PERO LÓPEZ DE AYALA AS HISTORIAN AND LITERARY ARTIST

by

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Submitted to the Department of Spanish and Portuguese and the Faculty of the Graduate School of the University of Kansas in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT

I would like to express my most sincere appreciation to Dr. Arnold H. Weiss for his invaluable help and encouragement in the direction of this dissertation.

C.L.S.
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INTRODUCTION

Pero López de Ayala (1332-1407) has traditionally been considered to be Castile's first great historian in the modern sense—a pre-Humanist, whose historical veracity and innovations in style paved the way for a new era in Spanish historiography.

But despite his high reputation, Ayala and his chronicles have mostly been written about in general histories or in histories of literature; few critics have dealt with him exclusively or in detail. It is my intention, therefore, to present a thorough study of the four chronicles—La Crónica del Rey Don Pedro I (1350-1369), La Crónica del Rey Don Enrique II (1369-1379), La Crónica del Rey Don Juan I (1379-1390), and La Crónica del Rey Don Enrique III (1390-1396), in order to evaluate the chronicler and his work from both the historical and literary points of view.
CASTILE AND LEON FROM ALFONSO X TO JUAN II
(adapted from Russell, English Intervention in Spain and Portugal in the Time of Edward III and Richard II.)

ALFONSO X (1252-84)

SANCHO IV (1284-95) (second son; seized throne)

FERNANDO IV (1295-1312) Alfonso de Fernando de Juana de la Cerda la Cerda Lara

Maria = ALFONSO XI (1312-50) = Leonor de Guzmán (murdered 1351)
(daughter of Alfonso IV of Portugal)

Maria de Padilla = PEDRO I (1350-69)

Juan Sancho Tello Padrique ENRIQUE II (1369-79) = Juana Manuel

Alfonso Beatriz Constanza = John, Duke of Lancaster Isabel

JUAN I = Leonor (1379-90) of Aragón

John Catalina = ENRIQUE III (1390-1406) Fernando I of Aragón (1412-16)

JUAN II (1406-54)
CHAPTER I
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The years between 1350 and 1396, which Ayala describes, represent a fascinating and extremely complex phase of Castilian history. The Reconquest came to a standstill because of the intense power struggle between Castile, Aragon and Portugal for control of the Iberian Peninsula. Castile itself became a battleground for the bitter struggle between those who advocated a strong centralized monarchy and those who favored the signorial rule of a powerful nobility. The entire peninsula was involved in the intermittent conflicts between England and France known as the Hundred Years' War. Since the chief prize at stake was the royal fleet of Castile, the main efforts of both English and French diplomacy were concentrated on the central kingdom in particular.

Castile

Four monarchs ruled Castile between 1350 and 1396 - Pedro I (1350-69), Enrique II (1369-79), Juan I (1379-90), and Enrique III (1390-1406). Pedro I attempted to establish a centralized, personal monarchy and was
defeated by Enrique of Trastamara, his half-brother, whose usurpation of the crown of Castile placed the Trastamaran family on the throne. Enrique's victory represents the triumph of signorial control over the personal authority of the monarch, although succeeding monarchs attempted to centralize the kingdom's rule. In foreign policy the Trastamarans were allied closely to France.

Aragon

Pere IV of Aragon (1336-87) known as En Pere or El Ceremonioso, was a realistic monarch, who attempted to improve Aragon's position in the Iberian peninsula by seizing as much of Castile's eastern frontier area as possible. During the years of struggle between Pedro I and Enrique de Trastamara, En Pere actively collaborated with the usurper with the condition that he be rewarded with large portions of Castilian territory. This agreement was never fulfilled by Enrique after his accession to the throne, but En Pere, due to internal difficulties in Aragon and the threat of France, was in no position to use force against his former ally. Whereas the Trastamarans were pro-French, En Pere guided Aragon toward a neutral position in the Anglo-French struggle.
Portugal

Under Alfonso IV (1325-57) and Pedro I (1357-67), Pedro of Castile's grandfather and uncle respectively, Portugal maintained amicable relations with Castile. Fernando I (1367-83) tried to seize territories from Castile's western frontier during the reign of Enrique II, but was defeated by the Castilian monarch and forced to sign the humiliating peace treaty of Santarém in 1373.

Relations between Portugal and Castile again became strained when Juan I of Castile tried to claim the Portuguese throne upon the death of Fernando I in 1383. He was opposed by the popular and powerful Maestre D'Avis, Fernando's illegitimate brother, who had himself declared king of Portugal in 1385 as João I and ruled until his death in 1433. After the Castilian defeat at the battle of Aljubarrota (1385), peace treaties most unfavorable to Castile were signed, their terms extending into the reign of Enrique III.

Navarre

This small kingdom, under the rule of Carlos II, el Malo (1332-1387), and Carlos III, el Noble (1387-1425), spent most of its energies in diplomatic intrigue in order to avoid being incorporated by the other kingdoms of the Iberian peninsula or by France. Navarre was regarded as an untrustworthy ally under Carlos II, because
of the facility with which el Malo changed sides during the wars between Castile and Aragon. However, in spite of the uncomplimentary name given to this wily ruler by his enemies, he seems to have been popular in Navarre, which of all the kingdoms in the peninsula was probably the most stable.

Granada

Granada was saved from the Reconquest because of the disorders in Castile and Aragon. Pedro I of Castile was forced to make treaties with Mohammed V, and gained a trustworthy ally in the Moslem ruler by helping him defeat Abu Said, el Rey Bermejo, a usurper who had seized the throne of Granada. Peace was maintained between Castile and Granada until the end of Enrique III's reign, when a resurgence of crusading fervor appeared in Castile. This was due in part to Christian reaction against a new wave of Islam under the domination of the rising Ottoman Empire and also to the accession to the throne of Granada of Mohammed VII, who abandoned his father's pacifism to preach against the Christian rulers.

England, France and the Hundred Years War

This name, a misleading one, is the general title given to the series of intermittent wars fought between England and France from 1337 to 1453. The basic cause for
this struggle was French resentment against the possession by the English of lands in France. Edward III of England (1327-77) claimed the French throne when the Capetian male line ended in 1328. An important economic factor and the one which actually precipitated hostilities was French restriction of English wool trade in Flanders.

At the peace treaty of Bretigny in 1360, Edward III renounced his claim to the French throne and to Normandy, but retained full sovereignty over Poitou, Guyenne, Gascony and Calais. In general, the English held the upper hand at this time. However, the situation reversed itself between 1369 and 1380, when the French, led by Bertrand du Guesclin, ejected the English from all but a string of seaports; among those remaining in English hands were Bordeaux and Calais. This series of victories was largely due to the energy of Charles V, le Sage (1364-1380), who had ruled as regent during the captivity of his father, Jean (1350-1364), before becoming monarch of France. Charles VI (1380-1422) was less successful than his father, due to intermittent attacks of insanity which incapacitated him for months at a time.

Castile and the Iberian peninsula were drawn into the conflict in 1366, when Enrique de Trastamara invaded Castile with Bertrand du Guesclin and the group of mercenary soldiers, known as the White Companies, which had previously been commissioned by Charles V to fight against the English. Pedro I sought help from Edward, Prince of
Wales, better known as the Black Prince, who was governor of English territory in France. Pedro and the Prince routed Enrique and the Companies at the Battle of Nájera in 1367, thus recovering the kingdom of Castile. However, disagreement between the two allies caused the English to withdraw their forces from Castile, whereupon Enrique and the Companies were able to destroy Pedro's forces; Enrique eventually killed the monarch himself in 1369.

Castile, under the Trastamarans, placed itself directly in the French camp. English attempts to regain a foothold in the Iberian peninsula were led by the Black Prince's brother, John of Gaunt, Duke of Lancaster. Lancaster married Pedro I's daughter, Constanza, and claimed the throne of Castile. His pretensions to the Castilian throne were not very enthusiastically supported by the English until the Franco-Castilian alliance completely monopolized the trade routes to Flanders. Lancaster made a treaty with the Maestre D'Avis to invade Castile in 1385, but the Anglo-Portuguese invasion of the following year failed because of a plague which decimated the invading troops. The result of this failure was the Treaty of Bayonne between Lancaster and Juan I, signed in 1388, in which it was agreed that Juan I's first-born son, Enrique, marry Catalina, daughter of Lancaster and Constanza.

The last few years of Juan I's reign and the years of Enrique III's reign represent a general period of peace in all of Europe. Truces signed between Spain and Portugal
coincided with similar treaties between France and England.

The Papacy

France's control of the Papacy between 1309 and 1377 has been referred to as the Babylonian Captivity of the church, because the Papal capital was removed from Rome and placed in Avignon. Upon the death of Gregory XI in 1378, one Pope, Urban VI, was elected in Rome, and a rival Pope, Clement VII, was elected in France. Thus, the Babylonian Captivity evolved into a schism which was to split Christendom until 1417. The English supported Urban VI, while the French backed Clement VII. In spite of the attempts of En Pere of Aragon to keep the peninsula neutral, all of the Iberian kingdoms eventually followed Clement VII. The situation was complicated even further by the death of Clement VII in 1394. The Cardinals of Avignon agreed to elect an Aragonese Pope, Benedict XIII, whom they later tried to remove from the Papacy when he insisted on moving the Papal Seat back to Rome.

By the end of the fourteenth century, Europe was exhausted from years of continual warfare. It was hoped that a meeting in 1396 between the Black Prince's son, Richard II of England (1377-99), and Charles VI of France at Calais would form the basis for perpetual peace between the two countries, and aid in putting an end to the disgraceful Schism of the West.
CHAPTER II
PERO LÓPEZ DE AYALA

Pero López de Ayala (1332-1407) was born in Alava, the son of a Basque nobleman. His father, Ferránd Pérez de Ayala, was a loyal vassal of Alfonso XI. He convinced his fellow Basque nobles to turn Alava over to Castile, served as ambassador to France and Aragon, and was with Alfonso XI during the siege of Gibraltar against the Moors, during which the Castilian monarch died in 1350. During the reign of Pedro I, Ferránd Pérez was sent to pacify the rebellious nobles of Vizcaya, and accompanied the king to Soria to establish a peace treaty with the Aragonese. The first evidence of disloyalty to Pedro was in 1354, when Ferránd Pérez acted as spokesman for the group of rebellious nobles who gathered to plead with Pedro I to abandon his mistress, María de Padilla, and live with his French queen, Blanca de Borbón. Ferránd Pérez was with Pedro I when the king abandoned Burgos in 1366 upon the invasion of Enrique and the White Companies. He joined Enrique's forces in Toledo in the same year, rejoined Pedro in 1368, then followed Enrique after Pedro's death at Montiel in 1369. He died in 1385, after spending the last ten years of his life as a monk.1
Not much is known about Ayala's early upbringing. It is supposed that his uncle, Pero Barroso, Cardinal of Spain, had a substantial influence in his education. Rafael Floranes believes that Ayala was educated at home, but admits that the Cardinal's influence would explain the chronicler's inclination to courtly life. Meregalli suggests that Ayala spent time in Toledo, where he had relatives, and that his translations were a result of his contact with this cultural center. He also mentions the possible influence of another cultural center, Palencia, where Ayala might have spent time in the court of Pedro I. Lozoya mentions the possibility of his having spent some years at the Papal court in Avignon with his uncle, learning courtly manners, French, Latin and the art of subtle reasoning. This would explain Ayala's Francophile position and pro-Avignon affiliation during the Papal Schism. Meregalli rejects this theory, since the Cardinal died in 1345, when Ayala was only thirteen years old, and because Ayala's poor knowledge of Latin does not seem to be in accord with an education at the Papal court.

The first official record of Ayala comes from his own chronicles. In 1353 he, as Doncel of Don Pedro, was sent to tell a rebellious noble, Pedro Carrillo, to remove the sign of La Orden de la Banda which this knight had received from Alfonso XI. In 1354, Ayala served as Doncel to Pedro's cousin, the Infante Don Ferrando of Aragon. In 1359 Ayala was made captain of Pedro's fleet in Seville,
which was being prepared to attack a rebel faction protected by the king of Aragon. Further news of Ayala comes in 1360, when, as Alguacil Mayor of Toledo, he was ordered to send the Archbishop of Toledo, Don Vasco Ferrández, into exile for suspected treason against the king. It is believed that Ayala served Pedro I until the latter left Toledo in 1366. Although many nobles hated the monarch, Ayala was possibly influenced in his antipathy to him by an event which touched him more closely; this was the scandal caused when the chronicler's niece, Teresa de Ayala, gave birth to an illegitimate child which was generally believed to be Pedro's.

During Enrique II's reign, Ayala began to climb in his political career. At the Cortes of Toro in 1371, Enrique II confirmed Ayala's position as Alférez Mayor del Pendón de la Orden de la Banca, a title which Ayala had received under the usurper in 1367 before Pedro's death. In 1374 Ayala was named Merino of Vitoria, and in 1375 became Alcalde Mayor of Toledo. Ayala's international career began in 1376, when he was sent as ambassador to Aragon; in the following year he was ambassador to France.

During the reign of Juan I, Ayala served as ambassador to both France and Portugal. He was sent by the king to Nuño Álvarez Pereyra, Constable of Portugal, in order to attempt a settlement of differences between Castile and Portugal. He failed in this effort to preserve peace, and was consequently taken prisoner after the Portuguese vic-
tory at the Battle of Aljubarrota in 1385. He was probably in prison until 1388, since he did not reappear at the Castilian court until the beginning of 1389. The chronicler's detailed description of the Cortes of Guadalajara in 1390 indicates his presence there as one of the king's advisers. He was obviously one of those opposed to Juan I's Quixotic plan of giving up the crown of Castile for the whim of becoming king of Portugal.

Under Enrique III, Ayala fought for a council of regency rather than individual regents and tutors, and was one of the youthful king's first advisers. In 1392 he was again ambassador to Portugal, and in 1394 took part in the renewal of alliances with France. The extensive report of the Papal dispute in 1395 indicates Ayala's presence at Avignon, while the isolated chapter of the meetings between Richard II of England and Charles VI of France at Calais in 1396, described in great detail, indicate his presence there also. By the middle of 1399 Ayala was Canciller Mayor of Castile, a position which he held until his death in 1407.

The most complete description of Ayala can be found in Fernán Pérez de Guzmán's Generaciones y Semblanzas: "Fue este don Pero López de Ayala alto de cuerpo e delgado e de buena persona.... Fue de muy dulce condición e de buena conversación e de grant conçiençia, e que temia mucho a Dios. Amó mucho la çiençia, díójse mucho a los
libros e estorias, tanto que como quier que él fuese asaz cavallero e de grant discreción en la plática del mundo, pero naturalmente fue muy inclinado a las ciencias e con esto grant parte del tiempo ocupava en el ler e estudiar, non obras de derecho sinon filosofía e estorias. ... Amó mucho mugeres, más que a tan sabio cavallero como él se convenía."16
Footnotes


2. Floranes, pp. 56-57.


6. Pero López de Ayala, Crónica del Rey Don Pedro I, Biblioteca de Autores Españoles, LXVI, Madrid, 1875, Year 4, Chapter VIII.


8. Pedro I, Yr. 10, Ch. XI.

9. Pedro I, Yr. 11, Ch. XVI.

10. Meregalli, p. 43.

11. Meregalli, p. 50.


13. Meregalli, pp. 84-93.

14. Pero López de Ayala, Crónica del Rey Don Juan I, Biblioteca de Autores Españoles, LXVII, Madrid, 1877, Year 12, Chapter I.


CHAPTER III
LA CRÓNICA DEL REY DON PEDRO I

Many writers have been interested in Pedro I of Castile, and have had to base most of their research on the chronicles of Pero López de Ayala, whether they were attacking or defending Ayala's viewpoint. Other Castilian sources are very scanty, while Aragonese, French and Italian sources have a distinct anti-Pedro bias. The basic problem which concerns us here is the degree of objectivity with which Ayala recorded the events of Pedro's reign. After presenting the facts in a cold, withdrawn style, Ayala still leaves the reader with the impression that Pedro I was a cruel and unjust tyrant, defeated at last by God through the instrument of his illegitimate brother, Enrique. Is his attitude toward Pedro a reasonable one, or is it a result of the fact that Ayala himself defected in 1366 to Enrique and therefore was rationalizing his own actions? Was Ayala guilty of subjectivity by omission? To answer these questions one must study Pedro's family relationships, his relationship to those in his realm and finally his relationship to those countries involved in Castilian politics during his reign.
Pedro I and his Family

First we will take up the question of Pedro's family, which consisted of Doña María de Portugal, Pedro's mother; Doña Leonor de Guzmán, Pedro's step-mother, and her illegitimate sons, known as the Trastamarans; Doña Leonor de Castilla, Pedro's aunt, and her sons, the Infantes de Aragon; and finally, Pedro's French wife, Doña Blanca de Borbón.

Pedro's mother, Doña María de Portugal, daughter of Alfonso IV of Portugal, and wife of Alfonso XI of Castile, seems to have been a reasonably good mother and queen; she gave Pedro a careful education, with works such as Guido de Colonna's famous De Regimine Principum as his guide. Juan Alfonso de Alburquerque, a Portuguese nobleman and relative of the queen, was young Pedro's tutor and later chief adviser. There is no evidence that Doña María was a particularly cruel person, even though some writers suggest that Pedro was tutored in cruelty by her. Ayala censors only her responsibility in the assassination of Leonor de Guzmán, Alfonso's mistress. Ayala goes so far as to say that this event was one of the principal causes of so many wars: "...Ca mucho mal y mucha guerra nascio en Castilla por esta razon." Ayala later shows the queen in the role of being merciful when she tries to warn a nobleman against certain death at her son's hands. However, Pedro's mother allied herself to the Trastamarans
against her own son, when they had Pedro virtually imprisoned in order to force him to return to his wife, so as to gain more important positions in the government of Castile for themselves. Though Ayala moralizes about many things throughout the chronicles, he makes no comment about this strange alliance, nor of the fact that Pedro took no revenge on his mother, but rather granted her request to go back to Portugal.

The greatest problem in Pedro's reign was created by Alfonso XI's mistress, Doña Leonor de Guzmán, and her illegitimate children, Enrique, Fadrique, Tello, Juana, Juan and Pedro, known as the Trastamaran family. Doña Leonor was responsible for stirring up trouble immediately after Alfonso's death, by entering her city of Medina Sidonia instead of continuing with Alfonso's body to Seville, where young King Pedro was waiting. This act put everyone on the defensive, including Pedro's adviser Juan Alfonso de Alburquerque, who then wanted to arrest her sons, until seeing what steps she would take. Ayala defends the theory that she entered Medina Sidonia only to replace Alfonso Ferrández Coronel, a nobleman who held that fortress in her name and who wanted to be relieved of this duty. Whether she was preparing some sort of conspiracy or not is not known, but it seems more probably than Ayala would have us believe. In any event, Doña Leonor was disposed of by Pedro's mother on the advice of Alburquerque, after Leonor had her son Enrique consummate a marriage with Doña Juana
Manuel, his betrothed, in order to prevent Alburquerque's plan of marrying her to Pedro.

Enrique de Trastamara was Pedro's principal enemy from the time of Alfonso XI's death in 1350 to Pedro's death at Enrique's hands in 1369. Ayala presents Pedro's illegitimate brother as the one chosen by God to rid Castile of a brutal tyrant. To present Enrique in a good light without deliberately falsifying the facts, Ayala uses a clever method. He minimizes Enrique's crimes either by describing them briefly, or else he rationalizes Enrique's behavior. A good example of the technique of rationalization is the description of the slaughter of 1,200 Jews in Toledo in 1355. Ayala states: E el conde [i.e. Enrique] e el Maestre, desque entraron en la cibdad, asosegaron en sus posadas; pero las sus companas comenzaron a robar una juderia apartada que dicen el Alcana, e robaronla, e mataron los Judios que fallaron fasta mil e docientas personas, omes e mugeres, grandes e pequenos.\(^5\)

Here Enrique is obviously not responsible for the actions of his men. On the other hand, Pedro's crimes, such as the assassination of his half-brother, Fadrique, are described in most vivid and graphic terms. If we carefully follow Enrique's steps throughout Ayala's chronicle, we can see that the king had a most forgiving spirit. Enrique betrayed his brother at least five times: in 1350, when Enrique attempted to subdue the city of Algeciras immediately after his father's death; in 1352, when Enrique rebelled
against Pedro in Gijón, after Alfonso IV of Portugal had convinced Pedro to permit his half-brother to return to Asturias; in 1353, when Enrique and Tello arrived at Pedro's wedding in Valladolid armed for war; in 1354, when Enrique made an agreement with the now out-of-favor Alburquerque to hand over the throne of Castile to the Infante Don Pedro of Portugal (a plan thwarted by Alfonso IV); and in 1354, when the Trastamarans, Pedro's mother, the Infantes de Aragon and their mother, Doña Leonor de Castilla, literally imprisoned Pedro to force him to return to his queen, Doña Blanca, and to remove his advisers, who were relatives of his mistress, María de Padilla. Even though this eliminated any possibility of reconciliation between Pedro and Enrique, Pedro later gave his brother a safe conduct pass to go to France. Ayala asserts that Pedro ordered him arrested, but there is no proof of this. It seems reasonable that Pedro was only too happy to be rid of his troublesome brother.

Thus, Ayala's chronicles alone, while minimizing Enrique's behavior, give ample proof that he was a traitor to Castile and his king. Ayala's assertion that Enrique's earlier belligerent acts were due only to dislike and resentment against Alburquerque seems unreasonable when one considers the alliance between the former enemies, after Alburquerque had fallen out of favor. Further evidence of Enrique's treasonable acts, can be found in the Archivo de la Corona de Aragon. Two examples might be mentioned;
one is "El Tratado de Pina," of January 20, 1357, in which Enrique offered to serve the King of Aragon instead of Pedro in exchange for towns which had belonged to the Infantes de Aragon and their mother; the other is "El Tratado de Monzón" of March 31, 1363, in which Enrique promised to give the King of Aragon one-sixth of Castilian territory in exchange for the latter's aid in securing the throne of Castile for him. This agreement was nullified when a peace treaty was signed between Castile and Aragon in July, 1363.7

The culmination of Enrique's treason was the bringing of the White Companies into Castile in 1366. Jean Froissart, a completely biased, anti-Pedro historian, described the men who were supposed to liberate Castile from Pedro as follows: "Encores avoit adonc en France grant fuison de pilleurs englès, gascons et alemans, qui voloient, ce disoient, vivre, et y tenoient des forterèces et des garnisons... Quant li papes Innocens VIe et li colleges de Romme se veirent ensi vexé et guerriiet par ces malecites gens, si en furent durement esbahî et ordonnèrent une croiserie sus ces mauvais crestiens qui se mettoient en painne de destruire crestianneté, ensi comme les Wandeles fisent jadis, sans title de nulle raison, et gastoient tous le pays ou il conversoient sans cause, et roboient sans deport quanqu'il pouoient trouver, et violoient femmes vielles et jones sans pité, et tuoient hommes et femmes et enfans sans merci qui rien ne leur avoient mefait...
Si fisent li papes et li cardinal sermonner de le crois partout publiquement, et absoloient de painne et de coupe tous chiaus qui prendoient le crois et qui s'abandonnoient de corps et de volunte pour destruire celle mauvaise gent et leur compagnie." Ayala's description of the Companies is limited to mentioning that the King of Aragon had sent for them and that they entered Castile with Enrique. Ayala could hardly justify Enrique's role in Castilian history if he were to describe such men as his country's saviors.

Enrique's twin brother Fadrique was designated by Alfonso XI to be Maestre de Santiago. In 1351 he attacked Algeciras with Enrique and was pardoned, whereupon he retired to his possessions in Santiago. There is no mention of his presence at the Cortes of Valladolid held in 1351, nor did he take part in the uprising of Enrique at Gijón in 1352. He did not attend the wedding of Pedro and Doña Blanca as did his brothers Enrique and Tello. He reappeared in 1354 to conspire with Enrique in order to put the Infante Don Pedro of Portugal on the Castilian throne. He was also present when Pedro was arrested at Toro, where, however, he had a reconciliation with Pedro and thereafter no more dealings with Enrique. On May 29, 1358, Fadrique was brutally assassinated by order of Pedro, though there was no evidence of his being involved in any acts of conspiracy against his king. The question is why?
There are several possibilities, which are inconclusive but interesting to explore. One is the rather Tristanesque story of Fadrique and Pedro's bride-to-be, Doña Blanca de Borbón. Ballads and histories have been written suggesting that Fadrique went to France to bring Blanca back to Valladolid and that he had relations with her during the journey.

"Entre la gente se dice,
Mas no por cosa sabida,
Que la reina Doña Blanca
Del Maestre está parida."

This would perhaps explain why Pedro abruptly abandoned his bride almost immediately after their marriage and refused to have anything to do with her thereafter. Bases for this story are the following: Fadrique could possibly have been among those who went to bring the queen, since there is no news of him between December 3, 1362 and February 25, 1363, the period of her journey to Spain; Fadrique later recognized his son, Alonso Enríquez, without naming his mother, though he had named other women in similar circumstances; Fadrique did not attend the wedding of Pedro and Blanca as did his brothers. Bases to refute this possibility are the following: Pedro received Fadrique affectionately on July 29, 1354, which would be improbable if he suspected his brother of such a betrayal. According to Pérez de Guzmán's Generaciones y Semblanzas, Alonso Enríquez died in 1429 at the age of 75, which means that the illegitimate child was born more than a year after Blanca's arrival in Castile. To contra-
dict Sitges' theory against the story of Fadrique and Blanca, one might mention the possibility of error (perhaps intentional) in the calculation of Alonso Enríquez' age. In addition, the fact that Pedro received Fadrique affectionately is no proof, since he also received him affectionately before having him killed: "e el Rey le rescivió con buena voluntad que le mostró..." 

Ayala does not mention the Fadrique-Blanca affair at all, and gives no reason for the murder of Fadrique. The description of Fadrique's death is long and blood-curdling, and is obviously told in such detail to show Pedro's brutal nature. A plausible reason for Pedro's seemingly treacherous act is the fact that Fadrique represented a constant threat to the stability of Pedro, who did not trust his bastard brother in any contest between him and Enrique. To Pedro, such a powerful knight as Fadrique on Castilian soil must have been a constant threat.

One need not go to too much trouble to defend Pedro's desire to be rid of another of his bastard half-brothers, Don Tello. Even Ayala shows Tello to be a cowardly and untrustworthy figure. He subserviently offered himself to serve Pedro immediately after his own mother's death, saying, "Señor, y no he otro padre, nin otra madre salvo a la vuestra merced." In 1352, he robbed some Castilian merchants and then defected to Pere III el Ceremonioso of Aragon. In 1353, after a reconciliation with Pedro, he attended Pedro's wedding along with Enrique, prepared
for war, and was with the conspirators at Toro. Tello's cowardice was reflected in the Battle of Nájera in 1366, from which he and his men fled, abandoning Enrique to his fate. He died in 1370, according to Ayala, possibly poisoned by his own brother, Enrique. 17

Pedro's youngest half-brothers, Juan (age 19) and Pedro (age 14), were both assassinated by order of Pedro in 1359 after he suffered a serious defeat by the Aragonese and Enrique at the Battle of Araviana. Since they were children, Juan and Pedro certainly had committed no crime against their king; they were, however, unfortunate victims of their own brothers' treachery. By 1359, Pedro had pardoned the guilty too often; he could not afford to be merciful to the innocent, who were, after all, Trastamarans. It is certainly true, as Ayala suggests, that these deaths came as revenge for a defeat, in which Ferrández de Henestrosa, one of Pedro's most faithful vassals, was killed. 18

Next to the Trastamarans, Doña Leonor de Castilla and her sons, the Infantes Don Fernando and Don Juan, came to represent the second major threat to Pedro's throne. Doña Leonor was Pedro's aunt, sister of Alfonso XI. She was the second wife of the Aragonese king Alfonso IV, and was therefore forced to seek refuge in Castile upon the accession of her step-son, Pere III el Ceremonioso to the Aragonese throne. Pedro's desire to do away with all three stems from the following reasons. As Infante, Fernando
was the heir to the Castilian throne; possibly he would like to have assassinated Pedro before he had a male heir. All three were involved in the Toro conspiracy. Pedro had knowledge that the Infantes had been dealing with the King of Aragon since 1355. There is evidence of a letter from the King of Aragon to Pedro insinuating that Leonor and her sons were plotting his death. Juan, who had offered to murder Fadrique personally, was himself murdered on Pedro's order in Bilbao in 1358. Doña Leonor was murdered in 1359 after a long imprisonment. Fernando, who returned to Aragon after the murder of his relatives, was finally killed on the order of the King of Aragon in 1363. The opportunism of all three shows clearly through Ayala's chronicle.

One of the most intriguing problems of Pedro's reign was his treatment of his French wife, Doña Blanca de Borbón. The wedding between the daughter of the Duke of Bourbon and Pedro of Castile in 1353 was the result of Alburquerque's attempt to cement a French-Castilian alliance. Pedro abandoned his new bride two days after the wedding, and refused steadfastly thereafter to live with her as husband and wife. It is true that he fell in love with María de Padilla between the time of the first negotiations and the wedding; however, it is unlikely that his love for his mistress could have interfered with this marriage. If this had been the case, he probably would have refused to participate in the wedding in the first place. Physical repugnance can hardly have been a factor,
since Ayala describes her as a very handsome woman.\textsuperscript{22} Sitges proposed the hypothesis that after the wedding Pedro learned something from his bride which infuriated him to such an extent that he refused to stay with her. He refutes the popular legend of the involvement of Blanca with Don Fadrique and attributes Pedro's wrath to the question of money and honor—perhaps that Jean II of France could not and would not pay the dowry which he had promised.\textsuperscript{23} Whatever it was that Pedro found out about Blanca, it must have been fairly serious, if he was willing to jeopardize his position with the already troublesome nobles and undergo excommunication because of her.

Ayala offers no explanation for Pedro's attitude, and is obviously a supporter of the conspirators' attempt to force Pedro to return to his bride. Doña Blanca became the banner around which the rebellious nobles rallied to oppose the influence of the Padilla family, who had replaced Alburquerque as Pedro's advisers. Pedro finally had Doña Blanca poisoned in 1361 after a long imprisonment. Ayala mentions the dismay of many Castilian vassals at Pedro's action. From a practical point of view, however, her death was necessary so that Pedro could either marry someone else and have children by her or so that he could declare María de Padilla his wife and thus make her children legitimate heirs to the throne. If there was some reason which kept him from living with his wife, then he had to
Pedro I and the Nobles

In addition to the difficulties within his own family, Pedro I was plagued by rebellions from other sectors of the nobility, such as the powerful Lara and Manuel families. These continued to resist royal hegemony under the new young king as they had done under his father, Alfonso XI.

Even before the assassination of Leonor de Guzmán, many nobles were supporting Juan Núñez de Lara, who was a pretender to the Castilian throne. This problem came to a head in 1350 during a serious illness to which Pedro nearly succumbed. The nobility divided into those who supported Pedro's cousin, the Infante Don Ferrando of Aragon, and those who supported Juan Núñez de Lara. Pedro I's privado, Alburquerque, supported Ferrando and viewed those who opposed his will as potential enemies. Two of the most important nobles who supported Juan Núñez were Garci Laso de la Vega and Alfonso Ferrández Coronel. Garci Laso, who held the position of Adelantado de Castilla, had also been responsible for rebellion against Pedro in Burgos, and was killed on Alburquerque's advice in 1351. Alfonso Ferrández Coronel, Cónfero under Alfonso XI and Pedro I, began rebelling against Pedro in Andalusia and was finally killed in 1353.
The situation of Pedro and Doña Blanca eventually gave rise to the downfall of Alburquerque, who wanted to force Pedro to return to his wife. Alburquerque, realizing his precarious position and seeing his influence threatened by the relatives of Pedro's mistress, fled to Portugal and there allied himself to his former enemies, the Trastamarans, in order to hand the Castilian throne to the Infante Don Pedro of Portugal. When this plan failed, the conspirators took up the banner of Doña Blanca and were joined by many other nobles who were distressed by Pedro's treatment of his wife. Ayala emphasizes the injustice being done to Doña Blanca, but also admits that the nobles were also concerned with the fact that Pedro had put some of the Padilla family in positions of power. Ayala stresses this throughout the chronicle, but to all appearances only three members of this family had positions of any great importance—Juan Ferrández de Henestrosa, Diego García de Padilla and Juan García de Villagera. The same nobles who had criticized and resented the influence of Alburquerque now joined with him to protest against the Padilla regime. Obviously all were seeking more for themselves and were using Pedro's wife as an excuse.

Though this protest began as a meeting at Tejadillo in 1354, in which fifty knights representing Pedro and fifty representing the defenders of Blanca were to meet, Pedro was eventually taken prisoner at a town called Toro, whereupon the rebellious vassals demanded that he banish
Maria de Padilla from Castile, return to Doña Blanca and accept their conditions for governing the kingdom. Pedro never forgot nor forgave this outrage to his dignity as a sovereign. As a good diplomat, however, he began bargaining secretly with various nobles, promising them offices and lands. Many, lured by greed, promptly gave up their gallant defense of Doña Blanca and returned to Pedro's side. Pedro was not grateful to those nobles who returned to him, since these had been won over only by their desires for profit, not out of loyalty to their sovereign. In fact, the first two nobles to reap Pedro's harsh vengeance were precisely those who had gone back to his service: Pero Ruiz de Villegas and Sancho Ruiz de Rojas. Pero Ruiz de Villegas had been Don Tello's Mayor-domo Mayor and as such had committed treasonable acts against his king as early as 1351. Ayala even mentions his responsibility in influencing Enrique and Tello to appear at Pedro's wedding in Valladolid armed for war. He was involved in the plan to dethrone Pedro in 1354, and was present on the conspirators' side at the meeting in Tejadillo. His condition for returning to Pedro at Toro was his being named Adelantado Mayor of Castile, a post which already belonged to Garci Ferrández Manrique. It is little wonder, then, that Pedro took the first opportunity to rid himself of such an untrustworthy subject, which he did by having him murdered during his siesta at Medina del Campo. Sancho Ruiz de Rojas was also killed at Medina del Campo.
Ayala only mentions him otherwise as having been with the conspirators at Tejadillo.

After her son's escape, Pedro's mother remained at Toro with Fadrique and several nobles. The king returned and besieged Toro, which was finally forced to surrender, especially after Fadrique's defection to the king. Pedro spared his mother's life, although she had allied herself with his half-brothers; he was not so generous with her followers, all of whom were executed.

Another important noble whom Pedro was well rid of was Don Juan de la Cerda. He sought to defend Alfonso Ferrández Coronel in 1353 by bringing in troops from Granada and Morocco, and conspired against Pedro with the Trastamarans at Toro, but returned to Pedro's side in exchange for the fortress of Gibralén. He and Álvar Pérez de Guzmán left their posts as fronteros in Aragon, because Pedro supposedly wanted to seduce Aldonza Coronel, Álvar Pérez' wife and Juan de la Cerda's sister-in-law. Juan de la Cerda then began stirring up trouble in Andalusia and was killed in 1357 after his defeat in a battle with Micer Gil Bocanegra and Juan Ponce de León, who were in the service of the king.

The Civil War between the Trastamarans and Pedro began in earnest after Pedro's escape from Toro. In general, Pedro maintained the upper hand and was implacable in his justice against those who aided his enemies. The nobles who helped Enrique's abortive attempt to take Toledo and
who then surrendered to Pedro were immediately put to death. Although Fadrique returned to Pedro's service after Toro, Pedro gave no respite to his followers. It is evident that Pedro had not forgiven his half-brother's actions and was only biding time to take revenge on him also.

One example might serve to corroborate Pedro's fierce implacability and distrust of anyone who had once betrayed him. Martín Abarca, one of the vassals of Pedro's mother, was with the nobles who were killed after her surrender at Toro. In order to save his own life, Martín Abarca came out holding Don Juan, Pedro's Trastamarian half-brother. When Pedro threatened to kill him anyway if he came out, Martín Abarca bravely approached Pedro and offered him his life. Pedro was impressed with his valor, and consequently spared him. One year later, Martín Abarca was holding castles for the King of Aragon in the war between Aragon and Castile. Pedro captured the Aragonese fortress of Tarazana in 1358 and this time had Martín Abarca put to death.

The fact that wives and families had to suffer the consequences of their husbands' actions was not only a proof of Pedro's particular justice, but a practice common to the times. Pedro's victims were Juana Núñez de Lara, Don Tello's wife, who was killed in 1359, and Isabel de Lara, the wife of Don Juan de Aragón, who was killed in 1361.
The invasion of Castile by Enrique de Trastamara and his followers in 1360 was the cause of a substantial increase in political assassinations ordered by Pedro. The only really innocent victim of the king's wrath was a Dominican monk who sought out the king to warn him against Enrique, because he had had a vision in which Santo Domingo de la Calzada predicted Pedro's death at the hands of his half-brother. Pedro, who, according to Ayala, had a very superstitious nature, believed that Enrique had sent the monk to frighten him, and therefore had the unfortunate man burned to death. All others killed were followers of Enrique.

Another group of political murders which took place in 1360 came about as the result of an exchange of nobles between Pedro of Castile and Pedro of Portugal. This was a rather infamous but convenient agreement by which each monarch got rid of several troublesome subjects. One of those handed over to the king of Castile was Pero Núñez de Guzmán, Adelantado Mayor de León, who in 1359 had earned Pedro's enmity by abandoning his post at the Aragonese border after the Battle of Araviana, in which Pedro's forces were badly defeated. Pedro Núñez escaped to Portugal, where he remained until the exchange of refugees caught him off-guard. Ayala calls his execution in Sevilla too brutal to describe - "e la manera de su muerte seria asaz fea e crua de contar."24
Two rather isolated cases of murder in 1360 are that of Simuel Levi and that of Gutier Ferrández de Toledo. Both seem to have been loyal followers of Pedro without any record of betrayal. Simuel Levi, a Jew, was made treasurer of Castile under Alburquerque's regime and served Pedro in this capacity until his death. He had helped increase the treasure of the realm and seemed to be one of the king's most loyal vassals. Suddenly Pedro had him and all the members of his family throughout Castile arrested. Simuel Levi was tortured, so that Pedro could find out if he had any more money hidden away, and died from his tortures. His death is hard to justify, unless one can change it to Pedro's lack of trust in anyone at this point and his need for funds to finance the war against Aragon. Though Ayala gives no further explanation of Pedro's actions, it is logical to assume that Pedro suspected his treasurer of embezzling funds and therefore had him tortured to find out where they were.

The case of Gutier Ferrández de Toledo is more moving in Ayala's account, because of a letter which Gutier Ferrán- dez wrote protesting his innocence and warning Pedro against murdering his loyal subjects. Gutier Ferrándex had been one of Pedro's most faithful servants since 1350, without any evidence of treason. He was Pedro's Guarda Mayor in 1350 and was in charge of the force sent to Algeciras to put down the insurrection led by Enrique there. In 1354 he held the post of Alcalde Mayor of Toledo and as
such was with Pedro at Tejadillo. He was later promoted to Repostero Mayor. In 1360 Pedro sent him to Tudela for peace talks between Aragon and Castile, which were being arranged by the Papal Legate, the Cardinal of Bologna. Ayala asserts that Gutier Ferrández, seeing that peace talks were not going well, tried to bribe Don Ferrando, Infante de Aragon, to return to Pedro, which Don Ferrando refused to do. Pedro learned of these secret meetings between Don Ferrando and Gutier Ferrández and immediately suspected the latter of treason. He therefore had him killed.

The years between 1360 and 1366 represent Pedro's struggle to retain the Castilian crown against the forces of Enrique, intermittent wars with Aragon, and the resolving of the Civil War in Granada to Pedro's satisfaction. He was successful in all endeavors until 1366, when Enrique invaded Castile for the second time with the White Companies, whereupon Pedro was forced to flee from his kingdom.

The last series of political murders ordered by Pedro took place in 1367 after his smashing victory with the Prince of Wales over Enrique at the Battle of Nájera. Pedro had taken many prisoners and would probably have had them all put to death were it not for the influence of the Black Prince, who had a high sense of chivalric behavior. Those nobles who were spared and ransomed (such as López de Ayala) later aided in Pedro's downfall and eventual death.
Foreign Policy

Besides studying Pedro's relationship with his family and vassals, one must examine his relationship to those countries involved in Castilian politics during his reign. Pedro's foreign policy differed from that of his father, Alfonso XI, in that there was less emphasis on continuing the fight against the Moors in Granada and a more belligerent policy toward the kingdom of Aragon. This change, however, came about as the result of the internal situation in Castile in which Aragon supported the nobles who fled from Pedro. The principal powers involved in Castilian affairs during Pedro's reign were Granada, Portugal, Aragon, Navarre, France, England and the Papacy. Using Ayala as the basic source, we shall attempt to analyze Pedro's major decisions and Ayala's view of them.

Granada

The kingdom of Granada was undoubtedly saved from reconquest by the death of Alfonso XI, who was waging a vigorous campaign for Gibraltar after having conquered Algeciras. Pedro, on the other hand, became too enmeshed in his own kingdom's internal struggles to be able to dedicate his efforts in the direction taken by his father. Pedro had signed a peace treaty with Mohammed, King of Granada, who was overthrown in 1359 by his younger brother Ismael. In 1360 Ismael's adviser, Abu Said, known as
the Rey Bermejo, took over the throne after having Ismael assassinated. He made an alliance with Aragon, an act which incurred Pedro's wrath, since Pedro's policy had always been specifically aimed at avoiding being caught with an enemy on two frontiers. Pedro then actively took part in aiding Mohammed to regain the throne of Granada. Ayala describes Pedro's alliance with Mohammed, their cooperative efforts in Granada, and finally the assassination of Abu Said in cold blood by Pedro's order. The circumstances of this assassination were the following: Diego García de Padilla, Maestre de Calatrava, had been taken prisoner by Abu Said in the wars with Granada, and was not only freed without ransom, but was given gifts to take back to Pedro. Later, Abu Said, in a daring move, went to Pedro personally, bearing jewels and rich gifts in order to render homage to him. Pedro, according to Ayala, was overcome by greed and had Abu Said killed for the jewels. This, of course, is absurd, since the jewels were destined for him anyway. Ayala also mentions Pedro's desire for revenge because of Abu Said's alliance with Aragon, an alliance which forced Pedro to seek peace with Aragon at a time when he was winning the war (1361). This reason is the more probable one. In any case, Ayala considers the act barbaric and unchivalrous. Pedro had to make a choice between three alternatives: betraying Mohammed and making an alliance with Abu Said; remaining an ally of Mohammed, but permitting Abu Said to leave in
peace, whereupon the Civil War in Granada would have continued; and murdering Abu Said, whereupon Mohammed could rule in peace. Pedro's choice reestablished Mohammed as monarch in Granada, thereby assuring Pedro a loyal ally on his southern frontier. He could now dedicate his efforts to the Aragonese wars and his own internal political and family problems. Ayala in this case lets his personal opinion and medieval admiration for chivalric behavior cloud his good political sense.

Portugal

Due to family ties, Portugal was basically an ally of Castile during Pedro's reign. Alfonso IV of Portugal, Pedro's maternal grandfather, remained neutral during the conflict between Pedro and Alburquerque although he did prevent his son, the Infante Don Pedro, from accepting the Castilian crown offered to him by the Trastamarans and Alburquerque in 1354. The same Infante Don Pedro became Pedro I of Portugal in 1357; as king he maintained friendly relations with Pedro of Castile, in spite of the former conspiracy against him. Their alliance led to an exchange of prisoners in 1360, whereby Pedro of Castile handed over the assassins of his former mistress, Inés de Castro, in exchange for several Castilian nobles who had rebelled against him. Relations were further cemented in 1363, when the king of Aragon had his half-brother, the Infante Don Ferrando of Aragon, killed. (Ferrando's wife was
Dofia Maria, daughter of Pedro of Portugal. Portugal thereafter aided Castile with ships and troops for the wars against Aragon and even against the supporters of Enrique. However, when Pedro of Castile was forced to flee in 1366, the King of Portugal refused him asylum and renounced the proposed marriage between his son, Fernando, and Pedro of Castile's daughter, Beatriz. Ayala reports the Portuguese-Castilian alliance with complete detachment and objectivity. He has no comment to make about the fact that the Castilians wanted to hand over the throne of Castile to a foreign monarch, nor about the infamous alliance between Alburquerque and the Trastamarians, and alliance which existed despite the fact that Alburquerque had Doña Leonor de Guzmán killed. Ayala does not moralize in cases in which Enrique is to be censured.

Aragon

King Pedro III el Ceremonioso ruled Aragon from 1336 to 1387, from long before to long after the reign of Pedro I of Castile. His principal problems were the struggle with his ambitious step-mother, Leonor of Castile, and her sons, the Infantes Ferrando and Juan; the conquest of Mallorca; the fight with those in favor of an Aragonese union; the wars with Corsica and Sardinia; and the wars with Castile.

Ayala mentions the principal cause of the war with Castile as being the "Perellós" incident in 1356, when ten
ships from Catalonia under the command of Mosén Francós de Perellós took olive oil from ships bound for Alexandria, stating that it had belonged to the Genoese, enemies of Catalonia. Pedro sent word that the goods should not be touched or he would have all Catalanian merchants in Seville arrested and their possessions confiscated. Nevertheless Perellós confiscated and later sold the goods, and sailed off to France. Pedro's advisers, in order to regain his esteem, urged Pedro to take a belligerent stand, and to demand that Perellós be handed over to him; if not, he should declare war. Ayala's report and judgment of the matter are reflected in the following words: "El Rey lo fizo asi segund le consejaron; ca el Rey era mancebo en edad de veinte e tres anos, e era ome de grand corazon e de grand bollicio, e amaba siempre guerras, e creyó a los que le consejaron esto." Pedro sent an alcalde from his court to Aragon to demand the delivery of Perellós and also to demand that the encomienda of Alcañiz of the Order of Calatrava be given to Castile, since Pedro was not content with the fact that Pero Moñiz de Godoy, a rebellious Castilian nobleman should be in charge as Comendador of this territory. The king of Aragon answered that justice would be done to Perellós when he returned to Aragon, and that the encomienda would be handed over to Castile as soon as something else could be given to Godoy. The attitude of El Ceremonios as presented in Ayala is most conciliatory, and from this
chronicle one would have to place the entire blame for the conflict on Pedro's intransigence and desire for war.

Gerónimo Zurita, the important Aragonese chronicler of the early 17th century and one of Spain's most objective historians, offers some information which Ayala neglected to mention and which is doubly valid, due to the fact of Zurita's naturally pro-Aragonese stand. Zurita mentions the following additional causes of the war. There was a deep hatred between the two kings, because each protected dissident members of the other's family: Pedro of Castile protected his aunt and cousins, Leonor of Castile and the Infantes Juan and Ferrando of Aragon; En Pere of Aragon protected the Trastamarans and other rebellious Castilian nobles. After Pedro's escape from Toro in 1354, he made an agreement with Ferrando by which Ferrando's castles of Orihuela and Alicante and other possessions in the Kingdom of Valencia would be given to him as security ("rehenes"). Pedro of Aragon was incensed by this bargain, since he was an heir to these possessions.

The Perellós affair, a seemingly isolated incident, not worthy of starting a war, indirectly caused a great deal of hardship in Andalusia. The area was wracked by internal disturbances, starvation and inflation (wheat was 120 maravedis a fanega). An important wheat shipment which was to come into the port of Seville was diverted because of the fear that it might be hijacked as the oil had been. Consequently Andalusia was deprived of an im-
important means of alleviating the famine. When Diego García de Padilla was named Maestre de Calatrava, the King of Aragon did not allow him to take over the encomiendas which the Order of Calatrava had in the kingdom of Aragon under the standing arrangement which gave Castile political control over the three military orders both within and without Castilian territory. Alcañiz had been given to Pero Moñiz de Godoy, Comendador de Caracuel, who served Aragon and who refused to obey Diego García de Padilla as Maestre of the Order. All Castilian rebels, such as Gonzalo Mexía and Gómez Carrillo, who rebelled against Pedro, were actively supported by el Ceremonioso. As early as the Toro incident, the King of Aragon was anxious for war with Castile over the question of Doña Blanca: "Antes del rompimiento de la guerra con Castilla, tuvo el Rey sus inteligencias con el rey de Francia, y con el Duque de Borbón so hermano, para que se hiziesse guerra al rey de Castilla, hasta que recibiesse a la reyna doña Blanca su muger, y hiziesse vida con ella." Certainly, then it is evident that Ayala's description of the causes of the war is such as to make Pedro of Castile seem to be a war-monger, while El Ceremonioso was pictured as going out of his way to keep the peace.

The war between Castile and Aragon, which began toward the end of 1356, was intermittently mediated by the Papal Legate. Twice during the year 1357, the Pope's representative managed to establish truces, one for fifteen days and
one for one year. According to both Ayala and Zurita, Pedro of Castile was responsible for violating both of them; the second time Pedro filled the city of Tarazana, which he had captured from Aragon, with Castilians instead of turning it over to the Papal Legate, as he had agreed to do. Zurita mentions that Pedro was excommunicated for this action. War actively broke out again, however, in 1358, when Pedro learned that his half-brother Enrique had entered Castile, though the peace treaty was still on, and that the Infante Don Ferrando was doing a great deal of damage in Murcia. The fighting was still going on in 1359, when a new Papal Legate, the Cardinal of Bologna, was sent to mediate. According to Ayala, Pedro's conditions for terminating the war were unreasonable. They included the handing over of Perellós; the removal of the Trastamarans and the Infante Don Ferrando from Aragon; the return of Orihuela, Alicante, Gardamar, Elche and Val de Alda, taken in the time of Jaime II of Aragon from Pedro's grandfather, Don Fernando IV; and payment by El Ceremonioso of the expenses of the war. Once again, in Ayala's view, the King of Aragon is the peace-loving monarch, ready to make any possible concessions: If Perellós were found guilty, he would be sent to Pedro to be executed; all Castilians would be paid and asked to leave Aragon; the lands which Aragon had inherited according to an agreement signed in 1342 between the kings of Castile and Aragon would be put in the Pope's hands.
for mediation; Pere of Aragon would not pay the war expenses, since the war was not his fault; but he would aid Pedro of Castile in the war against Granada. The Aragonese monarch goes on to say that if the Castilian king really wanted peace, he would not make such impossible conditions, and he appeals for friendship like that which existed between himself and Alfonso XI.\textsuperscript{31} Pedro of Castile then offered to terminate the war on the second and third conditions, i.e., the expulsion of the Trastamarans and the return of the lands, since the agreement had been made with advisers when Fernando IV was a child.\textsuperscript{32} The Consejo de Aragon advised \textit{El Ceremonioso} to insist on putting the question of the disputed lands before the Pope, and proposed a six month interim to straighten the matter out. But Pedro of Castile insisted on continuing the war.

Ayala is correct in presenting Pedro \textit{El Ceremonioso} as conciliatory at this point. But this can be explained easily. \textit{El Ceremonioso} was losing the war on land and sea, and had already lost a great deal of territory to his Castilian adversary. Pedro of Castile had his fleet prepared, his forces in position and all salaries paid;\textsuperscript{33} he had everything to lose and nothing to gain by a six-month truce. The prospect of Papal intervention was of little value, since the Papacy had a pro-Aragonese and pro-French policy.

A new attempt at peace took place in 1360 in Tudela, in Navarre. Here Pedro of Castile was more conciliatory,
because he had just suffered a resounding defeat in the Battle of Araviana at Almazán on the Aragonese frontier. Nevertheless, no agreement was reached. A peace treaty was finally agreed upon in 1361, however, brought about by the Papal Legate. This came about as a direct result of an impending alliance between the King of Aragon and Abu Said, the usurper to the throne of Granada, who had brought about the overthrow of Pedro's trustworthy ally Mohammed. Pedro's whole imperialistic design for Castile was thwarted by the Hey Bermejo. In the agreement between the two Pedros, the Trastamarans and other Castilian nobles were to be expelled from Aragon in return for the castles which Pedro I had captured from Aragon. This was not a conciliatory gesture on the Castilian's part, but rather a desperate measure taken from a position of weakness.

After disposing of the Hey Bermejo, Pedro of Castile once again directed his belligerent attentions toward Aragon. He planned to attack some Aragonese towns secretly, while En Pere was resting in Perpignan. Pedro's excuse for war, according to Ayala, was that the White Companies were preparing to invade Castile through Aragon and Navarre. Ayala's words express what he considered to be the sentiments of Pedro's vassals: "¡ninguno podia entender que el rey queria facer guerra a Aragon." Pedro's action might be considered as foresight, since the Aragonese were continually conspiring with Enrique and the French. In addition, Pedro took advantage of the fact
that the King of Navarre, Carlos II, was at odds with the King of France, Charles V, to form a Castilian-Navarrese mutual defense pact. Carlos II, being confident that Pedro of Castile was now at peace with everyone, agreed in order to receive aid against France. Pedro then reopened the war with Aragon, to the surprise and dismay of his new ally, who was forced to participate by the terms of the pact he had just signed.

Between 1363 and 1366 Pedro of Castile had the upper hand in the war. He captured a great deal of territory, including Calatayud, Teruel, Alicante, Elche and some possessions in Valencia, and was threatening the city of Valencia itself. In Aragon the nobles were divided between those who favored the Infante Don Ferrando's idea of returning with Enrique and his Castilian followers and the Companies to France to help the French king against the English and those who insisted on invading Castile with Enrique and the Companies. This dilemma was solved when the King of Aragon had his half-brother arrested. When he tried to escape, Ferrando was murdered by Enrique's squire.

The turning point in the Castilian-Aragonese wars came about with the entrance of Enrique and the Companies into Castile in 1366. Pedro was forced to flee, and as Aragon's ally, Enrique was recognized as King of Castile. Enrique's triumph was short-lived, however; Pedro returned to Castile in 1367 with the Prince of Wales, who helped him
win the decisive battle of Nájera. After Pedro's victory there was a four-power conference at Tarbes in November of 1367, between Castile, Aragon, Navarre and England. It was agreed that the Castilian-Aragonese conflict be resolved by the marriage of Pedro's daughter Constanza to En Joan, Duke of Gerona and heir to the Aragonese throne. The Aragonese territorial claim could then be settled by a dowry. There is also evidence in the Archives of Aragon that El Ceremonioso made several alternative secret proposals to the English in order to prevent any possible conquest of Aragon. One was an alliance between Pedro of Castile and El Ceremonioso by means of marriage; a second was a similar sort of alliance with Enrique instead of Pedro; and a third was the partition of Castile among Aragon, Navarre and England. But there is no evidence that the Prince of Wales agreed to betray Pedro of Castile.

In his presentation of the facts, Ayala interprets his own monarch as the belligerent one and the King of Aragon as a reasonable and conciliatory person. Actually both were imperialists and realistic politicians—ruthless when they could be and conciliatory when they had to be. Zurita's description of the two monarchs, though favoring the Aragonese king, is more to the point: "los Reyes que en estos hechos concurrieron eran de animo feroz, y mas inclinados a rigurosa venganza que a clemencia; y aunque el nuestro se justifica mucho en las causas de la guerra y encarece la crueldad de sus adversario, el no fue el mas maso y benigno Rey de sus tiempos.... El uno
y el otro cruelissimamente persiguieron a sus propios hermanos hasta la muerte."

Navarre

This kingdom, ruled by Carlos II, El Malo, was coveted by France, Castile and Aragon. Its importance was strategic, in that it controlled the pass of Honces- valles, through which any troops had to go in order to reach Castile from the north. Ayala analyzes Carlos II's role in these wars as pure expedience; he changed sides often and managed to avoid being annexed by any power—a delicate feat of diplomacy. But Navarre was a completely untrustworthy ally to anyone.

England

Edward III's interest in the Iberian peninsula was based mainly on the fact that Castile as well as Aragon had superior naval fleets. It was also of interest to England to have a friendly power near France in order to have an even greater advantage in its wars on the continent. There had been one attempt at an alliance between England and Castile during the reign of Alfonso XI by means of a proposed marriage between Pedro and Jane Plantagenet, Edward's daughter; this alliance collapsed with Jane's untimely death. Pedro, under Alburquerque's pro-French influence, did not encourage further relations. Then on June 22, 1362, at a public ceremony in London, a political
and military alliance between the Kings of England and Castile was concluded. This represented a reversal in Castile's traditional pro-French policy which had gone on from the times of the Cluniac and Cistercian monks nearly three centuries before. Ayala claims that the treaty was brought about because of Pedro's fear of French reaction to the death of his wife.\(^{39}\) A more likely explanation for this treaty is Pedro's awareness that he was in danger from the impending alliance between Enrique, En Pere of Aragon and the dreaded White Companies which were ravaging the French countryside. After all, Enrique had been fighting along with these mercenaries for the king of France, and it is natural that he would want to use them in his struggle against his half-brother. In addition, it was known that the Pope and the French king wanted to remove the Companies from France, since they were ruining the country.

The expected invasion of Castile by Enrique and the Companies took place in September, 1366, under the pretense that they would fight Moors and Jews. This was Pope Urban V's idea to get the Companies out of Languedoc.\(^{40}\) Ayala neglects to mention the Pope's hypocritical excuse for the invasion of Castile, and is sparing in his description of these men, who were considered devils throughout the Christian world.

During Pedro's exile in France, a treaty was agreed upon at Libourne between him, Navarre and England by which
Navarre would receive Alava and Guipuzcoa, while Vizcaya would go to the Prince of Wales. Thus the most highly developed mercantile and shipbuilding centers upon which Castilian sea-power depended were to be ceded in exchange for the aid that England and Navarre would give Pedro to recover Castile.41

The success of this alliance was culminated by the victory of the English-Castilian coalition at Nájera. Ayala's account of this battle seems to coincide in important details with that of Jean Chandos, constable of Aquitaine under the Black Prince. The letters between Enrique and the Prince before the battle are recorded in both and are basically the same; Enrique protests against the Prince's intervention in Castile and defends his role as the one chosen by God to overthrow the tyrannical Pedro.42 Both Ayala and Chandos record an enormous list of prisoners and refer to the Prince's refusal to turn the prisoners over to Pedro, who wanted to kill them. The Prince's motives were his chivalric code and the desire for ransom, while Pedro only wanted revenge.43

Ayala emphasizes the chivalric qualities of the Black Prince. This is evident in his horrified reaction to Pedro's desire to kill the prisoners.44 Ayala mentions the disagreements between Pedro and the Prince over Pedro's hesitation in paying his debts; he portrays Pedro as a scoundrel, and the Prince as a disillusioned ally, tired out by Pedro's treacherous behavior. Actually Pedro was a
more realistic politician; he was trying to preserve his throne, and used whatever means he had at his disposal to do so. The Black Prince, by refusing to keep supporting his Castilian ally because of the debt, thereby lost the strategic position which he had gained in Castile. France would once again get the upper hand. Ayala in his analysis of the Castilian-English alliance is guided by the chivalric ideal of the Middle Ages.

France

During Pedro's reign, there were two kings on the French throne, Jean II le Bon and Charles V le Sage. Castile's pro-French policy followed a long tradition, which was renewed in 1352, when Pedro's advisers arranged a marriage between Pedro and Doña Blanca de Borbón, Jean's niece, and daughter of the Duke of Bourbon. Jean II was principally concerned with Carlos II of Navarre and the wars with England. From 1356 he spent most of his time as a prisoner in London, where he died in 1364.

Charles V acted as regent of France from 1356 due to his father's imprisonment. He became more involved with the Iberian peninsula than Jean II because of the fact that Enrique of Trastamara and his followers were fighting as mercenaries with him against the English. He wanted to get rid of the White Companies, and saw Enrique's invasion of Castile as the perfect opportunity; he also was interested in keeping English influence out of Spain.
Ayala exaggerates the importance of Doña Blanca's role in France's relations with Castile. France was not at all interested in supporting a war against Castile in 1354 in order to force Pedro to return to his wife. This proposal had been made to France by El Ceremonioso, and had been ignored. Pedro's troubles with France had only to do with the matter of the Companies and Enrique de Trastamara.

The Papacy

Popes Innocent VI (1352-62) and Urban V (1362-70) supported French interests, since both were French. Their principal activities in Castile were to try to force Pedro to return to his legitimate wife and to mediate the Castilian-Aragonese conflict. Innocent VI had Pedro excommunicated twice, in 1354 for escaping from Toro, and in 1357 for breaking the fifteen-day truce at Tarazana. Ayala does not mention either case of excommunication, possibly because in neither case had Pedro committed any act against the dogma of the Church. Ayala is also silent about the Church's refusal to concede the standard of the Church to Pedro in 1354 for the war against the Moors. Urban V was responsible for actively backing the White Companies against Pedro by contributing 100,000 florins to them in addition to absolving them of all their past sins. Ayala does not mention this fact, nor the fact that Pedro had just offered to help the Pope rid France
of these cursed people, as Froissart calls them.\textsuperscript{46} From reading Ayala, one has the impression that the Papacy was a neutral observer, distressed by Pedro's treatment of his queen and active in the cause of peace.

\textbf{Conclusion}

Pedro I of Castile was more of a modern politician than Ayala was a modern historian. Pedro was a forerunner of the monarchs of a nationalistic, unified Spain, such as eventually appeared with the Catholic kings just over a century later. His internal policies were basically concerned with subduing rebellious nobles; his foreign policy was imperialistic, in that he wanted to unify the Iberian peninsula under Castilian rule. Ayala, in spite of his detached manner of recording the events which he knew at first hand, was still imbued with such medieval ideals as chivalric behavior, and represented the power of the nobles rather than the concept of the state unified by the authority of the monarch. This is the measure of the difference between the historian and his subject in their day, and helps serve to explain how that subject would appear to future generations.
Footnotes


2. Pero López de Ayala, *Crónica del Rey Don Pedro I*, Biblioteca de Autores Españoles LXVI, Madrid, 1875, Year 1, Chapter III.

3. Pedro I, Yr. 2, Ch. VI.

4. Pedro I, Yr. 1, Ch. III.

5. Pedro I, Yr. 6, Ch. VII.

6. Pedro I, Yr. 6, Ch. VI.

7. Sitges, pp. 76-83.


9. Pedro I, Yr. 16, Ch. IV; Yr. 17, Ch. I.

10. Pedro I, Yr. 6, Ch. I.


13. Pedro I, Yr. 5, Ch. XXVII.


15. Pedro I, Yr. 9, Ch. III.

16. Pedro I, Yr. 2, Ch. IV.

17. Pero López de Ayala, *Crónica del Rey Don Enrique II*, Biblioteca de Autores Españoles LXVII, Madrid, 1877, Year 5, Chapter VI.

18. Pedro I, Yr. 10, Ch. XXIII.


20. Pedro I, Yr. 9, Ch. VI.
21. Pedro I, Yr. 10, Ch. IX.
22. Pedro I, Yr. 12, Ch. III.
24. Pedro I, Yr. 11, Ch. XV.
25. Pedro I, Yr. 7, Ch. VII.
26. Pedro I, Yr. 7, Ch. VIII.
27. Pedro I, Yr. 7, Ch. IX.
28. Pedro I, Yr. 7, Ch. X.
31. Pedro I, Yr. 10, Ch. V.
32. Pedro I, Yr. 10, Ch. VI.
33. Pedro I, Yr. 10, Ch. VI.
34. Pedro I, Yr. 13, Ch. VIII.
39. Pedro I, Yr. 14, Ch. I.
40. Russell, p. 36.
41. Russell, p. 65.
42. Russell, p. 94; Pedro I, Yr. 17, Ch. II.
43. Russell, pp. 104-106.

44. Pedro I, Yr. 17, Ch. XIX.

45. Sitges, p. 169.

46. Froissart, Tome VI, p. 73.
CHAPTER IV

LA CRÓNICA DEL REY DON ENRIQUE II

La Crónica del Rey Don Enrique II deals with Enrique's attempt to consolidate his position as legitimate monarch on the Castilian throne. This involved not only the re-establishment of domestic peace, but also the perhaps even more arduous task of restoring Castile to a position of power on the international scene.

Enrique's Domestic Policy

Pedro's death in 1369 nominally ended the Castilian Civil War. Enrique, however, was confronted with the problem of facing many rebellions in various parts of his kingdom. The number of rebellious areas mentioned by Ayala himself would seem to contradict his former assertion in the Crónica del Rey Don Pedro I that Enrique was almost unanimously supported throughout Castile. Martín López de Córdoba held Carmona and made war in Andalusia until 1371. Zamora and Ciudad Rodrigo tried to join Portugal. Galicia continued fighting against the new monarch, while several cities on the eastern frontier surrendered to the King of Aragon. Soria and several
Basque ports remained loyal to Pedro. If Ayala mentions these rebellions so explicitly, it is not to show that Enrique was unpopular, but rather to demonstrate his force and ability in subduing his enemies. After two years of fighting against constant resistance, Enrique was finally able to defeat Martín López and Fernando de Castro, his two most powerful pro-Pedro adversaries. Ayala defends Enrique's decision to execute Martín López by mentioning that Martín López had previously killed many of Enrique's men who had tried to scale the towers of Carmona. Nevertheless, Martín López had bargained with Enrique for his liberty, so that his murder was no more justifiable than those committed by Pedro. Ayala eliminates the more gruesome details of the method by which Pedro's former servant was disposed of, but it is known that his death was an extremely brutal one: "E el lunes doce días de junio arrastraron a Martín López por toda Sevilla, e le cortaron los pies e las manos en la plaza de San Francisco e le quemaron."

Enrique's other major victory was the taking of Zamora and Ciudad Rodrigo for Castile and the flight of Fernando de Castro to Portugal, whereby Galicia lost its greatest Petrist leader and ultimately surrendered to the Trastamaran dynasty.

Another major event of Enrique's early years in power was the death of Don Tello, his brother. He died mysteriously, and Ayala mentions the possibility of his having been
poisoned for dealing with Enrique's enemies. Though this seems to be a logical assumption, Ayala hastens to add that this rumor was not at all true. This is amusing when one compares it to Ayala's description of the death of Pedro's first privado, the Duke of Alburquerque. There Ayala had clearly insinuated that Alburquerque was murdered by his Roman doctor at Pedro's command. In neither case is there a definite falsification of the facts, but rather a subtle bias to sway the opinion of the reader.

The lands of Lara and Vizcaya which had belonged to Don Tello through his marriage to the Lara family now were given to Enrique's son, Don Juan. This brought a protest from Doña María de Lara, sister of Tello's wife. Ayala shows Enrique's clever political ability in this situation. The king recognized the family's claim to these lands and agreed to hand them over to Doña María's sons, the Counts of Alanzón and Percha, if they, in turn, agreed to leave France and take care of their Castilian holdings. Enrique knew that the two young lords would never give up their holdings in France, so that there was no danger in such an offer. Ayala openly admired such clever maneuvering—an inconsistency with his somewhat overly moralistic attitude on other occasions.

Enrique's military ability and energy certainly cannot be denied. His successes in this area, however, were counter-balanced by his failure to administer well the land which...
he had fought so long and hard to rule. Some of his administrative problems, of course, can be blamed on the ravages of the Civil War, but the fact that Castile economically had deteriorated even more by the time of Enrique's death in 1379 must be attributed in part to his inept rule.

Since Ayala does not deal extensively with Enrique's domestic policies, one must study the documents of the Cortes de León y Castilla, published by the Real Academia de la Historia. Here there is abundant evidence of the anarchy which was raging through Castile throughout Enrique's reign. The Cortes of Toro in 1369 were convoked to quell internal disorder. The country was being ransacked by thieves, murderers and rapists; court officials were guilty of graft; and justice had become a term without meaning. Enrique's decision to mint new coins (cruzados and reales) in order to pay off the foreign mercenaries had had a drastic effect on Castilian economy, and had caused an inflation which was still going on at the time of Enrique's death ten years later. Enrique at Toro attempted to control the inflationary monster which he had released by establishing set prices for almost all goods which were on the market. The failure of these measures became clear the following year, when the Cortes were reconvoked at Medina del Campo, and Enrique was obligated to retract many of these price controls. The economic crisis was such that Enrique was forced to restrict the sale of products outside
Meanwhile the wave of crimes continued in spite of the hermandades set up to establish some sort of order.8

At the Cortes of Toro, in 1371, there were demands that the money which Enrique had created after the earlier Cortes be devaluated in order to solve the financial crisis. Another cause of discontent was the fact that so many lands—especially villages and towns—had been given away to foreigners such as Du Guesclin. Also there was a dearth of previously abundant goods, especially livestock and other edibles.9

The Cortes of 1373 and 1377 brought no improvement in the economic situation of Castile. Prices and crime remained high; the level of justice low. Tributes were being imposed for the first time on towns by certain nobles who were unlawfully taking them over and building fortresses nearby to keep them under control. The citizens complained that Enrique was handing over royal lands to these rapacious lords and knights to the detriment of the inhabitants, who under royal tutelage had had a certain autonomy which was now disappearing. Excessive taxation was causing some areas to become depopulated.10

Finally one notices in the documents of the Cortes the amount of discussion and legislation with reference to the Jewish problem. As early as 1367, (1366 according to Ayala) at Enrique's first session of the Cortes in Burgos, the Jews were blamed for a great part of Castile's
troubles: "O trossy alo que nos dixieron que todos los delas cibdades e villas e lugares de nuestros rregnos, que tovieron quelos muchos males e dapnos e muertes e des-terramientos queles venieron en los tiempos pasados que fueran por consejo de judios que fueron privados e officia-
les delos rreyes passados que ffueren ffasta aqui, por que querien mal e dapno delos cristianos..."11 The Jews continued to be Enrique's economic scapegoat throughout his reign. They were the unscrupulous tax-collectors, usurers, enemies of God and Man, and friends of the devil. Thus, Enrique's anti-Semitic propaganda was one of the main factors which would eventually cause such a drastic step as that taken by the Catholic kings in 1492.

Of all this Ayala has extremely little to say. He explains very briefly the creation of new coinage, with the resulting inflation and the distribution of lands to the mercenary soldiers. A Jewish problem is insinuated, but not explained; Ayala only mentions that Jews and Moors were made to wear some sign on their clothes, whereby they would be known to Christians and to each other.12

All in all, it would seem that Ayala's reticence about the administrative difficulties of Enrique II was a deli-
berate attempt to pass over the most unsuccessful aspect of the monarch's regime.

Enrique's Foreign Policy

A great portion of the Crónica dei Rey Don Enrique II
deals with Castilian foreign policy. As was the case with Pedro, Enrique became immediately enmeshed in a web of international intrigue, in which the principal forces were once again England, France, Aragon, Portugal, Navarre, Granada and the Papacy. The difficulties and enmities which surrounded Enrique on all sides and the skill with which he overcame them form the underlying theme of Ayala's work.

Aragon

Relations had not been too amicable between the former allies, Enrique II and En Pere of Aragon, ever since En Pere had refused to cooperate with Enrique after the latter's defeat at Najera in 1366. The situation was aggravated further in 1369 when many towns on the eastern frontier of Castile handed themselves over to Aragon upon learning of Pedro's death. Ayala only mentions that there was evidence of war between Enrique and En Pere and that Enrique had sent men to Requena, one of the frontier towns which had surrendered to En Pere.13 Zurita gives many more details about the outbreak of war. The King of Aragon wished to hold Du Guesclin to his promise of going to Sardinia to fight in his place, and therefore sent to Castile for him. Du Guesclin, as En Pere's vassal, was obligated to comply with this request. Enrique, however, had given Du Guesclin the rebellious towns of Molina and Requena; therefore Du Guesclin not only refused to serve En Pere, but also threatened to help Enrique attack Aragon
and Catalonia in order to remove the towns which had surrendered to Aragon. The excuse for this belligerency was that an Aragonese nobleman, the Viscount of Castelbo, had inflicted damage on the Castilians and mercenaries who had returned to Castile to fight against Pedro after Nájera. En Pere claimed his right to Molina and Requena, not only because these towns had surrendered to him, but also because they lay in the territory which Enrique had originally promised him during Pedro's reign. Du Guesclin, according to Zurita, showed himself to be a disloyal vassal in his refusal to serve En Pere and in his refusal to accept En Pere's offer to arbitrate the matter of land distribution. To add to the dispute, En Pere also claimed Murcia according to former treaties, and refused to give his daughter Leonor to Enrique's son in marriage unless Murcia were given to Aragon. Upon seeing Enrique's warlike attitude and ingratitude, En Pere decided to come to an agreement with Navarre and Portugal.

In all fairness to Ayala and his view of the Aragonese-Castilian conflict, one must remember that Zurita was Aragonese and therefore as liable to bias as Ayala himself. It is clear that discussions had been going on over the division of Castile by England, Portugal, Aragon and Navarre even before Pedro's death. There is evidence of negotiations between Aragon and England at Bordeaux in 1369, after Pedro's death, for the conquest and partition of Castile. If the Prince of Wales were to inherit the
Castilian crown, Aragon wanted Murcia, Albacete, Cuenca, Guadalajara, Soria, parts of Burgos and Logroño. If Fernando of Portugal were to inherit the throne, the claims would have to be more modest. Aragonese hopes for a thorough conquest of Castile were shattered by England's involvement with France, an invasion of Aragon by Jaime III, Infante of Mallorca, mistrust of Portugal, and internal opposition to En Pere within Aragon itself.¹⁵

The Aragonese situation seems to disappear from the Crónica until 1374, when Enrique learned that En Pere's nephew, Jaime III (whose kingdom had been taken by En Pere) was warring with En Pere in Aragon. Since Enrique was still angry at En Pere's refusal to hand over Leonor in marriage to the Infante Don Juan, he decided to actively aid Jaime. Ayala says "... e aun non estorvaba nin extranaba a algunos suyos que ayudasen al Infante de Mallorcas."¹⁶ The bias of Ayala in such a statement is obvious, when one thinks back to the Crónica del Rey Don Pedro I, in which Ayala maintained that all were horrified over the idea of any Aragonese-Castilian conflict.

Enrique continued to send messengers to Aragon to demand that Leonor and Juan marry according to the agreements made while he was in Aragon. En Pere obstinately refused, because Enrique had not handed over the promised territories. En Pere's final compliance to Enrique's demands without the corresponding territorial compensation was according to Ayala a clear indication that Aragon now
realized that Enrique was firmly entrenched as monarch of Castile. The wedding between the Infante Don Juan of Castile and the Infanta Doña Leonor of Aragon was held in Soria in 1375.

Castilian-Aragonese relations between 1371 and 1375 must be gathered from the Archivo de la Corona de Aragón. Summed up briefly, it is evident that Aragon continued seeking allies, especially England and/or Portugal, for the invasion and partition of Castile. When the Duke of Lancaster took control of Aquitaine from the Prince of Wales in 1370 and established himself as a pretender to the Castilian throne in 1371, Aragonese hopes were rekindled. However, En Pere was more cautious, for any overt belligerent intentions on his part without any real guarantee of English support would be disastrous for Aragon. The Treaty of Alcoutim, signed on March 22, 1371, between Portugal and Castile, had ruined Aragonese invasion plans. Aragon was, therefore, worried about becoming involved in any more treaties with Portugal. With this background in mind, it becomes evident that the marriage between Leonor and Juan meant an end to Aragonese imperialistic designs on Castilian territory--an obvious triumph for Enrique II. Ayala's failure to capitalize on Aragonese plots and frustrations to the glory of Castile is due most likely to the simple fact that he was unaware of Aragonese plans.
Portugal

While En Pere of Aragon was greedily eyeing eastern Castile after Pedro's death, Fernando I of Portugal was ready to grab what he could of the western territories. Some cities, such as Ciudad Rodrigo and Zamora, Alcántara and Tuy, had surrendered to Portugal, while Ferrando de Castro was fighting for Galicia with Portuguese cooperation. Fernando I prepared to make war on Enrique, declaring that, as great-grandson of Sancho IV of Castile, he was heir to the Castilian throne. Enrique responded energetically by capturing Braga and Breganza. Peace between Castile and Portugal was brought about in 1371 through the mediation of Alfonso Pérez de Guzmán, a Castilian nobleman whose mother was Portuguese. The peace treaty was sealed by a marriage agreement between Ferrando and Enrique's daughter, Leonor, but this tie was immediately undone when Ferrando married Leonor Téllez de Meneses. Enrique received la Coruña, Ciudad Rodrigo and Valencia de Alcántara as compensation, so that the peace treaty was preserved for the moment.

Ferrando broke the treaty in 1372 by making war in Galicia and confiscating Basque and Asturian ships in Lisbon. Enrique immediately declared war, and was occupied with fighting in Portugal for most of 1373. Ayala describes this war in some detail, from Enrique's entrance into Portugal via Coimbra to the besieging of Lisbon. A Papal
Legate finally arranged a peace treaty at Santarem in 1373 with the following provisions; the Portuguese were to lend five galleys to Castile each year to help the French against England; Portugal was to send Ferrando de Castro and all other rebellious Castilian nobles out of the country; and a series of marriages were to be arranged to tie the two dynasties together. These involved Sancho, Enrique's brother and Beatriz, Fernando's sister; Fadrique, Enrique's illegitimate son and Beatriz, Fernando's daughter; and Alfonso, Enrique's son and Isabel, Fernando's daughter.21

As was the case with En Pere of Aragon, Fernando had hoped to gain at least a portion of western Castile through the intervention of the Duke of Lancaster in Castile. English failure to give aid to Portugal after Enrique's invasion of that country in 1373, forced Fernando to sign the humiliating peace treaty of Santarem with Enrique. Because of the provision by which Portugal had to aid the French with ships, it even came about that Portugal was to fight against her own ally, England, until 1379.22

Once again Enrique was triumphant. Certainly Ayala's presentation of the Portuguese situation was exact, and any details omitted were probably done so out of ignorance rather than out of deliberate suppression of the facts.

Granada

The King of Granada, who had been faithfully supported by Pedro against el Rey Bermejo, continued fighting
against Enrique after Pedro's death. While Enrique was occupied in Portugal, the Moors recaptured Algeciras, an occurrence mourned greatly in Castile, since this city had been won at such a great cost by Alfonso XI in 1349. Ayala states that it had been a great port and was completely destroyed by the Musullmans. In 1370 a peace treaty was signed with Granada, after which relations between the two kingdoms must have been peaceful, since Ayala makes no further mention of them.

Navarre

After Enrique's successful negotiations with Portugal, he sent word to King Carlos II of Navarre to return Vitoria and Logroño to Castile. Once again an agreement was reached through the mediation of the Papal Legate. Navarre would cede Vitoria and Logroño to Castile, and the Infante Don Carlos, first-born son of Carlos II, would marry Enrique's daughter, Doña Leonor for a dowry of gold. This alliance having been agreed upon, Carlos II then attempted to loosen Franco-Castilian ties by proposing that Enrique pay Pedro's debt to the Prince of Wales, in exchange for the latter's renouncing any claims to Castile. Enrique refused to enter into any agreement with England except in the case of an Anglo-French treaty.

A conflict between the two monarchs arose at the time of the wedding in May, 1375, over the means of payment. Carlos of Navarre was to receive 120,000 doblas—100,00
as a dowry and 20,000 for Vitoria, Logroño and Salvatierra. Pero Ferrández, treasurer of Castile, wanted to pay in silver (150,000 reales), whereas the agreement had been for payment in gold. The wedding took place, but the conflict was not settled, and caused future strife.26

The marriage ties between Navarre and Castile put Enrique in an embarrassing position due to Navarre's pro-English stand. This was aggravated in 1377 when Enrique's new son-in-law, the Infante Don Carlos of Navarre, decided to pay a visit to his uncle, the King of France. In France itself, it was rumored that Don Carlos wanted to take over the fortresses which he possessed in Normandy in order to join the English. This rumor was confirmed when the King of France had Jacques de Rua, squire of Don Carlos and privado of the King of Navarre, arrested. A note was found on him from the King of Navarre instructing his son to make war on the French for control of Guyenne and to aid with the fortresses in Normandy. Jacques de Rua was killed, and Don Carlos and his brother, Don Pedro, arrested. The Duke of Burgundy and Du Guesclin were sent to Normandy to destroy Navarrese castles there (except Cherbourg, leased by Navarre to England).27

In 1378 the King of France sent word to Enrique of the Navarrese plot and suggested that Enrique make war on Navarre. Meanwhile, Pero Manrique, Adelantado Mayor of Castile, had written to Enrique that Carlos of Navarre was trying to buy back Logroño for 20,000 doblas. Enrique,
angry about the Navarrese plot in France, decided to trap the Navarrese king by having Pero Manrique agree to sell Logroño, arrange to meet him there for the exchange and then capture him. The plan failed, because Carlos of Navarre suspected foul play and refused to enter the city. Enrique then declared open war and sent his son, the Infante Don Juan, to invade Navarre in order to carry out agreements with France, which was at war with Navarre at the time. The king of Navarre received immediate aid from England, and attacked Castile. Juan entered Navarre with lancers from the Basque countries, destroyed the area near Pamplona and captured Viana, which he handed over to Pero Manrique, before returning to Castile. A peace treaty was finally agreed upon, on Castilian initiative, whereby Enrique declared that Castile would be an ally of France and Navarre; Navarre would in turn send the English out of the country. Enrique would pay 20,000 doblas to English and Gascon mercenaries and would hand back to Navarre all territories taken over by Juan.

In contrast to the situation with Portugal and Aragon, the treaties between Castile and Navarre in 1379 can hardly be called a diplomatic victory for Enrique. The whole war in 1378 gained nothing for Castile, and only demonstrated to what extent Enrique was subservient to the king of France. Russell maintains that Navarre was the kingdom of the peninsula which showed the greatest diplomatic skill and internal harmony in this turbulent period. Her
subjects were loyal, feudal magnates were few and racial laws liberal. Jews immigrated from Castile and established large and prosperous aljamas in the three principal cities of Navarre—Pamplona, Estella and Tudela. The survival of an independent Navarre, surrounded by larger imperialistic powers—Aragon, France and Castile—depended on skillful diplomacy, intrigue and defensive military strategy.31

France and England

Pedro's death in 1369 cemented a firm Franco-Castilian alliance, in which Enrique was constantly faithful to Charles V of France, the man who had helped him obtain the Castilian crown. Enrique's loyalty to his former benefactor affected his relations with England in that he refused to make any treaty with either the Prince of Wales or the Duke of Lancaster while France and England were at war.

Ayala emphasizes the success of the Castilian fleet, which aided France against the British on many occasions. In 1371, Enrique's Admiral, Micer Ambrosio Bocanegra, was sent with twelve galleys to help France and captured the famous English captain, Pembroke, after which the March of Guyenne was returned to France. Enrique received a great ransom for Pembroke with which he bought back Soria, Almazán and Atienza from Du Guesclin.32 In 1372 Enrique sent forty armed ships to La Rochelle to help the French against the coming of an English fleet, which, in fact, never
In 1374 he sent an Armada under Ferrand Sánchez de Tovar, to aid the French. Russell also emphasizes the role of Castile as a sea-power in the Franco-English struggle and the fact that Enrique acquiesced to demands of France that booty was to be equally shared between the French and the Castilians, even though the French squadron was smaller. Enrique told his subjects that the French only received one-third of the booty. Russell concludes that the Franco-Castilian naval alliance was favorable to the Duke of Lancaster's designs in Spain, since many were ready to accept his argument that defeating Trastamaran Spain was even more urgent than a victory over France itself.

In 1374, Castilian fears of an English invasion were confirmed when the Duke of Lancaster appeared in Guyenne with his wife, Doña Constanza, Pedro's daughter; he bore arms with castles and lions, and claimed the Castilian throne in his wife's name. Lancaster had married the exiled daughter of Pedro in 1372, whereupon he was given permission by the English council to bear the title and arms of the King of Castile and Leon. On Feb. 10, 1372, the new Duchess of Lancaster made her ceremonial entry into Lisbon as Queen of Castile. Even Froissart, a pro-Enrique historian, admitted the right of Constanza to rule Castile: "Si se tenoient la les deus filletes toutes esgarées, dont on pourroit avoir grant pité, car elles estoient hiritieres de Castille, qui bien leur fesist droit,
par la succession dou roy, leur pere." 39 Lancaster was also supported in his plans by many "emperogilados" (i.e., former supporters of Pedro) such as Fernando de Castro, Fernán Rodríguez de Aza and Fernán Alfonso de Zamora, who had been forced to flee to England after the Castilian-Portuguese peace treaty. 40

As Enrique was in Burgos preparing to meet the awaited invasion in 1374, he received word from the Duke of Anjou in Languedoc that Lancaster had lost many men in France and was returning to England. Anjou then enlisted Enrique to aid in a campaign against the English in Bayonne—a plan which failed because the Duke of Anjou never showed up. Many Castilians died as a result of floods and starvation, while vainly awaiting the arrival of Anjou's troops. 41

Ayala mentions very briefly peace talks between France and England in Bruges in 1375. The Dukes of Anjou and Burgundy, brothers of Charles V, represented France; the Dukes of Lancaster and York, brothers of Edward III, represented England. Castile sent Pero Ferrández de Velasco, Enrique's Camarero Mayor, as a representative to the meetings. 42 What Ayala neglects to explain in all this is that in the peace talks at Bruges, Lancaster had offered to give up claims to Castile in exchange for Enrique's promise not to penalize "emperogilados," who would have their lands and titles restored. E. Perroy demonstrates, in an article entitled "The Anglo-French Negotiations at Bruges 1374-1377," that the Trastamarans were hostile to
this proposal and furthermore were opposed to any Anglo-
French agreement whatsoever.\footnote{43} Froissart backs this
statement with one phrase: "Et quant on estoit sus voies
d'acord, Bretagne et Espagne desrompoient tout."
\footnote{44} The fact that Pero Ferrández de Velasco was trying to
sabotage negotiations is evident in his act of capturing
an Englishman, the Lord of Lesparre, during a period of
truce. The Castilians, under Fernán Sánchez de Tovar,
again violated the truce on August 10, 1375, by attacking
English merchant ships and burning or capturing thirty-
nine of them.\footnote{45}

Enrique, instead of attempting to resolve the situa-
tion with England, tenaciously clung to France for support.
This policy prolonged the inevitable Anglo-Castilian con-
fusion, which fell eventually on the shoulders of Enrique's
son, Juan. Ayala seems to admire Enrique's support and
loyalty to Charles V. For Ayala it was surely an example
of chivalric behavior on Enrique's part to maintain such
ties. Politically, however, it postponed a resolution
of the differences between Castile and the English to
the later detriment of Castile.

The Papacy

In 1378 Enrique was confronted with the Papal discord
which occurred at the death of Pope Gregory XI. The
Cardinals elected a new Pope, under the threat of Roman
mobs, who demanded that the Pope be Italian. Urban VI,
was chosen. The Cardinals then went to France, declared the Roman election to be fraudulent, and chose Clement VII as Pope.

Enrique remained neutral in this conflict—the only instance in which he defied Charles V of France, who was definitely in favor of the French Clement VII. On his deathbed, Enrique warned his son, Juan, to be cautious about the schism in Rome.

Conclusion

Ayala admired Enrique II as a man and as a political ruler. His description of Enrique reflects this without any doubt. "E fue pequeño de cuerpo, pero bien fecho, e blanco e rubio en de buen seso e de grande esfuerzo e franco e virtuoso e muy buen recebidor e honrador de las gentes."46

Because of this admiration, Ayala emphasized Enrique's triumphs within and without Castile, while minimizing such faults as Enrique's lack of administrative ability in internal affairs and his short-sightedness in external affairs, reflected particularly in his excessive anti-English and pro-French policies. Luis Suárez Fernández, a medieval historian who defends Enrique II, states: "En la guerra civil castellana se acostumbró a ver, en el pretendiente, un defensor de la nobleza. Vencedor, no desmintió tales esperanzas. En este aspecto la alianza francesa tiene también honda significación. Desde los
días de San Luis, Francia representaba en Europa el espíritu caballeresco lo que, en términos políticos, quería decir también la defensa de un sistema social de predominio aristocrático. Para la burguesía los Trastamara representaban un régimen especialmente antipático.¹⁴⁷

France, aristocracy and chivalry: these are the political ideals of Ayala. For this reason Enrique II represented a great monarch in the eyes of the chronicler, where Pedro I had been a brutal tyrant. Ayala and those of his class were simply not prepared to give up the privileges of aristocracy for the dubious virtue of a unified monarchy at this time.
Footnotes


2. Pero López de Ayala, Crónica del Rey Don Enrique II, Biblioteca de Autores Españoles LXVII, Madrid, 1875, Year 6, Chapters I-II.


4. Enrique II, Yr. 5, Ch. VI.

5. Pedro I, Yr. 5, Ch. XXVII.

6. Enrique II, Yr. 8, Ch. XXI.


8. Cortes, pp. 164-188.

9. Cortes, p. 204.


12. Enrique II, Yr. 6, Ch. VII.

13. Enrique II, Yr. 6, Ch. II.


16. Enrique II, Yr. 9, Ch. VII.

17. Enrique II, Yr. 9, Ch. XII.


19. Enrique II, Yr. 4, Ch. IV-VI.

20. Enrique II, Yr. 6, Ch. VI-VII.

21. Enrique II, Yr. 8, Ch. VI.

23. Enrique II, Yr. 4, Ch. VII.
24. Enrique II, Yr. 5, Ch. IV.
25. Enrique II, Yr. 8, Ch. VIII-IX.
26. Enrique II, Yr. 10, Ch. II.
27. Enrique II, Yr. 12, Ch. I.
28. Enrique II, Yr. 13, Ch. II.
29. Enrique II, Yr. 13, Ch. III-IV.
30. Enrique II, Yr. 14, Ch. I.
32. Enrique II, Yr. 6, Ch. X.
33. Enrique II, Yr. 7, Ch. II.
34. Enrique II, Yr. 9, Ch. IX.
37. Enrique II, Yr. 9, Ch. I.
41. Enrique II, Yr. 9, Ch. V.
42. Enrique II, Yr. 10, Ch. III-IV.
44. Froissart, Livre I, Tome IX, p. 198.
46. Enrique II, Yr. 14, Ch. III.
CHAPTER V

LA CRÓNICA DEL REY DON JUAN I

Juan I was proclaimed sovereign of Castile in Santo Domingo de Silos on May 1, 1379, at the age of 21. He was crowned at the Monastery of Las Huelgas on June 21 with his queen, Doña Leonor, daughter of Pere III of Aragon. Ayala mentions that great celebrations were held in Burgos, and a session of the Cortes was convoked, wherein all former privileges were confirmed. With Juan's ascension to the throne, the Civil War in Spain itself became a dead issue. This is due to the fact that the new king was able to claim the throne through his mother, Doña Juana Manuel, from the line of Fernando de la Cerda, eldest son of Alfonso X. Thus, the Pedro-Enrique struggle, the contest between the legitimate and illegitimate lines descending from Alfonso XI became practically irrelevant except for the presence of Pedro I's daughters in England. In Castile there was no popular movement to place Constanza, Pedro's eldest daughter, on the throne, although the Duke of Lancaster would later claim the crown through her.

Whereas Enrique II had successfully managed to con-
solidate Castile's role as an important European power, Juan I would be more successful at laying the foundation of the Castilian monarchy itself.

"Las Mercedes Enriquenas"

At the first session of the Cortes in Burgos, in 1379, Juan and the procuradores or representatives of the cities seemed to be in complete agreement about the necessity of limiting the concession of privileges and territories, a policy which had been so prevalent under Enrique II that it has come to be known as "Las Mercedes Enriquenas." A revision of privileges was carried out to a slight extent, and means were taken to begin a general statistical census of taxes. Two other measures, the Ordenamiento de Luto in which the nobles were to dress as if in mourning, and the prohibition of the export of precious metals and livestock, were taken to restrict excessive expenditures.2

Ayala goes into some detail about the problem of lands and privileges in his recording of the session of the Cortes of Guadalajara in 1390, the last year of Juan I's reign. According to Ayala's statement, the situation had not improved very much during Juan I's reign in spite of his good intentions. The procuradores complained that Pedro, Enrique and other kings had given towns to certain knights and lords under the privilege of mixto imperio--i.e., joint control by both the king and the nobleman in-
volved. Many noblemen refused to recognize the sovereign's part in the control of these lands, as a result of which royal control was being dissipated. The king ordered court quarrels to be resolved before the alcaldes ordinarios of the towns which belonged to the noble in question. If necessary the decision could be appealed before the monarch.³

Juan's decision not to violate any previous privileges was carried out continually during his reign. This is brought out by Ayala in another passage on the Cortes of Guadalajara in which lords and knights who had received lands from Enrique were afraid of a supposedly secret clause of Enrique's will, in which Enrique had ordered these donations to be made into Mayorazgos--lands which in the case of no direct heir would revert to the crown. Juan reassured them of his guarantee of the integrity of all such donations.⁴

In spite of Juan I's attempt to alleviate the situation, the problem created by the "Mercedes Enriqueñas" was never really solved and would again become acute during the reign of his son and successor, Enrique III.

Nobility vs. Clergy

A struggle between the nobility and the clergy manifested itself during Juan I's reign. A vigorous, reform-minded clergy led by Don Pedro Tenorio, Archbishop of Toledo, was able to ally itself closely with the
pious monarch. This alliance was based on the fact that the Archbishop saw a strong monarchy as the necessary means of preventing rapacious nobles from encroaching on the lands of the church. Major religious reforms included the founding of three monasteries, Guadalupe, El Paular and San Benito de Valladolid, and the installation of Carthusian monasteries throughout Castile.

Ayala was intimately involved with several of the conflicts between the first two estates, and gives a detailed account of them in the chronicle. The first great struggle took place in 1380 when abbots and abbesses from Castile and Leon came to the new king at Medina del Campo and complained that the great lords were taking lands and vassals from the monasteries. These monasteries, argued the clergy, had been founded by the kings and could be traced back to the Cid. Juan I ordered two knights and two doctors to arbitrate the quarrel. One of the knights was Ayala himself. The final decision was made in favor of the monasteries and the law was made public at the Cortes of Soria in 1380. Ayala adds that this law was obeyed during Juan's reign.

Ayala's decision in favor of the clergy seems strange and extremely generous when one considers his family position. This fact, however, is most logical if one takes into account the situation of the nobility under Juan I as studied by Luis Suárez Fernández in Nobleza y monarquía. Suárez sees reconciled in Juan I the formerly opposing
concepts of a strong monarchy and a strong nobility, which had been defended by Pedro I and Enrique II respectively. He states: "Hacia 1380 el problema político castellano se plantea como una pugna entre dos posibles oligarquías - la de los parientes del rey y la de los principales linajes de la segunda nobleza. Por eso la ascensión de la oligarquía nobiliaria es, en su primera fase, un crecimiento de la monarquía." Juan I leaned for support on the lesser nobility and withdrew from the Trastamáras. Ayala, who belonged to the so-called lesser nobility, was unaffected by the decision to return lands and vassals to the monasteries, whereas others, including the king's own relatives and families such as the Sarmientos, the Velascos, and the Manriques, lost much of their land and vassals to the monasteries.

Ayala's anti-clerical feelings become more manifest in another struggle which took place in the cortes of Guadalajara. There is a long passage in which he presents the complaints against the Pope, who was favoring Castile less than he was other kingdoms throughout Christendom. The following are recorded in the chronicle. Foreign clergy had no desire to live in Castile, and those few who did were of little worth, since they took the church income of gold and silver from the kingdom; the churches were poorly served, since the best offices were given to people outside of Castile; since Castilians received no benefits, they were reluctant to have their sons become
clergymen, with the result that learning was not encouraged. Ayala also stresses the unfairness in salaries. For example in one church in which there were two canons, the Castilian received 2000 maravedis, whereas the foreigner received 13,000. Juan agreed to send ambassadors to the Pope about these injustices.

A more direct attack on the prelates of Castile can be found in Ayala's presentation of their requests at the cortes of Guadalajara to force knights and lords of the diocese of Calahorra, to which all the Basque areas were subject, to stop taking tithes. The prelates maintained that the nobles violated the Old and New Testaments by interfering in clerical matters. Speaking for the nobility, Ayala presents a long, impassioned answer, through which his own views and those of his class are completely evident. The nobles argue that for 400 years it had been the practice for the nobles to take tithes and to provide each church with a clergyman, who would be supported by the nobles. This privilege came to them as a reward for their crusade against the infidel at a time when no Christian church even existed in that area. The preservation of the faith was due to the efforts of Cabdillos to whom the people gave a tenth of all their earnings to finance the fighting against the Moors. The nobles go on to say that as far as the Old Testament is concerned, it was also stated that those prelates who received tithes should have no other temporal goods. This was in direct contrast to the practice
of the day, where the clergy now had castles, cities, towns and vassals. Juan I decided that since the Basque situation could not be changed without a scandal, it was better to leave things as they were. To the prelates' complaint that there were clergymen in some Dioceses who were forced to pay taxes on lands bought from peasants, Juan answered that no clergymen would pay taxes for inherited lands, but that lands bought for the church were taxable.11

That Juan I was by no means completely dominated by the clergy is evident in the fact that he openly appointed new Maestres de Santiago and Calatrava in 1384, after a plague which had taken the life of the former Maestre de Santiago. Ayala admits that the king could order this: "...e ficieron los Freyres de las dichas Ordenes segund el rey les mando."12 He also mentions the discontent it created because the Maestre de Calatrava of the Cistercian Order became Maestre de Santiago, while the Prior of the Order of San Juan became Maestre de Calatrava.13 The interesting thing here is Ayala's apparent approval of a monarch's interference in the affairs of the Military Order, a practice which he had censured in Pedro I's regime.

The Jewish Problem

The Jewish problem, which had begun during Enrique's regime, increased during the reign of Juan I. In 1379 Don Jusuf Pichón, a rich Jew who, ironically, had served
the anti-Semitic Enrique II as **contador mayor** was tried and executed by his own people. Juan was furious at such an outrage and had this privilege of private criminal jurisdiction retracted.\(^{14}\) Though Ayala gives no further details, it is evident from a study of the documents of the Cortes of Soria that this event served as good propaganda to enforce new anti-Jewish measures, among which was the prohibition against their taking charge of criminal cases. Other measures were the complete segregation of the **aljamas** and rigorous prohibition of proselytizing.\(^ {15}\) This anti-Semitism of 1380 was directly related to the support which Juan I sought from the clergy at that time.\(^ {16}\)

**The Titled Nobility**

What Suárez Fernández calls **la alta nobleza** consisted mainly of Juan I's immediate family and certain foreign collaborators, all of whom were titled nobility. During most of Juan's reign they had little direct influence on the government of the realm until the Cortes of Guadalajara in 1390. The warriors and diplomats came from the **baja nobleza**, those who possessed lands but no title. These were families such as the Ayalas, the Tovars, the Manriques, the Velascos, the Mendozas and the Quiñones.\(^ {17}\)

The members of Juan's family were as untrustworthy in their loyalty to the crown as the Trastamars had been under Pedro I. However, due to various circumstances and perhaps to a certain amount of good fortune on Juan's
part, they were unsuccessful in early attempts to rid themselves of their sovereign. It is probable that the memories of the Civil War were too bitter. Ayala mentions the various attempts of Don Alfonso Enríquez, Conde de Noreña, Enrique II's illegitimate son, to incite a rebellion against Juan I. He and Pero Manrique, Juan's Adelantado Mayor de Castilla, were involved in an insurrection in 1380. Juan solved the situation by arresting Pero Manrique and appointing his brother, Diego Gómez Manrique, to the post. In 1381, Juan learned that his brother was in the town of Paredes de Nava, dealing with the king of Portugal. A reconciliation took place in Oviedo, after Alfonso had fled to Asturias. In 1382 Alfonso was in Braganza dealing again with Fernando of Portugal. Juan had to grant him lands and privileges and make him Condestable in order to force his brother into loyalty. After another evidence of treason--this time letters to the King of Portugal--Alfonso was arrested and his goods in Asturias were confiscated.

In 1385, Juan called together his advisers to see what should be done with his troublesome brother. Ayala's detailed account indicates that Ayala was on the king's advisory council. He presents Juan's whole case against Alfonso and shows the number of times when Juan pardoned him. The king had in fact given Alfonso more land and privileges than Alfonso had received from his own father. Nevertheless, Alfonso had since repeated dealings with the King of Portugal; he had tried to arrange a marriage be-
between himself and Doña Beatriz, daughter of the King of Portugal, when he knew that Beatriz was already promised to Juan's son; Juan had had to bribe Alfonso to join him against Portugal in Zamora; Alfonso refused to attend the wedding of Juan I and Beatriz when Juan decided to marry her himself; instead, Alfonso went to Asturias and began pillaging the land; Alfonso had also dealt with the English at Bayonne. Juan wanted to execute Alfonso, since he himself had almost died in Seville of an illness and had fears of Alfonso's rebelling against his infant son, Enrique, in the event of his own death. Juan therefore, presented the problem of his rebellious brother to his advisory council. 22

The answer to the king, apparently formulated by Ayala, is a long discourse on the evils which arise when monarchs carry out their own justice. He lists crimes of such monarchs as Alfonso X, Sancho IV, Alfonso XI and Pedro I. Enrique II is not included in the list. The outbreak of war between Castile and Aragon is attributed to Pedro I's murder of Don Fadrique and the Infante Don Juan de Aragon. Ayala states that putting the matter into the hands of the Alcaldes would make it look outside of Castile as though the Alcaldes were lackeys of the king. He suggests that Juan should follow the procedure which King Jean II of France, father of Charles V, used with his prisoner, King Charles of Navarre, who had been accused of dealing with the English. The defendant was given the best de-
fense lawyers in Europe. However, the trial never took place because of Jean's capture at Poitou by the English and Charles of Navarre's escape from Paris. Ayala states that Juan an "ome de buena conciencia," wanted to follow this procedure. However the suggested trial never took place, because of Juan's return to Portugal. 23 Juan I's good conscience with Alfonso was to prove prejudicial to Castile, as the latter continued to sow rebellion during the subsequent reign of Enrique III.

Pedro, Count of Trastamara, Tello's illegitimate son, had formed a plan to assassinate Juan I, marry Doña Leonor, widow of Fernando of Portugal, and proclaim himself and Leonor regents of Portugal in the name of Fernando's daughter, Beatriz. This plan failed. 24 Ayala mentions nothing of this plot, but does indicate some former conflict between Juan and his cousin, when he speaks of the return of Pedro to Castile from France, where he had been banished. Don Pedro returned after the disaster of Aljubarrota in 1385 and received the town of Paredes de Nava, which had belonged to Alfonso. 25

Juan's youngest illegitimate brother, Fadrique, Duke of Benavente, was a child during most of Juan I's reign, so he presented no immediate threat to the monarchy. However, by the time of Juan's death, he was one of the leaders of the alta nobleza which had been dispersed during the years of the Portuguese conflict, but which at the Cortes of Guadalajara in 1390 demonstrated renewed vigor. From that
time the alta nobleza began increasing in number and power, led by the Duke of Benavente and the Count of Trastamara. Juan I's death in that year unleashed new ambitions of the nobility, a fact which during the reign of Enrique III would sabotage the monarchical gains achieved by his father.26

The Cortes and the Third Estate

One of the great goals of Juan I's reign was the attempt at establishing a centralized monarchy through the creation or reform of such national organisms as the Consejo Real (of which Ayala became a member), the audiencia, the hermandades, and a rudimentary army. Modern historians consider the last years of Juan's reign (1386-90) to be the high point of the Cortes in Spanish medieval history, mainly because these organizations received their true form at this time. The group mainly responsible for this success were the procuradores, or representatives of the cities—in other words, the Third Estate. It is evident from Ayala's chronicle that he was unaware of the importance which the bourgeoisie had in the formulation of the country and of the institutions which it had developed. His main impression of the Cortes seems to be that many laws were passed which were often violated.

Though Ayala discusses in detail many decisions of the Consejo, he says nothing of the importance of its formation. The original plan formulated for this advisory body
to the king was quite revolutionary, and came into effect during the Cortes of Valladolid of 1385. The Consejo would consist of twelve members, four from each of the three estates—nobility, clergy and citizens. This council was to carry out all affairs of the kingdom except those which would be dealt with by the Audiencia, a judiciary body. The king explains the creation of the Consejo as follows: "E nos por las sobre dichas razones queriendo tomar exemplo dela Escriptura de Dios, fizimos esta ordenacion por ser mas aliviado delos trabajos que fasta aqui aviamos, e pudiessemos aver algund rremedio de nuestra enfermedad, e principalmente, para aver tiempo e manera para fazer justicia, la qual esta muy mengoada eneste regno..."27

This revolutionary representation given to the citizens on the Consejo was short-lived; four doctors of law were substituted for the citizens by the King's request at the Cortes of Briviesca in 1387. Was Juan I under pressure from discontented nobles? An answer would only be conjecture, since nothing is mentioned in the documents of the Cortes. In addition to the removal of the citizens, the Consejo was limited to receiving and distributing petitions and to direct control only over the dispositions of income and appointment to government positions. Further, the Consejo Real would be appointed directly by the king.28

The Audiencia had been created under Enrique II at the request of the procuradores, but was completely re-
formed at the Cortes of Briviesca. All problems of criminal and civil justice would go to the Audiencia rather than to the monarch himself. The place of residence of this judicial body was to be fixed in four areas: Medina del Campo from April to June, Olmedo from July to September, Madrid from October to December, and Alcalá de Henares from January to March. The Audiencia would have two classes of member, oidores and alcaldes, who would be paid and supported by the king. There would be eight laymen and two prelates, two each from Castile, Leon, Extremadura and Andalusia. Each would serve for a six-month period. Its existence was not considered incompatible with the right of appeal to the king himself nor with the right of adelantados and merinos to carry out justice in their own areas of jurisdiction. The Audiencia insured the existence of a high Court of Appeal and Tribunal sustained by the Crown.

A third measure to stabilize the kingdom was proposed at the Cortes of Segovia in 1386. This was the creation of the Hermandades or type of civil rural police force which was to be supported by the cities. The Hermandades were founded in 1382 during a session of the Cortes which Sancho IV, then in rebellion against his father, Alfonso X, convoked in Valladolid. These, however, were basically groups of cities formed to defend their interests and privileges. They were destroyed by the succeeding monarchs, especially Alfonso XI. The actual model for this police
force was the Hermandad Vieja formed by the bee-keepers and archers of Toledo, Talavera and Ciudad Real to defend the mountain roads. This was protected by the monarchs, and later evolved into a civil police force. Juan I in 1386 incorporated this idea into the entire kingdom. Without mentioning any monarch, several statutes resemble el "Ordenamiento de Pedro I", proclaimed at the Cortes of Valladolid in 1351.32

The last great reform carried out by Juan I was the military reform—an attempt to establish some sort of standing army. This reform was also put into the hands of the procuradores at the Cortes of Guadalajara in 1390. Juan wanted the representatives to decide the number of lancers needed and how much each would receive. It was decided that royal lands should be distributed to a permanent force of 4,500 lancers and 1,500 Andalusian horsemen, all of whom should receive 1,500 maravedis per year and necessary provisions such as arms, horses and mules. The king's brothers, the Duke of Benavente and the Count of Trastamara, were given the difficult task of carrying out this provision.33 Ayala's view of this decision for a national army is a pessimistic one. He mentions the great difficulties involved in establishing an army, the confusion which it caused, and the problem of keeping royal soldiers from serving other lords as well as the king.34

A sharp conflict arose between the third estate and the first two estates over the issue of taxation. The
extensive wars and the "Mercedes Enriqueñas" had greatly overburdened the citizens financially. In the Cortes of Burgos of 1379, the procuradores convinced Juan of the need for limiting these privileges, as we have already mentioned. In subsequent Cortes of 1380, 1383 and 1385, they protested so strongly against the abuses of the nobility that Juan decided to incorporate them into one branch of the Consejo Real. The rise in power of the third estate, it seems, is directly related to the temporary downfall of the nobility because of wars and plagues and the disaster of Aljubarrota. In the Cortes of Briviesca of 1387, the monarch decided to tax the nobility and clergy to meet the economic needs of the realm. Ayala mentions that the overwhelming protests of the nobles and clergy prevented this law from going into effect. When Juan sought 45,000 maravedis from the procuradores to pay off the Duke of Lancaster at the Cortes of Palencia in 1388, the citizens showed violent indignation—especially after the exemptions of the hidalgos were reinstated; they even demanded to examine the royal accounts.

Ayala mentions the tax situation in great detail at the Cortes of Guadalajara in 1390. He states that the procuradores had expected a reduction and were unpleasantly surprised by the king's request for a huge increase. A final agreement was made that the monarch must put the expenditures of Castile in order with the aid of the procuradores. The king's weariness and disillusion are seen
in his decision to turn the whole financial matter over to the city representatives and let them straighten it out.38

It is interesting that the Cortes of Guadalajara are considered to be evidence of a decline in the influence of the third estate and a renewal of power in the titled nobility. The Historia de España has this to say about the last Cortes of Juan's reign: "Se las ha considerado como las más importantes, pero en ello tal vez influya la atención minuciosa que les dedicó en su Crónica Pedro López de Ayala."39 Ayala's view of the Cortes in general is reflected in a statement which he made about the Cortes de Segovia: "De muchas leyes y ordenamientos allí publicados pocos se guardaron."40

Ayala, Juan I and the Medieval Christian Ideal

Pero López de Ayala's description of Juan indicates that he felt a sincere affection for the pious son of the audacious Enrique II. Ayala saw his king as a completely good person--so good that he was unsuccessful in many undertakings: "...fuera el Rey Don Juan de buenas maneras e buenas costumbres e sin saña ninguna, como quier que ovo siempre en todos sus fechos muy pequeña ventura."41

A study of the Cortes completely corroborates Ayala's opinion. Juan I lived as the Father of his kingdom and suffered for his people. The number of religious reforms and provisions of the Cortes also indicates to what extent
the king was trying to improve the conditions of Castile. Among the religious provisions of the Cortes during Juan I's reign are the following: Any person who insulted a converted Jew was to be fined or imprisoned; all women who had immoral relationships with members of the clergy were to wear a red cloth so that they could be distinguished from honorable married ladies; fasting and prayers were required to help Castile, while mourning was to be worn for the country's sins; there were measures against evil customs such as the clergy's having mistresses; vagabonds (who could be forced to work one month without pay), gambling in public or in private; and against bigamy. Weeping and disfiguring of faces was prohibited during burial ceremonies, since such demonstrations led people to believe that one did not conform to God's will. Juan's sincerity and humility are most evident in his desire to terminate the custom of having the people of a certain town or village come to meet their sovereign with a cross or religious image in hand. A king in Juan I's view was a temporal ruler and should therefore go to the Cross, not vice versa. Juan I at the Cortes of Valladolid in 1385 had a speech read in which he developed his interpretation of the role of the monarchy. The sovereign was to be a representative of God on earth and custodian of order, peace and justice.42

Ayala could not help but admire a monarch who represented to the fullest extent possible the ideal of a Christian monarch. Both Juan I and his chronicler were
dominated by the chivalric spirit of France and were distressed by the apparent lack of ideals in the nobility and clergy of Castile.

The interest which Ayala had in chivalry is clearly evident throughout the Crónica de Don Juan I. One example is the rather romantic story of the King of Armenia whose kingdom had been invaded by the Sultan of Babylonia and who sought aid for his ransom from the Christian monarchs of Europe. Ayala emphasizes that Juan I sent many jewels, whereas the King of Aragon only sent letters.43 Two years later, in 1383, a huge reception was prepared in Badajoz to receive the recently liberated monarch. The King of Armenia dismounted, knelt before Juan and threw off his hat in gratitude. Juan presented him with gold and silk cloth, jewels, money, silver dishes and the towns of Madrid and Andújar, plus a pension of 150,000 maravedis a year.44 This chivalric gesture on the part of Juan I, so admired by Ayala, caused great resentment on the part of the Castilian subjects, who were suffering the pains of war and over-taxation.45

Juan I should be credited for making a serious attempt to straighten out the anarchy which was rampant in Castile as a direct result of the years of Civil War. However, most of the progressive measures taken were done so at the insistence of the procuradores, who became very influential between 1385 and 1388, during a period when much of the nobility was incapacitated by the ravages of war and the
plague. The failure of his attempts and the renewed vigor of the nobility in 1390 would represent a regression in the internal policies of Castile.

Neither Juan I nor Ayala seemed to be fully aware of the revolutionary importance of the third estate, but clung tenaciously to the chivalric ideals of the past.

Juan I's Foreign Policy

In contrast to Enrique II, Juan I was a failure in foreign affairs. Ayala himself admits this and attributes it to the king's other-worldly nature.46 The costly wars with Portugal and England were more than a little responsible for the king's difficulty in putting into practice with efficiency many of the new measures enacted by the Cortes. Castile's excessively pro-French stand and imperial designs in Portugal were partially the reason why the international situation was so complicated to resolve. Ayala recognized the folly of Juan I's designs in Portugal; he did not have such insight in regard to the Anglo-French struggle.

The Iberian Peninsula and the Papal Schism

The Anglo-French conflict was directly involved with the Papal Schism. Charles V of France had immediately supported Clement VII, while the English favored the legitimist Pope, Urban VI. The Iberian peninsula at the time of Enrique II's death in 1379 was neutral, and the
four major kingdoms—Castile, Navarre, Portugal and Aragon—remained undecided for one year. Both Popes considered the peninsula important enough to dispatch messengers immediately to convince the monarchs of their right to the Papal throne.

Pere III *El Ceremonioso* of Aragon made great efforts to create a bloc of neutralism throughout the peninsula in an attempt to keep it free from the conflict between France and England.\(^47\) Evidence from the Archivo de la Corona de Aragon shows a letter dated Dec. 27, 1379, from Pere III to Juan I, announcing the reception of Juan's ambassador to France, Pero López de Ayala. In this letter, *El Ceremonioso* expresses his desire to consult with Juan about the Schism, so that they can be in accord about what action to take.

**Barcelona - 27 - Dic - 1379**

"Quanto al feyto de los Pappes ete que los ditos messageros vros. nos han faulado de part vra., Nos hemos feyta haver toda aquella información que hemos podida haver e la feyta encara por personas solemnas de nro. Regno recibir, e al mas antes que podremos, sobre esti (sic) feyto e otros, nos embiaremos nros. messageros informados de nra. intención. E certificamosvos, key muy car fillo, que a nos plazerá muyto que vos e nos seamos una cosa e una voluntat a determinarnos sobrebl dito feyto. Y assía que al día present sean venidos a nos messageros del rey de Francia, sobre esta razón, certificamosvos que a ellos ni a otros no faremos cierta respuesta sobre esto entro le hayamos con vos concordada..."\(^48\)

Zurita also mentions a great meeting which was to be effected between the two monarchs and the outstanding persons of each kingdom.
"Luego que sucedió en Castilla el rey Don Juan, procuró el Rey de Aragón su suegro, que ambos se concertasen en lo que tocava a declararse cerca de la unión de la Iglesia, y que diessen la obediencia al que entendiessen que era verdadero pastor, y vicario della y canonicamente elegido." ... "Allende de los perlados se avia de juntar las personas más señaladas en letras de sus Reynos." 49

It is curious that Ayala, who was directly involved with En Pere's proposals, never mentions them in the chronicle. His report of the Schism in the Crónica del Rey Don Juan I deals with the King of France's ambassadors to Castile, who were consulting with Juan on the matter and the arrival of messengers of Urban VI at the Castilian court. Juan I called a meeting of learned men and prelates who gathered in Medina del Campo to argue the issue. "E avian sus disputaciones, ca el fecho era peligroso e muy dubdoso, e non se podia tan aina declarar." 50

At the beginning of 1381, Juan I voted for Clement VII. Once again Castile followed in the footsteps of Charles V. Since Fernando I of Portugal had also voted for Clement, any hopes of Castilian neutrality were shattered, while French diplomacy was triumphant. In Aragon and Navarre, the reigning monarchs remained neutral until their deaths in 1387. The heirs to the crowns, Charles III of Navarre and Juan of Aragon, abandoned their fathers' neutrality and also voted for Clement VII. 51

Juan's pious fervor and pain are reflected in his letters addressed to Christendom in general, which Ayala inserts in the chronicle. The tone is one of despair
over the Papal split.

"O devoción corrompida del pueblo cristiano..."

"A dó es, a dó es la Fe de Jesu Christo?"

"Como se escureció el sol e el guiador lumbroso de la verdad, e como los carros resplandecientes de luz son trastornados en tinieblas?" 52

The length and eloquence of this portion of the chronicle are sufficient to indicate Ayala's preoccupation with religious matters. His avoidance of the matter of a possible neutrality indicates his strong pro-French sympathies.

Castile and the War with Portugal

Juan I's greatest mistake was his desire to be monarch of Portugal. It was his policy with this kingdom that led to the near destruction of Castile both morally and economically.

In 1380, Juan I and Fernando I of Portugal agreed on the marriage of Juan's first-born son, the Infante Don Enrique, to Fernando's only daughter, Beatriz. Both monarchs agreed that since they were first cousins and great-grandsons of Sancho VI of Castile, they should be allies. It was agreed also that one would inherit the crown of the other in case either died without leaving an heir. 53

Evidence from the Portuguese chronicler Fernão Lopes, however, indicates that the treacherous Portuguese monarch was dealing secretly with England, because many of his opponents were Francophiles, especially the powerful Bishop
Juan Francisco Andeiro, a Portuguese nobleman who had fled to England after Santarém, was responsible for the Anglo-Portuguese alliance of 1380. It was decided that one thousand men would go to Portugal under the orders of Edmund, Duke of Cambridge, who would marry Fernando's daughter, Beatriz, and become heir of Portugal. Andeiro, meanwhile, in his secret mission to Portugal, became the paramour of Fernando's wife, Queen Leonor, a development which would prove to be important in future events.

When Juan I learned of the Anglo-Portuguese plans, he immediately went to Zamora and declared war on Portugal. Because of Castilian readiness on land and sea (twenty Portuguese galleys were captured immediately), Fernando hastened to send Alvar Pérez de Castro (Ferrando de Castro's brother) to Juan I to undertake negotiations. An agreement was reached in which the Infanta Doña Beatriz would marry the Infante Don Fernando, Juan's second son, rather than Don Enrique. The Portuguese monarch was thus assured of the continued separation of Portugal and Castile.

Another factor which influenced Fernando's decision to abandon the English alliance for a Castilian one was the diplomatic and material difficulties with the English. The English disembarked without horses, so that they were nearly useless in battle. The Duke of Cambridge brought Papal Bulls of Excommunication against those who supported Clement VII—a dangerous policy in a country whose clergy
and nobility were strongly Francophile. When the powerful Portuguese nobleman, the Count of Ourem, died in 1381, the title was given to Andeiro, through the influence of Queen Leonor. He then abandoned the English cause which he had previously so strongly defended.57

In 1382, the situation was favorable to Castile due to the breakup of the Anglo-Portuguese alliance and internal dissension throughout Portugal itself. There was strong opposition to the lascivious Queen Leonor, to the corrupt administration of the King, and to the useless war.58

The real troubles began for Castile when Juan I decided to marry Fernando's daughter himself rather than hand her over to his son. Thus, Juan would inherit Portugal if Fernando of Portugal had no sons. Fernando's wife, Leonor, would be regent until a son of Juan and Beatriz should reach fourteen years of age. Their son would then become king of Portugal.59 Of the wedding itself Ayala has little to say: "É alli fueron fechas grandes fiestas estando y los Señores e Ricos omes e cavalleros de Portugal e muchos de Castilla."60 According to Fernão Lopes, Juan I's wedding with Beatriz was due to the initiative of Queen Leonor, who was looking for support against Portugal's rebellious nobles, since Fernando I was dying. She was disillusioned upon meeting Juan I personally and remarked to Fernando's illegitimate brother, the Maestre D'Avis, on the day of Juan I's wedding, that she wished
he were more of a man.61

One motive for Juan's desire to become monarch of Portugal not mentioned by Ayala was to unite Portugal to the system of Franco-Castilian defenses and to deny the English access to European ports from Antwerp to Gibraltar. This policy, which gave Castile exclusive control over the route to Flanders, would excite the already hostile burghers of Oporto and Lisbon to open rebellion.62

The crisis arose with the death of Fernando I. Juan immediately had Fernando's brother, the Infante Don Juan, arrested in Castile, out of fear that the people of Portugal would claim him as king.63 He then sent men and arms into Portugal to enforce the agreement previously made with Fernando that he should be king and Leonor regent, until Beatriz's son was fourteen years old. Some of his advisers suggested that he go to Salamanca and negotiate his position. Ayala seems to have been one of them, to judge from his lengthy description of the advisability of a more conciliatory position.64 In Portugal, the regency of Leonor was partially controlled by "emperogilado" (i.e., Anti-Pedro) emigrants such as Juan Alfonso Baeza and Fernán Alfonso de Zamora. She was opposed by the Consejo Real of the realm. On December 3, 1383, her lover, Juan Ferrández de Andeiro, was assassinated in the Queen's chamber by the Maestre D'Avis, who was extremely popular in Lisbon.65 A Bishop of Lisbon, originally from Zamora, who had been a privado of Fernando I, was killed by a mob
in the bell tower of the main church where he had taken refuge after hearing of Andeiro's death. Queen Leonor, upon seeing the gravity of her position, made a deal with d'Avis and escaped to Santarém. The people of Lisbon clamored for d'Avis as regent for either Don Juan, Fernando's brother, or Doña Beatriz, Fernando's daughter and wife of Juan I of Castile. 66

While Juan I was in Portugal attempting to aid the desperate Doña Leonor, he learned that she, her brother, Don Gonzalo Méndez de Vasconcelos, and Juan I's cousin, the Count of Trastamara, were conspiring to assassinate him and proclaim the Count as King of Portugal. 67 Ayala states that the question of whether or not to arrest her was bitterly debated by Juan's advisers. Those against such a measure maintained that she had previously handed over Santarém to Juan willingly. Those in favor of arresting her wanted her safe in Castile, where she could cause no trouble. 68 Ayala seems to have been against her arrest. However, she was taken to Castile and shut up in the convent of Santa Clara de Tordesillas, a measure which caused her supporters in Portugal to join the forces of d'Avis. 69

1384 and 1385 are the years of major catastrophe in Juan's designs in Portugal. Ayala describes the period in minute detail—the plague in the Castilian forces besieging Lisbon, which took over two thousand lives; the failure of a Castilian blockade, when a heroic Portuguese nobleman sacrificed himself and several small ships to permit
the entry of a convoy bringing goods from Oporto to Lisbon; and finally the humiliating Castilian defeat at Aljubarrota. Ayala's accounts of the entire war are extremely objective—but this is not surprising, since he himself obviously was against the war in the first place. Ayala attempted to show why the war was absurd without openly criticizing Juan I, whom he admired in all other aspects.

One method which Ayala uses to present his dissention is by reporting discussions between Juan I and his advisers, specifying clearly the pros and cons of a certain question and then adding a phrase which indicates that he himself was not in agreement with the final decision. One example of this was in 1384, when Juan I returned to Lisbon and found that the Castilian camp was being ravaged by plague. He then called the advisers together to determine whether to besiege the city or to make war throughout other areas of Portugal. Those against staying in Lisbon were mainly concerned with the plague, but also mentioned that without an effective blockade, the siege was ineffective. Those in favor of fighting in Lisbon wanted to capture d'Avis and Lisbon since he was the leader of the opposition, while Lisbon was the center of the supply lines of Portugal. Juan I decided to continue the siege. Ayala ends the passage with these words: "E fue muy grand dano, segund adelante oiredes." 70

Another method which Ayala uses to indicate his personal opinion without expressing it directly, is by pre-
senting the arguments for his views in more detail. For instance, in 1385, Juan I held a council meeting to decide whether to enter Portugal with a full force to meet d'Avis, who was advancing toward Coimbra, or to leave fronteros and withdraw the main Castilian force. The argument in favor of a full-scale invasion is only that d'Avis would not dare to fight a full force. Those opposed to the invasion had several arguments: if the king died, no one could lead his troops, since the other leaders had died of the plague; Juan's captains were young and inexperienced; d'Avis was brave and would most certainly fight. In addition, Juan did not have enough money to pay those soldiers holding towns; if they actually saw him without money, they would rebel. He should distribute goods from the ships to various posts and return to Castile. Juan decided to enter Portugal.71

Ayala's account of the disaster of Aljubarrota is a long description of prudent battle technique. In this case Juan was advised to have the Castilian force let the Portuguese attack first. This defensive policy was more practical because of a valley in front of the two wings of the Castilian formation, which would hinder any offensive action. Also the Portuguese only had one day's supply of food and would have to attack. An old and experienced French knight was in complete agreement. However, some young knights who had never been in battle convinced the king that this was cowardly; thus, the Castilians took the offensive. The passage dealing with Aljubarrota ends
thus: "E duró la porfia de la batalla, antes que pare-
ciese cuales perdian o ganaban, media hora asaz pequeña."\textsuperscript{72}

Ayala also makes it clear that Juan's claim to Portu-
gal was extremely unpopular with the Portuguese. In 1383, 
Juan I sent a knight of Santiago, Alfonso López de Tejada, 
to take letters to the Queen of Portugal and the important 
nobles, asking that they obey the agreement made between 
him and Fernando I. All professed agreement. Ayala then 
says: "empero avia algunos que maguer asi lo decian, non 
lo tenian en voluntad."\textsuperscript{73} After Fernando's death, Don 
Enrique Manuel, Count of Sintra, went through the streets 
in Lisbon with a banner crying "Real, Real, Portogal, 
Portogal por la Reina Doña Beatriz."\textsuperscript{74} Ayala states that 
many knights were upset and feared the union of Castile 
and Portugal.\textsuperscript{75} Over d'Avis' usurpation of the Portuguese 
monarchy in 1385, Ayala states: "e plogo dello a todos 
los mas del Regno de Portogal, asi cibdades e villas, como 
Fijos-dalgo e otros, salvo aquellos que tenian la parte del 
Rey de Castilla, e de la Reyna Dona Beatriz..."\textsuperscript{76}

In 1386, Castile was recovering from the effects of 
the plague and Aljubarrota, when Juan learned that the Duke 
of Lancaster was in Galicia.\textsuperscript{77} Lancaster and D'Avis met 
at Oporto and agreed to make war on Castile in full force. 
D'Avis, a Cistercian monk, should obtain a Papal dispensa-
tion and marry Philippa, Lancaster's daughter. D'Avis 
would be rewarded with towns and villages in Castile. Lan-
caster agreed to make no treaty with Juan I without con-
sulting D'Avis first—a promise which he promptly broke.78

The Anglo-Portuguese advance began in the summer of 1387. The Castilians were saved by a plague which forced the invaders to return to Portugal.79 D'Avis' aspirations were abruptly frustrated with the Anglo-Castilian agreement signed at Bayonne in 1388. In 1389, D'Avis and Juan I signed a six-year non-aggression treaty which followed a three-year Anglo-French peace treaty. Portugal would return all lands taken in Galicia, and Juan would return lands taken in Portugal.80

That Juan I was extremely unhappy over this peace treaty is evident in Ayala's recording of the year 1390. Ayala explains in detail Juan's plans, which he had been formulating for six years, to leave his kingdom to his son, Enrique. Juan planned to retain Seville and Cordoba, the Diocese of Jaen, the kingdom of Murcia and the Señorío of Vizcaya. His reasons were the following: All Portugal refused him as king, because people feared the union of Castile and Portugal. Therefore, he would keep many territories but not the title of king of Castile. Finally, he wanted to organize everything for Enrique, who was young. Ayala's presentation of the Consejo's answer represents a definite, unanimous NO to Juan's request. He mentions the evils of partitioning kingdoms, using the example of the wars caused by the partitions of Fernando el Magno. The Portuguese do not want Juan I; if he cannot subdue them as the powerful king of Castile and León, how
can he hope to succeed without this title? In addition, it was bad policy to have two separated areas such as Andalusia and Vizcaya under one monarch with Castile under another. Ayala uses the simile of bees to illustrate that the hive functions better under one queen. If Enrique were monarch, Castile would be severed by a division of command. When Enrique came of age, his desire to possess all of Castile would most likely lead to a new civil war. Also any son of Juan I and his Portuguese wife, Beatriz, would also want to inherit Juan's land in Castile. If Juan did not manage to become ruler of Portugal and the Moors attacked, he would not be able to defend his reduced possessions. The Consejo's final argument was that a king does not rule wisely until the age of 25, and the Infante Don Enrique was still a child. 81

Although the Consejo was able to convince Juan I to abandon this fantastic scheme, the Castilian monarch still planned to settle accounts with Portugal. At the Cortes of Guadalajara, Juan I made it clear that the war with Portugal was definitely not finished. To those who complained about the loss of cities and honor, the monarch responded that the realm was weary of war and taxes, and good captains were lacking. All should rest for six years, after which period he would certainly renew the war. 82

The Portuguese crisis of 1383 revealed an internal debility which had lain dormant beneath the victories of the previous fifteen years---a victory of the nobility and
reconstruction of the country based on a new signorial regime. Under Juan I of Castile the nobility continued triumphant; in Portugal the middle-class was victorious.83

Ayala saw clearly the folly of Juan I's Portuguese policy. However, he, as a member of the signorial class, did not appreciate the importance of D'Avis' victory in Portugal as a triumph for the third estate in that country.

Castile and the Anglo-French Struggle

After the peace with Navarre in 1379, Castile turned its eyes once again to England, since the war with the English involved the most vital economic interests of the kingdom. The British military situation improved, when Charles VI of France alienated the population of Brittany by incorporating that land to the French crown.84 Castile sent eight galleys to help the French king against the English, who were aiding the Duke of Brittany. The Franco-Castilian force took the castle of La Roche Guyon at the mouth of the Loire, a fortress which had belonged to the Duke of Brittany.85

From the beginning of 1380, the government of Richard II was willing to accept Aragonese mediation for peace in Castile. The Castilians, however, were unwilling to give up their traditional Francophile policies for neutrality. Ayala reports Enrique II's desire that Juan I continue his pro-French policy, whereupon messengers were sent to Charles V.86 Ayala himself was one of the ambassadors
to the French court, a fact which explains his own Franco-
phile position. He held this post intermittently from
1378 until 1384, and it is now believed that he spent one
and a half years--from April 1381, until the end of 1382,
in France in close contact with the French court. 87

In 1380 the new king sent 20 galleys under the Castilian
admiral Ferrand Sánchez de Tovar to aid Charles V. The
Franco-Castilian fleet attacked the coasts of southern
England, pillaged Winchelsea and even entered the mouth
of the Thames. 88 This, however, was the high point of the
maritime threat to the English presented by the Franco-
Castilian alliance. With the death of the energetic
French monarch, Charles V, and the Castilian involvement
in Portugal, the control over English Channel--so important
for the maritime cities of Castile--was left to private
initiative. 89

In 1381 Castile became involved in the war with Portu-
gal, and thus with the English, who were sending men to
Portugal under Edmund of Cambridge. 90 Since Juan I knew
that the Portuguese and English were gathering horses and
mules for an invasion of Castile, he kept his own companies
together for six months near the Portuguese border. 91

Later, English designs in the peninsula were foiled by the
secret alliance between Fernando I and Juan I in 1382.

While Castile was involved with Portugal, Flanders
became the major scene of the Anglo-French discord. Ayala
describes the situation in some detail, which indicates
that he was probably present. The Flemings rebelled against the Count of Flanders and defeated him near Bruges. The Count sought aid from Charles VI, thirteen year old monarch of France, who went with his uncles, the Dukes of Berry, Burgundy and Bourbon to crush the rebellion. Ayala describes the care taken of the youthful king and the honors given to twenty-six French knights who died in battle. Ayala was at the battle as camarero of Charles VI—a fact which indicates his influence in the French court. 92

The fall of Bruges in 1382 provoked a collapse in international relations. France's interest in the rebellion was based on the fact that the Duke of Burgundy was heir to Flanders. Castile's interest was to protect Bruges, which was the principal market for Castilian exports. The battle of Roosebeke on Nov. 27, 1382, permitted Castile to establish a monopoly in wool commerce. 93

An English counter-offensive took place in 1383, when a huge force entered Flanders and encircled Ypres, a French possession; Ghent supported the invaders. Charles VI sent 22,000 men—the best knights of France, including the Dukes of Berry, Burgundy and Bourbon. Ayala says that the Duke of Brittany arranged a treaty, when it was clear that the English cause was lost—a fact which proved that he favored the English, according to Ayala. 94

That Ayala was on his way to France in 1384 is known by the existence of a safe-conduct pass issued to him on February 17 of that year. 95 Ayala was at the side of the
Dukes of Berry and Burgundy when the Treaty of Boulogne was signed between France and England in September of 1384. In May of the same year, the Count of Flanders had confirmed Spanish economic privileges in Flanders. The route to Flanders had come to be the spinal column of Castilian economy. Ayala does not mention either agreement in the chronicle. His portrayal of the Flemish situation is an account of glorious, chivalric warfare, while the economic aspects of Castile's interest in Flanders are completely ignored.

In 1385 the Iberian peninsula once again became a main center of the Anglo-French struggle. The failure of the siege of Lisbon by the Castilians awakened the merchants of London, who saw in the victory of the Maestre D'Avis a chance to break the Castilian economic monopoly of the Atlantic. The Duke of Lancaster decided to take advantage of the opportunity to assert his claim to Castile, and was prepared to help D'Avis. Juan I reacted by asking Charles VI to aid.

A treaty between England and Portugal had been signed on May 9, 1385, at Windsor. Lancaster agreed not to make peace with Juan I except for an indemnity of 200,000 pounds, enough to cover the deficit for the mobilization of a great fleet. England, meanwhile, looked to En Pere of Aragon for an alliance, but the king of Aragon maintained strict neutrality, and even offered to mediate between Lancaster and Juan I. An agreement between Richard II and the Duke
of Lancaster at Westminster on April 38, 1386, contained clauses to assure liberty of commerce in the future between the respective monarchies. This brought about the active support of London merchants, who had traditionally been opposed to Lancaster's designs in the Iberian peninsula.\textsuperscript{101}

The British fleet left Plymouth on July 8, 1386, and immediately took La Coruña—the first British victory since the battle of La Rochelle. Santiago de Compostela was captured, Urban VI proclaimed Pope, and the city of Orense was converted into a temporary court for the English. During 1386 the British were negotiating with both the Castilians and the Portuguese. An agreement was made with Portugal at the Ponte do Moura, in which Lancaster, upon taking the Castilian throne, would alter the frontier of Castile to give Portugal more territory. The line would be drawn through Ledesma, Plasencia, Cáceres, Mérida and Zafre.\textsuperscript{102}

A pestilence in his troops caused the Duke of Lancaster to seek a secret treaty with Castile. In an exchange of heralds, Juan I and the Duke each gave his reason for claiming the Castilian crown. Juan based his claim on his descent from Fernando de la Cerda, and offered to settle the question in hand-to-hand combat in order to avoid shedding more Christian blood. Lancaster claimed the throne through his marriage to Pedro I's daughter, Constanza, and through Doña Leonor, Fernando el Santo's daughter, who had married the King of England. Secretly they proposed
a solution of the problem by an agreement to have Juan's first-born son, Enrique, marry Catalina, daughter of Lancaster and Constanza. ¹⁰³ This time England betrayed Portugal by signing the Treaty of Bayonne in 1388 with Castile. The provisions of the treaty were the following: Both monarchs would work for peace between England and France, and for the union of the Papacy. Enrique of Castile would marry Catalina of England within two months. The couple would receive Soria, Almazán, Atienza, Deza and Molina; Juan should declare Enrique and Catalina his heirs at the Cortes. Lancaster and Constanza would get 600,000 gold francs and 40,000 francs per year for the rest of their lives; Castile would not increase galley contributions to France. Pedro's sons, whom Enrique II had arrested, would be released within two years; and goods previously confiscated would be returned to Pedro de Castro, Ferrando de Castro's son; all Castilians who had helped Lancaster would be pardoned. Inheritance of Castile would go in the following order; Enrique; Enrique's sons; Fernando, Juan I's second son; other relatives of Juan I; the Duke and Duchess of Lancaster and their daughter, Catalina. Lancaster would renounce his right to the Castilian crown for as long as he received payments from Castile; Juan gave his brother, Fadrique, and other knights as hostages until certain debts were paid. Constanza would receive Guadalajara, Medina del Campo and Olmedo. ¹⁰⁴

After the Treaty of Bayonne, Lancaster attempted to
weaken Anglo-French ties even further. He proposed, for example, that English pilgrims and merchants be permitted to go to Santiago de Compostela, but the Castilians feared doing anything which would violate the Franco-Castilian alliance. 105

By 1389 exhaustion was general in most of Europe. A three-year peace treaty was signed between England and France, followed by a six-year treaty between Castile and Portugal. The treaty with Granada was even extended in 1390 immediately before Juan I's death. Juan's feelings of any further war against the infidel at that moment are expressed by Ayala's explanation of the treaty: "E el Rey, entendiendo que en aquel tiempo así complia a su servicio, otorgólo e firmó con él sus treguas por cierto tiempo." 106

Conclusion

Pero López de Ayala presented the Portuguese situation in a clearly objective manner, because he himself was against Castilian policy, while sympathizing with Juan I as a man. His detailed reports of the discussions in the King's council indicate that he was present at council debates and in respect to Portugal was mostly against Juan I's final decisions.

In respect to England and France, Ayala was much more partial. He neglects to admit that the treaty of Bayonne, signed in 1388 after a long war, could have been signed
much sooner, if Juan I had bellowed in Pere's policy of neutrality in regard to the Papacy and the struggle between England and France. In fact, the idea of neutrality is never even mentioned in the chronicle.

In Castile itself, Ayala slights the importance of the laws enacted in the Cortes which provided for the basis of national rather than signorial rule of the kingdom. And his family position kept him from appreciating the contributions of the third estate. However, it must be added that Ayala was in Portugal during the period between 1385-1388, when the Cortes reached their highest point of development.
Footnotes

1. Pero López de Ayala, Crónica del Rey Don Juan I, Biblioteca de Autores Españoles LXVII, Madrid, 1877, Year 1, Chapter I.


3. Juan I, Yr. 12, Ch. XIII.

4. Juan I, Yr. 12, Ch. XIV.


7. Juan I, Yr. 2, Ch. VIII.


10. Juan I, Yr. 12, Ch. VII.

11. Juan I, Yr. 12, Ch. XII.

12. Juan I, Yr. 6, Ch. XII.

13. Juan I, Yr. 6, Ch. XII.

14. Juan I, Yr. 1, Ch. III.

15. Cortes, pp. 311-312.


17. Historia de España XIV, pp. 204-205.

18. Juan I, Yr. 2, Ch. IV.

19. Juan I, Yr. 3, Ch. III.

20. Juan I, Yr. 4, Ch. I.

21. Juan I, Yr. 5, Ch. VII.
22. Juan I, Yr. 7, Ch. IV.
23. Juan I, Yr. 7, Ch. V.
25. Juan I, Yr. 8, Ch. IV.
27. Cortes, p. 335.
28. Cortes, p. 381.
31. Suárez Fernández, p. 36.
33. Cortes, p. 461.
34. Juan I, Yr. 12, Ch. VI.
36. Juan I, Yr. 10, Ch. I.
38. Juan I, Yr. 12, Ch. V-VI.
40. Historia de España XIV, p. 238.
41. Juan I, Yr. 12, Ch. XX.
42. Cortes, pp. 309-313; 332-359.
43. Juan I, Yr. 2, Ch. VI.
44. Juan I, Yr. 5, Ch. II.
45. Historia de España XIV, p. 236.
46. Juan I, Yr. 12, Ch. XX.
47. Historia de España XIV, p. 217.

49. Jerónimo Zurita y Castro, Anales de la Corona de Aragón II, Zaragoza, 1610, p. 375.

50. **Juan I**, Yr. 5, Ch. VII.

51. **Juan I**, Yr. 8, Ch. XI.

52. **Juan I**, Yr. 3, Ch. II.

53. **Juan I**, Yr. 2, Ch. III.


55. **Historia de España** XIV, p. 221.

56. **Juan I**, Yr. 4, Ch. II.

57. Russell, pp. 312; 319-321.


59. **Juan I**, Yr. 4, Ch. IV.

60. **Juan I**, Yr. 5, Ch. I.


63. **Juan I**, Yr. 5, Ch. VII.

64. **Juan I**, Yr. 5, Ch. IX.

65. **Historia de España** XIV, p. 244; **Juan I**, Yr. 5, Ch. XIV.

66. **Juan I**, Yr. 5, Ch. XIV.


68. **Juan I**, Yr. 6, Ch. VII.

69. **Historia de España** XIV, p. 248.

70. **Juan I**, Yr. 9, Ch. VII.

71. **Juan I**, Yr. 7, Ch. XI.
72. Juan I, Yr. 7, Ch. XI.
73. Juan I, Yr. 7, Ch. XIV.
74. Juan I, Yr. 5, Ch. XIII.
75. Juan I, Yr. 5, Ch. XIII.
76. Juan I, Yr. 7, Ch. VI.
77. Juan I, Yr. 8, Ch. VI.
78. Juan I, Yr. 9, Ch. II-III.
79. Juan I, Yr. 9, Ch. II-III.
80. Juan I, Yr. 11, Ch. VI.
81. Juan I, Yr. 12, Ch. II.
82. Juan I, Yr. 12, Ch. III.
83. Historia de España XIV, p. 245.
84. Historia de España XIV, p. 211.
85. Juan I, Yr. 1, Ch. II.
86. Juan I, Yr. 1, Ch. V.
88. Juan I, Yr. 2, Ch. I; Historia de España XIV, p. 212.
89. Historia de España XIV, p. 213.
90. Juan I, Yr. 3, Ch. II.
91. Juan I, Yr. 3, Ch. V.
92. Juan I, Yr. 4, Ch. VI.
94. Juan I, Yr. 5, Ch. XV.
95. López de Meneses, p. 125.
97. Historia de España XIV, p. 239.


99. Juan I, Yr. 7, Ch. XX.

100. Russell, p. 408.


103. Juan I, Yr. 8, Ch. X.

104. Juan I, Yr. 11, Ch. III.

105. Juan I, Yr. 11, Ch. III.

106. Juan I, Yr. 12, Ch. XV.
CHAPTER VI

LA CRÓNICA DEL REY DON ENRIQUE III

When Enrique III became monarch of Castile in 1390 at the age of eleven, he found a kingdom whose treasury was exhausted and whose nobles were anxiously waiting to take advantage of the youthful king for their own profit. Ayala describes the first seven turbulent years of Enrique's reign in minute detail, and in this chronicle, more than any of the preceding ones, we can see that the chronicler was completely loyal to the crown and openly critical of those rapacious nobles who opposed the authority of the king.

The Archbishop of Toledo versus the Archbishop of Santiago

After Juan I's burial, nobles, prelates and representatives of the towns gathered in Madrid to set up a regency, since Enrique III could not rule until he was fourteen years old. The problem immediately arose as to what sort of government should rule the kingdom in the king's name. Ayala mentions that Juan I had made a will while he was in Portugal, which Ayala and others had signed as witnesses. Because all knew that Juan I had later
changed his mind about many provisions of this will, it was decided that even if it were found, it should be ignored. Two forms of government were proposed—rule of regents or rule by consejo. The Archbishop of Toledo proposed following the Segunda Partida of Alfonso X, in which it was stated that one, three or five regents be appointed if a monarch died without leaving a will and while the heir to the throne was too young to rule. The Archbishop of Santiago and many others, including Ayala, favored rule by consejo with all classes represented. Ayala's viewpoint here is evident, since he mentions the model of Charles VI of France, who had a Consejo until he was twenty years of age. Ayala also emphasizes the bad results of "tutores" and "regidores" in the history of Castile and Leon. 

"...e facieron muy grandes sinrazones e muertes e robos en el Regno, por lo qual grand tiempo lazeró el Regno, fasta que el Rey ovo edad de catorce anos que tomó su regimiento e cesaron las tutorías."

No decision had been reached in the conflict between a consejo and tutorial regency, when several nobles, including Ayala, found Juan I's will in an old coffer. Most of the nobles were displeased with the discovery, since Juan I had later changed many decisions in it, including the regents he had named. Most of those present were in favor of burning the will, but the Archbishop intervened with the excuse that some donations to the church were found in it. He then kept it himself.
The will presented no immediate problem, however, and the conflict continued to flare between those who preferred the Segunda Partida and those who preferred a consejo. Besides the Archbishop of Toledo, those who preferred this form of rule were mainly those of the upper nobility such as the king's relatives, who, according to Ayala, wanted more influence than other knights and prelates. The Archbishop of Santiago led the lower nobility and the third estate, who preferred a consejo in order to keep the upper nobility from having too much power.3

The final acceptance of a consejo was a triumph for the Archbishop of Santiago. Ayala himself was one of the advisers named along with the Duke of Benavente, the Count of Trastamara, the Archbishops of Toledo and Santiago and others. To the eight nobles, there were to be fourteen representatives of the cities, a seemingly great victory for the third estate. This victory was only apparent, however, for the consejo was mistrusted and therefore rendered almost impotent by numerous restrictions. Advisers were not to give or take away privileges other than those designated by Juan I at the Cortes of Guadalajara; no government positions could be given or taken away, except upon the request of the citizens of the towns involved; Juan I's foreign policy was to be followed; no taxes could be levied, unless absolutely necessary and then only after the approval of the Cortes. All letters had to be signed by four regents, one from each estate. With the
rivalries between the members of the consejo, this was not an easy task. Ayala says "É luego se comenzó todo esto a guardar bien, empero adelante non se guardó tan bien."4

The procuradores did manage to take momentary advantage of the strife between the various factions of the nobility in order to pass a law devaluing the coins called blancos, which had been created by Juan I when he needed money. Ayala agreed with this measure, whereas many nobles were opposed to it. "É todas las gentes del Regno se queixaban con aquella moneda, ca las cosas valían grandes sumas, e las tierras e mercedes que los Señores e Caballeros e otros omes avian de los Reyes no les aprovechaban, por quanto ge lo daban segund la cuenta de la dicha moneda, e les daba en paga aquellos blancos."5

The effectiveness of the regency was almost immediately impaired by the Archbishop of Toledo, who had been in favor of the Segunda Partida and therefore refused to swear loyalty to the Consejo. After great pressure was put on him by the other members, he finally agreed to cooperate in order not to cause a scandal throughout the kingdom. According to Ayala, he acquiesced because one of the procuradores warned him that his life would be in danger if he did not do so. The Archbishop then left the court in Madrid and began sending letters to the Pope, to the Cardinals, to the kings of France and Aragon and to those whom Juan had named as tutors in the will, saying that the Con-
sejo was not valid, because Juan I had left a will designating regents for his son. He enclosed copies of the will in the letters and kept the original document. The conflict was aggravated further when the ruling body began handing out jobs and lands against the provisions accepted at the Cortes of Madrid. The kingdom inevitably divided into those in favor of the will and those in favor of the Consejo. Ayala stresses the gravity of this situation by saying that every city and town had two parties - "E cada partida decia sus razones asaz fuertes para afirmar su opinión, e sobre esto avia muchas contiendas e escándalos. E ovo en muchos logares por esta razón muertes e peleas, e los que podian mas echaban a los otros de la cibdad o villa do estaban, e tomaban los dinero del Rey e avia poca avenancia e obediencia en todo el Regno, e muchos escándalos, e mucha discordia."  

Those who were on the Consejo were forced to promise more lands and privileges than those granted by Juan I, in order to have followers. "E de aquí se comenzó mucho a desgastar e desordenar el Regno... E los Cavalleros del Regno, desque vieron tal desordenamiento, no curaban de nada, e todo se robaba e coechaba." The city of Burgos proposed a meeting of the Cortes in that city to settle this scandalous affair. An agreement was finally reached, which represented a resounding victory for the Archbishop of Toledo and his followers. It was decided that rule by Consejo be abandoned and that Juan I's will be followed
with certain modifications. Ayala praises the role of
the third estate of the city of Burgos in arranging a
solution. "Todo esto se hizo muy bien, e con grand costa
de la cibdad de Burgos, por guardar servicio del Rey e del
Regno."\textsuperscript{10}

Ayala presents the will of Juan I in its entirety in
the chronicle. Six regents were named: the Marqués de
Villena, the Archbishop of Toledo, the Archbishop of San-
tiago, the Maestre de Calatrava, the Count of Niebla and
Juan Furtado de Mendoza, plus six citizens from Burgos,
Toledo, Leon, Seville, Cordoba and Murcia. Ayala, as
Alférez de la Banda, was one of the witnesses who signed
the will.\textsuperscript{11} At the Cortes of Burgos, it was agreed to in-
crease the number of regents from six to nine, so that the
Duke of Benavente, the Count of Trastamara and Maestre de
Santiago could be included.\textsuperscript{12}

The great problem which rule according to Juan I's
will created was how to resolve situations in which Juan's
orders given after the will was written conflicted with
the provisions of the will itself. For example, Juan Al-
fonso de Guzmán, Count of Niebla, was one of the six ori-
ginal regents named. Later, however, he was made Adelantado
Mayor de la Frontera: no adelantado could be a tutor, so
therefore he was ineligible for that post. Similar situa-
tions arose in the granting of lands and privileges. In
the will, Medina del Campo and Olmedo were to be given to
Juan's second son, the Infante Don Ferrando. Meanwhile
those lands were given to Pedro I's daughter, Constanza, following the treaty between Castile and England, signed several years after the will was written.13

As one can well imagine, numerous conflicts of this sort caused incessant strife throughout the kingdom. Ayala says that many provisions were made in conflict with what Juan I had designated in the will in order to keep people happy and to avoid scandals. Ayala's view of the effectiveness of the regents is expressed in a few words: "E con todo esto los dichos tutores nunca eran entre si bien avenidos, e cada uno queria ayudar al que bien queria, e por ende muchas vegadas se olvidaba el provecho e bien comunel."14

The young king was so disgusted with the regents that he went to Burgos in 1379, several months before his fourteenth birthday, and publicly announced at the monastery of Las Huelgas that he was going to rule by himself.15 After his fourteenth birthday, he convoked the Cortes at Madrid and immediately revoked all laws made by the regents.

The end of the regency marked a definite victory for the Archbishop of Toledo, who became privado to Enrique, while the Archbishop of Santiago began to lose influence in the governing of the kingdom. The latter joined forces with his former enemies, the king's family, who were also distressed about the influence of the Archbishop of Toledo. Ayala says that the Archbishop of Santiago finally left
Castile, lost his possessions and allied himself with the Roman Pope.¹⁶

Ayala was actually impartial in this struggle between the two prelates, although he had been allied to the Archbishop of Santiago as long as the kingdom was being ruled by the Consejo. Ayala's opinion of the dispute between these two personalities is expressed in the following words: "E nin la una partida, nin la otra no facian mención de la manera de governamiento que avian primero tomado, que era el Consejo, nin curaba de ello."¹⁷ Of the two Archbishops Ayala says: "Fecnado ne a el agraz Ferrezuelo a Manchagaz; pero si Manchagaz se suelta, Ferrezuelo es en revuelta."¹⁸

The Upper Nobility

Enrique's uncles, the Duke of Benavente and the Count of Noreña; his aunt, Leonor, Queen of Navarra; and his second cousin, the Count of Trastamara were intimately involved in the affairs of the regency and reign of Castile. They tried to take advantage of the monarch's youth in order to gain more lands and privileges for themselves, and were therefore constantly opposed to the crown, which depended largely on the lesser nobility and the bourgeoisie for support.

In 1390, when Enrique became king, Fadrique, duke of Benavente, and Pedro, Count of Trastamara, refused to pay homage to him until all of their privileges were confirmed.¹⁹
Fadrique then tried to increase his power by demanding to be married to the Countess of Alburquerque, the woman with most lands and money in Castile. Because such a marriage would have jeopardized the position of the monarch, it was decided that the Countess marry Enrique's brother, the Infante Don Ferrando.20

During the discussions at the Cortes of Madrid in 1391, Fadrique and Pedro favored the system specified in the Segunda Partida, one, three or five regents—themselves included. When the Consejo was accepted as the form of rule, both joined the opposition and allied themselves to the Archbishop of Toledo.

After the agreement at Burgos, which increased the number of regents from six to nine, a problem arose when the members of the Consejo decided to liberate the brother of the Duke of Benavente, Alfonso, Count of Noreña, who had been imprisoned under Juan I. This was done so that Alfonso would join the faction of the Archbishop of Santiago against the Archbishop of Toledo. A stalemate was reached when the Archbishop of Santiago's faction insisted on increasing the number of regents to ten in order to place Alfonso on the governing body.21

In 1392 the Queen of Navarra resolved the situation by convincing Pedro and Fadrique that Alfonso's alliance to the Archbishop of Santiago was only temporary and that the four relatives should be united. Two groups of regents were finally agreed upon, each group ruling for six months.
One group was to be made up of Fadrique, the Archbishop of Toledo, the Maestre de Santiago, and Juan Furtado de Mendoza. The other consisted of Alfonso, Pedro, the Archbishop of Santiago and the Maestre de Calatrava. Two other regents, the Marqués de Villena and the Count of Niebla, were disregarded, since they had refused to appear at court.  

Fadrique caused further trouble by threatening to marry the illegitimate daughter of the Maestre D'Avis, who had seized the throne of Portugal. The other regents, including his ally, the Archbishop of Toledo, begged him not to take a step which would ruin the honor of Castile. Fadrique's insistence on such a tie caused great concern in the kingdom, due to the hostile relations between Castile and Portugal. Fadrique kept responding that he mistrusted the king's advisers and sought aid from Portugal. Ayala's reaction to Fadrique's flimsy excuse is precisely expressed in the words "...aquellas imaginaciones que tenia." It was finally agreed that Fadrique receive more money each year, plus an additional sum to help him find a suitable wife in place of the Maestre's daughter.

When Enrique III took personal control of the kingdom after three disastrous years of regency, he decided to cancel all privileges distributed during the regency and revert to Juan I's instructions in all financial matters. This procedure was necessary for stabilizing the regime; however, it alienated the members of the upper nobility.
whose allotments were considerably reduced. 26

Fadrique began sending letters to small villages and towns, demanding that they pay taxes to him rather than to the king. If the citizens refused, they would be arrested. Ayala states that those villages which disobeyed were greatly harmed. 27 The king also learned of conspiracies between Fadrique, Pedro, Alfonso and the Queen of Navarre, and therefore sent a messenger to investigate the situation. An agreement was finally reached between Enrique III and the Duke of Benavente under the following conditions: the Duke was to keep the taxes which covered any amount of money due to him and repay the rest; his yearly salary was to be substantially raised; however, he had to hand two of his castles over to the king, and his most important vassals had to swear to abandon his service in case of any hostilities between himself and the monarch. 28

No sooner had the agreements between the king and Benavente been settled when Pedro and Leonor of Navarre began to conspire. This time Enrique lost his patience and immediately had all the villages of Trastamara and Benavente confiscated. He then proceeded with one thousand men to pursue the Count, who escaped to Galicia. The Queen of Navarre was ordered to stop robbing territory of Castile, and her jurisdiction was restricted to a reduced area. 29

To make matters worse, Alfonso, Count of Noreña, began fortifying Gijón and Oviedo. Alfonso also used the excuse that the king was controlled by privados, and refused
to go to court until Enrique reached the age of twenty-five. En route to Asturias to punish Alfonso, Enrique stopped in Leon. There, after a solemn Mass in the Iglesia Mayor, he decided to confiscate all of Alfonso's possessions, giving the following reasons: The rebellious brother of Juan I had always caused trouble and had only been released as a political pawn during the regency. He had then received more money and land after his release than he had had under Enrique II or Juan I. Still he had left the court and was taking taxes for himself without the king's permission. He also refused to take an oath to obey the peace treaty with Portugal, and finally was fortifying his holdings throughout Asturias. Ayala emphasizes the pious attitude of the king at the time of this decision, thereby expressing overt approval of the king's actions: "E porque esto fuese cierto, que luego, presentes los que y estaban, lo juraba asi en las manos del Obispo de Leon, que alli estaba, sobre la Cruz e los Sanctos Evangelios." The king's troops took Oviedo and began the siege of Gijón with the aid of the Count of Trastámara, who had begged the king's pardon. Since winter was approaching, the king wished to end this siege as soon as possible. Finally he and Alfonso agreed to send ambassadors to the king of France within six months and let the French monarch arbitrate the dispute between them. During those months, the king would keep all of the Count's lands except Gijón, where Alfonso was to remain.
The meeting between the French king and the ambassadors of Enrique III and Alfonso took place in Paris in the summer of 1395. Ayala's long, detailed description of the proceedings is ample proof that he was one of the representatives of the Castilian monarch. There is no doubt about his own feelings in the matter, as is evident from the words of Enrique's ambassadors: "A lo que decía (Alfonso) quel Rey de Castilla le tomará la tierra de Asturias sin razón e sin derecho, a esto responderían ellos delante del Rey de Francia, non así como delante juez, mas como delante amigo del Rey de Castilla, su Señor, porque viese e oyese que lo quel Rey de Castilla hiciera, lo hiciera con razón e con derecho."32 To the Count's assertion that the young king was controlled by privados, Ayala says: "E el conde no ponia excusas ningunas que paresciesen razonables."33 Ayala adds that Alfonso secretly warned those of the French court that the privados of Castile were pro-English. Of this, the chronicler says: "E todo esto decía el Conde por poner alguna sospecha entre el Rey de Francia e el Rey de Castilla."34 Charles VI of France vacillated in his decision and attempted to prolong the period of compromise. Enrique's ambassadors, however, refused to extend the time limit without their king's permission, especially since many of the king's advisers had been opposed to placing an internal matter into another sovereign's hands for arbitration. Finally Charles VI ordered Alfonso to obey his king and refused
him aid of any sort--food, ships, arms or men. Enrique ended the threat of his rebellious uncle by having the town and castle of Gijón destroyed.35

The Jewish Problem

The situation of the Jews, which had become progressively worse since the reign of Enrique II. and which had been practically ignored by Ayala in previous chronicles, is presented quite openly in the Crónica del Rey Don Enrique III.

During 1391, the Consejo received a complaint from the Jewish community of Sevilla that a certain clergyman, el Arcediano de Ecija, was preaching public sermons against the Jews and exciting the population to an anti-Semitic frenzy. When two officials of the city had a man whipped who had done a great deal of harm to many Jews, the whole city tried to assassinate the officials. Ayala states that the fervor aroused by this zealous priest spread not only through the Castilian cities of Córdoba, Burgos, Toledo and Logroño, but also to the Aragonese cities of Barcelona, Valencia and Lérida. The aljamas were completely destroyed, and those few Jews who escaped remained miserably poor, because they had to give all their money to the great lords for protection.36 As to the motives for such behavior, Ayala uses a masterpiece of understatement: "E todo esto fue cobdicia de robar, segund paresció, mas que devocion."37 The chronicler adds that the Moors would have suffered the same fate, were it not
for the fact that the Castilians were afraid of reprisals against the Christian captives in Granada. Ayala mentions that the Archdeacon had preached such anti-Semitic sermons before Juan I's death, but that the discord among the rulers of the regime under the youthful Enrique had unleashed the barbaric passions of people who were unafraid of punishment.38

Ayala's presentation of the internal situation of Castile under Enrique is complete and told in great detail. He was disgusted at the discord between both the Prelates and the upper nobility and therefore took no one's side. He obviously resented the end of the Consejo, since he had been named as one of the original consejeros, and he openly proclaimed the superiority of this sort of rule over that of the regents.

Foreign Policy

Enrique III's youth and the internal problems caused by it led Castile to a period of pacifism in external affairs. One must also take into account the economic triumph which Castile had won in the Low Countries, under Juan I, and the increased trade which would be jeopardized by a foreign war. Finally the rising danger of the Ottoman Empire forced the Christian nations to attempt to form a common front against the new threat from the east.39
Navarre

Immediately before Juan I's death at the Cortes of Guadalajara in 1390, two ambassadors from Navarre arrived at the Castilian court with letters from Carlos III, Juan I's brother-in-law. He requested that Juan I send Leonor, his wife and Juan I's sister, back to her husband to live with him according to her matrimonial vows. She had been in Castile for two years, ostensibly due to illness, and refused to return to Navarre. Leonor insisted that her husband had treated her badly, that she had not been paid her monthly allowance, and that in order to live, she had been forced to pawn her jewels. She even feared that her life was in danger and that a Jewish doctor at the court of Navarre had tried to poison her.¹⁰

Juan I's counselors advised that she return to Navarre, if Carlos III agreed to take an oath to guard her safety and to hand over certain areas to Castile as security. The Navarrese ambassadors naturally refused to accept these conditions, since Navarre could lose these lands through one word from the Queen. Ayala emphasizes Juan I's bewilderment in this matter, because he was extremely fond of his sister, but also was desirous of seeing her live as a Christian wife. Ayala also mentions the fact that some of those who were with Leonor in Navarre considered this fear of poisoning to be a figment of her own imagination. A compromise was finally agreed upon to send Juana,
Leonor's first-born daughter, to her father in Navarre. This was important to Carlos III because he still had no legitimate sons and was not likely to have any under the existing situation. He therefore wanted to be certain that his first-born daughter marry someone of whom he approved. If she remained in Castile, he would have no choice in this matter.41

During the first year of the regency, Enrique III received ambassadors from several kingdoms, among whom were ambassadors from Navarre. They continued to plead with Enrique to force his aunt to return to her husband. Because of Leonor's meddling in internal Castilian affairs, Enrique finally forced her to return to Navarre at the beginning of 1395, thereby resolving a situation which had been causing ill will between Castile and Navarre for nearly seven years. Two bishops, legates of Benedict XIII, witnessed the oath of Carlos III not to harm his wife. It was understood that Castile would attack Navarre if anything happened to the Queen. Ayala adds that the king of Navarre received the Queen and her company very well, a note which seems to indicate that her fears were probably imaginary and that Enrique III had done well to send her out of Castile.42

Portugal

Enrique III sent ambassadors to Portugal in 1392 in order to extend the peace treaty with João I (the
Maestre D'Avis). They returned reporting no agreement, and blamed this on Fadrique, because of his scheme to marry D'Avis' illegitimate daughter. D'Avis, seeing the dissension in the Castilian nobility, wanted to demand more favorable terms for Portugal before granting an extension of the treaties. Enrique then sent a new group of ambassadors, including Ayala, to Portugal.\textsuperscript{43} The meetings were held in a neutral town near Ciudad Rodrigo. The Portuguese tried to use Fadrique as a bargaining power, which seems to have aroused the wrath of the Castilian ambassadors. Their reply is a statement typical of Ayala: "...que puesto en la guerra pasada oviéra algunas perdidas, que esto era aventura de guerras e tiempos que adolescéan los Regnos, ellos Principes e los Señores; e quando Dios place aderésza sus fechos, e despues, como el doliente guaresce, asi guarescen e tornan sus fechos e sus honras contra sus adversarios....e que les era mejor aver sosiego, que poner bollicos en estos fechos."\textsuperscript{44} The influence of Divine Will is often used by Ayala to explain historical events; here he uses it as a warning to the enemies of Castile. Though the Portuguese tried to delay settlement until seeing what further action the Duke of Benavente would take, the Castilians managed to arrange a two-month interim, which was later prolonged.\textsuperscript{45} Ayala here seems to have been partly responsible for Castile's diplomatic success, since the first ambassadors had failed to bring about an extension of the treaties.
The Portuguese, however, continued to demand terms humiliating to the Castilians—the return of two neutral towns to Portugal; twelve noblemen and twelve citizens as hostages for twelve years; a promise from Enrique III not to aid or grant favors to his mother, Beatriz of Portugal, or to the Infantes Don Juan and Don Donis, sons of Pedro of Portugal, who were in Castile. Ayala states that Castile acceded to Portuguese demands because of Enrique's youth, fear of an alliance between D'Avis and Fadrique and lack of funds in the Castilian treasury. Ayala also makes it clear that the treaty and its conditions were discussed thoroughly in the Consejo before the ambassadors were permitted to sign it. The fact that Castile at this point was willing to suffer a grave affront to its honor indicates that the kingdom was far too exhausted for war. The peace treaty was finally signed in May of 1393, and was to last for fifteen years.\(^6\)

Granada

Luis Suárez Fernández cites Enrique III's most bellicerent attitude in foreign politics as his desire for a war against Granada. The reason which he gives for this is the rise of the Turkish Empire and the fear of a new wave of Islam in the peninsula. In 1391 Mohammed V, an old friend and ally of Pedro I, died. In 1392, Mohammed VII took over the throne and started a campaign to avenge some of the damages which Granada had received from the
frontier territories of Castile. When the Moors entered Murcia, they were soundly defeated by the Christians and were forced to respect the treaties, which were then kept until 1405. 47

Ayala relates in great detail a rather novelesque event which almost caused strife between Granada and Castile in 1394. The Maestre de Alcántara had challenged the Sultan of Granada to a battle by sending him a letter stating that Christianity was holy and Islam a false religion. If the Sultan denied this, he would have to fight the Castilians, but he would be given a two-to-one advantage regardless of the number of men involved in the battle. By the time Enrique III's messengers arrived at Alcántara to prevent a rupture of the treaties by the crusading Maestre, the latter was en route to Córdoba. Ayala indicates that the Maestre's cause was popular among the people of Córdoba, because the knights of that city were unable to prevent his passing over the bridge en route to Granada for fear of the hostile reactions of the populace should they attempt to do so. The Maestre explained that he owed more obedience to the faith than to the king, and refused to retreat. 48 In Alcalá la Real, near the Grenadine border, two knights tried to dissuade the Maestre by assuring him that neither he nor Andalusia was prepared for hostilities, and that only harm could come from breaking the treaty. They proposed that he offer to fight two Moorish knights on neutral ground;
if the Moors refused, Granada would be dishonored, not Castile, and the treaties would be preserved. The Maestre's men were pleased with the knights' advice and hoped that the situation could be resolved in such a simple manner. The Maestre, who expected a miracle, obstinately insisted on entering Moorish territory. Ayala did not admire the Maestre's actions as an example of chivalric behavior, but rather thought him a superstitious fool, as is indicated by these words: "Empero lo uno el Maestre era ome que avia sus imaginaciones quales él queria; otrosi cataba en estrelleria e en adevinos, e tenia consigo un hermitaño que iba con él, que decian Juan del Sayo, que le decia que avia de vener e conquistar la Moreria." The Maestre insisted on fighting and in spite of a valiant battle fought by the Maestre and his followers, most of the Christians were killed or captured, except for a few who managed to arrive safely at Alcalá la Real.

Enrique III's advisers told the monarch to prepare for war, since it was rumored that the Moors were incensed at the Maestre's actions, and no one was certain of what actions they would take. The king was warned to show the Sultan that no Moor should dare to invade Castilian territory, no matter what the provocations had been. But as the king and his forces were heading toward Toledo, the king received messages from Granada that the Moors were interested in preserving the treaties.
The Papacy

When Pope Clement VII died in 1394, the College of Cardinals met and agreed on the necessity of working for the reunion of the Church. In an effort to bring about an end to the Papal schism, Pedro de Luna, a Cardinal from Aragon, was elected Pope, taking the name of Benedict XIII. Soon after, the Cardinals began to dissociate themselves from the new Pontiff, because he wanted to move the Apostolic See to Rome.

Ayala describes in detail the intrigues through which the French tried to force Benedict XIII to renounce his claim to the Papacy. The Dukes of Berry, Burgundy and Orleans were sent to Avignon to confer with him. They insisted that his renunciation of the Papacy was the only way to bring about reunion of the Church. Benedict, on the other hand, insisted that the only way to end the schism was to meet with the Roman Pope and Cardinals and come to an agreement with them. Ayala's sympathies with Benedict are reflected in his statement that some Cardinals agreed with the Pope's plan but did not want to go against the wishes of the French monarchy. He mentions that the only cardinal who openly opposed Benedict XIII's renunciation was a Spaniard from Pamplona. And Ayala's commentary on the Pope's proposal that each side elect a certain number of representatives to vote for the true Pontiff was "...respondióles asaz bien e legitimamente."

That Ayala was probably in Avignon during the dispute
is evidenced by the fact that he was ambassador to France during this period. Meregalli suggests that the ambassadors had passed through Avignon, where Ayala had stayed at least during the month of May while the Dukes of Berry, Burgundy and Orleans were in Avignon conferring with the Pope.54

England and France

Enrique III followed Juan I's example in his dealing with England and France. Treaties with both countries were confirmed during the regency in 1391, and no serious problems arose thereafter. In 1393, when Lancaster sent word to his son-in-law that he had not received his yearly allotment during the past two years, Enrique had the money sent immediately to Bayonne.55 Castile's increasingly neutral attitude is somewhat reflected in the Papal conflict and in the objections of some of Enrique III's advisers to Charles VI's mediation between Enrique and the Count of Noreña. However, a greater factor in this neutrality was the temporary truce between France and England themselves, symbolized by the meetings of Richard II of England and Charles VI of France at Calais in 1396. Ayala describes the meetings and celebrations in great detail, and mentions the monarchs' decision to found a church, Saint Marie de la Paix, to commemorate the historic event. Valuable gifts were exchanged and treaties were confirmed. Richard II then received Isabelle, Charles VI's daughter, as his
wife, whereupon the French monarch began to weep. Ayala's report terminates with several requests which Isabelle made to her father; these included the preservation of peace between England and France and the cooperation of the two countries in the reunion of the Christian Church.56

Conclusion

Ayala's sympathies lay with the monarch, with the lesser nobility, and with the third estate, all of whom were working for the union of the realm. In contrast to his position during the reign of Pedro I, he criticized the members of the higher nobility, who actually were behaving in a similar fashion to the Trastamaraans under Pedro I. Ayala's change of position can be attributed to the fact that under Pedro, he was an outsider as far as the workings of the regime were concerned, while under Enrique III he became one of the principal advisers to the king. Ayala's resentment against the Archbishop of Toledo and the members of Enrique's family is natural, when one considers that he lost influence when the Consejo was replaced by rule through regents, all of whom came from the upper nobility or the higher clergy.

In foreign affairs Ayala was a pacifist; he was instrumental in arranging peace treaties with Portugal, and favored the reunification of the Papacy. He sympathized with the new Aragonese Pope Benedict XIII—a change from his usual Francophile position—a view, however, which
was shared throughout the Iberian peninsula. Finally, Ayala's description of the Anglo-French situation toward the end of the fourteenth century reflects optimism for the future political and spiritual unity of Europe.

Ayala's disillusion with the upper nobility and criticism of the Maestre de Alcantara's crusading folly give the impression that he had become less interested in chivalric gestures and gradually more interested in the practical aspects of everyday domestic politics—a centralized monarchy defended by the lesser nobility and the third estate.
Footnotes

1. Pero López de Ayala, Crónica del Rey Don Enrique III, Biblioteca de Autores Españoles LXVIII, Madrid, 1877, Year 1390, Chapter III.

2. Enrique III, 1390, Ch. IV.

3. Enrique III, Yr. 1, Ch. I.

4. Enrique III, Yr. 1, Ch. I.

5. Enrique III, Yr. 1, Ch. II.

6. Enrique III, Yr. 1, Ch. III.

7. Enrique III, Yr. 1, Ch. VI.

8. Enrique III, Yr. 1, Ch. XXIII.

9. Enrique III, Yr. 1, Ch. XXIV.

10. Enrique III, Yr. 1, Ch. XXVII.

11. Enrique III, Yr. 2, Ch. VI.

12. Enrique III, Yr. 1, Ch. XXVII.

13. Enrique III, Yr. 2, Ch. VII.

14. Enrique III, Yr. 2, Ch. VIII.

15. Enrique III, Yr. 3, Ch. XVII.

16. Enrique III, Yr. 3, Ch. IX.

17. Enrique III, Yr. 2, Ch. XXX.

18. Enrique III, Yr. 3, Ch. IX.

19. Enrique III, Yr. 1390, Ch. I.

20. Enrique III, Yr. 1390, Ch. II.

21. Enrique III, Yr. 1, Ch. XXVIII,XXX.

22. Enrique III, Yr. 2, Ch. II.

23. Enrique III, Yr. 2, Ch. XIII.

24. Enrique III, Yr. 3, Ch. I.

25. Enrique III, Yr. 3, Ch. XI.
26. Enrique III, Yr. 3, Ch. XXVI.
27. Enrique III, Yr. 4, Ch. I.
28. Enrique III, Yr. 4, Ch. XVII.
29. Enrique III, Yr. 4, Ch. XXV-XXVI.
30. Enrique III, Yr. 4, Ch. XXIII.
31. Enrique III, Yr. 4, Ch. XXX, XXXI.
32. Enrique III, Yr. 5, Ch. VI.
33. Enrique III, Yr. 5, Ch. VI.
34. Enrique III, Yr. 5, Ch. VI.
35. Enrique III, Yr. 5, Ch. X.
36. Enrique III, Yr. 1, Ch. V.
37. Enrique III, Yr. 1, Ch. XX.
38. Enrique III, Yr. 1, Ch. XX.
40. Juan I, Yr. 12, Ch. VIII.
41. Juan I, Yr. 12, Ch. IX-X.
42. Enrique III, Yr. 1, Ch. XVI; Yr. 5, Ch. II-III.
43. Enrique III, Yr. 2, Ch. XI.
44. Enrique III, Yr. 2, Ch. XIV.
45. Enrique III, Yr. 2, Ch. XIV.
46. Enrique III, Yr. 2, Ch. XIV.
48. Enrique III, Yr. 4, Ch. VIII-IX.
49. Enrique III, Yr. 4, Ch. X.
50. Enrique III, Yr. 4, Ch. X.
51. *Enrique III*, Yr. 4, Ch. XXIII.
52. *Enrique III*, Yr. 5, Ch. XV-XVII.
53. *Enrique III*, Yr. 5, Ch. XXI.
55. *Enrique III*, Yr. 3, Ch. XIV.
56. *Enrique III*, Yr. 1396.
CHAPTER VII

LITERARY DEVICES IN THE CHRONICLES

Ayala's principal interest throughout the chronicles is political and this dedication of purpose often detracts from his literary style. However, the various methods which he uses to give life to the day-by-day events recorded are of interest not only to the historian but to the literary scholar as well. Ayala gives some variety to the chronicles by the abundant utilization of speeches, letters, messages, dialogue and brief character analyses.

Description

The Castilian chronicler, because of his rather cold, analytical nature, is often overly reserved in descriptive writing. He cannot compare with his French contemporary, Froissart, in this respect. However, there are a few descriptive passages in Ayala which can be studied for their literary merit—particularly those dealing with chivalry and with certain dramatic events. On the other hand, scenes of local color and human interest are dry and generally uninspired.
Chivalric Behavior

Ayala has a special interest in chivalric description, which is especially prevalent in the chronicles dealing with Pedro I and Juan I. In the Crónica del Rey Don Pedro I, we can observe the knightly behavior of Enrique de Trastamara, his allies, Du Guesclin, Audreheim and the Prince of Wales which form a contrast to the barbaric actions of Pedro I.

After the victory of Pedro and the Black Prince at Nájera, Audreheim and Du Guesclin are taken prisoners. Audreheim is brought before the Prince and accused of violating an oath not to fight against the Black Prince, except under his own king. The accused knight gives the following defense of his actions, which pleases the Prince:

"Señor: verdad es que yo fui preso en la batalla de Piteus do mi señor el Rey de Francia fué preso: e es verdad, señor que yo vos fice pleyto omenage, e vos dí mi fe, que non me armase contra el Rey de Inglaterra, nin contra vos, fasta que toda mi rendicion fuese pagada, la qual aún non he pagado, salvo si me armase con el Rey de Francia mi señor viniendo él por su cuerpo, o con alguno o algunos de su linage de la Flor de Lis. E Señor, yo veo bien que mi señor el Rey de Francia non es aquí, nin ninguno de su linage de la Flor de Lis; pero con todo esto yo non só caído en mal caso, nin fementido; ca yo non me
armé hoy contra vos, que vos non sodes hoy aquí el cabo desta batalla, ca el Capitan e cabo desta batalla es el Rey Don Pedro, e a sus gages e a su sueldo como asoldadado e gañero venides vos aquí el día de hoy, e non venides como mayor desta hueste.'

...E los doce Caballeros jueces que el Príncipe ordenara para oir e librar este pleyto, segundo dicho avemos, entendieron que el Mariscal decia razón, e se defendia como Caballero: e dixeron al Príncipe, que el Mariscal respondia bien, e con derecho: e dieronle por quito de la acusacion que el Príncipe le facia. El al Príncipe e a todos los Caballeros plogo mucho que el Mariscal toviera buena razón para se escusar, porque era buen Caballero."

Du Guesclín, also a prisoner after Nájera, presents another aspect of chivalric behavior, which has to do with the ransom of prisoners. He asks to be ransomed, but the Black Prince considers him such a great knight that he prefers to keep him prisoner rather than permit him to help the French. Du Guesclín is pleased by the Prince's esteem, but again expresses the desire for freedom, whereupon the Prince asks him to name his own ransom price. Though Du Guesclín is poor, he sets the sum at 100,000 gold francs as a point of honor for his own worth. Ayala praises the actions of all concerned:

"E acordamos de poner este hecho en este libro como pasó, por que acaesció así a este Caballero que fué
preso en la batalla de Najera: otrosi por contar los grandes e nobles fechos que los buenos facen: ca el Príncipe de Gales en todo lo que fizo en este fecho fizo como Grande, primeramente en poner a rendicion a Mosen Beltran, porque non dixesen que avian rescelo los Ingleses a un solo Caballero: e otrosi fizo bien en dexar la finanza en alvedrio de Mosen Beltran, e non mostrar cobdicia... é Otrosi fuele contado a bien a Mosen Beltran en se poner en grand quantia de rendicion, pues vio que la intencion del Príncipe era que por pequeña valia le dexaria, e que non le preciaria mas. Otrosi fue e es grand razon de ser contada la nobleza e grandeza de corazon del Rey de Francia en la dadiva que fizo en dar a Mosen Beltran cien mil francos para su rendicion, e otros treinta mil para se apostar. E por todas estas razones se puso aquí este cuento; ca las franquezas e noblezas e dadivas de los Reyes grand razon es que siempre finquen en memoria, e non sean olvidadas: otrosi las buenas razones de caballeria." 

Ayala's chivalric ideal is also evident in the scene in which Enrique arrives in Castile and swears never again to leave his kingdom:

"E él estonce descavalgó de un caballo en que venia, e fincó los finojos en tierra e fizo una cruz en un arenal que estaba cerca del rio de Ebro, e besó en
ella, e dixo así 'Yo lo juro a esta significanza de cruz, que nunca en mi vida, por menester que haya, salga del Regno de Castilla, e antes espere y la muerte o la ventura que me viniere.'

The best example of chivalric description in the Crónica del Rey Don Juan I is found in the passage which deals with the meeting of Juan I and the King of Armenia, whom he had ransomed from the Sultan of Babylonia:

"El día que llegó el Rey de Armenia a Badajoz, salió el Rey Don Juan a le rescebir una legua de la cibdad; e quando el Rey de Armenia vido que el Rey venia, dixo a los que venian con él que le mostrasen do venia el Rey de Castilla; e ellos se le mostraron, diciendole así: 'En esta gente que agora viene delante vos, do traen el espada alzada, viene el Rey de Castilla.' Estonce el Rey de Armenia, desque le vio cerca, descavalgó de la mula en que venia, e fincó los finojos en tierra, e tiróse el sombrero e el capirote de la cabeza. E el Rey Don Juan, quando aquello vio, descavalgó de la mula, e todos los Señores e Caballeros que allí eran se pusieron a pie. E el Rey de Armenia dixo al Rey de Castilla: 'Señor, yo so el que debo facer tal reverencia a la vuestra Magestad, como aquel que por vos e por la vuestra bondad so librado de tan cruel e dura prision como yo estaba.' E el Rey de Castilla le abrazó, e dieronse
paz, e cavalgaron luego, y otro día el Rey Don Juan le envió muchos paños de oro e de seda, e muchas joyas, e doblas, e vajillas de plata, e diole para en toda su vida la villa de Madrid, e la de Villareal, e la de Andújar con todos sus pechos e derechos e rentas que en ellas avía, e diole más en dada año para en toda su vida ciento e cinquenta mil maravedís."

That Ayala's descriptions of chivalric behavior are reserved for the chronicles dealing with Pedro I and Juan I is a logical phenomenon, when one considers the fact that for Ayala Pedro was the antithesis of the chivalric ideal, while Juan was the most perfect symbol of it.

Dramatic Action

It is not surprising that the most dramatic passages of the chronicles are those which deal with the fates of Pedro I's enemies. The most famous passage of suspense and drama is that of the death of Pedro's brother, Fadrique.

"E el Maestre llegó en Sevilla el dicho día martes por la mañana a hora de tercia: e luego como llegó el Maestre fué a facer reverencia al Rey, e fallóle que jugaba a las tablas en el su Alcazar. E luego que llegó besóle la mano el e muchos Caballeros que venían con el: e el Rey le rescivió con buena voluntad que le mostró, e preguntóle donde partiera aquel día,
e si tenía buenas posadas....E el Rey dixole que fuese a sosegar las posadas, e que después se viniese para él: e esto decía el Rey porque entrarían con el Maestre muchas compañas en el Alcazar. E el Maestre partió entonces del Rey, e fue ver a Doña María de Padilla, e a las hijas del Rey, que estaban en otro apartamiento del Alcazar, que dicen del caracol. E Doña María sabía todo lo que estaba acordado contra el Maestre, e quando le vió hizo tan triste cara, que todos lo podrían entender, ca ella era dueña muy buena, e de buen seso, e non se pagaba de las cosas que el Rey facía, e pesaba mucho de la muerte que era ordenada de dar al Maestre....E el Maestre tornóse para ir al Rey espantado, ca ya se rescelaba del más.... E el Rey estaba en un palacio que dicen del fierro, la puerta cerrada: e llegaron los dos Maestre de Santiago e de Calatrava a la puerta del palacio dó el Rey estaba, e non les abrieron, e estuvieron a la puerta. E Pero Lopez de Padilla, que era Ballestero mayor del Rey, estaba con los Maestres de partes de fuera: e en esto abrieron un postigo del palacio dó estaba el Rey, e dixo el Rey a Pero Lopez de Padilla su Ballestermayor: 'Pero Lopez, prended al Maestre.' E Pero Lopez le dixo: 'A qual dellos prenderé?' E el Rey dixole: 'Al Maestre de Santiago.' E luego Pero Lopez de Padilla travó del Maestre Don Fadrique, e dixole: 'Sed preso.' E el Maestre estuvo quedo muy
espantado: e luego dijo el rey a unos Ballesteros de maza, que ay estaban: 'Ballesteros, matad al Maestre de Santiago.' Aun los Ballesteros non lo osaban facer: e un ome de la cámara del rey, que decían Huínez Gonzalez de Atienza, que sabía el consejo, dijo a grandes voces a los Ballesteros: 'Traidores, ¿qué facedes? Non vedes que vos manda el Rey que matedes al Maestre?' A los Ballesteros estonce, quando vieron que el Rey lo mandaba, comenzaron a alzar las mazas para ferir al Maestre Don Fadrique.... A los Ballesteros llegaron a él por le ferir con las mazas, e non se les guisaba, ca el Maestre andaba muy recio de una parte a otra, e non le podían ferir. A Nuño Ferrandez de Roa, que le seguía mas que otro ninguno, llegó al Maestre y diole un golpe de la maza en la cabeza, en guisa que cayo en tierra; e estonce llegaron los otros Ballesteros, e firieronle todos.... A tornóse el rey do yacia el Maestre, e fallóle que aun non era muerto; e sacó el Rey una broncha que tenía en la cinta, e diola a un mozo de su cámara, e fizole matar. E desque esto fue hecho, asentóse el Rey a comer donde el Maestre yacia muerto en una quadra que dicen de los Azulejos, que es en el Alcazar. 5

At the beginning of the passage, we find Fadrique coming to the king and being well received. Suspense is built up by his meeting with Doña María de Padilla, during which the Maestre begins to realize that something is wrong.
Dramatic tension increases through the Ballesteros' confusion as to which Maestre, [the Maestre de Santiago or de Calatrava] is to be arrested. This tension is maintained by the hesitation of the Ballesteros in carrying out the king's orders and also by Fadrique's ability to avoid his assassins for a short time. The barbaric scene is appropriately brought to a close with a description of the king placidly eating a meal near the body of his brother.

Another scene of dramatic intensity is the one in which Pedro I orders the deaths of those who helped his mother defend the city of Toro. The moving element in this case is not the murders themselves, but rather the reaction of the queen to her son's barbarity:

"E la Reyna Dona Maria madre de Rey, quando vió matar asi a estos Caballeros, cayó en tierra sin ningun sentido como muerta, e con ella la Condesa Dona Juana muger del Conde Don Enrique. E desque la Reyna cayó, estuvo en tierra grand pieza; e despues levantaronla, e vió los Caballeros muertos enderredor de sí, e desnudos, e comenzó a dar grandes voces maldiciendo al Rey su fijo, e diciendo que la deshonrara e lastimara para siempre, e que ya mas queria morir que non vivir." 6

This sense of drama which is found in the Crónica del Rey Don Pedro I is an element which is definitely
lacking in the succeeding chronicles. For Ayala, drama is only a means to an end, the end being the exaggerated insistence on Pedro's barbaric nature. Where this end is lacking, the sense of drama is also lacking.

Battle Scenes

Ayala's descriptions of battle scenes are extremely realistic and exact in detail, with little concern for dramatizing the action. Two famous battles which represent Ayala's typical style are the Battle of Nájera, fought between Pedro and Enrique in 1367, and the Battle of Aljubarrota between Castile and Portugal in 1385. In both cases such factors as physical terrain and strategic position are instrumental in the victory or defeat of the parties involved. There is very little evidence of glory or heroism in either report.

Nájera: "El Rey Don Enrique, segundo dicho avemos, tenía un Real asentado en guisa, que el río Najarilla estaba entre él e el logar por donde avian de venir el Rey Don Pedro e e Príncipe, e ovo su acuerdo de pasar el río, e poner la batalla en una gran plaza que es contra Navarrete, por do los otros venian e fizolo así. E desto pesó a mucho de los que con el estaban, ca tenian primero su Real a mayor ventaja que después le asentaron."7
Aljubarrota: "E así fue, segund que algunos avian res-
celo, que las dos alas de la batalla del Rey non
pudieron pelear, que cada una dellas halló un valle
que non pudo pasar, e la avanguarda del Rey peleó
sin acorro de las sus alas..."8

It is tempting to suggest that Ayala does not dramatize
in either case because in both battles the side which
he represents is the losing side. Therefore, the losses
are attributed to natural factors.

Scenes of human Interest

A few passages of human interest arouse the sympathy
of the reader for the personage involved, but these are
relatively rare. One such scene is Ayala's description
of the pity which the people of Toledo felt for Pedro I's
wife, Doña Blanca, when it was learned that she was to be
arrested by the king:

"E las dueñas de Toledo, quando estas razones oyeron
de la Reyna Doña Blanca que ge las decia cada día,
otrosi de Doña Leonor de Saldana su aya, ovieron
muy grand piedad de la Reyna, e fablaron con sus
maridos e con sus parientes, diciendoles que serian
los mas menguados omes del mundo si tal Reyna como
aquella, que era su Señora, e muger del Rey su Señor,
moriese tal muerte en la cibdad donde ellos estaban."9
Here also, however, as in the scenes of drama, Ayala is utilizing a more literary style of writing in order to strengthen his personal viewpoint in the eyes of the readers.

Only one passage of the chronicles deals with soldiers and their fates, and this is found in a report of the Battle of Tarazana fought between Pedro I and the king of Aragon: it is a brief sidelight within a long, detailed description of the battle:

"E ese día facía grand calor, e ovo grand sed en la hueste del Rey, en tal guisa que algunos omes de pie perescieron de sed."\(^{10}\)

In general, however, Ayala keeps to the matter at hand, without attempting to alleviate dull reports with interesting sidelights of human interest.

Natural Disasters

Ayala does not deal with natural phenomena, except in a very few cases, and when he does mention them, it is a matter of a few words or lines at the most. There is the example of the fear of flood in Seville in 1353: "E este año ovo en Sevilla muy grandes crecimiento[s] del rio Guadalquivir, en guisa que cerraron e calafetearon las puertas de la cibdad, e ovieron muy grand miedo que seria la cibdad en grand peligro."\(^{11}\) Ayala mentions the earthquake in Lisbon which also hit Seville in 1356. "E este año fue el terre-
moto, vigilia de Sant Bartolomé, e cayeron las manzanas que estaban en la torre de Sancta Maria de Sevilla, e tremió la tierra en muchos logares del Regno en aquel día, e fizo grand destroimiento en el Regno de Portugal e en el Algarbe, e derribó la capilla de Lisbona que avia hecho el Rey Don Alfonso. 12

The plague which decimated the Castilian troops besieging Lisbon is described in somewhat more detail. This is not presented as an isolated point of interest, however, but rather as an important factor in the failure of Juan I to capture the Portuguese capital. "Estando el Rey Don Juan en su real que tenia sobre Lisboa, la pestilencia e mortandad fue cada día creciendo muy fuertemente, e morían muchos de los que con él estaban, en manera que del día que murió el Maestre de Sanctiago fasta dos meses morieron de las compañas del Rey dos mil omes de aramas de los mejore que tenia..." 13 It is evident here that Ayala is only interested in presenting the plague from a military point of view rather than from a descriptive one.

Fiestas

If one wants to read colorful descriptions of feasts, wedding ceremonies, and other events of local color, Ayala is a poor example to choose. His presentations of such events are mostly distant and lifeless—the product of an analytical rather than an imaginative mind. The most picturesque wedding scene in the chronicles is the cere-
mony uniting Pedro I and his wife in 1353:

"...el Rey Don Pedro fizo sus bodas con su esposa Dona Blanca de Borbón, e tomóla por su muger, e velóse con ella en Sancta María la nueva de Valladolid: e ficieronse muchas alegrias, e muchas justas e torneos. E iban el Rey Don Pedro e la Reyna Dona Blanca su muger aquel día vestidos de unos paños de oro blancos enforrados de armiños, e en caballos blancos: ...E iba la Reyna Dona María, madre del Rey Don Pedro, en una mula, e levaba paños de xametes blancos son peñas veras:"14

Other wedding ceremonies in the chronicle are more in the style of the wedding of Juan I and Beatriz of Portugal in 1383:

"E esto hecho, otro día fue el Rey ver la Reyna de Portugal, su suegra, e falló que salía a él fuera de la villa de Yelves a las tiendas que ende estaban, e allí traxieron a la Reyna Dona Beatriz, que estonce avia de tomar por su muger: e tomóla, e traxéla consigo ese día para Badajoz, e otro día se veló con ella, e allí fueron fechas grandes fiestas, estando y los Señores e Ricos omes e Caballeros de Portogal, e muchos de Castilla."15

Description for Ayala is unimportant as an end in itself. He is capable of fine descriptive and dramatic
writing when it serves to reinforce his own opinions. When this is not the case, Ayala's writing tends to be drily factual and literarily uninteresting.

Speeches

Ayala's use of speeches is an effective literary device by which the intercalation of accounts in the first person give more psychological insight into the character who is speaking. In the Crónica del rey Don Pedro I, most of these discourses are directed in some way against the abuses of the king. Enrique of Trastamara expresses his fear of the privados; Pedro's mother and aunt plead with him to return to his wife; Alburquerque makes an eloquent speech in defense of his policies as privado; and Ferrand Pérez de Ayala, the chronicler's father, speaks for the nobility in protest against Pedro's misrule.

In the other chronicles, speeches serve principally to present problems which must be resolved, such as decisions of policy. There are several long discourses presented in which Ayala seems to be recording his own words. One discourse of this type is the impassioned answer of the Basque nobles to the Prelates at the Cortes of Guadalajara in 1390. Another is the answer of the Consejo to Juan I about the fate of the king's troublesome brother, the Count of Moreña; the speaker for the Consejo to whom Ayala refers as 'este Caballero' begins with the following words:
"Señor: Yo he pensado en esta razón que avedes dicho a los del vuestro Consejo sobre el hecho del Conde Don Alfonso; e como quier que veo asaz peligros en ello, yo non querría por cosa del mundo que vos fuesedes contra Dios, nin contra vuestra fama, antes querría que vos parasedes a todos los peligros que venir vos pudiesen. 

E esta razón es loada e alabada de todos los sabidores, que antes debe sufrir ome cualquier peligro, aunque sea de muerte, que es el más duro que ser pueda, que hacer cosa mala nin fea."

The speaker goes on to enumerate the brutal policies of previous monarchs in order to demonstrate the evil results of such actions. After suggesting that the matter be decided by a legal trial, the speaker ends the discourse with the following words:

"E, Señor, a mi paresce, si la vuestra merced fuera, que vos en esta guisa debedest tener el hecho del Conde Don Alfonso de que demandastes consejo, e que en esto guardaredes justicia e vuestra fama; e si el merecese pena, cualquiera que sea, todos los de los vuestros Regnos, e los de los otros Regnos de Christianos e de Moros, do esto fuere sabido, tornan que lo que ficiereades sera bien hecho; e si fallaredes que non meresce pena, avredes guardado todo lo que debedes de derecho e justicia."
The moralizing tone of the speech, and the plea for justice in the kingdom indicate that the speaker is Ayala himself. Through his words, we can gain insight into his character as a rational human being horrified by the brutality of his time.

Dialogues

In addition to lengthy speeches, Ayala creates live characters through the abundant use of short dialogues interspersed through lengthy narratives. This technique is particularly effective in the first of the four chronicles, in which dialogue adds to the drama or pathos of those condemned to death by Pedro I. A good example of dramatic dialogue occurs in a passage dealing with the death of el Rey Bermejo. Pedro stabs his enemy with a lance while speaking the following words: "Toma esto, por quanto me fecistes facer mala pleytesia con el Rey de Aragón, e perder el castillo de Ariza." The Moorish king answers: "¡Oh qué pequeña caballeria feciste!" In a few brief lines we feel the pathetic nobility of the infidel in contrast to the treacherous barbarity of the Christian monarch.

Dialogue is also used to present a person's psychological makeup. Ayala's poor opinion of Enrique de Trastámara's brother, Don Tello, is evident from the passage in which Tello meets Pedro after the death of his mother, Leonor de Guzmán. Pedro says: "Don Tello, sabedes como
vuestra madre Dona Leonor os muerta?" Tello answers: "Señor, yo non he otro padre, nin otra madre salvo a la vuestra merced." 19 No other words are needed to express Tello's extreme cowardice and obsequious behavior than this one sentence in which he denies his own mother to please the king.

Letters

Though most of the many letters which Ayala records in the chronicles serve only as vehicles of historical communication, there are several which are of definite literary value. Once again the most important letters of this sort appear in the chronicles of Pedro I and Juan I.

There are several letters in the first chronicle which are presented as an indictment of the king's policies. One is a letter from Gutier Ferrández de Toledo to Pedro, written after the former has been informed by Pedro's men that he is to die.

"Señor: Yo Gutier Ferrandez de Toledo beso vuestras manos, e me despido de la vuestra merced, e yo para otro Senor mayor que non vos. E, Señor, bien sabe la vuestra merced como mi madre, e mis hermanos, e yo, fuimos siempre desde el dia que vos nascistes en la vuestra crianza, e pasamos muchos males, e sufrimos muchos miedos por vuestro servicio en el tiempo que Doña Leonor de Guzman avia poder en el Regno. Señor, yo siempre vos servi; empero creo que por vos decir
algunas cosas que complian a vuestro servicio me mandastes matar: en lo qual, Señor, yo tengo que lo fecistes por complir vuestra voluntad: lo qual Dios vos los perdone; mas yo nunca vos lo meresci. E agora, Señor, digo vos tanto al punto de la mi muerte (porque este será el mi postrimero consejo), que si vos non alzades el cuchillo, e non escusades de facer tales muertes como esta, que vos avedes perdido vuestro Regno, e tenedes vuestra persona en peligro. E pido vos por merced que vos guardedes; ca lealmente fablo con vusco, ca en tal ora estó, que non debo decir si non verdad."20

The pathos of this letter from a knight who, after protesting his own innocence and the injustice done him, is still able to speak to his king as a loyal subject, is especially moving, and charged with dramatic effect.

The two letters from the Moor of Granada to Pedro I are of great interest, because they are pure fictional creations, inserted by the chronicler to express his own views about Pedro I and his barbaric treatment of his subjects. Ayala utilizes such traditional literary forms as fables and proverbs and wise sayings to emphasize his ideas:

"...los males son en caso semejante de las malecinas, amargas o pesadas para el que las bebe, e son aborridas del, mas él que las puede sofrir e atender en penar el
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su mal sabor está en esperanza de bien e de salud."

"La manera del Rey con sus gentes es semejada al pastor con so ganado, e la gran piedad que na con él, que anda a le buscar la mejor agua e el buen pasto, e la grand guarda que le face de los contrarios, así como lobos;

"...el percebido es el que piensa como salga de la cosa antes que contesca; el orgulloso el que piensa como salga de la cosa después que nasce."

"E vuestra manera con ellos [Pedro's foreign allies] paresce al ome que criaba un leon, e cazaba con el animalias, e aprovechnabase del; e un día fallescio de comer al leon, e comio a un fijo que tenia aquel que le criaba."

"E los fechos de los Reyes e de los Grandes son contrarios de los fechos de los mercaderes; e ellos non deben mostrar cobdicia, pues son Reyes, e non mercaderes." 21

Ayala gives greater force to the letter by emphasizing the qualities of a bad monarch rather than those of a good one. This sort of king, meaning Pedro, of course, has no respect for his people; his followers are as evil as the enemy; his excessive physical appetites are self-destructive; he has no respect for laws and is full of cruelty.

Another fictional letter of this type was supposedly
found in Pedro's coffer after his death at Montiel. Pedro asks the meaning of a prophecy, supposedly written by Merlin, which the Moor proceeds to interpret. The prophecy is as follows:

"En las partidas de occidente entre los montes a la mar nascerá una ave negra, comedora, e robadora, e tal que todos los panares del mundo querría acoger en si, e todo el oro del mundo querrá poner en su estómago; e después gormarlo ha, e tornará atrás, en non perer- cerá luego por esta dolencia. E dice mas, caérsele han las alas, e secársele han las plumas al sol, e andará de puerta en puerta, e ninguno la querrá acoger, e encerrarse ha en selva, e morirá y dos veces, una al mundo, e otra ante Dios, e desta guisa aca- bará."22

The wise Moor interprets the prophecy as referring to Pedro, who is so avaricious and cruel that he will finally be rejected by all and abandoned.

The letters in the Crónica del Rey Don Juan I which hold some interest for the literary scholar are those which have some religious importance. One example is an emotional letter from Juan I to his subjects about the schism of the Church:

"Don Juan por la gracia de Dios Rey de Castilla, e de Leon: a todos los fieles Christianos salud e gracia, aquella que face a los omes venir a conocimiento del su Pastor verdadero. Desde el lugar do el
sol nasce, fasta do se pone, parece asaz manifiesta-
mente quanta tribulacion es levantada en la Christian-
dad, e quanta malicia el enemigo del humano linaje
ha sembrado en el Santuario de Dios; ca contra él,
e contra el su ungido puso asechanzas llenas de
pestilencia, segund su acostumbrada maldad, e con fu-
riosos ruegos e comienzos aborrescederos, e con artes
e engaños feos e malos dañó al principazo e señorío
de los oficios del servicio divinal con malicia que
se non puede decir, amargando la entegridad e union
de la Fé e de su religion, e menospreciandola, e
escureciendola; e así se puso por romper el atamiento
de la unidad católica, que con sus artes mortales afo-
gaba la verdad de la devocion del fiyo, se esforzó
e armó a contrariar la piedad del padre, olvidada
la unidad, e con maravillosos engaños de la ceguedad
fea e non limpia, para rescevir una esposa fizo llamar
dos maridos, e para guarda del su ganado en lugar de
un pastor, fizo quistion de dos pastores. E así en la
dubda del casamiento de la esposa se movió quistion
escura, la cual non se determina; e seyendo mani-
fiesta la herencia, qual de los fijos la debe aver,
es entre los huerfanos la dubda; lo qual con grand
dolor es de doler e de gemir, e diremos asi: ¡O
devocion corrompida del pueblo Christiano! ¡Cruza
arrebatadad ceguedad engañosa sin piedad! ¿cómo se
escureció el sol e el guiador lumbroso de la verdad,
e como los carros resplandecientes de luz son trans-tornados en tinieblas? ¿A dó es, a dó es la Fé de Jesu-Christo? a do esta la ley e el atamiento e el ayuntamiento de la caridad?"23

Literary effects in the letter are the use of symbolism to emphasize the gravity of the schism (the flock with two shepherds and the wife with two husbands) and the use of rhetorical questions and exclamations to express shock and dismay over the situation of the Church.

Another letter written in a similar tone is that of Clement VII to Juan I consoling him after his defeat at Aljubarrota. The author states the fact that many other great men have been defeated in battle by lesser men. He reinforces his statement with many examples from Biblical and Spanish history. Then he shows how an initial defeat can lead to an even more brilliant victory, and gives several symbolic examples: "Escripto es que en la edifi-cacion del templo de Jerusalem todas las piedras eran primeramente labradas e picadas con martillos, porque mansamente fuesen puestas en la lavor que avia de durar. E por este exemplo tiene que aquellos que son a poner en la pared e muro de aquel templo celestial, que es dicho Jerusalem e parayso, primero en este mundo son atormentados e feridos de muchos peligros e fortunas, porque despues con paz e mansamente sean alli trasladados e puestos."

The Pope concludes by advising Don Juan to dress in "vesti-duras de salud e de fortaleza e de gracia" in order to
keep face before his enemies and maintain his dignity as a great king. 24

Several letters of interest because of their flamboyant Oriental style are those from the Sultan of Babylonia to Juan, having to do with the ransom of the King of Armenia. One letter begins with a lengthy catalogue of the Sultan's titles: "El Rey alto regnante, Rey justo, senor noble, justiciero, conqueridor, hermitaño, defendedor e favorable vencedor, mejoramiento del mundo e de la fé, Rey de la morisma e de los Moros, averiguador de la justicia en los mundos, atendedor de los agravados, e destroidor de los agravadores e de los hereges e descreidos, conqueridor de las tierras e de los regnos e de los climas, heredero del señorío de los Arabigos e de los Ladinos e de los Turcos, Alexandre del tiempo, señor de la guerra, ayuntador de las palabras de creencia, sombra de Dios en la tierra, afirmador de la su ley e de los sus mandamientos, asegurador de las carreras de los romerages, servidor de las dos casas sanctas, e señor de los Reyes e Emperadores, ensalzado Rey de los creyentes, Abulanayche Hagi, fijo del Rey de fe, Rey noble defendedor del mundo e de la fé,...:" ensalce Dios su regnado, e defienda sus gentes e sus ayuntamientos e su caballeria." Juan I is referred to with the following titles: "...grande honrador, ensalzado, presciado, esforzado, el Caballero de prez, el leon Juan, defendedor de la Christiandad, honrador de la gente de Jesu, corona de la ley de Christus, defendedor de las partes de los
enemigos, afirmador de las gentes de la Cruz, facedor de los Caballeros, fermosura de las noblezas e de las corónicas, amigo de los Reyes e de los Emperadores, señor de Castilla e de los otros señoríos que son con ella..."25

The remainder of the letter is actually shorter than the lists of titles of the two monarchs, interesting reflections in themselves of the pomp and splendor of the Oriental world as Ayala knew it.

Character Sketches

One literary feature for which Ayala has often been praised is the brief character sketch, which is believed to be a precursor to such writers as Fernán Pérez de Guzmán and Fernando del Pulgar. These sketches generally appear in the chronicles as an epilogue to the descriptions of the deaths of such important characters as Pedro I, Enrique II, Juan I, María de Padilla, and Charles V of France.

Of Pedro's mistress, María de Padilla, Ayala says: "E fue Doña Maria muger de buen linage, e fermosa, e pequeña de cuerpo, e de buen entendimiento."26 The description of Doña Blanca is somewhat more complete: "E era esta Reyna Doña Blanca del linage de Francia, de la flor de lis de los de Borbon...e era blanca e ruvia, e de buen donayre, e de buen seso: e decía cada día sus horas muy devotamente: e pasó grand penitencia en las prisiones do estuvo, e sufriólo todo con muy grand paciencia."27
Ayala seems to have found Pedro’s mistress to be a lovely and reasonable woman, as can be gathered from his description of her; his sympathies lay, however, with the Queen to whom such a great injustice had been done.

The longest character sketch is naturally the description of Pedro I, whom Ayala accuses of being greedy, lascivious and cruel:

"E fue el Rey Don Pedro asaz grande de cuerpo, e blanco e rubio, e ceceaba un poco en la fabla. Era muy cazador de aves. Fue muy sofridor de trabajos. Era muy temprado e bien acostumbrado en el comer e beber. Dormia poco, e amó mucho mugeres. Fue muy trabajador en guerra. Fue cobdicioso de allegar tesoros e joyas, tanto que se falló después de su muerte que valieron las joyas de su camara treinta cuentos en piedras preciosas e aljofar e baxilla de oro e de plata, e en panos de oro e otros apostamientos...E mató muchos en su Regno, por lo qual le vino todo el daño que avedes oido." 28

Ayala ends the analysis on a moralizing note: "Agora los Reyes aprended, e sed castigados todos los que juzgades el mundo: ca grand juicio e maravilloso fue este, e muy espantable." 29

Style

Aside from those cited examples which offer some
literary interest, Ayala's style is generally monotonous. Characters are reidentified each time they appear in the chronicle, and events are often repeated in great detail. The reader is constantly overwhelmed with unnecessary details such as lists of those who fought in a battle, lineages of the kings of Castile, and other tedious digressions. The sentence structure is generally simple, while phrases such as é, otrosí and como dicho aviamos recur incessantly, in the narrative tradition of the Middle Ages.

Most of the interesting literary devices mentioned occur in La Crónica del Rey Don Pedro I and La Crónica del Rey Don Juan I—perhaps because Ayala seems to have had more feeling for these two monarchs than for the others. La Crónica de Don Enrique II is cold and distant, whereas La Crónica del Rey Don Enrique III is so full of minute details as to make it nearly unreadable.
Footnotes

1. Pero López de Ayala, Crónica del Rey Don Pedro I, Biblioteca de Autores Españoles LXVI, Madrid, 1875, Year 18, Chapter XIII.

2. Pedro I, Yr. 18, Ch. XVIII.

3. Pedro I, Yr. 18, Ch. XXXIV.

4. Pero López de Ayala, Crónica del Rey Don Juan I, Biblioteca de Autores Españoles LXVIII, Madrid, 1877, Year 5, Chapter II.

5. Pedro I, Yr. 9, Ch. III.

6. Pedro I, Yr. 7, Ch. II.

7. Pedro I, Yr. 18, Ch. XII.

8. Juan I, Yr. 7, Ch. XIV.

9. Pedro I, Yr. 5, Ch. XXI.

10. Pedro I, Yr. 8, Ch. IV.

11. Pedro I, Yr. 4, Ch. XXIX.

12. Pedro I, Yr. 7, Ch. VI.

13. Juan I, Yr. 6, Ch. XI.

14. Pedro I, Yr. 4, Ch. XI.

15. Juan I, Yr. 5, Ch. II.

16. Juan I, Yr. 7, Ch. V.

17. Juan I, Yr. 7, Ch. V.

18. Pedro I, Yr. 13, Ch. VI.

19. Pedro I, Yr. 2, Ch. IV.

20. Pedro I, Yr. 11, Ch. XVII.

21. Pedro I, Yr. 18, Ch. XXII.

22. Pedro I, Yr. 20, Ch. III.

23. Juan I, Yr. 3, Ch. II.
24. Juan I, Yr. 8, Ch. III.
25. Juan I, Yr. 5, Ch. III.
26. Pedro I, Yr. 12, Ch. VI.
27. Pedro I, Yr. 12, Ch. III.
28. Pedro I, Yr. 20, Ch. VIII.
29. Pedro I, Yr. 20, Ch. VIII.
CHAPTER VIII

AYALA AND HUMANISM

The principal evaluation of Ayala among historians and literary critics has centered around the chronicler's qualities as a Pre-humanist. Before undertaking a discussion of this subject, it might be well to cite the basic principles of historiography which distinguish the Medieval from the Humanist period.

In general, medieval chroniclers believed in a Divine interpretation of history in which world events were attributed to Providence. Love of chivalry was often more important than practical politics. Most events described were of equal importance, so that there was little or no selection of material. Historians considered themselves as belonging to a world order held together by the Catholic Church. There was sometimes little distinction between fact and fantasy, because of the abundance of legends, accounts of miracles and superstitions, and also due to the historians' lack of interest in accurate sources. In style, dramatic presentation was of secondary importance, so that the wealth of detail often overwhelmed the reader and distracted him from the main theme of the work.
The Humanist writers tended to ignore Providence in favor of a natural explanation of events. Instead of describing everything, they usually wrote of great events such as wars and revolutions which served to exalt their country or city-state. For the Humanist, dramatic presentation of history was often as important as the event itself. The church as representative of world order was unimportant and was therefore ignored rather than attacked. Livy was the model which the Humanist historians followed, especially for his idea of history as a teacher and moral guide of future behavior. Livy's style of writing—full of harangues and exhortations to exalt the idea of patriotism and heroism—formed the basis for humanistic writing in the Renaissance.

Menéndez y Pelayo, following to some extent the ideas of Ayala's principal biographer, Rafael Floranes, established Ayala as a definite precursor of humanism and as a new light in Spanish historiography. His judgment is based on the fact that Ayala translated such writers as Livy, Boccaccio, Boethius, Saint Gregory the Great, and Guido di Colonna into Castilian, thereby making available for the first time works previously unknown in Castile. "Las obras de Petrarca y Boccaccio mirados entonces más bien como eruditos, como humanistas y moralistas que como poetas, empiezan a correr de mano en mano entre príncipes, obispos, maestros y próceres, ya en copias del texto original...ya en traduc-
ciones que comienzan a nacerse dando ejemplo el canciller Ayala y el ilustre converso, obispo de Burgos, Don Alonso de Cartagena.¹ Menéndez y Pelayo goes on to call Ayala the first writer of the Middle Ages in whom history appears with the same character of human and social reflection which was to appear in the great Italian historical writers of the Renaissance. Ayala, according to Menéndez y Pelayo, was the first prototype of a modern Machiavellian hero—a man who looks after himself without harming others.²

Many other critics, such as Benito Sánchez Alonso, C. Sánchez Albornoz and José Luis Romero, have followed in the footsteps of Menéndez y Pelayo in their evaluation of Ayala. As proof of Ayala's humanist traits, they cite the following: the appearance of the portrait or short biography; his profound observation of human nature with psychological and critical insight; the predominance of reason over passion; his definite lack of superstition and miraculous tales; the influence of Livy in Ayala's magistral view of history and in his style; his historical fidelity; his interest in practical politics; and his use of diverse literary devices—dialogue, speeches, and letters—to give life to the chronicles.³

More recently, critics have begun challenging the authority of Menéndez y Pelayo and his followers. One such writer is the eminent Medievalist, Robert B. Tate, who questions Ayala's qualities as a forerunner of the Humanist movement. He states that Ayala supported a
chivalric order of the world controlled by the church and nobility, as opposed to a unified monarchy. Ayala's moral tone is reminiscent of the school of Don Juan Manuel rather than of Livy. Tate cites the influence of the 'exemplum' literature of the 13th and 14th centuries with its abundance of brief stories, proverbs and fables, and the character of the wise Moorish vizier. Tate denies any influence of Livy on Ayala's style, and maintains that Ayala's obsession with internal politics and wars had nothing to do with Livy, but rather followed the Medieval tradition of Castilian chronicles from the time of Alfonso X. The new interest in social and administrative themes which Menéndez y Pelayo used to show Ayala's humanistic interests are according to Tate no proof of his humanism, since the humanists eliminated such detailed digressions.⁴

A careful reading of the chronicles makes it evident that most of these critics, whether attacking or defending Ayala's humanism, have utilized those passages of the chronicles which tended to support their own particular views, while playing down the importance of those which weakened their case. It is necessary, therefore, to give a clear evaluation of Ayala free from preconceived prejudices, a task which is extremely difficult because of the length and breadth of his production and the contradictions in the chronicles themselves.
Divine Interpretation of History

There is no doubt that Ayala considered world events to be an act of Providence. He makes it quite clear, for example, that Pedro I was defeated by his half-brother because it was God's will that the people of Castile be saved from the tyrant. However, within this broad framework of divine providence, Ayala is realistic in his explanation of historical events and gives causes and effects in natural terms.

Nobility vs. Crown

It is too simple an evaluation of Ayala to state that he represented the nobility in opposition to the authority of the crown. There is an evolution of his viewpoint which comes about from his disillusion with the members of the upper nobility and causes him to ally himself to the interests of the lesser nobility and even of the middle class, as well as to the interests of the monarchy. This evolution is, of course, tied closely to Ayala's personal interests and opinions of the monarchs involved. As he becomes more powerful in the affairs of the government, his interests become more and more closely allied to the concept of a strong, centralized monarchy.

Livy and the Magistral View of History

To all appearances, Ayala's moral tone throughout
the chronicles is an expression of his own personality and has nothing to do with Livy's magistral view of history. Livy continually emphasizes the glories of the past in contrast to the decadence of the present—a point of view which has no echo in Ayala whatsoever. In this respect, one must agree with Tate, who places Ayala in the moralizing tradition of the school of Don Juan Manuel.5

Ayala—A Literary Humanist?

But Tate is unfair to Ayala in his statement that the chronicles have a completely Medieval orientation because of the abundance of 'exemplum' literature. This type of writing appears only in the two letters from the Moor of Granada to Pedro I, and is Ayala's way of emphasizing his antipathy to the king without expressing it directly as his own idea.

On the other hand, the followers of Menéndez y Pelayo exaggerate the humanistic characteristics of Ayala's style. Diego Catalan's careful study of La Gran Crónica of Alfonso XI demonstrates very clearly that the literary 'innovations' formerly attributed to Ayala, such as harangues, letters, messages and dialogue, are also present in the works of the anonymous author of La Gran Crónica, who knew nothing of Livy.6

Historical Fidelity

Ayala's interest in relating the facts in as objective
a manner as possible is another quality of his own per-
sonality rather than a characteristic of his humanist orienta-
tion. The humanists were often rather subjective, since their motives were patriotic; they wanted to show the glories of their own particular countries or city-
states. In this sense, it could even be stated that Ayala was perhaps even more modern than the humanists themselves, since his cold, analytical presentation of the facts is more appropriate to the ideals of modern historiography than to humanism.
Footnotes


5. Tate, p. 169.

CONCLUSION

Ayala's family position and ties to France were mainly responsible for his short-sighted view of the political situation of Castile in the second half of the fourteenth century. His antipathy to the brutal justice of Pedro I prevented him from realizing that this king was a forerunner of the concept of a national, unified Spain. Pedro's defeat and death meant the prolongation of the struggle between the nobility and the monarchy, which Ayala himself was to criticize in the Crónica del Rey Don Enrique III.

Ayala's portrayal of the reign of Enrique II emphasizes that monarch's military victories while minimizing the gravity of Castile's internal situation as exemplified in such policies as Las Mercedes Enriqueñas.

In the reign of Juan I, Ayala intelligently opposes Juan's policies in Portugal. However, he fails to see the harm of Castile's anti-English stand, which thrust her into a costly war over a situation which could have been settled in a peaceful manner, had Castile followed the prudent example of En Pere of Aragon. The same can be said of Ayala's Francophile stand in respect to the Papal Schism.
Ayala demonstrates more modern tendencies in the last chronicle, in which he deals with Enrique III. Here he is united to the ideals of a centralized monarchy, and criticizes the rapacious policies of the upper nobility which he had defended in the Crónica del Rey Don Pedro I. Likewise, he shows signs of being critical of France, particularly of that country's role in trying to force Pope Benedict XIII to renounce the Papal throne. The idea of neutrality in the Anglo-French struggle becomes much more manifest in the last of the four chronicles.

But whereas the chronicles show evidence of evolution, historically speaking, the same cannot be said for their literary style. The only chronicle which is truly readable from the literary point of view is the first. This is due to Ayala's greater interest then in dramatic presentation, which serves the purpose of emotionally arousing the reader's antipathy to Pedro I. The last chronicle, on the other hand, weighed down by its overwhelming wealth of detailed information, is inferior to the others from the stylistic point of view. It is therefore clear that Ayala's main purpose is political, and that the injection of speeches, letters, dialogue and other dramatic devices is secondary to this purpose. It may safely be concluded, then, that in this sense, Ayala does not represent the spirit of the humanist, for whom style was almost as important as content.

Ayala's traditional place in Castilian historiography
as herald of the dawn of a new age has been much exaggerated, thanks in great part to an unquestioning reading of Menéndez y Pelayo. The general form and style of the chronicles follow paths both long known and well trodden. In simplest terms, Ayala represents to the unprejudiced reader the highest expression of the chronicle tradition of the Spanish Middle Ages.
GLOSSARY

Adelantado mayor: Governor in the king's name of one of the constituent provinces of the kingdom of Castile and Leon. He exercised executive, judicial and military authority in his province on behalf of the crown.

Adelantado fronterizo: one holding the governorship of a frontier province.

Adelantado del rey: court official; deputy of the king in the latter's capacity as supreme judge.

Alcalde: local judge with criminal and civil jurisdiction.

Alférez: standard-bearer.

Alférez del rey: commander-in-chief of the army before the military reforms of Juan I in 1382.

Aljama: the name used to designate a community of Jews or Moors inhabiting a special quarter (barrio) of any Spanish city, town, or village.

Canciller: chancellor.

Canciller mayor: chancellor of the great seal of the realm.

Concejo: municipality.

Conde: count. A title of Visigothic origin revived by Alfonso XI as a title of honor granted to individual magnates.

Condestable: the king's deputy as commander-in-chief of the army—a permanent post created by the Castilian and Portuguese military reforms of 1382.

Consejo: council.

Copero: bearer of the cup, an honorary title.

Cortes: parliament.

Mayordomo mayor: the chief officer of the royal household.
Merino mayor: in certain provinces the equivalent of the adelantado mayor.

Oidor: title held by a judge belonging to the supreme tribunal of Castile but having jurisdiction in civil suits only.

Repostero mayor: king's butler; an honorary title.
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