COOPTATION: ANALYSIS OF A NEGLECTED SOCIAL PROCESS

by

Michael G. Lacy

B.A., University of Kansas, 1973

Submitted to the Department of Sociology and the Faculty of the Graduate School of the University of Kansas in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in Sociology.

Redacted Signature

Professor in charge

Redacted Signature

For the Department

Redacted Signature
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank my adviser, Dr. Sakari Sariola, and the other members of my committee, Dr. Robert J. Antonio and Dr. Jill S. Quadagno. They were generous sources of positive criticism and encouragement, and were always readily available for consultation. I also appreciated the intellectual and moral support of the Ohio Street Players, who are now my friends and colleagues and whom I trust will be so in the future.

M. G. L.

December, 1977 Lawrence, Kansas
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</th>
<th>ii</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS OF COOPTATION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working Definition and Framework</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic Concepts</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review of the Literature</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Endnotes</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. THE CASE OF AMERICAN INDIANS</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political History of American Indians</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The NCIO and the BIA in Depth</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Form and Substance of the Indian Threat</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussion of Indian Cooptation</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusions</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. REVISION AND EXTENSION OF THE MODEL</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimacy, Audiences, and Threats</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filtering: Channeling and Blunting</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Characteristics of the Cooptee</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Situations Conducive to Cooptation</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Endnotes</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS OF COOPTATION

The concept of cooptation is at the same time very popular and quite neglected. One frequently reads or hears the phrase mentioned in passing, as though there were agreement as to what it meant, but there is a dearth of work on the subject. In one of the few works focusing directly on the subject, Karl Loewenstein (1973:21) decries the "complete lack of systematic research on cooptation" and notes that the standard references in sociology and political science either mention it not at all or contain only a few sentences on the subject. There exist only two books, to the current author's knowledge, in which cooptation is a major concept: Loewenstein's work in German, which is an attempt to develop a model of cooptation, and one work in English, Selznick's TVA and the Grass Roots (1949), a case study of the TVA using cooptation as a basic concept.

The neglect of the concept, coupled with the varieties of its use, as will be documented below, would be enough to justify the current investigation. Additional justification rests on two bases: 1) insofar as power is a basic process in all societies, organizations, and groups, and since cooptation is a part of the power process, it has import; and 2) hopefully, the reader will agree that cooptation is a ubiquitous phenomenon, occurring just as ordinarily as other recognized social processes, such as assimilation, accommodation, or revolution.
The intent of this investigation is to clarify the concept of co-optation and show its use as an analytic and explanatory device, and to formulate some notions about typical patterns and outcomes of the cooptation process. To begin, my working definition of a threat model of co-optation will be presented along with a model of a power system which, as will be seen, is the locus for the occurrence of cooptation. Then, several other models of cooptation will be examined with critiques indicating the need for the new conceptualization represented by the threat model.

Working Definition and Framework

First, here is a brief definition of cooptation as it will be used within the threat model. Cooptation occurs if, in a system of power, actors who pose a threat to the powerholder are intentionally brought into positions and situations in which they come to participate to a greater extent in the official process of the system in question. It is crucial that there be opposition between the powerholder and the dissident actor prior to occurrence of cooptation. Without the imputation of opposition, one cannot speak of cooptation.

To explicate this definition, a model of a power system must first be adopted. The model here espoused of a power system has two levels: the official, formal "planfully established" sector, referred to as the state, the public sector, or the powerholder, and the "unplanned, informal, spontaneous" sector, also known as the people or civil sector (Sariola, 1972:11). I do not share the Weberian (1964:152) notion of power as an ability exercised despite resistance, but rather I see the powerholder attempting to realize his intentions given that resistance
by the people is a normal process of the system. Resistances may not exist overtly at every moment in every system, but they are at least a long-range possibility in any system. The potential background of resistance forces us to view the exercise of power as involving a tension between the public sector and the civil sector.

Legitimacy, defined as existing if the people view the powerholder as having the right to rule, is a problem for the powerholder. He must tread the line between coercion, power based on the threat of or use of negative sanctions (de Crespigny, 1970:43ff), and authority (legitimated power). Power is the generic concept, with authority and coercion being poles of a continuum. Any actual exercise of power exists somewhere between these extremes and involves elements of both. The powerholder exists in a tension between coercion and authority in two senses. First, there is a trade-off between coercion and authority, since the powerholder uses up his supply of legitimacy when he resorts to coercion. Similarly, less coercion is necessary when a powerholder has high legitimacy. Second, because the exercise of power involves dealing with new situations which require the transcendence of or departure from traditional modes of action, no powerholder's actions can ever be fully legitimated. Even if one accepts the possibility of power being legitimated in form (as in legal-rational authority), it is problematic whether the substance of a new policy or command can be fully legitimate, unless the new directive is a response to overwhelming pressure from the civil sector. Hence, even the powerholder who has high legitimacy must resort to some actions which fall along the coercion-authority continuum in the area of non-legalitimate power.
This conception of power may be termed a "decay" model. No power-holder may permanently maintain control or fully carry out his original plan. Power systems have a tendency to decay for a number of reasons, of which the following are a few: the system's legitimating ideology may cease to fit the facts of power and/or be discredited among the people; changes may spontaneously arise in the civil sector (e.g., resource deficits due to population pressure); schisms in the civil sector (e.g., ethnic conflict) may arise; a previously quiescent group may come to realize its potential for resistance (e.g., labor movements); and there is the possibility of external political threat. An analogy may be made to a physical system. Just as the assumptions of thermodynamics require the input of energy to maintain an ordered physical state, this model of power contains the assumption that there must be an input of legitimacy or force to maintain the unity of a power system. Resistances tend to develop and are a threat to the unity of the system and thus must be eliminated, neutralized with the input of legitimacy, or channeled through some sort of a filter (e.g., bureaucratic complaint mechanisms) if the existence of the system is to be insured.

Taking this analytic division of the power process into two levels, there exist two basic occurrences in any system: action by the power-holder onto the subjects and resistances by the civil sector toward the powerholder. There is a potential two-way flow of power. Thus, there are two problems for the state. First, it must attempt to insure that its policies, laws, and administration will be accepted by the people. Second, it must deal with the potential and actual resistances and demands that arise from below.
The powerholder must solve these problems in order to prevent the dissolution of the system. The solution to the first difficulty, assuming the problematic case in which the people do not spontaneously and universally accept the actions of the powerholder, comes via supplies of legitimacy, and through the basis of legitimacy, an ideology (defined here as a unified set of political beliefs, which function to justify the scope, form, and substance of the state's power). Solutions to the second problem require what Sariola (1972:270) has termed "the imperative of forced yielding." Yielding involves modification of the original policies of the powerholder so as to soften or concede to the demands of the civil sector. The powerholder might expand suffrage, allow freedom of speech, create bureaucratic agencies to deal with the complaints of the dissidents, or allow increased participation in decision making. A contemporary example of yielding occurred when Richard Nixon, in response to civil sector pressure during the Watergate affair, finally relinquished the tape recordings.

For analytic purposes, these two problems, that of gaining the acceptance of policy and that of dealing with resistance, and their solutions, legitimacy and yielding, have been presented as though they were unconnected. One complicating factor is that yielding, being itself a source of legitimacy, is a solution to the problem of acceptance of policies. In a parallel fashion, sufficient supplies of legitimacy may prevent the development of resistance. Furthermore, this discussion assumes that the powerholder chooses to avoid the use of coercion. Coercion can be a solution to the problem of implementing policy, as happens when the National Guard is used to assist in school integration, and coercion can
be a solution to resistance as well, as when police are used to disperse demonstrators. Powerholders generally avoid coercion as a solution to these problems, since it is expensive monetarily and because it may destroy legitimacy. The destruction of legitimacy hastens the decay or overthrow of the system because, as stated above, it is an input required for system maintenance.

Basic Concepts

Let us now return to the issue of cooptation per se. Cooptation is a mode of yielding to resistance. The "threats" mentioned in the definition can be classified as resistance arising from the civil sector, threatening the unity of the system, and eroding the legitimacy of the powerholder. These threats may be actual, latent, or projected. Several types of threats could be preliminarily identified. One category of threat would be actors, movements, and organizations who are actually part of an organized opposition to the powerholder. An important characteristic of such threats is that they possess power separate from and in opposition to the official (legitimate) system governed by the powerholder. They are power systems themselves yet they exist within larger systems. An example of cooptation here would occur if a labor union leader, threatened by an organized rank and file protest against union corruption, formed an investigative committee and appointed some of the dissidents to the committee. A second category of threat would be constituted by unorganized actors who share an interest opposed to a policy of the powerholder or even opposed to organizing principles of the system itself. This threat is aptly described by the phrase "a community of interest." It is a collection of persons who share a common basis of
interest but who are not actually members of an organization designed to further this interest against the powerholder. Such actors do not possess the countervailing power represented by a power system dwelling within the beast, as in the first category, but the powerholder always stands to lose legitimacy if he does not yield to their interest. They also threaten the public sector because their withdrawal of support from the powerholder may spread to other persons. Or, members of a community of interest might decide to organize and resist the powerholder. If one takes students as a community of interest, their participation in university governance would constitute cooptation. A third category of potential threat includes actors who have not previously been members of the power system. When a system expands, as in colonization or in territorial acquisitions, the new subjects are ipso facto a threat to the powerholder. The powerholder has not had experience with them and cannot gauge his legitimacy among them, nor has he had a chance to publicize his ideology and thereby legitimate himself among them. The British colonial practice of creating civil service positions for natives was cooptation oriented to this threat. A closely related but analytically separate type of threat occurs when the public sector expands its scope to actions not previously legitimated within the system. Selznick's TVA documents such a case. The TVA constituted an expansion of government action into a new realm, and met threats in part by bringing citizens into official positions in the organization. Finally, apathetic actors are a fourth category of threat to the state. Those who show so little interest in the system that they do not support or oppose it threaten the powerholder. They do not participate in the
system except by being under its control. This can be convenient for
the powerholder, but it is also a problem. Marginals leave the power-
holder in the position of ignorance of their attitudes and desires,
since he receives no input from them. They evidence a lack of legiti-
macy and they hold the potential to become an organized opposition or a
community of interest. In a state with low proportions of citizens vot-
ing (e.g., the U.S.), the apathy threat exists. The appropriate coopt-
ive maneuver might be easing the difficulties of voter registration to
increase participation. Threats may be actual or perceived. If the
powerholder perceives a group as a potential threat at some future time,
that is sufficient.

Implicit in these categories of threat is a key characteristic of
the concept of cooptation: the labeling of an event as one of coopta-
tion involves imputation of opposition between the powerholder and the
coopted member of the system. The observer who speaks of cooptation is
claiming that the coopted group or actor possessed power separate from
that of the legitimate system (at least potentially) and that the parti-
san's interests or desires oppose those of the powerholder. If no oppo-
sition were to exist, what would occur would be merely normal advance-
ment in a hierarchy. A young executive who assents to the ideals of a
corporation's owners and is moved into the leadership would not be said
to have been coopted. This would only be a case of selecting, recruit-
ing, or assimilating members in a typical fashion, i.e., one in which
"friendlies" are promoted. What makes cooptation interesting is precisely
that the leaders are recruiting hostiles into their midst. Likewise,
without the imputing of motive (intention) to the powerholder, coopta-
tion loses meaning. If it is identified sheerly on a behavioral level as involving the move from lower to higher levels of participation, co-optation is indistinguishable from upward mobility. It is not just that participation has been achieved by the threat group, but that the powerholder has encouraged or created the structure of participation.

Another element in the definition requires explanation, namely "participation in the official political process." An actor participates officially if he engages in policy determination or implementation within a structure nominally (legally) under control of the powerholder or at least sanctioned by him. Participation could range from voting, to citizen participation in public meetings set up to solicit opinion on some issue, up through membership in the administration of the state, to appointed or elected office.

There are several possible outcomes of cooptation to be thematized here; the issue upon which they hinge is the defusing of the threat. Since cooptation involves yielding, the powerholder aims at softening the impact of the threat so as to defuse it. While it is always problematic whether this is successful, one can point to two generic types of outcomes which are successful from the point of view of the powerholder: 1) Defusal of the threat may come through the "legitimacy payoff" to the powerholder. He may point to the fact of increased formal participation and use this as an ideological justification for his power. The extension of suffrage to women illustrates this. 2) Cooptation can defuse threats by inserting a "filter" between the powerholder and threatening group. With participation in the official system, the demands of the threat now impact on the powerholder through a structure of participation.
(filter) which is nominally under control of the powerholder and may even have been created by him. The previously cited example of student participation in university governance fits here. Finally, one must recognize that unsuccessful outcomes may occur—the filtering and legitimacy functions may not manifest themselves or may even backfire. The structure of participation may allow too much participation and changes in the system may result. The rise of the third estate in Europe was a failure of a structure of participation extended to a threatening group. In the long run, it did not filter the pressures from the rising bourgeoisie who used it to achieve eventual domination of the system. Or, the threatening group could see the offered participation as a sham and react against any attempt to make ideological capital out of it. Their opposition to the powerholder would increase in this case. Charges of tokenism made by ethnic groups in reaction to offered political participation in the U.S. exemplify this failure outcome of cooptation.

Review of the Literature

Having presented my threat model of cooptation, I now wish to discuss other models of cooptation. For rough heuristic purposes these can be categorized into several basic types: the traditional elite recruitment model (Loewenstein, Feron, et al.); the formal organization model (Selznick, Thompson, Allen); the power-protest model (Gamson, Spector and Kitsuse, threat model); and the political socialization model (Greer and Orleans, Domhoff).

The traditional model of cooptation describes a process of elite recruitment which might be called quasi-election. In this usage, it refers to "the election to vacancies on a legislative or other body by the
votes of the existing members of the body, as opposed to election by an outside constituency" (Encyclopedia Britannica, 1969, 6:458). Karl Loewenstein (1973:18), in what is the most comprehensive work on cooptation, adopts this usage as his basic definition. He places cooptation within a listing of modes of investiture into office, including as other types such processes as nomination and appointment. Mackenzie, in an article on elections (1968, 5:2f), also places cooptation in the context of election and appointment, with cooptation being a middle ground between these two. In his view, cooptation involves the selection of a colleague, whereas appointment involves a subordinate and election by a superior. In general, the traditional model of cooptation treats it as a formal leadership recruitment process characteristic of certain organizations. Loewenstein's (1973:15) exemplar for cooptation illustrates this aspect. He cites the French Academy, an elite cultural organization which fills vacancies in its membership by a vote of the existing members; it is a power-holding organization which has as its official recruitment mechanism a particular process, namely cooptation. An important characteristic here is that this process is officially provided for in the constitution or tradition of the group. This is implicit in the traditional model of cooptation.

The official aspect is one of the divergences between the traditional and threat models of cooptation, since no such restriction is contained within the threat model. The major difference between these two models lies in the emphasis placed on the concept of threat. Cooptation as an official recruitment process apparently could take place in any organization, regardless of whether the civil sector posed a threat.
A connection does exist between the traditional model and the one presented here, however, in that the particular technique described (quasi-election) would be one way in which cooptation could occur. A threatened group of powerholders could select one of the people into their membership, a situation which would fit both the classic model as well as my own. Furthermore, Loewenstein implicitly recognizes the importance of threat to cooptation, since he sees cooptation as one way by which privileged groups maintain their unity and identity. Cooptation, Loewenstein claims (1973:191), is frequently a means "to protect the existence and future of a group in its present form" and he agrees (1973:193) that cooptation (in his sense) can be used to give political participation in the organization to "rival powers." However, the emphasis for Loewenstein is not the defusing of rivals by the incorporation of previously hostile elements into leadership, but rather recruiting people whose presence in leadership will serve to preserve the coopting group in its present form. While this could lead to the selection of threatening actors, what Loewenstein has in mind, as his examples (the French Academy, the European Common Market) indicate, is more likely the recruitment of new members whose views are compatible with those of the status quo. Thus, while he adumbrates the notion of threat, it is not central to his model. In sum, then, the traditional model of cooptation, while referring to processes of power, does not sufficiently focus on threat and is overly restrictive in its concentration on cooptation as a constitutionally-provided-for procedure.

Frederic Fleron (1969) presents a concept of cooptation which is similar to the traditional model in that it delineates an elite recruit-
ment process. He describes cooptation as a process which occurs when a political elite lacks skills necessary for the management of the system. It obtains these skills by recruiting into subordinate positions of authority persons who have previously been a member of another (e.g., technical or scientific) elite (1969:181-182). This is a technique resorted to by powerholders with particular problems, namely deficiencies in expertise. In his study of the Soviet system of political leadership, Fleron (1969:177) operationalizes cooptation by classifying as coopted those persons who entered into the political elite after at least seven years in a career outside of politics. Fleron (1969:181-182) sees cooptation as a characteristic process of some political systems, as his model includes "cooptative" political leadership systems as one of several modes of adaptation of political systems.

In addition to solving the adaptation problem of obtaining necessary skills, cooptation may have several other results. According to Fleron (1969:190), there are five reasons why a political elite might coopt members of specialized elites: 1) to gain legitimacy, particularly vis-a-vis the specialized elites; 2) to obtain necessary skills; 3) to increase "access" to the specialized elites; 4) "to share power"; and 5) "to share responsibility." His consideration of these reasons for cooptation, particularly 1), 3), 4), and 5) brings his model somewhat closer to the threat model. In particular, he argues that cooptation of specialized elites in the Soviet Union has increased the legitimacy of the regime in the eyes of the specialized elites. There is the implication here that the specialized elites withheld their support from the political elite prior to cooptation. If so, a threat situation (that of
a community of interest) would have existed. There also is a threat involved in an actor's possession of skills the powerholders need. The actor's ability to withhold these skills from the state is always a potential problem for the powerholder if he needs these skills to implement his policies. Cooptation would be particularly appropriate as a means to get these skills, since it may be difficult to coerce someone into using his mental abilities to the fullest.

Fleron's model, like Loewenstein's, does hint at some of the same issues of threat and has a further resemblance to the threat model in referring to the giving of political participation to previously unrepresented actors. The insufficiency of Fleron's conceptualization is the failure to make threat an explicit defining characteristic of the cooptation process.

The person most responsible for bringing the concept of cooptation into contemporary sociology is Philip Selznick (1948, 1949) who used it in the context of the sociology of formal organization. It is striking that Selznick (1949:13), while acknowledging the unfamiliarity of the concept of cooptation, recognizes it to be an old concept and yet does not cite any sources for it.

He uses the perspective of an organization adapting to its environment, with cooptation being a way to meet certain environmental pressures. Selznick (1949:13) states: "[C]ooptation is the process of absorbing new elements into the leadership or policy-determining structures of an organization as a means of averting threats to its stability or existence." Two different types of cooptation may occur, depending on the character of the environmental threat to be met. If the threat is
one of a diffuse lack of legitimacy with people at large on the part of the organization, formal cooptation results. There is a public (open, recognized) broadening of the leadership in order to achieve legitimacy (Selznick, 1949:13f). Actors are brought in who "reflect the sentiment or possess the confidence" of the people (1949:14). As examples, Selznick suggests company unions and the practice of bringing natives into colonial bureaucracies. There is another case in which formal cooptation takes place. When it is useful to establish "the forms of self-government" (1949:14), as in a government housing project, the leaders may institute citizens' committees or other devices of participation. These provide channels of communication for the powerholder and also, according to Selznick, (1949:14), increase legitimacy by sharing the responsibility for power. In either of these cases, the essential characteristic of formal cooptation is that it does not involve the intention on the part of the leaders to actually share power. It is window dressing, as the powerholder wishes to give the "forms of participation but not the substance" (Selznick, 1949:14). Informal cooptation (Selznick, 1949:14f), on the other hand, involves an actual sharing of power. It arises as a response to specific alternative, competing, or dissident loci of power. This form of cooptation, as its name indicates, does not take place openly; to openly acknowledge the power of other (resistant) actors would be problematic for the coopting powerholder. Selznick (1949:260) hypothesizes that cooptation involving "actual sharing of power" will typically be informal, whereas cooptation as an attempt to gain legitimacy will generally be formal, an hypothesis which he supports with the case history of the TVA.
Obviously, the current author's model has been influenced by Selznick. He clearly acknowledges the element of threat involved in cooptation, connects cooptation to problems of power and legitimacy, and highlights the expansion of a power system as a threat that involves cooptation. Another merit of Selznick's treatment of cooptation is his recognition that it can have severe consequences for the power system. By no means does cooptation always result in the neutralization of the threat and increased freedom of action for the organization. Selznick (1949:262f and Chap. 3 and Chap. 4) shows that the cooptation by the TVA of rival agricultural leaders severely constrained its policy in this area. Conversely, he recognizes the use of cooptation as a control device in which the people do not actually exercise power. A related theme underlies Selznick's discussion of democratic planning and the TVA. The implication is that there exists a formal similarity between cooptation and democracy in that they both involve the extension of participation. However, a main theme of Selznick's work is that cooptation tends to destroy democracy. On the one hand, cooptation of powerful threats (agri-business in the case of the TVA) may lead to acquiring a set of sectarian interests within the ranks of power to which capitulation may be necessary. Alternatively, "grass roots" citizen participation may appear to be a democratic maneuver while actually functioning as formal cooptation.

There are several other intriguing ideas suggested by Selznick. One is the parallel between cooptation and ideology; both are defensive techniques used by an organization to adapt to its environment (Selznick, 1949:259). Another is his connection of the type of threat faced by the
organization with the ensuing type of participation. This connection should be the task of a theory of cooptation, and it is begun by Selznick's distinction between formal and informal cooptation.

There are difficulties with his model which require further development of the theory of cooptation. First, his model of a power system is poor. The choice of boundaries of the system is incorrect. When Selznick speaks of the organization adapting to its environment, he implies that the boundaries of the system are to be drawn to include all members of the organization as the powerholder. The environment is made up of all actors and conditions to which this organization must adapt. In my view, the system would include only the powerful members of the formal organization as the powerholder. For example, in the case of the TVA, one would include its officers, board of directors, etc. The civil sector would not directly correspond to Selznick's "environment" but would contain all actors over whom the powerholders nominally have control in the context of operations of the TVA. Unlike the environment, the civil sector would include the less powerful members of the organization itself; it would not contain superordinate organizations, such as the federal government, which in Selznick's model is part of the environment. In discussing cooptation, the relevant distinction is between the less powerful and the more powerful, rather than between an organization and its environment. It does not make sense to lump together as "environment" actors with vast differentials in power.

To see this clearly, we might take Selznick's organization/environment division to an absurd extreme. One would then say that the janitors and secretaries of the TVA, since they are a part of the organization,
help the organization meet threats to its power. Similarly, it would be absurd to think of the whole organization absorbing new leaders, or the whole organization being threatened by its environment. The "thing" that absorbs and gets threatened is not the organization but the power-holding segment of the organization. The TVA was not an anonymous organism finding its niche but an organization of real human beings, particular ones of whom exercised power. An anonymized view of power is the result of drawing the system boundaries as Selznick does.

The use of a formal organizational perspective is the source of other problems with Selznick's model. It leads to the ignoring of the possible cooptation of threats within the system. Suppose a secretary in the TVA had discovered cooptation in the organization and was promoted (coopted) to a more powerful position in the organization. Selznick's model could not count this as cooptation since the threat is not part of the "environment." In other words, Selznick's conception of threat is too restrictive, as it excludes internal threats which may be just as common as threats in the environment. He also had a deficient concept of threat, since it only includes two threats (a diffuse lack of legitimacy and specific alternative powerholders) out of a range of possible types of threat, as I have shown above.

The use of the formal organization as the level of analysis is too restrictive. Cooptation is likely to have a different content, for example, on the level of the nation-state. The more abstract vantage point of a power system avoids this problem. Selznick's statement of the forms that participation may take, namely absorption into leadership or policy-determining, is also too narrow since there are other ways, such as ex-
pansion of suffrage, in which a powerholder could increase participation and legitimacy.

The biggest gap in Selznick's work is the lack of theoretical material on cooptation. He stretches what are literally a few pages on the definition of cooptation through hundreds of pages of substantive analysis and concludes without extending the theory but only providing empirical support for the formal/informal hypothesis. Thus, even if Selznick's model is satisfactory, there is still a need for the extension of the theory of cooptation.

A contemporary variant of Selznick's model of cooptation emerges within the field of formal organization. In James Thompson's book (1967: 35) on basic concepts of formal organization, he presents a definition taken word-for-word from Selznick and conceptualizes cooptation as a form of cooperation among organizations who are members of one another's environment and thus mutually dependent. Cooperation involves "the exchange of commitments . . . [and] the reduction of potential uncertainty for both parties" (Thompson, 1967:35). In Thompson's view, cooptation represents a middle ground between contracting and coalition, which are the extremes of a continuum of cooperation, the dimension of which is the degree of constraint exercised by the cooperating parties upon one another. Allen (1974) produced an empirical study using this concept of cooptation and attempted to test some hypotheses proposed by Thompson. The specific hypotheses need not concern us here; what is interesting is the example of cooptation he chooses, for it reveals something about the cooperation approach to cooptation. Allen examines interlocking among the boards of directors of corporations as a case of cooptation. This
example comes from Thompson (1967:35). The example highlights the distortion of the concept of cooptation which their approach brings about. It ceases to be a phenomenon peculiar to systems of power. In the current author's view, systems of power involve two levels, that of the powerholder and that of the relatively powerless people. Cooptation involves a relation between these two levels. In Allen's or Thompson's view, cooptation becomes a relationship between two actors of more or less equal power and thus could refer to processes between competing organizations. Systems of power involve one-way dependency, not the mutual dependence implied by Thompson and Allen. If cooptation is a phenomenon of power it can not be a symmetrical relationship of cooperation.

Since Selznick discusses cooptation within the context of power, it may seem curious that Thompson (and Allen, albeit indirectly) take him as a starting point. The explanation resides in their use of the organization adapting to its environment as their principle of analysis. One can understand how they arrive at their peculiar point of view: they must share Selznick's construction of the system boundaries as being between organization and environment, rather than between powerholder and people. Given this, a sharing of decision-making between an organization and its competitors in its environment could be viewed as cooperation and cooptation simultaneously. It is only because Selznick's model of cooptation is separated from his organization-and-environment perspective that his model of cooptation is somewhat compatible with the threat model. Although Thompson cites Selznick's definition of cooptation, his model of cooptation flows more directly out of the organizational perspective than does Selznick's. Thompson's model is more consistent in this re-
spect, but because of its reliance on a formal organization perspective, it is even less compatible with the threat model.

Another treatment of cooptation is the power-protest model, represented by Gamson (1968), who cites Selznick's definition but treats the concept in a different way. He sees cooptation as a "control mechanism" (i.e., a tool of the powerholder) which "involves yielding access [to the powerholder] to the most difficult and threatening potential partisans" (Gamson, 1968:135). The consequences of cooptation, according to Gamson, involve a trade-off: the powerholder gives up insulation of the partisan group as a technique in exchange for other controls possible once the partisans gain access to the powerholder. Once the partisans are actually participating in the legitimate system, new controls on them are available to the powerholder (Gamson, 1968:135). They are subject to the rewards and punishments that are available in the legitimate system, and they may acquire an interest in maintaining the system as it is. Gamson (1968:136) claims that "attitudinal changes" in the partisans are likely to result from their participation, with them becoming committed more to the system than to their original cause. In a later work, Gamson (1975) operationalizes cooptation and uses it in a different way. He defines cooptation in this usage as a situation in which a dissident group becomes tamed. The group is accepted as a normal element in the system by the powerholder but fails to achieve the changes originally campaigned for (Gamson, 1975:29). The coopted group, in this definition, is one which has given up active protest in exchange for legitimate access to the powerholder. This latter definition of Gamson's does not correspond to his 1968 usage. What he has done here is to identify co-
optation with one of its possible results, namely, the neutralization of a threatening group coupled with its continued existence as a group. This amounts to answering the question "What are the results of cooptation?" before it can be asked. He compounds his error by not only defining cooptation by its results but also by limiting it to one of its possible outcomes.

Gamson's 1968 model of cooptation is much more satisfactory. He uses cooptation within the context of a threatening interaction between powerholder and people. However, he seems to restrict cooptation to cases in which threat is severe and openly acknowledged. This is different from the threat model I propose, since Gamson would exclude threats such as the community of interest or the threat of apathy. The threat which has not yet manifested itself openly would also be excluded; this is an error, since the clever or forward-looking powerholder may wish to extend participation before the fact of open disaffection. This is clearly a coptive maneuver, yet Gamson's model would not include it.

Spector and Kitsuse's construction (1973) of the natural history of a social problem incidentally contains a power-protest model of cooptation. They posit four stages through which social problems pass. The process begins with a dissident claiming that a certain condition is a social problem. Next comes official recognition by the government that a social problem exists, along with establishment of a government agency or process to deal with it. The outcome of official recognition, according to Spector and Kitsuse (1973:152), is that the group is invited to "participate in official proceedings on the problem." Stark (1975:11) calls attention to the coptive nature of this stage and refers to it as
"legitimation and cooptation."

The process described here is directly parallel to my description of a threatening group being given participation within the official system. The social problem process as constructed by Spector and Kitsuse corresponds to the coopting of a manifest threat of the organized movement variety. Spector and Kitsuse (1973:152) point concisely to the ambiguous results of cooptation: "While official response may give the protest group their finest hour, it may also represent the end of their control over the claims they raise." The group may lose the ability to define its problem and "the responding agency may take over the issue, making it their own, and neutralize or eliminate the original protest group" (Spector and Kitsuse, 1973:153). Participation in the official system may lead to a bureaucratic filtering of the threat.

There are further stages in the process of a social problem. Assuming that the official solution is not satisfactory to the protesting group, a third stage arises in which there is renewed protest aimed now at the government's official remedy. Then, according to Spector and Kitsuse, a fourth stage ensues and cooptation may occur again. The group may decide that no solution exists within the traditional procedures and institutions of the system and mount new threats in the form of alternative, non-official solutions to the problem (Spector and Kitsuse, 1973:153). Here, they explicitly use the concept of cooptation for the first time in their article. If "successful and workable alternative institutions" are developed, "established institutions may attempt to . . . coopt [m. i.] the alternatives" (Spector and Kitsuse, 1973:157). What they talk about here would be, in my terminology, co-
opting the leaders of an organized threat to the public sector. Spector and Kitsuse (1973:157) go on to explain how this cooptation might be accomplished, in other words, how increased participation might be given to the threatening actors. This might be done by making "attractive offers" to the leaders and experts of the social problem groups. The government might, in the case of alternative schools, invite their leaders to participate in conferences or extend grants for the study of alternative schools. The government would then gain control over the groups by separating the dissident leaders from their people. The government may be able to gain legitimacy by claiming the innovations as its own.

Spector and Kitsuse (1973:157) insightfully note that this need not be viewed negatively by the protest group. It depends on whether their goal was to establish a new institution for the society as a whole, in which case they would approve cooptation, or whether they were oriented to defending their groups' specific interest, in which case they would disapprove the government takeover.

Spector and Kitsuse's model has no conflict with the threat model. Although they speak about social problems, the way they conceptualize them as involving a threatening cycle of interaction between a state and a protest group makes it applicable to cooptation as well. However, there is an incompleteness to their discussion. They commit the typical error of construing threat too narrowly. The threat they consider, a social problems protest group, is only one of several possible types of threat suggested in the threat model.

Now let us consider two representatives of a fourth type, the political-socialization model. Greer and Orleans (1964) present such a
model. In their view, cooptation refers to "the mechanisms of committing necessary subgroups to the dominant group and ongoing enterprise" (1964:831). This does not refer to cooptation as a process of change in the composition in the leadership of a power system or to the extension of participation to dissidents, as do other models. Cooptation in Greer and Orleans' usage could indicate any of the techniques that powerholders use to unify their systems and deal with resistance. Thus, it could include such phenomena as ideology, cooptation in the sense I have used it, showy public ceremonies, or the adoption of new laws favoring certain segments of the people. Cooptation would include all kinds of yielding procedures. This is excessively inclusive.

Domhoff (1967) has a similar concept of cooptation. He briefly notes that Greer and Orleans' concept is like his own (Domhoff, 1967:158). He defines cooptation as a "process whereby individuals are assimilated and committed to the institutions and values of the dominant socioeconomic group" (Domhoff, 1967:5). This, as in Greer and Orleans, refers to a process of socializing the civil sector into accepting the legitimacy of the power system. While cooptation serves the purpose of increasing legitimacy, Domhoff's definition of it again could include a fantastic array of other techniques. He further confuses the issue by speaking of (e.g.) elite law schools in the U.S. as coopting mechanisms, in that they serve as a source of members for the dominant group. Here he uses an elite recruitment model in which "friendlies" advance in a hierarchy. The dimension of threat is obscured, unless one assumes that the law school students were a threat to the legal order prior to their law school political socialization.
We can now see the differences and advantages of the threat model. It makes threat a defining element of cooptation, whereas in previous models it was implicit or unanalyzed. The idea of threat is the thread which connects all concepts of cooptation. In the traditional or elite recruitment model the cooptive type of recruitment would not be necessary unless the powerholders were threatened by possible changes in their midst. In the power-protest model, and in Selznick's formal organization model, specific types of threat lead to cooptation, but the range of threats considered is too narrow. In the cooperation variant of the formal organization model, threat is represented by the notion of the uncertainty of elements in the environment. The political socialization model implies the existence of threat, since it considers the needs of a dominant group in dealing with the subgroups and individuals which confront it. In fact, whenever one speaks of power, threat is implied. All modes of power, from legitimate to coercive, contain the idea of someone controlling others. Since control might break down, there is always the element of threat. Thus, to say that cooptation takes place in a power system is to say that it involves threats. A model of cooptation must therefore have explicit reference to threat.

Having emphasized the notion of threat, the proposed model achieves greater conceptual accuracy by recognizing the existence of a variety of types of threat. Also, the threat model achieves greater clarity and accuracy by defining a process which is inclusive enough to be theoretically interesting (in contrast to the traditional model) yet not so broad as to be conceptually useless (as in the political socialization model). The choice of a power system as the unit of analysis also helps here, as
it is a theoretical vantage point which is sufficiently abstract but theoretically well-defined and meaningful. Another contribution of this model of cooptation is the identification of two kinds of successful outcomes, the filtering and legitimacy payoffs. Finally, this reformulation of cooptation should hopefully serve as a framework with which one can recognize, give form to, and analyze the everyday substance of power systems.
1I have no intention of suggesting that social systems can be treated in the manner of physical systems. This is only an illustrative reference.

2Selznick's earlier article (1948) also treats cooptation, but his book expands and clarifies the same material. There are no conflicts between the two presentations.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


CHAPTER II
THE CASE OF AMERICAN INDIANS

Before beginning the description and analysis of an example of cooptation, let us recall a few of the central concepts of the threat model. Cooptation will refer to extensions of political participation to actors (persons or organizations) who pose a threat to the state. Threats refer to resistance by members of the civil sector. Cooptation is also characterized by opposition and intention. There must be an expansion of participation, initiated or at least directed by the powerholder, to actors who hold power separate from and in opposition to that provided by the official system, and it must be plausible to impute an opposition of interest between the powerholder and the dissident. The terms "legitimacy payoff" and "filtering payoff" denote two possible results of cooptation, which, from the standpoint of the powerholder are successful outcomes, since they refer to the enhancement and preservation of control over resistance, despite the apparent weakening of control involved in the extension of political participation.

Political History of American Indians

The example of cooptation to be considered took place between the United States government and American Indians. Specific expansions of participation (i.e., cooptation) occurred during the 1960's and 1970's, but the background of these events as well as other instances of cooptation are found in the earlier history of the Indian within the American
power system.

The structural position of the Indian in the U.S. was first that of a member of a tribe, an independent, relatively sovereign group which the colonizing American system confronted as an obstacle. In its dealings with tribes, the American government pursued until 1871 a basic policy of treaty-making with individual tribes; although this practice may have rarely been one of free contracts between equals, and was often prefaced by war, it nevertheless indicates something about the position of the Indian up until then. He appeared to the government not as a recalcitrant citizen, but as a member of what was an alien nation within the expanding American system.

One of the government's early policy innovations was the reservation system, which began in the middle 1800's (see Tyler, 1973:70-73 et seq.). The rationale for the placement of Indians on reservations was to isolate the Indians, keep them peaceful, and open up more lands for settlers. The government allowed the tribes, on the reservations, to manage their own internal affairs, thus maintaining up through the 1860's a policy of dealing "with Indian tribes largely as self-governing units." (Tyler, 1973:91)

Starting around 1870, the thrust of the U.S. government's policy was directly toward assimilating the Indians into the American system, instead of dealing with them as members of separate nations within the nation. As Tyler (1973:124) says, the "long range goals set by the government for the Indians [were] assimilation and 'civilization'." There are several indications of the impetus toward assimilation, one being the 1885 extension of federal criminal jurisdiction to Indian territor-
ies, at least for certain crimes (Tyler, 1973:91). In another act indicative of the trend toward assimilation rather than pluralism, Congress in 1871 forbade further treaty making between the government and the Indians (Tyler, 1973:91). Another facet of the new direction in policy was the Dawes Act of 1887. It established the allotment system, a plan in which the government deeded land to individual Indians rather than to the traditional tribal or community structures (Tyler, 1973:95). The allotment plan, in its attempt to persuade Indians to become freeholding individual farmers, particularly aimed at assimilation of the Indian into white civilization. Furthermore, it was easier for whites to acquire lands that were owned by individual Indians rather than tribes (Tyler, 1973:96). Generally, the trend of government Indian policy during the 1870's and 1880's was to further minimize the functions of tribal leaders and tribal institutions and to continually strengthen the position of the government representative and his subordinates, and to improve the effectiveness of their programs to break down traditional patterns within the Indian communities. (Tyler, 1973:91)

The Indian's relationship with the government was becoming more that of an individual quasi-citizen, a change from his previous position as a member of a sovereign alien group, the tribe. In 1924, President Coolidge signed a bill which gave citizenship to all Indians, although nearly two-thirds already were such (Tyler, 1973:110). The citizenship decree can be viewed as an attempt at political assimilation; the cultural assimilation of the allotment policy had failed to make good American farmers out of the Indians.

In 1933, John Collier, who had a personal history as a worker for reform of Indian policy, became Commissioner of Indian Affairs for the
government. He took a stand against assimilation by supporting the right of Indians to exercise their traditional cultural practices, such as language, crafts, and religion. (Tyler, 1973:128) Collier first began the explicit practice (known as Indian Preference) of bringing Indians into the government's Indian Service; by 1934, one-third of the classified employees in the service were Indians (Tyler, 1973:128). He also was a chief force behind the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, a piece of legislation that reversed the policy of breaking up tribal landholdings and governments by giving more self-government to tribes. It also established the policy of giving preference to Indians in consideration for employment in the Indian Service (Fey and McNickle, 1970:111-112). Another feature of this bill was its provision for a series of Indian congresses around the country at which Indians could give their opinions on its provisions and vote whether or not it would be applied to their tribes (Tyler, 1973:129). One problem with this act, as expressed by the Indian Rights Association at the time, was its treatment of all tribes as being alike (Tyler, 1973:131). During this period of tribal reorganization, the government's policy seems to have wavered between two tendencies, that of assimilation, exemplified by the cooptation of Indians into the Indian Service through Indian Preference and the Indian Reorganization Act's inattention to cultural differences among tribes, and that of pluralism, represented by Collier's defense of traditional cultural practices and the self-government provisions of the Reorganization Act. However, Tyler (1973:151-152) argues that the Reorganization Act's revitalization of the tribal organization was only a new technique in the long term policy of assimilation. The hope was that Indians
might be assimilated by treating tribes more like other local political communities.

The next change in government policy came in the late 1940's and 1950's. The policy of termination began, which meant that tribes that were prosperous and deemed capable of managing their own affairs would be terminated from their special status in relations with the government. Indians in these tribes would no longer receive special services, privileges, and monies as Indians, but would be dealt with as private citizens. Termination met with strong resistance from even the more cautious Indians and their supporters. (Tyler, 1973:175) According to Cahn and Hearne (1970:16), "[f]ear of termination pervades Indian thinking. It colors the Indian's appraisal of every proposal, suggestion, and criticism." Members of tribes that were terminated (e.g., Menominee and Klamath) did not fare well economically. Consequently, fear of termination has led to Indian support for the Bureau of Indian Affairs as the lesser of evils. While Indians may dislike intensely the paternalism, bureaucracy, and coercion of the BIA, they often view it as better than no protection at all (Cahn and Hearne, 1970:22-23). By the beginning of the 1960's, termination (and the notion of assimilation which underlay it) had subsided as the overt policy of the government (Tyler, 1973:186), but Cahn and Hearne (1970:20-21) claim it remained as an ultimate objective behind the strategies of government Indian policy.

**The NCIO and the BIA in Depth**

Starting in 1968 during the Johnson administration, the most clear cases of cooptation began. The government started a policy that Tyler (1973:217) calls "self-determination through Indian leadership," but
which I view as the expansion of legitimate participation to a threatening group. In 1968 Lyndon Johnson initiated this era with the creation of the National Council on Indian Opportunity (NCIO). In a Special Message to Congress, Johnson (1968:440) said: In order to "launch an undivided government effort in this area [of Indian problems], I am issuing an Executive Order to establish a National Council on Indian Opportunity." He stipulated that members of this council were to be the cabinet department secretaries of Interior; Agriculture; Commerce; Labor; Health, Education and Welfare; Housing and Urban Development; the director of the Office of Economic Opportunity; the vice-president as chair; and six Indian leaders to be appointed by the president. The council's purpose and mandate was "to review Federal programs for Indians, make broad policy recommendations, and ensure that programs reflect the needs and desires of the Indian people" (Johnson, 1968:440). The NCIO is a case of cooptation in the strict sense used here.

On 26 January 1970, during the Nixon administration, the Indian members of the NCIO made a statement, which Josephy (1971:204) sees as a reaction to the failure of the Nixon regime to act on Indian policy. In this statement, the Indian members of the council (NCIO, 1970:205) demonstrated some awareness of the potential justificatory functions of the NCIO; they alluded to the "symbolic importance" of their participation, and claimed that their meeting with the vice-president and cabinet members would tend to "alleviate some of the cynicism and despair rife among" Indians. Beyond this, they (NCIO, 1970:205) argued that action and commitments by Federal members of the council were necessary if continued "suspicion" and "distrust" of the government were to cease among
Indians. They gave a series of concrete suggestions; some of these called for the establishment of special positions for Indians in cabinet departments, and others concerned education, economics, urban Indians, legal services, land rights, housing, and agriculture. In a Special Message to Congress on 8 July 1970, Nixon made a series of legislative recommendations that attended to nearly all of the suggestions made by the NCIO. Nixon suggested the following:

(1) a new Concurrent Resolution that would "renounce, repudiate and repeal the termination policy . . .",
(2) support for voluntary Indian control of Indian programs with the necessary technical assistance from the Government to facilitate transfers of responsibilities,
(3) restoration of the sacred lands near Blue Lake, New Mexico,
(4) recognition of the right of and support for Indian communities to take over Indian schools . . .,
(5) economic development legislation . . .,
(6) additional appropriations to improve health programs for Indians,
(7) strengthening of efforts of Government agencies to deliver services needed to assist Indians living in urban centers, and
(8) the establishment of an Indian Trust Counsel Authority "to assure independent legal representation for the Indians' natural resource rights . . ." The President also asked the Congress for the New Assistant Secretary for Indian and Territorial Affairs . . . (Tyler, 1973:221-222)

These recommendations were almost exactly what the Indian members of the NCIO had asked for in their statement of January, 1970. The fate of this legislation will be considered below.

Nixon shortly afterward expanded the NCIO and at least verbally altered its purpose from what it had been under Johnson. On 31 August 1970, Nixon (1970:1132) announced the appointment of eight new Indian leaders to the NCIO, thereby replacing former members whose terms had expired and adding two additional Indian members. The council continued
under the chairmanship of the vice-president, retained the cabinet heads as before, and added the Attorney General. The NCIO was now mandated to encourage

full use of Federal programs to benefit the Indian population . . . , encourage interagency coordination and cooperation in carrying out Federal programs for Indians . . . , [and] suggest ways to improve such programs. (Nixon, 1970:1132)

The tone of Nixon's mandate for the NCIO might be interpreted as having indicated a change toward less authority for the NCIO, as compared to Johnson's statement. Nixon's use of "appraise, encourage, and suggest" implies a less authoritative position than Johnson's "review, recommend, and ensure." This may be a hint of Nixon's possible interest in the legitimizing and justifying functions of a cooptive organ such as the NCIO. However, his adoption of their legislative program contradicts the tone of his statement.

Some of the activities of the NCIO can be explored. In one of their first actions after Nixon's appointments, the Indian members of the council traveled around the U.S. with the president's Indian legislative proposals and met with Indian leaders to solicit opinions and suggestions from them (Tyler, 1973:221). Reaction gained at these meetings was mixed. According to Tyler (1973:222), there was considerable praise for the "'intent' of the legislative proposals," but there was some skepticism about their outcome. A typical response was: "We've heard this kind of thing before; now we'll sit back and wait to see the results." (Tyler, 1973:222).

Their skepticism was well founded, as Congress failed to act on much of the legislation, other than the section dealing with the restor-
ation of sacred lands at Blue Lake. Tyler (1973:255) says that some scholars attribute the legislation's failure to pass to the "actual priority given this legislation by the Nixon administration," others point to the conflicts among congressional committees about the use of lands and resources, and others claim that the legislative package had little strong support among Indians and that this discouraged action by Congress. Whatever the reason, little of the proposed legislation became law.

Another view bearing on the efficacy of the NCIO comes from Alvin Josephy (1971:204), who notes that Indians, at least prior to 1970, had "mixed feelings" about the council, with many believing it was "another government bureaucracy controlled by white officials and 'rubber stamped' by its Indian members, who would be unable to accomplish anything significant." Other Indians, such as some tribal officials, felt that the NCIO was sympathetic to their problems, and Josephy himself (1971) thinks that the NCIO was in a position to influence federal agencies and policy.

Josephy (1971:204) gives a list of the Indian members of NCIO under Nixon. Their backgrounds are revealing: seven were tribal officials, one was also a state legislator, and one (LaDonna Harris) was the wife of a U.S. senator. These people may have been staunch Indian advocates, but their backgrounds do not type them as radicals. They were experienced participants in established forms of the official political process.

There were other expansions of participation (cooptation) under Nixon. In 1970 and 1971, "the Indian desk concept," i.e., the creation
of positions for Indians in cabinet departments, was put into practice; this had been advocated by the NCIO in their previously mentioned 1970 statement. The policy of Indian preference in the Bureau of Indian Affairs established under Collier's leadership in the 1930's was reaffirmed and expanded during the Nixon administration. Previously, qualified persons of at least one-fourth degree or more Indian blood had been given preference for employment opportunities in the BIA, but a 1971 BIA study found that this policy had only been applied in the case of "initial employment and reinstatement . . . [and] not in the case of training opportunities or promotion" (Tyler, 1973:225).

In September, 1971, Commissioner Bruce of the BIA recommended the extension of Indian preference to all BIA employment situations, and in June of 1972 the Interior Secretary approved the change. A final instance of cooptation in the BIA is indicated by the backgrounds of the commissioners under Johnson and Nixon. Both of them (Robert Bennet and Louis Bruce) were Indians themselves.

At this point, let us look at the quality of Indian political participation in the BIA. Tyler (1973:225) claims that more than 50 percent of BIA employees were Indian at the time of his writing, including "many of the top officials," but he admits that a "much smaller though steadily increasing percentage" were in the higher level positions. Cahn and Hearne (1970:129) quote an Indian as seeing the BIA as "skimming off the top of the potential Indian leadership by incorporating 'good' Indians into the system: 'The educated Cherokee who knows he is a Cherokee tries to help his people and immediately he is stopped and loses his job.'"

That some Indians view BIA participation by Indians as cooptation in the pejorative sense can be seen in the following statement by Mildred
Ballenger, an Indian tribal official: "The potential leaders of our tribe really have but about two choices: . . . [to leave the Indian community for employment elsewhere], or join the white-oriented group [m.i.] by getting a job with the Indian Bureau . . ." (Ballenger, quoted in Cahn and Hearne, 1970:128). This suggests that Indian participants in the official government process (within the BIA in particular), while they are representatives of a threatening group, are actually drawn from those members of the threatening group likely to be sympathetic and friendly to the government viewpoint. The composition of the NCIO, which was discussed above, demonstrates the same: the people selected are relatively assimilated to the American political system, as shown by their previous experience in state-sanctioned political organs.

Another factor bearing on the significance of Indian participation in the BIA is its position within the state's administrative structure. The Bureau is not situated so as to effectively help and/or represent Indians. Being in the Department of the Interior is one of the BIA's chief liabilities, from the perspective of the Indians. Cahn and Hearne (1970:158) point to the Interior Department's amicable connections with natural resource business interests. They also mention other bureaus housed within Interior, such as the Bureau of Mines and the Bureau of Land Management. Cahn and Hearne (1970:158) cite several instances in which agencies have fought against specific Indian interests, and they claim that within the Department of the Interior the wishes of the BIA usually lose out to others. Even Tyler (1973:254), in his history published by the BIA, admits that there is an inherent "conflict of interest" within the Department of the Interior due to its role in land and
natural resource policy as well as its role in representing Indians. The Secretary of the Interior, under whom the BIA commissioner and operatives must serve, cannot be exclusively supportive of Indian interests. According to Cahn and Hearne (1973:160), the Interior Secretary must primarily deal with questions of resource use, and that Indian "culture, human welfare . . ., self-determination and sovereignty are given less weight in a search for the best use of land and natural resources." The Interior Secretary, whatever his own views, must live in a world of realpolitik. The Indian and the BIA have little political influence as compared to others with whom the secretary must interact, and some of the influential others (within the Bureau of the Budget in particular) are not at all supportive of the Indian cause (Cahn and Hearne, 1970:161). Other writers also say that the Bureau of the Budget has caused problems for the BIA. Donnelly (1972:445) tells of a case in which the federal government's budget office set a limit on BIA expenditures, yet at the same time expected them to pay for a new and expensive highway program. The BIA as an organization is not located in a position to have much influence on policy. Its residence within the Interior Department, an organization having other commitments, other powerful influences, and numerous conflicts of interest, enervates the BIA's potential to help Indians. The point is this: Even if Indians completely controlled the BIA, they could not adequately represent Indian interests because of the structural position of the Bureau.

Alvin Josephy (1969:122) believes that the BIA must be relocated within the government, preferably to a position directly under the president. But he also criticizes another problem with the BIA, namely its
inefficiency as an organization. Citing a study by Leon Ovsiew (n.d., n.p.), Josephy (1969:128-129) indicts the BIA for having a structure which impedes change. Specifically, any innovation suggested by a local BIA operative on a reservation must be approved by a host of higher-level personnel within the BIA. The administrative practices of the BIA thus de-emphasize and excessively subordinate action by local Indians and local BIA personnel. The emphasis is on "echelons of administrators and absentee specialists higher up" (Josephy, 1969:129). Josephy (1969:131) further argues that the Bureau contains many people who could and would act to serve Indians, but the organization of the BIA prevents them from doing so; therefore, he believes that Indians' criticism of BIA employees is more accurately thought of as criticism of a "structure which binds and frustrates its personnel."

Form and Substance of the Indian Threat

This ends the description of the cooptation of American Indians. Now it can be analyzed from the point of view of the threat model of cooptation. The purpose is not to validate the model using an empiricist criterion of verification. The goal is to illustrate how the concepts and themes of the model might be used and to let the example be suggestive of new ideas.

Using the model of a power system outlined above, American Indians would be classified as actors within the civil sector, with the American government (including the President, Congress, cabinet departments, Bureau of Indian Affairs, etc.) as the state. The first question concerns what type of threat the Indian was to the state. Historically, American Indians posed the threat of being subjects in the process of being en-
closed by a new power system which had not previously ruled them. Indians are a polar case here, since they were not for some time even citizens of the new American system but were instead members of alien systems (tribes) dwelling within the same geographic territory as that covered by the Americans. Since conflicts took place over land, the tribes were a threat to the powerholder who had an interest in opening land to citizens of his own system. As the Indians lost their land, were moved onto reservations, were split up by the Allotment policy, and became citizens of the U.S., the tribal unit ceased to be the only source of threat. Contemporary Indians confront the state as individual citizens, as members of a tribe, and in some cases (e.g., the American Indian Movement, the National Congress of American Indians) as members of protest organizations. Considered as citizens, they threaten the state as members of a community of interest. As members of a tribe, they exemplify the threat of actors who are new members of the civil sector and who do not necessarily view the powerholder as legitimate. Tribes are also a threat in their status as organizations of opposition within the system that are power systems themselves. As members of protest organizations, they are again part of an organized opposition to the powerholder. Thus, several of the types of threat mentioned in Chapter I are characteristic of American Indians.

Although the preceding discussion treated the formal aspect of Indians as a threat, a consideration of the content of their threat is also necessary. The most important substantive aspect of the Indian threat derives from the state's commitment to "fair-play", to democratic self-determination and to legal-rational norms of conduct in governing
its subjects. When Indians are denied legally sanctioned rights, the
state can be trapped by its own ideology of democracy. When Indians
raise objection to their treatment, American ideology can be called into
question if the government does not give at least the appearance of ad-
hering to its norms of procedure.

It is the government's ideological and to some extent actual com-
mmitment to legal-rational procedure that has made possible the Indian
as a legal threat. Indians have long used the courts of the United
States to pursue, with some success, their various interests and legally
guaranteed (e.g., treaty) rights. One might begin with the lawsuit
filed against the State of Georgia in the 1830's by the Cherokee, who
argued in the Supreme Court that the laws of Georgia were not applicable
to them, thereby attempting to defend their political sovereignty (De-
loria, 1974:8). Although the court refused the Cherokee's right to sue
in this case (Cherokee Nation vs. The State of Georgia, 1831), in 1832 a
Christian missionary to the Cherokee raised the same issue by deliberate-
ly disobeying Georgia law while on the reservation. When he appealed
his conviction to the Supreme Court of the United States, the court ruled
that Georgia laws were not applicable on the reservation, as the Cherokee
had a degree of sovereignty acknowledged in their treaties with the
United States, which recognized the tribe as a power with sufficient
sovereignty to treat with the United States (Worcester vs. The State of
Georgia, 1832). However, even a cursory acquaintance with American In-
dian history would show that the principles embodied in these decisions
have not been honored or enforced. The significance of these cases is:
(1) that they are early examples of the Indian's use of the courts as a
technique of resistance and hence an early display of their ability to mount a legal threat; and (2) that these decisions established a legal recognition of Indian tribes as alien sovereign nations, albeit dependent ones, existing within the power system of the United States. As indicated in the previous discussion, the government in practice attempted to avoid treating Indians as members of tribal nations (at least after 1871) and tried to assimilate them politically and culturally. Nevertheless, the legal precedents articulated in these decisions remain rarely honored, but as a potential basis on which Indians, given a legal-rational political system, could resist the state.

Other important legal cases came about in the 1850's when tribes sued for damages claiming breach of treaty rights when lands were taken by the state. The government created a Court of Claims in 1854 to handle these and similar cases, but tribal suits became such a problem that the government later acted to exclude them from the jurisdiction of the court except when exclusively permitted by Congress on a case-by-case basis (Deloria, 1974:209-210). Another important case took place in the late 1800's when Indians in Oregon and Washington sued to protect fishing rights guaranteed by treaty, but which had been encroached upon by commercial fishing. Eventually, a suit came to the Supreme Court; Indian treaty rights were upheld (Deloria, 1974:14-15). The seriousness of the threat constituted by the Indians' recovery of their fishing rights was demonstrated by the fact that, as recently as 1965, local white officials used police force as well as the courts in attempts to limit these rights (Cahn and Hearne, 1970:76-77).

The Congress passed a bill in 1924 that strengthened Indians' titles
to their lands. Through a series of lawsuits based on this legislation, the Pueblos Indians successfully evicted 3,000 whites from their lands during the 1920's and 1930's. Their victory helped popularize litigation as a tool for the preservation of Indian rights and for the publicizing of Indian problems (Deloria, 1974:17).

Litigation has intensified since then, with suits being far too numerous to cover completely. In the United States vs. Shoshone Tribe in 1938, Indian land titles were further strengthened with the recognition that Indians had title to "all elements of value" from their land, regardless of whether the government had formally recognized such title (Deloria, 1974:108). This provided a further theoretical basis for Indian litigation. A new concrete structure for the processing of Indian lawsuits over land came about in 1946, at which time the federal government created a special Indians Claims Commission to deal with cases involving treaty rights. Another basis of Indian litigation is the trustee status of Indian assets. Under this principle, the BIA must see that Indian natural and financial resources are properly used. With this "overly protective stance," the government has placed itself in a position of financial liability, and the courts have forced the government to pay over $100 million to tribes for damages (Deloria, 1974:158). As of Deloria's writing (1974:253), some 100 suits brought by Indian tribes were pending against U.S. federal employees and agencies for misuses of funds.

The point to be gleaned from this recitation of Indians' theoretical and actual chances to sue is not that their legal rights are adequately defended through these means. Rather, it is only that, within a
formally democratic (i.e., legal-rational) political system, the existence of such legal precedents and structures means that Indians are a continual legal threat. Secondly, they have frequently taken advantage of these chances through actual legal action. Whether they win cases or not, Indians can create trouble and expense for the government. They can create disruption through these suits, when, for example, the government must mediate between the legal claims of Indians and the demands of powerful non-Indians. In a situation like the current one in the State of Maine, the federal government is in the unenviable position of balancing what are probable legally justified claims of Indians to large portions of the state against the demands of white owners of the land, who in numbers and economic resources are more influential than the Indians (see Akwesasne Notes, 1977). Furthermore, if the government recognizes the legitimacy of Indian claims but declines to honor them for (sometimes openly) admitted pragmatic reasons, it must violate the American ideological tradition of the sanctity and stability of legal-rational procedure. The Indians can trap the state in its own ideology, thus potentially precipitating a loss of legitimacy.

Some examples of Indian lawsuits to defend rights guaranteed by treaty or other agreement will illustrate the consequences of the legal threat of the Indian. Blumenthal (1955:165-166) presents one such case: The Sioux sued the United States in 1923 seeking compensation for lands taken from them after gold was discovered on their lands in 1874. A previous treaty of 1869 provided that the Sioux were to have complete possession and control of the land allotted to them in the treaty. It further stipulated that none of the land could be given or taken away
without consent of three-quarters of the male members of the tribe. The United States Court of Claims agreed with the Sioux's version of the facts, but claimed that there was legal precedent for the government's action in taking away the land. The court further ruled that the government had acted for the good of the Indian! (Blumenthal, 1955:166). The Sioux were therefore unable to recover any compensation for their land. This illustrates a situation in which the government, while not losing anything financially, responded with a court decision that openly ignored treaty guarantees--a curious and potentially dangerous response for a government that ideologically upholds the sanctity of contracts.

In a more successful case (Blumenthal, 1955:167), the Indian Claims Commission in 1951 awarded the Kaw Indians some $2.5 million, ruling that the payment for Kaw lands in an 1846 treaty was too low. In 1952, the Utes were paid $13 million for lands taken from them by force in the 1800's (Blumenthal, 1955:175). In another spectacular suit, the Seminole Tribe of Oklahoma and Florida sued before the Indian Claims Commission to recover damages for treaty violation. The Seminoles, the aboriginal inhabitants of Florida, were given title to some 80 percent of the state by a treaty of 1823 (Gaillard, 1970:146). The federal government, during the next 20 years, ignored this treaty and finally via military action forced the Indians off their land. The Seminoles' 1964 suit before the Claims Commission eventually succeeded, and it awarded them $12 million in 1970 (Frye, 1970:47). Many similar cases have appeared before the Indian Claims Commission. Awards to Indian tribes by the Commission have totalled a half billion dollars over the last 30 years, with the largest successful claim being a $35 million award to the Kiowa,
Commanche, and Apache in 1975 (Indian Claims Commission, 1975). These several cases illustrate the consequences and extent of the violation of Indian land rights. They are examples of possible outcomes of the Indian legal threat based on the various legal precedents outlined above.

There are two other aspects of the Indian threat; one is the economic exploitation of Indians, and the other is the rise of Indian protest organizations in the 1960's. Economic exploitation refers to the colonial situation in which Indians find themselves. Even when they technically own their lands, they frequently lose the profits from it to outsiders. On the Pine Ridge Reservation in South Dakota, for example, Indian farmers and ranchers use less than one percent of the land, while non-Indians farm over 50 percent, thereby realizing "substantial profits" (Cahn and Hearne, 1970:82). Of the $170 million earned through agriculture on Indian reservations in 1968, only about one-third went to the Indians themselves (Schusky, 1970:vi). In 1967, minerals (including oil) on reservations brought $31 million to Indian tribes; at the same time, large corporations earned billions from minerals on Indian properties (Schusky, 1970:vii). The economic exploitation of the Indian has as its consequences the well-known low per capita income of Indians, the high rate of infant mortality, low life expectancy, and so forth. The profitability of Indian lands, coupled with Indians' relative exclusion from these benefits further contribute to the Indian threat, if one assumes that this exploitation can be maintained only through the power of law backed by the potential use of force. Such exploitation may also make Indians an object of sympathy of other liberal and radical elements, as well as radicalizing the Indians themselves.
Precisely this happened in the 1960's. Deloria (1974:2) mentions the desires of radical groups in the 1960's to include the Indians as another exploited minority within their united front, a move that met with rather mixed reaction among Indians, who saw themselves as members of alien nations, not as oppressed citizens within the United States. The Indians did, however, come to adopt protest tactics in the 1960's, using public demonstrations as a means to dramatize their situation. The tribal leaders were able to play off the protest groups against the government; they could gain concessions by presenting less radical demands than did the younger and less traditional Indians in protest groups (Deloria, 1974:28). Urban Indians living off the reservation formed protest organizations such as the American Indian Movement (AIM). Some 100 Indians participated in the Poor People's March on Washington in 1968 (Deloria, 1974:33). In general then, the 1960's saw an increase in Indian protest movements that cooperated to some extent among themselves and with other dissidents.

The prime source of the Indian threat has been, and continues to be, that of litigation. This, together with economic exploitation and protest organizations, has been the content of the Indian threat. This is the general background of threat to which the state had to adapt, and as such, is the key factor underlying the cooptation of Indians.

As well as being a threat, Indians as a group have other characteristics that are necessary if their participation in the American system is to be viewed as cooptation. One can impute opposition between Indians and the government. Tribes were and are (to a limited extent) systems possessing power separate from that of the legitimate system, and
Indians have interests in controlling their land which oppose those of the government in its attempt to give possession and use of the land to other persons and organizations. All of the instances of cooptation to be analyzed below were intentional (see Chapter I for the importance of this): the state specifically encouraged participation by Indians and created structures and practices to allow it. The cooptation of American Indians has the background of threat, opposition, and intention that are necessary if a process is to be viewed as cooptation.

**Discussion of Indian Cooptation**

Here are the specific instances of cooptation in the history of the American Indian. The first of these was the allowing of Indians to become citizens, made final by legislation in 1924. This is cooptation since it involved the extension of political rights and participation to the Indians. The second instance was the establishment in 1933 of the policy of Indian Preference for BIA employment. This was participation in the state's bureaucracy governing Indian relations; hence it was cooptation. Third, the Indian Reorganization Act's strengthening of tribal government was cooptation, since the federal government was expanding the role of Indian political participation in the system: through the medium of the tribe. Indians again had a tribal organization which could interact with the state. Fourth, the NCIO was a cooptive organization created explicitly to give Indians participation in the state. A fifth example of cooptation was the creation of "Indian desks" in cabinet departments. Sixth, there was the revival and extension of Indian Preference in 1972. Finally, there are the cases of Louis Bruce and Robert Bennet, the two Indians who were recently commissioners of the
Prior to looking at the outcomes of the specific cases of cooptation, let us consider a related process which coexists with cooptation in the situation of the U.S. government and American Indians. The American government used various strategies to deal with the threat posed by the Indians. Assimilation was one overall policy goal of the state in attempting to defuse the Indian threat. Through such means as the allotment policy, termination, government schools, and the Indian Reorganization Act, government policy aimed at eliminating cultural differences between Indians and other Americans. If Indians became sufficiently similar to other Americans, the threat they posed, which derived ultimately from their status as members of an alien socio-cultural group, might cease. Cooptation can be connected with assimilation. First, it can be a means of assimilation. If the state gives members of a minority group political participation, the individual participants may shed some of their alien cultural characteristics through the experience of contact in political participation. A trickle-down effect to other members of the group could take place. This could apply to the Indian Preference policy, for example. Cooptation can serve assimilation by involving the minority group members in the normal processes of the system. Secondly, cooptation can be a different means to the same end served by assimilation. One of the characteristics of a successful cooptation is defusal of a threat, an end also shared by assimilation. It is interesting that cooptation of Indians did not begin until the 1920's, some 150 years after their first dealings with the U.S. It might be hypothesized that cooptation of new subjects in a power system is not
possible until a certain period of assimilation has taken place. The new subjects must be sufficiently acquainted with the system for the legitimizing potential of cooptation to have some effect on them. Another connection of cooptation with assimilation can be seen in the fact that two of the most significant efforts to coopt Indians took place under the guide of persons who also acted against assimilation. Collier, who supported Indian preference and the Indian Reorganization Act, was also an opponent of assimilation. Nixon repudiated termination, a policy which amounted to forced assimilation, and was president during an era of several cooptive procedures. There are several possible interpretations of the trade-off between assimilation and cooptation. One would be to view Nixon and Collier as supportive of Indian rights by being both anti-assimilationist and pro-Indian self-determination. Another interpretation would be to conceive cooptation as an alternative to cultural assimilation: If assimilation does not successfully defuse the cultural minority group, cooptation may be its substitute as a technique of control. Expansion of participation to a threat group has the additional advantage of being received more favorably than efforts to diminish its cultural uniqueness.

One feature of cooptation alluded to in the theoretical discussion (Chapter I) is the "hostile" nature of the cooptee. This appears to be contradicted by the background of the members of the NCIO and by Indians' descriptions of BIA Indians as "white-oriented." Indian political participants almost appear as "friendlies" to the powerholder who are brought into the public sector rather like the executive placed on the board of directors of a corporation because he shares the interests of its owners.
However, seeing Indian participants as friendlies is not quite accurate. The BIA and NCIO Indians may be relatively assimilated into American political life, but they are participants because they are Indians, and they thereby carry the tag of membership in a resistant group. Particularly if the intention of the powerholder is to justify his power, it is only necessary to coopt persons who can be claimed to represent the threatening group. The less the actual participants are hostile to the powerholder, the better it is for him. Only in the most extreme cases of resistance (e.g., imminent revolution) might it be to the powerholder's advantage to yield to the point of giving participation to persons who are actively hostile to him. From the powerholder's standpoint, it is better to coopt persons who are only symbolically hostile.

The two key outcomes of any cooptation, within the model used here, are filtering and legitimacy payoffs (see Chapter I). The issues involved are, respectively: (1) Does the structure of participation operate to blunt the impact of the threat group on the state? and (2) Does increased participation increase people's favorableness to the powerholder? Both of these outcomes are part of a more general issue, namely, the extent to which cooptation enhances the powerholder's control over resistance. For most of the instances of cooptation of Native Americans, a judgement is possible about the success of the powerholder in gaining these outcomes.

The Indian Preference policies of the BIA (both in 1933 and 1972) and the presence of Indians as BIA commissioners illustrate well a successful filtering outcome. As detailed before, Indians exert little power through the BIA. The inefficiencies of the BIA, its location
within the Department of the Interior, the conflicts within Interior, the marginality of Indian problems within a cabinet department dealing primarily with other issues, the centralization of power in the BIA, and the typically low status occupied by Indians in the BIA all contribute to the blunting of Indian impact on the state. To exaggerate the picture, one might describe a typical BIA-employed Indian as a relatively powerless individual within a relatively powerless bureau that is only part of a larger department subject to control by the President and Congress. The BIA's attraction of potential Indian leaders into its employ also filters the Indian threat. Within the BIA, educated, competent Indians work for an organization in which they can do little for the Indian; alternatively, they might have chosen to expend their efforts helping Indians as leaders of various kinds of resistance. While working in the BIA they become more assimilated to the dominant culture and cease to be viewed by Indians as truly Indian leaders, thus further diminishing their potential as popular leaders of resistance.

In terms of the legitimacy payoff, the preference policy did little to increase the acceptance among Indians of the state and its policies. The Bureau's unpopularity among Indians comes not from its lack of Indian personnel, but from its inefficacy in helping Indians and the excessive control it exerts over them. Thus, a legitimacy payoff could not be realized among Indians through the establishment of preference policies. Despite a lack of direct evidence, one might conjecture that Indian Preference could serve to justify state Indian policy to non-Indians. If Indians are seen as the controllers of the BIA, its failures could be attributed to them rather than to the President, Congress, or other rep-
resentatives of the state, thus displacing responsibility for Indian problems onto the victims.

The Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) is another good example of filtering. The IRA revitalized tribes as political communities that could govern their citizens and deal with the federal government. However, despite the appearance of a genuine transfer of power, such did not occur. As Schusky (1970:13) emphasizes, most tribal politics have concerned property. Land was deeded to tribes in a trust status under which the BIA, like a guardian overseeing his ward's affairs, was ultimately responsible for the use made of the property. As a consequence, tribal constitutions (established under the IRA) frequently contain the phrase "subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior" (Schusky, 1970:43). Tribal governments do not have final authority over expenditures of their money or over the use of their land. If the BIA disagrees with a tribal council's decision on property or expenditures, they can overturn it. As a result, "Indians are apathetic about their local government" and tribes' officers are "without influence in their communities" (Schusky, 1970:14). Thus, the IRA accomplished filtering by allowing Indians a structure of participation (self-determination) subject to veto of the state. If Schusky is right in his assessment of Indian attitudes toward tribal government (and I have seen no evidence to the contrary), the legitimacy payoff of the IRA failed. Indians do not see the tribe as their own democratic government, but as an alien force ("The Tribe") coercing them and interfering with their lives, much like some "urban working class people look at the police force and city government" (Schusky, 1970:44).
The IRA illustrates another possible advantage of cooptation to the powerholder. When the state confronts a plurality of unorganized resistant actors in the civil sector, there are many possible sources of disruption. In the limiting case, each actor could engage in resistance. Since individual unorganized action is not the most effective mode of protest, the threat most likely faced by the powerholder here is that the dissidents will coalesce into several threat organizations. Cooptation could forestall this by creating an organization through which resistant actors may confront the state, a strategy which substitutes one source of threat for a possible plurality of sources. The resistance of organized actors may be more predictable insofar as the business of the organization is public. In the case of the IRA, the preceding allotment policy encouraged the atomization of Indians, whereas Reorganization created formal, public, tribal organizations. The government could now have more rationalized dealings with Indians, and created an organization which could serve to channel resistance through one public organization rather than through several (potential) movements. As a specific example, the U.S. government could make land settlements legally through a single entity, the tribe, rather than through allotments to numerous individual Indians.

The extension of citizenship to Indians has had filtering effects. Given that Indian population at the time (1924) numbered only a few hundred thousand, they could hardly have had impact on national elections. The citizenship act stipulated that gaining of the status of citizen was not to be construed as affecting Indian rights to tribal lands or other property (Schusky, 1970:21). This caveat was probably
motivated by a desire that citizenship not eliminate any Indian rights. Neither, however, did this aspect of the citizenship decree eliminate the trust status of Indian lands. The extension of citizenship did not give Indians any significant additional control over their lives or property; hence citizenship was filtered participation. Many Indians did not wish to be citizens, a situation which remains today. Citizenship was unilaterally "imposed" by the state. (Schusky, 1970:21) Indians' status as citizens has been used to support their dependent position. When confronted with the demands of an Indian protest movement to restore the right of treaty making, the state used the Citizenship Act as one of its lines of argument in claiming that Indians could not have this right, as only foreign nations and not citizens could make treaties with the United States (Deloria, 1974:xi-xii). As with the preference policy of the BIA, the citizenship cooptation has had limited success as a means to increasing Indian support for the state. Any legitimacy payoff was more likely realized with other elements in the civil sector. Schusky (1970:23) sees the origin of the drive for Indian citizenship as arising from a stirring of "the national conscience" in the years preceding the 1924 decree. This particularly happened among easterners who saw Indians as earning citizenship through the civilizing influence of farm ownership and labor during the allotment period. It would have been among such people that any legitimacy payoff would be gained.

The National Council on Indian Opportunity (NCIO), the most recent example of Indian cooptation considered here, was probably oriented to the problem of justifying state Indian policy and engendering greater support for the government among Indians and their sympathizers. Lyndon
Johnson's (1970:438) speech that announced the creation of the NCIO was titled "The Forgotten American" and began with a flowery tribute to the Indian followed by the recitation of a litany of Indian problems of the past and present. In the statement of the Indian members of the council (NCIO, 1970:205), there was recognition of the "symbolic importance" (i.e., justifying effect) of their participation. In contrast, other evidence suggests that the NCIO had little impact on Indian public opinion. A reading of numerous Indian newspapers (see Contemporary Newspapers of the North American Indian) for the periods surrounding Johnson's creation and Nixon's expansion of the NCIO shows little mention of this new organization. Only a few had articles on it, and in none was it praised or criticized strongly. Since there is almost no reaction to the NCIO, it could hardly have done much to increase the government's support among Indians.

In terms of filtering, the NCIO presents a mixed situation. Its direct association with the vice-president of the U.S., and Nixon's adoption of the Indians' legislative proposals are evidence that the NCIO increased Indian impact on the state. On the other hand, the failure of the legislative program to pass is evidence of filtering in that concrete Indian interest could not be directly advanced through the NCIO. The excess of government representatives over Indian (eight to six) insured that the state could always veto any problematic moves of the Indians, if need be. And finally, the NCIO as a whole had no real authority, other than the mandate to make suggestions and recommendations. Any impact Indians had through the NCIO was due only to increased access to government officials, and not to a position of authority. To summa-
rize, the NCIO was set up in such a way that filtering of any maneuvers by Indians was always possible, even if the state did not always take advantage of this.

Conclusions

In its relations with American Indians, the United States' government has used techniques which may be viewed as cooptation. As the American power system has developed, Indians have continually been a threat to which it has had to adapt. The Indian nations within the United States, in their status as aboriginal and sovereign states within the system, were a formal threat to its unity. As time has passed, the most disturbing aspect of the Indian threat has been legal, as the Indians have been able to use legal procedures and precedents to win lawsuits against the government. Cultural and political assimilation has been a goal toward which the government has striven in its attempts to neutralize the threat; actions that may be termed cooptation have also been used with success. The Indian Preference policy of the BIA, the Citizenship Act, the Indian Reorganization Act, and the National Council on Indian Opportunity are all cases of cooptation with successful filtering payoffs, but the legitimacy payoffs have not been so effective.

The way in which filtering took place in these cases suggests a clarification of the concept of filtering. The original formulation of filtering was somewhat too extreme, as it applied the term to cases in which a lessening of the impact of resistance occurs. On second thought, an actual lessening of resistance could only happen in the most extreme cases of cooptation, as when, hypothetically, an Indian resistance leader
takes a position in the BIA at the invitation of the government. It is more descriptively accurate to say that resistance is not necessarily lessened, but that the dissidents are not able to use their participation to exert more influence on the powerholder, despite the appearance of giving-in on the part of the state. In the filtering payoff the powerholder is more likely to preserve his control rather than extend it. In this more limited sense, filtering was definitely successful with all the cases of cooptation of Indians, since the evidence shows that the cooptive participation offered to Indians, although it may not have lessened Indian impact on the state, did not lessen the state's control over Indian affairs.

Judgements about the success of legitimacy payoffs are more difficult. Again, there was misplaced emphasis in the threat model, as it concentrates on the justificatory potential of cooptation among the cooptees and their constituents to the neglect of mentioning legitimacy payoffs among other actors. This introduces the idea of the relevance of third parties in many instances of cooptation. Certainly gains in legitimacy may be made among dissidents to whom political participation has been extended, but in none of the cases of Indian cooptation was there unequivocal evidence for increases in Indian support for the state based on the various extensions of participation. If anything, the evidence suggests no effect, and in the operations of the BIA, the IRA, and the Citizenship Act, cooptation may even have decreased the popularity of the United States government with Indians. For the legitimacy payoff in Indian cooptation, one might look to non-Indians to see if the government's cooptive Indian policies were received favorably among them.
At the level of the model, it may be necessary to insert a third theoretical actor, namely other interested sympathetic potential dissidents, as a third element to be added to the dyad of coopting-powerholder and coopted-dissident.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Indian Affairs, Editor. Indian Affairs, No. 69, 1968, n.p.


CHAPTER III

REVISION AND EXTENSION OF THE MODEL

As was indicated at the end of the previous chapter, certain refinements of the initial model are suggested by the study of American Indians. At this point, I would like to reiterate the threat model of cooptation, giving attention to these additions, as well as others.

The basic framework of the discussion of cooptation, the power system, can be retained as presented previously. The working definition is also adequate: Cooptation, within the threat model, is defined as a process whereby actors (persons or groups) who pose a threat to the powerholder are brought into positions and situations in which they participate in the official system. This definition of cooptation is markedly different from popular use of the term, and from the concept of cooptation used in either of the so-called political socialization models in Chapter I. In these other usages, cooptation may refer to almost any neutralization of a threat to the state. For example, popular use would describe intellectuals congenial to the powerholder as being coopted; the political socialization model would characterize as coptive the various educational institutions that inculcate dominant political attitudes into students. Neither of these would be considered cooptation in the threat model, as they do not involve extensions of political participation to threatening actors. The only similarity these usages have with my model is their reference to interactions between powerholder and
threatening actors. The threat model of cooptation also diverges sharply from the traditional elite recruitment model, which describes a more narrow process. In the traditional model, cooptation is a constitutionally or traditionally provided procedure for recruiting new members of a system. The new members are not necessarily representative of threats, the purpose being rather to recruit qualified new members compatible with the interests of current members of the system. The similarity to the threat model is only that a system could, as Loewenstein says (1973: 193) use cooptation (in the traditional sense) as a means to give participation to threatening groups or actors, a process that would fit the traditional as well as the threat model. Other than this, there is little overlap between the threat and traditional models.

A central element of the threat model of cooptation is the expansion of participation, and this process may now be illustrated. Participation in the official system does not denote only actual policy determination, but as in the Indian case, includes maneuvers such as the following: (1) the extension of citizenship, which is the formal minimum of participation in a bourgeois-democratic power-system; (2) employment in the BIA, another minimal form of participation, particularly if one considers the many Indians who are, for example, clerks in the BIA, a type of participation that is only symbolically political; (3) the IRA's restoration of limited sovereignty for tribes; and (4) the establishment of the NCIO, an organ specifically created to increase Indian access to the state. An understanding of the concept of official participation does not come just from its literal definition; rather, what is necessary, if one wishes to use cooptation as an explanatory concept, is
to be sensitized to the variety of activities that can be seen as participation. Specifically, when one uses the concept of cooptation, a recognition of the symbolic and ideological element in participation is crucial. In determining whether a yielding action by the powerholder is an expansion of participation, the question is not, at the outset, whether the participation is really political in the sense of allowing influence on policy, but whether the powerholder can define and present it to the public as political participation, and whether there is some possibility that it will be viewed as such by members of the civil sector. Not all yielding procedures, of course, are to be interpreted as the expansion of participation. Expanded participation involves at least the appearance of increased influence over policy via an official (legal) mechanism, and sometimes involves a genuine concession of political control to the dissidents. However, in the usual case of cooptation, the sociologist analyzing expanded participation must be attuned to the ideological aspect of cooptation, i.e., the powerholder's implied or explicit claim that he has now included the threatening actor in the official system of policy determination. The question of whether participation is "real" or "meaningful" is temporarily bracketed.

If cooptation is to have any meaning, this bracketing must cease at a later point in the analysis, a consideration that is embodied in the threat model of cooptation under the heading of legitimacy and filtering payoffs, two concepts dealing with the neutralization of resistance that frequently results from cooptation. Refinements of these concepts are also necessary.
Legitimacy, Audiences, and Threats

The legitimacy payoff, as shown in the previous chapter, may not materialize among the threatening actors themselves, but with other actors in the civil sector. Thus, cooptation typically involves a triad of powerholder (coopter), threat (cooptee), and audience. A model of the scenario of a legitimacy payoff is as follows: The threat group has withdrawn support from the powerholder, or may do so in the future; this actor is a potential source of resistance. Clearly, the powerholder needs increased legitimacy among members of the threat group. But given the concept of a power system adopted early in this essay, the powerholder has potential legitimacy problems with all members of the civil sector as well. They are a possible target for legitimacy payoffs in addition to any realized with the threat group. Since members of a threat group are more aware of their situation than are other members of the civil sector, it is probably typical as in the Indian case that the legitimacy payoff would fail among them, with the threat group charging the powerholder with tokenism and the participating members of the group with "selling-out."

It is different with the third party of the triad, the audience. To be considered an audience to cooptation, an actor must find the plight of the threat group sufficiently justified that he takes notice of what the powerholder does for the threat. The situation of the disenfranchised threat group might interest the audience member because of an attachment to abstract principles, such as the sympathy for Indian self-determination held by many whites who are otherwise conservative. Or, again using the case of the United States, the relevant audience
might be international, as in the attempts to coopt various minorities through "affirmative action" for the purposes of demonstrating a concern for human rights to the Soviet Union, the Third World, etc.

There are thus different types of audiences, varying in their relationship to the situation of power. Actors (collective or individual) within the civil sector who are sympathetic to the plight of the threat group but not actually members of it are one obvious type of audience. Their relationship to the powerholder is one of potential threat, as mistreatment of the threat group may serve as an issue around which they may organize. Conversely, cooptation may function to defuse the issue, and delay or prevent the threat group's organizing; white sympathizers of Indians as mentioned above exemplify an audience in this situation. In the Indian case, it is relatively easy to distinguish the audience from the threat group, assuming one has a basis for distinguishing Indians from non-Indians. In other empirical cases of cooptation, the distinction between threat and sympathizer is not easy to make, particularly when the threat group is not formally organized or otherwise bounded. A hypothetical example illustrates the problem: Suppose a powerholder coopts members of an incipient revolutionary movement. Is the threat group only those who actively work toward his overthrow, with the audience of sympathizers constituted by actors who are active only in the sense of holding beliefs opposing the powerholder? Or, is there some degree of opposition that distinguishes a mere sympathizer from a member of the revolutionary threat group? The issue here is the transition from the conceptual to the empirical level. In the ideal-typical situation, an organized, bounded threat group which the coopted actors repre-
sent is opposed to an unorganized audience of sympathizers. Empirically, this distinction cannot always be exactly mapped.

Since I have not conceptually restricted threats to organized bounded groups, the distinction between the audience of sympathizers within the civil sector and the threat group must be clarified for several other types of threat mentioned in Chapter I. The first category of threat is organized opposition. This is quite similar to what Ralf Dahrendorf (1959:180) has termed an "interest group;" it has a leadership, a program or ideology, and a consciousness of opposition to the powerholder. The audience can be distinguished by their lack of these characteristics of organization. The second type of threat is the community of interest, parallel to Dahrendorf's (1959:180) "quasi-group." Here members of the group share a basis of interest that opposes them to the state, but they are not organized and may not even be aware that they share this latent interest with others. An example can be found in the Marxian concept of a "class in-itself" but not "for itself;" the working class in this case constitutes a community of actors who share an interest but who are not conscious of it and who have not organized on this basis. A community of interest considered as a threat group is separable from the audience of sympathizers by virtue of the objectivity of the basis of the interest. "Objectivity" refers to the character of bases of interest such as occupation, ethnicity, or even, as Dahrendorf (1959:176) argues, the actor's power position as indicated by his membership or non-membership in the ruling group of the power system. An audience member may believe the interest of the threat group to be justified, but cannot be said to belong to it if he does not share the objective
characteristics of its basis of interest. Intellectuals who support working class interests are an example of an audience sympathetic to a community of interest.

The expansion of a power system to include new actors (e.g., territorial acquisition) defines another type of potential threat group. The audience of sympathizers within the system would be constituted out of the population of current subjects, and may thus be distinguished from the threat group composed of the new subjects. The boundary is not so distinct for the next type of threat, namely that created by an expansion of the scope of control by the powerholder. For example, if the state begins intervention into economic life, actors holding varying positions within the economy and having interests that may be affected differently will constitute a number of communities of interest or organized oppositions. Consequently, the distinction between audience and the threat group can be made here only if we assume that some particular type(s) of threat group(s) will emerge after the expansion of scope. Thus, while a clear distinction between the threat group and audience of sympathizers within the system is possible conceptually, this distinction may be difficult to make in empirical cases in which the threat group cannot be bounded.

There are also audiences outside the system in which cooptation takes place. Competitor systems are one type of external audience. Errors in cooptation, such as the provision of filtered participation or a complete failure to include the threat group in participation may be a source of failures in the ideological conflict between the competing systems. If the competing system aligns itself with the threat group, the
coopting system's treatment of the threat provides an opportunity for
the competitor to make ideological gains. The "Cold War" provides an
eexample of this confrontation of power. If the U.S. does not include
workers, minorities, socialists, etc., in the official structure of
participation, or if a threat's participation is filtered, the Soviet
Union (an external ideological competitor) may capitalize on this fail-
ure to coopt by claiming that the U.S. does not live up to its preten-
sions of democracy. Systems for whose allegiance the two systems com-
pete are another locus of legitimacy payoffs and failures when coopta-
tion occurs. The Third World is an example of this type of external
audience. Cooptation of threat groups in the U.S. with whom the Third
World countries are sympathetic may occasion legitimacy losses or gains,
particularly if powerholders in the competing systems are eager to point
these out. Though the examples of the external audiences have been
drawn from the Cold War, the same competition may happen at more micro-
scopic levels. Any situation of ideological competition for the alle-
liance of actors outside the system could be the stage for a play of
claims and counter-claims performed in relation to cooptation.

Audiences can be found inside or outside the system where coopta-
tion occurs, but the audience must in some way find the situation of the
threat group justified if the powerholder is to gain legitimacy in the
eyes of the audience. It is to such audiences, in addition to the threat
group, that the powerholder may orient attempts for a legitimacy payoff,
and it is among audiences that successful legitimacy payoffs are most
likely. Since the audience may lack acquaintance with the threat
group's situation, they are less likely to critically examine the mean-
ingfulness of the expanded participation (except if the audience is a competitor) and are more likely to increase or maintain support for the powerholder on the basis of the cooptation. There are thus several possible targets for a legitimacy payoff: the threat group itself, the audience within the system, and the audience outside the system.

Filtering: Channeling and Blunting

Elaboration of the concept of filtering is also a result of the current investigation. In my original formulation, filtering was only vaguely defined as referring to the defusing of a threat group that may occur when its resistance is directed into the official structure of participation. In the application of filtering to the case of Indians, the emphasis was on the degree of impact on the powerholder permitted by the Citizenship Act, the NCIO, the IRA, and Indian Preference. Filtering indicated in a general way that cooptation may function to lessen the possibility of effective resistance by the threat group. Actually, there are two separate processes involved in filtering. The aspect emphasized in the Indian case may be called blunting. This refers to the effect of structures of participation (e.g., Indian employment in the BIA) that allow minimal Indian influence over policy and slight impact on the powerholder. The other aspect of filtering I term channeling. This occurs when members of a threat group, having accepted officially provided participation, cease resistance via other means (e.g., riot, strike, demonstration) and confine their activities to those possible within the official structure.

From the powerholder's point of view, channeling is a particularly advantageous outcome; resistance arises from a more limited source, and
because it comes through the structure of participation, blunting is also possible. However, channeling obtains in limited circumstances only, viz. ones in which the threat group resists solely through the structure of participation that the powerholder has offered. First, channeling may develop if the tradition of acceptable protest in the system is such that the threat will lose popular support if its protesting is not channeled through the filter. The powerholder might then successfully label continued protest as unjustified, since he has already given the threat an official channel for protest. The likely result is that the threat group, if they were to continue resistance, would lose actual or potential support from other members of the civil sector. Examples like this do occur, as when men polemically ask "What do these women want?" in response to women (a threat group) who continue to mount demands despite the existence of governmental affirmative action policies, a filtering mechanism viewed by some men as already too much of a concession to women. Here, the state can with some success channel the resistance of many women into the filter of organizational employment sponsored through affirmative action. Men may thus circumscribe the resistance of women by opposing women's demands beyond those granted by affirmative action. Secondly, channeling might occur if the threat accepted its participation as completely "meaningful," "realistic," and adequate and voluntarily limited resistance to actions within the filtered structure of participation. Or, the powerholder might offer participation before organized or open resistance took place, thus providing an outlet for resistance before the threat developed the consciousness of an organized opposition that would lead to open resistance
and a critical attitude toward the nature of participation. Finally, channeling may occur through an implicit or explicit bargain whereby the threat group agrees to give up extra-legal resistance in exchange for participation in the official structure. These examples show how channeling might happen. Though for conceptual purposes I have presented channeling as if it were a categorical process that either occurs completely or not at all, empirically there is variability in the extent to which the threat group confines its activities to official participation in lieu of other forms of resistance.

The other, more common aspect of filtering, what I have called blunting, can occur independently of channeling. Whether or not the threat group chooses or is forced to restrict resistance to the official channel, the influence allowed by official participation may be slight. Participation via a bureaucratic mechanism is a typical form of blunted participation; the case of the BIA shows how participation within a large bureaucracy affords little influence over policy, even for participants occupying high-level positions. Because the coopted participant in a bureaucracy must function within a relatively fixed set of regulations, and because the organization in which he participates may, like the BIA, be buried within a larger organization, any impact of the cooptee on the powerholder can be neutralized. A judgement about the impact on the powerholder requires comparison of the influence on the powerholder from the threat's other possible exertions of power outside the official structure of participation. The question of "possible" acts of power is particularly interesting. Here one must engage in a mental experiment about what might be if the threat group were to pursue
their interest in some other way. Using such a criterion, blunting can be found even among seemingly meaningful modes of participation when these are compared with alternative avenues for political participation. When threat groups charge tokenism or "selling-out" or cooptation (in the popular sense), this is what they implicitly refer to: They are denigrating the offered participation, even though it may offer considerable influence, in comparison with another hypothetical distribution of power: The adequacy of the participation provided by the Indian Reorganization Act, which appeared as a real step towards self-determination, is blunted in comparison with the power Indian tribes would hold if they regained a semblance of their original sovereignty.¹

The concept of filtering can be further elaborated by considering the combinations of its two aspects, blunting and channeling. This suggests an ordering of the possible filtering outcomes from least to most successful for the powerholder. To do this, consider the following diagram:

```
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHANNELING</th>
<th>BLUNTING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>present</td>
<td>Absent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>incomplete</td>
<td>incomplete</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>filtering</td>
<td>filtering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>open</td>
<td>channeled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>impact</td>
<td>impact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
```

- **BLUNTING**
  - Present: low impact on the powerholder allowed by the structure of participation
  - Absent: limitation of resistance to that possible through the structure of participation
(1) Open impact. This is the least successful outcome for the powerholder. He has ceded some control to the threat group by giving them high impact ("meaningful") participation, yet the dissidents continue resistance outside the official structure, since their participation is not channeled. As an example, I suggest the hypothetical case of a revolutionary labor movement that accepts and uses effective trade unions (an official structure of participation) but continues to attempt to make a revolution.

(2) Channeled impact. For the powerholder, this is somewhat more successful. He has gained the advantage of dealing with a more limited source of resistance but high impact means that he has lost control to some extent. Again, trade unions provide an example. A company might permit a union for its workers, even allowing them real bargaining power, yet still enhance control. The advantage would come from the predictability and stability of contracting with one organized agent (the union), thereby limiting the sources of resistance. To some degree, the history of labor unions in the United States fits this pattern.

(3) Incomplete filtering. The structure of participation permits little impact but the threat group continues to resist by other means. The cooptation of American Indians is an example here. Despite the expansion of blunted participation for Indians (BIA, IRA, etc.) during the twentieth century, they have maintained resistance in the form of lawsuits, demonstrations, and land takeovers.

(4) Complete filtering. This is the most successful for the powerholder, since he has realized payoffs in both channeling and blunting. For an example, imagine a nation-state where resistance outside of the
established political party is illegal or otherwise dealt with harshly. The powerholder could bring dissidents into the party, where their resistance will be relatively blunted. Channeling would be enforced by sanctions against resistance outside of the party structure.

Changes in the filtering outcomes of cooptation are possible over time. The use of the terms "incomplete" and "complete" filtering indicate this. Originally, a powerholder may establish blunted participation without any channeling, but over time, the official structure of participation may come to be institutionalized and legitimized as the only means of resistance. The various forms of affirmative action (including Indian Preference), although they are blunted forms of participation, may as time passes become the only legitimized channel for the protesting of the coopted threat groups. Similarly, open impact may change into channeled impact. If an institutional channel for resistance is provided, the threat group may find it increasingly difficult to recruit new members into an organized opposition resisting outside of the official channel. A threat group that has been given open impact participation may find losses of support with potential sympathizers if they continue open resistance. The result in either situation would be that a group that originally resists through a variety of tactics may find itself forced to restrict its resistance to that possible through the official structure of participation. The channeling aspect of filtering may thus require a period of time to develop.

The payoff of two of the filtering outcomes particularly depends on their connection with legitimacy payoffs. Incomplete filtering in itself holds no benefit for the powerholder and does entail costs and
risks. Incomplete filtering costs the powerholder at least the inconvenience of arranging for recruiting participants and setting and maintaining the structure of participation (e.g., the expense of running the affirmative action programs in the U.S.); there is furthermore the risk that the impact will be higher than the powerholder anticipated. Definitionally, the presence of channeling is not included in incomplete filtering. Therefore, the threat will keep on with its other tactics of resistance as well as the blunted resistance allowed within the structure of participation. Apparently, there is no gain made by incomplete filtering. The advantage lies in its tie to legitimacy payoffs. The powerholder may publicize the blunted participation as meaningful, audiences inside or outside the system may view it as a genuine concession to the threat, and legitimacy gains may be the result. Incomplete filtering is useful as a technique to increase legitimacy without incurring the risk of high-impact participation. The other benefit in incomplete filtering, of course, is the possibility that it will develop into complete filtering. The open impact outcome, also apparently a failure for the powerholder, may be beneficial in a similar way. Suppose that the powerholder knows that he must yield to the threat group at some point. By choosing cooptation (with open impact participation), he may increase legitimacy to the extent that he can avoid more severe yielding in the future. Any of the four filtering outcomes could be matched with the presence or absence of a legitimacy payoff with the audience or threat group; the combination of these would give 16 different types of outcomes. This is too elaborate to be useful at this point. The issue is that there are wide variety of types of outcomes, ranging from open
impact/no legitimacy gain with audience or threat to complete filtering/increased legitimacy with audience and threat. Determination of the success of an instance of cooptation could take account of all of the possible combinations of legitimacy and filtering payoffs.

The focus on filtering and legitimacy payoffs should not be interpreted to mean that the powerholder always successfully defuses a threat via cooptation, or even intends to do so. Cooptation may be a genuine yielding, and may lead to further changes in the powerholder's program. The powerholder may decide, as in attempts to bring blacks into positions of power (i.e., federal judgeships), that he must modify the state's original opposition to deliberate inclusion of representatives of a particular group. The powerholder may coopt because he feels the threat group deserves representation, and thereby yield to their pressure. The participation given by the state to cooptees may allow high impact; it may involve a position of considerable influence. Once the cooptee has entered the official system of power, he may be able to use the provisions of the system against the powerholder. A black judge may insist on adherence to the law, and thereby place the powerholder in the position of having to openly violate the law or adhere to it in ways beneficial to the threat group. As mentioned in the first chapter, structures of participation created for a threat group may develop into much more consequential organs than the powerholder anticipated. The Third Estate in France, and the House of Burgesses in England began as relatively inconsequential cooptive structures of participation, but became one of the chief ruling elements within their respective states. Cooptation may thus entail modification of the program of the power-
Characteristics of the Cooptee

"Who gets coopted," i.e., the characteristics of the actors brought into participation, affects the form and success of cooptation. Until now, this problem has been overlooked in the present essay. Matters of terminology point to this issue, as when I have referred to the cooptation of a threat group. It may appear a misnomer to speak of a group being coopted, except when the powerholder expands participation to include all members of a group. There are examples of an entire group being brought into participation, as in expansions of suffrage or in organizational rearrangements (such as the Indian Reorganization Act) that bring a group into a different relationship to power. More typically, a relatively few "representatives" of the coopted group enter into the structure of participation. Sometimes, the powerholder may appoint the actual cooptees, in which case they (e.g., the Indian members of the NCIO) only putatively represent the threat group. In other cases, the cooptees are true representatives, tied to their constituency by an election or other selective procedure. However, even if the cooptees are selected in an election controlled by the threat group, the powerholder has in a sense structured the selection, since only persons willing to "work within the system" will likely apply for the positions. The small number of cooptees and their relation of representation to the threat group are crucial to seeing the uniqueness of cooptation as a technique of power. It can be an efficient device for reducing the complexity of resistance when protest is channeled through a few representatives. The fact that the cooptees' participation symbolizes that of an
entire group is what allows the powerholder to make legitimacy gains by claiming inclusion of a threat group, when actually he may have selected "representatives" compatible with his own views. Indians brought into the BIA, for example, are selected at the discretion of the state. For the powerholder, then, the object in recruiting actual cooptees is to acquire those who symbolically represent the threat group, who will be seen by the threat group and other audiences as genuine representatives, yet who actually are not so far from his own views. The purpose of the powerholder and the outcome of cooptation is not usually to neutralize the particular individuals coopted, but to neutralize the group threatening him. This and the cooptees' representation of the group are what makes the apparent misnomer "cooptation of a group" a meaningful use of the term.

Thus far, I have focused on the cooptation of threat groups via the inclusion of representatives or through group inclusions such as suffrage expansions. But as my definition of cooptation indicates, the threatening actors that the powerholder coopts may be persons as well as groups. Certainly, there are occasions when the powerholder might wish to coopt particular persons. The example of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn shows a single individual can be a threat by creating legitimacy problems, even for a large modern state. Without initial group backing, such an actor may dissent against the powerholder in a way that foreshadows the rise of popular resistance. It might benefit the powerholder to coopt such a person and channel his resistance into the official structure by offering him a position within the state administration or by giving him an institutionalized voice in policy decisions. Another situation in
which cooptation of a certain individual might be necessary could occur if a threat group (such as early Christians) were to have its existence, unity, and organization tied to the person of a particular leader. If the state coopts the leader, the result might involve less severe yielding than would be necessary if the threat group were allowed to develop further or if its leader were negatively sanctioned by the state. The phrase "divide and conquer" is applicable when the powerholder can bring leaders of threat groups into the official structure, which makes the leaders subject to the rewards (promotion, power, prestige) that participation in the state can offer. If the threat group's leader(s) can be drawn off by the powerholder, its unity and existence may dissolve. Pontius Pilate might well have coopted Jesus Christ before he was crucified. Note that in these cases, the person is coopted not in his capacity as proxy for a threat group as in the cooptation of a group, but because of his personal power (as an internationally respected dissenter in the example of Solzhenitsyn or as the nucleus of group organization in the case of Christ).

However, my emphasis on cooptation of a group is well-founded. The possibility or actuality of group resistance underlies all serious threats. What must concern the powerholder facing a Solzhenitsyn or a Christ is not that this one person opposes him, but that a mass of people will come to oppose the policies. The group basis of threat is obvious in such threats as the organized opposition or community of interest. Therefore, cooptation of a group (in the sense discussed above) is most relevant. Unless it is possible to coopt a leader of the threat group the only cooptive counter to group threat is group cooptation,
wherein the inclusion of a few individuals may neutralize group threat via the legitimacy or filtering payoffs.

**Situations Conducive to Cooptation**

The concept of threat has appeared throughout this essay. Obviously, cooptation can only be expected when threats can emerge, and the character of the threat conditions the occurrence of cooptation. Cooptation does not, however, bear a simple or "linear" relationship to the severity of threat. Under conditions of relatively slight threat, where the threatening actor has little countervailing power, cooptation is unlikely, as the powerholder may safely ignore the threat. In the opposite situation, that of severe threat, cooptation may also not occur, as a well-organized threat group may have sufficient power to gain high-impact participation if it is coopted, thus eliminating filtering payoffs to the powerholder. However, cooptation is quite possible, whatever the severity of the threat. A powerholder may coopt a minor threat because he can afford to give them blunted participation, gain legitimacy payoffs with various audiences, yet incur little objection from the threat group over the quality of their participation. If the threat is not severe (i.e., if it has little power), members may accept any offered participation, and they certainly will not be able to demand effective participation, lacking as they do the power to extract such a bargain. In contrast, a powerful group may be able to force the powerholder to include it in an official structure of participation in exchange for cessation of certain types of resistance. Thus, one cannot argue a priori for a simple correspondence between the severity of threat and the probability of cooptation. Particular circumstances can
make cooptation an advantageous or impractical choice for the power-holder, whether the threat is severe or not.

This is not to say that the existence of threats is not conducive to cooptation. The presence of threat is a defining element of my concept of cooptation. More importantly, cooptation is a means of dealing with threats, and therefore can be a typical or common process only in social situations in which threats arise. The relevant problem is to explicate the situations that are conducive to the emergence of threat and hence to the existence of cooptation.

A social situation must be politicized if cooptation is to be a feasible process. By politicization it is meant that the political questions of what is legitimate rule, whose demands are to be acceded to, who is to decide for the whole, and so forth are present in the situation. While all social situations, societies, and organizations contain the elements of power and resistance, there is variation in the urgency with which the aforementioned questions present themselves. For contrast, compare the level of politicization of a family, where power, though present, is exercised informally, to that of a nation-state, where a defined set of leaders exercise power on an explicit formal basis. Since threats are not likely in the less politicized situation, cooptation, as a response to threat, cannot there be as common a process.

The expansion of the scope of control in a system, whether the expansion is intensive or extensive, encourages cooptation. As was suggested in Chapter I, legitimacy is more problematic as a consequence of the expansionist process; in other words, threats become more likely. Territorial (extensive) expansion almost necessarily creates threats by
the forceful inclusion of new subjects within the scope of power. When the powerholder claims control over a new sphere of life (e.g., economics), the effect on interests inherent in the previous arrangement will generate threats. In either case, the powerholder must find ways of softening the impact of resistance. He may choose or be forced to provide participation to new subjects; filtered participation oriented to a legitimacy payoff could serve the double purpose of softening resistance and increasing support.

While expansion of power encourages cooptation, cooptive maneuvers may also occur in systems undergoing contraction via a crisis of legitimacy. The Democratic Party in the U.S. did exactly this when, faced with a loss of traditional left-liberal membership and support in the aftermath of the 1968 convention, they created a new arm of the party ("Newdeck") to give participation to the disaffected left-wing element. This illustrates how cooptation, in a declining power system, may be used to draw in new elements and retain the old in an attempt to preserve the system.

Politicization and expansion are two factors conducive to cooptation because they facilitate the emergence of threats within the system. Other conditions encourage cooptation insofar as they affect the possibility of filtering and legitimacy payoffs.

To the extent that the state is bureaucratized, filtering outcomes are more likely; this would encourage the powerholder to choose cooptation. Political participation through a bureaucratic structure, exemplified by the BIA, will result in at least blunted participation. The cooptee will have at best influence over the means of administration
rather than policy. The symbolic halo of such an organization has distorting effects also: One can work for the BIA as a secretary, having no influence over the means or ends of policy, yet symbolically be represented as having been given responsibility for the fate of Indians. The state may report that 50 percent of its employees in a minority affairs agency are members of the relevant ethnic group, without mentioning that 90 percent of them are clerks, secretaries, and janitors. Again taking the BIA as an example, the hierarchical network of authority in state bureaucracies means that even the highest level of functionaries will have relatively little influence over policy. The bureaucratization of the state therefore encourages cooptation, since by facilitating filtering outcomes, it provides a motivation for cooptation.

Formally democratic systems, that is, ones which hold to a democratic ideology and in which the legitimacy of the exercise of power is tied to the provision of opportunities for citizen input into the political process, are conducive to cooptation. The ideological necessity for citizen input can be matched with the cooptic inclusion of threatening actors in an official structure of participation. If the ideological emphasis is on formal democracy, the focus will be on the possibility of input by citizens rather than on performance by the powerholder which reflects the interests and desires of the people. Here there is a fit with the blunting aspect of filtering payoffs, a process in which there is low impact on the powerholder despite the threat's input through the structure of participation. Cooptation with successful filtering and legitimacy payoffs could easily result if the ideology stresses the formal (input) aspects of participation. Under these circumstances, the
powerholder could provide blunted participation and still secure increased legitimacy, if the people expect the formal aspect of participation rather than the impact of their participation on the powerholder and his subsequent performance.

Systems with an established tradition of formal democracy also furnish a motive for cooptation by being conducive to channeling payoffs. Formal democracy involves not only the prescriptive emphasis on citizen input, but also the proscription of resistance via extra-official or extra-legal means. This provides a mechanism to channel resistance exclusively into the official structure of participation. Threat groups who accept participation in the official structure will meet with little popular support if they continue to mount unofficial resistance against the background of an ideology that prescribes dissent through official, institutionally-arranged channels. Loss of support with sympathizers in the audience would serve as a force to deflect their resistance into the cooptive official structure of participation.

The connection of democracy with cooptation may seem a cynical outlook unless one recalls that the neutralization of threat by cooptation is only a possible outcome and may not even be intended by the powerholder. Cooptation, as in the example of student participation in university governance and in the case of the cooptation of the Indians, can be the outcome of democratically motivated persons attempting to further self-determination by providing the formal means of democracy. As a caution, it should be noted that the resemblance of cooptation to some aspects of democratic procedure is only partial. Without attempting a complete definition of democracy, I would suggest that democracy
an ideal-type involves at least two criteria: The actions of the state must attend to and reflect the needs and desires of all citizens, and that this be accomplished via the widest possible political participation on the part of citizens. Although cooptation has a formal similarity to democratic procedure in its extension of representation and participation to a wider spectrum of actors, this is only part of democracy, the formal (input) aspect, and cooptation has no necessary relation to the substantive ideal that the state serve the interests of the people. The latter criterion is particularly unlikely to be realized in cases where filtering payoffs occur. If one attaches a further characteristic to democracy, namely that the people have control over selection procedures for their representatives, cooptation violates this, as cooptation usually involves the exercise of selectivity by the powerholder when cooptees ("representatives") are chosen.

The discussion of formally democratic systems shows that, despite the apparent antithesis between cooptation, potentially a deceptive technique for quelling resistance, and democracy, with its principle of state responsiveness to the people, there is a connection between cooptation and certain features of democracy. It goes without saying that totalitarian systems are prone to coopt. There are at least two reasons for this. For one, totalitarian systems represent the extreme of intensive expansion of the state; the state has assumed control over all possible spheres of life in these systems. The more areas of social life the state controls, the more possible settings there are in which interests of actors in the civil sector may be adversely affected. Totalitarian systems therefore generate many potential threats. Another
characteristic of totalitarian systems is their intolerance to any level of threat; they do not have the commitment to allow a certain degree of resistance that, for example, a democratic system would. Cooptation, as compared to coercion, is generally less costly (in terms of legitimacy) as a means of neutralizing threats. The powerholder in a totalitarian system may thus frequently choose cooptation rather than coercion as a technique for dealing with threats. Keeping in mind the constant background of threat faced by the state in totalitarian systems and the destruction of legitimacy that would occur were coercion to be frequently used, one can see why totalitarian systems are so prone to coopt.

To summarize, then, the following conditions are conducive to cooptation:

(1) Politicization, as it indicates situations where threat groups arise, and where legitimacy can be a problem for the powerholder.

(2) Expansion of the scope of control, as it almost necessarily generates threat groups, and creates a need for increased legitimacy among the new subjects of power.

(3) Formal democracy, since powerholders committed to the input aspect of democracy will likely expand participation to threat groups, and may thereby realize legitimacy and channeling payoffs.

(4) Bureaucratization of the state, since by facilitating filtering payoffs, it provides increased reason for the powerholder to coopt.

(5) Totalitarianism, as the total state's intolerance to the threats it generates produces the need to neutralize threats.

This catalogue of factors conducive to cooptation is one of the achievements of this monograph. I wish to close by recapitulating the
outlines of my work and its other accomplishments. I began by using the power system as the basic framework of analysis, something that had not been previously done with the concept of cooptation. A working model of cooptation was adopted. A review of the literature demonstrated the variety of meanings that the term has been given. All previous uses of cooptation were shown to be deficient in some respect. The concept of threat, however, emerged as a latent element in all previous models of cooptation. In the next chapter, the case of American Indians was used to illustrate my working definition of cooptation and two key concepts, filtering and legitimacy payoffs. The last chapter accomplished several things. The basic concepts of the model, namely threat group, participation, legitimacy payoffs, and filtering payoffs were elaborated. The importance of audiences to legitimacy payoffs were highlighted, and the concept of filtering was divided into channeling and blunting. The particular efficiency of cooptation as a means to deal with threat groups was noted. Finally, I mentioned the several conditions that are likely to lead to cooptation.

The threat model of cooptation provides heuristic concepts that may be applied to power systems at any level of analysis, be it the family, the formal organization, the nation-state, or the world system. It is hoped that this essay provides a useful approach to the analysis of cooptation that can be substituted for the unsystematic orientations that previously have been available for the study of this common but theoretically neglected process of power.
1 Deloria (1974: especially Chapters 7 and 8) provides an interesting illustration of what this would mean by suggesting that Indian tribes be given the international status of dependent but sovereign nations such as Monaco or Luxembourg.

2 The quantitatively-oriented researcher could construct a logically ordered Guttman scale from these dichotomies which could measure the successfulness of an instance of cooptation.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

