Military activities were necessary to enforce the order. Forbes says that "In carrying out the disarmament, no authoritative representation was made to the Moros that Filipino officials would not be placed over them."²

In a footnote, he says,

Governor Carpenter asserts that at no time during the seven years of his residence and association with the Moros did he hear any of them claim that they had submitted to disarmament on the assurance that Filipino officials would not be placed over them, nor any other

1. Hagedorn, op. cit., p. 46
 2. Forbes, op. cit., p. 25.

assurance except that the government would undertake to protect their lives and property against outlaws.¹

This should thoroughly disprove the oft repeated statement that by giving independence to the Philippine Islands including Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago, we are breaking faith with the Moros. Forbes was on the Philippine Commission from 1904 and was governor-general from 1909 to 1913. Carpenter was in charge of Moro affairs from 1913 to 1920. Their testimony should be conclusive.

The non-Christian regions in the Philippines, including of course the Moro provinces, remained under the exclusive legislative and administrative jurisdiction of the Commission even after the inauguration of the Assembly.

The civil governor of that region from the time control was assumed until 1913 was the military officer in command of that region. As mentioned above, he reported to the governor-general on civil matters and to the officer commanding the Philippine Department on military matters. While the quality of men selected as governors of the provinces was very good, the military requirements of the service resulted in them being transferred just when they had learned their duties as well as the language of their district. Accordingly Governor-General Forbes and General Pershing recommended in 1912 that the next governor of the Moro Province should be chosen from civil life. Governor-General Harrison agreed to the plan and with the approval of the Secretary of War, appointed Frank W. Carpenter who served very effectively in that

1. Loc. cit., footnote.

position. When the Jones act was passed in 1916, abolishing the Philippine Commission, the Philippine legislature succeeded to the control of the Moro regions. The Jones act established the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes and in 1920 the Philippine Legislature abolished the Department of Mindanao and Sulu and placed the seven provinces of Sulu, Zamboanga, Cotabato, Lanao, Davao, Bukidnon, and Agusan directly under this Bureau.

No change of status has occurred since that time in the Moro provinces.

Ch. XII. The Democrats control the Philippines

The Republicans lost control of the House of Representatives during the last two years of the administration of Taft. The result was the consideration or the passage by the House of Representatives of a number of bills which would define the position of the Democratic party in legislative matters. There was no hope, or perhaps intent, that the Senate would pass and that the president would sign any of these bills. Included in the bills of this type were two relating to the Philippines. H. R. 22143 was "to establish a qualified independent government for the Philippines and to fix the date when such qualified independence shall become absolute and complete." H. J. Res. 278 was "to authorize the President of the United States to secure the neutralisation of the Philippine Islands and the recognition of their independence by international agreement."

The first bill (H.R. 22143) was introduced by Representative Jones of Virginia on March 20, 1912 and was referred to the Committee on Insular Affairs.¹ This committee reported it back to the House April 27.² The report of the majority submitted by Jones said,

It is doubtful if there is today any considerable or even appreciable public sentiment in the United States favorable to the permanent retention of the Philippines. When these islands were first acquired, and for a few years thereafter, there was a more or less prevalent belief that their permanent retention would prove of great commercial advantage to the

1. Congressional Record, 62 Congress, 2nd session, (Washington: Government Printing office, 1912), p. 3717.

2. Ibid., p. 5514.

United States. It is true that during the past two years, those in which Philippine products have had free access to the markets of the United States, the value of the trade between the two countries was materially increased, and yet if every dollar in value of the merchandise imported into the Philippine Islands from the United States during the fiscal year 1911 had been clear profit to the American manufacturer, the sum total would not have equaled the cost to the people of the United States of the maintenance for a single year of our military establishment in the Philippines.

.

Those who oppose fixing a definite time at which the Philippine Islands shall acquire their independence, although professing to favor their ultimate independence, base their opposition upon the assumption that the Filipinos are not as yet capable of governing themselves. They do not hazard even a guess as to when that time may be expected to arrive; in the judgment of most of them it may be a generation, possibly two or three generations. The menace to the peace and happiness of the American people which lies in the indefinite retention of the Philippine Islands is not to be compared, in their judgment, to the harm which they fear may result to the Filipinos if they are prematurely given the independence which they crave, and to which, it is admitted, they will some day be entitled. The grievous financial burdens which their long-continued retention as a colonial dependency will entail upon the American taxpayers is as nothing, they contend, compared to the moral obligations which the United States have assumed. Thus the "moral" or "altruistic" argument, based upon the alleged incapacity of the Filipinos for self-government, is the only argument now heard in favor of the indefinite retention of the Philippines.

But is it true, according to any just and fair standard, that the Philippine people are not capable of self-government? For, if not true, then the only argument seriously advanced by those who would deny them independence must fall to the ground. The facts, or alleged facts, relied upon to establish their incapacity for self-government are (a) that the Philippine population is made up of many different tribes, inhabiting different islands, or different parts of the same islands, and speaking different dialects or languages; (b) that because of this isolation and difference of language they possess no common means of intercommunication; (c) that a number of these tribes are uncivilized and unchristianized

and will always remain so, and that the Moros, the most savage and adventurous, as well as the most numerous, of the tribes, can never be brought peaceably under any government which may be established by Christian Filipinos; and (d) the extent of illiteracy, . . .¹

Later in the report, Jones says,

In considering the question of Philippine independence, as proposed in this bill, and in reaching the conclusions to which we have come, your committee have not by any means regarded it solely from the standpoint of the people of the Philippine Islands. On the contrary, our views are largely, if not mainly, controlled by what are believed to be the true interests of the people of the United States. The free principles upon which the American Government is founded are wholly incompatible with the idea of holding and governing against their consent any people who aspire to independence and are capable of governing themselves. Moreover, the policy of the United States has always been against expansion beyond the seas.

. . . The incidents which led up to the war with Spain had not the remotest connection with the Philippines. . . . The Spanish-American War was fought to free Cuba and not to enslave the Philippines; to erect a republic in the Occident, not to establish a subject colony in the Orient.²

This bill provided for a more autonomous government for the islands and for independence on and after July 4, 1921. The terms under which Philippine independence was to be granted were that the United States should retain and exercise the right of sovereignty over naval and coaling stations, cable terminals, etc. designated by the United States; that the Government of the Philippines should assume and carry into effect the treaty obligations of the United States with Spain and that citizens of the United States should have most favored nation consideration in the Philippines with the right to travel and do business in the Philippines.³

1. House Report 606, 62nd Congress, 2nd session, (Washington: Government Printing office, 1912), p. 4-5.

2. Ibid., p. 10.

3. Ibid., p. 13.

The minority report, submitted by Olmsted of Pa., stated,

This bill . . . would . . . increase rather than diminish our responsibility, while lessening our ability to perform our moral and just obligations.¹

The expense to the United States . . . under an attempted government by Filipinos themselves would be greater than under our present control.²

The report concludes,

It would be a cowardly shirking of our duty, a disgrace to the American people, and an injury to the Filipinos to give them self-government before they are fitted for it.³

The companion measure to the above bill was H. J. Res. 278 introduced by Jones March 25, 1912 and referred to the Committee on Insular Affairs⁴ which reported it back from Committee on May 1, 1912.⁵ The report recommended the passage of the bill and then said,

The sole object and purpose of the Joint Resolution is to have the independence of the Philippine Islands recognised and their independence and neutrality guaranteed by international agreement whenever such independence shall have been granted by the United States.

The purpose was to prevent the invasion of the islands and to remove from the United States individual responsibility for the maintenance of the independence of the Philippines.⁶

The minority of the committee made the following comments,

-
1. House report 606, part 2, op. cit., p. 1.
 2. Ibid., p. 5.
 3. Ibid., p. 6.
 4. Congressional record, op. cit., p. 3814.
 5. Ibid., p. 5721.
 6. House report 635, 62nd Congress, 2nd session, (Washington: Government Printing office, 1912), p. 1-3.

The resolution is premature. According to the usages of international law, no state can be neutralized except it be a sovereign, independent state, capable itself of being a party to the compact. The Philippine Islands do not constitute such a State.¹

Neither of these bills were considered by the House of Representatives.

In the summer following the reporting of these bills, the national conventions of the political parties were held.

The Democrats reaffirmed their belief in Philippine independence, condemned the policy of the Republicans, and demanded "an immediate declaration of the nation's purpose" to give independence to the Philippines as soon as a stable government could be established. This was to be followed by neutralisation as soon as that was possible.² Then they nominated Woodrow Wilson of New Jersey for President and Thomas Marshall of Indiana for vice-President.

The Republicans became slightly original in their platform. They said,

The Philippine policy of the Republican party has been and is inspired by the belief that our duty toward the Filipino people is a national obligation which should remain entirely free from partisan politics.³

They nominated William Howard Taft for President and James S. Sherman of New York for vice-President.

The Progressive party made no declaration as to their prospective policy toward the Philippines. Theodore Roosevelt and Hiram Johnson were their nominees.

-
1. House report 635, 62nd Congress, 2nd session, (Washington: Government Printing office, 1912), p. 1-3.
 2. Democratic Campaign Textbook, 1912 (New York: Isaac Goldmann Co., printers, 1912), p. 30.
 3. Ibid., p. 31.

As important as the party platforms, if not more important, in determining party policies are the declarations of the future official.

While governor of New Jersey, Woodrow Wilson on August 16, 1911, had said,

I do not believe that the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands are prepared for independence. I believe that they should be prepared for independence by a steadily increasing measure of self-government.¹

In his speech accepting the Democratic nomination for President, Wilson said,

In dealing with the Philippines, we should not allow ourselves to stand upon any mere point of pride, as if, in order to keep our countenance in the family of nations, it were necessary for us to make the same blunders of selfishness that other nations have made. We are not the owners of the Philippine Islands. We hold them in trust for those who live in them. They are theirs, for the uses of their life. We are not even their partners. It is our duty as trustees, to make whatever arrangement of government will be most servicable to their freedom and development. Here, again, we are to set up the rule of justice and of right.²

The Democratic party was victorious in the election as was expected in view of the bitter fight of the Republicans. The victory cannot be ascribed entirely to that cause as both houses of Congress were to be Democratic.

In a speech at Staunton, Virginia, delivered December 28, 1912, Wilson said, "The Philippines are at present our frontier but I hope we presently are to deprive ourselves of that frontier."³

-
1. Ray Stannard Baker, Woodrow Wilson, Life & Letters, (Garden City New York: Doubleday, Page & Co., 1931), Vol. 4, p. 454.
 2. Democratic Campaign Textbook, op. cit., p. 351-352.
 3. W. Cameron Forbes, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 208.

Wilson was inaugurated March 4, 1913 and on July 15 wrote to John Sharp Williams, one of the Democratic leaders, saying,

You may be sure that I shall not be diverted in the Philippine matter, though I must acknowledge that there are many difficult points of judgment to solve as to the way in which the thing ought to be done.¹

Francis B. Harrison, a Democratic member of Congress from New York was selected by Wilson as Governor General of the islands. In his first speech, delivered in Manila October 16, 1913, Harrison read the following message sent by President Wilson:

We regard ourselves as trustees acting not for the advantage of the United States but for the benefit of the people of the Philippine Islands. Every step we take will be taken with a view to the ultimate independence of the islands and as a preparation for that independence; and we hope to move toward that end as rapidly as the safety and permanent interests of the islands will permit. After each step taken experience will guide us to the next.

The administration will take one step at once. It will give to the native citizens of the islands a majority in the appointive Commission and thus in the Upper as well as in the Lower House of the Legislature a majority representation will be secured to them. It will do this in the confident hope and expectation that immediate proof will thereby be given, in the action of the Commission under the new arrangement, of the political capacity of the native citizens who have already come forward to represent and to lead their people in affairs.²

November 15, 1913, ex-President Taft made a statement that it would take the Filipinos two generations to acquire the "character of self-government,"³ and on November 20 he indicted the Harrison administration for the grant of a majority of the Philippine Commission to the Filipinos, who, he said, were not ready for such an increase in their powers.⁴

1. Baker, *op. cit.*, p. 455.

2. Ray Stannard Baker and William E. Dodd, editors, The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson, (New York: & London: Harper and Brothers, 1926), Vol. 3, p. 53.

3. News item in New York Times, November 15, 1913.

4. Ibid., November 20, 1913.

On the 23rd, ex-governor Forbes said the plan to give the Philippines their independence was premature.¹

In contrast with these attacks on the Democratic policy in the Philippines was the statement of another former Republican official in the Philippines. Moorfield Storey in an article, "The Democratic Party and Philippine Independence," quotes Judge Elliott, formerly a member of the Philippine Commission as saying,

I never had any sympathy with the party which opposed the retention of the Philippines. But the Filipinos have been promised independence and have been led to believe that American occupation was temporary and only for the purpose of training them for self-government. They are competent today to conduct a fairly good government, such a one as they desire to live under. They can maintain law and order and can protect the lives and property of foreigners, and that is about all we can expect or rightfully demand. I am therefore in favor of keeping the faith with these people and passing a law somewhat similar to the Jones bill.²

The attacks on Wilson's policy the latter part of November were followed on December 2, 1913 by his first annual message to Congress. In regard to the Philippines and the policy of the United States toward them Wilson said,

There stands our obligation toward our territories overseas. Here we are trustees. Porto Rico, Hawaii, and the Philippines are ours, indeed, but not ours to do what we please with. Such territories, once regarded as mere possessions, are no longer to be selfishly exploited; they are part of the domain of public conscience and of serviceable and enlightened statesmanship. We must administer them for the people who live in them and with the same sense of responsibility to them as toward our own

1. Ibid., November 23, 1913.

2. Senate Document 159, 63 Congress, 1 session (Washington: Government Printing office, 1913), p. 35.

people in our domestic affairs. . . . We must hold steadily in view their [the Philippines] ultimate independence, and we must move toward that independence as steadily as the way can be cleared and the foundations thoughtfully and permanently laid.

Wilson then mentions his appointment of a fifth native citizen to the commission. This is the way, he says, of finding out their capacity-- by letting them see what responsibilities they are capable of assuming, and then using that evidence for further action. He concludes by saying,

At last, I hope and believe, we are beginning to gain the confidence of the Filipino people. By their counsel and experience, rather than by our own, we shall learn how best to serve them and how soon it will be possible and wise to withdraw our supervision. Let us once find the path and set out with firm and confident tread upon it and we shall not wander from it or linger upon it.¹

The policy thus expressed was not different from the policy expressed by the Republicans. The appointment of the fifth Filipino member of the commission merely meant that Wilson was going a little faster than Taft or Forbes would have gone had they been in control.

W. Morgan Shuster, who was Insular Collector of Customs from 1901 to 1906, a Member of the Philippine Commission from 1906 to 1909, and treasurer-general and financial adviser of Persia from 1911 to 1912 wrote an article in the February 1914 issue of *Century* entitled "Shall the Filipinos have a Fourth of July? Altruism Versus Profit." In this article he said the groups opposing Philippine independence were:

1. Republican statesmen in and out of Congress, because the party policy is otherwise. Motives of policy hereby admitted to be altruism, to avoid argument.

1. Baker and Dodd, op. cit., p. 76-77.

2. Business men, because it might diminish the area of business, trade influence, markets, etc. Asserting always, however, that we hold the Filipinos altruistically.

3. Exporters and manufacturers of American goods and products, all admitted into the Philippines free of duty (foreign goods pay duties.) Opposed to Philippine independence because the Philippines might not appreciate the benefits of free trade with America, hence are unfit for self-government. We must hold them altruistically until they are enlightened.

4. Strategists, who more or less believe that we should have floating docks, arsenals, and coaling stations all over the world. Manila is a convenient base for the "Asiatic Squadron" of the American navy; or, rather, it would be except in case of war with Japan.

5. Distinguished churchmen, who sincerely fear that the islands, with their Christian population, if granted independence, might be seized by Japan, a pagan nation.

6. American investors in the islands, because their holdings and interests might lose such special, but artificial, increase in value as therefore attaches at certain times when the owners are citizens of the dominant and sovereign nation; also, because the new Filipino Government would naturally be unable to give such guaranties of stability and order as an older, stronger, and more experienced government like that of the United States. This view is reasonable from their point of view; but if it is adopted, the Filipinos have already lost all chance of gaining their independence because some Americans and foreigners voluntarily invested capital in the islands.

7. Philippine bondholders, because a mistaken idea of the facts on the part of the investing public might cause the price of these bonds to decline.

8. Imperialists; the name conveys their argument. Fourth of July celebrations--for themselves--and the defense of the American flag, whether it is attacked or not, are their specialties.

9. St. Louis Exposition visitors, who do not believe that people "who eat dogs, as we saw them doing at St. Louis," should have independence.

10. Tourists, in and out of official life, who have visited the islands for one or more weeks and become authorities at home on the Philippine problem. The tourist point of view is that the Philippines should be made attractive.¹

Ex-governor general W. Cameron Forbes, who had resigned as governor general effective March 4, 1913, delivered a speech at the Hotel Plaza, New York., December 19, 1913 in which he urged that the economic development of the islands should precede the political development and that the increase in participation in their government by the Filipinos should go slowly and steadily "until ultimately, many generations hence, I fear, the matter of the future relations between the Philippine Islands and the United States will be determined by the representatives of both satisfactorily to both. . . ." He says in conclusion that he is not, personally, a believer "in the United States permanently holding an alien people in subjection against their will." ²

President Wilson called a special session of Congress immediately following his inauguration. Out of that session came the Underwood-Simmons tariff act of 1913, which, as discussed above, provided for complete free trade between the United States and the Philippine Islands.

The second Philippine legislation to be considered was the bill (H. R. 18459) "to declare the purpose of the people of the United States as to the future political status of the people of the Philippine Islands, and to provide a more autonomous government for these islands" introduced

1. Hearings on House Res. 18459, 63 Cong., 3 sess. (Washington: Government Printing office, 1915), p. 742.
 2. Ibid., Testimony of Ferguson, Dec. 18, 1914.

by Jones of Virginia August 20, 1914 and referred to the Committee on Insular Affairs.¹ The bill was reported from Committee August 26² with both a majority and a minority report.

Representative Jones, speaking for the majority, said the bill contained three essential ideas: (1) a solemn declaration of the intention of the United States ultimately to give independence when a stable government has been established, (2) provisions enlarging the scope of self-government of the Filipinos, and (3) provisions declaring the nature of the relations between the United States and the Philippines. The committee said that every administration had started the intention of ultimately giving independence to the Philippines. The preamble to this bill merely puts that promise into a more definite and specific form.³

The minority approved the conservative features of the bill. They also commended the Democrats for coming to the idea of "future independence" from the idea of immediate independence held two years previously. Strenuous objection to the preamble was stated. The minority would prefer to postpone consideration of the bill until the next session of Congress because of unsettled conditions in the Pacific.⁴

The preamble, as indicated above, evoked the most serious opposition of any part of the bill. It read,

Whereas it was never the intention of the people of the United States in the incipency of the War with Spain to make it a war of conquest or for territorial aggrandisement; and

-
1. Congressional Record, 63rd Congress, 2nd session, (Washington: Government Printing office, 1914, p. 14072.
 2. Ibid., p. 14311
 3. House report 1115, 63rd Congress, 2nd session, (Washington: Government Printing office, 1914),
 4. House report 1115, part 2, op. cit.,

Whereas it is, as it has always been, the purpose of the people of the United States to withdraw their sovereignty over the Philippine Islands and recognize their independence as soon as a stable government can be established therein; and

Whereas for the speedy accomplishment of such purpose it is desirable to place in the hands of the people of the Philippines as large a control of their domestic affairs as can be given them without, in the meantime, impairing the exercise of the rights of sovereignty by the people of the United States, in order that, by the use and exercise of popular franchise and governmental powers, they may be the better prepared to fully assume the responsibilities and enjoy all the privileges of complete independence, Therefore,¹

The preamble was agreed to by a vote of 214 to 62.² The 214 yeas consisted of 201 Democrats, 9 Republicans, 3 Progressives, and 1 Progressive Republican. The 62 nays consisted of 58 Republicans, 2 Progressives, 1 Progressive Republican, and 1 Democrat. The geographic distribution is shown on map no. 18.


The bill was then passed by a vote of 212 to 60.³ The 212 yeas consisted of 199 Democrats, 8 Republicans, 4 Progressives, and 1 Progressive Republican. The 60 nays consisted of 59 Republicans and 1 Progressive.

In the Senate the following day, the bill was referred to the Committee on the Philippines⁴ which took no action on it at this session.

In opening the final session of the 63rd Congress, President Wilson made the following statement concerning the Philippines,

-
1. Congressional Record, op. cit., p. 16027.
 2. Ibid., p. 16628.
 3. Ibid., p. 16629.
 4. Ibid., p. 16668.

Map No. 18. House vote on preamble to Jones bill, October 14, 1914.



And there is another piece of legislation which awaits and should receive the sanction of the Senate: I mean the bill which gives the larger measure of self-government to the people of the Philippines. How better in this time of anxious questioning and perplexed policy, could we show our confidence in the principles of liberty, as the source as well as the expression of life, how better could we demonstrate our own self-possession and steadfastness in the courses of justice and disinterestedness than by thus going calmly forward to fulfill our promises to a dependent people, who will now look more anxiously than ever to see whether we have indeed the liberality, the unselfishness, the courage, the faith we have boasted and professed. I can not believe that the Senate will let this great measure of constructive justice await the action of another Congress. Its passage would nobly crown the record of these two years of memorable labor.¹

The Senate Committee on the Philippines held rather extensive hearings during December, 1914 and January, 1915 on the bill which had been passed by the House of Representatives.

Dean C. Worcester, formerly Secretary of Interior in the Philippines, thought that at least one generation should be educated by Americans before independence should even be considered. He said the backward peoples would be oppressed by the lowlanders. The United States needed and should retain a naval base there to protect her trade, he added.²

The next day, January 2, 1915, Taft said our purpose in the islands was to prepare the Filipinos for self-government but that this was not possible until at least one generation had been educated. He said the preamble to this bill was likely to stir up trouble.³

W. Morgan Shuster said before the Committee that he thought the Philippines were capable of governing themselves according to their

-
1. Baker and Dodd, op. cit., p. 218.
 2. Hearing on H. R. 18459, op. cit., p. 308.
 3. Ibid., p. 383.

own standards. As a result partly of his experience as financial adviser to the Persian government, he doubted whether one country should ever try to rule another. He favored Philippine independence.¹

In the January number of *Everybody's Magazine*, Theodore Roosevelt was to make the following statement,

The first and most important thing for us as a people to do in order to prepare ourself for self-defense is to get clearly in our minds just what our policy is to be, and to insist that our public servants shall make their words and their deeds correspond. For example the present administration was elected on the explicit promise that the Philippines should be given their independence, and it has taken action in the Philippines which can be justified only on the theory that their independence is to come in the immediate future. I believe that we have rendered incalculable service in the Philippines, and that what we have there done has shown in the most striking manner the extreme mischief that would have followed if in 1898 and in subsequent years we had failed to do our duty in consequence of following the advice of Mr. Bryan and the pacifists or anti-imperialists of that day.

But this good has been in the Philippines themselves. The only good that has come to us as a Nation has been the good that springs from knowledge that a great deed has been worthily performed. Personally, I think it is a fine and high thing for a nation to have done such a deed with such a purpose. But we cannot taint it with bad faith. If we act so that the natives understand us to have made a definite promise, then we should live up to that promise. The Philippines from a military standpoint are a source of weakness to us. The present administration has promised to let them go and by its actions has rendered it difficult to hold them against any serious foreign foe. These being the circumstances, the islands should at an early moment be given their independence without any guarantee whatever by us and without our retaining any foothold in them.²

Senator Hitchcock, February 2, 1915, reported the bill back from Committee with certain amendments and a report.³ The changes recommended

-
1. Ibid., testimony of W. Morgan Shuster. (Also news item in New York Times, Jan. 9, 1915, p. 15.)
 2. Ibid., p. 497
 3. Congressional Record, 63rd Cong., 3rd sess., (Washington: Government Printing office, 1915), p. 2839.

by the committee provided for an elective senate, an increase in the possible indebtedness of the island, and an increase in the number of voters. A more direct preamble was also substituted. The report stated further,

It is the opinion of the committee that there is an urgent need for action on the pending bill at this session for two reasons:

First. Longer delay will inflame and provoke political agitation, possibly leading to disturbances, and certainly breeding discontent.

Second. Longer delay will continue and increase the present business depression in the islands, due in part to the fact that the uncertainty prevents capital from entering upon new enterprises and even from developing those already entered upon.¹

Objection to the consideration of the bill was made in the Senate on March 3, 1915 so it was passed over.² This Congress ended March 4, 1915.

A new Congress met in December 1915 and to it President Wilson, on the 7th, delivered the following message concerning the Philippines,

There is another matter which seems to me to be very intimately associated with the question of national safety and preparation for defense. That is our policy toward the Philippines and the people of Porto Rico. Our treatment of them and their attitude toward us are manifestly of the first consequence in the development of our duties in the world and in getting a free hand to perform those duties. We must be free from every unnecessary burden or embarrassment than to fulfill our promises and promote the interests of those dependent on us to the utmost. Bills for the alteration and reform of the government of the Philippines and for rendering fuller political

-
1. Senate report 942, 63rd Cong., 3rd sess., (Washington: Government Printing office, 1915), p. 1-4.
 2. Congressional Record, op. cit., p. 5342.

justice to the people of Porto Rico were submitted to the sixty-third congress. They will be submitted also to you. I need not particularise their details. You are most of you already familiar with them. But I do recommend them to your early adoption with the sincere conviction that there are few measures you could adopt which would more serviceably clear the way for the great policies by which we wish to make good, now and always, our right to lead in enterprises of peace and good will and economic and political freedom.¹

That day, Senator Hitchcock of Nebraska introduced a bill (S. 381) "to declare the purpose of the people of the United States as to the future political status of the people of the Philippine Islands, and to provide a more autonomous government for those islands" which was referred to the Committee on the Philippines.²

December 16, Brigadier-General Frank McIntyre, Chief of the Bureau of Insular Affairs, told the Senate Committee on the Philippines that it would be much better to change the preamble of the bill from the statement that independence would be granted when the Filipinos were fitted for it to a promise of independence when, in the judgment of the United States, it would be to the permanent interest of the people of the islands for them to become independent. He said the Filipinos objected to being referred to as temporarily unfitted for independence.³

The next day Hitchcock reported the bill from committee with amendments and a report.⁴ The report said the vote on the preamble was 10 in favor, 3 opposed, and 1 absent. The bill was substantially the same bill recommended in the previous Congress. The suggestions of McIntyre as to the preamble were adopted.⁵

1. Baker and Dodd, *op. cit.*, p. 418-419.

2. *Congressional Record*, *op. cit.*, p. 80.

3. News item in *New York Times*, December 16, 1915.

4. *Congressional Record*, *op. cit.*, p. 372.

5. Senate report 18, 64th Cong., 1st sess., (Washington: Government Printing office, 1915).


Senator Gronna of North Dakota proposed an amendment extending prohibition to the Philippines. Senator Hitchcock offered an amendment "But this shall not apply to native wines and beverages known as vino, tuba, basi and tapuy" which was agreed to 32 to 26.¹ The 32 yeas consisted of 9 Republicans (Borah of Idaho, Catron of New Mex., Clark of Wyo., Harding of Ohio, McLean of Conn., Page of Vt., Sterling of S. Dak., Townsend of Mich., and Wadsworth of N. Y.) and 23 Democrats (Bryan and Fletcher of Fla., Lane and Chamberlain of Oreg., Gore of Okla., Hardwick and Smith of Ga., Hitchcock of Neb., Hollis of N. H., Hughes and Martine of N. J., James of Ky., Johnson of Me., Kern of Ind., Lee of Md., Lewis of Ill., Ransdell of La., Robinson of Ark., Shafroth of Colo., Simmons of N. C., Stone of Mo., Underwood of Ala., and Williams of Miss.) The 26 nays consisted of 14 Republicans (Clapp and Nelson of Minn., Cummins and Kenyon of Iowa, Curtis of Kan., Gronna of N. Dak., Lippitt of R. I., Norris of Neb., Oliver of Pa., Jones and Poindexter of Wash., Sherman of Ill., Smoot of Utah, and Weeks of Mass.) and 12 Democrats (Ashurst of Ariz., Bankhead of Ala., Beckham of Ky., Chilton of W. Vir., Lea of Tenn., Myers of Mont., Owen of Okla., Sheppard of Texas, Swanson of Vir., Thompson of Kan., Vardaman of Miss., and Husting of Wis.) The geographic distribution is shown on map no. 19.

The Gronna amendment as amended was then adopted by a vote of 35 to 23.² The 35 yeas consisted of 16 Republicans (Clapp and Nelson of Minn., Cummins and Kenyon of Iowa, Curtis of Kan., Norris of Neb., Jones and Poindexter of Wash., Gronna of N. Dak., Sherman of Ill.,

1. Congressional Record, op. cit., p. 1206.

2. Ibid., p. 1207-08.


Map No. 19. Senate vote on Hitchcock amendment to Gronna amendment extending prohibition to the Philippines, January 18, 1916.



Smoot of Utah, Borah of Idaho, Clark of Wyo., Page of Vt., Sterling of S. Dak., and Townsend of Mich.) and 19 Democrats (Ashurst of Ariz., Bankhead of Ala., Beckham of Ky., Chilton of W. Vir., Fletcher of Fla., Lane and Chamberlain of Oreg., Lea of Tenn., Myers of Mont., Simmons and Overman of N. C., Sheppard of Texas, Shafroth of Colo., Smith of Ga., Smith of S. C., Swanson of Vir., Thompson of Kan., and Vardaman of Miss.) The 23 nays consisted of 17 Democrats (Bryan of Fla., Hardwick of Ga., Hitchcock of Neb., Hollis of N. H., Hughes and Martine of N. J., Husting of Wis., James of Ky., Johnson of Mo., Lee of Md., Lewis of Ill., Newlands of Nev., Ransdell of La., Robinson of Ark., Stone of Mo., Underwood of Ala., and Williams of Miss.) and 6 Republicans (Catron of N. Mex., Harding of Ohio, Wadsworth of N. Y., Weeks of Mass., Lippitt of R. I., and McLean of Conn.) The geographic distribution is shown on map no. 20.

There can be little doubt about the lack of wisdom of the United States Congress legislating in such a fashion about a purely Philippine affair. Without regard to the merits of the prohibition issue in the United States, the attempt to force on a people, about whom most Congressmen knew surprisingly little, a new system of institutions was absurd. The Filipinos are, according to the testimony of all witnesses, a very temperate race among whom drunkenness and heavy drinking are practically unknown. The enforcement of a provision such as this would be practically impossible since the Filipinos did not want it. It represents the influence of United States pressure politics in the determination of imperial policies. Much more of this was to come later in our relations with the Philippines.

Map No. 20. Senate vote on Cronna amendment as amended, Jan. 18, 1916.



Senator Clarke of Ark., January 24, 1916, presented an amendment to the bill by which the President was authorized to bring about independence for the Philippines in from two to four years unless there were disturbances in the island.

If there were disturbances, the time would be extended until the adjournment of the succeeding session of Congress so that Congress could decide what should be done. The president was instructed to work for the neutralization of the island and, failing in this, was to guarantee the independence of the islands for five years. In the latter case, the United States would reserve such control in the internal affairs of the Philippines as would prevent foreign complications and would enable the American army to make good the American guarantee.¹

February 2, Hitchcock proposed a substitute for the Clarke amendment. The main differences between the two amendments were that the president by the Hitchcock amendment was allowed two to six years rather than two to four years; the time was to begin with the meeting of the legislature rather than with the passage of the act; the government was to be republican in form, based on the consent of the people, and established by peaceful means; the rights of peoples of other nations, already existing in the Philippine Islands under American protection, should be protected and recognized by the new Philippine government; the new government should assume such obligations as the United States had assumed in the treaty of Paris.² This substitute was rejected 24 to 58, 6 Republicans joining 18 Democrats in voting for it and 27 Republicans and 31 Democrats voting against the proposal.

1. Ibid., p. 1426.

2. Ibid., p. 1986.

It was moved to strike out the following:

After the passage of the act, the president shall invite the cooperation of the principal nations interested in the affairs of that part of the world in which the Philippines are located in the form of a binding agreement, whereby the cooperating nations shall mutually pledge themselves to recognize and respect the sovereignty and independence of the said Philippines, and also to mutually obligate themselves, equally and not one primarily nor to any greater extent than another, to maintain as against external force the sovereignty of said Philippines. If any of the nations so invited to join the United States in such undertaking shall decline to do so, then the President shall include as parties to such convention such nations as may be willing to join therein and to assume such obligations; and if none are willing to so unite therein, then the President is authorized to give such guaranty on behalf of the United States alone for a period of five years from and after the expiration of said period of four years, and any extension thereof, and pending the existence of such separate guaranty by the United States, the United States shall be entitled to retain and exercise such control and supervision in said Philippines as may be necessary to enforce order therein and to avoid external complications.¹

The motion to strike out carried by a vote of 53 to 31,²

30 Republicans (Berah of Idaho, Brandegee of Conn., Clapp of Minn., Clark and Warren of Wyo., Colt and Lippitt of R. I., Cummins and Kenyon of Iowa, Curtis of Kan., Dillingham and Page of Vt., du Pont of Del., Fall of N. Mex., Gallinger of N. H., Harding of Ohio, Jones and Poindexter of Wash., LaFollette of Wis., Lodge and Weeks of Mass., Morris of Neb., Oliver of Pa., Smith and Townsend of Mich., Smoot and Sutherland of Utah, Sterling of S. Dak., Wadsworth of N. Y., and Works of Cal.) and 23 Democrats (Ashurst and Smith of Ariz., Beckham of Ky., Chamberlain and Lane of Ore., Hitchcock of Neb., Hollis of N. H., Lea and Shields of Tenn., Lewis of Ill., Martine of N. J.,

1. Ibid., p. 1997


2. Loc. cit.

Myers and Walsh of Mont., Newlands and Pittman of Nev., O'Gorman of N. Y., Phelan of Cal., Pomerene of Ohio, Randsell of La., Reed of Mo., Shafroth and Thomas of Colo., and Williams of Miss.) voting for the amendment. Opposing the amendment were 27 Democrats (Bankhead and Underwood of Ala., Clarke and Robinson of Ark., Bryan and Fletcher of Fla., Chilton of W. Vir., Hardwick and Smith of Ga., Husting of Wis., James of Ky., Johnson of Me., Kern of Ind., Lee and Smith of Md., Martin and Swanson of Vir., Overman and Simmons of N. C., Saulsbury of Del., Sheppard of Texas, Smith and Tillman of S. C., Stone of Mo., Thompson of Kan., Vardaman of Miss., and Broussard of La.) and 4 Republicans (McCumber and Gronna of N. Dak., Catron of N. Mex., and Nelson of Minn.) The geographic distribution is shown on map no. 21.

The Clarke amendment was then approved, February 2, by a vote of 41 to 41 with Vice-President Marshall voting for the amendment.¹ Voting for the amendment were 36 Democrats (Ashurst and Smith of Ariz., Bankhead and Underwood of Ala., Broussard of La., Bryan and Fletcher of Fla., Hardwick and Smith of Ga., Hollis of N. H., Chamberlain and Lane of Ore., Chilton of W. Vir., Clarke and Robinson of Ark., Husting of Wis., James of Ky., Johnson of Me., Kern of Ind., Lee of Md., Martine of N. J., Newlands and Pittman of Nev., Overman and Simmons of N. C., Shafroth and Thomas of Colo., Shields of Tenn., Smith and Tillman of S. C., Stone of Mo., Swanson of Vir., Thompson of Kan., Vardaman and Williams of Miss., and Sheppard of Texas) and 5 Republicans (Berah of Idaho, Clapp of Minn., Kenyon of Iowa, LaFollette of Wis.,

1. Ibid., p. 1997-98.

Map No. 21. Senate vote on motion to strike out guarantee of Philippine independence in Clarke amendment, February 2, 1916.




and Works of Cal.) Voting against the amendment were 12 Democrats (Beckham of Ky., Lea of Tenn., Hitchcock of Neb., Lewis of Ill., Myers and Walsh of Mont., O'Gorman of N. Y., Phelan of Cal., Pomerene of Ohio, Ransdell of La., Reed of Mo., and Saulsbury of Del.) and 29 Republicans (Brangegee and McLean of Conn., Catron and Fall of N. Mex., Clark and Warren of Wyo., Colt and Lippitt of R. I., Cummins of Iowa, Curtis of Kan., du Pont of Del., Gallinger of N. H., Gronna and McCumber of N. Dak., Harding of Ohio, Jones and Poindexter of Wash., Lodge and Weeks of Mass., Nelson of Minn., Norris of Neb., Oliver of Pa., Page of Vt., Smith and Townsend of Mich., Smoot and Sutherland of Utah, Sterling of S. Dak., and Wadsworth of N. Y.) The geographic distribution of the vote is shown on map no. 22.

The vote on concurring in the amendments made in the Committee of the Whole was 48 to 27.¹ The bill then passed the Senate, February 4, 1916, by a vote of 52 to 24,² 46 Democrats (Ashurst and Smith of Ariz., Bankhead of Ala., Bryan and Fletcher of Fla., Chilton of W. Vir., Clarke and Robinson of Ark., Hardwick and Smith of Ga., Hollis of N. H., Hughes of N. J., Husting of Wis., James and Beckman of Ky., Johnson of Mo., Johnson of S. Dak., Kern of Ind., Lea and Shields of Tenn., Lee of Md., Lewis of Ill., Martin and Swanson of Vir., Myers and Walsh of Mont., Newlands and Pittman of Nev., Overman and Simmons of N. C., Pomerene of Ohio, Reed and Stone of Mo., Shafroth and Thomas of Colo., Smith and Tillman of S. C., Vardaman and Williams of Miss.,

1. Ibid., p. 2124-25.

2. Ibid., p. 2125.

Map No. 22. Senate vote on Clarke amendment, February 2, 1916.



Saulsbury of Del., Sheppard of Texas, Thompson of Kan., Hitchcock of Neb., O'Gorman of N. Y., and Ransdell and Broussard of La.) and 6 Republicans (Clapp of Minn., Borah of Idaho, Kenyon of Iowa, LaFollette of Wis., Norris of Neb., and Weeks of Cal.) voted for the bill. Those voting against the bill were all Republicans (Brandeggee and McLean of Conn., Clark and Warren of Wyo., Colt and Lippitt of R. I., Cummins of Iowa, Curtis of Kan., Dillingham and Page of Vt., Gallinger of N. H., Gronna and McCumber of N. Dak., Harding of Ohio, Jones and Poindexter of Wash., Smith and Townsend of Mich., Smoot and Sutherland of Utah, Sterling of S. Dak., and Wadsworth of N. Y.). The geographic distribution is shown on map no. 23.

During the consideration of the bill, President Wilson had made a preparedness day speech at Topeka, Kansas in which, after speaking about the United States giving up Cuba, he said,


The American people feel the same way about the Philippines, though the rest of the world does not believe it. We are trustees for the Filipino people, and just as soon as we feel that they can take care of their own affairs without any direct interference and protection, the flag of the United States will again be honored by the fulfillment of a promise. That flag stands for honor, not for advantage. That flag stands for the rights of mankind, no matter where they be, no matter what their antecedents, no matter what the race involved; it stands for the absolute right to political liberty and free self-government and wherever it stands for the contrary American traditions have begun to be forgotten.¹

February 8, the bill (S. 381) was referred to the Committee on Insular Affairs of the House of Representatives.²

1. Baker and Dodd., op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 92.

2. Congressional record, op. cit., p. 2275.

Map No. 23. Senate vote on passage of bill, February 4, 1916.



The next day Lindley M. Garrison, Secretary of War, brought to a head a difference of opinion about army reorganization and Philippine policy when he wrote a letter to President Wilson. Concerning the Philippines he said,

Two matters within the jurisdiction of this department are now of immediate and pressing importance I refer, of course, to the Philippine question and [army reorganization]. . . .
 . . . I consider the principle embodied in the Clarke amendment an abandonment of the duty of this nation and a breach of trust toward the Filipinos; so believing I cannot accept it or acquiesce in its acceptance.¹

The next day, February 10, Wilson replied to the letter. He made the following statement about the Philippine legislation,

It is my judgment that the action embodied in the Clarke amendment . . . is unwise at this time but it would clearly be most inadvisable for me to take the position that I must dissent from that action should both houses of Congress concur in a bill embodying that amendment.²

Because of this divergence of views, Secretary Garrison resigned that same day, February 10.³ Four days later the New York Times said the resignation of Garrison had helped the chances for the Clarke amendment as he was bitterly opposed to it.⁴

At this time Taft characterized the bill passed by the Senate as embodying a policy of "Scuttle and breach of faith."⁵

February 12, the Times reported that the leaders of all the native parties were privately opposed to the Clarke amendment.⁶

-
1. News item in New York Times, February 11, 1916, p. 2.
 2. Loc. cit.
 3. Loc. cit.
 4. Ibid., Feb. 14, 1916, p. 6.
 5. Ibid., Feb. 13, 1916, Sec. 1, p. 6.
 6. Ibid., Feb. 12, 1916, p. 5.

This view is reinforced by the statement of General McIntyre, Chief of the Bureau of Insular Affairs, that while "at present all of these parties favor, with certain modifications, the Jones bill, as it is known" he is convinced "that no serious part of the Filipino people desire separation at this time, and that the serious people of the islands are wholly without belief that they can foresee clearly the day they would desire this separation."¹

The bill was reported from Committee April 6 with the Clarke amendment² by a party vote of eleven to eight.³

In the House caucus on the Philippine bill, the Democratic ranks were split. The vote was 140 to 35 with 28 Democrats refusing to be bound by the action of the caucus. The Democratic majority was 21.⁴ The Times reported, April 30, that the Democrats would seek to retain in the bill a definite promise regarding the date upon which the Philippines would be given independence.⁵

The House of Representatives voted on the Philippine government bill on May 1, 1916. In Committee of the whole, a motion to strike out the Clarke amendment passed 193 to 151.⁶ An amendment proposing the Clarke amendment with a two to six year period for withdrawal failed 146 to 184.⁷ Another amendment by Jones providing for withdrawal in not less than four nor more than eight years failed by a vote of 162 to 193.⁸ Jones then proposed the preamble which had been adopted for

-
1. House report 499, part 2, 64th Cong., 1st sess., (Washington: Government Printing office, 1916), p. 8.
 2. Congressional record, op. cit., p. 5619.
 3. House report 499, op. cit.
 4. News item in New York Times, April 28, 1916, p. 6.
 5. Ibid., April 30, 1916, Sec. 1, p. 3.
 6. Congressional record, op. cit., p. 7205.
 7. Loc. cit.
 8. Loc. cit.

the Jones bill during the previous congress.¹ This proposal was approved 199 to 142.² The consideration of the bill in Committee of the Whole having been completed, the bill was taken up in the House, where a separate vote was taken on the motion to strike out the Clarke amendment. The motion carried by a vote of 213 to 165³ with 178 Republicans, 30 Democrats, 2 Progressives, 1 Progressive Republican, 1 Progressive Protectionist, and 1 Independent voting for the motion and 163 Democrats, 1 Socialist, and 1 Prohibitionist voting against it. The geographic distribution of the vote is shown on map no. 24. The bill was then agreed to without a vote.

Fitzgerald of New York then offered the following motion:

That the managers on the part of the House are instructed not to agree to any declaration or provision setting a definite time, or fixing a definite period, at or within which the Philippines shall be granted independence.⁴

After a motion to adjourn had been defeated 157 to 209,⁵ the previous question was ordered by a vote of 208 to 150.⁶ The Fitzgerald instructions were then agreed to by a vote of 203 to 156.⁷ The 203 yeas consisted of 171 Republicans, 27 Democrats, 2 Progressives, 1 Progressive Republican, 1 Progressive Protectionist, and 1 Independent. The 156 nays consisted of 153 Democrats, 1 Socialist, 1 Republican, and 1 Prohibitionist.

1. Ibid., p. 7209 (also in Congressional Record, 63rd Cong., 2nd Sess., op. cit., p. 16027.

2. Loc. cit.

3. Ibid., p. 7210-11.


4. Ibid., p. 7212.

5. Loc. cit.

6. Ibid., p. 1212-13.

7. Ibid., p. 1213-14.

Map No. 24. House vote on motion to strike out Clarke amendment, May 1, 1916.



■ Yeas 213 (178 R, 30 D, 2 P, 1 PR, 1 PP, 1 Ind)
■ Nays 165 (163 D, 1 Soc, 1 Prob)
■ Not voting.

Most of the Democrats who broke away from the party ranks to vote, with the Republicans, against independence were Catholics from New York. This tends to confirm suggestions that the Catholic church was opposed to independence and used its influence against the Clarke amendment.

Over two months later, on July 18, Hitchcock's motion to disagree to the House amendments and to agree to a conference was agreed to by the Senate.¹

The conference report, which eliminated the Clarke amendment and Gronna's amendment on prohibition, was agreed to by the Senate 37 to 22,² on a straight party vote except for Lane, Democrat from Oregon, who voted against accepting the report. The House accepted the report by a vote of 34 to 29.³ President Wilson signed the bill August 29, 1916.⁴

The bill made a few changes in the government of the Philippines. The free trade relationship between the United States and the Philippine Islands was expressly retained. The government of the Philippines was forbidden to levy export taxes. The bill provided for a Senate to be elected by the people of the Philippines. The officials appointed by the President with the consent of the United States Senate were reduced to the Governor General, the Vice-Governor, who is also head of the department of public instruction, and the members of the Philippine Supreme Court. An auditor and deputy auditor were to be appointed by the President with nothing being said about the consent of the Senate. A promise

1. Ibid., p. 11234.
 2. Ibid., p. 12732.
 3. Ibid., p. 12844.
 4. Ibid., p. 13417.

of independence when a "stable government can be established" in the Philippines was included in the preamble mentioned above.¹

Immediately after this bill had passed the House and Senate, Newton D. Baker, Secretary of War, wrote a letter of instruction to Governor-General Harrison to regulate his action under the new law. Baker said that he felt that Congress had extended to the Filipinos a greater measure of self-government than they were "capable of exercising in the way most beneficial to the people." He thought that Congress had accorded to the Filipinos more power than they intended them to have as in all cases where the original bill was changed, it was in the direction of reduced powers for the Filipinos. He then said that no encroachment on the powers placed in the hands of the Filipinos should be permitted. He then adds,

We should give to the people of the islands what Congress has given to them but we should be particularly careful and not give them those powers which Congress has withheld lest we, in assuming this responsibility, may hereafter be charged with failure due to a lack of appreciation of the spirit that governed the preparation of this act.

Baker then mentions the bad effects which resulted when Taft extended power to the Filipinos too rapidly, especially powers not granted by the then existing legislation.²

Harrison followed a policy of active cooperation with the native leaders in the Philippines, thus disregarding the very sound advice which Baker sent to him. Later administrations were to be sorely

-
1. U. S. Statutes at Large, Vol 29, 64th Congress, (Washington: Government Printing office, 1917), p. 545-556.
 2. Congressional Record, 61st Cong., 1st sess., (Washington: Government Printing office, 1926), p. 1381-83.

troubled in reestablishing the position of the governor general as Congress in the Jones act had intended. In January, 1917, Harrison was considering the formation of a Council of State to act in an advisory capacity. It was to include the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the department heads.¹ It was finally created in November, 1918. Harrison, in 1921 said,

The undersigned, while believing that the Council of State is of undoubted great value to the executive and productive in general of greatly increased harmony between executive and legislative branches, has been unwilling to approve the suggestion that this extra-constitutional body be established by law in order not to tie the hands nor to appear to limit the constitutional powers of his successor.²

During the consideration of this act, the political conventions of the several parties met and decided on platforms and candidates.

The Republicans said,

We renew our allegiance to the Philippine policy inaugurated by McKinley, approved by Congress, and consistently carried out by Roosevelt and Taft. Even in this short time it has enormously improved the material and social conditions of the islands, given the Philippine people a constantly increasing participation in their government, and if persisted in will bring still greater benefits in the future.

We accepted the responsibility of the islands as a duty to civilisation and the Filipino people. To leave our task half done would break our pledges, injure our prestige among nations, and imperil what has already been accomplished.

We condemn the Democratic administration for its attempt to abandon the Philippines, which was prevented only by the vigorous opposition of Republican members of Congress, aided by a few patriotic Democrats.³

-
1. News item in New York Times, January 5, 1917, p. 8.
 2. Annual Report of Governor General of Philippine Islands, 1920, (Washington: Government Printing office, 1922), p. 17.
 3. Congressional Record, 71st Cong., 2nd sess., (Washington: Government Printing office, 1930), p. 1024.

The Republicans then nominated Charles Evans Hughes, New York, for President and Charles W. Fairbanks of Indiana for Vice-President.

The Democrats declared,

We heartily endorse the provisions of the bill recently passed by the House of Representatives further promoting self-government in the Philippine Islands as being in fulfillment of the policy declared by the Democratic party in its last national platform and we reiterate our endorsement of the purpose of ultimate independence for the Philippine Islands expressed in the preamble of that measure.¹

Woodrow Wilson and Thomas R. Marshall of Indiana were renominated by the Democrats. With the assumption of office the Democratic party thus fulfilled Hay's suggestion given in 1904 that the Democratic party would do the same thing that the Republican party was doing about relinquishment of the islands. We see that they had changed their plea from immediate to ultimate independence. The question of the disposition of the Philippines was not an issue in the campaign. Woodrow Wilson was reelected.

The Republican policy was stated at this time by Elihu Root. He had become Secretary of War under McKinley, assuming that position August 1, 1899, at the time of the requested resignation of Alger, and had continued in that position to February 1, 1904. He became Secretary of State July 1, 1905 and continued in that position until January 27, 1909. He then became a Senator from New York from 1909 to 1915. While Secretary of War he had drafted the instructions to the Philippine Commission referred to by the Republicans as the United States declaration of policy in the Philippine Islands.

¹. Ibid., p. 1023.

Mr. Root, August 8, 1916, wrote a prefatory note for the two volume work on the Philippines by Charles B. Elliott, saying,

The question whether it was wise or unwise for the United States to take title to the Philippines and assume the burden of government there no longer calls for consideration. We did take the Philippines. We acquired the rights and undertook the duties of sovereignty. We declared a trust for the benefit of the people of the Islands. We are committed to the undertaking. Self-respect requires that we should discharge the obligations that we have assumed. We cannot relieve ourselves from them except in one way, and that is by carrying out our performances to such a point that our cestuis que trustent will be competent to take care of themselves. When that point is reached we can resign the trust with credit; but not until then. . . . We declared our adherence to the most advanced view of colonial relations--The view that the good of the colony is to be the primary consideration in all administration. . . . We undertook to go a little farther than other countries have gone and to make the first consideration in our government of the islands the training of the inhabitants in the difficult art of self-government so that they would as soon as possible become competent to govern themselves instead of being governed by us. Accordingly one of the first things that we did was to send over teachers by the shipload--thousands of them--and to establish schools all over the Islands. And then we provided a form of government under which the Philippines should receive what may be called clinical instruction in administration and in the application of the principles which we consider vital to free self-government, and we provided that, step by step, just as rapidly as they become familiar with the institutions of free government and capable of continuing them, the powers of government should be placed in their hands. . . .

Mr. Root then speaks of the need for continued study of and interest in the Philippines by the people of the United States. He shows that the right to vote does not give self-government, using as an example the case of the negroes in the South after the Civil War. Mr. Root would improve the power of self-government of the Filipinos through education. He concludes,

. . . the best service we can render to a people whom we wish to benefit is to help them acquire the art of self-government. This is the theory upon which we are proceeding in the Philippines, but the application of such a theory requires knowledge and genuine interest and sympathy and these qualities ought to characterize the relations of the people of this country to the people of the Philippine Islands.¹

Theodore Roosevelt made several comments on the relations of the United States and the Philippines. In reading his statements one should keep in mind the extreme bitterness which Roosevelt felt for "that professor" in the White House. In a statement he made interpreting the Jones act, he commented on the effectiveness of the navy within a reasonable distance of the territorial United States, such as could be protected from Panama, Alaska, and Hawaii. He continued:

I exclude the Philippines. That is because I feel that the present administration has definitely committed us to a course of action which will make the early and complete severance of the Philippines from us not merely desirable but necessary. I have never felt that the Philippines were of any special use to us. But I have felt that we had a task to perform there and that a great nation is benefited by doing a great task. It was our bounden duty to work primarily for the interest of the Filipinos; but it was also our bounden duty, inasmuch as the entire responsibility lay upon us to consult our own judgment and not theirs in finally deciding what was to be done.²

In a public address delivered in March 1918, Taft said that the statement in the Democratic platform favoring Philippine independence "is an affirmation of policy only slightly different from that repeatedly announced by this and preceding Republican administrations."³

-
1. Charles B. Elliott, The Philippines to the end of the Military Regime (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1917), Prefatory Note.
 2. Congressional Record, 71 Cong., 2 sess., op. cit., p. 4797.
 3. Loc. cit.

Even though the platforms might contain practically the same ideas, the views of the Democratic administrative leaders were becoming much more inclined to immediate independence than were those of the Republican leaders. The New York Times in April 1919 announced the support of President Wilson and Secretary Baker to immediate Philippine independence.¹

In a message written by President Wilson to Secretary Baker and delivered in May 1919 by Secretary Baker to the Philippine Independence mission Wilson had said,

I am sorry that I can not look into the faces of the gentlemen of this mission from the Philippine Islands and tell them all that I have in my mind and heart, as I think of the past labor, with the end almost in sight, undertaken by the American and Filipino people for their permanent benefit. I know however that your sentiments are mine in this regard and you will translate truly to them my own feelings.

In connection with this statement Secretary Baker said to the mission,

I know that I express the feelings of the President--I certainly express my own feelings; I think I express the prevailing feeling of the United States--when I say that we believe the time has substantially come, if not quite come, when the Philippine Islands can be allowed to sever the most formal political tie remaining and become an independent nation.²

At the Joint Committee hearings (Senate Committee on the Philippines and House Committee on Insular Affairs) on Philippine Independence held in June 1919, Governor General Harrison reaffirmed his belief that the Philippines had fulfilled the conditions precedent to independence. He said further,

1. News item in New York Times, April 5, 1919.

2. Congressional Record, 71st Cong., 2nd sess., op. cit., p. 10585.

I wish to state on my authority as governor general that in my opinion there exists today in the Philippine Islands a stable government, which I think should answer the requirements laid down by President Grant and McKinley, and as I understand it also, by Mr. Root, namely a government elected by the suffrages of the people, which is supported by the people, which is capable of maintaining order and of fulfilling its international obligations.

Harrison then recommended the earliest grant of independence that it was policy to make. He urged the enactment of an act similar to the Platt amendment for the Philippine Islands.¹

The next month, Republican leaders in Congress announced the decision to postpone indefinitely the question of granting independence to the islands. The members of the committees were not sufficiently impressed with the representations of delegates to take a stand in favor of freeing the islands at that time.²

Mr. Harrison reaffirmed his belief in Philippine independence in his annual report. He said that the Filipinos had fulfilled the requirement of maintaining a stable government. He hoped "early independence will be conceded."³

Wilson stated his belief in immediate independence in his last message to Congress, dated December 7, 1920. He said,

Allow me to call your attention to the fact that the people of the Philippine Islands have succeeded in maintaining a stable government since the last action of Congress in their behalf, and have thus fulfilled the condition, set by the Congress, as precedent to a consideration of granting independence to the Islands. I respectfully submit that this condition precedent having been

-
1. Hearing of Joint Committee on Philippine independence, June 1919, (Washington: Government Printing office, 1919), Statement of Harrison.
 2. News item in New York Times, July 21, 1919, p. 12.
 3. Ibid., November 29, 1919, p. 24.

fulfilled, it is now our liberty and our duty to keep our promise to the people of these islands by granting them the independence which they so honorably covet.¹

The last Democratic utterance on Philippine policy during this period was made by Mr. Harrison who, in speaking to the Philippine Columbian Association at Manila, said that he offered to tender his resignation as governor general 18 months before upon the condition that the Secretary of War recommend to President Wilson that a Filipino be appointed as his successor. He said he made the offer while in Washington in 1919.²

The suggestion of Harrison was one of the logical administrative methods of giving the Philippines self-government if not complete independence. It was the method followed in the Anglo-Australian movement for the self-government of Australia. Another procedure leading to self-government of Australia. Another procedure leading to self-government was the policy of Harrison, like that of Lord Elgin in Canada, of signing all the bills that were passed by the legislative assembly. This policy of Harrison did not gain sufficient prestige during the period of the incumbency of Wilson and Harrison to become established practice. It was discontinued March 4, 1921 when the terms of Wilson and Harrison expired.

1. Ibid., December 8, 1920.

2. Ibid., January 18, 1921.

, CHAPTER XIII

THE REVERSAL OF POLICY TOWARD THE PHILIPPINES

The campaign of 1920 was the starting point for Republican policy toward the Philippines after the World War. For the succeeding ten years, there was no significant change in the nature of the relationship of the islands to the United States. This was a period of prosperity for the United States and of lack of interest in the Philippines. Economic shock, coming in 1929 and 1930, produced results completely at variance with anything that had been expected in the 1920's.

The Republicans in 1920 made no declaration of policy concerning the Philippines, and thus, by omission, indicated an intention of maintaining the status quo. They nominated Warren G. Harding of Ohio for President and Calvin Coolidge of Massachusetts for vice-president.

The Democratic platform said, "We favor the granting of independence without unnecessary delay to the 10,500,000 inhabitants of the Philippine Islands."¹ James M. Cox of Ohio was their nominee for President and Franklin D. Roosevelt of New York was their nominee for Vice-president.

In the ensuing election the question of Philippine independence was not an issue. But the result, as in previous elections, had important results for the Philippine Islands. The Republicans won a landslide victory, Harding receiving 404 electoral votes to 107 for Cox.²

1. News item in New York Times, July 3, 1920, p. 4.

2. Edward Stanwood, History of the Presidency, (Boston & New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1928 edition), Vol 2, p. 422.

About the middle of February, 1921, Harding offered the position of governor-general of the Philippines to Leonard Wood,¹ who had been a candidate for the Republican nomination for the Presidency in 1920. Wood and Harding deliberated about the appointment of Wood for several weeks and then Harding announced, March 7, the appointment of Wood as the head of a special mission of investigation to the Philippines.²

The plans for the special mission became definite in the latter part of March. Harding wrote to John W. Weeks, Secretary of War, on March 20, 1921 that Wilson had stated that the Philippines were ready for independence. Harding then continues,

The suggestion made was not acted upon by that session of Congress. Undoubtedly that nonaction was due to the fact that all the evidence available to Congress was not of this same tenor. Based, however, as it was, on official reports from the highest authority in the Philippine Islands, as well as on current reports from lesser authorities given the widest circulation in the United States, as well as in the islands, it can not with propriety be ignored, nor yet can it, in the face of conflicting evidence from any sources, be accepted as the final word on so important a subject.

I have, therefore, selected General Leonard Wood and W. Cameron Forbes to go to the Philippine Islands and to make there a study of the situation and to report thereon, in order that I may have a judgment on which I can base my action and my recommendations with a consciousness that I am dealing justly with the Filipino people and pursuing a policy which the American people will sanction and support. I have discussed this subject with you, and will ask you . . . to give to them such instructions as will insure a full understanding and a frank report of the problem submitted.³

Three days later, Weeks issued the definite instructions to Wood and Forbes. He said, in part,

-
1. News item in New York Times, February 16, 1921, p. 2.
 2. Ibid., March 8, 1921.
 3. Annual Report of Governor General Philippine Islands, 1921-
(Washington: Government Printing office, 1922), p. 14-15. (Also House document 398, 67th Cong., 2nd sess.)

It is asserted . . . that the Philippine government is now in a position to warrant its total separation from the United States Government . . . and that the government so conducted would be one in which the American people could take pride because of the assistance heretofore given it.

All of this is quite positively denied by other persons . . . Between these conflicting views you are to render judgment.

The decision of the question thus arising is of momentous importance, involving, as it may, the very life of the Filipino people as a people and the reputation and credit of our own country. . . .

Every consideration, therefore, urges us, before taking a step of importance in this matter, to satisfy ourselves that we are not acting through emotions, but are acting wisely as the facts present themselves to us after a careful, impartial study.

.

We can not neglect in considering the question of the maintenance of a government in the Philippine Islands the financial condition of the people. A study of the situation must embrace, therefore, a first-hand examination of the financial condition of the Philippine government and of the Filipino people--the present and prospective revenues of the government and the extent to which these revenues are dependent on the present relation of the islands to the United States.

Of even more importance than the economic position of the government is that of the people. A careful study should be made of the effect on the people of treating their products in the American market as those of a foreign country, as well as . . . such disadvantages as may accrue to them as the result of the free entry of American goods in their markets.

Passing now from the economic question, attention should be directed to the likelihood of the maintenance of a stable government in the islands as this likelihood may be determined from evidence drawn from the operation of the existing government.

.

The government thus constituted is the one to be studied as the basis of judgment. Of first importance it should be determined whether or not this government has contributed duly to the happiness, peace, and prosperity of the Filipino people, and the determination of this question must necessarily depend largely on the views of those people.

It should be determined whether or not the government is reasonably free from those underlying causes that result in the destruction of government. Is the government effectively administered; are the officials and employees reasonably faithful to the trust imposed upon them; is justice impartially administered; are the elections conducted honestly so that the public will receive expression in the selection of elective officers; are the results of the elections generally acquiesced in by defeated minorities; are the civil service laws honestly administered; and are appointments to office and to employment under the government made as a result of competency?

The effect of extension of powers to Filipinos in their own government should be carefully scrutinized, and it should be determined whether such extension results in a lowering of the standards of government and whether such lowering, if it exists, decreases with the experience of the Filipino so charged with responsibility, or if there is a steady relaxation of effort and a more marked deficiency as we recede from the previous standard. The result of Filipinization of the important services, education, health, public works, and agriculture, should be noted and given due weight in a final determination of the problem submitted.

.....

It should be remembered that our obligations are to all of the people who inhabit the Philippine Islands, and in a particular manner, because of their relative helplessness, we are committed to look after the welfare of the backward people of the islands--Christian, Moro, and Pagan. The keeping of our faith to these people has been committed to the present Philippine government. How has this faith thus committed been kept, and what is the outlook for the future?

The Filipino people have for ages, due to the fact that the sovereignty of the Philippine Islands rested first in Spain and then in the United States, been protected in the ownership of territory and potential wealth out of all proportion to that of their neighbors. It is important to determine whether reasonable plans exist for the utilization of these resources by the Filipino people in order that their unused land and resources may not continually be a source of temptation to their less fortunate, but probably stronger, neighbors, and whether on the withdrawal of a strong sovereignty from these islands these resources would remain exclusively available to the Filipino people.¹

1. Ibid., p. 15-17.

Upon arrival in the Philippines, Forbes spoke before the Columbian Association (Manila) and stated that he had never criticized the Filipinos for desiring their independence. He had neither discouraged nor encouraged that desire. He hoped the desire for independence would act as a stimulus for them to do the things that would prepare the country for independence.

The Americans in the Philippines expressed a desire for the appointment of Wood as governor-general in a message sent to Harding on July 4.² There were intimations that Wood might reconsider his decision against acceptance of the position of governor-general on July 27. At the same time came the announcement that Harding was waiting to obtain the recommendations of the investigating commission before announcing his choice.³ On August 12, it was announced that Wood was to be named governor-general if the University of Pennsylvania would extend him further leave from his position as President of that University.⁴ Wood accepted the position September 2. It was his patriotic duty to accept, he said, owing to the seriousness of the situation in the Philippines.⁵

A summary of the Wood-Forbes report was received in Washington by cable on September 21, but Secretary Weeks would not give it out. He said, "We are not going to abandon those islands."⁶

1. News item in New York Times, June 11, 1921. p. 2.

2. Ibid., July 5, 1921.

3. Ibid., July 27, 1921.

4. Ibid., August 12, 1921.

5. Ibid., September 3, 1921.

6. Ibid., September 21, 1921.

Meanwhile the Commission had left the Philippines on September 10 and had stopped at Peking where they conferred with Jacob Gould Schurman, the minister there. Wood's diary for September 23, 1921 reports the following results from the conversations,

The opinion of all present was to the effect that our withdrawal from the Philippines at this time would be very disastrous to American prestige, trade and to the general Eastern situation. . . and a further encouragement to Japan to continue . . . inroads on Chinese territory and interests. I stated that, in my opinion, our position in the Pacific and peace in the Pacific depended very largely upon having an adequate naval force in those waters, and that such a force would tend to hold the aspirations of Japan in check and prevent trouble. . . .¹

The Wood-Forbes report was dated October 8, 1921. In reporting on the conditions in the islands the joint authors reported as general conclusions:

We find the people happy, peaceful, and in the main prosperous and keenly appreciative of the benefits of American rule.

We find everywhere among the Christian Filipinos the desire for independence, generally under the protection of the United States. The non-Christians and Americans are for continuance of American control.

We find a general failure to appreciate the fact that independence under the protection of another nation is not true independence.

We find the government is not reasonably free from those underlying causes which result in the destruction of government.

We find that a reasonable proportion of officials and employees are men of good character and ability, and reasonably faithful to the trust imposed upon them, but that the efficiency of the public service has fallen off and that they are now relatively inefficient, due to lack of inspection and to the too rapid transfer of control to officials who have not had the necessary time for proper training.

1. Hagedorn, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 394-5.

We find that many Filipinos have shown marked capacity for government service and that the young generation is full of promise; that the civil service laws have in the main been honestly administered, but that there is a marked deterioration due to the injection of politics.

We find that there is a disquieting lack of confidence in the administration of justice to an extent which constitutes a menace to the stability of the government.

We find that the people are not organized economically or from the standpoint of national defense to maintain an independent government.

We find that the legislative chambers are conducted with dignity and decorum and are composed of representative men.

We feel that the lack of success in certain departments should not be considered as proof of essential incapacity on the part of the Filipinos, but rather of indicating lack of experience and opportunity, and especially lack of inspection.

We find that questions in regard to confirmation of appointments might at any time arise which would make a deadlock between the Governor General and the Philippine Senate.

We feel that with all their many excellent qualities, the experience of the past eight years, during which they have had practical autonomy, has not been such as to justify the people of the United States in relinquishing supervision of the government of the Philippine Islands, withdrawing their Army and Navy, and leaving the islands a prey to any powerful nation coveting their rich soil and potential commercial advantages. In conclusion, we are convinced that it would be a betrayal of the Philippine people, a misfortune to the American people, a distinct step backward in the path of progress, and a discreditable neglect of our national duty were we to withdraw from the islands and terminate our relationship there without giving the Filipinos the best chance possible to have an orderly and permanently stable government.

In regard to future policy the following recommendations were made in the report:

1. We recommend that the present general status of the Philippine Islands continue until the people have had

time to absorb and thoroughly master the powers already in their hands.

2. We recommend that the responsible representative of the United States, the Governor-General, have authority commensurate with the responsibilities of his position. In case of failure to secure the necessary corrective action by the Philippine Legislature, we recommend that Congress declare null and void legislation which has been enacted diminishing, limiting, or dividing the authority granted the Governor General under Act of Congress No. 240 of the 64 Congress, known as the Jones bill.

3. We recommend that in case of a deadlock between the Governor General and the Philippine Senate in the confirmation of appointments the President of the United States be authorized to make and render the final decision.

4. We recommend that under no circumstances should the American Government permit to be established in the Philippine Islands a situation which would leave the United States in a position of responsibility without authority.¹

The complete report was received in Washington November 15, 1921, and it was announced it would not be given out for some time.² The cabinet discussed it the next day after which the statement was issued that the administration was opposed to independence at that time but that the policy was "not reactionary."³ The report was given to the press November 30, 1921.⁴

The Philippine government had become involved in certain business enterprises during Harrison's administration, this being due, in part, to the lack of desire on the part of capital to go to the Philippines under the conditions which existed there. Among the businesses which the government owned at this time were the National bank, the

1. Report of the Governor General of the Philippine Islands, 1921, op. cit., p. 42-43.
 2. News item in New York Times, November 15, 1921.
 3. Ibid., November 16, 1921.
 4. Ibid., November 30, 1921.

Manila railroad Co. which owned a hotel in Manila, and the National Development Company which owned cement plants, coal mines, etc. The national bank had lent money during the war for the construction of modern sugar centrals. When the price of sugar declined, many of these became bankrupt and the government was forced to take them over in order to protect its investment. Leonard Wood, a staunch advocate of laissez-faire principles, recommended a return to such principles in the Philippines. In a letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate, dated December 6, Wood said, in part,

I am sure that you concur in the opinion that the government should, as soon as possible and as far as possible, get out of business and keep out. This is, of course, easy to say, but hard to do under the commitments already made and it can only be successfully accomplished with your earnest cooperation. Realizing the mistakes that have been made, I appeal to you most earnestly for your help in remedying them along the specific lines I shall propose from time to time.

.

It is claimed, with some degree of fairness, that the American and Philippine Governments in their endeavors to safeguard the people and patrimony of the Philippine Islands from exploitation have gone too far and have reached the point where little or no new capital seeks investment in the islands. When this is coupled with the fact, which we all must face, that there is not sufficient capital in the Philippine Islands to develop effectively our natural resources, we find ourselves in an unsatisfactory position.

In order that this situation may be cured, I am convinced that we must do all that we can do to encourage and attract foreign capital to the islands. . .¹

Hagedorn made the following comments on the activities of the Philippine leaders,

1. Annual report of the governor general Philippine Islands, 1921,
op. cit., p. 1-2.

The Philippine leaders . . . seemed, at times, in their devotion to their one political issue, singularly obtuse to larger considerations. In the midst of their financial humiliation and the internecine political struggle which was blocking Wood's efforts to rehabilitate the country's finances, Osmena and Quesen, with . . . Rafael Palma . . . patched up a momentary truce to call upon the governor-general and ask him what steps he would approve for the extension of Philippine autonomy.

Wood told them that he did not think that the American government would consider any extension of the autonomy they now enjoyed until the evidences of misgovernment cited in the report of the special mission had been corrected. . . .¹

Wood, in his diary for January 25, 1922, continues,

I told them further that I felt that if they would only rise to the level of cooperating vigorously in bringing about a better condition of affairs and putting the government upon a thoroughly efficient basis, they would render the best possible service to the cause of their people and strengthen very much the plea for independence.

I said that we all appreciate their desire for independence; that it was a worthy one; that I felt that the great bulk of the American people feel that if they were strong enough and well enough organized industrially and from the standpoint of defense to defend themselves and hold their country, there would be little opposition to independence; . . . that if we got out now their national life would be very short; that they are absolutely without any adequate preparation, financial or otherwise, to maintain a national existence.

.

. . . You have practical autonomy now and if you will only give me men who will be keen and efficient in the discharge of their departments, I shall be very glad indeed to give them a very real autonomy in the administration of them prescribing only certain general lines of policy.

. . . If you'll take hold and make proper provision for the care of your sick, your insane, and your lepers; put your currency on a sound basis; clean up the administration of justice; in other words, establish a really efficient government, then you can say to the United States: "Here we are with a good, efficient, and well-administered government."

1. Hagedorn, op. cit., p. 412-413.

Now what are you going to do about it?" but until the situation is cleaned up, it is folly to talk of any further autonomy.¹

Two months later, March 31, Wood wrote to Secretary Weeks the following letter,

The Filipinos, like other peoples, want to be free and independent as a matter of sentiment. This very natural sentiment has been played upon for years by political leaders, each demanding and promising a little more than the other, as a means of gaining popular favor and support. The leaders know that the people are not organized either from the standpoint of financial resources or from that of defense to maintain an independent national existence. . . .

A condition has been established which may be described as a struggle between the heart and the head. Sentimentally the people want independence, practically the well-informed people realize the difficulties and impracticability of the situation so far as real [complete] independence goes

Leaders have gone on for years fanning the popular imagination, arousing popular sentiment for independence, until they have established a condition which is a difficult one to deal with.

A number of propositions have been under consideration by the leaders:

Complete independence, severing all relations with the United States. This finds few supporters, even among the radicals, and the business men are against it, as it is regarded as dangerous and means the loss of the free trade concessions now given by the United States.

Independence under the protection of the United States; in other words, the establishment of a condition of responsibility without control.

The establishment of a self-governing commonwealth somewhat on the lines of that of Australia or Canada, the United States maintaining here a special representative with extraordinary reserve powers such as the right of intervention and veto under certain conditions; in other words, a pretense at independence. A most dangerous proposition which fails to take into consideration the fact that the people of Australia and Canada are

1. Ibid., p. 413-414.

in effect Englishmen, men of the same race with the same traditions and characteristics as those of the mother country.

The retention by the United States of a military, naval, and commercial base in the Philippines, with practically complete autonomy for the rest of the territory. The United States to maintain a special representative with the power of intervention in questions involving relations between the Philippine Islands and foreign countries. . . .

Continuance of the status quo. This finds little or no public support among the politicians; but I believe that, notwithstanding the general desire for independence, it has a very substantial support among the thinking people of the Islands, especially among the property-owning and business element, who, like the others, want independence, but realize the impracticability of true independence under present conditions.¹

Another mission seeking independence was sent to the United States in 1922, starting on April 30. The instructions under which it operated were,

Whereas, it is the unanimous desire of the Filipino people immediately to obtain recognition of immediate, absolute, and complete independence of the Philippines; therefore,

Be it resolved, that the Filipino mission shall work for the immediate restoration of the Filipino Republic, founded on the enduring basic customs of democracy and liberty and enjoying all the rights and prerogatives of a complete and absolute sovereignty.²

Late in May, Secretary Weeks said to the mission, "I am not in favor of granting independence to the Philippines now and the President is not."³

Harding in replying to the mission said,

I can only commend the Philippine aspirations to independence and complete self-sovereignty. None in America would wish you to be without national aspirations. You would be unfitted for the solemn duties of self-government without them.⁴

1. Ibid., p. 493-94.

2. News item in New York Times, April 22nd, 1922, p. 15.

3. Ibid., May 21, 1922, Sec. 1, p. 22.

4. Congressional Record, 71st Cong., 2nd sess., (Washington: Government Printing office, 1930), p. 1022.

August 1, Edwin Denby, Secretary of the Navy, made the following statement of Philippine independence:

If I were the Philippines I would regard withdrawal from the United States as the greatest possible disaster at present. The islands are more peaceful and prosperous than most sections of the globe.

Although independence is the ultimate ideal set up for the Philippines by America, I believe it to be many years away when the American flag will come down there.¹

Wood summarizes his work for the year in his annual report which is dated December 31, 1922. He says,

Vigorous and unremitting efforts have been made to encourage and extend agriculture, the principal source of wealth of the islands and the chief occupation of their people. This has been done by improving communications on land and sea, lowering freight rates, furnishing expert professional advice, encouraging the building up of agricultural schools, urging the youth of the country to devote themselves to agriculture, by continued efforts to eradicate epidemic disease among horses, cattle, and carabaoes, by a vigorous campaign against locusts, by the enactment of helpful legislation, and in various other ways.²

The department recognizes the world's growing demand for tropical products and the necessity for providing laws and regulations which will encourage capital, both foreign and domestic, to take up tracts of land with a view to developing industries engaged in the cultivation of tropical products such as rubber, gutta-percha, hemp, copra, sugar, cacao, cinchona, camphor, etc. All these flourish in the Philippines and there is ample room for tremendous development.

With a view to encouraging the production of rubber, which is very important from the American standpoint, a measure is now before the legislature which provides for the lease to any responsible person of a tract of 50,000 acres, or, roughly speaking, 80 square miles, for a period of 25 years, with the right to renew for a similar period providing the conditions of the first lease are lived up to.³

-
1. News item in New York Times, August 2, 1922, p. 16.
 2. Annual report of Governor General Philippine Islands, 1922, (Washington: Government Printing office, 1924), p. 22.
 3. Ibid., p. 25.

In 1923, there began a bitter and vigorous fight between Wood and the Filipino political leaders which was to continue with increasing bitterness until the death of Wood on August 7, 1927.

The excuse for the beginning of the controversy revolves about charges of misconduct in office filed against an American police officer in Manila named Conley. After an investigation, the charges were held to be not proved. Nevertheless the Secretary of the Interior and the Mayor of Manila sought Wood's permission to discharge Conley. Wood told them to try the case before the courts, which was done and the court held the charges not proved. The Secretary of the Interior and the Mayor then resigned precipitating this dispute.¹

Hagedorn reports that the Secretary of Justice, Santos, telephoned Wood saying he would like "to see the governor-general in the presence of the other secretaries." Hagedorn continues,

The cabinet, Santos stated, had been called together by Queson in his own office at the City Hall and the question had been raised regarding their duties and their freedom of action in their own departments, and of their relations to the legislature. . . . He, Wood, told Santos that the method of government in the Philippine Islands was definitely defined in the Jones Bill and would be continued without change or modification. He had extended every possible courtesy to the secretaries, as they knew, had allowed them the largest measure of freedom consistent with any reasonable supervision and control. The "wretched condition of their finances and general administration which he had found was due to the fact that in the past they had been left to do entirely as they liked, without coordination or direction. As long as they were secretaries of the governor-general, in official relations they would be responsible to him. If they felt that was contrary to their theory, then there was only one thing to do. Under no circumstances would he tolerate their considering themselves as responsible to the legislature. The American form of government "would be adhered to," he added, "and the British not adopted. . . ."

-
1. Annual report of Governor General Philippine Islands, 1923, (Washington: Government Printing office, 1925), p. 37-39.
 2. Hagedorn, op. cit., p. 421-22.

The members of the Council of State then resigned on July 17, 1923. This included all departmental secretaries except that of Public Instruction (vice governor). (The under-secretaries took over the work and the government continued without interruption.) The officials who resigned did so, they said, because Wood had followed a policy of intervening in and controlling "even to the smallest details, the affairs of our government, both insular and local, in utter disregard of the authority and responsibility of the department heads and other officials concerned."¹

Wood in reply stated his regret at their action. He continues,

It indicates an organized and preconcerted attack by the Filipino secretaries of departments and legislative members of the council of state upon the authority of the Governor-General under the organic act and as the representative of the sovereign power of the United States.

Their charges were baseless but he must, if they insisted, accept their resignations.²

He cabled Secretary Weeks the same day describing the situation.

Wood concludes by saying,

It is simply an ill-advised and short-sighted attempt to force an added grant of authority at a time when they think political conditions here and at home are favorable to the attempt. Political and personal ambition on the part of one or two leaders has temporarily over-balanced the better judgment of the others.³

The first phase of this controversy is ended by a cablegram from Secretary Weeks to Wood, dated July 20, 1923, which says,

-
1. Annual report of Governor General Philippine Islands, op. cit., p. 35.
 2. Ibid., p. 35-36.
 3. Ibid., p. 36.

Please deliver the following message when and if you deem it advisable:

Manuel Queson, president of the senate, and Manuel Roxas, speaker of the house of representatives: . . . I sympathize with you in your desire jealously to protect from encroachment those powers granted to you by the organic act. I advise you, however, to recall that these powers were granted to you on the conditions set forth in the act and to justify them nothing was set forth more clearly in that act than the authority and responsibility of the Governor-General. A rigid guardianship of the authority given and responsibility imposed on the Governor General is an essential part of that officer's duties. This was set forth clearly in a letter of the then Secretary of War to the then Governor-General after the passage of the organic act. If the Governor-General in the specific action of which you complain exceeded, encroached on the legal authority of other officials those officials should have called to the attention of the Governor-General their views in the premises and there is no reason to believe that he would not have disposed of the matter with the most careful regard to the authority of the complaining officials.¹

Queson was reported to favor a native as governor-general of the Philippines. He said the existing trouble was not a reflection on Wood personally.² August 25, President Coolidge announced full support of Wood as the legal representative of the United States in the Philippine Islands.³ The Filipino leaders said, Sept. 13, that they wanted the Governor-General to be a mere figurehead as he was in the British self-governing colonies. Liberties are won, they added, by encroaching on the powers and prerogatives of the

1. Ibid., p. 37.

2. News item in New York Times, July 26, 1923, p. 3.

3. Ibid., August 25, 1923, p. 5.

Governor General.¹

The policy of the administration is further explained by a cablegram from Weeks to Wood, dated October 11. Weeks stated,

After personal conference with the President and recognizing the necessity of bringing about cooperation between the branches of the Philippine government, executive, legislative, and judicial, maintaining the clear line of demarcation between them which is essential to well-balanced government, it seems well to make the following authoritative statement of the views of the administration here.

The personal sacrifice involved in your acceptance of your present office is proof of your desire to serve the Filipino people as you have served the United States. You are entitled to the support of the administration, and you have it.

The controversy with the legislative leaders and certain executive officers is at bottom a legal one. The Congress after full consideration vested the authority of control and supervision over all departments and bureaus in the Governor-General, which makes these officials directly responsible to him and not to the legislature as in a parliamentary form of government.

The powers of the Governor General have not been exceeded or misused by you in any instance of which the War Department is advised. If the legislature has enacted legislation violative of the provisions of the organic law, such legislation is to that extent null and void, and in so far as it provides for encroachment on the authority of the Governor General is in no way binding on that official.

The legislature has in a number of instances delegated legislative power in violation of the principles of constitutional government. Silence of Congress on such legislation does not affect a modification or amendment of the organic law.

The veto power granted to the Governor General is applicable to all legislation whether it be local or otherwise.

The legislature has provided for the establishment of a bank and for certain investments of a business or semi-business character. This was within the authority of the legislature. In agreement with this administration you believed these investments unwise and have advised the legislature accordingly. This was your duty. . . .

1. Ibid., Sept. 13, 1923, p. 3.

The legislature must now determine whether these government enterprises are to be carried on, or not. So long as the legislature indicates through adequate legislative enactment and provision of necessary means its desire and purpose to carry them on, you should endeavor to have it done efficiently.¹

The best summary of Wood's idea of the nature of the controversy² comes in a letter to J. B. W. Gardiner written December 2, 1923.

In this letter Wood says,

The purpose of Quesen and his associates is to destroy the authority and control of the governor-general, thereby reducing the control and, in a way, the sovereignty of the United States. They have no sense of financial responsibility and a very hazy conception of a well-balanced government with sharp distinctions between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, nor do they appear to appreciate that under such government the lawful and constitutional acts of any one of the branches are binding upon the others. What they wish to do is to subordinate the executive to the legislature and place the courts under legislative control. In other words, they do not want a government which is coordinating, restraining and controlling. They want a government dominated by the legislature. Back of all this is the little understood fact that the problem here is really biological and not political.

.

The thing that really has put them to the quack is that I have put a stop to the free and unsecured circulation of public money among political friends. In other words I had to take hold of a disordered chaotic situation, put it on its feet, bring to a proper shape the various departments of the government, and take from the hands of a few a dangerous control.

. . . Every leader of prominence has told me that it will be years before they are ready for independence, but they do not dare to come out and say this publicly. . . . The leaders had to do something to put themselves in the limelight. The safest thing was to attack the American government in the Philippines, for they knew that the home government was strong, generous, and tolerant. It was a case of a boy throwing a stone at a policeman.

.

-
1. Annual Report of the Governor General, Philippine Islands, 1923, op. cit., p. 41-42.
 2. Another good statement of Wood's views is found in Annual Report of the governor-general for 1923, p. 2-3.

America must prepare her own program, go ahead and do her duty as she sees it and believes to be right and not be influenced by wandering voices and empty and false statements.¹

Further controversy was aroused when the Philippine legislature passed a bill entitled "An act remitting the penalty on the land tax in the Philippine Islands for the year 1923" which was vetoed by Wood November 24, 1923 and returned to the legislature. The Senate re-passed it November 26 and the House re-passed it November 27 both by the required two-thirds vote. The bill was returned to Wood by a letter dated December 1. In accordance with the Jones act, it was submitted to President Calvin Coolidge with a memorandum in its behalf signed by Roxas, Speaker of the House of Representatives, and Isauro Gabaldon and Pedro Guevara, Resident Commissioners, and dated March 18, 1924. In this memorandum they conclude,

We submit that the bill under discussion should be approved by the President of the United States for the following reasons:

1. The Governor General has no power under the Philippine organic act to veto the bill which is not unconstitutional and is of mere domestic concern.

2. Even granting that such power resides in the Governor General, still the disapproval of this bill was unwarranted and unwise because--

- a. The bill is intended to provide relief from failure of crops.

- b. The measure is but the continuation of a practice followed since 1902.

- c. The activities of the provincial and municipal governments would not be hampered by this bill.

- d. The final disapproval of this measure might diminish the confidence of the people in the ability of the Government to afford relief in cases of emergency.

- e. The Philippine Legislature is in a better position to know the needs of the Filipino people.

- f. The different provinces and municipalities, which alone are affected by this tax because no portion of it goes to the

¹. Hagedorn, op. cit., p. 439-441.

Insular Treasury, have petitioned for the measure. The inhabitants of many regions visited by the legislature have urged its passage. And the executive Bureau of the Department of the Interior, which exercise supervision over local government, has likewise recommended the enactment of the bill.¹

Wood had already written a letter to Weeks, dated January 24, 1924, transmitting the bill and including all pertinent information and statements on it. To Secretary Weeks he wrote, in part,

In my opinion this action was taken by the Filipino leaders principally for the purpose of testing the scope of the veto power of the Governor General as defined in the Organic Act and your interpretative telegram of October 11, 1923 and in the hope of securing a recognition of their contention that the veto power does not extend to legislation of local import only.²

President Coolidge formally upheld Wood's action in vetoing the bill in a message to Wood dated April 12, 1924. He said,

After mature consideration of the bill itself, of your veto message, and of the memorandum I return ~~in~~ the bill to you with my disapproval. I find myself in complete accord with what is set forth in your veto message. . . .

.

As is shown in the opinion of the Judge Advocate General of the Army, there is absolutely no ground for the contention that the exercise of the duty imposed on the Governor General by the organic act . . . is in anyway limited to a particular class of bills. The precedents in the Philippine Islands alone show that this theory was only advanced as of possible use in a controversy with the Governor General. The first three bills vetoed by the former Governor General in the Philippine Islands after the passage of the present Organic act would all be classed as local bills if the bill under consideration could be so classed.

.

. . . The powers of the Governor General were intentionally made greater than the powers ordinarily given to executives in our system of Government because of the accepted theory that we are training in self-government people who had no

-
1. Annual report of Governor General Philippine Islands, 1923,
op. cit., p. 49-56.
 2. Ibid., p. 56.

experience therein and who were to be guided by an executive selected with a view to his ability so to do. As a check against the abuse of this power of veto accorded the Governor General, the legislature is given the right of appeal to the President.¹

Meanwhile Congress was becoming aroused in the matter of Philippine policy. Before this controversy was aroused, Senator King of Utah gave notice, February 6, 1923, that he was going to move to suspend the rules and amend the army appropriation bill by including a section giving independence to the Philippines.¹ The motion failed on February 9 due to failure to receive the two-thirds vote necessary for such action.²

The Democrats made substantial gains in the Congressional elections of 1922 and this may account, in part, for renewed Congressional interest in the Philippines. Three sets of hearings were held during the first half of 1924. The House Committee on Insular affairs held hearings on Philippine independence during February and on Philippine local autonomy during April and May. The Senate Committee on Territories and Insular Possessions held hearings on Philippine independence during February and March.

It is quite difficult to make an exact statement of motives for Congressional action which affect the Philippines. Domestic needs, or hopes, can usually be assumed to have controlled action or non-action. The renewed interest by Congress in Philippine independence, or in more autonomy, coming immediately after the development of visibly unsatisfactory relations between the American and Filipino elements in the Philippine government, would seem to indicate that at this time

1. Congressional Record, 67th Congress, 4th session, (Washington Government Printing office, 1923), p. 3134.
 2. Ibid., p. 3310.

Filipino agitation may have had some influence on Congressional sentiment. The continual jangling may have led some congressmen to desire to get rid of a bad bargain.

The Filipino statement of grievances is summarized in a memorial to the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States presented January 8, 1924 and signed by Manuel Roxas, Isauro Gabaldon, and Pedro Guevara. They said, in part,

... Governor General Wood has set at naught all understandings the Filipino people have had with the American Government, and has ignored the assurance given them by the late President. He has most decidedly taken a backward step by depriving our government of the key and the nerve center of the former autonomous administration--the counsel of the Filipinos. He has surounded himself with a ~~secret cabinet~~ composed of military and other extra legal advisers, which has encroached upon the legitimate functions of the Filipino officials in the government. He has broken asunder the bonds of concord that united Americans and Filipinos after the bloody struggle of 1899, a concord that reached its highest expression in the first years of autonomous government. He has placed himself over and above the laws passed by the Philippine Legislature, laws that have never been declared null and void by the courts or by the Congress of the United States. He has claimed for himself an unlimited executive responsibility that neither the existing laws nor the practices already established have recognized. He has deviated from the policy of the American Government to give the Filipino people an ever-increasing self-government, a policy announced by every President, beginning with President McKinley, and ratified by the Congress of the United States in the Jones law. He has abused the veto power, exercising it on the slightest pretext on matters of purely local concern that did not affect the sovereignty of the United States or its international obligations. Thus he has attempted to control our legislature, a prerogative that has never been claimed by the elected executives of America, by the President of the United States, or the governors of the several states. He has disregarded the rights of the senate in the exercise of the appointive power. He has destroyed our budget system. . . He has endeavored to defeat the economic policy duly laid down by the Philippine Legislature for the protection of the rights

and interests of the Filipino people in the development of the resources of the islands.

The theories and principles underlying Governor Wood's actions are utterly repugnant to the policies that go to make up the cornerstone of Philippine autonomous government. To inject the autocracy of an irresponsible appointed executive into a representative democracy such as the Congress of the United States implanted in the Philippines sets at defiance every American tradition, violates that good faith that has been the precious and untarnished heritage of the American people and is incompatible with any workable theory of free government.¹

At the hearings on Philippine independence held February 17, 1924, the men who had introduced bills for independence testified. Cooper of Wisconsin, whose name is attached to the organic act of 1902, favored independence and stressed especially their ability and qualifications for leadership.² King of Illinois said the Wood report substantiated their qualifications for independence. ~~The report substantiated the qualifications for independence.~~ The report had merely said that their government was not entirely free from the causes that lead to the failure of governments. He said the Philippines had fulfilled Root's definition of a stable government.³

Sabath of Illinois thought that the international situation in the Orient made this a favorable time to act on Philippine independence.⁴ Isauro Gabaldon, Resident Commissioner from the Philippines, mentioned

-
1. Annual Report of the Governor General Philippine Islands, 1923, op. cit. p. 43-44.
 2. U. S. Congress: Hearing before House Committee on Insular Affairs on H. J. Res. 151, H. R. 5924, H. J. Res. 127, H. R. 2817, 68th Cong., 1st sess., (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1924), p. 4-11.
 3. Ibid., p. 12-20.
 4. Ibid., p. 20-25.

the progress there, the Filipino ability to maintain order and their success in self-government.¹ Manuel Roxas, Special Commissioner, mentioned the rapid increase in literacy in the islands.² February 25, Secretary Weeks made the following statement to the Committee:

The dangers to an independent Philippine government would arise from external aggression, internal dissention, the lack of Filipino participation in the commerce and industry of the islands, and from the financial condition of the government.³

In mentioning the financial condition, Weeks spoke of the refund of about \$1,000,000 in United States internal revenue taxes collected on Philippine products consumed in the United States and the saving of interest on their bonded debt due to American sovereignty there. The Philippines paid about 4½% interest while most governments in that area paid 6½% to 7½% interest. The currency difficulties and adverse exchange rates in the period from 1919 to 1922 were mentioned.⁴ Weeks said further that the following points should be considered before replying to the Filipino request for independence:

First, there should be on the part of the leaders of the Philippine Islands an obvious disposition to obey the present law and to cooperate with the officials of the Philippine government appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. . . .

Second. The financial condition of the Philippine government does not warrant the withdrawal from it of any aid now given it, or the imposition on it of the additional burdens which would follow our withdrawal. . . . We have the example of a government which through speculation in a period of four years lost outright more than the total revenue from taxation for one year. We find that this relatively immense loss has been of minor interest to the representatives of the Philippine people. This does not indicate a quickened public opinion such as would be necessary to protect the rights of the people when independent.

-
1. Ibid., p. 26.
 2. Ibid., p. 34.
 3. Ibid., p. 61.
 4. Ibid., p. 62-68.

Third. The Philippines are making commendable progress in creating a Filipino people which might be assumed to be reasonably free from regional disturbances. . . .

Fourth. Little progress is being made in placing in beneficial use the natural wealth of the islands.

Fifth. There is no disposition to depreciate the really remarkable progress being made in the Philippine Islands in education, in public affairs, and in other fields. The Filipino as yet is almost a negligible quantity in the principal commercial and industrial fields. This is being slowly overcome.

The best evidence of what is being done in the Philippine Islands is presented in the person of the chief of the independence mission and his associates. It would be criminal to discourage the aspirations of such people for the independence of their country under the American flag or separated entirely from the United States. It would, however, be a greater crime to sacrifice these people through a mistaken emotionalism.¹

On March 3, the Committee agreed by a vote of eleven to five to report a bill providing for Philippine independence. Chairman Fairfield said the action was due to the desire to give the House an opportunity of passing on the question. The Committee favored incorporating in the bill provisions to guarantee the payment of bonds issued by the Philippine government as well as provision for a United States naval base there.²

The testimony before the House Committee on Insular Affairs was largely duplicated before the Senate Committee on Territories and Insular Possessions in their hearings held February 11 and 16 and March 1 and 3, 1924. On the latter date, however, Rear Admiral Hilary P. Jones, speaking for the United States Navy said,

Some mention has been made of the millions that have been poured into the Philippine Islands from America without any return. From the standpoint of the Navy this is not quite a true statement. The Navy has to be strong, not because of the Philippines, nor because of any one particular country

1. Ibid., p. 62-68.

2. News item in New York Times, March 4, 1924, p. 11.

or island in which we may be interested, but because the Nation is great, and because its interests are world-wide, and because those interests can not be safeguarded by words. There must always be behind those words a potential force that will insure attention. The Navy is compelled to grow, not because of local conditions, but because of world questions. The mere fact that we have owned the Philippine Islands has not caused the growth of the Navy nor has it increased materially the expense of the maintenance of the Navy,

.

The yearly expenditure of ten or twelve millions of dollars in maintaining a stable government where we have special responsibilities is a very economical way of warding off troubles which might otherwise develop into situations requiring the expenditure in war of many hundreds of millions.

.

From every point of view the retention of the Philippines by the United States is desirable. From every naval point of view — the protection of the Philippines by the United States will be made vastly more difficult if they are independent than if they are kept in statu quo.

The money spent in maintaining the Philippines is not money wasted but money used to guarantee stability where there will be instability if we surrender our guardianship, and with that instability is likely to come expenses now undreamed of for us.¹

This statement brings to the foreground a question which has provoked much discussion throughout the period during which the United States has controlled the Philippines. How much money have the Philippines cost the United States? What effect has United States control over the Philippines had on the size of our army and navy? Most governmental officials agreed with Rear Admiral Jones that possession of the Philippines had no effect on the size of the Army and Navy. Many of them indicated that the United States was not maintaining a military

1. U. S. Cong., Hearing before Senate Committee on Territories and Insular Possessions on S. 912, 68 Cong., 1 sess., (Washington: Government Printing office, 1924,) p. 99-101.

force in the Philippines to protect them but to have a force which could be used to protect American interests in the Orient, as had been done at the time of the Boxer rebellion. The question of the value to the United States of the military training accorded United States officers and men is also indeterminate. As a result of the military operations in the Moro country, the army was able, on the basis of actual war operations, to weed out incompetent officers and to promote competent officers in the army. The value of this is unquestionably great but is a matter the value of which is impossible to determine. In addition to this matter of expenditure of money from the United States Treasury in the Philippines there is the question of loss or gain of governmental revenue due to the nature of trade relations with the Philippines. This phase of the problem will be discussed later.

On March 5, President Coolidge delivered to the Philippine mission a reply, dated February 21, 1924. Coolidge in outlining American-Philippine relations said,

. . . A considerable section of the Filipino people is further of the opinion that at this time any change which would weaken the tie between the Filipinos and the American Nation would be a misfortune to the islands. . .

Although they have made wonderful advances in the last quarter century, the Filipino people are by no means equipped, either in wealth or experience, to undertake the heavy burden which would be imposed upon them with political independence. Their position in the world is such that without American protection there would be the unrestricted temptation to maintain an expensive and costly diplomatic service and an ineffective but costly military and naval service. It is to be doubted whether with the utmost exertion, the most complete solidarity among themselves, the most unqualified and devoted patriotism it would be possible for the people of the islands to maintain an independent place in the world for an indefinite future.

.

A fair appraisal of all these considerations and of others which suggest themselves without requiring enumeration will I am sure justify the frank statement that the Government of the United States would not feel that it had performed its full duty by the Filipino people nor discharged all of its obligation to civilisation if it should yield at this time to your aspiration for national independence.

The present relationship between the American Nation and the Filipino people arose out of a strange, an almost unparalleled, turn of international affairs. A great responsibility came unsought to the American people. It was not imposed on them because they had yielded to any designs of imperialism or of colonial expansion. The fortunes of war brought American power to your islands, playing the part of an expected and a welcome deliverer. You may be very sure that the American people have never entertained the purpose of exploiting the Filipino people or their country. There have indeed been different opinions among our own people as to the precisely proper relationship with the Filipinos. There are some among us, as there are among your people, who believe that immediate independence of the Philippines would be best for both.

I should be less than candid with you, however, if I did not say that, in my judgment, the strongest argument that has been used in the United States in support of immediate independence of the Philippines is not the argument that it would benefit the Filipinos but that it would be of advantage to the United States. Feeling as I do and as I am convinced the great majority of Americans do regarding our obligations to the Filipino people, I have to say that I regard such arguments as unworthy. The American people will not evade or repudiate the responsibility they have assumed in this matter.¹

Speaking of the work of Wood, Coolidge continues,

. . . I have found no evidence that he [Wood] has exceeded his proper authority or that he has acted with any other than the purpose of serving the real interest of the Philippine people. Thus believing, I feel that I am serving those same interests by saying frankly that it is not possible to consider the extension of a larger measure of autonomy to the Philippine people until they shall have demonstrated a readiness and capacity to cooperate fully and effectively with the American Government and authorities.²

-
1. Annual report of Governor General Philippine Islands, 1923, op. cit., p. 45-46.
 2. Ibid., p. 47.

In concluding, Coolidge says,

If the time comes when it is apparent that independence would be better for the people of the Philippines, from the point of view of both their domestic concerns and their status in the world, and if when that time comes the Filipino people desire complete independence it is not possible to doubt that the American Government and people will gladly accord it.

Frankly, it is not felt that that time has come.

It is felt that in the present state of world relationships the American Government owes an obligation to continue extending a protecting arm to the people of these islands.

It is felt also that, quite aside from this consideration, there remain to be achieved by the Filipino people many greater advances on the road of education, culture, economic and political capacity before they should undertake the full responsibility for their administration. The American Government will assuredly cooperate in every way to encourage and inspire the full measure of progress which still seems a necessary preliminary to independence.¹

Six days later McIntyre of the Bureau of Insular Affairs cabled Wood saying,

It seems certain that both houses of Congress favor immediate independence of the Philippines. This notwithstanding President's letter to Roxas . . . Dominant sentiment seems to be desire to get rid of the Philippine Islands. Opposition to free admission of Philippine sugar, cigars and other products, has great weight in determining attitude of many. No suggestion of continuing free trade with the islands or in effect of granting to the Philippines any tariff differential in American markets. Such a suggestion would probably be defeated here.²

On March 14, Wood cabled in reply that the Philippines need the United States and that "the people as a whole in their hearts appreciate the benefits which have come to them under our flag." He speaks of the misrepresentation of conditions in the islands and adds,

We must not be swept off our feet by the purely local and artificial agitation produced by a small group fanning the very natural desire of the people for independence, but

-
1. Ibid., p. 48.
 2. Hagedorn, op. cit., p. 447-48.

absolutely failing to enlighten them as to existing conditions or the costs and responsibilities which independence involves.

. . . In conclusion, as I see it, the responsibility rests squarely upon us to continue our work here until we ourselves are satisfied these people are prepared to maintain an independent national existence.¹

Senator Willis of Ohio on March 27, at the direction of the Committee on Territories and Insular Possessions, wrote a letter to Secretary Weeks outlining the views of the committee and requesting his suggestions. The letter says,

At a meeting of the Committee . . . I was directed informally to advise you that a majority of the committee is of the opinion that Senate bill 912 "Providing for the withdrawal of the United States from the Philippine Islands" should be favorable reported with the following suggestions and conditions:

That a final and complete withdrawal of the Government of the United States from the Philippine Islands should take place on or after January 1, 1935, upon compliance with the following conditions:

1. A vote of a majority of the whole people in the Philippines eligible to vote.
2. Cession to the United States in perpetuity of all sovereignty over Cavite and Corregidor and all lands and waters within a radius of five miles thereof.
3. Refunding of all bonds of the Philippine Government and of its municipalities and political subdivisions, now held by citizens or nationals of the United States.

It should be added that while it was the opinion of some members of the committee that January 1, 1935, should be the date of final withdrawal, others were of the opinion that the date should be instead January 1, 1930. One member of the Committee was of the opinion that the date of final withdrawal should be postponed to a date even later than 1935, it being the informal opinion of the committee that some date should be fixed for the termination of the connection of the Government of the United States with the Government of the Philippine Islands.

1. Annual report of Governor General Philippine Islands, 1923, op. cit., p. 48-49.

It is very earnestly requested that you make to the committee such suggestions as to conditions of withdrawal . . . as you deem advisable.¹

Secretary Weeks replied on April 1, saying, in part,

I believe that I have heretofore made it clear that in the opinion of the department this period of ten years is not adequate to the accomplishment of the purpose which has justified our entering and remaining in the Philippine Islands. It is difficult to say what time would be necessary, but I would regard twenty years as the minimum in which we could hope fairly to accomplish our purpose.²

The Congressional movement for independence seems to have been stopped by this action of Weeks together with the President's message of March 5 to the independence mission. The latter part of the activity centers about the discussion of the movement for greater autonomy for the Philippines.

On April 23, 1924, Representative Fairfield of Indiana introduced a bill (H. R. 8856) which was referred to the House Committee on Insular Affairs.³ The bill would grant greater autonomy to the Philippines. One week later Fairfield made the following comments on the Philippine situation,

. . . Those of us who are at all familiar with the processes in the evolution of human society know that, starting where we did, it was an impossible task to have done by this time the work which we had in mind at the beginning . . . Marvelous things have been done, which reflects great praise upon the Filipino people. They have shown a marvelous adaptation and a keen discriminating sense of the spirit and character of the institutions of the Great Republic. Yet, thoroughly convinced, as I am, that we have not yet accomplished what we should accomplish in the interests of the Philippine people,

-
1. U. S. Cong., House Committee on Insular Affairs. Hearings on H. R. 7233, 68 Cong., 1 sess., (Washington: Government Printing office, 1932), p. 296-7
 2. Ibid., p. 297.
 3. Congressional Record, 68th Cong., 1st sess., (Washington: Government Printing office, 1924), p. 6999

before we make them wholly independent, I have earnestly sought to study the whole problem and to secure such legislation as will be progressive, in line with the very things we have been doing, and that I hope may meet the approbation of the Filipinos themselves.¹

He then adds,

. . . I am free to confess that matters are not now satisfactory in the Philippine Islands. Whoever may be at fault, the system inaugurated under the Jones Act has proven to be inadequate. There remains one of three things to be done. First, we may refuse to alter existing conditions and insist that matters go on under the system established by the Jones law. Were that acquiesced in by the Filipino people and the people of the United States, in my judgment it would be a most happy solution, but unfortunately there is very grave disagreement as to the administration of the Jones Act, and for that reason contention has arisen which would seem to indicate that some change should be made.

Second, we may initiate legislation to so modify the Jones law as to make the representative assembly subordinate itself to the judgment of the governor. My own judgment is that neither of the preceding is a practicable solution of the present situation.

Third. In line with the gradual movement toward future independence we may enact a law granting further autonomy, but by its provisions removing the occasion which gives rise to friction between the administrative office and the legislature. In conformity with the idea that the present status is neither wise nor profitable and possibly fraught with danger, I have introduced a bill, House Resolution 8856.

Without taking time to explain in detail the provisions of this act, I may say in general that it provides for the election of a Governor-General by the Filipino people. This would make a government elected by the people of the Philippine Islands supreme in control of all matters, primarily domestic. Their natural resources would be completely under the control of the Filipino people to be developed in their own interest. . . .

.

The bill provides for a Resident Commissioner without power to veto any measure that might be passed by the Philippine Legislature. If, however, in his judgment, any measure passed by the Legislature

1. U. S. Cong., House Com. on Ins. Aff. Hearings on H. R. 8856, 68 Cong., 1 sess., (Washington: Government Printing office, 1924), p. 2.

would deplete the reserve for the redemption of currency, or increase the bonded indebtedness of the Philippines beyond what the government would be able to properly meet, or involve themselves or the United States in international difficulties, then he is empowered by the terms of this bill to suspend the going into effect or the operation of the law until the matter can be referred to the President of the United States.¹

After Fairfield's statement, the Committee heard the testimony of a number of Americans with business interests in the islands, Mr. Queson, and some women representing groups which favored independence.²

The business men who testified were uniformly opposed to immediate independence and uniformly in favor of giving them greater autonomy with a definite date established upon which independence would be granted. This would remove uncertainty and encourage the upbuilding of the islands.³ John H. Pardee, President of the Philippine-American Chamber of Commerce said in addition,

As far as the commercial interests . . . in the islands are concerned, whatever is for the best interests of the Philippines themselves and the Filipino people is for the best interests of all the commercial people.⁴

John W. Switzer, President of the Pacific Commercial Co. of New York said,

. . . We either should never have remained in the islands at all or should remain long enough to perform our task creditably and with reasonable completeness. . . .⁵

Later he added,

As the responsibility of an error in this matter rests solely on the American people, is it not a wise precaution for our

-
1. Ibid., p. 3-4.
 2. Ibid., p. 5 et seq
 3. Loc. cit.
 4. Ibid., p. 15.
 5. Ibid., p. 87.

own record of being sure of doing what is best for these people, to thus put on them for a period of years the full responsibility of government, reserving to ourselves, if they go far amiss, only that measure of authority which is commensurate with our remaining responsibility.¹

The committee reported the bill favorably on May 10.² The majority report repeated the statement about possible courses of action made by Fairfield on April 30. The bill as amended in committee proposed a twenty year period of autonomy and no plebiscite on independence. The Philippines were to be given autonomy in domestic matters with an elective governor general. The President was to have an absolute veto over currency bills, bonded indebtedness and matters relating to foreign relations. Trade relations were to be regulated by the United States.³

Eight members of the committee favored the grant of independence in the near future. If immediate independence was not to be granted, the situation should not be changed.⁴

Senator Johnson of California on May 23, 1924 introduced an almost identical bill (S. 3373) which was referred to the Committee on Territories and Insular Possessions.⁵ At the hearing held on this bill Weeks reaffirmed his opposition to immediate independence and then added,

I am at this time urging the passage of this bill because of my belief that if it is passed at this session it will receive the earnest support of the Philippine leaders and will be satisfactory to the people of the islands. By this

1.

Loc. cit.

2. Congressional record, op. cit., p. 8310.

3. House report 709, 68th Cong., 1st sess., (Washington: Government Printing office, 1924), (part 1.)

4. Ibid., part 2.

5. Congressional record, op. cit., p. 9249.

I do not mean that every detail of the bill would meet either their approval or my own, but that in general form and content the bill is satisfactory.¹

The Republican steering Committee informed Fairfield May 29, that if Congress adjourned by June 7, it would be impossible for the House to consider his Philippine bill.²

Hagedorn has a caustic comment on the activities of the Filipino leaders during the period just described which is worth considering. He says,

It was not without significance that, shortly after Osmena and Queson arrived in Washington, the independence movement in congress began to lose its momentum.³

Thus was ended the only substantial movement for Philippine independence between the struggle for the Clarke amendment and the final movement which developed so rapidly in the 1930's with the coming of the depression.

-
1. Congressional record, 72nd Cong., 1st sess., op. cit., p. 3397.
 2. News item in New York Times, May 30, 1924, p. 3.
 3. Hagedorn, op. cit., p. 450.

CH. XIV. RECEDING PHILIPPINE INDEPENDENCE, 1924-1929.

Congress had adjourned to clear the way for the meeting of the national conventions of the respective political parties. The Republicans in their convention of 1924 nominated Calvin Coolidge of Massachusetts for President and Charles G. Dawes of Illinois for vice-president. Their platform made the following comments on the Philippines.

The Philippine policy of the Republican party has been inspired by the belief that our duty toward the Filipino people is a national obligation which should remain free from parties and politics.

In accepting the obligations which came to them with the control of the Philippine Islands the American people have only the wish to improve the condition of the Filipino people. That thought will continue to be the dominating factor in the American consideration of the many problems which must inevitably grow out of our relationship to the people.

If the time comes when it is evident to Congress that independence would be better for the people of the Philippines with respect to both their domestic concerns and their status in the world and the Filipino people then desire complete independence, the American government will gladly accord it. A careful survey of conditions in the Philippine Islands has convinced us that the time for such action has not yet arrived.¹

The high hopes of the Democrats due to the Harding scandals were blasted in the long fight for the nomination. On the 103rd ballot, they nominated John W. Davis for President. They then quickly nominated Charles Bryan of Nebraska for vice-president. In their platform they said,

1. News item in New York Times, June 12, 1924, p. 4.

The Filipino people have succeeded in maintaining a stable government and have thus fulfilled the only condition laid down by Congress as a prerequisite to the granting of independence. We declare that it is our liberty and our duty to keep our promise to these people by granting them immediately the independence which they so honorably covet.¹

The Progressive party in 1924 nominated Robert M. LaFollette of Wisconsin for President and Burton K. Wheeler of Montana for vice-president. Their declaration in regard to the Philippines said, "Resolved, That we favor the immediate and complete independence of the Philippine Islands in accordance with the pledges of official representatives of the American people".²

The result was much as expected. Coolidge received 382 electoral votes, Davis received 136, and LaFollette received 13.

A year later, President Coolidge in his annual message to Congress, dated December 8, 1925, said in regard to the Philippines,

From such reports as reach me there are indications that more authority should be given to the Governor General, so that he will not be so dependent upon the local legislative body to render effective our efforts to set an example of the sound administration and good government which is so necessary for the preparation of the Philippine people for self-government under ultimate independence. If they are to be trained in these arts it is our duty to provide for them the best that there is.

What President Coolidge meant was to increase the dictatorial power of an appointed governor general at the expense of the legislative

1. Ibid., June 29, 1924, p. 4.

2. Congressional Record, 71st Cong., 2nd sess., op. cit., p. 1024.

3. News item in New York Times, December 9, 1925.

assembly elected by the Philippine people. This was definitely to be a step in the direction of restricted powers of self-government.

Governor General Wood in his annual message for 1925, in line with the Republican policy of this period, recommended legislation to encourage the entrance of outside capital to develop the natural resources, especially the rubber industry.¹

Soon after the release of this report, Carmi Thompson of Ohio was selected ^{by whom?} to go to the Philippines to investigate conditions there.

At the very first of his tour in investigation the Carmi Thompson party was reported as believing that the political problem must be solved before the question of economic development is tackled.² Soon after this Carmi Thompson stated that the United States must do something definite as soon as possible to end the political uncertainty blocking the economic development of the islands. ^{He} He said that the long time policy of more or of less autonomy should be decided upon, and that we should announce that policy saying that there would be no reconsideration of independence in the meantime.³ This shows that there was at least one Republican who could not understand the Root instructions to the Taft Philippine Commission as definite instructions carrying over to this date and marking out the policy the United States was to follow in the future.

1. Ibid., July 17, 1926.

2. Ibid., July 30, 1926.

3. Ibid., August 9, 1926.

About a month later Wood said that the United States should retain the Philippines indefinitely. He said that he sympathized with the desire for independence but that such a grant would be a betrayal.¹

Coolidge delivered his annual message for this year, 1926, on December 8. He said,

This government holds in sacred trusteeship the islands which it has acquired in the East and West Indies. In all of them the people are more prosperous than at any previous time. A system of good roads, education and general development is in progress. The people are better governed than ever before and generally content.²

Carmi A. Thompson wrote his report on Philippine affairs December 4, 1926 and it was transmitted to Congress December 22, by President Coolidge, who said that he did not agree with all the views and recommendations but that it was an excellent report. Mr. Thompson said,

The fundamental need in the Philippines is the solution of the political problem in such a way as to assure the existence for a considerable period of time of a government which will be reasonably favorable to economic development and financial investment and which will inspire confidence on the part of investors.

The political problem has two principal phases: First, a widespread and insistent agitation for immediate, absolute, and complete independence; second, a deadlock between the Governor General and the legislature.

Complete independence is impossible now and for a long time to come for the following reasons:

1. The Philippines lack the financial resources necessary to maintain an independent government

1. Ibid., September 18, 1926.

2. Ibid., December 8, 1926.

2. Because they lack a common language, and for other reasons, the Filipinos do not have the homogeneity and solidarity which are prime requisites of a strong democratic nation
3. The controlling public opinion which is necessary for the support of a democracy does not now exist in the Philippines, nor can it until the daily press and other vital organs of public opinion are very much more widely circulated than they are at present.
4. From the standpoint of American commercial interests in the Far East, it would be unwise to relinquish control of the Philippines at the present time . . .
5. Abandonment of the Philippines at this time might complicate international relations in the Orient.
6. Granting of complete and immediate independence would end free-trade relationship between the United States and the Philippines resulting in economic disaster for the Philippines

The second phase of the situation, the deadlock between the Governor General and the legislature, appears to have resulted in mutual loss of confidence on both sides. Responsibility for the friction appears to be divided between the two branches, according to Mr. Thompson. The legislative leaders have contested the efforts of Wood to regain powers granted to the executive by the Jones bill but virtually abandoned to the Filipinos by Wood's predecessor. The presence of military advisers for Wood has caused unfortunate reactions on the part of the Filipino leaders. Mr. Thompson would prefer a more purely civil administration.

The policy of the United States should look to the actual preparation of the Filipinos for self-government. We should keep them and not exploit them. Autonomy in internal affairs should be gradually extended to them. Steps should be taken to restore co-operation

between the two peoples and the two governments.

In accordance with your request I have included in this report a number of suggestions of what might be done to secure a better administration of affairs in the Philippines and a further development of their economic condition. In conclusion, these suggestions are summarized and certain other recommendations made.

I have the honor to recommend-

First. That such steps should be taken as may be necessary to reestablish cooperation between the executive and legislative branches of the Philippine Government.

Second. That the granting of absolute independence to the Philippines be postponed for some time to come; that this matter — be considered at some future date when the islands are sufficiently developed to maintain an independent government, and that in the meantime there be granted such autonomy in the management of internal affairs as conditions may from time to time warrant.

Third. That the United States Government establish an independent department for the administration of the Philippine Islands and other overseas territory.

Fourth. That the Governor General be provided with the necessary civil advisers in order to relieve him of the present necessity of selecting such advisers from the United States Army.

Fifth. That Mindanao and Sulu should not be separated from the rest of the islands, but that American control be strengthened in the Moro country.

Sixth. That the Federal Reserve System be extended to the Philippine Islands.

Seventh. That one or more Federal land banks be established to provide loans at reasonable rates for farmers, who now pay 12 to 30 percent interest.

Eighth. That the United States Department of Agriculture establish a sufficient number of experiment stations in the Philippine Islands to properly develop the agricultural resources of the islands.

Ninth. That the fundamental law governing the Philippines, known as the Jones Act, be not amended or changed at this time.

Tenth. That the Philippine legislature should amend the Philippine land laws (with proper safeguards) so as to bring about such conditions as will attract capital and business experience for development

Eleventh. That no amendments be made at this time to the Philippine land laws by the American Congress.

Twelfth. That the Philippine Government withdraw from private business at the earliest possible date.

The fundamental problems in the Philippines concern the government of the islands and their future relations with the United States. Upon the proper solution of the problems depend the political, social, and economic welfare of the Filipinos.¹

This report was about as clear out a condemnation of the major policies of General Wood as one could expect from a conservative, big-business Republican interested in retention of the Philippines. He could not publicly condemn Wood so he says there is much to praise in his administration, as there undoubtedly was, then says that co-operation must be reestablished between the executive and legislative branches and advises against reducing the power of the legislative. Thompson is also opposed to separation of the Moro country from the the remainder of the islands, which was desired by American rubber interests at this time. He certainly is opposed to Wood's "Cavalry Cabinet", as it was called, and denounces it and the effect which he believes that it has on the Filipino people.

1. Senate Document 180, 69 Congress, 2 session (Washington: Government Printing office, 1927), p. 2-10.

The report led to much discussion but no immediate action. To change the policy along the lines mentioned by Thompson would have involved the repudiation of the policy of Wood, and that would have been bad politics.

Hagedorn, describing Wood's attitude during the period of the Thompson investigation and report, says,

He had come to the conclusion--reluctantly, his aides knew--that cooperation with the Filipino leaders, in the mood in which they appeared fixed, was impossible. Their intransigency delayed or actually prevented all efforts toward economic reconstruction, notably the sale or lease of the sugar centrals and other unprofitable ventures in which they had involved the government¹

This attitude certainly would not lead to improvement in relations.

Soon after the appointment of Carmi Thompson to go to the Philippines to investigate and report on conditions there, the House of Representatives passed a bill providing for a board of visitors, made up of Senators and Representatives, to make a biennial visit to the Philippines.² The bill (H. R. 2789) had been introduced by Representative Wainwright December 10, 1925 and referred to the Committee on Insular Affairs³ which reported it back with amendments and a report on May 25, 1926.⁴ Included in the report is a letter from Dwight F.

1. Hagedorn, op. cit., p. 471.

2. Congressional Record, 69th Cong., 1st sess., (Washington: Government Printing office, 1926), p. 11710.

3. Ibid., p. 684.

4. Ibid., p. 10058.

Davis, the Secretary of War, who in commenting on the bill said,

. . . .It is not supposed that a Congressional committee would in general be a unit on controversial questions, but there are many facts so patent that are being constantly brought into question that it is ~~fact~~ to suppose that congressional committees authorized to investigate and report on conditions would, at least prevent wide acceptance of unfounded rumor.

In my view, the advantage of the regular visits will be the following: Junkets

First. It would prevent agitation for useless and expensive investigations based on rumor.

Second. The reports of such committees would constitute a statement of intelligent observation of conditions in the islands and would have a greater weight with Congress than such reports as have been heretofore available.

Third. Congress is charged in a peculiar manner with responsibility for the government of the islands, and the passage of this act would assist it in passing intelligently on questions arising with reference to that government.¹

The bill was referred in the Senate to the Committee on Territories and Insular Possessions² which reported it back December 17, 1926³ with a report which said, in part,

Your committee believes that in view of the responsibility resting on Congress for the safety, security, and just government of those millions of people . . . and in view of the remoteness of those islands and the difficulty experienced by members of Congress in obtaining first hand, personal information regarding the government of the Philippine Islands

-
1. House report 1301, 69 Cong., 1 sess., (Washington: Government Printing office, 1926), p. 3.
 2. Congressional record, op. cit., p. 11728.
 3. Congressional Record, 69 Cong., 2 sess., (Washington: Government Printing office, 1927), p. 689.

and conditions in those islands . . . there should be a regular biennial official visit made by members of Congress to gather information and to inspect governmental activities.¹

No action was taken on this measure in the Senate. Senator King announced his intention of doing everything possible to defeat the bill.² This seemed to be sufficient to prevent further consideration of the measure. Attempts at later Congresses to obtain the passage of similar measures were equally unsuccessful.

Very few Congressmen have visited the Philippines during the entire period the United States was in control there. Only one official Congressional Committee ever investigated the Philippines and that came after the decision to free the islands had been taken. It seems most unfortunate that there was such a lack of interest in the Philippines by those persons in the "mother" country responsible for legislating for them. It is possible that each visit by the Congressional Committee would have resulted in a resurgence of independence agitation but that could have been easily managed by a refusal to discuss the matter of independence. The advantages of the investigation would seem to have been greater than the disadvantages.

-
1. Senate report 1205, 69 Cong., 2 sess., (Washington: Government Printing office, 1926), p. 1.
 2. Congressional record, op. cit., p. 4540.

In the first part of 1927 Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War under Taft, who was then visiting the Philippines, said that the agitation for independence originated with a small body of politicians, especially those around Manila. He added that ninety per cent of the people of the islands were comparatively prosperous and entirely content.

This comment of Stimson added very little to the knowledge of the situation. It is almost universally the case that a "small body of politicians" conduct the agitation for certain policies - either reforms or a continuation of existing conditions. It is always a small group of leaders who head any political movement. The great mass of people hardly ever act spontaneously in any controversy. The real question at issue, as far as the public in the Islands is concerned, was whether the mass of the Filipino people agreed with the "small body of politicians" who were agitating for independence.

The Philippine legislature at this time passed a bill to provide for a plebiscite on independence, the purpose being to silence the statements of those persons who said the Filipino people did not want independence. Wood vetoed the bill and it was passed over his veto. It then went to President Coolidge for approval or disapproval. April 6, 1927 he vetoed the bill saying that such a vote by the Filipino people would "be unconvincing, that the discussion of the question of immediate or proximate absolute independence is untimely" and that submitting the question of independence to a vote of the Filipinos, unless such action were requested by the American Congress would be

disturbing to good relations. The advantages of the continuation of the present status were listed. The chief ones were protection, more favorable tariff treatment, saving of interest on the public debt, and the increased cost of an independent government; Coolidge added that "they are not ready for self rule." Specific reasons for the veto were:

The plebiscite, under the conditions provided, or, in fact, now possible, would not accomplish the stated purpose. The result of the vote would be unconvincing.

It might create friction and disturb business, slowing down progress.

It might be taken to mean its approval by the United States or as an act likely to influence the United States.

Finally, I feel that it should be disapproved because it is a part of the agitation which, by discouraging capital and labor, is delaying the arrival of the day when the Philippines will have overcome the most obvious present difficulty in its maintenance of an unaided government.

The people should realize that political activity is not the end of life, but rather a means of obtaining these economic, industrial, and social conditions essential to a stable existence. A plebiscite on the question of immediate independence would tend to divert the attention of the people toward the pursuit of more political power rather than to the consideration of the essential steps necessary for the maintenance of a stable, prosperous, and well-governed community.

I therefore return the bill without my approval.¹

Governor General Wood needed medical treatment and rest and

1. Annual report of the Governor General Philippine Islands, 1927. (Washington: Government Printing office, 1928), p. 64-69.

returned to the United States for both of these in the summer of 1927. He had a conference with Coolidge about Philippine policy after which it was announced that he would return to the islands in the fall if his health permitted. Wood said that the Philippine people were progressing under our rule but they were not prepared for independence.¹ He died August 7, 1927 during an operation on a head tumor.

Leonard Wood was a very able man, ~~He~~ was, however, not a very successful politician. He became governor general at a time when the possibilities for trouble with the Filipino politicians were as great as those existing at any time in the period of the United States sovereignty. He did not escape those difficulties. It is evident that he did not establish cooperation in spite of these difficulties.

Wood's position was made more difficult by the failure of Harrison to exercise the powers the Jones act had stated should be exercised by the governor general. Just as Secretary Baker had said, this failure to act was to cause trouble for Harrison's successors. Harrison had created a Council of State to aid him in carrying on his administrative and legislative work. He used the veto power very rarely. He seems to have lived the part expected of him by Queson who publicly boasted that he had been responsible for the appointment of Harrison.

1. News item in New York Times, June 25, 1927, p. 1.

Wood undoubtedly trod upon the toes of many politicians in cleaning up the financial mess which he found in the Philippines.

The local political situation is credited by J. R. Hayden with being the cause of the controversy which occurred in 1923.¹ From 1907 to 1921, there had been two parties in the islands: the majority "immediate independence" Nacionalists party led by Osmena and the minority "ultimate independence" Democrats party whose ablest leader was Juan Sumulong. In 1921, Quezon revolted against the leadership of Osmena and organized the Colectivista party. In the election of 1922, no party obtained a majority of the seats in the House of Representatives but Quezon's party had the most members, followed by the Democrats and then by the Nacionalistas. In the succeeding assembly, an alliance between the Quezon and Osmena factions was arranged but it did not work well--four bills had been passed during the first ninety-nine of the one hundred days of the session of the legislature. A vacancy⁶ in a senatorial district found the Quezon-Osmena faction without a candidate or an issue. According to Hayden, they took advantage of a clash between Wood and the Secretary of the Interior, described above, over the reinstatement of Conley to raise the issue of American interference in Philippine affairs. Hayden adds, "The old leaders made a spectacular appeal to 'patriotism,' a 'last refuge' in the Philippines as elsewhere,

1. Joseph Ralston Hayden, The Philippines, (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1942), p. 338-340.

and their appeal was not in vain."¹ Thus Quezon and Osmena broke with Wood and cooperation became impossible. Neither side could give in because acquiescence in the views of the other would have meant loss of prestige and influence. If Wood had resigned or been removed, the Filipinos would have felt that they could get rid of any governor general by making life miserable for him. They would have succeeded with a less determined person than Wood.

Wood's death removed, very satisfactorily to all concerned, his presence from the troubled Philippine situation.

In a statement issued in November 1927, Coolidge stated that he stood where he did before, holding that the Filipinos themselves will determine "by their own actions and compliance with the law their capacity for self-government."²

This statement sounds excellent but it is impossible for the Filipinos to fulfill such expectations. In the first place, both Republican and Democratic governor generals have spoken of the excellent public order maintained for sixteen years previous to this time. Coolidge desired a cessation of independence agitation in the Philippines. If this occurred, he thought that greater economic progress would be made. This would result in two things. First. The

1. Ibid., p. 340.

2. Ibid., November 16, 1927.

islands might become so profitable to certain business men that they would not want to give them up. Second. The opponents of independence in the United States would say that the Filipinos did not want independence any more, proving it by showing the cessation of agitation for independence. As an alternative proposal, we have the continuation of independence agitation and the offending of Republican leaders who thought such efforts could be better used in making money and in increasing the prosperity of the islands.

On December 3, 1927 President Coolidge again asserted his opposition to granting independence to the Philippines.¹

In his annual message to Congress, Coolidge, December 6, 1927, said,

Conditions in the Philippine Islands have been steadily improved. Contentment and good order prevail. Roads, irrigation works, harbor improvements, and public buildings are being constructed. Public education and sanitation have been advanced. The government is in sound financial condition

Greater progress could have been made, more efficiently could be put into administration, if Congress would undertake to expend, through the appropriating power, all or a part of the customs revenues which are now turned over to the Philippines Treasury. . . . The Government of the islands is about ninety-eight percent in the hands of the Filipinos. An extension of the policy of self-government will be hastened by the demonstration on their part of their desire and ability to carry cordially and efficiently the provisions of the organic law enacted by the Congress for the government of the islands. It would be well for a committee of the Congress to visit the islands every two years.²

1. Ibid., December 3, 1927.

2. Ibid., December 7, 1927, p. 24.

Before the delivery of this message, President Coolidge had, in a conference with Representative Kiess, Chairman of the House Committee on Insular Affairs, reasserted his opposition to granting independence to the Philippines. At the same time, he expressed approval of a bill sponsored by Kiess to transfer taxes collected on Philippine products in the United States to the United States Treasury for use in paying for an American civilian personnel in the islands to aid the governor general.¹ Bills for this purpose were introduced by Willis in the Senate² and Kiess in the House on January 5, 1928.³ Reports from Committees were presented February 27.⁴ Further action was made unnecessary when the Philippine legislature passed the "Belo" act which authorized the governor general to spend \$125,000 in the employment of "expert advisers and civilian assistants to help him in the performance of his duty of supervision imposed on him by the organic law of 1916."⁵

Upon his appointment to succeed Wood, Henry L. Stimson said that the policies put into practice by Wood would be continued by him.⁶

In his inaugural address he said that the discussion of the question of independence was not within the province of the governor

-
1. Ibida, December 3, 1927, p. 2.
 2. Congressional Record, 70 Cong., 1 sess., (Washington: Government Printing office, 1928), p. 1000.
 3. Ibida, p. 1085.
 4. Ibida, p. 3580 and 3655.
 5. Annual report of Governor General Philippine Islands, 1928, (Washington: Government Printing office, 1930), p. 6-7.
 6. News item in New York Times, January 13, 1928, p. 15.

general, that his duties were administrative.¹

The position of Stimson was the true position for a governor general to take. He considered himself an administrator and not a determiner of policy. Stimson was very successful and obtained the cooperation of both parties in the Philippines, attaining the end mentioned by Carmi Thompson when he said "that such steps should be taken as may be required to reestablish co-operation between the executive and legislative branches of the Philippine government." The requirement seemed to be the substitution of Stimson for Wood.

This was the year for the election of the president. The Republican party met in Kansas City, Missouri and nominated Herbert Hoover of California for President and Charles Curtis of Kansas for Vice President. They made no mention of the Philippines in their platform.

The Democrats met at Houston, Texas and nominated Alfred E. Smith of New York for President and Joseph Robinson of Arkansas for Vice President. Their Philippine plank stated,

The Filipino people have succeeded in maintaining a stable government and have thus fulfilled the only condition laid down by the Congress as a prerequisite to the granting of independence. ~~We declare that it is now our liberty and our duty to keep our promise to these people by granting them immediately the independence which they so honorably covet.~~ We declare that it is now our liberty and our duty to keep our promise to these people by granting them immediately the independence which they so honorably covet. 2

-
1. Annual Report of Governor General Philippine Islands, 1928, op. cit., p. 35.
 2. News item in New York Times, June 29, 1928, p. 5.

The question of Philippine independence did not enter the campaign. Republican prosperity and the Catholic religious belief of Smith combined to elect Hoover and Curtis. They received 451 electoral votes to 80 for Smith and Robinson.

Henry L. Stimson was selected as Secretary of State by Herbert Hoover, and many people in the Philippines said he was the greatest governor general they had ever had.

Mr. Stimson's report of his activities as governor general was dated March 1, 1929, exactly one year from the day on which he arrived in Manila. I feel that the accomplishments of that year equal those of any other year in the administration of the Philippines by the United States. In spite of the continual squabbling that had occurred for five years before the arrival of Stimson, the situation did have certain aspects which made the outlook for the new governor-general quite favorable. There can be little doubt that the Filipino leaders were tired of arguing. They had tried to force Wood to grant them greater autonomy by making Secretaries of Departments responsible to the Legislature. Failing in this, they had agitated at Washington for greater autonomy. An attitude of Congressional cooperation in this matter which was evident in the early part of 1924 had changed by 1927 or 1928 to one of disgust. Considerable support was manifested for restrictions on Philippine autonomy, such as would have come through the Kiess proposal and other bills of similar import. Another factor contributing to a cooperative attitude by the

Filipino politicians was that the best jobs at the disposal of the government, the Secretaries of Departments, were vacant and would be the reward for cooperation. Any person who has studied the control of Congress or of a State Legislature by the Executive can see the value of having these jobs available as rewards for cooperation.

Secretary Stimson was a very able and cooperative person. His work was of the greatest value for the Philippines. He realized that much more could be done through cooperation with the legislature than by any governor-general alone. The report which he wrote is one of the best statements of the Philippine situation available.

In speaking of the problem presented by the Philippine political situation at the time of his appointment, Stimson says,

It has been frequently asserted that opposition to American administration in the Philippines is an almost wholly artificial result of selfish agitation by comparatively few native leaders. The result of my year's experience has been to make me feel that such assertions are much exaggerated and to recognize that there is a racial sensitiveness between the brown and the white races in the islands which is inevitable and enters into almost every problem of administration, and which can be handled only by the exercise of the utmost consideration on the part of those Americans who are vested with executive responsibility. In the absence of such consideration, this racial sensitiveness of the Malay may easily be provoked into fanatical outbursts. On the other hand . . . the Filipino is gifted with such natural kindness and hospitality of character . . . that when given the necessary tact on the part of his white colleagues he is one of the easiest men in the world to work with.

Before my acceptance of the appointment as Governor General, I was visited in America by Filipino legislative leaders who promised me that if I would come to the islands I should receive their cooperation. When I suggested that such cooperation must involve no surrender of American principle, they cordially accepted that limitation. Now at the end of the year I can truthfully say that this promise has been loyally fulfilled . . . I have conferred with them alone in the same manner and upon the same terms as I would confer with political leaders of my own

country. There has been no attempt to take advantage of such relationships, and their word when given has been faithfully observed. In view of certain current assertions as to their attitude toward past administrations, they are entitled to the full credit of this acknowledgement ~~from~~ mine. 1

Stimson then mentions the fine cooperation which he received from the Filipino politicians, their honesty, frankness, and reliability. 2

The following comments on the problem presented by lack of economic development and consequent lack of revenues are then made:

Economic development in the islands . . . has been slow, due partly to racial and tropical inertia and partly to the hesitancy of foreign capital to enter the islands while their future political status is deemed to be uncertain. As a result their governmental revenues have increased very slowly and for the five years prior to my arrival in the islands had been almost stationary in spite of the fact that taxation had reached a level which in general was quite as high as the islands should bear.

.....

Economic development is further controlled by historic Filipino policy toward their public land. Their experience during the Spanish regime with large accumulations of land and other property in the hands of the friars, and the consequent tyranny from which they suffered, not only resulted in the passage of laws, under the American regime, strictly limiting the size of such landholdings in the future, but has also resulted in a general public sentiment against such large landholdings which is one of the strongest political sentiments which the average Filipino holds today. It is so strong as to be controlling upon their future legislation and can not be disregarded in any plan for the future development of the islands. The average Filipino believes that it is better for his country to be slowly and gradually developed by a population of comparatively small individual landowners than to be more rapidly exploited by a few large corporations which own the land and till it either with tenant farmers or hired employees.

-
1. Ann. rept of gov. gen., P. I., 1928, op. cit., p. 2.
 2. Ibid., p. 2-3.

The existence of this native sentiment has not been generally recognized in the United States, but the events of my own year's experience brought it to my attention as one of the deepest and most controlling currents of public opinion in the islands and one which it would be folly to disregard or attempt to defy 1

In describing the political situation on his arrival, he says that while he abstained from participation in the triennial election held that year, the defeat of Mr. Isauro Gabaldon who ran on a platform of non-cooperation with his administration" was fortunate for future cooperation." He indicated his intention of managing the Philippine National Bank and the other government-owned corporations in so far as this was possible in accordance with "the legitimate purposes which the Filipinos had in mind in establishing these corporations." 2

Stimson's legislative program to encourage cooperation between the executive and the legislature consisted of:

(1) Passage by the legislature of the so-called Belo Act making a permanent appropriation of an annual sum of 250,000 (\$125,000) and authorizing the employment therewith to help him in the performance of his duty of supervision imposed upon him by the organic act of 1916; (2) the appointment of a cabinet nominated by the Governor General from the members of the successful party at the recent election after conference with the leaders of that party; (3) the amendment of the rules of procedure of the two houses so as to vest members of the cabinet with the privileges of the floor . . . ; (4) the appointment by the Governor General of a council of state with purely advisory powers, consisting of himself, the cabinet, the presiding officers, and majority floor leaders of both houses. 3

The Belo Act was of special importance since it gave the governor

-
1. Ibid., p. 3-4.
 2. Ibid., p. 5-6.
 3. Ibid., p. 6-7.

private assistance which was of the greatest importance. (Wood had been unable to get civilian advisers because of the law existing at the time so he relied on army officers detailed for his service.) Stimson continues,

. . . The necessity of such further assistance to the Governor General had become more and more evident since the unduly rapid steps in Filipinization under Governor General Harrison had deprived the Governor General of the trained American assistants who had previously held key positions in the civil service of the islands 1

Stimson then speaks of the legislation designed to promote the economic development of the islands. He says,

There were two chief elements of this problem . . . (1) by legislation to remove certain obstacles in the law which prevented the entry of imperatively needed foreign capital; and (2) and much more important, to transform the attitude of the minds of the whole people on this subject, so that they should recognize that such development might, if intelligently handled, be made an aid, and not an enemy, to their aspirations for freedom. To a marked extent both of these aims were accomplished by the events of the first session of the legislature. 2

The joint committee of the Filipino and American Bar associations of Manila, which had been studying the question of revising the corporation law, prepared the necessary amendments to the law upon the suggestion of Stimson. They were then introduced into the legislature. Stimson then says,

The debate which ensued on these measures, not only in the legislature but in the press and in public meetings throughout the islands, was the feature of the legislative session and covered a far wider field than the provisions of the bills themselves. It opened up the whole question of the development of the islands by outside capital, their relations to America,

1. Ibid., p. 7.
2. Ibid., p. 9.

the land policy of the islands, and the relations of capital to labor and to the government. I was told by competent observers that no such fundamental discussion had ever taken place to such a wide extent before. Against the leaders were arrayed all the reactionary forces in the islands; an actual racial opposition to change, particularly one coming from without; the agricultural classes' dread of large business aggregations; and the Filipino fear of Caucasian or other domination. Taking the lead in guiding and crystallizing these hostile elements were certain business interests which were profiting by the existing situation and certain leaders of Spanish thought and culture as distinguished from American thought and culture. The success of the bills would have been very doubtful except for the arrival in August of Senate President Quezon Under Mr. Quezon's leadership the hostile opinion which had been previously prevalent in native newspapers and circles was won over and the corporation amendments were finally passed. 1

In summarizing his work Stimson says,

It is self-evident that the things accomplished during the past year are but the beginning of what should be a carefully planned and worked-out development of a great insular program. It is also evident that insufficient time has elapsed to appraise the value of even the things that have been done But this much, I think, has been done:

Certain governmental machinery of cooperation has been established which has already shown itself to be of distinct value and, what is much more significant, indicates a very hopeful line for future development in the solution of this most difficult problem of joint action between American and the Philippine Islands. This machinery has already served to make possible a very fruitful legislative session and, what is even more important, has, so far as it has gone, satisfied the natural Filipino anxiety that the promised development of Filipino autonomy had not been forgotten but was going ahead

In the second place, during the year there was given a great impetus toward a general mental change on the part of the people themselves in which they have come to consider, almost for the first time, the industrial and economic foundations of their political problems. The general change and progress in this respect is very noticeable and not only constitutes a hopeful factor as to future Filipino development but also serves as

1. Ibid., p. 10-11.

an assurance and, to some extent, a guaranty that the attitude taken by the Filipinos toward all business questions, including that of the investment of foreign capital, will be enlightened and of a nature to make such investments secure

In the third place, and perhaps most important of all, the cessation of the period of acrimonious deadlock and the substitution therefor of a period of recognized cooperation and friendly feelings has produced a general amelioration in the relations of Americans and Filipinos, which is of marked encouragement for the future success of the problem in hand. 1

Stimson left the Philippines to become Secretary of State. In Washington, he became the official spokesman for the administration on Philippine affairs, a position which he was well qualified to fill.

His influence, while sufficient to prevent the extension of the coastwise trading laws to the Philippine Islands and the limiting of Philippine sugar exports to the United States under the Hawley-Smoot tariff act, was not sufficient to prevent an independence bill from becoming law. In the succeeding four years, the beginning and then the intensification of the depression led to agitation for independence from groups formerly merely acquiescing in the agitation, or even opposing it. The power of the Hoover administration to control American Philippine policy rapidly waned and eventually disappeared under the vigorous pressure of these groups.

1. Ibid., p. 18-19.

CHAPTER XV

THE REVIVAL OF THE INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT

Dwight F. Davis was selected to succeed Stimson as governor-general. In his inaugural address, July 8, 1929, he sounded a note of opposition to efforts in Washington to limit the free entry of Philippine sugar into the United States. He also said that the question of independence was not a subject which a governor-general should discuss.¹

Dwight Davis in this statement as well as in his work as governor-general was to follow the example of Stimson. Theodore Roosevelt Jr. was to follow this same school of thought when he became governor-general upon the resignation of Davis. These three men followed a policy of conciliation of the Filipino leaders feeling that successful administration must be based on cooperation. Many American residents of the Philippines felt that these cooperators had carried things too far. They seemed to favor a stronger stand for American "rights" in the islands, usually suggesting something like Wood's attitude on the subject of Philippine-American relations. The men who went to the islands as governor-general hoped for later political advancement. Peace and quiet in the islands and later promotion could come only through cooperation. These later men must

1. News item in New York Times, July 8, 1929, p. 3.

have felt this pressure. At any rate they "cooperated." They were probably more conciliatory than Wood. They had had more experience in political office than Wood. Certainly they succeeded better. Although often presented with the same problems that had confronted Wood, their handling of them provoked less controversy.

Davis and Roosevelt were not as successful in carrying out their policies as Stimson had been in carrying out the specific policies in which he was interested due largely to conditions beyond their control. Two factors of great significance for future Philippine development greatly slowed down the work begun by Stimson: the world depression and renewed agitation for Philippine independence in the United States.

These factors were to be influential in sounding the death knell of the Philippine policy of the administration in Washington also.

Only one president in the entire period of American-Philippine relations was to completely and totally fail to affect in any manner the Philippine policy of the American government. Due in part, but only in part, to the depression, control of Philippine policy shifted during the Hoover administration from the executive branch of the government to Congress. The administration even lost the power to prevent action. The depression was not entirely responsible for this since a rather effective agitation for and support of independence had been manifested in Congress before October, 1929, the time of the stock market crash.

President Hoover called Congress in session soon after his inauguration March 4, 1929 to revise the United States tariff. During the consideration of this tariff bill, a number of amendments were offered bearing on Philippine policy. Senator Broussard of Louisiana offered an amendment on October 9, 1929 which provided that the President should call a conference of Pacific powers to agree to guarantee the independence of the Philippines. The latter part of the amendment provided for full tariff rates to be applied to Philippine products with the money to be refunded to the Insular treasury. United States goods, however, were still to be admitted to the Philippines free of duty.¹ Senator King of Utah then proposed the following substitute for Broussard's amendment:

In conformity with the act . . . approved August 29, 1916, the Philippine Legislature is hereby authorized to provide for a general election of delegates to a constitutional convention for an independent republican government for the Philippine Islands, and upon the ratification and promulgation of said constitution and the election of the officers therein provided for, and as soon as the government provided for under said constitution is organized and ready to function, the President of the United States shall recognize and proclaim the independence of the Philippine government under said constitution . . . and the President is directed to withdraw the military forces of the United States from said island within six months after said proclamation recognizing the independence of said Philippine government.

The debts and liabilities of the Philippine government, its provinces and municipalities and instrumentalities . . . shall be assumed by the government established thereunder.

If the Philippine government fails to pay any of its debts and liabilities referred to in the foregoing section or the interest thereon when due, the United States Government may

1. Congressional Record, 71 Cong., 1 sess., (Washington: Government Printing office, 1929), p. 4375.

thereupon take over the customs offices and administration of the same and apply such part of the revenue received therefrom as may be necessary for the payment of such overdue indebtedness or interest. When such overdue indebtedness . . . shall have been paid, the United States Government shall restore to the Philippine Government the control and administration of its customs offices and the revenues derived therefrom. 1

The motion of Bingham of Connecticut to lay Broussard's amendment on the table, which would have carried King's substitute with it, failed by a vote of 34 to 54.² The King substitute was then defeated by a vote of 36 to 45,³ with 29 Democrats (Ashurst and Hayden of Ariz., Barkley of Ky., Black and Heflin of Ala., Blease and Smith of S. C., Bratton of N. Mex., Connally and Sheppard of Texas, Dill of Wash., Trammell and Fletcher of Fla., George and Harris of Ga., Glass of Va., Hawes of Mo., King of Utah, McKellar and Brook of Tenn., Overman of N. C., Robinson of Ark., Steck of Iowa, Stephens of Miss., Thomas of Okla., Walsh and Wheeler of Mont., Wagner of N. Y., and Walsh of Mass.) and 7 Republicans (Blaine and LaFollette of Wis., Brookhart of Iowa, McMaster of S. Dak., Norris of Neb., Nye of N. Dak., and Pine of Okla.) voting for the amendment and with 40 Republicans (Allen and Capper of Kan., Wolcott and Bingham of Conn., Thomas and Borah of Idaho, Vanderberg and Cousens of Mich., Cutting of N. Mex., Dale and Greene of Vt., Densen and Glenn of Ill., Edge and Kean of N. J., Fess of Ohio, Goff and Hatfield of W. Va.,

1. Ibid., p. 4377.

2. Ibid., p. 4389.

3. Ibid., p. 4399.

Goldsborough of Md., Gould of Me., Hebert of R. I., Howell of Neb., Johnson of Cal., McNary and Steiwer of Ore., Oddie of Nev., Smoot of Utah, Phipps and Waterman of Colo., Warren of Wyo., Norbeck of S. Dak., Keyes and Moses of N. H., Reed of Pa., Patterson of Mo., Robinson and Watson of Ind., Schall of Minn., Sackett of Ky., and Townsend of Del.) and 5 Democrats (Broussard and Ransdell of La., Copeland of N. Y., Kendrick of Wyo., and Pittman of Nev.) voting against the king amendment. The geographic division of this vote is shown on map No. 25. The vote indicated above is not an exact expression of senatorial opinion since Pittman of Nevada said he voted ¹ may so he could vote for the Broussard amendment and Borah and Johnson, among others, did not think this was the proper time for a vote. ²


Broussard then substituted for his original motion the following proposal:

Whereas the Government of the United States proposed to grant independence to the Philippine Islands in the immediate future, the President of the United States is requested to invite such governments as he may deem advisable to send representatives to a conference to consider an agreement to respect the independence and territorial integrity of the Philippine Islands. Such agreement shall be reported to the respective governments for their approval. ³

The proposal was objected to because it was undiplomatic, not pertinent to the tariff bill and put at the wrong time. Some senators

1. Loc. cit.
 2. Ibid., 4400.
 3. Ibid., p. 4424.

Map No. 25. Senate vote on King substitute for Broussard amendment, October 9, 1929.



said it was a matter for the United States while others said the League of Nations would protect the islands.¹ It was then defeated 19 to 63.² Broussard then proposed that the full United States duty be levied on Philippine products while United States products received free entry into the Philippines. This proposal was then rejected.³

Greater interest in Philippine independence was to be manifested in the second session of the 71st Congress than had ever before been indicated. Groups appeared before Congress demanding, either for the first time or with increased vigor, Philippine independence. Successive groups were to demand restrictions on the economic advantages which came to the Philippines under the relationship which existed in the 1920's, either with or without independence. As these attempts failed, as Broussard's amendment had failed, their proponents were often added to the group of those supporting Philippine independence.

During the session of Congress a number of bills were introduced which related to the Philippines. Senator King introduced S. 204⁴ and S. 3108⁵ both of which were "to enable the people of the Philippine Islands to adopt a constitution and to form a free and

1. Ibid., p. 4424-26.

2. Ibid., p. 4426.

3. Ibid., p. 4426-27.

4. Ibid., p. 105.

5. Congressional Record, 71 Cong., 2 sess., (Washington: Government Printing office, 1930), p. 1488.

independent government." Senator Bingham introduced S. J. Res. 113 "requesting the President to call a conference on the Philippine question."¹ Senator Vandenberg introduced S. 3379 "to enable the people of the Philippine Islands to adopt a constitution and form a government for the Philippine Islands and to provide for the future political status of the same." This bill provided for increasing duties in both the United States and the Philippines on the products of the other with a plebiscite the tenth year when the full tariff duties were levied.² Senators Hawes and Cutting jointly introduced S. 3822.³

Soon after Congress met in December, the Senators and Representatives from farm states were reported to be determined to seek a solution for the problem presented by the duty free importation of sugar and coconut oil from the Philippines by setting the islands free.⁴

January 9, Senator Vandenberg, in discussing the sugar schedules in the tariff bill, indicated that he did not want to tie up Philippine independence with sugar duties. He then suggested tariff autonomy for the Philippines so they could see if they were economically ready for independence.⁵

The senate by a vote of 54 to 22 killed the proposal for a sugar bounty opening the way, it was reported, to freeing the Philippines

1. Ibid., p. 1095.

2. Ibid., p. 2736.

3. Ibid., p. 4794.

4. News item in New York Times, Dec. 9, 1929, p. 12.

5. Congressional Record, op. cit., p. 1308.

from American sovereignty.¹ Later in the month both Senator Tydings of Maryland and Johnson of California opposed a materialistic consideration of Philippine independence.² On April 23, 1930, during the consideration of S. 51, a bill to establish a quota on immigrants from the western hemisphere, Senator Shortridge of California proposed the following amendment:

That from and after July 1, 1930, the migration of citizens of the Philippine Islands to the continental United States shall be limited to students, visitors for business or pleasure, merchants, government officials, their families, attendants, servants, and employees

This section shall be in force and effect for five years from and after the date of its approval and, if within that time the independence of the Philippines shall have been granted or by act of Congress definitely provided for, then this act shall continue in force indefinitely thereafter.³

It was rejected by a vote of 23 to 41⁴ with 9 Democrats (Ashurst and Hayden of Ariz., Black and Heflin of Ala., Dill of Wash., Harris of Ga., Ransdell of La., Steck of Iowa, and Trammell of Fla.) joining 14 Republicans (Capper of Kan., Hatfield of W. Va., Hebert of R. I., Johnson and Shortridge of Cal., Jones of Wash., McNary and Steiwar of Ore., Oddie of Nev., Thomas of Idaho, Sullivan of Wyo., McCulloch of Ohio, Pine of Okla., and Rebsion of Ky). in voting for the amendment and with 25

1. News item in New York Times, January 18, 1930, p. 1.

2. Congressional Record, op. cit., p. 2589 et seq.

3. Ibid., p. 7510.


4. Ibid., p. 7529-30.

Republicans (Allen of Kan., Bingham and Wolcott of Conn., Blaine of Wis., Borah of Idaho, Couzens and Vandenberg of Mich., Cutting of N. Mex., Greene and Dale of Vt., Fess of Ohio, Frazier and Nye of N. Dak., Norbeck of S. Dak., Howell and Norris of Neb., Phipps and Waterman of Col., Patterson of Mo., Robinson of Ind., Goldsborough of Md., Townsend of Del., Kean of N. J., Keyes of N. H., and Hale of Me.), 15 Democrats (Copeland and Wagner of N. Y., Walsh of Mass., Glass and Swanson of Va., Simmons of N. C., George of Ga., Harrison and Stephens of Miss., McKellar of Tenn., Hawes of Mo., Thomas of Okla., Kendrick of Wyo., Walsh of Mont., and Pittman of Nev.) and 1 Farmer Laborite (Shipstead of Minn.) voting against the amendment. The geographic division of the vote is shown on map no. 26.

While the Senate was taking this action, the Committee on Territories and Insular Possessions had begun holding extensive hearings on the Philippines. Everyone interested in appearing before the Committee was allowed to testify. These included the members of the Philippine independence mission, Filipino students in the United States, representatives of the United States farm, labor, and industrial groups, and representatives of the administration who appeared in both open and executive (secret) sessions.

The hearing held January 15 was given over very largely to the statement of Manuel Roxas, Speaker of the Philippine House of Representatives, concerning the condition, progress and ambitions of the islands and

Map No. 26. Senate vote on Shortridge amendment to establish a quota on Filipinos coming to the United States, April 23, 1930



islanders.¹ The farm organizations which were represented January 20 were the American Farm Bureau Federation, the National Dairy Union, and the National Grange. They advocated independence for the Philippines and the consequent termination of the free trade status of Philippine products. The sugar, Oil, fat, etc. industries in the United States might then be protected from competition. Chester Gray of the Farm Bureau admitted that if protection were given the American producers, that he would not be interested in the independence question.² Mr. Hushing, representing the American Federation of Labor, favored independence on both humanitarian grounds and because of recent developments in immigration and tariff situations, he said. He mentioned the riots against the Filipinos in California as a reason for Philippine independence.³ During the hearing on February 17, John M. Switzer said that probably not over five percent of the members of Congress ever saw the Philippines. He added that Congress had never sent an investigating mission to the islands.⁴

Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of State, appeared before the Committee on May 22, 1930. He said, in part,

-
1. U. S. Congress, Senate Committee on Territories and Insular Possessions, 71 Cong., 2 sess., Hearings on S. 204, (Washington: Government Printing office, 1930), p. 6-37.
 2. Ibid., p. 67-104.
 3. Ibid., p. 113-118.
 4. Ibid., p. 378-379.

. . . I am opposed to the immediate independence of the Philippine Islands, on three grounds, which I will take up in their order:

First, I am opposed to it, because I believe it would be disastrous to the interests of the United States, both in the islands and in the Far East, in connection with the present conditions in the different countries having interests in and exercising sovereignty there. . . .

I am opposed because it would be disastrous to the Philippine people. I believe that to be true, because I believe the Philippine people are today quite unprepared for independence, either politically or economically.

. . . . I believe that political independence, in the sense of the separation of the Philippine Islands from all leadership and control by the American Government, would destroy self-government in the Philippines, and the result would be either a condition of anarchy or a condition of oligarchy, in which a comparatively small class of Filipinos would exercise arbitrary power over the ordinary rights of the individuals, the small men in the islands. And by the small group I refer to the money lenders and to the local politicians. One of the greatest efforts made by the Government, and necessarily now by the Government, is to protect the small Filipino against financial tyranny from the one class and political tyranny from the other. In that sense and toward that end the effort of the American influence has been directed for the past 30 years.

I also believe that it would impair their self-government, because it would result in the control of the population of the islands by an alien race, the Chinese . . . (Chinese could not be kept out of the islands by an independent government.)¹

He next indicated the dependence of the Philippines on the United States as a place in which to market their goods. He indicated his belief that the Orient would be the place where the United States would develop her trade in the twentieth century and he believed

1. Ibid., p. 658-659.

that development would be aided by United States possession of the Philippines.¹ He then said,

The third point, the third reason why I am opposed to hasty and premature independence, is the general unsettlement which it would cause in the Far East, if it happened in that way

At that time the Philippine Islands and their government represented the most contented and generally peaceful part of the Orient. A great civil war was raging across the sea in China, and had been for years. Japan was still suffering from economic difficulties the consequence of the earthquake and the disasters which ensued. There had been revolution in Java under the autocratic control of the government there In that environment the Philippine Islands were contented, developing rapidly along the lines of self-government, and in every respect happy. Some apprehension was thrown into them just before I left by the threat over here against their market by the Timberlake resolution, but other than that it was in striking contrast to the rest of that part of the world.

. . . . If our influence should be withdrawn, there would be a void created proportionate to the size of the influence that is withdrawn.²

The committee reported the Hawes-Cutting bill (S. 3822) on June 2, 1930. Its title was:

A bill to provide for the withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States over the Philippine Islands and for the recognition of their independence; to provide for the notification thereof to foreign governments; to provide for the assumption by the Philippine government of obligations under the treaty with Spain; to define trade and other relations between the United States and the Philippine Islands on the basis of a progressive scale of tariff duties preparatory to complete independence; to provide for calling of a convention to frame a constitution for the government of the Philippine

1. Ibid., p. 659-669.

2. Ibid., p. 672-673.

Islands; to provide for certain mandatory provisions of the proposed constitution; to provide for the submission of the constitution to the Filipino people and its submission to the Congress of the United States for approval; to provide for the adjustment of property rights between the United States and the Philippine Islands; to provide for the acquisition of land by the United States for coal-
ing and naval stations in the Philippine Islands; to continue in force certain statutes until independence has been granted; and for other purposes.¹

Quite extensive reports were submitted by both Hawes (assisted by Cutting) for the majority and by Bingham for the minority.²

The majority said the purposes of the bill were;

- 1) To provide for the drafting of a constitution for a free and independent government of the Philippine Islands;
- 2) To provide for the ratification by the Philippine people of the constitution so formulated, and the election of governmental officials under the new constitution;

The bill provided for a five year test period before the withdrawal of the United States and, in the event of an affirmative vote in a plebiscite, the withdrawal of the United States subject to certain conditions prescribed in the bill.³

The majority then said that uncertainty over the status of the Philippines could be removed in one of the following ways:

- (1) Granting immediate independence.
- (2) Setting a date in the distant future when independence shall be granted.

1. Congressional Record, op. cit., p. 4794.

2. Ibid., p. 9853.

3. Senate report 781, 71 Cong., 2 sess., (Washington: Government Printing office, 1930), p. 3.

- (3) Creating what might be termed a colonial form of government for future retention of the Philippines.
- (4) Incorporating Philippines as one or more States of the American Union.
- (5) Providing, as in this bill (S. 3822), for the organization of a free government and permitting the Philippine people to determine whether under the new conditions they desire to become independent, and grant them independence.¹

The conclusions of the Committee are:

- (1) That it is the policy of the American Government to free rather than retain the Philippines.
- (2) That the Philippine people are justified in their plea for independence at this time.
- (3) That the Philippine people have made remarkable strides in the path of self-government.
- (4) That the Philippine people are, at present time, with few exceptions conducting the affairs of government.
- (5) That Philippine people are keenly alive to the untoward eventualities of independence.
- (6) The Philippine people prefer breaking their economic ties with the United States now rather than later, especially since there would be the chance that later there would be no independence.
- (7) That, so far as the interests of Americans are concerned in Philippine trade, it will be more simple to grant independence at an early date than when their interests have a deeper and more far-reaching contact with the Philippines.
- (8) Political uncertainty in the Philippines is hampering economic development.
- (9) There are important elements, both American and Philippine,

1. Ibid., p. 6.

whose interests demand some action on the part of Congress in the settlement of the national uncertainty.

- (10) That action of the American Government in relation to the Philippines will determine America's prestige in the Orient.
- (11) That the Philippine Islands, of doubtful advantage at the present from a purely trade standpoint have little or no utility in times of war . . .
- (12) That proposals to postpone independence will probably lessen chance of independence.
- (13) That no selfish motives of commercial advantage or expansion should interfere with redemption of our pledges to these people.
- (14) That the Philippine people are unanimous in their demand for early and complete independence.

The United States owes a solemn duty to the Philippine people--the duty of an honest declaration of our future intent. If we have decided to retain these islands under some form of colonial government, we should be frank enough to proclaim it. We should not further encourage national aspirations to ultimate independence on the part of the Philippine people if we are opposed to their independence.

If the delay of independence for thirty years is for the purpose of defeating independence, we should say so frankly.¹

The minority of the committee believed five years was too short a period to prepare the Philippines for independence as they are not yet prepared for immediate or early independence.

Arguments against the pending plan may be summed up under the following principal heads:

- (1) Immediate, or early, independence would be disastrous to the Filipinos themselves.

1. Ibid., p. 23-24.

- (2) It would be harmful to the interests of the United States both in the Philippines and in the Far East.
- (3) It would inevitably create an unsettled condition in the Far East in connection with the present stabilization of affairs in the different countries having interests in the Far East and exercising sovereignty there.¹

The minority supported the views expressed by Secretaries Hurley and Stimson. Quite extensive quotations from the statements of each are made as expressing the opinion of the minority.² The report concludes:

The signers of this minority report are not prepared to place in grave jeopardy the well-being and economic and political prosperity of 13,000,000 people who have been wards of the United States for a generation and for whom we have undertaken an altruistic experiment which is as yet but half accomplished.³

This report was signed by Bingham of Conn., Robinson of Ind., Metcalf of R. I., and Goff of W. Va.

Senator Vandenberg attached the following statement to the report:

I concur in the minority report in respect to its conclusion that a five year probation period is wholly and dangerously inadequate to the safe development of Philippine independence. Otherwise I agree with the general program embraced in the bill recommended by the majority report because I know of no method whereby either we or the Filipinos can ever know whether the Philippines are self-sufficient except as an autonomous probationary interval provides the proofs.⁴

No action on Philippine independence was taken during the remainder of this session.

1. Ibid., part 2, p. 1-2.
2. Ibid., p. 2-5.
3. Ibid., p. 5.
4. Ibid., p. 6.

On the last day of the Congress, Representative Sabath of Illinois expressed satisfaction that Congress did not bar Filipinos from this country previous to granting independence to them. He said we should not limit the amount of sugar or coconut oil imported from the Philippines until we had kept our solemn agreement to make the Filipinos free.¹ He seems to have expressed the attitude of Congress at this time.

The Democrats made such substantial gains in the election of 1930 and in the election of members to fill vacancies occurring after the regular election that they controlled the organization of the House of Representatives in 1931.

The period from the adjournment of the 71st Congress in March, 1931 until the meeting of the 72nd Congress in December is a period of marshalling of forces and facts. President Hoover's inability to do anything to stop the depression was directly related to and a cause of his inability to prevent Congress from enacting independence legislation.

The summer of 1931 saw many pilgrimages to the Philippines with nearly every one who went there succeeding in reinforcing previous conclusions about the islands. Among those who went to the islands were Secretary Hurley and Senators Vandenberg, Hawes and Pittman.

On May 7, Vandenberg said a speedy solution of the problem of Philippine independence was imperative. While he saw no connection between

the dairy industry of Michigan and coconut oil, nevertheless the present strength of the independence sentiment was the result of the economic pressure of Philippine products, he reported.¹

The renewed interest in Philippine independence caused consternation in Filipino political circles. The leader of the more conservative party in the Philippines, Juan Sumulong, said on May 19 that immediate independence for the Philippines was impractical. Some of the newspapers which had previously urged complete and immediate independence now talked of a continuation of the existing status.²

This dispatch caused confusion among Senators and Representatives, especially those from sugar, dairy and cotton states. Representative Knutson of Minnesota favored forcing independence on the islands and restricting immigration from there. The Hoover administration, by way of contrast, was encouraged by the report.

All this doubt and uncertainty was changed when Senator Hawes arrived in the Philippines. While he says in his book that he was not interested in independence parades, fiestas, and celebrations, one was arranged spontaneously, so he indicates, in every village, town, and city through which he went. He found the people were unanimously in favor of independence.⁴

1. News item in New York Times, May 8, 1931, p. 14.

2. Ibid., May 20, 1931, p. 10.

3. Ibid., May 21, 1931, p. 11.

4. Harry B. Hawes, Philippine Uncertainty, New York: The Century Co., 1932.

The summer of 1931 was to be the period of Hawes' triumphant tour of the Philippines. The fall was to be the period of Hurley's relatively quiet investigation. Hurley sailed for the Philippines on July 30¹ and September 1 in Manila in an interview he stated emphatically that the administration was not committed to a veto of the Philippine legislation pending in the United States Congress. He said that no conclusion had been reached yet on the matter.² Later in the month he said that the greatest difficulty in the islands was the unwillingness of many persons to say openly what is readily told confidentially.³ September 25, he issued his only formal statement in the course of the trip. He said,

Intelligent, honest and successful Filipinos who approached me confidentially stated that suppression of the freedom of speech made the formation of intelligent public opinion difficult.

He indicated that he had been told that the fear of boycott was involved in statements of influential merchants on independence. The change in the petitions from the demand for immediate, complete and absolute independence to immediate political separation from the United States is noted by Hurley.

Secretary Hurley reported his observations on the Philippines to the President October 26. The next day Hoover made it clear

-
1. News item in New York Times, July 31, 1931, p. 10.
 2. Ibid., September 2, 1931, p. 11.
 3. Ibid., September 19, 1931, p. 5.

that his administration was opposed to immediate independence. He said that "the problem is one of time."

In the interest of the Philippine people, the time element involves the necessity that independence must be assured of durability and the government of the Philippines must be assured of stability. For instance, the economic independence of the Philippines must be attained before political independence can be successful. Independence tomorrow without assured economic stability would result in the collapse of Philippine government revenues and the collapse of all economic life in the islands. We propose to give further consideration to the whole question during the immediate future.

Thus far, President Hoover had been able to prevent action by Congress in opposition to his announced Philippine policy. He was soon to lose this influence in the case of the Philippines just as he was to lose it in the most aspects of Congressional policy: The period of executive control of Philippine policy was drawing to a close. Congress had acquired that control. Logically, responsibility for mistakes in policy must be charged to Congress---not to the President.

CHAPTER XVI

THE HAWES-CUTTING-HARE INDEPENDENCE BILL - 1931-1933

A large number of bills affecting the Philippines were introduced in Congress when it met in December, 1931. Two bills were of the greatest importance: H. R. 7233 introduced by Representative Hare of South Carolina, Chairman of the House Committee on Insular Affairs, on January 8, 1932¹ and S. 3377 introduced by Senators Hawes of Missouri and Cutting of New Mexico on January 28.² These bills were referred to their respective committees the same day they were introduced.

Hearings on these bills were held by both committees, the hearing of the House Committee on Insular Affairs being very complete. Manuel Roxas on January 23 and 25, 1932 outlined the geography of the islands, their economic resources, described their population, indicated the main facts about their educational system, described their currency system, discussed the matter of Philippine sugar production especially with reference to domestic American interests, and gave figures on the investment of American and other capital in the islands. He discussed the agricultural uses of the islands and concludes by discussing the ability of an independent Philippine government to finance itself.³ Chester Gray, Washington representative of the American Farm Bureau

1. Congressional Record, 72 Cong., 1 sess., (Washington: Government Printing office, 1932), p. 1554.

2. Ibid., p. 2861.

3. U. S. Congress House Com. on Ins. Aff., 72 Cong., 1 sess., Hearings on H. R. 7233, (Washington: Government Printing office, 1932), p. 1-103.

Federation, on January 29 indicated he favored the principle of graduated increases in tariff rates rather than graduated restrictions on imports into the United States from the Philippines. He rather favored immediate independence with a five year transition period¹ for economic adjustment after independence. Fred Cummings, President of the National Beet Growers Association, admitted that he favored Philippine independence because of the loss of revenue from the duty-free importation of sugar from the Philippines and because of the competition of their sugar with domestic sugar. He said American labor could not compete with "cheap" Filipino labor and then said that 55% of the beets in Colorado in 1931 were worked by Spanish speaking people. Forty per cent of these were Mexicans while the remaining 60% were American citizens of Spanish-Mexican origin.² Fred Brenckman, Washington representative of the National Grange, presented a resolution of the Grange advocating Philippine independence because of the social problem presented by increasing immigration of Filipinos, "economic disadvantages and competition encountered by our farmers as a result of their inability to secure protection against the importation and competition of Philippine products," and because we had promised them independence when "a stable government can be established therein." Mr. Brenckman then said that roughly "80% of our exports to the islands are composed of manufactured products, while about 80% of our imports from the

1. Ibid., p. 149-158.

2. Ibid., p. 158-164.

Philippines come into direct or indirect competition with the products of the American farmer." ¹ Mr. J. H. Johnson presented a statement for the Texas and Oklahoma Cottonseed Crushers' Associations January 29 in which these organizations advocated Philippine independence. After mentioning our promises, the expense of keeping the islands, and similar arguments, they said,

. . . The retention of these islands, combined with our sentiment that there should be no tariff imposed on products received from same, is placing an undue and unjust burden on the farmers of the southern portion of the United States, and on the manufacturers of cottonseed products, which have to be sold in competition with coconut oil coming from said islands, and with copra from there and elsewhere.

As a matter of fact, the very large quantities of oil and copra received from said islands are made the basis for sundry other exceptions to our tariff schedules on edible oils . . . so that . . . the entire tariff list is ineffective, and fails . . . to protect the producers of cottonseed and the manufacturers of cottonseed oil. This is also true in regard to the lack of protection to the producers of domestic animal fats of all kinds.

.

You understand that these oils are largely interchangeable, and that, through deodorization and other processes, they can be substituted one for another; so that we have a condition where free copra, free sesame, and free palm and palm kernel oils invalidate the whole vegetable oil schedule

.

For all of the above reasons, and particularly because the retention of said islands is an especially heavy tax and burden upon the cotton farmers . . . and cottonseed oil mills . . . we urge that the Philippines should be given their entire freedom at the earliest possible date. ²

1. Ibid., p. 164-168.

2. Ibid., Statement of J. R. Johnston, Jan. 29, 1932.

The arguments of Mr. Johnson and all others who agreed with him were answered February 1 by James D. Craig, representing Spencer Kellogg & Sons, importers of coconut oil as well as other products. Mr. Craig was not particularly concerned with the independence question. He did not want the coconut oil industry in the islands, in which his company was interested, to be ruined by a tariff following independence and thus he sought to show Congress that coconut oil did not compete with butter, lard, or cottonseed oil. He hoped that by convincing Congress and these groups that coconut oil did not compete with any domestically produced oils or fats that the agitation for independence for the Philippines by these groups would be terminated. The source of supply for coconut oil would not then be disturbed. Mr. Craig said that United States manufacturers of margarine used 156,000,000 pounds of coconut oil in the fiscal year 1930-1931. There was produced in the United States 4,200,000,000 pounds of hog lard and butter and about 2,000,000,000 pounds of cottonseed oil, corn oil, oleo oil, edible tallow, and other edible domestic fats all of which sold at a lower price than margarine and were thus available for use in margarine if the manufacturer had so desired. The United States exported in that year 1,000,000,000 pounds of edible oils and fats indicating that the 156,000,000 pounds of coconut used in margarine was not the cause of all the trouble.¹ As a factor in determining the

1. Ibid., p. 206-207.

interchangeability of these oils, Craig mentions the shortening value. Giving lard the base figure of 100, butter, after correction for its moisture content, had a shortening value of 96, cottonseed oil, corn oil, and peanut oil about 94-95, and, by contrast, coconut oil about 40.¹ Coconut oil is not usable in salads because of its high melting point nor as a frying compound because it sputters when heated to a high temperature.² He says further concerning the interchangeability of these oils and fats,

The statement was made here that coconut oil had pushed butter completely out of the confectionery industry. On that point I wish to say that coconut oil and butter are used for two entirely different purposes in candy. Butter imparts a flavor. Coconut oil has no flavor whatever, and is used for the purpose of imparting body and improving keeping qualities.

Without the use of coconut oil many kinds of candy would not keep satisfactorily during the time they are kept in the stores. In the early days only butter was used, but the candy had to be sold quickly after being made

With regard to the use of coconut oil in toilet and laundry soap, the official spokesmen of the dairy industry . . . never revealed to the dairy farmers that from 60 to 62 per cent of the coconut oil consumed in this country goes into soap, for which purpose it is as indispensable as rubber in the manufacture of an automobile tire, and no more interchangeable with any other fat or oil produced in the United States than rubber is with leather in the manufacture of this same tire.

No domestic fats and oils are intentionally produced for use in the soap kettle. No American agriculturist is deliberately producing any oil for use in the production of soap, because all the oils and fats produced in the United States, with the exception of linseed oil, when recovered in their natural prime condition, are suitable for edible purposes and find their most valuable outlet for use in edible products

.

1. Ibid., p. 211.

2. Ibid., p. 213.

Now, coconut oil, when used in the manufacture of soap, is absolutely non-competitive with any domestic oil or fat, for the simple reason that no domestic-produced oil or fat has the same valuable soap-making properties. Coconut oil is necessary in order to incorporate into the soap the required qualities which the consumer demands in the way of abundant lathering, rapid rinsing, and thorough cleansing properties. . . . 1

A number of other persons appeared before the Committee. Charles W. Holman, Secretary of the National Cooperative Milk Producers' Federation, supported Philippine independence because of competition of coconut oil with cottonseed oil and of margarine with butter.² John A. Simpson, President of the National Farmers' Union, supported independence because of the competition of coconut oil with cottonseed oil. Importations of coconut oil reduced the price of cottonseed oil, he claimed, and thus lowered the price paid farmers for their cottonseed.³ A. M. Loomis of the National Dairy Union favored Philippine independence because "by decreasing consumption of bananas you increase consumption of apples."⁴ W. C. Hushing speaking for the American Federation of Labor favored Philippine independence and the exclusion of the Filipinos.⁵ R. D. Mead, Vice-President of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters Association, and Victor Houston, Delegate in Congress from Hawaii, did not want Filipinos to be excluded from Hawaii.⁶

Patrick J. Hurley, Secretary of War, who had been in the

1. Loc. cit.

2. Ibid., Statement of Charles W. Holman.

3. Ibid., Statement of John A. Simpson.

4. Ibid., Statement of A. M. Loomis.

5. Ibid., Statement of W. C. Hushing.

6. Ibid., Statements of R. D. Mead and Victor S. K. Houston.

Philippines the previous year, appeared before the Committee February 10. He stated his fundamental conclusions first and then discussed them. His conclusions were:

The political chaos in the Orient to-day is such that in my opinion this is no time to deal with Philippine independence. The present legislation directed to that end would serve the interests of neither the Filipino people nor the United States.

Until the Filipino people shall have made greater progress toward economic independence political independence would merely invite revolution and anarchy. All the measures necessary for the attainment of economic independence can not be determined in advance.

The political and social institutions of the Filipino people are not yet developed to a point where the stability of an independent government would be reasonably assured.

The most essential steps toward economic independence for the Philippine Islands are the establishment of stable trade relations, and greater diversification of Philippine agriculture and industry

The immigration of Filipino labor to the United States is not to the best interests of either the Philippine Islands or the United States and equitable numerical limitation should be placed on such immigration accompanied by special provisions permitting the entry of public officials, students, and others ordinarily excepted from the full application of our immigration laws. Immigration regulation should not be based on racial grounds during the period of American sovereignty in the Philippine Islands.

Increased participation by Filipinos in local government administration is desirable provided it involves no surrender of any authority now possessed by the American Government. The continuation of American responsibility without adequate authority should not be considered. No final solution of the political relations between the United States and the Philippine Islands can be undertaken at the present time without grave danger to both peoples. 1

1. Ibid., p. 385-386.

He says later,

The composite objective in Filipino problems by the United States . . . visualizes an entirely practical program intended specifically to establish responsible government among all elements of the Filipino population; to secure to the Philippines a measure of economic independence that can be sustained indefinitely; and, finally, to develop an enlightened electorate capable of voicing an intelligent opinion concerning the position that must ultimately be occupied by the Philippines in the family of nations. To demonstrate that that stage of development has not been reached I need only to call attention to the fact that I have repeatedly asked to be shown the economic program which the Filipino leaders propose to put into effect in the event of independence. Up to this time no Filipino leader has offered any suggestion as to how an independent Philippine government is to be adequately financed except through favored trade relations with the United States. This would seem to indicate that even the leaders who cry for absolute, immediate, and complete independence do not expect to obtain it unless accompanied by special economic assistance from the United States 1

Hurley feels that the Hare bill is unwise. Some of the outstanding objections were that its enactment would:

- (a) Inaugurate a period of hasty and premature liquidation of investments upon which are based the most important present factors in the foreign trade and domestic business of the islands.
- (b) Result almost certainly, at or before the inauguration of the independent government of the Philippine Islands, in a disastrous economic collapse in the trade and business of the Philippine Islands, with an attendant acute financial crisis; . . . loss of public confidence in the financial stability of the government . . . Widespread unemployment and discontent; public disorders which the weakened government would be helpless to repress; . . . and absorption by some stronger power would be the natural and probable sequence.
- (c) Subject the United States to grave risk of becoming involved in many of the conditions outlined above
- (d) Disrupt the governmental system built up through thirty years' effort in order to permit a five year experiment with a new type of Philippine government prior to independence.
- (e) Weaken the power and prestige of the United States by prescribing the incorporation, in the constitution for the new

1. Ibid., p. 387.

Philippine government prior to independence, of provisions, the inclusion of which would imply that the continuance during that period of essential attributes of United States sovereignty was by sufferance and not by right

.....

(h) Prescribe for a period of approximately five years immediately preceding complete independence, trade relations with the United States which, while purporting to promote the solution of economic problems, would, in fact, reflect no adequate economic preparation of the Philippine Islands for the imminent independence contemplated and would be futile as a measure of protection for American farm and dairy interests.

(i) Give the specious assurance of reserving important powers of American control and supervision during the period prior to independence, while providing, in fact, no adequate means for the effective exercise of the powers

.....

(k) Fail to insure duly the fulfillment of existing moral obligations of the United States to the holders of such bonds of the present Philippine government and its instrumentalities as may have been issued under the authority of acts of Congress and with the aid and assistance of any agency of the United States Government.

(l) Grant, to the new five-year government . . . "all property and rights which may have been acquired in the Philippine Islands by the United States" . . . except such land and other property as may be "actually occupied and used by the United States for military and other reservations" at the date of enactment of the bill; thus apparently disregarding the possibility that . . . occasion might arise for some additional reservation of lands for United States military or other public purposes.

.....

(o) Tend to bring on, near the close of the period immediately preceding the withdrawal of American sovereignty from the Philippine Islands, such a condition of chaos as would prevent the withdrawal of the United States. In that case the charge would doubtless be made that such conditions were the result of design; that they were intended to prevent, rather than expedite, the withdrawal of American sovereignty, and to defeat the purpose of the bill.

(p) Be generally destructive, rather than constructive, in its ultimate practical effects as regards the progress and welfare of the people of the Philippine Islands. 1

The next day he appeared before the Senate Committee on Territories and Insular Possessions where his testimony largely duplicated that before the House Committee. He spoke of the great improvement in the Philippines under American sovereignty.

I wish no one to understand me to claim that these splendid achievements could have been made without intelligence, courage, and industry on the part of the Filipinos themselves. However, the achievement was brought about under American leadership and guidance which have been intelligently exercised and without which, in my opinion, this progress would not have been made.

Essential to these achievements also was the free market with the United States.

The sudden withdrawal of these two agencies would, in my opinion, destroy in a very short period of time that which has been built up during the American occupation 2

Secretary Hurley again emphasized his views on the economic catastrophe likely to result from independence under the conditions prescribed by these bills.³ Congress was not interested in the probability of ruin for the chief export industry of the Philippines. In concluding his statement, Hurley said,

We have made two promises to the Philippine people. One to give them their independence when they may be prepared to sustain a government. If the second of those obligations has already been fulfilled, do not pass an act here dragging out our sovereignty, limiting our jurisdiction, weakening our position, and still retaining responsibility without adequate authority. If we have reached a point where the Filipinos are able to sustain their

1. Ibid., p. 408-410.

2. U. S. Congress-Senate Com. on Terr. and Ins. Poss., 72 Cong., 1 sess., Hearing on S. 3377, (Washington: Government Printing office, 1932), p. 28-29.

3. Ibid., p. 30-31.

independence, then give them independence tomorrow. Do not drag something out here that is going to destroy the reputation of the United States and prevent the Philippine Islands from ever taking its place as a nation among the family of nations. 1

This concluded the hearings. The Philippine mission had at the beginning of these hearings presented its statement as to why it thought the Philippines were ready for independent existence. Secretary Hurley at the end of the hearings had made his statement indicating his belief in a "not yet" policy. In between we have a succession of statements by labor, sugar, dairy, and cottonseed oil interests that they wanted the Philippines freed, not because they were ready for independence but because of supposed competition by Philippine products.

While these hearings were progressing, Senator Bingham, Chairman of the Committee on Territories and Insular Possessions, said, January 30, that he thought the situation in the Far East would have a profound influence on legislation affecting Philippine independence. He continues,

To give up the Philippines, particularly at this time, would be sheer folly.

The question is whether or not we shall give up our right to share freely in the commerce with hundreds of millions of people in the Orient.

Heretofore we have stood for the policy of the open door in China. If we are to adhere to that policy, then we ought to keep control of the Philippines and of our base there.

The present crisis, in which American warships were able to reach the scene of trouble within a short time, furnished proof of the value of the Philippines in defending our nationals and their property.

1. Ibid., p. 120.

The value of our naval base in the islands will be still further enhanced if some other power is to seize control of Chinese ports or if China insists in doing away with extra-territorial rights. Either event will close the harbors and rivers of China as naval stations for our warships.

To give up the Philippines would mean a step backward - a step in which we acknowledged, and the world would consider we acknowledged, that we no longer cared about our prestige and our rights in the Far East.

To give up the Philippines would mean, of course, to give up Guam. And since Guam is surrounded by Japanese islands and since its people could not maintain their own sovereignty, it would mean ceding Guam to Japan. That would leave us with Pearl Harbor our naval base nearest the Orient. 1

On March 15, 1932, Representative Hare reported H. R. 7233 with amendments and a report and it was referred to the Committee of the

2
Whole House. The report stated:

A careful analysis of the Philippine question and of all the evidence submitted at the hearings held before the committee disclosed the following facts:

1. When the United States . . . assumed sovereignty over the Philippine Islands, it disclaimed any intention to colonize or exploit them.

2. In pursuance of such lofty purpose the United States . . . pledged itself to grant independence to the Philippines. The only condition precedent imposed by the Congress was the establishment of a stable government.

3. It is believed that a stable government now exists in the Philippines; that is, a government capable of maintaining order, administering justice, performing international obligations and supported by the suffrages of the people.

4. Every step taken by the United States since the inception of American sovereignty over the Philippines has been to prepare the Filipino people for independence. As a result, they are now ready for independence politically, socially, and economically.

1. News item in New York Times, January 31, 1932, p. 25.

2. Congressional record, 72 Cong., 1 sess., op. cit., p. 6184.

5. The American farmer is urging protection from the unrestricted free entry of competitive Philippine products.

6. American labor is seeking protection from unrestricted immigration of Filipino laborers, especially at this time of widespread unemployment.

7. The solution of the Philippine problem can no longer be postponed, without injustice to the Filipino people and serious injury to our own interests.

8. Any plan for Philippine independence must provide for a satisfactory adjustment of economic conditions and relationships. The present free-trade reciprocity between the United States and the Philippines was established by the American Congress against the opposition of the Filipino people. The major industries of the islands have been built on the basis of that arrangement. This trade arrangement can not be terminated abruptly without injuring both American and Philippine economic interests. 1

On April 4, 1932, Hare asked unanimous consent for consideration of H. R. 7233 with one hour of debate on each side. Bacon objected.² Hare then asked unanimous consent that the bill be given a privileged status to be considered under the rules of the House. The speaker said he suggested the procedure just followed and if objection was made that Hare, not later than 2:30 or 3 o'clock would move to suspend the rules and pass the bill. Bacon and Chipperfield objected to the privileged status for the bill.³ Later in the day Hare moved to suspend the rules and pass the bill as amended by the Committee. Forty minutes were given to the discussion of the bill, twenty minutes to be controlled by Representative Hare and twenty minutes

-
1. House report 806, 72 Cong., 1 sess., (Washington: Government Printing office, 1932), p.
 2. Congressional Record, 72 Cong., 1 sess., op. cit., p. 7393.
 3. Loc. cit.

by Representative Knutson.¹ Hare opened the discussion by saying that there was a definite promise at the time the Philippines were acquired to grant them independence when they were capable of establishing a stable government. He said that from the evidence

submitted, they were ready now.² Cross of Texas said the Philippines were an economic liability and especially an agricultural menace. Their retention would mean a destructive humiliating war.³ Underhill of Massachusetts said that if the bill were passed he would say "that patriotism is dead, that honor lies bleeding, and that self-interest and politics are paramount to the welfare of the world."⁴ Thurston of Iowa said the farm organizations were opposed to this method of passing the bill. They wanted the House to have an opportunity to amend the bill. Thurston admitted that if the bill were open to amendment, it would be amended in the interest of the American farmer.⁵

Brumm of Pa. concluded his remarks with the following statement:

But I want to say here and now that from what I know of the situation, to cast these people adrift, under circumstances like those that exist at present in the East, when foreign war is threatening the world, when the people of the Philippine Islands are changing their minds, when there is absolute uncertainty as to what is to happen in the Far East, for Members of Congress to tell me that the way to save America is to pick up and go is contemptible. There are those who are today crying for independence and pretending to be thinking only of the yearning

-
1. Ibid., p. 7401.
 2. Ibid., p. 7404, 05.
 3. Ibid., p. 7405-08.
 4. Ibid., p. 7408.

of this people for freedom, and posing as friends of the Filipinos. But I say to you that ere many years have passed over our heads it will be I and those who think like me, and not you, my friends, who, among the true friends of this people, will lead all the rest. ¹

Welsh of California pleaded for the redemption of the promise of independence. "During the last three depression years, 25,000 Filipino laborers have come into this country unrestricted. This bill, if passed, will stop this flow 60 days after the President of the United States signs the bill." ² Stafford of Wisconsin said the motive for the passage of the bill was to exclude Filipino immigrants and competition for beet sugar interests and interests with which coconut oil competed. "I will vote against this bill because I believe they are the wards of the United States, entitled to the same economic advantages as the people of Cuba." ³ Dyer of Missouri said,

I am not for this legislation on account of the tariff or the immigration or any other question other than that it is just, right, and fair to the Filipinos, to whom we have promised independence for so many years. ⁴

LaGuardia of New York then said,

This is not a question of the tariff or of oil or of sugar or of immigration. This is a question of fundamental human liberty, within the meaning of the best American traditions. Nothing can enter between our vote and the real issue. The Filipinos are not our "wards" as has been suggested. They are our brothers, now grown to full majority and entitled to the freedom pledged to them on the honor of the American nation. ⁵

-
1. Ibid., p. 7409.
 2. Loc. cit.
 3. Loc. cit.
 4. Loc. cit.
 5. Ibid., p. 7410-11.

These speeches sum up rather accurately the motives for the grant of independence. Many of them were not entirely frank but often the actual motives creep in inadvertently.

The vote on the motion to suspend the rules and pass the bill carried 306 to 47.¹ Voting for the bill were 117 Republicans, 188 Democrats, and 1 Farmer-Laborite. All those voting against the bill were Republicans. Paired for the bill were 12 Democrats and 8 Republicans. Paired against the bill were 8 Republicans and 2 Democrats. The geographic distribution of votes and pairs is shown on map no. 27.


Meanwhile the Senate had been considering its own independence bill. February 15, Secretary Stimson had written a letter to Senator Bingham in which he opposed independence because of the influence it would have on our foreign relations. He said it would disturb the balance of power in the Pacific and eliminate our political, economic, and social influence in the Far East. Stimson thought some arrangement could be effected with the Filipinos giving them less than independence and allowing the United States to safeguard her interests in that region.²

The Hawes-Cutting bill (S. 3377) was reported back favorably March 1.³ The report, dated February 24, said:

Virtually every witness who testified at the extended hearings . . . has expressed the view that the present uncertainty

-
1. Ibid., p. 7411-12.
 2. Ibid., p. 7715-16.
 3. Ibid., p. 5020.

Map No. 27. House vote and pairs, on motion to suspend rules and pass H. R. 7233, April 4, 1932.



characterizing our relations with the Philippine Islands should be removed. Further delay threatens to be prejudicial to the best interests of both the United States and the Philippine Islands.

The present situation in the Orient should not prevent Congress from taking definite action at this time. Unsettled conditions in the Far East may continue indefinitely; they may be settled at any time. But the varying fortunes of conflicting forces on the other side of the Pacific can not justly be set up by us as an excuse for delaying the solution of our own problems.

The fulfillment of our duty toward the Philippines must be determined upon the basis of the welfare of the people of the United States and the 13,000,000 people in the Philippine Islands. To change at this time a long established national policy because of conditions for which we are not responsible and over which we have no immediate control will be interpreted as timidity or weakness. 1

The report said the bill harmonized the previous divergent views of different groups likely to be affected by Philippine independence: American farmers, dairymen and workingmen and the Filipinos themselves.

He, too, is under the American flag, and that not by his own choice but by our own will and purpose. While he remains under our sovereignty he should not be discriminated against. It would be politically immoral to retain indefinitely the Filipino people in their present status as wards and at the same time impose upon them discriminating and unfair restrictions and inhibitions. 2

The provisions of the bill are discussed and then the report concludes with the following statement:

Every condition precedent that we have imposed upon them has been fulfilled. They now have a stable government. We can no longer postpone a definite solution of the question of independence without serious injustice. The Filipino people unitedly are respectfully, but with insistence, urging their independence.

-
1. Senate report 354, 72 Cong., 1 sess., (Washington: Government Printing office, 1932), p. 1-2.
 2. Ibid., p. 2.

Further delay will not be understood by them and can not be justified by us. 1

The Senate began consideration of the Philippine bill in April. Senator Bingham reported H. R. 7233 with the Hawes-Cutting bill as an amendment in the nature of a substitute.² The same day, April 29, Bingham moved to proceed to consideration of S. 3377. The motion carried by a vote of 39 to 29,³ with 26 Democrats and 13 Republicans voting for the motion and 23 Republicans, 5 Democrats, and 1 Farmer-Laborite voting against the motion.

W. Cameron Forbes wrote a letter to Senator Walcott of Conn., dated May 7, in which he stated that while he still believed the interest of the Philippines would be best served by a continuation of American sovereignty, he thought that with a few changes in the Hawes-Cutting bill "that a workable solution of the Philippine problem would ensue."⁴

During consideration of a revenue bill (H. R. 10236), Shipstead of Minnesota proposed a tax on imported edible oils. Hawes then moved to amend the proposal by removing from the proposed duties the copra and coconut oil from the Philippines.⁵ The Hawes motion was approved by a vote of 56 to 23,⁶ with 23 Republicans (Bingham and

1. Ibid., p. 6.

2. Congressional Record, 72 Cong., 1 sess., op. cit., p. 8948.

3. Ibid., p. 9204.

4. Ibid., p. 10880.


5. Ibid., p. 11113.

6. Ibid., p. 11115.

Walcott of Conn., Hale and White of Me., Keyes and Moses of N. H., Dale of Vt., Blaine and LaFollette of Wis., Carey of Wyo., Cousens and Vandenberg of Mich., Cutting of N. Mex., Jones of Wash., McNary and Steiwer of Ore., Metcalf of R. I., Norris of Neb., Nye of N. Dak., Oddie of Nev., Patterson of Mo., Reed of Pa., and Smoot of Utah) joining 33 Democrats (Ashurst and Hayden of Ariz., Bailey of N. C., Barkely of Ky., Bratton of N. Mex., Bulkeley of Ohio, Caraway and Robinson of Ark., Cohen and George of Ga., Connally of Tex., Coolidge and Walsh of Mass., Copeland and Wagner of N. Y., Gostigan of Col., Dill of Wash., Fletcher of Fla., Glass of Va., Gore of Okla., Harrison and Stephens of Miss., Hawes of Mo., Hull of Tenn., Kendrick of Wyo., King of Utah, McGill of Kan., Neely of W. Va., Pittman of Nev., Smith of S. C., Wheeler and Walsh of Mont., and Tydings of Md.) in voting for the Hawes motion (against a tax on Philippine coconut oil.) Voting against the motion of Hawes were 18 Republicans (Borah and Thomas of Idaho, Brookhart and Dickinson of Iowa, Capper of Kan., Fess of Ohio, Frazier of N. Dak., Hastings of Del., Hatfield of W. Va., Hebert of R. I., Howell of Neb., Johnson and Shortridge of Cal., Kean of N. J., Norbeck of S. Dak., Robinson and Watson of Ind., and Schall of Minn.) 4 Democrats (Sheppard of Tex., Bulow of S. Dak., Broussard of La., and Bankhead of Ala.) and 1 Farmer-Laborite (Shipstead of Minn.) The geographic distribution of this vote is shown on map no. 28.

On June 13, Vandenberg of Michigan said that the aim in some quarters in the United States was not to free the Philippines from the United

Map No. 28. Senate vote on Hawes motion to exempt Philippine coconut oil from tax proposed by Shipstead to H. R. 10236, May 25, 1932.



but to free the United States from the Philippines. He opposes this idea very strenuously. Nine attitudes toward the Philippine question are found in the United States, he says. They are:

(1) A belief in immediate, absolute, and complete independence. This has ceased to exist as a practical possibility. (2) The suggestions offered by King of Utah for separation after four years. (3) The Hare bill (H. R. 7233). (4) The Hawes-Cutting bill which contemplated independence in from seventeen to nineteen years. (5) A conference compromise of about ten years. (6) His own substitute requiring twenty to twenty-one years for completion. (7) The War Department plan to define ultimate attainment of Philippine independence in terms of certain objectives rather than by a fixed term of years. (8) Copeland of New York demanded a constitutional amendment. (9) Independence question is closed and must not be reopened.¹

Hawes then showed the extreme weakness of the Philippines from the standpoint of defense and the impracticability if not impossibility of defending them.²

1. Ibid., p. 12827-39.

2. Ibid., p. 12840.

One week later Hawes broadly listed the groups favoring the independence of the islands. He stated that there was little purely benevolent feeling in our relations with the Philippines. The groups favoring independence were: 1) Three nationally organized farm organizations, 2) The Co-operative Milk producers' Association and the National Dairy Union, 3) the American Federation of Labor, 4) certain fairly well organized interests in nineteen beet sugar growing States and eight cane sugar growing states, 5) an element, independent of the labor organization, favoring the exclusion of Filipinos from the United States for the same reasons that Japanese and Chinese have been excluded, 6) American investors in Cuban sugar, 7) a disorganized but somewhat assertive element in the population whose concern is that the continued free entry of Filipinos into this country may permit them to compete with our negroes in certain labor to which during many years the latter have been deemed specially adapted. The groups opposing independence were: 1) the "Manila American" 2) bureaucrats who fear the loss of their positions of the curtailment of our governmental activities in the islands, 3) some American manufacturers who have found in the islands a free market for their products which are not taxed under tariff laws as similar products from other countries are, and 5) Americans who have investments in the islands.¹

1. Ibid., p. 13432-6.

Action on the bill during this session of Congress was stopped when the motion of Robinson of Ark. to postpone consideration of H. R. 7233 until December 8, 1932 was agreed to on July 1, 1932.¹

Our quadrennial election campaign for the Presidency occurred at this time. Philippine-American relations were more of an issue than at any time since 1900.

The Republicans made no platform pronouncements as to the Philippines and renominated Herbert Hoover of California for President and Charles Curtis of Kansas for Vice-President.

The Democrats in their platform said;

"We advocate;

14. Independence for the Philippines."²

They then nominated Franklin D. Roosevelt of New York for President and John N. Garner of Texas for Vice-President.

Both presidential nominees made statements regarding the Philippines in the course of their campaigns. For evident reasons, both statements were made in the beet sugar belt of the United States.

Roosevelt in a speech at Salt Lake City, Utah, September 17, 1932, and said that "the American people are interested in Philippine independence, which the Democratic platform favorably endorses."³

1. Ibid., p. 14441-42.

2. News item in New York Times, June 30, 1932, p. 15.

3. Congressional Record, 73 Cong., 2 sess., (Washington: Government Printing office, 1934), p. 5131.

Hoover, during his transcontinental trip to California to vote, stopped at Denver, Colorado. He issued a statement there, November 4, 1932 which reads,

My attention has been called to the misrepresentation by Democratic agencies upon the question of the restriction of Philippine sugar. The Democratic Hawes-Hare bill provides for a probation for Philippine independence varying from nine to seventeen years, during which the quota of sugar which can be imported is to be increased from the present average of about 600,000 tons to 850,000 tons. At the end of that period a catastrophe will come to the Philippine people through the total break of their duty-free trade relations with us.

The Republican proposal is for a gradually modified relationship with the Philippines. We say they cannot in their own interest attain political independence until they have secured economic independence. That is in the interest of both the Philippines and the American farmer.

The Democratic proposal continues and makes worse the situation of the American farmer for nine to seventeen years and in the end plunges the Philippines into ruin as the price of their liberty. The Republican proposal gives immediate relief to the beet-sugar grower and brings about a safe basis of Philippine independence.¹

This statement was merely a clarification of the earlier Hurley statement. Hoover means that we are going to cut off the importation of Philippine products into the United States either by tariff or by quotas while forcing them through tariff legislation to continue buying American products at the American price. Hoover's figures on the importation of Philippine sugar were erroneous, being the figures for 1928 which were about 250,000 to 300,000 tons less than those of 1932. In the face of a false base on imported sugar, the Republicans

1. Loc. cit.

were going to impose non-reciprocal tariffs and then going to remain in the islands to insure political stability under those conditions.

The Democrats, supported by the opponents of colonial exploitation, said that they favored gradual increases in the tariff with equally fair treatment in the Philippines for American products. Both sides were in favor of restrictions on importation of Philippine products. The Republicans said restrictions without independence, the Democrats said restrictions with independence.

Hoover's speech at Denver was a definite bid for support in the beet sugar states. It failed as his whole program for reelection failed. The Democratic party won a landslide victory, Roosevelt and Garner receiving 472 electoral votes and Hoover and Curtis receiving 50.

The Senate resumed consideration of the Philippine independence bill on December 8, 1932 in accordance with the motion of Robinson of Arkansas which had been agreed to July 1.

Hawes included in the Congressional Record a letter from Representative Hare who had been in the islands in September. Hare suggested that the limitation on the sugar imported duty free should be at least 1,050,000 long tons raw and 50,000 long tons refined instead of the limitations in the bill of 800,000 and 50,000 long tons. The latter figures were those of 1931 and production had increased in the meantime. Hare then said that

1. Loc. cit.

the solution of the problem in the islands "can no longer be delayed without injury to the United States and the Philippines."

The Philippine people earnestly desire their independence and should have it as soon as possible, and that legislation along the lines of the bill now pending is the only statesmanlike and feasible method of dealing with the problem, and should be enacted in the present session of Congress.¹


The next day an amendment proposed by Long of La. restricting the duty free importation of refined sugar to 30,000 long tons and of unrefined sugar to 585,000 long tons² was agreed to without a record vote.³ Considerable objection to the time feature of the Hawes-Cutting bill developed. The bill provided for a ten year period of the Commonwealth with existing exports being allowed, followed by a five year period of gradually increasing tariff duties. Broussard moved to change this period to eight years.⁴ Dickinson of Iowa then moved an amendment to Broussard's amendment to reduce the time to five years.⁵ To compromise the issue, Hawes then brought in a proposal for a seven year free trade period, instead of ten years, with the same five year period of increasing duties.⁶ The amendment of Dickinson was rejected December 14 by a vote of 37 to 38,⁷ 13 Democrats (Black and Bankhead of Ala., Thomas of Okla., Bulow of S. Dak., Trammell of Fla., Byrnes of S. C., Cohen and

-
1. Congressional Record, 72 Cong., 2 sess., (Washington: Government Printing office, 1933), p. 180-181.
 2. Ibid., p. 266.
 3. Ibid., p. 270.
 4. Ibid., p. 326.
 5. Ibid., p. 393.
 6. Ibid., p. 425.
 7. Ibid., p. 436-37.

George of Ga., Connally and Sheppard of Texas, Costigan of ^{Cal.} Col., Dill of Wash., Long and Broussard of La., McGill of Kan., and Reynolds of N. C.), 20 Republicans (Shortridge of Cal., Borah of Idaho, Smoot of Utah, Capper of Kan., Carey of Wyo., Couzens of Mich., Schuyler of Col., Davis of Pa., Dickinson of Iowa, Fess of Ohio., Nye and Frazier of N. Dak., Hatfield of W. Va., Howell of Neb., Moses of N. H., White of Me., Norbeck of S. Dak., ~~Townsend~~ of Del., Robinson of Ind., and Schall of Minn.), and 1 Farmer-Laborite (Shipstead of Minn.) voting for the amendment were 21 Democrats (Ashurst and Hayden of Ariz., Bailey of N. C., Barkley and Logan of Ky., Bulkley of Ohio, Coolidge and Walsh of Mass., Glass of Va., Gore of Okla., Harrison of Miss., Hawes of Mo., Hull and McKellar of Tenn., Kendrick of Wyo., Neely of W. Va., Pittman of Nev., Robinson of Ark., Tydings of Md., Wagner of N. Y., and Walsh of Mont.) and 17 Republicans (Austin and Dale of Vt., Bingham of Conn., Keyes of N. H., Metcalf of R. I., Hale of Vt., Blaine and LaFollete of Wis., Cutting of N. Mex., Goldsborough of Md., Grammar of Wash., Hastings of Del., Johnson of Cal., Oddie of Nev., Patterson of Mo., Reed of Pa., and Vandenberg of Mich.) voted against the amendment. The geographic division of the vote is shown on map no. 29.

The amendment of Broussard which provided for independence for the Philippines eight years after the date of the inauguration of the Commonwealth government and ~~eliminated~~ the provision for the plebiscite, was accepted by a vote of 40 to 38,¹ 19 Democrats (the 16 who voted for

1. Ibid., p. 437.




Yeas 37 (16 D, 20 R, 1 F L)
Nays 38 (21 D, 17 R)
Not voting.

the Dickinson amendment and Kendrick of Wyo., King of Utah, and Neely of W. Va.), 20 Republicans (Capper of Kan., Smoot of Utah, Oddie of Nev., Moses and Keyes of N. H., Cousens of Mich., Carey of Wyo., Davis of Pa., Schuyler of Col., Dickinson of Iowa, Nye and Frazier of N. Dak., Hatfield of W. Va., Howell of Neb., White of Me., Norbeck of S. Dak., Townsend of Del., Robinson of Ind., Schall of Minn., and Shortridge of Cal.), and 1 Farmer-Laborite (Shipstead of Minn.) voted for the amendment while 20 Democrats (Ashurst and Hayden of Ariz., Bailey of N. C., Barkley and Logan of Ky., Bratton of N. Mex., Bulkley of Ohio, Coolidge and Walsh of Mass., Glass of Va., Gore of Okla., Harrison of Miss., Hawes of Mo., Hull and McKellar of Tenn., Pittman of Nev., Robinson of Ark., Tydings of Md., Wagner of N. Y., and Walsh of Mont.) and 18 Republicans (Dale and Austin of Vt., Bingham of Conn., Blaine and LaFollette of Wis., Borah of Idaho, Cutting of N. Mex., Goldsborough of Md., Grammar of Wash., Hale of Me., Hastings of Del., Fess of Ohio., Johnson of Cal., Metcalf of R. I., Patterson of Mo., Reed of Pa., Steiwer of Ore., and Vandenberg of Mich.) voted against the amendment. Thus the amendment was agreed to. The geographic division of this vote is shown on map no. 30.

This action was looked upon with grave disapproval by the managers of the bill and Bulow of South Dakota was persuaded to move for reconsideration of Broussard's amendment. (Only a senator who voted with the majority could move to reconsider the vote.) Bulow's motion was approved

Map No. 30. Senate vote on Broussard amendment for independence in eight years (First vote), December 14, 1932.



December 16 by a vote 42 to 34¹ with 21 Republicans and 21 Democrats voting for the motion and 18 Republicans, 15 Democrats, and 1 Farmer Laborite voting nay.

The vote then recurred to the original Broussard amendment. This time it was defeated 31 to 45.² This change in vote from the previous vote on the same bill was due to a different group of senators voting on the bill, although Bulow of S. Dak. and Kendrick of Wyo. did change their votes to the opposition. On this vote 14 Democrats (Bankhead and Black of Ala., Broussard and Long of La., Byrnes of S. C., Cohen and George of Ga., Costigan of Col., Dill of Wash., King of Utah., McGill of Kan., Neely of W. Va., Reynolds of N. C., and Trammell of Fla.), 13 Republicans (Capper of Kan., Carey of Wyo., Couzens of Mich., Dickinson of Iowa, Frazier and Nye of N. Dak., Hatfield of W. Va., Howell of Neb., Moses of N. H., Norbeck of S. Dak., Robinson of Ark., Schall of Minn., Schuller of Col., Oddie of Nev., Smoot of Utah, and White of Me.), and 1 Farmer-Laborite (Shipstead of Minn) voted for the amendment while 21 Democrats (Ashurst and Hayden of Ariz., Bailey of N. C., Barkley and Logan of Ky., Bulkley of Ohio, Bulow of S. Dak., Coolidge and Walsh of Mass., Glass of Va., Gore of Okla., Harrison of Miss., Hawes of Mo., Hull and McKellar of Tenn., Kendrick of Wyo., Robinson of Ark., Smith of S. C., Tydings of Md., Wagner of N. Y., and Walsh of Mont.) and 24 Republicans (Austin and Dale of Vt., Barbour and Kean of N. J., Bingham and Walcott of Conn., Blaine and LaFollette of Wis., Borah of

1. Ibid., p. 5391


2. Ibid., p. 539-40.

Idaho, Cutting of N. Mex., Fess of Ohio, Gollsbrough of Md., Grammar of Wash., Hale of Me., Hastings of Del., Hebert and Metcalf of R. I., Johnson of Cal., McNary and Steiwer of Ore., Patterson of Mo., Reed of Pa., Vandenberg of Mich., and Watson of Ind.) voted against the amendment. The geographic distribution of this vote is shown on map. no. 31.

Byrnes of S. C. then proposed an amendment which would strike out the provision for the plebiscite at the end of the Commonwealth period. It was rejected 33 to 35¹ with 19 Democrats (Ashurst of Ariz., Bankhead and Black of Ala., Barkley and Logan of Ky., Broussard of La., Smith and Byrnes of S. C., Cohen and George of Ga., Costigan of Col., Dill of Wash., Glass of Va., Kendrick of Wyo., King of Utah, McGill of Kan., Neely of W. Va., Reynolds of N. C., and Walsh of Mont.), 13 Republicans (Blaine of Wis., Borah of Idaho, Capper of Kan., Carey of Wyo., Dickinson of Iowa, Fess of Ohio, Hatfield of W. Va., Howell of Neb., Norbeck of S. Dak., Oddie of Nev., Schall of Minn., Schuyler of Col. and Smoot of Utah), and 1 Farmer-Laborite (Shipstead of Minn.) voting for the amendment and 22 Republicans (Austin and Dale of Vt., Barbour and Kean of N. J., Birmingham and Walcott of Conn., Couzens and Vandenberg of Mich., Cutting of N. Mex., Frazier and Nye of N. Dak., Hebert and Metcalf of R. I., Grammar of Wash., Hastings of Del., Johnson of Cal., LaFollette of Wis., McNary of Ore., Moses of N. H., Patterson of Mo., Reed of Pa., and Watson of Ind.) and 13 Democrats (Bailey of N. C., Bulkeley of Ohio, Coolidge and

1. Ibid., p. 554-5.

Map No. 31. Senate vote on Droussard amendment (Second vote), December 16, 1932.



Walsh of Mass., Gore of Okla., Harrison of Miss., Hawes of Mo., Hayden of Ariz., Long of La., Pittman of Nev., Robinson of Ark., Tydings of Md., and Wagner of N. Y.,) Voting against the amendment. Long of La. originally voted yea, which would have made a tie vote with vice-president Curtis then deciding, but changed it to nay and moved to reconsider the vote.¹ The geographic distribution of the vote, with Long listed as voting yea, since that was his evident sentiment, is indicated on map no. 32.


The next day Byrnes proposed another amendment which would consider the vote on the constitution, adopted before the opening of the Commonwealth period, as a plebiscite on the question of independence.² This would transfer the plebiscite from the end of the period of the Commonwealth, when they could see something of what independence would be like, to the period just before the establishment of the Commonwealth, when it might be confused with the vote on the adoption of the constitution.³ This amendment was approved 44 to 29⁴ with 16 Republicans (Austin of Vt., Borah of Idaho, Capper of Kan., Carey of Wyo., Couzens of Mich., Dickinson of Iowa, Fess of Ohio, Frazier and Nye of N. Dak., Hatfield of W. Va., Howell of Neb., McNary of Ore., Norbeck of S. Dak., Oddie of Neb., Schuyler of Col, and Smoot of Utah.) 27 Democrats (Bailey and Reynolds of N. C., Bankhead and Black

1. Loc. cit.

2. Ibid., p. 612.

3. Ibid., p. 612-16.

4. Ibid., p. 616.



of Ala., Broussard and Long of La., Bulkley of Ohio, Byrnes and Smith of S. C., Cohen and George of Ga., Coolidge of Mass., Costigan of Col., Dill of Wash., Glass of Va., Harrison of Miss., Hayden of Ariz., Kendrick of Wyo., King of Utah, McGill of Kan., McKellar of Tenn., Neely of W. Va., Robinson of Ark., Thomas of Okla., Trammell of Fla., Tydings of Md., and Walsh of Mont.), and 1 Farmer-Laborite (Shipstead of Minn.) voting for the amendment and with 21 Republicans (Barbour and Kean of N. J., Bingham of Conn., Blaine and LaFollette of Wis., Dale of Vt., Davis and Reed of Pa., Goldsborough of Md., Grammar of Wash., Hale and White of Me., Hastings of Del., Hebert and Metcalf of R. I., Johnson of Cal., Moses of N. H., Patterson of Mo., Steiwer of Ore., Vandenberg of Mich., and Watson of Ind.) and 8 Democrats (Ashurst of Ariz., Barkley and Logan of Ky., Gore of Okla., Hawes of Mo., Pittman of Nev., Wagner of N. Y., and Walsh of Mass.) voting against this amendment. The geographic distribution on this so-called compromise plebiscite proposal is shown on map no. 33.


Vandenberg then offered a motion to recommit the bill with instructions to change the bill so that the Constitution would be adopted at the end of the period rather than at the beginning.¹ This proposal was defeated 19 to 54. All the yeas votes were Republicans. Voting nay were 18 Republicans, 35 Democrats, and 1 Farmer Laborite.

A motion to place a tariff on all pearl buttons over 800,000 gross imported from the Philippines was defeated 21 to 46² with 19

1. Ibid., p. 622.

2. Ibid., p. 630.

Map No. 33. Senate vote on Byrnes "compromise" plebiscite amendment, December 17, 1932.



Republicans, 1 Democrat, and 1 Farmer Laborite voting yea and 34 Democrats and 12 Republicans voting nay.


Another motion by Dickinson which provided for annual reductions in the amount of sugar to be admitted duty free was rejected 20 to 48¹ with 19 Republicans (Barbour and Kean of N. J., Capper of Kan., Carey of Wyo., Dale of Vt., Davis of Pa., Dickinson of Iowa, Fess of Ohio, Frasier of N. Dak., Goldsborough of Md., Moses of N. H., Norbeck of S. Dak., Oddie of Nev., Patterson of Mo., Schuyler of Col., and Watson of Ind.) and 1 Farmer-Laborite (Shipstead of Minn.) voting yea and with 34 Democrats (Bailey and Reynolds of N. C., Bankhead and Black of Ala., Barkley and Logan of Ky., Broussard and Long of La., Bulkley of Ohio, Bulow of S. Dak., Byrnes and Smith of S. C., Cohen of Ga., Coolidge and Walsh of Mass., Costigan of Col., Dill of Wash., Gore and Thomas of Okla., Harrison of Miss., Hawes of Mo., Hayden of Ariz., Hull and McKellar of Tenn., Kendrick of Wyo., King of Utah, McGill of Kan., Neeley of W. Va., Pittman of Nev., Robinson of Ark., Trammell of Fla., Tydings of Md., Wagner of N. Y., and Walsh of Mont.) and 14 Republicans (Austin of Vt., Bingham of Conn., Blaine and LaFollette of Wis., Borah of Idaho, Couzens of Mich., Grammar of Wash., Hale of Me., Johnson of Cal., McNary and Steiwer of Ore., Metcalf of R. I., Nye of N. Dak., and Reed of Pa.) voting nay. The geographic division of this vote is shown on map no. 34.

The bill was then passed, December 17, 1932, without a record vote.²

1. Ibid., p. 630.

2. Ibid., p. 633.

Map No. 34. Senate vote on Dickinson amendment for annual reductions in free duty Philippine sugar,
December 17, 1932.



The House agreed to Hare's motion to disagree to the Senate amendments and to ask the Senate for a conference. Hare, Williams¹ of Texas, and Knutson were appointed as conferees.

The Senate agreed to the House request for a conference and Bingham, Johnson, Cutting, Pittman, and Hawes were appointed conferees.²

The conference committee report was a compromise. Both receded on the time period. They agreed on a ten year period with five years of free trade and five years of adjustment, on the House duty-free export figure, the House immigration quota, and the Senate provision as to the time when this quota was to take effect.³ The compromise bill was agreed to by unanimous consent in the Senate on December 22.⁴ The House agreed to it December 29 by a vote of 171 to 16.⁵

The bill was sent to President Hoover. He conferred with Secretary Stimson and then with Hurley to whom he gave the bill for study. After the conference Hurley issued a statement, January 4, 1933, in which he expressed "serious doubts as to the constitutionality of the bill." He then added,

My views on the measure are well known. I am still opposed to it. I do not want to say there are no good features in the measure. However, it is not a solution of the Philippine problem. It does not solve the inherent difficulties of the situation. It merely accentuates them.

I am opposed to the bill for the reason that it continues the responsibility of the United States in the Philippines while limiting its authority to discharge the responsibility.

-
1. Ibid., p. 714.
 2. Ibid., p. 689.
 3. Ibid., p. 880-885.
 4. Ibid., p. 885.
 5. Ibid., p. 1094.

I am opposed to the bill because it is predicated on the present social, economic, and political preparedness of the Philippine people to assume the responsibilities of independence.

The measure constitutes no solution - economic, political, or social - of the question of future Philippine-American relations. Its provisions reflect not progressive steps, each taken in the light of facts and experience developed by preceding steps, but an attempt to prescribe detailed measures to be applied over a long period and under future conditions that cannot be known in advance.

It tends to complicate any subsequent sound solution of the Philippine question, based on facts instead of forecasts, and upon the general interest of the two peoples concerned. 1

In addition to the opinion of Secretary Hurley of the Department of War, President Hoover asked for the views of Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson, the Secretary of Agriculture Arthur M. Hyde, and the Secretary of Commerce Roy D. Chapin.

Secretary Stimson opposed Philippine independence because withdrawal would seriously affect the "prestige and future interest of the United States." The presence of the United States in the islands has "contributed to the development of a new base of political equilibrium throughout the area of the Western Pacific and Eastern Asia." He adds,

Withdrawal of our sovereignty from the Philippines and the termination of our responsibility in and for the islands under the best of circumstances, would tend profoundly to disturb that equilibrium.

It would inevitably have an unsettling effect in the relations to political thought of the various races or nations in the Far East, and in the relation of these races or nations among themselves or with the rest of the world.

In summary Secretary Stimson said,

In the first place it [the bill] finally and totally abandons the opportunity for a constructive solution of the Philippine problem,

1. News item in New York Times, January 5, 1933.

which would preserve for future generations of Americans and Filipinos the benefit of this remarkable and successful experiment in co-operation between these two peoples. In the second place, it terminates our relationship to the Philippines in a way which will inevitably create economic distress and provoke resentment and unrest in the islands. Thirdly, it will thus tend to disturb the equilibrium of the Far East and also to greatly damage the prestige and material interests of the United States in that region. And, fourthly, it will cause these evils unnecessarily and without any commensurate benefit to the agricultural interests of the United States. ¹

Arthur M. Hyde, Secretary of Agriculture, in commenting on the bill mentioned the tariff provisions with respect to American agriculture. He concluded,

It seems clear to me that the American farmer is being misled as to the protection offered by this bill. It is now that he needs protection, not several years hence, when the country has generally recovered. ²

Roy D. Chapin, Secretary of Commerce, was opposed to the bill because the tariff provisions would shut off the shipment of goods from the Philippines to the United States and would thus ruin the financial condition of the Philippines and thereby ruin the market for American products in the islands. ³

Secretary Hurley largely repeated his statement given after his talk with President Hoover. He recommended that President Hoover veto the bill, House Resolution 7233. ⁴

The views of the Cabinet members are thus shown to be diverse. Senator Bronson Cutting of New Mexico pointed out the dissimilarity of the views expressed. ⁵ All four cabinet members were opposed to this

-
1. Congressional Record, 72 Congress, 2 sess., op. cit., p. 1925-6.
 2. Ibid., p. 1926.
 3. Ibid., 1926-7.
 4. Ibid., p. 1927-9.
 5. Ibid., p. 1865-7 & 1911-6.

independence bill. Secretary Hyde was opposed because the bill did not protect the farmer by an adequate tariff. Secretary Chapin was opposed because it protected the American farmer so well that it would ruin the Philippine farmer, and thus ruin the market in the Philippines for American products. They both reached the same conclusion for exactly opposite reasons. Secretary Hurley said that they were not ready for independence now and probably would not be ready for a long time. He objected to the bill without suggesting a substitute. Stimson spoke like he wanted to keep the Philippines forever. Hurley wanted to stay in the islands but criticized the authors of the bill for not getting out sooner. The cabinet members seemed to use the same facts to arrive at the conclusion that retention was necessary that many other people were using at this time to attempt to prove that we should relinquish the islands.

President Hoover returned the Philippine Independence bill, House Resolution 7233, to Congress without his approval. In the message returning the bill, delivered January 13, 1933, he said:

The Philippine people have today as great a substance of ordered liberty and human freedom as any people in the world. They lack the form of separate nationality which is indeed their rightful spiritual aspiration. They have been encouraged in this aspiration by every President of the United States during the years of our association with the Philippines and by declarations of the Congress.

But in securing this spiritual boon to the 13,000,000 people in these islands the United States has a triple responsibility. That is, responsibility to the Philippine people, responsibility to the American people, and responsibility to the world at large. Our responsibility to the Philippine people is, that in finding a method by which we consummate their aspirations we do not project them into

economic and social chaos, with the probability of breakdown in government, with its consequences in degeneration of a rising liberty which has been so carefully nurtured by the United States at the cost of thousands of American lives and hundreds of millions of money. Our responsibility to the American people is that we shall see the fact of Philippine separation accomplished without endangering ourselves in military action hereafter to maintain internal order or to protect the Philippines from encroachment by others, and above all that this shall be accomplished so as to avoid the very grave dangers of future controversies and seeds of war with other nations. We have a responsibility to the world that having undertaken to develop and perfect freedom for these people we shall not by our course project more chaos into a world already sorely beset with instability. The present bill fails to fulfill these responsibilities. It invites all these dangers. It does not fulfill the idealism with which this task in human liberation was undertaken.

President Hoover condemns the proponents of independence - those who would gain by independence and then speaks of the inadequate protection afforded by this bill to the Americans whom it is supposed to help. The bill gives us responsibility without the authority to discharge that responsibility. The only authority which we could use was the military authority of the United States government. He said the islands did not have revenue sufficient to support an independent government.

Hoover spoke of the external danger to independence due to probable "peaceful infiltration or forcible entry," without specifying more exactly what nations or peoples he had in mind. He said that the fact "that the spirit of imperialism has not departed from the earth" was against independence, without stating when the spirit of imperialism would leave this earth. Present political instability in the Orient was a reason against independence. The attempt at neutralization is the only way we have indicated of maintaining the independence of the islands

against external aggression. Hoover concludes by stating:

If the American people consider that they have discharged their responsibilities to the Philippine people, have carried out the altruistic mission which we undertook if we have no further national stake in the islands, if the Philippine people are now prepared for self-government, if they can maintain order and their institutions, if they can now defend their independence, we should say so frankly on both sides. I hold that this is not the case. Informed persons on neither side have made such declarations without many reservations. Nor can these conditions be solved by the evasion and proposals of this bill without national dishonor.

President Hoover favored further steps leading to a clear plebiscite in fifteen or twenty years and further extension of authority to the Philippine government.

Immigration should be restricted at once The United States should plainly announce prior to the time of this plebiscite whether (a) it will make absolute and complete withdrawal from all military and naval bases, and from every moral or other commitment to maintain their independence, or (b) the conditions as to authority and rights within the islands under which we will continue that protection.

These final steps can not be determined now by either the Philippine people or ourselves.

We are here dealing with one of the most precious rights of man - national independence interpreted as separate nationality. It is the national independence of 13,000,000 human beings. We have a specific duty. The ideals under which we undertook this responsibility, our own national instincts and our institutions which we have implanted on these islands, breathes with these desires. It is a goal not to be reached by yielding to selfish interests, to resentments or to abstraction, but with full recognition of our responsibilities and all their implications and all the forces which would destroy them. We seek to confer and the dangers to our own freedom from entanglements which our actions may bring. Neither our successors nor history will discharge us of responsibility for actions which diminish the liberty we seek to confer nor for dangers which we create for ourselves as a consequence of our acts. This legislation puts both our people and the Philippine people not on the road to liberty and

safety, which we desire but on the path leading to new and enlarged dangers to liberty and freedom itself. 1


This is a very contradictory message. President Hoover sums up all the arguments on all sides in opposition to independence, even two arguments which are opposed to each other. He is afraid of some other nation acquiring the Philippines, and yet demands that we should not be left in a position of responsibility without authority. He says the bill does not protect American agricultural interests sufficiently and then contends that Philippine products are not competitive. He urges restrictions on immigration to the continental United States while the Philippines remain under the American flag. He urges measures which, in their results, will reduce governmental revenues in the Philippines while contending they are not sufficient for an independent government.

The House of Representatives on January 13, 1933, passed the bill over the presidential veto by a vote of 274 to 94² with 192 Democrats, 81 Republicans, and 1 Farmer-Laborite voting yea and 93 Republicans and 1 Democrat voting nay. The geographic distribution of this vote is shown on map no. 35.

Four days later, the Senate voted 66 to 26 to override Hoover's veto of H. R. 7233³ with 45 Democrats (Ashurst and Hayden of Ariz., Bailey and Reynolds of N. C., Bankhead and Black of Ala., Barkley and Logan of Ky., Bratton of N. Mex., Broussard and Long of La.,


-
1. House Document 524, 72 Congress, 2 session (Washington: United States Government Printing office, 1933).
 2. Congressional Record, 72 Cong., 2 sess., op. cit., p. 1768-69.
 3. Ibid., p. 1924.

Map No. 35. House vote on passage of H. R. 7233 over veto of Hoover, January 13, 1933.



Bulkley of Ohio, Bulow of S. Dak., Byrnes and Smith of S. C.,
 Caraway and Robinson of Ark., Connally and Sheppard of Texas,
 Coolidge and Walsh of Mass., Costigan of Col., Dill of Wash., Fletcher
 and Trammell of Fla., George and Russell of Ga., Glass and Swanson of
 Va., Gore and Thomas of Okla., Harrison and Stephens of Miss., Hawes
 of Mo., Hull and McKellar of Tenn., Kendrick of Wyo., Lewis of Ill.,
 McGill of Kan., Neely of W. Va., Pittman of Nev., Tydings of Md., Walsh
 and Wheeler of Mont., and Wagner of N. Y.), 20 Republicans (Bingham
 of Conn., Blaine and LaFollette of Wis., Borah of Idaho, Capper of
 Kan., Couzens of Mich., Cutting of N. Mex., Frazier and Nye of N. Dak.,
 Hatfield of W. Va., Howell and Norris of Neb., Johnson and Shortridge of
 Cal., McNary and Steiwer of Ore., Metcalf of R. I., Norbeck of S. Dak.,
 Oddie of Nev., and Robinson of Ind.), and 1 Farmer Laborite (Shipstead of
 Minn.) voting yea on the motion and 25 Republicans (Austin and Dale of
 Vt., Barbour and Kean of N. J., Davis and Reed of Pa., Dickinson of
 Iowa, Fess of Ohio, Glenn of Ill., Goldsborough of Md., Grammar of Wash.,
 Hale and White of Me., Hastings and Townsend of Del, Hebert of R. I.,
 Keyes and Moses of N. H., Patterson of Mo., Schall of Minn., Schuyler
 of Col., Smoot of Utah, Vandenberg of Mich., Walcott of Conn., and
 Watson of Ind.) and 1 Democrat (Copeland of N. Y.) voted nay. Brookhart
 of Iowa and Thomas of Idaho (yea) were paired with Carey of Wyo. (nay).
 The geographical distribution of this vote, including pairs, is shown
 on map no. 36.

Map No. 36. Senate vote on passage of H. R. 7233 over veto of Hoover, January 17, 1933.



The position of Copeland of N. Y. on this bill brings back memories of the fight on the treaty of Paris, for Copeland held that the United States Congress had no power to give the Philippine Islands their independence. The proper way to free the islands, he stated, was by the enactment of a constitutional amendment. He was very desirous of arguing this question quite fully with anyone who would discuss the matter with him. His position received little support and he had little influence on the bill.

This bill was the enabling act for the establishment of an independent nation. Its provisions, as well as an analysis of the fallacious reasoning of many proponents of Philippine independence, will be discussed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER XVII

THE HAWES-CUTTING-HARE ACT; PROVISIONS AND MOTIVES

The Hawes-Cutting-Hare act stated that its provisions should "not take effect until accepted by concurrent resolution of the Philippine Legislature or by a convention" called for that purpose.¹ The Philippine legislature was authorized to provide for a constitutional convention to meet within one year after the enactment of this act and to draft a constitution subject to the requirements of the act. The constitution was to "be republican in form," "contain a bill of rights," and, either in the constitution or "in an ordinance appended thereto," contain a number of provisions designed to assure the continuation of American authority and the preservation of certain American principles of government and of individual rights. The Constitution thus drafted was to be submitted to the President of the United States within two years after the enactment of the act and he "shall determine whether or not it conforms with the provisions of this act." If the Constitution does not conform, the President shall "submit provisions which will in his judgment make the Constitution so conform." The people of the Philippines were to vote on the constitution. "If a majority of the votes cast shall be for the constitution, such vote shall be deemed an expression of the will of the people of the

1. U. S. Statutes at Large, 72nd Congress, (Washington: Government Printing office, 1933), p. 770.

Philippine Islands in favor of Philippine independence" The existing status was to continue if the majority voted against the constitution.¹

All property and rights acquired in the Philippine Islands by the United States under the treaties with Spain of 1899 and 1900 are granted to the government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines when it is constituted "except such land or other property as had heretofore been designated by the President for military and other reservations of the Government of the United States."²

Trade relations between the United States and the Philippine Islands were to continue on the existing basis subject to the following exceptions: Full tariff duties were to be collected on refined sugar in excess of fifty thousand long tons, of unrefined sugar in excess of eight hundred thousand long tons, of coconut oil in excess of two hundred thousand long tons, and of "yarn, twine, cord, cordage . . . of manila (abaca) or other hard fibre" in excess of three million pounds imported from the Philippine Islands in any one calendar year. Provision for allocation of exportable goods among the producers or manufacturers when a quantity in excess of the quota was available for export were provided. The other important exception to the free trade status was the proviso that, beginning with the sixth year of the Commonwealth period, the government of the Philippines "shall impose and collect an export tax on all articles that may be exported to the United States from the

1. Ibid., p. 761-763.

2. Ibid., p. 764.

Philippine Islands." During the sixth year "the export tax shall be five per centum of the rates of duty which are required by laws of the United States to be levied, collected, and paid on like articles imported from foreign countries." These rates were to increase five per centum each year until the figure of twenty-five per centum of the United States is reached the tenth year of the period. The funds obtained from this export tax were to be placed in a sinking fund and used solely to pay the principal and interest on bonded indebtedness of the Philippine Islands and its instrumentalities.¹

Pending the final withdrawal of American sovereignty, all amendments to the Constitution of the Commonwealth "shall be submitted to the President of the United States for approval."

The President of the United States shall have authority to suspend the taking effect of or the operation of any law, contract, or executive order of the government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, which in his judgment will result in a failure of the government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines to fulfill its contracts or to meet its bonded indebtedness and interest thereon or to provide for its sinking funds, or which seems likely to impair the reserves for the protection of the currency of the Philippine Islands, or which in his judgment will violate international obligations of the United States.

The Chief Executive of the Philippine Commonwealth "shall make an annual report . . . and such other reports as the President and Congress may request."

The President was to appoint a High Commissioner who would be the official representative of the United States in the islands and would look after the interests of the United States there. His salary would

1. Ibid., p. 764-765.

be paid by the United States. The Philippine Commonwealth was to select and pay the salary of a Resident Commissioner to the United States who would be the official Philippine representative to this government. The power of the United States Supreme Court to review cases arising in the Philippines was continued according to existing law.¹

The provisions of the United States immigration laws were applied to the Philippines and a quota of fifty was assigned to the islands. Hawaii was exempted from the provisions of this law where "such immigration shall be determined by the Department of the Interior on the basis of the needs of industries in Territory of Hawaii."²

Sec. 9. There shall be no obligation on the part of the United States to meet the interest or principal of bonds and other obligations of the government of the Philippine Islands or of the Provincial and municipal governments thereof, hereafter issued during the continuance of United States sovereignty in the Philippine Islands; Provided, That such bonds and obligations hereafter issued shall not be exempt from taxation in the United States or by authority of the United States. ³

The President was to withdraw all control and sovereignty over and to recognize the independence of the Philippine Islands "on the 4th day of July, immediately following the expiration of a period of ten years from the date of the inauguration of the new government except such land or property . . . as may be redesignated by the President of the United States [for military and other reservations] not later than two years after date of such proclamation."

1. Ibid., p. 765-767.

2. Ibid., p. 767.

3. Ibid., p. 768,

The Philippine government must agree to the following terms before independence was recognized:

(1) That the property rights of the United States and the Philippine Islands shall be promptly adjusted and settled, and that all existing property rights of citizens or corporations of the United States shall be acknowledged, respected, and safeguarded to the same extent as property rights of citizens of the Philippine Islands.

.....

(3) That the debts and liabilities of the Philippine Islands . . . shall be assumed by the free and independent government of the Philippine Islands; and that . . . the Philippine government will make adequate provision for the necessary funds for the payment of interest and principal, and such obligations shall be a first lien on the taxes collected in the Philippine Islands.

(4) That the government of the Philippine Islands, on becoming independent of the United States, will assume all continuing obligations assumed by the United States under the treaty of peace with Spain ceding said Philippine Islands to the United States. ¹

The President was requested, when practicable, to enter into negotiations for the neutralization of the Philippine Islands. When the independence of the Philippines was recognized, the President should notify other nations of that fact and invite them to likewise recognize their independence. ²

After the Philippines became independent, the full United States tariff rates were to apply to goods coming into the United States from there. However, a conference of representatives from the United States appointed by the President and from the Philippines appointed by their Chief Executive should meet "at least one year prior to date

1. Loc. cit.

2. Ibid., p. 769.

fixed in this act for the independence of the Philippine Islands" to formulate "recommendations as to future trade relations between the Government of the United States and the independent government of the Philippine Islands." 1

Upon withdrawal of United States sovereignty over the Philippines, the immigration laws of the United States were to apply to all persons born there "to the same extent as in the case of other foreign countries." 2

The act was, except in a few sections, the sort of proposal which one would expect to emanate from any Congress interested in establishing an independent government. The spirit and philosophy of the bill was, in general, typically American. Those parts of the bill which were, perhaps, not in accordance with this statement are the really significant parts of the bill, however. These parts were the result of pressure on Congress which resulted in this independence bill and, with it, restrictions on the importation of goods from the Philippines. Resentment toward the bill developed in the islands due to provisions affecting export quotas for products from the Philippines to the United States, the quota on Filipino emigrants to the United States, the question of United States military bases in the islands, and the position of the High Commissioner.

What justification was there for placing quotas on Philippine exports to the United States? How seriously did Philippine products compete with domestic products? If there was no economic basis for

1. Loc. cit.

2. Loc. cit.

the exclusion of goods from the Philippines, the actual reason why independence came to the Philippines will have been proved false. It has been seen that independence was given to the Philippines to obtain relief from Philippine products. The Filipinos were thus presented with the choice of independence and restricted exports to the United States or continued American sovereignty and free trade, with the United States deciding according to her supposed interests which of these two plans were to be followed. Independence for the Philippines could come only as the result of presumed economic pressure from the Philippine products.

Independence agitation came chiefly from the rural areas in the United States and comes chiefly from the dairy, sugar, and cottonseed oil producers with some support from opponents of the Filipino as a laborer. Was the position of these groups sound?

A careful examination of the situation existing in 1932 and of probable trends in the near future indicated that competition was, at that time, non-existent and was not likely to develop in the near future. One can see this by examining Philippine export products one by one.

The chief products exported by the Philippines to the United States are sugar, copra and coconut oil, abaca (Manila hemp) and cordage, and tobacco and tobacco manufactures.

The matter of tobacco competition had been well worked out between 1900 and 1933. In contrast with the situation between 1902 and

1909 when the tobacco growers and manufacturers flocked to every hearing on the Philippine tariff, not a single representative of a tobacco interest appeared between 1930 and 1932 to testify in favor of Philippine independence or the imposition of a United States tariff on products from the Philippines. The reason is not hard to find. The United States did not import tobacco or its manufacturers from the Philippines in particularly large quantities. The Filipinos developed a liking for American cigarettes. The American tobacco industry was not interested in cutting its own throat at this time.

The dairy industry had not had time to adjust its ideas on this subject. They seemingly did not realize that in getting rid of the Philippines, they lost the best foreign customer for dairy products that the United States had while no particular improvement in the position of the producer of dairy products was likely to come due to independence being given to the Philippines.

Copra is the dried meat of the coconut and has always been on the United States free list. Coconut oil is extracted from this copra leaving copra meal or cake, a commodity used in feeding livestock, especially cattle and sheep. The tariff of 1921 placed a duty of two cents a pound on coconut oil. Dessicated coconut is made from fresh coconuts which are shredded. It is an edible product used in the confectionery trade, and when sweetened, in the home. Coconuts are not produced in the United States in commercially important quantities.

Dessicated coconut in the United States comes from (1) nuts grown in the Caribbean area and manufactured chiefly in New York and (2)

imports of the prepared product from the Philippines and Ceylon. No cry for Philippine independence came from the desiccated coconut industry. The demand was rather the other way, coming from American interests with investments in the Philippines.

Copra has no use as such. It is of commercial usefulness only when the coconut oil is extracted. Coconut oil has both edible and inedible uses. It was the edible uses into which it entered that provoked the greatest support for independence. It was supposed to compete here especially with butter and cottonseed oil. The butter industry was especially vocal. Cottonseed oil interests also complained but did not indicate too clearly whether it was the edible or inedible uses of coconut oil to which they objected. Any discussion of competition between coconut oil used in margarine and butter needs to bear in mind two facts. The first of these is that "the wholesale price spread between butter and uncolored vegetable margarine averaged 17.2 cents per pound during 1935."¹ The second fact is that only 124,000,000 pounds of coconut oil were used in margarine during 1934² as compared with the consumption of 2,229,000,000 pounds of butter.³ The coconut oil used in margarine thus represents about $5\frac{1}{2}\%$ of the quantity of butter consumed in that year. The complete elimination of coconut oil from margarine or the prohibition of production of

-
1. U. S. Tariff Commission. United States-Philippine Trade. Report No. 118, second series. (Washington: Government Printing office, 1937), p. 103.
 2. Ibid., p. 101. (Table)
 3. Ibid., p. 96. (Table)

of margarine (which totaled 216,000,000 pounds in 1934)¹ would hardly have operated to raise the price of butter to any substantial extent. Prohibiting the manufacture of margarine would adversely affect the cottonseed oil industry also.

The Tariff Commission report then says,

Prior to 1934 the only major edible use for coconut oil in the United States besides margarine was in the manufacture of certain special confectioners' and bakers' supplies. For these² uses no oil of domestic origin can satisfactorily be substituted.

Due to drought in 1934, a new process by which cottonseed oil could be made usable in margarine, and excise taxes in certain states on margarines made from "foreign" oils, there was a shift of cottonseed oil into the production of margarine, with some slight increase in the use of coconut oil in vegetable shortening to take the place of the cottonseed oil which had gone into the production of margarine.

In 1934, out of the 5,984,000,000 pounds of edible oils and fats consumed in the United States, coconut oil represented 211,000,000 pounds. This is 3.5% of the edible consumption.³ Not all of this coconut oil came from the Philippines either. The fear of competition of coconut oil with butter, lard, cottonseed oil, etc. in edible products seems unreasonable. The facts were before Congress for James D. Craig had presented them to the House Committee on Insular Affairs on February 1, 1932.

1. Ibid., p. 101 (Table)
 2. Ibid., p. 103.
 3. Ibid., p. 96 (Table)

What about competition of coconut oil in inedible uses? Here also the testimony of Craig is borne out. The Tariff Commission says,

In the inedible field, coconut oil finds its chief use in the production of soap. For this purpose it has long been the most important of the vegetable oils. Prior to the World War cottonseed oil was extensively used in making soap, but more recently it has practically disappeared from this use, although cottonseed-oil foots are still used

The preference in the United States, particularly in those regions where the water is hard or semihard, is for hard white soaps which lather quickly and rinse easily, and which have good keeping qualities. The lathering properties depend chiefly on the lauric acid content of the oil ingredient. Coconut oil and palm-kernel oil are both high in lauric acid content, but soaps made of palm-kernel oil tend to be darker in color than those made of coconut oil. Soaps made chiefly of cottonseed oil, corn oil, or peanut oil not only possess poor lathering qualities, particularly in hard water, but have a tendency to become rancid. Yellow laundry soaps contain little or no coconut oil, being made chiefly of tallow, greases, fish oils, or cottonseed-oil foots, together usually with resin which gives them their characteristic odor. The demand for such soaps, however, has declined in recent years.

The practical disappearance of cottonseed oil from use in soap is not to be attributed to the increased use of coconut oil. Cottonseed oil is no longer used even in soaps in which coconut oil was never an appreciable ingredient, yellow laundry soaps for example. Cottonseed oil has disappeared from use in soap principally because the entire supply of the edible grade is now absorbed in food uses at much higher prices than it could command for use in soap.

.....

. . . During the whole of the period under review [1931-35], the proportion of coconut oil and palm-kernel oil combined, including the fatty acids derived from them, fluctuated only to a limited extent, despite considerable changes in the respective tax-paid prices of these oils compared with other soap oils. Coconut oil and palm-kernel oil . . . are the only important soap oils containing

lauric acid, a necessary constituent of free-lathering soaps.

. . . No oil or fat now produced in the United States, or likely to be produced in any appreciable quantity, contains any lauric acid whatsoever. It would appear, therefore, that for soap-making purposes, domestically produced oils and fats can replace coconut oil only to a limited extent under existing conditions of production technique and consumer demand. Coconut oil and other oils of lauric acid content may be said to be complementary to domestic soap oils and fats to a much greater degree than they are competitive with them 1

The third Philippine export which distributed a powerful industry in this country was sugar. From the time when the Philippines were acquired until the present, the fear of competition from Philippine sugar haunted the domestic producer. The industry was always opposed to free trade with the Philippines and often supported independence for them. The sugar industry in the islands was not an American creation. Sugar cane was produced in the Philippines for centuries before the United States arrived there. During the first few years of control, the sugar industry, like all other industries in the islands, was terribly depressed. It was 1922 before Philippine sugar production under American control equalled the production under Spanish control. The Tariff Commission says that while production between 1920 and 1934 was increasing over 200 per cent, the area devoted to sugar cane production had increased only 55 per cent. Increased production "was due primarily to the use of better varieties of cane, to improved methods of cultivation, and to the introduction of modern centrifugal mills." 2

1. Ibid., p. 98-100.

2. Ibid., P. 45.

How could Philippine sugar affect the price of United States domestic sugar? The price of sugar in the United States, before the Jones-Costigan act of 1935, was the world price of sugar plus the duty on Cuban sugar. (Before Cuba produced more sugar than the United States imported from her, the price in the United States was the world price plus the full United States duty.) Until such time as Philippine free duty sugar displaced Cuban partial tariff sugar, the United States price would remain at the world price plus the amount of the Cuban duty. Under these conditions, the only influence of increased Philippine sugar production would be that Cuban sugar would be forced on the world market depressing the world price, and thus depressing the domestic American price. However, United States citizens who had invested money in the Cuban sugar industry would be adversely affected by increased production in the Philippines for they would be forced to sell their sugar in a poorer market.

Competition between domestic beet and cane sugar and Philippine sugar did not exist. The threat of competition did exist as a threat for some time in the distant future. The advantage to the United States of a diversified source of supply (domestic, Porto Rico, Cuba, Hawaii, Philippines) as a means of preventing price fixing should not be entirely overlooked. No tangible benefit to the American consumer can be ascribed to the importation of Philippine sugar. The United States treasury was a definite loser, however, as it lost the amount of the Cuban duty on every ton of sugar imported from the Philippines.

Manila hemp (abaca) and cordage represent the last substantial export from the Philippines. Abaca does not compete directly with any product in the world. The Philippines have a monopoly at present on the production of abaca, a fibre for which no satisfactory substitute has ever been found in producing rope (cordage). The cordage industry of the islands competes to some extent with the United States cordage industry. In 1935, the Philippines exported 201,624 tons of abaca of which 47,666 tons went to the United States.¹ In the same year, the United States imported about 4,000 tons of cordage from the Philippines (a figure exceeded only in 1934) out of a total production² in the islands of 8800 tons. At a time when domestic production of cordage was decreasing from 192,991,638 pounds in 1927 to 87,949,699 pounds in 1935 and imports from foreign countries declined in the same period from 5,528,037 pounds to 1,307,086 pounds, the increase in imports from the Philippines from 4,891,349 pounds to 11,009,125 pounds³ represented a threat about which American interests were not likely to remain silent. Increased imports from the Philippines at a time when American production and consumption was declining worried the domestic cordage industry.

Thus we see the fallaciousness of the reasoning which led American interests, with which, these interests claimed, Philippine sugar and coconut oil competed, to demand independence for these islands. The only existing competition was with cordage which was a

1. Ibid., p. 129. (Table)

2. Ibid., p. 131.

3. Ibid., p. 134.

relatively small industry and one whose complaints would not lead to independence.

Philippine sugar, while it competed with Cuban sugar for a place in the American market, affected the price at which domestic sugar was sold in the United States only to a very slight degree if at all.

Competition between butter and coconut oil, used in margarine, is very slight. It would be very difficult to eliminate the use of coconut oil in margarine. While coconut oil and cottonseed, and certain other domestic oils now compete slightly in vegetable shortenings and margarine, there was practically no competition in 1932.

Competition between the American and Philippine tobacco industries has been settled through Philippine purchase of American cigarettes and American purchase of Philippine cigars and filler tobacco.

Throughout the period of American control of the Philippines, many Congressmen have commented critically on the unfavorable balance of trade of the United States with those islands. It was mentioned as an additional reason for severing relations. When their acquisition was being discussed, the fact that tropical countries export more than they import, leaving an unfavorable balance of trade, was mentioned as a reason for their non-acquisition. This was, and still is, true of United States trade with practically all tropical countries and could hardly be used justifiably as a reason for giving independence to the Philippines.

Filipino immigration to the United States provoked resentment, chiefly on the West Coast where most of the Filipinos located. The movement of Filipinos to this country increased rapidly between 1925 and 1932, a period of increasing unemployment in the United States, and thus measures to restrict immigration were undertaken. The defeat of the Shortridge amendment left independence as the only alternative solution.

The increasing isolationist sentiment in the United States in this period was a powerful influence for Philippine independence. It was hoped that by leaving the Philippines, the possibilities of involvement of the United States in war would be reduced, at least in that area.

The Hawes-Cutting bill had become law. A higher group of motives than those which actuated Congress in 1932 and 1933 in granting independence might have been expected in view of many phases of the relationship of the United States and the Philippine Islands. The United States was truly seeking to become independent of the Philippine Islands just as Vandenberg had stated earlier.

CHAPTER XVIII

IMPENDING INDEPENDENCE THROUGH COMMONWEALTH STATUS, 1933-41

March 4, 1933, Franklin D. Roosevelt was inaugurated President, the second Democratic President since the acquisition of the Philippine Islands.

The Democratic party was in supreme control of the National government and President Roosevelt in a position of unprecedented power and prestige. Before the fateful and tragic December 7, 1941, many students of Philippine affairs had good reason to believe that the final episode of the Islands as a part of the American political system was no further off than July 4, 1946, when, as the President has said, the United States would keep "its word and we are going to see the independence of the Philippine Islands."

Frank Murphy, former mayor of Detroit, was appointed governor general of the Philippines by Roosevelt. In his first message to the Philippine legislature delivered the middle of July, Mr. Murphy urged the Filipinos to study and decide quickly the question of their acceptance or rejection of the independence bill.¹

Meanwhile, a factional fight was occurring in the Philippines between the leaders who had been in the United States working for the independence bill (Camila Osias, Sergio Osmena, Manuel Roxas, Isadore Gabaldon, etc.) and the group who had stayed at home, headed by Manuel Quezon, the dominant political leader in the Philippines.

1. News item in New York Times, July 18, 1933, p. 6.

The men who had been in the United States favored the acceptance of the bill, Queson opposed it, saying that better terms should have been obtained. Queson seemed to forget that the United States was making the terms, or perhaps he desired delay in independence for financial or other reasons but could not say so and, like imperialists of an earlier day, used a rabble rousing argument to hide his real purpose.

The Philippine legislature, October 17, 1933, declined to accept the Hawes-Cutting-Hare bill. The reasons given were, in part,

. . . in the opinion of the legislature, among other reasons, the provisions of the law affecting relations of trade between the United States and the Philippine Islands would seriously imperil the economic, social, and political institutions of this country and might defeat its avowed purpose to secure independence to the Philippine Islands at the end of the transition period; because the immigration clause is objectionable and offensive to the Filipino people; because the powers of the high commissioner are too indefinite; and finally because of the military, naval, and other reservations provided for in the said act are inconsistent with true independence, violate national dignity, and are subject to misunderstanding.¹

Administration leaders in the United States refused to consider any alteration of the bill during 1933. They said there were more important things to consider and that the Hawes-Cutting-Hare bill was the best bill obtainable under existing circumstances.

Camilo Osias, Resident Commissioner from the Philippines, speaking January 15, 1934, said that the Queson mission to effect changes in the bill sailed from the Philippines November 4, 1933, and reached San Francisco November 27. President Roosevelt had received Queson December 24 and had "wisely asked Mr. Queson to submit a concrete proposal in writing." Osias said further, "This concrete proposal requested by President Roosevelt has not as yet been submitted." An extension of time was then asked so that the people

1. Congressional Record, 73 Cong., 2 sess., (Washington: Government Printing office, 1934), p. 130.

could express their desires through the election in June of members to the Philippine legislature. The Legislature would convene July 16, 1934, and could then act on the bill.¹

January 18, 1934, Quezon was reported to have offered a substitute plan to Roosevelt whereby independence would be obtained in two or three years with free trade for ten years after that. He proposed a limitation of 1,000,000 long tons of sugar, 2,000,000 tons of coconut oil, and 6,000,000 pounds of cordage. As an alternative, Quezon suggested the establishment of a more autonomous government for six years to be followed by independence.²

Tydings announced, January 23, 1934, that there would be "no new Philippine legislation in reference to ultimate independence at this session of Congress" but that the Senate Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs had recommended that the time within which the "Philippine legislature must move to carry out" provisions of the Hawes-Cutting act be extended to October 17, 1937.³

Over a month later, Roosevelt transmitted to Congress a message which represented a compromise agreement reached between Roosevelt and Quezon. The message stated,

Over a third of a century ago the United States as a result of a war which had its origin in the Caribbean Sea acquired sovereignty over the Philippine Islands Our Nation covets no territory; it desires to hold no people over whom it has gained sovereignty through war against their will.

In keeping with the principles of justice and in keeping with our traditions and aims, our Government for many years has been committed by law to ultimate independence for the people of the Philippine Islands whenever they should establish a suitable government capable of maintaining that independence among the nations of the world. We have believed that the time for such independence is at hand.

1. *Ibid.*, p. 639-40.
 2. News item in *New York Times*, January 18, 1934, p. 11.
 3. *Congressional Record*, 73 Cong., 2 sess., *op. cit.*, p. 1217.

A law passed . . . over a year ago was the initial step . . . That act provided that the United States would retain the option of keeping certain military and naval bases in the islands after actual independence had been acquired.

As to the naval bases, I recommend that the law be so amended as to provide for the ultimate settlement of this matter on terms satisfactory to our own Government and that of the Philippine Islands.

I do not believe that other provisions of the original law need be changed at this time. Where imperfections or inequalities exist I am confident that they can be corrected after proper hearing and in a fairness to both peoples.

Roosevelt then added that a readjustment period was needed and that it would be unfair to reduce the quotas on importation of Philippine products below the figure stated in the Hawes-Cutting act. The relationship should be continued on such a basis as would continue friendship between the United States and the Philippines.¹

The changes suggested by Roosevelt were the most insignificant possible. Undoubtedly, they were made so that anyone could accept the bill as originally written, for all practical purposes, and yet announce to the Filipinos that he had obtained a great concession. It is certainly doubtful that the United States would desire to maintain army posts in the Philippines after their independence had been recognized.

On March 10, Representative McDuffie of Alabama introduced H. R. 8573 which was referred to the Committee on Insular Affairs.² McDuffie reported the bill back three days later without any amendments.³ The bill was like the Hawes-Cutting bill except for the

1. *Ibid.*, p. 3580-81

2. *Ibid.*, p. 44 4325.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 4466

provision about army reservations and an extension of time for acting on the bill. It was considered in the House March 19. On motion to suspend the rules and pass the bill, two-thirds voted yea so the bill was passed. ¹

March 14, Senator Tydings of Maryland introduced S. 3055, which was identical with H. R. 8573, and it was referred to the Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs. ² The bill was reported back on March 19. ³ It was considered in the Senate on March 21 and 22, 1934. An amendment proposed by Dickinson of Iowa to change the ten year period of the Commonwealth government to five years was rejected 21 to 49 ⁴ with 13 Republicans (Austin of Vt., Barbour and Kean of N. J., Borah of Idaho, Carey of N.Y., Dickinson of Iowa, Frasier and Nye of N. Dak., Goldsborough of Md., McNary of Ore., Morris of Neb., Schall of Minn., and Vandenberg of Mich.), 7 Democrats (Dill of Wash., King of Utah, Long and Overton of La., Murphy of Iowa, Reynolds of N. C., and Russell of Ga.), and 1 Former Laborite (Shipstead of Minn.) voting yea and with 11 Republicans (Capper of Kan., Coudens of Mich., Davis of Pa., Gibson of Vt., Hastings of Del., Johnson of Cal., Keyes of N. H., Metcalf of R. I., Steiwer of Ore., and Walcott of Conn.) and 38 Democrats (Adams and Costigan of Col., Ashurst and Hayden of Ariz., Bachman and McKellar of Tenn., Bailey of N. C., Barkley and Logan of Ky., Brown of N. H., Bulkley of Ohio, Bulow of S. Dak., Byrd of Va., Byrnes and Smith of S. C., Caraway and Robinson of Ark., Clark of Mo., Dietrich of Ill., Duffy of Wis., Erickson of Mont., George of Ga.,


1. Ibid., p. 4831-42

2. Ibid., p. 4477

3. Ibid., p. 4758

4. Ibid., p. 5117

Map No. 37. Senate vote on Dickinson's motion to change ten years to five years in Tydings-McDuffie bill,
March 21, 1934.



■ Yeas 21 (7 D, 13 R, 1 F L)
■ Nays 49 (38 D, 11 R)
■ Not voting.

Gore and Thomas of Wla., Harrison of Miss., Hatch of N. Mex., Lauffgan of Conn., McGarran and Pittman of Nev., McGill of Kan., Neely of N. Va., O'Mahoney of Wyo., Pope of Idaho, Sheppard of Texas, Thomas of Utah, Thompson of Neb., Tydings of Md., and Walsh of Mass.) voted nay. The geographic distribution of his vote is shown on map no. 37.

Two substitute proposals for this Tydings-McDuffie bill were proposed. The first was that of Vandenberg and the second was the bill of King.

Vandenberg offered his substitute because of the lack of power the United States would have under this revised Hawes-Cutting (now called Tydings-McDuffie act).¹ He continues,

If we shall not stay in, we must get out as speedily as possible. If we shall shed the authority of guidance during the next decade, we should correspondingly shed the responsibility for what happens if and when self-guidance fails. That is an obligation which we owe to our own citizens of our own United States. . . .

Clark of Missouri asked him the difference between his bill and that of King. Vandenberg replied,

. . . The Senator from Utah proposes immediate, absolute and complete independence at the earliest moment possible under the necessities of creating the new native government, which, for the sake of the argument, would be, let us say, two or three years.

The substitute which I have presented, ~~and which is now pending~~, and which is now pending, does precisely that same thing so far as the establishment of this new government is concerned, but then creates a subsequent, post-independence economic period of readjustment, during which would lose our free markets in a constantly increasing degree, my purpose being, after having created immediate independence, precisely as would the Senator from Utah, subsequent thereto to give this new government its maximum chance to readjust itself economically in respect to the markets of the world.³

The Vandenberg bill provided for tariff rates of ten per cent of the regular United States tariff rates on Philippine products

1. Ibid., p. 4986-89

2. Ibid., p. 4989

3. Ibid., p. 4991

from 90 days after the passage of the bill to the time of independence. A rate of twenty per cent of the regular United States rate would be levied the first two years of independence, of forty percent the third and fourth years, of sixty per cent the fifth and sixth years, of eighty per cent the seventh and eighth years. The Philippines were authorized to levy the same rate of their regular tariff on United States goods. The President was authorized to negotiate a permanent twenty per cent preferential tariff rate with the Philippines during the seventh and eighth years.¹

The Vandenberg substitute was rejected 24 to 49² with 16 Republicans (Austin of Vt., Barbour and Kean of N. J., Capper of Kan., Carey of Wyo., Davis of Pa., Dickinson of Iowa, Fess of Ohio, Frazier and Nye of N. Dak., Goldsborough of Md., Norris of Neb., Schall of Minn., Steiwer of Ore., Townsend of Del., and Vandenberg of Mich.), 7 Democrats (Black of Ala., Dill of Wash., Coolidge of Mass., King of Utah, Long of La., and Reynolds of N. C.) and 1 Farmer Laborite (Shipstead of Minn.) voting yea and with 7 Republicans (Cousens of Mich., Cutting of N. Mex., Gibson of Vt., Johnson of Cal., Keyes of N. H., McNary of Ore., and Metcalf of R. I.) and 42 Democrats (Ashurst and Hayden of Ariz., Backman and McKellar of Tenn., Bailey of N. C., Bankhead of Ala., Barkley and Logan of Ky., Brown of N. H., Bulkley of Ohio, Bulow of S. Dak., Byrd of Va., Byrnes and Smith of S. C., Caraway and Robinson of Ark., Clark of Mo., Connally and Sheppard of Texas, Costigan of Col., Dietrich of Ill., Duffy of Wis., Erickson of Mont., George and Russell of Ga., Gore and Thomas of Okla., Harrison of Miss., Hatch of N. Mex., Lonergan of Conn., McGill of Kan., Murphy of Iowa, O'Mahoney of Wyo., Overton of La., Pittman of Nev., Pope of Idaho, Thomas of Utah, Thompson of Neb., Trammell of Fla., Tydings of Md., and Walsh of Mass.) voting nay. The geographic

1. Ibid., p. 499Q-91.

2. Ibid., p. 5162.

distribution of this vote is shown on map no. 38.


After the defeat of the Vandenberg substitute the King proposal was voted on. It failed 28 to 44¹ with 14 Democrats (Adams of Col., Bailey of N. C., Clark of Mo., Coolidge and Walsh of Mass., Dill of Wash., George of Ga., King of Utah, Logan of Ky., Long and Overton of La., McGilloof Kan., Murphy of Iowa, and Thompson of Neb.), 13 Republicans (Austin of Vt., Barbour and Kean of N. J., Carey of Wyo., Dickinson of Iowa, Fess of Ohio, Frazier and Nye of N. Dak., Goldborough of Md., Norris of Neb., Schall of Minn., Townsend of Del., and Vandenberg of Mich.), and 1 Farmer Laborite (Shipstead of Minn.) voting yea and with 33 Democrats (Ashurst and Hayden of Ariz., Backman and McKellar of Tenn., Barkley of Ky., Brown of N. H., Bulkley of Ohio, Bulow of S. Dak., Byrd of Va., Byrnes of S. C., Caraway and Robinson of Ark., Connally and Sheppard of Texas, Costigan of Col., Dietrich of Ill., Duffy of Wis., Erickson of Mont., Fletcher and Trammell of Fla., Gore and Thomas of Okla., Harrison of Miss., Hatch of N. Mex., Lonergan of Conn., McCarran and Pittman of Nev., Nelly of W. Va., O'Mahoney of Wyo., Pope of Idaho, Russell of Ga., Thomas of Utah, and Tydings of Md.) and 11 Republicans (Capper of Kan., Couzens of Mich., Cutting of Md., Davis of Pa., Gibson of Vt., Johnson of Cal., Keyes of N. H., McNary and Steiwer of Ore., Metcalf of R. I., and Walcott of Conn.) voting nay. The geographic division is shown on map no. 39.


The bill was then passed 68 to 8² with 51 Democrats, 16 Republicans, and 1 Farmer Laborite voting for it and 8 Republicans voting against it. It was signed by President Roosevelt on March 24, 1934.³

The Tydings-McDuffie Act as signed by the President was a word for word reproduction of the Hare-Hawes-Cutting act except that the

1. Ibid., p. 5163.
2. Ibid., p. 5164.
3. Ibid., p. 5540.

Map No. 38. Senate vote on Vandenberg substitute for Tydings-McDuffie bill, March 22, 1934.





time within which the Philippine legislature must act was extended nine months to October 17, 1934, army bases were to be given up when sovereignty was relinquished, and the President was to negotiate concerning the naval bases. The chief provisions of the act were:

(1) Provisions for the creation of the Commonwealth government were prescribed: the acceptance of the act by the legislature, the calling of a constitutional convention, the mandatory provisions in the constitution to effect the continuation of American control and of American principles of government and of individual rights, the examination of the Constitution by the President of the United States to see if it conformed with the requirements of Congress as provided in this act, the vote on the constitution indicating a desire for independence by the Filipinos, and the inauguration of the Commonwealth government.

(2) Trade between the United States and the Philippines was to be as provided by law before this act was passed except that refined sugar over 50,000 long tons, unrefined sugar over 800,000 long tons, coconut oil over 200,000 long tons, and cordage over 3,000,000 pounds exported to the United States in any one year was to pay the full United States duty and except that beginning the sixth year the Philippine government was to levy export taxes on goods going from the islands to the United States. During the sixth year, the rate was to be five per cent of the United States tariff. This rate was to increase five per cent each year until the figure of twenty-five per cent was reached the last year before independence. With independence came the full United States duty. The money collected from the export tax was to be used to pay of the bonded indebtedness of the Philippines.

(3) The President of the United States could suspend the operation of any law of the Philippine government which might result in failure to meet interest or to provide sinking funds for bonded indebtedness,

impair currency reserves, or "violate international obligations of the United States."

(4) The President appointed, with the consent of the Senate, a High Commissioner to look after the interests of the United States in the Islands,

(5) The provisions of the United States immigration laws were applied to the Philippines and a quota of fifty was assigned to the islands, Filipinos were to be excluded when independence came.

(6) The Commonwealth period was to end and the Philippines become free on the July 4 immediately following the expiration of ten years from the inauguration of the Commonwealth government.¹

This was the fundamental act which established the relationships which were to continue during the Commonwealth period. The trade provisions of this act were constantly modified during the years following its passage.

The first modification came because Congress was seeking to devise some method of aiding the domestic producer of fats and oils. Eventually Congress decided to place an excise tax on certain fats and oils used in this country but none of which were produced in the continental United States. It was actually a protective tariff under the name of an internal revenue tax. Harrison's motion to exempt Philippine coconut oil from the tax of three cents per pound was defeated 15 to 59² with 13 Democrats (Bankhead of Ala., Barkley and Logan of Ky., Coolidge and Walsh of Mass., Copeland and Wagner of N. Y., Harrison and Stephens of Miss., Hayden of Ariz., Lonergan of Conn., Robinson of Ark., and Van Nuys of Ind.) and 2 Republicans (Cousens of Mich. and Steiwer of Ore.) voting for the amendment and with 34 Democrats (Adams

1. U. S. Statutes at Large, 73 Cong., (Washington: Government Printing office, 1934), p. 466-465.

2. Congressional Record, 73 Cong., 2 sess., op. cit., p. 6392.

of Col., Ashurst of Ariz., Bailey and Reynolds of N. C., Bone and Dill of Wash., Brown of Mich., Bulkley of Ohio, Bulow of S. Dak., Byrd and Glass of Va., Byrnes and Smith of S. C., Clark of Mo., Connally and Sheppard of Texas, Erickson of Mont., Fletcher of Fla., George and Russell of Ga., Hatch of N. Mex., Lewis of Ill., Long and Overton of La., McGill of Kan., McKellar of Tenn., Murphy of Iowa, Neely of W. Va., O'Mahoney of Wyo., Pope of Idaho, Thomas of Okla., Thomas of Utah, Thompson of Neb., and Tydings of Md.), 24 Republicans (Borah of Idaho, Capper of Kan., Carey of Wyo., Davis and Reed of Pa., Dickinson of Iowa, Fess of Ohio, Frazier and Nye of N. Dak., Gibson of Vt., Goldsborough of Md., Hastings and Townsend of Del., Hatfield of W. Va., Hebert of R. I., Johnson of Cal., Keyes of N. H., LaFollette of Wis., McNary of Ore., Norris of Neb., Patterson of Mo., Robinson of Ind., Schall of Minn., and Vandenberg of Mich.), and 1 Farmer Laborite (Shipstead of Minn.) voting against the amendment. The geographic distribution of the vote is shown on map no. 40.

A proposal of Norris of Nebraska to refund to the Philippines government the money collected on Philippine coconut oil¹ was agreed to by the Senate.²

This action did not prevent President Roosevelt from sending to Congress a much needed but not very effective rebuke for passing this legislation. He had considered vetoing the whole tax bill but eventually decided against so doing. Roosevelt asked for the repeal of the tax provision for three reasons:


First. It is the withdrawal of an offer made by the Congress of the United States to the people of the Philippine Islands.




Second. Enforcement of this provision at this time will produce a serious condition among many thousands of families in the Philippine Islands.

1. Ibid., p. 6380.

2. Ibid., p. 6389.

Map No. 40. Senate vote on Harrison's motion to exempt Philippine coconut oil from excise tax.



	Yeas 15 (13 D, 2 R)
	Nays 59 (34 D, 24 R, 1 F L)
	Not voting.

Third. No effort has been made to work out some form of compromise which would be less unjust to the Philippine people and at the same time attain, even if more slowly, the object of helping the butter - and animal - fat industry in the United States.¹

Congress did nothing about this recommendation.

While the Morris amendment removed some of the inequalities of the legislation from the standpoint of the Philippines as a whole, it did not help the coconut oil producers at all. When one realizes that the coconut industry ranks second to rice in area under cultivation and constitutes a money crop for more people than any other crop in the Philippines,² one can see the hardship imposed on the Filipino coconut producer when his crop dropped to one-half its former value as a result of this tax. The drought in the United States later in the summer of 1934 reduced the domestic production of fats and oils to such an extent that their price, as well as that of coconut oil, increased considerably.³ Thus the period of acute depression in this industry in the islands was not too long. While the coconut industry was relatively depressed, the Philippine government had larger receipts than ever before as a result of this excise tax. Thus, due to the operation of this law, a period of increased governmental activities and of inflation was occurring just at a time when adjustments for lower governmental revenues and depression should have been taking place.

The effect of this excise tax on the oil and fat industry of the United States is very ably described by the Tariff Commission. They say,

Domestic producers of oils and fats, who meet competition either from coconut oil derived from Philippine copra, or from oils or fats from foreign countries, have been clearly benefited by the excise taxes. The taxes have not operated appreciably to enlarge domestic production of oils and fats . . . but they have operated to increase prices. Domestic consumers of foreign and domestic oils and fats, in consequence, have generally been obliged to pay higher prices for their requirements than they would have paid in the absence of the excise taxes.⁴

1. Ibid., p. 9682.

2. U. S. Tariff Commission. Report 118, op. cit., p. 68.

3. Ibid., p. 72.

4. Ibid., p. 111.

It seems to me that the effect of the law was generally unfortunate. If aid for the edible oil industries in the United States was sought, a tax on coconut oil, as well as other imported oils, used for edible purposes only, rather than all coconut oil, would have achieved the desired result much more satisfactorily. Proposals for such a change were introduced in Congress. The Tariff Commission said the probable effects of such a change would be:

(1) to reduce the cost of coconut oil to domestic manufacturers of soap, but by somewhat less than the full amount of the tax, inasmuch as some portion of it is now shifted to producers of coconuts and copra in the Philippines; (2) to increase the proportion of coconut oil used in the manufacture of soap appreciably above the level prevailing before the imposition of the excise taxes, particularly since imported tallow has recently become subject to an excise tax of three cents per pound; (3) to depress in some degree the price of both domestic and foreign competitive soap oils now used in the United States; (4) to lower the proportion of coconut oil entering edible channels, since edible coconut oil would advance in price if the inedible coconut oil were exempt from the tax; and (5) to enhance the price of domestic edible oils which are competitive with coconut oil.¹

No action to change this excise tax was, however, successful in Congress.

This revenue act is the first of a series of acts passed in the six years following the approval of the Tydings-McDuffie act which modify the economic provisions of that act.

The independence act had provided for the importation free of duty of 3,000,000 pounds of cordage from the Philippines. All imports over that quantity were to pay the full tariff duty. In the year 1934, 8,943,167 pounds had been exported to the United States from the Philippines and it was feared that much of the surplus would be able to jump the United States tariff wall on cordage. Exports to the United States in 1934 constituted 48.8 per cent of the total cordage exports from the Philippines.²

1. Ibid., p. 112.

2. Ibid., p. 131.

As a result of this situation, negotiations between United States cordage interests and representatives of the Philippine people were undertaken. The result was an agreement by which the free-duty quota on Philippine cordage was increased to 6,000,000 pounds and made an absolute quota, no importations above that figure being permitted. The agreement was to be effective for three years and could be extended "for an additional period of three years or more, provided such extension is accepted by the President of the Commonwealth of the Philippines." When the operation of this act expired, the provisions of the Tydings-McDuffie act were to be again applicable. The operation of the law was to commence on May 1, 1935¹ which was five and one-half months before the Commonwealth government was inaugurated.

The bill passed the Senate May 1, 1935,² the House of Representatives on June 3,³ and was signed by the President June 14.⁴

In pursuance of a request of the Philippine Legislature, which paid their expenses, a committee from the Senate was appointed June 16, 1934 to investigate conditions in the Philippines. Composing this committee were Senators Tydings of Md., McAdoo of Cal., McKellar of Tenn., Hayden of Ariz., and Gibson of Vt. Tydings and McAdoo never presented a formal report although the former expressed his views on the current issues in a speech before the Philippine Constitutional Convention on December 22, 1934. Separate reports were filed by other members. Hayden had preceded the others to the islands.

Senator Tydings, speaking to the Constitutional Convention, outlined American relations with the Philippines and then in speaking of the export tax provisions of the independence law, which had been objected to

1. ~~Congressional Record~~, 74 Cong., 1 sess., (Washington: Government Printing office, 1935), p. 6704.

2. Loc. cit.

3. Ibid., p. 8599.

4. Ibid., p. 9351.

in the islands, said,

The export-tax provisions of the independence law seem to have evoked the most discussion in the islands. It is well to note that these export-tax provisions were inserted to accomplish the three following purposes: First, to settle accounts completely between the Philippines and the United States when actual independence is obtained so that the United States might not be kept in the position of morally guaranteeing the payment of another country's obligations, in which country it has no voice in the conduct of affairs; secondly, the payment of this debt will start the independent Filipino nation upon the way free of all indebtedness whatsoever, and hence place the new Filipino nation in the strongest position possible for the settlement of the then existing independence problems and for conduct-int affairs, both internal and external, of an entirely newly born country; third, . . . the imposition of the export taxes will commence to prepare the Filipino producer for the situation which will confront him when, as a citizen of an independent country, he desires to continue to sell his products in the United States. To make no provision for such a contingency and to have it all fall upon the shoulders of the Filipino producer at one time would be cruel and inhuman and cause hardships which a gradual infliction of such taxes will, to some extent, mitigate.¹

McKellar indicates his disgust with the Filipinos in the report which he presented to the Senate May 1, 1935. He says that the Filipinos wanted independence but were fearful of its effects because of three factors:

One was the fear of economic collapse if the Filipinos should not secure a trade agreement under which they could indefinitely sell their products duty free in America after their independence was granted.

A second fear was of outside aggression. . . .

A third fear is that the islands could not stand the export tax levied . . . for the payment of their unpaid bonds which the United States Government has substantially and morally guaranteed.²

Later, in discussing the past and probable future relations of the Philippines with the United States, McKellar says,

The difficulty of defending them in case of war with a maritime nation and the ever-increasing competition of Philippine products with those of the continental United States were urged, among other things, as imperative reasons for taking at their word the Filipino leaders who demanded independence, summarily withdrawing from the islands, and in fact . . . abandoning them to their fate. . . .

1. Senate document 119, 74 Cong., 1 sess., (Washington: Government Printing office, 1935), p. 2-3.

2. Senate document 57 (part 1), 74 Cong., 1 sess., (Washington: Government Printing office, 1935), p. 2.

Instead of yielding to these demands and consulting only the welfare of the United States, this country has accepted many heavy responsibilities during the time which is to elapse before complete independence. It has given the products of the islands free access to the markets of the United States . . . save for a few products as to which quotas were established. . . .

So far, therefore, from charging the United States with seeking to inflict upon the Philippines "inequalities" or "injustices" in the legislation granting independence, the Filipino leaders should be, and I believe many of them are, sincerely grateful for the unexampled liberality of this country in dealing with their nation. . . .

We find upon investigation that the Filipino leaders are still not satisfied with the act. They desire to have stricken from it the export-tax provision, by which tax it is proposed that the Philippines shall pay. . . bonds on which the United States is morally obligated by way of security. In my judgment, to do this would be totally and wholly unfair to the United States, and would end by our making a gift of that sum to the Philippines.

Next, the Filipino leaders want the economic provisions changed or added to so that the Philippines may continue to have a free market in America for their sugar, copra, hemp, and other products after final independence. . . It is true that these leaders say if the islands had to pay our tariff taxes on sugar even in part it would bring about the economic annihilation of the islands. I am sure they are correct in this contention; but the answer to it is that they cannot have their cake and eat it, too.

.

As I look at the situation about the Philippines, what will it profit the Filipinos to obtain national independence if, at the same time, they make uncertain their economic welfare and possibly bring about their ruin? High standards of living, and bumper crops sold in a free market at high prices, bringing prosperity and happiness to all their people, are far better than a weak fling at national independence, or even a local dictatorship. . . . When the free markets of the Philippines are gone, when their balances of trade are no longer favorable, attendant want and poverty will come, and their so-called "national independence" will fade out as a dream which failed to come true.

Senator McKellar made the following recommendations:

1. That inasmuch as the Tydings Act has passed, proposing complete national independence, and has been accepted by the Philippine legislature, as provided in the act, no other course is open to us than to complete the transaction providing the conditions specified in the act are fully met.

2. Filipino leaders were in Washington when the act was passed. They urged its passage as meeting their approval. It was one of the most generous acts of one people toward another ever recorded in history. I find in the act no injustices or inequalities toward the Filipinos.

3. . . . If the Filipinos insist upon full compliance with the Tydings Act, I recommend that no naval or fueling stations be retained, as such retention would likely involve us in further claims of protection, or other international complications. My opinion is that the United States must either stay in the Philippines with full sovereignty, or get out entirely.

4. . . . I call attention to the following proposals in the constitution which are at war with the act, or are so far out of harmony with it as to fail to follow its requirements:

(a) There is a provision in the Tydings Act that English shall be taught in the public schools. In one section of the constitution it is provided that English shall be taught only in the primary schools. . . .

(b) The Tydings Act further provides that the property rights of citizens and corporations of the United States shall be acknowledged, respected, and safeguarded. The constitution provides that the legislature shall have the right to sequester large estates and divide them among the Filipino citizens.

(c) The Tydings Act requires that the constitution shall provide for a government "republican in form." . . . The truth is, that the Filipinos are not ready for a republic and they know they can give themselves no kind of government other than a dictatorship; not do I believe any other kind of government is intended, or will be had.

5. The Filipinos desire a trade agreement by which they can sell their products in America free of tariff duty. . . . The United States should not bind itself ten years in advance of national independence as to what kind of trade agreement it will make with the Philippines. . . .

6. I desire to warn our Filipino friends that they are making a great mistake in asking for complete independence after a period of ten years. I suggest to them that they petition the Congress to amend the Tydings Act by reserving to the United States sovereignty, control of foreign affairs, Army, Navy, and air matters, tariff and immigration leaving to the United States the final determination as to issuing bonds and creating debts. They can well afford, and so can we, to leave the presidency as provided for under the new constitution, and to leave with the Philippine Government control over all other matters.

In view of the present condition of political and economic world affairs, this is the most inopportune time imaginable for the Filipinos to have granted to them complete national independence.¹

In conclusion, McKellar says,

I went to the islands earnestly desiring to help them in those aspirations to be a separate, free, and independent nation. After seeing the situation, however, after studying their problems, talking

1. Ibid., p. 20-22.

to their leaders and their people, I am convinced that is to their best interests at this time to become a completely self-governing local political entity, like one of our own States, but that it is wholly unwise and probably will be ruinous to them to separate themselves as an independent nation. Under the Tydings Act, of course, the matter has gone so far that it is now in their power to have national independence at the end of ten years; but to persist in their present proposal, in my judgment, will result in bringing them nothing but economic disaster and ruin, and almost beyond a doubt political disaster as well. This course I cannot recommend.

The conclusions I have stated are those to which I am conclusively persuaded by the logic of the facts as I found them. I have discussed this subject from the standpoint of the Filipinos and what is best for them. I have scarcely referred to what is best for the United States. My best judgment is, however, that for the Philippines to separate from the United States, and become an independent national entity, would be harmful to both peoples.

Senator Gibson in his report, presented May 7, 1935, says, in part,

There are imperfections in the Tydings-McDuffie Act that directly affect our people. The justice of the act lies in the fact that it carries out any promise of independence that may bind us. The injustice lies in the fact that its provisions will cause us to lose a position of influence in the East and render it difficult to carry out any consistent Far Eastern policy.

It will gain for us the reputation of deserting a problem before its solution.

It will help to turn back our race movement for the first time in its history.

It will make America, once the hope of Christendom, the leader in the retreat of the white man.

It will put us in a position of leaving a people we have promised to help at the mercy of grasping imperialistic nations, unless and until a neutralization treaty can be negotiated - an idle dream.

It may operate to lose for us one of our best markets.

Under the terms of the act we are required, in effect, not only to give up the islands but to give them a bonus coupled with the independence. We are required to make a tremendous financial sacrifice in the form of reservations, lands, hospitals, and other property involving many millions of dollars. It is true, however, that we will also be relieved of our annual expenditures in the islands.

.....

It may be observed that so far as the political situation is concerned we have enacted the Independence Law. It is my opinion it should not have received the sanction of the Congress in its present form.

1. Ibid., p. 22.

I voted for it and now tender my regrets for having done so. But it has been approved by the Philippine Legislature and constitutes an obligation which we cannot ignore. The economic provisions of the Tydings-McDuffie Act can be changed and the imperfections or inequalities adjusted. Even the political set-up can be changed, but this must be done upon the initiative of the Philippine people. We Americans are bound by what we have done. All the Filipino leaders know the dangers that confront them but, with the present political control, few will back a proposal for a change in the political part of the act. The situation affords an acid test of Filipino statesmanship of the present day.

Our course has been correct. The Filipino people have been warned of the direct effect of the Independence Act in clear and unmistakable language. . . .¹

Meanwhile the Philippine Constitutional Convention had completed its work. In accordance with the provisions of the independence bill, the constitution was submitted to President Roosevelt to see if it was in accord with the provisions of the independence bill. Roosevelt approved the Constitution March 23, 1936 saying that the Constitution was acceptable. In conclusion he said,

Animated solely by feelings of cordiality, sympathy, and loyalty, the people of the United States and the people of the Philippine Islands have been conducting together a great experiment, and during the period of the Commonwealth Government this experiment will continue until the ultimate withdrawal of United States sovereignty and the establishment of complete independence.²

Early in the fall of that year President Roosevelt made a trip westward to dedicate Boulder Dam. He stopped a short time in Salt Lake City, Utah, on September 29, 1935 and while there gave a short speech in which he indicated his regret that the Secretary of War, George Dern, could not be there at that time. He continued, saying,

The Secretary of War left a few days ago on a mission to represent me at the inauguration of the first president of the new Philippine Commonwealth, and I know that George Dern, your former neighbor and Governor, is going to represent not only me but all the people of America in congratulating the Philippine people on the beginning of what will be their complete independence.

To me it is a remarkable and fine thing in the history of the world that a great nation obtaining territory as a result of a war and

1. Senate document 55 (part 2), op. cit., p. 9-10.

2. News item in the New York Times, March 24, 1935, Sec. II, p. 1.

agreeing to give independence to the people in that far-flung territory, that this nation has kept its word and that we are going to see the independence of the Philippine Islands in a very few years.

It is an illustration of the fact that our people in this country believe in keeping their word, and that is a mighty good thing for all the world.

Secretary Dern left September 6 on a tour of the Orient and arrived in the Philippines November 2. The Congressional party, headed by vice-president John N. Garner, left for the Philippines October 17, 1935, and arrived in Manila November 6.

November 15, Secretary Dern declared that the ten year period was necessary "in order to launch the Philippine Republic under the most favorable auspices and provide an adequate safeguard for the interests both of the American and Filipino people."²

The final act of President Roosevelt was the signing, November 14 (which was November 15 in Manila), of a proclamation to be issued by Secretary Dern in Manila. The proclamation was made public in Washington and stated:

By direction of the President of the United States of America, I, George H. Dern, Secretary of War of the United States of America, do hereby promulgate the proclamation of the President of the United States of America announcing the results of the election held in the Philippine Islands on September 17, 1935, for the purpose of electing officers of the government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines in entering upon its rights, privileges, powers, and duties as provided under the Constitution of the Commonwealth and the laws of the United States of America, is the successor to the heretofore existing Philippine Government and to all the rights and obligations thereof.³

Thus was inaugurated the government of the Commonwealth of the Philippine Islands. It represented the final step in the movement toward independence which, unless something interfered, was to come ten years from the next succeeding July 4. That means that independence would automatically come on July 4, 1946.

Manuel Quezon was elected President and Sergio Osmena was elected vice-president of the new Commonwealth. Frank Murphy, the popular

1. Ibid., September 30, 1935.
2. Ibid., November 15, 1935.
3. Loc. cit.

governor-general appointed by Roosevelt, became the first High Commissioner, retaining that position until 1936 when he was elected governor of Michigan. Paul V. McNutt, former governor of Indiana, was appointed High Commissioner in 1937 and held that position until July, 1939. Francis B. Sayre, former assistant Secretary of State, has been High Commissioner since 1939.

Mr. McNutt presented an interesting contrast to Murphy. Murphy had been content to remain inconspicuously in the background - to let the Filipino political leaders hold the spotlight. He did not interfere with the management of the Philippine Commonwealth. He was not interested in matters of social precedence. Many Americans, especially those residing in Manila, thought he was not sufficiently active in upholding American rights and prestige.

Paul V. McNutt was much more aggressive. Immediately after his arrival he sent notes, May 16, 1937, to all the foreign consulates in Manila advising them to send all official communications intended for Commonwealth officials through the High Commissioner's office. He was merely seeking to carry out the express provision of the Tydings-McDuffie Act which gave the United States control over the foreign relations of the Commonwealth. His action created a furore however.¹ McNutt's work was generally quite successful.

Almost a year later, March 14, 1938, McNutt made a radio address in which he said, in part,

And what of the Philippines? They have come to the crossing of the roads. The events of the past year have given many thoughtful Filipino leaders an object lesson and food for thought. Perhaps, suddenly, but we hope not too late, many have come to realize that independence, however attractive from a spiritual viewpoint, may mean a mere trade of sovereignties. . . .

From the American viewpoint the picture is equally gloomy. If we withdraw from the Philippines, we lose our voice in Oriental diplomacy. . . .

1. News item in New York Times, May 16, 1937, p. 30.

Again, today the Philippines is a happy spot in an unhappy Orient--the one place out there where decency, democracy, and peace reign, where the orderly processes of democracy have a chance to develop, where, and only where, the peculiar culture of America holds forth a torch of liberty and the love of fellow man.

.

To us there comes a responsibility. It appears now in respect to the Philippine problem broadened to become a part of a greater Oriental problem. If we scuttle, if we run away, our monument will be destroyed. The things we counted on, our aspirations to point the way to a new colonialism, our handicraft will perish. . . .

I believe I voice the inherent desire of my Nation when I say that we want to solve the Philippine problem in fairness to all--we want to solve it just as we wish with fairness and justice to solve our domestic problems. It can be solved.

On the political side our flag and sovereignty should remain, allowing to the Philippines every ounce of domestic autonomy they can absorb--holding in our own hands foreign affairs, tariffs, immigration, currency, and public debt--scarcely more than marks of the necessary reservations of a dominion. We should feel free in case of any crisis to help preserve the democratic basis of the Philippine Government.

On the economic side, we should from time to time give the Philippines the best trade deal we can without injuring our domestic producers. We must admit the possibility of competition. Our aim should be to assist with capital and men, with goodwill and such preferences as we can afford, the return to a complementary and reciprocal economy between the United States and the Philippines.

. . . I venture to predict that so long as our flag flies over the islands no foreign power will trespass. . . . I further venture that if our flag comes down, the Philippines will become bloody ground and the center of war within war for a generation.

Without too great a loss of time and with the cooperation of the leaders among the Filipinos we should proceed to a realistic reexamination of the needs of these people and the long-range interests of ourselves. If this study results in a policy favoring a permanent political and economic relationship with the Philippines, it shall be, I trust, because Filipinos want it and because it is in aid of our national purposes. America will not impose her sovereignty by force upon any people. The enduring welfare and safety of both countries are to be the paramount consideration.

It is my conviction that they are not far apart and that they can be harmonized--harmonized for the salvation of the Philippines, for the larger interests of America, and for the peace of the Pacific.

In Manila, President Quezon issued the following statement on the

McNutt speech,

I think his presentation of the facts as related to the present Philippine-American economic relations is unassailable. . . .

No reasonable person . . . can find fault with the proposition of the commissioner that a reexamination of the whole question should be undertaken at once. Everybody in the Philippines knows that the Philippine Legislature in accepting the Tydings-McDuffie law did so despite its objectionable features . . . and that in finally accepting the act by unanimous vote the members of the legislature bore in mind that President Roosevelt had said . . . that he would recommend a further study of the whole situation with a view to righting injustices and inequalities. . . .

It is unnecessary for me to add that when upon my return from the United States last fall I found some divergence of opinion among Filipinos as to what policy would best safeguard our national interest, I encouraged a free discussion of the subject. . . .¹

The Manila correspondent of the New York Times then says,

Mr. Quezon's statement was carefully calculated not to alarm the independence advocates and yet not to object to the indefinite retention idea. It left little doubt here that Mr. Quezon's assent was prearranged before High Commissioner McNutt's departure.²

The next day, however, Quezon said he had missed the paragraph about American retention of the Philippines. He would not agree to continued American control of foreign affairs, tariff, immigration, currency, and public debt.³ Some persons said that radio reception was very clear in Manila the night of March 14.

July 7, 1939, McNutt urged permanent retention of the Philippines by the United States "for the salvation of the islands, the larger interests of America, and for the peace of the Pacific." The Philippines were described as "an outpost of decency and peace, and a happy place in an unhappy Orient."

So long as our flag flies there, the Philippines will be the cornerstone of peaceful reconstruction in the Far East. If our flag comes down, trouble will follow for a generation.

McNutt then urged dominion status under American sovereignty allowing "every ounce of domestic autonomy they can absorb, while holding in our

1. News item in New York Times, March 16, 1938, p. 10.

2. Loc. cit.

3. Ibid., March 17, 1938, p. 4.

hands foreign affairs, tariffs, immigration, currency and public debt."

On the economic side, we should . . . give the Philippines the best trade deal we can without injuring our domestic producers.

Our aim should be to assist with capital and men, with goodwill and such preferences as we can afford, the return to a complementary and reciprocal economy between the United States and the Philippines.¹

McNutt resigned as High Commissioner and was succeeded by Francis B. Sayre who after four months in that position said that he did not believe the United States would remain permanently in the islands. He thought the existing act providing for independence in 1946 would be carried out. Neither the fear of Japanese aggression nor the practical certainty of economic dislocation to the Philippines after the loss of free trade with the United States was likely to cause a reversal of the present program. The American taxpayer was unlikely to be willing to support the necessary Philippine defense force either. Commissioner Sayre then says,

The movement toward independence is like the flow of a great river which has carried both peoples along its current. They have been carried along to a point where it would be difficult to turn back. I do not believe the Filipinos would voluntarily relinquish any of the autonomy they now enjoy.

In fact I think they would be unwilling to accept, following 1946, any form of government or even dominion which would restrict them in what they now enjoy. Remember President Quezon's statement before the Assembly last month. The only kind of arrangement he said he would be willing to consider would be one giving the Filipinos full control over immigration, imports, exports, currency and related financial subjects as well as the right to conclude commercial treaties with other nations without being subjected to the supervision and control of the United States.

In short, the tide has carried both Americans and Filipinos to a point where the only kind of dominion status the Philippines would probably be willing to accept would be one which the United States could not grant.²

There were suggestions at the time McNutt resigned that his views did not conform to those of the Roosevelt administration. The appointment of Sayre, followed by the above statement, would seem to have ended any

1. Ibid., July 8, 1939, p. 13.

2. Ibid., February 26, 1940, p. 1 and 5.

suggestion of "reexamination" of the independence question. At the time of the outbreak of war with Japan, the United States seemed conclusively determined to give the Philippines their independence on July 4, 1946.

Meanwhile an analysis of the economic problems of the Philippines was under way. The Tydings-McDuffie act had provided that a committee should make a study of and report on Philippine-American trade relations at least one year before the date of final independence.

After some preliminary negotiations, Roosevelt and Quezon created the Joint Preparatory Committee on Philippine Affairs on April 14, 1937.¹ The functions of this committee had been announced March 18, 1937 in a joint statement of Quezon and Sayre, then assistant Secretary of State. This statement said,

Arrangements are being made for the appointment shortly of a joint preparatory committee of American and Philippine experts. The Committee is to study trade relations between the United States and the Philippines and to recommend a program for the adjustment of Philippine national economy. . . .

In as much as the Independence Act provides that complete political independence of the Philippines shall become effective on July 4, 1946, and in as much as President Quezon has suggested that the date of independence might be advanced to 1938 or 1939, it was agreed that the joint committee of experts would be expected in making its recommendations to consider the bearing which an advancement in the date of independence would have on facilitating or retarding the execution of a program of economic adjustment in the Philippines. It was further agreed that preferential trade relations between the United States and the Philippines are to be terminated at the earliest practicable date consistent with affording the Philippines a reasonable opportunity to adjust their national economy. Thereafter it is contemplated that trade relations between the two countries will be regulated in accordance with a reciprocal trade agreement on a non-preferential basis.²

After mentioning the provisions of the Tydings-McDuffie act on Philippine export taxes if the goods were sent to the United States, the report of this group of experts, dated May 20, 1938, states,

Such abrupt change in trade relations will be certain to affect adversely a number of Philippine export industries, as well as others

1. Joint Preparatory Committee on Philippine Affairs. Report of May 20, 1938. (Washington: Government Printing office, 1938), Vol. 1, p. 3.

2. Loc. cit.

directly dependent upon them. Many firms would be forced to liquidate on or before the date of independence; and the consequent decline in the volume of business, coupled with increased unemployment would have serious repercussions on the Philippine economy. American export trade would also be impaired by the sudden imposition of Philippine duties on United States products.

With a view to affording both American and Philippine interests a reasonable opportunity to adjust themselves to the changed relationship, the Committee recommends that trade preferences should not be terminated on July 4, 1946, but should, by a process of gradual elimination, be terminated at the end of the year 1960. The Committee believes that the period recommended would afford a reasonable opportunity not only for the orderly liquidation of existing Philippine industries but also for the establishment of new industries which could provide additional products for domestic consumption or for export. The gradual elimination of preferences would also benefit American interests engaged in the United States-Philippine trade.¹

The Committee then suggested that import duties on Philippine products start at 25% on July 4, 1946 and be raised to 30% on January 1, 1947 and increase 5% "on each January 1 thereafter until January 1, 1961 when full duties would be assessed." The same plan was to apply to United States products entering the Philippines.²

The Committee said further,

The graduated Philippine export taxes and the graduated United States and Philippine import duties will not affect in the same degree all industries, the products of which enter into United States-Philippine trade. Several commodities are permitted duty-free entry from all countries under the tariff laws of both the United States and the Philippines, and therefore will not be directly affected by the changed relationship. Moreover, many industries producing dutiable products will doubtless be able to continue exportations despite the imposition of export taxes and graduated import duties. In the opinion of the Committee, however, certain Philippine industries will be forced to curtail drastically or to discontinue shipments to the United States upon the imposition of export taxes, and certain United States industries will likewise be forced to discontinue shipments to the Philippines upon the imposition of graduated Philippine import duties. This situation will arise principally because of the extreme height of the duties applicable to certain products which now are shipped only because of the free-duty privilege accorded to them.

. . . In those instances, therefore . . . the committee recommends . . . declining quotas which would be graduated so as to provide for their complete elimination by January 1, 1961. Shipments within the quota limitation would be exempt from export taxes and import duties. . . .

1. Ibid., p. 35.

2. Ibid., p. 36.

Commodities which the Committee recommends be made subject to declining quotas are cigars, scrap and filler tobacco, cigarettes, coconut oil, and pearl buttons. . . .¹

The Committee had been asked to study the bearing of the date of independence on the program of economic adjustment. Concerning this problem the Committee said,

The two essential factors for the effectuation of a program of economic adjustment are time and funds. With regard to the first factor, the Committee assumes, for the purpose of the discussion, that the period contemplated in its recommendations . . . would remain the same regardless of the date of independence. With regard to the second factor, however, the date of independence has an important bearing. Since it may be expected that the extraordinary revenues which now accrue from the remittances of United States excise taxes on sugar and coconut products will cease upon attainment of independence, any advancement in the date of independence will result in a reduction of the funds available for economic readjustment. An advancement in the date of independence would also reduce the revenue to be derived from export taxes required by the Independence Act, and thus deprive the Philippine Government of an important source of revenue for debt-retirement sufficient, it is estimated, to liquidate the greater part of the existing Philippine bonded indebtedness. In addition, the Commonwealth Government would have to complete within a shorter period its national defense program and other preparations for its future independent status. The resulting increase in expenditures for those purposes would coincide with the decline in revenue, and thus reduce the funds available for carrying out the economic adjustment program.

The Committee believes, therefore, that an advancement of the date of independence would materially increase the difficulties of the Philippine adjustment program and result in a delay in the attainment² of the objectives contemplated in the Committee's terms of reference.

The report of this committee, made up of experts from the United States and Philippine governments and with John Van A. MacMurray as Chairman, was an excellent study of Philippine-American trade relations. The report of this committee³ with that of the Tariff Commission made in 1937, focused the attention of Congress on the need for an adjustment in the trade relations of the United States and the Philippine Islands.

On January 26, 1939, bills were introduced in the Senate (S. 1028)³ and in the House of Representatives (H. R. 3330)⁴ embodying the ideas

1. Ibid., p. 37.

2. Ibid., p. 157.

3. Congressional Record, 76 Cong., 1 sess., (Washington: Government Printing office, 1939), p. 810.

4. Ibid., p. 859.

suggested by the joint preparatory committee. Hearings were held by the Senate Committee¹ but considerable opposition to the bills developed in both houses of Congress. As a result, bills which dealt with the pre-independence period and neglected the post-independence period were introduced by Kocialkowski in the House on July 6, 1939 (H. R. 7096)² and by Tydings in the Senate on May 10 (S. 2390).³

The report of the Senate Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs said,

The bill contains no provisions affecting political aspects of United States-Philippine relationships and does not alter those provisions of the act of March 24, 1934, relating to the date on which the Philippines will attain their independence.⁴

The report describes the existing provisions of law affecting exports from the Philippines to the United States then says,

After studying the probable effects of the application of this export-tax provision to exports to the United States of Philippine cigars, scrap tobacco, cigar ends, stripped filler tobacco, coconut oil, pearl buttons, and embroideries, it was found that the imposition of the export tax on these commodities, even during the early stages when the tax would amount to only five or ten per cent of the United States duty, would result in the destruction or serious curtailment of the industries producing these articles.

Inasmuch as these Philippine articles are produced primarily for export purposes to the United States and inasmuch as the combined value of these exports constitutes more than 40% of the total value of all Philippine exports, serious dislocation of the economic life of the Philippines would attend the imposition of the export taxes on these particular commodities. Similarly, the purchasing power of the Philippines would be abruptly diminished to the detriment of American exporters. To avoid such a situation section 1 of this bill provides for gradually declining quotas free from the export tax for each of these

-
1. U. S. Congress. Sen. Com. on Terr. and Ins. Aff. 76 Cong., 1 sess., Hearings on S. 1028. (Washington: Government Printing office, 1939).
 2. Congressional Record, 76 Cong., 1 sess., op. cit., p. 8756.
 3. Ibid., p. 5343.
 4. Senate report 453, 76 Cong., 1 sess., (Washington: Government Printing office, 1939).

articles, except for embroideries for which this device would be impractical and therefore another method is substituted. In this manner the adjustment of these industries could be affected in a gradual and orderly process. 1

In speaking of the use of the excise and import taxes, the report stated,

Under existing law Philippine coconut oil and sugar and the products thereof are subjected to excise and import taxes, the proceeds of which are remitted to the Philippine treasury. In order to assure the most beneficial use of these funds, the bill requires that these remittances must be dedicated to the financing of new or additional expenditures which will be necessary to adjust Philippine economy to a position independent of trade preferences in the United States and to prepare the Philippines for the assumption of the responsibilities of an independent state. In this connection the President of the United States is vested with supervisory powers and in the event that he finds that the Commonwealth Government is not complying with this mandate he may order the Secretary of the Treasury to discontinue further remittances in whole or in part. 2

The bill (S. 2390) passed the Senate but since it embodied revenue features, the House preferred to originate and pass their own bill. 3

On July 10, 1939, the House Committee referred H. R. 7096 back without amendment. 4 July 31, a motion to suspend the rules and pass the bill passed since two-thirds voted in favor of the bill. 5 The Senate passed this bill August 3 6 and President Roosevelt signed it August 7, 1939. 7

The bill as passed included a provision amending the independence act by providing for a conference at least two years prior to

-
1. Ibid., p. 2.
 2. Ibid., p. 3.
 3. Congressional Record, 76 Cong., 1 sess., op. cit., p. 10897.
 4. Ibid., p. 8798.
 5. Ibid., p. 10601.
 6. Ibid., p. 10900.
 7. Ibid., p. 11222.

the date fixed for Philippine independence "for the purpose of formulating recommendations as to future trade relations between the United States and the independent Philippine Republic." The Representatives for the United States were "to consist of three United States Senators appointed by the President of the Senate, three Members of the House of Representatives appointed by the Speaker of the House, and three persons appointed by the President of the United States." The President of the Commonwealth of the Philippines was, "with the consent of the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly," to appoint nine members.¹

Thus was completed the legislative enactments under which the Commonwealth of the Philippine Islands was to operate pending the coming of independence. It seems rather unfortunate that Congress and the President could not have devised by 1935, after six years of consideration of Philippine independence and trade relations with the islands, a bill which would not have required four changes in about four years to effect the purposes originally intended to be effected. One can reasonably say that Congress in legislative independence was concerned with protecting certain American interests against Philippine competition without destroying all hope for ultimate success of the future Philippine Republic. As the depression waned and as the American interests supposedly affected by competition with Philippine manufactures either recovered or realized

1. U. S. Statutes at Large, 76 Cong., 1 sess., (Washington: Government Printing office, 1939), p. 1231.

there was little such competition, the opposition to such Philippine trade concessions as would allow continued Philippine economic activity waned. There was, however, no growth of retentionist sentiment in Congress. When the Senate in 1939 passed the bill (H. R. 7096) modifying the trade relations with the islands, a number of Senators expressed their appreciation of the position Sayre had taken in favor of making the Philippines independent in 1946. No one expressed disagreement with this view. Thus Congress ended the decade of the 1930's opposed to "reexamination" of the independence question and willing to make certain concessions to the Philippines which it was thought would prevent economic and political collapse.

Ch. XIX. The Workings of a Policy

The Philippines are located in the midst of ~~Malayan~~ territory which, until the present war, was dominated by colonial powers: the Dutch to the South, the English to the west and south-west, the French to the west and north-west, and the Japanese to the north and east of these islands. In the midst of that troubled region, the United States pursued her policies only slightly disturbed by the troubles in that and other parts of the world.

In general, that policy has been benevolent rather than exploitive. I feel that during the first few years of occupation of the Philippines, the people of the United States wanted, like Beveridge, to exploit the Philippines. This group received their vocal expression through the leaders of the Republican party, Beveridge and Lodge representing this view. The activities of this group were to some extent hampered by the statement of McKinley that he had been forced to take the Philippines because of the misgovernment by Spain. Thus our job was to fit the natives for self-government. Having made this statement of aims, any deviation from this standard would allow the Democrats, who stood ready to grasp each and every opportunity to belabor the Republicans for violation of this sacred trust, to gain political advantage. The Democrats always stated their belief in immediate independence. The sugar interests were also interested in the Philippines. Their activity was not partisan, being concerned primarily with the problem of preventing, in so far as that was possible, the development of sugar production in the Philippines. Each of these three groups (Republicans, Democrats, and sugar people) was concerned with its own private interests but out

of the mutual distrust and watchfulness arose a policy which was not out of accord with the best interests of the Filipinos themselves. Many Republicans wished to keep the islands and perhaps to exploit them if that could be done without giving the Democrats campaign material. The Democrats did not want the Philippines. They also did not want the Republicans to make the Philippines so profitable that they would be indefinitely retained. They were free traders, so they said, in relation to the world and were willing to extend free trade to the Philippines. The Republicans were soon converted to free trade with the Philippines. Free trade was of tremendous benefit to the Philippines in the period from 1909 to 1940. The domestic beet and cane sugar interests were opposed to any development of the sugar industry in the Philippines. They were not powerful enough to prevent all development but were able, by uniting with the anti-imperialists, to prevent any large scale purchase or lease of land in the Philippines by American sugar interests. The rapid development of the sugar industry with all the peonage and bad conditions of life and labor associated with plantation agriculture was thus prevented. The development of the Philippines was thus slow, being based on the small holding of the individual who engaged in diversified agriculture rather than in the large holding of land by a few men who would, with hired or peon labor, engage in one crop agriculture.

A last group who assisted in the determination of Philippine policy was that small group of very sincere men who attempted to do the best thing for the Philippines that could be done. It gives one a pleasant

feeling to say that the persons most directly concerned with the Philippines were, in general, in this group. Notwithstanding the difference in the policies advocated, these men were sincerely interested in helping the Filipinos. Included in this group are our officials in the Philippines, the Chiefs of the Bureau of Insular Affairs, the Secretaries of War, and the successive chairmen of the Senate and House committees which dealt with the Philippines. One might disagree with their actions but could not doubt that they were designed to advance and not to exploit the Filipinos. This group was small in numbers but influential in position. The policies and plans of Elihu Root, William Howard Taft, Henry W. Cooper, W. Cameron Forbes, Henry L. Stimson, Bronson Cutting, Frank Murphy, and Millard Tydings, among many others in this group, cannot but convince one that these men were concerned, in their relations with the Philippines, with the welfare of the Filipinos.

Out of the policies thus developed through forty years, culminating in the Commonwealth transition period to complete independence, can be seen many of the reasons why the Filipinos cooperated so effectively, considering their limited number and poor equipment, in the defense of their homeland at a time when the Dutch and British were getting little or no help from the peoples they had conquered. The possessions of the Dutch and British were considered much more valuable in 1898. The Philippines resisted better in 1942.

The United States had a certain advantage over the other colonizing nations in that it was a rich nation of 100 to 130 millions of people controlling seven to fifteen millions of colonials while the colonial populations of the English and Dutch were many times greater than that of

the home country. The United States could thus afford to treat the Philippines differently. We did not need to make money out of them to help support the home government and the home populace.

In spite of these advantages of the United States as an imperial power, I feel that it was something else that marked the difference in performance. Could this difference be that the Filipinos realize that the Schurman idea of the "Philippines for the Filipinos" had won out over Lodge's idea of "trade expansion." Could our policy in the Philippines have given a demonstration of the value of a new colonialism for the future when relative peace returns to the world?

ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Government publications form the fundamental bibliographical basis for this study. The Congressional Record is, of course, the most important single source of information. Congressional opinion is indicated here in the speeches on the various bills. Here also votes on bills and amendments are recorded as well as moves in Parliamentary strategy. The Record constituted a source of invaluable information.

To supplement this information, one needs the Senate and House reports on bills when reported from committee. The reports, often including minority views, indicate not only the nature of Committee sentiment but often give more detailed views of the nature of Congressional sentiment than is found even in the Congressional Record. The Reports constitute a more thoughtout approach to the question. They represent the views of the Congressional experts, the members of the committee concerned with the problem.

Another source of information from government publications are the various Senate and House Documents. A wide variety of materials are included here: the reports of special investigating agencies, veto messages, annual messages on the state of the Union by the President, material requested by the Senate or the House, information which executive agencies feel that Congress should have in order to perform its function most effectively.

Congressional committee hearings are often valuable. While much of their testimony is concerned with the attempt of interested parties to convince Congress of the desirability of certain legislation or lack of legislation and is of a very petty nature, often questioning by Congressmen brings out very satisfactorily the expected effect of Congressional activity.

An excellent source of information for executive policy consists of the annual reports of various agencies such as the Philippine Commission, the governor general, the Chief of the Bureau of Insular Affairs, the Secretary of War, and the annual messages of the President. These form a "progress" report on Philippine affairs.

The files of the New York Times have also been very helpful. The news service of this great paper covers the Philippine question intensively, both here and in the Islands. While it often repeats material found in the Congressional Record during sessions of Congress, the Times, during recesses of Congress, is particularly valuable. Much material which never finds its way into the Congressional Record is found in the New York Times.

Some of the books which have been written about the Philippines and about men who were active in Philippines affairs are a noteworthy source of information. Many of the books concerning the Islands are of slight value. A few are of tremendous assistance in explaining the difficulties under which Americans in the Islands

worked as well as Philippine problems and progress. Several books are especially helpful, four deserving special mention. Forbes's The Philippine Islands and Hayden's The Philippines are valuable primarily for understanding conditions in the Philippines. Two biographies are very helpful: Pringle's The Life and Times of William Howard Taft and Jessup's Elihu Root. The biography of Taft constitutes an excellent and realistic history of American administration in the Philippines from 1900 to 1907. These four works merit high praise.

I. Books Relating to the Philippines.

Anderson, William H. The Philippine Problem. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1939.

Mr. Anderson is very much anti-independence, anti-Quezon, anti-Stimson, anti-Murphy and very much pro - Wood and pro-retentionist. Very little is added to the knowledge of the Philippines to be found in any number of other places. Very derogatory of the Philippines and of Filipinos.

Apostol, Jose P. The Economic Policy of the Philippine government; Ownership and Operation of Business. Manila: University of the Philippines, 1927.

A scholarly piece of work on a subject not very pertinent to my thesis. Discussion of Filipino policy rather than American policy, the sole exception being the administration of government corporations by Wood while he was governor general.

Baker, Ray Stannard, Woodrow Wilson, Life and Letters. Vols. III-VI. Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Page and Co., 1931.

Woodrow Wilson as governor of New Jersey, as a presidential candidate, and as president. Especially valuable for the period before Wilson became president. Very readable and well authenticated.

Baker, Ray Stannard, and Dodd, William E., editors, The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson, the New Democracy. Two Volumes. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1926.

Source material on the policy of Wilson during his presidency. Contains presidential messages and state papers, speeches, and letters.

Bemis, Samuel Flagg, editor. The American Secretaries of State and their Diplomacy. Vol. IX. New York: A. A. Knopf, 1929.

Not very useful. Source material was not available for the authors in the latter part of the period and the work thus lacks authoritativeness. A little bit of source material in the Appendices.

Blount, James Henderson. The American Occupation of the Philippines. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1912.

The most important of the early controversial works on the Philippines. Mr. Blount, a Democrat, proves to his own satisfaction by quotations from selected sources, and by leaving out all other pertinent information, that the Filipines (through Aquinaldo) were promised independence, that they could have maintained a fine government, and that the American policy in the Philippines was very bad. I do not feel that the work is accurate in content, emphasis, or interpretation.

Bowers, Claude G. Beveridge and the Progressive Era. New York: The Literary Guild, 1932.

Treats of Beveridge's investigations in the Philippines and his work in Congress on the Philippines. It duplicates the Congressional Record for Congressional work but is very interesting and informative on the other aspects of the problem. A very interesting work on the man who was America's most effective and most vocal exponent of imperialism.

Brown, Arthur Judson. The New Era in the Philippines. 3rd ed. New York: Fleming H. Revell Co., 1903.

The "Christian" outlook and possibilities of the Philippines are the points mainly emphasized.

Buell, Raymond Leslie. Philippine Independence. New York: Foreign Policy Association, Inc., 1932.

A good brief discussion of American policy and motives for independence. Prepared for and published in the Foreign Policy Reports.

Chamberlain, Frederick. The Philippine Problem. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1913.

This ~~small~~ one volume work treats of the early period without distinction or special merit.

Clark, Champ. My Quarter Century of American Politics. 2 vols. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1920.

Personal reminiscences of a man who was very prominent in Democratic party policy determination from 1904 being Speaker of the House of Representatives from 1911 to 1919. Of only slight value on the Philippine question.

Cortissoz, Royal. Life of Whitelaw Reid. 2 vols. New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1921.

The standard biography of Whitelaw Reid, one of the most prominent and powerful Republicans in the early part of the period under consideration. The influence of Reid on the instructions to the peace commissioners as well as on the peace negotiations is shown. Contains much good source material as well as very excellent background material for the period.

Democratic Campaign Rextbook, 1912. New York: 1912.

Contains the platforms of the three major parties and Wilson's speech of acceptance of the nomination. Good source material for the Democratic side of the election campaign.

Dennett, Tyler. John Hay. New York: Dodd Mead & Co., 1933.

One of the most useful biographies used. Contains a slight amount of source material with a wealth of explanatory background material. Very useful in explaining Philippine policy, although Mr. Dennett restricts the discussion of that subject to a very minor place in the book.

Dennis, Alfred Lewis Pinneo. Adventures in American Diplomacy, 1894-1907. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1928.

One of the better secondary works on the peace negotiations. Considerable source material which, interspersed with secondary material, makes the book very valuable for the general student.

Dewey, George. Autobiography. New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1913.

This work, except for some source material in the appendices, is of very slight value even for background material on the Philippines.

Dulles, Foster Rhea. The Philippines and the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act. New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1934.

Another publication in the Foreign Policy Reports. A good, brief, well documented discussion of the provisions and motives of this act. The sources of information used are available for all students of Philippine affairs.

Dunn, Arthur Wallace. From Harrison to Harding. 2 vols. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1922.

Contains a very readable short account of the ratification of the treaty with Spain and the influences which caused McKinley to decide to take the Philippines. Mr. Dunn was a newspaper man with knowledge of the immediate situation at the time of the ratification of the treaty. He seems, like many newspapermen, to dislike to indicate his source of information.

Elliott, Charles B. The Philippines to the End of the Military Regime & The Philippines to the End of Commission Government. Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1916-1917.

A very excellent work on Philippine-American relations during the first two periods of American occupation. Mr. Elliott was a high official in the Philippine administration and knew the problems of the early period from a first hand perusal of them. He was an avowed imperialist.

Fernandez, Leandro H. The Philippine Republic. New York: Columbia University, 1926.

This doctor's dissertation is a very interesting and well documented history of the Philippine Republic (the Filipino rebellion against Spain and the insurrection against the United States.) Mr. Fernandez states his desire to arrive at an objective view of this republic. He seems to succeed rather well. His work, in those parts dealing with American policy in the islands, is based on the same government documents available to all students of the subject of American policy.

Foraker, Joseph B. Notes on a Busy Life. 2 vols. Cincinnati: Stewart and Kidd Co., 1916.

Foraker was one of the Senators who was reasonably interested in Philippine affairs. The book is not too valuable in explaining Philippine policy.

Forbes, W. Cameron. The Philippine Islands. 2 vols. New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1928.

The ablest work that had appeared on the Philippines at the time of its publication. Any person seeking information about Philippine life, education, resources, development, government, etc. could very well begin with Forbes. He was very conversant with affairs in the Philippines, having been governor general under President Taft and having returned with Wood in 1921 to investigate conditions there. Mr. Forbes finds it necessary to justify certain actions he took as governor general, although they are not excessively emphasized. He is anti-Harrison as are many other students of Philippine affairs. Forbes does include both favorable and unfavorable comments by competent persons on the Harrison administration so that the picture will not be deliberately one sided. The book appears to me to be an honest and quite successful attempt to discuss, fairly and honestly, the Philippine Islands.

Funston, Frederick. Memories of Two Wars. New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1911.

Interesting reminiscence of military activities in the Philippines.

Hagedorn, Hermann, ed. Theodore Roosevelt, State Papers. Vol. 15. (National edition.) New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1925.

Contains the text of the presidential messages and state papers transmitted to Congress by Roosevelt during his occupancy of the office of president. They are very valuable.

Hagedorn, Hermann, Leonard Wood, a Biography. Vol. 2. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1931.

The only biography of Wood worthy of consideration by any person interested in studying the man. Mr. Hagedorn likes Wood very much, perhaps too much to give the truest picture of his life and work. Wood's opponents are almost invariably wrong, according to Hagedorn.

Hawes, Harry B. Philippine Uncertainty, An American Problem. New York: The Century Co., 1932

Mr. Hawes records the results of his trip to the Philippines in 1931, emphasizing the unanimity of the feeling for independence. Many celebrations were arranged to prove to Hawes that independence was wanted by the Filipinos.

Hayden, Joseph Ralston, The Philippines, A Study of National Development. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1942.

A study of the organization of the Commonwealth of the Philippines and its problems. The background of the movement is ably traced when that seems desirable. The book is about the Philippines with a minimum of attention being devoted to formulation of policy in Washington. Mr. Hayden analyzes in a clear, unprejudiced, and interesting manner the strengths and weaknesses of the Philippine Commonwealth and of its leaders. It is unquestionably one of the best studies of the Philippines that has been published. Mr. Hayden, Chairman of the Political Science department at the University of Michigan, was in the Philippines in 1922-23, was visiting professor at the University of the Philippines 1930-31, and was vice governor and Superintendent of Public Instruction there from 1933 to 1935.

Hensley, Mrs. Matie Manard. Oceanic Interlude. San Antonio, Texas: The Naylor Co., 1941.

This is personal reminiscences of life in the Philippines during the earlier period of American control there.

Hibben, Paxton. The Peerless Leader, William J. Bryan. New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1929.

Very much pro-Bryan. Hibben explains Bryan's reasons for favoring the ratification of the treaty with Spain in 1899.

Horn, Florence. Orphans of the Pacific. New York: Reynel and Hitchcock, 1941.

One will find in this book the best popular account of present day conditions in the Philippines that has been presented. While devoting little time to American policy, the book appears to be honest in intent and presentation.

Jessup, Philip C. Elihu Root. 2 vols. New York: Dodd Mead & Co., 1938.

Mr. Root was one of the most influential persons in the determination of Philippine policy. This book, in its treatment of Root's Philippine policy, does a fine job in discussing that work.

Kirk, Grayson V. Philippine Independence: motives, problems and prospects. New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1936.

Mr. Kirk does a very good job analyzing the problem presented in the title of his book. The matter of competition of American and Philippine products is very ably discussed.

Letters of John Hay and extracts from diary. Washington: 1908.
Printed but not published. Vol. 3.

Volume 3 deals with the period under consideration but was of only slight value.

Malcolm, George A. The commonwealth of the Philippines. New York: D. Appleton-Century Co., 1939.

A scholarly discussion of Commonwealth problems and policies by a man who was for years a justice of the Philippine Supreme Court.

Mayo, LaFence, Shaw, editor. America of Yesterday, the Diary of John D. Long. Boston: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1923.

Gives the ideas of John D. Long, Secretary of Navy under McKinley, as to retention of the Philippines. Mr. Long was a New England Anti-imperialist and expresses the ideas of that group rather well.

Olcott, Charles S. The Life of William McKinley. Boston & New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1916.

The standard biography of McKinley, and decidedly favorable to him. It gives very high motives for all McKinley's acts. Political motives play a very minor part in the decision of important events if one is to interpret the causes of McKinley's actions as Olcott has done. Volume 2 of this work deals with the negotiations for peace, the ratification of the treaty, and the determination by McKinley of future Philippine policy.

Orias, Camilo and Baradi, Mauro. The Philippine Charter of Liberties. Baltimore, Md.: French-Bray Printing Co., 1933.

This work by the Philippine Resident Commissioner to the United States and his secretary was prepared to provide information of the nature and meaning of the various bills introduced in Congress which provided for Philippine independence.

Palma, Rafael, Our Campaign for Independence from Taft to Harrison. Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1923.

A pamphlet on policies emphasizing activities in the Philippines although affairs in Washington are not completely neglected. Very ably done. The Filipino point of view is emphasized.

Pepper, David H. Creating a Philippine Commonwealth. New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1936.

A brief, able analysis of the situation existing in the Philippines at this time. Economic factors are emphasized.

Pringle, Henry F. The Life and Times of William Howard Taft. 2 vols. New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1939.

This biography of Taft is the most useful secondary book examined in this study. It is a fine biography of the most influential man in the determination of America's Philippine policy. Pringle evaluates the actions and motives of Taft very clearly and honestly.

Bringle, Henry F. Theodore Roosevelt. New York; Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1951.

This is probably the best biography of Roosevelt but was of only slight value in explaining Philippine policy.

Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt. Vols 2-4
New York: Random House, 1938.

Presidential press conferences, appointments, economic adjustments, etc. relating to the Philippines are included here.

Recommendations Regarding the Future of the Philippines, by Committee on the Philippines. Boston: World Peace Foundation and New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1934.

Recommendations by a group of non-political experts, are very carefully done. They were not, and are not in the future likely to be, very influential in determining policy.

Report of Special Mission to the United States, 1938-39. Manila: On Bureau of Printing, 1939.

The activities of the Philippine mission to obtain the modification of the provisions of the Tydings-McDuffie act are described. The report is prepared for circulation in the Philippines primarily.

Remington, Woodburn Edwin. Cross Winds of Empire. New York: The Mohr Day Co., 1941.

This book contains personal reminiscences of an army officer stationed at Zambeanga who made several trips to other Malayan territory.

Reyes, Jose S. Legislative History of America's Economic Policy toward the Philippines. New York: Columbia University, 1923.

This work, doctoral dissertation, is a very useful work not only in the discussion of economic policies but in evaluating the motives behind annexation. The trends of economic policy are treated briefly rather than extensively.

Rhodes, James Ford. The McKinley and Roosevelt Administrations. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1922.

This work had its chief value for me in giving an account of the cross-currents of public sentiment.

Robinson, William A. Thomas B. Reed. New York: Dodd, Mead & Co. 1930.

Reed was Speaker of the House when the Treaty of Paris was ratified. He was a staunch party man who, while making cynical comments about the purchase of 10,000,000 Filipinos at \$2.00 per head refused to do anything against the party policy of acquiring the Philippines. He retired from public life soon after the acquisition of the islands. This book treats of his activities during this period.

Roosevelt, Theodore. Colonial Policies of the United States. Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Doran and Co., 1937.

This book had little value for me.

Root, Elihu Root. The Military and Colonial Policy of the United States, ed. by Robert Bacon and James Brown Scott. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1916.

Bacon and Scott have collected the addresses and reports of Root on colonial matters. The work was very helpful for, as I have pointed out elsewhere, Root was one of the most influential men in the determination of Philippine policy.

Russell, Charles E. The Outlook for the Philippines. New York: The Century Co., 1922.

A small, one volume work written to cover the same ground covered by Forbes at a later time in two large volumes. The thesis of the book is that the Philippines have been promised their independence and are capable of maintaining it. A small amount of source material was included on Philippine policy.

Schurman, Jacob Gould. Philippine Affairs, retrospect and prospect. New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1902.

Consists of the reprint of an address delivered by Mr. Schurman some time after his return from the Chairmanship of the Philippine Commission. Includes a very interesting account of his appointment to the headship of the Commission. The remainder of the book is devoted to discussion of parts of the report of the Philippine Commission, which had been originally written by Schurman.

Smalley, George W. Anglo-American Memories, second series. New G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1912.

Interesting comments on Whitelaw Reid's connection with the Treaty with Spain.

Stanwood, Edward, The History of the Presidency. Vol. 2 1928 8d.
Boston & New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1928.

Stanwood is the authority on presidential elections. Nearly all the figures on electoral votes come from this book. It was also checked for the political issues of the presidential campaigns.

Storey, Moorfield and Lichauco, Marcial P. The Conquest of the Philippines by the United States, 1898-1925. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1926.

Another of the controversial works on the Philippines. Storey was a leading American anti-imperialist and develops this idea throughout the book.

Wilbur, Ray Lyman and Hyde, Arthur Mastick. The Hoover Policies. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1937.

Contains parts of messages on Philippines found more completely elsewhere.

Worcester, Dean C. The Philippines, Past and Present. 2 Vols. New York: The Macmillan Co. 1914.

Written immediately after Blount's book was released. Worcester demolished the thesis that the Philippines had been promised independence, advanced by Blount. He produced arguments against independence. Mr. Worcester had been criticized for certain actions and policies pursued and thus found it desirable to refute those claims and justify his actions while a member of the Philippine Commission from 1899 to 1913. Neither the work of Blount nor that of Worcester was the scholarly product produced by Elliott or Forbes and especially by Hayden. Worcester's book is not a well proportioned discussion of the Philippines.

II. United States Government Publications relative to the Philippines.

A. Senate Reports:

181, 57 Congress, 1 session.

On H. R. 5833, the Philippine tariff bill passed in 1902. The minority views include the Rawlins substitute bill for independence.

915, 57 Congress, 1 session.

On S. 2295, the Lodge bill for administration of civil government in the Philippines: 1902.

2586, 57 Congress, 2 session.

On H. R. 15702, to reduce the tariff rate on goods from the Philippines entering the United States.

1898, 58 Congress, 2 session.

On S. 5328, to authorize a guarantee of interest on bonds issued for railroad construction in the Philippines.

1178, 59 Congress, 1 session.

On H. R. 13104, to reduce the tariff rate on Philippine products.

9, 61 Congress, 1 session.

On the Philippine tariff bill, the companion measure for the Payne-Aldrich tariff bill.

942, 63 Congress, 3 session.

On H. R. 18459, the Jones bill for increased self-government proposed during Wilson's first Congress.

18, 64 Congress, 1 session.

On S. 381, a bill modeled on the Jones bill which had been introduced by Hitchcock.

573, 66 Congress, 1 session.

On H. R. 19378, the Merchant Marine act of 1920. This act changed the law regarding Philippine shipping.

1205, 69 Congress, 2 session.

On H. R. 4789, to provide for a Congressional board of visitors to the Philippines.

224, 70 Congress, 1 session.

On S. 2787, changing the law regarding appointment of governors of non-Christian provinces.

414, 70 Congress, 1 session.

On S. 2292, for employment of civilian assistants by the governor general.

550, 70 Congress, 1 session

On S. 755, for biennial appointment of a Congressional board of visitors to the Philippines.

781, 71 Congress, 2 session.

On S. 3822, the Hawes-Cutting independence bill introduced in Hoover's first Congress.

354, 72 Congress, 1 session.

On S. 3377, the Hawes-Cutting independence bill which eventually, with slight modifications, became law.

494, 73 Congress, 2 session.

On S. 3055, the Tydings-McDuffie bill. It includes House Report 968, the report in the House on this bill.

444, 74 Congress, 1 session.

On S. 2530, the Philippine cordage bill.

453, 76 Congress, 1 session.

On S. 2390, the bill to amend the Tydings-McDuffie act in respect to trade provisions. It changed the law from an increasing duty on certain Philippine products to a declining quota of duty-free imports.

B. House Reports:

4, 57 Congress, 1 session.

On H. R. 5833, establishing tariff relations with the Philippines. The fundamental act, which was with slight modifications to continue until 1909, is provided for here.

1540, 57 Congress, 1 session.

On H. R. 15445, the Cooper civil government bill for the Philippines, 1902.

2907, 57 Congress, 2 session.

On H. R. 15702, to reduce the tariff rate on Philippine products entering the United States from 75% to 25%.

1904, 58 Congress, 2 session.

On S. 2259, modifying shipping regulations between the United States and the Philippines.

2227, 58 Congress, 2 session.

On H. R. 14623, to guarantee the interest on investment in Philippine railroad bonds and other purposes.

4600, 58, Congress, 3 session.

On H. R. 18985, to amend the Philippine tariff laws to make easier the importation of United States goods into the Philippines in competition with goods from other countries.

4867, 58 Congress, 3 session.

On H. R. 17752, duties on Philippine products to the United States. Both majority and minority views were filed.

20, 59 Congress, 1 session.

On H. R. 3, reducing duties on Philippine products.

7559 & 8115, 59 Congress, 1 session.

Majority and minority views on S. 6249, to establish an agricultural bank in the Philippines.

1475, 60 Congress, 1 session.

On S. 5262, amending the shipping laws affecting the Philippines.

1, 61 Congress, 1 session.

On H. R. 1438, the Payne-Aldrich tariff bill which established free trade, with quotas, with the Philippines.

7, 61 Congress, 1 session.

On H. R. 9135, the companion measure to the Payne-Aldrich tariff act. This bill, with very slight amendment, is the tariff law of the Philippines today. It was a tariff bill for the Philippines.

2289, 61 Congress, 3 session.

This is the report on the investigation of the administration of Philippine lands in accordance with H. Res. 795. The public land policy and its administration is discussed very fully in this report. There are two sub-reports to the majority report and a minority report. It represents a very clear statement of the wishes of the members of the Committee on Insular Affairs in the matter of Philippine land disposition.

606, 62 Congress, 2 session.

On H. R. 22143, the Jones bill introduced during Taft's administration to embarrass that administration. Both majority and minority views are included.

635, 61 Congress, 2 sessions.

On H. R. 278, to provide for the neutralization of the Philippines. It also includes both majority and minority views.

1115, 63 Congress, 2 session.

On H. R. 18459, the Jones bill introduced during Wilson's first Congress. Majority and minority views filed.

499, 64 Congress, 1 session.

On S. 381, the bill passed by the Senate with the Clarke amendment included. Majority and minority views were submitted..

1108, 64 Congress, 1 session.

The conference report on S. 381.

1093 & 1102, 66 Congress, 2 session.

Conference reports on the Merchant Marine act of 1920.

709, 68 Congress, 1 session.

On H. R. 8856, the Fairfield bill for increased autonomy for the Philippines (1924). Three reports were submitted.

1301, 69 Congress, 1 session.

For a board of visitors (Congressional) to the Philippines.

806, 72, Congress, 1 session.

On H. R. 7233, the Hare bill for independence.

1811, 72 Congress, 2 sessions.

Conference report on H. R. 7233, with statement of House conferees.

968, 73 Congress, 2 session.

On H. R. 8573, the Tydings-McDuffie bill.

1068, 76 Congress, 1 session.

On H. R. 7096, to amend the trade provisions of the Tydings-McDuffie act by substituting declining free quota imports of certain Philippine goods for increasing tariff duties.

C. Senate Documents:

62, 55 Congress, 3 session.

Diplomatic correspondence of State department with consuls in the Orient.

95, 55 Congress, 2 session.

Articles from Singapore Free Press on course of events. Bray's reports on discussions of Pratt, Aguinaldo, Santos and others.

124, 56 Congress, 1 session.

The supplementary treaty with Spain, 1900, to cover islands in Philippines not covered by treaty acquiring islands.

136, 56 Congress, 1 session.

The negotiations for and treaty with the Sultan of Sulu.

208, 56 Congress, 1 session.

Communications between Executive department of government and Aguinaldo.

221, 56 Congress, 1 session.

Report of Committee appointed by President to investigate conduct of War Department in war with Spain.

143, 56 Congress, 2 session.

Papers relating to the treaty with Spain.

134, 57 Congress, 1 session.

Tariff between the United States and the Philippine Islands.

171, 57 Congress, 1 session.

The provisions and development of the Philippine customs tariff.

182, 57 Congress, 1 session.

The Treaty of Peace between the United States and Spain and the McEnery resolution with the votes on the treaty and the resolution and on the amendments to each.

187, 57 Congress, 1 session.

The message of the Federal party (in the Philippines) to Congress. This includes considerable documentary material on the origin and development of that party as well as on conditions in the islands and acts by American administrators.

283, 57 Congress, 1 session.

A discussion of railroads in the Philippines with suggestions for further roads.

331, 57 Congress, 1 session.

Hearing on affairs in the Philippines. There are three volumes of these hearings which include testimony by Taft and others on the civil government bill, on atrocities, and on everything concerning the Philippines.

422, 57 Congress, 1 session.

The Philippine situation: Speech of Beveridge including testimony and statements of witnesses both American and foreign. Part of this material is duplicated in the Congressional Record as well as elsewhere.

443, 57 Congress, 1 session.

The Conference report on S. 2295 to establish civil government in the Philippine Islands, June 30, 1902.

7, 58 Congress, 2 session.

Sale of lands in the Philippine Islands: the act of the Philippine Commission on this subject.

105, 58 Congress, 2 session.

Laws relating to Insular and Military affairs, 1897-1903. The Philippines are included.

124, 58 Congress, 2 session.

Shipping between the United States and the Philippine Islands. Hearings on S. 2259.

182, 58 Congress, 2 session.

Hearing by Secretary of War on Philippine Shipping bill.

191, 58 Congress, 2 session.

Speech of Taft, December 17, 1903, on duty of Americans in the Philippines.

304, 58 Congress, 2 session.

Article "What has been done in the Philippines," prepared by Bureau of Insular Affairs. A very nice article.

95, 59 Congress, 1 session.

Address by Senator Frye to Tobacco Growers Association on possible competition from Philippine tobacco.

156, 59 Congress, 1 session.

Railway lines in the Philippine Islands: terms, bids, etc. relating to construction of new lines.

277, 59 Congress, 1 session.

Hearings on revenue for the Philippine Islands. Three volumes of hearings on revenue and related matters.

454, 59 Congress, 1 session.

Letter from Secretary Dickinson to Senator Lodge on agricultural bank and increase in public lands obtainable in Philippine Islands.

200, 60 Congress, 1 session.

The Special report of Secretary of War Taft, dated January 23, 1908, following his trip to Manila to open the Philippine Assembly. A very excellent source of information on the Philippines.

159, 63 Congress, 1 session.

An article, "The Democratic party and Philippine independence," by Moorfield Storey.

242, 64 Congress, 1 session.

Report on Government of Philippine Islands by Brigadier General Frank McIntyre, Chief of Bureau of Insular Affairs.

527 & 530, 64 Congress, 1 session.

Conference reports on Philippine government bill(S.381).

77, 69 Congress, 1 session.

Communication from President Coolidge to Manuel Roxas, dated February 21, 1924, on the Philippine problem and the question of independence.

180, 69 Congress, 2 session.

The very excellent report of Carmel Thompson.

150, 71 Congress, 2 session.

Letters from Hurley, Secretary of War, dated May 15, 1930, and Parker, Chief, Bureau of Insular Affairs, dated May 5, 1930, on Philippine independence bills and Philippine independence to Senator Bingham, Chairman, Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs.

43,74 Congress, 1 session.

The Constitution of the Philippines.

57, 74 Congress, 1 session.

Reports of Senators McKellar and Govson of the Special Mission to the Philippines (2 parts).

119, 74 Congress, 1 session.

Speech of Tydings before Philippine Constitutional Convention. December 22, 1934.

120, 74 Congress, 1 session.

Letter from Senator Hayden to Tydings on reciprocal trade with the Philippines, dated at Manila, August 6, 1934.

D. House Documents:

210 part 10, 53 Congress, 2 session.

Richardson's Messages and Papers of the Presidents. Limited usefulness since only a limited period of my study was covered by this work.

1, 56 Congress, 1 session.

Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States with the annual message of the President, December 5, 1899.

659, 56 Congress, 1 session.

General order made by the military governor of the Philippine Islands and providing for a system of municipal government.

1, 56, Congress, 2 session.

Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States with the annual message of the President, December 3, 1900.

2, Vol. 1, part 4, 56 Congress, 2 session.

Report of the Lieutenant General commanding the Philippine division of the army (1900).

509, 56 Congress 2 session.

The Insular cases: testimony, arguments before the Supreme Court, and the decision of the Court.

2, part 2. Report of Commanding General in Philippine Islands for year ended June 30, 1901.

14, 61 Congress, 1 session.

Proposed tariff revision law for the Philippine Islands (1900).

894, 61 Congress, 2 session.

Sale of friar Lands in the Philippines.

911, 61 Congress, 2 session.

Friar lands in the Philippines.

914, 61 Congress, 2 session.

Report of the Director of Lands in the Philippine Islands.

1071, 61 Congress, 3 session.

Sale of Friar lands in the Philippine Islands.

1261, 61 Congress, 3 session.

Special report of Dickinson, Secretary of War, November 23, 1910, after trip to the Philippines.

875, 62 Congress, 2 session.

President Taft's message on the cost to the United States of occupying the Philippines.

1067, 62 Congress, 3 session.

Annual message of President Taft, December 6, 1912.

325, 67 Congress, 2 session.

The report of the special mission to the Philippine Islands (Wood-Forbes) dated October 8, 1921. Also found in the report of the governor general for 1922.

524, 72 Congress, 2 session.

President Hoover's veto message of H. R. 7233.

272, 73 Congress, 2 session.

President Roosevelt's message suggesting modifications in Philippine independence bill, 1934.

388, 73 Congress, 2 session.

Request by President Franklin D. Roosevelt for repeal of excise tax on Philippine coconut oil.

144, 74 Congress, 1 session.

Certification of President Roosevelt that Constitution of Philippines Commonwealth conformed to Tydings-McDuffie act.

400, 74 Congress 2 session.

Documents relating to the inauguration of the government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines: speeches, proclamations, messages, documents, etc.

E. Congressional Committee Hearings:

House Insular Affairs Committee. Committee reports, hearings and acts relating thereto. 1900-01. 56th Congress.

_____. Committee reports, hearings and acts corresponding thereto, 57th Congress, 1901-03.

_____. Committee reports, hearings, and acts corresponding thereto, 58th Congress, 1903-05.

_____. Committee reports, hearings, and acts corresponding thereto, 59th Congress, 1905-07.

_____. Committee reports, hearings, and acts corresponding thereto, 60th Congress, 1907-09.

House Committee on Ways and Means. Duties on Philippine products. Hearings before committee. January 23-28, and February 3, 1905. (Hearing on H. R. 17752.)

_____. Duties on Philippine products. Hearing before Committee, December 13-16, 18, 1905 (to which is appended the public hearings held in the Philippines, August, 1905.)

-
- . Duties on Philippine Products. Hearings before Committee, April 20, 1909 on the Philippine Tariff bill.

Senate Committee on the Philippines. Government of the Philippines, 63 Congress, 2 session, hearings on H. R. 18459, to declare purpose of the people of the United States as to the future political status of the people of the Philippine Islands and to provide a more autonomous government for the islands.

-
- . Government of the Philippines, hearings on S. 381, to declare the purpose of the people of the United States as to the future political status of the people of the Philippine Islands and to provide a more autonomous government for the islands. 64th Congress.

Senate Committee on the Philippines. Philippine independence, hearings before Committee on the Philippines, Senate, and Committee on Insular Affairs, House, held jointly, 66th Congress.

House Committee on Insular Affairs. Hearings on H. J. res. 131, H. R. 3924, H. J. Res. 127, and H. R. 2817, 68 Congress, 1 session. Philippine Independence.

Senate Committee on Territories and Insular Possessions. Hearings on S. 912, a bill providing for the withdrawal of the United States from the Philippine Islands. 68th Congress, 1 session.

House Committee on Insular Affairs. Hearing on H. R. 8856, a bill providing for Philippine local autonomy. 68 Congress, 1 session.

Senate Committee on Territories and Insular Possessions. Hearing on S. 2787, appointment of governors of non-Christian Provinces in the Philippine Islands. 70 Congress, 1 session. February 1, 1928.

-
- . Hearing on S. 756, Disposition of moneys collected as taxes upon articles coming into the United States from the Philippine Islands. 70th Congress, 1 session. December 16, 1927.

Senate Committee on Territories and Insular Possessions and House Committee on Insular Affairs, Joint hearing on S. 2292, Employment of Certain Civilian Assistants in Office of Governor General of the Philippine Islands, 70 Congress, 1 session.

Senate Committee on Commerce. Hearing pursuant to S. Res. 130, October 18-24, 1929, 71 Congress, 1 session. Extension of coastwise Shipping Laws of the United States to the Philippine Islands. 2 parts.

Senate Committee on Territories and Insular Possessions. Hearing on S. 204, S. 3108, S. J. Res. 113, S. Res. 199, S. 3379, and S. 3822, 71 Congress, 2 session. Independence for the Philippine Islands.

House Committee on Insular Affairs. Hearing on H. R. 7233, 72 Congress, 1 session. Independence for Philippine Islands.

Senate Committee on Territories and Insular Possessions. Hearing on S. 3377, 72 Congress, 1 session. Independence for the Philippine Islands.

Senate Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs. Hearing on S. 1028, 76 Congress, 1 session.

The above hearings are of considerable value in showing the trend of policy toward the Philippines and especially in showing public reaction to certain suggested policies such as free trade with the United States and independence.

The hearings before the House Ways and Means Committee from 1905 to 1909 indicate very effectively the reasoning of the tobacco and sugar interests in the matter of reduced duties on Philippine products.

The hearings before the House Committee on Insular Affairs from 1900- 1909 brings out considerable information on present and future Philippine policy. This information, coming at the time when the policy was being established, is of the greatest value.

The hearings from 1930 to 1932 show the reasons why the Philippines were given the promise of independence in 1946. The testimony of interested economic interests takes up the greater part of the space in the printed hearings.

Other hearings were held when information on certain specific

matters was desired. The information presented in this way was quite usable.

F. Miscellaneous Government Publications:

Annual report of the Governor General, Philippine Islands, 1917-1935.

Includes statement of conditions in the islands, problems presented and solved during the year, financial and other condition of the government, the reports of the secretaries of departments, and any other information the governor-general wishes to include. Wood in 1921 included the report of the Wood-Forbes mission. The report for 1923 includes the correspondence with the Filipino political leaders concerning the resignation of the Secretaries of departments. Other reports include information which indicate the progress of the controversy. Stimson's report for the year 1928 describes his work, problems, and accomplishments very ably. The reports present the idea of the governor-general as to what has been done that is worthy of mention with suggestions for improvement of conditions.

Annual report of the High Commissioner to the Philippine Commonwealth, 1935----

Less important since the High Commissioner had so much less to do with determination and execution of policy.

Annual report, Chief, Bureau of Unusual Affairs, 1902-1938.

Usually a brief summary of Philippine Commission and Governor General reports although occasionally including other material. Especially valuable for concise statement of exports, imports, etc. Very helpful as a source of information on railroad construction in period 1905 to 1919.

Annual report of Philippine Commission, 1900-1916.

The Jones act abolished the Philippine Commission which had been created by Executive Order of the President, (confirmed by Congress in 1901) to at first aid and later to be fully responsible for the government of the Philippines. Its reports, especially in the earlier period are among the finest sources of information on Philippine policy that are available. The reports tend to become rather standardized in content after the first and second Taft reports. This was to be expected, in part, since the policy also became more standardized. The reports thus would describe administration rather than policy formation as time elapsed.

Annual report of the President of the Philippines, 1935--

Policy in the administration of the Philippine Commonwealth by Filipinos could hardly be considered American Policy. These reports had little value in the preparation of this work.

Annual report of the Secretary of War, 1900-1938.

The same comment made for the reports of the Philippine Commission apply to the reports of the Secretary of War. They contain much valuable information, especially in the earlier period. The report for 1902 contains the instructions and negotiations of Taft with the Pope concerning the Friar lands. Other reports are equally valuable. When the Secretary of War made a trip to the islands, he usually issued a special report rather than including this information in his annual report thus the value of the annual reports is diminished.

Congressional Record, 55 Congress, 3 session, to 77 Congress, 1 session.

The Congressional Record is the authoritative record of Congressional action. It is an unexcelled source of information on motives for Congressional policy. Through debate, the reasons for action by members receive as full statement as they wish to give. The quotations made by the Congressmen are often valuable although the possibility of selected excerpts which would give a wrong impression of the point of view of the person quoted is not to be forgotten.

Correspondence relating to the War with Spain, including the Philippine expedition, and the China relief expedition. 3 volumes.

Volume 2 contains correspondence between the Department of War and the military commanders in the Philippines. Source of information on McKinley's Philippine policy as administered by the Army.

Executive Journal of the Senate.

Record of motions relating to consideration of treaty with Spain and of vote on amendments and the treaty.

Foreign Relations, 1898.

Contains record of negotiations of that calendar year. Authoritative source of diplomatic history, especially of relations with Spain; instructions transmitted through the French Ambassador, instructions to American peace commissioners, various proposals during the negotiations, and peace treaty as signed.

Joint Preparatory Committee on Philippine Affairs . Report of May 20, 1938. Four Volumes.

An excellent study of Philippine economic problems. An excellent group of recommendations considering the nature of the instructions which limited them to preparing the Philippine economy for a non-preferential position in the American market. The hearings held by the Committee reveal the nature of the economic forces at work. They are printed in the report.

Report of Philippine Commission, dated January 31, 1900.

This is the Schurman commission report, perhaps the best and most important report made by any group in the whole history of American sovereignty in the Philippines. It contains a wealth of information about the Philippines as well as recommendations of the most far-reaching importance. It includes information on all phases of the Philippine situation; economic, social, cultural, ethnological, educational, etc. It is also printed as Senate document 138, 56 Congress, 1 session.

United States Statutes at Large, 55 Congress, 3 session to 76 Congress, 1 session.

Official text of treaties as ratified and acts as they became law.

United States Tariff Commission. United States-Philippine tariff and trade relations. Report no 18 second series.

Prepared in 1931, this represents an excellent study of trade relations at that time with a brief background of previous policies.

. United States-Philippine trade with Special Reference to the Philippine Independence Act and other recent Legislation. Report no. 118 second series.

Published in 1937, this report is the finest survey of Philippine-American trade possibilities and difficulties available. It is authoritative and honest. It shows the complementary character of most Philippine production. The Joint Preparatory Committee made considerable use of this excellent report.

III. Newspaper Files.

New York Times, 1913 to 1941.

The files of the New York Times were extremely useful. They contain the statements of the men concerned in their true setting in relation to the events of the day. The practice followed by the Times of literal quotations of the exact words of the man making the statement is of great help. The wide sources of information which are combined to make up the content of the Times result in the reader obtaining a truer picture of the position of the Philippines in world affairs. All affairs relating to the Philippines obtain consideration, not just those occurring in Washington. For the Washington news during the sessions of Congress, the Times merely gives a brief resume of the material which appears in the Congressional Record and in Committee reports. The New York Times Index made the files of the Times speedily and conveniently available.

Rand McNally World Atlases and Indexed World Globes



KEEP up with the times . . . follow the news of the day on a Rand McNally indexed globe and atlas. Know where current events take place . . . double the pleasure and profit from your daily reading. Plan your journeys and refresh your travel memories with a globe and atlas.

A globe shows world relationships . . . an atlas gives detailed information. Both are necessary. A globe is the only true representation of the earth, correctly shaped, with oceans and continents in their proper locations and relative sizes. An atlas shows the smaller cities and towns, rivers, lakes, populations, and statistics that can't be put on a globe.



Rand McNally Indexed Globes and Atlases are the standards of accuracy and completeness. Accepted as high authority by those who know maps. Available in a wide variety of sizes, styles, and prices, there is an atlas and a globe for every purse and purpose.

See Rand McNally Atlases and Globes at your local bookstore, stationery store, or department store. Or write direct for catalogs.

RAND McNALLY & COMPANY

111 Eighth Avenue
NEW YORK

556 S. Clark Street
CHICAGO

559 Mission Street
SAN FRANCISCO

National Press Building
WASHINGTON

125 E. Sixth Street
LOS ANGELES

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

Pocket Map

Showing

Political Divisions, Cities
and Towns, Railroads,
Waterways, etc.

50c

RAND McNALLY and COMPANY

New York

111 Eighth Ave.



San Francisco

559 Mission St.

