Rethinking Diversity Ideologies: Critical Multiculturalism and its Implications for Social Justice Issues

By

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Abstract

Social psychologists have long explored how colorblind and multicultural ideologies may improve intergroup relations. Criticisms from an epistemic standpoint of mainstream social psychological research discuss the inconsistencies of the effects/implications of these two ideologies on outcomes related to intergroup relations and prejudice reduction. Criticisms from a variety of critical epistemic perspectives suggest that, despite their antiracist origins, both ideologies have become incorporated into dominant cultural formations that reproduce white normativity, reflect white sensibilities, and serve white power. In light of these problems, education scholars discussed a different ideological approach to diversity, critical multiculturalism, which recognizes the importance of the contribution and participation of marginalized people in social and political domains and challenges oppressions that are perpetuated through dominate norms. In three studies, I examine how critical multiculturalism is a separable construct from multiculturalism, how it differentially predicts issues related to social justice, and its effect on social justice policies. White participants (Studies 1 – 3) responded to a diversity ideology scale that measured the extent to which they supported each of the diversity ideologies (Studies 1 – 2) including a general social justice policy measure (Study 1) and policies measures relevant to each type of ideology (Study 2). Results showed that although multiculturalism and critical multiculturalism were strongly positively related, critical multiculturalism was consistently a stronger predictor of social justice policies. Finally, participants read one of three diversity ideology passages (Study 3) to examine the effects of the ideologies on policy endorsement. Results showed little effect of the experimental manipulation on policy endorsement. These findings suggest that multiculturalism and critical multiculturalism may be variations of a single multicultural construct, but critical multiculturalism differentially and more strongly predicts social justice policies.

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As multicultural societies such as the United States become more diverse, it is important to understand how people's cultural identities (e.g. racial, ethnic, religion, gender etc.) shape the ways they live, learn, and work together in integrated settings (Plaut, 2010; Zirkel, 2008). Within social psychology, conflict and cooperation between people with different cultural identities has been the subject of a research area called intergroup relations (Allport, 1954; Sherif, 1966; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Resonating with atomistic or ontological individualist constructions of person and society more generally, social psychological research on intergroup relations has focused on the mental habits of individuals—stereotypical beliefs and prejudiced affect of both consciously endorsed and less consciously embodied varieties—as the proximal drivers of intergroup conflict. Accordingly, efforts to improve intergroup relations have focused on reduction of individual propensities for prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1998; Fiske, Xu, Cuddy, & Glick, 1999).

Mainstream social discourse and research in social psychology have focused on two general types of diversity ideologies: colorblindness and multiculturalism (Apfelbaum, Pauker, Sommers, & Ambady, 2010; Richeson & Nussbaum, 2004; Wolsko, Park, Judd, & Wittenbrink, 2000; Wolsko, Park, & Judd, 2006). I use the term ideology when referring to different types of diversity because in contrast to the emphasis in hegemonic psychological science on inherent propensities of individuals as the source of action and experience, a cultural psychology perspective directs attention to the ecologically inscribed structures of "mind in context" (Adams, Salter, Pickett, Kurtis, & Phillips, 2010) that both reflect and constitute individual propensities. This perspective extends consideration beyond individual beliefs to the cultural

ideologies—which I define generally as beliefs inscribed in the practices and institutions that structure social interaction—for managing diversity in multicultural societies. Colorblind ideology suggests that societies can best promote intergroup harmony and social justice by deemphasizing group membership (Wolsko et al., 2000). Multicultural ideology suggests that societies can best promote intergroup harmony and social justice by recognizing and appreciating group categories (Wolsko, et al., 2000).

Critics have discussed weaknesses of both ideologies. Criticisms from an epistemic standpoint of mainstream social psychology focus mainly on inconsistency of research that investigates the effects/implications of these ideologies on/for outcomes related to intergroup relations. More important for present purposes are criticisms from a variety of critical epistemic perspectives that interrogate the White racial standpoint of mainstream or hegemonic knowledge foundations. These perspectives suggest that, despite their apparent differences and antiracist origins, both ideologies have become incorporated into dominant cultural formations that reproduce white normativity – the ideas and practices that make whiteness appear to be the standard set of social norms – reflect white sensibilities, and serve white power.

In light of the problems of mainstream diversity ideologies, education scholars identified a different ideological approach to diversity that I will call *critical multiculturalism* (May, 1999; May & Sleeter, 2010; McLaren, 1995). Critical multiculturalism recognizes the importance of the contribution and participation of marginalized people in social and political domains and challenges oppressions that are perpetuated through dominant social norms. I refer to the perspective as critical *multiculturalism* because, like hegemonic multiculturalism, it celebrates and recognizes the differences between cultural groups. I refer to the perspective as *critical*

multiculturalism because, unlike hegemonic incorporations or appropriations of multiculturalism, its goal is to radically disrupt the hegemonic social order of white normativity.

The current research examines whether critical multiculturalism is a separable ideology from multiculturalism or a different manifestation of a multicultural construct. It also considers how critical multiculturalism relates to and affects different policy endorsement. In what follows, I provide a critical overview of research on diversity ideologies in mainstream social psychology (see Table 1 for a summary of each ideology). First, I will discuss colorblind and multicultural ideologies for improving intergroup relations by reviewing relevant theoretical and empirical work. The overview will focus on associations of these diversity ideologies with racial and ethnic intergroup relations as the majority of the empirical work has focused on race and ethnicity group memberships as opposed to other group memberships. Next, I will review origins and implications of critical multiculturalism as a tool for intergroup relations. I regard critical multiculturalism not just as another diversity ideology but instead as an "Other" diversity ideology. Resonating with decolonial perspectives of cultural psychology (see Adams, Dobles, Gomez, Kurtis, & Molina, 2015) and critical race theory (see Crenshaw, Gotanda, Peller, & Thomas, 1995) this diversity ideology has its foundations in the critical consciousness of and experiences of subordinated group members. It applies this consciousness as a resource to challenge knowledge forms that perpetuate normative standards that support systems of oppression. I then report three studies that examined whether multiculturalism and critical multiculturalism are separable constructs, whether the three diversity ideologies show different patterns of relationships with theoretically important variables (e.g. identification and policy), and how the ideologies effect policy endorsement. I end with implications and future directions of research on critical multiculturalism.

Colorblind Ideology

Colorblindness is a model of diversity that deemphasizes and minimizes the significance of racial group distinctiveness and membership (Apfelbaum, et al., 2010, Plaut, 2010, Rattan & Ambady, 2013, Richeson & Nussbaum, 2004). This ideology was prominent during the civil rights movement, anti-racist movements, and dismantling of Jim Crow laws and emerged in the U.S. (Ansell, 2013) as an antidote to the practices of segregation and discrimination. Advocates of colorblindness supported Martin Luther King Jr's (1963) sentiments that people should be judged "by the content of their character" (p. 5) and not by their racial identity. Thus, notions of separate but equal were no longer viable, and proponents proposed colorblind society as a means to protect equal opportunity for all individuals regardless of race (Ansell, 2013).

Besides the United States, another context where colorblind ideology is influential is France. French governments have coped with increasing cultural diversity by establishing public policies and laws that deemphasize treatment on the basis of racial or ethnic category and even outlaw the classification of citizens by ethnic characteristics and identities in official statistical data (Lieberman, 2001). From this perspective, actions that emphasize or engage people in terms of racial, religious, or ethnic identities are fundamentally problematic to the extent that they degrade the ideal of *egalite*, *fraternite*, and universal rights that all people possess as individual citizens (Lieberman, 2001). In this context, colorblindness affords support for individual rights and discourages public recognition of difference in favor of a common cultural and assimilative identity.

Organizations that adopt colorblind ideologies have emphasized equal treatment of people on the basis of individual characteristics and merit regardless of racial identities (Banks, 2004). One reason that proponents have advocated this ideology is their belief that attention to

social identities is divisive (Jansen, Vos, Otten, Podsiadlowski, & van der Zee, 2016; Richeson & Nussbaum, 2004). Another reason that proponents have advocated colorblind ideology is the belief that fair distribution of benefits (e.g. university admission, employment, promotion) should be based on relevant personal qualifications (e.g., ability) rather than considerations of collective identity. Related to this, yet another reason proponents have advocated colorblind ideology is the concern that any special treatment based on racial identity was inherently discriminatory (*Regents of University of California v. Bakke*, 1978).

The idea that social categorization is productive of intergroup conflict is not limited to social discourse outside of the academy, but also has informed mainstream approaches to intergroup relations in hegemonic psychological science. One thread of research on intergroup relations within the U.S. has been a social cognition perspective that emphasizes how categorization promotes intergroup conflict by facilitating the operation of stereotypes and prejudice (see, Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000; Park & Judd, 2005, for reviews; Wilder, 1981). Given this construction of the problem, researchers have investigated decategorization strategies designed to improve intergroup relations. According to the decategorization model, encouraging members of different groups to view one another as individuals and not as members of a collective group eliminates the functional utility of the category itself (Bettencourt, Brewer, Croak, & Miller, 1992; Brewer & Miller, 1984; Wilder, 1981) and leads to a reduction in negative intergroup attitudes. In general, researchers of this strategy argued that decategorization through a process of personalization will create more inclusive and expansive group boundaries resulting in cooperative interactions with outgroup members (Brewer & Miller, 1984). Research suggests that when contact situations were person focused (rather than task focused) and

permitted personalized interactions, participants reported more positive attitudes toward the outgroup members in the contact situations (Bettencourt et al., 1992).

Researchers of decategorization strategies argue that, on a psychological level, categorization is a basic tool for which we organize the world and it is unlikely that people will not go through this process (Park & Judd, 2003). Brewer (1988) found that people automatically utilize three elements (e.g. age, gender, and race) to rapidly categorize and this type of reaction is difficult to suppress, therefore, suggesting that it may not be feasible for people to ignore distinct group identities.

In contrast to decategorization strategies that focus on psychological elimination of categories all together, recategorization strategies attempt to undermine problematic intergroup categorization through unification or establishing a common ingroup identity (see Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000). Specifically, recategorization strategies stresses redrawing social group boundaries so that, psychologically, people see themselves as members of a larger groups rather than of distinct categories (Park & Judd, 2005). Here the emphasis is on shared communities which will unite individuals and decrease bias towards outgroup members by establishing them as ingroup members. Thus, the common ingroup identity model argues that members of separate groups can come together and see themselves as members of the same group through cooperative interdependence (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000), eliminating former distinctions that divided them.

Critics of recategorization strategies argued that successfully establishing a superordinate identity is difficult to sustain. Hewstone (1996) proposed that interventions to create a superordinate identity are unlikely strong enough to overcome the process of ethnic and racial categorization. Theoretically, Brewer (1991, 1997) proposed the optimal distinctiveness theory which suggests that people have competing motives for assimilation – a desire for belonging to

social groups – and differentiation – an opposition to the need for immersion in social groups.

People will identify with social groups that help them achieve a balance between the needs for

both inclusion and differentiation simultaneously. When situations of imbalance are experienced

by a person (e.g. situations that produce feelings of deindividuation) it threatens their need for

distinctiveness, resulting in them reestablishing distinctive subgroup identities.

A critique of both strategies is that abstraction (e.g. decategorization) or unification (e.g.

recategorization) is not so positionless or culture-neutral; instead, it involves the imposition of

default norms of whiteness. This imposition is reminiscent of work on assimilation which argues

that member of marginalized groups should give up their own identities and cultures and adopt

the dominant groups' identity and culture (also referred to as minority group assimilation, see

Hornsey & Hogg, 2000b; Whitley & Webster, 2018). However, empirical evidence suggests that

colorblindness and assimilation are distinct ideologies and unrelated (Purdie-Vaughns, Steele,

Davies, Ditlmann, & Crosby, 2008; Whitley & Webster, 2018). For example, a recent meta-

analysis found that scores on measures of support for assimilation and colorblind ideology were

not correlated, $g = −0.18$, $p = .21$, $r.= −.09$ (Whitley & Webster, 2018). Theorists who distinguish

between these ideologies propose that assimilation entails eliminating group differences by

requiring marginalized group members to abandon their distinct group memberships and adopt

the dominant group's culture (Levin et al., 2012; Verkuyten, 2005; Whitely & Webster, 2018). In

contrast, colorblind ideology does not require that people from marginalized groups abandon

their own culture for the dominant culture but merely suggests that people should ignore cultural

identity when making decisions about evaluations or outcomes. This ideology has an egalitarian

focus because it emphasizes ways to avoid discrimination and promote equality (Knowles,

Lowery, Hogan, & Chow, 2009); however, colorblind ideology is not without critics.

Problems with Colorblindness

White normativity. One of the main criticisms of colorblindness is that it preserves white normativity—again, the elevation of White cultural patterns as the norms and practices for defining the socially expected or "neutral" range of human attributes and behavior (Bell & Hartmann, 2007; Bonilla-Silva, 2018; Morris, 2006; Ward, 2008). The basic principle of white normativity is that tendencies of White people are the "natural" baseline against which to evaluate other cultural practices. An alternative conception of white normativity is that White people are people and individuals of other social groups are people to the extent that they are similar to White people (Morris, 2006). Research indicates that people associate being American with being White (Devos & Banaji, 2005). When people imagine the unmarked category American, the default features of the category prototype are tendencies of White people. Critiques suggest that calls to ignore racial identity do not lead to race-neutral evaluation or perception, but instead instantiate or elevate particular (White) tendencies as something akin to a "just-natural" standard—a standard against which cultural difference becomes deviance or abnormality. One of the consequences of white normativity is to preserve a racial structure in which Whites occupy unquestioned positions of power and privilege.

In this attempt to preserve white normativity, Blake, Ioanide & Reed (2019) discuss how current rhetoric about race claims to embrace racial equality and diversity, while upholding racial violence and discrimination. The researchers described that within the political spectrum, individuals tend to misuse critical language about the relationship between race and power to counter liberation movements. For example, public school officials in Arizona invoked Martin Luther King Jr to argue against ethnic studies courses and praise support for colorblind ideologies. Public school officials appropriated Dr. King's vision of a colorblind society to deny

group-based discrimination, thus, neutralizing Dr. King's radical vision of racial justice, suggesting that a focus on ethnic studies in education would instead lead to resegregation. They argued that they instead were the ones who strived to protect the civil rights of marginalized students by opposing racial specific curriculum. This example shows how colorblind rhetoric is co-opted to legitimize white domination of epistemologies, methods, and histories, while sanitizing radical platforms challenging racism and racial power to argue that colorblind ideology is the better solution for systemic racism.

The previous discussion suggests that white normativity results from the exercise of racial power. Because White people occupy positions of cultural dominance, their ways of being and knowing acquire the status of unmarked standard. Some research suggests that White people are motivated to maintain their dominant group status and, therefore, have a general preference for inequality (e.g., Knowles et al., 2009; Plaut, Thomas, & Goren, 2009). Research has highlighted that one way to maintain their position as members of the advantaged group was to focus on commonalities between themselves and those in disadvantaged groups as to blur and deny the power differential that exists between them (Saguy, Dividio, Pratto, 2008).

Colorblind racism. Given these consequences of colorblind ideology for preservation of the status quo, it is perhaps not surprising that endorsement of colorblind ideology tends to be stronger among White people than among people from marginalized racial groups (Apfelbaum, Grunber, Halevy, Kang, 2017; Knowles, et al., 2009; Neville, Lilly, Duran, Lee, & Browne, 2000; Ryan, Hunt, Weible, Peterson, & Casas, 2007). One reason why there are group differences in the endorsement of colorblindness is *white ignorance*. Mills (2007) discussed the concept of white ignorance and argued that White people do not have to learn about their own positionality or about the inequitable disparities that various cultural groups experience because

their privilege insulates them from all responsibility for the consequences. He explained that this process of ignorance is not passive, or a simple lack of knowledge on the part of White people, but rather a deliberate tactic which extends white supremacy into a culture of (non)knowledge, which infiltrates not only at an individual level but also at a systemic level. One main criticism of endorsing colorblind ideology is that it becomes a way for White people to deny that racism exists because white ignorance affords them to ignore differential outcomes between dominant and marginalized groups, or at the very least minimize the negative implications of the outcomes.

The second main criticism of colorblind ideology is that it may produce a lack of awareness of the roles that race and racism play in society. Indeed, Bonilla-Silva (2017) suggests that present advocates of colorblind ideology deploy it more as a means to maintain rather than undermine social inequalities (e.g. racism). The failure to acknowledge racial and other identity differences allows people to ignore manifestations of persistent racism.

Bonilla-Silva identifies four central frames of colorblind racism: abstract liberalism, naturalization, cultural racism, and minimization of racism. Abstract liberalism includes notions of both political liberalism (e.g. equal opportunity) and economic liberalism (e.g. individualism and choice). The thinking goes that because equal opportunity is available to all, any inequalities experienced by a group is because of their own choice. Naturalization is a frame that allows White people to explain away racism by saying inequalities are natural occurrences. For example, Whites can explain structural segregation as the product of natural preferences for people to seek affiliation with (racially) similar others. Cultural racism is the use of culturally-based explanations for the apparent failure of marginalized groups to overcome obstacles or current standings in life. An example would be the belief or assertion that people from marginalized groups are overrepresented in social welfare programs and public assistance

programs because they lack cultural values of hard work or self-control (e.g., "they are too lazy"). Lastly, minimization of racism is a frame that suggests racism is no longer the main problem for marginalized group members because it is better than it was in the past. This frame also involves regarding any discrimination as affecting all races (e.g. sentiments of "All Lives Matter" in response to the "Black Lives Matter" movement).

Although all four of Bonilla-Silva's (2017) frames of colorblind racism are important, I will emphasize abstract liberalism. This frame operates under notions of liberalism – a political doctrine based on equal opportunity, individualism, egalitarianism, and free-choice. By framing social issues under these components of liberalism, White people can appear reasonable and even moral while opposing policies designed to reduce social inequalities. Another way to frame this is the notion that colorblind ideology has ego-protective features (Plaut, Thomas, Hurd, & Romano, 2018). Adopting colorblindness allows the dominant group, who is likely to perpetuate racism, to maintain egalitarian self-images because it allows them to self-present as nonprejudiced. For example, by evoking the principle of equal opportunity, people from dominant social groups oppose policies such as affirmative action because they claim such policies represent preferential treatment of some groups over others. This can affirm their perception that policies such as affirmative action are contradictory to the principle of equal opportunity for all. However, this argument and justification abstract the notion of opportunity from history, focus it on the present, and ignore the longstanding racism that denies people from marginalized groups equal opportunity in a larger sense. Alternatively stated, this convenient philosophy ignores the facts that subordinate groups are underrepresented in good jobs, schools, and universities and is an "abstract utilization of the ideal 'equal opportunity" (Bonilla-Silva, 2017, p. 56). Thus, a colorblind ideology may provide justification to dismiss poor race relations

and social inequalities (Bonilla-Silva, 2017; Richeson and Nussbaum, 2004; Schofield, 2010; Wolsko et al., 2000) simply by arguing that ideals of liberalism would be violated.

Evidence for the idea that colorblind ideology serves as a mechanism for denial of racism comes from research on the Color-Blind Racial Attitudes Scale (see Neville et al., 2000). Researchers developed this scale to measure the extent to which people deny the existence of white privilege, institutional discrimination, and the possibility that racism remains a problem. Some examples of items include, "White people in the U.S. have certain advantages because of the color of their skin," "Social policies, such as affirmative action, discriminate unfairly against white people," and "Racism may have been a problem in the past, it is not an important problem today," (p. 62). People who score high on this measure demonstrated less awareness of white privilege, implying that they held more distorted views of institutional forms of racism and race relations more generally. A likely motivation for this avoidance of race is defense against charges of racial bias. However, the consequence is that White people fail to recognize an important force that structures everyday life in the United States.

Instead of reducing discrimination, colorblind ideology may further perpetuate the inability to recognize discrimination. In another study, Rattan & Ambady (2013) found that children who were taught about colorblindness were less likely to recognize clear cases of bias and discrimination. Further, teachers working in a school setting that endorses colorblind policies were less likely to acknowledge race-related problems between students, minimized the disparate suspension rates for Black students, and failed to include academic material that reflects the diversity of students in the in classroom (Schofield, 2010). This research suggests that de-emphasizing group memberships within the schools may cause teachers to overlook inequalities between groups and neglect to implement programs to advance students' academic success. In

sum, colorblind ideology may afford denial of racism and undermine support for policies to eliminate racial discriminate—it is difficult to motivate people to support policies designed to alleviate a problem that doesn't exist—rather than improving intergroup race relations or social justice.

Multiculturalism

As a remedy to the shortcomings of colorblind ideology, civil rights activists in law and education articulated ideologies of multiculturalism (Berry, 1984; Plaut, Cheryan, & Stevens, 2015). Within education, a major goal of multiculturalism was to reform institutions so that they better reflected the cultural diversity of U.S. society (Banks, 2004; Banks & Banks, 2004). Banks (1993, 2004) explained that another goal was to bring about structural and systemic changes in the school system to increase educational equality for marginalized students. To achieve this goal, multicultural educationists were influenced by earlier ethnic studies movements which demanded the incorporation of marginalized people's history, cultures, and voices into the curricula and structures of schools, colleges, and universities (see, Banks 1993 for a history of ethnic studies and its influence on multicultural education). Thus, education scholars used multiculturalism to disrupt the hegemonic structures and overemphasis of the dominant culture. Some scholars describe multiculturalism as "a moral movement" (Fowers & Richardson, 1996, p.609) intended to gain rights and equality for marginalized groups as well as to reduce intergroup conflict and prejudice.

In contrast to colorblindness, multiculturalism suggests that people should not only acknowledge and recognize distinct cultural group origins (Benet-Martinez, 2012; Plaut 2010; Rattan & Ambady, 2013), but also value and respect them (Berry, 1984; Fowers & Richardson, 1996; Huo & Molina, 2006; Park & Judd, 2005; Rattan & Ambady, 2013). Generally, scholars

suggest that multicultural ideology yields positive outcomes for members of both dominant and marginalized groups.

With respect to people from dominant groups, scholars argued that attention to racial and ethnic differences associated with multiculturalism will promote more inclusive attitudes (Berry & Kalin, 1995). Thus, thinking about cultural difference may increase commitment to tolerance and equality among people from dominant groups (Morrison, Plaut, & Ybarra, 2010). Similarly, engagement with multicultural institutions enables people to gain more knowledge about cultural patterns different from their own (Hornsey & Hogg, 2000a; Rosenthal & Levy, 2010). In turn, such knowledge can reduce prejudice as people learn that cultural others are similar to themselves.

Among people from marginalized groups, emphasizing and celebrating cultural differences associated with multicultural ideology can promote cultural identification and its positive effects, including psychological well-being (Branscombe, Schmitt, & Harvey, 1999) and positive self-worth (Benet-Martinez, 2012). One important benefit of multiculturalism for marginalized groups is that it is identity supporting (Verkuyten, 2007). That is, multiculturalism offers marginalized groups the possibility to maintain their own ethnic identity and culture. Researchers have documented evidence for this argument in domains of education (Banks, 2004; Sleeter & Grant, 2009), corporate organizations (Plaut, et al., 2009) and counseling (Sue & Sue, 2012).

Multiculturalism emerged as a result of activism by people from marginalized racial and ethnic groups who were opposed to the assimilationist pressures and white normativity of colorblind ideology. Similar processes were evident in academic social psychology, particularly in its hegemonic North American articulations. Conventional work in social psychology

portrayed the self in individualist fashion as distinctly separate from the collective. It often

regarded social influence as a problematic force that compromised individual behavior (e.g.

conformity, obedience, diffusion of responsibility, etc.; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Myers, 1993)

and prescribed individuation as a remedy to such group mentality. As multicultural ideology

gained force in broader society, it informed several responses to this "collective fear of the

collective" (Markus & Kitayama, 1991) in hegemonic articulations of (North American) social

psychology.

Association of Black Psychologists

A primary source of multicultural resistance to the colorblind white normativity of

mainstream (social) psychology has been the work of psychologists from marginalized cultural

groups associated with the Society for the Psychological Study of Culture, Ethnicity, and Race

(Division 45 of the American Psychological Association). Some of the earliest and most forceful

articulations of this perspective came from the members of the Association of Black

Psychologists who advocated for the discontinuation of psychological testing (e.g. intelligence

testing; Cleary, Humphreys, Kendrick, & Wesman, 1975; Jackson, 1975). They argued that these

psychological tests were not objective or neutral measures of individual differences but instead

were oppressive practices meant to prevent Blacks from gaining equal and fair access to

educational and employment opportunities. This resistance by Black psychologists illuminated

the white normativity within mainstream psychology and demonstrated the need to focus on

studying the psychological effects of the collective rather than individual.

The idea that people are group members not individuals separate from society is further

supported by the formal emergence of ethnic minority (and other marginalized groups')

psychologies within the psychological literature. Marginalized groups in the U.S. do not

conceptualize their identity and psychological experience in the same way as the dominant group (Russo & Vaz, 2001; Tomes, 2018). As such, each marginalized group experiences a unique psychological consequence as a result of being, for example, Black, Latinx, Asian, LGBTQ, women, among others (e.g., see Baldwin, 1986 for Black psychology; see Padilla & Olmedo, 2009 for an overview of Latinx psychology; see Chrisler, Golden, & Rozee, 2008). Thus, the importance of the study of specific social groups emerged within academic scholarship to be more contextually responsive to the lived experiences of these various marginalized cultures.

Social Identity Theory

Another source of multicultural sensibilities in social psychology was social identity theory. In contrast to the idea of collective influence as a problematic force, researchers of social identity theory argued that collective identification was necessary and beneficial, especially for people from marginalized groups. In their discussion of social groups, Tajfel and Turner (1979) suggested that individuals identify with social groups as a way to systematize the social world, and create and orient the individual's place in society. Social groups, therefore, provide members with a way to identify themselves in the social context. In addition, this social identification with a group helps to maintain and enhance people's self-esteem and provides a sense of distinctiveness from relative outgroups. Thus, not only is identifying with social groups inherent (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), but identifying with marginalized identities can buffer wellbeing when it is threatened (e.g., perceived discrimination; Branscombe et al., 1999; Schmitt, Branscombe, Postmes, & Garcia, 2014) and motivate collective action. This theory assumed a dynamic interaction between psychological processes and the social context (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Thus, it considered the importance of collective realities and understood that people are situated culturally and collectively as group members not individuals separate from society.

Cultural Psychology

A third intellectual site in which the influence of multicultural ideology is evident is cultural psychology (see Adams, 2012; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Shweder, 1990). Scholars working in this perspective emphasized the mutual constitution of psyche and culture, arguing that one cannot understand person abstracted from context. These researchers further emphasized the positive effects of collective identities and recognized that the self is interdependent with the collective and is therefore inherently an integral part of the collective (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). A key feature of this interdependence is an awareness of the other, and of the relationship and mutuality with the other. Thus, this perspective helped scientists not only investigate how a person is distinct from groups but also how he or she related to the collective. Importantly, cultural psychology revealed that people's experiences are not independent of culture but that basic psychological processes are cultural and, therefore, psychology must attend to the cultural positioning of both researcher and researched.

These perspectives emphasis the fundamental role of collective identity in psychological experiences and processes. Psychological research has long included frameworks that have helped scientists to not only investigate how a person is distinct from groups but also how he or she relates with collectives. This emphasis on providing knowledge and understanding of marginalized groups validates their voice and unique challenges, which supports the principle goals of multiculturalism: to acknowledge and value distinct cultural groups.

Effectiveness of Diversity Ideologies for Improving Intergroup Attitudes

Although supporters of multiculturalism argue that this ideology improves intergroup relations and reduces prejudice better than colorblind ideology, empirical evidence to support this argument is mixed. Whitley and Webster (2018) explained in their meta-analysis that experimental studies that investigated the effects of multiculturalism on prejudice included either abstract or concrete primes to manipulate multicultural ideology (see Yogeeswaran & Dasgupta, 2014). Abstract primes discuss multiculturalism in terms of positive outcomes (e.g. promoting harmony among different cultural groups; Whitley & Webster, 2018). Concrete primes discuss multiculturalism in terms of societal outcomes (e.g. supporting ethnic groups to maintain their distinct identities at work, school, etc.). Because concrete primes discuss multiculturalism in ways that challenge the social order, Whitley and Webster (2018) hypothesized that priming multiculturalism in concrete terms would lead to higher prejudice, whereas abstract primes would lead to lower prejudice relative to a control condition. The results of their meta-analysis supported their hypotheses. Specifically, concrete primes used in experimental studies produced higher self-reports of prejudice than a control condition, $g. = 0.20$, $p < .05$, $r. = .10$, whereas abstract primes produced marginally lower self-reports of prejudice than a control condition, $g. = -0.07$, $p = .08$, $r. = -.05$, $\chi2(1) = 9.37$, $p = .002$. These mixed results indicate that although multiculturalism manipulations may lower explicit prejudice, the effects are dependent on the type of multicultural message (abstract versus concrete) that is made salient to participants. Specifically, it appears that positive messages of multiculturalism are more likely to reduce prejudice than messages that promote changing societal outcomes.

In another series of studies (Wolsko et al., 2000), researchers primed participants to think about colorblindness or multiculturalism (versus a control condition), and then asked them to

report stereotypes about and attitudes toward Black targets. Overall, colorblind and multicultural ideology primes led participants to express less race bias compared to the control group, but colorblindness led to more ethnocentrism – evaluating other groups based on the standards of the ingroup – than did multiculturalism. Additionally, multiculturalism encouraged *more stereotyping* but *less prejudice* towards Black targets than both the colorblind ideology and the control conditions. Extending this research, Richeson and Naussbaum (2004) found that both explicit and implicit forms of pro-White bias were lower after researchers primed participants with multicultural ideology than after priming with colorblind ideology.

Evidence suggests that perception of intergroup conflict moderates the effect of diversity ideologies on prejudice. Correll, Park, and Allegra Smith (2008) extended earlier work (Richeson & Nussbaum, 2004; Wolsko et al., 2000) by manipulating perceptions of intergroup conflict. When researchers portrayed conflict as low, the colorblind and multiculturalism conditions did not differ from one another. When researchers portrayed conflict as high, participants exposed to a multicultural ideology treatment exhibited greater explicit prejudice than did participants in a colorblind ideology condition. However, this pattern was evident only immediately after the conflict reminder. After an additional 20-minute time lapse, participants in the colorblind condition showed greater implicit prejudice than did participants in the multicultural condition. The findings suggest that colorblind ideology can afford suppression of prejudiced attitudes immediately after reminders about high intergroup conflict, but does not prevent later expression of prejudiced attitudes. One interpretation of this study is that multiculturalism may produce conflict for people in the present but it may reshape their affect in the long term, whereas colorblindness provides people a way to suppress expressions of prejudice in the short term that will resurface later.

The studies I discussed in the preceding paragraphs conform to standard tendencies in the field of social psychology to emphasize prejudice (reduction) as an outcome of interest. Rather than measuring prejudice as an outcome, Vorauer and Sasaki (2010) investigated prejudice as a moderator of the effects of diversity ideologies on perceptions of Aboriginal Canadians. Using similar primes and methods as the previous studies, they found that diversity ideologies had differing effects based on the participant's level of prejudice. Specifically, colorblind ideology had negative effects on feelings of warmth toward Aboriginal Canadian outgroup members across all participants (no moderation of prejudice level). Multiculturalism (compared to colorblindness) led participants to believe that there were greater differences between themselves and Aboriginal Canadians. Additionally, multiculturalism had positive effects for participants low in prejudice who reported greater feels of warmth toward and perceived similarity with the outgroup members, however, it had negative effects for participants high in prejudice who reported less feelings of warmth toward and greater perceived cultural differences between themselves and the outgroup members. Overall, these patterns suggest that exposure to multicultural ideology may have some positive effects but only among people with low prejudice towards outgroup members and may lead to more bias for those with high prejudice.

There is also some evidence to suggest that diversity ideologies have differential effects on people from dominant and marginalized groups. For example, one study (Wolsko, et al., 2006) found that endorsement of multiculturalism was associated with less ingroup bias among White participants, but was associated with more ingroup bias among participants from marginalized racial minority groups (African American, Asian American, and Latinx American participants). The opposite patterns emerged for endorsement of colorblind ideology: positively associated with ingroup bias among White participants, but negatively associated with ingroup

bias among participants from marginalized groups. These results suggest that, for White participants, embracing colorblind ideology amounts to endorsing white normativity and more positive sentiments towards White members. For participants from marginalized groups, endorsement of colorblind ideology requires giving up allegiance with and deriving less positive regard for their cultural background. In order for Whites to endorse multiculturalism it may require some commitment to relinquish their positions of power within a white normative center.

Other research showed that people in dominant groups feel threatened by multiculturalism (Ginges & Cairns, 2000; Morrison et al, 2010; Verkuyten, 2005) and perceive it as exclusionary (Plaut, Garnett, Buffardi, & Sanchez-Burks., 2011; Rattan & Ambady, 2013). For example, Morrison and colleagues (2010) found that highly identified White participants reported higher levels of social dominance orientation (SDO) after being primed with multiculturalism than with colorblind ideology. Less identified White participants reported lower levels of SDO following the multiculturalism prime. Another study (Plaut et al., 2011) used an implicit association task (IAT) to test the association between multiculturalism and colorblind ideologies with inclusion and exclusion among White participants. They found that participants implicitly associated multiculturalism with exclusion rather than inclusion. However, this association was not present when the multicultural information explicitly included Whites. Thus, when presented with a type of all-inclusive multiculturalism in which they perceived their group to be included, Whites were more likely to endorse multiculturalism (Plaut et al., 2011).

It appears that the original goals of multiculturalism (e.g. improvement of intergroup attitudes and structural changes to gain equality for marginalized groups) took on many forms to make it more palatable to dominant sensibilities. For example, Whites often report feeling threatened and excluded when asked to evaluate or when exposed to multiculturalism. However,

these feelings of threat and exclusion may be a result of Whites not willing to give up the power associated with their membership in the dominant group. A reshaping of what constitutes valued knowledge and consciousness disrupts dominant cultural norms and is often perceived as a zero-sum game--a gain for the subordinate group directly means a loss for the dominant group (Jones & Dovidio, 2018; Norton & Sommers, 2011). A consequence of adjusting multiculturalism to fit dominant sensibilities is that Whites tend to define multiculturalism "safely" in a domesticated fashion as superficial embrace of other cultures: attending occasional food festivals, sampling different cultural traditions, and even recognizing cultural achievements. However, they resist embedding various cultural traditions into mainstream cultural institutions (e.g., the use of Spanish in public schools), especially if they pose a challenge to dominant culture (Plaut, 2010). This adjusted version of a safe multiculturalism may lead to the recognition and tolerance of cultural diversity but it fails to establish marginalized knowledge and experiences to address social inequalities as well as dismantle white hegemonic power inequities.

This overview of empirical evidence suggests the effects of diversity ideologies on improving intergroup attitudes are variable. One reason for this variability may be because the measures of the ideologies used in research are multifaceted constructs that are conceptually capturing different components of the ideology (Whitley & Webster, 2018). For example, Rosenthal and Levy (2010) suggest that multicultural ideologies are composed of various forms (e.g. acknowledgement of group differences and belief that groups should maintain their own cultures and traditions), each of which may be discussed in either concrete or abstract terms (Yogeeswaran & Dasgupta, 2014). To better understand the relationship between multiculturalism and outcomes such as prejudice reduction, it is important to identify the separate facets and examine how they relate to outcomes of interest. These facets of

multiculturalism may influence outcomes differently in isolation than when incorporated together.

Another important manifestation of this inconsistency is that multicultural ideology appears to have different implications for people from marginalized and dominant groups. Among people from marginalized groups, it appears that multiculturalism may result in higher levels of ingroup bias. From the perspective of marginalized groups, this result may not be seen as a negative consequence because identifying with one's ethnic ingroup also leads to positive in-group evaluation (Verkuyten, 2005). Among people from dominant groups, it appears that multiculturalism may elicit feelings of threat and exclusion which may lead White people not to endorse multiculturalism (Plaut et al., 2011). These differential effects suggest that conventional articulations of multiculturalism may not productively address improvements to intergroup relations.

Criticisms of Multiculturalism

Criticisms from mainstream epistemic perspectives of multiculturalism. A central criticism of multicultural ideology from mainstream epistemic perspectives is that it promotes separatism and balkanization. For example, critics of multiculturalism argue that increasing recognition of various ethnic, cultural, gender, or religious identities is inherently destabilizing to the common bond of nationhood (May, 1999; Lieberman & Goucher, 1999). Brewer (1997) suggested that multiculturalism can lead to reified group distinctions that result in conflict. Similarly, Fowers and Richardson (1996), and Schlesinger (1992), contend that multiculturalism may result in balkanization of previously harmonious groups because the boundaries between them have become vaster and overly distinct, resulting in unnecessary division and separatism.

Critics of multicultural ideology also have expressed concern that it can promote cultural relativism (Fowers & Richardson, 1996). From this perspective, the mandate to respect, celebrate, and value different cultural groups is problematic to the extent that it requires that one extend such respect and honor to morally reprehensible practices and groups (e.g. Nazis). They also explained that at times there may be differences in moral perspectives across cultural groups that are too reprehensible to tolerate or respect.

A final criticism from mainstream epistemic perspectives is the concern that multicultural ideology promotes devaluation and resentment of dominant cultural groups and their associated cultural patterns. For example, Fowers and Richardson (1996) argue that multiculturalism fails to give the same respect and value to White people that it demands for people from marginalized groups. Similarly, if multicultural education reminds people about histories of racialized colonial violence at the center of modern societies, then it may lead to anger toward people in dominant cultural groups who maintain the status quo. Accordingly, multicultural ideology—especially more critical versions that that draw attention to histories of colonial violence and present hegemonic power relations—is likely to prompt mutual resentment. In other words, this suggests that multicultural ideology fails to reduce intergroup tensions.

Criticism from marginalized perspectives of multiculturalism. Conventional thinking about multiculturalism was that multiethnic societies could achieve intergroup harmony through recognition and respect for cultural differences. However, scholars in critical education studies have argued that conventional approaches to multiculturalism constitute a deracialized discourse that reifies culture and cultural difference while failing to address issues of racism and social inequality (Hatcher, 1987; McLaren, 1995; May, 1999; May 2003). Others scholars suggest that multiculturalism denies, obscures, and minimizes the pervasiveness of systemic racism and

discrimination (Blake & Ioanide, 2019). One way this occurs is to use multiculturalism as a way to reinterpret the meanings of racial justice by disregarding group-based discrimination and limiting racism to individual proclivities. Current events in sports and popular culture reflect these theories. For example, Colin Kaepernick protested patterns of systemic police violence against Black people by highlighting that stereotyping an entire group of people is racist. Those who opposed Kaepernick, reinterpreted his protests as unpatriotic group-based stereotypes against police officers, thus, denying, obscuring, and minimizing matters of systemic racism against Black people, and the opposers suggested instead that Kaepernick was being racist against police officers (Blake & Ioanide, 2019). Thus, the Kaepernick's opposers shifted the conversation obscured and denied the systemic discrimination against Black people and limited the conversation on how they thought Kaepernick's proclivities were instead examples of racism.

Drawing on these critiques, education scholar Peter McLaren (1995) identified three articulations of multiculturalism that enabled mainstream education institutions to incorporate this ideology without disturbing white domination. The first articulation of multiculturalism that McLaren (1995) identified was *conservative* (or *corporate*) *multiculturalism*. He used this label to refer to versions of multicultural ideology in which people from the dominant culture distance themselves from racist ideologies without giving up any of their positions of power or privilege (McLaren, 1995). This construction of multiculturalism positions whiteness as an "invisible norm by which other ethnicities are judged" (McLaren, 1995, p. 93). Under conservative multiculturalism the hope is to integrate different cultures into society without changing the policies and practices of that society. The goal is for people of different backgrounds to settle into society without resistance and to assimilate their different life experiences into the Eurocentric ideals currently in place. Conservative multiculturalism welcomes "others" to the

extent that they separate themselves from all but the external markers of "otherness" and settle within the normative structure. Thus, conservative multiculturalism welcomes a visual form of racial and cultural diversity as affirmation of tolerance and progressive aspirations, but expects people from marginalized groups to remain silent about their perspective as they assimilate to dominant social norms. In this way, conservative multiculturalism avoids disruption of the social order and maintains silence about racial power and institutional forms of racism.

The second articulation of multiculturalism that McLaren (1995) identified was *liberal* multiculturalism. Liberal multiculturalism asserts that there is an "intellectual sameness among the races…that permits them to compete equally in a capitalist society," (McLaren, 1995, p.96). This perspective appears to be anti-racist to the extent that it celebrates the essential equality of people from different racial communities. However, it retains and promotes a racialized ignorance about the persistence of structural inequality that reproduces relations of dominance and subordination, regardless of essential individual equality. Liberal multiculturalism is different from conservative multiculturalism because it rejects the idea that people from marginalized cultural groups need to assimilate into the dominant culture; instead, it encourages the maintenance of their collective identities and practices. Thus, liberal multiculturalism appears to be compatible with and not opposed to the fair integration of marginalized others into society. However, this articulation of multiculturalism still does not address the structural inequalities inherent in the modern social order. The modern social order is organized around norms that are specific to the historical realities constituted by dominant groups. Thus, essential or inherent equality only exists for one group at the expense of another because the social order was created for dominant sensibilities and advancement. Without directly addressing structural inequalities,

the logic that all people can "compete equally" is flawed and reinforces a racist system that will continue to hinder marginalized groups' routes to equality and progress.

The third articulation of multiculturalism that McLaren (1995) identified was *left-liberal* multiculturalism. He used this label to refer to a version of multicultural ideology that emphasizes cultural differences to the point of essentialism. In extreme forms, left-liberal multiculturalism exoticizes differences and reifies them into tightly bound identities. One consequence of this essentialism is to treat expressions of cultural difference as defining features of collective identity. This version of multiculturalism proposes that there is an "authentic" way to embody a social identity (e.g. female, African American, Latinx), leading to conservative responses to innovations or creative adaptations to changing circumstances as inauthentic. The more important consequence of essentialism is the tendency to valorize intergroup differences as expressions of cultural values without interrogating the social and historical processes that are the source of many intergroup differences. In other words, left-liberal multiculturalism abstracts cultural difference away from contexts of history, political economy, and power. As a result, left-liberal positions of multiculturalism do not effectively advance social transformation.

To summarize, McLaren (1995) suggests that "Multiculturalism without a transformative political agenda can just be another form of accommodation to the larger social order" (p.98). Alternatively stated, hegemonic forms of multiculturalism emphasized an idealistic preoccupation with culture at the expense of structural concerns and thereby domesticated or counteracted its liberatory potential. People may value these versions of multiculturalism because they maintain normative presumptions of whiteness that avoids discussion of social inequalities.

Evidence for the preference of domesticated varieties of multiculturalism to preserve white normativity comes from work by Bell and Hartmann (2007), who conducted interviews in four racially diverse U.S. cities to better understand people's conceptualizations of diversity. Participant responses revealed two separate themes about the meaning of diversity. One theme focused on general descriptions of diversity such as being exposed to different people and different cultures resulting in participants listing various racial/ethnic groups, various cultural traditions, food, music, etc. The second theme highlighted diversity as a current and future goal in which people should recognize and accept group differences. These two themes revealed tensions between idealized notions of diversity (e.g. embracing differences, multiculturalism) and the day-to-day complications that people experienced as a result of these differences (e.g. misunderstandings with those of other races).

Bell and Hartmann also reported that most participants, even the most politically engaged, found it difficult to discuss inequality, power, and privilege in the context of diversity. When they asked participants directly about inequalities in the context of diversity, participants were noticeably anxious and they gave vague responses. However, a few respondents were able to discuss inequality within the context of diversity. For example, one respondent mentioned:

> "Diversity is something that you write down in columns, so many of this kind, so many of that kind, so many of this kind. But it doesn't carry with it then, the why are these in different columns...And it's to keep from having to say racism...Or feminism, sexism, whichever one it may be" (p. 911).

The respondent's critique suggests that there are fundamental issues of inequality that are absent from diversity discourse; to fully engage with ideas of diversity is to directly engage with issues of inequality. Despite the few respondents who were able to articulate a response, the researchers

suggested that these tensions resulted in more superficial articulations about diversity based on white normative perspectives.

Similar to colorblind ideology, multiculturalism sustains white normativity. The analysis of white normativity specific to multiculturalism demonstrates that inclusion of marginalized members is not necessarily accompanied by social change. For example, even in ethnically diverse environments in which people from marginalized groups occupy some positions of power, white normativity may still dominate in the prevailing norms for ways of thinking, knowing, and behaving (Ward, 2008). These forms of multiculturalism treat marginalized groups as mere additions to the dominant culture, contributing to an external appearance of diversity that fails to produce systems of white accountability or new structural outcomes (McLaren, 1997; Ward, 2008). Such versions of multiculturalism maintain assimilationist assumptions in that marginalized cultural groups function to add spice, flavor, or color to the dominant culture themes. Although proponents of this multiculturalism celebrate cultural differences, these differences exist against the background of white normativity.

Evidence that multicultural discourse can reproduce white normativity comes from Bell and Hartmann's (2007) research. Specifically, some participants who perceived diversity as a positive element qualified their response with appeals to cultural assimilation (Bell & Hartmann, 2007). For example, participants expressed the necessity of a defining thread, whether political or linguistic, that unifies the diversity within the U.S., calling into question people's right to deviate from these norms practiced by the dominant group. Thus, there is a disparity between the focus on celebrating cultural differences while also preserving the dominant cultural norms. This is different than the assimilative properties of colorblind ideology in that multiculturalism emphasizes appreciation of cultural differences but only to the extent that it preserves the

dominant white normative order. Rather than being truly transformative, multiculturalism strengthens the power and privilege of the white normative centrality by masking its assimilative properties as acceptance of diversity.

To summarize, dominant forms of multiculturalism may fail to achieve the goal of creating long-lasting, substantive social change. One strategy to effectively address and promote social change is to incorporate the epistemological perspectives of members of marginalized groups into multiculturalism. This strategy will challenge mainstream perspectives of diversity and cultural differences, which may have better implications for social justice and progress. In its current form, dominant interests have domesticated multiculturalism, adapted it to celebrate and benefit formal cultural diversity without challenging white normativity and the associated naturalization of white patterns. Thus, a restructuring of the social order that relies on the critical consciousness of marginalized knowledge is required to push past superficial celebrations of different cultures, white normativity, and return to an ideology of liberation and social justice, known as critical multiculturalism.

Critical Multiculturalism

What is Critical Multiculturalism?

In light of the problems with multiculturalism, researchers in education have discussed a different approach that I will call critical multiculturalism (see McLaren, 1995; May, 2009; May & Sleeter, 2010). Rooted in critical race theory (see Crenshaw, Gotanda, Peller, & Thomas, 1995), critical multiculturalism is an ideology that recognizes the importance of participation of people from marginalized groups in social and political domains and challenges various forms of oppression (e.g. racism, classism, sexism, etc.) that are perpetuated through dominant social norms (McLaren & Farahmandpur, 1999). The main goal of critical multiculturalism is to

emphasize the collective issues of oppression and the social inequalities experienced by marginalized groups in the context of their political activism and social mobilization.

Principles of Critical Multiculturalism

As I noted in the previous section, multiculturalism encompasses practices that affirm pluralism across various identities (e.g. gender, race, class, ability, sexuality, etc. Leistyna, 2002). Proponents of this ideology stress the importance of cultural diversity, using appropriate cultural codes (e.g. traditions, customs etc.) in various settings, and recognizing the contributions of all people, especially those in marginalized groups (Leistyna, 2002). However, conventional manifestations of this ideology are usually limited to the celebration of cultural otherness, which perpetuates the centrality of Eurocentric knowledge and reinforces white normativity (Bell & Hartmann, 2007).

Critical multiculturalism is similar to multiculturalism to the extent that its proponents recognize, value, and respect diverse cultures. However, critical multiculturalism extends dominant appropriations or expressions of multiculturalism in that it brings diverse experiences to the center of discourse (rather than perceiving them as mere add-ons to dominant sensibilities) and empowers people to critique and challenge social norms that benefit some at the expense of others (May & Sleeter, 2010; McLaren, 1997). That is, critical multiculturalism is an ideology that recognizes the historical contributions of people from marginalized cultural backgrounds to American society, and it values the active participation of people from marginalized groups. A genuinely critical multiculturalism is not merely multiculturalism—essentializing, recognizing, and celebrating the differences of marginalized cultures—understood as equitable representation as the focus of official attention (e.g., in educational activities or public holidays) (May & Sleeter, 2010; McLaren & Farahmandpur, 1999; Sleeter & Bernal, 2004). Instead, what makes

critical multiculturalism *critical* is its approach to knowledge: that is, an understanding of society in general from the perspective of marginalized cultural groups as a tool for used for critiquing and changing the social order. To elaborate on this ideology, I will discuss three essential principles that separate critical multiculturalism from a superficial focus on cultural differences and tolerance.

   Deconstruction of the neutrality of civism. First, critical multiculturalism deconstructs what May (1999) refers to as the neutrality of *civism*—the notion that the values and practices that underpin the current social order are neutral and universal. From this perspective, the current social order in American society is not culture-neutral, but instead represents a specific cultural system that reflects and reproduces dominant group interests. Society represents a particular cultural construction of practices and values (e.g. linguistic, individualism) based primarily on the dominant group. These practices gain social capital and become embedded within society while practices specific to marginalized groups do not. One main consequence for many people from minority groups, both at the individual and collective level, is the loss of ethnic and cultural practices as a necessary price of entry to the civic realm (May, 1999). Another consequence is that many of the practices and values (e.g. individualism, freedom of choice, opportunity, etc.) that constitute dominant cultural patterns are not common or accessible to many people from marginalized groups. One reason is that marginalized group members may not have social capital required to gain access to the practices and values of the dominant group. Therefore, acknowledging and deconstructing the historical and cultural situatedness within the civic realm places cultural differences within the histories of the dominant cultural system. This may help to better understand differing experiences of dominant and marginalized groups with the practices and values as they relate to the current social order.

Acknowledging (unequal) power relations. This suggests the second key principle of critical multiculturalism: to *situate* cultural differences within relations of domination by analyzing differences in power between marginalized and dominant groups and the implications of such differences for the production of institutionalized inequality (May & Sleeter, 2010). Whereas the first principle emphasizes that the everyday habits of mainstream society reflects dominant group sensibilities, the second principle highlights the unequal power relations that afford differential opportunities to gain influence in the civic realm. An analysis of unequal power relations makes visible the processes of cultural reproduction that institutionalize or realize dominant group preferences and cultural practices over others. By attending to these processes, one can avoid the mistake of believing that different cultural groups have equal opportunities across the civic realms (May, 1999). In this process of understanding culture within the nexus of power relations, previously "subjugated knowledge" become valuable counter-hegemonic critiques of dominant ways of knowing (May, 1999).

Conceptions of relationality within historical contexts of cultural difference. The recognition and incorporation of cultural knowledge as a tool to disrupt unequal power relations can still be problematic to the extent that it treats culture as essential properties of rigidly bounded collective entities (Adams & Markus, 2004). This understanding of culture reproduces inequality by mandating that people from marginalized cultural groups perform as authentic cultural actors (according to a restrictive definition) and by constraining their agency to enact creative innovations to re-imagine society in ways that better serve humanity in general (rather than White supremacy). In response to this problematic essentialism, the third principle of critical multiculturalism is a *relational* conception of culture and cultural difference (May, 1999; McLaren & Farahmandpur, 1999). My understanding of this concept has roots in a cultural

psychological perspective that emphasizes the mutual constitution of mind and context: the idea that culture and person, or the human psyche and context, exist in a dynamic relationship that make each other up (Adams, Estrada-Villalta, & Kurtis, 2017; Shweder, 1990). From this perspective, the recognition of cultural or historical situatedness does not require an essentialist conception of social identities as static, fixed, or monolithic. Instead, cultural patterns emerge through a dynamic process located in a particular place, at a specific time in history, from particular experiences, but without being bound to that particular position (May, 1999).

The principle of relationality affords a reflexive critique with respect to cultural practices, not only between cultural groups but also within them (McCarthy, 1993). A goal of critical multiculturalism is to foster a reflexive engagement with cultural diversity in which people better appreciate the racial and cultural positioning of experience, not just for exotic Others, but especially for the familiar, everyday settings of their own lives (May, 1999). This philosophy helps people from both marginalized and dominant groups to recognize and explore the interconnections, gaps, and differences that emerge between their own and the collective identities of others. One consequence for people from marginalized groups is that they can participant in and reconstruct the social order, without expectation of assimilation to the social norm. A consequence for people from dominant groups is that they can better participate in critical dialogues regarding the dominant nature of white normativity. This reflexive and reciprocal process allows people from both marginalized and dominant groups to recognize both the limits and interconnections, gaps, and differences that occur between their own and other cultural groups. Thus, critical multiculturalism moves beyond essentialist understandings of cultural differences as commodities and celebration of identity that legitimizes the social order

through racial harmony (May, 1999), and embraces a direct challenge to the oppressive nature of the current social order.

To summarize, critical multiculturalism supports pushing societal and hegemonic boundaries to work constructively to understand the nature of oppression in modern society. Supporters have specific plans to recognize diversity and promote social action centered on restructuring a discriminatory social system. Advocates argue for a critical multiculturalism that prepares both dominant and marginalized groups to reorder society to better serve the interests of all, especially those who have been historically oppressed and have been expected to adopt the norms of the dominant group.

Theoretical and Empirical Examples of Critical Multiculturalism in Social Psychology

Discussions of critical multiculturalism emerged within the field of education, as educators considered how to create forms of multicultural education that served liberatory purposes rather than reinforcing the status quo of white normativity. There have been few discussions of critical multiculturalism or related concepts in the field of (social) psychology.

Theoretical/empirical evidence from (social) psychology. A possible exception to this generalization is work on polycultural ideologies (Rosenthal & Levy, 2010). Proponents of polycultural ideologies, like proponents of multiculturalism and critical multiculturalism, not only call for recognition of racial and ethnic identities, but also focus on the past and present interactions that have mutually influenced the connections between groups. This component relates to the relationality principle of critical multiculturalism I discussed earlier because it "implies a dynamic, fluid process whereby habits of the mind are simultaneously conditioned by … the particular affordances of everyday cultural worlds" (Adams, et al., 2017, p. 236). Thus, supporters of this ideology are more concerned with how various racial and ethnic groups have

been shaped by history and their connections with one another. (Rosenthal & Levy, 2010). This ideology is similar to critical multiculturalism in that it does not essentialize differences or define cultural groups as discretely bounded entities (Adams & Markus, 2004). Rather, polyculturalism highlights how current connections with other cultural groups are rooted in historical and contemporary constructions. Although supporters of this theoretical approach attempt to avoid cultural essentialism by reflecting on the relationships between various groups, there is no discussion of how cultural differences are situated within power relations. Additionally, polyculturalism does not require the active participation of marginalized group members in the reordering of hegemonic culture and the reinterpretation of history.

One social psychologist who does explicitly refer to critical multiculturalism is James Jones (2010), who discusses the concept in a special issues article about a sociocultural perspective of diversity. According to Jones, critical multiculturalism extends beyond standard recognition of cultural difference associated with mainstream multiculturalism to address the differential social and cultural capital that hegemonic power relations confer to some identity groups at the expense of others. He briefly reports an unpublished study that he presented as a poster at a professional psychological conference (Engleman & Jones, 2007). In this study, researchers examined the effect of diversity ideologies (colorblindness, multiculturalism, and critical multiculturalism) on a variety of outcomes including perceptions of ingroup and outgroup membership, the degree to which participants blamed a group for their status of poverty, the types of reasons participants gave to explain poverty, and allocation of funding to organizations that support structural and economic change (Engleman & Jones, 2007; as cited in Jones, 2010). Although the article does not offer full details about the method or results of the study, Jones reports that participants exposed to a critical multiculturalism treatment were more likely to

endorse structural sources of poverty, less likely to blame people for their poverty, and more likely to allocate funds to organizations that support structural and economic change than were participants in other (colorblind and multicultural) conditions. Jones (2010) suggests that such outcomes cannot occur by merely acknowledging or valuing differences. Rather they are related to understanding the necessity and motivations to change the effects of structural biases.

Limitations of Critical Multiculturalism

Many of the criticisms and limitations of critical multiculturalism are similar to those that I discussed earlier concerning multiculturalism. These criticisms include consequences of separatism, balkanization, cultural relativism, devaluation of dominant members, and expressions of resentment between dominant and marginalized groups. In addition, I anticipate these other critiques of critical multiculturalism.

First, I anticipate that critical multiculturalism will be especially threatening to white normativity and, therefore, generate especially strong resistance among people from dominant groups. Critical multiculturalism turns the lens on societal values of white normativity to identify and contest the construction of white supremacy and institutions of white hegemony. Accordingly, it is likely to promote feelings of threat among people from dominant groups who find it difficult to give up their status of power and privilege (see Plaut et al., 2011).

Second, I anticipate that people will regard critical multiculturalism as undesirably political in comparison to more popular articulations of (domesticated) multiculturalism. Rather than deny the political stance that informs critical multiculturalism, my response to this criticism (itself informed by critical multiculturalism) is to illuminate the political positioning of conventional scientific approaches that masquerade as politically neutral. Science and academic inquiry are neither neutral nor completely objective (Adams et al., 2015; Bonilla-Silva & Zuberi,

2008). Indeed, they implicitly (and at times explicitly) reflect and reinforce inequitable social practices, institutions, and values. From a critical multiculturalism perspective, the desire to preserve "neutral" scientific inquiry is not realistic because these spaces are inherently political. Pretending otherwise is itself the reflection and realization of a political agenda that preserves the status quo (Adams, et al., 2015).

A final critique of critical multiculturalism is that it is likely to increase prejudice-- defined as hostile affect or antipathy toward a person or a group (Jones, 1997). As I previously noted, Whitley & Webster (2018) found that primes about concrete representations of multiculturalism – representations that focused on specific ways to implement multiculturalism and how society must change to achieve multiculturalism – led to increased expressions of prejudice by ethnic majority group members (e.g. Whites) toward ethnic minority group members (e.g. non-Whites). Critical multiculturalism will likely result in the same outcome.

Despite this potential consequence for increased prejudice, my rationale for preferring critical multiculturalism to other diversity ideologies reflects the conception of racism, antiracist action, and social justice that informs this work. But this may be one price to pay for social justice (Dixon, Tropp, Durrheim, & Tredoux, 2010). Racism and social inequalities will not be effectively eradicated by teaching tolerance or providing information that prejudice towards marginalized groups is bad. Instead the principle of critical multiculturalism that emphasizes the relationality of people within contexts provides the understanding that connections with other cultural groups are rooted in historical and contemporary constructions situated within power relations. From a dominant hegemonic perspective, racism and its consequences is portrayed as a phenomenon of individuals abstracted from historical context (Adams, Biernat, Branscombe, Crandall, & Wrightsman, 2008). This way of knowing preserves the social order by advocating

the adjustment of individuals rather than the transformation of the status quo. As a response, critical multiculturalism encourages a reordering of the current social order by a process of unknowning dominant sensibilities. This reflects a version of a cultural psychology approach that reflects engagement with and understanding of marginalized knowledge in order to rethink concepts and practices that inform mainstream ways of knowing (Adams et al., 2015).

Overview of the Current Research

The conceptual overview of the diversity ideologies argued that colorblindness and multiculturalism are ideologies that perpetuate normative standards and support systems of oppressions. As a result of rethinking the diversity ideologies, I purposed the inclusion of an(other) diversity ideology, critical multiculturalism, which extends expressions of multiculturalism by bringing diverse experiences to the center of discourse and empowers people to critique and challenge social norms that benefit some at the expense of others. Is a more critical consciousness of a diversity ideology required in order to gain support for social justice issues that value the active participation of people from marginalized groups? To investigate this question, the broad purpose of the research is to consider where support for different ideologies come from by examining potential antecedents and consequences related to these diversity ideologies. Regarding potential antecedents, it is possible that people support issues based on how they receive cultural messages and the ways they interact with their cultural artifacts. It is also likely possible that people already have certain proclivities and social positions that resonate with the tenets of one diversity ideology over another, and are therefore motivated to stay true to these proclivities and preserve their positions in the world. In considering these possible antecedents, my goal is to focus on identifications constructs.

Antecedents

Two identity constructs that are worthy of examination as antecedents of diversity ideologies are national identification and political conservatism. Although there are many antecedents that may be relevant for examination, I will specially focus on and describe the relevance of investigating both national identification and political conservatism in relation to diversity ideologies and provide brief predictions on how they may be related to the diversity ideologies based previous research.

National Identification

American historian Arthur Schlesinger (1992) voiced concerns and challenges of the growing cultural diversity in U.S. society to nationalism. His discussion centered around "people of different ethnic origins, speaking different languages and professing different religions….[who] live under the same political sovereignty"(pp.13). He warned that unless a common purpose binds diverse people together, "tribal antagonism will drive them apart,"(pp. 13). He suggested that without a superordinate commonality, multiculturalism negatively effects national politics, national language, public education, and national identity. Previous research on national identity has found that White Americans tend to view American national identity as prototypical of their own racial group, thus, perceiving that ethnic minorities are not prototypical of being "American" (Devos & Banaji, 2005). This tendency of positioning White as normative of national identity may also lead White Americans to view cultural traditions, values, and practices of marginalized cultural groups as threatening and in opposition to the American national prototype, which is defined in terms of European American values and traditions (Yogesswaran & Dasgupta, 2014). Broadly speaking, this conceptualization of national identification can be understood as a defense for maintaining the status quo. Thus, the goals of

multiculturalism, or diversity more broadly, may be perceived as a type of symbolic threat to one's national culture, values, and worldview.

Within the U.S. context, few research studies examined the relationship between national identification and diversity ideologies. Instead, some research investigated how diversity ideologies may threaten national identity. For example, one study examined the effects of abstract versus concrete construal of multiculturalism on symbolic threat to national identity. Results showed that when multiculturalism is construed in concrete terms (specific steps to achieving multiculturalism) versus abstract terms (broad goals of multiculturalism), White participants reported higher feelings of threat to national identity (Yogesswaran & Dasgupta, 2014). This suggests that a form of multiculturalism that evokes concrete change in support of marginalized groups, is considered a threat to national identification. Research conducted outside of the U.S. studied how national identification is related to out-group threat and support for multiculturalism. Verkuyten (2009) proposed three different models of the relationship among national identification, perceived out-group threat, and support for multiculturalism.

The first model, *group identity lens*, hypothesizes that national identification can be an antecedent of perceived out-group threat. In line with self-categorization theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987; Turner & Reynolds, 2001), this model suggests that people's social identity is a lens through which they perceive and make meaning of the world. Group identity, such as national identification, is one lens that may make people aware when their group is being harmed. Thus, higher national identification may lead to greater perceptions of threat leading to perceptions that result in some other response (e.g. negative attitudes towards out-group members; Van Oudenhoven, Prins, & Buunk, 1998).

The second model, *group identity reaction*, proposes that a group's perceived threat leads to stronger identification with their in-group with leads to more negative attitudes toward out-groups. Previous research has indeed shown evidence that perceived threats increased group identification (Jetten, Branscombe, Schmitt, & Spears, 2001).

Finally, the third model Verkuyten (2009) described is the *group identity moderator model*. This model predicts that the interaction between national identification and out-group threat predicts support for multiculturalism. In line with social psychological research on social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), this model suggests that because there are different motivational meanings of perceived threat, it has different effects depending on national identification.

Verkuyten (2009) found consistent support for the group identity lens model, but not the other two models in his studies with Dutch participants. He found that national identification was indirectly related to support for multiculturalism. Specifically, he found that national identification was positively related to out-group threat (Muslim immigrants were posed as the outgroup members in the study), and threat was negatively related to support for multiculturalism. Thus, national identification may present as an antecedent for support (or not) for different diversity ideologies.

Given that national identification is an important consideration for endorsement of diversity ideologies as exhibited by some empirical and theoretical evidence, I included it as a correlate to investigate in this research. For the purposes of the present research, I conceptualized national identification in two ways. Most social psychological research operationalizes national identity in terms of identity attachment – the degree to which a person has a connected personal experience with an identity category (Phinney, 1992). This form of national identification, which

I call *national identification attachment,* is conducive to understandings of identification that is fixed and not permeable to change. Aligned with the previous research that I described earlier in this section, this form of national identification acts as a defensiveness of things that don't align with one's cultural traditions and values. This tendency towards attachment would most likely be in support of a colorblind ideology. Another conceptualization of national identification is more typical of developmental approaches to identification as a process of active engagement that is conducive to openness and curiosity to learn more about one's national identification, which I will call *national identification exploration*. National identification exploration is flexible to change as one's process with and understanding of their national identification can change and is not fixed. This tendency towards exploration would most likely be at odds with colorblind ideologies and in support of both multiculturalism and critical multiculturalism. While research on diversity ideologies and national identification have mostly centered around perceptions of threat, it is important to examine how they are directly related and how their relationship may influence other related outcomes (e.g. support for related diversity policies).

Political Conservatism

Psychology researchers (e.g., Jost 2017) have proposed that individuals are not passive vessels of beliefs and opinions they are exposed to, but rather are drawn to beliefs and ideologies that are aligned with their needs and interests. People have an epistemic motivation to maintain certainty, order, structure, and to avoid threat. One can hypothesize that this epistemic motivation is associated with conservative attitudes that preserve the status quo, because political conservatism promises certainty, order, and security by maintaining traditional, and normative hierarchical social organizations (Eidelman & Crandall, 2012; Jost, 2017). To embrace political liberalism instead of political conservatism would mean to accept the possibility of uncertainty,

complexity, and ambiguity for the sake of equity, progress, diversity, and acceptance of differences (Jost, 2017).

Results from a comprehensive review of the psychological bases of political orientation showed that epistemic motivations associated with intolerance, dogmatism, need for certainty, and social order were positively related to political conservatism (Jost, Blount, Pfeffer, & Hunyady, 2003). Accordingly, it is likely that political conservatism is associated with support for colorblind ideology as this ideology is most related to maintaining hegemonic norms and practices associated with whiteness that represent order, structure, and certainty. Although I have argued that multiculturalism in its current form is most palatable to dominant sensibilities, it may be less associated with political conservatism. As Jost (2017) explained, political liberalism is associated with diversity and acceptance of difference, which are both included in multiculturalism, thus, it is likely that multiculturalism will be associated with political liberalism rather than political conservatism. Accordingly, critical multiculturalism would also more likely be related to political liberalism as it aligns more with some of the components of multiculturalism.

Differences in political orientation are often times studied to understand how it shapes prejudice or behaviors intentions (Yogesswaran & Dasgupta, 2014). Thus, one's reaction towards diversity ideologies may be influenced by their political orientation. In their research examining how participants' political orientation affects reaction to abstract versus concrete multiculturalism, Yogesswaran & Dasgupta (2014) found that political conservatives exposed to concrete (versus abstract) multiculturalism showed higher prejudice towards Latinx Americans. However, there were no differential effects on attitudes towards Latinx Americans for liberals when exposed to either type of multiculturalism. Thus, for conservatives, a concrete

multiculturalism framing is inconsistent with their ideological position – it highlights cultural group differences, support for marginalized groups, therefore, promoting equity and diversity, exposing too much uncertainty and opposition to the normative social order. It is important to further understand how one's political ideological position may influence support for diversity ideologies and policies.

Consequences

Previous research in social psychology in the area of intergroup relations has focused on reduction of individual propensities for prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination. Thus, consequences of diversity ideologies have also been focused around prejudice and bias reduction. Although supporters of multiculturalism argue that this ideology improves intergroup relations and reduces prejudice better than colorblind ideology, empirical evidence to support this argument is mixed (Whitely & Webster, 2018). Similarly, because critical multiculturalism goes against conventional understandings of diversity ideologies and reconstructs knowledge through marginalized critical consciousness, it likely to be ineffective in reducing prejudice. However, as I noted previously, the purpose of critical multiculturalism is not to highlight ways toward harmony, but rather to reflect conceptions of racism, antiracist action, and social justice for people from marginalized groups. Thus, for the purposes of the current research I focus on policy support as the consequence to better understand if the diversity ideologies differentially predict support for critical social justice issues.

Policy Endorsement

America has been characterized as a vision of a "melting pot" – a community of ethnic groups with unique identities and equal status that alludes to the idea of equal rights in the distribution of public benefits and resources. The failure of the civil rights movement to

dismantle racial inequality despite illegalization of racial discrimination fueled a push for racial-conscious policies in the Black community (Hall, 2005). Massive immigration from other countries attracted ideals of multiculturalism for the purposes of fair public benefits (Citrin, Sears, Muste, & Wong, 2001). As a result, policies that supported multiculturalism emerged with the purpose of promoting equal standing of marginalized groups (Citrin et al., 2001). These policy agendas included affirmative action, bilingual education, recognition of cultural customs of different groups by law, support for autonomous cultural institutions, and the allocation of public space (e.g. radio, television, etc.) to include the diverse preferences of marginalized groups (Loobuyck, 2005). Thus, an important question to consider is how one's support for a diversity ideology is related to diversity policy endorsement.

Previous research has investigated the impact of threat on foreign and domestic policies related to diversity. For example, one study conducted six months after the attacks that took place on 9/11, presented a document to participants as either a domestic or foreign policy on intergroup relations which either endorsed an assimilation or multicultural ideology (Davies, Steele, & Markus, 2008). Participants completed a questionnaire that measured the extent to which they endorsed the policy on intergroup relationships they read about. White and non-white participants both endorsed multicultural domestic policies as a model of intergroup relations within America, but outside of America, the participants expressed a preference for assimilation as a foreign policy. The researcher believed that salient foreign threat to America (e.g. 9/11 attacks) led to increased tolerance of multiculturalism domestically but not internationally. In a subsequent study, Davies and colleagues (2008) showed that when they manipulated foreign threat, participants preferred assimilation as a foreign policy, but when the threat was absent, the participants were more responsive to multiculturalism within foreign policy. Thus, these results

suggest that under conditions of threat, policies that incorporate multiculturalism may be too inconsistent with people's cultural values resulting in opposition of multicultural polices.

Other research suggests that support for multiculturalism could lead to support for pro-immigration based policy. In a study conducted in New Zealand, researchers conducted a correlational study investigating New Zealanders' attitudes towards immigrants and immigration policy (Ward & Masgoret, 2008). Support for multiculturalism, high contact with immigrants, and low levels of perceived threat of immigrants, were directly related to endorsement of immigration policies (Ward & Masgoret, 2008). Similar to the research conducted by Davies and colleagues (2008) these results suggest that in the absence of threat, people may be willing to support multiculturalism policies that support the advancement of marginalized people

Overview of the Research Studies

The research presented here explores whether multiculturalism and critical multiculturalism are separable constructs, whether the three diversity ideologies show different patterns of relationships with theoretically important variables (e.g. identification and policy), and how the ideologies affect policy endorsement. I focus on critical multiculturalism because past research has demonstrated the effects of multiculturalism and colorblind ideologies on intergroup relations and prejudice. It's important to begin to investigate how an(other) diversity ideology may differently influence how people support social justice issues.

In the current research, I examine the distinctions among the three diversity ideologies – colorblind ideology, multiculturalism, and critical multiculturalism. Beyond exploring the separateness of the diversity ideologies, I was also interested in whether the diversity ideologies predicted social policies related to diversity in unique ways. Specifically, while previous research

suggests that multiculturalism is a predictor of multicultural policies, I am interested to see if critical multiculturalism is a stronger predictor of these policies. Additionally, I examined the effects of each of the diversity ideologies on diversity policies to better understand whether a critical multicultural framing would cause greater endorsement of policies related to social justice issues. Finally, I included national identification (e.g. attachment and exploration) and political conservatism to understand their relationships with the diversity ideologies and whether they may be antecedents of endorsement of the diversity ideologies.

To the extent that multiculturalism and critical multiculturalism overlap, one can hypothesize that both multiculturalism and critical multiculturalism would be related to one another. I predict competing hypotheses for their relationships with colorblind ideology. Since both colorblind ideology and multiculturalism resonate with dominant sensibilities of normative hegemonic values of maintaining white normativity (Bell & Hartmann, 2007; Bonilla-Silva, 2017), it is possible that they may be positively related with one another. However, multiculturalism was initially introduced as the opposite of colorblind ideology. Multiculturalism is an ideology that advocates for the explicit awareness of and appreciation for cultural differences, and as such it is conceivable that colorblind ideology and multiculturalism may be negatively related. Further, because critical multiculturalism goes further than multiculturalism by placing marginalized voices in the center of discourse to challenge social norms (May & Sleeter, 2010; McLaren, 1997), I hypothesize that critical multiculturalism and colorblind ideology will be negatively related.

Because critical multiculturalism offers a way to reconstruct the social order through the critical consciousness of marginalized knowledge to move beyond the denial of racism and illuminate how white normativity embedded in conventional ways of knowing, I hypothesize that

critical multiculturalism will be a stronger predictor of endorsement for social justice policies. Given some of the overlap between multiculturalism and critical multiculturalism, it is possible that both ideologies may predict policies aligned with multiculturalism (e.g. diversity appreciation and respect for differences), but I predict that critical multiculturalism will be the strongest predictor of policies that more explicitly support marginalized groups (e.g. social justice polices, affirmative action, etc.). Additionally, following previous research on intergroup relations and diversity ideologies, being presented with the different diversity ideologies will affect the types of policies one might endorse. Specifically, I predict that being primed with the ideologies will lead participants to endorse its complementary policy. That is, a framing of critical multiculturalism will lead to endorsement of more social justice policies as well as multiculturalism polices, whereas multiculturalism and colorblind ideologies will only correspond to their similar diversity policies.

With regard to the identification variables, I predict that colorblind ideology will be positively related to national identification attachment and political conservatism because they represent a fixed and normative orientation that maintains white normative cultural traditions, values, and practices. In contrast, colorblind ideology will be negatively related to national identification exploration because national identification exploration promotes openness and flexibility with one's nationality, which does not align with colorblind ideology. I believe the opposite patterns to be true for both multiculturalism and critical multiculturalism. That is, both ideologies will be positively related to national identification exploration, but negatively related to national identification attachment and political conservatism. Critical multiculturalism and to a smaller extent multiculturalism both represent openness in exploring one's American identity

while accepting uncertainty, and complexity for the sake of progress and equity for marginalized groups.

In Study 1, I examined whether critical multiculturalism constituted a separable construct from standard multiculturalism, and whether endorsement of critical multiculturalism showed divergent relationships with identification and policy measures than did multiculturalism. Additionally, I explored how participants defined multiculturalism to better understand if they defined multiculturalism in a celebratory or critical fashion. I predicted that the majority of participants would overwhelmingly define multiculturalism in a celebratory fashion.

I tested similar predictions in Study 2 except I included separate policy measures that corresponded with each of the diversity ideologies. I included an affirmative action policy measure as an extension to better understand the benefits of critical multiculturalism. I also included a measure of awareness of race and privilege to examine if a critical consciousness will support more politicized policies of social justice. Finally, in Study 3, I used an experimental approach to explore the effects of the three diversity ideologies on policy endorsement relevant to each type of ideology and tested whether results from Studies 1 and 2 replicated in another study.

Study 1

To put hypotheses about critical multiculturalism to empirical test, I first created a measure of critical multiculturalism by modifying items on an existing scale of standard multiculturalism. In Study 1, I administered this critical multiculturalism scale along with standard measures of colorblind ideology and multiculturalism, identification measures, and policy support. The primary purpose of Study 1 was then to examine whether critical multiculturalism constitutes a separate (or separable) construct from original/standard

multiculturalism. More specifically, I considered not only whether critical multiculturalism items constituted a psychometrically separate factor from multiculturalism items, but also whether endorsement of critical multiculturalism items showed different patterns of relationship with theoretically important variables than did multiculturalism items.

A secondary goal of this study was to understand how people conceptualize multiculturalism. In particular, I was interested in whether people defined multiculturalism primarily in celebratory fashion or as something more consistent with critical consciousness.

Method

Participants. I used Amazon's TurkPrime to recruit participants. TurkPrime is an online survey tool that produces reliable data comparable to traditional methods (e.g., Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Litman, Robinson, & Abberbock, 2017). Recruitment efforts indicated that the study was about people's attitudes and beliefs about culture. There were no other special recruitment requirements for this study (e.g. specific racial/ethnic groups, specific gender, etc.) except that all consequent studies will include a unique group of participants who did not participate in any of the previous studies.

A total of 250 participants responded to the survey and received $1.00 for their time. One participant indicated a desire to withdraw data from the study, and so I excluded this participant's responses from all analyses. I report analyses including only the 183 participants who self-identified as White.[1] The age of the participants who I included in the analyses ranged from 20–75 years ($M = 39.68$, $SD = 13.21$, $Mdn = 36$). About half the participants identified as

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[1] For all studies, the analyses that I report include only those participants who self-identified as White. The rationale for this exclusion was because previous research (Correll, Park, & Smith, 2008; Richeson & Nussbaum, 2004; Wolsko et al., 2000) studied multiculturalism and colorblind ideology as approaches to ameliorating intergroup relations and, thus, their results were based on analyses of responses from White participants. I recognize this as a limitation of the studies and will discuss further in the general discussion. Results for Study 1 do not change when I include all participants in the analyses.

male (50.8%), earned a Bachelor's degree or higher (54.6%), and earned $40,000 or less in annual income (52.5%). For the final analyses, all participants were U.S. citizens.

Procedure and measures. I used thematic analysis to identify patterns and themes to the question "What does multiculturalism mean to you?" Specifically, I coded and developed themes in a deductive, top-down way driven by specific theoretical conceptualizations. That is, coders coded data that were relevant or captured something specific to the research question. A team of five trained coders rated these responses (with at least two coders per rating item) according to the system that appears in Table 2. For the first two items, coders rated the extent to which participants mentioned key themes of *differences* (emphasis on differences of people's identities) and *celebration* (emphasis on recognition of and celebrating the differences of people's identities) on a scale from 0 (*not at all*) to 3 (*very much*). These two themes do not capture a critical consciousness of multiculturalism. Interrater reliability/agreement for these items ranged from .546 to .608.

For the final 3 items, coders indicated whether participants did (coded as 1) or did not (coded as 0) discuss the themes: *structural disadvantage* (the idea that different cultural perspectives are due to structural disadvantage), *whiteness* (discussed set of norms related to white sensibilities), and *racism/oppression* (discussed racism, oppression or overcoming barriers). These themes reflected a more critical consciousness of multiculturalism by including discussions about different cultural perspectives as a result of structural disadvantage, white racialization and privilege, and racism when discussing multiculturalism. Interrater reliability/agreement for these items ranged from .313 to .702.

Participants next completed key constructs about demographic background. A full set of materials for Study 1, appear in Appendix A.

Diversity Ideology Endorsement. The first set of items assessed endorsement of different diversity ideologies. To assess endorsement of colorblind ideology, I used the 5 item measure from Morrison et al., 2010, (adapted from Knowles et al., 2009). A sample item was, "We must stop obsessing so much about race and ethnicity." Participants used a 7 point scale ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*) to indicate their endorsement of each item. To assess endorsement of multicultural ideology, I used the 5 item multiculturalism subscale from the Interethnic Ideology Items measure (e.g., "We must appreciate the unique characteristics of different racial and ethnic groups;" Wolsko et al., 2006). Participants used a 7 point scale ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*) to indicate their endorsement of each item..

I could not find an appropriate measure of critical multiculturalism, so I created one based on the conception of critical multiculturalism that informs the work. Specifically, I understand critical multiculturalism as multiculturalism (i.e., the celebration of the important contribution and participation of marginalized people) plus a recognition of the systemic cultural and racial oppression embedded in dominant social norms of European settler societies. Accordingly, to create a measure of critical multiculturalism, I modified each of the five multicultural items to deemphasize the celebratory focus of conventional multiculturalism in favor of an emphasis on issues of social inequality and mainstream cultural domination of marginalized groups. For instance, I modified the multicultural item named above to read, "We must appreciate the unique experiences of oppression that different racial and ethnic groups have suffered" (see Appendix A for a list of all items). Participants used a 7 point scale ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*) to indicate their endorsement of each item.

I conducted a Principle Component Analysis (PCA) of all 15 diversity ideology items with Varimax rotation. Results suggested two factors that accounted for 66.39 % of variation:

One factor included all multiculturalism items, all critical multiculturalism items, and one colorblind ideology item, "We must learn about the similarities between racial and ethnic groups" (item number 13; see Appendix A and B). The second factor included the four remaining colorblind ideology items. Clearly, these PCA results did not reveal the neat, three-factor structure that I imagined when I selected and created items. Of particular relevance to the current project, they did not reveal a critical multiculturalism component separate from a multiculturalism component. This tentatively suggests that one can understand multiculturalism as an overarching set of ideas with celebratory and critical manifestations.

As the goal of this project is not necessarily scale development, but instead to assess identity and social justice implications of theoretically separable diversity ideologies, I proceeded to conduct analyses as originally planned. I calculated the mean of the four items that loaded together on the second factor of the PCA to create a composite measure of colorblind ideology endorsement CB ($\alpha = .77$). I calculated the mean of the five items for the other ideologies to create a composite measure for endorsement of multiculturalism ($\alpha = .87$), and critical multiculturalism ($\alpha = .90$).

Social Justice Policy. I created a measure of reactions to social justice policies that are the subject of public debate within multicultural societies (see Joseph, 2017). Participants used a scale ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*) to indicate their endorsement of seven items (e.g., "I support the allocation of public funds for autonomous cultural institutions such as communal charities, libraries, and museums." I computed a mean score of all the items; higher scores indicated higher policy endorsement ($\alpha = .92$).

National Identity. To assess national identification, I adapted items from the Multi-Ethnic Identity Measure (Phinney, 1992) and a measure of social identity (Cameron, 2004). Five

items constituted a measure of *national identification exploration* (e.g. "I have spent time trying to figure out more about American history and traditions"; α = .86). Participants responded to 12 items that measured national centrality (e.g., "I often think about the fact that I am American"), national affect (e.g., "I am glad to be an American."), and national ingroup ties (e.g. "I feel strong ties to other Americans"). Participants responded to each item on a scale from 0 (*not at all*) to 6 (*completely*), where higher values indicated greater identification. I computed the mean of these 12 items to create a composite index of *national identification attachment* (α = .90).

Demographics. Finally, participants responded to a series of demographic questions including items about age, gender, annual income, educational attainment, and residency status. They used a scale from 1 (*very liberal*) to 7 (*very conservative*) to indicate their political orientation separately for economic and social issues. I computed the mean of these to items to create an indicator of overall political conservatism (α = .87).

Results

Prior to running any analyses, I conducted relevant test of assumptions. My analyses of residuals and scatter plots indicated that I could reasonably assume linearity and homoscedasticity (Meyers, Gamst, & Guarino, 2013) but not normality (Meyers et al., 2013). I examined boxplots to determine if any cases met the cutoff range of 1.5 to 3.0 times the interquartile range (IQR). These tests indicated that five cases were outliers. I removed these cases, resulting in a final sample of n = 178 cases whose data satisfied all tests of assumptions.[2]

Qualitative analyses: Conceptualizations of multiculturalism. For the purposes of this study, I was interested in whether or not participants understood multiculturalism with a critical consciousness. Thus, I focused on five themes for the goals of this study. Descriptive statistics

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[2] Inclusion of the five outliers did not change conclusions for either the main or supplemental statistical analyses.

for the themes *differences* and *celebration* appear in Table 3 and the descriptive statistics for the themes *structural disadvantage*, *whiteness*, and *racism/oppression* appear in Table 4. First, I analyzed the interrater reliability between the two coders who coded a particular theme for all participants. Interrater reliability statistics for each themes appear in Tables 3 and 4.

I assessed interrater reliability for *differences* and *celebration* by assessing the intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC). The results showed there was a moderate degree of reliability between coders on both *differences,* average measures ICC = .546 (95% CI, .046 to .754), $F(174, 174) = 3.10$, $p <.001$, and *celebration*, average measures ICC = .608 (95% CI, .128 to .793), $F(175, 175) = 3.60$, $p <.001$. I assessed Cohen's κ to determine the level of agreement between the coders' for the binary response options (*structural disadvantage, whiteness, and racism/oppression)* on whether the themes was present or not in participants' responses. Based on Landis and Koch's (1977) interpretations, there was fair agreement between the two coders' on *structure disadvantage*, κ = .313 (95% CI, -.036 to .662), $p < .001$, *whiteness*, κ = .394 (95% CI, -.147 to .935), $p < .001$, and moderate agreement on *racism/oppression*, κ = .702 (95% CI, .426 to .978), $p < .001$. I resolved all instances of disagreement between coders by first reviewing the codes assigned by each coder and choosing the code I agreed with the most The most frequent understanding of multiculturalism was a focus on celebration (79.1%) or cultural differences (74.6%), and 60.5% offered responses that include both celebration and cultural differences. This understanding was evident in responses like the following:

> *Multiculturalism means many different cultures living within the same area.*
>
> *Multiculturalism is a facet of a country, state, town, or otherwise general population where multiple people from different backgrounds live together in that community of a town.*
>
> *[Multiculturalism] means to me a true society where we have a bunch of cultures races and all types of people that come together and unify.*

> *[Multiculturalism] means celebrating that we all have a different culture and come from different*
>
> *places but we can live together peacefully.*

The first two examples imply that *multicultural* means differences of backgrounds, people who are from different places, or different cultures living together. The last two examples highlight the celebratory aspect of multiculturalism by suggesting that it promotes unity or enables people from different backgrounds to live together peacefully. Taken together, the majority of participants emphasize the celebration of cultural differences associated with multiculturalism.

In contrast, very few participants discussed a critically conscious understanding of multiculturalism in terms of Structural Disadvantage (3.9%), Whiteness (0.6%), or Racism/Oppression (3.4%). One of the few participants who mentioned these themes noted that,

> *It means valuing diversity. Non-dominant paradigms, cultures, and traditions, and value to*
>
> *society as a whole and we should work for inclusivity in all social institutions, especially where*
>
> *historical inequalities have created exclusion and disadvantage.*

More generally, though, most participants failed to mention institutional disparities, inequalities, or disadvantages of marginalized cultural groups as part of their conceptualization of multiculturalism. These results suggest that themes of critical consciousness do not figure prominently in White American understandings of multiculturalism in general.

Quantitative analyses: Relationships between variables. Correlations, means, and standard deviations for all measures appear in Table 5.[3] A first point of interest was the relationship between endorsements of different diversity ideologies. Consistent with the PCA of diversity ideology items (as I discussed in the *Method* section), results indicated a strong positive association between critical multiculturalism and multiculturalism ($r = 0.89$, $p < .001$). However,

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[3] Across all studies, participants endorsed critical multiculturalism the least compared to the other two ideologies as indicated by the low mean.

some indication of the differences between these ideologies appears in their separate relationships with colorblind ideology. Although endorsement of colorblind ideology was positively associated with endorsement of multiculturalism ($r = 0.16$, $p = .029$), it was unrelated to endorsement of critical multiculturalism ($r = 0.08$, $p = .320$), although these patterns are not significantly different from each other.

A second point of interest was the relationship between measures of identification and endorsement of diversity ideologies (Plaut, et al., 2011; Navarro, Worthington, Hart, & Khairallah, 2009). Endorsement of colorblind ideology was positively associated with national identification attachment ($r = 0.28$, $p < .001$) and political conservatism ($r = 0.28$, $p < .001$), but endorsement of multiculturalism was unrelated to national identification attachment ($r = -0.12$, $p = .126$), and negatively related to political conservatism ($r = -0.40$, $p < .001$). Consistent with hypotheses, endorsement of critical multiculturalism was negatively associated with both national identification attachment ($r = -0.25$, $p = .001$) and political conservatism ($r = -0.48$, $p < .001$). In other words, these relationships were similarly negative in direction for both manifestations of multiculturalism, but slightly (although not significantly) stronger in magnitude for critical multiculturalism than for multiculturalism. National identification exploration was positively associated with multiculturalism (multiculturalism: $r = 0.32$, $p < .001$) and critical multiculturalism, $r = 0.21$, $p = .005$). However, contrary to hypotheses, national identification exploration was also positively related to colorblind ideology ($r = 0.27$, $p < .001$).

A third point of interest was the relationship between diversity ideologies and endorsement of social justice policies. Endorsement of social justice policies was unrelated to colorblind ideology ($r = 0.03$, $p = 0.716$), but was strongly positively correlated with both multiculturalism ($r = 0.82$, $p < .01$) and critical multiculturalism ($r = 0.87$, $p < .01$).

At first glance then, results appear to contradict the hypothesis that critical multiculturalism is more conducive than multiculturalism for promotion of social justice policies. However, the equally strong relationship of different manifestations of multiculturalism may be an artifact of their strong relationship with each other. In order to test the independent contribution of different diversity ideologies as predictors of social justice policy endorsement, I conducted a multiple regression analysis.

Predictors of social justice policy endorsement. I conducted a standard multiple regression analysis with social justice policy endorsement as the dependent variable (Table 6). I entered all three diversity ideologies, identification variables, and political conservatism into the model simultaneously. The overall model was significant, $F(6,171) = 105.83$, $p < .001$, and accounted for 78.8% of the variance in policy endorsement (adjusted $R^2 = .780$). More important for present purposes, results revealed that critical multiculturalism was a strong predictor ($b = 0.65$, SE $=.08$, $t(171) = 7.79$, $p < .001$) and uniquely explained 7.6% of the variation in policy endorsement. Multiculturalism ($b = 0.25$, SE $= .10$, $t(171) = 2.67$, $p = .008$), and conservatism ($b = -0.13$, SE $= .04$, $t(171) = -3.20$, $p = .002$) also contributed significantly to the regression model, but were weaker predictors and explained less variance (0.9% and 1.3%, respectively) than did critical multiculturalism.

Discussion

These results indicate that critical multiculturalism and multiculturalism have some level of compatibility with one another and with policy endorsement, whereas colorblind ideology is not at all compatible with critical multiculturalism or social justice policy endorsement. This suggests that multiculturalism and critical multiculturalism are related rather than completely distinct, which aligns with my theoretical assumptions.

One aim of Study 1 was to examine how participants conceptualize multiculturalism. Analyses of open-ended responses suggest that the majority of participants have a mainstream and normative understanding of multiculturalism. When describing what multiculturalism means to them, their responses included mostly discussions of cultural differences and celebrating cultural differences, both of which are current common understandings and principles of multiculturalism (Bell and Hartman, 2007; McLaren 1997; Ward, 2008). Very few participants discussed multiculturalism in terms of structural disadvantage, whiteness, or racism/oppression. These results provide some evidence that dominant conceptualizations of multiculturalism lack critical elements regarding what multiculturalism means. This was also apparent in the low mean endorsement of critical multiculturalism in the study. Therefore, it is reasonable to examine how critical multiculturalism may differently signal awareness of the systemic disparities and inequalities experienced by marginalized cultural groups, while also celebrating and encouraging peoples' cultural or racial differences.

Another aim of Study 1 was to investigate the relationships between the three diversity ideologies, their relationships with national or political identification, and their relationships with and support for social justice policies. On one hand, results suggest considerable overlap between multiculturalism and critical multiculturalism. Specifically, results of the PCA showed that the two measures loaded on the same factor; bivariate correlations indicated strong positive relationships between them; and both emerged in multiple regression analyses as unique, positive predictors of social justice policy endorsement. These results are consistent with the idea that multiculturalism and critical multiculturalism share a common core related to an emphasis on celebration of cultural difference.

On the other hand, results also provide evidence for hypothesized divergence of critical multiculturalism from multiculturalism. A first point of divergence was bivariate relationships with colorblindness. The results also showed that colorblind ideology and critical multiculturalism were unrelated supporting the idea that the two ideologies include dissimilar principles. Second, results showed that although both multiculturalism and critical multiculturalism were negatively related with national identification attachment and political conservatism, this relationship was nominally (but not significantly) stronger in magnitude for critical multiculturalism than multiculturalism. Finally, multiple regression analysis reveals independent contributions of both forms of multiculturalism to support social justice policies, but a stronger relationship between social justice policy and critical multiculturalism than multiculturalism. This suggests that even though there is some level of similarity between to the two, there is some support for the idea that the two ideologies diverge in their predictive value.

Patterns from the standard multiple regressions are particularly relevant for the guiding idea of this research: namely, that critical multiculturalism is more conducive to promotion of social justice than multiculturalism. However, it remains unclear whether this is a general relationship or particular to the measure of social justice policy that I used in Study 1. I deliberately chose social justice policy domain to show that it was a compatible concept with critical multiculturalism. It remains unclear whether the critical multiculturalism advantage would extend to a broader range of social justice policies. Study 1 implies that each of the diversity ideologies may be stronger predictors for different types of policy measures. Therefore, in Study 2, I examine how the three diversity ideologies may differentially predict policy measures that are specific to their principles.

Study 2

Study 1 showed that whereas both multiculturalism and critical multiculturalism predicted social justice policy endorsement, critical multiculturalism explained the largest amount of variance in policy endorsement. However, a skeptical critic might argue that the social justice policy items in Study 1 were closely tailored to the critical multiculturalism items. It would be informative to know how critical multiculturalism and other ideology items were related to endorsement of a broader range of policies. As a result, I made three changes in Study 2.

First, in contrast to Study 1, I developed a set of policy measures in which items were relevant to each type of diversity ideologies (see Appendix B). A straightforward hypothesis is that is that each of the diversity ideologies will most strongly predict its corresponding policy measure. Beyond that straightforward expectation, the specific motivation for the current study is to test a second and somewhat competing hypothesis that a politicized critical multiculturalism is a better predictor of a range of social justice policies than a domesticated multiculturalism.

Second, I added an affirmative action measure as another relevant policy that might show differential correlations with multiculturalism and critical multiculturalism. I was interested in how the diversity ideologies differently predicted a policy that has triggered both colorblind narratives against it and multicultural narratives somewhat in favor of affirmative action (Citrin et al, 2001). The hypothesis is that critical multiculturalism ideology will be a stronger predictor of affirmative action policies than multiculturalism because it includes acknowledgement and understandings of structural issues where multiculturalism does not.

Third, I added a measure of awareness of race and privilege measure and tested its mediating effects. I wanted to examine whether awareness of race and privilege mediated the

relationship between diversity ideology and policy endorsement. Since critical consciousness acknowledges the historical inequities and policies that created them, it will be associated with more support for politicized policies that rectify these structural issues.

Method

Participants. Based on the similarities in design between Study 1 and Study 2 (similar number of predictors with two additional outcomes), I chose to recruit 280 participants. I conducted a post-hoc analysis using G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009) to ensure the sample size was adequate to yield a power of .80. Analysis was set at a small to moderate effect size, alpha of .05, and a power of .90. Results indicated that the final sample used for the study had adequate power. As in Study 1, I again used TurkPrime to recruit participants, and I retained only those participants who self-identified as White. Two participants wished to withdrawal their results from the study, so I excluded their data from all analyses. The final sample size was 190 White participants.

Participants' ages ranged from 21 - 71 years ($M = 38.72$, $SD = 13.01$, $Mdn = 35$). About half the participants identified as female (50.5%), did not earn a Bachelor's degree or higher (52.1%), and earned $40,000 or less in annual income (51.1%). All participants were U.S. citizens. Recruitment efforts were similar to Study 1 indicating that the study was about people's attitudes and beliefs about current social issues.

Procedure and measures. The procedure for this study was similar to that of Study 1, except that I omitted the open-ended question about understandings of multiculturalism. The full set of materials appears in Appendix B.

Diversity Ideology Endorsement. First, participants responded to the same 15-item diversity ideology scale from Study 1. I analyzed responses in terms of the same three

subscales—specifically, colorblind ideology ($\alpha = .83$)[4], multiculturalism ($\alpha = .89$), and critical multiculturalism ($\alpha = .87$)—from Study 1.

Policy measure. Participants responded to a set of policy measures which included items that were distinct to each diversity ideology.[5] *Common-identity* policy items were an expression of colorblind ideology (e.g. "give priority to core or mainstream American themes (rather than diversity for its own sake) in public education and arts institutions;" $\alpha = .84$). *Diversity appreciation* policy items were an expression of multiculturalism (e.g. "support the creative traditions (e.g. art, music, literature, etc.;") associated with a broad set of cultural communities;" $\alpha = .86$). *Social justice* policy items were an expression of critical multiculturalism (e.g. "expand government investment in communities of color as a form of reparation for past and present injustice;" $\alpha = .86$). Participants responded to the extent to which they endorsed each policy on a Likert-type scale from 0 (*not at all*) to 5 (*completely*).

Affirmative action support. Next, participants responded to 4 items about their support for affirmative action policies on a scale of 0 (*not at all*) to 5 (*very much*). The items ranged from no support of affirmative action policies (e.g. "nothing, I believe we should end the use of affirmative action policies as a means to ensure proportionate representation in important institutions across social identity categories"), to high support (e.g. "to ensure recruitment and retention of people from racial and cultural communities who

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[4]Similar to Study 1, the colorblind ideology scale only included the four items which emerged as one factor based on results from the PCA analysis.

[5]I conducted a PCA of all the policy items with Varimax rotation. Three factors emerged with eigenvalues greater than 1. Together, they explained 67.57% of the variance. Factor 1 included policy items associated with both multiculturalism and critical multiculturalism ideologies, Factor 2 included four of the policy items associated with colorblind ideology, and Factor 3 included the one remaining item associated with colorblind ideology, item 5. Based on these results, I computed the colorblind policy measure using the four items that loaded together from the PCA. Cronbach alpha of all five colorblind policy items was 0.81 compared to 0.84 after I excluded policy item 5.

have suffered from a history of exclusion and disempowerment"). I reverse coded the no

support item and I computed an affirmative action policy support index by averaging across the

four items (α = .85); higher scores indicated stronger support of affirmative action.

Colorblind racial attitudes scale (CoBRAS). Participants next responded to the 7-item

Awareness of Race and Privilege subscale from the CoBRAS (Neville et al., 2000). The

CoBRAS measures the extent to which participants believe that racism is a factor related to

racial divisions and inequities. The subscale measured the extent to which participants believe

that racial divisions and inequities are due to white privilege. Responses were measured on a

scale from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*). Some example items were "White people

in the U.S. have certain advantages because of the color of their skin," and "Racial and ethnic

minorities do not have the same opportunities as white people in the U.S." I reverse coded items

such that higher scores indicate higher levels of *awareness* of racial privilege (α = .93).

Identification measures and demographic questionnaire. Participants responded to the

same two identification measures (U.S. identity exploration, α = .86 and national identity

attachment, α = .92), as in Study 1. They also completed the same demographic questionnaire as

Study 1, including 2-item composite measure of political conservatism (α = .88).

Results and Discussion

Prior to running analyses, I conducted relevant tests of assumptions. Analyses of scatter

plots and Q-Q plots of residuals of all quantitative variables included in the analyses (e.g.

predictor variables, outcomes variables, etc.) indicated that data met assumptions of linearity and

homoscedasticity (Meyers et al., 2013) but violated assumptions of normality (Meyers et al,

2013). I examined boxplots to determine if any cases met the cutoff range of 1.5 to 3.0 times the

interquartile range (IQR). These tests indicated that 20 cases were outliers. Further investigation

led me to remove the seven most extreme of these 20 were cases (2.2. - 3.0 times the IQR; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001).[6] I analyzed data from a final sample of 183 participants.[7]

Relationships among variables. Correlations among all measures and descriptive statistics appear in Table 7. Similar to Study 1, there was a strong positive association between critical multiculturalism and multiculturalism ($r = 0.85$, $p < .001$) that reflects a degree of conceptual overlap. Other results deviated from Study 1 patterns. Whereas colorblind ideology was positively associated with multiculturalism and unrelated to critical multiculturalism in Study 1, it was unrelated to multiculturalism ($r = -0.00$, $p = .955$) and negatively associated with critical multiculturalism ($r = -0.15$, $p = .044$) in Study 2. Nonetheless, consistent with hypotheses, relationships with colorblind ideology were more incompatible—that is, less positive (or more negative)—for critical multiculturalism than for multiculturalism in both Study 1 and Study 2.

Consistent with Study 1, colorblind ideology was positively associated with national identification attachment ($r = 0.31$, $p < .001$) and political conservatism ($r = 0.31$, $p < .001$). Furthermore, the other two diversity ideologies showed negative relationships with both national identification attachment and political conservatism that were slightly more pronounced, although not significantly different, in the case of critical multiculturalism ($r = -0.29$, $p < .001$; and $r = -0.50$, $p < .001$, respectively) than multiculturalism ($r = -0.13$, $p = .090$; and $r = -0.39$, $p < .001$, respectively). Contrary to hypotheses, national identification exploration was unrelated to

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[6] Although removal of these 7 cases resulted in slight improvements, the data still violated assumption of normality (Shapiro-Wilks test of normality changed from $p = .000$ to $p = .011$). However, I chose not to remove more cases because data in the remaining cases did not appear to be the result of systematic bias (e.g. extreme or neutral responding).

[7] Removal of the seven outliers did not change any of the statistical patterns for either the main or supplemental statistical analyses.

both multiculturalism (multiculturalism: $r = 0.08$, $p = .267$) and critical multiculturalism ($r = -0.07$, $p < .326$), but positively related to colorblind ideology ($r = 0.16$, $p < .029$).

Predictors of policy endorsement. I conducted a series of standard multiple regression analyses with each of the policy endorsement subscales—common-identity, diversity appreciation, and social justice—as separate dependent variables. Similar to Study 1, I entered the three diversity ideologies, political conservatism, and the identification variables simultaneously into the model.

Predictors of common identity policy endorsement. The multiple regression analysis for common identity policy endorsement appear in Table 8. The regression model explained 51.5% of the variance in common-identity policy endorsement and the predictive model was significant, $F(6,176) = 31.14$, $p < .001$, Adjusted $R^2 = .498$. Colorblind ideology ($b = .25$, $SE = .06$, $t(176) = 4.38$, $p < .001$), political conservatism ($b = 0.30$, $SE = .06$, $t(176) = 5.49$, $p < .001$), critical multiculturalism ($b = -0.27$, $SE = .12$, $t(176) = -2.36$, $p = .020$), and national identity exploration ($b = 0.11$, $SE = .08$, $t(176) = 2.18$, $p = .030$), were significant predictors. Colorblind ideology and political conservatism uniquely explained the highest proportion of variance in colorblind policies (5.3% and 8.3%, respectively) then critical multiculturalism (1.5%), and national identity exploration (1.3%).

Consistent with expectations, higher endorsement of colorblind ideology predicts stronger endorsement of common-identity policies. I propose this connection is an expression of colorblind ideology. More interesting for current purposes, critical multiculturalism—but not multiculturalism—emerged as a significant predictor of the opposite, weaker endorsement of common-identity policies. This suggests that critical multiculturalism may be more effective

than multiculturalism for mobilizing resistance to common-identity policies associated in the current political climate with colorblind ideology and White supremacy.

Predictors of diversity appreciation policy endorsement. The standard multiple regression analysis for diversity appreciation policy endorsement appear in Table 9. The regression model was significant $F(3,176) = 70.02$, $p < .001$, and accounted for 70.5% (Adjusted $R^2 = .695$) of the variance in diversity appreciation policy endorsement. Multiculturalism ($b = 0.32$, $SE = .08$, $t(176) = 4.21$, $p < .001$), critical multiculturalism ($b = 0.33$, $SE = .07$, $t(176) = 4.51$, $p < .001$), national identity attachment ($b = -0.28$, $SE = .06$, $t(176) = -4.68$, $p < .001$), and national identity exploration ($b = 0.15$, $SE = .05$, $t(176) = 3.02$, $p = .003$) emerged as significant predictors.

Similar to the relationship between multiculturalism and critical multiculturalism, it appears that because both share many of the same principles, they almost equally predict diversity appreciation policy. With regard to this type of policy, these two ideologies are compatible and are not differentially predictive of diversity appreciation policies. Also consistent with hypotheses—higher engagement of one's national identity (exploration) predicted endorsement of diversity appreciation policy, while attachment with national identity predicted opposition to diversity appreciation policy.

Predictors of social justice policy endorsement. The standard multiple regression analysis for social justice policy endorsement appears in Table 10. The regression model was statistically significant, $F(6,176) = 61.21$, $p < .001$, and accounted for 67.6% (Adjusted $R^2 = .665$) of the variance in social justice policy endorsement. Critical multiculturalism ($b = 0.45$, $SE = .08$, $t(176) = 5.73$, $p < .001$), national identity attachement ($b = -0.28$, $SE = .06$, $t(176) = $

-4.47, $p < .001$), and political conservatism ($b = -0.11$, $SE = .04$, $t(176) = -2.82$, $p = .005$) were significant predictors, but critical multiculturalism was the strongest predictor and uniquely explained 6.1% of the variance in social justice policy. Thus, although it may be related to the other diversity ideologies, critical multiculturalism uniquely predicted support for this set of social justice-related policies. Both multiculturalism and critical multiculturalism similarly predicted diversity appreciation policy, but they diverge in their prediction of support for social justice policy. In fact, multiculturalism ideology is not well positioned as an ideology to predict a more critical type of social justice policy measure. This suggests, again, the ineffectiveness of multiculturalism with regard to policies that require more than the acknowledgement of different identities and celebration of those identities. There are indeed policies that require a critical lens that acknowledges the voice of marginalized cultural groups, the inequities specifically experienced by those groups, and more radical changes to support more critical types of social justice.

Predictors of affirmative action. I used a similar standard multiple regression model approach to examine the predictors of affirmative action endorsement (see Table 11). The model was significant, $F(6,172) = 38.09$, $p < .001$, $R^2 = .565$, Adjusted $R^2 = .550$, and revealed three significant predictors, critical multiculturalism ($b = 0.45$, $SE = .10$, $t(172) = 4.39$, $p < .001$), colorblind ideology ($b = -0.11$, $SE = .05$, $t(172) = -2.09$, $p = .038$), and conservatism ($b = -0.10$, $SE = .05$, $t(172) = -2.06$, $p = .041$). Critical multiculturalism was the strongest predictor, uniquely accounting for 4.8% of the variance in endorsement of affirmative action policy. Aligned with hypotheses, critical multiculturalism may be a better predictor than multiculturalism at mobilizing support for affirmative action policies.

Predictors of awareness of racism and privilege. I used the same standard multiple regression approach to assess predictors of awareness of racism and privilege. Results, which appear in Table 12, show a significant final model, $F(6,176) = 36.03$, $p < .001$, $R^2 = .551$, Adjusted $R^2 = .536$, and revealed four significant predictors, colorblind ideology, ($b = -0.24$, $SE = .07$, $t(176) = 3.67$, $p < .001$), critical multiculturalism ($b = 0.58$, $SE = .13$, $t(176) = -4.42$, $p < .001$), national identity ($b = -0.27$, $SE = .11$, $t(176) = 2.50$, $p < .013$), and political conservatism ($b = -0.29$, $SE = .06$, $t(176) = 4.62$, $p < .001$). Critical multiculturalism and conservatism uniquely explained the most variance (5.0% and 5.4% respectively) in opposite directions.

Consistent with hypotheses, critical multiculturalism predicted the *awareness* of racism and privilege while colorblind ideology, political conservatism, and national identification attachment predicted the *denial* of racism and privilege. Colorblind ideology and critical multiculturalism ideologies diverge in how they predict denial and awareness of racism and privilege, again supporting the distinction between the predictive value of the diversity ideologies.

These results also suggest further exploration of the possible mediating effects of awareness of racism and privilege between diversity ideologies and policy endorsement. It is possible that awareness or denial of racism and privilege is a mechanism by which diversity ideologies are related to policy endorsement. More current purposes, it may also reveal how critical multiculturalism and multiculturalism may diverge as diversity ideologies.

Awareness of racism and privilege as a mechanism between diversity ideologies and policy endorsement. To better understand the relationship between diversity ideologies, awareness (or denial) of racism and privilege, and policy endorsement, I conducted several

exploratory mediation analyses. Few empirical studies have investigated diversity ideologies as predictors of different outcomes mediated by different types of identification (Deaux et al, 2006). Rather than exploring the mediating effects of identification, my interest was whether critical awareness or denial of racism and privilege would mediate effects of diversity ideologies on endorsement of social justice policies. To my knowledge no empirical work has examined a model with these sets of constructs.

All mediation analyses controlled for national identification exploration, national identification attachment, and political conservatism since at least one of these constructs emerged as a significant predictor in multiple regression models. I conducted three analyses to test the mediating effects of awareness of racism and privilege on the relationship between the three diversity ideologies (which I entered into each model simultaneously) and each policy measure outcome, tested separately. A theoretical model appears in Figure 1. To test these models, I used Hayes' (2016) PROCESS macro for SPSS. This macro produced estimates of co-efficient and standard error as well as direct and indirect effects with 95% bias-corrected confidence intervals ([CIs]) using a 10,000 bootstrap resampling method. Bootstrapping resamples a subset of the sample from the original data set to produce estimated indirect effects. This is a preferred method for testing mediation models because it does not assume a normally disturbed mediated path (Hayes, 2012; 2018). An indirect effect is significant if the CI does not include zero within the range.

Model testing. The results of path statistics for each of the three models appear in Figures 2 – 4, and indirect paths and CIs appear in Table 13. Mediation was significant for both the common identity policy and social justice policy outcomes. First, the *denial* (or low awareness) of race and privilege partially mediated the relationship between colorblind ideology and

endorsement of common-identity policy (see Figure 2). The indirect effect through denial of racism and privilege was significant (a_1b = .04, 95% CI[.0066, .0912]). The mediation was only partial because colorblind ideology was still significantly related to common-identity policy when accounting for the effects of denial of racism and privilege (c' = 0.21, p = .0004). Similarly, the indirect effect of colorblind ideology on social justice policy endorsement via awareness of racism and privilege was significant (a_1b = -.05, 95% CI [-.0860 to -.0172]), and revealed a full mediation because colorblind ideology was not related to social justice policy endorsement after accounting for the effects of denial of race and privilege (c_1 = 0.03, p = .42; see Figure 4). These results are consistent with the idea that colorblind ideology lead to endorsement of common-identity policies and opposition to social justice policies because it promotes denial of racism and privilege.

A*wareness* of race and privilege fully mediated the relationship critical multiculturalism and common-identity policy endorsement (a_3b = -.10, 95% CI[-.2136, -.0148]; see Figure 2). That is, critical multiculturalism predicted lower support for common-identity policies via its positive effect on race/privilege awareness. The opposite pattern was true for social justice policy endorsement. The mediational path was significant (a_3b = .11, 95% CI[.0459 to .2604]; see Figure 4), and mediation was partial. These results support the idea that the awareness of structural issues related to race and privilege helps explain why people support critical multiculturalism and are likely to endorse social justice policies but not common-identity policies.

There were no significant indirect effects of multiculturalism through awareness of race and privilege for any of the outcomes (common-identity, diversity appreciation, and social justice policy; see Figure 3). Across all the models, it appears that multiculturalism is unrelated

to awareness of structural issues of racism and privilege and, therefore, is not a significant predictor of either support for social justice or diversity appreciation policies, or for opposition of common-identity policies. Critical multiculturalism, more so than multiculturalism, is related to attunement to structural issues such as racism and privilege and also problematizes the endorsement of common-identity policy.

Studies 1 and 2 were correlational and provided information about the relationship between the ideologies themselves and the ideologies and policy endorsement. However, the correlational design of Studies 1 and 2 does not allow for conclusions, regarding the causal effects of diversity ideologies on support for social policies. In order to examine the *effects* of the diversity ideologies on policy endorsement, I conducted an experiment.

Study 3

I had two primary goals for Study 3. The first goal was to examine the effects of the three diversity ideologies on policy endorsement relevant to each type of ideology through an experimental design. The second goal was to explore whether results observed in Studies 1 and 2 would replicate in another study.

Method

Participants. I conducted an a priori power analysis to determine adequate sample size. Setting the analysis with an effect size of $f = .20$, alpha at .05, and power at .80 yielded a sample size of 244. I changed the power estimate to .90, and plotted a range of sample size value at different estimates of power to help me determine a sample size that would buffer for exclusions based on manipulation failures, yielding a sample size of 320.

I used TurkPrime and recruited 352 participants. Since I included only White participants for the prior studies, I maintained consistency by including only White participants in the final

analyses for Study 3, leaving a sample of 282 White participants. This sample size meets a

conventional range of power as it falls between the lowest point of power of estimation (244

participants) and the highest point of estimation (320 participants). Participants' ages ranged

from 20 to 73 years ($M = 36.12$, $SD = 10.86$, $Mdn = 33.00$). About half the participants identified

as female (51.2%) and did not earn a Bachelor's degree or higher (50.9%). Most participants

earned $60,000 or less in annual income (72.2%) and were U.S. citizens (96.8%).

Procedure and measures. Participants first read instructions explaining that the purpose

of the study was to understand people's impression of various issues pertaining to diversity in the

United States. I randomly assigned participants to one of three diversity conditions: colorblind

ideology, multiculturalism, or critical multiculturalism, which were manipulated via a written

passage espousing diversity goals. Each of the passages differed in what social scientists advised

for long-term peace and prosperity in the U.S. In the colorblind condition, the social scientists

advocated an emphasis on common identity (e.g, "The bottom line is this: social scientists advise

that an emphasis on our common identity is essential for long-term peace and prosperity of the

United States"). In the multiculturalism condition, the social scientists advocated appreciation of

cultural differences (e.g. "The bottom line is this: social scientists advise that appreciation for

cultural differences is essential for long-term peace and prosperity of the United States"). In the

critical multiculturalism condition, the social scientists advocated a push beyond mere

celebration of cultural differences to recognize the ongoing legacy of racism (e.g. "The bottom

line is this: social scientists advise that we must push beyond mere celebration of cultural

difference and recognize the ongoing legacy of racism to ensure long-term peace and prosperity

of the United States"). After participants read the passage, they listed five reasons why they

thought the approach to diversity they read about would benefit U.S. society. Thus, the design

for this study was a one-way between-subjects design with three levels of the diversity condition. All materials appear in Appendix C.

Policy endorsement. Participants then completed a modified version of the policy endorsement items from Study 2. Previously, participants responded to 5 items relevant to each diversity ideology. For Study 3, I chose a smaller subset from each category to reduce the number of items from 15 to 10 items. I chose items that best reflected each of the diversity ideologies and labeled each sub-measure the same as in Study 2: two "common-identity policy" items as an expression of colorblind ideology ($\alpha = .75$)[8], three "diversity appreciation policy" items as an expression of multiculturalism ($\alpha = .76$), and four "social justice policy" items as an expression of critical multiculturalism ($\alpha = .84$). I created a composite score for each policy measure; higher scores indicated higher endorsement.

Diversity ideology endorsement. Next, participants responded to the 15 item diversity ideology scale which measured colorblind ($\alpha = .87$), multiculturalism ($\alpha = .87$), and critical multiculturalism ($\alpha = .90$) ideologies from the previous studies. I made one minor change to item number 13 from the previous two studies. In the previous studies, factor analysis of the measures showed that item 13, which I intended as a colorblind ideology, loaded with multiculturalism and critical multiculturalism. I edited this item to, "We must learn to appreciate individual accomplishments without so much attention to people's ethnic or racial identities." A PCA with Varimax rotation replicated the two-factor structure that I observed in previous studies, but the new item loaded with other colorblind items as I intended. Thus, in Study 3, I computed the colorblind ideology subscale using five items rather than the four items from Studies 1 and 2.

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[8] Originally three items were included as part of the common-identity policy measure. However, I excluded one item because it correlated weakly with the other two items and reduced the scale reliability ($\alpha = .61$).

Manipulation checks. Participants answered a recall manipulation check. They indicated which of four statements—(1) *Social scientists advise that we emphasize a common identity*; (2) *Social scientists advise that we appreciate cultural difference*; (3) *Social scientists advise that we recognize the ongoing legacy of racism*; (4) *I do not recall*—best described the approach to diversity they read. A large number of participants (n = 62; 22%) failed the recall manipulation check (colorblind condition failures = 6.4%; multicultural condition failures = 2.1%; critical multiculturalism failures = 13.5%). Participants assigned to the critical multiculturalism and colorblind conditions both incorrectly recalled that they read about multiculturalism (43.5% and 24.2%, respectively). A possibility for these failures may be due to the timing of the recall check. This manipulation check followed the response task, and the policy endorsement and diversity ideology measures. Thus, too much time may have elapsed for participants to respond to this question accurately.

I reviewed participants' five responses about why they thought the approach to diversity they read about would benefit U.S. society. Only about half (55.9%) of the participants assigned to the colorblind condition wrote responses that aligned with the passage. Most failures (26.9%) were a result of responses that were irrelevant to the task (e.g. "seems fun," "social scientists," "all good"), while 17.2% of participants wrote responses that resonated with multiculturalism (e.g. "our differences are what makes us great," "different viewpoints"). The majority of participants (64.8%) assigned to the multicultural condition wrote responses that aligned with the ideology (e.g. "so people are respectful of differences," "must respect cultural differences and learn to appreciate"). Similar to the colorblind condition responses, most failures (30.8%) were a result of irrelevant responses to the task (e.g. "this will unite us," "less hate"). Finally, the majority of participants (69.9%) assigned to the critical multicultural condition were unable to

write responses that articulated the tenets of the diversity ideology. There was a relatively even distribution of responses that were either not relevant to the passage (32.3%; e.g. "more love," "possibility of nuclear wars that could end the world") or that resonated with multiculturalism (37.6%; e.g. "Better understanding and acceptance of other cultures can help us reach new solutions to problems"). Some examples of response that did resonate with the critical multicultural passage were "we confront our racist legacy and design institutions that reflect the strength of our vibrant cultural diversity," and "only when we are able to recognize our historical racism will be able to move forward." Interestingly, five participants outwardly opposed the passage and wrote responses such as, "It won't benefit society. Most claims of racism are fabricated," and "White privilege is a figment of one's imagination. Be honest and look around. Most Whites are NOT privileged."

Compliance with the post-response exercise may have been low because the instructions, "In the space below, please list five reasons why you think the approach to diversity you read about will yield benefits for U.S. society", may have been vague. Additionally, perhaps the inclusion of the word "diversity" in the instructions implicitly signaled multicultural ideology to participants as previous research has shown that many people conflate ideas of diversity with multicultural ideology (Bell & Hartmann, 2007; Plaut, 2010). This may explain why the second most common response that participants wrote across all conditions resonated with multiculturalism. Despite these various manipulation failures, final analyses included all participants as removal of participants who failed the manipulation check did not change patterns.

Identification measures and Demographic questionnaire. Participants next responded to the same two identification measures as used in the prior studies: U.S. identification exploration

(α = .90) and national identification attachment (α = .88), as well as the same demographic items

and the same two item measure of political conservatism (α = .88).

Results

      I first conducted tests of statistical assumptions. Analyses of residuals of all quantitative

variables included in the analyses indicated data met assumptions of homogeneity of variances

(Meyers et al, 2013) but not normality (Meyers et al., 2013). I ran tests of normality of the

residuals on the outcome variables. These included the Shapiro-Wilks test of normality and

examination of histograms, Q-Q plots, and boxplots. The Shapiro-Wilks tests of normality was

significant for all six outcomes (ps < .001), indicating a violation of assumptions of normality.

Examination of the histograms showed slight right skewness for most of the outcomes except for

the common-identity policy outcome, which was normally distributed. Next, I examined

boxplots to determine if any cases were outliers or extreme outliers (2.2. – 3.0 or more times the

IQR; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001) and warranted removal. From this investigation, there were

approximately a dozen possible outliers.

      When I investigated these cases closely, some participants responded in ways that

followed hypothesized patterns—participants randomly assigned to the colorblind condition

responded with higher values for common-identity policy items and colorblind ideology items

and lower values for multicultural and critical multicultural policies and diversity ideologies.

Other participants did not respond in hypothesized patterns—participants assigned to

multicultural or critical multicultural conditions either responded with high endorsement of

common-identity policy and diversity ideology items and low endorsement of all others, or

responded similarly on both multicultural and critical multicultural policy and ideology items.

Under these circumstances, I did not deem removal of these cases appropriate. One case met the

threshold for removal. Responses across all outcome items were exactly the same value except

for two, indicating that this participant was not discriminating between the items and showed

floor effect responding patterns. Based on this result, I removed the one case, resulting in a final

sample of 281.[9] Assumptions of normality did not greatly improve after I removed this case and

no other interventions were deemed appropriate to remedy this violation.[10]

Effects of the diversity ideology manipulations on policy endorsement and diversity

ideology. I conducted a series of separate one-way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) to compare

the effects of the diversity ideology conditions (colorblind, multiculturalism, and critical

multicultural) on endorsement of policy (common-identity, diversity appreciation, and social

justice*)* and diversity ideology (colorblind ideology, multiculturalism, and critical

multiculturalism) outcomes. Results of all analyses appear in Table 14.

Effects of the ideology manipulation on ideology endorsement. Results of the separate

one-way ANOVA indicated that the diversity ideology manipulations had a significant effect on

endorsement for colorblind ideology, $F(2, 278) = 4.72$, $p = .010$, $\eta^2 = .033$. Simple contrasts

showed a significant difference between the colorblind ($M = 5.49$, $SD = 1.31$) and critical

multiculturalism conditions ($M = 4.86$, $SD = 1.57$; $p = .003$), but not between colorblind and

multiculturalism condition ($M = 5.27$, $SD = 1.42$; $p = .285$). The difference between the

multiculturalism ($M = 5.27$, $SD = 1.42$) and critical multiculturalism ($M = 4.86$, $SD = 1.57$)

conditions were marginally significant, $p = .052$. Similar to correlational results of previous

studies, this pattern suggest that critical multiculturalism may be incompatible with colorblind

ideology in way that multiculturalism is not. There were no effects of the diversity ideology

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[9] Removal of the outlier did not change any of the statistical patterns for all analyses.
[10] Previous research suggests that in terms of Type I error, F-tests for Analyses of Variance (ANOVA) are robust regardless of the degree of deviation from a normal distribution in the groups (Blanca, Alarcon, Arnau, Bono, & Bendayan, 2017).

manipulations on either multiculturalism, $F(2, 278) = .12$, $p = .884$, $\eta^2 = .001$, or critical

multiculturalism $F(2, 278) = .75$, $p = .475$, $\eta^2 = .005$, outcomes.

Effects of the ideology manipulation on policy endorsement. Inspection of means for

each diversity ideology condition suggests hypothesized patterns for policy endorsement

outcomes (e.g. participants assigned to critical multiculturalism condition endorsed social justice

policy more than the other policies). However, analyses did not reveal significant effects of the

diversity ideology conditions on identity-blind policy, $F(2, 278) = 1.12$, $p = .326$, $\eta^2 = .008$,

diversity appreciation $F(2, 278) = 1.00$, $p = .369$ $\eta^2 = .007$, or social justice policy $F(2, 278)$

$= .91$, $p = .405$, $\eta^2 = .006$.

Summary. The primary analyses revealed little effect of the diversity manipulations on

either the policy and diversity ideology outcomes. When participants were primed with a

particular type of diversity ideology it did not cause them to endorse a certain type of policy over

the another, or a certain type of diversity ideology over another. The single exception to this

generalization was endorsement of colorblind ideology. Exposure to critical multiculturalism

appeared to inhibit endorsement of colorblind ideology relative to exposure to colorblind

ideology or even multiculturalism.

Supplemental Analysis. Given that the experimental manipulation failed to impact

responses, I computed correlations and conducted regression analyses to determine whether

results found in Studies 1 and 2 replicated in Study 3.

Relationships among variables. Bivariate correlations (see Table 15) showed that similar

to Studies 1 and 2, multiculturalism and critical multiculturalism were strongly and positively

related ($r = .87$, $p < .001$). Despite this conceptual overlap, this different expression of

multiculturalism showed different relationships with colorblind ideology. Colorblind ideology

was negatively associated with critical multiculturalism ($r = -.14$, $p = .017$) but not significantly associated with multiculturalism ($r = .000$, $p = .993$). This pattern replicates results of Study 2, and is generally consistent with the proposition that colorblind ideology is more incompatible with critical multiculturalism than multiculturalism.

Identification and political conservatism measures also showed similar patterns with the diversity ideologies as in the two previous studies. National identification attachment and political conservatism were positively related to colorblind ideology ($r = .29$, $p < .001$; and $r = .33$, $p < .001$, respectively), but negatively related to both multiculturalism ($r = -.21$, $p = .001$; and $r = -.31$, $p < .001$, respectively), and critical multiculturalism ($r = -.26$, $p < .001$; and $r = -.41$, $p < .001$, respectively). The magnitude of the relationship with national identification attachment continued to be more slightly more pronounced, but not significantly different, with critical multiculturalism than with multiculturalism. National identification exploration was positively related to endorsement of colorblind ideology ($r = .22$, $p < .001$), but unrelated to both multiculturalism and critical multiculturalism ($r = .10$, $p = .11$, $r = .03$, $p = .58$, respectively).

Multiple regression analyses of the policy outcomes. I conducted a series of standard multiple regression analyses with each of the policy endorsement outcomes – common-identity policy, diversity appreciation policy, and social justice policy – as separate dependent variables.

Predictors of common-identity policy endorsement. The standard multiple regression analysis for common-identity policy endorsement appears in Table 16. The predictive model was significant $F(6, 274) = 33.81$, $p < .001$, $R^2 = .425$, Adjusted $R^2 = .412$. Predictive relationships of individual variables were similar to patterns from Study 2. Colorblind ideology was a significant predictor ($b = 0.28$; $p < .001$) and uniquely explained 6.1% of the variance in common-identity policy. Political conservatism ($b = 0.33$; $p < .001$) was also a significant predictor and uniquely

explained 9.6% of the variance in common-identity policy. National identifications exploration was marginally significant ($b = 0.13$; $p = .05$). A major difference from Study 2 was that critical multiculturalism did not meet conventional levels of significance as a predictor.

Predictors of diversity appreciation policy endorsement. Results of the standard multiple regression analysis for diversity appreciation policy endorsement appear in Table 17. The regression model explained 55.0% of the variance in diversity appreciation policy, $F(6, 212) = 39.04$, $p < .001$, Adjusted $R^2 = .511$. In this case, predictive relationships of individual variables deviated considerably from the patterns of Study 2. With all predictors in the model, only multiculturalism emerged as a significant predictor ($b = 0.51$; $p < .001$) and uniquely explained 7.6% of the variance in diversity appreciation policy.

Predictors of social justice policy endorsement. Finally, the regression model for social justice policy endorsement (Table 18) was statistically significant, $F(6, 274) = 116.25$, $p < .001$, $R^2 = .718$, Adjusted $R^2 = .712$. Critical multiculturalism ($b = 0.44$; $p < .001$) was a significant predictor and uniquely explained 6.5% of the variance. Political conservatism ($b = -0.18$; $p < .001$) and multiculturalism ($b = 0.17$; $p = .009$) also emerged as significant predictors, and uniquely explained 4.3% and 0.7% of the variance, respectively.

Discussion

These results provided no evidence that experimental priming of diversity ideology affected endorsement of the separate policy measures of diversity measures (other than colorblind ideology). Participants in both the colorblind and multicultural conditions were more likely to support colorblind ideology than in the critical multiculturalism condition. This is important, as it suggests that multiculturalism fails to push participants to reject colorblind ideology in the same way that critical multiculturalism does. Thus, multiculturalism, a more

normative ideology, is not making significant strides in terms of garnering support for a more critical lens of social justice.

A major limitation of the experimental investigation is that the manipulations may have been weak or produced overlaps between the diversity ideologies principles and values making it difficult for participants to differentiate between the ideologies. For example, when participants completed the open response task in which they wrote five reasons why the diversity approach they read about would benefit U.S. society, a significant percentage of participants from each conditions wrote reasons that were not relevant to the diversity ideology. Participants in the colorblind and critical multiculturalism condition wrote reasons that resonated more with multiculturalism. This suggests that the manipulations may have failed to articulate the differences between the two ideologies, and as a result responses on the outcome measures showed little variability.

Another reason for the failure of the manipulation may be reactance. Indeed, previous research has found that multiculturalism led to reactance (Brewer, 1997), especially when a threat was present (Davies et al., 2008; Yogesswaran & Dasgupta, 2014). Given the emphasis on critical consciousness about intergroup wrongdoing, it is likely that critical multiculturalism may be even more threatening and may generate even more reactance, leading participants to respond in ways that are opposite to affordances of the manipulation.

The supplemental results of the study provided mostly consistent support for the second aim of Study 3 regarding how the diversity ideologies are related to each other, identification, and policy measures. Consistent with hypothesized patterns across all studies, multiculturalism and critical multiculturalism was strongly related to each other. Additionally, colorblind ideology was negatively related to critical multiculturalism while unrelated to multiculturalism. There was

also relatively consistent predicted patterns between national identification attachment and political conservatism and the diversity ideologies. National identification attachment and political conservatism was consistently positively related to colorblind ideology, while negatively related to both multiculturalism and critical multiculturalism. The magnitude of these relationships were consistently stronger for critical multiculturalism than multiculturalism.

Although colorblind ideology was consistently related with national identification exploration, some major deviations in Study 3 were that both multiculturalism and critical multiculturalism were unrelated with national identification exploration. These patterns were inconsistent with the hypotheses that national identification exploration would have a negative relationship with colorblind ideology and a positive relationship with the other two diversity ideologies. It is possible that national identification is not as important a predictor of diversity ideologies as is political conservatism. I return to this possibility in the general discussion.

Results of Study 3 are consistent with the hypothesis that each diversity ideology predicts policy measures that are similar to its principles and values. Contrary to beliefs that multiculturalism is a good predictor of social justice policy, it appears that critical multiculturalism is a much stronger predictor and possibly better suited to gain support for social justice issues. Critical multiculturalism may be a better ideology to move people closer toward adopting a critical lens in understanding social issues and endorsing more critical social justice policies in favor of helping marginalized cultural groups.

Analyses Across Studies

One main limitation of Studies 1 through 3 is that I did not include participants with marginalized identities in the analyses. Although inferences from statistical tests did not change as a function of inclusion or exclusion, the number of such participants in any particular study

was too small to afford a test of hypothesized differences. Rather than combine participants from marginalized groups together with White participants and imply no differences in responses without adequate power to observe such differences, I opted to characterize results more precisely as responses of White participants.

Although the number of participants from marginalized groups was small in any particular study, aggregation of samples across studies does afford sufficient power to test hypothesized differences in support of diversity ideologies as a function of identity group. In particular, the theoretical framework that I elaborated in the introduction suggests that experiences of people with marginalized identities may provide them with critical consciousness that leads them to greater endorsement of critical multiculturalism than I observed among White participants.

To examine this hypothesis, I combined data from Studies 1 through 3 to compare the differences in diversity ideology endorsement between White and non-White participants. I chose to retain four race categories—Asian, $n = 53$; Black, $n = 73$; Latinx, $n = 46$; and White, $n = 642$—for the purposes of this analysis because these four categories included the highest number of participants and would be somewhat stable for conducting statistical tests. However, it is important to note that these sample sizes are small and I will make interpretations of the results with caution. I excluded race categories (Native American/Native Alaskan $n = 10$; multi-ethnic $n = 25$; something not listed $n = 8$) that comprised of less than 5% of the total sample. I also excluded four participants who indicated they wished to be excluded from all final analyses, leaving a final sample size of 814 participants. Participant ages ranged from 19 to 75 years ($M = 36.74$, $SD = 11.67$, $Mdn = 33.00$). Half the participants identified as female (50.1%).

The main goal of this analysis was to compare diversity ideology endorsement across participant race categories; therefore, the only measure I included for analysis was the 15 item diversity ideology measure. I created the same three subscales which included the 5 items—specifically, colorblind ideology ($\alpha = .82$), multiculturalism ($\alpha = .87$), and critical multiculturalism ($\alpha = .89$)—from Study 1.[11] Demographic information and means for endorsement of diversity ideologies as a function of identity category appear in Table 19.

To test hypotheses, I conducted a 3 (Study: 1, 2, 3) x 4 (Race: Asian, Black, Latinx, and White) x 3 (Diversity Ideology Type: colorblind, multiculturalism, critical multiculturalism) mixed-model Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) of diversity ideology endorsement with Study and Race as between-subjects factors, and Diversity Ideology Type as a within-subjects factor. Results indicated no significant main effect or interactions involving the Study factor ($ps > .05$), so I removed it from the model. The resulting 4 (Race) x 3 (Diversity Ideology Type) mixed-model ANOVA indicated main effects of Race, $F(3, 809) = 7.36$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .027$, and Diversity Ideology Type, $F(1, 809) = 5.10$, $p = .024$, $\eta^2 = .006$, qualified by a significant, $F(6, 1618) = 3.82$, $p = .001$, $\eta^2 = .014$.

To probe the interaction, I conducted a series of one-way ANOVAs to test for group differences in endorsement separately for each diversity ideology. Results of the omnibus test indicated no significant difference for endorsement of colorblind ideology, $F(3, 809) = 0.70$, $p = .550$. In contrast, results of the omnibus test did reveal the hypothesized difference in endorsement of critical multiculturalism, $F(3, 809) = 8.02$, $p < .001$. Post-hoc comparisons

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[11]I conducted a PCA of all 15 diversity ideology items with Varimax rotation. Results followed similar patterns that emerged in the previous studies, That is, two factors emerged that accounted for 64.31% of variation: One factor included all multiculturalism items and all critical multiculturalism items, and the second factor included the five colorblind ideology items. I conducted the same analyses separate for White participants and non-White participants and the same two factor structure emerged.

indicated that endorsement of critical multiculturalism among White participants was significantly less than among Black and Latinx participants, but only marginally less than among Asian participants. In addition, results of the omnibus test revealed differences in endorsement of multiculturalism, $F(3, 809) = 8.63$, $p < .001$. Post-hoc comparisons indicated that endorsement of multiculturalism was significantly weaker for White participants than Asian, Black, and Latinx participants.

This pattern for multiculturalism is consistent with previous work which suggests that White people find multiculturalism threatening (Ginges & Cairns, 2000; Morrison et al, 2010; Verkuyten, 2005). I have proposed the hypothesis that this resistance to multiculturalism is particularly strong for the more critical manifestations of multiculturalism that I examine in the present work. To test this hypothesis, I combined Black and Latinx participants into a single "marginalized identities" category[12] and conducted a 2 (Race: marginalized identity and Whites) x 2 (Diversity Ideology Type: multiculturalism and critical multiculturalism) mixed-model ANOVA. Results indicated a marginally significant interaction of racial group and diversity ideology, $F(1, 761) = 3.83$, $p = .051$, $\eta^2 = .005$. Although endorsement of both ideologies was lower among White participants than Black and Latinx participants, the interaction pattern suggests that the difference in endorsement was greater for critical multiculturalism (Ms = 5.62 versus 4.99, SDs = 1.16 and 1.48) than for multiculturalism (M = 5.74 versus 5.25, SDs = 1.05 and 1.28). Although this pattern is consistent with the hypothesis that White folks are especially

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[12] I excluded Asian participants for these analyses because their positions within U.S. social structures are ambiguous: advantaged and overrepresented in some ways and also disadvantaged and underrepresented in other ways. Given this ambiguity, there is a greater chance that Asian Americans are able to assimilate into U.S. social structures in ways that are not available to Black and Latinx people (Citrin & Sears, 2014). Thus, it is possible that critical multiculturalism may be endorsed slightly higher by Black and Latinx people.

resistant to critical multiculturalism, the marginal significance level for the interaction effect requires that one retain due skepticism about this interpretation.

General Discussion

The general purpose of this research was to explore whether critical multiculturalism constitutes a separable construct from standard multiculturalism. Critical multiculturalism is an ideology that recognizes the importance of participation of people from marginalized groups in social and political domains and challenges various forms of oppression (e.g. racism, classism, sexism, etc.) that are perpetuated through dominant social norms (McLaren & Farahmandpur, 1999). One aim was to examine how participants conceptualize multiculturalism. Another aim was to examine if critical multiculturalism was a separate diversity ideology in its own right, or a different manifestation of a normative multiculturalism diversity ideology. A third aim was to determine whether endorsement of or exposure to different diversity ideologies was associated with different patterns of policy endorsement.

Overview of Results

Conceptualizations of multiculturalism. Consistent with hypotheses, qualitative results showed that participants reported celebratory understandings of multiculturalism and only few included critical understandings of multiculturalism. Participants wrote about celebrations of differences and goals of unification and peace of different cultural groups living together. This follows previous research that suggests that multiculturalism maintains normative understandings of diversity that deracialize discourse and reifies culture and cultural difference while failing to address issues of oppressive systemic inequalities (Hatcher, 1987; McLaren, 1995; May, 1999; May 2003). One limitation of this investigation is that responses only included that of White participants. It is possible that the overwhelming responses of celebratory

manifestations of multiculturalism is more specifically a White understanding of

multiculturalism (Flowers & Howard-Hamilton, 2002), which may be different for people from

marginalized groups (Flowers & Howard-Hamilton, 2002). Although this initial exploration

suggested that critical multiculturalism is not a common conceptualization, I wanted to continue

to consider how it may be related to multiculturalism and when it might emerge as separable

from multiculturalism.

Critical multiculturalism as a separate construct. Next, I examined the relationships

among the diversity ideologies and their relationships with the identification variables. The

results showed considerable strong positive associations between multiculturalism and critical

multiculturalism across all the studies. This may suggest that these two ideologies are variations

of a single multicultural construct rather than separable constructs. Supporters of

multiculturalism intended it as a remedy to the shortcomings of colorblind ideology (Berry,

1984; Plaut, Cheryan, & Stevens, 2015). The goals of multiculturalism were to bring reform to

various institutions to better reflect the cultural diversity of U.S. society, and more specifically,

to improve educational equality for marginalized students with the influence of ethnic studies

movements (Banks, 1993; Banks, 2004; Banks & Banks, 2004). In its early conceptualization,

multiculturalism emerged in U.S. society as a vehicle to bring social justice issues to the

forefront. Although over time multiculturalism has changed to meet the sensibilities of the

dominate cultural group (Bell & Hartmann, 2007; McLaren, 1995), it is likely that any other

manifestation of multiculturalism, such as critical multiculturalism, will appear to have much

overlap in similarities due to the origins of multiculturalism.

However, the results also supported hypothesized patterns of difference between

multiculturalism and critical multiculturalism. First, there were differences in their bivariate

relationships with colorblindness. Although not consistent across all three studies, Study 1 showed a compatibility between colorblind ideology and multiculturalism as evident with their positive association with one another. Studies 2 and 3 showed more incompatibility between colorblind ideology and critical multiculturalism than multiculturalism as shown with the stronger negative relationship between them. Second, and consistent with hypotheses, there were modest differences in relationships with national identification attachment and political conservatism with the diversity ideologies across all the studies. Studies showed that the magnitude of the relationships were slightly higher with critical multiculturalism than with multiculturalism suggesting possible incompatibility between the two identification measures and critical multiculturalism. A third area of divergence was results of the exploratory mediation analyses. Consistent with hypotheses, these results showed that a critical consciousness exists with critical multiculturalism through a greater awareness of racism and privilege but not with multiculturalism. A critical consciousness led to stronger endorsement of social justice policies and greater opposition of common-identity policies, indicating that multiculturalism is weak in endorsing critical social justice issues and possibly even less incompatible with common-identity policies.

Predictors of social justice policy endorsement. A final area of divergence and support for hypotheses were the multiple regression models. Despite the overlaps between multiculturalism and critical multiculturalism, patterns across all three studies showed that critical multiculturalism was the strongest predictor of social justice policy endorsement. This is particularly important when thinking about real-life policy endorsement. Although true that a normative multiculturalism may promote support for policies in favor of increasing diversity for the sake of appreciating differences or valuing the importance of including different cultural

groups within dominant structural institutions, it fails to strongly promote support for more critical policies that tend to drive social change for marginalized groups. These results suggest perhaps a more critical manifestation of multiculturalism is required in order to gain support for more critical social justice policies.

Effects of diversity ideologies on policy support. Although less supportive of hypotheses, the effects of diversity ideology manipulations on support for the diversity ideologies showed some divergence between multiculturalism and critical multiculturalism. Specifically, only exposure to critical multiculturalism, and not exposure to multiculturalism, resulted in less support for colorblind ideology than did exposure to colorblind ideology. Critical multiculturalism influences clear opposition to colorblind ideologies in ways that multiculturalism fails to do, suggesting patterns of differentiation between the two diversity ideologies.

Limitations and Future Directions

Participant race. One major limitation of these studies was that the results focused on White participant responses only. Previous research has shown that White participants and participants of different racial identities conceptualize multiculturalism differently (Flowers & Howard-Hamilton, 2002), making it possible that the lack of a critical conceptualization of multiculturalism that I observed in this research was because White participants may endorse more normative understandings of multiculturalism than critical ones. To this respect it may be likely that critical multiculturalism will influence non-White participants differently. The results from the aggregated analysis across all three studies supported some of these previous rationales. Specifically, all participants, non-White and White, endorsed multiculturalism the highest, suggesting that perhaps that the cultural pervasiveness of multiculturalism in U.S. culture makes

it an ideology that is most commonly endorsed. The results also showed initial support for the idea that people from marginalized groups did indeed endorse critical multiculturalism the most, while White participants endorsed it the least. White participants' low endorsement of critical multiculturalism was also apparent in each of the three studies. This suggests that perhaps critical multiculturalism is more threatening to White participants than participants from marginalized racial groups. Including threat as a construct in future empirical studies will provide more insight into this rationale.

Previous research has shown that Black and Latinx participants are more likely to endorse multiculturalism than colorblindness (Ryan, Hunt, Weible, Peterson, &, Casas, 2007; Ryan, Casas, Thompson, 2010) and that multiculturalism affects White participants and non-White participants differently (Morisson et al., 2010; Ryan et al., 2007, 2010; Wolsko et al., 2006). The results also modestly suggested that of the three marginalized groups included in the aggregated analysis, Black and Latinx participants may endorse critical multiculturalism more than Asian participants. Further studies can further explore the differential endorsement of critical multiculturalism among various marginalized racial groups. Since the sample sizes of marginalized racial groups were much smaller in these studies, even after aggregating across all the studies, more empirical work is needed to understand how racial group identifications are related to critical multiculturalism. This future extension of the research may provide further evidence for deviations between multiculturalism and critical multiculturalism.

National identification measures. Another limitation was that national identification exploration did not show strong or consistent evidence with being associated with the diversity ideologies as expected. On the one hand, national identification exploration is theoretically relevant to critical multiculturalism because it suggests a process of more active engagement

informed by openness and curiosity of national identity. This active engagement with national identity may motivate people to be more open to critical understandings of multiculturalism and policy support. However, results from the studies did not show support for this particular aspect of the framework.

National identification as it relates to diversity ideologies may be different within the U.S. context compared to other countries. For example, Hahn and colleagues (2010) suggest that national identity can be construed in terms of values and political beliefs or in terms of ethnicity and culture. In countries such as France, nationhood is strongly tied to a superordinate identity of being culturally and ethnically French, even politically finding ways to minimize or ignore differences among its citizens within in legal policies (Libereman, 2006; Banks, 2001). However, traditionally, the U.S. is an immigrant country without any official policies dictating how to consider the diversity of its citizens. Rather it imparts an ideal of a "melting pot." People born on American soil are given citizenship and ethnicity can be attached to any American identity (e.g. Russian American, African American, Persian American, etc.) without loss of legal American citizenship. Even with the complications of race relations with the U.S., Black people born in American are not denied legal American citizenship (Hahn, Judd, & Park, 2010). Thus, it is possible that in non-U.S. contexts where national identity is construed in ethnic and cultural ways, an emphasis on differences or diversity may seem more disruptive to the social fabric of the nationhood of the country (Hahn et al., 2010; Verkuyten, 2005; Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2006). The relationship between national identification and diversity ideologies outside the U.S. remains a direction for future research.

Study design. A third limitation was that two of the three studies were correlational studies. In particular the greatest limitation is that the directionality of how the diversity

ideologies are related to national identification, political conservatism, and policy outcomes is unclear. This research primarily focused on the diversity ideologies being the predictors of policy outcomes. It is possible that identification may predict what diversity ideologies people are more likely to endorse. This is of particular importance as a limitation because the experimental study showed no effects of the diversity ideologies primes on policy endorsement. Thus, taking into considerations of directionality between the diversity ideologies and other related variables in future studies will help to better understand whether identification variables impact diversity ideologies which in turn have an effect on policy endorsement, or if people choose their identifications based on the diversity ideologies they support.

Finally, the measurement of critical multiculturalism that I used in this research needs to be revisited. The limitation of the critical multiculturalism measure that I used in this research is that I created it based on multiculturalism measure previously used in empirical research. The overlaps observed between the two ideologies across the studies may be simply a result of the measurement construction. Thus, it is important to explore other ways to construct the measurement that highlights the differences between the two ideologies. Particularly, due to the overlap of the two ideologies as seen from the factor analyses across the separate studies and aggregated analysis, it may be beneficial to include critical multiculturalism items that highlight the unique difference of the ideology from multiculturalism rather than also including its areas of overlap. This would help to further examine whether the construct of critical multiculturalism is either another manifestation of multiculturalism or a distinct and separate ideology from multiculturalism.

Conclusion

The current research provides some support for the idea that another more critical version of multiculturalism is needed to move people towards higher endorsement of social justice policies. Previous research in social psychology examined how diversity ideologies improve intergroup relations and reduce prejudice with mixed results. Some research suggests that different construals of multiculturalism (abstract vs. concrete) (Berry & Kalin, 1995; Ryan et al., 2007; 2010; Yogeeswaran & Dasgupta, 2014) may differentially contribute to improving intergroup attitudes or supporting diversity ideologies, but it is unclear whether these results extend to public policy support and actual behavior. The current work provides some insight that suggests that at the very least a different manifestation of multiculturalism, one that is more critical in its expression, is needed to move people towards supporting more social justice issues that are centered around marginalized peoples' sensibilities and experiences. It will be important for future research to continue to examine the distinctions between a multicultural and critical multiculturalism ideology to better understand how diversity ideologies can reconstruct knowledge through a marginalized critical consciousness.

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Table 1

Overview of Diversity Ideologies

Diversity Ideology	Goals	Basic Tenets	Implications for Intergroup Relations	Criticisms
Colorblind	▪ Originated in effort to increase equality ▪ An antidote to the practices of segregation and discrimination ▪ Stood for equal protection and opportunity for all regardless of race	▪ Deemphasis and minimization of the significance of racial group distinctiveness and membership ▪ The commonalities among people are more important than their differences ▪ Focus on people as unique individuals and not as members of a social group	▪ Main goal is to achieve positive intergroup relations and decrease prejudice by emphasizing individual characteristics rather than collective identities	▪ Mixed effects for improving intergroup relations ▪ Produces a lack of awareness of the roles of racism plays in society ▪ Preserves white normativity
Multiculturalism	▪ Emerged as a remedy to the shortcomings of colorblind ideology especially in the domains of civil rights activism and education ▪ Attempted to assert collective identity to oppose "melting pot" idea – expectation of groups to conform to dominant cultural norms ▪ In education, courses focused on ethnic groups (called single- group or ethnic studies) as dominant characteristics of school reforms to reflect the experiences, cultures, histories, and perspectives of marginalized ethnic groups	▪ Dominant cultural institutions should recognize collective identity and cultural diversity ▪ Includes practices that affirm cultural pluralism across various social identities. ▪ Three main aspects include: (a) acknowledging differences between groups, (b) appreciate the contributions different groups make to society, and (c) different groups should maintain (rather than abandon) their own culture and traditions	▪ Main goal is to the achieve positive intergroup relations and decrease prejudice by emphasizing respect of and increasing knowledge about different cultures and collective identities	▪ Support that multiculturalism reduces bias and prejudice is inconsistent ▪ Promotes separatism and balkanization ▪ Promotes cultural relativism ▪ Devalues dominant group contributions to society ▪ Promotes resentment between dominant and marginalized groups ▪ Promotes and supports hegemonic standards and knowledge of the dominant group and preserves white normativity ▪ Conventional forms celebrate diversity but fail to critique domination
Critical Multiculturalism	▪ Emerged as a response to criticisms of multiculturalism education ▪ Education scholars argued multiculturalism constituted deracialized discourse, reified culture and cultural difference, and failed to address issues of racism and related forms of inequality ▪ Draw on experience of marginalized cultural groups to reimage society that resonates with their experience ▪ Draw on marginalized perspectives to understand how hegemonic institutions are located in a white normativity	▪ Includes basic tenets of multiculturalism but encourages consideration for the role of power and structural inequalities. ▪ Brings marginalized groups' experiences to the center of discourse and recognizes the historical contribution and *participation* of marginalized groups ▪ Turns the lens to disrupts the hegemonic social order of white normativity ▪ Includes three basic principles: (a) neutrality of civism, (b) understand differences between social groups within power relations and assessment of structural inequalities and, (c) relationality	▪ Main goal is to achieve positive intergroup relations and decrease *racism* by reimagining hegemonic institutions in ways that reflect and promote marginalized cultural perspectives, and by revealing the extent to which dominant institutions reflect white cultural power	▪ Similar to multiculturalism: separatism, balkanization, devaluation of dominant group, promotes racial resentment between dominant and marginalized group ▪ Especially threatening to white normativity and power, therefore, generates massive resistance ▪ Too politicized; does not maintain neutrality within institutions ▪ May increase prejudice

Table 2

Qualitative Codes

A.   Themes of normative multiculturalism.
1.   **Differences**: to what extent does the participant emphasize differences related to identity of people?
2.   **Similarities**: to what extent does the participant focus on similarities of people?
B.   Themes of critical multiculturalism.
1.   **Structural disadvantage**: participant discussed understanding different cultural perspectives that are a result of structural disadvantage (i.e. country wasn't built for them, barriers, experiences of other people, racism, exclusion from institutions).
2.   **Whiteness**: participant discussed whiteness, white racialization, white privilege/privilege, etc.
3.   Racism/Oppression: participant discussed racism, oppression or overcoming barriers when discussing MC.

.

Table 3

Study 1 Interrater Reliability and Descriptive Statistics for Differences and Celebration Themes

	Average Measures ICC	95% CI interval		*M*	*SD*	Median
		Lower	Upper			
Differences	.546	.046	.754	1.80	1.13	2.0
Celebration	.608	.128	.793	1.59	1.10	2.0

Table 4

Study 1 Interrater Reliability of Structural Disadvantage, Whiteness, and Racism/Oppression

	Cohen's κ	95% Confidence Interval		Frequency of absence	Percentage	Frequency of presence	Percentage
		Lower	Upper				
Structural Disadvantage	.313	-.036	.662	170	95.5%	7	3.9%
Whiteness	.394	-.147	.935	176	98.9%	1	0.6%
Racism/Oppression	.702	.426	.978	170	95.5%	6	3.4%

Note. Frequency of absence = "0" ratings; Frequency of presence = "1" ratings.

Table 5

Study 1 Bivariate Correlations of Diversity Ideologies, Identification Measures, and Policy Endorsement

	CB	MC	CMC	Explore	NatID	Conservatism	M	SD
CB							5.07	1.38
MC	0.16*						5.28	1.29
CMC	0.08	0.89**					4.90	1.50
Explore	0.27**	0.32**	0.21**				4.30	1.09
NatID	0.28*	-0.12	-0.25**	0.49**			4.20	0.4
Conservatism	0.24**	-0.40**	-0.48**	0.13	0.48**		3.50	1.72
Policy	0.03	0.82**	0.87**	0.21**	-0.19*	-0.51**	4.80	1.52

Note. CB = colorblind ideology measure; MC = multiculturalism ideology measure; CMC = critical multiculturalism ideology measure; Explore = national identity exploration; NatID = national identification attachment; Conservatism = political conservatism measure, higher numbers indicate more political conservatism; Policy = policy endorsement; *p < .05, **p < .01.

Table 6

Study 1 Standard Multiple Regression Analysis for Variables predicting Policy Endorsement

Model	b	SE B	β	t	sr^2
Constant	0.47	0.38		1.24	
CB	-0.05	0.04	-0.04	-1.07	.001
MC**	0.25	0.10	0.22	2.67	.009
CMC***	0.65	0.08	0.64	7.79	.076
Explore	-0.00	0.06	-0.00	-0.06	.000
NatID	0.12	0.08	0.08	1.57	.003
Conservatism**	-0.13	0.04	-0.15	-3.20	.013

Note. The dependent value was social justice policy. R^2 = .788, Adjusted R^2 = .780. CB = colorblind ideology measure; MC = multiculturalism measure; CMC = critical multiculturalism measure; Conservatism = political conservatism; Explore = national identity exploration; NatID = national identification attachment; *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. sr^2 = semipartial correlation coefficient which shows unique contribution of each predictor variable.

Table 7

Study 2 Bivariate Correlations of Diversity Ideologies, Identification Measures, and Policy Measures

	CB	MC	CMC	Explore	NatID	Conservatism	CI policy	DA policy	CMC policy	AA endorse	M	SD
CB											5.01	1.45
MC	-.00										5.19	1.28
CMC	-.15*	.85***									4.95	1.39
Explore	.16*	.08	-.07								4.04	1.16
NatID	.31***	-.13	-.29***	.54***							3.99	1.11
Conservatism	.31***	-.39***	-.50***	.14	.45***						3.62	1.79
CI policy	.45***	-.30***	-.46***	.30***	.47***	.61***					3.86	1.47
DA policy	-.14	.75***	.78***	.00	-.37***	-.52***	-.47***				4.18	1.18
SJ policy	-.21**	.66***	.77***	-.09	-.45***	-.57***	-.52***	.86***			4.24	1.21
AA endorse	-.25**	.64***	.70***	-.07	-.32***	-.50***	-.47***	.74***	.74***		3.83	1.39
CoBRAS	-.40***	.42***	.59***	.12	.44***	-.61***	-.59***	.58***	.68***	.64***	4.20	1.75

Note. CI policy = common-identity policy endorsement; DA policy = diversity awareness policy endorsement; AA endorse = affirmative action policy endorsement; AA non-endorse = no endorsement of Affirmative action; CoBRAS = awareness of race and privilege; CB = colorblind ideology measure; MC = multiculturalism ideology measure; CMC = critical multiculturalism ideology measure; Explore = national identity exploration; NatID = national identification attachment; Conservatism = political conservatism measure, higher numbers indicate more political conservatism. $*p < .05$, $**p < .01$.

Table 8

Study 2 Standard Multiple Regression Analysis predicting Common Identity Policy Endorsement

Model	b	SE B	β	t	sr^2
Constant	1.33	0.56		2.38	
CB***	0.25	0.06	0.25	4.38	.053
MC	0.07	0.12	0.06	0.59	.001
CMC*	-0.27	0.12	-0.26	-2.36	.015
Explore*	0.17	0.08	0.14	2.18	.013
NatID	0.11	0.09	0.08	1.16	.004
Conservatism***	0.30	0.06	0.37	5.49	.083

Note. The dependent value was common identity policy. R^2 = .515, Adjusted R^2 = .498. CB = colorblind ideology; MC = multiculturalism; CMC = critical multiculturalism; Conservatism= political conservatism, higher values indicate more politically conservative; Explore = national identification exploration; NatID = national identification attachment. sr^2 is the squared semi-partial correlation. *p < .05, ***p < .001.

Table 9

Study 2 Standard Multiple Regression Analysis predicting Diversity Appreciation Policy Endorsement

Model	b	SE B	β	t	sr^2
Constant	1.59	0.35		4.55	
CB	0.01	0.04	0.01	0.23	.000
MC***	0.32	0.08	0.34	4.21	.030
CMC***	0.33	0.07	0.38	4.51	.034
Explore**	0.15	0.05	0.15	3.02	.015
NatID***	-0.28	0.06	-0.26	-4.68	.037
Conservatism	-0.07	0.03	-0.10	-1.88	.006

Note. The dependent value was diversity appreciation policy. R^2 = .705, Adjusted R^2 = .695. CB = colorblind ideology; MC = multiculturalism; CMC = critical multiculturalism; Conservatism= political conservatism, higher values indicate more politically conservative; Explore = national identification exploration; NatID = national identification attachment. sr^2 is the squared semi-partial correlation. *p < .05, ***p < .001.

Table 10

Study 2 Standard Multiple Regression Analysis predicting Social Justice Policy Endorsement

Model	b	SE B	β	t	sr²
Constant	2.56	0.38		6.78	
CB	-0.01	0.04	-0.02	-0.35	.000
MC	0.12	0.08	0.13	1.51	.004
CMC***	0.45	0.08	0.51	5.73	.061
Explore	0.10	0.06	0.10	1.86	.006
NatID***	-0.28	0.06	-0.26	-4.47	.037
Conservatism*	-0.11	0.04	-0.16	-2.82	.015

Note. The dependent value was social justice policy. $R^2 = .676$, Adjusted $R^2 = .665$. CB = colorblind ideology; MC = multiculturalism; CMC = critical multiculturalism; Conservatism= political conservatism, higher values indicate more politically conservative; Explore = national identification exploration; NatID = national identification attachment. sr^2 is the squared semi-partial correlation. *p < .05, ***p < .001.

Table 11

Study 2 Standard Multiple Regression Analysis predicting Affirmative Action Policy Endorsement

Model	b	SE B	β	t	sr^2
Constant	1.73	0.50		3.44	
CB*	-0.11	0.05	-0.11	-2.09	.011
MC	0.20	0.11	0.19	1.89	.009
CMC***	0.45	0.10	0.45	4.38	.048
Explore	0.05	0.07	0.04	0.66	.001
NatID	-0.12	0.08	-0.10	-1.42	.000
Conservatism*	-0.10	0.05	-0.13	-2.06	.010

Note. The dependent value was affirmative action policy. R^2 = .565, Adjusted R^2 = .550. CB = colorblind ideology; MC = multiculturalism; CMC = critical multiculturalism; Conservatism= political conservatism, higher values indicate more politically conservative; Explore = national identification exploration; NatID = national identification attachment. sr^2 is the squared semi-partial correlation. *p < .05, ***p < .001.

Table 12

Study 2 Standard Multiple Regression Analysis predicting Awareness of Race and Privilege

Model	b	SE B	β	t	sr^2
Constant	3.08	0.64		4.80	
CB***	-0.24	0.07	0.20	3.67	.034
MC	-0.16	0.14	0.12	1.15	.003
CMC***	0.58	0.13	-0.46	-4.42	.050
Explore	0.14	0.09	-0.09	-1.47	.005
NatID*	-0.27	0.11	0.17	2.50	.016
Conservatism***	-0.29	0.06	0.30	4.62	.054

Note. The dependent value was unawareness of race and privilege. R^2 = .551, Adjusted R^2 = .536. CB = colorblind ideology; MC = multiculturalism; CMC = critical multiculturalism; Conservatism= political conservatism, higher values indicate more politically conservative; Explore = national identification exploration; NatID = national identification attachment. sr^2 is the squared semi-partial correlation. *p < .05, ***p < .001.

Table 13

Study 2 Indirect Effects and Lower and Upper Confidence Intervals for each Mediation Model

	Indirect effect coefficient		
	CB through CoBRAS	MC through CoBRAS	CMC through CoBRAS
Common identity policy	.40 [.0066 to .0912]*	-.03 [-.0082 to .1105]	-.10 [-.2136 to -.0148]*
Diversity appreciation policy	-.02 [-.0554 to .0033]	-.02 [-.0694 to .0043]	.05 [-.0105 to .1253]
Social justice policy	-.05 [-.0860 to -.0172]*	-.03 [-.1000 to .0128]	.11 [.0471 to .1997]*

Note. Numbers in brackets are lower and upper confidence intervals. CB = colorblind ideology; MC = multiculturalism; CMC = critical multiculturalism. COBRAS = awareness of racism and privilege. CB through CoBRAS = indirect effect of colorblind ideology through CoBRAS; MC through CoBRAS = indirect effect of colorblind ideology of multiculturalism through CoBRAS; CMC through CoBRAS = indirect effect of critical multiculturalism through CoBRAS. *indicates a significant indirect effect.

Table 14

Study 3 Analysis of Variance of Diversity Ideologies, Policy Measures, by Manipulations

	CB cond.		MC cond.		CMC cond.		F	p	η^2
Dependent Variables	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*			
CB	5.49[f]	1.31	5.27[g]	1.42	4.86[f,g]	1.57	4.72	.010	.033
MC	5.24	1.40	5.33	1.19	5.27	1.28	0.12	.884	.001
CMC	4.92	1.64	5.16	1.30	5.15	1.62	0.75	.475	.005
Common Identity policy	3.77	1.40	3.45	1.45	3.60	1.57	1.12	.326	.008
Diversity appreciation policy	4.40	1.32	4.63	0.93	4.54	1.15	1.00	.369	.007
Social justice policy	4.27	1.34	4.47	1.03	4.48	1.32	0.91	.405	.006

Note. degrees of freedom for all analyses = (2, 278); CB = colorblind ideology; MC = multiculturalism; CMC = critical multiculturalism; CB cond = colorblind manipulation condition, MC cond. = multicultural manipulation condition, CMC condition = critical multiculturalism manipulation condition; simple contrast results: [f]= significant difference between CB and CMC conditions, p = .003, [g] = marginal significant difference between MC and CMC conditions, p = .052.

Table 15

Study 3 Bivariate Correlations of Diversity Ideologies, National Identification, Conservatism and Policies

	CB	MC	CMC	Explore	NatID	Conservatism	CI policy	DA policy	M	SD
CB									5.21	1.45
MC	.00								5.28	1.29
CMC	-.14*	.87***							5.08	1.53
Explore	.22***	.10	.03						4.16	1.23
NatID	.29***	-.21**	-.26***	.51***					3.98	1.12
Conservatism	.33***	-.31***	-.41***	.30***	.37***				3.49	1.70
CI policy	.44***	-.27***	-.35***	.29***	.33***	.57***			3.61	1.48
DA policy	-.05	.73***	.68***	.05	-.20**	-.31***	-.28***		4.52	1.15
SJ policy	-.18**	.73***	.81***	-.05	-.31***	-.54***	-.40***	.73***	4.41	1.24

Note. CB = colorblind ideology measure; MC = multiculturalism ideology measure; CMC = critical multiculturalism ideology measure; Explore = national identity exploration; NatID = national identification attachment; Conservatism = political conservatism measure, higher numbers indicate more political conservatism. CI policy = common-identity policy endorsement; DA policy = diversity awareness policy endorsement; SJ policy = social justice policy endorsement; *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.

Table 16

Study 3 Standard Multiple Regression Analysis of Variables predicting Common-identity Policy Endorsement

Model	b	*SE B*	β	t	sr^2
Constant	1.29	0.47		2.77	
Explore*	0.13	0.07	0.11	1.97	.008
NatID	0.02	0.08	0.02	0.32	.000
Conservatism***	0.33	0.09	0.38	6.76	.096
CB***	0.28	0.05	0.27	5.38	.061
MC	-0.08	0.11	-0.07	-0.74	.001
CMC	-0.10	0.09	-0.10	-1.02	.002

Note. R^2 = .425, Adjusted R^2 = .413. CB = colorblind ideology; MC = multiculturalism; CMC = critical multiculturalism; Conservatism = political conservatism, higher values indicate more conservatism; Explore = national identification exploration; NatID = national identification attachment . sr^2 is the squared semi-partial correlation. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.

Table 17

Study 3 Standard Multiple Regression Analysis predicting Diversity Appreciation Policy Endorsement

Model	b	$SE\ B$	β	t	sr^2
Constant	1.46	0.32		4.57	
Explore	0.03	0.05	0.03	0.58	.001
NatID	-0.04	0.05	-0.04	-0.74	.001
Conservatism	-0.04	0.03	-0.07	-1.34	.003
CB	0.00	0.04	0.00	-0.01	.000
MC***	0.51	0.08	0.57	6.81	.076
CMC	0.11	0.07	0.15	1.75	.005

Note. $R^2 = .550$, Adjusted $R^2 = .540$. CB = colorblind ideology; MC = multiculturalism; CMC = critical multiculturalism; Conservatism = political conservatism, higher values indicate more conservatism; Explore = national identification exploration; NatID = national identification attachment. sr^2 is the squared semi-partial correlation.*$p < .05$, **$p < .01$, ***$p < .001$.

Table 18

Study 3 Standard Multiple Regression Analysis predicting Social Justice Policy Endorsement

Model	b	$SE\ B$	β	t	sr^2
Constant	2.13	0.27		7.78	
Explore	0.02	0.04	0.02	0.47	.000
NatID	-0.06	0.04	-0.05	-1.31	.002
Conservatism***	-0.18	0.03	-0.25	-6.47	.043
CB	-0.01	0.03	-0.01	-0.21	.000
MC*	0.17	0.06	0.17	2.62	.007
CMC***	0.44	0.06	0.54	7.91	.065

Note. $R^2 = .718$, Adjusted $R^2 = .712$. CB = colorblind ideology; MC = multiculturalism; CMC = critical multiculturalism; Conservatism = political conservatism, higher values indicate more conservatism; Explore = national identification exploration; NatID = national identification attachment. sr^2 is the squared semi-partial correlation.*$p < .05$, **$p < .01$, ***$p < .001$.

Table 19

Means and Standard Deviations of Aggregated Analysis Across all Studies

	Asian ($n = 53$)		Black ($n = 72$)		Latinx ($n = 46$)		White ($n = 642$)		Total ($N = 813$)	
	M	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*
CB	5.15	1.42	5.08	1.45	5.41	1.04	5.13	1.33	5.14	1.33
MC	5.78[a]	1.01	5.79[b]	1.00	5.74[c]	1.08	5.25[a,b,c]	1.28	5.36	1.25
CMC	5.50	1.12	5.67[d]	1.08	5.63[e]	1.23	4.99[d,e]	1.48	5.12	1.44

Note. CB = colorblind ideology; MC = multiculturalism; CMC = critical multiculturalism. Post-hoc Tukey results indicated significant difference for multiculturalism between: [a] = White and Asian; [b] = White and Black participants; [c] = White and Latinx participants. Post-hoc Tukey results indicated significant difference for critical multiculturalism between: [d] = White and Black; [e] = White and Latinx participants.

Figure 1. Theoretical model of awareness of racism and privilege as mediator between diversity ideologies predicting each of the policy outcomes. The diversity ideologies entered the model simultaneously but were tested with policy outcomes in three separate models. Path coefficients of each separate model appear in Figures 2 – 4. Notes. CB = colorblind ideology; MC = multiculturalism; CMC = critical multiculturalism.

Figure 2. The mediating effect of awareness of race and privilege in the relationship between colorblind ideology, multiculturalism, and critical multiculturalism and common-identity policy endorsement. Notes. CB = colorblind ideology; MC = multiculturalism; CMC = critical multiculturalism; *$p < .05$, **$p < .01$, ***$p < .001$; All presented effects are unstandardized; a_n is the effect of the three diversity ideologies on awareness of racism and privilege; b is the effect of awareness of racism and privilege on common-identity policy endorsement; c' is the direct effect of each of the diversity ideologies on common-identity policy endorsement; c is the total effect of each of the diversity ideologies on CB policy endorsement.

Awareness of racism and privilege

a₁ = -.24** → $a_1 = -.24^{**}$

$a_2 = -.16$

$a_3 = .58^{***}$

$b = .09^{*}$

CB

MC

CMC

$c_1 = .01, c' = .03$

$c_2 = .32^{***}, c' = .33^{***}$

$c_3 = .33^{***}, c' = .28^{**}$

Diversity awareness policy endorsement

Indirect effects with lower and upper confidence intervals; *indicates significant indirect effect.
CB through awareness of racism and privilege:
-.02 [-.0554 to .0033]
MC through awareness of racism and privilege:
-.01 [-.0694 to .0043]
CMC through awareness of racism and privilege: .05 [-.0105 to .1253]

Figure 3. The mediating effect of awareness of race and privilege in the relationship between colorblind ideology, multiculturalism, and critical multiculturalism and diversity awareness policy endorsement (N = 183). Notes. CB = colorblind ideology; MC = multiculturalism; CMC = critical multiculturalism; *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001; All presented effects are unstandardized; a_n is the effect of the three diversity ideologies on awareness of racism and privilege; b is the effect of awareness of racism and privilege on diversity awareness policy endorsement policy endorsement; c' is the direct effect of each of the diversity ideologies on diversity awareness policy endorsement; c is the total effect of each of the diversity ideologies on diversity awareness policy endorsement.

Figure 4. The mediating effect of awareness of race and privilege in the relationship between colorblind ideology, multiculturalism, and critical multiculturalism and social justice policy endorsement. Notes. CB = colorblind ideology; MC = multiculturalism; CMC = critical multiculturalism; *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001; All presented effects are unstandardized; a_n is the effect of the three diversity ideologies on awareness of racism and privilege; b is the effect of awareness of racism and privilege on social justice policy endorsement policy endorsement; c' is the direct effect of each of the diversity ideologies on social justice policy endorsement; c is the total effect of each of the diversity ideologies on social justice policy endorsement.

Appendix A
Full set of materials for Study 1

What is Multiculturalism?

Instructions: There is lots of discussion about multiculturalism in the U.S. People tend to understand multiculturalism in many ways. We are interested in how you understand what multiculturalism means to you.

In the space below, please answer the question: What does multiculturalism mean to you?

Diversity Ideology Endorsement

Instructions: Many people have different beliefs about living in a just and peaceful society. Please read each statement and indicate to the extent to which you agree about the importance of each statement for a just and peaceful society. There are no correct answers to these items; we are just interested in your opinions.

In order to have a peaceful and just society …

1. We must stop obsessing so much about race and ethnicity. [CB]
2. We must appreciate the unique characteristics of different racial and ethnic groups. [MC]
3. We must appreciate the unique experiences of oppression that different racial and ethnic groups have suffered. [CMC]
4. Everyone must remember that we're all just human and not become preoccupied with race and ethnicity.[CB]
5. Everyone must learn the unique histories and cultural experiences of different racial and ethnic groups.[MC]
6. Everyone must learn the history of racism (e.g., colonization and enslavement) that has characterized American society.[CMC]
7. It is important during social interaction to remember that putting racial and ethnic labels on people obscures the fact that everyone is a unique individual.[CB]
8. It is important during social interaction to consider the history and cultural traditions of different groups.[MC]
9. It is important during social interaction to consider group differences in power and privilege.[CMC]
10. We must recognize that race and ethnicity are artificial labels that keep people from thinking freely as individuals.[CB]
11. We must recognize that each racial and ethnic group has the right to maintain its own unique traditions.[MC]
12. We must redefine the norms of American society to match the diversity of cultural groups in it.[CMC]
13. We must learn about the similarities between racial and ethnic groups.[CB]
14. We must learn about the ways that different racial and ethnic groups resolve conflict.[MC]
15. We must learn about the ways that different racial and ethnic groups struggle against discrimination and injustice.[CMC]

Social Justice Policy Measure

Instructions: Please indicate how likely you are to endorse the following public policies. There is no correct answers to these items. We are just interested in your opinions.

1. I believe that public schools should provide students of underrepresented cultural groups to gain access to historical materials from their own cultural groups.

2. I believe that public school systems should provide the choice for children of all cultural groups to be educated in the culture of their own groups if their parents so desire.

3. I support the allocation of public funds to break the link between poverty, education, and ethnicity in our country to cultivate fairer access to resources for those undermined.

4. I support the allocations of public funds for public space, including air space on television and radio to accommodate all cultural groups.

5. I support that customs and practices of different cultural groups (e.g. religious holidays, wearing a head scare to cover one's hair, etc.) should be recognized by law.

6. I support the allocation of public funds for autonomous cultural institutions such as communal charities, libraries and museums.

7. I believe that public schools should educate children to be familiar with and cultivate attitudes of respect for the history and traditions of all cultures in their country.

National Identity Exploration

Instructions: Please use the scale below to indicate how much you agree with each statement. There are no correct answers to these items; we are just interested in your opinions.

1. I have spent time trying to find out more about American history and traditions

2. I have often talked to other people to learn their views about what it means to be American.

3. I enthusiastically participate in holidays, festivals, and other practices associated with American history and culture.

4. I enjoy the chance to visit monuments, museums, and other sites to better understand what it means to be American.

5. I have often done things to better understand what it means to be American.

National Identity

Instructions: Please use the scale below to indicate how much you agree with each statement. There are no correct answers to these items; we are just interested in your opinions.

Centrality
1. I often think about the fact that I am an American.
2. Overall, being an American has little to do with how I feel about myself*
3. In general, the fact that I am an American is an important part of my self image
4. The fact that I am an American rarely enters my mind.*

Affect
5. In general, I am glad to be an American.
6. I often regret that I am an American*
7. I don't feel good about being an American.*
8. Generally, I feel good when I think about myself as an American.

Ingroup Ties
9. I have a lot in common with other Americans.
10. I feel strong ties to other Americans
11. I find it difficult to form a bond with other Americans*
12. I don't feel a sense of being "connected" with other Americans*

*Reverse coded items

Demographics Questionnaire

Instructions: Please reach each question and indicate the appropriate response.

1. What is your age? _____

2. What is your gender?
   __Male
   __Female
   __ Transgender
   __Genderqueer
   __ Something not listed: _____

3. Please indicate your race/ethnicity:
   __ American Indian/Alaskan Native
   __ Asian or Pacific Islander
   __ Black, not of Hispanic Origin
   __ Latino/Hispanic
   __White, not of Hispanic Origin
   __Multi-ethnic
   __Something not listed: _____

4. Resident Status:
   __ U.S. Citizen
   __ Permanent Resident
   __ Foreign Exchange Student
   __ Something not listed: _____

5. Specifically, with regard to **economic issues**, and setting social issues aside, how would you describe your political orientation?

0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Very Liberal						Very Conservative

6. Specifically, with regard to **social issues**, and setting economic issues aside, how would you describe your political orientation?

0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Very Liberal						Very Conservative

7. Please indicate what religious category you identify with: _____

   To what degree do you identify with this religious category?

0	1	2	3	4	5	6
Not at all						Very Much

8. What is the highest educational degree you have completed?
___some high school, did not graduate
___ High school GED or alternative credential
___High school diploma
___some college
___Associates degree (e.g. AA, AS)
___Bachelor's degree (e.g. BA, BS)
___Master's degree (e.g. MA MS, Meng, Med, MSW, MBA)
___Professional degree beyond a Bachelor's degree (e.g. MD, DDS, DVM, LLB, JD)
___Doctorate degree (e.g. PhD, EdD)

9. From the choices listed below, please choose the best range that describes the income you earned in the past 12 months:
___less than $20,000
___$20,001 – 40,000
___$40,001 – 60,000
___$60,001 – 80,000
___$80,0001 – 100,000
___$100,001 – 250,000
___more than $250,001

More Information about the Study

Thank you very much for completing this study. As you read in the consent portion, we are conducting this study to better understand people's beliefs and attitudes about current social issues. Specifically, we were interested what multiculturalism means to people. First, we asked you to write about what multiculturalism means to you. Next, we had you respond to a survey to better understand what type of diversity ideologies (e.g. colorblindness, multiculturalism, and critical multiculturalism) people generally endorse. We were interested in whether people's conceptualizations of multiculturalism is similar to the type of diversity ideology they endorsed. Lastly, we also asked you to complete several other surveys regarding your identity and some demographic questions.

We did not tell you about these details at the beginning of the study because we wanted to avoid well documented response biases (i.e., when participant responses are influenced by anything other than their own inclinations). Studies have shown that a number of response biases will occur in experiments if participants are aware of the true purposes of the study. For example, participants may respond in a way they think will confirm the study's hypothesis in an effort to be helpful to the researcher. But in the end, such responses will result in invalid data however well motivated. By withholding the true purpose of the study, we hope to prevent this type of response bias from occurring. We hope that you understand the reasons why we did not fully inform you about all details of the study. We did not withhold information to trick you; instead, we did so to protect the integrity of the research.

Now that we have more completely informed you about the design and hypotheses of the research, we remind you that have the opportunity to withdraw your responses from the study without any loss of credit or other penalty. If you no longer agree to let us include your responses in the analyses and results of our research, then you can inform us now by checking the box below, and we will delete your responses completely without any penalty to you (i.e., you will still receive payment for participation). Otherwise, we will include your anonymous responses with other anonymous responses in the analyses and reporting of this research.

If you have any questions or concerns about the study, please do not hesitate to contact Dr. Glenn Adams (adamsg@ku.edu) or Pegah Naemi (pnaemi@ku.edu). Again, thank you very much for your participation.

Glenn Adams, Ph.D.   Pegah Naemi, M.A.
adamsg@ku.edu   pnaemi@ku.edu

At this time, you have the option of withdrawing your responses. Please select the option below to indicate your permission to let us include your responses in our analyses or to indicate your wish to withdraw your responses. Regardless of your choice, you will receive information on the next page regarding the completion code to receive payment.

_____I AGREE to have my responses INCLUDED in the analyses and results of the research

_____I wish to WITHDRAW my responses, and I do NOT want the researchers to include them in the analyses and results of the research.

Appendix B
Full set of materials for Study 2

Diversity Ideology Endorsement

Instructions: Many people have different beliefs about living in a just and peaceful society. Please read each statement and indicate to the extent to which you agree about the importance of each statement for a just and peaceful society. There are no correct answers to these items; we are just interested in your opinions.

In order to have a peaceful and just society …

16. We must stop obsessing so much about race and ethnicity. [CB]
17. We must appreciate the unique characteristics of different racial and ethnic groups. [MC]
18. We must appreciate the unique experiences of oppression that different racial and ethnic groups have suffered. [CMC]
19. Everyone must remember that we're all just human and not become preoccupied with race and ethnicity.[CB]
20. Everyone must learn the unique histories and cultural experiences of different racial and ethnic groups.[MC]
21. Everyone must learn the history of racism (e.g., colonization and enslavement) that has characterized American society.[CMC]
22. It is important during social interaction to remember that putting racial and ethnic labels on people obscures the fact that everyone is a unique individual.[CB]
23. It is important during social interaction to consider the history and cultural traditions of different groups.[MC]
24. It is important during social interaction to consider group differences in power and privilege.[CMC]
25. We must recognize that race and ethnicity are artificial labels that keep people from thinking freely as individuals.[CB]
26. We must recognize that each racial and ethnic group has the right to maintain its own unique traditions.[MC]
27. We must redefine the norms of American society to match the diversity of cultural groups in it.[CMC]
28. We must learn about the similarities between racial and ethnic groups.[CB]
29. We must learn about the ways that different racial and ethnic groups resolve conflict.[MC]
30. We must learn about the ways that different racial and ethnic groups struggle against discrimination and injustice.[CMC]

Policy Measure

Instructions: Please use a scale from 0 (not at all) to 5 (very much) to indicate the extent to which you endorse the following policies. There are no right or wrong answers; we are just interested in your opinion about each.

To what extent to do you endorse policies that…

8. Restrict immigration based on merit considerations to applicants who contribute critical skill and pass rigorous background checks (i.e., extreme vetting). [CB policy]

9. Expand immigration to people from all world regions to increase the vibrant diversity of U.S. society. [MC policy]

10. Change immigration priorities to emphasize economic, political, and environmental refugees who are fleeing violence and injustice. [CMC policy]

11. Require people to demonstrate legal residence and English proficiency in order to gain access to government services or benefits. [CB policy]

12. Require public schools systems to support parents who wish to educate children in heritage cultural traditions (e.g. history, language, literature). [MC policy]

13. Prohibit racial profiling in law enforcement: that is, the use of demographic features as justification for traffic stops or searchers (e.g. "stop-and-frisk). [CMC policy]

14. Require people to present proof of citizenship or government-issued ID to vote in elections. [CB policy]

15. Protect the right of immigrants to maintain customs and practices associated with heritage cultural traditions (e.g. religious holidays, wearing head scarfs, etc.). [MC policy]

16. Protect communities of color from violence by police, school security personnel, Immigration Customs Enforcement, and other law enforcement personnel. [CMC policy]

17. Require organizations to make decisions about admissions, employment, or promotion on an "identity-blind" basis without taking into account racial or ethnic background. [CB policy]

18. Ensure equal representation of a variety of cultural traditions in public education institutions (e.g. libraries and museums) of American society. [MC policy]

19. Require judicial review of legislative districts to ensure they do not disenfranchise (i.e. dilute political expression of) communities of color. [CMC policy]

20. Give priority to core or mainstream American themes (rather than diversity for its own sake) in public education and arts institutions. [CB policy]

21. Support the creative traditions (e.g. art, music, literature, etc.) associated with a broad set of cultural communities. [MC policy]

22. Expand government investment in communities of color as a form of reparation for past and present injustices. [CMC policy]

Affirmative Action Scale

Instructions: Please use a scale from 0 (not at all) to 5 (very much) to indicate the extent to which you endorse the following policies. There are no right or wrong answers; we are just interested in your opinion about each.

In my opinion, the primary basis of affirmative action policies should be…

1. to foster inclusion of people who are economically disadvantaged (e.g., first generation college student, poverty) regardless of racial and cultural identity.

2. to ensure that important social institutions reflect and benefit from the cultural diversity of U.S. society.

3. to ensure recruitment and retention of people from racial and cultural communities who have suffered from a history of exclusion and disempowerment.

4. nothing: I believe that we should end the use of affirmative action policies as a means to ensure proportionate representation in important institutions across social identity categories.*

* reverse-coded items – higher scores indicate higher affirmative action policy endorsement

Colorblind Racial Attitudes Scale – Race and Privilege subscale

Instructions: Please use a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) to indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements. There are no right or wrong answers; we are just interested in your opinion about each.

1. White people in the U.S. have certain advantages because of the color of their skin.*
2. Race is very important in determining who is successful and who is not.*
3. Race plays an important role in who gets sent to prison.*
4. Race plays a major role in the type of social services (such as type of health care or day care) that people receive in the U.S.*
5. Racial and ethnic minorities do not have the same opportunities as white people in the U.S.*
6. Everyone who works hard, no matter what race they are, has an equal chance to become rich.
7. White people are more to blame for racial discrimination than racial and ethnic minorities.*

* reverse-coded items – higher scores indicate blindness or unawareness of race and privilege

National Identity Exploration

Instructions: Please use the scale below to indicate how much you agree with each statement. There are no correct answers to these items; we are just interested in your opinions.

5. I have spent time trying to find out more about American history and traditions

6. I have often talked to other people to learn their views about what it means to be American.

7. I enthusiastically participate in holidays, festivals, and other practices associated with American history and culture.

8. I enjoy the chance to visit monuments, museums, and other sites to better understand what it means to be American.

5. I have often done things to better understand what it means to be American.

National Identity

Instructions: Please use the scale below to indicate how much you agree with each statement. There are no correct answers to these items; we are just interested in your opinions.

Centrality
    13. I often think about the fact that I am an American.
    14. Overall, being an American has little to do with how I feel about myself*
    15. In general, the fact that I am an American is an important part of my self image
    16. The fact that I am an American rarely enters my mind.*

Affect
    17. In general, I am glad to be an American.
    18. I often regret that I am an American*
    19. I don't feel good about being an American.*
    20. Generally, I feel good when I think about myself as an American.

Ingroup Ties
    21. I have a lot in common with other Americans.
    22. I feel strong ties to other Americans
    23. I find it difficult to form a bond with other Americans*
    24. I don't feel a sense of being "connected" with other Americans*

*Reverse coded items

Demographics Questionnaire

Instructions: Please reach each question and indicate the appropriate response.

10. What is your age? _____

11. What is your gender?
    __Male
    __Female
    __ Transgender
    __Genderqueer
    __ Something not listed: _____

12. Please indicate your race/ethnicity:
    __ American Indian/Alaskan Native
    __ Asian or Pacific Islander
    __ Black, not of Hispanic Origin
    __ Latino/Hispanic
    __White, not of Hispanic Origin
    __Multi-ethnic
    __Something not listed: _____

13. Resident Status:
    __ U.S. Citizen
    __ Permanent Resident
    __ Foreign Exchange Student
    __ Something not listed: _____

14. Specifically, with regard to **economic issues**, and setting social issues aside, how would you describe your political orientation?

o	o	o	o	o	o	o
Very Liberal						Very Conservative

15. Specifically, with regard to **social issues**, and setting economic issues aside, how would you describe your political orientation?

o	o	o	o	o	o	o
Very Liberal						Very Conservative

16. Please indicate what religious category you identify with: _____

    To what degree do you identify with this religious category?

0	1	2	3	4	5	6
Not at all						Very Much

17. What is the highest educational degree you have completed?
    ___some high school, did not graduate
    ___ High school GED or alternative credential
    ___High school diploma
    ___some college
    ___Associates degree (e.g. AA, AS)
    ___Bachelor's degree (e.g. BA, BS)
    ___Master's degree (e.g. MA MS, Meng, Med, MSW, MBA)
    ___Professional degree beyond a Bachelor's degree (e.g. MD, DDS, DVM, LLB, JD)
    ___Doctorate degree (e.g. PhD, EdD)

18. From the choices listed below, please choose the best range that describes the income you earned in the past 12 months:
    ___less than $20,000
    ___$20,001 – 40,000
    ___$40,001 – 60,000
    ___$60,001 – 80,000
    ___$80,0001 – 100,000
    ___$100,001 – 250,000
    ___more than $250,001

More Information about the Study

 Thank you very much for completing this study. As you read in the consent portion, we are conducting this study to better understand people's beliefs and attitudes about current social issues and policies. Specifically, we were interested in how people's endorsement of different diversity ideologies are related to their perceptions of various policies. First, we had you respond to a survey to better understand what type of diversity ideologies (e.g. colorblindness, multiculturalism, and critical multiculturalism) people generally endorse. Next, we had you asked about your perceptions of various public policies. We were interested in how different endorsement of diversity ideologies are related to various public policies. Lastly, we also asked you to complete several other surveys regarding your identity and some demographic questions.

We did not tell you about these details at the beginning of the study because we wanted to avoid well documented response biases (i.e., when participant responses are influenced by anything other than their own inclinations). Studies have shown that a number of response biases will occur in experiments if participants are aware of the true purposes of the study. For example, participants may respond in a way they think will confirm the study's hypothesis in an effort to be helpful to the researcher. But in the end, such responses will result in invalid data however well motivated. By withholding the true purpose of the study, we hope to prevent this type of response bias from occurring. We hope that you understand the reasons why we did not fully inform you about all details of the study. We did not withhold information to trick you; instead, we did so to protect the integrity of the research.

Now that we have more completely informed you about the design and hypotheses of the research, we remind you that have the opportunity to withdraw your responses from the study without any loss of credit or other penalty. If you no longer agree to let us include your responses in the analyses and results of our research, then you can inform us now by checking the box below, and we will delete your responses completely without any penalty to you (i.e., you will still receive payment for participation). Otherwise, we will include your anonymous responses with other anonymous responses in the analyses and reporting of this research.

If you have any questions or concerns about the study, please do not hesitate to contact Dr. Glenn Adams (adamsg@ku.edu) or Pegah Naemi (pnaemi@ku.edu). Again, thank you very much for your participation.

Glenn Adams, Ph.D.   Pegah Naemi, M.A.
adamsg@ku.edu   pnaemi@ku.edu

At this time, you have the option of withdrawing your responses. Please select the option below to indicate your permission to let us include your responses in our analyses or to indicate your wish to withdraw your responses. Regardless of your choice, you will receive information on the next page regarding the completion code to receive payment.

_____I AGREE to have my responses INCLUDED in the analyses and results of the research

_____I wish to WITHDRAW my responses, and I do NOT want the researchers to include them in the analyses and results of the research.

Appendix C
Full set of materials for Study 3

Diversity Ideology Manipulations

INSTRUCTIONS: This study is part of a larger program of research in which we are interested in people's impression of various issues pertaining to diversity in the United States. You will read a passage and then some questions will appear on the page for you to respond to. Please read the passage on the next page by clicking "continue."

<u>Colorblind Ideology Manipulation</u>
Sociologists, psychologists, economists, and political scientists all agree that issues surrounding relations between people of different cultures are a major concern for a diverse society such as the United States. Social scientists suggest that, in order to make the U.S. as strong and successful as possible, we must recognize our shared humanity and emphasize our common identity as "Americans". Different people contribute to the nation through their unique, individual abilities, so we must look beyond cultural identity and understand each person as a unique individual. We need to de-emphasize our cultural differences and recognize the similarities that we share as equal citizens of the U.S. If we celebrate our similarities and our shared American identity, we can overcome political divisions and begin work on the difficult and important problems (e.g., education, health care, aging population) facing our society.

The bottom line is this: social scientists advise that an emphasis on our common identity is essential for long-term peace and prosperity of the United States. Educators and other community leaders should develop strategies to celebrate and cultivate respect for our shared American identity.

In the space below, please list five reasons why you think the approach to diversity you read about will yield benefits for U.S. society. When you finish with this task, a "continue" button will shortly appear for you to press to move on to the next page.

<u>Multiculturalism Manipulation</u>
Sociologists, psychologists, economists, and political scientists all agree that issues surrounding relations between people of different cultures are a major concern for a diverse society such as the United States. Social scientists suggest that, in order to make the U.S. as strong and successful as possible, we must respect cultural differences and learn to appreciate the strengths that different cultural groups bring to the United States. Different cultural groups contribute to the nation through the richness of their cultural heritage. By recognizing, respecting, and celebrating this diversity, we not only validate the identity of each cultural group but also recognize its importance to the social fabric of the nation. If we respect and celebrate our differences, we can overcome political divisions and begin work on the difficult and important problems (e.g., education, healthcare, aging population) facing our society.

The bottom line is this: social scientists advise that appreciation for cultural differences is essential for long-term peace and prosperity of the United States. Educators and other community leaders should develop strategies to celebrate and cultivate respect for cultural differences.

In the space below, please list five reasons why you think the approach to diversity you read about will yield benefits for U.S. society. When you finish with this task, a "continue" button will shortly appear for you to press to move on to the next page.

<u>Critical Multiculturalism Manipulation</u>
Sociologists, psychologists, economists, and political scientists all agree that issues surrounding relations between people of different cultures are a major concern for a diverse society such as the United States. Social scientists suggest that, in order to make the U.S. as strong and successful as possible, we must recognize the contributions of marginalized cultural groups and confront the racism that informs our past and present. U.S. society has a foundation in the violent exploitation of people whom the European colonists regarded as "cultural others." This racist legacy persists in cultural domination that privileges White American beliefs and desires over other cultural traditions. If we confront our racist legacy and design institutions that reflect the strength of our vibrant cultural diversity, we can overcome political divisions and begin work on the difficult and important problems (e.g., education, healthcare, aging population) facing our society.

The bottom line is this: social scientists advise that we must push beyond mere celebration of cultural difference and recognize the ongoing legacy of racism to ensure long-term peace and prosperity of the United States. Educators and other community leaders should work hard to promote understanding of diversity and privilege in American society.

In the space below, please list five reasons why you think the approach to diversity you read about will yield benefits for U.S. society. When you finish with this task, a "continue" button will shortly appear for you to press to move on to the next page.

Policy Measure

Instructions: Please use a scale from 0 (not at all) to 5 (very much) to indicate the extent to which you endorse the following policies. There are no right or wrong answers; we are just interested in your opinion about each.

To what extent to do you endorse policies that…

23. Require people to demonstrate legal residence and English proficiency in order to gain access to government services or benefits. [CB policy]

24. Require public schools systems to support parents who wish to educate children in heritage cultural traditions (e.g. history, language, literature). [MC policy]

25. Protect communities of color from violence by police, school security personnel, Immigration Customs Enforcement, and other law enforcement personnel. [CMC policy]

26. Require organizations to make decisions about admissions, employment, or promotion on an "identity-blind" basis without taking into account racial or ethnic background. [CB policy]

27. Protect the people's rights to maintain customs and practices associated with heritage cultural traditions (e.g. religious holidays, wearing head scarfs, etc.). [MC policy]

28. Require judicial review of legislative districts to ensure they do not disenfranchise (i.e. dilute political expression of) communities of color. [CMC policy]

29. Give priority to core or mainstream American themes (rather than diversity for its own sake) in public education and arts institutions. [CB policy]

30. Ensure equal representation of a variety of cultural traditions in public education institutions (e.g. libraries and museums) of American society. [MC policy]

31. Change immigration priorities to emphasize economic, political, and environmental refugees who are fleeing violence and injustice. [CMC policy]

32. Expand government investment in communities of color as a form of reparation for past and present injustices. [CMC policy]

Diversity Ideology Endorsement

Instructions: Many people have different beliefs about living in a just and peaceful society. Please read each statement and indicate to the extent to which you agree about the importance of each statement for a just and peaceful society. There are no correct answers to these items; we are just interested in your opinions.

In order to have a peaceful and just society …

31. We must stop obsessing so much about race and ethnicity. [CB]
32. We must appreciate the unique characteristics of different racial and ethnic groups. [MC]
33. We must appreciate the unique experiences of oppression that different racial and ethnic groups have suffered. [CMC]
34. Everyone must remember that we're all just human and not become preoccupied with race and ethnicity.[CB]
35. Everyone must learn the unique histories and cultural experiences of different racial and ethnic groups.[MC]
36. Everyone must learn the history of racism (e.g., colonization and enslavement) that has characterized American society.[CMC]
37. It is important during social interaction to remember that putting racial and ethnic labels on people obscures the fact that everyone is a unique individual.[CB]
38. It is important during social interaction to consider the history and cultural traditions of different groups.[MC]
39. It is important during social interaction to consider group differences in power and privilege.[CMC]
40. We must recognize that race and ethnicity are artificial labels that keep people from thinking freely as individuals.[CB]
41. We must recognize that each racial and ethnic group has the right to maintain its own unique traditions.[MC]
42. We must redefine the norms of American society to match the diversity of cultural groups in it.[CMC]
43. We must learn about the similarities between racial and ethnic groups.[CB]
44. We must learn about the ways that different racial and ethnic groups resolve conflict.[MC]
45. We must learn about the ways that different racial and ethnic groups struggle against discrimination and injustice.[CMC]

Manipulation Check

In the beginning we presented you with a passage discussing an approach to diversity that social scientists advocate as essential for long-term peace and prosperity of the United States. Which of the following statements best describes the approach you read about?

- Social scientists advise that we emphasize a common identity.
- Social scientists advise that we appreciate cultural difference.
- Social scientists advise that we recognize the ongoing legacy of racism.
- I do not recall.

National Identity Exploration

Instructions: Please use the scale below to indicate how much you agree with each statement. There are no correct answers to these items; we are just interested in your opinions.

9. I have spent time trying to find out more about American history and traditions
10. I have often talked to other people to learn their views about what it means to be American.
11. I enthusiastically participate in holidays, festivals, and other practices associated with American history and culture.
12. I enjoy the chance to visit monuments, museums, and other sites to better understand what it means to be American.
5. I have often done things to better understand what it means to be American.

National Identity

Instructions: Please use the scale below to indicate how much you agree with each statement. There are no correct answers to these items; we are just interested in your opinions.

Centrality

    25. I often think about the fact that I am an American.
    26. Overall, being an American has little to do with how I feel about myself*
    27. In general, the fact that I am an American is an important part of my self image
    28. The fact that I am an American rarely enters my mind.*

Affect

    29. In general, I am glad to be an American.
    30. I often regret that I am an American*
    31. I don't feel good about being an American.*
    32. Generally, I feel good when I think about myself as an American.

*Reverse coded items

Demographics Questionnaire

Instructions: Please reach each question and indicate the appropriate response.

19. What is your age? _____

20. What is your gender?
    __Male
    __Female
    __ Transgender
    __Genderqueer
    __ Something not listed: _____

21. Please indicate your race/ethnicity:
    __ American Indian/Alaskan Native
    __ Asian or Pacific Islander
    __ Black, not of Hispanic Origin
    __ Latino/Hispanic
    __White, not of Hispanic Origin
    __Multi-ethnic
    __Something not listed: _____

22. Resident Status:
    __ U.S. Citizen
    __ Permanent Resident
    __ Foreign Exchange Student
    __ Something not listed: _____

23. Specifically, with regard to **economic issues**, and setting social issues aside, how would you describe your political orientation?

0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Very Liberal						Very Conservative

24. Specifically, with regard to **social issues**, and setting economic issues aside, how would you describe your political orientation?

0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Very Liberal						Very Conservative

25. Please indicate what religious category you identify with: _____

    To what degree do you identify with this religious category?

0	1	2	3	4	5	6
Not at all						Very Much

26. What is the highest educational degree you have completed?
___some high school, did not graduate
___ High school GED or alternative credential
___High school diploma
___some college
___Associates degree (e.g. AA, AS)
___Bachelor's degree (e.g. BA, BS)
___Master's degree (e.g. MA MS, Meng, Med, MSW, MBA)
___Professional degree beyond a Bachelor's degree (e.g. MD, DDS, DVM, LLB, JD)
___Doctorate degree (e.g. PhD, EdD)

27. From the choices listed below, please choose the best range that describes the income you earned in the past 12 months:
___less than $20,000
___$20,001 – 40,000
___$40,001 – 60,000
___$60,001 – 80,000
___$80,0001 – 100,000
___$100,001 – 250,000
___more than $250,000

More Information about the Study

Thank you very much for completing this study. As you read in the consent portion, we are conducting this study to better understand people's beliefs and attitudes about current social issues. First, we randomly assigned some participants to read one of three passages describing an approach to diversity: either colorblind, multicultural, or critical multicultural approaches. Next, we had participants write reasons why the diversity approach they read would benefit U.S. society. We asked all participants to complete surveys regarding endorsement of different types of policies. We were interested in how priming people with different diversity ideologies (e.g. colorblindness, multiculturalism, and critical multiculturalism) is related to policy endorsement. Theory lead us to hypothesize that people in the critical multicultural ideology condition will be more likely to endorse policies that are social justice oriented. Lastly, we also asked you to complete several other surveys regarding your identity and some demographic questions.

We did not tell you about these details at the beginning of the study because we wanted to avoid well documented response biases (i.e., when participant responses are influenced by anything other than their own inclinations). Studies have shown that a number of response biases will occur in experiments if participants are aware of the true purposes of the study. For example, participants may respond in a way they think will confirm the study's hypothesis in an effort to be helpful to the researcher. But in the end, such responses will result in invalid data however well motivated. By withholding the true purpose of the study, we hope to prevent this type of response bias from occurring. We hope that you understand the reasons why we did not fully inform you about all details of the study. We did not withhold information to trick you; instead, we did so to protect the integrity of the research.

Now that we have more completely informed you about the design and hypotheses of the research, we remind you that have the opportunity to withdraw your responses from the study without any loss of credit or other penalty. If you no longer agree to let us include your responses in the analyses and results of our research, then you can inform us now by checking the box below, and we will delete your responses completely without any penalty to you (i.e., you will still receive payment for participation). Otherwise, we will include your anonymous responses with other anonymous responses in the analyses and reporting of this research.

If you have any questions or concerns about the study, please do not hesitate to contact Dr. Glenn Adams (adamsg@ku.edu) or Pegah Naemi (pnaemi@ku.edu). Again, thank you very much for your participation.

Glenn Adams, Ph.D.   Pegah Naemi, M.A.
adamsg@ku.edu   pnaemi@ku.edu

At this time, you have the option of withdrawing your responses. Please select the option below to indicate your permission to let us include your responses in our analyses or to indicate your wish to withdraw your responses. Regardless of your choice, you will receive information on the next page regarding the completion code to receive payment.

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_____I wish to WITHDRAW my responses, and I do NOT want the researchers to include them in the analyses and results of the research.