

NONVIOLENCE:
A STRATEGY OF SOCIAL PROTEST

by

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To Barbara, my wife

I love you
The decision is made
The commitment sanctified before
God and friends

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CHAPTER I

INTFODUCTION

Martin Luther King, Jr., once remarked that the "disenchanted, the disadvantaged and the disinherited seem at the time of deep crisis, to summon up some sort of genius that enables them to perceive and capture the appropriate weapons to carve out their destiny."¹ For King and the Civil Rights Movement in America this "weapon" was nonviolent direct action. It was a weapon which "inspired and informed far flung movements which included sit-ins, boycotts and mass marches; it became clear that a new method of protest action had been born."²

Even though nonviolent means of social protest have been shown to be effective,³ violent and destructive means of social protest are still widely used as weapons by the disenfranchised and disinherited. Terrorism, including knee-capping, kidnapping, and assassination, appears to be the tactic of choice for many radical protest groups. Those advocating a violent approach to conflict see the destruction of the opposition's values as an essential pre-requisite for improvement and re-integration.

There are also many who believe that social conflict cast within a framework of violence, destruction, and competition only serves to intensify conflict and make the

management and/or resolution of conflict more difficult. In contrast, they believe that a nonviolent, cooperative orientation to social conflict should (will) lead to its easy resolution.⁴ Thus, supporters of a nonviolent approach to social conflict advocate its use because of their assumption that it is less costly than violent means of social protest.⁵

One of the assumptions of this position is that conflict is an inevitable aspect of human interaction. Humans are brought together in the pursuit of goals and needs, some of which are complementary; and some, contradictory. However, one aspect of human interaction and integration is fundamental; even though people may be in pursuit of individual goals and satisfaction. They are inescapably interdependent with their fellows. This fundamental interdependence is the basis for the assumption that within conflict there is always the possibility of some kind of mutually advantageous outcome.

As Frost and Wilmot argue, the key to understanding "destructive" conflict is recognizing the attempts of one party, within an interdependent relationship, to unilaterally assert control; changing the structure and expectations of the relationship, restricting the choices, and altering the rewards which accrue to parties involved.⁶ Advocates of nonviolence argue that their approach is more productive, emphasizing the fundamental interdependence of social agents, and pursuing a course of action which helps to create an atmosphere conducive to bargaining and negotiation.

The search for a more humane, less destructive approach to the management of social conflict is a worthy pursuit in itself; however, the interests of the social scientist go beyond the ethical dimensions of its practice to the more pragmatic concerns of explanation: what it is and how it works. Of particular interest to the communication theorist is the special role which communication plays in the process of conflict resolution.

Nonviolence, as a strategy of social protest, is particularly interesting because it speaks where violence is wordless. Thomas Merton, speaking from a Gandhian perspective, perhaps best expresses this point of view when he says that it is within the public, political realm that issues are decided "in a way worthy of free men: by persuasion and words, not by violence. Violence is essentially wordless, and it can begin only where thought and rational communication have broken down."⁷

Nonviolent direct action is a form of communication in a very real sense. It is a language of action which communicates not only ideas, but feelings and attitudes as well.⁸ As a strategy its objective is to create a situation wherein the parties may meet as equals and exercise mutual influence, one over the other. It seeks to create a relationship wherein "genuine argument" can be pursued.⁹ It seeks to create a bargaining situation.

Where there are those who would speak of nonviolence as a way of forcing change, there are others who view it as

a means to reforge and reintegrate all the elements of the community. Schelling speaks of nonviolence as a strategy whereby either side may, if adequately disciplined and organized, exert enough power and control to turn an asymmetry of force into a two-sided bargaining situation.¹⁰ It attempts, through various mechanisms and tactics, to force confrontation of issues; to equalize the balance of power so as to provide both sides with a functionally equivalent amount of influence in the decisions which affect their lives. Nonviolence, unlike violence, is not a strategy of domination but, rather, one of dialogue, adjustment and adaptation. Within this context there is no guarantee that the protestors will "win."

Martin Luther King, Jr., when asked why he advocated peaceful resistance responded by writing:

You may well ask, 'why direct action? why sit-ins, marches, etc.? Isn't negotiation a better path?' You are exactly right in your call for negotiation. Indeed, this is the purpose of direct action. Non-violent direct action seeks to create such a crisis and establish such creative tension that a community that has constantly refused to negotiate is forced to confront the issue. It seeks to dramatize the issue which can no longer be ignored.¹¹

Nonviolent direct action seeks to create dialogue where, before, none had existed. It seeks to force those in a position of power and domination to re-examine the social situation from the vantage point of equals. It seeks through coercion and persuasion, through economic and moral means, through confrontation and negotiation, to restructure society along the lines of "justice" and a fair distribution

of social benefits.

The examination and the proposed study which follows attempts to accomplish two things. First, by investigating what nonviolence is and how it works it is hoped that discrete variables can be isolated which will provide for a more precise explanation of its efficacy than the humanistic and philosophical accounts of its power. Second, this research seeks to translate those variables into an appropriate experimental design to test and verify the apparent causal relationships. Hopefully, such an investigation will add to the general body of knowledge concerning not only nonviolence as a strategy of conflict but also those forces which underlie conflict and the processes of social influence.

Nonviolence:
A Strategy of Protest

Before proceeding further, we need to define the strategy of nonviolence. Thus far we have discussed nonviolence as if there were general agreement as to its nature. Regrettably, this is not the case. Gene Sharp, after extensive research, has identified nine different and distinct types of nonviolence.¹² These types of nonviolence vary along several dimensions including the scope of acceptable consequences, the techniques or means employed (coercive or persuasive), and the motives which inform the act (morality and/or expediency).

For the purposes of this study we will attempt to provide a definition of nonviolence which is consistent with most of the orientations which exist by abstracting out those elements which are essential to general acceptance. The definition and characteristics which follow represent an operational definition which focuses primarily on what those who engage in nonviolent action do, as opposed to identifying motives and beliefs which stand behind those actions.

First and foremost, advocates of nonviolence reject the threat or use of physical force against persons or their property.¹³ The justification for this rejection may be either moral or pragmatic, but it is a clear characteristic that nonviolence, categorically, excludes the use of

violence under any circumstances.

However, there are some who believe that the implicit threat (potential) of violence, should demands go unheeded, and the fear associated with this does serve to motivate elements of the opposition to negotiate.¹⁴ Others believe that any allusion to the use of violence in response to opposition action will only serve to legitimize repressive measures, strengthen the opposition's resolve, and alienate possible supporters. In addition, violent action on the part of protesters may violate certain values held by the movement concerning the moral superiority of its methods and its demands.¹⁵

A second characteristic is that protest behavior is not considered "nonviolent" unless the action occurs in a context wherein a violent response would be considered not only appropriate but, an expected response.¹⁶ This consideration excludes a wide range of behavior which might be associated with normal decision-making processes and focuses on the more extreme forms of social conflict.

Two implications are particularly important here. First, nonviolent action implies restraint and self-control: refraining from the expected use of violence; refusing to "play the game" by the opposition's rules. Second, this violation of the opponent's expectations is an essential ingredient in the potential success of the strategy. Refusing to do what the opposition expects or wants serves to create an atmosphere of uncertainty which, hopefully, can be

exploited by the protesters. The violation of expectations enables them to enact, and possibly gain acceptance of, a new set of social norms that will provide the structure necessary to reduce uncertainty and restabilize the system.

A third dimension of nonviolence as a strategy of social protest is the means or techniques employed. Here the question centers on the legitimacy of using coercion in concert with persuasion. Some advocates clearly reject coercion as an appropriate means of bringing about social change. Their tendency is to rely solely on persuasion as a mechanism of change. This rejection tends to be predicated on the assumption that coercive techniques, insofar as they bring about physical or psychological hardship, are violent.¹⁷

The difficulty with this position is twofold. First, even attempts at persuasion may bring about intense psychological discomfort. Second, since persuasion can induce psychological distress and "hardship"; how does one assess the real or potential intensity which a persuasive attempt engenders? Without knowing in advance the potential hardship that persuasive attempts may have, one cannot determine whether or not it is an appropriate tactic.

The question then becomes, "where does one draw the line?" It is easier to draw the line at clearly observable physical actions than hidden, internal, psychological states. Those coercive techniques which do not employ physical force to injure or harm others are considered acceptable tactics by most advocates of nonviolence.¹⁸

The inclusion of limited coercive means seems to be supported by a majority of nonviolent activists. Of the nine types of nonviolence identified by Sharp, seven clearly advocate the use of coercion as a mechanism of social change.¹⁹ This includes Gandhi's "Satyagraha" and King's "Peaceful Resistance". In fact, for most of these advocates, the coercive elements of the strategy are at least equally, if not more, important than the persuasive dimension. Consequently, for our purposes here, both coercive and persuasive techniques will be considered legitimate parts of nonviolence.

Finally, it is essential that nonviolence be recognized as a strategy of social protest. There are two ways to look at the question of "strategy": as a practitioner or the theoretician. Where the practitioner is concerned with the efficient application of a set of tactics, the theoretician is concerned with accounting for and explaining the whole range of possible applications and potential consequences. The one perspective is concerned with results; the other, with explanation.

The perspective adopted for this study is that of the theoretician. Implicit in this view is the assumption that the best course of action is contingent upon the behavior of the other. Taking a "strategic perspective" assumes an interdependence between the adversaries' decisions and expectations which govern each other's behavior.²⁰ One's choice of action depends upon what (s)he expects the other

to do in response. This dependence can set up a self-fulfilling prophecy which reinforces the status quo, or it can provide an avenue for social influence and social change. Nonviolent activists believe that social expectations and interdependence can be exploited to produce change.

An examination of social protest centers on attempts by those outside the normal decision-making process to influence community decisions and social structure. Consequently, attempts at social influence which exist within the establishment will not be examined. The concern here is with issues raised by elements of the community which exist outside the power-structure: those who have, in the past, had little control over the decisions which shape their destinies--e.g. women, blacks, the poor, etc. This examination focuses on the collective, public, active attempts at social influence engaged in by the disenfranchised, the disinherited, and the dispossessed.

Nonviolent direct action is not a particularly new strategy, but never before has it assumed such popularity as a means for bringing about social change. At no time before its implementation by Gandhi in India or King in America had it been the dominant strategy for mass protest. Violence seemed to be the accepted means for settling social disputes. Violent coercion was standard procedure. In fact, there are many people, both past and present, who scoff at the idea that nonviolence can prove an effective means of waging conflict. For example, Marxist philosophies argue that

violent revolution is an inevitable aspect of social change. However, there are those who have successfully argued for, and demonstrated, the practical and psychological advantages of a nonviolent approach to conflict. For this reason alone, nonviolence merits close examination.

Nonviolence:
A Mechanism for Change

Nonviolence is a strategy of protest employed by the weak and disenfranchised to effect a change in their status. Its efficacy is predicated upon certain fundamental assumptions about the structuring and conduct of human relationships. Kenneth Boulding speaks of all social systems as being composed of three distinct yet interrelated components: the exchange system, the threat system, and the normative system.²¹ The exchange system corresponds to inducements and promises which establish mutual expectations and obligations. The threat system consists of coercive actions which serve to deter or compel certain actions on the part of others.²² The integrative system represents those normative and moral considerations which serve to legitimize or condemn the actions of the parties to the system.

Advocates of nonviolence work from the premise that human association, organization, and differentiation is based upon a complex process of exchange. Nonviolent protesters seek to manipulate the social system by dramatizing the basic interdependence of the system's members, restructuring social perceptions, and reintegrating the system along a new line of norms, while at the same time trying to minimize the reactionary efforts and the use of threats (coercive and repressive action) by the dominant

members of the system.

People come together because they are attracted by the prospect of meeting needs and gaining benefits through social interaction.²³ If these social transactions are to be maintained, and perhaps grow, then all parties involved must be satisfied with the derived benefits. However, the exchange of commodities and services is seldom equitable, leading to an imbalance of exchange. The party who cannot match the benefits bestowed upon him by another becomes obligated and dependent upon the other. This inequity or imbalance confers power on the dominant member over the actions of the dependent member. The greater the imbalance in exchange the greater the obligation and the greater the power of the dominant party.

Balanced relationships are fairly stable. Imbalanced transactions are inherently unstable, generating pressures toward the creation of a more equitable exchange. However, as long as the relationship and the demands imposed by the more powerful are perceived as legitimate, there will be little pressure to change the system. If, at some time, the inequities of the transaction should be viewed as illegitimate or exploitative, unrest and agitation for change are likely to result.

The form which this agitation takes will be affected by the disparity which exists between the power of the dominant and the dependent. The greater the disparity, the weaker the dependent, and the less likely the prospects for

successful agitation. Further, the greater the weakness of the protesters the more likely they are to rely upon violence as a strategy of change; moving outside the exchange relationship to apply coercive pressure through threats.

However, advocates of nonviolence argue that the application of violence is the worst possible alternative.²⁴ They claim many disadvantages to the use of violent protest. The use of violence not only invites but justifies aggressive and violent repression by the agents of social control. Consequently, the use of violence may end up causing more harm to the protesters than the status quo. Thus, increased potential for harm has a tendency to reduce the number of resisters and weaken the movement.

Furthermore, the use of violence by protestors is hard to justify. Violence, as a mechanism to force change, is seldom considered a legitimate means of bringing about a desired end. Because of this, violence tends to strengthen the opposition, scaring off potential supporters and sympathizers. Finally, and perhaps most important, violence creates a defensive and closed psychological climate, inhibiting the desire for creative problem-solving.

On the other hand, they claim that nonviolence results in several strategic advantages.²⁵ A nonviolent approach to social change creates a real problem for the power-dominant. It becomes increasingly difficult for agents of social control to justify the use of violence and repressive measures in the face of a nonviolent counter action. Repres-

sive and violent action taken against nonviolent protesters may alienate the general population and members of the opposition from the opponent's camp. By contrast the opponent's tactics appear dispicable and unjust. Nonviolence gives the protester a "moral" advantage, increasing the number of protesters and rallying public opinion. But, perhaps most important, continued and sustained resistance on the part of the nonviolent protester in the face of violence and repression on the part of the power-dominant demonstrates that the protesters are immune to threat and cannot be cowed. Eventually, the power-dominant's ability or will to continue will be successfully undermined. However, nonviolent activists experience difficulty in maintaining "continued and sustained resistance." Herein lies its major limitation.

Regardless of what advocates claim about the strategic superiority of nonviolence, its psychological and/or moral advantages, those employing nonviolence have little chance for success. The major obstacle confronting the nonviolent protester is that (s)he has few resources with which to withstand the pressure brought to bear by the opposition. The opposition simply has greater resources, better organization and more power than the nonviolent protester. Insofar as the goal of the agitation is to create a bargaining situation, the protesters must somehow reduce the disparity in the power relationship. Dialogue and creative problem-solving will occur only between those who are functionally

equal. Nonviolent protesters must raise the costs of social control and containment to such a level that negotiation and appeasement become desirable alternatives.

Let me summarize by saying that nonviolence is a strategy which seeks to disrupt social transactions in an effort to dramatize and alter perceived inequities. However, since those who seek to change the status quo are weak their ability to create sufficient disruption to cause the opposition to negotiate a new system of exchange is severely limited. Consequently, nonviolent protestors seek to enhance their power position by forming a coalition with other interested parties. Direct confrontation of the power-dominant without aid of an interested third party is doomed. The power-dominant, with greater resources and reserves, need only "wait out" the protesters in order to reassert his dominance.

Advocates of nonviolence believe that concessions can be gained by focusing attention on the basic interdependence of the parties involved through acts of noncooperation and civil disobedience.²⁶ Even though one party may be more powerful, it has need of and has come to depend on the compliance of the other. Certain expectations and obligations have emerged over time which define the proper order of things. As long as the power-dependent comply with those expectations and obligations there is little impetus for change.

However, noncompliance violates expectations and creates uncertainty. If noncooperation can be sustained long enough,

it can leave the opposition open to the imposition of a new, more "equitable" exchange structure. Significant disruption of the social system opens the way for the negotiation of normative prescriptions and exchange ratios which will allow the system to proceed again. Nonviolent protesters seek to create a controlled disruption and invoke superordinant values which define a new and proper exchange relationship.

Continued and sustained resistance can occur only if the protesters can create an ideology which elevates the value of self-sacrifice and conduct themselves in such a way as to gain the support of powerful others. As Oberschall indicates, "nonviolence is not likely to be successful unless there exists third parties or an independent public opinion whose support can be mobilized and who in turn will bring pressure to bear on the agents of social control and the government."²⁷

~~Noncooperation and civil disobedience are tactics~~ employed within the larger strategy of coalition. Noncooperation is directed, primarily, at the exchange relationship: relying upon the withdrawal of the material or labor contribution of the protesters. Civil disobedience is, essentially, a moral weapon; a symbolic act of confrontation intended to force consideration of dominance relations in the full light of public opinion. This dichotomy may very well be an oversimplification of the focus of these two tactics, but it does serve to direct attention on the two essential dimensions of the nonviolent strategy: noncooperation and moral persuasion.

Both noncooperation and civil disobedience may be disruptive, however, without widespread exposure and publicity they can easily be dealt with by the authorities as criminal acts, routine deviance not worthy of consideration. Nonviolent protest needs access to media and publicity. The more massive and the publicized the nonviolent action is, the greater the embarrassment of the authorities becomes. Massive and widespread social disruption brands the dominant's claim "to rule based upon the consent of the governed" as a fraud.²⁸ The cloak of legitimacy has been stripped away.

The formation of coalitions, so necessary for the success of a nonviolent movement, may proceed along one or both of two lines: economic (exchange) or normative (moral). If there exists an exchange relationship between the protesters and the third party, the protesters may make any future exchange contingent upon the third parties support and cooperation. Normative alliances may be formed through the dramatization of shared values and social expectations concerning a "just world." Normative appeals become moral persuasion; relying upon shared and/or superordinant values to reintegrate and redefine the social system.

Even though both the economic and the normative dimensions of social interaction may result in an alteration of the status quo, I believe that economic or exchange concerns, representing the foundation of social relationships, are more basic and carry greater weight. This is not to say that people cannot or do not act upon principle in the face

of real or perceived harm to their exchange interests, but, rather, that moral action is impeded or reinforced by existing exchange relationships. Consequently, the ability of protesters to develop coalitions with powerful third parties is contingent upon the existing exchange relationships between the third parties and the conflicting parties. There would appear to be at least four possible relationships between the third party and the conflict participants.

First, the third party may have direct economic (exchange) ties with the power-dominant (opposition). Such a condition would pose considerable difficulties for the protester. In such a situation the protester would have to rely upon superordinant or shared values to motivate the third party to act in a manner contradictory to his economic (basic security) interests. An example of such a condition might be America's relationship to South Africa. Our moral commitment to civil rights runs counter to our need for certain commodities or services, such as weapons grade uranium or the need for a strong anti-Soviet ally, which South Africa supplies and which are believed to be essential to our economic and national security. America's involvement with Israel may represent a case where value identification has supremacy over economic dependence. Even though America has a strong dependence on Arab oil, we still provide economic and military aid to Israel. This aid has resulted in a military equality that seems to have led to negotiations as a method of resolving the conflict. Because of recent

price increases and the threat of an oil embargo one can see how economic dependence has influenced the kind of support that the third party is willing to give.

The second type of relationship is where the third party is "economically" linked to the power-dependent (protester). In this situation both economic and normative justifications can be raised to induce the third party to support the protesters. The normative and exchange processes reinforce and strengthen one another. An example of such a relationship may be the coalition of black voters and the federal government during the civil rights agitation of the 60's. Blacks exchanged votes for federal support of civil rights legislation.

A third type of situation exists where the third party is not linked to one side or the other but, rather, to the continued functioning of the system. In such a case economic disruption may be a cause of concern for the third party but will not necessarily influence the direction of its support or intervention. When economic or exchange pressures are neutral or balanced, moral or normative considerations will take on more importance as a basis (perhaps the sole basis) for making a decision about the direction and kind of support given by the third party. If, for example, during the Iranian revolution the U.S. believed its economic or security interests would not be jeopardized by a new Islamic government then a decision about who to support and how much support to give may have been conditioned by issues

of "civil rights" rather than concern over its exchange interests. As long as we perceived little threat to our national security the U.S. probably experienced little concern over who actually controlled the country or the oil production.

The fourth and final relationship may be somewhat rare. This is the situation where the economic interests are nonexistent or minimal. The third party is not dependent on the antagonists in any meaningful way. In this case purely moral considerations are likely to control the actions of the third party. The intervention of the Arab League in the conflict between North and South Yemen may be an example of this situation. Presumably, certain normative concerns over Arab solidarity motivated the intervention of the league.

It is conceivable that in each of these situations the interaction of disruption, economic and moral appeal, and the strategic approach employed (violent versus nonviolent) will lead to differing outcomes and variable success for the power-dependent. Nonviolence relies upon the disruption of the exchange system and the imposition of certain normative (moral) axioms to coerce the opposition into accepting a negotiated settlement. Hopefully, such a settlement will lead to greater gains for the power-dependent and a more stable relationship. The efficacy of noncompliance and moral appeals will be enhanced or inhibited by the exchange relationship that exists between the third party and the parties to the conflict. It is further expected that when nonviolent

and violent strategies are compared within situations that have similar exchange relationships that, due to its "moral" superiority, the nonviolent strategy will lead to better outcomes and a greater willingness on the part of the third party to intervene on behalf of the nonviolent protester.

I propose that nonviolence as a strategy of social protest is an interesting and valuable subject for study. Whereas there has been considerable philosophical and speculative analysis of nonviolence, there has been little systematic empirical/experimental analysis. Nonviolence represents an area of study which asks how the weak and dependent can take charge of their own destiny, bring about fundamental social change, while at the same time minimizing the destructive and dehumanizing tendencies of intense social conflict.

The study of nonviolence is an apt subject for the field of communication because it focuses attention on the organizing and integrating properties of interaction. Nonviolent protesters must alter perceptions and redefine social relationships. This is accomplished by articulating and dramatizing the fundamental disparity between the way things are and the way things should be; by presenting a new vision with such force that it becomes compelling.

Further, nonviolence is in need of study because past research has failed to adequately and clearly identify the bases for its efficacy. A complete study of nonviolence needs to consider carefully exchange relationships,

normative appeals and the deterrent capabilities of the opposition. Initially, there is the need to focus clearly upon the exchange relationship as the foundation upon which the strategy stands or falls. Ultimately, the key to an understanding of nonviolence can be found in a thorough examination of the relationship between conflict, power, and communication.

Preview

This chapter has presented a general framework and rationale for the study of nonviolence. This discussion has been based upon the work of activists and scholars who have spent considerable time examining, speculating, and testing the strategy in an effort to better understand and implement the strategy. The next chapter examines experimental research relevant to the study of nonviolence with the goal of developing useful hypotheses for the further study of this strategy. Chapter three will present a research methodology designed to test several hypotheses concerning the efficacy of nonviolence. Chapter four will present the results of this research and chapter five will consist of a discussion of these results.

CHAPTER I

ENDNOTES

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25 Gregg, Power of Nonviolence, pp. 46-47; Lakey, Living Revolution, pp. 57-59; Sharp, Politics of Nonviolence, pp. 109-113; Gene Sharp, "The Technique of Nonviolent Action," in Conflict: Violence and Nonviolence, ed: Joan V. Bondurant (Chicago: Aldine-Atherton, 1971), p. 157; Schelling, Conflict: Violence and Nonviolence, p. 173.

26 Leroy H. Pelton, The Psychology of Nonviolence (New York: Pergamon Press Inc., 1974), pp. 149ff and 240ff; Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action, pp. 9, 13-16, 64; Sharp, "Meanings of Nonviolence," 41-66; Lakey, Living Revolution, pp. 123ff; Martin Luther King, Jr., Stride Toward Freedom (New York: Harper and Row, 1958), p. 212; Martin Luther King, Jr., The Trumpet of Conscience (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), p. 69.

27 Anthony Oberschall, Social Conflict and Social Movements (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1973), p. 320.

28 Oberschall, Social Conflict, p. 321.

CHAPTER II

A REVIEW OF EXPERIMENTAL RESEARCH

This chapter provides a review of experimental research relevant to nonviolence as a strategy for conflict. The research reviewed is limited to those studies which have specifically investigated the efficacy of different strategies at inducing cooperation. Some of these strategies are quite similar to the concept of "nonviolence" presented in the first chapter. All of these studies provide some relevant implications for an understanding of nonviolence and how it works as a strategy.

Fixed Strategies

Several researchers have sought to influence the overall level of cooperation in a conflict (game) by altering the level of cooperation in the strategy employed by one of the participants. The level of cooperation in the strategy employed by one of the participants. The level of cooperation was preplanned and not contingent upon the choices of the other player, hence the concept of fixed strategy. The general expectation seems to have been that a strategy with a high level of cooperation will elicit more cooperation from the opponent than a strategy which demonstrates few cooperative choices.

A cooperative choice is one which serves to maximize the joint payoffs and to minimize any differential rewards between players. For example, given a payoff matrix like the one below (fig.2-1), a cooperative choice for player 1 would be the C_1 regardless of what player 2 chose. The assessment of overall levels of cooperation is predicated upon player 2's responses; C_2 being a cooperative choice and D_2 being competitive.¹

		Player 2	
		C_2	D_2
Player 1	C_1	1,1	-1,2
	D_1	2,-1	-1,-1

(Fig. 2-1: Prisoner's Dilemma Payoff Matrix)

The first set of fixed strategy studies have compared 100% cooperative choices with 100% competitive (0% cooperative) choices. In other words, the ratio of cooperative (C) choices to competitive (D) choices is fixed at 100% cooperative or 100% competitive. The results of these studies tend to suggest that a 100% cooperative strategy will elicit greater levels of cooperation from an opponent than a 100% competitive strategy.² However, even though the 100% cooperative strategies elicited greater levels of cooperation, those levels were not exceptionally high. Wilson achieved levels of 56% cooperation as compared to 6% for pure competitive strategies.³ Sermat achieved levels of cooperation of 40% for the cooperative strategy but only 15% for the competitive strategy.⁴ Lave achieved the highest

levels of cooperation with 90% for the cooperative strategy and 28% for the competitive strategy.⁵

Another series of fixed strategy studies varied the percentage of cooperative choices and found the higher the percentage of cooperation, the greater the overall level of cooperation manifested by the opponent.⁶ For example, Whitworth and Lucker found that a 90% cooperative strategy was more effective at inducing the other player to choose cooperatively (52%) than a 10% cooperative strategy (31%).⁷ Other studies have compared mixes of 50% cooperative choices versus 10% cooperative choices⁸ and 50% cooperative vs. 25% vs. 0%.⁹

There are two general problems with these studies. First, the overall levels of "cooperation" obtained were not particularly high, seldom over 50%. Second, many of these studies failed to report the significance achieved, so conclusions and claims based upon these studies lack probative force. Even with these limitations these studies tend to suggest a limited form of reciprocity; cooperation elicited cooperation.

Contingent Strategies

Another type of strategy examined is the contingent or matching strategy. With this approach the experimenter matches the choices made by the subject. This matching is either simultaneous, each choosing at the same time, with matching occurring on the next trial, or choices are

sequential, where the subject chooses first on every trial and the accomplice chooses second, but always choosing the same as the subject.

The method of matching has two implications for the interpretation of the results. Johnson argues that the sequential play is a "clearer" method where the subject can readily determine the relationship between his choice and the other player's choice. Simultaneous play is less clear. The subject is not able to clearly identify the causes of the other player's choice behavior.¹⁰ The supposition here is that the "order of choice" may influence the subject's interpretation of the game situation and, consequently, influence his/her game behavior differentially.

The second implication has to do with the perceived power of the two parties. Oskamp indicates that the differences achieved with sequential play are greater than with simultaneous play.¹¹ His contention is that the order of choice confers greater power on the one who chooses second. The one who chooses last has a greater potential to influence the outcomes of the other by virtue of his greater knowledge. Consequently, the research cited here may be subject to some significant and unaccounted for order effects. With this caution in mind let us turn to the findings of these studies.

Contingent strategies, also called matching or tit-for-tat (TFT), employ a firm principle of reciprocity. If the first player chooses cooperatively, then the second player chooses likewise. If the first player chooses competitively,

then the second player chooses competitively. In other words, the second player's choices are contingent upon and match the choices of the first player.

Crumbaugh and Evans and Wilson, employing simultaneous choices, found the matching strategy elicited more cooperation than a 0% cooperative strategy; 54% vs. 40% and 52% vs. 6%, respectively.¹² Solomon employing the sequential choice method found similar results.¹³

Comparisons of the contingent strategy with a 100% cooperative strategy have shown mixed results. Solomon, employing sequential choices, found the matching strategy more effective (69% vs. 29%) while Wilson, using simultaneous play, found the matching strategy less than or equal to the 100% cooperative strategy (52% vs. 59%).¹⁴ A study by Oskamp and Perlman produced results similar to the Wilson results.¹⁵ Here, as suggested earlier, the results may be more a product of the order of choosing than the strategy employed. If the sequential method is clearer and more powerful, one would expect these kind of results.

A number of other studies have shown the contingent strategy to elicit more overall cooperation than freeplay. Pilisuk, Skolnick and Overstreet; Pilisuk and Skolnick; and Oskamp all found a matching strategy to produce significantly more cooperation than game situations where subjects played with no preplanned programs.¹⁶ However, Oskamp and Perlman found no significant difference between freeplay and matching strategies.¹⁷ In fact, the freeplay condition in the Oskamp

and Perlman study overall level of cooperation of 75% where the contingent condition elicited only 50% cooperation. One explanation for these results may stem from the order effects derived from simultaneous choices employed by Oskamp and Perlman.

Wilson employed variations of a contingent strategy which he called coaxing and retaliatory strategies.¹⁸ These strategies were conceived as a compromise between a competitive strategy, which obscured one's desire to cooperate, and a cooperative strategy that rewarded double-crossing. The coaxing and retaliatory strategies differed from a consistent matching strategy which was thought to lead to "locking-in" effects.¹⁹ Wilson found the matching strategy elicited more cooperation than either the coaxing or the retaliatory strategies.²⁰ A study by Bixenstine and Gaebelien found that a matching strategy that was slow to retaliate (similar to Wilson's coaxing strategy) produced greater levels of cooperation than a competitive strategy.²¹

The findings related to the contingent or matching strategies suggest that where parties to a conflict have the ability to adjust their choices to the moves of the other cooperation is enhanced. It may be that the contingent strategy "forces" the other to recognize the value of cooperation to achieve the maximization of long term gains. All other strategies rewarded competitive behavior to greater or lesser degrees. It must also be kept in mind that the power invested in the players was relatively equal.

Implications

The strategy of nonviolence might be likened to the contingent strategies examined in these studies. Nonviolent activists make their cooperation contingent upon the actions and choices of the other. When compared to the fixed strategies the contingent strategy consistently elicited greater cooperation, given sequential choices. This suggests that a "nonviolent" approach should be more effective than a "violent" approach (contingent vs. competitive) at inducing cooperation. However, the nonviolent situation does not match the Prisoner's Dilemma situation exactly. In the PD game players have equal power, and given the sequential choices the confederate may have had greater power. Such is not the case with nonviolence.

Strategy Shifts

Another area of study has dealt with changes in strategy that occur during the play of the game. McClintock, Gallo and Harrison examined the impact of a shift in opponent's strategy on subjects identified as having an orientation described as either "internationalist" or "isolationist."²² Subjects who were internationalists were found to be more sensitive and responsive to shifts in strategy than isolationists. When the internationalist was confronted with a cooperative strategy in the first half of game play, he reciprocated with cooperative behavior during the 2nd half

of play; when confronted with competition, he responded competitively. No significant differences in response were found for the isolationist.²³

Swingle found that subjects' reactions to a shift in strategy tended to vary with their initial orientation.²⁴ Subjects who approached the conflict from a highly competitive orientation became more cooperative when confronted with a shift to a more competitive strategy. Highly cooperative subjects responded competitively, retaliating quickly and severely when the opponents strategy shifted to a more competitive approach.

Swingle also found that shifting strategies from an initially 5% to a 95% cooperative strategy elicited more cooperation than a fixed strategy of 95% cooperation (34% vs. 24%).²⁵ Unfortunately, the effects were not significant. Swingle and Coady also failed to find significance when comparing a shifting strategy of 4% to 96% cooperation with a fixed strategy of 96%.²⁶ Scodel, on the other hand, did find a significant difference when comparing a shifting strategy of 0% to 100% with a 100% cooperative strategy.²⁷ A sudden shift from low to high cooperation elicited more cooperation than a consistently high cooperative strategy. Changes from highly cooperative to highly competitive choices either failed to achieve significance or the results were uninterpretable given the reported findings.²⁸

The reformed sinner strategy produced greater levels of cooperation than did the lapsed saint within the first 20

trials after the shift. When the matching strategy was continued beyond this point the levels of cooperation converged.³⁰ Studies by Oskamp and Sermat showed that the long term (over 60 trials) concurrent effects of the matching strategy overrode the delayed effects of both the reformed sinner and the lapsed saint.³¹

Sermat found that pretreatment with cooperative or competitive strategies which were then followed by a matching strategy (simultaneous choices) yielded a significant increase in the levels of cooperative choices by the subject.³² This "pretreatment" seems akin to the reformed sinner and the lapsed saint strategies.

Comparisons between the reformed sinner or lapsed saint strategies and a contingent strategy have provided no reliable results. Studies by Harford and Hill, Sermat and Crumbaugh and Evans have resulted in findings of no significance.³³ Results discovered by Harford and Solomon indicated that both the lapsed saint and the reformed sinner produced significantly more cooperation than the contingent strategy.³⁴

Implications

Consider for a moment the relationship between the participants in a conflict where nonviolence is advocated. The parties are not of equal power, and their relationship has been characterized by a period of cooperative behavior. Suddenly the power-less participant shifts to a competitive or contingent strategy (it seems likely that the opponent

would see only the competitive nature of the resistance). Within this context, the nonviolent strategy would resemble the lapsed saint. Given equal power conditions the lapsed saint was not very effective at eliciting cooperation; at least, it was not as effective as the reformed sinner. It seems reasonable to assume that given less power it would be even less effective.

The Quality of Strategy Shifts

Teger found that the impact of abrupt shifts in strategy varied with the size of the hostile act. When a hostile reaction was preceded by cooperation it was perceived as being more hostile and evoked stronger retaliation than when there was no prior cooperation. The size and strength of the retaliation was reduced when the hostile act was small.³⁵ In a related study Bixenstein and Gaebelein found that a strategy that was slow to reciprocate competitive behavior was most effective at inducing cooperation.³⁶

A study by Gruder and Duslak reports similar results.³⁷ They hypothesized that a player programmed to respond to exploitation (competitive choices) with mildly retaliatory resistance would be more effective in eliciting the subject's cooperation than would players programmed with either strongly retaliatory or nonretaliatory strategies.³⁸ Their results confirmed this hypothesis. It also demonstrated that both the low retaliatory and high retaliatory strategies produced more cooperation than did no retaliation.

This study differs from those cited previously on two critical points. First, the confederate had a third choice while the subject did not. All previous studies employed the prisoner's dilemma game where the number of choices were the same. Second, because of this third choice, the confederate had more power to influence the outcomes of the subject. What is interesting to note is that the greater the power, the more competitive the subjects played. Perhaps less intense responses were perceived as more "legitimate" and, hence, did not provoke strong resistance.

Implications

The Gruder and Duslak study has significant implications for the qualitative difference between violent and nonviolent strategies. Consider that violence would constitute a highly retaliatory strategy where the nonviolent strategy would represent low retaliation. Whereas both produced more cooperation than did no retaliation (100% cooperation), the low retaliatory strategy produced more cooperation than did the highly retaliatory strategy. Unfortunately, this occurred in a context of greater power for the confederate as agitator or protester; a condition not indicative of a nonviolent situation. The Bixenstine and Gaebelin study also suggests that a strategy which is slow to reciprocate competitive behaviors (retaliate) was most effective at eliciting cooperative behavior from an opponent.

Place both of these studies within the context of the

Teger findings, and they assume new significance. Consider that the less powerful participant has "cooperated" for some time prior to effecting a change. The fact that he agitates for change is going to elicit retaliation. However, the perceived magnitude of his hostile behavior will effect the intensity of the other's retaliation. Nonviolence might be conceived of as a small hostile act and result in milder retaliation. Violence would clearly be viewed as a large hostile act and provoke stronger retaliation. The Teger study also serves to reinforce the observations that the "oppressor" almost universally responds with repressive measures when confronted with resistance.

Strategy and Power Relationships

It has been stated several times in this review that the PD game involves a relationship of equal power and that this is not representative of a nonviolent situation. So far all of the research on "strategy" has focused on equal power or superior power situations. In other words, researchers have examined the impact of various strategies on subjects who have had equal power or less power than their opponent. From the perspective of nonviolence there is need to examine the impact of various strategies as used by the less powerful to influence the more powerful. However, current research on power relationships may provide some useful insights.

Deutsch and Solomon have both examined the efficacy of different strategies at inducing individualistically oriented

opponents to cooperate.³⁹ Solomon's study is a follow-up on Deutsch's and, consequently, they both employ the same manipulations. The essential question they asked was, "how would subjects in different power positions respond to variations in strategies as enacted by their opponents?"

Four power conditions were employed. Power condition one (PC1) placed the opponent (O) in a position of absolute power over the subject; however, O was provided with no incentive to compete. Power condition 2 (PC2) also placed O in a position of absolute power, but now O has an incentive to choose competitively. Power condition 3 (PC3) provided the subject (S) with some power to influence the outcomes of O; S being able to reduce O's net gain but not able to cause a loss. Power condition 4 (PC4) placed S and O in equal power positions (see fig. 2-2).

PC1				PC3			
O				O			
A				A			
B				B			
S	X	30,30	-30,30	S	X	30,30	-30,40
	Y	20,30	-10,30		Y	20,10	-10,20

PC2				PC4			
O				O			
A				A			
B				B			
S	X	30,30	-30,40	S	X	30,30	-30,40
	Y	20,30	-10,40		Y	40,-30	-20,-20

Fig. 2-2 Payoff Matrices
Power Relationships

The three strategies employed were: 1. Unconditional cooperation (benevolent)-- O makes a cooperative choice (A) on every trial regardless of S's choice; 2. Conditional

cooperation (benevolent)-- O makes a cooperative choice (A) on the first trial and matches S's choices from then on;
 e. Noncooperation (unconditionally malevolent)-- O makes a competitive choice (B) on every trial regardless of S's choice.

In both studies S's were instructed to approach the game individualistically; pursuing their own best interests regardless of the rewards gained by the other player. After five trials in the Deutsch study and after six trials in the Solomon study S's reversed positions with O for one trial.

The results of both studies followed the same general pattern. S's responded more competitively the greater the disparity with respect to power. S's tended to respond more cooperatively when O had little incentive to deal with them competitively. Where subjects were exposed to a cooperative strategy they tended to both trust and like O more than when confronted with a competitive strategy. The conditionally cooperative strategy was most effective at eliciting cooperation in the equal power condition (as reported by Solomon). S's tended to respond to unconditional cooperation in the equal power condition with highly competitive behavior.⁴⁰ Deutsch, focusing on the partial power condition (PC3) found almost the same results.

Implications

Once again it seems that the conditional or matching strategy has been shown to be superior. However, beyond

this these studies have little to offer for an examination of nonviolence. The crucial limitation of these studies is that the strategies were employed by the power-full party. What this does serve to do, however, is justify the need for the present study into the impact of strategies used by the power-less.

These studies also serve to point out the need for a relatively equal basis of power. All of the PD studies are by definition, games of equal power. Under conditions of equal power even the unconditionally cooperative strategies have been shown to elicit moderate levels of cooperation. The major question now is whether these same strategies would prove equally effective if employed by the power-less member when the opponent knows they have the advantage.

It can also be argued that even though levels of cooperation were moderate, the opposition still exploited the cooperative tendencies of the other player. As long as this "exploitation" was within reasonable bounds, i.e. legitimate, the behavior was not seen as "exploitative." Or perhaps, the competitive behavior of the opposition would have been seen as "exploitative" had the researchers assumed the perspective of the confederate. In other words, if a naive subject had played a purely cooperative strategy and had been subjected to the same kind of competitive behavior demonstrated in these studies, would the naive subject perceive that behavior as exploitive? As the subjects in the Deutsch and Solomon studies reported, they

disliked the competitive player more and trusted them less than the more cooperative players. Does this suggest that they felt exploited? Unfortunately, no answers have been provided.

The entire issue of the impact of power relationships takes on special significance when it is remembered that competitive behavior in equal power conditions evoked highly competitive responses. Acts perceived as noncooperative employed by the power-less would certainly elicit the same if not more severe kind of response. Furthermore, in light of the research by Teger and Gruder and Duslak it seems most likely that there would be an even more intense response. So far there has been no research that has assumed the perspective of the power-dependent with respect to the implementation of different strategies.

Motivational Orientation

An area highly related to the impact or choice of strategy is the motivational orientation of the subject. The motivational orientation reflects an attitude assumed by the subject concerning the extent to which his/her rewards are linked to the choices of the other. The conflict situations investigated here are mixed motive, which means that there exists both cooperative and competitive incentives. Participants may perceive that cooperative incentives dominate, competitive incentives dominate, or may perceive themselves to be relatively independent of the

other.

It was mentioned earlier that McClintock, Gallo and Harrison found subjects who were "internationalists" were more sensitive to shifts in strategy than "isolationists," and Swingle found that a subject's reaction to a shift in strategy varied according to a measure of their initial competitiveness.⁴² Both of these studies suggest that a subject's initial orientation to the conflict will influence his/her perceptions of the other's behavior and consequently, his/her response.

Deutsch conducted one of the earliest studies on the impact of motivational orientations on the level of cooperation experienced in a conflict.⁴³ Subjects were given instructions which described the manner in which they should approach the game. In the cooperative orientation they were instructed that concern should be given to mutual gain and that the other player felt the same way. They were led to believe that cooperation was the best way to maximize their gains. The individualistic orientation conveyed to subjects that they should seek their own interests without regard for the outcomes of the other person, and that the other subject felt the same way. The final condition, the competitive orientation, asked subjects to maximize their own gains and to do better than the other person. These orientations were then matched with four communication conditions: 1. no communication, simultaneous choices; 2, communication, simultaneous choices; 3. no communication, sequential choices;

and 4. no communication, simultaneous choices with the opportunity to change choices (reversibility).

The results of the study showed that a cooperative orientation led to cooperative choices and mutual gain regardless of the communication condition. The competitive orientation led to competitive choices and mutual loss regardless of the communication condition. The results of the individualistic orientation were mixed.

Where choices were sequential and no communication was allowed the individualistic orientation resulted in competitive play. Where choices were simultaneous and prior communication was allowed or when choices were reversible the individualistic orientation resulted in cooperative behavior. Furthermore, individualistic and competitive orientations both tended to become more competitive over time.

What these results seem to suggest is that the more ambiguous the situation, the more likely people are to respond competitively: uncertainty breeds self-oriented action. The cooperative and competitive orientations were quite clear, and subjects' expectations about game behavior tended to be confirmed and reinforced. The individualistic orientation was less clear. It was not easy to assess the motives behind an individualistic choice as contrasted with a competitive choice.

Where ambiguity was high, e.g., with no communication and simultaneous choices, individualistic and competitive choices were much alike. Where ambiguity was low, e.g.,

with communication and reversibility options, subjects were able to identify their respective motives and clarify the most rewarding combination of choices.

Few other studies have made a deliberate attempt to manipulate motivational orientation. Solomon and Deutsch, et.al. employ only the individualistic orientations in their research.⁴⁴ The most one can assume with respect to the other research is that in the absence of explicit instructions concerning orientation, subjects were free to assume whatever orientation seemed best. Consequently, no conclusions can be drawn about motivational orientation from other research.

Implications

This research suggests that when two parties with relatively equal power, and individualistic orientations, come together in conflict that cooperation can be achieved if the parties make effective use of communication channels and are able to adjust their behavior to one another. In this sense, this research differs little from the research on contingent strategies. The pertinent question to this study is, "how do you move one who enters the conflict with a competitive orientation and a power advantage into a more cooperative posture?"

It seems reasonable to assume that the party who has been "exploiting" another is more likely to have a competitive than an individualistic orientation. A nonviolent

situation is likely to reflect such a competitive orientation. Furthermore, the relational style of a nonviolent situation takes on an abrupt change; from meeting exploitation with cooperation to meeting exploitation with resistance. In other words, the motivational orientation of one party has shifted from cooperative to competitive. The relationship between motivational orientations and their implications for choices of strategy needs further exploration.

The Impact of a Third Party

It was argued earlier that if a nonviolent strategy is to succeed it must have the support of a powerful third party. Deutsch conducted a study of the impact of a 3rd party on a conflict and found that awareness of mutual opposition to a 3rd party led individualistically oriented players to choose more cooperatively.⁴⁵ When the 3rd party was interdependent with the two players and his payoffs linked to their losses, there resulted the highest percentage of cooperation. When the 3rd party was merely an observer, there was less cooperation. The least cooperation occurred when there was no 3rd party.

The mutual awareness of a disliked other may have led to the formation of superordinant goals which required cooperation. In other words, to deny the 3rd party his payoffs the participants had to cooperate with each other. It may also be that when they found some common ground, dislike for another, their liking for each other increased, yielding

greater cooperation.

Two other studies used the experimenter as the powerful 3rd party. Evans found that when the experimenter threatened to penalize anyone who used a communication channel to deceive the opponent, cooperation increased.⁴⁶ Krauss and Deutsch discovered that when the experimenter set the norms for how the parties were to communicate about the conflict, the level of cooperation was increased.⁴⁷

Implications

What these studies clearly point out is that the presence of an involved 3rd party has an impact on the conduct of the conflict. The Evans and Krauss and Deutsch studies clearly indicate the ability of a powerful 3rd party, of greater or lesser power, tries to influence the behavior of a power-ful other? How does the power-less party induce a power-ful third party to become involved on his behalf? How powerful does the 3rd party have to be to successfully influence the outcome of the conflict? These and other questions still need to be answered.

Communication and Cooperation

It was argued in chapter 1 that the key to a successful nonviolent campaign was to create sufficient disruption and uncertainty such that the protestors could exploit the resulting ambiguity and redefine the exchange relationship or the norms which govern interaction. There have been

several studies on the impact of communication on conflict which support this contention.

There are two ways to approach the question of the impact of "communication" on conflict. One way is to examine the choice behavior of the participants to determine the information they convey about the expectations and intentions of the players (tacit communication). Multiple choice games fall in this category, games where one player has a third choice which may be used to signal cooperation or competition to the other party.

Pilisuk and Skolnick, using a multiple choice game, found that the inclusion of multiple choices enabled the chooser to convey a more precise and unambiguous message concerning his desire to cooperate.⁴⁸ The results were that there was a higher level of cooperation than that found in a two-choice game. The Gruder and Duslak study also demonstrated the effectiveness of a third choice in signalling the players' intentions and influencing the response of the other.⁴⁹ Komorita, Sheposh, and Braver also employed a third choice which allowed the user to convey one of three messages: 1. if you cooperate we can profit equally, but if you do not cooperate I will punish you; 2. I have the advantage and intend to use it; and 3. I will not use my power over you.⁵⁰ Message number 1 was the most effective at inducing the other party to cooperate. It must be pointed out that in all these studies, the person with the third choice was clearly in a more powerful position. Consequently,

it is hard to determine which had more effect, the power advantage or the message.

Those studies that have relied upon explicit communication have produced similar results. Deutsch systematically varied the communication content of messages sent between individualistically oriented, equal power, players.⁵¹ He found the level of cooperation significantly enhanced when subjects had the capacity to communicate a "system" of cooperation. This system included information about mutual responsibilities, punishment for competitive behavior and procedures for returning to a cooperative relationship, with a minimum disadvantage. Terhune likewise found that messages which clearly reduced uncertainty concerning the intentions and expectations of the players were correlated with the amount of cooperative behavior manifested in the conflict.⁵²

Implications

Both the studies on tacit and explicit communication indicate the importance of communication in structuring the conflict. The strategy of nonviolence relies upon the uncertainty reduction capacity of communication to redefine and restructure the conflict situation. The strategy of nonviolence has two functions: first, to create uncertainty and second, to reduce it. Noncooperation and civil disobedience are the mechanisms which create uncertainty; messages from the protesters and the third party are the mechanism

for reducing it.

More Complex Two-Person Games

So far most of the studies reviewed have made use of the prisoners' dilemma game. The studies to be reviewed now have made use of more complex mixed-motive games. Because of the structural differences, comparisons are more difficult to make. Consequently, it was decided to treat them apart from the other research, even though they provide results that are quite similar. The similarity of results, in a different context, can be taken as reinforcement of the general conclusions reached by others.

Tactical Variety

Deutsch, et.al., employed a more complex two-person game involving the choice of different colored pegs which expressed different tactical moves, e.g., attack, defend, disarm, etc.⁵³ They then developed five different strategies and tested their effectiveness at inducing cooperation in subjects who were individualistically oriented. The five strategies were:

1. Turn the other cheek (TOC) -- the confederate responded to attacks and threats altruistically (100% coop.).
2. Nonpunitive (NP) -- the confederate responded defensively to attacks and threats and matched the subjects behavior otherwise.
3. Deterrent (D) -- the confederate counter attacked when attacked and responded threateningly to any competitive acts.
4. Reformed Sinner -- Confederates shifted their strategies after a period of highly competitive

play.

- a. Reformed Sinner 1 (RSTOC) -- the confederate adopted a turn the other cheek strategy after the 16th trial.
- b. Reformed Sinner 2 (RSNP) -- The confederate adopted a nonpunitive strategy after the 16th trial.

As can be seen, these five strategies resemble the manipulations of other researchers. The TOC strategy parallels the 100% cooperative strategy, where the NP and D strategies represent variations on the contingent strategy of previous research. The differences may be expressed in terms of the intensity of the response; the NP being less intense than the D strategy. The reformed sinner strategies address the issue of shifts in strategy; changing their strategies from highly competitive to 100% cooperation in one case and matching in the other.

Subjects chose simultaneously without communication. The pegs they chose varied in color and implied different responses. The potential combination of colors resulted in different payoffs for the subjects. Subjects played against accomplices who responded to the subjects moves with pre-planned programs.

The effects of the five strategies tended to parallel the results of the PD research. When comparing the payoffs derived by subjects and accomplices and their average differences, the effects of the different strategies are most clear. Subjects tended to exploit the TOC strategy over time. The mean difference from trial block 1 to block IV ranged from 6¢ to 12¢. Subjects behaved most cooperatively

with the NP strategy. The mean difference in payoffs ranging from 1¢ to -2¢. The RSNP strategy produced considerably more cooperation than the RSTOC.⁵⁴

In other words, the unconditionally cooperative strategy (TOC) was least effective at eliciting cooperation. The contingent strategies elicited significantly more cooperation. The less intense strategy (NP) produced more cooperation throughout than did the more competitive deterrent strategy. Furthermore, the RSTOC strategy produced more cooperation in the last two trial blocks than the TOC strategy produced throughout.

The interpretation by Deutsch, et.al. that the TOC strategy was "exploited" may be subject to interpretation. Clearly, all the research so far reviewed suggests that a person is ill advised to employ an unconditionally cooperative strategy if he/she hopes to achieve the maximum personal payoff. The only way one can determine if the 100% cooperative strategy was exploited would be to ask subjects employing the strategy if they felt exploited.

Implications

The notion that a 100% cooperative strategy is least effective as a strategy at eliciting cooperation is very important to a study of nonviolence. Keep in mind that the participants in these studies were of relatively equal power. If a 100% cooperative strategy is "exploited" when participants are of relatively equal power, how much more

likely is it that a power-less party would be "exploited" by a power-ful opponent? The contingent strategy has been shown, time and time again, to be most effective at eliciting cooperation within a conflict characterized by equal or superior power. How effective would it be if employed by the power-less participant? These are issues that need to be examined.

Pacifism

Several studies have been conducted that have sought to test "pacifism" as a strategy of conflict management. These studies are the only ones that have clearly attempted to approximate a "nonviolent" strategy. The primary focus of these studies was to examine the impact of the moral dimension or the moral superiority of pacifism as an inducement to cooperation.

Two studies, one by Shure, Meeker and Hansford and the other by Meeker and Shure, have sought to test the effectiveness of a "pure" pacifist strategy in a bargaining situation.⁵⁵ They employed a communication-channel message-transmission task, similar to the Acme trucking game, where they simulated the strategy of a pacifist other. The object of the game was to send a message through a one-channel system during a fixed time period.

Three possible patterns of interaction were possible: dominance, where one party consistently won, sharing, where subjects alternated, and deadlock, where neither subject could transmit. The likelihood of a dominating strategy was

increased by the inclusion of an electric shock which could be used to "override" and "jolt-back" the other from the communication channel. The player being forced out had the ability to retaliate.

Subjects played against a preprogrammed pacifist strategy. This strategy allowed the subject to transmit his/her message first, giving him/her the jolt-back power. The pacifist never shocked the subject, but confronted the subject by entering the communication channel and refusing to back-out thereby making a claim to a division or sharing of payoffs. By standing in the way the pacifist forced the subject to respond "violently" to gain and maintain an advantage. To ensure that subjects assumed an aggressive posture, some conditions placed the subjects on a team which encouraged the dominating strategy. Subjects were then confronted with different manipulations after the fifth trial. They were provided with information concerning the pacifists intentions, biographical data, and information concerning disarmament. The pacifists were presented as Quakers with a strong moral commitment to fair play and nonviolence.

The Shure, Meeker and Hansford study made comparisons between pregame intentions and subsequent game choices.⁵⁶ They found that out of 143 subjects, 75 planned to employ a dominating strategy from the outset. Of the 68 who intended to employ an alternating strategy, 54 shifted to a dominating strategy. Only 18 subjects refused to use the shock to gain the advantage.

Meeker and Shure, duplicating and extending the previous study, found similar results.⁵⁷ Based upon pregame intentions "pacifism" was found to be a relatively ineffective strategy for eliciting cooperation. However, based upon comparisons made after trial five, the point at which experimental manipulations were introduced, the pacifist strategy did influence some shifts from competition to cooperation. In fact, by trial five almost 90% of all subjects were employing a dominating strategy. From this point on nearly one-third of the dominating players shifted to an alternating pattern.⁵⁸ Construed in this way the results show moderate success for the pacifist bargaining strategy. The only significant shifts in game behavior occurred in the communication condition.

Rapoport and Deutsch, et.al., argue that the experimental conditions were stacked against the pacifist strategy in the first study by the imposition of a competitive orientation manipulated through the use of cohorts that urged domination.⁵⁹ This criticism is true. However, it seems reasonable to assume that the nonviolent "situation" would be "stacked against" the pacifist. Consequently, any meaningful test of the strategy should be conducted under the most stringent conditions.

At any rate, Meeker and Shure, in response to this criticism examined "outsider" influences under two conditions: cohort vs. no cohort and audience vs. no audience.⁶⁰ In the "cohort" condition subjects became more dominant under the

urgings of their teammates than when left to themselves. However, both the cohort and the no cohort conditions shifted toward dominating patterns.

In the "audience" condition the presence of an observer led more than twice as many subjects to plan a cooperative approach. However, as the game progressed the two conditions tended to converge and show little difference. A more interesting result was that in the communication condition the absence of an observer resulted in greater cooperation than when the observer was present. Perhaps the presence of an audience "forces" the actor to behave consistently regardless of the consequences. The results are interesting; the reasons, unclear.

Vincent and Tindell, not satisfied with the scope of the pacifist studies extended their investigation into sex differences, attitudinal orientations (i.e., authoritarianism), intellectual achievement and strategy variation.⁶¹ Since the primary concern of this study is with strategy, only the results of strategy manipulations will be examined.

Vincent and Tindell examined three strategies: the pure pacifist, the warning pacifist and the shocking pacifist. The differences between these strategies rested upon the use of threat and retaliation. The warning pacifist threatened the use of the shock but never fulfilled his threat. The shocking pacifist not only warned but followed through with the use of the shock. The pure pacifist renounced the use of the shock.

They expected the shocking condition to inhibit aggression. In fact, just the opposite occurred. Warning aggressive subjects and then following through only intensified their aggressive behavior.⁶² Subjects were also quite willing to shock a nonaggressive pacifist opponent. There were no significant differences between the pure pacifist strategy and the warning pacifist strategy. The pacifist strategy was shown to be ineffective at inducing cooperation.

The participants in these conflicts had equal power to the extent that the "jolt-back" ability was available and employed by both parties. When the pacifist gave up the "jolt-back" ability, or disarmed, he placed himself in a power-less position. Reliance upon "civil disobedience" and moral persuasion proved to be ineffective weapons. This situation cannot be characterized as "noncooperation" because noncooperation presumes an exchange relationship where the withdrawal of support has, at least limited, impact on the others' outcomes. The power relationship that existed between the parties was based upon threat potential and not exchange processes. Consequently, the only source of influence the protester had left was moral, or normative. This placed the pacifist in a very weak bargaining position and he was exploited.

Ofshe argues that the key to the success of the pacifist strategy lies in the application of social pressures external to the parties to the conflict.⁶³ He sums up the

findings on pacifism as follows "... the progressive disclosure of one individual's moral position as a pacifist, the pacifist's use of overt gestures of good faith, and his rejection of the means of violence have the effect of producing either no substantial change in his opponents aggressive behavior or results in an increased aggression."⁶⁴

All of the results gathered so far suggest that the subjects' behavior is controlled by the expectations of the experimenter and the expectations and/or actions of others external to the conflict, or it is controlled by the application of power from the protester. In the absence of a powerful protester, the only source of control is an interested third party. The pressures exerted by "outsiders" serve to define the proper game behavior for the subjects more so than any information provided by the opponents. In fact, the protesters' disclosures are most likely to be discounted as trickery or deceit.⁶⁵

Implications

It is possible to conceive of the pacifist strategy as a type of nonviolent strategy; a fairly weak form of a contingent strategy which relies solely upon normative influences. Even though the pacifist strategy employs contingent behavior, it is not born of the exchange relationship. By giving up the jolt-back capability (threat) the pacifist creates for himself a power imbalance of the three mechanisms for creating change, threat, exchange and norms,

the pacifist strategy employs only normative pressures. The opponent now has a clear advantage that can be maintained and is exploited. The pacifist strategy was able to change 33% from a dominating to an alternating strategy but these do not seem like very favorable odds, especially when the stakes may be high.

The presence of a third party, as an observer or a cohort, did influence the subjects game behavior. The question now is, "will exhortations to cooperate be equally effective as exhortations to dominate and, if so, under what conditions?" Beyond this is the question, "how does the pacifist get the third party to intervene on his behalf?"

In real life, the deck is stacked against the nonviolent protester. How does he go about ensuring a new shuffle and a fair deal? Further research needs to be conducted which will identify the characteristics of the social situation and the kinds of inputs required to ensure the success of a non-violent strategy.

Conclusions

The review of this research demonstrates quite clearly the superiority of a contingent strategy at eliciting cooperation when the participants exhibit relatively equal power. It has also shown that the presence and/or intervention of a third party can influence the outcome of a conflict. Furthermore, it has shown that "communication" can serve to reduce the uncertainty of a conflict situation and facilitate

greater cooperation between conflicting parties.

The limitations of this research reside in the fact that the interests of the researchers have focused on the manipulation of strategies by participants with equal or greater power. The nonviolent protestor is the power-less participant. Consequently, the implications of this research for an examination of nonviolence is somewhat limited.

Subsequent research needs to focus more closely on the power relationship that exists between the conflicting parties and its impact on the efficacy of various strategies. Also, future research needs to examine the relationship and potential impact of a third party on the outcomes of the conflict, trying to identify the necessary conditions for successful intervention on behalf of the power-less.

I propose just such an investigation; an examination of the impact of a nonviolent strategy as employed by a power-less participant in a competitive conflict, focusing on the role of the third party as an "equalizer." The investigation also looks at the impact of differing exchange relationships between the third party and the other participants on the third party's willingness to intervene on behalf of the power-dependent; the nonviolent protestor.

Research Questions and Hypotheses

With the preceeding in mind three basic research questions are raised:

1. How will third party intervention (cooperation) be affected by existing exchange relationships?
2. How effective is nonviolence at eliciting the cooperation of a powerful third party?
3. How effective is nonviolence at eliciting cooperation from an opponent?

Each question is a functional pre-requisite to the next. Any investigation of nonviolence must of necessity begin with the first question.

I have argued elsewhere that since the nonviolent protester is relatively weak he will require the support of a powerful third party to increase his bargaining position. However, not only the third party's willingness to intervene but also the extent of his support will be contingent upon his relative dependence upon either the protester, the opponent, or both. The third party may also find himself in a position of relative independence.

This means that there are four possible dependency conditions. It is hypothesized that these dependency patterns will either facilitate or inhibit the support provided the protester. A formal statement of these hypotheses is listed below.

- H₁ A nonviolent strategy employed within a context where the third party has an exclusive exchange relationship with the power-dependent will be more effective than a nonviolent strategy employed within a context where the third party has an exclusive exchange relationship with the power-dominant at eliciting coalition and third party intervention on behalf of the power-dependent.
- H₂ A nonviolent strategy employed with a context where the third party has an exclusive exchange relationship with the power-dependent will be more effective than a nonviolent strategy

employed within a context where the third party has exchange relationships with both the power-dependent and the power-dominant at eliciting coalition and third party intervention on behalf of the power-dependent.

- H₃ A nonviolent strategy employed within a context where the third party has an exclusive exchange relationship with the power-dependent will be more effective than a nonviolent strategy employed within a context where the third party has no exchange relationship with either the power-dependent or the power-dominant (is dependent).

The research questions also point to "strategy" as an independent variable. The efficacy of nonviolence can only be assessed as contrasted with a violent strategy. Research hypotheses that address the issue of strategy are listed below.

- H₄ Where the third party has an exclusive exchange relationship with the power-dominant, a nonviolent strategy will prove more effective at eliciting coalition and third party intervention than a violent strategy.
- H₅ Where the third party has an exclusive exchange relationship with the power-dependent, a nonviolent strategy will prove more effective at eliciting coalition and third party intervention than a violent strategy.
- H₆ Where the third party has an exchange relationship with both the power-dominant and the power-dependent a nonviolent strategy will prove more effective at eliciting coalition and third party intervention than a violent strategy.
- H₇ Where the third party has no exchange relationship with either the power-dominant or the power-dependent, a nonviolent strategy will prove more effective at eliciting coalition and third party intervention than a violent strategy.

The purpose of the research undertaken here is to test certain of the assumptions which underlie the perceived

efficacy of nonviolence as a strategy of protest and conflict management. The hypotheses suggested represent an attempt to explain the success or failure of nonviolence. A procedure designed to provide relevant information to test these hypotheses is offered in the next chapter.

CHAPTER II

ENDNOTES

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37 C. L. Gruder and R.J. Duslak, "Elicitation of Cooperation by Retaliatory and Nonretaliatory Strategies in

a Mixed-motive Game," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 17 (1973), pp. 162-174.

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40 This conclusion may seem in contradiction of other research on cooperative strategies, however, the reader should keep in mind that overall levels of cooperation were seldom reported to be very high, and further, in these studies subjects were instructed to maximize their own gain regardless of the others' payoffs. Thus they may have seen highly competitive choices as being in their own best interests.

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62 Vincent and Tindell, "Alternative Bargaining Strategies," p. 504.

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CHAPTER III

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This chapter presents the research design and the procedures used in preparing for and executing this experiment. This study limited the investigation to an examination of the impact of nonviolence on the perceptions, choices and actions of the third party, under differing exchange relationships. This resulted in the study assuming a two-way analysis of variance design. The specific steps involved in implementing this basic design are discussed below under five headings: (1) stimulus materials, (2) dependent measures, (3) selection of subjects, (4) experimental tasks and procedures, and (5) summary of data analysis.

Stimulus Materials

The first task that was undertaken was the creation of a stimulus that would adequately reflect the characteristics of a "nonviolent" conflict situation. The method employed was that of a role-play which presented the relevant data to the subjects in the form of a fact-finding report. Role-playing was deemed the most efficient and expeditious method for implementing this design. Such a procedure allowed for the creation of the eight different conditions necessary to test

the proposed hypotheses.

The role-playing situation (developed with the assistance of Dr. Thomas Beisecker) detailed a conflict involving three nations: Zimba, Thebes and Sirraco. Zimba was an underdeveloped nation that depended on its neighbor, Thebes, as the only market for a raw material called illium. Illium was the economic foundation of Zimba's well being. Thebes purchased illium for a very low price, processed it into trillium, a valuable new source of energy, and sold it on the open market for enormous profits. Zimba lacked the capital to develop the technology necessary to process illium and, since Thebes refused to provide financial aid for this purpose, she had to remain dependent on Thebes for her survival.

In this way the essential relationship between power-less and power-ful was established. It was also emphasized that this was a long standing dependency relationship with the expectation that subjects would see resistance on the part of Zimba to be unexpected and uncharacteristic. Sirraco was introduced as the powerful third party.

Sirraco was a neighboring country which had been a long time friend to both Zimba and Thebes. Sirraco was presented as a very powerful country which both Zimba and Thebes turned to for assistance. Sirraco's dependence in this situation was manipulated through her need for xenthoxide, a raw material vitally important to the development of Sirraco's economy. Dependency was expressed by making either Zimba the sole "friendly" supplier of xenthoxide (dependency condition

1), by making Thebes the sole "friendly" supplier of xenthoxide (dependency condition 2), by making Sirracco dependent on their combined output of xenthoxide (dependency condition 3). Relative independence (dependency condition 4) was expressed as Sirracco having only friendly interests in the well being of her two long time allies (see Appendix C).

Both the strategies of violence and nonviolence were employed by Zimba; the power-less party. Only the violent approach was employed by Thebes. The strategies were operationalized as "letters" sent to the leader of Sirracco from the leaders of Zimba and Thebes. Nonviolence was expressed as a message from Zimba demanding a fair price for illium, indicating a refusal to sell illium to Thebes until they agreed to a higher price (noncooperation), and a plea to Sirracco to intervene on behalf of Zimba. The violent approach presented Zimba heaping verbal abuse on Thebes, demanding a fair price, refusing to sell illium, and expressing the belief that military action was the only language Thebes would understand. Sirracco was asked to join in the victory which must surely follow. Thebes' message, in all conditions, involved verbal abuse, a refusal to be blackmailed, a promise to punish Zimba through military action for refusing to sell illium, and a call for Sirracco's aid (see Appendix D).

The messages from both Zimba and Thebes were constructed to mirror one another with respect to substance and structure. The messages were designed to be as ambiguous as possible; providing no clue to an objectively correct solution. The

messages from Zimba and Thebes were alternated in the hope of minimizing any order effects. These precautions were taken to ensure that elements of message construction or order would not contaminate the manipulations under investigation. The only clear differences should have been with respect to strategy and dependency; leaving only the independent variables as a basis for making a decision concerning cooperation and intervention.

Other information provided to the subjects involved background on Sirracco's relationship to the other countries, her capacity to intervene successfully, the nature and history of the conflict, and the expected difficulty of solution (see Appendix B). This information was presented as objective data necessary to the development of a common frame of reference from which the subjects could base their interpretation of the messages.

Dependent Measures

Two methods of observation and measurement were employed. Since the intent of this study was to maximize the amount of relevant information derived from subjects, a content analysis was performed on the messages produced by the subjects. After reading the role-play data, subjects were asked to respond to the leaders of the other nations in the form of a letter. Writing letters allowed the subjects maximum freedom to respond to the situation and conceivably to develop some totally unforeseen solutions or interpretations. The subsequent

content analysis allowed the abstraction of data without imposing predetermined response categories.

The content analysis focused on three general areas: intervention direction, intervention means, and motives. I designed a coding scheme for each area with specific criteria for categorizing subject responses. The coding scheme for each content area is presented in detail in Appendix F.

Intervention direction was a content area constructed to measure Sirraco's position with respect to an increase in the price of illium. Zimba's demand for an increase in the price of illium was the central issue of the conflict, and, consequently, Sirraco's response to this demand should be a good indicator of not only the direction but the strength of her support. Variations in Sirraco's position on the price of illium should correspond to strategy and dependency manipulations.

Within the area of intervention direction subject responses were categorized according to Sirraco's expressed position on a price increase. These statements were categorized according to the amount of the increase advocated by Sirraco; ranging from no increase to the full increase. Categories were also included for responses which did not indicate a specific price. A category was also constructed for those responses which bore no reference to the price of illium.

The second content area centered on intervention means. It specified the methods or mechanisms of intervention and influence employed by Sirraco. The scheme called for coding

responses within one of four general areas, with special sub-categories in some. If the subject's statement indicated an unwillingness to become involved in the conflict it was classified as avoidance. A response that indicated Sirraco's desire to act as mediator or called upon the other parties to discuss the problem was classified as negotiation. Those responses that indicated the imposition of some kind of economic sanctions or economic aid were categorized as economic intervention. This category was further divided with respect to the direction of economic intervention; providing aid to Zimba alone, Thebes alone, or both Zimba and Thebes. If the subject's message included a statement which threatened the use of military action it was classified as military intervention.

The final content area focused on the motives or reasons for the course of action proposed by Sirraco. If the theoretical assumptions were correct the motives for Sirraco's course of action should be a direct function of either strategy, dependency, or some combination of both. The final item on the survey asked the subject to complete the following phrase: "I chose the course of action I did because . . .". Statements which indicated that subjects reacted against or expressed a total rejection of violence as a method of resolving conflict were classified as antiviolence motives. Responses that reflected a preference for nonviolent means of conflict management as the only or best way to solve the problem were classified as pro nonviolence motives.

Expressions that indicated a strong desire to keep the peace, regardless of the cost, were coded as pacifist motives. When the subject's response argued that Zimba's needs were of paramount importance and Sirraco was acting out of a desire for justice or because of moral obligations it was categorized as fairness. When Sirraco said that her own needs, either economic dependence or national security, were most important in deciding her course of action it was classified as self-interest. Statements which argued for compromise as the only or best way to solve conflicts were categorized as compromise. Categories were also constructed to record responses that were uninterpretable or absent.

It seemed possible that the letters which the subjects wrote might not contain all of the information deemed necessary to test the hypotheses so a second method of measurement was constructed to compensate for any unforeseen information gaps. It also seemed advisable to incorporate some kind of manipulation check into the measurement process to determine whether or not subjects perceived the situation and its characteristics as intended.

This second method of measurement involved the construction of a forty-five item questionnaire. It was designed to gather information concerning subject perceptions, attitudes, and reactions to the experimental manipulations. Each survey item was a Likert type question with a five point response scale ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree.

There are six general areas that seemed of particular

importance. Questions were designed to gather information on each of these areas. See Appendix G for a detailed breakdown of these survey areas and their questions. The survey sought to assess the motives or reasons for Sirraco's choice of action, the direction of Sirraco's support in the conflict, the perceived legitimacy of Zimba's demands, the perceived legitimacy of the strategies employed, the method of intervention employed, and a series of manipulation checks.

In order to properly assess the impact of the nonviolent strategy it is important to know what motivated Sirraco to act as she did. Questions were designed to test the impact of strategy and dependence factors. Also some measure of overall impact was necessary so as to determine the general efficacy of the strategy. Five questions were designed to measure the direction and strength of Sirraco's support of Zimba's demands. Another five questions were designed to test Sirraco's perception of the legitimacy of Zimba's demands. It seemed reasonable to assume that Sirraco's public position may not reflect her private preferences, especially if dependency needs forced a moderation or alteration of the preferred course of action. Several questions were also designed to test the impact of the strategy and dependency manipulations on the method of intervention employed by Sirraco.

Another series of questions were designed as manipulation checks. It was important that subjects perceive certain characteristics of the nonviolent situation as described in Chapter 1. A major concern was that the subjects perceived

the "nonviolent" strategy as truly nonviolent and that they saw the "violent" strategy as truly violent. Four questions were devised to test this. It was also important that subjects saw and understood the power differences between the parties and in particular that they saw Zimba as an "oppressed" party. Four questions were constructed to verify this concern.

A characteristic of vital importance to the creation of a "nonviolent" conflict situation is that the observer or third party expect a violent response on the part of the power-less. Part of the power of the nonviolent strategy is that it violates expectations and creates confusion. It seemed essential that this expectation be tested.

It was also believed that if the mundane realism and interest expressed by subjects were high that the validity and generalizability of the results would be increased. The assumption was that an involved subject would provide a more spontaneous and honest response. Two questions were constructed to test for these effects. Two final questions were included to test for response bias due to demand characteristics. Four other questions of a miscellaneous nature were included to fill out the remainder of the questionnaire.

Selection of Subjects

One hundred and sixteen subjects were selected from among students attending speech communication courses during the summer session of 1979 at the University of Kansas and Eastern Illinois University. This resulted in 15 subjects per

cell for the nonviolent conditions and 14 per cell for the violent conditions. Participation in the experiment was voluntary, but generally occurred at the request of their instructors. Data concerning the demographic characteristics of this sample appear in Appendix H.

Experimental Task and Procedures

Approximately 30 subjects participated in each session of the experiment. All sessions occurred within a two week time period from June 8-19, 1979. Sessions were held in classrooms during the time of their regularly scheduled class.

The experimenter was introduced by the class instructor and proceeded to hand out the informed consent statement and instruction form. They were asked to read the statements and then sign. When these were returned subjects were given a packet of information containing all of the stimulus materials for a single condition and the response forms for their letters. The attitude survey was not distributed until after they had finished their letters. Prior to the sessions the packets were indexed and coded. They were then distributed in an order that would ensure randomness. They were asked to write the index/code number at the top of their response forms and their attitude survey. Afterwards response forms and surveys could then be matched for data analysis.

Subjects were instructed that they were being asked to participate in a role-playing situation involving several different conflict situations. They were asked to assume the

the role of the leader of the country of Sirracco. As leader they were to make a decision concerning Sirracco's course of action in a conflict involving two neighboring countries. They were further instructed that there were eight different conflict situations, but they were being asked to respond to only one (see Appendix A).

Subjects were given time to read their reports and then respond to the letters. They were instructed to begin whenever they were ready. No specific time limits were imposed on the subjects. They took anywhere from 30 minutes to 1½ hours to complete the exercise. The average lapsed time to complete the task was 1 hour. Subjects were allowed to leave when they were done, however, they were told that an explanation of the experiment would follow. When time was not sufficient for a thorough debriefing the experimenter returned and provided an explanation at the next class period. Because of the sequencing of the classes (one after the other on the same day) it seems unlikely that the experiment was compromised by subjects discussing the experiment with students from other classes.

Summary of the Data Analysis

Subject messages were analyzed according to the content categories identified above. The content categories were abstracted from the messages after they were written. In other words, the subject responses suggested the categories. To insure that the coding scheme for impressions and responses

was not idiosyncratic to the experimenter, criteria for defining each category were established. These criteria should have enabled another person, unacquainted with the study, to code in a similar manner.

Therefore, I provided an independent judge with the coding system (see Appendix F) and asked her to independently code all 116 responses. The percentages of agreement were quite high, 83%. Consequently, I decided that the criteria were valid and reliable.

Subject responses to the survey and the demographic information sheet were transferred to coding sheets and then to punched cards. A spot check of selected surveys against the coding sheet revealed no errors in transferring information. The punched cards were verified against the coding sheet.

A one-way analysis of variance was applied to the attitude survey in order to determine which if any of the 45 items showed any significant effects. Those items which showed significance were then subjected to a two-way analysis of variance. The two-way analysis was followed by a t-test for determining differences between several means so as to identify the specific differences between conditions.

CHAPTER IV

RESULTS

The results of the experiment conducted to test the hypotheses presented in Chapter II are reported here. An extended discussion of these results and their impact on the arguments about the nature and efficacy of nonviolence will be deferred until the next chapter. The first set of results reported below will summarize the data pertinent to the "dependency" hypotheses. The second set of results relate to the "strategy" hypotheses. Following this I will examine the results of the manipulation checks. Finally, I will present a summary of the demographic data.

Tests of Hypotheses: Dependence

The "dependence" hypotheses were designed to test the impact of exchange relationships on the effectiveness of a nonviolent strategy at inducing a third party to intervene on behalf of the power-less. Four dependency conditions were identified: 1. a condition where the third party was dependent on the power-ful (D/C 1), 2. a condition where the third party was dependent on the power-less (D/C 2), 3. a condition where the third party was dependent on both the power-ful and the power-less (D/C 3), and 4. a condition where the third

party was relatively independent (D/C 4).

The hypotheses were based on the assumption that third party intervention would be impeded or reinforced by existing exchange relationships. The effectiveness of the nonviolent strategy should be enhanced when the third party is linked with the power-less and should be inhibited when the third party is linked with the power-ful.

The content areas of Intervention Direction and Intervention Means were constructed to assess the impact of both dependence and strategy factors on Sirracco's support for Zimba. A chi-square analysis of both Direction and Means provided no significant differences between dependence conditions. Further, a one-way analysis of variance of those survey items designed to measure Sirracco's "direction of support" (see Appendix G, Section 1) showed no significant differences.

These questions asked whether Sirracco chose to support Zimba, Thebes or some compromise position. The mean response for item #16 (support Zimba) was 3.13 or neutral. The mean response for #27 (support Thebes) was 1.94, a clear no. Item #32 (support compromise) had a mean response of 4.5, indicating strong agreement. This pattern suggests that subjects, in general, supported a compromise position which rejected Thebes and favored Zimba. This compromise was consistent across all conditions.

The results of the content analysis of subject "letters" and the analysis of variance test on the relevant survey

items also failed to provide evidence in support of the dependency hypotheses. Even though no dependency effects were demonstrated on these measures there were some interesting results relating to dependency factors. One survey category in particular proved quite informative; those items which sought to test the impact of dependence on Sirraco's perception of "pressure" generated by dependence relationships (see Appendix G, Section 5a). Of the six survey items constructed for this category four of them provided significant results; items 3, 9, 28, and 44 (see Table 4-1). Survey item #22 also provided significant results related to dependency considerations (see Table 4-2). An examination of the pattern of response provides indirect support for hypotheses 1, 2, and 3.

Questionnaire item #3 provided some interesting results. The F ratio comparing difference between dependence conditions was significant ($F = 3.75$, d.f. = 3, 108; $p = .013$). As expected, Sirraco felt the strongest pressure in support of Thebes when they were linked in an exclusive exchange relationship. The mean response for D/C 1 was significantly greater than for any of the other dependence conditions. Within the nonviolent condition (NVS) a comparison between D/C 1 and D/C 2 proved significant in the expected direction. Dependency factors did significantly influence Sirraco's perception of "pressure."

An interesting pattern of results, not directly related to the hypotheses, involved a comparison of response means

TABLE 4-1

Response Means for
Survey Items:
Perceived Pressure

- #3 Because of Sirraco's dependence on xenthoxide I felt pressured to support Thebes. (strongly agree = 5, strongly disagree = 1)

Individual Cell Means

	NVS	VS	M
D/C 1	2.60	3.21	2.91
D/C 2	2.07	2.14	2.11
D/C 3	2.53	2.21	2.37
D/C 4	2.27	2.43	2.35
M	2.37	2.43	

F ratio for main effect for dependence = 3.75, d.f. = 3, 108;

p = .013

Critical difference between individual cell means = .450, d.f. = 108;

p = .05

- #9 Because of Sirraco's dependence on xenthoxide I felt pressured to support Zimba. (strongly agree = 5, strongly disagree = 1)

Individual Cell Means

	NVS	VS	M
D/C 1	2.27	1.93	2.10
D/C 2	3.20	3.00	3.10
D/C 3	2.80	2.00	2.40
D/C 4	2.47	2.71	2.59
M	2.69	2.41	

F ratio for main effect for dependence = 6.013, d.f. = 3, 108;

p = .001

Critical difference between individual cell means = .567, d.f. = 108;

p = .05

Table 4-1 Cont.

#44 Sirraco could not afford to antagonize the conflicting parties.
(strongly agree = 5, strongly disagree = 1)

Individual Cell Means

	NVS	VS	M
D/C 1	3.33	3.36	3.35
D/C 2	3.50	3.64	3.57
D/C 3	4.00	3.64	3.82
D/C 4	2.73	2.64	2.69
M	3.39	3.32	

F ratio for main effect for dependence = 5.09, d.f. = 3, 107;

p = .002

Critical difference between individual cell means = .719, d.f. = 107;

p = .05

#28 Sirraco's needs in this situation were of paramount importance.
(strongly agree = 5, strongly disagree = 1)

Individual Cell Means

	NVS	VS	M
D/C 1	3.20	3.71	3.46
D/C 2	3.79	4.00	3.90
D/C 3	3.20	3.79	3.50
D/C 4	3.13	3.07	3.10
M	3.33	3.64	

F ratio for main effect for dependence = 3.601, d.f. = 3, 107;

p = .016

Critical difference between individual cell means = .557, d.f. = 107;

p = .05

TABLE 4-2

Response Means for
Survey Items:
Perceived Legitimacy of Demands

#22 Zimba was not justified in making its demands.
(strongly agree = 5, strongly disagree = 1)

Individual Cell Means

	NVS	VS	M
D/C 1	2.33	2.43	2.38
D/C 2	1.67	2.36	2.02
D/C 3	1.87	2.29	2.08
D/C 4	2.27	1.79	2.03
M	2.04	2.22	

F ratio for two-way interaction effect (S X D) = 3.36, d.f. = 3, 108;
p = .022

Critical difference between individual cell means = .456, d.f. = 108;
p = .05

within the violent condition (VS). D/C 1 was found to be significantly greater than D/C 2, D/C 3, and D/C 4. Further, the mean response for D/C 1 in the violent condition was significantly greater than the mean response for D/C 1 in the nonviolent condition. This indicates that Sirraco felt the pressure to support Thebes most strongly when both Thebes and Zimba employed a violent strategy. It also suggests that the nonviolent strategy inhibited or reduced these dependency pressures. Furthermore, it is possible that dependency becomes a much more salient decision factor when strategies do not differ.

Survey item #9 is similar to #3 in that it is also assessed perceived dependency pressures but with regard to Zimba not Thebes. A comparison of means between dependency conditions shows D/C 2 to be significantly greater than D/C 1 and D/C 3 ($F = 6.013$, d.f. = 3, 108; $p = .001$). A comparison of means within the nonviolent condition (NVS) shows that the perceived pressure to support Zimba was greater in D/C 2 than D/C 1 or D/C 4. Here again exchange relationships seem to have influenced Sirraco's perception of "pressure." The pattern of these results provide indirect support for hypotheses 1 and 3.

The results from survey item #44 also provided indirect support for the research hypotheses. Item #44 sought to assess Sirraco's sensitivity to actions which might be perceived as hostile or antagonistic to an exchange partner. Dependency factors did significantly affect their sensitivity

vity ($F = 5.09$, d.f. = 3, 108; $p = .002$). Both D/C 2 and D/C 3 were significantly greater than D/C 4, where Sirraco was relatively independent. This suggests that dependency did affect their perception of antagonistic choices if not their actual course of action. This would tend to suggest an inhibiting effect from dependency factors.

It would seem reasonable to assume that as one perceives greater pressure from some direction that it would influence the course of action they chose and that as the perceived pressure varied so would the amount of support given. However, the results cited above indicate that no corresponding changes in Sirraco's behavior were observed. This suggests one of two things: either the subjects deliberately resisted these pressures or the methods of assessing the nature and direction of Sirraco's support were not sufficiently sensitive. More will be said on this in Chapter V.

Item #28 showed significant main effects due to the dependence conditions with regard to the perceived salience of Sirraco's needs ($F = 3.601$, d.f. = 3, 108; $p = .016$). A comparison among cell means in the nonviolent condition (NVS) showed the perceived importance of Sirraco's needs to be greatest where Sirraco was linked in an exclusive exchange relationship with Zimba (D/C 2 greater than D/C 1, D/C 3 and D/C 4). The question is why would Sirraco see its stake in D/C 2 to be any greater than any other dependency condition?

Survey item #22 also provided significant differences

between cell means for dependence conditions (see Table 4-2). This item sought to assess Sirraco's perception of the legitimacy of Zimba's demands. One would expect that a dependency relationship which favored Zimba would enhance their perceived legitimacy. An examination of #22 confirms this expectation. Within the nonviolent condition, the mean response for D/C 2 was significantly greater than D/C 1 and D/C 4 ($F = 3.36$, d.f. = 3, 108; $p = .022$).

A dependency relationship that favored Zimba seems to have resulted in an enhanced perception of the legitimacy of Zimba's demands while an exchange relationship which favored Thebes reduced the perceived legitimacy of those demands. One would expect that attitudes favorable to an expressed position would result in actions supportive of that position and that the more favorable the attitude the greater the support. However, Sirraco's recorded position in this conflict did not confirm this expectation.

In summary, no direct support of the dependency hypotheses was found. However, the findings do indicate that dependency did influence the subjects' perceptions of the situation. Exchange relationships did affect the subjects' perception of the legitimacy of Zimba's demands, the perception of dependency pressures, and the perceived salience of Sirraco's needs. The pattern of responses from these items suggests an interpretation of the situation that favored Zimba, however, there is no confirmation that they influenced Sirraco's actual course of action. These results do seem to

provide indirect support for the impact of exchange relationships.

Tests of Hypotheses: Strategy

Hypotheses 4 through 7 predicted the relative effectiveness of a nonviolent versus a violent strategy within each of four dependency conditions. The content area labeled Intervention Direction was used to determine the direction and degree of support tendered by Sirraco. Sirraco's support was assessed by determining her position on an increase in the price of illium. This measure did not prove to be as effective as originally hoped. Subjects responded with a multitude of complex solutions which were not easily quantified. The solutions suggested often consisted of a combination of actions or failed to specify a clear outcome. For example, one solution demanded that Thebes pay the full increase asked by Zimba, whereas another advocated a summit meeting with a promise of financial aid to one or both of the other countries, while another advocated a gradual increase in the price of illium with financial aid going to Thebes to help compensate. However, relying on the original assumption did provide some information relevant to the question.

A comparison of strategy with Sirraco's expressed position on the price of illium showed significance in the expected direction (Chi-square = 13.77, d.f. = 5; $p = .025$; see Table 4-3). However, a contingency coefficient of .327

TABLE 4-3

Summary of Chi-square Analysis
for Intervention Direction

	Direction: Price of Illium						Total
	1	2	3	4	5	6*	
NVS	11	9	1	17	17	5	60
VS	5	5	10	9	22	4	55
Total	16	14	11	26	39	9	115**

Chi-square = 13.77, d.f. = 5, p = .025; c.c. = 3.27

* Response Categories

1. support full increase
2. supports increase greater than 50%
3. supports increase less than 50%
4. supports some unspecified increase
5. supports unspecified negotiations
6. uncodable

** one response missing

suggests that the relationship is fairly weak.

The results indicate that strategy did influence the degree of support which Zimba received from Sirracco, at least with respect to the price increase. Twice as many subjects supported a price increase greater than 50% in the nonviolent condition as compared to subjects in the violent condition. Approximately 33% more subjects chose some unspecified negotiations in the violent condition as compared to subjects in the nonviolent condition. Finally, almost twice as many subjects in the nonviolent conditions favored some kind of price increase as compared to those in the violent conditions.

Whereas these results do not provide specific support for individual hypotheses they do provide evidence that strategy does have a significant impact on the course of action chosen by the third party. The weakness of these results may be due to the variety and complexity of the solutions advocated rather than to the efficacy of the strategy. Further clarification is required on this point.

An examination of the questionnaire provided very little in the way of support for these hypotheses. Three survey items were constructed to assess the direction and level of Sirracco's support (see Appendix G, Section 1). These questions asked whether Sirracco chose to support Thebes, Zimba, or some compromise position. A one-way analysis of variance showed no significant differences between conditions for any of the items.

Two other questionnaire categories provided results

relevant to the impact of strategy: the content category which focused on the perceived legitimacy of Zimba's demands and the one which assessed the impact of strategy on the degree of Sirracco's support (see Appendix G, Sections 2 and 5a).

Five survey items were designed to test the subjects' perception of the legitimacy of Zimba's demands. A two-way analysis of variance showed item #22 to have a significant interaction effect ($F = 3.65$, d.f. = 3, 108; $p = .022$; see Table 4-2). A t-test for differences between means showed a significant difference in the expected direction for D/C 2, whereas significance was found in the opposite direction for D/C 4 (NVS vs. VS). An examination of the pattern of results indicates that the condition where Sirracco most favored Zimba's demands was D/C 2 in the nonviolent condition, whereas Sirracco's support for Zimba's demands was strongest in D/C 4 for the violent condition. The results from item #22 provided support for hypothesis 5; however, it provided evidence in the opposite direction for hypothesis 7.

The mean response for the other survey items dealing with "perceived legitimacy" indicated that subjects, regardless of conditions believed Zimba was right in making its demands and did not believe the original price was fair. However, subjects appeared undecided about the necessity of the full increase.

Three survey items sought to test the impact of strategy on the subjects choice of action (see Appendix G, Section 5a).

A one-way analysis of variance demonstrated only one item to be significant, #23 ($F = 3.17$, d.f. = 7, $p = .004$). A two-way analysis of variance showed a significant mean effect for strategy ($F = 13.15$, d.f. = 1, 108; $p = .00$). A t-test for difference between several means showed significant differences for 3 of the 4 conditions: NVS D/C 1 greater than VS D/C 1, NVS D/C 2 greater than VS D/C 2, and NVS D/C 3 greater than VS D/C 3 (see Table 4-4).

Item #23 showed a marginally significant interaction effect ($F = 2.65$, d.f. = 3, 108; $p = .053$). In the nonviolent condition subjects indicated that Thebes' "approach" to the conflict influenced their choice of action most strongly in D/C 1, D/C 2 and D/C 3. However, in the violent condition Thebes' "approach" influenced subjects' choice of action most strongly in D/C 4, where Thebes was relatively independent.

The pattern of results for item #23 provided indirect support for hypotheses 4, 5 and 6'. The results show that contrasting Thebes' violent strategy against Zimba's nonviolent approach did significantly influence Sirraco's choice of action. However, subjects seemed to react against the violence more so than reacting for the nonviolent.

Two other survey items, #31 and #39, showed significant main effects for strategy (see Table 4-5). Subject responses indicate that while subjects were uncertain about how well Zimba handled the situation in the nonviolent condition, they clearly disapproved of Zimba's handling of the conflict in

TABLE 4-4

Response Means for
Survey Items:
Perceived Impact of Strategy

#23 My choice of action was influenced by the approach taken by
Thebes. (strongly agree = 5, strongly disagree = 1)

Individual Cell Means

	NVS	VS	M
D/C 1	3.47	2.57	3.02
D/C 2	3.53	2.57	3.05
D/C 3	3.47	2.50	2.99
D/C 4	3.13	3.36	3.25
M	3.40	2.75	

F ratio for main effect for strategy = 13.15, d.f. = 1, 108;
p = .00

F ratio for interaction effect (S X D) = 2.65, d.f. = 3, 108;
p = .053

Critical difference between individual cell means = .596, d.f. = 108;
p = .05

TABLE 4-5

Response Means for
Survey Items:
Perceived Legitimacy of Strategy

#31 I thought Zimba handled the whole situation rather well.
(strongly agree = 5, strongly disagree = 1)

Individual Cell Means

	NVS	VS	M
D/C 1	3.53	1.89	2.71
D/C 2	2.93	1.93	2.43
D/C 3	3.00	2.29	2.65
D/C 4	3.20	2.00	2.60
M	3.17	2.03	

F ratio for main effect for strategy = 54.41, d.f. = 1, 107;

p = .00

Critical difference between individual cell means = .517, d.f. = 107;

p = .05

#39 I thought Zimba's behavior was inappropriate and out of place.
(strongly agree = 5, strongly disagree = 1)

Individual Cell Means

	NVS	VS	M
D/C 1	2.33	3.07	2.70
D/C 2	2.27	2.79	2.53
D/C 3	2.13	2.57	2.35
D/C 4	2.67	3.21	2.94
M	2.35	2.91	

F ratio for main effect for strategy = 9.796, d.f. = 1, 108;

p = .002

Critical difference between individual cell means = .594, d.f. = 108;

p = .05

the violent condition. And, whereas they expressed uncertainty about the appropriateness of Zimba's approach in the violent condition, they clearly say nonviolence as appropriate. This seems contradictory, but it may reflect more of an assessment of the methods of dealing with conflict in general than with an evaluation of the nonviolent strategy. Refusing to sell illium and creating a major incident may have seemed an inappropriate way of dealing with this conflict, reflecting poor handling. However, if the choice is between violence and nonviolence they clearly prefer nonviolence.

In summary, the results from the content analysis of Intervention Direction provided partial support for the "strategy" hypotheses. Strategy did influence Sirraco's choice of action in favor of Zimba but its effect could not be determined for specific exchange relationships. The results from the survey items provided partial support for the hypotheses. Item #22 provided support for hypothesis 5 but contradicted hypothesis 7. Item #23 supported hypotheses 4, 5, and 6.

Manipulation Checks

A review of the results of the manipulation checks reveals that subjects did perceive a clear difference between the strategies. Four items related to a descriptive assessment of the strategies (see Table 4-6). When asked if they believed Zimba's strategy was nonviolent (#7) the mean response in the nonviolent condition was 3.78, indicating agreement, while the mean response in the violent condition

TABLE 4-6

Response Means for
Survey Items:
Manipulation Check -- Strategy

- #7 Zimba's approach to this whole situation could be called nonviolent.
(strongly agree = 5, strongly disagree = 1)

Individual Cell Means

	NVS	VS	M
D/C 1	3.87	1.57	2.72
D/C 2	3.93	1.64	2.79
D/C 3	3.60	1.71	2.66
D/C 4	3.71	1.78	2.66
M	3.78	1.68	

F ratio for main effect for strategy = 124.54, d.f. = 1, 107;
p = .00

Critical difference between individual cell means = .625, d.f. = 107;
p = .05

- #14 I thought the tone of Zimba's message was quite hostile.
(strongly agree = 5, strongly disagree = 1)

Individual Cell Means

	NVS	VS	M
D/C 1	2.20	4.21	3.21
D/C 2	2.07	4.07	3.07
D/C 3	1.93	3.71	2.82
D/C 4	2.60	4.07	3.34
M	2.20	4.02	

F ratio for main effect for strategy = 108.89, d.f. = 1, 108;
p = .00

Critical difference between individual cell means = .577, d.f. = 108;
p = .05

was 1.68, indicating disagreement. A two-way analysis of variance showed these to be significantly different ($F = 124.54$, d.f. = 1, 107; $p = .00$). The strategy manipulation clearly worked.

Subjects also indicated an understanding of the power relationships that existed between the three countries and they found the role-playing situation both realistic and interesting (see Tables 4-7 and 4-8). However, subjects did not "expect" a violent response from Zimba. Item #25 asked the subject if given the circumstances as presented, whether or not they would have expected Zimba to react violently (see Table 4-8). The reader may remember that one of the key factors for defining a nonviolent context is that participants and observers perceive violence as a "reasonable" and expected response. The responses to #25 provided no significant differences, but the mean response was 3.03, suggesting uncertainty. Consequently, this experimental situation may not, by definition, qualify as a "nonviolent" conflict.

Furthermore, a check for possible demand characteristics indicated that subjects believed they knew the purpose of the study (see Table 4-8). Subjects responded across all conditions that they did know what was expected of them, but that they did not commit themselves to a solution early in the exercise. The possibility of a demand characteristic limits the viability of this experiment.

TABLE 4-7

Assessment of Power Relationships

#2 SIRRACO's support is the key to ZIMBA's success.

mean response = 3.91 -- agree

#8 ZIMBA and THEBES are equal in terms of power.

mean response = 1.71 -- disagree

#15 SIRRACO is stronger than THEBES and ZIMBA combined.

mean response = 3.95 -- agree

#18 THEBES has dominated and exploited ZIMBA.

mean response = 3.15 -- neutral

TABLE 4-8

Manipulation Checks

Summary of One-way Analysis
Assessment of Role-playing Situation

#6 I thought this conflict represented a realistic situation.

mean response = 4.08 -- agree

#20 I found this to be an interesting and involving experience.

mean response = 3.7 -- agree

Summary of One-way Analysis
Expectation of Violent Reaction

#25 Given the circumstances, I would expect Zimba to react violently.

mean response = 3.03 -- neutral

Summary of One-way Analysis
Demand Characteristics

#12 I haven't the slightest idea as to what this experiment is trying to prove.

mean response = 2.5 -- disagree

#37 I decided from the very beginning that Thebes should pay Zimba's price.

mean response = 2.5 -- disagree

Demographic Data

A review of the demographic data collected from the subjects reveals that of the one hundred and sixteen subjects 62% were female, approximately 78% were caucasian, and the average age was approximately 22 years. The majority of subjects (53%) expressed an affiliation with a protestant religion, but clearly 25% expressed no religious preference, Politically, 44% declared themselves to be independents, with the remainder fairly evenly divided between Democrats and Republicans. Thirty percent of the subjects identified themselves as liberals, 41% claimed to be politically moderate, while only 6% identified themselves as politically conservative. These figures tend to suggest that this sample was representative of a fairly young, liberally oriented, predominantly caucasian population (see Appendix H),

CHAPTER V

DISCUSSION

The data summarized in Chapter IV are discussed below. First, I will present a general discussion and explanation of the research results. Second, I will examine specific aspects of the research design which may provide an alternate explanation of the research findings. Finally, I will conclude with a discussion of the implications of these findings for future research.

General Discussion

The results of this study provide evidence that strategy does have a significant effect on the position taken by a third party, even though that effect is weak. The results also support the prediction that dependency has an impact on third party intervention, but the precise nature of the impact is not clear. Those measures which were intended as a direct assessment of dependency effects on Sirracco's support for Zimba proved nonsignificant. However, several survey items (#3, #9, #22, #28, and #44) demonstrated that dependency did influence Sirracco's perception of the situation in a way that favored Zimba, but these perceptions, apparently, did not result in behavioral differences in support.

It is clear from these results that subjects perceived

strategy differences and dependency pressures, but they appear to have ignored or played down these factors in pursuit of a "fair" solution or resolution to the conflict. A close examination of "motives" and "intervention means" indicates that subjects shared a fairly consistent view of the proper way to deal with the conflict. Respondents consistently assumed the position that the only fair solution would be a compromise brought about through negotiation.

An examination of the results shows that subjects favored diplomatic intervention, negotiation and mediation, as the dominant means of social influence (62%). Approximately 35% of the subjects indicated that compromise was the best method of resolving conflict; while 21% indicated a "concern for fairness" as their motive. Response patterns on the survey items #16, #27, and #32 show compromise as clearly the dominant solution. However, it is also possible that "compromise" was an umbrella term used by subjects to cover a solution that favored Zimba without giving full and unqualified support. If this is the case, then the method of measurement was not sensitive enough to identify the variations.

Nonviolence, as a strategy, seeks to bring about negotiation. However, the demand for negotiation was equally strong in the violent conditions. One of two reasons may be working here: either subjects were reacting to the disruption of social and economic ties through the imposition of controlling norms or they were applying a general "myth" of conflict

strategy differences and dependency pressures, but they appear to have ignored or played down these factors in pursuit of a "fair" solution or resolution to the conflict. A close examination of "motives" and "intervention means" indicates that subjects shared a fairly consistent view of the proper way to deal with the conflict. Respondents consistently assumed the position that the only fair solution would be a compromise brought about through negotiation.

An examination of the results shows that subjects favored diplomatic intervention, negotiation and mediation, as the dominant means of social influence (62%). Approximately 35% of the subjects indicated that compromise was the best method of resolving conflict; while 21% indicated a "concern for fairness" as their motive. Response patterns on the survey items #16, #27, and #32 show compromise as clearly the dominant solution. However, it is also possible that "compromise" is an umbrella term used by subjects to cover a solution that favored Zimba without giving full and unqualified support. If this is the case then the method of measurement was not sensitive enough to identify the variations.

Nonviolence, as a strategy, seeks to bring about negotiation, however, the demand for negotiation was equally strong in the violent conditions. One of two reasons may be working here: either subjects were reacting to the disruption of social and economic ties through the imposition of controlling norms or they are applying a general "myth" of conflict

resolution which argues that the only fair solution is a compromise. There is evidence to suggest that the more intense the disruption brought about by conflict, the more likely those involved are to invoke superordinant norms;¹ in this case the norm of "talking it over." If this is the case subjects may have reacted against the threat of violent conflict more so than supporting a nonviolent approach. The "myth" of compromise would certainly constitute one norm of conflict management that could be easily applied.

If either or both of these explanations is correct, it would represent a major social obstacle (or at least deny a hoped for advantage) to the success of a nonviolent strategy and would tend to suggest that either strategy, violent or nonviolent, would be effective if sufficiently disruptive. However, and I think this is important, nonviolence elicited a more favorable response, even given this barrier, than did violence. Subjects were more willing to support the demands of Zimba in the nonviolent conditions than in the violent conditions.

Another interesting finding is that dependency factors seemed to carry greater force in the violent conditions, where both Zimba and Thebes responded violently, than in the non-violent conditions. This raises a question regarding the relative impact of strategy versus dependency. In Chapter I I argued that dependency was a primary, or more forceful, factor than strategy. These results suggest that subjects were more willing or better able to resist dependency pres-

asures when nonviolence was employed that when a violent strategy was used by both countries. Of course, it may also be that dependency became a more salient or useful criterion when no other significant criterion was available. Even so, this suggests that in the value hierarchy of these subjects, strategy was a more important variable than was dependency.

In summary, the impact of strategy on third party intervention was not strong, but it was significant. Dependency factors were recognized, but the precise nature of their effect was not consistent. These results do provide evidence that a nonviolent strategy is superior to a violent strategy in the management of conflict and the elicitation of support from a powerful third party. These results also suggest the possibility of a strong socio-psychological barrier which may inhibit the success of any strategy.

I have tried to provide an explanation for the results which were reported in Chapter IV. It is possible that the results may have been the result of other factors unrelated to the impact of the manipulations themselves. The next section seeks to explore specific aspects of the research design, which upon reflection may have been responsible for some of the effects, or lack of effects, associated with this study. This review is not intended as an apology for the research results but merely to explore all possible avenues which might explain the observed data.

Alternative Explanations

Obviously, one explanation for the weakness of the results is that nonviolence is a weak strategy. However, before one can make such a claim, every effort should be made to identify and examine any alternative explanations for the observed results. Some of these explanations were examined above. Those explanations which might derive from factors involved with the research design or sample selection are examined here.

The first area involves possible sample bias. The demographic data on this sample (summarized in Chapter IV) indicates a fairly young group of college students who describe themselves as politically moderate or liberal. It could very well be that this sample is not representative of the greater population. College students may approach what is a complex social situation with fairly naive and simplistic attitudes about how the world operates or, at least, how it should operate. This possibility can be eliminated only after conducting research with other samples which reflect other political and attitudinal perspectives.

It may also be that research results were influenced by the history or context of the conflict. It was important to the theory that nonviolence be tested in a context where subjects expected a violent response from Zimba. If this were to be a true test of nonviolence then participants and observers must expect a violent response. The violation of

such expectation serves to enhance the moral impact of the strategy. Survey item #25 sought to test for this expectation and found subjects uncertain.

An attempt to develop such an expectation was incorporated in the background information provided the subjects. It was hoped that by presenting a history of the development of the conflict subjects would agree that a violent response by Zimba seemed "expected" if not reasonable. It may be that the history failed in this respect. If so, then the reactions of both parties may have seemed inexplicable; the intensity of the conflict wholly unexpected. The subjects may have pursued a cautious approach in order to gather more information and so better enable them to deal with the conflict. Such a reaction would tend to diminish the impact of the strategy and dependency manipulations.

Another factor that may have influenced subject responses was the message order. Because of the nature of the messages the subjects might have relied on the order of the messages as a means of fixing blame and assessing the appropriateness of the others' response. The country which was the author of the first message would be seen as the one who "started the fight" and the subjects evaluation of the second party's response would be conditioned by the first message. Consequently, the order of the messages could have been used to establish subject expectations, and perhaps should have been used to do so. However, message order was randomized in order to minimize such effects for fear they

would interfere with strategy and dependency manipulations. Subsequent research should examine the significance of perceived blame and the effects of message order in establishing this perception.

A fourth factor which may have influenced the results of this study is the perceived salience of Sirracco's dependence on xenthoxide. This was a fairly complex role-play situation. A number of factors needed to be remembered and analyzed by the participants. The only place Sirracco's dependence was mentioned was in the statement of background information. It could be that in processing subsequent information her dependency was either forgotten or its importance minimized; this latter especially true if subjects were not able to perceive the potential threat to her supplies as a result of the conflict. This would account for the lack of effects due to dependency.

In future research some effort will need to be taken to ensure that subjects perceive some potential threat to their vital interests. This might be accomplished by introducing a paragraph in the messages, as well as in the background information, that indicates the potential impact of the conflict on Sirracco's supplies of xenthoxide. This would serve to increase the salience of dependency as a factor to be considered.

A final consideration is the possibility that the methods of measurement were not sufficiently sensitive. It was assumed that subjects would respond directly to the issue

of an increase in the price of illium. However, subjects responded with a myriad of complex and divergent solutions. The majority did not even specify a position with regards the price of illium (56%). This made it nearly impossible to assess the level of Sirraco's support. Future research may need to force a decision on this issue in order to adequately assess the impact of strategy and dependency factors on third party support.

These five factors may have influenced the results of this study in ways unforeseen by the theory or in ways that interfered with the impact of the variables. Before subsequent research can be conducted with any confidence questions concerning the integrity of the research design need to be addressed. The selection of subjects needs to be broadened to include nonstudents, older and more politically conservative people. Furthermore, the presentation of the role-playing situation needs to be restructured to test for the possible design effects outlined in this section.

It needs to be emphasized that these concerns represent only tentative explanations for the observed results. They are presented for consideration in the hopes that they will lead to a strengthening of future research necessary to provide firm conclusions. The next section looks at the implications of the findings examined here for the conduct of future research.

Implications for Further Research

This study was exploratory and was not intended as an exhaustive examination of the efficacy of nonviolence as a strategy of protest and conflict management. This research showed that nonviolence was successful at influencing the intervention of a powerful third party. More research is needed to verify this conclusion and to explore other dimensions of the nonviolent situation which may influence its impact.

Yet to be explored is the impact of a nonviolent strategy on the opposition. Does nonviolence have a significant effect on the opposition in and of itself and, if so, how strong is that effect? How important is pressure brought to bear by the third party and what kind or combination of pressure is necessary? The impact of the nonviolent strategy could be strengthened or diminished by the position taken by the third party. Conceivably, the third party could support the opposition, support the protestors, or remain neutral.

Also to be explored is the impact of nonviolence when confronted by a nonviolent opposition. How important is the contrast effect between strategies? It seems reasonable to assume that a contrast effect would not only serve to dramatize the conflict but also to enhance the moral position of the protestors. However, what happens when the opposition refuses to engage in grossly violent or repressive activities? Will nonviolence work when the opposition merely

"waits them out?" Ultimately, the question reduces to an assessment of the importance of "violence" to a nonviolent strategy.

One further area that needs to be explored is variations in the power relationships between the parties to the conflict. In this research the third party was presented as clearly superior in all respects to the other nations. What happens when the third party is not clearly superior? Would different "rules of coalition" apply if the third party were of equal power to one or the other, or if the third party, in coalition with the protestors was only equal in power to the opposition? This area of power is a critical dimension for a theory of nonviolent protest.

Research which addresses questions such as these would serve to increase our understanding of nonviolent conflict management. Continued research would also serve to help those researchers and practitioners who seek to understand and control the destructive tendencies which threaten the world community.

Summary

The results of this study indicated that strategy and dependency factors did have a significant effect on the perceptions and behavior of the subjects. The nonviolent strategy was more effective than the violent strategy at eliciting third party support. Dependency factors did not result in behavioral differences in support but did clearly

influence subject perceptions of the conflict situation.

This chapter also examined several possible alternative explanations for the observed results. These explanations centered on sample bias, subject expectations, message order, the salience of dependency, and measurement. Future research must carefully examine the possible impact of these five factors and control for any possible influence.

Future research needs still to examine the impact of the nonviolent strategy on the opposition; the impact of nonviolence when confronted by nonviolent resistance; and variation in power relationships between the third party and the others. Each of these areas requires further exploration and elaboration.

ENDNOTES

¹ See the discussion in C.L. Gruder, "Social Power in Interpersonal Negotiation," The Structure of Conflict, edited by Paul G. Swingle (New York : Academic Press, 1970), pp. 137ff.

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APPENDIX A
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS

INFORMED CONSENT STATEMENT

It is the right of every participant in a research project to be informed of the nature of that project. The Department of Speech and Drama at the University of Kansas supports the practice of protection for human subjects participating in research. The following information is provided so that you can decide whether you want to participate in the present study. You should be aware that even if you participate you are free to withdraw at any time, without prejudice.

You are being asked to participate in a study of communication and conflict. We are interested in your communication behavior given different kinds of conflict situations. You will be asked to read background information about the conflict, respond to the conflicting parties, and then, fill out a survey concerning your reactions to the situation. To do this you will be asked to assume the role of one of the conflicting parties.

The conflict exists between three nations. The role you assume will be as the leader of one of the nations involved. Information concerning your relationship to the others and the nature of the conflict will be provided later. There are several conflict situations. You will be asked to respond to only one. The time involved in this study is about one hour.

You will be given a packet of information, response sheets and the survey. On the upper right hand corner of the information packet is an index number. This number must be placed on the upper right hand corner of the response sheets and the survey (as indicated). This is necessary so that your reactions can be matched to the specific conflict situation that you responded to. All that is asked is that you respond honestly to the situation.

We are unaware of any harmful aspects of this study. However, if at any time you feel threatened or perceive any possible harm or injury to yourself, withdraw and notify the experimenter. All information gathered will be anonymous. At no time will your name be associated with any of the studies data. If you have any questions please ask.

Thank you.

I have read the description of the experimental situation provided above and have offered to participate. My participation is voluntary and I understand that I may withdraw at any time, without prejudice.

Name: _____ Date: _____

Principle Investigator: Terry M. Perkins
Department of Speech and Drama
The University of Kansas
Lawrence, Kansas
(913) 864-3633

APPENDIX B
BACKGROUND INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS:

You are asked to place yourself in the role of the leader of Sirraco who must make a decision about Sirraco's position in a conflict between two countries with whom it shares common borders. The conflict is of concern because it poses a threat to a long standing relationship, characterized by friendship and cooperation, between the three nations. It is important that you assume this role with the realization that you are responsible for the well being and security of your people. The pursuit of these interests may very well place you in direct conflict with others (and even with some of your own personal values). However, your primary responsibility is to look after the interests of your own people.

What follows is a series of reports and messages that pertain to this situation. There will be description of Sirraco's capability to exercise influence in the situation, a fact finding report from the Sirracan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and messages sent to you by the leaders of the nations involved in the dispute. After you have read this information you will be asked to respond to the conflicting parties and to react to the conflict itself.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION: SIRRACO'S RELATIONSHIP TO THEBES AND ZIMBA

Sirraco has been a valued and trusted friend of both Thebes and Zimba for many years. Not only do the three countries share a common border, they are also politically and ideologically aligned. The stability of the entire region depends upon their remaining cooperative. It seems only reasonable, then, that both Zimba and Thebes would turn to Sirraco in time of trouble, seeking advice and assistance.

Sirraco is strong enough to impose its will on both Thebes and Zimba (and the other two nations know this), but it has seldom done so, preferring to work with them in solving problems. This does not mean that Sirraco has not or would not use its considerable economic, political and military power to force the acceptance of some policy if it believed it to be in Sirraco's best interests.


Sirraco, Thebes and Zimba not only share common border but they also share a common access to the sea (see map below). There are no troops or military installations along their joining borders, but they all maintain a strong naval presence in the Sea of Agran. Militarily Sirraco is by far the strongest and has supplied military aid and training to both Thebes and Zimba. Zimba is the weakest militarily. Because of the world political situation all three nations keep a standing army in ready reserve. In essence Sirraco,

Thebes and Zimba stand together as a world political and military force against another block of nations that are ideologically opposed to their way of life.

Sirraco also has extensive economic interests in both Zimba and Thebes; providing large grants in aid to both countries. Economically, Sirraco is by far the wealthiest nation and whereas an economic downturn in another country might cause some discomfort it would not seriously impair its economic progress. In general, business dealings between the three nations have always been cordial and mutually profitable.

Sirraco has dealt with both of these countries long and often enough to know that they mean what they say. They may at times see the world differently, but when they believe themselves to be right they are not easily dissuaded. They can be extremely stubborn and compromise can be extremely difficult to achieve. This poses a very real dilemma for Sirraco in the present situation.

Sirraco has the capacity to lend aid and assistance to these countries but the choice of who to support and how present a real problem. Sirraco could easily intervene militarily and quickly impose a settlement on the parties involved. It could withdraw or increase investments in one country or another to soften or induce acceptance of a proposed solution. It could provide developmental grants to either country which could be used to promote economic growth. It could rely upon diplomatic discussion and persuasion. All these are possible, but the choice must be conditioned by the necessity to maintain cordial relations with them.



The only "fly in the ointment" is that Sirraco is vitally dependent on an ore called Xenthoxide. Xenthoxide is essential in the development and manufacturing of many of Sirraco's more technologically advanced products. At this time Thebes is the only "friendly" nation that has a supply of Xenthoxide sufficient to meet Sirraco's needs. Consequently, it is of vital interest to Sirraco to keep the supply of Xenthoxide from Thebes secure. If Sirraco were to lose this source or suffer even a short term disruption they would be dependent on countries which are its political and military enemies for any future supply. This could destabilize the world balance of power. For the welfare of its people and the security of the nation this is a condition which Sirraco cannot allow under any circumstances.

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS:
FACT FINDING REPORT --
THE THEBAN-ZIMBAN COMFLICT

Zimba is a federated state within the commonwealth of Thebes. This means that Zimba and Thebes are politically, economically and culturally related, but that they are independent and autonomous. Zimba mines a raw material called illium which it sells exclusively to Thebes. Thebes has the technological skill and the capital to process illium and make trillium; a valuable new energy source. Illium is the foundation of Zimba's economy and because Thebes is its only market, it is highly dependent on its sister state. Other possible markets either have enough illium of their own, or they lack the technology to process it into trillium.

Whereas Zimba is underdeveloped, Thebes is a progressive and technologically advanced state. Because Thebes is highly developed, it is a wealthy state and most of its wealth comes from the sale of trillium. Thebes sells trillium on the open market for about \$150 a ton. Where illium is the foundation for Zimba's economy, trillium is the foundation for Thebes' economy. Zimba supplies Thebes with 40% of the illium it needs. The other 60% is mined by Theban companies under strict government control.

It costs \$5 a ton to mine illium. Zimba produces and sells 10,000 tons a day. Traditionally, Thebes has purchased illium for \$20 a ton. This income has been sufficient to meet Zimba's basic needs. Thebes processes illium at a cost of \$10 a ton, thus it costs Thebes \$30 a ton to produce trillium from Zimban sources. It costs only \$15 a ton to produce trillium from Theban sources. Thebes sells trillium for \$150 a ton. Because of international competition, to raise the price of trillium above \$150 is next to impossible. It would result in canceled orders and the loss of revenue. The production costs which Zimba and Thebes pay are stable (fixed); the technology involved is such that there is little likelihood that production costs will increase in the foreseeable future. Currently, the only figure that is subject to change is the selling price of illium.

The current price for illium was set at a time when Zimba was just beginning to tap its resources and needed a lot of investment capital. The capital was provided by Thebes on the condition that Zimba not acquire the hardware to process illium into trillium. Now, all these loans have been paid back and Zimba is no longer in Thebes debt. Zimba now believes that the price of illium should be raised and has often expressed this belief publically and in negotiations with Thebes, but with no effect.

Zimba believes some action must be taken. However, the

problem is that illium is the foundation of Zimba's economy and Thebes is the only buyer. Any disruption of the purchase of illium would cause Zimba's economy to suffer. A short disruption of 2-3 months would be tolerable, but any disruption longer than this would all but destroy its economy. Currently, the people of Zimba have a low standard of living.

Thebes is in a much more comfortable position. Whereas trillium remains the foundation of its prosperity there is greater diversity within its economy. Since Thebes produces 60% of its own illium any disruption of supplies from Zimba would have minimal short term effects. It would require a disruption of 6-12 months to cause any serious damage, and even longer to undermine its economy. Currently, the people of Thebes have a high standard of living.

There has been considerable and mounting pressure from citizen groups, labor and business interests within Zimba to take some action to pressure Thebes into paying a higher price. Tempers are running high on both sides. Thebes resents any attempt to increase prices and "destabilize" the exchange. Zimba believes the price should be set according to the needs of the country. Zimba's reasoning is that Thebes can easily get along with less, but Zimba, to prosper, must have more. Zimbans believe that Thebes holds an unfair advantage in the relationship and through Thebes monopoly on illium they control the destiny of Zimba.

An increase in the price from \$20 to \$50 a ton for illium is what Zimba is asking. Zimba believes that such an increase would provide an acceptable margin for economic expansion without causing undue distress in Thebes. Zimba's profits would rise from \$15 a ton to \$45 a ton. Thebes profits would drop from \$120 a ton to \$90 a ton on the 40% of trillium processed from Zimban sources. The profits on the other 60% would remain at \$120 a ton. A price of \$50 a ton would certainly slow Thebes economic growth and might result in a rather severe recession.

APPENDIX C
DEPENDENCY INSTRUCTIONS

DEPENDENCY CONDITION #1: Sirracco dependent on Thebes

The only "fly in the ointment" is that Sirracco is vitally dependent on an ore called Xenthoxide. Xenthoxide is essential in the developemnt and manufacturing of many of Sirracco's more technologically advanced products. At this time Thebes is the only "friendly" nation that has a supply of Xenthoxide sufficient to meet Sirracco's needs. Consequently, it is of vital interest to Sirracco to keep the supply of Xenthoxide from Thebes secure. If Sirracco were to lose this source or suffer even a short term disruption they would be dependent on countries which are its political and military enemies for any future supply. This could destabilize the world balance of power. For the welfare of its people and the security of the nation this is a condition which Sirracco cannot allow under any circumstances.

DEPENDENCY CONDITION #2: Sirraco dependent on Zimba

The only "fly in the ointment" is that Sirraco is vitally dependent on an ore called Xenthoxide. Xenthoxide is essential in the development and manufacturing of many of Sirraco's more technologically advanced products. At this time Zimba is the only "friendly" nation that has a supply of Xenthoxide sufficient to meet Sirraco's needs. Consequently, it is of vital interest to Sirraco to keep the supply of Xenthoxide from Zimba secure. If Sirraco were to lose this source or suffer even a short term disruption they would be dependent on countries which are its political and military enemies for any future supplies. This could destabilize the world balance of power. For the welfare of its people and the security of the nation this is a condition which Sirraco cannot allow under any circumstances.

DEPENDENCY CONDITION #3: Sirracco dependent on Both Thebes and Zimba

The only "fly in the ointment" is that Sirracco is vitally dependent on an ore called Xenthoxide. Xenthoxide is essential in the development and manufacturing of many of Sirracco's more technologically advanced products. At this time Thebes and Zimba are the only "friendly" nations which have a supply of Xenthoxide sufficient to meet Sirracco's needs. Consequently, it is of vital interest to Sirracco to keep the supply of Xenthoxide from Thebes and Zimba secure. If Sirracco were to lose this source or suffer even a short term disruption they would be dependent on countries which are its political and military enemies for any future supplies. This could destabilize the world balance of power. For the welfare of its people and the security of the nation this is a condition which Sirracco cannot allow under any circumstances.

DEPENDENCY CONDITION #4: Sirraco relatively independent

Even though Sirraco has considerable economic investments in both Thebes and Zimba, Sirraco does not depend on either of them for any vital resources or support. The main reason for association is ideological and historical similarities. In other words, they share similar values and a common heritage. Militarily, Sirraco is quite capable of dealing with most, if not all, threats to its security unaided. Sirraco's interest in Thebes and Zimba is based upon long years of friendship.

APPENDIX D
MESSAGES

STRATEGY CONDITION #1: Nonviolence

From: Zimba
TO: Sirraco

Dear Friend:

We turn to you for assistance in time of great national trouble. Our neighbor, Thebes, has exploited our people and our resources for many years. It is time that Zimbans assert their right to fair and just compensation for their labor and their national resources. It is time that the suffering and the humiliation that we have suffered at the hands of our "friends," the Thebans, be ended. It is time that we walk tall, our heads high and with pride in our hearts.

In times past, Thebes arrogantly tapped our wealth that is the source of their prosperity -- illium. We were a poor and underdeveloped nation easily fooled by the promises of prosperity that Thebes offered. We accepted their promises, we trusted them, and we were deluded by them. We soon found ourselves to be little better than puppets in their hands. We do not have mastery over our own fate. The root of all this evil can be found in Thebes' control over our economy through the purchasing of illium. The Thebans steal our illium while claiming that they pay a "fair" price -- a fair price that barely enables us to survive.

While our people struggle and die due to the lack of proper sanitary and health systems; while our people suffer in ignorance due to inadequate education; while our people go hungry due to antiquated and insufficient agricultural techniques--the Thebans live in good health, are well educated and are well fed. And who has paid the price for their well being? The people of Zimba!

The people of Zimba have a right to the pursuit of security, health and future prosperity. The people of Zimba have a right to be free of the domination of others. The people of Zimba have a right to pass on the fruits of their labor to their children. All that the people of Zimba ask is that they be given what is rightly theirs -- a truly fair price based upon their need.

The future of Zimba depends upon the diversification and the development of our economy. Illium is a finite resource. Someday it will be gone and we must be prepared. But we cannot prepare while we lack the freedom and the finances necessary to accomplish our goals. Our goals are not unreasonable nor our demands unfair. All we ask is that Thebes pay us a "fair" price for our illium. If they will do this, then we can achieve our modest goals.

The increase that we ask is not excessive. It represents the barest minimum that we must have if we are to achieve our goals. This increase in revenue is essential if we are to engage in the cautious, careful and responsible program of economic development that Zimba so desperately needs. The increase in income would allow for a gradual rise in the standard of living. It would allow us to provide better health care, education, housing and more food. We have deserved better than we have received at the hands of our neighbor.

Whereas this would mean a great deal to us, its overall impact on Thebes would be minimal. The price we are asking would represent only a 6% overall decrease in income and only a 9% overall increase in costs. This would not seriously impair the economy of Thebes.

If Thebes cannot be persuaded to meet our demands then we are left with little choice. Even though it would mean severe hardship for our people, and inevitable retaliation from Thebes, we will refuse to sell any more illium to Thebes. We will never give in! It is not our wish to inflict injury or harm the innocent people caught in the middle of this struggle, but Thebes must be made to understand the seriousness of our plight and the firmness of our resolve. Under no circumstances will we engage in senseless acts of violence against our neighbor. It is not our way to inflict needless harm on others. It is better that we suffer the hardships that will ensue than to subject the innocent to any more harm than is necessary to dramatize our plight.

Undoubtedly, the hardships will be greater for us than for Thebes, but it is a sacrifice we must make if we are to maintain our own sense of dignity and independence. We have lived long enough under domination and oppression. We will be free! We will be masters of our own destiny, even if that means we are masters only of the way we die.

But there is no need for any to suffer. If Thebes can only be made to realize the justice of our claims, all this can be averted. Dear friend, we ask for your assistance. You can make Thebes listen to our plea. You can convince Thebes to see the right in our cause. You can force Thebes to feel the hunger of our children. Without your aid we will always be little more than slaves. With your aid we can be proud and independent people. Please, do not deny us.

STRATEGY CONDITION #2: Violence

From: Zimba
To: Sirracco

Friend:

We will no longer put up with the extortion and oppression imposed upon us by our neighbor. We intend to teach them a lesson they will never forget. We have a right to defend our lives and our honor, and if you will join with us we can give them a resounding defeat; wrenching our freedom from their blood-stained hands. We will fight this battle on the field of honor, and we will win!

Thebes has exploited our people and our resources for many years. It is time that we fight for what is rightly ours. We have asked Thebes to pay a "fair" price for our illium and they refuse. Now, it is time that we force them to pay fair and just compensation for our labor and our nation's resources. It is time that we treat Thebes to a taste of the suffering and humiliation that we have suffered at their hands.

In times past, Thebes arrogantly tapped our wealth that is the source of their prosperity -- illium. We were a poor and underdeveloped nation, easily fooled by the promises of prosperity which Thebes offered. They lied to us, and for this we hate them. We accepted their promises, we trusted them, and we were betrayed by them. We soon found ourselves to be little better than puppets in their hands. We will be puppets no longer! We will cut the strings that bind us with the sword of wrath. The puppet masters will be made to bleed. They will feel the sting of our fury. They will be taught that we are not animals to be domesticated and trained to jump through hoops.

The root of all this evil can be found in Thebes' control over our economy through the purchasing of illium. The Thebans steal our illium while claiming that they pay a fair price. A fair price?! While our people struggle and die due to the lack of proper sanitary and health systems; while our people go hungry due to antiquated and insufficient agricultural techniques; while our people suffer in ignorance due to inadequate education -- the Thebans live in good health, are well educated and grow fat. And who has payed the price for their well being? The people of Zimba!

The people of Zimba will no longer pay the bill. The people of Zimba have a right to the pursuit of security, health and future prosperity. The people of Zimba have a right to be free of the domination of others. The people of Zimba have a right to pass on the fruits of their labor to

their children. All that the people of Zimba ask is that they be given what is rightly theirs -- a truly fair price based upon their need.

The future of Zimba depends upon the diversification and the development of our economy. Illium is a finite resource. Someday it will be gone and we must be prepared. But we cannot prepare while we lack the freedom and the finances necessary to accomplish our goals. Our goals are not unreasonable nor our demands unfair. All that is asked is that Thebes pay a "fair" price for our illium and they have refused.

The increase that we ask is not excessive. It represents the barest minimum that we must have if we are to achieve our goals. This increase in revenue is essential if we are to engage in the cautious, careful and responsible program of economic development that Zimba so desperately needs. The increase in income would allow for a gradual rise in the standard of living. It would allow us to provide better health care, education, housing and more food. But, we are denied. As we are made to suffer, so shall those who torment us be made to suffer.

Thebes claims that the price we ask is too much; that it would ruin their economy. Absurd! Its overall impact would be minimal. The price asked represents only a 6% overall decrease in income and only a 9% overall increase in costs. This would not seriously impair the economy of Thebes. But they are a callous and greedy lot. Like misers they hoard their wealth, unable to realize that it cannot, should not, be substituted for life and friendship. They are a shriveled and soulless people.

Since Thebes cannot be persuaded to meet our demands, we are left with little choice. Even though it means severe hardship for our people, and inevitable retaliation from Thebes, we will no longer sell illium to Thebes until they give us a fair price. To hasten their decision, we have already mobilized our army and are ready to strike. At this moment, our navy is proceeding to attack and destroy Thebes' harbors. Our fighters have been scrambled to meet any air invasion. They will lose more by refusing our offer than by accepting. Thebes must be made to pay!

We will never give in! Thebes may appear strong, but it is rotten throughout. It will soon crumble from its own decay. But, the new order can be hastened with your help. Together we can deal Thebes such a defeat that it will never again be able to force her will on others. The evil must be rooted out, even if some of the innocent must perish. There is no room in the world for the evil which is known as Thebes.

Thebes must be destroyed, and the more quickly the better. Friend, we ask you to join with us to crush the life from this most insidious evil. With you fighting along side us we will present an invincible front. Together we can rid the world of yet another threat to freedom loving people everywhere. Justice will prevail. Join with us now.

From: Thebes
To: Sirracco

Friend:

You must join with us to crush a most insidious threat to the well being of our people. Our neighbor, Zimba, motivated by greed, is even now engaging in activities which will bring great harm to the stability of the region. Whereas we have always treated Zimba fairly in all our dealings, they have the audacity to make unreasonable and unjust demands of us. They demand that we pay an excessively high price for illium, or they will punish us. This is nothing short of extortion. We are poised to punish them for their affrontery.

As you know, in the past, we have given generously to Zimba so that they could grow and prosper. They were a poor and underdeveloped nation and we took pity on them; providing technological and economic assistance. After all that we have done for them, they now turn against us, claiming that we have exploited them for our own selfish aggrandizement. They have the audacity to claim that we have stolen the future of their nation. NOT SO! Without us they would have no future worth speaking of; without us, they would still be living in stone huts; without us, they would still be savages, little better than wild dogs.

The people of Thebes have been diligent and prosperous; building better lives for ourselves and our children. We have succeeded in building a life that is the envy of many. It is undoubtedly this envy which causes Zimba to make the stupid demands they do. We will not allow the fruits of our labor to be spoiled by the avarice of Zimba. We have a duty to guard the welfare of our people. We will not allow some third rate country to disrupt our society. We will fight to preserve it.

Zimba claims that they lack the funds necessary for development and growth. This is a total absurdity. They have more than enough to allow proper, patient growth. Zimba, like a child, merely lacks patience and like all impatient children they do not want to accept the basic fact of life. Like all unruly children they must be punished when they are wrong so that they will not continue to harm others. Zimba does not have the right to pursue its selfish goals at the expense of others.

The price they ask is grossly unfair. To give in to the demands of Zimba would cause us great hardship and we do not intend to accept it peacefully. The price they ask would represent a 50% increase in the costs of producing trillium; resulting in a loss of \$30,000,000 a month. Losses such as these cannot be considered reasonable and fair. Losses such

as these would have severe repercussions for our economy, our lives and our future.

Since Zimba cannot be persuaded that their demands are unfair, we are left with little choice. Taking direct military and economic action against Zimba will cause us great suffering, but we will not be blackmailed into jeopardizing the future of our people. It is always sad that the innocent must suffer for the sins of others. If Zimba will not sell us illium, then we must take it; and if in doing so they suffer, then so be it. We fully intend to punish them for their crimes.

We will never give in! Already our forces are being marshalled so as to punish Zimba. Our Air Force is poised to strike deep into the heart of our enemy. Our Navy is massing to blockade Zimba's ports. There is no doubt that Zimba will be treated to a resounding defeat. Never again will we allow them to be in a position to harm us, even if that means taking control of their country; a burden we do not relish.

Zimba must be made to suffer, but its suffering can be shortened if it can be made to give up its foolish demands. Friend we ask you to join with us to end this unfounded threat to our nation. With you fighting by our side Zimba would collapse easily. Together we can force Zimba to see the error of its way. With your aid we are assured of an easy victory and the justice of our cause will be affirmed.

APPENDIX E
MEASUREMENT

Index # _____

DEMOGRAPHIC DATA SHEET

Age: _____

Gender: Male _____ Female _____

Student _____ Class Level _____

Nonstudent _____ Occupation _____

Ehtnic Background: _____ Black
(check one) _____ Caucasian
_____ Hispanic
_____ Oriental
_____ Other _____

Religion: _____ Catholic
(check one) _____ Protestant
_____ Moslem
_____ Jewish
_____ Other _____

Political: _____ Democrat _____ Liberal
_____ Republican _____ Moderate
_____ Independent _____ Conservative
(check one) (check one)

Index # _____

SURVEY INSTRUCTIONS:

Now that you have finished your messages, you are asked to fill out a survey concerning your reactions to the conflict situation, your perceptions and your choices. Below you will see a series of statements followed by certain response choices. You are to circle the response choice that best expresses your feelings or beliefs.

EXAMPLE:

The energy crisis in the U.S. is SD D N A SA
very real

SD = strongly disagree N = neutral A = agree
D = disagree SA = strongly agree

If you strongly disagree with this statement, circle the letters SD.

If you agreed with this statement, but not strongly, circle the letter A.

You will find that not all of the questions below pertain to your experience. If you believe a question is not applicable or if you are undecided circle the letter N. If you have any questions please ask. Leave no statement unmarked.

1. Thebes' approach to this whole SD D N A SA
situation could be called
nonviolent.
2. Sirraco's support is the key SD D N A SA
to Zimba's success.
3. Because of Sirraco's dependence SD D N A SA
on Xenthoxide I felt pressured
to support Thebes.
4. My choice of action was SD D N A SA
influenced mostly by
economic considerations.
5. I decided to rely upon SD D N A SA
persuasion as the best means
of achieving a solution.
6. I thought this conflict SD D N A SA
represented a realistic
situation.

- | | | | | | | |
|-----|--|----|---|---|---|----|
| 7. | Zimba's approach to this whole situation could be called nonviolent. | SD | D | N | A | SA |
| 8. | Zimba and Thebes are equal in terms cf power. | SD | D | N | A | SA |
| 9. | Because of Sirraco's dependence on Xenthoxide I felt pressured to support Zimba. | SD | D | N | A | SA |
| 10. | I decided that economic sanctions were the best way to achieve a solution. | SD | D | N | A | SA |
| 11. | My choice of action was influenced mostly by moral considerations. | SD | D | N | A | SA |
| 12. | I haven't the slightest idea as to what this experiment was trying to prove. | SD | D | N | A | SA |
| 13. | Zimba was wrong in making its demands for a price increase. | SD | D | N | A | SA |
| 14. | I thought the tone of Zimba's message was quite hostile. | SD | D | N | A | SA |
| 15. | Sirraco is stronger than Zimba and Thebes combined. | SD | D | N | A | SA |
| 16. | I chose to support Zimba's position against Thebes. | SD | D | N | A | SA |
| 17. | The welfare of my own people was my major concern. | SD | D | N | A | SA |
| 18. | Thebes had dominated and exploited Zimba. | SD | D | N | A | SA |
| 19. | I decided that military action was the best way to achieve a solution. | SD | D | N | A | SA |
| 20. | I found this to be an interesting and involving experience. | SD | D | N | A | SA |
| 21. | I thought the tone of Thebes message was quite hostile. | SD | D | N | A | SA |

22.	Zimba was <u>not</u> justified in making its demands.	SD	D	N	A	SA
23.	My choice of action was influenced by the approach taken by Thebes.	SD	D	N	A	SA
24.	I decided to withdraw investments from Thebes as a method of influencing the outcome.	SD	D	N	A	SA
25.	Given the circumstances, I would expect Zimba to react violently.	SD	D	N	A	SA
26.	I thought Thebes handled the whole situation rather well.	SD	D	N	A	SA
27.	I chose to support Thebes' position against Zimba.	SD	D	N	A	SA
28.	Sirraco's needs in this situation were of paramount importance.	SD	D	N	A	SA
29.	My choice of action was influenced by the approach taken by Zimba.	SD	D	N	A	SA
30.	I decided to withdraw investments from Zimba as a means of influencing the outcome.	SD	D	N	A	SA
31.	I thought Zimba handled the whole situation rather well.	SD	D	N	A	SA
32.	I chose to support some compromise solution.	SD	D	N	A	SA
33.	I thought the price Zimba was originally paid for illium was fair.	SD	D	N	A	SA
34.	I decided to increase investments in Thebes as a means of influencing the outcome.	SD	D	N	A	SA
35.	The full amount Zimba asked for was essential to its future well being.	SD	D	N	A	SA
36.	I thought Thebes' behavior was inappropriate and out of place.	SD	D	N	A	SA

- | | | | | | | |
|-----|--|----|---|---|---|----|
| 37. | I decided from the beginning that Thebes should pay Zimba's price. | SD | D | N | A | SA |
| 38. | I decided to increase investments in Zimba as a means for influencing the outcome. | SD | D | N | A | SA |
| 39. | I thought Zimba's behavior was inappropriate and out of place. | SD | D | N | A | SA |
| 40. | I decided that the best thing for me to do was to stay out of it. | SD | D | N | A | SA |
| 41. | Zimba simply did not need as much money as it claimed. | SD | D | N | A | SA |
| 42. | I realized that compromise could be achieved only if Sirracco "paid" for it. | SD | D | N | A | SA |
| 43. | It was in Sirracco's best interests to <u>impose</u> a solution. | SD | D | N | A | SA |
| 44. | Sirracco could not afford to antagonize the conflicting parties. | SD | D | N | A | SA |
| 45. | For any solution to work, the parties involved must be "happy" with it. | SD | D | N | A | SA |

I chose the position and the course of action I did because:

APPENDIX F
CODING SCHEME

CODING SCHEME

Coding Intervention Direction

Each subject's response will, if possible, be coded according to Sirracco's expressed position on the price of illium.

- Category 1 -- A response is coded as category 1 if Sirracco advocates or supports a price that falls within \$46.00 to \$50.00.
- Category 2 -- A response is coded as category 2 if Sirracco advocates or supports a price that falls within the range of \$35.00 to \$45.00.
- Category 3 -- A response is coded as category 3 if Sirracco advocates or supports a price that falls within the range of \$20.00 to \$34.00.
- Category 4 -- A response is coded as category 4 if Sirracco advocates or supports a price increase but does not specify the amount.
- Category 5 -- A response is coded as category 5 if Sirracco advocates or supports some form of negotiation without specifying a position with regard to the price of illium.
- Category 6 -- A response is coded as category 6 if it is uninterpretable as expressed.

Coding Intervention Means

Each subject's response will, if possible, be coded according to the methods or mechanisms of intervention and influence employed by Sirracco.

- Avoidance A response is coded as avoidance if Sirracco expresses an unwillingness to become involved in the conflict.
- Negotiation A response is coded as negotiation if Sirracco advocates or demands that the conflicting parties meet and discuss their differences, if Sirracco offers to serve as a mediator or arbitrator, or if Sirracco calls for a summit meeting.
- Economic 1 A response is coded as economic 1 if Sirracco promises economic aid to Zimba but not Thebes.

Economic 2	A response is coded as economic 2 if Sirracco promises economic aid to Thebes but not Zimba.
Economic 3	A response is coded as economic 3 if Sirracco promises economic aid to both Zimba and Thebes.
Military	A response is coded as military if Sirracco threatens the use of military action or reprisals.
Miscellaneous	A response is coded miscellaneous if the method of intervention is unclear, missing, or uninterpretable.

Coding Motives

Each subjects response will, if possible, be coded according to the statement used to complete the phrase, "I chose the course of action I did because . . . "

antiviolence	A response is coded as antiviolence if the statement expresses a total rejection of violence as a method of resolving conflict.
pro nonviolence	A response is coded as pro nonviolence if the statement expresses a preference for nonviolent means of conflict management as the only or best way to solve the problem.
pacifist	A response is coded as pacifist if the statement expresses a strong desire to keep the peace, regardless of the cost.
fairness	A response is coded as fairness if the statement expresses a position that places Zimba's needs as paramount and sees Sirracco as acting out of a desire for justice or because of a moral obligation.
self-interest	A response is coded as self-interest if the statement expresses the position that Sirracco's needs, either economic or national security, were most important.
compromise	A response is coded as compromise if the statement expresses the position that compromise is the only or best way to solve conflicts.
miscellaneous	A response is coded as miscellaneous if the statement is uninterpretable or if there is no response.

APPENDIX G
QUESTIONNAIRE CATEGORIES

QUESTIONNAIRE CATEGORIES

Section 1
Direction of Support

- #16 I chose to support Zimba's position against Thebes.
- #27 I chose to support Thebes' position against Zimba.
- #32 I chose to support some compromise solution.

Section 2
The Perceived Legitimacy of Demands

- #13 Zimba was wrong in making its demands for a price increase.
- #22 Zimba was not justified in making its demands.
- #33 I thought the price Zimba was originally paid for illium was fair.
- #35 The full amount Zimba asked for was essential to its future well being.
- #41 Zimba simply did not need as much money as it claimed.

Section 3
The Perceived Legitimacy of Strategy

- #26 I thought Thebes handled the whole situation rather well.
- #31 I thought Zimba handled the whole situation rather well.
- #36 I thought Thebes' behavior was inappropriate and out of place.
- #39 I thought Zimba's behavior was inappropriate and out of place.

Section 4
Intervention Methods

- #5 I decided to rely upon persuasion as the best means of achieving a solution.
- #10 I decided that economic sanctions were the best way to achieve a solution.

- #19 I decided that military action was the best way to achieve a solution.
- #24 I decided to withdraw investments from Thebes as a method of influencing the outcome.
- #30 I decided to withdraw investments from Zimba as a means of influencing the outcome.
- #34 I decided to increase investments in Thebes as a means of influencing the outcome.
- #38 I decided to increase investments in Zimba as a means of influencing the outcome.
- #40 I decided the best thing for me to do was to stay out of it.

Section 5
Motives

a. The perceived impact of strategy on support.

- #11 My choice of action was influenced mostly by moral considerations.
- #23 My choice of action was influenced by the approach taken by Thebes.
- #29 My choice of action was influenced by the approach taken by Zimba.

b. The perceived impact of dependence on support.

- #3 Because of SIRRACO's dependence on xenthoxide I felt pressured to support Thebes.
- #9 Because of SIRRACO's dependence on xenthoxide I felt pressured to support Zimba.
- #4 My choice of action was influenced mostly by economic considerations.
- #17 The welfare of my own people was my major concern.
- #28 SIRRACO's needs in this situation were of paramount importance.
- #44 SIRRACO could not afford to antagonize the conflicting parties.

Section 6
Manipulation Checks

a. Strategy

- #1 Thebes' approach to this whole situation could be called nonviolent.
- #7 Zimba's approach to this whole situation could be called nonviolent.
- #14 I thought the tone of Zimba's message was quite hostile.
- #21 I thought the tone of Thebes' message was quite hostile.

b. Expectations

- #25 Given the circumstances, I would expect Zimba to react violently.

c. Power Relationships

- #2 Sirraco's support is the key to Zimba's success.
- #8 Zimba and Thebes are equal in terms of power.
- #15 Sirraco is stronger than Zimba and Thebes combined.
- #18 Thebes has dominated and exploited Zimba.

d. Realism

- #6 I thought this conflict represented a realistic situation.

e. Interest

- #20 I found this to be an interesting and involving experience.

f. Demand Characteristics

- #12 I haven't the slightest ideas as to what this experiment is trying to prove.
- #37 I decided from the very beginning that Thebes should pay Zimba's price.

APPENDIX H
DEMOGRAPHIC DATA

DEMOGRAPHIC DATA

<u>Age</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>Gender</u>	<u>Class Level</u>	<u>Party Affiliation</u>
16-20	48	Male 44	Fresh 31	Demo 29
21-25	49	Female 72	Soph 24	Repub 22
26-30	11	<u>116</u>	Jr 21	Independ 51
31-35	3		Sr 27	Other 14
36-40	3		Other 13	<u>116</u>
41-45	1		<u>116</u>	
mean = 22.2		<u>Ethnic Group</u>	<u>Religion</u>	<u>Political Ident</u>
		Black 17	Catholic 23	Liberal 35
		Caucasian 90	Protest. 61	Moderate 48
		Hispanic 2	Other 32	Conserv. 7
		Oriental 3	<u>116</u>	Other 26
		Other 4		<u>116</u>
		<u>116</u>		