

**A STUDY OF THE MEANING OF DEMOCRACY AND OF ITS
SALIENT IMPLICATIONS FOR TEACHING**

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CHAPTER ONE

CHAPTER I

THE PROBLEM, ITS JUSTIFICATION AND IMPORTANCE

The Purpose Of The Study

For many years difference of opinion has existed among American educators regarding the meaning of democracy and democratic education. Disagreement, instead of residing in closely-knit, opposing schools of thought, is characterized by indefiniteness and variety of interpretation. Certain of these interpretations appear to stem from historical theories and practices of democracy. Others originate from numerous and varied modern theories and practices of government.

The purpose of the study, therefore, is (1) to compare historical and modern theories and practices of democracy; (2) to compare modern theories and practices with those of alternative forms of socio-governmental organization; (3) to determine whether there are any definite, fundamental principles which distinguish modern democracy from historical interpretations or from alternative present-day socio-governmental forms; and, if so, (4) to define some of these principles with reference to democratic education.

Justification Of The Study

Justification of such a study resides in the circumstance that, although American educators are in rather complete agreement that educational programs in the United

States should be founded on principles of democracy, there is little, if any, general agreement among educators regarding the nature of democracy and its implications for education.

The term "democratic education" became popular in the United States during the third decade of the present century. Before that time it was mentioned but rarely in educational literature, and then only to indicate universal education. The assumption seemingly was entertained that, if schools were provided for all American children and if all children were in attendance, democratic education would be a reality. However, during and since the 1930's, there have been but few books written on the subject of American education which have not made at least some reference to democratic methods of conducting schools.

Observation of the present situation, however, indicates that educators encounter difficulty when they attempt to explain what they mean by democracy and democratic education in the methodological sense of the terms. Moreover, those who make the attempt to explain democracy and its function in the schools find themselves in serious disagreement concerning what constitute vital characteristics of democracy and democratic education. As a probable result of such disagreement, charges frequently are made that democracy -- as in case of "fusion," "correlation," and other such terms which have come and gone in educational usage -- has become nothing more than a popular mouthing, either

meaning nothing at all or meaning a great variety of things. A more serious charge is that the mouthing of democracy and of democratic education has become a device for masking ideas and practices which decidedly are not democratic.

Finally, a question has arisen regarding how much democracy is really desired in nation and schools. It sometimes is contended that the American people must conduct their affairs democratically "as far as possible," and that American educators must make the school program function democratically "as far as is feasible." The inference appears to be that democracy is to be desired up to a certain point but, beyond that, it becomes impracticable if not evil.

Of writers concerned with curriculum development, Albery has found but " . . . little disagreement with the general thesis that the philosophy of the secondary school should be based upon the democratic way of life." (1) Adams states that " . . . methods of teaching should, first of all, be democratic." (2) Leonard points out that "the curriculum worker . . . must draw upon [sources of subject matter] with a new central focus in mind, the focus of the emerging democratic citizen." (3) Stratmeyer, Forkner, McKim, and associates ostensibly base an entire volume on the educational aims and procedures required in a democracy. (4)

The Association of Supervision and Curriculum Development (5), the Department of Supervisors and Directors of Instruction (6), and the National Council for the Social

Studies (7) all embrace democracy as the basis for American educational programs. The same position is taken by the Advisory Commission on Education (8), the American Association of Teachers Colleges (9), and the President's Commission on Higher Education. (10)

The Progressive Education Association emphasized at considerable length the role of democracy in education with reference to teaching mathematics (11), science (12), English (13), and the social studies. (14) The Commission of the Progressive Education Association on the Relation of School and College reported that ". . . the objectives of the schools [of the Eight-year Study] show general agreement that the educational program must . . . seek to preserve and extend democracy as a way of life." [Italics in original] (15) The Educational Policies Commission devotes several volumes to the role of democracy in American education (16) and a committee of the North Central Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools devotes the first chapter of a book to the proposition that "America must have genuinely democratic high schools." (17)

Other groups, among many which emphasize democracy in educational programs, include The Commission on Teacher Education (18), The John Dewey Society (19), The American Association of School Administrators (20), and the National Society for the Study of Education. (21)

Thus, an array of educational leaders and educational groups advocating democracy in the schools becomes evident.

In fact, there appears to be no educator who has advocated autocracy, per se, as the basis for education in the United States. Investigation, moreover, reveals no pronouncement overtly advocating education based on anarchy.

Disagreement, however, is widespread concerning the direction democratic education should take. Albery observes that, although "there is little disagreement with the general thesis that the philosophy of the secondary school should be based upon the democratic way of life, difficulties arise when we try to agree upon the precise implications of democracy for the program" (22) In another instance, he states that "it must be recognized at the outset that there are few basic principles upon which those who seek to interpret democracy wholly agree." (23) Lull (24), among other individuals, and the National Society for the Study of Education (25), among other organizations, make essentially the same emphasis.

Such indications of diverse outlook would seem to raise important questions. It becomes understandable how doubt has arisen whether educators are really serious about democracy in education. Bining, Mohr, and McFeely observe that "discussions of democracy frequently resolve themselves into little other than words, platitudes, and meaningless phrases." (26) Such a statement becomes all the more significant, perhaps, in view of the fact that, after it is made, the authors of the statement appear to shed but little light on the meaning of democracy and its implications for education.

Spears warns that democratic mouthings " . . . have a sweet, satisfying effect [but that such words] demand something more than lip service from education, for in their general way they are likewise used in the addresses of the leaders of totalitarian states." (27)

Caswell appears to believe that educators are hedging. He contends that:

We either believe whole-heartedly in our system of public education as a fundamental democratic institution, or we do not. If we do, we need to throw all of our strength and resources into helping it reach its greatest potentialities; if we do not, we need to face realistically the fact that we should devise other systems to educate youth. (28)

Lindeman takes a similar view with reference to the national scene when he states that:

Democracy, like all other good ideas, may be drowned in words. In fact, the flood of words which American apologists of democracy have already let loose gives cause for suspicion. If we really believed in democracy as deeply as we insist, it would not be necessary to talk so much about its virtues. He who protests too loudly is usually attempting to conceal something. With respect to democracy it is my conviction that many of its contemporary spokesmen speak so loudly because they are aware that their behavior does not conform with their protestations. (29)

Of the educators who qualify their espousals of democratic education with such terms as "as far as possible," Mursell (30) is typical. Teachers, according to this view, must provide for pupil choice in matters of belief "as far as possible." Such qualifications appear to apply to pupil

conduct as well. The pupil, it seems, should be allowed both to think and to do as he pleases as far as the teacher can permit it. Just how far this is, in either case, is never made clear. But the likelihood is that "as far as possible" will not be the same for all teachers and that such qualifying phrases will serve merely to leave the door open for anything, provided only that it is labeled democratic. In any case, the inference persists that too much democracy may be a bad thing.

Thus, it appears that, although most if not all of the American educational profession is in verbal agreement that education in the United States should be founded upon principles of democracy, the extent to which these democratic principles should be employed and what exactly constitute the principles are not made clear. The word democracy is acceptable in virtually all quarters. But what of the meaning underlying the word?

Faculty psychology, as embraced by Plato and Aristotle, as adopted by education under the sponsorship and domination of Scholasticism and the Medieval Church, and as carried into the Colonial Massachusetts schools by the Puritans under Calvinistic and Lutheran influences, placed chief emphasis upon words instead of their meanings. It was assumed that the use of "right" or "good" words would rather automatically call up right or good ideas. Thus, the educational practice, as implied in the underlying assumptions of faculty psychology, was based largely upon verbalization -- use of words

without consideration of their meanings. But, in spite of the seeming inclination of the American educational profession to employ the term "democracy" without clear formulation of its commitments, it is scarcely to be doubted that but few present-day educators would do other than decry verbalization. The question, then, is what democracy should be taken to mean. If maximal progress is to be made in working out a genuinely democratic educational program, first consideration should be to clarify the meaning of democracy and to determine how it differs, if it does, from alternative ideologies. Moreover, a configurational approach, regarded as valid by many educators, would also indicate the necessity, if clear understandings regarding its meaning are to be achieved, of determining what democracy is not as well as what it is. In other words, if educators are to secure solid footing for devising educational programs in terms of democratic principles, it would appear to be advantageous to understand what to avoid in educational practice as well as what to adopt.

However, it has been suggested, and it is not inconceivable, that democracy may represent some quality or quantity which cannot be described or measured. If, as sometimes appears to be the case, democracy means nothing in particular because it means everything in general, democracy may not in fact be amenable to definition. If such should prove to be the case, a study which made this clear would nonetheless be worth while because it would enable educators

and others to re-direct attention to other matters -- matters which show promise of becoming fruitful in formulating bases for national life and for educational programs. Such a study would contribute to clearer understanding by a process of elimination. It would narrow the field of possibilities to be considered.

There seems to be good reason, however, to suppose that democracy can be defined. Frequently it is contended that democratic America affords a pattern for individual and group living on a basis decidedly different from that of certain other ideologies. It is contended that peoples within the orbit of certain other ideologies live in subjugation, whereas the people of democratic America are privileged to lead lives of their own choosing. If such be the case, democracy may be expected to represent certain features which are decidedly different from those of other ideologies. By examining the features of various ideologies, democracy might be given a definition which would contrast it clearly with alternatives. Such a definition should suggest educational practices distinctly different from those based on the alternatives.

Importance Of The Study

A study which would contribute to clearer understandings of democracy should be salutary both within and without the field of education. After having participated in two World Wars ostensibly for the purpose of maintaining and

furthering democratic ideals and institutions and now being faced with the possibility of a third, the observation still seems appropriate that it is "doubtful whether the American people were ever so lacking in a sense of direction." (31) If education is to assist in gaining a sense of direction, clarification of the meaning of democracy and of democratic education seems to be urgently needed. As the Educational Policies Commission has pointed out, inasmuch as the history of mankind shows "that free men again and again have lost their liberties simply because they did not know the consequences of the choices . . . [being made or accepted, democracy more than any other social system] must make provision for the enlightenment of the people . . . or [it must] perish." (32)

Hook appears to be on solid ground when he contends that:

The ways of belief . . . are important. It is no exaggeration to maintain that there are few things in our time which are more important in their bearing upon questions of social survival. For in the field of social and political behavior, errors in belief are costlier than anywhere else. This is a lesson which has not yet been sufficiently learned in America despite the evidence for it piling up all over the world Today, whether an individual is aware of it or not, he is staking his head -- and the heads of others -- on his ideas. They are loaded and can no longer be safely fooled with. In a world where everyone must be armed with ideas, it is well to look to our weapons. (33)

And, as the American people were cautioned by Benes who might be regarded to have known from bitter experience whereof he spoke:

One must have . . . a right conception of democracy as theory and one must have the courage to put these theories into practice rightly, justly, and courageously. Otherwise all these great words about democracy are but vain words, nothing but words intended to cover the most vulgar, egoistic interests of ruling classes, parties, and individuals.
[Italics in original] (34)

Before a democracy can flourish and defend itself intelligently against external and internal enemies, it would seem that a people must have a clear conception of the meaning of democracy and what it implies for practice, both in national and in educational situations. There are indications that the American people are not entirely clear on the matter. Widespread differences of opinion within the profession indicate that American educators are none too well grounded as regards the meaning of democracy or of democratic education.

Summary

In view of seeming confusion regarding the meaning of democracy and of democratic education and in view of the evident importance of clear understanding regarding them, an attempt will be made to determine whether there are definite, fundamental principles for education to be derived from the theory and practice of democracy and, if

so, to define some of these principles with reference to various historical and twentieth-century theories and practices of democracy. In order first to determine wherein the difficulty lies, some of the conflicting interpretations of democracy on the American scene will be examined in the next chapter.

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CHAPTER TWO

CHAPTER II

SOME CONFLICTING INTERPRETATIONS OF DEMOCRACY

Ambiguity Concerning The Meaning Of Democracy
And The Extent To Which It Should Be Applied
In National And Educational Programs

De Huszar's observation that the American people are not clear in their thinking regarding the meaning of democracy parallels indications noted in the first chapter that confusion and differences of opinion exist in both lay and educational circles regarding the matter. De Huszar observes that:

Anyone speaking on the problem of democracy today finds his audience eager, interested, but bewildered. Again and again I have been asked the same questions by different types of groups all over the country: "What is a democracy? Do we really have one here in the United States? And how about the English? Surely they cannot have a true democracy since they have a king?" (1)

However, as often is the case, recognition that democracy is not well understood is not always followed by clarification of the problem. De Huszar's point becomes all the more significant for the purposes of this study when it becomes evident that his readers may be virtually as bewildered about the meaning of democracy after reading his book as before. He gets about as close as he ever gets to clarification when he states that democracy should lie somewhere between oppression and license. Inasmuch as oppression and

license are relative terms which may be given widely differing interpretations, De Huszar appears to arrive no closer to a solution of the problem than those authors who, when discussing the educational scene, proclaim that teachers need to be democratic in the classroom "as far as possible."

Democracy As Freedom And Liberty
As Opposed To Interpretations Requiring Respect
For Authority, Law, And Order

In spite of inability or reticence on the part of persons in and out of classrooms to make a clear commitment on the meaning of democracy, many will volunteer that democracy means freedom. This notion is so widely entertained that the terms "democratic peoples" and "free peoples" have virtually come to be employed synonymously. The feeling seems to exist that Americans, with democracy, are a free people who enjoy liberty, whereas peoples of dictatorships are not free and have no liberty. Assuming that democracy does mean freedom and liberty, what may freedom and liberty be taken to mean? Freedom to do what? Liberty to act in what ways? Is it to be assumed, for example, that any infringement on personal liberty is undemocratic? Are peoples of democracies at liberty to break laws? Are not laws of any kind actual limitations on personal freedom? Are all laws then undemocratic? Is this what writers mean when they contend that democracy must be practiced "as far as possible"? Must a line always

be drawn somewhere, invoking undemocratic restrictions on personal liberty? Is this the point where democracy must stop being democratic?

Hinman, on the other hand, believes that respect for law and authority is a prime requisite of democracy, not the antithesis of it. He maintains that "one of the first principles of democracy is to respect law and order and those in authority." (2) But does such a pronouncement clarify the matter? The German people, for example, are reputed to be eminent as regards respect for law and authority. Regardless whether there is any basis of truth in the claim, it is contended that the German people excel in this respect whereas the American people manifest grave shortcomings. However that may be, the Nazi Germans appear to have fulfilled fully the requirement "to respect law and order and those in authority" set forth by Hinman. Yet, from the American point of view the German people under Adolf Hitler respected authority in a way that the American people held in high contempt. If respect for authority is taken as the criterion, who were more democratic, the Americans or the Germans?

Hinman continues by contending that:

. . . . We failed [in child-centered schools to instill] our pupils [with] respect [for] law; they didn't respect authority. We should have taught them to obey laws, to respect authority, and to act occasionally without a question. We do that in life. An ideal [educational] program needs to employ some discipline or formality. (3)

But here again, such advocacy does not indicate the occasions on which school children should obey rules or respect authority and those on which they should act without question. It is not unlikely that Goebbels would have been happy with a pronouncement such as Hinman's. Hence, did Hinman really say what he meant?

Although certain child-centered schools may have been undemocratic -- though Hinman does not reveal why or under what conditions lack of respect for order and authority is undemocratic, if it is --, Hinman's pronouncements do not set principles of democratic education clearly apart from those acceptable in a dictator nation. If principles of democracy and democratic education may be applied also to autocracy and to autocratic education, and vice versa, there would be no essential difference between democracy and autocracy, at least as they affect national and educational programs. If such be the case, American educators would appear to be wasting their time with the subject. If such be not the case, it would seem that, in pronouncements such as those above, crucial aspects of difference have not been fully clarified.

In light of the foregoing difficulties, the issue becomes more confused than ever. The question centers around matters such as freedom to do what? when? and under what circumstances? Are Americans free to maltreat Jews as did the Nazis? Are Americans free to deliver their personal enemies into the hands of a secret police, to prison,

and to death without trial? Are such freedoms permitted in the United States? If not, is it not evident that the Nazis were more free in some respects than are Americans? Is it to be assumed, then, that Nazi Germany was more democratic than the United States?

Freedoms Of Speech, Press, And Assembly

As Opposed To

Democratic Restrictions On Speech, Press, And Assembly

Freedom of speech is another quality frequently associated with democracy. Educational and lay publications, college classes, and the general public contend, almost without exception, that freedom of speech is essential to democracy. Such, apparently, is what college and university professors have in mind when they insist upon "academic freedom." It appears also to be what writers and publishers have in mind when they defend freedom of the press. To the man on the street, freedom of speech means the right "to speak his mind" whenever and wherever he pleases. If other such representative groups are to be included, as clergymen and producers of radio or motion picture programs, freedom of speech may be taken to mean freedom of both written and oral communication. Freedom of assembly, another feature generally associated with democracy, is considered as a more or less necessary concomitant of freedom of speech.

If freedom of speech and freedom of assembly are what is to be meant by democracy, is it to be assumed that any and all exceptions thereto are undemocratic? According to some educators, such is the case. Under the heading, "THE CHARACTERISTICS OF DEMOCRACY IN AMERICAN LIFE AND EDUCATION," Wrightstone and Campbell list, among other "ideals and practices," "Freedom of Speech . . . freedom of the press . . . [and] freedom of assembly" (4)

May it be assumed, then, that an individual is to have the right -- the freedom of speech -- to shout "Fire!" in a crowded public theatre when no such hazard exists? Perhaps it will be felt that raising such a question is begging the point -- that times, places, and circumstances make a difference. However, it may not be amiss to ask whether it is lack of consideration of just such extenuating or exceptional circumstances which confuses the issue. If circumstances alter cases, it would seem that such possibilities should be recognized. If the welfare and safety of the public are considered under certain circumstances to be more important than freedom of speech, it would seem to make matters less confusing, not more, to say so. And, if democracy is to be defined clearly, it would seem that all extenuating circumstances should be indicated clearly.

Freedom of speech and freedom of the press, when claimed as integral features of democracy, also raise questions regarding military censorship in times of war, preservation of "atomic security," and other matters having to do with national security. The United States has laws forbidding

incitation to insurrection. Are such regulations democratic, or do they represent situations in which democracy, of necessity, must be undemocratic? Logically, one might wonder whether the Smith Act, making it illegal to conspire to teach and advocate the overthrow of the United States Government by force and violence, does not represent an abridgment of democratic freedom. It certainly is a limitation on freedom of speech. The American people take for granted laws prohibiting libel and slander. How is it that, at the same time, they take for granted freedom of speech and freedom of the press without qualifications? This investigator has noted college classes in which, if these two seemingly conflicting ideas are discussed on different days, students will contend that the American Way of Life is exemplified in both cases and that the American Way represents the democratic way. Such outlooks encompass conflicting aspects, to say the least.

The handmaiden of freedom of speech -- freedom of assembly -- also appears to clash with certain American laws affecting public gatherings. As long as permits have to be issued for such gatherings, some individual or group must issue them. How then, can freedom of assembly be claimed as inviolable (unless, of course, one wishes to deny the existence of democracy) when certain persons have the power to refuse it? Public safety and traffic regulations are claimed under certain conditions to take precedence over

freedom of assembly. If, however, such circumstances do, in fact, constitute a democratically valid reason for restricting public gatherings, it would appear that a need exists to determine the nature of such circumstances and the criteria for their determination.

Conflicting Arguments Concerning Freedom Of Worship
As A Principle Of Democracy

Freedom of worship -- as in case of freedom of speech, press, and assembly -- receives much attention in discussions of democracy. The American public hears on every hand -- from pulpit, radio, and political rostrum -- about the American democratic heritage of freedom of worship. Religious agencies frequently castigate dictator-nations for their lack of godliness and for their suppression of religious freedom. The impression is conveyed that democracy and religion go hand in hand and that dictatorship is a governmental counterpart of spiritual godlessness. Wrightstone and Campbell, cited before in connection with freedom of speech and freedom of assembly, list freedom of worship seventh under basic characteristics of democracy in American life and education. (5) Spears also includes "free worship" as a basic feature of American democracy. (6)

This close relationship between religious freedom and democracy in the thinking of the American people appears to have originated in part, at least, from an idea, fostered no

less by American school textbooks than by other sources, that the Massachusetts Bay Puritans came to America to achieve religious freedom and that it was they who contributed largely to the "democratic heritage of freedom of worship" in the United States. In the interest of accuracy, however, such an idea requires close scrutiny.

That the Puritans came to America for religious freedom is true as far as it goes. But the inference persists that these Colonial forbears established freedom of worship, thereby making freedom of worship a necessary concomitant of democracy. Perusal of historical accounts, however, indicates that, although the Massachusetts Bay Puritans may have come to America for religious freedom, they had no intention whatever of granting that freedom to dissident members within or without their own group. Seemingly, it was not to dictatorial religious absolutism that the Puritans objected. They objected rather to a circumstance in Europe in which opposing religious absolutists outweighed and discriminated against the particular brand of religious absolutism embraced by the Puritans. Moreover, it appears that separation of state (and education) from religion, accredited largely to the Puritans, was not the intention of these people but rather, as far as they were concerned, occurred quite by accident.*

*

The Massachusetts Bay Puritans placed religious matters under control of the church fathers and municipal matters, including education, in the hands of the town fathers or selectmen. However, inasmuch as the churchmen and the

Nonetheless, interpretations (or misinterpretations) placed upon early American outlook regarding religion appear to confuse the role of religion today where democracy is concerned. The entire matter in the thinking of many Americans today reduces itself to an a priori assumption that democracy and religious freedom necessarily are closely allied, an emphasis which easily transfers to an assumed alliance between anything of a religious nature and democracy.

There may be justification, however, for wondering whether religion may not become just as dictatorial as any governmental dictatorship. The history of the East, of Europe, and of early America indicates that it may and many times has. Thus, in cases where religious groups clash with governmental authority, the conflict easily may become one between two dictatorial interests rather than, as frequently supposed, between democratic-religious and dictatorial-antireligious combinations. Assumptions regarding the kinship of religion and democracy appear to supply justification, at times, for countenancing as democratic the most dictatorial of practices, merely because they occur in the name of religion. The off-

selectmen were intentionally one and the same group of men for the most part, it appears that the Puritans had no idea of separating daily affairs or education from religious domination. It was not until later, when church and municipal governmental groups grew apart in their membership and views, that religious matters became separated from civil and educational matters. In this sense, it appears that separation occurred by accident rather than by design.

shoot of the matter seems to be that one scarcely dares to question publicly any matter having religious endorsement for fear of being branded godless, therefore undemocratic.

Aside from the foregoing, examination of modern practices in America and in other nominally democratic nations cast serious doubt on the tenability of claims that democracy implies religious freedom -- complete religious freedom, at least. Historical accounts indicate, for example, that the Mormons were required to discontinue practices of plural marriage. It may be argued that polygamy did not derive from a valid religious belief. But whether any religious belief is valid or not would seem to depend necessarily upon the opinion of those who so believe, such matters seemingly not being amenable to demonstrable proof or disproof. It would seem that, in any case, either (a) no religious connection must be assumed in the matter, or (b) the United States was acting in an undemocratic manner, or (c) there is no necessary relationship between complete freedom of worship and democracy.

Certain cults in the United States, moreover, have been forbidden by regulation to handle poisonous snakes in religious ceremonies. On the other hand, conscientious objection to combat duty in the armed services of the United States, stemming from religious affiliations, has been recognized as sufficient cause for excuse from combat duty. One might wonder, however, whether such provision might not be reversed

if and when the Congress of the United States so desires. Would repeal of such a condition be undemocratic? Is it undemocratic to prohibit snake cultists from handling venomous snakes? Or do such matters have no bearing upon the problem of democracy?

The Encyclopedia Americana states that "there is complete religious liberty in Switzerland" (7) and, yet, that "the order of the Jesuits is not allowed within the confederation." (8) The two statements appear to be mutually incompatible. Surely it may be assumed that the order of the Jesuits is religious. Americana further relates that ". . . [in Switzerland] the ecclesiastical authorities [are now] completely subjected to the civil power; and primary education is made . . . secular." (9) Thus, a question arises as to what one should conclude as regards democracy. Is it to be assumed that the banning of Jesuit orders within the confines of Switzerland marks that country as undemocratic -- in that respect at least? Does inclusion of ecclesiastical authorities under civil power constitute an undemocratic condition?

Liberty, Equality, And Fraternity And Inalienable Rights
To Life, Liberty, And The Pursuit Of Happiness
As Indices To Democracy

Another frequent claim is that democracy is closely associated not only with freedom but also with equality and fraternity. The French Revolutionary slogan, "liberty,

equality, fraternity," often is encountered in both oral and written discussions of democracy. The American Declaration of Independence is also cited. It is contended that the meaning of democracy may be found in the proposition that ". . . all men are created free and equal . . . [and possess] unalienable* rights . . . [to] life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." To these rights, the French Rights of Man add "the right to property." (10) (11) In these connections, it is frequently contended that an index into the meaning of democracy may be found in the proposition, even though admittedly false, that one man is as good as another, often spoken of as equalitarianism. Likewise, protestations of democratic leanings based on willingness to associate with the "common man" appear to be accompanied, implicitly at least, by assumptions of uncommonness on the part of the one proffering the association.

Thus, more words and phrases which are claimed to represent the essence of democracy come into the picture. If democratic theorists are charitable, they call them watchwords of democracy; if not, they call them catchwords. Used, as they frequently are, largely in isolation and without further elaboration, the question is: What do these terms mean? All of the previously raised questions apply here.

* "Unalienable" was the original spelling employed in the Declaration of Independence. Many sources now modernize the spelling to "inalienable." Henceforth in the investigation the modernized spelling is used.

Are, for example, the American people free to violate laws as they see fit? If not, do any and all laws represent undemocratic impositions on personal freedom? Is it to be assumed that, because of invoking restrictions on personal liberty, the United States is not a democratic nation? On the other hand, if the role of liberty is to acquire clear meaning with reference to democracy, perhaps reinterpretations of freedom are in order.

As regards " . . . inalienable rights . . . [to] life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," one may wonder whether the democratic right to live applies to criminals sentenced to death. If so, it would seem that laws requiring capital punishment are undemocratic. Or, if such criminals are not to have the "inalienable right" to life, it might be asked what the democratic conditions are which abrogate such a right.

Does a member of the armed services of the United States have the right to disregard orders of a commanding officer if death seems imminent in connection with carrying out the orders? Are persons committed to American penal institutions entitled to liberty? Is it to be assumed that any penal system is undemocratic?

Concerning the pursuit of happiness, frequently claimed as a principle of democracy, one feels compelled to ask whether it makes any difference what makes a person happy. Does it make any difference what a person pursues? Is it to be assumed that it is undemocratic to restrict a person from pursuing just anything -- or perhaps anyone -- which

gives him pleasure?

The Founding Fathers proclaimed that all men are created equal, and the claim frequently is incorporated in descriptions of democracy. But, judging from even casual observation, there is much doubt in the matter. Moreover, psychological and physiological experimental evidence points overwhelmingly to an opposite condition. Must the assumption of individual differences, then, be abandoned in order to hold to democracy? Must democracy be abandoned because the principles claimed for it run counter to experimental evidence regarding the psychological and physiological inequalities of man? Or is it possible that such interpretations of equality are imperfectly, if not erroneously, descriptive of democracy? Is it wise to take equalitarianism in this sense as the meaning of democracy? Equality, in the regimentative sense of the word, appears to resemble the very feature which ardent democrats so frequently criticize about dictator-nations.*

As regards the proposition that no one is any better than anyone else, it is hardly to be assumed that a person who behaves himself is no better than one who does not, that honor is no better than infamy, or that industriousness is not better than sloth. What, then, becomes the criterion re-

* No claim is made regarding what the Founders of American Independence may have meant by the term, "equality." Regardless what they may have meant, the term frequently is employed without elaboration today to describe democracy.

garding these questions in a democracy? How does democracy differ in these respects, if it does, from alternative forms of socio-governmental organization?

It sometimes is claimed that a person of wealth is no better than one in dire financial straits. Presumably there is no reason why a poor man may not be just as good as a wealthy man -- the less fortunate one may be better for that matter --, but it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the one lives better than the other. What is to be concluded? Is it to be assumed that it is undemocratic for one person to live under better financial circumstances than another? Or does the matter require reinterpretation?

As regards fraternity and democracy, one is reminded of the frequent American rejoinder to the salutation, "Brother," which takes the form, "I am not your brother!" Facetiously employed as the American expression may be, Metternich appears not to have been joking when, with reference to democratic fraternity in the nation where the word originated, he is reported to have observed that, "If I lived in France, I would prefer to have cousins rather than brothers." (12)

Thus again, there seems to be doubt that a term (fraternity in this case) employed to define democracy is truly descriptive of it. Else it would seem that democracy is very imperfectly implemented. Is it to be supposed that fraternity is a necessary feature of democracy? Is one to believe that a person may not discriminate in his associations and remain democratic? Or does the term actually have little, if anything,

to do with essential characteristics of democracy?

Self-evident, Divinely Ordained Rights Opposed To
Rights Which Are Created And Allowed By The State

The American Declaration of Independence prefaces the assumption that "all men are created free and equal" and the assumption of "inalienable rights [to] life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" with the proposition that "we hold these truths to be self-evident." Yet, Follett questions that such rights can reasonably be considered self-evident and believes that, instead of looking to rights showered from heaven, it would be more profitable to direct efforts toward "creating all the rights we shall ever have." (13) Hudson reminds his readers that another way men have used to defend rights is to appeal to long established custom. (14) However, it would seem that man might work to his own disservice if he should call upon such a source, inasmuch as custom and tradition historically have deprived man of his liberties rather than grant them. Hudson also refers to the practice of discovering rights by referring to an original state of nature. "Why," though, he asks, "is an original state of nature any more authoritative than any later state . . . into which man has developed? Is there any sanctity," he asks, "in earlier versus later? Aren't the later states of development just as 'natural' as the earlier" [Italics in original]

(15)

Looking upon rights as Divinely ordained -- that "all men are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights" -- Hudson wonders " . . . how . . . one [is] to discover just what rights God is supposed to have given us?"

(16)

Hudson appears to have a strong counter-argument against those who would claim certain self-evident characteristics for democracy when he states that:

Those who have believed that the equality of the worth of all men is guaranteed by self-evidence have been earnestly opposed by those who believed in the self-evidence of a natural inequality -- a self-evident aristocracy of worth. You may deny as much as you please that one or the other of these positions is actually self-evident; but if your denial is all that you have to offer, you will be met by some one who is sure that his own denial of your position is equally valid and self-evident. (17)

Aside from the fruitlessness of such an approach, it would seem that self-evident justification of any premise becomes risky in that such an approach lends itself as readily, if not more so, to autocracy as to democracy. For centuries absolute monarchs have defended their right to rule on the basis of Divine Right, taken to be self-evident. The Nazis also supported several of their dogmas on the basis of self-evidence, included among which was the "self-evident inferiority" of the Jew and the "self-evident superiority" of the Aryan-German race. One wonders if the "inalienable," "self-evident," "Creator-entitled" rights, of which the Founding Fathers wrote, were not rather the kind

of rights which they, themselves, regarded as advantageous for establishing the kind of society which they desired. It is difficult to imagine that those rights would have been inalienable had the British won the War. It is not easy to believe that George III regarded those rights as self-evident. If God bestowed them, the British came very close to nullifying God's bestowal.*

Hudson's conclusion in the matter is that:

We have exactly such rights as the State gives us. [italics in original] And, since the State commonly expresses its will through law, this position is usually taken to mean that man has no rights whatever except those which the law actually grants him. If the law gives him the right to property, he has it, and in such mode as the law decrees; if the law does not, he has not -- and that is all there is to it.** Positive law is the real source of all our rights. All else is vain speculation. (18)

Thus, further conflicts become evident in the interpretation of democracy. Interpretations of democratic rights vary all the way from those based on Divine Ordination, self-evident truth, the original state of nature, and usage or custom, to the rights which, it is claimed, man formulates and secures for himself through the medium of the state. Al-

* Metaphysical interpretations sometimes hold that rights are self-evident and provided by God whether man is able to exercise them or not.

** Wrightstone and Campbell include "the right to property" among the features and characteristics which they list for democracy, basing this inclusion, presumably, on the right to property proclaimed in the French Rights of Man. (11)

though Hudson's contention, that man has precisely those rights which the state allows him, seems reasonable, solution of the problem of what constitutes democracy appears to be little nearer than before. If, as Hudson contends, man has only those rights which the state allows him, what would represent a democratic state and how would it differ from undemocratic states?

Democracy As The American Way Of Life:

The American Heritage

In addition to the foregoing, an impression frequently is voiced in the United States that the meaning of democracy is to be found in the "American Way of Life." Apparently, one of the most serious charges which can be made, in the eyes of many Americans, is that a proposition, or the person suggesting it, is un-American. Implicit, if not explicit, in such an accusation seems to be that, if a proposition is un-American, then it is undemocratic. Thus, in the thinking of many persons, the terms un-American and undemocratic have acquired essentially the same connotation.

Closely associated with this logic is an assumption that "the American heritage" is the criterion of Americanism; hence, of democracy. Early American leaders such as Thomas Jefferson and John Adams are mentioned frequently as representing the essence of Americanism, hence of democracy. American tradition, then, -- the things that used to be -- becomes the basis for judging democracy. For this

reason, the Constitution of the United States tends to be regarded as sacrosanct. Any hint of change in the way in which government is to be conducted is many times accompanied by misgivings bordering on feelings of betrayal of the Founding Fathers. A notion seems to prevail that the Founding Fathers reached the acme of democratic thought, leaving to the present an American heritage not to be questioned. Free enterprise, for example, appears to have been the order of their day. Hence, suggestions today for economic controls and other extensions of governmental supervision become suspect as un-American, hence undemocratic. Socialism is taken to mean something very close to, if not identical with, autocracy, and governmental controls are widely regarded as unavoidably totalitarian or dictatorial.

But are such interpretations or inferences valid? Is it justifiable to assume that free enterprise represents the essence of democracy, and governmental control its anti-thesis? Does the phrase, American Way of Life, become a means of clarifying democracy or does it serve rather to confuse? Is it to be assumed that the American Way of Life has been the same during all periods of American history? Was it then, or is it now, democratic? Are the problems it presumably was designed to solve in the last decades of the eighteenth century the same as in the nineteenth century or as today? What does the American Way of Life mean? And, determining that, is that what is meant by democracy?

Is it to be assumed that American governmental machinery as it now stands (or as it has stood) furnishes the index to Americanism and democracy? Is democracy irrevocably tied to three branches of government and the principle of checks and balances? Is the Supreme Court a necessary institution of democracy? These matters presumably represent the American Way. Do they represent democracy?

What may be deduced regarding a constitution? Must a nation in order to be democratic have a written federal constitution? Is Britain undemocratic because she does not have one? Is it undemocratic to make changes in the Constitution? Was the United States undemocratic in the past when doing so? Is it democratic for the Senate to kill a bill passed favorably by the House of Representatives -- representatives of the American people? Is the president's veto power a necessary adjunct of democracy?

What may be believed regarding such early American leaders as Thomas Jefferson and John Adams? Did the views which they entertained constitute the essence of democratic outlook? Is it to be assumed that the principles which even such revered leaders held are the last word on democracy? The Democratic Party carries the name given it by Jefferson, to indicate presumably that it follows his principles and that his principles represent the true meaning of democracy. Yet Sait, among others, contends that Jefferson, as well as certain of his contemporaries, despised democracy. (19)

What is to be made of such contradictions?

Jefferson and Adams wrote of "government by consent." Is it to be assumed, then, that the meaning of democracy is to be found in this phrase? Merriam thinks not. He states that:

Even in the Middle Ages it had been generally agreed that government rests theoretically upon the consent of the governed, but practically the implications of this brave theory were very slight. The person might actually be a serf or a slave, or be entirely ignored in political decisions, or confined to a very narrow range of them.

The earlier democracies themselves strictly limited the number of eligibles, without serious challenge in many cases. The area of general participation came later and slowly. (20)

Sait concurs in Merriam's view concerning the matter when calling attention to the circumstance that:

No doubt the proposition would hold good that in the past all governments, even those despotic in form, have rested on the consent of the governed, even though that consent may have been merely passive and based on superstition or the habit of obedience (21)

Sait's statement seems to indicate that custom and tradition may work at cross purposes with democracy. If Mulhern's understanding of primitive societies may be relied upon (22) -- and other writers agree essentially with his views -- primitive man, although outwardly seeming to conduct tribal affairs democratically, is not the unfettered being that Rousseau imagined him. Actually the beliefs and customs of a primitive group, according to Mulhern, restrict individual liberty on every side, causing people to become

slaves to social tradition and religious power. So conservative is the force of primitive belief and custom that primitive peoples appear to be blind to the potentialities of their frequently very rich environments, their enslavement to beliefs and traditions contributing to arrested development.* Mulhern relates, moreover, that the basic effect of primitive education is to preserve tribal beliefs and traditions, not a thought being given to change or improvement.

Presumably the influence of a few nonconformists was felt somewhere along the way between a primitive state of culture and that of the American Founders. Evidently some persons fell from grace, broke with tradition, and did something which led to advancement. However, assumptions that ultimate democratic perfection was attained by the Founding Fathers or that tradition based on their culture should go forever unquestioned would seem not to differ in effect from primitive outlook. The traditions themselves would differ, but not the penchant for unquestioning acceptance and perpetuation of tradition.

Thus, it would appear that tradition, when regarded as sacrosanct, could exert enslaving influences as well as dictators. There would seem to be a question whether it is justifiable to associate democracy with any kind of enslave-

* Dewey makes essentially the same point in Democracy and Education. (23)

ment -- whether by tradition or by despots.

Hence, is it to be assumed that democracy represents a static something to be perpetuated in certain unchanging outlooks and ways of doing things? Or, may it be assumed that the American heritage, when employed to dictate present national policy, is a feature which surreptitiously has crept into the national thinking in the name of democracy? In short, is it to be assumed that the so-called American heritage, so widely revered and often indoctrinated in the schools, may actually work to the detriment of democracy? Or should it be thought that the meaning of democracy is to be found in the American heritage?

What is to be concluded regarding free enterprise, capitalism, socialism, and other such matters? Is one of these economic outlooks representative of democracy to the exclusion of the others? If so, which one? Is it to be assumed that governmental control of any kind represents the antithesis of democracy? Or, is it to be assumed that an extensively planned society is a prime requisite of democracy? In view of her keeping a royal family, may Britain be regarded as being a democratic nation? If so, did Britain lose democracy when embracing socialism after World War II? Were the nominally democratic Australasian nations actually democratic during periods of their seeming socialistic economies, or did the logic of such affiliation represent something other than democracy? By returning to greater emphasis on free enterprise just recently, did the Australa-

sian nations return to democracy? Or, may it justifiably be assumed that such a change had no basic or implicit bearing on the problem of democracy? These and other questions require an answer if one is to derive a workable concept of democracy and achieve a degree of order out of the confusion of claims and counter-claims regarding its meaning.

Altruism Versus Self-interest As Criteria Of Democracy

One frequently hears it said as well as occasionally sees it written that democracy is an ideal which probably can never be achieved. The reason given is that men simply are not good enough to live up to democratic standards. Democracy admittedly is a fine ideal, but probably one which is unattainable and impracticable -- in this world at least. Assuming that democracy is contrary to human nature anyway, it usually follows that there is no cause for alarm when admittedly undemocratic practices are adopted. It may be this logic which accounts for contentions that the American people and American educators should be democratic "as far as possible." (See earlier discussion in this chapter).

Such reasoning appears to originate, in part, from features claimed for democracy such as selflessness, altruism, respect for the individual, and tolerance for others and for the opinions of others. To cite a few of the many statements incorporating such claims, Kilpatrick maintains that "selfishness and democracy are mutual exclusives as regards respect for personality." (24) Newlon suggests that

democracy " . . . emphasizes the brotherhood of man, co-operation and not selfishness." "Belief in the worth and dignity of human personality," according to Newlon, "is the foundation of the democratic idea." (25) Democracy, according to Spears (26), " . . . asks the individual to be tolerant of others, to respect their rights and opinions." Counts, in summarizing the meaning of democracy, states that " . . . democracy asserts the worth and dignity of the individual human being" (27)

Because of such pronouncements, democracy becomes associated with altruism and selflessness. The claim in some quarters, perhaps with justification, is that men are not inclined to be selfless and altruistic. If human beings may be regarded as having individual interests or goals, it must be admitted that these goals may be expected to conflict, at times, with those of other persons. Is it valid, however, to assume that democracy is impossible of realization because it is identified with selflessness? Or, perhaps, is there some reason to doubt that selflessness and attendant features claimed for democracy are, in fact, necessary concomitants of democracy.

Surely the peoples of dictator-nations manifest a high degree of selflessness when they place the good of the state so far above their own interests. Is this the kind of selflessness which democracy implies? Such so-called enslaved peoples also appear to respect others and the opinions of others -- certain others, at least. But what is to be

deduced from the fact that the American people many times regard such persons unworthy of respect and consider their opinions contemptible? Does the American outlook in such matters represent democracy? Does that of a dictator-nation? Or, perhaps, does neither outlook have anything particularly to do with democracy? If democracy is to mean "respect for the individual and for the opinions of others," what is to be the basis for such respect and how is it to differ, if it is, from that required in dictator-nations? Surely an American is not expected to "believe in the worth and dignity of human personality" in instances where human personality shows itself to be of little worth or in instances in which no dignity is apparent. What, then, may be considered as involved in terms of democratic outlook? Such features claimed for democracy also tend to place emphasis upon the individual human being. Is it to be thought, then, that individualism holds the key to democracy? These appear to be questions which require an answer if the confusion due to conflicting ideas attending discussions of democratic theory and practice is to be clarified.

Summary

Of the many features and principles attributed to democracy in oral and written discussions on the subject, freedom and liberty receive first place, appearing under the guises of freedom of action, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and freedom of worship. Equality and fraternity, too, -- the

latter term, particularly, coming from France -- appear frequently in discussions on the subject. It sometimes is contended that the key to democracy is to be found in the American Declaration of Independence which proclaims " . . . inalienable rights . . . [to] life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness . . . " and which embraces the proposition that " . . . all men are created free and equal." The American Way of Life also is thought by many to be representative of democracy, chief emphasis being placed on "the American heritage" stemming from principles entertained by the Founding Fathers. Democracy, moreover, is claimed to include principles such as selflessness, belief in the worth and dignity of human personality, and respect for others and the opinions of others.

Difficulty, however, is encountered in determining precisely what democratic freedom and liberty may be taken to mean. There are instances in which the American people do not enjoy freedom of action. There appear to be instances in which the peoples of dictator-nations have more freedoms than do the Americans. There are conditions in nominally democratic nations in which freedom of speech is curtailed, in which freedom of assembly is not permitted, and in which freedom of worship is not allowed. Moreover, there are indications that men are not, in fact, equal, but that widespread inequalities and differences exist among them. There seems to be a question whether fraternity, as a principle, is descriptive of democracy. There are reasonable arguments

that man has no absolutely inalienable rights of any kind; that he has only those rights with which a state provides him and that his life, liberty, and pursuits of happiness are contingent in great measure upon the kind of person he is and the kind of society in which he lives. Furthermore, there are suggestions that the ever-changing American Way of Life may be too vague a conception to be clearly descriptive of democracy. It even is suggested that, in both early and later periods of American history, the American Way may not have been democratic. There are indications, moreover, that terms such as selflessness, belief in the worth and dignity of human personality, and respect for others and their opinions, claimed as principles of democracy, do not clearly differentiate democracy from opposing forms of socio-governmental organization.

In light of all such conflicting interpretations which have been and are placed upon democracy and of the claims and counter-claims regarding its characteristics, it would seem to be of value to examine the theory of democracy with reference to its practice and with a view toward testing various theories in terms of the manner in which present-day democratic nations actually operate. In this way it may be determined how nations which are nominally democratic differ from nations regarded generally as undemocratic, if indeed they do differ.

But, inasmuch as the theory and practice of democracy have been and are so intimately interwoven with tradition,

it would seem advantageous as a first consideration to determine what democracy has been taken to mean historically, both in theory and in practice. . In the next chapter an examination will be made of historical aspects of democratic theory and practice.

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27. George S. Counts, The Prospects of American Democracy (New York: The John Day Company, 1938), p. 319.

CHAPTER THREE

CHAPTER III

HISTORICAL INTERPRETATIONS OF DEMOCRACY

Historical Differences In Interpretation Of Democracy

One of the chief difficulties encountered in defining democracy, and one which undoubtedly contributes to confusion regarding the meaning and implications of the word today, is that the word "democracy" -- aside from the fact that it means different things to different persons -- has had vastly different interpretations placed upon it during various periods of history. Democracy, as it was understood and applied in antiquity, had a far different meaning from that attached to the word today. Present-day laymen, often admittedly innocent of democracy's finer meanings and implications, would recognize some of these differences immediately if acquainted, even superficially, with the older theory and practice. There are indications, moreover, that the meanings attached to democracy by the American Founding Fathers were considerably different from concepts of the term entertained today. As Hudson (1) observes:

Democracy changes. The ancient Athenian democracy was far different from our modern democracies, both European and American. "The facts about our democracy to-day obviously are not the facts of yesterday, nor are they the facts of tomorrow. The democracy in the United States which De Tocqueville saw in the early part of the nineteenth century is not the American democracy rising to power in the twentieth century." (2)

Bryn-Jones, in showing that "democracy is a word that comes to us weighted with . . . associations which history has created," would not have had to go back as far as ancient Greece, with her slaves and disfranchised metics* who outnumbered the free Athenian citizenry, to indicate differences between the theory and practice of democracy historically and today. (3) It must be remembered that the United States, frequently characterized as the birthplace and home of democracy, entertained slavery until after the middle of the nineteenth century. Moreover, the American public, including many women themselves, was not at all sure, as late as the second decade of the twentieth century, that universal suffrage was a wise choice.

Ellwood, in tracing the derivation of the word "democracy" from the Greek dēmos, the people, reminds his readers that the meaning of the word "people" itself "has . . . varied from age to age, so that to understand the nature of democracy we must view it as an historical process of development." (4) Barnes notes some of the differences in emphasis on the meaning of democracy as follows:

. . . . The early definitions [of democracy] were generally formalistic and concerned chiefly with such problems as distinguishing between "pure" and "representative" democracy and analyzing the political concept of democracy. Especially important has been the "democratizing" of the very conception of democracy. The old

* See following pages.

Aristotelian notion of the "people" as the upper and middle class members of society, which persisted down to the close of the 18th century, has been supplanted by the newer view which regards the people as embracing all the members of society with no exception. Consequently, the phrase "government by the people" meant quite a different thing when used by Lincoln than it did when employed by Aristotle . . . Locke or Rousseau. Again, more recent students of the subject have come to see that democracy is far more than merely a form of government. [This newer view holds] . . . that democracy is a form of government, a form of the state and a type of social organization and social control. As a form of government a "pure democracy" is held to mean the enfranchisement of the majority of the population and the direct participation of the whole mass of the citizens in the operation of all the affairs of government. The much more common "representative democracy" is defined as one in which the citizens govern indirectly through periodically selected deputies or representatives. As a form of the state democracy implies the existence of popular sovereignty. Lastly, as a form of society democracy means both a democratic organization and control of non-political forms of activity and a determination of public policy by a majority of the citizens. . . . Finally, a number of students of democracy . . . have become dissatisfied with a formalistic and static analysis of democracy, have given it a pragmatic definition, and have identified it with a dynamic program. [Those who hold such a view maintain] . . . that democracy not only requires the popular control of public policy, but also implies a type of social organization which will develop to the fullest extent the latent potentialities of every member of the society, and imposes upon society the moral obligation to do everything in its power to hasten the realization of such a condition.

(5)

It is precisely because of these differing interpretations of democracy that it is important to understand what

the word has been taken to mean at various stages of history. By bringing into focus many of the older concepts of democracy, it may be possible to achieve a clearer understanding of the modern meaning of the word. That is, if one is to untangle the maze of confusion seeming to exist because of the mixing of older and newer concepts of democracy, it may be wise to begin the investigation by noting what modern democracy is not.

Pre-historic And Primitive Societies

Although most accounts of the origins of democracy begin with the Periclean Age of Athens,* it is probable that the beginnings of democracy were earlier than Greek antiquity, as evidenced from the study of primitive societies which are regarded, in their arrested state of development, as furnishing an index into conditions existing in pre-historic periods. If Ellwood's understanding of the matter is correct -- and numerous other accounts bear him out --, many primitive societies adopted democratic forms of governmental control as far as any formal control was exercised within the tribe. Ellwood states that:

The conclusion of present-day anthropologists is that primitive society and primitive government were everywhere essentially democratic. That is, in primitive society there existed only natural class distinctions

* Autocracy, according to various historians, originated in the East. (6)

such as the distinctions of age, sex and capacity; and that such government as existed in primitive groups was usually based upon the customs and the opinions of the adult members of the group -- the headmen, leaders or chiefs, usually being selected by the free suffrages of the group. The case of the North American Indians with their clan and tribal assemblies and councils will serve as an illustration of this "primitive democracy." Such primitive democracies usually decided what the action of the group should be, whether it concerned the election of a peace chief, a war chief, the making of war or a penalty for some offender against tribal usages, only unanimously. A discussion was held until practically unanimous agreement was reached regarding the policy of the group, usually without formal voting. (7)

Ellwood goes on to explain that "a democratic form of group control [in primitive societies] was possible . . . because of the similarity of the habits, feelings and ideas of all members of the group." (7) It should be noted, however, that these similarities of habits and ideas which contributed to outward appearances of democratic governmental control probably constituted a chief cause, as noted in Chapter II, for the arrestment of primitive civilization. There are indications that, even when primitive societies have adopted seemingly democratic forms of social control, these peoples have been enslaved extensively by customary ways of thinking and of doing things.

Greek And Roman Antiquity

There may be justification, however, for beginning historical accounts of democracy with the ancient Greeks, for it

was the Greeks who appear to have influenced later interpretations of democracy so greatly in Western culture, including America. Some writers claim for the Periclean Age the most perfect democracy of all time. Other writers, especially Nietzsche and kindred neo-Platonists, entertained the idea that there never was a time before or since the time of Plato when social organization reached such heights. There are indications, however, that ancient Greek democracy, whether during the time of Pericles or of Plato, was far from democracy according to modern standards.

Before proceeding, attention parenthetically is invited to the circumstance that, inasmuch as this research is concerned broadly with the large problem of democracy and its implications for education rather than with any particular aspect of it, such as the historical theories and practices of democracy which follow, this investigator has drawn to some extent upon direct researches, within concentrated areas, by others regarded as competent in such matters. However, these references -- particularly concerning writings by Plato, Aristotle, Hobbes, Rousseau, and Locke -- are included to corroborate this investigator's own interpretations and not as the source of them. They are employed for the two-fold purpose of representing and confirming interpretations of original sources. Such a course was taken of necessity in order to save the space which otherwise would have been required for countless documentations from original, rather involved sources, and in order thus to provide time and space

for the larger problem at hand. The need for approaching the problem thus does not exist in succeeding chapters.

After having passed, during various periods of history, from rule by chieftains, kings, and heads of chief wealthy families in most Greek states, (8) Athens and the surrounding countryside, in particular, moved toward democracy. (9) It is probable, from all accounts, that Athens entertained "more" democracy than any of the other Greek city-states. The Achaean League, too, which grew from a small handful of city-states in Southern Greece to include virtually every state in the Southwest of the peninsula, was at least an approximation of the cantonal union of early Swiss history and of the beginnings of American Union, although this Greek federation disintegrated upon the appearance of external danger. Barnes' observation, however, appears to be correct when he states that:

. . . . True democracy was not prominent in Hellenic society. Even Athens, the most liberally inclined of the Greek city-states, at the period of its most democratic organization could scarcely be regarded as a democracy in the modern application of the term. While . . . there has been a tendency to exaggerate the number of slaves in Athens, there can be no doubt that there was never a time in Athenian history when a majority of the population was not excluded from participation in the life of the state.* Greek "democracy" meant relative social and political equality only among the citizen

* If women (even Athenian citizens' wives) who had no voice in government are included in this majority which was denied a voice in governmental affairs, the majority excluded from governmental participation becomes large indeed.

class Within this privileged citizen class, however, Athenian democracy made the closest approximation in antiquity to a democratic control of group activities. (10)

With reference to differences in interpretation which historically have been placed upon the phrase "government by the people," Marshall points out that, although Athenian democracy may have meant rule by the many as opposed to rule by the few, "the many who ruled Athens were a prescribed class of citizens whose ancestors had farmed the hills and valleys of Attica and grazed their herds among them for generations." He goes on to say that "the slaves and the foreign merchants [the metics] who were settled in Athens, and even their children and grandchildren born in the city-state, who formed the great majority of people living there, could take no part in the government and had no voice in its affairs." (11) In this connection, Sait contends that "Rousseau was resting on solid facts when he styled the regime of the Periclean age 'a tyrannical oligarchy.'" Although there is considerable disagreement regarding the exact number of slaves and metics* living in Athens,** Sait places the number, which is conservative according to most estimates, at fifty percent slave and fifteen percent metic population. (12)

* The metics were alien non-citizen freemen living in Athens who made up largely the business and artisan classes of the population.

** There is rather complete agreement that disfranchised groups constituted a majority of the population.

Although servitude perhaps was less severe in Athens than in other Greek city-states, notably Sparta where the Helots were harshly subjugated,* still the Athenian economic structure was built upon a slave foundation. "Here," according to Cousins, "slave groups were divided into two broad categories: residents of Athens who fell into bondage through debt default or those who were born into it (many of them and their . . . descendants served the same family for generations); and the foreigners who were bought in the slave market." (13) Bryce points out that:

. . . . Those [of the ancient Greeks] who owned slaves could not very well have talked of the Rights of Man, for though the Americans of the South did so talk before the Civil War, reading the Declaration of Independence publicly on every Fourth of July, their difficulty was reduced by the fact that the bondmen were of a different colour, whereas among the ancients the slave might well be of as light a tint as his master, and possibly superior in natural intelligence (14)

Both Plato and Aristotle, who occasionally are attributed erroneously as friends of democracy (probably because both theorized on the form democracy should take), considered servitude natural and just. Although Plato would have emancipated women from the home, their sole field of activity and a position in Athens to which they previously had been relegated, and would have given them opportunity to succeed on a basis equal with men, Plato did not question

* The Helots, having descended from the original settlers and being subjugated by the Spartans, were always alert for any opportunity to revolt.

the old Greek institution of slavery.* And, although Aristotle's philosophical outlook differed in some respects from that of Plato, Aristotle considered servitude natural. As Bryn-Jones states the matter:

Aristotle was not running counter to the accepted opinion of his day, and certainly not to that of the earlier days of the golden age of Pericles, when he frankly defended the institution of slavery on the ground that it was natural. Men were by nature different, and unequal. Some were fitted for subjection, others were capable of citizenship; some were born to be slaves, others were born to be masters. The slave was made for obedience and benefited by it; the master was made for rule and therefore exercised it. It was not government that drew the line of demarcation but nature -- or government drew it because nature had drawn it first. There were, then, certain vital and natural differences running through humanity that constituted basic inequalities among men. The fact that the slave might win his freedom was one of those inconsistencies that hardly seemed to qualify, and certainly did not invalidate, the general principle. (15)

Aside from his views on slavery, Plato appears in many ways not to have favored democracy. Various interpretations of Plato's views in the matter square with his writings on the subject. Thayer, for one, has no illusions about Plato's desire for democracy. Thayer observes that Plato's choice lay with aristocracy (16) -- an aristocracy of philosopher-kings, or more exactly, a monarchy by a philosopher-king. Barnes, too, reminds his readers that:

* Plato considered women inferior to men in general, but considered some women as superior to some men.

In the "Republic" and the "Statesman," (17) [in which] Plato discussed the nature of democracy, he defined it as the rule of the many and held that it inevitably tended to degenerate into anarchy. [But this] "rule of the many" . . . meant only the rule of the citizen minority of the population. Even this shadowy democracy did not attract Plato who preferred an enlightened monarchy. (18)

Interpretations of Aristotle's views on the matter are also those which might be expected in light of his writings on the subject. As Barnes points out:

. . . . Aristotle . . . maintained that democracy was that form of government in which the majority of the citizens, excluding foreigners [metics] and slaves, directed the activities of the state for the advancement of their own class interests. . . . Aristotle was no more favorable than Plato to the exclusive "democracy" of the Greeks He laid down his famous dictum that merit should determine social and political position and held that certain individuals on account of their inferior intelligence were born to serve the more intelligent and capable members of society. It is scarcely necessary to add that by the "intelligent and capable," Aristotle meant the Attic Greeks, and by those fitted for perpetual servitude, the "barbarians." Thus, his seemingly useful conception of social differentiation on the basis of ability resolves itself upon closer examination into a chauvinistic apology for racial egoism. . . .*(20)

Bryce in general accurately appraises the essential differences between Platonic and Aristotelian outlooks regarding democracy, together with the philosophical underpinnings for the outlooks, when he states that:

. . . . The judgments of Plato are more severe [in their criticism of democracy]

* See Aristotle, Politics. (19)

than those of his great disciple [Aristotle], because he [Plato] tries what he saw by the standard of that Ideal Polity which he imagines to be stored up somewhere in the heavens, never to become actual on earth till the day comes when philosophers are kings or kings are philosophers, -- a day of which not even the dawn is yet discernible. Aristotle applied a standard drawn from the facts of his own time, and he finds Athens rather above than below the average of excellence which its republics presented. The kind of government he sketches as being the best attainable under existing Greek conditions is founded on his observations of the institutions which were working well in various cities . . . and shows that he wished to blend some features of an aristocratic with others of a democratic type. (21)

Aside from the purely political aspects of Platonic and Aristotelian outlooks, their philosophical views in general seem to contain elements which conflict with democracy in the modern sense.* Although it is true, as Bryce relates, Aristotle embarked to some extent upon observation -- philosophical realism -- as a means of drawing his conclusions, it must be remembered that Aristotle was imbued thoroughly with Platonic idealism, having been Plato's pupil for twenty years.** And, as regards an idealistic outlook, there would appear to be a question whether it can, because of inherent characteristics in the theory, lend itself logically to

* Although the philosophical underpinnings of socio-governmental theories and practices are discussed throughout the investigation, they are treated fully in the closing pages of Chapter V.

** Aristotle touched both on idealism and realism in his philosophical outlook.

democratic treatment. Inasmuch as idealistic truth is regarded as originally derivable only from intuition or revelation and to reside in the form of disembodied, immaterial ideas which, once obtained, are regarded as constituting final, absolute truth regarding any matter, there would appear to be no known way of subjecting such ideas to material tests for determining validity. Thus, inasmuch as idealistic truths are not considered amenable to material tests, there would seem to be no alternative except to agree upon some person to dictate which ideas are correct (which Plato and later Aristotle endeavored to do themselves) or else to permit everyone to hold his own ideas (which Plato and Aristotle were quite unwilling to do). In short, inasmuch as it would be impossible to apply any material test to intuitions and accompanying ideas (the intuitions and ideas being non-material in form), it would seem that some one must dictate which intuitions and ideas are the "right" ones on one hand, or permit everyone to rely upon his own intuitions and ideas on the other.* Such a course would appear to reduce itself to autocracy in the first instance and anarchy in the second, with democratic-scientific appraisal impossible in either case.**

* As an example of the handling of such idealistic truths, the Roman Church established the Papacy to determine the validity of all such ideas, whereas Luther advocated that everyone individually go directly to the Bible to make his own interpretations.

** See closing pages of Chapter V.

Moreover, to consider a truth as absolute and final would seem to preclude any possibility, henceforth, of comparing that truth or idea with others for comparative evaluation, or, in fact, of questioning the original truth at all. Such a condition would appear to represent special privilege for certain ideas and for the persons presenting them, a situation which resembles the practice by the ruling classes in dictator-nations today.

Finally, it must be remembered that, in instances wherein Aristotle departed in philosophical outlook from Plato, absolutism and finality of truth were just as much a part of Aristotelian realism as of Platonic idealism. Thus, even in instances where Aristotle differed from Plato, the difference would seem not to have been between democratic and autocratic outlooks, but between two autocratic though conflicting views.*

Marshall's interpretation of the ancient Greek situation summarizes the foregoing interpretations when he states that:

In the Athens of Plato, traders and artisans, even the great sculptors, did not share in the citizenship of the city. Farmers might be citizens but . . . [as early as] the Periclean Age many of them had become gentlemen farmers. The sea captain and the trader were foreigners, the cobbler and the artisan slaves. The land and the capital, the leisure and the intellectual life were Greek. The higher learning and the eagerness to pursue the ideal perfection of citizenship were only to be achieved by those legally entitled to citizenship. Here was an aristocracy,

* See discussion on Lockean outlook later in this chapter and discussion in the closing pages of Chapter V concerning philosophical realism.

membership in which entitled one to the arms of war and a passport to contemplation. It is worth noting that all of the Aristotelian discussions of autocracy and democracy dealt with political forms within the confines of this group, the particular structure of Greek government* in each instance being, as Aristotle pointed out, that which was appropriate to the needs of the group in power. It was consequently inevitable that sea captain and trader should not be deemed educated (merely because they knew their business) in a democracy which was democratic only within the confines of an hereditary class and in which social practice severed on class lines those who might labor from those who might think and rule, who might pursue the perfection of citizenship. And where, as in the case of Plato and those in his tradition, it was not functional effectiveness and satisfaction that was sought, but the ideal perfection of citizenship or of beauty or of something else, it was inevitable that contemplation should have risen from reality, should have left earthiness for fantasy. When the first great rush of abstract thinking was over, after Aristotle had summed up all that was known of man and nature (perhaps all that could be known without the willingness of thinkers to make manual effort), it followed that thought was devoted to piling untried fantasy on untried fantasy until its heights were reached in realms of mysticism. (22)

The Roman republics, mentioned also with reference to origins of democracy, appear to have contributed little, if anything, not already advanced by Greek antiquity toward modern democracy. Barnes is representative of other re-

* For a scholarly, detailed account of the ancient Greek forms of government including their branches, techniques and devices, and practical outcomes, see James Bryce, Modern Democracies (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1921), Vol. I, pp. 170-181.

searchers when he states that:

In republican Rome the same conception of exclusiveness in the citizenship existed as had prevailed in Greece. The large numbers of the slaves and foreigners were excluded from the political life of the state and within the citizen body itself there was less of a democratic control of political activities than had existed in Athens. (23)

Barnes goes on to relate that "the Roman Empire ended with the growth of plutocracy and the crushing out of practically all of the few democratic tendencies which existed." (24) He concludes that:

Classical antiquity . . . never brought real democracy in the political, social or economic realms. It passed, leaving a more decided condition of inequality than it had received from the primitive tribal society with which it had started. (25)

Medieval And Renaissance Religious Influences

On Democracy In The West

Medieval Europe is not generally regarded as having been democratic. It is curious, therefore, that close alliance sometimes is claimed between religion and democracy inasmuch as religion, which joined forces with Platonic and Aristotelian precepts, constituted the foundations of the Medieval Church which for centuries dominated Europe both politically and spiritually. Moreover, the American Colonists, who frequently are accredited with implanting democracy in America, were thoroughly imbued with a religious outlook which stemmed basically from the Medieval Church, hence which

necessarily incorporated many Platonic and Aristotelian viewpoints. Once having become somewhat doubtful of the democratic character of Platonic-Aristotelian outlook, it is difficult to avoid suspecting the democratic nature of forces which were congenial to it.

Regarding the early American scene, Bode comments that:

The proposition that the supreme test of progress is to be sought in the development of the individual could not be made to harmonize with the other beliefs, and particularly with the theological beliefs, of the early immigrants. A man who knows what he is doing can hardly believe that the development of the individual is the ultimate test and at the same time believe that conformity to divine command is the ultimate test. The thing was possible only by leaving the idea of democracy somewhat obscure. (26)

Bode goes on to say that:

If men were really rational animals, as Aristotle once said they are, the colonists would soon have got together and decided, after due deliberation, which of these two standards should prevail. Being more English than rational, however, they just muddled along on the basis of both the democratic standard and the authoritarian standard. By limiting democracy as much as possible to the realm of politics they established a modus vivendi, which relieved them of the task of thinking the matter through. Our whole American life has been an unedifying mixture of authoritarianism and democracy from those earliest days down to the present time. [Italics in original] (27)

Bryn-Jones, on the other hand, contends that:

. . . . Deep in the human spirit, manifest especially in great religions, there seems to have been a feeling of revolt against the inequalities that existed in human society. It breathes, for instance, in the impassioned invective and

the fiery denunciations of the great Hebrew prophets, and it finds even more definite expression in Christianity, which declares that in the eyes of God there is neither Greek nor barbarian, Jew nor Gentile, bond nor free; all are one. Where all are the children of the one Father, the distinctions that create inequality are difficult to accept and still more difficult to justify. In most of, if not all, the great religions thought is colored by some such sentiment more or less definitely. (28)

However true or untrue the foregoing statement may be, the same method employed in obtaining religious truth which may contribute ideas and practices for the emancipation of mankind also appears to lend itself to the derivation of ideas and practices for his enslavement. Because most religious ideas are claimed to have been derived by means of idealistic intuition or revelation, the method employed by the founder of a benevolent religious system many times is indistinguishable from that employed by a despot in deriving the authority for his suppressions.* Even as Bryn-Jones was compelled to admit, despite his statement above, ". . . it may be . . . that modern democracy is the child of the Reformation . . . but not of the reformers" (29)

And, as Cousins observes:

. . . . There has not been a great idea or ideal which has not been perverted or exploited at one time or another by those who are looking for a means to an end -- an end seldom compatible with the idea. The greatest idea ever to be taken up by the

* See closing pages of Chapter V.

mind of man -- Christianity -- was for many centuries sidetracked and even corrupted by its very administrators. Alexander's great vision of a brotherhood of men fell victim to the forces behind it. Mohammed dreamed of a universal religion based on the noblest of ethics, and taught that conversion by the sword was no conversion at all; yet his followers built an empire largely at the point of a sword. Buddha sought to emancipate man in the fullest sense, to deliver him from cruelty and deception, and to make him an instrument of truth and honesty; but there is little resemblance between many of these ideas as expressed in the original theory and certain of its later manifestations. (30)

Such appears to be the outcome of quests for disembodied ideas and to be the nature of intuitive, revelatory truths, which are not regarded by those who beget them as subject to worldly, consequential tests. Mulhern points out that, although various systems of religion historically have had great appeal to mankind because of man's desire for certainty -- his desire for definite, final answers to baffling questions regarding the mysteries of the unknown as well as final answers regarding conduct which would insure his well-being in this and the after life --, such religious systems frequently have served to enslave man by keeping him from thinking, thus restricting progress of a kind which actually would have contributed to his well-being. Mulhern presumably has in mind that, inasmuch as religious truths are regarded usually as God-given, absolute, and final, they are not to be questioned. Mulhern goes on to say that Jesus of Nazareth dreamed of a universal culture and the universal Fatherhood of God and brotherhood of all men, regardless of race or status, but that this was a dream which, for all practical purposes, remained

but a dream. (31) The Medieval Church, supposedly based upon the ideas of Jesus of Nazareth and His dream of a universal Christian democracy, became in practice a tyrannizing influence rather than a liberalizing force. Although the purpose of the Medieval Church and of the education under its domination was intended solely to prepare man for the service of God and the way of salvation, the common man not only served his God and the Church but also served specially privileged individuals who controlled the Church and claimed to speak for God. As Merriam explains it, "in Christianity all men were held to be equal in the sight of God, but the full enjoyment of this reality was postponed until the other world" (32)

As in case of Plato's attention to universals, Christianity had its worldly and otherworldly kingdoms, of which the worldly came to be considered a very imperfect reflection of the otherworldly, a condition which contributed to emphasis upon the hereafter rather than to the brotherhood of men during the here and now. (33) In this sense, Platonic idealism and theological idealism were closely related in basic characteristics. The Medieval Church, although showing the Jewish-Christian influence, was also essentially Platonic in character, the priestly hierarchy playing the role intended by Plato for philosopher-kings. The only difference, if it could be called a difference, between the autocratic type of domination which Plato advocated and that of the Church was that the men of the cloth took over the function intended by Plato for the men of gold.

Through the efforts of St. Thomas Aquinas, Aristotle's writings became incorporated in the beliefs of the Medieval Church, subsequently to become as authoritative as the written word of God, a condition typical of Scholasticism and one which appears seriously to have impeded scientific advancement. To the Medieval-Church hierarchy, as in case of Plato, the visible world was one of unrealities, reality existing only in disembodied, metaphysical ideas. Because of these influences, man sought causes of natural phenomena in the Bible and in signs from the heavens rather than in actualities as observed by human beings. St. Augustine, for example, assigned final authority concerning all such questions to Holy Writ. Thus, the influence of Plato on Aristotle and of Aristotle on the Medieval Church appears to have constituted for centuries a chief obstacle to the growth of scientific inquiry.*

It probably was inevitable, due to foregoing circumstances, that the Medieval Church under feudal abbots and bishops became as guilty of impoverishing and degrading the common man as was the lay royalty of the period. Chivalry, which gave lip service to codes of conduct embracing gentleness, honor, loyalty, courtesy, respect for women, and piety, was an ideal which appears never to have been achieved in practice, inasmuch as the nobles, to whom it applied solely, despised the common man and were abetted by the Churchmen

* See Chapter V for discussions concerning the growth of modern democracy and modern scientific thinking.

in their despotic treatment of the lowly born. Mulhern points out that, in Medieval society, there were three classes of persons: clergy, nobility, and peasants. However, the fact that the clergy were in collusion with the nobility made, for all practical purposes, only two classes -- nobility and serfs --, the latter being tyrannized by the former. (34)

Thus, one needs only to examine the history of the Holy Roman Empire to see, for all practical purposes, how democracy fared under religious domination. Hook states with justification that:

Catholicism is the oldest and greatest totalitarian movement in history. Other totalitarian movements have borrowed from it even when they have fulminated against it. Its essential totalitarian character is at times obscured, particularly when it finds itself in conflict with the newer movements which must consolidate their power at its expense. Compare it with Fascism, Nazism, Stalinism. In every case the mystique is different; but in every case we find present not merely dogmas, sacred and profane, rituals of canonization and excommunication, but the desire to revolutionize "the soul" of man through the directing force of a highly organized minority, using these three great instruments described by Dostoevski's Grand Inquisitor -- miracle, mystery, and authority -- to order a society in behalf of the interests of a bureaucratic hierarchy [Italics in original] (35)

However, entire blame need not be laid at the door of Roman Catholicism. The Reformationists committed excesses of the same type as were prevalent during the Inquisition. Although Galileo found it necessary to reverse his position on matters, regarded today as scientific fact, which

conflicted with religious dogma, one of the reasons Servetus was burned at the stake by John Calvin was because of his ideas, considered correct today, regarding pulmonary circulation -- this because his formulation ran counter to the Aristotelian idea in the matter adopted by the Medieval Church and carried on by the Protestants.* Thus, to re- quote Bryn-Jones, " . . . it may be . . . that modern democracy is the child of the Reformation . . . but not of the reformers" (36) In the same vein it might justifiably be added that, judging from history, democracy may be related to Christianity but not to the views and practices of a great many so-called Christians.

The Medieval position of women appears also not to have improved over the golden age of Pericles. What few gains toward freedom and independence were made by women after the Greek period, particularly in Rome, were lost because of the attitude of the Medieval Church regarding them. St. Thomas Aquinas (as well as St. Paul at an earlier date) took the attitude that women were inferior and subject to the domination of men.

Moreover, slavery continued by virtue of its support by Medieval Church law. This circumstance should not be surprising in view of Platonic and Aristotelian views and their influence upon the Church. In the United States, the South

* Servetus was regarded as a heretic in other respects also, particularly regarding his views on the Trinity.

appears to have relied upon these precedents when defending slavery on religious grounds -- by virtue of its sanction by God.

Thus, although religious systems appear in some respects to have contributed to freedom, they many times have abetted man's enslavement. Apparently, if democracy and religion are to live together compatibly, some criterion in religion other than the metaphysical idea must be found as a basis for judging the efficacy of acts and deeds of mankind on earth.

Democratic Theorists Prior To The
American And French Revolutions

Prior to American and French revolutionary movements, interpretations of democracy which frequently appear in discussions of democratic theory are to be found in the philosophies of Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Jean Jacques Rousseau. It would seem especially important to note distinctions between the Hobbesian and Roussellian views inasmuch as they differ in important respects and inasmuch as both have become at different periods of history the bases of interpreting the Constitution of the United States. Hobbes, interested primarily in achieving unity and order out of British dissensions, would leave to majority decision the form of government initially to be adopted. However, once the decision was made, Hobbes would give the people no further

control over government or no opportunity to change its form.* In effect, Hobbes would give the people power only to terminate majority rule henceforth, especially if they decided initially in favor of monarchy, which Hobbes preferred, or aristocracy, his next choice. Such an interpretation, when employed in the United States, took the form of regarding the Constitution and the original governmental machinery as sacrosanct, never to be changed. In effect, such interpretation, even though democracy were the governmental form initially adopted, would seem eventually to place the affairs of oncoming generations in the hands of persons long since dead. Thus, although there may be justification for associating the Hobbesian outlook with democratic theory, it would be only in the initial stages. Mims recognizes this aspect of the theory when he states that:

[Thomas Hobbes believed a majority should decide, and the minority abide by, the form of government to be inaugurated, whether that form be] . . . "democracy," which to Hobbes meant a type of government in which all of the citizens were at the same time governors; or preferably an "aristocracy," in which a smaller number of professional governors were elected by the citizens; or, best of all from Hobbes's point of view . . . a "monarchy," in which power was concentrated in the hands of a single ruler whose authority did not depend on election. But in every case, Hobbes insisted, the sovereign -- whether it had

* Hobbes' principles of government are contained primarily in his Philosophical Rudiments Concerning Government and Society and in his Leviathan, or the Matter, Form, and Power of a Commonwealth, both published in 1651. See especially, Leviathan. (37)

taken the form of monarchy, aristocracy, or democracy -- must not be altered by the community, except upon express authorization from the existing government.

[Hobbes believed that] . . . every individual should agree . . . to be bound by the decision arrived at by the majority of individuals. If . . . the vote turned out 51 per cent in favor of monarchy as against 49 per cent in favor of an alternative form of government, such as aristocracy or democracy, then . . . [the minority] would consider itself bound to abide by the decision Once this form of government is constituted, it may not be altered except in accordance with its own decrees. [Four paragraphs omitted]

. . . . [Thus] no sooner has Hobbes created this political society [of majority rule] than he proceeds by a quick twist of logic to annihilate it The most that the majority can say in declaring the will of this society is that we herewith turn over to this particular form of government the entire authority which has just been turned over to us And in turning over to this aforesaid "representative" all available power and will we hereby decree our own demise.

For, according to Hobbes, the only majority that can use its discretion in selecting the form of government under which it shall live is this original majority Once the government has been set up, the door is closed, forever, to the further operation of the principle of majority rule. With the passage of time, a majority might come into being with altogether different ideas as to what form of government was best suited to the needs of society, but if it should make an attempt to express this will and to translate this will into effective action, it would be guilty of the grossest sedition and subject to suppression as a subversive group (38)

Rousseau, in The Social Contract, (39) appears to have built his political doctrine largely on that of Hobbes'

Leviathan and John Locke's The Second Treatis on Government.

However, Rousseau's view embodies a crucial difference from that of Hobbes. Whereas Hobbes would have the majority abrogate sovereignty after the initial decision, Rousseau would endeavor to insure that sovereignty would remain. For Rousseau, successive majorities could do anything they please except abrogate majority rule. Mims has gotten this interpretation when he comments that:

[Rousseau believed that] . . . sovereignty must remain at all times in the hands of the political society itself. It is impossible for the original majority to make any decision that will prevent a corresponding majority at some future date from using its discretion in the matter of choosing between the various alternative forms of government under which it might live. (40)

Closer examination of Rousseau's logic, however, seems to reveal an inconsistency. It is difficult to conceive a powerful majority which does not have sufficient power to abrogate its own enactments. Such power, of course, means that a democratic people might even decide to discontinue democracy. Such power, however, would seem to constitute a form of jeopardy to which democracy is necessarily subject. Otherwise, democracy would hardly have existed in the first place. The German people, for example, chose Adolf Hitler as head of their government and, in so doing, destroyed any subsequent right of choice in such matters. Their initial choice, though democratic, constituted a form of non-reversible action; non-reversible except by way of violent

revolution or of intervention by some outside power. Thus, apparently there is no guarantee that a democratic people will not abrogate democracy or permit it to slip from grasp.

However, it would seem to be one thing to set the stage in such a way that abrogation of democracy almost certainly must occur, as in case of Hobbes, and another to look toward its continuation, as in case of Rousseau, even though it cannot be assured that a democratic people will not voluntarily and democratically abandon their democratic rights. As Mims explains it, in distinguishing between the Hobbesian and Roussellian outlooks:

Hobbes, by assuming a two-fold agreement between the original associates [or group], had transferred sovereign authority from the individuals as individuals, first to the organic majority, and then to an omnipotent government. Rousseau, by assuming a one-fold agreement, had merely transferred sovereign authority from the individuals as individuals to the political community as the sum total of individual general wills

With Hobbes sovereignty resided for a fleeting second of time in the majority; with Rousseau sovereignty resided in the majority for all time. Hobbes used the device of majority rule to destroy the principle of majority rule. Rousseau imposed limitations on the device of majority rule in the interests of the principle of majority rule, by declaring that no majority can take action which prevents a future majority from articulating and implementing its will. With Hobbes the constituent majority exhausted its power in signing its own death warrant and that of its successors; with Rousseau the majority husbanded its power with a view to passing it on to those majorities which were to come afterward. With Hobbes majority rule is an incidental contrivance for justifying governmental sovereignty; with Rousseau it is the central mainspring of popular sovereignty. (41)

Thus, although there is justification in looking to Hobbes and to Rousseau for sources of modern democratic theory, there would seem to be important reservations to be kept in mind in doing so. In case of Hobbes, the majority sovereignty provided at first almost surely would put an end to majority sovereignty later on, a logical possibility in any case, but hardly a tenable first premise upon which to formulate a valid plan for democracy. In case of Rousseau, the majority, in which complete power is to be vested, may perform any function except that of terminating majority supremacy, a laudable plan (and a crucial one if democracy is to endure), but hardly one which, in itself, is logically assured in all its ramifications.

As mentioned, Locke's The Second Treatise On Government (1687) (42) anticipated the Roussellian outlook. Whereas Hobbes assumed that rulers could be relied upon to govern in the best interests of "the Commonwealth," Locke, in The Second Treatise, as Rousseau, in The Social Contract, indicated distrust of non-accountable power in the hands of individuals and governments, and held to a principle of continual majority rule.* (43) However, Locke's An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (also published in 1687) (44)

* It must be recognized, however, that, when Locke writes of government by a "majority of freemen," he remains rather vague about the constituency of the "freemen." Every indication points to a highly select electorate of the wellborn.

would seem also to have a bearing upon his political outlook and would, in fact, appear to cast some doubt on his democratic leanings. Although Locke, in the first-mentioned of his writings, inveighed against the tyranny of individuals, he seems, in the second-mentioned, to have recognized no such danger in the despotism of ideas. Although Locke, in the former, reveals his distrust of power in the hands of individuals and governments, he appears, in the latter, not to have questioned the efficacy of the British status quo with many of its traditions and practices which, today, would be considered highly undemocratic.

Locke's philosophy, as contained in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, seems intent upon perpetuating specially privileged British ideas of the period. Locke regarded philosophical truths or principles, once gotten, as no less ultimate and absolute than did Plato. Although Plato attended to the intuitive contemplation of disembodied, metaphysical ideas (or forms) as the source of his philosophical principles, and although Locke regarded these principles or "Laws," as he called them, to reveal themselves through the passive observation of nature, no essential difference existed in the two outlooks as regards the finality and perfection of principles derived. In much the same way that Platonic idealistic truth lends itself only to alternatives of autocratic or anarchistic treatment, precluding any possibility

of proof or disproof,* so also does Lockean realistic truth lend itself in cases of controversy to dictation on one hand, or to believing as one pleases on the other. Moreover, in both cases, to regard certain principles as absolute and final would preclude any possibility, from that point hence, of comparing them with other ideas to determine relative merit, or indeed of questioning the original principles at all. In this respect, both the outlook of Plato and of Locke are concerned with specially-privileged ideas, not to be questioned. As suggested in an earlier discussion of Plato, such specially-privileged ideas, not subject to question, appear to fit the pattern of dictator-nations today rather than that of democratic societies.

Locke assumed that the human mind is neutral and passive. In contrast with the assumption that man innately is bad and actively so, an assumption entertained by the Medieval Church and unchallenged by reformationists such as Martin Luther, or that man is born good and actively so, as suggested by Comenius and carried forward in Russellian theory, Locke advocated tabula rasa theory based upon the assumption that man innately is endowed with no ideas at all -- neither with good ideas nor bad -- with the added quality of passivity on the part of the individual. Likening the human mind to a smoothly shaved, or blank, tablet (tabula rasa),** Locke

* See page 63.

** The Romans shaved smooth the wax tablets upon which they wrote, as a means of erasing them.

assumed that human learning occurs by sense impressions upon the mind. Inasmuch as the mind was assumed by Locke to be passive and amenable only to external influences, Locke wished to make very sure that the school pupil be presented only with the "right" ideas in order that his mind might be shaped or, as Locke would regard it, engraved, aright. It may be because of these considerations that educational historians frequently attribute Locke with wishing to indoctrinate British pupils with right habits of thinking, right attitudes, and right habits of conduct, according to what the British aristocracy of the period considered right. It must be remembered, in this connection, that workhouses supplied the "right" habits for the working classes, and Rugby, Oxford, and Cambridge the habits for future English gentlemen. Thus, although Locke in The Second Treatise embraced a theory of government based upon majority rule (as in case of Rousseau), many indications point to the possibility that Locke's leanings concerning the function of ideas, which in turn appear to shape human conduct, were decidedly undemocratic. Moreover, there is reason to believe that, in view of his usual position in such matters, Locke regarded the majority about which he wrote as encompassing something less than a majority of the British population, as was the case in so-called Athenian democracy.

The American And French Revolutionary Movements

The last decades of the eighteenth century, particularly in America and in France, are frequently supposed to have ushered in theory and practice of democracy in their present form. It is curious that this supposition should be so widely entertained in view of the great preponderance of readily available historical data which indicate that democracy, in the modern sense of the word, had not yet arrived upon the scene. Although, as Lindsay points out, the modern democratic state eventuated in the nineteenth century from these revolutionary movements, (45) there are indications that the immediate results of the American and French Revolutions were far from democratic according to modern standards. In fact, there is good reason to believe that democracy was not even the governmental form desired by many of the leaders of the American and French Movements. This circumstance, no doubt, prompted Bryce to observe that "popular government has been usually sought and won and valued not as a good thing in itself, but as a means of getting rid of tangible grievances or securing tangible benefits" (46) Bryce is on solid ground when he states that people did not so much want popular, self-government as good government. (47) It appears that the Founding Fathers of the United States, as one example, were not so much for democracy as they were against the administration of Colonial American affairs by George III and his ministers. Aside from the fact that Whit-

lock, more than other historians, gives Thomas Jefferson credit for being a friend of democracy, Whitlock appraises the situation essentially in keeping with other historians when he writes that:

. . . . The revolt of the [American] colonies was not, strictly speaking, inspired by a belief in democracy, though it resulted in the establishment of a republic. In its beginnings it was the familiar and typical revolt of the haute bourgeoisie. It was only after Thomas Paine arrived from England and . . . stirred the feelings of the masses that the struggle took on the aspects of a democratic movement. His pamphlets Common Sense and The Crisis, with their flaming appeals to democratic principles and prejudices, roused that popular emotion without which such a movement could never be carried to success, and Thomas Jefferson, saturated with the doctrines of the philosophers and the most thorough-going democrat of his land,* wrote the Declaration of Independence, setting forth eloquently the theory of the natural rights of man. Many of the leaders had no belief in such a doctrine, and no liking for its implications; but any weapon that comes to hand is welcome in a scrimmage.
 (48)

Moreover, the Founders of American Independence appear to have been looking to Greek antiquity for any measure of popular government they might wish to adopt. As James Marshall interprets the situation:**

* Whitlock contends that Jefferson was a real democrat and had faith in the common man, whereas Hamilton was contemptible of democracy and had no such faith in the people. However, Whitlock gives Jefferson more credit for democratic leanings than do other historians.

** James Marshall is not to be confused with John Marshall, Chief Justice from 1801-35.

It should . . . be noted that the democracy of the fathers of our [American] republic was conceived in terms of Athenian democracy infiltrated by the practices of the New England town meeting.* In Athens democracy meant the rule of the many as opposed to . . . the rule of the few. But the many who ruled Athens were a prescribed class of citizens

Thus in America . . . the recognition of classes of citizens and limitations on the right to vote and to participate in government was a concept based on the authority of ancient Greece, which was only relatively democratic when not actually oligarchic or monarchic. "The theory of the natural equality of human nature" had not been accepted [in America] in spite of the brave words of the Declaration of Independence that all men were created equal. To the landed squires and the men of commerce who were the backbone of the Anglo-American state, a limited democracy was adequate, for it avoided dynastic tyranny and mob rule. This is made clear by The Federalist [by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay] and other federalist writings of the period. A vestigial remain of this attitude is to be found in the poll tax still used in some of our [American] states as a prerequisite to the right to vote. This serves to disenfranchise [disfranchise] not only Negroes, but also the poor whites, that part of the population which is feared by those in control. (49)

Cousins points to the fact, moreover, that Hamilton and Madison not only were looking to ancient Greece for faults and virtues of the theory** and practice of democracy, but

* The New England town meeting, for that matter, appears to have been modeled after Greek "pure" democracy, in which there was direct participation by large numbers of citizens in one gathering.

** This theory, presumably, was based essentially upon Platonic and Aristotelian theories of democracy.

that " . . . they examined the Amphietyonic League, the 'council of neighbors' originally formed to look after religious matters, but which later increased its powers, especially in relation to interstate disputes," to find a basis for American Union. (50)

Thus, if the great bulk of historical research may be relied upon in the matter, there is good reason to believe that the early periods of American Union and eighteenth century so-called popular movements in France represented less of democracy in the modern sense than is commonly supposed. Sait, after pointing out that democracy was not born at the Boston Tea Party, at Bunker Hill, or with the French Revolution, offers a summary of conditions as they actually existed. He states that:

. . . . It would seem grotesque to describe the United States as a democracy in 1789, when the voters constituted only 3 per cent of the population (51)

The [first] French Revolution, if it gave currency to the idea of manhood suffrage, fell short of it in practice. If it took the Rights of Man* as its creed and made genuflections at appropriate passages in the ritual, its new faith was not applied literally in the region of mundane affairs. The middle-class deputies diluted the principle of equality when they framed the constitutions of 1791 and 1795. As devout worshippers of an idea, one might say, they gave ostentatious welcome to the clodhopper in their own pews when the democratic mass was celebrated; as calculating politicians they shrank from rude contact with him at the polls. Otherwise, why did they base voting rights upon a tax-paying qualification, with indirect election and a higher qualification at the second stage? Napoleon [I], it is true, invoked the plebiscite: he decorated the institutions

* French counterpart to the American Declaration of Independence.

of Consulate and Empire with a halo of universal suffrage; but what he gave was the illusion, not the reality, of popular control. With the restoration of the Bourbons [1814] even that illusion vanished. The vote was now restricted to persons of consequence who paid a direct tax of at least 300 francs. (52)

The American Revolution was still less than the French a democratic movement. Discontent had been aroused, not by the domestic institutions which the colonists themselves had built up, but by restrictions which an external authority had imposed. After independence had been achieved, the position of the propertied classes remained almost as secure as it had been before. The right to vote depended upon a property qualification in eleven states and upon a tax-paying qualification in the other two. Thomas Jefferson supported in 1776 and 1783 a property qualification in Virginia; and in later years, while endorsing the principle of manhood suffrage, he did not regard it as an essential element of republican faith. Nor did his followers generally accept it during his lifetime. The Declaration of Independence had no more practical application than the Declaration of the Rights of Man. The age of Jefferson was the age of aristocratic politics in the United States, of government by the rich and well-born. The voters, themselves a very limited body according to our present democratic notions, accepted as a matter of course the leadership assumed by men of wealth and social prominence. The Livingstons and Clintons and Schuylers governed New York, as the great planters governed Virginia; and John Adams declared that a few rich merchants could carry any election in Massachusetts. John Adams was, of course, no democrat. "Democracy is," he said, "the most ignoble, unjust, and detestable form of government, its only excellence being that it is the quickest to pass away." He was giving voice to convictions that were entertained, in the eighteenth century, by men of substance everywhere. Those convictions persisted well into the nineteenth century. In the New York constitutional convention of 1821

Chancellor Kent vehemently denounced the proposal to abolish the property qualification for the suffrage. "Such a proposition, at the distance of ten years past, would have struck the public mind with astonishment and horror," he exclaimed. ". . . The apprehended danger from the experiment of universal suffrage, applied to the whole legislative department, is no dream of the imagination. It is too mighty an excitement for the moral condition of men to endure . . . We stand, therefore, on the brink of fate, on the very edge of a precipice. If we let go our present hold on the senate, we commit our proudest hopes and our most precious interests to the waves."
(53)

Conflicting Hobbesian And Roussellian Interpretations
Of Democracy On The American Scene

In addition to a seeming paucity of democracy in the modern sense, in the prosecution of the early affairs of the United States, interpretations of the Constitution fluctuated between the Hobbesian and Roussellian views, a condition which, when taking the former course, appears to have indicated a further distrust of the common man and a desire to place -- or at least to preserve -- widespread checks upon his questionable intentions and aptitudes.

In raising the question of what is meant by the word sovereignty in the American sense -- whether it resembles popular sovereignty in the Roussellian sense, in which sovereign power resides at all times in the hands of the living majority, or whether it resembles the Hobbesian thesis, in which ultimate discretion regarding constitutional change, after being established by the majority, is transferred to

the existing government --, Mims shows that many early American leaders held that the majority, as it currently was interpreted in a limited sense, not only could establish, but alter or completely abolish, their pattern of government. This view was held by John Quincy Adams (in his references to "constituent power"), Mr. Justice James Wilson (Washington's appointee), George Mason (member of the Constitutional Convention), James Madison ("Father of the Constitution"), Sam Adams, Thomas Jefferson, Alexander Hamilton, and John Marshall (Chief Justice, 1801-35). Even so, Madison and Hamilton perhaps did some hedging by pointing to the ticklish business of allowing the people to exercise sovereign prerogatives and powers. They deemed it far safer to entrust matters of crucial discretion to the good judgment of a people's rulers than to the passions of an excited and aroused people. John Marshall also hedged in his view that the sovereign people could modify the powers of government at will, by pointing out that such action involved a most strenuous type of exertion and that occasions for resorting to it should be reduced to a minimum. (54)

Mims shows that, after the generation of Madison and Marshall had passed from the political scene, the fundamental principles of American government veered from a questionable allegiance to above-mentioned Rousseauian popular sovereignty toward Hobbesian governmental sovereignty. Men such as Daniel Webster (in his arguments before the Supreme Court

in the 1840's) and Chief Justice Roger B. Taney (from 1836-64, in his opinions in the 1850's) openly repudiated the basic assumptions of the principles of constituent powers in the Roussellian sense, and "within a few decades this [the Hobbesian] version of governmental sovereignty had become so widely accepted that a new generation of legal scholars, headed by jurists like Judge Cooley* and Judge Jameson,** were able to incorporate it without elaboration into the textbooks of American constitutional government." (55) Mims quotes Cooley, in his Constitutional Limitations, as follows:

The voice of the people, acting in their sovereign capacity, can be of legal force only when expressed at the times and under the conditions which they themselves [their ancestors, in this case] have prescribed and pointed out by the constitution . . . and if by any portion of the people, however large, an attempt should be made to interfere with the regular agencies of government, at any other time or in any other mode, than as allowed by existing law, either constitutional or statutory, it would be revolutionary in character. (56)

Mims goes on to show that the closer examination becomes of the pronouncements of Taney, Webster, Jameson, and Cooley " . . . the more obvious it becomes that they have stepped completely outside Rousseau's system of logic

* Thomas M. Cooley (1824-98) was Professor of Law at the University of Michigan, Justice and Chief Justice of the Michigan Supreme Court, and a well-known writer on constitutional law.

** John F. Jameson (1859-1937) was a prominent historian and Professor of History at Brown University, The University of Chicago, and Carnegie Institute, and was further associated with the Library of Congress.

in the direction of Rousseau's logical opposite, Thomas Hobbes." Mims goes on to point out that:

When the Websters and the Taney's and the Cooleys declare that, through the particular provisions of the constitutional charter of 1787, the majority has excluded itself from the exercise of certain types of power in the future, they are denying the primary assumption on which Rousseau constructed his entire system of thought (57)

In flat defiance of Rousseau they are saying that the majorities of 1788 were justified in using the device of majority rule to destroy the principle of majority rule, which logically should guarantee the majority of 1840 or of 1940 exactly the same prerogatives as to the majority of 1788 (58)

The heart of the problem would seem not to lie in the sanctity of the Roussellian outlook as opposed to the Hobbesian view -- it is not suggested that the Roussellian view is any more sacrosanct, per se, than the Hobbesian. It lies rather in (1) the elements of the respective theories which indicate them to be democratic or undemocratic and in (2) the confusion which resulted on the American scene because of the application of the two conflicting outlooks as bases, presumably, for judging democracy. Mims summarizes the conflict, existing because of dual interpretations placed upon majority sovereignty in the United States, as follows:

. . . . Every allusion to "the constituent power" of John Quincy Adams, or to James Wilson's "original and inherent and continued power of the society to change its constitution," or to George Mason's "indubitable, unalienable, indefeasible right" of the majority of the people "to

alter, reform, or abolish" an inadequate or anti-social government, will be countered with an equally vehement dictum from the Websters or the Taney's or the Cooleys, who during the past hundred years have institutionalized the primary Hobbesian dogma that there shall be no seditious or subversive activity against the existing framework of government.

For what we are confronted with, once we examine our constitutional traditions at all closely, is, on the one hand, a theory of popular sovereignty which renders the existing agencies and techniques of government subordinate to the will of a group outside the government, and, on the other hand, a theory of governmental sovereignty which renders all groups in the community subordinate to governmental devices and arrangements, predetermined generations ago. On the one hand James Madison can declare: "The authority of constitutions over governments, and of the sovereignty of the people over constitutions, are truths which are at all times necessary to be kept in mind." On the other hand the Senate Judiciary Committee in 1937, with Taney's and Webster's [views] . . . in mind, can declare: "But, if you say the process of reform by amendment is difficult and uncertain, the answer is, the people made it so when they framed the Constitution." On the one hand we have a flexible system designed to afford expression at all times to the principle of majority rule, and on the other a rigid system designed to place as many obstacles as possible on the operation of the principles of majority rule. . . . (59)

The Advent Of Modern Democracy

In Europe And America

Despite certain features which appear historically to have represented limitations on and inadequacies of democracy, the influences of events in the march of democracy

from ancient Greece to the American and French revolutionary movements contributed to gradual modification and refinement. It was not, however, until the nineteenth, and in many cases until the twentieth, century that the theory and practice of democracy began to take present form. Barnes agrees with other historians when he states that, "at the beginning of the 19th century, democracy [in the modern sense of the term] did not prevail in any country in the world, and only England, France and the United States had made any notable progress in that direction." (60) However, it should be noted that, although at the time concerning which Barnes writes Switzerland had temporarily lost her democratic gains because of French invasions, the Swiss probably had till then carried democracy farther than any other nation in the world.

In the United States, the administration of Andrew Jackson frequently is credited with inaugurating reforms which marked the beginning of modern democracy. Sait has found that:

. . . . Manhood suffrage then prevailed in fourteen of the twenty-four states; the property qualification, which had been universal in the eighteenth century, survived in only four. In the original states the process of change had been gradual, personal property appearing as an alternative to landed property in satisfaction of the suffrage requirements, these later giving way to tax payments of one kind or another, and finally tests being abolished altogether. The influence of the new frontier states had accelerated the process. There, social conditions among the homesteading pioneers

assumed a remarkable uniformity that reflected itself in politics; and the leveling ideals of the West, propagated by economic equality, served to encourage the democratic movement as it made headway in the East. (61)

Bryce, however, cautions against assumptions that democracy in the modern sense got its roots entirely in the New World when he states that:

. . . . The Americans . . . began soon after the Revolution to think of themselves . . . as a new people. They fancied their history to have begun from 1776, or at earliest from 1607 and 1620, forgetting, in the pride of their new nationalism, that both their character and their institutions were due to causes that had been at work centuries before, as far back as Magna Charta and even as [far back as] the Folk Motes of their primitive ancestors in the days of Egghbert and Alfred. Rather were they an old people, the heirs of many ages, though under the stimulus of a new nature and an independent life (62)

Although democracy, no doubt, had its beginnings in the Old World, it may be that Bryce is supplying questionable data to prove his point when he employs Magna Charta and English Folk Motes.* Barnes, with the support of other historians, thinks that:

. . . . The Magna Charta as a harbinger of modern democracy has withered before modern historical research quite as much as the Teutonic folk-moot. It did not mark a movement looking toward modern political liberalism, but was a

* Sometimes called Folkmoots or Folemots: early Anglo-Saxon national assemblies or councils composed of hundreds of townships, presided over by the sheriff, in which cases concerning important personages and lawsuits were tried and questions of making war or peace decided.

reactionary manifesto of the feudal lords who were irritated by the recent extension of royal power and in 1215 made an effort to pull England back into the decentralized lawlessness and local tyranny of the feudal period.* . . . (63)

Nonetheless, as regards early contributions to democracy by Britain, Barnes indicates that:

. . . . Before the close of the [seventeenth] century [in England], through successive concessions from the king and through the revolutions of 1649 and 1689, the bourgeoisie had dethroned two autocratic monarchs, had eliminated the rule of royal arbitrariness in politics and law, had brought about a predominance of Parliament in the government and had enacted into a constitutional document** those guarantees which have since come to be recognized as the most fundamental of human rights.*** (64)

Barnes goes on to say that:

While oppressive religious disabilities, exclusive property qualifications for participation in political life and the perpetuation of many of the social phases of mediaeval feudal aristocracy all operated to prevent England from being classed as a democratic nation in 1700, the fact that the middle class had created a constitutional system and had secured the complete domination of the Parliament -- the popular branch of the government -- constituted an epoch-making step toward the ultimate development of [modern] democracy. (65)

* These findings presumably became known after publication of Bryce's Modern Democracies in 1921. Bryce's work usually indicates agreement with other historians and democratic theorists, and gives every indication of scholarly research.

** This, of course, was a law, not a constitutional document in the sense of the American or Swiss Constitutions.

*** It is interesting to note that it was two years after the Revolution of 1649 that Hobbes published Leviathan. Because of stress of the period, Hobbes' primary interest seems to have been to establish order, not democracy.

Later events in Britain which led to modern democracy in that nation are traced by Bryce as follows:

The process of change by which Great Britain became a [modern] democracy was resumed in 1867 by an Act [Disraeli's Borough Franchise Bill] which lowered the electoral franchise in the boroughs, was continued in 1885 by another Act [Gladstone's bill of 1884], which lowered it in counties also, and was ended by an Act of 1918 which enfranchised virtually the whole adult population, women as well as men.* All these measures were accompanied by redistributions of seats [in Parliament] which have now made representation almost exactly proportioned to population. Thus the United Kingdom has now universal suffrage (66)

France in the Revolutionary Period, already mentioned in connection with the early United States as having manifested serious shortcomings from the standpoint of modern democracy, is noteworthy for other similarities to, and differences from, early American theory and practice. That phase of history which commonly is regarded as having brought democracy to the French began, as in America, not so much a popular movement as an opposition of the aristocracy to existing government. " . . . It was the nobles and the magisterial aristocracy of the provinces," according to Encyclopaedia Britannica, "who gave the signal for the revolt." (67) In France, moreover, as in America, democracy did not come abruptly. Differing from the United States, it underwent numerous and

* Severe property qualifications, which later were dropped, still remained in 1918 for women, as noted in the following chapter.

serious setbacks at various periods throughout the nineteenth century. However, as Barnes points out:

. . . . The calling of the Estates-General in 1789 [in France] is worthy of passing mention in any historical survey of the development of democracy because the first instance in history of the exercise of universal manhood suffrage occurred in the election of the deputies of the third estate. The most significant achievements of the French Revolution were the abolition of those economic and social aspects of feudalism which still persisted, the establishment of a constitutional monarchy in 1791 and of a republic in 1792. Though many of these reforms proved transitory, their effect was never entirely lost and they constituted the stimulus and precedent for the more gradual development of French democracy in the 19th century. (68)

All in all, the French scene has represented a curious mixture of democracy and autocracy. As The Encyclopedia Americana points out:

. . . . Loving liberty, the French people yet gave enthusiastic support to a commander [Napoleon I] who detested liberty for any but himself. Crying out for equality and fraternity they yet upheld a leader whose predominant thought was to impose his absolute will upon all others through every means at his command, and whose vision was that of absolute power. . . . (69)

Following the regime of Napoleon Bonaparte, the Bourbon dynasty was re-established in France in 1814.* In 1830, the Second Revolution established a monarchy of the House of Orleans. The House of Orleans was overthrown by another

* Some sources date the first Napoleonic Empire from 1804 to 1815 and the regime of the Bourbons from 1815.

insurrection -- the Third Revolution, in 1848 -- which resulted in the Second Republic and a proclamation of universal male suffrage. The Second Republic then "perished," according to Bryce, "at the hands of its [the Republic's] President [Louis Napoleon Bonaparte III], who had been elected . . . by an enormous popular vote, before there had been time either to create local self-government or to provide guarantees for the freedom of the citizens." (70) Louis Napoleon succeeded (in 1851) by means of a plebiscite of questionable character in prolonging his regime for ten years. By a second "popular vote" he succeeded in establishing a Second Bonapartean Empire to be hereditary in his family. Napoleon III, however, after capture by the Germans at Sedan in 1870, was succeeded by the Third Republic. The following year a new Assembly, elected by universal manhood suffrage to negotiate a peace with the Germans, named Adolphe Thiers Chief Executive of the French Republic. This phase was named a republic by a monarchist-dominated assembly, to avoid the responsibility (by the monarchists) of having to sign the stringent peace treaty imposed by the Germans. (71) Bryce, in summing up the paradoxical pursuits of the French to the period of the Franco-Prussian War -- first toward and then away from democracy --, states that:

Through these three monarchies, from 1814 to 1870, the centralized administration, as reconstructed by Napoleon [I], continued to exist, with the same autocratic powers.

But the spirit of the First Revolution . . . persisted in large sections of the urban population, and after 1830 its tendencies became more socialistic [by which Bryce appears to mean democratic] and aggressive. They burst into flame in the insurrection of the Commune of Paris in 1871, just after the Germans had evacuated the city.
(72)

Thus democracy went in France -- a series of successes and reverses, of gains and retreats. Yet, all through this series of progressions and regressions the basic governmental machinery (curiously established originally by Napoleon I) and the principles which later were to become associated with democracy in France became steadily more entrenched. There was no attempt to destroy the constitutional government by force after the Constitutional Law of 1875.

Switzerland, perhaps more than any other country in the world and surely more than any other European state, contributed to gains in democracy which eventuated in the concept as it is understood today. Although Swiss democratic institutions date back farther than those of other nations, democratic institutions in Switzerland (as in France, Britain, and America) were established -- or, more accurately, re-established -- and consolidated in the course of the nineteenth century. (73) Having made notable early strides toward modern concepts of popular governmental control, democracy in Switzerland underwent reverses during the early part of the nineteenth century, particularly as a result of Napoleonic invasions.

It would be difficult to improve upon Bryce's account of the transition in Switzerland which contributed to modern concepts of democratic theory and practice. Bryce relates that:

Towards the end of the thirteenth century three small Teutonic communities dwelling in secluded valleys to the south and southeast of the Lake of Luzern, entered into a league of mutual defence to protect themselves against the encroachments of the landowning nobles of the lower country to the north, to whose exactions, based on more or less doubtful feudal rights, they would not submit. Turning to account the strength of their mountain fastnesses, they repelled the repeated attacks of the Counts of Hapsburg, though never disputing the ultimate sovereignty of the Emperor, having indeed received favours from the great monarchs of the house of Hohenstaufen. Like the Englishmen who in the same age were wresting from the Crown a recognition of English liberties, they proclaimed no abstract principles of freedom, but stood on the foundation of their ancient rights. They lived off the produce of their own fields and woods and pastures, governing themselves by gatherings of the people in which every householder was the equal of every other. This was the beginning of [modern] democracy. After a time other rural communities were added, all being allied to the original three, but not necessarily to each of the others. In 1353, when Bern joined, the League came to number eight cantons. In 1513 the accession of Appenzell raised it to thirteen, at which figure it remained down till the changes induced by the French Revolution The internal political institutions of the allied communities varied greatly. The rural cantons were pure democracies, governing themselves by meetings of the people. Of the cities, some, like Bern, were . . . oligarchies of nobles: in others oligarchy was more or less tempered by a popular element. As the Confederation bound them together only for offensive and defensive purposes, each canton had control of its domestic affairs. The [Confederal] Diet met to deal with external

policy and . . . matters in which the cantons were jointly interested, and the delegates who sat in it acted on the instructions given by their respective cantons. There was, as in the United States between 1776 and 1789, no Central Executive

The French Revolution ushered in a period of storm and confusion. In 1798 French armies entered Switzerland. Much fighting followed. The old system was completely overthrown. A centralized . . . Republic was created, and vanished when a Federal system . . . was established by Napoleon in 1803. Change followed change. A new and larger Confederation was set up in 1815; and even thereafter unrest and dissensions continued till, after the short Sonderbund* war of 1847 between the Protestant and Catholic cantons had ended by the victory of the former, a new Constitution was created in 1848, which turned what had been a League of States into a Federal State, modelled in many respects upon the lines of the United States Constitution.** This frame of national government was, after long debates, further amended in 1874, and it is by the Constitution of that year (altered subsequently in certain points) that Switzerland is now governed. The territories formerly subject to particular cantons, as Vaud was subject to Bern and as the Italian districts now forming Ticino were to the three oldest Forest Cantons (Uri, Schwytz, and Unterwalden), were in 1903 raised into autonomous cantons, and all [male] Swiss citizens now enjoy equal political rights under cantonal constitutions, and under the Constitution of the Confederation. (74)

Canada, Australia, And New Zealand

Nations other than Switzerland, the United States, Britain, and France which are notable for contributing essential

* The Sonderbund was a separate league of seven seceding Roman Catholic cantons.

** See Chapter V.

characteristics and features to democracy in its modern form include Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.* Inasmuch as their political independence grew out of, and was based largely upon, that of Britain, short historical accounts of their democratic beginnings are taken up in Chapter IV in connection with modern democratic practice. (See p. 137 ff.)

Summary

It becomes evident that democracy has meant different things to different cultures and to different ages. Interpretations of democracy today are far different from those associated with the word historically, even as late as the nineteenth century. To look to Greek antiquity, to the beginnings of American Union, to early French revolutionary periods, or, in fact, to any period of history prior to the nineteenth and in some cases to the twentieth century for authority concerning the meaning of modern democracy would

* Although, as noted in Chapters I and II, there is considerable disagreement and vagueness in educational and lay circles regarding the precise nature of democracy and democratic education, it is commonly accepted opinion among political scientists and democratic theorists that Switzerland, France, Britain, the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand are representative of modern democracies. These nations do not represent the personal choice of this investigator. Rather this investigator has abided by the consensus that they are fundamentally democratic. Judging from certain writings on the subject, still other countries might be included. Czechoslovakia, for one example, is not included, however, because there is much doubt that it remains democratic today. Norway, as another example, is not included because it is not widely discussed in connection with democratic theory and practice. The intention has been to include only those nations regarded generally by political scientists and democratic theorists

contribute more to confusion than to clarity.

Although many primitive societies have adopted seemingly democratic forms of socio-governmental organization, manifestations of autocracy exist in the primitive's enslavement to specially privileged ways of acting and of thinking.

Ancient "Athenian democracy" excluded a majority of the total population from exercising any voice in government. Moreover, the philosophical outlook of Greek society fostered special privilege for certain ideas, a condition which appears to parallel conditions today in dictator-nations. The so-called Roman Republics came no closer to democracy, in the modern sense of the term, than did the Greek city-states. The same concept of exclusiveness of citizenship that prevailed in Greece existed in Rome. In Rome, large numbers of slaves and "foreigners" were excluded from the political life of the state. In Rome, to a more pronounced degree than in Greece, there was a paucity of democratic political activity within the citizen-body itself.

Early, Medieval, and Reformationist European religion, which largely dominated the civil as well as the spiritual life of the people, seems to have inherited all of the shortcomings of the Greek theory and practice of government and to have added some undemocratic outlooks and practices of its own.

as democratic -- nations regarding whose democratic form of government no question is apparent. This matter is clarified further in the next chapter.

Of pre-American and pre-French Revolutionary philosophers associated with democratic theory, Hobbes in particular embraced a governmental outlook which would eventually ensure an undemocratic form of government. And Locke, although in some respects embracing a principle of continual majority rule, advocated perpetuation of specially-privileged ideas which, in turn, appear to have contributed to perpetuation of undemocratic practices in Britain. Moreover, a majority of the people of whom Locke wrote constituted considerably less than a majority of the British population.

Even American Revolutionary leaders, frequently supposed to have founded the principles upon which modern democracy rests, had no great allegiance for democracy, in the modern sense of the term. Those leaders who would give currency to democracy at all favored many of the restrictions upon a majority of the people which had been imposed in Athens and Rome. Moreover, in later history of the United States, interpretations which were placed upon the Constitution and upon governmental practices in general seem to parallel the Hobbesian view by restricting current majorities from exercising complete sovereignty. France, although credited with democratic reforms, was slower than the United States in advancing democracy as it is regarded today.

Thus, although the march of democracy from Athenian antiquity to the American and French Revolutionary Movements no doubt contributed a degree of modification and refinement

to the theory and practice of popular government, social scientists and democratic theorists are in general agreement that it was not until the nineteenth, and in some instances the twentieth, century that democracy began to assume its modern meaning.

Of the various nations which played a part in this later transition and which, according to rank and file social scientists and democratic theorists, eventually adopted generally acceptable forms of democratic control, Switzerland, France, Britain, the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand are notable. Inasmuch as older interpretations of democracy differed so radically from new concepts, it would seem necessary, if progress is to be made in defining democracy and in deriving tenable implications for educational programs, to examine modern theory and practice in nations generally regarded as democratic.* In the next chapter, modern theory of democracy will be examined with reference to governmental practices in modern democratic nations.

* See p. 102, footnote.

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CHAPTER FOUR

CHAPTER IV

TWENTIETH CENTURY THEORY AND PRACTICE OF DEMOCRACY

PART I

Alternatives Of Democratic Association And Logical
Expectations Of Such Alternatives

The primary purpose of this chapter is to determine the nature of democracy -- to ascertain its features, characteristics, and basic principles -- not to defend it. American educators, because of the position taken by the American people, logically are committed to democracy at present and in the foreseeable future. But what might one regard to be the alternative or alternatives of democracy, with all its possible imperfections and failures of implementation? It would seem that an answer to such a question might serve both to establish the efficacy (or inefficacy) of democracy and to make it more understandable. By comparing democracy with alternatives, it may be easier to judge its value. And by comparing democracy with alternatives -- that is, by determining what it is not -- it may be easier to understand what democracy is.

Thus, what choice or choices are available in selecting a form of socio-governmental organization? What may one regard the logical alternative or alternatives of democracy to be? Thayer sees the choice as lying between democracy, with all of its faults and shortcomings, and an oppressive despotism:

Opposed to Democracy stands Despotism, which has many varieties, from the privilege, disguised or open, of a certain class, to the absolute authority of a tyrant. It rests primarily on brute force and assumes . . . that nine tenths of the race are born with bits in their mouths and saddles on their backs, and that the other tenth come into the world booted and spurred to ride them.

In one way or another the Despot draws the majority of brute force to his side, and thenceforth his control is comparatively easy until a stronger than he arises and wrests his power from him. By self-interest, he attaches one class to his fortunes; by oppression, another; by terror, a third. He finds it easy to dupe the credulous by claiming to reign by divine right -- a claim which, whatever its sedative value in earlier ages, cannot be treated seriously in our modern time, when we know the diabolical methods by which dynasties have been established. (1)

At best, Hook regards "all alternatives [of democracy] . . . to involve some form of benevolent despotism -- whether a personal or a class or a party despotism." (2) Hook's misgivings even of a "benevolent" despotism, however, appear logically to be well founded. He cautions that:

. . . The fatal objection to a benevolent despotism of any sort -- aside from the fact that people with different interests have different ideas of what constitutes benevolence -- is that no one knows how long the despotism will remain benevolent, not even the despot himself. We may appeal from Philip drunk to Philip sober, but who is to keep Philip sober? (3)

Hook goes on to contend that, in actual practice, there has "not [been] a single benevolent act of a despot recorded in history but [which] can be matched with scores of malevolent

acts. For every guilty man a dictator spares there are thousands of innocent men he dooms." (4) If any credence at all may be placed on reports which have come out of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy or which today are attributed to the Russian scene, Hook is thoroughly justified in his contention. Moreover, one might wonder whether, from a democratic point of view, there is justification either in sparing the guilty or dooming the innocent.

In a similar vein, T. V. Smith points out that:

The vices of our [democratic] politicians [politicians] we must compare not with the virtues of the secluded individual but with the vices of dictators. In this context, almost beautiful things may be said of our politicians -- by way of compensation, if not by way of extenuation, of whatever vices attend upon the arduous process of saving us from violence and murder. People elsewhere get killed in the conflicts of interest over which our politicians preside with vices short of crimes and with virtues not wholly unakin to magnanimity. (5)

There seems to be no inclination on the part of twentieth century democratic theorists, especially those who have thought the matter through carefully and logically, to gloss over the imperfections and shortcomings of democracy. However, these theorists do protest the tendency to compare an "ideal" despotism with a flesh-and-blood democracy, as practiced, and thus to confuse the issue between democracy and forms of socio-governmental organization which appear to be seriously at odds with democracy. What these theorists desire, seemingly, is to compare opposing socio-governmental

ideologies on a fair field, with no favor to any, in order to deduce the logical human consequences to be expected from each. In this connection Hook points out that:

. . . . The ideal benevolent despotism is a mere figment of the imagination; and even as an ideal, it is no more promising than ideal democracy. Moreover, it is wrong to compare the ideal form of benevolent despotism with the actual practice of democracy. If we intelligently compare the practices of both, whether in antiquity or in the modern world, the lovers of democracy need not fear the outcome. (6)

Thayer also " . . . would not screen Democracy from any charges, dark and unlovely though they be, which can be justly brought against it." (7) His view is that:

The sternest condemnation of its [democracy's] faults and shortcomings will best serve to correct them. But [he] protests in the name of Justice, against drawing a parallel between the perfection of the men, who never existed, under the oak, which never existed,* and the sins of Democracy, which we all know. (8)

In this connection, Thayer suggests that:

What we distrust is not Democracy, but its very imperfect counterpart. One does not need to be a Bismarck in order to satirize its failures, absurdities, inconsistencies, and ills: any fool can do that. The wise man . . . inquires in each case the conditions under which the Democratic experiment is made, and he remembers that the medium through which every system works, for better, for worse, is our finite human nature. In being worked out a theoretically perfect system cannot escape the defects of humanity. (9)

* It is assumed that Thayer refers to Rousseau's reference to a band of peasants directing state affairs under an oak tree. Rousseau, however, being familiar with current governmental practice in certain of the Swiss forest cantons, appears not to have dreamed up a fiction entirely.

Although it is not exactly what Thayer actually says, the foregoing statement suggests that many of the ills which are attributed to democracy are not in fact representative of democracy itself but are indicative rather of lack of democracy in certain respects. It is not inconceivable that a nation regarded as democratic might not be democratic in every way. The United States might justifiably be considered essentially democratic, without denying that there are practices in the United States which are undemocratic. As Follet has observed:

. . . . The so-called evils of democracy -- favoritism, bribery, graft, bossism -- are the evils of our lack of democracy, of our party system and of the abuses which that system has brought into our representative government. It is not democracy which is "on trial," as is so often said, but it is we ourselves who are on trial
 (10)

However, noting the criticisms of democracy and for the moment assuming them to be valid, what may one expect of alternative forms of socio-governmental organization in terms of practical, human consequences? A charge frequently leveled against democracy by its critics, from the time of Plato, is that majorities cannot be relied upon to make wise decisions. The nub of the argument is that, inasmuch as democracy represents government by the common people, democratic decisions are likely to be quite common indeed. It is claimed that mediocrity is embraced in place of excellence and that, instead of achieving improvement, democracy actually repre-

sents a retrogressive tendency as concerns advancement of civilization. Regardless of the validity of such criticism -- and it is hardly to be expected that the quality of democratic decisions will be any better than the ability and disposition of the people to make them --, who, it might be asked, is to make the decisions if not the people themselves? And if they are not to make them, by whom are they to be made and what are the practical consequences likely to be? If the people are to carry out their pursuits in ways of their own choosing -- if they are to realize their interests or goals --, who but they are to make the choices? Or, perhaps, human happiness and man-as-an-end-in-himself are not valid bases for judging socio-governmental organization. It has been claimed in the past and sometimes is contended today that man has been placed on earth to serve other than his own interests. If so, what interests is he to serve?

As regards the role of experts versus the people in determining what constitutes human welfare, Hook draws the lines of the argument as follows:

. . . . It [the argument] holds that, the ultimate end of government being human welfare, only those having the best knowledge and highest intelligence are qualified for the difficult pursuit of discovering the nature of human welfare. Since the problems of government are largely administrative, demanding knowledge and intelligence, and since an effective democracy presupposes the possession of both knowledge and intelligence by the majority of the population, which even the lover of democracy must admit is rarely the case,

democracy must be rejected. Plato put the nub of the argument in a metaphor: Who would propose that, setting out on a perilous journey, we should elect the pilot of the ship. And yet the pilot of the ship of state has a task infinitely more difficult, and the course of the vessel is beset by many more perils. What rhyme or reason exists, therefore, for electing him? Or as Santayana, a direct lineal descendant of Plato in political philosophy, put it: "It is knowledge and knowledge only that may rule by divine right."

Space permits only a brief indication of the Achilles-heel of this argument. While there may be experts in knowledge of fact, there are no experts in wisdom of policy. Ultimate welfare presupposes that there is an "ultimate good." But a conclave of philosophers gathered together to determine the nature of the ultimate good would resemble nothing so much as the Tower of Babel. Wisdom of policy depends upon knowledge of one's interests. It is true that some men are not clear as to what their own interests are. But it is arrant presumption for other men to pretend to them that they know what their interests "really" are, or what they should be. A parent dealing with children may sometimes be justified in asserting that he knows better than they what their real interests are; but any ruler who justifies his abrogation of democratic control by proclaiming that he knows what the real interests of the governed are better than they do themselves is there-with telling them that they are no more responsible than children. Besides oppressing them, he is insulting them, for he envisages their childhood as perpetual. It is not accidental that we call dictatorial government paternal. In paternal government, however, there is more authority than affection. The paternal ruler often takes his political children for guinea pigs upon whom he can try peculiar experiments. Their peculiarity lies in the fact that, whatever their outcome, the present generation of guinea pigs never recovers.

True, there may be no wisdom in electing a pilot or a cobbler. But in the last analysis, as even Plato was compelled to recognize, it is the user and not the maker who is the best judge of work done. Who wears the shoe knows best where it pinches. On this homely truth every theoretical attack on democracy founders. (11)

Dewey (12), Merriam (13), and Marshall (14), among others, note the same alternatives and conclude in general, as does Hook, that, although the common man may be unable to build a house, he can tell when the roof leaks and that, although he may be unable to cook a meal, he can tell whether he likes what is prepared for him.

It should be recognized that the foregoing argument holds only so long as one proceeds from the basic premise that social welfare is to be judged in terms of what a people as a whole, at least as expressed by a majority, regard as good for themselves. Such an argument, if it is to be logically sound, must stem seemingly from original recognition of interests, purposes, or goals as the bed rock criterion of human welfare. If one is unwilling to make such an assumption, it is understandable that one would favor autocracy. However, it would appear to be incongruous to claim to favor human goals as criteria of human pursuits and yet to be unwilling to trust the decisions of a people. The point seems noteworthy inasmuch as it is hardly to be expected that a would-be autocrat would publicly advocate that he is not interested in what the common people want.

There appears to be no reason, however, why democracy must of necessity sacrifice excellence for mediocrity. There would seem to be no reason, per se, why a democratic people could not or would not choose, for its leaders and for positions requiring a high degree of specialized competence, persons who are highly qualified. Aristocracy, as interpreted in standard dictionaries (15) (16) and encyclopedias (17) (18), is taken to mean either rule of a specially privileged minority, exclusive of the common people, or government by the best qualified citizens of a society. Aristocracy, when interpreted in the second sense, would be thoroughly in keeping with the democratic principle so long as the people retain free choice of, and control over, their governmental "aristocrats," a matter which is taken up more in detail later in this chapter. Obviously a people must be competent and favorably disposed to recognize and choose excellent leadership when it presents itself (a matter which also is taken up later). There would appear to be no insurmountable reason, however, why democracy must mean inferior leadership. As regards democracy and its alternatives, the issue would lie between governmental leadership sensitive to the popular will and arbitrary rule by a specially privileged minority. As Merriam states the proposition:

The curse of aristocracy is not that great men fill great places, but that small men fill great places and piece out their inferiority with arrogance. Truly

great natures are likely to find a response in the mass of mankind. They need not fear the Many as much as the jealous Few. In the very nature of aristocracy [as interpreted in the first sense above] it is difficult, if not impossible, to appraise the position of the aristoi properly, to be as expert and responsive to the problems of equitable distribution as of production. Aristocracy tends to identify the public good with its own material and spiritual values. Can aristocrats know what justice is when they are judges in their own cause? (19)

It might be well, moreover, for an intelligentsia to remember that, in cases of minority rule, it is not always mental superiority which is elevated to positions of leadership. Nazi Germany, as only one example, expelled or liquidated some of her most capable intellectuals, including those in colleges and universities, and placed in authority men of inferior ability.

Human Goals Or Interests The Criteria Of Democratic Association As Opposed To Alternative Criteria

In light of the foregoing considerations, the argument seems not to resolve itself into the proposition that democracy is but an ideal which probably cannot be achieved fully because of the selfishness and perversity of human nature. It seems, rather, to suggest that, precisely because individuals and minority groups repeatedly have demonstrated their greed and brutishness, the people collectively dare not relinquish their sovereignty to any individual or to any minority group. In this sense the basic motivation of democracy

becomes self-interest -- collective and (preferably) enlightened self-interest to be sure, but nonetheless self-interest -- instead of altruism. It would seem to be precisely because human beings have their own interests to protect that elementary caution and wisdom would indicate a democratic social order as the means of keeping inordinate ambition and aggressiveness in check. Democracy would seem not to require that human beings change their spots, but rather that, because human nature is what it is, democracy becomes a logical and practical necessity. Moreover, one may wonder whether it is not autocracy which requires the selflessness of altruism rather than democracy. It is difficult to imagine a more selfless people than one which is ground under heel by a tyrant. It would seem that such a group would have given to the utmost by relinquishing their own interests in order that a dictator might realize his.

From the standpoint of actual democratic practice, there is no question that the purpose of suffrage has been to register popular will or that the citizens of democracies have voted for their own interests as they saw them, whether wisely or not. Otherwise, why would suffrage have been established in the first place and why would a citizenry bother to vote at all?

However, returning to the argument that man's function on earth is to serve other than his own interests -- assuming that individuo-collective goals are not to be regarded as

criteria for human pursuits --, what may one regard the alternatives of human interests to be? An answer, though perhaps partial, may be found in alternative criteria adopted historically. In the past, man has been called upon to gear his pursuits to many different "glories" in preference to his own goals or interests. His activities have been irrevocably bound up, variously, with the glories of God, of empire, of race, of state, and of tradition. None in particular appears to have been dominant; man has sublimated his own interests to many different gods and to various empires, races, states, and traditions. If, however, a variety of criteria have been employed as bases for ordering the lives of mankind, these criteria all appear to have had a common denominator in the form of otherworldliness, or absolutism, or both. They all have required that mankind be regarded as a last consideration in the scheme of things, not a first.

With Plato, it was the absolute universal which was supreme, and man was to defer to various absolutes and to apply them in everyday life. In the case of Medieval Europe, it was the salvation of man and the Glory of God. The pattern has been the same essentially, whether thinking in terms of Mohammedism, Shintoism, or Nazism. A Turk willingly gave his life with full confidence that, if he did so in killing Christians, he would be assured a place in Heaven. A Crusader, on the other hand, was assured a place at God's

right hand if he died while killing Turks. Yet, curiously, both religions taught -- in other contexts -- that it is wrong to kill.

The essence of the argument employed against such criteria -- criteria which are regarded by adherents as the All-Knowing Purpose of Life and by opponents as extraneous -- is that, behind every metaphysical glory, there appears to be a finite interpreter to indicate the precise nature of the glory and what it requires of mankind in day-to-day pursuits and actions. Although there is no objection to the proposition that God should rule the world and that man should serve God, critics of such criteria feel that, actually and in every case, mortal men stand behind the scenes and call the moves. Moreover, it is not inconceivable that mortal men may get their Divine interpretations all mixed up with special worldly interests. As Abraham Lincoln, although fundamentally a religious man, is reported to have said to an adviser claiming Divine Origin for his advice, "If God had expected me to do these things which are of such great import to the people, I am confident He would have come directly to me instead of conveying the command by messenger."

As concerns the glory of state and the glory of race as bases for ordering daily human affairs, Benes observes that:

. . . . Fascism, which could not count either on an absolute monarchy "by the grace of God" or on God through the medium of the authority of the church . . . makes a god of its party, its nation and state. [italics in original]

Here we have the theory of the absolute state, which is not quite new, and which bears traces of its medieval models. But fascism has an absolute state without the absolute medieval monarch, who has had to be replaced by a modern absolute "Duce" or "Fuhrer." Fascism embellishes this theory with a curious irrational, sentimental, and emotional, almost religious, mysticism, which has its effect on the unthinking masses and which makes it easy for tired postwar [I] mankind not to think at all. In former times the masses entrusted themselves to the hands of almighty God and His church; later to the hands of the all-powerful king or tsar -- today they put themselves into the hands of this "Leader" inspired by genius. From the purely political point of view, there is scarcely any difference. (20)

For Benes there is little difference between Italian fascism, German national socialism (nazism), and Russian Stalinism, when contrasted politically with democracy. He saw Italian fascism as working for the regeneration of Italy and for the strengthening of her position among nations, whereas he saw national socialism as wishing not only to strengthen Germany but, through its "super-race," to dominate the rest of the world and transform it into the spirit of nazism. Benes distinguishes Russian communism as placing chief emphasis on class struggle, in the destruction of all classes and establishment of a classless society. All three ideologies embrace a dictator and a mystique.* In the case of communism, dictatorship is claimed to be only temporary,

* Sidney Hook also uses this term. See Chapter III.

until conditions become equitable and the people are able to take the reins of government. When that time will come, if ever, is a moot point. With fascism and national socialism, dictatorship is regarded as a permanent institution.

(21) From a democratic point of view, the catch in each case appears to be, as Swabey points out, that "the program, not the man [the people], is dominant." (22) She might have added that behind every program it is not improbable that the persons in power will give their own special interests higher priority than those of the people as a whole. It may not be unreasonable to contend that in such cases the people in effect will have substituted for their own collective goals the goals of individuals or of minority groups.

Thus, underlying every such criterion, there appears to be a mystique, an absolute, one person or a minority pulling the strings, and a relegation of the people as a whole to a position of secondary importance. Democracy, on the other hand, is attributed by theorists as looking to the actual consequences of finite acts eventuating from the common interests of all as the final test or basis of judgment of right and wrong. Instead of regarding such bases of judgment as absolute, democracy evaluates each case relatively as it works (or fails to work) in individual instances and under varying circumstances. Instead of leaving judgments to individuals or to minorities, the people themselves make the choices, either directly or indirectly. Finally, instead of

the people as a whole taking a position of importance secondary to a program or to some institution, all institutions and devices are considered as justified only as they contribute to realization of the common interests of all the people. As Bryn-Jones states the proposition:

. . . The democratic faith involves a belief in man as an end in himself. He does not exist merely as an instrument for the achievement of the purposes of any other organization or institution.
 (23)

And in another context, he states that:

. . . It is the assumption of democracy that the state exists to enhance and to further human welfare Whatever difference may have existed among liberal thinkers [as to how human welfare is to be conceived], there has always [in modern times] been a general consensus that the well-being of men and women was at once the aim of the state and the justification for its existence (24)

Bode, too, sees the goals of individuals and the common interests of all of society as the touchstone of democracy. However, he indicates, with justification (as indicated in the previous chapter), that the United States, for one democracy, has not been completely untouched by what democratic theorists regard as extraneous barriers to the realization of human interests. Bode contends that:

If we are to remain a democratic people, we seem to have no choice but to seek maximum development for the individual through the cultivation of a common life and to make the continuous extension of common interests our final test of right and wrong or of what is called progress. But when we act in accordance with this test we

come into collision with all the absolutes that have become encrusted in our tradition. These absolutes are not merely theological; they are also political and economic and social and ethical. These absolutes are often referred to collectively as "our American way of life," and it is innocently supposed that they represent the vital essence of democracy. (25)

Although there is little doubt that theological, political, and economic absolutes have become bases for arguing the efficacy or inefficacy of various matters prior to democratic decision on them or that such arguments have constituted a very decided deterrent to new and different approaches to various matters, still, in final analysis, traditional, religious, and economic absolutes appear not to have decided the issues in America, and particularly not in other democracies. The argument frequently is raised that the people of the United States must or must not do or enact certain things because such a course would be anti-religious or anti-God (whatever that may mean when analyzed in terms of differing religious beliefs and varying concepts of God). However, in actual practice, when the people of the democracies and their representatives have gotten down to cases, religious matters have been made to yield to whatever the people wanted.

The idea is widely entertained that democracy implies separation of church and state. If what is meant is that the church (or any church) does not take precedence over civil government, there may be justification for the claim.

But if it is meant that the church may always go its own way, regardless of society as a whole, the idea would not necessarily hold. Civil government in the United States, and in other democracies, has repeatedly restricted certain religious practices. There have been restrictions invoked in the United States against polygamy and against certain practices of snake cults, to mention only two. The reader may not recognize these matters as relating to his religion, but it is hardly to be doubted that they are, or have been, considered as religious matters by some persons.

In Switzerland today, ecclesiastical authorities are completely subjected to civil power. The Swiss Federal Constitution of 1874, as in case of the Constitution of 1848, forbids settlement in Switzerland by Jesuits and all affiliated religious orders. (26) (27) Membership in a Jesuit Order restricts persons by law from participating in any church or school activity in Switzerland. (28) Moreover, clergymen cannot become representatives in the Swiss National Assembly. (29) These restrictions on "religious freedom" are understandable in view of religious strife in Switzerland since the time of Zwingli and Calvin. Regardless, the fact of their existence indicates supremacy of the state over religious matters in a nation generally regarded as democratic.

France, too, has provided for "separation of state and church." Yet here also religion is subject to civil authority.

Separation of church and state in France, as in other democracies, has meant that no church now dominates the civil government. But this circumstance does not prevent the state from exercising control over various churches and religious activities. Encyclopaedia Britannica gives what appears to be a reliable and representative account of the situation in France as regards religion, as follows:

After 1905 Church and State were separated by law and public funds were no longer chargeable with the salaries of clergy. Religious organizations were not allowed to organize public schools save in the case of special schools training persons for educational service abroad, and such organizations as the religious orders of the Roman Catholic Church had to have the State's authorization before they could exist in France. These arrangements applied to all the republic save the departments of Moselle, Bas-Rhin and Haut Rhin, which were called Alsace-Lorraine, 1871-1918, under German rule; in these departments a special regime prevailed. . . . (30)

It is not unlikely that the peoples of Switzerland and France, as the people of the United States, recognize occasional instances of undemocratic conditions in their respective nations. Many persons in the United States, for example, feel that, in many cases, Negroes are treated undemocratically. However, there is no indication by democratic theorists or by historians that civil control over religion, especially as control pertains to overt religious acts, is regarded in these nations as undemocratic. On the contrary, historical accounts indicate that, especially in Switzerland and France, civil control over certain dic-

tatorial religious tendencies was necessary before democracy could be achieved. (31) (32) (See also discussion of Medieval religious domination of government, Chap. III).

Also true in practice, certain traditional absolutes (set governmental practices, for example, regarded by some persons as sacrosanct and not to be questioned) have constituted a potent force opposed to change in the United States (as noted in the previous chapter). But, in final analysis, these supposed absolutes also have given way to change, when the people really wanted change, as exemplified in governmental machinery and national ways of doing things since the beginning of American Union. And, as will be brought out in the next chapter, ways of doing things in other democracies, especially in the Australasian nations, have been more amenable to flexible treatment than in the United States.

Economic absolutes ("free enterprise," for example, in the United States) have been invoked in arguments calculated to prevent economic controls. But it requires no elaboration here to establish the point that government (hence, in a democracy presumably the people) has had the final word regarding economic policy or that economic policy in the United States has fluctuated repeatedly due to various causes. The same situation is true of other democracies, a matter which is taken up in detail in the next chapter.

Thus, the democratic principle appears in theory and in practice to be founded upon the interests and goals of

society rather than upon extraneous considerations. Alternative criteria take the form of the glory of God, of race, of state, of tradition, of an economic system, or of something else. The chief objection to the latter types of criteria is that mortal man (who might be expected to consider his own special interests foremost) appears to be speaking for God, that whatever is to be considered as a glorious race appears to come under interpretation by man, that the particular program of a state to be revered apparently must be formulated by man, and that, inasmuch as traditions (economic or otherwise) vary and inasmuch as some particular tradition must be drawn upon, man apparently must make a choice.*

* Extraneous considerations might be imposed knowingly by some person with a view toward securing special privilege for himself or by a person honestly convinced -- although any such idea, if it is metaphysical in nature, can represent no more than a conviction -- that some such consideration is the valid underlying purpose of mankind. In the first instance, there would seem to be roguery afoot and, in the second, unenlightenment. In the first case, the person behind such a movement would seem to be a charlatan and, in the second, a fool. It is not likely, for example, that Herr Doctor Goebbels, conversant as he was with philosophy, was confused in the matter of selling the German people on the a priori assumption of a German super-race. On the other hand, crimes appear to have been committed as a result of honest and sincere, although self-righteous, conviction by an individual that he is carrying out a supreme will of some kind. John Calvin may have thought he was acting in accordance with Divine Will when he had Servetus burned at the stake. But, for that matter, it must not be forgotten that an entire people might willingly embrace some such extraneous criterion without being cognizant of its enslaving influences. As Bode has said, "a tradition may be hidebound to almost any degree without necessarily creating a feeling of tyranny on the part of those victimized by it." (33) In

Thus, inasmuch as man appears to be doing the choosing in any case, regardless of the type of government or of the issue involved -- whether making choices in a dictatorship, an aristocracy, or a democracy, or whether calling upon extraneous considerations --, the question arises as to which man or how many men are to make the choices, for good or ill, regarding any matter, if democratic requirements are to be met.

Majority Rule And "Government By The People"
Re-defined With Reference To
Modern Democracy

Most definitions refer to democracy in terms such as "rule by the people" or "government by the people collectively." In 1918, Jones described democracy as:

. that system of Public Polity under which The Will of The People decides all questions connected with establishing and administrating Government; under which The People exercise the Power to Govern, and continue in the control of its exercise. (34)

such cases, the people may be playing the fool but hardly the knave, inasmuch as it is difficult to expect that the people themselves would play the part of a villain in their own cause. Such a possibility of willingly but innocently going against one's own best interests -- as well as the inability to detect some extraneous consideration being foisted upon them -- would seem merely to strengthen the argument that enlightenment on the part of a people is necessary if they are to achieve effectively their own best interests.

Standard dictionaries and encyclopedias describe democracy also in general terms "of the people." Funk & Wagnalls Standard Dictionary defines democracy as:

The political system in which government is directly exercised or controlled by the people collectively; government by the people, as distinguished from aristocracy.
 (35)

According to Webster's New International Dictionary, democracy means:

Government by the people; a form of government in which the supreme power is retained by the people and exercised either directly . . . or indirectly . . . through a system of representation and delegated authority periodically renewed, as in a constitutional representative government in which the sovereign powers are exercised theoretically by all the people, actually only by the electorate (voters). (36)

Similarly, Encyclopaedia Britannica defines democracy as:

. . . that form of government in which the people rules itself, either directly . . . or through representatives
 In modern representative government the people does not govern itself, but periodically elects those who shall govern in its behalf. (37)

The difficulty with such definitions, unless they are elaborated, is that historically "the people" has had quite different interpretations placed upon it, as noted in the preceding chapter. "The people" also ruled ancient Greece, but examination of actual conditions there indicates that women, metics, and slaves, actually a majority of the entire

population, were not enfranchised. Moreover, "the electorate," mentioned in Webster's, does not indicate what part of the total population is included.

Bryn-Jones seems to be no more specific in the following definition, when he states that:

When we speak of a democracy [*Italics in original*], we are thinking primarily of a form of government with definite characteristics, which broadly speaking may be summed up in the phrase "government by the many." Its features in the modern world are the responsibility of the government to the people; the choice of representatives by election on the basis of a broad franchise; the freedom of the people to discuss issues of principle, policy, and administration; and opportunity for the people, when they have formed an opinion, to make that opinion effective. . . . (38)

The preceding definition when taken alone, besides employing the undefined terms "the people" and "government by the many" -- the latter term was employed also by Greek antiquity --, mentions "election on the basis of a broad franchise," without indicating what such a relative term may be taken to mean.*

Lincoln's frequently quoted "Government of the people, by the people, and for the people" (39) is no less ambiguous unless it is known what "the people" may be taken to include. Regardless of what Lincoln may have intended by the utterance, such a description meant far different things to different persons and to different ages. To an abolitionist, such

* Bryn-Jones clarifies his meaning in another connection. See his quotation on the second page following.

a definition may have included the Negro race; to many slave-owners, Negroes were not considered as part of the people. Moreover, at the time of Lincoln's speech, woman suffrage was not yet even an issue. It is probable that many persons in Lincoln's day who would have concurred in his generalized definition would have been aghast at the thought of women having a voice in government, not to mention the possibility of occupying responsible governmental positions.

In 1929, E. M. Sait defined democracy as follows:

Democracy . . . can be defined only in one way -- as government by the people, by the adults or at least the adult males of the community. With such a clear-cut definition we know how to identify the phenomenon as soon as it appears. (40)

At the time of Sait's publication, it is understandable that he would leave woman suffrage optional, inasmuch as there were still democracies which did not provide it. And earlier, in 1921, although Bryce specifies the franchise for "roughly, at least three fourth's" of the inhabitants of a nation as requisite for democracy, (41) he apparently recognized adult male suffrage as adequate, as evidenced by his recognition of Switzerland (which did not, and still does not, provide woman suffrage) as being eminently democratic. "Among the modern democracies which are true democracies," Bryce wrote, "Switzerland has the highest claim to be studied." (42)

In 1939, however, Clark defined democracy as:

A form of government in which the citizens, i.e., all grown men and women, are consulted from time to time as to the major issues before the nation. . . . (43)

And Benes, in the same year, regarded

. . . the fundamental principle of democracy [to be] the consistent rule of the whole people -- not of an estate, not of a party, not of several estates or parties, but the rule and government of all estates,* all parties, the whole nation. [Italics in original] (44)

And in 1945, Bryn-Jones stated that:

. . . . The government will . . . be democratic, other things being equal, only if the franchise is broad and comprehensive and in the last resort is extended to the people as a whole. Exclusion from the franchise on the basis of property, education, race, or sex [italics not in original] is from this point of view a limitation of the democratic character of government. (45)

The foregoing interpretations, at the dates they were made, are typical. Apparently the date of publication of a book, even in recent years, has a bearing upon what "the people" may be taken to mean in defining democracy. Theoretical changes in these respects may be understood in view of changes in practice in nations generally regarded as democratic. Although the United States, in 1870, made it illegal to withhold electoral suffrage from any citizen because of "race, color, or previous condition of servitude" (the Fif-

* An estate is a European designation indicating a political class of people.

teenth Amendment) and although by 1919 eleven states had granted suffrage to women,* it was not until 1919 that Congress proposed an amendment to the Constitution granting equal suffrage to women throughout the Union, this amendment being ratified by the required number of states in 1920.

Britain, according to Barnes, which, "in spite of [her] titular monarch and aristocracy . . . is at the present day, perhaps, the most democratic of the great modern nations," (46) did not grant suffrage to women until 1918, and then it was of a questionable type. In order to prevent a women's majority, hence to allay fears that a women's party might become dominant, the age of voting was set at thirty, and only householders and the wives of householders were permitted to vote. It was not until 1928 that British women obtained complete electoral equality with men.

"New Zealand," which, according to Bryce, "is one of the purest of [the British] colonial communities, and, indeed, of democratic communities anywhere, comparable in this respect with Switzerland," (47) enfranchised women in 1893. And Australia, which, according to Barnes, has "passed far beyond [its] model [the United States] in the originality and extent of [its] experiments in social, economic and

* Wyoming, Colorado, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Arizona, Oregon, Washington, California, New York, and Massachusetts.

political democracy,"* (48) and which, according to Bryce, "has travelled farthest and fastest along the road which leads to the unlimited rule of the multitude," (49) provided women electoral equality with men in 1902.**

It was not, however, until 1917, although slightly earlier than the United States, that Canada provided the franchise to women. And in France suffrage was not granted to women until 1945.

Switzerland, which still confines the electoral franchise to adult males (except in a few individual cantons), is included in this discussion of democracy almost of necessity because of the many allusions made, and the high tribute paid, to her democratic institutions by rank and file political scientists. Aside from the one limitation noted, Switzerland apparently may be regarded as eminently democratic. As The Encyclopedia Americana describes Swiss politics, a description which is by no means unusual regarding that nation:

. . . . That country may claim to possess the only truly democratic government in the world. The Swiss have produced great results with small resources; they have shown what the plain man can do in

* Although it is true that Australia borrowed from the United States in designing some of her governmental institutions, still it must be remembered that Australian governmental institutions resemble those of Britain to a greater degree than they do those of the United States. (See next chapter).

** Woman suffrage was present in certain respects in the Australian states before it was adopted by the Commonwealth, similar to conditions noted in certain states in the American Union prior to federal adoption.

the way of government without help of a ruling class, of gentlemen of leisure, of millionaires or of professional politicians. . . . The Swiss have solved . . . difficult problems [relative to the usual shortcomings associated with democracy] with ingenuity and originality; they have evolved a political machine in which the frank and sure expression of the popular will and the smooth working and stability of government are obtained to far greater extent than in any other country. (50)

Nonetheless, as this investigation draws upon Swiss practice as an index to democracy, certain reservations, in the interest of accuracy, should be kept in mind as regards the suffrage, as compared with other democracies under consideration.

The Role Of The Interactive Majority-Minority
Relationship In Democratic Association

Thus, once in discussions of democracy it has been determined more specifically what constitutes "the people," government based on majority decisions or "majority rule," which seems to be a basic principle of democracy, becomes more understandable. For Bryce, majority rule defines democracy adequately. He contends that, although democracy has been defined variously, especially at different periods of history, today "it is better to employ the word as meaning neither more nor less than the Rule of the Majority, the 'classes and masses' of the whole people being taken together." (51) But if the majority, or if a majority, is to be

supreme in deciding various matters in a democratic country, what may one regard to be the position of one or more minorities? If the classes and masses of the whole people are to be taken together, as Bryce indicates, or if democracy, as Benes defines it, is to mean "the consistent rule of the whole people" rather than any segment thereof, (52) what status may one regard a minority to have? The question would seem to be important. Hook warns that, although the principle of majority rule is a necessary condition of a working democracy, majorities can, and historically frequently have, oppressed minorities. (53)

According to James Marshall, "the majority should respect the individualities and variations among dissenters and minorities" for, he contends, "perhaps the minority will prove to be right. Then it ought to be possible for the minority to become a majority." (54) Right or wrong -- democracy appears not, any more than autoocracy, to guarantee good decisions --, Hook is correct when he writes that:

There is common agreement that democracy . . . can flourish only when differences of opinion can be negotiated by free, critical discussion in which those who at any time, and on any question, are a minority, may become the majority, provided they abide by democratic processes.
 (55)

Moreover, aside from majority rule and the right of minorities to become majorities through peaceful persuasion, democratic theorists see democracy as residing in the col-

lective will, or what has become identified as public opinion.

As Follett states the proposition:

. . . . We are beginning to see now that majority rule is only a clumsy makeshift until we shall devise ways of getting at the genuine collective thought. We have to assume that we have this while we try to approximate it. We are not to circumvent the majority, but to aim steadily at getting the majority will nearer to a true collective will. (56)

And in another connection Follett indicates that:

. . . . We do not want the rule of the many or the few; we must find that method of political procedure by which majority and minority ideas may be so closely interwoven that we are truly ruled by the will of the whole. . . . (57)

Bryn-Jones sees the relationship between majorities and minorities as working itself out efficaciously, where democracy prevails, in the fact that a majority decision will never be quite what it otherwise would have been if it were not for minority influence and for dissenters to majority opinion. (58) In the first place, he contends, "the right of the minority [in a democracy] is the right to convert itself into a majority if it can, and the obligation of the state is to provide the conditions that will give it fair opportunity to do so." (59) As regards fusion of majority and minority thinking, Bryn-Jones sees minorities not only as having certain rights, but as having crucial responsibilities. He observes that:

. . . . It is customary to speak of the rights of minorities; it is more appropriate and relevant . . . to speak of their duties. The performance of these duties

will demand courage and may frequently involve sacrifice, but if the members of the minority realize that in displaying the one and enduring the other they are fulfilling a function vital to the successful operation of democratic processes, something is gained. The vigor, the persistence, and the courage of minorities may be the safeguards against the worst dangers of majority rule. Minorities must assert themselves -- in the public interest! (60)

Principles of majority decisiveness with the right of minorities to become majorities through peaceful persuasion, basic to democracy, appear not to be based upon metaphysical assumptions regarding the rights of men. Rather, majority decisiveness, taken by itself, represents the most effective means known for realizing the goals -- the self-interests -- of the greatest number of persons on any given issue. Moreover, the minority right to become a majority would seem not to eventuate from a priori assumptions or from altruism on the part of majorities, but rather from recognition of a logical, earthy, common-sense necessity based, again, on self-interest. Since, as Hook observes, "every member of the community is part of a minority at some point or on some issue," (61) it would behoove members of majorities, if they are wise, to enact nothing which restricts any minority from voicing opinions or from attempting to become a majority, if for no other reason than to protect their own interests under conditions in which they inevitably will find themselves at some time or other. Majorities, when they oppress minorities, while tending at first to

remain majorities, are inclined to dwindle in the long run, until eventually, what originally were majorities which oppress become minorities which oppress. The situation then becomes a matter of the "ins" and the "outs," as regards privilege, and the odds become progressively greater, as purging continues, that any given person will find himself in the ranks of the "outs." The transition from Weimar democracy to Nazism would seem amply to exemplify such a condition.

In general, the seven democracies under consideration all provide in practice for majority decisiveness and for minorities to evolve peacefully to majorities. Although it would represent nothing more than conjecture to comment on the fidelity with which public opinion has been translated into appropriate action, it remains clear that representatives of the people in various democracies have regarded public opinion, as they interpreted it, as of utmost importance.

As concerns "rule by all of the people," there are restrictions placed upon voting qualifications in all of the democracies. Whereas these restrictions vary slightly in various nations, in general they are based upon age, mental competence, residence requirements, compliance with the laws of the nation, and, in some cases, upon the solvency of the individual. (62) All democracies set an age requirement on voting qualification, usually at physical maturity, whatever that is regarded to be in various nations. The Swiss, for

example, set voting age at twenty, one year younger than voting age in the United States. Cases of dementia and amentia are excluded from suffrage, as are criminals in most democratic nations. In no case is an unnaturalized alien permitted suffrage. However, differing from Greek antiquity, modern democracies have provisions for naturalization of immigrants. A throwback to the old property qualification still exists in the exclusion of paupers from suffrage by devices such as the poll tax which in certain American states also appears to be a device calculated to discourage the Negro vote.

In addition to certain legal restrictions upon voting there are instances, particularly in the United States, of illegal restrictions which, however, instead of constituting limitations of democracy as reflected in the laws, are rather cases of breaking the law. As concerns the racial situation in the United States, Bryce observes that:

In 1868 and 1870 Constitutional amendments were passed (Amendments XIV. and XV.) intended to secure the suffrage to the (then recently emancipated) negroes, but the apparently sweeping provisions of the latter enactment have been in nearly all of the former Slave States so far nullified by State Constitutions ingeniously contrived to exclude the coloured people, so that less, perhaps much less, than one-fifth of these now enjoy voting rights. Members of Congress from the North and West at first resented, and sought means of defeating, these contrivances, but when a new generation arose, little influenced by memories of the Anti-Slavery struggle and the Civil War, interest in the question subsided [and] . . . the doctrine that every adult human being has a natural right to a vote,

though never formally abandoned, has been silently ignored. (63)

Thus, in light of actual practice and although there are exceptions as noted, Hook's appraisal of democracy appears fairly to represent its essential position:

A democratic society is one where the government rests upon the freely given consent of the governed By "the governed" is meant those adult participating members of the community, with their dependents, whose way of life is affected by what the government does or leaves undone. By "the government" is primarily intended the law-and-policy-making agencies, legislative, executive, and judicial, whose activities control the life of the community. In the first instance, then, government is a political concept; but in certain circumstances it may refer to social and economic organizations* whose policies affect the lives of a large number of individuals. In saying that the government rests upon the "consent" of the governed, it is meant that at certain fixed periods its policies are submitted to the governed for approval or disapproval. By "freely given" consent of the governed is meant that no coercion, direct or indirect, is brought to bear upon the governed to elicit their approval or disapproval. A government that "rests upon the freely given consent of the governed" is one which in fact abides by the expression of this approval or disapproval. (64)

Susceptiveness Of Democracy To Accurate Description
When Contrasted With Alternatives Despite The
Inexistence Of Democratic Perfection In Practice

Hook, although recognizing limitations of democracy in practice, has a reasonable argument when he contends that

* The relationship of various economies to democracy is taken up in detail in the next chapter.

democracy can be understood when differentiated from alternatives. He is aware that:

A direct consequence of this [his foregoing] definition may be that there is no complete democracy anywhere in the world. [However, he contends that] this no more prevents our employing the term intelligently and making comparative evaluation than the fact that no one is "perfectly healthy" prevents us from making the concept "health" basic to medical theory and practice. There is no absolutely fat man, but we can easily tell whether one man is fatter than another. So long as our definition enables us to order existing communities in a series of greater or less democracy, our definition is adequate. (64)

He goes on to point out that:

If a democratic government rests upon the freely given consent of the governed, then it cannot be present where institutional arrangements -- whether political or non-political -- obviously obstruct the registering or the implementing of the common consent. We do not have to settle any metaphysical questions about the nature of freedom in order to be able to tell when consent is not free. A plebiscite or election which is held at the point of a bayonet, or in which one can only vote "Yes," or in which no opposition candidates are permitted, obviously does not express freely given consent. These are only the crudest violations of the democratic idea but they are sufficient to make the pretense that the present-day regimes in Italy, Russia and Germany are democratic sound almost obscene. (65)

In this connection, Merriam draws attention to the proposition that:

. . . Freedom of discussion, freedom of association, in a relatively peaceful atmosphere, are the conditions making popular decisions possible. Obviously it is impossible to obtain a mass decision if

those who decide are intimidated, if they are not in a position to consider the questions of policy or personnel at stake, if violence and duress and the distortion of facts through the agencies of [censored] communication take the place of deliberation and free choice. . . . A plebiscite following a period in which freedom of association and of discussion are repressed is no plebiscite at all, but a cynical imposition of authority. The assertion that the people have voted and approved a policy or a person under such circumstances is of no significance except that those who have used force have mislabeled it consent. No intelligent person need be deceived by consent obtained in "robbery with a gun." (66)

Nonetheless, heads of governments which democratic peoples regard as thoroughly undemocratic and dictatorial are prone to claim that their governments are the only truly democratic regimes, or, at least, that they are more democratic than those of nominally democratic nations. Clark has recorded one such claim by Adolf Hitler as follows:

. . . . Herr Hitler . . . speaking to three thousand German ex-Service men at Munich on November 8, 1938 . . . said "Don't forget that I, the leader of Germany, have come to power according to the laws and the constitution of democratic Germany.* I still command the greatest majority in Germany that anybody ever had. When they speak about our having destroyed two democracies in one year I can only reply, No, that is a lie, I have not destroyed two democracies. I, the arch-democrat, have in this year destroyed two dictatorships -- the dictatorship of Herr Schuschnigg and the dictatorship of Herr Benes." (67)

* Hitler, to this point, may very well have been speaking the truth, although it should be added that his democratic elevation to the Chancellorship of Germany marked the beginning of a quick end to German democracy.

Clark also draws attention to the fact that "the Russian Press . . . has been known to include the Soviet Union among the great democratic powers." (68)

However, Rappard has noted that:

. . . . When attacking the form of government they [the dictators] most abhor, they are prone to divide their oratorical energies between the denunciation of its [democracy's] failings and the denial of its existence. This position, while obviously self-contradictory, is none the less, and, in fact, all the more, enlightening. It shows that however we define democracy, it is a regime inherently and essentially opposed to that of contemporary dictatorships and therefore, if nothing else, a historical reality. Like all historical realities it must be susceptible, if not of nice logical definition, at least of faithful description. (69)

Various Forms Of Government Defined

In Their Generalized Aspects

If, as is contended, democracy (and presumably any alternative form of government) is a historical reality, what may one regard as the basic characteristics of various forms of government? A better understanding of these various types of government may enable one to set democracy out in relief and thus serve to make more understandable some principles of democracy other than those already noted.

Although various types of government sometimes are given some such simple classification as monarchic, aristocratic, or democratic, not only in standard dictionaries

and encyclopedias but also in volumes on comparative government, (70) closer examination of the subject of government reveals many different designations. One not only encounters monarchy, autocracy, theocracy, empire, aristocracy, oligarchy, plutocracy, dictatorship, and democracy, but also several different conditions of each, such, for examples, as limited, constitutional, and absolute monarchy, and as pure, representative, and republican democracy. If, as is generally assumed, a fundamental dichotomy exists between democratic and undemocratic forms of government, it would seem important to examine the principles of various types of government in order to understand what conditions set democracy apart from its alternatives.

Various sources are in agreement that autocracy, strictly speaking, is "a term applied to that form of government which is absolute and vested in one single person" (71) Funk & Wagnall's Standard Dictionary refers to "the rule or authority of an autocrat" and to "absolute government." (72) Webster's New International Dictionary describes autocracy as constituting "independent or self-derived power, absolute supremacy, the uncontrolled authority of an autocrat, [and] government by an individual possessing supreme power," listing as synonyms of autocracy "monarchy, despotism, and absolutism." (73) The Encyclopedia Americana points to absolute governmental power vested in a single person who unites in himself the legislative and executive

powers of the state* and who rules uncontrolled by the people at large. This source indicates that many governments in the ancient and more recent East were of this type, as well as those of the late czars of Russia. (74) In light of the foregoing definitions, autocracy represents an extreme form of minority rule (by one person), with complete (or absolute) unaccountability of the ruler to society at large as regards matters which concern the whole people.

Inasmuch as monarchy is included as a synonym of autocracy (in Webster's among other sources), it would be expected that monarchy would have essentially the same characteristics as autocracy. In the strict sense of both words, such is the case. However, as indicated previously, there are different conditions of monarchy. Although Funk & Wagnall's Standard Dictionary defines monarchy as "government by . . . [a] single sovereign ruler," this source indicates that a monarchy may be "hereditary or elective, autocratic or restricted by constitutional provisions." (75) Webster's New International Dictionary also gives the dual interpretation, indicating that monarchy, when taken to mean "sovereignty of a single person, now [is] rare." This source indicates that "a monarchy is called an absolute monarchy when there are no constitutional limitations on the monarch's power [and] a limited, or constitutional, monarchy

* Americana might also have included judicial powers.

when there are such limitations." (76) Encyclopaedia Britannica explains the different emphases of meaning placed upon monarchy and the circumstances which account for these differences as follows:

Monarchy, strictly, [means] the undivided sovereignty or rule of a single person. . . . Hence the term is applied to states in which the supreme authority is vested in a single person, the monarch, who in his own right is the permanent head of the state. The word has, however, outlived this original meaning, and is now used, when used at all, somewhat loosely of states ruled over by hereditary sovereigns, as distinct from republics with elected presidents; or for the "monarchical principle," as opposed to the republican.

The old idea of monarchy, viz. that of the prince as representing within the limits of his dominions the monarchy of God over all things, culminated in the 17th century in the extreme version of the doctrine of the divine right of kings, and was defined in the famous dictum of Louis XIV.: L'etat c'est moi! The conception of monarchy was derived through Christianity from the theocracies of the East; it was the underlying principle of the mediaeval empire and also of the mediaeval papacy, the rule of the popes during the period of its greatest development being sometimes called "the papal monarchy." The monarchical principle was shaken to its foundations by the English revolution of 1688;* it was shattered by

* The Stuart Restoration in 1660 (Charles II, 1660-85), which followed the Commonwealth Protectorate of Oliver and Richard Cromwell (1649-60), was attended by a period of reactionary license. James II (1685-88) added to his already unpopular position due to his, and earlier, his brother's (Charles II) reactionary tendencies, by attempting to restore the Roman Catholic Church, as a result of which he was deposed by Parliament in the Revolution of 1688, after which time the power of the British monarchs was severely curtailed.

the French revolution of 1789,* and though it survives as a political force, more or less strongly, in many European countries, "monarchists," in the strict sense of the word, are everywhere a small and dwindling minority. To express the change [in the meaning of the word "monarchy" when used to designate any government in which the political head is called a king or prince, regardless of the authority he may exercise or the manner in which political power is distributed (77)], phrases were invented which have come into general use, though involving a certain contradiction in terms viz. "limited" or "constitutional monarchy," as opposed to "absolute" or "autocratic monarchy."

Finally, a distinction is drawn between "elective" and "hereditary" monarchies.
 (78)

Thus, in view of the preceding definitions of monarchy and the changes which have occurred in the meaning of the word, it might reasonably be expected today that monarchy, in one form or other, could represent various types of government from the standpoint of democracy and alternatives. If any credence may be attached to the general consensus of political scientists that Britain today is a rather thorough-going democracy, then it would seem that a limited, titular monarchy might take democratic form. On the other hand, an absolute monarchy, patterned after the older emphasis of the word, would resemble autocracy, in the strict sense of that word, in every respect.

* It must not be forgotten, however, that Napoleon I, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, called himself Emperor and exercised all of the powers of an absolute monarch.

Emperership* is defined by virtually all sources in essentially, if not exactly, the same way as autocracy.

Webster's New International Dictionary defines emperor as "the sovereign or supreme monarch of an empire (79)

According to Funk & Wagnall's Standard Dictionary, the title of emperor is "considered superior in dignity to that of king," (80) and similarly, The Encyclopedia Americana refers to the title as "the highest rank of sovereigns."

(81) The word, which is derived from the Latin imperator, from imperare, to command, and which is akin to imperium, authority, was employed originally, in most cases, as an honorary title for victorious Roman generals during the time of the Roman Republic. However, as indicated by The Encyclopedia Americana, imperator became, after the overthrow of the Roman Republic, "the title of the rulers or emperors who assumed to themselves personally every department and privilege of civil and military imperium." (82) Emperor, in the strict (autocratic) sense of the word, became the title of Charlemagne and remained the title of succeeding sovereigns of the Holy Roman Empire. And, as indicated in Funk & Wagnall's Standard Dictionary:

. . . . The last of these [Holy Roman] sovereigns, Francis II., took the title as hereditary emperor of Austria in 1804. Peter the Great of Russia assumed the title of German Emperor (Deuscher Kaiser) in 1871. Queen

* The word is coined by this investigator. Curiously, there appears to be no word which corresponds to emperor as monarchy corresponds to monarch or as autocracy corresponds to autocrat.

Victoria became Empress of India, May 1, 1876, under the Royal Titles Bill passed by Parliament, April 27, 1876; hence the King of England . . . [was, until India received her independence after the close of World War II.] also Emperor of India. In 1804 and 1852 the first and second empires were established in France under the first and third Napoleons. Mexico and Hayti have had emperors, and in 1822 Brazil became an empire (now a republic).* The Sovereigns of Japan, Abyssinia, and formerly of China have often been called emperors by Europeans. (83)

Thus, in final analysis, emperorship, as monarchy, has had different connotations. Whereas, in the strict sense of the word, it may be used to indicate absolute sovereignty (by one man) of an empire, the word has been employed in instances in which the bearer of the title had no such absolute power, and, in fact, in which no empire in the strict sense existed. The English title of Emperor of India appears to have had no more political significance in recent years than the present-day English title of king. Moreover, although the power of Mexican and Haitian rulers at various times has been absolute enough, no empire has seemed to exist.

On the other hand, the title has been employed in numerous instances to denote actual presence of absolute supremacy of a single man at the head of an empire, as in

* Some of these nations in the New World change forms of government so frequently that it is not possible to determine from the names applied whether government is truly republican or dictatorial.

case of Napoleon Bonaparte. The position of the Japanese emperor, Hirohito, has not in recent years been clearly understood, although today (1951), even if it were not for the presence of American occupation troops in Japan, the consensus is that Hirohito is no more than the titular head of the Japanese nation. Haile Selassie, on the other hand, before and since the Italian occupation of his country, has been considered as absolute ruler of Ethiopia. Thus, emper- orship, as monarchy, may be taken to represent various forms of government, as concerns democracy and alternatives, depending upon where, in fact, true sovereignty of a nation or empire resides.

As indicated previously in this chapter, the word aris- tocracy has had placed upon it the dual interpretation either of government by the best or rule of a minority, ex- clusive of the people as a whole. But if "the best" is taken to mean that the most capable representatives are chosen by society at large and remain under control of that society, such a condition appears not to have been called aristocracy, but rather democracy.* On the other hand, if aristocracy is to be considered as rule by a minority which is unaccountable to society at large -- the situation as it has seemed in practice to work out --, a condition would exist which is basically at odds with democracy. In spite

* See discussion on democratically delegated authority in the next chapter.

of the fact that Webster's New International Dictionary places major, although not entire, emphasis upon rule by the best qualified citizens, (84) in spite of the fact that Encyclopaedia Britannica while likening aristocracy to oligarchy looks upon aristocracy as minority rule in the best interests of society* and oligarchy as rule by a self-centered, corrupt minority, (85) and in spite of the fact that The Encyclopedia Americana shows that the word aristocracy, etymologically, has been taken to mean the rule by the best, (86) the last-mentioned source points out correctly (according to this investigator's findings) that the more usual significance of the word has been:

. . . any system of government in which the right to govern is vested in a few; an oligarchy. From its strict political meaning and the fact that most aristocracies have been hereditary, it [the word] has taken on the secondary significance of any hereditary caste which has claimed or has been accorded a superior rank in social [and governmental] matters. The ancient Spartan state, the Athenian state before the Persian wars, the Roman republic are good examples of communities where the aristocratic tendencies predominated. Though mediaeval feudalism involved the existence of privileged classes, the dominating aspect of the system was a graduated hierarchy of absolute monarchs. . . . [However, then and later], when a weak monarch or dynasty came on the throne, as was the case with the house of Valois in France [1328-1589] or the four Georges in England, it became easy for vigorous noble families

* This would appear to be a matter of opinion based upon differing interests, as indicated in an earlier discussion of aristocracy in this chapter.

to assume the real control of the state.
. . . . (87)

Hence, for all practical purposes, aristocracy usually has indicated the same prerogatives for a small minority of persons which have been exercised by absolute autocrats, monarchs, and emperors. Whereas, in the latter case, government has taken the form of absolute rule by one person, the former has constituted absolute rule by a very few persons, exclusive of a great majority of the people when taken as a whole.

Then again, aristocracy in modern times has been preserved as a kind of traditional symbolism in much the same way as limited monarchy, as in England, where the titular aristocracy has no more political power than the titular monarch.

Thus, it would appear that aristocracy may be taken to indicate supreme, absolute rule by a minority of persons or to indicate simply the existence of a group of figure-heads whose titles have carried down from former times but who, in fact, exercise no more political power, individually, than do commoners provided with an equitable franchise. In this sense, as regards democracy and alternatives, so-called aristocracy may represent more than one form of government.

In defining oligarchy, however, there is no such equivocating as in case of aristocracy. Oligarchy is defined by standard encyclopedias (88) (89) and dictionaries (90) (91) simply as the term applied to government in which

supreme power is vested in a small class of persons or in a few ruling families. And, whereas plutocracy is defined by the same sources as governmental rule by the rich, there would seem to be no basic difference between plutocracy and oligarchy inasmuch as the wealthy historically have been relatively few as compared with the whole of society and inasmuch as it might be expected (and historically has been the case) that, if any great importance is placed upon wealth, an oligarchy, if its members are not already wealthy, will make sure, through special privilege, that it soon will become so.

Theocracy -- derived from the Greek words Theos, God, and kratos, power -- is regarded by various sources as a form of government based upon the authority of God and His laws. As indicated by The Encyclopedia Americana, "the priests in such a government are the promulgators and expounders of the divine command [and] the representatives of the invisible Ruler." (92) Although this source regards "the most notable theocratic government of all times [as] . . . that established by Moses among the Israelites" and points to the Puritan government of Massachusetts as a possible one, (93) most if not all absolute monarchs have claimed to rule by Divine Right, as evidenced by the Holy Roman Emperors as one further example among many. But, as concerns the worldly scene, there would appear to be no essential difference between absolute power by "the Grace

of God" and absolute power which is admittedly self-derived. From a purely political point of view, the situation would still represent absolute authority vested in one person -- or, in case of a priestly hierarchy, in a small minority --, with no recourse for a great majority of the people concerned.

Dictatorship is the most frequently encountered modern equivalent of the absolute monarchies of former times, the difference between the two being -- and this is more of a distinction than a difference -- that dictatorship, as noted in previous pages in quotations from Benes, draws upon the "glory of state" instead of the "glory of God" as the basis of authority. And, as Wilson indicates, modern dictators have not obtained their positions through hereditary lines as was almost exclusive practice previously.

(94) Funk & Wagnall's Standard Dictionary defines dictator as "a person having absolute powers of government" (95), and Webster's New International Dictionary defines dictatorship as "the office, or term of office, of a dictator; hence, absolute authority or power." (96) Thus, in light of the foregoing and other descriptions, (97) dictatorship represents essentially the same type of power politically as autocracy, when the latter term is interpreted in the strict sense.

Definitions of democracy include references to various conditions of democracy (as in case of monarchy), such as

direct and indirect, pure and representative, and absolute (pure) and republican (representative) democracy. Funk & Wagnall's Standard Dictionary defines democracy as:

. . . . A commonwealth in which the people as a whole legislate and choose executive and judicial officers, either (1) directly as in some of the ancient Greek states in which the sovereign powers were exercised directly in popular assemblies, and many towns in the United States (pure democracy), or (2) through elected representatives, as in every State of the United States (democratic republic). (98)

According to Webster's New International Dictionary, democracy represents:

Government by the people; a form of government in which the supreme power is retained by the people and exercised either directly (absolute, or pure, democracy) or indirectly (representative democracy) through a system of representation and delegated authority periodically renewed, as in a constitutional representative government in which the sovereign powers are exercised theoretically by all the people, actually only by the electorate (voters) [which, however, as established in previous pages, include the great majority of the people, with the exception of Switzerland which does not enfranchise women] Specifically, and commonly in modern use, a democracy is a representative government where there is equality of rights without hereditary or arbitrary differences in rank or privilege, and is distinguished from aristocracy. . . . (99)

Although no principal nation today is small enough to practice pure (or absolute) democracy nationally, there are instances within representative democracies in which pure democracy is carried on. As Bryce describes the Swiss scene:

The cantons [the Swiss equivalent of the American states] . . . fall into two classes -- those ruled by primary, and those ruled by representative assemblies. Four, viz. two whole cantons (Uri and Glarus) and four half-cantons [the two Unterwaldens, Obwalden and Nidwalden; and the two Appenzells, Appenzell Ausser-Rhoden and Appenzell Inner-Rhoden], all of them small and all among the older cantons,* have retained or returned to . . . a primary assembly, in which every adult male citizen can speak and vote. The assembly[s'] . . . manner of doing business resembles that of the Town Meeting in New England. It meets once a year in the open air under the presidency of the annually elected Landaman, enacts laws or ratifies those previously passed by the Council, passes resolutions, settles current questions such as those that relate to finance and public works, and elects both the principal officials, including the judges, and (as a sort of standing committee) an Administrative Council. In cantons where the number who attend the Assembly is not too large to be reached by the voice, every one can speak, and can present a proposition. A smaller council, which manages the less important current business, is chosen by the citizens in local divisions. This is the oldest, simplest, and purest form of democracy which the world knows. (100)

Aside from direct rule of popular assemblies, which have disappeared except in the Swiss Forest Cantons and in certain municipal governments in the United States, and aside from direct voting through the initiative and referendum which is not dependent on the legislature, Bryce

* The cantons mentioned by Bryce, and those supplied from other sources, joined the Swiss League (now, a Confederation) on the following dates: Uri, Obwalden, and Nidwalden, in 1291; Glarus, in 1352; Appenzell Ausser-Rhoden and Appenzell Inner-Rhoden, in 1513.

lists three main types of democracy in practice: the parliamentary and cabinet system of Britain, reproduced in British Self-Governing Dominions and in France; the Presidential system of the United States, adopted in many other American republics [some of which, however, constitute military dictatorships for all practical purposes]; and the Executive Council system of Swiss Confederation.

(101)

Thus, in democracy, as in monarchy, there is evidence of varying emphases on the term. However, there is one crucial difference as regards these gradations. Whereas absolute and limited (or constitutional) monarchy imply a basic difference as concerns the number or proportion of persons of a nation with a voice in government, pure and representative democracy (along with all other variations noted) merely indicate different approaches for registering the opinion of virtually all of the population, rule by the great bulk of the people remaining a basic feature of democracy of whatever kind.*

* In the following pages, when phrases such as "virtually the entire population," "the great bulk of the people," and the like, are employed with reference to democratic sovereignty, the qualifying terms are included to recognize that relatively small proportion of persons in modern democratic nations, such as aments, dements, criminals, minors, etcetera, who are not enfranchised. All phrases such as "the people," "popular will," and "society at large," should be interpreted in light of foregoing definitions of what constitutes "the people" in modern democratic nations. See past discussion under the topic heading, "Majority Rule And Government By The People Re-defined."

Rule By All As Opposed To Minority Sovereignty
The Basic Division Separating All Forms
Of Governmental Control

The foregoing examination of various kinds of government brings the discussion back to a basic dichotomy between minority rule (from the rule by one to the rule by less, and in most cases much less, than half the people) and rule by virtually all of the people of a nation. Regardless of what type of government is considered and regardless of minor distinctions without real differences, the basic difference -- when a real difference exists -- appears to reside between minority rule and rule by virtually all of the people. In the first instance, no voice in government is exercised by any but the ruling minority. In the second, majorities are decisive on any given issue, and minorities may become majorities by means of peaceful persuasion. That is, virtually all of the people are entitled to a hearing where democracy is concerned.

Autocracy, in the strict sense of the word, represents absolute authority of one person to decide what the people as a whole must or must not do, without recourse, short of revolution, by the people as a whole. Although the people at large must abide by and bear the brunt of decisions made by an autocrat, the autocrat, nevertheless, remains unaccountable to the people as a whole.

Although monarchy, in the broad sense of the word, may represent absolute government by one person, or haphazard monarchical rule in which an aristocracy actually takes over the reins of government, or a titular monarchy in which the people as a whole govern for all practical purposes, the dividing line as regards these various kinds of monarchy still exists between minority rule and rule by virtually the whole people. Minority sovereignty would be in evidence in the first two instances noted, and sovereignty by society at large in the last.

Emperorship resembles monarchy in crossing the line dividing sovereignty vested in a minority and that residing in the whole of society. If an emperor's power is absolute and final, his position resembles absolutism in autocracy or monarchy. If he is nothing more than a figurehead, then either an absolute aristocracy or oligarchy may rule for all intents and purposes* or virtually all of the people may be invested with supreme sovereignty, as appears to have been the case where the British monarch's title included that of emperor. Here again, however, the basic difference, from a governmental point of view, would lie in popular as opposed to minority sovereignty.

Aristocracy, when interpreted as government by "the best," conceivably could apply to the democratic principle.

* The military clique in Japan is regarded to have been supreme before and during World War II.

At least, it is to be hoped (although it cannot be guaranteed) that "the best" will be selected to represent the people in a democratic nation.* However, this does not appear generally to have been the interpretation placed on the word. For all practical purposes, aristocracy has been the term used historically to denote absolute rule by a hereditary, specially privileged class of persons -- a minority -- from whose decisions there has been no appeal by the great bulk of a nation's population. In later years, aristocracy sometimes assumed approximately the same political significance (or insignificance) as titular monarchy, as in Britain. If, however, one is to regard aristocracy as constituting democratically delegated governmental leadership, then society as a whole would still remain supreme. And if, as in case of Britain, the titled aristocracy is preserved as a popularly desired symbolism, but the great bulk of all the people control all governmental matters, the democratic principle would remain intact. If, on the other hand, a minority group of aristocrats actually controls all governmental matters, unaccountable to the people as a whole, the minority principle of sovereignty would be in evidence. Thus again, wherever a basic difference exists between various applications of the word aristocracy, the difference resides

* It must be remembered that an absolutistic type of aristocracy cannot guarantee excellence either.

between minority and popular control.

Oligarchy represents a clear-cut condition of absolute minority sovereignty, undifferentiated essentially from aristocracy in the last instance noted above. Theocracy, too, in the sense that a priestly hierarchy is supreme concerning worldly decisions, resembles absolute rule by an aristocracy or oligarchy.

Dictatorship would not differ politically from absolute autocracy or absolute monarchy, unless, of course, the dictator chooses to consult a small minority which he gathers around himself.* But a dictator, as well as an absolute autocrat or monarch, being supreme, would not have to consult anyone at all. Regardless, there would be no difference, as concerns minority and popular sovereignty, whether a dictator makes all decisions himself concerning a nation or whether he consults a small group of confidants. Minority rule would be dominant in either case.

Democracy, as in case of monarchy and emperorship, exists in more than one form, the two usual types having been pure and representative democracy. However, as suggested earlier, both of these types are founded upon interactive majority-minority supremacy, the only difference being in the method employed in implementing the public will.

* Absolute monarchs, though, have maintained ministers and advisors.

Whichever type is adopted appears to depend upon practical considerations having to do mostly with the physical size of the nation in question, the circumstances under which democracy is practiced, and the wishes of the people concerned.

Democracy Designated As Any Form Of Popular
Sovereignty And Autocracy As Any Form
Of Minority Sovereignty

Thus, in viewing what appears to be a representative picture of different kinds of governmental control, various forms of government divide into two basically different types: those in which supreme, absolute sovereignty is vested in a small part of a people and in which the remainder of the population has no voice in the government; and those in which sovereignty is vested in all of the people, in which virtually every adult member of the society has a voice in government. For the sake of simplicity and clarity, it is proposed henceforth in the investigation to designate all forms of government of the first type as autocratic, or as representing autocracy, and all forms of government of the second type as democratic, or as representing democracy.* By distinguishing the two opposing principles of socio-gov-

* This practice is followed widely by democratic theorists and by political scientists, despite the fact that no such usage may be found in the usual dictionary references.

ernmental organization thus, it is thought that confusion may be avoided in instances, for example, in which a nominal monarchy might conceivably represent either minority sovereignty, in the first sense noted above, or popular sovereignty, in the second, depending on the number or proportion of persons in whom governmental sovereignty is vested. In this sense, then, autocracy represents minority sovereignty with no provision for the others of a society to register or to implement their opinions regarding governmental matters, and democracy represents the opportunity for virtually all of the members of a society to register and implement their opinions, and for majority opinion in any given instance to prevail.* But is this, the number or proportion of persons

* It has been noted that, although modern democracy provides for majority decisiveness on any given issue, democratic majority decisiveness implies fluidity. Both modern theory and practice indicate that, in order for democracy to prevail (for long, at least), minorities must have the right through peaceful persuasion to become majorities on given issues. Otherwise, there comes into being a static majority which, if it deprives the others of a voice in government, becomes a majority which oppresses. As noted, a static majority which oppresses tends to dwindle, until eventually what originally was a majority which oppresses becomes a minority which oppresses. Rigid majority rule, in this sense, has fore-shadowed autocracy; it has been the fore-runner of loss of democracy. Thus, instead of employing the frequently-quoted term "majority rule" which might be interpreted as rule by a static, oppressive majority, perhaps "dynamic majority decisiveness" would be a more accurately descriptive term in that it would not conflict with the crucial democratic right of minorities to evolve peacefully to majorities. In short, it would not conflict with the proposition that virtually all of the people (See "the people" defined in preceding pages) must have a continuing voice in government -- crucial to modern democracy.

enjoying a voice in government, the only difference between autocracy and democracy?

Democracy And Autocracy Contrasted With Reference
To The Status Of Persons And Ideas

If autocracy -- whether in form of monarchy, emperorship, dictatorship, aristocracy, or oligarchy -- represents absolute rule by one person or by a small minority, without voice in governmental affairs by the others of society, what might one logically expect to follow in other respects? If an absolute autocrat, in the strict sense of the word, is accountable to no one, if an absolute monarch is irresponsible to his subjects, or if an aristocracy is not answerable to the great bulk of society, what might one regard to be the practical consequences of such a condition? Obviously the autocrat, monarch, emperor, dictator, aristocrats, or oligarchs, if strictly and absolutely so, would enjoy special privileges in determining what society at large must or must not do. If, as Louis XIV proclaimed, "I, myself, am the state," it would, in effect, be to say that he, himself, was the law. That is to say, the law would be whatever he regarded it to be. In this sense, autocrats singly or oligarchs collectively in their groups small or large would enjoy and exercise special privileges in deciding what the law should be.

But what of abiding by laws, once proclaimed? If an autocrat is responsible to no one in deciding what the law shall be, may he be expected to abide by the laws decided

upon? Is he not also responsible to no one as to which laws he himself observes? It would seem that, inasmuch as autocrats, in one form or other, are accountable to no one, they would also enjoy special privileges in abiding by the laws. In this sense, it would appear that autoocracy implies special privileges for certain individuals both in deciding what laws shall be established and in deciding which of these laws they themselves shall follow or observe. The laws, decided upon by a specially privileged individual or by a small group of individuals, would apply to some persons but not to others. In this sense, autoocracy implies inequality of opportunity to decide upon laws and inequality of responsibility or obligation to abide by them.

There is little doubt that autoocracy has followed this pattern from ancient times to present. Although it is true that, since the first World War, dictators have gone through the motions of seeming to permit their subjects to decide upon some matters after a program of colored and censored news which is followed by a phony plebiscite in which the voters have no real choice in the matter, the absolute autocrat, in final analysis, appears to have had the only real choice in deciding what laws and policies shall be invoked, and the people, even though unconvinced, have had to abide by them. Moreover, the question seems never to arise that an autocrat should abide by these decisions, inasmuch as autoocracy fosters the idea that the autocrat

is above criticism in any matter. The decisions, as they work out, are to apply to others but not to the autocrat unless he voluntarily observes them.

Various methods have been employed to stamp out opposition and to ensure conformity to the dictates of autocracy. However, if the devices or techniques of stamping it out have differed, they all appear to have had common characteristics of terrorism. In modern times, a nocturnal visit by the dictator's personal police, the victim never to be seen or heard from again, has been effective both from the standpoint of getting rid of persons regarded as objectionable and as furnishing object lessons to others in the society who might entertain ideas of gainsaying the dictator. And, although the rack, the iron maiden, and other such older forms of torture may have been exchanged for newer, refined kinds, the newer forms according to all accounts are no less conducive to human degradation and misery than the older ones.

If, as it appears, autocracy implies and provides in practice for special privileges for certain individuals, both in deciding upon and in abiding by various laws, how may democracy be regarded to differ in principle, if it does, from autocracy in these respects? If democracy represents a form of government in which virtually every adult member of society has a voice in government (as determined by investigation noted earlier), what may one regard to be the

democratic principle as concerns establishment and observation of laws?

If Louis XIV could regard himself as the state, hence, for all practical purposes, as the law, then it would not seem unreasonable to assume that a democratic state represents the people as a whole and that the laws will take exactly that form which the people as a whole, as determined in final analysis by majority vote, wish them to take. Inasmuch as virtually every adult member of a democratic society has a vote, directly or indirectly, in the establishment of laws governing what the people as a whole must or must not do, it would appear that democracy implies equality of opportunity in reaching such decisions.

But what of the matter of abiding by laws once enacted? Is it to be assumed that a person, if he does not approve a law, is under no obligation to abide by it? Seemingly, such is not the case, or there would be no point in enacting laws in the first place. Although majority vote is decisive in democratic nations in determining various laws and policies, the laws once enacted apply to everyone alike. An individual, although he may not like a particular law and although he may have registered his vote against it (and, for that matter, although he may continue to criticize it*), is nonetheless obligated to abide by it so long as it remains

* This particular matter is taken up in the next chapter in a discussion of differences between matters of action and matters of belief.

in force. In this sense, democracy implies equality of responsibility for everyone alike to abide by democratically enacted laws and policies.

Thus, whereas autocracy provides for inequality of opportunity for arriving at decisions and inequality of responsibility for abiding by them, democracy provides for equality of opportunity for arriving at decisions and equality of responsibility for abiding by them. Whereas autocracy implies special privilege for certain individuals both in making and in abiding by the laws, democracy implies no special privilege in either respect.

As concerns practice in these matters, it immediately becomes apparent to an American reader that democratic nations sometimes, although not generally, fail to provide equality of opportunity for deciding various matters, providing, in effect, for special privilege in this respect. Restrictions upon Negro suffrage in certain of the southern states exemplify this condition. But when this occurs the question needs to be asked whether such occurrences are characteristic of democratic principles or are more in keeping with the special privilege usually associated with autocracy. Moreover, such practices (these practices in the United States, at least) take place in violation of law. Thus, the question needs to be asked whether countenanced law violation, in special instances, resembles democ-

racy or autocracy in general.*

Taking the picture as a whole, in a larger view of democracies as compared with autocracies, it would seem that cases of discrimination indicate lack or violation of democracy, not something typical of it. Isolated instances of special privilege, although they constitute a blight on working democracy, represent exceptions when viewed in light of the overwhelming number of cases in which equality of opportunity prevails in these respects. Moreover, when such special privilege does exist, it is illegal and/or is regarded as undemocratic by democratically-minded persons.

Again, as concerns equal obligation of all to obey laws once enacted, it sometimes happens in democratic countries that certain individuals disregard democratically enacted decisions with impunity. However, such instances are relatively rare despite their seeming frequency, and can hardly be regarded as a principle of democratic organization.** Law violation occurs in many instances under any conditions, whether with democracy or autocracy, but democratic peoples expect, and in last analysis insist, that democratically enacted laws apply to all alike, with no

* This matter is taken up in detail later in this chapter in a discussion concerning strict or lax law enforcement as regards democracy.

** If a majority of the people oppose a law, it is expected that the law will be rescinded or repealed, as in case of the Twenty-first Amendment to the Constitution of the United States which repealed the Eighteenth Prohibitory Amendment concerning possession and sale of alcoholic beverages.

exceptions. (See p. 186 ff.) Thus, as generally practiced, democracy implies equality of opportunity for arriving at decisions and equality of responsibility for abiding by them. Instances in which such is not the case seem to represent lack of democracy and to be more in keeping with autocracy than democracy. Special privilege for certain individuals, both in the making and abiding by laws, appears to be the exception and not the rule in democracy, whereas it represents the rule instead of the exception in autocracy. If such differences do not in fact exist, it would seem that there is no real difference between autocracy and democracy.

But are the foregoing the only implications to be drawn from democracy, in which sovereignty is vested in the whole of a people, as opposed to autocracy, which is based on absolute rule by an individual or part of a society? If certain individuals of an autocracy are accorded special privilege, as noted, then it would not seem unreasonable to suppose that the ideas originated, or accepted, by such individuals would also be accorded special privilege. If the position of the individuals who enjoy absolute power is not to be questioned, then it follows both logically and practically that the ideas which these individuals embrace will also be accorded the same special status. On the other hand, if democracy implies no special privilege for individuals, it follows that the ideas which these individuals entertain will be accorded the same impartial treatment.

The term "dangerous idea" is encountered frequently in historical accounts of autocratic regimes. Apparently a dangerous idea has been something with which autocrats have had to cope and cope vigorously. Heresy, presumably the thinking or voicing of dangerous ideas, has represented a condition which autocrats have found intolerable. To be labeled a "free thinker" in an autocratic nation has tended in large measure to mean prison, banishment, or death.

In modern times, the term, heretical, has been replaced by terms such as non-Aryan, subversive, and treasonable, but there is scarcely any difference as concerns the status of ideas unacceptable to those in power. In each instance, a person is thinking or voicing a "wrong," hence dangerous, idea. Socrates was compelled to drink the hemlock since he would not recant his dangerous teachings. Galileo chose, publicly at least, to change his mind under pressure of the Inquisition. Servetus was burned at the stake because of his disagreement with Aristotle as well as with Calvin. It was at one time as much as a man's life was worth to advocate the Copernican theory.

The peril of "dangerous" ideas obviously lies in the danger to the autocrat or autocrats if such ideas, or counter-ideas, are permitted to prevail or even be voiced. Socrates constituted a threat and, because of his stature as a philosopher, a dangerous one, to the traditional ways of thinking and doing in oligarchic Greece. If observations

by Galileo and Servetus had been permitted to stand, they would have imperiled the whole foundation of existing religious and "scientific" dogma. Similarly, Copernicus suggested that Rome, in fact, might not be the center of the universe, an idea which, if allowed to prevail, would have constituted an obvious threat to theocratic absolutism. Thus, the peril of dangerous ideas is that persons tend to act as they think, and such thoughts, if translated into action, represent real danger to any specially privileged position.

In the modern world, special privilege for ideas is fostered by censorship of communications, particularly in the newspapers, over the radio, and in the schools. "The big lie" has become an admitted technique of dictators. Even thought control is attempted. Apparently it is not enough to protest one's conformity to the "party line." One must look as though he agrees with it; he must be convincing. Thought control carries into all walks of life, even to musical ideas. The Russian Secretariat, through the party organ Pravda, has castigated Shostakovich from time to time for his non-Marxian musical outcroppings. Charlemagne anticipated the Stalinists in attempting to control the type of music written by banning the use of intervalic thirds, under penalty of death.* And although

* An attempt was made by Charles the Great to discourage secular, or profane, music and to preserve the strict organum of the Church (parallel 4ths, 5ths, and octaves, which today are considered ugly and austere). If this attempt had been successful, Western Culture probably would not have known music in its present form.

Mendelssohn is regarded highly in some musical circles, his music was not permitted in Nazi Germany inasmuch as nothing good -- and perhaps something bad -- could come from the pen of a Jew.

Thus, in view of preceding considerations, a rather logical corollary, and one which follows the practice, of special privilege for persons is provision for special status for ideas. As the authority of an autocrat is absolute, so also the specially privileged ideas entertained by an autocrat are not to be questioned. In this sense, autocracy implies inequality of opportunity for ideas.

But what of democracy as concerns the status of ideas? If a democratic state is to represent the will of a whole people -- if a majority vote is to be regarded as decisive in settling matters requiring early action and if a minority is to be afforded the opportunity to change its position to a majority through peaceful persuasion --, democracy logically should provide for treatment of ideas on a basis fundamentally different from that of autocracy. If the immediately preceding principles may be regarded as necessary components of democracy -- and they appear everywhere to exist in democratic practice --, it follows that democracy must provide every one of its members the privilege of thinking independently and of voicing the outcomes of his thinking. In this sense, democracy must avoid special privilege not only for persons but for ideas as well. Thus, everyone

in a democracy, so long as abiding by the law (a matter of majority-established action*), must be afforded the privilege and opportunity -- equality of opportunity -- to voice his views, regardless what they may be. In this sense, democracy implies equality of opportunity for ideas to be expressed and to be heard.

Obviously, provision for equality of opportunity for ideas is no more the practice in every instance, although generally so, in democratic countries than is restriction upon the voicing of "counter-ideas" in autocratic nations. For one thing, as mentioned in another connection, there are persons who violate the law, whether in democracy or autocracy. Everything which applies to discrimination against Negro suffrage in the United States, mentioned before, applies to discrimination against the registering of opinions, hence to discrimination against certain ideas -- the ideas of certain persons. Moreover, democratic nations have not been above conducting witch hunts from time to time, a circumstance which would seem to negate the principle in question. However, by an large, it is hardly to be denied that democratic nations seek basically to provide their members with far-reaching opportunities to engage in free interchange of ideas. And, although certain persons have found it difficult to secure and maintain an audience for their views --

* Matters of action and matters of belief are discussed and differentiated in several connections in the succeeding chapters.

although democracy would seem not to imply that one has to listen or to like what he hears --, strong-arm tactics of storm troopers in breaking up public gatherings and speeches (a practice which has heralded the first death throes of formerly democratic nations in post World War I Europe) represent, by far, the exception in democratic nations, at least in nations which are to remain democratic. And banning by law the voicing one's views is virtually, if not altogether, unheard of in democratic nations.* Thus, if special privilege for certain persons and for certain ideas is the rule in autocratic states, no special privilege, in these respects, is the rule in democracy. From the standpoint of basic principles involved, it would seem that there is no real difference between democracy and autocracy if such is not the case.

Hence, if the foregoing logic is sound and if autocratic practice has been described accurately, it would

* As noted, there are certain bans against religious orders in France and Switzerland, especially regarding their activities in the public schools. But the reasons for these restrictions appear to have been precisely to prevent indoctrination of specially-privileged ideas and to ensure free interchange of thinking. Most democratic nations, moreover, have laws prohibiting libel and slander. Here again, however, the laws appear to have been calculated to prevent partiality for ideas, not to foster it. If, as determined by the courts, what has been written or said about a person proves to be true, after free interchange of evidence, no libel or slander is regarded to exist. On the other hand, if the plaintiff can show, after a hearing of all sides of the matter, that he has been libeled or slandered, the untruthful nature of the defendant's remarks is curbed or punished.

appear that autocracy provides inequality of opportunity to decide upon laws and inequality of responsibility to abide by them. However, wherein may one consider the responsibility for establishment of laws to lie in autocracy? Although a people as a whole must bear the brunt of any ill-chosen laws proclaimed, they are not responsible for them in the sense of having decided what they will be, for good or ill. In this sense, autocracy implies not only inequality of opportunity for deciding upon laws, but also inequality of responsibility for deciding upon them. Moreover, as regards ideas entertained in autocracy, although a people must bear the brunt of ideas permitted to prevail, they are not responsible for them in the sense of having had any choice in the matter.

Thus, it would appear that autocracy implies inequality of opportunity for arriving at decisions, inequality of responsibility for arriving at them, and inequality of responsibility for abiding by decisions reached. It would appear, moreover, that autocracy implies inequality of opportunity for ideas and inequality of responsibility for them. Thus, it might be said that autocracy implies inequality of opportunity and of responsibility for arriving at and abiding by decisions which concern a society, individually or as a whole. Or, to put the matter another way, autocracy implies special privilege for certain persons and for certain ideas.

On the other hand, if the foregoing logic holds and if

democratic practice has been drawn upon with fidelity, it would appear that democracy provides for equality of opportunity to decide upon laws and equality of responsibility to abide by them, once decided. However, wherein may one consider the responsibility to lie in democracy as concerns the establishment of laws? A democratic people must not only bear the brunt of any ill-chosen laws enacted, as in case of autocracy, but, in contrast with autocracy, must assume the responsibility for them in the sense of all having had a voice in deciding what laws will be enacted, for good or ill. In this sense, democracy implies not only equality of opportunity for deciding upon laws but also equality of responsibility for deciding upon them, as well as equality of responsibility for abiding by laws enacted. Moreover, as regards the status of ideas in a democracy, democracy implies not only equality of opportunity for ideas but equality of responsibility for them in the sense that everyone has a free choice in evaluating various ideas presented.

Thus, democracy implies equality of opportunity for arriving at decisions and equality of responsibility for carrying them out. Democracy implies equality of opportunity for ideas and equality of responsibility for them. In summary it may be said that democracy implies equality of opportunity and of responsibility for arriving at and abiding by decisions which concern a society, individually and

as a whole.* Or, to put it another way, democracy implies no special privilege for persons or for ideas.

The Democratic Necessity For Strict,
Uniform Law Enforcement

A lay assumption frequently entertained in democratic countries, particularly in the United States, is that a nation is democratic in inverse proportion to the number of laws or restrictions it has on personal liberty. The ideal condition is regarded as one in which there are no laws or restrictions of any kind upon individual freedom. A rather common accompaniment of this assumption has been that weak governmental control is indicative of democracy. Such an interpretation of democracy is understandable, even if it is unjustified.

The geographical scene during which in several instances modern democracy might be said to have grown to maturity was largely one of virtually unlimited frontiers.** If an individual, a family, a sect, or some other group, did not

* Democracy has been defined by Bayles as "a form of governmental control in which there is equality of opportunity and of responsibility for arriving at and carrying out decisions on matters of individual or group concern," (102) and as "a form of socio-governmental organization in which there is equality of freedom or opportunity to participate in making decisions on matters of group or individual concern, and equality of obligation or responsibility to abide by such decisions and carry them out." (103)

** This was true of Canada and the United States in particular, and of Australia and New Zealand to a large extent.

like the order of things in a community, there were in the New World wide opportunities for moving to a new home where life could be ordered in ways of one's own choosing. Such conditions were likely to foster an extremely individualistic outlook. And, inasmuch as the socio-governmental order under which this individualism was practiced has been regarded by many as democratic, it is understandable that democracy, for many persons, has been taken as synonymous with individualism. Moreover, inasmuch as the first efforts toward democracy usually have taken the form of opposition to tyrannical government, it is understandable that any government, because of its edicts, has often been regarded as synonymous with autoeracy. Bryn-Jones appears to be on solid ground when he observes that the liberals of the world (in fighting for freedom) probably knew better what they were fighting against than what they were fighting for. According to him:

This explains, in part at least, the general temper and spirit of nineteenth-century liberalism. There was left as an aftermath of the democratic struggles of earlier days a distrust of government and a tendency to restrict its activities within the narrowest possible bounds. The state was regarded with suspicion as constituting a permanent menace to the liberties that had cost so dear in blood and tears. Laws were necessary no doubt, but the fewer they were and the narrower their scope the better. We have seen how this issued in the economic sphere in the general acceptance of laissez faire as the prime condition of freedom. It was not, however, confined to the economic sphere. The functions of government were conceived

in the main as negative functions, and the state was less an engine of progress than a bulwark against unnecessary interference with individual liberties. Government existed for other purposes, no doubt, but none was so important as that of safeguarding the rights that in some sense or other were [regarded as] inherent in, and natural to, man. (104)

However, indications, both in theory and in practice, point to the probability that democracy, like autocracy, does imply limitations upon personal liberty and strict enforcement of these limitations. Merriam contends that:

Democracy, and indeed any other type of association, may interfere from time to time with one form or another of a person's liberty as expressed in a person's unlimited will to act as he wishes.
 (105)

And in another of his books, Merriam points out that:

. . . . States are not strong in proportion as their government is weak. Liberty is not secure in proportion as government has no power. Protection at home and abroad is the life of liberty -- protection against special groups at home and against warlike powers abroad.
 (106)

Ward looks at the matter as follows:

What is often forgotten in the discussion of democracy is that while in principle it substitutes government by consent [of the whole people] for government by coercion [by an individual or small minority], nevertheless it must operate at present through the state which is based upon the power to coerce, and in the last analysis depends upon that power. What [those] who are opposed to repression within and war without often forget is that the democratic state at times depends upon its power to coerce for its very life. Democracy has not removed the element of coercion from the state; it has

subordinated it to the element of consent. That element was not entirely missing from the absolute states. They had to satisfy their subjects enough to avoid revolt. To this end the modern dictatorships use their control of propaganda. Coercion is the major element in their power, consent the minor. The democracies reverse the relationship. Also the consent is different. In dictatorships it is secured after the event, by official propaganda. In the democracies it is secured before the event, by democratic discussions, in which propaganda plays its part. By deciding things for the people the dictators prevent them from acquiring the capacity to think and to judge, to make choices and decisions. This is the capacity that democracy develops and upon which it depends. (107)

. . . . Hence the state is a legally coercive instrument for maintaining a given order of society. Both its authority and its stability depend upon its ability to defend itself against enemies without and within. It exists only so long as it can perform this function adequately. (108)

. . . . That power [to coerce], even in the democratic state, is absolute and final over the individual. Democracy has not changed the nature of state power. That power reaches its climax in the control of the state over life and death, through its ability to make war, to imprison and to execute. Democracy took these powers away from the few and put them in the hands of the many. It then put limitations around their use, in order that the few -- even the lone individual -- might be protected from unjust and anti-social uses of state power. But the power to coerce remains. (109)

There is no justification, based upon practice, for assuming that democracies may not place restrictions upon personal liberty or that democracies are particularly lax, as compared with autocratic governments, in enforcing laws. Although, as might be expected, exceptions may be found

wherein laws have not always been enforced to the letter, still, an earnest, and in general a successful, attempt has been made to do so in all of the democracies under consideration. Bryce, in the two volumes of his Modern Democracies, sees democracies, in general, as having been as successful in the enforcement of laws as autocracies. Although he points to some of the American States "where lynching and other disorders have been tolerated," he observes that "against none of the other democracies is it chargeable." And, although "strike riots have been frequent in Australia, France, and New Zealand, to a less extent in Canada," (110) Bryce has indicated that these peoples, in most respects, are law abiding, those persons who are not being brought to account under penalties provided by law. As regards Britain and two of her now self-governing Dominions, Bryce observes that:

Throughout Australia the police is efficient, a fact the more creditable because there exist large mountainous and thinly peopled areas not far from the great cities which would afford a convenient refuge to malefactors, as they did in the old days of the bush-rangers.* Lynch law is unknown. The people, as in England and in Canada, take their stand on the side of the law, and the administration of the law justifies their confidence. (111)

* Bush-rangers were gangs of Australian outlaws who operated in the early days of colonization.

On the basis of the foregoing considerations and in view of conclusions to be reached from even cursory observation of conditions in democratic countries, it is scarcely to be questioned that democracies place limitations upon personal liberty or that democracies enforce, or at least conscientiously attempt to enforce, these restrictions. Occasional cases of lax enforcement do not negate strict law enforcement as a principle of democracy but rather when they occur indicate a defect in the implementation of democracy. As in cases noted previously in other connections, lax enforcement is more nearly representative of lack of democracy than of democracy.

In any case, both democracy and autocracy invoke limitations on personal freedom. The difference between democracy and autocracy in this respect lies in the method (and the proportion of persons) by which these restrictions are adopted and how, after they are adopted, they are applied -- whether to everyone alike, in democracy, or to some persons but not to others, in autocracy. What form these restrictions take in democracy depends entirely upon the democracy in question. Whereas Britain, her now self-governing dominions, and the United States would regard it as an encroachment upon personal liberty, the French police are legally empowered to search domiciles and persons under conditions which are not allowed in the English-speaking democracies. Although the French system, perhaps, is not

wise -- it may (or may not) be such that it supplies an opening wedge for autocratic usurpation --, it seems nonetheless democratic from the standpoint of having been adopted or allowed to exist by the people.

Bryce points repeatedly to differences which exist among democratic nations as concerns individual rights:

. . . . Of civil liberty, as understood in Britain and America, there is not too much but too little [in France]. The citizen is not safe from domiciliary visits and arbitrary arrests. On the other hand, the press enjoys practical impunity for whatever charges it may bring against individuals. (112)

In another connection Bryce states that:

. . . . The range of action and the arbitrary methods allowed to the police [in France] shock the Englishman or American, but they are seldom used with an evil purpose The procedure in criminal cases which foreign observers have censured as harsh towards the suspected prisoner, and the laxity of the rules regarding the admission of evidence, are things of old standing in France, and unconnected with the form of government. . . . (113)

If it is difficult for an American to fathom such conditions in France as being sanctioned under a democratic form of government, the American incidence of lynching -- although differing in the respect of its being illegal -- is no less difficult for Frenchmen to understand. Bryce appends his preceding remarks concerning France with the observation that "respect for the law and the Executive have

prevented the growth of the habit of lynching [in France].*
(114)

Thus, regardless of the freedoms or limitations thereon which various democracies may entertain -- Switzerland, for example, does not have a Bill of Rights and does not mention trial by jury in her Constitution as in case of the American Constitution, although both are provided in spirit by the Swiss (115) --, limitations on personal freedom, nevertheless, are invoked in democracy, these limitations are decided upon by the whole of the people as determined by direct or indirect vote, and they apply equally to all of the society. To requote Hudson:

. . . . We [the people of a democratic nation] have exactly such rights as the state gives us. [Italics in original] [And since in a democracy the state is the people, we have exactly such rights as we propose to give ourselves, these conceivably differing in different democracies]. And, since the State commonly expresses its will through law, this position is usually taken to mean that man has no rights whatever except those which the law actually grants him. If the law gives him the right to property, he has it, and in such mode as the law decrees; if the law does not, he has not -- and that is all there is to it. Positive law is the real source of all our rights. All else [such as Divine rights, natural rights, inalienable rights] is vain speculation. (116)

* Although lynching was quite prevalent in France during the revolutions, though virtually unheard of today, it should be noted also that lynching in the United States has declined markedly in recent years.

In view of the foregoing considerations, there is no justification for the oft-entertained assumption that democracy implies paucity of laws or that weak governmental control is indicative of democracy.

Anarchism Distinguished From Democracy And Autocracy

Aside, however, from numerous indications that democracy does, in fact, imply limitations on personal freedom and does enforce laws, what logically might one expect to ensue if democratically enacted laws were not enforced? If certain individuals succeeded in violating the laws of a democratic society without consequence to themselves, what practical consequences might one expect to follow as concerns the society as a whole? Or, what might be expected to result if everyone should disregard law?

It would appear that, if a few individuals succeeded in violating democratically established laws without jeopardy to themselves, a situation would develop which, for all practical purposes, would resemble the special privilege of autocracy. Or, if no one at all were to abide by democratically enacted laws, a situation would ensue amounting to complete absence of law, a condition which is generally conceded as anarchy,

Webster's New International Dictionary defines anarchy as a condition constituting "absence of government, [as] the state of society where there is no law or supreme power;

hence, a state of lawlessness or political disorder"

This source gives "chaos" and "lawlessness" as synonyms of anarchy, distinguishing between lawlessness and anarchy by indicating that "lawlessness is less definite than anarchy, and signifies rather a prevalent or habitual disregard of law and order than their absence or suspension." This source lists "government" as an antonym of anarchy. (117)

Funk & Wagnall's Standard Dictionary also defines anarchy as "absence of government," indicating that the word is "often applied to social and political confusion and disorder." (118)

The use, however, of terms such as "chaos" and "disorder" in connection with definitions of anarchy appears, in some respects, to reveal a point of view regarding the efficacy of anarchy, rather than any component part of the theory. Chaos may likely result from anarchy in any form. However, in all fairness to the evolutionary anarchists,* their theory of social organization was not based upon a society without order, but rather upon the premise that human association and natural human gregariousness are best served by voluntary co-operation, in absence of governmental compulsion. (119)

Regardless of how one might expect a state of anarchy to eventuate, and regardless of the different emphases

* There have been two different kinds of anarchists: evolutionary and revolutionary. The activities of the latter have been attended by terrorism and assassination, justifying the synonym, chaos, in dictionary references above.

placed upon anarchism by the evolutionary and revolutionary anarchists, most accounts of the theory of anarchy employ the term rather interchangeably with the terms individualism and laissez faire. (120) The latter term, having been associated with economic theories of the French physiocrats and with the economic outlook previously held by the Scottish Adam Smith (1723-1790), is defined by Webster's New International Dictionary "literally, [to] let (people) do, or make (what they choose); hence, [as] noninterference" (121) Funk & Wagnall's Standard Dictionary, while placing main emphasis upon laissez faire as it pertains to economics, also defines the term as relating to the principle of non-interference by government with the liberty of the individual. (122)

Thus, in view of common usage, anarchy or laissez-faire or individualism may be taken in general to mean absence of restriction on personal liberty or absence of law, hence absence of government. Whereas both autocracy and democracy imply limitations upon individual liberty, anarchy implies no such limitations.

Previous discussions indicated that any alternative to democracy is to be found in some kind of despotism, wherein the liberties of a great majority of the individuals of a society are restricted according to the dictates of a single person or of a part of the group. However, democracy also imposes limitations upon the personal liberty of

individuals, although differently from autocracy. Would it not be reasonable to assume, then, that anarchy logically is preferable not only to autocracy but to democracy? If freedom to carry out one's goals is to be considered the touchstone of human endeavor and as a first premise of democracy, would not anarchy furnish the means of achieving it to a greater degree even than democracy? Would not anarchy, so to speak, beat democracy at its own game?

After raising the question of what constitutes liberty, Bryn-Jones points out that:

. . . . Generally interpretation has swung between two poles as emphasis has shifted from the negative to the positive concept of freedom. From the negative point of view freedom has always meant the absence of restraint. Man is conceived as a being exercising choice, making decisions, and proceeding to put these decisions into effect. Whether this choice is ever real is the core of the agelong controversy concerning free will and determinism [But] granted the assumption of essential human freedom, we may assume that man has desires, is conscious of preferences, and exercises choice; the curtailment of freedom occurs when the effect of this choice is frustrated, when limits are imposed so that his decisions cannot be put into effect. This is restraint. (123)

However, Bryn-Jones contends that:

Restraint in itself . . . is not necessarily a limitation of liberty. It all depends upon the nature of the restraint. If desire is completely unregulated and passion holds sway without check or hindrance, the result is not freedom but license. There are justifiable restraints and necessary limitations -- bounds that must be observed as a condition of real freedom So long as man does merely what

he likes, he is missing true freedom, not achieving it. Choice must be rational, and decision must be governed by reason (124)

In this connection Merriam points out that:

If all . . . types of life could agree upon the field and priorities of their "liberty" or "liberties," there would be no need for the political association. They might pursue their peaceful ways, revolving in their own orbits without clash or conflict. But it is precisely one of the functions of the [democratic] state to balance these ways of life and to prevent an anarchy of liberties, rudely crashing against each other, and leading to an intolerable form of life. (125)

And Reves contends that:

If we gave every man -- strong and weak -- and every nation -- large and small -- complete freedom of action without imposing any restrictions whatsoever on their impulses, it would result in the greatest terror, oppression, violence -- in total anarchy. (126)

Reves goes on to say, then, that:

It is obvious . . . that that kind of freedom which we regard as a human ideal is some kind of a synthesis between freedom and compulsion. The fact that some outside power forbids me to kill a man I dislike, or to take away the property of those who have more than I, considerably restrains my freedom. But this very same restraint protects me from being murdered by those who dislike me, and of being robbed by those who envy whatever I may possess. I definitely have the feeling that being protected against assassination and theft adds to my feeling of liberty in greater proportion to how much this same restriction deprives me of my liberty in prohibiting me from committing

these same acts against others.* [Italics
in original] (127)

Thus the argument goes concerning the relative merits of democracy and anarchy as means of securing individual liberty. The proponents of democracy claim a greater degree of individual freedom under democracy, deriving from the common interests of and restrictions imposed by society at large; whereas the evolutionary anarchists see voluntary coöperation, minus compulsion, as the better means of achieving optimal individual freedom. In support of democracy, with equal restrictions upon personal liberty, Swabey contends that:

It needs hardly to be pointed out that democracy views the state as a good, not an evil, and looks to the perfecting of the mechanism of government, not as the sharpening of a deadly knife to be discarded once the canker [of overlapping anarchistic impositions] is out, but as a permanent element in the realization of social justice
(128)

In support of democracy, as regards strict law enforcement, Follett believes that:

. . . . We are beginning to know now that our freedom depends not on the weakness but on the strength of our government, our government being the expression of a united people. We are

* As an actual example of anarchy and its aftermath in the old West of the United States, the liberties of the individual were considerably restricted after such time as men were no longer allowed to carry sidearms. But examination of historical accounts seems to reveal that the individual was a great deal freer from the possibility of death in a spontaneously initiated gun fight.

freer under our present sanitary laws than without them; we are freer under compulsory education than without it. (129)

Regardless of individual opinion concerning the relative merits of democracy and anarchy,* anarchy, still, is not democracy. Regardless whether one prefers autocracy to democracy or anarchy to democracy, democracy appears to differ basically from autocracy and anarchy. If autocracy places limitations upon freedom and these restrictions on personal liberty apply to some persons but not to others, it follows that autocracy implies unequally limited freedom. If democracy also places limitations upon freedom but these restrictions apply to all persons of that society alike, it follows that democracy implies equally limited freedom. But if anarchy is based upon tenets of absence of government and absence of restraint, then anarchy implies unlimited freedom.**

* Although there have been, and are, instances of voluntary co-operation, notable among which is Quaker practice, where concensus is reached in place of majority decisiveness and compulsion of dissidents, the phenomenon of anarchy historically has in most cases followed disasters of governmental breakdown due to external or internal causes and has been attended by terrorism and by pre-occupation of individuals with self-preservation to such an extent that little, if any, real freedom has been in evidence in the sense that freedom is understood in democratic nations.

** Democracy, autocracy, and anarchy have been distinguished by Bayles, respectively, as implying equally limited, unequally limited, and unlimited freedom.
(130)

Anarchy, Democracy, And Autocracy Contrasted
With Reference To The Status Of
Persons And Ideas

But are the above the only implications to be drawn from anarchy as compared with democracy and autocracy? If autocracy implies inequality of opportunity for ideas, and if democracy implies equality of opportunity for ideas, then anarchy, as democracy, would imply equality of opportunity for ideas. But if autocracy implies inequality of responsibility for ideas, and if democracy implies equality of responsibility for ideas, then anarchy, as opposed to democracy, would imply no responsibility for ideas.

Thus, if autocracy implies special privilege for certain persons and for certain ideas, as noted, and if democracy implies no special privilege for persons or for ideas, anarchy would imply no responsibility, either for persons or for ideas as concerns a society as a whole. The theory of anarchy seems to incorporate all of the freedom and, perhaps, all of the equality of opportunity implied in democracy (assuming that the strong will not impose upon the weak under anarchistic conditions), but none of the responsibility. It would seem that persons attributing absence of restraint and weak law enforcement to democracy are thinking in terms of anarchy, not democracy.

Summary

Examination of theory and practice of government indicates that, although government includes such forms as autocracy, monarchy, emperorship, aristocracy, oligarchy, plutocracy, theocracy, dictatorship, and democracy, as well as variations within some of these designations, the basic difference as regards various forms of government, regardless of name or type, resides in absolute rule by one or by a portion of the group, on one hand, and rule by virtually all of the people of a society, on the other. Although various criteria, such as the glory of God, of race, of state, and of tradition, have been claimed as bases for governmental authority, there may be justification for assuming that all governmental decisions, of whatever kind, are based upon human choices requiring human interpretations and relating to human interests. Inasmuch as man, in every case, appears to be doing the choosing, the problem, as concerns making governmental decisions, resolves itself to a question of how many persons of a society are to make the choices. Approaching the problem from this vantage point, various forms of government divide basically into two main categories: those forms of government in which the interests of a single person or of a small part of a people are dominant in ordering the way of life of a nation; and those in which the common interests of the whole of a people, as determined by interactive majority-minority vote, are

dominant. In view of the existence of but two main divisions of governmental control in this sense, it was suggested that, for the purposes of this study, the first category be designated under the general heading of autocracy and the second under democracy.

Further investigation indicates that, inasmuch as autocracy represents absolute rule by one person or by a part of a people, without voice in governmental affairs by the great bulk of the society, the ruler or rulers of an autocracy enjoy special privilege in deciding upon laws pertaining to society at large. Moreover, there are indications that autocracy implies not only special privilege in deciding upon laws, but that, inasmuch as autocratic rule is attended by non-accountability to society at large, autocracy implies special privilege in abiding by laws. In this sense, autocracy implies inequality of opportunity in deciding upon laws governing a nation and inequality of responsibility to abide by them. In examining the matter further, it appears that, inasmuch as the position of an individual or of a portion of society enjoying absolute power is not to be questioned in autocracy, so also the ideas which these individuals embrace are accorded special privilege. In view of these considerations, a rather logical corollary (and one which follows the practice) of special privilege for certain persons -- which in turn accompanies autocratic, part-group supremacy -- is provision for special

status for certain ideas. In this sense, autocracy implies inequality of opportunity for ideas.

Carrying the matter still further, it appears that, although a great majority of the people must bear the brunt of any ill-chosen laws proclaimed in an autocracy, they are not responsible for them in the sense of having had any voice in deciding what they will be, for good or ill. In this sense, autocracy implies not only inequality of opportunity in deciding upon laws, but also inequality of responsibility in deciding upon them. And, as regards the ideas which are permitted to prevail in autocracy, it appears that, although a great majority of the people must bear the brunt of specially privileged ideas entertained, if they contribute detrimentally to society, this majority cannot be regarded as responsible for them in the sense of having had any choice in the matter.

Thus, autocracy implies inequality of opportunity for arriving at decisions (the laws), inequality of responsibility for arriving at them, and inequality of responsibility for abiding by such decisions. Autocracy, moreover, implies inequality of opportunity for ideas and inequality of responsibility for them. Thus, autocracy implies inequality of opportunity and of responsibility for arriving at and abiding by decisions which concern a society, individually and as a whole. To state the proposition somewhat differently, autocracy implies special privilege for certain

persons and for certain ideas, both as concerns reaching decisions and abiding by them.

In examining democracy from the same approach as autoeracy for implications deriving from theory and practice, it appears that, inasmuch as democracy represents a form of government in which virtually every adult member of society (as defined) has a voice in the government, democracy implies equality of opportunity to decide upon laws and that, inasmuch as democratically established laws apply to everyone alike, democracy implies equality of responsibility to abide by laws in force. Thus, whereas autoeracy provides for inequality of opportunity in deciding upon laws and inequality of responsibility in abiding by them, democracy provides for equality of opportunity in deciding upon laws and equality of responsibility to abide by them. Whereas autoeracy implies special privilege for certain individuals, both in making and abiding by laws, democracy implies no special privilege in either respect.

In examining the matter further, it appears that, inasmuch as democracy provides virtually every adult member of the society with the franchise as a means of registering opinion and provides for a free interchange of ideas in the formation of opinions, democracy provides for equality of opportunity for ideas. Whereas autoeracy gives special privilege to certain ideas, democracy implies no special privilege in the treatment of ideas.

Looking into the matter further, a democratic people must not only bear the brunt of any ill-chosen laws enacted, as in case of autocracy, but, in contrast with autocracy, must assume responsibility for laws enacted in the sense of all having had a voice in their enactment, for good or ill. In this sense, democracy implies not only equality of opportunity for deciding upon laws and equality of responsibility for abiding by laws enacted, but equality of responsibility for deciding upon them. Moreover, as regards the status of ideas, democracy implies equality of opportunity for ideas in the sense that everyone may evaluate and adopt ideas of his own choosing, and equality of responsibility for them in the sense that everyone is responsible for ideas entertained.

Thus, democracy implies equality of opportunity for arriving at decisions and equality of responsibility for arriving at decisions. Democracy implies equality of opportunity for ideas and equality of responsibility for ideas. In short, democracy implies equality of opportunity and of responsibility for arriving at and abiding by decisions which concern a society, individually and as a whole. To state the matter somewhat differently, democracy implies no special privilege either for persons or for ideas.

Thus, as implied in the laws which govern a people, both democracy and autocracy place limitations upon the personal freedom of individuals. In case of autocracy,

these limitations not only are determined by one person or by a small part of the group, but apply to some persons and not to others. In this sense, autocracy implies unequally limited freedom. In case of democracy, these limitations on freedom are not only decided upon by the whole of a society, as determined by majority vote with provisions for minorities to evolve to majorities through peaceful persuasion, but apply to all persons alike. In this sense democracy implies equally limited freedom. In instances in which no such limitations on freedom are provided, a condition of anarchy or individualism or laissez faire exists. Inasmuch as anarchy infers absence of restraint and non-interference with individuals in general (no government), anarchy implies unlimited freedom.

In examining anarchy in other respects, as compared with autocracy and democracy, it would seem that, if autocracy implies inequality of opportunity for ideas, and if democracy implies equality of opportunity for ideas, anarchy, as democracy, would imply no restrictions on opinions which persons hold or proffer. But if autocracy implies inequality of responsibility for ideas, and if democracy implies equality of responsibility for ideas, then anarchy, as opposed to democracy, implies no responsibility for ideas, as concerns society as a whole.

Thus, in the sense that autocracy implies special privilege for certain persons and for certain ideas, and

democracy implies no special privilege for persons or for ideas, anarchy implies no responsibility, either for persons or for ideas, as concerns society as a whole. The theory of anarchy, although incorporating all of the freedom implied in democracy, implies none of the responsibility.

On the basis of investigation to this point, various forms of socio-governmental organization divide basically into autocracy, democracy, and anarchy.* As concerns the freedom of the individual, democracy represents equally limited freedom, autocracy unequally limited freedom, and anarchy unlimited freedom. To state the matter somewhat differently, from the standpoint of the status of individuals and ideas, democracy implies no special privilege for individuals or for ideas, autocracy does imply special privilege for certain persons and for certain ideas, and anarchy implies complete freedom for persons and for ideas, without responsibility for either as regards a society as a whole.

In the next chapter the investigation is continued with a view toward determining still other principles of democracy as they compare with those of alternative forms of socio-governmental organization.

* Whereas chief emphasis has been placed upon forms of governmental organization, the term "socio-governmental organization" is employed in order to include anarchy which, though not representing a form of government, would seem to constitute a plausible alternative to democracy and autocracy and, in fact, to have been a historic reality upon occasion.

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CHAPTER FIVE

CHAPTER V

TWENTIETH CENTURY THEORY AND PRACTICE OF DEMOCRACY

PART II

Seeming Instances Of Anarchistic And Autocratic Practices
Examined In Nominally Democratic Nations With Reference
To The Larger Framework Of Democratic Association

In seeking to work out basic democratic principles through study of practices in supposedly democratic nations, an investigator runs into numerous difficulties. Chief among these, as a class, are cases in which espoused principles and actual practices seem to be at odds with one another.

For example, investigation in the preceding chapter indicated that, within an electorate of virtually all of the people, democracy provides for dynamic majority decisiveness in reaching decisions as opposed to minority rule (autocracy) on one hand, and as opposed to absence of government (anarchy) on the other. Yet, in the United States, approval by two-thirds of those voting is required in some instances of legislative procedure. Approval by three-fourths of those voting is required for ratification by the states of certain measures enacted and submitted by the Congress. Measures and issues submitted to such treatment are either of a positive or negative nature. That is, such issues are based upon the proposition that the people of

the United States either must or must not do certain things. It is evident, therefore, that, in instances of the two-third's majority vote requirement, a minority of the people (or of their representatives) could prevent passage of a measure and thus decide any given issue. Similarly, thirteen of the forty-eight states could prevent passage of such a measure and thus decide any given issue submitted for ratification. It would appear, therefore, that the United States submits to minority rule in these respects. And minority rule, as noted in the previous chapter, constitutes the very foundation of oligarchy, a form of autocracy.

The Supreme Court of the United States, as another example, is empowered (at least by common consent) to interpret the Constitution by passing upon the Constitutionality of legislation enacted by the representatives of the people.* It may be argued that the Supreme Court functions to ensure that the Constitution be not superseded by secondary legislation. However, historians doubt that the Supreme Court has always functioned to make sure that ordinary legislation shall comply with the Constitution. Moreover, there is reason to believe that the Court has interpreted the Constitution in the ways that its members have seen fit. Mims

* This power is provided nowhere in the Constitution or by law, but apparently was assumed in an opinion, establishing a precedent, by Chief Justice Marshall.

is on solid ground when he contends that:

The unpredictability of the [Supreme] Court has been documented by so many able critics . . . that there is little point at this late date in proving that the Constitution is both what the judges say it is -- and what they say it isn't. So little evidence is there of any integral connection between the written words of the Constitution and the decisions of the ever shifting Court majorities, that Professor Reed Powell, in his capacity as chief Court jester, has maintained that the course of American constitutional history would not have been materially altered had all the "nots" in the Constitution been surreptitiously lifted from their present contexts and reinserted in the affirmative clauses conferring power.
(1)

With seemingly full power to interpret the Constitution and to nullify laws enacted by the representatives of the people as it sees fit, it would appear that the United States Supreme Court has power both to legislate and to adjudicate. How can such a condition be justified in terms of democratic principles? Representing a body of no more men than Adolf Hitler gathered around himself at the height of his power, it would seem that the Court now is vested with no less autocratic powers than Nazi dictatorship at its zenith. Furthermore, the justices enjoy life tenure, barring conviction on charges of moral turpitude or malfeasance in office. But if members of the Supreme Court were convicted on such charges, and then were to pass final judgment on the convictions as they may pass final judgment on all lower court decisions, it would

seem that the justices might become judges in their own cause. How could any dictator wish for more?

Again, church property, owned privately by various religious denominations, is exempted from government tax in the United States, whereas that owned by non-religious individuals, partnerships, or corporate bodies is subject to tax. Moreover, although Selective Service Laws presumably apply to all men in certain classes and of certain ages, conscientious objection to warfare based on religious belief is regarded as valid reason for exemption from at least certain kinds of combat duty. Yet, religious denominations enjoy all of the benefits accruing from ownership of property, and conscientious objectors enjoy the safety afforded by the United States through the armed services. By enjoying the benefits and shouldering none of the burdens in these respects, things and persons religious appear to enjoy specially privileged status. How may such practices be reconciled, if they may, with the democratic principle of equality of responsibility -- no special privilege -- for persons or for ideas?

In addition to the autocratic special privilege seeming to exist in cases noted and aside from the anarchistic irresponsibility implied in each instance, there are other practices in the United States approximating the unlimited freedom and irresponsibility of anarchism. Certain practices of labor and management and the activities of

certain individuals indicate an abundance of freedom but little, if any, responsibility.

There are no curbs, for example, concerning what a person may write or speak, except in cases of libel and slander, incitation to insurrection, conveying security secrets to an enemy of the nation, and the like. Persons in the United States may, and do, make utterly false and damaging statements without consequence to themselves. Although advertizing, in some instances, is required by law to meet certain requirements of truth in its claims, the press and the radio accept advertizing upon occasion which appears seriously to misrepresent the product for sale.* And, although the United States press is held responsible as regards libel and slander, the French press is entirely unrestricted by such curbs, bringing charges against French citizens with impunity. (2) How may these seeming instances of anarchism be reconciled with democratic principles?

As regards the type of checks and balances provided in the United States by the two-third's and three-fourth's majority vote, by the Supreme Court, and by the presidential veto, certain other democratic nations provide for much more sensitivity to the popular will. Notable among these are the Australasian democracies. These nations

* The United States is more strict concerning untrue claims placed on labels of products than concerning untrue claims made in other connections in advertizing the products.

are less encumbered by Constitutional curbs and by tradition than the United States.* However, all of the democracies under consideration, though differing in details, entertain manifestations of anarchy and autoocracy to more or less degree.

What, then, is to be deduced from such conditions? Are the principles of democracy which were derived in the foregoing chapter to be regarded as untenable? Are the nominal democracies in question not, after all, in accord with the democratic principle? Is there no difference in practice between democracy and autoocracy or between democracy and anarchy? Or are these seeming instances of autoocracy and anarchy actually democratic when viewed within the larger framework of governmental principles at work?

As regards absence of curbs or regulations pertaining to certain practices of business and certain activities of individuals and as regards absence of curbs on irresponsible claims by individuals and business enterprises, such provisions (or lack of them) exist at the pleasure of the people and apply equally to all. As previous investigation indicated, democracy does not infer any particular limitations on freedom. Moreover, such provisions may be democratically changed just as in the first place

* This matter is taken up in detail later in this chapter when the governmental machinery of various democracies is compared.

they were democratically established or tacitly permitted to exist. In case of the French press, the provision, or lack of it, governing the press applies equally to all newspapers and exists only so long as it pleases the people for it to do so. Thus, in view of the larger picture of democratic practice, such conditions meet requirements of democratic popular sovereignty and requirements that the laws of a democracy -- whether good or bad or whether democratic or undemocratic in themselves -- apply equally to all of the society within the scope of established law.

In case of seeming special privilege for religion, such practices were inaugurated by popular consent, they exist by popular consent, and they apply equally to all religions and churches under the conditions set forth. There would be no democratic reason why the people of the United States might not decide that church property is to be taxed as much as, or more, for that matter, than other property. Moreover, whereas the present number of conscientious objectors to military service seems not to impair the efficiency of the military services or to constitute a serious threat to national security, it is conceivable that if the number should rise alarmingly the law would be modified promptly, making military duty compulsory regardless of religious belief. Thus, such practices regarding religion, although seeming in themselves to represent autocratic and anarchistic conditions, are democratic in

the sense that they were provided democratically, they apply equally to all of society under the conditions of each provision, and they may be modified or rescinded by majority choice whenever the people desire it.

Provision for the Supreme Court to interpret the Constitution and decide on the Constitutionality of various laws enacted by federal and state legislative bodies would seem to conflict with the principle of supremacy of a people as a whole. But it must be remembered that the Court exists because it is desired by the people. Moreover, its power to interpret the Constitution and decide on the Constitutionality of various laws, although provided neither by law nor by Constitution, seems not to run counter to the wishes of the people. In this sense, the Court is an instrument or servant of the people, not a master. If the Court should fail to serve society at large, there is no reason why it might not be abolished democratically, just as it was established.* At least, it would seem that the Court's assumed powers to act on the Constitutionality of laws might be curtailed whenever the people so decide.**

* Of course, the situation becomes complicated in instances in which Constitutional amendment -- the two-third's and three-fourth's majority vote requirement -- is necessary for change.

** This particular power of the Court to interpret the Constitution and pass on ordinary legislation has been challenged upon occasion, notably following the Civil War, when its decisions were virtually ignored. This power was questioned in recent times, during the administration of F. D. Roosevelt.

On the other hand, if the Court could and should declare un-Constitutional a democratically enacted provision to curtail its interpretive power or one for the Court's own abolition -- and make it stick --, then the United States would have an autocratic head of the government. In the sense that the Court presumably could confirm or nullify legislation as it saw fit and at the same time could remain unaccountable to the people as a whole, such a condition, should it occur, would constitute dictatorship of the Supreme Court.

Provisions for the two-third's and three-fourth's majority vote are explainable, in part at least, in the same way as the foregoing. In the sense that such provisions were established democratically to begin with and apply uniformly under the conditions of the provisions, they are democratic. However, difficulty is encountered when it comes to modifying or rescinding such provisions, in that a minority is capable of blocking the change. It would appear to be one thing to vote democratically for such provisions and another to have a change of heart and be able to do anything about it democratically.*

* Such voting requirements are incorporated in the Constitution. Yet, Constitutional change requires the same two-third's and three-fourth's majority vote. What, then, is to prevent a minority which uses this voting arrangement to decide other matters from using it also to block any attempt to eradicate the evils contained in the voting arrangement itself? Although democratically reached, such requirements may be unwise. Democracy does not guarantee wise decisions.

It is understandable why these voting requirements originated; why the people then felt as they did. In order to form a union of the original thirteen states at all, based on acceptance of the Constitution, unanimity obviously had to be achieved. Inasmuch as great emphasis was placed on Colonial rights, the Colonies having been autonomous after capitulation of Britain and prior to federal union, the two-third's and three-fourth's majority voting requirements were invoked, according to historians, to protect the few states against the possibility of discriminatory legislation which might subsequently be inaugurated by a simple majority of the states. Nonetheless, such voting requirements, although democratic in their establishment, would seem to indicate distrust of majority rule, hence of democracy.* And, from a democratic point of view, such voting requirements present certain dangers, perhaps greater than the safeguards which the Founding Fathers had in mind.**

It must be remembered, as noted with reference to termination of the Weimar Republic, that it is possible for a democratic nation to repudiate democracy democratically. But such a course, as noted, constitutes a process of

* The American Founders, of course, did distrust democracy, at least in the modern sense of the word. See Chapter III.

** The conservative nature of the American system, with its checks and balances, is compared with governmental mechanisms of other democracies later in this chapter.

nonreversible action, with no peaceful means of correcting such a move, once made. Thus, although two-third's and three-fourth's majority voting requirements may be (and in this case were) established democratically, they appear, from a democratic point of view, to be unwise.* Such provisions make it easier later on to do away with democracy altogether, and, in their effects, they are undemocratic in any case. Hence, to the extent that such voting requirements negate democratic principles of dynamic majority decisiveness, to that extent the United States has lost, if indeed it ever had, democracy in this particular respect. Aside from dangers of autocratic (minority) usurpation or of rule, in effect, by past generations,** such two-third's and three-fourth's majority voting requirements tend to restrict progress of a kind favored by a majority of a people, thus curtailing majority will.

Thus, in the several pages preceding, numerous instances of seeming autocratic and anarchistic conditions are noted in nominally democratic nations. However, with the exception of two-third's and three-fourth's majority

* Attention again is drawn to the proposition that the quality of democratic decisions depends on the ability and disposition of a people to make wise decisions.

** See discussion concerning supremacy of the "original majority" (Hobbesian theory) as opposed to on-going majority decisiveness (Roussellian theory) in Chapter III.

voting requirements (which make it possible for a minority to decide an issue, and which are more easily established than reversed), these manifestations of autocracy and anarchy are, in the larger picture, democratic. Or, it might be said that, within the over-all framework of government, they represent instances of democratically-reached and democratically-applied decisions to pursue undemocratic action in isolated cases. Regardless of the wisdom or folly of these various provisions, they have met requirements of equality of opportunity for persons and for ideas in the process of their enactment and have applied, within the scope of the respective provisions, to all persons alike. Moreover, such provisions are amenable to change (except as noted) under the same conditions that they were established. Thus, the democratic provision for a minority choice to become majority choice -- provision for dynamic majority decisiveness -- is in evidence. In these respects, then, such provisions meet (or have met) democratic requirements of equality of opportunity and of responsibility for arriving at and abiding by decisions.*

* No inference is intended that this investigation proves democracy to mean all that this investigator finds it to mean. Nothing is being proved with absolute finality. Rather, an attempt is made to set down with care the rationale underlying the case. The considerations herein contained are those which make it appear to this investigator that his conclusions are the best available. This, it is felt, is all any scientific investigator can do in a report.

Democratically Delegated Authority

There are still other provisions which, at first glance, seem to conflict with democratic principles outlined in the preceding chapter but which, upon closer examination, square with over-all principles of democracy. There are cases in democratic nations in which certain persons exercise special prerogatives in conflict with the suggested democratic principle of equality of opportunity and of responsibility -- no special privilege -- for individuals. Again, without denying that there are individuals, although representing the exception, in democratic nations who enjoy special privilege, usually outside the law, there are other cases wherein persons seem to enjoy autocratic special privilege who, when the circumstances are examined, are found to be acting in a thoroughly democratic manner.

In carrying out decisions on matters of action enacted by a people, individuals are designated to perform various tasks. Police officers, for example, carry firearms which private citizens in several of the United States are not allowed to carry without specific permission. But police officers are delegated to represent the people as a whole and are charged with responsibility which a private citizen is not required to meet and for which firearms are regarded by society as necessary. In carrying out or enforcing matters of action, police officers, so long as they comply

with the enforcement of legally established laws, overrule individuals who are breaking the law. This can hardly be interpreted as constituting autocratic special privilege, but as enforcing the laws established by society at large. Similarly, certain other officials are provided with seeming special privileges to facilitate their handling of special tasks assigned to them by the people. But these officials, too, are provided with special responsibilities for which special prerogatives are regarded by society as necessary. The crux of the matter, as regards democracy, resides in the proposition that, instead of enjoying special privileges as individuals, all such officials function as servants of the people as a whole. Aside from the authority vested in them by society at large, they have only the rights and responsibilities of other private citizens. Moreover, those who are charged with special responsibilities attended by special prerogatives in carrying out matters of action in democratic nations remain responsible to, and are subject to recall by, society at large which establishes the forms of action and assigns the task.

In addition to cases of the afore-mentioned type in which democratically appointed officials are required to enforce democratically enacted laws, democracy under certain circumstances delegates authority for making decisions. As Merriam points out:

There is nothing . . . [whether in a population of 10,000, 5 million, or 140 million] to indicate that a democratic society cannot set up forms

of authority adequate to all social situations, normal or critical, providing for the determination of policy by a council and for administrative management under the general control and supervision of the determiners of policy. . . . (3)

In another connection Merriam contends that:

. . . Peoples democratic or otherwise who cannot adjust their institutions and choices to the needs of emergency decision are . . . doomed If they cannot trust themselves to use the powers of their community for the common good -- nay, the common life -- they will not survive. Fear, distrust, suspicion -- these are not the bases of vital power. States are not strong in proportion as their government is weak. Liberty is not secure in proportion as government has no power. Protection at home and abroad is the life of liberty -- protection against special groups at home and against warlike powers abroad. Wars cannot be conducted without wide ranging authority in the hands of the leader; and important social changes cannot be made without wide powers of policy and administration in the hands of the leaders. Not to trust any leaders is not to trust yourself -- the formula for weakness and dissolution. Graveyards are full of timid men and timid nations who died because they trusted no one. (4)

Needless to say, this trust in leadership need not, and if democracy is to endure must not, be blind. A democratic people, to remain democratic, must remain vigilant regarding the policies, and the administration of policies, of its leadership. If democratic sovereignty is to prevail, leadership must originate from and remain accountable to society at large. Hook, in recognizing the necessity of mechanisms for prompt action through delegated authority, emphasizes the necessity for accountability of such authority

to society. He maintains that:

. There is nothing incompatible with democracy in freely delegating specific functions to authority provided that at a certain fixed time an accounting is made to the governed who alone have the prerogative of renewing or abrogating the grant of authority.* (5)

And as Griffith indicates, " . . . the essential element in dictatorship is not authority, but nonaccountability." (6) Merriam, too, points out that a despot's policies rest upon "personal assumption of responsibility for the common weal, without any accountability" (7)

Bryn-Jones explains the function of democratically delegated authority, distinguishing it from dictatorial authority, as follows:

The [democratic] leader is distinguished from the dictator not by the measure of his power, but by the sources whence it is derived, the instruments and methods by which it is exercised, and the purposes to which it is directed. An American president or a British prime minister may actually have as much power as a German fuehrer, but that power will be derived from sources entirely different -- from the expressed wishes of an electorate and

* Britain and her now self-governing dominions do not have a "fixed time" of accounting in the sense that the United States does. However, the people of these democracies, as reflected in their representative Parliamentary majorities, do select the time for election and change of representation and administration. In some respects, as indicated later in this chapter, the British system appears to be more democratically sensitive to the popular will than that in the United States where the executive and representatives are elected for fixed periods of time.

the declared preferences of a majority of the people. And democratic leaders will retain that power only by continuing to maintain their hold upon the people's political preferences and by remaining the people's choice. They will not engage in "purges," nor will they attempt the wholesale suppression of parties and of opposition, to which a dictator periodically finds it necessary to resort. They will retain their leadership only so long as they prove able to lead, and the test of their ability to lead will be whether the ends they seek and achieve are those that are actually sought and desired by the people. Thus, and thus only, can they hope to maintain the confidence and retain the loyalty of their followers. They must serve as the executives of the popular will, not as external agents of coercion. They must win men, not break them! (8)

Failure to understand the function of democratically delegated authority may be responsible also for the frequent and seemingly erroneous assumption that democratic nations, because of their employment of parliamentary discussion, are not only less capable of prompt action in emergency but less efficient, in general, than dictatorships. However, if one may regard the results of two World Wars as criteria -- and presumably a major war requires large measure of promptness and efficiency --, the democracies did not fare ill. And in cases where democracies have made poor showings, the reason, apparently, did not stem from lack of authority on the part of leadership but rather from lack of personal ability on the part of leadership to cope with the situations at hand.* Merriam's contention appears to be well founded

* This circumstance re-emphasizes the necessity of democracies to be enlightened to the extent that their peoples are able and disposed to select competent leadership.

when he states that efficiency is a monopoly neither of democracy nor of autocracy. He observes that:

. . . . The difficulties at Munich were not due to a lack of power on the part of Chamberlain or of Daladier, but to a lack of ability to use effectively, in that particular situation, the authority they had. Mussolini a little later also demonstrated capacity for muddling
(9)

Merriam goes on to point out that:

. . . . Germany and Italy . . . [were] non-democratic states, but their results measured in terms of efficiency were not the same. The British navy developed by a democratic state on the other hand was definitely superior to the Italian navy developed under Fascism. The United States could have developed [and later did develop] a vast apparatus of planes, tanks, and armored divisions, had it willed to lend its national energies to war The Soviets willed to set up a demonstration of a particular economic theory, and to accomplish this through a form of dictatorship. The government assumed the broadest legal powers, but this did not automatically ensure it against governmental and economic inefficiency. (10)

Most, if not all, autocrats, kings, emperors, and dictators historically have consulted advisors, few or many, though choice of advisors remained solely with the autocrat and he could heed or disregard their advice as he saw fit. The question arises, however, whether the best ideas available regarding any problem will be more likely to present themselves under conditions of special privilege for ideas of autocratic rule, or under conditions of equality of opportunity and of responsibility for ideas of democratic rule.

Democracies require expert leadership in capacities other than statesmanship. As Tead points out:

A democracy needs . . . the direct results of scientific effort in making existence more safe and more enjoyable. We need no longer argue together about certain problems for which the scientist has given us the answer. Typhoid, small-pox, diphtheria, vitamin A -- these are matters now outside the realm of the controversial.* The scientist helps us progressively away from opinion about the good to the practice of the demonstrated good. Enlightened [italics not in original] democracies are by way of understanding that on many issues test tubes work better than ballots, and that certain liberties are bought in the laboratory. We shall thus ask more, rather than less, of the scientist as democracy matures and understands that liberty has to do with knowledge of and obedience to certain kinds of law which are written into the nature of things, rather than merely into law books.
(11)

Griffith also calls attention to the necessity for utilizing scientific knowledge and expert opinion in democratic nations. He observes that:

. . . . Before the days of public health, the location of the town pump was a political problem solvable by the layman in town meetings. The modern equivalent of the town pump is or should be left

* Tead's assumption that such matters are no longer subject to argument would not always hold. A democratic people must be schooled in scientific thinking to the point that they can understand the advantages of such scientific advancements. Many an M. D. can attest to examples of refusal of such medical safeguards which seem to stem from superstition and religious absolutes. It is not always easy to convince the inhabitants of backward districts even in the "enlightened democracies," that vaccination is to be desired. An appendectomy is not necessarily the solution to appendicitis for persons of certain religious beliefs.

to the technical competence of the sanitary or hydraulic engineer. The early provision for the poor was settled by ordinary men in their religious or philanthropic moods. The modern approaches to the problem of poverty, stressing prevention and rehabilitation, are the province of the economist and trained social worker. These are but random instances of a basic, all-pervading fact about modern government. Modern government demands technical competence in the solution of all save an infinitesimal fraction of the problems which face it. Looked at from this angle, one of government's major problems becomes the discovery, the utilization, and the control of such technical competence. Moreover, whether we like it or not it is implicit in modern technology that such technical competence be accepted by the uninitiated rest of us. (12)

Yet, Griffith gets at the crux of the matter, from a democratic point of view, when he points out that:

. . . This [the above proposition] is not the whole truth. We have also spoken of values, community values; and in the light of these there must be an accountability somehow demanded of the technically competent government official in terms of results -- that is, of results measured in the light of these values. If technology demands the acceptance of the authority of the technically competent as to means used, then it should demand of the technically competent that they on their part accept the community values or ends as the effective standards in governing their conduct. In other words, the specialist must think of his activity, not as an isolated phenomenon, but as a function in an integrated or organic community pattern. (13)

Marshall brings up a point in this connection, also touched upon in the two foregoing chapters, that:

The development of a people can be stunted by the paternalism of science as readily as by that of church or state. It is only the official who regards his

office as one for public service, and the man of God who looks upon himself as of service in bringing comfort and salvation who help men develop -- not the official or churchman who tries to exercise control. The same is true of the specialist. To the degree to which he can be of service he is useful. But to the degree to which he seeks to impose his expert opinion as a new tablet of commandments inscribed by the man made lightning bolts of the laboratory, he is no better than the German king who, in refusing the imperial crown from a revolutionary assembly, said that if that crown "is to be given away, then it will be I and my equals who will give it"

Therefore, they [the experts and specialists -- those to whom authority is delegated] must be guided by the people whose needs are to be served. They must perform their tasks in accordance with a popular mandate. They must be controlled by popular debate, discussion and judgment. The most intricate and clever machine must be set for the job it is to do: the most wise and clever expert must have his appointed task laid out for him. He is not deus ex machina. (14)

Thus, the role of the expert and of delegated authority in democratic socio-governmental organization, indispensable as it is if a democratic people is to thrive, returns to the basic democratic proposition that, although a shoemaker is more expert than a layman in remedying trouble, the man who wears the shoe knows best that it pinches. (15) It would appear that delegated authority is an indispensable element of democratic socio-governmental organization, not only from the standpoint of making decisions and carrying them out in time of crisis but also in bringing expert opinion to bear in solving the many and intricate problems

facing a modern society. However, the crux of the matter, as regards basic principles of democracy, resides in the proposition that such experts must originate from the choice of society and must remain accountable to the source of their power. As Hook concludes in the matter:

That such grants of authority may be abused goes without saying. It may even be acknowledged that there is no absolute guarantee against the risks of usurpation. But unless these risks are sometimes taken, democratic government may be destroyed by evils whose urgency will not wait until the close of prolonged debate. Common sense recognizes this in case of flood and plague. Flood and plague have their social analogues. But whatever the crisis may be, the recognition that it is a crisis must come from the governed or their delegated representatives; grants of power must be renewed democratically; and the governed cannot, without destroying their democracy, proclaim that the crisis is permanent.
[Italics in original.] (16)

If modern democracies, because of their great size and large populations, must of necessity substitute devices of representative government and delegated authority for direct participation of pure democracy as means of furthering the popular will and if that delegation of authority is to remain responsive to the people who bestow the authority, then it becomes evident that effectual methods of ensuring accountability must be invoked. If government by consent is to mean something more than mere consent to, or protest against, various choices, none of which conceivably may be acceptable to the voter; or if consent is to mean something

more than a condition which Sait shows to have been characteristic even of despotic governments and to have been based merely upon habits of passive obedience; (17) then methods of one kind or another must be devised which will translate public opinion into effective action and make sure that delegated authority will remain responsive to public opinion.

Ellwood sees no reason inherent in representative democracies why they should not be as sensitive to the public will as pure democracies. However, he recognizes the necessity for representative democracies to create devices which will ensure popular government in actuality as well as in name. He maintains that:

. . . . If means of intercommunication are sufficiently highly developed and kept untrammelled . . . there is no reason why democratic government should not work equally successfully under the system of delegated representatives. [However], popular control in representative democracies . . . depends upon some system for the "recall" of officials, when elected, at the will of the electors, if they are not found to be truly representative. For the same reason the initiative and referendum are necessary means of completing representative democracy in the field of legislation. . . . (18)

As concerns democratic practice in such matters, Britain and her now self-governing dominions provide for methods of ensuring accountability through kindred systems which call for an election when the executive cabinet can no longer maintain a majority of Parliamentary confidence and when

there are indications that officials in various other capacities no longer have the confidence of the people. Under these systems, a general popular election, if need be, may be called at any time. The Australian people go a step further in that they invoke the referendum in matters calling for constitutional amendment, thus keeping the functions and powers of their officials under direct popular control. Moreover, the Australian Parliament regarded it as within the province of its power to submit the issue of compulsory military service to the people for direct legislation in 1915 and 1917. (19) On the other hand, the Constitution of the Canadian Commonwealth and the provincial Constitutions do not provide for the referendum. (20) Yet, the Canadian governmental machinery, as brought out later in this chapter, appears to insure adequately for accountability of Canadian officials to the people.

It is to the United States and to Switzerland that democratic theorists look for examination of the devices of recall, referendum, and initiative as such. Without taking space to describe in detail the variations in practice of these techniques in each of the United States, recall, referendum, and popular initiative, all three, are employed in various states under various circumstances. The recall, which provides for direct action by the people, is a device employed to correct misuse of delegated authority by removing from office an unsatisfactory official

before expiration of his term. In the United States recall may be invoked variously against legislative representatives, administrative officials, judges, and municipal authorities, providing, if this specially-called election goes against an official, for election of another in his place. In addition to, and in some cases in place of, the recall, various of the American legislative bodies have been provided with power to unseat fellow legislators according to rules which they adopt or which are explicit in the constitutions governing such matters. And impeachment proceedings are provided variously for indicting and trying governmental officials on various charges. Where a bi-cameral legislature exists, indictment usually originates in the House of Representatives and the Senate tries the case. The referendum provides for submission of various measures passed or suggested by legislative branches to direct popular vote for approval or disapproval. The referendum is initiated either by a prescribed number of citizens, which varies in different states, or it is routinely required by constitutional law in some of the states. The popular initiative employed in various of the United States provides the privilege for varying prescribed numbers of citizens (depending on the state) to prepare and propose a bill or an amendment to be voted upon directly in a popular election. The number of persons who may submit a popular initiative proposal varies in different states, usually

ranging from five to fifteen percent of the qualified voters. The prescribed number of persons who may demand a referendum varies in different states, usually from five to ten percent of the qualified voters. (21)

It is probably because of nearness of the Swiss government to its people through its devices of recall, referendum, and initiative that, in spite of Switzerland's failure to provide for woman suffrage, the nation is regarded in many quarters as the most democratic of all nations. Bryce described the Swiss system in 1921 as follows, and it remains essentially the same today:

When the [Swiss] Federal Constitution was . . . revised in 1874, power was given to 30,000 voters [or eight cantons] (22) to require that a Bill passed by the Legislature should be submitted to the people. This created the Federal Referendum. The possession by the people, since 1848, of the right to demand, by a petition signed by 50,000 voters, that the Constitution should be amended, suggested a new clause, enacted in 1891 . . . enabling that number of citizens to put forward a specific amendment to be submitted to the vote of the people. This is the . . . Popular Constitutional Initiative. These two institutions, Referendum and Initiative, represent an effort to return from the modern method of legislation by representative assemblies to [one more nearly approximating] the ancient method [of pure democracy] of legislation by the citizens themselves. . . . (23)

Bryce indicates also that referendum and initiative are applied not only to constitutional amendments, laws, and resolutions of the Confederation, but to those of [all

of] (24) the cantons.* The two devices, moreover, are applied in large communes** and in some cities which are too large for direct (primary or pure) democracy. These devices, of course, are unnecessary in certain of the forest cantons which, in any case, are governed by primary assemblies of all the male citizens. (26) In addition to foregoing instances of direct popular government, Bryce points out that:

. . . . No one [in Switzerland] can disallow laws [by veto, for example, as in the United States] except the people themselves by means of the Referendum . . . [which provides] the right of the citizens to vote directly upon measures passed by the Cantonal Legislatures . . . [and by the Assembly of] the Confederation. . . . There are, moreover, seven cantons which permit the people, by a specified majority, to demand the dissolution and re-election of the Great Council, as no longer truly representing popular sentiment. This resembles the American "Recall" . . . (27)

Matters Of Action And Matters Of Belief Differentiated

Thus, some of the aspects of the democratic principle of dynamic majority choice and its implementation -- by direct popular voting, electing representatives, delegating authority, and ensuring accountability of delegated authority to

* Zurich has had an obligatory referendum since 1869, one which provides that all laws passed by the cantonal council be submitted to the people who, according to Zurich's constitution, "exercise the legislative power with the assistance of the Cantonal Council." (25)

** A commune in Switzerland is a political organizational unit corresponding roughly to an American township.

the people -- have been noted as they concern matters of action, having to do with what a nation decides it as a people must or must not do. These laws (or matters of action) governing various aspects of national life differ in different nations and differ from time to time within the same nation. That is, democracy does not imply any particular set of laws or regulations. So long as they are determined democratically, are applied uniformly within the provision of any given law, and remain subject to democratic change under the conditions that surrounded their establishment, they meet democratic requirements. Moreover, different democracies have adopted different means of carrying out matters of action. Authority is delegated variously, and various techniques have been adopted to ensure accountability to the people. For the most part, then, the discussion has centered around matters of action and the implementation of matters of action.

But what of opinion or matters of belief? Opinion comes into play in deciding matters of action. That is, viewpoints are brought to bear in a democracy in deciding which laws are needed and what forms the laws will take. Presumably, a citizen, when he votes at the polls, is bringing matters of belief -- his opinion -- to bear in making choices. However, matters of action, after adoption, apply to all of society alike so long as in force. Are matters of belief, then, also to be decided upon and legislated in such a way

as to apply equally to all of society? Does democracy imply that a people vote directly, elect representatives, and delegate authority to decide and enforce what they, as a whole, must or must not believe or advocate regarding various matters?

Such questions may appear to require an obviously negative answer. However, closer examination indicates that a negative answer is not as obvious as it might at first seem. In any case, such questions return the investigation to the controversy, noted in Chapter II, regarding what constitutes democratic freedom of speech and attendant matters having to do with opinion and voicing of opinion.

Reves, who is representative of one way of thinking about such matters, contends that:

. . . It appears to be the most simple logic that in organized [democratic] society liberty of speech cannot signify liberty of speech for those who want to abolish liberty of speech.

Freedom of vote cannot mean freedom of vote for those who want to destroy parliamentarism.

The democratic institutions have not been created for and cannot be at the disposal of those who want to abolish democracy. (28)

The foregoing statements are suggestive of outlooks, noted in Chapter II, based on the proposition that a democratic society should be democratic "as far as possible." If it is assumed that democracy implies the right to hold and voice opinions, Reves seems to be saying that these

(the above matters) are some of the points at which a democracy must stop being democratic. It should be noted that Reves does not say that a democratic people must constantly be on guard against such advocations in order to recognize them for what they are and what they will lead to if translated into action. Instead, he is saying that the people of a democracy have no right, per se, to express opinions against these various freedoms. Reves goes on to contend that:

Freedom of speech means that every individual has the right to express his thoughts and to have complete freedom to say whatever he wants to say, with one single exception: He shall have no right to say that he is against freedom of speech.

Freedom of the press means that every individual has the right to print books, periodicals or newspapers and to publish in such printed media any idea he wishes, with one exception: He shall have no right to print or publish that freedom of the press is an institution which is bad and which must be abolished.

All individuals must have freedom of assembly and in such assemblies every individual must have the liberty to express whatever views he may hold, with one single exception: He shall have no right to attack or to criticize the right of free assembly.

Every political party must have the right to be admitted to legislative assemblies, and every duly elected representative must have the right to express freely his views on public affairs, with one single exception: No speaker shall have the right to attack the institution of parliamentarism and representative government, and no parties advocating such views shall be permitted to participate in parliamentary debates.

The last aim of democracy is naturally the democratic man, but in view of the fact that the human race, even the most highly civilized nations, are not comprised entirely of democratic men, we must secure democracy for those who are democratically minded and it is our primary democratic duty to oppose anti-democratic thoughts, movements and forces with anti-democratic methods. (29)

The proposition which Reves regards as representing "the most simple logic" seems not entirely to be simple or logical in the sense that it is clearly consistent. It would appear that, when he claims that "liberty of speech cannot signify liberty of speech for those who want to abolish liberty of speech," he is advocating the very thing which he contends must not be advocated. Moreover, Reves seems to be saying, in effect, that democracy cannot assent to its own destruction. However, there are instances in history which refute him. And logically, if democracy is founded upon the fundamental principle of majority decisiveness within an electorate of virtually all of the people, what is to prevent a majority, or all, of the people from abrogating democracy and doing so democratically, if they so desire? Of course, once democracy is lost, there is no peaceful, democratic way of restoring the loss. That is the end of democracy. Nonetheless, it would appear that, logically, a democratic people has all of the power it needs for terminating its own democratic social order.

Aside from his failure to indicate who is to decide what shall constitute freedom of speech and exceptions there-to,* Reves appears not to have detected the resemblance of his advocations to those of a type of governmental theory and practice against which he would protect democracy. The Russian ideology, based upon Marxian and Hegelian dialectic logic, sets out to secure what it claims to be a democratic economic system and democratic social order by exercising dictatorial powers over the society and its economy. As Swabey points out, the Marxists advocate strife to generate peace, want to generate plenty, class divisions to bring about classlessness, and dictatorship and suppression to bring about democracy and freedom. (30) However, from a democratic point of view, and judging from all appearances, the Russian regime generates more strife, want, class division, suppression, and dictatorship than peace, plenty, classlessness, freedom, and democracy. When the violence of dictatorship will be supplanted by democracy, as Marxian theory claims it will be, is anybody's guess. But to advocate autocracy as a means of ensuring democracy, as Reves has done -- "it is our primary democratic duty," he maintains, "to oppose anti-democratic thoughts, movements and forces with anti-democratic methods" -- would appear to be utterly incongruous.

* Any freedoms or limitations upon freedom are matters for democratic decision in democratic nations.

Such advocacy resembles essentially the position that a brawny giant of a man is facetiously reputed to have taken when he arose in meeting to proclaim that the assemblage was going to act democratically if he had to break the heads of everyone present to make it do so.

Finally, Reves speaks in each instance of a "single exception" to the various freedoms which he discusses. Thus, he seems to be inferring, if not explicitly asserting, that any exceptions other than those which he mentions are undemocratic. Is it, then, to be assumed that curbs against slander, libel, fraud, perjury, conveying of security secrets to enemy agents, and threats to do violence, measures which all of the democracies under consideration have enacted into law, are undemocratic impositions against freedom of speech?

Ward appears to be nearer the logic and practice of democracy than Reves when Ward contends that:

It is self-evident that democracy cannot survive without taking the risk of losing its life. If it denies free speech, it ceases to be. If it gives free speech to its enemies they may persuade the people to put them in power. Then they will destroy completely the right, and opportunity, of the people to govern themselves. This is the dilemma It arises out of the nature of democracy. The people's power to govern themselves is also their power to destroy self-government. . . . (31)

But to re-emphasize a point made previously: Once a people has embarked upon a course which eventuates in repudiation of democracy, there is no means of reversing the condition short of violent overthrow of the government in

power by forces within or without the nation, as Ward observes (32) and as events in Germany and other former democracies confirm. The only assurance, apparently, that a democratic people will not of its own accord abrogate democracy or permit it to slip from grasp through unwise decisions and usurpation is that its members be sufficiently enlightened, alert, and disposed to preserve it.

Thus, there appears to be a measure of jeopardy inherent in democracy which, if it is not entertained, repudiates democracy at the outset. But what of dangers facing democracy other than those of voluntary and peaceful abrogation? What of forces which threaten to circumvent the laws provided for the implementation of democracy and threaten to overthrow democracy by violence outside the law? Must a democracy sit passively by and permit so-called subversive forces to destroy governmental machinery, democratically provided to facilitate the process of democracy? Perhaps these are the matters which Reves had in mind when making his pronouncements, although he did not make himself clear if such be the case. As Hook sees the matter:

Those who believe in democracy . . . must distinguish between honest opposition within the framework of the democratic process and the opposition, subsidized and controlled by the totalitarian enemies of democracy, which is a form of treason to everything democrats hold dear. Opposition of the first kind, no matter how mistaken, must be tolerated, if for no other reason than that we cannot be sure that it is not we who are mistaken. Opposition of the second kind, no matter what

protective coloration it wears -- and it will usually be found wrapped up in counterfeit symbols of patriotism or in recently acquired vestments of the Bill of Rights -- must be swiftly dealt with if democracy is to survive. (33)

Granting that Hook has defined the issue as regards the function of democratic criticism as opposed to subversiveness, still, how is one reliably to know the difference between undemocratic activity and honest difference of opinion? Moreover, what is to be done about the former cases after true intent is discovered?

All of the democratic nations under consideration have legal provisions, either in form of a constitution or a body of laws (democratically established), which define procedures to be followed in implementing the interactive majority-minority will. Moreover, all of the democracies have laws for the purpose of enforcing their various methods adopted for registering the public will and translating it into action. Such prescribed procedures, taking the form of laws, as any other laws democratically enacted and subject to democratic change, relate to matters of action and apply to everyone in society alike so long as such laws are in force. Thus, the opinion or belief of an individual or of a group of individuals is no longer the criterion for obeying or failing to obey the laws.

In this sense, belief and action are entirely different matters in democracy. Different beliefs or viewpoints are brought to bear -- there is discussion and voting -- to

determine what the laws governing various matters shall be. But after a law is adopted, it must be obeyed by all so long as it is in force. Everyone is required to abide by the law and, if he does not do so, is subject to penalties provided by the law. If the law is strictly and impartially enforced, as it previously was noted that it must be enforced if democratic conditions are to prevail, so far forth the democratic processes would be secure.

However, obligation to abide by law would not mean that everyone must approve every law. Unless passage were unanimous, it would seem that there would be cases of dissatisfaction with any and every adopted measure. If laws democratically enacted are subject also to democratic change whenever a majority so desires it, and if democracy implies the right of any individual or minority to work toward becoming a majority through peaceful persuasion as previous examination indicated, equal obligation to abide by a law would not mean that a person must refrain from voicing his objections to any particular law with a view toward having it rescinded or modified. Thus, it would seem that every person has the right to voice his opinions (relevant to matters of belief) on any matter concerning himself or society so long as he obeys the laws (since laws are matters of action). If such be the case, an individual or minority may conceivably persuade a people to abrogate democracy if the entire people is so dull, disinterested, or disposed as to succumb to the argument. Such would seem

to be an ever-present hazard with which the people of a democratic nation must be intelligent enough to cope.

But there would be no reason to tolerate individuals or groups intent upon destroying democratic governmental machinery by illegal, hence undemocratic, means. As noted, all democracies have enacted safeguards of various kinds against such threats. The United States, for example, has enacted laws prohibiting incitation to insurrection, and other measures designed to prevent circumvention of legally established mechanisms of government. Although American interpretations of such matters have run the gamut from a Supreme Court definition of "immediate acts of incitation to insurrection"* (34) to a later law invoked against "conspiring to teach the overthrow of government" (Smith Act) and to a still later provision prohibiting "totalitarians" from entering the country (McCarran Act), any law must be strictly enforced if democratic requirements are to be met.

There has been much criticism of the Smith Act and of kindred measures based on the claim that such widespread restrictions upon free speech endanger the very existence of democratic processes. However that may be -- and it may or may not be the case --, logic seems to identify such measures more closely with matters of action than with matters of belief or with the voicing of opinion. A confidence game,

* Opinion of the Supreme Court handed down in 1919, written by Justice Holmes who defined "immediate danger."

too, is a form of free speech, but it would seem to represent an incipient act of theft which, beyond all doubt, is prohibited by law -- a matter of action -- in democracies. Also a threat to commit murder is only a voiced threat, although such threat would seem to foreshadow an overt act of homicide. Regardless of the logic, fraud and threatened homicide are specifically prohibited by law, removing any doubt concerning their kinship to matters of action.

But in the same sense, certain revolutionary movements based upon violent overthrow of legally constituted governments are identifiable, perhaps, more closely with matters of action than with belief or opinion. Inasmuch as Russian communism, for example, is founded upon principles of violent overthrow of governments (excepting the Russian government, of course), a matter in the United States which, when it becomes an overt act, is illegal even according to the most tolerant estimates of the law, it would seem that affiliation with Russian communism might justifiably be regarded as transcending a matter of belief and as approximating a matter of action, even though incipient. In this sense, affiliates of Russian communism might logically be likened to those who threaten to do bodily harm or murder, the latter threats of which can hardly be classified as freedom of speech or as a matter of belief in that such threats foreshadow acts, which, if not prevented, actually result in acts against which there are democratically

established laws.* Hence, it would seem to be one thing to advocate by peaceful persuasion that a form of government should be changed at the polls -- a matter of belief -- and another to declare one's intention explicitly or implicitly to incite to insurrection at the first opportunity or to give aid and comfort to an enemy bent upon destroying by force a democratically established government.

As noted, democratic nations may consent, in fact having done so, to their own demise. The only safeguard against that possibility would be sufficient enlightenment and inclination to preserve democracy. But it is a different matter to permit persons to hold loaded guns, so to speak, until such time as they choose to fire them at peaceful, law-abiding citizens. As Bryn-Jones regards the matter:

. . . . Where one side frankly avows its intention to rely on force, the other has no option but to take measures to meet the threat. There is already an incipient state of civil war. A democratic government must meet the threat to its existence by a readiness to meet force with force. Argument and persuasion cannot be maintained with those who have abandoned them. Those who appeal to the sword cannot [reasonably] complain if the challenge

* Different democracies, and the same democracy at different times, might be expected to regard such matters in different ways. Mere membership in a party in the United States has not, until recently, been taken to mean that the threat actually has been made. In spite of present tension, the British, rather than outlaw the Communist Party and jeopardize freedom of opinion, have so far chosen to give Communism what they call "the fresh air treatment." The British, of course, have imprisoned under their laws persons convicted of trafficking security secrets to Russia.

is accepted. Those who deny liberty must not claim her protection when they are hard pressed on the field of their own choosing. . . . (35)

Democracy must defend itself. Where the attack is by argument, it will meet the attack by argument; where the attack is by fire and sword, it must use -- however much it hates to do so -- the only weapons that are effective against such attack. Those who use force must be circumvented, those who organize plots must be frustrated, those who plan violence must be restrained. Hard saying though it may be, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion: "Of them we are not bound to be tolerant." (36)

Regardless of logic or of esoteric arguments, when such matters are defined as illegal under democratically enacted law, all doubt is removed as to their relating to matters of action and applying equally to all of the society under coercion if necessary to ensure their observance. Democratic practice in every instance confirms such an interpretation. What laws are enacted depends entirely upon the people concerned. And the quality of the laws -- whether they further democracy and the common interests of the people concerned -- depends upon ability and disposition of the people to make wise choices. Thus, libel, slander, treason, threats to do violence, among other matters, all, when they are specifically prohibited by democratically enacted laws, relate to matters of action and differ basically in function from having or voicing opinion. Thus, freedom of speech, as any other freedom, depends entirely upon what a society chooses to regard as freedom of speech. The term is not an absolute; it has to be defined clearly enough to be applicable in particular cases. If the law provides freedom of speech in certain

respects, the citizens of a democracy have it; if the law does not, they do not have it.

Foregoing interpretations notwithstanding, there appears to be a critical point beyond which freedom of speech cannot be restricted if democracy is to exist. Before democracy can function, it is necessary, for example, to provide the right to criticize various measures, even though having to abide by them. It is necessary to provide the right for a minority to present its arguments in an effort to become a majority. Without these basic freedoms or rights through media of speech, publication, and assembly, democracy cannot prevail. Such primary rights as these constitute some of the foundational principles of democracy. Intelligence in recognizing honest difference of opinion (as well as recognizing attempts to curtail it) and in detecting and deterring subversive plotting appears to hold the key to the problem. Overemphasis on curbing suspected subversive plotting may place intolerable restrictions upon honest differences of opinion, and overemphasis on free speech may permit enemies of democracy undemocratically to slip through the back door. Either extreme, apparently, may result in a loss of democracy.

To repeat, perhaps this is what Reves meant by his (the foregoing) pronouncements. However, he states, in effect, that a people has no democratic right to abrogate democracy. Actually -- and elementary caution would necessitate recognition of such possibility -- a democratic people has the right and all the power it needs to abrogate democracy. The brute fact remains, however, that, if the members

of a democratic society do abrogate democracy, they no longer have it. Here appears to lie the no-man's-land, wherein the way must be felt as one goes, relying on generalizations but making decisions when occasions requiring them arrive. It is concerning just such borderland cases that a democratic nation must decide which adopted regulations will preserve democracy and which regulations will push the nation over the brink and make return impossible. Thus, a question continually confronting democracies is: At what point will regulations against subversive action become the very action which itself achieves the subversiveness that the regulations are designed to preclude?

Regardless, democratic theory and practice indicate a basic difference -- as well as a close relationship -- between matters of belief and matters of action. Matters of belief are brought to bear in deciding matters of action, and matters of belief may be brought to bear in criticizing matters of action with a view toward change. However, it is not left to the belief or opinion of an individual whether to observe or violate a law, which, constituting a matter of action, applies to everyone regardless of personal opinion. On the other hand, matters of belief are not legislated in the sense that they are proclaimed and regimented in autocratic nations.

Thus, democracy implies equality of opportunity for ideas, relevant to matters of belief, in the sense that

everyone is entitled to a hearing of his views. And inasmuch as a people, in final analysis, is responsible for the quality of ideas which it brings to bear in reaching decisions, democracy implies equality of responsibility for ideas, concerning matters of belief.

In the sense that every adult citizen has a voice in government, democracy implies equality of opportunity for determining the matters of action to be adopted. In the same sense, and because every adult citizen therefore is responsible for his part in making the choices, democracy implies equality of responsibility for adopting appropriate forms of action. In both cases, matters of belief -- equality of opportunity and equality of responsibility for ideas -- are implicit in the process of adopting the forms of action. However, democracy also implies equality of responsibility for abiding by matters of action adopted. In this case, matters of belief have no bearing on the obligation to abide by the action. Thus do relationships and differences between matters of belief and matters of action exist. And thus does the generalized definition still appear to hold: that democracy implies equality of opportunity to arrive at decisions and equality of responsibility to abide by them.

National Institutions, Governmental Mechanisms, And Laws
Of Society Distinguished From Fundamental
Principles Of Democracy

The investigation to this point has centered around some

of the basic principles which are fundamental to democracy as differentiated from those of alternative forms of government or absence thereof. Attention also has been given to some of the generalized aspects of implementing these fundamental principles of democracy. Representation, delegated authority, popular initiative, recall, and the respective roles of matters of belief and of action, as generalized considerations, have been discussed with reference to the interactive majority-minority sovereignty. However, the particularized method -- or perhaps the technique -- of setting up representation, of delegating authority, and of ensuring accountability differs among the various democracies. National institutions, governmental machinery, and the laws governing various matters differ from case to case. This circumstance appears to have prompted Bryce to comment that:

There is no such thing as a Typical Democracy, for in every country physical conditions and inherited institutions so affect the political development of a nation as to give its government a distinctive character. . . . (37)

Wilson also indicates that, although there seems to be general agreement among political scientists on democracy's fundamental character, democracy is not the same as regards particular institutions in any two countries. (38)

It may be because of failure to distinguish between particular governmental institutions, which serve merely as adjuncts of democracy, and basic principles, which are

fundamental, that a widespread and erroneous notion has arisen that democracy is not amenable to accurate description. This notion, seemingly, has led to an unjustified assumption that democracy can mean almost anything, hence to an implied assumption that it probably does not mean anything at all. Such confused outlooks may account for the feeling of futility on the part of certain democratic peoples in times of crisis when they compare their own seeming indefiniteness of direction with the people of autocratic nations who know exactly where they stand because of the special privilege autocracy accords to certain ideas and institutions. Merriam recognizes this circumstance when he states that:

Much confusion has been caused by failure to distinguish between the essential elements of democracy and special features of democratic organization, program, or social background. The general principle of community control over essential community problems is in this way lost in the controversy over special and temporary features of a general system.

Merriam contends that:

In general political theory, democracy is not identifiable with:

a. Any special size or area such as a city, state, nation state, world state.

b. Any special form of economic organization, agrarian, industrial, capitalistic, socialistic, state capitalistic, or otherwise.

c. Any special form of centralization or decentralization of powers or functions, as federal or centralistic, or any special form of the separation or balance of power among agents of authority.

d. Any particular form of representative or executive organization, such as unicameral, bicameral, multicameral, regional or occupational representation, or special types of administrative or managerial arrangements.

Of course, in different historical situations -- Swiss, English, Swedish* -- democracy is associated with special types of machinery, program, cultural background. But the general principle of democratic association and purpose lies deeper down than these special forms and problems, however important they may be in a given phase of social development in a particular territory or people. The principle and the practice of democracy may be found in any kind of social, economic, religious, racial, cultural situation; or it may be found in many varying types of governmental organization; or it may be found with many widely ranging programs designed to carry out the principle of democracy under very different circumstances. (39)

In another of his books, Merriam contends, similarly, that:

The general temper of the representative organization [in democracies] is more important than its structure. The process of wisely formulating broad measures expressing the common judgment on the commonweal is not a matter of technical procedure primarily, or even of fine drafts-

* Norway and Sweden, although not generally recognized by the American lay public as being such, appear to be rather thorough-going democracies as democracy is defined in this study. These nations were omitted from this investigation only because they are not as widely discussed by political scientists and democratic theorists as the nations included. As noted at the end of Chapter III, this investigator has abided by the consensus of political scientists and democratic theorists that Switzerland, France, Britain, Canada, the United States, Australia, and New Zealand are unquestionably representative of modern democratic nations.

manship, however important the latter may be. The legislative process is that of translating a popular decision into a general directive -- a process of turning the wisdom and the will of the state into broad lines of administrative action, and this on the basis of responsibility and accountability. . . . (40)

Bryn-Jones also distinguishes between fundamental democratic principles and the details of implementation, when he states that:

. . . . When we speak of a democracy [*Italics in original*], we are thinking primarily of "government by the many." Its features in the modern world are the responsibility of the government to the people; the choice of representatives by election on the basis of a broad franchise; the freedom of the people to discuss issues of principle, policy, and administration; and opportunity for the people, when they have formed an opinion, to make that opinion effective. . . . (41)

Such interpretations are consistently in keeping with conclusions derived earlier in the study. If the previously suggested principles of democracy hold -- if, for example, democracy implies no special privilege for persons or for ideas --, any attempt to state precisely what governmental mechanisms a democracy must adopt or what path a democracy must take would negate the democratic principle itself. As Ward observes, democratic peoples may "govern themselves in ways of their own choosing, changing those ways from time to time as they need and desire" (42) In this connection Merriam points out that, although:

Reorganization of representative systems has always been one of the critical interests of students of government and democracy . . . [and although] the various devices contrived have been numerous and

sometimes ingenious . . . none yet developed is fundamental. They are important, but not fundamentally important, since they deal with details rather than with the larger principles really involved. . . . (43)

The foregoing interpretations are of particular interest from an American point of view inasmuch as many Americans assume, as noted in Chapter II, that democracy and the American Way of Life (whatever that may be taken to mean) are identical. Inasmuch as the American Way of Life has changed rather frequently and extensively since the time of the Founding Fathers and, because of size and cosmopolitan makeup of the nation, has been fairly diverse at any particular period, it is little wonder that the American people sometimes find themselves hard pressed to explain what they mean by democracy when they regard it as representing the American Way of Life. As Ward observes:

To many people [in the United States], perhaps to most, democracy means not only a method of government but our present form of government, which then becomes sacred to them. Forgetting that all forms of life must change, that the old order must continuously give way to the new, they regard our present political institutions as the final, perfect work of man in that field (44)

The foregoing statement, true as it is, does not appear to represent the worst of the picture. Some persons in the United States seem not only to regard the present form of government as representing the essence of democracy, but to get present ways of doing things all mixed up with older ways which, under other circumstances, they also regard as

representing the essence of democracy.

Confusion seldom engenders consistency unless it is the consistency of inconsistency. Such dualistic and pluralistic outlooks regarding the meaning of democracy seem to furnish the basis for labeling almost anything or anyone as "un-American," "undemocratic," or "totalitarian" with which they disagree. Such derogatory epithets have a tendency to discourage the uninitiated (not wishing to be undemocratic or un-American or totalitarian) from suggesting any new or different approaches to various problems, whether a change from left to right, from right to left, or from either one toward the middle. Moreover, such name-calling in general would seem to result, for all practical purposes, in special privilege for certain ideas and institutions, hence special privilege for the persons who favor such ideas and institutions.*

No attempt is being made here to say whether American governmental institutions are good or bad -- whether they should be exchanged or retained. Attention merely is called to the proposition that many particularized forms employed in the United States are not necessarily inherent in democracy. If American ways of doing things appear to a majority

* As noted with reference to invoking various extraneous considerations for authority concerning right and wrong, such practices may be followed innocently, in which case confusion would be apparent, or knowingly, in which case certain individuals would be attempting to hoodwink their opponents in an argument. See Chapter IV.

to be good in terms of the common interests, then, presumably, the institutions should be retained as they stand. If they appear not to be good, it would seem that steps should be taken to replace or modify them with something which shows promise of working better. But the institutions and governmental machinery are not inherent in democracy, an interpretation which may be worth noting if the nation is to avoid damaging confusion and domination by special minority interests playing upon pseudo-patriotic and pseudo-democratic arguments centering around the vagaries of the American Way of Life. The question which the people need to ask themselves is whether any given proposition makes sense in terms of basic principles of democracy and whether it contributes to furthering the common interests of the nation. If it does, presumably it should be adopted; if it does not, presumably it should be discarded or modified.* As Ward states the proposition:

. . . . The American people need to remember that the state and its constitution are human instruments, designed to meet human needs at a given time, and therefore to be changed when they no longer serve their purpose (45)

If various democratically derived institutions are not inherent to democracy, neither are certain techniques adopted by dictators inherent necessarily in autocracy. It would

* This argument, of course, is based on the assumption that democracy is the form of governmental control that the people wish to have.

seem that, if the best interests of democratic peoples are to be served, they should place their governmental devices under scrutiny as compared with those of other nations, including autocracies, in order to adopt or refine those which seem best suited to achieve the popular will. As Woodrow Wilson is reported to have said:

If I see a murderous fellow sharpening a knife cleverly, I can borrow his way of sharpening the knife without borrowing his probable intention to commit murder with it; and so, if I see a monarchist dyed in the wool managing a public bureau well, I can learn his business methods without changing one of my republican spots. He may serve his king; I will continue to serve the people; but I should like to serve my sovereign as well as he serves his. (46)

Theoretical claims that certain specified types of governmental mechanisms, national institutions, and ways of doing things are not necessary concomitants of democracy find support in democratic practice. Space permits only the briefest indication of different approaches to democratic association as compared with the magnitude of the subject, but such would appear to bear out foregoing interpretations.

The French form of governmental control is highly centralized, emanating largely from Paris. On the other hand, the Swiss have emphasized decentralization. Of the chief political divisions in Switzerland, which include communes, districts, and cantons,* the commune represents the heart

* To give an idea of the relative size of the Swiss political divisions, there are 3,164 communes (47), 198 districts, and twenty-two cantons. Since three cantons are divided into two each, there are in effect twenty-five cantons. Three cantons (Unterwalden, Appenzell, and Basel) are

of Swiss political association. (48) Membership in some commune (roughly the equivalent of an American township) is the requisite of Swiss naturalization and carries with it both cantonal (equivalent to American state) and confederal (national) citizenship. (49) As Bryce points out:

They [the communes] deal with many branches of local business (though not everywhere to the same extent) such as education, police, poor relief, water-supply, sometimes in conjunction with a cantonal authority. Usually, too, a commune holds property, and has, in rural areas, the supervision of the communal woods and pastures. In the German-speaking cantons it [the canton] is governed, in rural places and very small towns, by a mass meeting of the citizens in which questions are debated as well as voted upon. Where the population [of a commune] is larger, and generally in the French-speaking districts, the main business is the election of the Communal Council, a standing body for conducting current business and making minor appointments. Its chairman . . . has often special functions and a certain measure of independent action. (50)

Bryce sees Swiss emphasis on local communal government as accounting for their high degree and efficient form of democratic association. It will be remembered also that it is in Switzerland, even more than the United States, that popular initiative and referendum have been developed throughout the nation. Bryce states that:

divided into independent half-cantons, and in each, the two halves, taken together, have the representation of one entire canton in the Confederational Assembly.

Local self-government has been in Switzerland a factor of prime importance, not only as the basis of the administrative fabric, but also because the training which the people have received from practice in it has been a chief cause of their success in working republican institutions. Nowhere in Europe has it been so fully left to the hands of the people. The Swiss themselves lay stress upon it, as a means of educating the citizens in public work, as instilling the sense of civic duty, and as enabling governmental action to be used for the benefit of the community without either sacrificing local initiative or making the action of the central authority too strong and too pervasive. (51)

The Swiss form of government, though resembling that of the United States in several respects, does not provide executive veto power, either in cantons or in the Confederation, in the sense that governors of the United States and the American President may exercise it.* Except for those

* The rights and powers of a Swiss canton correspond roughly with those of various states in the United States and with those of the states of the Australian Commonwealth. Cantonal power, however, is considerably greater than that exercised by Canadian provinces. (52) The Swiss Constitution states that "the cantons are sovereign so far as their sovereignty is not limited by the Federal Constitution, and as such they exercise all the rights not delegated to the Federal Government." In cases where the province of sovereignty between the cantons and the Confederation has been in doubt, the tendency has been, as in the United States, to favor cantonal jurisdiction. The Swiss Constitution also appears to have been modeled upon the United States Constitution, although the former is a longer document and "enters more fully into details, some of which belong to the sphere of ordinary rather than to . . . constitutional legislation . . ." (53) The Swiss cantons (excepting those forest cantons which practice pure democracy) have their own constitutions and representative frames of government, as in the American states. The Swiss Confederation, as the American Union, provides for two houses of representation (the National

small forest cantons governed by direct assemblies of all the enfranchised male citizens, cantonal executive authority "is always vested in a Council, the chairman of which is a presiding officer and nothing more, with no wider opportunities of exerting authority than have his colleagues."

(54) This arrangement is descriptive also of the confederal executive. Only the people of Switzerland hold veto power, being able, as noted, to revoke laws through the referendum based upon a demand initiated by 30,000 enfranchised citizens as regards confederal matters, and by a demand of various lesser numbers of citizens as regards the laws of different cantons. (55) Moreover, the Swiss Tribunal* differs from the American Supreme Court in that the former body may not declare any confederal law or part thereof as unconstitutional. However, the Swiss Court may annul cantonal provisions which it regards as transgressing the Confederational Constitution. The legislative branch of the Confederation, instead of the Tribunal, is

Council, or Nationalrat, corresponding to the American House of Representatives; and the Council of States, or Standerat, corresponding to the American Senate). However, the smaller house in Switzerland, as in the Australian Commonwealth, but not in the United States, is the less important of the two.

* The Swiss Federal Supreme Court, or Bundesgericht, has twenty-eight full members plus nine supplementary judges who are elected by the Federal Assembly (combined houses) to six-year terms and are eligible to re-election. (56) In the United States Supreme Court justices are appointed by the President of the United States, and confirmed by the Senate, for life.

provided by the Constitution with authority to interpret both its own laws and those incorporated in the Constitution, and the people hold check upon the legislative branch through the initiative and referendum. (57)

The confederation's executive machinery (the Federal Council, or Bundesrat) is perhaps the most distinctive aspect of Swiss government, having no exact counterpart anywhere else in the world.* The seven members of the Bundesrat, elected to four-year terms by the Federal Assembly (the Nationalrat and Ständerat combined), act as ministers of (1) Foreign Affairs, (2) Interior, (3) Justice, (4) Military, (5) Finance, (6) Agriculture and Industry, and (7) Posts and Railroads. (58) A president and vice-president of the Federal Executive Council, no one of which may succeed himself in the same post in successive years, are chosen annually by the Federal Assembly. Despite the title of President of the Confederation, the President merely sits as chairman of the Council, exercising no more relative power, as noted, than the other members of the Council. As Klein describes the Swiss situation:

. The Swiss executive, unlike the British Cabinet [which is headed by a Prime Minister with considerably more personal power than the Swiss President], is not renewable all at once, but only gradually as the term of office of each member comes to an end. Nor is it dependent for its existence . . . [subsequent to initial election of the members] on the vote of a majority

* Most of the cantons, as noted, have essentially the same type of executive device.

in the Federal Assembly [as is the British Cabinet which requires frequent votes of confidence by Parliament]. Yet the Swiss executive, like the British Cabinet, but unlike the American Cabinet, has the right and duty of initiating legislation; but if a measure introduced by it, or having its support, is rejected by the Assembly, that measure merely disappears for the time being. Nothing else happens [as in Britain where the Cabinet, along with the Prime Minister who heads it, may be replaced, or even a general election may be called to elect members of Parliament]. There is no political crisis and no general election [in Switzerland under such circumstances]. A Swiss election causes no uproar. It has become the habit of the Assembly to elect members of the Federal Council to the presidency in the order of their seniority on the Council, and for years past Swiss presidents have succeeded each other as noiselessly and as surely as if they followed each other by right of heredity. . . . (59)

Besides being the only democratic nation which allocates executive power evenly throughout a council instead of vesting it in a single person,* Switzerland appears largely to have eliminated party politics from the executive body. As Bryce points out, the Federal Council stands apart from party loyalties, is not chosen to carry out party work, and does not determine party policy. (60) Detachment of the Executive Council from party politics is dictated by custom, not by law, and may be accounted for in part at least by the fact that party lines are not drawn as precisely in

* French executive power resides with the Ministry, but the French Premier exercises relatively more power than the other members of the Ministry. Britain, too, although vesting executive power in its Cabinet or Ministry, places the real leadership in the hands of the Prime Minister.

Switzerland as in other democracies, particularly the United States. Members of the Swiss Executive Council, according to Bryce, are usually selected to include cross-section representation of the cantons as regards cantonal linguistic and religious affiliations. German-, French-, and Italian-speaking cantons, as well as Protestant and Roman-Catholic predominations, ordinarily are represented in the Council. (61)

Although Executive Councillors may not sit as members in either house of the Assembly or hold any other confederational or cantonal posts during the term of their office, the Council is usually chosen from among members of the Assembly. And, although many of the Councillors previously have been active politicians, Bryce points out that they are chosen for their administrative skill, mental grasp, good sense, tact, and temper, rather than because of previous party affiliations.

(62) Besides the rather specific responsibilities of each Councillor to his particular department, the Executive Council meets together frequently to discuss important business, to prepare an annual report to the Legislative Assembly, and to make decisions as concerns intercourse with foreign powers. All decisions concerning such matters emanate from the executive body as a whole. Moreover, although members of the Executive Council may not vote in the National Assembly, they appear there when business concerning their respective departments is discussed and when bills which the Executive Council has prepared and presented are considered. Council

members give explanations, answer queries, and join in debate.* (63)

The French frame of government, although showing resemblances to that of certain other democratic nations, includes unique features of its own. France provides two legislative bodies (Chamber of Deputies and Senate) for introducing and voting laws, the respective functions of which correspond somewhat to those of the American House of Representatives and Senate.** However, the French have not embraced the balance of powers concept to the extent of the United States, where executive and legislative branches are elected separately and, except

* Throughout the foregoing and following comparisons of governmental mechanisms in various democracies, Political Handbook of the World Parliaments, Parties and Press (64) and Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences (65) have been drawn upon extensively.

** Except for all finance laws which must be initiated and voted first by the Chamber of Deputies (comparable to the American House of Representatives), either house of the French Congress may introduce bills. And somewhat similar to the impeachment indictment empowered to the American House of Representatives to be tried by the Senate, the French Senate acts in the judiciary capacity of a High Court to try the President of the Republic or his ministers in cases where they have been arraigned by the Chamber of Deputies on felonious charges, possible among which may be a charge of conspiracy against the security of the Republic. But, whereas the French Chamber of Deputies corresponds somewhat to the American House of Representatives in that both bodies, in effect, represent the people proportionally as a whole, a basic difference exists between French and American Senates in that the former body consists of proportional representation, from two to ten Senators being elected from each French Department, depending upon its population.

for the check which each holds upon the other, function relatively independent of each other. The President of the Republic of France, who, subsequent to his election, appoints a ministry to act with him as the executive, is elected by joint session of Congress.* His powers seem to be quite extensive in that he can "promulgate and execute laws, making appointments to all civil and military offices, dispose of the armed forces and negotiate and sign treaties." However, inasmuch as he can exercise these powers only through the medium of his ministers, his extensive power actually amounts only to that of appointing his ministers. (66)

Revealing similarities to British practice which requires that the Prime Minister and his Cabinet submit collectively to Parliamentary votes of confidence, the French system provides for individual accountability of members of the executive Ministry to the representatives of the people through right of "question and interpellation" by either house of Congress. Executive ministers individually may be summoned before either French legislative body to undergo interpellation which is followed by a vote which, if a majority is against the minister, requires his resignation. Thus, in addition to usual voting methods, the Americans endeavor to ensure popular government through recall in certain states of the United States. The Swiss emphasize

* The two French legislative bodies also meet in joint session for the purpose of amending that body of laws which might be regarded as the French Constitution.

popular initiative and referendum (true also in certain of the United States). The British Prime Minister and his Cabinet maintain their collective position through parliamentary votes of confidence. And the French executive is responsible individually to both legislative bodies. The two French legislative chambers, especially that of Deputies, exert the really dominant influence over French government, (67) as is true of the House of Commons in Britain and in her now self-governing Dominions.

Other features of French government also indicate differences from other democracies in governmental machinery. Whereas the American and Swiss frames of government are specified rather concretely in written constitutions, much of French practice is only implied, as in Britain. Moreover, such written constitutional provisions as are made in France are not found in usual constitutional form but rather in three laws, one voted in 1875 and the other two being later amendments, one in 1879 and the other in 1884.

Thus, existence or non-existence of a constitution appears to have no bearing, per se, on democratic practice. For that matter, a written document, although democratic in its provisions, does not ensure democratic practice. Bryce points out that:

. . . . There are countries in which the Constitution has a popular quality in respect of its form, but in which the mass of the people do not in fact exercise the powers they possess on paper. This may be because they are too ignorant or too indifferent to vote, or because actual

supremacy belongs to the man or group in control of the government through a control of the army. Such are most of the so-called republics of Central and South America* (68)

Bryce draws attention, moreover, to the fact that:

. . . . Bulgaria and Greece were nominally democratic in 1915, but the king of the former carried the people into the Great War [World War I], as the ally of Germany, against their wish, and the king of the latter would have succeeded in doing the same thing but for the fact that the Allied fleets had Athens under their guns. (69)

Bryn-Jones also points to the Russian Constitution of 1936 which he regards as eminently democratic in form, superior in this respect to those employed in most democratic nations. However, as Bryn-Jones indicates, the Stalin regime has shown not the least inclination to implement that document. (70)

If, as is frequently contended, French government is rather too centralized in function to permit any great degree of sensitivity to popular will, "drawing trivial matters to Paris for decision," (71) and if personal rights of the French people are shockingly curtailed, according to American and British ways of regarding personal liberties, (72) an explanation, perhaps, may be found in traditional French ways of looking at such matters and in Napoleonic and monarchist influences on the present form of government. Many of the

* The Central and South American republics, so-called, have had numerous ups and downs as regards democracy, sometimes having been democratic and sometimes autocratic.

present governmental institutions, particularly as concerns centralized control, are traceable directly to Napoleonic autocracy. And, although the three aforementioned constitutional laws furnish an adequate enough foundation for democratic government (at least as the French interpret them today), these laws were adopted, curiously, by an assembly made up of a majority of monarchists. (73) However, if such aspects of French government are bad -- and no attempt is made here to say that they are either bad or good --, such conditions and the circumstances accounting for their existence would merely exemplify one or more of several truisms of democracy suggested previously:

(1) that democracy does not imply any particular governmental machinery or any particular national institutions;

(2) that governmental mechanisms with which a democratic people provide themselves will be no better than their ability and inclination to provide them, as is true regarding the quality of any other decisions made;

(3) that, except for previously noted primary or critical freedoms to choose, criticize, and implement choices, democracy does not imply any certain freedoms, democratic liberties constituting only those liberties with which a people provide themselves; and

(4) that "a tradition may be hidebound [italics not in original] to almost any degree without necessarily creating a feeling of tyranny on the part of those victimized by it."

(74)

Of the British self-governing Dominions, the Canadian framework is of interest in that it shows resemblances both to British and United States governments, yet includes characteristics of its own. Though still retaining vestiges of former colonial status (such, for example, as appointment of the Canadian Governor-General by the British Monarch to represent the Crown), a series of events beginning with the British North America Act of 1867 and eventuating in the reports of the British Imperial Conferences of 1926 and 1930 and in the British Statute of Westminster of 1931 have made Canada entirely self-governing. (75) Apart from an obligation (which applies to all British self-governing Dominions) to consult with other Commonwealth nations regarding such international affairs as foreign policy pertaining to neutrality, war, and peace, Canada represents a fully sovereign, democratic state. Both independence of, and inter-relationships among, the Commonwealth nations are defined in a report of the Imperial Conference of 1926, designating -- or perhaps reaffirming -- the Dominion governments as:

. . . autonomous communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown and the British Commonwealth of Nations. (76)

In addition to written provisions to be found in laws of a constitutional nature such as the North America Act and the

Statute of Westminster which reflect British influences,* Canada has adopted many of the unwritten British conventions of governmental practice. Nonetheless, the Canadian frame of government differs in one important respect from that of Britain: the former is federal in character.** (77) As regards its federal structure, Canadian government shows resemblances to the governmental framework of the United States. The North America Act, the main purpose of which was to insure a union of the colonies, prescribes, among other matters, the terms of federal agreement and indicates the areas of legislative authority assigned respectively to the Dominion and to the provinces.

Regardless of federal aspects of Canadian government, its basic structure remains essentially British, if not colonial. The Canadian Governor-General, as noted before, is appointed by the English King to serve as his Dominion representative. The Canadian Governor-General, however, acts

* It should be noted, however, that the North America Act was devised by a group of Canadian Colonial statesmen.

** The necessity for federal union in Canada (as in the United States, Australia, and New Zealand) is understandable in view of the circumstance that a " . . . large measure of self-government had been conceded to the separate [Canadian] colonies [now called provinces] before confederation [by the North America Act of 1867]" (78) A second factor having a bearing upon the federal structure adopted may have been the dual character of the Canadian population, part of which consists of French speaking Roman Catholics who follow Roman law established by early French settlers, and part of which consists of English speaking Protestants who follow English common law. Still a third factor may have been the vastness of the Canadian territory which, because of its great expanse, might be expected to require a measure of local government to meet unique, local exigencies. (79)

solely upon the advice of his ministers (the Canadian Prime Minister and Cabinet) in the same way that the British King acts only upon the advice of his ministers as regards British affairs. (80) Moreover, the Privy Council of Britain still remains nominally the final court of appeals for Canada, exercising final word as to interpretation of Canadian constitutional law. This arrangement exists, however, only at the pleasure of the Canadian people and has done so since enactment of the Statute of Westminster. (81) Even prior to this final enactment of Canadian independence, the British Parliament appears to have shown no inclination to act counter to the wishes of the Canadian people, as expressed by the Canadian Parliament and Ministry.

The Encyclopedia Americana synthesizes relationships between Britain and Canada as regards government of the latter nation as follows:

. . . Colonial origins and the maintenance of imperial ties have fashioned the forms of Canadian government, both in the provinces and in the Dominion, after the pattern of constitutional monarchy [in Britain]. The governor general, like the King, calls and dissolves Parliament. He chooses his ministers from the party which has the confidence of the House of Commons. These "ministers of the Crown" control the royal prerogative in so far as it relates to Canadian affairs, and formal action by the governor general is always on their advice. Canadian government is cabinet government and the conventions which have made it workable in England are faithfully followed in Canada. The governments of the provinces adhere to the same pattern. The nominal head is the lieutenant governor, appointed by the governor general on the advice of his Dominion ministers. The real head is the premier, whose title to office

is appointment by the lieutenant governor but whose claim to office is the fact that he is the leader of the majority party in the legislature. The Ministers are responsible to the legislatures and each legislature has full supremacy in its sphere.
 (82)

Although similar to the American frame of government as regards its federal character, still the interpretations which Canada places upon federation itself differ from those in the United States. Judicial authority in Canada, except for minor local courts, is vested solely in the Dominion government, whereas the Judiciary plays a relatively much more important role in American states. Moreover, whereas cases of doubt between federal and state sovereignty are (or at least have been) resolved usually in favor of the states in America (and in Australia), the presumption is reversed in Canada, where all powers and functions of government not explicitly assigned to the Dominion or to the provinces are regarded as belonging to the Dominion. (83)

A further difference between Canadian and American frames of government is that, whereas the United States has proceeded with caution and has adopted devices designed to ensure checks and balances between executive and legislative branches of government, Canadian government has vested full supremacy in the legislative branch of government.* Com-

* Virtually everything which applies to Canada in these respects also applies in general to Britain, New Zealand, and Australia.

parison of Canadian and American systems in these respects can best be understood, perhaps, by noting some of the possible accompaniments of each form of governmental practice. Legislative and executive branches of government in the United States, elected separately and responsible separately to the electorate rather than to each other, may easily be of different and mutually hostile political parties. In such an event, Congress is empowered to block any or all legislation which may be introduced by Congressional members friendly to the presidential viewpoint, and the President, on the other hand, is empowered to veto Congressional legislation. Such a situation, if it should occur and barring ability of Congress to muster a two-third's majority vote to over-ride the presidential veto, would result in an impasse, making legislation of any kind difficult if not impossible, regardless of urgency. Moreover, barring impeachment proceedings against the President and recall techniques against Congressmen (the latter device having been provided in only certain of the states), there would be nothing to be done to alleviate the condition until such set times as elections are prescribed by law.*

A further possible consequence of such blocking devices is that, although they were inaugurated presumably to prevent

* Even so, it is not inconceivable that the executive and legislative branches may remain seriously out of kilter because of the different duration of various terms of office and because of the different times at which they commence.

inordinate uses of power and to keep sovereignty in the hands of the people, they may result in the practice of shifting blame back and forth between legislative and executive branches of government to such an extent that the people find it difficult to assess real responsibility for inaction or for improper action.* The American system is designed, of course, to provide safeguards against hasty, ill-advised action, not only on the part of any one of the three branches of government but also on the part of the people themselves.

The Canadian frame of government, instead of providing for election of executive and legislative branches of government separately as in the United States, vests executive power in the majority leadership of the legislative branch itself. Bryce, in describing the roles of Canadian executive and legislative authority, points out that, although:

. . . . Executive power is vested nominally in the Governor-General as representative of the British Crown . . . [but] is in fact exercised by a Cabinet or group of ministers, who hold office only so long as they can retain the support of a majority in the Dominion House of Commons.** They are virtually

* The still further check and balance in the form of a judiciary to interpret the laws furnishes the possibility of complicating matters even more, not to mention the possible hostility which may exist between Senate and House of Representatives.

** The House of Commons in the British system of government is comparable to the American House of Representatives.

a Committee of Parliament, and in it all of them sit. Thus the actual Executive is the creature of the House of Commons, possessing as against it only one power, that of appealing to the people by [means of] a dissolution of Parliament. If ministers do not dissolve [Parliament when a Parliamentary vote goes against them] they must resign, and if they dissolve [Parliament] and the [popular] election goes against them, they resign forthwith and a new Cabinet is formed.* The relations of the Executive and Legislative Departments are thus far more intimate than in the United States, for the Ministry sit in the Legislature and are . . . the leaders of its majority for the time being. (84)

Although Canada provides, as does the United States, for a second legislative house comparable in Canada to the British House of Lords, this "upper" House of Parliament in Canada, though theoretically endowed with the same powers (excepting finance matters) as the House of Commons, exerts little, if any, real influence. (85) Thus, the House of Commons, inasmuch as it also determines Canadian executive authority, is the dominant, if not the sole, governing agency in Canada.** Moreover, the Canadian House of Commons is restrained by no such limitations as those imposed upon the American Congress by the Constitution of the United States. (86) And inasmuch as the Canadian people elect representatives to

* A popular election may be held in such cases as frequently as necessary, but in any case a popular election must be held at certain frequencies, usually, under the British system, at least once every five years, depending on the Commonwealth nation in question.

** The House of Commons, in the sense that it selects the Ministry which in turn appoints the Judiciary, also has a dominant voice in selecting judicial officials.

Commons directly and are also in good position to assess responsibility there,* it would appear that sovereignty by the Canadian people is complete. As Bryce sees the situation:

Viewed as a whole, the government of Canada, although nominally monarchical, is rather more democratic than that of the United States. No single man enjoys so much power as the President [of the United States] during his four years, for the Prime Minister of the Dominion is only the head of his Cabinet; and though, if exceptionally strong in character and in his hold over his majority in Parliament, he may exert greater power than does a President confronted by a hostile Congress, still he is inevitably influenced by his Cabinet and can seldom afford to break with it, or even with its more important members, while both he and they are liable to be dismissed at any moment by Parliament. The voters are in the United States more frequently summoned to act, but in Canada their power, when they do act at an election, is legally boundless, for their representatives are subject to no such restrictions as American Constitutions impose. Were there any revolutionary spirit abroad in Canada, desiring to carry sweeping changes by a sudden stroke, these could be carried swiftly by Parliamentary legislation. (88)

Thus, in case of the United States, the governmental structure is based upon a system of checks and balances with a view toward preventing hasty and inordinate uses of power by any one branch of government or by the people themselves.

* Bryce observes that, whereas power and responsibility are divided between executive and legislative branches of government in the United States, responsibility is more concentrated and more definitely fixed upon a small number of persons in Canada inasmuch as power rests with and responsibility attaches to the Cabinet which is created by the House of Commons. (87)

In case of the Canadian system, the people through their control over the legislature enjoy unlimited sovereignty. Critics of the American system make the charge that it represents a system in which there is all ballast and no sail. Conversely, critics of the Canadian system contend that it is all sail and no ballast. As to which system is the better would depend on opinion and be a matter for democratic decision. The question, thus, resolves itself to whether more sail is needed, or more ballast. Nonetheless, to the degree that checks and balances (including two-third's and three-fourth's majority voting requirements) extend to the point where they restrict the mass of the people from implementing their choices, the democratic processes have been curtailed. As noted in Chapter III, the American Founding Fathers in general did not favor thoroughgoing democracy in the modern sense of the word. However, it must be recognized that, even though governmental processes inherited from the Founders of American Union may sometimes have been tortuous and slow, changes of all kinds including Constitutional changes have been made when the desire has existed to make them. Thus, since sovereignty resides in fact with the people, it would appear that, regardless of governmental procedures followed, democratic requirements have been met.

The foregoing comparisons between Canadian and American systems of government represent essentially the position

of Britain and the self-governing Dominions wherein Canada has been concerned. Although slight differences in governmental mechanisms and emphases exist among the Commonwealth nations, these represent minor distinctions rather than real differences. As noted, the federal government of Australia, as that of the United States, has been endowed with narrower powers than the Dominion government of Canada. Powers not explicitly allotted to the central government of Australia are regarded as residing in the Australian states, as in the United States. (89) Whereas the Canadian people engage in no direct referendum voting, leaving all governmental decisions to the House of Commons and Ministry, Australia has adopted a type of referendum as part of the process of amending the Federal Constitution. (90) And whereas members of the Senate in Canada are appointed by the Crown (hence by the Canadian Governor-General, hence, for all practical purposes, by the Ministry) and for life, members of the Australian Senate are elected by popular vote for six-year terms, six members from each of the six Australian states. Although possibly exercising somewhat more influence than the Canadian Senate (which exercises practically none), the Australian Senate, as Bryce observes, "from the first [has] counted for little."

Moreover, although members of the Legislative Council of New Zealand (comparable to Canadian and Australian Senates and to the British House of Lords) were appointed at first

for life and did exercise considerable influence, that legislative body in 1890, having acted at cross purposes with the New Zealand House of Representatives (comparable to the British and Canadian House of Commons), was partly shorn of its power when the term of office in the Council was reduced to seven years. Later, the Council's power was reduced in other respects. Today the New Zealand "upper house," as the Australian and Canadian Senates and the English House of Lords, exercises little, if any, real influence in governmental matters. (91)

As typified in these few examples, governmental institutions adopted by the Commonwealth nations, although sometimes assuming different names and varying in details as to function, all follow essentially the British system of parliamentary or cabinet government.

In view of foregoing investigation, it is evident that there are numerous approaches to democratic association and that, within certain broad limitations, no particular governmental institution or type of governmental machinery is fundamental to the principle of democracy. Of the seven democracies examined, in addition to minor differences in handling details of implementing the popular will these nations embrace approaches to democracy which differ in major respects.*

* Examination of still other democratic nations, no doubt, would reveal still other approaches to democratic association.

The British parliamentary or cabinet system is followed rather faithfully by the self-governing Dominions and less exactly by France. The presidential system of the United States represents a quite different approach to democracy. And the executive council system of Switzerland differs in major respects from both cabinet and presidential systems of government. (92) Conceivably, any number of other approaches to democratic association are possible, depending upon local requirements and on resourcefulness in meeting these requirements.

Economic Systems Distinguished From Fundamental
Principles of Democracy

Just as no governmental device in particular is basic to underlying principles of democracy, democratic theory and practice indicate that no particular economic system is fundamental. Arguments frequently are made that democracy, if it is to be achieved, must embrace some particular economic system, or, if it is to endure, must avoid some particular economic system. Despite such arguments, economic systems are devices apart from democratic governmental organization, important as they may be as adjuncts of democracy.* Economic

* An exception, among various economic theories which are prevalent today, is Marxian communism which, in addition to representing an economic theory, incorporates dictatorship as the means of imposing the economic theory. This subject is discussed in the following pages.

policies adopted by a democratic society, as governmental mechanisms adopted, may serve a people for good or ill and may exert facilitating or restricting influences on the democratic process itself. But economic policies, as various governmental devices, important as both may be to democratic association, are not fundamentally important in the sense that one or another must or must not be adopted.

Swabey, in heading a chapter, "Is Democracy Socialism?" contends that "forms of government are things distinct from economic systems . . . however [much] each may react on the other." (93) And to requote Merriam:

In general political theory, democracy is not indentifiable with:

a.

b. Any special form of economic organization, agrarian, industrial, capitalistic, socialistic, state capitalistic, or otherwise. (94)

Merriam reiterates his foregoing claim and contends further that certain economic structures are not inherently connected with, or opposed to, autocracy either. He states that:

Democracy . . . is not related to any particular form of production of commodities or services. There may be a rural-agrarian democracy or an urban-industrial democracy, or any other variation, depending on the circumstances of the period [and locale]. What is called "collectivism" might exist under a monarchy, an aristocracy, a democracy, a dictatorship, a theocracy, or other types. In the same way democracy might exist in connection with either so-called "individualism" or so-called "collectivism." Capitalism in modern times has

been developed under an ancient autocracy in Japan, under monarchy in Germany, under democracy in England. Socialistic and communistic colonies have existed for a thousand years under many types of political and religious organization. (95)

Merriam goes on to point out that the battle between so-called collectivism and individualism is a sham battle in many of its phases, inasmuch as any type of government, whether democratic or autocratic, is collectivist in some respects and recognizes individualism in others.* Thus, Merriam sees no reason why a democratic people must fall into an either-or trap as regards so-called individualism or collectivism. Instead, he envisages a wide field of intermediate choices awaiting any open-minded and inventive people between complete public ownership and exclusive private ownership of property, industry, and the like. (96)

With reference to forms of government as distinguished from economic systems, T. V. Smith contends that:

. . . . The democratic discipline does not . . . commit us to any dogma about who shall own how much property, or whether anybody shall privately own any property at all. Democracy and communism have no final quarrel here** It is not the Marxist

* Apparently no government, regardless how despotic, regulates every minute detail of human activity as concerns the individual. In fact, it is not inconceivable that an autocracy might impose fewer restrictions in certain respects than a democracy, although imposing them differently.

** In a democratic nation, public or private ownership of property would be a matter for democratic decision, and such decisions reached might be expected to differ in different nations.

dogma against private property, but communism's drive against private beliefs, that renders impossible any genuinely united front of democratic discipline and communistic regimentation. (97)

Presumably Smith alludes to that aspect of the particular Marxian brand of communism which incorporates not only an economic system but also a form of government. Inasmuch as dictatorship is the means prescribed in Marxian theory for implementing communism, Marxian communism would be precluded as a democratic choice unless that choice, at the same time, was intended for terminating democracy. Moreover, if democracy implies no special privilege for ideas, the principle would also apply to economic ideas. To set out to prescribe and enforce a preconceived economic idea -- that a people must (or must not) adopt a given system of economics, not to be questioned -- would negate this democratic principle.

Thus, as Smith indicates, it is this autocratic aspect of Marxian communism which places the theory at odds with democracy, not the economic aspect. Communism (aside from the Marxian brand) would constitute only one possible choice of many as regards economic policies which might serve for good or ill in a democracy. But, since Marxism represents a peculiar combination of dictatorial government and an economic system -- an economic system autocratically imposed --, it then cannot be both Marxist and democratic.

From a democratic point of view, however, it must be recognized that, if any other economic system were imposed

by some means or other as an economic absolute on a society, the system in its practical workings would be as opposed as Marxian communism to principles of democracy. Such a condition, moreover, is not as far removed from the realm of possibility as might be supposed, even in a nominally democratic nation. Bryn-Jones points to such possible danger with reference to capitalism as it sometimes has worked out in the democratic nations. He maintains that:

The techniques and arts of propaganda have been developed to a high degree of perfection and will be utilized to the full by those who have mastered their use and control. The agencies of propaganda include the press, the radio, and the motion picture -- all powerful instruments for shaping and influencing public opinion. These agencies are now in the hands of the relatively small minorities that govern industry and finance. The result is a monopoly of the sources of information and of the agencies of dissemination. Where public opinion rules, this control over the agencies that are most effective in making it is decisive. Those who lack wealth cannot hope to overcome the disparity of power that results, nor can they exercise much influence upon the character or the operations of these strong corporations.* Controlled propaganda, rather than the reasonable discussion or the calm deliberation of informed citizens, is the maker of public opinion. And makers of opinion are the real rulers in a political democracy. (98)

* Without discounting the danger to which Bryn-Jones points, it should be noted that the organization of labor and professional unions of various kinds and of co-operative consumer associations in recent years has had a leveling influence. For the role played by the latter in capitalistic democracies, see James Marshall, The Freedom to be Free. (99)

Bryn-Jones goes on to point out that:

The agencies of public information and propaganda not only follow the pattern of the autocratic organization of large-scale industry, but they are largely dependent upon that industry and will be integrated with it. Their revenues are derived in the main from the industrial and commercial interests that are able to pay adequately for their services. That this is so in the case of press and radio is too obvious to need emphasis. They depend upon the sale of space or of time to other concerns that are organized on the same general principle and form a part of the same general system of capitalist enterprise. Where interests coincide, opinions and policies tend to coincide also. The public interest is not likely to be the primary factor in deciding policy under these conditions. The groups that control these vast enterprises are small in number, but they are sufficiently united in objectives and in purpose to constitute a united front against any agency or body of opinion that may challenge them. They are powerful primarily because of the enormous resources they have at their command and the strategic position they hold.
(100)

Needless to say, such conditions, either actual or potential, constitute a threat to democracy; and democratic peoples must devise -- and in some measure have devised -- means of counteracting these and other tendencies toward special privilege for certain ideas when they occur. A successful democracy requires an enlightened citizenry and one capable of judging views critically; and enlightened, critical judgments are impossible if a full and fair array of data or information is not available.

Such potential threats against equality of opportunity for ideas exist also in so-called socialistic, state-owned outlets of information, in that the existing government might conceivably take steps to color various viewpoints and news items in its own favor. However, all such possibilities, whether occurring under capitalism, socialism, or something else, merely exemplify the proposition that choices of economic systems and policies, although they (as well as particularized governmental mechanisms) are distinct from basic principles of democracy, nevertheless may affect democracy for good or for ill, as may any other democratic choice -- even to the point of losing democracy.

Regardless of perils involved in various economic systems or in various governmental mechanisms -- democracy, as noted, is always in jeopardy from one cause or another --, a democratic nation may adopt any economic system or governmental mechanism desired and remain democratic as long as no serious interference results with previously mentioned primary or critical democratic freedoms to choose, to criticize, and to implement choices. So long as outcomes do not interfere in turn with equality of opportunity, whether in making money or in making decisions, democratic principles remain intact. Swabey's interpretation regarding economics and democracy seems sound, when she states that:

From the democratic standpoint, the function of the state in promoting economic justice is much like that of an umpire in a game. The umpire's business is to see that the game gets off to a fair start

and that the conditions of fair play are maintained throughout. This means that the participants are admitted as far as possible on equal terms and that the rules are enforced on all alike. Here the state seeks not only to guarantee an equality of chances,* but that each shall take his chance. The latter element certain forms of paternalism largely rule out. Instead, they [the paternalistic governments] seek to call off the game when they see certain players getting worsted, to remove the element of risk and loss -- as well as the fruits of victory. . . . The most that fairness demands is that all be given a fair start (by canceling so far as possible antecedent inequalities), and that the rules bear equally on all and be uniformly enforced. (101)

Contentions by democratic theorists that democracy is not committed to any particular economic system or policy are borne out in democratic practice. Regardless whether one favors one or another of the various designations given to differing economic policies -- this would depend upon personal interests and views in a democracy --, the nations under consideration have differed and have run the gamut of economic experimentation, from so-called individualism to so-called collectivism. The United States, which in former years is regarded as having embraced an extreme degree of

* Presumably the anti-trust laws in the United States were designed to prevent large accumulations of money from interfering with equality of opportunity on the part of other businesses to make money. Such also presumably lay behind various fair-trade practices acts, to prevent large chain corporations from squeezing out small business with below-cost prices in order subsequently to be able to raise prices without competition. Benefits to consumers -- to the whole of society -- would also seem to be implicit in both types of laws designed to curb monopoly, a form of special privilege.

economic individualism, has moved in a direction of governmental economic controls, though fluctuating back and forth as necessity and opinion have dictated. Britain, regarded as having embraced a capitalistic economy in former years, appears at present to be moving in the direction of greater nationalization of control over production, services, and distribution. All of the democracies inaugurated more extensive economic controls during World War II than previously. Some of these devices still exist in some of the democracies, whereas some of them have been relaxed or discarded. The Australasian democracies, which in the past have adopted numerous so-called socialistic policies, appear at present to be moving back somewhat in the direction of so-called private enterprise.* Yet, these generalized changes and differences

* No exact information is available at present regarding Australia's and New Zealand's present positions as regards economic policies. However, there have been indications in the press that a trend may be in progress to relinquish some of the governmental economic controls previously in force in the two countries. See also "What They Learned About Socialism in Australia and New Zealand," by Stanley High, Reader's Digest (August, 1950) and "Road Back to Freedom in Australia," by Stanley High, Reader's Digest (October, 1950). (102) It may be significant that High has inferred, both in the title of the second article and in the contexts of both articles, that democracy and socialistic economic policies are opposed, per se. To favor one economic system over another, as High has done, would be his democratic right. But so also is it Australia's and New Zealand's democratic right. To infer that Australian and New Zealand economic policies have been undemocratic on the face of them would not be justified, inasmuch as they were democratically inaugurated and appear now to be changing at the behest of popular will.

in economic policy appear to have had no bearing on the democratic governmental form of control of the various nations concerned. The United States, with its increased governmental controls over the economy, still is a democracy. Britain has not altered her disposition of governmental sovereignty. And the Australasian nations are as democratic now as before.

Australia and New Zealand were among the first democracies to inaugurate so-called collectivist policies regarding the economic life of a people. Bryce found Australia to be "the land in which the labouring masses first gained control of the legal government and displayed their quality as rulers." By 1921, Australia, more than any other country with the exception of New Zealand, had "extended . . . the action of the state in undertaking industrial enterprises and in determining by law the wages and hours of labour."

(103) It may be noteworthy, in view of preceding theoretical positions taken, that Australia and New Zealand, although possessing essentially the same governmental mechanisms as Britain, had embarked upon quite different approaches to economics at that time.

New Zealand brought democratic state control to bear on economic conditions as early as the nineteenth century as a result of events which, according to Bryce, had permitted two-fifths of the total value of the land to be owned by one-eightieth of the total number of land holders.

(104) Bryce indicates that:

In the earlier years of the Colony [of New Zealand] when all the land of the islands, except the parts reserved for the Maoris (aborigines), lay at the disposal of the Government . . . vast blocks were permitted to pass into the hands of speculators, so that in the early "seventies," when immigrants desired to take up farms, much of the richest and best-situated arable soil was already gone, while the boom . . . which began in 1870 had run up the price against small buyers (105)

Bryce relates that the New Zealand government, after several experiments which failed, finally did much to break up a large part of these estates by law. This was accomplished by imposing a Progressive Land Tax which became virtually prohibitive when applied to estates of enormous proportions; by restricting the amount of land one person could buy; by selling repossessed government land and limiting the amount to any one individual, using the funds therefrom in turn to buy up more land; and by leasing government land by refusing to sell it.* (106)

The New Zealand government further attempted to make financial pursuits more equitable to small farmers by making it possible for them to borrow money on easier terms than those available from private commercial interests. Bryce describes this step as follows:

* Such a course conceivably would have been unnecessary if government lands, in the first place, had been handled more wisely, as, for example, in the United States where public lands were disposed of under the Homestead Act. Thus, local conditions and problems seem to have a bearing on economic policies adopted.

. . . . In 1894, when prices had been falling, and there was a good deal of pressure from the farming class . . . legislation carried authorizing loans to be made to agriculturists by way of mortgage at 5 per cent, the interest usually charged on farm mortgages being then from 6 to 8 per cent, or even more. The Government could do this, because it could borrow in England at 3 to 4 per cent, and make a profit on lending at 5. Under the powers of this Advances to Settlers Act, it went into business as a money-lender, with the result of relieving the farmers and bringing down the rate of interest in the open market. Repayment by small instalments was required, and the State has, in fact, profited by this enterprise* (107)

The New Zealand government also owns and operates various other enterprises which, particularly in the United States today, remain in private hands. Bryce indicates that:

. . . . In 1910 [in New Zealand] coal had become scarce and dear, owing to a diminished importation from Australia, and it was alleged that a coal Ring was keeping up prices. An Act was therefore passed . . . empowering the Government to work the coal-beds it possessed on the west coast. This it has continued to do, supplying its own railways [virtually all of which in the nation the government owns and operates] (108) and also competing in open market with private mine-owners (109)

* Several of these New Zealand governmental activities are notable only because of the early dates when they were carried out. The United States, which today is not regarded as socialistic in the sense that New Zealand is, took steps in the 1930's fundamentally not different from those taken in New Zealand in the nineteenth century, as exemplified by devices such as the Federal Housing Authority (FHA) and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC).

New Zealand, moreover, outlawed labor strikes and retaliatory measures by management before the turn of the twentieth century, providing by law for compulsory settlement of disputes between employers and working men. (110)

No attempt is made in this study to take a point of view regarding relative merits of various economic approaches, but merely to point out that democracy is not committed to any particular economic system or policies. Bryce, in answer to those who, after reading of New Zealand's experiments in legislation, ask if New Zealanders are all socialists and, if so, what has become of the individualists, contends that:

. . . . They [the New Zealanders] are in principle no more Socialists than Individualists. The great majority do not think in abstractions: they have no use for theories. If the most obvious way to avert some evil or obtain some good seems to lie in invoking the State's action, they invoke it. "What is the State but ourselves? It is ours to use; why be jealous of it?" There is in this none of the German deification of the State as Power. The State is not to them a mighty organism in which national life is to centre, and by which national life is to be moulded and controlled, but rather an instrument ready to hand to be employed for diffusing among themselves and their neighbours comfort and prosperity, the things they really care for (111)

To note just a few other differences which exist among democracies regarding economic and other policies, the Swiss prohibit by law the cutting of trees on one's own property without governmental permission. The United States also regulates forestry under certain conditions, but for

different reasons. The United States usually has confined regulation of lumbering to measures calculated to ensure reforestation in large tracks of timber, whereas the Swiss invoke such restrictions everywhere to preserve the natural rampart of the trees against avalanches. (112) Such considerations, although seeming to be insignificant, throw additional light on the "inalienable rights" claimed for democracy, in this case economic rights.

The United States has contributed greatly in land and subsidies to private companies in building major railway lines in the United States. However, these lines remain in the hands of private enterprise. This, however, is not the entire picture, for the United States government regulates these lines to some extent through the Interstate Commerce Commission and occasionally steps in to operate them, as when service is impaired by labor-management disputes or under wartime necessity as in World War I.

Canada, on the other hand, has built and operated two national railway systems on her own initiative and later has taken over and continued to operate three other major lines, the latter having become bankrupt during World War I. Canada differs from certain of the other democracies which nationally own and operate railways, in that the Canadian national system does not attempt to maintain a monopoly on transportation. Although every Canadian province and city of importance is served by the national system, this system meets

strong competition from private companies over a large part of the nation. (113)

In France, all independent and state-owned railways were merged in 1938 into an organization in which the national government secured a majority of shares. (114) However, according to The Encyclopedia Americana:

It [the French system of handling the railways] is a mixed system, which, while respecting the supreme rights of the state and according it a very extensive control over the companies, leaves the . . . [independent operators who also have a stake in the roads] as much independence and initiative as are necessary for the proper management of their business.

The [private] companies enjoy a monopoly and operate the lines, while the state continues to own [the majority of shares in] them, and only concedes them [the railway lines] for a limited period. Entrusted with a public service, the rights and duties of the companies depend on contracts made with the state (115)

Switzerland not only owns and works the railways, but also endeavors to derive revenue from them as well as from other state-owned and state-operated enterprises. Klein points out that:

Switzerland derives its revenue from the alcohol monopoly, customs, railways, posts, telegraphs, state property and investments, and military service exemption taxes. . . . (116)

Whereas the Swiss own and operate their communication networks nationally, these utilities remain in private hands in the United States. However, whereas the mails in the United States were handled at first entirely by private

business, the United States took over the mails quite early, at a time when emphasis was decidedly on free enterprise.

The Process Of Democracy Differentiated From
Various Possible Outcomes Of The Process

Data in the preceding pages, and those presented throughout Chapters IV and V, indicate that democracy does not imply any specific decisions -- whether concerning human rights, governmental machinery, economic systems, or any other -- except the decision to abide by democratic procedures of reaching and applying them. It must be recognized, moreover, that democracy in final analysis does not even ensure a continuing commitment to the democratic processes, although it is recognized that abrogation of them will result in permanent loss of democracy except through revolution.

Thus, in light of what has gone before, the proposition still appears to hold that democracy represents a way of making and abiding by decisions which permits no special privilege for persons or for ideas. In this sense, democracy becomes a method or a process of solving problems; of making choices based on and issuing from individual and collective interests. Whereas autocracy implies special privilege for both persons and ideas and usually bases its program on extraneous considerations,* democracy provides equality of

* As shown in Chapter IV, the claim usually is made that the autocratic program, whatever it is, is based upon the glory of God, of tradition, of race, of state, of economic system, or of some consideration other than human interests.

opportunity and equality of responsibility for arriving at and abiding by decisions relevant to individuo-collective human goals.

Relationships Of Alternative Socio-governmental Systems
To Alternative Philosophical Outlooks

Investigation of historical interpretations of democracy in Chapter III indicated that, aside from exclusion of most of the people from governmental participation and other practices recognized today as highly undemocratic, prevailing philosophical outlooks contained elements in conflict with modern democracy. Plato and Locke for examples, whose theories of democracy are widely cited, embraced philosophical outlooks respectively of idealism and realism which, because of inherent characteristics, lend themselves more readily to autocratic or anarchistic than to modern democratic treatment.

Modern theories and practices of government appear also to have philosophical accompaniments. Because of the difference in treatment of ideas in democracy and autocracy, it probably is no accident that Dewey's experimentalism** and the modern scientific method reached fruition in democratic

* The term, experimentalism, is employed as defined by Dictionary of Education (117) " . . . to designate the . . . educational philosophy of John Dewey . . . which accepts only the experimental techniques of science as the valid test of beliefs and practices."

nations. Although scientific thinking is employed in twentieth-century autocratic nations for the purpose of contributing to and enforcing underlying national dogmas, there are areas of national life in these nations in which scientific thinking is not permitted. Although Nazi Germany, for example, employed the scientific method in making war materiel and in developing an efficient and brutal secret police, there apparently was no use in Germany of scientific methods for proving or disproving superiority of the German super-race or inferiority of the Jews. It is thus in autocratic nations that scientific methods of thinking always lie within a larger framework of dogma.*

Other than the realm in which scientific thinking is allowed, the remainder of an autocratic program invariably is based on some kind of dogmatic absolute. In Nazi Germany that dogma appears to have eventuated from the idealism of Kant, Bismarck,** and Nietzsche, and to have added a few

* For another of a long parade of accounts indicative of incompatibilities between modern science and autocracy, see Leonid Smirnov, "Russia Oils Up The Arctic." (118) Smirnov, a former Soviet geologist, shows some of the difficulties encountered by those who would think scientifically when they live under autocratic regimes. He observes that dogma always takes precedence over scientific thinking -- that a Russian scientist may be summarily executed as readily for being right as for being wrong, if his findings conflict with the all-pervasive, specially privileged Marxian-Leninist national dogma.

** Bismarck usually is not regarded so much philosopher as statesman, but his ideas for a program of living for the German "race" would make him a philosopher.

features of its own to take the form of a mystical set of qualities attributed to der Vaterland and to die deutsche Bestimmung.

In Russia, the dogma is attributed to a curious mixture of Hegelian idealism and Marxian materialism (so-called neo-Hegelian-Marxian dialectic materialism) in which an economic system, dictatorially imposed, represents the absolute, and in which the objective claimed to be desired is to be achieved by pursuing its opposite. Instead of making actions conform to what is advocated, precisely the opposite course is taken. (119) If peace is advocated, war is fomented; if democracy is advocated, autocracy is invoked; and if classlessness is advocated, class hatreds are encouraged. Thus, up is down, black is white, aggressor is defender, dictatorship is democracy, ad infinitum.*

Just as it seems to be rather more than chance that experimentalism reached maturity in a modern democratic nation, it would seem significant that Dewey, chief formulator of experimentalism, is also considered an authority on democracy. The circumstance that Plato and Locke are also quoted widely with reference to the theory of democracy should not confuse matters but should clarify them as regards modern democracy. The fact that Plato was an idealist,

* M. Jean Chauvel, French delegate to the United Nations, in referring to claims of the Soviet delegate, Jacob A. Malik, called this the chair-and-table trick. According to Chauvel, it consists of re-naming a chair a table and of becoming indignant thenceforth when anyone denies that the chair is now a table.

that Locke was a realist, that Dewey is an experimentalist, and that all three philosophers are frequently cited with reference to the theory of democracy serves simply to point up further important differences concerning the meaning of democracy historically and today.*

Plato, who disliked even the relatively slight applications of democracy in Athens (though he did theorize on the form democracy should take), looked intuitively to otherworldly universals for an index to the pursuits in which society should engage.** Dewey, on the other hand, is concerned with problems arising from everyday living and with solutions to these problems which will effectively carry forward human goals, individual and collective.

Plato would judge every worldly consideration -- from beauty to justice -- as it measures up to the ultimate perfection of his metaphysical forms or ideas, intuitively derived. Dewey would judge such matters in terms of human consequences, with reference to individual and collective human interests. For Plato, the people must conform to a supernatural idea, intuitively discovered. Dewey regards an idea as formulated by man himself and to be good only as

* However, failure to recognize these factors -- to attempt, as is so often done, to mix older and newer concepts of democracy as a means of attaining the modern sense of the word -- would understandably lead to confusion.

** See discussion on Plato in Chapter III with reference to the following discussion.

it serves humanity and as long as it remains subservient to human purposes. For Plato, truth once discovered is absolute -- final, perfect, universal. For Dewey, truth is relative; depending on whether it effectively solves problems at hand which are based on human interests. For Plato, the world must bend itself to a metaphysical idea. For Dewey, ideas become useful only as they provide effective means for society to cope with the physical and social world.*

Locke, in contrast with Plato, would completely abandon metaphysical ideas as means of obtaining truth.** Locke would look to the physical and social world -- to the environment -- for the source of truth. Whereas Plato was concerned solely with supernatural, disembodied ideas, to be discovered by intuition and revelation, Locke was concerned solely with passive observation of nature as the original source of all truth. Thus, for Plato, truth revealed itself through metaphysical ideas. For Locke, truth revealed itself through passive observation; the facts spoke for themselves.

Yet, the ultimate, universal, and absolute nature of truth was just as strongly assumed by Locke as by Plato. Both philosophers sought ultimate, perfect, unchanging, and

* See also Plato, The Republic and The Statesman (120) and Dewey, Democracy and Education. (121)

** See discussion on Locke in Chapter III with reference to the following discussions.

absolute laws. The only essential difference between them was that Plato sought the nature of these laws through contemplation of metaphysical ideas, whereas Locke expected these laws to reveal themselves through passive observation of nature. In both cases, truth, once discovered, was regarded as perfect, final, and absolute; not to be questioned.

Although Locke, as opposed to Plato, did favor the idea of popular governmental control, Locke's conception of "the people" appears, nevertheless, to have been confined to the well-born. For Locke, British status quo was the condition to be emulated, and British status quo of his time was government by a privileged few. The well-born were to live like gentlemen, conduct affairs of government, and determine the British way of life; the British lowly born were to perform menial tasks suitable to their station, and to respect their betters.

Thus, British status quo of the seventeenth century was an aspect of the environment which revealed the laws of nature to Locke. And man, according to Locke, should adjust to his environment. This was proper because, according to Locke, it was natural. Hence, man, according to the Lockean view, becomes an adjusting mechanism; he is neutral and passive, and the environment makes him what he is.*

Dewey, in contrast, has formulated the principle of interaction. Man, according to Dewey, is neither the sole, domin-

* Attention is invited again to John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. (122)

ating force which shapes his environment, nor is environment the sole, dominating force which molds man. Instead, man interacts -- co-operates, so to speak -- with his environment. Sometimes the environment becomes dominant, and man adjusts to it. Sometimes man is the dominating force, changing the environment to suit his needs and purposes. Thus, according to Dewey, man copes with his environment, sometimes adjusting to it and sometimes adjusting it to him. In either case -- whether adjusting to or changing the environment -- action which man will take is, according to Dewey, dependent upon his goals and insights with reference to the environment with which he must cope.

Although interaction implies much more than this,* it would appear to be in foregoing respects especially that kinship exists between Dewey's formulation and modern concepts of democracy. Modern democratic pursuits are based on individual and collective goals of society as a whole. Problems arise with reference to goals and obstacles which prevent their realization. The effectiveness with which a democratic society achieves its goals depends upon its ability to formulate solutions to problems which arise in pursuing these goals. And from all indications, modern democracy, as opposed to

* Interaction deals also with human perception. This matter is not taken up because the study is not concerned primarily with philosophical considerations. They have entered only incidentally and of necessity because of their bearing on the governmental outlooks of widely quoted democratic theorists.

the Lockean view, provides equality of opportunity and equality of responsibility for arriving at and abiding by solutions to such problems.

Experimentalism in which interaction is explicit, appears in other respects to square with democratic principles. Whereas truth once obtained, in idealism (the Platonic approach) and in realism (the Lockean approach), is regarded as absolute and final (thenceforth in effect providing special privilege for ideas discovered and for persons holding them), experimental truth is regarded as tentative and based only on evidence at hand. Thus, whereas both idealists and realists are more than occasionally inclined to regard final evidence as already in, thus discouraging new or modified formulations regarding various matters, experimentalists insistently leave the way clear for new or modified interpretations based upon new evidence which may later come to light.* The only requirement as regards ex-

* A constant difficulty with idealistic and realistic approaches is that a newcomer might come up with something different which, although it is not welcome, sometimes can scarcely be denied. Thus, a realist in particular (an idealist can ignore such new ideas by saying they just seem to be the case, the world being only an imperfect reflection of the real truth) is sometimes forced to admit that he was wrong before. Curiously, however, the attitude then (after the mistake is admitted) seems to prevail that now the real truth has been discovered, with all of the implications of finality, ultimacy, and absolute perfection that existed before. Such an outlook would tend to discourage new and different ideas regarding various matters, thus to restrict progress beneficial to mankind even in the realm of science. Note such restrictive influences in 17th, 18th, and 19th century medical science. Note, for one example, the case of

perimental formulations is that new (as well as old) ideas be subject to demonstrable proof.

Idealistic truth, moreover, inasmuch as it is based upon intuitively discovered, disembodied ideas, would not be amenable to material tests. Hence, inasmuch as there would be no way of proving or of disproving idealistic ideas by worldly means, it would be necessary to set up an authority to dictate truth or to permit everyone to believe as he pleases. Such alternatives would constitute autoeracy on one hand and anarchy on the other. The absolutistic character of realistic truth would seem also to eventuate to some extent in the same alternatives of dictated truth on one hand or rebellious anarchistic thinking on the other.

Experimentalism, differing from both idealism and realism, appears to avoid autocratic approaches to truth-getting by guaranteeing any and every formulation a hearing, and to avoid anarchistic approaches by requiring that all formulations submit to demonstrable proof. With experimentalism, it is not who is right, based on a person's station in life, but what is right, based on evidence.

Semmelweiss who in 1849 announced to the medical world his formulation of the causes and avoidance of puerperal septicemia (childbed fever). Semmelweiss, because his ideas conflicted with older, established obstetricians, was ostracized by European medical men, as a result of which he lost his medical practice and later his sanity. Such attitudes are not unknown today. The American Medical Association ignored Sister Kenny, a mere nurse, until her formulations for rehabilitating muscles damaged by poliomyelitis could no longer be disregarded.

Summary

Democracy implies no particular decisions -- whether pertaining to rights, freedoms, governmental mechanisms, economic policies, or other matters -- except a decision to employ democratic methods of reaching and abiding by decisions.

Except for primary democratic rights to criticize, to make choices, and to implement choices -- rights without which the democratic process itself would be non-existent --, various democratic nations have provided themselves with different kinds and degrees of rights, have allowed themselves freedoms of various types and to various extents, and have enacted various laws governing these and other matters.

Democratic practice, moreover, indicates wide range of choice regarding the implementation of democratic theory. Democratic nations have adopted a wide variety of techniques of governmental accountability to the people. In addition to a wide range of difference in handling minor details of government, democratic nations have embraced basically different approaches to government: the presidential system, the executive-council system, and the parliamentary or cabinet form.

Democracies also have adopted different economic approaches, depending on local desires, problems, and inventiveness of the people.

Different as these approaches to government and economic life are in democratic nations, democracy presumably is not confined even to known ways of doing things. It provides for inventiveness regarding any matter, the possibilities of which are limited only by the resourcefulness of the society concerned.

Thus, in implying no specific decisions except a decision (which, itself, may be democratically, though unwisely, abrogated) to follow democratic methods of reaching and abiding by decisions, democracy represents a way of making and abiding by decisions permitting no special privilege for persons or for ideas. In this sense, democracy represents a process of solving problems or of making choices based on individuo-collective goals. Whereas autocracy provides special privilege both for persons and for ideas and bases its program on extraneous considerations, democracy provides equality of opportunity and equality of responsibility for arriving at and abiding by decisions relating to human goals.

Because of differences in status accorded to persons and ideas and because of different criteria drawn upon as bases of human pursuits, democracy and autocracy show resemblances and disparities to opposing philosophical outlooks, also based upon different assumptions. The circumstance that oft-quoted, supposedly democratic theorists such as Plato, Locke, and Dewey have embraced philosophical out-

looks respectively of idealism, realism, and experimentalism does not mean that all three of these philosophical outlooks are equally congenial to modern democracy. Rather, this circumstance aids in explaining how it is that historical democracy is more closely identifiable with the position taken by modern autocracy than with that of modern democracy. Whereas idealism and realism appear to be logically compatible with autocracy (or anarchy), experimentalism alone appears to be logically compatible with modern democracy.

In the next chapter, the conflicting interpretations of democracy noted in Chapter II will be re-examined with reference to the findings on modern democracy in Chapters IV and V.

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CHAPTER SIX

CHAPTER VI
 CONFLICTING INTERPRETATIONS OF DEMOCRACY RE-EXAMINED
 WITH REFERENCE TO
 MODERN THEORY AND PRACTICE OF DEMOCRACY*

The Position Of Democracy Between License And Oppression

The prevalent view that, although democracy is a laudable ideal, it probably cannot fully be achieved and the accompanying advocacy that, nevertheless, national and educational programs should be conducted democratically "as far as possible" seem to indicate that democratic principles are not well understood. Viewed with reference to matters of action, such outlook suggests that democracy is confused with anarchistic, unlimited freedom and that, when a point is reached wherein necessity for restrictions on personal liberty becomes evident, such restrictions are regarded as autocratic per se. Viewed with reference to matters of belief, such outlook suggests that democracy is confused with anarchistic irresponsibility for ideas and that, when a reckoning becomes necessary, the calling to account is regarded as autocratic. Thus, such outlook suggests that democracy is regarded as a do-as-you-please and a think-as-you-please state of affairs and that any exceptions imply cessation of democracy. The inference seems to be that, in order to be practical about

* Chapters IV and V synthesized with reference to Chapter II.

national and educational programs, there comes a time that it is necessary to stop being democratic.

Educationally, one may wonder whether a view based on "democracy as far as possible" would not eventuate in vacillation between anarchy and autocracy. It is not inconceivable that it would lead to a condition in which students may do and think as they please until the teacher can endure it no longer. At that point it might be expected that a teacher will arbitrarily dictate to students how they must act and think. Such a condition, should it exist, would miss completely the spirit of democratic equality of opportunity and equality of responsibility -- no special privilege -- for persons and ideas.

If democracy is to be the ideology to which an educational system gives allegiance, there would be no practical reasons why principles of democracy could not be followed faithfully throughout every aspect of the educational program. Inasmuch as democracy implies limitations on personal freedom applied equally to all of society (and not unlimited freedom to do as one pleases), all laws and codes of conduct applying to society at large would apply to students while at school.

Moreover, schools require regulations regarding personal conduct of students peculiar to the problems of the educational program itself. School administrative and instructional staffs, democratically delegated by society to administer the educational program, would be thoroughly justified

in prescribing such rules and regulations as are necessary for successful prosecution of the program. Students would have no choice except to abide by these democratically established matters of action.

Concerning matters of action which may be left to students for decision, the same principles of equality of opportunity and equality of responsibility for arriving at and abiding by decisions should apply to student bodies as apply to adult society. Students should be aided in understanding the democratic process as it relates to that aspect of the educational program which is controlled by adult-established action, and they should be invited to co-operate. As regards decisions which are left to student bodies, the decisions adopted should apply equally to all students. Interpreted thus, it is not only an educator's right but his democratic duty to enforce all such regulations uniformly throughout the school, using coercion if necessary.

Obligation, however, for students to abide by matters of action would not imply that they must like every regulation governing them or that they must refrain from voicing objections. Adult democratic practice implies right of criticism for the purpose of securing a following which will change or modify laws and regulations in force. Any minority in a democratic nation has the right to work peacefully toward becoming a majority. Such a right to criticize, in an effort to change, various school regulations would also

apply to students even though they must observe regulations while in force. Voicing views regarding such matters would have to do with belief rather than action. And as regards matters of belief, all of the implications of equality of opportunity and equality of responsibility for ideas would apply to student bodies as apply to adult democratic society.

Moreover, equality of opportunity and equality of responsibility for ideas and for the persons who hold them should apply in classroom learning situations. All ideas -- whether by students, teacher, or source books -- should stand on merit alone, or not stand at all. Democratic education interpreted in this way would be based on scientific thinking and would imply that conclusions be reached on the basis of evidence, rather than caprice on one hand or dictation on the other.

Thus, genuinely democratic education would not require that there be a stopping point for democracy. Rather, if education is to be consistently democratic, democratic principles must permeate every aspect of the program so that anarchy may be avoided on one hand and autocracy on the other. Advocations that a democratic nation or educational system should be democratic "as far as possible" and contentions that democracy resides at some undisclosed point between license and oppression (See Chap. II), do not define democracy accurately enough for practical application. It seems likely that democratic principles will be applied or they

will not. It seems probable that a fundamental principle of equality of opportunity and equality of responsibility -- no special privilege -- for persons or for ideas will be followed or else that, either innocently or purposely, the irresponsibility of anarchy or the special privilege of autocracy will be embraced instead.

Democratic Freedom And Autocratic
Enslavement Re-interpreted

Similarly, to differentiate between democratic societies and autocratic societies by referring to the former as "free peoples" and the latter as "enslaved peoples" requires clarification. If it is meant that a democratic society enjoys the requisite primary freedoms to make the democratic process workable and that an autocratic society does not, such designations are accurate. But if it is meant that democracy implies unlimited freedom and that autocracy implies no freedom, or if it is meant that a democratic people enjoys a greater number of specific liberties than an autocratic society, then such designations are untenable. It is not the number or extent of freedoms, rights, and privileges which makes one nation more democratic than another, but the way in which decisions regarding these matters are reached and applied. A dictator may allow the rank and file of his subjects more freedoms in certain respects than the people of a democratic society permit themselves. The

difference is that decisions regarding these matters are made under auspices of special privilege for persons and for ideas in case of autoeracy, whereas they are made under provisions for equality of opportunity for persons and for ideas in case of democracy. Moreover, decisions relevant to freedom apply to some and not to specially privileged others in case of autoeracy and apply equally to all of society in case of democracy.

Respect For Law And Order And Those
In Authority Re-interpreted

Thus, democracy implies restrictions on individual liberty. But these restrictions are desired by a majority of a people, they apply equally to all, and they remain subject to change if and when a majority can be mustered which desires to make the change. Democracy, in this sense, implies laws and regulations requiring that a people do certain things and not others and implies strict enforcement to ensure that such laws and regulations apply uniformly. But to contend that students need to "act occasionally without question" (See Chap. II) would, from a democratic point of view, represent questionable doctrine. Rather, students, on the level of their maturational and experiential ability to understand what is involved, should know exactly why they must act in certain ways and not in others. Genuine interest in such matters would provide functional opportuni-

ties for acquainting students with fundamental principles of democratic citizenship. Moreover, if there is no good reason for insisting upon certain codes of conduct, there would be no democratic reason for not recognizing the fact, with a view toward adopting codes for which there is good reason. That is to say, autocracy requires unquestioning obedience to specially privileged ways of thinking and acting; not democracy.

The further claim that "one of the first principles of democracy is to respect law and order and those in authority" (See Chap. II) also requires clarification. If it is meant that all members of a democratic society are obligated to abide by democratically enacted laws and by legally constituted powers delegated to authorities in enforcing laws, there is no objection to the pronouncement. But it may be profitable to remember that, from a democratic point of view, it is entirely possible to be thoroughly dissatisfied with some of the laws enacted (although being obligated to abide by them) and to disapprove of certain persons appointed to represent society at large. Such being the case, the people of a democracy, including students in the schools, have the right -- and the responsibility -- to indicate their displeasure and the reasons for it. This, it would seem, must be recognized if a democratic society is to make decisions which are wise and to delegate authority in the best interests of all concerned.

Freedoms Of Speech, Press, And Assembly Re-examined
With Reference To Matters Of Action And Belief

Prevalent tendencies to regard freedoms of speech, press, and assembly, without qualifications, as indispensable elements of democracy appear to confuse democracy with anarchy and to contribute to the misconception that any and all restrictions on freedom are undemocratic. Although these so-called freedoms identify in some cases with matters of belief and constitute some of the requisite freedoms without which the democratic process is non-existent, they are not inviolable when they identify with matters of action and are prohibited by law. It is thus that libel, slander, and the disclosure of national security secrets may be prohibited by law without necessarily impairing the democratic process. Although freedom of assembly for the purpose of congregating peacefully to discuss various issues exists in every instance where democracy exists, public assembly is curtailed democratically in instances wherein public safety and health are at stake. In the latter cases, extenuating circumstances are regarded to exist and the situations are regarded as having no bearing on the right to exercise the fundamental democratic process. Thus, concerning even these so-called freedoms, democracy does not imply any specific ones except the freedom to employ the democratic process in reaching decisions. The crux of the matter resides in the proposi-

tion that, if the fundamental freedom to implement the democratic process is abrogated, democracy cannot exist. If it is curtailed, to that degree democracy is curtailed. If, on the other hand, this fundamental freedom is provided, all other freedoms of, and limitations on, speech, press, and assembly depend entirely upon the democratic decisions of a society. These decisions differ in various democracies according to national desires and problems.

Religion And Democracy

A further misconception prevails -- that religious freedom, or freedom of worship, is a necessary part of democracy. If democracy is to be maintained, religious beliefs must be treated the same as any other beliefs. And the forms of action resulting from religious beliefs must also be treated the same as actions deriving from any other form of belief. It is all right from a democratic point of view to believe as one chooses (though democracy, too, implies equality of responsibility for beliefs). But what one may propose overtly to do about his religious beliefs depends upon the laws in force.

Thus, there may be justification for contending that democracy implies separation of church and state if this means that no particular church dominates any of the democratic nations under consideration. However, the inference that religion is entitled always to go its own way, regardless, is unjustified. Religious activities, as any other

activities in which individuals or groups may engage, are contingent on the laws of society in a democracy. If autocratic, special privilege is to be avoided, a democratic nation must be capable of requiring abidance to law on the part of any group within it, religious or otherwise.

Re-interpretations Of Popular Watchwords Of Democracy

There are other terms and phrases frequently employed in connection with democracy which imperfectly describe modern democratic theory and practice. To regard "inalienable rights . . . [to] life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," without further qualifications, as integral features of democracy is unreliable, if not thoroughly misleading. A member of a democratic society has the right to life if he does not break democratically enacted laws, violations of which provide for capital punishment. Apparently, he must take his chances along with everyone else in military engagements. The possibility that he may lose his life in battle does not excuse him from participating if the law requires that he take part. A member of a democratic society has a right to liberty if he does not run afoul of democratically enacted laws, violations of which provide for imprisonment. He may pursue happiness in ways of his own choosing if his activities do not run counter to enacted laws.

Obviously, other than rights specifically provided by law (or those existing by virtue of absence of regulation),

an individual in a democratic society has no rights whatever; none that might be called inalienable. At least, whether or not he has inalienable rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, he is unable to exercise them under certain circumstances.*

The "equality principle" is accurate in describing democracy when equality is interpreted as equality of opportunity to participate in making decisions and equality of obligation to carry them out. It is inaccurate when equality is interpreted as sameness or equality with reference to anything else. Democracy implies equality before the law, for example, because that means equality of obligation to abide by decisions.

But the prevalent claim that democracy implies that one person is as good as another has no foundation in theory or practice. The goodness or badness of persons depends upon interpretations which a democratic society places upon goodness and badness or rightness and wrongness and, in final analysis, depends upon conformity of one's actions with the laws in force. Thus, in attempting to explain democracy by drawing upon the early French pronouncement of equality ("liberty, equality, fraternity") and the early American proclamation that "all men are created . . . equal,"

* An idealistic philosophical outlook sometimes takes the position that an individual possesses certain inalienable rights whether the state permits him to exercise them or not.

care must be taken to avoid interpretations which imply sameness or equality of outcome. It is for this reason, apparently, that certain writers decry "equalitarianism" as a characteristic of democracy.*

Physiological, intellectual, temperamental, and moral differences exist among persons without doing damage to the concept of modern democracy. The fact that human beings differ widely would seem not to prevent thorough-going implementation of the democratic principle. Rather than in-born equality or equality of outcome in human pursuits, democracy implies equality of opportunity to participate in making decisions and equality of responsibility to play, so to speak, according to the rules adopted. As long as an individual abides by the laws of society as a whole, he is entitled to achieve according to his ability and inclination to do so.

Democracy interpreted thus, instead of implying compensating special privileges for dull, indolent, or evil persons, implies that all individuals have the equal opportunity to prove themselves -- or fail -- on merit. And, rather than implying equalizing special privileges for poor ideas, democracy provides equality of opportunity for all ideas, good or bad, to stand or fall on merit. Thus, democracy implies that, if and when persons and ideas prove not to be equal, they should be regarded as unequal.

* See John S. Brubacher, Modern Philosophies of Education.
(1)

Fraternity, if interpreted to mean that a democratic citizen is obligated to associate with any and all persons, would not represent an intrinsic feature of democracy. A democratically enacted law may require that persons associate under certain conditions, but such a law would represent a possible outcome of the democratic process instead of an aspect of democracy itself; that is, of the process. Unless specifically curtailed by law, democracy implies that each individual has a right to be different from others and to choose his associates as he is able and inclined to do so.

Democracy And The American Way Of Life

Identification of democracy with the American Way of Life, except as the American Way is identifiable with the democratic process itself, confuses democracy, the process, with some of the end-products or decisions reached by means of this process. A decision may be reached and applied democratically, in which case the decision may be regarded as democratic.* But, as repeatedly shown, there is a difference between democratic decisions, which differ from case to case, and the process by which such decisions are democratically reached and applied, which remains essentially

* Attention is drawn again to the fact that a decision to abolish democracy may be democratically adopted. However, as indicated in several contexts in Chapter V, this constitutes an end to democracy.

the same in the various democracies.

During the history of the United States "The American Way of Life" has represented many different ways of life, some which have been adopted and kept, others modified or discarded. To the degree that these various ways of life or decisions have been adopted, applied, and changed democratically, they have been democratic. However, instead of representing integral features of democracy itself, these constantly changing ways of life have been the results of various democratic decisions as the nation has grown. Identification of specific decisions with democracy -- except for the one and only decision to reach and abide by decisions democratically -- tends to eventuate in special privilege for certain ideas and thus actually to conflict with the essential character of democracy. Hence, it again appears necessary to distinguish the process of democracy as representing its fundamental character from the end products of that process as representing outcomes of democracy.

Viewing the matter in this way, an economic system in the United States based on so-called free enterprise would be democratic if a decision to adopt such a system of economics were reached and applied democratically. But free enterprise, as such, would not represent an integral feature of democracy. Governmental controls of various kinds, if adopted and applied democratically, would also be democratic. But they, too, would not constitute any logically necessary

concomitant of democracy. Thus, free enterprise, capitalism, limited capitalism, or socialism, although one or another may be adopted and applied democratically, would, in and of themselves, be no determinant of whether a nation is democratic. Any one or a combination of these approaches to economic life may be adopted democratically for good or for ill. But no one, nor any combination, constitutes a "must" as regards the fundamental character of democracy.

A democratic nation, moreover, may base its pattern of living upon traditional ways of life and may do so democratically if tradition, as a thing in itself, does not dictate the choice. Perhaps traditional ways have proved to be the best ways; perhaps they manifest grave shortcomings. Regardless, if tradition is what is desired; if what is incorporated in tradition is retained and applied democratically; if these traditional ways of doing things remain subject to democratic modification or change; then the fundamental requirements of the democratic process have been met. But tradition in itself -- whether concerning economic systems, governmental devices, or anything else -- has nothing to do with the fundamental character of modern democracy, and to infer that it does confuses the issue of democracy, whether asserted innocently or knowingly. From a democratic point of vantage, the crux of the matter resides in the proposition that traditional ways of life shall be accorded no more privilege than newer, invented, or suggested

ways. The newness or oldness of ways of conducting national affairs, as such, has no bearing on fundamental principles of democracy.

Democracy And Altruism

Prevalent identification of democracy with features of selflessness, sanctity of individuality, respect for the individual, tolerance for others and the opinions of others, and a belief in the worth and dignity of human personality also requires clarification if the fundamental character of democracy is to be well understood.

As regards selflessness and altruism, a wise decision relevant to social relationships would seem to necessitate that the other person, the other group, or the other nation be taken into account if the best interests of the person or group making the decision are to be achieved. That is to say, an ineffectual way, apparently, of achieving one's own goals in the long view takes the form of riding roughshod over the interests of others. For, in so doing, the others sooner or later are quite likely to retaliate in ways decidedly contrary to one's own interests. In this sense, it would be in one's best interests -- one's self-interest -- to take the desires, interests, or goals of others into account in arranging to achieve one's own goals. If such may be interpreted as altruistic, then wise decisions would imply selflessness.

But, if by the term selflessness is meant that human interests must be sublimated to metaphysical, extraneous considerations such as the glory of a supernatural power, of a state, of a race, or of a tradition, then democracy does not imply selflessness. The pursuits of a democratic society, according to all indications, are based on human interests and the proposition that all interests take into account all other interests. That is, the interactive majority-minority relationship is based on the common interests -- the self-interests -- of a society. All institutions, governmental devices, laws, and regulations exist solely for the purpose of furthering these common interests. In this sense, democracy is based upon self-interest, although, if the best interests of society are to be achieved, upon long-range, enlightened, intelligent self-interest.

"Respect for the individual" also, if it is to be regarded as a feature of democracy, requires interpretation. Democracy implies respect for the individual if it is meant by this that all members of a democratic society are entitled to participate on an equal basis in making decisions and that the provisions adopted apply to all alike. But democracy does not commit one individual to respect another who is not respectable though such respect is required frequently in autocratic nations. Similarly, as regards "tolerance for others and for the opinions of others," democracy implies equality of opportunity for other persons and for their ideas. But the democratic principle is based also on equality of responsibility for persons and for ideas.

Thus, although democracy implies equality of opportunity for all persons according to the rules adopted by society, some persons in a democratic society simply do not have to be tolerated and, of course, are not tolerated. Although all opinions are entitled to a hearing, this does not mean that a democratic citizen must like or respect all of the opinions which are expressed. In short, democracy does not require that all things be regarded equal if and when they are not equal; that one person be regarded as good as another if and when there is a difference; that all ideas are equal if and when some are better than others. Rather, democracy provides impartial treatment for persons and ideas in order to separate reputable persons from disreputable, and good ideas from poor. Democracy, interpreted thus, provides equal opportunity for the best, whether pertaining to men or ideas, to become distinguished from the mediocre or worse. Conversely, if persons and ideas are intolerable, if they are disreputable, if they lack worth and dignity, democracy affords a fair opportunity to judge and act with reference to them accordingly.

Summary

It follows from investigation in preceding chapters that democracy is characterized by a method or process of reaching and abiding by decisions which provides impartial

treatment for both persons and ideas. Distinguished from any particular decisions or outcomes of the process, democracy implies equality of opportunity and equality of responsibility for reaching and abiding by solutions to problems which arise in the pursuit of individuo-collective goals or interests. Interpreted thus, democracy constitutes a method of evaluating alternatives, of passing judgments, of making choices. If, as investigation indicates, no particular choices are involved except for choice of democratic method, the quality of choices would depend entirely on the ability and inclination of a democratic people to evaluate, judge, and choose wisely.

Thus, if democracy is to thrive -- even survive --, competence obviously is required on the part of a democratic nation's citizenry to apply the democratic process effectively in making intelligent evaluations, judgments, and choices. Such competence necessitates education. Inasmuch as large measure of responsibility for developing democratic competence presumably extends to the schools, aspects (not already discussed) of an educational program necessary for producing a democratic citizenry competent to exercise its rights and duties are considered in the next chapter.

References

1. John S. Brubacher, Modern Philosophies of Education
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pp. 134-35.

CHAPTER SEVEN

CHAPTER VII
EDUCATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF MODERN DEMOCRATIC
THEORY AND PRACTICE*

The Responsibility Of The Schools To Prepare
For Competent Democratic Citizenship

If through education a society is to become optimally conversant with the democratic process and maximally proficient in its use, democracy must be practiced by teachers and students alike with reference both to personal conduct and to learning. To practice democracy, it must be understood. Therefore, meanings and implications of democracy must be taught.

Undemocratic Aspects Of Indoctrinating Democracy

Prevalent opinion to the contrary, democracy must not be indoctrinated in democratic schools. If by indoctrination is meant an " . . . attempt to insinuate into the experience of the individual any doctrine . . . to the exclusion of all others in such a way as to prevent the doctrine [from] being dependably evaluated or seriously modified by the individual upon ensuing experience . . . ," (1) indoctrination must be avoided even when teaching democracy.**

* This chapter should be read as a continuation of the preceding chapter.

** Many, perhaps most, educators are willing to examine most ideas critically in order to evaluate them properly in comparison with other ideas. But there is little liking

At first glance it might seem that, if schools are to develop democratic competence, creation of a liking for democracy by students should be a first step; democracy itself should not be questioned. However plausible it may seem at first -- and much would depend on how this liking is to be fostered --, the implications of the notion require examination.

If students are to be educated with a view toward creating democratic competence, a teacher must let them know what he is doing with and to them as he handles matters both of action and of belief. But in order to understand thoroughly what is democratic and why, it would also seem necessary to draw attention to situations which are undemocratic, with the reasons. Educators who examine the question thoughtfully would be likely to agree that one cannot become fully aware of advantages of democracy without realization of the disadvantages of not having it. It is little less than an inconsistency in outlook to infer, as often is done, that democracy should not be questioned and at the same time to complain, as often is done, that the American people take democracy for granted. It would seem that democracy could be understood better -- and liked better, if there is more about it to like -- when alternatives are also understood.

in the United States, either in lay or in educational circles, for questioning the idea of democracy. Democracy, according to prevalent views, must be accepted; it must be liked.

At lower levels of the educational sequence this will probably mean no more than getting children to think about alternatives of fair versus unfair play. Fair play -- no special privilege -- is a principle of democracy which must be employed as much on the kindergarten level as on any other.

When pertaining to personal conduct, fair play would relate to matters of action. Inasmuch as democracy implies uniform application of regulations on matters of action, it would be a teacher's obligation to enforce, and a child's obligation to abide by, whatever rules of conduct apply to the schools. As shown in Chapter VI, some of these regulations are already decided by adult-established action, others by teachers as delegated authorities of society at large, and still others may be left to the students. To the extents of their various capacities, children should be aided in understanding this on whatever levels of ability they may be.

As an example of beginning approaches both to teaching and to practicing democracy, let it be supposed that a situation exists in which there are three playground swings and fifteen kindergarten children, and that the teacher wishes to exploit this situation in the classroom as a practical problem in democracy.* If all fifteen child-

* A teacher may choose to leave such a matter to children for solution, although, as a delegated authority of society at large, he would be justified in deciding it himself. Teachers are decisive as regards conduct, because conduct is a matter of action.

ren like to swing, the problem is immediately apparent to them.

What, then, is to be done? Are Harold, Mary, and Richard to have sole access to the swings? If so, why should it be they, and what are the others to do who also like to swing? Or is the difficulty to be settled by a free-for-all scramble; the swings to be taken by those who get there first? If so, how will this work for the others? Or, should all take turns?

It is to be expected that there will be children at lower as well as higher educational levels who, when they understand what is involved, will not favor a democratic solution. However, inasmuch as this constitutes a matter of opinion or belief, they are entitled to dislike it and to speak out against it even though having to abide by the arrangement adopted, a matter of action.

Thus, as regards all educational matters, maturational and experiential background of students must be taken into account. As maturity increases, students should be brought to grips with increasingly more complex problems, including more complex interpretations of democracy and its alternatives.

The Role Of Scientific Thinking In Democratic Schools

As brought out in Chapter V, democracy implies no particular decisions or choices other than choice of the generalized,

democratic method. This method furnishes a dynamic means of coping with problems as they arise. Changes in the world, as regards both problems for democratic solution and knowledge necessary for solving them, occur rapidly and directions of change are often unpredictable. Educators, therefore, cannot know precisely what in future years students in democratic nations will need to know or what problems they will have to solve. It follows that, if democratic competence is to be achieved, democratic schools must teach students to learn and to think independently -- to solve their own problems in a progressively more efficient manner -- in preparation for the time after which formal schooling ends.

As indicated in the last section of Chapter V, the modern method of science as a generalized approach to thinking appears to be the logical choice in democratic schools. Because of the provision it makes for equality of opportunity and equality of responsibility for persons and their formulations, modern scientific thinking is congenial with democracy. Dynamic, self-corrective aspects of scientific thinking together with its record for having derived valid, reliable findings would make it an efficacious choice from the standpoint of democracy.

Modern scientific thinking, however, as with the democratic process itself, must not be sanctified and indoctrinated if democratic education is to prevail. Such indoctrination would provide special privilege for the scientific

method. From a scientific point of view, whichever of various techniques is employed within the generalized framework of modern scientific method must prove itself to be the most valid and reliable way of thinking and reaching conclusions which is available if it is to be adopted.

In order, therefore, to be either democratic or scientific, modern scientific method must be compared with other methods, historical and contemporary, so that students may see for themselves what promises various methods hold as means of understanding and coping with their worlds of interest. As in the case of teaching democracy, this would appear to be the only way in which students can really become convinced of the efficacy of scientific thinking. Moreover, such procedure would represent another case wherein students would be evaluating alternatives and making choices on merit -- an ability which is crucial to democratic competence.

As concerns children in the lower reaches of the educational sequence, this would probably mean no more than beginning attempts to get them to see the difference between conclusions which are demonstrably verifiable and those which are not. (Does putting wraps in regular places, for example, lead to more, or less, confusion in getting them later). Unless the process is accomplished through slanted information, no indoctrination exists.

Although scientific methods of thinking are utilized to some extent in teaching science-type subjects at various

educational levels, in many cases entirely too much emphasis is placed on learning the so-called facts of science and too little on enabling students to understand why the facts are what they are and how they may be used. There is so much "ground to cover" that little opportunity is given to understand how scientific conclusions are obtained and how they may be applied.

Science treated thus tends to become authoritarian and to defeat the dynamically, self-correcting aspect of scientific thinking which makes it a dependable way to obtain truth. From the scientific (and democratic) point of view, it is important not only to be familiar with a representative, up-to-date body of scientific data, but also to understand something of how the data were obtained and how they apply to human situations. If students are to learn to think for themselves, it is important that certain data be recognized as leading logically to certain conclusions and applications. Moreover, it is important to know that new data many times modify and change conclusions. Science classes, of all educational situations, would seem to be the last place in which one should expect to encounter authoritarian, right-answer handouts.

Although science teachers are not entirely above criticism, it probably is in areas not ordinarily associated with science that scientific thinking is most neglected, if indeed it is recognized as at all applicable. Certain moral and religious concepts are notable for the dogmatic,

unscientific manner in which they are handled. Rather than examine moral and social concepts in terms of logical, observable human consequences, there is a widespread tendency to indoctrinate these matters, or leave them obscure. Frequent are the claims that social problems, because of "the human element," either can not or should not be handled scientifically. But is it unwise to assume that social concepts may be approached scientifically? Cannot the human consequences of poverty and degradation be observed and assessed quite objectively? Is it impossible to ascertain rather accurately what is likely to happen if aggressions are committed by a nation -- or by a kindergarten-playground bully? Must society appeal to some supernatural edict to determine the antisocial outcomes of homicide, theft, and marital infidelity?

Experts in physical science may, on matters within their own spheres of competence, be correct more frequently than experts dealing with social concepts. But, if such be true, it may be due to the fact that the former are employing scientific methods of thinking whereas the latter are not. Or it may be due to the fact that the problems of the former are less complicated than those of the latter -- though complexity in itself is no absolute criterion for separating scientific from philosophical problems. Or else the more consistently reliable concepts may be explainable in terms of thinking which has been carried further --

to a point where findings are more reliable.* In any case, alternative approaches appear always to represent either dictation or irresponsibility.**

The Teacher-Student Relationship In Reaching Conclusions

If education is to be conducted democratically and scientifically, it follows that views from any and every possible source -- from students, teachers, and available references -- must receive a hearing and that ideas must stand on merit. Alternative and conflicting interpretations should be taken into account whenever they exist, and students should be given wide opportunities to present and defend their views. Provision for disagreement in cases where students have reason to differ is important not only from democratic and scientific points of view, but as a means for teachers to uncover inadequacies of data which students are taking into account and to discover conflicts in thinking which otherwise might go undetected. Thereby it becomes a means for students to gain new knowledge and a new integration of thinking and, conceivably, a like means for teachers.

* It must be remembered that full significance of scientific thinking regarding social problems did not become clear until Dewey's writings at the turn of the century and later. There may be truth in the contention that, as regards social outlook, the world today is no farther advanced than were physical scientists a few centuries ago.

** See idealism, realism, and experimentalism discussed with reference to democracy and alternatives under the last topic heading of Chapter V.

If students are to be required to support their views, in the interests of democracy the same responsibility applies also to teachers. Even if teachers are correct more often than students (and why should they not be?), no significance should be attached to the circumstance except that students are in an advantageous position of having brought to their attention views and experiences of an advanced student. Democratically (and scientifically) speaking, views of teachers shall stand only as they can be supported, just as those of students. Thereby, reasons underlying conclusions become equally if not more important in the long view than any particular conclusions in and of themselves. Rather than attempt to dictate to students what to believe, it is a teacher's democratic responsibility to ensure that all possible light be brought to bear on various issues of concern to them and that they be encouraged and aided to think logically and independently in terms of available data.

The Democratic Necessity For Developing
Reflective, Critical Thinking Ability

Education of the foregoing type would represent primarily a program for promoting critical, reflective analyses of various issues which concern students.* Its purpose would

* This implies that learning situations, at whatever level, must be based on student maturation and experiential background; that the "pacing" principle must be meticulously followed.

be to bring students to grips with their present problems and to aid with solutions. It would be to introduce students to issues of which they are unaware; to aid in defining new problem-areas preparatory to working out solutions. Necessity for valid, serviceable knowledge in reaching conclusions would be implicit throughout.

Teaching of this kind would rule out rote, memoritor, drill-type learnings, isolated from meaningful contexts and from human applications. The democratic necessity for helping students to think critically and independently, moreover, would rule out indoctrination for the status quo, a meaning easily taken to be implied by expressions such as "education for adjustment."

If "adjustment" is taken to mean that all students in a democratic nation must learn to maximum capacity to cope interactively with their world of effect, there is no objection to the term. However, if adjustment is interpreted, as in many cases it seems to be, as student adjustment to present conditions, it is democratically indefensible. Besides being undemocratic in its provision for specially privileged ideas and institutions, such an approach is shortsighted.*

There is little doubt that the usual purpose of formal schooling has been to perpetuate a culture. Presumably also,

* See the Lockean philosophical outlook as regards adjustment to status quo, under the last topic heading of Chapter V.

one purpose of democratic education is to perpetuate the democratic mode of association. The method of perpetuation, however, must be unique in case of democratic education.

In order to perpetuate autocratic cultures, special privilege for ideas and institutions prevails and, because of the inherent characteristics of autocracy, logically so. However, it cannot be emphasized too strongly that, in order to perpetuate democracy, perpetuation in the usual sense as it applies to continuation of rigid, static ways of doing and thinking must be abandoned. Otherwise, democracy is repudiated; not perpetuated.

From a democratic point of view, society is justified in making changes if and when they are sensed by the people as advantageously in keeping with the promotion of common interests. As Dewey has observed, a primitive people (enslaved by traditional ways of thinking) has unusual ability for adjusting to environmental conditions in the sense of putting up with them. However, Dewey points out that civilized man does not adjust to arid conditions if he insightfully sees ways of changing such conditions and wishes to do so. Rather, according to his insights and purposes, he irrigates deserts and introduces plants and animals which will flourish under such conditions. In short, a thinking people may transform the environment. (2)

Dewey's illustration of one aspect of interaction has socio-governmental and educational analogies. Rather than

fostering adjustment (or perhaps, submission) to the culture as it exists with the result that students are led to believe that present conditions must not be questioned, democratic schools must promote reflective, critical analyses into various aspects of the culture in order to understand them and note their trends so as to develop clear and valid notions of how refinement may be achieved. Democratic schools must conduct studies into various aspects of the culture with a view toward creating independent, competent student judgments as to what seems necessary to improve the culture. A democratic nation, if it is to flourish, requires strong (though not static) beliefs on the part of the people. But the people, including students, must make up their own minds about the various issues after having had opportunities to examine available choices in the light of available data.

The Appreciation Subjects

In light of the foregoing educational principles, definite implications follow for developing appreciations, skills, and attitudes. It is frequently assumed that, in order to make aesthetic progress in the arts, the schools must get students to like the "good" things, and that it takes experts to determine what is good. It is scarcely to be doubted that in most cases art teachers are superior to students in making such judgments. But when teachers endeavor to impose their judgments and tastes on students, are they not teaching autocratically?

As in all other subject areas, democratic teaching requires that reflective thinking be encouraged on the respective levels of maturational and experiential ability of students. Students should be encouraged to make up their own minds about various works of art. But they need the help of good teachers. Good teachers (i.e., democratic teachers) will promote co-operative, critical examination of alternatives -- the good in comparison with the bad. The more students know about any given object of study, particularly as to how it compares with others, the more they will find to like or dislike about it.

Imposition of teacher-tastes on students, besides being undemocratic, seems psychologically unwise. Likes and dislikes change as new insights develop. Teachers, therefore, should encourage students to enhance their acquaintance with works of art, progressively and continually making discoveries and letting likes and dislikes change as they inevitably will. From time to time will arise the question: What makes for high-quality art and what for low? Reflective, analytical comparisons of the one with the other will progressively bring enlightenment. Taste based on anything but comparative understandings seems likely to result in snobbishness and to create an atmosphere in which works of art are considered as objects of gush.*

* It is not suggested that participation in appreciation subjects always, if ever, should represent a "coldly intellectualized" analysis. It merely is suggested that in democratic schools intelligence is preferable to gush both in enjoying and producing art, music, and literature.

Development Of Skills

Critical, reflective thinking is promoted little enough in subject-areas commonly thought to require understanding. It is promoted even less in the so-called appreciation-type subjects. It is emphasized perhaps least of all, and many times not at all, in the so-called skill-areas.

To illustrate, it is likely that most educators would agree to the desirability of developing student understandings in certain subject-areas such as social studies. Even here, however, arises the difficulty that educators often do not have in mind the type of understanding which would result from critical analyses of various sides of questions. These educators may contemplate understandings which might be said to be configurational in character, but they do not regard it necessary that the configurations be of such scope as to encompass alternatives. In short, contrasts are missing. Such understandings are precisely those which students are desired to get; none other. Understanding, interpreted thus, suggests indoctrination; right-answer handouts.

Although the idea may be held that appreciation-subjects require understandings, in much practice these understandings are monitored according to teacher preferences even more strictly than the so-called content subjects.

In developing skills, however, it is not unusual for teachers to contend that little if any understanding is

necessary -- least of all, understanding based on reflective, critical thinking. The method of developing skills, it is claimed, should be through practice, and practice alone. Teachers who hold this view appear to assume that understandings are one thing, appreciations another, and skills still another. Skills are taken to require "sensory-motor learning," not "ideational learning."

In democratic schools it would seem that understandings, appreciations, and skills might be developed in conjunction with one another and that each should be achieved through critical, reflective thinking. In order that education may be functional and that motivation may be genuinely inherent in the learning process, the time to start developing skills would be when the needs become apparent to students; when they are sensed as means of accomplishing goals.

Presumably, the underlying purpose of instrumental music instruction is to enjoy as well as to produce music. Yet, it is not uncommon for teachers to put children to work in an utterly unthinking manner on deadening exercises. The difficulty is that relationships between the thing "learned" and its uses are not emphasized.

From a democratic point of view, music teachers should, at least at the start of instruction, play upon the interests which prompt students to take up music in the first place. Teaching should start from simple melodic approaches. As obstacles arise, problems of technique become apparent to students. Instead, however, of merely showing students pre-

cisely how to overcome such difficulties, teachers and students co-operatively and reflectively should go into the various technical possibilities which show promise of accomplishing the ends in view -- those of producing the desired musical effects. Then, instead of advice merely to "practice it again," students should be aided to understand for themselves what different ways of doing will accomplish or fail to accomplish, with a view always toward choosing the most effectual means to particular ends at hand.

What applies to instrumental music in these respects applies to other skills. In the interests of democratic teaching, emphasis must be placed on understandings, critical thinking, taking alternative approaches into account, and making choices -- all in terms of what one is wishing to achieve. As understandings develop regarding the relative effectiveness of various approaches to technical problems, it may be expected that appreciation will increase. As appreciation increases and as various approaches are sensed as successful or unsuccessful for accomplishing tasks at hand, personal feelings may be expected to become favorable or unfavorable. Again, it would appear that, the greater a person's appreciation regarding any matter, the greater or less value he may be expected to see in it. It is thus that understandings, appreciations, and skills may be developed together.

Attitudes And Ideals

Educational literature includes numerous discussions on development of student attitudes and ideals. In certain instances one might be led to believe that attitudes are things apart from other educational matters; that attitudes and ideals should be inculcated whether students learn anything else or not. Wherever this inference prevails, it seems to reduce to the proposition that students should be encouraged to have certain feelings about certain things; that they should be imbued with right attitudes and worthy ideals.*

Inasmuch as students are going to have attitudes of one kind or another anyway, the heart of the educational problem resides in aspects which have a bearing on the formation of attitudes. If implications of interaction are tenable, attitudes are predicated on and grow out of understandings (or lack of them) with reference to interests or goals.**

* It frequently is contended, for example, that American students must be instilled with the scientific attitude. As noted earlier, this would depend entirely on the method employed to foster the attitude. In democratic schools, it should not be indoctrination.

** It is recognized that attitudes are frequently classified in different ways such, for example, as those resulting from trauma and subconscious assimilation. Inasmuch as this discussion is concerned primarily with generalized teaching procedures necessary for developing attitudes democratically, these various classifications are not elaborated here.

It would seem that attitudes, instead of representing things apart from other educational matters and instead of being first to develop, result from correct or incorrect interpretations which persons make or have made. If a given matter is interpreted, either erroneously or correctly, as favorable to cherished goals, it may be expected to educe an attitude of favor; if not, an attitude of disfavor. If a matter is interpreted as of no consequence, the consequent attitude may be expected to be one of indifference. Furthermore, subsequent action will be in accordance with the attitudes: favorable action if the attitude is favorable; unfavorable action if the attitude is unfavorable.

If the foregoing interpretations are accurately descriptive, it may be expected that a skillful disseminator of propaganda can produce on the part of students virtually any attitude and resultant action which he may desire. By censoring information-sources and by fabricating falsehoods, dictators have been able to produce desired attitudes, thereby being able to control the actions of the people to their own ends. Persons who see through such stratagems, and let it be known that they view them with disfavor, may even be imprisoned or put to death.

Thus, from a democratic educational point of view, inculcation of the precise attitudes which it is thought students should have is to be decried. Rather learning should be conducted so as to give student-attitudes a chance

to develop democratically. Attitudes may be expected to be of one type if student outlooks are based largely on ignorance, of another if based on censored data or monitored understandings, and of still another if based on impartial, critical analyses of the various issues which do or should concern them.

Inasmuch as democracy implies no special privilege, for persons or for ideas, public school teachers in democratic nations should not "stack information cards" against students; they should only ensure that students have access to all (or at least a fair sample of) available data. After examining various aspects of any question, it must be left to students to make up their minds. Attitudes must depend on student understandings of the human consequences of various issues. Evaluations, judgments, and choices of alternatives must depend on what students come to see as desirable.*

Long-range views of conditions, as students would wish them to be, might be considered as ideals. Inasmuch as any citizen in a democratic nation is almost certain to find himself in a minority position on many issues in the ever-changing majority-minority relationship, it would behoove a wise demo-

* This should not be taken to mean that teachers may not require (as a basis for grading, for example) that students understand what has come into the picture regarding various issues taken up. The point is this: After understanding what is involved, students should be encouraged to make up their minds independently about various issues with reference to their interests. It is implicit also that students need to place their interests under critical examination.

cratic citizen, in his own self-interest, to examine his ideals with reference to what he would wish conditions to be if they were to affect him directly. As one possible ideal among many, students in democratic schools might do well to examine searchingly the proposition that all interests should take into account all other interests.

Summary

Inasmuch as democracy has been found to carry the obligation to abide by decisions once they are reached, teachers in American public schools are obligated to apply democratic procedures to every aspect of educational programs. In order to practice democracy in the schools, it must be understood. Therefore, its meanings and implications must be studied in the schools.

If genuine democratic teaching is to prevail, care must be taken to avoid indoctrination even for democracy. Indoctrination for democracy, besides providing special privilege for the democratic ideology, precludes advantages to be derived from examining democracy with reference to opposing ideologies.

The circumstance that modern scientific method is congenial with democracy in its provision for impartial treatment for persons and for ideas makes it a logical choice as the method of democratic education. The further circumstance that the method of modern science has proved to be a valid and reliable method of reaching conclusions would make it an efficacious choice. As in case of the democratic

process, scientific thinking must not be indoctrinated as a specially privileged method. It must be compared with various methods of reaching conclusions in order that students may make up their minds independently regarding the relative promise or value of each.

Although scientific thinking is commonly employed to some extent in science-type classes, there is over-emphasis on the so-called facts of science and too little attention on the derivation of facts and their human utility. This condition tends to deify facts, hence to detract from the essential spirit of scientific thinking as a basic means of modifying and refining outlooks.

There is a widespread tendency to ignore scientific thinking entirely in the social studies. However, inasmuch as all known alternative methods seem sure to eventuate in decidedly unscientific and undemocratic privilege for certain ideas on one hand, or in anarchistic irresponsibility on the other, attempts must be made to employ scientific thinking throughout democratic educational programs.

To handle education democratically and scientifically, views from any source must receive a hearing and all ideas must be required to stand on merit. Students should be given wide opportunities and should be urgently incited to present and defend their views. Views of teachers should be adopted only as they show themselves tenable, just as those of students. Thereby, reasons underlying conclusions

become equally, if not more, important in the long view than any particular conclusions in themselves. It is crucial that such be the case if students are to be provided opportunities to learn and to think for themselves for the time after which schooling ends.

The purpose of teaching thus becomes one of conducting critical, reflective analyses into various issues of concern to students and of aiding students to identify new problem-areas preparatory to working out solutions. Teaching of this kind would rule out rote, memoriter, drill-type learning of bits of information isolated from meaningful contexts and from human applications. It further would rule out indoctrination in any form. Rather than indoctrinate the culture, in order to be democratic the schools must conduct reflective studies into various aspects of the culture so as to understand them, note their consequences, and look toward improvement.

Democratic teaching precludes inculcation of specially privileged standards of taste with reference to the arts. Rather than impose teacher preferences, alternatives choices must be considered in order to permit students independently to judge the relative quality of any particular object of study. As in all other areas of learning, teachers should determine student maturity, experiential background, and interest, and then should provide suitable opportunities for new contacts and new understandings with a view always toward developing new interests and new tastes. Appreciation

subjects should be taught with a view toward increased appreciation leading progressively to increased ability to discriminate independently and intelligently.

Students themselves must see the necessity for developing skills as means of accomplishing goals. This would rule out the teaching of skills as ends in themselves, in isolation from practical applications. Schools must aid students in understanding what various ways of doing things accomplish or fail to accomplish, with a view toward developing the ability to choose the most effectual technical means to any ends at hand.

Inasmuch as attitudes result from correct or incorrect interpretations of various matters with reference to goals, democratic schools must insist that students have access to all possible sides of any question. After the various possible choices have been taken into account, students must make up their minds independently. Attitudes must depend on student understandings of the human consequences of various issues. Evaluations, judgments, and choices of alternatives must be in terms of what students would wish to prevail.

Long-range views of conditions, as students would wish them to be, may be considered as ideals. Inasmuch as any person in a democratic nation is certain to find himself in a minority position on many issues in the ever-changing majority-minority relationship, students in demo-

eratic schools must be brought to grips with the proposition that all interests need to take into account all other interests.

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CHAPTER EIGHT

CHAPTER VIII

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Problem, Its Justification And Importance

The purpose of the study has been (1) to compare historical and modern theories and practices of democracy; (2) to compare modern theories and practices with those of alternative forms of socio-governmental organization; (3) to determine whether definite, fundamental principles can be formulated which will distinguish modern democracy from historical interpretations and from alternative present-day socio-governmental forms; and, if so, (4) to make a start at determining the implications of these principles with reference to democratic education.

Justification of such a study resides in the circumstance that, although American educators are in rather complete agreement that educational programs in the United States should be founded on principles of democracy, they encounter difficulty when attempting to determine what is meant by democracy and democratic education. Moreover, those who make the attempt to define democracy and make explicit its functions in the schools find themselves in serious disagreement with one another concerning what constitute vital characteristics of democracy and of democratic education.

As a result of such disagreement, charges frequently are made that democracy has become nothing more than a popular mouthing, either meaning nothing at all or meaning a

great variety of different things. A more serious charge is that the mouthing of democracy and of democratic education has become a device for masking ideas and practices which decidedly are not democratic. Finally, a question has arisen regarding how much democracy is really desired in the nation and her schools. It sometimes is contended that the American people must conduct their affairs democratically "as far as possible," and that American educators must make the school program function democratically "as far as is feasible." The inference appears to be that democracy is to be desired up to a certain point but, beyond that, it becomes impracticable if not pernicious.

The importance of such a study as this resides in the circumstance that, after having participated in two World Wars ostensibly for the purpose of maintaining and furthering democratic ideals and institutions and now being faced with the possibility of a third, the observation is still appropriate that it is "doubtful whether the American people were ever so lacking in a sense of direction." (1) The Educational Policies Commission has warned that, inasmuch as the history of mankind shows "that free men again and again have lost their liberties simply because they did not know the consequences of the choices . . . [being made or accepted, democracy] must make provision for the enlightenment of the people . . . or [it must] perish." (2)

Before a democratic nation can flourish and defend itself intelligently against external and internal enemies, the people must have a clear conception of the meaning of democracy and what it implies for practice, both in national and in educational matters. There are indications that the American people are not entirely clear on the matter. Widespread differences of opinion within the profession indicate that American educators are none too well grounded as regards the meaning of democracy or of democratic education.

Ambiguous And Conflicting Interpretations Of Democracy

Claims are made that democracy should lie somewhere between oppression and license. However, inasmuch as oppression and license are relative terms which may be given widely differing interpretations, such contentions are no more definite than advocations that national and educational programs should be democratic "as far as is feasible."

The notion is so prevalent that democracy means freedom that the terms "democratic peoples" and "free peoples" have come virtually to carry the same meaning. Conversely, autocratic societies are frequently referred to as "enslaved peoples," yet it is obvious that supposedly democratic nations place restrictions on individual liberties. There are instances, moreover, in which nominally autocratic societies have more freedoms in certain respects than do democratic societies.

On the other hand, it is contended without elaboration that one of the first principles of democracy is to respect law and order and those in authority, and that persons in a democracy should on occasion act as they are told without question. Yet, pronouncements such as these do not indicate clearly the occasions upon which democracy implies unquestioning obedience. Moreover, certain nominally autocratic peoples respect authority in a way which supposedly democratic nations hold in high contempt. A question thus arises whether such pronouncements really clarify the differences between democracy and autocracy.

Almost without exception it is claimed in written and oral discussions on the subject that freedoms of speech, press, and assembly are basic to democracy. Yet, there are numerous instances in nominally democratic nations in which freedom of speech is curtailed, in which freedom of the press is not allowed, and in which freedom of assembly is not permitted.

Religious freedom or freedom of worship also is generally considered as a necessary part of democracy. However, there are instances in supposedly democratic nations, including the United States, in which legal restrictions have been placed on religious activities.

Assumptions are prevalent in the United States that the key to democracy is to be found in the American Declaration of Independence which proclaims " . . . inalienable rights . . . [to] life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness

. . ." and which embraces the proposition that " . . . all men are created free and equal." The French Revolutionary slogan, "liberty, equality, and fraternity," also appears frequently in discussions on the subject. In addition to questions already raised regarding the term "freedom" as a reliable index to democracy, there is considerable doubt that the terms equality and fraternity are truly descriptive. Reasonable arguments are advanced, moreover, that man has no inalienable rights whatever; that he has only those rights with which a nation provides him and that his life, liberty, and pursuits of happiness are contingent in great measure upon the kind of person he is and the kind of society in which he lives.

It is frequently supposed that the meaning of democracy is to be found in the "American Way of Life." However, it has been suggested that the American Way of Life is too vague a conception to be clearly descriptive of democracy. Moreover, historical accounts indicate that, in both early and later periods of American development, the American Way may not have been consistently democratic.

Other features claimed for democracy include altruism, selflessness, sanctity of individuality, respect for the individual, tolerance for others and for the opinions of others, and a belief in the worth and dignity of human personality. Again, there are numerous indications that such features do not clearly differentiate democracy from opposing forms of socio-governmental organization.

Historical Interpretations Of Democracy

Inasmuch as democratic theory and practice have been and are so intimately interwoven with tradition, it has seemed necessary to determine what democracy has been taken to mean historically. It is evident from investigation that interpretations of democracy today are far different from those associated with the word historically, even as late as the nineteenth century. To look to Greek antiquity, to the beginnings of American Union, to early French revolutionary periods, or, in fact, to any period of history prior to the nineteenth and in some cases the twentieth century for authority concerning the meaning of modern democracy contributes more to confusion than to clarity.

Although primitive societies have adopted seemingly democratic forms of socio-governmental organization, manifestations of autocracy exist in the primitive's enslavement to specially privileged ways of acting and of thinking.

Ancient "Athenian democracy" excluded a majority of the total population from any voice in government. Moreover, the Platonic philosophical outlook of Greek society fostered special privilege for certain ideas, a condition which resembles conditions today in dictator-nations. The so-called Roman Republics came no closer to democracy, in the modern sense, than did the Greek city-states.

Early, Medieval, and Reformationist European religion, which largely dominated the civil as well as the spiritual

life of the people, inherited all of the shortcomings of the Greek theory and practice of government and added some undemocratic outlooks and practices of its own.

Of pre-American and pre-French Revolutionary philosophers associated with democratic theory, Hobbes in particular embraced a governmental outlook which would eventually ensure an undemocratic form of government. And Locke, although in some respects embracing a principle of continual majority rule, embraced a philosophical outlook which tended to perpetuate specially privileged ideas which, in turn, contributed to perpetuation of undemocratic practices in Britain.

American Revolutionary leaders, frequently supposed to have founded the principles upon which modern democracy rests, did not give full allegiance to democracy in the modern sense of the term. Those leaders who would support democracy at all favored many of the restrictions upon a majority of the people which had been imposed in Athens and Rome. France, although credited with democratic reforms, was slower than the United States in advancing democracy as it is known today.

Thus, it was not until the nineteenth and in some instances the twentieth century that democracy began to assume its modern meaning. Of various nations which played a part in this late transition and which, according to rank-and-file political scientists and democratic theorists, eventually adopted generally acceptable forms of democratic control,

Switzerland, France, Britain, the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand are noteworthy.

Twentieth Century Theory And Practice Of Democracy

Although government includes forms such as autocracy, monarchy, empire, aristocracy, oligarchy, plutocracy, theocracy, dictatorship, and democracy, as well as variations within some of these designations, all forms of government, regardless of name or type, divide basically into two main categories: (1) those which are autocratic, in which the interests of a single person or of a fixed part of a people are dominant in ordering the way of life of a nation; and (2) those which are democratic, in which the wishes or desires of the whole of a people, as determined in case of disagreement by majority vote, are decisive.

As implied in the laws which govern nations, both democracy and autocracy place limitations on personal freedom. In case of autocracy, these limitations are determined by one person or by a fixed part of the group, and apply to certain persons but not to others. In this sense, autocracy implies inequality of opportunity and inequality of responsibility for arriving at and abiding by decisions. In case of democracy, limitations on freedom are decided upon by the whole of a society, as determined by majority vote with provisions for minorities to evolve peacefully to majorities, and apply to all persons alike. In this sense, democracy

implies equality of opportunity and equality of responsibility for arriving at and abiding by decisions. In instances in which no limitations on freedom are imposed, a condition of anarchy, individualism, or laissez faire is presumed to exist. Inasmuch as anarchy infers absence of restraint or non-interference -- no government --, anarchy implies unlimited freedom.

It follows both logically and practically that autocracy implies special privilege for certain persons and for their ideas. Democracy implies no special privilege for persons or for ideas. And anarchy implies no responsibility for persons or for ideas, as concerns a society as a whole.

As indicated both by theory and by practice, democracy implies no particular set of decisions -- whether pertaining to rights, freedoms, governmental mechanisms, economic policies, or other matters -- except a decision to employ democratic methods of reaching and abiding by decisions.

Except for primary democratic rights to criticize, to make choices, and to implement choices -- rights without which the democratic process itself would be non-existent --, various democratic nations have provided themselves with different kinds and degrees of rights, have allowed themselves freedoms of various types and to different extents, and have enacted various laws governing these and other matters.

Democratic practice, moreover, indicates wide range of choice regarding the implementation of democratic theory.

In addition to differences in handling minor details of government, democratic nations have embraced basically different approaches to government: the presidential system, the executive council system, and the parliamentary or cabinet form.

Democracies also have adopted different economic approaches, depending on local desires, problems, and inventiveness of the peoples.

Different as these approaches to government and economic life are among democratic nations, democracy presumably is not confined even to known ways of doing things. It provides for inventiveness regarding any matter, the possibilities of which are limited only by the resourcefulness of the society concerned.

Thus, implying no specific decisions except a decision to follow democratic methods of reaching and abiding by decisions, democracy constitutes a way of making and abiding by decisions permitting no special privilege for persons or for ideas. In this sense, democracy represents a process of solving problems or of making choices based on individual-collective goals. Whereas autocracy provides special privilege both for persons and for ideas and bases its program on extraneous considerations, democracy provides equality of opportunity and equality of responsibility for arriving at and abiding by decisions relating to human interests.

Because of differences in status accorded to persons and to ideas and because of different criteria drawn upon

as bases of human pursuits, democracy and autocracy show resemblances and disparities to opposing philosophical outlooks, also based upon different assumptions. Whereas idealistic (Platonic) and realistic (Lockean) philosophical outlooks are logically compatible with autocracy (or with anarchy), experimentalism (of Dewey) is logically compatible with modern democracy.

Ambiguous And Conflicting Interpretations Of Democracy

Re-examined With Reference

To Modern Theory And Practice Of Democracy*

Contentions that a democratic nation and educational system should be democratic "as far as possible" do not define democracy accurately enough for practical application. Viewed with reference to matters of action (laws, regulations, and codes of conduct), such outlook suggests that democracy is confused with anarchistic, unlimited freedom and that, when a point is reached wherein necessity for restrictions on personal liberty becomes evident, such restrictions are regarded as autocratic per se. Viewed with reference to matters of belief, such outlook suggests that democracy is confused with anarchistic irresponsibility for ideas and that, when a reckoning becomes necessary, the calling to account is regarded as autocratic.

* The second topic of this chapter re-examined with reference to the fourth.

Inasmuch as democracy implies limitations on personal freedom applied equally to all of society -- not unlimited freedom to do as one pleases --, all laws and codes of conduct applying to society at large apply to students while at school.

Moreover, schools require regulations regarding personal conduct of students peculiar to the problems of the educational program itself. School administrative and instructional staffs, democratically delegated by society to administer the educational program, are thoroughly justified in prescribing such rules and regulations as are necessary for successful prosecution of the educational program.

Concerning matters not already prescribed by society at large which may be left to students for decision, the same principles of equality of opportunity and equality of responsibility for arriving at and abiding by decisions should apply to student bodies as apply to adult society.

Obligation, however, for students to abide by various regulations in force does not mean that they must like every regulation governing them or that they must refrain from voicing objections. Adult democratic practice implies right of criticism for the purpose of securing a following which will be able to change or modify laws and regulations. Such a right -- to criticize, in an effort to change, various school regulations -- should also apply to students. As regards the voicing of opinions in such matters, all of the

implications of equality of opportunity and equality of responsibility for ideas should apply to student bodies as apply to democratic societies.

Moreover, equality of opportunity and of responsibility -- no special privilege -- for ideas and for the persons holding them should apply in classroom learning situations. All ideas -- whether presented by students, teacher, or source books -- should stand on merit, or not stand at all. Democratic education interpreted thus would be based on scientific thinking and would imply that conclusions shall be reached on the basis of evidence, rather than of caprice on one hand or of dictation on the other.

Similarly, to differentiate between democratic and autocratic societies by referring to the former as "free peoples" and the latter as "enslaved peoples" requires clarification. If it is meant that a democratic people enjoys the requisite primary or critical freedoms to make the democratic process workable and that an autocratic society does not, such designations are accurate. But if it is meant that democracy implies unlimited freedom and that autocracy implies none, or if it is meant that a democratic people enjoys a greater number of specific liberties than an autocratically governed people, such interpretations are untenable. It is not the number or extent of freedoms, rights, and privileges which makes one nation more democratic than another, but the way in which decisions regarding such matters

are reached and applied. Decisions are made under the auspices of special privilege for persons and for ideas in case of autocracy, whereas they are made under provisions for equality of opportunity for persons and for ideas in case of democracy. Moreover, decisions relevant to freedom apply to some and not to others in case of autocracy and apply equally to all in case of democracy.

Thus, democracy implies restrictions on individual liberty. These restrictions are desired by a majority of a people, they apply equally to all, and they remain subject to change if and when a majority can be mustered which desires the change. But to contend that persons need to act occasionally without a question would, from a democratic point of view, represent questionable doctrine. Rather persons, including students on the level of their ability to understand what is involved, should know exactly why they must act in certain ways and not in others. Moreover, if there is no good reason for insisting upon certain codes of conduct, there would be no democratic reason for not recognizing the fact, with a view toward adopting codes for which there is good reason. That is to say, it is autocracy which requires unquestioning obedience to specially privileged ways of thinking and acting; not democracy.

The further claim that one of the first principles of democracy is to respect law, order, and those in authority also requires scrutiny. If it is meant that all members of a democratic society are obligated to abide by democratically

enacted laws and by legally constituted powers delegated to authorities in enforcing laws, there is validity to the pronouncement. But, from a democratic point of view, it is possible to be thoroughly dissatisfied with some of the laws enacted (although being obligated to abide by them) and to disapprove of certain persons appointed to represent society at large. Such being the case, the people of a democracy, including students in the schools, have the right -- and the responsibility -- to indicate their displeasure and the reasons for it.

Prevalent tendencies to regard freedoms of speech, press, and assembly as indispensable absolutes of democracy tend to confuse democracy with anarchy and to contribute to the misconception that any and all restrictions on freedom, though at times necessary, are undemocratic. Although these so-called freedoms identify in some cases with matters of belief and constitute some of the requisite freedoms without which the democratic process is non-existent, they are not inviolable when they identify with matters of action and are prohibited by law. It is thus that libel, slander, and the disclosure of national security secrets may be prohibited by law without necessarily impairing the democratic process. Although freedom of assembly for the purpose of congregating peacefully to discuss various issues exists in every instance where democracy exists, public assembly is curtailed democratically in instances, for example, wherein public safety and health are at stake. The crux resides in

the proposition that, if the fundamental freedom to implement the democratic process is abrogated, democracy cannot exist. If it is curtailed, to that degree democracy is curtailed. If, on the other hand, this fundamental freedom is provided, all other freedoms of, and limitations on, speech, press, and assembly depend entirely upon the democratic decisions of a society.

Democracy does not imply complete religious freedom. If democracy is to be maintained, religious beliefs must be treated the same as any other beliefs. The forms of action resulting from religious beliefs must also be treated the same as actions deriving from any other form of belief. There may be justification for contending that democracy implies separation of church and state if this means that no particular church dominates any of the democratic nations under consideration. The inference, however, that religion is entitled always to go its own way, regardless, is unjustified. Religious activities, as any other activities in which individuals or groups may engage, are contingent on the laws of society in a democracy. If autocratic, special privilege is to be avoided on one hand, and anarchistic, unlimited freedom on the other, a democratic nation must be capable of requiring abidance to law on the part of any group within it, religious or otherwise.

To regard "inalienable rights . . . [to] life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" as integral features of democracy is unreliable, if not thoroughly misleading. A member

of a democratic society has the right to life if he does not break democratically enacted laws, violations of which provide for capital punishment. He must take his chances along with everyone else in military engagements if required by law to do so. A member of a democratic society has a right to liberty if he does not run afoul of democratically enacted laws, violations of which provide for imprisonment. He may pursue happiness in ways of his own choosing if his activities do not run counter to enacted laws. Obviously, other than rights specifically provided by law or those existing by virtue of absence of regulation, an individual in a democratic society has no rights whatever; none that might be called inalienable.

The "equality principle" is accurate in describing democracy when equality is interpreted as equality of opportunity to participate in making decisions and equality of obligation to carry them out. It is inaccurate when equality is interpreted as sameness or equality with reference to anything else. Thus, in attempting to explain democracy by drawing upon the early French pronouncement of equality ("liberty, equality, fraternity") and the early American proclamation that "all men are created . . . equal," care must be taken to avoid interpretations which imply sameness or equality of outcome. Rather than inborn equality or equality of outcome in human pursuits, democracy implies equality of opportunity to participate in making decisions and equality of responsibility to play, so to speak, according to the

rules adopted. As long as an individual abides by the laws of a society, he is entitled and expected to achieve according to his ability and inclination to do so.

Democracy interpreted thus, instead of implying compensating special privileges for dull, indolent, or evil persons, implies that all individuals have equal opportunity to prove themselves -- or fail -- on merit. And, rather than implying equalizing special privileges for poor ideas, democracy provides equality of opportunity for all ideas, good or poor, to stand or fall on merit. Democracy implies that, if and when persons and ideas prove not to be equal, they should be regarded as unequal.

Fraternity, when interpreted to mean that a democratic citizen is obligated to associate with any and all persons, does not represent an intrinsic feature of democracy. A democratically enacted law may require that persons associate under certain conditions, but such a law would represent a possible outcome of the democratic process instead of an aspect of democracy itself; that is, of the process. Unless specifically curtailed by law, democracy implies that each individual has a right to be different from others and to choose his associates as he is able and inclined to do so.

Identification of democracy with the American Way of Life, except as the American Way is identifiable with the democratic process itself, confuses democracy, the process, with some of the end-products or decisions reached by means of this process. A decision may be reached and applied demo-

cratically, in which case the decision may be regarded as democratic.* But there is a difference between democratic decisions, which differ from case to case, and the process by which such decisions are democratically reached and applied, which remains essentially the same in the various democracies.

As regards selflessness and altruism as features of democracy, a wise decision relevant to social relationships seems to necessitate that the other person or the other group be taken into account if the best interests of the person or group making a decision are to be achieved. An ineffectual way, apparently, of achieving one's own goals in the long run takes the form of riding rough-shod over the interests of others. For, in so doing, the others sooner or later are quite likely to retaliate in ways decidedly contrary to one's own interests. In this sense, it would be in one's own best interests -- one's self-interest -- to take the interests of others into account in arranging to achieve one's own goals. If such may be interpreted as altruistic, then wise democratic decisions would imply selflessness.

If, however, by the term "selflessness" is meant that human interests must be sublimated to extraneous, metaphysical considerations, then democracy does not imply selflessness. Pursuits of a democratic society are based on human interests

* A decision may be democratically adopted to abolish democracy altogether. However, this constitutes an end to democracy.

and the proposition that all interests take into account all other interests. All institutions, governmental devices, laws, and regulations exist solely for the purpose of furthering these common interests.*

Similarly, democracy implies respect for the individual if this means that all members of a democratic society are entitled to participate on an equal basis in making decisions and that adopted provisions apply to all alike. But democracy does not commit one individual to respect another who does not merit respect though such respect is frequently required in autocratic nations. And, as regards tolerance for others and for the opinions of others, democracy implies equality of opportunity for other persons and for their ideas. But the democratic principle is based also on equality of responsibility for persons and for ideas.

Thus, although democracy implies equality of opportunity for all persons according to the rules adopted by society, some persons in a democratic society simply do not have to be tolerated and, of course, are not tolerated. Although all opinions are entitled to a hearing, this does not mean that a democratic citizen must like or respect all opinions which are expressed.

* To argue that certain groups behave undemocratically when they make decisions on the bases of their own self-interests is indeed to argue fallaciously. They may be deciding unwisely, but this in and of itself should not be taken to mean that they are deciding undemocratically. Democracy does not guarantee wise decisions.

In short, democracy does not require that all things be regarded equal if and when they are not equal or are not seen as equal; that one person be regarded as good as another if and when there is a difference; that all ideas be regarded as equal if and when some are better than others. Rather, democracy provides impartial treatment for persons and ideas in order to separate reputable persons from disreputable and good ideas from poor. Democracy, interpreted thus, provides equal opportunity for the best, whether pertaining to men or ideas, to become distinguished from the mediocre or worse. Conversely, if persons and ideas are intolerable, if they are disreputable, if they lack worth and dignity, democracy affords a fair opportunity to judge and act with reference to them accordingly.

Educational Implications

Of Modern Democratic Theory And Practice*

Inasmuch as the American people have committed themselves to democracy at present and in the foreseeable future and since democracy has been found to carry the obligation to abide by decisions once they are reached, teachers in American public schools are obligated to apply democratic procedures to every aspect of educational programs. In order to practice democracy in the schools, it must be understood. Therefore, its meanings and implications as concerns

* See also pp. 380-382 regarding educational applications of matters of action and of belief.

matters both of action and belief must be taught.

However, democracy should not be indoctrinated in democratic schools. If by indoctrination is meant an ". . . attempt to insinuate into the experience of the individual any doctrine . . . to the exclusion of all others in such a way as to prevent the doctrine [from] being dependably evaluated or seriously modified by the individual upon ensuing experience," (3) indoctrination must be avoided even when teaching democracy. Indoctrination of democracy, in addition to providing special privilege for the democratic ideology, precludes advantages to students to be derived from examining democracy with reference to opposing ideologies.

As to a generalized method of thinking and reaching conclusions in democratic classrooms, modern scientific method, because of its compatibility with democracy in providing impartial treatment for persons and for ideas, is the logical choice. The further circumstance that the generalized method of modern science has proved experimentally and experientially to be a valid and reliable method of reaching conclusions makes it an efficacious choice. As in case of the democratic process, however, scientific thinking must not be indoctrinated as a specially privileged method. It should be compared, on respective levels of student maturity to understand what is involved, with various methods of thinking in order that students may make up their minds independently regarding the relative promise of each.

Although scientific thinking is employed to some extent in science-type classes, there is over-emphasis on so-called facts of science and too little attention given to derivation of facts and their human utility. This condition tends to deify facts, hence to detract from the essential spirit of scientific thinking to modify and refine outlooks as new data come to light.

There is widespread tendency to ignore scientific thinking entirely in connection with social problems. However, inasmuch as all known alternative methods seem sure to eventuate in decidedly unscientific and undemocratic special privilege for ideas on one hand, or in anarchistic irresponsibility on the other, attempts need to be made to employ scientific thinking throughout democratic educational programs.

To handle education democratically and scientifically, views from any and all sources must receive a hearing and all ideas must be required to stand on merit. Students should be given wide opportunities to present and defend their views. Views of teachers should hold only as they can be supported, just as those of students. Thereby reasons underlying conclusions become equally if not more important in the long view than any particular conclusions in themselves. It is crucial that such be the case in order to provide opportunities for students to learn and to think for themselves for the time after which schooling ends.

The purpose of democratic teaching thus becomes one of conducting critical, reflective analyses into various issues of concern to students and of aiding students to define new problem areas preparatory to working out solutions. Teaching of this kind would rule out rote, memoritor, drill-type "learnings" isolated from meaningful contexts and from human applications.* It further would rule out indoctrination in behalf of the status quo. Rather than indoctrinate the culture, democratic schools must conduct reflective studies into various aspects of the culture in order to understand them and note their consequences with a view toward improving the culture.

Democratic teaching precludes inculcation of students with specially privileged standards of taste for the arts. Rather than impose teacher preferences, alternatives choices must be considered in order to permit students independently to judge the quality of any particular object of study as compared with others. As in all other areas of learning, teachers should determine student maturity, experiential background, and interest, and then should provide opportunities for new contacts and new understandings with a view toward producing new interests and new tastes. Appreciation-subject areas should be taught with a view toward increased appre-

* No inference is intended that some things should not be memorized. Advantages are apparent, for example, in "learning" the multiplication table in such a way as to handle it fluently; without hesitation. In the interests of democratic teaching, however, it should be taught in meaningful contexts -- as a means to the end of dealing effectively with human problems -- on various levels of student maturity and interest. Even so rote a thing as a rote song should be taught on a meaningful basis with

ciation leading progressively to increased ability to discriminate independently and intelligently.

Students themselves must see the necessity for developing skills as means of accomplishing goals. This would rule out teaching skills as ends in themselves, in isolation from practical applications. Schools must aid students in understanding what different ways of doing accomplish or fail to accomplish, with a view toward developing the ability to choose the most effectual technical means to any ends at hand.

Inasmuch as attitudes result from correct or incorrect interpretations of various matters with reference to goals, democratic schools must insist that students have access to all possible sides of any question. After alternative choices have been taken into account, students must make up their minds independently. Attitudes must depend on student understandings of the human consequences of various issues. Evaluations, judgments, and choices of alternatives must depend on what students would wish to prevail.

Long-range views of conditions, as students would wish them to be, might be considered as ideals. Inasmuch as any person in a democratic nation is certain to find himself in a minority position on many issues in the ever-changing majority-minority relationship, students in democratic schools must be brought to grips with the proposition that all interests take into account all other interests.

a view toward aiding children progressively to deal intelligently with things musical and poetic.

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