

KENNETH BURKE AND THE DIALECTICAL TRADITION

by

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"The reform of consciousness exists merely in the fact that one makes the world aware of its consciousness, that one awakens the world out of its own dream, that one explains to the world its own acts."

Karl Marx, letter to Arnold Ruge

"What is involved, when we say what people are doing and why they are doing it?"

Kenneth Burke, opening statement,
A Grammar of Motives

"The rhetorical theoretician is condemned not only to being constantly reminded of formal logic but also to having to hear ad nauseum about dialectic. No one really knows what dialectic is, but it is an excellent word to use to bait the rhetorician. It suggests a domain of purer, more rigorous, more powerful arguments lying beyond the messy arena in which rhetoric holds sway. But the nature of dialectic is obviously in need of clarification. Dialectic cannot simply be whatever private preserve a philosopher may set up for arguments that he wishes to exempt from attack. At the same time, it would be a mistake if the removal of its privileged status resulted in the collapsing of dialectic back into rhetoric. In using the term, Plato, Aristotle, Hegel, and Marx were trying to tell us something. What they were trying to tell us, and what more there is to say on the relation between rhetoric and dialectic is a theme that I expect to see developed during the next few years."

Henry W. Johnstone, Jr., "Some Trends
in Rhetorical Theory."

"All enterprises are dialectical which would cure us through the medium of words--and all the more so if their words would cure by training us in the distrust of words."

Kenneth Burke, A Grammar of Motives

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Background and General Orientation

"By dialectics in the most general sense," writes Kenneth Burke in A Grammar of Motives, "we mean the employment of the possibilities of linguistic transformation."¹ "Or we may mean," he adds, "the study of such possibilities."² In the spirit of this definition, Burke not only restores the traditional Aristotelian relationship of dialectic and rhetoric as counterparts³ but also surpasses classical thought in his contention that language itself is profoundly dialectical, since it contains, in his estimation, all the possibilities for transcendence, separation, unification, naming, division, and so on.⁴ It is within the dialectical nature of a symbol system that ethical and moral concepts arise, that men endeavor to choose, to feel, to form attitudes. For Burke, as Marie Hochmuth Nichols has observed, "speech is a full moral act, grounded in man's biological and rational nature, living in and through dialectic."⁵

In a significant sense, Burke's insight into the dialectical nature of language provides an alliance with the symbolist perspective.⁶ First, his contention that language is moral in its basis coincides with the symbolistic imagination. That is, for Burke and the symbolists dialectic is understood as emanating from a language-ridden world; hence the conflict of ideas that marks dialectical activity takes place entirely

within a universe of discourse.⁷ Second, Burke basically aligns with the symbolistic position that "dialectic arises in an opposition of meaning which have been shaped by a structure of terms and it resolves the opposition by a further meaning."⁸ Third, as a consequence of the above mentioned insights, Burke holds, along with the symbolists, that the dialectical process, because of its roots in the very nature of language, is never-ending. It is, so to speak, a continuously spinning wheel of conflicts and resolutions. As Charles Feidelson has observed of the symbolic irony of dialectic, "each new resolution contains within itself the possibility of a new conflict."⁹

In light of these observations, Burke's dramatistic system has come to regard dialectic as an inextricable aspect of the drama of human relations. It permeates humanity's perpetual symbolic actions, where conflicts are sometimes resolved through the perspicacious manipulation of transcendent (encompassing) terms, but where, as well, hostilities are forged through the capricious or calculated use of divisive terms. For Burke, a wonder of language is the fact that it contains so many opportunities for merger and division. Indeed, in the dialectical sense, merger, which implies identification, is compensatory to division. It is because of the fact that identification and division exist ambiguously together, notes Burke, that both dialectic and rhetoric are essential ingredients in the human drama.¹⁰ For both, in the Aristotelian sense of these arts, deal with opposites.¹¹

Aside from this kinship to the symbolists, Burke deploys the resources of dialectic over the broad methodological landscape of his critical system. Although he agrees with the symbolists that language can be viewed as constituting an autonomous realm of meaning, he approaches and employs dialectic in some unique ways. In its most profound application, dialectic has shaped Burke's provocative dramatic-
-logological construct, which is simultaneously a critical system and a synoptic perception of the human symbolic condition. The construct deals with human propensities such as the establishment of order and hierarchies, categorical guilt and purification. Dialectic, in Burke's opinion, in some way pertains to all of these elements of existence. As William Rueckert has observed of Burke's perspective on language and dialectic:

From language, then, comes man's separation from his natural condition, his abstraction from the physical, the hierarchic psychosis, categorical guilt, and a great many other results, but through and by means of the various modes of dialectical, rhetorical, and symbolic purification ingrained in language, man can unify himself and the world, treat his hierarchic psychosis, and expiate his categorical guilt.¹²

This explanation of Burke's language-centered view of the world suggests that dramatism harbors its own brand of eschatology. It suggests, moreover, that dialectic, symbolic action, humanism, sin and redemption are themes that are intricately intertwined in a comprehensive vision of life. As Robert Murphy has noted, there is contained within the dialectical attitude toward life the story of man's fall from grace and

the promise of his redemption.¹³ Burke stands well within this orientation when he comprehends the drama of human relations as a secular, symbol-centered analogue to the Christian story of salvation.¹⁴

Kenneth Burke's life-long project of fashioning a critical system leading to the apprehension of the drama of human relations has been infused with messianism. For Burke has zealously pursued the accomplishment of a total vision which grasps the essence of man. The vision breeds humility and exhilaration, solemnity and euphoria, neo-stoicism and yet critical involvement in symbolic affairs. This demeanor is the result of Burke's years of dialectical preparation for an overarching insight into the human condition. It is the equivalent of the Greek "nous"¹⁵ or theoretical apprehension of things in their self-evident purity, a sublime moment which brings inner peace and a sense of the divine. In contrast to the traditional religious orientation, however, Burke accepts the fact that the drama cannot be overcome. Burke's concept of salvation, as Leland Griffin has noted, is hinged not to imminent world peace and total and complete moral and ethical accord but rather to the tragicomic realization that man, the rhetorical animal, is somehow "saved" in his acceptance of the recurring condition; he is "saved," that is, through the affirmation of the nobility of the "striving, the struggle itself."¹⁶

This is not to imply, however, that Burke is merely resigned to the world's travail. Actually, there is a strong activist dimension to Burke's life and work. The confirmed dialectician, as Mortimer Adler

has remarked, embodies the seemingly antithetical values of methodological impartiality and partisan spirit.¹⁷ He is somewhat like James in his partisan advocacy of his own philosophy and somewhat like Santayana in his detached contemplation of the significance of the whole issue.¹⁸ At one and the same time, he transcends a controversy to discern its meaning and thrusts himself into it as arguer of a position. Both activity and detachment are thus essential to dialectic. These two moods, which seem initially to be incongruous, ultimately appear as the active and passive phases of the same event.¹⁹

Burke's dialectical disposition has resulted in what William Rueckert has called a "both/and"²⁰ approach to art and life. It is a quality of mind which often offends adherents of formal Aristotelian logic who champion the inviolability of the law of contradiction. And yet Burke's "both/and" temperament aids in the clarification of his claim that dramatism is an attitude embodied in a method. His intellectual temperament bespeaks a special ability to blend meta-symbolics with the propagation of a theory of language as symbolic action. He fulfills the Aristotelian ideal of rational man as a combination metaphysician-scientist-political participant, one who dwells upon the laws of thought and the conditions of knowing, understands the special subject matter and how to demonstrate it, and operates in the realm of prudential conduct so as to apply theory and wisdom to human ethical and moral concerns.²¹ In Burke's own terms, this means a reflection upon the conditions of

language, an assessment of its nature as special subject matter, and the application of his wisdom and knowledge about linguistic activity to the various levels of human existence. From Counter-Statement²² to Language as Symbolic Action,²³ a span of over thirty five years, Burke's critical writings have served a theoretical and a persuasive function. He has, for example, fashioned a systematic theory of literature and a poetic theory built around the term "catharsis,"²⁴ but he has also endeavored to persuade his readership to understand if not accept the dramatic admonition that "perversions of the sacrificial principle (purgation by scapegoat, congregation by segregation) are the constant temptation of human societies, whose orders are built by a kind of animal exceptionally adept in the ways of symbolic action."²⁵

Thesis and Objectives of the Dissertation

It is primarily Burke's version of the symbolic drama of human relations that has attracted the attention of literary and rhetorical scholars during the past few decades. This is understandable, since Burke's ideas about literature, poetry, rhetoric and dialectic make little sense when divorced from the context of his massive and intricate dramatic-logical discipline. There remain, nonetheless, numerous areas in Burke's corpus that invite extensive and intensive examination. And certainly the subject of the sources of his dialectic qualifies as an area worthy of investigation.

The thesis of this study is that to a significant extent, dramatism has developed through Kenneth Burke's ability to integrate diverse philosophical methods and perspectives associated with the dialectical tradition into a language-centered system. The word "significant" is meant to suggest importance, consequence, notability. The word "extent" is used to denote "the degree to which" or "range of" something. In this case, the task is to ascertain how the sources of the dialectical tradition have been absorbed into and reconciled to a philosophy of language as symbolic action and to chart the impact of various dialectical methods and philosophies upon the essential elements of dramatism-logology.

The objectives of this dissertation are, then, to discuss how and with what effect to his system Burke has drawn upon dialectic and the dialectical tradition, to locate the dialectical ingredients in dramatism by assessing Burke as a dialectician, and to examine the ways in which specific philosophers and their dialectics have influenced Burke's world-view and critical methodology.

Nature of the Dissertation

In order to accomplish the objectives outlined above it is necessary to: (1) appreciate dialectic and its role in intellectual history, which, in turn, requires an appraisal of the dialectical tradition and the major philosophers involved in it; (2) explain the essentials of Kenneth Burke's dramatiastic-logological system; (3) assess the dialectical implications of this system from Burke's point of view and from an external vantage-point;

(4) chart the lines of influence by showing how various dialectical doctrines or methods have been utilized in dramatism's development.

The particular nature of this dissertation demands tasks that are both comprehensive and intricate. A basic comprehension of Burke's system must be achieved, and this necessitates an explication of his views on man, language, human relations, rhetorical theory and art, as well as an indication of his critical procedure in appraising the various artistic forms in symbolic life. Moreover, a survey of the dialectical tradition must be offered which accounts for the variety of approaches to dialectic and captures the contributions made to dialectical theory by outstanding philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, Marx, Dewey and Mead. The study concentrates on the lines of influence from these seven thinkers to dramatism, although the survey of the tradition covers additional philosophers and contributions to dialectical theory.

With respect to the seven philosophical sources, occasional points of convergence need to be drawn if the dissertation is to eventually substantiate the claim that Burke finds legitimate kinship between, say, Aristotle and Marx where little had previously been thought to exist. Which is to argue that Burke's success in integrating philosophically dissimilar ideas into his own framework may be attributed to his dialectical facility in finding, for example, Aristotelian strains in Marx and Dewey, Hegelian influences in Marx's and Dewey's modes of inquiry and

Kantian tendencies in the critical-skeptical procedures of Hegel, Marx and Dewey.²⁶

Finally both the common and unique dialectical contributions of Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, Marx, Dewey and Mead must be identified as substantive and/or methodological sources in the Burkeian corpus. Burke's writings during the "depression", for instance, exhibit a skepticism not unlike the critical-dialectical, antinomic method borrowed from Kant by a century of German and German-influenced philosophers.²⁷ Nevertheless, Burke's quest since the "thirties" has been for a synoptic vision of life.²⁸ This happens to be a prime characteristic of the dialectical tradition: an organic perspective that transcends the awesome, nagging dualisms of mind and body, subject and object, knower and what is to be known, etc., which have dogged Western civilization since Descartes.²⁹ Hegel, Marx and Dewey all sought the unifying principles which would resolve the perplexing ontological and epistemological cleavages that imperiled the integrity of philosophy. They concentrated on the merging of theory and practice in order to root the philosophical enterprise in "action" instead of staking its fate to "other-worldly" contemplation.³⁰ In this regard, Burke has emerged as an inheritor of European and American ventures to restore philosophy to the conditions of this life. The theory that language is symbolic action is a serious and altogether auspicious endeavor to implement "praxis"³¹ into the study of the symbolic world, into rhetorical theory and criticism, into literary and

poetic appraisal, and into the linguistic implications of ethical-moral conduct.

Organization of the Dissertation

The organization of the dissertation correlates with its objectives. Chapter II involves a survey of the dialectical tradition from Zeno to Mead and Dewey. A second segment of this chapter is devoted to a discussion of the relationship of dialectic to various philosophical constructs and assumptions and a consideration of those aspects of dialectic common to the multitude of philosophies associated with the tradition. A third segment of this chapter previews Burke's indebtedness to the dialectical tradition through a glimpse of themes and methods involved in dramatism.

Chapter III provides an explanation of Burke's dramatisitic system. It is structured according to Burke's views on man, language, the critical methodology of dramatism, the historical context of the drama of human relations, rhetoric, and social ideas.

Chapter IV contains a discussion of Burke as dialectician, as well as a consideration of the dialectical dimensions of dramatism. It covers, in order, Burke's definitions of dialectic, dialectic in relation to his views on man, dialectic in relation to his philosophy of language, dialectic and the major aspects of dramatism, such as movements and counter-movements, transcendence, form and substance, and ethics, dialectic and the methodology of the pentad, dialectic and Burke's views on rhetoric, and dialectic in relation to his social ideas.

Chapter V, which is the most comprehensive entity in the dissertation, offers an investigation of the dialectical sources of dramatism. It includes six distinct sections: Platonic dialectic and Burke, Aristotelian dialectic and Burke, Kantian dialectic and Burke, Hegelian dialectic and Burke, Marxian dialectic and Burke, and, finally, the dialectic of pragmatism and Burke, which is further divided into the respective influences of Mead and Dewey on dramatism.

Chapter VI concludes the study with an overall assessment of Kenneth Burke's dependence upon some outstanding themes and methods emanating from the dialectical tradition and by noting, in particular, his intellectual reliance upon Hegel and Marx.

Intended Contributions

It is hoped that this portrait of Burke as a dialectical philosopher will help to stimulate a wider and deeper appreciation of him as a student of language, philosopher of the human condition and sociologist of knowledge. Furthermore, it is hoped that this study will add to the growing view of Burke as a serious systematic thinker and thus in some measure serve to refute his detractors, who give minimal effort to a consideration of his ideas. Finally, it is hoped that this study will encourage subsequent investigation into the philosophical implications of dramatism and into, for instance, the dialectical significance of Burke's reliance upon Freud, Richards, Bergson, Emerson, Coleridge, Aquinas and Augustine.

Some years ago, Louis Fraiberg observed that Burke was "in the process of synthesizing a number of disparate disciplines into what he hopes will be a workable tool for the analysis of poetry."³² And William Rueckert added, somewhat later, that studies need to be undertaken which show how Burke is like "Freud, Marx, Coleridge, and Nietzsche--to name a few . . ."³³ Such studies, he suggested, might provide an understanding of Burke in new and significant ways. Perhaps this is the guiding motive of this study.

Methodological Problems

An important objective of this dissertation is the appraisal of Burke's encounter with the dialectics of Marx and Hegel. It raises the question: what is the significance of Burke's association with Marxian and Hegelian thinking in the overall development of the dramatic system? An additional question, flowing from the first, asks: how has it been possible for Burke to relate Marx and Hegel to classical, traditional and pragmatic philosophers whose world-views seem, in many ways, to contradict one another? Granted, Burke does not shy away from the challenge of integrating Coleridge, Freud, Richards, Kant, Aristotle and numerous others into the dramatic framework; indeed his capacity for incorporating diverse outlooks and fields of knowledge into dramatism has translated into a prolific career, marked by astonishing richness of conjectures and perspectives. Still, the attempt to find points of coordination between Marx and Hegel, on the one hand, and

other major philosophers, on the other hand, seems presumptuous enough to defy success. And yet Burke has managed to use all available dialectical sources in fostering the continuity of the symbol-oriented system.

The overriding problem in the analysis of Marxian and Hegelian influences on Burke resides not in the explication of Burke's own language-centered framework; this has been provided, cumulatively, by a number of scholars approaching Burke through a variety of interest areas: rhetoric, literary criticism, semantics, poetry, etc.. The problem centers on the fundamental interpretations of Marx and Hegel.³⁴ Both thinkers have become the subject of searching reappraisals and reexaminations during the past three decades.³⁵ And along with these reappraisals, some of which are thoroughly revisionist, have come new insights into the conceptual kinships of Marx and Hegel to a range of philosophical schools once held to be unequivocally alien to the formers' views of the world.³⁶ Which is to imply that if Burke has indeed been influenced by Marx and by Hegel during the development of dramatism-logology, then the question of how hinges upon a prior understanding of what Marx and Hegel actually thought. Whether Burke consciously or inadvertently championed ideas which have only of late been attributed to Marx and Hegel is not as crucial to this study as the disclosure of common themes and motifs.

During the "thirties", for example, Burke ventured a theory of action that has no small bearing on the concept of "praxis" -- an idea essential to the philosophies of Aristotle, Hegel and Marx, as well as

to Dewey and Mead.³⁷ Only in the last twenty years, however, has there been sufficient scholarship on the concept, which opens the way for new comparisons between Burke and these philosophers. Only in the past twenty years, moreover, have there been serious attempts to link Marxian naturalism and humanism with the philosophy of John Dewey, albeit the outstanding divergence in political creed.³⁸ And yet Burke's speculations in the "thirties", in Counter-Statement, in Permanence and Change, and in Attitudes towards History especially, suggest a hearty effort on his part to harmonize aspects of Marx's thought with Dewey's instrumentalism.³⁹ At the time, Burke's efforts in this direction seemed ideologically perverse; at the very least they seemed theoretically ludicrous to many of his readers and critics.⁴⁰ And yet from the contemporary vantage-point, the problem lay not so much in Burke's unbridled desire to absorb everything into an inordinately expansive literary-critical framework as in the then prevalent misunderstanding of what Marx and Hegel actually had said, apart from the interpretations offered by rigidly doctrinaire adherents of Marxism-Leninism.

The influential interpretations of Marx and Hegel, during the years when Burke groped for a coherent, comprehensive system, were mired down in dialectical materialism or idealism. But crucial manuscripts and philosophical works eventually emerged, to be subsequently translated, which cast doubt upon the narrow and orthodox portraits of both thinkers. After World War II, recently uncovered and translated works of Marx and

Hegel came to the attention of European and American scholars who eventually saw in Marx's philosophical manuscripts of 1844,⁴¹ for example, an indication of a deeply humanistic approach to the world. These manuscripts afforded the academic community new insights into the valuative dimension of Marx's writings on political economy.⁴² Similarly, reappraisals and translations of Hegel's work led to intensive investigations into his impact upon existentialism,⁴³ upon Dewey's logic,⁴⁴ and upon Marx's social and political thought.⁴⁵ In addition, the new appraisals and translations of Hegel provoked studies concerning his influence on Ernst Cassirer⁴⁶ and other philosophers attuned to the issues of symbolic form, language, logic and conceptualization.

Burke's intellectual development includes the subtle fact that he intuited much of Marx's humanistic and aesthetic perspective in the midst of a political climate when Marxism was either pandered or vilified as the "dialectics of nature." This particular doctrine, as most scholars of Marx readily concede, was fashioned by Engels and then interpreted by Plekhanov, embraced by Lenin and Trotsky, and espoused by Stalin, but is certainly not a contribution of Marx himself.⁴⁷ By a remarkable coincidence, Burke's attempt to establish a poetic-humanistic world-view derived from Marx, without the benefit of the then buried⁴⁸ 1844 philosophical manuscripts and the "Grundrisse,"⁴⁹ parallels in boldness the original attempts of Georg Lukacs⁵⁰ and Karl Korsch⁵¹ to intuit the

philosophical and aesthetic foundations of Marx's thought during the repressive party orthodoxy of the "twenties".

Limitations of the Study and Review of Contemporary Approaches to Burke

This pursuit of the dialectical influences on Burke is tempered by a respect for the awesome scope and complexity of his work. The full appreciation of Burke's mind--he manifests the intellectually omnivorous capability of digesting, coordinating and reconciling varied and disparate philosophies within the framework of dramatism--comes only after a life-time in contemplation of the range and implications of his system. Each encounter with one of his ideas stimulates further and often tangential inquiries, such as into the importance of Aristotle in Mead's theory of the significant symbol⁵² or the relevance of the Bergsonian "No" to the dialectical nature of language.⁵³

A discussion of scholarly limitations is in order. Burke's corpus defies immediate comprehension of the full meaning of an idea. His views on order and hierarchy, for example, make little sense when considered apart from his views on the negative, categorical guilt, redemption, etc. Serious students of dramatism are sobered to the necessity of unraveling the implications of his work over a period of years. It is an onerous venture merely to chart the ways in which dialectical philosophers and those using dialectic in auxiliary ways have provided Burke with bases for his most seminal ideas and critical methods.

This study is not intended as a defense of Burke's political convictions, particularly his affiliation with Marxism in the "thirties." Burke's early political speculations may be attributed to his penchant for "larking"; in creating dramatism, Burke has often titillated, infuriated, baffled, exhausted, dispirited or enraptured his critics with unabashed conjectures about man and the symbolic world. Burke, as William Rueckert has observed, moves forward by "multiple side excursions."⁵⁴ To purify him, therefore; contends Rueckert, "is not only a matter of hacking through the stylistic and terminological underbrush, but of finding and then mapping the main route."⁵⁵

Nor is this study a defense of or an apology for Burke's literary theory and critical technique. The "Burke-Sickness",⁵⁶ about which Rueckert has warned, leads either to hysterical enthusiasm or to hysterical anger, and both extremes preclude a judicious and measured discussion of a serious mind. Burke, as those who have known him personally attest, is a magnanimous and compassionate man and, on this basis alone, deserves dispassionate critique.

Further, it is not the intent of this study to promote Burke as essentially a Marxist or Hegelian critic. Burke has chosen to call himself a dramatist-logologist, and considerate scholars appraising his work have so honored his own definition of his thought and methodology. In order to facilitate the comprehension of his system, as it has evolved, Burke advanced the outline of dramatism in "Linguistic Approach to

Problems of Education," in 1955,⁵⁷ and then offered a more substantial version of his life-work in 1968 in The International Encyclopædia of the Social Sciences.⁵⁸

The essentials of Burke's system have been sufficiently explicated through the combined efforts of scholars such as William Rueckert,⁵⁹ Hugh Dalziel Duncan,⁶⁰ Marie Hochmuth Nichols,⁶¹ Leland Griffin,⁶² Armin Paul Frank⁶³ and Stanley Edgar Hyman.⁶⁴ All have written about Burke's commitment to a language-centered view of the world, which began to congeal after A Rhetoric of Motives, in 1950.⁶⁵ Burke's system, while incorporating the ideas of Marx, Hegel, Kant and countless others, culminates in a vision of the drama of human relations as it is reflected in the verbal antics of mankind. Burke thus defines man, not within the context of Absolute Idea or Spirit, not in the terminology of class-conflict and political economy, but in the linguistic context of the symbol-making and symbol-using animal. From this definition, as Malcolm Cowley noted, Burke's system "exfoliates in all directions."⁶⁶ Appraising Burke's contributions in 1950, Cowley concluded:

Already it has its own methodology (called "dramatism"), its own esthetics (based on the principle that works of art are symbolic actions), its logic and dialectics, its ethics (or picture of the good life) and even its metaphysics, which Burke prefers to describe as a meta-rhetoric.⁶⁷

William Rueckert's assessment of the meaning of Burke's system reaches conclusions similar to Cowley's:

Burke selects the poetic verbal act, particularly drama, as the ideal or perfect verbal act . . . and derives a whole system from the contemplation of drama.⁶⁸

Within the construct of dramatism, Burke has managed, moreover, to develop theories of tragedy and catharsis. He has provided a panorama of the human travail and has tracked the critical moments of man's movements: Order, Guilt and the Negative, through Victimage and Mystification, to Catharsis and Redemption.⁶⁹ He has, in addition, produced a theory of tragedy as the representative anecdote.⁷⁰ He has tied to this theory the important systemic concepts of mystery and hierarchy.⁷¹ In summing up the significance of Burke's outlook, Rueckert has emphasized its resemblance to religion. The entire system, says Rueckert, serves as a secular variant of Christianity:

The whole dramatisitic system is laid out on a moral-ethical, Christian-Catholic bias, and is presented in such a way as to make perfectly clear Burke's belief that he has developed a new 'scientific' religion which twentieth century man can 'believe' in, but which, unlike the old one it replaces, is designed to save man in this world.⁷²

What with Burke's unique approach to the problems of the age, it is not surprising that he should be written about as "so thoroughly sui-generis that it is difficult to fit him into any contemporary philosophical pigeon-hole."⁷³ It is hardly surprising that Burke should be likened to Thoreau as a critic who beats out "his own rhythms to the music of his own times. And he has an unusually fine ear."⁷⁴ It is hardly surprising,

moreover, that Burke should be acknowledged for the "brilliantly original qualities of his mind;"⁷⁵ that he should be acclaimed "the seminal figure of our time in the field of symbolic analysis."⁷⁶ Finally, Burke's originality in dealing with the intellectual issues of the time has led to the observation that "he cannot be stuffed into any of the bins whose occupancy brings fame and fortune in the groves of academe."⁷⁷

Needless to say, Burke's originality and conceptual meanderings have provoked extensive controversy over the intelligibility and worth of his offerings. "He is at once one of the most compact and one of the most 'panoramic' writers of our time", observed Duncan.⁷⁸ "He makes his points in highly aphoristic style and, therefore, is highly quotable. But this very compactness creates a density of meaning that exhausts every resource of the reader . . ."⁷⁹ Small wonder, then, that admirers and opponents alike admit the difficulty in conceptualizing Burke's system and mention the controversies engendered by his bold speculations. "Burke's mind," said Rueckert, "is such that he is almost incapable of resisting the temptation of the many side roads which he comes on in all his intellectual journeys . . ."⁸⁰ And Marie Hochmuth Nichols, an ardent admirer of Burke's contributions to rhetorical theory, has conceded that he is "difficult and often confusing. He cannot be understood by casual reading of his various volumes."⁸¹ Confusion occurs, suggests Nichols, "because of the compactness of Burke's writing, uniqueness of organizational patterns, penetration of his thought and breadth of his endeavors."⁸²

Merle Brown, who has issued strong criticism of Burke, states unhesitatingly that he is "probably the most controversial literary figure of the past fifty years in America."⁸³

Finally, this study is not intended as a definitive statement on Burke. First of all, a definitive work would have to assess Burke's contributions in every phase of artistic and intellectual life: his stories, poems, music criticism, rhetorical theory, and so on. Second, a definitive work would have to unravel the subject's complex mentality, but this requires, in Rueckert's words, a very special ability "to locate and accurately render the strange mixture of tensions which make up Burke's mind."⁸⁴ Third, a definitive work usually builds upon the considerable area-studies on the subject that have been produced by a scholarly community. And yet, except for the excellent books and articles published on Burke by those already cited, plus a few others, the secondary literature on Burke, as Hugh Dalziel Duncan lamented in 1965, "is neither notable nor voluminous."⁸⁵ As Duncan observed: "That a thinker of Burke's stature should have evoked so little serious and intense commentary is a sad reflection on American intellectual life."⁸⁶ As for Burke's reputation on the European continent, Armin Paul Frank observed that his reception there "has been even less notable than in America."⁸⁷

Paradoxically, those who stress the importance of understanding the "whole" Burke also emphasize the limited nature of their own incursions into his life and labors. On the one hand, Burkeian scholars

assert that he must be read as a whole to understand what he says about language, social order, literature, etc.; Marie Hochmuth Nichols, for instance, warns that Burke "cannot be understood by casual reading of his various volumes"⁸⁸ and then suggests that a partial acquaintance with his work can only thwart comprehension "because of the specialized meanings attaching to various words and phrases."⁸⁹ On the other hand, most of the ardent explicators of Burke's corpus have moved cautiously to concentrate on dimensions of his life-work. Rueckert unashamedly announced his "purely intrinsic" approach to Burke which is "so devoted to his literary theory and critical practice and so severely limited to a particular presentation of them that it may also be cause for wonder."⁹⁰ Duncan, for his part, borrowed heavily from Burke to fashion a symbolist-methodology as the gateway to the understanding of both the how and why of communication in social structure and order. Here again, the scholarly effort was ultimately compressed into the championing of Burke for his contributions to the tradition of Peirce, James, Dewey, Cooley and Mead.⁹¹ Stanley Edgar Hyman, who proclaimed Burke to be "the finest literary critic in the world, and perhaps the finest since Coleridge,"⁹² and who was the first to grasp the systematic nature of Burke's language-philosophy in The Armed Vision, nevertheless channeled his discussion of the dramatist to literary theory and critical practice.⁹³ Marie Hochmuth Nichols extricated the implications of Burke's system for a modern rhetoric, and yet she ended her influential article in The Quarterly Journal of Speech

on the note that "the most that one can achieve is to signify his importance as a theorist and critic and to suggest the broad outlines of his work."⁹⁴ Armin Paul Frank, who suggested that the diminution of the bi-polar East-West confrontation and the subsequent reappearance of internal factionalist pressures in the various nation-states might help to put Burke's writings about, say, the "psycho-rhetorical principles of party controversy"⁹⁵ into the public's consciousness, also cautioned readers about the limitations of his study. Approaching Burke with the same type of deep admiration and affection manifested by Rueckert and Duncan, Frank, in his "Twayne Series" biography of Burke, concentrated on the subject's literary significance and the general implications of dramatism-logology.⁹⁶ Ieland Griffin synthesized and then applied Burke's system to the analysis of movements,⁹⁷ much as Francis Fergusson had previously related Burke's methodology to the critical appraisal of the theatre.⁹⁸ In both cases, Burke was applied significantly to specific fields of knowledge, which bespeaks the abilities of Griffin and Fergusson to grasp the essentials of an intricate language-centered philosophy. But, here too, the applications were made with the concession that a large part of Burke remained unexamined.

Justifications for the Study

In keeping with the respective endeavors of Rueckert, Duncan, Nichols, Hyman, Frank and Griffin, as well as the other Burke-scholars thus far mentioned, this dissertation establishes a particular vantage-

point. The justification resides in the intent to expand the appreciation of Burke and the dramatic-logical system through the discussion of the sources for and influences upon his dialectics. If, as Armin Paul Frank has contended, Burke's intellectual procedure is "syncretistic",⁹⁹ then how and why has he been able to reconcile so many diverse and disparate philosophies along the way to the perfecting of dramatism? Specifically, the "syncretistic" mentality is noted for its ability to combine different forms of belief and practice, and Burke has certainly combined a multitude of different ideas and frameworks into his massive system. The task of this study is to provide insights into the impact of the dialectics of Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, Marx, Dewey and Mead upon the fashioning of Burke's philosophy. What makes this study imperative is that Burke himself often "covers his dialectical tracks," so to speak, after employing the Pentad to unravel some philosophical school's rationalistic structure. As Francis Fergusson so aptly observed of Burke in a critique of A Grammar of Motives: "He is a dialectician who cleans up after himself so well, as he goes along, that both dialectic and dialectician have disappeared when all is over."¹⁰⁰

What, then, of the particular justifications for appraising Marxian and Hegelian influences on Burke? How can the intensive examination of these sources serve to broaden the understanding of Burke's corpus? The answers to these questions must be prefaced by the observation that a bevy of critics have already suggested Marxian and Hegelian influences

in Burke without, however, pursuing the theoretical and methodological significance of such sources. It is noteworthy that while he rightfully asserted that "Burke is not a Marxist (or a Freudian for that matter), though he has used--and continues to use--some of Marx's ideas," William Rueckert, has also admitted that "the influence of Marx or perhaps 'theoretical communism' on Burke has been profound."¹⁰¹ Rueckert's statement is substantiated by Stanley Edgar Hyman's observation that "Burke has drawn heavily on Marxism in all his books while at the same time criticizing its mechanical simplifications . . ."¹⁰² "Marx himself is one of Burke's heroes," added Hyman, "a great dramatist or impresario."¹⁰³

What makes the examination of Marxian influences on Burke so unpromising to many scholars is the memory of the plethora of perplexed and exasperated reactions to his political pronouncements of the "thirties." Most critics, to put it mildly, were genuinely baffled by Burke's "unique" approach to Marx. And yet, as previously argued, the predominant American perspective of Marx during the depression years, and up until this decade, was conditioned by both pro-Marxist and anti-Marxist dogma and propaganda. The portrait of Marx accepted by the intellectual community-at-large was the one advanced by strident programists and militants. But Burke defied the doctrinaire presentations of Marxism and sought a personal affiliation with Marx so as to give the emerging symbol-oriented system a humanistic-poetic aura. Such being the case, it is

understandable that Henry Bamford Parkes would define Burke as an un-Marxist Marxist who "rejects the two most significant features of the Marxist cosmology which give it an appearance of optimism and of rationality--beneficence of history or the economic interpretation of history."¹⁰⁴ Similarly, it is understandable, through hindsight, that Walter Sutton could depict Burke's Marxism as "a commitment curiously qualified and perhaps neutralized" because it was grounded in a philosophy of "being" rather than a philosophy of "becoming".¹⁰⁵ Looking back, it is understandable that John Crowe Ransom,¹⁰⁶ Charles Glicksberg¹⁰⁷ and Crane Brinton¹⁰⁸ would all suggest that Burke's conceptual flirtation with Communism was "mild". Given Burke's rather eccentric liaison with the political tenets of Marxism, as then generally interpreted, it is not so astonishing that he would be vilified by Sidney Hook in the following, supremely condescending passage:

I cannot give Burke credit for his socialist intentions--not yet. I am prepared to give him credit, if he asks for it, for not taking pennies from a blind man's cup or not scalping his grandmother. But I refuse to give him credit for his "socialism"--until I know what kind of socialism he believes in!¹⁰⁹

Having suggested Burke's reliance on Marx and the often confused reaction to his aberrant political speculations of the "thirties", the question arises as to why no one has ventured a special examination of this source of Burke's thinking. As previously noted, William Rueckert called for scholarship into the sources and influences on Burke which would

match, in intent, Virginia Holland's¹¹⁰ comparison of Burke and Aristotle.

Said Rueckert:

If others would undertake this with Freud, Marx, Coleridge, Nietzsche to name a few, we would certainly be able to understand and see Burke in new and significant ways.¹¹¹

This charge is equally applicable to an examination of the influence of Hegel's thought on Burke. Armin Paul Frank, for one, has stated that Burke's dramatism "is in many ways tantamount to a translation of Hegelian dialectics,"¹¹² but nowhere is this "translation" fully explored. Years ago, John Crowe Ransom conjectured that "Hegel's logic, more than drama, is the classical locus for Burke's dialectic,"¹¹³ but he refrained from elaborating upon this theme. Because the post-World War II reappraisals of Hegel by Hyppolite,¹¹⁴ Kaufmann,¹¹⁵ and Findlay¹¹⁶ have reached American scholars, as well as Alexandre Kojève's¹¹⁷ pre-war lectures on Hegel's phenomenology, it is perhaps time to rejoin the issue of the Hegelian impact upon Kenneth Burke.

Summary

In summary, this chapter has provided an introduction to the dissertation, "Kenneth Burke and the Dialectical Tradition." Sections within the chapter have been devoted to background and general orientation, thesis and objectives, the nature of the dissertation, its organization, intended contributions, methodological problems, limitations of the study and review of contemporary approaches to Burke, and justifications for the dissertation.

The chapter that follows presents a survey of the dialectical tradition, relates dialectic to philosophical methods, and previews Kenneth Burke's indebtedness to this tradition.

NOTES

CHAPTER I

1. Kenneth Burke, A Grammar of Motives, (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1945), p. 402.
2. Ibid.
3. See Aristotle, Rhetorica, tr. Rhys Roberts, The Works of Aristotle, ed. W. D. Ross, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1946), 1354^a 1-7. Burke covers the Aristotelian relationship of rhetoric and dialectic in A Rhetoric of Motives, (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1950), pp. 53-54. His use of Aristotle in fashioning a "new rhetoric" is noted, for example, in Marie Hochmuth [Nichols], "Kenneth Burke and the 'New Rhetoric'," The Quarterly Journal of Speech XXXVIII (1952), pp. 133-144.
4. See "II, Dialectic in General", A Grammar of Motives, pp. 402-444.
5. Marie Hochmuth Nichols, "Burkeian Criticism", in Essays on Rhetorical Criticism, ed. Thomas R. Nilsen, (New York: Random House, 1968), p. 78.
6. In another respect, Burke clearly disassociates himself from the tendency of the Symbolist movement to stress "the unreality of the world in which we live, as though nothing could be what it is but must always be something else . . ." The Philosophy of Literary Form, 2nd ed. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1967), p. 8. On the nature and contributions of the Symbolist movement, see Charles Feidelson, Jr., Symbolism and American Literature, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953). Cf. Martin Foss, Symbol and Metaphor in Human Experience, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949); Wilbur M. Urban, Language and Reality, (New York: Macmillan Co., 1939); William Wimsatt, Jr. and Cleanth Brooks, Literary Criticism: A Short History, Vintage Books, (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1957), pp. 583-609, 699-720.
7. Feidelson, op. cit., p. 68. See also A Grammar of Motives, p. xix. "Distinctions, we might say, arise out of a great central moltenness, where all is merged. They have been thrown from a liquid center to the surface, where they have congealed. Let one of these crusted distinctions return to its source, and in this alchemic center it may be remade, again' becoming molten liquid, and may enter into new combinations,

whereat it may be again thrown forth as a new crust, a different distinction."

8. Feidelson, op. cit.

9. Ibid. See also Mortimer J. Adler, Dialectic (London: Kegan Paul, Trench Trubner and Co., 1927). Adler's view of dialectic as a particular kind of intellectual activity relating to meaning rather than the facts of the empirical world provides the basis for Feidelson's discussion of the dialectics of symbolism, as well as the basis for Richard Weaver's discussion of dialectic in The Ethics of Rhetoric, (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1953), esp. pp. 27-32.

10. A Rhetoric of Motives, esp. "I The Range of Rhetoric", pp. 3-46.

11. Ibid., p. 25. The ambiguous relationship of identification and division is a characteristic invitation to rhetoric, notes Burke, and "is a major reason why rhetoric, according to Aristotle, 'proves opposites'." Cf. Friedrich Solmsen, "Notes on Aristotle's Rhetoric," in The Province of Rhetoric, ed. Joseph Schwartz and John Rycenga, (New York: Ronald Press, 1965), pp. 128-137.

12. William H. Rueckert, Kenneth Burke and the Drama of Human Relations, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1963), p. 137.

13. See Robert F. Murphy, The Dialectics of Social Life (New York: Basic Books, 1971).

14. Rueckert, op. cit., pp. 132-134.

15. "Nous" is a kind of intuition or apprehension of truth. For Aristotle, in particular, it represents the grasping of first principles as the culmination of a dialectical investigation into the subject matter of a theoretical science. The mind comprehends a thing's substance, its being-what-it-is. It sees the universal in the perceived particular. On scientific demonstration and intuition, see Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, tr. G. R. G. Mure, The Works of Aristotle, ed. W. D. Ross, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1949), 100^b 5-15. Cf. Marjorie Grene, A Portrait of Aristotle, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), pp. 109-112, 241-247.

On Burke's approximation of "Nous", see Rueckert, op. cit., pp. 139-140; and Rhetoric of Motives, p. 333. The final step in Burke's system is from dialectics to hierarchy, to a cosmological vision of

universal order. The transition from A Grammar of Motives to A Rhetoric of Motives is itself a kind of passage from the dialectical discord of competing voices to a hierarchy or sequence or evaluative series resembling the idea of the "Great Chain of Being". The hierarchic phase leads to apprehension of the guiding idea or unitary principle, headed "in God as the beloved cynosure and sinecure, the end of all desire".

16. Leland M. Griffin, "A Dramatistic Theory of the Rhetoric of Movements", in Critical Responses to Kenneth Burke, 1924-1966, ed. William H. Rueckert, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1969), p. 472.

17. Adler, op. cit., pp. 128-129.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

20. See Rueckert, Kenneth Burke and the Drama of Human Relations, pp. 8-33.

21. For Aristotle, a man who is both metaphysician and scientist, possesses speculative wisdom and the virtue of the theoretical soul and thus his thought is one with the universe as it really is. See G. R. G. Mure, Aristotle, (London: Methuen, 1932), pp. 215-216. Cf. Richard McKeon, "Aristotle's Concept of the Development and the Nature of Scientific Method", Journal of the History of Ideas, VIII (1947), pp. 3-44.

22. Counter-Statement, (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1931); 2nd ed. (Los Altos, California: Hermes Publications, 1953); Phoenix paperback, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957); paperback, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968).

23. Language as Symbolic Action: Essays on Life, Literature and Method, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966).

24. See Rueckert, Kenneth Burke and the Drama of Human Relations, esp. pp. 163-226, for a discussion of how Burke developed his theories of imitation, poetic language, language, catharsis, tragedy, metaphor, symbolism, and form and also how he has applied his dramatic method of literary analysis, "indexing", to various novels, poems, dramas, speeches, etc.

25. Kenneth Burke, "Dramatism", International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. 7, (New York: Macmillan and Fress Press, 1968), p. 451.

26. The dialectical sources of dramatism are suggested in all of his critical works, but "Part Three--On Dialectic", A Grammar of Motives, pp. 323-441, contains the most thorough discussion of the term and suggests numerous philosophical influences.

27. See Richard McKeon, "Dialectic and Political Thought and Action", Ethics, LXV (October, 1954), pp. 1-33. Kant's skeptical dialectic influenced Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, although these three eventually fashioned their own brands of dialectic. Kant's influence on Marx is indirect. Ibid., pp. 13-14. On the relationship of Hegelian to Marxian dialectic, see Sidney Hook, From Hegel to Marx: Studies in the Intellectual Development of Karl Marx, Ann Arbor paperback ed. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1960), pp. 61-77, and Herbert Marcuse, Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory, Beacon paperback ed. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960), pp. 312-322.

Burke's two books of the "mid-thirties" are perhaps the most politically Marxist of his entire corpus. See Permanence and Change: An Anatomy of Purpose (New York: New Republic, 1935); rev. ed. with new preface and appendix, (Los Altos, California: Hermes Publications, 1954); rev. paperback ed. (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965); and Attitudes towards History, (New York: New Republic, Inc., 1937), 2 vols.; rev. 2nd ed. (Los Altos, California: Hermes Publications, 1959); Beacon paperback, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1961).

28. Rueckert; Kenneth Burke and the Drama of Human Relations, p. 129.

29. See Harry Prosch, The Genesis of Twentieth Century Philosophy, (New York: Doubleday, 1964), pp. 44-47. On the attempts of various dialectics to transcend dualism, see McKeon, "Dialectic and Political Thought and Action", op. cit., pp. 13-16.

30. See Richard J. Bernstein, Praxis and Action, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971).

31. Ibid. Cf. Nicholas Lobkowitz, Theory and Practice: History of a Concept From Aristotle to Marx, (Notre Dame, Indiana: Notre Dame Press, 1967). Both Bernstein and Lobkowitz draw upon the Aristotelian concept of "praxis" as the practical application of a discipline--a discipline whose end, or "telos" is successful performance, especially in political and ethical life.

32. Louis Fraiberg, Psychoanalysis and American Literary Criticism, (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1960), p. 183. Cf. pp. 184-190, 199-201.

33. Editor's note, Critical Responses to Kenneth Burke, 1924-1966, pp. 307-308.

34. The literature on Hegel and Marx is vast and extremely varied. For astute discussions of Hegelian philosophy, see, for example, J. N. Findlay, Hegel: A Re-examination, (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1958); Jean Hyppolite, Studies on Marx and Hegel, tr. John O'Neill, (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1969); Walter Kaufmann, Hegel: Reinterpretation, Texts, and Commentary, (New York: Doubleday, 1965); Alexander Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, ed. Allan Bloom and tr. James H. Nichols, Jr., (New York: Basic Books, 1969); Marcuse, op. cit.; John McTaggart, A Commentary on Hegel's Logic, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1910).

For accessible translations of the Hegelian corpus, see Hegel's Philosophy of Right, tr. with notes by T. M. Knox, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953); Hegel's Science of Logic, tr. A. V. Miller, (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1969); The Logic of Hegel, tr. William Wallace, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1892); The Phenomenology of Mind, tr. with introduction by J. B. Baillie, 2nd rev. ed., (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1949); Reason in History: A General Introduction to the Philosophy of History, tr. with introduction by Robert S. Hartman, (New York: The Liberal Press, 1953).

On Hegel's impact upon Nineteenth Century thought, see Karl Lowith, From Hegel to Nietzsche, tr. David E. Green, Anchor Books ed., (New York: Doubleday, 1967).

Excellent introductions to Marx's thought include Isaiah Berlin, Karl Marx: His Life and Environment, 2nd ed., (London: Oxford University Press, 1948); Ernst Bloch, On Karl Marx, tr. John Maxwell, (New York: Herder and Herder, 1971); Henri Lefebvre, The Sociology of Marx, (New York: Vintage Books, 1969); George Lichtheim, The Concept of Ideology, (New York: Vintage Books, 1967); David McLellan, The Thought of Karl Marx: An Introduction, (New York: Harper and Row, 1971); Nathan Rotenstreich, Basic Problems of Marx's Philosophy, (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Marrill, 1965); Robert Tucker, The Marxian Revolutionary Idea, (New York: Norton, 1969). An excellent collection of essays on Marx may be found in Marx and the Western World, ed. Nicholas Lobkowitz, (Notre Dame, Indiana: Notre Dame Press, 1967).

The Marxian corpus is enormous. The following works are most notable: Capital, tr. Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling, ed. Frederick Engels, 3 vols., (New York: International Publishers, 1967); Grundrisse der Kritik der Politischen Ökonomie, 2 vols., (Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute, Moscow, 1939). [Reissued in one volume (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1953)]; Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations, tr. Jack Cohen and ed. with introduction by E. J. Hobstawn, (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1964); The Poverty of Philosophy, tr. H. Quelch, (Chicago: Charles H. Kerr, 1910); Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society, ed. Loyd D. Easton and Kurt H. Guddat, Anchor Books ed., (New York: Doubleday, 1967). Cf. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The German Ideology, ed. R. Pascal, (New York: International Publishers, 1933); Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Historish-Kritische Gesamtausgabe, ed. D. Rjzanov and V. Adoratskij, (Frankfurt-Berlin: Marx-Engels Verlag, 1927-32). [Referred to by Marxian Scholars as MEGA]; Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Werke, Vols. I-XXXIX, (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1956-).

35. Reconsiderations of Hegel include: Findlay, op. cit.; Kaufmann, op. cit.; Kojève, op. cit.; Marcuse, op. cit. Cf. Kenley Dove, "Hegel's Phenomenological Method," The Review of Metaphysics, XXIII, (June 1970); Gustav Mueller, "The Hegel Legend of 'Thesis-Antithesis-Synthesis'," Journal of the History of Ideas, XIX, (June, 1958).

Reappraisals of Marx have centered on his early philosophical perspective, his indebtedness to Hegel, his theory of alienation and especially the point that his philosophy of man underpins his massive economic studies. See, for example, Schlomo Avineri, The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968); Louis Dupre, The Philosophical Foundations of Marxism, (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1966); Erich Fromm, Marx's Conception of Man, with a translation of the "Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts" by T. B. Bottomore, (New York: Frederick Ungar, 1961); Karl Korsch, Marxism and Philosophy, tr. with introduction by Fred Halliday, (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970); David McLellan, The Young Hegelians and Karl Marx, (London: Macmillan, 1969); Istvan Meszaros, Marx's Theory of Alienation, (London: Merlin Press, 1970); Robert C. Tucker, Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx, 2nd ed., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972).

A significant dialogue among German Protestant theologians over the religious, humanistic and philosophical implications of Marx's early manuscripts has developed in the past two decades. See, Marxismusstudien, ed. Iring Fetscher, 2 vols., (Tubingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1954).

The outstanding article on the relationship of philosophical reinterpretations of Hegel and Marx to the understanding of their respective dialectics is Louis Dupre, "Dialectical Philosophy Before and After Marx," New Scholasticism, XLVI, (Autumn, 1972).

36. Bernstein, op. cit., makes the ambitious attempt to find points of philosophical convergence in Hegel, Marx, Sartre, Peirce, Dewey, and the analytical philosophers.

37. Ibid., for a discussion of "praxis" and its importance in four philosophic movements: Marxism, existentialism, pragmatism, and analytic philosophy.

38. See, James Collins, "Humanistic Naturalism in Marx and Dewey," in Crossroads in Philosophy, Gateway ed. (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1962), pp. 220-251. Cf. Jim Cork, "John Dewey and Karl Marx," in John Dewey: Philosopher of Science and Freedom: A Symposium, ed. Sidney Hook, (New York: The Dial Press, 1950), pp. 331-350.

39. See, Permanence and Change, pp. 37-49, for an early Burkeian attempt to integrate Marx and Dewey into a theory of "occupational psychosis". Burke's attitudes toward Marxism and pragmatic liberalism permeate Philosophy of Literary Form which is essentially a compilation of articles and reviews written in the late "thirties". Cf. pp. 305-328, 379-394.

40. See, for example, Charles I. Glicksberg, "Kenneth Burke: The Critic's Critic", The South Atlantic Quarterly, XXXVI (1937), pp. 74-84; Sidney Hook, "The Technique of Mystification", Partisan Review, IV (December, 1937), pp. 57-62; Margaret Schlauch, "Review of Attitudes toward History, Science and Society, II (1937-38), pp. 128-132; Henry Bamford Parkes, The Pragmatic Test: Essays on the History of Ideas, (San Francisco: Colt Press, 1941), pp. 202-220.

41. The philosophical manuscripts of 1844 are contained in Historisch-Kritische Gesamtaustabe [MEGA]. They involve Marx's early assessment of Hegel and Feuerbach and especially his philosophical views on alienated labor, political economy, private property, and money. An adequate English translation of the manuscripts by T. B. Bottomore is included in Fromm, op. cit. Cf. Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, tr. M. Milligan, (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961); Raya Dunayevskaya, Marxism and Freedom, (New York: Bookman Associates, 1958).

42. See Dupre, op. cit.; Korsch, op. cit.; McLellan, op. cit.; Tucker, op. cit. The impact of Hegel upon Marx's philosophical manuscripts and his critique of political economy is discussed in Shlomo Avineri, "The Hegelian Origins of Marx's Political Thought", The Review of Metaphysics, XXI, (September, 1967), pp. 33-50.

43. See Walter Kaufmann, From Shakespeare to Existentialism, Anchor Book ed. (New York: Doubleday, 1960), pp. 95-174; Cf. William Barrett, Irrational Man, (New York: Doubleday, 1958); Jean Paul Sartre, Existentialism and Humanism, tr. Philip Mairet, (London: Methuen, 1957).

44. For a discussion of Dewey's indebtedness to Hegel, see Morton G. White, The Origin of Dewey's Instrumentalism, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1943), and Richard J. Bernstein, John Dewey, (New York: Washington Square Press, 1966).

45. See, for example, Hook, op. cit.; Tucker, op. cit.

46. See Ernst Cassirer, Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, 3 vols., tr. Ralph Manheim, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953); An Essay on Man, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944); Language and Myth, tr. Susan Langer, (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1946). Although he has been called a "neo-Kantian, Cassirer was nonetheless influenced by Hegel's Weltanschauung". Cf. Jurgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, tr. Jeremy Shapiro, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968); Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, tr. John Cumming, (New York, 1944).

47. Avineri, The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx, p. 65, notes that "Though Marx's Weltanschauung is widely called materialistic, Marx himself never dealt with materialism systematically . . . much of what is known as 'Marxist materialism' was written not by Marx but by Engels, in most cases after Marx's own death. Students sometimes forget that Marx himself never used the terms 'historical materialism' or 'dialectical materialism' for his own systematic approach."

48. Actually, the Bottomore translation did not reach the English speaking academic community until 1959. The translation included in Fromm, op. cit. had just previously been published, in part, as Karl Marx: Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, tr. T. B. Bottomore, (London: Lawrence and Wishart, Ltd., 1959).

49. Part of this work was made available in English through the Cohen translation in E. J. Hobsbawm, ed., op. cit. Not until the "sixties" was it generally considered in America. For an introduction to the significance of grundrisse to Marxist studies, see, Martin Nicholaus, "The Unknown Marx", in The New Left Reader, ed., Carl Oglesby, (New York: Grove Press, 1969).

50. See, for example, Georg Lukacs, Writer and Critic, and Other Essays, tr. and ed. Arthur D. Kahn, (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1971). This book contains essays assembled during the "thirties" and "forties" under the Stalin and Rakosi (Hungary) regimes.

51. Korsch, op. cit., Cf. Dupre, "Dialectical Philosophy Before and After Marx," op. cit. for an appreciation of Korsch's role in the shaping of Marxist humanism.

52. See Grammar of Motives, pp. 236-238, for a discussion of the applicability of Mead to "act", which incorporates Aristotelian metaphysics and scholastic realism.

53. See Kenneth Burke, "Postscripts on the Negative", The Quarterly Journal of Speech, XXXIX (1953), pp. 209-216.

54. Rueckert, Kenneth Burke and the Drama of Human Relations, p. 5.

55. Ibid.

56. Ibid.

57. "Linguistic Approach to Problems of Education," Modern Philosophies and Education, The Fifty-Fourth Year Book of the National Society for the Study of Education, ed. Nelson B. Henry, (Chicago: Published by the Society and distributed by University of Chicago Press, 1955), LIV, I, pp. 259-303.

58. "Dramatism", op. cit., pp. 445-452.

59. Rueckert, Kenneth Burke and the Drama of Human Relations.

60. Hugh Dalziel Duncan, Communication and Social Order, (New York: Bedminster Press, 1962).

61. Marie Hochmuth Nichols, "Kenneth Burke: Rhetorical and Critical Theory", Rhetoric and Criticism, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Press, 1963), pp. 79-93.

62. Griffin, op. cit.

63. Armin Paul Frank, Kenneth Burke, (New York: Twayne, 1969).

64. Stanley Edgar Hyman, "Kenneth Burke and the Criticism of Symbolic Action", The Armed Vision: A Study in the Methods of Modern Literary Criticism, (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1948), pp. 347-394.

65. See Rueckert, Kenneth Burke and the Drama of Human Relations, pp. 128-162. As Rueckert has noted, A Rhetoric of Motives added the clusters of identification and hierarchy to the Grammar's clusters of substance and dialectic. Although the projected Ethics has not yet appeared, Burke's project received its framework about 1950, and since then he has expanded his theory of literature within this framework. Cf. p. 163.

66. Malcolm Cowley, "Prolegomena to Kenneth Burke", New Republic, CXXII, (June 5, 1950), p. 19.

67. Ibid.

68. Rueckert, Kenneth Burke and The Drama of Human Relations, p. 207.

69. See, "On Human Behavior Considered Dramatically", Permanence and Change, pp. 274-294. Cf. Griffin, op. cit., pp. 457-458.

70. See Kenneth Burke, "On Catharsis, or Resolution", Kenyon Review, XXI (1959), pp. 337-375; "Catharsis--Second View", Centennial Review, V (1961), pp. 107-132. Cf. Kenneth Burke, The Rhetoric of Religion: Studies in Logology, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1961); Rueckert, Kenneth Burke and the Drama of Human Relations, pp. 208-226.

71. "On Human Behavior Considered Dramatically", op. cit., pp. 276-281; A Rhetoric of Motives, pp. 306-307. Cf. Duncan, op. cit.,

72. Rueckert, Kenneth Burke and the Drama of Human Relations, pp. 133-134.

73. Joseph Frank, "Symbols and Civilization", The Sewanee Review, LXXII (1964), p. 484.

74. Rueckert note in Critical Responses to Kenneth Burke, 1924-1966, p. 60.

75. Rueckert note in Ibid. , p. 159.
76. Hugh Dalziel Duncan, "Introduction", Permanence and Change, p. xiii.
77. Ibid.
78. Ibid. , p. xiv.
79. Ibid.
80. Rueckert, Kenneth Burke and the Drama of Human Relations, p. 5.
81. "Kenneth Burke and the New Rhetoric", op. cit. , p. 144.
82. Ibid.
83. Merle E. Brown, Kenneth Burke, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1969), p. 5.
84. Rueckert note in Critical Responses to Kenneth Burke, 1924-1966, p. 270.
85. Duncan, "Introduction", op. cit. , p. xliii.
86. Ibid.
87. Armin Paul Frank, "Notes on the Reception of Kenneth Burke in Europe", in Critical Responses to Kenneth Burke, 1924-1966, pp. 424-455.
88. "Kenneth Burke and the New Rhetoric", op. cit. , p. 144.
89. Ibid.
90. Rueckert, Kenneth Burke and the Drama of Human Relations, p. 3.
91. Hugh Dalziel Duncan, Symbols and Social Order, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 253.
92. As quoted on back cover of Burke, Language as Symbolic Action.

93. Hyman, op. cit.
94. "Kenneth Burke and the New Rhetoric", op. cit., p. 144.
95. "Notes on the Reception of Kenneth Burke in Europe", op. cit., p. 443.
96. Frank, Kenneth Burke.
97. See "The Rhetoric of Historical Movements", The Quarterly Journal of Speech, XXXVIII (April 1952), pp. 184-188; "The Rhetorical Structure of the New Left Movement, Part One", The Quarterly Journal of Speech, L (April, 1964), pp. 113-135.
98. See "Kenneth Burke's Grammar of Motives", The Human Image in Dramatic Literature (New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1957), pp. 193-204.
99. See Frank, Kenneth Burke, and "Notes on the Reception of Kenneth Burke in Europe", op. cit., p. 426.
100. "Kenneth Burke's Grammar of Motives", in Critical Responses to Kenneth Burke, 1924-1966, p. 179.
101. Bibliographical annotation to Parkes, op. cit. in Rueckert, Kenneth Burke and the Drama of Human Relations, pp. 241-242.
102. "Kenneth Burke and the Criticism of Symbolic Action", in Critical Responses to Kenneth Burke, 1924-1966, p. 213.
103. Ibid.
104. "Kenneth Burke," in Critical Responses to Kenneth Burke, 1924-1966, p. 112.
105. "Selections from Modern American Criticism", in Ibid., p. 372.
106. Burke, remarks Ransom, "is a master of Marxist 'dialectic'-- an analytic instrument which is acute, and has made incriminating literary discoveries as I know to my discomfiture. But he does not force it, and I wish other Marxists would learn from his moderation". "An Address to Kenneth Burke", in Ibid., p. 143.
107. "Burke", says Glicksberg, "is too honest a thinker to embrace communism directly on emotional grounds; it takes him a long time before

he can logically convince himself that Marx provides the only feasible solution. At heart he is a relativist; his essential skepticism will force him to modify his views--at least as far as literature is concerned." "Kenneth Burke: The Critic's Critic", in Ibid., p. 77.

108. Burke's Attitudes toward History, notes Brinton, is "based on a Marxism so tolerant, so tentative, that he must find it a bit uncomfortable . . ." "What is History", The Saturday Review of Literature, XVI (August 14, 1937), p. 4.

109. "Is Mr. Burke Serious?" in Critical Responses to Kenneth Burke, 1924-1966, p. 100.

110. See Virginia L. Holland, Counterpoint: Kenneth Burke and Aristotle's Theories of Rhetoric, (New York: The Philosophical Library, Inc., 1959); Cf. "Kenneth Burke's Dramatistic Approach in Speech Criticism", The Quarterly Journal of Speech, XLI (1955), pp. 352-358.

111. Rueckert note in Critical Responses to Kenneth Burke, 1924-1966, p. 308.

112. "Notes on the Reception of Kenneth Burke in Europe", in Ibid., p. 441.

113. "Mr. Burke's Dialectic", The New Republic, CXIV (February 18, 1946), p. 258.

114. Hyppolite, op. cit.

115. Kaufmann, op. cit.

116. Findlay, op. cit.

117. Kojève, op. cit.

CHAPTER II

ON DIALECTIC AND THE DIALECTICAL TRADITION

A critical task of this dissertation is the assessment of the extent to which Kenneth Burke has been influenced by the works of prominent figures in the dialectical tradition and a charting of the ways in which their respective ideas about dialectic have been absorbed into the content and form of dramatism. When this is accomplished, Burke's capacity for integrating a variety of worldviews and methodologies into his own language-centered system should be afforded greater appreciation and acclaim. But this task requires, first of all, a discussion of the development of dialectic in western history. A review of the diverse and often disparate applications of dialectic by leading philosophers in the tradition serves to illustrate the enormous scope of the dramatist's coordinative mission.

This chapter is divided into three parts: (1) the development of dialectic in intellectual history; (2) dialectic and philosophical method; (3) a preview of Kenneth Burke's indebtedness to the dialectical tradition. The first and most extensive part traces the development of dialectic from classical Greece to the modern era and highlights the contributions of Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, Marx, Mead and Dewey. The second part discusses the relationship of dialectic to various philosophical constructs and assumptions and then considers the ideas which unite and separate

them. The last segment of the chapter provides a preliminary glimpse of Burke's dependence upon themes and intellectual operations emanating from the dialectical tradition.

The Historical Development of Dialectic

Dialectical activity undeniably arose in classical Greece, but its specific originator and its exact definition remain questionable.¹ A number of ancient thinkers have been credited with the creation of dialectic, and the term seems to incorporate a variety of operations. Some definitions will be considered first of all, and a survey of early thinkers will follow.

One of the early meanings of dialectic is "discourse or intercourse between two or more speakers who express two or more positions or opinions."² This conception thus seems to require interpersonal thinking or thinking based on the confrontation of ideas or theses. It involves, as McKeon has noted, "a clash of opposition or paradox [and] is embedded in the term (dia + legein) and also reiterated in the early history of the method."³

It is basically this definition which, according to McKeon, Aristotle attributed to Zeno.⁴ A different definition emanates from Socrates, who is attributed by Zenophon with the fashioning of a dialectical procedure which relates the art of classifying (dialegein) to discussion (dialegesthai).⁵ This definition implies a joint venture. It is a meeting together for common deliberation in which the participants agree, through

cross-questioning, to sort things after their kind as the most efficacious way of perfecting definitions in the doing of philosophy.⁶

Notably, the idea of a cooperative search for definitions seems to deny the intent of the first definition which focuses on argumentative combat. In the first rendering of the term, the accent is upon opposition (eristic is taken from the root, eris, which means strife). This accords with the influence of Pythagorean mathematics and geometry which stressed the law of contradiction in the explanation of proofs.⁷ Simply, hypotheses are false when they are seen to entail incompatible consequences. The Sophists, in particular, used the argumentative techniques of dialectic to discredit various theories by driving the proponents of these theories into the eventual espousal of contradictory ideas.⁸ In this combative spirit, as Kneale and Kneale have noted, the "dissoi-logoi" was advanced as the basis of dialectic.⁹ Discourse was viewed as essentially that which can be true or false, meaning that an assertion is not significant unless its denial is also significant.¹⁰ Hence, the grounds for dialectic: opposing theses which must withstand withering cross-examination in the interests of internal consistency. Out of the initial definition of dialectic, therefore, came the emphasis upon victory, or the defeat of one's opponent. The technique of prolonged cross-examination was mastered by the Sophists in order to refute an adversary's original thesis by maneuvering him into drawing from it, through question and answer, a consequence or consequences contradicting the thesis.

The definition stressing cooperation, however, seems to accentuate inquiry and insight rather than refutation for the sake of debunking. The alternative to "elenchus" was "epagoge", a procedure of definition which led the participant on to a generalization by getting him to accept the truth of a bevy of propositions about particular cases.¹¹ This strain of dialectic resulted in the Socratic method of universal definition and the Platonic method of division which sought definitions by dichotomizing notions beginning with the most general idea.¹² Ultimately, of course, Socrates and Plato were to utilize the refutative technique of "reductio ad impossibile" in leading participants to the truth, thus making "elenchus" and "epagoge" correlative elements in their respective dialectics of philosophical inquiry.¹³ Nonetheless, the intellectual thrust of these dialectics seemed rooted, not in winning for winning's sake, which merely championed the "eristic" of making the worse appear the better, but rather in a conscionable victory based upon the mutual apprehension of truth. This type of dialectical enterprise, which subordinates refutation to insight, preserved the Homeric definition of dialectic emphasizing "dialegein" (legein), which, according to Janssens, means to choose or gather up, to sort out by discussing things in kind.¹⁴

The dual emphasis of refutation and discovery, spawned a more encompassing definition of dialectic as the art of logical discussion. Indeed, as Kneale and Kneale have shown, dialectic was first understood as a technical term inseparable from logic.¹⁵ Its distinguishing

characteristics were the facts that its premises were chosen by disputants in an argument and that such premises were for the most part rooted in opinion rather than incontestible, necessary truth.¹⁶ By the time of Socrates, the dialectical enterprise assumed the overarching task of apprehending truth, and thus the logic of the method attained metaphysical significance.¹⁷ In sum, the two strains of criticism and the search for truth have meandered in and out of the predominant philosophies in the dialectical tradition. It is this very fact that separates the dialectical worldview philosophies of Plato, Hegel and Marx from the inquiry-oriented philosophies of Aristotle, Kant, Mead and Dewey, which use dialectic in important but clearly auxiliary ways. This distinction should become clear in the segment devoted to dialectic and philosophical method. The immediate objective is to review some important contributions to dialectical thought and methodology. This review, rather than culminating in a synthesis of the various philosophies discussed, provides the more sober point that no one interpretation of the term prevails out of the rich diversity of approaches. Or, as Richard McKeon has so aptly put it:

The history of dialectic leaves little doubt concerning the possibility of defining dialectic unambiguously or of distinguishing clearly between dialectical and nondialectical methods. In a true sense, there is no history of dialectic--there are dialectical histories of dialectic which treat all method of thought, action, and expression as dialectical or as deviations from dialectic; there are nondialectical histories of logic and scientific method which treat dialectic as metaphysical or mystical transformations of logic.¹⁸

This survey proceeds in nondialectical fashion and covers merely the outstanding contributions to dialectic made by the philosophers selected. In the case of Plato, Hegel and Marx, dialectic is inextricably interwoven into both a view of the world and the method of philosophizing about it. The explication of these respective dialectics thus involves a detailed explanation of philosophical systems--an onerous venture even for historians of philosophy. Indeed, the explication of dialectic in the inquiry-oriented systems of Aristotle, Kant and Dewey leads inevitably into a comprehensive assessment of their constructs. The review that follows, however, is a modest attempt to trace the uses of dialectic from Zeno to Mead and Dewey.

Zeno of Elea, who lived during the Fifth Century B.C., was recognized by Aristotle as dialectic's inventor.¹⁹ He used dialectic seriously for philosophical purposes,²⁰ and yet he also provided an argumentative technique which the Sophists were to later employ eristically. Specifically, Zeno developed the craft of refuting an hypothesis by luring its maker, through the give and take of question and answer, into the drawing of unacceptable consequences from the hypothesis.²¹ This mode of indirect logical argument, stressing the paradox, was for Zeno a method of philosophical instruction, but it was eventually abused by those Sophists intent upon disputational victory for its own sake.²²

Protagoras is frequently associated with the claim about making the worse argument appear the better through dialectical chicanery.²³

And if this were his only identifiable contribution to the history of disputation he would surely stand as the prime trickster, flippant and opportunistic, of "eristic" sophistry. But if, in fact, Protagoras did author the "dissoi-logoi", then his contribution widens as a legitimate ancestor of medieval and Hegelian-Marxian dialectic in the sense of observing that every subject invites two opposite statements.²⁴

Dialectic came to philosophical fruition in classical Greece under the influences of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. All three abhorred the Sophist's disdain for immutable truths and the exercise of dialectic to uphold a personal relativism on all worldly matters.²⁵ And yet all three made use of dialectical refutation to expose the speciousness of contending ideas which, they believed, blocked the path to the grasp of truth.²⁶ All three employed both the critical device of "elenchus" to discredit generally accepted but fallacious opinions and the constructive device of "epagoge" to bring others through universal definition and division to the true nature of things.²⁷ By the time of Aristotle, the two lines of dialectical endeavor, "elenchus" and "epagoge" assumed the important role of defending the first great systematized philosophy in that dialectic was crucial to both the defense and the apprehension of the first principles of the Stagirite's theoretical sciences.²⁸

Their respective commitments to dialectical criticism and construction in the search for truth does not mean, however, that Socrates, Plato and Aristotle used the enterprise always in the same way for the same

philosophical purposes. There are significant differences among the three, and these differences should be noted through a brief discussion of each thinker's dialectic in relation to his philosophical disposition.

Socrates, first of all, admitted to a diffident quest for truth and practiced dialectic under the pretense of not knowing anything and not seeking the discreditation of his intellectual adversaries in discussion.²⁹ In fact, however, the Socrates of the Platonic dialogues engaged in extensive refutation, driving the proponents of errant theses into contradictions and hence into shame, so that they would ultimately confront the shallowness of their ideas and acknowledge their ignorance.³⁰ But the dialectical facility of humbling pretenders to knowledge served only as the initial step toward wisdom. From this point onward Socrates' adversaries were led to the correct definitions of things and thus to an approximation of what is real.³¹ The format of cross questioning turned into a sophisticated logical discussion which sought the definition of a concept by sorting things after their kind. Socrates led his adversary to a generalization by maneuvering him into accepting the efficacy of numerous propositions pertaining to particular cases.³² Because of Socrates' skill with the processes of division and generalization (analysis and synthesis), Aristotle ascribed to his predecessor the innovation of universal definition.³³ It may be said, in sum, that Socrates took dialectic from a rather loose art of discussion to a method of thinking and philosophizing. Unfortunately, he himself wrote nothing; his philosophical demeanor and views

were captured by Plato in the dramatic medium of the latter's dialogues and the historical authenticity of the characterization remains to this day a subject of intricate scholarship.³⁴

For his part, Plato advanced the notion of dialectic considerably.³⁵ In his mind, dialectic was no longer but a method: it was itself the unique manner, the epitome, of philosophy which led to the discovery by reason of the truth about realities.³⁶ Its focus, as McKeon has noted, was "Being, reality and eternal immutability;" for it rendered an account of the essence of each thing and stood as a synoptic art which viewed things in their interconnections.³⁷ For Plato, as McKeon has added, dialectic "simultaneously defines terms, clarifies minds, and discovers truths about things: it occurs in ordinary discussion; it is the method of any science that treats of the nature of things; it is the supreme science which lays the foundations of arts and sciences in being."³⁸

Plato not only elevated dialectic to the status of the science of reality but also refined the Socratic method of definition. As with Socrates, he utilized cross-questioning to free the mind of errors and contradictions and verbal distortions, but he went beyond Socratic technique in the procedure of division and collection, contending that the true philosopher knows how to cut things into appropriate classes "where the natural joints are."³⁹ Platonic division was marked by the incessant analysis of genera into species, of the more general ideas into the less general ones so that ultimately a definition would be formulated which of

itself admitted of no further division.⁴⁰ Correlatively, Plato fashioned a process which operated in the opposite direction, namely synthesis or collection.⁴¹ (Plato's progressions from particulars to generalization and from generalization to particulars have been commonly called, respectively, the "upward" and "downward" ways or paths.)⁴²

Dialectic's identity as the highest of human arts, as the "coping-stone",⁴³ as it were, placed above the sciences, suggested its importance in the education of the philosopher kings whose mission was to apprehend the forms and, ultimately, the supreme form, the Good.⁴⁴ For contemplation of the eternal, immutable truths which transcended the illusions of the sensory world was according to Plato, the equivalent of divine inspiration.⁴⁵ This manner of contemplation, moreover, implied that dialectic often occurred as the internal dialogue of the soul as well as an external, interpersonal communication with another person or persons.⁴⁶

The mystical, and, in a sense, most ironical aspect of Platonic dialectic concerns the relation of discursiveness to truth. Dialectic, for Plato, moves by and through language to a stage beyond it where the forms can be grasped free of all verbal entanglements. In the Seventh Epistle, for example, he contends that words are not enough.⁴⁷ Some things, he says, remain ineffable, things of which one cannot speak.⁴⁸ The forms, as it turns out, can never be more than adumbrated in verbal definitions. Therefore, Plato turns to myths, to parables or sensible analogues as preparation for the discovery of truth.⁴⁹

Finally, Plato's very philosophical outlook presented a dialectical explanation of man, who lives between the opposite pulls of the absolute and the immediate, between the ontological vision of the good and the natural inclinations of the material world. For Plato believed, as Gustav Mueller has written, that man exists as the dialectic of what ought to be and what is, of harmony and disharmony, as agreement and disagreement with himself, as imperative and as resistance to it, as universal idea and as particular realization of the good life.⁵⁰ In short, man can understand and accept his dialectical destiny: that he is not absolute but is nevertheless privileged, at times, to participate in the absolute.⁵¹ And it is perhaps this seminal observation about the human condition that has endeared Plato to generations of scholars, writers, artists, humanists and theologians.

Aristotle's contribution to the dialectical tradition is extraordinary, principally because he bothered to explain the multifarious roles of dialectic within the context of a systematized philosophy.⁵² For him, dialectic had a number of uses, some pertaining to mere argumentative facility and some to the more lofty enterprise of apprehending and defending the first principles of his theoretical sciences.⁵³ First of all, he considered dialectic as a mental gymnastic. In the spirit of Socrates and Plato, Aristotle examined the technique of logical discussion which involved cross-questioning on an issue rooted in probable premises.⁵⁴ The dialectical encounter, as he explained it, involved two persons--a

questioner and a respondent--plus a problem. Essentially, the questioner poses a problem and the respondent chooses a position. The questioner adopts that side of the problem repudiated by the respondent. The encounter, in short, finds the questioner attempting to draw conclusions in favor of his view (through a kind of backward syllogistic) after eliciting answers from his adversary.⁵⁵

The practice of dialectic as mental gymnastic led to a second function, according to Aristotle: the ability to argue with uneducated persons on the basis of their own opinions. In short, the first role of argumentative training translated into a second, practical activity of winning a battle of wits with people who, in every day discourse, offered shallow opinions on matters relating, for the most part, to the probable world.⁵⁶

The third, and most philosophically significant activity of dialectic in Aristotle's schema was its role with respect to the first principles of his sciences. As he stated in Topics (101b 4-6) "dialectic is a process of criticism wherein lies the path to the principles of all inquiries."⁵⁷ That is, dialectic, though not immediately philosophical, nevertheless constituted a preparation for the grasp of truth in serious philosophical questions. For dialectic, he contended, was rooted in popular opinion, and argument from popular opinion was the only way to discuss the principles since they could not themselves be derived scientifically from other principles.⁵⁸ To bring his students to the

apprehension of the "archai" of his theoretical fields, Aristotle first had to render fallacious the prevailing opinions which blocked insight into the true nature of things.⁵⁹ Alternative hypotheses were dialectically disarmed through the process of seeking definitions and relating arguments to pairs of contraries.⁶⁰ In particular, as McKeon has observed, the dialectical syllogism was developed to reason from generally accepted premises to the contradictory of a given thesis and this became the appropriate way of examining and defending the principles of the sciences.⁶¹

Aristotelian dialectic differed in some crucial respects from the Platonic version, albeit the Stagirite's indebtedness to the definitional processes refined by his mentor. For one thing, Aristotle abandoned the dialogue form of dialectic in favor of distinct fields of inquiry, each one systematized through strict deductive ("apodeictic") procedure.⁶² In addition, he made of dialectic a kind of floating method (lacking both first principles of its own and appropriate subject matter) which serviced yet did not equate with science.⁶³ For Plato, on the contrary, dialectic was philosophy. It was the method of science, of thinking which clarified the mind and discovered truth.⁶⁴ For Aristotle, however, it was used to lead the capable learner to the apprehension of first axioms which, once grasped, would appear as self-evident. It provided a way or opening through traditional ideas and current conceptions which prevented the arrival of insight ("nous") into the self-evidency of the principles.⁶⁵

Furthermore, dialectic in the Aristotelian schema served as the means of investigating questions of prudential conduct in ethics and politics.⁶⁶ And, finally, it stood as the counterpart of rhetoric since both, he contended, were anchored in opinion and probability and could thus be applied to deliberative affairs (that is, to problems of choice and avoidance).⁶⁷ Dialectic was further related to rhetoric in the realm of policy in that, as Richard Weaver has noted, the former, as inquiry, focused on terms subject to the contingency of evaluation, such as "justice" and "goodness", and the latter concentrated on the artful presentation of propositions involving such terms.⁶⁸

The chronological gap between Aristotle and Kant is well over two thousand years, and there is no desire here to slight the numerous philosophical schools and philosophers whose ideas dominated various eras within this gap. In the interests of brevity, however, the relationship of some influential schools and thinkers to dialectic must be merely outlined.

Stoic philosophy, under the leadership of Chrysippus, equated dialectic with a formal logic which stressed inferential processes strongly resembling propositional calculus. Dialectic, for the Stoics, also applied to grammatical theory and to the consideration of meaning's relation to truth. It pertained to signification in discourse and to language or sound.⁶⁹

In opposition to the Stoics, the Academics, as McKeon has noted, "used a dialectic which balanced opposed doctrines without commitment in the development of their skepticism and based choice on consideration of likely outcomes in the development of their probabilism."⁷⁰ Intellectually, they challenged the theory of the natural basis of the state and argued that wisdom involved choice of probabilities in the realm of social conduct.⁷¹

For their part, the Epicureans incurred the wrath of both the Stoics and the Academics by rejecting dialectic in favor of a logic whose method of inquiry and proof was based upon "sensations, feelings and 'anticipations' . . ."⁷² They held that all men approach the concept of justice from the standpoint of expediency although justice varies in its application relative to particular circumstances.⁷³

Finally, the Peripatetics restored the major ingredients of Plato's dialectical method while at the same time utilizing the Aristotelian modes of ethical and political inquiry, which meant, in specific, that they viewed the sciences of ethics and politics as involving dialectical investigation into those forms of government which had traditionally served men best, as well as those social habits and behaviors which seemed to mark the prudent and discerning man in society.⁷⁴

Roman dialectic, especially as developed by Cicero, seemed to favor a methodology grounded in the material world of becoming rather than a transcendental world of being. It was marked by attention to

probability and history. For Cicero's intent was to make philosophy relevant to earthy affairs and, to this end, he fashioned a dialectic of the New Academy attuned to the habits of men and the practical wisdom of leading thinkers. His dialectic was closely connected to rhetoric since he viewed eloquence as an essential factor in philosophy's applications to everyday civic life.⁷⁵

Cicero's version of dialectic accorded with the branch of his logic stressing judgment and proof. The other branch which he called Topic, was devoted to the art of discovery. Though differing somewhat from the Aristotelian schema, Cicero's dialectic nevertheless honored Aristotle's kinds of empirical tests for political institutions and for individual conduct.⁷⁶

The importance of dialectic in the emergence of Christian thought in the West is best illustrated by reference to St. Augustine. Augustinian dialectic was at once indebted to the practical philosophic method of Cicero and the otherworldly orientation of Plato.⁷⁷ It focused on the dual needs of earthly indoctrination and the search for eternal truths. In the second instance, that is, Augustine used dialectic "to find above experience a rational ground for things, thoughts, and arguments."⁷⁸ Although he rejected Cicero's skepticism, Augustine nonetheless adapted the political aspects of Ciceronian dialectic to an historical view of the distinction between the temporal and the eternal. His City of God, for example, attempted to demonstrate the causes of Rome's glory and

decadence and to render a detailed differentiation of terrestrial cities, which were fashioned for the fulfillment of human values, from the City of God, which transcended the evolution of history and time.⁷⁹

The role of dialectic during the Middle Ages seems to have been threefold. It developed, as McKeon has written, "in three interrelated strands: as a method of theology; as a method of interpreting Scripture and Canon Law, and thereby treating the concrete and the practical; and as one of the liberal arts of the trivium."⁸⁰ In the theological sense, dialectic pertained to the construction of hierarchies of being, to knowledge and to contemplation in the stages of natural and mystical theology. In matters of interpretation, dialectic was employed as the basis for those exegetical and hermeneutic rules which bore upon the legal operation of adjudicating cases, as well as upon scholastic argumentative activity, especially the practice of listing and then refuting all solutions opposed to the approved one in questions admitting of contradictory positions. In the third respect, dialectic assumed the status of a liberal art, often to be identified with logic and also treated as a rational or verbal skill. At times, it was synonymous with the art of thinking which led to an understanding of the nature of being, as contrasted to the communication arts occasionally relying upon logic. At times, it was identified as the part of logic rooted in probability and opinion and thus, in the Aristotelian sense, distinguished from strict scientific demonstration. Whatever its affiliation with logic in the minds of medieval

thinkers, however, dialectic was invariably contrasted to rhetoric on the basis of the latter's inclinations toward prolixity and diffuseness in argumentation, and its more concrete application to, and practical purpose in the deliberative realm.⁸¹

A number of scholastic figures are worth noting for their contributions to dialectic during the Middle Ages. These contributions are quite varied, even disparate, in theoretical purpose and method. Nicholas of Cusa, for instance, developed a rationale of the hierarchy of being, knowledge and contemplation through the dialectical method of coincidence of contraries.⁸² Boethius presented a dialectical doctrine of "topics" which in effect made logic subordinate to dialectic.⁸³ Alcuin's Dialectica helped to establish the integrity of the art in the trivium (along with grammar and rhetoric).⁸⁴ Cassiodorus equated dialectic with logic, as did Isidor of Seville. For Cassiodorus, dialectic was to be distinguished from rhetoric as the fist was to be contrasted to the open palm, meaning that the former enterprise championed a tight-knit argumentation as opposed to the latter's more diffuse art of eloquence.⁸⁵ Isidore called dialectic the rational basis of philosophy since it pertained to inquiry, definition and expression.⁸⁶ Gerbert, who eventually became Pope Sylvester the Second, established a curriculum which included instruction in dialectic, and this led to the wide use of the enterprise in the religious disputations of the Eleventh Century.⁸⁷ Lombard used the logical form of dialectic in his Book of Sentences which was studied by university students

as a model for disputation.⁸⁸ Hugh of St. Victor included dialectic in rational logic, along with apodictic and sophistic, and distinguished these three from the spiritual realm, which embraced the tropological, allegorical and anagogic.⁸⁹ Abelard identified logic and dialectic in the Aristotelian sense and argued that dialectic's mission was to provide resolutions to questions by reducing the subject into an orderly body of true propositions and by refuting false arguments.⁹⁰ As McKeon has put it, Abelard "engaged both in a violent attack on sophists and pseudo-dialecticians and in a desperate personal defense of dialectic as the one means by which truth can be distinguished from error."⁹¹ Thomas Aquinas treated dialectic as a mode of probable reasoning. To a large extent, he was influenced by Aristotle's theory of nature, certainty, and probability and grasped the distinction between demonstrative proof and dialectic. The argumentative structure of Summa Theologia is dialectical in that the contraries of propositions are examined, i.e., the form brings out the opposition of meanings in discourse.⁹² Roger Bacon allied logic and dialectic. He defined logic as the art of distinguishing and also as the science of disputation and explanation and retrieved the classical meaning of dialectic as a form of reasoned communication between two persons. He advanced three distinct tasks for dialectic: (1) as the science of sciences, which guides the construction of each field of inquiry; (2) as the science of disputation and definition concerning probable matters; (3) as a critical technique which proceeds from

probabilities and tests the opinions of adversaries.⁹³ Finally, John Scotus Eriugena considered two forms of dialectic: theoretical ("dialectics docens") and practical ("dialectics utens").⁹⁴ The first treated those intentions which reason apprehended in things. It concerned demonstrative reasoning from principles to particulars. The second treated common intentions as they related to the sciences. It stressed the criticism of opinions in the sphere of probability.⁹⁵

Renaissance dialectic was most notable in the hands of Rudolph Agricola and Peter Ramus; for both endeavored to establish a dialectic of discovery in opposition to rhetorical discovery.⁹⁶ Rhetoric, partly through their influence, was relegated to the status of mere words, independent alike of dialectic and philosophy. Both Agricola and Ramus fashioned a place logic and made invention and disposition dialectical rather than rhetorical concerns.⁹⁷ Still, Agricola's De Inventione Dialectica valued dialectic for its part in rhetorical investigation, and Ramus' Training In Dialectic, though distinguishing it as learned discourse from style-oriented popular speaking, nevertheless considered both dialectic and rhetoric as parts of the theory of communication.⁹⁸

In addition to Agricola and Ramus, Thomas Wilson associated dialectic with logic which, as distinguished from rhetoric, provided "inventio" and "judicium".⁹⁹ The former pertained to the discovery of material agreeable to one's cause, and the latter related to the framing of things together and the knitting of words for the purpose of the

communication.¹⁰⁰ The separation of logic and dialectic from rhetoric, whose charge became mere style and delivery, was also upheld by Abraham Fraunce, whose Arcadian Rhetorike addressed itself solely to "elocuteo" and "pronunciatio" ("inventio" and "dispositio" having been consigned to the dialectical investigation of logic).¹⁰¹ For his part, Leonard Cox argued that the material for logical orations depended ultimately upon the modes of dialectical inquiry. His theory of rhetorical invention was intended as a parallel to dialectical invention, although he gave the latter greater authority in the discovery of arguments for eventual oratory.¹⁰²

Well into the Renaissance, dialectic began to lose its prestige as an important facet of science. By the Seventeenth Century, as McKeon has observed, "dialectic was abandoned in its basic metaphysical and epistemological sense, and for two centuries the foundations of philosophic method were sought in canons of induction, in tracing ideas to the impressions from which they originated, and in isolating and combining clear, distinct, and adequate ideas."¹⁰³ The diminution of dialectic's status as an integral aspect of scientific inquiry was partly the result of a transition from mental interpretation to external realities for the conduct of inquiry, and this affected the role of "inventio" in the then prevailing theories of communication.¹⁰⁴ Initially, the rationalists and then the British empiricists began to assault the basis of traditional reason and its efficacy in the construction of new knowledge, and the dialectical

enterprise associated with the old notions of common sense and general reason began to wane. (At the end of the Renaissance, as Wilbur Samuel Howell has noted, orators seemed to rely more on external realities than internal reasoning for their subject matter. Burke's advocacy of conciliation with America, for example, referred extensively and minutely to such concrete realities as population figures and trade statistics.)¹⁰⁵

Bacon and Descartes undermined the traditional status of dialectic when they took a decisive philosophical step toward the development of the modern scientific attitude. Essentially, they viewed dialectic as allied with traditional speculation which failed to promote deliberation conducted in the light of all the particular facts bearing upon a question.¹⁰⁶ Bacon considered dialectic useless in the advancement of knowledge; for him, logic consisted of inquiry or invention, judgment, retention and transmission of knowledge (somewhat reminiscent of classical rhetoric) but dialectic failed, in his view, to align with scientific procedure.¹⁰⁷ Descartes, similarly, found dialectic unrelated to the nature and order of things. For one thing, he contended, dialectical syllogizing was often irrelevant to the processes of inquiry and the discovery of new truths.¹⁰⁸ For another, dialectic was too often in league with the art of concocting fictitious entities and occult qualities.¹⁰⁹ Dialectic's value, he believed, existed in the rather restricted role of phrasing clear questions. Locke and Hume, from their respective philosophical constructs, stressed the investigation, accumulation, and

codification of new data about the world for the advancement of learning, and thus dialectic's alliance with mental cogitation was further disparaged by the growing academic dependence upon experience and verification.¹¹⁰

So long as the basis for philosophic method was sought in the canons of induction, in tracing ideas to the impressions which engendered them, and in the empirical testing of the adequacy of ideas, their causes and their interrelations, the image and import of dialectic suffered. Ultimately, however, content and form were distinguished.

The skeptical-critical task of exposing the alluring, yet deceptively shallow claims of metaphysics occupied the forefront of philosophical endeavor. And dialectic returned, ironically, not as the servant of transcendental speculation, but rather as the critical-skeptical technique which at once defended the distinction of form from content and deterred metaphysical assaults upon it.¹¹¹ In this respect, dialectic was restored in the conceptual revolution of Kantian philosophy, which sought to expose the illusory nature of transcendental claims.¹¹² Dialectic, as a critical-skeptical tool became a "cathartic of the understanding."¹¹³ It served, paradoxically, as a critique of the classical logic of semblance or illusion whereby the sophists employed dialectic to fashion a respectable yet, in fact, wholeheartedly specious aura for their ideas.¹¹⁴ Dialectic, in the hands of Kant, thus contained the marks and rules by which things were seen to disagree with the formal criteria of truth. This kind of dialectical role was frequently directed toward those who,

in the fashion of the sophistic dialecticians, used the art of semblance to persuade the truth about matters transcending the experiential world.¹¹⁵

Thus for Kant, dialectical activity assumed an altogether new significance. Its role was predominantly skeptical. In the "Transcendental Dialectic", for example, he exposed the illusory nature of transcendental judgments--those professing to leap beyond the boundaries of experience.¹¹⁶ His "antinomies of pure reason" were employed dialectically as a critique of understanding and reason in regard to their hyperphysical use.¹¹⁷ In particular, he sought to demonstrate through the dialectical structure of four basic sets of theses and antitheses that reason culminated in delusion when it attempted to use its ideas for other objects and then considered these objects as conceptions of actual things.¹¹⁸

Kant's Critique of Pure Reason displayed the dialectical outcome of transcendental claims by showing, as in the antinomies, that such statements were inevitably opposed by a conclusion equally acceptable to reason and by demonstrating, as in the paralogisms, that these statements had a superficial cogency in that they were false conclusions clothed in correct and unexceptional form.¹¹⁹

Of transcendental illusion, Kant provided the ironic observation that it would persist even after it had been repeatedly exposed by means of the transcendental dialectical criticism; for the mind, he argued,

relentlessly pursues superexperiential matters impossible to resolve scientifically and thus cannot escape the frustrations attending such speculation. Human reason, he contended, naturally and unavoidably seeks to understand universal questions once and for all time, but it inevitably reaches the dialectical impasse of contradicting itself.¹²⁰

Kant's skeptical dialectic did not fail to influence subsequent generations of philosophers, especially German thought throughout the Nineteenth Century. His critical and analytical methods stirred Fichte, Schelling and Hegel in particular.¹²¹ And yet, curiously, these philosophers tended to reverse Kant's dialectic by trying, in opposition to him, to unite form and content and by attempting to relate knowledge and its method "to the thinking subject and to the content thought."¹²² Fichte initially endeavored to fuse formal and transcendental logic but finally concluded that this led inexorably to circular reasoning.¹²³ Schelling considered dialectic as the logical form of philosophy and argued that human thought corresponds to the essence and forms of the development of things.¹²⁴ Hegel, whose mark on philosophy has come to be the greatest of the three, contrived a grandiose schema for uniting form and content, subject and object, etc., by viewing dialectic as a pervasive process--a necessary movement in history, indeed the universe as a whole, not just a process of thought.¹²⁵ Dialectic, according to Hegel, involves the passing over of thoughts or ideas into their opposites so as to attain a new unity at a higher stage of development.¹²⁶

Hegel's dialectic reflected the antinomic and skeptical aspects of Kant's critical methodology. But he superseded Kant's refutation of rationalism, so he believed, by describing the development and progress of Reason in the world and by explaining how Reason and the Rational are intertwined. His crucial departure from Kant occurred over the association of dialectic with natural processes, which made it not only an analytic-synthetic method but also an important aspect of being.¹²⁷ For Hegel, dialectic is inherent in the thoughts of Spirit, which corresponds to the essence and forms of the growth of things. The creative advance of pure thought, he argued, is a dialectical self-development by negation.¹²⁸

Marx, of course, borrowed from the Hegelian construct. His pronouncement that he stood Hegel's dialectic on its head has frequently been interpreted as the desire to materialize the idealism of his predecessor. It has been taken to mean that Marx exposed the Hegelian ideal as nothing more than the natural world reflected in the human mind and translated into the forms of thought. Thus, the dialectic of matter came to replace the dialectic of Spirit.¹²⁹

Fortunately, serious students of Marx's thought, such as Sidney Hook, have gone considerably beyond the superficiality of the metaphor about turning Hegel's method right side up. Marx's dialectic, observes Hook, can be grasped "only in application". That is, "it must be

construed from his actual intellectual procedure, from his economic and historical analyses."130

From Hegel, Marx took the triadic idea of sublation: a dialectical process whereby two phases offer a relation of both opposition and interaction.¹³¹ The result of this relation yields something qualitatively new, preserves elements of the interacting phase and discards other elements.¹³² Hegel's dialectic is exemplified as a logic of continuity in the meaning of "aufgehoben".¹³³ Essentially, aspects of a thesis and its antithesis are conserved in a new situation or whole and "are reinterpreted or 'elevated' . . . as subordinate moments in a more inclusive whole . . ."134 In Marx's view, this process is historical and social, rather than merely logical.¹³⁵

Marx adapted Hegel's formulation to the "algebra of revolution", arguing, in the main, that through class consciousness society achieves consciousness of its own condition. Specifically, he argued that since class is the subject of the historical process and the social environment the object of this process, it is inevitable that a class, by acting upon and changing the object, changes itself. He concluded that man can indeed alter his nature by acting upon the external world; for man's nature, he reasoned, is a variable, not a constant, and therefore can be modified, within limits, in the dialectics of social and historical activity.¹³⁶

What has come to be known as "dialectical materialism", a rubric generally attributed to Marx, is, in fact, a contrivance of Engels, who overlapped Marx's thought with a dialectics of nature.¹³⁷ Engels' own view of the world was heavily indebted to Hegelian metaphysics and became the basis for the logic, ontology and epistemology of orthodox Marxism-Leninism.¹³⁸ As a matter of fact, Plekhanov was probably the one who coined the term "dialectical materialism" as the best representation of what he took to be the combined worldviews of Marx and Engels.¹³⁹

As with Marx, Engels used "materialism" with respect to the view that matter is the primary being and mind the subordinate and dependent feature of the world. But he went beyond Marx in fashioning dialectical principles or laws of development. For him, dialectical thinking grasps things in their interrelationships and in the totality to which they belong. It apprehends the process of change: an evolution from simple to new and more complex phenomena. It accounts for novelty and qualitative differences in the world and recognizes the inevitability of sudden, often catastrophic, change.¹⁴⁰

Basically, this view bears a heavy debt to Marx's own "weltanschauung". Yet Engels, not Marx, was chiefly responsible for the presentation of the following laws of development: (1) the transformation of quantitative into qualitative changes; (2) the interpenetration of opposites; (3) the negation of the negation. The first law stated that

gradual alterations in the quantity of something are not necessarily accompanied by a merely gradual alteration in its characteristics. Indeed, changes in a single quality transform it into a new one. This idea of a "leap" from one quality into another has been perennially advanced by orthodox Communists to support the claim that revolutionary change is a fundamental character of the universe as a whole. The second law focused on the contradictions in nature and asserted that change occurs because the world consists of opposing forces overcoming or being overcome. Essentially, contradiction, or opposition, is the motive force of both natural and human history and accounts for the great social, political and economic crises moving humanity from one stage to another (and higher) one. The third law, as Engels advanced it, overlaps the second and accentuates the concept of change from old to new. It is comprehensive enough to explain developmental processes in biology, geology, history, mathematics, philosophy, etc.. It stresses the inevitability of progress through continual destruction and amplified renewal. A plant, for example, ultimately dies after ripening, but in its process of growth it produces seeds that germinate and result in the growth of further plants, better and more various than the originator. This process, he believed, holds true for socio-economic systems as well; for feudalism was negated by capitalism which, in turn, will be negated by socialism. Hence the new arises by negation of negation.¹⁴¹

There remains an enormous conceptual gap between this kind of ideological perspective, which reverts to the Platonic tendency to make of dialectic a supreme science and explanation of the world, and the kind of experiential dialectic employed by John Dewey and George Herbert Mead. Dialectical materialism champions a conflict model of economic and social life. It tends to justify the kind of revolutionary zeal repugnant to American social pragmatism, which has consistently favored amelioration and social reconstruction through democratic means.¹⁴²

And yet both Dewey and Mead promoted a theory of the development of the social self that depended upon some dialectical aspects of Hegelian and Marxian philosophy. In their respective ways, Dewey and Mead viewed the relationship of self and society from the essentially Hegelian and also Marxian thesis that man is not self-contained; that he is free only when he is truly a "man"--an integral part of the community.¹⁴³ This view suggests an insight into the dialectic of self and society where individual identity is fashioned through interaction with others.¹⁴⁴ For Dewey, and especially for Mead, the dialectical interplay of self and society is a crucial factor in the formation of mind. The dialectical interaction, in turn, depends upon communication: the significant symbol.¹⁴⁵

Hegelian dialectic, which Marx later attempted to refashion, also served as a basis for the pragmatist position that learning involves conflict. Albeit some strenuous reservations over the metaphysics of

Hegelian doctrine, Mead, for instance, noted that his predecessor was "correct in the assumption that the development of our knowledge takes place through conflict"; for it involves "the appearance of problems and the solution of these problems."¹⁴⁶ In Mead's opinion, Hegel's notion of thesis-antithesis-synthesis could be adapted to the explanation of reflection as the process of solving problems. Reflective intelligence,¹⁴⁷ as both Mead and Dewey understood it, requires the acknowledgement of some exception to what has been habitually believed. In brief, the formulation of a hypothesis involves the reconstruction of an older theory in the light of new facts which somehow contradict it so that new ways of looking at a problem are introduced and pursued. "In this sense, then", as Mead observed, "Hegel is correct in his assumption that our knowledge grows through the giving of problems--problems which arise out of contradictions in our knowledge."¹⁴⁸

In addition to its role in the inducement of new hypotheses, dialectic has served to monitor both the internal consistency of philosophical systems and their application to the external world. Every system of philosophy, as Dewey maintained, while forging its own approach to logical forms and relations, must nevertheless submit itself, on the one hand, to the tests of logical discourse and allegiance to its own principles and methods and, on the other hand, to the criterion of relevance to the material world. Both logical adequacy and verifiability suggest a constant

dialectical quest for consistency: one internal and the other with respect to the facts about the nature of the empirical world.¹⁴⁹

Dialectic and Philosophical Method

It is obvious from this review of the dialectical tradition that the term "dialectic" has been associated with a great variety of philosophical outlooks. Indeed, the definitions and uses of dialectic suggest tremendous disparity of meaning and method from the Pre-Socratics to modern American pragmatism.

Such diversity of meaning and operation has occasionally caused students of the tradition to utter their frustration about achieving a workable definition of the art. As Sidney Hook, for example, concluded after surveying the role of dialectic in social and historical inquiry:

Looking back upon the long history of the use of the term "dialectic", it seems to me that a justified moral emerges from our discussion, viz., that it is not likely to function as a serviceable designation for any concept or intellectual procedure in any inquiry which aims at the achievement of reliable knowledge about ourselves and the world we live in.¹⁵⁰

This kind of disenchantment with the art should not, however, foreclose discussion of the nature and varieties of dialectic and the attempt to make some order out of the "rich diversity of histories and of facts about scientific and philosophic methods"¹⁵¹ associated with dialectic at one time or another. Richard McKeon has provided an estimation of dialectic's importance in history by examining its significance in relation to three major methodological schools, which he calls

"dialectic", "logistic", and "inquiry".¹⁵² All three differ in important respects, though dialectical philosophy differs in general demeanor from the other two. All three methodological approaches incorporate aspects of the other two. But what is accentuated and what is subordinated seems to be the crucial determinant.¹⁵³

Briefly, in a dialectical philosophy, dialectic is a method of proof and of inquiry and is even employed for "the more restricted objectives of formal logic and experimental methodology."¹⁵⁴ In a logistic philosophy, by contrast, "such validity as dialectic and the methods of inquiry possess can be expressed in formal arguments."¹⁵⁵ As for a philosophy of inquiry and discovery, it "depends particularly on reflexive principles to translate the analysis of problems to their test in action."¹⁵⁶ Here, dialectic and logistic are "abstract forms unless given content by the results of inquiry."¹⁵⁷

Dialectical philosophies, which attempt to transform or transcend the contradictions of nature, history, experience, knowledge and action, etc., have been most closely associated with Plato, Hegel, Marx and Engels. All four endeavored to develop comprehensive principles in order to reconcile or remove basic oppositions which separated, say, subject from object, thing from thing, spirit from matter, being from becoming, and so on. In his inimitable manner, each thinker strove to attain an organic whole, an ultimate overarching synthesis of the disparate aspects of existence. Each one endeavored to construct a supreme

dialectical science which could serve as a basis for and method of all other arts and sciences.¹⁵⁸

As McKeon has noted, all forms of the dialectical method have tried to unite thought and its object and have attempted to prove that the "processes by which the universe and its parts are constituted are not fundamentally different from the actions by which men achieve purposes and establish communities or from the devices by which men acquire and organize knowledge."¹⁵⁹

Logistic philosophies have in general used dialectic in an auxiliary capacity in seeking to trace knowledge back to the elements of which it is composed and the processes by which they are related. "The logistic orientation has included thinkers such as Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz and the Scottish Common-Sense school who prized analysis, precision of statement, cogency of proof, strict definition of terms and correct representation of relations among terms. For them, basic truths are identities and tautologies. Philosophy must set forth simple principles and clear inferences to order all knowledge."¹⁶⁰ Despite its antipathy to dialectic, this school of philosophical method often depended upon "a dialectical use of substance, judgment, and proposition as comprehensive principles to establish organic simples of which atomic simples are analytical parts."¹⁶¹

Finally, philosophical methods emphasizing inquiry have given dialectic a propaedeutic, and a critical mission. That is, dialectic

has served as a preparation for learning, as with Aristotle and Kant, and as a critical device for exposing the speciousness of non-scientific or transcendental claims, as with Aristotle, Kant and Dewey. With these three philosophers, logic and dialectic were employed as aids to the discovery of solutions to problems and to the advancement of learning. Dialectical reasoning was often used in association with reflexive principles for the purpose of translating the analysis of problems to their test in action.¹⁶²

These three methods of dialectic, of logic and of inquiry, as McKeon has observed, are processes which differ so radically that they completely transform the contents, forms, and purposes of philosophy. Yet these methods are so closely related that the same (subject) statements can be repeated and seem to refer to the same subject-matter and problems. In one respect, then, the kind of dialectic associated with each method helped to reinforce that method and estrange it from the other two. In another respect, however, recourse to dialectical activity served to pull the methods together, notwithstanding the disparaging pronouncements of numerous schools and thinkers about the scientific relevance of dialectic.¹⁶³

What seems to unite the most influential philosophers and schools in the dialectical tradition is a concern about antithesis and conflict. The thread of common meaning which runs through the Platonic, Aristotelian, Kantian, and Hegelian conceptions of dialectic, as the

Syntopicon suggests, is to be found in the principle of opposition.¹⁶⁴ (This would, of course, also be true of Marx and Engels.) In each conception, dialectic either begins or ends with some sort of intellectual conflict, or develops and then resolves such oppositions. Invariably, dialectic is employed to overcome contradictions, whether they occur in nature, in history, in art, in scientific thought, or elsewhere.

Dialectic's relation to philosophy can also be examined through a consideration of the historical formulation of the doctrine according to three main sources: a historical matrix, a theological-metaphysical matrix and a logico-deductive matrix.¹⁶⁵ The first two especially are indebted to the biological model of development. In the historical matrix, for example, Hegel's dialectic can be appreciated for its dependence upon the Neo-Platonist concept of the development of life. Essentially, development was considered according to the phases through which it passes in each person and according to the evolution and process of life from father to son. Proclus, for instance, advanced a theory of the general triadic movement of the universe involving a begetter or producer as the first moment, a processing or reproduction where the product both contains and surpasses the essential aspects of the producer, as the second moment, and a returning of each being produced to that from which it proceeds, as the third moment.¹⁶⁶

From this basic biological model, Hegel, Marx and Engels fashioned an historical perspective involving, among many things,

process to a higher form, through negation and continuity but also circularity from cause to cause. In brief, Hegel's concept of "aufgehoben", subsequently adapted by Marx and Engels, meant for him that theories, in opposition to their predecessors, nonetheless preserve within themselves the elements of truth which their predecessors contained. In other words, an earlier theory or social system or life form is both annulled and at the same time preserved and sublated. The theory, or system, or life form which succeeds it pushes the predecessor to the side and takes its place in the sequence of life and yet constitutes the continuation of the earlier entity, both preserving and improving upon its character and heredity. ¹⁶⁷

What gives additional distinction to this model is its adaptation of Aristotle's idea of natural and violent motion. His teleology offered the view that inner purpose operates in matter, which provides it with a development and orders its various moments. Each moment of development takes the place of the preceding one and yet preserves what has already been achieved. No single moment in the developmental process is conclusive. But the entire process involves a striving for ultimate perfection. ¹⁶⁸

The Hegelian, Marxian and Engelian historical dialectics were thus fashioned upon the foundation of Aristotelian and Neo-Platonist concepts of development. Moreover, the ideas about alienation and estrangement that Hegel and Marx in particular entertained derived from

the notion of the circularity of process, whereby each being returns to that from which it proceeds. Hegel's story of Spirit estranged from itself and Marx's concept of alienated labor are drawn from this well-spring of classical thought.¹⁶⁹

Hegelian and Marxian dialectic also drew upon the theological-metaphysical matrix when arguing, respectively, for example, that Reason would ultimately pervade and rule the world or that a communist life of freely associating individuals would ultimately reign. Each employed an analogue of Christian thought in consideration of the world's salvation, its deliverance from evil.¹⁷⁰

Finally, the logico-deductive matrix serves to contrast Hegelian, Marxian and Engelian logic from the classical procedures formally enunciated by Aristotle and practiced by generations of philosophers, including Kant.¹⁷¹ Indeed, Dewey's theory of inquiry, in its methods of inductive investigation, often contrasted from formal logic.¹⁷² Of special significance is the fact that Hegel considered true necessity as given, not by abstract concatenation, but rather by the dialectical structure of the process governing the evolution of all things in the world.¹⁷³ In moving from the Hegelian idiom to what he conceived to be a scientific, materialist one, Marx nevertheless preserved the idea that necessity, such as the logic of the laws of social and economic development, is not formally rational but dialectical. The passage from capitalism to socialism, as Marx contended, would occur by way of the

dynamic contradictions inherent in the former system, not through any classically or mediævally reasoned syllogistic built into history.¹⁷⁴

For Dewey and Mead, the logico-deductive matrix with its emphasis on instruction received through argument proceeding from pre-existent knowledge must be supplanted by a dialectically self-corrective method of inquiry which implies a willingness to renew and even revise prevailing knowledge claims in the light of their social and semantic contexts.¹⁷⁵

Dialectic's relation to philosophical method can be examined in yet a third respect. For dialectical method often accords with and depends upon symbolism. Both, as Charles Feldelson has observed, involve intellectual strife.¹⁷⁶ Moreover, dialectic as a symbolic event usually becomes a purely conceptual experience, an excursion into the meaning of something, aside from the urgency of facts.¹⁷⁷

In this respect, dialectic hinges upon internal coherence, not external correspondence; its practitioners acknowledge the point that they are operating in an autonomous realm of meaning where any contradiction can be transcended through the creation of a larger symbol uniting the previously antithetical positions.¹⁷⁸ Here, dialectic operates "in vacuo," as Mortimer Adler has put it.¹⁷⁹ It becomes the philosophical basis of rhetoric by providing, in Richard Weaver's words, "that basis of 'high speculation about nature' without which rhetoric in the narrower sense has nothing to work upon."¹⁸⁰ "Dialectic", as Weaver has observed, "is that stage which defines the subject satisfactorily with regard

to the "logos", or the set of propositions making up some coherent universe of discourse; and we can therefore say that a dialectical position is established when its relation to an opposite has been made clear and it is thus rationally rather than empirically sustained."¹⁸¹

This view of dialectic, it should be noted, is more nearly Socratic and Platonic than, say, Hegelian, Marxian or even Aristotelian. It suggests the process of definition through dialogic communication rather than a process of thought that accords with a world process. To be sure, this latter conception of dialectic somewhat stems from the Platonic theory of forms. Nevertheless, the symbolic significance of the dialogues has been integrated into contemporary views on the prerequisites for rhetorical activity.

Finally, dialectic's relation to philosophy can be viewed in terms of the critical, self-consciousness disposition. For it has spawned both the reflexive attitude and the relentless critique of the forms of socio-political life. In the first place, dialectic is rooted in the Socratic dictum that a life of self-examination is the only one worth living.¹⁸² In a more systematic way, this attitude permeates Aristotle's metaphysics, where he thinks upon the very laws of thought governing the conduct of scientific demonstration.¹⁸³ It is imbued in the German philosophers, Kant, Hegel and Marx and in the American pragmatists, such as James, Peirce, Dewey and Mead. They all tried, in one way or another, to turn upon their own formulations to cleanse them of conceptual

impurities, to coordinate conflicting assertions, to rectify previous errors and to ascertain the conditions of knowing as they themselves endeavored to know what is certain and what is probable.¹⁸⁴ This attitude, in sum, requires unswerving allegiance to consciousness. At all times, one must be aware of what one is doing.¹⁸⁵

In the second place, dialectical activity has been undertaken to destroy neat systems and ordered structures. At the service of analysts of society, it has, for instance, involved the questioning of everything seen and heard, the complete examination of phenomena from every angle. It has resulted in the exhaustive evaluation of the contradictions inherent in social propositions and the consideration of every social category from the viewpoint of its non-contents as well as its positive attributes.¹⁸⁶

These attitudes suggest a kind of pervasive theme or motif for the dialectical tradition: man as craftsman, critic and logician. The idea of man as craftsman has its roots in Greek philosophy, where dialectic originated, and extends through Hegel and Marx to Dewey and Mead. It emphasizes man as creator of his own life, as actor and artist.¹⁸⁷ Aristotle suggested that life could be considered as "techne"--a project in composition.¹⁸⁸ Moreover, he stressed the continuity of thought and action in the individual's life, which is exemplified in the concept of "praxis".¹⁸⁹ This concept, as Lobkowitz and Bernstein have shown, played an important role in the shaping of Hegelian and Marxian philosophy as well as in the development of pragmatism.¹⁹⁰

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The idea of man as critic and logician implicates all those philosophers who employed dialectical reasoning or attributed dialectic to natural and/or social development. They fancied themselves as devastatingly effective critics of other's thought and qualified reasoners, of one logical sort or another. Moreover, most of them endeavored to apply critical method and logic to the resolution of social problems stemming from the ambiguities and perplexities arising out of dialectical terms, such as "rights", "justice", "freedom", and "equality".¹⁹¹

A Preview of Kenneth Burke's Indebtedness to the Dialectical Tradition

The dialectical tradition, in summary, admits of diverse and often disparate approaches to the term "dialectic", to its uses and philosophical import. From the golden age of Greece to the present, dialectic has been variously associated with the art of logical discussion, the practice of definition through dialogic communication, the construction and critique of philosophical systems and claims (implying both the quest for synoptic vision and skepticism of transcendental propositions), the processes of thought, nature and social development, philosophical method in the primary or subsidiary sense, and the perception of the human condition which rests upon self-consciousness and the criticism of social life.

No one thinker has managed to create a definition of dialectic that encompasses all of these concerns, although many philosophers have traversed these areas of interest. Through the development of his dramatic system, Kenneth Burke has fashioned a symbol-centered perspective

of the human condition which involves the dialectical tradition as thoroughly as any philosophy or philosophy of language.

At this point in the study, it is appropriate to merely preview the influences of the tradition upon the development of Burke's system. A forecast of some lines of influence provides a perspective for the chapters that follow. Essentially, Burke's own system is the consequence of a kind of Hegelian triadic development. It has moved through a series of critical moments which incorporate yet surpass previous speculations about the linguistic drama of human relations.¹⁹² It has been energized by a dialectical skepticism of partial claims but also powered by a quest for the synoptic vision of life.¹⁹³

Dramatism, in its recognition of the dialectical aspects of language, has itself become in pentadic method and outlook a kind of dialectical philosophy. And yet it gives due consideration and employment to logistic and inquiry in its discovery, charting and indexing of rhetorical, grammatical and symbolic data and, further, in its attempt to derive principles out of the assessment of the facts about linguistic behavior.¹⁹⁴

In its broad vision of the drama of human relations, dramatism draws upon the historical and theological-metaphysical matrixes which are underpinned by a biological model. Burke's notion of the self in quest, his secular analogue of the Christian story of salvation, his views on order, hierarchy, the negative, guilt and redemption, are all fashioned in the spirit of these dialectical matrixes. His view that man is alienated

from the sources of his being because of the social and physical consequences of his symbolic prowess reaffirms the Neo-Platonic concern with the circular aspect of life development.

Furthermore, Burke's dramatistic system upholds the dialectical ideal of man as craftsman, critic and logician. For he stresses two dominant images of man: as poet and as actor.¹⁹⁵ These imply respectively creativity and purpose and freedom, moral choice and action.¹⁹⁶ He views life as a kind of poem in process and considers art a moral force in society.¹⁹⁷ Burke as artist, poet and critic is best able to make counter-statements to the myths of the age.¹⁹⁸ His critical mission has been to promote maximum consciousness of humanity's linguistic fate through dramatism's methodology of exposure.¹⁹⁹ Finally, his own methodology has resulted in the development and utilization of a logologic-- a logic that language necessarily follows.²⁰⁰

Summary

Dialectic was developed in classical Greece as a form of logical discussion and eventually became Plato's philosophical method and Aristotle's critical device for defending the first principles of his theoretical sciences. Dialectical reasoning was an important aspect of theological doctrine and scholastic logic. During the Renaissance, Ramus, Agricola and Wilson associated it with "invention" and close-packed logic, as opposed to rhetoric's preoccupation with stylistic contrivances, such as tropes and schemes. By the late Eighteenth Century, Kant had

advanced a skeptical dialectic to reveal the illusory character of transcendental claims. His critical influence on subsequent German dialecticians was profound, but Fichte, Schelling and Hegel ironically reversed Kant's emphasis on the critique of the illusory employment of reason beyond experience and sought a dialectic with wider ontological implications. Hegel conceived of dialectic as the evolution of Spirit. And then Marx "materialized" the Hegelian dialectic to explain the laws of social development. Engels fashioned a doctrine of the dialectics of nature. But the doctrine ossified under the guardianship of Communist theoreticians. Dewey and Mead drew upon the framework of Hegelian dialectics to explain the interrelationship of self and society and the crucial role of communication in both social and thought processes.

Dialectic, as both concept and activity, is best understood in relation to philosophical method and historical theme. It has often been conceived of as synonymous with philosophy and has been put to use in subordinate capacities in philosophies stressing "logistic" or "inquiry". In another respect, it has variously developed through an historical matrix, a theological-metaphysical matrix, both underpinned by a biological model, and a logico-deductive matrix. Whatever its use or definition, however, dialectic has its roots in the idea of conflict, and, in its strictly symbolic sense, it often operates within a rational universe of discourse, aside from the facts of the empirical world. It has

frequently been employed by philosophers who combined the qualities of craftsman, critic and logician.

Kenneth Burke owes much to this dialectical tradition for the development of his language-centered system. The dialectical implications of dramatism warrant and will receive extensive discussion in Chapters IV and V and in the conclusion, Chapter VI. The immediate task of the study is to proceed to the explanation of the essentials of dramatism, which will afford a conceptual bridge from the survey of the dialectical tradition to a discussion of Burke as dialectician.

NOTES

CHAPTER II

1. See William Kneale and Martha Kneale, The Development of Logic, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962), p. 7.
2. Richard McKeon, "Dialectic and Political Thought and Action," Ethics, LXV (October, 1954), p. 3.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.: Kneale and Kneale, op. cit.: I. M. Bochenski, A History of Formal Logic, tr. Ivo Thomas, (South Bend, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1961), p. 26.
5. McKeon, op. cit. pp. 3-4, and Emile Janssens, "The Concept of Dialectic in the Ancient World," tr. Henry W. Johnstone, Jr., Philosophy and Rhetoric, I, (Summer, 1968), p. 175.
6. Janssens, pp. 175-177.
7. See John Burnett, Early Greek Philosophy, 3rd ed., (Cleveland: World Publishing Co., 1957), pp. 276-309.
8. See, for example, Plato, Cratylus, tr. Benjamin Jowett, with introduction by Raphael Demos, The Dialogues of Plato, Vol. I, (New York: Random House, 1937), pp. 384-391. Cf. Harold Cherniss, Aristotle's Criticism of Presocratic Philosophy, (New York: Octagon, 1964); Everett Lee Hunt, "Plato and Aristotle on Rhetoric and Rhetoricians," in Studies in Rhetoric and Public Speaking, (New York: Century Co., 1925), pp. 3-60. For an account of Isocrates' opposition to those sophists who taught "eristic" for disputation's sake in the field of ethics, see J. W. H. Atkins, Literary Criticism in Antiquity, (London: Methuen, 1934), Vol. I, p. 124, and Werner Jaeger, "The Rhetoric of Isocrates and Its Cultural Ideal," in Paideia: the Ideals of Greek Culture, tr. Gilbert Highet, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1944), Vol. III, pp. 46-70.
9. Kneale and Kneale, op. cit., p. 16.
10. Ibid.

11. See Ernst Kapp, "Induction; Ancient and Modern Logic," in Greek Foundations of Traditional Logic, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1942), pp. 75-87.

12. See Richard Robinson, "Socratic Definition," in The Philosophy of Socrates, ed. Gregory Vlastos, Anchor Book, (New York: Doubleday, 1971), pp. 110-124. Cf. George Makhnikian, "Elenctic Definitions," Ibid., pp. 125-157.

13. On "epagoge", see Kapp, op. cit., pp. 75-76. For a thorough discussion of Aristotle's use of "epagoge" in the dialectical defense of first principles, see Richard McKeon, "Aristotle's Concept of the Development and Nature of Scientific Method," Journal of the History of Ideas, VIII (1947), pp. 3-44. On "elenchus", see Richard Robinson, "Elenchus", in The Philosophy of Socrates, pp. 78-93, and his "Elenchus: Direct and Indirect", in Ibid., pp. 94-109. For a significant discussion of the Socratic and Platonic dialectics in their definitional and refutative phases, see Richard Robinson, Plato's Earlier Dialectic, 2nd ed., (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953). The Robinson articles in The Philosophy of Socrates were drawn from this book.

14. Janssens suggests that the dual emphasis on definition and refutation seemed to the non-Platonist observers to put Plato's dialectic between "sophistic, rhetoric and Socratic reasoning," op. cit., p. 177.

15. See Kneale and Kneale, "Plato and the Philosophy of Logic," in op. cit., pp. 17-22.

16. Ibid.

17. See Gregory Vlastos, "The Paradox of Socrates," in The Philosophy of Socrates, pp. 1-21.

18. McKeon, "Dialectic and Political Thought and Action," op. cit., p. 16. See also, Sidney Hook, "Dialectic in Social and Historical Inquiry," The Journal of Philosophy, XXXVI, (July, 1939), p. 378. "Looking back upon the long history of the use of the term 'dialectic'," observes Hook, "it seems to me that a justified moral emerges from our discussion, viz., that the term 'dialectic' is so infected with ambiguity, that it is not likely to function as a serviceable designation for any concept or intellectual procedure in any inquiry which aims at the achievement of reliable knowledge about ourselves and the world we live in."

19. As McKeon, among others, has noted, "Aristotle is said to have attributed the invention of dialectic to Zeno of Elea . . . while

Zenophon attributed to Socrates a definition of dialectical discussion which brings out the relation of 'classifying . . . to discussing . . .'. See "Dialectic and political Thought and Action," op. cit., p. 3. Cf. Kneale and Kneale, op. cit., pp. 7-9; Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, tr. and ed. R. D. Hicks, (London, 1925), VIII.57 and IX.25; Xenophon, Memorabilia, tr. E. C. Marchant, Loeb Classical Library, (New York: Putnam, 1923), IV, 5.12.

20. "Dialectic and Political Thought and Action," pp. 3-4; Kneale and Kneale, op. cit.

21. Kneale and Kneale; Cf. H. D. P. Lee, Zeno of Elea, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1936) for an overview of Zeno's life and contributions to logic.

22. On the abuse of logic by the sophists, see, for example, Edward Zeller, Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy, tr. L. R. Palmer, 13th ed., rev. by William Nestle, (New York: Meridian Books, 1957), pp. 92-98.

For an indication of Plato's contempt for the "eristic" exploits of the sophists see Socrates' attack on them in Euthydemus, 286-288. The Dialogues of Plato, Vol. I, tr. Benjamin Jowett. Aristotle criticizes the sophists for using reasoning processes (a sham form of dialectic) that are rootless and unsystematic. See Aristotle, De Sophisticis Elenchis, tr. W. A. Pickard-Cambridge, The Works of Aristotle, ed. W. D. Ross, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1928), 183^b-184^b.

23. In Theaetetus, 167-168, Protagoras is portrayed as a relativist who will argue with equal zest, one side or the other on a given issue. The Dialogues of Plato, Vol. II tr. Benjamin Jowett. Gomperz observed of Protagoras that his own dialectic was much more rhetorical than Zeno's. "The chief weapon in his armoury was that of long speeches delivered successively to refute one another." As quoted in Lester Thonssen and A. Craig Baird, Speech Criticism, (New York: The Ronald Press, 1948), p. 37. Everett Lee Hunt has maintained that Protagoras' reputation as an unprincipled relativist and subjectivist is undeserved, although he notes that "his practice of having his students argue upon both sides of certain general themes may have been responsible for the charge against him, recorded by Aristotle, that he made the worse appear the better reason." "On the Sophists", in The Province of Rhetoric, ed. Joseph Schwartz and John Rycenga, (New York: The Ronald Press, 1965), p. 76. Cf. Theodor Gomperz, Greek Thinkers, tr. Laurie Magnus, (London: Methuen, 1920), Vol. I, p. 465.

24. See Gilbert Ryle, Plato's Progress, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), pp. 115-116. As Ryle observes, the "Dissoi Logoi" means arguments both ways and contains the thesis that virtue is not teachable, plus its opposite. The argument against the thesis, says Ryle, is akin to that which Plato's dramatic Protagoras advances in Protagoras 327-8. "This, with some corroborative evidence," adds Ryle, "strongly suggests that the backbone of the 'Dissoi Logoi' derives from Protagoras himself, though some stretches, including a mention of the result of the Peloponnesian War, must be additions by a later hand." Ibid.

25. See Plato, Cratylus, op. cit.; Euthydemus, op. cit.; Aristotle De Sophisticis Elenchis, op. cit. Aristotle's criticism of Protagoras' dictum that man is the measure of all things centers on the absurdity of the latter's claim: "for to maintain the view that we are opposing is just like maintaining that the things that appear to people who put their finger under their eye and make the object appear two instead of one must be two (because they appear to be of that number) and again one (for to those who do not interfere with their eye the one object appears one)." Metaphysica, tr. W. D. Ross, 1063^a 5-10.

26. Robinson, "Elenchus," op. cit. See Rosamond Kent Sprague, Plato's Use of Fallacy, (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1962), for an account of Plato's refutative techniques in Euthydemus, Theaetetus, Cratylus, and Hippias Minor. On the refutative aspects of Aristotelian dialectic see, for example, J. H. Randall, Aristotle, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960), pp. 37-40. Among dialectic's tasks are the finding of good arguments, meeting others on their own ground and examining the consequences of their theses, and the exposing of spurious arguments.

Cf. W. D. Ross "The Topics," in Aristotle, Meridian Book (Cleveland: World Publishing Co., 1959), pp. 58-61.

27. Nakhnikian, "Elenctic Definitions," op. cit. On the use of dialectic as preparation for instruction in the theoretical sciences, see Marjorie Grene, A Portrait of Aristotle, Phoenix Book, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), pp. 109-115, 185-186, 191-192; Kapp, op. cit., pp. 75-76.

28. See McKeon, "Aristotle's Concept of the Development and Nature of Scientific Method," op. cit.

29. Perhaps epitomized in Socrates' evangelistic flights in the Apology, where he says that "God only is wise; and by his answer he

intends to show that the wisdom of men is worth little or nothing; he is not speaking of Socrates, he is only using my name by way of illustration, as if he said, He, O men is the wisest, who like Socrates, knows that his wisdom is in truth worth nothing." Apology, 23.

30. As Vlastos has noted, Socrates "makes you feel that the failure to sustain a thesis or find a definition is not just an intellectual defeat, but a moral disaster." "The Paradox of Socrates," op. cit., p. 6. Aristotle uses "peirastic", in a similar vein, to dialectically burst the bubble of an individual's intellectual conceit. Metaphysica, 1004b26.

31. See, for example, R. E. Allen, "Plato's Earlier Theory of Forms," in The Philosophy of Socrates, pp. 319-334. As Allen puts it, "Socratic moral inquiry is inquiry about reality." Ibid., p. 334.

32. Robinson, "Socratic Definition," in Ibid., p. 117. One of Socrates' objectives is to "get at what he calls the essence or the form X, the one in the many, that single identical something whose presence in all the many Xes is guaranteed precisely by the fact that we call them all Xes . . .".

33. Aristotle, Metaphysica, 1078b 27-32. "For two things may be fairly ascribed to Socrates -- inductive arguments and universal definition, both of which are concerned with the starting-point of science-- but Socrates did not make the universals or the definitions exist apart: they, however, gave them separate existence, and this was the kind of thing they called Ideas."

34. See A. R. Lacey, "Our Knowledge of Socrates," in The Philosophy of Socrates, pp. 22-49. Lacey concludes that Plato must be rightly regarded as the main source but that "no source can be trusted or ignored entirely, and no source can be assumed to be equally reliable throughout." Ibid., p. 49.

35. The various qualities of dialectic are discussed in the Republic. Dialectic uses hypotheses as steps or points of departure into a world which is above hypotheses, "in order that she may soar beyond them to the first principles of the whole . . .", 511; dialectic proceeds by reason only, without any help of sense. That is, "a person starts on the discovery of the absolute by the light of reason only, and without any assistance of sense, and perseveres until by pure intelligence he arrives at the perception of the absolute good . . .", 532; dialectic is "the only science which does away with hypotheses in order to make his ground secure." 533; the "comprehensive mind is always the dialectical." 537.

36. See McKeon, "Dialectic and Political Thought and Action," op. cit., p. 4.

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid.

39. As Socrates says to Phaedrus, "The second principle is that of division into species according to the natural formation where the joint is, not breaking any part as a bad carver might," Phaedrus, 265. A moment later, Socrates announces that "I am a great lover of these processes of division and generalization; they help me to speak and to think." Ibid., 266. Cf. Richard M. Weaver, "The Phaedrus and the Nature of Rhetoric," in The Ethics of Rhetoric, (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1953), pp. 3-26.

40. For an incisive discussion of Plato's method of division, see, Francis Cornford, Plato's Theory of Knowledge, (New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1957), pp. 261-268.

41. Ibid. Cf. H. P. Munro, "Dialectic and the Written Word," Kansas Speech Journal, XXIV (November, 1962), pp. 22-23; Edwin Black, "Plato's View of Rhetoric," The Quarterly Journal of Speech, XLIV (December, 1958), p. 365.

42. See Kenneth Burke, "Rhetoric--Old and New," The Journal of General Education, V (April 1951), p. 204; and his "The Socratic Transcendence," A Grammar of Motives, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), pp. 420-430.

43. Plato, Republic, 534. "Dialectic, then, as you will agree, is the coping-stone of the sciences, and is set over them; no other science can be placed higher--the nature of knowledge can no further go."

44. Ibid., 484. ". . . philosophers only are able to grasp the eternal and unchangeable . . .".

45. See, for instance, Phaedrus, 237-256. Cf. Weaver, op. cit.; Claud A. Thompson, "Rhetorical Madness: An Ideal in the Phaedrus," The Quarterly Journal of Speech, LV (December, 1969), pp. 358-363.

46. See Gustav Mueller, Plato: The Founder of Philosophy as Dialectic, (New York: Philosophical Library, 1965), pp. 137-138.

47. Plato, Epistle VII, in Plato's Epistles, tr. with critical essays and notes by Glenn Morrow, The Library of Liberal Arts (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1962), pp. 238-241, 342A-344D. Cf. Grene, op. cit., pp. 48-49. "In fact for Plato all speech . . . is metaphorical. And hence, further, dialectic, the attempt to move through disciplined and reasoned argument to knowledge of the really-real, remains a task: problematic, to be pursued again and again, now from one perspective, now another, but never to be finished and done with and set down, black on white, for him who runs to read." Ibid., p. 49.

48. Ibid. Also see Arthur O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being: A Study of the History of an Idea, 1st Harper Torchbook ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1960), p. 37.

49. See, for example, Plato, Phaedrus, 246-257, on the nature of the soul as understood through the story of a pair of winged horses and a charioteer. Cf. Weaver, op. cit.

50. Mueller, op. cit., p. 138.

51. Ibid.

52. See, for example, Topica, tr. W. A. Pickard-Cambridge, op. cit., 100^a18-100^b31; De Sophisticis Elenchis, op. cit., 165^b3-4; Metaphysica, op. cit., 1004^b15-27. Cf. Proceedings of the Third Symposium Aristotelicum, "Aristotle on Dialectics," ed. G. E. L. Owen, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968).

53. See McKeon, "Aristotle's Concept of the Development and Nature of Scientific Method," op. cit., and Joseph Owens, "The Aristotelian Conception of the Sciences," International Philosophical Quarterly, IV (1964), pp. 162-169. Cf. G. Downey, Aristotle and Greek Science, (London: Chatto and Windus, 1964).

54. On the probable premise and dialectical reasoning, see Lloyd Bitzer, "Aristotle's Enthymeme Revisited," The Quarterly Journal of Speech, XLV (December, 1959), pp. 399-408, and Edward H. Madden, "Aristotle's Treatment of Probability and Signs," Philosophy of Science, XXIV (April, 1957), pp. 167-172.

55. On the nature of the dialectical syllogism, see Kapp, op. cit., p. 14. For a trenchant discussion of dialectical definition, see Alessandro Guilliani, "The Aristotelian Theory of the Dialectical Definition," Philosophy and Rhetoric, V (Summer, 1972), pp. 129-142. On Aristotle's syllogistic, see, for example, Kneale and Kneale, "The Doctrine of the Syllogism,"

in op. cit., pp. 67-81; Jan Lukasiewicz, Aristotle's Syllogistic From the Standpoint of Modern Formal Logic, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957).

56. See W. D. Ross, Aristotle, pp. 58-64.

57. "The Apprehension of the First Principles of Science," Ibid., p. 57. Aristotle, Topica, 101^b4-6.

58. Topica, 101^b1-3.

59. On dialectic as the way of breaking conceptual impasses as preliminary to instruction in the sciences, see Joseph Owens, The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics: A Study in the Greek Background of Mediaeval Thought, 2nd rev. ed. (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1963), p. 205.

60. Kapp, op. cit., pp. 14-17.

61. Ibid.; McKeon, "Dialectical and Political Thought and Action," op. cit., p. 5.

62. McKeon, Ibid., pp. 4-6.

63. Ibid., pp. 5-6.

64. Republic, 533, 537.

65. Owens, The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics, pp. 205-206. Grene, "Nous", op. cit., pp. 241-247. For Aristotle, "Nous" constitutes "the mind's link with the premises of scientific knowledge . . ." and "it is also the highest 'part' of mind itself . . ." Ibid., p. 243.

66. Ross, Aristotle, p. 185. "If ethics is not demonstrative, is it then (to use a distinction frequently drawn in Aristotle's logic) dialectical? In a sense it is; one of the uses of dialectic is just this, to lead us to first principles. Hence Aristotle often reasons dialectically, not from the principles known to be true but from the opinions whether of 'the many' or of 'the wise', and particularly from those of the Platonic school.

67. See Lane Cooper, "The Rhetoric of Aristotle," The Quarterly Journal of Speech, XXI (February, 1935), pp. 10-19; Aristotle, Rhetorica, tr. W. Rhys Roberts, op. cit., 1354^A 1-12.

68. Aristotle, Topica, 104^B 1-18; Cf. Weaver, op. cit., p. 16.
69. McKeon, "Dialectic and Political Thought and Action," op. cit., p. 7. Cf. Benson Mates, Stoic Logic, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1953); Kneale and Kneale, "The Megarians and the Stoics," op. cit., pp. 114-176.
70. "Dialectic and Political Thought and Action," p. 7.
71. Ibid.
72. Ibid.
73. Ibid.
74. Ibid. Cf. W. D. Ross, "Justice," Aristotle, pp. 203-209.
75. "Dialectic and Political Thought and Action," p. 8; Richard McKeon, "Rhetoric in the Middle Ages," in Schwartz and Rycenga, op. cit., pp. 172-185; Kneale and Kneale, "Roman and Medieval Logic: From Cicero to Boethuis," op. cit., pp. 177-198; Thonssen and Baird, op. cit., pp. 180-183. For a thorough discussion of the dialectic of Cicero, Cf. Richard McKeon, "Introduction to the Philosophy of Cicero," Marcus Tullius Cicero, Brutus, On the Nature of the Gods, On Divination, On Duties, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1950); Cicero, De Inventione, tr. H. M. Hubbell, The Loeb Classical Library, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1949).
76. "Rhetoric in the Middle Ages," pp. 172-180; "Dialectic and Political Thought and Action," p. 8.
77. "Rhetoric in the Middle Ages," pp. 177-180; Cf. Charles Sears Baldwin, "St. Augustine and the Rhetoric of Cicero," Proceedings of the Classical Association, XXII (1925), pp. 24-46; St. Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, tr. D. W. Robertson, Jr., The Library of Liberal Arts, (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1958).
78. McKeon, "Dialectic and Political Thought and Action," pp. 8-9.
79. Ibid., p. 9.
80. Ibid.
81. Ibid.; "Rhetoric in the Middle Ages," pp. 195-203.

82. "Dialectic and Political Thought and Action," p. 9.
83. Ibid., pp. 9-10.
84. See Kneale and Kneale, "Roman and Medieval Logic: From Alcuin to Abelard," op. cit., pp. 198-224. On Alcuin in specific, Ibid., pp. 198-199. Cf. Wilbur Samuel Howell, The Rhetoric of Alcuin and Charlemagne, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1941).
85. "Dialectic and Political Thought and Action," pp. 9-10.
86. Ibid.
87. "Rhetoric in the Middle Ages," p. 180, 191.
88. On Lombard's use of the logical form of dialectic in his Book of Sentences, see Carl Stephenson, Mediaeval History (New York: Harper Bros., 1935), pp. 94-95.
89. "Rhetoric in the Middle Ages," pp. 193-195.
90. Ibid., p. 197; "Dialectic and Political Thought and Action," p. 10; Kneale and Kneale, op. cit., pp. 203-224. For an imaginative reconstruction of Abelard's dispute with William of Champeaux on the Neo-Platonist-Nominalist controversy, see Mortimer Adler, Dialectic, (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co., Ltd., 1927), pp. 64-77.
91. "Dialectic and Political Thought and Action," p. 10.
92. Kneale and Kneale, op. cit., pp. 226, 229, 236; McKeon, "Dialectic and Political Thought and Action," p. 11.
93. Ibid.
94. Ibid.
95. Ibid.
96. Regarding Agricola's influence on the dialectical tradition, see Wilbur Samuel Howell, Logic and Rhetoric in England, 1500-1700, (New York: Russell & Russell, 1961), pp. 49-51, 149-152. On the impact of Ramus's dialectic on English logicians and rhetoricians, see Ibid., pp. 146-246, and passim. Cf. Walter J. Ong, S. J., Ramus, Method and the Decay of Dialogue, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1958).

97. Howell, op. cit., pp. 49-51, 152; McKeon, "Rhetoric in the Middle Ages," pp. 210-211.
98. Ibid., 210n.
99. See Wilbur Samuel Howell, "Renaissance Rhetoric and Modern Rhetoric: A Study in Change," in Schwartz and Rycenga, op. cit., pp. 300-303. Cf. Russell H. Wagner, "Thomas Wilson's Contributions to Rhetoric," in Papers in Rhetoric, ed. Donald C. Bryant, (St. Louis: Privately Printed, 1940), pp. 1-7.
100. "Renaissance Rhetoric and Modern Rhetoric," op. cit., pp. 300-301; Cf. William G. Crane, "English Rhetorics of the 16th Century," in Schwartz and Rycenga, Ibid., pp. 216-218.
101. See Howell, Logic and Rhetoric in England, 1500-1700, pp. 257-258; Crane, op. cit., pp. 220-221.
102. See Logic and Rhetoric in England, 1500-1700, pp. 90-95.
103. McKeon, "Dialectic and Political Thought and Action," op. cit., p. 12.
104. Ibid., pp. 12-13; "Renaissance Rhetoric and Modern Rhetoric," op. cit., pp. 294-296.
105. Ibid., p. 302.
106. "Dialectic and Political Thought and Action," pp. 12-13.
107. Ibid., Cf. Karl R. Wallace, Francis Bacon on Communication and Rhetoric, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1943). Regarding invention and dialectic in terms of Bacon's view of science, see Howell, Logic and Rhetoric in England, 1500-1700, pp. 336-375.
108. On Descartes's repudiation of traditional modes of dialectical invention, see Ibid., pp. 342-349, and "Renaissance Rhetoric and Modern Rhetoric," pp. 294-295.
109. See McKeon, Dialectical and Political Thought and Action, p. 12.
110. Ibid., p. 13. Cf. Wilbur Samuel Howell, "John Locke and the New Rhetoric," The Quarterly Journal of Speech, LIII (December, 1967), pp. 319-333.

111. McKeon, Dialectic and Political Thought and Action, " pp. 13-14.
112. Ibid. For an excellent account of the substance of Kantian dialectic, see Jonathan Bennett, Kant's Dialectic, (London: Cambridge University Press, 1974). Cf. John Kemp, "The Conditions of Knowledge," and "The Illusions of Speculative Metaphysics," The Philosophy of Kant, (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 5-37, 38-55; N. K. Smith, A Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason', (London: Macmillan, 1919).
113. Immanuel Kant, Introduction to Logic, tr. T. K. Abbot, (London: Longmans, Green, 1885) II, p. 7.
114. See Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B423-424.
115. See Kemp, op. cit., pp. 38-55, and McKeon, "Dialectic and Political Thought and Action," pp. 13-14, 19-20.
116. See Bennett, op. cit., pp. 5-8 for Kant's motivation for writing the Dialectic.
117. On the antinomies, see Ibid.; pp. 280-283 and passim. Regarding the application of the Dialectic to the Critique of Practical Reason, see Kemp, op. cit., pp. 65-69; Cf. H. J. Paton, The Categorical Imperative: A Study of Kant's Moral Philosophy, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), pp. 230-231, 266 ff.
118. See Kemp, op. cit., and John E. Llewelyn, "Dialectical and Analytical Opposites," Kant-Studien, LV (1964), pp. 171-174.
119. Ibid.
120. Kemp, op. cit., pp. 48-55.
121. McKeon, "Dialectic and Political Thought and Action," pp. 13-14.
122. Ibid., p. 14.
123. Ibid.
124. Ibid.

125. Ibid., Cf. Herbert Marcuse, "A Note on Dialectic," Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory, 1st Beacon Paperback ed. (Boston: Humanities Press, 1960), pp. vii-xiv; Henri Lefebvre, Dialectical Materialism, tr. John Sturrock, (London: Jonathan Cape, 1968), pp. 21-45; Walter Kaufmann, "Hegel: Contribution and Calamity," From Shakespeare to Existentialism, Anchor Book (New York: Doubleday, 1959), pp. 163-174; J. N. Findlay, Hegel: A Re-examination, (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1958), pp. 64-67.

126. See Richard Bernstein, Praxis and Action, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971), pp. 20-26, and Walter Kaufmann, Hegel: Reinterpretation, Texts, and Commentary, Anchor Book (New York: Doubleday, 1965), pp. 406-408.

127. Marcuse, op. cit., pp. 43-49.

128. Ibid., pp. 47-48; Bernstein, op. cit., pp. 21-28. Bernstein explains Hegel's analysis of the dialectic of lordship and bondage as a paradigm of what Hegel meant by Geist realizing itself through its own 'negation.' Ibid., p. 28.

129. See Sidney Hook, From Hegel to Marx: Studies in the Intellectual Development of Karl Marx, Ann Arbor Paperback, (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1960), pp. 64-65. Marx's examination of Hegel's dialectic in the latter's "Philosophy of Right" and the implications of this for Marx's economic theories is brilliantly discussed by Shlomo Avineri, "The Hegelian Origins of Marx's Political Thought," The Review of Metaphysics, XXI (September, 1967), pp. 33-50. Cf. Lefebvre, op. cit., pp. 60-62.

130. See Hook, op. cit., pp. 61-77.

131. See Bernstein, op. cit., pp. 48-50.

132. As Bernstein has put it, Hegel's dialectic involves Spirit's alienation from itself, which produces a serious struggle between two moments. "Out of this conflict and struggle, out of this negativity, emerges a 'moment' which at once negates, affirms, and transcends the 'moments' involved in the struggle--these earlier moments are aufgehoben." Ibid., p. 20.

133. Ibid., p. 18n. "Aufheben is to negate, affirm and transcend, or go beyond. These are not necessarily three distinct moments, but can be involved in a single process."

134. Ibid., p. 43. "Marx's materialism" adds Bernstein, "can best be understood as an Aufhebung--in precisely the sense in which Hegel used this concept--of previous materialistic and idealistic doctrines . . ."
135. Hook, op. cit., pp. 66-77.
136. See, for example, Robert C. Tucker, "Marx as a Political Theorist," in Marx and The Western World, ed. Nicholas Lobkowitz, (South Bend, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1967), pp. 103-131.
137. As Shlomo Avineri has put it, "Though Marx's weltanschauung is widely called materialistic, Marx himself never dealt with materialism systematically . . . Much of what is known as 'Marxist materialism' was written not by Marx but by Engels, in most cases after Marx's own death." See The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx, (London: Cambridge University Press, 1969), p. 65.
138. See H. B. Acton, The Illusion of the Epoch: Marxism-Leninism as a Philosophical Creed, (London: Cambridge University Press, 1955). Cf. George Lichtheim, "Oriental Despotism," The Concept of Ideology, (New York: Vintage Books, 1967).
139. As Lichtheim has observed, Engels' dialectical materialism, advanced in Anti-Duhring "has only the remotest connection with Marx's own viewpoint . . ." Moreover, "the subsequent emergence of Soviet Marxism was mediated by Plekhanov and Lenin and differs in some respects from Engels' version . . ." "On the Interpretation of Marx's Thought," in Marx and the Western World, op. cit., pp. 6-7.
140. Ibid., pp. 7-8.
141. See Frederich Engels, Dialectics of Nature, tr. G. B. S. Haldane, (London: Cambridge University Press, 1940).
142. For an analysis of pragmatic and Marxist-Leninist approaches to history and the concept of freedom, see Richard McKeon, Freedom and History: The Semantics of Philosophical Controversies and Ideological Conflicts, (New York: The Noonday Press, 1952). An excellent introduction to Dewey's social and political thought is found in Richard Bernstein, John Dewey, The Great American Thinkers Series, (New York: Washington Square Press, 1967). Cf. John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, Ed. ed. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1948); The Quest for Certainty: A Study of the Relation of Knowledge and Action (New York: Putnam, 1929); Freedom and Culture, (New York: Putnam, 1939).

Mead's social views are suggested in his analysis of philosophical schools in Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century, ed. Merritt H. Moore, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1936).

As Bernstein has noted in Praxis and Action, op. cit., "the dialectic that can take place between Marx and Dewey is the political dialectic of our time. On the Marxist side, there is the sharp criticism that liberalism can be self-defeating and sanction what it seeks to change. From a Marxist point of view, reformist liberalism of Dewey's variety doesn't get at roots and facts to appreciate the extent to which conditions of political economy as they now exist in advanced capitalist societies (including the state capitalism of many so-called Communist countries) continues to perpetuate the alienation and exploitation of man." "But on the side of Dewey and the pragmatists, we cannot forget how easily a demand for absolute humanism and human emancipation can turn into its opposite--absolute totalitarianism. Radicalism, not simply as a professed intellectual ideal but as actual political practice, is double-edged. It can and has at times ended in destroying the basic ideals professed by the most thoroughgoing radicals. We can, from the vantage point of scholarly objectivity, say that the crimes committed in the name of 'orthodox' Marxism are the greatest perversion of the letter and spirit of Marx's work, that the Marxism represented by a Stalin is an absolute distortion of Marx." pp. 80-81.

143. See, for example, Richard Bernstein, "The Community, The Individual and the Educative Process," John Dewey, op. cit., pp. 131-145; James Collins, "Humanistic Naturalism in Marx and Dewey," Crossroads in Philosophy, Gateway edition, (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1969), pp. 220-251. As Collins put it, "Although Dewey's experimentalism lacks the grand design of dialectical, historical materialism, it finds in social intelligence its own providential principle." Ibid., p. 246; Hugh Dalziel Duncan, "Communication and the Emergence of the Self in the Work of George Herbert Mead," Communication and Social Order, (New York: Bedminster Press, 1962), pp. 73-81. An incisive discussion on Mead's views of mind, self and society and their relationship to the processes of communication is provided here. Cf. Paul E. Pfuetze, The Social Self, (New York: Bookman Associates, 1954).

144. Duncan, op. cit.: George Herbert Mead, Mind, Self and Society, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934), p. 137; John Dewey, Experience and Nature, (Chicago: Open Court Publishing Co., 1925), pp. 204-205.

145. See Duncan, "The Problem of Form in Mead's Theory of the Significant Symbol," op. cit., pp. 92-106.

146. Mead, Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century, p. 135.
147. Ibid.
148. Ibid., p. 136.
149. See John Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1938), pp. 104-106. Cf. Bernstein John Dewey, pp. 101-113.
150. Sidney Hook, "Dialectic in Social and Historical Inquiry," op. cit., p. 378.
151. Richard McKeon, "Dialectic and Political Thought and Action," op. cit., pp. 17-18.
152. Richard McKeon, "Philosophy and Method," The Journal of Philosophy, XLVIII (October, 1951), pp. 653-682.
153. Ibid.
154. Ibid., p. 662.
155. Ibid.
156. Ibid., p. 668.
157. Ibid., p. 662.
158. Ibid.
159. Ibid., p. 670.
160. Ibid., pp. 671, 676-677.
161. Ibid., p. 671.
162. Ibid., p. 672, and "Dialectic and Political Thought and Action," p. 19.
163. "Philosophy and Method," pp. 668-669.
164. Great Books of the Western World, The Great Ideas, I, "Dialectic," (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1952), p. 350.

165. Mario Dal Pra, "On Dialectic," tr. S. J. Greenleaves, Diogenes, IX (Winter, 1967), pp. 1-19.

166. Ibid., p. 5.

167. See Bernstein, Praxis and Action, op. cit., pp. 18-34, 39. Bernstein discusses Marx's use of the Hegelian dialectic of Spirit to show how man becomes alienated from himself through economic activity and the conditions for his return to his 'species-being'. Cf. Karl Marx, Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society, ed. Lloyd Easton and Kurt Guddat, Anchor Book, (New York: Doubleday, 1967), pp. 320-321, 644-645. The biological model of development and the theme of the returning to the self are integral aspects of Marx's theory of alienation. On alienation, see Istvan Meszaros, Marx's Theory of Alienation, (London: Merlin Press, 1970).

168. Dal Pra, op. cit., pp. 7-8. Cf. R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of Nature, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1945), p. 124; Marjorie Grene, "The Biological Theme," Portrait of Aristotle, op. cit., pp. 227-229.

169. Dal Pra, pp. 4-5. An excellent review of Marx's notion of "Selbstgewinnung" (Man's regaining of self) is provided in Robert Tucker, Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), pp. 151-152.

170. Dal Pra, pp. 5-7.

171. Ibid., pp. 8-9.

172. Ibid., pp. 12-19, and Bernstein, John Dewey, op. cit., pp. 101-113.

173. See Louis Dupre, "Dialectical Philosophy Before and After Marx," New Scholasticism, XLVI (Autumn, 1972), p. 495. "In Hegel the contradiction which generates change and development is basically a simple one: it results from a progressive interiorization that requires no extrinsic determinations." As McKeon has noted, "According to all forms of the dialectical method, thought and its object are not separate or distinct, and the processes by which the universe and its parts are constituted are not fundamentally different from the actions by which men achieve purposes and establish communities or from the devices by which men acquire and organize knowledge." "Philosophy and Method," op. cit., p. 670.

174. Freedom, as Marx saw it, comes only with socialized man. This means "the associated producers rationally regulating their interchange with nature and bringing it under their common control, instead of being ruled by it as by the blind forces of nature." See Karl Marx, Capital, III, ed. Frederick Engels and tr. by Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling, (New York: International Publishers, 1967), p. 820. The passage from capitalism to communism is discussed in numerous works, but a most trenchant description of this passage is found in Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations, ed. E. J. Hobsbawm and tr. by Jack Cohen, (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1964), pp. 84-85.

175. See Bernstein, Praxis and Action, pp. 175-176. Peirce's notion of inquiry, which set the tone for the pragmatic attitude embodied by Dewey and Mead stressed inquiry as a self-corrective process having no absolute beginning or end points. Every claim is subject to rational criticism. And the method of criticism itself is subject to scrutiny.

176. Charles Feidelson, Jr., Symbolism and American Literature, Phoenix Book, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), p. 68.

177. Ibid., pp. 68-69. Cf. Mortimer Adler, Dialectic, op. cit., p. 75; Richard Weaver, The Ethics of Rhetoric, op. cit., pp. 27-28.

178. Feidelson, op. cit., pp. 68-76; Adler, Dialectic, pp. 4, 24, 28, 85-86. As Adler contends, dialectic investigates meaning in terms of language, in terms of the functioning of symbols--a phenomenology of the processes by which words, or other symbols, come to have the various meanings that they do have. No problems are solved. They are merely clarified by enumerating the many meanings of the word "meaning" itself. Ibid., p. 4. "Facts stop or destroy dialectic; they do not furnish dialectic with a logical conclusion, and it is in this latter sense that dialectic does not aim at empirical truth." Ibid., p. 24. "Dialectic is thinking in discourse. Its realm of being is the universe of discourse . . ." It is entirely an affair of words." Ibid., p. 28. The words of ordinary speech have the capacity for ambiguity, and because they are highly variable and indefinite entities with regard to meaning, they are the source of conflicts and contradictions; Ibid., pp. 85-86.

179. Weaver, op. cit., p. 21; Adler, passim, esp. pp. 75-123.

180. Weaver, op. cit., p. 17.

181. Ibid., p. 27. Cf. Maurice Natanson, "The Limits of Rhetoric," The Quarterly Journal of Speech, XLI (April, 1955), pp. 133-139.

182. See Plato, Apology, tr. Benjamin Jowett, op. cit., 38. "And if I say again that daily to discourse about virtue, and of those other things about which you hear me examining myself and others, is the greatest good of man, and that the unexamined life is not worth living, you are still less likely to believe me. Yet I say what is true, although a thing of which it is hard for me to persuade you."

183. On the comprehension of the Aristotelian scientist, see Marjorie Grene, A Portrait of Aristotle, op. cit., pp. 234-251.

184. See McKeon, "Dialectic and Political Thought and Action," op. cit., pp. 16-21.

185. On "self-consciousness" in Hegel and Marx, see Bernstein, Praxis and Action, op. cit., pp. 24-28. Regarding relentless critique, Ibid., p. 41. On the "self-correcting" attitude of pragmatism, Ibid., p. 190.

186. See Robert Murphy, The Dialectics of Social Life: Alarms and Excursions in Anthropological Theory, (New York: Basic Books, 1971), p. 86. "The principle characteristic of a dialectic is that it is critical and skeptical of received truth and established fact, an iconoclasm that follows from its premises."

187. Bernstein, Praxis and Action, op. cit., p. 219.

188. See John Herman Randall, Aristotle, op. cit., pp. 105-106, 135.

189. As Nicholas Lobkowitz notes, for Aristotle, praxis "refers to rational and purposeful human conduct." In general, it covers "those human actions and activities which Aristotle discusses in his ethical and political writings: moral choice and political activity." And "we may simply say that 'praxis' is Aristotle's term for man's free activity in the realm of political life." Theory and Practice: History of a Concept from Aristotle to Marx, (South Bend, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1967), p. 11. See also Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, in Introduction to Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon, The Modern Library, (New York: Random House, 1947). "Since, then, the present inquiry does not aim at theoretical knowledge like the others (for we are inquiring not in order to know what virtue is, but in order to become good, since otherwise our inquiry would have been of no use), we must examine the nature of actions, namely how we ought to do them; for these determine also the nature of the states of character that are produced, as we have said."

Ibid., 1103^b 27-32. Cf. Bernstein, Praxis and Action, op. cit., pp. ix-xii.

190. See Collins, "Humanistic Naturalism in Marx and Dewey," op. cit., pp. 240-251; Bernstein, op. cit., pp. 305-315.

191. On dialectic's role in the clarification of ideas, see Mortimer Adler, The Idea of Freedom, (New York: Dell, 1958), 2 Vols., and his The Conditions of Philosophy, A Delta Book, (New York: Dell, 1965). The dialectician, as Adler contends "can provide the philosopher with a clarification of the agreements and disagreements that exist in a particular field of thought . . ." Ibid., p. 291.

192. See, for example, Armin Paul Frank, "Notes on the Reception of Kenneth Burke in Europe," in Critical Responses to Kenneth Burke, 1924-1966, ed. William Rueckert, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1969), pp. 426, 441. George Knox suggested Burke's indebtedness to Hegel but never really explained the relationship of Hegelian "moments" to dramatism's development. See Critical Moments: Kenneth Burke's Categories and Critiques, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1957).

193. On Burke's skepticism and quest for synoptic vision, see William H. Rueckert, Kenneth Burke and the Drama of Human Relations, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1963), p. 140. Cf. Kenneth Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives, (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1950), p. 333.

194. For an assessment of dramatism, see Rueckert, "Dramatism: Language as the Ultimate Reduction," Kenneth Burke and the Drama of Human Relations, op. cit., pp. 128-162 and passim. Cf. Hugh Dalziel Duncan, Introduction to Permanence and Change, 2nd Rev. ed., The Library of Liberal Arts, (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965), pp. xiii-xliv, and Kenneth Burke, "On Human Behavior Considered Dramatistically," Ibid., pp. 274-294; Kenneth Burke, "Dramatism," International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, (New York: Macmillan and Free Press, 1968), Vol. 7, pp. 445-452.

195. Rueckert, Kenneth Burke and the Drama of Human Relations, p. 56.

196. Ibid., p. 161.

197. Ibid., p. 56.

198. See Kenneth Burke, Counter-Statement, (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1931), pp. 75-76. Cf. Rueckert, "Both/And: The Aesthetic of Counter-Statement," Kenneth Burke and the Drama of Human Relations, op. cit., pp. 8-33.

199. See Kenneth Burke, A Grammar of Motives, (New York: Prentice Hall, 1945), p. xv. "What is involved, when we say what people are doing and why they are doing it? An answer to that question is the subject of this book." Cf. "Linguistic Approach to Problems of Education," Modern Philosophies and Education, The Fifty-Fourth Year Book of the National Society for the Study of Education, ed. Nelson B. Henry, (Chicago: published by the Society and distributed by University of Chicago Press, 1955), LIV, Pt. I, pp. 270-271.

200. See Rueckert, Kenneth Burke and the Drama of Human Relations, pp. 153-162. For Burke, as Rueckert has put it, logologic "is the logic which language must follow." Ibid., p. 153.

CHAPTER III

KENNETH BURKE AND THE
DRAMATISTIC SYSTEM

Kenneth Burke's views on man, language, history, criticism, and so on, are comprehensible to those who have paid close attention to the dramatistic philosophy. In the past twenty five years, he has elucidated and refined dramatism-logology and has laid out the essentials of the system in Language as Symbolic Action¹ and in The International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences² for those who have not digested his speculations of a half century. Burke is always mindful of the complex and often unique aspects of his philosophy and frequently "doubles back" upon a concept to clarify it for the struggling reader.

The purpose of this chapter is to outline the essentials of the Burkeian corpus and to then show how, in his view, they relate to dialectic. The focus shall be upon Burke's views of (1) man; (2) language; (3) dramatism-logology, methodology and criticism; (4) the drama of human relations as historical context; (5) rhetoric; (6) social ideas. These concerns will then be related to dialectic in Chapter IV. A basic understanding of Burke's outlook is vital to any study seeking to identify some of the sources for his language-centered philosophy. This is especially crucial to a dissertation which intends to analyze the pre-dominant influences in the development of Burke's own dialectics.

There is a guiding perspective to Burke's various and sundry offerings--an orientation of orientations that helps to put his ideas into focus. According to Burke, man is the essential symbol-using and symbol-misusing animal.³ His "essence," so to speak, is linguistic action.⁴ With this in mind, Burke contends that his dramatic-logological system best develops the picture of the specifically language-using or symbol-using animal. The dramatic study of language, that is, concentrates on symbolic action, and logology provides the analytical tools for the understanding of language activity. Together, dramatism and logology forge a complete system--a synoptic vision of man and the universe. It is a language-centered system which provides, for Burke, coherence and internal consistency. The dramatist-logologist comprehends the scenes in which man lives and studies the drama of human relations enacted upon these scenes.⁵

Definition of Man

For his definition of man, Burke provides the following synthesis, derived from his considerable, and considerably expansive, writings over the years:

**Man is
the symbol-using (symbol-making, symbol-misusing) animal
inventor of the negative (or moralized by the negative)
separated from his natural condition by instruments of his own making
goaded by the spirit of hierarchy (or moved by the sense of order)
and rotten with perfection.⁶**

According to Burke, man is a creature who is by nature divided. He is a creature designed for striving and endowed for struggle. It is his biological basis--the very economy of his body--that urges him to "strive" in the world; for if he does not, he will decay. Indeed, he struggles in spite of himself.⁷

Man's need to strive, to struggle, is tied to another human endeavor: justification. Burke claims that man has an overwhelming desire to prove the rightness of his beliefs and acts. Through practical and aesthetic means, man adjusts his existence to his environment and justifies himself in the context of what he perceives to be his situation.⁸

If man is inherently a striver and justifier, he is, as well, an actor who thrusts himself upon the life-stage. His life is a series of acts upon scenes. Every man, says Burke, tries to construct a character so that he can sustain an identity. And it is this process of character-building that accounts for the amazingly complex drama of human relations. All men, contends Burke, need to develop identities, but each man does so in a particularly unique manner.⁹

In another sense, man is a poet. Metaphorically, life is a poem in composition. Man "crafts" his life by making and by moving. Thus art and experience may be intertwined. Man creates himself by doing, which involves both physical and symbolic action.¹⁰

Another characteristic of man, notes Burke, is his quest for perfection. For so long as he strives, says Burke, he is susceptible to

error.¹¹ The desire for perfection overcomes man, but this desire is played out in an imperfect world. Burke ponders this irony, as did the Greek philosophers concerned with teleology, but he adds that the incessant drive for utopia inevitably succumbs to man's equally intense propensity for bureaucratic compromise, order and hierarchy.¹²

Man is also a maker of movements. Specifically, he has the capacity to persuade others by and through language and the ability to merge into a collectivity whose actions are united toward the attainment of specified ends.¹³ Likewise, man is a promoter of divisiveness, capable of factionalism and scapegoating. His linguistic facility may result in the purging of a particular group, may be employed to separate peoples, to provoke one nation into warring against another.¹⁴ (It is a paradox of the human symbolic condition, observes Burke, that man must unite so as to separate--meaning that preparation for, and the waging of, war demands cooperation among a large number of people who are intent upon a divisive encounter against another group).¹⁵

Burke also views man as essentially a moral-ethical animal. In the dramatist's opinion, man is burdened with guilt; indeed it is integral to his substance, and thus it follows, for Burke, that man is in constant need of purification and redemption.¹⁶ (This is a facet of human existence, contends Burke, that experimental science has generally ignored).¹⁷ This guilt emanates from man's ability to reason which, in turn, is dependent upon language. For only through linguistic action

can man idealize; only by way of the dialectical resources of language can he value, can he engage in the abstracting process that comprehends "choices," clothed in the "good" and the "bad," the "right" and the "wrong," and so on.¹⁸

Man's ethical and moral life is generated and perpetuated symbolically, and this suggests to Burke that the story of the Fall, of salvation-redemption, is best understood as a symbolic rather than religious fact in the final reduction.¹⁹ Without language, man could not strive for ideals (whose ultimates are "god" terms); he could not envision the possibility of salvation. It is because of man's symbolicity, Burke argues, that he follows the impulse toward abstraction, and the need to abstract produces the conditions of the Fall.²⁰ In sum, man, who is naturally a symbol-user and misuser, also exists naturally of guilt-laden substance. Because this guilt is a permanent part of man's existence, says Burke, and because purification and redemption are continuous necessities, the guilt must be relieved or the self disintegrates.²¹

What, then, is permanent in man and what is transitory? Burke asserts that all men are constrained by these norms: they share a fundamental biological-neurological structure; the potential for language is built into their cells; they find themselves, because of biological-linguistic similarities, in certain universal situations; and they resort to certain universal strategies to adapt to or control the situations.²² They are, moreover, universally involved with three factors implicit in

every human situation. Burke explains these factors as, first, the threat of disorder, division and disintegration, second, the yearning to conform with the sources of one's being, and, third, the yearning for unity, for merger and integration.²³

What changes and varies? For Burke, change is associated with the manner in which each man, as agent, attempts to deal with his scene. This also holds for a generation of men, as agents, relating to their historical scene. Whereas the search for the self is a universal pattern of experience, says Burke, the individual self, and the manner of the quest, are capable of great variation.²⁴ All men share in the fact that the self is basically formed through symbolic action with society. They also share the biological and neurological potential for speech and reason. And yet each individual self is unique in its process of character-building, in its relationship to its specific scenes. Burke's position, then, is that the self is both a changeless and changing identity.²⁵

The key to Burke's view of man, in short, is that he is an animal who exists in the medium of language. He both moves, and is moved by, words. He uplifts himself through symbolic action and denigrates himself through the resources of language. His symbolicity provides for redemption as well as for the Fall.²⁶

Language

Burke's theory of language, as has been suggested previously, involves his assessment of man. The potential for language, as Burke contends, is embedded in man's biological-neurological composition, in his cells. Inborn in man's germ plasm is a potentiality for speech, as well as for activities such as art and mythology.²⁷ Although external aspects of these potentialities change (that is, a multitude of linguistic codes, artistic styles, philosophical constructs), there remains, nevertheless, the permanent fact of their existence.²⁸ The potential for language, then, is the "being" that undergirds the "becoming" world of diverse and disparate styles and statements.²⁹ Man's ability to symbolize is enhanced, as Burke suggests in the early speculation of Counter-Statement, by innate forms of the mind, such as crescendo, contrast, comparison, repetition, series and magnification.³⁰ These are actually the forms of thought that can be identified as psychological universals. Burke cautions the reader not to scoff at the extremism (from the modern vantage-point) of Plato's universals. For once these universals are taken out of heaven, where Plato had situated them, and put into the human mind (as Kant had done), they become psychological phenomena. That is, the divine forms that enraptured Plato must be reexamined as conditions of appeal.³¹

According to Burke, the poet, among all men, has a superior knowledge of the forms and thus greater insight into his identity, his

self, and its relationship to society, history and eternity.³² What Burke has in mind here is the position that because the poet, as prime manipulator of words, experiences the forms more intensely than other men, he is more aware of life. The poet is actually performing a dialectical function by merging what ordinarily would be considered as exclusive forms. Specifically, Burke, as William Rueckert has noted, considers form as a combination of essence and structure, as integrator of logical formula and spatial and temporal form.³³ In some quarters, there is a split between essence and structure. But Burke, in Rueckert's words, "is able to merge in the term form both logical and temporal, essence and narrative, static and rectilinear, equational and progressive--a merger which is central to the aesthetic of Counter-Statement and to Burke's work as a whole."³⁴

Burke's key contention seems to be that language is part of man's essence. With the benefit of language, man acts symbolically to stake out a moral position in the world and to define his existence with regard to some final purpose. Through language, man constructs the issue of his being and desires to return and conform to its sources.³⁵

Burke contends that language has rhetorical and dialectical power.³⁶ This, of course, aligns with the classical view of language. Burke's understanding of the dialectical and rhetorical qualities has, however, a unique framework. In the traditional sense, Burke notes that man is moved by words of meaning, value, and desire. Yet he

surpasses traditional perspectives by investigating the impact of words that cleanse and purify.³⁷ As with the classical philosophers, Burke observes that man is moved by words about "rights" and "obligations". He discusses the deliberative phase of rhetoric for policy matters, the epideictic for praise and blame, and the forensic for accusation and defense.³⁸ Where Burke transcends classical thought is in his delineation of "property" as a linguistic resource. Property, he says, is a necessity in the purely biological sense, but it can be conceptualized as rights, responsibilities and claims only through language.³⁹ Which is to say that rights are not in nature but rather arise out of the dialectical concerns of symbolism. The ability to conceive of "ownership," states Burke, rests upon an intricate network of purely symbolic operations.⁴⁰

From this perspective, Burke unravels the motive power of language. The symbolic of property begets divisions of labor, obligations, social classes. This suggests that language is necessary for the establishment of order. It generates authority (comprising loyalty and servitude), which begets the pyramidal or hierarchical form, which fosters a sense of mystery and ultimately encompasses humankind in a perpetual series of victimages and mortifications. All this, says Burke, is the result of the symbolic world.⁴¹ Within it, man fashions both problems and curatives. (Coincidentally, Burke's departure from Hegel and Marx is most noticeable here; for the dramatist suggests that

alienation derives from man's symbolism rather than being the result of Spirit's estrangement from itself or man's estrangement from the modes and results of production.)⁴²

Overall, Burke is arguing that symbolic manipulations have a perfection all their own. They transcend the non-symbolic level of existence--the level of "strict" biological functioning. Put another way, it is through language that man operates in the dimension of "action," rather than mere "motion."⁴³ And it is through language that man's personality arises and grows.⁴⁴

Language also surpasses the non-verbal level because, says Burke, it adds the negative to man's existence.⁴⁵ There are no negatives in nature, he contends, no negative states, commands, or acts in the purely natural world. It is man who imposes the negative upon nature. In the negative, which Burke claims is the "marvel" of language, lies the very essence of the linguistic activity.⁴⁶ Man's ability to use it is one of his primary characteristics. For he arose to consciousness within the hortatory "thou shalt not," as found, say, in the Ten Commandments. The admonitory "no" makes possible all of the "yesses" of human endeavor--meaning that freedom is the other side of the dialectical coin of prohibition or control, that "grace" is the flip side of "guilt".⁴⁷

Burke's contention that conceptualization and language are inextricably interwoven is substantiated by the observation that the mind

is formed by language. Specifically, the mind is shaped by a public grammar issuing from the societal and cultural scenes.⁴⁸ This public grammar, as Burke puts it, "coaches the realm of values."⁴⁹ Man attains reason out of his linguistic ability to relate or measure his assertions against the public reference. This position is allied with Mead's writings about the "significant symbol" and the supreme importance of language in the formation of the social self.⁵⁰

Burke departs from the positivistic intellectual disciplines by accepting the resources of ambiguity. Contrary to the positivistic wing of Semantics, which regards ambiguity as the bane of referentiality, Burke extols its significance.⁵¹ Ambiguity plays or can play a crucial role in rechanneling man's warlike propensities. (Burke suggests that man has the motives of combat in his genes but notes that these motives can be tempered symbolically to the point where it would be much more peaceful than the conditions we would now call peace.)⁵²

Burke also departs from many academic disciplines when he asserts that motives arise in and through language. The implication of this assertion, as Hugh Dalziel Duncan has put it, is that language can now be acknowledged as a basic not residual sociological category.⁵³ Indeed, Burke's theory of symbolics complements that school of social psychology and philosophy stressing the point that society exists in and through communication. In the tradition of Dewey, Mead and Cooley,

Burke sees the symbolic as prior, in significance, to the economic, the cultural, the political, etc.⁵⁴

Burke considers language and thought as modes of action. This orientation, he contends, best facilitates the understanding of motives. As with Mead, Burke stresses the fact that the symbolic is a phase of action. It may be incipient or consummatory action, but it is never substitutive.⁵⁵

Dramatism and Logology

This particular contention, that language-using is a mode of conduct, serves as the basis of dramatism. For dramatism, as Burke writes in "Linguistic Approach to Problems of Education," begins with a stress upon "action."⁵⁶ Whereas idealistic terminologies start with considerations of perception, knowledge and learning, and ground themselves therefore in epistemology, Burke's terminology, so he asserts, is rooted in the substantiality of the "act"--an ontological approach.⁵⁷

Burke says, in effect, that his dramatism is literal, not figurative. "Man literally is a symbol-using animal. He really does approach the world symbol-wise (and symbol-foolish)."⁵⁸ But to understand man's ways of approaching the world symbolically, it must first be conceded that the principles of symbol-using constitute an autonomous realm or dimension, apart from non-verbal nature, though man's sheer animality is conducive to description in terms of physical or physiological motion. Burke means to say, in effect, that dramatism cautions against the

extreme definitions of man as "animal rationale" and man as animal per se. Man's genus, to be sure, is as an animal, on the strictly material level, but this level of biological needs is transcended by the use of symbolic action. There is a differential function where man projects himself into the domains of ethics and personality. Here, rights and obligations are conceived and fashioned. Identity arises as the self takes symbolic actions in relation to ethical-moral choices.⁵⁹

The foremost critical apparatus of dramatism-logy is the pentad: a set of quasi-Aristotelian categories that concern the basic laws of thought which, in accordance with the nature of the world as man experiences it, are exemplified in the attributing of motives. The categories or terms are: act, scene, agent, agency and purpose, and Burke applies them to the analysis of discourse and to the understanding of the drama of human relations.⁶⁰ They correspond, he says, to the "what," the "where" or "when," the "who," the "how" and the "why."⁶¹ These categories, serving as a grammar akin in spirit to the Aristotelian four causes, are formulated into ratios. The ratio of scene-agent, for example, emphasizes the relationship of the agent's character to the setting for the agent's act.⁶² The scene-act ratio, as another example, establishes casual relations between the environment-as-orientation (family, culture, etc.) and the legitimation or prohibition of acts.⁶³ That is, the range of acts is shaped by the approvals and disapprovals of environmental forces. In effect, Burke has applied the various

ratios--thus using all that there is to use--to works of literature and poetry, understanding them as symbolic action.⁶⁴ By placing a poem historically, says Burke, one ascertains the scene. The poet's biography expands knowledge of the agent. The words of the poem provide the agency. The particular poem is itself an act, as are the agent's other works. And the characteristics of the act encompass factors such as plot, structure, imagery and genre. Finally, there is the agent's (author's) purpose, whether conscious or unconscious in the selection of images, details, etc. One significant aspect of the purpose, says Burke, is the function of the poem for the poet himself, namely, the implications of the act for its agent. As Rueckert has noted, Burke "tends to use purpose and function interchangeably--the purpose of a poetic act is always the private function it performs for the poet."⁶⁵

Burke also applies the pentad to philosophical works and movements.⁶⁶ He observes that a particular category or term has been featured by a philosopher or philosophical school in the development of its vocabulary. Thus, for example, realism stressed act, materialism stressed scene, idealism emphasized agent, pragmatism featured agency and mysticism stressed purpose.⁶⁷ A grammar of motives, suggests Burke, studies the dialectical relationships of the five terms. Through an analysis of the ratios, of the various combinations of terms, Burke attempts to understand the attribution of motives in all spheres of

intellectual endeavor: philosophy, politics, economics, literature, and so on.⁶⁸

The critical significance of the pentad is that it provides a logologic, a logic to which language subscribes.⁶⁹ Burke suggests that pentadic analysis requires the study of one factor, such as agent, in terms of other factors, such as scene, act, etc. By knowing about the equational clusters, the combinations of relationships between the five terms, the critic is best able to ascertain man's substance; for substance, argues Burke, is associated with something's essence or total attributes, and the pentad tries to expose all the attributes of the thing studied.⁷⁰

For Burke's own orientation, "act" is the key term.⁷¹ It signifies the dramatist's starting point. "Act is . . . a terministic center from which many related considerations can be shown to 'radiate,' as though it were a 'god-term' from which a whole universe of terms is derived."⁷²

In perhaps his most cogent definition of dramatism, Burke states:

Dramatism is a method of analysis and a corresponding critique of terminology designed to show that the most direct route to the study of human reasons and human motives is via a methodical inquiry into cycles or clusters of terms and their functions.⁷³

The Drama of Human Relations

That dramatism is a language-oriented study of the hows and whys of human action is abundantly clear to conscientious readers of Burke. "The dramatistic study of language comes to a focus in a philosophy of language (and of 'symbolicity' in general)," offers Burke,

and "the latter provides the basis for a general conception of man and of human relations."⁷⁴ Through dramatism-logology, then, it is possible to apprehend the ironies inherent in the drama of human relations--man's historical context. It is a context containing both the tragic and the comic, the cry and the laugh at the human predicament.⁷⁵ The ultimate vision is a kind of contemplation and neo-stoic resignation all wrapped up in one, though Burke's own system suggests his activity in this predicament as a symbolic-actionist operating to help purify war. The dramatist finds both the heroic and the futile in man's condition: an incessant striving for perfection which is inevitably doomed to failure, although the effort may be permeated with nobility. Salvation comes through the dramatist's apprehension of the drama of men playing out their lives through numerous persuasions. Which is to say that the dramatist understands rhetoric (and dialectic, its counter-part,) as persuasive forms to be examined for their own sakes. This constitutes "an attitude embodied in a method," the closest one gets, Burke believes, to pure form.⁷⁶ By grasping the theoretical basis of rhetoric, the dramatist appreciates dogma and doctrine as terminologies of action. In this regard, Burke states, at the conclusion of "Linguistic Approach to Education," that "the nearest man will ever get to a state of practical peace among the many persuasions is by theoretical study of the forms in all persuasion."⁷⁷

Associated with the drama of human relations are "interlocked moments," which, as Burke contends, are either directly or indirectly promoted by language and the negative.⁷⁸ The moments are "negation," "hierarchy," "guilt," "mortification," "victimage," "catharsis," and "redemption."⁷⁹ All of these belong to what Burke calls the 'order' or "covenant cluster."⁸⁰ In the rationale of logology, any one term must implicate all the others. Briefly, the moments develop in this fashion. First of all, language itself makes these moments possible, if not inevitable. It advances the negative into human experience. Now possessed of language and the negative, man creates various kinds of hierarchical situations or orders, each order encompassing a multitude of "thou shalt nots." Every time man develops a hierarchical situation, he must explain it as a kind of covenant. And yet, says Burke, no one can possibly satisfy all the demands of a covenant, all of its terms. In some way, one will fail to sustain the agreement, or perhaps destroy it. Because of the failure, one's identity is stigmatized by disobedience. It is the equivalent of "the fall from grace." And "the fall" causes guilt, which makes necessary the whole process of catharsis. The two avenues of purification, for Burke, are mortification and victimage. Either way, the drive is toward redemption--the alleviation of guilt.⁸¹

All this is done, says Burke, through the power of abstraction, originally made possible by the linguistic phenomenon. Initially, language separates man from his natural condition because the process

of abstraction induces him to think of the positive in terms of the negative, to regard the image in terms of the idea. Thus is man separated from his natural impulses; for the symbolic aspect comes to dominate the animal aspect of his nature.⁸² After this, the moments generate their own inexorabilities, such as hierarchic psychosis and categorical guilt.⁸³ And yet whereas language alienates man from his natural condition, its resources nevertheless may be employed to deal with the hierarchic psychosis and to atone for categorical guilt. Inherent in language are the rhetorical and dialectical modes of purification, as well as the sources of guilt.⁸⁴

Rhetoric

If dramatism is based upon Burke's definition of man as a symbol-using (and misusing) animal, then surely rhetoric plays an essential role in the drama of human relations. What, then, of Burke's rhetoric and its principles? Perhaps the best way of outlining his views on this subject is to proceed in the fashion of Marie Hochmuth Nichols who, some years ago, reviewed Burke's contributions to rhetorical theory.⁸⁵ Nichols first found Burke's point of departure and orientation from which he approached rhetoric. Next, she examined his general concept of rhetoric. Third, she explained his method for the analysis of motivation. Finally, she discussed Burke's application of rhetorical principles to specific literary works.⁸⁶ This section will develop in like manner, giving, however, but minimal treatment to the fourth concern.

Burke's point of departure and orientation for rhetoric seems to be his aesthetic: the critic's view of art in general. In this context, Burke argues that literature and poetry are designed to affect both the author and the reader (as well as listener). The intent of the literary offering is the arousal of emotions, the eliciting of a response of some sort. In addition, literature may be considered as symbolic-action, the embodiment of an art. This means, for Burke, that words can be thought of as "acts upon a scene."⁸⁷ For all critical and imaginative works, he believes, are responses to questions "posed by the situation in which they arose."⁸⁸ But these responses, says Burke, are not merely answers; they are "strategic" answers or "stylistic" answers. As a consequence, a literary endeavor becomes a kind of "strategy for encompassing a situation."⁸⁹ Indeed, it translates into an "attitude." Thus, for example, the American constitution can be understood as "the answer" to the then prevailing situational statements about the relationship of man and government.⁹⁰ As concerns poetry, Burke considers, for instance, Tennyson's In Memoriam, Eliot's The Waste Land, and Milton's Lycidas as containing ideas and values that permeated the social environment in which they were conceived.⁹¹ Each poetic offering grapples with a problem or problems involved in the historical context. As Rueckert has noted, for Burke,

. . . every poem is written at a certain time in a particular place or places in a certain climate of opinion; these scenes, or physical, psychic, and historical environments,

influence the poems enacted in them in the most profound way, and, according to the scene-act ratio, are always reflected in the poem.⁹²

The point of connection between art and rhetoric appears to lie in Burke's position that artistic works have a forensic dimension. That is, art has its suasive elements, its "hortatory function."⁹³ The restoration of rhetoric as an honorable study and enterprise is necessary to expand the appreciation of the functions and values of art. Thus, one must re-discover the elements of rhetoric that were foresaken by the scholastics and then by the majority of post-Renaissance intellectuals. The prospect that Burke advances is a blend of classical principles and modern contributions of sophisticated disciplines such as psychology, sociology and anthropology. The task of the new rhetorician, he suggests, is to examine the traditional principles of, say, Aristotle, Cicero and Quintilian in comparison to modern contributions by Freud, Bentham, Marx, Mead, Richards, and so on.⁹⁴

In the development of a new rhetoric, it is important to note the two major occupations of the subject. First, rhetoric can be considered as the employment of persuasive devices, rhetorica utens, to bring about conviction and action.⁹⁵ Second, it can be viewed as the theory or study of persuasive resources, rhetorica docens.⁹⁶

Burke's general concept of rhetoric springs from his interpretation of its function. "The basic function of rhetoric," he suggests, is the "use of words by human agents to form attitudes or to induce actions in

other human agents . . . "97 In a most provocative and cogent passage on the subject, Burke states that rhetoric is

. . . rooted in an essential function of language itself, a function that is wholly realistic, and is continually born anew; the use of language as a symbolic means of inducing cooperation in beings that by nature respond to symbols.98

Because men are by nature divided--this is a universal fact of human existence--the resources of rhetoric are essential to the promotion of cooperative living. Although all men share in the possession of a central nervous system, they nevertheless find themselves divided by a multitude of linguistic codes which influence this system in many ways. Each language community, that is, has its interests and values, which distinguishes it from other communities, and these interests and values symbolically play back upon the neuro-physiological complex that provided the genetic basis for symbolism in the first place. For Burke, in sum, the motives for persuasion derive from man's fundamental genetic divisiveness, not, as most ideologists would argue, from a fundamental divisiveness in social and economic class. Only secondarily do motives become peculiar to particular economic and social situations. The universal rhetorical situation stems from a generic, not learned, phenomenon.99

Burke's inventory of the diverse definitions of rhetoric and rhetorical theories culminates in the observation that all contributions have shared the common concern for "persuasion;" it is an "Edenic term,"

he says, from which they have "Babylonically" diverged.¹⁰⁰ And yet persuasion, in Burke's view, involves another term, "identification."¹⁰¹ To persuade, one must, he says, initially identify. Burke employs the term, "consubstantiality," to suggest that a man is persuaded only insofar as "you can talk his language by speech, gesture, tonality, order, image, attitude, idea, identifying your ways with his."¹⁰²

Identification, for Burke, is a key term. It is meant to be an "accessory to the standard lore," rather than a mere substitute for the traditional emphasis on persuasion. While the old rhetoric considered persuasion in the sense of deliberate design, the new rhetoric views identification as suggesting the partially unconscious factors involved in suasive appeals.¹⁰³ Moreover, identification may be used as a means or considered as an end.¹⁰⁴ In the former instance, it becomes a persuasive ploy, a device.¹⁰⁵ In the latter instance, it constitutes a desired state, as "when people earnestly yearn to identify themselves with some group or other."¹⁰⁶ Identification also includes the realm of transcendence, since men often seek a level of accommodation beyond the prevailing stage of bellicosity so as to grasp peace out of the jaws of war.¹⁰⁷

Undergirding Burke's theory of rhetorical identification is the assumption that men are naturally divided. "Identification," he states, "is compensatory to division."¹⁰⁸ Why is this so? Because, claims Burke, men are apart from one another and thus are in continuous need

of calls for unity. Were men "wholly and truly of one substance, absolute communication would be of man's very essence."¹⁰⁹ This means that pure identification precludes conflict, which gives impetus to rhetoric. Moreover, there is no conflict when men are absolutely separated; for there is no mediatory ground for the joining of battle, no piece of property or terrain that at least two parties desire enough to fight over. It is only when identification and division are put together ambiguously that "you have the characteristic invitation to rhetoric."¹¹⁰

"Here is a major reason," says Burke, "why rhetoric, according to Aristotle, 'proves opposites'."¹¹¹

The philosophical hinge of Burke's concept of identification is the notion of "substance." Considering the fact that, metaphysically, a thing is identified by its properties, it seems reasonable that identification is enhanced when a man allies himself with another's values or purposes and calls him "a friend or brother."¹¹² Conversely, alienation and opposition are promoted when a man assaults another's lineage, when the other's "whole line, his 'authorship,' his 'principle,' or 'motive' (as expressed in terms of the familial)" are vilified.¹¹³ Drawing upon the traditional usage of "substance" as an act, Burke extends the implications to the point that a way of life is an "acting together."¹¹⁴ "And in acting together," he adds, "men have common sensations, concepts, images, ideas, attitudes that make them consubstantial."¹¹⁵ In effect, Burke has returned for consideration the Kantian contention that substance

is a necessary form of the mind. But most significantly, Burke has supplied the reason why ambiguity about substance provides the grounds for rhetoric. For it is mainly when questions of substance become ambiguous, he says, that the rhetorician's trade flourishes, especially in the endeavor to describe a state of affairs as "substantially such-and-such."¹¹⁶

Although he advances a "new" rhetoric, Burke nevertheless pays homage to ancient formulations. His survey of the rhetorical tradition dutifully accounts for the Aristotelian "topoi," the classical canons and, most importantly, the idea of choice, of will.¹¹⁷ For persuasion, he argues, can be directed to a man "only insofar as he is free."¹¹⁸ Which is to say that in the context of determinism and dictatorship, respectively, men are compelled by the nature of things or by force to do something. But given freedom of action, they depend upon the persuasive elements of inducement and ingratiation to fulfill their intentions.

Modern contributions to the "new" rhetoric, says Burke, emanate from diverse disciplines such as anthropology, social psychology and ethnology. In one way or another such fields of study consider the functions of language, i.e., in magic, socialization, witchcraft, and mass movements. Burke is especially concerned with the contributions each field makes to persuasive communication in the sense of language "as addressed"--that is, direct or circuitous persuasion aimed at audiences real or ideal.¹¹⁹ Burke adds that an audience may be a group one faces or one's own self. In this latter case, Burke relates aspects of Freudian

analysis to the self's rhetoric and also discusses rhetoric in terms of a post-Christian conception of the ethical and moral conscience.¹²⁰

The third area of examination is devoted to Burke's concept of motivation as it bears upon the "new" rhetoric. Essentially, Burke's philosophy of motivation challenges the mechanistic stimulus-response, cause-effect explanations offered by the experimental sciences, on the one hand, and the rationalistic theories offered by the foremost ideologies, on the other.¹²¹ In brief, he contends that motives arise out of language activity; they are "distinctly linguistic products."¹²² They develop out of man's vocabulary of values: the "oughts" and "ought nots," the praiseworthy and blameworthy. Hence, men frame their world-views according to the ways in which they symbolize the desirable and undesirable. This fact, says Burke, is more fundamental than any theory that is tied to, say, the economic, sociological, ethnological or psychological explanations of the sources of human conduct.¹²³

Burke argues that "motive" is but another way of denoting a "situation."¹²⁴ And he adds that the subject may be approached on three levels: the grammatical, the rhetorical and the symbolic. On the grammatical level, the pentad of act, scene, agent, agency and purpose serves to chart, via its various ratios, the circumstances of action; it explores, for instance, an attitude in relation to a situation (which, for Burke, amounts to an act relative to a scene).¹²⁵ The rhetorical level pertains to the grammatical when act and circumstance figure in

deliberative affairs, in matters of policy which provoke persuasive appeals for acceptance or rejection.¹²⁶ The symbolic level suggests that motivation can be understood only in terms of action and end, rather than in the "motion" vernacular of the physical and natural sciences. For it is because of his symbolic trait that man is able to contemplate his actions with reference to possible consequences.¹²⁷ This kind of activity, says Burke, in all its moral and ethical significance, lies beyond the merely physical and biological explications of human nature engendered by the so-called "strict" sciences.¹²⁸

Finally, Burke's critical application of rhetorical principles to poetic and literary works deserves mention, although the dissertation admittedly underplays this important facet of his career. The thrust of Burke's criticism, as the dramatist puts it, "is to use all there is to use."¹²⁹ Approaching literature, the critic, in Burke's opinion, must post five basic questions: why, what, how, when and where. The first two are ontological inquiries, and the last three are methodological ones. Simply, the critic must know what to investigate. He must know, moreover, why he is looking for something as well as how, when and where to look for it. The "how" of the critical process is perhaps the most challenging element of analysis because it taxes the critic's innovativeness and insightfulness. This is especially true when the critic endeavors to peruse a poem's symbolism and to address symbolic action as a kind of cryptic presentation of the poet's private world.¹³⁰

The major objection to this brand of criticism has been that it inevitably reduces to Burke's own investigative idiosyncracies. The methodology of dramatism has, to be sure, a number of guidelines for aspiring Burkeian critics. And yet, as William Rueckert has observed, Burke's cryptology goes beyond borrowable method to "hunches, guesses, intuitive leaps, and sheer speculation."¹³¹

Burke's contention that the poetic verbal act functions rhetorically implies, in his view, that a poem may have a persuasive effect upon the poet as well as upon those encountering it. In the rhetorical sense, poetry allows both the poet and the reader to move through the purgative-redemptive sequence; for both the author and reader of the work may become immersed in the poem's imagery; may, that is, make themselves over in the image of its imagery to the extent that they partake of its cathartic function.¹³²

As rhetorical critic, Burke looks for the processes of appeal in literary works, be they short stories, novels, speeches, plays, poems, etc. His critical enterprise ranges, for example, from Shakespeare's Julius Caesar, to Hitler's Mein Kampf, to Keats' Ode to a Grecian Urn, to Kafka's The Castle.¹³³ Whatever the genre, however, Burke seeks to unravel both the intrinsic and extrinsic aspects of a work. On the one hand, he treats a literary offering according to its own determinants (that is, as literature). On the other hand, he looks for the implications that the work holds for the world beyond itself. He tries to ascertain

its significance as rhetoric, as knowledge, and as portraiture. In other words, Burke "indexes" a work's symbolic structure in order to discover its internal consistency and its way of unfolding. At the same time, he explores all ramifications for the author's own psychic condition, the emotional and intellectual condition of the readers or listeners, the implications for the immediate era and, especially, the relevance of the work to the continuing study of man as symbol-using animal.¹³⁴

All works of art, says Burke, have rhetorical implications, and the pentad should help one discern, through the ratios of the five categories, how the art bears upon the author, the audience and the times. When Burke does range far and wide in literary appraisal, to get at motives and effects, he constantly returns to the vantage-point of the human condition, fraught with hierarchy, victimage, purification, mortification, guilt, etc. Because there are rhetorical ingredients in every kind of complex linguistic form, Burke finds it necessary to methodologically meditate upon Dashiell Hammett's detective stories, Machiavelli's administrative prescripts, metaphysical systems, social etiquette, propaganda and so on.¹³⁵

Not surprisingly, such critical escapades have often infuriated scholars of literature whose analytical tastes necessitate distinct standards of worth. That is, what constitutes the sublime? Rene Wellek, in particular, once accused Burke of going beyond literature to life itself; accused him of going from literary critic to philosopher and sociologist

of knowledge. By so doing, argued, Wellek, Burke could no longer distinguish the classic work from the pedestrian, no longer provide eloquent reasons why Shakespeare rates higher on the scale than, say, Mickey Spillane.¹³⁶

Usually, Burke meets this type of assault upon his critical acumen by immediately acknowledging the fact that literature often serves him as a point of departure in the pervasive, dramatistic mission of charting human symbolic behavior and motivation. Burke's project, as he frequently proclaims, "takes him outside the realm of literary criticism proper."¹³⁷ For poetics is but one of the four categories in which he has divided his project; the others being grammar, rhetoric and ethics.¹³⁸ Nevertheless, the poetic realm remains one of Burke's fascinations. "I have written and published much in that [poetic] dimension," he exclaims, "and Deo volente I shall write and publish more."¹³⁹ He suggests that much of his writing on literary criticism pertains to "the sheer theory of criticism."¹⁴⁰ Indeed, he confesses to the use of formalist principles when, in dealing with one particular text, he considers "questions of method involved in the analysis."¹⁴¹

Social Ideas

If Burke's critical methodology has exasperated numerous contemporaries, so have his social ideas. The ultimate designation for Burke may well be that of the dramatist, aloof from the programmatic manias of his era. And yet a final portrait does not cancel out Burke's

ideological liaisons, most conspicuously his flirtations with communism in the early years. Burke has come to be associated with a bevy of social, philosophical and political positions, ranging from communism, to Fordism, to Jeffersonian agrarianism, to neo-Confucianism, to Meadian pragmatism, symbolic humanism, dialectical biologism, ad infinitum.¹⁴² As Stanley Edgar Hyman noted some years ago, Burke's social ideas have been "complicated and ambiguous."¹⁴³ But what emerges out of this welter of associations is a definite dislike for the cult of efficiency and the excesses of technology and scientism. In the "thirties", especially, Burke viewed his mission as a counter-statement to the technological ideal, a poetic-humanistic opposition to machine-like civilization.¹⁴⁴

Burke's counter-statement to the impersonal, industrial machine has been somewhat tempered in the past three decades by a neo-stoic resignation to the force of economic growth and its attendant absurdities, such as the emphasis on gadgetry, ever increasing material progress and pollution. Burke seems to be less pessimistic today about the impact of this force upon human life. And yet his campaign of the "thirties" exhibited a running battle with the titanic institutions of the age: big business, big science, big technology and industrialism. In Counter-Statement, Permanence and Change, Attitudes toward History and somewhat in Philosophy of Literary Form, Burke appeared as the guerilla of poetic-humanism, at the ready to pit his aesthetic, by wit, by fancy, by anathema, against the myths of capitalist and even communist technology

and economy.¹⁴⁵ What remains of this prolonged battle is a firm commitment to ecological balance and a nostalgia for the agrarian ideal. In keeping with the democratic tradition, Burke has maintained a neo-liberal posture, pragmatic and realistic, which steers a tolerant course between the extremes of fanaticism and dissipation.

As Burke noted in "Linguistic Approach to Education," this way of viewing human relations "would probably be happiest with democracy, of all political systems, since democracy comes nearest to being the institutionalized equivalent of dialectical processes . . ."¹⁴⁶ Although democracy has been "threatened by the rise of the enormous 'policy-making' mass media . . .", as Burke concedes, still "we can say that ideal democracy does allow all voices to participate in the dialogue of the state, and such ideal democracy is the nearest possible institutional equivalent to the linguistic ideal."¹⁴⁷

Summary

In summary, Kenneth Burke has fashioned a philosophy of language which stresses the definition of man as the essential symbol-using, symbol-making and symbol-misusing animal. From this definition, he has formed a view of the drama of human relations accounting for the tragic and comic aspects of existence and the various crucial moments in the human pageant: negation, hierarchy, order, guilt, mortification, victimage, catharsis, and redemption, Burke's contributions to rhetorical theory also derive from his definition of man and his perspective of the

drama of human relations. Rhetoric, he contends, "is rooted in an essential function of language itself, a function that is wholly realistic and is continually born anew . . ."148 The motives for persuasion spring from man's fundamental genetic divisiveness. That is, men are naturally divided, and in constant need of calls for unity. The human predicament admits of merger and division. But in order to unite, men must first identify with one another, must feel themselves of common substance or "consubstantial," as Burke puts it.

As rhetorical critic, Burke looks for the processes of appeal in all kinds of symbol activities: novels, speeches, poems, dramas, administrative letters, and so on. All works of art have rhetorical implications for the audience or readership as well as for the artist himself. Often, literature serves merely as a point of departure in the overall dramatistic mission of charting human behavior through the analysis of symbolic interaction. Although he professed a unique kind of humanistic communism in the "thirties", Burke's post-World War II speculations have culminated in a grand language-centered system, which, he believes, is a total and coherent way of understanding the human drama and the essence of humankind.

How, then, does dialectic relate to Burke's outlook and the development of dramatism-logology? Chapter IV endeavors to answer this question through the following mode of analysis. It considers

respectively, Burke's definitions of dialectic, dialectic and his views about man, language, dramatism, critical methodology, rhetoric and social ideas.

NOTES

CHAPTER III

1. Kenneth Burke, Language as Symbolic Action: Essays on Life, Literature and Method, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968).
2. Kenneth Burke, "Dramatism," The International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, (New York: Macmillan and Free Press, 1968), Vol. 7, pp. 445-452.
3. "Definition of Man," Language as Symbolic Action, op. cit., pp. 3-9.
4. Ibid., Cf. Kenneth Burke, "Linguistic Approach to Problems of Education," Modern Philosophies and Education, Fifty-Fourth Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education, ed. Nelson B. Henry, (Chicago: Published by the Society and distributed by the University of Chicago Press, 1955), LIV, Pt. 1, pp. 260-264.
5. "Linguistic Approach to Problems of Education," pp. 259-303, passim. For an incisive discussion of Burke's dramatism, see William H. Rueckert, Kenneth Burke and the Drama of Human Relations, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1963), esp. pp. 128-162 for a review of the dramatist's approach to language as the ultimate reduction. Cf. Hugh Dalziel Duncan, Communication and Social Order, (New York: Bedminster Press, 1962), pp. 109-176.
6. "Definition of Man," op. cit., p. 16.
7. Kenneth Burke, Attitudes toward History, Revised Second Edition, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1961), p. 124.
8. Ibid., pp. 124-125.
9. On Burke's view of "Identity, Identification," see Attitudes toward History, op. cit., pp. 263-272. On the ideas of "striving" and "acting," see "The Language of Poetry Dramatistically Considered," The Chicago Review, IX (Spring, 1955) pp. 42, 46.
10. Kenneth Burke, Permanence and Change, Second Revised Edition, The Library of Liberal Arts, (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965), pp. 263-272.

11. On perfection and error, see "The Language of Poetry Dramatically Considered," op. cit. Burke's views on the principle of perfection (the 'entelechial' principle) are advanced in "Definition of Man," op. cit., pp. 18-20, and Permanence and Change, op. cit., pp. 292-294.

12. Ibid., pp. 184-185, fn. "There seems to be in man," says Burke, "an unremitting tendency to make himself over, in the image of his distinctive trait, language." And it is also the case that language is by nature hierarchic, for the culmination of the impulse towards abstraction is an ascending order of terms topped by a god-term. Any social order, he suggests, involves hierarchy and bureaucracy which "imply each other," Ibid., p. 282. Inevitably people find a practical need for an authoritative ladder in official organization, Ibid., pp. 282-283, the organization is institutionalized, and those in authority tend to protect their special interests through hierarchal psychosis, which interweaves "the social order with the motives of guilt, wonder, adventure, catharsis, and victimage . . ." Ibid., p. 294. Cf. Attitudes toward History, passim. This book, as Hugh Dalziel Duncan has observed is basically about authority. As a matter of fact, "it could easily be called 'Attitudes toward Authority', op. cit., pp. 136-137 fn; for it covers acceptance and rejection of authority, doubt of it, how it merges and divides power to reach a synthesis and how people adjust to it, Ibid., p. 137 fn; Burke, "Definition of Man," op. cit., pp. 15-16.

13. On the movements of the human drama, see Kenneth Burke, The Rhetoric of Religion: Studies in Logology, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1961), pp. 4-5. Cf. Rueckert, "The Interlocked Moments," op. cit., pp. 134-153. Leland M. Griffin, "A Dramatistic Theory of the Rhetoric of Movements," in Critical Responses to Kenneth Burke, 1924-1966, ed. William Rueckert, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1969), pp. 456-478.

14. In talking about the secular equivalents of the Christian concepts of original sin and redemption, Burke notes that the "pattern proclaims a principle of absolute 'guilt,' matched by a principle that is designed for the corresponding absolute cancellation of such guilt," and then suggests that the cancellation "is contrived by victimage, by the choice of a sacrificial offering that is correspondingly absolute in the perfection of its fitness." Permanence and Change, op. cit., p. 284. As regards a drastic example of scapegoating, Burke suggests Hitler's endeavor to promote social cohesion through the choice of the Jew "as 'perfect' ritual offering." Ibid. Cf. "The Rhetoric of Hitler's 'Battle'," The Philosophy of Literary Form: Studies in Symbolic Action, Second Edition, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1967), pp. 191-220.

15. Because men desire order, says Burke, they build cooperative systems though such systems turn out to be hierarchical. Still, they need to feel the "reasonableness" of their own society, its aims and methods; see Attitudes toward History, op. cit., pp. 341-343. And yet, paradoxically, men are often "brought to that most tragically ironic of all divisions, or conflicts, wherein millions of cooperative acts go into the preparation for one single destructive act. We refer to that ultimate disease of cooperation: war." A Rhetoric of Motives, (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1950), p. 22.

16. As Rueckert has put it, "Burke's main coordinates are essentially moral-ethical . . ." Kenneth Burke and the Drama of Human Relations, op. cit., p. 46. In fact, Burke holds that "the scientific, rational account of the human condition is inadequate; it fails to take into account the fact that man is essentially a moral-ethical animal of guilt-laden substance, in continuous need of purification and redemption." Ibid., p. 47. Cf. Attitudes toward History, (New York: New Republic, Inc., 1937), Vol. II, p. 41.

17. Rueckert, Kenneth Burke and the Drama of Human Relations, p. 47. On the poetic-humanistic orientation and its challenge to scientism, see, for example, Kenneth Burke, Counter-Statement, Second Edition, (Los Altos, California: Hermes Publications, 1953), p. 154, and A Rhetoric of Motives, op. cit., pp. 29-31.

18. That is, man is able to add the verbal to non-verbal nature and thus he is able to add the peculiar possibility of the negative to all things. Through language he has contrived religious, social, moral and political systems which require obedience and threaten and deliver punishment for disobedience. See, for example, "A Dramatic View of the Origins of Language," The Quarterly Journal of Speech, XXXVIII (October, 1952), pp. 251-264; and continued in XXXVIII (December, 1952), pp. 446-460; and XXXIX (February, 1953), pp. 79-92. Cf. Burke's discussion of "property" in Permanence and Change, op. cit., pp. 275-276; "The Dialectic of Constitutions," A Grammar of Motives, (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1945), pp. 323-401, passim. Burke's analysis of valuative words is most illuminating when, for example, he discusses terms such as "freedom" and "necessity." Ibid., pp. 350-355.

19. See The Rhetoric of Religion, op. cit., p. 187. As Burke puts it, "eliminate language from nature and there can be no moral disobedience." Cf. Rueckert, Kenneth Burke and the Drama of Human Relations, op. cit., pp. 131-134.

20. See Permanence and Change, op. cit., pp. 283-286; The Philosophy of Literary Form, op. cit., p. 50; Rueckert, Kenneth Burke and the Drama of Human Relations, op. cit., p. 46.
21. The Philosophy of Literary Form, pp. 50-51. Cf. The Rhetoric of Religion, op. cit., pp. 7-42, 172-272, passim.
22. See Permanence and Change, op. cit., pp. 162-163; Counter-Statement, op. cit., p. 107.
23. Ibid., p. 69; The Philosophy of Literary Form, op. cit., pp. 205-206.
24. See Counter-Statement, op. cit., pp. 149-150.
25. Ibid., p. 46; Attitudes toward History, Vol. II, op. cit., pp. 215-216.
26. See "Linguistic Approach to Problems of Education," op. cit., pp. 260-264, and "Dramatism," op. cit., pp. 450-452.
27. Counter-Statement, op. cit., p. 48.
28. Ibid., p. 149.
29. Ibid., p. 107, Permanence and Change, op. cit., p. 163.
30. Counter-Statement, p. 46.
31. Ibid., p. 48.
32. Ibid.
33. Kenneth Burke and the Drama of Human Relations, op. cit., p. 13.
34. Ibid.
35. Attitudes towards History, Vol. I, op. cit., p. 108; Vol. II, p. 138. Cf. Rueckert, Kenneth Burke and the Drama of Human Relations, pp. 42-46.
36. A Rhetoric of Motives, op. cit., pp. 43, 51-54.

37. Ibid., pp. 37-42. Cf. "Catharsis--Second View," Centennial Review of Arts and Science, V, (Spring, 1961), pp. 107-132. As Rueckert has noted, Burke considers poetry, among other things, as rhetoric and finds that one of the subdivisions of poetry "is the rhetoric of catharsis, where the form or structure of the work becomes a magical formula for effecting a catharsis in the auditors . . ." Kenneth Burke and the Drama of Human Relations, p. 31.

38. A Rhetoric of Motives, p. 70.

39. Ibid., pp. 23-24, and Permanence and Change, pp. 275-276.

40. Permanence and Change, p. 276.

41. Ibid., pp. 276-294. "For once the division of labor and the handing-down of property (with its attendant 'rights' and 'obligations') have given rise to classes," says Burke, "there must be some 'order' among these classes." Ibid., p. 276. Then he [Burke] goes on to show the full role of symbols in hierarchy, bureaucracy, order, the two great moments of sin and redemption, catharsis and tragedy, victimage and categorical guilt, perfection, etc. Ibid., pp. 277-294.

42. See "Definition of Man," op. cit., pp. 13-15. As Burke puts it, man is "separated from his natural condition by instruments of his own making." Ibid., p. 13. But he means symbolism, not labor or Spirit. Cf. Permanence and Change, pp. 224-230; Attitudes toward History, 2nd Rev. ed., op. cit., pp. 216-220.

43. "As regards our basic Dramatistic distinction," says Burke, "'things move, persons act,' the person who designs a computing device would be acting, whereas the device itself would but be going through whatever sheer motions its design makes possible." "Mind, Body, and the Unconscious," Language as Symbol Action, op. cit., p. 64. Cf. "Terministic Screens," Ibid., p. 53.

44. See Attitudes towards History, 2nd Rev. ed., p. 341. "The individual, by reason of his 'property in' the public grammar, the 'collective' property of speech, becomes concerned with processes of socialization. These needs of socialization are implicit in the nature of human relations, the productive and distributive patterns and their corresponding concepts of right and obligation. And they are implicit in the nature of the language that gets its shape by reference to such economic foundations."

45. See "A Dramatistic View of the Origins of Language," op. cit., p. 252. "The essential distinction between the verbal and the nonverbal," says Burke, "is in the fact that language adds the peculiar possibility of the Negative."

46. Ibid., p. 251.

47. Ibid., pp. 253-254, 264.

48. Attitudes toward History, 2nd Rev. Ed., p. 341.

49. Ibid.

50. See A Grammar of Motives, pp. 236-239; A Rhetoric of Motives, p. 193.

51. See "Semantic and Poetic Meaning," The Philosophy of Literary Form, pp. 138-167. Cf. A Grammar of Motives, pp. 238-242.

52. "Linguistic Approach to Problems of Education," op. cit., pp. 299-300.

53. See Hugh Dalziel Duncan, Communication and Social Order, op. cit., pp. 114-116, 143-151. "Like Mead," says Duncan, "Burke argues that language determines society. It orders experience because it creates the forms which make possible the communication of experience." Ibid., p. 144.

54. Ibid., pp. 146, 147, and 49-106, passim.

"The 'structure of bureaucracy,' the hierarchically arranged, continuously functioning offices, which 'determine,' or 'structure,' the behavior of occupants by 'channeling' their actions through general rules which are 'obeyed' impersonally, cannot be observed but only inferred. What we do observe is people acting together as superiors, inferiors, and equals, as they pass from one position to another because of death, changes in authority, the need to meet new problems, or profound changes in the society in which the bureaucracy exists. But all this is done through, and can be observed only in, communication. Even the most rigid rule exists only as it is communicated where it is communicated, by whom, when, how, and for what purpose, determine its meaning." Ibid., p. 146.

"Burke's claim that language is rejected in principle, as a proper study for the social scientist, is only too true. Yet as Cooley,

James, Mead, Dewey, and Burke stress, until we discuss the end, purpose, goal, or value--what is generally called the consummatory moment in the art--we are discussing not human, but physical interaction." Ibid., p. 149.

55. See A Grammar of Motives, pp. 236-238.

56. "Linguistic Approach to Problems of Education," op. cit., pp. 259-260.

57. Ibid., p. 261.

58. Ibid., p. 260.

59. Ibid., pp. 260-263.

60. A Grammar of Motives, p. xv.

61. Ibid.

62. Ibid., pp. 7-12.

63. Ibid., pp. 9-15.

64. See Rueckert, Kenneth Burke and the Drama of Human Relations, p. 74. As Rueckert puts it, "when Burke says that the main ideal of criticism is 'to use all that there is to use' he literally means what he says."

Each ratio in the pentad, observes Rueckert, "contains two terms and each asserts a causal or equational relation between them. For example, every poem is written at a certain time in a particular place or places in a certain climate of opinion; these scenes, or physical, psychic, and historical environments, influence the poems enacted in them in the most profound way and, according to the scene-act ratio, are always reflected in the poem." Ibid.

65. Ibid., p. 77.

66. See A Grammar of Motives, pp. 127-317. "Our program in this section," says Burke, "is to consider seven primary philosophic languages in terms of the pentad, used as a generating principle that should enable us to 'anticipate' these different idioms." Ibid., p. 127.

67. Ibid., pp. 128-129.

68. Burke's analysis of the philosophic schools in A Grammar of Motives, pp. 127-317, touches upon politics and economics as offshoots of worldviews. See, for example, the application of the dramatist's grammar to Marxism, Ibid., pp. 204-214. In the larger sense, Burke has examined the attribution of motives in all spheres of intellectual endeavor since the inception of his critical career. Cf. Permanence and Change, op. cit., pp. 33-36 for a discussion of motives in relation to schools of psychology.

69. As Rueckert has put it, "Burke calls his methodology logologic (a more recent term for his theory of substance and the pentadic logic) because it is the logic which language must follow." Kenneth Burke and the Drama of Human Relations, op. cit., p. 154. Cf. Ibid., pp. 153-162 for a review of logologic in relation to Burke's use of substance, moments, and clusters.

70. On the operation of the pentad for illuminating the linguistic significance of theological, metaphysical, and juridical doctrines and other idioms, see A Grammar of Motives, pp. xv-xxiii. On the centrality of substance, see Ibid., pp. 55-58. Regarding the paradox of substance, see Ibid., pp. 21-26. Burke's review of various definitions of substance leads him to the conclusion that this word "etymologically refers to something outside the thing, extrinsic to it." That is, substance, as a word, refers to an attribute of the thing's context. "And a thing's context, being outside or beyond the thing, would be something that the thing is not." Ibid., p. 23. This, in Burke's estimation, makes for a "strategic" or "alchemic moment" where miracles of transformation take place. For here the intrinsic and extrinsic change places. "For to tell what a thing is, you place it in terms of something else." Ibid., p. 24. Thus the ratios of the pentad are designed to define and locate through the study of their interrelationships, the ways in which they bear upon each other. It is a definition which is "positional" or "locational." Ibid., p. 26. It stresses "placement." Ibid., p. 28.

In this regard, Burke shows, in The Rhetoric of Religion, op. cit., pp. 172-272, how his seven moments are interrelated or interlocked; that the presence of one suggests the existence of the others. Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysica, tr. W. D. Ross, The Works of Aristotle, ed. W. D. Ross, 4th ed., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1958), 1017^b, 24-25. Substance, according to Aristotle, has two senses: the ultimate substratum, which is not predicated on anything else, and "that which being a 'this,' is also separable and of this nature is the shape or form of each thing."

71. "Dramatism," The International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, op. cit., p. 445.
72. Ibid. Cf. A Grammar of Motives, p. 227.
73. "Dramatism," p. 445.
74. Ibid., pp. 445-446.
75. As Burke puts it in Attitudes toward History, 2nd rev. ed., op. cit., p. 171, "The comic frame should enable people to be observers of themselves, while acting. Its ultimate would not be passiveness, but maximum consciousness. One would 'transcend' himself by noting his own foibles. He would provide a rationale for locating the irrational and the nonrational." Cf. Ibid., 1st ed., Vol. I, pp. 220-221.
76. Dramatism, offers Burke, "is designed to embody its attitude in a method of linguistic analysis." "Linguistic Approach to Problems of Education," op. cit., p. 268. Cf. Hugh Dalziel Duncan, Communication and Social Order, op. cit., p. 143. "Burke's search," says Duncan, "is a search for method."
77. "Linguistic Approach to Problems of Education," p. 300.
78. See "A Dramatistic View of the Origins of Language," op. cit. "Here," observes Rueckert, "Burke works out one of the central coordinates of his system, the theory of the negative." Kenneth Burke and the Drama of Human Relations, p. 130. Cf. The Rhetoric of Religion, p. 187.
79. Ibid., pp. 4-5, and Permanence and Change, pp. 274-294. See also Rueckert, Kenneth Burke and the Drama of Human Relations, p. 131. "The great moments of the drama are the Negative, Hierarchy, Guilt, Mortification, Victimage, Catharsis, and Redemption; they are 'interlocked' because all of them belong to the 'Order' or 'Covenant' cluster of terms and any one of them 'logologically' implies all the others."
80. See Permanence and Change, pp. 278-279. Cf. The Rhetoric of Religion, passim, for the secularized version of man's fall from grace and his yearning for redemption.
81. Permanence and Change, pp. 274-294.
82. "Definition of Man," op. cit., pp. 13-15; "Linguistic Approach to Problems of Education," op. cit., pp. 263-264.

83. Permanence and Change, pp. 278,284.
84. "Linguistic Approach to Problems of Education," p. 269.
85. Marie Hochmuth Nichols, "Kenneth Burke and the 'New Rhetoric'," The Quarterly Journal of Speech, XXXVIII (April, 1952), pp. 133-144.
86. Ibid., p. 133.
87. The Philosophy of Literary Form, 2nd Ed., op. cit., p. xvii.
88. Ibid., p. 1.
89. Ibid., p. 109.
90. Ibid. Cf. A Grammar of Motives, pp. 323-401.
91. See Rueckert, Kenneth Burke and the Drama of Human Relations, pp. 74-75, 78. Cf. Attitudes toward History, 2nd Rev. ed., op. cit., p. 87; A Rhetoric of Motives, p. 319.
92. Kenneth Burke and the Drama of Human Relations, p. 74.
93. The Philosophy of Literary Form, p. 321.
94. A Rhetoric of Motives, p. 40.
95. Ibid., p. 36.
96. Ibid.
97. Ibid., p. 41.
98. Ibid., p. 43.
99. Ibid., p. 146.
100. Ibid., p. 62.
101. Ibid.
102. Ibid., p 55.

103. "Rhetoric--Old and New," The Journal of General Education, V (April, 1951), p. 203.

104. Ibid.

105. Ibid.

106. Ibid.

107. Ibid.; A Rhetoric of Motives, pp. 55-59.

108. A Rhetoric of Motives, p. 22.

109. Ibid.

110. Ibid., p. 25.

111. Ibid.

112. A Grammar of Motives, p. 57.

113. Ibid.

114. A Rhetoric of Motives, p. 21.

115. Ibid.

116. A Grammar of Motives, p. 52.

117. A Rhetoric of Motives, p. 50.

118. Ibid. As Burke puts it, "Only insofar as men are potentially free, must the spellbinder seek to persuade them."

119. Ibid., pp. 43-44.

120. Ibid., pp. 37-38.

121. Permanence and Change, pp. 25-29.

122. Ibid., p. 35.

123. Ibid., pp. 35-36, 275-276.

124. Ibid., p. 29.

125. A Grammar of Motives, p. xv.
126. "Linguistic Approach to Problems of Education," op. cit., pp. 261-262.
127. Ibid.
128. Ibid., pp. 262-263; Permanence and Change, pp. 274-276.
129. The Philosophy of Literary Form, p. 23.
130. Ibid., p. 68. Cf. Rueckert, Kenneth Burke and the Drama of Human Relations, p. 71.
131. Kenneth Burke and the Drama of Human Relations, p. 72.
132. Ibid., p. 77. As Rueckert notes, every poem from Burke's point of view, "is something of a compulsive act, performed in response to some sort of the poet's deepest needs. A poet writes because he has to, because there is something curative about poetic action itself."
133. See The Philosophy of Literary Form, pp. 27, 191-220, 329-343; A Grammar of Motives, pp. 447-463. A Rhetoric of Motives, pp. 233-244.
134. See "Fact, Inference and Proof in the Analysis of Literary Symbolism," Symbols and Values: An Initial Study, Thirteenth Symposium of the Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion, ed. Lyman Bryson, et al. (New York: published by the Conference and distributed by Harper and Brothers, 1954), pp. 283-306. Cf. Rueckert, Kenneth Burke and the Drama of Human Relations, pp. 83-95.
135. See A Rhetoric of Motives, pp. 101-102, 122, 158-166, 221-233.
136. See Rene Wellek, Concepts of Criticism, ed. with intro. by Stephen G. Nichols, Jr., (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963), p. 325.
137. "Formalist Criticism: Its Principles and Limits," Language As Symbolic Action, op. cit., p. 494.
138. Ibid., p. 495.
139. Ibid.

140. Ibid.

141. Ibid.

142. See, for example, early criticism of Burke's political views in Critical Responses to Kenneth Burke, 1924-1966, ed. William Rueckert, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1969), pp. 48-159.

143. Stanley Edgar Hyman, "Kenneth Burke and the Criticism of Symbolic Action," in Ibid., p. 218.

144. See Counter-Statement, op. cit., pp. 108-111; Permanence and Change, op. cit., pp. 63-66.

145. See, for example, "Comic Correctives," Attitudes toward History, 2nd Rev. ed., op. cit., pp. 166-175.

146. "Linguistic Approach to Problems of Education," op. cit., p. 285.

147. Ibid.

148. A Rhetoric of Motives, p. 43.

CHAPTER IV

DIALECTIC AND DRAMATISM: BURKE AS DIALECTICIAN

Kenneth Burke's reputation as a dialectical critic is of long standing. Marianne Moore, for instance, once called Burke "the philosopher of opposites."¹ Kermit Lansner spoke of his "extraordinary preoccupation with opposition and antithesis."² Hugh Dalziel Duncan noted Burke's propensity to think in companion terms and especially to pair antithetical terms.³ Malcolm Cowley observed of Burke that he "is a dialectician who is always trying to reconcile opposites by finding that they have a common source. Give him two apparently hostile terms like poetry and propaganda, art and economics, speech and action, and immediately he looks beneath them for the common ground on which they stand."⁴ And Francis Fergusson noted that "Mr. Burke does indeed work dialectically, forewarning us and forearming us against this dangerous art; but so effectively that the substantial world behind it is always clearly implied. He masters dialectic so completely that he points beyond it, to the unwritten drama or comedy of contemporary life."⁵

The task of this chapter is to probe Burke's dialectical demeanor and to account for the major ways in which it has figured, methodologically and substantially, in the development and refinement of the dramatistic system. The following analytical units of the chapter should clarify the dialectical significance of Burke's intellectual growth and

also provide a key to the understanding of him as a system-builder:

- (1) Burke's definitions of dialectic; (2) dialectic and his views on man;
- (3) dialectic and his approach to language; (4) dialectic and dramatism;
- (5) dialectic and methodology; (6) dialectic and Burkeian rhetoric;
- (7) dialectic and his social ideas.

Burke's Definitions of Dialectic

Burke compresses the various uses of dialectic into what he considers to be the functions of linguistic transformation, conceived in terms of "Merger and Division," "the Three Major Pairs: action-passion, mind-body, being-nothing," and "Transcendence."⁶ The prominent definitions that he takes account of in A Grammar of Motives include "reasoning from opinion;" "the discovery of truth by the give and take of converse and redefinition;" "the art of disputation;" "the processes of 'interaction' between the verbal and the non-verbal;" "the competition of cooperation or the cooperation of competition;" "the spinning of terms out of terms;" "the internal dialogue of thought;" "any development . . . got by the interplay of various factors that mutually modify one another, and may be thought of as voices in a dialogue or roles in a play, with each voice or role in its partiality contributing to the development of the whole;" "the progressive or successive development and reconciliation of opposites;" and "so putting questions to nature that nature can give unequivocal answer."⁷

Burke's definition of dialectic as linguistic transformation, which incorporates merger and division, polarity and transcendence, also suggests his affiliation with a process view of the world. The value of dialectic he believes is that it does understand process. Burke has adapted the indispensable contribution of dialectic that things are indissolubly interconnected to the dramatistic search for coordinates. Although Burke has often spoken for "being" rather than for "becoming," this does not mean that he champions a world of hard and fast distinctions.⁸ Indeed, his insights into symbolism lead to the conclusion that terms operate as an almost unending series of chain reactions and must be studied relative to one another. "Distinctions," he asserts, "arise out of a great central moltenness, where all is merged. They have been thrown from a liquid center to the surface, where they have congealed. Let one of these crusted distinctions return to its source, and in this alchemic center it may be remade, again becoming molten liquid, and may enter into new combinations, whereat it may be again thrown forth as a new crust, a different distinction."⁹

This particularly vivid passage, in all its metaphorical splendor, suggests that Burke, as dialectician, wishes to emancipate the reader from the misconception that language is a closed and static symbolic form. Hegel and Marx, of course, endeavored to emancipate mankind from its closed and static world. They used dialectic as a force destructive of neat systems and ordered structures; they saw it as

compatible with the idea of a social world that had neither fixity nor solid boundaries.¹⁰ (Engels' dialectic of nature and the concept of economic determinism, as this dissertation has shown, hardly qualify as Hegelian or Marxian views.)¹¹ In this respect, Burke, despite his penchant for "a medieval world of stable nouns,"¹² despite his preference for a "philosophy of categories," as voiced in Attitudes toward History,¹³ nonetheless reworks into good linguistic sense the Hegelian observation that dialectic's purpose is to demonstrate the finitude of the partial categories of understanding.¹⁴ For Burke, linguistic transformation implies that dialectic is inherent in the symbolism of language. As Wayne Booth has observed:

Burke would say that the superiority of any language would lie partly in its refusal to be perfected, its roughness about the edges, its celebration of ambiguities. It is true that the language of dramatism is forced upon us, but its terms are, as we have seen, inherently fluid, and their use is kept molten by the cultivation of systematic incongruity. Methods that freeze mislead us because the reality that interests us is dramatic, in process, fluid.¹⁵

Dialectic and Man's Existence

Of course, the dialectical nature of language is not the extent of Burke's observations. For he views man's existence as a kind of dialectic of division and merger, of disintegration and reintegration, of death and rebirth, war and peace.¹⁶ He holds, in brief, that the drama of human relations is a dialectic of existence in the sense that man, symbolically alienated from his animality, desires to return to the sources

of his being, his natural state, and in the sense that the norms of his existence are ever in tension with the changing scenes.¹⁷ The idea of man "returning" to the sources of his being, as Mario Dal Pra has pointed out, relates to a biological matrix as a major influence in the historical formulation of the doctrine of dialectic.¹⁸ Ultimately, Hegel implicates himself in this matrix which derives from Neo-Platonism and Proclus. "Connected to the biological matrix," says Dal Pra, "is the circular concept of the process, present in Neo-Platonist thought; indeed the return of every being to that from which he proceeds is explained by Proclus as the very essence of the process: 'every being desires good and this is achieved through its nearest cause; in fact the way by which each being achieves existence, he also achieves good.'"¹⁹ Dal Pra adds:

The begetter, therefore, as the cause of the begotten is also the model of its movement and the point to which its desire turns and the point at which its conversion is accomplished. In this way 'all beings proceed in a circle from cause to cause'; and all the begotten tend to achieve the perfection present in the model that begot them.²⁰

This biological model, as Dal Pra has noted, conferred great authority upon the field of theology. It also served as Marx's secular variation of the Christian yearning for salvation and now seems to appear in the existentialist's quest for authenticity and for the return to the self as the true act of genuineness.²¹ The coordination of the secular, the religious and the linguistic occurs in Burke precisely because he establishes the dialectic of identity as a paramount theme.²² As Rueckert has

so aptly observed, "the mystery of the self in quest is Burke's point of departure; and the ideal self--one which follows uninterruptedly the 'transcendental spirals of [its] moral grows' (ATH. 2, 108)--is his goal," for "it is the course of the self in quest which Burke charts, endlessly, ingeniously . . ."23 In sum, Burke's emphasis on man-in-search-of-himself is not only the focus of dramatism as the method of grasping the drama of human relations but also the theme that pervades his system and gives it a salvationist urgency.

The idea that the norms of man's existence are ever in conflict with the changing scenes also carries great dialectical significance.²⁴ For it implies the importance of experience in human growth. Experience, as Marvin Farber has said, must be "understood literally, in terms of the interrelationship of sentient beings with their environment."²⁵ Dialectic is crucial to this interrelationship because, as a concept, it expresses "transition, transitoriness, and negation,"²⁶ which human beings apprehend about their environment. Dialectic, adds Farber, "is a response to the awareness of opposites."²⁷ Certainly Burke's perspective in this respect is one of man feeling the divisiveness between his natural animality and the changing social, cultural and physical worlds--ironically fluid by virtue of his symbolic powers.

Dialectic and Language

Dialectic, according to Burke, is integral to language because both are agencies of transformation.²⁸ As a process of abstraction,

language produces hierarchies which promote categorical guilt and yet provide man with the means of purifying and redeeming himself.²⁹ The "means" is linked to a dialectic of transcendence. Seen from another angle, the dialectic of transcendence is made possible by symbolic action and the verbal hierarchy.³⁰ For Burke, then, the word has dialectical power; it both stigmatizes (makes culpable) and cleanses.³¹ Without language, man could not possibly develop a moral-ethical cycle; for such a cycle is constantly fueled by terms made meaningful only with reference to their dialectical or polar opposites.³²

The dialectical power of the word, in Burke's view, provides for symbolic operations such as the "representative anecdote" and "perspective by incongruity." The former allows for a human role to be summed up in certain slogans, or formula or epigrams or ideas that characterize the agent's situation or strategy.³³ "The role," suggests Burke, "involves properties both intrinsic to the agent and developed with relation to the scene and to other agents."³⁴ "Where the ideas are in action," he contends, "we have drama; where the agents are in ideation, we have dialectic."³⁵ The latter, perspective by incongruity, is Burke's way of saying that terms interact upon one another to produce new outlooks, new truths.³⁶ Linguistic transformation seems to reach its zenith when, for instance, two impulses originally defined as standing in direct opposition are eventually merged to create a totally acceptable, harmonious, self-consistent insight.³⁷ Here, Burke's critical theory

comes close to Cleanth Brooks' "irony," I. A. Richards' "synaesthesia" and Thomas Mann's "ironie," which the dramatist describes as the artistic merging of moral contraries.³⁸ The dialectical significance of this symbolic phenomenon is that the synthesis of supposedly irreconcilable notions produces a viewpoint that at once transcends the initially antithetical aspects of ideas in confrontation and preserves those elements in the ideas capable of being integrated into a higher, more comprehensive view of things.³⁹

This operation is, for Burke, a product of the distinctly anti-formalistic logic of language. Indeed, it is akin to the Hegelian dialectical logic which rebuffed the tradition of Aristotelianism.⁴⁰ Burke subscribes to Hegelian dialectical logic because he finds it flourishing in symbolic communication, where the linguistic resources of ambiguity and metaphor make for continuously surprising syntheses of notions which, in their formally Aristotelian separateness, appear to be incapable of "rational" marriage.⁴¹ That is to say, Burke applies Hegelian dialectic to the analysis of language, although, as logologist, he eventually disowns the German's application of it to the whole of history and life.⁴²

As logologist, Burke maintains the Hegelian dialectical spirit (though not the Hegelian "Spirit") by continuously generating second-order reflections upon the synthetic power of language. In his meta-symbolic, Burke as logologist tacitly rejects the once unassailable univocalism stemming from Aristotle's laws of thought. With a

predominantly Hegelian disdain for the classical laws of identity and excluded middle, as they have come to be called, Burke characterizes dialectic as a verbal resource which may be used to take "A on a verbal journey from which it returns as non-A."⁴³ And he adds that it is a resource which may be used to change a "troublesome either-or . . . into a both-and."⁴⁴

What makes "perspective by incongruity" so utterly Hegelian at its base is the fact that Burke hinges the truth or falsity of a statement to its situation or context. Truth and falsity may both be apparent in a statement, he says, depending upon the frame of reference, the orientation from which it is approached.⁴⁵ This position somewhat suggests, without the metaphysical trappings, Hegel's contention that our evaluating categories must appear as relative until the Absolute is realized and world unity attained. (As is well known, Marx borrowed this Hegelian insight and asserted that categories are historical and transitory products.)⁴⁶

Dialectic and Dramatism

The system devoted to charting the language-caused and language-resolved movements of man, namely the drama of human relations, is, of course, known as dramatism. Dialectic, says Burke, should be equated with this system, at one end, and with scientific method, at the other, although the overall complexity of view is ironic.⁴⁷ What Burke means by "scientific method" is a matter of great perplexity to those formally trained in the so-called "rigorous" disciplines, but what he means by

dramatism is at least digestible since he himself coined the term and fashioned the methodology.⁴⁸ Within the context of the dramatic system, dialectic is shown to be involved in movements and counter-movements; it provides for transcendence; it underpins the aesthetic theories of form and substance; it "coaches the realm of values." Operating in the domain of ethics and morals, dialectic explores the concept of reasonableness and matters of prudential conduct.

Dialectic is involved in movements and counter-movements in that it is the stuff of struggle.⁴⁹ As Burke contends, movements develop out of the alienation suffered by individuals or groups who raise the "banner of No," so to speak, to aspects of a social system or to the system per se.⁵⁰ Movements are enactments of a Negative, as they fuel the fires of rejection toward the hierarchical situation; they provoke conflict by goading the high priests of the prevailing order into guilt and by taunting them into the reaction-formation of counter-movements--into the stern defense of the symbols of the status quo.⁵¹ The dialectic of the struggle emerges as the counter-movement gains in its counter-veiling power. "It is the counter-movement, in fact, that provides the movement with the potential for crisis, and hence for consummation" since it produces a Kill, a scapegoat, an enemy to be exterminated.⁵² In effect, Burke's concept of the counter-movement, as Leland Griffin has explained it, "provides a Negation to be negated; and hence the potential for

movement, the purifying struggle of contradictions, the purgative striving that ends in transformation and transcendence."⁵³

Of equal significance is the fact that Burke relates dialectic to movements in terms of man's drive for perfection--what he often calls "ethical striving." The entire symbolic movement of man from his initial estrangement through purification and ultimately to redemption is described by Burke with reference to the dialectical models of Plato's Phaedrus,⁵⁴ Coleridge's Anima Poetae,⁵⁵ Castiglione's The Book of the Courtier,⁵⁶ Dante's Divine Comedy,⁵⁷ and E. M. Forster's A Passage to India.⁵⁸ These models provide the images of ascent and/or descent, the Upward and the Downward ways. In the Platonic sense, the concern is with both the Upward and the Downward. The Upward takes shape, says Burke, as ascent from "a world of disparate particulars to a principle of one-ness, an 'ascent' got, as the semanticists might say, by a movement toward progressively higher levels of generalization)."⁵⁹ The Downward signifies a descent "back into the world of particulars, all of which would now be 'identified' with the genius of the unitary principle discovered en route."⁶⁰ In his reference to the dialectical implications of Anima Poetae, Burke points to the Coleridgean image of a geometrical staircase, of five or more landing places, being equated with the principle of social distinction.⁶¹ Here, Burke contends, the need for hierarchical mounting or striving often results in the deception that we occupy the highest level, where, in actuality, there are levels above. Burke also calls

upon Castiglione's Book of the Courtier to explain the "merger of the two dialectical series: the verbal and the social pyramids."⁶² This work, he observes, "deals with questions of courtly ascent, while rising through four successive stages from the mere quest of personal advancement, to a concern with the insignia of the courtier as expert or specialist, thence to the cult of courtly sexual relations, and on to the vision of an ultimate courtship."⁶³

Another major model for Burke is Dante's Divine Comedy, whose three books, the inferno, purgatory and heaven, can be related to the "divine human comedy of language" and its movements.⁶⁴ The first stage of inferno, suggests Burke, might be equated with the worst possible conditions of language-using--that is, the deceptions of speech, the terministic screens which produce neurosis.⁶⁵ ("Man walks among forests of symbols," says Burke, and he "exists in a fog of words.")⁶⁶ This is the stage of alienation, of man's estrangement from his natural condition because of the symbolic instrument he has shaped.⁶⁷ The second stage of language activity is comparable to Dante's version of the journey from hell to purgatory, to the kind of life encountered in the second state, and to the reestablishment of contact with the first from the orientation of the second.⁶⁸ In other words, the transition suggests both upward and downward passage. The Upward movement, in terms of language activity, is from particulars in disarray and conflict, a veritable hell says Burke, to higher levels of generalization uniting originally

disparate claims, the realm of dialectic, and then a Downward movement back into the world of particulars, where they would be identified "with the genius of the unitary principles" apprehended in the initial ascent.⁶⁹ This, in Burke's mind, is the stage most closely associated with dialectical activity; it is the Socratic domain and, most significantly for Burke, the domain of A Grammar of Motives. For this book is actually a dialectic on the nature of dialectics and symbolics, a work which, therefore, must incessantly turn back upon itself, up and down, round and about, but never quite breaking out of the wrangle of competing voices and claims to make a completion, to apprehend the ultimate principle that authenticates every thing's position in the hierarchical chain.

The third stage is equivalent to Dante's heaven, to the "vision of one-ness," as Burke puts it.⁷⁰ Here, the passage is from the frenetic actions of dialectic, from competing voices, all of them partial, to the peaceful, harmonious, contemplation of the ultimate order of the universe through, dramatically speaking, the ultimate order among all terms. Put into the perspective of Burke's own intellectual progression, the passage from A Grammar of Motives to A Rhetoric of Motives corresponds to Dante's journey from purgatory to heaven. In both instances, the movement is from the circular activity characteristic of dialectic to the hierarchical, upward activity to godhead or its equivalent: the synoptic vision of the universe or, at the very least, the drama of human relations.⁷¹

Finally, E. M. Forster's A Passage to India provides, in Burke's estimation, an excellent example of a modern novel's development as upward way with mystic implications. In this work, as Burke suggests, Forster presents a structure that is analogous to the stages in Plato's Phaedrus, Dante's Divine Comedy and the symbolic drama of human relations.⁷² The stages, to reiterate, are from abysmal ignorance to partial dialectical enlightenment to the apprehension of the universal truth, from hell to purgatory to heaven, from linguistic deception to dialectical interplay to a vision beyond language, i.e., "per linguam, praeter linguam."⁷³ Forster's novel, in brief, begins with the misconceptions of individuals and ways of life, of characters and cultures, then moves to the dialectical confrontation between individuals and world-views, which produces both truth and error, and finally arrives at the gateway or passage to a comprehensive and profound insight into human nature, which is the uniting principle for civilizations and their inhabitants.⁷⁴ As with Plato and Dante, Forster seems to employ the "pollution-purgation-redemption" framework with the unique twist, notes Burke, that the ultimate vision is translated into Hindu myth or mythic images.⁷⁵ The dialectical significance of this work, for Burke's meditations on the movements of humanity, is nowhere more eloquently put than in William Rueckert's chapter on the dramatist's method of analysis. As Rueckert explains A Passage to India:

Even though the novel ends with the phrases, "No, not yet . . . No, not there," or with four flat negatives, the dialectic of the novel, exposing, as it does, the source and nature of the error, the ignorance, and stereotyped blindness which prevents unity for both sides, moves also toward the revelation of the way to unity--a passage to India; the dialectic of the novel brings the reader to a realization that even though man and nature are by nature divided, the right kind of men (Stella and Ralph, Godbole), through knowledge, compassion, and understanding, and through various man-made systems of thought, such as religion, can transcend nature and effect unity for which the whole novel yearns. The dialectic of the novel is designed to carry or move the reader to this truth, and it is this truth which is translated into myth in those extraordinary chapters devoted to the Hindu Festival in the Temple section of the novel.⁷⁶

With extraordinary conceptual dexterity, Burke has thus provided the significant link between dialectical activity and transcendence. The dramatist-logologist's irresistible impulse to grasp the essence of the symbolic drama played by mankind, his need to methodologically meditate upon the resources of persuasion in human conduct, parallels, in its intensity and nobility, the Platonic quest for the vision of the Good, the Aristotelian instruction leading to the apprehension of the first principles of the theoretical sciences and all the other quests, intellectual and/or theological, for God and for Good, as "the end of all desire."⁷⁷ Put another way, Burke's dialectic incorporates the classical ideal of "nous," embodied by Plato and Aristotle; it serves as a stage preliminary to the symbolic equivalent of the grasp of the great chain of being, as conceived in the Stagirite's metaphysics. "Nous" implies a leap over the world of partial and conflicting claims to the unalterably true, to the synoptic view that finally unites all disparate thoughts.⁷⁸ Only at such a moment

of profound unity can the mind receive its long-desired rest. For the Greeks, this moment of ecstasy constituted a meld of intellectual and spiritual achievement, a divine "logos," so to speak. For the dramatist, the apprehension of the drama of human relations carries a similar spiritual and intellectual weight. It is the supreme contemplation, at long last offering a discordant, dialectical mentality its bath of peace.⁷⁹

As concerns the great chain of being, Burke ties it to the mystery of the hierarchic which, he says, is forever with us, and then he praises

the rhetorical and dialectical symmetry of the Aristotelian metaphysics, whereby all classes of beings are hierarchically arranged in a chain or ladder or pyramid of mounting worth, each kind striving towards the perfection of its kind, and so towards the kind next above it, while the strivings of the entire series head in God as the belovedynosure and sine-cure, the end of all desire.⁸⁰

In sum, man's ability to engage in complex dialectical operations--his ability to develop imagery so as to conceive beyond imagery--enables him slightly to transcend the human dimension. (In a somewhat obtuse manner in "The Tactics of Motivation," Burke suggests that animals may also be capable of transcending their own dimension, though 'homo sapien' is exclusively the language-user among all the creatures of the earth.)⁸¹

Burke's notion of transcendence is intimately associated with two pivotal conditions in the drama of human relations: the tragic and the comic. And both have dialectical implications. An understanding of the roles of both in the movements of humanity is in itself a triumph of sorts.

The tragic, Burke contends, is concerned with the relation between an individual and some overwhelming force, be it social, natural or cosmic.⁸² Usually the tragic signifies the opposition between the excessive ambitions and demands of the individual and the unyielding, inexorable scheme of things, or the divine order. "The act organizes the opposition," as Burke puts it, bringing "to the fore whatever factors resist or modify the act."⁸³ In the framework of the dramatist's trilogy of pollution-purification-redemption, as well as in the traditional sense, tragedy provokes intellectual awareness, increases moral stature, and provides a restoration of peace or balance, if but temporarily. These qualities are the culmination of prolonged or brief but intense anguish and suffering. The tragic figure, from Oedipus to Othello, as Burke observes, ultimately grasps the reality of his crime--his pollution, then acknowledges it, re-affirms the principle against which he has transgressed, and finally wounds or kills himself to purge and to redeem himself and all others affected by his misdeed.⁸⁴ The dialectical elements involved in tragedy, writes Burke, seem to gather at the point "where the agent's action involves a corresponding passion, and from the sufferance of the passion there arises an understanding of the act, an understanding that transcends the act."⁸⁵ In his perception of the counter-assertion, the agent "has transcended the state that characterized him at the start." When the tragic vision finally occurs, says Burke, "intrinsic and extrinsic motivations are merged."⁸⁶

The outcome of the tragic condition, then, is heightened consciousness. According to Burke, the dramatistic system, in charting the symbolic movements of humanity, stimulates maximum awareness of the tragedy emanating from man's linguistic activity: namely, the power of language that provides for the fall and for grace.⁸⁷

The comic condition is tragedy's companion in the significant sense of heightened consciousness. It breeds stoicism, permitting both the laugh and the cry at the human story.⁸⁸ Most often found in the poetic attitude as "an attitude of attitudes," the comic regards the errors of men as human truths.⁸⁹ It nurtures charity and understanding and urges the abatement of alienation. Most of all, the comic dialectically merges what Burke considers to be excessive orientations. That is, it produces a symbiosis of the accepting and rejecting attitudes; it creates an attitude of ambivalence "neither wholly euphemistic nor wholly debunking."⁹⁰ Specifically, it unites the transcendental and the material, the bureaucratic and the imaginative, service and spoils.

In both the tragic and the comic, nevertheless, there is the paramount fact of the dialectical-critical faculty. This demeanor encourages a turning upon the self and upon life. In one instance, the individual accounts for his culpability in an act that outrages the order of things. In another instance, the individual accounts for his own foibles. What gives the comic a strong sense of proportion however is its commitment

to continuously corrective behavior. It encourages that temperament which observes itself while acting.⁹¹

This consideration of Burke's views on the dialectic of transcendence, on the pivotal concepts of the tragic and the comic, will be reintroduced in the section pertaining to form and substance because, in Burke's view, various kinds of form pertain to the dialectic of the Upward way and to the pollution-purification-redemption cycle and also because the very ambiguity of substance necessitates an understanding of how intrinsic and extrinsic motivations are merged.

Kenneth Burke's approach to form and substance has dialectic very much in mind. As concerns form, he stresses the progressive and repetitive kinds as especially applicable respectively to the dialectics of ascent and to the salvational cycle. He dwells at some length on "the total drama as agon"--the dramatic alignment or "what vs. what" which incorporates the principles of dialectic opposition--and then considers, on another level of analysis, a literary work, poetry especially, in its dialectical relation to the issues inherent in its historical context, that is, as a strategy for the encompassing of a situation. As concerns substance, Burke examines the paradoxes of thinking of a thing both in terms of what it is in itself and what it is extrinsically. The very ambiguities of substance, he concludes, invite dialectical activity. In this regard, Burke utilizes the pentad as "dialectical substance;" for the five-termed framework is based upon the dialectical necessity of locating

and defining something in relation to something else. And, finally, Burke puts form and substance together in the critical sense that the dramatist, with his acute understanding of the grammar of thought, is able to drive to the core of a philosophy's system and pentadically expose its internal inconsistencies. A discussion of the dialectics of form and substance should heighten the appreciation of the major implications just previewed.

In the exposition of the dialectical aspects of progressive and repetitive form and the agon, it is important to review Burke's overall perspective of the subject. Form is defined by him in Counter-Statement as an arousing and fulfillment of desires.⁹² "A work has form in so far as one part of it leads a reader to anticipate another part, to be gratified in the sequence."⁹³ Most notably, this view emphasizes human participation. It lends credence to Plato's assertion that poetry feeds and waters the passion, and it tacitly honors Aristotle's notion of catharsis by regarding poetry as "relief" from the burdens of verbalization.⁹⁴ To elaborate, the poet is "'cleansed' of his 'extra-poetic materiality'," says Burke, "when he hits upon his theme and starts to track down its implications."⁹⁵ He is cleansed, secondly, "when he becomes so deeply involved in his symbol system that in effect it takes over, and a new quality or order of motives emerges from it."⁹⁶ And, finally, he is cleansed through the attainment of a goal, which brings fulfillment.⁹⁷

There is, however, another direction in which the cathartic moves. For tragedy, from which catharsis springs, also involves the audience.

It persecutes the audience, says Burke, so that it may be purged as well. That is, tragedy arouses tensions in the audience and then provides for the release.⁹⁸ (It is important to note at this point that Burke's desire to chart the effects of literature-as-symbolic-action on both the writer and reader implies attention to the "intentional" and "affective" critical orientations, and yet he also considers the poem, drama or literary product per se in and for itself. This would seem to suggest that the dramatist is attempting to overcome the fallacies associated with the restricted approaches to imaginative and creative offerings, in particular the critical appraisals addicted solely to the author's motives or to the psychological impact of the work upon its readership or listenership.)⁹⁹

Dialectic comes to be involved in progressive and repetitive form because, in the first case, it is inextricably tied to the movement of the Upward way and because, in the second case, it bears upon the cyclical phenomenon that Burke calls "the rhetoric of rebirth." Progressive form in poetry, the novel and drama thrusts both the author and reader into the pollution-purification-redemption movement, inducing them symbolically to travel the route from hell, through purgatory, to heaven or some other desired state.¹⁰⁰ This form, as Burke contends, has the force of inevitability. In a syllogistic progression, "everything falls together," as in the sense of premises forcing a conclusion.¹⁰¹ Those absorbed in the work feel the rightness of the conclusion, and even accept the legitimacy of a reversal.¹⁰² (Burke's idea about logic concerning "patterns of

experience," as Ross Winterowd has suggested, requires a dialectical approach to form.)¹⁰³ In qualitative progression, the movement from stage to stage is subtler than in the syllogistic mode; it lacks the anticipatory nature of the first. But the reader is nevertheless prepared to accept a particular condition or point of view.¹⁰⁴ He is prepared by way of an intermediate commitment which leads him to the acceptance of a more significant idea. The dialectical dialogues of Plato's Phaedrus, Dante's journey in Divine Comedy and the tragic advance of actions and events in Sophocles' Oedipus Rex depend upon progressive form to move from a state of depravity, degradation or confusion through the purgatorial dialectic of conflicting desires, voices, ideas, etc., all of them partial, to the vision of the Good, or of heaven, or of the scheme of things, or the order that one has violated through the consequences of one's excessive pride.¹⁰⁵

Dialectic comes to be associated with repetitive form when such form is translated into a rhetoric of rebirth.¹⁰⁶ Here, the dialectical concept of "nisis," of the returning to the sources of one's being, emerges in the symbolic action of poetry, which carries the poet and reader alike through the pollution-purification-redemption sequence. Of crucial concern to Burke is the poet's need to authenticate his real self, to establish an identity based upon a unity of being. The poet's drive for redemption is a compelling quest for a "better" self, a more ideal or truer self that emerges only as the pain of guilt is assuaged. In this

respect, the poet seeks rebirth, and the poem, in its repetitive form, provides the mechanism for the eventual cleansing or unburdening of guilt necessary for regeneration. In the archetypal sense, poetry provides those pervasive images, motives, characters, terms and structures that demonstrate the truth of the perpetual search for the self. The poem stands as symbolic autobiography, charting the poet's quest for redemption, and, in a larger respect, this genre symbolizes the divine comedy of mankind engaged, through language, in a cyclical process of sin-guilt-expiation-redemption. (A theme running from Counter-Statement through Permanence and Change, Attitudes toward History to The Philosophy of Literary Form and lingering in the works on motives and logology is that of life itself as a poem in composition.)¹⁰⁷

Progressive and repetitive form are, of course, interrelated (as dialectically speaking are all of Burke's concepts) in the context of the salvational movement. Both imply the participation of the poet and his readership in the flow of the poem. Both kinds of form dialectically fuse the patterns of experience in the work with the patterns of experience known to writer, reader or auditor.¹⁰⁸

Along with the progressive and repetitive forms, Burke considers "the total drama as the agon," to have dialectical significance since it "is analytically subdivided into competing principles of protagonist and antagonist."¹⁰⁹ Characteristic of the agon is the fact that characters in

opposition must ironically cooperate in some way to sustain their competition. This means, in effect, that "there is obviously a philosophic sense in which agon, protagonist and antagonist can each be said to exist implicitly in the others."¹¹⁰ By this, Burke invokes the efficacy of the logical triad, of agon, protagonist and antagonist as "three in one."¹¹¹ Thus, he inevitably draws upon the Hegelian formula that "everything is its other" to show, for example, that in the classic drama of opposition, say, Iago against Othello and Antony opposing Caesar, is to be found "the polar kind of otherness, as a certain kind of villainy is implicit in a certain kind of heroism, and vice versa."¹¹²

In addition to an outrightly antithetical relationship there exists what Burke calls "synecdochic otherness."¹¹³ Whereas polar otherness is dissolved when opposites are harmonized, as in the manipulations of oxymoron and perspective by incongruity that fuse apparently contradictory terms into a legitimately rational meaning, synecdochic otherness denotes the unification of things that are simply different from one another, not antithetical. "The beloved's house is not opposite to the beloved, but merely different from the beloved," says Burke, and yet "under dialectical pressures . . . any difference may come to be felt as an antithesis."¹¹⁴ To illustrate this point, Burke refers to the propensity of Marxists to dramatize the differences between bourgeois and proletarian as an antithesis.

The fact that the agon is built around associational clusters-- members of pairs go together though they also contend with one another--

means, in Burke's view, that the metaphor, as minor or incidental form, has dialectical status. In The Philosophy of Literary Form, Burke writes about the "cooperation of competing principles" and "the philosophic sense in which agon, protagonist and antagonist can each be said to exist implicitly in the others."¹¹⁵ And in similar fashion in A Grammar of Motives, he applauds the metaphor as "a device for seeing something in terms of something else."¹¹⁶ "It brings out," he adds, "the thisness of a that, or the thatness of a this."¹¹⁷ Indeed, the poem lifts us dialectically to the heights of its meaning and feeling by "shifting the images of its metaphors," and this "permits us to contemplate the subject from the standpoint of various objects," to see things "in terms not of some other but of the other."¹¹⁸ On the level of political conflict, the fact that protagonist can be motivated by the nature of the antagonist is exemplified in "the situating of socialist motives in resistance to capitalism, or the unifying effect of the Allied Nations' joint opposition to Hitler."¹¹⁹

That agon and associational cluster pertain to the issue of identity is soon enough apparent to those studying Burke's theory of dialectical substance. Which is to say that form seems to merge with substance when the dramatist goes about charting the "essence" of something by relating it to everything different or antithetical that comes into its ground or location. In the fashion of Coleridge, who, as Burke notes, "observed that rivales are the opposite banks of the same stream," the dramatist seeks the meeting place of extremes so as to shed new light on their

identity.¹²⁰ With respect to the pentad, the ratios of the critical apparatus thus stand as a methodological form for the "tracking down" of motivational properties, and this, in turn, amounts to the consideration of "dialectical substance."¹²¹

In one other major respect, dialectic bears upon the question of form. For the literary endeavor, be it poetry, novel, drama, etc., is in itself a form arising out of the problems of the historical context. In The Philosophy of Literary Form, Burke begins his treatise by asserting that "critical and imaginative works are answers to questions posed by the situation in which they arose."¹²² In fact, he continues, "they are not merely answers, they are strategic answers, stylized answers."¹²³ This pronouncement, as those following Burke's critical development have realized, is a significant departure from the earlier definition of form in Counter-Statement centering on the arousing and fulfilling of desires. A decade later, Burke contends that literary works, poetry especially, can be appraised "as the adopting of various strategies for the encompassing of situations."¹²⁴ "These strategies," he adds, "size up the situation, name their structure and outstanding ingredients and name them in a way that contains an attitude towards them."¹²⁵

On the grand scale of intellectual history, the author and his work, the poet and his poem, are engaged in the dialectic of the times; each creative endeavor is a competing voice, as it were, in the parliamentary wrangle of voices. Indeed, poets and novelists and playwrights

may be collaborating, whether they know it or not, in the perfecting of an assertion about the era or about the world.¹²⁶ Put another way, creative writers are involved in a cooperative competition when they present their variously stylized answers to the problems that gave rise to their works in the first place. The literary effort, in pitting itself against the scene, actually begs for feedback, for rebuttal.¹²⁷ A work's chart of meanings, as Burke suggests, is inadequate as a description of the scene (it cannot encompass the scene, that is) unless the opponent's voice is alive and vital enough to offer a response, to push the problem to "'collective revelation' to the maturing of which a vocal opposition radically contributes."¹²⁸ From this basis, as would be expected, Burke also champions the concepts and precepts of liberal democracy--the free flow of ideas, the give and take of opinions that competitively cooperate to sharpen man's policies in the realm of prudential conduct. Moreover, this entire line of argument also leads Burke to the inescapable conclusion that censorship, in stultifying the artist, implicitly impedes the dialectic of ideas which nourishes progressive civilizations.¹²⁹

Imaginative and critical works, then, can be said to survive in the "maieutic" environment that Socrates fosters in the Platonic dialogues. Generally engaged in a dialectic on the predominant themes of the age, the artist is a kind of mid-wife of philosophical positions.¹³⁰ In keeping with this insight, Burke discusses "dialectic as dramatic," claiming that "we automatically have our perspective for the analysis of history which

is a 'dramatic' process, involving dialectical oppositions."¹³¹ In this regard, the Constitution of the United States, as document, is explicable only as an answer or rejoinder "to assertions current in the situation in which it arose."¹³² It is part of "the 'unending conversation' that is going on at the point in history when we are born."¹³³ (Burke's argument that the Constitution must be treated as an act in a scene outside it comes to fruition in A Grammar of Motives where said document serves as representative idealistic anecdote.)¹³⁴

If dialectic plays a consequential role in Burke's theory of form it is also of inestimable value to his theory of substance. Three matters are attended to in this particular analysis: first, speculations old and new about the nature of substance; second, Burke's position that dialectic arises out of the ambiguities of substance; third, the pentad as dialectical substance. A discussion of these connections, unfortunately, merely touches the periphery of the topic of substance in the dramatic system. Nevertheless, the major dialectical implications should emerge.

"In the old philosophies," as Burke observes, "substance was an act; and a way of life is an acting-together, and in acting together, men have common sensations, concepts, images, ideas, attitudes that make them consubstantial."¹³⁵ Here, Burke recalls aspects of Aristotelianism and Thomism and considers at great length the concept of "act" as the basis for a "new" rhetoric grounded in the processes of identification.¹³⁶ The underlying significance of Burke's speculations about old and new

notions of substance is the shift of focus from a thing's enduring and indestructible qualities--that is, the essence of this rock and the irreducible matter of this stone--to a thing's identity in terms of how it acts, what it makes, what it does.¹³⁷ To be sure, Burke originally argued in Permanence and Change for a return through symbolism to a philosophy of "being"--for a Spinozistic concern with man "sub specie aeternitatis."¹³⁸ But this early request for the replacement of the metaphor of progress with the metaphor of a norm does not vitiate the dramatist's growing conviction that man's ultimate motive is to act in creative, synthetic ways. Moreover the fact that underneath it all the aims and genius of man have remained basically the same does not detract from the dramatist's contention that man's essence stems in part from linguistic "activity." Indeed the two seem to blend quite effectively. The permanent and transitory aspects of man's existence are of paramount concern to dramatism. The system itself, as a matter of fact, is anchored to the dialectical position that the self is a changeless yet changing identity. Each man makes himself a unique identity by acting upon the scene; but mankind per se struggles to restore, under new particularities, the same basic patterns of the good life.¹³⁹

In reaching back to Aristotle and to Aquinas, Burke has retrieved not only the concept of act but also the notion of purpose, derived from the Stagirite's entelechy and later adopted by Saint Thomas. The

influence of these sources on the dramatist's theory of substance can be estimated, however, only within the context of Aristotle's views on the subject.

Aristotle states in the Categories that substance is "that which is neither predicable of a subject nor present in a subject; for instance, the individual man or horse."¹⁴⁰ He seems to mean that in the most basic sense of the word, "ousia", substance is the concrete individual thing and the stuff of which it is made.¹⁴¹ Elsewhere in the Categories, the Stagirite contends that essences or natures are substances, and the more qualities they comprise the more substantial they really are. He suggests, in addition, that what is capable of independent existence, of self-sufficiency, is a substance, i. e., the concrete, individual thing.¹⁴² Aquinas, in the Aristotelian tradition, holds that there are many species of bodily substances. He means the different kinds of inanimate material, such as wood, gold and water, plus all the species of plants and animals. Within each species, he asserts, there is the substantial form of dog, horse, and so on.¹⁴³ Both thinkers, however, are noted for approaching essence in the entelechial sense. That is, all things are said to have a purpose which they strive vitalistically to achieve. The essence of a thing, therefore, consists in the form which it has achieved.

From this tradition, Burke salvages the notion of entelechy. As the dramatist theorizes, the entelechial motive is built into that phenomenon of abstraction: language, and this motive takes shape as an

overwhelming need for perfection. Burke's reasoning generally follows this pattern: man tries to make himself over in the image of his distinctive trait, which is linguistic activity, and this being the case he will endeavor to imitate the idea of himself that comes with symbolic capacity.¹⁴⁴

The dialectics of substance emerge, as Burke suggests, because the entire issue of a thing's essence or identity involves ambiguities. As a matter of fact, it involves a fundamental paradox of thinking of a thing both in terms of what it is in itself and what it is extrinsically. "A child both is and is not one with its parents," says Burke.¹⁴⁵ "It is both part of and separate from its parents."¹⁴⁶ Likewise, "men are not only in nature:" they also develop through the language motive a culture that becomes "a 'second nature' with them."¹⁴⁷ Furthermore, they "confront the ambiguities of a substance, since symbolic communication is not merely external instrument, but also intrinsic to men as agents. Its motivational properties characterize both 'the human situation' and what men are 'in themselves.'"¹⁴⁸

The irony of dialectical substance is explicit, says Burke, since it "derives its character from the systematic contemplation of the antinomies attendant upon the fact that we necessarily define a thing in terms of something else."¹⁴⁹ In the development of Christian thought, for example, the devil is seen as an angel, else one could not imagine "a common ground in which the two great conflicting motives, good and

evil, can join battle."¹⁵⁰ Similarly, the concept of "Being" has no designated ground unless put into the larger context with its dialectical opposite, "Not Being."¹⁵¹

For Burke, "dialectical substance" serves as "the overall category of dramatism, which treats of human motives in the terms of verbal action."¹⁵² And yet to get at this substance, where the essence of anything is equal to the sum of its attributes, there must be a critical tool or method, a logologic which coordinates all of the elements of act, scene, agent, agency and purpose and locates the constituents of a language situation. In this respect, the pentad employs the dialectical ratios of its terms to comprehend the substance of man through the treatment of his verbal action in relation to the scenes in which they took place. "This five-pronged approach," as Marie Hochmuth Nichols has noted, "operates to locate in Act, Scene, Agent, Agency and Purpose the integrated pattern of any experience, and to trace out the location in which identifications are possible."¹⁵³

In the critical sense, the dramatist employs the pentad and ratios to unravel the casuistries of philosophical schools. Every major philosophy, has grounded itself in one of the five terms in relation to the other four. The fundamental nature of the five terms, says Burke, makes it possible to comprehend a world-view as basically a symbolic construct, utterly dependent upon a certain grammar.¹⁵⁴ As with the Aristotelian dialectician, who finds it possible, knowing the laws of thought, to

scrutinize the conduct of demonstration without having to know the special subject, Burke's dramatist-dialectician purports to scrutinize the conduct of any philosophical position by "inquiring into the purely internal relationships which the five terms bear to one another . . ." ¹⁵⁵ The laws of thought, for Burke, thus translate into the grammar inherent in the pentad. From another critical angle, the dramatist is also a kind of Kantian transcendental dialectician, exposing the fact that philosophical claim and counter-claim, thesis and antithesis, might be viewed as equally plausible or equally spurious, though the respective proponents of these claims would argue for supremacy in what the semanticists would call a two-valued world. In effect, the dramatist is concerned with the internal consistency or inconsistency of a "weltanschauung." The analysis takes place apart from empirical verification. The dramatist, as pentadic dialectician, critiques with the ratios of terms always in mind, "considering their possibilities of transformation, their range of permutations and combinations--and then to see how these various resources figure in actual statements about human motives." ¹⁵⁶ Thus, for example, Burke's grammar, when put to the test of examining the Marxian calculus, comes upon the antinomic aspects of the ideology. "The belief in the withering away of the state . . .," as Burke observes, "does seem to violate a law of grammar. For no continuity of social act is possible without a corresponding social status; and the many different kinds of act

required in an industrial state, with its high degree of specialization, make for corresponding classifications of status." ¹⁵⁷

From this discussion of "dialectical substance" there has emerged the point that Burke's pentad emphasizes "Act": among the five terms, it is the one perspective that maintains a philosophical neutrality for the grammar, that preserves its skeptical-critical mission in a world still ripe with metaphysical and ontological commitments. And it is surely no coincidence that "Act" implies choice, which Aristotle regarded as the origin of action. For dramatism, as Burke conceives it, stresses action as opposed to mere motion: for language, being a fundamentally moral activity, is intimately involved with beliefs, attitudes and feelings. Language is a valuative medium that makes possible the development of ethics. ¹⁵⁸

Ethics is one of the four categories that comprise Burke's project-- the others are poetics, grammar and rhetoric--and it, too, sparkles with dialectical implications. In its most profound application, dialectic as Burke puts it, "coaches the realm of values." Seen in another light, it permeates the issue of reasonableness: for men constantly engage in the give and take of disputation over matters of right and wrong. They need to feel that their society is just and prudent in its aims and in its methods.

It is to this end, the promulgation of a dialectic of reasonableness within the dramatic framework, that Burke accents the need for a perspective of perspectives--a synthesis of the partial perspectives put

forth by men in the heat of symbolic battle. In his opinion, a perspective of perspectives is the culmination of the dialectic of competing ideas and incorporates those aspects of each philosophy or political program amenable to unity with all the others. The aim is to take the various factions up the ladder of abstraction, which language is capable of providing, until the essentials of each position are harmonized in some transcendent ideal. "From the standpoint of this total form (this perspective of perspectives)," says Burke, "none of the participating sub-perspectives can be treated as either precisely right or precisely wrong."¹⁵⁹ "When the dialectic is properly formed," he continues, "they are the number of characters needed to produce the total development."¹⁶⁰

What Burke contends about the synthesizing function of a perspective of perspectives relates both to the agon and to perspective by incongruity. The former, as Burke suggests, produces a sense of reverence for nature as a kind of experiential feedback that helps man to hone his conduct. For "the dialectic (agonistic) approach to knowledge," says Burke, "is through the act of assertion, whereby one 'suffers' the kind of knowledge that is the reciprocal of his act."¹⁶¹ It is not just men, therefore, but also nature that figures in the testing of an assertion. "Men can so arrange it that nature gives clear, though impartial and impersonal answers to their questions," Burke contends, and "the dialectical motives behind such methods usually escape our detection, though

we get a glimpse of them when Galileo speaks of experimental testing as an ordeal. -162

Perspective by incongruity, for its part, produces new insights through the interaction of terms upon one another, as does the metaphor on the stylistic level. Extrapolating this phenomenon into deliberative affairs, however, it is soon evident that the parliamentary jangle of voices conduces to a cooperative effort (the cooperation of competition) to forge widely-accepted policies for a given society. The loyal opposition is cherished not only because it upholds the legitimacy of the democratic procedure but also because it stands as a strenuous check against the flimsy speculations that one's own side is capable of. "A linguistic approach to human relations," says Burke, "would probably be happiest with democracy, of all political systems, since democracy comes nearest to being the institutionalized equivalent of dialectical processes . . ."163 Although this form of government is sometimes burdened by the "partial tyranny" of the mass media, which exerts "great rhetorical pressure upon their readers without at the same time teaching how to discount such devices . . .," it can nevertheless be said "that ideal democracy does allow all voices to participate in the dialogue of the state . . ."164

Dialectic, in Burke's view, also has profound ethical implications for the tragic and the comic. As for the former, in dramatic terms, "the act organizes the opposition (brings to the fore whatever factors resist or modify the act), that the agent thus 'suffers' this opposition, and as

he learns to take the oppositional motives into account, widening his terminology accordingly, he has arrived at a higher order of understanding."¹⁶⁵

Similarly, the comic frame promotes a higher order of understanding because of its dialectical impetus as a "methodology of exposure" that demythifies and demystifies things. The comic is at once a pragmatic orientation, free of ideological entrapments, and a way of accommodating one's life to others. It is a most magnanimous mental posture; for the comic entertains the dogma of all conceivable political and ideological schools, seeking the extent of each one's contributions without succumbing to each one's excesses.¹⁶⁶

Burke's commitment to the dialectics of deliberation is in no small way a tribute to both Hegel and Dewey. The synthetic power of a perspective of perspectives is based upon an Hegelian quest for the whole picture, the complete vision that ultimately reconciles all the partial, disparate, conflicting claims in a fragmented world. But the application of dialectic to liberal democracy and its processes is most definitely a product of pragmatism, not German metaphysics. Dewey's thoughts about moral and social agreement, while rooted in the triadic structure of Hegelian dialectic, coincide nevertheless with a tentative, experimental mentality--an anti-authoritarian outlook emphasizing the competition of ideas as the most prudent way of eventually securing agreement on a common purpose.¹⁶⁷

Dialectic and Methodology

All of this comes into focus in a review of Burke's A Grammar of Motives by Kenneth D. Benne, who observes "that Burke's grammar is a methodology of practical judgment--a methodology addressed to the formulation of common decisions, common policies, common principles of conduct in situations broken apart by conflict between rival perspectives, slogans and formulas of action."¹⁶⁸

As this passage suggests, Burke's dialectical propensities are intertwined with his methodology. Indeed, the methodology is but a manifestation of Burke's own thinking process. On this point, the development of the pentad itself need only be considered. In an interview with Daniel Fogarty, Burke noted that this format "seems to have begun with a dialectical, many-angled examination of a problem."¹⁶⁹ "Inside [Burke's] own thinking process," adds Fogarty, "he would state his case, refute his statement and then formulate a compromise or a neutral, residual statement."¹⁷⁰ To round out this process of inquiry, Burke turned to etymological analysis (plus the study of punning and jockeying) and then proceeded to implement the symposium form of dialectic. "It is as though Burke were a five- or six-man discussion group, taking all the speaking parts himself until he has sifted the best resultant formulation of the idea in question."¹⁷¹ In correspondence with Fogarty, Burke states:

Ideally, all the various 'voices' are partisan rhetoricians whose partial voices 'competitively cooperate' to form the position of the dialogue as a whole (a position that transcends all the partial views of the participants, though there may be a Socratic voice that is primus inter pares).¹⁷²

In sum, "'the train of thought' in Burke's writings more nearly approximates pantologue than anything else--meaning that Burke himself becomes all possible voices or facets of any topic under discussion."¹⁷³ Perhaps it is this very propensity to embrace all of the possible arguments on a given topic that has led Burke's most astute critics to see him as the incarnation of 'homo dialecticus,' about whom A Grammar of Motives is concerned. To this ground--Burke's dialectical approach to motives--have advanced the most challenging objections to the dramatist's methods and results. Abraham Kaplan said it most effectively when he commented that Burke's claim that only through the dialectical perspective (which is a form of "poetic realism" about nature and knowledge) can motive be understood "is not in turn to be refuted dialectically, but will be met more and more adequately as the sciences of personality and interpersonal relations develop . . ."¹⁷⁴ Kaplan qualified his defense of such sciences to mean, not mere motion, but the integrity of those disciplines seeking to expand knowledge through employment of observational procedures and experiential controls "which are applicable to man as to the rest of nature."¹⁷⁵

Dialectic and Burkeian Rhetoric

What has been said of dialectic's role in the methodology of dramatism can also be said of its importance to the Burkeian rhetoric. Although he espouses a "new" rhetoric, Burke is, nevertheless, steeped in the classical tradition--a tradition that sustains the indispensable interrelationship of rhetoric and dialectic in treating the realm of public affairs. As Marie Hochmuth Nichols has said of Burke: "No modern critic has done more to make meaningful the opening of words of the Aristotelian Rhetoric: 'Rhetoric is the counterpart of Dialectic.'"¹⁷⁶

For Aristotle, of course, both types of discourse are rooted in the realm of opinion, or "doxa"; this implies a realm of probability, where things are for the most part true but may be otherwise.¹⁷⁷ In this respect, both rhetoric and dialectic bear upon the ethical branch of politics (though dialectic has a para-scientific function in leading the astute learner to the grasp of the first principles of the theoretical fields). And yet dialectic must precede rhetoric as inquiry into the philosophical grounds of a course of action, a policy, to be eventually promoted by artful, persuasive means. In Aristotle's view, as Richard Weaver has remarked, "there is a branch of dialectic which contributes to 'choice or avoidance,' and it is with this that rhetoric is regularly found joined."¹⁷⁸ "Generally speaking," as Weaver continues, "this is a rhetoric involving questions of policy, and the dialectic which precedes it will determine not the application of positive terms but that of terms which are subject to the

contingency of evaluation. Here dialectical inquiry will concern itself not with what is 'iron' but with what is good."¹⁷⁹

With this Aristotelian context in mind, the dialectical implications of Burke's rhetorical theory should rise to their full significance. Two avenues of analysis are undertaken. First, dialectical inquiry serves as the philosophical grounds for rhetoric. Here, in effect, Burke's explanation of the relationship of dialectic to rhetoric coincides with studies on rhetoric and dialectic made by scholars such as Richard Weaver, Mortimer Adler, Chaim Perelman and Maurice Natanson. Second, dialectic provides the critique of philosophical schools as rhetorical-argumentative systems. In this respect, Burke's grammatical treatment of "the various schools as languages,"¹⁸⁰ of the various philosophic idioms as modes of appeal, corresponds to Chaim Perelman's observation that "the goal of philosophy is to influence the mind and win its agreement, rather than to perform purely formal transformations of propositions."¹⁸¹

As for the first avenue of analysis, Burke's dialectic serves as philosophical grounds for rhetoric because: (1) it is an inquiry into the meanings of terms; (2) the inquiry has consequences for the world of action--the contingent realm of prudential conduct; (3) the inquiry, in its most profound theoretical sense, aims toward the clarification of the concept of justice, whose realization is then pursued rhetorically. These matters shall be attended to in the above-mentioned order, but an initial

consideration of the "preliminary" function of dialectic (to rhetoric) is needed to put everything into proper perspective.

As Maurice Natanson, in drawing upon the writing of Richard Weaver, has observed, dialectic must come to be accepted not as the "art of logical discussion but in the much broader sense of the conceptual ordering of propositions into coherent structures of a priori nature."¹⁸² Here is the point where, according to both Weaver and Natanson, rhetoric and dialectic are united and, most importantly, where dialectic begins to build up rhetoric's philosophical basis.¹⁸³ For "dialectic in this sense is no longer 'argumentative inquiry,'" states Natanson, "but rather . . . philosophical inquiry."¹⁸⁴ "The unification of rhetoric and dialectic," he adds, "is really the rapprochement between philosophy and rhetoric because dialectic is given a unique interpretation: dialectic constitutes the true philosophy of rhetoric."¹⁸⁵ In his review of the classical relationships of dialectic and rhetoric, Natanson observes that for Plato "good rhetoric . . . presupposes dialectic" as "persuasion presupposes truth."¹⁸⁶ Moreover, for Aristotle, "dialectic has as its object the achievement of knowledge; rhetoric, persuasion. Dialectic strives for and may achieve 'episteme;' rhetoric 'doxa.'"¹⁸⁷

The case that Natanson presents, in sum, centers on the theoretical nature of rhetoric as legitimized through dialectic. And thus he is justifiably chagrined over the contemporary tendency to ignore the essential link between the two "in favor of the pragmatic subject matter with

the result that the theoretical nature of rhetoric is obscured."¹⁸⁸ But Kenneth Burke is certainly not one of those perpetuating the sophistical image of the rhetorical art. On the contrary, the dramatist, as with Natanson, is fully aware of the philosophical underpinnings of rhetoric. "Burke's is a substantive rhetoric," remarks Marie Hochmuth Nichols, "not a rhetoric of techniques, although he does not omit techniques altogether."¹⁸⁹ In the following passage concerning Greek and Roman sources, Burke lends credence to Natanson's thesis:

Or dialectic could be treated as the ground of rhetoric, hence as not merely verbal, but in the realm of the universal order, guiding the rhetorician in his choice of purposes (as we noted with respect to Augustine). Cicero himself stressed the notion that, since the rhetorician must also be adept in logic and wordly knowledge, such universal aptitude is intrinsic to his eloquence.¹⁹⁰

Burke's consideration of dialectic as the philosophical basis of rhetoric emerges in another manner, however. For A Grammar of Motives, which amounts to a dialectic on dialectic, is as much a theoretical underpinning for the "new" rhetoric of A Rhetoric of Motives as it is an argumentative whirligig with purificatory impact that prepares for the latter work's hierarchical ascent and ultimate redemption.¹⁹¹

Burke's commitment to the dialectical foundations of rhetoric, it is here suggested, necessitates his inquiry into the meaning of terms. In accord with Adler, Weaver, Natanson, and Charles Feidelson, the dramatist realizes that the language of dialectic arises "in vacuo"--apart, that is, from empirical referents. Furthermore, Burke comprehends

the fact that dialectical terms are for the most part, value-laden and that such terms are "meaningful" only on a relational basis--that is, through assessment of the linguistic interplay of opposites and appositives.¹⁹² To recall Burke's reliance upon the dialectical ratios of the pentad, he concentrates on the "purely internal relationships which the five terms bear to one another . . ." and means "by a Grammar of motives a concern with the terms alone, without reference to the ways in which their potentialities have been or can be utilized in actual statements about motives."¹⁹³

Burke's view of dialectic as "linguistic transformation," his intrinsic appreciation of linguistic structures, is akin in spirit to the common position of Adler, Feidelson, Natanson and Weaver that dialectic takes place apart from the facts of the empirical world. Dialectic, as Adler puts it,

investigates meaning in terms of language, in terms of the functioning of symbols--a phenomenology of the process by which words, or other symbols, come to have the various meanings they do have. No problems are solved. They are clarified by enumerating the many meanings of the word meaning itself.¹⁹⁴

And he adds that,

Dialectic is a process of thinking which never seeks the truth in the empirical sense, although accidentally it is often concluded by the intrusion of "facts." It would be more accurate to say that facts stop or destroy dialectic; they do not furnish dialectic with a logical conclusion, and it is in this latter sense that dialectic does not aim at empirical truth.¹⁹⁵

Drawing upon the observations of Adler, Charles Feidelson, some years later, contends that,

Dialectic works backward from logical dilemmas by finding the more inclusive statement under which opposing concepts may be reconciled. It assumes that the conflict is entirely within the universe of discourse, that the problem is produced by the relationship of terms and does not involve a 'question of fact.'¹⁹⁶

For his part, Maurice Natanson offers "the new enriched conception of dialectic" as a concern "not with facts but with the theoretical structure that is logically prior to fact."¹⁹⁷ And Richard Weaver, in his examination of the purely conceptual nature of dialectic (which, as Natanson points out, "leads to a notion of rhetoric as applicative or practical"),¹⁹⁸ concludes that "the urgency of facts is never a dialectical concern."¹⁹⁹

This cavalcade of quotations about the conceptual autonomy of the dialectical enterprise has been presented with two purposes in mind: first, it puts Burke into eminent company and stresses a sizeable alliance of those who have grasped the special symbolic nature of the method, and, second, it establishes the strain of anti-positivism that Burke shares with these scholars.

Although Kenneth Burke is not of the so-called "Symbolist" school of criticism--in The Philosophy of Literary Form, for example, he objects "to 'symbolism' as a label, because it suggests too close a link with a particular school of poetry, the Symbolist Movement," which implies "the unreality of the world in which we live"²⁰⁰--his approach to dialectic nonetheless implies a kind of symbolist orientation. In effect, Burke shares with those just cited a view of dialectic as an extraordinary

symbolic affair devoted to intellectual strife as a means to intellectual harmony, that is, agreement at some level of definition. This symbolic affair is insulated from the empirical world; for dialectic, in Burke's opinion, as in the opinion of the others, involves a universe of discourse that constructs the "logos" to be eventually "rhetorized" by resort to all the available, artful means of persuasion. The emphasis, therefore, is upon knowledge and not upon the presentation of empirical data.²⁰¹ The dialectician focuses upon the internal coherence of theses rather than upon, as Feldelson puts it, "the external correspondence of the medium."²⁰² Indeed, dialectic may be considered, as it is by Weaver, "an intellectual thing" since it involves the reconciliation of extremes aside from the rhetoric that seeks to promote good action, to implement policy in the social world.²⁰³ "The crucial defect of dialectic alone," in Weaver's estimation, "is that it ends in what might be called social agnosticism."²⁰⁴ The dialectician knows, but he knows in a vacuum; or, he knows, but he is without knowledge of how to act."²⁰⁵

Reflecting upon Burke's grammar and rhetoric of motives, with Weaver's observations in mind, it now appears that the dramatist's initial work on motivation is unresolved precisely because it is "a thing" and that his rhetoric moves toward closure because it offers, in symbolic action, the path to redemption. For it is rhetorical activity, not dialectic, that induces the vision with myth and metaphor, though dialectic initiates the process, at least for Socrates and Plato, at the level of logical

discussion and definition. In the sense of Burke's own development, this means a contrast between A Grammar of Motives as "methodological meditation" and A Rhetoric of Motives as "exhortation."²⁰⁶

The strain of anti-positivism in Burke, as in Weaver and Chaim Perelman, is based upon the common charge that those who intend to scientize language fail to comprehend the points that rhetorical terms have functions for exhortation and command and that dialectic deals with definition rather than with empirical verification.²⁰⁷ As Burke writes in A Grammar of Motives:

. . . one may discern the . . . pattern of embarrassment behind the contemporary ideal of a language that will best promote good action by entirely eliminating the element of exhortation or "command." Insofar as such a project succeeded, its terms would involve a narrowing of circumference to the point where the principle of personal action is eliminated from language, so that act could follow from it only as a non-sequitur, a kind of humanitarian after-thought. For the principle of personal action would lie completely outside the circumference of the terms . . .²⁰⁸

Nowhere is Burke's position more forcefully made than in a biting critique of Korzybskian semantics for its strictly referential stance. Suggesting that Korzybski cannot grasp the purely linguistic operations of dialectic, Burke says that what bothers him always "is the conviction that Korzybski is continually being driven by the nature of his keen intuition to grope beyond the borders of his terminology."²⁰⁹ Korzybski, Burke continues, needs a "consciousness of dialectic in general (a consciousness that would be manifest not merely in a general policy or

attitude of skepticism as regards language, but by a detailed analysis of linguistic aptitudes and embarrassments).²¹⁰ Thus Burke objects to Korzybski's stilted emphasis upon the correspondence of words to the empirical world, upon the scientization of language which translates "the problems of action into terms of motion."²¹¹ As Burke constantly reminds his readership, "all enterprises are dialectical which would cure us through the medium of words--and all the more so if their words would cure us by training us in the distrust of words."²¹² And yet the logical consequence of Korzybskian semantics is that "a truly 'scientific' cure *ab extra* would be such as corrected a false idea by a drug, glandular operation, and the like. But purely linguistic operations, such as those involved in the use of the "structural differential, are wholly dialectical."²¹³

It is not surprising that Richard Weaver, in The Ethics of Rhetoric, should point to Burke's statement about rhetoric as exhortation and command;²¹⁴ for Weaver himself has warned of the "peculiar craftiness of those who ask us to place our faith in the neutrality of their discourse."²¹⁵ "We cannot deny," he continues, "that there are degrees of objectivity in the reference of speech. But this is not the same as an assurance that a vocabulary of reduced meanings will solve the problems of mankind."²¹⁶ Similarly, Chaim Perelman's "new rhetoric" berates the positivist (as well as the rationalist) orientation for attempting to scientize language, and he notes that it is rhetorical reason that operates in the

realm of the probable, the contingent and the plausible--the realm of deliberative affairs.²¹⁷

What this all leads up to is the identification of Burke, Weaver Perelman, Natanson, Adler, Feidelson and all other such scholars sensitive to the nuances of the dialectical process as an anti-scientific school rejecting the idea that every linguistic utterance should be amenable to empirical proof. Which is to say that logical positivism and its offshoots seem to have denigrated rhetoric and dialectic by preoccupying philosophers with the conviction that only "verifiability" (later modified to "testibility") could serve as the criterion of meaningfulness.²¹⁸ To counter this movement both Burke and Weaver have reached back to the classical occupation of definition as the essential factor in a dialectic of morals and values. As Weaver puts it, "dialectic is primarily concerned with defining."²¹⁹ Which is to say that "the definition of non-empirical terms is itself a dialectical process."²²⁰ In this regard, offers Weaver, Socrates and Plato are best remembered as "namers; for both tried to define 'justice' or 'love' by now widening, now narrowing the categories . . ."²²¹ Essentially, the dialectician's exercise of definition "takes the form of an argument which must prove that the definiendum is one thing and not another. The limits of the definition are thus the boundary between the thing and the not-thing."²²²

That Burke uses the classic theory of species and genera in his own dialectical investigations is altogether apparent to readers of

A Grammar of Motives.²²³ Here, Burke's theory of defining ultimately expands to the order of words, grammatical function and growth of vocabulary and then to the four kinds of definition most capable of fostering ambiguity: contextual definition, derivational definition, circumference shifting and scope-reduction-deflection.²²⁴ Thus, Burke is both mindful of the drive toward accuracy manifested by the classical philosophers in their rationalistic way and the modern insight that language is pregnant with ambiguity, which is often a blessing rather than a burden (witness Burke's concern with the terms that clearly reveal the strategic spots at which ambiguities necessarily arise).²²⁵

Thus far, this discussion has centered on the self-contained nature of dialectic--the symbolic universe of discourse that Burke seems to have grasped, along with the other theorists mentioned, in the most profound sense. Moreover, this discussion has proceeded within the larger frame of dialectic as inquiry into the meaning of terms, and this larger frame, in turn, is bounded by the more general issue of dialectical inquiry as the philosophical grounds for rhetoric. The next step in the examination of dialectic as inquiry into the meaning of terms is the consideration of the terms themselves. That is, if the dialectical enterprise, as the prelude to effective rhetoric, constitutes an autonomous universe of discourse, then what is rhetoric's primary subject matter? The answer, as previously suggested, is values!

Burke's argument about the hortatory, attitudinal nature of rhetoric implies that the so-called "scientizers" of language have relied upon the naming or definitional mission of the classic dialectic to an extreme. Those supporting "the ideal of a purely 'neutral' vocabulary, free of emotional weightings" he observes, try "to make a totality out of a fragment, 'till that which suits a part infects the whole.'"²²⁶ This observation, made in 1941 in The Philosophy of Literary Form, is ultimately refined over two decades later in Language as Symbolic Action from the maturing dramatist's perspective:

We might begin by stressing the distinction between a "scientific" and a "dramatistic" approach to the nature of language. A "scientific" approach begins with questions of naming, or definition. Or the power of language to define and describe may be viewed as derivative; and its essential function may be treated as attitudinal or hortatory: attitudinal as with expressions of complaint, fear, gratitude, and such; hortatory as with commands or requests, or, in general, an instrument developed through its use in the social processes of cooperation and competition . . .²²⁷

Though by no means mutually exclusive, the two approaches, says Burke, diverge in that the scientific "builds up the edifice of language with primary stress upon a proposition such as 'It is, or it is not'" while the dramatistic "puts the primary stress upon such hortatory expressions as 'thou shalt, or thou shalt not.'"²²⁸

Burke's concern for the valuative hinge of both dialectic and rhetoric finds ample support in the works of Perelman and Weaver. The former, for instance, returns to the topics of Aristotle, to the dialectical

proofs, in order to find a logic of value judgments for the conduct of the judicial system--that is, the role of rhetorical argument in jurisprudence.²²⁹ The goal of lawyers, as well as philosophers, is to influence the mind and win agreement, notes Perelman, and not to "perform purely formal transformations of propositions."²³⁰ This being the case, their active rhetoric must be grounded in a dialectic that offers a plethora of tactical vantage-points.²³¹ The latter, Richard Weaver, returns to Plato's Phaedrus to contend that both rhetoric and dialectic are unintelligible unless such modes of discourse pertain to ethical matters, which in Plato's view means the ultimate concept of the Good.²³² Or, as Ralph T. Eubanks and Virgil L. Baker have put it: "In a word, the central function of rhetoric is to crystallize and transmit human values, the 'what-fors' of a culture. Put another way, rhetoric is purposive speech about the human condition."²³³ But such a rhetoric, to recall Natanson's thesis, "truly becomes the art it was originally intended to be" so long as it "sustains itself . . . in and through its involvement with dialectic."²³⁴ This means a dialectic understood as the philosophy of rhetoric investigating matters such as "knowledge, existence, communication and value."²³⁵

Values, in turn, become meaningful in discourse only because the terms employed have a relational status; that is, terms such as "justice," "beauty," "privilege," and "virtue," are conceptualized with reference to opposites or apposites or, as Richard Weaver has suggested, with reference to "their negatives or privations."²³⁶

Burke exhibits his comprehension of the status of valuative terms when charting the structure of H. B. Parkes' Marxism: An Autopsy. The dramatist discusses the concept of "freedom relative to necessity."²³⁷ "Freedom, as the dialectical counterpart of 'necessity,'" he contends, "may be treated as either in opposition to 'necessity' or in apposition with 'necessity.'" Or, if you divide 'necessity' into two terms, one impersonal ('law') and the other personal ('authority' or 'dictatorship'), you could treat 'freedom' as in apposition with some kind of natural law and in opposition to some kind of leadership or bureaucratic control."²³⁸

And yet Burke also argues that valuative opposition (polarity) can be overcome when "troublesome either-ors are transformed into both-ands."²³⁹ This occurs, for example, when terms such as "authority," "control," and "discipline," on the one hand, and "freedom" and "initiative," on the other, are integrated into the higher perspective of the "good life" by accepting the typical virtues and by discarding the typical vices generally associated with each side. For ideally, says Burke in A Rhetoric of Motives, the dialectical dialogue "seeks to attain a higher order of truth as the speakers, in competing with one another, cooperate towards an end transcending their individual positions. Here is the paradigm of the dialectical process for 'reconciling opposites' in a 'higher synthesis.'"²⁴⁰

Implicit in Burke's view of the valuative role of dialectic and rhetoric is the observation that terms in conflict presuppose a "meeting

ground" and that symbolic conflict itself derives from man's propensity to conceive of property legalistically.²⁴¹ First of all, Burke recalls the classical basis of the two modes of communication when he states that "the notion of rhetoric as a means of 'proving opposites' again brings us to the relation between rhetoric and dialectic."²⁴² But opposites are formed only when they are put ambiguously together such as the concepts of identification and division. For in "pure identification there would be no strife."²⁴³ Likewise, there would be no strife in absolute separateness, since opponents can join battle only through a mediatory ground that makes their communication possible, thus providing the first condition necessary for their interchange of blows."²⁴⁴ It is only when the two, identification and division, are put "ambiguously together, so that you cannot know for certain just where one ends and the other begins that you have the characteristic invitation to rhetoric."²⁴⁵ In this respect, the most thorough going dialectical opposition is that between Being and Not-Being. The only ground for Being, says Burke, is Not-Being since the former is "so comprehensive a category that its dialectical opposite . . . is the only term that would be left to designate its ground)."²⁴⁶

The ethical and moral dimensions come to the fore when, as Burke puts it, "we come upon the vast structure of 'rights' and 'obligations' that takes form when 'property' is conceived legalistically."²⁴⁷ In the critique of constitutions, for example, where "rights," "obligations," and "responsibilities" are of paramount concern, it is imperative to note

the dialectical basis of the document; "for what a Constitution would do primarily is to substantiate an ought (to base a statement as to what is)."²⁴⁸ "And in our 'agonistic' world," adds Burke, "such substantiation derives point and poignancy by contrast with notions as to what should not be."²⁴⁹

That Burke's thinking accords with Richard Weaver's on the relational basis of dialectic is soon apparent to those perusing the latter's essay on "The Rhetoric of Social Science."²⁵⁰ Whereas Burke talks about dialectic's role in an "agonistic" world which contrasts the "should be" with "notions as to what should not be,"²⁵¹ Weaver characterizes the dialectical term as "positional."²⁵² That is, "a writer no sooner employs one than he is engaged in an argument;" for "to say that the universe is purposeless is to join in argument with all who say it is purposeful" and "to say that a certain social condition is inequitable is to ally oneself with the reformers and against the standpatters."²⁵³ Hence, all terms reflecting judgments of value "depend on something more than the external world for their significance."²⁵⁴ They depend upon their negatives or privations as, for instance, the term 'justice' is defined by 'injustice' and "'social improvement' is made meaningful by the use of 'privation of social improvement.'"²⁵⁵

To sum up the discussion thus far, it has been established that Kenneth Burke's dialectic serves as philosophical grounds for rhetoric because it is an inquiry into the meaning of terms--terms which are eventually used for persuasion. This implies dialectic's unique function

as a self-contained universe of verbal discourse ordinarily insulated from the urgency of the facts of the empirical world. It also implies the valuative status of dialectical terms and their relational nature. But two additional matters, treated briefly, bear upon dialectic as the philosophy of rhetoric: action and justice. Which is to say that Burke, as with Weaver, is altogether mindful of the fact that dialectic, in the classic Aristotelian sense, is most often found joined to that part of rhetoric dealing with questions of choice and avoidance. And he is aware of the fact that "by its very nature, language . . . drives toward the 'ultimate' of itself" which is "'justice,' a kind of completion whereby laws are so universalized that they also apply to the law giver."²⁵⁶

In treating dialectic as the theoretical prelude to deliberative rhetoric, such as the Aristotelian "topoi" provide the available means of persuasion, Burke recalls the classical belief that "persuasion involves choice, will: it is directed to a man only insofar as he is free."²⁵⁷ For ". . . only insofar as men are potentially free, must the spellbinder seek to persuade them. Insofar as they must do something, rhetoric is unnecessary, its work being done by the nature of things."²⁵⁸ By way of this observation, Burke, as Marie Hochmuth Nichols suggests, has called back the ethical foundations of rhetoric from its source in the Aristotelian Ethics and has thereby retrieved the Stagirite's dictum that the origin of action is choice, and choice, in turn, is dependent upon reason and intellect, especially right action which derives from moral stature.²⁵⁹

Thus, for Burke, dialectic is joined to an art that prospers only in an atmosphere of tolerance for the give and take of social and political ideas (cooperating to compete). Or, as Eubanks and Baker, drawing upon the insights of P. Albert Duhammel, have put it, ". . . 'right action' is central in man's value-world, for it places before him the crucial question of how he shall use his freedom."²⁶⁰

Once again, it is possible to view Burke's transition from A Grammar of Motives to A Rhetoric of Motives as the passage from theory to action. The former work constitutes an expression of an attitude of linguistic skepticism toward language--an attitude embodied in a method or, put another way, a kind of "methodical quizzicality towards language [that] may best equip us to perceive the full scope of its resourcefulness."²⁶¹ The latter promotes an examination in detail of "the ways in which the Grammatical resources are employed for the purposes of persuasion . . ."²⁶²

One major question remains, however. If the function of rhetoric is to persuade men to action in the realm of prudential conduct, then what is the ultimate ideal about which rhetoric and its basis, dialectic, find their most noble moments? The answer is, the ideal of justice. For this concept, note Eubanks and Baker, "synthesizes the classical trinity of democratic ideals, liberty, equality and fraternity, whose central premise is the essential worthfulness and profound potentialities of the individual human being."²⁶³ In this regard, Burke's dialectic and rhetoric must be

appreciated within the context of his views on hierarchy and order since, as William Rueckert has written, "the whole is a monolithic structure of ascent headed by the heavenly idea of 'universal justice' which, for Burke, is the noblest ideal ever conceived by the mind of man. It is toward this ideal, toward 'the purification of war' that all dialectics should move by following the grammar of ascent inherent in hierarchy."²⁶⁴

Chaim Perelman's rhetoric finds its kinship with Burke over this very concern for the attainment of justice. For Perelman, the task is to unravel the ways in which rhetoric, from its dialectical grounding in the topics of persuasion, bears upon juridical activity and the idea of justice. Justice, he contends, lies in an area where value-judgements abound; indeed, there can be no perfect justice because arbitrary elements enter into every normative system. The primary goal is to investigate the dialectics and rhetoric of forensic reasons, as they are argumentatively advanced in the contingent world.²⁶⁵

Dialectic, as Burke sees it, serves not only as the philosophical ground for rhetoric but also stands as the critical procedure for exposing philosophical and ideological schools as rhetorical and argumentative systems. In other words, the dialectical virtue of pentadic analysis is that it can be "used as a generating principle that should enable us to 'anticipate' these different idioms," these philosophical languages that appeal to societies and civilizations for acceptance.²⁶⁶ "Theological, metaphysical and juridical doctrines offer the best illustrations of the

concerns we place under the heading of Grammar," says Burke, and then he goes on to show how the various philosophies, as casuistries, apply grammatic principles to temporal situations.²⁶⁷ In its intent and critical procedure, Burke's A Grammar of Motives is thus based upon the kind of insight found in Perelman's rhetoric, to the effect that "the goal of philosophy is to influence the mind and win its agreement, rather than to perform purely formal transformations of propositions."²⁶⁸ Aware that every metaphysician must furnish reasons for the superiority of his system, Perelman contends that knowledge of the ways of dialectic and rhetoric is indispensable to an understanding of how philosophers, on behalf of their world-views, resort to the processes of rhetorical argumentation. For "whoever develops a philosophical system undertakes to address everyone and to convince everyone."²⁶⁹

Of the two, it is Burke who makes the most penetrating critique of philosophical and ideological constructs, and one need but turn to the dramatist's assessment of rhetoric and dialectic in Marxism to realize the depth and breadth of his analysis. Noting that Marxist rhetoric derives from a dialectic of nature (equated with "certain" science) rather than from a dialectic rooted in probability and contingency (as with Aristotle), Burke attempts to explain how the Marxists appeal rhetorically for the acceptance of axioms such as that ideas derive from social relations (rather than determining them).²⁷⁰ Ironically, observes Burke, Marx and Engels wrote The German Ideology as a dialectical critique of the rhetoric

of prevailing philosophical schools so as to demythify and demystify them. But they themselves pleaded objectivity--which also meant scientific superiority--over the major bourgeois ideas which, they contended, were wrapped in the social hieroglyphs of monetary value. While Marx and Engels unraveled the mystifications of "ruling class" rhetoric--a symbolism endowing things and relationships with the glory of the ruling class--they also produced, as Burke sees it, a fog of symbols on behalf of communism. The outcome of their speculations, says Burke, is the puritanic severity of Soviet Russian industry and bureaucracy. Indeed, he argues, "we find the stress upon private property as a rhetorical motive so convincing, that we question whether communism is possible under the conditions of extreme specialization (division of labor) required by modern industry."²⁷¹

Still, cautions Burke, "we do not have to believe the Marxist promises to apply the Marxist diagnosis for rhetorical purposes."²⁷² Wisely, Burke distinguishes the critical potency of Marxism, the potential for radical openness, from its own ideological trappings and traps and acknowledges the contributions of Marx in analyzing the manner in which the Idea, for instance, becomes accepted as "a universal self-developing organism."²⁷³ That is, Marx shows how the Hegelian Idea, as creator of nature and history (which are but concrete expressions of it) "generates a whole set of beliefs."²⁷⁴ Of all Burke's admirers only Hugh Dalziel Duncan has concentrated on this aspect of the dramatist's

rhetorical criticism, namely, turning Marx's analysis of the rhetoric of ideology against Marx himself.²⁷⁵ The following passage is perhaps the best indication of what Burke has done as dialectician-rhetorician with the dialectics of nature and the rhetoric of ideology:

Thus, while the Marxists, like all who communicate, have a rhetoric and use all the arts of persuasion, they argue that their rhetoric is grounded in a dialectic. The rhetoric is symbols; the dialectic, since it is concerned with non-symbolic orders of social motives, is equated with "science." An art of rhetoric in keeping with this "science" would, as Burke stresses, "be grounded in 'science' (or 'dialectic') in so far as it took its start from the experience of natural reality, while being rhetorical in proportion as its persuasiveness helped form judgments, choices, attitudes deemed favorable to communist purposes."²⁷⁶

Dramatism, as this section suggests, is both a dialectical and rhetorical critique of all symbolic constructs appealing for commitment, whether philosophical, ideological, economic, or otherwise. Burke, that is, has tried to reunify the ideal that Marx himself abused: a radical openness and relentless scrutiny of the outstanding intellectual rationales. But Burke's own critical stance is imbued with the democratic temperament more nearly found, say, in the outlooks of George Herbert Mead and John Dewey. Burke's development has culminated in a kind of pragmatic plateau whereby his methodology is of itself a substantive commitment--an attitude embodied in a method which (if the pun be pardoned) is more "wholesome" than the partial views competing for social and political acceptance. In this light, Burke's social ideas can be studied in evolution from a unique type of Marxian pragmatism, a "dialectic biologism"

as Burke once called it, through American pragmatism, to ultimate incorporation into the all-embracing framework of the dramatistic system. Along the way, Burke has assimilated Freud, Korzybski, Coleridge, Aristotle, Richards and so on, into his orientation, selecting from each source those contributions especially suited to his own language-centered philosophy.

Dialectic and Burke's Social Ideas

In A Grammar of Motives Burke announces his belief "that a kind of 'Neo-Stoic resignation' to the needs of industrial expansion is in order."²⁷⁷ "For better or worse," he adds, "men are set to compete the development of technology, a development that will require such a vast bureaucracy (in both political and commercial administration) as the world has never before encountered."²⁷⁸ The dramatist pleads for the formulation of an attitude of linguistic skepticism, of an on-going, quizzical mentality, both hypocondriacal and appreciative. The attitude of hypocondriasis is akin to the "patient who makes peace with his symptoms by becoming interested in them."²⁷⁹ The attitude of appreciation "would seek delight in meditating upon some of the many ingenuities of speech."²⁸⁰

Those who studied Burke carefully during the years of the "Depression" anticipated such an outlook. In Permanence and Change, for example, Burke emphasized a kind of "dialectical biologism" which, along with materialism, idealism, and dialectical materialism, is a system of verbalization stressing, "in accord with science, the need of manipulating

objective material factors as an essential ingredient to spiritual welfare."²⁸¹ In Attitudes toward History, he conceded the fact that bureaucracy is embedded in Communism, that the hierarchical, the graded series, usually associated with the capitalistic world, is noticeable in the Russian system.²⁸² Indeed, Burke's association with Communism was so thoroughly Burkeian--he saw above all else the poetic-humanistic elements in Marx--that critics such as Henry Bamford Parkes assailed his audacity in dabbling with this dogma. Predicting that Burke would never suppress "his non-Marxist convictions," Parkes cited the two heresies that separated the dramatist from the mainstream of the ideology: "He does not believe either in the beneficence of historic destiny or in the economic interpretation of history. The result is that he is unable to present Communism as either a stage in the predestined advance of mankind toward the kingdom of freedom or as a desirable method of satisfying human needs."²⁸³

In retrospect, however, there are Nineteenth Century dialectical themes that have been refined by Burke, despite the eventual abandonment of the "curve of history" as advanced Attitudes toward History. Actually Burke's messianism is worked out through the dramatist perspective. The "curve of history," a concoction of Hegel, Marx, Spengler, Darwin and Dewey--a curious melding of European idealism and naturalistic evolutionism--is ultimately reformulated into the purgative-redemptive schema that characterizes the drama of human relations. Those who have

not studied Marx miss the significant point that he too thought of the historical process in terms of grace and redemption.²⁸⁴

Despite his repudiation of the dialectics of nature and his Neo-Stoic resignation to the growth of industrialism and bureaucracy in East and West alike, Burke manages to salvage some dialectical aspects of Hegelian and Marxian philosophy. It is instructive, as the culmination of this chapter, to note how this is done. The study calls upon the insights of Helmut Kuhn, Gerhart Niemeyer and Robert C. Tucker in charting the Burkeian passage from the "curve of history" to the "rhetoric of re-birth." What, then, are the dialectical elements appearing in the first that find reformulation in the second?

To answer this question, it is necessary to first review the "curve of history" as Burke conceived it. Second, it is important to analyze this curve according to the dialectics of history--what Helmut Kuhn has called "the ontological antithesis," "the organic rhythm," and "the religious reconciliation."²⁸⁵ The third factor is essential to the system of dramatism--logology and to The Rhetoric of Religion. The other two are much more subtly absorbed into the language-centered philosophy.

The "curve of history" has been created, suggests Burke, to emphasize those "collective poems" evolved by the widest group activities.²⁸⁶ Now how does this bear upon the persistent issue of rational choice versus the inexorability of natural, social or economic forces--of individual action and determinism? Burke, with respect to this issue,

focuses not upon individual strategy but rather upon the productive and mental patterns developed by aggregates, although he acknowledges the interrelationship of the individual's frame of acceptance or rejection and the materials of the collective frame. The change from individual to aggregate, he contends, shifts the emphasis from the poetic to the historical.²⁸⁷

The curve is actually a drama in five acts. Act One announces the situation "out of which the action will arise."²⁸⁸ It stresses two themes: Hellenistic stoicism in decline, and Christian evangelism emergent, each one of them a world-view to match the Roman cosmopolitanism as fostered by Pax Romana. The forensic activities of Stoicism, in particular, "schematized the legalistic material which the evangelical doctrine could eventually borrow when its vague promises of a new and better day had to be fitted into the practical requirements of a going concern."²⁸⁹ For its part, Act Two of the drama presents a medieval synthesis of the conflicting demands inherent in the first stage. Here the Christian frame of acceptance encounters the problems of guilt, justification, earning and alienation. The irony, suggests Burke, is that Christianity's preoccupation with such problems is both its special appeal and its weakest facet: for classes of people emerging into the Renaissance and Reformation inevitably stretch the religion's opportunities to its "Malthusian limits" to earn their world anew.²⁹⁰ That is, they alter the course of history when the Christian frame of reference is so stretched

that it breaks. Enter, then, the "watershed" of the historical drama-- what Burke calls "our peripety."²⁹¹ At this point in the historical cavalcade, dissociation occurs with the separation of church and state.²⁹² (And the separation of government from business, of the judiciary from the legislature, etc.) This period is exceptional, says Burke, in that three major forces converge: Renaissance enlightenment, Protestant fanaticism, and emergent bourgeois enterprise.²⁹³ The seeds of the modern malaise are planted at this time. Calvin sanctions profits for the glory of God. Descartes wields the doctrine of "organized doubt" as the negativism of the inductive method. Material aggrandizement is democratized, and bourgeois freedom ruses thousands of dispossessed farmers. Unemployment grows, as Protestantism becomes the adumbration of the Capitalistic frame. And yet one of the ironies is that it stresses uniformity. This Third Act culminates in dissociation, sectarianism, splintering and disintegration.²⁹⁴ The Fourth Act, says Burke, ushers in all the negativistic features of Protestant dissociation, such as aggravated pugnacity-- the pugnacity of Fascism.²⁹⁵ (Fascism, as Burke sees it, is but the remnant of feudal socialism.) In this act, Adam Smith's notion that individual interests, pursued individually, add up to a collective welfare (the balancing of self-interests) ascends to prominence.²⁹⁶ The immutable laws of exchange replace the laws of God. That is, the market place produces a market law to replace the laws of God (a mechanical providence). "This new found scheme of beneficence," says Burke, "is really

a kind of secular prayer."²⁹⁷ As translated into the naive but burgeoning activities of capitalism, it spells the victory of the "holding company" and "ladling devices" over Rooseveltian and Wilsonian "trust-busting."²⁹⁸ Paradoxically, however, the corporate giant and the humble employee are dependent upon each other. The former provides the latter with economic welfare, and the latter provides the consumption for the former's products. Still, the system must end in contradictions that tear it asunder.²⁹⁹ And as for the Fifth Act? Like Marx, Burke suggests that it be left partly unfinished.³⁰⁰ In Burke's case, the reader must be induced to participate in the writing of it, but there is no strident call for the revolutionary action of the proletariat. Emergent collectivism has already been revealed in the previous phase, says Burke, especially when Adam Smith's rationale is rendered asymmetrical by the growth of corporations. The guess is that a new type of collectivism will arrive, so to speak, "through the back door."³⁰¹ It shall be characterized by the "socialization of losses," whereby the government protects the financial empires of "private" businesses through the national credit (the collective medium of exchange.)³⁰² Hence incipient national planning occurs under the guise or euphemism of "private enterprise."³⁰³ Employing the Hegelian archetype of the lord-servant relationship, Burke shifts it into and then out of the Neo-Marxist gear and observes that the corporate-individual relationship is not freedom versus bondage but rather a fundamental ambivalence, which can best be exploited through the comic frame (Burke's departure from Marxian

orthodoxy).³⁰⁴ Specifically, the corporation pays off its debt to society through social service, thereby discharging itself of guilt. The individual, in turn, pays off his debt to society through a psychology of individual service to capitalism, thus assuaging his guilt. The comic frame perceives this phenomenon as it cuts through the priestly mystifications of the system.³⁰⁵ But this orientation is not wholly debunking; rather, it is charitable in its perspective. It enhances one's shrewdness about the mentality of "cashing in." It stresses the ways in which an act dialectically transcends the transcendental-materialistic split which bedevils mankind: it accents the way a synthesis arises out of thesis-antithesis, out of the confrontation between the bureaucratic and imaginative. The comic frame has dialectical punch because it carries to completion the translative act.³⁰⁶ "It considers human life as a project in composition, where the poet works with the materials of social relationships."³⁰⁷

This review of the "curve of history," conceived by Burke in the midst of the "Great Depression", shows the dramatist to be working out the purgative-redemptive theme, the Neo-Stoic perspective, hierarchy and order, the pragmatic appraisal of political forces and ideologies, and the need for synoptic vision, against the prevailing pull of social disillusionment. The "curve", in effect, is a curious stew of Hegel, Marx, Spengler and Dewey, with the author's own ingredients thrown in to give it a distinctive poetic-humanistic taste. What complicated the understanding of this five-act drama, and sent Leftist readers into a tizzy was

Burke's avowed preference for a world of nouns, a philosophy of categories instead of processes.³⁰⁸ All this was offered in the context of an historical overview suggesting Hegelian and Marxian "becoming" instead of Aristotelian "being". "Readers of Science and Society," observed Margaret Schlauch, "are not apt to share this nostalgia for a medieval world of stable nouns. They have presumably made themselves at home in a world of verbs and change."³⁰⁹ From another vantage-point, Sidney Hook, then a Socialist of definite anti-Russian sentiments, reacted to Burke's historical perspective as a mode of thinking neither comic nor humanistic but "the style in which weak men of minor talent make a bid for acceptance to the side they think will win."³¹⁰ As Hook saw it, Burke was an apologist for Stalin. This was not the case, of course, but Hook nevertheless unleashed his critical furies on Burke for rendering an incomprehensible blend of democratic latitudinarianism and Communist party-line dogma.³¹¹

The dialectical quality of Burke's "curve of history" and its value for the eventual dramatic schema of rebirth is best examined with the dialectics of history in mind. For Burke's speculations on the historical procession evidence a type of reasoning rooted in Hegel with influential branches in Marx, Spengler, Darwin and Dewey, to name but four conspicuous sources in the development of the "curve." Hegel's dialectical scheme of history, as Helmut Kuhn has written, was "as brittle as it was grandiose" and it "failed in its orthodox form to command ascent."³¹² "Its success," says Kuhn, "was nonetheless stupendous."³¹³ "By virtue

of bringing the world of Platonic ideas ('the Absolute') in contact with the concrete life of nations rather than with the metaphysical aspiration of the solitary soul, dialectic," adds Kuhn, "put a peculiar metaphysical leaven into historical thinking" and "its fermenting power is not yet spent."³¹⁴

Marx, of course, reworked Hegel's metaphysically-rooted notion of "becoming" to advance his own explanation of the historical process as an intelligible series.³¹⁵ Economic and social determinants replaced Hegelian Reason in the inexorable flow of nations, cultures and systems to the ultimate collective stage of freely-associating men.³¹⁶ Spengler employed a special brand of historiography and cultural determinism to ponder the rise and fall of civilizations.³¹⁷ The pragmatic-evolutionist view of history, as Kuhn observes, ". . . tries to uphold the somewhat discredited idea of progress and "is alive with dialectical dynamism."³¹⁸ "With its alternating rhythm of maladjustment and adaptation, the salient feature of John Dewey's philosophy, it achieves a physiological interpretation of the Hegelian scheme."³¹⁹ What unites Marx and Darwin, in the context of a theory of history is, according to Otis Lee, that they "hold in common that nature is in process of evolution, that the forms of nature are changing, and that these forms are determined by the modes of activity or behavior of natural entities in interaction with other entities and environmental conditions in general."³²⁰ Which is to say that Marx and Darwin "apply the same basic idea to two different sets of problems and bodies of data."³²¹ (The fundamental difference between the two, in

Marx's view, is that the Darwinians, being bourgeois in their thinking, see evolution only in terms of gradual change, thus missing the significance of qualitative dialectical leaps in nature.)³²²

In sum, the belief that Hegel's influence ended at the termination of the previous century merely deludes one about the ideological power of "the Dialectic" in modern times. As Kuhn has written:

In fact, the wide-spread willingness to see history as the field in which antagonist "forces" operate, testifies to the spectral but effective after-life of the Hegelian Weltgeist that uses individuals as tools for its dialectical self-manifestation. A lingering ghost of Hegelian dialectic is abroad not only on both sides of the border-line between Communism and defunct Fascism, but it also straddles the more recent divide between Soviet totalitarianism and Western democracy.³²³

Burke's dalliance with the dialectics of history has permitted him to touch upon what Kuhn has called the "three sources of dialectic," or "the three points at which the dialectical scheme is in touch with reality."³²⁴ The three are: (1) the ontological antithesis; (2) the organic rhythm; (3) the religious reconciliation. The first concerns dialectic's emergence whenever "Being enters into conjunction with the spatio-temporal Process, the Absolute with the Relative, the Necessary with the Contingent."³²⁵ Burke has understood this source as "the being-nothing pair," of which he has written in A Grammar of Motives that

. . . in historicist frameworks, the pair may take the form of a distinction between the becoming and the having-become. Here the vital principle that gives form is equated with becoming; and the formed is equated with the fossilized, as a state of having become."³²⁶

What with the Hegelian-Marxian influences in "the curve of history," Burke has nevertheless sought stable entities, those enduring aspects of existence that (neurophysiologically and biologically, not Platonically) survive man's involvement in the realm of flux and contingency. Although the five-act drama seems to have a "becoming" emphasis, Burke's overall mission is to locate the effects of a changing historical situation in relation to the permanent universal situation of man--a concern voiced in Permanence and Change.³²⁷ As William Rueckert so wisely noted, it carries through all the rest of Burke's offerings.³²⁸ (By the "mid-fifties," for example, Burke had already resigned himself to man's symbolic tendency to incessantly generate conflicts. The motto, "ad bellum purificandum" implies not the Marxian thought of ending conflict entirely in the perfect cooperative state but the dramatic thought of being linguistic-wise in order to temper or rechannel hostilities into verbal rather than physical combat.)³²⁹

The organic rhythm enters into "the curve of history" when Burke considers the concept of equilibrium in the rise and fall of frames of acceptance. Ordinarily, the concept implies two forces working against each other with approximately equal strength so that a balance sets in. When forces become asymmetrical, an entire age sways under the pressure of one's ascendancy and the other's decline, as when the serf and semi-serf population of Sparta overwhelmed the numerically decreasing ruling class. The Marxian model, in this respect, recognizes the role of the

strong English middle class in negotiating the passage of the populace from semi-feudalism to modern industrial society. It pictures the industrial revolution, with the rise of Capitalistic competition, as leading, in turn, to the alienation of the working class and the dispossession of the worker not only from the products of his labor but also from the world per se.³³⁰ And yet Capitalism is seen to have within it the seeds of its own destruction, meaning that it unwittingly sets up the collectivistic thrust that the proletarian revolution shall "capitalize" upon to form a communist future. For so impoverished and estranged is the worker that he seethes for revolution. Marx's man, as Nicholas Lobkowitz has written, "is forced to realize how wretched a being he is--and consequently to revolt and to act with the force of a desperate man who has nothing to lose and everything to gain."³³¹

Implicit in this perspective is not merely the idea of equilibrium but of "dynamic equilibrium," where societies, cultures, social and economic systems are understood as attempts to self-adjust. But the asymmetry of internal forces moves the entire frame inexorably forward or upward to a higher stage. For there must occur a fundamental asymmetry so that the life-process of history has a directedness rather than a mere stasis, that is, a perpetual tug of war. The rhythm of history shows growth, decay, integration and disintegration, but the overall outlook is progressive, and this often infuses the panoramic view of the rise and fall of civilizations with a messianic urge for man's ultimate salvation.³³²

That the "curve of history" submits to the dialectics of organic rhythm is apparent to anyone attending closely to its acts. The schema is progressive and forecasts the Neo-Marxian hope that Capitalism's demise will occur as the asymmetry of forces within it pulls the exploited together in rebellion against corporate aggrandizement of the people's welfare. Burke's use of "the socialization of losses" is, however, a sincere hope that the system can be shifted into the next stage without undue violence; for Attitudes toward History acknowledges the wisdom of the "tragic sense of history" and disdains bloodbaths initiated in the name of the people or of the providential.³³³ Still, contrary to H. B. Parkes' critique, Burke does meddle with the beneficence of historic destiny and economic determinism. Yet the stronger impulse, as later works bear out, is not toward the propagandistic heralding of collectivism but rather toward the dramatic apprehension of the drama of human relations as a symbolic cycle equivalent to the Christian story of the Fall, through purgation to redemption. Burke's meditations upon the endurance of hierarchy and order in A Rhetoric of Motives and his resignation to the bureaucratic mania accompanying industrial expansion, as expressed in A Grammar of Motives, implicitly rebut the Marxian dream.³³⁴

There is, however, no small significance in the fact that the Marxist model carries with it some notions about grace and redemption-- notions which Burke eventually reworks into his own symbolic-oriented

system. This is all foreshadowed by Burke in an otherwise tangential footnote in Attitudes toward History:

The doctrine of "grace" lurks behind the Marxian vocabulary of secular determinism, since the individual as such can transcend the morality of his class (people always rightly pointing to Marx himself, a "bourgeois renegade," as an example of this). Also, in identifying himself with a proletariat that is to redeem the world by a blood sacrifice, he may even be said to have rounded out his morphology along the usual lines of guilt and tragic expiation.³³⁵

This insight into Marx accords, for example, with Gerhard Niemeyer's discussion of the relationship between the Marxian total critique of man and his faculties and the views of St. Augustine. "There are in Marx two historical dialectics, rather than one," observes Niemeyer.³³⁶ The first centers on the "alleged laws of change from one type of society to the other, through economic developments conducive to legal and political upheaval."³³⁷ This constitutes the explanation of how societies rise and fall. The other centers on the dialectic of alienation and contemplates redemption, "or, to use Marx's own term, 'the emancipation of mankind.'³³⁸ "Reversely," says Niemeyer, "one might call it a message of redemption through dialectic, the dialectic of consciousness. Instead of a series of changes, this dialectic envisages only one change: from alienation to the realm of freedom."³³⁹ In this sense, history is divided into the Before and the After. Man is seen to be in a fallen condition; he cannot "be counted on to produce a genuinely harmonious social order, real peace or true justice."³⁴⁰ But eventually he becomes aware of

his condition and his potential for acting in the world--thus the merger of theory and practice--and then he moves to save the world for himself (and vice versa).³⁴¹

Granted, Marx differs from Augustine who, as Niemeyer notes, "never lost sight of Creation's original goodness even in man's most perverted strivings" and who "perceived the action of divine Grace in its healing of human corruption and never attributed to evil a positive reality."³⁴² Curiously, however, there resides in Marx a hope that man will be healed, but through the negating force of the proletariat as it changes the world. Marx's tie to religious reconciliation may thus be considered as a secular translation of the three stages: primeval harmony; disruption of the soul; movement to new harmony through repose in God. Marx translated these into man's natural harmony with nature, his alienation and estrangement from himself, others and the world through the corruption of the modes of production, and the return to the self-in-nature with the advent of Communism.³⁴³

Burke's departure from Marxism, and from the religious story per se, is signaled in the depiction of man's movements from order, guilt and the negative, through victimage and mortification, to catharsis and redemption, in the symbolic drama of human relations. Here, as Leland Griffin has written, "the wheel forever turns."³⁴⁴ Which is to say that, for Burke, man is seen as continuously striving in an imperfect world, symbolically destined to contrive ideals never completely to be attained.

Still, the mixture of the tragic and comic elements inherent in the drama offers a salvation or redemption of sorts: a reflection upon one's own foibles, as in the attitude of the hypochondriac neo-stoically evaluating the fundamentals of his condition, and the appreciation of the participation in the symbolic struggle itself.³⁴⁵ In a sense, Burke moves from the classic orientation of Plato, Aristotle, through Kant, Hegel, Marx, and Dewey, and back to the ancients again. He accepts an imperfect world with both Platonic and Kantian irony in mind. Man's purpose is to seek ideals that cannot be attained; he inevitably longs for indubitable truth, for a kind of Kantian knowledge of the universe, the truth of which should be categorical.³⁴⁶ But the truth is, after all, in the aspiration or striving itself, not as possession. This theme permeates not only the various pragmatic philosophies of the present century but also existentialism, particularly Albert Camus' discussion of the ennobling value of Sisyphus's struggle.³⁴⁷

Summary

This chapter has endeavored to analyze Kenneth Burke's dialectical attitudes and methodology and to account for the importance of dialectic in his development and refinement of the dramatistic system. Burke understands the varied definitions of dialectic that have evolved through philosophical history, and he manages to put numerous definitions to work in dramatism, although "linguistic transformation" seems to stand out as the definition crucial to the study of symbolic action.

As Burke sees it, man's existence is a kind of dialectic of merger and division, disintegration and reintegration, death and rebirth, war and peace. The search for the self also implies a dialectical theme that carries from Plato, through Proclus, to Hegel and Marx. This dialectic of the self regained is but a secular equivalent of the Christian story of the Fall and Redemption. Burke eventually worked this out in dramatism as a synoptic perspective of the movements of mankind from Order, Guilt and the Negative, through Victimage and Mortification, to Catharsis and Redemption. Within the dramatist perspective, moreover, Burke has explained transcendence, form, substance and ethical life through an examination of their relationship to dialectic.

Methodologically, Burke relies upon the dialectical ratios of the pentad to get at a thing's substance. As with the eminent dialectical critics, he doubles back upon early ideas and brings them into harmony with his most recent speculations.

Burke's rhetoric is "new" in the sense that it stresses identification. And yet it is also rooted in classical notions of persuasion where, in the Aristotelian respect, rhetoric is the counterpart of dialectic. Burke uses dialectical inquiry as the philosophical basis of rhetoric, and thus he aligns with the rhetorical theories of Richard Weaver and Chaim Perelman. And yet he seems to surpass his contemporaries by launching dialectical critiques of the rhetoric of various philosophical systems.

Burke's social ideas were no doubt Marxian during the "thirties," but his brand of Marxism was of a humanistic-poetic flavor. Although his "curve of history" suggested an historical dialectic, Burke eventually fashioned a unique, non-programmatic vision of the human drama involving a secular dialectical equivalent of the Christian story of salvation. Of course, Marx's historical perspective paralleled the theme of religious reconciliation. But Burke's secular equivalent is based, not upon alienated labor, but rather upon the fact that man is a symbol-using, symbol-making, symbol-misusing creature who has ironically become estranged from his natural condition because of his skill with symbols.

NOTES

CHAPTER IV

1. Marianne Moore, "A Grammarian of Motives," in Critical Responses to Kenneth Burke, 1924-1966, ed. William Rueckert, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1969), p. 313.
2. Kermit Lansner, "Burke, Burke, the Lurk," in Ibid., p. 261.
3. Hugh Dalziel Duncan, Communication and Social Order, (New York: Bedminster Press, 1962), pp. 123-124, 131.
4. Malcolm Cowley, "Prolegomena to Kenneth Burke," in Critical Responses to Kenneth Burke, op. cit., p. 250.
5. Francis Fergusson, "Kenneth Burke's 'Grammar of Motives,'" in Ibid., p. 178.
6. Kenneth Burke, A Grammar of Motives, (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1945), pp. 402-403.
7. Ibid., p. 403.
8. Kenneth Burke, Permanence and Change, An Anatomy of Change, 2nd rev. ed., The Library of Liberal Arts, (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965), pp. 162-163.
9. A Grammar of Motives, op. cit., p. xix.
10. See Richard Bernstein, "Part I, Praxis: Marx and the Hegelian Background," Praxis and Action, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971), pp. 11-83.
11. See, for example, Shlomo Avineri, The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), p. 65; Louis Dupre, The Philosophical Foundation of Marxism, (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1966), p. viii; Erich Fromm, Marx's Concept of Man, (New York: Frederick Ungar, 1961), pp. 8-19; Robert Tucker, Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), p. 12.
12. Permanence and Change, op. cit., pp. 162-163.

13. Kenneth Burke, Attitudes toward History, 2nd rev. ed., (Boston: Beacon Press, 1961), pp. 166-175, 339-344.

14. See, for example, J. N. Findlay, "The Dialectical Method," The Philosophy of Hegel: An Introduction and Reexamination, (New York: Collier Books, 1966), pp. 55-79; Walter Kaufmann, Hegel: A Reinterpretation, Anchor Books ed., (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1966), pp. 181-187.

15. Wayne Booth, "Kenneth Burke's Way of Knowing," Critical Inquiry I (September, 1974), p. 20.

16. Attitudes toward History, p. 263; Permanence and Change, pp. 69-79. Cf. Kenneth Burke, The Philosophy of Literary Form: Studies in Symbolic Action, 2nd. ed., (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1967), pp. 205-206, and A Rhetoric of Motives, (New York: Prentice Hall, 1950), pp. 22-23.

17. Kenneth Burke, "Definition of Man," Language as Symbolic Action: Essays on Life, Literature and Method, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), pp. 13-15; Permanence and Change, pp. 162-163.

18. Mario Dal Pra, "On Dialectic," tr. S. J. Greenleaves, Diogenes, IX (Winter, 1967), p. 5.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid.

21. See Tucker, op. cit., and Gaston Fessard, S.J., "Is Marx's Thought Relevant to the Christian? A Catholic View," in Marx and the Western World, ed. Nicholas Lobkowitz, (South Bend: University of Notre Dame Press, 1967), pp. 337-370. The most pronounced view of Marx as messianist with existential implications is found in Fromm, op. cit., p. 5. As he puts it, "Marx's philosophy constitutes a spiritual existentialism in secular language and because of this spiritual quality is opposed to the materialistic practice and thinly disguised materialistic philosophy of our age. Marx's aim, socialism, based on his theory of man, is essentially prophetic Messianism in the language of the nineteenth century." Ibid.

22. "All the issues with which we have been concerned," says Burke, "come to a head in the problem of identity." Attitudes toward History, p. 263.

23. William Rueckert, Kenneth Burke and the Drama of Human Relations, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1963), p. 43.
24. Kenneth Burke, Counter-Statement, 2nd ed., (Los Altos, California: Hermes Publications, 1953), pp. 149-150, and Permanence and Change, pp. 162-163.
25. Marvin Farber, "Toward a Naturalistic Philosophy of Experience," Diogenes, LX (Winter, 1967), p. 127.
26. Ibid., p. 128.
27. Ibid.
28. A Rhetoric of Motives, pp. 10-13, 265.
29. See Permanence and Change, pp. 274-294.
30. See, for example, A Grammar of Motives, pp. 420-430. Here Burke meditates upon Socratic transcendence, especially the dialectic of the Upward Way to a vision of the One. Ibid., pp. 428-429; A Rhetoric of Motives, pp. 260-267. Transcendence comes into discussion with reference to Order, the Secret, and the Kill. Cf. Leland Griffin, "A Dramatistic Theory of the Rhetoric of Movements," in Critical Responses to Kenneth Burke, op. cit., pp. 456-478.
31. See Kenneth Burke, A Rhetoric of Religion: Studies in Logology, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), pp. 1-316, passim. Burke argues, in effect, that all religious doctrine is verbal and thus necessarily exemplifies its nature as verbalization. The dramatist-logologist charts and clarifies religious expression and, through this, helps to illuminate ways in which language affects us. The entire book is a meditation upon the religious system as a system of symbolic action, involving the Covenant, order, disorder, obedience, disobedience, guilt, victimage, purification, redemption, and so on.

Among the considerations stressed in the dramatist perspective are "the modes of symbolic purification ingrained in the nature of symbolic action, and culminating in acts of victimage." See Kenneth Burke, "Linguistic Approach to Problems of Education," Modern Philosophies and Education, Fifty-Fourth Year Book of the National Society for the Study of Education, ed. Nelson B. Henry, (Chicago: Published by the Society and distributed by the University of Chicago Press, 1955), LIV, Pt. I, p. 269.

32. Rights, as Burke puts it "are a result of man-made laws, which depend upon the resources of language for their form." Permanence and Change, p. 276. As he remarks, in a slightly different way, above man's sheer animality "there has been erected a social complexity that could not have existed without the aid of man's differentia (his capacity for symbolic action)." "Linguistic Approach to Problems of Education," op. cit., p. 263. On Burke's discussion of polar terms, see, for example, A Grammar of Motives, pp. 350-354.

33. A Grammar of Motives, pp. 59-61, 323-325. Burke notes that the "representative anecdote" is itself "so dramatic a conception that we might call it the dramatic approach to dramatism: an introduction to dramatism that is deduced from dramatism, and hence gains plausibility in proportion as dramatism itself is more fully developed." Ibid., p. 60.

34. Ibid., pp. 511-512.

35. Ibid., p. 512.

36. Attitudes toward History, pp. 308-314. Burke calls "perspective by incongruity" a "method for gauging situations by verbal 'atom cracking.'" Which means, in his view, that "a word belongs by custom to a certain category--and by rational planning you wrench it loose and metaphorically apply it to a different category." Ibid., p. 308.

37. Ibid., p. 309. Burke also sees "perspective by incongruity" as a methodology of the pun; "a pun, he observes, "links by tonal association words hitherto unlinked." And "'perspective by incongruity' carries on the same kind of enterprise in linking hitherto unlinked words by rational criteria instead of tonal criteria. It is 'impious' as regards our linguistic categories established by custom." See also, Permanence and Change, pp. 69, 84-87. There are many ways of putting things together, notes Burke, and frequently new meanings arise out of the juxtaposition of terms which seemed to be incapable of affiliation from a formally logical or rationalistic standpoint.

38. See, for example, "Four Master Tropes", A Grammar of Motives, pp. 503-517. For Burke's treatment of Brooks' "irony," see Ibid., p. 512. On Richards, see Ibid., p. 506, and The Philosophy of Literary Form, pp. 3, 6, 9. Burke examines Mann's "irony" in Counter-Statement, pp. 104-105, and in A Grammar of Motives, p. 514.

39. See Kenneth Burke, "A Dramatic View of the Origins of Language: Part Two," The Quarterly Journal of Speech, XXXVIII (December, 1952), p. 447 fn. Burke notes the dialectical phenomenon of "Aufheben"

in Hegel's philosophy. "Starting from A, we get a view of B in terms of A; next we advance to a view of B that transcends A; and then, looking back, we can view A in terms of B." Burke applies this kind of dialectic to social, political and economic conflicts by noting that divergent idioms and persuasions can be brought together under the auspices of the topic that transcends them all: the topic of persuasion itself. See "Linguistic Approach to Problems of Education," *op. cit.*, p. 299. Cf. A Rhetoric of Motives, pp. 183-189. On the concept of "Aufheben" see Kaufmann, *op. cit.*, pp. 180-187. The term has a double meaning, says Kaufmann "in that it signifies conserving, preserving, and at the same time making cease, making an end." *Ibid.*, p. 181. Bernstein, *op. cit.*, p. 18 fn, approaches "Aufheben" as meaning "to negate, affirm and transcend, or go beyond." Charles Feidelson applies this kind of dialectic to his study of the language of literature. See Symbolism and American Literature, Phoenix Books, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), pp. 63-69.

40. See, for example, Morton White, The Age of Analysis: 20th Century Philosophers, Mentor Books, (New York: The New American Library, 1955), p. 14. "Because the idea of change and development was so central to his thought," notes White, "Hegel was forced to conclude that the traditional, formal, and (as he called it in derogation) static logic of Aristotle was hopelessly inadequate, and that it had to be replaced by what he called a dialectical logic more adequate to deal with the fluid workings of the absolute."

41. Permanence and Change, pp. 84-87; A Grammar of Motives, p. xix, 503-517. Early in his critical career, Burke advanced his reservations concerning logic, noting that various peoples think in ways other than the syllogistic regularity of the schoolmen, those inheritors of the Aristotelian deductive system. Savages, as he observed, actually "behave quite logically" because they act "on the basis of causal connectives as established by tribal rationalizations." Permanence and Change, p. 85. Later on, he examined the ways in which language, through metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche and irony, creates realities other than those devised through "scientific realism," with its mathematico-quantitative ideal. "Language," says Burke, "develops by metaphysical extention" when, say, it borrows words from the corporeal and applies them by analogy to the incorporeal, influencing the former to replace the latter, or vice versa. A Grammar of Motives, p. 506. Burke thus admonishes both Aristotelianism and scientific behaviorism for neglecting the ways in which the resources of language figure into the creation of realities by setting ideas rolling in one direction or another.

As White adds, "Aristotle had said that a thing must either have an attribute or its opposite at a given time but Hegel disagreed,

usually by calling attention to intermediate or twilight zones when he said, a thing appears to possess neither." White, op. cit. And Kaufmann observes that Hegel established the point that "'the forms of thinking are first of all articulated and laid down in the language of man . . .'" Kaufmann, op. cit., p. 185. Finally, Findlay has written of Hegel that one of his main purposes was "to explore notions from a peculiar angle, to see them as embodying half-formed tendencies, sometimes conflicting, which other notions will bring out into the open, and to explore such relations among notions certainly requires a new vocabulary." Findlay, op. cit., p. 21.

With respect to these observations about Hegel, Burke's dramatistic system seems to comply with this very philosophical disposition: the emphasis upon language as forming the basis for various logical views of the world, the intricacies of the symbol system in shifting world-views, the acknowledgement of ambiguity and subtlety in the linguistic code and the twilight zones of our thinking.

42. See A Grammar of Motives, pp. 202-204, and A Rhetoric of Motives, p. 103. Burke examines Hegel's metaphysics under "Agent in General" in the Grammar and then charts its impact upon Marx in a subsequent review of Marxism.

43. As quoted in Rueckert, Kenneth Burke and the Drama of Human Relations, p. 139. In A Grammar of Motives, p. xix, Burke talks about taking "A back into the ground of its existence, the logical substance that is its causal ancestor, and on to a point where it is consubstantial with non-A; then we may return, this time emerging with non-A instead." He ends the book, p. 517, by noting that "'what goes forth as A returns as non-A.'"

44. "Linguistic Approach to Problems of Education," op. cit., p. 293.

45. See "The Destiny of Accepted Frames," Attitudes toward History, pp. 92-105.

46. See, for example, G. W. F. Hegel, Reason in History, tr. with introduction by Robert S. Hartman, (New York: The Liberal Arts Press, 1953), p. 14. Cf. Kaufmann, op. cit., p. 183, and Burke, A Grammar of Motives, pp. 281-282, and A Rhetoric of Motives, p. 190.

47. A Grammar of Motives, pp. 511-512; Permanence and Change, pp. 274-275.

48. Perhaps the most erudite critique of Burke's estimation of the "scientific attitude" is Abraham Kaplan's. See Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, V (March, 1947), pp. 233-234. Reprinted in Critical Responses to Kenneth Burke, op. cit., pp. 169-172. Cf. Kenneth Burke, "Dramatism," The International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, (New York: Macmillan and Free Press, 1968), Vol. 7, pp. 445-452.
49. Attitudes toward History, pp. 216, 242.
50. Ibid. Cf. Griffin, op. cit., p. 460.
51. Permanence and Change, pp. 278-294; A Rhetoric of Motives, pp. 260-267.
52. See Griffin, op. cit., p. 464.
53. Ibid.
54. "Rhetoric--Old and New," The Journal of General Education, V (April, 1951), p. 204; A Grammar of Motives, pp. 420-430.
55. Permanence and Change, pp. 279-280.
56. "Rhetoric--Old and New," op. cit., pp. 204-205; A Rhetoric of Motives, pp. 221-222.
57. A Rhetoric of Motives, p. 307. Cf. "Rhetoric--Old and New," op. cit., pp. 204-205.
58. "Social and Cosmic Mystery: A Passage to India," in Language as Symbolic Action, op. cit., pp. 223-239.
59. "Rhetoric--Old and New," op. cit., p. 204.
60. Ibid.
61. Permanence and Change, p. 280.
62. "Rhetoric--Old and New," op. cit.
63. Ibid.
64. See Rueckert, Kenneth Burke and the Drama of Human Relations, pp. 110-111, and "Rhetoric--Old and New," op. cit., pp. 202-204.

65. "Rhetoric--Old and New," p. 202.
66. See "Terministic Screens," in Language as Symbolic Action, op. cit., pp. 44-62.
67. "Rhetoric--Old and New," op. cit., p. 202, and "Definition of Man," in Language as Symbolic Action, op. cit., pp. 13-15.
68. "Rhetoric--Old and New," pp. 202-203. Cf. A Rhetoric of Motives, pp. 327-328.
69. "Rhetoric--Old and New," p. 204.
70. Ibid. Cf. A Rhetoric of Motives, pp. 187-189, 333. Burke notes that "the difference between a merely 'dialectical' confronting of parliamentary conflict and an 'ultimate' treatment of it would reside in this: The 'dialectical' order would leave the competing voices in a jangling relation with one another . . . but the 'ultimate' order would place these competing voices themselves in a hierarchy, or sequence, or evaluative series . . ." Ibid., p. 187. Burke ends his study by discussing the unitary principle that arises out of the diversity of voices. The process, he observes, is somewhat akin to the Aristotelian metaphysics, "whereby all classes of beings are hierarchically arranged in a chain or ladder or pyramid of mounting worth, each kind striving toward the perfection of its kind, and so towards the kind next above it, while the strivings of the entire series head in God as the beloved cynosure and sinecure, the end of all desire." Ibid., p. 333.
71. Burke's own passage from A Grammar of Motives to A Rhetoric of Motives is a movement from the realm of dialectic to hierarchy and order. Likewise, it is a movement from the purgatory of opposing ideas to the heaven of ideas hierarchically arranged, culminating in the idea of God. See Rueckert, Kenneth Burke and the Drama of Human Relations, p. 139. Burke's Grammar, observes Rueckert, "is a perpetual-motion machine, in itself dialectical as it develops and illustrates a method of dialectical analysis," but his Rhetoric "constitutes the completion of his journey and system." Ibid.
72. See "Social and Cosmic Mystery: A Passage to India," in Language as Symbolic Action, op. cit., pp. 227-228, and "Definition of Man," in Ibid., pp. 15-16.
73. "Rhetoric--Old and New," op. cit., pp. 202-204, and "Linguistic Approach to Problems of Education," op. cit., p. 263.

74. "Social and Cosmic Mystery;" op. cit., pp. 233-239.
75. Ibid., pp. 227, 231-232, 238.
76. Rueckert, Kenneth Burke and the Drama of Human Relations, p. 111.
77. A Rhetoric of Motives, p. 333.
78. See, for example, Marjorie Grene, A Portrait of Aristotle, Phoenix Book, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), pp. 241-247. "'Nous,'" as Grene remarks, "is not only the mind's link with the premises of scientific knowledge, with the being-what-it-is of each kind of thing. It is also the highest 'part' of mind itself and the only part of which Aristotle seems to believe there is an existence separate from the body." Ibid., p. 243.
79. See A Grammar of Motives, pp. 428-430; A Rhetoric of Motives, p. 230; "Linguistic Approach to Problems of Education," op. cit., pp. 300-301. In his Grammar and Rhetoric, Burke contemplates the dramatic implications of Plato's Phaedrus, Republic and Laws and focuses on the philosophical phenomenon of transcendence as the vision of the One. He extends the discussion to Aristotelian hierarchies and then concludes, in "Linguistic Approach to Problems of Education," p. 300, that the dramatist's vision is of the "theoretical study of the forms in all persuasion." This brings man closest "to a state of practical peace" and provides him with a sense of 'stasis' in a world beset by various persuasions and conflicting doctrinal idioms. Ibid. Cf. Arthur O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being: A Study of the History of an Idea, Harper Torchbook, (New York: Harper and Row, 1960), pp. 24-66.
80. A Rhetoric of Motives, p. 333.
81. See Kenneth Burke, "The Tactics of Motivation," Chimera, I (Spring, 1943), pp. 21-33; cont. II (Summer, 1943), pp. 37-53.
82. A Grammar of Motives, p. 39.
83. Ibid.
84. Ibid., pp. 413-414.
85. Ibid., p. 38.
86. Ibid.

87. "Linguistic Approach to Problems of Education, op. cit., pp. 296-301; A Rhetoric of Religion, op. cit., pp. 1-10.
88. Attitudes toward History, p. 171.
89. Ibid., pp. 173-175, and Permanence and Change, pp. 263-266.
90. Attitudes toward History, p. 166.
91. Ibid., p. 171.
92. Counter-Statement, p. 141.
93. Ibid., p. 124.
94. Kenneth Burke, "On Catharsis, or Resolution with a Postscript," Kenyon Review, XXI (Summer, 1959), p. 364.
95. Ibid.
96. Ibid.
97. Ibid.
98. See Rueckert, Kenneth Burke and the Drama of Human Relations, p. 25.
99. See "Formalist Criticism: Its Principles and Limits," in Language as Symbolic Action, op. cit., pp. 480-506. Burke admits that his project takes him "outside the realm of literary criticism proper and that at such times [he uses] literature merely as splendid illustrations of [his] theories . . ." Ibid., pp. 494-495. But he then adds that much of his "writings on literary criticism have to do with the sheer theory of criticism." Ibid., pp. 495. Cf. "The Problem of the Intrinsic," in A Grammar of Motives, pp. 465-484.
100. See Rueckert, Kenneth Burke and the Drama of Human Relations, pp. 126-127. See also, The Philosophy of Literary Form, op. cit., pp. 73-80, 94-102. Burke first advances his position that the critic must note what the poem is doing for the poet, and then he shows how, for example, Coleridge's poems have a tactical function with reference to drugs and how they reflect his psychological guilt and drive for redemption. "By charting the imagery in his poems with relation to the imagery he employs in his letters when describing his drug, we can disclose the ways in which 'The Ancient Mariner' is a ritual for the redemption of his

drug." Ibid., p. 96. Cf. "On Catharsis or Resolution, with a Post-script," op. cit., p. 366.

101. Counter-Statement, pp. 124-125, 128.

102. Ibid.

103. W. Ross Winterowd, Rhetoric: A Synthesis, (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1968), pp. 137-139.

104. Counter-Statement, p. 125.

105. See "Rhetoric--Old and New," op. cit., pp. 202-204; Counter-Statement, p. 124; Rueckert, Kenneth Burke and the Drama of Human Relations, pp. 169-170.

106. Attitudes toward History, pp. 317-319.

107. On the poem as rhetoric of rebirth see Burke's analysis of Arnold's "Sohrab and Rostum," in A Rhetoric of Motives, pp. 7-10. Cf. Rueckert, Kenneth Burke and the Drama of Human Relations, pp. 97-101. On the concept of "nisus," see R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of Nature, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1945), pp. 83-84, 124.

108. Counter-Statement, pp. 128-129.

109. The Philosophy of Literary Form, p. 76.

110. Ibid., p. 77.

111. Ibid., pp. 76-77.

112. Ibid., p. 76.

113. Ibid., p. 78.

114. Ibid.

115. Ibid., p. 77.

116. A Grammar of Motives, p. 33.

117. Ibid.

118. Ibid.

119. Ibid.
120. Ibid., p. 34; The Philosophy of Literary Form, p. 76.
121. A Grammar of Motives, pp. xv-xxiii, 33-35.
122. The Philosophy of Literary Form, p. 1.
123. Ibid.
124. Ibid.
125. Ibid.
126. Ibid., p. 107.
127. Ibid., pp. 107-108.
128. Ibid., p. 108.
129. See "Linguistic Approach to Problems of Education," op. cit., p. 285. Burke remarks that "ideal democracy does allow all voices to participate in the dialogue of the state, and such ideal democracy is the nearest possible institutional equivalent to the linguistic ideal."
130. See A Rhetoric of Motives, p. 53, and The Philosophy of Literary Form, pp. 107-108.
131. The Philosophy of Literary Form, p. 109.
132. Ibid.
133. Ibid., p. 110.
134. A Grammar of Motives, pp. 323-325.
135. A Rhetoric of Motives, p. 21.
136. Ibid., pp. 21-23; A Grammar of Motives, pp. 227-232; "Dramatism," op. cit., pp. 445-446.
137. A Rhetoric of Motives, p. 21; A Grammar of Motives, p. 33.
138. Permanence and Change, p. 163.

139. Ibid; Attitudes toward History, pp. 263-264.
140. Aristotle, Categoriae, tr. E. M. Edgehill, The Works of Aristotle, ed. W. D. Ross, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1949), 2^a 11-14.
141. Ibid., 2^a 20-25.
142. Ibid., 2^b 1-29.
143. See Burke's discussion of Aquinas and Aristotle and "Act" in A Grammar of Motives, pp. 227-229.
144. "Definition of Man," in Language as Symbolic Action, op. cit., pp. 13-15.
145. A Rhetoric of Motives, p. 21.
146. Ibid.
147. A Grammar of Motives, p. 33.
148. Ibid.
149. Ibid.
150. Ibid., p. 34.
151. Ibid.
152. Ibid., p. 33.
153. Marie Hochmuth Nichols, "Burkeian Criticism," in Essays on Rhetorical Criticism, ed. Thomas R. Nilsen, (New York: Random House, 1968), p. 81.
154. A Grammar of Motives, pp. xvi-xvii.
155. Ibid., p. xvi.
156. Ibid.
157. Ibid., pp. 45-46.

158. Permanence and Change, pp. 274-276; "Linguistic Approach to Problems of Education, op cit., pp. 262-263. Cf. "Mind, Body, and the Unconscious," in Language as Symbolic Action, op. cit., pp. 63-80.
159. A Grammar of Motives, p. 512.
160. Ibid.
161. Ibid., p. 38.
162. Ibid.
163. "Linguistic Approach to Problems of Education," op. cit., p. 285.
164. Ibid.
165. A Grammar of Motives, pp. 39-40.
166. Attitudes toward History, pp. 170-175.
167. "Linguistic Approach to Problems of Education," op. cit., p. 286. Cf. The Philosophy of Literary Form, p. 185 fn. Here, Burke acknowledges Dewey's indebtedness to Hegel, though the dramatist emphasizes Dewey's shift from Hegel's metaphysics to political liberalism and instrumentalism.
168. Kenneth D. Benne, "Toward a Grammar of Educational Motives," in Critical Responses to Kenneth Burke, op. cit., p. 205. [Reprinted from The Educational Forum, XI (1947), pp. 237-239.]
169. Daniel Fogarty, S.J., "Kenneth Burke's Theory," in Roots for a New Rhetoric, (New York: Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, Columbia University, 1959), p. 60.
170. Ibid.
171. Ibid., p. 61.
172. As quoted in Ibid.
173. Ibid., p. 63.
174. Abraham Kaplan, "Review of A Grammar of Motives," Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, V (March, 1947), p. 234.

175. Ibid.
176. Marie Hochmuth Nichols, "Burkeian Criticism," in Essays on Rhetorical Criticism, op. cit., p. 83.
177. Aristotle, Rhetorica, tr. W. Rhys Roberts, The Works of Aristotle, ed. W. D. Ross, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1946), 1354^a 1-10.
178. Richard M. Weaver, The Ethics of Rhetoric, (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1953), p. 16.
179. Ibid.
180. A Grammar of Motives, p. 127.
181. Chaim Perelman, An Historical Introduction to Philosophical Thinking, tr. Kenneth A. Brown, (New York, 1965), p. 101.
182. Maurice Natanson, "The Limits of Rhetoric," in Philosophy, Rhetoric and Argumentation, ed. Maurice Natanson and Henry W. Johnstone, Jr., (University Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1965), p. 98.
183. Weaver, op. cit., pp. 16-18. Natanson, "The Limits of Rhetoric," p. 98.
184. Natanson, "The Limits of Rhetoric," p. 98.
185. Ibid.
186. Ibid., p. 94.
187. Ibid.
188. Ibid., p. 95.
189. "Burkeian Criticism," in Essays on Rhetorical Criticism, op. cit., p. 84.
190. A Rhetoric of Motives, p. 60.
191. See Rueckert, Kenneth Burke and the Drama of Human Relations, p. 139.

192. A Grammar of Motives, pp. 33-34, 350-355; A Rhetoric of Motives, op. cit., pp. 30-32.
193. Ibid., p. XVI
194. Mortimer J. Adler, Dialectic, (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co., 1927), p. 4.
195. Ibid., p. 24.
196. Charles Feidelson, Jr., Symbolism and American Literature, Phoenix Book (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), p. 68.
197. Natanson, "The Limits of Rhetoric," op. cit., p. 99.
198. Ibid., p. 97.
199. Weaver, op. cit., p. 27.
200. The Philosophy of Literary Form, p. 8.
201. Adler, op. cit., pp. 24-25.
202. Feidelson, op. cit., p. 67.
203. Richard M. Weaver, Language is Sermonic, ed. Richard L. Johannesen, Rennard Strickland and Ralph T. Eubanks, (Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press, 1970), pp. 174-175.
204. Ibid., p. 175.
205. Ibid.
206. See Rueckert, Kenneth Burke and the Drama of Human Relations, op. cit., p. 139.
207. See A Grammar of Motives, pp. 238-241. As Burke argues, Korzybski fashioned a "linguistics" and a "semantics" based upon the scientific ideal of the correspondence of propositions to the empirical world, but he did not grasp the profound dialectical nature of language and the curative implications of "action" rather than "knowledge." Ibid., p. 240. Cf. The Philosophy of Literary Form, op. cit., pp. 138-167.
208. A Grammar of Motives, p. 90.

209. Ibid., p. 239.

210. Ibid.

211. Ibid.

212. Ibid., p. 240 fn.

213. Ibid.

214. The Ethics of Rhetoric, op. cit., p. 22.

215. Ibid.

216. Ibid.

217. See Chaim Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, Rhetorique et philosophie pour une theorie de l'argumentation en philosophie, (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1952). The English version of their work on rhetoric and philosophy is The New Rhetoric, (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1969). Cf. Chaim Perelman, "The New Rhetoric," tr. E. Griffitt-Collart, in The Prospect of Rhetoric, ed. Lloyd Bitzer and Edwin Black, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1971), pp. 115-122; "Reply to Henry W. Johnstone, Jr.," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, XVI (December, 1955), pp. 245-247. For excellent reviews of Perelman's rhetorical theory and especially its philosophical import, see Henry W. Johnstone, Jr., "A New Theory of Philosophical Argumentation," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, XV (December, 1954), pp. 244-252, and Ray Dearin, "The Philosophical Basis of Chaim Perelman's Theory of Rhetoric," The Quarterly Journal of Speech, LV (October, 1969), pp. 213-224.

Perelman, in brief, has endeavored to restore the integrity of rhetorical dialectical logic in deliberative life; for he has felt that the narrowing of the field of logic to formal reasoning "is disastrous for the methodology of the human sciences, for law and for all branches of philosophy." "Reply to Henry W. Johnstone, Jr.," op. cit., p. 245. Perelman's attack on the positivists' quest for a scientifically neutral language serving the social, political and economic disciplines has been particularly strong. See Max Loreau, "Rhetoric as the Logic of the Behavioral Sciences," tr. Lloyd Watkins and Paul Brandes, The Quarterly Journal of Speech, LI (December, 1965), pp. 455-463.

218. See, for example, Lawrence W. Rosenfield, "An Autopsy of the Rhetorical Tradition," in The Prospect of Rhetoric, op. cit., pp. 64-77. Rhetoric, as he suggests, grew out of the classical commitment to "common-

sense," which implied a trust in the senses for acquiring knowledge. It was linked to active political and social life and thus involved the unity of thought and action, of choice and oral interaction. But scientific positivism, among numerous movements, has helped to defeat this traditional orientation by denying "entirely man's 'experiential capacities'" and by limiting the picture of man "to that of an automaton consisting of a network of observable behaviors." Ibid., p. 71.

219. Language is Sermonic, op. cit., p. 179.

220. The Ethics of Rhetoric, op. cit., p. 190.

221. Language is Sermonic, p. 179.

222. The Ethics of Rhetoric, p. 190.

223. See A Grammar of Motives, pp. 408-410.

224. Ibid.: "A Dramatistic View of the Origins of Language: Part Three," The Quarterly Journal of Speech, XXXIX (February, 1953), pp. 88-90. Cf. Fogarty, "Kenneth Burke's Theory," in op. cit., pp. 67-72.

225. See, for example, "Semantic and Poetic Meaning," in The Philosophy of Literary Form, op. cit., pp. 138-167. This essay, announces Burke, is a "rhetorical defense of rhetoric" and is intended to give support, sometimes directly and sometimes indirectly, to the thesis that the ideal of a purely 'neutral' vocabulary, free of emotional weightings, attempts to make a totality out of a fragment, 'till that which suits a part infects the whole.'" Ibid., p. 138. By the writing of A Grammar of Motives, Burke has decided that "instead of considering it our task to 'dispose of' any ambiguity by merely disclosing the fact that it is an ambiguity, we rather consider it our task to study and clarify the resources of ambiguity." Ibid., p. xix.

226. "Semantic and Poetic Meaning," in op. cit., p. 138.

227. "Terministic Screens," in Language as Symbolic Action, op. cit., p. 44.

228. Ibid.

229. See Chaim Perelman, The Idea of Justice and the Problem of Argument, (New York: Humanities Press, 1963).

230. As quoted in Dearin, op. cit., p. 215.

231. Ibid. See also Perelman, "The New Rhetoric," op. cit. Perelman discusses the Aristotelian relationship of rhetoric and dialectic, as rooted in generally accepted opinions--the starting point of Topics-- and suggests, eventually, that "the commonplaces of each audience, their variation in time and space, [should] be an object of study for the sociology of knowledge." Ibid., p. 120.
232. The Ethics of Rhetoric, op. cit., pp. 23-26.
233. Ralph T. Eubanks and Virgil L. Baker, "Toward an Axiology of Rhetoric," in The Province of Rhetoric, ed. Joseph Schwartz and John Rycenga, (New York: The Ronald Press, 1965), pp. 331-332.
234. "The Limits of Rhetoric," in Philosophy, Rhetoric and Argumentation, op. cit., p. 98.
235. Ibid., p. 100.
236. The Ethics of Rhetoric, op. cit., p. 188.
237. A Grammar of Motives, pp. 350-351.
238. Ibid., p. 351.
239. "Linguistic Approach to Problems of Education," op. cit., p. 293.
240. A Rhetoric of Motives, p. 53.
241. A Grammar of Motives, p. 34; Permanence and Change, pp. 275-276; "Linguistic Approach to Problems of Education," p. 262.
242. A Rhetoric of Motives, p. 53.
243. Ibid., p. 25.
244. Ibid.
245. Ibid.
246. A Grammar of Motives, p. 34.
247. "Linguistic Approach to Problems of Education," op. cit., p. 262.

248. A Grammar of Motives, p. 358.
249. Ibid.
250. See Weaver, The Ethics of Rhetoric, op. cit., pp. 186-210.
251. A Grammar of Motives, p. 358.
252. The Ethics of Rhetoric, p. 188.
253. Ibid.
254. Ibid.
255. Ibid.
256. Burke, "A Dramatistic View of the Origins of Language: Part Two," op. cit., p. 449, and Weaver, The Ethics of Rhetoric, op. cit., p. 16. Cf. Aristotle, Rhetorica, op. cit., 1359^b1-1360^a35.
257. A Rhetoric of Motives, p. 50.
258. Ibid.
259. "Burkeian Criticism," op. cit., p. 83.
260. "Toward an Axiology of Rhetoric," op. cit., p. 331. Cf. P. Albert Duhamel, "The Function of Rhetoric as Effective Expression," Journal of the History of Ideas, X (June, 1949), p. 356.
261. A Grammar of Motives, pp. 441-442.
262. Ibid.
263. "Toward An Axiology of Rhetoric," op. cit., p. 335.
264. Rueckert, Kenneth Burke and the Drama of Human Relations, op. cit., p. 140.
265. See, for example, Chaim Perelman, The Idea of Justice and the Problem of Argument, tr. John Petrie, (New York: Humanities Press, 1963), pp. 94-117, passim. Cf. Julius Stone, Human Law and Human Justice, (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1965); Dearin, op. cit., pp. 219-222.

266. A Grammar of Motives, p. 127.
267. Ibid., p. xviii and pp. 127-320, passim.
268. As quoted in Dearin, op. cit., p. 215.
269. Ibid. See also, Chaim Perelman, "The New Rhetoric," in The Prospect of Rhetoric, op. cit., pp. 120-121. "Every philosophy," says Perelman, "presents a vision of man and of the Universe. It thereby gives preponderant value to a certain type of argument while disqualifying certain others." "By generalizing," adds Perelman, "we could thus study the various philosophical systems from the point of view of the type of arguments favored or disqualified. The appeal to reason so typical of philosophical discourse could be analyzed as an appeal to a peculiar type of audience which I have called the universal audience."
270. See A Rhetoric of Motives, pp. 105-108.
271. Ibid., p. 109.
272. Ibid.
273. Ibid., p. 106.
274. Ibid., p. 107.
275. Ibid., pp. 107-110.
276. Duncan, Communication and Social Order, op. cit., pp. 181-182.
277. A Grammar of Motives, p. 442.
278. Ibid.
279. Ibid., p. 443.
280. Ibid. Cf. "Linguistic Approach to Problems of Education," op. cit., p. 300.
281. Permanence and Change, pp. 229-230.
282. Attitudes toward History, p. 320.
283. Henry Bamford Parkes, "Kenneth Burke," in Critical Responses to Kenneth Burke, op. cit., p. 112.

284. See Gaston Fessard, S. J., "Is Marx's Thought Relevant to the Christian? A Catholic View," in Marx and the Western World, ed. Nicholas Lobkowitz, (South Bend: University of Notre Dame Press, 1967), pp. 355-357.

285. Helmut Kuhn, "Dialectic in History," Journal of the History of Ideas, X (February, 1949), pp. 17-23.

286. Attitudes toward History, p. 111.

287. Ibid.

288. Ibid.

289. Ibid., p. 122.

290. Ibid., p. 126.

291. Ibid., p. 135.

292. Ibid.

293. Ibid., pp. 135-136.

294. Ibid., p. 141.

295. Ibid., pp. 142-143.

296. Ibid., p. 154.

297. Ibid.

298. Ibid., pp. 155-156.

299. Ibid., pp. 156-158.

300. Ibid., p. 159. For a general discussion of Marx's views on utopia, see David McLellan, The Young Hegelians and Karl Marx, (London: Macmillan, 1969).

301. Attitudes toward History, p. 160.

302. Ibid., pp. 160-161.

303. Ibid., p. 161.

304. Ibid., p. 165. On "comic correctives," see pp. 166-175. For a trenchant review of Hegel's use of "lordship and bondage" in discussing "self-consciousness," see Richard Bernstein, Praxis and Action, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971), pp. 25-28. Cf. G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, tr. with introduction by J. B. Baillie, 2nd rev. ed. (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1949), pp. 228-240.
305. Attitudes toward History, pp. 162-164.
306. Ibid., pp. 166-167.
307. Ibid., p. 173. Cf. Permanence and Change, pp. 65-66.
308. Permanence and Change, pp. 162-163, 271-272.
309. Margaret Schlauck, "A Review of 'Attitudes toward History,'" in Critical Responses to Kenneth Burke, op. cit., p. 108. (Originally published in Science and Society, II, (1937-38), pp. 128-132.
310. Sidney Hook, "The Technique of Mystification," Partisan Review, IV (December, 1937), p. 62.
311. Ibid., pp. 57-62. Cf. Sidney Hook, "Kenneth Burke and Sidney Hook: An Exchange," Partisan Review, IV (January, 1938), pp. 44-47. Burke's reply to Hook's first article appears on pp. 40-44.
312. Kuhn, op. cit., pp. 15-16.
313. Ibid., p. 16.
314. Ibid.
315. See Sidney Hook, "The Dialectical Method in Hegel and Marx," in From Hegel to Marx: Studies in the Intellectual Development of Karl Marx, Ann Arbor Paperback edition, (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1962), pp. 60-76.
316. Ibid.
317. See, for example, Crane Brenton, The Shaping of Modern Thought, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1963), p. 204; Kuhn, op. cit., p. 22. Cf. Oswald Spengler, The Decline of the West, (Munich, 1920).

318. Kuhn, op. cit., p. 16.
319. Ibid.
320. Otis Lee, "Dialectic: Part II," in Existence and Inquiry: A Study of Thought in the Modern World, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949), p. 154.
321. Ibid.
322. Ibid., p. 155.
323. Kuhn, op. cit., p. 16.
324. Ibid., p. 17.
325. Ibid.
326. A Grammar of Motives, p. 419.
327. Permanence and Change, pp. 271-272.
328. Kenneth Burke and the Drama of Human Relations, op. cit., p. 35.
329. "Linguistic Approach to Problems of Education," op. cit., pp. 299-301.
330. See Kuhn, op. cit., pp. 18-22; Burke, Attitudes toward History, pp. 139-141, 153-158; Karl Marx, Capital, tr. Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling, ed. Frederick Engels, (New York: International Publishers, 1967), Vol. I, p. 81, and Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society, ed. Lloyd Easton and Kurt Guddat, (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Anchor Books, 1967), p. 281.
331. Nicholas Lobkowitz, "Marx's Attitude Toward Religion," in Marx and the Western World, op. cit., p. 334.
332. Kuhn, op. cit., pp. 20-22.
333. Attitudes toward History, pp. 166-175.
334. See A Rhetoric of Motives, pp. 103-110, 189-199; A Grammar of Motives, pp. 442-443.

335. Attitudes toward History, p. 183 fn.
336. Gerhard Niemeyer, "Marx's Impact on European Socialism," in Marx and the Western World, op. cit., p. 206.
337. Ibid.
338. Ibid., p. 207.
339. Ibid.
340. Ibid.
341. Ibid., p. 206. Cf. Karl Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach," in Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society, op. cit., pp. 400-402. As Marx puts it in the eleventh thesis, "The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways: the point is, to change it. Ibid., p. 402.
342. Niemeyer, op. cit., p. 203.
343. Kuhn, op. cit., pp. 22-23. See also Robert C. Tucker, Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961), pp. 23, 157. Marx's conception of Communism as the self-regained may be understood, as Tucker suggests, as "a metamorphosis of his theological notion of salvation of the soul." Ibid., p. 157. Marx paints a picture of the world which is significantly akin to the Bible and to Hegel. In brief, man loses the created world because of his greed. The reconstruction of his self depends upon his ability to effect an act of reappropriation which, in economic terms, means that a world-wide revolution is necessary to wrest private property from the capitalist class. Only a cooperative, Communist society can provide the grounds for man's return to his "species being." Only at this stage can he be truly social, unified with nature, his self, and fellow-men, and in complete command of his labor. Only at this stage does he renounce exploitation for cooperation.
344. Leland Griffin, "A Dramatistic Theory of the Rhetoric of Movements," in Critical Responses to Kenneth Burke, op. cit., p. 472.
345. A Grammar of Motives, p. 443, and "Linguistic Approach to Problems of Education," op. cit., pp. 299-301.
346. "Definition of Man," in Language as Symbolic Action, op. cit., pp. 18-20.

347. Albert Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus, tr. Justin O'Brien, (New York: Vintage Press, 1955). Cf. Walter Kaufmann, From Shakespeare to Existentialism, (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Anchor Books, 1960), pp. 280-282.

CHAPTER V

THE DIALECTICAL SOURCES OF DRAMATISM

Thus far, this dissertation has surveyed the dialectical tradition, reviewed Kenneth Burke's dramatistic system, including his views on man, language, human relations, methodology, rhetoric and social ideas, and then moved to a consideration of the various roles of dialectic in the structure and content of that system. The next step in the analysis concerns the philosophical influences upon Burke's dialectic. This particular chapter identifies prominent sources in the development of Burke's multifaceted dialectic and discusses the ways in which they have been used in the fashioning of the language-centered system.

The inquiry begins with Plato and considers, respectively, Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, Marx, Mead and Dewey. To be sure, Burke has drawn upon numerous intellectual giants during his critical career. But these seven seem to have made theoretical and/or methodological contributions especially amenable to the perspective of language as symbolic action.

Burke and Plato

Burke's reliance upon the Platonic tradition, first of all, is manifested in what might be called the dramatist's "both-andedness." For Burke the "both-and" temperament is demonstrated in the attitude of the philosopher of language who charts the drama of human relations. It is an attitude at once involved in and detached from the drama itself. That

is, Burke both rhetorically participates in the "wrangle of the barnyard" as persuader of the dramatistic system and methodologically meditates upon symbolic activity as a key to the understanding of the human condition. Whereas for Plato the ultimate vision is of the Good, for Burke it is of man's symbolic existence and the enduring and changing qualities it involves. And yet for both thinkers the synoptic vision acts as a "higher" dialectic reconciling the "ought" and the "is"--the lives of action and contemplation.¹

Plato's endeavored to harmonize Parmenidean "being" and Heraclitean "becoming," to grasp both the durable and variable aspects of the cosmos. "Plato himself," as Gustav Mueller has written, "is actually and personally involved in this ethical conflict between the eternal and the temporal. On the one hand he is sublimely aloof; on the other hand his books bristle with educational fights and satirical denunciations of his time. He is not only the philosopher of the Absolute, but also the Athenian patriot, the rebellious son of his declining time, the Sicilian adventurer in all-too-human experiments."²

So too with Burke, the knight-errant of dramatism, who constantly tests the mettle of his system against all contenders, although he also appears to be removed enough from the battle to comprehensively explore, indeed to meditate upon, human motives "and the forms of thought and expression built around them . . ."³ In Burke's case, the "being," or permanence, is seen as man's neuro-biology, with its language potential,

as well as the human symbolic travail, from the Fall to Grace (the rhetoric of rebirth implicit in the purgative-redemptive cycle).⁴ To gaze upon this condition, however, is also to recognize change--the endless symbolic variations or human life-stories that evolve and dissipate within the enduring fact of the drama itself. If, for Plato, the motive for striving is participation in the Absolute (though man himself is not absolute), for Burke it is the apprehension of man's symbolic condition, which entails the heroic as well as craven features of existence.⁵ As Burke suggests, dramatism leads to an attitude somewhat short of absolute piety but considerably above absolute drought. Such an approach "should help some of the rawness abate, by including a much wider range of man's symbolic prowess under the head of the fearsomely appreciated, and thereby providing less incentives to be overprompt at feeling exalted with moral indignation."⁶

The Platonic theme so conspicuous in Burke is the notion that man exists as the dialectical interplay of "this-worldly" temptations and "other-worldly" hopes. Albeit a secular, humanistic posture, Burke's indebtedness to Plato (whose Forms are eventually translated into Christian doctrine) emerges in the revival of the ancient wisdom that the life of reason must be dialectically harmonized with the life of action. The Platonic concept of "the mean", about which Mueller writes, might well be applied to Burke's sense of both the tragic and comic elements of

living--that is, an exuberant participation in the "less-than-perfect-life" coexistent with a resignation to life's limitations and exasperations:

The 'mean' in this last analysis is man as right, a living 'middle,' a mean between the longing for the ideal and the insight into the limits of possibility. between the different and clashing realizations of the ideal in experience, all of them actual and present and held together and perpetuated by the unceasing travail of this culture itself. To affirm this life of actuality is the 'third' good, an absolute tolerance which comprehends the fragmentary achievements and failures of experience.⁷

To accept the wisdom of Plato, as Burke seems to have done, is to implicitly reject theories of "becoming" espoused by Hegel and Marx, although these Nineteenth Century thinkers undeniably drew their inspiration from the Greek heritage, i. e. , the former's propensity to use the Platonic Forms as a rudiment of the concept of the Absolute Idea in tandem with the use of the Hericlitean ceaseless and universal mutibility as a source of the historical flow,⁸ and young Marx's tendency to borrow the notion of "wholeness" to ponder the consequences of alienation in the Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844.⁹ The point is, Burke's dramatism appears to depend upon the same kind of balance that Plato so eloquently advocated: an equilibrium between the ontological vision (of the Good) and the natural, moral struggle. This is not to suggest that Plato is devoid of messianism; indeed, the quest for transcendence aims at producing a divine inspiration that comes with the vision of the order of things, the universal logos. It is merely to acknowledge his practicality in dealing with the conditions of the contingent realm.¹⁰

Plato's demeanor, contrary to critics such as Karl Popper, who see in him but the seeds of totalitarianism,¹¹ may also serve as a model for those withstanding the Faustian spinoffs of "becoming" philosophy, such as the idealist metaphysics that postulates Spirit's journey toward ultimate freedom in the world and the materialist ideology that professes communism as the inevitable triumph over historical conflicts born of the profoundly inequitable system of production and distribution of goods.¹² If Burke's own messianism is steeped in Plato, it is of the kind that takes note of the "mean." Dramatism acknowledges the two tendencies: to grasp the uniting principle, on the one hand, and to engage in the inconclusive affairs of this world, on the other hand. Burke, that is, not only explains the ambivalence of the major frames of acceptance and rejection but also advises about the futility of attaining mankind's perfection in the definitive collective state (though the quest for perfection, ironically, is, in and of itself, indicative of man's "being").¹³ As Mueller contends, Plato's late dialogue, Philebos, "develops the good life as unconditional acceptance; the life of reason, the vision of truth as agreement and harmony with ourselves is good" but this life also embraces the vital pleasures, "the fugitive goods of blind and particular satisfactions."¹⁴ Burke's dramatic outlook seems, in many ways, to substantiate this temperament.

Burke's endeavor to locate the permanence beneath man's incessant striving in the contingent world--he also writes about Spinoza's

concern for man "sub specie aeternitatis," indicating that the metaphor of progress should be replaced with the metaphor of a norm¹⁵--coincides with yet another classical theme: the notion of each kind seeking its own purpose, hence perfection.¹⁶ This theme is passed from Plato to Aristotle, whose teleology sharpens the doctrine that the end of each object is to be itself.¹⁷ Burke's idea of the self in quest of its own purpose is drawn from this wellspring of ancient wisdom.¹⁸ The notion of the returning to the true self goes to the core of Plato's concept of anamnises; for the invocation to "know thyself" is hinged to the belief that the soul, which is permanent, enters the world of "becoming" and thrills to the beauty it once knew. The dialectic that transpires in the realm of flux leads, therefore, not to new knowledge but to the recollection of ideas prior to and more substantial than the fleeting facts of imminent life.¹⁹

For Burke, the theme is reworked to entail man's grasp of the irreducible core of his being--the changeless undergirding the transitory. Beyond the incredibly varied ways of dealing with the social and physical environments, there remains an essence of man. In Counter-Statement, for instance, Burke considers the psychological universals inborn in man's germ plasm, that is, the potentiality for speech, art, mythology.²⁰ This is man's "being," the biological and neurological norms inherited from nature. (Coincidentally, this also relates Burke to Kant's considerations of substance, the ways of experiencing, and the necessary forms of the mind.)

Whereas Plato's dialectic induces its participants to apprehend their purpose, to understand the perfection they strive to realize, Burke's dramatic dialectic fosters the apprehension of the meaning of man's symbolic powers and antics and sparks the insight that linguistic capability itself foments ideas of perfection which man thereupon struggles to fulfill.²¹ In any case, Burke restores the Platonic theme that the process of striving itself, the never-ending quest of man to find harmony with the sources of his "being," indicates his very identity. This is the classically-based dialectic of existence, although Burke accents the profound split between man's natural, biological functioning and his symbolic overlay in contrast to the Marxian variation of the profound split between man's natural, biological functioning and his material superstructure--the productive forces that have resulted in his estrangement from nature.²²

Associated with this quest is the possibility of transcendence, in all its mystical and religious respects. From the dialogues of Plato, Burke sifts out the conviction that the poet, among all men, is best able to grasp the forms, best able to achieve the synoptic vision uniting all the disparate and conflicting facts of the sensuous life.²³ This conviction comes, not so much from what Plato says, indeed the Platonic Socrates is often wary of the imaginative excesses of poets,²⁴ but rather from Socrates' own rhetorical flights of metaphor and myth when, for example, he leads Phaedrus to the understanding of love.²⁵ That is, the dialectic that rests strictly on logical talk, where things are divided by

classes, must eventually yield to the persuasiveness and passion of the myth of the charioteer. Myth and imagery, in turn, must yield to "nous" which is pure insight or grasp of things beyond the imperfections of words.²⁶ Thus Burke's motto, "per linguam, praeter linguam"; in and through language, beyond language, pays tribute to Plato's insight that discursiveness is not sufficient to secure the vision of the Good, although it provides the initial path to "nous."²⁷ One must speak in parables, in sensible analogues, suggests Plato; for essences (ideas) cannot be more than adumbrated in verbal definitions. In the Seventh Epistle, Plato says that words are not enough, that some things remain ineffable and perchance are "seen" only in supreme but fleeting moments when the soul leaps out of the prison of the sensuous-bound body to know the truth in its immutability and invariability.²⁸ That Burke is not a Platonist is obvious to all those familiar with his writings, and yet he is continuously writing around this theme of "nous," implying that dramatism, which can be mastered in and through words, somehow leads to a sublime moment when the nature of man's symbolic existence is "seen," in the Greek sense of "theoria," beyond the distortions and terministic screens of the linguistic code.²⁹

Finally, both Plato and Burke are committed to their respective philosophies as the highest pursuit of the human mind. For the former, philosophy and dialectic are intertwined; for Burke dramatism-logology is inherently dialectical. For Plato, the progress of the soul depends upon its increased knowledge of the Forms; for Burke the progress of the mind

seems to depend upon an increased knowledge of the ways of "homo symbolicus." Whatever the ultimate insight, however, Burke has restored the hope that man may achieve a total vision of himself and the universe and thus bring himself both to exaltation and humility.³⁰

Burke and Aristotle

Students of dramatism readily acknowledge Burke's considerable adaptation of Aristotelian principles to his own corpus,³¹ and yet the Stagirite's dialectical influences are not sufficiently drawn in the major studies on Burke.³² Aristotle's stress upon the substantiality of the act, his four causes, his teleology, his probabilistic ethics, his views on hierarchy, tragedy and catharsis, and his rhetoric, to name but a few contributions, receive ample consideration and incorporation from Burke. It is in the metaphysical temperament, however, that the importance of the Aristotelian dialectic to dramatism emerges. But a word of caution here. Burke's emphasis is upon linguistic activity and symbolization-as-such, and not, as in Aristotle's case, upon being-as-such, distinct from the study of particular kinds of being which form the subject matter of separate sciences. Nor is Burke's metaphysics a first philosophy or theology in the sense of a subject matter treating separate but unchanging being, that is, transcendent suprasensible being, the most outstanding case of which is God. Rather, Burke's metaphysics is the equivalent of Aristotle's work in its reflexiveness. For logology, as words about words and words about words about God, performs the kind of critical function

ascribed by Aristotle to his laws of thought when he thinks upon the nature of thinking. It is the classical arrival at "theoria," the contemplation of pure form which brings man to the periphery of the divine.³³

Burke's comprehension of the major differences between Platonic and Aristotelian dialectic is most astute. Unfortunately, the passages in A Grammar of Motives, where the distinctions are made, are often read for their relevance to "act" instead of to "hierarchy." Essentially, Burke notes the Aristotelian challenge to the Platonic theory of forms, the Stagirite's eventual turn away from the dramatic dialogue to a systematized philosophy accentuating syllogistic demonstration, and, most important, the Greek philosopher's attribution of dialectical structure to the universe itself.³⁴ This latter conviction culminates in a vista of a hierarchy of being, a formulation that Burke considers in its symbolic significance in A Rhetoric of Motives. "The mystery of the hierarchic is forever with us," chants the dramatist as the close of this book.³⁵ So "let us observe, all about us, forever goading us . . . the motive that attains its ultimate identification in the thought . . . of the universal order--as with the rhetorical and dialectic symmetry of the Aristotelian metaphysics, whereby all classes of beings are hierarcically arranged in a chain or ladder or pyramid of mounting worth, each kind striving towards the perfection of its kind, and so towards the kind next above it, while the strivings of the entire series head in God as the beloved cynosure and sinecure, the end of all desire."³⁶

Burke's reliance upon the Aristotelian perspective of a great chain of being translates into the dramatist's concern for linguistic terminology at the positive, dialectical and ultimate levels or orders.³⁷ (The Hegelian influence upon this construct will be examined later.) The "ultimate order" of terminology presents the guiding idea or unitary principle that legitimizes everything's place in the great schema. Rhetoric, as Burke sees it, is used to promote social cohesion and to offer a view of the perfect society. In this regard, the rhetorician might well seek assent by posing an "ultimate" order, which places competing voices, arising out of dialectical terms, in "a hierarchy, or sequence, or evaluative series, so that, in some way, we went by a fixed and reasoned progression from one of these to another, the members of the entire being arranged developmentally with relation to one another."³⁸ Thus instead of an Aristotelian grasp of the dialectical structure of the universe, there is a dramatic grasp of the fact that men may create symbolically their own hierarchies through a universe of discourse. Through symbolization, that is, men not only divide themselves but also transcend their divisions and animosities by mutually formulating a hierarchy of values conducive to merger and unity. For Burke, the great chain is not a fact outside of human linguistic activity that awaits apprehension but rather a symbolically created progression of desires and virtues culminating in "God terms." Mankind's ability to achieve levels of symbolic accommodation, argues Burke, enhances the quest for peace.³⁹

Burke recognizes not only the hierarchical idea in Aristotle's metaphysics but also the Stagirite's accomplishment as a systematizer, which Burke endeavors to attain through dramatism--"a coherent and total vision," as Rueckert puts it, which constitutes "a self-contained and internally consistent way of viewing man . . ."40

Burke is careful to distinguish Plato's dialectic as science, aimed at the discovery of truth, from Aristotle's dialectic as a kind of floating methodology which underpins the various sciences.⁴¹ Specifically, Aristotelian dialectic is neither a science, for it has no special subject matter to deduce, nor the demeanor of science, for its syllogisms are not apodeictic but interlocutory; the premises are gotten "ex concises."⁴² Rather, dialectic, in the highest Aristotelian sense, lies beyond mere mental gymnastic. It provides the path towards the apprehension of the first principles of the theoretical sciences and must be employed when demonstration is impeded, often by obstinate challengers or by the sheer conceptual sluggishness of students.⁴³ On most occasions, however, it is the esteemed but nevertheless spurious opinions of the so-called wise or the many that block the way to real knowledge. Dialectic plays its most vital, critical role in reasoning such opinions to absurdity or irrelevance and thus opening the way, once again, to the understanding of "episteme theoretika."⁴⁴

All this Burke understands.⁴⁵ Indeed Burke adapts the Aristotelian dialectic in another significant critical sense. For Aristotle, the mark of

the dialectical philosopher is that he seeks definitions and relates arguments to pairs of contraries without always having to know the essence of something. Armed with the laws of thought, the dialectician speculates about contraries and appraises the conduct of demonstrations on the basis of form or procedure. Similarly, Burke's dramatist armed with the principles of symbol-using, inquires into the linguistic significance of a philosophy or theory without resort to empirical proof of the theorist's claims. As Burke suggests, the principles of symbol-using can be known in their own right as a separate realm or dimension, and these principles are not reducible to nature in the non-verbal or extra-verbal sense. The pentad, in this light, is both dialectical substance and form, surmising a thing's identity through the interrelationships of the five terms and appraising theological, metaphysical, and juridical doctrines by charting how each world-view specifically utilizes the grammatical resources.⁴⁶ Though modernists have scoffed at Burke's "internal" critiques and chided him for evading the issue of scientific verification, they seldom if ever acknowledge the classical dialectical nature of his method of scrutiny.⁴⁷

As with Aristotle, Burke acknowledges the contingent nature of ethics, where deliberation must be dialectical because the meanings of terms in this realm depend upon their opposites.⁴⁸ Plato, of course, realized this but still approached "justice" and "virtue" in the certain world of Forms and not in the probable world where things may be for the most part true but can be otherwise.

Committed to a more nearly Aristotelian than Platonic ethics, Burke is thus able to champion rhetoric as the counterpart of dialectic; for both are rooted in opinion and probability and must inevitably deal with opposites.⁴⁹ Of equal import, however, both rhetoric and dialectic acknowledge the indeterminacy of political claims. Which is to say that rhetoric, as an offshoot of the ethical branch of politics, flourishes within the provisionality of political deliberation.⁵⁰ The mature quality of Western political speculation, as Henry Kariel has suggested, lies in the Neo-Aristotelian refutation of "legions of true believers who have heard the voice of some sacred abstraction (be it God, Nature, Reason, Race, Destiny, History, Nationality, or Science), [and] felt confident that they had truth enough to justify action, and fought to make the truth prevail."⁵¹

Burke's pragmatic approach to politics, as with Mead's and Dewey's, draws its strength from the contingent nature of Aristotle's ethics. The dramatist accepts the position that any belief or value is subject to continuous dialectical examination, criticism or revision in the ongoing dialogue of the democratic system. As with Aristotle, Burke contends that rhetoric arises when men act upon dialectically clarified beliefs about the world in which they live, especially about how they shall organize and conduct society.⁵²

In sum, the survival of Aristotle's ethical dialectic depends upon those who promote a spirit of relentless criticism of all finalities and balance private passion and procedural adherence. Burke's dramatism is

a foremost methodological proponent of these necessities; it is tentative in its social and political speculations.⁵³ What Burke does to transcend Aristotelianism, nevertheless, is to build the case that a symbolic universe of discourse, as moral action, is itself a motivational force.⁵⁴ And this ontological characterization of man as "homo symbolicus" not only rebukes the philosophical problems associated with rationalism but also ironically strengthens the value of the Stagirite's dialectic in the modern social milieu. For a symbol-oriented view of man provides perpetual dialectical inquiry into questions of prudential conduct and accepts the fact that each symbolic resolution of a problem harbors within itself the potential for new conflicts.⁵⁵ Thus it stands above ultimates. In dramatism's updating of the Aristotelian ethics, Burke also lends credence to John Dewey's dictum that "the proper study of man is the study of how he communicates."⁵⁶

Burke and Kant

Kenneth Burke's indebtedness to Immanuel Kant's dialectic should not be underestimated. In a number of significant ways, dramatism involves Kantian ideas and methodology. Drawing upon the German philosopher, Burke promotes the mind as a positive agent which selects and reconstructs experience as it arises. Second, Burke's critical faculties are sharpened by adapting the "Transcendental Dialectic" to his own system's concern with the linguistic conditions of knowing and the limits of knowing. This leads, in a third sense, to a skeptical outlook. As

with Kant, Burke is supremely dubious of the metaphysical and ideological claims that overleap experience. As a dramatist, however, Burke is uniquely concerned with the symbolic significance of such claims, and this leads to intense scrutiny of the processes of attributing motives to man. Burke's pentad, in this regard, displays the antinomic power of Kant's critiques; for the ratios engendered by the five terms reveal the fact that assertions about suprasensible entities and events, along with their antitheses, may be argued on an equally reasonable or spurious basis, despite the Neo-Aristotelian assumption of the philosophies advancing such assertions that one side of a contradictory pair must yield truth. On a fourth level of influence, Burke's organic vision is inspired by Kant's synthetic propensities though, ironically enough, the German philosopher actually perpetuated the Cartesian dualism by recognizing both the knower and the reality of the thing-in-itself, which suggests two ontological entities.

Burke's attitude about the mind as an active agent warrants not only consideration but also qualification. Which is to say that when the dramatist writes that mind has an active, choosing function, he means to acknowledge both the Kantian position on generic forms of thought and the Meadian view that the mind is formed through symbolic interaction with others, who bring socialization and acculturation to the developing person.⁵⁷ Initially, the two views seem to clash theoretically. But Burke is careful to explain that the theory of "innate forms of the mind"

can be given a naturalistic explanation.⁵⁸ The inborn sense of crescendo, contrast, comparison and balance, for instance, can be considered as a constant of humanity.⁵⁹ And yet, he argues, this does not necessarily commit him to Idealism. Taking an essentially Meadian position, Burke contends that mind, being formed by language, is fashioned by a public grammar.⁶⁰ The extension of this view, of course, is Dewey's basically anti-Kantian conviction that categories should be considered as the product of social transmission of mental habits from adults to children.⁶¹

If there is a reconciliation between the Kantian forms and, say, Mead's social behaviorism, then Burke's system will surely attempt it. The dramatist writes of the biological norms, of "potentials" inborn in man's "germ-plasm," which nature bestows upon him.⁶² And yet these "potentials" are developed and refined only when man "experiences" in relation to a social context.⁶³ As Rueckert has put it, for Burke "the interaction between agent and scene (man and environment) actualizes the potentials to produce experience . . ."⁶⁴ Man may, for example, move from loss to grief to despair to suicide, which constitutes a progression from situation to emotion to attitude to action, as a particular pattern of experience.⁶⁵ But this pattern must necessarily follow the "innate forms of the mind."⁶⁶ Since all men share them, says Burke, the forms act as conditions of appeal in the artistic encounter between artist and audience.⁶⁷

Burke distinguishes his dramatism from Kant's philosophy in the key respect of "act." Whereas idealistic terminologies begin with

considerations of perception, knowledge and learning, dramatism begins with a stress on action; it is rooted in the Aristotelian and Thomistic notions of the substantiality of the act.⁶⁸ Contrary to Kant, Burke advances not a philosophy of knowledge but rather a philosophy of, or meditation upon, linguistic activity. Kant's epistemology serves dramatism in that the inquiry into the conditions and limits of knowing applies to the fundamental (for Burke) question of the nature of man's symbolic existence.

If Burke is to utilize Kant, the dramatist must first clear away, as is the dialectical thinker's custom, the paradoxes inherent in the latter's construct. By turning the pentad upon Kant's theory of knowing, and by charting his system through the dialectical ratios of the five terms, Burke shows, for example, that the German philosopher's a priori categories actually imply determinism, not freedom and activity, which Kant championed.⁶⁹ Kant's contention that man must act "as if" (als ob) he knew there was God, freedom and immortality makes moral action dependent upon these ideas.⁷⁰ Approaching Kant from the standpoint of the dramatist grammar, Burke suggests that Kant, in fact, is not an idealist after all since he acknowledges a reality beyond the agent. That is, mind isn't the only reality; "things-in-themselves" do exist independently, but nothing can be known about them (although the noumenal realm of 'ding-an-sich' is "thinkable").⁷¹

Burke's analysis of the Kantian "weltanschauung" is beyond the scope of this section. It may justifiably be said, however, that the dramatist penetrates to the core of the Kantian problems. His analysis of the foundations of Kant's theory of knowledge not only follows the German's own process of reasoning but also charts the ambiguities implicit in the Konigsbergian's philosophy. Kant's transcendental logic, says Burke, "paradoxically enough, arrives at its stress upon agent through a question about scene ('conditions' of knowing)."72 How is this brought about? Essentially, argues Burke, Kant's philosophy "takes its beginning in a scientist problem, not the problem of action, but the problem of knowledge. The vital concern here is with 'the object', as perceived through intuition and conceived by the understanding."73 This is not, however, a question about a particular object but rather about "the object in general."74 And yet once the dramatist charts the key terms of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason he realizes that "the surprising thing about an object in general is that you can't distinguish it from no object at all."75 Indeed, the object in general is as impossible to represent as "ding-an-sich"; which by definition resides beyond the domain of sense relationships. Granted, a discussion of "the conditions of the possibility of the knowledge of nothing," as Burke puts it, tests the true mettle of a philosopher.76 As a matter of fact, offers Burke, "it takes a really profound thinker to say profound things about nothing."77 The point remains, nevertheless, that Kant is left to talk about not the object in general but the knower. As

Burke suggests, Kant is drawn from talk about the object, which would culminate only in the grossest obscurities, to talk about the nature of one's own mind; for the mind imposes upon the object the concepts that give meaning to what the senses passively receive.⁷⁸ The focus is upon the mental conditions inherent in the agent and how the understanding thinks through the data of the sensible world in terms of the mind's a priori evaluative requirements of time, space, quality, quantity, relation, etc.⁷⁹ Such mental conditions are named "Transcendental" by Kant, and their logic pertains not to the ultimate criterion of internal consistency, as with formal reasoning, but to the mind's own propensities for understanding relative to what is to be understood.⁸⁰ Which is to say that transcendental logic suggests the agent's thinking only in relation to what can be known in his scene.⁸¹

Continuing along this critical vein, Burke comes upon yet another paradox in Kantian philosophy: the fact that the categories suggest determinism instead of freedom of action. Which is to say that the agent must act in terms of the categories. Kant, as Burke argues, describes intellectual synthesis as active, but this act is far from being original and spontaneous. Simply put, the mind cannot do otherwise than see according to its inherited faculties, and is there not, from the linguistic perspective, a hint of passivity here?⁸²

In A Grammar of Motives, as well as in "A Dramatistic View of the Origins of Language," Burke summarizes Kantian philosophy with the aid

of three ratios: agent-act, scene-agent, scene-act. In "out and out Dramatistic terms," as Burke prefers to say it, Kant's position is reviewed by asking, what kind of agent must there be for an act to be possible, what kind of scene must there be for such an agent to be possible and what kind of scene must there be for an act to be possible?⁷³ This discussion, it must be remembered, aids in the paramount consideration of language adding the peculiar possibility of the negative to human affairs, especially to ethics. What with the dramatistic brand of criticism, however, Burke's conclusions about Kant do not differ significantly from other appraisals of the latter's thought. The dramatist acknowledges Kant's assault upon the barren rationalism of the age which attempted to overleap experience but wound up instead in antinomic dilemmas. Aware of the crisis of philosophy, and its historic circumstances, Kant nonetheless failed to make philosophy a science established like other sciences in universal and lasting esteem. As with Aristotle, the German thinker made a mighty contribution to the conditions of knowing, but his own critical standing sagged as epistemology withered under the metaphysical strain of "ding-an-sich." Kant pondered the immense problem of escaping from the enclosed circle of sensation and appearance into the unknowable domain of things-in-themselves and eventually backtracked to the uneasy cleavage of scientific knowledge and faith. His preoccupation with both the knower and what is to be known contains the anomaly that relegates him to a metaphysical corner in the last analysis. For the relationship

of agent to scene, of perceiver to the objects of perception, implies the existence of two ontological entities--Kant is certainly not a pure idealist, as Burke argues, since he concedes that things-in-themselves have an intrinsic nature aside from the terms in which they are seen--and the chasm between these entities merely perpetuates the Cartesian dualism that the German endeavored to bridge.⁸⁴ This is as fitting an irony as the Neo-Kantian embarrassment, dramatically speaking, that "a thing in itself is Grammatically a thing without reference to a context."⁸⁵

The dramatic consideration of the complexities of Kant's philosophy is indebted to the very dialectical methods employed by the German himself. For his part, Kant used the antinomies to exhibit the ability of human reason to maintain the equal cogency of opposite metaphysical beliefs. He showed that mutually exclusive propositions about the ultimate nature of things could be defended by reason with equally strong arguments. Kant's own formulations, as Burke critiques them, are also susceptible to the antinomic test, especially when the philosopher moves from knowledge into faith and into the postulates about moral conduct, such as those advanced in The Critique of Practical Reason.⁸⁶ Briefly, Kant is willing to concede that man cannot know things as they are in themselves. Thus man finds himself caught in an antinomy when he reaches the edge of his own knowledge. And yet Kant also asserts that man must act on the basis of the assumption that the universe is going to continue to be rational; that man has a part to play in it by being

moral; that man must make the unprovable postulates that he fashions the basis for his actions. The complications of this view, particularly the position that the moral law transcends the limits of the senses, are fully examined by Burke, with the inevitable observation that Kant himself attempts to overleap experience.⁸⁷

But the dramatist is more concerned with the grammatical scrutiny of Kant's philosophy and the subtle linguistic transformations occurring in his construct than he is with Kant's philosophy apropos the internal consistency of formal logic. Which is to say that Burke turns the transcendental logic of the pentad, as categories or necessary "forms of talk about experience," upon Kant's transcendental logic, which constitutes the "forms of experience."⁸⁸ Concentrating on the motivational strands of the Kantian ethics, Burke discovers how, for example, Kant works out a scheme "that corresponds to the step from the 'negative' attitude in the lex talionis to the 'positive' attitude in the Golden Rule."⁸⁹ Burke's critique of the symbolic structure of The Critique of Pure Reason brings to light not only the positive-negative interrelationship but also the major dialectical pairs of freedom-necessity and action-passion. Here the dramatist shows that the integrity of Kant's distinctions is mitigated by the linguistic fact that his terms actually serve as grounds for each other. The interrelationships of Kantian terms produce the kinds of turn-about that forever delight the semanticist and the dialectician. Burke is quick to expose the linguistic twist in Kant's use of "active" and "passive,"

for example. On the one hand, the act of intellectual synthesis is said to be original and spontaneous, and yet, on the other hand, the "active" is vitiated by Kant's concurrent implication that this mental operation is inevitable. It is, as Burke puts it, "compulsory, lacking the elements of freedom necessary for action."⁹⁰ That is, Kant's philosophy contends that man must observe something in terms of the categories, but this is not an act in the sense that man is fully free to choose either to observe it or not to observe it. "Conversely, though the sensibility is 'passive,'" says Burke of Kant's philosophy, "we find space and time called the 'forms' of sensibility. And in the tradition from which Western philosophy stems, 'form' is the act word par excellence. So the 'passive' begins to look as active as the avowedly active."⁹¹ The objective of this dramatic inquiry into Kant, it must be reiterated, is not so much to prove internal inconsistency by way of formal logic as it is to unravel the grammatical opportunities and embarrassments, the grammatical inconsistencies, that derive from Kant's particular linguistic maneuvers in his talk about human motives.

In charting the paradoxes inherent in Kant's philosophy, Burke is nonetheless respectful of those elements of the German's world-view adaptable to a theory of symbolic activity and aesthetics. First of all, the pentad, in the Kantian tradition, presumes to employ the five terms as "categories which human thought necessarily exemplifies," though, of course, the accent is upon "forms of talk about experience."⁹² The

import of this is the view that mind is a positive agent. As with Kant, Burke believes that action cannot be reduced to motion in questions of morality. "Now when one talks of the will," comments Burke, "one is necessarily in the field of the moral; and the field of the moral is, by definition, the field of action."⁹³ And it is none other than Kant "who expended vast ingenuity upon precisely this problem of allowing personal action (moral freedom) in a world of mechanical motion."⁹⁴

Concomitantly, the foundation of ethical conduct is choice, and Burke's dramatism accords with Kant's position that man, as a creature who chooses, must assume responsibility for his own actions. Embedded in Burke's concept of "act," as differentiated from "motion," notes Marie Hochmuth Nichols, lies the ethical concept that language is moral in its basis, and this means that the linguistic code "contains the choices, feelings, attitudes of originators."⁹⁵ The dramatist's view of choice and responsibility is not too different from Kant's notion of the will, which the German philosopher regards as the power of a rational being to produce effects in the phenomenal world. Since the will, in Kant's estimation, is a power to act in accordance with one's conception of laws, willing must be a conscious, indeed a self-conscious activity. If rational beings are considered to be endowed with a will, then they must also be considered to possess consciousness of their causality in regard to action.⁹⁶

The notions of will, choice and responsibility are also applicable to aesthetic problems, and here Burke restores the fundamental belief in

the poet's creative power which Coleridge, in particular, upheld on the basis of Kant's philosophy. According to Burke, the poet creates new visions and images of the world and gives to life the kinds of meanings and insights beyond the capacity of mere mechanical science to give.⁹⁷ From Counter-Statement to the rounding out of dramatism, Burke has been expounding upon the thesis that the poet's outlook is generally more sensitive and perceptive than other men's views; for the poet experiences more intensively than others the forms and formulae which constitute the essential materials of the artistic enterprise.⁹⁸ As William Rueckert has observed, "Burke believes that a superior knowledge of the forms and formulae implies a deeper knowledge of the self--the self and society, the self and history, and the self 'eternity'--and that because of his profound knowledge, the poet is able to mediate between the particular and the universal, the temporal and the eternal, the self and society."⁹⁹ Burke, as Rueckert continues, sees the poet as spontaneously generating images and symbols "to externalize and embody his revelation."¹⁰⁰ The difference between the poet and the dreamer, in this respect, is that the former desires to communicate his revelation to others.

In espousing the creative power of the poetic mind, Burke challenges the mechanistic view of man which would make of him a passive receptor of sensations. And in so challenging this view, the dramatist, in a way, recreates the battle fought by Coleridge, with the aid of Kantian ideas, against associationism and British empiricism at the dawn of the

Nineteenth Century. A digression into the significance of this battle should serve to eventually illuminate Burke's own somewhat Neo-Kantian poetic crusade against modern scientism. For both Coleridge and Burke, whatever their respective motivations, the idea of the mind as a positive, creative agent undergirds aesthetic theory. What gives impetus to this idea is the essential contribution of Kant, who posits rationally creative activity in the human will and also forges a theory of action in which the self, and consciousness of self, emerges; the craftsman, in acting and creating, affirms his own existence and expands his awareness. In formulating a theory of action, in which the human mind achieves its own reality and its own existence as a mind (at the same time achieving consciousness of its own reality as mind), Kant renews Aristotelian and Scholastic themes invaluable to Coleridge and especially to Burke's concept of "act."

By the end of the Eighteenth Century, Coleridge had reached a philosophical and theological watershed, desiring to justify a mode of thought both aesthetic and moral without sacrificing rationality. But what was an acceptable solution to the problems posed for moral and religious philosophy at that time? First of all, the Cartesian dualism of mind and body provided no rational basis for any integral act of knowledge; for Descartes had posed a double consciousness which divided reality and the very act of knowing.¹⁰¹ The associationists, for their part, defined man as a passive, mechanical organism incapable of innate ideas.

Hartley's science claimed that the association of ideas humanized and socialized man--a rather condescending view for the religious Coleridge.¹⁰² Likewise, Locke's solution to the problems of epistemology seemed drastic to Coleridge; for it stripped away the fundamental basis for the poet's equanimity.¹⁰³ The argument that the imagination is based upon the mere conjunction of simple ideas negated any possibility of apprehending the purposive and intelligent forces of nature, which Coleridge seemed driven to grasp. If one was to embark upon an exhaustive examination of nature's laws then one was compelled to go beyond the ominous thesis that the objects imagined are complex only on the basis of associating simple ideas which, in turn, are mere copies of impressions and sensations. The poet, operating within this philosophical construct, could never hope to get beyond the superficial dimension of life. And for Coleridge, the ultimate dimension was a kind of mystical consciousness of union with God.¹⁰⁴

Beset by the fixed categories of the mental and the physical, Coleridge searched for a means of "vaulting the chasm," so to speak. And in the philosophy of Kant, which provided a new gymnastics of the mind, he found a different race of thought and modes of reasoning which might conceivably overturn the influences of Locke and Descartes, not to mention Hume, whose theory of atomistic sensations concluded that the creative power of the mind amounts to nothing more than the faculty of transposing or compounding or augmenting or even diminishing the materials afforded man by the senses and experience.¹⁰⁵ Against this trend,

Kant proposed the principle that objects must conform to man's mode of cognition, which reversed Hume, and then the German philosopher tried to dispel the Cartesian dualism by arguing that the primary datum of knowledge is the single whole of experience. What is more, Kant seemed to give a new status to man when he claimed that man and nature are not separate.¹⁰⁶

For Coleridge, this seemed to be the philosophical tonic of the age. If man's reason was an instrument in tune with the workings of the universe, as Kant contended, and if man's morality was an instrument inborn which needed no guide save its own dignity, then the limitations of nature, as posed by Locke, Hume and others, were really not obstacles after all. Indeed, these limitations were the conditions of human freedom. Man could act and move closer to nature. The knower, especially the poet, and what he knows must be in natural accord.¹⁰⁷ The idea of "free will" that seemed so vital to Coleridge was for Kant a necessity of nature; for the conception of morality, the latter believed, necessitated "free will" as a postulate.

Kant's philosophy, later refined by Fichte and Schelling,¹⁰⁸ helped to broaden Coleridge's rationale so that he could eventually work out the distinctions between primary and secondary imagination and fancy. Coleridge's contact with this philosophical movement sparked his own dialectical endeavors. He drew from Fichte the model of the inner, conscious self in conflict with the outer, conscious self and realized its import as a human dialectic of great poetic implication.¹⁰⁹ He took from

Schelling the process of imaginatively reconciling opposite or discordant qualities.¹¹⁰ Still, the initial influence of Kant was the paramount factor in Coleridge's dialectical development. And it is precisely the dialectic of Coleridge--that the dialectical counterparts of understanding and reason are designed to relate as concentric circles greatly differing in circumference and that the principles of unity and multitude are both opposed and fused--that so aptly serves Burke's own discussion of linguistic transformations.¹¹¹

The Kantianism in Burke's battle against atomistic science and behaviorism permits significant parallels with Coleridge's war against strict associationism. To be sure, the dramatic system is characterized not by the analysis of reality but rather by the analysis of language, the end being a "consciousness of linguistic action generally."¹¹² And yet Burke's view of the creative power of the mind, albeit the Meadian concession that it is also formed by a public grammar, coincides with Coleridge's insight, drawn from Kant, that the poet creates a world, or vision of the world, whose credibility, as an organic whole, is aside from the canons of formal logic and of the empirical sciences which demand a discrete language--the demarcation of every logical concept.¹¹³ Moreover, Burke's dramatism, as a thinking upon the forms of thought manifested linguistically, pays tribute to Coleridge's fortitude in making a poem, such as "Kubla Kahn," a "highly personal, poetic analogue of Kantian transcendentalism, which sought conceptually to think about

itself until it ended in a schematization of the forms necessarily implicit in the very act of thinking."¹¹⁴ Which is to say that for both Coleridge and Burke, the poet is creator of a vision of the world totally true apropos the determinants of the particular symbolic form. In the Kantian tradition, therefore, the poet must become self-conscious of his own modes of apprehension. He must utilize reflective judgement and theoretical reason capable not only of dialectically ascertaining its own limits but also its own idea. In this way, in the Kantian sense, the human mind achieves its own reality, its own existence as a mind. Coleridge's task was to initiate reflection through poetry per se; Burke's own consciousness has been raised mainly through methodological meditation upon linguistic habits and their bases. Whereas Kant circumvented the problem of knowledge, of the unknowability of "ding-an-sich," by concentrating upon the mind that must at least "think" about it,¹¹⁵ Burke circumvents the problem of knowledge by concentrating upon the symbolic processes intrinsic to "thinking about" things; hence the shift from epistemology to symbolic action.¹¹⁶

In viewing the poem as a self-sufficient activity, Burke's speculations about the rhetoric of rebirth, the purgative-redemptive cycle, come close to Coleridge's view of poetry as a "dim analogue of Creation."¹¹⁷ Not to say that Burke himself subscribes to pure Idealism. Rather, it is to say that Burke takes the position, also espoused by the Neo-Kantian Ernst Cassirer, that poetry, as a symbolic form, is itself a

way of apprehending the world, the construction of a way of dealing systematically with one's experiences.¹¹⁸ This mode of apprehension has as much integrity as alternative symbolic versions of the world such as science, myth and history; for it has its own rationality and orderliness.

All of this comes to light in Burke's consideration of poetic meaning as opposed to semantic meaning--the latter derived from the positivistic zest for referentiality, for "a vocabulary that gives the name and address of every event in the universe."¹¹⁹ The integrity of the poet, Burke contends, rests upon the acceptance of ambiguity and of the visionary miracles wrought by the metaphor. There is no doubt in the dramatist's mind that ambiguity is crucial to the poetic frame and to the comic orientation; for it underlies metaphor and all the jolting juxtapositions of terms that provoke insight through wit, absurdity, and so on.¹²⁰ Metaphor authorizes the merging of contexts and fosters a "progressive encompassment" of meanings. Ideas thought to be antithetical or irrelevant or utterly alien to each other, in discrete form, may be brought together to provide aesthetic truth, quite apart from strict logic perhaps, but nevertheless truth.¹²¹ Indeed, the shifting of images in a poem, which permits the contemplation of a subject from the standpoint of various objects, rests oftentimes upon the dialectical mechanism of seeing one thing in terms of its opposite.¹²² Coleridge, as Burke points out, imparted the wisdom "that rivales are the opposite banks of the same stream."¹²³

Burke is not one to merely gloss over the difference between the poetic and the semantic. His discussion is bountiful and his arguments compelling. His case can only be hinted at here, but an indication of poetry's authenticity will emerge. The statement, "New York City is in Iowa," argues Burke, can be 'poetically' true.¹²⁴ For "as a metaphor it provides valid insight" and "to have ruled it out, by strict semantic authority, would have been vandalism."¹²⁵ Thus, for the validity of poetic meaning, Burke contends "that the 'test' cannot be a formal one, as with the diagrams for testing a syllogism."¹²⁶ "Poetic characterizations," he adds, "do not categorically exclude each other in the either-true-or-false sense, any more than the characterizations 'honest' or 'tall' could categorically exclude the characterizations 'learned,' 'unlearned,' or 'thin.'"¹²⁷ The test of a metaphor's validity, he goes on to say, requires a "filling-out, by concrete body, of the characterizations which one would test."¹²⁸ Which is to show, for example, that three metaphors such as "man a vegetable," "man an ant," and "man a communicant," emerge as reasonable only after the scope, range, relevancy, accuracy, and applicability of each perspective is exposed and examined with regard to the other two.¹²⁹

This excursion into the domain of poetic meaning has been undertaken to accent Burke's affinity with Coleridge in the Neo-Kantian repudiation of scientific reductionism. Kant's great contribution to philosophy, as C. E. M. Joad has written, "is . . . to stress the activity

of the experiencing subject,"¹³⁰ and surely Burke makes profound application of this philosophical perspective to the life of symbolic action, as opposed to mere motion. While Burke emphasizes the power of the agency itself, namely language, in prescribing to the world that man knows the forms and conditions under which it shall appear to him, the underlying Kantian influence is unmistakable. For Kant's contention that the mind is an active force lends credence to the poet's worth as creator of a symbolic form autonomous in the sense that it has its own distinctive mode of symbolic construction. Simply put, this form, as with art, myth, and so on, cannot be reduced to another without loss. The atomistic vocabularies of the physicalists, positivists and behaviorists, notes Burke, imply the reduction of ethical, moral and aesthetic issues to mechanistic terms.¹³¹

Although Burke may object to the position that the understanding makes nature, he nevertheless draws from the Kantian wisdom the insight that nature is understood in accordance with the forms. Along with Ernst Cassirer, Burke has built upon the Kantian base a view of man constituting the world in accordance with symbolic forms. For Burke, as for Cassirer, man is portrayed as a creature who builds up a cultural world of his own, an ideal world, over and against the purely natural stimulus-response world of animal existence.¹³² Burke's preoccupation, of course, is with the many motives deriving from man's symbolicity--the ethical realm of perfection and pride which man, inventor of the negative, linguistically contrives. "Aside from the ontological truth or falsity of the

case," he remarks, "there are sheerly technical reasons, intrinsic to the nature of language, for belief in God and the Devil."¹³³

Along with the notion of mind as a positive agent, Burke has sifted out of Kantian philosophy the methodological values of the "Transcendental Dialectic." As the dramatist announces in A Grammar of Motives, the Pentad is transcendental rather than formal and is thus Kantian to the extent that the five terms are categories which human thought necessarily reflects.¹³⁴ But equally important, the dramatistic system, as with Kant's, attunes itself to the limits of knowing by reflective thought upon the function of knowledge instead of upon its content. In this respect, both Kant and Burke utilize Aristotle's technique of dialectically rebuffing a philosophical claim on the basis of the form in which the claim is advanced. But Burke adds the critical dimension of the claim-as-symbolic-construct; he estimates the philosopher's "weltanschauung" through the dialectic of the pentad's ratios. In the exposure of each claim's partiality, that is, the stress is upon a philosophical statement or system as a symbolic function.¹³⁵

Burke's critique of the partial nature of philosophical claims is in no small way dependent upon the Kantian antinomies, since the dramatist's task is to show the failure of reason ever to reach finality or completeness in its account of motives. For "men's linguistic behavior . . . reflects real paradoxes in the nature of the world itself--antinomies that could be resolved only if men were able, not in thought, as with the program of

Hegelian idealism, but in actual concrete opinions, to create an entire universe."¹³⁶ To illustrate his point, Burke provides the "antinomies of definition," wherein he argues that each strategy of definition, be it contextual, familiar or whatever, ultimately succumbs, in its quest for the capture of man's substance, to the paradoxes and embarrassments inherent in a symbol system.¹³⁷ Man's urge, as Burke suggests in a Neo-Kantian way, may be to conquer irrationality and inexplicability, but the urge, though inevitable, conflicts with the equally inevitable ambiguities involved in the language that would supposedly provide for him the means of conquering obscurity and disorder. Burke has, in effect, provided a symbolic model or overlay for Kant's observation that man tries to explain experience by getting outside of it and yet every attempt to do that is an attempt lying within the field of experience. In Burkeian terms, man tries to explain his motives by getting around the problems of symbolism and yet every attempt to by-pass a grammar, rhetoric, or symbolic of motives lies within symbolic experience. For Kant, man cannot be both inside and outside of experience. That attempt is the basis for the antinomies of pure reason. For Burke, man cannot be both inside and outside of symbolic action in the attribution of motives. The task, as the dramatist sees it, is to regard the concepts of "action" and "motion," in the placement of statements about motives, not as a "philosopher's stone," but as a "'philosopher's stone for the synopsis of writings that have sought the philosopher's stone."¹³⁸ Which is to say that dramatism, through the

pentad, offers a synoptic way of talking about man's way of talking about things.

From this vantage-point, Kantian in orientation, Burke contemplates the irony that the anti-dialectical scientists of human behavior actually wind up employing a linguistic system which is inherently dialectical. Their terminologies of motion and conditioning, he notes, "are to be treated as dialectical enterprises designed to transcend terminologies of action and substance."¹³⁹ Every terminology, argues Burke, "is dialectical by sheer reason of the fact that it is a terminology."¹⁴⁰ But the opponents of dialectical operations do not apprehend this fact, so thorough is their aversion to any intellectual endeavor which would focus upon the paradoxes of substance. The denial of the dialectical, in sum, is akin to the denial of one's place wholly within experience. Portraits of man based upon mere motion culminate in antinomies, much as the metaphysical claims of philosophers, who tried to overleap experience, terminated in the embarrassment that the antitheses of their claims seemed equally plausible to reason. What is most conducive to observation and analysis, however, is the manner in which the claims are made. Indeed, what is eminently chartable is the attempt by a man to deal with another man's identity. "Nothing is more imperiously there for observation and study than the tactics people employ when they would injure or gratify one another--and one can readily demonstrate the role of substantiation in such tactics."¹⁴¹

Finally, Burke's temperament bespeaks a certain Kantianism in that the dramatist embraces the two strains of the skeptical and the synoptic. At times, Burke has seemed to be an "all-destroyer," as Mendelsohn said of Kant. At other times, however, he has been accused of trying to abolish knowledge to make room for faith, as Kant had tried to do. Only Burke's faith has moved from a poetic-humanistic Communism of the "thirties" to a dramatistic, methodological meditation upon the linguistic ways of humankind. As with Kant, his skepticism has been but a prelude to the fashioning of an organic vision.¹⁴² (There is much in Plato, Aristotle, Hegel and Marx that suggests the same tendency, and this implies a point of coordination as Burke shuttles back and forth among these philosophers in the development of dramatism.) For his part, Kant was completely skeptical about metaphysical knowledge, and yet he was convinced that universal and necessarily certain knowledge existed about the conditions of all possible experience.¹⁴³ Similarly, Burke, while skeptical of metaphysical and ideological claims, has seemed convinced that the pentad contains the categories which human thought necessarily exemplifies; convinced, that is, of its synoptic power. Moreover, his definition of man, as being rotten with perfection and goaded by the spirit of hierarchy, pays tribute to Kant's observation that man yearns for categorical truth even though he can never really attain it.¹⁴⁴

In Burke's view, "the principle of perfection is central to the nature of language as motive."¹⁴⁵ "The mere desire to name something

by its proper name," he adds, "or to speak a language in its distinctive ways is intrinsically 'perfectionist.'"¹⁴⁶ Notwithstanding the dramatic basis of these statements, Burke has played upon the Kantian theme, itself a variation of the Aristotelian entelechy, that man by nature aspires to indubitable truth but cannot attain it. Burke's synoptic vision, then, though centered in logology, is nonetheless a way of acknowledging the fact that the quest for certainty is universal but the consummation is beyond man's reach. The infinitely varied ways in which this quest is engendered and perpetuated through symbolic action becomes the subject of study for the dramatist-logologist. The quest is implicit in the drama of human relations. Burke's emphasis is upon terminologies which contain "various implications and there is a corresponding 'perfectionist' tendency for men to attempt carrying out those implications."¹⁴⁷

In a second sense, Burke's synoptic bent bespeaks the dialectical thinker's drive for unity, especially for the reconciliation of dualisms. Burke, to be sure, is neither an idealist nor a symbolist of the Symbolist Movement (with which he contrasts himself in The Philosophy of Literary Form).¹⁴⁸ And yet Kant's transcendental unity of apperception, which influenced the Symbolists, is a sufficient force in Burke's system. Kant's consideration of the unifying power which holds together, constructs our precepts, makes them different from bare sensations and gives unity to them finds its parallel in Burke's consideration of the unifying (and dividing) power of language which organizes our sensations and permits the

solidarity of a world fraught with divisiveness. Such is the power of linguistic transformation. Once attention is drawn away from the external correspondence of words to objects to the internal coherence of a work, poem, philosophy and so on, those awesome dualities between subject and object, knower and what is to be known, between inner experience and outer world, seem to dissipate.¹⁴⁹ The focus shifts to the reality generated by words, to the literary endeavor which brings into existence its own meaning and confronts the world in a particular fashion. Certainly Susanne Langer's "philosophy in a new key" dissolves the old dichotomies by concentrating, as did Cassirer, upon the world as known in symbolic form.¹⁵⁰ And certainly Burke's grammar of motives dispenses with the problems of dualism by appraising philosophies apropos the "purely internal relationships which the five terms [of the pentad] bear to one another . . . in actual statements about human motives."¹⁵¹

Burke and Hegel

Generally speaking, the contemporary age of analysis has fostered intellectual endeavors hardly compatible with the philosophical enterprise and outlook of G. W. F. Hegel. The current preoccupation with conceptual and linguistic clarification, with what Richard Bernstein has called "the description, analysis and understanding of our complex web of thought,"¹⁵² tends to cast Hegel's system as an incomprehensible and obscure metaphysics incorrigibly jumbled in abstractions such as "freedom," "subject," "mind," "spirit," and "reason."¹⁵³ On the one hand, Hegel has been

commended for his encompassing vision. He is "one of the few philosophers," says Walter Kaufmann, "who in several of his books offered us a vision of the world, worked out in considerable detail" and "in this respect he belongs with Plato and Aristotle, Aquinas and Spinoza, Kant and Nietzsche."¹⁵⁴ On the other hand, as Morton White has observed, philosophers from "Russell and Moore, to Wittgenstein, to logical positivists like Carnap and his followers, to some of the American realists" completely and totally reject "Hegelian doctrine and Hegelian style" and they "deny that philosophy must construct a world-view that will encompass and illuminate science, art, morals, religion and politics."¹⁵⁵ Even those admiring the scope of Hegel's philosophy and his synoptic zeal, such as Dewey and Santayana ultimately rebuke him for engaging in sophistry and myth. Moreover, the existentialist movement has found considerable dispute with Hegel. "Kierkegaard fought against the Hegelian climate of his time," remarks William Barrett.¹⁵⁶ The Dane believed that "Hegelianism threatened Christians more than does any professedly anti-Christian philosophy, because the System can only lead to confusion and misunderstanding as to what Christianity really is, and therefore to self-deception among those who continue to believe that they are Christians when in fact they are not."¹⁵⁷ As for Sartre, asserts Barrett, he "can never go the way of Hegel: he believes, in opposition to the idealist, that Evil is real and cannot be redeemed, that the negative can never be sublimated in the pure positive being of the Absolute."¹⁵⁸

These anti-Hegelian sentiments to the contrary notwithstanding, there is a marked and serious return to Hegel's philosophy as an important and imperative source of ideas crucial to modern thought and modern problems. Hegel deserves a restatement and reassessment, argues J. N. Findlay, not on account of his mere influence but "on account of the originality and permanent interest of his ideas, and on account of the extent to which these ideas have been overlaid by prejudiced misconceptions, due largely to the extreme difficulty and wanton obscurity of the language in which they were stated."¹⁵⁹ In his reinterpretation of Hegel, Walter Kaufmann states that "misconceptions about Hegel begin with his very name."¹⁶⁰ Ironically, philosophers in the tradition of Dewey and Santayana continue to pay homage to Hegel's grand, monumental approach by considering the importance of a synoptic, total view of the universe and man.¹⁶¹ "Existentialists like Heidegger, Jaspers, Marcel, and Sartre," notes Morton White, "continued to do philosophy in a sprawling and turgid manner that reminds one of Hegel even when it is directed against him."¹⁶² Hegel, in fact, provides a crucial methodological base for the very linguistic analysts who are to eventually repudiate him. For as Findlay has shown in his remarkable essay on "The Contemporary Relevance of Hegel" the German philosopher operates in a manner "extraordinarily like what is done in modern syntactics or semantics or similar formal studies" by creating the metalinguistic exercise of passing from discourse in a language to comment about that language."¹⁶³

Thus there is considerable ground for asserting the pertinence of Hegel to present philosophical questions and methods. In this regard, there is even a return to the study of Hegel's dialectic, with Herbert Marcuse, in particular, rejuvenating the relevance of Hegelian dialectic to the rise of social theory and to issues provoked by the ways of technological civilization.¹⁶⁴ And in his own unique but no less astute manner, Kenneth Burke has recalled the dynamic aspects of Hegelian dialectic to forge both the critical and substantive dimensions of dramatism. But the strains of Hegelianism in Burke's own corpus are not always obvious. For this reason, it is important to probe some of the lines of influence. First of all, Hegel's views on negative thinking provide a basis for Burke's consideration of the negative as a linguistic category.¹⁶⁵ Second, Hegel's approach to logic--his thoughts on the nature of contradiction, the relational status of paired terms, the mediatory ground that makes possible the clash of opposing forces and ideas--has been adapted by Burke to a theory of "identification" built upon the interrelatedness of merger and division. Indeed,¹⁶⁶ Hegel's provocative section on Lordship and Bondage in The Phenomenology of Spirit seems to cast an archetypal shadow over Burke's insights into the process of gaining self-consciousness about one's independence and dependence in the social world.¹⁶⁷ Third, Hegel's conceptual style of higher order comment on a thought position previously achieved, namely, "notional deepening," permeates Burke's own method of analyzing the resources of a term, and the German's

concern for the examination of the unclear corners of all living notions, namely "interstitial thinking," pervades Burke's conviction that poetic meaning contains much more than, as he says, "pragmatic, positivistic, futuristic values."¹⁶⁸ It contains ambiguity, overlap, emotional and moral weightening which helps, dialectically, to push a term or idea this way or that way in subtle and intricate fashion. Fourth, Hegel's account of the various modes of thought--that is, the "understanding," "dialectic," and "reason"--seems to have influenced Burke's use of "positive," "dialectical," and "ultimate" terms in the latter's explanation of hierarchy and what he calls "the magic and rationality of Order, and its corresponding modes of Identification."¹⁶⁹ And, finally, Hegel's self-conscious temperament, his views on man-in-society and his synoptic mission bear in no small measure upon Burke's propensity for reflexiveness, his pentadic ratios, and his desire, as Stanley Edgar Hyman once put it, "to integrate all man's knowledge into one workable critical frame."¹⁷⁰

It goes without saying that an evaluation of Hegelian influences in Burke, as with an evaluation of Marxian influences in Burke, depends upon recent reappraisals by the scholarly community. Reinterpretations have sparked, first of all, a renewed interest in what Herbert Marcuse has called "the power of negative thinking."¹⁷¹ And certainly this interest is collateral with Kenneth Burke's statement that "the essential distinction between the verbal and the non-verbal is in the fact that language adds the peculiar possibility of the Negative."¹⁷² Specifically,

Burke's theory of the negative--the negative, for him, is the very essence of language--is closely related to Hegel's contention that thinking is essentially the negation of that which is immediately before us. For Burke, the argument is that man adds verbalization to non-verbal nature, thus establishing negativity in acts, commands, etc.¹⁷³ For Hegel, negation is inextricably intertwined in the pervasive dialectic of Spirit, which seeks freedom in the world.¹⁷⁴ According to Burke, man employs language to symbolically infuse nature with negativity, giving it, consequently, the dialectical status of "yesses" and "nos" in opposition (albeit a mediatory, intermediate realm of "maybe").¹⁷⁵ According to Hegel, man confronts negativity as part of his inevitable and inexorable, though unwitting--Hegel calls it "the cunning of Reason"--role in the story of Spirit's quest for freedom, which suggests Spirit's realization of itself and manifestation of itself.¹⁷⁶

The fundamental difference between the two, however, is that Burke shifts the concern from ontological to linguistic categories. For Hegel, that is, "Reason" is the negation of the negation in that the understanding of all objects of thought and elements as aspects of a totality requires the dialectical (negative) breaking down of appearances and self-assurances, which prolong alienation.¹⁷⁷ For Burke, as William Rueckert has suggested, reason is reduced to language so that rational (and moral) life can be subjected to linguistic analysis.¹⁷⁸ This distinction can also be

grasped by way of J. N. Findlay's often heeded assessment of the unbounded disposition of the Hegelian dialectic:

It will be plain from what we have said that Hegel has no merely subjective, no merely linguistic or conceptual view of the contradictions involved in Dialectic. He does not limit contradictions to misapplied or misguided notions or principles: he goes further, and attributes them to 'the world.'¹⁷⁹

A common bond emerges, nonetheless, over a basically contra-scientific and contra-logical (Aristotelian formal logic, that is) framework devoted to the consideration and reconciliation of opposites. Burke and Hegel envision a dichotomous world, whether symbolical or ontological, which demands "overcoming," perpetual "overcoming," by a process that, "aufhebe," at once negates, affirms and transcends.¹⁸⁰

Burke's indebtedness to Hegel also emerges in the assumption that opposites have no dialectical value unless there is a common ground for the meeting of unalloyed contradictions. When Burke speaks of the coexistence of merger and division, of unity and dissociation, for example, he is but reconsidering the Hegelian dictum that the drive to overcome contradictions and irrationalities implies their permanent acceptance. Burke's notions of "identification" and "consubstantiality" are actually a spinoff of the Hegelian insight. "Here are ambiguities of substance," says Burke in A Rhetoric of Motives.¹⁸¹ "In being identified with B, A is 'substantially one' with a person other than himself. Yet at the same time he remains unique, an individual locus of motives. Thus he is both joined and separate, at once a distinct substance and consubstantial with another."¹⁸²

This particular Burkeian observation constitutes the key issue of A Rhetoric of Motives. "We emerge from the analysis with the key term, 'identification,'" he states, in the introduction to this book.¹⁸³ (Hugh Dalziel Duncan, for one, has honored Burke's insistence that this "is the crux of his whole system.")¹⁸⁴ The point to be made with respect to Hegel is that Burke's concept of "identification" derives from the "relational" emphasis of the former's dialectic. The ideas of opposition and negation, that is, suppose mutual relationship between contradictories and between positives and negatives. "Contradictions arise," notes Otis Lee, "because we attribute both opposites to the same thing--this person is both changing and permanent--changing in his actions but permanent in that he has the same personal identity--biological endowment."¹⁸⁵ As for negation, Lee writes that it "both unites and separates its terms. I unite the terms in my statement, but its form recognizes or formulates their separation."¹⁸⁶

Burke argues the Hegelian notion that pair terms have relational status since one term cannot exist without the counterpart. For Burke, antitheses arise in the linguistic code because of the very structure of the language itself.¹⁸⁷ For Hegel, antitheses arise out of the structure of the world. The Burkeian view is language-oriented, the Hegelian is existence-oriented and serves as explanation of the process of reality. Still, when Burke argues that language makes possible the attribution of opposed characteristics to the same thing, such as good and evil,

permanence and change, he is but reiterating the basically Hegelian view that opposites have a complementary nature. Were this not so, Burke could not justifiably talk of the interplay of unity and dissociation, merger and division, and so on.¹⁸⁸

Perhaps one more round of comparisons will show the Hegelian strain in Burke's attitude toward the "rational" qualities of words. Consider, first, the passage by Otis Lee and then the passages by Burke. As Lee has written:

Relations are as objective as the terms; and relatedness, the double process of relating, is an original datum. The problem of dialectic is that of permanence and change, of identity and difference. How can things become different, yet remain the same? It is the problem of process.¹⁸⁹

Lee, in describing the Hegelian basis of dialectic, provides the kind of rationale found in the following Burkeian argument at the conclusion of "A Dramatistic View of the Origins of Language, Part Two:"

Let us sum up by saying that, however 'positive' a style, or moral injunction, may contrive to be in its wording, behind it always lurks the Basic Negative, the Great, Tragic, Freud-like Lex Talionis, itself a universal principle of justice, and one without which the art of an Aeschylus would be meaningless.¹⁹⁰

As Burke has also commented:

We need not decide whether, in such paired opposites, the positive or the negative member of the pair is to be considered as essentially prior. We can settle for the indubitable fact that all moral terms are of this polar sort. And we can settle merely for the fact that such positives and negatives imply each other. However, in a hit-and-run sort of way, before hurrying on, I might avow that I personally would treat the negative as in principle prior, for this reason: (1) Yes and no

imply each other; (2) in their role as opposites, they limit each other; (3) but limitation itself is the 'negation of part of a divisible quantum.' (I am quoting from the article on Fichte in the Encyclopaedia Britannica, eleventh edition.)¹⁹¹

Notwithstanding Burke's personal preference for the priority of the "no", the idea of opposites implying each other is requisite to the type of dialectic that developed in Nineteenth Century German philosophy, through Hegel, Fichte, Schelling, although Plato made such an observation in his dialogues more than two thousand years before these distinguished thinkers were born.¹⁹²

Additionally, Burke's concept of identification, with its admonitions to grasp the twists of personal identity, bears no small relationship to Hegel's dialectic of self-certainty, wherein the roles of master and slave are interdependent, hence, paradoxically, at times, reversed. In charting the slave's acquisition of self-consciousness, Hegel notes that it occurs at the moment of supreme oppression. The slave realizes that he has a mind of his own when the tyranny against him is most intense. This is the moment, says Hegel, when he begins to understand his capability for a kind of stoical freedom, a consciousness of the pain of the world. This type of consciousness is like "pure thought," though Hegel warns that man cannot escape the bleak conditions of his existence merely by denying its reality. The master, conversely, realizes at the moment of supreme power that his supremacy over the slave is actually quite tenuous, since he has enslaved himself by becoming dependent upon the existence of the

slave. "The slave is the essential reality of the master," as Richard Bernstein has written of the Hegelian dialectical paradox, for "he is the essential condition by which the master can be what he is."¹⁹³ The slave and the master, then, usually apprehend the nature of their relationship at the zenith of degradation or power. For both, identity has been formed through the relationship to the other, though the toiler now begins to grasp his capacity for toiling independently, and the lord begins to envision his utter nothingness without the servant's work to uphold the former's status.¹⁹⁴

This is surely one of the most suggestive dialectical paradoxes offered by the Hegelian philosophy, and it has provided the foundation for Burke's ponderings on identification. Consider the following twist. "If the shepherd is guarding the sheep," says Burke, "so that they may be raised for market, though his role (considered in itself, as guardian of the sheep) concerns only their good, he is implicitly identified with their slaughter."¹⁹⁵ And in his explanation of identification in A Rhetoric of Motives, Burke argues:

When two men collaborate in an enterprise to which they contribute different kinds of services and from which they derive different amounts and kinds of profit, who is to say, once and for all, just where 'cooperation' ends and one partner's 'exploitation' of the other begins?¹⁹⁶

This observation, to be sure, is made within the context of some Aristotelian implications of rhetoric. Still, the reflection that rhetoric grows out of situations where there are grounds for both conflict and

cooperation--"opponents can join battle only through a mediatory ground that makes communication possible, thus providing the first condition necessary for their interchange of blows."--is as Hegelian as it is Aristotelian.¹⁹⁷

Indeed, Hegelianism pervades Burke's musings on "perspectives by incongruity" more so than Aristotelianism, and Burke makes this abundantly clear in Permanence and Change. Discussing, "orientation," "new orientation" and "state of transition" in the introduction to Part Two, Burke likens the intermediate stage, which involves a "shattering or fragmentation," to "a process in the Hegelian dialectic [which] has been called a 'logonomical purgatory.'"¹⁹⁸ The book itself, as a matter of fact, seems to be the dramatist's analogue of an Hegelian triad--a process dedicated to "thought's perpetual transcendence;"¹⁹⁹ it is a process involving "higher-order comment" on a thought position previously achieved.²⁰⁰ For Hegel, dialectic produces "moments" out of conflicts which, all at once, negate, affirm and transcend the previous struggles. These "moments" go beyond, so to speak, the original conflicts. For Burke, the process of going beyond is fulfilled in the strategy of the work. Part One deals with "reading of the signs." Part Two pertains to the "intermediate stage" between old and new. And Part Three "concerns the 'solution,' insofar as a new fixed way of reading the sign is deemed necessary."²⁰¹

Burke's affiliation with Hegelian dialectic implies that, in addition to a facility for triadic reasoning, he has borrowed two basic

characteristics which, as Findlay has noted, Hegel "actually evinced in his philosophical practice."²⁰² These are, respectively, the propensity for "notional deepening" and "interstitial thinking."²⁰³ The former is a method and a disposition often associated with semantics and linguistic analysis.²⁰⁴ In Hegelian fashion, Burke first stands as a given level of thought, accepts its assumptions, then goes to the limits in its terms, then stands outside of it. "In dialectic," says Findlay, "one sees what can be said about a certain thought-position that one cannot actually say in it."²⁰⁵ A deepening process occurs analytically because the dialectic is attuned to the mode of conceptualizing, to the conceptual approach, rather than to the "truth" of what is being said. The following passage by Findlay can be applied to dramatism as easily as it has been applied to syntactics and semantics:

What Hegel does is in fact extraordinarily like what is done in modern syntactics or semantics or similar formal studies, when we pass from discourse in a language to discourse about that language, when we make a language an object language for a meta-language. It includes of course the further willingness to make what is brought out in this manner itself part of a widened object-language, but this is likewise something regularly done in many metalinguistic exercises.²⁰⁶

The latter, "interstitial thinking," is a companion practice since it concerns "the unclear corners of all living notions."²⁰⁷ Hegel's dialectic concentrates on "the interstices between clear-cut notions, fixed axioms and rigorous deductive chains, the interstices where we are as yet unclear as to what our notions cover and what they do not. . ."²⁰⁸

In this respect, Burke's unswerving belief that symbolic analysis is inexhaustible, that one must probe a literary or rhetorical piece from a multitude of perspectives or angles, is a tribute to the Hegelian insight that, as Findlay has put it, it is natural for ideas to "move or develop in certain ways as soon as they are subjected to unwanted pressures."²⁰⁹ This often involves the basic ideas that people hold about time, being, matter, etc. Burke, in the Hegelian sense, has frequently suggested that such ideas can be upset by sly pushes from esoteric examples. "The language of common sense," he remarks, "is full of abstractions, analogies, and double or triple names for the same thing."²¹⁰ "For once you take words as mere symbolizations, rather than as being the accurate and total names for specific, unchangeable realities, you have lost the criteria of judgement which will tell you that it is 'wrong,' say, to describe a bullfight as a love encounter between the male toreador and the female bull, with the audience perhaps as peeping Toms."²¹¹ In sum, Burke's Hegelian demeanor is a forthright challenge to the scientific, logical atomism of the Russellians and to the positivism of the Vienna Circle which sought to conquer ambiguities through operational definitions (empirical verifications) and strict "logical" usages.²¹² As with Hegel, Burke rebukes the formal logician's definiteness of assertion for a self-subversive system that provokes reversals of perspective, that also finds, in the manner of Hegelian dialectic, "absoluteness, finality and infinity precisely in what at first promised never to be so."²¹³

By attending to the Hegelian practice of "deepening" notions and by concentrating on the thought in the "interstices" between well-defined concepts, Burke has come upon yet another similarity in the distinctions of terms. Whereas Hegel distinguishes between the "Understanding," "Dialectic," and "Reason" as characteristic moments in philosophical thinking, Burke distinguishes between "positive," "dialectical," and "ultimate" terms as characteristic moments in the symbolic drama. "These are orders or levels of persuasiveness in the linguistic terminology, suggests Burke). A brief comparison of the two systems helps to reveal the influence of Hegel on Burke.

For Hegel, as well as for Burke, the "moments" seem to progress from partial definiteness, through opposition and contradiction, to reconciliation and order. For both, again, the movement is from discord and divisiveness to peace and harmony. As will soon be evident, Burke's concept of hierarchy attains significance in the context of this progression.

Hegel advances the important distinctions in the following fashion. The thought of the "Understanding" is noted by great fixity and definiteness of notions. It stresses distinctions--the independence of one notion or principle from another. Everything, in this realm of thought, is kept neat and orderly. Attention, therefore, is to individual aspects of a matter. The "Understanding" must serve as the foundation of the sciences and even of practical life. Moreover, it is the initial phase of philosophy.²¹⁴

Dialectic's role is to take the elements that the "Understanding" has separated and guide such elements into merger (so that they pass over into each other). In his Lesser Logic, Hegel calls "Dialectic" the "self-supersession of the finite determinations of the Understanding."²¹⁵ Which is to say that "Dialectic" challenges the hard and fast, partial abstractions rendered by the "Understanding" because the first moment produces one-sided statements that demand to be complemented or opposed by other such abstractions. Standing alone, the supposedly definite statements of the "Understanding" will inevitably grind down into senselessness. Realizing that contradiction is the motive force of the world, "Dialectic" becomes a kind of shuttle between individually one-sided notions. It knows, that is, that the elements isolated by the "Understanding" must be shown to be interdependent and correlative at a higher level, else our view of the world remains scattered and fragmentary.²¹⁶

If "Dialectic" overcomes the hard and fast notions and fixed presuppositions of the "Understanding," it is itself overcome by a higher level of thought, called "Reason." "Reason" accepts the ubiquitousness of contradictions--Hegel notes that everything in the world involves antithetical aspects--but it also attempts to form opposed concepts into new unities. It is "Reason," not "Dialectic," that provides knowledge of how the concepts actually require each other and why they are necessary conditions of each other.²¹⁷ For Hegel contends, as Findlay has written, that

. . .if Dialectic has shown that concepts so opposed either break down into senselessness or simply pass over into one another--then the function of Reason is to integrate such notions into new unities, where they will be shown to require each other and to be necessary conditions of each other. Thus Reason would lead one, e.g., to form the notion of an underlying reality which reveals itself more and more fully the more we probe it with our senses, or of an intrinsic nature shown up in the interactions of things with other things, or of a freedom which entails necessity, etc., etc.²¹⁸

Of cardinal importance is the fact that Hegel accepts the permanence of contradictions, although, for him, "Reason" endeavors to develop a harmonious order. "Reason," that is, both overcomes contradictions and accepts their existence. In Hegel's view, as Findlay has so astutely observed, contradictions are overcome "only in the sense that they are seen to be necessary conditions of a reasonable result, and so, in a sense, not overcome at all."²¹⁹ Findlay finds it altogether permissible to declare, "with some exaggeration," that "for Hegel the overcoming of contradictions and irrationality consists really in their permanent acceptance, since they are seen to be essential to, and therefore part of, the final rational outcome."²²⁰

Hegel's critical moments and his views on contradiction have no doubt outraged, at the very least perplexed, the empirically-minded scientists and formally-minded logicians of the modern era. Framed in the linguistic context, however, the Hegelian terms warrant serious consideration. Burke's translation amounts to this: positive, dialectical and ultimate levels or orders. Positive terms, for Burke, are most

unambiguously themselves when they name a tangible, visible thing, a thing which can be located in time and space.²²¹ Dialectical terms, conversely, have no strict location. They have no positive referents. Rather, they are polar terms, requiring opposites to define them. Such terms occur on the level of action, of principles and ideas.²²² Ultimate terms, finally, strive for order, for a guiding idea or unitary principle under which all the seemingly disparate and warring ideas can be "overcome" for the purpose of peace and harmony. This is the equivalent of the "great chain of being," the hierarchical perspective of Aristotelianism, which motivated scholastic and medieval life, and now finds an analogue in the Burkeian dramatic construct.²²³ Whereas, for Burke, the dialectical level keeps the "competing voices in a jangling relation with one another. . .the ultimate order places these competing voices themselves in a hierarchy, or sequence, or evaluational series. . ." ²²⁴ Burke suggests, then, that it is possible to symbolically contrive a "fixed and reasoned progression of ideas," to transcend the competition of voices, by rearranging them or developing them anew from some ultimate standard or "God term."²²⁵ The Marxist dialectic, as he observes, is ultimate in its order because a spokesman for the proletariat supposedly represents the "grand design of the entire historical sequence. . ." ²²⁶

That Burke is a paradigmatic thinker is surely suggested in the above-mentioned levels or orders. Burke, as William Rueckert so aptly observed, is a great lover "of 'pure' or 'ideal' forms arrived at through

dialectical ascent to even higher levels of abstraction. . ."²²⁷ That Burke's paradigm harks back, as he himself says, to Plato's four types of imperfect government, which are arranged in ascending order and can be judged from an ultimate standard, is undeniable.²²⁸ And yet the similarity to the Hegelian "moments" in philosophical thinking is equally significant, given the assumptions about contradiction undergirding the dialectics of dramatism. Honoring Hegel, though nevertheless departing from him in a profound respect, Burke accepts the permanence of contradictions in language, even as he offers the possibilities for linguistic transcendence and ruminates about symbolic hierarchies. In a passage which blends the insights of dramatism with the anti-logical formalism of Hegel, Burke advances this view of the machinations of language:

Distinctions arise out of a great central moltenness, where all is merged. They have been thrown from a liquid center to the surface, where they have congealed. Let one of these crusted distinctions return to its source, and in this alchemic center it made be remade, again becoming molten liquid, and may enter into new combinations, whereat it may be again thrown forth as a new crust, a different distinction. So that A may become NON-A. But not merely by a leap from one state to the other. Rather, we must take A back into the ground of its existence, the logical substance that is its causal ancestor, and on to a point where it is consubstantial with NON-A; then we may return, this time emerging with NON-A instead.²²⁹

Along with the dialectical disposition, Burke shares with Hegel the temperament of a self-conscious intellectual--a demeanor unafraid of broad conjecture. Indeed, Hegel's aphorism that "what is most harmful is trying to preserve oneself from errors"²³⁰ might well be applied to

Burke's grand manner, to the uninhibited quality of his speculations. Disciples of both men, after all, tend to "discount" the speculative excesses of the master while at the same time relishing the vast reservoir of ideas readily available for the watering of their own thoughts. It may be no mere coincidence that Burke's "multiple side excursions,"²³¹ especially apparent in his early works, bear a striking similarity in intellectual boldness and facility to the rambling digressions in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit.

Lastly, Burke's neo-stoic resignation to the drama of human relations, his sense of both the comic and the tragic in human affairs, accords with Hegel's desire to edify the human condition. Granted, Burke's devotion to the processes of liberal democracy and his unswerving desire to purify war are commitments which do not seem to coincide with Hegel's outlook, as it is generally interpreted. The dramatist appears, nevertheless, to have been influenced by Hegel's insights into man's social identity and by the residual effects of Hegel's attack upon the myths of the Enlightenment, myths which even today provide the basis for the American belief in ever-increasing progress and happiness.²³²

But to merely assert Burke's kinship to Hegel is not sufficient to drive home the point. For there remain some outstanding misconceptions about what Hegel himself actually believed. The Hegelian influence in Burke's social thought is unfortunately blurred by the characterization of the German philosopher as an unmitigated reactionary and a purveyor of

notions which eventually serviced the warped rationales of Hitler, Stalin, and other such despots.²³³ And yet Hegel contributed to a view of man-in-society which undergirds not only the pragmatic, democratic liberalism of Mead and Dewey but also Burke's own pentadic admission that the agent's identity is bound up with the determinants of the scene. Hegel argues, in short, that man is not "self-contained," that he is free only when he is truly a man and an integral part of the community/society. From this, Mead formulated the theory of the dialectic of self and society, where individual identity depends upon the internalization of roles played by others in the social milieu, where mind is formed through the interplay of self and society by means of the significant symbol.²³⁴ For his part, Dewey took from Hegel the notion that the concept of the environment is necessary to the concept of the organism. Simply, once the environment is acknowledged as a contributing factor, it is impossible to consider psychic life as an individual, isolated thing developing in a vacuum.²³⁵ (Burke himself notes that Dewey stresses the overlap of act and scene, "rather than the respects in which they are distinct. . .")²³⁶

Within the contours of this tradition, Burke has concerned himself, dramatically of course, with the variety of ways in which the scenic condition pertains to agents and their acts. "In any given historical situation," he remarks, "there are persons of many sorts, with a corresponding variety in the kinds of acts that would be most representative of them."²³⁷ And it must also be qualified that "one set of scenic conditions

will 'implement' and 'amplify' given ways and temperaments which, in other situations would remain mere potentialities, unplanted seeds, 'mute inglorious Miltons.'"²³⁸

What clouds this line of influence is Hegel's supposedly ultra-conservative temperament, repudiated by a stream of critics from Rudolf Haym to Karl Popper.²³⁹ Hegel's critics have generally accosted his philosophy as engendering the handiest arguments for elitist tyranny and state totalitarianism. After all, it has been pointed out, Hegel supported hereditary monarchy, glorified the state as "the self conscious ethical substance, the union of the principles of the family and of civil society" and called it the supreme and most effective embodiment of reason in the social sphere.²⁴⁰ Moreover, while acknowledging the fact that wars bring suffering and evil, he rationalized that they serve the important purpose of moving history along by breaking doctrinal deadlocks. For this prevents the torpid acceptance of the "status quo." That is, Spirit realizes itself in man's history, which involves the carnage and slaughter he engenders.²⁴¹

On the other hand, Hegel's philosophy has provided the groundwork for social activism, humanism and existentialism, and these forces have carried from the mid-stages of the previous century to the present period. Hegel's impact upon contemporary thought is a subject that attracts considerable scholarship. And for good reason. For he attempted to resolve the problem of the relation between theory and practice--a

problem, as Nicholas Lobkowitz notes, that "is one of the cardinal points on which Hegel's whole philosophy turns."²⁴² Marx, along with Moses Hess and August von Cieszkowski, realized the radical implications of Hegel's thought, and they came to believe that man's awareness of his place in history would expand his freedom, that conscious activity and the control of social circumstances by conscious action ("praxis") would pave the way to a divine world. This active approach developed despite Hegel's contention, often viewed as the core of his system, that the business of philosophy is to reconcile thought with reality, not to tell the world how it ought to be, not to reform it or revolutionize it. But Hegel's supposed resignation to the prevailing order belies the fact that he accounts for man's development by his transformation of the natural world through labor, and this, of course, is a theme essential to Marx.²⁴³

A theme essential to the pragmatism of Dewey is man-in-community. Dewey's explication and application of the concept of the interacting organism is in no small measure dependent upon Hegelian insights, as Richard Bernstein has observed.²⁴⁴ And surely Hegel's account of man as maker of himself, as well as his references to death and fear, have fascinated the long line of existentialists from Kierkegaard to Sartre.²⁴⁵

That so many conceptual tributaries could have flowed from the Hegelian sea, notwithstanding the diverse and often contradictory courses of Marxism, pragmatism, existentialism and so on, bespeaks the gargantuan enterprise of the German's philosophy. Which is to say that Hegel

endeavored to absorb all truth into his system, such was the astonishing scope of his mind. And even those contesting his system tended to write in Hegel's terms; for his was the dominant construct of the age--the one promising to transcend and yet incorporate all other modes of thought, including art and religion. Ironically, most attempts to adapt and/or renounce Hegel culminated in a vision of the world Hegelian in scope.²⁴⁶

No doubt Burke's encounter with Hegel has contributed to the expansiveness of dramatism, to its synoptic stature and to its meaning as a total way of life. This is not to argue that Burke's language-centered project parallels the metaphysical grandiosity of Hegelian philosophy, which presumes to chart the true life of the Idea, beginning in history and culminating in freedom for the world. Rather, it is to say that the Burkeian study of the ways of "homo symbolicus" and the drama of human relations pays homage in the nobility of its effort to Hegel's way of doing philosophy: the continuous integration of diverse and disparate disciplines and conceptual orientations into a coherent and complete vision of man and his world.

Burke and Marx

Kenneth Burke's flirtation with Communism and his indebtedness to Karl Marx provide perhaps the most intriguing aspect of his critical career. The introduction to this study acknowledged some Marxian themes utilized by Burke, and the segment on social ideas in the previous chapter explored the ways in which these themes have been incorporated

into dramatism. The final chapter will cover Burke's indebtedness to Marx with respect to the dialectical tradition per se. The immediate task of this section is to probe the relationship of Marx's dialectical attitude and criticism to Burke's own intellectual development.

Two lines of influence are worthy of consideration: (1) self-consciousness; (2) relentless critique. Throughout Burke's corpus there seems to be a driving desire to make man conscious of his own linguistic acts. There also seems to be an incessant critical power that systematically peels off symbolic layer upon layer of a philosophical or ideological rationale. Inevitably, a world-view or reasoned construct is exposed by Burke as basically an argumentative and rhetorical enterprise exhorting the world to accept its tenuous premises. In its inimitable, pentadic manner, A Grammar of Motives does to idealism, materialism, rationalism, mysticism, etc., what Marx did to philosophy in The German Ideology: namely, it strips away the pretentious rhetorical clothing of a system until the bare essentials are exposed for withering criticism.²⁴⁷

Burke's commitment to consciousness is apparent at the very beginning of the Grammar; for he initiates the work by asking: "What is involved, when we say what people are doing and why they are doing it?"²⁴⁸ This question, as it turns out, is but a variation of Marx's vow to Arnold Ruge to "make the world aware of its consciousness," to awaken "the world out of its own dream" and explain "to the world its own acts. . ."²⁴⁹ For his part, Burke concentrates on "consciousness of

linguistic action generally" as the tonic that tempers man's "absurd ambitions that have their source in faulty terminologies."²⁵⁰ But this shift to linguistic analysis does not diminish the fact that he has merely reoriented Marx's pronouncement in the preface to The German Ideology, which states that "hitherto men have constantly made up for themselves false conceptions about themselves, about what they are and what they ought to be."²⁵¹ If, as William Rueckert contends, the influence of Marx or perhaps theoretical communism on Burke has been profound, then surely it is reflected in the Burkean demeanor of dialectical reflexiveness and analysis.²⁵²

The implications of these lines of influence will receive examination shortly. But the implications have little meaning if Marx himself continues to be so flagrantly misinterpreted. It is therefore important to reiterate the fact that recent scholarship on Marx has produced a portrait of him fundamentally at odds with the stilted image designed through "cold war" propaganda. And this implicates, among many sources, the official propaganda of the United States, The Soviet Union and China. "The material in Marx's early writings," as Louis Dupre has shown, "has revolutionized the interpretation of Marx's entire thought. It is becoming evident that Marx's own weltanschauung differs considerably from what 'dialectical materialists,' particularly in Communist countries, have traditionally presented as Marxist doctrine."²⁵³ Robert Tucker's study of philosophy and myth in Marx lends authority to Dupre's observation.

For Tucker contends that "the discovery of Marx's first system has reinforced a trend of thought about Marxism that has been growing independently for a long while, especially in the West. It seems fair to say that a change in the generally accepted view of Marx has been taking place in the Twentieth Century. -254

An outgrowth of this change has been the rectification of serious misnomers, such as "dialectical materialism" and "historical materialism." "Though Marx's weltanschauung is widely called materialistic, Marx himself," as Shlomo Avineri has noted, "never dealt with materialism systematically. . . -255 Avineri goes on to prove that Engels, not Marx, was responsible for what has come to be known as Marx's materialism. "Students sometimes forget," asserts Avineri, "that Marx himself never used the terms 'historical materialism' or 'dialectical materialism' for his systematic approach. -256 And Erich Fromm puts it as strongly as does Avineri. "Marx never used the terms 'historical materialism' or 'dialectical materialism,'" says Fromm, but "he did speak of his own 'dialectical method' in contrast with that of Hegel and of its 'materialistic basis, by which he simply referred to the fundamental condition of human existence. -257

This reappraisal is crucial to the dissertation because, for one thing, it substantiates Burke's early insight into the poetic and humanistic nature of Marx--an insight which once outraged orthodox Marxists and anti-Marxists alike. During the "thirties," for example, Charles

Glicksberg grasped the significance of Burke's attempt to argue that the fundamental criteria of communism have a "highly humanistic or poetic nature."²⁵⁸ But Walter Sutton seemed perplexed by Burke's "distinctly un-Marxian" Communism,²⁵⁹ and H. B. Parkes wondered how Burke could justifiably call himself a Marxist after rejecting "the two most significant features of the Marxist cosmology which give it an appearance of optimism and rationality--benificence of history or the economic interpretation of history."²⁶⁰ Second, this reappraisal is crucial because the values of Marx's critical method should survive the frail speculations about the dialectics of nature and history, for which Engels, Plekhanov, Lenin and others are chiefly responsible. Marxism, as Burke so convincingly writes, is itself a terminology that induces action, though its adherents proclaim it to be a science. It is "unsleepingly rhetorical."²⁶¹ But this fact, plus the outcome of various Communist movements in history, should not detract from the analytical values of Marx's critique of mystification. "We consider it a sign of flimsy thinking, indeed," says Burke, "to let anti-Communist hysteria bulldoze one into neglect of Marx."²⁶² For "we do not have to believe the Marxist promises to apply the Marxist diagnosis for rhetorical purposes."²⁶³ What makes such distinctions commendable is the context in which they were offered: for A Rhetoric of Motives was conceived and then published during the height of American-Russian animosity.

In addition to the necessity for reviewing the results of the re-appraisal, it is important to thereupon record, in a paragraph or two, Burke's major agreements and disagreements with Marx. Both the reappraisal and the notation of agreements and disagreements should sharpen the implications of self-consciousness and radical critique in Burke's own system.

That there has been a serious reappraisal of Marx in the West during the past two decades is undeniable. Scholars have tended of late to detach Marx from his orthodox disciples, such as Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin, Mao Tse Tung and Brezhnev. These scholars have helped to cast aside the hysteria towards Marxism that was rampant during the most intense moments of the so-called "cold war." They have returned Marx to the Western tradition, where, whether in sympathy with his ideas or not, it must be admitted he belongs. For "Marx and Marxism," as Nicholas Lobkowitz has written, "are among the many possible outcomes of centuries of Western thinking and culture."-264

Most significantly, scholars such as George Lichtheim,²⁶⁵ Shlomo Avineri,²⁶⁶ David McLellan,²⁶⁷ Louis Dupre,²⁶⁸ Henri Lefebvre,²⁶⁹ Nathan Rotenstreich,²⁷⁰ Robert Tucker,²⁷¹ and Erich Fromm,²⁷² just to name a few out of a growing number of reinterpreters, have been drawn to the philosophical foundations of Marx's thought. Within the Communist world, Karl Korsh,²⁷³ Georg Lukacs,²⁷⁴ Leszek Kolakowski²⁷⁵ and Adam Schaff²⁷⁶ have attempted to humanize Marx, shifting the emphasis of

Marxist studies from cosmocentrism to anthropocentrism, from questions about social determinism to questions about individual responsibility and "praxis." From such reappraisals has come much discussion of the poetic and humanistic basis of theoretical Marxism. But this side of Marx is even today generally eclipsed by the massive influence of his work on capital and political economy.

The understanding of Marx has been a difficult task. In the "twenties," for example, Karl Korsch, Georg Lukacs, and perhaps a few others, independently rejected party dogma and intuited the philosophical basis of Marxism.²⁷⁷ At the time, it was the pervasive opinion that only the advanced material on economics and the so-called "scientific" method of historical materialism constituted the mature contributions of Marx. In actuality, some of Marx's early works had been suppressed for fear that they would expose ideas contrary to the harsh, doctrinaire ramblings of the Soviet authorities and the party bureaucrats. As Henri Lefebvre has observed:

A deep mistrust prevailed (it still does) with regard to Marx's early writings. The ideological authorities in the Marxist and Communist workers' movement feared--not without cause--that Marx's thought would be understood quite differently if these newly published works were read. As politicians, operating in accordance with those methods of political action and organization which they practised, they forestalled them; they made their dogmatism more rigid so as to protect it against the impact and preserve it.²⁷⁸

But the eventual appearance and translations of The Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844,²⁷⁹ The Grundrisse²⁸⁰ and The German Ideology²⁸¹

opened a whole new vista, and an outpouring of questions, on and about Marx's development and worldview. Today, it is apparent to many that Marx's ideas about man and society have been debauched by dictatorships which invoke Marx's authority to legitimize the policies of their "socialist" states. It is also now apparent to most scholars of Marx's thought that his ideas have been unjustifiably reduced to historical materialism, which the party ideologues conceived of, in Iring Fetscher's words, "as a particular case of the application of so-called dialectical materialism."²⁸² Indeed, it is now argued with authority that Marx, from youth to maturity, held to certain themes underlying the economic formulations, themes that actually infused his economic analyses with philosophical value. It is imperative to see in Marx, contends Mark Wartofsky, "the fundamental continuity of certain root concepts--in particular, the central ones of alienation and objectification."²⁸³ Thus in opposition to those interpretations that split Marx's life into immature philosophizing and mature economic theory, there is an ascendent view of his later work as a continuation of early ponderings about man, self and society.²⁸⁴ "Marx's analysis in Das Kapital," argues Wartofsky, "is at the same time political economy and philosophical anthropology."²⁸⁵ He adds:

The analysis of the commodity is for him a fundamental means whereby to analyze the abstract 'human' nature in its concrete historical-social form. Thus, in this sense, Marx's later work is the continuation of his earlier work, indeed the answer to and elaboration of Feuerbach's analysis of 'human existence.'²⁸⁶

On this basis, in particular, students of Marx's thought have directed their attention to the anthropological and phenomenological aspects of his economic theory.

They have sought out Marx's radical anthropology which addresses itself to the dichotomy of fact and value and to the paradoxes accompanying alienated labor. They have asked, in short, about man's estrangement from his "species being" in the commodity and exchange value system of Capitalism. From another vantage-point, existentialists such as Sartre²⁸⁷ and Merleau-Ponty²⁸⁸ have delved into the phenomenological implications of Marx's thought, especially into the themes of alienation and human wholeness. In addition to these themes, some scholars have even considered, ironic as it may initially seem, the religious significance of Marx's ideas. For Marx, although profoundly critical of organized religion, nevertheless infused his worldview with secular analogues of religious motifs: the degradation of man, the imminence of salvation (through revolution) and messianic aspiration. Robert Tucker has written about the biblical temperament of Marx and has pointed to the way in which his historical perspective--the stages of man--parallels the fall-redemption formula of Augustine and medieval Christianity.²⁸⁹ Gaston Fessard, S.J. has remarked that "Marx, without realizing it, comes so close to the realist and catholic conception of human existence that he lays the foundation on which a 'secular religion' could be established, or better, a Church whose Magisterium shall have to guide its members

infallibly in the way of salvation, while its social body will make present to the eyes of all this very salvation, the End of History."²⁹⁰

The portrait of Marx emerging from these reappraisals is that of a man who speaks to humanity's deepest anxieties, problems and needs--spiritual and social as well as economic. And it is in this vein that Kenneth Burke seems to have been influenced by Marx. Fundamentally, there is Burke's early attachment to Marx's poetic-humanistic metaphor of theoretical Communism. Burke has drawn upon the concept of alienation; he has pondered the theme of man's sense of his "whole self" and has forged a linguistic equivalent of the story of man's quest for salvation. He has, moreover, developed an historical and organic notion of birth, death and rebirth. He has addressed himself to "praxis," though he has not really used the term per se, and he has worked diligently for the synoptic vision of life, for a comprehensiveness and breadth of view well beyond the fragmented outlooks of ordinary men. At one time, it should be added, Burke was captivated by Marx's aesthetic utopia and believed then that Communism would usher in the post-historical world where human existence would be characterized by artistic expression.

But this attachment to Marx was never so thoroughly doctrinaire as to keep Burke a committed political Marxist. Burke's allegiance to Marx was on his own terms. For one thing, Burke confounded most ardent Marxists by arguing in Attitudes toward History and Permanence and Change for a philosophy of "being" rather than one of "becoming."²⁹¹ He wrote

about the recovery of a world of nouns and a philosophy of categories, thus perplexing the process-oriented readers of Science and Society who, said Margaret Schlauch, "are not apt to share this nostalgia for a medieval world of stable nouns."²⁹² He began to contrast himself with the Marxian antinomic perspective which views the human condition only in the terms of conflict. He eventually contested what he thought to be Marx's determinism and materialism. Whereas Marx stressed the inevitability of movement of the social whole, though granting the role of the individual, Burke stressed symbolic action, which emphasized individual lives. Though Marx himself warned about the perils of terminism, Lenin and others, as Burke has noted, ultimately attempted to hypostatize Marx's categories--to construe a conceptual entity such as "class struggle" as a real existant. Thus Burke has taken Marxists to task for the very trait they attribute to the bourgeois world: reification. In opposition to Marx, Burke has maintained that language is a constitutive, not residual (of class and social relations) category. He has renounced the Marxian stress on "scientific man" and the fetish of technological efficiency. The dramatic approach to the drama of human relations accentuates the "quest" rather than the escape from history into a new secular heaven. Moreover, dramatism stresses the neo-liberal values of procedural politics and symbolic ameliorations rather than the revolutionary and apocalyptic slogans of Marx's absolutist disciples. There are,

to be sure, numerous other points of dispute between Burke and the orthodox Marxists, but the differences suggested above are enough to make the point.²⁹³

But these profound differences must not detract from Burke's commitment to two major Marxian imperatives: self-consciousness and persistent critique. In its unique way, dramatism attempts to awaken the world to the meaning of its own acts, but it stresses symbolic action rather than economic or social determinants. Like Marx, Burke is both relentless and radical in his critique of philosophies. Burke has accepted the Marxian legacy of self-criticism and root analysis as being fundamental to an open society. Marx, for his part, did not always practice what he advocated.²⁹⁴ Burke, for his part, has endeavored to rectify previous conceptual errors and has cultivated a pragmatic openness on the predominant issues of the time. For he has been able to transcend the Nineteenth Century conception of "wissenschaft" which captivated Marx. In short, Marx, along with most thinkers of his era, believed that a social science would ultimately reveal the way things are with finality and necessity.²⁹⁵ And this tended to abuse the spirit of criticism in The German Ideology. But Burke's criticism has been founded on the Aristotelian insight that probability, not certainty, flavors deliberative issues. Thus dramatic critique of the rhetoric of philosophic schools is rooted in a dialectic associated with the processes of linguistic transformation. Burke's rhetorical attitude, that is, is embodied in dialectical method. Marx's

critique of the rhetoric of philosophies, on the other hand, is predicated on the laws of social development. And his followers, while disclaiming the rhetoric implicit in their own terminology, have nonetheless employed a rhetoric of words grounded, as Burke himself observes, in a "dialectic . . . concerned with the non-verbal order of motives," meaning a dialectic equated with science.²⁹⁶

This distinction is crucial: for it illustrates what Burke accepts and rejects in The German Ideology. He accepts, for rhetorical and grammatical purposes, the Marxist diagnosis of the verbal machinations of ideology. But he rejects the dialectical conception of history and of freedom.²⁹⁷ This conception, as Richard McKeon has noted, "identifies the essence of man with his production and philosophies are viewed as ideologies which are not reliable as knowledge of the conditions which they treat or as a guide in actions which they aspire. . ."²⁹⁸ As a kind of radical criticism of philosophy as terminology, Burke's pentad, in contrast to Marx's intentions, attempts "to show how certain key terms might be used to 'call the plays' in any and all philosophies."²⁹⁹ When he examines Marxism itself as terminology, Burke says that "his problem. . . is to characterize as accurately as possible the strategy involved in the dialectical-materialist rejection of idealism."³⁰⁰ Burke's critique is thus a treatment of Marxism, and any other philosophic school, as language. Along with its competition, dialectical materialism (which Burke does attribute more to Engels and Lenin than to Marx himself) features one of

the five terms of the pentad and develops "a vocabulary designed to allow this one term full expression (as regards its resources and its temptations) with the other terms being comparatively slighted or being placed in the perspective of the featured term."³⁰¹

Burke's critique differs from Marx's in another sense. The tendency to debunk and demystify is always tempered by the comic attitude--a kind of maximum consciousness that fosters humility: in effect, one becomes aware of one's own foibles and intellectual pretensions. As with Marx, Burke endeavors to strip appearance away from reality, but for the dramatist reality does not mean the economically induced developmental processes of man. It means an apprehension of the ways in which man tries to make the world and himself over in the image of his distinctive trait: language. Burke's orientation, as Rueckert has noted, is that "man has a language-ridden view of himself, his products and the universe; and language acts as a key motive or scene for all of man's acts."³⁰² Burke's mission is to show just how man contrives terministic screens in dealing with the world and how man's symbolic activities have facilitated, complicated, frustrated and endangered civilized life.

Marx's mission, by contrast, is to promote his own world-view as the one, clear and unadulterated grasp of the reality of man's practical developmental processes. The German Ideology is a radical critique of previous philosophies which, according to Marx, have managed to confound the understanding of man's condition. Marxism, however, is proclaimed

a science, to be distinguished from the metaphysical speculations characterizing philosophy. Marx wants to destroy philosophy because it puts heaven before earth. For the first time, he announces, a worldview (his and Engels') will begin with the real life processes of man and will prove that consciousness is determined by life, not the other way around, as the Hegelian idealists and others would have it. And so he lambasts all previous philosophy for denying the primary importance of economic base and ideological superstructure in human affairs. Man, he argues, cannot think without and cannot live at all, without producing the material means of life. Social existence determines consciousness. "The first historical act," says Marx, "is thus the production of the means to satisfy . . . needs, the production of material life itself."³⁰³ One must, he adds, "observe this fundamental fact in all its significance and all its implications and to accord it its due importance," but it is apparent that "the Germans have never done this, and they have never, therefore, had an earthly basis for history and consequently never an historian."³⁰⁴ The German Ideology as critique must get to the roots of man's condition. To achieve this, however, it must debunk and demystify all intellectual constructs which have engendered confused thinking, which have viewed men and their circumstances upside down as in a "camera obscura."³⁰⁵

Marx's task is thus to probe the mystifications of social and economic class, to expose the workings of ideology as a conceptual force that diverts men from the necessity of remaking their own lives.

Somewhat in the Aristotelian sense, ironically, Marx's dialectical examination of prevailing opinions is intended to cast aside all beliefs that block the path to the apprehension of first principles.³⁰⁶ Radical critique makes a passage to the apprehension of "objective conditions." For Marx, the "first premise of all humanity is, of course, the existence of living human animals. Thus the first fact to be established is the physical organization of these individuals and their consequent relation to the rest of nature."³⁰⁷

As far as Burke is concerned, the primary fact is language; without it man could not possibly transcend his animality. Language, as symbolic action, is the basic instigator of moral codes, social relations, economic systems, etc. It is the gigantic step beyond mere motion. Language itself, that is, constitutes a key motive for all of man's acts.³⁰⁸ From this standpoint, Burke turns Marx upon Marx, criticizing Marx's thought as terminology, whereas Marx himself tied criticism to the exhaustive analysis of what he believed to be the objective situation. (Because of his orientation, Burke has been upbraided for "perspectivist" detachment; for justifying verbal analysis as an end in itself without committing himself to the question of a specific worldview's credibility in resolving contemporary socio-economic problems.)³⁰⁹

Burke's assessment of the conceptual traps of Marxism does not, however, negate the critical values of The German Ideology. He savors Marx's contribution to the study of the war of words and proceeds to show

how the Marxian analysis of ideology "becomes a contribution to rhetoric."³¹⁰ Marx shows, for example, how the Hegelian Idea, as a universal self-developing organism, generates a whole set of beliefs; how "private property makes for a rhetoric of mystification, as the 'ideological' approach to social relations sets up a fog of merger terms where the clarity of division terms is needed."³¹¹

Finally, there is apparent in the development of Burke's own dramatism a dialectical continuity similar to that characterizing the Marxian corpus. As Richard Bernstein has said, "Marx was engaged in a continuous process of self-criticism in which he sought to extract the 'truth' implicit in his earlier hypotheses, reject what he took to be vague, inadequate, and misleading, and pass beyond to new insights and hypotheses."³¹² "This is a characteristic," adds Bernstein, "that pervades Marx's thinking from his earliest gropings to the latest fragments."³¹³ In this light, Burke seems very Marxian indeed in his propensity to double back and rework earlier speculations and dangling conjectures, to reconcile disparate parts of his language-centered philosophy. The second edition of Counter-Statement, for instance, includes a "Curriculum Criticum," whereby Burke returns to his early offerings and discerns a change from individualistic aestheticism to a concern for the interdependent, social, or collective aspects of literature.³¹⁴ Likewise, in a post-war edition of Attitudes toward History, Burke reconsiders, for example, his use of the concept, "socialization of losses," and the

circumstances that compelled its use.³¹⁵ Similarly, as John Crowe Ransom once observed, Burke's A Grammar of Motives is "like an endwork which assimilates to a new perspective the fragments of one's earlier writings."³¹⁶

Perhaps there is one vignette to add to this section of the study. Thinkers of dialectical and synoptic bent often begin with limited objectives and end up producing massive works that exhaust the subject of concern. "In our original plans for this project," says Burke, "we had no notion of writing a 'Grammar' at all. We began with a theory of comedy, applied to a treatise on human relations."³¹⁷ What has evolved out of A Grammar of Motives has, of course, been considered awesome in impact and scope. But was this not also the case with Marx? Originally, he intended to finish Capital in six to eight weeks, but he lived to see only Volume One published. Engels edited his partner's massive manuscripts which engulfed the known literature on economics. For Marx's project was no less than the explanation of Capitalism's nature, down to the most minute fact. The other volumes of Capital published posthumously are excruciatingly detailed in the analysis of labor and money.

Like Marx, Burke has climbed theoretical mountains to comprehend the human condition, to see it whole and clear. Lesser mortals have resigned themselves to viewing merely a piece of the landscape.

Burke and the Pragmatic Orientation: George Herbert Mead and John Dewey

Kenneth Burke's dramatism, as Hugh Dalziel Duncan has observed, puts him "squarely in the tradition of Pierce, James, Dewey, Cooley, and Mead. . ."³¹⁸ One measure of this affinity with pragmatism is, of course, Burke's stress upon the key term of "act"--his system's terministic center from which a multitude of related considerations radiate. This stress upon "act", as Duncan suggests, shows Burke to be more compatible with the American sociological orientation than with the European tradition of "culture" analysis, championed by erudite minds such as Burckhardt, Cassirer and Dilthey. Action theory, suggests Duncan, is very different from culture theory, since "art, science, religion, and philosophy in the European tradition are systems of knowledge (how we 'apprehend' the world); in the American they are systems of action (how we 'act' in the world)."³¹⁹

A clue to Burke's kinship with pragmatism resides in the fact that, like Mead and Dewey especially, dramatism proclaims communication to be a constitutive rather than a residual category. Which is to contend that men act as they do because they communicate, not because they have prior drives or ideas which cause them to then get together to express such drives or ideas.³²⁰ For Burke, as for Mead and Dewey, the self and society are seen to originate and develop in communication.³²¹ It is this fundamental perspective on the importance, the centrality, of communication in selfhood and society that affords Burke the opportunity to integrate the most seminal ideas of Mead and Dewey into dramatism.

From both, for instance, Burke receives strong arguments about the mind as social and functional, about the instrumental function of thought in the service of conduct, about the mind as the symbolic functioning of events-- a result of evolutionary processes which culminates in sociality, itself the principle and form of emergence, about the social nature of symbols and about the significance of language as matrix of mind and meaning.³²² For language can be viewed as action for a situation, a problem-oriented tool employed in response to a problem. It is the tool of tools; for without a refined system of expression, men are incapable of relating because they are unable to act together. There is, then, a sense of the instrumentalist in Burke.³²³

In other applications to dramatism, Burke draws upon Mead's analysis of attitude (as an ambiguous word for incipient action) to expand the range of the pentad into a hexad.³²⁴ From Dewey, in particular, he takes the inspiration that works of art can be understood and appraised as critical and imaginative answers to questions posed by the situations in which they arose, as "strategic answers" no less. But there is also a consumatory dimension to art. For art liberates men to enjoy new and satisfying events. A great work, that is, constitutes both a completed act in the domain of communication and the impetus for further consumatory experiences.³²⁵

Of crucial importance to Burke, however, is Dewey's and, to a lesser extent, Mead's attempts to forge a perspective of communication

and art aimed toward the reconciliation of dualisms. For Kant and for countless other philosophers, Descartes' dichotomy of thinking and extended substances provoked reactions mostly into idealism or materialism. Confronted with the cleavage between the knower and what is to be known, the idealists, as Whitehead has remarked, put matter inside mind and the materialists placed mind inside matter. But in neither case could there be any integral act of knowledge.³²⁶

The contribution of Dewey and Mead, in this regard, is to view communication as an activity which overcomes the necessity of splitting the objects of experience into the two domains of the ideal and the physical. Art itself helps to close the gap between theory and practice as well; for the very act of the artist is a dialectical merger of knowing and doing. The focus, in other words, is upon the process or the experience rather than upon the agonizing horns of the dilemma which invites a choice between the knower and what is to be known. In conjunction with the view of art as experience, Dewey and Mead assert the inextricable interrelationship of ends and means, of knowing and doing bound together because knowing is for the sake of action, conduct and control.³²⁷

Such dichotomies are also overcome by Burke's stress on "act," which allows for the circumvention of epistemological problems bedeviling both traditional rationalistic and contemporary positivistic philosophies rooted in agent or in scene.³²⁸ Although Burke attributes a stress upon agency to pragmatism in general, it is nevertheless clear that he draws

upon the instrumentalist's concept of communication to heal the sores of dualism.³²⁹ Subject and object, theory and practice, "is" and "ought to be," interpenetrate each other when communication is considered as an experience that is funded with reason and intelligence, and not as experience in contrast to these other activities. Moreover, Burke's stress upon "act," though reviving the Aristotelian and Thomistic notions of substance as an activity, pays considerable homage to Mead's and Dewey's theory of mind. The mind, as they put it, is not a substance in the sense of an essence located in the brain; rather, it is the functioning of communication, of significant symbols in Mead's view.³³⁰ These symbols arise only in a social context, actually in a social process. Thus the self is not content but an activity--an activity defined, for Dewey especially, in terms of analysis and reconstruction.³³¹

It is the dialectics of the self's development that so fascinates Burke. The Meadian contribution to the dramatist's system is made abundantly clear in both The Philosophy of Literary Form³³² and in A Grammar of Motives.³³³ The application of the dialectics of Mead's theory of the social self to dramatism will be discussed in the following order: (1) Mead's theory of the self; (2) dialectical implications of the theory; (3) Burke's evaluation of Mead's importance to a view of language as symbolic action. Dewey's influence is also apparent in any theory of the social self stressing the crucial factor of communication, but his major dialectical contribution lies more in the area of moral and social

agreement. A discussion of this intellectual strain in Burke follows the examination of Mead's influence on dramatism.

The dialectical implications of Mead's theory are best approached through a preliminary discussion of the emergence of the social self. And this necessitates the question: what, for Mead, is the process through which the self emerges? The answer resides in an understanding of the importance of role-taking and role-playing in the development of sociality. As Mead contends, one learns, first of all, to assume the role of one person, then another and another. Out of this procedure, one comes gradually to see one's own role as it is demarcated from those of other persons whose roles one has temporarily assumed. Self-awareness arises because one is ultimately able to distinguish one's own role from the roles of others. In other words, the self becomes conscious of itself as distinct from other selves. And yet the self can come into being only through a process of self-conscious interaction and interpenetration with other selves. Two critical factors seem to be paramount in this theory. On the one hand, there is a sense of distinctiveness or uniqueness from others. On the other hand, there is a sense of similarity with others, which fosters cohesiveness and cooperation in society. Both senses, however, are dependent upon communication, which makes interaction and interpenetration possible.³³⁴

What is the basic element in the development of the self? Mead, as suggested earlier, accentuates the point that the self is a process,

not an entity. It is an achievement. It develops critical facility by criticizing the self whose role it has taken; thus it learns to criticize itself. "When playing at being someone else, the self," says Mead, "realizes its own nature at the same time it realizes the nature of the person whose role is being played."³³⁵

Mead's concern with the development of the self is not an entirely new contribution to knowledge. Kant, Hegel and the Romantics in particular gave considerable thought to the idea of the self. But their efforts were mainly clothed in metaphysical explanations. Mead's work, by contrast, creates a basis for social psychology; among his many contributions is a theory of how culture and norms come to be internalized into the person, how self-control is a reflection of social control. This theory, as Anselm Strauss has pointed out, found its acceptance in the functionalist constructs of Talcott Parsons and Robert Merton.³³⁶ Mead himself acknowledges the roles of his predecessors in bringing to light the importance of the self. Kant, as Mead observes, provided the impetus for the Romantics by declaring that mind gives laws to nature.³³⁷ "Well now," says Mead, "the Romantic movement. . .grew out of this phase of the Kantian doctrine."³³⁸ For the Romantic attitude is "the externalizing of the self" where one "projects one's self into the world, sees the world through the guise, the veil, of one's own emotions."³³⁹ This attitude is "the ability to project one's self upon the world so that the world is identified in some fashion with the self."³⁴⁰ In Hegel's

case, the self, and non-self, are identified with the Absolute Idea of Spirit. Which means that the self is identical with the movement or process pervading and governing the universe. In a sense, the self, for Hegel, becomes the universe writ small.³⁴¹ "In the philosophy of Hegel," writes Mead, "the development of mind is the same thing as the development of the world."³⁴² Hegel's accomplishment, suggests Mead, is to consider the world as an object which answers to the self as subject. In a larger sense, both the individual's thought and the Absolute are involved in a process.³⁴³ Indeed, for Hegel, as Mead notes, "that process is the mind of the Absolute."³⁴⁴

To be sure, Mead as social psychologist draws upon the speculations of his intellectual forerunners, albeit the pre-Darwinian nature of their philosophies. His study of the problem of identity in Kant and the Romantics, as blended with the theory of the social self, sheds much light on the mysteries of identity as a theme in modern literature. As Robert Langbaum has written, Mead's hypothesis on role-playing helps to explain "a new kind of dramatic nature poem in which a poet, whom we identify as Wordsworth, Shelley or Keats, makes us believe that he is really seeing the landscape or hearing the bird he writes about, and even that he is writing the poem on the spot."³⁴⁵ As for the influence of Hegel, Mead's writings on self and society reflect the former's contention that man is not "self-contained;" that he is free only when he is a

"men"--an integral part of the community. This implies a dialectic of self and society in which individual identity is bound up with others.³⁴⁶

Still, the contributions of his precursors must be demarcated from Mead's own way of doing social science. For Mead's focus is not upon the self as explained through Eighteenth or Nineteenth Century metaphysics but upon the self as explained through social psychology-- a perspective which would supplement scientific conclusions. "Mead's interest," notes Paul Pfoetz, "was the framework of scientific behaviorism," and he was "concerned as a social psychologist with the empirical study of mind, self and society in their bio-social evolution."³⁴⁷ This orientation permitted him to scrutinize the shortcomings of Kantian, Hegelian and Romanticist doctrine. Kant's doctrine of the forms, as Mead examines it, leads to conclusions inappropriate to the modern temperament; for the assertion that these forms are given in advance of sensuous experience--this is the "Transcendental Logic's" presupposition that they pre-exist the object--is overturned by Darwinian evolutionism, with its accent upon process. Similarly, Hegel and the Romantics end in a dilemma over the individuality and universality of experience. Both approach the world from the point of view of the individual and thus posit a world that varies as it appears in the experience of different groups of individuals. And yet their fundamental assumption is that the world is the same for all. Such philosophical problems are overcome, says the social behaviorist, only by inquiries into the genesis of persons,

the basis of sympathy, the development of awareness of social life and the development of reason, whose locus, Mead believes, is found in the interaction between the self and society.³⁴⁸ Mead's work culminates in a perspective of individual identity epitomized in this passage:

...the human self arises through its ability to take the attitude of the group to which he belongs--because he can talk to himself in terms of the community to which he belongs and lay upon himself the responsibilities that belong to the community; because he can recognize his own duties as over against others--that is what constitutes the self as such...³⁴⁹

As Mead concludes:

The structure of society lies in these social habits, and only in so far as we can take these social habits into ourselves can we become selves.³⁵⁰

Underpinning such investigations is the study of the role of language in promoting interaction between self and society. As Hugh Dalziel Duncan has noted, "Mead believed that the data of symbolic interaction offered sociologists their greatest clue to an understanding of society."³⁵¹ Such data provides for the acute observation of self and society in action. At the fundamental level, therefore, Mead holds that the self and society originate and develop in communication. As he himself puts it in The Philosophy of the Present:

There remains the mechanism by which the individual living his own life in that of the group is placed in the attitude of taking the role of another. That mechanism is, of course, that of communication.³⁵²

And it is this very capacity for symbolic communication that gives man the capability of self-reflexiveness--a mental phenomenon crucial to

his social existence. For the reflexive mood in language permits the self to understand its position as both subject and object of an experience. This mood is the gateway to "self-awareness," in other words. As Merritt H. Moore has observed, for Mead "the self has no significance unless it can turn back upon itself, can become its own object, distinguish itself in a milieu of other selves. Until this can be done, the self cannot be made significant for the psychological and sociological problems which are Mr. Mead's major concern at this point."³⁵³

At the core of Mead's theory of the self is the "significant symbol." He argues, in essence, that all symbols are universal because meaning is social, and that the social meaning of a symbol precedes individual meaning. This makes possible a mode of communication which evokes similar responses in individuals. Thus, through communication it becomes possible to arouse "in one individual the attitude of the other, and his response to these responses."³⁵⁴ The result of this, says Mead, "is that the individual may be stimulated to play various parts in the common process in which all are engaged, and can therefore face the various futures which these difficult roles carry with them, in reaching finally the form that his own will take."³⁵⁵ When one thinks, observes Mead, one is actually involved in a process of communication with one's self, and yet this process implies the ability to assume the common attitudes of the whole group--an ability which in itself depends upon the phenomenon of shared meanings in society. Put another way, meaning in

communication depends upon the fact that symbols mean the same to speaker and listener. If the meaning of symbols could not endure in society, there would be no social relations.³⁵⁶

The primary implication of Mead's theory of the social self for this study is that it is dialectical. The self for Mead, as Pfuetze has observed, is "the human individual who, in an ego-alter dialectic, in a dialogic meeting with the other, comes to know himself as a self. . ."³⁵⁷ For "we become or acquire selves when we know ourselves to be known, when we are apprehended and valued by self-disclosing others, when we reply to others who have spoken 'themselves' to us. Each man finds himself in every other man; each man finds his own good in every other man's good."³⁵⁸

In the dialectical interaction with society, the self is both subject and object at the same time, both transcendent and empirical. Man, says Mead, needs the reality of others and a relationship with them to be himself. And yet he is not the exact same as any other. He is at once a person and an outgrowth of society.

This "both/and" dialectic of self and society puts the issue of freedom into a social framework. Man becomes man through freedom, but freedom itself flourishes only when there is order in the life of the community. Man's identity, that is, is bound to his being-in-community; his existence takes shape out of cooperation with and responsibility to the others who comprise the polis. This orientation, then, highlights

the dialectical interrelationship of self and society, freedom and order. For Mead, as for Dewey, the concepts of the unique self and social cohesion are not antithetical but rather interdependent, indeed mutually reinforcing.³⁵⁹

Kenneth Burke's reception and use of Meadian dialectics centers on the implications of the social self for dramatism. Out of this theory of the self, Burke also finds an application to the democratic idea: for "the metaphor of the conversation (uniting 'democratic' and 'dialectical' by the forensic element common to both) is systematically carried throughout Mead's view of human relations."³⁶⁰ Burke first reflects upon Mead's dialectic in The Philosophy of Literary Form,³⁶¹ noting its relevance to the temper of democracy, and then he continues the discussion of Mead with reference to social attitude in A Grammar of Motives.³⁶² Here Burke makes a sparkling insight that Mead applies "in ways of his own the pattern of the Hegelian dialectic whereby Spirit is alienated as Nature, and then attains a higher stage of self-consciousness by seeing itself in terms of its Natural other."³⁶³

The influence of Mead's dialectic on Burke's system deserves some discussion, but for the purpose of perspective it is advisable to first note the context in which the applications occur, namely, the Philosophy of the Act. Undeniably, Burke puts Mead and Dewey into that school stressing means or agency, which is pragmatism, and the dramatist cautions that his section on "act" is not to be read "as an

argument for any one traditional application of the dramatist grammar, but simply as a review, from the dramatist standpoint, of grammatical principles involved in the attributing of motives."³⁶⁴ These qualifications do not, however, deter Burke from stressing "act," and a way of life as acting-together, as a key to the issue of substance and as the basis for a doctrine of consubstantiality.³⁶⁵ Moreover, Burke's concern with language as action for a situation draws upon Mead's position that attitudes are "the beginnings of acts."³⁶⁶

In providing a conception of the act and of man as actor in society, Mead believes that he has helped to reconcile the conflicting schools of philosophy. For a philosophy of action, in contrast to other constructs, emphasizes "praxis," which undercuts the fact-value and theory-practice dichotomies nagging most schools of thought. Questions of "is" and "ought to be" merge in the human organism's communicative experience in the world and in its instrumental approach to the problems in its environment. Likewise, knowing and doing are reconciled because thought is action, not a mere preparation for it. So the very stress upon act itself has dialectical worth as a means of integrating the seemingly disparate or warring claims of philosophies into a higher orientation of social psychology.³⁶⁷

In like manner, Burke's Grammar, by illustrating "the featuring of act,"³⁶⁸ endeavors to dialectically transcend the claims of philosophical schools hinged to one of the five terms. An emphasis upon "act" leads

to the study and clarification of the resources of ambiguity involved in the dialectical interrelationships of "act," "scene," "agency," "agent" and "purpose" and ultimately to a dramatic perspective free of the metaphysics of any particular school of thought. Burke selects dramatism as representative anecdote, which leads to the discovery "that we have made a selection in the realm of action, as against scientific reduction to sheer motion."³⁶⁹ Eventually, says Burke, the question must be raised: "What would be 'the ultimate act' or 'pure drama' that one might use as the paradigm of action in general?"³⁷⁰ And the answer is "the Act of Creation, discussed substantially or in principle."³⁷¹

As with Mead, then, Burke points out that man is more than an organism; he is, in fact, an actor who seeks to create environments which will satisfy him. But Burke, of the two, as Hugh Dalziel Duncan has argued, shows how this environment is created symbolically.³⁷² For dramatism as a system is grounded in symbols themselves. It focuses upon symbols operating as symbols and explains how symbols-as-motive affect social order and social behavior.³⁷³

Burke identifies Mead's philosophy of the act, where "the concept of the Self is pivotal,"³⁷⁴ with his own concerns about communication. Burke is taken by Mead's seminal mind, which says the dramatist, envisages "the act of reflection as the holding of conversation with one-self--of seeking to contain within oneself, dialectically, the entire drama--of asserting in the form of an incipient act, which is delayed, to

be corrected from the standpoint of the 'generalized other' ('the attitude of the generalized other is the attitude of the whole community')--and of thus waging this internal dialogue back and forth, in search of truth matured by the checking of an imaginary opponent."³⁷⁵

Mead's portrait of the inner conversation of the self, where one puts oneself in the role of the other, where one, as subject, sees oneself as object, broadens the study of symbolic action for Burke. This portrait suggests, for one thing, that language is crucial in lifting humanity above the level of purely biological motivation.³⁷⁶ It points, secondly, to the reflexive significance of the symbol, to the necessary connection between linguistic activity and self-awareness. It gives credence, in a third respect, to Burke's belief that symbolic acts are, as Rueckert has put it, "representative, symptomatic acts of the self that performs them and, at the same time, perform some compensating function for that self."³⁷⁷ It provides a basis for studying the function of symbols in the relationship of self to social order. It helps to explain how man, a fundamentally moral and ethical creature, acquires a moral sense and how the process of guilt and redemption is bound to hierarchies that his linguistic capacity allows him to internalize.³⁷⁸

In the most profound sense, Burke sees beyond the social behaviorism of Mead to the pragmatist's adaptation of Hegel's dialectic. To be sure, as Burke observes in The Philosophy of Literary Form, Mead turns "from a metaphysical emphasis to a sociological one" and "substitutes

for the notion of an Absolute Self the notion of mind as a social product . . ."³⁷⁹ But a few years later, Burke peers behind Mead's analysis of the complexity of social attitudes comprising the self and apprehends an Hegelian pattern.³⁸⁰ At the level of social psychology and social behaviorism, the self is explained as complexly erected atop biological motives, but also modified in particular by the formative effects of language. Language asks the individual to develop in accordance with its social guidelines. In a way, offers Burke, this model of the emerging social self resembles Hegel's philosophy of Spirit estranged in Nature and ultimately achieving a higher stage of self-consciousness by viewing itself relative to its Natural other.³⁸¹ That is, Mead argues that higher levels of consciousness are attained when the individual learns to anticipate the kinds of resistances which external forces will advance if he acts in this way or that.³⁸² And this very process of the self's growth through the foreseeing of consequences emanating from external forces is not unlike the "aufheben" of Hegel's dialectic. As Burke views this dialectic:

Such Aufheben is reduced to this process: Starting from A, we get a view of B in terms of A; next we advance to a view of B that transcends A; and then, looking back, we can view A in terms of B.³⁸³

Of considerable importance to Burke, Mead's philosophy of the act unearths a correspondence between the social dialectic of the self's emergence and the ideals of democracy, although the dramatist tends to

soften "the promissory mood that went with the happier days of progressive evolution."³⁸⁴ "We have been hearing much of 'democracy' and much of 'dialectics,'" writes Burke, "and surely Mead's approach helps us to understand the integral relationship between these concepts. For dialectics deals with the converse, the conversational, while democracy is the ideal of expression in the market place, the dramatics of the forum."³⁸⁵ "The truth of the debate," Burke adds, "arises from the combat of the debaters, which would transform the competitive into the cooperative (somewhat as competitors in a game 'cooperate' to make it a good game)."³⁸⁶ Most significantly, the self, in Mead's view, is able to contain within itself the dialectics of democratic decision-making; for it may assume every possible idea or opinion, encompass all viewpoints in an issue. "The parry is an interpretation of the thrust," notes Burke on Mead's metaphor of the dialectically democratic inner conversation, "as one even 'converses' with objects, cooperating with them to his benefit only in so far as he allows them to have their say, takes their role by telling himself what their modes of assertion are, and corrects his own assertions on the basis of their claims."³⁸⁷ The spirit of this metaphor, not surprisingly, reappears in "Linguistic Approach to Problems of Education," wherein Burke writes "that ideal democracy does allow all voices to participate in the dialogue of the state, and such ideal democracy is the nearest possible institutional equivalent to the linguistic ideal."³⁸⁸

By championing ideal democracy, Burke is also associating himself with the philosophy of John Dewey and by way of this association with the pragmatic theory of moral and social agreement. Burke's appraisal of Dewey is readily available to readers of The Philosophy of Literary Form,³⁸⁹ but the relationship of dramatism to moral and social deliberation requires deeper analysis; for it is implicit in Burke's views on linguistic transformation--the dialectics of symbolism. As for Dewey's philosophy as a whole, Burke is generous in his applause. The Quest for Certainty is reviewed as a "tolerant and inquisitive" book.³⁹⁰ Experience and Nature is heralded for its brilliant writing on art.³⁹¹ Burke comments upon "the total lack of authoritarianism in Dewey's thinking" which "is forever leading him into the expansive and adventurous."³⁹² To be sure, Burke raises some tentative objections about Dewey's adaptation of scientific-experimental method to the deliberative realms of value and policy. He prods Dewey for tending to be obscure on the definition of intelligence and points to defects in Dewey's study of Liberalism's identity. But these are tolerable objections.³⁹³ Compared to most philosophers, Dewey is impressively openminded and exploratory in his approach to knowledge and social problems. Burke finds Dewey's methodology particularly noteworthy in The Quest for Certainty; for "its extension of strict dialectic by borrowings from psychology, anthropology, history, sociology, economics, fits into a wider scheme than mere matters of dogma and makes it an important contribution to our culture."³⁹⁴

Yet Burke's early appraisals of Dewey do not delineate dramatism's (as then developing) indebtedness to the latter's work on the dialectics of democratic decision-making. The entire Burkeian corpus must be digested for this relationship to be properly understood. Burke's coverage of Dewey over the course of dramatism's development and refinement is succinct and is epitomized by a statement of allegiance to pragmatic tentativeness and experimentalism. Dramatism, says Burke, "is uncompromisingly liberal in the sense that its first principle must be the systematic distrust of any social certainties as now set. . ."³⁹⁵ Thus, this view necessarily reaffirms Dewey's emphasis upon the experimental attitude, backed by experimental method.³⁹⁶ What with this salute to pragmatism, however, Burke is basically tacit rather than explicit in his use of Dewey's theory of moral and social agreement.

To comprehend this strain in Burke's thought, it is first necessary to discuss Dewey's commitment to the ideal of a democratic community, his views on inquiry, and his position on the nature and worth of moral deliberation. These will be seen to accord with Burke's language-centered approach to moral and social agreement; for both thinkers rely upon the dialectical possibilities for promoting peaceful resolutions to conflicts sparked by the clash of antithetical beliefs. That is, they both seek ways of transcending and yet incorporating elements of the warring claims. The task is to define a higher ground of conciliation for the disputants while guaranteeing for them the integrity of their initial, though disparate

or polar, goods. For his part, Dewey considers "moral objectivity" as the culmination of reasoned deliberation.³⁹⁷ Burke, on the other hand, relies upon the verbal resources of literature and mysticism as entrance to a theory of moral and social agreement. The poet talks "of first and last things" and employs images "that do not appeal merely to the senses, but derive radiance and vibrancy from their 'anagogic' and/or 'socio-anagogic' nature. And since the mystic communicates ultimately in terms of the oxymoron (the figure that combines contradictory elements within a single expression), we would see in the packing of an image or idea with divergent motives a more or less remote instance of 'literary mysticism.'"³⁹⁸ Underlying this perspective is the Hegelian "aufheben," though Dewey's route away from his predecessor is moral objectivity and Burke's route is the consideration of merger through symbolic manipulation to ultimate or "God" terms, i.e., the "range of mountings," ultimate identification and consubstantiality.³⁹⁹

How, then, does Dewey arrive at his theory of moral and social agreement? Briefly, he does it within the context of the ideal creative, participatory democracy. Dewey's preoccupation is with the ways in which a democratic community of creative individuals develops and flourishes, particularly amidst a supercharged industrial-technological society. For him, democracy is not just a political system but actually a way of life, a mode of association based upon conjoint communicated experience. Democracy is a moral ideal. It is a fluid, pluralistic,

adaptive type of existence. It promotes freedom of communication and inquiry and champions toleration of diverse viewpoints. These qualities, it so happens, are altogether compatible with the scientific spirit.⁴⁰⁰

Within the democratic atmosphere, men are encouraged to share their common interests. Social cohesion does not, however, imply the diminution of individual identity. Contrary to some portraits of Dewey, he does value individualism, but he manages to frame the question of individual identity within the larger issue of self-realization through interaction with community and nature. He thinks of human individuality, notes Richard Bernstein, as being "manifested in choice, and choice itself is dependent on the natural transactions that make up the life history of man and his intelligent deliberations."⁴⁰¹ The net result of a working democracy, suggests Dewey, is a community of persons who continuously readjust to new situations and problems, who produce effective decision-making procedures leading to the reconciliation of various and varied social, economic, moral and political conflicts.

From within this democratic context comes Dewey's stress upon inquiry. Inquiry, he maintains, arises because there is a felt need, a tensional situation requiring satisfaction or solution. Often, one encounters the classic dilemma built of conflicting desires or alternative goods, and one's mental and social equipoise seems to demand the resolution of the problem. For Dewey, the task is always to locate the difficulty, the

core of the discordance or dissentiency, and to then devise a method for dealing with it. ⁴⁰²

And here is precisely where Dewey parts company with traditional logic: for the devising of methods to resolve problems must rely upon all the available procedures employed by science. Which is to say that logic ought to be modified according to new developments in the methods of inquiry. Dewey sets out to show, as John Passmore writes, "that formal distinctions arise within 'the matrix of inquiry' and have no significance except as ingredients in that matrix. Logical principles. . . are not eternal truths which have been laid down once and for all as supplying a pattern to which all inquiry must conform; on the contrary, they are principles which science, at a certain stage in its development, has found to be involved in its own success."⁴⁰³ In Logic, the Theory of Inquiry, published late in his life, Dewey reaffirms a long-held conviction that the older forms of logic, based upon Platonic and Aristotelian essence relationships, are in need of radical reconsideration if logical principles are to serve contemporary attempts to resolve contemporary problems.⁴⁰⁴ Whereas a formal logician would, for instance, merely concede the irresolvability of a contradiction, a Dewey pragmatist would accept the situation as a spur to inquiry. He would initiate a new investigation which so modifies the original generalization that "all X are Y" that it also accounts for the contradictory case, namely that "this X is not Y." (Dewey felt this to be the contradiction of the first proposition

rather than the formal logician's "some X are not Y."⁴⁰⁵ In making his logic "instrumental," Dewey's early Hegelianism emerges; for as Passmore, Bernstein and others have noted, the whole theory of inquiry is a challenge to the assumption that propositions can have any truth except as phases of a system. The issue, as Dewey sees it, is not the designation of "true" or "false" for diagnostic statements but rather a proposition's effectiveness, pertinence and economy in dealing with real problems. For doing inquiry is, in effect, experiencing. Put another way, the things that are experienced are, so to speak, "interrogations"; they generate problems and provoke man into dealing with them. This inquiry is always a part of man's endeavor to control his environment and circumstances. Dewey asserts time and again that modern man is no mere spectator of the world who is but content to contemplate timeless, invariable truths; rather, he is a choosing, rational agent who continuously interacts with the natural and social worlds in his attempts to modify the conditions of his life. Concomitantly, pragmatic philosophy lauds intelligence as a self-reflexive activity, as the grasp of its own nature and methods. Moreover, the idea of the active, choosing agent suggests the interanimation of theory and practice since, in the instrumental sense, knowledge is bound up with the resolution of felt difficulties, with the unceasing cavalcade of problematic situations.⁴⁰⁶

With this background material in mind, it is not too difficult to grasp the theory of moral and social agreement as an outgrowth of Dewey's

complete philosophical stance: his commitment to democratic decision-making, to the spirit of scientific investigation, to the merger of theory and practice, fact and value, to the kinds of inquiry that are based upon the inductive, openminded search for truth. For all forms of dogmatism and absolutism are abhorrent to Dewey. He distrusts the claims of metaphysical systems. His reconstructive-reformist bent is dubious about the utopian claims of ideological propagandists, though Dewey himself seems to envision progress and betterment for an enlightened, technically and scientifically sophisticated society. Morality, for Dewey, is not tied to eternal verities, to essences, natural laws, Spirit, and so on. It is not prior to the practical world of deliberation. Rather, morality arises because men are able to use reason in deliberation or controlled argumentation in order to resolve differences that initially divided them. Mutually acceptable solutions to problems, solutions which transcend the original polarities of the dispute and yet preserve the integrity of the basic ground of each position for its advocate, help to maintain a humanistic society. It is a society fostering both unity and diversity, individual liberty and social cohesion.⁴⁰⁷

Dewey holds that moral objectivity must be based upon these assumptions: first, moral goods do not exist except through one's own choices; second, moral goods receive their structure only in the formulation of contingent states of affairs for decisions. To say that moral values are "objective" is to imply that such values are obligatory, that

they exist independent of inclination. Such values are obtainable by choice. Which is to suggest that "moral objectivity" is not waiting for people. "Morals," says Dewey, "are not chosen from without."⁴⁰⁸ Practical wisdom needed for solutions to problems is not gained by a process of deduction from prior knowledge. Rather, moral values are arrived at through competence and tolerance in deliberation.⁴⁰⁹

This theory applies to nations as well as to individuals. It rejects the notion that a person's or country's personality is finite and that its structure can be deduced from some universal principle. Rather, each individual or nation can determine what its personality is to be. In short, the manner in which a person or country exercises practical wisdom determines the structure of moral value.⁴¹⁰

Dewey adds to this theory the belief that a man, or nation for that matter, cannot keep a personality open unless the common good is put above self-interest. He argues, in fact, that the change to a common good makes morals more personal than they were when custom ruled. Dewey's belief is not just some "pie in the sky" idealistic desire for intranational and international cooperation but a sober apprehension of the requirements for liberty and freedom. For without appropriate resolutions in the international, national and local communities, individual lives would be buried under a ton of violence, repression and fear.⁴¹¹

It is the spirit or tenor of Dewey's theory that permeates dramatism rather than the details of pragmatic philosophy. Burke's position that

disputes over "rights" and "obligations" must be studied and handled first and foremost as symbolic affairs affirms Dewey's contention that morality cannot be deduced from prior knowledge but must be won through the verbal engagement of contending parties who find some higher ground for accommodation.⁴¹² The dramatist frequently focuses on the language of ethics, of justice, freedom, virtue, etc., and he finds that the dialectic of such concepts arises in an opposition of meanings which have been formed by a structure of terms. "Distinctions," to repeat a Burkelian observation, "arise out of a great central moltenness, where all is merged. They have been thrown from a liquid center to the surface, where they have congealed. Let one of these crusted distinctions return to its source, and in this alchemic center it may be remade, again becoming molten liquid, and may enter into new combinations, whereat it may be again thrown forth as a new crust, a different distinction. So that A may become non-A. But not merely by a leap from one state to another. Rather, we must take A back into the ground of its existence, the logical substance that is its causal ancestor, and on to a point where it is consubstantial with non-A; then we may return, this time emerging with non-A instead."⁴¹³

For Burke, a dialectic of morals contains areas of ambiguity, and ambiguity provides for transformation. Such a dialectic attains a zenith of accommodation when initially antithetical meanings are so transformed, because of their ambiguous base, that they can eventually be incorporated into a higher or prior term, perhaps an ultimate term that fosters

identification. What makes this possible is that man, as homo dialecticus, creates and uses symbols which "simultaneously reflect and transcend the 'reality' of the non-symbolic."⁴¹⁴ A dialectic over morals or social rights, however, may be completely aside from the criterion of empirical verification. The coherence of positions, not the urgency of facts, is dialectic's concern. Moreover, the culmination of one dialectical encounter turns into the springboard for a new moral or social issue. For each dialectical resolution harbors within itself the potential for a new conflict. Each dialectic revolves around naming, defining and classifying, as in the classical tradition of Plato's dialogues, and Burke is quick to note that man is not "a 'class animal' but. . . a 'classifying animal.'"⁴¹⁵ This suggests that an entire dispute over moral or social obligations is actually a kind of "social agnosticism," as Richard Weaver has suggested.⁴¹⁶ For the conflict occurs entirely within a universe of discourse. The problems involved have been engendered by the relationship of terms, not by a question over the reality of some thing. This latter issue begs for settlement through laboratory or field procedure where the control or manipulation of phenomena helps to monitor the "external correspondence" of the medium.⁴¹⁷

Burke's language-centered approach to conflict-resolution accords with Dewey's contention that values are obtainable by choice, that the participants are free, theoretically at least, to forge a "common good" or principle that promotes awareness of their consubstantiality. This

approach suggests a pragmatic temperament, although Burke waxes Platonic in summoning up the poetic and mystic elements in the Upward Way to encompassing principles.⁴¹⁸ Socrates' rhetorical flights in the dialogues come to mind when the dramatist writes about "literary mysticism" and urges, for instance, the use of oxymoron with its poetic and mystic capability of combining contradictory elements within a single expression.⁴¹⁹ Still, Burke's anti-dogmatic demeanor seems to suggest an affinity with Dewey's openmindedness on social and political issues. Ever cautious about the underlying assumptions of philosophical and ideological schools, the dramatist realizes that "every system of exhortation hinges about some definite act of faith, a deliberate selection of alternatives." And even "when this crucial act is not specifically stated, it merely lies hidden beneath the ramifications of the system."⁴²⁰

At the most basic level of the theory of moral and social agreement, then, Burke relates to Dewey on the issue of choice. Indeed, both appear existential in their respective ways of considering man as maker of meaning in the world. For Dewey especially this perspective is tinged with irony because his general optimism has frequently invited the criticism that he lacks the "tragic sense" of life.⁴²¹ Nevertheless, both Dewey and Burke acknowledge the inevitability of frustration and failure in human life. Both hold that there are no ultimate values born into humans, no ultimate purpose to the universe apart from man's symbolic

existence. Values arise only when man arrives on the world scene and struggles to infuse his existence with meaning.⁴²²

From the dramatist's perspective, however, any debate about the origin of "rights" and "obligations" must consider "the full role of symbols in shaping men's view of. . .property. . ."423 "Man as a biological organism requires property in the sheerly biological sense," says Burke, but "by reason of his nature as a characteristically symbol-using species he can conceptualize a symbolic analogue."⁴²⁴ The fundamental fact that man's specific nature as a symbol-user transcends his generic nature as sheer animal must be kept in mind when one is ready to engage in moral and social deliberation as a passionate advocate. In this regard, one can be active and contemplative--actively involved in deliberation for the purpose of reconstructing and directing the course of human experience and culture and contemplatively cautious about man's verbal machinations as the originator of values that he too often claims to be derived from a higher, unassailable source.⁴²⁵

This combination of activity and contemplation is another way of reconciling practice and theory. For Burke has been both "messianic" in the scope of the dramatistic project and temperate in his "Neo-Stoic" resignation to man's limitations in the on-going drama of human relations.⁴²⁶ He has been both attentive to man's tendency to be "rotten with perfection"⁴²⁷ and committed to "the purification of war."⁴²⁸ Perhaps Burke is more inclined to see the "tragic sense" of life than were Dewey and

Mead. He has had the benefit of living through the third quarter of this century and is thus able to view in historical terms the fragmentation and turmoil of American life, the shattering of post-World War Two ideals, the impact of existential despair upon contemporary thought. And yet for all this, his motto "ad bellum purificandum" suggests that linguistic skepticism, the attitude of methodical quizzicality towards language, may yet equip men with the understanding necessary to resolve their differences short of physical violence and bloodshed.⁴²⁹

Summary

The purpose of this chapter was to explore the dialectical sources of dramatism. Seven philosophical influences were examined and related to various aspects of dramatism: Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, Marx, Mead, and Dewey. Burke has drawn extensively upon these seven during the development of his language-centered system. To be sure, he has drawn from the philosophies of numerous others, but these seven were seen to be of particular significance in Burke's perspective of man as "homo dialecticus "

Plato's dialectic is particularly important to Burke's views on "being" and "becoming," "permanence" and "change." Moreover, Burke has woven Plato's brand of inspiration and transcendence, his teleology, his mysticism, his conception of "nisus," his process of definition, and his theory of Forms into the dramatic tapestry, albeit the fact that the dramatist rejects a philosophy of essences for one of symbolic action.

Burke has taken much from Aristotle: the Stagirite's four causes, his notion of substance for the dramatic feigning of "act," his hierarchical vision of the world, with its culminating, synoptic vision, and his metaphysical temperament in the sense of the reflexive power of a first philosophy which turns upon the conditions of knowing. More than this, however, Burke has studied Aristotelian rhetoric and dialectic in depth, recognizing their roles as counterparts and as verbal forms crucial to deliberative processes in the realm of human relations, the ethical and political worlds of "rights" and "obligations."

As for Kant, Burke has adapted the skeptical power of the "Transcendental Dialectic" to show that any attempt to ascertain a reality beyond the reality of symbolic experience is destined to end in futility. The pentad is the dramatist's equivalent of the Kantian categories because the five terms amount to forms of talk about experience. Kant's dialectic thus serves as a stimulus to Burke's own brand of reflexiveness, although Burke concentrates not on the function of knowledge but rather upon the function of language in talk about the function of knowledge. Kant's ethics serves as a philosophical support for Burke's crucial distinction between action and motion and his contention that symbolic action supposes "choice" and "will" (as an alternative to scientific approaches to man which consider mere motion and are basically deterministic).

Burke has been one of the few leading critics to grasp the contemporary relevance of Hegel to a philosophy of language. The dramatist has

been stirred by Hegel's views on negative thinking, his theory of contradiction and opposition, his modes of thought, self-conscious temperament, dialectic of self and society and his grand vision of the world.

As with Hegel, Marx has been greatly misunderstood. Burke undeniably rejects the political orthodoxy associated with contemporary Marxist-Leninist movements and institutions. Burke's flirtation with Marxist politics during the "thirties" resulted in a most unique poetic-humanistic orientation which acknowledged the tragic sense of history. Essentially, Burke has utilized Marx's methods of demythification and demystification, the spirit of his relentless critique and self-conscious attitude. He has accepted Marx's diagnosis of ideology because of its rhetorical value but rejected the substantive basis of Marxism--the dialectical conception of history and freedom. Burke's stress has been upon man's linguistic activities and, in somewhat Marxian fashion, he has endeavored to unfold the symbolic processes of humankind.

As Hugh Duncan has observed, Burke can be justifiably placed in the pragmatic tradition of Mead and Dewey for accentuating the fact of communication as a basic rather than residual category. He has drawn from Mead's theory of self and society and his philosophy of the act. He has been influenced by Dewey's instrumentalism, his theory of moral and social agreement and the overarching democratic temperament of American pragmatism.

NOTES

CHAPTER V

1. See William Rueckert, "Dramatism" Language as the Ultimate Reduction," in Kenneth Burke and the Drama of Human Relations, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1963), pp. 128-162. Cf. p. 137. Burke's concern with transcendence and hierarchy encompasses the purificatory process found in Plato's Phaedrus. "The end result of this dialectic," as Rueckert puts it, "is a vision of oneness, of an ultimate order among all terms which has the effect of unifying everything in the vision of a universal hierarchy."
2. Gustav Mueller, Plato: The Founder of Philosophy as Dialectic, (New York: Philosophical Library, 1965), p. 138.
3. Stanley Edgar Hyman, The Armed Vision: A Study in the Methods of Modern Literary Criticism, Vintage Book, (New York: Random House, 1955), p. 335.
4. Kenneth Burke, Permanence and Change: An Anatomy of Purpose, 2nd rev. ed., The Library of Liberal Arts, (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965), pp. 261-262; The Rhetoric of Religion: Studies in Logology, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), pp. 7-42, 172-272.
5. See Kenneth Burke, "Linguistic Approach to Problems of Education," Modern Philosophies and Education, Fifty-Fourth Year Book of the National Society for the Study of Education, ed. Nelson B. Henry, (Chicago: Published by the Society and distributed by the University of Chicago Press, 1955), LIV, Pt. 1, pp. 300-301.
6. Ibid., p. 301.
7. Mueller, op. cit., p. 139.
8. On Hegel's indebtedness to the Greeks for the formulation of the dialectic of Spirit, see Richard Bernstein, Praxis and Action, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971), pp. 14-28. Cf. Herbert Marcuse, Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960), pp. 16-29.
9. On "alienation" and "wholeness" as concerns of the young Marx, see, for example, David McLellan, The Young Hegelians and Karl

Marx, (London: Macmillan, 1969); Istvan Meszaros, Marx's Theory of Alienation, (London: Merlin Press, 1970); Robert Tucker, Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx, 2nd ed., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972). Regarding the philosophical manuscripts, see Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Historish-Kritische Gesamtausgabe, ed. D. Rjazanov and V. Adoratskij, (Frankfurt-Berlin: Marx-Engels Verlag, 1927-32). [Referred to by Marxian scholars as MEGA]. An adequate English translation of the manuscripts by T. B. Bottomore is included in Erich Fromm, Marx's Conception of Man, (New York: Frederick Ungar, 1961).

10. See G. M. A. Grube, Plato's Thought, Beacon Paperback ed., (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968), pp. 216-289.

11. See Karl Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies, rev. ed., (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950). For a critique of Popper's interpretation of Hegel, see Walter Kaufmann, "The Hegel Myth and its Method," in From Shakespeare to Existentialism, Anchor Book ed., (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1960), pp. 95-128.

12. For an indication of Burke's criticism of Hegel and Marx, see A Rhetoric of Motives, (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1950), pp. 101-110. In the appendix to the second revised edition of Permanence and Change, op. cit., namely, "On Human Behavior Considered 'Dramatistically,'" pp. 274-294, Burke's view of property is distinctly unmarxian. He argues that property is an outgrowth of the full role of symbols and that, furthermore, divisions of labor and hierarchies will develop out of man's symbolic propensity, regardless of ideological claims for an ultimate classless society. Ibid., p. 276.

13. See, Kenneth Burke, Attitudes toward History, 2nd revised ed., (Boston: Beacon Press, 1961), pp. 3-33, 314-317, 319-320. On Burke's notion of man as "rotten with perfection," see "Definition of Man," in Language as Symbolic Action, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), pp. 3-24. Cf. Leland M. Griffin, "A Dramatistic Theory of the Rhetoric of Movements," in Critical Responses to Kenneth Burke, 1924-1966, ed. William Rueckert, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1969), p. 472.

14. Mueller, op. cit., p. 139.

15. Permanence and Change, op. cit., pp. 162-163.

16. See, for example, Marjorie Grene, "Aristotelian teleology," in A Portrait of Aristotle, Phoenix Book, (Chicago: University of Chicago

Press, 1967), pp. 133-136. Cf. R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of Nature, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1945), pp. 124-126.

17. Grene, op. cit., p. 65, 136.

18. Attitudes toward History, op. cit., p. 263. Cf. Rueckert, Kenneth Burke and the Drama of Human Relations, op. cit., pp. 44-45.

19. See, for example, Socrates' account of the soul in his discussion of love with Phaedrus. The image of the two winged horses and a charioteer is evoked to illustrate the idea that the soul is self-moving and thus immortal and unbegotten. Plato, Phaedrus, tr. Benjamin Jowett, The Dialogues of Plato, (New York: Random House, 1937), Vol. 1, 245-256.

20. Kenneth Burke, Counter-Statement, 2nd ed., (Los Altos, California: Hermes Publications, 1953), pp. 46-48, 107.

21. "Definition of Man," op. cit., pp. 13-15; Permanence and Change, op. cit., p. 275.

22. "Definition of Man," pp. 13-15. Cf. "Alienation," in Attitudes toward History, op. cit., pp. 216-220. On alienation in Marx, see Bernstein, op. cit., pp. 48-50.

23. Counter-Statement, op. cit., pp. 75-76, 168-169; Attitudes toward History, op. cit., pp. 34-91, 171-175.

24. See Grube, op. cit., pp. 183-186; Plato, Phaedrus, 238-241.

25. Plato, Phaedrus, 252-257. Cf. Claud A. Thompson, "Rhetorical Madness: An Ideal in the Phaedrus," The Quarterly Journal of Speech, LV (December, 1969), pp. 358-363; Richard Weaver, "The Phaedrus and the Nature of Rhetoric," in The Ethics of Rhetoric, (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1953), pp. 3-26.

26. Plato, Phaedrus, 255-256; Grene, op. cit., pp. 243-244.

27. "Linguistic Approach to Problems of Education," op. cit., p. 263; Grene, op. cit., pp. 48-49.

28. Plato, Epistle VII, in Plato's Epistles, tr. with critical essays and notes by Glenn Morrow, The Library of Liberal Arts, (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1962), pp. 238-241, 342A-344D. See also Grene, op. cit., p. 49. For Plato, as Grene notes, all speech is metaphorical and thus dialectic ". . . remains a task: problematic, to be pursued again and

again; now from one perspective, now another, but never to be finished and done with and set down, black on white, for him who runs to read."

29. See, for example, "The Socratic Transcendence," in A Grammar of Motives, (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1945), pp. 420-430. A Rhetoric of Motives, op. cit., p. 333, ends with a Burkeian tribute to the hierarchical beauty of Aristotelian metaphysics but it has the Platonic Forms also in mind. See further the dialectic between The Lord and Satan in "Epilogue: Prologue in Heaven," in The Rhetoric of Religion, op. cit., pp. 273-316.

30. "Linguistic Approach to Problems of Education," op. cit., pp. 300-301. Cf. Rueckert, Kenneth Burke and the Drama of Human Relations, op. cit., p. 129.

31. See, for example, Marie Hochmuth Nichols, "Kenneth Burke: Rhetorical and Critical Theory," in Rhetoric and Criticism, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Press, 1963), pp. 79-93, and her "Burkeian Criticism," in Essays on Rhetorical Criticism, ed. Thomas R. Nilsen, (New York: Random House, 1968), pp. 75-85; Daniel J. Fogarty, S.J., "Kenneth Burke's Theory," in Roots for a New Rhetoric, (New York: Teachers College, Columbia University, 1959), pp. 56-87; Virginia L. Holland, Counterpoint: Kenneth Burke and Aristotle's Theories of Rhetoric, (New York: The Philosophical Library, Inc., 1959).

32. As William Rueckert observed, in a note following Virginia Holland's article in Critical Responses to Kenneth Burke, op. cit., pp. 307-308, she was one of the few ever to discuss Burke and his sources or influences and "if others would undertake this with Freud, Marx, Coleridge, and Nietzsche--to name a few--we would certainly be able to understand and see Burke in new and significant ways."

33. See The Rhetoric of Religion, op. cit., pp. 7-42; Grene, op. cit., pp. 245-247. As she points out, Aristotle "considered intellectual activity the highest, purest, most self-sufficient form of life," and the zenith of such activity was thought about God, the unmoved mover, whom he considered "'pure thought,' as 'living,' as supreme actuality in the sense. . . of pure activity." Ibid., p. 246.

34. A Grammar of Motives, op. cit., pp. 253-254.

35. A Rhetoric of Motives, op. cit., p. 333.

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid., pp. 183-189.
38. Ibid., p. 187.
39. Ibid., pp. 328-333; The Rhetoric of Religion, op. cit., p. 184. Here Burke diagrams the "Cycle of Terms Implicit in the Idea of 'Order,'" with "God as Author and Authority." Cf. "Linguistic Approach to Problems of Education," op. cit., pp. 272, 288-289.
40. Rueckert, Kenneth Burke and the Drama of Human Relations, op. cit., p. 129.
41. A Grammar of Motives, pp. 253-254; A Rhetoric of Motives, p. 53.
42. See Ernst Kapp, "Induction; Ancient and Modern Logic," in Greek Foundations of Traditional Logic, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1942), pp. 75-87; William Kneale and Martha Kneale, The Development of Logic, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962), pp. 7-12; 33-44.
43. Aristotle, Topica, tr. W. A. Pickard-Cambridge, The Works of Aristotle, ed. W. D. Ross, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1949), 101^b 1-4. On dialectic as the way of breaking conceptual impasses, see Joseph Owens, The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics: A Study in the Greek Background of Mediaeval Thought, 2nd rev. ed., (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1963), p. 205; Grene, op. cit., pp. 114-115, 184-185.
44. Owens, op. cit., pp. 205-206; Grene, op. cit., pp. 184-185.
45. A Grammar of Motives, pp. 253-254.
46. Ibid., pp. xviii-xix, 127-131.
47. See, for example, Max Black, "Review of 'A Grammar of Motives,'" The Philosophical Review, LV (July, 1946), pp. 487-490; Abraham Kaplan, "Review of 'A Grammar of Motives,'" Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, V (March, 1947), pp. 233-234. On Burke's explanation of the "scientific use" of dramatism, see "Dramatism," International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, (New York: Macmillan and Free Press, 1968), Vol. 7, pp. 488-450.
48. A Grammar of Motives, pp. 34-35; A Rhetoric of Motives, pp. 25, 53-54.

49. A Rhetoric of Motives, pp. 53-54, Aristotle, Rhetorica, tr. Rhys Roberts, op. cit., 1354^a 1-7.
50. As Richard Weaver has put it, the "branch of dialectic which contributes to 'choice and avoidance'" is the one with which "rhetoric is regularly found joined;" for this is a rhetoric "involving questions of policy, and the dialectic which precedes it will determine not the application of positive terms but that of terms which are subject to the contingency of evaluation." The Ethics of Rhetoric, (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1953), p. 16.
51. Henry Kariel, The Promise of Politics, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1966), p. 11.
52. See A Rhetoric of Motives, pp. 25-26, 53-55; "Linguistic Approach to Problems of Education," op. cit., p. 262; Permanence and Change, p. 276. As Burke also observes, property exists as a function of language and involves "a certain cluster of expectancies, rights, material rewards, honors. . ." Men, as he suggests, will always quibble about these things and use rhetoric to persuade this way or that way about them. Ibid., p. 279.
53. A Grammar of Motives, pp. 441-443; "Linguistic Approach to Problems of Education," op. cit., p. 276.
54. As Burke puts it, "Man being specifically a symbol-using animal, we take it that a terminology for the discussion of his social behavior must stress symbolism as a motive, if maximum scope and relevancy is required of the terminology." Permanence and Change, p. 275.
55. A Grammar of Motives, p. xix. Cf. Charles Feidelson, Symbolism and American Literature, Phoenix Book, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), p. 68.
56. See Hugh Dalziel Duncan, Communication and Social Order, (New York: Bedminster Press, 1962), pp. 66-67. Cf. Symbols in Society, paperback ed., (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 44; John Dewey, Art as Experience, (New York: Minton, Balch and Co., 1934), pp. 25-36.
57. Burke statement in Attitudes toward History, op. cit., p. 341, that the mind is formed "by a public grammar" relates directly to Mead's position that mind, self and society are born in communicative acts. See George Herbert Mead, Mind, Self and Society, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934). Cf. A Grammar of Motives, p. 236 and Duncan,

Communication and Social Order, *op. cit.*, pp. 92-106. On Kant's view of the analysis of the faculty of understanding itself, see John Kemp, The Philosophy of Kant, paperback ed., (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 20-29.

58. Counter-Statement, pp. 46-48.

59. Ibid., p. 107.

60. Attitudes toward History, p. 341.

61. See Richard Bernstein, John Dewey, (New York: Washington Square Press, Inc., 1967), pp. 69-70.

62. Counter-Statement, p. 46.

63. Ibid., p. 150; see also Permanence and Change, pp. 25-36, and A Grammar of Motives, pp. xix-xx.

64. Rueckert, Kenneth Burke and the Drama of Human Relations, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

65. Ibid., p. 13.

66. Ibid.

67. Counter-Statement, p. 46.

68. A Grammar of Motives, pp. 227-232. See also Permanence and Change, p. 274. Dramatistic terms, says Burke, "begin in theories of action rather than in theories of knowledge."

69. A Grammar of Motives, pp. 190-192.

70. Ibid., p. 196.

71. Ibid., pp. 190-197.

72. Ibid., p. 189.

73. Ibid., p. 188.

74. Ibid.

75. Ibid.

76. Ibid., p. 189.

77. Ibid.

78. Ibid.

79. Ibid., pp. 189-190.

80. See Jonathan Bennett, Kant's Dialectic, (London: Cambridge University Press, 1974), pp. 30-39.

81. And yet, notes Burke, Kant's things-in-themselves, in their transcendent realm, present the grammatical embarrassment of being considered without reference to a context. A Grammar of Motives, p. 194.

82. Ibid., p. 190.

83. Ibid., pp. 185-198; "A Dramatistic View of the Origins of Language: Part Two," The Quarterly Journal of Speech, XXXVIII (December, 1952), p. 446.

84. See, for example, J. Bronowski and Bruce Mazlish, The Western Intellectual Tradition from Leonardo to Hegel, Harper Torchbook, (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), pp. 472-479.

85. A Grammar of Motives, p. 194.

86. See Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, tr. L. W. Beck, (New York: Library of Liberal Arts, 1949). Cf. L. W. Beck, A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Practical Reason, (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1960), and H. J. Paton, The Categorical Imperative: A Study in Kant's Moral Philosophy, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948).

87. A Grammar of Motives, pp. 195-196; "A Dramatistic View of the Origins of Language: Part Two," op. cit., pp. 446-447. Cf. Paton, op. cit., pp. 23-24, 231.

88. A Grammar of Motives, p. 317.

89. "A Dramatistic View of the Origins of Language: Part Two," op. cit., p. 452.

90. A Grammar of Motives, p. 190.

91. Ibid.
92. Ibid., p. 317.
93. Ibid., p. 136.
94. Ibid.
95. Nichols, "Burkean Criticism," op. cit., p. 83.
96. Paton, op. cit., p. 209. Cf. Immanuel Kant, Groundwork, tr. H. J. Paton, (London: Hutchison, 1948), pp. 427-455.
97. Counter-Statement, pp. 75-76, 154, and Attitudes toward History, pp. 3-33.
98. Attitudes toward History, pp. 171-175.
99. Rueckert, Kenneth Burke and the Drama of Human Relations, p. 15.
100. Ibid., p. 16.
101. On this aspect of Coleridge's intellectual and moral development, see Richard Haven, "Coleridge, Hartley and the Mystics," Journal of the History of Ideas, XX (October-December, 1959), pp. 477-494. On Cartesian dualism, see Arthur O. Lovejoy, "Cartesian Dualism and Natural Dualism," in The Revolt Against Dualism, 2nd ed. (LaSalle, Illinois: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1960), pp. 1-41. Cf. Bronowski and Mazlish, "The Method of Descartes," in op. cit., pp. 216-229; L. J. Beck, The Method of Descartes: A Study of the Regulae, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952).
102. Haven, op. cit.
103. Ibid.
104. See Herbert Piper, "The Pantheistic Sources of Coleridge's Early Poetry," Journal of the History of Ideas, XX (January, 1959), pp. 47-59.
105. Haven, op. cit.; Collingwood, op. cit., p. 213; Bronowski and Mazlish, op. cit., pp. 474-475.

106. See, for example, John Kemp, "Aesthetics and Teleology," in The Philosophy of Kant, (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 97-122.

107. See Elinor S. Shaffer, "Metaphysics of Culture: Kant and Coleridge's Aids to Reflection," Journal of the History of Ideas, XXXI (April-June, 1970), pp. 199-218. Cf. Rene Wellek, Emmanuel Kant in England: 1793-1838, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1931).

108. On the Kantian dialectic and its influence upon Fichte and Schelling, see, for example, Richard McKeon, "Dialectic and Political Thought and Action," Ethics, LXV (October, 1954), pp. 13-14.

109. The influence of German dialecticians upon Coleridge's views on imagination and imaginative reconciliation is a subject of considerable scholarship. Regarding the relationship of German ideas to Coleridge, see William Wimsatt and Cleanth Brooks, Literary Criticism: A Short History, (New York: Vintage Books, 1957), pp. 363-411. On the dialectical implications of Coleridge's theory of imagination, see Edward Bostetter, "Coleridge's Manuscript Essay on the Passions," Journal of the History of Ideas, XXX (January-March, 1970), pp. 99-108; Edward Casey, "Imagination: Imagining and the Image," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, XXXI (June, 1971), pp. 475-490; I. A. Richards, Coleridge on Imagination, (London: Methuen, 1950); Alice Snyder, The Critical Principle of the Reconciliation of Opposites as Employed by Coleridge, (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1918); Rene Wellek, Concepts of Criticism, ed. with introduction by Stephen Nichols, Jr., (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963), pp. 180-182. Cf. Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, ed. John Shawcross, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1907), 2 Vols.

110. Wimsatt and Brooks, op. cit., Snyder, op. cit., Wellek, op. cit.

111. A Grammar of Motives, pp. 411-413. On Kantian criticism in general, see Rene Wellek, "Kant's Aesthetics and Criticism," The Philosophy of Kant and our Modern World, ed. Charles Hendel, (New York: The Liberal Arts Press, 1957), pp. 65-89.

112. A Grammar of Motives, p. 317.

113. Burke's attack upon the positivistic-scientistic ideal of a neutral language is most compelling in his rhetorical defense of rhetoric and poetic meaning. See "Semantic and Poetic Meaning," in The

Philosophy of Literary Form: Studies in Symbolic Action, 2nd ed. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1967), pp. 138-167. Cf. A Grammar of Motives, pp. 238-241.

114. "'Kubla Kahn,' Proto-Surrealist Poem," in Language As Symbolic Action, op. cit., p. 209.

115. See Bronowski and Mazlish, op. cit., pp. 476-477.

116. Permanence and Change, p. 274; "Linguistic Approach to Problems of Education," op. cit., p. 259.

117. A Grammar of Motives, p. 174; The Rhetoric of Religion, pp. 174-175.

118. "Semantic and Poetic Meaning," op. cit. Regarding Cassirer's viewpoint, see Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, Vol. 1: Language, tr. Ralph Manheim, with introduction by Charles W. Hendel, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971); An Essay on Man, Bantam Matrix Edition, (Toronto: Bantam Books, 1970). Man has so enveloped himself in linguistic forms, artistic images, mythical symbols and religious rites, observes Cassirer, "that he cannot see or know anything except by the interposition of this artificial medium." Ibid., p. 25. Indeed instead of defining man as an animal rationale, he adds, "we should define him as an animal symbolicum." Ibid., p. 28.

119. "Semantic and Poetic Meaning," op. cit., p. 141.

120. See "Four Master Tropes," in A Grammar of Motives, pp. 503-517. As Burke concludes, "we could lay it down that 'what goes forth as A returns as non-A.' This is the basic pattern that places the essence of drama and dialectic in the irony of the 'peripety,' the strategic moment of reversal." Ibid., p. 517.

121. Ibid., pp. 503-505. Cf. Charles Feidelson, Symbolism and American Literature, Phoenix Book, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), pp. 65-72.

122. A Grammar of Motives, pp. 33-34, 503.

123. Ibid., p. 34

124. "Semantic and Poetic Meaning," op. cit., p. 144.

125. Ibid.

126. Ibid., p. 145.
127. Ibid.
128. Ibid.
129. Ibid., pp. 145-146.
130. C. E. M. Joad, Guide to Philosophy, Dover Edition, (New York: Dover Publications, 1957), p. 368.
131. See A Grammar of Motives, p. 97. Cf. "Mind, Body, and the Unconscious," in Language as Symbolic Action, pp. 63-80.
132. Permanence and Change, pp. 275-276; Cassirer, An Essay on Man, op. cit., pp. 29-45.
133. "Definition of Man," in Language as Symbolic Action, p. 20.
134. A Grammar of Motives, pp. xv-xxiii, 317.
135. Ibid., pp. xvi-xvii, 127-131. Cf. "Linguistic Approach to Problems of Education," op. cit., p. 299.
136. Ibid., p. 56
137. Ibid., pp. 21-58.
138. Ibid., p. 56.
139. Ibid.
140. Ibid., p. 57.
141. Ibid. Cf. "Semantic and Poetic Meaning," op. cit., pp. 141-146.
142. See, for example, Austin Warren, "The Skeptic's Progress," The American Review, VI (1935-36), pp. 193-213, and William Rueckert, Kenneth Burke and the Drama of Human Relations, op. cit., pp. 140-141.
143. See Kemp, "The Illusions of Speculative Metaphysics," in The Philosophy of Kant, op. cit., pp. 38-55; Paton, op. cit., pp. 23-24; Ernst Cassirer, Rousseau, Kant, Goethe, tr. James Gutmann, Paul Oskar Kristeller, and John Human Randall, Jr., (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1970). Cassirer endeavors to show that, despite

his profound differences with Rousseau, Kant shared with him an enthusiasm for the "pure idea of right." Ibid., p. 57.

144. "Definition of Man," in Language as Symbolic Action, pp. 3-24.
145. Ibid., p. 16.
146. Ibid.
147. Ibid., p. 19.
148. The Philosophy of Literary Form, p. 8.
149. Feidelson, op. cit., pp. 65-70.
150. Susanne Langer, Philosophy in a New Key: A Study in the Symbolism of Reason, Rite, and Art, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1942), pp. vii-viii, 21-22
151. A Grammar of Motives, p. xvi.
152. Bernstein, Praxis and Action, op. cit., p. 225.
153. Ibid., pp. 230-231.
154. Walter Kaufmann, Hegel: A Reinterpretation, Anchor Books Edition, (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1966), p. 296.
155. Morton White, The Age of Analysis, (New York: New American Library, 1965), p. 17.
156. William Barrett, Irrational Man: A Study in Existential Philosophy, Anchor Books Edition, (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1962), p. 158.
157. Ibid., p. 160.
158. Ibid., pp. 246-247.
159. J. N. Findlay, The Philosophy of Hegel: An Introduction and Re-examination, Collier Books Edition, (New York: Macmillan, 1962), pp. 14-15.
160. Kaufmann, Hegel: A Reinterpretation, op. cit., p. 1.

161. White, op. cit., pp. 16-17.
162. Ibid., p. 17.
163. J. N. Findlay, "The Contemporary Relevance of Hegel," in Language, Mind and Value, (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1963), p. 226.
164. See Herbert Marcuse, Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory, Beacon paperback edition, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960).
165. See Burke, "A Dramatistic View of the Origins of Language: Part Two," op. cit., p. 447 fn; The Rhetoric of Religion, op. cit., pp. 30-33. Cf. Marcuse, op. cit., vii-xiv; Kenneth Burke, "Postscripts on the Negative," The Quarterly Journal of Speech, XXXIX (April, 1953), pp. 209-216.
166. A Rhetoric of Motives, pp. 19-23.
167. G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, tr. with introduction by J. B. Baillie, 2nd rev. ed. (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1949), pp. 228-240. For a penetrating discussion of Hegel's use of "Lordship and Bondage" in the study of "self-consciousness, see Richard Bernstein, Praxis and Action, op. cit., pp. 25-28. Burke addresses himself to the "bondage-freedom ambivalence" in the fifth act of the Curve of History: Emergent Collectivism. Attitudes toward History, pp. 164-165.
168. The Philosophy of Literary Form, p. 148. Cf. Findlay, The Philosophy of Hegel, pp. 23-24, 55-68.
169. A Grammar of Motives, p. 523; A Rhetoric of Motives. On positive, dialectical and ultimate terms, see pp. 183-189. Regarding hierarchy and mystification, see pp. 141-142.
170. Stanley Edgar Hyman, "Kenneth Burke and the Criticism of Symbolic Action," in The Armed Vision: A Study in the Methods of Modern Literary Criticism, Vintage Paperback Revised Edition, (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1955), p. 361.
171. Marcuse, op. cit., p. vii.
172. Kenneth Burke, "A Dramatistic View of the Origins of Language: Part One," XXXVIII (October, 1952), p. 252.

173. Ibid., pp. 251-252, and "Linguistic Approach to Problems of Education," op. cit., p. 282. As Burke puts it, the sociolinguistic nexus "is headed in the principle of negativity, the astounding linguistic genius of no, which merges so perfectly with the conscientious thou-shalt-not's of property."

174. See Bernstein, Praxis and Action, op. cit., pp. 14-23. The dialectic of Spirit, or Geist, is for Hegel a dynamic and organic process. One moment of this process, as Bernstein describes Hegel's theory of it, gives rise to its own negation when it is fully developed or understood. This isn't the mechanical explanation of thesis colliding with a foreign antithesis but rather a process somewhat "like that of a tragedy where the 'fall' of the tragic hero emerges from the dynamics of the development of his own character." "Out of this conflict and struggle," adds Bernstein, "out of this negativity, emerges a 'moment' which at once negates, affirms, and transcends the moments' involved in the struggle--these earlier moments are aufgehoben." Cf. G. W. F. Hegel, Reason in History: A General Introduction to the Philosophy of History, tr. with introduction by Robert S. Hartman, (New York: The Liberal Arts Press, 1953).

175. In the first section of Attitudes toward History, Burke "deals with those most basic of attitudes: Yes, No, and the intermediate realm of Maybe." See Introduction to Revised Second Edition, and "Part 1, Acceptance and Rejection," pp. 3-106, passim. Toward the end of this section, Burke notes that "Hegel 'transcended' by using a dialectic of historic process as a way of resolving metaphysical opposites." Ibid., p. 90. Burke incorporated these early observations about opposition and ambivalence and Hegel's "transcendent" dialectic into the dramatic view of the origins of language, which considers the negative as a marvel of language. The dramatic starting point, as distinguished from Hegel, Bergson and others who have written about negative thinking or the negative in nature, resides in problems of action rather than problems of truth or falsity. That is, dramatism approaches the negative in terms of command. "A Dramatic View of the Origins of Language, Part One," op. cit., pp. 252-254.

176. By the "cunning of Reason," Hegel means that the complex web of human passions serves the Idea, which is the active development of a general principle in history. The actions of men, to be sure, proceed from their needs, passions, characters and talents, and thus it seems that these needs, passions, interests, etc., are the sole springs of action. And yet these activities of men take place within the wider context of Spirit seeking to actualize itself. Indeed, the Idea cannot hope to actualize itself without engaging all human passions. Whatever the human tragedy, at any one moment in history, argued Hegel, it

somehow serves the more pervasive quest of a world-spirit for reconciliation with the estranged aspects of its self. Thus Hegel could write that history is a slaughter-bench at which the happiness of peoples, the wisdom of nations and the virtue of individuals have been sacrificed. But he could also contend that all of this has justifiable meaning as destruction; for it constitutes the means by which freedom in the world is ultimately realized. See Reason in History, op. cit., p. 27. That this philosophy presents the egoistic rationale for authoritarian and totalitarian regimes is widely acknowledged. But serious students of Hegel caution that the philosopher himself was not simply a political reactionary. He had profound respect for the Enlightenment ideals and understood the failures of the French Revolution. See Ernst Cassirer, "Hegel's Theory of State," in The Myth of the State, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1946), pp. 263-276, and Walter Kaufmann, "The Hegel Myth and Its Method," in From Shakespeare to Existentialism, op. cit., pp. 96-128.

177. Findlay, The Philosophy of Hegel, op. cit., pp. 62-63.

178. Rueckert, Kenneth Burke and the Drama of Human Relations, pp. 130-131. As Rueckert has noted, Charles Feidelson also comments upon Burke's tendency "to have reduced logic to literature." Symbolism in American Literature, op. cit., p. 264 fn.

179. Findlay, The Philosophy of Hegel, op. cit., p. 62.

180. See, for example, "A Dramatistic View of the Origins of Language: Part Two," op. cit., p. 447 fn for Burke's comments on Hegel's "Aufheben," and Bernstein, Praxis and Action, op. cit., p. 18 for an explanation of the term in the context of Hegel's dialectic. Cf. Findlay, The Philosophy of Hegel, op. cit., pp. 44-45.

181. A Rhetoric of Motives, p. 21.

182. Ibid.

183. Ibid., p. xlii. Cf. Attitudes toward History, pp. 263-273.

184. Hugh Dalziel Duncan, Communication and Social Order, op. cit., p. 159.

185. Otis Lee, Existence and Inquiry: A Study of Thought in the Modern World, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949), pp. 97-98.

186. Ibid., p. 119.

187. A Rhetoric of Motives, p. 25. There is no strife in absolute separateness, notes Burke, but when a mediatory ground is present to make their communication possible, opponents can join battle. Cf. A Grammar of Motives, pp. 34, 240 fn.
188. A Grammar of Motives, pp. 403-406; A Rhetoric of Motives, pp. 23-27.
189. Lee, op. cit., pp. 122-123.
190. "A Dramatistic View of the Origins of Language: Part Two," op. cit., p. 460.
191. "Definition of Man," in Language as Symbolic Action, op. cit., pp. 11-12.
192. On the development of dialectic in German philosophy from Kant, through Fichte and Schelling, to Hegel, see Richard McKeon, "Dialectic and Political Thought and Action," Ethics LSV (October, 1954), pp. 13-14.
193. Bernstein, Praxis and Action, op. cit., p. 27. Cf. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, op. cit., pp. 236-237; Burke, Attitudes toward History, pp. 164-165.
194. Bernstein, Praxis and Action, op. cit., pp. 27-28; Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, op. cit., pp. 236-238.
195. "Rhetoric and Poetics," in Language as Symbolic Action, pp. 301-302.
196. A Rhetoric of Motives, p. 25.
197. Ibid.
198. Permanence and Change, p. 69.
199. See Findlay, "The Contemporary Relevance of Hegel," op. cit., p. 220, and "How Hegel Actually Uses His Dialectic," in The Philosophy of Hegel, op. cit., pp. 68-73. On the dialectic of Hegel's Logic and the somewhat different process of reasoning in The Phenomenology, see Kaufmann, Hegel: A Reinterpretation, op. cit., pp. 183-187.
200. Findlay, "The Contemporary Relevance of Hegel," op. cit., p. 219.

201. Permanence and Change, p. 167.
202. Findlay, "The Contemporary Relevance of Hegel," op. cit., p. 219.
203. Ibid.
204. Ibid., p. 220.
205. Ibid.
206. Ibid.
207. Findlay, The Philosophy of Hegel, op. cit., p. 22.
208. Findlay, "The Contemporary Relevance of Hegel," op. cit., p. 218.
209. Findlay, The Philosophy of Hegel, op. cit., p. 23.
210. Permanence and Change, p. 109.
211. Ibid., p. 110.
212. See, for example, John Passmore, "Logical Positivism," in A Hundred Years of Philosophy, (London: Duckworth, 1957), pp. 369-393.
213. Findlay, "The Contemporary Relevance of Hegel," op. cit., p. 221. On Burke's criticism of the positivist ideal of a neutral language, see "Semantic and Poetic Meaning," in The Philosophy of Literary Form, pp. 150-152, and A Grammar of Motives, pp. 238-241. Burke has devoted himself to finding terms that clearly reveal the strategic spots at which ambiguities necessarily arise rather than to chasing after terms that avoid ambiguity. In this respect, Burke's rebuke of Russell's logical atomism is as strong as Wittgenstein's reaction against the movement to describe the structure of atomic propositions. Both men embody the Hegelian desire to overcome the rigidities offered by a language solely dedicated to fixity and definiteness. Both renounce the extreme stress on the independence of notions.
214. Findlay, The Philosophy of Hegel, op. cit., p. 57-61.
215. G. W. F. Hegel, The Logic of Hegel, tr. William Wallace, 2nd ed., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1892), 81, p. 190. Wallace's translation is based on the first section of Hegel's Encyclopaedia and,

as Bernstein points out, is frequently called The Lesser Logic so as to distinguish it from Hegel's Science of Logic. See Bernstein, Praxis and Action, op. cit., p. 17 fn.

216. Findlay, The Philosophy of Hegel, op. cit., p. 61-64.
217. Ibid., p. 63.
218. Ibid., pp. 63-64.
219. Ibid., p. 64.
220. Ibid.
221. A Rhetoric of Motives, p. 183.
222. Ibid., p. 184.
223. Ibid., pp. 186-187.
224. Ibid., p. 187.
225. Ibid., pp. 187-189, 328-333.
226. Ibid., pp. 190-191.
227. Rueckert, Kenneth Burke and the Drama of Human Relations, op. cit., p. 209.
228. A Rhetoric of Motives, p. 188.
229. A Grammar of Motives, p. XIX.
230. As quoted in Kaufmann, Hegel: A Reinterpretation, op. cit., p. 157.
231. See Rueckert, Kenneth Burke and the Drama of Human Relations, op. cit., p. 5.
232. Hegel, as Kaufmann observes, was not an optimist. "He never shared the view that gained ground in the later nineteenth century, and beyond that until 1914, that happiness had grown throughout history, and that ultimate happiness was around the corner. Nor did he believe that gradually so much had been learned from history that at long last tragedy was avoidable." Hegel: A Reinterpretation, op. cit., p. 253.

See also, Burke, Attitudes toward History, pp. 314-320. The dispossessed have used a rationale of history as a first step toward the repossession of the world. This is like owning a "myth", which takes up the slack between what is desired and what is got. This operates in capitalist, Fascist and Communist environments, whereby the alienated (oppressed) justify their work by investing in a rationale of history. Ibid., p. 315.

233. See Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, op. cit. Cf. "What is Dialectic," in Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge, Torchbook Edition, (New York: Harper, 1968), pp. 312-336.

234. See, for example, George Herbert Mead, "The Romantic Philosophers--Hegel," in Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century, ed. Merritt Moore, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1936), pp. 127-152

235. See Richard Bernstein, "From Hegel to Darwin," in John Dewey, (New York: Washington Square Press, 1967), pp. 9-21. Cf. Morton G. White, The Origin of Dewey's Instrumentalism, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1943).

236. A Grammar of Motives, p. xxi.

237. Ibid., p. 18.

238. Ibid., p. 19.

239. On Rudolf Haym's criticism of Hegel, see Kaufmann, Hegel: A Reinterpretation, op. cit., pp. 83-86, 112. On Popper's criticism, see The Open Society and Its Enemies, op. cit. Regarding the critique of criticism of Hegel's theory of the state, see Kaufmann, "The Hegel Myth and Its Method," in From Shakespeare to Existentialism, op. cit., pp. 95-128. Haym's work, in the original, is Hegel und seine Zeit: Vorlesungen über Entstehung und Entwicklung, Wesen und Wert der Hegelschen Philosophie, (Berlin: 1857).

240. See Bernstein, Praxis and Action, op. cit., pp. 38, 54 Cf. G. W. F. Hegel, The Philosophy of Right, tr. with notes by T. M. Knox, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953). A most astute examination of Marx's indebtedness to Hegel's political thought is Shlomo Avineri's "The Hegelian Origins of Marx's Political Thought," The Review of Metaphysics, XXI (September, 1967), pp. 33-50.

241. Hegel, Reason in History, op. cit., p. 27. Cf. Cassirer, The Myth of the State, op. cit., pp. 268-270.
242. Nicholas Lobkowitz, Theory and Practice: History of a Concept from Aristotle to Marx, (South Bend: University of Notre Dame Press, 1967), p. 143.
243. See Avineri, op. cit., pp. 41-42; Bernstein, Praxis and Action, op. cit., pp. 35-41.
244. Bernstein, John Dewey, op. cit., pp. 11-12.
245. See, for example, William Barrett, Irrational Man: A Study in Existential Philosophy, op. cit., pp. 156-161; Bernstein, Praxis and Action, op. cit., pp. 100-105, 130-139.
246. See Bernstein, Praxis and Action, pp. 230-231; Kaufmann, From Shakespeare to Existentialism, op. cit., pp. 95-96.
247. See Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The German Ideology: Part One, "With Selections from Parts Two and Three and Supplementary Texts," Ed. C. J. Arthur, (New York: International Publishers, 1970).
248. A Grammar of Motives, p. xv.
249. Marx's letters to the young Hegelian, Arnold Ruge, written mostly from 1842 to 1844, are contained in Karl Marx, Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society, ed. Loyd Easton and Kurt Guddat, Anchor Book Edition, (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1967). See p. 214.
250. A Grammar of Motives, p. 317.
251. Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, op. cit., p. 37.
252. Rueckert, Kenneth Burke and the Drama of Human Relations, op. cit., p. 242.
253. Louis Dupre, The Philosophical Foundations of Marxism, (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1966), p. viii.
254. Robert C. Tucker, Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx, 2nd ed., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), p. 12.

255. Shlomo Avineri, The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), p. 65.
256. Ibid.
257. Erich Fromm, Marx's Conception of Man, with a translation of the "Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts" by T. B. Bottomore, (New York: Frederick Ungar, 1961), p. 9.
258. Charles Glicksberg, "Kenneth Burke: The Critic's Critic," in Critical Responses to Kenneth Burke, op. cit., p. 75.
259. Walter Sutton, "Selections from 'Modern American Criticism,'" in Ibid., p. 372.
260. Henry Bamford Parkes, "Kenneth Burke," in Ibid., p. 112.
261. A Rhetoric of Motives, p. 101.
262. Ibid., p. 105.
263. Ibid., p. 109.
264. Nicholas Lobkowitz, "Preface" in Marx and the Western World, ed. Nicholas Lobkowitz, (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1967), p. ix.
265. George Lichtheim, The Concept of Ideology, (New York: Vintage Books, 1967).
266. Shlomo Avineri, The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx, op. cit.
267. David McLellan, The Thought of Karl Marx: An Introduction, (New York: Harper and Row, 1971).
268. Louis Dupre, The Philosophical Foundations of Marxism, op. cit.
269. Henri Lefebvre, The Sociology of Marx, (New York: Vintage Books, 1969).
270. Nathan Rotenstreich, Basic Problems of Marx's Philosophy, (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965).

271. Robert Tucker, The Marxian Revolutionary Idea, (New York: Norton, 1969), and Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx, op. cit.
272. Erich Fromm, Marx's Conception of Man, op. cit.
273. Karl Korsch, Marxism and Philosophy, tr. with introduction by Fred Halliday, (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970).
274. Georg Lukacs, Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein, (Berlin: Der Malikverlag, 1923).
275. Leszek Kolakowski, "Karl Marx and the Classical Definition of Truth," in Toward a Marxist Humanism, tr. Jane Zielonko Peel, (New York: Grove Press, 1968); "The Priest and the Jester," in The Modern Polish Mind, ed. M. Kuncewicz, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1965). Cf. The Alienation of Reason, (New York: Doubleday, 1968).
276. Adam Schaff, "Alienation and Social Action," Diogenes, LVII, (Spring, 1967), pp. 64-82.
277. See, for example, Iring Fetscher, "The Young and the Old Marx," in Marx and the Western World, op. cit., pp. 19-20, and Louis Dupre, "Dialectical Philosophy Before and After Marx," New Scholasticism, XLVI (Autumn, 1972), pp. 501-502.
278. Henri Lefebvre, Dialectical Materialism, tr. John Sturrock, (London: Jonathan Cape, 1968), pp. 13-14.
279. The Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 are contained in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Historish-Kritische Gesamtausgabe, ed. D. Rjazanov and V. Adoratskij, (Frankfurt-Berlin: Marx-Engels Verlag, 1927-32). [Referred to by Marxian scholars as MEGA]. See also Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, tr. M. Milligan, (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961), and the T. B. Bottomore translation in Fromm, op. cit., pp. 93-196.
280. Karl Marx, Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Okonomie, 2 Vols., (Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute, Moscow, 1939). [Reissued in one volume (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1953)].
281. Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, op. cit. For a more complete version, see R. Pascal, ed., (New York: International Publishers, 1939).
282. Fetscher, in Marx and the Western World, op. cit., p. 23.

283. Marx Wartofsky, "Comment on Fetscher's 'The Young and the Old Marx,'" in Ibid., p. 40.

284. Ibid. The difference between the young and old Marx, reasons Wartofsky, "is no more than the difference between the earlier programmatic statements and the elaboration and fulfillment of this program in the mature work; for in a clear sense, the analysis of capitalist production and exchange is the elaborated critique of 'sensuous-practical' human activity in its concrete form, in commodity production."

For a similar view, see Michael Harrington, Socialism, Bantam Edition, (New York: Bantam Books, 1973), pp. 41-49. For an indication of the view that the older Marx abandoned the earlier themes of alienation for the intensive study of political economy, see, for example, the orthodox Communist Louis Althusser, For Marx, (New York: Vintage Books, 1969), and the liberal, democratic Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology, Rev. Ed. (New York: Collier Books, 1961).

285. Wartofsky, in Marx and the Western World, op. cit., p. 41.

286. Ibid.

287. Sartre's phenomenological ontology endeavors to expose the Marxian dream of ultimate freedom by countering that man cannot escape from unhappy consciousness. And yet he eventually turns to Marxism and declares it to be the only humanistic philosophy available at this time in history. This attempt to blend existentialism and Marxism is itself a subject of much study, with students of Sartre's work often embroiled in controversy over his early and late stages. His prodigious work, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology, tr. with introduction by Hazel Barnes, (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956), delves deeply into the Hegelian concept of identity and ends on a kind of dispassionate nihilism. But his Critique de la raison dialectique, (Paris: Gallimard, 1960) attempts to relate Marx's notions of alienation and consciousness to the modern social and political temperament and suggests the winning of freedom through action in concrete situations. On the issue of Sartre's Marxism, see George Lichtheim, Marxism in Modern France, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966).

288. Maurice Merleau-Ponty has made an ambitious attempt to explain, from a phenomenological perspective, the role of language in keeping man close to reality and in developing a sense of community among men. His humanism is drawn from the philosophical Marx. See, for example, Signs, tr. Richard McCleary, (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1964).

255. Shlomo Avineri, The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), p. 65.
256. Ibid.
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261. A Rhetoric of Motives, p. 101.
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277. See, for example, Iring Fetscher, "The Young and the Old Marx," in Marx and the Western World, *op. cit.*, pp. 19-20, and Louis Dupre, "Dialectical Philosophy Before and After Marx," New Scholasticism, XLVI (Autumn, 1972), pp. 501-502.
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280. Karl Marx, Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Ökonomie, 2 Vols., (Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute, Moscow, 1939). [Reissued in one volume (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1953)].
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289. Tucker, Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx, op. cit., pp. 23-24.
290. Gaston Fessard, S.J., "Is Marx's Thought Relevant to the Christian? A Catholic View," in Marx and the Western World, op. cit., p. 342.
291. Permanence and Change, pp. 162-163, 271-272; Attitudes toward History, pp. 173-175. The comic frame is based upon acceptance of this world, though it has self-reflexive value in helping man to locate the irrational and non-rational in his life. It cautions against too great a reliance on moral indignation which often leads to cynical brutality.
292. Margaret Schlauch, "Review of Attitudes toward History," Science and Society, II, (1937-1938), p. 132.
293. See, for example, A Grammar of Motives, pp. 441-443; A Rhetoric of Motives, pp. 110-114; "Linguistic Approach to Problems of Education," op. cit., pp. 299-301.
294. As Bernstein has noted, Marx "was constantly engaging in self-criticism" but this commitment to internal evaluation "is not a characteristic that has always played a fundamental role in many of his followers and disciples." Even Marx, adds Bernstein, often failed to provide "the norms of critical inquiry, by which it can continually refine and correct itself." Praxis and Action, op. cit., p. 308.
295. Ibid., p. 309. Cf. John Dewey, The Quest for Certainty: A Study of the Relation of Knowledge and Action, Capricorn Edition, (New York: G. P. Putnam, 1960), pp. 216-222.
296. A Rhetoric of Motives, p. 102; A Grammar of Motives, pp. 441-443.
297. A Rhetoric of Motives, pp. 109-110.
298. Richard McKeon, Freedom and History: The Semantics of Philosophical Controversies and Ideological Conflicts, (New York: The Noonday Press, 1952), p. 48.
299. A Grammar of Motives, p. 201.
300. Ibid.
301. Ibid., p. 127.

302. Rueckert, Kenneth Burke and the Drama of Human Relations, op. cit., p. 130. Cf. Burke, Attitudes toward History, pp. 171-175.
303. Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, op. cit., p. 48.
304. Ibid., p. 49.
305. Ibid., pp. 51-52.
306. As Grene had noted, Aristotle's instructional strategy in the Lyceum was often to refute prevalent conceptions of nature and methodology because they hindered clear thinking. "Both the problems, and the solutions, of older thinkers, must be wrestled with before the proper, Aristotelian approach to a given subject can be successfully undertaken." A Portrait of Aristotle, op. cit., p. 115.
307. Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, op. cit., p. 42.
308. Permanence and Change, pp. 275-276.
309. See, for example, Benjamin De Mott, "The Little Red Discount House," The Hudson Review, XV (1962), pp. 551-564.
310. A Rhetoric of Motives, p. 107.
311. Ibid., pp. 107, 109.
312. Bernstein, Praxis and Action, op. cit., p. 41 fn.
313. Ibid.
314. Counter-Statement, 2nd ed. (Los Altos, California: Hermes Publications, 1953).
315. "Afterward to Second Edition," Attitudes toward History, op. cit., pp. 345-347. Cf. "Prologue," Permanence and Change, 2nd Rev. Ed., op. cit., pp. xvii-lix.
316. John Crowe Ransom, "Mr. Burke's Dialectic," The New Republic, CXIV (February 18, 1946), p. 257.
317. A Grammar of Motives, p. xvii.
318. Hugh Dalziel Duncan, Symbols and Social Order, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 253.

319. Hugh Dalziel Duncan, Symbols in Society, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 13.
320. Permanence and Change, pp. 275-276.
321. Attitudes toward History, pp. 341-342; George Herbert Mead, Mind, Self, and Society, ed. Charles Morris, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934); John Dewey, Experience and Nature, (New York: W. W. Norton, 1922), and Art as Experience, (New York: Minton, Balch and Company, 1934).
322. The Philosophy of Literary Form, pp. 379-388.
323. See Duncan, Communication and Social Order, op. cit., p. 56.
324. A Grammar of Motives, pp. 236-238.
325. The Philosophy of Literary Form, p. 1. Cf. Bernstein, "The Artistic, the Esthetic, and the Religious," in John Dewey, op. cit., pp. 147-165.
326. See Charles Feidelson, Symbolism and American Literature, Phoenix Book, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), p. 50. Cf. Alfred North Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, (New York: New American Library of World Literature, Inc., 1959); Process and Reality, (New York: Harper and Row, 1960); Science and the Modern World, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1933).
327. Dewey, Experience and Nature, op. cit., p. 368. Regarding Dewey's theory of art as communication and Mead's association with this theory, see Duncan, Communication and Social Order, op. cit., pp. 49-72.
328. See Kenneth Burke, "Dramatism," International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, (New York: Macmillan and Free Press, 1968), Vol. 7, pp. 445-447; "Linguistic Approach to Problems of Education," op. cit., pp. 259-260. A Grammar of Motives, pp. 227-274, passim.
329. A Grammar of Motives, pp. 275-281.
330. Mead, Mind, Self and Society, op. cit., pp. 137-145.
331. See, for example, Bernstein, John Dewey, op. cit., pp. 81-88. Cf. John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, (New York: New American Library, 1950).

332. The Philosophy of Literary Form, pp. 379-382.
333. A Grammar of Motives, pp. 236-238.
334. See George Herbert Mead, George Herbert Mead on Social Psychology, ed. Anselm Strauss, Phoenix Book, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), pp. 199-246. [This section first published in Mind, Self and Society, op. cit., pp. 135-226.] See also, Duncan, Communication and Social Order, op. cit., pp. 73-81.
335. George Herbert Mead, The Philosophy of the Act, ed. Charles Morris, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938), p. 374.
336. "Introduction," in George Herbert Mead on Social Psychology, op. cit., p. xii.
337. George Herbert Mead, Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century, ed. Merritt Moore, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1936), pp. 75-77.
338. Ibid., p. 77.
339. Ibid., p. 75.
340. Ibid.
341. Hegel, Reason in History, op. cit., p. 69.
342. Mead, Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century, op. cit., pp. 138-139.
343. Ibid., p. 139.
344. Ibid.
345. Robert Langbaum, "The Mysteries of Identity: A Theme in Modern Literature," The American Scholar, XXXIV (Autumn, 1965), p. 570.
346. See Paul Pfueteze, Self, Society and Existence, Torchbook Edition, (New York: Harper, 1961), p. 300; Mead, Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century, op. cit., p. 148.
347. Pfueteze, op. cit., pp. 300-301. See also his The Social Self, (New York: Bookman Associates, 1954).

348. See Mead, George Herbert Mead on Social Psychology, op. cit., pp 274-276.
349. Mead, Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century, op. cit., p. 375.
350. Ibid.
351. Duncan, Communication and Social Order, op. cit., p. 76.
352. George Herbert Mead, The Philosophy of the Present, ed. Arthur Murphy, (Chicago: Open Court Publishing Company, 1932), p. 83.
353. Merritt Moore, "Introduction," in Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century, op. cit., p. xxxiv.
354. Mead, The Philosophy of the Present, op. cit.
355. Ibid., pp. 83-84.
356. See, for example, George Herbert Mead, "A Behavioristic Account of the Significant Symbol," Journal of Philosophy, XIX (1922), pp. 157-163; "The Social Self," Journal of Philosophy, X (1913), pp. 374-380.
357. Pfuetze, Self, Society and Existence, op. cit., p. 300.
358. Ibid.
359. Mead, The Philosophy of the Present, op. cit., pp. 86-87; Dewey, Democracy and Education, (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1916), pp. 100-101. Cf. Freedom and Culture, (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1939).
360. The Philosophy of Literary Form, p. 380.
361. Ibid., pp. 379-382.
362. A Grammar of Motives, pp. 236-238.
363. Ibid., pp. 237-238.
364. Ibid., p. 252.
365. A Rhetoric of Motives, p. 21.

366. A Grammar of Motives, p. 236.
367. "Linguistic Approach to Problems of Education," op. cit., pp. 259-260; Bernstein, John Dewey, op. cit., pp. 154-155.
368. A Grammar of Motives, p. 227.
369. Ibid., p. 61.
370. Ibid.
371. Ibid. Cf. The Rhetoric of Religion, op. cit., pp. 8, 47-48, 174-175.
372. Duncan, Symbols in Society, op. cit., pp. 18-19, 30.
373. Duncan, Communication and Social Order, op. cit., pp. 109-110; Burke, "What are the Signs of What," in Language as Symbolic Action, pp. 378-379.
374. The Philosophy of Literary Form, p. 379.
375. Ibid., p. 380.
376. See Permanence and Change, p. 275.
377. Rueckert, Kenneth Burke and the Drama of Human Relations, op. cit., p. 57.
378. Permanence and Change, pp. 283-286. Cf. The Rhetoric of Religion, pp. 7-42.
379. The Philosophy of Literary Form, p. 379.
380. A Grammar of Motives, pp. 237-238.
381. Ibid.
382. Mead, Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century, op. cit., pp. 135-137.
383. Burke, "A Dramatistic View of the Origins of Language: Part Two," op. cit., p. 447 fn.
384. The Philosophy of Literary Form, p. 381.

385. Ibid., p. 380.
386. Ibid.
387. Ibid.
388. "Linguistic Approach to Problems of Education," op. cit., p. 285.
389. The Philosophy of Literary Form, pp. 382-391.
390. Ibid., p. 387.
391. Ibid., p. 388.
392. Ibid., p. 387.
393. Ibid., pp. 386-387, 390.
394. Ibid., p. 387.
395. "Linguistic Approach to Problems of Education, op. cit., p. 286.
396. Ibid.
397. John Dewey and James Tufts, Ethics, (New York: Henry Holt, 1952), pp. 350-351.
398. A Rhetoric of Motives, p. 324.
399. Ibid., pp. 328-333.
400. Dewey, Freedom and Culture, op. cit., pp. 102, 148.
401. Bernstein, John Dewey, op. cit., p. 138.
402. Ibid., pp. 139-141.
403. Passmore, A Hundred Years of Philosophy, op. cit., p. 172.
404. John Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, (New York: Henry Holt, 1938). As Dewey suggests, all logical forms arise within the operation of inquiry and bear upon the conduct and control of inquiry. The end in view is the warranted assertion. Dewey means, in effect, that

standards and norms evolve, are tested and refined, through inquiry and serve to guide further inquiries. Ibid., pp. 3-5.

405. Passmore, A Hundred Years of Philosophy, op. cit., pp. 173-174.

406. See John Dewey, "Philosophies of Freedom," in John Dewey on Experience, Nature and Freedom, Ed. Richard Bernstein, Library of Liberal Arts Paperback, (New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1960), pp. 286-287.

407. See John Dewey, "Creative Democracy--The Task Before Us," in Classic American Philosophers, ed. Max Fisch, (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1951), pp. 393-394.

408. Dewey and Tufts, Ethics, op. cit., p. 351.

409. Ibid. Cf. Bernstein, John Dewey, op. cit., pp. 115-129.

410. On the application of Dewey's ethics to deliberation in international affairs, see Germain Grisez, "Moral Objectivity and the Cold War," Ethics, LXX (July, 1960), pp. 293-299.

411. Dewey argued that a person or a nation, for that matter, cannot keep its personality open unless it cares more for a common good than for itself. Indeed, the change to a common good makes morals more personal than they were when custom ruled. Ethics, op. cit., p. 350.

412. "Linguistic Approach to Problems of Education," op. cit., p. 262; Permanence and Change, p. 276.

413. A Grammar of Motives, p. xix.

414. A Rhetoric of Motives, p. 275.

415. Ibid., p. 283.

416. Richard Weaver, Language Is Sermonic, ed. Richard Johannesen, Rennard Strickland, and Ralph Eubanks, (Baton Rouge; Louisiana State University Press, 1970), p. 175.

417. On the nature of dialectic as a symbolic activity that occurs in an autonomous realm of meaning, see Feidelson, Symbolism and American Literature, op. cit., p. 68, and Mortimer Adler, Dialectic, (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co., Ltd., 1927), pp. 24-25.

418. Kenneth Burke, "Rhetoric--Old and New," The Journal of General Education, V (April, 1951), p. 204; The Rhetoric of Religion, p. 8.

419. A Grammar of Motives, pp. 421-430; A Rhetoric of Motives, pp. 324-328.

420. Permanence and Change, p. 235.

421. See Bernstein, John Dewey, op. cit., p. 177.

422. "Linguistic Approach to Problems of Education," op. cit., p. 262.

423. Permanence and Change, p. 276.

424. Ibid., p. 275.

425. A Grammar of Motives, pp. 441-443.

426. Ibid.

427. "Definition of Man," in Language as Symbolic Action, pp. 16-20.

428. See title page, A Grammar of Motives.

429. A Grammar of Motives, pp. 441-443; "Linguistic Approach to Problems of Education," op. cit., pp. 299-301.

CHAPTER VI

KENNETH BURKE AND THE DIALECTICAL TRADITION

Some years ago, in "The Philosophic Bases of Art and Criticism," Richard McKeon observed that Kenneth Burke belonged to that school of literary and artistic criticism relying heavily on dialectic and analogy.¹ As McKeon saw it, Burke was closest in attitude and critical method to those who discussed art adequately by discussing something else, who examined the meaning of art "by means of other phenomena" and thus "borrowed the principles and terminology of aesthetics and criticism from some fashionable science, from semantics, psychoanalysis, or economics, from sociology, morals, or theology."² Which was to contend that Burke saw the art object and the art experience as being determined by circumstances and requiring principles of explanation drawn from varied and diverse fields, such as social psychology, history and biology.

Moreover, observed McKeon, Burke could be associated with those critics stressing philosophical principles expressed in terms of "'process' and 'symbol' interpreted . . . analogically in a dialectic of being and becoming . . ."³ By defining his terms through analogical method, Burke, in McKeon's opinion, was actually basing his principles for discussion on a fundamental metaphor or metaphors, such as synecdoche, which stood as a basic figure of speech for the structure of

poetry as well as for the structure of human relations outside poetry. In this respect, Burke, like Coleridge, conceived of poetry as vision, symbolic-action, life experience, etc., and thus he could generalize or specify any one of these to determine "a sense in which all men, or the best of men, or the best of some peculiarly fortunate kind of men, are poets or poems."⁴

Through analogy, Burke, as McKeon suggested, was able to apply the critical principles of other schools to his own dialectical framework. He could, for example, methodologically relate poet, poem and audience to each other under a fundamental metaphor "(as when experience, symbolic act, or creation characterize all three)."⁵

The dialectical mode of criticism which, as McKeon suggested, seemed to fit Burke, is distinguished from other modes of aesthetic analysis in significant ways. For one thing, the dialectical mode seeks full universality of subject matter and scope.⁶ Second, it demands a great dialectician or poet--in the hands of a lesser critic, this mode "deteriorates to timid and common-sense apologies for what seems extravagant or sophistical in the moral judgment of art..."⁷ Third, the dialectical mode tends toward the differentiation of terms in application to subjects and their reduction in the solution of problems."⁸ These tendencies pertained, say, to Plato, Kant, Marx, and Dewey, whether the particular concern was "being," "knowledge," "history," or "inquiry," or whether the reduction was to "things," "faculties of the

mind," "laws of social development," or "processes and events."⁹

Whatever the treatment of art, the context is usually synoptic analysis and the driving motive or hope is that the inquiry will "become scientific and the object of art or the appreciation of art will become an instance of physiological, psychological, sociological, ethnological, economic, or psychopathic phenomena, to be explained, used, and, when the circumstances warrant and the techniques are adequate, even cured as such."¹⁰

Finally, dialectical criticism, through its reductive impetus, endeavors to incorporate and reconcile all of the prevalent literal critical modes into its own framework. It may, for instance, draw upon Aristotle's scientific criticism, such as the analysis of tragedy which depends upon a criterion of unity and structure. It may use the poetic mode of criticism, which proceeds from the conceptions and expressions of great authors and uses them as touchstones for other statements. It may, moreover, draw upon the scholarly mode which reconstructs the author's character and significance from the intensive examination of his life work. It may, in addition, use the technical mode of criticism, which concentrates on those factors pleasing or instructing audiences. It may utilize formal criticism, which accentuates the work itself and analyzes it, as composition, into constitutive parts so as to evaluate the effectiveness or appropriateness of devices to purposes. Whatever the borrowing, however, the dialectic spirit seems to encourage using all

that there is to use for the sake of some overarching perspective or statement about humankind.¹¹

McKeon's article was written before Burke had finished A Grammar of Motives--the work that seems to have initiated the grand dramatic vision, although earlier works forecasted Burke's synoptic demeanor. And yet the association of Burke with the dialectical mode of criticism remains entirely appropriate in the light of the dramatist's subsequent writings. Unlike McKeon's article, this study does not concentrate on the problems of literary and artistic criticism. But it does substantiate McKeon's early insight into Burke as a dialectical critic tending toward synoptic analysis and a comprehensive view of human problems. It supplements McKeon's observations by probing into the dialectical resources of Burke's language-centered system and by focusing upon pertinent philosophical sources associated with dialectic from whom Burke took significant ideas and methods in the development of dramatism.

As a concluding perspective, this chapter attempts to place Burke, as dramatist, in the dialectical tradition. First, it considers the themes of man as craftsman, as critic, and as logician, which stem from this tradition. Second, it summarizes the main ingredients of Burke's dialectical outlook which tie him to philosophers in the tradition, albeit the distinctive orientation of dramatism. Third, it reviews the major dialectical ideas and methods that he has incorporated into his language-centered system. Finally, it reiterates Burke's particular

attachments to Hegel and Marx--an area of influence that has thus far received but minimal treatment by students of Burke.

Man as Craftsman-Critic-Logician

Kenneth Burke's dramatism owes much to three important themes in the dialectical tradition: man as craftsman, as critic, and as logician. These themes serve to unify the otherwise disparate philosophical views of Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, Marx, Dewey and Mead, from whom Burke has borrowed in the fashioning of dramatism-logology. As concerns the theme of craftsmanship, Burke sees life as a kind of poem in the making. Man crafts his existence in relation to the determinants of his natural and social environments, which he is often capable of altering or modifying through symbolic action and through the material inventions made possible by linguistic activity. Man is a symbolic artist, so to speak, who necessarily approaches the objects of the material world "in accordance with the genius of his nature as a symbol-human species."¹² Man's linguistic artistry is dramatism's "literal" concern. It focuses upon his differentia--the capacity for symbolic action--and charts the myriad ways in which he imposes the "socioanagogic" element upon the extralinguistic domain of pure motion.¹³

Moreover, Burke sees man as a critic. As with all other living organisms, man interprets many of the signs about him.¹⁴ Unlike other living creatures, however, man alone has the power of meta-criticism. "Though all organisms are critics in the sense that they interpret the

signs about them," says Burke, "the experimental, speculative technique made available by speech would seem to single out the human species as the only one possessing an equipment for going beyond criticism of experience to a criticism of criticism."¹⁵ In this regard, Burke has developed a logologic, a meta-perspective of symbolic activity, that ascends to the conceptual level of pondering "words about words." The Rhetoric of Religion, for example, is concerned "not directly with religion, but rather with the terminology of religion, not directly with man's relationship to God, but rather with his relationship to the word 'God.'"¹⁶ Dramatism concentrates on theological doctrine as a body of words, especially "'words about' God."¹⁷

Finally, Burke accepts man's logical capabilities. He does so in the sense that the human species, because of its symbolicity, contrives vast and intricate social networks, based upon "rights" and "obligations." Man, argues Burke, builds a logic of ownership and property through symbolic action. He constructs elaborate social, political and legal systems by creating terminologies of "'right,' 'justice,' 'beauty,' 'propriety,' 'truth,' 'the good life,' etc., in which the logic of a given social order comes to an ideal, theoretic head."¹⁸

Man's logical capabilities, notes Burke, have led to technological achievements as well as to social systems. Language makes reason possible, and reason, in turn, helps man to fashion what Burke calls "the materials of our second nature." Which is to contend that

man's material achievements are but "externalizations of internal aptitudes."¹⁹ The inventing of something, suggests Burke, is not merely an "act;" it is a rational act. What makes this phenomenon so paradoxical, in Burke's view, is that symbolic action too often culminates in a complex of technological inventions that mother their own necessity. Hence the ironic situations where man is seemingly outwitted by the end-products of his language-induced reason. He finds himself the servant of the very mechanical servant he has created.²⁰

Man's logical faculties have been most awesomely displayed in the philosophical tradition. Each philosophical school, notes Burke, has relied upon logic to construct and defend its worldview. Each has endeavored to present the ultimate rationale for man and his position in society and nature. In the restricted sense, rationalism refers to those philosophies treating reason "as the very ground and substance of reality, somewhat as though, instead of saying, 'a philosophy of the universe,' one were to say, 'the universe is a philosophy.'"²¹ In a larger sense, however, rationalism is implicit in all philosophies. It is, as Burke suggests, "intrinsic to philosophy as a medium, since every philosophy attempts to propound a rationale of its position, even if it is a philosophy of the irrational."²²

As with all philosophical constructs, dramatism has its rationale, although its focus is symbolic action and its ontological basis is the "act." Dramatism is rationalistic in a dialectical sense. For "an

explicit approach to language as a dialectical structure admonishes us both what to look for and what to look out for, as regards the ways of symbolic action (and no statement about motives can ever be anything other than symbolic action)."²³ The dramatic project is also rationalistic in that it seeks, "by a rationale of language, to chart methodically the 'non-rational' and 'irrational' aspects of language. . ."²⁴ This second task, says Burke, is somewhat akin to the rationalism of Freud's psychoanalysis.

The Dialectical Outlook

Kenneth Burke's demeanor is that of the dialectician: a concern for opposites or antitheses and their resolution, a relentless critical mind that turns upon prevailing intellectual assumptions as well as upon itself and an overwhelming desire to gather the seemingly fragmented, disparate facts of human existence into a coherent, organic vision that grasps the meanings of the human drama in its historical contexts.

As dialectician, therefore, Burke is very much in keeping with the general dialectical outlook that has characterized the dialectical tradition. His philosophical disposition is closest to McKeon's description of the dialectical orientation, as contrasted with the orientations of logic and inquiry, albeit Burke's ability to blend the methods of these other two into the critical framework of dramatism. As with the eminent thinkers of the tradition, Burke has striven for a comprehensiveness of vision through the development of comprehensive principles. In his

particular case, however, this has meant principles of symbolic activity, rather than Platonic Forms, Hegelian Spirit or Marxian laws of social development.

In a second sense, the comprehensive-dialectical disposition has focused on the dialectical aspects of life itself. Plato, for example, spoke of the dialectical implications of "this-worldly" passions and "other-worldly" yearnings. Kant concentrated on the basis for belief in the ethical-moral world and used the dialectical power of the antinomies to propound the categorical imperative. Without freedom of the will, he reasoned, no moral law and no moral responsibility are possible. Hegel placed the endeavors of mankind in the context of the dialectic of Spirit, whose reconciliation with the estranged aspects of its self meant freedom for the world. And Marx contemplated the laws of social development, the dialectical forces inherent in each socio-political era and historical stage which were leading inexorably to the definitive, cooperative communist life. For Burke, each one of these viewpoints constitutes an ingenious symbolic approach to human motivation and must be studied pentadically as philosophical idiom and persuasive system.²⁵ And yet, for all its grammatical, rhetorical and symbolic scrutiny of philosophical schools as languages, dramatism shares with the dialectical perspectives especially the inclination to delve into the dialectical dimensions of existence. For Burke, this is done through a study of language as symbolic action, which is the key to the comprehension of human

relations. As Burke sees it, language itself, as motive, is inherently dialectical, as it contains the grounds for identification and alienation, merger and division, war and peace, and so on. It is language per se that adds the peculiar possibility of the Negative to nature, and the Negative is integral to dialectical thought. Hence all terminologies, even the scientific, positivistic ones which constantly disdain dialectical activity, are dialectical because, at base, they are mere words. "All enterprises are dialectical which would cure us through the medium of words. . . ."26

In the linguistic context, then, Burke emerges as a student of the dialectics of social-moral-artistic life. Instead of the Platonic Forms and the Kantian categories, however, there is the dramatistic stress upon the forms of appeal and the internal relationships of the pentad's terms as "categories which human thought necessarily exemplifies."²⁷ These are "'forms of talk about experience.'"²⁸ Instead of Hegelian oppositions in nature, there are oppositions in language, which get ideas to roll in uncanny and unexpected ways. Instead of Marx's alienated labor, homo faber, there is dramatism's stress on alienation through symbolism, homo symbolicus. What with these differences, nevertheless, Burke participates in the common preoccupation with the dialectical dimensions of life.

Burke's quest for a comprehensive view and his attention to the dialectics of life have involved him in yet a third aspect of the dialectical

outlook, namely, determinism, which appears in different forms, in dialectical philosophers from Plato to Hegel and Marx. Determinism, as Brand Blanshard has defined it, "is the view that all events are caused."²⁹ An event, says Blanshard, is "any change or persistence of state or position."³⁰ By saying that an event is caused, he adds, one is suggesting "that the event is so connected with some preceding event that unless the latter had occurred the former would not have occurred."³¹ Indeterminism is the denial of this view. "Everyone vaguely knows that to be undetermined is to be free," continues Blanshard, "and everyone wants to be free."³² For Hegel this meant that man's historical activities were determined by ideas which constituted "the logical framework within which alone a world of nature and men, of unthinking being and thinking beings, was possible."³³ For Marx, who boasted of standing Hegel's dialectic on its head, determinism was synonymous with a kind of historical naturalism--i.e., "the principle that historical events have natural causes."³⁴ For Burke, who has pinpointed the metaphysical implications of Hegelian and Marxian attempts to ground agent in scene,³⁵ determinism occurs through the resources of language itself. For language is motive. It drives man to hierarchy and order, initiates the cycle from the Fall through purification to redemption, and generates the quest for perfection--the entelechial paradox whereby man's symbol-making capacity compels him to attain the ideals implicit in the very attempt to name something by its "proper" name.³⁶ In sum, "there are sheerly technical

reasons, intrinsic to the nature of language, for belief in God and the Devil . . . "37

And yet, for all his eloquence on the intrinsic power of language in shaping human relations, Burke has, at the same time, propounded a theory of rhetoric based upon choice, upon freedom of action. His rhetorical theory is anchored to a doctrine of consubstantiality, and "a doctrine of consubstantiality," as he puts it, "either explicit or implicit, may be necessary to any way of life. For substance, in the old philosophies, was an act; and a way of life is an acting-together . . ."38

Moreover, persuasion itself implies opportunity to act upon others and to convince them to believe or do something. "Persuasion involves choice, will; it is directed to a man only insofar as he is free."39 This perspective places Burke in the company of Aristotle, Kant, Mead and Dewey who talked of free will in the realm of ethics. For Aristotle, rhetoric was an offshoot of the ethical branch of politics, and its counterpart, dialectic, provided the preliminary conceptual investigation into ideas which were then artfully presented to the public. The pragmatism of Mead and Dewey pays homage to the contingent nature of Aristotelian ethics and to the value of rhetoric and dialectic in a society that sees its very processes of decision-making as being indicative of its tolerance and civility.

How, then, does Burke attempt to reconcile the seemingly contradictory inclinations toward determinism and freedom of action? The

answer lies in the dramatist's ability to see the "active" dimensions of so-called deterministic philosophies and to grasp the common theme from the Greeks, through the Germans, to the pragmatists: "praxis."

Burke does not employ this word. But he most assuredly grasps the significance of the concept it suggests when he observes that although Marxism grounds "agent in scene," it is "by reason of its poignant concern with the ethical [that] it requires the systematic featuring of act."⁴⁰ In effect, Burke recognizes the simultaneous concern with determinism and freedom of action in Marx's thought.

Undeniably, Marxist materialism and historicism, as concepts, appear to critics of this philosophy to collide with the call for "revolutionary praxis." But for Marx and his various disciples, generally speaking, there is no contradiction between the theory of inexorable forces moving societies to communism and the conscious activities of the proletariat in shaping events as agents of revolution. First of all, though Marx tended to focus on individuals as personifications of particular class relations and class interests, he readily conceded that an individual is more than the personification of a class and that, in a sense, class relations and interests are unreal entities as they are abstractions (by thought) from the real social context. Individuals are real, concrete beings who change, often capriciously so, in a changing world. Indeed, human nature is not static but changing. Thus man makes himself by acting. And by acting, he enters into the ethical realm. As Marx

consistently remarked, philosophers had only interpreted the world in various ways, but the real task is to alter it. Knowing must end in action.⁴¹

But the question remains, if man makes his own history, then why do Marxists come to trumpet the inevitability of economic forces making society what it is? The contention is that although man makes his own history, he does not make it out of conditions chosen by himself, but out of those material things at hand. Which is to say that material conditions are a framework within which man's freedom operates. While it is true, argues Marx, that mind influences matter, it is equally true that matter influences mind. In fact matter is the ultimate determiner.

Marx argues, in effect, that economic forces shape society and thus the attitudes, desires, wishes of men. Granted, within this framework men enjoy a certain vitality or quasi-independence to then modify economic forces and influence events; for as agents they do act upon matter. But the emphasis must be upon historical processes and upon the institutions that inevitably shape desires, wishes, attitudes at a given state of social development.⁴²

The active (or, for the Marxist, quasi-independent) dimension of existence, says Burke, leads, by way of language, to rhetoric--the hortatory life. Marxists, notes Burke, have paraded their philosophy as a science, as the apprehension of the laws of social development, when, in fact, it is but another philosophical idiom, with grammatical, rhetorical

and symbolic implications.⁴³ Much of the rhetorical strength of the Marxist dialectic, observes Burke, "comes from the fact that it is 'ultimate' in its order. And by reason of this symbolic fact," he adds, "a spokesman for the proletariat can think of himself as representing not only the interests of that class alone, but the grand design of the entire historical sequence, its final outcome for all mankind."⁴⁴

By recognizing the active dimension of Marx's philosophy, Burke has also sensed its pragmatic ties to, say, Dewey and Mead. That is, Marx accents the instrumentalist position that knowing is for the sake of doing and that it arises in relation to problems that demand solutions. He stresses socialization as a force in the shaping of values, attitudes and wishes, and he observes that particular truths and theories of truth must be seen relative to the historical stage in which they are presented and sustained. What Marx fails to see, as distinguished from pragmatists like Dewey and Mead, is that communication is a constitutive, not residual, category in the study of society.⁴⁵ Burke aligns himself, as dramatist, with the non-ideological movement of American philosophy that recognizes the importance of rhetoric in the inconclusive deliberations over values and policies.

Notwithstanding his pragmatic disposition, Burke entertains the problem of determinism versus freedom of action by being conspicuously "both-anded" about the issue, as was Marx. Instead of matter or economic forces, Burke concentrates on the inherent motive power of language

in the development of social order and in the fashioning of movements. But he likewise considers the opportunity for each individual, at least in a politically "open" society, to create a unique personality and to choose values and a life-style within "the Scramble, the Wrangle of the Market Place, the flurries and the flare-ups of the Human Barnyard, the Give and Take, the wavering line of pressure and counterpressure, the Logomachy, the onus of ownership, the Wars of Nerves, the War."⁴⁶ The use of language itself, therefore, seems to invite continuous speculation over ends and means in human relations. Barring effective authoritarian suppression of speech and writing, there will be interminable squabbles about what is desirable in life and how best to attain a given goal. The constant dialectic over values and policies in democratic life presumes an environment conducive to freedom of choice.

Burke's linguistically-based approach to the determinism-freedom issue also draws heavily upon Kantian philosophy and the crucial distinction between the phenomenal and noumenal realms, the realms of is and ought. Burke updates the Kantian distinction between the deterministic physical-biological level of existence and the ethical, choosing level of free will to substantiate the dramatistic thesis that man is generically a biological organism yet specifically a symbol-using animal. This is not to say that symbolism is reducible to biology--it isn't--but rather to assert that "the ideal terminology must present his symbolic behavior as grounded in biological conditions."⁴⁷ Whereas Kant talked

about the empirical self and the moral, or transcendental self, Burke considers the implications of man as motion and as action. It is in the latter sphere of life, he argues, that man conceptualizes a symbolic analogue to his sheerly biological need for property. That is, man superimposes "rights" and "obligations" upon rudimentary properties of living, such as food and shelter. When symbolism is treated as motive, says Burke, it becomes clear that man chooses his rights and conceives laws that result in "obligations."⁴⁸ Consciousness of this symbolic fact--or a sense of linguistic skepticism--leads to the acknowledgement of the role of freedom, of choice, in the deliberative world. As Kant had reasoned, two centuries prior to Burke, consciousness of moral obligation is inextricably bound up with the consciousness of freedom, of the self that wills--the transcendent self. Man may have strong instructive tendencies to act this way, reasoned Kant, but when one says that he ought to act that way, one implies freedom to act in that way, since it is nonsense to say that a man ought to do what he cannot do.⁴⁹ As Burke has put it with regard to rhetoric, only when men are potentially free (from necessity and dictatorship) is persuasion relevant. For "insofar as they must do something, rhetoric is unnecessary, its work being done by the nature of things, though often these necessities are not of a natural origin. . ."⁵⁰

For Kant, the feeling of moral obligation cannot be accounted for on phenomenal lines. While psychology, for instance, can declare what

man is and what he wants to do, it cannot tell him with equal authority what it is his duty to do. Beyond the analysis of man's antecedents and character, the analysis of what he is and how he is thus disposed to act, there remains the fundamental fact that he can act differently--that he can urge a course of action which seems to contradict his instinctive tendencies.⁵¹

Burke puts the argument in a somewhat different context, given the dramatic emphasis on the linguistic imperative and its general opposition to the mysticism and idealism in the Kantian system and the ironies attending the notion of the transcendent Self.⁵² Nevertheless, like Kant, he manages to account for both the deterministic and free dimensions of human existence. "If man is the symbol-using animal," he states, "some motives must derive from his animality, some from his symbolicity, and some from mixtures of the two."⁵³

Dialectical Ideas and Attitudes

In the development of dramatism, Burke has addressed himself to numerous ideas and methods flowing from the dialectical tradition. He has, for example, placed the idea of the "returning to the self" in a linguistic context. He has updated the concept of "nisus" and the classical notion of the "entelechy" in a philosophy of symbolic action that stresses the entelechial paradox provided by the very nature of language itself. He has assumed the critical, self-conscious disposition that pervades the tradition from Socrates, through Hegel and Marx, to

Dewey. He has quested, through relativism and skepticism, for a total vision of mankind and, like recent thinkers, he has grappled with the hopes and dreams of the Enlightenment: the victory of science and reason over irrationality, ever-increasing happiness and progress, the ultimate triumph of justice. Burke has confronted these beliefs from the standpoint of man's linguistic behavior and the determinants of his lexical code. Salvation for him lies not in the escape from history but rather in the Neo-Stoic stance of linguistic skepticism that cautions against utopian thinking yet hints at moral victory of a sort through the very study of symbolic action itself.

The theme of the "returning to the self" stems from the Neo-Platonist, Proclus, who claimed "that the course of the world is governed by a process with three stages: unity (mone), going out of oneself (prohodos), and return into oneself (epistrophe)."⁵⁴ This idea, as Dal Pra has noted, can be associated with a biological matrix which appears eventually in Hegel's "Idea" and Marx's theory of alienation.⁵⁵ The highlight of this matrix is the concept of "generation," also developed by Aristotle, which describes a begetter who, as the cause of the begotten, is also the model of its movement and the point at which its conversion is accomplished.⁵⁶ The belief in the return of every being to that from which he proceeds is explained by Proclus as the essence of the circular concept of process. Specifically, "every being desires good and this is achieved through its nearest cause; in fact the way by which each being

achieves existence; he also achieves good."⁵⁷ Paradoxically, this model of generation sees the relationship between father and son as marked by both continuity and negation. The son, in taking the father's place in the sequence of life, pushes him to the side; as the continuation of the father, however, the son preserves the sire's character and heredity.

This biological model, when applied to theology, conferred great authority on it, though it also tended to obliterate its anthropomorphic origins. Still, it provided Hegel's "Idea" and Marx's historical perspective with the motive power of salvation. That is, the biological model served Hegel's notion of history "as a process of thought-production on the part of the thinking spirit,"⁵⁸ and Marx's notion of history, which takes "the practical developmental process as the primary datum and the human thought-process as its reflex."⁵⁹

As concerns the concept of "returning," Hegel saw the movement of the "Idea" from its initial containment within itself, to the achievement of independent existence, with the accompanying paradox of alienation, to the reunification with itself, which heralds freedom for the world. For his part, Marx saw the movement of mankind from an initial containment in nature, to an independent existence as "homo faber," with the accompanying estrangement from the world incurred by the productive consequences of its own economies, to the ultimate reconciliation with its species-being (and nature) in Communism.⁶⁰

While Burke's dramatism departs significantly from both classical and Nineteenth Century philosophical constructs, it nevertheless makes considerable use of the biological model. The theme of "returning" pervades Burke's view of the self in quest which is for him, as Rueckert has observed, "an extraordinarily complex lifelong ritual of death and rebirth, rejection and acceptance, purification and change, disintegration and re-integration. . ."⁶¹ At first, Burke depended upon a Marxian-oriented "curve of history" for an overall perspective of man's movements.⁶² Within this construct he used "alienation" as a term designating "that state of affairs wherein a man no longer 'owns' his world because for one reason or another, it seems basically unreasonable."⁶³ He conceived of "Emergent Collectivism," Act Five, as the time when man "repossesses the world' somewhat by forming allegiance to a new rationale or purpose . . ."⁶⁴ Ultimately, however, Burke jettisoned the political ideology of the "curve" for a more comprehensive linguistic, secular equivalent of the Christian story of salvation.

Man, in Burke's opinion, is separated from his natural condition by linguistic instruments of his own making, and yet he yearns to conform to the sources of his being. (Ironically, man has used language--it is part of his essence--to remove himself terministically from both the physical and social worlds.) Man's fall from grace is in part caused by his neurological capacity for reasoning. It might be more appropriate to say that, dramatically, language and reasoning (for the two are often

inseparable) constitute the very factors causing the guilt and sin that man struggles to overcome; for communication and reason make possible the vast network of social relations and the hierarchical order whose commands and injunctions he will accept, challenge or defy during the drama of human relations.⁶⁵

The irony of generation suggested in the biological model's relationship of father and son is evident in Burke's observations on the coexistence of merger and division, unity and dissociation, and so on. For man's biological composition authenticates his place in the natural world and yet the potential for language, built into his cells, is inevitably exploited by him to the point of separation from nature, his sire. In another respect, the terministic screens that he fashions out of his language-capacity are soon interposed between himself and the raw occurrences of the world, with the result of fragmented descriptions of the natural whole from which he was generated.

The concept of "nîsus" is most conspicuous in Burke's thesis that language is inherently perfection-oriented and that it involves its makers (users-misusers) in the quest for abstract ideals that can never be fully realized. In the classical sense, "nîsus" denotes the ultimate irony of a thing whose purpose it is to strive to attain an ideal that lies beyond attainment. It is the notion of something not altogether succeeding in being itself. As R. C. Collingwood has noted, this entelechial phenomenon is apparent not only in the thinking of Plato and Aristotle but

also in Hegel's speculations (and, it must be added, in the Kantian categorical imperative).⁶⁶

For Aristotle, development implied "nisus"--a movement or process, as Collingwood puts it, "not merely oriented towards the realization in bodily form of something not yet so realized but actually motivated by the tendency towards such realization."⁶⁷ And yet, in Aristotle's estimation, the thing never quite becomes itself. For Plato, the issue was even more paradoxical. The conception of the ideal state, for example, cannot be exactly realized in any actual state; for human nature cannot organize itself into a perfect embodiment of that conception. Nevertheless what is essential to the form itself is the demand that the ideal state be realized. The form sends human nature on a quest it cannot shirk but also never hope to accomplish. Similarly, Kant's antinomies, in exposing the uncertainties of rival metaphysical beliefs, come upon the irony that human reason longs for categorical truth, on the one hand, but that it cannot verify claims that overleap experience, on the other hand. The persistent quest for certainty is universal, he suggests, but the consummation of that quest is "beyond reason." Hegel accepts the outline of this particular theory and incorporates it into his "weltanschauung" that all natural things are engaged in a process of becoming but that they never quite succeed in realizing perfect embodiments of their own forms. (Hence the crucial meaning of the disparity between appearance and reality in Hegelian thought.)⁶⁸

The entelechial paradox is resurrected by Burke when he contends that language promotes the conception of ideals which cannot be perfectly realized. When he remarks that man is "rotten with perfection," Burke means, first of all, that "the mere desire to name something by its 'proper' name, or to speak a language in its distinctive ways is intrinsically 'perfectionist,'" ⁶⁹ but on a more profound level, he means that man has a "'terministic compulsion' to carry out the implications of [his] terminology," which frequently results in a petition to God (through the employment of "god-terms"). ⁷⁰ In other words, "there are sheerly technical reasons, intrinsic to the nature of language, for belief in God and the Devil," and yet Burke realizes, in the more nearly Kantian sense, that man would have to transcend experience to verify the ontological truth or falsity of the object of his petition. ⁷¹

As dialectician, Burke has assumed a particular critical disposition that characterized the leading philosophers in the tradition. This critical disposition is structured around the exigency of heightened consciousness. This is evident not only in the philosophical demeanors of Kant, Hegel, Marx, and Dewey but also in the philosophical and/or social commentary of thinkers such as Dilthey, Nietzsche, James, Sorel, and Veblen. Each critic attempted to strip away the pretenses of society and penetrate to the core of its ills. But this necessitated an understanding of incongruity, of the ways in which social and natural existence joined the seemingly variant, often incompatible, aspects of life.

Moreover, it demanded the courage to face one's own intellectual prejudices and rationalizations and to adopt an attitude of self-correction. The dialectical mentality requires constant surveillance of one's own postulates and acknowledgement of competing theories and facts which might undermine them.

Burke has exhibited a dialectical turn of mind throughout his critical career, not only by attempting to make the world aware of its linguistic acts but also by acknowledging his own potential for theoretical excess. He has engaged in a kind of running guerrilla warfare with the prevailing frameworks of the era and yet maintained a "comic" temperament devoted to the acceptance of his own foibles. His mission has been to promote maximum consciousness through dramatism's methodology of exposure. His more specific objective has been to get men to see that they are looking at the world through a fog of symbols--to provoke them, through the methodic study of symbolic action, to see "behind the clutter of the machinery, both technological and administrative, which civilization has amassed in the attempts to live well" and thus to grasp "the basic motives of human effort . . ." ⁷² A crucial facet of this orientation is "perspective by incongruity," which Burke defines as "a method for gauging situations by verbal 'atom cracking.'" ⁷³ It is a methodology of the pun in that it "links hitherto unlinked words by rational criteria" (similar to the pun's occupation of linking hitherto unlinked words by tonal association). ⁷⁴ "It is 'impious' as regards our linguistic categories

established by custom."⁷⁵ As with his ancestors in the dialectical tradition, then, Kenneth Burke, though from a symbol-centered outlook, has understood that "incongruity is the law of the universe; if not the mystic's universe, then the real and multiple universe of daily life."⁷⁶

In its endeavor to direct men to an appreciation of their linguistic acts, dramatism absorbs yet another ingredient of the dialectical tradition: the critique of ideology. Modern analyses of ideological constructs incline toward the styles and investigative techniques of Marx, Nietzsche, Veblen and, in a more pragmatic vein, Dewey. From all of these thinkers, Burke has learned much, though Marx's and Engels' German Ideology provides invaluable hints for demystification and demythification (even to the point, in Burke's view, of exposing the rhetoric of Marx and Engels).⁷⁷

Upon the critical-dialectical foundation, Burke has constructed a language-centered analysis of ideology. In its most intricate form, it becomes "socioanagogic" criticism, whereby the dramatist assesses everything as social allegory and mystery.⁷⁸ Socio-political life, marked by hierarchical composition, depends upon the primary fact of man's linguistic capability. That is, hierarchy and social order are linguistic products since they are symbolic constructs made possible only by the tendency toward abstraction, hierarchic modes of thought and the negative. Whereas Marx, Nietzsche and others would dwell upon the manipulation of the symbol system by those advancing the

predominant rationales of the era, Burke would, at the onset, consider ideology itself as a linguistic entity; in this regard, the basic problems of order and disorder, hierarchy and anarchy, merger and dissociation, etc., are rooted in the nature of language. Albeit this crucial contrast in emphasis, Burke's criticism is nonetheless indebted to the styles of his critical forerunners.

Throughout the history of philosophic thought, the dialectical modes of criticism have been accompanied by skepticism and relativism-- i.e. the inclination to doubt prevailing beliefs and the disposition to regard the postulates of competing systems as equally efficacious or spurious. No doubt influenced by Hegel, Marx and Dewey, for instance, approached "truth" from a contextual vantage-point. They argued that the particular era, with its distinctive religious, economic, social and political orientations, molded man's conception of what is valuable and what is right, of the "good life," that is. Medieval man's vision of truth, for instance, coincided with the synthesis of Christian faith and classical reason. This orientation melded Aristotle's hierarchical philosophy and syllogistic methodology with Augustine's faith and other-worldliness. Its motive forces were transcendence of the external world, personal immortality, the sacraments and original sin. The Enlightenment, on the contrary, tended to deny the doctrinal core of Christianity; it repudiated any kind of transcendence of this world, personal immortality, the sacraments and original sin. It elevated reason above faith and

revelation, championed its role in the discovery of nature's laws and in the movement of humanity (progress) to effective and efficient control of the social and physical environments and thus to a better life on earth.⁷⁹

Philosophers engaging in contextualistic criticism have long argued for a realization of the powerful influence that all social institutions exert on the shaping of human beliefs and belief systems. Marx and Dewey especially stressed the significance of the complex of social, economic, religious and political institutions in fashioning modes of moral and ethical behavior. Thus, they tended to repudiate claims to encompassing truth (though Marx was to defy his own contextualism with the apocalyptic vision of economic forces and the "laws" of social development). Marx and Dewey, in their respective ways, often suggested that the intellectual, moral, methodological and socio-political prejudices of a given time constrained the thought of even the most daring and expansive intellect. Thus views of the world, presented as all-encompassing, turned out to be merely partial. Although Marx eventually turned Hegel's dialectic "on its head," so to speak, and although Dewey ultimately rejected Hegel's metaphysics, both took from him the evolutionary approach to the development of thought forms.⁸⁰

Ironically, however, the skepticism and relativism (contextualism) of philosophers in the dialectical tradition served as building-blocks for a synoptic view of life. Dialectical activity, after all, admits of both analysis and synthesis. It tears ideas apart and yet puts them back

together again, usually through the reconciliation of what originally appeared to be antithetical elements. In this regard, Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, Marx and Dewey were skeptics only to the extent that doubt served to clear away theories and opinions precluding the apprehension of some higher truth. For Plato it was the Forms, for Aristotle the first principles of the theoretical sciences, for Kant, the moral imperative, for Hegel Spirit's quest for unity with itself, for Marx the laws of social and economic development, for Dewey the organic view of man ever in the process of growth as he interacts with his social and natural environments.

With this in mind, it should be easier to grasp the meaning of Kenneth Burke's skepticism and relativism, his drive for the dramatic-synoptic vision of human relations and his organic view of art. Burke's critics once upon a time chastized him for his skeptical wanderings, but the past four decades have witnessed an astonishingly enterprising attempt to resolve the conflicting orientations of the various philosophical eras through the language-centered perspective of dramatism.

Burke's early skepticism makes little sense unhinged from the mature dramatist's vision of man and the drama of human relations. To reiterate a crucial point, his system "is a coherent and total vision, a self-contained and internally consistent way of viewing man, the various scenes in which he lives and the drama of human relations enacted upon those scenes."⁸¹ This signifies his need for synthesis, for a final, certain statement about man and the universe.

Actually, the drive for total vision began early in Burke's critical career. It is suggested in Counter-Statement where Burke attempted to unify the dominant theories of art. It intensified in The Philosophy of Literary Form and came to fruition in A Grammar of Motives when he laid out his theory of substance which maintains that the essence of anything is equal to the sum of its attributes. Which is to say that the value of the pentad and its ratios lies in the search for the sum of each verbal act's functions and range of meanings. (Richard McKeon, as previously noted, has cited Burke's dialectical approach to literary criticism as one which endeavors to absorb numerous other approaches, and William Rueckert has added that Burke's criticism tries to analyze functions and techniques and then correlate means and ends.)⁸²

The drive for total vision is apparent in the stories and critical articles of the "twenties" where, to quote Gorham Munson, Burke "yearned for some consensus omnium bonorum, some radical faith, some group of commonly accepted assumptions, upon which he might rest untroubled by skepticism."⁸³ Eventually, of course, Burke attained his high theoretical peak from which to assess the panorama of symbolic existence. The drive seems to culminate in the notion of universal order and hierarchy as worked out in A Rhetoric of Motives. Here, the dramatist apprehends the linguistic implications of the idea of the great chain of being. He asserts that language, itself as motive, induces the kind of symmetry found in Aristotle's metaphysics, with its hierarchically

arranged classes of being headed "in God as the beloved cynosure and sinecure, the end of all desire."⁸⁴ In sum, Burke's thoughts on order and hierarchy provided his system with a sense of closure by 1950, although he has continued to elaborate upon and refine the study of language as symbolic action in subsequent years. The mature Burke's identity as a system-builder tempers the appraisal of his early criticism as the offerings of an inveterate iconoclast.

Dramatism as a total and coherent vision of symbolic man and the drama of human relations thus nullifies the charges levied against him by his early critics who, in the manner of Austin Warren, accused him of emphasizing the dangers of intellectual retreat to certitude without himself arriving at some "terminus of conviction."⁸⁵ Yet Burke's system is able to encompass an array of orientations: skepticism, relativism, contextualism and any other attitude or disposition which can be subordinated to the larger task of explaining the human symbolic condition. An excellent indication of this lies in his notion of "terministic screens." On the one hand, he contends, each terministic screen "can be valued for the light it throws upon the animal," since "there will be as many world views in human history as there are different people."⁸⁶ Thus "no one's 'personal equations' are quite identical with anyone else's."⁸⁷ On the other hand, "each one of us shares with all other members of our kind the 'fatal fact' that . . . all members of our species conceive of reality somewhat roundabout, through various media of symbolism."⁸⁸

An assessment of Burke's place in the dialectical tradition depends upon an understanding of the ways in which he has grappled with the profound themes of the Enlightenment--themes that even today constitute motive forces for Western politics, economics and social life in general. The Enlightenment overturned the framework of Medieval man; it has also provoked counter-arguments from those stressing the irrational, tragic and absurd dimensions of human existence. Burke's attention has, of course, been directed to every historical framework and its symbolic significance. His "curve of history," as previously noted, is an attempt to explain "frames of acceptance and rejection" and "collective poems" which have been "evolved by the widest group activities."⁸⁹ Combining the poetic, dramatic and historical in his inimitable way, though the influences of Spengler and Marx are undeniably important, Burke considers five significant acts in the historic drama, from Christian evangelism to emergent collectivism. He sweeps through the dominant issues preoccupying mankind in each framework; he confronts and reconsiders the seminal ideas abounding in the Western conscience since the dawn of reason and of faith; he assesses the linguistic impetus of the crosscurrent of world perspectives and charts the myriad ways in which symbolic constructs both associate with and disassociate from each other.

And yet of all the frameworks covered, the Enlightenment seems to have occupied Burke's mind, sometimes for the sake of acceptance and sometimes for ultimate modification or rejection. The Enlightenment

stands as the basis of the modern democratic temperament and also as foundation for the belief in technological industrial-scientific progress. Its generally optimistic view of life changed man's orientation from heavenly to earthly salvation. It repudiated the Christian version of the Fall, of original sin and other-worldly salvation. Its positivistic mentality yearned for a rigorous science that would overcome the social crises which vexed civilization and thwarted the "good life." It held out the possibility of never-ending progress. It authorized man's natural virtue and engendered concepts of individualism which today underpin both capitalist economic theory and constitutionally-guaranteed liberties. It invested immense hope in technology and science which, ironically, preoccupy the major contemporary Communist nations as well as those belonging to the so-called Western alliance. It nurtured the visions of Nineteenth Century thinkers such as Hegel and Marx who foretold of the inevitable arrival of freedom and justice for mankind.⁹⁰

In the half-century that he has developed and then refined dramatism, Kenneth Burke has stood within, aside from and against the combination of values just described. His early commitment to Marxism, for instance, assumed some of the Enlightenment ideas pervading Marx's own thought. And yet, to the surprise of his literary and political colleagues, Burke ensconced himself in a philosophy of "being" rather than "becoming."⁹¹ He reached back to the classical and medieval worlds of nouns rather than committing himself to the evolutionary world of verbs.

He accepted the pragmatic contributions of, say, Dewey and Mead but not the attendant belief in progress. (Though greatly respectful of Dewey, Burke has rejected "his references to the 'conquest' of nature.")⁹²

By accentuating the importance of language itself as motive, Burke has reinterpreted the basis for man's various historical frames of reference. He does not accept the Christian explanation of man as empirical fact, to be sure, but he does maintain that language generates an equivalent of the purgative-redemptive cycle. Man must perpetually confront the phenomena of guilt, disobedience, ambition and perfection, victimage and mortification. These have been constants since man developed as a symbol-user and mis-user, although the themes are played out in endless variations. Language itself has an entelechial power which generates and sustains such tendencies over the course of history.

Dramatism accepts the inevitability of human foibles and traits that Enlightenment thinkers believed could be eventually eradicated or, at the very least, successfully controlled. Burke's humanism accords with a tragic-comic view of life and a resignation to man's drive for order and hierarchy. His linguistic-oriented project cautions against utopianism, especially the brand advanced by revolutionists whose frenzied calls for the end of human aggressiveness have ironically been supplemented by physical aggression. Dramatism, with its vantage-point of linguistic skepticism, continually warns about the tendency to make men virtuous. While Marx himself, for example, saw some of the difficulties

arising out of Enlightenment optimism, he nonetheless helped to legitimize Faustianism--"ambition as a disease"--by envisioning a new state of affairs for mankind that included the Enlightenment ideals of science, moral certitude, justice, and widespread artistic accomplishment. Underlying these ideals was a belief in the triumph of reason.

At one time, Burke shared the Marxian dream of a post-historical, or newly-historical, era of freely associating men devoted to artistic life. His poetic-humanistic approach to Marx's philosophy suggested that he had been enchanted by the possibility of a poetic orientation in the collective environment. The poetic perspective remains, of course, a vital element of dramatism. But Burke's maturing comprehension of the nature of reason has led him to repudiate the illusory and excessive claims of the optimists. His project admonishes all to beware of the dark side of reason. The irony is that reason both invigorates choice and provokes guilt. On the one hand, man has for centuries possessed the power of logic through the power of language. For the Greeks especially, rationality arose out of "right talking," and mankind at that time felt itself a part of the great logical schema of the universe. "Logos" and "Analytika" made it possible for him to articulate the order of the cosmos and the overwhelming feeling that this was actually possible persisted through subsequent centuries, whose leading philosophical spokesmen accepted the correspondence of reason and reality, of logic, mathematics and geometry with truth. On the other hand, reason and rationality play a

significant role in the formation of guilt. Burke is closest to existentialism when he chides the purveyors of scientific rationality for beclouding the moral-ethical dimension of existence--a dimension that deals with the fact that man is of guilt-laden substance.⁹³ Contemporary orientations, he asserts, overstress the "rational scientific categories of linkage" and understress the "emotional categories."⁹⁴ Attention must be paid to both, especially as they bear upon ambition. For dramatism is actually an educational project which, in its very essence, is negative, but of a paradoxical sort--it is "Faustological," centering on ambition as a disease.⁹⁵

Hegel and Marx in the Dialectical Tradition

Burke's particular attachments to Hegel and Marx have, for the most part, emerged through the discussion of man as craftsman-critic-logician, the dialectical outlook, and dialectical ideas and attitudes. It is best to merely reiterate the major contributions of both thinkers that Burke absorbs into dramatism. Since both Hegel and Marx are still so widely misunderstood, Burke's dependence upon them needs to be reviewed.

Hegel's importance to dramatism resides in his overall philosophical demeanor, bold speculations and distinctive views on logic, contradiction, language and thought. His views on negative thinking underpin Burke's examination of the nature of ethical-moral language. His delineation of the Understanding, Dialectic and Reason is the impetus

for Burke's own inquiry into positive, dialectical and ultimate terms. His self-conscious attitude has been an intellectual stimulus for Burke's own self-reflexive disposition. His notion of "aufheben"--which at once involves obliteration, preservation and transcendence-- has had a marked effect upon Burke's homage to dialectic and its capacity for reconciling seemingly opposing ideas. In other line of influence, Hegel's propensity for "interstitial" thinking and "notional deepening" pervades the methodology of dramatism. For one thing, Burke meditates upon what Hegel came to realize are the unclear corners of all living notions. Burke's unswerving conviction that symbolic analysis is inexhaustible, that one must probe a literary or oratorical piece from various perspectives or pentadic coordinates admits of the Hegelian insight that "all living notions imply more than they clearly cover, and in the further fact that it is natural for them to move or develop in certain ways as soon as they are subjected to unwanted pressures."⁹⁶ The Hegelian awareness that our basic ideas about time, being, matter, etc., can be upset by a subtle push from unusual examples (which set ideas or words rolling off in new directions) is resumed through Burke's own "perspective by incongruity."⁹⁷ The practice of examining a notion from deeper and deeper levels, a continuous penetration into an idea, this way and that, is but the Hegelian temperament accompanying Burke's propensity to "use all that there is to use" in critical analysis.⁹⁸ And, finally, it is Hegel's grand vision that has

helped to inspire Burke's synoptic bent--the quest for a total view of man and his drama.

Much of the Hegelian influence has, of course, been reinforced through Marx, despite the latter's endeavor to debunk the former's metaphysics. As in the case of his reliance upon Hegel, therefore, Burke has drawn upon Marx's self-consciousness, his relentless criticism for the exposure of the rhetoric of ideology, his variation of the Hegelian "auf-heben," and his encompassing grasp of the human condition in history.

The immense scope of Marx's corpus has undeniably impressed Burke and helped to fuel his own drive for an ultimate synthesis of the leading philosophies on the nature of man. Burke, as with Marx, has surpassed a particular discipline, whether it be literary criticism or political economy, to fashion a radical anthropology. Stanley Edgar Hyman was so incredibly close to Burke's life mission when he observed that the dramatist was attempting to unify every discipline and body of knowledge that could throw light on literature into one consistent critical frame.⁹⁹

In retrospect, Burke's poetic-humanistic approach to Marx was not so idiosyncratic after all. For Marx, contrary to standard interpretations of his work, actually fashioned a general conception of ultimate Communism as fundamentally aesthetic in character. Moreover he provided a great drama of human relations which Burke was quick to acknowledge. Both the "curve of history" and the "interlocked moments" draw

from Marx's insight in The Poverty of Philosophy that the dialectical relation between the individual and history can be expressed as a moment in which the internal unity of the two is constituted.¹⁰⁰ The uniting principle is the play! As Karel Kosik has shown, Marx characterized the materialistic idea of history as a method which investigates the real profane history of the people in each century.¹⁰¹ It also describes these people both as authors and actors of their own drama.¹⁰² Finally, Marx's view of history is a secular eschatology in that his expectation for the future victory of the proletariat is, in its fervor, akin to religious apocalypse. While Burke does not share Marx's hope of deliverance, he nevertheless relates his great moments, interlocked by the "Order" or "Covenant" cluster of terms, to the Christian story of salvation with its cycle of the Fall, guilt, purification and redemption.¹⁰³

Summary

Kenneth Burke's place in the dialectical tradition, as dramatist-logologist and literary critic, can be estimated by discussing his dependence upon Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, Marx, Dewey and Mead, within the context of: (1) man as craftsman-critic-logician; (2) the dialectical outlook; (3) dialectical ideas and attitudes; (4) reinterpretations of Hegel and Marx. Burke's indebtedness to these philosophers, and numerous others of course, is profound and his contact with dialectical methods and issues undeniably impressive. From Counter-Statement to the present decade of rounding out the dramatic system, Burke has

charted the ways of "homo dialecticus." As he suggests in Dialectician's Hymn, "the lines are meant to suggest that, insofar as man is the symbol-using animal, his world is necessarily inspirited with the quality of the Symbol, the Word, the Logos, through which he conceives it."¹⁰⁴ It reads, in part:

Let the Word be dialectic with the Way--
 Whichever the print.
 The other the imprint.
 Above the single speeches
 Of things,
 Of animals,
 Of people
 Erecting a speech-of-speeches--
 And above this
 A Speech-of-speech-of-speeches,
 And so on,
 Comprehensively,
 Until all is headed
 In Thy Vast Almighty Title,
 Containing implicitly
 What in Thy work is drawn out explicitly--
 In its plenitude.
 And may we have neither the mania of the One
 Nor the delirium of the Many--
 But both the Union and the Diversity--
 The Title and the manifold details that arise
 As that Title is restated
 In the narrative of History.

Not forgetting that the Title represents the story's Sequence,
 And that the Sequence represents the Power entitled.

For us
 Thy name a Great Synecdoche
 Thy works a Grand Tautology.¹⁰⁵

NOTES

CHAPTER VI

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35. A Grammar of Motives, p. 210.
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