A QUESTION OF TREASON?
CONFEDERATE GENERALS AND U.S. ARMY POST NAMES

By

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ABSTRACT

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This thesis explores the process by which present-day U.S. Army posts came to be named for Confederate officers of the Civil War through an examination of U.S. Army regulations dictating how and for whom installations are to be named as well as surveying the history of each of the current posts named for a Confederate officer. By searching Army regulations, published histories, and newspaper articles the attitudes of local communities and military leaders are ascertained so as to better understand how men who rebelled against the United States are now honored by the Army through one of the most selective means available. This thesis concludes that while financial concerns played an immediate role in the introduction of Army posts to Southern communities, the spread of Lost Cause mythology and its acceptance by U.S. military leaders, especially after the Spanish-American War, created an atmosphere that encouraged the Army to honor those who had been viewed as traitors only one generation prior.
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On November 5, 2009, United States Army Major Nidal Hasan walked into a Soldier Readiness Center on Fort Hood, Texas, and opened fire on the approximately three hundred soldiers and civilians inside. After killing thirteen and wounding thirty, Hasan was engaged by two Department of the Army Civilian Police officers, Kimberly Munley and Mark Todd, who shot Hasan four times, bringing to an end a shocking attack on American soldiers – by an Army officer no less – on a seemingly secure U.S. Army post. Hasan survived and is still waiting to be tried on thirteen counts of premeditated murder and thirty-two counts of attempted premeditated murder. If convicted Hasan faces possible execution.

Of course this was hardly the first time U.S. soldiers have attacked and killed their fellow Americans. United States history is replete with examples of military personnel, or former military personnel, who have, for whatever reason, turned against their nation, its defenders, or its leaders; Lee Harvey Oswald, Timothy McVeigh, and Benedict Arnold are among the most infamous. While it is probable that Maj. Hasan will rank among those at the top of any such list, there is a great deal of irony that his crime occurred on an Army post that is named in honor of another such man – John Bell Hood – who, along with his fellow Confederate officers, is often viewed as merely an honorable adversary rather than as a traitor or criminal.

Hood graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in 1853, served as an officer in the infantry and cavalry, and was even offered the position of Chief of Cavalry at West Point, but resigned his commission in 1861 in order to join the Confederate cause. When his native Kentucky did not secede from the Union, Hood offered his services to the
Confederate government as a Texan and was commissioned as a lieutenant in the Confederate Army. By March 7, 1862, Hood had been promoted to brigadier general and placed in command of the Texas Brigade of the Army of Northern Virginia. Hood’s rise continued, and on July 17, 1864, he was elevated to command of the Army of Tennessee. During his time as the commander of the Army of Tennessee, Hood’s forces would be battered by Union General William Tecumseh Sherman, who inflicted nearly 30,000 casualties upon the Army of Tennessee, while Hood, in turn, managed to inflict only 10,000 casualties upon Sherman’s forces. Hood was responsible, therefore, for the death or wounding of nearly 40,000 Americans, or nearly one thousand times the number Maj. Hasan was responsible for. Furthermore, this number includes only those who were killed or wounded when Hood was an army commander; thousands more would have to be counted when one considers his time in subordinate commands. After the Civil War, Hood moved to Louisiana, where he worked in the cotton and insurance businesses until he died of yellow fever in 1879. Hood and his fellow Confederate officers, besides some inconveniences Reconstruction caused for former high-ranking Confederates, never suffered any consequences for what many at the time considered treason.

It is risky, to say the least, to compare Nidal Hasan to John B. Hood. Civil War buffs, Confederate supporters, Lost Cause adherents, and perhaps even professional historians may protest the direct comparison of Maj. Hasan and Hood as well as the implied comparison of Maj. Hasan to other Confederate officers, perhaps most provocatively to Robert E. Lee. Many Confederate officers simply followed their states into secession, many might argue. The leaders of the Confederate armies, these same apologists may argue, believed they were acting within the legal framework of the
Constitution and certainly did not see themselves as acting in any kind of criminal or treasonous manner. And finally, many may argue that when the Confederate armies fought against the United States it was within the accepted rules of war that existed in the nineteenth century and came only after years of political wrangling. While these arguments are not necessarily wrong, they do not negate the comparisons between Confederate leaders and Maj. Hassan.  

Hood himself did not follow his state into secession. While Kentucky was certainly a contentious area during the Civil War, it never seceded. On May 16, 1861, the legislature of Kentucky passed a resolution stating, “That this state and the citizens thereof shall take no part in the Civil War now being waged … and that Kentucky should, during the contest, occupy a position of strict neutrality.” Hood, in effect, seceded twice, first from his state and then from his country. Such loyalty to the Southern cause may have served, and may continue to serve, to endear him to his fellow Confederates, but, unlike the cases of men such as Lee or John Brown Gordon, leaves little room for arguments of state loyalty.

Any argument concerning the beliefs of the legality of secession is of little value as well. To be certain, Confederate leaders believed their actions to be legal, justified, and even patriotic, but Maj. Hasan believed in the legitimacy of his actions as well. Major Hasan is a devout Muslim and deplored the military involvement of the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan. His actions fit within a set of Muslim beliefs, obviously not endorsed by all Muslims, that encourages the spread and defense of Islam through force. The point is not to argue for or against such beliefs, nor is it to paint all Muslims as violent terrorists. One must only recognize that Maj. Hasan believed his actions were
justified by a law greater than the Constitution and therefore were not criminal or treasonous. This belief on the part of Maj. Hasan also colors any argument regarding open and declared combat on the part of the Confederates versus Maj. Hasan’s surprise attack that November day. Once again, Maj. Hasan’s religious beliefs legitimize his methods and targets. Such beliefs have precedents in the United States; one of the most famous is the “higher law” doctrine as spelled out in the U.S. Senate by William H. Seward, who would go on to serve as secretary of state under Lincoln. While speaking of the evils of slavery Seward stated, “there is a higher law than the Constitution, which regulates our authority over the domain … The territory is a part … of the common heritage of mankind, bestowed upon them by the Creator of the universe. We are his stewards.”12 Southerners condemned Seward’s doctrine as “monstrous and diabolical;” Henry Clay called it “wild, reckless, and abominable.”13

Finally, observers may argue the passage of time allows us to reflect upon secession and the Civil War and conclude that the actions of the Confederates were honorable, while Maj. Hasan’s are clearly not. This argument flounders as well, however. There are probably few events in U.S. history that inspire such emotion as the Civil War. If we are able to justify the actions of men such as Hood and the death and destruction they were responsible for, perhaps in 150 years historians and laymen alike will look back with greater religious moderation and tolerance and seek to justify or lessen the apparent vile of Maj. Hasan’s actions in light of new sensibilities, just as today we view the actions of men like Hood today through a drastically different lens than his contemporaries. While speaking in Stillwater, Minnesota, in 1879, Union veteran Colonel Thomas Barr stated the Civil War “was no gladiatorial contest in which we were
engaged … It was a death grapple between right and wrong.” Barr went on to say that “treason” had to be “so punished … that it might never come to be eulogized as true loyalty.”

And yet, while Maj. Hasan faces a grim future, many of those defeated Confederates were not only never tried in court but would later receive one of the greatest honors the military can bestow upon the memories of those who fought for, or against as the case may be, the preservation of the United States – their memories are forever honored in the names of U.S. Army posts. Truly Col. Barr demonstrated a prophetic understanding of the American people.

That the men who led the effort to splinter the United States would be so honored would almost certainly come as a complete shock to those who opposed them in battle and those who followed in their immediate footsteps. James Tyrus Seidule has argued that the Army continued to view the Confederates negatively well after the rest of the country had seemingly embraced reconciliation. “After Reconstruction ended in 1877, when the rest of the nation moved toward reconciliation, West Point did not,” writes Seidule. “This defensiveness led the faculty and alumni to create a series of written and stone memorials, mainly in the 1890s, highlighting West Point’s role in saving the Union. All of the memorials excluded Confederates.”

How is it then, that if the United States Army could not even countenance a small memorial on the grounds or near the grounds of West Point to honor the memory of its Confederate graduates, it would one day name entire Army installations in their honor?

It is easy to understand why the Army would be hesitant to recognize its prodigal Southern brethren. After all, the Confederate Army killed some 140,000 Union soldiers in battle; only the Germans in World War II killed more U.S. troops in any single war.
But the United States has never honored any German officers in a similar manner, not even those, such as Erwin Rommel, who today occupy positions of prestige among many in the armed forces. Nonetheless, before the United States and Germany were embroiled in World War II, the United States Army had already seen fit to name numerous Army installations after a number of Confederate officers who only a few years prior had remained traitors in the eyes of the Army’s leadership. Obviously, in the early years of the twentieth century something had changed within the collective memory of not only the United States as a whole, but more importantly, within the collective memory of the Army as well.

Initially many Southerners had legitimate reason to believe the process of reintegration into the United States would be long and painful. President Andrew Johnson gave former Confederates little hope, stating in 1864, “Treason must be made odious, and traitors must be punished and impoverished.” When meeting with Radical Republicans after ascending to the presidency in 1865, Johnson reassured them, “treason is a crime, and crime must be punished.” Toward that end, some 200,000 Union soldiers remained in the South as occupation troops immediately after the defeat of the Confederate States.

The struggle of Reconstruction was to determine whose vision of the reimagined South would emerge – a white supremacist vision that imitated as closely as possible the Southern culture in existence before the Civil War or a vision of justice and equality before the law that attempted to honestly achieve the lofty goal of all men being created equal. At the same time Reconstruction had to ease sectional hostilities and restore
national unity. In the end a reconstructed United States of harmony and justice proved impossible to create.\textsuperscript{20}

Radical Republicans viewed Reconstruction as an opportunity to overthrow the aristocratic ruling class of the South through granting suffrage to freedmen while disenfranchising and confiscating the property of ex-Confederates. Indiana Congressman George W. Julian envisioned the rise of “small farms, thrifty tillage, free schools, social independence, flourishing manufactures and the arts, respect for honest labor, and the equality of political rights.”\textsuperscript{21} In short, Radical Republicans desired to see the traditional fabric of the slave-South torn asunder and discarded from a post-Civil War United States, to be replaced with free labor and political and legal equality.

Presidential Reconstruction reflected Johnson’s inherit racism and belief that the Reconstructed South must remain firmly in the control of white Southerners despite his rhetoric of odious treason. In his 1867 annual message to Congress Johnson urged that blacks not be given the right to vote, stating:

“it must be acknowledged that in the progress of nations negroes have shown less capacity for government than any other race of people. No independent government of any form has ever been successful in their hands. On the contrary, wherever they have been left to their own devices they have shown a constant tendency to relapse into barbarism.”

Johnson would go on to say that if African Americans were included as full members of the electorate they would “create such a tyranny as this continent has never yet witnessed.”\textsuperscript{22} Eric Foner calls this “probably the most blatantly racist pronouncement ever to appear in an official state paper of an American President” and rightly suggests that “it is difficult to imagine what regime blacks might impose more tyrannical than chattel slavery.”\textsuperscript{23}
In the South violence directed at African Americans and pro-Republican whites, both carpetbaggers (Northerners who came South to partake in the political rebuilding of the defeated states) and scalawags (Southerners who preached cooperation with Republicans and Reconstruction), became the vehicle through which Southern whites regained political control of their local and state governments. From 1867 until 1871 or early 1872, the Ku Klux Klan, described as “the military arm of the Democratic party” with the goal of restoring “home rule in the southern states,” engaged in significant acts of violence throughout the South, violence intended to “influence the broader society beyond the attackers’ immediate victims,” politically active African Americans and white Republicans.

By 1870 many in the North were weary of conflict with the South, which had been churning nearly nonstop since the annexation of Texas in 1845. The New York Tribune implored, “Let us have done with Reconstruction. The country is tired and sick of it … LET US HAVE PEACE.” What Southern whites would come to call Redemption was a truly painful and tragic period. Cut loose from their Northern support, Republican governments in the South fought loosing battles, often times quite literally, against the overwhelming will of Southern whites in what today might be termed an early form of insurgent warfare. On Easter Sunday 1873, no fewer than fifty-four African Americans were slaughtered in Colfax, Louisiana. While three men were convicted for violating the Enforcement Act of 1870, their convictions were overruled by the Supreme Court. To celebrate, white Louisianans murdered two more African Americans; no one was convicted of these killings either. The state’s Republican governor, William Pitt Kellogg, stated the Colfax Massacre and the acquittal of those tried for the slayings “was
regarded as establishing the principle that hereafter no white man could be punished for killing a negro.”

The return of nearly uncontested white supremacy in the South brought about the incredibly close presidential election of 1876, the Compromise of 1877, the presidency of Rutherford B. Hayes, and the end of Reconstruction. “Reconstruction,” writes Nicholas Lemann, “which had wound up producing a lower-intensity continuation of the Civil War, was over. The South had won.”

Reconstruction was, quite simply, a failure. If union was the key object of the Civil War, then after the military victory the South could have been readmitted more quickly and with less conflict and bloodshed. If retribution inspired Reconstruction, then it must also be deemed a failure, as the Reconstruction process, while lasting over a decade, did little to substantially punish Southerners for their role in bringing about the Civil War. If, however, the freeing of some four million enslaved souls and their subsequent protection and integration into the national framework as citizens was the true object of the Civil War, then Reconstruction must be viewed as an abysmal failure. W.E.B. Du Bois summed up this perspective: “The slave went free; stood a brief moment in the sun; then moved back again toward slavery.”

The Lost Cause is the tale of the Civil War and Reconstruction as seen through the eyes of Southern whites who lived through that time. Certainly the Lost Cause has been added to and amended over the years in an effort to make it easier for Northern audiences to accept, but its creators were the very Confederate officers and soldiers defeated by the Union armies. Gaines M. Foster argues that while the Lost Cause may not have been and may not provide the most accurate interpretation of the antebellum
South or the Civil War, its development and acceptance by Americans, North and South, was vital in the process of reconciliation that eventually did succeed in reuniting the divided nation. It allowed Southern Americans to accept defeat in the Civil War while maintaining their sense of honor; it also permitted a renewed loyalty to the United States and the new order that emerged in the post-bellum nation. This was accomplished by emphasizing “not the issues behind the conflict but the experience of battle that both North and South had shared.”

Through this emphasis on the shared gallantry and bravery of all combatants, Yankee and Rebel, those men who took up arms against the United States government were transformed from traitors into heroes.

While many historians insist that the Lost Cause is of little importance to our current understanding of the Civil War, the fact is that the Lost Cause remains incredibly influential in popular history. Even historians such as Gary Gallagher, who argues that many, but certainly not all, Lost Cause arguments are built on “solid foundations,” has tried to downplay the continuing influence of the Lost Cause in American popular culture. For example, in his fascinating look at the portrayal of the Civil War in movies, Gallagher prefers to refer to movies produced before Glory (1989) as exulting in the Lost Cause while those produced after Glory he tends to refer to as “Reconciliationist.” Two decades earlier, however, Gaines M. Foster argued that the Lost Cause, “eased the region’s [the South’s] passage through a particularly difficult period of social change,” and in effect made reconciliation possible. If Foster is correct, than any attempt to paint a “Reconciliationist” picture of the Civil War draws upon and perpetuates at least some of the values of the Lost Cause. Therefore, Gallagher, without intending to do so, reinforces the importance of the Lost Cause in today’s popular culture. In this
environment, therefore, Lost Cause interpretations of the actions of men such as Hood remain powerful and help explain the controversy inherent in criticizing a Confederate hero such as Robert E. Lee as well as why the U.S. Army chooses to honor Confederate heroes.

Today there are eight U.S. Army posts named in honor of Confederate officers: Fort Lee and Fort A.P. Hill in Virginia, Fort Benning and Fort Gordon in Georgia, Fort Bragg in North Carolina, Fort Rucker in Alabama, Fort Polk in Louisiana, and, of course, Fort Hood in Texas. These installations pay homage to eight officers who, for four years, dedicated themselves to defeating the United States Army in order to gain the independence of a slave-holding South from the Union. Such an apparent dichotomy between the mission of the Army and what the men honored by these installations attempted to accomplish begs the question, why would the Army choose to honor those who attempted to defeat it and overthrow the authority of the federal government in half of the country?

Perhaps it is because Confederates have remained Americans first in the eyes of most, Americans who fought with great honor and dogged determination. It may possibly be because many believe the South fought an unwinnable war for ideals they believed were greater than the United States of the mid-nineteenth century. Maybe later wars, especially the Spanish-American War, served to prove Southern loyalty and devotion, making the Civil War little more than an intra-familial dispute, and it is widely accepted that whatever differences exist within a family can be set aside during times of international conflict. The answer certainly incorporates all these beliefs as well as
several others, but above all, the existence of U.S. Army posts honoring Confederate officers can be summed up in three words – the Lost Cause.
In recent years a surge of historical research has analyzed the meaning of popular memory and the commemoration rituals of the Civil War. Several important studies within the last fifteen years in particular have attempted to explore how Americans, North and South, past and present, have remembered the Civil War and what that memory says about the United States and its citizens. Honoring the dead through memorial and decoration days, Civil War cemeteries (memorial days and cemeteries are closely linked, especially early in the development of memorialization efforts), statues and monuments, literature, art, and film, and the differences of memorialization based upon gender and race have proven to be popular subjects of late.\textsuperscript{1} But to date no one has explored the naming of U.S. Army posts as an act of memorialization.

First it must be recognized that memorialization is a political action. Clausewitz is of course famous for stating that “war is a mere continuation of policy (or politics) by other means.”\textsuperscript{2} If Clausewitz is correct – and he is – then how we remember war and honor those who fight in war is political in nature as well; David Bight refers to this as the “politics of memory.”\textsuperscript{3} Therefore all acts of Civil War memorialization make a political statement about and to the citizens of the United States and to those from other nations; it would therefore seem to be of vital importance that Americans remember the Civil War accurately. How to accurately remember the Civil War, however, is a question that historians have debated for decades; nonetheless there can be no doubt of the fact that how we remember the Civil War is in fact political. Caroline E. Janney provides one of the more interesting proofs of the politicization of remembrance.
Janney argues that Southern women played an essential role in guaranteeing a positive memory of the Confederacy and those who fought under its flag. Most interestingly, Janney argues that women and the ladies’ memorial associations (LMAs) were granted the room necessary to develop the Lost Cause mythology specifically because of their gender. Janney states that immediately after the Civil War, Southern men could never have attempted to accomplish what the LMAs did because it would have been viewed as treasonous and treason is a political act. Women, however, were viewed as incapable of being political; therefore, their actions were merely viewed as those of grieving mothers, wives, sisters, and daughters.\textsuperscript{4} Ironically, however, most women who joined LMAs had no male relatives who fought in the Civil War and those who did were rarely killed.\textsuperscript{5} According to Janney, this is clear evidence that the LMAs were engaged in political activism and not “mere” memorialization. Nonetheless, because of the perceived apolitical attitudes of women, the LMAs were allowed to organize events and sponsor speakers vital to the growth of the Lost Cause, an interpretation of the Civil War that has had tremendous political influence throughout the past century.

There has been, and remains, a great deal of debate over the social and political origins of the Civil War. Any attempt to rightly interpret the Civil War is perhaps a quagmire from which there is no escape; interpretation is, nonetheless, of vital importance because it dictates how the sectional conflict and those who fought in it should be remembered. If the social and political question of the war was emancipation, then most would agree that that the Civil War should be remembered as a great Northern victory that eradicated the scourge of slavery from America’s shores. This interpretation also places a high value on the attempted process of incorporating African Americans in
the political fabric of the United States. The Federal forces and their leaders should therefore receive one of the highest honors possible, while the Confederacy and its leaders should be remembered, at best, as stubborn and egotistical men dedicated to an unjust institution who shamefully betrayed their nation and their fellow human beings. Gary Gallagher refers to this as the “Emancipationist Cause.”

But this is hardly the only political interpretation of the Civil War. The Lost Cause has proven to be one of the oldest and most persistent interpretations of the war. One of the earliest crafters of the Lost Cause was John William Jones, who served in the Army of Northern Virginia and wrote influential biographies of Robert E. Lee and Jefferson Davis. Jones and later Lost Cause apologists argued that Southern leaders did all in their power to avoid the dissolution of the Union, and that once the North forced the Southern states to exercise their “constitutional right of secession” Davis and his fellow Southern leaders did everything possible to “avert war, stood purely on the defensive, and made as purely a defensive fight for sacred principles and rights as the world ever saw.” In this interpretation it would seem proper to honor the Confederate warriors, who did no more than defend their homes against the tyranny of the North, and while losing in the end, fought valiantly for their righteous cause.

A political interpretation that grew in the North counter to the Lost Cause was an understanding of the Civil War as a fight to keep the nation united. This understanding of the war focuses little on the causes that led to secession, instead concentrating on the importance of maintaining a United States of America. As such, Southern leaders are viewed as misguided and their acts as illegal, but the focus is placed upon those who saved the Union. Reunion was the aim of the war and the war achieved that aim due to
the loyalty and determination of the Northern military forces, who should be held in the highest of esteem. Gallagher refers to this as the “Union Cause” \(^\text{10}\) while John Neff terms this the “Cause Victorious.” \(^\text{11}\)

Gallagher and Blight describe one further political interpretation of the Civil War, one Gallagher calls the “Reconciliationist Cause” \(^\text{12}\) and Blight refers to as the “reconciliationist vision.” \(^\text{13}\) Gallagher describes this understanding of the war as one that “muted the divisive issue of slavery, avoided value judgments about the righteousness of either cause, and celebrated the valor and pluck of white soldiers in both Union and Confederate armies.” While Gallagher has gone to the trouble of describing and naming this political explanation of the Civil War it seems to be a more nuanced reinterpretation of the Lost Cause. Gallagher himself implies as much: “the Reconciliationist Cause most often was characterized by a measure of northern capitulation to the white South and the Lost Cause tradition.” \(^\text{14}\) Blight is more explicit, stating that the “white supremacist vision” of the Civil War “locked arms with reconciliationists of many kinds, and by the turn of the century delivered the country a segregated memory of the Civil War on Southern terms.” \(^\text{15}\) This “memory of the Civil War on Southern terms” is the Lost Cause, presented in a manner so as not offend Northern whites while diluting any significant lessons that can be learned from the sectional conflict; it allows Northerners and Southerners to honor one another’s heroes without having to face the difficult and uncomfortable questions posed by the United States’ deadliest war.

It is well beyond the scope of this work to more fully explore these interpretations, their meanings, and their accuracy. But it is important that they are recognized and understood as shaping the politics of the Civil War and, therefore, its
memorialization. Whether or not any one, or even all, of these interpretations is “correct” is not central to this study; what is important is that each of these various interpretations is “correct” to individuals and groups throughout the nation, indeed throughout the world, and that these interpretations impact the political memory of the war, both individual and communal.

Each of these interpretations was conceived in an effort to explain the tremendous death and suffering caused by the Civil War. The volume of death during the sectional crisis was beyond anything any American could have imagined in 1861. Most believed, North and South, that the war would be quick and relatively bloodless. After all, the 4,435 battle deaths of the American Revolution remained the most in U.S. history when the Civil War began. By the time the Civil War reached its end at least 140,000 U.S. soldiers would be killed in battle; more than 220,000 more would die of disease and infection.¹⁶ Confederate records were not as well kept as Union records, but it is generally accepted that no fewer than 260,000 Southern soldiers would die during the war as well, bringing the total dead to more than 620,000.¹⁷ J. David Hacker recently published an article wherein he estimates, using census records from 1850 through 1880, the number of soldiers who died at approximately 750,000.¹⁸ Religion offered hope for after death, but killing on such a grand scale raised “disturbing questions about God’s benevolence and agency;”¹⁹ there was nothing in the nation’s history to prepare it for the carnage of the Civil War.

Almost as soon as the soldiers began to die the living began to remember and honor them and the cause for which they had fought and died. This was partly because the Civil War defied the social norms of death in the antebellum United States. Death
turned from a personal affair involving the dying and their family to a largely impersonal, often solitary, and anguished event. A “good” death brought peace to the families of the dead; it assured them of an “inward saving grace” within the departed. If achieving a good death was of great importance to many Americans during the nineteenth century, the Civil War destroyed the possibility of such a death, placing it beyond the reach of hundreds of thousands of soldiers and their families. Thus Civil War memorials were not for the dead, but for the living. It helped those left behind to make sense of the chaos that had denied them their loved ones.

The act of burying the fallen was the first effort to memorialize the Civil War dead. As such, the United States government took relatively quick action to develop what became national cemeteries. Arlington National Cemetery and Gettysburg National Cemetery are examples of two cemeteries established while the war continued to rage.

The Confederacy was largely unable to match the Union in developing a parallel cemetery system and immediately following the war the North was unwilling to pay for or organize cemeteries for fallen Confederate soldiers. It fell, instead, upon various private individuals and organizations to establish such resting places for Southern soldiers; early on these efforts were often led by Southern women (it is these women and their political activism to which Janney refers). Eventually the federal government would establish places of repose within many national cemeteries for those who died fighting for the Confederate cause.

Special days of remembrance – decoration or memorial days – soon followed the establishment of cemeteries. While some of the first days of remembrance were organized by African Americans to celebrate emancipation, white Americans North and
South soon organized days of remembrance to recognize those who died in the conflict. Often local in character and celebrated on days of local significance, it took many years before the United States recognized Memorial Day as a national holiday in 1888. Nonetheless, many Southerners continued to honor their fallen on separate days of remembrance.

Throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries memorial statues were built in the North and the South to honor the general memory of those who fought as well as specific heroes of the war. The most famous might well be the Lincoln Memorial, which dwarfs any other statuary memorial. But Richmond has developed an area that evokes a very different memory of the Civil War – Monument Avenue. The first statue unveiled on Monument Avenue was of Robert E. Lee in May of 1890 and was witnessed by a crowd estimated at between 100,000 and 150,000. Monuments to other Confederate leaders were built along the avenue: Jefferson Davis and J.E.B. Stuart in 1907, Stonewall Jackson in 1919, and Matthew Fontaine Maury in 1929. The 1995 decision of Richmond’s city council to enshrine Arthur Ashe, an African American, was not without controversy. Although the council voted 7-0 to build the memorial to Ashe, one member of the council abstained from the vote that followed a seven-hour public hearing that included some Richmond residents dressed as Confederate soldiers.

Literature has been one of the most influential of Civil War memorial efforts. David Blight writes:

“In an era of tremendous social change and anxiety, a popular literature that embraced the romance of the Lost Cause, the idyll of the Old South’s plantation world of orderly and happy race relations, and the mutuality of the ‘soldier’s faith’ flowed from mass-market magazines as well as the nation’s most prominent publishing houses.”
Some, like Walt Whitman, spoke with great honesty of the horrors of war. Other works soon began to cast the Civil War in the romanticized light of the Lost Cause, the most famous of which must surely be Margaret Mitchell’s *Gone with the Wind*. Alongside such romanticized fiction the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries saw an explosion of Civil War memoirs. The most famous may be Ulysses S. Grant’s *Personal Memoirs* but Confederate soldiers wrote their own recollections of the war as well. John Bell Hood and John Brown Gordon are two Confederate generals who wrote important memoirs and whose names would later be memorialized by Army posts. Biographies, such as John Williams Jones’ books on Robert E. Lee and Jefferson Davis, as well as histories of the war became popular as well. And of course it was Jubal Early who championed the Lost Cause through his writings in the *Southern Historical Society Papers*, edited by Jones. Literature remains important today. There is a surplus of Civil War magazines and journals and authors such as Michael and Jeff Shaara keep Civil War fiction alive in works such as *The Killer Angels*.

As the technology of the twentieth century advanced film became one of the leading forms of Civil War memorialization. The 1915 film *Birth of a Nation*, based on Thomas F. Dixon’s novel *The Clansman*, was the first full-length cinematic exploration of the Civil War. Over the years a plethora of films interpreting the war quite differently from one another have been produced. Recent years have seen movies such as *Glory*, *Gettysburg*, and *Lincoln* hit the silver screen, each advancing different interpretations of the Civil War. Due to their mass market appeal and ease of digestion movies are probably the most influential form of memorialization today.
What is interesting about the memorialization of Confederate officers through the naming of Army posts rather than almost any other memorialization effort or project is the tacit approval of the former Rebels by the federal government inherent in post naming; this sense of approval is missing from almost all other Confederate memorials. Confederate cemeteries, statues, paintings, literature, film, or the organizations that support those efforts are typically individually or locally supported. For instance, other than allowing the memorial to exist, the federal government is not a player in the creation and existence of the Civil War monument on the grounds of the Texas state capitol in Austin. At most this is a monument that endorses, or endorsed, the perspective of the Texas state government and perfectly reflects the Lost Cause tradition, even if many of the facts are wrong. On the other hand, by choosing to name Fort Hood after John Bell Hood the federal government is essentially telling all who choose to listen that Hood and his actions are to be respected and honored by all Americans and particularly by those in uniform serving in the armed forces today.

It is fascinatingly paradoxical that the United States government would seem to endorse the actions of men who sought to sever the ties of union with the nation of their births and were responsible for killing hundreds of thousands of U.S. soldiers. Yet this is essentially what the federal government has done by establishing and maintaining the eight Army posts named in honor of Confederate officers. On the other hand, by only naming two posts for Union officers one can argue that the federal government is implying that their cause, whether Emancipationist or Union, is less worthy of remembrance than the Confederate cause. One might even argue that the preponderance of Confederate-named posts implies that the Army endorses the overthrow of the federal
government and the fragmenting of the United States into smaller independent nations. It is highly doubtful that any such thoughts were actually in the minds of those who approved the post names, but the implication remains.

On the other hand, it is quite probable that many Americans neither recognize nor care that current Army posts are named after Confederate officers. In a recent conversation, one retired soldier asked, when learning of this study, “Why does it matter?” Such a question suggests that Gallagher’s Reconciliationist Cause and Blight’s reconciliationist vision have gained a strong acceptance over the years. Perhaps this is an indication that the Civil War and its causes are growing less contentious in the United States. After all, the Civil War is celebrating its sesquicentennial; if Americans can accept Germany and Japan as allies less than seventy years after World War II, then surely Yankees and Confederates can accept one another and their heroes 150 years after the Civil War. On the other hand, perhaps this modern-day veteran, born and raised in Nebraska, simply reflects the relative unimportance of the Civil War in the Northern mind while the Civil War remains, in Tony Horwitz’s words, “unfinished” in the Southern mind.
Chapter 3 – Naming U.S. Army Posts

It may come as a surprise to those associated with the modern military to learn that for much of its history the Army paid very little attention to the names of its posts. Today the Army’s bureaucracy is extensive, ranging not only from obvious military matters such as weapons development and tactics, but to the unexpected as well, such as high school completion programs for spouses.¹ There is very little that today’s Army does not have a regulation, pamphlet, technical manual, field manual, or memo to explain, instruct, clarify, or regulate. And while many soldiers may not be able to imagine a time when Army organization was significantly different, the fact is that such bureaucracy is relatively new to the U.S. Army.

A large standing Army and the accompanying support structures are largely a result of and remnant of the Cold War. Prior to the half-century conflict between the United States and the former Soviet Union, America’s armed forces tended toward the miniscule, except in times of armed conflict. During these times, of course, the military would balloon to meet a challenge and then once again shrink when the conflict ended. Such a pattern was probably linked to Americans’ traditional fear of a standing army as an instrument of tyranny and the high cost associated with a large military. A small army, and especially a small officer corps, had less need for the mountains of regulations characteristic of the modern military. As a result, records outlining how Army posts were named are sketchy until well into the twentieth century. After all, the job of the Army is to fight, not keep historical records on the naming process of what were often temporary military outposts. When taken with the question of Confederate officers, the subject becomes even more confused. One historian at the U.S. Army Quartermaster Museum,
located at Fort Lee, stated, “It was our impression that most cantonments were named per
the Secretary of War and QM Construction Division using Civil War general names, as at
Camp Lee. Those north of the Mason Dixon Line Union and south Confederate.”

There is a tradition of seeming haphazardness in the building and naming of U.S.
Army posts that dates back to colonial times. In 1754, a young George Washington,
leading a contingent of Virginia militia, built a hasty fort along the Ohio frontier as
protection from the French. Washington was pragmatic in choosing the name of his
small citadel, calling it Fort Necessity. Over the years local commanders would
continue to name posts as they were built, often drawing upon geographic features,
Native American tribes and traditions, and historic foreign names. Additionally, Army
posts were designated as barracks, cantonments, or forts at random, despite the facts that
all posts have barracks and cantonments were originally intended as temporary
installations.

Such arbitrariness lacks the good order and discipline any army strives for, even a
small one lacking in bureaucracy. By 1832 the randomness of post names reached a
point that the Army took, for the first known time, steps to regulate the naming of
installations. Adjutant General Roger Jones issued General Order No. 11 on February 6,
1832, stating that all cantonments where to be known as forts and that all future posts
would be named by the War Department and announced in general orders from the
Headquarters of the Army. While seemingly straightforward in delineating
responsibility for the naming of future Army posts, the Army would come back to this
question repeatedly, especially after World War II.
According to most sources, the Army did not speak on the naming of posts again until 1878. However, it appears as though the Army had to deal with the naming of posts without authorization at least a full decade earlier. Despite the fact that General Order No. 11 of 1832 reserved the right to name posts to the War Department, General Order No. 95 of 1868 further clarified, “Permanent military posts can only be established under special authority from the Secretary of War, and they will be named by him.” While not truly altering the existing order of 1832, it did further specify the naming authority as the Secretary of War, rather than simply the War Department. Perhaps young officers in the West were creating and naming posts without permission. Or maybe someone within the War Department was authorizing the creation and naming of posts without approval from higher up the bureaucratic food chain. The historical record is silent on this point, but certainly the Army would not issue a new general order concerning the naming of posts without motivation, particularly when the Army had only commented on the subject once in its history.

In 1878 the Army, probably in response to the proliferation of temporary posts in the West, issued General Order No. 79. This order authorized division commanders (of a geographic territory rather than a military unit) to designate permanent posts as “forts” and temporary posts as “camps.” It would seem this order should have brought to an end, at least for some time, any further questions concerning the naming of Army posts, but in 1893 the Quartermaster General of the U.S. Army, Brigadier General Richard Napoleon Batchelder, made several suggestions regarding the naming of posts in his annual report.
General Batchelder noted that by 1893 a certain randomness had returned to the naming of Army posts. Batchelder cited General Order No. 11 of 1832, but stated, “With the lapse of time, however, a contrary practice grew up and, although a partial reform was instituted by General Order 79, of 1878, certain anomalies still exist in the nomenclature of our military posts which might be corrected, for the sake of uniformity and propriety.”

Batchelder sought to remove naming authority from the various division commanders and return it solely to the Secretary of War. Additionally, although two previous general orders directed that permanent installations were to be known as forts, Batchelder thought it necessary that the order be repeated a third time and that the nomenclature “barracks” be dropped completely because all military posts “must of necessity comprise a variety of buildings and quarters for officers, as well as barracks for enlisted men.” Clearly, because all posts contained barracks, Batchelder thought it extremely improper to refer to an entire installation, Carlisle Barracks in Pennsylvania for example, as such. Finally, Batchelder also recommended that all “local names be eliminated from the nomenclature of military posts” and be replaced with the names of men who had served the nation with distinction, honor, and bravery. “What names more appropriate could be bestowed upon the different military posts of the country?” Batchelder asked. “To perpetuate the names of such men is to keep the memory of their deeds ever in the minds of our officers and soldiers.”

Despite more than sixty years of interest regarding post names, this is the first recorded instance of concern for the “name” rather than the “nomenclature” of Army installations.

It appears that Batchelder’s report generally served the purpose he desired, but no official change in Army policy was forthcoming for over a decade. A 1906 circular
directed that no Army posts, nor any “building, hall, street, driveway, etc., on a military reservation will be named in honor of a living officer” as was the “established practice with regard to naming military posts.”

This seems to indicate that while the Army did not officially change the naming practices for installations between 1893 and 1906, Batchelder’s desires had resulted in establishing a new, generally comprehensive, practice of naming posts after deceased men of honor. For the first time, questions of nomenclature, whether posts were to be called forts, barracks, cantonments, or camps, were not mentioned, apparently because, as would be confirmed in later Army publications, that question had finally been resolved. The question of post naming would remain silent for forty years. In the interim, Forts Lee, Benning, Bragg, and the first Fort Gordon were established in reaction to the needs of World War I and Forts Polk, A.P. Hill, Rucker, Hood, and the second Fort Gordon due to World War II.

The Second World War saw the Army expand as had always been the case when the United States went to war. What was different this time was that, unlike in the past, the Army did not shrink to a shell of its former self once the conflict ended. While the military did not maintain its World War II levels, the beginning of the Cold War ensured that the United States, for the first time, maintained a large peacetime Army. As a result, the Army’s bureaucratic structure grew large as well and began to regulate on a scale never before seen. In the seventy-four years between 1832 and 1906 the Army published four official orders and updates to those orders, as well as the 1893 Quartermaster-General report, concerning the naming of Army posts. In the sixty years between 1946 and 2006 the Army published no fewer than fifteen regulations and revisions regarding
installation naming. As time went on, the regulations themselves also became longer and more detailed, reflecting the refinement of the Army’s bureaucracy.

The first of these bureaucratic regulations came shortly after the end of World War II. In 1946 the Army established the Department of the Army Memorialization Board. Army Regulation (AR) 15-190 tasked the Board with executing Army policy “relating to the memorialization of outstanding military personalities” and recommending legislation to aid in the “performance of its mission.” Nothing was stated, however, about any criteria to be used in the memorialization efforts of the Board. This was remedied in a revised regulation published in 1951. The revised regulation directed that “only deceased persons will be memorialized” and that “no installation … whose naming might for any reason provoke objection or controversy will be named.” Additionally, five categories were developed for various levels of memorialization. (1) National heroes of “absolute preeminence” could be honored through the naming of a national park or national highway. (2) Army commanders and above whose death was the result of battle wounds could be honored by the naming of a “large military reservation or activity” (emphasis added). (3) Army commanders and above whose death was not the result of battle wounds could be honored by the naming of a military reservation or activity. (4) Individuals who “performed an act of heroism” or those below the position of Army commander whose death was the result of battle wounds could be honored by the naming of a small post or subpost. And finally, (5) those who performed an act of heroism or those below the position of Army commander whose death was not a result of battle wounds could be honored by the naming of a “building, street, group of buildings forming a functional entity on a post, or an area within a post or subpost.” Lastly, the
1951 regulation indicated that the Adjutant General would receive all recommendations for memorialization and that the Memorialization Board would make the final decisions in questions concerning memorialization and post namings. These categories and criteria would form the foundation upon which all future memorialization regulations would be built.

In 1958 the Memorialization Board was done away with and AR 1-30 replaced AR 15-190. The new regulation maintained that only the deceased were to be honored and that “no memorialization action will be taken which might for any reason provoke objection or controversy.” The categories for memorialization were maintained as well. The only true difference was that the approving authority for memorialization became the Headquarters Department of the Army. In 1972 the regulation was changed again, this time to AR 1-33. The 1972 regulation removed the Adjutant General from the naming process, with all recommendations to be sent directly to the Headquarters of the Department of the Army. The 1975 revision addressed the question of renaming posts, which was “discouraged because they [renaming actions] are seldom appropriate, and strong resistance can be expected from local residents, heirs, historical societies, and others.” The 1979 revision of the regulation finally allowed that some enlisted soldiers, or at least senior non-commissioned officers, could be worthy of recognition as well, but only within categories 3-5. Additionally, the regulation stipulated that installations should be named in honor of those who, meeting the other criteria, were also significant and well known in the locality of the installation. It is interesting to note that the 1980 revision reminded commanders that the memorialization program was intended to “honor
deceased heroes … of all races in our society” and to “present them as inspirations to their fellow soldiers, employees, and other citizens.”

No other changes were made to AR 1-33 until 2006. In this most recent version of the regulation the Secretary of the Army is clearly named as the final approving authority for the entirety of the Memorial Program. The 2006 version of AR 1-33 also discourages renaming but does allow that renaming may become appropriate and briefly outlines such a process. It also does away with the old five categories, replacing them with eleven memorialization categories, only one of which actually concerns the naming of Army posts. The updated regulation allows an installation to be named after any “deceased distinguished individuals” except Presidents, Chiefs of Staff, and generals of the Army (five-star generals). Finally, in 2008 Army Directive 2008-03 was published, allowing the Secretary of the Army to dedicate “facilities” to living soldiers or their spouses in exceptional cases.

Clearly the manner in which the Army now views the naming of Army posts has evolved tremendously since the first directive concerning the issue was released more than 180 years ago. The question of naming posts has especially taken on significance since the end of World War II, with the Army ever working to refine the process for installation naming and who should be so honored by the naming of Army posts. The Army’s policy regarding installation names is highly reactionary, however, and discourages change, preferring to maintain the status quo when and wherever possible. For example, Fort Huachuca, Arizona, meets neither the criteria General Batchelder wished to establish in 1893 nor the criteria of ARs 15-190, 1-30, or 1-33, taking its name from a Native American word which means “place of thunder.”
While the regulations have changed over time, it is helpful to observe two key aspects of the various regulations in their totality. First, it must be remembered that the Army’s memorialization program exists, primarily, to honor deceased soldiers, and especially deceased generals. As such, it should come as no surprise that the second goal of the program is to avoid controversy by honoring those who, without question, are deserving of recognition. While all the Army posts currently named for Confederate officers were established and named prior to the publication of the plethora of army regulations and memorandums following World War II, it seems the Army has, at least at times, had these posts clearly in mind when writing policy.

The Army’s policy, repeated through many variations of the regulations, discourages controversy when selecting post names. This could very well be a recognition that naming future posts in honor of Confederates could be controversial and something the Army wishes to avoid. It also seems as though the Army’s wish to avoid controversy works in the opposite direction as well. The Army policy discouraging the renaming of posts was almost certainly written with an eye toward the Confederate posts and their surrounding communities. We see, therefore, that the modern Army wishes to avoid controversy and will act in seemingly contradictory ways to avoid it.

While the Army discourages renaming posts, it also intends the names to honor “all races” and serve as inspiration to the various citizens of the United States. It is difficult to understand, however, how posts named after those who fought to preserve the institution of slavery honor or inspire African Americans or others sensitive to questions of race. Additionally, because the Army does almost nothing to instruct soldiers regarding the namesakes of Army installations it seems likely that at some time in the
past Army leaders saw contradictions in those installations named for Confederates but, wanting to avoid controversy and negative press, made a conscious decision to make the naming of Army posts a non-issue by simply remaining silent. The question becomes, therefore, what other factors in dealing with the politics and memory of the Civil War explain why so many posts bear the names of Confederate generals?
Chapter 4 – The Confederate Posts

Today eight U.S. Army posts bear the names of former Confederate Army officers: Forts Benning, Bragg, Gordon, A.P. Hill, Hood, Lee, Polk, and Rucker. All of the posts are located in the states of the former Confederacy. Forts Benning and Gordon are in Georgia, Fort Bragg in North Carolina, Forts A.P. Hill and Lee in Virginia, Fort Hood in Texas, Fort Polk in Louisiana, and Fort Rucker in Alabama; all were established less than eighty years after the Civil War ended in response to either World War I or World War II. While posts were established in the North and West during the world wars, the Army preferred southern locales because the warmer climate allowed for year-round field training exercises.¹

When creating these Army posts the War Department took into account the desires of Senators, Congressmen, military officers, and local civilians. Each post was established independently of the others, however, and therefore each post, and the man for whom each is named, will be briefly investigated individually. An examination of the process of creating and naming the forts reveals both unique circumstances and common themes.

**Fort Benning**

Fort Benning is located south of Columbus, Georgia, sprawling across the Chattahoochee River into Alabama. Farming and the local textile mills provided employment for most of the area’s population prior to the arrival of the Army. In the early 1900’s Columbus ranked second only to Augusta, Georgia, among Southern states in the manufacturing of cotton goods.²
Beginning in 1913, United States infantrymen received their training at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. When the United States was drawn into the First World War, however, the Army determined a new location for the training of infantry soldiers was necessary. Throughout 1917, the Columbus Chamber of Commerce and the city’s mayor, Lucius H. Chappell, envisioning the economic boom an Army post would mean for the city, petitioned the Army and Congressman W.C. Adamson for consideration in the building of a new Army post to house the infantry and machine-gun firing school that General John J. Pershing greatly desired. One of the members of the delegation the city sent to Washington D.C., Albert Kirven, even gave his life for the cause, the Washington weather leading to a case of pneumonia that killed him.

Colonel Henry E. Eames was selected to lead the board of officers tasked with choosing a new site for infantry training. His first choice was Fayetteville, North Carolina, while Columbus was his second choice. Upon learning that the infantry desired Fayetteville, War Department chief of staff, General Peyton March, an artilleryman, is credited with saying, “If Fayetteville is all that damned good and the infantry wants it, maybe artillery should have it.” Secretary of War Newton D. Baker approved March’s request for the Fayetteville location to be awarded to the artillery, essentially settling the question of the infantry school in favor of Columbus. On August 27, 1918, the War Department officially designated Columbus as the location for the Army’s new Infantry School of Arms, with all equipment and personnel to be at the new location by October 1, 1918.

Major John Paul Jones was tasked with building the new post, which remained nameless and still lacked an exact location. Interestingly, it was Major Jones, a relatively
low-ranking officer, who selected the site of what was to become Fort Benning and negotiated the sale of the original eighty-four acres from the owner, Alex Reid. The temporary accommodations of the new post were completed within fourteen days; several weeks later, however, the camp moved several miles further south of Columbus, with Major Jones again tasked with overseeing construction at the permanent location. Colonel Eames was named commandant of the Infantry School, his home on Camp Benning was the former main house, known as “Riverside,” of a 1,750-acre plantation owned by Arthur Bussey.

The suggestion that the new post be named after Henry Lewis Benning came from several local groups, including the Rotary Club, Confederate Veterans, and the United Daughters of the Confederacy (UDC). It was UDC member Winnifred Moore Minter who presented the written proposal to Secretary of War Baker and members of Congress. Throughout the South the UDC, along with the United Confederate Veterans (UCV), was at the forefront of ensuring that the Confederacy was correctly remembered in all issues concerning the Civil War. The UDC, led by Mildred L. Rutherford, sought to purge Southern schools, colleges, and universities of textbooks that did not present the war, the Confederacy, or the Confederacy’s leaders in the most positive of lights. It is not surprising then that the UDC took a leading role in determining the proper personage to be honored by Columbus’ new Army post.

Benning himself was born in 1814 near Sparta, Georgia. Benning studied law and in 1835 was admitted to the bar in Columbus. Benning soon found himself involved in politics and in 1853 was elected to the Georgia Supreme Court, where he served until 1859. Benning was an ardent supporter of state’s rights and slavery. As early as
1849 Benning suggested an “early dissolution of the Union” in order to preserve slavery. When Abraham Lincoln was elected president in 1860, Benning spoke before the Georgia State Legislature urging secession and helped in drafting Georgia’s ordinance of secession.\textsuperscript{12}

Benning raised the 7\textsuperscript{th} Regiment of Georgia Volunteers when war broke out and was appointed the regiment’s colonel. Benning fought in eleven major battles, rose to the rank of major general, and was at Appomattox Court House when Lee surrendered. After the Civil War Benning moved his family to Columbus where he practiced law until his death in 1875.\textsuperscript{13} Benning remained one of Columbus’ favorite sons well after his death; as recently as 1999 a memorial service was held in his honor in Columbus and included a proclamation by the city’s mayor honoring Benning.\textsuperscript{14}

Benning’s daughter, Anna, took part in the official opening ceremonies of Camp Benning in December 1918, raising the Stars and Stripes over the new post and participating in a celebratory parade.\textsuperscript{15} Despite the city’s desire to serve as a location for the new post, not all Columbus residents were pleased. In a speech given in 1975, Louise Jones Dubose recalled that her grandmother, “a completely unreconstructed rebel,” upon seeing Anna Benning in the parade riding behind a large United States flag, “cried out, ‘Tina Benning, I’m ashamed of you – riding down Broad Street behind that old rag,’ and she pointed her finger at the stars and stripes.”\textsuperscript{16}

Today Fort Benning is one of the Army’s most important installations. Besides serving as home to the Infantry School, the Armor School was moved from Fort Knox, Kentucky, to Fort Benning in 2008, creating the Maneuver Center of Excellence.\textsuperscript{17} Additionally, soldiers travel to Fort Benning for basic and advanced infantry and armor
training, the Infantry and Armor Officer Basic and Advanced Courses, Officer Candidate School, Airborne School, and Ranger School.  

**Fort Bragg**

Fort Bragg, North Carolina, may well be the most well-known Army post in the nation today. Already home to nearly 50,000 military personnel at the start of the new millennium, the U.S. military’s 2005 Base Closure and Realignment Commission (BRAC) aims to add an additional 40,000 soldiers and airmen to Fort Bragg’s population by the end of 2013, making Fort Bragg the nation’s largest military installation. Located approximately fifty miles south of Raleigh, North Carolina, Fort Bragg lies beside the town of Fayetteville, often referred to as “Fayetteenam” by the local soldiers.

The post was named after North Carolina native, Confederate General Braxton Bragg. Bragg graduated from West Point in 1837 and was appointed a second lieutenant in the Third Artillery. In 1855 Bragg resigned his position in the Army, but volunteered for the Confederate Army early in the sectional conflict. During the war Bragg would rise to full general, commanding soldiers in some of the Western Theater’s most renowned battles, including Shiloh, Chickamauga, and Chattanooga.

After the Civil War Bragg proved a restless spirit, holding a number of different jobs in Alabama, Louisiana, the Carolinas, and Texas. Bragg even considered travelling to Egypt, where he believed the climate and soil to be perfect for growing cotton and sugar. Bragg died in Galveston, Texas, in 1876 at the age of 59.

Like Fort Benning, Fort Bragg was created in response to World War I. Major General William J. Snow, the Army’s Chief of Field Artillery, sought a location that would allow for better training of artillery soldiers and testing of new artillery weapons.
and equipment; thus Braxton Bragg was a fairly natural selection as the post’s namesake due to both his North Carolina origins and service as an artillery officer. The sparsely populated area of what became Fort Bragg, along with adequate rail lines and a climate that allowed for year-round training, convinced Snow that he had found the location for his new field artillery post and with General March’s help secured the location. Fascinatingly, until the first year of World War II, Fort Bragg would continue to serve as the home of the U.S. Army’s unit of “horse artillery,” a seeming world away from its modern designation as “Home of the Airborne.”

One hundred seventy families occupied about seven percent of what would become Fort Bragg. The U.S. government paid these families $6 million for their land, and Camp Bragg came into existence on September 4, 1918. World War I ended two months later, and by 1921 the Army decided to close Camp Bragg. As with other installations threatened with closure, local civilians fought to keep Camp Bragg alive. As a result of the civilian petitions, not only was the installation saved, but in 1922 the post was officially redesignated as Fort Bragg, thus becoming a permanent Army installation.

World War II was responsible for the incredible growth of Fort Bragg. The first U.S. military parachute jump was made from an artillery observation balloon at Fort Bragg in 1923 and during the Second World War all five of the Army’s airborne divisions – the 82nd, 101st, 11th, 13th, and 17th – trained at Fort Bragg. In 1951 the XVIII Airborne Corps was assigned to Fort Bragg and the post truly became the Home of the Airborne. Today, Fort Bragg is home not only to the 82nd Airborne Division and the XVIII Airborne Corps, but over the years has added the 1st Special Operations Command,
the Army Parachute Team (the Black Knights), the U.S. Army Institute for Military Assistance, where special forces soldiers train soldiers of allied nations, the U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), and the U.S. Army Reserve Command.

**Fort Lee**

Given that many U.S. Army posts bear the names of Confederate officers, it comes as no surprise that one be named after the man who has grown to become the greatest icon of Southern and Confederate military prowess and honor. Fort Lee is located, of course, in Virginia, three miles east of Petersburg; much of the installation is located upon the ground Union and Confederate soldiers fought upon during the siege of Petersburg. Today, Fort Lee is the “Home of the Quartermaster Corps,” training the thousands of soldiers necessary to ensure the U.S. Army is fully equipped and prepared for combat.

Construction on Camp Lee began in June 1917 and took three months to complete. The post opened in July 1917, before construction was complete, as a mobilization and division training center for World War I. The area locals generally welcomed the construction of Camp Lee, deriving civic pride from the camp as well as recognizing the economic benefits of having a military installation as part of the community. Additionally, local residents envisioned Camp Lee as serving a vital purpose in “the healing of sectional wounds in a way that rhetoric and patriotic gestures never could.”

The 80th Infantry Division received its training at Camp Lee prior to seeing combat in Europe, but it was the only division to complete its training there before the war ended. During the war so many soldiers were stationed at Camp Lee that it became
the third largest “city” in Virginia, behind only Richmond and Norfolk, with a population of about 60,000.\textsuperscript{38} At the end of World War I, Camp Lee was immediately downsized, and in 1921 was officially closed,\textsuperscript{39} much of the land being returned to the state of Virginia, which turned it into a wildlife refuge, and some being given to the Petersburg National Battlefield.\textsuperscript{40}

As with many other posts closed at the end of the First World War, Camp Lee was reopened in October 1940 with the threat of hostilities in Europe looming once again.\textsuperscript{41} The Army’s Quartermaster School officially moved to Camp Lee in 1941\textsuperscript{42} and was responsible for training more than 300,000 quartermaster soldiers and officers for World War II.\textsuperscript{43} For a short while Camp Lee served as a prisoner of war camp as well.\textsuperscript{44} In 1948 the Women’s Army Corps Training Center moved to Camp Lee, where it remained until 1954, when it moved to Fort McClellan.\textsuperscript{45} On April 15, 1950, Camp Lee was officially reclassified as Fort Lee, becoming a permanent U.S. Army installation.\textsuperscript{46}

There is little that can be added to the mountain of volumes detailing Fort Lee’s namesake, Confederate General Robert E. Lee. A native Virginian, Lee was a career U.S. Army officer who resigned his commission in the Army when Virginia seceded. Lee rose to the level of a demigod after he assumed command of the Army of Northern Virginia during the defense of Richmond in 1861. For many Americans the story of the Civil War is the story of Robert E. Lee, who seemed to baffle and defeat every general Abraham Lincoln threw at him. In the end, Lee and his army were, of course, defeated by the Army of the Potomac under the generalship of Ulysses S. Grant. After the war Lee became the president of Washington University (later renamed Washington and Lee University) where he remained until his death in 1870.
Today Fort Lee remains the training center for the U.S. Army’s Quartermaster Corps, training more than 25,000 quartermaster soldiers every year. It is the home of the Army Logistics Management College, Defense Commissary Agency, U.S. Army Women’s Museum, U.S. Army Ordnance Corps, U.S. Army Transportation Corps and School, and the U.S. Army Combined Arms Support Command. Fort Lee boasts a daily population of more than 34,000 and provides support, befitting the mission of the Quartermaster Corps, to more than 18,000 retirees in the area.

**Fort Gordon**

Located about nine miles southwest of Augusta, Georgia, today Fort Gordon serves as the home for the U.S. Army’s signal corps. The present Fort Gordon, however, is not the only Army installation in the nation’s history that so honored the memory of John Brown Gordon.

Camp Gordon was originally created, like Forts Benning and Bragg, in response to World War I. The original Camp Gordon was established near Atlanta; one historian has called this first Camp Gordon the “focus of Atlanta’s wartime patriotic spirit.” The construction, the largest such project in Atlanta’s history to that point, was overseen by Major J.N. Pease and was finished in five months. The camp was responsible for training one of the nation’s most famous divisions, the 82nd Infantry Division, now synonymous with Fort Bragg and known as the 82nd Airborne Division. Sergeant Alvin York, the most decorated American soldier of World War I, received his training at Camp Gordon. At war’s end, however, the camp became superfluous, and by 1921 Camp Gordon had been closed and the land sold. Today the Peachtree-DeKalb Airport occupies most of the original Camp Gordon.
In 1941 the United States found itself on the brink of war and once again in need of Army posts suitable for training the influx of civilians being transformed into soldiers. As a result, Camp Gordon was resurrected, this time near Augusta. Dedicated October 18, 1941, the second Camp Gordon was used for a variety of purposes during the war. Two infantry divisions, the 4th and the 26th, and one armored division, the 10th, received their training at Camp Gordon before seeing action in Europe. The post also served as both a military prison, or disciplinary barracks, and a prisoner of war camp for German and Italian soldiers.

When World War II ended it initially appeared as though Camp Gordon might be closed once again, but was saved when the U.S. Army Signal School and the Military Police School moved there in 1948. In 1956, General Order No. 11 officially designated the post as Fort Gordon, bestowing permanent status on the installation.

Much like the post named after him, Confederate Lieutenant General John Brown Gordon experienced a post-war revival of his own. Having received no formal military training, Gordon nonetheless volunteered for the Confederate cause almost as soon as Georgia seceded. Elected captain of his company of volunteers, Gordon would serve with the Army of Northern Virginia throughout the Civil War, seeing combat in almost every major battle in the Eastern Theater, including Bull Run, Antietam, Gettysburg, and Appomattox. It was Gordon who was tasked with supervising the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia at Appomattox. After the war, Gordon rose to become among the most prominent men in the United States, eventually serving as the governor of Georgia and even becoming a U.S. Senator.
Today, the post that bears his name continues to serve an important role for the U.S. Army. The post is home to some 11,000 soldiers and an additional 2,100 family members and 4,800 civilian employees, to say nothing of the thousands of military retirees that receive services from the post on a daily basis. Due to the high-tech nature of modern warfare, it seems likely that Fort Gordon will continue to train the soldiers needed to install, operate, and maintain the Army’s modern communications and electronics equipment.67

**Fort A.P. Hill**

Located twenty miles southeast of Fredericksburg, approximately halfway between Washington D.C. and Richmond,68 Fort A.P. Hill is the smallest, in terms of population, of the Army posts named for Confederate officers. The Garrett farm, where John Wilkes Booth was killed, is located just beyond the current boundaries of the post.69 Fort A.P. Hill occupies almost 76,000 acres, making it, geographically, the sixth-largest military installation on the East coast,70 and is a key training area for units in the region.71

In July 1940 the Army began a search for 60,000 acres between the Potomac River and the upper Chesapeake Bay for a training area. Lieutenant Colonel Oliver Marston investigated the area that became Fort A.P. Hill and recommended it as a site for heavy weapons and maneuver training.72 On June 11, 1941, General Order No. 5 officially established Fort A.P. Hill.73

During World War II the post served as a training area for division and corps-sized elements. In 1942 Fort A.P. Hill served as a staging area for Task Force A, commanded by George Patton, of Operation Torch, the invasion of French Morocco.74 During the Korean War, the post served as a staging area for units enroute to Europe.75
From 1944 through the Vietnam War the post also served a training site for the Engineer Officer Candidate School and a field training site for the Engineer Officer Basic Course. The post continues to serve as a training site for the Quartermaster, Transportation, and Special Forces schools.  

The post is named after Confederate Lieutenant General Ambrose Powell Hill, who was born into a well-connected Virginia family in 1825; there is some evidence to suggest that Hill’s family was related to Henry II of England. Hill attended West Point, where he was classmates with Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson, George Pickett, Ambrose Burnside, and was even roommates with George McClellan. After graduation, Hill was assigned to the artillery and sent to fight in the Mexican War; the conflict, however, was in its final stages, as Mexico City had already been captured. In 1861, with conflict between North and South eminent, Hill resigned his commission in the U.S. Army because his loyalty to Virginia was greater than his loyalty to the nation. On May 9, 1861, Hill was appointed a colonel of infantry in the Confederate Army and given command of the 13th Virginia Infantry Regiment. Initially promotion came relatively slowly, but between March and May 1862, Hill was promoted from colonel to major general and became the commander of the so-called “Light Division” of the Army of Northern Virginia. Hill fought in every major battle in the Eastern Theater between 1862 and 1865, most famously leading the column that reinforced Lee at Antietam, perhaps preventing the destruction of the Army of Northern Virginia. After the death of Stonewall Jackson, the Army of Northern Virginia was reorganized from two corps into three and Hill was given command of the newly created III Corps. Hill was killed April 2, 1865, during the defense of Petersburg.
While one of the smallest Army posts – in fact, it is considered a sub-installation of Fort Belvoir – Fort A.P. Hill nonetheless trains more than 150,000 military personnel each year. Today Fort A.P. Hill focuses on “providing realistic joint and combined arms training” not only to the members of the United States military, but to members of other government agencies as well as members of allied foreign militaries.

**Fort Hood**

Fort Hood, Texas, is one of the United States’ largest military installations, both in terms of population and land area, and is the only military installation in the United States capable of supporting two full armored divisions. It is located in central Texas about halfway between Waco and Austin, with the town of Killeen serving as the gateway to the post.

Fort Hood came into existence as a reaction to the success of German tanks throughout Europe during the early years of World War II. The Army realized it needed an area where infantry soldiers and officers could be trained to fight against tanks and other armored vehicles, but the location most Army leaders envisioned for the training area, Fort Gordon, was too narrow for effective tank maneuver training. The man tasked with finding a location suitable for large-scale armored training, Lieutenant General Herbert J. Brees, was confident central Texas held the answer to the Army’s dilemma.

Local political and business leaders throughout central Texas soon learned of Brees’ desire to create a military installation in central Texas and began lobbying for their county to be chosen. The economic windfall an Army base would bring to an area still trying to recover from the Great Depression served as their key motivation. In November 1941, Valley Mills, twenty miles west of Waco, was awarded the camp due to the
influence of Senator Tom Connally. Representatives from Killeen and Gatesville refused to accept defeat, however, taking their case directly to Major General Richard Donovan, commander of the 8th Corp Area and the final deciding authority on the location of the new post. Led by newspaper publisher Frank Mayborn, the Killeen and Gatesville representatives convinced Donovan their community better served the interests of the Army, and on January 10, 1942, it was announced that the home of the new Tank Destroyer Technical and Firing Center would be based at Killeen.93

In a story repeated throughout communities selected for southern Army posts, some local farmers were less than excited by the prospect of having to sell their land and abandon lives that had taken over a century and several generations to establish. In fact, three farmers took their own lives rather than leave their land.94 The soil, however, in the Killeen/Gatesville area was largely composed of limestone and was ill-suited to agriculture. What success local farmers had met with came to an end with the Great Depression. Farmers were forced to stop growing cotton in order to grow just enough food for their own survival. The social programs of the New Deal never made their way to the Killeen/Gatesville area95 and inhabitants not tied to the soil saw the introduction of the Army into their community as an economic bonanza that promised, and delivered, a strong, diversified economy and a route clear of the lasting effects of the Depression.96

Colonel Andrew D. Bruce (by the end of the year he would be a major general) was tasked with securing the needed land, organizing the new installation, and becoming the first commander of what became Camp Hood. It was Bruce who chose to honor Confederate Lieutenant General John B. Hood by naming the post after him.97 Apparently, Bruce sent the secretary of the Tank Destroyer Center, based at the time in
Temple, Texas – another town on the doorstep of Fort Hood – to the local library in search of possible names for the new post. The library’s offerings were meager, but of the resources within the library, the most information was found concerning John B. Hood, thus securing his name for the installation. Much has already been stated regarding the life of Hood (see Chapter 1, pages 1-3), but it should be added that Hood’s audacity and aggressive manner fit the image Bruce wished to instill in the armored soldiers he would train and lead. The Confederate general’s son, Colonel (Ret.) John Bell Hood, was present on September 18, 1942, when Camp Hood officially opened.

Fort Hood remains one of the U.S. Army’s most vital posts today. It is the headquarters of the First Army Division West (DIVWEST), III Corps, and the 1st Cavalry Division. Housing more than 30,000 soldiers as well as their families and employing thousands of civilians, Fort Hood ranks among the largest U.S. Army posts in the world and is recognized as the “Home of America’s Armored Corps.”

Fort Polk

Fort Polk is located in west-central Louisiana, about forty-five miles from Alexandria, 150 miles from Baton Rouge, and 250 miles from New Orleans. The post was established in 1941 as an infantry training location for World War II and covers nearly 200,000 acres. The post is named in honor of Lieutenant General Leonidas Polk, the so-called “fighting bishop,” who served for a time as the commander of the Confederacy’s Department of Mississippi and East Louisiana.

Like many military posts established during World War II, when the war ended Fort Polk was closed. With the beginning of the Korean War, Fort Polk was reopened.
but was once again closed at the end of the conflict. In 1961 the post was reopened yet again, this time permanently, in response to the Berlin Crisis.

In 1962 Fort Polk was designated as an infantry training center and in 1965 was selected as the location for Vietnam-oriented training. Little changed in Fort Polk’s mission until 1993 when the post became the home of the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC). The mission of JRTC is to provide “realistic training and mission rehearsal exercises for brigade combat teams in scenarios supported by joint forces.”

Fort Polk is named in honor of Leonidas Polk, perhaps one of the more unique Confederate generals. Born in 1806, Polk was the fourth son of a well-to-do North Carolina family. Between 1821-23 he attended the University of North Carolina, but always intended to attend the Military Academy at West Point. Polk graduated from West Point in 1827, but had already decided to enter the ministry rather than the military. Polk next attended the Virginia Theological Seminary and on April 9, 1830, was ordained a deacon in the Episcopal Church. In 1838 Polk was ordained as the Bishop of the Southwest, which first brought him to Louisiana. When the secession crisis struck the United States, Polk was hopeful that conflict could be avoided; nonetheless, he quickly moved into the secession camp, advocating for an independent South. Likewise, Polk was at first hesitant to join the military, but did eventually accept a commission as a major general in the Confederate Army in 1861. Fighting throughout the Western Theater of the Civil War, Polk’s war record is controversial; it was his troops that violated Kentucky’s “neutrality” and Polk’s relationships with his superiors were often very strained, including a highly stressed relationship with Braxton Bragg. Polk would
eventually become a Lieutenant General and was killed June 12, 1864, during the defense of Atlanta.\textsuperscript{118}

Today Fort Polk is home to about 8,300 military personnel, 2,000 civilians, and more than 2,000 students and contractors.\textsuperscript{119} Remaining true to its origins as a training post for the Louisiana Maneuvers prior to World War II, Fort Polk remains one of the military’s best and most important training centers.\textsuperscript{120}

\textit{Fort Rucker}

Fort Rucker is situated in the southeastern corner of Alabama, approximately ninety miles south of Montgomery and 180 miles east of Mobile. Covering more than 64,000 acres, today Fort Rucker serves as the “Home of Army Aviation.”\textsuperscript{121}

The land for Fort Rucker was acquired by the Federal government in 1935 as part of a New Deal project. Members of the Works Progress Administration (WPA) set to work on reforestation, development of game preserves, and the building of lakes, swimming holes, picnic grounds, and camp sites. Eventually the area received the nickname “Bear Farm” when a government employee, frustrated by repeatedly explaining what the government planned on doing with the land, finally stated, “They’re going to raise bears out there; it’s going to be a bear farm.”\textsuperscript{122} Although the possibility of the Bear Farm becoming a military post was mentioned as early as 1935, it was not until 1940 when President Roosevelt announced an increase of the size of the military in response to the threat posed by Germany and Italy that the Bear Farm began to be seriously considered as a possible location for a military installation.\textsuperscript{123}

Initially, the impetus for the creation of what would become Fort Rucker came from several prominent local politically and business-minded men. Jesse B. Adams,
editor of the local newspaper *The Southern Star*, Sam J. Carroll, Sr., founder and president of The Bank of Ozark; E.C. Clouse, Sr., the local Sinclair Oil Company distributor; and Walter Brackin, owner of the Dale Theater, all made trips to Washington D.C. to convince their congressman, Henry B. Steagall, that the Bear Farm should be turned into a military base. While not all local residents desired the imposition of the Army—farmers with generational roots to the area and outdoorsmen who did not want to lose the outdoor opportunities of the Bear Farm—it seems most local residents welcomed the economic growth an Army post promised the region. While initially hesitant to push for the introduction of the Army in southeastern Alabama, Congressman Steagall was convinced by the cavalcade of significant citizens that the Army did indeed belong in his district.¹²⁴

In July 1941 the War Department announced that the Bear Farm had been selected as the site for a new army post, designated the “Ozark Triangular Division Camp.”¹²⁵ Included in the planning was the acquisition of an additional 30,000 acres to increase the size of training areas and ease access to the railroad. The attack on Pearl Harbor led the federal government to file a condemnation suit to acquire the lands under the powers of eminent domain in January 1942. When the federal government won the suit, some 325 farm families were displaced; local authorities did their best to help these families find new homes and livelihoods.¹²⁶

Unlike Fort Benning in 1918, where construction responsibilities were assigned to an Army officer, the construction of what became Fort Rucker was awarded to a contractor who was given 120 days from January 15 to complete the post, construction was completed in 106 days.¹²⁷ It was also during this time that the War Department
announced that the new post would be named Camp Rucker in honor of Edmund W. Rucker, who commanded the famous Rucker Legion and was the last surviving brigade commander of the Confederate Army when he died.128

Rucker was originally from Tennessee and during the Civil War served under Nathan Bedford Forrest, eventually losing an arm at the Battle of Nashville before being captured by Union forces. There is some confusion as to Rucker’s rank during the war – was he a colonel or general? Interestingly, Rucker was promoted to brigadier general near the end of the Civil War, but the commission officially conferring the rank did not reach him until the war was over.129 After the war Rucker found success heading-up a railroad project in Alabama with Forrest and became one of Birmingham’s leading industrialists.130 Rucker lived well into the twentieth century, dying in 1924.

During World War II Camp Rucker was used to train infantrymen for combat in Europe. With the end of the Second World War, Camp Rucker was “temporarily inactivated,” with only three officers overseeing 300 civilian employees tasked with maintaining and protecting the post. Camp Rucker’s long-term future was very much in doubt, but local leaders continuously petitioned the Pentagon to convert the post into a permanent installation.131 The outbreak of the Korean Conflict saw the reactivation of the camp in 1950. This was a short-lived pardon, however, as the post was scheduled for closure in 1954.132 An unexpected reprieve came to Camp Rucker, however, in the form of the Army Aviation School.

Just as the Infantry School chose to leave Fort Sill for Fort Benning in 1918 due to overcrowding associated with the Army Artillery School, the Aviation School was searching for a new home away from Fort Sill in 1954. Congressman George Andrews
and Senators Hill and Sparkman lobbied hard for the school to choose Camp Rucker, and in July 1954 their efforts were rewarded by the announcement that the Aviation School would begin moving to Camp Rucker immediately. In March 1955 Camp Rucker was officially designated as the “Army Aviation Center,” and in October the post was made permanent when it was redesignated Fort Rucker.

Fort Rucker remains home to the U.S. Army Aviation Center of Excellence (USAACE) and is home to more than 8,000 active-duty soldiers and 3,800 family members while employing approximately 7,000 civilians. Today the USAACE “trains, educates, and develops Army Aviation professionals and integrates indispensable Aviation capabilities across warfighting functions in support of commanders and Soldiers on the ground.”

Besides those officers who have posts named after them, one must additionally take note of those Confederate generals the Army has not honored with installation names. The most obvious omission is that of Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson. It would seem that if A.P. Hill is worthy of a post in Virginia then certainly Jackson is deserving as well. There is, however, already a Fort Jackson among the list of U.S. Army posts. Built in Columbia, South Carolina, the installation is named in honor of President Andrew Jackson. Lieutenant General James Longstreet is another notable exclusion. Jeffry D. Wert believes “Longstreet, not Jackson, was the finest corps commander in the Army of Northern Virginia; in fact, he was arguably the best corps commander in the conflict on either side.” Nonetheless, it should come as no surprise to the informed that Longstreet has not been honored by a post name. Southerners have never forgiven Longstreet for his betrayal of the Confederate cause when, after the war, he advocated
cooperation with the Republican Party and even accepted a government position in New Orleans from Ulysses S. Grant. Additionally, as the Lost Cause developed Longstreet became, largely due to Jubal Early, the villain who cost the Army of Northern Virginia victory at Gettysburg and therefore lost the war for the South.

Early served as a corps commander in the Army of Northern Virginia as well and his importance in establishing the Lost Cause could lead some to believe a post would be named after him. Early remained far too unreconstructed after the war, however, serving a self-imposed exile in Mexico and Canada from where, at one point, he wrote, “I have got to that condition, that I think I could scalp a Yankee woman and child without winking my eyes.”

Three other Confederate generals without post names bear mentioning – Joseph Johnston, J.E.B. Stuart, and Nathan Bedford Forrest. Each of these men has been passed over for rather understandable reasons. Johnston is unacceptable because his cautious, defensive style of fighting was intolerable to the Confederacy in the 1860s and remains so to this day. Stuart lacks recognition because there is a Fort Stewart in Georgia, named after Revolutionary War Brigadier General Daniel Stewart. While the names are spelled differently, their pronunciation makes it impossible to establish posts named after both men. And finally, Forrest remains one the most romanticized Lost Cause heroes of the Civil War, but his ties to the Ku Klux Klan make him completely unacceptable for memorialization in a post name.

It is interesting to note the relative lack of local hostility to the creation of these installations in the South. The fact that hundreds of thousands of acres had to be taken under the powers of eminent domain, to say nothing of those who took their own lives
during the creation of Fort Hood, is a clear indication that some locals resisted the creation of Army posts in the South. Almost all were small farmers who depended on agriculture for survival; they were not opposed to the creation of an Army post per se, but rather were opposed to being forced to abandon their homes, land, and way of life. On the whole, however, most area residents supported the introduction of federal military posts to their communities, in the cases of Forts Benning, Bragg, Lee, and the first Fort Gordon, a mere forty years after federal troops were “removed” from the South by Rutherford B. Hayes.

The first reason for this support of the “reintroduction” of the Army to the South was among the most American – the almighty dollar. The building and manning of posts created jobs and the introduction of soldiers and their paychecks meant a dramatic shot in the arm to local economies. One must also remember that when Forts Gordon (reestablished), A.P. Hill, Hood, and Rucker were created in the early 1940s the nation was still trying to recover from the Great Depression. Almost anything the government could do to stimulate local the economy met with widespread approval, and the building of Army posts, which meant jobs and an influx of dollars, was no exception.

A second reason for the general support of the establishment of Army posts in the South was a sense of patriotic duty. There is a generally held belief that the Spanish-American War at the end of the nineteenth century did much to achieve sectional reconciliation. The suggestion that a foreign war could help heal sectional differences dates back at least to William H. Seward’s 1861 suggestion to Abraham Lincoln that a war with a European nation would serve to reunify North and South against a common enemy. In 1887 John Brown Gordon himself would state, “I have sometimes thought
that I would be willing to see one more war, that we might march under the stars and stripes, shoulder to shoulder, against a common foe.”146 Paul H. Buck, among the first to suggest the Spanish-American War helped to heal the old wounds of the Civil War, wrote, “when it [the Spanish-American War] subsided a sense of nationality had been rediscovered, based upon consciousness of national strength and unity.”147 Gaines M. Foster believes the Spanish-American war was so successful at healing sectional wounds that he wrote, “Southerners who sought to both vindicate the Confederate soldier and to reunify the nation might have staged the Spanish-American War if it had not come along when it did.”148

Whether or not the Spanish-American War truly allowed Southerners, and even ex-Confederates themselves,149 to demonstrate their loyalty to the United States, many viewed the war as such an opportunity and it probably did achieve much in reconciling North and South. Additionally, the war exposed Southerners to military installations in the former Confederacy; temporary installations for the training, equipping, and organizing of the hasty assembled military forces were established in several Southern locations. The largest two were Camp Alger, at Falls Church, Virginia, where 23,500 soldiers of the II Corps prepared and trained, and Camp Thomas, named for Union Major General, and Virginia native, George H. Thomas, located on the Chickamauga Battlefield Park, where the soldiers of the I and III Corps prepared for war.150 While none of the Army posts established for the Spanish-American War were long-lasting, it did begin the process of acclimating Southerners to the reintroduction of federal troops on Southern soil, a process that would be completed with the onset of World War I and the creation of the Confederate-named posts in 1917.
Finally, there is no evidence of any significant controversy or debate surrounding the creation of Confederate-named posts from either the African American community or Northerners opposed to honoring federal installations after those who attempted to split the nation. This is hardly surprising, however. In *Race and Reunion* David Blight speaks of the silence with which the African American community reacted to the unveiling of the monument to Robert E. Lee in Richmond in 1890. Some black leaders, like Frederick Douglass, did condemn the monument, but a more common reaction was the one endorsed by John Mitchell, editor of the *Richmond Planet*, who wrote that African Americans “had a perfect right to ‘keep silent’ about the monument.”¹⁵¹ If the black community was encouraged by leaders such as Mitchell and then chose to largely remain silent in 1890, then how much more silent would it remain in 1917 once Jim Crow was more prominent and powerful throughout the South?

The lack of complaint from Northern whites is not surprising either. By the early twentieth century the Lost Cause, reconciliation, and Northern accommodation of Southern Civil War memory had become the order of the day. If the Lost Cause was instrumental in helping to speed reunion between the sections, it did so at the expense of an understanding that honestly explored the causes of the Civil War, focusing instead on the shared valor of soldiers, regardless of whether they wore the blue or the gray. What the South had fought for became insignificant; how the South had fought became all consuming.¹⁵² An understanding of the Civil War based on this matrix left any discussion of the appropriateness of Confederate-named posts not only uncouth, but completely irrelevant.
While the naming of Army installations after Confederate officers may seem a bit puzzling in light of their rebellion against the United States, the naming of posts for Union officers seems, on the other hand, a natural, indeed almost obligatory, action. If posts should be named for “departed heroes distinguished for brilliant and grand achievements in the service of the Republic,” as Brigadier General Batchelder suggested in 1893,¹ then certainly the U.S. Army of the Civil War must have provided its share of such heroes. After all, it is difficult to imagine any other crisis that so threatened the survival of the nation.

Today there are nine U.S. Army posts honoring the memory of an officer who served in the Union army during the Civil War. Seven of the officers, however, are memorialized more for what they achieved either before or after the Civil War rather than for what they achieved during the conflict itself. Fort Campbell, Kentucky, was created in 1942 and named in honor of Brigadier General William Bowen Campbell, who served for one year during the Civil War. What he is truly remembered for is his service during the Mexican-American War and his time as the governor of Tennessee.² Fort Carson, Colorado, was established in 1942 and named in honor of Kit Carson. Carson served as a colonel in the Union Army during the Civil War, most famously commanding the First Regiment, New Mexico Volunteers, at the Battle of Glorieta Pass;³ however he is remembered, and Fort Carson bears his name, because of his fame as a frontiersman.⁴ Fort Dix, New Jersey, was built to train soldiers for combat during World War I. Opened in 1917, the post is named for Major General John Adams Dix. While Dix rose to high rank during the Civil War he had previously served in the Army during the War of 1812.
Additionally, Dix served in the U.S. Senate, as the U.S. secretary of the treasury, the American minister to France, and the governor of New York. The *Guide to Military Installations* describes Dix as a “nineteenth century soldier-statesman,” without a single mention of the Civil War. Fort Greely, Alaska, was built in 1942 and named in honor of Major General Adolphus Washington Greely, who enlisted in the 19th Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry as a private during the Civil War, was wounded three times, and rose to the rank of brevet major of volunteers by the time the war ended. But Fort Greely is named for General Greely because of his scientific work as an Artic explorer, thus explaining his name being attached to an installation in Alaska.

Fort Myer was constructed in June 1863 as one of nearly seventy fortifications built to defend the nation’s capital from Confederate attack. The fortification was originally named Fort Whipple in honor of Major General Amiel Weeks Whipple, who was killed at the Battle of Chancellorsville. Fort Whipple was the only Washington D.C. fortification to survive the end of the Civil War and in 1881 the post was renamed Fort Myer in honor of Major General Albert J. Myer, the first chief of the U.S. Army Signal Corps. While Myer served for the duration of the Civil War, he truly made a name for himself after the war ended, serving as the Army’s chief signal officer until his death in 1880 and most importantly beginning the United States Weather Bureau, under the direction of his Signal Corps, in 1870. Fort Myer is the birthplace of Army aviation, with several fixed-wing aircraft flights, and the first military aeronautical fatality, in 1908. Today Fort Myer is most famous for being home to the 3rd Infantry Regiment – “The Old Guard.”
Hawaii is home to two posts named for officers honored largely for their post-Civil War careers. Fort Shafter is named in honor of Major General William R. Shafter and was built in 1907. Shafter rose to the rank of brevet general of volunteers during the Civil War, but afterwards earned a Medal of Honor during the Indian Wars and, most importantly, served as the commander of the expeditionary force sent to Cuba during the Spanish-American War. It was Shafter who received the Spanish surrender of Santiago de Cuba. Finally, Schofield Barracks was named in 1909 in honor of Lieutenant General John M. Schofield. Schofield did have a distinguished Civil War record, being awarded the Medal of Honor for gallantry while leading a regimental charge at Wilson’s Creek, Missouri, in 1861 and rising to the rank of brevet major general by 1862. After the Civil War Schofield would go on to serve as the Superintendent of the Military Academy and from 1888 to 1895 was the commanding general of the U.S. Army. Additionally, Schofield served as secretary of war from June 1, 1868, to March 13, 1869. While Schofield’s Civil War accomplishments may, by themselves, warrant an installation name, especially because the most recent Army regulation only requires that posts be named after “deceased distinguished individuals,” there are many other officers with similarly notable Civil War careers who have not received the same honor as Schofield; it is difficult to imagine Schofield being so honored without his additional service as secretary of war and as the commanding general of the U.S. Army.

This leaves only two current Army installations truly named for Union officers of the Civil War compared to eight posts named for Confederate officers. These posts are Fort Sill, Oklahoma, and Fort Meade, Maryland. One of these generals is honored
because of who he roomed with at West Point and the other is remarkable only for his unexceptionalism.

Fort Sill was established January 7, 1869. Originally called Camp Wichita, the post’s purpose was to aid in controlling the southern plains Indians, specifically the Cheyenne and Kiowa tribes. The name was changed to Fort Sill in July 1868 by Philip Sheridan without consulting with the War Department, as regulation required.\textsuperscript{19} Brigadier General Joshua W. Sill was a friend of Sheridan’s, they had been roommates at West Point, and served as one of Sheridan’s brigade commanders. Sill was killed at the Battle of Stones River in Tennessee in December 1862.\textsuperscript{20} While in command of the Department of the Missouri Sheridan chose to name the post after his friend,\textsuperscript{21} despite the fact that General Order No. 98 of 1868 reserved naming rights to the secretary of war.

The existence of Forts Benning and Rucker owe much to Fort Sill, as the post proved too small to house the Army’s Artillery School, which is still based at Fort Sill, as well as the Infantry School, which moved to Fort Benning in 1918, and the Aviation School, which moved to Fort Rucker in 1955.

Fort Meade was created in 1917 in response to World War I. The post’s location in Maryland, about halfway between Baltimore and Washington D.C., was chosen due to its proximity to the railroad, Baltimore’s port, and the nation’s capital. During the war three infantry divisions, three training battalions, and one depot brigade – over 400,000 soldiers total – trained at Fort Meade. Additionally, Fort Meade was home to an important remount station, collecting over 22,000 horses and mules. Major Peter F. Meade, General George Meade’s nephew, commanded the remount station. In 1928 an effort was made to rename the post Fort Leonard Wood,\textsuperscript{22} but Pennsylvania congressmen
held up Army appropriations until the Army relented and officially renamed the post Fort George G. Meade on March 5, 1929.  

This Fort Meade, however, is not the only Fort Meade to have existed. In fact, there were two Fort Meades existing simultaneously for nearly twenty-seven years. The “other” Fort Meade was actually constructed in the Black Hills of South Dakota near present-day Sturgis in 1878, thirty-nine years before Fort Meade, Maryland. It was at the old Fort Meade that the “Star-Spangled Banner” was first played at military ceremonies, as ordered by Brigadier General Caleb H. Carlton, who later campaigned actively for the song to become the national anthem. The garrison was originally a cavalry post and many different cavalry units, including the Seventh Cavalry Regiment after Little Bighorn, would see service there over the years. The 4th Cavalry Regiment was the last horse cavalry unit stationed at Fort Meade, departing in 1943 after being mechanized, and was replaced by the 88th Glider Infantry Regiment. Additionally, during World War II the post served as a prisoner of war camp, housing German prisoners. In 1944 the post was transferred to the Department of Veterans Affairs for use as a VA hospital and it remains so today. In 1986 the South Dakota National Guard established the South Dakota Military Academy on a portion of old Fort Meade for the purpose of training the state’s commissioned and non-commissioned National Guard officers.

Meade himself is often viewed as an imminently mediocre general. T. Harry Williams describes Meade as “competent in a routine sort of way … he was above average as a tactician, and he had a fair amount of courage in a crisis. He did not have enough boldness or originality to be a good strategist. His strategic plans showed no brilliance, not even imagination.” Meade’s greatest attribute was a reputation as a solid
handler of troops. Meade was able to work his way through the ranks and eventually was appointed commander of the Army of the Potomac, perhaps from a lack of other acceptable candidates. When Secretary of War Edwin Stanton remarked to Lincoln that Meade was from Pennsylvania, where a crucial battle was anticipated, Lincoln is supposed to have remarked that Meade “will fight well on his own dunghill.” Meade’s greatest moment came only days after he assumed command of the Army of the Potomac when a crucial battle did occur in Pennsylvania and he defeated Lee at Gettysburg. Meade failed to pursue Lee’s defeated army however, despite the fact that he had 20,000 fresh reserves. Lincoln recognized the lost opportunity but could not afford to dwell on it. In a letter to Major General Oliver O. Howard, who commanded the IX Corps at Gettysburg, Lincoln wrote:

“I was deeply mortified by the escape of Lee across the Potomac, because the substantial destruction of his army would have ended the war, and because I believed, such destruction was perfectly easy – believed Gen. Meade and his noble army had expended all the skill, and toil, and blood, up to the ripe harvest, and then let the crop go to waste … A few days having passed, I am now profoundly grateful for what was done, without criticism for what was not done.”

It is for this reason that James McPherson groups Meade with McClellan as generals who “threw away chances in the East.” When Grant became general-in-chief of the U.S. Army he made his headquarters with the Army of the Potomac and therefore largely overshadowed Meade for the remainder of the Civil War. At one point Meade even wrote in a letter to his wife, “I suppose after awhile it will be discovered I was not at Gettysburg at all.”

It is worth taking note of the unique existence of two Fort Meades at the same time and how Civil War remembrance was related to what can only be referred to as a
fiasco. It appears that the memory of General Meade, and by extension Civil War memory in general, had become so insignificant in the North by the early twentieth century that the Army blundered into assigning Meade’s name to the new installation in Maryland even though Fort Meade had existed continuously for thirty-nine years in South Dakota. Additionally, no one seemed to notice the gaffe for eleven years, when the effort to change the name of Fort Meade, Maryland, to Fort Leonard Wood was finally made. The effort was stopped by perhaps the only ones who cared, Meade’s fellow Pennsylvanians. It is hard to imagine Southerners being so uninformed regarding memorials to their Confederate heroes that a similar development could have occurred in the South.

It is also rather interesting that only two posts are named for exclusively Civil War Union generals, and rather unremarkable ones at that. While most of those Confederate officers for whom posts are named had notable post-Civil War accomplishments, the fact is their Civil War service is why they are remembered. For seven of the posts named for Union officers their Civil War service could be removed from their records and their other accomplishments fully justify the selection of their names for Army posts. Additionally, the criterion that led to Fort Sill being named for Joshua Sill is rather insubstantial. To take nothing away from Sill, his service, or his sacrifice, it is quite likely that if he had attended West Point one year earlier or later he probably would not have been Sheridan’s roommate, the two men would not have become friends, and Fort Sill might still be known as Fort Wichita. Is this lack of recognition of Union generals proof that Civil War memory is of greater importance in the South than the North? Taken with the endurance and popularity of organizations like
the Sons of Confederate Veterans\textsuperscript{36} and the United Daughters of the Confederacy,\textsuperscript{37} it would certainly appear so.\textsuperscript{38}

Perhaps the most interesting question surrounding posts named after Union generals concerns who posts are \textit{not} named after. The most important Union generals are left unrepresented among those honored by posts names: Ulysses S. Grant, William Tecumseh Sherman, Philip H. Sheridan, and George Henry Thomas. All proved vital to the Union victory and all were involved in pivotal battles that saw the defeat of all of the honored Confederate officers. This is not to say that these four generals were perfect, without blemish or controversy, but in the end they were victorious. Yet it is the victors who remain unhonored.

The fact that these men lack memorialization is due to several factors. The first is that Civil War memory seems to carry far less weight in the North. A second reason, one that is closely tied to the first, is the tradition of the Lost Cause. Because of the Lost Cause the leaders of the Confederate armies are often portrayed as enormously skilled – they only lost due to the overwhelming industry and manpower possessed by the North. The inverse of this is that the Northern generals were not very capable and achieved victory through means that were not of their own making. Thomas B. Buell tells of an instance when he accompanied students from the Army War College on visits to Civil War battlefields. According to Buell, these senior Army officers, “expressed the view that the Confederacy’s generals were superior leaders in terms of competency and experience; the Federal generals ultimately prevailed, they asserted, not because of their leadership skills, but rather the abundance of Northern manpower and materiel.” Buell calls this the “prevailing but mistaken view of the Civil War.”\textsuperscript{39} If this is what senior
Army leaders think of the generalship of the Union officers, it is no surprise that there is a lack of Army posts named after those generals, such as Grant, Sherman, Sheridan, and Thomas, who were among the most important in achieving United States’ Civil War victory.

The final reason for a lack of Army posts named after Union generals are the exigencies of history. At some point in time each of these men did indeed have at least one military post named after him. The unforeseen turns of history brought about the closure of each of these posts while allowing other posts to remain active. It has been already been established that Camp Thomas was created during the Spanish-American War in Georgia for the training and transportation of U.S. soldiers bound for Cuba (see Chapter 3, page 55). Grant, Sherman, and Sheridan also had their names honored, only to have the locations of their memorials forgotten, or at least misplaced.

There have been at least two posts named in honor of Ulysses S. Grant. The first was, and in fact remains, in present-day Arizona. In 1862 the frontier post of Camp Stanford was established on the remains of Fort Breckenridge at the junction of the San Pedro River and Arivaipa Creek. In 1866 the camp was renamed Camp Grant in honor of General Grant. In 1872 the post was relocated to the base of Graham Mountain. The Army abandoned the post in 1905 and when Arizona was granted statehood the state government turned the old fort into a reformatory school. Today Fort Grant is a unit of the Arizona State Prison Complex.40

The second post named for Ulysses S. Grant was built in 1917 near Rockford, Illinois. It was constructed on 3,000 acres bought for $835,000 from five area farm families. During World War I infantry, engineers, machine gunners, and artillery soldiers
and officers trained at Camp Grant, which housed a wartime population of over 50,000 military personnel. After World War I the post was given to the Illinois National Guard but in 1940 once again became a regular Army post. During World War II Camp Grant was used to train replacement soldiers until 1943. By 1945 the camp was closed and the Greater Rockford Airport Authority, today known as the Chicago Rockford International Airport, was built on the land that once had been Camp Grant.41

The first Fort Sherman was built in Idaho in 1878. Like most western forts in the late nineteenth century, Fort Sherman was built in an effort to control the Native American population. The location of Fort Sherman was actually selected by General Sherman and was comprised of 1,000 acres in northwest Idaho. After the Spanish-American War the post was never again fully garrisoned and in 1901 the Army abandoned the post. The city of Coeur d’Alene now occupies most of the land that was once Fort Sherman.42

The second Fort Sherman was established in Panama by War Department General Order 153 in 191143 and was located at Toro Point on the Atlantic side of the Panama Canal.44 This Fort Sherman was intended for the “protection of the Panama Canal” but for much of its history Fort Sherman was most valuable as a jungle training center for American soldiers, known originally as the Jungle Warfare Training Center until 1953 when its name was changed to the Jungle Operations Training Center.45 Fort Sherman remained in existence as an Army post until the United States returned the Panama Canal to Panama in 1999.46 While this Fort Sherman certainly outlived either of the Forts Grant the fact that it was located in Panama is not without importance. Immediately after the Civil War Sherman was not vilified by Southerners as he often is today. It was after the
1881 publication of Jefferson Davis’ memoirs that Sherman truly became *persona non grata*, one of the greatest demons of the Civil War to Southerners. As no Southern community would be willing to acquiesce to a Fort Sherman in the former Confederacy, and no Northern community thought it important enough to honor him, Sherman’s commemoration through post naming was relegated to the fringes of the U.S. Army, banished to the borders of the Caribbean.

Philip Sheridan, like Grant and Sherman, was honored by the establishment of an Army post that is no longer in existence. Unlike the first posts honoring Grant and Sherman, however, Fort Sheridan was not a frontier post established to aid in the protection of white settlers and the control of local Native American populations. Construction began on Fort Sheridan in 1889 on the shore of Lake Michigan, approximately twenty-five miles north of Chicago. Fort Sheridan is important because it was built “during a period of transition in national policy which signaled the closing of temporary frontier posts and the establishment of permanent garrisons of troops at strategic points throughout the United States.”

Fort Sheridan was unique because instead of protecting Americans from outsiders it was intended to protect Americans from themselves. A series of incidents of civil unrest in Chicago – the Great Chicago Fire of 1870, the deaths of thirty striking railroad workers in 1877, and the Haymarket Riot of 1886 – convinced the business leaders of Chicago that a military base near the city was necessary to maintain order. It was Philip Sheridan, by now the commanding general of the U.S. Army, who named the fort after himself. In 1894 the post sent soldiers to Chicago to restore peace during the Pullman Strike; it was the only time the soldiers of Fort Sheridan were called upon to perform the
original mission of the post. During World War I the fort was used to train civilians preparing to fight in the Great War. During World War II it was a recruitment center and served as the administrative center for prisoner of war camps in Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin, as well as maintaining its own POW camp. In 1988 the post was recommended for closure and in 1993 Fort Sheridan officially closed. Today, a portion of the former fort is used by the Army Reserve while the rest has been transformed into private residences and a golf course.49

All this brings to light several points worth mentioning. First, the Confederacy is greatly overrepresented among Army installations named for Civil War officers. Sources vary because scholars sometimes differ over who actually was or was not a general officer (the case of Edmund Rucker is an example of such debate), but most sources recognize between 1,900 to 2,000 Union generals and 400 to 500 Confederate generals.50 Despite having four times fewer generals during the Civil War there are four times as many Army posts named after Confederate generals.

It also becomes clear when comparing the years during which the various posts opened that in the years immediately following the Civil War there seemed to be a greater Northern pride in the victory and for those who made the victory possible. Fort Sill was established in 1869, the first Fort Meade in 1878, the first Fort Grant in 1866, the first Fort Sherman in 1878, Fort Sheridan in 1889, and Camp Thomas in 1898. The earliest Confederate-named posts were established in 1917. This may be further evidence of sectional reconciliation as a result of the Spanish-American War, as all the Union-named post are from before the war while all the Confederate-named posts are from after the war.
Finally, we see in the examples of posts named after Grant, Sherman, Sheridan, and Thomas a trend of closing posts named after Union generals while posts named after Confederate generals seem to be much more resilient. A quick survey reveals that since the Department of Defense’s first Base Closure and Realignment Commission in 1988 six Union-named posts have been closed – Fort Sheridan (1993), Fort Wingate (1993), Fort Ord (1994), Fort McClellan (1999), Fort Sherman (1999), and Fort McPherson (2011) – while only one Confederate-named post – Fort Pickett (1997) – has been closed during that same time. The various BRAC Commissions cited financial reasons for the closing of these posts – for example it is estimated that the closing Fort McPherson will save the Department of Defense $257,000,000 over a twenty year time period\(^1\) – revealing once again that issues of finance remain among the most important concerns in regard to Army posts, not only for the Army, but for local area residents as well, and that naming posts after Confederate heroes was not and is not vital in the existence of Army installations in the South.

Local concerns regarding base closure do not appear to be vastly different from one locale to another, even with Union-named posts located in the Deep South. For example, a local newspaper reported the residents of Nottoway County, Virginia, were “in a near panic” when the 1995 BRAC commission recommended the closure of Fort Pickett. The near panic was due to the potential of lost jobs and because the “thousands of soldiers who trained annually at Fort Pickett pumped millions of dollars into the regional economy.”\(^2\) The Anniston Star referred to the closure of Fort McClellan as a “dire situation” because “Calhoun County’s one-crop economy was Fort McClellan. As long as the military saw fit to spend, northeast Alabama reaped the benefits.”\(^3\) There
were similar concerns in both communities when the local Army installation closed; there
was not a pouring out of national pride in an effort to save the post, nor was there a
defense of the post based on pride in the posts’ namesakes. Instead the concern was
financial, just as it largely was when Southern communities began petitioning for Army
posts in the early twentieth century.

While an examination of U.S. Army posts named for Union generals reveals the
same financial concerns as those surrounding Confederate-named posts, Civil War
remembrance tends to be more important to Southerners, thus their greater vigor in
promoting local heroes when choosing military installation names. Conversely, the lack
of importance of Civil War memory in the North is demonstrated by a lack of posts
named for exclusively Civil War related heroes. The overwhelming majority, seven out
of nine posts, related to Union officers are honored more for actions before or after the
Civil War than for actual Civil War accomplishments.

Again the Spanish-American War seems to be a turning point of sorts in Southern
displays of patriotism to the United States while maintaining a collective expression of
patriotism to the defunct Confederate States. There was a period of about fifty-two years
following the Civil War when no posts were named for Confederate war heroes. This is
understandable considering the costly fighting that engulfed the nation between 1861 and
1865 and the feelings of anger and distrust that resulted. The Union heroes were honored
by the naming of posts, even while (or perhaps because) they were still alive. This
changed in the early twentieth century. It is worth noting that by the time Confederate
posts began to be established most Civil War veterans were dead, leaving the fight to
honor their memories to the younger generation; clearly the South had done a better job
than the North of teaching their interpretation of the war to the young. As World War I approached, the naming of posts for Confederate generals became almost commonplace. It is as if the Spanish-American War and the acceptance of Lost Cause mythology in the North gave Southerners the confidence to wear their U.S. patriotism on one sleeve while wearing their C.S.A. patriotism on the other. During this same time Union generals were still honored, but Union-named posts were either established in fringe locations or were allowed to fade into insignificance.

Financial considerations, however, remained the most important immediate factor concerning the continued existence of Army posts, regardless of location. Finances were the ultimate motivation in the Army’s decision to close military installations throughout the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Simultaneously, the locales affected by base closures were most concerned with the impact the loss of government dollars would have on their communities, regardless of who a post happened to be named after. Above all else, money remained the most significant factor in an area’s willingness to accept a military post.\textsuperscript{54} While the authors of Fort McClellan’s popular history are referring to the state of affairs in northeastern Alabama, they could be referring to almost any locality being considered for a military base:

“It [Fort McClellan] would be the first Southern installation named in honor of a Northerner – worse, the commander of the Union forces between 1861 and 1862. This challenge to Southern sensibilities was forgiven in light of the economic boost the camp would inject into the town of Anniston and Calhoun County, Alabama. Anniston … was ready for this infusion after the depression of the 1890s.”\textsuperscript{55}
Chapter 6 – Conclusion

At first glance the existence of Army posts in the United States named in honor of Confederates is an anachronistic puzzle. There were forts in the South during the Civil War named for Confederate generals; this makes sense. Likewise, had the Confederacy won the Civil War the existence of Fort Lee in Virginia would be unremarkable. But the current existence of Confederate-named posts is a conundrum. Setting aside the issue of secession’s legality and the cause of the Civil War, the fact remains that the eight Confederate men honored by post names made war upon the United States; half of these men – Lee, Hood, Bragg, and Hill – had sworn oaths as U.S. Army officers to defend the United States. An argument can be made that Bragg’s oath was invalidated when he resigned from the Army in 1855, but Lee, Hood, and Hill all resigned their commissions in order to fight against the nation they were sworn to protect. That these men would receive one of the highest honors the Army can bestow, a military base bearing their name, certainly begs an explanation.

One justification for the existence of Confederate-named posts is that by naming posts after local Confederate heroes the Army intended to make the building of these posts and the reintroduction of soldiers in the South easier for local residents to accept. There is truth to this, but it seems that the naming of posts was a relatively minor issue for the decision makers within the Army and for the local communities. Three pieces of evidence demonstrate the relative unimportance of Confederate-named posts with regard to the ease of Southern consumption.

First, after Reconstruction ended soldiers were reintroduced in the South during the Spanish-American War. The military did not return as an army of occupation, as in
1865, but rather as an expeditionary force in need of a location for training and equipping before setting out to battle a foreign enemy. Many in the South patriotically embraced this army and the cause for which it fought as well as viewing the Spanish-American War as an opportunity to demonstrate renewed Southern loyalty to the United States. Additionally, the largest military encampment was named in honor of George H. Thomas, the Union hero who destroyed Hood’s forces at Nashville. The presence of United States soldiers and a Union-named post demonstrate an early willingness in the South to accept Army posts, at least on a temporary basis, in the heart of the former Confederacy. By the time the Confederate-named posts began to be built in 1917 the practice of creating temporary posts, as the World War I Confederate-named posts were expected to be, for the training of U.S. expeditionary troops was already established in the South. There was no expectation at the time that the posts should bear Confederates names.

Additionally, the now closed posts of Fort McPherson near Atlanta and Fort McClellan near Anniston also attest to the relative lack of importance that posts in the South be named for Confederates. Both men were important Union generals and in their own way each man was vital to the eventual Union victory. Nonetheless, both communities accepted the establishment of Union-named posts with little vitriol for the same essential reason – the economic boon the military posts would prove to be to the communities. An article from the Atlanta Constitution only speaks of Fort McPherson in the most positive of lights and pays special attention to the $150,000 dollars spent on the construction of the installation to that point and the additional $500,000 expected to be spent in completing the post.² The construction of Fort McClellan required a large labor
force, with Anniston locals working ten-hour days and time-and-a-half overtime guaranteed in their contracts.³

Such financial concerns are the final nail in the coffin in any argument that Army posts built in the South needed Confederate names for acceptance. The fact is the Southern communities that received Army posts wanted the Army in their communities. There are examples of those who did not want a new Army post in their community, but dissenters were motivated by financial concerns as well; these were mostly farmers who were forced to sell their land to the federal government under the authority of eminent domain. Those not forced to sell their land almost universally welcomed Army installations and the boost the local economy received as a result. In fact, these communities were so eager for the financial windfall of an Army post that they actively campaigned for the creation of Army posts in their areas. It is clear, therefore, that these posts did not need to be named after heroes of the Confederacy. At most the recognition of Confederate generals was a polite nod to the white members of these Southern communities. Because the naming of posts for Confederates was not a necessity and previous posts built in the South during the late nineteenth century were named after Union generals, it stands to reason that there was a shift in the popular memory of the people of the United States during the early years of the twentieth century. This shift was caused by the growth and acceptance of the Lost Cause.

Papers, edited by Civil War Confederate chaplain and Lee hagiographer John William Jones and ideologically driven by Jubal Early, served to dogmatize the Lost Cause. Certainly by the 1890s the Lost Cause had gained a tremendous following in the South. The North, however, continued to rejoice in what John R. Neff has termed the “Cause Victorious” – the truth of Union military victory and the unquestioned belief that the nation was stronger as a result of that victory.\(^4\)

It was the Spanish-American War that largely seemed to ease residual sectional tensions and allowed white Americans to place the Civil War and Reconstruction in the past. With the reality of Northern and Southern soldiers marching under one flag, taking orders from officers from both sections, and fighting for one cause, the Spanish-American War united the nation after decades of turmoil and division. Northerners could now accept Southerners as full-fledged Americans once again; their debt of blood had been paid. With their honor restored, Southerners could once again stand with their heads held high.\(^5\) The North, however, more fully embraced this change in status.

Neff rightly argues that the first Civil War goal of the North was the reunification of the nation. He also states that unlike bringing slavery to an end, reunification was a difficult goal to evaluate. Neff asks was “the mere lack of open, violent opposition the standard of unity?” He further notes that Reconstruction fell short of any standard of unity: “White Southerners acquiesced, under military occupation, to the transformation of their state governments … but it required the presence of the military to enforce the acquiescence.” Neff also asks if the Spanish-American War, “when the sons of Northern soldiers fought alongside the sons of Southern soldiers,” was when the country once again became united,\(^6\) but does not answer this last question.
Of course it is naïve to believe one moment in time or one event in history accomplished what decades of debate and struggle could not. But the Spanish-American War does stand as a major turning point in sectional relations. It allowed the North, confident once again in the South’s loyalty, to feel comfortable with forgetting. As early as 1867 Republican Senator Henry Wilson of Massachusetts pleaded for such forgetfulness. Speaking to a North Carolina audience, Wilson argued that the North had won the war and now was the time for “the passions, prejudices, and bitter memories engendered by the great struggle” to be “forgotten.” Clearly 1867 was too soon, the memories were still too deep and too bitter to be forgotten. But the North could not fully reincorporate the Southern states if it continuously rubbed the South’s collective nose in the dung-pile of defeat. The Spanish-American War gave the North the excuse it needed to forget. The South was happy to accept the North’s forgetfulness, but the sting of defeat lasts much longer than the exuberance of victory. Civil War memory retained greater importance in the South; instead of forgetting the Civil War, the South seized its opportunity during the early twentieth century to impose its memory upon the North.

Woodrow Wilson, a Virginia native and the first Southern president since the Civil War, would serve, perhaps unwittingly, to aid the South in the kidnapping of the nation’s popular memory of the Civil War. In 1913 Wilson took part in the festivities marking the 50-year anniversary of the Battle of Gettysburg. Reticent about attending at all, Wilson spent less than an hour at the event, but during that time he delivered a speech that further encouraged the North to forget the Civil War. “How wholesome and healing the peace has been!” stated Wilson. “We have found one another again as brothers and comrades, in arms, enemies no longer, generous friends rather, our battles long past, the
quarrel forgotten.” Four years later the North continued to forget, as Wilson had exhorted, but the South continued to remember and the newest installations of the U.S. Army were named in honor of Henry Lewis Benning, Braxton Bragg, John Brown Gordon, who was grievously wounded at Antietam, and Robert E. Lee, four men who as Confederate generals had led their armies onto the field of battle with the sole intent of killing as many United States soldiers as possible; Lee was responsible for more death during the Civil War than any other general. With the nation bracing for the Second World War some twenty-two years later, and with Northern memory even more diluted, A.P. Hill, John Bell Hood, Leonidas Polk, and Edmund W. Rucker were added to the list of honored Confederates. The Lost Cause and its cousin reconciliationism, made this possible and remain influential in the nation’s popular understanding of the Civil War today.

In the popular memory of the United States, Confederate soldiers and armies still receive the romantic nod over their Union counterparts. Even in historical works that tend to be complimentary of Northern generals, the Southern leaders are, almost against the will of the author it seems, cast in a more idyllic light. In Thomas B. Buell’s *The Warrior Generals*, three Union generals – Ulysses S. Grant, George H. Thomas, and Francis C. Barlow – are compared to three Confederate generals – Robert E. Lee, John Bell Hood, and John Brown Gordon. Buell’s analysis tends to be flattering of the Union leaders and critical of the Confederate leaders (excepting Brown generally). Nonetheless, the sobriquet he assigns to each fits nicely into the vision of North and South that Lost Cause adherents encourage.
Grant is the “Yeoman,” a common man with no dash, merely the hard-headedness to move forward regardless of the consequences. Thomas is the “Roman,” a professional soldier who plays it by the book at all times. Barlow is the “Puritan,” a religious zealot from New England unwilling to accept the differences of others. On the other hand, Lee is cast as the “Aristocrat,” the wealthy landowner who is personally and socially the better of those around him. Hood is the “Knight-Errant,” the chivalrous warrior without a home seeking an opportunity to prove his worth in honorable combat. And finally Gordon is the “Cavalier,” the gallant gentleman of unquestioned honor seeking to protect what is right and good. If the leaders of the Civil War are still presented in this light after 150 years of scholarship it is no wonder that many non-experts accept Lost Cause doctrine without much thought or debate.

There is, nonetheless, change in the air. Much recent scholarship has placed an emphasis on the emancipationist meaning of the Civil War. In recent years the works of David Blight and Eric Foner in particular have focused attention on slavery as the cause of the Civil War and the problems African Americans faced in the post-bellum United States. Many others have taken their cues from these two historians; the result has been a period of scholarship that has served as a needed correction to the Lost Cause and Reconciliationist literature of previous decades. Perhaps Gary Gallagher’s Lee and His Army in Confederate History provides a taste of what future scholarship may hold. Gallagher argues that much of the Lost Cause is based upon a foundation of truth, the North did outnumber the South and did have a stronger industrial base and these factors contributed to the Union victory, but that the propagandistic elements of the Lost Cause need to be discarded from the interpretation. Gallagher importantly asks, “Can we accept
part of what the Lost Cause authors said about Lee and his army without also lending a
measure of authority to their denial of slavery’s centrality to secession and the
Confederacy, their romantic portrayal of a united white South battling to the end, and the
blatant distortions regarding other aspects of the war?"15

Despite the continuing progress of Civil War scholarship the Lost Cause and its
variants continue to be influential in the nation’s understanding of the war. Part of the
reason for this is the apparent endorsement of the Lost Cause that the United States
government continues to provide to this interpretation of the Civil War. Not least among
the federal government’s endorsements of the Lost Cause is the continued existence of
Army posts named for Confederate generals. Post naming is a fairly unique form of
memorialization because of the approval of the Confederate cause by the United States
government that post naming implies. The inclusion of Confederate sections within Civil
War cemeteries may be the only other form of memorialization that gives a similar
implicit endorsement of the Confederacy.

Besides endorsing the Confederate cause, Confederate-named posts also endorse
the men they honor. The Army’s memorialization program is intended to “provide
lasting honor and to pay tribute to deceased Army military … personnel with records of
outstanding and honorable service” and to “Present them as inspirations to their fellow
Soldiers, employees, and other citizens.”16 While the regulations outlining these
requirements were written after the Confederate-named posts were established, the
continued existence of these posts seems to indicate that their namesakes meet the
requirements the Army has since established for post naming. Therefore the Army, and
by extension the entire federal government, is stating that the Confederate officers
honored by post names are men of “outstanding and honorable service” who should serve as “inspirations to their fellow Soldiers … and other citizens.” This is difficult to reconcile with the fact that these men made war against the United States.

The honored Confederates may have been “good” men – a moral question rather than a historical one – but the regulation does not demand that honored individuals be morally good. Instead, it requires memorialized individuals to have honorably served the Army and the nation. Confederate officers, no matter how good they may have morally been, cannot be viewed as having provided honorable service to an Army they attempted to destroy, regardless of the service they may have provided the Army before the Civil War. Additionally, Gordon, Rucker, and Benning never served in the U.S. Army and while Polk attended the Military Academy at West Point, he resigned from the Army almost as soon as he graduated. While such resignations were allowed at the time, it is difficult to call a man who accepted a free education from the military, quit that military as soon as he could, and then fought to destroy that military, honorable.

Finally, Army personnel honored with post names are supposed to serve as inspirations to their fellow soldiers and other citizens; it is difficult to understand how these men, who fought to protect slavery and even expand it, serve as inspirations to African American soldiers and citizens today. Yet in naming and, perhaps more importantly, maintaining Confederate-named posts the federal government is, with intent or not, advocating for slavery and those who sought to rupture the nation in order to defend it. It requires a romantic reading of the Civil War to construct these Confederate-named posts as anything other than an insult to the memories of those who fought and died to restore the nation and destroy slavery. It is most especially insulting to the
200,000 African Americans who served in the U.S. military during the Civil War. Surely no one in the Army or the national government today would publicly endorse such beliefs, but it is an understanding of the Civil War based upon the Lost Cause that allows the military’s and the nation’s leaders to overlook such blatant conflicts.

Examining the evolution of the Army’s regulations in regard to post naming reveals that the Army recognized the paradox of Confederate-named posts fairly early. In 1951 the Army limited those who could be honored to individuals who would not “provoke objection or controversy.” World War II served as an important point of departure for African Americans. Gerald Nash writes, “What is striking in surveying the course of minorities in the twentieth century … is the crucial impact which the Second World War had in stimulating the movement for equal rights.” By 1951 the Army recognized that Confederate-named posts could easily lead to a controversy the Army wished to avoid. Instead of closing the installations or changing their names, however, the Army hoped to avoid controversy on all fronts by quietly banning any such future namings. In 1975 after years of Civil Rights activism and the Vietnam War, during which approximately 300,000 African Americans served in the military, the Army faced additional pressure regarding Confederate-named posts. The Army addressed the issue as low-key as possible once again, adding to the regulation that the renaming of posts was discouraged because “strong resistance can be expected from local residents, heirs, historical societies, and others.” Aware that the renaming of any Confederate-named post would draw unwanted attention to all controversially named posts, the Army chose to essentially ignore the problem.
Army posts named for Confederate heroes is not a topic that can remain hidden forever, however. Continued scholarship on the subject of Civil War memorialization ensures that this will become an issue the Army will have to one day face publicly. The internet not only allows a more rapid diffusion of knowledge, it also allows communities to ask questions together and more easily band together in response to perceived wrongs. There are already internet forums and blogs on which posters are beginning to ask why the United States maintains posts named in honor of Confederate generals.\textsuperscript{21} Additionally, the continuing growth of the African American population in the United States, both in terms of raw numbers and percentage of the population,\textsuperscript{22} further ensures that the Army will have to address this issue at some point in the future. It may be only a few years or it may be decades, but the continuing existence of U.S. Army posts honoring those who fought to defend a slave-based culture and economy cannot remain the status quo.

The Civil War freed African Americans from slavery. For a time Reconstruction sought to incorporate African Americans as full and equal members of the nation. Reconciliation saw the U.S. government abandon African Americans in favor a united white America. The Lost Cause gained in influence due to the North’s belief that reconciliation made it possible to forget the lessons of the Civil War while the South seized the opportunity to shape public memory regarding the war. It was during this time, as a celebration of the Lost Cause, that the U.S. Army named posts in honor of Confederate heroes. Scholarship of the last few decades focusing on Civil War memory has served as a corrective to the Lost Cause and redirected focus toward the emancipationist vision of the Civil War. Perhaps the United States will shortly arrive at a
time when it can begin, as a nation, to shake off the ball-and-chain of the Lost Cause, honestly evaluate the lessons of the Civil War and Reconstruction, and reimagine a nation that truly seeks liberty and justice for all. When that time comes, one of the first and more powerful steps that can be taken will be the elimination of Confederate-named United States Army posts.
NOTES

Chapter 1

1 A Soldier Readiness Center is a centralized location that allows soldiers preparing to deploy overseas or who recently returned from deployment to undergo medical screening.

2 Munley was shot three times during the exchange. Both officers have since lost their jobs on Fort Hood due to budget cuts. Jeremy Schwartz, “Officers Who Responded to 2009 Fort Hood Shootings, Hailed as Heroes, Losing Their Jobs,” American-Statesman, 7 August 2011.

3 The government considered, but opted against, charging Hasan with a fourteenth count of premeditated murder due to the death of the unborn baby of one of the victims. Kevin Baron, “Hasan Charged with 13 Counts of Murder,” Stars and Stripes, 13 November 2009.

4 Hasan, who remains in the Army during the judicial process, has refused to shave. The military judge hearing the case, Colonel Gregory Gross, has ordered Hasan to be forcibly shaved and has stated Hasan’s court-martial will not begin until the issue of Hasan’s beard is resolved. The U.S. Army Court of Appeals recently upheld Col. Gross’ order. Hasan’s lawyers have stated they will appeal the decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces. Either defense or prosecution may then appeal that decision to the U.S. Supreme Court. Megan McCloskey, “Army Court Orders Fort Hood Suspect to Shave,” Stars and Stripes, 18 October 2012.


6 Ibid., 126.


8 Several Confederate leaders, including Jefferson Davis and Robert E. Lee, were initially charged with treason. Only Davis was ever indicted for treason and he spent two years in prison awaiting a trial that never happened. Many Southerners viewed this as a form of martyrdom suffered by Davis for all Southerners and the Confederate cause. For his part, Davis was eager to stand trial, rejected any thought of a pardon, and refused to ever admit that secession was treason. In the end no one was ever held legally culpable for a rebellion that killed hundreds of thousands. David W. Blight, Race and Reunion: The Civil War in American Memory (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 57.

9 Alan T. Nolan has little sympathy for the traditional claim that Lee simply followed Virginia into secession, writing, “Lee had an unusually high tolerance for ambiguous loyalty” and that Lee “was essentially committed to the Southern cause before Virginia seceded by virtue of his feelings about slavery and its expansion and by his sense of sectional loyalty.” Alan T. Nolan, Lee Considered: General Robert E. Lee and Civil War History (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991), 51 and 57.


17 German forces killed approximately 50,000 U.S. service members in World War I and approximately 170,000 U.S. service members in World War II, for a total of about 220,000 U.S. service members killed by German military forces. Office of the Adjutant General Statistical and Accounting Branch, Army Battle Casualties and Nonbattle Deaths in World War II, 1946, 5; and Leland and Oborocanu, American War and Military Operations Casualties, 2.
Chapter 2

1 David Blight might be, currently, the most important historian of Civil War memory. His book Race and Reunion: The Civil War in American Memory is often viewed as the standard by which all other works addressing Civil War memory are measured. His more recent work, American Oracle: The Civil War in the Civil Rights Era, addresses how Civil War memory was impacted by several popular writers of the mid-twentieth century. In Standing Soldiers, Kneeling Slaves: Race, War, and Monument in Nineteenth-Century America, Kirk Savage explores in depth the role of statuary memorialization. William Blair explores how memorial and decoration days were used to cement the power of white Southerners in Cities of the Dead: Contesting the Memory of the Civil War in the South, 1865-1914. John Neff offers a counter argument to that of Blight and Blair, arguing that memorialization served to divide rather than unite and that rapid reunification of the sections after the Civil War best served the North’s needs, even at the expense of African Americans. Caroline Janney’s Burying the Dead but not the Past: Ladies’ Memorial Associations and the Lost Cause is important for its focus on the role of women in the South’s remembrance of the Civil War. Finally, the esteemed Gary Gallagher explores Civil War remembrance in art and film in Causes Won, Lost, and Forgotten: How Hollywood and Popular Art Shape What We Know about the Civil War.

5 Ibid., 56-57.
7 Kirk Savage argues that the elevation of Robert E. Lee as the “South’s premier representative” served as an effort to depoliticize the Confederacy: “With Lee as the major historical actor, the story of the Lost Cause became a glorious military record rather than a political struggle to secure a slaveholding nation.” Kirk Savage, *Standing Soldiers, Kneeling Slaves: Race, War, and Monument in Nineteenth-Century America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 131. If it is true that the elevation of Lee was an attempt to depoliticize remembrance of the war, it is in fact further evidence of the political nature of memorialization and the efforts of some to harness memory for their own political agenda.
9 Charles Reagan Wilson’s *Baptized in Blood: The Religion of the Lost Cause, 1865-1920*, is vital in understanding the depth and importance of the Lost Cause in the former Confederate states as well as how the Lost Cause aided in Reconciliation and Reunion. Gaines M. Foster’s *Ghosts of the Confederacy: Defeat, the Lost Cause, and the Emergence of the New South*, is also of great importance in understanding these concepts.
12 Gallagher, *Causes Won, Lost, and Forgotten*, 33.
14 Gallagher, *Causes Won, Lost, and Forgotten*, 33.
17 James M. McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1989), 854. A proportionate number of deaths based upon today’s U.S. population of more than 300,000,000 would result in more than 6 million dead soldiers.
18 J. David Hacker, “A Census-Based Count of the Civil War Dead,” *Civil War History* 57, no. 4 (2011), 311. Hacker’s methodology is unable to differentiate between Union and Confederate deaths, but the lack of reliable Confederate records when compared to Union records makes it probable that many of the additional 130,000 deaths were Confederate soldiers. If Hacker is correct, and his findings are supported by historians such as James McPherson, the proportionate number of deaths today would be approximately 7.5 million.
26 Gallagher, *Causes Won, Lost, and Forgotten*, 42.
27 The words on the memorial are as follows: “Died for state rights guaranteed under the Constitution. The people of the South, animated by the spirit of 1776, to preserve their rights, withdrew from the federal compact in 1861. The North resorted to coercion. The South, against overwhelming numbers and resources, fought until exhausted. During the war, there were twenty two hundred and fifty seven engagements; in eighteen hundred and eighty two of these, at least one regiment took part. Number of men
enlisted: Confederate armies, 600,000; Federal armies, 2,859,132. Losses from all causes: Confederate, 437,000; Federal, 485,216.”

Chapter 3

1 Department of the Army Pamphlet 352-4: Dependents Education High School Completion Programs for Army Dependent Spouses, 1978.
2 Luther Hanson, e-mail message to author, 10 September 2012. Such a policy never existed. Several installations, such as Forts McClellan, Meade, and McPherson, were named after Union generals and built south of the Mason Dixon Line.
4 Report of the Secretary of War; being part of the message and documents communicated to the two Houses of Congress at the beginning of the second session of the Fifty-third Congress, 53rd Cong., 2nd sess., 1893, H. Exec. Doc. 1, Pt. 2, serial 3198, 220.

Chapter 4

4 Stelpflug and Hyatt, Home of the Infantry, 2-4.
5 Ibid., 4-6.
6 Ibid., 7-8.
8 Stelpflug and Hyatt, 8.
11 Benning owned eighty-nine slaves, valued at nearly $100,000; Stelpflug and Hyatt, Home of the Infantry, 12.
12 Ibid., 11-13.
13 Ibid., 13-14.
14 Dameron, General Henry Lewis Benning, 281-282.
15 Stelpflug and Hyatt, Home of the Infantry, 14-15.
17 DeQuesada, Georgia Forts, 106.
22 Ibid., 139.
23 Bragg also commanded at the Battle of Stones River, where Union Brigadier General Joshua Sill was killed. Sill was a West Point classmate of Philip Sheridan, who, in 1869, named a new Army post in Oklahoma Fort Sill. W.S. Nye, Carbine and Lance: The Story of Old Fort Sill (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1969), 100.
27 “Fort Bragg History.”
29 Ibid.
30 Fayetteville and Fort Bragg in Vintage Postcards, 127.
31 “Fort Bragg History.”
32 Ibid., 253.
34 Ibid., 18.
36 O’Gorman and Anders, Fort Lee, 7.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
40 O’Gorman and Anders, Fort Lee, 7.
41 Ibid.
42 “Fort Lee Virginia: History.”
43 O’Gorman and Anders, Fort Lee, 7.
44 “Fort Lee Virginia: History.”
45 O’Gorman and Anders, Fort Lee, 7.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid., 8.
48 Ibid., 7.
49 Ibid., 24.
“Fort Lee Virginia: History.”
“Fort Lee Virginia: History.”
Cragg, Guide to Military Installations, 93.
deQuesada, Georgia Forts, 101.
Ibid., 101.
Ibid., 20.
Ibid.
deQuesada, Georgia Forts, 143.
Ibid., 143.
Joiner, Smith, and Anzuoni, Fayetteville and Fort Bragg, 7.
Joiner, Smith, and Anzuoni, Fayetteville and Fort Bragg, 9.
Ibid., 7.

Cragg, Guide to Military Installations, 93.
Cragg, Guide to Military Installations, 249.
Ibid.
Ibid.
“Iinstallation Summary: Fort A.P. Hill.”
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid., 4.
Ibid., 7-12.
Ibid., 14-15.
Ibid., 34.
Ibid., 36.
Ibid., 58.
Ibid., ix.
Ibid., 143.
Ibid., 193.
Ibid., 318.
Cragg, Guide to Military Installations, 249.
“Fort A.P. Hill History.”
Fort Hood is over 330 square miles; Cragg, Guide to Military Installations, 237.
Pugsley, Imprint on the Land, 3-4.
Odie B. Faulk and Laura E. Faulk, Fort Hood: The First Fifty Years (Temple, TX: The Frank W. Mayborn Foundation, 1990), 31-34.
Pugsley, Imprint on the Land, 148.
Ibid., 139.
Ibid., 8.
Faulk and Faulk, Fort Hood, 39.
Richard L. Powell, email message to author, 12 September 2012.

Ibid.

Faulk and Faulk, *Fort Hood*, 58.


“Installation Summary: Fort Polk.”


Ibid.

“About JRTC & Fort Polk: History.”

“Ibid.”

“Ibid.”

“Ibid.”

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid., 21-23.

Ibid., 45.

Ibid., 77.

Ibid., 154.

Ibid., 170.

Ibid., 181.

Ibid., 384.

Ibid., 381-383.

“Ibid.”


Ibid., 83-84.

Ibid., 84-90.

Ibid., 100-102.

Ibid., 111-112.

Ibid., 116.


Ibid., 92.

Ibid., 117.

Ibid., 150-152.

Ibid., 154 and 164.

Ibid., 168.

Ibid., 173.


Ibid., 130.


West Point. After Lincoln’s assassination a note was found on his desk asking his successor that, if
sons. After Whipple’s death Lincoln presented Whipple’s oldest son with a presidential appointment to
would visit with him in the Custis
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28, 1862
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Houses of Congress at the beginning of the second session of the
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Press, 1994)
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The Political Genius of Abraham Lincoln
148
The Origins of Fort Rucker, 111.
147
From 1861 to 1862 Whipple was responsible for the defense of Washington D.C. President Lincoln
146
Guide to Military Installations
144
The Origins of Fort Rucker
145
149
Henry Holt and Company
151
The Road to Reunion, 1865-1900 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1937), 306.
148
Gaines M. Foster, Ghosts of the Confederacy: Defeat, the Lost Cause, and the Emergence of the New
144
For example, some 375 farm families were forced to move off of 27,220 acres in Dale County, Alabama, for the creation of Fort Rucker. The “average” family, therefore, lost about 72.6 acres; McGee, The Origins of Fort Rucker, 111.
144
Hayes did not truly remove all Federal soldiers from the South. As part of the deal, however, he did
145
-150
Robert E. Lee’s nephew and a Confederate major general, was commissioned as a major general of volunteers and after the war was added to the retired list of the Regular Army. Matthew C. Butler and Thomas L. Rosser, also Confederate major generals, were commissioned as a major general of volunteers and brigadier general of volunteers, respectively. None of these three saw combat, but Joseph Wheeler, a confederate lieutenant general did. Commissioned a major general of volunteers, Wheeler was a division commander within the V Corps and at the Battle of San Juan Hill reportedly yelled, “Hurrah! We’ve got the damn Yankees on the run!” Nonetheless, Wheeler retired as a brigadier general in the Regular Army in 1900. James M. Powles, “Civil War Veterans of Both Sides Fought in the Spanish-American War 30 Years Later,” Military History 21, no. 1 (2004), 72.
150
151
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Ibid., 357-358.
145
During the Spanish-American War several former Confederate generals were commissioned as general officers in the United States Army. Fitzhugh Lee, Robert E. Lee’s nephew and a Confederate major general, was commissioned as a major general of volunteers and after the war was added to the retired list of the Regular Army. Matthew C. Butler and Thomas L. Rosser, also Confederate major generals, were commissioned as a major general of volunteers and brigadier general of volunteers, respectively. None of these three saw combat, but Joseph Wheeler, a confederate lieutenant general did. Commissioned a major general of volunteers, Wheeler was a division commander within the V Corps and at the Battle of San Juan Hill reportedly yelled, “Hurrah! We’ve got the damn Yankees on the run!” Nonetheless, Wheeler retired as a brigadier general in the Regular Army in 1900. James M. Powles, “Civil War Veterans of Both Sides Fought in the Spanish-American War 30 Years Later,” Military History 21, no. 1 (2004), 72.
150
151
152
Ibid., 357-358.

Chapter 5

1 Report of the Secretary of War; being part of the message and documents communicated to the two Houses of Congress at the beginning of the second session of the Fifty-third Congress, 53d Cong., 2d sess., 1893, H. Exec. Doc. 1, Pt. 2, serial 3198, 220.
4 Cragg, Guide to Military Installations, 56.
9 From 1861 to 1862 Whipple was responsible for the defense of Washington D.C. President Lincoln would visit with him in the Custis-Lee mansion in Arlington and became close to Whipple and his two sons. After Whipple’s death Lincoln presented Whipple’s oldest son with a presidential appointment to West Point. After Lincoln’s assassination a note was found on his desk asking his successor that, if
anything should happen to him, Whipple’s youngest son be given an appointment to the Naval Academy at Annapolis, which Andrew Johnson honored. John Michael, *Fort Myer*, Images of America (Charleston: Arcadia Publishing, 2011), 7 and 15.


25 Ibid., 220-223.

26 Ibid., 228.

27 Ibid., 236.

28 Ibid., 237.


30 Ibid., 259.

31 Ibid., 260.


36 The homepage of the Sons of Confederate Veterans refers to the Civil War as the “Second American Revolution” (italics in the original) and states the “preservation of liberty and freedom was the motivating factor in the South’s decision to fight.” “Sons of Confederate Veterans,” http://www.scv.org/ (accessed 27 February 2013). It might be difficult to explain to the four million slaves in the United States at the time of the Civil War how an independent Confederate States of America would have protected their liberty and freedom.

37 The United Daughters of the Confederacy’s home page declares the UDC to be the “oldest patriotic organization in our country.” “United Daughters of the Confederacy,” http://www.hqscd.org/ (accessed 27 February 2013). The many references to the Confederate States of America and complete lack of
references to the United States of America on the homepage, however, perhaps implies that while the UDC may be the oldest patriotic organization in the country, it is not the oldest patriotic organization dedicated to this country.

38 Tony Horowitz’s book Confederates in the Attic is a fascinating and entertaining look at the importance of Civil War remembrance in the South.


41 Gregory S. Jacobs, Camp Grant, Images of America (Charleston: Arcadia, 2003), 7-8 and 121.


44 “Designation of Military Reservations,” in The Panama Canal Record (Mount Hope, Canal Zone: The Panama Canal Press, 1919), 114.


46 Ibid., 50.


50 Eicher and Eicher, Civil War High Commands, xvii.


52 Associated Press, “Redeveloped Army Post Revitalizes Nottoway: County Reborn after Closure of Fort Pickett,” The Free-Lance Star 2000, c1. Ironically, directly above the referenced article, on the same page is a story regarding Bethel Baptist Church, site of a supposed memorial for Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson in 1863, celebrating its bicentennial. Herbert R. Collins, curator emeritus of the Smithsonian Institution and historian of Caroline County, is quoted in the story as saying some of the church’s history is unknown because of the Union soldiers under Ulysses S. Grant: “They somehow started fires better than anyone else … So they probably burned the records here.”


54 The acceptance of Fort McClellan by Southerners may also be related to the fact that he is often viewed as having been sympathetic to the Confederate Cause. Doris Kearns Goodwin writes that Edwin Stanton even considered McClellan a traitor after his delay in supporting John Pope at Second Bull Run. Doris Kearns Goodwin, Team of Rivals: The Political Genius of Abraham Lincoln (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2005), 475. Additionally, McClellan ran against Lincoln in the 1864 presidential election and it is widely believed that if he had won, would have moved to restore the Union through negotiation if at all possible. James M. McPherson and James K. Hogue, Ordeal by Fire: The Civil War and Reconstruction, 4th ed. (St. Louis: McGraw-Hill, 2010), 475-476.


Chapter 6

1 An important aspect of the Lee mythology is that he was dragged into the conflict despite his tremendous loyalty to the United States and because of his greatest of loves for Virginia. In 1868 Lee wrote, “I then [upon the posting of his resignation] had no other intention than to pass the remainder of my life as a private citizen.” As Alan T. Nolan demonstrates, however, this is a disingenuous claim. Nolan argues that Lee was aware of Virginia’s vote to secede no later than April 19, posted his resignation on April 20 (a
Saturday), and accepted command of Virginia’s military forces on April 22. Nolan posits that Lee tendered his resignation with the understanding that he would be offered command of Virginia’s armed forces. Additionally, as Lee had been informed of the United States’ plans to raise an army in order to “enforce the Federal law” and been offered command of that army, it is therefore plain that Lee resigned from the U.S. Army because he fully intended to make war upon it. Alan T. Nolan, Lee Considered: General Robert E. Lee and Civil War History (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991), 38-43.  


6 Neff, Honoring the Civil War Dead, 8.  


8 Ibid., 11.  

9 At Antietam, while defending the Sunken Road, Gordon was shot twice in the leg and once each in the arm, shoulder, and jaw. Thomas B. Buell, The Warrior Generals: Combat Leadership in the Civil War (New York: Three Rivers Press, 1997), 119.  

10 Lee’s armies inflicted approximately 135,000 casualties upon Union forces during the course of the Civil War and suffered approximately 121,000 casualties, for a total of approximately 256,000 men killed or wounded as a result of fighting ordered by Lee. While Ulysses S. Grant defeated Lee on the field of battle, he comes in a distant second to Lee in terms of casualties he is responsible for. Grant’s forces inflicted about 84,000 casualties upon various Confederate forces while sustaining about 81,000 casualties, for a total of approximately 165,000. The number is lessened to approximately 135,000 when the nearly 30,000 Confederate troops Grant captured at Vicksburg, rather than killing or wounding, are removed from Grant’s total. Grady McWhiney and Perry D. Jamieson, Attack and Die: Civil War Military Tactics and the Southern Heritage (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1988), 22-23.  

11 See Chapter 2, pages 13-15 of this thesis for a discussion of various Civil War interpretations.  

12 Buell, The Warrior Generals, xxix-xxxiii.  

13 Is this also a comparison of Thomas to Julius Caesar, and the famous invasion of his homeland in 49 B.C.? Thomas, a native Virginian, remained loyal to the United States during the Civil War and led armies against his homeland as well. Ibid., xxxi-xxxi.  

14 Is this also a comparison of Brown to the Cavaliers of the English Civil War, who sought to defend and protect the monarchy and then its restoration in 1660? The implication could be that as the “Cavalier” Gordon was defending the legitimate government and interpretation of the Constitution. Ibid., xxxii-xxxi.  


16 Army Regulation 1-33: Administration: Memorial Programs, 30 May 2006, 3.  

17 Army Regulation 15-190: Boards, Commissions, and Committees: Department of the Army Memorialization Board, 20 August 1951, 1.  


20 Army Regulation 1-33: Administration: Memorial Programs, 23 September 1975, 2.  

http://answers.yahoo.com/question/index?qid=20091106073457AAfOLn8; “Falcons Boards: Anything but Football: Army Bases Named after Confederate Generals Should Their Name Be Changed,” http://boards.atlantafalcons.com/topic/3949534-army-bases-named-after-confederate-generals-should-their-name-be-changed/ (accessed 9 March 2013). This last message board included a poll asking posters if Confederate-named posts should have their names changed; 23 posters answered “No” (85.19 percent) while 4 posters answered “Yes” (14.81 percent).

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