SAM HOUSTON AND THE INDIANS:
A RHETORICAL STUDY OF THE
MAN AND THE MYTH

by

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B. A., Goshen College, 1963
M. A., University of Kansas, 1965

Submitted to the Department
of Speech and Drama and the
Faculty of the Graduate
School of the University of
Kansas in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the
degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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GRACIE AND AL
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to acknowledge my indebtedness to Professor Wil Linkugel, the advisor of this study, and to Professor Donn Parson. Their criticism, encouragement, and perseverance were very much appreciated and most helpful. Likewise, the study was improved by the suggestions of Professor David Berg.

Dr. Llerena Friend, Barker Historical Library, University of Texas, contributed much to my appreciation of "Ole Sam." The study benefited in many ways because of her resourcefulness. The following people were also most helpful: Mrs. Helen Rugeley, Austin, Texas; Mr. Robert M. Land and Mr. Roy P. Basler, Library of Congress; Mr. G. P. Edwards and Mrs. Marie E. Keene, Gilcrease Institute, Tulsa, Oklahoma; Mr. Mark G. Eckhoff, National Archives and Records Service; Mrs. Anna Rundall, Chatham, New York; Mrs. Eugenia Learned James, St. Louis; Mrs. Alice C. Dalligan, Detroit Public Library; and Dr. Arthur Fish, Stevens Point, Wisconsin.

My colleagues in the Communication Department at Wisconsin State University, Stevens Point, Wisconsin, were understanding and helpful. I am especially indebted to Dr. Elizabeth Kyes and Mr. Fred J. Kauffeld -- for listening; to Mr. Richard Rogers and Dr. James D. Moe -- for their persistent inquiry and reading of the text; and to Dr. Albert J. Croft -- for believing.

Finally, I wish to acknowledge the assistance of: Dr. David Yoder -- for lending; Dr. Monica Bainter and Professor Irene Gray -- for proof-reading; and Gracie, my wife,-- for her devotion and understanding.
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Romantic and many-sided Houston! No accurate conception of the man can be obtained until it is known in the beginning that he was shot through with romanticism -- the most intense, extraordinary, overwhelming -- and with it, that rarely accompanying egoism of achievement.

SAM HOUSTON AND THE INDIANS:
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MAN AND THE MYTH

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

When the Sam Houston Commemorative Stamp was issued in January of 1964, the First Day of Sale ceremonies included a speech of tribute by Senator Ralph Yarborough.¹ Houston, Senator Yarborough proclaimed,

... was no mere politician, bending with the winds of change. He fought a bitter, lonely, unpopular, losing fight for justice for the American Indian. He fought a bitter, lonely, unpopular, losing fight in Texas against secession and disunion. And when he lost, they stoned and jeered him in the streets of the capital for [sic] the Republic he created. In all these fights, he was a true statesman, his positions were just and history gives him a halo for fairness, justice and governmental wisdom, while the men who defeated and jeered him then, are forgotten now.²

In the opinion of Senator Herman Talmadge, Sam Houston is "the greatest, most typically American figure in American history."³

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¹ The Houston stamp was scheduled for issuance in November of 1963 to commemorate the 100th anniversary of Houston's death (July 26, 1863). After the assassination of President Kennedy the Post Office Department deemed the stamp inappropriate because of the rifle Houston carried.


³ Ibid., p. 2. The statement attributed to Talmadge is quoted without mention of authorship. In a letter to the author (April 22, 1968), Yarborough identifies Talmadge as the source.
While these remarks are typical of the overstatement found in a speech of tribute, they provide an indication of the popular heroic image of Houston today. Indeed, one could argue that a speech, such as that delivered by Senator Yarborough, must present the popular beliefs of the audience. The question comes unbidden: upon what basis does history give him a "halo" and how accurate is the resultant image?

A perusal of the major Houston biographies reveals a blending of two distinct heroic images: on the one hand, biographers depict Houston as a folk hero, possessing the romantic qualities of a Davy Crockett. This image, however, soon transcends into a political and military leader of serious national stature -- a man characterized as having the toughness, stamina, and strength of Andrew Jackson. Through this mixture of heroic types Houston becomes "the greatest" and "the most typical American." With the exception of Llerena Friend's Sam Houston: The Great Designer, biographies seldom answer our question; if anything, they account for it. Houston's role in the national arena is well documented. Except in early partisan diatribes, Houston is credited for his leadership at the Battle of San Jacinto, for his political acuity in the fight for Texas annexation, for the prophetic stands he took as the only Southern Democrat to

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4 W. Rhys Roberts, trans., Aristotle's Rhetoric (New York, 1954), p. 128. Aristotle notes that in a speech of tribute, the "onlookers for whom such a speech is put together are treated as judges of it."
vote against the Kansas-Nebraska Act, and for abdicating the Governorship of Texas, rather than take the Confederate oath.

Houston as a politician and statesman finds justification in both his words and deeds. It was on this basis that President Kennedy included Houston in Profiles in Courage. However, when examined in terms of these courageous acts, Houston is stripped of his character; it is as a folk hero that he achieves personal warmth. In this capacity Houston becomes "the personification of much of the romantic in American history. Everybody is acquainted with the 'buckskin hero from Tennessee.'"  

A strong attraction to Sam Houston as a folk hero has led to misinterpretations of Houston, and, in particular, his rhetoric. The numerous remarks that Houston made in defense of the American Indian, the newspaper articles that he wrote while in exile, and the speeches that he sent to various Indian chiefs are an important basis for contemporary representations of Houston as the folk hero. The explanation is fairly simple: because of Houston's interludes with the Cherokees (twice during his lifetime Houston felt sufficiently alienated from white society to withdraw from it and live with the Indians), he could identify with the Indians. Since he understood their ways, he became a spokesman


in their defense; but, these primitive interludes have further ramifications.

According to Professor Albert Castel, Houston "acquired an Indian-like penchant for using subtle, secretive methods in achieving his ends." In *Sam Houston with the Cherokees*, Gregory and Strickland observe:

Many of Houston's basic attitudes -- attitudes reflected in his policies as President of the Republic of Texas, United States senator, and governor of Texas -- were formulated during these "missing years." Statements from the Cherokee period are re-echoed in public statements and speeches throughout his Texas career. Charles Edwards Lester, Houston's first biographer, concluded that "his early life among the Indians, was, as the event proved, a necessary portion of that training that fitted him for his strange destiny."

The formula is clear. The American Indian gave birth to the folk hero in Houston's rhetoric. When biographers and historians read Houston's words, they brought to that reading an understanding of Houston's attitude toward the Indian, and, of course, with that expectation were able to

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reaffirm it. This study challenges such an assumption and reverses the process, beginning the inquiry with an examination of Houston's rhetoric.

Eugene C. Barker initiated such a reversal by challenging Houston's "Indian rhetoric." Although Barker felt that Houston "spoke eloquently about Indians," he also doubted Houston's "complete sincerity." In his judgment, the talks that Houston wrote to the Indians, while President of Texas, "leave . . . one with the impression that he wrote them with tongue in cheek." While Barker raises questions that escaped previous authors, he does not provide any answers. However, his "impressions" suggest that an inquiry into Houston's motives must begin with a re-examination of Houston's rhetoric. The major objective of this study is to construct a more viable and less construed image of Sam Houston. The rhetorical critic is perhaps best equipped to handle the sort of reversal alluded to earlier.

In Rhetorical Criticism: A Study in Method, Edwin Black notes that criticism investigates and appraises "the activities and products" of other men, seeking in the end "the understanding of man himself." Rhetorical criticism assumes

10 Eugene C. Barker, "Impressions Suggested by the Writings of Sam Houston," unpublished manuscript, Barker Historical Library, University of Texas, Austin, Texas, p. 13.

11 Ibid., p. 9.

that there will be a correspondence among the intentions of a communicator, the characteristics of his discourse, and the reactions of his auditors to that discourse. The postulate is justified by the fact that to deny it is to deny the possibility of language, as we ordinarily understand that term.\footnote{Edwin Black, Rhetorical Criticism: A Study in Method (New York, 1965), p. 16.}

Language functions in at least two ways: as a reference and as an expression.\footnote{Roger Brown, Words and Things (New York, 1958), pp. 307-315.} A man's speech is simultaneously referential and expressive, since language always refers to something and also tells us something about the communicator.

The word apple refers to apples and expresses membership of the speaker in the class of people who speak English. \ldots The lady who tells me that our friends are heading for divorce, also, inadvertently, tells me that she herself is a gossip and can be expected to pass on anything I may say.\footnote{Ibid., p. 307.}

In the instance of the lady gossiper, Roger Brown interprets the expression as a symptom, since he treats the language as a sign of something not intended by the speaker. If a confirmation of this inference can be found in the actions of the speaker, reasonable assurance exists for the accuracy of the appraisal. "Freudian interpretations are excellent examples of the use of language and behavior as a set of expressive symptoms."\footnote{Ibid., p. 313.}

For the rhetorical critic the essays of Kenneth Burke
provide perhaps the most insight as to how to interpret lan-
guage as expressive symptoms. Although Burke prefers to en-
title his approach in such a phrase as "language as symbolic action," his primary interest is almost synonymous with
Brown's -- the derivation of motives (Brown uses the term
"intentions") from man's use of symbols.

Kenneth Burke describes his approach as a way "to con-
sider the matter of motives in a perspective that, being de-
veloped from the analysis of drama, treats language and
thought primarily as modes of action."17 "Thus," Robert
Cathcart concludes,

all criticism, if it is to be meaningful, must
interpret the verbal inducements of men as moti-
vated acts in this social drama. It is through
language that man induces cooperation and under-
standing, and therefore action, in an otherwise
divisive world. Burke claims that viewing lan-
guage in this manner would bring within the scope
of rhetoric any and all symbolic resources that
function to promote social cohesion, and all sym-

tibilic resources that induce attitude or action.

"Dramatism," Burke contends, as an approach to
the human situation "linguistically," in terms of symbolic action, fulfills its purposes only
in so far as it makes methodical the attitude
of patience. The "dramatic" may thunder. It
should. The "dramatistic," in a commingling of
techniques and hypochondriasis, will "appreciate"

17 Kenneth Burke, A Grammar of Motives and a Rhetoric
of Motives (Cleveland, 1962), p. xxiv.

18 Robert Cathcart, Post Communication: Critical
man's ways of thundering. 19

The critic begins by determining the "equations" operative within the text. "The first step... requires us to get our equations inductively, by tracing down the interrelationships as revealed by the objective structure." 20 By "equations" Burke has in mind the "dramatic alignments" within the discourse. The task is one of noting: "what is vs. what." 21

Obviously, such alignments move into the category of sheer psychology insofar as the equations embodied in a text resemble those of the speaker's mind, regardless of the text. Yet I grant: As we move from the text (the act) to the speaker (the agent), we cannot postulate an absolute identity.

One can never be wholly sure whether a speaker equates some particular act with heroism, cowardice, etc. because that's how he really sees things, or whether he is using the given equation simply for effect. To that extent, the nature of a work's equations cannot be uncritically taken as identical with the "psychic economy" of the author's mind, though personal letters, biographical data, and similar expressions in quite dissimilar circumstances can appreciably increase the plausibility of such inferences.

But, in any case, right there in front of us, on the record of the work itself, there are equations that should be looked at. 22


21 Ibid., p. 58.

The study of "equations," Burke argues,

is a way of yielding without demoralization. One cannot know in advance what the "equations" are to be (what "hero" is to equal, what "villain" is to equal, what "wisdom" is to equal, etc.) Yet in one's search for such "equations," which the author himself spontaneously exemplified rather than upheld as conscious doctrine, one is guided by method. Accordingly, such analysis is no mere surrender, though it does set up a preparatory stage in which one wholly "yields" to the text.\(^2^3\)

The equations reveal the speaker's strategy for winning over the audience. If the speaker hopes to persuade, he must set forth equations "with which his audience as a whole can 'identify.'"\(^2^4\) It is necessary to derive the equations in order to find the pattern of identification. The "overlap" between the equations and identification amounts to this:

If a speaker individually equates "reason" with "authority," his audience can "identify with" him and his persuasion only insofar as they share the same equation. On the other hand, both the speaker and his audience may equate "reason" with distrust of authority. And his speech may be effective at a time when that equation is vigorously on the rise.\(^2^5\)

The rhetorical critic, then, will properly focus on how a speaker achieved or failed to achieve identification with his audience. "Identification" is the key term in Burke's

\(^{2^3}\) Kenneth Burke, "Linguistic Approach to Education," p. 270. The italics are Burke's.

\(^{2^4}\) Kenneth Burke, "Comments," Western Speech, p. 181.

\(^{2^5}\) Ibid., p. 181.
rhetorical theory, because it is by identifying with one another (becoming consubstantial) that men achieve unity. Indeed, it seems likely that Burke chose drama to represent what men do with symbols because drama portrays men in conflict. When Burke looks at men, he sees conflict -- drama, the Scramble of the human barnyard. The existence of rhetoric hinges upon the division between men.

Identification is affirmed with earnestness precisely because there is division. Identification is compensatory to division. If men were not apart from one another, there would be no need for the rhetorician to proclaim their unity. If men were wholly and truly of one substance, absolute communication would be of man's very essence. It would not be an ideal, as it now is, partly embodied in material conditions, and partly frustrated by these same conditions.26

Burke's emphasis on identification separates his theory from the so-called "old" rhetoric.

If I had to sum up in one word the difference between the "old" rhetoric and a "new" (a rhetoric reinvigorated by fresh insights which the "new Sciences" contributed to the subject), I would reduce it to this: The key term for the old rhetoric was "persuasion" and its stress was upon deliberate design. The key term for the "new" rhetoric would be "identification," which can include a partially "unconscious" factor in appeal.27

Men compete with one another and the groups they join are the groups they can identify with. Unity is achieved by


formal appeals (distinct from "purely formal" or stylistic considerations) and these appeals can be classified in their "partisan aspects." So Burke would have us consider "the ways in which individuals are at odds with one another, or become identified with groups more or less at odds with one another." Some of the means of identification recur so often that they can be considered universal (differing only in their "individualizations").

For example, the scapegoat is so prevalent that it is a conventional way of achieving unity. In his essay, "The Rhetoric of Hitler's Battle," Burke derives equations (what goes with what) to demonstrate that Hitler's rhetoric was a "bastardization of fundamentally religious patterns of thought." The Jew became an "international devil materialized." The hypothesis is that Hitler found an enemy that would unite the German people -- an enemy that became in the Hitler rhetoric "partly embodied in material conditions," for a people "partly frustrated by these same conditions." Burke's critical commentary on the Hitler rhetoric is a rather substantial listing of the intracacies of identification in

29 Ibid., p. 546.
30 Kenneth Burke, The Philosophy of Literary Form, pp. 167, 188.
Mein Kampf. The object here is merely to illustrate the Burkeian approach. 32

The critical assumptions of this study are in basic agreement with Burke's notions of human essence. It is not necessary to superimpose Burke's system upon Houston's discourse -- in a sense only Burke could do that anyway. It is possible, however, to examine problems from a Burkeian perspective and, hopefully, with the common objective: to be able to generalize about human action by studying "individualizations."

In an essay entitled "The Rhetorical Situation," Lloyd F. Bitzer argues that the situation is so controlling "that we should consider it the very ground of rhetorical activity." 33 Accordingly, Bitzer defines the rhetorical situation and postulates three constituents.

Rhetorical situation may be defined as a complex of persons, events, objects, and relations presenting an actual or potential exigence which can be completely or partially removed if discourse, introduced into the situation, can so constrain human decision or action as to bring about the

32 I am indebted to a number of articles and studies that facilitated my appreciation of Kenneth Burke. All of these are cited in the bibliography, but three proved especially beneficial: Thomas Francis Mader, "Coriolanus and God: A Burkeian View of William Buckley" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Northwestern University, 1966); Donald Walter Parson, "The Rhetoric of Isolation: A Burkeian Analysis of the America First Committee" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Minnesota, 1964); William H. Rueckert, Kenneth Burke and the Drama of Human Relations (Minneapolis, 1963).

significant modification of the exigence. Prior to the creation and presentation of discourse, there are three constituents of any rhetorical situation: the first is the exigence; the second and third are elements of the complex, namely the audience to be constrained in decision and action, and the constraints which influence the rhetor and can be brought to bear upon the audience.34

Bitzer's observations provide the basis for classifying Houston's rhetoric into meaningful entities for criticism. When examined in total, Houston's rhetoric responds to three generally different situations. Consequently, as a result of different situational contexts, it is convenient to focus on Houston's rhetoric as "parcels" -- in terms of the situation addressed.

There is no study, to my knowledge, that attempts to resolve the issues raised above. As noted, Barker acknowledges his hesitancy to accept Houston's references to the Indian.35 At the conclusion of *Sam Houston: The Great Designer*, Llerena Friend asked the "yet unanswered question" posed once before by E.H. Cushing: "What were the springs of action in his mind?"36 Houston's speeches have been studied before, but never from the perspective of motive. Harold C. Marsh examined Houston's Senate speeches by applying the classical canons of rhetoric. The speeches were then evaluated by citing

34 Bitzer, p. 6.

35 Barker, unpublished manuscript, pp. 9, 13.

36 Friend, p. 353.
contemporary accounts of Houston's effectiveness. A dissertation by Yetta G. Mitchell examined all of Houston's oratory. Mitchell's study proposed "to evaluate Sam Houston's oratory, to point out his techniques, to interpret the sources and quality of his materials, to discuss his methods of public speaking, and to analyze the effect of his speeches upon the audience." A lengthy biographical account preceded a description of Houston's speeches and eight "subject matter headings" were derived from them. To evaluate his speeches, various postulates were advanced as reasons for the intentional omission of Houston's speeches from 19th century collections of "masterpieces." Mitchell concluded that Houston's speeches "fall short" when measured by the "literary standards for masterpieces of American oratory."

Lorayne M. Doegey did her master's and doctor's theses on Sam Houston. In the master's thesis, "The Ethos of Sam Houston," Doegey set out to apply Aristotle's discussion of this form of proof to an analysis of Houston's use of ethos


38 Yetta G. Mitchell, "An Evaluation of Sam Houston's Oratory" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Southern California, 1945), p. 4. Although Mitchell notes that Lester is to be the major source, the biographical sketch resembles Creel's Sam Houston: Colossus in Buckskin.

39 Ibid., p. 348.
in his speeches, but in the main she relied upon biographical accounts to assess Houston's character, sagacity and good will. "Houston was keenly aware of the power of ethos," she concluded. "Having been endowed with a thorough knowledge of human nature, and more important, an ability to use this knowledge, he assiduously strove to develop and reinforce his ethos." ⁴⁰

Doegey's doctoral dissertation employed the "Tensions-Freedom concept of rhetorical criticism" to an analysis of Houston's pro-union speeches. This concept, she writes, is based upon certain assumptions. Persuasion occurs in terms of tensions. When individuals are confronted with a choice or when a course of action is impeded or stopped, pressures build, individuals coalesce into groups, and group tensions become the source of persuasion. Issues are merely verbalized tensions, and these tensions are created, directed, or reduced through persuasion. In this system, a study of tensions is vital for tensions are the source of persuasion.

In a political system, the kind of autonomy granted the individual is the index of the freedom of the system. The political structure of our society is democratic, and the end of democracy is freedom. But whenever men live together, there must be a compromise between freedom and order; in a democracy, the goal is the maximum of freedom with the minimum of restraint. In attempting to maintain the balance between freedom and authority, tensions arise. When a choice becomes necessary, however, we must always move in the direction of the will of the majority. Politics is the written code of a society, but there is also an unwritten code that is prescriptive.

ethics. The ethics of a society may circumscribe behavior as surely as the politics of a society.\textsuperscript{41}

After providing a biographical sketch of Houston, Doegey examined several of Houston's pro-union speeches in terms of this theory, judging "effectiveness" according to Houston's ability to "assess the tensions of the audience" and "worth" according to "the ethics and politics of the society, in terms of social consequences." Over-all, the study does not contribute to a fuller understanding of Houston. The "Tensions-Freedom" concept is at best a vague notion and when imposed upon "selected" speeches it provides little insight into the "essence" of Houston's rhetorical efforts to save the Union.

Rufus Jefferson Banks wrote a descriptive thesis on the Houston image as presented in works of fiction. While Banks' study is impressive in terms of the materials assembled, it lacks sufficient evaluation or even comparison of the fictional Houston portrait.\textsuperscript{42} Bobbie Marie Morrow analyzed two of Houston's Senate speeches from the perspective of invention, organization, and style.\textsuperscript{43}

\textsuperscript{41} Lorayne M. Doegey, "Sam Houston: Southern Spokesman for the Cause of Union" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Southern Illinois University, 1968), pp. 7-8.

\textsuperscript{42} Rufus Jefferson Banks, "Sam Houston in Fiction" (M.A. Thesis, Baylor University, 1956).

\textsuperscript{43} Bobbie Marie Morrow, "A Rhetorical Analysis of Two Speeches Delivered in 1854 and 1858 by Samuel Houston in Congress During the Period Immediately Preceding the Secession
Lawrence L. Dorsett examined Houston's use of invention in a speech delivered in 1860. He described Houston's use of invention in terms of the criteria set forth by Thonssen and Baird. 44

Patricia Brown did a comparative study of Houston, Crittenden, and Botts "as Southern humorists." 45

The speeches that Houston wrote to various Indian chiefs are analyzed in my master's thesis. 46 Second thoughts about that study led to questions responsible for the current investigation. In addition to the research cited above, there are a number of unpublished historical studies that have been helpful in acquiring a perspective of Houston's times. 47

The Writings of Sam Houston, edited by Williams and Barker, constitutes the major source for the texts of Houston's speeches. 48 That work is the only collection of Houston's

44 Lawrence Lee Dorsett, "A Rhetorical Analysis of Sam Houston's Use of Invention as Revealed in his Speech at the Union Mass Meeting, Austin, Texas, September 22, 1860" (M.A. Thesis, University of Houston, 1965).


46 William C. Davidson, "The Indian Rhetoric of Sam Houston" (M.A. Thesis, University of Kansas, 1965).

47 The unpublished manuscripts are cited in the bibliography.

48 Amelia W. Williams and Eugene C. Barker, eds. The Writings of Sam Houston (Austin, 1938-1943).
speeches and letters available in print. Whenever possible, the editors' accuracy has been established by an examination of the original source. Other sources for Houston's writings have included: the unpublished correspondence in the Houston Collection at the University of Texas, the Library of Congress, and the executive documents of Houston's presidency at the Texas State Archives, Austin, Texas.49

Since the object of this study is to offer a reassessment of Houston, numerous other sources play an important role. The reaction that Houston received, for example, is helpful to an understanding of the context of the situation and to a fuller understanding of what prompted Houston to take the position he occupied. Various Congressional journals (of the Republic of Texas and of the United States) have been most helpful to acquiring a full perspective of the man. Likewise, the House and Senate records of committee hearings offer basic data and insight into the subtleties of Houston's interaction and the complexities of his mind. Such

49 See: Sam Houston Papers, Library of Congress, microfilm; Sam Houston Unpublished Correspondence, twelve typescript volumes (copies of scattered original letters), Archives Collection, University of Texas Library; Executive Record Book, Texas State Archives, Texas State Library, Austin, Texas. There are various private collections of Houston's correspondence; see: Barker, unpublished manuscript, pp. 2-5. Of the collections enumerated therein, I have been successful in obtaining access to that of Mr. W. A. Philpott, Dallas, Texas; his collection is thought to be the largest single private collection available. Other collectors, in particular the descendents of John Houston (Sam Houston's cousin), were unreceptive.
documents serve as primary sources and are a major asset to the argument advanced because they have been largely ignored in previous interpretations.50

Of course, the Houston biographies are themselves an important set of "documents," for they reveal the evolution of a myth. The authors merit careful study; indeed, Houston's first biographer, Charles Edwards Lester, is particularly crucial to understanding the legend. Consequently, his correspondence was examined and, to whatever extent possible, the study sought additional information on the other authors as well.51

The records of the Bureau of Indian Affairs also proved to be a valuable source, especially for assembling data on Houston's term as a sub-agent to the Cherokees (1818) and his activities while in "exile" (1829-1832).52 During his "exile," Houston wrote four newspaper articles -- criticizing the

50 See: Register of Debates in Congress, Journal of the House of Representatives of the Republic of Texas, and The Congressional Globe, for the years that Houston served in those respective bodies. Also note the House and Senate documents cited in the bibliography.

51 Lester's personal correspondence is located in the Sylvester Larned Papers, Burton Historical Collection, Detroit Public Library, Detroit, Michigan.

alleged corruption of government agents. The replies that appeared in *The Arkansas Gazette* were another source that helped to account for the vindictiveness of Houston's pen.53

Finally, since the study continually seeks to reflect upon the "reality" of Houston's relationship to the Indians, numerous sources are brought into account to establish not only basic data about the Indians, but also about what the Indian symbolized to most Americans of Houston's time. There is a wealth of material available about the various tribes that Houston was associated with.54 And, various literary historians of the 20th century provide a critical interpretation of the symbolic importance of the Indian in the mind of the 19th century American.55

Even though a study is as comprehensive as possible -- in terms of assembling all the relevant data -- there remain certain limitations. It is the critic's task to make every possible effort to cope with them. As Burke warned, one cannot "uncritically" accept initial findings. Interpretation is


54 These range from bulletins published by the Bureau of Ethnology to chronicles of that period. For a complete listing, see the bibliography.

continuously subject to an ever widening range of factors to which one must by necessity be sensitive. "Any research method," says Ordean G. Ness,

has its limitations and its advantages. The historian is limited by a lack of precision in measuring causations and probabilities. He is limited by the existence of his own scheme of values, even though he successfully represses it. He is limited by the realization that the results he observes are always subject to reinterpretation within descriptive contexts that are broader in scope.56

Even though a study cannot "escape purposiveness," Lionel Trilling maintains that it need not try, since

in pursuing our purpose, in making our abstractions, we must be aware of what we are doing; we ought to have it fully in mind that our abstraction is not perfectly equivalent to the infinite complication of events from which we have abstracted.57

The "purposiveness" of this study has been acknowledged; hopefully, the following analysis is sufficiently responsible to the past to deem credible an interpretation of its meaning. A precis of the argument developed in each chapter follows.

Prior to any criticism of the Houston rhetoric, it is necessary to critically appraise the Houston biographies so as to verify and define the characteristics of the folk hero. Chapter II, "Lester and the Legend," traces the emergence of


the folk hero to Houston's first biographer, Charles Edwards Lester. The literary talents of Lester find their parallel in other 19th century biographers, such as Parson Weems and William Wirt. The method of the second chapter is that of the historian-detective who seeks to "sift the golden grain of truth from the chaff of myth." By an internal criticism of the text -- a criticism that scrutinizes the content and tone of Lester's pen, the folk hero is exposed. Relevant materials external to the text are also included whenever available. Finally, the second chapter illustrates how the folk hero emanates in the 20th century biographies owing its origin to Lester. Later biographies borrow Lester's content and method, thereby using Houston's words as oral expressions of the folk hero. In this survey of Houston biography, the popular image of Houston is found to be wanting, because as Boulding once noted, all too often the historian/biographer provides "what he believes are correct images of the past from an extremely imperfect sample of recorded data." The object of Chapter II is, as Hockett once put it, "to gather a body of ascertained facts which, properly presented, will clarify our understanding of the


past and its significance for the present." 60

After revealing the folk hero, the inquiry proceeds to the larger question of this thesis: the rendering of a more accurate interpretation of Houston's rhetoric. Chapter III, "The Alienated Hero," offers a critical appraisal and interpretation of Houston's rhetoric while an "exile" among the Cherokees. Houston's "exile" was the chaotic finale of a mistaken marriage -- a marriage that (after two months) ended in separation. 61 This personal tragedy accounted for Houston's resignation of the Governorship of Tennessee. For the next three years (1829-1832), he lived with the Cherokees in what was then referred to as Arkansas Territory. Under the pseudonyms of "Standing Bear" and "Tah-Lohn-Tus-Ky," Houston wrote five articles for the Arkansas Gazette. 62 These articles, plus a few personal letters, attack the alleged corruption in the United States Government's handling of Indian affairs -- particularly the peccant and malign actions of some agents. Day and Ullom, editors of The Autobiography


61 Houston's separation prompted a great deal of speculation and the mystery of it is as clouded today as it was in 1829. Wisehart provides a reasonable interpretation. See: Marion Karl Wisehart, Sam Houston: American Giant (New York, 1962), pp. 38-50. Llerena Friend relates all that is actually "known" in one paragraph. See: Friend, pp. 19-20.

of Sam Houston, maintain that these articles "form a definite part of the 'reliable' story of what happened to the Indian." That assertion is shown to be erroneous in Chapter III, which argues that Houston's rhetoric during this period must be viewed as a symbolic act of cleansing and purification. Moreover, this pattern is somewhat typical of the alienated man: the political outcast attempts to expose men in power and in so doing identifies common weaknesses. The chapter concludes with a critical interpretation of how Houston redeemed himself in a speech of self-defense before the House of Representatives.

Chapter IV, "The Rhetoric of Salvation and Courtship," examines Houston's rhetoric concerning the Indians while President of the Republic of Texas (1836-1838 and 1841-1844). After securing its independence (1836), Texas faced the almost insurmountable task of nation building. Among the numerous obstacles: the influx of white immigrants (and land speculation), the ever present rumor of a Mexican conspiracy, and the fear of Indian reprisals. During his two terms as President, Houston wrote more than thirty


64 The importance of these "obstacles" can be found in: Joseph Milton Nance, After San Jacinto: The Texas-Mexican Frontier, 1836-1841 (Austin, 1963); W.W. Newcomb, Jr., The Indians of Texas (Austin, 1961); Stanley Siegel, A Political History of the Texas Republic, 1836-1845 (Austin, 1956); Henderson Yoakum, History of Texas (New York, 1856).
speeches to various Indian chiefs. These speeches, along with Houston's defense of his Indian policy, constitute the basis of criticism in Chapter IV.

It is argued that his talks to the Indians are essentially a form of the rhetoric of "courtship," inasmuch as they were primarily calculated to maintain "law and order." Furthermore, Houston's speeches defending his Indian policy are viewed as the rhetoric of salvation, since Houston's principal concern was saving himself.

When Texas became a state (1846), Houston became a U.S. Senator. For the next thirteen years he often spoke about the Indians. As Barker noted, "Hardly any subject was too remote to prevent him from dragging in the Indians when he wanted to make a speech." The Senatorial speeches are the subject matter of Chapter V, "Inborn Dignity: An Appeal For the Preservation and Expansion of the Union." National expansion and national preservation are shown to be the contingency of Houston's defense. In many instances the

65 These speeches are scattered throughout the first three volumes of The Writings of Sam Houston.

66 The occasional addresses referred to include: the only extant account of Houston's discourse at an Indian council meeting and Houston's defense of the Cherokee Land Bill. See: Dorman H. Winfrey, ed., Texas Indian Papers (Austin, 1960), vol. II, pp. 103-119; Writings, vol. II, pp. 317-347.


68 The texts of these speeches are available in volumes IV, V, VI, and VII of The Writings of Sam Houston.
Indians were a diversionary ploy enabling Houston to find the room he needed to maneuver rhetorically. "Dragging in the Indians" became a tactic for postponing serious national division which he felt could be momentarily avoided and perhaps eventually resolved without civil war.

In Chapter VI, "The Impersonation of Mythical 'Sam,'" the conclusions drawn from previous chapters serve as the basis for taking issue with the folk hero found in biographical and historical accounts of Houston. By examining history and biography through the eye of a rhetorical critic, this study seeks to understand why Houston's rhetoric was so easily prey to misinterpretation. Too often these accounts overshadow the influence of the Indian and ignore that Houston was born on a Virginia plantation; too often they fail to recognize what it meant to be the political protégé of Andrew Jackson; too often they overlook Houston's commitment to expansionism.

69 The idea for this approach stems from: David Levin, In Defense of Historical Literature (New York, 1967).
We hope the day may come when our young authors will stop writing and dreaming about European castles, with their crazy knights and lady-loves... and set themselves to work to glean the unwritten legends of heroism and adventure, which the old men would tell them, who are now smoking their pipes around the rooftrees of Kentucky and Tennessee.

CHAPTER II

LESTER AND THE LEGEND

The adventurous story of life on the American frontier of the 19th century is a favorite among Americans of the 20th century. Its appeal is so compelling that some observers consider the settlement of the West as the American epic.¹ Emigration, conflict, and hardship become a catalyst, according to Arthur K. Moore, for "a heroic age, heroes, and subsequently heroic literature, provided that the emigrants while breaking decisively with the main body of the race yet preserve their identity and meet the challenges of the new and perilous environment without major compromises."²

Woven into the fabrication of almost every frontier hero from Daniel Boone's first pilgrimage to Kentucky (1769) to the death of Wild Bill Hickock (1876) is the encounter with the red man -- whether admired as a noble savage or detested as a fearless savage. The wilderness became an even more difficult environment because of the Indian and this situation "produced substantially heroic conditions, first in Kentucky


and Tennessee, and afterward at nearly every stage of the
march to the Pacific."³

The original story of those who led that march is record-
ed in narrative biographies written for popular consump-
tion -- often with political motivation. Charles Edwards
Lester, Houston's first biographer, wrote such a book; his
object was to refine and enhance the public image of Sam
Houston. At the same time, but with less obvious intent,
he justified the Texas Revolution and annexation, a sensi-
tive issue in 1846. Had Lester been a more skillful writer,
his intentions might have come closer to fulfillment. How-
ever, he followed closely what Steckmesser aptly calls the
"ironbound tradition" or frontier biography. That is to say,
the emphasis is "literary and folkloric rather than histori-
cal in nature."⁴ This chapter attempts to show how Lester
used the Indian to distinguish Houston from other men and
how that primitive image evolved in future Houston biography.

³ Moore, p. 79.

⁴ Steckmesser, p. 241. Charles Edwards Lester (1815-
1890) was a great-grandson of Jonathan Edwards. After study-
ing law, he attended Auburn Theological Seminary, 1835-1836,
and became a Presbyterian minister. In 1842 he was appoint-
ed the United States Consulship at Genoa, Italy, a position
he held until 1847. While on an extended visit to the
United States in 1846, he wrote the Houston biography. He
had already published three other books. After his return
to the United States in 1848, he pursued a literary career
for the remainder of his life. See: Allan Westcott,
(New York, 1951), Vol. VI, pp. 189-190; also see: Library
of Congress Microfilm, Department of State (Record Group
59, T-64, Rolls 2-4).
Lester wrote three Houston biographies: *Sam Houston and His Republic* (1846); *The Life of Sam Houston* (The Only Authentic Memoir of him ever published) /1855/; and, *Life and Achievements of Sam Houston: Hero and Statesman* (1883). Although Lester denied being a "eulogist," it is quite apparent from the "Forward" to the first biography that his purpose in writing is to defend his hero. He warns the reader ("before he begins this book or throws it down"): [I have lived to see unmeasured calumny poured on the head of an heroic Man who struck the fetter from his bleeding country on the field, and preserved her by his counsels in the Cabinet. And I have lived to do justice to that man and that People by asserting the truth.]

The exaggeration in Lester's statement of what he "lived to see" suggests that what he lived to write would also be exaggerated. Indeed, at one point when Lester

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5 The first two-thirds of *Authentic Memoir*, an anonymous publication, is a virtual replica of *Sam Houston and His Republic*. The last third adds Houston's career as a Senator, but is basically an attempt to produce Houston's presidential credentials, apparently as a nominee of the American (Know-Nothing) Party. Houston's Senate speeches were quoted at length, but no new biographical information was added. Future editions appeared in 1860 and 1867; in the latter, the title was altered to include: "The Hunter, Patriot, and Statesman of Texas." All three editions are identical. Hereafter cited: *Authentic Memoir*.

6 With the exception of the "Introduction" and the last chapter, "Houston at Home," this work also duplicates *Sam Houston and His Republic*. Houston's career in the Senate is reduced to ten pages taken from the *Authentic Memoir*.

7 Lester, *Sam Houston and His Republic*, p. 3. Lester's reliance upon repetition, spaciousness, and the hackneyed phrase, stylistic traits evident in this quote, are typical of his writing.
digresses to bemoan current literary trends, he inadvertently forecasts in more accurate terms what is to follow.

We hope the day may come when our young authors will stop writing and dreaming about European castles, with their crazy knights and lady-loves, and hunting through the mummy-haunted halls of the pyramids, and set themselves to work to glean the unwritten legends of heroism and adventure, which the old men would tell them, who are now smoking their pipes around the roof-trees of Kentucky and Tennessee.8

To fill this void, Lester set out to write a legend about one of Tennessee's heroes. It was not necessary to rely on "old men," since, as he later recalled in *The Life And Achievements of Sam Houston* (1887), he had the "constant and invaluable assistance" of the hero himself "in whose private room the record was prepared without intermission of an entire day during the succeeding three months."9 By the time Lester wrote the last biography, he was spinning tales about his own authorship -- at least he misrepresented what had actually taken place when he wrote *Sam Houston and His Republic*. "I saw the General," Lester wrote in a letter to his wife early in the summer of 1846,

and was with him 5 hours -- I have begun the life and shall be through in quick metre -- He says that my scheme is grand, practical and noble -- the only sensible one any of his friends have ever proposed to him. He said I was rendering him the highest service any man living could

8 Lester, *Sam Houston and His Republic*, p. 10. In the introduction to the new edition (1954) of Marquis James' biography of Houston, *The Raven*, Henry Steele Commager erroneously credits this quotation to Houston "in his old age."

render to him and I might command him. I said nothing to him about my present desire -- but he asked me if I was satisfied with my present post -- I made an answer which showed how the case stood. He has a Sec'y whom he had the utmost confidence in and he is crazy about the entire business -- my own success as well as his masters. Now Nelly, I tell you my plan from which there will be no variation -- I shall hurry through this business and write out days what I take down nights and in one week or less I shall be in New York ready to sail -- for I have no other business to do which I cannot accomplish in 2 or 3 days.10

Although the book must have surely taken more than a week to write, it was obviously "hurried through."11 Furthermore, Lester was motivated by more than simply a desire to write a biography. He hoped that Houston would prove to be a useful political resource, should his appointment to the United States Consul at Genoa, Italy, be jeopardized.

Lester began by noting that Houston acquired the maturity and confidence to govern himself at an early age. Family hardship kept him from attending school for "more than six months in all."12 Nevertheless, Lester tells us, Houston became so fond of the Iliad that "he could repeat it almost entire from beginning to end."13 Disappointed by

10 C. Edwards Lester to Ellen Lester, Summer, 1846, in: Sylvester Larned Papers, Burton Historical Collection, Detroit Public Library, Detroit, Michigan. The italics are Lester's.

11 It is quite clear from future correspondence that Lester spent little time on the book. See: C. Edwards Lester to Ellen Lester, September 13, and October 14, 1846.

12 Lester, Sam Houston and His Republic, p. 10.

13 Ibid., p. 11.
the denial of a request to study Latin or Greek and intolerant of the authority that his older brothers exercised over him, Houston "suddenly disappeared." He went to live with the Cherokee Indians -- eight miles from the family's homestead. With the Indians, Lester romanticized, Houston spent his time chasing the deer through the forest with a fleetness little short of their own, engaging in all those gay sports of the happy Indian boys, and wandering along the banks of the stream by the side of some Indian maiden, sheltered by the deep woods, conversing in that universal language which finds its sure way to the heart.14

Just how long Houston remained among the "untutored children of the forest," Lester could only estimate. "Weeks passed" before Houston returned home for more clothes (apparently he did not feel sufficiently comfortable among the Cherokees to assume their dress). He remained at home until the "tyranny" of his brothers "drove him to the woods again, where he passed entire months." Evidently Houston did not remember many of the details either, for as Lester observed, "from a strange source we have learned much of his Indian history during these three or four years, and in the absence of facts it would be no difficult matter to fancy what may have been his occupations."15 Lester was best at "fancying" the image that

14 Lester, Sam Houston and His Republic, p. 12. The quotes that immediately follow are also from this page.

15 Ibid., p. 12.
stemmed from Houston's having lived with the Indians.

The experience "moulded" Houston's character, according to Lester. His early life among the Indians was, as the event proved, a necessary portion of that wonderful training that fitted him for his strange destiny. There it was he became initiated into the profound mysteries of the red man's character, and a taste was formed for the wild forest life.16

On this basis Lester concluded that "no man ever lived on this continent (whose history we know) who has had so complete a knowledge of the Indian character -- none who could sway so powerful a control over the savage mind."17 Contemplating Houston's "wild history" so enthralled Lester that he found it comparable to "the story of Romulus, who was nurtured by the beasts of the forest till he planted the foundation of a mighty empire."18 This analogy revealed not only that the Indians made Houston unique among men by "nurturing" him to greatness, but it also showed that the author perceived his biography of such a man as an epic.

Houston finally had to sacrifice this "sojourn in the forest" because he was indebted for purchases he made while living with the Indians and "had no other resources left but to abandon his 'dusky companions,' and teach the children

16 Lester, *Sam Houston and His Republic*, p. 13.
of pale-faces." He charged a higher tuition because, as Lester says, "one who had been graduated at an Indian university ought to hold his lore at a dearer rate." Such unique qualifications transcended the ordinary; hence, Houston became, in Lester's terminology, an "Indian Professor." 19

The mysterious "lore" that won for him this curious title, also won the reader's favor as it became increasingly inseparable from Houston's image. In the Lester biography, Houston's disappearance and return become equivalent to the rite of manhood. As a boy Houston had gone into the woods to escape the suppression of childhood; he returned as a man with special gifts and with the capacity of self-determination. Of course, such a rite was also purifying, for, as Lester observed, Houston had removed himself from the "coldness," "treachery," "vices," and "artificialities" of civilized life. 20

As soon as Houston earned enough to pay his debt, he closed the school and, at the age of twenty, joined the army. A few months after enlistment Houston's display of inordinate strength and courage at the battle of To-ho-pe-ka (Horseshoe Bend) gained him the "fame of a hero" and the "lasting regard of General Jackson." 21 Lester's narrative of Houston's

19 Lester, Sam Houston and His Republic, p. 15.
20 Ibid., pp. 13 and 28.
21 Ibid., pp. 20 and 23.
five years in the military centered around this engagement and the physical suffering that Houston endured as a result. By a vivid and exaggerated description of Houston's prowess and boldness, Lester inflated the image to make room for the exceptional soldier. E.W. Johnston challenged Lester on this point by asking if anyone could "contrive, with his utmost effort at the preposterous, to invent what shall seem a fiction, bolder and more imprudent."22 The account, said Johnston, was told in such a way that it "cast the most violent discredit even upon the few facts stated."23

In a similar fashion Lester enlarged the image even more when he spoke of Houston's clever mind and sharp intellect. After resigning from the military, Houston sought the aid of a tutor and began studying law in June, 1818.

He read a few of the standard works prescribed in a course of law studies, and read them thoroughly. He grasped the great principles of the sciences, and they were fixed in his mind for ever. . .

His teacher had prescribed eighteen months of study. In one third of the time he was recommended to apply for license, and he was admitted with eclat. A few months' study had enabled him to pass a searching examination with great honor to himself and his new profession. 24

A book review critic for the New York Mirror took issue with


23 Ibid., p. 582.

24 Lester, Sam Houston and His Republic, p. 29. The italics are Lester's.
Lester's claim by noting that some lawyers would find Houston's legal training "startling." "If Mr. Houston had been a resident of New York, he would have been compelled to study seven years before he could have been admitted to the bar."25

Although little objection can be raised to Houston's not going beyond the standard requirements of his state, Lester's claims of Houston's brilliance as a District Attorney were somewhat outlandish.

He was obliged to come in collision with all the talent of one of the ablest bars of Western America. Every step he trod was new to him, but he was almost universally successful in prosecutions, and his seniors who rallied him upon his recent advancement and his rawness in the practice, never repeated their jokes. They discovered to their mortification that neither many books nor much dull plodding could enable them to measure weapons with a man so gifted in rare good sense and penetrating genius.26

Evidently "dull plodding" was not exactly Lester's sport either. Even though he had taken "considerable pains" to become "familiar with the various steps of Houston's advancement," he still found it necessary to "pass rapidly" over the next eleven years "in order to leave space to speak more minutely of his subsequent achievements."27 Hence, Houston's two terms in Congress and his term as Governor of

26 Lester, Sam Houston and His Republic, pp. 29-30.
27 Ibid., p. 30.
Tennessee consumed only a brief paragraph. Nevertheless, Lester argued, Houston's "popularity was unlimited." By this selective technique Lester compressed the years and events that he wanted to so as to emphasize and expand endlessly upon the days and hours that seemed most appropriate to his image of Sam Houston. Such a tactic is typical in 19th century frontier biography. Selection and overstatement are also commonplace in myths and legends for they provide the means by which real men are made into folk heroes.

In sum, Lester utilized the following characteristics in order to shape the Houston image in the form of a folk hero of epic significance: a sense of the primitive, inordinate strength, superior intellect, and unlimited popularity. Although all four characteristics were confirmed in the remainder of the biography, the impression derived from Houston's encounters with the Indians was the most dominant. While Houston's words and actions contributed to Lester's design, the folk hero resulted from a rhetorical imbalance within the biography itself.

Overstatement eventually led to discrepancies within the text and selection necessarily resulted in the omission

28 Lester, Sam Houston and His Republic, p. 30.
29 Steckmesser, pp. 244-245.
of the realities of Houston's life. But more than either of these, Lester's use of repetition and the Indian idiom imbued the Houston image with a sense of the primitive. Such techniques allowed for an arbitrary merging of Houston's romantic Indian past and his present military and political heroism. Once brought together, the Indian became a permanent mark of Houston's character. Lester continually interspersed a reminder of Houston's experiences with the Indians and he often incorporated idiomatic expressions commonly associated with the Indians. Indeed, he seemed unable to restrain himself from conjuring up incidents to illustrate the unique benefits of Houston's past. Consider, for example, Lester's careless inconsistency in the following description of Houston's effort to hear the silenced guns of the Alamo.

At the break of day, Houston retired some distance from the party, and listened intensely, as if expecting a distant signal. Col. Travis had stated in his letters, that as long as the Alamo

31 Of course, overstatement would be expected in Lester's claims of Houston's epic significance. But Lester was not careful enough to refrain from contradiction. For example, Lester exaggerated the conditions in Tennessee at the time of Houston's separation. When Houston was about to leave, Lester wrote (p. 33): "It was not even necessary retirement from turbulence and excitement, for even before he left, the fury of his enemies had abated and his real strength was greater than ever." Lester had obviously forgotten about this claim when he described Houston's visit to Tennessee three years later (p. 43): "Years had passed since other painful occurrences had taken place -- and with them had passed, too, the storm they had raised. Reason had resumed its sway over the public mind. . . ."

Lester's criteria of selection was based almost exclusively upon the positive aspects of the dramatic conflicts in Houston's life. Such a choice is typical in legends; see: Orrin E. Klapp, Symbolic Leaders (Chicago, 1964), pp. 66-100.
could hold out against the invaders, signal guns would be fired at sunrise. It is a well authenticated fact, that for many successive days, these guns had been heard at a distance of nearly two hundred miles across the prairie -- and being now within the reach of their sound, Houston was anxiously waiting for the expected signal. . . He listened with an acuteness of sense which no man can understand but one whose hearing has been sharpened by the teachings of the dwellers of the forest.32

The Indian idiom afforded a more subtle means of capturing the image. For instance, near the end of the biography, Lester reminisced about the "pleasant lights and shadows that had fallen over the path where we were walking."33 But, occasionally even the hero's path was "clouded" -- Lester consistently referred to Houston's separation from his first wife as "the dark cloud that fell over his path."34 Lester was willing to invoke the Indian idiom even at the risk of other connotations when he compared the eloquence of Houston's valedictory address to a "storm" that "swayed" the audience "like a forest swayed by a strong wind."35 Whenever Houston became engaged in a contest, such as a political campaign or the Stanbery Trial, Lester typified the opposition as an "enemy" or "evil force" that "hunted

32 Lester, Sam Houston and His Republic, p. 66. The "authenticated fact" was revised in the Authentic Memoir and the distance that guns could be heard across a prairie was altered to a mere one hundred miles.
33 Ibid., p. 188.
34 Ibid., pp. 33, 34, and 191.
Houston down." Because of these "stormy spirits" Houston's "hopes clouded" and his "great heart felt dejected." Such phraseology, scattered in this manner throughout the biography, contributed to the "Indianization" of Sam Houston.

Lester consciously used the language to purposefully manipulate Houston's image so as to convert the possible detriment of his association with the Indians into a definite asset. That conclusion is warranted by noting the changes and additions that Lester made between the first biography, Sam Houston and His Republic, and the second, the Authentic Memoir.

One of these alterations concerned an event that occurred at the close of the Battle of San Jacinto. In the first edition (1846), Lester told about two bald eagles "hovering over the field" of victory. He quoted Houston as having interpreted this sign as a "good omen. The bird of Washington points out to you the course of your empire. I own I am a little superstitious." In the revised version (1855), Lester realized that by using Houston's Indian name (The Raven), he could more fully exploit the potential of this story: hence, the two bald eagles became two ravens. Houston still read the sign as "a good omen," but the discourse

36 Lester, Sam Houston and His Republic, pp. 60-61.
37 Ibid., p. 116.
that followed was altered to read: "Their heads are pointing westward. 'Tis the course of empire. I own I am a little superstitious about the raven."\(^{38}\) Insignificant as this change is, it does indicate that Lester contrived to inject yet another remnant of Houston's primitive attributes by recalling something of his association with the Cherokees. In sum, Lester purposefully intended that the Indian be a part of the Houston aura.

In the last third of the *Authentic Memoir*, Lester developed the primitive image with an even greater persistence. He repeated the same things about Houston and the Indians and he quoted at great length from the Senate speeches in which Houston defended the Indian's integrity and attacked the Government's policy.\(^{39}\) But, Lester added a new dimension. The primitive became the magic of Houston's success; it was his foremost political qualification.

We have said Houston was a primitive man. In his temper and spirit, as well as in his policy, this is true. There is no place on the face of the earth where the mind of a man, who has a will to that end, can expand and ripen into value and power more rapidly than in the wilderness, or in the extreme borders of civilization. Houston had the advantage of an education of self-culture in the solitudes. . . .\(^{40}\)

Because Houston was "simple," "he was effective." "He may be


\(^{39}\) Thirty-two pages (over one-fourth) of the new material in the *Authentic Memoir* were excerpts from Houston's Senate speeches on the Government's Indian policy.

\(^{40}\) Lester, *Authentic Memoir*, p. 314.
esteemed," said Lester, as "the only primitive statesman of our day." 41

Earlier Lester observed that Houston "had become an Indian." 42 But, Houston's becoming an Indian was, in the Lester biography, only a means to a more perfect reincarnation in the form of the primitive statesman. Once this notion of the primitive was accepted, Houston's associations with the Indians became a legend of virtue. Lester's basic strategy can be found in many other 19th century biographies. He "fancied" much -- too much. But, future Houston biographers, seeking an affirmation of the folk hero, soon discovered that many of the romantic aspects of Houston's life -- especially those pertaining to the Indians -- could only be gleaned from Lester.

For example, in William Carey Crane's, Life and Select Literary Remains of Sam Houston, substantial portions of Lester's work were copied verbatim. Crane, President of Baylor University (Independence, Texas), had been commissioned by Houston's wife "to write the life and edit and publish the literary remains of her husband." Mrs. Houston specially requested "at least one chapter setting forth Gen. Houston's religious character." 43 In his

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41 Lester, Authentic Memoir, p. 314.
42 Ibid., p. 76; Sam Houston and His Republic, p. 55.
43 William Carey Crane, Life and Select Literary Remains of Sam Houston (Philadelphia, 1884), p. 3. In this chapter
acknowledgment of sources, Crane singled out the importance of the Lester biographies.

C. Edwards Lester, having written "Houston and his Republic," under the same roof in Washington City with Gen. Houston, and Mrs. Houston having informed me that Gen. H. had told her that Lester's book was the only reliable account of him then written, I have taken his statements without question, and often used his language, although consulting and comparing all varied statements with his points of fact.44

It is not surprising, then, to find a close resemblance between Crane's depiction of Houston and the folk hero that Lester presented. Crane inserted, at appropriate points in the Lester dialogue, the letters that he received from Houston's contemporaries.45 In this manner Crane provided the basis for "consulting": the reader could do his own "comparing". Crane made a more important addition in the last third of the biography, when, setting aside Lester's text, he set forth two aspects of Houston's character: his religious convictions and his superiority as a statesman. Crane dispensed rather quickly with Houston's religious beliefs and practices by publishing two letters

only the more prominent Houston biographies are considered. Those works that treat a special aspect of his life (for example, the battle at San Jacinto), or works classified under the rubric of juvenile literature or fiction are omitted. Baylor University was originally located in Independence, Texas; it was later (1886) relocated in Waco, Texas.

44 Crane, p. 4.
that he received from Houston's pastors. These testimonials satisfied Mrs. Houston and assured the reader that Houston ascribed to the tenets of the Christian faith.

Besides meeting his obligation to Mrs. Houston, Crane also went beyond Lester's account in his discussion of Houston's career as a Senator and Congressman. It was here that Crane diminished the importance that Lester had placed upon the primitive by emphasizing Houston's associations with men of high esteem. To Crane, Houston's entry into the House of Representatives, as a young Congressman from Tennessee, was comparable to going to "school." "Among the older was gathered such a galaxy as never before or since has met together; and these were to be Houston's teachers." His teachers included: John Randolph, Henry Clay, Daniel Webster, and many others not as well known to the twentieth century reader. When Houston returned to Congress as a Senator from Texas, Crane again pointed out the stature of his colleagues. In cannonade fashion he proceeded to document Houston's statesmanship by quoting excerpts from his Senate speeches. It was in these speeches, declared Crane that Houston "showed himself the peer of statesmen like Crittenden and Webster." There was a "natural and

46 Crane, pp. 240-245.
48 Ibid., p. 193.
49 Ibid., p. 196.
just comparison," Crane maintained, between the speeches of Webster and Clay, and "the like utterances of Houston."\(^{50}\)

In his discussion of Houston's statesmanship, Crane had substituted what Lester attributed to the primitive for something more familiar, but no less mysterious: the self-made man. Houston was an equal to men already held in veneration because he had learned from his associations with them, and, in Crane's estimation, his works were comparable to their own. Houston still emerged as a folk hero in the Crane biography, but the blending of the constituent parts varied from Lester's portrayal.

Lester's configuration was more accurately recast in Henry Bruce's, *Life of General Houston*. "A hero is still ours," Bruce proclaimed, "and for a poet we have Mr. C. Edwards Lester."\(^{51}\) Of course, Bruce depended heavily upon the poet -- poetic imagery was the life blood of the folk hero.\(^{52}\) When Bruce was not quoting Lester, he was quoting "his honoured friend and master," James Parton, who had written a three volume biography on the *Life of Andrew

\(^{50}\) Crane, p. 213. Crane merely asserted that Houston's skill was comparable to that of Clay and Webster; he did not elaborate the basis for this judgment.


\(^{52}\) Two-thirds of the Bruce biography consists of quoted material from Lester and Parton. Over sixty pages are taken from Lester's, *Authentic Memoir*. 
Jackson. Whenever the lives of Houston and Jackson intertwined, Bruce felt in "safer hands" borrowing from Parton.\textsuperscript{53} But, Parton's contribution was minor, since Lester was also his source.\textsuperscript{54}

This compounding of source dependence led one reviewer to conclude that Bruce composed "by the aid of the scissors chiefly."\textsuperscript{55} The biography reflected Lester's perspective of Houston in other respects as well. Both authors said little of substance about Houston's life after 1846. Even Bruce's chapter titles seemed Lesterian: "Dark Days" (for Houston's exile) and "T'was the Manner of a Primitive Man" (for his command of the Texas Army). In sum: Bruce sustained the image of the folk hero and, like Lester, singled out the

\textsuperscript{53} Bruce, pp. v11, 57.

\textsuperscript{54} There was only one deviation from Lester as a result of this alliance and that concerned the Stanbery case. Parton condemned Houston for assaulting Stanbery and viewed the attack as an indication of Houston's guilt. In Parton's estimation, Houston attempted to swindle the government and the Indians by exploiting his personal friendship with the President, and, Parton added, he almost succeeded. Bruce followed the cue and judged Houston guilty. See: James Parton, \textit{Life of Andrew Jackson} (Boston, 1885), Vol. III, p. 385; also see: Bruce, pp. 57-62. It is unfortunate that Bruce did not more faithfully emulate the biographical method of his "honoured friend and master." Parton set the standard for twentieth century biography; his interpretation of Jackson is still regarded as one of the best biographies ever written. See: Milton E. Flower, \textit{James Parton: The Father of Modern Biography} (Durham, 1951).

essential primitiveness of Houston's character.

Yet, ironically, Bruce entertained certain misgivings about emulating Lester; unfortunately, he treated skepticism with cavalier ambivalence. While Bruce may have recognized the folk hero, he did not forestall its perpetuation. For example, Bruce felt that Lester's account of Houston's exile had "so much vraisemblance, and so many elements of pathos, that it ought, at least, to be true." 56 He criticized Lester for not telling "more about the romance of Houston's forest life and less about his efforts in behalf of Lo the poor Indian." 57 And, before quoting one of Houston's attacks on the Government's Indian policy, Bruce challenged Houston's sincerity by recalling "Prescott's remark, that probable is as strong a word as history often may venture to employ." 58

But, Bruce failed to substantiate any of these reservations and this omission was tantamount to the perpetuation of the legend. Near the conclusion of the biography Bruce criticized Crane with similar temerity:

One who wishes to preserve Houston's memory, but who has rendered that memory a very doubtful service, has gathered Houston's speeches in the United States Senate into a dense and dreary volume, and labelled them Select Literary Remains. I have been unable to read this volume through;

56 Bruce, p. 52.
57 Ibid., p. 54.
58 Ibid., p. 54. Bruce's italics.
and I think it safe to say that while the sun shines and the free wind blows, no man will ever read it. 59

Bruce approached the task with such belligerence that he never really confronted Houston. His previous doubts about Houston's sincerity become suspect when he later professes only a modicum of familiarity with Houston's speeches. Bruce asked some important questions, but he made no serious attempt to resolve them. By resorting to plagiarism, he produced only an imitation of the caricature found in Lester. Again Houston was portrayed as the "half-mythical founder of a State," lamented a critic for The Nation. "It is a pity that there is not some adequate account of his character and career." 60

George Creel's, Sam Houston: Colossus in Buckskin, offered a more adequate account of Houston's career -- especially of his two terms as President of the Republic of Texas. But, Creel's assessment of Houston's character failed to rectify past errors, because he heightened the image of the folk hero. Certainly Creel's position as head of President Wilson's Committee on Public Information, during World War I, helped equip him for the task. Reporters "commonly referred to Creel as 'Uncle Sam's Press Agent.'" 61

59 Bruce, p. 188.
60 The Nation, op. cit., p. 415.
61 New York Times, Vol. CIII (October 3, 1953), p. 17. George Creel (1876-1953) continued to be quite active in
came to writing the Houston biography, Creel employed many of the same propaganda tactics associated with an effective control of information. Indeed, he was a perfervid advocate of Houston's primitiveness -- more so than any previous biographer. "From the cradle to the grave," Creel began, Houston "walked with drama." And, in this biography Houston did.

Creel supplemented Lester's account with even wilder assertions, so as to increase dramatic effect. For instance, in the chapter on the "Boyhood of a Titan," Creel paraphrased Lester, without acknowledgment, and then went a step further by assuming that Houston knew Cherokee "as thoroughly as his own tongue." Houston no longer read the Iliad in the politics as an advisor to President Roosevelt; he later split with Roosevelt and became an unsuccessful candidate for Governor of California. The Eisenhower Administration invited Creel to reorganize the United States Information Service, but he declined because of poor health.

Creel's use of the "Four-Minute Men" (an organization of speakers sponsored by the Committee on Public Information) was an especially effective propaganda instrument of the Wilson administration. For a discussion of the Four-Minute Men, see: Cedric Larson and James R. Mock, "The Four-Minute Men," Quarterly Journal of Speech, Vol. XXV (February, 1939), pp. 97-112. For an assessment of Creel's committee, see: Daniel G. Amon, "A Study of the Manipulation of American Ideals By George Creel's Committee on Public Information" (M.A. Thesis, Bowling Green State University, 1968).


63 Creel, p. 8. Creel seldom acknowledged his sources and never observed his indebtedness to Lester and Crane. The abuse of overstatement led to a more serious misrepresentation when Creel maintained that Houston "braved the hate and anger of the South by an unflinching stand against slavery (p. 2)."
peacefulness of the woods, as Lester envisioned. According to Creel, he "spouted Homer... delighting his hosts with nightly description of the grapple between Trojan heroes and cunning Greeks."\textsuperscript{64}

Likewise, Creel could outdo Lester when it came to tracing "the influence of the Indian" upon Houston's life. As if postulating a causal relationship, Creel alleged that the Indian contributed to Houston's personality:

the loathing of barter, the disregard of money, the childish vanity, the dignity, the invincible love of theatrics that mark the savage in his natural state. Wealth was his for the taking, but he died in poverty; even when drunkest and lowest, he bore himself with a pride that forbade liberties; his real rages were not more terrifying than his premeditated outbursts, and his dress always had a leaning to barbaric effects.\textsuperscript{65}

The fact that these characteristics were not necessarily "Indian" did not matter. Nor did it matter if this composite of attributes produced dissonance. The mystery of Houston's uniqueness -- the folk hero -- was all the more appealing precisely because it did not make sense. To accentuate Houston's primitiveness, Creel, like Lester, continually equated Houston's habits and mannerisms with "Indian ways." When angered, Houston's "resentments were Indian in their implacability."\textsuperscript{66} "Another of his Indian traits was that he

\textsuperscript{64} Creel, p. 9.

\textsuperscript{65} Ibid., p. 9. Houston did not "die in poverty." The executors of Houston's estate assessed its total worth, four months after his death, at $89,288.00. See: \textit{Writings}, VIII, pp. 341-344.

\textsuperscript{66} Ibid., p. 24.
never forgave an injury nor forgot a favor."67 Even his posture resembled "Indian stoicism."68 In Texas politics, Houston exercised "Indian cunning" and "had a point of view which was that of a tribal chieftain."69 "Picturesque phrases" were the trademark of Houston's Senate speeches, for they contained "a breath from the forest."70

Creel tried too hard to make Houston all things to all men. As a result he could not help but occasionally contradict himself. Early in the biography, Creel noted that Houston preferred "forest aisles to corn rows. The great outdoors called him, and to the day of his death he was more at home under the heavens than beneath a roof."71 But, later on Creel related that Houston "was essentially domestic, for home and children were passions with him."72 Such contradictions in the Houston image were not so frequent as to offset Houston's primitiveness, but they did represent an author bent on manipulating the image of a man for popular consumption -- not accuracy. Creel dramatized the folk hero, but he did not substantially alter its manifestations. The proportions became further exaggerated, with wider ramifications. Colossus

67 Creel, p. 27.
68 Ibid., p. 172.
69 Ibid., pp. 220, 226.
70 Ibid., p. 302.
71 Ibid., p. 6.
72 Ibid., p. 248.
in Buckskin, said Stanley Walker in a book review, "is anything but a balanced critical examination of Sam, the man. And yet it is probable that the man was more interesting and more understandable than the Titan."73

A year later Marquis James wrote The Raven: A Biography of Sam Houston. Unquestionably, it was a more interesting and understandable account of the man. "Thorough, scholarly, fair and alive," raved John Carter of the New York Times.74 In 1930 James received the Pulitzer Prize for the best American biography.75 For the first time a Houston biographer seriously attempted to exhaust the primary sources -- at the time of James' writing that task was itself monumental.76


75 Marquis James (1891-1955) was a fifth cousin of Jesse James. He also received a Pulitzer Prize for The Life of Andrew Jackson, published in 1938. For most of his life, he pursued a literary career. After W. W. I., he became publicity director for the American Legion and helped found The American Legion Monthly. He was on the original staff of The New Yorker magazine and resigned from that position to write the Houston biography. See: New York Times, Vol. CV (November 20, 1955), p. 89.

76 Marquis James, The Raven: A Biography of Sam Houston (Indianapolis, 1929), pp. 467-470. As a result of his acquaintance with Temple Houston, James had access to much of Houston's personal correspondence, made available not only by Temple Houston, but by other members of the Houston family as well. In addition, James consulted private collectors, newspapers, periodicals, court records, and Texas scholars. He even went to England to read the diplomatic correspondence of the Texas Republic.
As a youngster, James grew up in the Cherokee Strip of Oklahoma Territory. He always remembered the day "when Temple Houston, Sam Houston's youngest son, a semi-legendary character in his own right because of Edna Ferber's, *Cimarron* drove across the prairie... I can see him now, with his long hair and high-heeled boots." 77 This romantic picture lingered in James' memory and became a part of the aura with which he approached the Houston biography. It was quite natural that James would share his enthusiasm for Houston with Houston's descendents. Furthermore, James lived in a part of the country where the myth of Houston's primitiveness was passed from generation to generation. 78 Because James really believed that Houston was "The Raven," he could write about the folk hero in a most convincing manner. As James notes, "the body of legend that surrounded Sam Houston is a part of the saga of his life." 79

James was insightful enough to recognize that Houston's "past was romantic and a little mysterious." 80 But, he could not escape past impressions, the books he read, and the "old people" he talked to, all of which served to reinforce

77 James, p. 469.

78 Jack Gregory and Rennard Strickland, *Sam Houston with the Cherokees, 1829-1833* (Austin, 1967), p. 30. See particularly, the citation to the interviews of the Works Progress Administration concerning the stories that the Cherokees told about Sam Houston.

79 James, p. 179.
the folk hero configuration that Lester offered. This may explain why it is that in an otherwise carefully documented biography, the material gleaned from Lester was commonly omitted from citation. James justified this procedure by claiming that Lester's biography was not a biography at all; rather, James asserted, it was a "virtual autobiography" of Houston. Simultaneously, James documented the folk hero and reaffirmed the autobiographical interpretation, when he pointed out that Houston referred to himself in the third person throughout the work bearing Lester's authorship. Such a practice was, according to James, another of Houston's "Indian traits." Of course, it is a biographer's trait as well!

Nevertheless, notice for a moment what happens if Lester's biography is accepted as Houston's autobiography. Perhaps the most significant consequence is that "in Houston's words" can precede quotations from Lester. By the authority of that kind of documentation, James substantiated "The Raven" -- the epitome of the folk hero. Hence, James renamed Houston, and accordingly, dismissed Lester as a "fluent hack" who was

81 James, p. 437. This quote appears in a footnote to the first reference that James makes to Lester (p. 14).

82 Ibid., p. 23, 126. This practice does not occur elsewhere in Houston's rhetoric. Even when addressing Indians, Houston referred to himself in the first person.
the "cousin of Aaron Burr." While Lester was certainly paid by Houston to write the biography, there seems to be little basis for assuming that he merely copied down words from the "master."  

Although James wrote admirably and told a lot more of the detail of Houston's life, the folk hero remained, owing its origin to Lester. James recaptured the familiar story of Houston's boyhood in romantic imagery.

In the evening Sam sat about the fires where the long pipe was passed, filling his mind with the maxims of the headmen and the picturesque idioms of the Indian speech, which time never eradicated from his vocabulary. . . .

These years were a permanent influence on Sam Houston's life. They left him with an attachment for the wilderness, a deep interior preference for deer tracks to tape, and a faith in primitive fellowships.

James, along with Creel, had few qualms about going beyond Lester to emphasize Houston's primitiveness. For example, James noted that while in exile, Houston "destroyed his civilized clothes, changed his name and renounced the English tongue." And, James asserted, "The Raven, in breech clout and turkey feathers, was a more plausible figure than

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83 James, p. 362. For an example of James' practice of equating Lester's words with Houston's, see: pp. 14, 15, 16, 19, 22, 23, 30-34, 84, 92, 126, 147, 157, 182, 239, and 248.

84 Neither the extant writings of Houston or Lester give credence to James' interpretation.

85 James, pp. 21-22.
a general in broadcloth and a cravat."  

By the subtle, almost parenthetical, addition of detail, James made The Raven a more plausible representation of the folk hero. In all likelihood his description of Cherokee attire did not offend the stereotype, even though it was seriously inaccurate. In fact, had Houston appeared as described, he would have offended Cherokees.

The most heroic and farfetched claim of all was James' assessment of Houston's influence upon the Indians.

His flagging forces whipped up by whisky, The Raven had thrust himself into a position of leadership over seven thousand Indians who controlled the country from Missouri to Texas and westward to the great plains. He had accomplished this in the space of eight weeks.

Yet, in spite of occasional fantasies, James portrayed The Raven with a tinge of realism -- at least enough to lead such a prominent historian as Henry Steele Commager to conclude, almost twenty-five years later, that James had "taken folklore and unwritten legends and transformed them into history." Even the name "is like something out of mythology,"

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86 James, p. 98.
87 Cherokee dress during this period "was a mixture of Indian and white attire. Some wore top hats and black morning coats. Others had turbans wound round their heads and wore bright calico Indian hunting shirts which contrasted oddly with their white man's breeches or pantaloons that, in many instances, were quite shabby and threadbare." See: Grace Steele Woodward, The Cherokees (Norman, 1963), p. 239.
88 James, p. 117.
Commager says; yet, it is "soberly authentic."\textsuperscript{89}

The authenticity of The Raven is rather dubious, however, once it is realized that many of the quotations attributed to him owe prior allegiance to Lester's pen. The transformation of folklore and legends into history accounted for the error that Commager made when he relied upon The Raven for a quotation from Houston. "In his old age," Commager wrote,

\begin{quote}
Sam Houston remarked that American authors had no need to turn for inspiration to "European castles and their crazy knights and lady loves." They should rather "set themselves to work to glean the unwritten legends of heroism and adventure which the old men would tell them who are now smoking their pipes around the rooftrees of Kentucky and Tennessee."\textsuperscript{90}
\end{quote}

Commager's mistake can be appreciated; without having read Lester, he had no way of knowing that the above remark was not Houston's, but that it appeared as a plea from Lester, when Houston was fifty-three, not "in his old age."\textsuperscript{91} "In a sense," Commager admitted, "Houston is too good to be true." But, "if he had not existed, we should have had to create him."\textsuperscript{92} James made the legend acceptable and The Raven promised the folk hero immortality.

\begin{footnotes}
\item[90] Ibid., n. p.
\item[91] Lester, Sam Houston and His Republic, p. 10.
\item[92] Commager, op. cit., n. p.
\end{footnotes}
In 1954, Llerena Friend wrote *Sam Houston: The Great Designer*. Friend concentrated on "Houston's place in national politics."

Houston as frontiersman and soldier has been the personification of much of the romantic in American history. Everybody is acquainted with the "buckskin hero from Tennessee," but questions concerning him tend to relate to his life with the Indians, his marital problems, and his conviviality, and to ignore his work as a practical politician and a statesman.93

Friend purposefully ignored the folk hero. Occasionally, she pointed out Lester's errors when they conflicted with historical documents. In total, Friend devoted only four sentences to Houston's early experiences with the Cherokees and only a part of one chapter to his exile. *The Great Designer* was an unprecedented accounting of Houston's activities, all carefully documented by primary sources. It told where Houston was, what he did and said, and what responses were accorded him by individuals and the press. Nevertheless, the folk hero was neither affirmed nor rejected; it was not dealt with. Friend strove fervently for "impartiality" and came close to achieving it, although she remained an enthusiast and at times an apologist (if only by omission). *The Great Designer* left unanswered some puzzling questions regarding Houston's personality -- in particular, an understanding of the motives that prompted the

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Indian rhetoric.

After the appearance of The Writings of Sam Houston and the substantiation that Friend's book offered, it became less and less possible to contain Houston's image within the mould of Lester's folk hero. Future authors could not ignore the mythical simplicity of that view, but the romance of the legend remained a strong attraction, "on call" to resolve questions that were otherwise enigmatic.

The only biography written since Friend's is Marion Karl Wisehart's, Sam Houston: American Giant. "I got interested in Sam Houston... as a man of principle," Wisehart later reminisced. If the inquiry concentrates upon what Houston said, Wisehart postulated, one soon discovers "that there are major aspects of the man's life that call for new understanding, interpretation, and judgment." On this basis, Wisehart decided to give Houston "the floor and let him speak in his own words more often than is usual in a book of this character."  

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95 M.K. Wisehart, Sam Houston: American Giant (Washington, 1962), pp. vii-viii. Wisehart (b. 1889) currently resides in Alexandria, Virginia. He was a European correspondent for various New York City newspapers and national magazines from the close of W. W. I. to the end of W. W. II. Since that time he has been a free lance writer, publishing a number of articles in such popular magazines as: Saturday Evening Post, Reader's Digest, American Home, etc.
Wisehart considered Lester's biographies as a potential resource for Houston's "own words." After all, he reasoned, Lester was "Houston's self-appointed would-be press agent." Even though Lester may not have quoted Houston's "actual words," Wisehart noted, there "can be no doubt that the Memoir expressed Houston's personal views, convictions, and recollections." Consequently, most of the first eighty-five pages, from Houston's boyhood to his arrival in Texas, strongly emphasized Lester's portrait. Houston "was a white man who had learned to think red." He "walked straight," became familiar with sign language, and once when negotiating with a band of Texas Cherokees, Houston communicated by both "sign language and the Cherokee tongue."

From this quotation it is apparent that Wisehart supplemented Lester's account with whatever details he could gather together from past biographies; Creel had been the first to credit Houston with the ability to speak Cherokee. Wisehart borrowed many of the particulars concerning Houston's exile from sources first cited by James. But, occasionally, Wisehart added some information of his own. For example, Wisehart theorized that Houston ran away from home to live with the Cherokees, not simply to escape the

96 Wisehart, p. 564.
97 Ibid., p. 680.
98 Ibid., pp. 22 and 164.
"tyranny" of his brothers, as Lester had advocated, but because he was curious to find out how they lived among themselves at home, about their inner natures and their beliefs in the Great Spirit. One might think that he was minded to make a kind of anthropologist's survey to find out for himself what he had heard much about.99

By in large, however, Wisehart's book was eclectic. American Giant, said Henry F. Graff,

supersedes Marquis James' "The Raven" (1929) as the standard biography of that extraordinary Texan. . .

It offers not a truer portrait of Houston than we had before, but one that is sharper and more detailed. The source of Houston's curiously cold and aloof personality remains, as heretofore, subterranean.100

Charles A. Bacarisse agreed, "Mr. Wisehart had added little that is new."101 Yet, Wisehart did de-emphasize the primitive image associated with the folk hero. Perhaps he was influenced by Friend's biography. More than likely, his conviction sprang from an inner feeling that Houston's letters and speeches reflected a man "of enormous probity."102 At least it is clear from the last half of the biography that

99 Wisehart, p. 9.
101 Charles A. Bacarisse, Mississippi Valley Historical Review, Vol. 50 (June, 1963), p. 127.
102 From a conversation between M.K. Wisehart and the author.
Wisehart admired Houston in precisely this light.

Nevertheless, Wisehart's admiration was not sufficient to explain the driving force behind Houston's Indian rhetoric. He would allow that Houston differed from other men of his time in many respects -- among them being the fact that "he liked Indians." But, Wisehart would not attribute Houston's defense of the Indians to simply past associations. Nor, would he parade Houston as a "primitive statesman" -- that had been Lester's route. Rather, Sam Houston was an "American giant" because he defended the Indians, or anything else he believed in, as a matter of principle.

Houston's affection for his own children left room for unswerving devotion to the "children of the forest." Again and again the Senator from Texas pleaded with his colleagues in behalf of the Indians. He confessed that he had little hope of persuading his fellow senators to act with greater justice towards the Indians. Yet, accepting the risk of being called a bore and a fanatic, he persisted. He tried in vain to save the treaty rights of the Cherokee nation from destruction by Senator Douglas' Nebraska Bill...

His religion, his relations with his family, the manner in which he treated human beings whose skins were more deeply tinted that his own -- all these contributed to making him a durable statesman who had the strength to pursue an unpopular course despite the opposition of the mob.

103 Wisehart, p. 9.

104 Ibid., p. 552. The Kansas-Nebraska bill did not affect the Cherokee Nation and the error is Wisehart's, not Houston's. Houston spoke in defense of the Senecas and Shawnees, whose rights he felt would be violated by the passage of the bill.
This interpretation makes sense until weighed against what was surely Wisehart's strongest assertion: that Houston was "the boldest and most vocal of all American imperialists of all time." 105 Although a basis for this judgment can be found in Houston's speeches (and, obviously, in his acts), Wisehart did not really pursue that point. More often than not the principle of manifest destiny outweighed any other consideration -- including the Indians. Therefore, something besides "primitiveness" or "principle" must have brought Houston to the defense of the Indians. Like other Houston biographers, Wisehart left that question unanswered and a mythical explanation of the man was perpetuated.

105 Wisehart, p. 515.
My firm and undeviating attachment to Genl Jackson has caused me all the enemies that I have, and I glory in the firmness of my attachment to Jackson and to principle. I will die proud in the assurance, that I deserve, and possess his perfect confidence.

-- Sam Houston, May 27, 1826.
CHAPTER III

THE ALIENATED HERO

"We see the world the way we see it," writes Kenneth Boulding, "because it pays us and has paid us to see it that way."¹ To a large extent the perpetuation of the Houston myth, discussed in the previous chapter, resulted from a failure to connect Houston's discourse and action to the way Houston perceived the world, rather than to a preconceived notion of Houston's world borrowed from C. Edwards Lester, the first Houston biographer. What Houston said, particularly in reference to the Indian, became the basis for substantiating the romantic and mysterious qualities of the folk hero. In other words, the fact that Houston spoke to and for the Indian affirmed his understanding of the primitive and because this understanding was also assumed to be genuine, Houston acquired certain primitive attributes.

The remainder of this study seeks to correct that error and reconstructs the image of Sam Houston so as to bring it into closer perspective with the motives operative in his discourse. This chapter begins with a

critical examination of Houston's rhetoric while an "exile" among the Cherokees (1829-1832); it starts at this point simply because it is the earliest period in Houston's life in which he specifically speaks about Indians. Of course, what he said and did prior to that time is taken into account, so as to reconcile the interpretation advanced in this chapter with Houston's past.

Houston's dramatic and unexpected resignation of the Governorship of Tennessee and his decision thereafter to abandon society and take up residence with the Western Cherokees symbolized the frustration and anxiety that he felt as a result of the chaotic finale of his first marriage -- a marriage that ended in separation after two months. From a letter addressed to his father-in-law, Col. John Allen, it is clear that Houston had accused his wife of lacking the necessary virtues that would warrant his affection. "That I was satisfied & believed her virtuous," Houston wrote, "I had assured her on last night & this morning. This should have prevented the facts ever coming to your knowledge, & that of Mrs. Allen."2

2 Houston to John Allen, April 9, 1829, Writings, I, p. 130. The italics are Houston's. Houston's separation has been the subject of much speculation, ranging from the gross to the absurd. See for example, the following article: Louise Davis, "Mystery of the Raven," Nashville Tennessean Magazine, May 5, 12, and 19, 1962. There are few, if any, actual documents which are as enlightening as Houston's letter to Mr. Allen. Houston never provided any additional information and neither did the Allen family.
The "facts" in this instance must refer to a counterstatement of the assurances (or the equivalent), for in order to have "prevented the facts" from ever coming to light, the assurances would have to contradict or deny the "facts."
The only remedy, Houston continued, is "for us all to meet as tho it had never occurred, & this will keep the world, as it should ever be, ignorant that such thoughts ever were. Eliza stands acquitted by me." Most certainly Houston had accused her, otherwise she would not "stand acquitted." But now, Houston notes in the next sentence, "I have received her as a virtuous wife, & as such I pray God I may ever regard her, & trust I ever shall."3 All his assurances were to no avail.

One week later, on April 16, 1829, Houston submitted his resignation. In it he acknowledged his gratitude to the people of Tennessee for "recollections so eminently due to the kind partialities of an indulgent public."4

Most biographers report that Eliza loved someone else, but married Houston in compliance with family pressures. This interpretation was first given credence by Crane who cites Houston's second wife as his source. See: William Carey Crane, Life and Select Literary Remains of Sam Houston (Dallas, 1884), p. 37. For additional information, see: Marquis James, The Raven: A Biography of Sam Houston (New York, 1929), pp. 75-85; Llerena Friend, Sam Houston: The Great Designer (Austin, 1954), pp. 19-24; Marion Karl Wisehart, Sam Houston: American Giant (Washington, 1962), pp. 38-50.

3 Houston to John Allen, April 9, 1829, Writings, I, p. 130.

4 Resignation as Governor of Tennessee, Writings, I, p. 131.
He maintained that even though

sheltered by a perfect consciousness of undiminished claim to the confidence & support of my fellow citizens, yet delicately circumstanced as I am, & by my own misfortunes, more than by the fault or contrivance of any one, overwhelmed by sudden calamities, it is certainly due to myself & more respectful to the world, that I should retire from a position, which, in the public judgment, I might seem to occupy by questionable authority. 5

In the last sentence Houston paid tribute to President Andrew Jackson, "that Great and Good man now enjoying the triumph of his virtues in the conscious security of a nation’s gratitude." 6 It is curious that Houston equates individual security with a nation’s gratitude. When considered in the light of his previous admission (that "in the public judgment, I might seem to occupy my position by questionable authority"), there is a basis for concluding that Houston was insecure. Once his indebtedness to Jackson is taken into account, one can appreciate his desire to reaffirm his veneration and esteem for the "old chief." 7

5 Resignation as Governor of Tennessee, Writings, I, p. 131.
6 Ibid., p. 132.
7 At the age of twenty (1813) Houston enlisted in the Army and joined the ranks of the Tennessee Regiment. In 1814, under General Jackson’s command, Houston received two wounds ("one by an arrow, and another by two rifle balls which lodged in my shoulder," see: Houston to James Monroe, March 1, 1815, Writings, I, p. 3.) in an encounter with the Creek Indians at the Battle of Horseshoe Bend.
Houston could part with that portion of his identity derived from his relationship with the people of Tennessee by severing that connection and he could maintain a part of his identity (his relationship to Jackson) by tribute. Furthermore, to preserve the latter identity would require that Houston resign, for there was no other way around the circumstances imposed by his "own misfortunes."

To continue as Governor, he would be compelled to offer some explanation that would at least allude to the causes of the separation suggested in his letter to Mr. Allen.  

From that time forward Houston and Jackson became better and closer acquainted. Although not noted in any biography, it was Jackson who interceded and obtained Houston's appointment as a sub-agent (thus extending Houston's military career, for officers were being disbanded) to the Cherokees in Tennessee, against the protests of Return J. Meigs, the Cherokee Agent. See: Meigs to Major General Jackson, September 9, 1817, "Cherokee Agency in Tennessee," Microfilm Publications, Copy No. 208, Roll No. 7, The National Archives of the United States. As a sub-agent Houston worked with Governor McMinn (Tennessee), another Jackson confidant. Shortly after Houston resigned from the Army (1818), McMinn appointed him Adjutant General of Tennessee. From 1823-1827 Houston served in Congress as a Representative of Tennessee's Ninth District. In Washington, Houston became a vigorous defender of General Jackson and in other ways looked after and tended to the General's political interests. In sum, Houston perceived himself in terms of these accomplishments which were interwoven at almost every turn with Andrew Jackson. Houston's speeches and writings attest to the fact that he identified with Jackson more than any other man.

Houston's letter to Mr. Allen was written prior to the separation. When the news broke that Eliza had returned home and that Houston had resigned, Tennesseans protested in the streets. In Gallatin, Eliza's home, Houston was burned in effigy. In Nashville, a mob threatened violence and the troops were called out to prevent
In essence, it meant a challenge to his wife's virtue. Such a statement would almost certainly terminate Houston's friendship with Jackson and the public would very likely share Jackson's view. After all, Jackson gained renown as one always ready to fight for "the sacred name of a lady" and the people, especially Tennesseans, respected him for it.

Houston's choices then were rather limited. By sacrificing his position he could maintain complete silence about the matter, except for occasional statements to affirm the lady's virtue, and thereby he could demonstrate that he, like Jackson, would never question "the sacred name of a lady." The world would remain ignorant "as it another effigy burning. See: Niles Register, XXXVI (May 23, 1829), p. 198 and Friend, pp. 21-22.

9 Marquis James, The Life of Andrew Jackson (New York, 1938), p. 94. Jackson's wife had been married before and she had not obtained a divorce prior to her marriage to Jackson, although she was under the impression that the divorce had been granted. This situation produced various slanderous attacks against Jackson who became irate at the mention of it. "In 1803," writes Dixon Wecter, "when Jackson's political foe 'Nolichucky Jack' Sevier taunted him with 'taking a trip to Natchez with another man's wife,' Jackson stiffened with flashing eyes. 'Great God! Do you mention her sacred name?' and he lunged at Sevier with his walking-stick. When friends parted them, Jackson sent him a blistering challenge. The duel ended with Governor Sevier hiding behind a tree to escape Jackson's bullet. Three years later... Jackson killed a fellow-lawyer, Charles Dickinson, for a similar insult." See: Dixon Wecter, The Hero in America (Ann Arbor, 1963), p. 202.
should ever be." Although "the world can never know my
situation and may condemn me," he wrote a year later, "God
will justify me!"\(^{10}\) The separation would become a mystery
and each speculation would cast more doubt upon the truth
of the causes. Houston's course of action was ingenious
in that it afforded the least compromise with his former
identity -- it preserved his vital link with Andrew Jack-
son. It also revealed that Houston was terribly insecure
and that ideas and causes were secondary to himself.

"Anyone who would turn from politics to some other
emphasis," observes Kenneth Burke, "must undergo some
change of identity, which is dramatic (involving 'style'
and 'ritual')."\(^{11}\) Houston dramatized these changes
through resignation and even further by the abandonment
of society. The sacrifice afforded him a means of re-
demption. Unlike Jackson, he could not challenge each
slanderer to retract his remarks or be silenced forever,
for the attack was against Houston and \textit{in defense of his}
wife.\(^{12}\) By his removal from society Houston sought an

\(^{10}\) Houston to Major William B. Lewis, May 20, 1830,
\textit{Writings I}, p. 151.

\(^{11}\) Kenneth Burke, \textit{The Philosophy of Literary Form}

\(^{12}\) Those willing to defend the lady's honor were num-
berous and articulate. The most thorough defense appeared
in May of 1830 when a committee composed of some citizens
of Sumner County (Eliza's home) issued a report "in re-
lation to the character of Mrs. Eliza H. Houston, and
escape from this environment and a place where his identity was free from the incriminations of his short lived marriage. Accordingly, Houston's communication during this period can be examined as a ritual or stylistic attempt to alter his identity. This struggle continued for nearly three years. It was not until Houston became involved in the Stanbery Trial (1832) that he was able to redeem himself and connect his past to his present condition without also facing the circumstances imposed upon him by marital disaster.

Houston's first effort, signaled in the resignation statement, was to insure his standing with Old Hickory. While stopped over in Little Rock, Arkansas, on his way to the Cherokee Nation, Houston wrote to the President. "Tho' an unfortunate, and doubtless, the most unhappy man now living," Houston began, "whose honor, so far as it depends upon himself, is not lost, I can not brook the idea of your supposing me capable, of an act that would not adorn."13 To assure Jackson that he had not changed,

the causes which led her to separate from her husband." Her character was deemed "unimpeachable." This report incorporated Houston's letter to Mr. Allen and was widely circulated by the public press. A copy can be found in: Josephus C. Guild, _Old Times in Tennessee_ (Nashville, 1878), pp. 270-273.

13 Houston to Andrew Jackson, May 11, 1829, _Writings_ I, p. 132. "An act that would not adorn" refers to a rumor that Houston "calculated to injure, or involve" his country in an embarrassing enterprise.
Houston referred him to the past.

You sir, have witnessed my conduct from boyhood through life -- You saw me, draw my first sword from its scabbard -- you saw me breast the forefront of Battle, and you saw me encounter successive dangers, with cheeks unblenched, and with nerves which had no ague in them! You have seen my private, & my official acts -- to these I would refer you... And now that domestic misfortune; of which I say nothing; and about which there are ten thousand imputed slanders; has come upon; as a black cloud at noonday I am to be hunted down! What am I? an Exile from my home; and my country, a houseless unsheltered wanderer among the Indians! Who has met, or who has sustained, such sad and unexpected reverses? Yet I am myself, and will remain, the proud and honest man! I will love my country; & my friends -- You Genl. will ever possess my warmest love, and most profound veneration! In return I ask nothing -- I would have nothing, within your power to give me!\footnote{\texttt{Houston to Andrew Jackson, May 11, 1829, \textit{Writings}, I, pp. 132-133. The italics are Houston's.}}

"An Exile" seems an appropriate enough entitlement for Houston; it has since been adopted by every biographer as a label for this period of Houston's life. And yet that term is quite disparate because of Houston's metaphorical reference to himself "as a black cloud." Customarily a black cloud is regarded as an agent or cause of the impending storm. The ordinary usage leads to a placement of the cause of his exile within himself. Although black clouds are not "hunted down," Houston was not really "hunted down" either. An exile, however, may be "hunted
down," especially if he tries to escape banishment. Viewed from this perspective, the two terms of entitlement suggest that Houston was trying to escape from himself.

That conclusion may seem contrived until the entire passage is examined. The exclusive concern is with who Houston was and now is, the sort of consideration usually taken for granted. The passage then symbolized a struggle to define self. The confused use of language reflected Houston's confused state of mind as he attempted to transcend was ("to these I would refer you") into is ("I am myself, and will remain") without admitting a part of the latter reality ("of which I say nothing"). A genuine exile would have been able to link his past and present status and within his past an explanation for his "exiled" condition could be found. But when Houston applied that term to himself, he engaged in self-deception.

Houston's acts as well as his use of language lend support to the argument. It is hardly appropriate for an exile to court the master of those from whom he is supposedly alienated. Of the forty months that biographers standardly include within Houston's exile (April, 1829 to July, 1832), twenty were spent in and around the Cherokee Nation and the other twenty were spent in the "civilized" world -- Little Rock, New Orleans, Nashville, Washington, D.C., New York and places in between. All this activity is atypical of the exile.
Houston's choice of the term, however, was purposeful and he has done well by it (that was certainly among his purposes). It glosses over the crises in Houston's life and the hero becomes a martyr, especially since he was willing to sacrifice himself for some honorable cause, even though an outcast of the world -- all because of a tragic romance. The formula has enough of the magic of which myths are made and can be sufficiently "documented" that it has become an acceptable part of Houston lore and history. To answer "What am I?" with the echo "an exile" is to follow Houston down the path of self-deception and image making. The reply is not that simple, for the disillusionments that Houston experienced brought forth a variety of responses and within them one can find an answer.

When he arrived at the Cherokee Nation, Houston immediately became an advisor on matters affecting government policy in Arkansas Territory. He had indicated that he intended to do so in the letter addressed to Jackson from Little Rock.

When in this section of the country if in my power to give information at any time of matters that concern either your feelings, or your administration I will be proud & happy to do so and in my individual capacity, if I can keep peace among the Indians, & between them & the whites I will cheerfully do it. If I find your favors abused, and injustice done to the Indians, by their agents, I will feel bound, to let you
know the facts.  

The information was soon forthcoming. To Secretary of War, John Eaton, Houston suggested a policy to establish peace between the Osages and the Pawnees (and other Western tribes) so that the trade route from St. Louis to Santa Fe, Mexico, might be free of Indian attack. An "exchange of prisoners," Houston advised, "united to the necessity of the Tribes being compelled to hunt off the same ground, would, as I believe, dispose them to peace on reasonable terms." He then recommended that Augustus F. Chouteau, a merchant and trader, be appointed to negotiate the treaties. Furthermore, Houston "would, with great pleasure accompany him on the Mission, and render all aid within my power, but will not accept any compensation for my services as the duty would recreate my mind."

15 Houston to Andrew Jackson, May 11, 1829, Writings, I, p. 133. The italics are Houston's.

16 Houston to John H. Eaton, June 24, 1829, Writings, I, p. 135. Houston writes with considerable confidence, especially for a newcomer who had been in the area for only two weeks. An exchange of prisoners would have been helpful, but the Indians could (and did) look after that themselves. Houston's advice regarding hunting grounds is subject to doubt. The trade route (and westward emigration that followed that route) was already beginning to compel the Indians to hunt off the same grounds and as that necessity increased, it gradually promoted and intensified the conflict, rather than lessening it. See: William T. Hagan, American Indians (Chicago, 1960), pp. 66-120.

17 Ibid., p. 136. Houston wrote similar policy
The act of writing to Eaton also served to "recreate" Houston's mind. In stepping down from one position of political leadership, Houston assumed another. Arkansas Territory was one of the few places (if not the only place) where Houston could make that assumption; but when his letters went unheeded, he must have recognized that his position lacked the necessary authority for his remarks to receive serious consideration. However, by September, Houston received encouragement from the fact that he did possess some authority, enough at least to command a letter from the President.

It "was a cordial to my spirits." "Had a scepter

suggestions to Col. Matthew Arbuckle, Commandant of Fort Gibson, a nearby military outpost. See: Writings, I, pp. 136-139.

The correspondence between the Osage, Creek, and Cherokee Agencies and the Office of the Secretary of War offers no substantiation that would lend credence to the belief that Houston's suggestions (such as those above) were incorporated into government policy. See: "Osage Agency," Microfilm Publications, Microcopy No. 234, Roll No. 631; "Creek Agency, West," Microfilm Publications, Microcopy No. 234, Roll No. 236; "Cherokee Agency, West," Microfilm Publications, Microcopy No. 234, Roll Nos. 77, 78, and 79; all of which are available from the National Archives of the United States, Washington, D. C. As a matter of fact, the United States did not enter into formal negotiations with the Plains tribes until the 1850's. Jack Gregory and Rennard Strickland, in Sam Houston with the Cherokees, 1829-1833 (Austin, 1967), refer to such letters as the one above to document Houston's role as a "peacemaker" (see: pp. 61-69). This thesis does not attempt to refute Gregory and Strickland per se because their errors are so numerous that a refutation soon becomes a task in and of itself. However, the argument advanced herein has considered all of their sources.
been dashed at my feet, it would not have afforded the same pleasure, which I derived from the proud consciousness, not only that I deserved, but that I possessed your confidence!"19 Although Houston wanted Jackson's confidence more than power, he yearned for both -- indeed, in the sequence of the sentence the scepter precedes Jackson. Whatever the case, the scepter certainly ranked high among Houston's exigencies. "It is hard for an old Trooper, to forget the note of the Bugle!" he confided.20

When I left the world I had persuaded myself that I would lose all care, about the passing political events, of the world, as well as those of my own country, but it is not so, for as often as I visit Cant. Gibson, where I can obtain News Papers, I find that my interest is rather increased than diminished. . . Having been so actively engaged for years past in politics, it is impossible to lose all interest in them for some time to come, should I remain in my present situation!21

The Indian Removal Bill (1830) presented Houston with an opportunity to continue in his "present situation" and become more actively involved in the government's policies in the West.22 President Jackson requested legislation to

19 Houston to Andrew Jackson, September 19, 1829, Writings, I, p. 141. The italics are Houston's.

20 Ibid., p. 142. The italics are Houston's.

21 Ibid., p. 142.

22 As early as 1817 the Monroe Administration had instituted a removal policy and a few bands of tribes east of the Mississippi conceded land in exchange for land west of the Mississippi (the Cherokees that Houston lived
initiate his Indian policy in the First Annual Message, but even before that time it was clear to all observers what the Administration's stance would be.\textsuperscript{23} Congressman John Bell (Tennessee) and Senator Hugh White (Tennessee), Chairmen of the respective Congressional Committees on Indian Affairs, were in the process of drafting a proposal that would accommodate the views of the Administration when Houston arrived in Washington, D. C., in mid-January, 1830.\textsuperscript{24}

with were one such group). Although Monroe and Adams urged Congress to take action that would authorize the President to encourage removal, the measures were defeated in Congress. The situation gradually worsened (heightened by the conflict between the State of Georgia and the Cherokees and Creeks -- the Cherokees asking for protection from the Federal Government as guaranteed in various treaties, while Georgia pressed for "states rights") until by the time that Jackson took office a removal bill of some sort seemed inevitable, although passage would be difficult. An excellent discussion can be found in: Francis Paul Prucha, \textit{American Indian Policy in the Formative Years} (Cambridge, 1962), pp. 213-249.

\textsuperscript{23} James D. Richardson, \textit{Messages and Papers of the Presidents} (Washington, 1897), III, pp. 1019-1022. Jackson's position was clear by his refusal to send protection to the Cherokees. See: Prucha, pp. 235-236. Jackson had been an advocate of removal ever since he helped Monroe negotiate the Treaty of 1817 with the Cherokees (the same group that Houston worked with as a sub-agent and now resided with in Arkansas).

\textsuperscript{24} Gales and Seaton, \textit{Register of Debates in Congress}, VI, Part I, pp. 128, 305, 507-508, and 580-581. See the remarks by and about Bell and White on the pages cited. Houston's arrival is documented by a letter that he wrote to his cousin; see: Houston to John H. Houston, January 11, 1830, \textit{Writings}, I, p. 147. Houston accompanied three Cherokees on this trip to Washington. He was not (as is often alleged) a part of any formal delegation from
Shortly thereafter Houston solicited Jackson for the contract to supply the emigrant Indians with rations.25

Section 5 of the bill stipulated that

upon the making of any such exchange as is contemplated by this act, it shall and may be lawful for the President to cause such aid and assistance to be furnished to the emigrants as may be necessary and proper to enable them to remove to, and settle in, the country for which they may have exchanged; and also to give them such aid and assistance as may be necessary for their support and subsistence for the first year after their removal.26

Houston maintained that he could supply the rations at a cost considerably under what the previous Administration had paid for similar subsistence; and, most importantly, he could see to it that the Indians were not defrauded.27

the Cherokee Nation and neither were the Indians who accompanied him. Indeed, the Council of the Cherokee Nation had specifically denied any representative authority to this group. John Rogers, the Nation's interpreter, was fearful of the group's intentions and wrote Secretary Eaton. We have "reason to believe that the men who went from here design, altho' they have no authority from the Nation, interfering with our concerns with the Government." See: John Rogers to John H. Eaton, January 4, 1830, "Cherokee Agency, West," Microfilm Publications, Microcopy No. 234, Roll No. 77, The National Archives of the United States.


27 See the testimony by Duff Green, Gov. Branch, and Secretary Eaton, in Reports of Committees, pp. 24-26 and 67.
The President referred Houston to the Secretary of War, John Eaton, who in turn imposed the first of what turned out to be a series of stumbling blocks that eventually prevented Houston from obtaining the contract. After conversing with Houston, the Secretary advised Jackson on the matter.

Public men must act, not merely not to deserve, but also not even to seem to deserve censure. Accordingly, I have said to General S. Houston that we cannot make a private contract with him; but must advertise for proposals. He is quite satisfied with the course. I propose, therefore, if you approve it, to advertise, say thirty days for proposals for supplying the Indians who may emigrate during this year; or may, for the next, also.28

The President agreed and two days later Col. Thomas L. McKenney, Director, Office of Indian Affairs, advertised for bids to supply the rations.29 A month later, when the bids were opened, a variety of pressures brought into focus a potentially embarrassing situation should the government award the contract to Houston. Col. John Sevier (Territorial Delegate from Arkansas to Congress) was upset because the time allotted had not been sufficient for "his people" to offer bids. Houston's bid, entered in

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28 John H. Eaton to Andrew Jackson, February 16, 1830, in Reports of Committees, pp. 66-67. The italics are Eaton's.

29 Reports of Committees, pp. 5-6. A ration consisted "of one pound and a quarter of fresh beef, or one pound of fresh pork, with two quarts of salt to every one hundred of these; or, if salted meat is issued, one pound of beef, and three-quarters of a pound of pork, with a quart of corn or corn meal to each ration of meat, whether fresh or salt, or eighteen ounces of flour."
concert with Gen. John Van Fossen, was five cents above the
lowest bid. Gen. Duff Green, editor of the United States
Telegraph, was determined "to defeat the contract with
Houston." Houston had tangled with Col. McKenney; as a
consequence, McKenney did not look upon Houston with favor.
In April, at the request of the House, McKenney submitted
a report to the Secretary of War which estimated the cost
per ration at a price even lower than the lowest bid.30
As a final blow, the fate of the removal bill was uncertain
as the debate in the House dragged on. Congressman Bell
introduced the bill in February, six days after the publica-
tion of the advertisement for ration contracts. Objection
had been raised to the whole notion of contracts.31 In
May, as a result of all of these factors and before the
bill passed, the Administration decided to turn the ration
business over to the Commissary Department of the Army.32

Houston left Washington early in April, hopeful, if

These conclusions are drawn from the testimony
offered in Reports of Committees; the quoted material is
taken from pp. 12, 15, and 62.

Mr. Everett (Massachusetts) and Mr. Test (Indiana)
raised objection to the letter of contracts. See: Gales
and Seaton, Register of Debates in Congress, VI, Part II,
pp. 1076-1077 and 1108. The bill passed by a small major-
ity (97-103) on May 26, 1830; see: Gales and Seaton, p. 1135.
Some biographers erroneously attribute Houston's failure to
obtain the contract to a failure of the bill to receive
passage. See: Wisehart, p. 66.

Reports of Committees, p. 23.
not confident, of being awarded the contract. He knew too that it would be at least a year before the business actually began -- treaties with each of the tribes had to be negotiated and then ratified by the Senate. In May, he wrote to Eaton to apply for the sutler's position at Fort Gibson "under the belief," he later observed, that the present sutler "would be removed." In preparation, he had a keel boat loaded with supplies and sent them ahead to his place in the Cherokee Nation.

Houston arrived in early June and by then it was already clear to him that his efforts to obtain the contract and the sutlership were for naught. The sutler had not been removed and it was rumored that Luther Blake, sub-agent to the Creeks, would receive the contract inasmuch as his bid of eight cents was the lowest (Houston's bid was thirteen). Embittered by this turn of events, Houston lashed out at Eaton. Even if the sutler had been removed, he began, "if the situation were now offered to me by you -- as a man of principle and honor I should feel bound to reject it, for reasons which have

33 Houston to John Van Fossen, April 4, 1830, Writings, I, pp. 147-148.
34 The bill was designed principally for the removal of the Southern Tribes (Cherokee, Creek, Choctaw, and Chickasaw) -- in all, about 60,000 Indians. A conservative estimate of the cost of the rations exceeded $4,000,000.
35 Houston to John H. Eaton, June 13, 1830, Writings, I, p. 152; also see: Houston to Major William B. Lewis, May 20, 1830, Writings, I, p. 151.
lately arisen, and for causes which now exist!" 36 Houston's stance seems peculiarly defensive until it is discovered that the "reasons lately arisen" refer to the charge that he "sought to impose upon the Government on account of Indian Rations." Furthermore, Houston notes, "Mr. Blake was the agent to asperse me, and Colonel McKinney (whose influence is undoubted with you) the cause." 37

Even more deplorable to Houston was the understanding that Eaton was about to award the contract privately -- exactly the same grounds on which he had previously refused Houston.

And Sir, by the last advices it is understood here, that Colonel Crowell was waiting at the city to take the contract for Indian rations "privately," and further that he has written to Mr. Blake (his) and Colonel McKinney's special Sub agent, to withdraw his bid, as it was the lowest put in for the contract, and then the bid (next lowest) of Mr. Prentiss another partner would get it!

"The lowest bid put in for the contract" was, of course, Luther Blake's bid for eight cents. But, Houston alleges and underlines in the next paragraph:

I informed you, that the ration could be furnished, at seven cents, if the contract was advertised, either ninety, or one hundred and twenty days (in Arkansas) previous to its

36 Houston to John Eaton, June 13, 1830, Writings, I, pp. 152-153.

37 Ibid., p. 153.
The letter conveys the sense of betrayal that Houston felt from the "last advices" which spelt the collapse of a scheme he had counted on. In Houston's mind Blake "was the agent to asperse me," Col. McKenney "the cause," and Eaton was "destroying himself by retaining McKenney." In fact, almost everyone involved, from Col. Crowell, agent to the Eastern Creeks, to Major William B. Lewis, Second Auditor of the United States Treasury (the auditor responsible for settling Indian accounts), and his assistant, John Peters, were guilty of "hellish corruption." "My next epistle," Houston threatened, "will


39 The indictment of Eaton comes from Houston to John H. Houston, June 28, 1830, Writings, V, p. 5. The other quotations are from his letter of June 13, 1830, to Eaton; see: Writings, I, p. 153.

40 Houston to John H. Houston, June 28, 1830, Writings, V, p. 5. This letter to his cousin who lived in Washington D. C., is intriguing because of Houston's derogatory reference to Major William B. Lewis. In a footnote the editors of the Writings incorrectly identify Lewis as with the Indian agency for the Creeks and Cherokees. In actuality, Lewis, although formally appointed as Second Auditor, was among Jackson's most intimate advisors throughout his years as President. He managed the 1828 campaign. Houston's attack on Lewis suggests that Houston was so disturbed by the loss of the ration contract (and the accusation) that he became paranoid and viewed practically everyone, except perhaps Jackson (although only one letter to Jackson is extant for the remainder of 1830 and all of
meet the public eye! The judgment will then belong to others, the Vindication to myself!"\(^{41}\) What a change from just a month before when he had written Eaton for the sutler's post at Fort Gibson. Instead of finding upon his return that a scepter had been dashed at his feet, Houston discovered that his ambitions had been thwarted and that he faced a new set of allegations. His alienation became intensified -- 1830 was considerably different than 1829. Although his misfortunes seemed to compound annually, he now had someone to blame besides himself. He had been betrayed by the same group that supposedly defrauded the Indians. Indeed, his plight seemed analogous to theirs. Frustrated by his inability to get what he wanted (note the sense of despair that accompanies "I informed you" in the letter to Eaton), Houston sought a new identity and became an Indian; or, more accurately, as will become apparent, he went through the motions.

"I will commence," Houston told Eaton, "a series of numbers in the Arkansas Gazette signed Talohntusky, showing in what manner the agencies have been, and are now managed in this quarter. The innocent will not suffer, the

\(^{1831}\), as part of a conspiracy against him. Much of Houston's correspondence with his cousin has yet to be published (see: footnote 2, *Writings*, I, p. 147). At this writing the letters remain in a private collection and unavailable.

guilty ought not to escape."  

This announcement coupled with Houston's previous rejection of many reigning symbols of authority were the first indications that his alienation was so complete that he would seek a new identity -- "thereby getting," as Burke explains such conduct, "purification by dissociation."  

"A thorough job of symbolic rebirth would require," according to Burke, "the revision of one's ancestral past itself."  

"To be complete... would require nothing less drastic than the obliteration of one's whole past lineage."  

It would appear that Houston intended to be rather thorough, for when the supplies arrived that he ordered for the sutler's store, Houston declared Cherokee citizenship so as to be immune to the laws affecting trade with the Indians. "I am a citizen of the Cherokee Nation," Houston wrote to Col. Arbuckle, "and as such I do contend that the intercourse laws have no other bearing upon me, or my circumstances, than they would upon any other native born Cherokee!"

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44 Ibid., p. 36.
45 Ibid., p. 36. The italics are Burke's.
46 Houston to Matthew Arbuckle, July 21, 1830, Writings, I, pp. 185-186.
In addition to altering his identity by "symbolic rebirth," Houston sought purification by route of the scapegoat. Scapegoating is an especially "'curative' process," for

the sense of frustration leads to a self-questioning. Hence, if one can hand over his infirmities to a vessel, or "cause," outside the self, one can battle an external enemy instead of battling an enemy within. And the greater one's internal inadequacies, the greater amount of evils one can load upon the back of "the enemy." This device is furthermore given a semblance of reason because the individual properly realizes that he is not alone responsible for his condition. There are inimical factors in the scene itself.47

Col. Thomas McKenney ("the cause") and Luther Blake ("the agent to asperse me") became the prime victims of Houston's "Vindication." But the Indians did not regard them in a similar light and this realization is a major clue to understanding why Houston's attempts at purification failed.48 If Houston were to succeed by rhetorical means, then the scapegoat would identify enemies held in common. Or, if they were not so regarded to begin with, Houston would need to convince the Indians that this was


48 All one needs to do is read the memorials and other correspondence between the various tribes and the Office of the Secretary of War to realize that the Indians complained about a great deal more than the injustices of particular agents -- none of whom Houston mentioned. In fact, individual agents were seldom made the object of their complaint. Col. McKenney was so remote to them that his name was never mentioned.
the case, so that the scapegoat would become a bond between
them, affording, in essence, consubstantiality. But Hous-
ton addressed a white audience, not the Indians, when he
published the articles in the *Arkansas Gazette*.

This conflict in strategies reveals the continuing
struggle within the man, as Houston sought to cast off
rejection by signing off as an Indian, while he simul-
taneously sought re-entrance into society by being a
savior of America's honor through the exposure of corrup-
tion. Houston's efforts to purify were doomed to failure
from the outset and that is clear from the sort of equa-
tions that emerge from an analysis of the articles.

The first article paved the way for what followed by
setting forth the problem in general, promising to present
the details in forthcoming "chapters." The opening sen-
tence awakens the suspicion that Houston's charge is more
concerned with the betrayal he experienced than it is
with an analysis of the ways America betrayed the Indian.
"There is a point of endurance in human suffering," Hous-
ton begins, "beyond which submission is meanness, and
silence would be worse than base slavishness."49 Human
suffering equaled "the anguish of hope deferred, and
promises violated or totally disregarded" and it was

49 Tah-Lohn-Tus-Ky, "THE INDIANS! -- Chapter First,"
*Arkansas Gazette*, XI (June 22, 1830) in *Writings*, I,
p. 155.
caused by the agents who "betrayed and abused public trust." Indeed, "were it not for the injustice of the Agents to the Indians, on the Arkansas, I should deem it the most appropriate abode of the Indians." Correct this injustice, Houston asserted, and those Indians living in the East who object to removal "would be infinitely better and happier. . . than they can ever be within the limits of the States, whose jurisdictional rights are, to my mind, unquestionable." 

Salvation rested upon "the hope of a just and faithful cooperation of those in power." Fortunately, "there is a polar star," Houston expounds, existing in the moral, as well as the physical world, which should regulate the course of the mariner, sailing on either ocean. My course will be directed to the genius, integrity, and intelligence, of the President of the United


51 Ibid., p. 157.

52 Standing Bear, Arkansas Gazette, XI (August 11, 1830), in Writings, I, p. 169. The editors of the Writings incorrectly assigned the date of "August 14, 1830" to the article and entitled it "In Defence /sic/ of the Indians." It appeared August 11, 1830 and was untitled. Houston is obviously defending Jackson's removal policy. At the time he wrote this article the Eastern Cherokees were preparing their case against the State of Georgia for presentation before the Supreme Court. Although the Court decided in their favor, Jackson ignored the ruling and brought about their removal by force. In sum: the jurisdictional rights of the Cherokees and not the States were deemed "unquestionable" by a decision of the Supreme Court.

States, as the polar guides, which are to con-
duct the Philanthropist to that haven, which
will secure to the Indians justice and stay the
hand of their rapacious and cruel oppressors.54

A correction of the injustices would bestow "real
benefits on the Indians, and throw back upon the character
of the United States, honor and the brightest sunshine of
national glory."55 However, Houston concludes, it "would
require much time, and attention to this subject," in
order

to place it in a situation, where the wisdom
of the President would be brought to act
fairly upon it. For that purpose, the writer
of this article will pursue the subject, by
chapters, in which he holds himself pledged to
exhibit a scene of corruption in the agents
of the United States, without parallel -- un-
less, it is to be found in the conduct of
Warren Hastings, while employed in the East
Indies.56

The remaining articles "exhibit a scene of corruption."
"The government has the money to pay, and a fat goose stands
picking the best," Houston observed in the next install-
ment.57 Foremost among the fat geese was Luther Blake
who "had been employed by the family," -- a term Houston
used to imply guilt by association, thereby linking Blake

54 Tah-Lohn-Tus-Ky, "THE INDIANS! -- Chapter First,"
Arkansas Gazette, XI (June 22, 1830), in Writings, I, p. 155.
55 Ibid., p. 155.
56 Ibid., p. 156.
57 Tah-Lohn-Tus-Ky, "THE CREEK INDIANS: Chapter Second,"
Arkansas Gazette, XI (July 7, 1830), in Writings, I, p. 160.
with Col. Crowell (who was disliked by removal advocates) and Brearley (who had already been removed from office). 58

Mr. Blake was sent to the Agency on Arkansas, by appointment of Col. Crowell; he had been employed by the family in the old nation; a Maj. Love also belonged to the retinue; and remained in this country. Mr. Jos Brearley was left here by his father, the Agent, in charge of his affairs. Mr. Blake, the Sub-Agent sent by Col. Crowell, had superseded Mr. Brearley, and was engaged in giving his receipts for the corn delivered under the contract. A speculation was presented, and, as the poor Indians were to be victims of rapacity, why, it was all very well. The aforesaid Maj. Love, "to secure the speculation, repaired to St. Louis, with letters of credit from Mr. Blake," the Sub-Agent of Col. Crowell, and purchased several thousand dollars worth of merchandise, and, so soon as he could reach the Creek Agency, commenced purchasing the corn receipts issued by the Sub-Agent. It is reasonable to suppose, that the goods were sold, on an average, at two hundred per centum above cost and carriage; and by this means the Indians would get about one-third of the value of their corn, at the contract price! They offered to let the receipts go at twenty-five per cent discount, if they could only obtain cash for them. 59

58 Brearley was removed from office because of alleged corruption. See: Creek Memorial to the President, March 7, 1829, in "Creek Agency, West," Microfilm Publications, Microcopy No. 234, Roll No. 236, The National Archives of the United States. Crowell was disliked because he sided with the Eastern Creeks in opposing the treaty that Chief McIntosh (who represented a faction that constituted about one tenth of the Creek Nation) had signed in 1825 ceding the remaining Creek land to Georgia. The Council of the Creek Nation sentenced McIntosh to death and the treaty was later annulled by the United States. The episode had especially strong emotional overtones because of McIntosh's unabiding loyalty to General Jackson and the United States. McIntosh served under Jackson as brigadier general in the war against the Seminoles (1817-1818). See: William Brandon, The American Heritage Book of Indians (New York, 1964), pp. 218-225.

"But what of all this?" asked Houston. Naturally, "the blame rests somewhere." To establish guilt Houston sifted through various candidates so that by a process of elimination the blame appeared to rest with one man.

Is it with the Agency? If so, there is a remedy! Or can it be, that the head of the War Department is obnoxious to censure? No: I would suppose not! The President of the United States cannot be censurable; because these things come within the general plan of arrangement, and are but details within that sphere! -- There is but one other individual to whom we can look, as the praiseworthy object of these crying and cruel enormities! And he will be found to be none other, than the successful diplomatist of three Administrations -- the constant apologist of every delinquent Agent in the Indian Department -- the complaisant sycophant of those in power -- always ready to play politician agreeably to the Vicar of Bray system, or the more lately approved very successful, and revised plan of, Col. Thomas L. McKinney, at the head of the Indian Department! Yes! Col. McKinney is the officer, to whom directly all the censure for withholding the funds should be attached.

Later on, under the name of "Standing Bear," Houston


61 Ibid., pp. 161-162. Thomas L. Mc Kenney (correctly spelled with two "e's") was Superintendent of Indian Trade from 1816-1824. In 1824, Secretary of War Calhoun created the Bureau of Indian Affairs and appointed McKenney to head that office, a position McKenney held until 1830. Prucha described him as a "zealous promoter of Indian welfare" (p. 57). Ironically, McKenney would have agreed with Houston's criticism of funding, for he had devoted much of his time to the reorganization of the Bureau and drew up legislation (1826) that would have given the Director more authority over all matters of Indian relations, one of which was appropriations. See: Prucha,
devoted an entire article to an attack on McKenney. After pointing to some alleged acts of corruption in the withholding of funds, Houston finally came to the point so directly that it was obvious his argument with McKenney stemmed from the loss of the ration contract. "The Colonel and myself agree upon our subject -- that of emigration -- but differ as to the 'modus operandi.'"62 "The plan I suggest," Houston said,

would be, to advertise contracts, and let them out to persons who would furnish good provisions, and let the Agents be responsible to the Government and the Indians, and see that they are well supplied with wholesome rations.63

The remaining articles were a repetition of the previous charges. "Although he screens himself under the signature of an honest Cherokee," Hugh Love replied, "the wolf is known, and the adopted Cherokee shall have his mask removed and his base and malignant character exposed."64 Houston's enemies were also able practitioners of invective!65 Luther Blake denied the allegations. "I

American Indian Policy in the Formative Years, pp. 57-60.

62 Standing Bear, Arkansas Gazette, XI (August 11, 1830), in Writings, I, p. 168. The italics are Houston's.

63 Ibid., pp. 168-169.

64 Hugh Love, "To the Public," Arkansas Gazette, XI (August 4, 1830), p. 2. The italics are Love's.

65 Skill in invective was as necessary and as common an ingredient of self-defense as was the fist. See: Frances Lea McCurdy, "Invective in Frontier Missouri," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XLVI (February, 1960), pp. 54-58.
pronounce all charges against the Agents, since the removal of Col. Brearly, as respects neglect or speculation, to be false. As for Houston, Blake concluded:

He wants nothing, he says; he certainly did want to get the contract to feed all the Indians West of the Mississippi, at the moderate price of thirteen to twenty cents per ration. A man who will say he wants nothing, and will misrepresent to the Government, for the purpose of trying to take advantage of the good citizens of Arkansas and Missouri, I think is dishonest.

According to Cho-To-Ga, a respondent who presented himself as "but a poor Osage," neither Blake nor Houston were "so bad as they would wish you to believe." "You must know," Cho-To-Ga confided, that Houston is very fond of money, and did engage with Mar-hin-wa/Blake/ in a speculation that would have made their fortunes, had not the honesty of one and the jealousy of the other prevented their cooperating. . . . Neither of them are such philanthropists as they would wish you to believe; for their zeal in the cause of us poor Indians, originates solely from their desire to get what is coming to us.

The replies allowed Houston to introduce himself more directly into the exchange. The "exile" to whom you allude, Houston wrote, "is well known to me, and I have had

67 Ibid., p. 2.
68 Cho-To-Ga, "To the Editor," Arkansas Gazette, XI (October 6, 1830), p. 3.
69 Ibid., p. 3.
an interview with him since the publication... I am fully in possession of all the facts which relate to him."70

Houston devoted more than half of the last article to an interview with himself in which he answered accusations concerning his role as sub-agent (1817) and his purpose in going to Washington in 1830. "Now," Houston concludes:

having, by a previous communication, called down your ire upon this "turban Governor," as you call him, I have felt bound thus far to justify him, by giving to the world his statement of facts. If they are untrue, or any one of them, and you will convince me of it, it is the last time that I shall take upon myself to offer any vindications in his behalf. But neither your interrogatories nor your statements will be received in evidence against him. But, since you have called my attention to the subject, I will, ere long, run a parallel between the conduct of Col. Webber and Agent, in relation to the improvement claims, and see who has acted the more praiseworthily. And it will be well enough to take a squint at contracts.71

The articles ended much as they began, with the author squinting at contracts under the illusion that by innuendo and a constant bellowing about corruption, he could become the "more praiseworthy" and so achieve "Vindication." The men Houston accused were either already removed from office (such as Brearley and Du Val) or, as it turned out, they were involved in one way or

70 Tah-Lohn-Tus-Ky, "THE INDIANS!!! -- Chapter Third," Arkansas Gazette, XI (September 8, 1830), in Writings, I, p. 171.

71 /unsigned/, "To the Editor," Arkansas Gazette (Supplement), XI (December 8, 1830), in Writings, I, p. 185.
another in the competition for the ration contract. The extent to which the latter were guilty of corruption is not, in all instances, possible to discern. However, the charges against Blake appear contrived. Houston's criticism of McKenney is not only a disservice to the man, it is almost inexcusable. Houston knew the limited authority of McKenney's office. Nevertheless, there were some highlights that attest to Houston's cleverness and his resilience; he was especially vicious with invective. But the articles ought to be understood for what they are -- namely, disguised attempts to defend himself under the aegis of defending the Indians. The articles benefited neither and they did not afford the means by which Houston could define a satisfactory role, although the writing probably served to "recreate" his mind and to that degree, the act offered vicarious "Vindication."

The futility of the articles must have been apparent even to Houston a year later. In July of 1831, while in Nashville, Houston came across a news item which maligned his character. It is "not the first which has found its way into the public prints, containing ridiculous and

unfounded abuse of me." In an effort to transcend any individual responsibility for his suffering, Houston submitted an advertisement to the *National Banner and Nashville Whig* in which he blamed such abuse upon the "American System." Although the following "Proclamation" was written partly in jest, it nevertheless demonstrates that Houston was still trying to unload his burden.

Now, know all men by these presents, that I, Sam Houston, "late Governor of the State of Tennessee," do hereby declare to all scoundrels whomsoever, that they are authorized to accuse, defame, calumniate, slander, vilify, and libel me to any extent, in personal or private abuse. And I do further proclaim, to whomsoever it may concern, that they are hereby permitted and authorized to write, indite, print, publish and circulate the same; and that I will in nowise hold them responsible to me in law, or honor, for either the use of the "raw material," or the fabrication of any, or all of the above named articles, connected with the "American System;" nor will I have recourse to nullification, in any case whatsoever, where a conviction would not secure to the culprit the dignity of a penitentiary residence. And as some ingenuity has already been displayed in the exhibition of specimens, and others may be induced to invest a small capital in the business, from feelings of emulation and an itching after experiment -- Be it known for the especial encouragement of all scoundrels hereafter, as well as those who have already been engaged, that I do solemnly propose, on the first day of April next, to give to the author of the most elegant, refined and ingenious lie or calumny, a handsome gilt copy (Bound in sheep) of the Kentucky Reporter, or a snug plain copy of the United States Telegraph, (bound in dog) since its commencement.  

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74 Ibid., p. 196. The italics are Houston's.
When the time came for the presentation of the awards, Houston had forgotten what he "solemnly proposed," but there is little doubt that had he remembered, the beneficiary would have been Congressman William Stanbery of Ohio. On March 31, 1832, the day before the "Proclamation" expired, Stanbery ripped into the Administration in the course of Congressional debate. Although he did not intend to impute fraud to Houston, the inference was unmistakable. "Unlimited confidence in the President is a doctrine unknown to the constitution," Stanbery asserted.

We are placed here to check the Executive. But now, it is thought the only mark of genuine patriotism to profess the most unbounded devotion to the will of the President. . . . Was the late Secretary of War Eaton removed in consequence of his attempt fraudulently to give to Governor Houston the contract for Indian rations? 75

After reading these remarks in the National Intelligencer, Houston wrote Stanbery and requested to know whether the "remarks have been correctly quoted." 76 Stanbery replied, through an intermediary, that he could "not recognize the right of Mr. Houston to make this request." 77 Before he answered Houston, Stanbery later


76 Houston to William Stanberry, April 3, 1832, Writings, I, pp. 199-200.

77 Register of Debates in Congress, Vol. VIII, Part II, p. 2571
recalled,

I had a consultation with some of my friends, who agreed with me upon the answer which was sent. It was the opinion of one of my friends /Senator Thomas Ewing of Ohio/ that it was proper I should be armed; that immediately upon the reception of my note, Mr. Houston would probably make an assault upon me. Mr. Ewing accordingly procured for me a pair of pistols and a dirk; and on the morning on which the answer was sent, I was prepared to meet Mr. Houston.78

Stanbery's expectations were not fulfilled until he met up with Houston nine days later at eight o'clock in the evening on Friday, the 13th of April -- across the street from Stanbery's boarding house on Pennsylvania Avenue. As soon as he crossed the street, "Houston stood before me," Stanbery testified. "He called me by my name, and instantly struck me with the bludgeon [walking cane] he had in his hand... and struck me repeatedly with great violence."79 In the ensuing struggle Stanbery tried to shoot Houston but the pistol misfired. When Houston


79 Ibid., p. 2572. Stanbery's constant reference to the cane as a "bludgeon" or "club" was noted by Francis Scott Key (Houston's counsel) as hardly an "adequate" description of the "terrific weapon." Indeed, the instrument, Key observed, reminded him "on seeing an honorable gentleman measuring it, and comparing it with his finger, of the venerable judge who is said to have presented his thumb to show the dimensions of the stick with which, in those strange old times, the law allowed a man to chastise his wife." See: Register of Debates in Congress, Vol. VIII, Part II, p. 2599.
"finished with him," Stanbery fled back across the street to his quarters.

On the next morning Stanbery addressed a formal complaint to the Speaker of the House. By a vote of 145 to 25, the House decided to arrest Houston for "breach of privilege." He was brought before the House on the following Monday and entered a plea of "not guilty" to the charges set forth in the arraignment. Three days later the trial began. Francis Scott Key was employed as counsel for the defense. The trial dragged on for a month, seemingly forever bogged down in the mire of parliamentary wrangling over "objections."

Finally, on May 7th, following the anthem writer's summation, Houston spoke in his own defense. It was clear to him at least a week beforehand that his basic strategy would be to transcend the role of defendant by enacting the part of a representative, a role delegated to him by the House when the majority converted Congress into a court. "Congress can do nothing with me," Houston boasted to a friend in New York. "It is the test of a great principle, in which the liberty & reputation of every American citizen is involved, and I am proud to be its representative on the present occasion."80 This strategy enabled Houston to purify his motives and brought about the

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80 Houston to James Prentiss, May 1, 1832, Writings, I, pp. 203-204.
symbolic rebirth that his previous rhetorical efforts had failed to achieve. From a Burkeian perspective, we might think of Houston's plea as a "secular variant of prayer." The stylization lends support to this interpretation, for the equations that can be derived from the text reflect a religious pattern of thought. Such a pattern is "based upon the use of ways for converting our sufferings and handicaps into a good." Houston brought about this conversion principally through "mystification," self-abnegation, and by associating the God-terms of the legislative body with his own redemption.

Houston first acknowledged his respect for the House and then proceeded to clarify certain points that had been raised in previous testimony. "All I demand is, that my actions may be pursued to the motives which gave them birth." He could hardly be more forthright in stating that his purpose was to cleanse. Houston wanted it understood by everyone that the charge of "lying in wait" and the description of his "attack" as an attempt at "assassination" existed "only in the imagination of my accuser."

The encounter was unexpected "on my part, and under cir-

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82 Kenneth Burke, *The Philosophy of Literary Form*, p. 166.

cumstances of provocation, such as I am well persuaded no member of this body would ever brook." Furthermore, he did not attack Stanbery for words spoken in the House. Rather,

it was for publishing in the Intelligencer libellous matter, to my injury; such as no member of this honorable court, who is conscious of the rights of an American citizen, would ever tamely submit to. . . . After having been "blasted" by the stroke of adversity, and hunted from society as an outlaw, to be now libelled for corruption, and charged with fraud upon the Government, is too much to endure. . . . Should I submit to this I should indeed think that I was man not only of "broken fortune," but of "blasted reputation."85

The explanation is noteworthy, for Houston says in essence that his perception of self, which had become "too much to endure," motivated his act. In other words, by physical assault, Houston affirmed who he was and regained self-esteem. In addition, by speaking in his own defense, Houston could confirm this image before the public -- if he could identify with them. The peculiarity of the circumstances lessened the task somewhat, but that ought not to detract from Houston's mastery of the situation. The question is "whether, in correcting one wrong, another may not spring up of far greater and overshadowing magnitude."86 By magnifying the shadow's magnitude, Houston

84 Houston's Defense in the Stanbery Case, May 7, 1832, Writings, I, pp. 208-209
85 Ibid., p. 209.
86 Ibid., p. 223
identified with the public (although certainly not with a majority of the Representatives) and made it appear that his case loomed as a threat, should he not be acquitted, to the inalienable rights of every American.

Some people are always ready to believe that the government (whether it be the President, the Congress, or the Court) is about to deny them their rights, but in 1832 it seemed a possibility to many -- especially to the Jackson loyalists who had not yet forgotten that it was Congress who kept the majority from electing the President in 1824. "Should Congress or the People elect our President?" had been the campaign slogan in 1828. Houston's argument about Congressional authority struck a delicate nerve. He appealed to this sentiment through "mystification" -- i.e., by focusing on "privilege" as an ultimate term, Houston made the authority of Congress appear abstruse and thereby achieved unity. "If I have violated any privilege, that privilege must be somewhere declared," he asserted.

It is a privilege which the American people do not know; and I demand, on their behalf, to know what it is. I shall bow to that privilege when it shall have been defined, and when it shall have become constitutional, by the people's acquiescence. But where there is no law, there is

no transgression.88

To Houston's way of thinking, the privileges of Congress, as they related to his case, were "undefined and indefinable." But there was no lack of clarity with regard to the "privileges" of the people which he equated with individual rights. Although Houston acknowledged that Congress had some privileges and that he would "fall in the first ditch to defend... their privileges as sacred," it was also true, he maintained,

that the citizen, however obscure, and however ruined in fortune, has privileges too. It is his privilege to earn and to wear an honest name -- to deserve and to enjoy a spotless reputation. This is the proudest ornament that any man can wear, and it is one that every American citizen ought to press tenderly to his heart; nor should his arm ever hang nerveless by his side when this sacred, brightest jewel is assailed.89

"Privilege" became an ultimate term in Houston's plea; it afforded a lucrative base for equivocation and once associated with individual rights, it became possible for Houston to expand his case into a defense of such constitutional guarantees as "a free and open trial" -- a basic freedom which Congress was about to deny.90

88 Houston's Defense in the Stanbery Case, May 7, 1832, Writings, I, p. 212.

89 Ibid., p. 213.

90 Ibid., p. 221. Eight years later on January 23, 1840, a "breach of privilege" was raised in the House of the Republic of Texas. Houston, then a Representative, objected to allowing the defendant the right to speak in
"I do not justify my course," Houston confided. But "I cannot forget that while I have my privileges, others have their privileges also, and must account for their improper exercise."\(^{91}\) In the use of "privilege" as an ultimate term, Houston engaged in what Burke describes as "mystification," for, in essence, he "set up a fog of merger-terms where the clarity of division terms is needed."\(^{92}\)

The fog intensified as Houston lengthened his plea. Having established that the authority of Congress was "of so mysterious a nature" and that the people had "privileges too," he proceeded to show how mysterious privileges become "tyrannical forces." The "blessings on the one hand" and the "curses on the other," were the polar extremes that Houston relied upon to associate his own redemption with the God terms of democratic process.\(^{93}\)

\(^{91}\) Houston's Defense in the Stanbery Case, May 7, 1832, \textit{Writings}, I, pp. 222-223.


\(^{93}\) Houston's Defense in the Stanbery Case, May 7, 1832, \textit{Writings}, I, p. 216.
Public liberty is assailed," Houston observed, "in the person of an individual, and, in prostrating him, a principle will be destroyed, which is the great safeguard of American liberty." By not acquitting him, the House placed "personal liberty... at the mercy of a principle purely tyrannical." The effects, Houston suggested, "may become cruel in the extreme."

To illustrate the cruel extremes and salve the "apprehensions" that others had raised ("lest violence should some day be employed to abridge this honorable body"), Houston referred to the rise of tyranny in other republics. "All history will show that no tyrant ever grasped the reins of power till they were put into his hands by corrupt and obsequious legislative bodies." Rome would not have known of Caesar, Houston said, "had there been an upright, honest legislature, faithful to virtue and to Rome." But instead, their constant cry was for "rank, and ribbons, and titles, and exclusive privileges!" The implications of history were clear: should the House decide unfavorably, it would be following the path of these "corrupt and obsequious legislative bodies"

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94 Houston's Defense in the Stanbery Case, May 7, 1832, Writings, I, p. 220.
95 Ibid., pp. 216-217.
96 Ibid., p. 217.
97 Ibid., p. 218.
which had become so concerned with "exclusive privileges." The conversion was now complete. Houston represented the side of liberty, freedom, and individual rights, and the House, by its decision, was about to make a determination that would affect "not my rights alone, but the rights of millions."98

In his defense of the "rights of millions" many things were "sacred" -- the privileges of Congress, a man's name and reputation, the right of petition, America's plains and valleys, and the American flag. But there was a hierarchy even among the sacred and in Houston's ordering "the personal rights of every American" equalled "the brightest jewel that Heaven ever made" and foremost among those personal rights was "the privilege to earn and wear an honest name."99 In a style appropriate to purification, Houston borrowed freely from religious terminology, as if to sanctify (which is "to cleanse") his cause. Throughout the proceedings, Houston confessed, when labelled with the epithet of assassin. . . I could not but think of the eloquent and impressive rebuke administered to the high priest of the Jews by the Apostle Paul, when he stood in bonds before him, and the high priest ordered him to be smote upon the mouth. "God shall smite thee thou whitened wall, for sittest thou to judge me according to the law, and commandest me to

98 Houston's Defense in the Stanbery Case, May 7, 1832, Writings, I, pp. 220.
be smitten contrary to the law?"\textsuperscript{100}

The text was appropriate; its selection suggests that Houston doubted a favorable verdict and that he, like Paul, would issue a "rebuke."\textsuperscript{101} More importantly, Houston's language was appropriate to the over-all strategy he adopted. His obvious attempts at self-abnegation were also in keeping with the "religious pattern of thought," for as Burke observes, "sacrifice is the essence of religion."\textsuperscript{102} By alluding to himself as a scapegoat ("victim"), Houston sought (albeit imperfectly) martyrdom -- "the idea of a total voluntary self-sacrifice enacted in a grave cause before a perfect (absolute) witness."\textsuperscript{103} Should the House "inflict upon me a heavier penalty than even the law itself would pronounce, I shall submit willingly to whatever it may adjudge."\textsuperscript{104} "I submitted," Houston said, "to my apprehension... and I shall ever submit to the decisions of this House... it will give me pleasure

\textsuperscript{100} Houston's Defense in the Stanbery Case, May 7, 1832, \textit{Writings}, I, p. 222.

\textsuperscript{101} When the majority of the House voted to convict Houston of a "breach of privilege," he entered a "protest," which was read into the House \textit{Journal} by Representative Archer (Virginia); see: \textit{Register of Debates in Congress}, VIII, Part III, pp. 3020-3021.

\textsuperscript{102} Kenneth Burke, \textit{A Grammar of Motives and A Rhetoric of Motives}, p. 790.

\textsuperscript{103} Kenneth Burke, \textit{The Rhetoric of Religion} (Boston, 1961), p. 248.

\textsuperscript{104} Houston's Defense in the Stanbery Case, May 7, 1832, \textit{Writings}, I, p. 215.
to endure their will." 105

Although the verdict was not favorable -- the House voted 106 to 89 to convict Houston -- Houston certainly endured a pleasure from the opportunity he had to purify his motives before that "high tribunal" and the public. 106 His appeal to martyrdom, although consistent with purification, was confounded by the hierarchy which set a man's name in the very center of the "brightest jewel that Heaven ever made." A man's name -- "Houston" -- was what the speech was all about and he could not and did not set that argument aside for "a grave cause" with total self-abandon. Rather, Houston associated his own values with those deemed sacred by his peers and in so doing he re-committed himself to the pursuit of those virtues. The speech announced the formal termination of a personal struggle. It had been three years in fruition and unlike his previous efforts, his rhetoric now revealed an attitude that expressed a positive outlook on the world.

Houston biographers have pointed to his "refuge"

105 Houston's Defense in the Stanbery Case, May 7, 1832, Writings, I, p. 215.

106 The House stipulated the penalty of a "reprimand." The Speaker called Houston before the bar and read to him a short reprimand which seemed to be more of a triumph for Houston than a defeat. Stanbery then filed charges against Houston in the district court. He was found guilty and sentenced to pay a fine of $500.00. The fine was later annulled by President Jackson.
with the Indians as if it were during this "sojourn in the forest" that the seeds were implanted for Houston's renewal. A critical inquiry into Houston's rhetoric finds that premise wanting. Andrew Jackson is a more realistic candidate for Houston's "bridge over troubled waters." It was to Jackson that he wrote an explanation of his "exile," even before arriving in the Cherokee Nation. Although Houston's articles in the Arkansas Gazette were but disguised attempts to "defend the Indian," they openly promoted Jackson's removal policy -- a policy that ran counter to the vested interest of the Indians. Moreover, the loss of the ration contract, which Houston equated with the scepter, was the motive which gave birth to the articles. When Stanbery took on the President, his attack contained an unintentional reference to Houston; within that insult Houston saw an opportunity not only to defend his name, but the chance to re-assert his former role as a Jackson loyalist, an identity that he had grown accustomed to from 1817 through 1829. He could renew a pledge affirmed in 1826: "I glory in the firmness of my attachment to Jackson and to principle. I will die proud in the assurance, that I deserve, and possess his perfect confidence."107

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107 Concerning Expected Trouble with Felix Grundy, May 27, 1826, Writings, I, p. 64. Houston's statement was written in anticipation of some difficulty he had yet to settle with Felix Grundy. Houston addressed it to "my next friend, shou'd I perish." Houston affirmed the pledge cited above in a letter to Jackson in 1829; see: Writings, I, p. 141.
I regard nations, as corporations, on a large and sometimes magnificent scale, but no more than this. Consequently they have no soul, and recognize no mentor but interest.

-- Sam Houston, May 6, 1844.
CHAPTER IV

THE RHETORIC OF SALVATION AND COURTSHIP

After the Stanbery Trial, Houston remained in Washington, D. C., to testify before a special House Committee hearing on Indian rations. The Committee, chaired by Congressman Stanbery, was to determine if either the President or the Secretary of War tried "fraudulently to give" the contract to Houston and whether Houston "made a fraudulent attempt to obtain said contract."\(^1\) After a month long investigation, the Committee issued its report in July of 1832; by a vote of four to three, Jackson, Eaton, and Houston were exonerated. While the hearing was in progress, Houston finalized plans for a trip to Texas. John Wharton, a close friend in New Orleans, kept him informed on political developments there. "Texas does undoubtedly present a fine field for fame, enterprize, and usefulness," Wharton

\(^1\) Reports of Committees, House of Representatives, 1st Session, 22nd Congress, Vol. V, Doc. 502, "Rations to Emigrating Indians," p. 1. By the time of the hearing, the issue had become largely political and the final vote, as well as previous votes over what testimony would be permitted, reflected a strict adherence to party lines. The testimony established that Houston sought the contract and that he would have profited immensely by it. When Houston's letter to John Eaton (June 13, 1830) is read within the context of the Committee's Report, it is also clear that Houston believed he would obtain the contract with the help of his friends in high places. See: Writings, I, pp. 152-155.
The prospect of fame -- "the scepter" -- loomed foremost among Houston's ambitions when he set out for Texas, even though he had received a commission from the War Department as a "Special Agent" to arrange for the Comanche to attend a council at Fort Gibson to establish peace with the United States. The seriousness with which Houston undertook the assignment is reflected in the "reports" he forwarded to the War Department. They were vague, inaccurate, and even inconsistent; in one instance, for example, the population figures were more than twenty times too high. After meeting with some Comanches at San Antonio,

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2 John Wharton to Houston, June 2, 1832, Writings, I, p. 231.

3 Houston to John Robb, October 4, 1833, Writings, II, pp. 18-19.

4 Houston estimated the population of the Wichita bands (in Texas) at twenty-four thousand, whereas other observers estimated twelve to fifteen hundred. He also overestimated the Comanche population by some four times. The most accurate report on the Indians of Texas during this period is that of Jean Louis Berlandier who accompanied the Comisión de Límites (a Mexican survey expedition, 1828-1830), as a biologist. The population data gathered by Berlandier agrees with Burnet's figures (1818-1819) and with Butler and Lewis (1846). See: Jean Louis Berlandier, The Indians of Texas in 1830, ed. John C. Ewers (New York, 1969); David G. Burnet, "The Comanches and Other Tribes of Texas and the Policy to be Pursued Respecting Them," in Henry Schoolcraft, Historical and Statistical Information Respecting the History and Prospects of the Indian Tribes of the United States, Vol. 1 (Philadelphia, 1851), pp. 229-241; P. M. Butler and M. G. Lewis, "Texas Indians," House Doc. 76, 29th Congress, 2nd Session, Vol. 4. Houston's failure to seek out and convey
Houston expressed high expectations for establishing peace. But later he attributed their failure to attend the council to his unwillingness to accompany the delegation. To have done so, Houston claimed, would have furnished a "plausible pretext" for complaint "on the part of Mexico" for "the Mexicans are a people jealous in the extreme, and particularly of the American Government, as well as its citizens." In other words, political considerations outweighed peace with the Comanches; under the auspices of a "Special Agent," Houston found a pretext for being in Texas.

At the same time that Houston wrote about the prospects for peace with the Comanches, he alerted Jackson to the likelihood of revolution. "I am in possession of some information," he began,

information from Colonel Ruiz, an officer at the presidio in San Antonio, is but one indication that he was not devoted to his role as a "Special Agent." Houston visited San Antonio in January of 1833 and talked with some Comanches at the presidio; more than likely, Ruiz was the translator at that meeting, for he customarily served in that capacity. Ruiz was Berlandier's principal informant on the Comanche; his reputation as a "good friend of the Indian" was known to none other than Thomas L. McKenney from an endorsement from Stephen Austin. See: Eugene Barker, ed., The Austin Papers, Vol. II (Washington, 1922), p. 256. Houston later came to recognize Ruiz as an authority on the Comanche. In a letter to Capt. Karnes, Houston observed that when it came to the Comanche, he regarded himself "as good a judge on what is needful as any man in Texas (Col. Ruiz excepted)." See: Houston to Henry Wax Karnes, March 31, 1837, Writings, II, p. 77.

5 Houston to Henry L. Ellsworth and Others, February 13, 1833, Writings, I, pp. 272-274.

6 Houston to Lewis Cass, July 30, 1833, Writings, II, pp. 15-16.
that will doubtless be interesting to you; and may be calculated to forward your views if you should entertain any; touching the acquisition of Texas, by the Government of the United States. That such a measure is desirable by nineteen /sic/ twentieths of the population of the Province, I can not doubt. My opinion is that Texas will by her members in convention by the 1st of April, declare all that country as Texas proper and form a State Constitution. I expect to be present at the convention /Houston chaired the committee charged with drafting the constitution/, and will appraise you of the course adopted.

Houston attended that convention and the next two that followed. At the Consultation Convention, which met in the Fall of 1835, he was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Texas Army; in the Spring of 1836, after surviving attempts to relieve him of command, Houston led the victorious forces at the Battle of San Jacinto. That victory won Houston immediate fame. When the first Presidential election was held four months later, eighty per cent of the votes cast favored the hero of San Jacinto. 8

From the time Houston first entered Texas as a "Special Agent," he encountered Indians. In biographical accounts, even that encounter afforded an opportunity to accent Houston's primitive attributes. Houston's two terms as President of Texas were far more significant however, for as President he was responsible for formulating an Indian

7 Houston to Andrew Jackson, February 13, 1833, Writings, I, pp. 275-276.

8 Stanley Siegel, A Political History of the Texas Republic (Austin, 1956), pp. 24-37.
policy, and the rhetoric of that policy has since become an important means for giving substance to the folk hero. Previous accounts perceived this discourse as a natural outgrowth of Houston's past and on that basis selected those passages which lent credence to such an association. What could not be accounted for by this procedure was ignored and for want of serious inquiry certain documents were simply overlooked. In sum, Houston's motives were a matter of arbitrary prescription. The most serious flaw inherent in this procedure is the omission of context and consequently an understanding of how Houston's rhetoric functioned as rhetoric. The criticism that follows attempts to discern the motives operative in Houston's discourse and thereby arrive at a more accurate impression of who Houston was.

At the time that Houston assumed the Presidency, approximately half of the population was Indian -- over forty different tribes (more than any other State in historic times) whose manners and customs varied from the nomadic hunting culture of the Comanche to the more sedentary ways of the Shawnee and Delaware. 9

9 Eighteen years later (1854) only one tribe (Alabama-Coushatta) remained (with any "legal" right to do so) in Texas. Berlandier discusses the living habits and population of forty-one tribes. See: Berlandier, pp. 99-152. Also see: Anna Muckleroy, "The Indian Policy of the Republic of Texas," Southwestern Historical Quarterly, XXV (April, 1922), pp. 229-260.
The Comanche were such a menace to the frontier that settlement in that general area (most of what is now the western half of Texas) was officially discouraged. Furthermore, the Mexican Government had previously established contacts with all of these tribes and had even invited such tribes as the Kickapoo (who were indigenous to Illinois) and the Cherokee (from Arkansas) to settle in Texas and become a sort of buffer zone between Mexico and the United States. With this policy, the Mexicans had hoped to discourage white settlement and lessen Comanche intrusions into what is now northern Mexico.\textsuperscript{10} After Texas gained its independence, the Mexicans (especially local dissidents) looked to the emigrant tribes for whatever support they could lend to a rebellion that would topple the Texas Republic. Wooing the Indian, particularly the tribes that had come to Texas at Mexico's invitation, became something of a contest as two suitors (Mexico and Texas) competed for their allegiance. This rivalry continued throughout Houston's first administration, as agents from both governments petitioned the emigrant tribes with promises and guarantees, if they would only not heed the words of the

"enemy."

"A subject of no small importance," Houston declared in the Inaugural Address,

\[ \text{is the situation of an extensive frontier, bordered by Indians, and open to their depredations. Treaties of peace and amity, and the maintenance of good faith with the Indians, present themselves to my mind as the most rational grounds on which to obtain their friendship. Let us abstain on our part from aggression, establish useful and necessary wants, maintain even-handed justice with them, and natural reason will teach them the utility of our friendship.} \]

The emigrant tribes became the principle concern of Houston's first administration (1836-1838), while the warm sentiment expressed in regard to all Indians gave way to a policy of military pursuit, when it came to impressing the utility of Texas friendship upon the "wild tribes" (Comanche, etc.). Within only eight months, Houston

\[ \text{11 The most thorough single source that documents the Mexican role is the "Report of the Secretary of State Relative to the Encroachments of the Indians of the United States upon the Territories of Mexico," Senate Executive Documents, 32nd Congress, 2nd Session, Vol. III, No. 14. Also see: Department of State Letterbook (November 1836-December 1841), pp. 110-114, Texas State Archives, Texas State Library, Austin, Texas; Valetin Canalizo to Señor Antonio Beloxi, Captain Ignacio of the Guapanques, Captain Coloxe of the Caddoes, the Chief of the Seminoles, Sor. Qixg mas gege de los Charaques /Big Mush of the Cherokees/, Captain Benito of the Kickapoos, Fama Sargento de los Brazos, Lt. Colonel Bul /Bowles/ of the Cherokees, Mata-mores, February 27, 1839, Army Papers, manuscript copy (translated), Texas State Archives, Texas State Library, Austin, Texas.} \]

\[ \text{12 Houston's Inaugural Address, October 22, 1836, Writings, I, p. 449.} \]
obtained legislation authorizing the employment of the
"Northern Indians" (emigrant tribes) into the military
service to "chastise those murderous Hords of wild Indians." Houston authorized James Parker to commission the volun-
teers and encouraged the enlistment of at least one hun-
dred and twenty "and as many as they may think fit to turn
out, so as to flog those Indians." "It will not do to
attack the enemy with too small a force," Houston warned,
"as I wish them well chastised." But when the emigrant
tribes proved unreceptive to the notion, Houston's policy
vacillated back toward reconciliation -- albeit haphazard.
The emigrant tribes were not averse to fighting; in fact,
the Comanche were their enemy. Rather, their reluctance
stemmed from the government's failure to approve and en-
force a treaty concluded with Houston during the revolu-
tion (February, 1836), which in turn resulted in a lack of
unity among the Indians themselves -- causing some of them


14 Houston to James W. Parker, June 10, 1837, Writings, IV, p. 32. The italics are Houston's.

15 Houston did not make any serious attempt to estab-
lish treaties with the nomadic tribes until the second
administration (1841-1844). The fact that the policy was
not consistent for all Indians and that Houston's position
toward the nomadic tribes wavered from one extreme to the
other (including the possibility of employing Indians to
fight Indians) has gone unnoted by historians as well as
Houston biographers.
to join the Mexican dissidents. Besides, many of these Indians went to Texas to escape from the Americans in the first place. (See map: "Texas in 1840," p. 123.)

In December of 1836, shortly after assuming office, Houston submitted the treaty to the Texas Senate, "most earnestly" recommending passage.

In considering this treaty, you will doubtless bear in mind the very great necessity of conciliating the different tribes of Indians who inhabit portions of country almost in the centre of our settlements as well as those who extend along our frontier. This becomes most judicious at present when we are at war with Mexico, the authorities of which have been labouring to engage the different tribes to war against us: and it has been confidentially stated, that these Indians are among the number, who have already engaged to join the Mexican army against us in the event of a second invasion, they being induced doubtless by promises of land and country.

The Committee on Indian Affairs took a different view of what would be the "most judicious" and a year later advised the Senate to "disapprove and utterly refuse to ratify the treaty." The Committee argued that there was "no evidence" for the political union recognized by the treaty as "the Cherokee and their Associate Bands"; besides,

16 A text of the treaty is printed in: Writings, I, pp. 358-360.

17 Houston to the Texas Senate, December 20, 1836, Writings, I, p. 518.

some of the twelve tribes enumerated in that conglomerate had been "enemies ever since and even at the very date of signing of this Treaty." \(^{19}\) Furthermore, the Territory therein mentioned forms part of the soil granted to David G. Burnet Esq. for the purposes of Colonization and which Colony was filed or nearly so prior to this Declaration. Many of the titles being completed and others commenced and now in progress. \(^{20}\)

The Committee recommended that Texas resolve the matter by making a "most urgent remonstrance" to the United States, for these Indians belonged "under the superintendence and direction of the Govt. of the U. S. of America." \(^{21}\) In December of 1837, a voice vote determined the almost unanimous rejection of the treaty. \(^{22}\)

\(^{19}\) "Report of Standing Committee on Indian Affairs," p. 36.

\(^{20}\) Ibid., p. 26. The "Declaration" mentioned above refers to a resolution passed by the Consultation Convention in November of 1835, authorizing the negotiation of a treaty with the "Cherokee Indians, and their associate bands." See: Gammel, Laws of Texas, I, p. 546.

\(^{21}\) Ibid., p. 28. The recommendation is perfectly absurd; the Cherokees came to Texas during the Winter of 1819, a year before Moses Austin; the other tribes arrived during the 1820's. Although they had permission to live on the land they occupied, none of them had legal title to their land, despite numerous attempts to acquire title. The colonization grants acquired by David G. Burnet and General Vincente Filisola encroached on the land occupied by the Indians. Consequently, the land stipulated in the treaty contained a number of white settlements to which legal title had been secured. For a complete discussion, see: William C. Davidson, "A Comprehensive Documentary of the Texas Cherokee," an unpublished manuscript on file with the General Counsel (Mr. Earl Boyd Pierce) of the Cherokee Nation, Muskogee, Oklahoma.

\(^{22}\) On December 16, 1837, the Senate adopted a resolution
Houston equated the defeat with an attack on himself -- after all, he had negotiated the treaty. Although the Committee's final recommendation was extreme and certainly unjustified, as well as impolitic for a nation that sought annexation, Houston's response was overly defensive. He became determined that Texas recognize the treaty and devoted his energies to outmaneuvering the Senate, at the expense of exploring other options which might have saved the intentions of the treaty without sacrificing justice to the Indians. He no longer acknowledged that some of the Indians were conspiring with Mexico, nor did he bother to address the specific objections set forth by the Committee on Indian Affairs. Rather, Houston argued that the treaty did not require ratification, for it already had "the force and effect of the supreme law of the land," coming under the "general provision" whereby the Convention approved all the acts of the Provisional Government.23

To support this view, Houston had Attorney General John Birdsall write an opinion, between the assurance of the Committee's report and the Senate's vote, offering the legal basis "to require its fulfillment by Mr. Wharton, declaring the treaty "null and void." See: Department of State, Box No. 10, File No. 884, Texas State Archives, Texas State Library, Austin, Texas.

23 Houston to the Texas Senate, May 21, 1838, Writings, IV, p. 58.
the people of Texas."  

If the treaty was not already valid, Birdsall pleaded, then neither was "the closing of the land offices and the suspension of the land system." "A little reflection," Birdsall contended, shows that any attempt to restrain the laws made at that time "within special limits" would involve "consequences to this country of the most serious character."  

In spite of the logical weight of the administration's position, the move lost much of its force because of the previous request for ratification. The relationship between Congress and the President became so strained that Congress eventually refused to publish his messages. When they


25 Ibid., p. 91.

26 Houston published his messages independently, a fact that was not realized until fairly recently when they were rediscovered; see the explanatory footnote in: Writings, IV, pp. 45-46. Consequently, the nature of this dispute, especially the way it intensified as each retaliatory act increased the animosity between the executive and legislative branches, has not been as fully appreciated as it ought to be. Actually, the dispute goes back to the Convention of 1835 and the factors that molded Houston's attitude could probably be traced back to the Convention of 1833. Many of the issues that came to dominate Texas politics stem from compromises and unresolved conflicts that occurred during the revolution. These differences and the effect they had on the decisions of the Houston Administration are sufficiently complex to be considered beyond the scope of this study. Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that the rhetoric of the revolution often reflected personal land interests and the influence of that motive upon almost all other issues certainly merits further research.
reconvened in the Spring of 1838, Congress enacted, over the President's veto, an amendment to the Militia Act of 1837 so as to circumvent some of the executive's control of the army by transferring his "constitutional rights" as Commander-in-Chief to the Major General, to whom it also authorized twenty thousand dollars "for the defense of the frontier." As time passed, the situation only worsened.

By the summer of 1838 approximately half of the land marked off in the treaty was claimed and occupied by white settlers -- some of whom had undoubtedly settled before the treaty was negotiated. (See map, p. 123.) Mexican dissidents, residing in and around Nacogdoches, Texas (the nearest community southeast of the disputed Indian lands), conspired under the leadership of Vicente Córdova to regain Texas for Mexico and during July and August they encouraged the Indians to join them. In July, Houston left the capital and removed to Nacogdoches to be closer

27 Houston to the House of Representatives, May 25, 1838, Writings, II, p. 238.

28 Houston to the Texas Congress, November 19, 1838, Writings, II, p. 301.

to the scene and take command of the situation. A party of Mexicans and Indians attacked a group of settlers on August 4, 1838, and in the skirmish one of the latter was killed. 30 Major General Rusk, acting under the authority granted by the Congressional amendment of the Militia Act, organized a group of sixty volunteers and requested two hundred more. When Houston heard of the request, he issued a Proclamation "ordering the Mexicans and the Indians to disperse and to return to their homes under penalty of being declared enemies of the Republic." 31 Córdova replied: "The citizens of Nacogdoches ... declare as they have heretofore done, that they do not acknowledge the existing laws, through which they are offered guarantees (by the proclamation) for their lives and property." 32 It seemed obvious that war was imminent.

Major General Rusk assigned one regiment of the volunteers to follow Córdova's trail, while he proceeded with the remainder to inspect the Cherokee villages. Meanwhile, Houston wrote Col. Bowles and Big Mush, the two Cherokee

30 James T. DeShields, Border Wars of Texas (Tioga, Texas, 1912), p. 268.

31 Joseph Milton Nance, After San Jacinto: The Texas-Mexican Frontier, 1836-1841 (Austin, 1963), p. 120.

32 Reply of Vicente Córdova, et al., to President Houston's Proclamation, August 10, 1838, manuscript copy (translation), in Ashbel Smith Papers, University of Texas Archives Collection, Austin, Texas.
Chiefs.

There is now some trouble between the Mexicans and the Americans. I wish you to stand by the treaty which I made with you, and my Red Brothers. I will never lie to that treaty while I live, and it must stand as long as a good man lives and water runs. I will build it up; and all men shall see it. . . 33

Do not be disturbed by the troubles which are around you, but be at peace -- Remember my words, and listen to no bad talks of any one! 34

On the same day, Houston wrote Andrew Jackson who had retired and was now living at the Hermitage. "A commotion broke out which had long been preparing," Houston began. 35

"This state of things has been brought about in part by the opposition which has existed to Sam Houston, not the President. . . How matters may terminate, I do not pretend to divine." 36 He turned to Old Hickory at this particular moment, because, as Houston explained, "I was aware that you had heard reports, touching my conduct and character, which were highly injurious to my reputation." 37 Fearful of "the worst," he asked a final favor.

33 Houston to Big Mush, August 10, 1838, Writings, II, p. 269.
34 Houston to Colonel Bowl, August 11, 1838, Writings, II, p. 270.
35 Houston to General Andrew Jackson, August 11, 1838, Writings, II, p. 270.
36 Ibid., p. 271. The italics are Houston's.
37 Ibid., p. 271.
Should matters prove unfortunate there is no one whose just appreciation I prefer to your own, and you will do me the Justice to vindicate me to the world so far as I place the facts in your possession.

You, General, have left monuments of Glory to your country, such as no man ever did before you. But you had an organized Government, and men who were accustomed to civil rule, while I had to command a Government from chaos, with men who had never been accustomed as a community, to any rule, but their passions, nor to any government, but their will. You had experience with mature wisdom. I lacked experience and could not render that assurance, which give largeness of promise to my country. Unimportant as my career has been thus far, or whatever it may hereafter be, I am aware that it must pass the present, and be subject to the scrutiny of after time.38

"The scrutiny of after time," the opposition, Jackson, and the Indians -- all had a way of being manifest at a moment of crisis, whenever fame approached the precipice -- the sequence suggests the order in Houston's mind. A word to Jackson would secure an important endorsement for future chronicles.39 To bring the Indians around, Houston wrote assurances similar to those already noted. "Remember me and my words. We have not asked you to join us but to remain at peace."40 He instructed an Indian agent to tell

38 Houston to General Andrew Jackson, August 11, 1838, Writings, II, pp. 271-272.

39 The most often quoted statement from Jackson regarding Houston is inscribed on Houston's tombstone: "The world will take care of Houston's fame."

40 Houston to Colonel Bowl, August 14, 1838, Writings, II, p. 277. Also see Houston's letters (August 12 and 15, 1838) to Colonel Bowl, Writings, II, pp. 274 and 277.
Chief Big Mush that "we will soon all have peace, I hope -- So soon as we have, the line will be run and they will be satisfied." Over a week had passed since Houston ordered a survey, but now, he observed, "this fuss may put it off a while. Yet before the leaves fall it shall be done or I will give them my life or my land, for I will not tell them a lie." To Major General Rusk, who was encamped on the outskirts of Chief Bowl's village, Houston had words of caution and advice.

Late in the evening, situate your men for the night, and be careful that none escape to the enemy after your encampment is pitched for the night. They will attack, you may look for it at night and from several points -- if at all, and you look out for it. Be prepared for the Indian yell, & let your men also -- if they even have no Indians with them. . . Let them know in the event of an attack the part they have to act. My soul burns for your success.

A day later Houston addressed Rusk again.

If the Bowl means to compromise with the enemy you will accept such terms as will give honorable peace to the country.

God prosper you, and I only wish you may soon put an end to the war.

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41 Houston to George May, August 12, 1838, Writings, II, p. 273.

42 Ibid., p. 272.

43 Houston to Thomas J. Rusk, August 12, 1838, Writings, II, p. 275.

44 Houston to Thomas J. Rusk, August 13, 1838, Writings, II, p. 276.
On the one hand, Houston was willing to make promises he alone could not guarantee -- if only the Indians would be peaceful; at the same time he was ready to advise the military and wish for their "success." He had neither the confidence nor the courage to defend the Indians when the risk of that defense imposed an unclear consequence upon his own reputation. "The scrutiny of after time" demanded "peace" and "success." Fortunately, the war ended almost as suddenly as it began; actually, it never materialized -- at least to the imagined proportions everyone feared. "Fuss" was a more accurate term to describe what had occurred. On August 18, 1838, two weeks after the skirmish began, Houston issued a general order discharging the men who had "rallied to their country's defense." The President expressed "confident hope that his old companions in arms" would not "disregard his solemn request." 45 Houston's "hope" was about as "confident" as the inclusion of such a remark would indicate. Of course, Rusk ignored the order -- all along he had not kept Houston fully informed of either the army's movement or of intelligence. Not only was Houston's ability to act severely limited, so was his understanding of what had happened. 46 Nevertheless,

45 General Orders, August 18, 1838, Writings, II, p. 278.

46 Had Houston been fully informed and in a position to command, he probably would not have dismissed the army.
since the opposition seemed bent on doing Houston in, he could follow suit and perhaps by doing them in, save himself.

After sufficient time had passed to make it obvious that his order had been ignored, Houston turned to the

General Rusk, and Colonel McLeod, Adjutant General of the Texas Militia, kept in minimal contact with the President and after the "general order" even this correspondence ceased, while they kept in direct touch with President-elect Mirabeau B. Lamar (who became President in December of 1838). See: Col. Hugh McLeod to Gen. M. B. Lamar, October 22, 1838, in C.A. Gulick, and Others, eds., The Papers of Mirabeau Bounaparte Lamar (Austin, 1922), Vol. II, pp. 265-267. Also see: Thomas J. Rusk Papers, University of Texas Archives Collection, Austin, Texas.

Córdova and his followers momentarily dispersed, but continued to roam the frontier in small bands and attack isolated settlements. In the Fall, they regrouped at the Kickapoo Village, where on October 16, 1838, they encountered Rusk's army. The engagement lasted for only a brief time before the enemy fled, but eleven Indians were killed. During the next few months there were other similar engagements, the most important of which was Rusk's pursuit of some Caddo Indians across the United States-Texas border, where the Caddoes were captured and turned over to the American Indian agent at Shreveport.

Meanwhile, back in Texas, the struggle (referred to as the "Córdova-Flores Rebellion" or "Incident") continued. Córdova was seriously injured in April of 1839; but, another party, led by Manuel Flores, took over. Flores was killed in a battle in mid-May and on his person were a number of papers, including letters between Córdova, Flores, and the Mexican officials at Matamoros, containing instructions to the Indians. Although there were no letters from the Indian leaders, the captured papers convinced President Lamar that the emigrant tribes were guilty of treason. Lamar's determination to remove the Indians led to a war with the Cherokees, ending in their defeat. The other tribes conceded without bloodshed. See: Nance, pp. 121-141.
the "opposition." Not much could materialize from a continuation of the feud between himself and the Congress. The presidential elections were held in early September; with the victory of Mirabeau B. Lamar, Houston's Vice President and ardent enemy, the President became a lame duck. Nevertheless, Houston felt compelled to dramatize the folly of Congress by transferring all responsibility for the fate of Texas to them, should they not support his course. The possibility of re-organizing the Army, so as to place himself in control, if not command (as threatened in his letter to Jackson), became all the more difficult and yet was all the more justified by Rusk's refusal to obey the dismissal order. 47 Such a move was about the only option remaining, if Houston intended to do much more than talk about justice to the Indians.

After a month of indecision, Houston implemented a strategy that had the appearance of being a formidable attempt to secure the Indians' right to land as stipulated

47 Houston to General Andrew Jackson, August 11, 1838, Writings, II, p. 271. Houston seriously considered the possibility, but decided against it because of the political repercussions. Barnard E. Bee (a friend of both Houston and Lamar) referred to Houston's refusal as "constitutional timidity." See: B. E. Bee to Mirabeau B. Lamar, September 6, 1838, and Memucan Hunt to M. B. Lamar, September 5, 1838, in the Lamar Papers, Texas State Archives Collection, Texas State Library, Austin, Texas. Houston could have done so without exceeding the bounds of the constitution which stipulated that the President be "Commander-in-Chief," and "that the military shall, in all cases and at all times be subordinate to the civil power." With Congress not in session, the only civil power remaining was the President.
by the treaty. On October 10, 1838, he ordered Rusk "to have the line run between the Cherokees and their associate bands, agreeable to the treaty concluded February, 1836. ... If it is not immediately done, all future calamities must be attributed to its omission." Knowing full well that Rusk would do as he pleased, Houston also ordered Colonel Alexander Horton (a staunch ally and witness to the treaty) to run the line, in the event that the survey had not been completed by October 20, 1838, the deadline set for Rusk.

Horton must have been suspicious of Rusk too, for he set out the next day to see the Indians.

Congress reconvened during the first week of November amidst rumor and speculation about events in Eastern Texas.

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48 The events related on the next few pages escaped the notice of Houston biographers. But, the failure to discuss this particular aspect points to a flaw in the scholarship and not to a purposeful omission, for the documents lend themselves beautifully to the sort of heroic defense that would have made the myth all the more exciting and credible.

49 Houston to Thomas J. Rusk, October 10, 1838, Writings, II, p. 288.

50 Houston to Alexander Horton, October 10, 1838, Writings, II, p. 288.

51 Undoubtedly, Houston conferred with Horton about this assignment and encouraged him to begin immediately. This conclusion seems quite likely inasmuch as Houston issued the orders to both Rusk and Horton on the same day and from San Augustine, Horton's hometown. In a letter to Houston, Horton states that he began on October 11th. See: Alexander Horton to Houston, November 10, 1838, in Journal of the House of Representatives of the Republic of Texas, 3rd Congress, Regular Session, pp. 94-96.
They requested that the President submit, in writing, "the state of the Republic." Houston declined because a "restriction" was placed "on the right of the President to select the mode, in which he would convey proper intelligence to Congress." 52 The House then resolved,

that the President be, and he is hereby required to inform this body whether or not he has appointed a commissioner to run a line setting apart a particular section of the country for the Cherokees, and the twelve associate tribes, and if he has made such an appointment, to state upon what authority he did it. 53

Houston began to prepare his defense and await word from Horton. Among the various documents that accompanied his message, was a specially prepared pamphlet containing "most of the data on which the Indian claims to land are predicated." 54 A copy of his orders to Rusk and Horton

52 Houston to the Texas Congress, November 5, 1838, Writings, II, p. 289. After Houston's rebuff, the House considered a motion to invite the President to address a joint session of Congress, but the motion failed.

53 Journal of the House of Representatives of the Republic of Texas, 3rd Congress, Regular Session, pp. 28 and 43. Before the week was out, Congress passed a joint resolution authorizing the appointment of five commissioners to confer with Major General Rusk "as to the objects and intentions of the Indians." They also agreed, unanimously, to congratulate Rusk, for his conduct of "the campaign against the Mexicans and Indians" met their "full and entire approbation." Finally, the House began debate on a bill for "the protection of the Northern and Western Frontier," which called for a regiment of eight hundred and forty men, to become law on December 10, 1838, when the new administration took office. See: Journal of the House of Representatives of the Republic of Texas, 3rd Congress, Regular Session, pp. 28-84.

54 Houston to the Texas Congress, November 19, 1838, Writings, II, p. 299. The pamphlet presented the documents
conveyed "information as to the course adopted by the Executive." 55 His authority, of course, rested upon the "general provision" whereby the treaty and all other acts of the Provisional Government were ratified by the Convention. Not only did the treaty stipulate that a line be run, but it was now "all important." "For the salvation of Texas, it is necessary at this time to tranquilize and conciliate the tribes yet friendly on our northern border." 56 In sum, Houston had acted within the bounds of the constitution and for the best interests of Texas. Had he not done so, Houston predicted, in "sixty days from the present there will not be a family residing between the Neches and Attoyac." 57

To substantiate the "peculiar situation of that section of the frontier" and establish that the survey had a conciliatory effect, Houston referred Congress to a letter in which the Texans recognized the Indian's right to the land; it began with the Convention of 1832, noting that the Convention had encouraged the Cherokees to obtain title and even petitioned the Mexican government on their behalf. Other pertinent documents, up to and including the treaty, were included. See: Documents on Indian Affairs, Submitted to Congress by the President, November 15, 1838 (Houston, 1838). But, the documents did not establish the "legality" of the claim, since actual recognition had never been formalized. See: Winkler, pp. 163-165.

55 Houston to the Texas Congress, November 19, 1838, Writings, II, p. 299.

56 Ibid., pp. 299-300.

57 Ibid., p. 300.
from Colonel Horton. "After a tiresome and disagreeable route," Horton began, "I have succeeded in running the line." Rusk's presence "rendered the undertaking dangerous," Horton said,

but on discovering the anxiety of some individuals to drive off the Cherokees right or wrong, for individual speculation and self-aggrandisement, regardless of the blood of innocent women and children, and conscious as I was, that it would have a happy effect, I determined to execute my orders, or perish in the attempt. . . We have succeeded and are all home safely, and the Indians are all well satisfied.

Horton's stirring three page account offered an "appeal to the honorable Congress for the adoption of such measures, as will preserve the eastern section of Texas from desolation." But, if this action is not "sustained by the Congress," Houston argued, then "the President will feel himself perfectly vindicated in the assurance that he has pursued and recommended that policy which alone can save

58 Alexander Horton to Houston, November 10, 1838, in Journal of the House of Representatives of the Republic of Texas, 3rd Congress, Regular Session, p. 94. Six months later, in an effort to convince the United States that the "Cherokees and other bands" belonged under the jurisdiction of the United States Government, David G. Burnet, Acting Secretary of State (under President Lamar), intimated that Horton "pretended" to run the line; pretension or not, Burnet observed, the action was "an absolute nullity," because Horton had acted "without authority." See: David G. Burnet to Richard G. Dunlap, May 30, 1839, in George P. Garrison, ed., Diplomatic Correspondence of Texas, Vol. I (Washington, 1907), pp. 396-400.

59 Ibid., pp. 94-95.

60 Houston to the Texas Congress, November 19, 1838, Writings, II, p. 300.
Eastern Texas from ruin, and the country generally from imminent danger."

The statement has a fatalistic air about it, as if Houston saw the futility of what he advocated, but nevertheless went through the ritual in order to "feel himself perfectly vindicated." Indeed, the similarity between this response and Houston's previous efforts at vindication (Chapter III), reflects essentially the same habit of mind. His self-consciousness and insecurity so dominated the rhetorical choices he made that the high sounding, uprighteous purposes he avowed, were simply ways of conjuring up glorious associations with the ideal man Houston envisioned himself being, when judged by "the scrutiny of after time." The documents added to this dramatic testimonial and functioned as certification of Houston's integrity. In Burkeian terms, the entire message might be thought of as a "salvation device" -- i.e., "any conscious or unconscious, adequate way of saving one's soul, saving one's hide, or saving one's face."\(^{62}\)

The first clue to Houston's purposes comes from the realization that he made virtually no attempt to identify with Congress, the immediate audience. Had he really

\(^{61}\) Houston to the Texas Congress, November 19, 1838, Writings, II, p. 300.

intended to persuade them, he would not have equated his own
vindication with their damnation, which is precisely what
he did in the last half of the message. It did not matter
if the arguments of condemnation seemingly contradicted
the sentiments previously expressed; Houston was saved --
on the one hand by virtue of the action he did take, and on
the other by actions he could not take because the Congress
had denied the "functions of command to the President." 63
But, Houston's attack on Congress was so bitter and so over-
stated that the entire message only makes sense rhetorically
if thought of as addressed to "the scrutiny of after time."

Having concluded that his policy "alone can save Eastern
Texas from ruin," Houston turned to other sections of the
country and the question of frontier defense in general.
The "unhappy circumstances" that Texas faced stemmed from
"causes" that "are assignable." 64 Of course, the principal
cause was the Congress itself. "How can a Maj. General,"
Houston asked,

acting upon the extreme frontier of the country
in person command, and to whom all the defences
of the country have been delegated, know the
wants of the upper Brazos, of Colorado, of San
Antonio, of Nueces, and Copano or of Corpus
Christi? Had the power remained with the Ex-
ecutive, and his constitutional rights not
been trampled down by the last Congress, the
country might have entertained some hope of

63 Houston to the Texas Congress, November 19, 1838,
Writings, II, p. 302.
64 Ibid., p. 301.
being in a defensible position. 65

Congress had so restricted the President, Houston maintained, that he had neither "the men nor the means" to either restrict surveying "beyond the limits of the settlements," or "repel the aggression of the Indians and chastise them for all wanton outrages so far as the energies of the nation can be combined." 66 When the people appeal to the President for aid, he has but one reply.

I can give you none. I have not the power. They exclaim, why not? The answer is simple, because Congress by a constitutional majority has deprived the Executive of his constitutional functions. Go to the Major General who is 200 miles east, he has the men and the money at his

65 Houston to the Texas Congress, November 19, 1838, in Journal of the House of Representatives of the Texas Republic, 3rd Congress, Regular Session, pp. 90-91. The passage is incorrectly quoted in the Writings; see: II, p. 302. Congress had not delegated "all defences" to the Major General. Although the amendment to the Militia Act was an infringement upon the President, it was also rather limited; as noted before, it would have made a stronger case had Houston argued that the Major General was responsible to the President, even though he was appointed by Congress. That question aside, the President could still enlist the use of regular troops and even the militia, subject only to the limitation that the "tour of duty" be "no less than three nor more than six months." See: Gammel (ed.), Laws of Texas, I, pp. 1427-1428. The point is, there were any number of ways within the law and the constitution (except dismissal) for Houston to have overseen the operation of Rusk's troops. One can grant that the Congress had extended its authority, but the President had not exerted his!

66 Ibid., p. 90; Writings, II, p. 302. Land speculators were forever sending out survey parties into the Indians' hunting ground, even though such surveys were unauthorized and illegal. This practice inevitably led to reprisals and became a major cause for Indian harassment of frontier settlements.
disposition. The President has neither.\textsuperscript{67}

Not only had Congress "trampled down" and "deprived the Executive of his constitutional functions," but, being a "deliberative body, general in its character, varied and diversified," they were by nature ill equipped to "perfect or carry out a system of defence."\textsuperscript{68} The Congress can not do so, Houston asserted, without being "influenced by every rumor circulated," "by passion or temporary excitement," ultimately they "will necessarily yield to the impulse of circumstances." "If the appeal is thrilling, it will influence the action and decision of the honorable body."\textsuperscript{69}

Furthermore, Houston concluded,

The executive functions are perpetual in their actions. The legislative is temporary, and has its intermissions; what Congress does is done by no one, and therefore no responsibility devolves upon it. The executive not being temporary to the same extent is responsible, and held so by the nation. The President has never sought to assume any extraordinary functions, he would spurn with abhorrence the idea of encroaching upon any coordinate department, and through a regard to harmony at the present crisis, he forbears to act in that manner which he believes circumstances would render necessary.\textsuperscript{70}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{67} Houston to the Texas Congress, November 19, 1838, in Journal of the House of Representatives of the Texas Republic, 3rd Congress, Regular Session, p. 91. This passage is also incorrectly quoted in the Writings; see: Vol. II, p. 302.
  \item \textsuperscript{68} Houston to the Texas Congress, November 19, 1838, Writings, II, p. 303.
  \item \textsuperscript{69} Ibid., p. 303.
  \item \textsuperscript{70} Ibid., p. 304.
\end{itemize}
When Houston finished, little doubt remained but that an embittered man had responded bitterly. Although "no responsibility" supposedly devolved upon the Congress, it could be transferred or symbolically unloaded upon the "honorable body." Consequently, the objurgation of Congress was integral to Houston's "salvation." If Congress did not sustain the survey, he was "vindicated." And, by his own decree, Houston became the reluctant agent of "harmony," because an irresponsible Congress made it impossible for him to act as the "circumstances would render necessary." These conclusions are amazing rationalizations which tend to get Houston off the hook, but they make little sense in other respects. In fact, the message is puzzling in one particular. Had Houston really wanted the survey "sustained" and believed that it was "all important" and "necessary for the salvation of Texas," then he would not have proceeded to castigate the Congress. But, Houston was still guided by the same impulse that led him to write Jackson. He did not intend to persuade Congress; rather, his object was to equate his course with the cause of justice so as to exonerate himself and make Congress the scapegoat of Texas' ills. After having argued for more than a year that the treaty was already the "supreme law of the land," Houston was willing to turn about face and transfer his responsibility to execute that law; it became the burden of Congress to see that the survey was "sustained."
When events threatened Houston's favor, the verdict of history became uppermost in his mind. Indeed, the fear of being judged unfavorably was so intense that he was overcome by the prospect of failure. Consequently, he concealed his weaknesses by referring to his own acts in positive terms ("eulogistic appellatives" in Burkeian terminology); and, by way of contrast, he described the acts of Congress in negative terms ("dyslogistic tonalities"). That is to say, Houston stylized his salvation in a "rhetoric of concealment." When a speaker identifies an act of his own, Burke observes,

he can gain an easy advantage by picking out the most favorable motive and presenting it as either predominant or exclusive (or as the one that sets the tone of the lot). And conversely, he can select the least favorable to name the essence of an enemy's motives. 71

To achieve this "advantage," Houston equated his ordering of the survey with the pursuit of "justice," attributed his failure to act to "harmony," and blamed the "honorable Congress" for the crisis on the frontier. These equations ought to alert the critic to Houston's purpose, for they reveal a motive of self-interest. Because this motive was predominant, Houston made virtually no effort to overcome the constraints imposed by the immediate situation. Rather than responding in a way that made some sense to the

realization and attainment of the espoused objectives, Houston's rhetoric reflected a man devoted principally to the affirmation of his self-righteousness. 72

Congress ignored the message: it did not even merit referral to a committee. 73 Houston waited out the last three weeks, keeping the pledge of "harmony." 74 Of course, Houston had other options that would have lessened the likelihood of a constitutional crisis and rebellion and, heightened the chance that at least the intention of the treaty might be carried out. He could have negotiated separate treaties with each of the twelve tribes, instead of insisting upon the recognition of "the Cherokees and their associate bands," a political entity which never had the slightest integrity. The "associate bands" had not yet complied with the treaty, for they had not re-located within the prescribed boundaries. And, there is no evidence that Houston ever sought their compliance. Although Siegel contends that Houston tried to negotiate separate treaties with the emigrant tribes, he is in error; in fact, the only treaty-making that is reflected in the extant documents, is with tribes outside this group. See: Stanley Siegel, A Political History of the Texas Republic (Austin, 1956), p. 82. Had David G. Burnet (President of the ad interim Government, March-October, 1836) not been such an ardent political enemy, Houston might have even seen the possibility of reapportioning land in the West -- especially to those tribes who had already expressed a desire to make such an exchange, while at the same time accommodating those who had settled within the Burnet Colony (part of which overlapped into the Indian lands) and whose legal claims pre-dated the negotiation of the treaty.


74 Although Houston took no official action, his Secretary of State, Robert A. Irion, instructed the Texas Ambassador to the United States to request that the latter government authorize and assist in the removal of the Caddoes from Texas. In the same letter, Irion pointed out the recent difficulties with the Cherokees and suggested that both tribes threatened the security of Texas and were vulnerable to the whim of Mexican conspirators. It seems unlikely that
it was too late to do much else. Not only was his Indian policy a failure, but his inability to cope with the strain of Texas politics hastened its collapse. When his successor took office, the emigrant tribes were still a potentially serious threat to Texas' security. If anything, the situation only worsened during Houston's first term. Nevertheless, when President Lamar initiated a policy of "expulsion or extermination," Houston seemed, in retrospect, to resemble the righteous hero that he made himself out to be in the last message to Congress.

For biographers, the contrast between Houston and Lamar afforded "proof," so to speak, for the myth. Since Houston followed Lamar, when re-elected President in 1841, a comparison could hardly be avoided; Houston was especially sensitive to Lamar's policy and when he returned to office, he criticized that policy at every opportunity and in the

Houston did not know of this letter and that he did not at least approve of exploring the possibility of a removal policy with the United States. See: R. A. Irion to Anson Jones, November 29, 1838, in Garrison, ed., Diplomatic Correspondence of Texas, Vol. I, p. 353.

75 Siegel, pp. 84-99.

76 If the Indians "continue to war upon us with the ferocity of tigers and hienas," Lamar argued, "it is time that we should retaliate their warfare." He proposed the "prosecution of an exterminating war upon their warriors; which will admit of no compromise and have no termination except in their total extinction or total expulsion." In Lamar's steadfast determination, moral considerations were subsumed by expediency, greed, and revenge. See: President Lamar to the Texas Congress, December 20, 1838, in Journal of the House of Representatives of the Republic of Texas, 3rd Congress, Regular Session, p. 174.
strongest possible terms. In his judgment, it had "proved utterly fallacious." Indeed, "extermination" was "so perfect a failure," Houston said, that "it will find but few advocates who have perceived the disasters and expense incident to the attempt." The biographer accepted these judgments and the injustices of "disasters" connected with Lamar's policy provided a kind of silent standard for establishing Houston's virtue. After all, Houston sought neither "expulsion" nor "extermination"; his policy was "peace." And, of course, "peace" was in the Indians' vested interest. This sharp contrast in policy also provided a basis for inferring Houston's purposes. By comparison and negation, Lamar's injustices became important to an understanding of Houston's character. After focusing on what Lamar did and emphasizing that Houston was not like Lamar, the biographer established, by implication, that Houston was just the opposite.

An essentially romantic view of Houston's past helped

77 First Message to Congress, Second Administration, December 20, 1841, Writings, II, p. 402.

78 To the House of Representatives, February 2, 1842, Writings, II, p. 470. Actually, Houston's attack on the Lamar administration began in the Fall of 1839, when, as a Representative in the Texas House, Houston became an ardent critic of the Cherokee War (July, 1839). His speeches on behalf of the "Cherokee Land Bill" are not included in this discussion because Houston's main purpose remained that of "salvation." In this instance, instead of condemning the Congress, he condemned Lamar. For the texts, see: Writings, II, pp. 315-321 and 323-347. Also see: Siegel, pp. 142-144.
make this comparison all the more convincing, for it seemed only natural that Houston would defend the Red man. Consequently, Houston's past, in conjunction with Lamar's injustices, became the "context" for understanding Houston's discourse. This error -- the failure to ascribe meaning and derive intention from the context in which Houston's discourse originated -- is fundamental to understanding how Houston's motives were so easily taken for granted.\(^79\) The error resulted in a failure to perceive Houston's rhetoric as rhetoric. Not only were his purposes for addressing Congress misconstrued, so too were his purposes for addressing the Indians. The remainder of this chapter argues for an interpretation of the rhetoric of Houston's policy during the Second Administration and focuses primarily upon his remarks to the Indians.

In previous accounts, Houston's talks served to verify his knowledge of the Indian character, as well as reflect his genuine concern for their welfare. For example, William Carey Crane felt that the talks exhibited,

\[\text{a mastery of the nervous thought and terse language of uncultivated minds, and an adroitness in employing Indian phraseology, indicative of high genius. Some of his Indian talks are admirable specimens of Indian ideas in English.}\]

And, according to George Creel, the "Indian talks proved that he had not forgotten the lessons learned around the council fires of the Cherokees." In short, the talks constituted a means of "documenting" the romantic folk hero.

In an unpublished essay, Eugene C. Barker, co-editor of The Writings of Sam Houston, questioned whether Houston had been forthright with the Indian. The talks "are eloquent examples of oratorical literature," Barker observed, but they leave one with the impression that he wrote them with tongue in cheek. The question comes unbidden: Did he see himself as he wrote, delivering these "talks" in person -- a thing he rarely if ever did -- and swaying the Red man to his will?

Barker was disappointed because Houston seemed to be overly conscious of being a "public character playing a part on a public stage. The part is often dramatic, played with all the arts of stage craft, but it leaves the audience cold. The man himself rarely encroaches the actor." 80 81 82 83

81 George Creel, Sam Houston: Colossus in Buckskin (New York, 1928), p. 257. Other biographers state or imply essentially the same thing. Llerena Friend made no reference to Houston's talks and, as noted in Chapter Two, devoted little attention to the Indians.
82 Eugene C. Barker, "Impressions Suggested by The Writings of Sam Houston," unpublished manuscript, Barker Historical Library, University of Texas, Austin, Texas, p. 9.
83 Ibid., p. 9.
Although Barker had no answer to this problem, his comments are encouraging, for he recognized that Houston's rhetoric was prone to a superficial and inaccurate understanding of the man. On the other hand, the difficulty was not so much a matter of Houston's theatrical inclinations; after all, he was on a stage. Rather, it stemmed from a failure to consider all that was relevant to the understanding of some particular communication. In this instance, for example, even Barker seemed to want an answer from within the talks themselves and, like the biographer, he did not relate the talks to the purpose of Houston's Indian policy. Of course, biographers relied upon the talks more for the romantic imagery than anything else and sought to associate that imagery with the Houston portrait. In addition, biographers (as well as other Houston scholars, including the editors of the Writings) overlooked Houston's interaction with the Indians at council meetings and consequently failed to reconcile the differences between that discourse and the talks. All of these oversights made a fanciful interpretation of Houston's talks seem feasible and, more importantly, prevented a less fanciful view from coming to light.

When Houston returned to office, he promptly reversed Lamar's policy on the grounds that it had been too costly and had hindered, rather than helped, the development of the frontier. "On the safety and security of our frontier
settlements materially depend the increase of emigration, the extension of our limits, and the general quietude and prosperity of all our citizens," Houston told the Congress. 84 He then proposed a policy that would assure "the general quietude." "We cannot pursue them [the Indians] with success," Houston asserted.

It is better calculated to irritate than to humble them. Neither can we pursue with the hope of exterminating them. Millions have been expended in the attempt, and what has been the result? War and theft are their vocation; and their incursions are made upon us with impunity . . . Our citizens, so continually harassed, are dispirited. Industry and enterprise are alike embarrassed -- the former prevented, the latter discouraged. 85

In the interests of "industry and enterprise," Houston recommended that,

a number of posts be established at suitable points extending from our Western border to Red River; -- that treaties be concluded with the several tribes, and that one or more traders be established, under proper regulations, at each of these points, with from twenty-five to thirty men for their protection. I do not doubt that this system, once established, would conciliate the Indians, open a lucrative commerce with them and bring continued peace to our frontier. Their intercourse with us would enable them to obtain articles of convenience and comfort which they could not otherwise procure unless by a very indirect trade with more remote tribes who have

84 First Message to Congress, Second Administration, December 20, 1841, Writings, II, p. 401.
85 Ibid., p. 402.
86 Ibid., p. 402.
commerce with traders of the United States.\footnote{First Message to Congress, Second Administration, December 20, 1841, \textit{Writings}, II, p. 402.}

Indians are "controlled," Houston argued, "by a sense of treaty obligations" and by their interests in trade. To substantiate this point, Houston turned to history. These two principals were,

established and pursued successfully by England, since the settlement of America. It has also been adopted by the United States, and continued with general success, by the late illustrious father of Texas -- Stephen F. Austin. Had not this policy been pursued by the first colonists, our country would at this day have possessed a far less population than it does -- if, indeed, it had not remained a wilderness.\footnote{To the House of Representatives, February 2, 1842, \textit{Writings}, II, p. 470. The italics are added.}

With the policy of his father land as a model, Houston set about the task of making peace and establishing lines of commerce. Admittedly, Houston was concerned about the maintenance of "good faith on the part of the whites," but all too often his statements to that effect were misconstrued. "Good faith" and "justice towards the Indian" simply insured "security," which was necessary and desirable for "industry and enterprise."\footnote{These or similar terms were employed in each annual message to Congress; this particular rendering is taken from: To the Texas Congress--Annual Message, December 12, 1843, \textit{Writings}, III, p. 466.} To Houston, the encouragement of the latter was not in conflict with the Indians'
rights, since the Indian would either benefit or be supplant-
ed by "industry and enterprise," which was the inevitable
and indomitable course of American destiny. Notice, for
example, the sense in which Houston spoke of industry and enterprise in his valedictory address. "The Pacific alone will bound the mighty march of our race and our empire. From Europe and America her soil is to be peopled. In regions where the savage and the buffalo now roam uncontrolled, the enterprise and industry of the Anglo-American are yet to find an extensive field of develop-
ment." See: Valedictory to the Texas Congress, December 9, 1844, Writings, IV, p. 403.

"Our former enemies may be converted into useful and lasting friends." Houston hoped not only to obtain peace with all the tribes, but, if some should prove receptive, to enlist their services in the military. The President "anticipates con-
fidently a treaty of peace and amity with all the Indians upon our borders," Houston informed the Congress in a "se-
cret" report. "Should adequate means be placed at his disposition, he can render them efficient friends in pre-
vanting the successful inroads of the Mexicans; as they would have it in their power to be ready, with small en-
couragement, to deprive the enemy of their cavalry and pack-
mules... We shall have the strongest guaranty for their fidelity to our cause, in the fact that they have been en-
gaged for years in hostility against us; for they will naturally feel solicitous to confirm our friendship by evincing a zeal in our service. They may be made as
policy, conversion and dependency were achieved through "friendly intercourse, treaties, and trade," which functioned rhetorically as unifying forces, by providing the social cohesion necessary for peace. This use of persuasive appeal further suggests that the essential nature of Houston's communication to the Indians was that of "courtship," since, as Kenneth Burke observed, "the 'principle of courtship'" involves "the use of suasive devices for the transcending of social estrangement." And, Burke contends, an explanation of this sort of communication must take into consideration the "mystery" of such an appeal.

valuable for their friendship as they have been injurious by their hostility." See: To the Texas Congress, December 22, 1842, Writings, III, pp. 247-248. The reports of the Secretary of War and Marine indicate that Houston was fairly successful in this regard. See, for example: G. W. Hockley To Sam Houston, June 23, 1842, in Harriet Smither, ed., Journals of the Sixth Congress of the Republic of Texas, 1841-1842, Vol. III, pp. 110-111.

During the second term there was much less Congressional opposition to Houston's policy. In part, this lessening can be attributed to the election of 1841, for several who had opposed Houston (especially in the House) were not re-elected, making the "Houston party" a majority. Secondly, as Muckleroy pointed out, Lamar's policy helped make the Indians more receptive to Houston's overtures and it did open up some new land. See: Anna Muckleroy, "The Indian Policy of the Republic of Texas," Southwestern Historical Quarterly, XXVI (October, 1922), pp. 128-148. Finally, Mexican attempts to conspire with the Indians against Texas decreased, although Mexico never completely abandoned the idea throughout the life of the republic. See: James Logan (Creek Indian Agent) to T. Hartley Crawford, November 9, 1844, Office of Indian Affairs, Western Superintendency, A1736 (Social and Economic Records Division, National Archives, Washington, D. C.).

In *A Rhetoric of Motives*, Burke elaborates upon the "mystery" or "magic" of persuasion by taking the reader on a number of "excursions," "trying anything and everything, improvising, borrowing from others, developing from others."93 He begins,

with the proposition that mystery arises at that point where different kinds of beings are in communication. In mystery there must be strangeness; but the estranged must also be thought of as in some way capable of communion.94 An appeal that attempts to unify different classes or kinds of beings can be thought of as "courtship," since that analogue serves so well to identify the mystification operative in "one class struggling to possess the soul of another class."95 "The abstract paradigm of courtship," when applied to "persuasion by address," involves "communication between classes of entities."96 "Such appeal, or address," Burke concludes,

would be the technical equivalent of love. But courtship, love, is "mystery." For love is a communion of estranged entities, and strangeness is a condition of mystery. When courtship attains its equivalent in the realm of group relations, differences between the sexes has its analogue in the difference between social

classes.97

It is important to consider discourse in this light, since "it puts rhetorical analysis on the track of much courtship that might otherwise remain undetected. And courtship, however roundabout, is a form of persuasion."98 Houston's "courtship" of the Indians was so "roundabout" that biographers were themselves taken in by the "mystery" of Houston's "friendship." In essence, they failed to recognize that Houston appealed to the "mystification of class" in order to conceal and transcend the real issues that divided the Indian and the white man.

Throughout most of 1842, Houston was delayed by the "incompetent manner in which matters were managed" by the agents.99 Consequently, the "courtship" did not begin in earnest until the Spring of 1843, when the first formal council convened at Tehuacana Creek. Although most of the tribes in attendance were already "friendly," Houston wanted to obtain a commitment from them to help establish peace with

97 Burke, A Grammar of Motives and A Rhetoric of Motives, p. 701. The italics are Burke's. Burke numbers the "steps" in this excerpt and that enumeration has been omitted.

98 Ibid., p. 647.

99 Houston to General George W. Terrell and Others, March 11, 1843, Writings, III, p. 331. It is difficult to say just what happened during 1842, since the extant documents consist of little more than Houston's orders. But, that scarcity lends credence to Houston's evaluation. See: Writings, III, pp. 52, 87-88, and 91.
the hostile tribes. "The very name of a treaty with those already there will have a very decided influence with those who have not attended to treat," Houston emphasized in a letter to George Terrell, the commissioner at Tehuacana Creek.100

Even a treaty for the present with the Shawnees, Delawares, and Kickapoos, would have an important bearing upon our Indian relations. This you can do at once, and bring the chief to see me. You surely can do something that will serve as a commencement and leave to the future its conduct and consummation.101

Houston was "convinced" that a formal treaty with the peaceful tribes would have "a salutary influence upon those who cannot be approached at this time."102 And, to insure that influence, he requested Terrell to accompany "such of the chiefs as the commissioners think best should come to this place. If I can once see and converse with them," Houston observed, "I will be enabled to devise such measures as will be best suited to the establishment of such relations with the Indians as will give peace and security to our frontiers."103

In addition to these instructions, Houston forwarded

100 Houston to General George W. Terrell and Others, March 11, 1843, Writings, III, p. 330. The italics are Houston's.

101 Ibid., p. 330. The italics are Houston's.

102 Houston to General George W. Terrell, March 20, 1843, Writings, III, p. 334.

103 Ibid., p. 335.
a couple of talks which he undoubtedly perceived as "measures" devised to "give peace and security to our frontiers." "After the usual preliminary [sic] of smoking," one of these talks was "read and interpreted" to the five different tribes represented at Tehuacana Creek.\textsuperscript{104} And, before adjournment the commissioners delivered the second talk which was received with "great satisfaction to all present."\textsuperscript{105} A complete text of that talk follows.

Brothers, The great rains, like your sorrows, I hope, have passed off, and the sun is again shining upon us. When we all make peace, it will be to the heart like the sunshine is to our eyes. We will feel joy and gladness. Sorrow will no longer fill our hearts. The noise of an enemy will not be near us, and there will be none to make us afraid. The voices of our women and children will be gladness. They will be heard, cheerful as the song of Birds which sing in the green woods of summer.

The sleep of your people will not be disturbed. The hunter will not be alarmed in his camp. When our people meet their red brothers -- they will grasp them by the hands, as friends, and they will no more remember their sorrows.

I will send good Agents to you who will give you my Talks, and when you may wish it, they will send your Talks to me. My heart will be warm towards you, and your people. If my people act badly towards your people, I will punish them. Our laws have given the head chief of Texas a right to do so. If your people do wrong to us, they must be punished!

\textsuperscript{104} "Minutes of Indian Council at Tehuacana Creek," March 28, 1843, in Dorman H. Winfrey, ed., \textit{Texas Indian Papers} (Austin, 1959), Vol. I, p. 150.

\textsuperscript{105} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 162.
I will keep our people from stealing from you, and you must not let your people steal from ours.

Bad men who are our enemies must be looked upon by you as enemies. You will be our neighbors and friends, and those who would injure us, wou'd do you wrong likewise. Let no Indians trouble our frontier and we will make you presents as brothers! When we know that you are our friends, we will sell you arms, powder, & lead to kill game. We will buy your skins, your mules, horses, and Jacks, or we will buy your sheep and goats if you should bring any to our trading houses.

I have sent for fine lances to make presents to the chiefs who are most friendly, and I will send them by the Agent in October! or I will send for the chiefs, and with my own hands, I will present them. I hope one Chief of each Band (at least) will come to see me, so soon as the Treaty is over. My counsellors will show you the way to my house!

Come! and no harm shall fall upon you, but you shall return to your people with presents and happy. You may rely upon my words -- they are not false -- nor will I let harm trouble you, as it did at Bexar! Those sorrows must be forgotten -- the thoughts of them only make the heart sad, -- sorrow cannot bring back our friends. Let peace now be made that we may lose no more, and trouble will not come upon us. -- Let the wild brothers who love the prairies, hunt the Buffalo, and those who love houses, build them, and plant corn in their own fields. -- While they remain friends, I will keep trouble and sorrow from them! Their women and children shall not weep for the loss of warriors and friends in battle.

The Great Spirit will be kind to all people who love peace. Let all the Red brothers listen to their Chiefs, when they counsel to speak peace! --

Your Brother

Sam Houston  

106 Houston to the Chiefs of the Border Tribes,
In this talk, as in all of the more general appeals, Houston tried to identify with the Indians through such obvious unification devices as celestial terms (such as the "Great Spirit"), naturalistic metaphors, the attraction of presents, and the material benefits of trade. And, through overtures of "peace," "love," and "friendship," Houston tried to transcend territorial conflict by the "mystification of class." Not even the style, although colorful and appropriately romantic, conceals the condescending tone of the implicit hierarchy which placed the Indians lowest in the social order, while the President, as judge, protector, and guardian -- all in one -- assumed the responsibility of their welfare. The bond of mystery that united these estranged classes is basically analogous to the mysterious bond that unites parents and children. Houston was "Big Daddy" and the time was appropriate to have a "talk" with the children of the forest. Even the entitlement of these

February 13, 1843, Writings, III, pp. 318-319. The "trouble" at "Bexar" refers to the "Council House Fight" or massacre at San Antonio, on March 19, 1840 (during the Lamar administration). The Comanches had come to make a treaty, exchange prisoners, and trade with the Texans. But, when it was apparent that they only intended to release one prisoner, the Texans decided to detain the chiefs as hostages, while the younger men were ordered to return to camp and bring in all the prisoners. When the Comanches resisted, a regular melee followed, in which thirty-five Indians were killed and twenty-seven were taken prisoner. The Texans lost seven. The Comanches were released in exchange for the remaining white captives. See: Writings, IV, pp. 162-163.
messages as "talks" (although the precedent was well established before Houston's time) is an indication of his fatherly attitude. He wanted to "grasp them by the hands, as friends," and, as long as "they remain friends," he would "keep trouble from them."

This interpretation, however, is a bit misleading, because the talks are misleading. Houston was not genuinely interested in protecting the Indians' rights. Nor, for that matter, was he concerned with what the children had to say to him. Rather, he was motivated by a desire to encourage "industry and enterprise" and he recognized that a policy of "dependent" friends (peace) was the most expedient route to "security." But, of course, it is difficult to find evidence of Houston's real attitude in the talks -- assuming that the Indians were to be taken in by such overtures. And yet, the social order that is implied ought to at least awaken suspicion of the sort that Barker raised when he said that he "had the impression" that Houston wrote the talks with "tongue in cheek."

Furthermore, the talks ought to be discounted because of Houston's propensity to affirm his self-righteousness in public documents. That is, he may have manufactured the talks as documents for the "scrutiny of after time." Given his self-consciousness and insecurity, it seems quite likely that the talks were designed, at least in part, for the purpose of artistic display and image making. "I wish to be
able to render such an account of my stewardship," Houston wrote to Thomas G. Western, Superintendent of Indian Affairs, "as will neither cause my friends to blush for me, nor leave my country anything to deplore." Houston's talks left little to deplore, while his policy kept his friends from blushing. In sum, the talks were addressed to the Indians and to future generations.

Finally, it should be noted that the talks are most seriously discredited by Houston himself -- not only in his remarks to Congress, but in his instructions to agents and by his statements at a council held in the Fall of 1844 (the only council he ever personally attended). "The Indians must know that there is a supervision exercised over them," Houston wrote to Benjamin Bryant, an agent. "They cannot know how poor the government really is." Among other things, "supervision" granted to the President "the power to regulate the relative grades of the Indians in council." Obviously, Houston recognized that his appeals

107 Houston to Thomas G. Western, May 1, 1844, *Writings*, IV, pp. 311-312. Houston took considerable care in seeing to it that the talks were recorded in the appropriate annals. During the second term, copies were filed with the papers on Indian Affairs, the *Executive Record Book*, and in "Houston's Private Executive Record Book." The latter reference was lent to William Carey Crane by the Houston family and was Crane's major source for the "literary remains." See: Crane, pp. 3-4.

108 Houston to Benjamin Bryant, February 24, 1843, *Writings*, III, p. 325.

109 Houston to the Indian Commissioners, October 9, 1842, *Writings*, III, p. 177.
were dependent upon the mystery of hierarchy. If the recipient was not "mystified," Houston could appoint a chief that would be -- a power that was itself mystifying. When the council convened in October of 1844, at the Falls of the Brazos, Houston used this power to reward those who accepted his "friendship" and to threaten those who had not.

The Wacoes had been accused of stealing some horses in the Spring of 1844. Narhashtowey, the principal Chief of the Wacoes, had previously confessed to doing "bad in this affair upon the Colorado" and he agreed to "make peace," hoping that his "bad conduct" would be "thrown away and forgotten."\textsuperscript{110} "We have been like people with their eyes shut," he explained.

Of the white people we know nothing; but now we are here and can see and judge for ourselves. I did not attend the council at Bird's Fort. I was sick and when my people came back I knew nothing about it. This is the first time I have been in council; the first time I have heard you talk.\textsuperscript{111}

The minutes of the two previous councils verify Narhashtowey's remarks.\textsuperscript{112} Indeed, the fact that he had not signed the treaty was specifically pointed out to Houston.

\textsuperscript{110} "Minutes of Treaty Council at Tehuacana Creek," May 14, 1844, in Texas Indian Papers, Vol. II, p. 47.

\textsuperscript{111} Ibid., p. 47.

\textsuperscript{112} "Minutes of Indian Council at Tehuacana Creek," March 28, 1843, and "Treaty of Peace Concluded at Bird's Fort," September 29, 1843, in Texas Indian Papers, Vol. I, pp. 155 and 246, respectively. Neither of these treaties contain Narhashtowey's signature.
in a report from Col. Eldridge. Furthermore, Acaquash, the Waco Chief who signed the treaty, indicated at the time of signing that there were two other chiefs in his tribe who would have to be consulted. Nevertheless, Acaquash had signed the treaty and he had been of "great assistance" to Texas in establishing contacts with other tribes.

Houston not only held the Waco responsible to the treaty that Acaquash had signed, but he blamed Narhashtowey for not enforcing it. "Some Waco who would not listen to the treaty and the voice of Acquash have stolen horses," Houston announced in his opening remarks at the Falls of the Brazos.

They must bring back those horses and steal no more. I intend to make Acaquash the Chief of that nation, because he is a good man and walks straight, and puts aside his men when they do bad. I do this because he remembers his Treaties and walks straight, if the other chief will learn to do this and walk straight, I will then hear his words.

When Houston finished speaking, he "arose from his seat, and requested Acaquash to rise also, when he bound around his

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113 "Letter to Sam Houston from J.C. Eldredge," December 8, 1843, in Texas Indian Papers, Vol. I, p. 255. Also see: p. 217. (Also spelled "Eldridge.")


115 "Letter from J. C. Eldredge to Sam Houston, June 2, 1843, in Texas Indian Papers, Vol. I, p. 212.

brow a silk handkerchief, with a large pin in front, and proclaimed him 'Chief of the Waco.'"\textsuperscript{117}

On the following day, Houston told Narhashtowey that if the horses were not returned, "mounted dragoons will come from the United States, hundreds and hundreds of them and they will sweep the Waco away from among the good chiefs of my red brothers."\textsuperscript{118} He told the Chief that he would appoint Col. Williams to accompany them back to their village to obtain the horses. "I want to know," Houston asked, turning to Narhashtowey, "if these men are to behave themselves?" "It may be that some of the horses are dead," Narhashtowey replied. "All that are living shall be sent in by Col. Williams." Exasperated by this response, Houston issued an ultimatum: "For every horse that's dead or missing a Waco shall be hung."\textsuperscript{119}

This exchange between Houston and the Waco Chief, as well as a disagreement that occurred at the same council between Houston and a Comanche Chief, over where the line should be run (which Houston finally solved by saying, "we will sign all but that part of the boundary line, which we will rub out and go on as before"), indicates that the


\textsuperscript{118} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 109.

\textsuperscript{119} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 112.
essence of Houston's appeal was more overpowering than the parent-child analogue suggests. Indeed, as President, Houston lorded over the native inhabitants with all the pomp and zeal of a sovereign monarch. In many respects, his reign over the tribes of Texas was akin to the Old Testament account of Jehovah's "courtship" of the tribes of Israel. "Houston is like a God," observed Chief Ke-chi-ka-roque of the Tawakoni. "He has talked to his red brothers and made their hearts glad. He has made the people happy and friendly."\(^{120}\) In essence, Houston's appeal centered upon the "mystery" of power and glory.

"I regard nations, as corporations, on a large and sometimes magnificent scale, but no more than this," Houston once wrote. "Consequently they have no soul, and recognize no mentor but interest."\(^{121}\) Houston's talks not only affirm his awareness of the mystery of courtship, but they confirm Burke's notion that courtship "attains its utmost thoroughness in the contrast between the mightiest sovereign and the lowliest of his subjects."\(^{122}\) Appropriately enough, Houston not only approximated the style of the Psalmist,


\(^{121}\) Houston to William S. Murphy, May 6, 1844, *Writings*, IV, p. 323.  

he assumed an omnipotent role, by commanding obedience to the "laws" that would preserve the social order between "your people and my people."

Bad men who are our enemies must be looked upon by you as enemies. You will be our neighbors and friends, and those who would injure us, would do you likewise. Let no Indians trouble our frontier and we will make you presents as brothers.123

123 Houston to the Chiefs of the Border Tribes, February 13, 1843, Writings, III, p. 318.
If you undertake to go into the wilderness, into the domain of the wild beast, and begin to pursue the game, to plant plantations -- when you see the farm, the field, the garden, springing up around you, your feelings will become attached to the land; it will imbue your hearts; you will catch the contagion of the frontier settler; you will not be able to escape it. You may escape the small pox, but you can never escape the contagion of land loving. As sure as you live, it will become a part of your nature. There is not an American upon earth but who loves land.

-- Sam Houston, January 29, 1848.
CHAPTER V

INBORN DIGNITY: AN APPEAL FOR
THE EXPANSION AND PRESERVATION OF THE UNION

In 1846, Texas finally obtained annexation and the "lustre of the 'Lone Star'" joined "the constellation of American freedom." The entry of Texas marked the beginning of a surge to expand national domain to the Pacific and for the next decade the United States pursued its "manifest destiny." But, each new acquisition also fomented sectional strife and in the end not even the diversion of expansion could conceal or resolve the pending civil crisis. Throughout most of this period, from 1846-1859, Sam Houston represented Texas in the United States Senate and his Senate speeches have since become an important basis for the reaffirmation of his "Indian ways" and friendly regard for "the untutored children of the forest."

In Sam Houston: American Giant, Wisehart summarized the position taken by the biographer. "Again and again," Wisehart noted,

the Senator from Texas pleaded with his colleagues in behalf of the Indians. He confessed that he had little hope of persuading his fellow senators to act with greater justice toward the Indians. Yet, accepting the risk of being a bore and a

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1 Houston to J. L. Farquhar, S. R. Roberts, and Others, October 27, 1845, Writings, IV, p. 426; also see: Houston to Citizens of Richmond, Texas, December 24, 1845, Writings, IV, p. 444. An excellent treatment of the history of the annexation of Texas can be found in: Justin H. Smith, The Annexation of Texas (Corrected Edition, New York, 1941).
fanatic, he persisted.  

Eugene C. Barker questioned the genuineness of Houston's persistence, but, as with Houston's talks to the Indians, he offered only an "impression." Houston "uniformly asserted the noble virtues of the Indian," Barker wrote, and defended them against injustice and oppression by the whites -- sometimes allowing less than justice to the whites, and particularly to the army, upon which the burden fell of protecting the frontier and enforcing government regulations. Hardly any subject was too remote to prevent him from dragging in the Indians when he wanted to make a speech. Nearly always he spoke eloquently about Indians, but frequently one doubts his complete sincerity.  

Llerena Friend followed Barker's lead. All too often, she observed, Houston "dragged in extraneous material with slight provocation, never forgetting the Indians." Neither Friend nor Barker, however, dealt with the rhetorical implications of "dragging in the Indians." And, as with other Houston biographers, they ignored those instances in which Houston looked upon the Indian with disfavor. Likewise, the fact that Houston continued to equate a policy of "control" with the "industry and enterprise" of the nation escaped notice.


3 Eugene C. Barker, "Impressions Suggested by The Writings of Sam Houston," unpublished manuscript, Barker Historical Library, University of Texas, Austin, Texas, p. 13. As will soon be evident, Barker is in error when he says that Houston "uniformly asserted the noble virtues of the Indian."

Moreover, previous interpretations failed to appreciate that Houston's remarks were motivated by his perception of the nation's welfare, not the Indian's. The following analysis argues that Houston "dragged in the Indians" because of an ulterior motive -- i.e., the Indian functioned symbolically as a means of concealment and diversion, thereby offering a humanistic impetus for national expansion and preservation.

In his maiden speech before the Senate, Houston revealed the formula for national expansion operative in the acquisition of Texas. "Texas was more coy than forward," he recalled.

As long as Texas evinced a great anxiety for annexation, she was treated with indifference and her application held in abeyance. Hence a change in policy had become necessary, and such a change as would induce the belief that Texas was about to form new relations with some other country.

In other words, Houston concluded, it was "necessary to operate upon the apprehensions and jealousies of the United States; to drive them to exertion; and no other course was as well calculated to attain that object as to speak of England in terms of commendation."

Although the particular "apprehensions and jealousies" might vary, Houston usually chose to be "more coy than

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5 Speech on the Oregon Question in the Senate of the United States, April 15, 1846, Writings, IV, pp. 467-468.
6 Ibid., p. 468.
forward" and most of his communication needs to be understood in this light. For example, in the same speech cited above, Houston spoke on the Oregon question in support of President Polk's request to notify England that the United States intended to abrogate the treaty agreement (1818) for the joint occupation of Oregon Territory. Houston also defended "a claim to the whole of Oregon." "We have to inquire of ourselves," he said,

> is the adoption of this measure necessary to the preservation and well-being of this Union? Is it necessary to the furtherance of our interests and the reestablishment and upbuilding of our nation that a certain measure should be adopted, or a certain policy pursued? If these questions can be answered affirmatively, then we have only to march forward in the highway to the destiny which is before us. We are not to falter in a decisive act because England may frown or smile on any particular line of our policy.  

After asking if anyone believed that England felt "sympathy with the millions of India whom they have slaughtered or enslaved," Houston suggested an "apprehension." "The same love of aggrandizement which has directed her policy in India will undoubtedly characterize her measures toward the United States -- the increase of power and extension of dominion."  

> "What sort of policy would it be," Houston asked, "to encourage our people to remove to Oregon, and remain there

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7 *Speech on the Oregon Question in the Senate of the United States, April 15, 1846, Writings, IV, pp. 454-455.*
8 *Ibid., p. 456.*
without the assurance of safety, surrounded by Indians under British control?"⁹ "As matters now stand," Houston pointed out,

they cannot settle north of the Columbia river. If they attempt it, they are seduced by bribery or driven by menaces to remove south of that river. England, if need be, will strengthen herself in Oregon. She has troops there, armed and disciplined, if she has not an agricultural population such as ours.¹⁰

Although the appeal is not fully developed in this speech the essence of what Houston meant by "more coy than forward" is clear. Two years later, when Oregon sought the status of a territorial government, Houston again took the floor. He favored immediate action, in order to "have protection extended to the people of Oregon. They require an organization," he argued, "to protect them against the surrounding tribes of Indians."¹¹ And, when the Oregon homestead bill was introduced, Houston found the proposed three hundred and twenty acres per family "insufficient, as a consideration for the hazards and difficulties incident to a removal to the far distant territory of Oregon."¹²

Houston's apprehension now shifted to the Indians, as he

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⁹ Speech on the Oregon Question in the Senate of the United States, April 15, 1846, Writings, IV, pp. 462-463.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 463.

¹¹ On the Bill to Establish Territorial Government in Oregon, June 2, 1848, Writings, V, p. 54.

¹² On Homestead Grants in Oregon, September 17, 1850, Writings, V, p. 253.
sought to interject a humanitarian concern into a justification of "the extension of the influence and increase of the power of the Republic."¹³ In Houston's judgment, the situation in Oregon was somewhat akin to "the early settlement of Tennessee." He went on to explain the advantages of the policy then adopted by North Carolina... A bounty or donation of land of 640 acres, or one section, was granted to all citizens of North Carolina who might choose to emigrate to Cumberland, or what is now West Tennessee. The reasons for this policy were obvious. Indian tribes of the most dangerous character—the Cherokees of Houston's boyhood/ surrounded them, and individuals, without some inducement, were unwilling to encounter the hazards of removing to that country. Some of the best farmers and most substantial citizens of Tennessee have been furnished by the policy then pursued by North Carolina in affording this inducement. The settlement of Cumberland indeed might have been postponed for half a century but for this wise and humane policy, suggested by the wisdom of North Carolina statesmen. The consequence was that Cumberland soon obtained a population sufficient to defend themselves against the powerful surrounding tribes of border Indians.¹⁴

In sum, the idea of offering homesteads to induce settlement had the sanction of our forefathers, was "wise and humane," and would open "new markets to our enterprise and industry."¹⁵

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¹³ On Homestead Grants in Oregon, September 17, 1850, Writings, V, pp. 254-255.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 253. "The wisdom of North Carolina statesmen" was also calculated to put an end to land speculation in that area. See: Thomas Perkins Abernethy, From Frontier to Plantation in Tennessee: A Study in Frontier Democracy (Chapel Hill, 1932), pp. 19-43.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 255.
Houston promised to support such a policy "as long as I have a seat on this floor." "I have no desire in this matter to make fish of one and flesh of another, and I am willing to extend this policy wherever these public lands can be reduced to cultivation." 16

From a Burkeian perspective, Houston's use of "wise and humane" functioned as a "eulogistic covering" (or means of concealment) and made it possible to bestow "honor" upon the ultimate term: "National Union." By this means of transcendence, Houston was able to get around any encroachment upon the rights of the native inhabitants -- for, as with the settlement of Tennessee, "the extension of the influence and increase of the power of the Republic" was anterior to any concern for the Indians. 17 "Historical-collectivistic emphases," Burke writes, "generally play about an intermingling of ideal and corporate grouping." 18

In the history of the United States, there is probably no parallel equal to the "historical-collectivistic emphases" that generated the spirit of manifest destiny in the 1840's. Among its advocates, Houston ranks as one of the foremost "interminglers."

16 On Homestead Grants in Oregon, September 17, 1850, Writings, V, p. 255.


At a war rally in New York City, late in January of 1848, Houston explained how the war with Mexico would allow America an opportunity to fulfill its "destiny." "As long as tomorrow's sun will rise and pursue its bright course along the firmament of heaven," he declared,

so certain it appears to my mind, must the Anglo-Saxon race pervade the whole southern extremity of this vast continent, and the people whom God has placed here in this land, spread, prevail, and pervade throughout the whole rich empire of this great hemisphere.19

Another consideration was "conclusive" in Houston's mind: "Americans regard this continent as their birthright," he proclaimed.20 Of course, if the "people whom God has placed here" were to "prevail and pervade," it naturally followed that they were of superior stock. In Houston's opinion, the "sacrifice and success" of the past demonstrated American superiority.

The pioneers who went forth into the wilderness poured out their heart's blood to prepare the country for their posterity; their scalps were taken by the Indians; they sacrificed their life's blood to acquire the possession which we enjoy. If all these difficulties and sacrifices did not terrify the bold pioneers, the success of centuries only tends to confirm what they began, and nothing can prevent our mighty march.21

19 Speech on the Mexican War, January 29, 1848, Writings, V, p. 34. The editors of the Writings inaccurately entitled this address: "Speech on the Boundary of Texas:" their estimate of the date is also in error. See New York Herald, January 30, 1848.

20 Ibid., p. 34.

21 Ibid., p. 34.
In his "coarse and vulgar way," Houston reduced this lesson of the past to a postulate of "cheating" for "the sake of humanity." "Your ancestors," he told the crowd at Tammany Hall, "were not long contented with that barren spot [Plymouth Rock]. . . . From the first moment they landed, they went on trading with the Indians, and cheating them out of their land."22 "The Mexicans," Houston continued, are no better than Indians, and I see no reason why we should not go on in the same course now, and take their land. But these countries will be benefitted by our occupation. Look at the Californias, Sonora, Western Mexico, New Mexico, etc. All these vast regions, where only a few hundred thousand souls are living in such wide dominions -- where the wild Indian extends with impunity his ravages, and, unchecked he penetrates into the heart of Mexico, even as far as Potosi, spoiling and destroying as he goes along; seizing upon the women with malicious minds, and incorporating them into their tribes as wives! Let the white man -- let the American interpose; let him say to the Indian, "Stay, savage, we will protect these helpless people. We will do it." -- [Loud applause.] We are the majority, and it must be done for the sake of humanity.23

According to Houston, a higher authority than our ancestors endorsed "cheating" for "the sake of humanity." "I think we may see the finger of God in this war," he asserted,

giving success to our arms, and crowning our forces with victory. I do not deplore it; for though blood has flowed, and valuable lives have been lost, yet not one act of cruelty has been

22 Speech on the Mexican War, January 29, 1848, Writings, V, p. 34.
23 Ibid., pp. 34-35.
committed in all the victories which our arms have gained. Their humanity has been displayed to the astonishment and admiration of the world, and as a model and example for all future armies. Then, I say, the Divine Being has been evidently carrying out the destiny of the American race. We give to the Mexican liberal principles; we elevate them far above what their tyrants have done; and the day will come when they will bless the Americans as their friends and liberators until time shall cease. 24

In essence, Houston sought conquest through a merger of humanistic and religious patterns of thought. The United States was supposed to "take" Mexico because the "continent" was a part of the Americans' "birth-right." The superiority of the Americans' birth-right was evident in their sensitivity to the needs of "humanity" and owed its origin to a "mandate from God" -- the same mandate that led the people of Israel "to possess themselves of the land of the Ammonites." 25 The unifying appeal in this speech can be characterized in the same manner that Burke used to sum up Hitler's "Battle" -- namely, it rests upon "a bastardization of fundamentally religious patterns of thought." 26 Such patterns stress "a 'natural born' dignity of man," Burke writes.

And this categorical dignity is considered to be an attribute of all men, if they will but

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24 Speech on the Mexican War, January 29, 1848, Writings, V, p. 34.
25 Ibid., p. 35.
26 Kenneth Burke, The Philosophy of Literary Form (New York, 1957), p. 188.
avail themselves of it, by right thinking and right living. But Hitler gives this ennobling attitude an ominous twist by his theories of race and nation, whereby the "Aryan" is elevated above all others by the innate endowment of his blood, while other "races," in particular Jews and Negroes, are innately inferior. This sinister secularized revision of Christian theology thus puts the sense of dignity upon a fighting basis, requiring the conquest of "inferior races." 27

In the Tammany Hall address, Houston "elevated" the American "race" and thereby justified the conquest of "inferior races."

While Houston spoke at Tammany Hall, Nicholas P. Trist, Chief Clerk of the State Department, completed a draft of a peace treaty with Mexico which was signed on February 2, 1848, and ratified by the Senate about a month later. 28 The Mexican Congress approved the treaty in May and by mid-June the returning troops received the welcome of a victorious nation. Between ratification and withdrawal, however, the expansionists' hopes were rekindled by a petition for American assistance from the Government of Yucatan. Secessionist

27 Kenneth Burke, The Philosophy of Literary Form (New York, 1957), p. 188.

28 Houston abstained from voting. He wanted the border to begin at Tampico on the Gulf of Mexico and to continue northwestward across the middle of Mexico to the Gulf of California, while the entire peninsula of Lower California was to be transferred to the United States. Houston biographers ignore his abstention, as well as his border proposal; his position even escaped the editors of the Writings, evidently because the proceedings were conducted in executive session and the debate was not published until 1887. See: Journal of the Executive Proceedings of the Senate, VII (Washington, 1887), pp. 302-342. The boundary line that Houston advocated can be found in: Charles O. Paullin, Atlas of Historical Geography of the United States (Washington, 1932), Plate 94.
factions in Yucatan had attempted independence from Mexico as early as 1839; during the Mexican War, expression of this sentiment was renewed by Yucatan's declaration of neutrality.\(^2\)\(^9\) When the Indian population rebelled in the Spring of 1848, the Yucatan authorities saw an opportunity not only to obtain the military assistance they so desperately needed, but to permanently alter their allegiance to Mexico. In a letter to Secretary of State James Buchanan, Justo Sierra O'Reilly, Yucatan's commissioner to the United States, requested "arms, ammunition, and a few troops, together with a very small quantity of money."\(^3\)\(^0\) He enclosed a similar request addressed to Secretary Buchanan, from Santiago Mendez, Governor of Yucatan, who concluded by "offering the dominion and sovereignty of the country to the nation which will assume the charge of saving it."\(^3\)\(^1\) Believing the fate of the country to be dependent upon "a foreign power to favor her with assistance," Mendez noted that he had also appealed to "the Spanish and English Governments."\(^3\)\(^2\)

On April 29, 1848, President Polk submitted a special


\(^3\)\(^0\) Sierra to Buchanan, April 18, 1848, in *Senate Executive Documents*, 30th Congress, 1st Session, No. 40, p. 16.

\(^3\)\(^1\) Mendez to Buchanan, March 25, 1848, in *Senate Executive Documents*, 30th Congress, 1st Session, No. 40, p. 17.

\(^3\)\(^2\) Ibid., p. 18.
message to Congress in which he outlined the effect of Yucatan's request upon the United States. Although he would never "recommend acquisition of the 'dominion and sovereignty' of Yucatan," Polk maintained that "our own security requires" that the United States reiterate and reaffirm the principle avowed by Mr. Monroe....

We now have authentic information that, if the aid asked from the United States be not granted, such aid will probably be obtained from some European power which may hereafter assert a claim to "dominion and sovereignty" over Yucatan.33

He concluded by asking the Congress to adopt such measures as in their judgment may be expedient to prevent Yucatan from becoming a colony of any European power, which in no event could be permitted by the United States, and at the same time to rescue the white race from extermination or expulsion from their country.34

The Senate referred the message to the Foreign Relations Committee and six days later, Senator Hannegan, an ardent expansionist, introduced a bill authorizing the President to: 1) take temporary occupation of Yucatan with the army and navy; 2) furnish the white population of Yucatan with arms, ammunition, and ordnance, to help them repel Indian hostilities and restore peace; 3) to accept the services of volunteer troops.35 Senator Calhoun led

33 James D. Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents (Washington, 1897), VI, pp. 2431-2432.
34 Ibid., p. 2432.
35 Congressional Globe, Appendix, 30th Congress, 1st Session, p. 590. Jefferson Davis' amendment was adopted
a coalition of Whigs and Democrats in opposing the measure. As a member of the cabinet which helped frame the Monroe Doctrine, he took exception to the President's "ingenuity" in applying that "declaration." He noted that the Senate was not privy to the "authentic information" which spoke to the probability of foreign intervention and he doubted that any such information existed. He emphasized the President's reference to some other power that "may" render aid or "may 'assert dominion and sovereignty.'" Lastly, as Frederick Merk pointed out in Manifest Destiny and Mission in American History, Calhoun was especially "distrustful" of the President's message because of "its mixing of purposes, its uniting of humanitarianism with policy, concern for imperiled Yucatecos with concern for the interests of the United States in the Gulf of Mexico."  

After four days of bitter debate, Houston joined the fray, adding his support to the list of proponents. His speech must have reinforced Calhoun's suspicions, since as a substitute motion for the original bill. It enabled the President "to accept the service of an equal number of volunteers to supply the place of such regular troops as are withdrawn from present duty to answer the exigent demand for immediate presence of a portion of the army in Yucatan: Provided their services be required." See: Ibid., p. 600.  

36 Congressional Globe, 30th Congress, 1st Session, pp. 712-713.  
37 Congressional Globe, Appendix, 30th Congress, 1st Session, p. 632.  
Houston argued the merits of intervention on two grounds: "true policy" and "the suffering of the unhappy Yucatecos."

"No case can possibly arise that will more directly appeal to the true policy or the humanity of a nation," Houston claimed.

Yucatan has appealed to this country for relief. She has offered to us in return her "dominion and sovereignty." Her existence is dependent upon our action. We are to decide in favor of civilization or barbarism. The war raging in Yucatan is not only one of desolation and rapine, but of unheard-of cruelty and extermination. It seems to me if any circumstance independent of the true policy of this Government could claim our consideration, it would be the sufferings of the unhappy Yucatecos.

Through overstatement, Houston sought to dramatize the appeal by making scapegoats of two old enemies: the British and the Indians. The speech offers an insight into Houston's mind and his use of the Indian to pursue national interest.

"True policy," Houston said,

would enforce upon the United States the propriety of taking possession of Yucatan, if there is even the slightest possibility of its falling into the hands of any other nation. If a foreign Power should possess it, with an able force at its command, it could at any time cut off our commerce with the Atlantic, and render it insecure, even within the Gulf of Mexico.

After stressing the geographical importance of Yucatan to


40 Ibid., pp. 39-40.
the interests of the United States, Houston emphasized its "closeness" by a rather fanciful extension of the Mississippi River.

What would be the condition of the great West and South, if the mighty egress from the Mississippi in our commerce was entirely prevented? It would be ruinous. Then it is our duty to prevent every probably impediment which might remotely affect that great interest.41

To play upon the consequences of not guarding against the "remote effects" of "every probable impediment," Houston introduced a "jealousy." Yucatan also "made tender of their dominion and sovereignty to England and Spain," he explained.42 England already possessed Belize [British Honduras]. If she were to help Yucatan and "acquire peaceable possession with the right of dominion and sovereignty, will we not be precluded from all interference hereafter in relation to that territory?"43 In short, by a refusal to render assistance, the United States might inadvertently rescind the Monroe Doctrine.

Through bifurcation Houston was able to speak even more emphatically about the imagined consequences of a hypothetical intervention. The Monroe Doctrine, he proclaimed,

41 Speech on the Yucatan Bill, May 8, 1848, Writings, V, p 40.
42 Ibid., p. 41.
43 Ibid., p. 41.
either meant something or it meant nothing; and if this Government does not take action in behalf of Yucatan, we must regard that proud sentiment of a revolutionary patriot as idle gasconade. . . If we do not aid Yucatan in this emergency, it will be an abandonment of all pretext for resisting any encroachment that may be made upon this continent upon any territory not within the defined boundary of the United States. Hence, I believe the true policy of this country, aside from motives of humanity, should induce us to act promptly and efficiently.44

In the advancement of the "true policy," Houston invoked the God-terms of nationalism (safety, well-being, security, duty, and honor) and in so doing he elevated "interest" to a "principle" or "axiom of government."45 By this means he was able to equate the "possession of Yucatan" to a "true policy." When a speaker translates "interests" into "principles" and "when they have been stylistically enabled," Burke observed, "any yielding on interests becomes a yielding on principles."46 Consequently, Houston equated the failure to act "on behalf of Yucatan" to the demoralization of "a great principle" (the Monroe Doctrine). He made that failure "stylistically ennobling" by speaking of it in such appropriately dyslogistic terms as "idle gasconade." "True policy" became the "titular term," representing "the principle or idea behind the positive terminology as a whole."47

44 Speech on the Yucatan Bill, May 8, 1848, Writings, V, p. 41.
47 Ibid., p. 713.
was a secondary or supporting "principle," even though Houston explicitly relegated "suffering" to an "aside."

Houston appealed to humanitarianism in essentially the same manner that he used to defend the "true policy." This principle also became an "all or nothing" proposition, as he sought to equate American intervention to the very "existence" of Yucatan. But, whereas the British served as the scapegoat of "true policy," the Indians became the enemy of "humanity." Indeed, Houston associated the Indians with all kinds of inhumane acts, making them the antithesis of the principle itself -- the worst creatures imaginable.

In the absence of documentation, personal acquaintance, or any understanding of the Indians of Yucatan, Houston relied upon existing prejudice. According to his description, the Mayas were

cannibals, who live upon fish, and feed upon their captive enemies, and when assailed, fly to their mountain fastnesses for safety. Such people inhabited the southern portion of Texas. They were of gigantic size, ferocious in their disposition, loathsome in their habits, and rioted on human flesh. Such are the natives against whom the people of Yucatan appeal to you for protection.48

48 Speech on the Yucatan Bill, May 8, 1848, Writings, V, p. 44. Houston's description of the Indians is ludicrous. They were not cannibalistic, the men averaged five feet, two inches, in height, and fish was not a common staple in their diet. Gann notes that the "shocking acts of cruelty" attributed to the Maya in 1848 were highly exaggerated. Before the uprising, "they were throughout this part of Yucatan practically in a state of slavery, and were often treated by their Spanish masters with the utmost barbarity." Gann cites the report of the Spanish having buried the Indians up to their neck, "with their heads shaved, exposed to the hot
Congress must "decide in favor of civilization or barbarism," between Yucatan's "existence" or "extermination." The "unheard-of cruelty," the "slaughter and indiscriminate butchery" were the reasons Houston offered why "we should interpose in defense of the whites, who bear upon them the impress of civilization and brotherhood with ourselves." In sum, the United States was supposed to protect those of its own kind because they, like us, bore "the impress of civilization." To extend that likeness, Houston compared "the calamities of savage warfare" in Yucatan to the "disease and famine" which swept through Ireland.

I appeal to honorable Senators, and ask them to draw a distinction between those who fall by famine, or who fall and perish by the ruthless butchery of the savage. They alike appeal to our humanity. They both demand our interposition

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sun; their heads were then smeared with molasses and the victims were left to the ants; and this punishment was inflicted for no very serious offense." See: Thomas W. F. Gann, *The Maya Indians of Southern Yucatan and Northern British Honduras* (Bureau of American Ethnology Bulletin No. 64, Washington, 1918), p. 18.

Undoubtedly, Houston was comparing the Maya to the Karankawa, a tribe that lived in southern Texas, along the gulf. Berlandier's account essentially agrees with Houston's. They were "a big people," ate fish, and were not especially cordial to the white man. See: Jean Louis Berlandier, *The Indians of Texas in 1830*, ed. John C. Ewers (New York, 1969), p. 149.


50 Ibid., p. 43.
that they may be saved.  

In his "appeal to our humanity," Houston echoed the "inborn dignity" found in the Tammany Hall address, for under the guise of "brotherhood and humanity" he sought racial conquest -- "in defense of the whites." Near the end of the speech, he blended "humanity" and "true policy" into a final grand appeal. Intervention would not be a "Quixotic expedition," he said. "In it I would unite reason with humanity, policy with mercy -- policy, so far as this Government is concerned, and humanity as far as the necessity of that people are involved."  

A week later the Yucatan Bill was withdrawn upon the request of Senator Hannegan. A newspaper report of a treaty between the civil authorities and Jacinto Pat, Chief of the Indian rebels, suddenly quelled all hope for passage. The premature and embarrassing death of the bill, Mexico's acceptance of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, and Britain's

51 Speech on the Yucatan Bill, May 8, 1848, Writings, V, p. 47.
52 Ibid., p. 47.
53 For a full account of the newspaper coverage of this bill, see: Frederick Merk, The Monroe Doctrine and American Expansionism (New York, 1966), pp. 219-227. Houston's involvement in the preparation of the bill and, in particular, his relationship with Justo Sierra, the Yucatan Commissioner, needs further investigation. It seems likely that Houston acted as an advisor to Sierra. Merk notes that Sierra's diary, covering the period of his stay in Washington, was published in two parts in 1938; the third volume, believed to have been missing, was published privately in 1953. See the above reference, pp. 213 and 224. Sierra's diary was not available at this writing.
failure to become much more than a hypothetical threat -- all
curtailed the expansionists' hopes for the fulfillment of
America's "birthright." 54

Occasionally, however, ardent activists, such as Hous-
ton, sought a revival of the grand scheme to "prevail and
pervade this continent." "After death," Merk writes, "frus-
trated ideas sometimes walk the earth at midnight." 55 Ad-
vocates bemoan the passing and try to reincarnate the de-
ferred hopes of the past. As late as 1858, Houston tried
to recapture enthusiasm for the "great principle" --
this time with a resolution to establish a protectorate over
Mexico. Through the strength of a "national purpose,"
America could escape the "angry controversies" emanating
from "hostility to the institution of slavery." 56 "We have
grander ends," Houston lamented,

than the frittering away of a healthful existence
upon such loathsome, ignoble subjects. Our aspi-
rations should be to spread our heaven-inspired
principles by our lofty public bearing on to the

54 Merk, Manifest Destiny and Mission in American History,
pp. 207-209. The popular account that Britain pursued an
imperialistic policy in Central America (between 1823 and
1850) is in error. For a history of the origin and evolution
of that idea and a reinterpretation of the British role, see:
Robert A. Naylor, "The British Role in Central America
Prior to the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850," Hispanic Amer-
ican Historical Review, Vol. XL (August, 1960), pp. 361-
382.

55 Ibid., p. 209.

56 Favoring a Protectorate over Mexico, April 20, 1858,
Writings, VII, p. 89.
most remote and benighted regions; proudly, in the rectitude of our intentions, taking our place at the very head of the nations of the earth.57

The "grander ends" no longer possessed the integrity of their origin. Nevertheless, Houston tried to transcend the realities of current division with a dream of unity and he tried to add integrity to the dream by playing up his role as an elder statesman. He told of how he looked, but looked in vain, in both wings of this Capitol, for a fellow-member who was a fellow-member with me when the celebrated Monroe doctrine was announced. Of the two hundred and sixty-one Senators and Representatives who constituted the Congress which commenced its session on the first Monday of December, 1823, I stand here alone, and I will not disguise it, as one who regards himself as among the last of his race, as one who feels that he is approaching his journey's end on life's pilgrimage, and who has now no other ambition to gratify than to render "the State some service."58

He cited the strengths of that early Congress and he called off the "strong intellects" name by name. "It was to such men," Houston maintained,

that Mr. Monroe. . . addressed himself in such confident and resolute language with reference to the ulterior purposes of this country. I shall never cease to remember the exultant delight with which his noble sentiments were hailed. They met not only with a cordial but an enthusiastic reception within and out of Congress. They were approved with as much unanimity as if the entire population of the Union had been previously prepared to re-echo their utterance. At that glorious epoch, there

57 Favoring a Protectorate over Mexico, April 20, 1858, Writings, VII, p. 89.

58 Ibid., p. 88.
was a broad, towering spirit of nationality extant.59

The remainder of the speech re-echoed essentially the same lines of argument that Houston used at Tammany Hall and in defense of the Yucatan bill. Once again he raved on about Mexican inferiority, savage ruthlessness, and the destiny of the "American race." Although he claimed to offer the bill, "not with a view to extending our dominion, but with a view of improving our neighborhood," Houston could not suppress his belief in the sanctity of America's "purpose" and the inevitable superiority that it bestowed upon the agents of so grand a design.

The day is coming when an influence, which is now in the East, must pass off to the West and South, and control and enlighten these people. It is as inevitable as that the Indian tribes have faded before the majesty of the Anglo-American morale. When they have all faded away, the natural consequence will be, that a weaker race will be brought in contact with us, and the stronger must prevail. These people will have to yield to the dominant spirit of our institutions, their moral, their physical, and all their powers, indicate a controlling influence that at some day will not even stop at Central America, but go beyond it. We are an increasing people. We have continual accessions from other nations, and they become imbued with our spirit, and commingle with us and our enterprises.60

As the "ghost" of manifest destiny, Houston offered the

59 Favoring a Protectorate over Mexico, April 20, 1858, Writings, VII, p. 88.
60 Remarks Concerning His Resolution Authorizing a Protectorate over Certain Latin-American States, February 16, 1858, Writings, VI, pp. 511-512. The italics are Houston's.
nation an old man's lament and, in the vain hope that yes-
terday might somehow redeem tomorrow, he became an advocate of
the past. Few people listened anymore; in spite of Hous-
ton's repeated attempts, the Senate refused to consider the
protectorate resolution.61

Racial bias cannot be escaped in Houston's rhetoric.
Yet, it is relatively easy to be misled, because more often
than not Houston seemed to be speaking on behalf of the
Indians. Such an impression, however, stems from a failure
to perceive that Houston really was "more coy than forward."
While the biographer represented Houston as the sole defendant
of the red man "accepting the risk of being a bore and a
fanatic," he failed to take into account that Houston pur-
posefully left that impression; furthermore, he ignored
the fact that Houston inevitably connected his "defense"
with some other cause. As a result, the biographer was
unable to grasp a full perspective of Houston's senatorial
career.

Houston's record in the Senate is the most immediate
route to challenging the myth. During the thirteen years

61 Houston tried to have the resolution referred to either
the Foreign Relations Committee or a Select Committee on four
different occasions. On June 2, 1858, he requested a vote.
The Senate refused (16-32) to take up the resolution. See:
Writings, VI, p. 508, and VII, pp. 33, 84, and 127. In
December of 1858, President Buchanan called for the establish-
ment of a protectorate over two of Mexico's northern border
states. See: Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presi-
that he served, he offered only one resolution that even remotely benefitted the Indians. At the same time, he supported every measure, with one exception, which encroached upon the land and life-style of the native Americans. He supported the homestead bills, the Pacific Railroad bill, the admission of each new state that applied for statehood, and every expansionist measure -- and he spent a lot of time conjuring up new ones. In all those years, there is no record extant of his communicating with an Indian, nor, for that matter, does a concern for the Indian appear in his personal correspondence. Although Houston often belabored the injustices of governmental agents, he did not pursue one of those injustices during his term as chairman of a select committee to investigate "frauds and abuses" against the government. In short, a careful study of Houston's acts during this period offers little in support of the myth.

Despite this evidence, the notion persists that Houston befriended the Indian whenever possible. The idea owes its

62 In 1854, Houston introduced a resolution calling for an investigation of a Cherokee claim. See: Writings, VII, pp. 25-26. In the following year, he presented a Cherokee memorial, which was referred to the Committee on Indian Affairs. See: Congressional Globe, 33rd Congress, 1st Session, p. 319.

63 See: Senate Documents: Special Session (1853), "Report of a Select Committee," No. 1 (Serial No. 688). Investigation of frauds and abuses against the Indians was clearly within the province of the Committee. Llerena Friend is in error when she notes that the Committee investigated injustices against the Indians. See: Friend, p. 220.
persistence in part to the critical mentality of the readers and writers of popular biography -- an audience that wants to believe that once upon a time such a man existed and an author that is willing to tell the half of it. Yet most of the credit must go to the man himself, for Houston had the genius of making the myth seem credible and previous interpretations simply failed to see what he was really up to.

Whenever Houston spoke about injustices to the Indians, he also spoke about what he perceived to be of the most benefit (either immediate or ultimate) to the nation. That is, he always equated "injustices" to something else that he objected to; hence, the origin of Barker's impression that almost no subject was "too remote to prevent him from dragging in the Indians." In essence, these "injustices" became a means of concealment, for through this appeal to our humanity, Houston tried to transcend other obstacles.

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64 Houston protested about Indian injustices on two occasions: when the military or Indian appropriation bills came up and during the debate over the Kansas-Nebraska bill. The appropriation bills provided Houston with a forum to trumpet his "policy" on how to "control" the Indians. It allowed for the introduction of a humanitarian concern into his preference for volunteers (or rangers) instead of "regulars" as a means of providing "security" to the frontier. The absurdity of this line of argument rests in the fact that while appealing to our humanity in order to obtain a "better" policy, the "better" policy boiled down to the efficiency of the rangers as a means of "controlling" (pursuing and killing) the Indians. See, for example, Remarks on His Own Amendment to the Indian Deficiency Bill, June 12, 1858, Writings, VII, pp. 159-180.

65 Barker, unpublished manuscript, p. 13.
Just as he invoked a humanistic pattern of thought to expand the nation, so too, he appealed to the same pattern to preserve the Union -- it had become, so to speak, a habit of mind.

In Houston's judgment, the speech he gave in opposition to the Kansas-Nebraska bill was his most important speech as a Senator. It also happens to be the speech in which he developed the strongest plea for justice toward the Indian. This position, however, was a correlate of the strength of his objection to the bill on other grounds -- namely, his estimation of how that act would ultimately jeopardize the Union. Since the bill proposed to open up new land, it also constituted another encroachment upon the Indians. That encroachment provided Houston with the opportunity to object to the measure on humanitarian grounds. But, the bill also called for the repeal of the Compromise

66 Nevins, II, p. 141. Nevins' study of the historical and political events which led up to the Kansas-Nebraska Act is unsurpassed. See especially: pp. 43-159, in the above volume.

67 Actually, the formal basis for Houston's objection had been removed by treaties concluded during the Summer of 1853 with eighteen of the different tribes affected by the Kansas-Nebraska Act. All that remained was ratification by the Senate. It is indeed ironic that on the one occasion that Houston rose to object to expansion because of Indians' rights, those rights had already been negotiated, the land ceded, reservations established, etc. The converse is true, however, in the settlement of Oregon, California, and even Texas! See: Nevins, II, p. 91.
of 1850, making slavery a matter of self-determination. Its passage could only lead to an increase in the conflict and national division over slavery -- as attention focused on the competing forces at work in the new territory.

On February 14, 1854, Houston introduced one of his reasons for opposing the bill. He began by alluding to the number of books he had brought along

as a matter of reference, and that the Senate may see how much pain has been taken in relation to the Indians by the Government of the United States, whether to negotiate treaties with them, to deceive them by promises, or to confirm to them rights long promised.68

Houston turned next to an elaboration of "the pain" and a prescription of "the remedy."69 He examined the "successive promises" and the "solemn pledges" to conclude in "the very harsh assertion" that

our Government acts in bad faith with the Indians. I could ask one question that would excite reflection and reminiscences among gentlemen. When have they performed an honest act, or redeemed in good faith a pledge made to the Indians? Let but a single instance be shown, and I will be prepared to retract. I am not making a charge against the Government of the United States which is not applicable to all civilized Governments in relation to their aboriginal inhabitants. It is not with the intention to derogate from the purity of our national character or from the integrity of our institutions that I make my accusation.70

68 Opposing the Kansas-Nebraska Bill, February 14-15, 1854, Writings, V, p. 469.
69 Ibid., p. 477.
70 Ibid., p. 483.
Rather, Houston's intention was to appeal to "every gentleman's charitable feelings." In essence, the line of argument incorporated a legitimate use of religious and humanitarian patterns of thought. Houston established the injustices (principally in terms of the Cherokees) and he sought to redeem the nation's reputation. Appropriately enough, he appealed to the conscience of the Senators. Would passage, he asked,

become Senators? Does it become Legislators? Does it become a magnanimous and powerful Government? Above all, sir, does it become Christians who acknowledge the Savior's maxim, "Do unto others as you would that they should do unto you?"

The "remedy" and the "redemption" extended beyond the rejection of the bill. It was not too late to adopt some system calculated not only to ameliorate the condition of the Indians, but to civilize and Christianize them. If that object is not worthy of the gravest contemplation of Senators and legislators, as well as the high functionaries of the Government, I shall realize the most melancholy apprehensions which I have entertained in relation to the fate of this devoted people.

The Senate could choose between "the remedy" and "the process of annihilation." Houston pleaded for the former.

Be just, and posterity, at least, will appreciate it. The country will be filled up some day, and our actions will be estimated by some moral standard.

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71 Opposing the Kansas-Nebraska Bill, February 14-15, 1854. Writings, V, p. 469.
72 Ibid., p. 481.
73 Ibid., pp. 474-475.
and not by the passions of men for accumulation of soil, or a disposition to transgress upon the public domain.74

The plea, so far, was an eloquent example of the use of religious and humanitarian appeals to support a seemingly uncompromising position: the principle of justice. Indeed, as an ultimate term, Houston sought to elevate "justice to the Indians" above all other considerations. Consequently, he invoked the Golden Rule "above all" else and conjoined the "Savior's maxim" with a plea to "be just."

On the following day, February 15th, Houston concluded his "remarks on the subject of the Indians. I leave them," he said,

to the vague and uncertain future. What kindness and justice the American people may exercise toward them is in the obscurity of the future. All that I can do is to invoke that beneficent spirit which prompts us, on some occasions, to extend them justice and right.75

Having invoked "that beneficent spirit," Houston turned to another reason for opposing the bill.

"If it were possible that I could feel more repugnant and determinedly against anything else," he asserted, "it would be the provision to repeal the Missouri compromise."76

That compromise, along with the Compromise of 1850, became

74 Opposing the Kansas-Nebraska Bill, February 14-15, 1854, Writings, V, p. 475.
75 Ibid., p. 488.
76 Ibid., p. 491.
the "interest" that Houston promoted in the remainder of the speech and he did so by systematically elevating that interest into a "principle" which became the ultimate or titular term. The Missouri Compromise was a "solemn compact." It had been "accepted by Texas with all the sanctity and solemnity that could attach to any compact whatever." 77 Likewise, the Compromise of 1850 "was solemnly entered into" and "ratified by the national will." 78 As a result, Houston maintained:

Our territory has extended for hundreds of miles along the Atlantic sea-board; from Georgia to the Rio Grande. Our vast domain has been spread from the Atlantic to the Pacific, embracing thousands of miles of sea-board there. In numbers we have outstripped all former examples by the increase of population. Our rapid strides in wealth, in commerce, and in high renown, is unexampled in the annals of the world. Has not this grown out of the Missouri compromise, or is it not consequent upon it? You may say that these things are not its necessary consequences, but at all events they have resulted since it was adopted, and since the country has been harmonized by the influences which have emanated from it. 79

In short, Houston equated the defeat of the Kansas-Nebraska bill to "the safety and preservation of this Union." 80 Because he was unwilling to yield to anything that involved

77 Opposing the Kansas-Nebraska Bill, February 14-15, 1854, Writings, V, p. 488.
78 Ibid., p. 495.
79 Ibid., p. 495.
80 Ibid., p. 495.
this "great principle," he would "oppose to the last by all means of rational resistance the repeal of the Missouri Compromise."\(^{31}\)

Houston's final appeal left little doubt as to which reason was genuine and which was dragged in. The repeal of the compromise "is the main point of the controversy." He then implored the Senate not to undo the work of their fathers and to tear asunder the cords that they had bound around the hearts of their countrymen. They have departed. The nation felt the wound; and we see the memorials of woe still in this chamber. The proud symbol (the eagle) above your head remains enshrouded in black, as if it deplored the misfortune which had fallen upon us, or as a fearful omen of future calamities which await our nation in the event this bill should become a law.

Above it I behold the majestic figure of WASHINGTON, whose presence must ever inspire patriotic emotions, and command the admiration and love of every American heart. By these associations I adjure you to regard the contract once made to harmonize and preserve this Union. \textit{Maintain the Missouri Compromise! Stir not up agitation!} Give us peace!\(^{82}\)

As soon as Houston finished, the vote was called for. By a margin of 37 to 14, the Kansas-Nebraska Act became the law of the land.

The line of argument developed in the last part of the speech suggests that Houston's plea for the Indian, while eloquent, was extraneous. It was simply one of the "means

\(^{31}\) \textit{Opposing the Kansas-Nebraska Bill, February 14-15, 1854, Writings, V, p. 498.}

\(^{82}\) \textit{Opposing the Kansas-Nebraska Bill, March 3, 1854, Writings, V, p. 522.}
of rational resistance" for "opposing to the last." As in
the Tammany Hall address and in his defense of the Yucatan
bill, "justice" was a secondary "principle" by which Hous-
ton appealed "to our humanity." When the basic issue shift-
ed from expansion to preservation, the recipient of justice
shifted according to the people affected. And so, in the
name of preservation, Houston glorified expansion. His
stand was, as he said, "entirely consistent." He sought to
redeem both the nation and himself, for unless the Union
was preserved, his own past acts made little sense.

Past interpretations missed this essentially redemptive
quality of the Kansas-Nebraska speech, since they stress
his defense of the Indians and his "prophetic" state-
ments.83 Basically, Houston pleaded for the preservation
of expansion and his defense of the Indian was, in reality,
"more coy than forward."

83 See, for example: Marquis James, The Raven: A Biogra-
phy of Sam Houston (New York, 1929), p. 384.
Once I dreamed of empire, as vast and expansive for a united people, as the bounds of American civilization. The dream is over. The golden charm is broken... War may still wage, and its march of desolation trample upon the hopes of millions, yet the chain of unity will be broken, and two people yet live, to attest how vain were the dreams of those who believed that the Union was a thing of forever.

-- Sam Houston, March 18, 1863.
CHAPTER VI

THE IMPERSONATION OF MYTHICAL "SAM"

In Profiles in Courage, John Kennedy referred to "the contradictions in the life of Sam Houston." "Although there are available endless collections of diaries, speeches and letters," he wrote,

in the center of the stage Houston himself remains shadowed and obscured, an enigma to his friends in his own time, a mystery to the careful historian of today... No one can say with precision by what star Sam Houston steered -- his own, Texas' or the nation's.¹

In part, the "enigma" stems from a disparity between words and deeds. And yet that kind of disparity is not so "mysterious"; indeed, it is rather ordinary. Nor, for that matter, is the "mystery" itself all that difficult to comprehend, for "mystery" seems to be a rather common asset among heroes.² This chapter attempts to piece together the previous arguments to explain the "mystery" of Sam Houston and the Indians. It is argued that the story as told in other accounts is largely a myth, generated by the man

himself as a means of making the most out of the assets of the frontiersman -- an image that Americans have long held in heroic esteem. A public forum provided Houston with an opportunity to collect "interest" on these "assets" every-time he spoke. In doing so, he inflated the past into mythical proportions and biographers and historians have to this day perpetuated the myth.

From the time of his "exile" onward, Houston talked about the Indians as a way of talking about himself (or his "policy"): his rebirth (Chapter III), his salvation (Chapter IV), or the expansion and preservation of the Union (Chapter V). Although this equation might occasionally benefit the Indian, that was incidental, for the appeal was essentially extraneous. As a Senator (1846-1859), Houston also consistently associated the Indian with his past. On the one hand, such an association made his defense seem credible; on the other, it provided an opportunity to romanticize about the past -- to introduce the "mystery" and thereby transcend the ordinary. The strategy was commonly practiced by the heroes of Houston's day -- especially those he identified with.

"From the time of the Revolution onward," Roy Harvey Pearce observed, "Americans tried to place the Indian in their lives."³ For Houston, this "placement" was a

relatively simple (and convincing) matter. But, Houston used this placement principally as a means to enhance his "identity." In Burkeian terms, such a pattern of identification amounts to the "braggadocio" of "epic heroism," whereby the speaker attempts to "cash in on" a "corporate identity." The first clue to Houston's purposes stems from the realization that he equated the Indian of his past to an Indian that never existed, except in the literary fiction of that era. The spaciousness of Houston's language is another basis for suspicion -- for it suggests that the image too, was larger than life. And finally, the most convincing factor of all: except for Houston's boasting and the refrain of the biographer who expanded upon this boast, there is little left to substantiate the myth.

Although Houston denied that he was "boasting" or motivated by "egoism," his remarks about his "boyhood" amounted to a purposeful attempt to manipulate his image. The strategy not only redeemed the past (boyhood inevitably led to manhood and complete "salvation"), it provided an "authoritative" basis for objecting to some present course.


5 For Houston's denials, see: On the Appropriation for Indians in California, August 11, 1852, Writings, V, p. 350; Opposing the Kansas-Nebraska Bill, February 14-15, 1854, Writings, V, p. 472; Against Increase of the Regular Army, February 11, 1858, Writings, VI, p. 497.
The appeal, however, was ingenious for the "compensatory gain" or "unearned increment" that Houston acquired from having placed himself in league with the frontier hero. 6 "I have had some experience with the Indians," Houston exclaimed in a debate over an appropriation bill. "It is no egoism in me to say that I, who have spent all my life upon the frontier, am acquainted with their dispositions and their character." 7 Although Houston had in fact spent a relatively small amount of time "on the frontier," the history of that "experience" became a consistent feature of Houston's rhetoric whenever he "defended" the Indian.

During the debate over the Kansas-Nebraska bill, Houston romanticized about his childhood. He "recollected" the time when

the first missionary, or schoolmaster, went to the Cherokee nation on the Tennessee river; for that was the northern boundary of the nation; and I found myself in boyhood located within six miles of that boundary, and every scene upon the banks of the river and its adjacent tributaries are as familiar to me as my right hand. I had every opportunity of becoming acquainted with them, and I knew the nation before there was an Indian, unless it is the present chief and one or two families, who could read a word of the English language, or write a legible hand; and the majority of them could not speak one word of English. I know when the first pair of cotton cards and spinning wheel were introduced

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7 On the Appropriation for Indians in California, August 11, 1852, Writings, V, p. 350.
among them; when the first mill was erected; and when the first road was made through their territory communicating between Tennessee and Georgia -- the great southern market for the produce of East Tennessee, and the only outlet then known. I was familiar with them in a savage state; they had no refinement. I recollect when the first farmer was sent there to teach them agriculture...  

There seemed to be little that Houston could not "recollect" about the Indians -- at least in terms of these "firsts" which he presented almost as "secrets" of the past, as "familiar" to him as his "right hand." Not only did he know about these "firsts," he also knew about the "savage state" and the attributes of the noble savage were, at least by implication, "assets" shared in common. In the early stage of the debate over Kansas-Nebraska, Houston asked the Senate to

reflect upon what the Indian once was, and upon the reverse which has taken place since the time he roamed over this vast continent its sole possessor, when he crossed the mountain summit, when he kindled his beacon fires upon their heights to admonish the friendly tribes of his presence, and concealed his night fires from his adversaries, when he was the proud monarch of all he surveyed, and had a vast continent for his domain illimitable, when he was able to go to war with all other nations, and if victorious, like Alexander, extend his dominion to some unknown portions of the world, we should endeavor at least to fulfill our pledge to him. A sad reverse has come upon him. No longer the proud Indian, he is looked upon as a degraded being not equal to a white man. He is not exactly a serf to

8 Opposing the Kansas-Nebraska Bill, February 14-15, 1854, Writings, V, p. 486.
the white man. He has claims to your justice. Wrong has been returned to him for kindness, and it seems that the once proud possessor of your country is only to be visited by Divine vengeance, for having permitted the landing of the first white man upon the continent. . .

Well, sir, the Indian no longer with pleasure walks the proud lord of the forest, or stands in the contemplation of some broad river flowing at his feet, or contemplates the beautiful lawns, with lofty trees protecting him from the vertical sun. This is no longer the enjoyment of the Indian. He is deprived entirely of all these delights. 9

The Indian that Houston referred to was not the Indian of his "boyhood," or even of America's past, for the description pre-dates the landing of the white man. In short, Houston described an Indian that never existed -- the same Noble Savage that Emerson looked for but could never find, because, as Pearce concluded, "noble savages did not exist." 10 Nevertheless, the "savage" of Houston's "boyhood associations" was as generous, as faithful and true to friendship, and as noble in the higher attributes which adorn humanity, as any man that I have met in the most refined civilized walks of life. 11

The temptation remains -- perhaps no less now than

9 Opposing the Nebraska Bill, March 3, 1853, Writings, V, pp. 438-439.

10 Pearce, p. 147.

11 Opposing the Nebraska Bill, March 3, 1853, Writings, V, p. 439.
in Houston's time -- to accept such protestations. Pre-
vious interpretations of Houston not only failed to rec-
ognize that the Indian served as a diversionary ploy, but
they followed the folk hero into the woods, without realiz-
ing that the Indian of Houston's "boyhood" more closely
approximated a sojourn with the literary romanticists than
with the Cherokees. Houston identified with one of the
most popular and romantic images of that day and in senti-
mentalizing over nature, he glorified his own past, just
as Cooper and Longfellow had celebrated the Indian of
America's past in The Leatherstocking Tales and The Song
of Hiawatha. In sum, Houston recognized the romantic
appeal of a popular symbol and through a sentimentalization
of "primitive" or naturalistic patterns of thought, he
transformed his own past into that likeness; he "cashed in
on" the "assets" often enough, until his past and the
Indian's became one and the same. Moreover, he looked the
part. "It is easy to believe in his heroism," Oliver

12 Cherokee culture was not as "savage" or "un-refin-
ed" as Houston made it out to be. But what is even more re-
vealing about Houston's discussion, is the fact that he
never defined "savage" culture as anything other than "un-
civilized" (they couldn't read, write, or speak English!).
For a discussion of Cherokee culture, see: Grace Steele

13 For a critical interpretation of Cooper, Longfellow,
and others, including the transcendentalists, see: Lucy
Lockwood Hazard. The Frontier in American Literature (New
York, 1961) pp. 147-180. Also see the works cited in the
footnotes that immediately follow.
Dyer, the Senate's recording secretary recalled.

He was then only fifty-five years old, and seemed to be in perfect health and admirable physical condition. He was a magnificent barbarian, somewhat tempered with civilization. He was large of frame, of stately carriage and dignified demeanor, and had a lionlike countenance capable of expressing the fiercest passions. His dress was peculiar, but it was becoming to his style. The conspicuous features of it were a military cap, and a short military cloak of fine blue broadcloth, with a blood-red lining. Afterwards, I occasionally met him when he wore a vast and picturesque sombrero and a Mexican blanket -- a sort of ornamented bedquilt, with a slit in the middle.

A Washington correspondent described an even more colorful attire:

Sam Houston sat dressed in dark pantaloons, a single breasted blue military coat, and a vest made out of the skin of a panther, with the hair outside... He always comes on in some singular dress, of half savage, half civilized character.

Even though Houston's dress was not especially "primitive," it was consistent with the sort of image he tried to project in his rhetoric: half savage, half civilized. Like the literary romanticists, Houston seemed undisturbed by the conflict of such a mixture -- by the disparity between America's destiny and America's Indian.

14 Oliver Dyer, Great Senators of the United States Forty Years Ago (New York, 1889), pp. 116-117.

between civilization and nature. The hero of the American West was big enough to capitalize on both images. After all, as Arthur Ekirch observed, biographers had made Daniel Boone "the symbol of an American empire and of the primitive Wilderness, without any awareness of the conflict between these two concepts." Henry Nash Smith viewed Boone as "the limit of possible absurdity." On one page he was "the harbinger of civilization and refinement." With the turn of a page, he became a "cultured primitivist." In The Frontier Mind, Arthur K. Moore agreed with the essential "absurdity" of the Boone portrait. "It is indicative," he concluded,

of nineteenth-century thinking that Boone should have been installed in two different myths -- progressivism and primitivism -- which, though not in all respects antithetical, clash on several levels and ultimately point in opposite directions.

Not only does the figure of Houston biography owe homage to the tradition of the western hero, it seems altogether possible that Houston purposefully imaged himself in this epic mold. There was little conflict in his inner

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19 In many respects the Houston myth resembles the myth of Davy Crockett which Parrington regarded as a "deliberate
mind, however, since the Indian he identified with was larger than reality -- and he knew it. Houston had little doubt but that the real Indian would "inevitably... fade away before the majesty of the Anglo-American morale." While Houston was sentimental and romantic about their "fading," that was all he was. The word choice captured the essence of his attitude. When he spoke of the Indian in other terms, he was either trying to save the nation or save himself. To save himself, he transformed aspects of his past into mythical proportions.

When the Indian of Houston's "recollection" climbed the "mountain summit" and "surveyed" the land below, he did so not from an Indian's perspective, but from Houston's. The view was derived from neither Houston's "boyhood associations," nor a "knowledge of the Indian character." Rather, it stemmed from his adulthood motivations. And what did the "Indian" see? He saw the "vast continent," an "illimitable domain... he was able to go to war with all other nations, and if victorious, like Alexander, extend his dominion to some unknown portions of the world."21


20 Remarks Concerning His Resolution Authorizing a Protectorate over Certain Latin-American States, February 16, 1858, Writings, VI, pp. 511-512. The italics are Houston's.

21 Opposing the Nebraska Bill, March 3, 1853, Writings, V, p. 458.
One good tale led to another and merited repetition. Four years later, in 1858, when Houston objected to an appropriation for "regular troops" (he wanted rangers), he told of another climb to the mountain top. "I was reared to manhood," he said to the Senate, on the immediate border of the Indians, and in constant association with them. It was where the bold Tennessee gushes her waters through the great mountain of Chilhowee; and I learned to scale its topmost peak realizing that perseverance and energy would master much. Indomitable will enabled me to reach its highest peak, and there stand and contemplate the valley below.22

Although he did not say so, Houston undoubtedly contemplated the "vast continent."

Houston's preference for the "romantic" over the "real" often restricted the argument to broad generalities. As a result, his "defense" of the Indian and even the messages that he wrote to them (Chapter IV) exemplified what Richard Weaver refers to as "spaciousness." Weaver treated "spaciousness" as an aspect of style which can be recognized whenever the speaker's "words do not impinge upon a circumambient reality; his concepts seem not to have definite correspondences, but to be general, and as it were, mobile."23

22 Against Increase of the Regular Army, February 11, 1858, Writings, VI, pp. 496-497.

Moreover, "spaciousness" is often an indication of "vanity and egocentricity." 24

Weaver thought that the effectiveness of such rhetoric was dependent upon the acceptance of "the uncontested term" -- i.e., those terms "which seem to invite a contest," but for one reason or another they are allowed to go unchallenged. 25 That Houston's language was spacious is obvious. His "recollection" of all the "firsts" that had affected the Cherokees was spacious, for the entire discussion was in vacuo. The "firsts" had little to do with any "circumambient reality." It was in fact irrelevant to talk about these "firsts" as a basis for opposing the Kansas-Nebraska bill. Interestingly enough, however, Houston was not always allowed to go unchallenged. The way he countered the challenge provides an additional confirmation for the argument that his object was self-centered.

In 1855, for example, during another debate over an army appropriation bill, Houston objected to the measure by invoking a humanitarian plea on behalf of the Indians. As usual, his basis for opposition was diversionary and his major arguments pointed in opposite directions. But, Houston was able to "cash in on" his "assets" and image himself as

24 Weaver, p. 166.
25 Ibid., p. 166. The italics are Weaver's.
the romantic hero of the West. He opposed the measure in the first place because regular troops were ineffective in Texas.

Sir, how can Texas expect peace; how can she expect protection to her citizens? Not from your army. It has never given her protection; it is incompetent to give her protection; and it is a reproach to the country. I will not say anything personally unkind of the officers who command, for they are gentlemen; but I say they know nothing about the Indians, and I shall prove it. Texas deserves protection, and she can have it if a national effort be made to give it to her, but not by your troops. 26

Houston then suggested his "policy":

Whenever you convince an Indian that he is dependent on you for comforts, or for what he deems luxuries or elegancies of life, you attach him to you. Interest, it is said, governs the world, and it will soon ripen into affection. Intercourse and kindness will win the fiercest animal on earth except the hyena; and its spots and nature can not be changed. 27

In short, Houston advanced "dependency" in order to obtain "control," so that Texas might have "protection." He continued by asserting his "knowledge of the Indian character" and on that basis concluded that the Indian's "nature can be changed." 28 In support of this point, Houston raved about his success while President of Texas and contrasted

26 On an Increase of the Army, January 29, 31, 1855, Writings, VI, p. 123.
27 Ibid., p. 124.
28 Ibid., p. 125.
it against Lamar's failures.29

Senator Augustus Caesar Dodge (Iowa) interrupted.
"Comparisons," he said, "are invidious and sometimes odious." He inquired about Houston's "ulterior purposes" and he wanted to know what "practical measure" Houston proposed.30 Being aware of Houston's "superior knowledge, and recollecting his past associations and acquaintance-ship with these people," Dodge wanted to know why Houston had not furnished the country with some plan by which this fast fading race was to be re-claimed from its down-trodden condition? He has complained of officers of the Army and of Indian agents, who are removed thousands of miles from the place where they are attacked, I believe these officers and agents, in the main to be high-minded, honorable men and patriots, desirous of serving their country, discharging their duty faithfully; but why does he not bring forward his bills of pains and penalties against those dishonest officers, who have caused, as he thinks, bloodshed and violence? I pledge myself to sit here all night, to vote for such measures as may be necessary to correct the evils of which he complains.31

Houston replied with more circumlocution, including another "old adage" which supposedly capsulized his opposition:

29 On an Increase of the Army, January 29, 31, 1855, Writings, VI, pp. 119-121; 141-142.
30 Congressional Globe, 33rd Congress, 2nd Session.
31 Ibid., p. 501.
You know there is an old adage about catching birds. Nurses tell children to put a little salt upon their tails, and you have them. /Laughter/ You cannot catch these fellows in that way. You cannot get near enough to them; and there is the difficulty.32

The adage may have captured the "difficulty," but it hardly answered Dodge's question. More importantly, it was rather inappropriate for someone who sought to "defend" the Indian and who knew so much about the "Indian character."

To sum up the argument: Houston romanticized about the Indian and he purposefully "boasted" about his "associations" because he recognized that the primitive image had popular appeal. The fact that his actions were not consistent with this sentiment did not matter. Throughout most of the nineteenth century (and it's probably no less true today), the way people "sentimentalized" had little to do with the way they "actually behaved."33

32 On An Increase of the Army, January 29, 31, 1855, Writings, VI, p. 153. Dodge was not the only Senator to take issue with Houston's defense of the Indians. In 1858, after Houston had criticized the army and encouraged the use of rangers, while also pleading for justice for the Indians, Jefferson Davis inquired about the blending of humanity and protection. "After all this," Davis observed, Houston "winds up with the plea of humanity -- humanity for the Indian; and mingles with that vaunting about the number of Indians a Texas ranger can kill. Why, sir, this is a queer view of it." See: Congressional Globe, 35th Congress, 1st Session, p. 2988. Davis had made essentially the same objection in February, 1858. See: Ibid., p. 649.

33 Perry Miller, "Romantic Dilemma in American Nationalism and the Concept of Nature," Harvard Theological Review,
Rather, as Perry Miller observed, it had "everything to do with how people apprehended their conduct." The conflict between Houston's policy of expansion and his defense of the Indian was nothing more than a manifestation of a much larger disparity, the conflict that Miller entitled: "The Romantic Dilemma in American Nationalism and the Concept of Nature." Houston had the credibility and rhetorical prowess to be apprehended as the "impersonation of mythical 'Sam'" -- a phrase that Lester used in 1855 to describe the Houston image.


34 Perry Miller, p. 245.
36 C. Edwards Lester to Houston, March 28, 1855, Sam Houston Unpublished Correspondence, VI, Archives Collection, University of Texas Library, Austin, Texas.
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