GENDERING THE BRITISH POSTHUMAN:
GEORGE Du MAURIER’ S TRILBY AND BRAM STOKER’ S DRACULA

By

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Abstract

Evolutionary theory in the late nineteenth-century used progressive narratives to explain the material or physical aspect of human development. The contemporary field of posthuman scholarship also depends on progressive narratives and evolutionary theory to discuss materiality. Some forms of posthumanism posit a utopian body as the effect of these progressive narratives. Looking at Bram Stoker’s Dracula and George Du Maurier’s Trilby from the end of the nineteenth-century will show some of the less than utopian effects of progressive narratives. The analysis presented here emphasizes the ways gendered nationalism writes the material posthuman in the late nineteenth-century.
John Wiehl

Thesis Introduction

Bodies Have Histories

British novelists of the nineteenth-century often took up the pen fighting, aiding, and developing the text of social Darwinism. Social Darwinism began with evolutionary theory, the dominant biological theory of the later nineteenth-century. George du Maurier’s *Trilby* (1894) and Bram Stoker’s *Dracula* (1897) work within the context of nineteenth-century organic materialism provided by evolutionary theory. Thinking of the human body as having a history and a particularly animalian materiality provides the basic framework for embodiment in these novels. This new framework emerged because Darwinism affected a wide range of human sciences, including biology, anthropology, and psychology; the various disciplines of the academy were dividing, gaining autonomy, and establishing their integrity in this period. In addition, critic Paul Goetsch writes that:

> implicit racism, which came out into the open in a number of works written by Social Darwinists and imperialists, was only one of several problematic aspects of evolutionary anthropology. Other problems included its emphasis on universals and neglect of cultural differences, its progressive direction and, last but not least, the terminology of ‘savagery’ and ‘primitivism.’ (97)

The universalizing trend inherent in anthropology is just as evident in physiognomists’ and phrenologists’ drawings of human anatomy in the nineteenth-century; individualized anatomical portraits might particularize parts of the anatomy, thereby seeming to emphasize difference and individuality, but distinction was measured as variance from a mean or norm. Patterns of difference regulated the viewing and description of the skull; recognizing similarities of shapes and sizes of skulls and faces led to particularized descriptions of criminality, normalcy, or abnormality.
For the purposes of this thesis, I am dealing primarily with literary representations of bodies and materiality. In both chapters, I focus on bodies and materiality in a larger, general sense, and, thus, I read bodies as being actively gendered male or female within a national context. Indeed, the body acts like a text being written by competing forces in these novels. Focusing on the gendering and nationalizing tendencies in these novels allows me to expose the always political contestation of reality even in literature.

According to Benedict Anderson, the novel and the newspaper are “forms [that] provided the technical means for ‘re-presenting’ the kind of imagined community that is the nation” (25). Contemporary scholars have long noted the political and cultural dimension of bodies in descriptions, drawings, and, more recently, photographs.1 Of the slightly earlier drawings of women by vivisectionists, Ludmilla Jordanova says:

[w]hen human development was visually represented in relentless naturalistic detail for the first time, the depths of the mother’s body were opened up for anatomists and artists to gaze upon. Given the powerful emotions with which the insides of women’s bodies were invested, the progressive revelation of anatomical layers inevitably carried a frisson, a hint of the forbidden, a suggestion of voyeurism, perhaps of violation, and a consciousness of a newly visible land. (104)

Viewing women’s bodies as “newly visible land” controlled those bodies for the reproduction of the nation. In addition to drawings, the literary representations of bodies provide another way to access the history of the nationalized, gendered body.

One strand of current literary theory thinks of the body as a discursively-produced phenomenon. Contemporary scholar N. Katherine Hayles wryly comments on this

1 Georges Didi-Huberman’s work on the photography used by J. M. Charcot, the only psychologist mentioned in either Trilby or Dracula, demonstrates the construction of hysteria through images and words.
position by saying that: “[o]ne contemporary belief likely to stupefy future generations is the postmodern orthodoxy that the body is primarily, if not entirely, a linguistic and discursive construction” (How 192). She further argues that “the postmodern ideology [says] the body’s materiality is secondary to the logical or semiotic structures it encodes” (How 192). These remarks come from the first book of her critical trilogy. In the subsequent books, she defines materiality as “an emergent property created through dynamic interactions between physical characteristics and signifying strategies” (Mother 3). Defining materiality as a “property” that comes from the interaction between something solid like “physical characteristics” and signifying (or discursive) strategies provides a solid corrective to postmodern theorists. However, it also posits an inaccessible blank that can only come into human knowledge through signifying strategies. Judith Butler, who famously argued for the view of the gendered body as a discursive production in Gender Trouble, continues to examine notions of discursivity and matter in Bodies that Matter. She says, “[t]hinking the body as constructed demands a rethinking of the meaning of construction itself. And if certain constructions appear constitutive, that is, have this character of being that ‘without which’ we could not think at all, we might suggest that bodies only appear, only endure, only live within the productive constraints of certain highly gendered regulatory schemas” (Bodies xi). In this thesis I am investigating the highly gendered regulatory schema of nationalism.

Instead of the asserting that the body is solely a linguistic production, Butler offers a new way to think about construction and materiality. She says:

What I would like to propose in place of these conceptions of construction is a return to the notion of matter, not as site or surface, but as a process of materialization that stabilizes over time to produce the effect of boundary, fixity, and surface we call matter. That matter is always materialized has, I think, to be
thought in relation to the productive and, indeed, materializing effects of regulatory power in the Foucaultian sense. (*Bodies* 9-10)

Matter here is a “process” not a “property,” and the self-referential definition bears the marks of Butler’s constant questioning of received grammar. Yet, to think about matter and materiality as a process that produces material effects (“boundary, fixity, surface”) gives critics a foundation for talking about the production of matter without relying on a property outside or before signifying strategies. Yet, there should be a language to talk about materiality as a real effect within discursive practices. Butler, in *Bodies that Matter*, focuses primarily on the processes of discursive structures of psychoanalytic criticism that bring the body into being; instead, I’ve chosen to continue to work with Hayles’s earlier theory to analyze the effects of this materiality within the regulatory schema and discursive practice of nationalism. Yet, like Butler, my goal is still “to show that the uncontested status of ‘sex’ within the heterosexual dyad secures the workings of certain symbolic orders, and that its contestation calls into question where and how the limits of symbolic intelligibility are set” (*Bodies* 16). Investigating the national symbolic order of late nineteenth-century Britain will show the active production of gendered bodies. Exploring the rules of production of this symbolic intelligibility should further demonstrate the contestability of naturalized sex.

For the purpose of this thesis, I have chosen postbody/posthumanist theory to investigate the active gendering and nationalizing of materiality.\(^2\) As a field actively

\(^2\) I have used the terms postbody and posthuman somewhat interchangeably throughout this thesis. “Postbody” usually refers to “different” human embodiment or materiality while “posthuman” refers to the philosophy and condition of this change.
engaging science studies, posthumanism and postbody theory provide one clear way to access nineteenth-century scientific stylizations of the body. While definitions of the postbody vary greatly, this paper relies on several key definitions. First, one of the most telling definitions of posthumanism calls it “the belief in artificially enhanced evolution” (Terranova *Posthuman* 234). This definition necessitates an investigation of the discourse of evolutionary theory and a consideration of how postbody theory may replicate some evils of evolutionary theory/social Darwinism. Will “artificial” selection remove differences often understood as the products of race, gender, or sexual orientation systems? Or will it quell the reproduction of some of the subjects already marginalized by these systems?3

Second, Hayles’s widely influential definition says that the posthuman view (1) “privileges the informational pattern over material instantiation,” (2) considers cognition an evolutionary accident and not ordained in any way, (3) “thinks of the body as the original prosthesis we all learn to manipulate,” and (4) “configures human being so that it can be seamlessly articulated with intelligent machines” (*How* 2-3). From this list, I have relied most on her third and fourth points. The section concerning *Trilby* argues that bodies can become prostheses for entities other than, and possibly greater than, one’s

Therefore, I consider the terms mutually dependent and, somewhat, collapsible.

3 Terranova comments that many contemporary cultures organized around high tech have “IQ testing, race discrimination and cognitive fatalism” in their intellectual milieu (240). Furthermore, this focus on intelligence is the product of “historically specific economic and cultural policies” that have been called “biological determinism” (240).
consciousness. Particularly, I look at the ways nationalism genders the main characters in *Trilby*. The British characters do not realize that their attempts to nationalize Trilby mirror Svengali’s radical othering of her. Her early, almost undetectable, transformation into an “English” machine proves that “[i]n the posthuman, there are no essential differences or absolute demarcations between bodily existence and computer simulation, cybernetic mechanism and biological organism, robot teleology and human goals” (Hayles *How* 2-3).

Third, postbody theory and posthumanism frequently discuss the conjunction of the human and the non-human or the inorganic machine. Donna Haraway calls this conjunction the cyborg. However, of utmost importance, is a human inability to distinguish between machine and human in a successful posthuman or cyborg. When the posthuman is successful, the distinction between human and machine disappears. This understanding of the posthuman factors heavily into my analysis of *Dracula* because gradually both the human becomes more like an automaton and the machine becomes more human. Thus, R. L. Rutsky argues that “the birth or coming to life of the machine is not simply the product of a rational, scientific design; it is not simply a matter of construction, of putting parts together, of engineering. Rather, such a machine is necessarily infused with a living spirit, with a soul” (24). The living spirit infusing characters or automatons in both *Dracula* and *Trilby* is a reasserted national identity. While Adrian Mackenczie, drawing on Haraway’s oft-cited “A Manifesto for Cyborgs,” writes that “[h]igh technology can symbolize the evaporation of political, religious, racial, ethnic, economic, and gender differences,” the emergence of the posthuman at the close of the nineteenth-century suggests the radical assertion of difference along
nationalist lines (X). And nationalism frequently relies on these systems (“political, religious” etc.) to mark difference. Furthermore, the disappearance of difference, rather than its affirmation, indicates one universalizing trend in posthuman scholarship that seems to replicate the evils of evolutionary theory.

The British felt the necessity of reviving a national identity at this historical juncture for many reasons, not least among them the possible dissolution of the empire. Krishan Kumar cautions us to “remember Hegel’s warning, that ideas and ideologies are most fully elaborated at the time when their subjects, as practical concerns, are on the point of dissolution. Such may be the case with the British Empire” (197). The English at home faced a lively reassertion of Scottish, Irish, and Welsh nationalist movements (Kumar 200). As he says, “when the United Kingdom seemed to lose its vigour and utility, this [non-English British national identity] could issue in full-blown Irish, Scottish and Welsh nationalism. For the English it was never going to be so easy. Ruling the roost, they felt it impolitic to crow” (187). And so:

\[\text{f} \text{altering confidence in empire; the decline of religion, and the identities it sustained; changing perceptions of the national enemy; the rise of cultural and ethnic nationalism; all these worked to undermine the primacy of the British identity [...] there was room now for the expression of other forms of nationalism in the United Kingdom. Specifically, there was room, and a felt need, for some expression of English national identity. (Kumar 202)\]

This development necessitated the assertion of a new “British” national identity, but since there were few tracts celebrating “Englishness” as a distinctive national character in the later nineteenth-century, we must look for obscure assertions of English or British national identity (Kumar 175-196). I will look in both *Trilby* and *Dracula* for these obscure assertions. Kumar traces out the Anglo-Saxon-ness of this reassertion and says
“[a] strong strain of anti-Celtic rhetoric marked late nineteenth-century Anglo-Saxonism” (202-208; 207). Furthermore “the future of English might seem to lie in a returning to itself, to its true Saxon nature, and in getting rid of the Celtic elements it had so unwisely acquired in the course of its expansion” (207).

In other words, the English wanted to create a national identity that had the façade of inclusion yet the goal of exclusion.

My two chapters offer different considerations of the posthuman at the end of the nineteenth-century. In the first chapter on *Trilby*, I elaborate the links between the progressive narratives of evolutionary theory and some strands of posthumanism. I’m especially concerned in this section with how the body behaves as a text for competing nationalities, particularly the attempted overlay of an English identity over bodies unfit for Englishness due to their mixed heritages. I also look closely at nineteenth-century scientific texts that argue for the embodied nature of the mind to show how changed materiality can indicate a change in cognition. In the second chapter on *Dracula*, I look at the way changes in materiality can be perceived as monstrous. Examining the physical nature of places and prosthetic additions to the body emphasizes the intense concern with materiality in *Dracula*. Aesthetic codes that look toward the machine and the postbody exist alongside a nationalism that asks for a particularized Englishness of the past. The assertion of a non-Celtic but Viking, Germanic, and very masculine historical identity marks the birth of the “new” British identity.
Creating a sense of the present happens in similar ways: people tend to deny the continuance of past evils in their civilized, advanced society. This process happens transhistorically or across periods. Progressive teleology posits a Utopian world lacking injustice, hunger, and the abuse of what we define as human rights. Almost any sense of modernity—not merely the literary or cultural period, but rather the belief that a contemporary society has broken with the “dark ages” of human history—comes in part from progressive teleological thinking. In a transhistorical perspective, this means that British and American cultures perpetually abuse notions of the past and deify expectations of the future to make sense of the now. As an example of the Victorians doing just this, Harriet Martineau writes of “[t]he great improvement in the treatment of idiots and lunatics since science began to throw light on the separate organisation of the human faculties” and believes that “there are now institutions […] raising the lowest, and blessing the most afflicted, members of our race” (324, 325). An oft-repeated version of this now-making says that from the turn of the nineteenth century until 1854 when Martineau wrote, the treatment of the insane went from bestial treatment with a full array of physical punishments that often involved excessive restraint and no chance of recuperation to more contemporary methods of internalized restraint and faith in the prospect of recovery from mental illness. However, Martineau’s belief that progress can always help the lowest and most afflicted implies a progressive teleology beyond reality. The utopian world implied where treatment works for all lunatics is always imaginable,
but just around the corner and yet to come.

Contemporary scholarship about postbodily states works both within and against the progressive constructs outlined above. The definition of posthumanism as “artificially enhanced evolution” implies a current usage of this progressive construct. This application of progressive constructs, even evolutionary theory, to a current theoretical movement reveals the underlying links between evolutionary mental science thinking and the development of posthumanist scholarship. Working through progressive narratives from just over a hundred years ago with contemporary postbody theory will help enlighten our sense of how the Victorians constructed their present. This process will reveal the implicit coding in descriptions of the postbodily state, a frequently celebrated condition in postbody theory.4 The “coding” metaphor emphasizes the way this method of describing and shaping bodily existence looks forward to computer-like versions of the human present in twenty-first century culture. The coding practices involved in the making of the postbody often write women as examples of nationalist progress and as scientifically-knowable biological specimens. Investigating George Du Maurier’s Trilby (1894) through postbody theory shows us the myriad coding practices involved in writing the ever better, more perfect future. Layers of competing ideologies code every choice the titular heroine can make and they all compete for control of her body. While similar codes also gender male characters, the beneficiary of this binarist scheme certainly is not Trilby herself. The nineteenth-century discourse of mental science—or the investigation, study, and treatment of abnormal mental states and a

4 Donna Haraway’s often reprinted “A Manifesto for Cyborgs” seeks to put the cyborg—one postbody or posthuman possibility—at the center of feminist and socialist progress.
theory of psychology generally—informs Du Maurier’s novel explicitly.\(^5\) Trilby’s focus is a case of mesmerism, which was investigated by several mental scientists. Furthermore, Du Maurier’s contemporary readers would have had knowledge of mental science, and its progressive teleologies, due to the massive popularity of its texts (Winter 1).\(^6\) Using postbody theory as a similar example of progressive teleologies opens up our understanding of the ways historical thinking and making a sense of the present happen in similar ways in different periods.

I find it important to insist on understanding the gendered aspect of the coding practices working here since other scholars working with scientific discourses, the imaginations of futurity, and the nineteenth-century have focused on other pressing issues

\(^5\) Mental science is often called pre-Freudian psychology. It addressed “the complex relationship between the mind and the body; the workings of individual consciousness; the power of unconscious processes and the limits of self control; the problematic boundary between normal and aberrant states of mind, and the connections between the individual life and the long-term genealogy of which it is part” (Bourne Taylor and Shuttleworth xiii).

\(^6\) Alison Winter primarily addresses the period from 1830-1870. About the succeeding era, she says, “[m]esmerism did not decline later in the century because scientists were more knowledgeable than hitherto, or because the British public was less gullible. Rather than being exposed as fraudulent or explained away by progressive science, it was absorbed into other practices, particularly psychic research, physiology, and psychoanalysis” (8).
and seem to dismiss the serious feminist critique of objectivity in science.⁷ For example, one of the first scholars to investigate the interplay of science and literature in the Victorian era, George Levine, writes that “the long Western tradition of aspiration toward an ideal extracorporeal condition obviously must be read in relation to questions of class: only the wealthy can afford to imagine the superiority of the unmoved mover to the worker. Scientific epistemology is bound up in a traditional religious and aristocratic

⁷ See Butler, *Gender Trouble*, 106-111; Ineke van Wingerden *passim*. Since no post-structuralist/feminist account dismissing the possibility of objectivity in science, especially when it comes to gender, would dismiss all such claims, Butler picks one particular scientific controversy. Butler investigates “the master gene that researchers at MIT in late 1987 claim to have discovered as the secret and certain determinant of sex” and finds “[t]he desire to determine sex once and for all, and to determine it as one sex rather than the other, thus seems to issue from the social organization of sexual reproduction through the construction of the clear and unequivocal identities and positions of sexed bodies with respect to each other” (106, 110). The scientists’ descriptions of DNA processes also replicate the active/passive gendered binary, according to Butler. Van Wingerden mainly discusses the medicalization and discussion of osteoporosis in the Netherlands, concluding that situating medical knowledges, rather than claiming for their universality, provides interventionist strategies for analyzing the scientific construction of bodies. Kirsten Gram-Hanssen, debating van Wingerden in the same collection of essays, claims for objectivity in feminist pursuits of science studies; interestingly, her bio-line says she is the “mother of two boys.” No similar subject-position claim to womanhood (or age) exists in van Wingerden’s bio-line or article.
enterprise” (6). This Marxist critique of the production of scientific knowledge rings true. However, when discussing critical science studies and feminism, he writes that, “the constraints politics impose on reasoning are inescapable and not grounds for dismissing the thought itself” (37). His problematic Marxist critique and dismissal of the implications of post-structuralist feminism needs revision or reconsideration. In this analysis I am suggesting, like Judith Butler, that the feminist position should refuse the scientific “thought itself” concerning the female body in a postbodily state. *Trilby* is centrally concerned with the body and how it is represented. The use of mental science as a representational technique needs to be critiqued rather than the narrator’s stance on mental science; critical or not, Du Maurier presents the possibility of her changes under

8 His collapse of the religious and secular movements to an “extracorporeal condition” or a postbody state also makes sense. The differences between the life-after-death religious “extracorporeal condition” and a secular/scientific postbodily “extracorporeal condition” are too numerous to elucidate. However, their mutual importance is structurally parallel, but historically different progressive narratives (of the soul or of the body, respectively) makes their mutual investigation more productive. This collapse marks one way of understanding what makes the transition from a primarily religious understanding of the body to a secular and scientific one less epistemically threatening. The comfort that the promise of a postbodily state provides for subjects under religious or scientific regimes becomes increasingly transparent in this analysis.

9 The sympathetic portrayal of so many artists might make this seem like an aesthetic or decadent novel, and therefore like Wilde’s *The Picture of Dorian Gray* critical of the notion that embodied degeneration can wholly affect one generation instead
this scientific regime. The coding of Trilby’s body and of the choices she can make are far too abhorrent to justify acceptance of this representation of a postbodily state and, therefore, the particular science involved in making such a representation must also be dismissed. Additionally, the gendering forces working in the novel always act along nationalist lines, and consequently the Englishwoman’s place is one perpetually elevated nationally but degraded sexually.

*Trilby*, a British novel popular in both Britain and America, tells the story of Trilby O’Ferrall, a young woman of English blood living in France. Set a few decades before its publication, Du Maurier represents the artistic world of the 1850s Parisian Left Bank as a hodgepodge of nationalities—French, English, German, and the racially-written Jew. Trilby seems to have little national identity at the beginning of the novel, but as the story progresses, her contact with three young British men develops her British

of happening over several (Constable, et al 20). However, the question of just how much decadence is portrayed positively in the novel is much debated. Dennis Denisoff argues that in *Trilby* Du Maurier celebrates a degree of artistic/sexual dissidence only to reject it fully in his next novel, *The Martian* (“Men” *passim*). Furthermore, Jonathan H. Grossman traces the lampooning of Wilde by Du Maurier in *Punch* to a critique of aestheticism also evident in *Trilby.*

10 Hayles says “scientific texts often reveal, as literature cannot, the foundational assumptions that gave theoretical scope and artifactual efficacy to a particular approach. The literary texts often reveal, as scientific work cannot, the complex cultural, social, and representational issues tied up with conceptual shifts and technological innovations” (*How* 24).
national identity. However, a mesmeric Jewish villain named Svengali turns Trilby into an unknowing automaton: a singer capable of the greatest vocalic feats but only as an unconscious performer. This use of Trilby’s body serves as my jumping off point to analyze this early postbody moment.

Postbody Theory: The importance of Possibility

In this section I will summarize the elements of postbody theory that are particularly applicable to Trilby to investigate Trilby’s automated appearance. Then, I will consider consciousness in the context of postbody theory and argue for its continuing importance as an analytical tool for thinking of the posthuman moment. Finally, I will assert the necessity of seeking libratory posthuman states across historical periods, and I

11 According to Linda Colley’s Britons, English, Welsh, and Scottish national identities fused to form a fourth identity, one of Britishness, that overlaid and did not replace the earlier, more local national identities. Colley suggests that national identity was “forged” during, approximately, 1700-1830. This argument directly contradicts earlier arguments that suggest Britishness is solely Englishness imposed upon Welsh and Scottish national identities through colonialist practices. Trilby’s recurring phrase trois Anglîches indicating the Scotch, Welsh, and English (and even possibly Irish) Laird, Taffy, and Little Billee shows that Englishness stands in for Britishness, and the effects of internal colonialism have produced Scotch subjects as English in the francophone eyes of the narrator. Essentially, it would seem that the varieties of Britishness do not really matter since they are all basically English, anyway. This allows for the slippage between English and British; in Trilby, contra Colley, one is essentially the other.
will investigate the limits imposed by Haraway’s argument that the cyborg exists in only one historical epoch.

To realize the full worth of postbody theory for interpreting *Trilby*, I must offer a few remarks specific to the way postbodily states appear in *Trilby*. N. Katherine Hayles, a leader in postbody/posthuman theory, sums up an important argument in this field. She says:

[one possibility] Hans Moravec […] has called our ‘postbiological’ future: the expectation that the corporeal embodiment that has always functioned to define the limits of the human will in the future become optional, as humans find ways to upload their consciousness into computers and leave their bodies behind […] I argued strongly against this vision of the posthuman, ending the book with a call to contest for versions of the posthuman that would acknowledge the importance of embodiment and be conducive to enhancing human and nonhuman life on the planet. (*My Mother Was a Computer* 1-2)

In this instance, Hayles rejects computerized consciousness as a viable postbody possibility. An important question for Hayles is: if Moravec’s idea of the posthuman comes true (and human consciousness no longer needs bodies), then what happens to the bodies no longer “holding” human consciousness? “Leftover” bodies, or the emptied remains of postbodied humanity, might not be an ethically acceptable side effect for the advancement of Western culture.

Interestingly, we see one such “emptied body” when Trilby performs in Paris, after her capture by Svengali. The three young Englishmen have heard that the incredibly famous and talented “la Svengali” is singing her way across Europe and they have seen her perform “music, ‘the highest’ of all art forms” (*Davison* 82).\(^{12}\) However,\(^{12}\)

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\(^{12}\) Multiple scholars try to account for Trilby’s singing ability. Phyllis Weliver argues that singing works as crowd control, and links the Victorian’s anxiety about mobs
her triumph on the stage greatly dismays her three English friends. They notice “a tall female figure […] in what seemed like a classical dress of cloth of gold, embroidered with garnets and beetles’ wings; her snowy arms and shoulders bare, a gold coronet of stars on her head […] Her lips and cheeks were rouged” (209). All these details significantly depart from her dress when they first met her and when they last saw her. Her unnatural appearance—painted, robed, and decorated like a queen—causes the Laird to disbelieve that the woman is actually Trilby. In fact, the woman is a shell of the woman Trilby was—it is as though her body has been re-shaped into another form. While she has not “uploaded” her consciousness into a computer, as Moravec might suggest, her emptied body shows the same result implicit in his postbody vision. The costume worn by the emptied Trilby gives her an appearance fitting the great stage presence she has become. As the idealized and automated stage presence, the Englishmen notice that “[h]er face was thin, and had a rather haggard expression, in spite of its artificial freshness” (209). The word “artificial” resounds here; the contradiction between “the original” that the narrator (and the three Englishmen) can see wasting away and the imposed/unnatural freshness suggests a history of unfair tampering and the possibility of mechanization. The emptiness of her eyes also appears the next day as the three Englishmen see her—“[s]he was rouged and pearl-powdered, and her eyes were blackened beneath, and thus made to look twice their size” (234). The enlarged, to Chartism. Neil Davison discusses singing and music as high art, ranking above other artistic pursuits in the novel like painting. Christine Ferguson sees language study becoming systematic at the end of the 19th century because language, ostensibly, separated man from beast.
darkened, and empty eyes emphasize a lack of interiority or consciousness. The extensive costume makeup she wears even outside of her performances further estranges the Englishmen from her. This version of femininity does not jibe with their vision of her middle-class Englishness. She has been painted to look like an unnatural woman, a prosthetic person in their eyes. Her actions also disturb them—“[s]he stared at [Little Billee] with a cold stare of disdain, and cut him dead—so did Svengali. And as they passed he heard them both snigger—she with a little high-pitched flippant snigger worthy of a London barmaid” (234-235). Trilby’s vastly different behavior seems far less like the proper woman they had previously known. The three Englishmen had worked hard at Anglicizing Trilby into a respectable, middle-class woman, and this utter reversal of their project shocks them. It is at this moment in the novel, where we realize that people can lose their consciousness and become machine-like beings or automatons, that we can see an initial troubling connection between *Trilby* and postbody theory.

Postbody theory, as discussed by Hayles, allows for the possibility of discussing postbodily states as early as the 1890s. Jeff Wallace, who cites Hayles approvingly, makes it clear that postbodily states can be discussed at least as early as evolutionary theorists wrote; he also says evolutionary theorists are also frequently considered mental scientists (11-33). Additionally:

> In the more holistic developmental thinking of posthumanism, and in direct continuity with the materialism of late nineteenth-century science, mind is a product of material evolution, invested with no transcendental status or power: consciousness just happens to have evolved in human bodies, and human bodies just happen to be the ‘instantiation’ of intelligence, ‘an accident of history’ rather than ‘an inevitability of life.’ (Wallace 28)

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13 James Berkly even uses postbody/posthuman theory to analyze Poe’s short stories from the middle of the nineteenth-century.
Emptying Trilby of her mind literalizes this “accident of history.” We see her consciousness completely rewired and this causes the *trois Angliches* anxiety. It is clear that they value the instantiation of her intelligence because they are so upset when she seems to lack consciousness, and they value the materiality of her body because at one point or another they all want to marry her and have children with her. Here, the postbody theory of Hayles which calls for embodied posthuman states contradicts Wallace’s description of posthumanism; Wallace’s argument that posthumanism might not need consciousness to define humanity, or posthumanity, resembles Moravec’s dismissal of the absolute linkage of bodies and consciousness. However, embodiment, materiality, and consciousness matter exponentially in ethical considerations of postbody theory.

The cyborg theory of Donna Haraway, a different strand of posthuman theory that also emphasizes the importance of materiality, offers an influential definition of the cyborg. She says a “cyborg is a cybernetic organism, a hybrid of machine and organism, a creature of social reality as well as a creature of fiction […] the] cyborg is a matter of fiction and lived experience […] the boundary between science fiction and social reality is an optical illusion” (2269). Trilby, as a manipulable machine in others’ hands, might be better understood as the fictional—even science fictional—hybridization of pre-hypnosis organic matter and hypnotized, mechanized consciousness. However, Haraway’s constant insistence that the possibility of the cyborg exists only in the late-twentieth century limits the exportability of her argument and sets up a temporally-determined understanding of embodied states. The category “monster” functions like the
posthuman across periods in Haraway’s analysis, but this solely negative view of the posthuman before the late twentieth-century forecloses too many possibilities (2298).

We might find positive accounts of the posthuman before the era of the cyborg.

Haraway’s deterministic understanding of history depends upon progressive, teleological narratives and the Utopian worlds (or the cyborg, a Utopian body in her mind) they posit throughout history. This negates any possibility of their analysis. Rarely is human progress imagined as monstrosity; her argument, while importantly reaffirming materiality, cannot account for the posthuman across temporal fields in the way Hayles’s and Wallace’s can.

**Encoding Trilby: Competing Ideologies and the Gendered body**

In this section, I consider other critiques of nationalism in *Trilby* and suggest that an additional analysis of the body is necessary. I look at the competing ways Englishness changes Trilby’s body, but also the effects of nationalism on some of the other characters, particularly Little Billee. As the attempt to gender him male, or at least male enough to procreate, fails, I look at the reasons neither Trilby nor Little Billee can successfully procreate. I also examine the way their bodies become prosthesis for English nationalist ideology.

In this thesis, I propose a critique of nationalism that approximates Sarah Gracombe’s argument about *Trilby* but extends it to include material factors. While Gracombe does not use postbody theory to discuss the “Englishing” of Trilby, she says that an English national identity serves as one central trope of *Trilby*. She writes, “throughout the novel, Little Billee’s efforts to convert Trilby to Englishness are
juxtaposed with Svengali’s seemingly more successful mesmeric ‘conversion’ of Trilby into a cosmopolitan diva” (81). If the “Englishing” of Trilby works like her later Svengali-induced automation, then the postbody perspective might enlighten our perspective on all sorts of identity-formations.

Gracombe’s argument focuses on the cultural location of national identity. She says:

Du Maurier […] suggests where else one might look for English identity. Throughout Trilby he investigates and implicitly proposes a definition of Englishness as primarily a cultural rather than a juridical, political, or geographic identity, one signified by books, food, and aesthetic and moral sensibility. In emphasizing what I call cultural Englishness, I take my cue directly from Du Maurier, who depicts dual meanings of that slippery term, “culture.” (76)

This important insight rightly emphasizes that English national identity is a cultural production, but it disregards the embodiment of this English nationality. Therefore, Gracombe cannot adequately account for the physical effects of Anglicization. Postbody theory, in Hayles’s terms, continually insists that the body and its effects must be at the center of critical analysis. As such, the “Englishing” of Trilby must be investigated as a parallel automating or productive force that acts on her body, much like Svengali’s attack on Trilby and her consciousness.

The three Englishmen’s continual Englishing of Trilby has an anatomical effect on her. This happens early in the novel. Trilby initially lacks a strong national identity but becomes a more proper Englishwoman, and this suggests that the coding and shaping of Trilby must happen according to some pattern: English housewife, Jewish performer, or possibly French prostitute. During her Englishing, the narrator observes that “the bones of her cheeks and jaws began to show themselves […] the improvement was
astonishing, almost inexplicable” (90). The Englishmen notice the physiological change in her as “[s]he was no longer slangy in French” and “her mouth, always too large, took on a firmer and sweeter outline, and her big British teeth were so white and regular that even Frenchmen forgave them their British bigness” (88, 90). Trilby has bent under the influence of English books, English language, English manners, English food, and, of course, the company of English men (60-68). Indeed, “[s]he grew more English every day; and that was a good thing” (62). Little Billee’s mother notices Trilby’s embodied Englishness when they first meet by commenting “‘oh, how beautiful she is, and what a voice! All that counts for so much” (129).14 Here it is painfully obvious that the racial purity of her blood has been enhanced by the culturally English trois Angliches so that she has become the perfect woman—in body, mind, and English cultural taste. This woman—now Anglicized—is primed for producing perfect Protestant progeny. And each of the trois Angliches want to marry her. It would seem that she has secured a place within the realm of the intelligible heterosexual symbolic.

The ability to speak the English language is also an important factor in this nationalist schema. Evolutionary theorists agreed that “the role of language [was] the apparent sine qua non of human identity” (Ferguson 21). Language took on an important identity for humans; it made them distinct from all else in a world radically revolutionized by the evolutionary claim that humans descended from the “lower orders” of the animal kingdom. In fact, language marked the orders of an ascending taxonomic system; evolution gave the higher or highest races the use of more abstract language. The

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14 Gracombe extensively analyzes Mrs. Bagot’s questioning of Trilby’s nationality.
highest races were the English or European in the English-speaker’s mind; this group was also Du Maurier’s ostensible audience. One mental scientist writes of a much lesser race, the “native Australian […] who is one of the lowest existing savages, [he] has no words in his language to express such exalted ideas as justice, love, virtue, mercy […] he has no such ideas in his mind, and cannot comprehend them” (Maudsley 56). Because of the developed vocabulary, Britons could display their “higher mental faculties [which] are formed by evolution from the more simple and elementary, just as the more special and complex structure proceeds from the more simple and general; and in the one case as in the other we must, if we would truly learn, follow the order of development” (5). This evolutionary teleology posits higher and higher orders of development; language, as a substantial reflection of this development, might be another way of theorizing the posthuman in late nineteenth century Britain. Trilby’s articulate use of language in singing, as opposed to her subhuman “snigger” later offered to Little Billee, is one reflection of her ostensibly highly evolved mental state. The next evolutionary step for the highly developed Trilby could be into the posthuman. Early in the novel, language was part of Little Billee’s attempt to convert Trilby from a young person first appearing in “the grey overcoat of a French infantry soldier” speaking in “English, with an accent half Scotch and certain French intonations” into the proper English, middle-class woman (12, 13). Also, in this regard, we see the three Englishmen’s progress in making Trilby “more English every day” (62). Trilby’s ability to speak proper English, with some training, further reflects her white, English, racialized position. This is specifically racial, in addition to cultural, because her materiality has changed. For this ability, not only is the structure of the throat important as Svengali supposes, but so is the brain and its
anatomy.

On the anatomy of the brain, Henry Maudsley, a premier mental scientist of the late nineteenth century, asserted that:

It behoves us, as scientific inquirers, to realize distinctly the physical meaning of the progress of human intelligence from generation to generation. What structural differences in the brain are implied by it? That an increasing purpose runs through the ages, and that ‘the thoughts of men are widened with the process of the suns,’ no one will call in question; and that this progress has been accompanied by a progressive development of the cerebral hemispheres, the convolutions of which have increased in size, number, and complexity, will hardly now be disputed. (53-54)

In this formulation, the brain develops further and further; as the primary seat of the mind, the brain is bound to have increasing ability. Here the materiality of the body cannot be denied; however, an extrapolation of Maudsley’s argument is the posthuman. Another intricate example from Maudsley will show the possibility for continual growth towards (or into) the posthuman. Since Maudsley does not assert that the brain is the sole seat of the mind but argues that the mind is distributed throughout the human body, other developed areas of the body could indicate posthuman potential. At one point, he draws an extended argument from a reference to instincts becoming embodied in nerve fibers that are not part of the brain. He says:

[the increased] superiority of the human over the animal mind seems to be essentially connected with the greater variety of muscular action of which man is capable: were he deprived of the infinitely varied movements of hands, tongue, larynx, lips, and face, in which he is so far ahead of the animals, it is probable that he would be no better than an idiot, notwithstanding he might have a normal development of brain. (30)

This complex interplay of bodily development/evolution and increasing intelligence suggests that if a more perfect body develops then a higher form of consciousness could
be possible. Svengali points out Trilby’s particularly well-developed vocal organs, one possible indicator of a highly evolved state. He says to her, “[t]he entrance to your throat is like the middle porch of St Sulpice when the doors are open for the faithful on All Saints’ Day” (50-51). The erotic suggestion here—that the faithful can enter her orally—begins to suggest the multiple uses her body might have for Svengali beyond that of simple singing machine. The possible use of her body for non-reproductive sex also adds to Trilby’s discomfort. This moment in the novel greatly contests the heterosexual imaginary apparent in late nineteenth-century British nationalism. Svengali’s later anatomizing leads him to predict that after her death she “shall have a nice little mahogany glass case all to yourself in the museum […] and Svengali shall come in his new fur-lined coat, smoking his big cigar of the Havana, and […] look through the holes of your eyes […] and up the nostrils of your high, bony sounding-board of a nose” (92).

Even after her imagined death his interest in her anatomy will not subside. This particular anatomy predisposes Trilby to musical greatness—and is a sign of evolutionary hyper-development—but Svengali knows he must manipulate her tone-deaf body to make it work. Trilby’s British racial heritage, however, has produced the machinery for Svengali to manipulate; racially-other Svengali cannot sing like she can because of her British-blood anatomy. That the three Englishmen find his anatomizing of her distasteful

15 Maudsley does not theorize a postbodily state explicitly in the same way that contemporary theorists discuss uploading consciousnesses into computers. However, Jeff Wallace notes that scholarship can trace contemporary debates about mechanized or machinist posthuman states to the mental science paradigm emergent at the end of the nineteenth-century. He says:I maintain that the posthuman is a theoretical construct, a way of thinking the human, whose emergence in the latter half of the twentieth and the beginning of the twenty-first centuries does not disallow its application to earlier periods. In part too, however, my case is that there are significant connections to be made between the moment of the posthuman, with its debates around the relationship between humans, creatures and machines, and the moment of post-Darwinian evolutionary materialism. (6)
reifies the racial boundaries explicit in the novel.

However, the gendering forces of English national identity do not work only on women’s bodies. Little Billee, as the chosen suitor of the three Englishmen, must also become appropriately English for his potential marriage to an English woman. In the beginning of the novel, the narrator openly praises Little Billee’s “faint suggestion of some possible very remote Jewish ancestor” who gave him an “infinitesimal dose of the good old Oriental blood, [which …] made him stick to his last through thick and thin” (6). However, the narrator condemns Oriental/Eastern influence more frequently and vehemently (157). The weakness of Little Billee appears not in “impure” language (such as Trilby’s) or overtly racialized facial features. Rather, his physiological weakness appears first in his feminized features—“Little Billee was small and slender […] also very graceful and well built, with very small hands and feet […] young and tender […] with] almost girlish purity of mind” (Du Maurier 6, 8, 9). His inability to respond to losing Trilby in a strong and brave manner also indicates his weakness: “[h]e grew more and more uncontrollable, became almost unintelligible, he stammered so—a pitiable sight and pitiable to hear” with an “epileptic seizure. It ended in brain fever and other complications” (135). This emotion-turned-embodied-disease more frequently defines the woman’s representation in the nineteenth-century novel. Thus, we realize that Little Billee, as a puny, less-than-masculine character in the novel, cannot procreate. The impossibility of a feminized man procreating enforces the heterosexual symbolic’s ban on legible androgyny. Even later, Little Billee’s small stature causes him to wonder, “[c]ould [Alice] possibly care for a shrimp like himself?” (176). The suggestion that if only Little Billee could gain weight—thereby properly coding his anatomy as English
and male, more fitting for Trilby’s—he might succeed in wooing her.

The frequent passages concerning Little Billee’s androgyne, and the overwhelming sex drive of Svengali, prompt Neil Davison to read Svengali as the “gendering” factor in *Trilby*. He suggests that since both Trilby and Billee appear androgynous early in the novel, and only become properly binarized after contact with Svengali, the figure of “the Jew” must have gender-producing powers. However, this reading neglects the overtly masculine powers the older Englishmen exert. Davison even analyzes a particularly suggestive image titled “Tit for tat” in a way that reveals the powerful representation of English masculinity. He says:

> The "young and tender" Billie is saved by "big" Taffy, and the adjoining illustration of the scene indeed highlights its implied dominance and submission. Each figure, one taller then the next, stands behind the other grasping the upper arms of the man in front. Svengali’s head is tossed back, and he appears to be wailing. If one allows for the progression of the homoerotic subtext to this point in the narrative, the positioning of the figures suggests that Svengali (as phallic mother) is poised to anally penetrate Billie, while Taffy readies for the same with Svengali. Greater virility here is "proven" through tops and bottoms, and Trilby herself has become momentarily—and patriarchally—beside the point. (96-97)

This reading shows the valorization of embodied big English manliness. Taffy’s superman status is clear from the beginning. He appears “[b]are-armed, and in his shirt and trousers […] he was perspiring freely and looked fierce. He was a very big young man, fair, with kind but choleric blue eyes, and the muscles of his brawny arm were strong as iron bands”; plus he escaped injury in the disastrous Crimean War (4, 5). This body is one that is more properly fit for evolution into a postbodily status. Maudsley’s injunction that the more sophisticated, perfect body is of higher evolutionary standing and can have a more attuned mind applies much more readily to Taffy than Little Billie. Indeed, Taffy’s embodied masculinity contrasts greatly with Billee’s miscegenated
androgyny. Taffy and the Laird use the time of the novel as a crash course in masculinizing Little Billee, but they frequently fail. No amount of Englishing can prepare Little Billee’s recalcitrant Eastern blood for evolution and the possibility of a postbody state. After the reappearance of Trilby as La Svengali, Little Billee must wonder “‘what an unmanly duffer!’” about himself (225). And, unlike the more reserved Englishman he should be, the “Little Greek that he was, he worshipped the athlete, and opined that all women without exception—all English women especially—must see with the same eyes as himself” (177). It is not a coincidence that Little Billee’s mixed blood accounts for his overly homosocial, potentially subversive tendencies, and that in the picture Davison analyzes the men with any amount of Jewish blood are penetrated, ultimately, by the hyper-masculine Englishman. Certainly they will feel the prick of English nationalist ideology’s “red-hot needle” that Trilby is numb to while under hypnosis (298). Sadly, Trilby’s penetration by Svengali makes her completely unfit for life as an Englishwoman and she dies. Little Billee, the excellent artist but failed Briton must die as well. Only Taffy, who with the perfected masculine physique is primed for progress into the postbody, marries and reproduces in the end, thereby becoming legible within the heterosexual symbolic.

Trilby’s disqualification for being a proper English matron has less to do with androgyny, part of the basis for Little Billee’s exclusion, than with her time under Svengali’s spell. During the extensive period of time that Trilby spends traveling Europe, Svengali has her “for his wife, slave, and pupil” (245). This period—when Trilby is partially under Svengali’s mesmeric powers and partially not—suggests something quite frightening to Mrs. Bagot. After Trilby’s “recovery” by the three
Englishmen, Mrs. Bagot “caught her in her arms, and kissed and caressed her, and burst into a flood of tears, and forced her back into her chair, hugging her as if she were a long-lost child” (269). The occasion for such a passionate outburst comes not only from Trilby’s return, but also because of her redemption from Svengali. The narrator says Mrs. Bagot “was just a shrewd little conventional British county matron of the good upper middle-class type, bristling all over with provincial proprieties and respectabilities” (271). Of course, at this point, no one has realized the method through which Trilby participated in Svengali’s schemes. Mrs. Bagot’s outburst is not predicated on Trilby’s potentially sexually exploited subalternity to a man; rather, it’s that Trilby served in this binary outside the justificatory scheme of English nationalism. Mrs. Bagot’s first question for the Laird and Taffy when discussing Trilby’s identity is not “is she a lady,” but is “[i]s she English?” (123). Mrs. Bagot’s transformation into Trilby’s admirer, and thus the metaphorical transformation of the English polity, though, is tempered by her “quite forgetting (or affecting to forget) on what very questionable soil the lily had been reared” (271). The impossibility of Trilby reproducing in her sickened state and a selective censoring of her history enables Mrs. Bagot’s forgiveness and protects the English national line and memory at the same time.

Seemingly, Trilby could have trained her inappropriately gendered body into an Anglicized, productive one through another of N. Katherine Hayles’s postbodily scenarios. She says that “the posthuman view thinks of the body as the original prosthesis we all learn to manipulate, so that extending or replacing the body with other prostheses becomes a continuation of a process that began before we were born” (How 3). Here, the distinction between “organic” and “mechanized” begins to break down.
And here Trilby begins to represent the possibility of a bio-machine—something existing in the blurred space created through the smudged (wo)man/machine boundaries. Little Billee cannot train his mixed body adequately and does not fit into this scheme. Yet, we see the body as an original prosthesis in Svengali’s coding of Trilby. Gecko, Svengali’s friend and accomplice, reveals that “Svengali with his little flexible flageolet, I with my violin—that is how we taught her to make the sounds—and then how to use them” (297). This process takes a period of several years and resembles more the writing of computer code than fine-tuning an instrument.16 Trilby is the instrument or device used by Svengali as a singer, just as she is the device used by the Englishmen for their nationalist ends; it is not that Trilby is learning or has learned to control her own body in this representation.17 Of course, the attempt to nationalize Little Billee also makes him resemble an instrument at times, but were the gendered nationalizing successful he would

16 I have explicitly drawn my use of the “coding” metaphor from Trilby’ treatment as a music-producing machine, and I have replicated the metaphor throughout this thesis. After all, one measure of the success of the postbody is in the perfect confluence of computer and human.

17 In addition to Trilby, the trois Angliches seem to or try to change according to the scheme of British nationalism; Svengali, oppositely, in the role of ultimate villain, represents un-changing radical alterity. This pattern does not repeat in Dracula where the Count also attempts to “become” British. The Count’s desire to mimic the Britons makes his threat far more frightening and helps account for the generic difference between the rather melancholy or sentimental Trilby and the gothically-inspired, faster-paced Dracula.
have benefited immensely. Computer code depends on exact inputs to produce an exact response, and this note-by-note rote learning turns the woman Trilby into a singing machine. While the computer had not yet debuted in Western consciousness, the calculator—as an adding machine with some pre-programming—existed decades before the publication of *Trilby* (OED). The ability to generate sensitive responses from a pre-programmed device more clearly resembles the function of a “machine” today, and this helps bridge the connection between the possibly disparate meanings or uses of the metaphor.

The three Englishmen realize Svengali’s use of Trilby as a machine but do not understand their own implication in a similar, but contradictory, process. Frighteningly, the narrator says, “[a]nd then Little Billee remembered there was such a person as Svengali in the world, and recalled his little flexible flageolet!” (214). The “little flexible flageolet” serves as the most important image linking Trilby with a manipulable object. The parallel between a beautifully singing “La Svengali,” once a woman with great physiological potential but no talent, and the phallus-like instrument, which gives Svengali great pleasure, becomes painfully obvious to the reader. We have seen Svengali play with his flageolet throughout the text. Early on, he “pulled out of his pocket a kind of little flexible flageolet (of his own invention, it seems)” (23). Svengali keeps this instrument in his pants pocket and “[h]e poured” all his energy “into his little flexible flageolet” for (musical) fulfillment (42). Paralleling Trilby with the flageolet, as a “traditional” instrument, might suggest Svengali uses Trilby as an instrument too. She might be just another prosthetic appendage used solely for music making and garnering Svengali fame. However, her extensive “programming” suggests a more complex
relationship than a one-to-one comparison with a flageolet. It very nearly resembles the
programming aided by the three Englishmen, but with vastly different narrative effects.
The real actor directing the Englishing of both Trilby and Little Billee, though, is
nationalism. Their bodies are essentially failed prostheses in posthumanist terminology.

Conclusion: From the Individual to the Collective

When thinking of the effects on the woman’s body when it is used both as
instrument for Svengali and as tool for national reproduction, the changes to her anatomy
that Maudsley discusses are also potential changes to her will. Because Maudsley argues
that cognition is dependent on the muscular abilities of the body, the shaping of the body
into any one national form will obviously limit or shape the mind and, therefore, the will.
This is a form of distributed cognition throughout the individual body; in the posthuman,
importance is place on cognition distributed throughout both the individual and the
collective. On cognition distributed throughout society or the collective, Hayles says that
“the presumption that there is an agency, desire, or will belonging to the self and clearly
distinguished from the ‘wills of others’ is undercut in the posthuman, for the posthuman’s
collective heterogeneous quality implies a distributed cognition located in disparate parts
that may be in only tenuous communication with one another” (3-4). We can now better
understand the distribution of agency or will of one throughout both a particularized
anatomy and social order. Moving from one body to the social body, though, sounds
suspiciously and dangerously like the “science” advanced by Max Nordau in
Degeneration (1895). He says, “it is a habit of the human mind to project externally its
own subjective states. And it is in accordance with this naively egoistic tendency that the
French ascribe their own senility to the century, and speak of *fin-de-siècle* when they ought correctly to say *fin-de-race*. But however a silly term *fin-de-siècle* may be, the mental constitution which it indicates is actually present in influential circles” (2).

Nordau suggests a way of thinking that is parallel to Hayles’s: both generalize thoughts from the individual to the social and both assert an absolute connection between the individual and the social. The difference, however, is that Hayles champions the underprivileged while not vilifying those in power, because those in power are just as affected by this distribution of cognition while Nordau attacks artists and says they are polluting an entire mindset and race. Because of its insistence on distributed cognition, the posthuman view would only acknowledge these pollutants as internal to all, rather than locatable within a few select members. The changes necessitated by my analysis, though, suggest that the progressive teleologies of evolution and posthumanism need to better account for the gendered nationalism inherent in evolutionary theory. Nothing about a revised view of the posthuman would suggest “enhancing” evolution because of evolution’s unsavory emphasis on “selection.”

Donna Haraway celebrates the machinist posthuman when it serves to break down binarist identificatory practices. In Trilby’s case it should be clear that the cyborg does not provide release from these systems. Haraway observes that for cyborgs “[i]t is not clear what is mind and what body in machines that resolve into coding practices” (2296). At this late point in her essay, what is clear is that machine and human have become one; theorizing the machine essentially theorizes the human concurrently. While her over-dependence on temporal distinctions might render my reading of the cyborg in the 1890s questionable, she has relied too heavily on a sense of Utopian historical progression to
help explain the past and our own current possibility of breaking with the dark ages of human history by embracing the cyborg. We must reject any Utopia where coding practices work explicitly on lines of gendered nationalism and any theory that cannot account for the historical rewriting of culture on ostensibly blank cyborg bodies. While mesmerism as a scientific field has been rejected, critiques of science from within (such as Haraway’s) do not adequately take into account the progressive teleologies underwriting their own perspectives.

Whether the character of Trilby can escape the gendered nationalism rampant in Du Maurier’s novel is not entirely clear. We see her as “being quite an imbecile, no doubt from grief and anxiety. But she never left her husband’s bedside for a moment, and had the obedience and devotion of a dog” until Svengali dies (246). To those with English eyes, Trilby’s participation with Svengali in a sexual union must look like a marriage; nothing else is intelligible from within this national symbolic. As such, they can see the unnaturalness of her sex and the construction of her desire for Svengali. Her farewell song to his picture also reeks of unwilling obedience to an unjust coding practice. Yet, she remembers her resistance to Svengali quite well; she says “[h]e used to say he’d come and look at me there [the Morgue], and the idea made me so sick” (256). These conflicting moments reveal her conflicting imbrication in the system of power that benefits Svengali. Questioning the Englishmen’s positioning of her comes in a much more subtle way. Paradoxically, the religious determinism she expresses before her death (called fate in a different kind of coding practice) contradicts the religious system of power represented by English nationalist Mrs. Bagot and the trois Anglîches. Of her father, Trilby says, “[h]e told me that he was responsible for me—he often said
so—and that mamma was too, and his parents for him, and his grandfathers and
grandmothers for them” (279). In her view, she has no control over her destiny, it’s all in
her ancestors’ hands. Interestingly, Trilby cannot participate in this sort of determinism.
Since she does not leave any descendents, the possibility of her responsibility for another
is unrealized. Trilby’s faith in religious determinism releases her from the bonds of
English nationalism which competed with Svengali’s mesmeric coding. Of course, this
release comes on her deathbed. The only feasible escape from embodied coding practices
in Trilby is death; no amount of contesting the intelligibility of the symbolic will
conclude its power over the living.
In Bram Stoker’s *Dracula* (1897), leading woman Mina Harker says, “‘[t]here is a poison in my blood, in my soul, which may destroy me, unless some relief comes to us’” (325). Here Harker acknowledges the direct embodiment of contamination; concurrently, she aligns her soul with a particular part of her materiality. Anatomical, or material, elements of humanity shape identity in this novel and set the novel firmly within evolutionist constraints. In this paper I will show how *Dracula* presents a new and threatening form of materiality—new and threatening, at least, in terms of British national identity. *Dracula* is intimately concerned with revitalizing, or even revamping, a British national identity. British nationalism and gothic alterity fight to write the body as their own text. The making of a national identity requires communal memory; organic and inorganic forms of national memory come under attack in this novel. The possibility of an inorganic remaking of memory threatens British identity. Bodily materiality in *Dracula*, much like in postbody theory, does not have to be organic. This means that prosthetic additions to the body may become parts of the body; inorganic prosthetic elements become articulated to the body for seamless functioning. The continual prosthetic additions to the body do not come solely through necessity but have an aesthetic quality as well; these incorporations look forward to a more contemporary type of high tech. Yet, often the making of British national identity in *Dracula* involves backward looking attempts to recuperate the Germanic and Nordic (masculinized) elements of British history while dismissing the French (othered) elements. The
recuperation is a highly gendered pursuit. Finding the right elements of the future and the past calls for the birth of a “new” British identity, one that might be posthuman. The success of the posthuman involves its exact performance of the human; the inability to locate a difference between posthuman and human elements of society is posthumanity’s victory. Birthing the posthuman involves a radical reshaping of materiality along gendered nationalist lines; Dracula suggests a rebirth of British national identity as Anglo-Saxon but cannot envision this reshaping outside of the evolutionary paradigm of materiality.

Unlike noted scholar Talia Schaffer, who focuses nearly exclusively on male/male interactions in the text, I have focused on the roles of both women and men in the text to avoid a disappearance of the female voice in this already overtly male text. I agree with Stephen Arata’s influential article “The Occidental Tourist: Dracula and the Anxiety of Reverse Colonization,” which says the condition of the empire negatively affected “Victorian confidence in the inevitability of British progress and hegemony. Late-Victorian fiction in particular is saturated with the sense that the entire nation—as a race of people, as a political and imperial force, as a social and cultural power—was in irretrievable decline” (622). While Arata’s argument is convincing, I find concerns of gender, the nation, and the material nature of the body to be intertwined within the novel and at the forefront of what the novel dramatizes. Dracula might seem like a feminist text because of Mina Harker’s ironic reference to biblical Eve’s giving Adam the apple and the initiation of knowledge, but the larger context of the novel shows her apparent feminism has severely limited success (193). This sole comment on her feminine perspective wryly notes her position, but the remark stands alone as dissident; the rest of
the novel relegates women to highly curtailed pursuits. Of Harker, Van Helsing says, "[s]he has a man’s brain—a brain that a man should have were he much gifted—and woman’s heart. The good God fashioned her for a purpose, believe me, when He made that so good combination," and then insists on her exclusion from the all male camaraderie (240). The dismissal of women from active pursuits is standard in *Dracula*. The symbolic order requires her exclusion for intelligibility; thus, Mina Harker’s anatomical androgyny has little effect in allowing her an equal role in finding and killing Dracula.

One major literary source for *Dracula*, Sheridan Le Fanu’s *Carmilla*, a surprisingly Sapphic gothic short novel, tells the story of a father and his daughter Laura who live in Styria—a rather out-of-the-way place in Eastern Europe.18 Faced with fantastic visions and a lack of society, Laura matures alone until Carmilla’s arrival.

18 The thesis of Matthew Gibson’s recent account of these novels says that while *Dracula* and *Carmilla* seem to be about Irish national concerns, the novels are actually engaged with the nations depicted in them. Irish politics play a role, but a very minor one in his account. Of *Carmilla*, he says, “[t]he contention of this chapter is that *Carmilla* is heavily influenced by the politics of Middle Europe, and that Le Fanu, rather than taking Styria simply as a fashionable location for a modern vampire story or as a mask for Ireland, is commenting upon recent politics in the region itself, and the dangers of the Ausgleich of 1867 […] The vices of Vampirism are thus a veiled symbol for a new political instability to Austria of which the Hungarians are the certain harbingers […] The embedded national allegory represented by the vampire is of a brutal Hungarian past set to destroy an orderly present” (44).
“Languid” vampire Carmilla and the more energetic Laura develop a particularly close relationship. Their lesbian-like passion and the household’s lack of a name-preserving son reveals the story’s preoccupation with history and lineage. Other elements of the story reveal its desire to preserve the English language. Indeed, anxiety about history, lineage, and Englishness become the organizing motives for the entire story. A team of historians, locals, and military personnel bind themselves together to end Carmilla’s slow reduction of the local female population. Dracula, by contrast, focuses on a formidable, virile anti-hero who, only somewhat metaphorically, tries to impregnate London with vampire-spawn. The several examples of Mina Harker’s baby, the production of multiple records of this collective’s chase, and Dracula’s vampiric descendents all involve production. Anxieties about generation and reproduction motivate this novel, and through reading the novel’s codes we see that it is the nation that needs to be reproduced. Nations-scholar Benedict Anderson says that “it may be useful to begin a consideration of the cultural roots of nationalism with death, as the last of a whole gamut of fatalities” (10). Dracula presents an interesting conflation of death and nationalism, but Count Dracula’s power to denaturalize his victims’ nationality necessitates a reassertion of a British identity.

Communal memory and nation building

Dracula emphasizes the material aspect of communal memory in nation building.

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19 Carmilla’s own family, the Karnsteins, “have long ceased to exist” in both “name and title” (193).

20 Jennifer Wicke discusses this angle in great depth.
Organic, and seemingly natural memories, come under attack by Dracula and his Eastern threat to British identity. Both bodies and places can serve as a memory’s location in the novel; British nationalism requires a strict policing of bodies and places to maintain its integrity. The Count knows that he must insert himself on English soil for a successful erasure of British national identity; Christine Ferguson notes this common trend in invasion novels (131-32). The attack on the historical land of Britain emphasizes the material quality of the threat.

Communal memory makes nation building possible; nations are, famously, imagined communities, according to Benedict Anderson. Since embodying memory is a particular concern of Dracula, the novel emphasizes the material possibilities of communal memory. Many look to national landmarks such as Westminster Abbey or the Tower of London as the sites of national memories; Stonehenge, a superannuated scientific tool, has become part of the national memory. It also serves as a regular reminder of how once important technologies can become out-dated. Count Dracula realizes that communal memory can have a material form outside of landmarks. Embodying memory is one of his particular concerns, and his attack on embodied memories threatens British identity. Count Dracula warns Jonathan Harker of the transferability of dreams, a transformed memory. About Harker’s guest room, he says, “‘should you leave these rooms you will not by any chance go to sleep in any other part of the castle. It is old, and has many memories, and there are bad dreams for those who sleep unwisely’ […] He finished his speech in a gruesome way, for he motioned with his hands as if he were washing them” (57). This passage suggests that memories inhabit a locale. Dracula’s home, apparently, has the power to transform the memory of any
inhabitants into the memories of his people. This inorganic attack on the body has a simple remedy; his own forgetting of these memories involves a quick bodily cleansing, hand washing. Harker soon falls asleep in another part of the castle and unwanted memories overcome him in an attempt to make him part of another community, the vampiric one. The threatening transformation of his material memories signals the birth of the posthuman; distributed cognition is an indicator of the posthuman (Hayles *How 3*).

Mina Harker’s shared mental connection with Dracula also signals this kind of posthumanism.

In addition to locales, individual bodies can serve as reminders or memories for a group as well. After Dracula appropriates Mina Harker’s consciousness in his flight from the camaraderie, she makes her husband promise not to inform her of their plans. By pointing to her scar, she indicates her necessary distance from the group. Jonathan Harker recalls the incident with, “‘I promise!’ and as I said it I felt that from that instant a door had shut between us” (322). The external factor of the memory—part of Mina Harker’s body affecting Jonathan’s mind—indicates the radical difference from traditional notions that memories are stored within one’s own body. The physical space of a door cuts off the communal interplay of their minds and seemingly shared materiality. The three-dimensional aspect of the door reinforces the fact that her scarred body, her materiality, can remind Jonathan Harker of her unsuitability for saving the nation. Barring Mina Harker from the group because of her contaminated mind allows the others, all male comrades, to continue the project of saving, reviving, or birthing the nation. Excising Harker and her contribution from the group protects British national identity from a scarred, and possibly transformed, materiality. It is no accident that the
group excises the sole female member as well. This kind of nationalist materialism indicates *Dracula*’s intellectual context of evolutionary theory, and the novel’s inability to escape evolutionary concerns.

The continuation of the nation requires the passing of communal memories on to the next generation. The final lines of the novel, Van Helsing’s fortune telling for young Quincey Harker, reads, “[w]e want no proofs; we ask none to believe us! This boy will some day know what a brave and gallant woman his mother is. Already he knows her sweetness and loving care; later on he will understand how some men so loved her, that they did dare much for her sake” (369). Van Helsing’s need to pass on communal memory to young Harker, thereby assuring the continuation of the nation, insists on the transformative abilities of memory. Their material effects, however, need not be mentioned by this late point in the novel; Dracula is dead, and the threat to national communal memory seems to be over. Chasing Dracula out of Britain to his Eastern European home potentially, but maybe only temporarily, assures the safety of Britain.

**Postbody Theory and *Dracula***

This section will provide a brief overview of the terminology of postbody theory in relationship to *Dracula* and postbody theory’s demand that we analyze various additions to the body (its accessories) as parts of the body. Examining the role of some additions to the body, vampiric prophylactics, in both *Carmilla* and *Dracula*, will demonstrate how *Dracula* reimagines national identity in terms of the Britishness or Englishness of its religion. Thinking of these various accessories in terms of historically-dependent aesthetic codes will allow me to connect materiality, nation building, and
language. Finally, I will consider how the high tech body, one created by the addition of prostheses, becomes a firm ground for the animating soul. Dracula firmly insists on particularized locations or embodiments of humanity.

Much as in the previous chapter concerning Trilby, understanding the potential for the posthuman across periods requires a recognition of the parallels between the contemporary condition of posthumanity and 1890s novels. Postbody theory illuminates Dracula’s preoccupation with materiality as bodies, bodily histories, and bodily accessories.21 When analyzing descriptions of academic critical theory in conjunction with various magazines covering contemporary high tech, Tiziana Terranova writes:

The story-line underlying most of these statements can be summarized in this way: there has been a huge ontological shift not only in the nature of human society, but in that of our very bodies. This mutation has been brought about, on the one hand, by the exposure to simulated images in the most traditional media, and, on the other, by the slow penetration into our daily life of almost invisible technological gadgets, from contact lenses to personal computers. (“Posthuman” 236)

Dracula’s own preoccupation with technological gadgets deals less with the vampire’s own body and more with the defenses against the vampire. Count Dracula’s first potential victim in the novel, Jonathan Harker, writes, “[h]ow was it that all the people at Bistritz and on the coach had some terrible fear for me? What meant the giving of the crucifix, of the garlic, of the wild rose, of the mountain ash? Bless that good, good woman who hung the crucifix round my neck! for it is a comfort and a strength to me whenever I touch it” (52). His repeated reliance on Catholicism’s crucifix and elements of continental cuisine emphasize not only the otherness of his attacker but the otherness of defenses against the attacker; the representative of mere Englishness—that wild

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21 Darwin’s work elucidates the notion that the body has a history.
English rose—fails its prophylactic duties for Harker. Instead, digging into the pre-modern history of Britain, from before Catholicism was cast out of England, affords Harker protection. He does not yet appreciate the value of the garlic and cross; however, both point towards the slow re-imagining of an English national identity for Harker that is about to unfold over the next few pages. This re-imagining happens through the incorporation of the garlic and cross into his body, much like contact lenses slowly become a naturalized part of the body today.

Stoker here has added several elements to the history of bodily accessories, or, frequently, prostheses in postbody theory’s terminology, to their history as invoked in Le Fanu’s *Carmilla*. A “hunchback,” notable for his status as bodily-othered, offers Carmilla and Laura their own devices against vampires. He says, “[w]ill your ladyships be pleased to buy an amulet against the oupire[^23^], which is going like the wolf, I hear, through these woods. […] here is a charm that never fails; only pinned to the pillow, and you may laugh in his face” (171). Unlike Dracula’s victim, these women only need to guard themselves against nighttime attacks. Interestingly, “these charms consisted of oblong slips of vellum, with cabalistic ciphers and diagrams upon them” (171). When used as protection against the vampires, occult drawings signal the lack of power Christianity has against the vampire and the capacity paganism has as preventative; yet Stoker’s version, complete with crucifix, places the body of Christ at the forefront of the

[^22^] Hardy’s scene in *Dracula’s* near contemporary *Tess of the D’Urbervilles* involves a hunt through a field in search of errant garlic plants that have distinctly altered the “pure” taste of a farmer’s butter.

[^23^] Vampire.
collective’s arsenal. Van Helsing’s best tool against Dracula, though is: “‘[t]he Host. I brought it from Amsterdam. I have an Indulgence’” (217). Here we have strangely foreign Catholicism imported into the heart of Britain to fight the time-defying vampire. The use of the cross is one way Germanic Van Helsing nationalizes the Britons with a pre-modern, and therefore Catholic, Northern Europe. Importantly, neither Le Fanu nor Stoker assert that science will provide the only way to fight the vampire. The necessity of religion, though lacking some of its polarizing capabilities, remains foremost in vampiric prophylactics. The Count does understand the importance of prosthesis in assuming another’s identity and, therefore, nationality; he steals Harker’s clothing in an attempt to confuse the villagers. The use of various prostheses as defense against the vampire signals that people can transform into posthuman creatures; the posthuman body does not require a birth even though *Dracula* emphasizes production.

Thinking about these technologies of the body as aesthetic codes illuminates the appeal nationalist strategies of presenting the body have, even outside of protection against vampires. Indeed, the interplay of technology and the art of the body is indispensable in some definitions of posthumanism as it is in *Dracula*. When interpreting Heidegger, postbody theorist R. L. Rutsky says:

[Heidegger] argues that the relationship between art and technology, so visible in the Greek *techmē*, has always been basic to technology, to its ‘essence,’ even when the *conception* of technology has been explicitly posed (as it has in the modern, instrumental conception of technology) in contrast to art, to the aesthetic sphere. High tech, with its emphasis on issues of representation, style, and design, seems to signal a reemergence of this repressed aesthetic aspect within the conception of technology. (4)

This is part of the larger project of modernism. Therefore, technologies of the body will almost always have an aesthetic element, according to Rutsky. Furthermore:
“This ‘aesthetic turn’ in the conception of technology does not, however, begin only with the inception of ‘high tech.’ Its beginnings can readily be seen in that strange conjunction of the technological and the aesthetic that occurs in the modernist aesthetics of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In fact, modernist aesthetics has often been defined precisely in terms of its relation to technology.” (8)

Significantly, the argument presented here is about periodization and division. The “now” of modernism insists on the conjunction of aesthetics and technology. This usually modernist impulse is present in Dracula as well.

Jonathan Harker makes this argument about modernism while discussing his diary. He says his diary “is nineteenth century up-to-date with a vengeance. And yet, unless my senses deceive me, the old centuries had, and have, powers of their own which mere ‘modernity’ cannot kill” (60). Indeed, in the novel history has interrupted the drive to a modernist break with the past. And Count Dracula’s home in the hills is part of Eastern Europe, not exactly a place from before time began. Rather, Eastern Europe had a different meaning in later nineteenth-century Britain. Stephen Arata glosses the relationship between British writers and Dracula’s homeland as follows: “[f]or Western writers and readers, these characteristics—racial heterogeneity combined with racial intolerance considered barbaric in its intensity—defined the area east and south of the Danube, with the Carpathians at the imaginative center of the turmoil” (Arata 629). The setting then demands a higher attention to racial heterogeneity, something frequently under attack in any era’s evolutionist aesthetics.

As a technology of the body, modernism’s high valuation of machine aesthetics furthers our understanding of the role of automation in late nineteenth-century novels. Lucy Westenra’s appearance—gradually made to fit the vampire aesthetic—represents
one type of automation. The aesthetic demands more than just appropriately coiffed bodies, however. The aesthetic affects the surroundings similarly. Rutsky says that the early twenty-first century science fiction dismisses the machine as aesthetically pleasing. Rather, the production of ostensibly contemporary aesthetics involves:

the human subject […] immersed in a vast and inescapably complex technological space. […] this space is presented as a kind of mutation. […] it is viewed as explicitly technological, not in the sense of an older, modernist aesthetic of machinery—which is present only as an allusion, as part of a pastiche of past style—but in the sense that it is constituted through technological reproduction: it is a space of surfaces, images, simulations, empty signifiers—as space, that is, of information, of data. (15)

Yet, this is like the space of the city in Dracula’s mind. Jonathan Harker writes that Dracula’s initial experience of the metropolis has been:

a vast number of English books, whole shelves full of them, and bound volumes of magazines and newspapers. A table in the centre was littered with English magazines and newspapers, though none of them were of very recent date. The books were of the most varied kind — history, geography, politics, English life and customs and manners. There were even such books of reference as the London Directory, the “Red” and “Blue” books, Whitaker’s Almanack, the Army and Navy Lists, and — it somehow gladdened my heart to see it — the Law List. (44)

This is not solely the city proper but the English countryside, which many little Englanders think defines England. These are books and learning about the country—information representing the laws, knowledge, and English history. For an Englishman, the information and data is hardly as inescrutable as “a space of surfaces, images, simulations, empty signifiers,” but it certainly represents a bank “of information, of data.” Jonathan Harker’s “gladdened heart” reveals his pleasure and contradicts Rutsky’s insistence that this kind of information aesthetics comes only with late twentieth-century/postmodernist aesthetics.
Of course, the representational status of these reference works hardly looks strange to Harker, an English speaker already versed in the codes of London and its language. The inscrutable nature of these codes is more readily apparent to non-English speakers or people distanced from the metropole in terms of geography or temporality, like the Count, who knows London through books only. Of “‘your great England,’” Dracula worries that “‘as yet I only know your tongue through books. To you, my friend, I look that I know it to speak’” (45). Learning to speak the proper language also participates in Stoker’s revision of literary history. In *Carmilla*, Laura says, “Mademoiselle De Lafontaine […] spoke French and German, Madame Perrodon French and broken English, to which my father and I added English, which, partly to prevent its becoming a lost language among us, and partly from patriotic motives, we spoke every day” (Le Fanu 152 emphasis added). However, Dracula insists on learning the English language. The later novel worries about creating (or birthing) new English speakers, not preserving them. Embodying a knowledge of spoken English requires particular stylizations of the lips and tongue; Dracula’s desire to sound more like a native English speaker requires at least a minimal reshaping of the body. The ability of the othered to

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24 In *Dracula*, Talia Schaffer says “a sort of sublimated nonphysical pleasure [is] associated with dematerialized texts” (402). Furthermore, “the material on which they inscribe—their waxen phonographic cylinders, diary books, and telegrams—are burned, mislaid, or misdirected, as if Stoker needs to salvage the pleasure of writing by destroying the sensuous experience of the document itself” (402). However, this analysis neglects the most insidiously inscribed text: the body. The body in *Dracula* behaves like a text, responding to both the writing of British nationalism and gothic alterity.
mimic the English-speaking subject represents the ability of the posthuman to appear human.25

Thinking about the body as malleable and as a useable tool allows an analysis of it as “high tech” within the terms of some postbody theory. This connection has not been made explicit by Rutsky, but nothing can be more “high tech” than an automaton or cyborg.26 Rutsky says, “[t]hus endowed with immanent value, high tech tends to be seen less as a means or tool for human use than as something autonomous of human control” (Rutsky 130). In Dracula, as well as Trilby, this tool has been offered up beyond human control to a higher power—that of the nation, the animating force of these novels. Of animating forces, Rutsky says: “[w]hether the figuration of technology as living is represented as utopian or dystopian, however, it remains a technology ‘animated’ by a certain ‘spirit’” (Rutsky 24). Here, it is the spirit of the nation that animates Mina Harker’s reproduction; her child could bear the traces of the history of both Englishness and Britishness. The frightening revelation that disembodied powers can control our bodies happens in Dracula significantly with Lucy Westenra’s automation, as hers is a

25 See Christine Ferguson for a lively discussion of Dracula and the standardized English language.

26 Adrian Mackenzie says “[t]he very threshold between what does and does not count as technological relies on stabilized materialities, living and non-living” (43). The great push in postbody theory to call the subject-object distinction into question comes from many sources, including Bruno Latour (194), Rutsky (passim), Ann Weinstone (10, 41). Often, this means dismissing any difference between human and intelligent machine.
particularly embodied loss of the will. The loss also happens, though less importantly, with the automation of the dead man steering the ship bearing the Count into Mother England’s territory (99). This sailor’s extra human abilities cause the newspaper’s, and thereby the general public’s, panicked reaction by representing a threat to symbolic intelligibility. The decomposition of his body indicates a foreseeable end to his postmortem powers, and the vibrancy of Lucy’s automated form causes a much larger stir, if on a much smaller scale, among the cadre of vampire slayers. Interestingly, the animation of dead bodies and inanimate bodies often threatens the symbolic order as de-naturalized sex does.

Mina Harker’s remarks about one instance of Lucy’s somnambulism directly follow the newspaper account of the Count’s British arrival. She writes:

Lucy was very restless all night, and I, too, could not sleep. The storm was fearful, and as it boomed loudly among the chimney-pots, it made me shudder. When a sharp puff came it seemed to be like a distant gun. Strangely enough, Lucy did not wake; but she got up twice and dressed herself. Fortunately, each time I awoke in time, and managed to undress her without waking her, and got her back to bed. It is a very strange thing, this sleep-walking, for as soon as her will is thwarted in any physical way, her intention, if there be any, disappears, and she yields herself almost exactly to the routine of her life. (107)

This passage demonstrates several important points about Lucy Westenra’s automation. First, her body and will are connected, “for as soon as her will is thwarted in any physical way, her intention […] disappears.” Secondly, and quite tellingly, “she yields herself almost exactly to the routine of her life” and thus could potentially become a proper British matron. Indeed, the tug of war between Mina Harker’s directing of Westenra’s body and Dracula’s similar attempt to move her materially shows that both vampirism and “the routine of her life” are conditioned responses. 27 Finally, both Dracula and

27 Arata says, “The struggle between the two camps [Vampire and British] is thus one
Harker can override whatever mental intention she might have by a simple manipulation of her materiality. The conjunction of materiality and consciousness reinforces thinking about her actions in embodied terms. The idea of “mind over matter” makes no sense in a context where we find the mind firmly rooted in the matter. In this way, the novel proper corrects the malpractice of its one physician, John Seward. Seward, discussing Renfield’s sedation, says, “‘[t]he poor soul’s body will enjoy the relief even if his mind cannot appreciate it’” (126). Tellingly, Lucy Westenra’s soul cannot rest until the camaraderie exorcises vampirism from her body. *Dracula* resists any notion of a disconnect between body and soul; representations of embodied nationality and embodied consciousness reverberate through the text.

The Birth of the Posthuman

This section will analyze how age and sexuality affect births in *Dracula*. Considering the nation’s overarching power in these situations will show how the birth of the posthuman is a national concern. I will also consider, more particularly, the assertion of a non-Celtic English national identity.

In the last chapter I argued the machine is one way to imagine the posthuman. On the machine’s birth, R. L. Rutsky says:

> For both modernist and romantic aesthetics, then, the birth or coming to life of the machine is not simply the product of a rational, scientific design; it is not simply a matter of construction, of putting parts together, of engineering. Rather, such a machine is necessarily infused with a living spirit, with a soul; it is a “dead” level a struggle over access to women’s bodies, and *Dracula*’s biological colonization of women becomes a horrific parody of the sanctioned exploitation practiced by the Western male characters” (633).
technological object reanimated, given the status of an autonomous subject. This bringing to life of technology must obviously, then, take place as much through magical or spiritual means as through science [...] The animation of technology, however, tends to be figured in the terms of a dichotomy, as either utopian or dystopian. Given the often-noted ‘romantic reaction’ against the rationalist, scientific-technological utopianism prevalent at the time, it is hardly surprising that the figure of a living, autonomous technology would appear to romantic aesthetics as almost entirely negative, dystopian. This representation will be maintained in modernism, but alongside it there is a return of the image of a utopian, animate technology. (Rutsky 24)

With this, Rutsky rather neatly sums up the production of the posthuman in Dracula, for there are not just technological powers animating Lucy Westenra, Mina Harker, or any of Dracula’s victims, but his living spirit also animates this posthuman birth, contra British nationalism. Here is the “dead” technological object, Lucy Westenra in her grave or even her bed, brought to life and beginning her growth by feasting on the bodies of young children. The image of a woman ready for marriage, and probably motherhood, consuming children instead of birthing them incites much public concern and certainly threatens the symbolic order’s intelligibility for the public. And the blurring of periodization present in such a text as Dracula shows both the utopist drive of animating English nationalism and dystopist paranoia about frightening Eastern powers. Yet, the ideologically fraught birth of the posthuman in the novel becomes less complex when paired with the example of Renfield and his horrifying need to kill everything. His feeding of larger and larger creatures has the concurrent and devastating side effect of killing small, then progressively larger and larger creatures. This violates Dracula’s implicit rule that (nearly all) production—on either English nationalist lines or the Count’s Eastern ones—should not come at the absolute expense of anyone or anything. Dracula’s victims all live on in either something like their original forms, as Jonathan
Harker does, or born into a new form, as Lucy Westenra is. Furthermore, the happy ending provided by the birth of Quincey Harker, and the marriages of Seward and Godalming, hold out the promise and hope of new British births.

Concurrent with the birth of the posthuman is an imbuing of the aged/youthful binary with representational power. As a counterpoint to the young Britons, Dracula describes his castle and how he likes the oldness, “the shade and the shadow” (48). He also says he will appreciate a chapel in his new house: “‘we Transylvanian nobles love not to think that our bones may be amongst the common dead. I seek not gaiety nor mirth, not the bright voluptuousness of much sunshine and sparkling waters which please the young and gay. I am no longer young; and my heart, through weary years of mourning over the dead, is not attuned to mirth’” (48). Contemporary Britishness has no use for the Count’s “noble” desire to stay away from commoners; disregarding Lord Godalming’s laughable “marriage” to Lucy Westenra, his willingness to marry and reproduce with her indicates the proper mixing of commoner and noble appropriate in a new, increasingly cash-based economy.28 While the Count’s aged appearance seems to support this statement, there is an underlying conflict between the fictionalized age of

27 Clearing away the outdated aristocracy further aids the creation of a new Britishness. Arthur, who becomes Lord Godalming, misses the rather telling point that all of his male friends have given his bride-to-be blood transfusions. He had considered the commingling of his blood with hers as a marriage (185). This reveals Dracula’s position that the aristocracy has become less competent or worthy in the new Britain, even if Van Helsing seems to prefer Lord Godalming’s blood over the other men’s blood (Arata 632).
Dracula’s materiality and his later-realized youthful potentiality. Jonathan Harker observes that, “[s]omehow his words and his look did not seem to accord, or else it was that his cast of face made his smile look malignant and saturnine” (48). Count Dracula’s body does not age the same as others; travels back in time to a youthful appearance are part of this instantiation’s strange potential and its ability to subvert the British nationalist symbolic.

In apparent contrast to Dracula’s frightful agedness, and later agelessness, Quincey Morris, the American, comments on the “‘fine old fellow [Van Helsing] is’” (164). Van Helsing, the Dutchman, represents a different, masculinizing force for the newly formed British identity. And, unlike frightening Dracula, the Brits crave his masculinizing Northern European capabilities. However, in terms of birthing a new British identity, the camaraderie must take his Germanic masculinity only so far, and Mina Harker knows this. She says,

[t]he moment we were alone in the carriage [Van Helsing] gave way to a regular fit of hysteric. He has denied to me since that it was hysteric, and insisted that it was only his sense of humour asserting itself under very terrible conditions. He laughed till he cried, and I had to draw down the blinds lest any one should see us and misjudge; and then he cried till he laughed again; and laughed and cried together, just as a woman does. (185)

Here, Harker realizes the limits of Van Helsing’s Germanic masculinity; age has rendered Van Helsing less potent than the fellowship would believe. Lessons and assistance from Van Helsing are highly appropriate; however, no material, genetic contribution to new Britishness should come from the secretly now feminized Van Helsing.

The frightening birth of the vampiric posthuman in Dracula comes from a long history. Van Helsing’s explanation of the progressive narrative of Dracula’s power
culminates in the question, “‘Do you mean to tell me that Lucy was bitten by such a bat; and that such a thing is here in London in the nineteenth century?’” (201). Here the speaker poses the standard question of disbelief that enforces and structures progressive narratives; it implies a disbelief in the persistent powers of ages past in a new and up-to-date era. It also signals the arrival of the past within the present era, and this frightening culmination of history allows for the posthuman birth of the new Lucy Westenra. Van Helsing continues his explanation using examples from the new and old worlds to rationalize the existence of the vampire for his contemporary, rational arbiters. The knowledge about this global phenomenon, condensed into narrative history, demonstrates the power of Western imperialism over an irrational and unbelievable pre-colonial world. The larger globe, a concept made possible because of Western imperial domination, provides the setting for the birth of colonial resistance; the vampire, as one possible example of colonial resistance, unbelievably appears in London for the camaraderie to exile, weaken, and kill. The British anxiety about their threatened identity necessitates this metaphorical death of material changes in their constitution. If Dracula dies, he cannot contaminate their bloodlines.

The malleable materiality of the vampire’s body represents one of its major threats to the new British imperial order. Lucy Westenra’s changed appearance after her death, and her ability to “pass in through the interstice where scarce a knife-blade could

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29 Arata considers Dracula to be an example of the reverse colonialism narrative, where colonized subjects seek to overthrow British government and install themselves or their representatives as rulers (623). This reveals the weakness of the British race and the uncertainty of its perpetual domination.
have gone [...] with a corporeal body as real at the moment as our own,” reveal to the
novel’s British nationalists the unsettling abilities heterogeneous bodies can have (220).
Possibly the most disturbing aspect of this odd body is its unnatural procreative abilities.
For, unlike homo sapiens, reproduction in the vampire world requires only one of the
species. Of his spouse, Jonathan Harker writes:

To one thing I have made up my mind: if we find out that Mina must be a vampire
in the end, then she shall not go into that unknown and terrible land alone. I
suppose it is thus that in old times one vampire meant many; just as their hideous
bodies could only rest in sacred earth, so the holiest love was the recruiting
sergeant for their ghastly ranks. (296)

Imagining Mina Harker’s companionship in death restores Jonathan Harker’s faith in her
happiness—wherever she might get it. However, the different mode of reproduction that
evidently means that one vampire can spawn many children is another aspect of the
strangeness of vampiric, posthuman reproduction. Stephen Arata says, “[h]orror arises
not because Dracula destroys bodies, but because he appropriates and transforms them
[...] Miscegenation leads, not to the mixing of races, but to the biological and political
annihilation of the weaker race by the stronger” (630).

Dracula is fascinated with traditional forms of reproduction too. Mina Harker’s
own take on the subject involves an extensive discussion with Lord Godalming. Of the
encounter, she says:

I suppose there is something in woman’s nature that makes a man free to break
down before her and express his feelings on the tender or emotional side without
feeling it derogatory to his manhood; for when Lord Godalming found himself
alone with me he sat down on the sofa and gave way utterly and openly. [...] We
women have something of the mother in us that makes us rise above smaller
matters when the mother-spirit is invoked; I felt this big, sorrowing man’s head
resting on me, as though it were that of the baby that some day may lie on my
bosom, and I stroked his hair as though he were my own child. I never thought at
the time how strange it all was. (235-36)
Lord Godalming’s breakdown can only come in front of a woman, since the woman does not threaten his masculinity and she, naturally, can care for him. Mina Harker’s later distancing of the event—calling it “strange”—complicates this rather standard point about nineteenth-century representations of women. The “unmanned” Lord’s infantile behavior and Mina Harker’s Jocasta-like incestuous reproductive urge certainly feels uncanny. The fascination with normative forms of reproduction and an unwillingness to accept an adult’s childlike but sexualized behavior keeps Mina Harker’s sexuality firmly within the range of the normative. This also furthers the novel’s distancing of the aristocracy and insistence on a middle-class picture of England.

Dracula’s own desire to secure this particular man-to-woman form of reproduction for spreading his own species and empire makes readers question his non-heteronormative procreative abilities. The desire to ape gendered norms even in non-normative situations becomes particularly apparent when we consider Dracula’s statement to the camaraderie that, “‘[m]y revenge is just begun! I spread it over centuries, and time is on my side. Your girls that you all love are mine already; and through them you and others shall yet be mine—my creatures, to do my bidding and to be my jackals when I want to feed’” (304). Dracula asserts that he can control the male characters through their women; reified modes of heterosexual reproduction provide Dracula’s means of seizing the Britons’ empire. Vampiric posthumanism frightens the Britons even more because it can take on the form of normative Britishness, and its subjects can become indistinguishable from the British. In the opening of the novel, Jonathan Harker’s slow realization that Count Dracula is not a usual human provides one of the gothic’s most frightening and suspenseful moments. The introduction also
contains the most overtly sexual example of Jonathan Harker’s ghoulish heterosexual desires. While falling asleep in the castle, three women approach him and he “felt in [his] heart a wicked, burning desire that they would kiss me with those red lips […] I could feel her breath upon me. Sweet it was in one sense, honey-sweet, and sent the same tingling through the nerves as her voice, but with a bitter underlying the sweet, a bitter offensiveness, as one smells in blood” (61). The mixing of bodily fluids here—breath usually smells of droplets of saliva, but this time it’s blood—underscores the strangeness of the vampire’s threatening embodiment. The repulsiveness and attractiveness of unusual heterosexual contact anxiously energizes Harker more significantly than any of his contacts with the Count, and this pattern proves effective for the Count’s infiltration of London.

The non-normative forms of sexuality in Dracula include the highly homoerotic tensions of the camaraderie. Talia Schafer analyses the homoeroticism apparent in Dracula in her excellent article “‘A Wilde desire took me’: The Homoerotic History of Dracula.” By tracing the mostly friendly relationship between Bram Stoker and Oscar Wilde, Schafer articulates the construction of closets and the function of closeting through Stoker’s personal writings and Dracula. Her focus on the erotic potential of male-to-male bodily contact in these various texts reveals a concern with materiality as well. However, a certain disconnect between sexuality and gender limits this analysis. In analyzing how “‘the sight of [one man’s] picture […] unmans’” Stoker, Schafer dismisses materiality and focuses on the mutuality of homosexual relations (cited on 386). I would suggest that the active de-masculinizing apparent in this quote necessitates a focus on the feminine, and other antitheses of masculinity and manhood in the era. This
involves investigating generalized “man” for all humanity as well; nonhuman elements need consideration, especially in this context. Stoker’s assumption of a submissive role in this context needs exploration as well. My analysis of the women’s role in this all-male context seeks to highlight their frequent disappearance in gay male-centered criticism of the novel.

Not all of the good guys are still alive at the end of *Dracula*. Quincey Morris, the American, dies a telling death. About his character, Dr. Seward says, “‘What a fine fellow is Quincey! I believe in my heart of hearts that he suffered as much about Lucy’s death as any of us; but he bore himself through it like a moral Viking. If America can go on breeding men like that, she will be a power in the world indeed’” (184). Here, new American strength is equated with moral Vikingness. Equating metaphorical Britannia’s rebellious American son with indigenous European masculinity clearly shows the path whereby a nation can masculinize, or re-masculinize, itself. The camaraderie’s reliance on Van Helsing, Germanic language speaker extraordinaire, to revitalize itself against the Eastern threat of Dracula, further refines the uses various nationalities have in shaping a new British identity. Metaphorically, this is the story of English language history. The death of Morris not only signals the British drive to kill the rebellious young America and its newly competitive pursuit of imperial wealth, but, as Morris contributes not only the primary name to Jonathan and Mina Harker’s child but also donates blood to the cause, shows his material implication in the process of creating a new British identity. Arthur

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30 See Arata, 641-642.

31 The 2007 debate about how the Anglican Communion will pay for their operations if they disavow their American branch (the American Episcopal church
Holmwood, later Lord Godalming, has “looked like a figure of Thor […] His face was set, and high duty seemed to shine through it” while killing Lucy Westenra’s posthuman form (223). This further appropriation of Northern European masculinity solidifies its place in new British identity formations. *Dracula* shows the worry that British nationalists have about contamination; paranoia about contamination guides their response to non-British identities and any lasting effect non-Britons might have.\(^{32}\) Interestingly, Krishan Kumar says, “[t]he meaning of the original word [Britain] evidently referred to the Celtic practice of painting the body” (5). No more perfect conflation of nationalism and a stylization of the body could exist. Yet, in the new British national identity, “English” stylizations of the body are at the forefront.

**Rethinking Materiality**

The preceding several sections concerning posthumanism and the birth of a new British identity have allowed us to scrutinize materiality. In this section I will continue to assert that linguistic identity helps shape national identity but that the material identity is just as, if not more, important in identity construction. I will show how materiality is at the center of this novel and how the novel uses particular ideas about anatomical currently bankrolls much of the larger church’s projects) over its acceptance of homosexuality shows how occasionally Britannia tries to reign in its unruly, 200-year-old child but must face material consequences in doing so.

\(^{32}\) Claire A. Simmons effectively demonstrates the function of the Teutonic and Old English in dismissals of other British ethnic groups in English national linguistic identity in the earlier part of the nineteenth-century.
It’s my contention that attacking materiality is the most basic attack to the stability of British national identity in the era of evolutionary theory. Christine Ferguson makes an interesting point about Britishness at this time, however. She says that “the danger, rather than necessity, of social and linguistic homogeneity that texts such as *Dracula* dramatize a homogeneity embodied, not by the valiant defenders of Britain, but rather by the nation’s alien antagonists. Stoker’s resistance to uniformity is most evident in his celebration of the non-standard Englishes that act as important tools in the vampire’s defeat” (131). In her argument, Britishness, particularly in relation to language identity, is heterogeneous, multiple, and inherently non-standard. This comes from the assertion that Britain’s various constituents acknowledge difference as part of their inherent identities and Dracula’s mistake is that “[t]o be English, he seems to believe, is to speak its language in an utterly unidiosyncratic way. This belief leaves him utterly unequipped to navigate the varied and multi-mediated forms of language that are rallied against him when he does alight on England’s shores” (143). Apparently, the Count cannot pass as British because his English is too pure. Important to this argument, though, is Ferguson’s use of the word “mimicry,” which also shows up in James Berkley’s argument about posthumanism and Poe. She says, “One of the most effective ways of assuring the failure of such a mimicry is by representing the identity, and perhaps more importantly, language, of the centre as too mobile, too evasive, to ever be mastered by someone from the outside. The multiplicity of home becomes a way of staving off the incursions of an apparently static and atavistic alien subject” (150). However, this understanding of multiplicity neglects the necessity of recognizing that the
“standardized” language is part of the whole as well. Variance from a norm cannot happen without the norm in place. It’s not that Dracula cannot pass as British because his too homogenized, or maybe too perfect, form of mimicry fails; his language mimicry is so perfect that it would seem the very center of English language identity has become changed by his entrance into the scene. Rather, it’s the radical alterity of his body that sets him apart from the Britons. The frightening potential of his sometimes human, sometimes unhuman, materiality is the real threat to national identity. The success of the posthuman is its ability to become indistinguishable from the human; if Dracula’s form of posthuman succeeded, no one would notice. Terranova’s definition of posthumanism as “the belief in artificially enhanced evolution” becomes increasingly important here (234). The changes Dracula makes to his victims look incredibly like advancement in human progress; their ability to change shapes represents just another possibility that will increase homo sapiens’ chance of survival.

References to the limits of the Britons’ and Dracula’s materiality pervade the text, and this necessitates our focus on material, rather than linguistic, identity. For instance, Van Helsing eagerly memorializes the internment of Dracula to only one box; “[h]e is confined within the limitations of his earthly envelope” (291). In a way, this novel is just a story about materiality, after all. The characters even seem to know this, saying:

We had a sort of perfunctory supper together, and I think it cheered us all up somewhat. It was, perhaps, the mere animal heat of food to hungry people—for none of us had eaten anything since breakfast—or the sense of companionship may have helped us; but anyhow we were all less miserable, and saw the morrow as not altogether without hope. (305)

Food, a material substance required by bodies, brings them together. Dracula’s minions attempt to feed together, on Jonathan Harker; Dracula, however, is the only “guilty eater”
who tries to consume his meals in solitude. The threat of a solitary existence haunts the novel’s Britons, and the strangeness of a solo life reconstitutes their desire to create a community. The alterity of Dracula’s body habits, at least in reference to procreation and feeding, mark him as inherently different from the British.

This difference is an all-consuming difference. Dracula’s ability to change the entirety of his body greatly contrasts with the inherent anatomical assumptions of nineteenth-century anatomists such as J. M. Charcot. Arguing about the different locations of brain or nerve lesions in discussing localized physical ills is Charcot’s main topic. For instance, Charcot would say that an inability to move an arm is caused by a lesion in a particular part of the brain. Locomotor ataxia, and hemorrhages causing this symptom, are some of his major topics. Charcot is most well-remembered today for having “re-invented” hysteria, or at least popularizing diagnoses of hysteria, for almost any trouble a feminine body might have (see Didi-Huberman). The example of the uterus, and its specific controlling nerves in the brain, also underscore the inherent anatomical assumption of doctors like Charcot. It is, quite simply, that specific parts of the brain control specific parts of the body (Brain passim; especially 121). So, Dracula’s ability to change the entire body would seem to contradict these advances in nineteenth-century evolutionary science. However, a change in the blood might affect the entire system. Of course, this is the essential element in any of Dracula’s transfusion transformations.33

33 When trying to make a claim for sanity, the madman Renfield says the following of Van Helsing: ‘When an individual has revolutionised therapeutics by his discovery of the continuous evolution of brain-matter, conventional forms are unfitting, since they would seem to limit him to one of a class. You, gentlemen, who by nationality, by heredity, or by the possession of natural gifts, are fitted to hold your respective places in the moving world, I take witness that I am as sane as at least the majority of men who are in full
The marks of Dracula may affect more than just the blood, of course. The example of Mina Murray’s scar illuminates several points. She says, “[m]y surmise was not finished, could not be; for I caught sight in the mirror of the red mark upon my forehead; and I knew that I was still unclean” (318). Here, like the common assumption postbody theory fights that consciousness supplements materiality, Harker’s shocked recognition of her scar supplements her consciousness. The scar comes from a piece of “the Host”—Jesus Christ’s transubstantiated body, in Catholicism—that marks her not only as “unclean” or vampire-like, but also as scarred by Catholicism’s very un-English purification rituals. Of course, Catholicism is an important part of the pre-modern sense of the nation that is being reasserted. Yet, its foreignness to the contemporary Protestant audience marks a definite change to the symbolic order. The historical progress of the nation has left Catholicism in the past; the necessity of distancing itself from the religion Van Helsing re-imports to British soil repeats the progress of the nation. Mina Harker’s “unclean”-ness is due both to the curse of the vampire and the drastically “other” means attempted to “purify” her. The reproduction of the nation depends on Harker’s maternal abilities and fitness, and removing all marks of Catholicism from her body is one final part of her saviors’ quest.

Another final part of the camaraderie’s quest involves disintegrating Dracula. Quite possibly the most interesting, and frightening, aspect of the postbody in Dracula is the suggestion that bodies can transfer themselves by breaking down into small particles and traveling through the air, or “corporeal transference” in Dracula’s terms. We see the possession of their liberties.” (249) That a madman would claim to know about significant scientific advances in the field of mental science seems to suggest the real breadth to which knowledge about mental science and anatomy spread in the nineteenth-century.
three women-spirits who threaten Jonathan Harker at the beginning of the novel approach him in his dream-state by corporeal transference. The possibility that Dracula lives even after the group thinks he has died also depends upon the principle of corporeal transference. Dracula’s death scene reads:

But, on the instant, came the seep and flash of Jonathan’s great knife. I shrieked as I saw it shear through the throat; whilst at the same moment Mr. Morris’s bowie knife plunged into the heart.

It was like a miracle; but before our very eyes, and almost in the drawing of a breath, the whole body crumbled into dust and passed from our sight. (367)

This forced rearrangement of the parts of Dracula’s body into a less threatening form suggests the possibility that his particles will reassemble and rise again, despite the penetrative powers of Jonathan Harker (representing the British empire) and Quincey Morris (likewise the burgeoning American one). Morris’s death makes room for even more British imperialistic endeavor. But nothing signals an end to Dracula’s ability to change the nation through corporeal transference.

**Investigating Nationalism**

Of Dracula’s critics, Talia Schaffer does begin to point to the powers of nationalism in Stoker’s role in Wilde’s trial and in the text of Dracula. My analysis, though, highlights the issue of nationalism in Dracula. In one instance, Schaffer says, “Stoker identifies with the national anti-Wilde homophobia, partly to disguise his own vulnerability as a gay man, partly because it justifies his belief in the value of the closet, and partly from horror at the monstrous image of Wilde produced by the media, which would haunt men of ‘his kind’” (388). The nationalism apparent in Dracula, though, suggests that nationalism needs further exploration: is it possible that Dracula’s
nationalism rests firmly on the stance that non-miscegenated, heterosexual reproduction must take place for the reproduction of the nation? Schaffer writes:

The furthest extension of ‘discretion’ is censorship. ‘To prevent [decadence] {Schaffer’s clarification}, the censorship must be continuous and rigid. There must be no beginning of evil, no flaws in the mason-work of the dam’ ([Stoker] F, 481). This rigid, erect, flawless monument, however, can barely hold back the article’s own fascination with incontinence. Indeed, censorship empowers homosexual fictions since it constructs them as universally appealing ‘intoxicants.’ From the potent tower of censorship, Stoker can safely direct our gaze at the forbidden land beneath, made more alluring by its danger and distance—rather like the vista of green tree-tops beneath Castle Dracula’s cliff. His ‘rigid’ ‘dam’ of censorship resembles his ‘stone’ exterior and his ‘still’ body during Irving’s and Caine’s respective stories. This useful metaphor hides his excitement and expresses his erection at the same time. The censor’s pen writes an ambiguous line. It should be no surprise that, within the stony fastness of Castle Dracula, censorship flourishes: Dracula reads and destroys Harker’s illicit literary productions, and within the great stone lunatic asylum, Dracula burns Seward’s overemotional diary. (389-90)

Importantly, the nation’s interest in, and power of, censorship nearly disappears in this analysis. Dracula’s interruption of the mail, a major national concern, and Stoker’s own intoxication with the power of the state, in the best interests of the nation, need to be considered as expressions of rampant patriotism. The state enables the metaphorical expression of Stoker’s erection. The state also allows British Stoker, the closeted person with various sexual interests, the censor’s power but demands that theouted homosexual relinquish the power of censorship. Stoker’s success in Trinity at Oxford shows his British “conventional morality” in relation to Wilde, if nothing else (393).

Postbody theory has allowed me to investigate the power of national interests in Dracula. I have shown how the discourse of mental science makes the sexed body legible in the national symbolic. The connection between the imaginable and sanity is also clear in Dracula. Renfield, the madman who is fascinated with watching small
animals get devoured by larger creatures, says, “I want no souls. Life is all I want” (271). Dracula’s ability to transfer his materiality through dust indicates the absolute connection between materiality and consciousness; while “soul” and consciousness are not synonymous, and neither are “life” and materiality, the translation from the language of religion into the language of evolution, and eventually to postbody theory, allows us to see the connection. Responding to Renfield, Seward thinks, “[w]hat about souls?” It was evident then that my surmise had been correct. Unconscious cerebration was doing its work, even with the lunatic” (272). Seward goes on to wonder “how are we to get the life without getting the soul also?” (272). This is the dilemma of some postbody theorists and many contemporary scientists who would like to create human consciousness-like artificial intelligence; the radical difference between the materiality of the body and the materiality of data processors makes for a nearly unimaginable evolutionary step, one that is especially unimaginable in Dracula’s terms. Acknowledging Dracula’s view of the necessity of a Germanic, biological/material contribution to the new British identity asserted furthers our understanding of the body as changing entity in Western culture. Temporal blurring has helped us see how Dracula participates in the forces of modernity that are still in place today. However, disavowing the role of new racial elements in creating an updated British identity and relying solely on one masculine, historical source for revitalization presents an overly synchronic picture of the nation. While the success of the posthuman is an indistinguishable replica of the human, the task is now to contest which version of posthumanity takes precedence in making British national identity.
Conclusion

*Trilby* and *Dracula* provide two excellent examples of the way nationalism can work as a “symbolic order,” in Butler’s terminology, that produces normatively gendered bodies for cultural intelligibility. Thinking of the body as a prosthetic addition for nationalist movements better phrases this phenomenon in posthumanist terms. However, the new phrase might also suggest that nationalism has a physical or material quality. What exact “body” nationalism might have seems less like discursive power than the material of the collective constituents of the nation. Looking at examples of these collective constituents in two novels has shown how progressive evolutionary narratives disadvantage people marked as different by systems of gender, sexuality, and race. It would seem that only successful characters are allowed to procreate in *Trilby*; the ending of *Dracula*, with the birth of Quincey Harker regenerating the nation, also emphasizes procreation. Characters *choosing* not to procreate does not appear as a viable option. This only further demonstrates the power of evolutionary logic, a form of heterosexualist binarism, over these novels.

The ideal posthuman position, though, calls for an end to asserting difference along the lines of the individual subject. According to R. L. Rutsky, “[a] posthuman subject position would, in other words, acknowledge the otherness that is part of us. It would involve opening the boundaries of individual and collective identity, changing the relations that have distinguished between subject and object, self and other, us and them” (21-22). So, a necessary change in philosophy to the posthuman perspective involves prioritizing a collective that does not end with any one group or nation. Asserting that the posthuman must arrive, however, only participates in the progressive teleologies
critiqued in the first chapter.

Possibly the posthuman has not yet arrived because a successful postbody has not yet happened. Changes in the individual material of the body might inaugurate a new philosophical epoch. The changes to the body that inaugurate the posthuman era must be guided not by the context of evolutionary materialism and must, instead, happen with a less programmatic design. Also, this epoch would have to dismiss any efforts that universalize the human; this rather radical position can only begin with an attempt to quit defining the human, and a related attempt to quit defining rights in terms of the human or the individual. Rights of animals and the environment might have to be considered; the rights of nonliving sentient machines might also demand attention. As revolutionary and unusual as this sounds, it might better refocus the debate about who currently has rights in any nation. When women fought for the right to vote in Britain in the early twentieth-century, bills ending property discrimination against universal male suffrage were quickly introduced and passed before women were allowed to vote. Similar serious national efforts to expand rights outside the “human” might quickly extend human rights to all currently living in the Western nations.
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