AN EXPLORATORY STUDY OF INTERPERSONAL
TRUST BETWEEN THE SEXES

By

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To

Mom and Dad
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION AND REVIEW OF RESEARCH

The Feminist Movement of the 1960's seems to have been the impetus for much research concerning the differences between females and males, sex-roles, and sex-role stereotypes. In over 600 pages Maccoby and Jacklin (1974) provide an excellent summary of the myriad scholarly studies conducted just since 1966. Differences between the sexes in terms of intellect and achievement, socialization, sex-typing, and social behavior are but a few of the topics covered. Chafetz' *Masculine/Feminine or Human?* (1974) is devoted entirely to the exploration of sex roles in our society. Baird (1976) has recently provided a comprehensive summary and review of research relating to sex differences in small group communication.

Coincidentally, another body of literature has emerged which applies human relations principles to the female-male relationship. Examples of such works are: Patton and Patton's *Living Together* (1976), O'Neill and O'Neill's *Open Marriage* (1972), and Masters and Johnson's *The Pleasure Bond* (1974). One variable that has been recognized by these authors as being of central importance in the female-male relationship is trust. O'Neill...
and O'Neill, for example, devote an entire chapter to this communication variable (pp. 221-235).

Aside from the specific context of the female-male relationship, trust is also consistently recognized by communication scholars as a variable of central importance in all contexts of human communication. Johnson (1972) flatly states, "Little happens in a relationship until the individuals learn to trust each other" (p. 43).

After more than twenty years of studying T-groups and problem-solving (i.e. task) groups, Jack Gibb has concluded that trust is the pacemaker variable in group growth. Trust among members is necessary for a group of two, ten, or fifteen members in order to develop an adequate feedback and data-processing system, to establish and integrate goals, and to develop a feeling of interdependence or mutual influence among group members (Gibb, 1964; Gibb and Gibb, 1974). The most important element in Rogers' client-centered therapy is an atmosphere of psychological safety. That is, the client feels safe and thus, trusts the therapist as a listener when she/he behaves in a manner that displays genuineness, nonpossessive warmth and accurate empathy (Rogers, 1961). Kim Giffin, who has made major contributions to the study of interpersonal trust, has concluded:

After having researched the construct from its earliest form to its latest advocates, after having conducted many groups of students who profess to have low trust of their own and others' communicative behaviors, we are more convinced
than ever that the central construct for good interpersonal relations is trust. (Giffin and Barnes, 1976, p. 9)

This author is equally convinced of the importance of trust in interpersonal relationships. Trust seems to be a prerequisite to sharing parts of ourselves or self-disclosing, which in turn, is necessary for establishing and maintaining human relationships. Specifically, trust is necessary and concomitant to the self-disclosure which is essential for establishing and maintaining the femalemale relationship. Yet, we have little empirical evidence of how trust operates as a communication variable between the sexes. We do not know to what extent, if any, females and males bring similar or dissimilar attitudes of trust to encounters with members of the same or opposite sex.

In order to explore the relationship between interpersonal trust and communication between the sexes, it is necessary first to provide a conceptual framework for studying the construct of interpersonal trust, and also a method for measuring it. Three such conceptual frameworks and measuring instruments are available as possible means of exploring this relationship. The following is a review of these approaches to the study of interpersonal trust. Special attention will be given to any findings related to differences or similarities between females and males.
Rotter's Interpersonal Trust Scale: Theoretical Perspective and Relevant Research

Julian Rotter (1967) defines interpersonal trust as "...an [generalized] expectancy held by an individual or a group that the word, promise, verbal or written statement of another individual can be relied upon" (p. 651). This definition of interpersonal trust is derived from a social learning theory perspective. A social learning theory orientation assumes that the individual expects certain outcomes from behavior due to promised positive or negative reinforcement in the past. Thus, the behavior and statements of parents, teachers, peers, and other trusted sources result in our learning to trust or distrust others. Trust is thus viewed as a "generalized expectancy," and this expectancy is said to differ for individuals due to differing past experiences. Rotter constructed the Interpersonal Trust Scale in an effort to adequately measure individual differences in generalized trust of others.

The Interpersonal Trust Scale (henceforth, ITS) is a 25-item (with an additional 15 filler items), Likert-type scale. On the basis of two estimates of test-retest reliability which were significant, Rotter (1967) argues that the ITS is a stable (i.e. reliable) measuring instrument. The correlations were significant: .56 and .68 (p<.01), but not unusually high. Also, sample sizes
for retest were rather small: 24 and 34 subjects for each. These are the only two tests for reliability reported by Rotter or other researchers, and thus, it does not seem to this writer that reliability of the ITS has been demonstrated conclusively. Rotter (1967) also reports a sociometric study conducted with two fraternities and sororities which included the use of the ITS to determine its construct and discrimination validity. Combined intercorrelations of sociometric and test scores again yielded rather low, but statistically significant results. For example, the correlation between the ITS and sociometric trust was .37 (p < .01).

In checking demographic data for 547 college students who took the ITS, Rotter found no significant differences in scores due to sex, age, or number of semesters of college attended. ITS scores were related significantly to position in the family, socioeconomic level, religion, and religious differences between parents.

Since Rotter's initial publication, the ITS has been widely used as a tool to measure the relationship between interpersonal trust and other variables. For example, in a correlational study, Massari and Rosenblum (1972) found a significant positive relationship between internality, the expectancy that one is in control or instrumental in achieving success or failing (as measured by Rotter's locus of control scale), and interpersonal trust. Trust and internality were negatively related to
academic achievement (as measured by final examination grades in an introductory psychology course) for women, and unrelated to academic achievement for men. The authors' hypothesis that high trust would be related to academic achievement was based on the assumption that given a high general expectancy to believe the statements of others, those students would accept statements of presumed fact from their instructors. Accepting statements of fact and remembering statements on a final exam involve two quite different cognitive processes. Thus, it is not surprising that Massari's and Rosenblum's hypothesis was not supported.

Wright and Tedeschi (1975) provide a concise review of several other studies in which interpersonal trust was measured by the ITS. High trusters are: less likely to lie to experimenters in debriefing sessions, more trustworthy with peers in games, rated by their peers as more trustworthy, and are more trusting of experimenters, peers in a Prisoner's Dilemma game, and peers in a trustwalk. Also, contrary to popular folklore high trusters are not more gullible than low trusters, at least in the contexts of deception experiments and games with peers.

Outside of the laboratory, are low trusters more suspicious than high trusters? Wright and Maggiied (1975) used an interesting technique to answer this question. Two experiments were conducted at two different universities utilizing an unobtrusive, nonreactive paradigm.
Subjects were students from introductory psychology classes who scored very high or very low on the ITS, which was completed at the beginning of the term. A female assistant telephoned the selected students in the evening and asked if they would be willing to participate in a psychology experiment. In both experiments, high trusters asked fewer "logistics" questions (e.g. Where? What time?), and fewer suspicious questions (e.g. Who's the experimenter? Why me?) than did low trusters. In one of the experiments the caller closed with: "Do you have any questions?" Again, high trusters asked fewer questions. It seems, that although high trusters aren't more gullible (i.e. easily duped), they are less suspicious than low trusters.

Hochreich (1975) explored the relationship between sex-role stereotypes and interpersonal trust. The author notes that there are differing cultural norms and expectations for females and males, which leads her to hypothesize that, "...stereotypes of the extremely masculine male would be...significantly lower in trust than stereotypes of the extremely feminine female" (p. 273). The results clearly supported her hypothesis. Both females and males see a "supermale" as being less trusting than a "superfemale." Furthermore, females see the "superfemale" as more trusting than males do. Although subjects' actual trust scores diverged from their same-sex stereotypes (i.e. males had higher trust scores than their
supermale stereotype scores, and females lower), Hochreich's study shows that there is a sex-role stereotype, perceived by both sexes, concerning interpersonal trust. Unfortunately, Hochreich did not test (or report) whether or not the actual trust scores for females and males differed significantly. Perhaps the author did not consider measuring this because of Rotter's (1967) earlier report of no difference between the sexes. Still, it seems that another test of that assumption would have either yielded more convincing evidence, or raised some questions for further research.

All of the researchers' work cited above apparently accepted Rotter's definition of interpersonal trust and his assumption that the ITS measures an unidimensional, generalized expectancy concerning the believability of others' statements, and as such, can be a predictor of people's behavior in all interpersonal situations. At least three attempts have been made to test this assumption. Each of these studies supply evidence that the ITS does not measure a generalized expectancy. Rather, different items seem to be tapping different expectancies (i.e. dimensions) or discrete components of trust.

Kaplan (1973) did a factor analytic breakdown of the ITS which revealed three discrete factors: (1) institutional trust - trust toward major social agents in society; (2) sincerity - perceived sincerity of others; and (3) caution - fear that people will take advantage of others.
To examine sex differences, Kaplan computed sub-scale scores for each factor by "...summing responses to items loading above .30 on each of the three factors and dividing by the number of such items" (p. 14). He then compared the sub-scale scores of males and females, and found that males' scores were significantly lower than females' (p < .05) on each of the sub-scales. We may tentatively hypothesize, then, that not only does a stereotype of males being less trusting exist (Hochreich, 1975), but also, males are actually less trusting than females.

Wright and Tedeschi (1975) rather sharply criticize Kaplan's study on methodological grounds. For example, they assert that his sample size was too small, and that the effect of sex was confounded by not including it as a variable in the factor analysis. Thus, the authors set out to correct these "errors" and search for "...sub-scales that would allow better predictions than the general scale in certain classes of situations involving interpersonal trust" (p. 471). Four large samples of students from two different universities, at two different times, supplied the data. Their cross-validated analysis revealed three factors also: political trust, paternal trust, and trust of strangers. The political trust factor seems quite similar to Kaplan's institutional trust, and trust of strangers may be compared to the caution factor. Wright and Tedeschi compared mean item response
scores between the factors and found the highest scores on the Paternal Trust factor, the lowest on trust of strangers, and an intermediate level of trust on the political trust factor. They did not provide a statistical comparison of males' and females' scores. However, looking at the means presented in their Table 3 (p. 475), there do not appear to be great differences in the sexes' scores.

Another research effort stemmed from the same concern which the previous studies indicated, that the ITS is a multidimensional rather than unidimensional scale, and also, that Rotter's definition of interpersonal trust seems incongruous with at least some items on the ITS. Chun and Campbell (1974) utilized a cluster analysis, factor analysis, and other statistical techniques to analyze scores from the ITS, which was interspersed in a larger questionnaire. Four dimensions, which they labeled: political cynicism, interpersonal exploitation, societal hypocrisy, and reliable role-performance were identified. The authors noted that the first two dimensions resemble Kaplan's institutional trust and caution factors, respectively. One of Chun and Campbell's statistical techniques revealed two marker items for the dimensions, and they suggest that they be used for a shorter form of the ITS. From their analysis the authors are led to conclude:

...that the Rotter Interpersonal Trust Scale is multidimensional for our college sample...However, multidimensionality is not a part of Rotter's
definition thus there is an incongruence between his definition and measure of interpersonal trust. (p. 1068)

Although the number and labels of factors differs, it seems fairly safe to conclude from these three studies that discrete dimensions are contained in the ITS. At least two, specific, independent dimensions, related to institutional trust and caution surfaced consistently when analyzing ITS scores. Thus a total score may not be reflecting a "generalized expectancy" at all. The addition of three or four separate, specific components does not necessarily a general expectancy make! The findings of the many studies which treat the ITS as a general measure may be suspect. For example, a person who scores very low on items concerning political trust may score very high on trust of strangers and paternal trust. His/her total score consequently will be fairly high. If we were to predict from that score that the individual would trust Jimmy Carter, we might be quite wrong!

Wrightsmann's Philosophes of Human Nature Scale: Theoretical Perspective and Relevant Research

For years social scientists have told us that there is no such thing as "THE human nature." But Lawrence Wrightsman (1964) reminds us that:

For most of us, "human nature" is a pervasive and useful concept. We rely on it frequently to justify our own behavior and the behavior of others. Our beliefs about it influence everything from the way we bargain with a used-car
dealer to our expectations about a nuclear war... we researchers appear unaware that the average man believes there is and that he employs his philosophy of human nature in his dealings with others. (p. 743)

Wrightsman (1974) posits that the sources for the development of our philosophies of human nature are: observation of others' behavior, opinions expressed by and training received by others, retesting one's philosophies in real-life, and one's own personality. Since life experiences and observations differ, people's philosophies of human nature should vary also.

With these assumptions as a theoretical foundation Wrightsman (1964) constructed a Likert-type scale for assessing philosophies of human nature. He reviewed historical and contemporary writings of social scientists, philosophers and theologians, which revealed six independent dimensions as components of philosophies of human nature. These dimensions are continua of: trustworthiness, altruism, independence, strength of will and rationality, complexity of human nature, and variability of human nature. After item analyses of an original 120 statements, the Philosophies of Human Nature Scale (henceforth, PHNS) included 14 items for each dimension or sub-scale (84 total) in its final form. In terms of test-retest reliability, coefficients for each sub-scale were significant (e.g. trustworthiness, .74; altruism, .83), and other tests revealed construct validity for each dimension.
Since the focus of this work is interpersonal trust, particular attention will be paid to findings related to the trustworthiness sub-scale of the PHN. Wrightsman (1964) operationally defines trustworthiness as "...the extent to which people are seen as moral, honest, and reliable" (p. 744). The statements comprising this sub-scale cover a variety of situations, from general (e.g. Most people would tell a lie if they could gain by it.), to specific (e.g. Most students do not cheat when taking an exam). This sub-scale, as have the others, has been shown to be a reliable, valid measure. First, findings related to sex differences will be discussed.

Due to differences in socialization and child-rearing practices for females and males, Wrightsman hypothesized that there would be differences in the sexes' views of human nature. He reports several studies which support this hypothesis (1974). Specifically, females seem to have a more favorable view of human nature. In Wrightsman's original samples from six different universities, females consistently scored significantly higher on the trustworthiness sub-scale of the PHN. In a study spanning the years 1962-1971, freshmen women at one college consistently showed more positive attitudes on the trustworthiness sub-scale. And sex differences in the same direction have been found for graduate students and social workers (pp. 80-83). There was a downward trend in scores for both men and women from 1962-1971, but women still perceived people as
more trustworthy than men did (pp. 169-171). From all of these findings it seems safe to conclude that women believe people to be more moral, honest, and reliable than men do.

Another instrument Wrightsman constructed for measuring philosophies of human nature is a bipolar rating scale (1974, p. 73). The trustworthiness scale has five bipolar adjectives: completely good vs. completely bad, religious vs. unreligious, honest vs. dishonest, trustworthy vs. untrustworthy, and trusting others vs. distrusting others. The bipolar scales are reported to correlate significantly with the Likert-type scale. Although data is not provided, we would expect to find similar differences between women and men using the bipolar sub-scale.

Chun and Campbell (1975) were concerned with the internal structure of Wrightsman's trustworthiness sub-scale. They employed the identical procedures and techniques as they did for Rotter's ITS (Chun and Campbell, 1974). The authors' analyses revealed two dimensions: global morality, and specific acts of honesty. Both males' and females' scores were encompassed in these two dimensions. The mean scores for females were significantly higher than males on the global morality dimension. For the specific acts of honesty dimension, no significant differences were found, but mean scores for males were slightly higher than those for females.

Thus, as with the ITS, Wrightsman's measure of trustworthiness has been found to be not unidimensional, but at
least bidimensional. Studies which have utilized the scale as a unidimensional one, and considered total scores only, may have confounded results.

Giffin's Trust Differential: Theoretical Perspective and Relevant Research

Kim Giffin (1967) provides another theoretical framework from which interpersonal trust can be viewed. He considers the following elements to be essential for describing trusting behaviors:

1. A person is relying upon something.
2. This something relied upon may be an object, an event, or a person.
3. Something is risked by the trusting person.
4. The trusting person hopes to achieve some goal by taking this risk.
5. The desired goal is not perceived as certain.
6. The trusting person has some degree of confidence in the object of his trust. (p. 104)

Given these essential elements Giffin then derives a definition of interpersonal trust: "...reliance upon the communication behavior of another person in order to achieve a desired but uncertain objective in a risky situation" (p. 105).

The "Trust Paradigm" includes degrees of interpersonal trust: trust of a speaker by a listener, and trust of a listener by a speaker; and intrapersonal trust: trust of oneself as a speaker, and trust of oneself as a listener (p. 106). Researchers have devoted a lot of attention to this first component, trust of a speaker by a listener, under the label "source credibility" in
public speaking situations. In an effort to measure the attitude of interpersonal trust (as per his definition) in interpersonal situations, Giffin (1968a) constructed the Trust Differential (henceforth, GTD). It is important to note that unlike Rotter's and Wrightsman's scales, Giffin's GTD does not attempt to measure a generalized expectancy or unidimensional concept, but an individual's attitude or readiness to respond, in a trusting or distrusting manner toward a particular person or group of persons.

As its name implies, the GTD is a semantic differential instrument including seven-point, bipolar rating scales. Two initial studies revealed that 72 items were discriminating and related to interpersonal trust (1968a). A later study (Giffin, 1968b) employing 325 students, and adults from ongoing groups for the sample, item analysis, and then factor analysis revealed 27 items to be most discriminating and loading most heavily on one of three factors: expertness, character, and dynamism. These factors appear to be independent of each other. Thus, Giffin considers an attitude of trust to be influenced by perceptions of:

1. Expertness - this may be in terms of quantity of relevant information, degree of ability or skill, or validity of judgment.
2. Reliability - Character - a characteristic perceived as dependability, predictability, or favorable intent of the trusted person.
3. Dynamism - behavior perceived as more active than passive, and more open or frank than closed or deceptive. (Giffin and Barnes, 1976, p. 46)
As mentioned above, the GTD, unlike the ITS and PHN, recognizes its multidimensionality, and allows for separate scores on the three dimensions. In determining one's attitude (i.e. potential for action) of interpersonal trust, the GTD allows us to check specific aspects of that attitude. A review of some relevant findings employing the GTD follows.

Giffin, Heider, Groginsky, and Drake (1970) explored the relationship between the variables: self-concept, speech anxiety, social alienation, and interpersonal trust. Self-concept was measured by the Tennessee Self-Concept Scale, and trust by the GTD. Expertness and character were significantly positively correlated with the combined measure of self-concept and each of the TSCS' sub-scales (with the exception of moral-ethical self and expertness). The relationship between dynamism and the combined scores was positive, but not significant; all but two of the sub-scales (personal self and moral-ethical self) were significantly related to dynamism. These findings led Giffin to later hypothesize that:

(1) A person's trust of another is a function of his/her own self-concept; and (2) A person with low self-concept will tend to trust others who give information that confirms his/her low self-concept, and tend to distrust others who give information that disconfirms it (Giffin, 1973, pp. 300-301).

At least two other, independent studies support those
hypotheses. Bormann and Shapiro (1962) report that students' perceived confidence in speaking is a function of their self-image; those low in self-concept are more anxious about speaking. A study conducted by Deutsch and Solomon (1959) found that subjects who negatively evaluated their own performance judged others who negatively evaluated them more positively than others who gave them positive evaluations. Another finding of Wrightsman's (1964) is relevant here. One hundred females were sampled to test his hypothesis that those dissatisfied with their self-concept would possess less favorable views of human nature (i.e., score lower on the PHN, including the trustworthiness scale). The results supported his hypothesis.

There is no research to date which utilizes the GTD to explore attitudes of interpersonal trust in same-sex vs. opposite-sex communication, or to see if any differences exist between females and males in their attitudes of interpersonal trust.

Summary

Three different approaches to the study of interpersonal trust have been reviewed. Each approach has its own accompanying scale to measure trust. Some research conducted using each scale has been reviewed with particular attention paid to findings concerning the relationship between trust and the differences between females
and males, and trust and self-concept. Tests of differences between females and males on the ITS and PHN have yielded conflicting results. The GTD has not been utilized to test for differences between the sexes. Research cited indicates an interaction between self-concept and trust.

Attention also has been given to work which evaluated and/or refined Rotter's ITS, and Wrightsman's trustworthiness sub-scale of the PHN. That the ITS is measuring a "generalized expectancy" is doubtful, and the unidimensionality of the trustworthiness scale is questionable also. The Giffin Trust Differential does include three independent dimensions, but other than Giffin's original analysis, no further attempts have been made to evaluate the GTD. Also, whereas the ITS and trustworthiness scales purport to measure a more global, generalized notion of trust, the GTD attempts to measure attitudes of interpersonal trust toward a specific person or group.

**Purposes of the Study**

This writer was concerned not only with the communication variable of interpersonal trust, but also with its effects for ongoing opposite- and same-sex interaction. Giffin's (1973) conceptualization of interpersonal trust as "...an attitude involving cognition, cathexis, and conation," (p. 298), and his operational definition of: "...reliance upon the communication behavior of another person in order to achieve a desired but uncertain
objective in a risky situation" (Giffin, 1967, p. 105), provided a framework most amenable to exploring attitudes of interpersonal trust between the sexes, and served as the guide for the specific questions that were asked.

Specifically, this study explored the following two questions:

1. **What are females' attitudes of interpersonal trust toward:**
   - a) females in general,
   - b) males in general,
   - c) their closest female friend,
   - and d) their closest male friend?

2. **What are males' attitudes of interpersonal trust toward:**
   - a) females in general,
   - b) males in general,
   - c) their closest female friend,
   - and d) their closest male friend?

"Informal hypotheses purporting to answer these questions abound. In discussions of interpersonal trust between females and males, students are very quick to state their positions: "Guys aren't trustworthy, but my boyfriend is!" "I trust my girlfriend, but not all women in general!" These are just a few individually stated opinions, and no evidence to date supports or refutes these assumptions. We simply do not know what attitudes of interpersonal trust females and males have for the same, and opposite sexes. Nor do we know which characteristics most influence an attitude of interpersonal trust between the sexes. Perhaps the largest component of interpersonal trust of women for men is perceived expertness. In terms of men, perhaps their attitude of interpersonal trust toward women is primarily composed of perceived character attributes. It is also possible
that differences in attitudes of interpersonal trust exist depending upon whether a sex group in general, or a closest friend of either sex is considered.

Prior research findings provide some indirect evidence that differences in attitudes of interpersonal trust do exist between the sexes. For example, Sidney Jourard (1971) posits that self-disclosure follows an attitude of love and trust (p. 5), and the most consistent difference he found in a series of questionnaire studies of self-disclosure was that women disclosed more about themselves than men did (p. 232). This finding indicates that perhaps females have greater attitudes of interpersonal trust than males. Another finding of Jourard's was a significant correlation between how well the subjects (both females and males) knew the target person, and the amount and type of information that was disclosed to him/her (p. 231). Also, Lockwood and Eman (1976), using a modified version of Jourard's self-disclosure instrument, found that one of the predictor variables that led to a discrimination between friends and acquaintances was "willingness to discuss intimate topics." Thus, some differences in attitudes of interpersonal trust might exist depending upon whether the attitude object considered is a closest male or female friend, or either sex in general.

The reader will recall Giffin's (1973) hypothesis and the related findings that a person's trust of another
is a function of his/her own self-concept. In terms of self-concept alone, it seems that females' and males' self-concepts would differ due to differing socialization processes. This is not to say that their self-concepts differ in terms of high and low. As a matter of fact, after reviewing several studies dealing with self-esteem or self-concept, Maccoby and Jacklin (1974) conclude that there are no differences between the sexes; females and males have equally positive or negative overall self-concepts (pp. 150-163).

There do seem to be differences, however, in the components of the sexes' self-concepts as perceived by men and women of all ages. For example, Broverman, Vogel, Broverman, Clarkson, and Rosenkrantz (1972) conducted a series of studies over a six-year period developing and administering a sex-role questionnaire. Attributes such as independence, objectivity, competitiveness, and self-confidence comprised a "competency" cluster, which both females and males perceived as being male-valued. A "warmth and expressiveness" cluster, including the attributes of gentleness, tactfulness, and ability to express tender feelings, were perceived by both sexes as being female-valued items. Thus, different characteristics seem to comprise both sexes' views of male self-concepts and female self-concepts. If Giffin's hypothesis that "P's trust of O is a function of P's self-concept" is correct, then we can expect differences in interpersonal
trust depending on both P's and O's sex.

Let us also look again at some of the findings employing Rotter's Interpersonal Trust Scale, and Wrightsman's trustworthiness scale. The reader will recall that although Rotter (1964) found no differences between the sexes in overall ITS scores, Kaplan (1973) did find that males' scores were significantly lower than females' scores on all three of the sub-scales which surfaced using factor analysis. Also, from Hochreich's (1975) study we know that in terms of stereotyped images, males are perceived as less trusting than females by both sexes. Wrightsman's (1964, 1974) trustworthiness scale has consistently shown men to be less trusting than women. It is interesting to note that his conceptualization of trustworthiness includes the terms: "moral, honest, and reliable," all of which are components of Giffin's character dimension of the GTD. Also, Wrightsman's bipolar rating scale employs adjectives similar to the GTD's character dimension (e.g. good-bad, honest-dishonest).

Given Wrightsman's consistent findings, it seems that a tenable, testable hypothesis is that females and males perceive females to be higher in character, as measured by the GTD. The results of Broverman et al. (1972) lead to another tentative hypothesis: that males will be perceived as higher on the expertness dimension, as measured by the GTD, than females by both males and females. These informal hypotheses seem intuitively
correct, but the writer realizes that such specific statements are quite premature and thus, are to be considered as highly tentative.

Thus, the following three main null hypotheses, and eight, null sub-hypotheses were tested. Three hypotheses, addressed specifically to the dimensions of the Giffin Trust Differential (i.e. expertness, character, and dynamism), were also tested for the second main hypothesis, and for each sub-hypothesis.

I. There will be no difference between females' and males' expressed attitudes of interpersonal trust (on the expertness, character, and dynamism dimensions) toward members of the same and opposite sex.

A. There will be no difference between females' and males' expressed attitudes of interpersonal trust toward "females in general."
   1. There will be no difference between females' and males' perceptions of expertness when considering "females in general."
   2. There will be no difference between females' and males' perceptions of character when considering "females in general."
   3. There will be no difference between females' and males' perceptions of dynamism when considering "females in general."

B. There will be no difference between females' and males' expressed attitudes of interpersonal trust toward "males in general."
   1. There will be no difference between females' and males' perceptions of expertness when considering "males in general."
   2. There will be no difference between females' and males' perceptions of character when considering "males in general."
   3. There will be no difference between females' and males' perceptions of dynamism when considering "males in general."

C. There will be no difference between females' and males' expressed attitudes of interpersonal trust toward their "closest female friend."
1. There will be no difference between females' and males' perceptions of expertness when considering their "closest female friend."
2. There will be no difference between females' and males' perceptions of character when considering their "closest female friend."
3. There will be no difference between females' and males' perceptions of dynamism when considering their "closest female friend."

D. There will be no difference between females' and males' expressed attitudes of interpersonal trust toward their "closest male friend."
1. There will be no difference between females' and males' perceptions of expertness when considering their "closest male friend."
2. There will be no difference between females' and males' perceptions of character when considering their "closest male friend."
3. There will be no difference between females' and males' perceptions of dynamism when considering their "closest male friend."

II. There will be no difference between expressed attitudes of interpersonal trust toward "females" versus "males."
1. There will be no difference between perceptions of expertness toward "females" versus "males."
2. There will be no difference between perceptions of character toward "females" versus "males."
3. There will be no difference between perceptions of dynamism toward "females" versus "males."

III. There will be no difference between expressed attitudes of interpersonal trust (on the expertness, character and dynamism dimensions) toward a "closest friend" of both sexes versus both sexes "in general."

E. There will be no difference between females' expressed attitudes of interpersonal trust toward "their closest female friend" versus "females in general."
1. There will be no difference between females' perceptions of expertness when considering "closest female friend," versus "females in general."
2. There will be no difference between females' perceptions of character when considering "closest female friend" versus "females in general."
3. There will be no difference between females' perceptions of dynamism when considering "closest female friend," versus "females in general."
F. There will be no difference between females' expressed attitudes of interpersonal trust toward their "closest male friend" versus "males in general."
   1. There will be no difference between females' perceptions of expertness when considering "closest male friend" versus "males in general."
   2. There will be no difference between females' perceptions of character when considering "closest male friend" versus "males in general."
   3. There will be no difference between females' perceptions of dynamism when considering "closest male friend" versus "males in general."

G. There will be no difference between males' expressed attitudes of interpersonal trust toward their "closest female friend" versus "females in general."
   1. There will be no difference between males' perceptions of expertness when considering "closest female friend" versus "females in general."
   2. There will be no difference between males' perceptions of character when considering "closest female friend" versus "females in general."
   3. There will be no difference between males' perceptions of dynamism when considering "closest female friend" versus "females in general."

H. There will be no difference between males' expressed attitudes of interpersonal trust toward their "closest male friend" versus "males in general."
   1. There will be no difference between males' perceptions of expertness when considering "closest male friend" versus "males in general."
   2. There will be no difference between males' perceptions of character when considering "closest male friend" versus "males in general."
   3. There will be no difference between males' perceptions of dynamism when considering "closest male friend" versus "males in general."
Summary

Trust has been recognized by communication scholars as a variable of central importance in human relationships. Its importance has also been recognized, but not studied empirically, in the specific context of the female-male relationship. The need for such research prompted the author to formulate specific questions designed to explore the operation of the communication variable interpersonal trust in the female-male context. After reviewing three approaches to the study of interpersonal trust, Giffin's conceptual framework was adopted as the guide for this study. "Informal" hypotheses and indirect evidence from other studies led to the formulation of specific hypotheses to be tested. The following chapter presents the procedures and methodology used for testing these hypotheses.
CHAPTER II

METHODOLOGY

This study was conducted in an effort to determine to what extent, if any, females' and males' attitudes of interpersonal trust toward the same- and opposite-sex differ. This chapter includes the procedures and methodology used for testing the main null hypotheses, and null sub-hypotheses stated in Chapter I.

Population for the Study

The source of data for the study were University of Kansas students enrolled in the Basic Communication Program, Fall Semester, 1976. Participation in the study fulfilled the students' Experiment Participation requirement for the semester. A total of 104 males and 137 females participated in the study. On the average, subjects were between first and second semester students. The mean age of subjects was 18.9, or between 18 and 19 years.

Measuring Instrument

The Giffin Trust Differential-Form E (1968b) served as the principle measuring instrument. As described in Chapter I, the GTD is a 27-item semantic differential
instrument, including seven-point, bipolar ratings scales. Nine items each comprise the expertness, character, and dynamism factors. At the top of each GTD was one of the following four attitude objects: your closest male friend, your closest female friend, males in general, or females in general. The GTD and scoring sheet are included in Appendix A.

Design and Procedures

The hypotheses to be tested called for a 2X2X2 factorial design which is presented below in Table 1. The first variable was sex of subject - female or male. The second variable was sex of attitude object - female or male. The third variable was relationship to attitude object - closest friend or that sex in general.

Table 1
Design

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sex of Attitude Object</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationship to Attitude Object</td>
<td>Closest</td>
<td>General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex of Subject</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>n = 25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>n = 34</td>
<td>n = 33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 237
Each subject was requested to fill out one Giffin Trust Differential. Subjects were randomly assigned to one of eight groups: four male groups and four female groups. The subjects in each group were instructed to consider one of the following four attitude objects when filling out the GTD: your closest female friend, your closest male friend, females in general, or males in general. Two males and two females failed to fill out the GTD completely, leaving a total of 237 subjects.

Given Rotter's (1967) finding of significant correlations between scores on his Interpersonal Trust Scale and position in the family, socioeconomic level, religion, and religious differences between parents, it seemed appropriate to provide an Information Sheet of demographic data for subjects to fill out after the GTD (see Appendix B). The demographic data was later correlated with GTD scores. This ensured that differences found using the GTD could be attributed to sex related factors rather than other demographic characteristics. The information requested included: age, number of semesters of college attended, subjects' religious preference, mother's religious preference, father's religious preference, and subjects' position in the family.

Finally, subjects filled out the Carrocci-McClearey Questionnaire (henceforth, CMQ), a questionnaire designed by Kevin McClearey and the author (see Appendix C). The purpose of the CMQ was to provide a straightforward indication of subjects' attitudes of interpersonal trust by
using a direct, self-report technique. Also, scores from the CMQ were later correlated with GTD scores in an attempt to provide some validation of subjects' expressed attitudes of interpersonal trust from the GTD. The CMQ includes four statements: "I trust my closest female friend," "I trust my closest male friend," "I trust males in general," and "I trust females in general." Subjects drew an arrow on a 100 millimeter line to indicate the extent to which they "trusted" the person or group designated for each statement, from 0 (not at all) to 100 (completely).

Statistical Treatment

The major reference for computational procedures was *Statistical Principles in Experimental Design* (Winer, 1971). All statistical tests, except where indicated, were performed at the University of Kansas Computer Center.

Each GTD was hand-scored for the factors of expertness, character, and dynamism. The design called for a three-way analysis of variance, which was performed for each of the three factors, using the BMDP2V statistical program. The independent variables for all three analyses of variance were: sex of subject, sex of attitude object, and relationship to attitude object (closest or general). The dependent variables were subjects' expertness, character, or dynamism scores. These analyses of variance provided the tests for the three main null hypotheses. All sub-hypotheses were tested by the author, who performed t-tests to compare the pairs of means. The author later
performed tests for simple effects for further analysis of significant interactions from the ANOVA's.

To check for any relationships between subjects' attitudes of interpersonal trust and demographic characteristics, the data from the Information Sheet was correlated with subjects' expertness, character, and dynamism scores. The Can corr Program of the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS, 1975) provided a correlation matrix and performed a test for canonical correlation between the sets of variables. Canonical correlation is a technique "... for assessing the degree of relationship between a set of \( p \) predictor variables and a set of \( q \) outcome variables." (Harris, 1975, p. 132). In the present case the demographic data served as the set of predictor variables, while expertness, character, and dynamism scores served as the set of outcome variables.

Three \( t \)-tests were performed to compare subjects' scores on the expertness, character and dynamism dimensions whose parents' religious preferences were the same to those subjects whose parents' religious preferences differed.

In an effort to see if any relationships existed between subjects' expertness, character, and dynamism scores, and subjects' scores from the CMQ, the SPSS program provided a matrix of Pearson Product Moment Correlation Coefficients. To discern what relationships (if any) existed between sex of subject and their GTD and CMQ scores, correlation coefficients for these variables were also
included in this analysis.

Finally, the BMDP2V program was employed to perform a 2X4 repeated measures analysis of variance of subjects' scores from the CMQ. The ANOVA compared female subjects' scores to male subjects' scores (between groups measure). Also, subjects' responses to all four statements were compared to discern differences among scores (within group measure).

Summary

The population for the study, measuring instruments used, design, procedures, and statistical analysis methods have been described in this chapter. Chapter III will present the results of the data analyses.
CHAPTER III

RESULTS

In this chapter the results obtained from the data analysis of subjects' scores on the Giffin Trust Differential will be reported. The order of presentation will be: (1) tests of hypotheses and sub-hypotheses utilizing subjects' scores from the expertness dimension; (2) tests of hypotheses and sub-hypotheses utilizing subjects' scores from the character dimension; and (3) tests of hypotheses and sub-hypotheses utilizing subjects' scores from the dynamism dimension.

The results from the demographic data analyses will then be reported. Finally, the results from analyses utilizing subjects' scores from the CMQ will be reported.

Before reporting the results, however, it seems appropriate to restate the main and sub-hypotheses that were tested:

I. There will be no difference between females' and males' expressed attitudes of interpersonal trust (on the expertness, character, and dynamism dimensions) toward members of the same and opposite sex.

A. There will be no difference between females' and males' expressed attitudes of interpersonal trust toward "females in general."

1. There will be no difference between females' and males' perceptions of expertness when
considering "females in general."

2. There will be no difference between females' and males' perceptions of character when considering "females in general."

3. There will be no difference between females' and males' perceptions of dynamism when considering "females in general."

B. There will be no difference between females' and males' expressed attitudes of interpersonal trust toward "males in general."

1. There will be no difference between females' and males' perceptions of expertness when considering "males in general."

2. There will be no difference between females' and males' perceptions of character when considering "males in general."

3. There will be no difference between females' and males' perceptions of dynamism when considering "males in general."

C. There will be no difference between females' and males' expressed attitudes of interpersonal trust toward their "closest female friend."

1. There will be no difference between females' and males' perceptions of expertness when considering their "closest female friend."

2. There will be no difference between females' and males' perceptions of character when considering their "closest female friend."

3. There will be no difference between females' and males' perceptions of dynamism when considering their "closest female friend."

D. There will be no difference between females' and males' expressed attitudes of interpersonal trust toward their "closest male friend."

1. There will be no difference between females' and males' perceptions of expertness when considering their "closest male friend."

2. There will be no difference between females' and males' perceptions of character when considering their "closest male friend."

3. There will be no difference between females' and males' perceptions of dynamism when considering their "closest male friend."

II. There will be no difference between expressed attitudes of interpersonal trust toward "females" versus "males."

1. There will be no difference between perceptions of expertness toward "females" versus "males."

2. There will be no difference between perceptions of character toward "females" versus "males."
3. There will be no difference between perceptions of dynamism toward "females" versus "males."

III. There will be no difference between expressed attitudes of interpersonal trust (on the expertness, character and dynamism dimensions) toward a "closest friend" of both sexes versus both sexes "in general."

E. There will be no difference between females' expressed attitudes of interpersonal trust toward "their closest female friend" versus "females in general."
   1. There will be no difference between females' perceptions of expertness when considering "closest female friend," versus "females in general."
   2. There will be no difference between females' perceptions of character when considering "closest female friend" versus "females in general."
   3. There will be no difference between females' perceptions of dynamism when considering "closest female friend," versus "females in general."

F. There will be no difference between females' expressed attitudes of interpersonal trust toward their "closest male friend" versus "males in general."
   1. There will be no difference between females' perceptions of expertness when considering "closest male friend" versus "males in general."
   2. There will be no difference between females' perceptions of character when considering "closest male friend" versus "males in general."
   3. There will be no difference between females' perceptions of dynamism when considering "closest male friend" versus "males in general."

G. There will be no difference between males' expressed attitudes of interpersonal trust toward their "closest female friend" versus "females in general."
   1. There will be no difference between males' perceptions of expertness when considering "closest female friend" versus "females in general."
   2. There will be no difference between males' perceptions of character when considering "closest female friend" versus "females in general."
3. There will be no difference between males' perceptions of dynamism when considering "closest female friend" versus "females in general."

H. There will be no difference between males' expressed attitudes of interpersonal trust toward their "closest male friend" versus "males in general."
1. There will be no difference between males' perceptions of expertness when considering "closest male friend" versus "males in general."
2. There will be no difference between males' perceptions of character when considering "closest male friend" versus "males in general."
3. There will be no difference between males' perceptions of dynamism when considering "closest male friend" versus "males in general."

1) Expertness

The following are the results obtained from the analyses utilizing subjects' scores on the expertness dimension of the Giffin Trust Differential. An analysis of variance provided the test of the three main null hypotheses for the expertness dimension. The results of this ANOVA are presented in Table 2 (see next page). The analysis of variance revealed that sex of subject was a significant factor (F = 5.96, p < 0.05). Thus hypothesis I was rejected. The overall mean score for female subjects (X = 48.21) was greater than the overall mean score for male subjects (X = 46.10), implying that females consider people of both sexes to be more expert than males do.

More specifically, the t-test results of the four sub-hypotheses tested (A1, B1, C1, D1) show how female and male subjects differed in their perceptions of expertness when considering: females in general, males in
Table 2
ANOVA: Expertness Dimension of GTD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Sum of Squares</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Mean Square</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1SEX</td>
<td>258.73462</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>258.73462</td>
<td>5.96326*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEXAO</td>
<td>67.873728</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>67.873728</td>
<td>1.56350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RELAO</td>
<td>1701.05823</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1701.05823</td>
<td>39.20562**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEX X SEXAO</td>
<td>550.89917</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>550.89917</td>
<td>12.69700**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEX X RELAO</td>
<td>1.74268</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.74268</td>
<td>0.04016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEXAO X RELAO</td>
<td>27.27319</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>27.27319</td>
<td>0.62859</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEX X SEXAO X RELAO</td>
<td>194.62769</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>194.62769</td>
<td>4.48574*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error</td>
<td>9935.88037</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>43.38812</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1SEX = Sex of Subject; SEXAO = Sex of Attitude Object;
RELAO = Relationship to Attitude Object (closest or general)
* p < 0.05
**p < 0.001

Table 3
Comparisons Between Mean Scores for Females and Males/Expertness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hyp.</th>
<th>Attitude Object</th>
<th>Males</th>
<th>Females</th>
<th>t</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A₁</td>
<td>Females in General</td>
<td>40.65</td>
<td>47.85</td>
<td>-4.16**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B₁</td>
<td>Males in General</td>
<td>45.96</td>
<td>43.33</td>
<td>1.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C₁</td>
<td>Closest Female Friend</td>
<td>47.38</td>
<td>50.57</td>
<td>-1.76*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D₁</td>
<td>Closest Male Friend</td>
<td>50.40</td>
<td>51.09</td>
<td>-.36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p < 0.05
**p < 0.005
general, closest female friend, or closest male friend. These results are presented in Table 3 (on page 38).

It can be seen from the Table that females' and males' perceptions of expertness when considering "females in general" differ significantly. That is, female subjects considered "females in general" to be more expert than did male subjects. Sub-hypothesis $A_1$ was thus rejected. Likewise, females rated their "closest female friend" higher than males rated their "closest female friend."

Because of this significant difference, sub-hypothesis $C_1$ was rejected. Sub-hypotheses $B_1$ and $D_1$ were accepted since the differences between females' and males' scores did not differ significantly when considering "males in general" or "closest male friend." The tendency of female subjects to consider people of both sexes to be more expert than male subjects was reversed when considering "males in general." For this group, male subjects had higher scores than female subjects, but since the difference was not significant no conclusions can be drawn from these results.

The result of the test for difference in perceptions of expertness due to sex of attitude object was not significant ($F = 1.56$). The mean scores of male and female subjects combined for all "male" attitude objects (closest and general, $\bar{X} = 47.695$) did not significantly differ from males' and females' combined scores for all "female" attitude objects (closest and general, $\bar{X} = 46.615$). There-
fore, hypothesis II - no difference between perceptions of expertness for "female" attitude objects vs. "male" attitude objects - was accepted.

However, the significant interaction between sex of subject and sex of attitude object ($F = 12.697, p < 0.001$) shows that sex of attitude object did have some effect on subjects' perceptions of expertness. A test of the simple effects of sex of subject for "male" (closest and general combined) and "female" (closest and general) attitude objects revealed that male subjects perceive "males" to be significantly more expert than "females" ($F = 23.18, p < 0.001$), and that female subjects consider "females" to be significantly more expert than "males" ($F = 5.35, p < 0.05$). There is an exception to this latter finding which can be detected by another look at the group means in Table 2: the mean for female subjects when considering "closest female friend" is slightly lower than the mean for female subjects when considering "closest male friend." This finding appears to account for the significant three-way interaction (SEX X SEXAO X RELAO): whereas female subjects perceive "females" ("closest friend" and "in general") to be more expert than "males" ("closest friend" and "in general"), and "females in general" to be more expert than "males in general," they perceive "closest female friend" to be slightly less expert than "closest male friend."

The third main factor, which was significant
(F = 39.21, p < 0.001), was relationship to attitude object. There was a significant difference between both male and female subjects' perceptions of expertness for a "closest friend" of either sex versus either sex "in general." Therefore, hypothesis III was rejected. Specifically, "closest friends" (X = 49.86) of both sexes were perceived to be more expert than both sexes "in general" (X = 44.95) by female and male subjects.

To determine the differences in expertness scores due to relationship to attitude object for female and male subjects separately, t-tests of the four sub-hypotheses (E₁, F₁, G₁, H₁) were performed. The results of these tests are provided in Table 4:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hyp.</th>
<th>Sex of Subject</th>
<th>SEX CFF</th>
<th>FIG</th>
<th>CMF</th>
<th>MIG</th>
<th>t</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>E₁</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>50.57</td>
<td>47.85</td>
<td>51.09</td>
<td>43.33</td>
<td>1.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F₁</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td></td>
<td>51.09</td>
<td>43.33</td>
<td>4.85**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G₁</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>47.38</td>
<td>40.65</td>
<td>43.89</td>
<td>3.59**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H₁</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>50.40</td>
<td>45.96</td>
<td>45.96</td>
<td>2.56*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CFF = Closest Female Friend; FIG = Females in General; CMF = Closest Male Friend; MIG = Males in General

* p < 0.05
** p < 0.005
Male subjects perceived their "closest female friend" to be significantly more expert than "females in general," and their "closest male friend" to be significantly more expert than "males in general." Thus sub-hypotheses $G_1$ and $H_1$ were rejected. Sub-hypothesis $F_1$ was similarly rejected since females perceived their "closest male friend" to be significantly more expert than "males in general." The mean of female subjects considering their "closest female friend" was higher than for those considering "females in general," but the difference between the means was not significant. Sub-hypothesis $E_1$ was accepted.

2) **Character**

Subjects' scores from the character dimension of the Giffin Trust Differential served as the data for the second analysis of variance. The results of this ANOVA, which provided the test of the three main null hypotheses, are presented in Table 5 (see page 43). The test of the first main hypothesis revealed no difference in scores due to sex of subject. Overall, females' and males' perceptions of character toward all four attitude objects did not differ significantly ($\bar{X} = 48.96$, females; $\bar{X} = 47.22$, males). Hypothesis I - no difference between females' and males' expressed attitudes of interpersonal trust on the character dimension - was accepted.

The t-tests between individual means for females and
Table 5

ANOVA: Character Dimension of GTD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Sum of Squares</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Mean Square</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SEX</td>
<td>176.96643</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>176.96643</td>
<td>2.95131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEXAO</td>
<td>897.34828</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>897.34828</td>
<td>14.96529*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RELAO</td>
<td>4322.06433</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4322.06433</td>
<td>72.08009*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEX X SEXAO</td>
<td>51.24329</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>51.24329</td>
<td>0.85460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEX X RELAO</td>
<td>154.15100</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>154.15100</td>
<td>2.57081</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEXAO X RELAO</td>
<td>139.78955</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>139.78955</td>
<td>2.33130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEX X SEXAO X RELAO</td>
<td>161.80225</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>161.80225</td>
<td>2.69841</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error</td>
<td>13731.29114</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>59.96197</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SEX = Sex of Subject; SEXAO = Sex of Attitude Object; RELAO = Relationship to Attitude Object (closest or general).
*p < 0.001

Table 6

Comparisons Between Mean Scores for Females and Males/Character

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hyp.</th>
<th>Attitude Object</th>
<th>Males</th>
<th>Females</th>
<th>t</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A2</td>
<td>Females in General</td>
<td>45.15</td>
<td>47.88</td>
<td>-1.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B2</td>
<td>Males in General</td>
<td>42.28</td>
<td>39.79</td>
<td>1.0765</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2</td>
<td>Closest Female Friend</td>
<td>52.27</td>
<td>54.91</td>
<td>1.4261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D2</td>
<td>Closest Male Friend</td>
<td>49.16</td>
<td>53.26</td>
<td>2.06*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < 0.025
males yielded similar results. The reader will recall that the four sub-hypotheses \((A_2, B_2, C_2, D_2)\) addressed differences between females and males toward each group of attitude objects. The individual means and results of the t-tests are displayed in Table 6 (see preceding page). There was one significant difference between means - that between females and males when considering their "closest male friend." Female subjects perceived "closest male friend" to be higher in character than did male subjects. Because of this significant difference, sub-hypothesis \(D_2\) was rejected. The other three sub-hypotheses \((A_2, B_2, C_2)\) were accepted since females' and males' perceptions of character for "females in general," "males in general," and "closest female friend" did not differ significantly. From these and the ANOVA main effect results, it seems safe to conclude that, except for a "closest male friend," females' and males' perceptions of character toward the same and opposite sex do not differ.

However, as the analysis of variance revealed, sex of the attitude objects was a significant factor for both females' and males' considerations of character \((F = 14.965, p < 0.001)\). The overall mean score for both female and male subjects was higher for "female" attitude objects ("closest" and "general," \(\bar{X} = 50.05\)) than for "male" attitude objects ("closest" and "general," \(\bar{X} = 46.12\)). This significant difference led to the rejection of
Hypothesis II2. Thus, it appears that both females and males consider "females" to be higher in character than "males."

Hypothesis III, which addressed subjects' perceptions of character toward a "closest friend" of both sexes versus both sexes "in general" was rejected (F = 72.08, p < 0.001). Females and males consider their "closest friends" of both sexes (\(\bar{X} = 52.40\)) to be much higher in character than both sexes "in general" (\(\bar{X} = 43.775\)).

This finding is also reflected in the results of the t-tests, where the means of "closest" vs. "general" were compared for female and male subjects separately. These results are presented in Table 7:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hyp.</th>
<th>Sex of Subject</th>
<th>1CFF</th>
<th>FIG</th>
<th>CMF</th>
<th>MIG</th>
<th>t</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>E2</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>54.91</td>
<td>47.88</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4.36*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F2</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>53.26</td>
<td></td>
<td>39.79</td>
<td></td>
<td>6.646*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G2</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>52.27</td>
<td>45.15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.14*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H2</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>49.16</td>
<td>42.28</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.077*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 CFF = Closest Female Friend; FIG = Females in General; CMF = Closest Male Friend; MIG = Males in General
*p < 0.005
All four sub-hypotheses ($E_2$, $F_2$, $G_2$, $H_2$) were rejected due to significant differences between all four pairs of means. More specifically, both females and males perceive a "closest female friend" to be higher in character than "females in general," and "closest male friend" to be higher in character than "males in general."

There were no significant interactions between the factors for the character dimension. Therefore, all differences in subjects' scores can be attributed either to sex of attitude object ("females" rated higher), or relationship to attitude object ("closest" rated higher).

3) Dynamism

The following results are those obtained utilizing subjects' scores from the dynamism dimension of the Giffin Trust Differential. The three main null hypotheses were tested through the use of the analysis of variance. Table 8 provides the results obtained from this analysis. The first main null hypothesis was rejected since sex of subject proved to be a significant factor ($F = 4.55$, $p < 0.05$). The significant difference between female and male subjects' perceptions of dynamism toward members of the same and opposite sex is reflected in the overall mean scores. Female subjects' mean score ($\bar{X} = 45.61$) was higher than male subjects' mean score ($\bar{X} = 43.61$). The conclusion is that, overall, females perceive people to be more dynamic than males do.
**Table 8**

ANOVA: Dynamism Dimension of GTD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Sum of Squares</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Mean Square</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SEX</td>
<td>230.68286</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>230.68286</td>
<td>4.55417*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEXAO</td>
<td>1143.53357</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1143.53357</td>
<td>22.57579**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RELAO</td>
<td>1112.79004</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1112.79004</td>
<td>21.96885**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEX X SEXAO</td>
<td>64.90112</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>64.90112</td>
<td>1.128129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEX X RELAO</td>
<td>1.62756</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.62756</td>
<td>0.03213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEXAO X RELAO</td>
<td>610.65808</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>610.65808</td>
<td>12.05569**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEX X SEXAO X RELAO</td>
<td>63.69482</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>63.69482</td>
<td>1.25747</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error</td>
<td>11599.55811</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>50.65309</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1
SEX = Sex of Subject; SEXAO = Sex of Attitude Object; RELAO = Relationship to Attitude Object ("close" or "general")
* p < 0.05
** p < 0.001

**Table 9**

Comparisons Between Mean Scores for Females and Males/Dynamism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hyp.</th>
<th>Attitude Object</th>
<th>Males</th>
<th>Females</th>
<th>t</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A3</td>
<td>Females in General</td>
<td>36.62</td>
<td>40.55</td>
<td>-2.09*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B3</td>
<td>Males in General</td>
<td>46.40</td>
<td>46.12</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C3</td>
<td>Closest Female Friend</td>
<td>45.12</td>
<td>47.29</td>
<td>-1.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D3</td>
<td>Closest Male Friend</td>
<td>46.32</td>
<td>48.47</td>
<td>-1.10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < 0.025
This difference between females and males is reflected somewhat in the individual means for each group of subjects. These means and the results from the t-tests comparing the pairs of means are presented in Table 9 (see preceding page). As the Table shows, except for "males in general," the means for female subjects are higher than the means for male subjects. Of the four sub-hypotheses tested, however, only $A_3$ - no difference' between females' and males' perceptions of dynamism when considering "females in general" - was rejected. Males' and females' mean scores for "males in general" (sub-hypothesis $B_3$) were nearly identical, which led to the conclusion that this group's level of dynamism is perceived quite similarly by both sexes. The last two sub-hypotheses ($C_3$ and $D_3$), concerning "closest female friend" and "closest male friend" were accepted also, since the differences between these pairs of means were not significant.

Hypothesis $II_3$ was rejected due to the significant difference found for female and male subjects' perceptions of dynamism toward "female" attitude objects ("closest" and "general") versus "male" attitude objects ("closest" and "general") $F = 22.57, p < 0.001$. The overall mean score for those females and males who considered "male" attitude objects ($\bar{X} = 46.83$) was higher than the overall mean score for those who considered "female" attitude objects ($\bar{X} = 42.39$). Thus, both females and males
perceive "males" to be more dynamic than "females."

The test of the third main null hypothesis revealed a significant difference due to relationship to attitude object \( (F = 21.96, p < 0.001) \). Combining female and male subjects' scores for dynamism, the mean score for a "closest friend" of both sexes \( (\bar{X} = 46.80) \) was higher than the mean score for both sexes "in general" \( (\bar{X} = 42.42) \). This result led to the rejection of Hypothesis III, and the conclusion that both females and males perceive their "closest friends" to be more dynamic than both sexes "in general." There was an exception, however, as reflected when the pairs of means for females and males were analyzed separately to test the four sub-hypotheses \( (E_3, F_3, G_3, H_3) \). These means and the accompanying t-ratios are presented in Table 10:

**Table 10**

Comparisons Between Mean Scores: "Closest" to "General"/Dynamism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hyp.</th>
<th>Sex of Subject</th>
<th>lCFF</th>
<th>FIG</th>
<th>CMF</th>
<th>MIG</th>
<th>t</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>E_3</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>47.29</td>
<td>40.55</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.485*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F_3</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.527</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G_3</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>45.12</td>
<td>36.62</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4.22*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H_3</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CFF = Closest Female Friend; FIG = Females in General; CMF = Closest Male Friend; MIG = Males in General

*\( p < 0.005 \)
When comparing the means for male subjects who considered their "closest male friend," to those males who considered "males in general" (sub-hypothesis H₃), we find no significant difference. Apparently, males perceive "males in general" to be no less dynamic than their "closest male friend." The mean for "males in general" is actually slightly higher than the mean for "closest male friend." Although the mean for female subjects who considered "closest male friend" is somewhat higher than for those who considered "males in general," the difference was not significant. Thus, sub-hypothesis F₃ was accepted also. A "closest female friend" was considered to be more dynamic than "females in general" by groups of both female and male subjects. Due to these significant differences, sub-hypotheses E₃ and G₃ were rejected.

The significant interaction between sex of attitude object and relationship to attitude object (\(F = 12.05, p < 0.001\)) further substantiates the above conclusions. Disregarding sex of subject, the combined means are presented in Table 11 (see page 51). It can be seen from this Table that "females in general" are perceived to be the least dynamic of all four groups. The test for simple effects revealed that the differentiation between "closest male friend" and "males in general" (\(F = 1.48\)) wasn't nearly as great as that between "closest female friend" and "females in general" (\(F = 66.58, p < 0.001\)). The finding that "females in general" are considered to
TABLE 11

Combined Means: Sex of Attitude Object and Relationship to Attitude Object

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sex of Attitude Object</th>
<th>&quot;Closest Friend&quot;</th>
<th>&quot;In General&quot;</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Males&quot;</td>
<td>94.79</td>
<td>92.52</td>
<td>1.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Females&quot;</td>
<td>92.40</td>
<td>77.16</td>
<td>66.58*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < 0.001

be the least dynamic also further explains the significant difference found in the test of Hypothesis II3, where "females" were perceived to be less dynamic than "males."

4) Demographic Data Analyses

The test for canonical correlation between the set of demographic data and the set of GTD scores was not significant at the .05 level (p = .21132, eigenvalue = .04465, p < .653). Therefore, no meaningful linear combination of the demographic data was derived for prediction of criterion scores (expertness, character, and dynamism scores). It appears that age, number of semesters of college attended, religious preference, parents' religious preferences, and position in the family bear no relationship to subjects' expressed attitudes of interpersonal trust from the GTD.

The mean expertness, character, and dynamism scores
for subjects' whose parents held the same religious preference were compared to those whose parents' religious preferences differed. The results of these t-tests are presented in Table 12:

Table 12
Comparisons: Same Religious Preference vs. Different Religious Preferences

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>1 Group</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>2-tailed Probability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Expertness</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>47.9336</td>
<td>3.79</td>
<td>0.000*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>42.5862</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Character</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>48.9905</td>
<td>3.18</td>
<td>0.002*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>43.2759</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dynamism</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>45.1280</td>
<td>2.07</td>
<td>0.039*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>41.8571</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Group 1 = Parents' religious preference same; Group 2 = Parents' religious preferences different
* = significant

For all three dimensions, subjects with parents who differ in religious preference had scores that were significantly lower than subjects with parents who have the same religious preference. Of the 29 subjects' whose parents' religious preferences differed, 16 were males and 13 were females. Since these cases were so few, no trends concerning sex of subject or attitude object considered could be discerned. The general conclusion that can be reached, however, is that expressed attitudes of interpersonal trust on the three dimensions are lower for those whose parents have differing religious preferences.
5j) Results Utilizing CMQ

As explained in Chapter II, subjects' expertness, character, and dynamism scores were correlated with subjects' scores from the CMQ. Each subject had four separate scores from the CMQ, ranging from 0 to 100. These scores were generated from subjects' responses to the four statements: "I trust my closest female friend," "I trust my closest male friend," "I trust males in general," and "I trust females in general." Table 13 provides the Pearson correlation coefficients obtained:

Table 13

Correlation Coefficients: GTD and CMQ Scores

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CMQ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GTD</td>
<td>1CFF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expertness</td>
<td>.0626</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2s=.167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Character</td>
<td>.2491*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>s=.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dynamism</td>
<td>.1103*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>s=.044</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 CFF = Closest Female Friend; CMF = Closest Male Friend; MIG = Males in General; FIG = Females in General
2 s = level of significance.
* = significant correlation

The correlations were not very high. Subjects' scores from the expertness dimension did not correlate significantly with any of the groups of scores from the
Scores from the character dimension did correlate significantly with subjects' expressed amount of "trust" on the CMQ toward: "closest female friend," "males in general," and "females in general." The two other significant correlations were between dynamism scores from the GTD and scores for "closest female friend" and "females in general" from the CMQ. Thus, there appears to be some relationship between subjects' expressed attitudes of interpersonal trust from the Giffin Trust Differential and their responses to the straightforward statements on the CMQ concerning "trust" toward members of the same and opposite-sex, but this relationship was not a particularly strong one. These results, as all others, will be discussed further in the next chapter.

In Table 14 the Pearson correlation coefficients between GTD scores and sex of subject, and CMQ scores and sex of subject are presented:

Table 14

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>GTD</th>
<th>CMQ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sex of</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subject</td>
<td>.1161*</td>
<td>.0736</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1E</td>
<td>.036</td>
<td>.128</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1E =Expertness; C = Character; D = Dynamism
2CFF = Closest Female Friend; CMF = Closest Male Friend
MIG = Males in General; FIG = Females in General
3s = level of significance
* = significant correlations
As the Table shows, the correlations were rather low here, also. However, there was a significant relationship between sex of subject and expertness scores, and sex of subject and dynamism scores. The reader will recall that the analyses of variance revealed a significant difference between females' and males' perceptions of expertness and dynamism toward members of the same and opposite sex, but no significant difference between females' and males' perceptions of character. Those findings correspond with the significant correlations found here for expertness and dynamism, and the lack of a significant relationship for character.

Only one significant correlation was found between CMQ scores and sex of subject. That is, a significant relationship was found between sex of subject and "closest female friend," but not for the other groups from the CMQ. Overall, there does not appear to be a strong relationship between subjects' sex and their responses to the statements on the CMQ.

The above conclusion is further substantiated by the results of the repeated measures analysis of variance, which utilized subjects' scores from the CMQ to check for differences between females and males toward: "a closest female friend," "a closest male friend," "males in general," and "females in general." These results appear in Table 15. Female and male subjects' scores
### Table 15
Repeated Measures ANOVA: CMQ Scores

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Sum of Squares</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Mean Square</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Between Groups-S (Females vs. Males)</td>
<td>465.68164</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>465.68164</td>
<td>.81646</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error</td>
<td>136317.62109</td>
<td>239*</td>
<td>570.36662</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within Groups-R (CFF vs. CMF vs. MIG vs. FIG)</td>
<td>156333.21484</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>52111.07178</td>
<td>226.64519**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S X R</td>
<td>1045.45703</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>348.48568</td>
<td>1.51566</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error</td>
<td>164855.19922</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>229.92357</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* 240 subjects filled out the CMQ completely
**p < 0.001

### Table 16
Mean Scores from CMQ

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitude Object</th>
<th>Sex of Subject</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Closest Female Friend</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closest Male Friend</td>
<td>83.625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Males in General</td>
<td>84.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females in General</td>
<td>59.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Males in General</td>
<td>58.24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
did not differ significantly, \( F = .81646 \). Thus, sex of subject was not a significant determinant of self-reported amounts of "trust" toward a "closest friend" of both sexes, and both sexes "in general." There was, however, a significant difference within subjects' responses to the CMQ statements \( F = 226.645, p < 0.001 \). Table 16 presents the means for each group (preceding page). As the Table shows, the means for "closest female friend" and "closest male friend" are much higher than the means for "males in general" and "females in general." This difference appears to account for the significant within subject difference. Both females and males reported that they "trust" a "closest friend" of both sexes more than both sexes "in general."

The mean score for females considering "closest female friend" was higher than the mean score for males. A t-test comparing these means showed this difference to be significant \( t = 1.68, p < .05 \). This appears to account for the significant relationship found between sex of subject and "closest female friend" (see Table 13), and implies that females "trust" their "closest female friend" more than males do.

**Summary**

The results from all data analyses have been reported in this chapter. Among the main significant
findings from subjects' scores on the GTD are the following: Females' and males' perceptions of expertness and dynamism differed overall, with female subjects' perceptions of others (i.e. scores) higher than male subjects' perceptions of others for both dimensions. Both sexes perceived "female" attitude objects ("closest" and "in general") as higher in character than "male" attitude objects ("closest" and "in general"), and "male" attitude objects were perceived as more dynamic than "female" attitude objects by both sexes. Females and males perceived a "closest friend" of both sexes to be more expert, more dynamic, and higher in character than both sexes "in general."

Another significant finding was the interaction on the expertness dimension between sex of subject and sex of attitude object, where it was revealed that male subjects perceived "males" to be more expert than "females," and female subjects perceived "females" to be more expert than "males." Finally, a significant interaction between sex of attitude object and relationship to attitude object was found for the dynamism dimension. Further analysis revealed that this interaction was due to almost no differentiation in females' and males' combined scores between "closest male friend" and "males in general," but a great differentiation between "closest female friend" and "females in general," with the latter being rated as least dynamic of all four groups.
No relationship was found between subjects' scores on the GTD and subjects' demographic characteristics. However, subjects whose parents' religious preferences differed had significantly lower scores (i.e. rated others lower) on all three dimensions of the GTD than subjects' whose parents held the same religious preference. Sex of subject was significantly related to scores on the expertness and dynamism dimensions of the GTD, and also related to subjects' reported "trust" for a "closest female friend" on the CMQ.

Tests for correlations between GTD and CMQ scores revealed the following significant relationships: those between subjects' expressed "trust" on the CMQ toward a "closest female friend," "males in general," and "females in general," and subjects scores on the character dimension of the GTD; and between subjects expressed "trust" on the CMQ toward a "closest female friend" and "females in general," and the dynamism dimension of the GTD.

A repeated measures ANOVA of subjects' scores from the CMQ revealed no difference between females' and males' scores overall. Within subjects, however a higher level of "trust" was expressed toward "closest friends" of both sexes than toward both sexes "in general."
Chapter III revealed the many interesting results of this study. The findings of major interest, of course, are those related to subjects' expressed attitudes of interpersonal trust as per the expertness, character, and dynamism dimensions of the Giffin Trust Differential. These results will be discussed first, followed by a discussion of demographic data results. Then results from the CMQ measure of trust will be discussed. The limitations of this study, implications, and suggestions for future research will be addressed in the final portions of the chapter.

**Attitudes of Interpersonal Trust**

The significant main effect due to sex of subject on the expertness dimension led to the conclusion that, overall, females perceive people of both sexes to be more expert than males do. When females' and males' scores were compared for all four attitude objects, this finding was further substantiated by the significantly higher mean score for females when considering females ("closest
friend" and "in general"), and the higher but nonsignificant mean score for "closest male friend." The trend was reversed, however, for "males in general," where male subjects had slightly higher mean scores than females. It appears, then, that the significant difference can be attributed mainly to females' considering females to be more expert than males consider females to be.

Based on previous research and socialization processes in our culture, the author had speculated earlier that males might be seen as more expert than females. However, in this study neither males nor females were perceived to be more or less expert overall by both sexes. Apparently, a stereotyped image of males being the experts does not exist for this group of university students. The significant interaction between sex of subject and sex of attitude object further explains this finding. It was revealed that men consider males to be more expert than females, and women consider females to be more expert than males. Thus, it seems that in matters requiring knowledge, intelligence, experience, etc., males and females prefer to turn to members of their own sex.

Overall, character of both sexes was not perceived differently by the females and males who participated in this study - sex of subject was not a significant factor. The t-tests revealed one exception, however. Females consider their "closest male friend" to be higher in character than males do. The most interesting finding from subjects' scores on the character dimension was that
females were rated higher than males by both females and males. The adjectives from this dimension include: kind, sincere, moral, nice, patient, and honest; both sexes perceive females to be the chief possessors of these qualities.

Wrightsman's (1974) conceptualization of "trust" closely resembles Giffin's conceptualization of the character component of an attitude of interpersonal trust. In his studies, Wrightsman has consistently found females to be more trusting than males. Therefore, given Wrightsman's findings and those from the present study, we can conclude that females are more inclined to trust others and that other females and males recognize this characteristic when asked to give their perceptions of females.

In relation to these findings it seems appropriate to point out that the items comprising the character dimension of the GTD are affect-oriented characteristics that usually surface in communication when operating on the level of feelings. Females in our society are encouraged and allowed to express their feelings much more so than males. Males may be as sincere, honest, kind, moral, etc. as females, but because they display their emotions less frequently than females (especially toward other males, who rated "closest male friend" lower on this component than females did), others do not get the opportunity to see these qualities in males.
The first conclusion drawn from subjects' scores on the dynamism dimension is that overall, females perceive people to be more dynamic than males do. There was almost no difference, however, between females' and males' perceptions of dynamism for "males in general," who were rated much higher than "females in general" by both sexes. In fact, overall, males were perceived by both sexes as being more dynamic than females. The interaction between sex of attitude object and relationship to attitude object revealed that the difference in subjects' perceptions of dynamism for a "closest male friend" compared to "males in general" was minimal, whereas the differentiation between "closest female friend" and "females in general" was very great. "Females in general" were perceived as much less dynamic than any of the other three groups. The stereotypic image of males being active, aggressive, bold, extroverted, energetic, etc. (all components of the dynamism dimension), and females being passive, unaggressive, timid, introverted, reserved, etc. still exists for college-age students of both sexes. These findings corroborate those of Chafetz' informal research (1974) and the series of studies conducted by Broverman et al. (1972). The stereotype of the passive, unaggressive female does not pervade people's perceptions of a "closest female friend," however.

One finding that consistently emerged for all three dimensions was that "closest friends" of both sexes were
rated higher than both sexes "in general." Both men and women perceive their closest friends to be more expert, more dynamic, and higher in character than males or females in general (with the exception noted above for males considering "closest male friend" vs. "males in general"). As Jourard (1971) and Lockwood and Eman (1976) have discovered, close friends are more apt to discuss intimate topics, and this type of self-disclosure follows an attitude of trust between the individuals. Thus, it seems logical that subjects would express a greater amount of trust toward a specific, close friend than they would toward a group of males or females in general.

**Demographic Characteristics**

The test for canonical correlation between the demographic data obtained from the Information Sheets and subjects' expertness, character and dynamism scores was not significant. Therefore, it appears that age, number of semesters of college attended, religious preference, parents' religious preference, position in the family, and number of children in the family bear no relationship to subjects' attitudes of interpersonal trust as expressed on the GTD.

The reader will recall the ANOVA results which showed a significant difference in perceptions of expertness and dynamism due to sex of subject. Also, both male and female subjects' perceptions of character and dynamism
differed due to the sex of the attitude object considered. These findings were further substantiated by the significant (albeit low) correlations found between sex of subject and expertness, and sex of subject and dynamism. Thus, we can conclude that differences in subjects' expressed attitudes of interpersonal trust were mainly due to sex-related factors, either sex of subject or sex of attitude object, and not due to age, birth order, or other demographic characteristics.

Although the test for canonical correlation revealed no relationship between subjects' scores on the GTD and subjects' mother's religious preference or father's religious preference, later t-tests showed that these demographic characteristics did have some bearing on subjects' expressed attitudes of interpersonal trust. Specifically, those subjects whose parents' religious preferences differed expressed less trusting attitudes on all three GTD dimensions than those subjects whose parents held the same religious preferences. Since such a small number of subjects indicated religious differences between their parents (n = 29), no trends could be discerned for attitudes toward closest friends of both sexes or both sexes in general. Still, these results concur with Rotter's (1967) earlier findings that students whose parents' religions differed were less trusting than those whose parents' religions were the same (as measured by his Interpersonal Trust Scale).
As mentioned in Chapter II, the CMQ was designed to provide a straightforward indication of subjects' attitudes of interpersonal trust toward the same and opposite sex via a direct, self-report technique. According to the results of the ANOVA utilizing subjects' scores from the CMQ, both female and male subjects indicated that they trusted closest friends of both sexes much more than both sexes in general, which is consistent with the findings from the GTD.

Attitudes of interpersonal trust did not differ between the sexes overall as measured by the CMQ. Females did, however, indicate that they trusted their "closest female friend" more than males did. In fact, the one significant correlation between CMQ scores and sex of subject was that between scores for "closest female friend" and sex of subject.

These results are somewhat contradictory to those obtained from the GTD, where females and males did differ in their perceptions of expertness and dynamism. There are several potential explanations for this discrepancy. First, subjects may have used a set response for "closest friend" of both sexes, and a different set response for both sexes "in general." Or, it could be that, on a straightforward instrument such as the CMQ, subjects were not willing to admit differences in attitudes of trust toward members of the same and opposite sex - they may have been attempting...
to appear consistent or socially aware. The GTD, on the other hand, may have revealed the differences that actually exist between the sexes in attitudes of interpersonal trust. It is also possible that expertness and dynamism are not components of the construct "trust" for these subjects.

It will be recalled that a second purpose for including the CMQ after subjects had filled out the GTD was to provide some validation for subjects' expressed attitudes of interpersonal trust from the GTD. Significant correlations were found to exist between: dynamism scores from the GTD and CMQ scores for "closest female friend" and "females in general;" and character scores from the GTD and CMQ scores for "closest female friend," "males in general," and "females in general." Thus, the last explanation considered above appears to be unlikely since there were some relationships between GTD and CMQ scores. These relationships (between CMQ scores and scores for the character dimension of the GTD) imply that the word "trust" as it appeared on the CMQ, may have connotated character for these subjects. It should be pointed out that "trust" was undefined in the statements on the CMQ. We have no way of knowing, therefore, whether the word had similar or dissimilar connotations for subjects.

Finally, it is recognized that the CMQ is a crude measuring instrument that was never used before, and so could be of limited reliability and validity.
Implications of the Study

One of the most significant findings of this study is the fact that males are not the experts as far as females are concerned. It appears that some changes in our society have taken place recently since, historically, males rather than females have been considered to be more knowledgeable, logical, scholarly, experienced, etc., especially by females. The results of this study suggest that presently females would rather turn to other females instead of males for help in matters requiring some expertise. Apparently, females are gaining more confidence in their own sex, and this newly-found female credibility may be a direct result of the feminist movement. For the female-male relationship, the implication is that the female no longer depends upon the male to be more educated and knowledgeable than she. This may be a reflection of a change in the old stereotypic male "breadwinner" role.

The findings here also imply that in an intimate female-male relationship, the female does not necessarily play a passive, timid role. Males (and females) still consider females in general to be less dynamic (i.e., active, aggressive, bold, etc.) than males, but when it comes to a closest female friend, she is considered to be almost as dynamic as males by both sexes.

The finding that both sexes consider females to be more sincere, honest, patient, moral, etc. than males implies that some sex-role stereotypes are still operant
in communication between the sexes, especially from the males' point of view. Females find their closest male friend's character to be almost as high as their closest female friend, but this is not the case for males, who apparently consider their closest male friend to be much less sincere, honest, etc. than their closest female friend.

Thus, the results of this study imply that some progress has been made in terms of reducing the number and pervasiveness of sex role stereotypes. At the same time, it is clear that females and males either differed in their perceptions of the dimensions of trust for the sexes, or both sexes perceived differences between the sexes. We can conclude that the variable of interpersonal trust operates differently for same-sex communication than it does for opposite-sex communication.

Limitations of the Study

It should be noted that the subjects for this study were a very homogeneous group. All subjects were University of Kansas students, most of whom were Freshmen between 18 and 20 years of age. Therefore, we cannot be sure that the results and conclusions reached here would be the same for these subjects as they become upper-classmen, non-students of the same age, older women and men, or women and men from a different geographic location. Also, there is the possibility that one, five, or
ten years hence, attitudes of interpersonal trust between the sexes may change as the mores and norms in our society evolve, and hopefully as sex role stereotypes diminish further.

All results from analyses utilizing the CMQ should be regarded as tentative. The limitations of this instrument are: 1) it had no previous use nor tests for reliability and validity; and 2) "trust" was undefined as it appeared on the questionnaire.

**Suggestions for Further Research**

In light of the above-mentioned limitations to this study, a most appropriate suggestion is that future study be undertaken to determine if the findings herein are applicable to different age groups, and people of varying backgrounds and sub-cultures.

Two separate investigations (Rotter's and the present) utilizing different conceptualizations of trust and different measuring instruments, have found people whose parents' religions differed to be less trusting and to hold less trusting attitudes toward others. No explanation presently exists for these findings and future investigation into this area seems clearly warranted.

Future studies of this nature that attempt to provide a straightforward measure of trust should provide an operational definition of trust before asking subjects to express their attitudes of trust for different persons.
or groups. This would insure that subjects have the same construct in mind while responding, and that any differences found could be attributed to subjects' differing attitudes of trust as defined — not different definitions of trust.

It has been proven in this study that the female and male subjects had some differing attitudes of interpersonal trust toward the same and opposite sex, and that both females and males perceive some differences between the sexes in terms of expertness, character, and dynamism. Further research attempts could be made to discern how these attitudinal differences operate behaviorally in specific same-sex or opposite-sex communication situations. For example, attitudes of interpersonal trust could be determined by administering the Giffin Trust Differential in a manner identical or similar to the procedures used in this study. Then, subjects could be presented with specific, risky situations that would require some type of trusting behavior on their part, and asked to choose between a female or male friend as the person they would trust. Subjects' choices in these situations could then be compared to their GTD scores to see if expressed attitudes of interpersonal trust match behavioral choices.

The types of studies mentioned above would also provide further tests of validity for the Giffin Trust Differential. Given direct relationships between subjects' responses to straightforward statements or their choices
in different risky situations and attitudes of interpersonal trust as expressed on the GTD, we would be more certain that the expertness, character, and dynamism dimensions are actually components of attitudes of interpersonal trust. This study provides some evidence that they are, but further research would allow us to be more certain.

**Summary**

The results obtained from this study have been discussed in this chapter. It has been concluded on the basis of the subjects studied that: 1) Females differ from males in perceptions of expertness and dynamism, and that females and males perceive differences between the sexes in terms of character and dynamism. 2) Demographic characteristics, such as age, college level, etc., are not related to subjects' expressed attitudes of interpersonal trust. 3) Results obtained from the CMQ instrument should be regarded as tentative. 4) There appear to be implications for the operation of trust as a variable in communication between the sexes. 5) The primary limitation of this study is the homogeneity of the students who participated. 6) Based on the results of this investigation, further study of interpersonal trust between the sexes is warranted.
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INTERPERSONAL PERCEPTIONS

The purpose of this questionnaire is to determine your attitude toward a specific other person or members of a specified group. Fill out all of the following items with this one person or group in mind (as designated at the top of the page that follows).

On the following page you will find a series of bipolar scales. You are to describe the person or group designated at the top of the page in terms of intervals on these scales. Please make your responses in terms of what these scales mean to you.

Here is how you are to use these scales:

If you feel that the person (or group) you are describing is very closely related to one end of the scale, you should place your check mark as follows:

fair: X:____:____:____:____: unfair

If you feel that this person (or group) is quite closely related to one or the other end of the scale (but not extremely), you should place your check mark as follows:

strong: ____:X:____:____:____: weak

If this person (or group) seems only slightly related to one side as opposed to the other side but is not really neutral, then you should check as follows:

active:____:____:____:____:X:____: passive

The direction toward which you check, of course, depends upon which of the two ends of the scale seem most characteristic of the person (or group) you are judging. If you consider the person (or group) to be neutral on the scale, both sides of the scale equally associated with the concept, then you should place your check mark in the middle interval:

safe:____:____:____:X:____:____: dangerous

IMPORTANT: 1) Place your check marks in the middle of the spaces, not on the boundaries:

This: Not this:

:____:X:____:____:X:
2) Be sure to check every scale--do not omit any.

3) Never put more than one check mark on a single scale.

Work at fairly high speed through this questionnaire. Do not worry or puzzle over individual items. It is your first impression, the immediate "feelings" about the items, that we want. On the other hand, please do not be careless, because we want your true impressions.
| SCHOLARLY | __:__:__:__:__:__ | UNSCHOLARLY |
| DISRESPECTFUL | __:__:__:__:__:__ | RESPECTFUL |
| UNKNOWLEDGEABLE | __:__:__:__:__:__ | KNOWLEDGEABLE |
| KIND | __:__:__:__:__:__ | CRUEL |
| EMPHATIC | __:__:__:__:__:__ | HESITANT |
| PASSIVE | __:__:__:__:__:__ | ACTIVE |
| FAST | __:__:__:__:__:__ | SLOW |
| MEEK | __:__:__:__:__:__ | AGGRESSIVE |
| EXPERT | __:__:__:__:__:__ | IGNORANT |
| BOLD | __:__:__:__:__:__ | TIMID |
| DISHONEST | __:__:__:__:__:__ | HONEST |
| AGGRESSIVE | __:__:__:__:__:__ | UNAGGRESSIVE |
| UNINFORMED | __:__:__:__:__:__ | INFORMED |
| TRAINED | __:__:__:__:__:__ | UNTRAINED |
| GOOD | __:__:__:__:__:__ | BAD |
| INEXPERIENCED | __:__:__:__:__:__ | EXPERIENCED |
| EDUCATED | __:__:__:__:__:__ | UNEDUCATED |
| INTROVERTED | __:__:__:__:__:__ | EXTROVERTED |
| ENERGETIC | __:__:__:__:__:__ | TIRED |
| SELFISH | __:__:__:__:__:__ | UNSELFISH |
| SINCERE | __:__:__:__:__:__ | INSINCERE |
| IMMORAL | __:__:__:__:__:__ | MORAL |
| PATIENT | __:__:__:__:__:__ | IMPATIENT |
| INTELLIGENT | __:__:__:__:__:__ | UNINTELLIGENT |
| ILLLOGICAL | __:__:__:__:__:__ | LOGICAL |
| AWFUL | __:__:__:__:__:__ | NICE |
| RESERVED | __:__:__:__:__:__ | FRANK |
SCORING KEY FOR

Giffin Trust Differential (GTD-Form E)

The following nine items are collected to score the factor of expertness and are tallied as indicated:

1. Scholarly - Unscholarly (7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1).
2. Expert - Ignorant (7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1).
3. Unknowledgeable - Knowledgeable (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7).
4. Trained - Untrained (7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1).
5. Inexperienced - Experienced (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7).
6. Educated - Uneducated (7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1).
7. Intelligent - Unintelligent (7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1).
8. Illogical - Logical (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7).

The following nine items are collected to score the factor of character (reliability plus intentions) and are tallied as indicated:

2. Disrespectful - Respectful (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7).
4. Kind - Cruel (7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1).
6. Passive - Active (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7).
7. Fast - Slow (7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1).
8. Meek - Aggressive (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7).
10. Bold - Timid (7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1).
12. Aggressive - Unaggressive (7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1).
18. Introverted - Extroverted (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7).
19. Energetic - Tired (7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1).
27. Reserved - Frank (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7).

The following nine items are collected to score the factor of dynamism (activeness and frankness) and are tallied as indicated:

5. Emphatic - Hesitant (7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1).
6. Passive - Active (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7).
7. Fast - Slow (7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1).
8. Meek - Aggressive (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7).
9. Bold - Timid (7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1).
10. Bold - Timid (7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1).
12. Aggressive - Unaggressive (7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1).
18. Introverted - Extroverted (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7).
19. Energetic - Tired (7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1).
27. Reserved - Frank (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7).
INFORMATION SHEET

Please fill out this information sheet with the appropriate responses. As you can see, your name is not requested. Therefore, all information obtained from this sheet will be anonymous and confidential.

1) Sex ______

2) Age ______

3) Number of Semesters of College attended ______

4) Your religious preference: Protestant ______ Catholic ______ Jewish ______ None ______ Other ______

   (check one)

5) Father's religious preference: ______________________ (choose one from Number 4)

6) Mother's religious preference: ______________________ (choose one from Number 4)

7) Your position in family: 1st____; 2nd____; 3rd____; 4th____; 5th____; Other____

   (check one)

8) Number of children in your family _____
APPENDIX C
Draw an arrow on the following lines to indicate the extent to which you trust the person or group of persons indicated.

For example, if the person indicated is your mother, and you trust her a great deal, your arrow might be placed:

Not at all 0 ________ \_________ 100

Completely

Remember, use an arrow to indicate your answer.

1. I trust my closest female friend:

Not at all 0 ________ \_________ 100

Completely

2. I trust my closest male friend:

Not at all 0 ________ \_________ 100

Completely

3. I trust males in general:

Not at all 0 ________ \_________ 100

Completely

4. I trust females in general:

Not at all 0 ________ \_________ 100

Completely