THE DETERIORATION OF CHINESE INFLUENCE IN THE MONGOLIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC, MAY, 1957 TO DECEMBER, 1960

by

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For the department
That Sino-Soviet rivalry over Outer Mongolia does exist seems clear. Sinkiang, Tibet, Manchuria, and Inner Mongolia are definitely Chinese now; Tuva and Buryat Mongolia definitely Russian. Only Outer Mongolia remains suspended between the two, subject to stresses and pulls of both.

-- Robert A. Rupen
This paper will attempt to show that in the three years from 1957 to 1960 the influence of the People's Republic of China in the Mongolian People's Republic was steadily waning, and to follow the events of this deterioration of influence. At the same time, this subject offers a unique opportunity to study the interaction of China and the Soviet Union in the quest for influence.

Although a number of sources have been utilized, the main research has been done with translations from Chinese and Soviet newspapers and news agency releases. Because of the paucity of information dealing with the recent period of Outer Mongolian history, it has been necessary to speculate on the importance of a number of incidents, and small events take on a much larger meaning only when viewed in the light of a continuing process of lessening Chinese influence in Outer Mongolia.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

The Mongolian People's Republic\(^1\) is the only independent nation which is completely surrounded by Russia and China. It is bounded on the north by the Soviet Union, on the west by the Chinese autonomous region of Sinkiang, on the east by Manchuria, and on the south by the province of Kansu, and the former provinces of Chahar, Suiyuan and Ninghsia. The latter three with Jehol form the present Chinese Communist administrative unit of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region.\(^2\) Outer Mongolia has an area of 604,095 square miles\(^3\) or 1,565,000 square kilometers,\(^4\) which is approximately three times the land area of France.\(^5\) The

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\(^{1}\)Throughout this paper, the name Mongolian People's Republic will be used interchangeably with Outer Mongolia, or, simply, Mongolia. Some direct quotes will refer to the nation as the M.P.R.

\(^{2}\)The Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region will be referred to by that name, or Inner Mongolia, or IMAR.


\(^{4}\)Ibid.

population, as of 1960, was 936,900, with a density of .60 per square kilometer. 6

The economy of the Mongolian People's Republic is, as it was in the past, totally dominated by the nomadic herding of livestock, although in the last ten years there has been an attempt to settle the nomads. Not only are the essential needs of the Mongols, such as housing, clothing and food, met by the raising of livestock, 7 but a majority of the industry is dependent on and ancillary to the herding of animals. 8 During the last ten years, the Mongolian government, on the initiative of the Russian government, has been stressing agriculture and the cultivation of virgin lands, so as to become independent in the production of cereal grains. 9 However, traditionally, the Mongolian people have been nomadic herders, without industry. 10

It is, however, not the function of this paper to deal with the economy, the topography, or the geography of the

9Ibid., p. 299.
Mongolian People's Republic. Rather, it is an attempt to show the deterioration of the relations between China and Mongolia during the period 1957 to 1960. During this time span the rising influence of the Chinese in Mongolia was checked by the Soviet Union, and Mongolia continued to stand as a firm supporter of Russia. It is necessary to discuss, albeit briefly, the relations between China, Russia, and Outer Mongolia before the twentieth century, the close contacts between Russia and Mongolia up to 1949, and then the slow process of rising Chinese influence there, before any discussion of the deterioration of Sino-Mongolian relations can begin.

The Chinese gained control over the area which now comprises the Mongolian People's Republic in 1691. In that year the Mongol princes were accepted as the vassals of the Chinese emperors. Concerning the method of Chinese control over the area, George Murphy explains it in these words: "The emperor of China formulated and proclaimed his edicts, his governors relayed them, and the Mongolian princes enforced them. Despite some minor changes, this system remained in force until 1911."  

The reasons for the Chinese interest in Mongolia were expressed in a statement by a Manchu official in 1840:

11Friters, Outer Mongolia, p. 151.
12Murphy, Soviet Mongolia, p. 31.
The weakness of the Mongols is China's strength. To tame the Mongols with the Yellow Religion [Lama Buddhism] is China's best policy; and, indeed, from the point of view of Mongol interests, it is much better for them to live quietly, and multiply, with no other cares than those of finding pasture and water, than to swoop down upon the frontiers as the Huns and Turks used to do, keep China under perpetual arms, and drench the plains with human gore. This policy, in fact, is what may be called dispelling ferocity through charity, and guiding untamable men with the doctrine of rewards and punishments. . . .13

The Chinese wished to keep the Mongols "tame," and to accomplish this they discouraged contact with Chinese, prohibited Chinese immigration to Mongolia and inter-marriage between Chinese and Mongols was not allowed.14 However, the Chinese-Manchus allowed certain licensed merchants to trade in Mongolia under strict controls. In time, the merchants were exploiting the Mongols by charging high interest rates, using false weights and measures, and similar practices.15

The Russians, although they shared in some of this economic exploitation,16 brought with them "fresh ideas, a belief in change, Western medicine, and Western science."17 By 1900, the Chinese completely changed their policy toward

13Friters, Outer Mongolia, pp. 155-156.
14Murphy, Soviet Mongolia, p. 31.
15Ibid., pp. 45-46.
16Knutson, Outer Mongolia, p. 20.
17Murphy, Soviet Mongolia, p. 34.
Outer Mongolia, and began to promote colonization by Chinese peasants. An explanation for this abrupt change in policy is offered by Gerard Friters; he says that the reasons were:

... [The] pressure of Chinese population and the success of Chinese colonization in Inner Mongolia, but still more important was the attempt of the Dynasty, after the humiliation endured in its dealings with Western powers and in the Sino-Japanese War, to save Outer Mongolia from the fate of Manchuria and other frontier territories.18

By the first decade of the twentieth century, this new Manchu policy was having quite an impact on the Mongols. [To the Mongols the most] pressing danger was not the "colonial" control of their country by a few foreigners representing a foreign government, but actual colonizing of the best part of their land by Chinese settlers; not subjection, but displacement; not the fate of India, but the fate of the American Indian.19

Given the respect for the Russians and the fear of the Chinese, it is not surprising that in 1910 the Mongol princes and high lamas appealed for Russian aid to protect Mongolia from China. With the fall of the Manchu Dynasty in 1911 and the formation of the Chinese Republic in 1912, the Mongols took advantage of the confusion and declared Mongolia independent from China.20 In 1915, China, Russia

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18 Friters, Outer Mongolia, p. 157.
19 Owen Lattimore, in the introduction to Gerard Friters, Outer Mongolia, p. xvii.
and Mongolia signed an agreement which stipulated that "Outer Mongolia recognizes China's suzerainty, China and Russia recognize the autonomy of Outer Mongolia, forming a part of Chinese territory." Mongolia was now an autonomous state within the Chinese Empire, but the Russians were in a position of possible dominance.

There followed a period of six years of confusion that would be difficult to detail. Let it suffice that with the Russian Revolutions of 1917, Russian influence lessened and the Chinese were able to re-enter Mongolia in a position of power. During the Russian Civil War, in February, 1921, a White general, Baron Ungern-Sternberg, entered Mongolia and defeated the Chinese garrison at Urga, the modern capital of Ulan Bator. His despotic rule was no change from the harsh Chinese rule. Therefore, the Mongolian Communist Party, which had been formed the year before in Siberia under the aegis of the Bolsheviks, with the hastily formed Mongolian People's Army and elements of the Russian Red Army entered Mongolia in July, 1921 and defeated the Baron.

The Soviet Union promised China that the Russian army units

21 The text of the agreement is found in Leo Pasvolsky, Russia in the Far East (New York, 1922), pp. 174-176.

22 For an excellent and detailed account of the events of this period, see Friters, Outer Mongolia, pp. 45-127; 171-193.

23 Eudin and North, Soviet Russia, pp. 124-125.
would soon withdraw from Mongolia. However, the Russians remained in Mongolia until 1924. After this time, Outer Mongolia was, in effect, under the control of the Russian government through its Mongolian Communist party.

The Russians made no attempt to integrate Outer Mongolia into the Soviet Union. Two reasons for this have been put forward. George Murphy's view is that "any Mongolian adventure was clearly to be subordinated to general Far Eastern considerations, and the Soviet Union was interested in friendship with China." Owen Lattimore accounts for it in this way:

The policies of a great power have a tendency to be continuous, even after a revolution. The Soviets inherited the Tsarist buffer-zone policy in Mongolia, and continued in large measure to practice it right up to the end of the Second World War.

Although the Russians had firm control over the Mongolian People's Republic during the 1920's, there was no great change. There was no "industrial development; no settlement of nomads; no large-scale urbanization; no large military establishment." But the new Mongolian government


\[25\] Murphy, Soviet Mongolia, p. 20.


\[27\] Rupen, Twentieth Century, p. 184.
used purge and terror tactics to maintain and expand control over the population.\textsuperscript{28}

The decade of the 1930's was influenced by the Japanese aggression on the Chinese mainland. The Russians, fearful of Japanese designs on Outer Mongolia, planned a defense for the country. The defense plans called for the establishment of an effective Mongolian army.\textsuperscript{29} Because the Buddhist lamas totaled almost one-third of the male population and were not disposed to military work, and for the purpose of establishing stronger Communist control of the country, the Mongolian government sought to destroy the Buddhist church in Mongolia.\textsuperscript{30} The Mongolian Red Army became an effective fighting force by the late 1930's, and with the Russian army took part in the routing of Japanese forces in eastern Mongolia in 1939.\textsuperscript{31}

The decade of the 1940's was one of continued Russian presence in Outer Mongolia, with the continued effect of isolating Mongolia from the rest of the world, and Japan and China in particular. The Mongolian function during the Second World War was mainly the supplying of foodstuffs for

\textsuperscript{28}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{29}Ibid., p. 230.
\textsuperscript{30}Ibid. See also, David Dallin, Soviet Russia and the Far East (New Haven, 1948), pp. 78-80.
\textsuperscript{31}Murphy, Soviet Mongolia, p. 132.
the Russian army and the Russian civilian population. 32 At the Yalta Conference, one condition the Russians exacted for their promise to declare war on Japan was that "the status quo in Outer Mongolia (The Mongolian People's Republic) shall be preserved." 33 After the war, the Chinese were faced with a fait accompli, that is, a declared independent Mongolia, even though China still claimed suzerainty over it. The Nationalist government was forced to agree to a plebiscite in which the Mongols would determine whether they wished to be independent of China. On October 20, 1945, the people of Mongolia overwhelmingly voted to remain independent of China. 34 In January, 1946, the Chinese government of Chiang Kai-shek formally recognized the independent status of the Mongolian People's Republic. 35

During the first seven years of the 1950's, clearly the single most important factor in Mongolia's relations with Russia and the internal development of the country was the return of a Chinese presence to Outer Mongolia. After approximately thirty years of no significant Sino-Mongolian contact, the newly formed People's Republic of China was recognized by Outer Mongolia, in 1949, and ambassadors were

32 Rupen, Twentieth Century, p. 257.
33 Friters, Outer Mongolia, p. 149.
34 Ibid., p. 212.
35 Ibid., p. 216.
exchanged. 36 In the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1950, both China and Russia acknowledged the independence of Mongolia. 37 However, until the death of Stalin in 1953, the Chinese Communist activity in the Mongolian People's Republic was on a small scale. 38

After this time, amid the turmoil of succession in Moscow, the Chinese began to reassert themselves in Mongolia. From 1953 to May, 1957, the Chinese began to establish closer ties with Outer Mongolia. It was reported at the time that when Khrushchev and Bulganin visited Peking in October, 1954, "they are said to have recognized that the Outer MPR, while retaining independence, should eventually come within China's sphere of influence." 39 However, in 1964, Mao Tse-tung said that during those discussions, "we took up this question [of Outer Mongolia] but they refused to talk to us." 40

A number of things indicate, however, that the Chinese did win some sort of Soviet approval for action in Mongolia. By 1956, all Russian troops were withdrawn from Mongolia,

36 Rupen, Twentieth Century, p. 272.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
and the number of non-military personnel was greatly reduced.\textsuperscript{41} Also, during this time, the Chinese began to extend themselves into Mongolia. The Chinese installed a new ambassador in Ulan Bator, Ho Ying, who had been a high official in the Chinese Foreign Ministry, and this signified a higher-level representation, in terms of the stature of Ho Ying.\textsuperscript{42} The Mongolian People's Republic and China signed an agreement in 1955 which provided that Chinese laborers would be allowed to immigrate to Mongolia on short term contracts, with the option of Mongolian citizenship.\textsuperscript{43} All of these events seem to show that the Chinese were taking a far larger role than before in Outer Mongolia, and that the Russians were either losing or relinquishing their control there.

However, in May, 1957, when the problems of succession had been solved in Moscow and Khrushchev was in control, the Russians seem to have begun to reassert themselves in Mongolia. For the next three and a half years, the Chinese and the Russians vied for power in Outer Mongolia. The remainder of this paper deals with the period from May, 1957 to December, 1960, that is, from the first indication that the Russians planned to re-enter the Mongolian scene to the time

\textsuperscript{41}Rupen, \textit{Twentieth Century}, p. 275.

\textsuperscript{42}Ibid., p. 273.

\textsuperscript{43}Ibid.
when it became obvious that the Chinese influence had deteriorated to the point at which it was almost non-existent. This paper will attempt to follow the declining relations between China and the Mongolian People's Republic during this time.
 CHAPTER II

MAY, 1957 TO AUGUST, 1958

May, 1957, marked the time when the Russians began to reassert themselves in Outer Mongolia after approximately three years of slow withdrawal. The Chinese countered the Russian moves, beginning in August, 1958, in an attempt to retain the initiative there. As was stated in the previous chapter (see pp. 11-12), the Chinese were given, or began taking, a larger role in the Mongolian People's Republic. Although an unnamed highly qualified member of the Russian Academy of Sciences insisted, in September, 1956, that "the Chinese will concentrate on developing such areas as Inner Mongolia, Sinkiang and Tibet, while Russia will concentrate on Siberia and the Mongolian People's Republic,"¹ it seems clear that the Chinese were becoming a powerful force in Outer Mongolia during these three years, 1955 to 1957.

The first indication that the Soviet Union intended to reassert its primacy in the Mongolian People's Republic came in May, 1957. On May 15, a joint Soviet-Mongolian statement was issued in Moscow, bearing the signatures of Nikolay Bulganin, Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers, and

Yumjagiin Tsedenbal, Mongolian Prime Minister. The statement was a pledge by the Soviet Union to give massive aid to the Mongolian economy. Two joint Mongolian-Russian stock companies were given over to complete Mongol control. The Soviet Union "turned over to the Mongolian People's Republic without compensation the enterprises of the Mongolneft (Mongolian Oil) Trust," a gift of more than 300 million rubles. Also, the joint-stock company that had established a small mining industry in Mongolia, Sovmongolmetal, was sold to Outer Mongolia "on favorable terms." Also, the two governments indicated that on Mongolian request, the Soviet Union would supply industrial and agricultural aid. There was to be a direct loan of government credits to Mongolia in the amount of 200 million rubles, also on easy terms. After a period of three years of Soviet inactivity, the Bulganin-Tsedenbal statement can be seen as the beginning of a Soviet effort to assert its primacy in Outer Mongolia.

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3 Ibid.; see also, Murphy, Soviet Mongolia, pp. 175-176.

4 Ibid. It is interesting to note that these joint-stock companies were among the last to be dissolved by Moscow. The joint-stock companies in Hungary and Rumania were terminated in September, 1954, and those in Bulgaria and China in October, 1954. The Soviet-North Korean companies continued until May, 1955. G. D. Embree, The Soviet Union Between the 19th and 20th Party Congresses (The Hague, 1959), p. 156.

Four days before this announcement of the Russian aid, the Mongolian ambassador to China, Gombojavyn Ochirbat, was replaced by Sonomyn Luvsan. Ochirbat, who was transferred to the Mongolian embassy in East Germany, had served as the Mongolian ambassador to Peking during the period of growing Chinese influence in Outer Mongolia. Luvsan, before his appointment to Peking, was a Deputy Prime Minister and the Minister of Trade. Although Luvsan was of high rank, the fact that Ochirbat, who as Mongolian ambassador to Peking must have played a role in the growth of Sino-Mongolian relations, was replaced at the time when the Russians were beginning to reassert themselves in Outer Mongolia, suggests that this ambassadorial change was the first step in the weakening of the Chinese position in Mongolia.

The timing of the Russian move into Outer Mongolia as shown in the Soviet-Mongolian statement and the ambassadorial change could be interpreted as a Russian response to both the growing Chinese power in Mongolia and the growing Chinese prestige in the Communist bloc countries. Following the unsuccessful revolts of 1956 in Hungary and Poland, the Chinese appear to have encouraged the Poles to demand the

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7 Rupen, Twentieth Century, p. 275.
8 Ibid.
right to "find Polish answers to Polish questions" and not be made to follow blindly the Soviet example. In other words, the Chinese wanted the Poles to be able to find their own path to socialism. The stance taken by the Chinese concerning the Polish and the Hungarian cases "was warmly welcomed by Soviet satellite countries and the international prestige of the Peking [sic] regime was highly enhanced by it."10

During May, 1957, Kliment Voroshilov, chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, was touring China attempting "to persuade the Peking regime to abandon the "contending and blooming" and adhere to the policy of proletarian dictatorship."11 Possibly the Russian move into Outer Mongolia was timed not only to regain Russian primacy in Outer Mongolia, but also to have an impact on Chinese prestige in the Communist bloc, and to aid the arguments of Voroshilov with a show of economic power.

Another change in the ranks of the three countries' diplomatic corps that possibly shows the renewed Russian interest in Outer Mongolia was the appointment of Vyacheslav Molotov, former Soviet Foreign Minister and member of the


11 Ibid.
Soviet Central Committee, as the new Russian ambassador to Ulan Bator in August, 1957.

Appointment of a man of Molotov's stature and reputation to Ulan Bator naturally suggests speculation that he operated as "dictator of Mongolia" and pursued especially aggressive and vigorous policies. And, since the period of his service (August 31, 1957 to September 27, 1960) corresponded to renewed Soviet activity in Outer Mongolia to counteract Chinese moves there, simple chronological "evidence" might suggest that Molotov himself reasserted Soviet primacy.12

However, Rupen indicates that since Molotov was assigned to Ulan Bator as a form of exile,13 he "may not have been the chosen instrument of policy."14

But Molotov probably did have power, and possibly did exercise some control over the internal affairs of the Mongolian government. In the summer of 1958, there was a border incident between Russian Tannu Tuva and Outer Mongolia.15 The Ulan Bator government protested to Moscow, but was forced to retract the protest.16 A special commission was formed in Ulan Bator and "one of the results of the

12Rupen, Twentieth Century, p. 275.

13"On 29 June 1957 a communique was issued [in Moscow] which stated that an 'anti-party group' consisting of Malenkov, Kaganovich and Molotov . . . had been expelled from the Central Committee . . . by a unanimous vote of the Central Committee." Leonard Schapiro, The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (New York, 1960), p. 561.

14Rupen, Twentieth Century, p. 276.


16Rupen, Twentieth Century, p. 277.
special commission, said to have been led by Molotov, was
alleged to have been the removal of the Mongolian Foreign
Minister, [Sodnomyn] Avarzed, in the summer of 1958."\(^{17}\)

The Chinese government did not officially decry these
manifestations of Soviet reassertion in Outer Mongolia.
However, Chou En-lai seemed to have voiced the Chinese
determination to continue its penetration into Outer Mon-
golia in a speech on October 3, 1957. Chou said:

The Chinese people admire the achievements of the
Mongolian people in their socialist construction,
and always look upon the Mongolian people's
achievements as their own. . . . We are convinced
that the friendly cooperation between China and
Mongolia in the economic and cultural fields will
further strengthen in the days to come. . . .\(^{18}\)

Although there was no official Chinese government response,
some Chinese took advantage of the relative freedom of the
"Hundred Flowers" period and commented on Soviet foreign
policy in general. "Several prominent Chinese (notably
Huang Ch'i-hsiang, a member of the National Defense Coun-
cil) professed to see little difference between Czarist and
Soviet imperialism. . . ."\(^{19}\) But the Chinese government
opposed this view in the "anti-rightist" campaigns that
followed the Hundred Flowers, "during which all anti-Soviet

\(^{17}\)Ibid.

\(^{18}\)SCMP, #1627, October 4, 1957, p. 47.

\(^{19}\)Dennis Doolin, Territorial Claims in the Sino-Soviet
tendencies were severely criticized."20

One indication of the Chinese attitude toward Outer Mongolia, and quite probably a determining factor in the Mongol attitudes toward Peking, were the actions of the Chinese government in the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region. During the Rectification Campaign after the Hundred Flowers, that is, the latter half of 1957 and 1958, one of the "rightist" tendencies that the Peking government attempted to overcome was the tendency toward local nationalism. In particular, they fought local nationalism in Sinkiang and Inner Mongolia.21

The Mongols of the Mongolian People's Republic undoubtedly were aware of the influx of Han Chinese into Inner Mongolia,22 and were aware of the fear of the Inner Mongolians of being Sinicized and of losing their national identity.


The close cultural tie between the Mongols of Inner and Outer Mongolia can be seen in a speech given by the head of the Outer Mongolian delegation, Suronjab, at the 10th anniversary of the autonomy of Inner Mongolia. On that occasion he said that "the people in his country and those in Inner Mongolia are of the same nationality and have long been sharing their happiness and sorrows." He further stated, "The people of his country regard the 10th anniversary of the founding of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region as their own festival..." This close tie would probably mean that the Ulan Bator government would carefully study any Chinese action against the Mongol minority in Inner Mongolia, and any suppression of Mongol nationalism there.

The tendency toward local nationalism in Inner Mongolia can be shown by the charges made by Peking against some Mongols. The charges indicate a growing fear of the Han Chinese by the Inner Mongolians, for Peking claimed that Mongols had called for:

... The separation of the Mongols and the Hans in Inner Mongolian autonomous region, and engaged in activities for seceding from the motherland. They opposed the setting up of economic centers in the pastoral areas, opposed the setting up of fodder bases, opposed migration and land reclamation and opposed construction Paotow [sic] into an

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24 Ibid.
industrial base, arbitrarily asserting that all these things were "harmful to the Mongol peoples!"  

Also, the Chinese claimed:

[The Mongols] opposed democratic reformation and socialist transformation, claiming that this would "destroy national characteristics." Where culture and education were concerned, they closed their eyes and said, "Since the liberation, the Mongol language has been retrogressing. The Mongols are about to be assimilated."  

Further, the Chinese accused the Mongols of:

... Making capital out of the fact that there are now in our region [Inner Mongolia] only 1,000,000 odd Mongolians but over 7,000,000 Han people plus some Mongolians who for historical reasons have forgotten the Mongolian language, both spoken and written, the rightists assert that "the Mongolian nationality is about to be assimilated by the Han nationality" and disseminate the nonsensical view that "there will always be a struggle between the Mongolian and Han nationalities."  

The government in Ulan Bator must have looked askance at these attacks on Mongolian nationalism that took place in China, at the expense of their brothers in Inner Mongolia. The Mongols possibly could have found reason to fear for the destruction of the Mongols, as a nationality, in Inner Mongolia. The Peking government commented on the assimilation of the Mongols in these terms:


26.Ibid.  
27.Wang Tsai-t'ien, "Persevere with Struggle Against Nationalism to the End!," SCMP, #1718, January 28, 1958.
In their working and living together, the Mongolian, Han and other nationalities will see a certain degree of fusion of their living habits and their different languages. Such fusion is not "assimilation but civilization" [my emphasis], as it were. It is inevitable in the course of social development, and must not be confused with the "compulsory assimilation" carried out by the reactionary ruling classes. 28

Similarly, the Soviet Union seemed, in July, 1958, to be making tentative moves in the direction of discouraging Pan-Mongolism. On July 7, 1958, the Supreme Soviet decreed that the word "Mongolian" would be deleted from the name of the Buryat-Mongolian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (BMASSR), and it was now to be known as the Buryat ASSR. 29

However, in the same month Moscow raised another Mongol group, the Kalmyks, to the status of an autonomous republic. 30 Therefore, as indicated by the treatment of Mongols in their respective countries, it would seem that the Russians were making far less substantial inroads into Mongolian nationalism and pan-Mongolism, or at least were more discreet in their activities, than were the Chinese.

The conclusion can be drawn then that the Russians in this

28Ibid., p. 19.


30Rupen, "Outer Mongolia, 1957-1960," Pacific Affairs, Vol. XXXIII, #2 (June, 1960), 133. Also, he explains that the Kalmyks were raised to the status of an autonomous region "as an act of contrition for unjustified abolition of the Kalmyk Autonomous Republic by Stalin on December 27, 1943."
field offered to the Mongolian People's Republic a better alternative than did the Chinese. 31

However, China was not willing to allow the Soviet Union to reassert itself completely in Outer Mongolia, and thereby exclude the Chinese, as had been the case in the years before 1949. One aspect of this unwillingness can be seen in the continuation of the Sino-Mongolian agreement of 1955, which allowed Chinese laborers to go to Outer Mongolia (see above, p. 11). The agreement had continued in effect into 1958, and 2400 additional Chinese laborers were sent into Outer Mongolia. 32 The Ulan Bator government was, and is, always in need of laborers, because, as Robert Rupen explains:

Mongols only rarely and then under protest would work on construction, dig ditches, build bridges, and they found it quite proper for Chinese to do these things for them. . . . They have protected their traditional nomadic pastoralism partly by refusing to do other things. 33

Possibly the Mongolians saw this as an opportunity to gain the needed laborers and, in a small way, to declare a desire not to be completely dominated by the Soviet Union.

31 Owen Lattimore, Nomads and Commissars, p. 10, interestingly disregards the whole question of pan-Mongolism, "As in the case of the Buryats, many Mongols of Inner Mongolia like to stress the theme of common Mongolness, while the Mongols of Outer Mongolia tend more and more to think of [the Inner Mongolians and the Buryat Mongols] as different people."

32 Rupen, Twentieth Century, p. 274.

33 Ibid., p. 351.
Another indication that the Chinese continued to desire to have a role in Outer Mongolia can be shown by their observer delegation to the Thirteenth Congress of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP), which was held in Ulan Bator in March, 1958. The Chinese delegation was led by Ulanfu, "head of the MAR [sic, IMAR] chief of China's National Minorities Commission, full member of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party . . . and alternate member of its Politburo." Ulanfu is a Mongol, and "no Soviet Mongol (Buryat or Kalmyk) occupies so important a national position as does Ulanfu in China."

However, there would seem to be a drawback in the Chinese choice of representation. Ulanfu, although of high rank and a Mongol, is almost completely Sinified and does not even speak Mongolian. Generally, Russian Mongols, although not in positions of such importance, were far less Russified than the Mongols of China were Sinified. Possibly, this could have been a contributing factor in the Outer Mongolians' analysis of the policies of Russia and China. That is, the Mongols of Russia are allowed to remain Mongols, while efforts are made to transform the Mongols of China into Chinese.

35 Rupen, Twentieth Century, p. 280.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
While in Outer Mongolia, Ulanfu toured the country making speeches to both the Mongols and the Chinese workers. He urged these Chinese laborers "to learn humbly from their Mongolian colleagues, to abide by the Mongolian laws and social customs, and to develop their labor initiative in work."\(^{38}\) This statement might indicate, by calling on the Chinese to "abide by the Mongolian laws and social customs," that there might have been some breaking of laws and social customs, and the creation of some ill will.

During 1958, the Chinese showed their continued interest in the Mongolian People's Republic by signing a number of diplomatic agreements with the Ulan Bator government. Among these agreements were a civil aviation agreement,\(^ {39}\) an exchange of commodities protocol,\(^ {40}\) and a cultural cooperation agreement.\(^ {41}\) According to the former Vice-Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Sodnomyn Avarzed, who was studying in Moscow, "A number of large industrial plants, cultural institutions and public services are being built with the fraternal, free assistance of the Chinese people!"\(^ {42}\)

\(^{38}\)SCMP, #1741, March 28, 1958, p. 34.
\(^{39}\)SCMP, #1701, January 29, 1958, p. 38.
\(^{40}\)SCMP, #1703, January 31, 1958, p. 46.
\(^{41}\)SCMP, #1719, February 21, 1958, p. 46.
However, the Chinese seemed to be drawing back from their 1953 to 1957 attitude of complete cooperation with Outer Mongolia. This can be seen by the introduction of the Latin alphabet into Inner Mongolia in 1958. In 1956 Peking had declared, in an obvious concession to Outer Mongolia, that the Cyrillic alphabet, which was used in Outer Mongolia, would become the alphabet for Inner Mongolia, replacing the traditional Mongolian script. Later, the Chinese even called for a faster conversion than had been originally planned. "Four instead of the previous six years [were]... to be allotted for completion of the plan." Now, however, in 1958, Peking announced that the Latin alphabet would be used in Inner Mongolia and all national minority areas. Robert Rupen, in an endnote, quotes a Chinese source as writing:

Since the Chinese language and Chinese script is becoming more and more the common tool of communication among the various nationalities of China, and since the present Chinese Language Transcription Policy has already decided to employ the Latin alphabet, this policy ought also to be taken as the common basis for the construction and reforming of the scripts of minority peoples. This is to say that hereafter, whenever a nationality (in China)


44 Ibid.

45 Rupen, Twentieth Century, p. 275.
constructs or reforms its script, it should always take the Latin script as its basis. . . . 46

Although the Chinese declared this policy applicable to all minority nationalities, this change in the language policy in 1958 can be seen as the end of a possible Chinese attempt to bring Outer Mongolia closer to Inner Mongolia and China. Hereafter, as had been the case before 1956, the two parts of Mongolia would have a different written language.

Another example of the retreat of the Chinese from Outer Mongolia became evident in 1958. The Chinese had participated in a joint Chinese-Soviet-Mongolian history project, to write the history of Mongolia. The Chinese had attended the meeting in 1956 at Ulan Bator, and in 1957 at Moscow; 47 but the 1958 joint meeting which was to take place in Peking was cancelled without explanation by the Chinese. 48 Also in 1958, the Chinese withdrew from participation in a joint Chinese-Soviet-Mongolian archeological expedition into Outer Mongolia. 49

During this period, 1957 to 1958, the volume of trade between Russia and Mongolia, and China and Mongolia remained

49 Ibid.
fairly constant. The Russians, with a greater capability, obviously imported and exported much more than the Chinese. Mongolian imports from China went up from 50 million rubles to 72 million rubles, approximately, in 1958.\textsuperscript{50} The Mongolian imports from Russia went down from 236 million rubles to 203 million rubles in 1958.\textsuperscript{51} Both Russia and China lessened their purchases from Mongolia in 1958. The Chinese had imported almost 18 million rubles of goods in 1957, but went down to 10 million in 1958.\textsuperscript{52} The Russians went from 190 million rubles in 1957 to 179 million in 1958.\textsuperscript{53} As these figures clearly show, the Russians dominated the Mongolian import and export trade. But the Chinese, while showing signs of withdrawing from Mongolia in 1958, made it clear in the amount of material sold to Mongolia that they intended to continue to exercise some influence on Mongolian life. By August, 1958, the Chinese were willing to mount a "counter-offensive" into Mongolia to offset the Russian re-entry there a year before.

\textsuperscript{50}National Economy for 40 Years, p. 152.
\textsuperscript{51}Ibid., p. 153.
\textsuperscript{52}Ibid., p. 154.
\textsuperscript{53}Ibid.
August, 1958 marked the first stages of a Chinese attempt to retain the initiative from the Russians in the quest for influence in the Mongolian People's Republic. For eight months, until March, 1959, the Chinese continued their offensive. In March, a high-level purge of what seems to be a pro-Chinese leadership clique was announced in Ulan Bator. This purge can be considered a major setback of the Chinese effort and a victory for the Soviet Union, although other interpretations will be discussed later in this chapter.

In August, 1958, Ho Ying, the Chinese envoy in Ulan Bator, was recalled to Peking.¹ He had served as the Chinese ambassador to the Mongolian People's Republic during the period of growing Chinese influence there and through the initial stages of its decline, that is, from September, 1954 to September, 1958. His replacement, Hsieh Fu-sheng, was appointed on September 22, 1958.² Interestingly, Who's Who in Communist China does not list any posts held by

¹Rupen, Twentieth Century, p. 275.
²Ibid., p. 276.
Hsieh prior to his appointment to Ulan Bator. The appointment of a relatively unknown might indicate that the Chinese were reducing the level of their representation in Outer Mongolia and reducing their efforts and interest there. However, the events of the next few months do not substantiate this appraisal.

Perhaps the Chinese leadership felt that the situation in Ulan Bator called for a new man to handle the renewed Chinese effort. Ho Ying's recall does not imply that he was demoted; on the contrary, he returned to Peking and was appointed as the Deputy Director of the First Asian Affairs Department (dealing with Communist Asian countries) in the newly reorganized Foreign Ministry. In January, 1960, he was given further responsibility as the Director of the West Asian and African Affairs Department of the Foreign Ministry.

Late September and October, 1958, were the months in which the Chinese not only began an attempt to bind the Sino-Mongolian relations more closely together, but also began to establish closer relations with all of the

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4 Ibid., p. 206.


Communist countries of the world. On September 30, the Chinese announced the establishment of Friendship Associations to aid in understanding other nations and in drawing the various Communist nations together. Among the Friendship Associations formed were Sino-Albanian, Sino-Bulgarian, Sino-Hungarian, Sino-Vietnamese, Sino-German, Sino-Korean, Sino-Rumanian, and Sino-Czechoslovak.

Also on September 30, a Chinese-Mongolian Friendship Association was founded in Peking, and a few days later, a Mongolian-Chinese Friendship Association was formed in Ulan Bator. Sharap, the Secretary General of the Presidium of the Great People's Hural (the parliamentary body of the Mongolian government) was selected to be the chairman of the Mongolian-Chinese Association. The president of the Chinese-Mongolian Association was Chang Chih-hsiang, Deputy Chairman of the State Council's Commission for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries. The Mongols' purpose in founding their association was expressed by Sharap at a banquet given by the Chinese ambassador to honor the founding of the associations. Sharap said that "the

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7 T'ien Ch'i, "Foreign Relations," p. 190.
8 SCMP, #1871, October 9, 1958, p. 80.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
association would enable the people to learn and make extensive use of China's experience in socialist construction. ... This statement might indicate that the two countries were indeed drawing more closely together.

Another indication of the Chinese interest in Outer Mongolia can be seen in the invitation to the Mongolian Army to send a delegation to view the Chinese People's Army. A Mongolian Army delegation, headed by Batyn Dorzh, Minister of the Army and Public Security, arrived in China in the last week in September, 1958. Perhaps the Chinese meant to impress the Mongolian officers with the might of the Chinese army, and in this way strengthen the ties between the Mongolian and Chinese armies. New China News Agency indicated that the visit "would further promote the friendship and solidarity between the peoples of the two countries, especially the armies of the countries [my emphasis]."

Beginning in mid-October, New China News Agency reported the turning over to the Ulan Bator government of a number of completed Chinese-financed and Chinese-built construction projects in Outer Mongolia. The completion of the

12 SCMP, #1870, October 8, 1958, p. 54.
13 SCMP, #1865, October 1, 1958, pp. 39-40.
14 SCMP, #1865, October 1, 1958, p. 41.
15 Among the completed projects were highway bridges, paved roads, a building, a stadium and a gymnasium. See
construction projects, taken with the change in the Chinese embassy in Ulan Bator, the formation of the Friendship Associations, and the apparent strengthening of military ties, all indicate that the Chinese were again entering into the competition in Outer Mongolia. T'ien Ch'i agrees with this viewpoint: "Since September, the Peiping regime extended again into . . . Outer Mongolia its economic and cultural influence which had been withdrawn from those areas earlier that year."\(^{16}\)

While the Chinese were thus engaged, there occurred in Outer Mongolia in November, 1958, the first step of a high level purge which probably had its basis in the rivalry between China and the Soviet Union. In 1954, Dordj Damba had taken over the position of First Secretary of the Party from Tsedenbal\(^{17}\) at the insistence of the new leadership in Moscow.\(^{18}\) Now, a plenary session of the Central Committee of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party which met from November 20 to 22, 1958, relieved Damba of his position as

\(^{16}\)T'ien Ch'i, "Foreign Relations," p. 189.

\(^{17}\)Rupen, Twentieth Century, p. 278.

\(^{18}\)Adam B. Ulam, "Soviet Ideology and Soviet Foreign Policy," World Politics, Vol. XI, #2 (January, 1959), 163. "The satellite parties were told in 1953-1954 that the office of Secretary General could no longer be combined with that of President or Prime Minister."
First Secretary. The session decided that Tsedenbal was to be the First Secretary of the Party, and he was to retain his position as Prime Minister. Two secretaries of the Central Committee, C. Suronjab and B. Damoin, were also relieved of their posts. This November "purge" was mild in character since Damba was given his pre-1954 post of Second Secretary of the Party.

The mildness of the "purge" can be seen in the language used in the Central Committee's communique:

The session relieved Comrade Dordj Damba from the post of the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party. The decision was made at his own request for better centralization of Party leadership.

Therefore, Damba was relieved "at his own request" and for the ostensible purpose of "better centralization of Party leadership." The language and the actions of the Central Committee were so mild, in fact, that "some observers viewed the reshuffle chiefly as being in line with the common communist practice of combining the Prime Ministerial position

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19 SCMP, #1902, November 26, 1958, p. 64.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
23 SCMP, #1902, November 26, 1958, p. 64.
with the key party function,"²⁴ and not as a purge. The second phase of the purge, in March, 1959, will be described later in this chapter when it better fits the chronological sequence of events.

The Chinese do not seem to have looked with alarm on these events in Outer Mongolia, but continued to press for closer relations. The planned visit of a Mongolian delegation to discuss a new economic agreement with China was carried out on schedule. The delegation, which was headed by Demchigiiin Molomjamts, Vice-Chairman of the Council of Ministers, arrived in China on December 23.²⁵ The Chinese government extended every courtesy to the visiting Mongolians. "During its two-week stay in mainland China, the Mongolian delegation was given honored-guest treatment."²⁶ An indication of the treatment accorded the Mongols can be seen in a report that stated:

All Peking papers today [December 24] give frontpage prominence to the arrival here yesterday of the Mongolian Government delegation . . . for talks with the Chinese government on strengthening Sino-Mongolian economic cooperation. . . . The Jen-min Jih-pao also gives background material on the Mongolian People's Republic and its

²⁴Geisler, "Recent Developments in Outer Mongolia," p. 184.
²⁵Ibid.
²⁶Ibid.
achievements in Building socialism since the founding of the Republic.\textsuperscript{27}

While the delegation was in China, the Chinese continued to turn over to the Ulan Bator government more completed construction projects, in line with the 1956 Sino-Mongolian Agreement on Chinese Economic and Technical Aid, which gave the Mongols 160 million rubbles in aid. Among the works that were given over to Mongolian ownership were a thermal power plant,\textsuperscript{28} a glass plant and a tile-brick plant.\textsuperscript{29}

In Peking, the two countries signed an economic and technical aid agreement on December 29, 1958.\textsuperscript{30} The agreement called for a long-term loan of 100 million rubles to the Mongolian government.\textsuperscript{31} Also, the Chinese agreed "to help to build two electric power stations, three reinforced concrete motor-road bridges, a poultry farm, starch factory, alcohol factory, workshop for small metal products and 50,000 square meters of housing."\textsuperscript{32} Clearly, the Chinese meant to continue to assert themselves economically in Outer Mongolia.

\textsuperscript{27}SCMP, #1924, December 31, 1958, p. 38.
\textsuperscript{28}SCMP, #1923, December 30, 1958, p. 31.
\textsuperscript{29}SCMP, #1924, December 31, 1958, p. 42.
\textsuperscript{30}SCMP, #1926, January 5, 1959, p. 45.
\textsuperscript{31}Ibid., pp. 45-46: "The Government of Mongolia will return the loan with commodities in the 15-year period beginning 1962."
However, in a speech Tsedenbal may have indicated that the Mongolian People's Republic had relied predominantly on the Soviet Union in the past, and intended to do the same in the future. At a meeting of the Revolutionary Youth League in Ulan Bator, shortly after the signing of the economic accord with China, Tsedenbal mentioned the Chinese aid in an off-hand manner. "He recalled the assistance from the Soviet Union in Mongolia's economic construction. The new 100-million-ruble loan from China would help forward the developments in Mongolia, he added."33

The internal affairs of Outer Mongolia were changing as rapidly as the foreign affairs during this period. The movement to establish cooperatives continued and intensified during this second period. The number of the collectives was reduced, as smaller cooperatives were merged into larger units. In December, 1958, there were listed 694 cooperative units, while by January, 1959, there were listed 289 cooperatives.34 Also, the percentage of the households that belonged to the cooperatives quickly rose. In October, 1958, the percentage of herdsmen households incorporated into cooperatives was listed as 55%, as opposed to 35% six months before.35 By March, 1959, the Mongolian People's

33 SCMP, #1927, January 6, 1959, p. 45.
34 Rupen, Twentieth Century, p. 293.
35 SCMP, #1890, October 23, 1958, p. 58.
Republic was able to proclaim that all herdsmen, that is 99.3%, were members of agricultural cooperatives. The purpose of the collectives is perhaps best summed up by Harrison Salisbury, who after a three-week journey through the country reported:

... Many large-scale state and collective farms have been established in order to provide the framework of the intended economy based on tillage, grain production, fodder production, cattle feeding, and dairying rather than meat raising on natural grass pasture.

In late March, 1959, the Mongolian People's Republic announced that the basic administrative unit, the bag or bago, would be abolished. After that time, the territorial unit roughly equivalent to a county, the somon, would be merged with the cooperative to form a new administrative unit, the somon-cooperative. It was announced that six of the seventeen Outer Mongolian provinces had already been reorganized along these lines. The purpose purported to be a way "to bring about a radical change in the existing division of administrative units in order to push production ahead." Also, it increased the centralization of power

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36 Rupen, Twentieth Century, p. 293.
38 SCMP, #1984, April 2, 1959, p. 59.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
in the hands of the Party and insured tighter control of the local level in a period of rapid collectivization.\footnote{G. Ginsburgs, "Local Government in Mongolia," Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. X, #4 (August, 1961), 504.} It is interesting to note that although Ginsburgs views this reorganization as being part of a "drive to copy the Soviet experiment . . . in line with a conscious belief on their [the Mongolian leadership's] part in the necessity to build socialism in Mongolia on a pattern already tested in the USSR,"\footnote{Ibid., p. 506.} Robert Rupen sees it differently. He points out that the reorganization resembles the Chinese system used in Inner Mongolia and notes that "only Chinese sources, and not Russian ones, have described this development in the M.P.R."\footnote{Robert A. Rupen, "The M.P.R. and Sino-Soviet Competition," Communist Strategies in Asia, ed. A. Doak Barnett (New York, 1963), p. 266. The Chinese Communists reported that a reorganization of the administrative units was undertaken in Inner Mongolia in 1959. A total of 2,200 livestock cooperatives were merged into 150 livestock communes, and, usually, one new livestock commune was equivalent to one somon. The names and purposes may differ between Inner and Outer Mongolia, but the basic reorganization was on similar lines. Ibid., p. 267.}  

It is, perhaps, the speed with which the Mongolian government moved to collectivize the herdsmen, and the damage collectivization does to the traditional nomadic way of life of the Mongols that prompted reports of internal dissension in Outer Mongolia. In mid-January, 1959, both
Russian and Chinese papers carried a statement from the Mongolian News Agency, Montisame, which labeled as false stories that were printed in various New Zealand newspapers. The stories, attributed to a member of the Nationalist Chinese government on Taiwan, alleged that "there had been 'armed uprisings' in the Mongolian People's Republic. It further alleged that one of those uprisings had been led by the Mongolian Prime Minister himself. The uprisings ... were put down by Soviet troops." There is no way to verify these reports; however, the folly of the statement that Tsedenbal had led an uprising which had to be put down by the Soviet army can be seen in the events of the next two months. Tsedenbal, with apparent Soviet approval, took control of the Party leadership only two months after this alleged internal uprising (see below). However, there may have been some reaction to the quick transition to the collectives and uprisings of some sort cannot be completely ruled out. The Montisame reaction to the New Zealand stories was possibly over-sensitive. They were labeled as:

... A crude invention from start to finish and a piece of foul slander against the Mongolian People's Republic and the Mongolian people who are rallied more closely than ever before behind

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45 Ibid., SCMP.
their Party and government and are confidently building socialism in their country. 46

As if to rebut the allegation that he had led a revolt that had been crushed by the Russian army, Tsedenbal headed the official Outer Mongolian delegation to Moscow for the Twenty-First (Extraordinary) Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The Congress convened on January 27, 1959. 47 It was at this Congress that N. S. Khrushchev continued his call for peaceful competition with the West, and inaugurated the seven-year plan. 48 Also, he put forth his plan for the development of the virgin lands of eastern and central Russia. 49 This was to entail the broader use of untouched land, the production of more tractors and a general emphasis on agriculture and light industry. 50

While in Moscow, Tsedenbal negotiated with the Soviet Union for aid, and on February 10 he signed an agreement with Khrushchev. 51 The effect of Khrushchev's planned program of the opening of new land on the negotiations is

46 Ibid.
47 CDSP, Vol. XI, #2 (February 18, 1959), 12.
48 Ibid., pp. 13-19; see also, CDSP, Vol. XI, #5 (March 11, 1959), 13-20.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
51 CDSP, Vol. XI, #6-7 (March 18, 1959), 23.
readily apparent. The agreement, in essence, called for "Soviet aid to the Mongolian People's Republic in cultivating virgin lands and in geological surveying."52 The purpose was also clearly stated: "The cultivation of virgin land in the next two years so that the country's grain needs can be met out of adequate output..."53 To accomplish this goal, the Soviet Union agreed to send to Outer Mongolia a number of tractors, reapers and combines; and, also, over 300 engineers, agricultural experts, and drivers.54 The expenses entailed in this two-year aid agreement were to be met by Soviet credits on favorable terms.55 The Chinese press makes no mention of this aid agreement, although there is an article which commented on the Outer Mongolian decision to develop agricultural production in 1959 to 1961. Also, it was reported that "the Soviet Union warmly supported this program and promised to give Mongolia economic and technical assistance."56

It seems likely that while Tsedenbal was negotiating the February aid package with Khrushchev, he was also discussing the internal politics of Outer Mongolia. Shortly

52 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid., p. 24.
after his return to Ulan Bator, a plenary session of the Central Committee of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party was held on March 27 to March 30. This meeting marked the second stage of the purge which began in November of the preceding year. The purge was far reaching and affected a number of men in the highest positions in the government. The main target of the purge was undoubtedly Damba, who only four months before had lost his post as First Secretary of the Party. The terms that were used as reasons for his dismissal from the Central Committee of the Party and its Politburo were "harsh even by communist standards." He was removed for "lack of principle and dishonesty to the Party, for profound ideological and political backwardness, for conservatism and inertia, for conceit and lack of a critical attitude toward himself and for opportunistic tolerance of distortions and shortcomings in work." Among those also removed from positions of power were: B. Damoin, D. Lamchin and Ch. Surenzhav from the Politburo, S. Balgan and D. Samdan from candidate membership in the Politburo. They were charged as being

58 Geisler, "Recent Developments in Outer Mongolia," p. 184.
60 Ibid.
"unfitting in ideological and political level and unworthy in work and personal character."\(^{61}\) Named to the position vacated by Damba, the Second Secretary of the Party, was Luvsantserengiin Tsende.\(^{62}\)

There are various interpretations that could be, and have been, put forward to explain this high level purge. These interpretations range from the view that the Soviet Union was directly responsible for Damba's downfall, to the view that the Chinese were responsible. It might be helpful, and enlightening, to pursue these differing views as an exercise in the problems inherent in any attempt to analyze the internal developments of a closed society. Harrison Salisbury, although granting that Tsedenbal is Moscow oriented,\(^{63}\) sees the main cause of the purge as the program of rapid collectivization and interest in fixed agriculture put forward by Tsedenbal.\(^{64}\) "The split centered on the ambitious scope of Premier Tsedenbal's plans."\(^{65}\) George Murphy agrees with this view, with a

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\(^{61}\)Ibid.

\(^{62}\)Ibid.


\(^{65}\)Ibid.
reverse emphasis. He says, "The lack of speed in economic development was held to his [Damba's] account." 66

Chin Szu-k'ai differs sharply from these two views, and he places the blame for the purge on the Chinese Communists. He says that Damba was in charge of the Mongolian de-Stalinization movement which down-graded Choibalsan, the former Prime Minister. Since the Chinese were opposed to de-Stalinization, the Chinese must have pressured Damba out of office. "The dismissal of Damba [sic] was probably due to the reinforced pressure exercised by Mao. . . ." 67

Geisler takes the same tack and arrives at a completely different conclusion. He blames the Russians, because Damba "had led the 1958 attack on the 'cult of personality' surrounding Choibalsan—an uneasy position following the 21st CPSU Congress and the elevation of Khrushchev in an atmosphere at least approaching 'cultism.'" 68 Also, he says, "While it may not be accurate to describe Damba as having a pro-Peking orientation, it is true that from then [1954] on increased Chinese influence was apparent, and Damba was widely considered to enjoy Chinese support." 69

66 Murphy, Soviet Mongolia, p. 150.
69 Ibid., p. 183.
agrees with Geisler's latter point: "It is conceivable that this purge may have been related to the Sino-Soviet competition for influence . . . so that labeling him [Damba] 'pro-Chinese' would appear reasonable." 70

It is difficult, therefore, to decide for what reasons Damba and the others were relieved of their positions in the Party organization. It is reasonable to assume that it was a combination of forces which precipitated the purge. Damba's economic policy, Tsedenbal's plans, personal power politics, and, probably, Soviet consent, all seemed to have played a part. The purge seemed to be much more acceptable to the Russian leadership than to the Chinese leadership. This can be "proved" in that Pravda carried a full account of the decisions of the Central Committee of the Outer Mongolian Party, 71 while the Survey of the China Mainland Press made no mention of the meeting of the Central Committee or its decisions. And it is reported that "news treatment in Peking was limited to one paragraph." 72 The only Chinese reports stated that Tsende had been named as the new First


71 CDSP, Vol. XI, #13 (April 29, 1959), 21, indicates that Pravda, April 1, 1959, carried the complete text of the Central Committee communique.

72 Geisler, "Recent Developments in Outer Mongolia," p. 187.
Vice-Chairman of the Council of Ministers, but there was no mention of his predecessor, Damba. 73

If these events do mark a shift of Mongolian emphasis to a more pro-Soviet vein, it is possible that the events that were taking place in Tibet during this time had some small part to play in the decision. During 1958 there grew in strength a revolt by the Tibetans against the Chinese rule, which had been established in 1950. 74 By mid-March, 1959, the Dalai Lama feared for his safety, as the Chinese Army moved against the guerrillas in eastern and southern Tibet, and against the Tibetan capital of Lhasa. 75 On the night of March 17, the Dalai Lama fled Lhasa for India, where he established a government in exile on March 19. 76 This revolt or rebellion has been termed the "last and greatest of the revolts of non-Chinese nationalities against Han rule." 77

Although the Mongolian People's Republic does not encourage Buddhism, and, if anything, discourages it, 78 there

75 Ibid., p. 319.
76 Ibid.
78 Rupen, Twentieth Century, pp. 281-282.
is still a tradition of close relations between the Tibetan and Mongolian people. Harrison Salisbury reported that until the Tibetan revolt there had been small-scale Mongolian pilgrimages to Lhasa, and that "there is nothing to indicate that the Buddhist faith is losing its grip." It would seem clear that "it is hardly likely that the Mongols would remain completely indifferent to the fate of a people with whom they have so long been closely linked by tradition and religion." Although the main struggle and blood-letting followed the period covered in this chapter, it would seem that the Ulan Bator government would have been well aware of the happenings in Tibet, and wary of the Chinese.

The period covered by this chapter, August, 1958 to March, 1959, was a period of Soviet success in the face of growing Chinese effort in the Mongolian People's Republic. Although Mongol independence was growing, economic agreements being signed with both the Soviet Union and China, there seems to be a discernible move toward closer relations with the Soviet Union. Damba's purge and the move to agriculture and virgin lands suggest that the Chinese "second

80 Ibid.
81 Ibid.
offensive" failed to meet the challenge of the Soviet Union. Even in the face of these Soviet successes, the Chinese continued to press for closer Sino-Mongol relations. The next chapter will deal with the continued Chinese efforts in Outer Mongolia.
CHAPTER IV
APRIL, 1959 TO DECEMBER, 1960

The period of more than a year and a half covered by this chapter was one of continued Chinese propaganda and economic assaults on the Mongolian People's Republic in hopes of enticing Mongolia into closer Sino-Mongolian relations. This chapter begins after the March, 1959 purge of Damba (the first sign of a more pro-Soviet stance) and follows the Chinese actions, the Soviet Union's counter-actions, and the final decision by the Mongolian leadership to align with the Soviet Union. The decision was made during or shortly after the Moscow Conference of eighty-one Communist parties in November-December, 1960. The Mongolian government seemed willing throughout the period to accept Chinese aid, perhaps as proof of its freedom from complete Russian domination. However, the process of Russia's re-entering the affairs of Mongolia, which began in May, 1957, reached its conclusion in late 1960 and early 1961.

Following, but not necessarily related to, the March purge, the diplomatic representation between China, Russia and Outer Mongolia was altered. The Mongolian ambassador to the People's Republic of China, Sonomyn Luvsan, was recalled from Peking. He left China for Ulan Bator on June 13,
1959.\(^1\) Dendeviin Sharav, a Deputy Prime Minister, was named as Luvsan's replacement.\(^2\) Sharav arrived in China on July 2, 1959 to take over his duties as Mongolian ambassador.\(^3\) Luvsan was named a vice-chairman of the Council of Ministers\(^4\) and deputy Prime Minister for Finance, Commerce, Transport and Communications.\(^5\) It is doubtful that Luvsan's recall was closely related to the "change" in Mongolian attitudes that was demonstrated by the March purge or the Sino-Soviet competition in Mongolia. It is of interest, however, that Luvsan was named as the Mongolian ambassador to the Soviet Union in March, 1960\(^6\) and that this was the first time that the same man had served as the Mongolian envoy to both capitals.\(^7\)

June, 1959, saw the visit to Ulan Bator by Peng Teh-huai, Chinese Defense Minister and Marshal of the People's Liberation Army.\(^8\) Peng's visit is made important and interesting because of his attitude toward the Chinese leadership.

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\(^1\)SCMP, #2037, June 18, 1959, p. 33.

\(^2\)Rupen, Twentieth Century, p. 275.

\(^3\)SCMP, #2051, July 8, 1959, p. 47.

\(^4\)SCMP, #2040, June 23, 1959, p. 34.

\(^5\)Rupen, Twentieth Century, p. 275.

\(^6\)SCMP, #2231, April 5, 1960, p. 47.

\(^7\)Rupen, Twentieth Century, p. 275.

\(^8\)SCMP, #2034, June 15, 1959, p. 38.
He stopped in the Mongolian People's Republic on his way back to China from a seven-week tour of Russia and Eastern Europe. During his stay outside of China he was given encouragement by the Soviet Union to oppose Mao and the Chinese policies. It is, of course, impossible to report what conversations occurred between the now anti-Mao Defense Minister and Tsedenbal, but it could be speculated that Peng might have indicated a distrust of the present Chinese leadership, which he opposed, and an agreement with the policies of the Soviet Union, which had given him encouragement. Coming from such a high ranking member of the Chinese Communist Party, criticism of the policies of China could have added weight to the pro-Soviet element in Mongolia. In any event, Peng Teh-huai was demoted for "anti-Party" activities at a Chinese Central Committee meeting in August, 1959, at Lushan.

The Chinese government continued to appeal to the Mongolian government using the same methods that were shown in the preceding chapters, that is, delegations, praise, and economic aid. During the 38th anniversary of the Mongolian

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9 Schurmann and Schell, The China Reader, p. 276.


People's Republic, Mongolian National Day, in July, 1959, the Peking newspapers went into great detail and great length describing the Mongolian People's Republic and a mass rally held in Peking in honor of Outer Mongolia.  

Jen-min Jih-pao devoted "almost a whole page to reports on the celebration of Mongolian National Day held in Ulan Bator . . . and to features and articles on . . . [Mongolia's] achievements in economic construction and the building of socialism."  

For the next couple of days the Peking papers carried editorials and articles praising Mongolia, including an editorial in Jen-min Jih-pao titled "The Glorious and Victorious Road of the Mongolian People."  

Also, there was an article by the Chinese ambassador to Outer Mongolia, Hsieh Fu-sheng, entitled "Splendid Victory of Co-operativization of Stock Farming in Mongolia."

Mongolian Premier Tsedenbal made two trips to China during the latter half of 1959. The first, in August, can be studied as an indication of Outer Mongolia's pro-Soviet leanings. Tsedenbal was en route to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) and India, and he made only a

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12 SCMP, #2056, July 16, 1959, p. 39.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
short stop in Peking. The intriguing aspect of this visit can be seen in that Tsedenbal was going to India for a state visit during the time when China and India were at odds over the question of national boundaries. This visit to India can be interpreted as an indirect attack on the Chinese posture concerning India. It indicates that the Mongolian position was very close to the Russian position of neutrality concerning the Sino-Indian disagreements.

However, Tsedenbal made another longer, and apparently more cordial, official visit to China in October, 1959. While in Peking, Tsedenbal met with various high ranking officials of the Chinese government, including Liu Shao-chi, Chu Teh, and Chou En-lai. His trip to China was as the head of the Mongolian delegation to the anniversary celebration of the founding of the People's Republic of China. It is important to note that on his departure from China, Tsedenbal was seen off by Chou En-lai and three members of the Politburo of the Central Committee. This gives an indication of the importance of Mongolia to China relative to China.

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16 SCMP, #2090, September 4, 1959, p. 39.
18 SCMP, #2112, October 8, 1959, pp. 44-45.
19 SCMP, #2113, October 9, 1959, p. 30.
20 SCMP, #2114, October 12, 1959, p. 30.
to the importance of the Eastern European bloc countries. The importance can be seen in that no high ranking member of the Chinese government or party saw off the delegations from Bulgaria, Germany, Rumania, Poland or Czechoslovakia.

From September, 1959 to May, 1960 the relations between China and Outer Mongolia followed the pattern that had been established in the previous six years. There were a number of delegations, both Chinese and Mongolian, that visited the other's country for discussions on various topics. Among the missions there was a delegation from the Chinese National People's Congress, a Mongolian economic delegation, a Mongolian education delegation, a Mongolian trade mission, and a delegation from the Great People's Hural. As before, the Chinese continued to publicize the transfer to the Mongolian government of projects built with Chinese aid. In September, 1959 a pulp and paper mill and a prefabricated wooden parts factory were turned over; in November,

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22 SCMP, #2123, October 26, 1959, p. 25.
23 SCMP, #2090, September 4, 1959, p. 35.
24 SCMP, #2121, October 22, 1959, p. 42.
25 SCMP, #2140, November 20, 1959, p. 36.
26 SCMP, #192, February 9, 1960, p. 45.
27 SCMP, #2238, April 14, 1960, p. 45.
28 SCMP, #2095, September 14, 1959, p. 51.
three highway bridges were transferred to Mongolian ownership; and in January, 1960, a woolen textile mill was given to Mongolia.

In the latter half of May, 1960, the Chinese and the Mongolian governments reviewed the 1956 Economic and Technical Assistance Treaty. It was discovered, at the final clearing of accounts, that there was an unspent portion of Chinese money. It was agreed that the Chinese would continue economic assistance for more projects "within the total of the surplus." In this favorable climate, Chinese Premier Chou En-lai and Foreign Minister Chen Yi arrived in Ulan Bator for discussions with the Mongolian government on May 27, 1960.

Chou En-lai's visit to Mongolia seems to be the culmination of the Chinese effort for closer ties with the Mongolian People's Republic. Even with the apparent pro-Russian leanings of the Mongolian leaders, the Chinese still held out the hope for better relations between the two countries, and, obviously, felt that more economic aid was the way to achieve this end. The result of the talks between

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29 SCMP, #2129, November 3, 1959, p. 39.
31 SCMP, #2268, May 31, 1960, p. 41.
32 Ibid.
33 SCMP, #2271, June 3, 1960, p. 36.
Chou En-lai, Chen Yi and Tsedenbal was a long-term loan for the period 1961 to 1965 (the third Mongolian Five Year Plan) in the amount of 200 million rubles. Also, the Chinese promised to build for Mongolia "a number of industrial enterprises, water conservancy works and public utilities." 

Another result of Chou's trip to Mongolia was the signing of a Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance between the two countries. Article II of the treaty stipulated that "the contracting parties will consult with each other on all important international questions of common interest to the People's Republic of China and the People's Republic of Mongolia." Article IV states that "the contracting parties reiterate that they will continue to consolidate and develop economic, cultural, and scientific and technological cooperation between the two countries. . . ." 

It appeared that the Chinese had made a strong bid to gain influence in Outer Mongolia, and had been successful. It was even reported at the time that "the new treaty places relations between China and Mongolia upon approximately the same basis as relations between the Soviet Union and

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34SCMP, #2273, June 8, 1960, p. 43.
35Ibid.
36SCMP, #2272, June 7, 1960, pp. 40-41 (complete text of treaty made public).
37Ibid.
38Ibid.
and Mongolia." However, two facts contradict this viewpoint. As was pointed out in the same article, "the Chinese treaty appears to lack the mutual military assistance clauses contained in the Soviet-Mongolian treaty." Also, a month later, Tsedenbal, in a report to the Great People's Hural, discussed the foreign assistance received by Mongolia. In his report he "dealt with the great significance of the fraternal assistance rendered by the Soviet people." But he made no mention, that was reported, of China or of the newly signed aid agreement with China or the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance.

Certainly not directly responsible for the pro-Soviet stance of the Mongolian government, but an indication of a cause for possible Mongolian fear of China, was a remark made by Chou En-lai in Ulan Bator during a speech. It is reported that he said, "The Mongolian Republic possesses vast lands and rich underground resources. . . . For construction, an increase of population is needed." Chou's statement provides a reason for a possible Mongolian fear of being used as a release for the growing Chinese population; a fear of a massive Chinese emigration to the

40 Ibid.
41 SCMP, #2295, July 13, 1960, p. 47.
42 China News Analysis, #328 (June 17, 1960), p. 7.
Mongolian People's Republic. Although surface indications were that the Chinese had once again regained the initiative and a great deal of influence in Outer Mongolia, the events of the next six months suggest that these were false indications.

On August 23, 1960, Molotov, the Russian ambassador in Ulan Bator, was replaced. The timing of this move does not seem to be of importance, nor does the removal itself seem to have any bearing on the Sino-Soviet competition in Mongolia. Reportedly Molotov had been suggested as ambassador to Argentina in 1958, to the Netherlands in 1959, and to Greece in early 1960. Therefore, the move had been anticipated for at least a year and a half. Finally, he was named as the Soviet representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna in August. Molotov's replacement in the Mongolian People's Republic was Aleksei Khvorostukhin, a member of the Soviet Central Committee.

As if to answer the Chinese thrust of the aid agreement of June, 1960, the Soviet Union signed an agreement with Mongolia on September 9, 1960. The Russian economic

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43 Rupen, Twentieth Century, p. 277.
44 Ibid., pp. 276-277.
46 Ibid., p. 276.
47 CDSP, Vol. XII, #37 (October 12, 1960), 22.
assistance for the period 1961 to 1965 was to be consider-ably more valuable and more sweeping than the promised Chinese aid. Whereas the Chinese committed themselves to the amount of 200 million rubles, the Russians countered with a long-term credit of 615 million rubles. Also, the Soviet government "agreed to meet the Mongolian government's request on postponing payments in the amount of 245,000,000 rubles for a part of previous credits that were to be paid in 1961-1965." 49

The agreement signed by Khrushchev and Tsedenbal in Moscow called for the Russians to build fifteen industrial enterprises, including an oil field, high-tension lines, and urban electric networks. Khrushchev continued his pressure for the use of virgin lands, for the statement issued in Moscow agreed that

In meeting the desires of the Mongolian government further to develop animal husbandry, to raise agricultural production and to expand the development of virgin lands, the Soviet Union will deliver . . . a substantial quantity of agricultural machinery. . . ." 51

Also, the Soviet Union agreed to "accept Mongolian specialists and workers for production experience at U.S.S.R.

48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
Because it was stated explicitly, it would seem that this aspect of training specialists was a new move to counter the Chinese ability to send badly needed skilled workers to Mongolia.

The Mongolians, still exhibiting an independence from Moscow, and the Chinese, determined to continue to gain influence in Mongolia, signed an agreement on September 20, 1960. The agreement called for the continued dispatching of Chinese workers to the Mongolian People's Republic, to aid in construction work. Under the terms of the agreement, 754 Chinese workers arrived in Ulan Bator in May, 1961. This arrival was the last mention of new Chinese in Mongolia. In the year following the Moscow meeting of November-December, 1960 (see below), this phase of Chinese aid, the dispatching of workers, had ceased and the Chinese began to return to China. The Chinese laborers, who numbered about 12,000 in 1960, numbered only 6,000 by mid-1962.

Harrison Salisbury reported in December, 1961, that the Chinese workers around Ulan Bator were housed in large camps "that resemble, at least superficially, concentration camps."

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52 Ibid.
55 Rupen, Twentieth Century, p. 333.
56 Ibid.
He described the camps as being "surrounded by high wooden fences with tall watch towers at the corners and guards with submachine guns. . . ." This type of housing for the Chinese in December, 1961 is opposed to the situation in 1959, when relations between China and Mongolia were much closer, when "the Chinese lived near the center of Ulan Bator in big barracks and camps. . . ." Obviously, the agreement reached in May, 1960 did not bear the results that had been anticipated and hoped for by the Chinese. The probable cause for the final disruption of close Chinese-Mongolian ties, in this field and in all fields, was the opening of the Sino-Soviet conflict in more or less open terms following the Moscow Conference.

The Moscow Conference of eighty-one Communist parties was held from November to December, 1960. "By the fall of 1960 a real question had arisen whether the Sino-Soviet alliance could survive in any meaningful sense." The Conference was an attempt to discuss the problems and resolve the differences between China and the Soviet Union;

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58 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
60 Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, p. 343.
and, to reach some agreement on the future of bloc relations. For two months the eight-one parties represented labored to reach some sort of compromise; a compromise within which both the Soviet Union and China could function and the Communist world could continue to be a unified whole.

The length and secrecy of the meetings indicate that the solution to the problems was not available, as the events following the meeting were to prove. During the two months of discussions, the parties involved were forced by the situation to support either the Soviet Union's position or the Chinese position. There is no reason to doubt that the Mongolian party chose to align itself with the Moscow oriented group. In fact, "the only delegation which is known to have supported the Chinese with any vigour was the Albanian." The document which came out of the meeting, the Manifesto of the Moscow Conference, issued on December 6, was lengthy and ambiguous. While attempting to heal the breach between the Soviet Union and China, the meeting had only drawn into sharper focus the differences between

61 For an excellent discussion of the events leading up to the Moscow Conference, see the whole of Zagoria's work, The Sino-Soviet Conflict. Chapter 15 of his work deals specifically with the Moscow Conference.

62 Floyd, Mao Against Khrushchev, p. 120.

63 For the full text of the statement, see CDSP, Vol. XII, #48, pp. 3-9 and Vol. XII, #49, pp. 3-8. For an analysis of the major points see the New York Times, December 7, 1960, p. 15.
the two countries' policies, and made it necessary for all the other parties to align with one or the other.

After the Moscow Conference, although the Chinese and the Mongolians continued to have contacts and continued to publicly express the close friendship between them, it became increasingly obvious that the Mongolian sentiment lay with the Soviet Union. And, on the part of the Soviet Union, it became increasingly apparent that they wanted to solidify the Mongolian position firmly in the Russian camp. At the fortieth anniversary of the founding of the Mongolian army in March, 1961, the Soviet Union was represented by the Minister of Defense, Marshal R. Y. Malinovsky; while the Chinese representative was of lower rank, the Vice-Minister of National Defense, General Hsu Kuang-ta. At the same celebration Mongolia expressed her commitment to the Russian side. Marshal Malinovsky and a Russian general were honored with the Mongolian decoration, the Order of Sukhe Bator. However, no Chinese was so honored and General Hsu was clearly given lesser treatment. Similarly, at the anniversary celebration of the founding of the Mongolian People's

64 The contacts included a Cultural Cooperation Plan, SCMP, #2475, April 13, 1961, p. 34; and a Commerce Treaty, SCMP, #2486, May 1, 1961, p. 31. For a statement of Mongolia's continued friendship for China, see New York Times interview with Second Secretary Tsende, December 17, 1961.

65 SCMP, #2463, March 24, 1961, pp. 36-37.


67 Ibid.
Republic in July, 1961, the Soviet representation was clearly more important and larger than the Chinese.68 The Soviet delegation was headed by Mikhail Suslov, a member of the Soviet Presidium; while the Chinese were represented by Ulanfu, an alternate member of the Chinese Communist Politburo.69

The speeches of the leaders of the Mongolian People's Republic indicate that the country was firmly adhering to the Moscow line. In early July, 1961, Tsedenbal made a speech in which "he extolled the Soviet Union but never mentioned China ... [and] lavished praise on Premier Khrushchev and said that 'the chief and decisive role in the preservation of peace is played by the great Soviet Union."70 Also in July, Tsedenbal suffered a rather serious accident to his leg and spent the rest of 1961 and part of 1962 in the Soviet Union recovering from his injuries.71 After the accident, the Mongolian Party's Second Secretary, Tsende, became the spokesman for the government following the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, during which the breach between China and Russia became public, with the Soviet attacks on Albania and Chou En-lai's sudden departure,72 Tsende made a number

69 Ibid., p. 3.
70 Ibid.
of speeches openly critical of China. In a speech in November, 1961, Tsende voiced stern criticism of Albania and Chinese policies. And in an interview held in December, 1961, although professing friendship with China, Tsende announced that a great many East Europeans were coming to Mongolia to aid in construction and agricultural projects. Undoubtedly these East European workers were to offset the vacuum created by the Chinese workers who began leaving Mongolia in latter 1961 and throughout 1962. Tsende also "made it plain that Mongolia had no intention of experimenting with the Chinese type of commune."

Therefore, during the period of this chapter, April, 1959 to December, 1960, the Chinese continued to exert economic and political pressure on the Mongolian People's Republic. But, the Russians were able to counter the Chinese efforts with more massive efforts, and when the differences between China and the Soviet Union became pronounced and the Communist parties were forced to align themselves, the Mongolian party opted for closer relations with the Soviet Union. The Chinese offensive into Outer Mongolia, which began in 1954, and faltered in 1957, ended in

75 Rupen, Twentieth Century, p. 333.
complete failure in 1960. Even though there was continued Sino-Mongolian contact after 1960 (see next chapter), the Chinese were clearly in a subordinate position vis-à-vis the Russians in the Mongolian People's Republic.
CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS

The trend of the government of the Mongolian People's Republic toward closer relations with the Soviet Union and away from close contacts with China, which began with the Moscow Meeting of December, 1960, continued and grew in intensity throughout the 1960's. Although China and Mongolia signed two agreements delineating the borders between the two countries in 1962¹ and 1964,² and continued to trade, the relations between them grew more strained.

The most recent event which indicates the tension between China and Outer Mongolia occurred in 1967. In August, an employee of the Mongolian embassy in Peking refused to accept a portrait of Chairman Mao from members of the Red Guard. The fury of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was vented on the Mongolian embassy, as the ambassador's car was burned and the embassy grounds were


²Dennis Doolin, Territorial Claims in the Sino-Soviet Conflict, p. 21. (Few details of the protocol have been made public.)
invaded. Both governments issued protests and each rejected the other's protest.

Another facet of the tension between Mongolia and China was reported by Harrison Salisbury on his 1966 trip to Outer Mongolia. He reported seeing a number of missile sites armed with Russian missiles in the Mongolian People's Republic. The obvious conclusion must be drawn that the Russian arms are meant to protect Mongolia, and ultimately Russia, from a Chinese military threat.

While turning from China, the Mongolians have come to rely heavily on the Soviet Union for support and assistance. In June, 1962, Mongolia became the first and only Asian member of the Committee for Economic Mutual Cooperation (CFMA), the Russian-East European economic community. East European workers have replaced the Chinese laborers, and ended the threat of a Chinese "fifth column" within Mongolia. The economic aid and the amount of money spent to buy Mongolian goods by the Soviet Union is far greater than the Chinese; and even the aid and buying power of the

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4Ibid.


6Rupen, Twentieth Century, pp. 334-335.

Eastern European nations surpasses the Chinese.  

However, no matter how strong the dependence on the Soviet Union, the Mongolians are attempting to stress their independence and to "prove" the reality of an independent Mongolia. In 1961, the Mongolian People's Republic was admitted to the United Nations after many years of waiting, and this undoubtedly did much to enhance the Mongolian feeling of independence. Also, the Mongolian government has been, and is, highly desirous of diplomatic relations with the West, particularly with the United States. Internally Mongolia has been able to subtly show its independence. An example might be the slow steps taken to discredit Choibalsan in the wake of Moscow's order for de-Stalinization. Similarly, a photograph included in an article by American jurist William Douglas of his 1961 trip to Outer Mongolia shows a painting at the University of Ulan Bator which represents the faces of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin;  

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8Rupen, Twentieth Century, p. 332.


this five years after Khrushchev's attack on Stalin and the
cult of the personality.

However, Mongolia can have only token independence,
because of the Sino-Soviet dispute, and its unique geographi-
cal position of being between the two contending powers. As
was no other Communist state, Mongolia was forced to choose
between China and Russia, and once having chosen, is heavily
dependent on Russia.

Also, independence demands economic self-sufficiency,
and Mongolia, at the present time, does not have that capabil-
ity. Therefore, although Mongolia may wish to be independent
of both China and Russia, economic necessity, the military
situation, and historical trends all have forced the Mongols
to rely heavily on the Soviet Union.

The reasons for the success of the Soviet Union in being
able to win the allegiance of the Mongolian People's Republic
are varied. The Mongolians, undoubtedly, are aware of the
Chinese feeling that Outer Mongolia is rightfully a part of
China. In an interview with Mao Tse-tung in 1936, Edgar
Snow asked about the relationship between Mongolia and
China. Mao's answer is indicative of the Chinese viewpoint,
even today: 12

The relationship between Outer Mongolia and the
Soviet Union . . . has always been based on the
principle of complete equality. When the people's

revolution has been victorious in China the Outer Mongolian republic will automatically become a part of the Chinese federation, at their own will. Mao seems to have reiterated this feeling that Outer Mongolia belongs to China in an interview with some Japanese socialists in 1964. In the interview he said: 13

In accordance with the Yalta Agreement, the Soviet Union, under the pretext of assuring the independence of Mongolia, actually placed the country under its domination. Mongolia takes up an area which is considerably greater than the Kuriles.

Later in his statement Mao demanded that the Kuriles, now under Russian control, be returned to Japan. 14 By equating Mongolia and the Kurile Islands in the first statement, and then demanding the return of the Kuriles to Japan, Mao seems to be implying that Mongolia, too, must be returned to its rightful owner. The Mongols, therefore, must fear the 750 million Chinese who are close to the border, more than the 200 million Russians who are relatively far away. Also, the Russians have made no claim on Mongolia. The ability to assure the continued independent existence of Outer Mongolia must have been one important reason that the Mongols chose to align themselves with the Soviet Union.

In the economic field the Russians are in a much stronger bargaining position than are the Chinese. The Chinese are not able or unwilling to siphon off as much

13 Dennis Doolin, Territorial Claims in the Sino-Soviet Conflict, p. 42.
14 Ibid., p. 44.
excess capital to give to the Mongolians, as are the Russians. This has been shown throughout this paper, in that when the Chinese would give a large loan to the Mongolian People's Republic, the Russians were willing and able to counter this move with a more massive aid package. Also, as Robert Rupen points out, the present governmental structure, which is supported by the Soviet Union with monetary aid, is strikingly large for a population of only one million people.\textsuperscript{15} It is doubtful that China could support this leadership in the same degree of affluence. Therefore, for reasons of self-preservation, the Mongolian leadership is tied to the Soviet Union.

Finally, the traditional relations between the three countries are of prime importance. Throughout the Ch'ing dynasty, the Manchus made inroads into Mongolian lands and economic life,\textsuperscript{16} and by the turn of the twentieth century the Chinese policy became much more assertive and exploitive toward Outer Mongolia.\textsuperscript{17} The Russians were one of the few peoples that the Mongols knew, and they did not distrust the Russians; they even asked for Russian aid. "... There developed a Mongol national outlook: China, either under Manchu rule or under Chinese rule, was to be feared. Russia

\textsuperscript{15}Rupen, \textit{Twentieth Century}, p. 324.
\textsuperscript{16}Knutson, \textit{Outer Mongolia}, p. 21.
\textsuperscript{17}Friters, \textit{Outer Mongolia}, p. 157.
was not to be feared. Quite the contrary, in fact; the Russians... might be helpful. 18

After the establishment of a Russian controlled "independent" Outer Mongolia in 1921, the Russians were able to foster this feeling of alienation from China. The Russians were able to seal off Mongolia from active contact with any other nation, including China. The knowledge of close Chinese-Mongolian contacts, in the past died out, as did the knowledge of the Chinese language. 19

A tradition of close Russian-Mongolian relations developed from 1921, the year of Mongolian independence from China, and 1949, when a unified Communist China posed a threat to Russian predominance in Mongolia. Almost a generation of Mongols matured, therefore, without any first-hand knowledge of the Chinese, and with only close relations with the Russians. Most of the present high-ranking Mongolian officials were educated in the Soviet Union. 20 An indication of the close Russian-Mongolian contact is that a number of influential Mongols, including Tsedenbal, have

18 Lattimore, Nomads and Commissars, p. 11.

19 By the 1950's, the knowledge of Chinese among the Mongolian population was almost non-existent. It was considered newsworthy to report that two schools in Ulan Bator, in 1959, were about to offer courses in the Chinese language. SCMP, #2089, September 3, 1959, p. 52.

20 Rupen, Twentieth Century, p. 332.
Russian wives.\textsuperscript{21} Even during the period of increasing Chinese influence, 1954 to 1957, the number of young Mongols studying in China was greatly overshadowed by the number studying in the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{22}

Therefore, the reasons for the Russian success in the Mongolian People's Republic are numerous. They include the traditional Mongolian trust in Russia, a traditional mistrust of China, and her overwhelming population, the stronger Russian economy, a generation of Russian-centered educational and cultural life, and the ability of the Soviet Union to capitalize on these strong points. It seems obvious that as long as the Russians desire to continue to exercise strong influence in Outer Mongolia, within the bounds of an independent Mongolia, they will be successful. The only time that the Chinese were moderately successful in expanding their influence in the Mongolian People's Republic was when the Soviet Union voluntarily withdrew. The Mongolian People's Republic is firmly tied to the Soviet Union, and the Chinese attempt to strengthen their influence there met with complete failure.

\textsuperscript{21}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{22}Ibid., p. 285. "... In 1958 over 1000 Mongols were studying in the USSR, while only about thirty ... in China."
A majority of the research for this paper has been done in the Survey of the China Mainland Press and The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, both offer translations of newspaper articles and news agency releases of the two countries. There is, however, a lack of material from the Mongolian People's Republic in English, although the Joint Publications Research Service fills this void somewhat. There is little or no public information dealing with certain aspects of Mongolian affairs, particularly military expenditures and military preparedness.

Also, there seems to be a lack of scholarly western work dealing with the recent history of the Mongolian People's Republic. Robert A. Rupen has done almost all of the work on recent history and foreign relations of Outer Mongolia, and is, therefore, cited in numerous places throughout the text. What scholarly work there is dealing with Mongolia concentrates on the period before 1949.

Union Research Institute of Hong Kong has published a number of works which deal directly and indirectly with the affairs of Outer Mongolia. I have also included in this bibliography works by journalists and visitors who have recently toured Outer Mongolia. The articles and books by Harrison Salisbury are of this type and have proved valuable.
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