
By

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Abstract

This dissertation explores the implementation of American policy in postwar Germany from the perspective of military government officers and other occupation officials in the Land of Bavaria. It addresses three main questions: How did American military government officials, as part of the institution of the Office of Military Government, Bavaria (OMGB), respond to the challenges of the occupation? How did these individuals interact with American policy towards defeated Germany? And, finally, how did the challenges of postwar Germany shape that relationship with American policy? To answer these questions, this project focuses on the actions of military government officers and officials within OMGB from 1945 through 1949.

Operating from this perspective, this dissertation argues that American officials in Bavaria possessed a complicated, often contradictory, relationship with official policy towards postwar Germany. Early in the occupation, Bavarian military government challenged or worked to mitigate the effects of American policy that promoted a harsh, deconstructive peace. At other times, however, military government officials implemented official policy, simply adapting it to the circumstances of postwar Bavaria. Policy implementation in Bavaria, therefore, was not a straight-forward matter, but was characterized by a series of challenges that complicated attempts to turn official directives and plans into reality.

Ultimately, this dissertation operates on the belief that it is vitally important to understand the challenges associated with policy implementation, particularly if nation-building remains a part of American foreign policy in the future. Future policy should be based on an accurate understanding of past experiences, including the role of low-level officials in implementing policy and the challenges associated with putting official directives into action.
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After nearly a decade as a university student of some sort and a lifetime of learning, it is difficult to adequately thank the many different teachers, professors, advisors, friends, and loved ones who have had a major impact on my academic career. The task could easily take up many pages, but I shall endeavor to be circumspect in my writing and to not write the equivalent of another chapter.

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At the University of Kansas I was fortunate to have many different professors influence my research, writing, and scholarship. First and foremost, my advisor Dr. Adrian Lewis provided
invaluable guidance throughout the dissertation writing process and in planning for my post-graduation career. He provided many thoughtful comments and suggestions on this dissertation, from its beginnings as an idea up through multiple full drafts of the manuscript. Those comments improved my scholarship and helped produce a better history of the U.S. Army’s occupation of Bavaria. Dr. Ted Wilson also read early papers related to my dissertation project, made insightful comments, and kindly devoted his time to my work, even after he had retired from the university. Outside of the field of military history, Dr. Sheyda Jahanbani was kind and generous with her time, offering sage advice on my research, writing, and future career paths. Additionally, her classes on twentieth century American history and international history encouraged me to think about my own work in a comparative and transnational context. Dr. Erik Scott’s class on Russian empire likewise helped me refine my understanding of empire and its relationship to American military history. Finally, many other professors in the History Department provided invaluable advice throughout my graduate career and modeled what it means to be a committed scholar and teacher. The support of the history faculty has helped me develop as a scholar and a professional.

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Introduction

When the Second World War ended in Europe on May 8, 1945, Germany remained a nation-state in name only. Millions of German soldiers and hundreds of thousands of German civilians lay dead after nearly six years of war. German government, even at the local levels, had ceased functioning. German cities lay in ruins, subjected first to years of strategic bombing at the hands of the Western Allies and then serving as the battleground in the final death throes of the Nazi regime. The German economy ground to a standstill, the basic economic infrastructure of the state wrecked by war. Many Germans faced defeat with a profound sense of apathy as their once proud nation lay at the mercies of the victorious Allies. And from north to south and east to west, the armies of the Allied powers occupied the entire territory of their great enemy. The racial dictatorship of Adolf Hitler and Nazi Germany was finally defeated.

Seventy-two years later a liberal, democratic Germany forms the core of a liberal, democratic Europe, which leads to the question: How did this astounding transformation take place? Obviously, the German people played a most important role in transforming first West Germany during the Cold War and then all of Germany. Germany became a liberal, democratic state because its people embraced this new vision. Historians of the occupation of West Germany by the American, British, and French allies stress the importance of military and civilian elites in crafting occupation policy that eventually sought the reconstruction and democratization of their zones of occupation. Yet these are not the only answers and they overlook an important truth: the actions of the Allied soldiers tasked with carrying out the occupation were just as important. Within the American zone, and particularly in Bavaria, the ability of military government officials to adapt policy to meet their circumstances and their empathy for the German people helped make the occupation a success.
It is the objective of this dissertation to bring these officials to the fore and to correct the imbalance in the historiography that favors elite-centric policy narratives of military government. As such, it will tell an institutional history, yet one from a different perspective. It explores the American occupation of Bavaria from the perspective of the Office of Military Government for Bavaria (OMGB) and the individuals charged with implementing occupation policy in the southern German Land. American policy towards defeated German, as developed in 1944 and 1945, created greater hardship for an already traumatized, injured, and hungry German populace. In Bavaria, these policies had the potential to cause a major humanitarian crisis, including starvation, economic stagnation, and political upheaval. Ultimately American policymakers reversed their course in early 1947, embracing reconstruction and economic recovery, which culminated in the announcement of the Marshall Plan in 1948.

However, the reversal of harsh American policy was not merely a top-down imposition by policymakers in Washington, Berlin, and Frankfurt. Instead, it first emerged out of the complex relationship that low-level military government officers (MGOs) in Bavaria possessed with American policy throughout the occupation period. These officials, this dissertation argues, at times worked to mitigate the effects of U.S. policies towards Germany and even pushed back against policy directives from their superiors, particularly during the first two years of the occupation. Yet at other times, MGOs worked within the confines of official policy, at most adapting the official position to the circumstances of their locale. Scenes of total devastation and interactions with Bavarians of all stripes – government officials, civilians, and even former soldiers – made OMGB officials and MGOs located in Bavarian communities sympathetic to the plight of the German populace. These individuals worked to feed the German people and restart economic life during the first eighteen months of the occupation, often challenging the
deconstructive tone of early American policy towards Germany. After warding off starvation and economic catastrophe, military government focused its attention on the challenges of democratization and the early Cold War. While American officials more commonly followed policy in these fields, they also adapted them to the circumstances that characterized their local and regional offices.

Beyond growing sympathy for the German population, a quick realization of the limits on military government shaped how American military government officials at the Kreis (county) and Land levels interacted with U.S. policy in Bavaria. The culture of military government developed during the interwar and wartime Army called for a hands-off approach to military governance and emphasized pragmatic approaches to solving the issues that would plague postwar communities. This culture of self-imposed restraints simultaneously encouraged pragmatic solutions that challenged American policy but also limited the ability of MGOs to mitigate the effects of those punitive policies. Additionally, the relatively small number of trained military government officers and the OMGUS belief that Germans should assume responsibility for their country as rapidly as possible meant that military government in Bavaria depended on the work of local German officials. Many of these officials sought reconstruction, not the punitive policies of the United States, which added another early challenge to the American approach towards Bavaria. This reliance on local officials further limited the authority of military government and led to significant clashes between Americans and Bavarians over U.S. policies in the Land. Overall, however, MGOs recognized the limits on their authority and worked within those limits during their interactions with American policy throughout the occupation.

Historiography of the Occupation
Almost immediately, the Army’s occupation of Germany attracted the attention of authors, whether former military government officials, historians, or academics from other fields. The earliest analysis of the occupation often came from disgruntled American officials. These former military government officers launched withering attacks against the American occupation and its supposed violation of American war aims and the Potsdam Agreement. Many of these officers served in the intelligence or information control divisions of military government, bastions of liberal, reform-minded MGOs who favored major structural reforms in Germany. Saul Padover, who served as an intelligence officer in Germany, criticized the occupation for what he saw as its half-hearted attempts at denazification and democratization.\(^1\) Similarly, Arthur Kahn launched a broadside against military government for its betrayal of democratization efforts, the Potsdam Agreement, and the Soviet alliance. Kahn’s sense of betrayal remained strong for decades, so much so that he published another book sixty-five years later to build upon his original argument.\(^2\) Written for a public audience, these early histories sought change in American policy towards Germany. For Padover, Kahn, and several other former military government officers, the United States too quickly abandoned the aims of denazification, demilitarization, and democratization in the name of fighting the Cold War.\(^3\)

Other literature, however, took a more academic approach to the occupation. Still often written by participants in American military government, these early works explored the

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bureaucratic structure of OMGUS and U.S. policy surrounding occupation. Foremost among these writers was Harold Zink, who spent time in Germany as a civil affairs officer and the chief historian of OMGUS. In two separate books, Zink argued that policymakers in Washington failed to provide sufficient guidance to General Lucius D. Clay, the American military governor, and the other occupation officials. As a result, these officials were forced to either implement half-thought-out policies or improvise on the fly.\textsuperscript{4} Considering this severe limitation, Zink believed that OMGUS officials did as good of a job with the occupation as could be expected. Additionally, Zink argued that American military government played a key role in the successful democratization of Germany. In many ways, Zink’s early work set the framework for the first phase of the historiography of the occupation. High-level policy debates and the significant American impact on Germany formed the major analytical discussions during this first phase.\textsuperscript{5}

Other scholars soon picked up on Zink’s theme and repeatedly castigated Washington for its failure to provide any coherent policy towards Germany. Manuel Gottlieb’s \textit{The German Peace Settlement and the Berlin Crisis} argued that tensions between the victorious Allies and divided opinions in Washington contributed to a disjointed occupation policy that reflected the views of the numerous agencies involved in occupation policy formation.\textsuperscript{6} Meanwhile, Franklin Davis extended his critique to the planning of the occupation. According to Davis, “the pursuit of military triumph naturally took precedence and priority over the problems of occupation


\textsuperscript{5} Eugene Davidson’s \textit{The Death and Life of Germany: An Account of the American Occupation} (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1959) adopted the same critique that military government lacked clear policy guidance from civilian officials in Washington. Davidson continued his focus on high policy by examining how the occupation fit within the international political context, arguing that what happened in Germany was connected with events in China, Korea, and other theaters of the early Cold War.

which were only dim shadows beyond the victory beacons.” As a result there was little consideration of potential policies for an occupied Germany and the lack of guidance, with the exception of the generally vague JCS 1067, continued after Germany’s surrender. Like Zink, Davis attributes the success of the occupation to the flexibility of Clay and his subordinates.

The emphasis on the lack of policy guidance continued for almost two decades until John Gimbel published the first major challenge to this thesis in 1968. The changing actions of OMGUS, he argued, did not reflect policy ambivalence from Washington but a “broad range” of American interests. Americans, Gimbel writes:

were…interested in seeing to their own continued security, bringing about the economic rehabilitation of Germany and Europe, and guaranteeing the continuance of free enterprise. They wanted to frustrate socialism, to forestall Communism, to spare American taxpayers’ money, to counteract French plans to dismember Germany, and to contain the Soviet Union in Central Europe.

While not always stated interests, they influenced American policy throughout the occupation. Gimbel was one of the first historians to have access to the records of OMGUS and he makes a persuasive argument about American policy towards Germany. Nevertheless, his work remained focused on policy debates and elites almost exclusively. The implementation of such policy or the relationship between military government officials in the field and the larger military government bureaucracy remained largely unexplored.

The high-level, policy-centric methodology continued through the 1970s and early 1980s. John Backer’s work on the occupation highlighted American efforts to “prime” the German economy for recovery before the introduction of Marshall Plan funds into Western Europe. While the remnants of the harsh peace proposed by Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau

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continued for several years, Backer argued that “most of the OMGUS staff was actively engaged in the reconstruction of the German economy from a starting point close to zero…”\textsuperscript{9} Other policies such as denazification and democratization remained important, according to Backer, but the overriding concern of military government elites was the revival of economic activity in Germany. When JCS 1779 – which called for a “soft peace” towards Germany – replaced JCS 1076 in July 1947 as official American policy very little actually changed in Germany, since Clay and his officials had actively worked for the reconstruction of the German economy since 1945. And when the Marshall Plan finally began pumping money into Western Europe, Backer contended that widespread recovery was possible because of the early efforts of American military government officials in priming the economic engine of Germany.

In his preface, Backer writes that he sought to describe the reconstruction of the German economy “as observed from its working level.”\textsuperscript{10} Backer, in many ways, succeeds in his attempt. The examination of important agencies such as the Joint Export Import Agency highlighted some of the difficulties in priming defeated Germany’s economy. Yet his study remains focused largely on the agencies and elites at the highest level of the American military government infrastructure and does not delve into the question of how occupation soldiers at the lowest levels of the military government hierarchy implemented that policy, approached issues like economic reconstruction, or interacted with the larger bureaucracy of military government.

In \textit{American Policy and the Division of Germany} Bruce Kuklick again examines the occupation through the lens of elite-level policy, with the focus on the role of American reparations policy in driving the division of Germany. According to Kuklick, “a hostile and belligerent American attitude, on the one hand, and an unrealistic attitude, on the other, were


\textsuperscript{10} Ibid., vii.
responsible for the partition of Germany and perhaps for the rigid division of Europe.”

The United States refused Russia’s quite reasonable demands for reparations because many policymakers did not want the country to pick up the tab for Germany’s reparations and because economic issues like reparations were viewed as one the most important source of leverage over the Soviet Union. Kuklick’s work clearly belongs to the revisionist school on the origins of the Cold War. However, he downplays the influence of events in Germany on American policy. The total destruction experienced by Clay and the Army worked its way back to Washington and convinced many that a punitive peace – which would be necessary to satisfy Russian reparations demands – would not work, even for a year or two. Additionally, in trying to explain the division of Germany in 1949, Kuklick downplays to larger Cold War context. One issue alone did not contribute to the division of Germany or the hardening of relations between the U.S. and the USSR.

Edward Peterson’s work *The American Occupation of Germany: Retreat to Victory* also viewed the occupation from a policy perspective. The occupation succeeded, Peterson argued, when the Americans transitioned from policies of “interference” to those of “noninterference.” Indeed, “the occupation worked when and where it allowed the Germans to govern themselves.” While Peterson remained focused on American policy, he did begin to move away from the elites of OMGUS by using a series of case studies to examine the implementation of policy in Bavaria. In particular, he cast his attention on the military government detachments stationed in the Bavarian cities of Augsburg, Nuremberg, Friedberg, and Eichstätt. He

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concluded that Washington’s “personalities and institutions were ill adapted to deciding on a Germany policy”\(^\text{14}\); that American officials in Bavaria tried to follow historical tradition and let Bavarians do things their own way; and that at the local level a wide variety of approaches revealed the idiosyncrasies of trying to run an occupation with less than adequate training and local knowledge. Ultimately, Peterson argues that the occupation had little impact on Germany. There was significant continuity from the Weimar Republic and the occupation was soon “largely irrelevant to its goals.”\(^\text{15}\) This demonstrated a notable break from scholars like Zink, who had maintained that the United States exerted significant influence on postwar Germany. For Peterson, the American occupation was simply not that important. Peterson looked beyond the upper echelons of OMGUS and examined local conditions and thus expanded the scope of the historiography for later historians. Additionally, he signified a new development in the literature: a questioning of the American impact on Germany. Yet policy remained the primary analytical framework of the historiography.

Paul Gulgowski adopted a similar perspective to Peterson, arguing that military government, outside of General Clay’s office, was largely ineffective and beset by bureaucratic feuds. According to Gulgowski, the total picture was “one of rival authorities, conflicting objectives, lack of expertise, erroneous perceptions and inadequate intelligence” at all levels of the occupation. Policymakers in Washington quarreled amongst themselves, high-level OMGUS officials feuded with their Allied counterparts and regular Army commanders, and rivalries characterized the relationship between local military government and tactical commanders.\(^\text{16}\) Gulgowski set out to capture military government’s relationship with American policy


throughout OMGUS. He largely succeeded at describing the policy debates among high-level American officials in both Washington and Germany, yet he did not adequately explore the relationship MGOs and other low-level bureaucrats possessed with U.S. policy. Instead, policy remained the purview of elites, particularly General Clay, and it was Clay alone who eventually altered American policy towards Germany.

Elite-level policy debates remained the dominant framework for Carolyn Eisenberg’s *Drawing the Line*. Examining the decision-making process in Washington and at OMGUS headquarters in Germany, Eisenberg argued that that the division of German “was fundamentally an American decision.” Civilian officials, particularly those in the State Department, saw a reconstructed Germany as the key for the postwar recovery of Europe and the creation of a liberal international world order. At first these officials – individuals like Dean Acheson, Averell Harriman, and John Foster Dulles – hoped for a unified Germany and cooperation with the Soviet Union. However, as relations between the former allies deteriorated, Eisenberg explained, American policymakers embarked on the path that led to division, such as the fusion of the American and British zones, ending reparations shipments from West Germany, and insisting that the American position on German issues was nonnegotiable. General Lucius Clay and Army officials within military government initially resisted the push for division, believing that an agreement could be reached with the Soviets. Clay and military government, however, joined their civilian counterparts on the path towards division after the failure of the Moscow Council of Foreign Ministers in April 1947. Ultimately, Eisenberg argued, mounting fear of Soviet aggression and the pursuit of American interests, at least as articulated by these policymakers, led to the American decision to divide Germany.

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Beginning in the 1970s and 1980s, however, scholars challenged the focus on American policy debates and elite-centric narratives. Instead of solely focusing on U.S. policy, these writers explored the impact of the occupation on the politics, culture, and society of the Federal Republic. Such as perspective had long been a minor focus of the policy-centric literature, with many Americans arguing that the United States exercised significant influence, yet it was not the main focus of analysis. For this expanded focus, the fundamental question was whether the American occupation reinforced continuity from the Weimar era or forged significant change in Germany. In many ways, Edward Peterson bridged the gap between the policy-centric analysis and the new focus on the occupation’s impact. He saw significant continuity due to the ineffectiveness of American policy that did not recognize the limits of military government at the local levels of Germany. Army officials may have tried to influence Germany, but the limits of their power, and the strength of their German counterparts, prevented any notable change.

In the field of reeducation and democratization, James Tent identified a similar phenomenon in his work *Mission on the Rhine: Reeducation and Denazification in American-Occupied Germany*. According to Tent, the American embarked on an ambitious program of reeducation in an attempt to denazify and democratize their zone of occupation. The American effort, however, quickly floundered:

Marked differences in educational traditions, the imperfect meshing of education functions with the military bureaucracy, a general lack of recognition...of the complexity, subtlety, and commitment that reorientation programs would require, and an underestimation of the diversity of needs and expectations within Germany all combined to hinder American efforts at “reeducation” the Germans toward democracy…

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As a result, conflicts between American occupiers and German educators erupted over a variety of reeducation programs, including the structure of the German educational system. The Americans saw the German system as insufficiently democratic and sought reforms borrowed from their own system of public education. German officials, intellectuals, newspapers, and the public defended their traditions and resisted the efforts at reform. Ultimately, the Americans did not fully “reeducate” the German populace, but settled for something akin to “reorientation.” In Tent’s analysis, then, the American impact on Germany, while greater than that described by Peterson, was limited. Some reforms occurred in the education system, such as free text books, but continuity largely ruled throughout the American zone.

For Rebecca Boehling, however, American actions in postwar Germany actively limited the prospects of democratic reform and encouraged continuity with pre-Nazi political institutions. In *A Question of Priorities*, Boehling described a fight between the efforts of reformers, both German and American, and the actions of local military government and German officials more concerned with restoring order and economic reconstruction. These stability-minded officials pressed for material recovery and bureaucratic efficiency, which left little room for significant democratization. The American ban on political activity, the reliance on old Weimar politicians, the near-obsession with efficiency, and suspicion of left-wing political parties, Boehling argued, favored the reestablishment of the old political order and discouraged the participation of reform-minded Germans. These actions ultimately meshed with the growing anti-communism of American policymakers and closed the door on significant democratic reform. According to Boehling, “[The] U.S. military, the German bureaucratic emphasis on the restoration of order, and the political primacy of capitalist economic recovery obstructed the
depth and breadth of the process of genuine democratization that many Germans had hoped for after the defeat of Hitler.”\textsuperscript{19}

While Boehling maintained that American occupation favored continuity, Diethelm Prowe argued that the impact of military government was to modify democratization, not to limit the process. In Prowe’s eyes, previous scholars underestimated that importance of “traditional German political-social forces in shaping West German democracy.” Political elites, therefore, sought a return to power, but they had to contend with American attitudes, ideas, and actions. As a result, conservative German leaders had to open their old power networks to labor, refugees, and new entrepreneurs. This form of democratization was not a simple “restoration” of old, undemocratic political elites, as disgruntled reformers insisted, but an American effort a democratic “restabilization.” Military government did not work against democracy, according to Prowe, they simply shaped it differently.\textsuperscript{20}

More recently, Jennifer Fay also explored the process of democratization through the distribution of American-made films in \textit{Theaters of Occupation}. According to Fay, military government officials saw Hollywood features and documentaries as a way to model democratic life. Reflecting academic scholarship at the time, occupation officials believed that democracy emerged from the national character of a society. Therefore, Germans would learn about democracy by watching American films. The 200-plus films shipped to Germany would not “teach democracy per se” but serve as “democratic, even ethnographic artifacts” that would


demonstrate an appropriately democratic worldview. Americans, Fay contended, then expected their German pupils to mimic the democratic practices supposedly on display in the films. Such mimicry would demonstrate the successful reeducation of German society.

Authors like Tent, Boehling, Prowe, and other scholars of the democratization campaigns successfully moved the literature away from a narrow focus on policy debates and the actions of high-level military government officials. Their focus on the impact of American actions in Germany, whether in the form of continuity or reform, added a new perspective to the historiography that had been largely absent under the focus of policy-centric histories. Scholars like Zink did argue that the United States played a key role in the democratization of Germany, for example. Yet their analysis remained superficial due to the focus on the elites of the American military government infrastructure. However, the interpretations of this collection of historians remained incomplete. Their focus on democratization efforts and the transformation of German society was important, but such a perspective does not capture the full scope of occupation work by American officials at the lowest levels of the military government bureaucracy. These Americans addressed the crippling food crisis, how to approach local reconstruction, and the impact of rising Cold War tensions. Additionally, they faced the challenge of navigating a complex military institution, one that often complicated their local tasks. As a result, they interacted with multiple aspects of American policy and responded to these challenges in several different ways. Tent, Boehling, and Prowe make significant

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22 Ibid., ix.
contributions to the literature, but they do not fully capture military government officials’ full interaction with American policy during the occupation.  

In the last fifteen years, meanwhile, historians embraced social and cultural history to explore the occupation experience of “ordinary Germans” or to study relations between Germans and their American occupiers. For example, Giles MacDonogh’s *After the Reich* set out to examine the so-called “brutal history” of the Allied occupation. While the Allies helped rid Germany of Adolf Hitler and his cronies, MacDonogh argued that they exacted a terrible price on the defeated German populace.  

Allied soldiers, particularly the Soviets, committed widespread rapes against German women; life in the zones of occupation was characterized by physical destruction, lack of food, and extreme hardship; and the Allies ruthlessly imposed a sense of collective guilt on all Germans. MacDonogh’s work provided some interesting insights into the harsh environment Germans encountered after 1945 and the discussion of collective guilt was intriguing, but his work suffered from several notable flaws, namely a lack of archival research, an ignorance of the historiography, and equating the isolated incidents of violence committed by the western Allies with the systemic violence perpetrated by the Soviets.

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The occupation experience of ordinary Germans also included their interactions with the American officers and soldiers that comprised the occupying army. Several historians have recently explored this relationship, often through the lens of gender and social history. Perry Biddiscombe, for example, examined the anti-fraternization movement among German and Austrian men during the American occupation. By and large, Biddiscombe argued, “the anti-fraternization cause was largely a gender issue, deriving mainly from male jealousy and anxieties about sexual control.”

The liberalization of sexual mores during the Nazi era and the widespread rape of German women by the Allied armies, in many ways, produced a sense of emasculation among German men and turned the family, as “the main surviving sociopolitical unit” in German society, into the site of the struggle over power and control.

While Biddiscombe focused more on German gender issues, Petra Goedde explored the cultural and gendered history of American-German relations during the occupation in her book *GIs and Germans*. “Within the first year of the occupation,” she argued, “American soldiers developed a feminized and infantilized image of Germany” in which the United States served as the male protector. By 1947 this idea had worked its way up to American policymakers who saw Germans as the victim and the U.S. as the provider. This new relationship was reinforced by the Berlin Blockade and the subsequent airlift which “consolidated American images of themselves as providers and protectors of victimized Germans.” The Soviet threat, therefore, operated as a justification for the new relationship that had slowly emerged since May 1945. Goedde’s analysis focused on the bottom-up influence on American policy towards Germany,

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26 Ibid., 611.


28 Ibid., 123.

29 Ibid., 167.
namely the informal interactions between American GIs and German women and children. These interactions, she contends, reshaped the image of Germany from one of masculine aggression to feminine victimhood. This interpretation makes an important contribution to the literature, showing how occupation soldiers challenged basic tenants of American policy from the beginning of the occupation. What it does not explore, however, is how military government officials, those tasked with implementing US policy, also circumvented American policy towards Germany.

Additionally, recent works have also examined the occupation experience for both American occupation troops and the displaced persons (DPs) living in postwar Germany. In *The Good Occupation*, Susan Carruthers challenged the popular memory of post-1945 occupations, including Germany, that dominate American society. Instead, of an occupation based on American benevolence, Carruthers argued that American soldiers and civilians alike expressed ambivalence to the Army, suffered occupation duty through the benefits of their status as conquerors, and generally thought the United States was losing the occupation at the time. Many GIs, Carruthers wrote, “regarded the military as a custodial institution that trapped reluctant inmates…and subjected them to myriad [sadistic] forms of regimentation.”

To make life bearable, these soldiers fraternized (which was soon a euphemism for sexual activity) with the local women and engaged in black market activity, causing widespread concern about the morals of the U.S. Army from civilian commentators across the Atlantic. Additionally, Carruthers pushed back against the narrative of American altruism towards the country’s defeated enemies. Instead, the work of postwar occupation “was cast in deconstructive terms that emphasized

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dismantling and disabling enemies.”

It was only with the pressures of the Cold War and the “domestication” of the occupation – through the arrival of wives and children overseas – that ultimately erased the unpopular dimensions and turned the postwar occupations into the “good occupation.”

Carruthers makes an important point about the complications surrounding America’s post-1945 military occupations; they were not as easy as historical memory and contemporary politicians like to portray. However, her analysis often lumps both regular Army soldiers into the same category as actual military government officials. While there were undoubtedly some similarities between their occupation experiences, it is important to recognize the differences between the two groups. Whereas regular Army GIs possessed few direct responsibilities in the occupation of Germany, for example, MGOs were responsible for numerous tasks, such as implementing American policy, that occupied much of their time and produced a significantly different occupation experience. Occupation officials, therefore, had a slightly different occupation experience and it is important to explore how these Americans interacted with the policies they were charged with implementing.

The plight of displaced persons and ethnic German expellees from Eastern Europe has also received significant attention from historians in recent years, further moving the historiography away from a narrow focus on elite-level policy. R.M. Douglas’ *Orderly and Humane*, for example, explored the expulsion of ethnic Germans immediately after the war from countries in Eastern Europe, notably Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. The Allies, Douglas argued, approved the forced population transfers but made few provisions to ensure that the

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31 Ibid., 308.
deportations would be “orderly and humane,” as outlined in the Potsdam Agreement.32 In a similar vein, Adam R. Seipp examined the relationship between American occupation officials, DPs, ethnic German expellees, and the local population in the Bavarian town of Wildfleckn. The overall refugee crisis, Seipp argued, was central to American occupation policies. Additionally, the presence of non-German DPs served as a catalyst for the integration of ethnic Germans expellees into the local community.33 Finally, Anna Holian’s Between National Socialism and Soviet Communism explores how the multitudes of displaced persons in the American occupation zone – Poles, Russians, Ukrainians, Jews – slowly formed their own communities to defend their common interests and competed with each other for the attention of U.S. military government officials. Jewish DPs, for example, sought American help to emigrate to the United States or Palestine. Meanwhile, the primary concern for many DPs from areas under Soviet control was to avoid repatriation, often for fear of being labeled a Nazi collaborator.34 Taken together, Douglas, Seipp, and Holian represent the recent trend of much occupation scholarship to move away from a sole focus on top-down policy analyses and, instead, to focus on the occupation experience for traditionally under-studied groups.35

Scholars of the other postwar occupations, too, have embraced more comprehensive histories of the postwar period in Germany. Norman Naimark’s pioneering history of the Soviet occupation, for example, examined the occupation of eastern Germany from a variety of perspectives. Naimark explored the systemic sexual violence towards German women that accompanied Soviet occupation, the Soviet use of German science, and relations with left-wing

political parties. In doing so, he did not focus solely on policy questions and the elites within the Soviet military government establishment, although he addressed the formation of Soviet policy in their occupation zone. Instead, Naimark analyzed the occupation experience for both Soviet soldiers and German civilians, examining how the two populations interacted and shaped the nature of the occupation.36

These new focuses in the historiography have not, however, completely relegated the old emphasis on policy to the back burner. Some recent scholars have re-examined American policy in Germany through different perspectives. Bianka Adams, for example, explored the process of denazification in the Bremen Enclave. Located deep within the British zone of occupation, officials from both occupying armies attempted to coordinate their different denazification policies which only produced “fits and starts” that “undermined the legitimacy of the program.”37 Ultimately, deadlines and waning governmental support meant that most Germans were classified as benign “followers,” even if they did not deserve such a label.38

In a similar vein, Walter Hudson’s Army Diplomacy examines how the U.S. Army ultimately dominated postwar foreign policy, particularly in the first two years after the end of the Second World War. Hudson focuses less on the implementation of American policy and more on its creation. The Army, Hudson argued, developed a nascent approach to military occupations during the interwar era based on its experiences before World War II, especially from the experience occupying the Rhineland during the 1920s. From this experience, Army leadership and officers created the doctrine, training, and organization necessary to carry out postwar occupations. This significant organization gave the Army notable advantages in the

37 Bianka J. Adams, From Crusade to Hazard: The Denazification of Bremen Germany (Lanham: The Scarecrow Press, 2009), 146.
38 Ibid., 148.
bureaucratic struggles within the U.S. government to control postwar planning. As a result, the Army’s vision of the occupation won out, which emphasized “military necessity” – including restarting local economic activity – and the desire to return control to local civilians at the earliest practicable movement. The Army’s dominant position meant that the postwar occupations, including in Germany, reflected military-oriented approaches and that U.S. policy “would be refracted through the army’s understanding of postwar governance.”

The work of Adams and Hudson demonstrate that policy perspectives still offer much to the literature on the occupation. Adams, for example, shows how the implementation of policy collided with the realities of overseeing an occupation with three other victorious powers. American military government officials in Bremen had to reconcile American denazification policy with the British approach, a task that complicated an already messy situation. Similarly, Hudson successfully demonstrates the long-term origins of American policy towards Germany. Whereas many historians examined the wartime debates over occupation planning within the federal government, Hudson argues that the Army developed its approach to military occupations over several decades of study, doctrinal development, and organizational reform. The policy perspective, then, still offers significant room for historians to examine the postwar occupation.

Nevertheless, policy studies of the occupation have largely been dominated by top-down methodologies. Considering the Cold War context in which many of these authors wrote, such a focus is understandable. Questions of policy were of paramount importance to historians who sought to understand the origins of the Soviet-American conflict or who examined the history of the new western alliance. The works of scholars like Davis, Gimbel, and Eisenberg skillfully

traced the debates in Washington, Frankfurt, and Berlin that shaped American policy towards the country’s defeated enemy. OMGUS officials were often frustrated by the lack of clear-cut guidance from their superiors in the United States, but, as Gimbel persuasively demonstrated, American actions in Germany reflected a wide variety of American interests – from denazifying German society and ensuring the reconstruction of Europe to the quest to keep down occupation-related costs and halting the spread of communism in Central Europe.

Yet these elite-centric policy approaches belie the importance of the individual soldiers, and their supporting infrastructure, who implemented policy on the ground. They obscure the intricacies and challenges associated with turning general statements of policy into the concrete action. These top-down histories also obscure the agency of the individuals that comprised the lower levels of military government. Such officials can easily be painted as individuals who simply carried out the wishes of their high-level superiors. To be sure, scholars of the American occupation have embarked on case studies that have either examined the totality of the occupation in a single locale – such as Gimbel’s work on Marburg⁴⁰ – or explored the impact of certain policies on geographical regions of the American zone of occupation.⁴¹ Such works are important to understand how individual policies were implemented or how specific locales responded to American occupation. What they do not do, however, is capture the full complexity surrounding the implementation of U.S. policy in postwar Germany. A variety of factors

influenced how MGOs and their superiors approached the broad outlines of American policy in their former enemy. Widespread destruction, economic collapse, impending starvation, disagreements within the Army, and German actions all complicated the process of implementing American policy. Additionally, occupation officials often balanced multiple competing policies that often required contradictory actions. These factors shaped the actions of MGOs throughout Germany and influenced the degree to which they followed the dictates of civilian officials in Washington and military officials in Frankfurt or Berlin.

While the elite-centric policy histories lost the humanity of lower-level occupation officials, the works of Boehling, Goedde, and Carruthers more successfully captured the occupation experience of the Americans involved. In the case of Boehling, military government officers focused their attention on immediate economic recovery and efficiency within the German bureaucracy. Demonstrating their agency, Boehling argued that these MGOs gravitated towards the German officials they were most comfortable with, namely “apolitical” experts and politicians from the Weimar-era center-right. Similarly, Goedde traced the growing rapprochement between the United States and Germans through interactions between the German population and the soldiers of the occupying army. Carruthers, too, captures the occupation experience for American GIs, particularly their boredom and ambivalence towards the American mission. These histories avoid the narrow focus on policy that dominated the early historiography of the occupation. Yet they are not without their faults. Often these bottom-up approaches to the occupation too easily conflate regular occupation soldiers with the American officials assigned to military government. While their experiences undoubtedly overlapped, MGOs, and not GIs, were directly responsible for the implementation of American policy. Additionally, one should not lose sight of the institutional context within which military
government officials worked. As Walter Hudson convincingly argued, “embedding such actors in institutions and bureaucracies provides context to their choices and very often shows how their choices are intensely constrained.” Military government officials worked within such an institution where structure and culture constrained their actions. Finally, the desire to avoid top-down, policy-heavy histories can ignore how the implementation of policy in postwar Germany was often fraught with difficulties and challenged by Americans and Germans alike.

The historiography of the American occupation, therefore, requires a work that bridges the gap between elite-centric policy studies and bottom-up examinations of the occupation experience. It needs a work that can move beyond questions of policy debates among policymakers to analyze the occupation from the lowest levels of military government. At the same time, such a work must not ignore the issue of policy. Instead, it should examine American policy from the perspective of those military government officials tasked with implementing it at the Kreis and Land levels in Germany. MGOs, working within the institutions of military government, faced significant challenges that complicated the implementation of American policy throughout the occupation, including economic collapse, limits on their authority, and even growing sympathy for their defeated enemy. The implementing process was complex, contentious, and fraught with starts and stops. Therefore, the literature of the U.S. occupation has room for a history that both moves away from the top-down policy framework while also recognizing the important role that policy played in the day-to-day responsibilities of the Americans who comprised the lowest levels of the major institution of occupation.

**Project Description**

This dissertation aims to provide that work. It will broadly address several major questions: How did American military government officials, as part of the institution of OMGB,

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respond to the challenges of the occupation? How did these individuals interact with American policy towards defeated Germany? And, finally, how did the challenges of postwar Germany shape that relationship with American policy? By exploring these questions, this dissertation will move beyond the elites at the head of civilian agencies in Washington, D.C. and at the top of the military government hierarchy in Germany. It will examine the history of the occupation from the perspective of the Americans at the lowest levels of military government, in the vein of recent scholars of the occupation. However, it will not relegate policy to the backburner. Instead, this dissertation aims to analyze how MGOs interacted with, challenged, and implemented key aspects of American policy towards Germany. It is important to reclaim the agency of military government officials at the bottom of the American hierarchy. Their position at the bottom rungs of large institutions limited their power, but they also did not mindlessly implement policy directives. They worked within the confines of their positions to modify American policy in response to the challenges that characterized postwar Germany. Overall, institutions and policy remain important perspectives to consider, but this dissertation will move away from the top-down approach that has characterized much of the historiography.

To reclaim the agency of these occupation officials and to provide a more well-rounded view of the occupation, this project will explore the occupation from a variety of levels of the American occupation of Bavaria, from OMGB headquarters in Munich to local military government offices in small farming communities. For these units and individuals, the broad outlines of American policy were important, but the problems of administering defeated Germany were even more so. Denazification sounded like a solid policy on paper, but the extent to which the Nazi Party pervaded pre-1945 German society meant it was often difficult to find qualified individuals who were not members of the party. Similarly, the democratization of
Germany appeared a worthwhile goal, yet the persistent food shortages and indifference of wide portions of the German populace posed several problems to military government detachments. Additionally, the early deconstructive tone of American policy sounded necessary after two world wars, but the threat of economic catastrophe provided and incentive towards reconstruction instead. These were just a few of the many issues that complicated the responsibilities of occupation officials at the lowest levels of the Army’s hierarchy. By focusing on the day-to-day problems facing the officials charged with implementing the occupation, this dissertation will examine the occupation from the perspective of OMGB officials beyond the policy-making circles and highlight how lower ranking military government officials took the broad policy guidance provided by their superiors and put it into action.

In order to gain such a perspective, this dissertation will focus on the records of military government units stationed in the German Land of Bavaria. Bavaria, the largest region of the American occupation zone, was in many ways unique from the rest of the US zone. Bavarian society was predominantly Catholic and Bavarian politics were traditionally suspicious of centralized government. Additionally, the region lacked the concentrated industry of the British zone and the large-scale agriculture of the Soviet zone. Nevertheless, the focus on Bavaria allows for significant insight into the American occupation experience. While the Land did not possess industry on the scale of the Ruhr Valley, it still held significant urban centers with major industry, such as Munich and Nuremberg, and smaller cities, like Schweinfurt and Regensburg, which were key industrial targets for American bombing raids during the war. The region also faced the same shortages of food and fuel that plagued the entirety of the occupation for several years. In addition, Bavaria was, in many respects, the birth place of National Socialism and therefore the American attempts to democratize Bavaria can provide valuable insight into the
day-to-day experience with the rather frustrating policy. Finally, Bavaria’s geographic location within Germany presented American occupation officials with significant challenges that were less notable in other portions of the zone. The Land, for example, was often the first stop for German expellees entering the US zone from Eastern Europe, in particular Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Additionally, Bavaria shared a significant border with Soviet-occupied territory, which presented its own series of problems for occupation officials as relations between the former allies deteriorated throughout the occupation. Bavaria, therefore, promises to offer valuable insight into how American officials implemented occupation policy at the lowest levels of military government.

By shifting the methodological focus away from civilian and military elites, this dissertation is not trying to downplay their importance in shaping American policy towards Germany. Civilians like John J. McCloy and Army generals such as Lucius Clay undoubtedly played major roles in crafting the U.S. approach to its former enemy and possessed the power and authority to change American policy. What this project does, however, is examine how military government officials reconciled policy directives with the conditions experienced at the local level. The multitude of challenges faced by MGOs at the local level shaped how they responded to the policies developed by their superiors. At times these Americans implemented the policies as directed, yet at other times they pushed back against policy directives and tried to mitigate the effects of a decision made in Washington or Berlin. Beyond the debates surrounding policy formation, it is important to understand the factors that shape the actual implementation of policy, for factors beyond the control of policymakers can easily influence how their decisions are implemented.
At the same time, this project tries to avoid some of the pitfalls of more recent methodologies applied to the American occupation. Histories from the past twenty years have excelled at moving beyond the narrow scope of top-down policy debates. They examined the impact of the occupation on German society, analyzed the interactions between occupiers and occupied, and explored the experience of occupation for all involved. Such approaches are vitally important to a complete understanding of the occupation. However, questions of policy – particularly its implementation – often receive scant attention or are relegated to the background. In addition, many of these works too easily conflate the experiences of military government officials with American GIs. Early on there was often significant overlap between the two populations, but as the occupation continued that common ground disappeared. Soldiers in combat units may have been envisioned as “ambassadors” for the United States and played a key role through their interactions with the German populace, but it was the MGOs who oversaw the implementation of American policy and dealt with occupation problems on a day-to-day basis. Therefore, it is important to understand how the Americans assigned to specific occupation duties – and not all Americans in Germany – dealt with the challenges of administering their defeated foe.

This project, therefore, aims to show how the institutions of the occupation implemented the decisions made in Washington, Frankfurt, and Berlin. It is the challenges faced by officers and soldiers outside the elite levels of the Army hierarchy in defeated Germany that this dissertation hopes to capture. These individuals and units faced the immense task of implementing American policy on the ground in the face of critical shortages of food and fuel, an apathetic and increasingly resentful German populace, the vacillating attention of the American public, and the rising tensions between the former wartime allies. The destruction in post-1945
Germany and the necessity of effective governance forced occupation soldiers to reconcile general policy directives from their superiors with the necessities of administering a defeated nation-state at the local level. This dissertation project will explore these problems, challenges, and crises experienced by soldiers and units tasked with occupation duty. It will examine the occupation at the grassroots by focusing on one of the most important regions of the American zone of occupation: Bavaria. Ultimately, Americans in Bavaria filtered U.S. policy through an increasingly pro-German lens. Interactions with Germans of all stripes and the challenges of governing postwar Bavaria led MGOs to challenge the punitive aspects of early American policy. Additionally, military government possessed definite boundaries in postwar Bavaria – imposed by American policy, the challenges of postwar Germany, and the actions of officials and civilians throughout the Land. These boundaries then constrained the actions available to Americans and limited the impact of military government officials from 1945 to 1949.

Finally, this dissertation represents, in part, a bottom-up institutional history of American military government in Bavaria. It focuses on the official actions of military government officials in the German Land, including the response to the food crisis, how to revive the German economy, efforts at democratization, and dealing with the early Cold War. As such, the project explores how military government officials, particularly at the local levels in Bavaria, responded to the challenges of occupying a former enemy and a devastated nation-state. Additionally, it examines how the institutional structure of OMGB both reacted to the postwar problems plaguing Bavaria and shaped the actions of low-level military government officials. This institutional perspective remains important. Institutions influence the context within which individuals move, particularly those institutions like the military. As Walter Hudson explained, “to ignore or to downplay institutional or bureaucratic forces is to overrate significantly the
ability of policymakers to act as purely rational agents and thereby to singularly control historical events."\(^{43}\) If institutions constrain high-level policymakers, it is also important to explore how they exert pressure upon the lower-level officials charged with carrying out policy and how those officials can shape the institution. In this case, the emerging Cold War reinforced the importance of studying the U.S. Army, OMGUS, and OMGB as institutions. Throughout the standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union, the American military, along with other key institutions, supported American interests as “manifestations of the power of the state.”\(^{44}\) Therefore, studying the American occupation from a bottom-up perspective will provide insight into how the major U.S. institutions of the 1940s responded to the challenges of the immediate postwar era.

**Chapter Overview**

To properly understand the enormity of the task facing American units as they began the occupation in May 1945, the first chapter of this dissertation – “Total War, Total Destruction” – will provide a rich description of the devastation that characterized much of postwar Germany. The destruction was truly immense. In many urban centers, up to three-quarters of the buildings were either totally destroyed or severely damaged. Ground combat between the Wehrmacht and the Allied armies contributed to the destruction, but it was the Combined Bomber Offensive of the Anglo-American air forces that turned German cities into ruins and crippled transportation throughout the country. This chapter will briefly survey the conduct of the Allies’ strategic bombing campaign during the war. By describing the process of bombing and the destruction of the German cities, this chapter will set the stage for the American occupation. Many of the most


significant problems faced by occupation units, particularly the urban food shortages, the lack of fuel resources, and the shortage of transportation, were the direct result of the Allied bombing campaign. The bombing also contributed to the widespread apathy among many Germans, which military government officials had to deal with throughout the occupation. Additionally, this introductory chapter will explore the contours of early American policy towards Germany. While there was significant policy confusion throughout 1944 and 1945, the general outline of American policy was to impose some kind of harsh peace on the country’s defeated enemy based on the assumption of collective German guilt.

After this introductory chapter, the dissertation will move on to its main focus through a series of thematic chapters that will explore the Army’s occupation from a number of perspectives. The second chapter – titled “An Occupation of Shortages” – will focus on one of the most pressing issues for the American occupation force from 1945 to 1949: the significant shortages of food that wracked Germany in the aftermath of the war. In the aftermath of the war a worldwide food shortage plagued the globe, but it was especially fierce in Germany. Urban centers were often dangerously low on food stocks, particularly in the first year of the occupation and after the fierce winter of 1947-1948; at times, rations were as low as 800-1000 calories daily. Meanwhile, the influx of German expellees exacerbated the problem, as the population of Bavaria swelled past its pre-war numbers despite the cost and destruction of war. This chapter will examine how occupation units in Bavaria sought to cope with this crisis. It argues that OMGB officials and MGOs challenged the basic framework of American policy through their growing sympathy to the plight of the German populace. It will examine what steps these officials took to alleviate the food crisis and how institutional forces constrained the available actions. The chapter will also delve into the struggle between the Americans and the Bavarians to
determine the severity of the postwar food crisis. Officials from both sides competed to define the severity of the crisis and to develop the best response to the shortages.

Bavaria, in particular, promises to offer interesting perspectives into these problems. As it pertained to food, Bavaria was the largest agricultural region of western Germany, not just the American zone. Yet it still faced significant food shortages, as wrecked transportation kept food from reaching its major cities. To make matters worse, the arrival of tens of thousands of ethnic German expellees in Bavaria from elsewhere in Europe only added to the problems faced by American occupation officials. This chapter, therefore, will examine these problems in Bavaria, while also highlighting the discrepancy between a rural population that often had enough to eat and an urban population that often faced starvation.

The third chapter – “Rebuilding Bavaria” – will then explore the problems associated with the attempts to rebuild the shattered German economy. There has been substantial work done on the American reconstruction of both Germany and Western Europe as a whole and American policy – both emanating from Washington and from OMGUS headquarters – formed the foundation of such works. Historians such as John Gimbel, John Backer, and Edward Peterson emphasized the importance of OMGUS and its institutional creations, such as the Joint Export Import Agency, and policy steps like the introduction of the new currency in June 1948 as important steps in priming the German economy. These steps laid the foundation for the true recovery that occurred with the introduction of Marshall Plan funds. This chapter does not seek to disprove such an interpretation but traces the origin of American “priming” of the Bavarian economy back to the earliest days of the occupation. Military government officials in Bavaria, witnessing the devastation of the war and its effects on the postwar economy, promoted forms of economic reconstruction from the occupation’s first weeks. As with the food crises, MGOs
challenged official American policy in the name of pragmatism and restoring the basic outlines of the Bavarian economy. These officials faced the challenge of reconciling policy directives from OMGUS headquarters, inevitably devised for the overall situation in the American zone, with the economic reality that existed in Bavaria. Occupation officials assigned to the major economic branches of American military government undoubtedly faced an unenviable task in their attempts to kick start the German economy. Yet the officers and soldiers at the grassroots faced their own challenges related to the economic reconstruction of Germany and this chapter will explore how these Americans responded to them.

Ultimately, the issue of economic reconstruction demonstrates some of the clear limits on military government in Bavaria. Early in the occupation the broad outlines of American policy, focused as it was on a more punitive peace, limited the options available to military government officials to address the economic crisis. MGOs sought out methods to promote recovery and challenge the dominant American policies, but the nature of those policies limited their options. Beyond that, however, American actions often exacerbated the economic problems plaguing Bavaria, while the determination to transfer responsibility to their German counterparts as rapidly as possible checked the reach of American officials. Even after policy changed, the limits remained for the rest of the occupation. Military government officers possessed few direct methods to spur economic recovery. Instead, they relied on indirect methods, such as reporting and persuasion, to rebuild Bavaria. Such actions proved important, but the quest for economic reconstruction clearly highlighted the boundaries on American military government throughout the occupation.

The fourth chapter of this dissertation – “Importing America: Reorientation and Democratization in Bavaria” – will address the efforts at denazification and reorientation, or
democratization, at local levels in Bavaria. Denazification was an important aspect of this process, but this chapter will focus on the more positive methods used by military government officials to democratize Bavaria. During the early stages of the occupation one of the most important aspects of democratization, at least from the American perspective, was military government’s youth program, German Youth Activities. Through GYA military government officials challenged the assumption of collective German guilt that animated early American policy in the country. The youth program also offered a testing ground for the major ideas and practices that would characterize the broader reorientation program in 1948 and 1949. By the time military government embarked on a full-scale democratization program in 1948 American policy towards Germany had embraced full-blown recovery. As a result, military government officials did not challenge official policy regarding reorientation to the degree they had during the food and economic crises of the first years of the occupation. Instead, MGOs in Bavaria implemented their own vision of democratization: a campaign of political modernization in which the Americans would tutor their inexperienced, backward German pupils. It was in the field of democratization that American officials most significantly abandoned their practice of noninterference in Bavarian affairs. This is not to say that MGOs directly controlled all aspects of the reorientation program; on the contrary, German officials played a key role. Instead, the importance placed on the program meant that American officials were more willing to take a more direct role in efforts to democratize the German populace than they were in their attempts to solve the food crises or revive economic activity in Bavaria.

The final chapter of this dissertation – “The Occupation in the Early Cold War” – will examine how OMGB officials and MGOs dealt with the deteriorating relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union and the perceived threat of communism to Bavaria. Unlike
the response of Americans in Bavaria to the food and economic crises of the early occupation, occupation officials largely reflected the attitudes of military government policymakers towards the Soviet Union and communism. While relations with the Soviets remained relatively cordial during the first half of the occupation there was little concern about the threat of communism in Bavaria. Instead, MGOs focused their concerns on other issues, especially the lingering influence of Nazism in Bavarian society. As relations deteriorated between the former allies and policymakers in OMGUS adopted a more antagonistic approach to the Soviet Union, however, military government officials in Bavaria saw communism as an increasing threat. Nevertheless, these MGOs retained some of the independence from policymakers that they had demonstrated in dealing with the food shortages and economic stagnation. Although American officials in Bavaria increasingly embraced anticommunism, they recognized the limited threat posed by communists in the conservative Land and remained focused on the threat of a Nazi revival. In addition, the early Cold War was a remote phenomenon for most MGOs in Bavaria. Ensconced in their local offices, the policy debates and crises that characterized the conflict were remote affairs that possessed limits direct influence on their day-to-day responsibilities as occupation officials.

Conclusion

In the last thirty years historians have strove to reclaim the agency of individuals long obscured by the conflicts, social processes, and elites that shape the world and dominated written history. The result is social, cultural, religious, racial, political, and military histories which recognize the importance of previously unheralded people or groups on the major events, movements, and processes of global history. Additionally, recent works delve into the experiences of non-elites and try to view history from the bottom-up. Within military history this
trend has produced many different works, from popular histories about individual units in conflict to scholarly works that examine how combat affected American soldiers.

In part, this dissertation operates within that framework. It will highlight the roles played by occupation officials at the bottom of the military government bureaucracy, examining how these Americans worked within the institution framework of the occupation and implemented policy in Bavaria. By doing so, this project will contribute to both the scholarly literature on the occupation and, hopefully, provide a broader context in which non-academics view the occupation. The ultimate success of the occupation can obscure the challenges faced by the American officials tasked with implementing US policy. In an era where nation-building remains an important aspect of American foreign policy, it is vital to accurately understand the full scope of the occupation experience, not to rely on simplistic arguments that the United States succeeded in Germany and can therefore easily succeed in other such efforts.

Within the field of occupation literature, along with the broader World War II and early Cold War historiography, this dissertation will fill an important gap within the historiography. Elite-centric policy histories, while fundamentally important, also obscure the agency of the low-level officials tasked with implementing the occupation. Some policy historians like Edward Peterson worked to include the bottom-up perspective, but it remained a tangential part of their scholarship. Similarly, case studies and histories of individual policies have explored implementation, but have not always placed their analysis within the context of other occupation policies. Other historians like Petra Goedde have notably moved away from the policy framework. Goedde’s emphasis on cultural interactions and gendered images of postwar Germany demonstrated how informal relationships between American GIs and German civilians, especially women and children, slowly reshaped American policy towards Germany. What is
largely absent from Goedde’s work, however, is an analysis of how officials within military
government itself worked within and challenged the dominant strand of American policy during
the occupation. American soldiers and their informal interactions with the German populace
were undoubtedly important in reshaping American attitudes, yet these were individuals outside
the bureaucracy of military government. The actions of military government officials, tasked
with implementing US policy, are just as important.

This dissertation will address this important gap in the historiography. It moves away
from the elite perspective and explores how military government officials in Bavaria interacted
with and implemented American policy at the lowest levels of the occupation bureaucracy. As
such, it argues that these OMGB officials and MGOs, in the first eighteen to twenty-four months
of the occupation, challenged basic tenants of American policy towards Germany due to their
growing sympathy for the plight of the Bavarian populace. In addition, it explores how American
occupation officials in Bavaria responded to the challenges of postwar Bavaria, how they
interacted with the higher levels of the military government bureaucracy, and how these
individuals responded to the coming of the Cold War. These military government officers, from
OMGB headquarters to the local offices in small farming communities, played a key role in
achieving a successful occupation. While the long-term American presence in Europe and the
actions of the Germans themselves were major factors, the persistence and adaptability of these
officials in Bavaria contributed to the creation of a stable, democratic Germany.
Chapter 1: Total War, Total Destruction

“Morale has reached a new low such as has not been observed since the outbreak of the war…Among the masses sayings are common such as: ‘The wage has gotten off the track. It got stuck in the dirt.’ ‘One ought to make an end, for it cannot become worse than it is now’…The air terror continues to be the crux in the holding of morale…”

- German Intelligence Report, Munich, March 1944

“Germany today is a country without cities. The countryside is practically untouched and in many spots as picturesque as ever. But in a physical and to a large degree psychological sense, the cities no longer exist.”

- Julian Bach, 1946

The Germany encountered by American occupation units beginning in the late spring and early summer of 1945 was, in many ways, a hollowed-out shell of a nation-state, gutted and burned by six years of war. Within the ruins of cities like Berlin, Munich, and Nuremberg, American GIs stood face-to-face with the effects of modern total war: unprecedented piles of rubble, an economy at a standstill, nonexistent government, and a population beleaguered by six years of bombing and by months of fighting during the final death throes of the Third Reich. For many Americans on the ground in Germany the magnitude of destruction represented the defining physical characteristic of the defeated country for many months. A small industry even emerged for officers and soldiers to share the devastation with friends and family back in the United States. In Berlin, for example, postcards showing the damage to many famous city monuments and buildings such as the Reichstag were available for purchase. These postcards highlighted the challenges faced by these American officers and soldiers, even as they shared the destruction with their families back in the United States. The effects of total war, including

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3 “Best Wishes from Berlin,” Box 31, Papers of Alvin J. Rockwell, Harry S. Truman Presidential Library.
widespread destruction, would exacerbate the task of administering and rebuilding a ravaged nation-state.

Germans, meanwhile, struggled to cope with the effects of modern total war. Hundreds of thousands suffered through food and housing shortages. A massive coal shortage meant long, cold winters for the few living in undamaged buildings. Years of bombing produced an increasingly apathetic populace. For those who survived the war the quest for survival dominated all other concerns, making them largely ambivalent towards attempts at democratization and other occupation policies. Ruins dominated the German landscape, despite rural areas largely escaping bombing until the last months of the war. “The sign of our times is the ruins,” wrote author Hans Werner Richter, a resident of Munich. “They surround our lives…They are our reality.”

American occupation officials in Bavaria faced a series of monumental tasks in providing food, fuel, and shelter for the German populace; restarting economic life; reorientating and democratizing German society; and combating communism within the framework of the early Cold War. The enormity of the destruction in Germany after 1945 exacerbated these difficulties. In the less urbanized region of Bavaria, American officials still faced great challenges. The war brought unparalleled devastation to German people, infrastructure, and cities. Ground combat during the last months of the war contributed to the destruction, but it was the strategic bombing offensive of the Anglo-American Allies which turned Germany into a nation of ruins. German civilians emerged from the war psychologically distraught and numb from years living under the bombs. A profound sense of fatalism dominated both during and after the war. Many Germans concerned themselves with mere survival. Additionally, Allied bombs ravaged Germany’s

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infrastructure, particularly the German national railroad, the Reichsbahn. Deprived of coal and transportation, economic life collapsed. The scenes of apocalyptic devastation in German cities made matters worse. Cleanup of rubble diverted resources away from other activities such as the distribution of food. Meanwhile, the loss of housing provided its own challenges, from Germans’ quest for survival to where to house the ethnic Germans expelled from Eastern Europe. All of these problems exacerbated the already monumental tasks faced by American occupation officials from 1945 to 1949.

Initial American policy towards their defeated enemy also posed a threat to the German population and a challenge to military government officials in Bavaria. Official planning for a postwar occupation was uncoordinated and competing government agencies offered different visions of what Germany should look like after the war. Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau offered perhaps the most famous, or infamous, proposal: the pastoralization of Germany. Convinced that German society was irredeemably militarized, Morgenthau called for the total deindustrialization of the country to prevent Germany from ever again waging aggressive war. Morgenthau’s ideas achieved a period of predominance before the end of the war before the Army and War Department beat them back. American policy, however, still envisioned a harsh peace, one that could exacerbate the problems already plaguing postwar Germany.

This chapter, then, explores the devastation that characterized Germany at the beginning of the occupation. The Allied bombing campaign, along with ground combat, produced widespread physical destruction, which became the defining visual characteristic of postwar Germany. The devastation of total war, combined with the broad outlines of a harsh American policy, produced major challenges for the American military government officials tasked with
overseeing the occupation. It was within this context that many MGOs grew sympathetic towards the Bavarian population. Living amidst the ruins of a defeated nation-state, these American officials experienced the plight of German civilians and saw first-hand the potential consequences of a harsh peace.

**The Combined Bomber Offensive**

For the first three years of the war Allied bombing against German targets proceeded in fits and starts. The British first tried daylight bombing, but their losses proved unsustainable. As a result, during 1942 the British unabashedly adopted area bombing, with the state objective of attacking the morale of enemy civilians. Arthur Harris, the new head of Bomber Command, proved a vocal advocate for the widespread destruction of German cities. In addition, a series of operational reforms allowed British bombers to drastically increase the tonnage of bombs dropped on Germany. New navigational devices and the introduction of pathfinder units made the task of finding enemy cities at night more manageable. Coupled with increased production of new heavy bombers, this allowed Bomber Command to contemplate, for the first time, the true annihilation of cities throughout Germany. The first thousand bomber raids in 1942, made by cobbling together every available bomber in the RAF, also presaged the destruction to be unleashed during the last year of the war. At the same time the U.S. Army Air Corps prepared for a campaign of daylight bombing against German industrial targets. Nevertheless, the bombing campaign remained largely haphazard and had yet to make any significant contribution to the war effort.

In January 1943, American and British military leaders met in Casablanca to plan the next stage of the war against Nazi Germany. While Bomber Command had continued to perfect the science of city bombing and the American Eighth Air Force made its first forays against
fortress Europe, no semblance of a strategy guided the Allied bombing campaign. At Casablanca, the Combined Chiefs of Staff issued its first guiding directive to the Allied air commanders. According to the CCS, the primary objective of what became known as the Combined Bomber Offensive would “be the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic system, and the undermining of the morale of the German people to a point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened.”\(^5\) The dual goals of the strategic bombing offensive transformed the differing doctrines of the western Allies from a potential source of conflict into a source of virtue. Now Allied bombers would attack Germany around the clock, never providing German defenses and civilians with a respite from attack. Yet at the same time the disparate approaches of the RAF and USAAF threatened to produce “redundant and pointless destruction” as the two strategic air forces would rarely coordinate their efforts.\(^6\)

With the largest number of available heavy bombers in early 1943 – 515 in January – Bomber Command was the first to escalate its air campaign. Throughout the year Arthur Harris launched a series of “battles” against German cities with the goal, once again, of wrecking the morale of the civilian population. The Ruhr industrial region was the first target of Bomber Command’s wrath. From March to July 1943 the British launched 43 major attacks against the cities of the Ruhr totaling some 18,506 sorties. German cities suffered heavily under the weight of the British bombs; in two major raids Cologne received 2,200 tons of bombs, while Düsseldorf absorbed almost 4,000 tons in the same number of attacks.\(^7\) However, Bomber Command’s losses were slowly rising as the German night defense became ever more capable.

By the end of July, British losses in the so-called Battle of the Ruhr reached 872 bombers destroyed and 2,126 damaged – a loss rate of 4.7 percent.⁸

Then during the last week of July Bomber Command achieved perhaps its most morbid success of the entire war. In an operation codenamed “Gomorrah” by Harris, the British conducted a series of area raids from July 24 to August 3 against the northern city of Hamburg and the Americans added daylight attacks on the city’s shipyards. Over the course of the operation some 3,091 sorties were flown against the city, dropping an astounding total of 8,344 tons of bombs. The culmination of the operation, however, arrived on night of July 27/28, 1943. Nearly 800 British bombers attacked the built-up center of the German town with incendiaries and blockbuster bombs to knock down any walls that might inhibit the spread of fire. The heavy concentration of the bombing combined with unseasonably dry weather and heavy winds to produce the first manmade firestorm of the war. Winds raged up to 150 miles per hour and fanned a fire that reached nearly 1,500°F. The raid ultimately incinerated nearly eight square miles of the city and killed over 40,000 German civilians.

At Hamburg the British, in conjunction with particular environmental circumstances, had nearly perfected the entire weapon system that was strategic bombing. The weapon was “not just a single type of aircraft, but an entire suite of planes, armaments, and bombs.”⁹ British planners worked on the “science” of fireraising, including the right mixture of blockbusters and incendiaries to create as much destruction as possible, and Bomber Command became quite adept at quickly destroying the heavily populated centers of German cities. More importantly, Hamburg represented a change, at least in part, of the rationale for area bombing. No longer were civilian casualties a byproduct of attempts to destroy morale. Harris now sought victory by

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⁸ Levine, The Strategic Bombing of Germany, 53.
“destroying the people manning the forge” and not through a psychological shock but “through sustained attrition of their habitats and lives.” The line between civilian and military targets, already blurred by total war, became even harder to discern as Bomber Command increased the tempo of its area raids.

Buoyed by the success of the raids against Hamburg, Harris decided to launch what he hoped would be a decisive “Battle of Berlin.” From November 1943 to March 1944 nearly half of Bomber Command’s major raids – 16 of 35 – were launched against the German capital in an attempt to knock Germany out of the war. The British, however, could not replicate Hamburg in Berlin and by the end of the “battle” Bomber Command had lost 1,047 bombers in the raids against the German capital – a loss rate of 5.2%. The Luftwaffe’s night defenses were now inflicting almost unsustainable losses on the British heavy bombers. German air controllers learned to see through Bomber Command’s feints and night fighters now contained equipment to track British airborne radar. The technological edge possessed by the RAF at the start of 1943 was now nonexistent and the result was the near defeat of Bomber Command. The British bombers “had smashed much of Germany’s cities to rubble, and damaged the enemy war effort. But it had not even come close to wrecking the German economy or morale. Instead, the attempt to evade German defenses under cover of darkness ended in failure.”

While Bomber Command razed German cities at night, the U.S. Eighth Air Force finally began major raids over Germany during the summer of 1943. From November 1942 to March 1943 the Eighth sent out over 100 bombers on raids just twice and in February had only an average of 74 planes and crews ready for operations. By the summer the Americans had reached enough strength to launch their first deep-penetration raids into Germany. On August 17

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12 Ibid., 80.
376 B-17 Flying Fortresses lifted off from their bases in Britain to attack the ball-bearing plant at Schweinfurt and the Messerschmitt factory at Regensburg. Although considerable damage was inflicted at Regensburg, the strike force suffered such heavy losses – 60 bombers out of 376 lost in action plus many more injured – that the Eighth could not follow launch follow up raids. A second raid on Schweinfurt in October proved even costlier and brought American morale dangerously low. Its attempts at unescorted deep-penetration raids a failure, the Eighth Air Force would not venture far into Germany again without fighter escort. In addition, the near disasters of the 1943 provided another lesson: it appeared “that sometimes urban area raids could be more fruitful and a lot less costly than precision attacks.” Beginning in the fall of 1943 American bombers were directed to use radar to attack targets important to the Luftwaffe whenever weather made precision bombing impossible. While military targets remained the objective, American planners were, at the least, signaling less concern for civilian casualties by approving the use of less accurate radar bombing.

During the winter months, the Eighth Air Force continued to recuperate from its earlier failures and by February 1944 was again ready to launch raids deep into Germany. General Jimmy Doolittle, the new commander of the American strategic bombers, approved new tactics to take advantage of the new P-51 fighters arriving in Europe and the extended range of the P-47s and P-38s. Fighters would now sweep ahead of the bombers, attacking any German fighters they saw and strafing any airfields they came across. The Eighth implemented these new tactics during “Big Week” in February. American and British bombers dropped a combined 19,000 tons of bombs in one week, including 4,000 on aircraft plants. The real value of the week, however, was the destruction of German planes and pilots in the air. Forced to defend its production, the

13 Ibid., 101 & 106.
Luftwaffe was ravaged by the Allied fighters sweeping ahead of the bomber formations. As Michael Sherry observed, “now the bombing was a prod to engage the Luftwaffe, the bombers themselves bait to lure it into combat.”¹⁵ The new tactics, combined with continued attacks on German aircraft production, gave the Allies air superiority over Europe by May 1944. On the ground, Germany was now “helpless in the face of the force in the sky.”¹⁶

By late spring the Allied air forces were poised to take advantage of their newfound air superiority. Combined, the Americans and British possessed over 4,000 heavy bombers – 1,023 in Bomber Command and 4,085 divided between the Eighth Air Force and the Fifteenth Air Force in Italy.¹⁷ This bombing force capable of raining down 100,000 tons of bombs per month, however, was not immediately directed against Germany. Instead, the Allied bombers came under the direct control of General Dwight Eisenhower in preparation for the upcoming invasion of occupied France. A fierce debate raged within Allied headquarters over the proper use of the heavy bombers. American airmen under General Carl Spaatz insisted that German oil production should be the primary target; this would immobilize German armor and bring the German economy to a halt. Arthur Harris, as usual, preferred to continue the systematic destruction of German cities. Air Marshal Tedder and his analyst Solly Zuckerman, however, proposed a coordinated attack on transportation targets in France, Belgium, and part of western Germany to isolate northwestern France from German reinforcements. Spaatz adamantly opposed the Tedder/Zuckerman plan as a diversion of resources from a potentially decisive offensive against oil. Nevertheless, Eisenhower sided with his deputy and gave primacy to transportation targets; he did, however, leave room for Spaatz to launch raids against German oil at the same time.

As a result of the transportation plan, Allied bombers were largely diverted away from Germany in the weeks before and after the Normandy invasion. From June through August, just one-third of American bombs and one-sixth of British bombs fell on Germany itself and American raids were largely directed against oil and fuel production. The D-Day invasion and the original transportation plan, then, provided something of a respite for German civilians and cities. This relative calm would not last, however. Based on the success of the attacks against transportation targets in occupied Europe, particularly marshalling yards, Allied planners readied similar strikes against Germany. Additionally, the rapid retreat of the German armies in France brought Allied armies to the door of the Reich and meant that American and British bombers were now free to focus the entirety of their destructive power against Germany. The phase of apocalyptic bombing was about to arrive.

**Apocalyptic Bombing: September 1944 to Surrender**

Although Allied bombers, particularly from Bomber Command, had brought significant devastation to Germany already, the widest levels of destruction came from the fall of 1944 to surrender in May 1945. The rapid advance of American and British armies across France in the summer of 1944 left Allied airmen free to focus their efforts on Germany, both in support of ground forces and as part of an intensified strategic bombing campaign; Germany was now effectively the sole focus of Allied bombers and the destruction rained down from the skies testified to this new phase of the war. Indeed, of all the tons of bombs dropped on Germany itself during the war, an overwhelming majority, 72 percent, were visited upon the country after July 1, 1944. The astounding weight of bombs was made possible by overwhelming Allied air superiority, as thousands of bombers roamed the skies above Germany at will. By the end of the

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18 Levine, *The Strategic Bombing of Germany*, 152.
war Bomber Command and the American air forces had piled up unprecedented levels of rubble and helped bring life in Germany to a halt. American occupation officials would then be forced to grapple with the effects of total war.

The oil offensive of General Spaatz and the American Eight and Fifteenth air forces continued throughout the fall of 1944, but it was the rising importance of transportation targets that ensured widespread destruction. In July and August of 1944 an average of 2,400 tons of bombs were dropped on transportation in Germany.²⁰ Field Marshal Tedder played a key role in prioritizing German transportation. Tedder emphasized the destruction of marshalling yards, but also called for attacks on interior water transport and important rail viaducts. The bureaucratic skill of Tedder, combined with his good relationships with senior Allied commanders like Eisenhower, shepherded transportation up the priority target list.²¹ While Tedder worked to prioritize a German transportation plan, bad weather during the late fall ensured that American bombers would focus transport targets. Following well-established policy, U.S. bombers used radar to attack targets like marshalling yards on days when bad weather prohibited precision raids and during the fall there was plenty of bad weather. From October through December a staggering 80 percent of the Eighth Air Force’s bombing was conducted via radar.²² As a result, the tonnage dropped on German transportation skyrocketed. In October alone, nearly 35,000 tons of bombs were dropped on transportation targets, including 18,844 tons by the Eighth Air Force and 4,657 tons by the Fifteenth Air Force. From November 1944 through January 1945 an astounding 102,796 tons were dropped on the German transportation system, particularly

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²⁰ Mierzejewski, *Collapse of the German War Economy*, 86.
²¹ Ibid., 102.
marshalling yards.23 As will be discussed later, this mounting tonnage soon crippled the German railroad system and would bring economic life in Germany to a standstill.

Meanwhile, the British continued to pile up rubble in German cities. Arthur Harris, reluctant to abandon the systematic destruction of German urban areas, begrudgingly agreed to shift the aiming point of area raids to marshalling yards and other transportation targets. Regardless of the theoretical objective, Harris still hoped that area bombing would crush German morale. On October 13, 1944, Harris issued a directive for Operation Hurricane, a new campaign against the Ruhr. “In order to demonstrate to the enemy in Germany generally the overwhelming superiority of the Allied Air Forces in this theatre,” Harris explained, “the intention is to apply within the shortest practical period the maximum effort…against objectives in the densely populated Ruhr.”24 Harris’s directive launched the “Second Battle of the Ruhr,” another blitz against cities in Germany’s largest industrial region. During this major effort, the Ruhr was wrecked by 60,000 tons of bombs. Essen was attacked by 1,055 bombers on the night of October 23-24 and by another 771 on October 25. Meanwhile, Duisburg absorbed 9,000 tons of bombs in a twenty-four-hour period.25 Despite this overwhelming onslaught and the growing American attacks, however, the war would continue for several more months.

After the turn of the calendar the rain of bombs got even heavier and, significantly, American air commanders increasingly flirted with idea of area bombing. The sheer size of the Allied bomber fleets brought an unprecedented level of destructive power into the skies above Germany. By early 1945 the Allies possessed a total of 10,000 available aircraft. Then on February 22 a total of 9,788 planes sortied against German targets; one day later another 8,400 planes sought targets in Germany. As German historian Jörg Friedrich observed, “Nothing in war

23 Ibid., 167; Mierzejewski, Collapse of the German War Economy, 103 & 127.
24 Quoted in Friedrich, The Fire, 209.
history up to that time was even remotely comparable to the annihilating capacity of those hordes in the sky.”

The overwhelming power of these air fleets drove some American commanders to search for ways to end the long war with an aerial Todestoss (deathblow) in Germany, as envisioned in their prewar plans. The urge to end the war with a single strike against German morale became nearly irresistible. After all, the United States now had a major army in the field, one which had suffered significant casualties during the Battle of the Bulge. In many ways, “Protection of that army was an ethics in itself. It demanded that the air forces break the civilian will to resist in the hinterlands of a stormed land front. That saved bloodshed; it was humane.”

The result was a series of raids that looked much like area attacks, even though the proclaimed targets, at least for the Americans, were considered legitimate military targets. The month of February, in particular, saw three different raids that brought American air forces dangerously close to the British policy of area bombing in the hope of ending the war by breaking German morale. In Operation Thunderclap, a major attack against Berlin on February 3, Allied air planners hoped that one large attack on the German capital might finally break civilian morale. While British planes attacked at night, American bombers sortied during the day. General Doolittle, commander of the Eighth Air Force, did not adopt a true policy of area bombing, however; American crews still aimed at transportation targets in the city, not just the city center. Then from February 13 through 15 the Allied air forces launched one of the most infamous campaigns of the air war against Dresden. British bombers struck the previously unbombed city center at night, causing a major firestorm. American planes then attacked

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27 Ibid., 128.
transportation targets during the day, but the smoke from the fires made bombing horribly inaccurate. Killing some 25,000 German civilians, the Dresden raids were the product of what one historian has called “casual destructiveness.”

The final major offensive of February aimed, at least indirectly, at German morale was Operation Clarion. Spread over February 22 and 23, these raids attacked transportation targets throughout Germany, including in small, un-bombed towns that were quickly leveled by one or two visits from Allied bombers. American planes attacked marshalling yards, stations, bridges, and other transportation targets in small towns all over Germany. In addition to paralyzing German transport, Clarion was the last grasp for an aerial deathblow by some American commanders. It was hoped that bringing the air war to towns that had been previously spared would finally crack German morale. “With so much firepower available,” historian Ronald Schaffer observed, “it was easier to believe that morale bombing had failed earlier simply because it had not been conducted on a large enough and sufficiently widespread scale.”

Over the last four months of the war the Allied air forces unleashed overwhelming destructive power against Germany. From January to surrender on May 7, a total of 370,000 tons of bombs fell from Allied planes. In addition, bombing killed at least 130,000 people – an average of 1,023 per day – over the last four months of the war, compared to 127 a day during 1944. During the final phase of Allied bombing, from September 1944 to May 1945, Allied aircraft, along with the effects of ground combat, turned an already damaged Germany into a wasteland of devastation. Under Arthur Harris the British unabashedly continued area bombing, even if the aiming point was different. The Americans, meanwhile, flirted with the distinction between precision and terror attacks. The search for an aerial deathblow combined with radar

30 Schaffer, Wings of Judgment, 103.
31 Friedrich, The Fire, 144.
bombing and the growing attacks on transportation ensured that German civilian casualties would rise.

For the Germans themselves, the last months of the war were characterized by extreme violence, shock, and trauma. The overwhelming onslaught of Allied bombers played a key role in this trauma, but it also encompassed the experience of ground combat. More than one-quarter of German military losses in the Second World War came in 1945, the vast majority of which occurred as a result of fighting on German soil. Nazi leaders hoped for one final struggle that would either win the war or serve as a rallying cry for future generations. Hitler, therefore, committed the Wehrmacht to combat that served little practical purpose. As historian Richard Bessel observed, “The essence of Nazism had overwhelmed the ethos of the German military. The Wehrmacht no longer existed to win military victories but instead to sacrifice its soldiers in an apocalyptic final struggle.”

Ground combat ultimately exacerbated the urban destruction unleashed by the fleets of Allied planes. Obsessed with the final struggle, Hitler declared numerous cities “fortresses” to be held at all costs. In Breslau, for example, 40,000 to 50,000 poorly-trained Germans, in an exercise of futility, were ordered to defend the city against thirteen Soviet divisions. The resulting fighting destroyed two-thirds of the city, leveled 20,000 houses, and killed 16,000 Germans. Such stubbornness produced the most violent months of the war, an extreme violence that almost all occurred within Germany itself. Coupled with the increasing destructiveness of Allied bombing, the final months of the war devastated Germany and turned its cities into giant piles of rubble.

**Germany under the Bombs: The Devastation of Strategic Bombing**

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33 Ibid., 38 & 41.
The devastation unleashed by total war, and bombing in particular, had a number of important effects on Germany, all of which would play a key role in the American occupation. Bombing, obviously, exerted a considerable influence on the German population. Although civilian morale did not collapse under the rain of bombs as interwar theorists of strategic bombing had expected, the trauma of living under near constant bombardment and among the ruins of Germany produced an apathetic German populace concerned largely with survival, which exacerbated the difficulties in restarting political life in Germany after the war. In addition, the destruction of the German transportation system, in particular the national railroad system known as the Reichsbahn, led to the collapse of the German economy in early 1945 and would inhibit recovery for several years. Finally, the devastation of German cities posed their own difficulties. The sheer volume of rubble made the cities scenes of vast desolation and the loss of housing made it difficult to provide for the population of Germany, which rose due to the influx of ethnic Germans expelled from Eastern Europe. For the Americans charged with overseeing the occupation, the devastation visited upon Germany in the name of expediency would make their already difficult tasks harder and would try the ability of German civilians to persevere amidst the wreckage of Nazi Germany.

Interwar military theorists like Giulio Douhet and, to a lesser extent, Billy Mitchell had expected civilian resistance to collapse in the face of aerial assault. After all, they reasoned, who could stand up to the sheer terror of bombardment from the air? However, no widespread collapse of civilian morale occurred among any civilian populace exposed to prolonged bombing. Indeed, the ability of the Germans to withstand the bombing produced a sort of awe; an awe at a “heroism that personified the basic strength of the human personality under the severest
form of stress.” German historian Jörg Friedrich explained the survival of the German populace to the distinction between “mood” and “attitude.” According to Friedrich, “The mood in the air war was necessarily miserable.” However, German attitude “proved itself in the throes of depression. There was a silent capacity to persevere, an obduracy of the Germans as of future targets of air war. Civilians are stubborn.” As a result, German civilians struggled onward despite the near-constant threat of death from the air. By the end of the war many Germans were apathetic and concerned largely with survival, but they were still alive; they had survived the aerial apocalypse.

German civilians had initially greeted the onset of war in 1939 somewhat reluctantly, but the triumphs of 1940 and 1941 produced a sense of optimism that the war would end soon. Early on, while relatively unexposed to the horrors of strategic bombing, many Germans hoped to take the bombing as well as Londoners and other British civilians. And as bombing slowly ramped up in 1942 many civilians expressed dissatisfaction with the government for providing inadequate shelters and warning. The optimism of 1940 and 1941, however, was broken during the early months of 1943. News from Russia of the defeat at Stalingrad and the rising tempo of Allied bombing produced a growing sense of despair as the chances of victory seemingly slipped away. In Hamburg, soon to experience the terror of a firestorm, Mathilde Wolff-Mönckeborg observed, “No one beds down for sleep these days. We sit stiffly on hard chairs, ready to jump up at a moment’s notice, and superficial conversation barely hides the inner tension.” Despite the rising despair, some Germans observed the resiliency that would characterize the final years of

34 Beck, Under the Bombs, 5.
36 Quoted in Beck, Under the Bombs, 47.
the war. “One endures everything,” Horst Lang confided in his diary. “One would even endure
the end of the world calmly, I believe, so weary is one already.”37

Even with the Luftwaffe’s temporary victory in the fall of 1943 the mood among the
German populace continued to decline. For many the most pressing task was simply the quest for
survival, Überleben. Near constant anxiety from expecting the next air raid meant that few
people got a full night’s sleep. For these civilians “the war was not fought, it was absorbed.”38 In
many ways bombing drew communities together as they strove against the adversity, often
ignoring politics. After all, as Christabel Bielenberg of Berlin noted, “The bombs fell
indiscriminately on Nazis and anti-Nazis…”39 The quest for survival also produced a powerful
desire for some sense of normalcy. As a result, Germans continued to go about their daily tasks,
including work at war factories or standing in line for the slowly decreasing food rations. In
addition, many Germans refused to leave their homes, even when severely damaged, and worked
to repair them as best as possible. Ardent anti-Nazi activist Ruth Andreas-Friedrich described the
urge to repair:

We repair because we must repair. Because we couldn’t live another day longer if one
forbade us the repairing. If they destroy our living room, we move into the kitchen. If
they knock the kitchen apart, we move over into the hallway. If only we can stay “at
home.” The smallest corner of “at home” is better than any palace in some strange
place…40

Morale was fading under the onslaught of bombs, but it was not cracking. A morale
report from Munich in March 1944 observed, “Morale has reached a low point never before
observed since the beginning of the war…The air terror proves, as hitherto, to be the crux in the

37 Quoted in Beck, Under the Bombs, 63.
39 Quoted in Beck, Under the Bombs, 87.
40 Ibid., 87-88.
molding of morale…” Nevertheless, living under the bombs became something of a routine for civilians. Although each raid carried the very real prospect of death, the tasks of taking shelter and then repairing damage became familiar to the residents of major German cities. Indeed, another report from Berlin noted that “the majority of our people are also firmly of the opinion that we must endure all difficulties and ‘set one’s teeth.’ One does it because one must and because there is nothing else to do.” At this point Allied bombing was a matter of fact and surviving the raids was a way of life.

The rising fury of the Allied bombers during the last six months of the conflict, coupled with the horrors of ground warfare, exacerbated the quest for survival. German society experienced a “total dislocation of civilian life” by the end of the war. Twenty-six percent of all homes in Germany had been destroyed or damaged by the bombing. Nearly seven million Germans lost transportation to work, eighteen million lost their water service, and over twenty million lost their electricity during the war. Additionally, almost five million Germans had been evacuated from cities and now found themselves in unfamiliar locales. Due to the immense dislocation, many Germans became concerned solely with surviving the closing months of the war. “Everyone is so overcome by his own personal worries that he no longer cares about the fate of Germany,” observed Lili Hahn. “It is far more important that one gets something to eat, that shoes will last a little longer, and above all whether there will be an air raid. Will we have a roof over our heads tomorrow, or even be alive?” In Munich German officials reported, “The raids caused such physical destruction that for the majority the whole of their energy was

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42 Quoted in Beck, *Under the Bombs*, 110.
44 Quoted in Beck, *Under the Bombs*, 168.
necessarily taken up in coping with elementary physical problems of existence.” Survival was the ultimate goal and marked a victory of sorts over the horrors of war; those who survived were now part of a “lucky elite.” Even the end of the war produced little reaction, so numb and full of “inner despair” were German civilians. As one American noted, “They were defeated, crushed, and in a sense relieved that the nightmare was over.”

Beyond elevating the quest for survival, the bombing also strained the foundations of German society. Bombed civilians often resented the un-bombed. In January 1943, the security police of Krefeld reported that local civilians happily received news that Allied planes bombed Berlin. “Without exception” the civilians of Krefeld expressed “great satisfaction that the loud-mouthed Berliner have at last got it…” Berliners had shown little understanding for the plight of civilians in the Rhineland, the report continued, and Krefelders welcomed the fact that the capital’s residents got “a taste of how we in the west are feeling.” Additionally, Allied bombing facilitated an explosion of crime, particularly looting and black market activity. Desperate to survive in the aftermath of air raids, large swaths of the population often turned to petty theft to secure the basic necessities of life. The black market also exploded and undermined social cohesion as “it brought a further cleavage between rich and poor, Party and non-Party member, those who could buy and those who could not.” Ultimately, many Germans became increasingly individualistic and unconcerned about the rest of society. Under the bombs survival of one’s self and family acquired paramount importance. As a result, the “hardship and disorder”

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45 Quoted in United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Effects of Strategic Bombing, 31.
46 Quoted in Beck, Under the Bombs, 180.
47 Saul K. Padover, Experiment in Germany: The Story of an American Intelligence Officer (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1946), 400.
48 Quoted in United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Effects of Strategic Bombing, 18.
49 Ibid., 91.
of the war “undermined social solidarity and led people to focus almost exclusively on their won individual, personal horizons.”

The ultimate product of the bombing campaign, and the final months of ground combat, was a psychologically distraught and apathetic German populace. No widespread collapse of morale had occurred. Throughout the bombing, Germans continued to work and go about the daily tasks of life in the search for some semblance of normalcy; the familiar provided a way to cope with the horrors of total war. Civilians did not even have to be directly bombed to feel the impact of the raids. In the Mainfranken region of Bavaria some 46,000 evacuees damaged morale by spreading stories of their experiences and insisting that Allied bombers “will gradually…smash the cities of central Germany.” While morale did not collapse and the civilian population trudged through to the end of the war, most Germans experienced profound fatalism and apathy. For some “emotional paralysis” helped ward of the dangers of the air war.

In addition to the destruction, the passage of large fleets of Allied bombers, unchecked by the German Luftwaffe during the final months of the war, helped demonstrate the overwhelming superiority of the Allied war machine, further exacerbating the sense of hopelessness experienced by German civilians. Yet the German population muddled through to the end of the war. The price of this resiliency, reaped by American occupation officials, was a largely apathetic population. The war attitude carried over into the postwar years; many Germans remained largely concerned with survival and would show little interest in politics or the reorientation of German culture.

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50 Bessel, *Germany 1945*, 337.
51 Quoted in United States Strategic Bombing Survey, *Effects of Strategic Bombing*, 47.
This apathy would be exacerbated by the destruction of the German transportation network and the subsequent collapse of the domestic economy. The prewar and wartime German economy was fundamentally based on a geographic division of labor centered on two great goal producing regions – the Ruhr and Upper Silesia – and was dependent on internal transportation, particularly the *Reichsbahn*, the German national railway. Both the Ruhr and Upper Silesia developed economic satellites that depended on the two regions for coal and basic industrial goods and in return provided both finished manufactured goods and food. For example, the Ruhr’s tributary regions stretched over western and southern Germany, including Bavaria.\(^\text{54}\) This economic division of labor was dependent on two interrelated factors: coal and transportation. Some 90 percent of German energy came from coal; without this vital source of energy German industry could not function. The distribution of coal subsequently relied on adequate transportation, for without transport, particularly on the *Reichsbahn*, the German economy would grind to a halt for lack of coal. The “physical embodiment of the economic division of labor” was the marshalling yard. It was in the marshalling yards where freight “from a host of origins was directed to equally numerous destinations” through a complicated and finally tuned system of sorting that was highly susceptible to disruption.\(^\text{55}\) The rising tempo of aerial attack by the Allies would upset this precarious system and help produce the economic collapse of Germany.

Until the late spring and early summer of 1944 German transportation had received relatively light bombing and this led to few economic disruptions. The availability of transport helped Albert Speer rationalize and increase German war production throughout 1942 and 1943 despite the impact of Allied air attacks. However, in the weeks and months after the landings at Normandy German transportation started to absorb ever larger loads of bombs as the Allied

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\(^{54}\) Mierzejewski, *Collapse of the German War Economy*, 22 & 29.

\(^{55}\) Ibid., 35-36 & 47.
bombers followed the American and British armies across France. In July and August an average of 2,400 tons of bombs were dropped on transportation targets in Germany, particularly on marshalling yards. A race began between the bombers’ ability to inflict damage on the railroads and the Germans’ ability to repair the Reichsbahn. The result of the rising tempo of Allied attacks on transport was the beginning of the coal crisis that would later bring the German economy to a standstill. During the summer coal car placings in the Ruhr dropped significantly as marshalling yards struggled to work around the Allied air attacks. As the ability to move coal out of the Ruhr decreased, the coal stocks in Germany’s largest industrial region began to pile up in the mines; hard coal stocks rose 462 percent from the previous year while brown coal increased by 400 percent.\footnote{Ibid., 88-89 & 92-93.} The bombing now interfered with the distribution of coal and undermined the economic division of labor. Without coal shipments, German factories were forced to rely on existing stocks to avoid a precipitous drop in production. This strategy, however, could only work for a limited period before existing stocks were exhausted and production ground to a halt.

It was Tedder’s full-scale transportation offensive in late 1944 and early 1945 that exacerbated the early signs of crisis and precipitated the economic collapse of Germany. Beginning in October Allied air forces dropped ever larger tons of bombs on transportation targets throughout Germany, particularly the marshalling yards which controlled traffic in and out of the Ruhr. The key coal gateways of Geisecke, Soest, Vorhalle, Hamm, and Münster could barely operate under the strain of bombardment. Disruption of the marshalling yards produced a severe backlog of trains and inhibited the loading of freight cars. By the end of October, the Reichsbahn experienced a backlog of 1,155 trains per day and the situation only grew worse as
the war continued.\textsuperscript{57} Meanwhile, fewer and fewer cars were actually loaded for transport. The week ending on August 19, 1944, saw 899,901 car loadings throughout Germany and by the end of October that number had declined to 703,580. The seven days preceding December 23 witnessed 547,309 loadings, just 60.8 percent of the August 19 figure. And by the beginning of March 1945 German rail traffic had nearly reached a standstill; the week ending on March 3 saw 214,001 freight cars loaded for transport, a mere 23.8 percent of the previous August.\textsuperscript{58} As a result, the Ruhr was increasingly isolated from the rest of Germany, including its economic tributaries. Weapons production suffered, but more importantly the region’s pivotal role as energy provider for western and southern Germany was rapidly waning. The incessant bombing “was prying out of place the lynchpin of the Reich economy.”\textsuperscript{59}

Due to the collapse of German transportation, particularly the \textit{Reichsbahn}, the early signs of a coal shortage exploded into a major energy crisis. From October 14 to December 31, 550,000 tons of coal passed through Cologne, a mere fourteen percent of normal traffic. To make matters worse, coal deliveries in December, a month when demand climbed due to the onset of winter, dropped by 52 percent when compared to September.\textsuperscript{60} Meanwhile, production of coal in the Ruhr declined from 10,417,000 tons in August 1944 to just 4,778,000 tons in the following February.\textsuperscript{61} The mines remained largely intact; however, the inability to move existing stocks meant that coal continued to pile up in the Ruhr. With few places to store the excess, coal mines cut back on production which was further damaged by the indirect effects of bombing, such as worker absenteeism and work hours lost in repair efforts. As a result, the tributaries dependent on Ruhr coal faced economic catastrophe. Bavaria, far away from the Ruhr, saw its coal

\textsuperscript{57} Ibid., 118.  
\textsuperscript{58} United States Strategic Bombing Survey, \textit{Over-all Report}, 61.  
\textsuperscript{59} Mierzejewski, \textit{Collapse of the German War Economy}, 114-115.  
\textsuperscript{60} Ibid., 130 & 138.  
\textsuperscript{61} United States Strategic Bombing Survey, \textit{Over-all Report}, 64.
deliveries drop by 50 percent in November 1944. In December a total of 590,000 tons of coal
was required throughout southern Germany for basic manufacturing, energy, and food
processing; actual deliveries, however, amounted to less than 190,000 tons and coal stocks
dipped to thirteen days. \(^{62}\) The critical point had been reached by the end of December 1944 and
early in January 1945; cities and factories were running out of coal, the lifeblood of the German
economy. \(^{63}\) February coal deliveries totaled just 25 percent of normal and reached a meager four
percent by the end of March. German railroads ground to a halt. In the last days of March car
placings for the Reichsbahn amounted to a meager eleven percent of normal traffic. \(^{64}\)

The devastation of German transportation and the mounting coal crisis produced
economic paralysis throughout Germany. Without transport and coal, postwar American
observers noted, “orderly production was no longer possible.” \(^{65}\) As a result, all aspects of the
German economy collapsed. Without coal German families shivered in their homes, if their
homes had escaped destruction during the war. Devastated transportation networks meant that
those factories which escaped destruction from the air could no longer operate for lack of energy
and raw materials. Shuttered factories meant loss of jobs or wages for thousands of Germans and
fewer goods to purchase for those who did manage to work. Large cities lacked basic public
utilities, including running water and consistent electricity. To obtain water many urban residents
returned to the old practice of acquiring water from a communal water sources. Civilians now
got their water from public street pumps and carried it home in pails, just as their ancestors had

\(^{62}\) Ibid., 63-64.
\(^{63}\) Mierzejewski, Collapse of the German War Economy, 159.
\(^{64}\) United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Over-all Report, 38; Mierzejewski, Collapse of the German War
Economy, 172.
\(^{65}\) United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Over-all Report, 64.
done for centuries.\textsuperscript{66} Hans Speier, a German émigré now working for the American government, described the scene in Munich:

Some shops are open, and people gather outside to look through the windows. Usually, these is only cheap stuff on display: a few color prints, bookmarks, little dolls made of rags – you can buy them if you bring some rags and thread…You can also buy postage stamps, but hardly anything else.\textsuperscript{67}

In Bremen, Theodor Spitta, a 72-year old soon to be appointed mayor by the Americans, similarly observed, “One does not spend any money because there is nothing to buy.”\textsuperscript{68}

The lack of transportation also meant that official rations steadily declined. In 1942, the average monthly ration included 8,000 grams of bread (half a loaf per day), 1,200 grams of meat (approximately one-tenth of a pound per day), 600 grams of other foodstuffs, and 900 grams of sugar (roughly two pounds).\textsuperscript{69} Nazi officials continued to cut rations as the war turned against Germany. As the aerial offensive against transportation escalated Albert Speer gave shipping priority to coal and war production, relegating food shipments to a lower rung. Coupled with a shortage of food, the lack of transportation whittled away at the average ration although many Germans would look back “back to those last few days of the war found things at least adequate in comparison with the really fundamental shortages that came during the occupation period.”\textsuperscript{70}

The sting of total war continued into the postwar years as American occupation officials struggled to relieve a long food crisis made worse by the devastation unleashed by their bombers during the last months of the war.

The economic collapse of Germany also produced a thriving black market, another problem that would plague occupation officials in the years after 1945. The black market

\textsuperscript{66} Padover, \textit{Experiment in Germany}, 367-368.
\textsuperscript{68} Quoted in Bessel, \textit{Germany 1945}, 340-341.
\textsuperscript{69} Beck, \textit{Under the Bombs}, 12.
\textsuperscript{70} Ibid., 185.
emerged as an important institution in wartime Germany soon after the start of the war. Many Germans tried to make a profit when official prices were strictly controlled and others sought out luxuries unavailable in the normal economy. Even before the collapse of the economy the black market offered more lucrative opportunities than official channels. In November 1943, for example, a single goose could sell for 150 marks or more. The collapse of late 1944 and early 1945 only made the black market more appealing. Even before the arrival of occupying forces tobacco and cigarettes served as unofficial currency. With few possessions left, everyone “sought to get some small advantage out of the few material possessions remaining after all the air raids.” The bombing even facilitated the growth of the black market. Government payments to bombing victims produced a glut of Reichmarks that drove up prices. In addition, the destruction of transportation networks turned rural Germany, especially Bavaria, into epicenters of the black market. Unable to transport their products to market, farmers collected large amounts of food. Searching for valuable food items like eggs, vegetables, and meat, city dwellers then traveled to the countryside to barter with the farmers. The black market would not disappear easily as the shortages experienced during the war became worse during the early years of the occupation.

Meanwhile, the devastation of German urban areas added to the problems of an apathetic populace and a collapsed economy. By the end of the war German cities were vast scenes of destruction, as rubble and burned out buildings became their defining physical characteristics. Allied bombers, particularly British area bombers, leveled large swaths of the centralized built-up areas and housing, leaving many cities as “suburban rings surrounding destroyed cores.”

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73 United States Strategic Bombing Survey, *Effects of Strategic Bombing*, 90.
city after city, scenes of apocalyptic destruction followed visits by Allied bombers. Ruins and rubble became the defining characteristic of many German cities. The jagged ruins of bombed out cathedrals, factories, and apartment buildings dominated the skylines of urban centers throughout Germany, from major cities like Berlin, Hamburg, and Munich to smaller cities such as Augsburg, Krefeld, and Würzburg. In Magdeburg piles of rubble produced “a panorama of gutted buildings, broad streets blocked by twisted cables and cascaded masonry.”

Wherever one traveled in German cities, the scars of war were unavoidable. Civilians, often dressed in the remnants of clothes, picked through the ruins in search of fuel for fires or materials to repair their damaged residences. Without adequate transportation to remove it, rubble piled up in the cities and became de facto landmarks. As Hans Werner Richter observed of Munich, “The sign of our times is the ruins. They surround our lives…They are our reality.”

The urban devastation was so complete that it is difficult to fully capture. Statistics can start to capture the essence of the destruction, particularly the obliteration of German housing. By the end of the war the bombing campaign had destroyed 3.6 million dwellings in 61 German cities with pre-war populations over 100,000, around 20 percent of Germany’s total housing. In the larger cities, the destruction of housing was even greater. The 49 largest cities in Germany lost 2,164,800 dwellings out of a total of 5,554,500, or some 39 percent of available living space. In Hamburg, for example, 79.5 percent of the city’s housing stock was damaged, including some 49 percent totally destroyed, by the end of hostilities in May 1945. Beyond the devastation of urban housing, the major built-up areas of cities, so important for social, economic, and political life, we also progressively annihilated as major cities absorbed dozens of

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75 Padover, *Experiment in Germany*, 368.
76 Quoted in Diefendorf, *In the Wake of War*, 13.
air raids. In cities with a population over 100,000 in 1939 an average of 50 percent of their built-up areas were destroyed, including an astounding 89 percent in Würzburg, 83 percent of Remscheid, and 75 percent of Hamburg. Stuttgart, the victim of 53 separate raids, saw 68 percent of its city center destroyed by the end of the war. The destruction of Aachen by the British in April 1944 demonstrated the fury unleashed against German cities, particularly in the last year of the war. On April 12, British bombers rained down over 4,000 high explosive bombs and nearly 43,000 incendiaries on the city near Germany’s western border. Sixty-one percent of Aachen’s buildings were leveled in a single raid and six bomb craters for every 1,000 square feet testified to the devastating nature of aerial bombardment.\(^79\)

The cities of Bavaria, relatively removed from the great industrial regions of the Ruhr and the German capital, also experienced unprecedented levels of devastation. The Allied aerial armadas dropped 28,300 tons of bombs on Munich and 22,000 tons on Nürnberg. Smaller industrial towns like Regensburg and Schweinfurt absorbed multiple air raids, as well. Even the small city of Kempten in southwestern Bavaria received 500 tons of bombs of Allied bombers over the course of the war.\(^80\) Augsburg, headquarters of Messerschmitt, experienced nineteen total raids from Allied bombers. By the end of the war 5,090 buildings were totally destroyed or heavily damaged in the small city, out of a total of 16,700. Augsburg’s housing also took a major hit, with 16,700 total dwelling units – houses, apartments, etc. – destroyed or heavily damaged out of a total of 52,550. All told, bombing destroyed and severely damaged approximately 31 percent of the city’s buildings, causing 60,000 Bavarians to lose their homes.\(^81\) While the destruction was not as apocalyptic as in the Ruhr or Berlin, Bavarian urban areas were scenes of

\(^{79}\) Diefendorf, *In the Wake of War*, 11; Friedrich, *The Fire*, 293 & 246.
devastation. Like other German cities, ruins and rubble became the defining characteristic of Munich, Nürnberg, and other Bavarian cities. Hans Speier observed the ubiquitous rubble of Munich. “At present,” he wrote, “there is more rubble – though not destruction – in Munich than in Berlin. The Berliners have made notable progress in cleaning up. Munich looks less orderly, if that term can be applied to the German mess.” Rubble remained a defining feature of the Bavarian capital well into 1946. The program for an Army-sponsored Eastern mass in April 1946 depicted major damage to the Frauenkirche (Church of Our Lady) in Munich. Almost twelve months after the end of the war, the physical devastation of Munich landmarks was still one of the defining features of the city, so much so that it was reproduced on the front of an Easter program.

The destruction from the war was so widespread that its traces were found outside of the cities as well. Smaller towns and rural areas had escaped much of the bombing until the last few months of the war, but still bore the scars of combat. Smaller German towns, home to perhaps a few small factories or minor marshalling yard, found themselves in the crosshairs as Allied bomber commanders searched after more targets for their expanding fleets of heavy bombers. Friedrichshafen, population 28,000, was home to a few minor factories producing parts for airplanes, tanks, and V-2 rockets. These military targets brought the fury of the air war upon the previously unscarred town on April 27, 1944. In just one raid half of the town was leveled, leaving behind 15.3 cubic meters of rubble for each resident. Even the village of Linnich, home to just 427 houses, received a visit from Allied bombers on October 8, 1944, just as the transportation offensive in Germany was moving into high gear. The village absorbed 120 bombs

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83 Easter mass program, 21 April 46, Personal Papers of William J. Moran.
84 Beck, Under the Bombs, 111.
which destroyed 40 houses, heavily damaged an additional 90, and left 180 more with some sort of damage. Afterwards the village “presented the same rubble-filled picture as the big cities.”

Additionally, roving Allied fighter-bombers attacked German transportation targets wherever they were found. As a result, bombed-out bridges, wrecked trains, and burned-out military equipment dotted the countryside. Walter Krause, a military government sergeant, described the destruction he saw traveling throughout Bavaria:

I looked at the desolation and the ruin that had been created. Whole trains, the engines, the coaches, the boxcars, the equipment – all was tumbled about together like playthings of some unruly and destructive child, who, after having given vent to his emotions by annihilation, had heaped insult on the havoc he had created by shoveling stone, gravel, and debris on top of it all.

Cities and towns were now centers of unprecedented devastation, the destruction of the air war made worse by the horror of ground combat. The amount of rubble often beggared imagination. Thirty-nine cities possessed over one million cubic meters of rubble, including 55 million in Berlin, 24 million in Cologne, and nearly 12 million in Frankfurt. Even less urbanized Bavaria contained mountains of rubble. Nuremberg contained 10.7 million cubic meters of rubble, an average of 23.5 cubic meters per resident. Düsseldorf provides yet another stark example of the devastation unleashed by total war. All told, the Allies dropped 18,000 tons of bombs on the city, which was also subjected to seven weeks of artillery fire. The war turned the city’s 120-million-cubic-yard volume of buildings into approximately 40 million cubic yards of rubble. Just four percent of the city’s public buildings and seven percent of commercial and residential buildings remained undamaged at the end of the war.

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85 Ibid., 153.
For individuals writing seventy years later it is hard to adequately visualize the amount of rubble clogging German cities and to comprehend the devastation one must employ extreme measures. If the Cologne’s rubble, for example, was placed in a field 100 yards long and 40 yards wide, the pile would reach 4.48 miles into the sky. Spread over one square mile the same rubble would form a pile thirty feet high. Even more astounding, Cologne’s rubble could build a wall ten yards high and two yards thick approximately 895 miles in length. Contemporary Germans also employed such measures to try to comprehend the vastness of the destruction. In Hamburg, it was estimated that if the city’s rubble was loaded into normal freight cars the train would reach around the earth. Bavarian officials in Munich similarly noted that their five million cubic meters of rubble was twice the amount of material contained in the Great Pyramid.89

The destruction of German cities ultimately exacerbated many of the problems facing American occupation officials. Loss of housing meant that there were not enough places to house the Germans currently living in the American zone, let alone the steady stream of ethnic Germans arriving due to expulsions in Eastern Europe. Additionally, destruction of transportation both within and between cities made the distribution of food and coal particularly problematic, exacerbating the already severe shortages. Many German civilians also remained rather apathetic and struggled to come to grips with the devastation of their cities and homes. In 1947 Hans Werner Richter said of the ruins, “They are the outer symbol of the inner insecurity of the people of our age. The ruins live in us as we in them.”90 Similarly, Joachim Günther of Hannover noted, “Ruins stand next to ruins and summer-clad people pilgrim among them as though they no longer took notice of them any more… For the destructions themselves there is

89 Diefendorf, In the Wake of War, 15.
90 Quoted in Diefendorf, In the Wake of War, 13.
The extreme devastation of German cities – the ruins and the rubble – starkly symbolized the major challenges facing American occupation officials as they entered Germany, and Bavaria, in 1945. Devastated by years of aerial bombardment and then often fought over, German cities remained cities in name only. Lacking basic utilities, sufficient food, and adequate housing, cities brought unprecedented challenges to occupation officials. Economic life was nonexistent. Bavarians lived in whatever could pass for homes, dwellings often missing windows or sporting large holes in the roof. Working amidst piles of rubble and the gaping ruins twentieth century metropolises, military government officers saw first-hand the plight of the Germans who still eked out a life in the ruins of their society. Surrounded by the effects of total war, many MGOS experienced profound sympathy for the plight of Bavarian civilians, increasingly saw them as victims, and worked for their benefit.

Creation of American Policy

The greatest obstacle for American MGOS, however, was the general attitude of American policy towards Germany during the first year and a half of the occupation. By the time the occupation started, the belief that Germany should be subjected to a harsh peace prevailed among key segments of the American administration and, significantly, among the American public. War Department policymakers crafted potential escape hatches from U.S. policy, but the overall tone remained one of a harsh, vindictive peace towards Germany. In postwar Germany, such a peace threatened to send the German populace hurtling towards catastrophe.

For much of the war President Franklin Roosevelt was not interested in early planning for the postwar occupation. Instead, the president obsessed with winning the war first. Roosevelt

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91 Quoted in Beck, *Under the Bombs*, 133.
expressed his disdain for postwar planning to Secretary of State Cordell Hull. “I dislike making detailed plans for a country which we do not yet occupy,” he wrote. “Much of this is dependent on what we and the Allies find when we get into Germany – and we are not there yet.” Despite Roosevelt’s lack of interest, however, occupation planning occurred, although much of it was highly fragmented and characterized by sharp divisions between administration conservatives and liberals. The earliest planning for the postwar occupation occurred within the Army and the War Department. During the interwar era the Army, drawing on its experiences in the Rhineland occupation after 1918, studied military government. In Field Manual 27-5 the Army set forth the essential conditions for military government, namely the primacy of wartime objectives over longer-term “political” ones, the predominance of military necessity, and the total authority of the commanding officer. Additionally, the manual called for the early return of power to local governmental authorities. To train military government officers the War Department established the School of Military Government at the University of Virginia and then created the Civil Affairs Division to defend military viewpoints in occupation planning. Throughout its postwar planning, the Army was relentlessly focused on military objectives in any occupation, a process that produced “limited, backward focused” plans that were “often unhelpful to the military governors who would be responsible for executing postwar governance.” Meanwhile, the State Department also conducted its own postwar planning, much of it based on the assumption that the German economy was vital to the recovery of Europe.

The plans of the Army and the State Department, despite their limits, attracted the opposition of administration liberals, most notably Secretary of Treasury Henry Morgenthau.

During a visit to London in 1944 Morgenthau acquired a copy of SHAEF’s *Handbook for Military Government*. The *Handbook* foresaw many of the postwar problems that would plague Germany and emphasized pragmatism in military government. For example, while it acknowledged that Nazi influence should be removed from the German administration, the Army authors emphasized that “the first concern of M.G. will be to see that the machine works efficiently” and “it may not be possible to eliminate every Nazi from every position of responsibility at the very outset.” Similarly, the *Handbook* argued that the MGO’s “main and immediate task” was “to get things running, to pick up the pieces, to restore as quickly as possible the efficient functioning of German civil government in the area for which you are responsible.”

Upset by the apparent ease with which the Army was preparing to treat Germany, Morgenthau shared the *Handbook* with Roosevelt. Angered at not being consulted on postwar planning, the president complained to Secretary of War Henry Stimson, “This so-called Handbook is pretty bad… [and gave] the impression that Germany is to be restored just as much as the Netherlands or Belgium.”

Buoyed by Roosevelt’s displeasure, Morgenthau and the administration’s liberals now jumped into the fray of postwar planning. For the liberals, the most important goals of the occupation should be the obliteration of fascism and German militarism. Morgenthau, therefore, proposed major deindustrialization of Germany, particularly the Ruhr Valley. The Treasury Secretary’s arguments derived from the belief of inherent German aggression. Unless the country was deindustrialized, Morgenthau believed, it was likely to rearm and start a third world war. Morgenthau’s proposals gained significant support from Roosevelt, who also “harbored a private

94 Quoted in Backer, *Priming the German Economy*, 8.
preference for a draconian peace.” At the Quebec Conference of September 1944 Roosevelt and Winston Churchill even approved a draft of the so-called Morgenthau Plan that called for the “pastoralization” of Germany. After the plan was leaked to the press, however, it received negative coverage and the president tried to walk back his support for Morgenthau by telling Stimson that he never really meant to completely deindustrialize Germany.

After the Morgenthau Plan leaked, the War Department, through Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy, tried to keep Morgenthau away from their postwar planning. McCloy consulted with the Treasury Secretary as he drafted JCS 1067, the Army’s initial occupation guidance to General Dwight Eisenhower, but tried to limit his ideas. Ultimately, JCS 1067 was a typical bureaucratic policy document. Without clear high-level policy goals provided by the administration, the Army focused on short-term goals. Nevertheless, the document contained draconian language similar to the Morgenthau Plan. For example, it directed that military government would “take no steps looking toward the economy rehabilitation of Germany, or designed to maintain or strengthen the German economy.” Additionally, the directive prohibited any actions “which would tend to support basic living conditions…on a higher level than that existing” in any neighboring Allied countries. In final form JCS 1067 also possessed several “escape hatches” for high-level military government officials; for example, economic reconstruction was allowed only to meet the needs of the occupying army or to prevent “disease and unrest” that could endanger American forces.

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97 Eisenberg, Drawing the Line, 20.
98 Backer, Priming the Germany Economy, 16.
99 Hudson, Army Diplomacy, 175.
Yet despite these escape hatches, the document shared a similar tone with Morgenthau’s proposals. After the Morgenthau Plan leaked the Roosevelt administration never disavowed the plan publicly. As a result, many Americans, and much of the world, assumed that the United States was preparing for a harsh, vindictive peace in Germany. Once JCS 1067 was finally released to the public in October 1945, the document was therefore interpreted within this context. Many Americans expected the Army to enforce a harsh peace and any divergence from those expectations during the first eighteen months of the occupation produced a negative reaction in the United States. The War Department may have crafted loopholes in the document, but the underlying tone remained and American policies still possessed the ability to cause significant harm to Germany. The seriousness of the postwar situation in Germany meant that indifference, not even ambivalence, could cause great harm. Without active American help, German officials stood little chance of solving the monumental crises facing their country.  

Indeed, a vocal contingent of Army and military government officials embraced the harsh tone of American policy towards Germany. The intelligence and information control branches of military government, in particular, contained many liberals and German experts whose primary concern was the eradication of Nazism and militarism from German society. These officials also embraced the idea of collective German guilt for the crimes of the Nazi regime and believed that the civilian population must suffer some kind of penance for their acquiescence.  

Herman Kahn, an intelligence officer with the Army’s Psychological Warfare Division, explained, “With my intense hostility against the Germans, I gazed with satisfaction at the vast acres of rubble in


the cities and felt not pity for the misery of people huddling in bunkers by the thousands.”

Saul Padover made a similar observation after witnessing the destruction of the ancient city of Münster. The rubble, Padover wrote, “was not an inappropriate monument to a land that had dedicated itself to the worship of force.” Similarly, the devastation of Nürnberg – “the shrine of Nazism” – “made one feel that there was justice on earth.” Kahn and Padover captured the underlying tone of American policy as publicly propagated by Morgenthau and the administration’s liberals: Germany was irredeemably militaristic and required a draconian peace to prevent the country from causing yet another global war. JCS 1067 possessed some “escape hatches” from high-level military government officials, but the public expectation of a harsh, vindictive peace was set.

However, various aspects of postwar planning instilled an emphasis on pragmatism at the local level within military government. Prewar planning, particularly Field Manual 27-5, placed overwhelming emphasis on “military necessity.” Additionally, the instruction at the School of Military Government emphasized that military government officials should be apolitical and occupy a supervisory role. MGOs “would not rule, they were taught, so much as exercise oversight: they would constitute an administrative carapace stretched over preexisting local arrangements.” In a similar vein, SHAEF’s Handbook unabashedly called for a pragmatic approach to the postwar occupation, placing efficiency as the most important goal of the MGO, not denazification, deindustrialization, or democratization. As a result, the emerging culture of military government emphasized pragmatism above virtually all other considerations. If forced to choose between the enforcement of denazification or avoiding starvation amongst the defeated

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104 Padover, Experiment in Germany, 341 & 391.
populace, this approach encouraged MGOs to prevent starvation since it would serve military necessity and protect occupation troops from any potential unrest. Therefore, there was an emerging disconnect between the pragmatic Army approach and the much harsher language of American policy. This disconnect quickly emerged in Bavaria as MGOs in the Land sought ways around the negative proscriptions of US policy towards their defeated enemy. If military necessity demanded it, military government officials looked to disregard or circumvent American policy.

**Conclusion**

The American soldiers and officers tasked with implementing the occupation of Germany, and Bavaria more specifically, faced a hard challenge made even more difficult by the destruction unleashed as a result of total war. American and British air forces, in search of victory through air power alone, unleashed unprecedented destructive power against Nazi Germany in the form of Flying Fortresses, Liberators, and Lancasters; leveling large swaths of the nation-state they would soon occupy. What began as the only means available for Britain to hit back against Germany and demonstrate its commitment to the war spiraled into a war of near apocalyptic devastation as thousands of Allied bombers roamed the skies above Germany to annihilate industry and to bring the horrors of war to the front door of tens of millions of Germans. Years of aerial assault wrecked much of German industry and burned out the centers of major urban areas; yet the German economy had not collapsed. The transition to the transportation offensive in the last months of 1944 finally precipitated the economic collapse long envisioned by air power theorists. As the Reichsbahn ground to a halt, coal, the lifeblood of the economy, disappeared from the market and pushed Germany towards economic chaos. By late winter and early spring of 1945 Allied air power had finally destroyed the German economy
in all but name. Coupled with the devastation of the German populace and their cities, the economic collapse demonstrated that total war wrought total destruction.

In city after city and town after town piles of rubble, burned out houses, and mangled railways presented vistas of seemingly endless destruction. It was this destroyed nation-state that American occupation officials, at least in part, were ordered to administer and later rebuild. The devastation unleashed by the war, and particularly the Allied air offensive, made their tasks all the more difficult. Devastated infrastructure and limited transportation made it difficult to restart the economy and distribute basic necessities of life, which were scarce enough already. Burned out city centers and the loss of housing meant that few Germans had a shelter over their heads, a problem made worse by the influx of ethnic Germans expelled from Eastern Europe. As a result, most Germans were concerned with merely surviving in the harsh postwar years. Beaten down by years of bombing, fatalistic and apathetic civilians hunted for food, clothing, and housing wherever it could be found. Concerned largely with survival, American officials would find many Germans uninterested in their programs of reorientation and democratization.

The American occupation of Germany in general, and Bavaria more specifically, cannot be understood without some appreciation for the devastation unleashed by total war. In a twist of irony, Americans had to deal with the effects of their own bombing offensive. The bombing had destroyed Germany’s economy, devastated its cities, and bombarded the populace into apathy. Now American occupation officials in Bavaria had to face the challenges unleashed by total war. The chapters that follow explore these challenges and how Americans, along with Germans, responded to the destruction of total war to lay the foundation for a new Germany.
Chapter 2: An Occupation of Shortages: Managing the Food Crises of Postwar Bavaria

“The population frequently complains of the fact that certain goods are to be had only theoretically, but cannot in reality be bought anywhere…”
- Herr Weiss, Munich City Councilor, 11 November 1946

“But events in the past few weeks have indicated that there is no assurance that you will get your 1800 calories or your 2000 calories throughout the winter and spring unless consumers, merchants and government move quickly and energetically to carry out the programs of food collection and food distribution.”
- Kenneth W. Ingwalson, November 1948

When American armies entered Bavaria in the spring of 1945 they encountered a region gripped by near paralysis. Years of attacks from Allied bombers, followed by months of ground combat, devastated the normally rich German Land. Wrecked factories and bombed-out buildings littered the urban landscapes of Munich, Nuremberg, and other small cities throughout Bavaria. The transportation networks, so thoroughly pulverized by Allied bombers during the last nine months of the war, were barely operational. Coal, the foundation of the German economy, was everywhere in short supply. The Bavarian economy was essentially at a standstill. These were problems that plagued American military government throughout the occupation. In the early years, the negative aspects of American policy exacerbated the crisis. Even as the occupation continued and US policy shifted from retribution to reconstruction, the economic problems remained a persistent thorn in the side of American officials. The crippling shortages of food, however, remained the most pressing challenge facing Americans during the first years of the occupation.

Bavaria, the closest region to a “breadbasket” in Western Germany, continued to produce significant quantities of grain, potatoes, and meat in 1945. Yet this production was a drop in the bucket compared to the exploding needs of postwar Bavaria. For starters, the ruined transportation networks meant that little of the food produced made it to the regions in desperate need of supply, particularly the large cities. Additionally, the Bavarian population was actually larger in 1945 than it had been in 1939, despite the toll of war. Displaced Persons (DPs) from all over Europe, civilians evacuated from cities elsewhere in Germany, and refugees who had fled the Red Army all crammed into Bavaria in 1945. Bavarian food production, which had not been enough to feed Bavaria before the war, now strained to feed millions of additional mouths. And within two years a new group of people would further strain the Bavarian food supply: ethnic German expellees from Eastern Europe and the Balkans. Finally, as the Western Allies moved towards unification of their zones, Bavaria was called upon to help feed other regions of Western German such as the industrialized Ruhr Valley.

American policy, however, exacerbated these problems. Determined that defeated Germans not live better than the liberated peoples of Europe, the United States, in conjunction with the other Allies, insisted that German food and fuel be shipped to countries like the Netherlands, Belgium, and France. Although the War Department defeated Henry Morgenthau’s most radical ideas about the de-industrialization of Germany, the general sentiment of a harsh peace remained, especially among Washington decision-makers. In addition, anti-German public sentiment in the United States ensured that policymakers in OMGUS avoided anything that resembled pro-German attitudes. Julian Bach, a reporter for the military periodical Army Talks, observed of high-level military government officials: “They are hyper-sensitive for fear of being branded ‘soft’ by the press and public in the U.S., when, in reality…the Occupation is more
severe than many of its critics suspect.”³ As a result, General Lucius Clay and other high-ranking officials at OMGUS requested food imports for Germany but insisted that they were only emergency measures to prevent widespread disease and unrest.

Bavarian agriculture struggled to keep up with the postwar challenges but often failed to do so. The result was a series of major food crises from 1945 through 1947. Even as the situation improved during and after the summer of 1948 and American policy transitioned from punitive to positive, the supply of food remained one of the major focuses of American occupation officials. Americans like George Quarles and Kenneth Ingwalson – who ran the Food, Agriculture, and Forestry Division of the Office of Military Government for Bavaria for much of the occupation – struggled repeatedly with the crises. From early concerns about feeding the recently defeated enemy to conflicts with Bavarians over how best to solve the food problems, American officials experienced profound challenges with feeding occupied Bavaria. However, growing sympathy with the plight of German civilians led OMGB officials and MGOs to challenge the basic framework of American policy. Convinced that the negative features of US policy towards Germany would produce undue suffering, American officials in Bavaria worked within the confines of that policy to mitigate its worst effects. Despite their efforts, the Americans faced significant resistance from Bavarians at all levels, who were reluctant to let their occupiers control their planting patterns, their delivery of food to market, or how much food would be shipped to other Länder. The challenges of the early years, however, did not disappear with the reversal of American policy in 1947 and 1948. Bavarian resistance to military government direction remained formidable and the United States’ open commitment to reconstruction could not change the structural issues that still plagued Bavaria. As a result, food problems, although significantly reduced, plagued Bavaria throughout the rest of the occupation.

Initial Crisis, 1945-1946

Before the end of the war in Europe, high-ranking American commanders had anticipated a European-wide food shortage. In January 1945, General Dwight Eisenhower’s headquarters issued a ration scale for occupied Germany before American forces even occupied large swaths of the country. Above all else, Eisenhower ordered, levels of consumption by Germans were not permitted to exceed consumption in the liberated territories of Western Europe. Once the liberated populations received their rations, the average German citizen would receive 1,550 calories a day. Heavy workers could receive up to 2,800 calories, expectant mothers 2,700 calories, and children aged three to five 1,250 calories. Early orders also emphasized the importance of turning responsibility for food distribution overt to German officials as rapidly as possible. Following Eisenhower’s order that German authorities were “responsible for the maintenance or re-establishment of the German food distribution and rationing system,” General Omar Bradley reinforced the importance of transferring responsibility to local Germans as rapidly as possible. Military units could facilitate the movement of rations, if necessary, Bradley explained, but regional administrations, under the supervision of military government detachments, would retain primary control. Army officials, uncomfortable with running an occupation, clearly sought to transfer authority to Germans and limit their own responsibilities.\(^4\)

Perhaps most importantly, these orders reflected the prevailing sentiment of American policy, such as it existed in early 1945. While Eisenhower’s order anticipated feeding the German populace, it also maintained a vindictive tone. Germans would not starve to death, but they would also not be treated with the same magnanimity directed towards the liberated peoples of Europe.

\(^4\) “Control of Distribution and Rationing of Food in Germany,” SHAEF Memo, 25 January 1945, Box 37, Walter Bedell Smith: Collection of WWII Documents, DDE Presidential Library; Memo from HQ 12\(^{th}\) Army Group, 12\(^{th}\) Armored Division, 22 May 1945, Box 144, US Army Unit Records, DDE Presidential Library.
Despite the anticipation of a potential food shortage, occupation authorities were unprepared for the magnitude of the crisis throughout all of Germany. German agriculture was wrecked by the war, especially the American and British strategic bombing offensive. The bombing campaign crippled the production and distribution of artificial fertilizer throughout Germany, which curtailed the production of German agriculture. The application of nitrogen fertilizer in all of Germany, for example, fell from approximately 563,000 tons in 1938/1939 to 105,000 tons in 1945. The utilization of phosphate fertilizer plummeted from 588,000 tons to 36,400 tons over the same period. As a result, German farms produced significantly less food in the aftermath of the war than before the conflict. Yields of food grains, such as wheat and barley, throughout Germany dropped from a 1934 to 1938 average of 2,000 kilograms per hectare to 1,500 in 1945. Similarly, in the American zone production dipped from an average of 1,860 kilograms per hectare to 1,520. The production of potatoes also experienced a noticeable decline. From 1936 to 1940 the average harvest yielded 49.8 million tons of potatoes. The harvest of 1944 to 1945, however, produced just over 38 million tons.\(^5\)

The result were alarmingly low rations throughout Germany at the end of the war, a situation that worsened by the end of 1945. A ration in the Rhineland, for example, averaged 1,150 calories and in Hesse the average ration was a mere 804 calories. In Munich, meanwhile, the official ration in May 1945 was a mere 900 calories. Even though they had expected a crisis, the severity of the food shortages took American commanders by surprise. As early as May 16, Eisenhower cabled the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington, “In view of the critical food situation in Germany, it is necessary for me to take timely action to meet emergency condition.”

To ward off starvation, he requested authority to distribute imported foodstuffs as the situation required. The CCS approved the importation of wheat and by early June American officials optimistically predicted that the imports “should be adequate to prevent starvation.” Nevertheless, the situation remained bleak. The liberated territories, displaced persons, and prisoners of war all received rations before German civilians. As a result, actual consumption by the average German was well below the 1,550 calories per day approved by Eisenhower. To make matters worse, the destruction of transportation networks made the distribution of food difficult and some Americans worried that “unless food is forthcoming from the Russian zone, overseas imports will again have to be resorted to during the 1945-46 consumption season to avoid disease and unrest.” Poor transportation also produced another problem throughout the American zone of occupation: the uneven distribution of food. By the end of October, German farmers and their families were expected to consume a total of five of the available eleven trillion calories in the coming months. As a result, fourteen million Germans not living on farms were expected to split a mere six trillion calories, which averaged out to only 1,200 calories per person.

The crippling food shortages even extended into American-occupied Bavaria, the richest agricultural region in western Germany. Like elsewhere in occupied Germany, official rations, already low at the end of the war, dwindled during the summer months, while actual

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consumption by Bavarians was even lower. At the end of the war Bavarians received 1,300 calories per day through official channels, including 1700 grams of bread, 250 grams of meat, and 3 kilograms of potatoes each week. However, due to shortages and transportation problems the civilian Bavarian Food Office reduced that number to 1,100 calories for the first ration period of the occupation. Bavarians now received official rations of just 1050 grams of bread, 200 grams of meat, and 2 kg of potatoes each week. Actual distribution, however, averaged a meager 900 to 1,050 calories per person per day. Food supplies were so low early in the occupation that on May 18 the city of Munich possessed a miniscule five-day supply of food. Captain Ralph Cole, writing to military government headquarters in Munich, reported that Bavarian officials planned to raise the official ration to 1,400 calories during the summer months, mostly due to an increase in the bread ration. Cole’s report was proved correct, when the official ration was raised to 1,550 calories on July 11. Yet raising the official ration did not solve the food shortages plaguing all of Bavaria and most civilians never received the entirety of their rations. Instead of 1,550 calories, most Bavarians received a mere 850 to 1,100 calories through official channels.

The immediate crisis moderated somewhat during the late summer and early fall months as the 1945 harvest made its way to market, but American officials were quick to understand the severity of the food shortages. In August, the Civil Affairs Section of the 3rd Army reported “that current rations were so low as to endanger the success of Military Government...” Starving Bavarians, many Americans realized, would not be receptive to the ideas of democracy or could

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10 Historical Report, August 1945, G-5 Section, 3rd US Army, Pg. 25, G-5 Section, Reports of Operations, 9 May 45-30 November 45 Folder, Box 1, 42823 (A1): Rpts of Ops, 45-46, RG 338, NARA.
threaten the safety of occupation forces in the Land. Americans also discovered that Bavaria’s position as the richest agricultural region in western Germany posed unique challenges. Although the Land was a major agricultural region, it was less than ninety percent self-sufficient and still counted on the import of foodstuffs to feed its population. In occupied Germany, however, Bavaria took on a new role as an exporter of food which “jeopardized” its own food supply.11 Called upon to feed other regions of Germany, such as the industrialized Ruhr Valley, Bavarians now had less food for themselves.

The approach of winter during the last months of 1945 exacerbated the food shortages in Bavaria. In Munich, the population rose steadily as civilians who fled Allied bombing returned to what was left of their homes and as refugees from the east arrived in the city. The number of residents entitled to food rations rose from 611,000 in October to 622,000 in November and continued to climb of the next several months. As the population increased, the food supply grew more acute. The already limited food supply had to feed increasing numbers of mouths. To make matters worse, the short-term improvement of the summer months slowly evaporated during the fall. In October, the arrival of cattle to stockyards and slaughterhouses in Munich declined significantly and only forty percent of the meat ration could be distributed. The supply of milk and butter also decreased and the fat ration was lowered to 300 grams per week. The supply of grain to the city was so limited that all breweries were ordered to cease production of beer on October 15. As Lieutenant Colonel Eugene Keller explained, “The critical food situation

11 Historical Report, October 1945, G-5 Section, 3rd US Army, Pg. 33, G-5 Section, Reports of Operation, 9 May 45-30 November 45 Folder, Box 1, 42823 (A1): Rpts of Ops, 45-46, RG 338, NARA.
required that all available barley be used for bread making.”

Beer, that staple of the Bavarian diet, was sacrificed in the name of feeding starving civilians.

The severe food shortages throughout Germany produced several effects among the civilian population. Most notably, Germans suffered from the meager rations available in the months after the end of the war. Hans-Erich Nossack, a struggling German author, described the food shortages to a friend in November. It was two months since he saw any potatoes and the last time he ate any vegetables, aside from the odd cabbage and turnips, was in May. “It’s a cruel life of starvation,” Nossack explained, “I can assure you.”

The result for Nossack and millions of other Germans was an enfeebled civilian population, particularly as the winter months approached. By the end of October, General Lucius Clay warned that nearly sixty percent of the population of the U.S. zone lived on a sub-standard diet. A sample of employed German men crossing the Rhine for work revealed that eighty-seven percent were underweight. Similarly, a group of 295 children examined in Frankfurt revealed that eighty-two percent showed “some signs of malnutrition” and forty-eight percent were “definitely undernourished.”

Mortality rates, particularly among infants, soared. In July 1945, the infant mortality rate in Berlin reached record highs, with some reports indicating sixty-five deaths out of every one hundred births.

As a result of the shortages and rising mortality rates, American officials faced a weakened population, particularly in the cities. Without adequate food, industrial laborers could not perform their work, at least to the expectations of military government officers. “Heavy

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workers” received extra rations, yet workers often smuggled the extra food out of factories or mines to feed their families. The result was a vicious economic cycle. Lacking sufficient coal, economic activity was minimal and damaged food production; the lack of food then led to underfed miners who mined less coal. Non-workers, meanwhile, struggled with the basic quest for survival. Not allocated extra food, most urban residents barely survived. To stretch their rations as far as possible, Bavarians often improvised and new cooking techniques proliferated to conserve food. The preface to one cookbook, for example, listed a variety of ration-saving practices, from cutting the fat from fatty meat and browning the meat in its own fat to cleaning used baking fat by pouring it hot into cold water and then removing the impurities.

While urban Bavaria went hungry, rural communities experienced less of a crisis and American MGOs maintained a tone of cautious optimism. They were concerned about the shortages, but believed they could be survived. In the rural Kreis of Wolfstein, Captain Raymond Douglass complained of “practically no stocks of flour products” at wholesale dealers on November 30, while made it difficult to fulfill ration requirements. But just three days later Douglass struck a more positive tone. The food situation in Wolfstein, he explained, “remains fairly good in comparison with most of Germany.” Additionally, the official ration slowly increased, despite the shortages plaguing Bavaria. The results of nutritional surveys conducted in rural Bavaria reinforced American optimism. The “nutritional status” of German civilians in Aschaffenburg and Bamberg was “excellent.” Civilians under the age of forty met American

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16 The persistent coal & economic problems in postwar Bavaria will be discussed in Chapter 3.


standards for body weight and those over forty reached ninety-three percent of the American standards. The surveys also uncovered an important development: actual food consumption by German civilians was approximately 500 calories above the official rations. Black market activity and hoarding by farmers allowed many Bavarians to supplement their state-issued rations. Although military government officials would devote much of their time to eliminating the black market and hoarding, their existence ensured that many Bavarians would not slowly starve.\textsuperscript{19}

The relative security of farmers contributed to a new division of German society. As one historian observed, those Germans who received “normal consumer” rations comprised “the new proletariat of the occupation.” Meanwhile, industrial workers – factory workers, railroad workers, and, most significantly, miners – made the “gentry” due to their significantly larger rations. The “out-and-out aristocrats,” however, were the farmers who possessed all the food they needed and did not have to live off official rations.\textsuperscript{20} Rural Bavaria’s emergence from the war relatively unscathed furthered the division of society. Hans Speier, traveling towards Berchtesgaden in November 1945, described a nearly idyllic scene to his wife. “There was a deep snow on the meadows all around you…everything in perfect peace with glistening snowfields; a few houses with their protruding gables and brown wooden balconies…For a moment, there had never been any war.”\textsuperscript{21} These social divisions ultimately grew in importance as food shortages persisted, with urban Bavarians resenting the relative wealth of rural farmers and those farmers growing frustrated with the demands placed upon them during the occupation.

\textsuperscript{19} Operation Report, Office of Military Government for Bavaria, December 1945, Pg. 29-30 & 37-38, Reports of Operations, 1 December 1945 Folder, Box 1, 42823 (A1): Rpts of Ops, 45-46, RG 338, NARA.

\textsuperscript{20} Earl F. Ziemke, \textit{The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany}, 273-274.

Critical shortages in transportation also exacerbated the chaotic food situation during the first year of the occupation in Bavaria. After years of bombing and months of ground combat, Germany’s railroads and roadways largely existed in name only. Urban marshalling yards were wrecked and overburdened, bridges and the rest of the infrastructure were in horrible condition, and the denazification of transportation, especially the Reichsbahn, left few qualified personnel to rebuild Bavaria’s transportation network. The transportation problems affected the entire economy in American-occupied Bavaria, as will be discussed in the following chapter, but the posed a particularly acute problem in the food crisis of 1945. For example, in May and June nearly 3,900 tons of railroad shipping was requested each day to deliver food in the regions occupied by the Third Army, but only 1,150 tons per day were actually provided. Without adequate transportation, food harvested in the rural regions of Bavaria was not shipped to cities like Munich or Nürnberg, or exported to the industrialized regions of western Germany now dependent on Bavarian foodstuffs. Individual communities also experienced pronounced transportation difficulties. In rural Bavaria, a severe shortage of draught animals, particularly horses, hampered production and local transportation. Meanwhile, the sheer level of urban destruction posed problems for the delivery of food within cities. This contributed to the maldistribution of food throughout the Land, where rural regions had an abundance of food while cities slowly starved. Indeed, military government officials realized early on that “transportation deficiencies were among the basic difficulties in the reorganization of elementary economic life” in Germany, including food distribution.22

Faced with a starving and distraught civilian population, many military government officials were increasingly sympathetic to the plight of Bavarian civilians. MGOs saw many

22 G-5 Section, Historical Report, May-June 1945, Pg. 16, G-5 Section, Reports of Operations, 9 May 45-30 November 45 Folder, Box 1, 42823 (A1): Rpts of Ops, 45-46, RG 338, NARA.
Bavarians, particularly women and children, as victims of the war and in need of their protection. Historian Petra Goedde examined this phenomenon among American GIs in Germany. Wartime propaganda painted Germans as a monolithic people unified in their support of the war, Nazism, and militarism. What these GIs found, however, was “a defeated population devastated by the destruction of the war and rather desperate” to make peace. In particular, their ubiquitous interactions with German women, many of whom struggled to survive in the postwar chaos, produced a feminized vision of Germany in which GIs became providers and protectors, “first literally for the women they dated, and later figuratively for what they perceived to be an emasculated, starving population.”

A similar development occurred among military government officials in Bavaria. Tasked with not just living in defeated Germany but with overseeing its administration, MGOs possessed day-to-day experience with the crises gripping the Land. They also interacted with both Bavarian women and Bavarian men, as their official duties brought them in contact with large numbers of government officials, economic leaders, and former soldiers. Combined with the engrained pragmatism of Army postwar planning and concerns about American morality in the former heartland of Nazism, these developments formed the foundation for military government officials to mitigate the effects of American policy in Bavaria.

Military government sympathy for German civilians emerged soon after the end of hostilities in May 1945. MGOs interacted with Bavarian civilians daily as part of their official responsibilities. Elderly German women and young, widowed wives were common sights at many detachment offices. Desperate for any help to survive in postwar Germany, destitute Germans begged American officials for help, whether that be getting a job for military

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government, intervening in food disputes, or providing housing. In the Army’s quest to turn responsibility over to German authorities as rapidly as possible, there was often little that could be done for individual Bavarians. Nevertheless, such appeals and the image of women and children struggling for survival had an impact. Sergeant Walter Krause, an MGO at a hospital in Bavaria, expressed “deep sadness at the destruction of property and a terrible rending as I identified with the people who had experienced the war.” For Krause, the suffering of German civilians, particularly women and children, became a personal experience. “The present want and suffering of the women and children involved us now,” he wrote. “We saw it; it became a personal thing. The need and the suffering was now.” Even many Jewish-American occupation officials expressed sympathy towards the civilian population. One medical officer, a Colonel Cohen, explained: “I am a Jewish fellow. I should hate these people but I cannot. A little girl came yesterday for medical attention for her father. I gave it to her.”

Intimately familiar with the depravations of postwar Bavaria and routinely interacting with suffering civilians, military government officials soon saw Bavarians as victims of the war.

Women and children alone did not stir military government sympathy, however. MGOs also interacted with large numbers of Bavarians as part of their duties and these interactions influenced American attitudes towards Germans. With relatively few individuals in military government, American officials were, from the beginning, dependent on Bavarian authorities to administer the Land. While these Bavarian officials often frustrated MGOs, there was also an appreciation for the challenges of administering postwar Germany since the Americans also addressed the same problems. Daily interactions between American and German officials,

therefore, often produced collegial, if not friendly, sentiments. Walter Krause described a close relationship he developed with former Luftwaffe General Herbert Schroeder at the hospital he oversaw. The two routinely met at Krause’s quarters to discuss philosophy, religion, and the war. Krause observed, “It was all very friendly and we found great satisfaction in spending our time together.”

In Munich, William J. Moran developed similar sentiments for his German counterparts. After being transferred from Munich, Moran wrote to Hans Mühlhauser, a civilian employee in the city’s police department who Moran worked with as the detachment’s Public Safety Office for almost two years. “Your abilities, experience and loyalties were given most generously to your tasks and your superiors,” Moran explained. “Your loyalty in remaining at your post, despite personal disadvantages, was typical of actions which gained the confidence of those with whom you were associated.”

Similarly, Moran penned a fond letter to his secretary in Munich, Ruth Brinkmann. “You have not been spared the trials and difficulties of the German people in their war-devastated nation,” he wrote. “It shall be [ever] to your credit, however, that in these times of chaos…you have not lost the proper perspective and have adhered closely to the sound teachings which you learned in your home.” Her devotion, Moran insisted, “played no small part” in the success of military government.

The sentiments of American officials, however, did not go unreciprocated. Many Bavarian officials and civilian employees of military government fondly recalled their experiences with local military government officials. Peter Christen, a German military government employee in Bavaria, wrote with reverence of a MGO particularly well liked in the local community. The MGO helped the local population however he could, Christen explained,

26 Krause, So I Was a Sergeant, 105.
27 William Moran to Hans Mühlhauser, 4 May 48, Personal Papers of William J. Moran.
28 William Moran to Ruth Brinkmann, 4 May 48, Personal Papers of William J. Moran.
and “shamed me and others by his sense of justice.” William Moran’s personal secretary, Ruth Brinkmann, expressed similar sentiments towards her superior in the Munich military government office. Writing to Moran for his birthday in July 1946, Brinkmann praised Moran’s “courage, zeal and good humor” and encouraged the American official to continue integrating “some humanity and kind helpfulness to [the] just and proper handling of office affairs.” The following Christmas Brinkmann again wrote Moran to thank him “for the lessons on business and general life-wisdom which I gained through you…”

Taken together, the plight of German civilians and the collegial, even fond, interactions with Bavarian officials and military government employees produced a notable strand of sympathy for the populace living under American rule in Bavaria. Many American MGOs, reflecting a trend among regular Army units, increasingly saw themselves as the protectors of victimized German women and children. Additionally, occupation officials interacted with German officials and employees daily. While these relationships may have started off cool, many saw the emergence of mutual respect and even friendship. Under such circumstances, MGOs were increasingly sympathetic to struggle for existence that the vast majority of Bavarians had to deal with on a daily basis. Therefore, many occupation officials, particularly at the local levels, found it difficult to implement American policy if Bavarian colleagues and seemingly victimized civilians faced the threat of starvation.

Beyond growing sympathy for Germans of all stripes, the food crisis reinforced the Army’s tendency towards pragmatism and raised concerns about the preservation of American morality in Germany. As discussed in the first chapter, the Army’s planning for the postwar

30 Ruth Brinkmann to William Moran, 22 July 46, Personal Papers of William J. Moran.
31 Ruth Brinkmann to William Moran, 20 December 46, Personal Papers of William J. Moran.
occupations stressed the importance of pragmatism and efficiency in re-establishing the foundations of civic society. This emphasis reflected Army concern that military necessity serve as the determining factor in postwar occupation, as evidenced in SHAEF’s *Handbook for Military Government*. MGOs embraced this tendency towards pragmatism in response to the suffering of German civilians. Faced with the choice between the negative tone of American policy or feeding the civilian population, many military government officials chose the latter in the name of pragmatism. Captain Julian Bach explained, “…there are two solutions: Import or Starve.” “Hungry people rarely make good democrats,” he continued. “Following amputation, doctors rarely kill their patients, but off them instead a crutch.”

Bach also insisted that the United States held a paternalistic responsibility towards the German people, who were “our subjects” and “our responsibility.” After twelve years of dictatorship and war, the German people were not in good moral or physical shape; the people were “withered and spent.” As ruler of these subjects, Bach argued that the United States was ultimately responsible for the fate of those Germans living in the American zone of occupation.

Some Army officials also expressed concern about American morality in Germany. Letting Germans starve, they feared, would damage the health and morality of the occupation and military government forces. Fear of American moral decay was not uncommon in postwar Germany. The Billy Wilder film *A Foreign Affair* portrayed German women as corrupting influences on naïve American soldiers. Nightclub singer Erika von Schlütow corrupts Captain John Pringle until the captain is saved by a female congresswoman.

Yet officials who would challenge the negative aspects of American policy also warned of American moral decay. “This is not for the sake of the Germans,” Julian Bach argued, “but for the sake of the Occupation

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33 Ibid., 11.
34 Goedde, *GIs and Germans*, 116-117.
troops, whose lives, health and morality are also at stake.” The refusal to accept that the German population must be fed would reduce Americans “to the morale level of the Germans and their concentration camps.”35 To preserve American moral authority, therefore, military government would have to secure the lives of Bavarian civilians.

Faced with a major food crisis in 1945, the general vindictiveness of American policy towards Germany, and growing sympathy for the plight of the Bavarian populace, military government officials sought ways around official policy. MG0s and OMGB officials wanted to mitigate the effects of US policy in Bavaria and address the crippling food crisis of the postwar era. However, limited measures were available to Bavarian military government. Located at the bottom of the military government hierarchy, MG0s could not radically expand the power of their offices by directly intervening in Bavarian affairs, nor could they single-handily change American policy. Additionally, Bavarian farmers had already planted their fields before the end of the war; little could be done to influence the harvest of 1945. Ultimately, the Americans adopted an indirect approach and stressed German responsibility for solving the food shortages. Captain Ralph Cole outlined the scope of military government efforts to combat the food crisis in July 1945. Writing to military government headquarters in Munich, Cole proposed a series of objectives and short-term actions to address the food crisis. The most important objective, in his mind, was to re-establish the Bavarian Food and Agriculture Office to coordinate the production, collection, and distribution of food throughout the Land. He also proposed surveys of agricultural supplies, farm labor, and the 1945 crop; the creation of a 1946 crop production plan; increasing the ration to 1,500 calories; making “every effort” to secure delivery of crops; and

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35 Bach, America’s Germany, 96 & 103.
acting “promptly and firmly” against violations of food regulations. Cole was not clear how exactly these often nebulous measures would solve the food crisis, yet this outline became the blueprint by which American military government officials addressed the food crisis and minimized the impact of negative US policy. By embracing the policy of returning responsibility to Bavarians as rapidly as possible, MGOs could work around the more constrictive aspects of American policy. If questioned by policymakers of American media, MGOs could defend efforts to protect civilians as the work of German authorities simply doing their jobs.

A survey of the 1945 crop represented one of the first actions taken by military government. MGOs knew the food situation was severe but did not understand the full parameters of the crisis. It would be difficult to mitigate the effects of American policy if military government officials did not know the extent of food shortages in Bavaria. On August 20 USFET published the preliminary crop estimate for the entire American zone, including Bavaria. The report warned, “The disruption of agricultural organizations and services resulting from the war and subsequent military occupation has made the estimation of the 1945 crop especially difficult.” In Bavaria, the survey estimated a wheat crop of 583,800 metric tons – a small increase over the 1944 crop of 582,000 metric tons, but well below the 702,000 tons from 1943. On the other hand, initial estimates of the potato crop indicated a smaller crop in 1945 – 4,050,000 metric tons – compared to the 1944 crop of 4,163,000 tons. Military government officials conducted these surveys for the next several months, hoping to get a more accurate picture of the harvest within the American zone and inside Bavaria, specifically. Subsequent

36 “Part II: Operational Plan: Food and Agriculture Section,” 2 July 45, Appendix B to “Field Trip,” 14 July 45, to Col. Omer W. Herrmann, from Capt. Ralph A. Cole, Pg. 5-6, Laender –Food & Agriculture Folder, Box 1087, 368: Foreign (Occupied) Area Reports, 1945-1954, RG 407, NARA.
37 “Preliminary Crop Estimate for the American Occupied Zone, Germany, August 1945,” 20 Aug 45, HQ, USFET, G-5 Division, Economics Branch, Pg. 1, 5, & 9, Food & Agriculture-Germany Folder, Box 1055, 368: Foreign (Occupied) Area Reports, 1945-54, RG 407, NARA.
reports appeared on 29 September, 10 November, and 27 February 1946. Each survey adjusted the estimated yield per hectare and the total production. By November production of potatoes in Bavaria had risen to 4,100,000 metric tons.\(^{38}\) However, the final survey in February 1946 revised wheat production downward to 525,000 tons, while wheat and rye production declined by fifteen percent in the American zone when compared to 1944.\(^{39}\)

These crop surveys served two main purposes for Americans within military government throughout the occupation of Bavaria. First and most obviously, they provided an estimate for that year’s harvest of wheat, rye, potatoes, and other important crops. Officials needed an accurate estimate to plan food imports, ration requirements, and exports to other regions of Germany. Second, the surveys served as a valuable comparative tool. Military government officials of all stripes in Bavaria compared each year’s crop production to the production of previous harvest, especially from the prewar years. When production lagged behind stated goals, the Americans then used the comparisons to previous years to encourage German officials and farmers to increase their production. If Bavaria produced so much wheat in 1938, Americans argued, then it could do so in 1946 or 1947.

Americans within OMGB also combatted the food crisis through requisitions of food and public encouragement to farmers to meet their delivery quotas. For example, in the first two months of the occupation military government units attached to the Third Army requisitioned 46,000 tons of imported foodstuffs for use during the rest of 1945. They also requisitioned two

\(^{38}\) “Preliminary Crop Estimate for the United States Occupied Zone, Germany, 1 October 1945,” 10 Nov 45, OMGUS, Food and Agriculture Branch, Table 6, Food & Agriculture-Germany Folder, Box 1055, 368: Foreign (Occupied) Area Reports, 1945-54, RG 407, NARA.

\(^{39}\) “Final Grain Estimate U.S. Occupied Zone of Germany, 1945,” 27 Feb 46, OMGUS, Economics Division, Food and Agriculture Branch, Table 1, Food & Agriculture-Germany Folder, Box 1055, 368: Foreign (Occupied) Area Reports, 1945-54, RG 407, NARA.
million Red Cross food parcels to give to displaced persons located in Bavaria. On the other hand, Americans actively encouraged Bavarian farmers to fulfill their delivery quotas to secure “maximum deliveries of farm products.” Newspaper reports, radio exhortations, and the public threat of “stringent late penalties” in late 1945 drove home the importance of deliveries, or so military government officials thought. These encouragements, relatively rare in 1945, became a staple of OMGB efforts to combat the food shortages of the occupation. Hoping to limit the effects of American policy in Bavaria, MGOs saw the compliance of Bavarian farmers with crop delivery quotas as one of the most important steps to take. Ultimately, the exhortations also served another purpose: to convince Bavarians, especially farmers, to view the food crises through the same lens as their occupiers. As the occupation progressed, Americans and Bavarians increasingly clashed over who defined the scope and severity of the crisis.

The most visible actions taken by Army and military government units, however, were attempts to shut down the near ubiquitous black markets. Desperate for food, ever larger numbers of Germans turned to the black market, which had been well-established in Germany before the end of the war. Additionally, a wide variety of American occupation soldiers, including individuals within military government, participated in the black market. The Bavarian black market, as with the black market throughout postwar Germany, was driven by the crippling shortages of food, the lack of any normal consumer goods, and the existence of large sums of money without anything to buy. Survivors of Allied bombings, for example, received significant relief payments from the state during the war. Yet the destruction of many goods during the war and the strict rationing of others made it difficult to spend that relief money at traditional stores.

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40 G-5 Section, Historical Report, May-June 1945, Pg. 15, G-5 Section, Reports of Operations, 9 May 45-30 November 45 Folder, Box 1, 42823 (A1): Rpts of Ops, 45-46, RG 338, NARA.
As a result, bombing victims used their state-provided cash to purchase badly needed goods, such as shoes, clothing, or fresh vegetables. Even urban residents who emerged from the war unscathed turned to the black market to supplement their meager rations. On the black market a resident of Munich could acquire fresh eggs, milk, or coffee for Reichsmarks, cigarettes, or something as mundane as a pair of pants. Free from official price controls, inflation plagued the black market. Survivors of bombing raids, with their cash relief payments from the state, could afford to drive up prices far beyond the ability of other Germans to pay. As a result, cigarettes had already become a de facto currency in the black market before the end of the war, a development that only escalated with the proliferation of highly-covered American cigarettes.

In some instances, the local black market operated out in the open and became a sort of market where Germans, displaced persons, and Americans haggled over goods. Often the cry of “Zigaretten” could be heard as you approached an open-air black market location, which became almost a cacophony by the time you reached the main market. At other times, enterprising civilians approached American barracks or clubs to engage in Americans in black market trading German civilians offered cameras, watches, Nazi memorabilia, and Occupation Marks – used to pay all Allied soldiers in Germany and illegal for Germans to possess – for cigarettes. Eager for a souvenir from their time in Bavaria, many American soldiers obliged, exchanging food and cigarettes for a Nazi Party badge or some other piece of memorabilia from the Third Reich. A good wrist watch, for example, could earn as much as three cartons of cigarettes or ten one-pound cans of American meat rations. Bavarians then took their newfound riches, particularly cigarettes, to barter with nearby farmers. For urban residents, this often meant long days traveling to local farming communities in search of extra potatoes, fresh vegetables, or eggs.

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42 Bach, America’s Germany, 62.
Sometimes Bavarians bypassed the American middleman and took their luxury goods directly to farmers. That same wristwatch might yield up to four pounds of butter from a farmer.\textsuperscript{43}

For many Americans, including military government officials, the economic opportunity of the black market was too much to pass up. An American cigarette often sold for the equivalent of $10 each, candy bars for $5 apiece, and watches for upwards of $200. Americans of all stripes could buy ten packs of cigarettes at their PX each week for fifty cents apiece. They could then sell them on the black market for the equivalent of $100 each. Following this practice, Julian Bach calculated that an American could make a $5,200 a year selling just the cigarettes from his Army ration.\textsuperscript{44} Enterprising Americans even had relatives mail cartons of cigarettes to Germany where they were sold on the black market and the profits sent back across the Atlantic. Additionally, the early policy of not capping the amount of money a soldier could send home provided a major incentive to participate in the black market. One Army company, totaling 123 men, sent home $200,000 worth of money orders in just one month.\textsuperscript{45} Other Americans, meanwhile, participated in the black market more indirectly. Sergeant Walter Krause, for example, stayed in a villa with a German family for some time. His host, Herr Koch, prepared meals and Krause provided extra American rations, cigarettes, and coffee for Koch to barter with at the black market. In exchange, Krause’s host received fresh eggs, meat, and vegetables.\textsuperscript{46}

The black market received the most attention, but Americans also facilitated other aspects of the informal Bavarian economy. Military government officials, occupation troops, and even visiting Americans often paid Germans, particularly women, for domestic services. Bavarian women might carry on a private laundering business for Americans, who would then pay in scare

\textsuperscript{43} Goedde, \textit{GIs and Germans}, 90-91.
\textsuperscript{44} Bach, \textit{America's Germany}, 57-58.
\textsuperscript{45} Ibid., 60.
\textsuperscript{46} Krause, \textit{So I Was a Sergeant}, 89.
items like cigarettes, coffee, and soap.⁴⁷ One American visiting Munich, Richard Berlin, observed the informal economy at work in his hotel. When he asked to have his clothes laundered, the maid said she would rather be paid with cigarettes and soap instead of money. Berlin observed, “Anyone in Munich will work 12 hours a day for food.”⁴⁸ Military government offices, in a more formalized system, also employed thousands of Bavarians who received daytime meals as part of their pay. These aspects of the informal economy existed alongside and in many ways facilitated the black market. Bavarians who accepted payment in cigarettes did so to barter those cigarettes for food with local farmers.

By fall 1945 prices soared on the Bavarian black market. In Munich, the price of eggs and pork shot up one hundred percent, while bread rose sixty percent.⁴⁹ To combat the black market, Americans tried a variety of measures. Most recognized early on that the black market would not truly be defeated until rare commodities were readily available again, but they still advocated negative means to hamper the growth of the illegal transactions. In August 1945, Major David Blossom on the Legal Section of OMGB encouraged one Munich military government detachment to post anti-black market notices near notorious black market locations. These notices, Blossom believed, would act as a deterrent and prevent Bavarian from feigning ignorance of military government regulations.⁵⁰ Then a few days later on 9 August the Third Army, at the command of General George Patton, dictated a new anti-black market law to the Bavarian government. The new law prohibited five or more civilians from gathering at any place where goods were sold, unless it was a licensed business. It also authorized civilian police to

⁴⁷ Goedde, GIs and Germans, 90.
⁴⁸ Berlin, Diary of a Flight to Occupied Germany, 97.
disperse or arrest all crowds at unauthorized business places. Violators could face a maximum sentence of five years in jail and/or a fine up to 10,000 RM.\(^{51}\)

In addition to combatting German black market activities, military government and Army officials worried about the activities of American servicemen stationed in occupied Germany. As a result, on 10 September General Eisenhower issued orders to limit American involvement in the black market. “This theater is faced with a serious and difficult black market problem,” Eisenhower explained, “which constitutes a direct menace to the United States control of the German economy, is directly in conflict with the United States objective of maintaining law and order, promotes inflation and encourages theft and robbery.” Therefore, all American personnel were prohibited from selling any American goods to Germans, from buying any rationed German goods, and from paying above legal prices for any non-rationed German goods.\(^{52}\) Then three months later the personnel of the Third Army were again prohibited from participating in the black market, this time by Lieutenant General Lucian Truscott, due to “numerous flagrant violations” of German rationing laws.\(^{53}\) Military government even tried to channel the black market into legal channels by setting up official barter stations. If Germans wanted to barter their luxury goods for foods, Americans reasoned, it was better for them to do so through a formal system.


\(^{52}\) “Troop Participation in Black Market Trade,” 10 Sept 45, to CG: USF, Austria; US Air Forces in Europe; US Group Control Council, Germany; Theater Service Forces, European Theater; Each Military District; 15th US Army; XVI Corps; Berlin District; European Division, Air Transport Command; Ground Force Reinforcement Command; HQ Command, US Forces, European Theater; Heads of Missions; Commanding Officer, Military Intelligence Service, from Brig. Gen. R.B. Lovett (by command of General Eisenhower), Black Market Notice Folder, Box 412, 669 (A1): Gen. Rec., 45-49, LSO Munich, RG 260, NARA...

Despite American efforts, however, the black market continued to thrive and even expanded as the food crisis continued into 1946. In January an Inspector Franz of the Munich Criminal Police Black Market Section reported that the illegal economy was “rather difficult to control” and that “most of the black market dealers are DPs who sell rationed goods and American Army goods for exorbitant prices.” Indeed, during the month of January alone there were 1,698 price control violations reported to OMGB, with a total of $608,476.96\text{ RM}$ in fines and excess profits confiscated. By the first week of February black market prices in Niederbayern-Oberpfalz region of Bavaria reached 17.5 RM per kilogram of meat, 2.55 RM for one American cigarette, and 50.2 RM per pound of butter.

German authorities preferred to blame displaced persons for the black market activity, but Germans and Americans alike actively participated in the illicit market economy of Bavaria. One particularly enterprising American, Andrew Wormser, racked up a long list of black market dealings in the town of Eschenbach. According to the local police, Wormser’s dealings possessed a total value of 21,000 RM. Wormser supposedly sold thirty pounds of sugar for 1500 marks, 120 packs of German cigarettes for 2000 marks, 40 packs of American cigarettes for 1000 marks, and 30 liters of brandy for 4500 marks. For hungry Germans and Americans looking to make extra money the black market offered a tantalizing opportunity, so it continued to thrive despite the early efforts of military government officials. In addition, participation in the

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55 Historical Report, Military Government for Land Bavaria, 1 February to 28 February 1946, Pg. 83, Military Government for Bavaria, Historical Report, February 1946 Folder, Box 1, 42823 (A1): Rpts of Ops, 45-46, RG 338, NARA.
black market and the informal goods economy provided one opportunity for military government officials to act on their sympathy for the Bavarian population. While many military government elites saw the black market as a drain on the economy, many MGOs saw the direct impact it had on the residents of their communities. Throughout Bavarian military government, American officials at the local level reported on the black market activities of Bavarians and German attempts to combat the illegal economy. However, these Americans remained aloof from efforts to clamp down on the black market and rarely took direct involvement in anti-black market operations.  

By early 1946, despite the efforts of military government, food stocks in Bavaria were dangerously low. The ration for “normal consumers” remained at 1,550 calories, but major shortages loomed. Available stocks of most important food items decreased over the course of January and by late February a bread shortage spread throughout Bavaria. Germans with unused ration tickets “stripped many bakeries of all available stocks of bread and flour” and “for the first time in many [months], queues formed before bakeries, and many were soon sold out.”  

In Regensburg the food shortages grew so severe that the Bavarian Food and Agriculture Warehouse in the city started to distribute spoiled food, including dried eggs, milk, biscuits, and canned goods that arrived spoiled. When good news arrived, it was often good only in comparison to the larger crisis. For example, the Food and Agriculture Branch of OMGB announced at the end of February that it would now be possible to distribute up to two eggs per person per month if Bavaria was not required to export eggs to other regions of Germany. Two

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59 Historical Report, Military Government for Land Bavaria, 1 February to 28 February 1946, Pg. 91-92, Military Government for Bavaria, Historical Report, February 1946 Folder, Box 1, 42823 (A1): Rpts of Ops, 45-46, RG 338, NARA.
eggs per month barely made a dent in the food shortages plaguing Bavaria, but at least military government could add to the diet of Bavarians instead of taking away.

By April the crisis was so serious that the Third Military Government Regiment began its own food conservation program. American units rarely lacked food, but the shortages in Bavaria were so great that U.S. units now took part in conservation efforts. The detachments of the Third MGR were ordered to “insure adequate care and safeguards” against breakdown of ration regulations, including the proper storage of perishable food items like meat, vegetables, and fruits. Additionally, the conservation program, in a seemingly contradictory move, prohibited German workers from eating leftover food because such a practice produces “an ever increasing amount of leftovers.” Finally, each mess officer was to post signs in sight of all personnel. Suggested signs included, “Food is vital, don’t WASTE it” and “Help prevent starvation, Don’t WASTE Food.”

The impact of measures such as this was limited, however. In occupied Bavaria food shortages worsened during the winter months and relaxed during spring and summer. As the second year of the occupation approached the food situation again moderated and was, in comparison to the previous year, relatively stable. Additionally, many military government officials recognized early on that the food crisis was best solved by the Bavarians and turned over as much responsibility to Bavarian officials as rapidly as possible. Yet as the Americans abdicated direct control over the food crisis they came into conflict with the same Bavarians they sought to empower. Food shortages frustrated both Americans and Germans, and as the occupation progressed the two groups clashed over who got to define the scope of the crisis, even as the situation steadily improved.

Continued Shortages, 1946-1947

During late spring and early summer 1946 in Bavaria, the food shortages roiling the occupation appeared less desperate than they were during the winter months. Winter crops alleviated some of the grain shortages, while fresh vegetables arrived at market to supplement the often dour official ration. Meanwhile, a period of dry spring weather provided a favorable planting season to Bavarian farmers and kindled hopes for a good harvest as long as the region received enough rain during the summer. Major Albert Snow predicted that Dachau would be in a position to export at least as much food as they had in 1945 since preliminary crop yields showed good results. The more favorable situation allowed American and Bavarian officials to slowly raise rations for the average Bavarian. The bread ration in Munich for the period from 19 August to 15 September increased from 4,200 grams to 5,000 grams per week, even though the overall caloric value remained the same. Then in September the population received the good news that the official ration would return to 1,550 calories per person per day. In Regensburg, reported Captain J.W. Bossert, this news “was received with enthusiasm by the population.” Despite the welcomed news, however, complaints persisted about the reduced fat ration.

Military government officials remained concerned about the lingering food crisis. The prospect of widespread starvation, particularly in Bavaria’s cities, was something MGOs wanted to avoid. In the spring and summer of 1946, however, American policy retained its vindictive

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tone. American officials in Bavaria, therefore, continued their indirect methods to address the major food shortages. In particular, they doubled down on their efforts, first enunciated by Captain Cole’s July 1945 report, to transfer responsibility over to Bavarian officials. The Americans, for example, pressured officials at all levels of the Bavarian government to increase food collections and compliance with delivery quotas. Military government officials encouraged Bavarians in Ministry for Food and Agriculture to develop more effective incentives and enforcement measures. By encouraging Bavarian government action on the food crisis, MGOs could portray efforts to alleviate the shortages as the work of Bavarian authorities and not a subversion of American policy. Encouraging German responsibility also reflected the general Army culture that wanted to limit its involvement in traditionally unmilitary tasks and the early postwar planning that called for transferring administrative responsibility to native officials as rapidly as possible.

However, local German officials – the *Landrat* in charge of each *Kreis*, the *Bürgermeister* of each town, and the local food officials – received the bulk of the pressure. For example, in late October 1946 the Food Ministry assigned *Landkreis* Dachau a quota of 2,000 tons of potatoes for export. Local Bavarian officials, according to First Lieutenant Jerome Walker, claimed that Dachau could not possibly meet the quota. Flooding and hail had damaged crops throughout the *Kreis*, they argued, and some regions lost nearly ninety percent of the crop; at most, Dachau could collect and deliver 1,200 tons. By 26 November the *Kreis* exceeded the predictions of the local officials, but the 1,300 tons of deliveries remained well below the assigned quota. At that point, Walker called all *Bürgermeisters* and Food Office officials to a meeting where the problem of deliveries was “thoroughly thrashed out” and each *Bürgermeister* promised to do his best to “drive out every last pound of potatoes.” During the last four days of
November farmers delivered an additional 666 tons of potatoes to bring the total to 1,966 tons; Dachau would meet the 2,000 ton quota by early December. According to Walker, the “constant harassing” of food officials and Bürgermeisters had produced “excellent results.”

The American commitment to empowering Bavarian officials soon produced conflict between OMGB and the Bavarians. Local Bavarian officials repeatedly complained about the high quotas set by the Food Ministry in Munich. Additionally, the Americans and Germans competed over who got to define the severity of the crisis and what constituted success. In particular, officials from Munich and the surrounding area clashed with military government. During May 1946, as the final efforts to collect food from the 1945 crop wrapped up, officials from Landkreis Munich complained of high quotas and sought to redefine what constituted successful deliveries of food. Lackluster deliveries from the Kreis led the Food Ministry to dispatch inspectors to the farming communities surrounding Bavaria’s largest city, such as Kirchheim and Taufkirchen. These inspectors visited local farms, totaled the food remaining, subtracted the amount needed to feed the farmers, and confiscated the rest. Yet even these drastic measures, according to city officials, did not secure 100 percent delivery of the assigned quotas. Indeed, these state inspectors even said, or it was reported to military government they said, that the quotas “had been fixed up too high by the State’s Ministry for Food and Agriculture.”

Additionally, persistent war damage, severe weather in the form of drought and hail, and a lack of farming supplies meant that the crop did not meet expectations. It was for these reasons that

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Munich officials asked the State Ministry “over and over again” to lower delivery quotas.\textsuperscript{66} These Munich food officials repeatedly complained about what they perceived as unrealistically high quotas for food delivery. At the same time, they tried to redefine what constituted success in food deliveries. Based on factors like weather and war damage, the farmers in the \textit{Kreis} succeeded in delivering as much food as possible. Due to these outstanding problems, therefore, the current deliveries should be considered a success and confiscations of additional food stopped.

Military government’s response to protestations such as these was often to double down on the pressure to meet the assigned quotas; yet they rarely used force to compel deliveries or intervened to lower quotas. In their eyes, Bavarians had to take responsibility for the crisis and solve it themselves. Even when a major crisis broke out, as it did in the final months of 1946 when a potato shortage threatened, the Americans remained reluctant to intervene directly. Instead, they pushed for Germans to take full responsibility. In October, major transportation problems threatened to undermine the delivery of the potato harvest from rural communities to urban areas. In response, Brigadier General Walter Muller, head of OMGB, proclaimed that the crisis “requires immediate action on the part of the members of Military Government.” That action, however, remained relatively indirect. Regular Army headquarters authorized the use of twenty percent of its truck transportation to ship the potato crop, but most of the responsibility for “Operation Spud” still resided with the Bavarians. \textit{Bürgermeisters} were to inform officials from the local Food Office A of the quantity of food to be collected, where it had to be delivered, and other pertinent information. The food officials then had to request the transportation through the closest military government office. In addition, the Germans were to provide all labor needed.

to load and unload the Army trucks. Military government officials, on the other hand, merely
relayed the requests for transportation to the pertinent regular Army commander, made sure the
Bavarians ordered the requisite amount of transportation, gathered appropriate information, and
took “necessary steps” to ensure that their Kreis met the additional potato quota assigned at the
end of October.  

By the time it ended in mid-November, Operation Spud produced notable success. From
7 to 16 November, 347 Army trucks hauled 1,414 tons of potatoes from just the area surrounding
Munich. Potato wholesalers in Munich were “very satisfied” and “do not want to fail to express
our thanks for the American trucks.” Several months later, OMGB circulated a letter from
General Clay to General Muller praising American involvement in the emergency food
collection program. According to Clay, potato collections increased by 80,000 tons and saved
American taxpayers “many millions of dollars” by reducing the need for imports of food. The
participation of local military government officers, Clay wrote, was “a tremendous factor in the
accomplishment of the emergency program." Clay’s letter, however, revealed the exceptional
nature of American involvement in Operation Spud. It was an emergency that drove this limited
form of direct U.S. involvement in trying to solve the food crisis. The program, thrown together
at the last minute, brought direct American intervention but it remained limited and Bavarians
retained primary responsibility. Indeed, Operation Spud quickly receded into the background

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once completed. Military government officials returned to using indirect methods, particularly pressure, on local Bavarian officials to ensure compliance with delivery quotas. At the end of November, Major Frank Tracy reminded military government detachments in the Oberbayern region that no force was to be used against Germans without first being approved by the Public Safety or Operations branches of OMGB. Americans cared deeply about solving the food crises plaguing Germany and wanted to circumvent US policy. However, they preferred indirect methods to secure their objectives, even when they produced rising conflict with Bavarian officials.

Meanwhile, the food situation deteriorated as winter approached. Rising shortages threatened to bring a new crisis, although one less severe than the previous winter. Even with the success of Operation Spud, “considerable difficulties” remained with the potato supply in Munich. In 1946 Bavarian officials, at the behest of military government, planned a cellar storage program for potatoes during the upcoming winter. By mid-November, however, few residents in Munich received their potatoes for storage. The problem continued into December, with twenty-five percent of the potatoes allotted for winter storage in Munich failing to arrive from Unterfranken due to transportation problems. As a result, Munich’s food officials reduced the amount of potatoes allocated to each resident from two and half zentners (or 150 kilograms) to one zentner (50 kilograms). Yet even this reduced amount could not be met in full by the end of the year. Other shortages also plagued Bavaria and contributed to the renewed crisis. During

November, evaporated milk and pudding powder were in short supply in Munich. The following month small amounts of peanut butter finally went on sale in Landkreis Wolfstein after a two-month delay, but good news was minimal as 1946 transitioned to 1947. By early January 1947 bread grain deliveries fell far behind their stated goals. In the communities surrounding Munich, for example, farmers delivered less than forty percent of the yearly quota due to shortages of fuel and spare parts for farm machinery.  

Due to these shortages, the Bavarian population grew increasingly restless. Munich residents frequently complained “that certain goods are to be had only theoretically, but cannot in reality be bought anywhere…” In addition, black market activity and petty thefts rose as Bavarians did all they could to survive in postwar Germany. All throughout 1946 the black market expanded throughout Bavaria, despite the efforts of military government and German police. The Dachau police were “particularly active” against the black market and arrested numerous offenders, especially displaced persons living outside of United Nations camps.

Nevertheless, the activity continued and without any major organized activity it was nearly impossible to defeat. Germans of all stripes participated in the black market. In Wolfstein one Johann List, a former POW, was “notorious in the whole community on account of his black market trade.” List traded in Czechoslovakian cigarette paper, saccharin, and sugar, and people

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from as far away as Munich and Stuttgart wrote to enquire about purchasing items he sold.\textsuperscript{75} Other Bavarians participated in the illegal economy on a less regular basis. Karl Richard Grosshäuser traveled from Nürnberg to Wolfstein in August 1946 to trade tobacco for mushrooms and raspberries when the local police apprehended him and his wife.\textsuperscript{76}

The frenzy of small-time black market activity produced higher and higher prices. By the end of March 1947, a pack of American cigarettes, which sold for 80 RM at the end of 1946, now sold for at least 100 RM. Coffee sold for 125 RM per pound, while a single pound of butter cost 70 RM.\textsuperscript{77} Additionally, rising prices frustrated large segments of the population, particularly farmers who had to sell their products at fixed prices. Lieutenant Jerome Walker warned from Dachau in November 1946 that “the largest dis-satisfied group is the farmer.” Farmers could sell potatoes for just 3.40 RM per one hundred pounds, yet a single cigar in Dachau cost 3.50 RM and similar ratios existed for items like milk and beer. In light of these high prices, Walker understood why farmers held back as much of their production as possible. After all, “With marks the farmer can buy little or nothing. With his produce he can trade for nearly any items.”\textsuperscript{78} As Bavarians grew more frustrated with high prices they also sought to blame their plight on perceived outside groups. Military government received its fair share of the blame, but displaced persons and Jews took most of the blame. German officials routinely held DPs responsible for most black market activity. Additionally, some Bavarians associated the Jewish population with


\textsuperscript{76} Confession of Karl Richard Grosshäuser, signed by Grosshäuser & Hans Dersch, Custom Police Officer, Investigations Folder, Box 972, 754 (A1): Gen. Rec., 45-49, LSO Wolfstein, RG 260, NARA.


the illegal economy and high prices, even though plenty of Germans participated on their own volition. In May 1946, for example, Bavarians complained to Major Albert Snow in Dachau of black market activities at three Jewish farms set up to train young people going to Palestine.\textsuperscript{79} The association of Jews with the black market remained relatively rare at this point, but when the food crisis returned with a vengeance in 1947 and 1948 it was ever more prevalent.

Increasingly desperate for food and protection, the number of Bavarians, particularly women, who relied on American providers also rose. Many young German women turned to companionship with American GIs to secure badly needed food for their families. At times these relationships centered solely on the material benefits. Some women turned to prostitution to save their families from starvation or to supplement their meager rations. In other instances, food was not the decisive factor in the relationship but still played a major role. As Petra Goedde noted, “Food…replaced flowers and jewelry as the most common instrument of courtship” in postwar Germany.” Kaethe Schmidt recalled how her future husband, Don Sears, provided her family with soap, food, and other scarce goods. Similarly, Liese-Lore Spreen’s future husband brought a turkey to their first date.\textsuperscript{80} Other German women accepted American companionship in an attempt to return a sense of normalcy. One unidentified young women explained that she was “happy because my friends provide me with food and decent clothes to wear.” Before her relationships with Americans she had spent long days foraging for potatoes or retrieving wood from the forest. “Now, is that really living? A life to lead when you’re young?” she asked. “No,


\textsuperscript{80} Goedde, GIs and Germans, 90. See all of Chapter 3 for a more detailed discussion of the relationship between American GIs and German women.
the nights are over when I felt the fear rising up in me that my whole life could go on and finish in such misery. Now I finally want to live for a change."81

Therefore, as spring approached in 1947 tensions surrounding the food shortages in Bavaria grew more acute. German civilians frustrated with the continued shortages resorted to black market activity and blamed their problems on DPs and the Jewish population. American and Bavarian officials, meanwhile, clashed for the first time over who defined the scope of the food crisis and the best way to respond. These tensions, which grew slowly over the course of 1946 and into 1947, did not appear threatening in early 1947. After all, the food situation improved significantly since the chaotic first year and the recent winter was relatively mild. Americans and Bavarians alike, however, were not prepared for the major crisis that hit Bavaria in 1947 and 1948, a crisis that caused these simmering tensions and frustrations to explode.

Renewed Crisis, 1947-1948

As the winter of 1946-1947 ended, concern about the food shortages remained prominent. Although food remained scarce in early spring 1947 and the food situation was not as chaotic during the first year and a half of the occupation, MGOs still expressed worry about the nagging problems. Shifting American policy, however, provided a reason to be optimistic. Starting with Secretary of State James Byrnes’ speech in Stuttgart on 6 September 1946 and continuing with the official merger of the American and British zones of occupation on 1 January 1947, American policy openly embraced the reconstruction of postwar Germany, including Bavaria.82 American officials in Bavaria would not have to mitigate the effects of a negative policy as they had for the first eighteen to twenty-four months of the occupation. However, American frustration did not disappear. Instead, it was now turned towards the

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82 This will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3.
Bavarians, particularly bureaucratic officials and farmers, as the most severe food crisis since the end of the war gripped the Land in late 1947 and early 1948. MGOs remained sympathetic to the plight of urban residents, but increasingly resented the resistance of bureaucrats and farmers who insisted that they could not meet quotas for food production or who challenged American policy.

One of the main targets of their frustration was what they viewed as a chaotic and inefficient system for the production, collection, and distribution of food. During April, Major W.W. Perman, director of the military government office in Berchtesgaden, reported that only five of the twenty-one communities in the Landkreis received delivery quotas from the Food Office A in Traunstein. In Landkreis Wolfstein, the situation was just as chaotic. The Food Office in Passau established quotas for communities, or Gemeinde, but possessed no direct control over the deliveries of individual farmers; instead, local Bürgermeisters were responsible for breaking down the community quotas. However, most farmers “don’t even know the exact amount of their quotas” and deliveries, when they did occur, were not reported correctly. As a result, delivery statistics remained out of date, sometimes by up to six to seven months. To exacerbate the situation, local Bürgermeisters had yet to impose a severe penalty on delinquent farmers. In response, farmers who met their quotas, the local military government office reported in May, “are considered as silly” and laughed at by their neighbors. Two months later, Captain Robert MacWhorter further described the chaotic system. “There is no uniformity in the assignment of quotas among the various gemeinde,” he explained. In addition, the records of the

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83 “Explanation of Inspection of Food Collection,” April 47, to Director, OMGB (Attn: Food & Agriculture Branch), from Maj. W.W. Perman, Pg. 1, Correspondence 1949 Folder, Box 366, 659 (A1): General Records, 1945-1949, LSO Berchtesgaden, RG 260, NARA.
“food offices, gemeinde offices and on the various farms are inadequate, poorly kept and widely misunderstood.”

Similar complaints about the food system littered American reports throughout Bavaria. The chaotic and inefficient methods of collecting food simply exacerbated the fact that western Germany was now “one of the great food-deficit areas of the world.” Without greater efficiency in the Bavarian system, any attempts to mitigate the impact of American policy in Germany would face an uphill battle. This reality increasingly frustrated military government officials committed to ending the food crisis in Bavaria as rapidly as possible. It would remain a next to impossible task if the Bavarian system remained an unorganized and inefficient mess.

Americans in military government also expressed rising frustration with Bavarians of all stripes. Bavarian officials from all levels of government received substantial amounts of criticism. From Berchtesgaden, Major Perman complained, “The food situation in this Landkreis is critical and that condition is contributed to by community official connivance to avoid compliance with delivery quotas…” The Bürgermeisters were “solely responsible” for the farmer’s “outright refusal to comply with the quotas.” In the small community of Piding, for example, the Bürgermeister, after the Food Ministry rejected his requests for reduced quotas, authorized local farmers to not comply based on the “mere contention that the full quota could not be met.” Military government officials also repeatedly highlighted the fact that the

86 “Maximization of Agriculture: Part I – Food Production Planning,” in “The Three R’s of Germany: Rebuilding a Peaceful Industry, Rehabilitating a Peaceful Economy, Re-educating a Defeated Enemy,” Public Information Division, Department of the Army, Pg. 6, Economy-Germany Folder, Box 1010, 368: Foreign (Occupied) Area Reports, 1945-54, RG 407, NARA.
Bürgermeisters were elected officials and therefore reluctant to take any actions that might anger their constituents, such as imposing fines for hoarding of foodstuffs. ⁸⁸

American frustration, however, was not limited to local officials. Increasingly, they complained about the inaction of Land-level officials, especially within the government. The Minister of Food and Agriculture, Dr. Josef Baumgartner, attracted much of their focus, but all officials received some complaints. For example, on 12 August 1947 General Muller chastised Dr. Hans Ehard, the Bavarian Minister President, for his government’s failure to “effectively” deal with the problem of food hoarding. According to Muller, “It is evident that the Economics Ministry has not attacked this problem with the tenacity and sincerity necessary to obtain satisfactory results.” To address the issue, Muller “suggested” that Ehard “give this matter your personal attention.” ⁸⁹ Four months later the new Military Governor for Bavaria, Murray van Wagoner, also expressed his frustration with the Bavarian government. Even though military government had spent considerable time trying to increase the amount of land devoted to consumption crops such as wheat and potatoes, Bavarian farmers continued to plant approximately the same hectarage. Van Wagoner then pushed Ehard to expand the regulatory purview of the Bavarian government by establishing local committees to oversee the distribution of delivery quotas. ⁹⁰

Meanwhile the conflict between American and Bavarian officials over who determined the severity of the food crisis continued. Competing crop yield estimates produced one source of

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conflict. In early June OMGB commissioned two separate surveys, one for crops and one for livestock in Bavaria. Each military government detachment investigated at least five farms in their Landkreis to determine planting levels and compare the livestock population with the numbers reported for the 3 June livestock census. Then in September OMGB complained about German yield estimates for bread grains and potatoes. Military government surveys on grains established “that the German yield estimates were much too low.” Additionally, the Americans expected that German estimates of the potato crop would also be low. An underestimate of just twenty doppelzentner (100 kg) per hectare, General Muller warned, represented the possible illegal disappearance of 1.3 million tons of potatoes, valued at $20.6 million, in the combined US-UK zones. In addition, accurate crop estimates remained vital to set fair delivery quotas. Therefore, OMGB ordered military government detachments to conduct yet another crop yield survey. The Americans’ rising frustration with German officials carried over into the fight over crop yield estimates. Military government officials suspected that the Bavarians might be purposefully underestimating crop yields to keep more food in Bavaria instead of shipping it to other regions of western Germany.

The conflict between the Americans and the Bavarians grew more pronounced as they struggled over who got to define the severity of the crisis. In particular, the Bavarian Minister of Food and Agriculture, Dr. Baumgartner, pushed back against the American view of the food shortages. In an 11 September memo to Ehard, and that was subsequently forwarded to OMGB, Baumgartner described a near apocalyptic situation. The drought plaguing Bavaria had

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“influenced the supply of the Bavarian population with food to an alarming degree.” According to the Food Minister, the bread grain crop – wheat and rye – was twenty-eight percent smaller than the 1946 crop, which meant that Bavaria could not meet its quota of 410,000 tons for the year. In addition, potatoes posed “the most serious problem of the supply to come.” German estimates placed the 1947 crop at fifty percent of the 1946 harvest and Baumgartner warned that Bavaria might run out of potatoes in January or February 1948. The meat supply also presented a major challenge. A livestock reduction program, designed to reduce the hectarage needed to grow fodder crops, meant that tens of thousands of cattle, pigs, and sheep would flood the market in the coming months. Bavaria, however, lacked the supplies necessary to lay “ample stores” of meat for the winter months. Baumgartner estimated the Land needed 70 million steel cans for storage, but only possessed some two million and lacked the sheet metal required to make more. “If it were not for the grain imports the American Military Government is placing at our disposal in a high-hearted manner,” the Food Minister wrote, “the situation would be truly desperate.” Indeed, he urged the Minister President to intervene with the Americans to secure greater imports of food, even though military government insisted it would not ship any additional food into Bavaria.93

A few days later George Quarles, head of OMGB’s Food and Agriculture Branch, wrote a detailed response to Baumgartner’s apocalyptic description. Quarles recognized the situation remained perilous, but he insisted that the Bavarian overstated the seriousness of the situation. Citing surveys conducted by military government offices, the American argued that the bread grain crop should total 500,000 tons, not the 410,000 reported by Baumgartner. Yet again diverging yield estimates shaped the conflict between American and Bavarian officials. In terms

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93 “Bavarian Food Situation,” 11 Sept 47, to Bavarian Minister President, from Dr. Baumgartner, NARA, Pg. 1, 2, & 4, Food & Agriculture 2 Folder, Box 5, 628 (A1): Gen. Rec., 46-48, Rec. of Land Dir., RG 260, NARA.
of potatoes, Quarles admitted that the drought affected the harvest, but he insisted it was not the full story. Bavarian farmers did not “come anywhere near” the planting quota of 394,000 hectares, instead planting just 224,000 hectares. If the farmers had planted according to plan, Quarles argued, “there would be sufficient potatoes in spite of the drought.” As for the storage of meat during the winter months, the military government official insisted that Bavaria was allocated six million steel cans and 2,000 tons of sheet metal, enough for some 25 million cans.94 Quarles clearly did not accept Baumgartner’s description of the situation. The situation remained precarious, but Quarles and the Americans believed that the Bavarians exaggerated the seriousness of the situation as an attempt to skirt responsibility for fulfilling their assigned quotas.

As winter approached, Baumgartner continued to push back against the American vision of the food crisis. In early November military government ordered the Food Minister to ship 126,000 tons of potatoes to Württemberg-Baden and another 8,000 tons to Hesse. Baumgartner complied, but complained to the Süddeutsche Zeitung that “the Bavarian potato supply will break down right away by compliance with the Frankfurt directive.”95 The following month he expressed his dissatisfaction with the order that provided displaced persons with three times the amount of potatoes as the rest of the Bavarian populace. Bavaria remained 100,000 tons short of its requirements for the winter, particularly in northern Bavaria where Erlangen received just thirty percent of its allotted potatoes and Bamberg forty percent. Instead of giving the DPs preferential treatment, Baumgartner proposed that DPs and civilians receive the same potato

The Americans, however, refused to implement Baumgartner’s proposals; displaced persons continued to receive preferential treatment. Throughout 1947, then, the Food Minister pushed back against the constraints imposed by military government and challenged the American view of the food crisis. He insisted it was more severe than the American recognized and called for new policies that let the Bavarians keep more of their food.

Military government, however, resisted and reasserted their definition of the situation: they acknowledged major problems, but insisted that Bavarians were partly to blame for their own predicament. The building frustration with obstinate farmers and Bürgermeisters undoubtedly influenced this point of view. After months of dealing with farmers who hoarded food and Bavarian officials who refused to punish them, Americans like George Quarles refused to let the Bavarians redefine the scope of the crisis. Indeed, the Americans also pushed back against the attempts of Baumgartner, the Bürgermeisters, and farmers. For example, military government enacted a new policy that reduced the imports of any Land that did not meet its quotas. If Bavaria was ten percent behind on its quotas, Bavaria would receive ten percent fewer imports. Then on 14 November a frustrated General Clay, in a telephone conversation with General Muller, expressed his frustration with the Bavarians, who were slow in following the order to ship potatoes to Württemberg-Baden and Hesse. He proclaimed he would not “ship one pound of American food into Bavaria if the Germans do not do their part.” Baumgartner, Clay fumed, was denying a direct order and that the Bavarians “playing a very destructive game if they do want their share of food.”

While the higher-ups responded to Baumgartner, the military government detachments upped the pressure on the Bürgermeisters. In a speech to local officials, the MGO of Landkreis Schwabach, Major Lund, insisted that “you and you alone will be held responsible in case disaster should overtake you, your families, and your country.” Military government, the major explained, had done its part; 454,000 tons of food arrived in western Germany from the U.S. during September 1947 alone. Now it was time for the Bürgermeisters to cooperate with the food program. “You and only you can stave off disaster,” the American proclaimed.98 This language reflected the American preference to turn responsibility over to the Bavarians. Yet its insistent tone was symptomatic of the rising frustration of many American military government officials. MGOS wanted to address the food crisis, yet Bavarian authorities and farmers, in American eyes, refused to cooperate.

The conflict between the Americans and the Bavarians grew in significance as the food situation worsened over the course of 1947 and early 1948. One of the most pressing issues was a major drought throughout Bavaria during the summer months. The drought, one of the worst in recent memory, negatively affected crops throughout Bavaria. In August, the head of Nürnberg’s Food Office reported that the hot, dry weather caused “heavy damage” to crops, especially wheat and rye, in the areas surrounding the city. Johann Kurz, a farmer from the town of Altdorf, similarly warned that the potato crop “can only be saved by sufficient rain during the next two weeks.”99 City officials in Munich also described weather characterized by “excessive heat and

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lasting drought.”100 Responding to the warning of Bavarian officials, George Quarles, head of OMGB’s Food and Agriculture Branch, warned General Muller that the drought would reduce Bavaria’s harvest by thirty to forty percent from the 1946 harvest. If that happened, Quarles explained, not only would Bavaria be unable to export food, the Land would also require extensive imports to ward off starvation.101

Expecting shortages due to drought and hoarding by farmers, military government officials imposed new controls on deliveries made by farmers. Assigned a potato quota of 1,162,600 metric tons for 1947-1948, OMGB urged military government officers to increase their pressure on local Bavarians. MGOs were to hold meetings with all involved local officials to ensure that farmers received their individual quotas and that the farmers then delivered their full quota. In addition, OMGB established aggressive deadlines for food deliveries. By 31 October Bavarian farmers needed to deliver forty percent of the grain crop and sixty percent of the potato crop. The full potato crop was then due by 30 November, while seventy-five percent of the grain harvest was due on 31 December and the full quota on 28 February 1948.102

Despite these ambitious goals, food collections and deliveries once again lagged behind schedule during the fall and winter months. Some Bavarian communities did meet their quotas on time, but many others fell behind early on and struggled to keep up. For example, on 1 December the Landkreis Regensburg met just 52.7 percent of its bread grain quota (7,371 tons out of 13,966 tons). More significantly, the Kreis’ potato deliveries amounted to a mere 51.7

101 Memo, 8 Sept 47, to Director, OMGB (through Economics Division), from George R. Quarles, Military Government III Folder, Box 1, 628 (A1): Gen. Rec., 46-48, Rec. of Land Dir., RG 260, NARA.
102 “Action to be Taken Regarding Food Collection,” 7 Nov 47, to L&S Officers/MGOs, from Gen. Muller, Pg. 1-2, Food & Agriculture 2 Folder, Box 5, 628 (A1): Gen. Rec., 46-48, Rec. of Land Dir., RG 260, NARA.
percent (15,748 tons out of 30,450 tons), even though the full quota was due on 30 November. By the New Year, Regensburg did manage to deliver seventy-five percent of its assigned bread grain quota as OMGB wished. However, potato collections remained far behind schedule with only 60.8 percent delivered. As the end of winter approached and weather improved, Regensburg’s food collections remained deficient. The Kreis delivered 18,663 tons of the required 20,240 tons of wheat, good for 92.2 percent of the quota, but had managed just 64.1 percent of the potato quota. The reluctance of many Bavarian farmers to meet their full quotas, as we shall see, played a key role in lagging deliveries, but several other factors also contributed to the problem. Electrical shortages during the late summer and early fall limited the amount of threshing that could occur on farms, which held back large portions of the bread grain crop. In addition, the winter of 1947 and 1948 was particularly severe, which limited the transportation of food and also encouraged additional hoarding by farmers.

Because of lagging deliveries, major food shortages threatened the whole of Bavaria. In particular, the urban areas of the Land faced a potentially crippling potato shortage. By early November the city of Nürnberg received a mere twenty-five percent of the potatoes required for winter storage. The Social Democrat and Communist factions of the city council “violently criticized” the perceived inactivity of the Bavarian government and even mulled over requesting

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106 Memo, 26 Aug 47, to Director OMGB, from George R. Quarles, NARA, RG 260, 628 (A1), Box 5, Pg. 1, Food & Agriculture 2 Folder, Box 5, 628 (A1): Gen. Rec., 46-48, Rec. of Land Dir., RG 260, NARA.
military government to take the collection of foodstuffs into its own hands. Meanwhile, Dr. Baumgartner and the Bavarian Farmers Association issued a direct plea to farmers. Baumgartner recognized that the summer drought had had a “fatal effect” but the Food Minister requested that farmers do “something” to keep city residents from starving, such as delivering a quarter of the potato ration entitled to farmers (50 kg or one zentner). “Think of the old and sick people in the cities,” Baumgartner pleaded, “think of the children, think of the working population in the cities which every day need their daily bread!”

The renewed food crisis posed significant health problems throughout the American zone, including Bavaria. By the middle of 1947 the average German weight reached its lowest point, according to military government street surveys. Women weighed an average of 118.7 pounds and the average weight for men was 134.5 pounds. In addition, the postwar mortality rate peaked in 1947 due, in part, to the severity of the food crisis. According to Lieutenant Colonel Walter DeForest, the mortality rate reached 15.4 per 1,000 in late 1947 before it began a slow decline. Figures from the German Bundesinstitut für Bevölkerungsforschung, however, place the crude death rate as high as 20 deaths per 1,000 in 1946 and 1947. Additionally, the infant mortality rate remained much higher than during prewar years. Before the war, the national infant mortality rate was approximately 60 deaths per 1,000 births. By 1947 that figure spiked to

108 “Bavarian Farmers!” 28 Nov 47, Signed “For the Bavarian State Government, Dr. Baumgartner, State Minister” and “For the Bavarian Farmers Association, Dr. Rothermel, 1st President,” Food & Agriculture 2 Folder, Box 5, 628 (A1): Gen. Rec., 46-49, Rec. of Land Dir., RG 260, NARA.

Coupled with these persistent health problems, the potato crisis and other food shortages contributed to rising tensions between Americans and Bavarians during the fall and winter months. Military government officials recognized the severity of the crisis, but remained frustrated with German officials and farmers. Indeed, Americans often stressed that the Bavarians had only themselves to blame for the severity of the situation facing them. On 16 January, Murray Van Wagoner, the new military governor of Bavaria, took that position in a letter to the Bayrischer Städteverband. According to Van Wagoner, OMGB was “profoundly concerned with the problems of providing adequate food to the cities of Bavaria,” so much so that it imported 469,467 tons of food into Bavaria during 1947. The Bavarian government deserved its fair share of blame for the current potato shortage, but the military governor also placed the blame on the Bavarians themselves. Farmers failed to meet the planting quota for 1947, for example, and planted seventy-one percent of the hectares allotted for potatoes. They also did not collect the entire crop as deliveries of grain and potatoes were some forty-five percent behind military government crop yield estimates. Van Wagoner, expressing American frustration with Bavarians of all stripes, concluded, “Apparent disregard for both planting and collection quotas for potatoes and a decrease in total land under cultivation in times like this must be accepted not only as a failure in the responsibility of the Bavarian Government, but of
large numbers of farmers, workers, and other segments of the Bavarian people.” The shortages of late 1947 and 1948, along with the severe winter, exacerbated the tensions between military government officials and the Bavarians they dealt with on a daily basis.

American frustration with Bavarian farmers and officials was heightened by the continued sympathy for the plight of Bavaria’s urban residents. On top of major food shortages, city dwellers still faced lackluster housing, inconsistent work, and devastated communities. Walter Krause, now assigned to a military government position in Munich, expressed admiration for the resiliency of the city’s population. “They work for little money, they connive, they have become shrewd,” he wrote, “because their existence depends upon these things, their skill. Their guile…One cannot quite forget that these people are human and that they have life and feelings, after all.” For Americans like Krause, the continued suffering of Bavaria’s cities provided stark evidence of the crippling food crisis. Meanwhile, Bavarian farmers possessed what seemed like an abundance of food. Hans Speier, describing a visit to a small town outside of Munich in early 1948, wrote, “Indeed, there was excellent food in abundance…I was almost shocked by the heaps of food on the table.” For MGOs, therefore, the obstinacy of officials and farmers, particularly in light of farmers’ relative food security, exacerbated American sympathy for urban Bavarians and exacerbated tensions between the occupiers and the occupied.

Meanwhile, the pervasive black market took on new life due to the severity of the renewed food crisis. For those Bavarians with the available cash, the black market provided access to much needed food and other supplies. Prices, however, skyrocketed as the crisis deepened, inflation expanded, and confidence in the Reichsmark plummeted. By the end of

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113 Krause, So I Was a Sergeant, 174.
114 Hans Speier, From the Ashes of Disgrace, 89.
September, Major John Rey reported that the monthly value of black market dealings in Regensburg approached one to two million Reichsmarks. Coffee cost 300 RM per pound, sugar sold for 80 RM a pound, and the cost of a pound of butter jumped to 200 RM. In Dachau the new military government officer, Captain George Jacobson, noted in January 1948 that the black market was almost “completely impossible to suppress.” Additionally, he mused that “the only persons in the [Landkreise] who do not engage in some black market activities are those persons in jail.” As a result, prices in Dachau remained sky high; a kilogram of coffee ran anywhere from 500 to 600 RM, while butter cost 400 RM per kilo. The problems with the black market grew so pervasive that General Clay issued yet another injunctive against American participation in the illegal economy. “Utilization of the black market,” Clay wrote, “indicates a lack of respect for our own regulations and sets a bad example for the German people.” It also undermined attempts to reconstruct the German economy. For these reasons, Clay urged his subordinate commanders to utilize “all available means” to combat the black market. Military personnel participating in the black market would be shipped to the United States, while American civilians engaged in similar activities could be forcibly removed from the American occupation zone. The stubborn persistence and rising prices of the black market demonstrated the continued severity of the food crisis facing American military government officials in Bavaria. As long as shortages remained, however, Bavarians and enterprising Americans would violate official regulations to secure much needed foodstuffs and other supplies.

Going into the 1948 planting season it appeared that little had been accomplished in Bavaria in the nearly three years since the end of the war. Indeed, a new shortage of meat added to the problems already posed by the lack of bread grains and potatoes. This deficit of meat, in many ways, was symptomatic of the problems still defining the food situation in occupied Bavaria. It also demonstrated the rut that the Americans fell into when it came to solving the food crisis. Once again, military government launched a collections drive and used indirect pressure on Bavarian officials to encourage compliance. To solve the “critical” meat shortage, in late February 1948 the Bizonal agencies in Frankfurt assigned Bavaria a quota of 156,447 tons, including 67,184 tons for export to other regions of Germany. Under the plan established by OMGB and scheduled to begin at the start of March, German officials retained primary responsibility, while American MGOs were tasked with organizing meetings between the appropriate local officials, overseeing the establishment of a meat collection committee, conducting spot checks of farms, and applying indirect pressure on Bavarians to comply with the program. One new measure demonstrated the seriousness with which OMGB viewed the situation: under some circumstances troops from the U.S. Constabulary, the law enforcement branch of the American Zone, were authorized to protect American or Bavarian personnel. However, American troops could not actually confiscate livestock. Kenneth Ingwalson, the new head of OMGB’s Food and Agriculture Branch, recognized that “this is not a popular program” but insisted “feeding people cannot wait: action must be taken now.”

Kenneth Ingwalson was symptomatic of the type of civilian that OMGB liked to hire for work on issues such as agriculture. Born in Little Falls, Minnesota, Ingwalson earned a

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bachelor’s degree in agricultural science from the University of Minnesota in 1931. He worked with for the University Department of Agriculture after graduation as an educational agent for a variety of programs, including efforts to eradicate the barberry. He then served on the state’s 4-H staff, coordinating activities for clubs throughout southern Minnesota. After several years of working in Minnesota, Ingwalson became the state director of New Jersey’s 4-H program. During World War II he wrote several pamphlets for the Extension Service of the Department of Agriculture on youth leadership and agricultural education. Based on his extensive experience in rural agricultural issues, OMGB hired him to work in their Food and Agriculture Branch (ultimately renamed the Food, Agriculture, and Forestry Division). As the occupation progressed, OMGB hired larger numbers of civilian experts to staff their branches or divisions, believing their knowledge and experience valuable in devastated Bavaria. These civilian experts, while important, often differed from the MGOs that ran individual detachments. Both groups embraced the pragmatism of the Army, but MGOs were often undertrained, did not possess the expertise of their civilian counterparts, and lacked significant familiarity with German society, including the ability to speak German. Some military government officers gained that experience if they stayed in the country long enough, but high levels of personnel turnover made such a task difficult. Therefore, experts like Ingwalson were needed to provide guidance to the over-burdened MGOs.

The new collection program promoted by Ingwalson initially succeeded at raising the collection cattle, sheep, and pigs throughout Bavaria. During the first week of March Bavaria collected an estimated 8,000 head of livestock, compared to the 7,693 collected during the first week of February. Then another 16,000 head of livestock arrived during the third week of March, some 7,000 more than during the third week of the previous month.\textsuperscript{123} Despite this significant increase, many communities throughout Bavaria quickly fell behind, just as they did with grain and potato deliveries. In Landkreis Wolfstein, for example, the local farmers fell behind before the month of March even ended. For the month, the Kreis received quotas 109.9 tons for cattle and 15.84 tons for pigs. Yet by 22 March local farmers provided just eighty-nine head of cattle weighing 32.141 tons and a single pig that came in at 0.07 tons.\textsuperscript{124} Similarly, Kreis Nürnberg quickly ran up significant deficits. During March a mere twenty-one head of cattle, with a total weight of 5.289 tons, were collected against a quota of ninety head, while farmers delivered a grand total of two head of swine against a quota of 268.\textsuperscript{125}

Growing dissatisfaction among the Bavarian population exacerbated the difficulties posed by the shortages of potatoes, grain, and meat. Farmers and rural officials resented the planting and delivery quotas, especially when they saw the quotas as patently unrealistic. Herr Höldermann, head of the Food Office A that oversaw Nürnberg and the surrounding farming communities, called the new meat quotas established in March 1948 “quite unreasonable” and predicted that they would be “impossible to fill.” He argued that fulfilling the quota would

\textsuperscript{123}“Livestock Delivery and Meat Procurement (Military Government Agriculture Support Program No. 1, Memo No. 2,” 31 March 48, to LSO, from Kenneth W. Ingwalson, Pg. 1, Meat Production Folder, Box 1431, 824 (A1): Corres. & Rel. Rec., 45-49, LSO Nürnberg, RG 260, NARA.


essentially mean exterminating the pig population in his region and therefore appealed to
military government for relief from the quotas. Local MGOs simply advised him to meet the first
month’s quota and then to appeal to the Bavarian Food Ministry for relief. Höldermann
acquiesced but warned that “our new democracy would…lose face” when it became apparent the
quotas were unenforceable.\textsuperscript{126} Captain George Jacobson reported similar resistance from the
\textit{Bürgermeisters} in Dachau. Due to upcoming local elections, the Bavarian officials were reluctant
to support any program so unpopular with their constituents.\textsuperscript{127} Hans Schlange-Schönningen, a
lobbyist for German farmers, defended the plight of farmers in early February 1948. “It is well
known in what a desolate condition the farms are, all, without exception,” he explained. The
“most basic things” – spades, ploughs, work clothes, shoes – were missing. Modern farming
equipment, such as threshing machines, were even rarer. Schange-Schönningen continued, “How
should the farmer deliver his grain in time, if he is forced to wait perhaps for weeks for some
threshing machine which may still be around somewhere?” Despite the difficulties, he lamented,
“the public will blame it on the farmers again.”\textsuperscript{128}

Meanwhile, urban residents grew increasingly resentful of the ever-present food
shortages plaguing their cities. Industrial workers began a series of strikes or work slowdowns to
demonstrate their dissatisfaction. In Nürnberg the employees of MAN Machine Factories and a
few other smaller businesses, for example, refused to work a full 45-hour week for more than a

\textsuperscript{126} Untitled Memo, 11 March 48, Det. B-211, SK-LK Nürnberg, Meat Production Folder, Box 1431, 824 (A1):
Corres. & Rel. Rec., 45-49, LSO Nürnberg, RG 260, NARA.
\textsuperscript{127} “Meat Production Report No. 1,” 17 March 48, to OMGB, Food, Agriculture and Forestry Branch, from Capt.
260, NARA.
\textsuperscript{128} \textit{Im Schatten des Hungers: Dokumentarisches zur Ernährungspolitik und Ernährungswirtschaft in den Jahren
month to protest declining rations.\textsuperscript{129} Even students voiced their frustration to military government officials. In an unsigned resolution that circulated at OMGB during the spring of 1948, Bavarian students proclaimed, “We demonstrate against hunger and against those who administer hunger.” Raising the specter of communist radicalization, the students requested “immediate help so that we do not rot away in misery and apathy or are driven into the arms of fanatically radical forces.” Finally, they criticized the “easy-going indifference” of German officials who did little to solve the food shortages facing Bavaria.\textsuperscript{130}

The resistance of students, workers, farmers, and local officials highlighted a key issue raised by the food crises that roiled Bavaria: the food problems threatened to undermine the larger goals of the occupation, namely creating a democratic Germany. The constant focus on food issues, although desperately important, distracted from other critical issues, including the American efforts at denazification and democratization. Additionally, the conflict between Americans and Bavarians over the scope of the crisis and how best to solve it soured the relationship between the two groups, at least temporarily, and limited their ability to cooperate on other issues. It is no coincidence that OMGB’s campaign of reorientation (covered in Chapter Four) did not begin in force until the food situation in Bavaria was stabilized. The renewed crisis of 1947 and early 1948, the worst since 1945, posed a major challenge. Even as American policy shifted in the aftermath of Byrnes’ Stuttgart speech, the crisis brought American and Bavarian frustrations to the fore. MGOs no longer had to circumvent US policy directives, yet they now faced an increasingly frustrated Bavarian populace that resented the continued crisis. As the

\textsuperscript{129} “Weekly Intelligence Report covering period Thursday, 4 March 1948, 2400 hours, to Thursday, 11 March 1948, 2400 hours,” 12 March 48, to Director, OMGB, Attn: Intelligence Branch, from Lt. Col. James C. Barnett, Pg. 5-6, History Reports Folder, Box 1426, 824 (A1): Corres. & Rel. Rec., 45-49, LSO Nürnberg, RG 260, NARA.

\textsuperscript{130} Unsigned Student Resolution, Food & Agriculture 1 Folder, Box 5, 628 (A1): Gen. Rec., 46-48, Rec. of Land Dir., RG 260, NARA.
spring planting season of 1948 approached there appeared no end in sight to the crisis, but within a year both Americans and Bavarians could put the years of crisis behind them.

**Away from Crisis, 1948-1949**

Early spring 1948 did not look promising for the food supply of Bavaria. The *Land* had experienced one of the coldest winters on record after a summer drought had wreaked havoc on the crops of farmers. Additionally, tensions between Americans and Bavarians reached a high point as both sides competed over who defined the severity of the food crisis. Despite the negative outlook, the food situation improved rapidly in 1948. Food shortages remained throughout the next twelve months, but an excellent harvest and improving relations between military government and their Bavarian counterparts signaled an improving situation. Additionally, the much-needed introduction of the Deutschmark in June 1948 provided some semblance of economic stability, while the announcement of the Marshall Plan provided unmistakable evidence of the shift in American policy. As a result, MGO efforts abandoned attempts to mitigate US policy. No longer challenging the will of Washington, Americans in Bavaria spent most of their time prodding Bavarians to comply with military government measures to address the food crisis. In American eyes, the Bavarians no longer took the shortages seriously. Nevertheless, an improved food situation characterized the last twelve months of the occupation and provided reasons for optimism.

By summer 1948 the food situation improved significantly. Early in the year such improvement appeared far away. Yet there were a several changes that laid the foundation for a quick turnaround. Dr. Alois Schlögl took over as Food Minister, replacing the rebellious Dr. Baumgartner, who had served as an irritant for most of the past year. Military government officials believed that Schlögl would at the least be less hostile than Baumgartner and welcomed
the change. In addition, the Americans and Bavarians agreed to conduct a combined crop yield estimate during July. This would, hopefully, remove one of the sources of irritation between the occupiers and occupied: differing expectations from each year’s harvest. Some of the sources of disagreement between the two camps were now gone and the foundation laid for a solution to the food crisis.

By the late spring and early summer, it appeared that a solution was at hand. Food planting and collections were more organized than at any previous time in the occupation. MGOs continued their indirect approach to encouraging deliveries, but the Bavarian government, especially under the new food minister, took a more active role in solving the crisis. In early April, for example, the Ministry of Food released a detailed “Kartoffel Anbauplan” to raise the planting and production of potatoes for the upcoming year. To meet the planning goal of 395,000 hectares, Schlögl proposed a “sign-up campaign,” educational programs, and a new incentive program where farmers received an allotment of sugar for each hectare of potatoes planted and then bonuses for meeting or exceeding their individual quota. Murray Van Wagoner called on all military government officials to “support this program and give the best kind of enthusiastic leadership to it.” To do so, Americans drew upon the familiar playbook of organizing meetings with local officials, conducting spot checks, exerting indirect pressure on Bavarians, and generally demonstrating their support of the program. While the potato program fit into the established pattern, military government also created a “good will garden” program to supplement the official rations received by Bavarians. Since many Germans received few

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vegetables, OMGB encouraged Americans throughout Bavaria to let civilians plant and cultivate small vegetable gardens in any unused land surrounding requisitioned homes or billets. It was important, Van Wagoner noted, “to encourage greater production wherever possible.”\(^{133}\) This program did just that, as the Americans wringed out calories wherever possible in occupied Bavaria.

These efforts seemingly paid off as reports of a fantastic crop flooded into military government offices throughout Bavaria. Gone was the crippling drought and heat of the previous summer. Instead, temperatures were cooler than average and rainfall was seventy-five percent above normal levels.\(^{134}\) By late August, Kenneth Ingwalson estimated a bread grain crop of nearly one million metric tons, a 125 percent of all 1947 production. Similarly, estimates for potato production skyrocketed to 4,620,000 tons, an increase of nearly 1,400,000 tons over the previous year’s crop. Without any evidence to back up his speculation, Ingwalson warned that these estimates could be ten percent below actual production.\(^{135}\) Most likely, the American remained suspicious of any numbers reported by Bavarians after the previous year’s conflict over crop estimates and due to continue frustration with hoarding by individual farmers.

In addition, the problems posed by the black market finally lessened. During mid-April prices remained high throughout Bavaria. In Regensburg, the acting MGO, Edward Garrison, reported that the price of coffee reached 600 RM per kilogram, while a kilogram of butter went


for 360 RM on the black market. Similarly high prices existed in Dachau. In that Landkreis a single kilogram of coffee cost 500 to 700 RM, butter ran 400 RM per kilo, and one liter of schnapps sold for up to 450 RM. However, after the combined British and American zones introduced a new currency, the Deutschmark (DM), on 20 June (discussed in the following chapter) black market activity and prices dropped significantly. From Dachau, Captain George Jacobson reported significantly lower prices throughout the Kreis. Coffee remained the most expensive product at 20 DM per kilogram, but butter now cost 9 DM per kilo and the price of a kilogram of flour dipped to 3 DM. The Dachau police also estimated, according to Jacobson, that black market activity had declined by fifty percent in the month following currency reform. In the small farming community of Mallersdorf outside of Regensburg, MGO William Neil reported similar developments. Some illegal buying and selling continued, but prices were far below legal prices. In essence, he explained, “black-market activity has practically ceased after the currency reform.” The same trend held true for the city of Regensburg itself. On 20 June, the cost of coffee on the black market was 700 RM per kilogram and butter sold at 500 RM per kilogram. Just eight days later those prices plummeted to 25 DM and 10 DM, respectively. Currency reform did not eliminate the black market; as many Americans had noted since 1945, only the return of a normal and healthy economy could do that. However, a new, stable currency restored German confidence and channeled black market activity back into the formal economy.

Bavarian farmers now had a significant economic incentive to comply with their production quotas and to stop hoarding. A weakened black market, therefore, stabilized the food situation and made it appear as if the years of crisis had passed.

Indeed, official rations and the quantity of food available through legal channels increased throughout the summer. In mid-July Ingwalson predicted that world food production, the Marshall Plan, and Bavarian production would make a standard ration of 1,800 to 2,000 calories possible in the near future.141 Expanding production and delivery numbers seemingly backed up Ingwalson’s optimistic attitude. During July cattle deliveries jumped an astounding 183 percent over the previous month, in part due to currency reform. Butter and cheese production also rose by 91 and 71.6 percent, respectively. Even vegetables, which had been in rare supply for months, existed in “abundance…all over.”142 Higher official rations quickly resulted from this significant uptick in food production. During July, the average Bavarian received over 1,900 calories per day from their official ration, which was some 600 calories more than the June ration and 725 calories higher than in May. Additionally, many Bavarians could supplement their ration with 250 to 350 calories from unrationed fruits, vegetables, and other goods.143 By late August the glut of available food decreased somewhat and official rations declined, but the authorized ration for September remained far higher than during the winter at 1,845 calories. Taken together, July, August, and September represented the highest rations since

the occupation began. To many Bavarians, and some Americans, the food crisis appeared, miraculously, over. Due to better weather and currency reform the production and delivery of food skyrocketed during the summer. Rations remained below the 2,500 to 2,800 calories that military government hoped to ultimately achieve, but after the major food shortages of the previous three years the crisis appeared gone.

Despite the improvement in the food situation, or because of it, a variety of problems remained. Farmers, for example, struggled with falling prices for agricultural goods while the prices for consumer goods steadily increased. Official prices for potatoes dropped from 16 DM per zentner (50 kg) to 14.5 DM, so if Bavarian producers wished to sell for higher prices they had to participate in the black market. A German clerk in the farming community of Mallersdorf, E. Hans Krista, sounded the warning about falling agricultural prices and the rising prices of consumer goods during September 1948. Prices for machines, clothing, and fertilizer, Krista explained, were “substantially raised” in the aftermath of currency reform. The price of nitrogen fertilizer in Mallersdorf shot up nearly 200 percent. Meanwhile, the prices farmers received for their goods declined steadily. In mid-September, no farmers in the Kreis received more than 3.5 DM per zentner of potatoes, which was well below the official price. The low price of wheat, 9 DM per zentner, exacerbated the problem. The result was a rising cost of living and increasingly frustrated farmers. In Freising the Landrat reported that the rural

population resented continued price control on agricultural products limited their income while de-rationed industrial products for farming, like fertilizer, skyrocketed in price. The Bizonal agencies in Frankfurt raised official prices in mid-October as a response to the complaints of farmers; the price of wheat and rye rose by nearly 26 percent, while the price for cattle also rose by 33 percent. These measures provided much-needed relief for Bavaria farmers, yet their frustration remained as occupation authorities de-rationed larger numbers of industrial goods but kept agricultural products under strict controls.

While farmers dealt with declining prices for their goods, urban residents faced rising food prices as food wholesalers sought to maximize their profit from the expanding supply of foodstuffs. Just as the prices paid for agricultural products could not keep up with rising prices, urban wages stagnated as the price of food in cities rose. The hardest hit, the working class, offered the most vocal protests. On 21 August, a public meeting of the Bavarian Trade Union in Kelheim railed against the black market and high prices. One Herr Wolf, a Landtag deputy and a secretary of the Bayerischer Gewerkschaftsbund of Niederbayern-Oberpfalz, criticized the “price dictatorship” of food dealers and producers. Wolf called for strict price caps and severe punishments against any business that violated them. Then in October all butchers in the Landkreise of Berchtesgaden, Traunstein, and Laufen announced they would close from 18 October to 1 November to protest high meat prices, which often sold for twice the legal price.

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The result, like the situation with the farmers, was a rising dissatisfaction among urban residents. Many blamed black marketers, the Bavarian government, and OMGB for their plight, but increasingly the non-agricultural population blamed the farmers for the food situation. The improving food situation probably exacerbated this frustration. Bavarians of all stripes simply wanted a return to normal and the relatively prosperous summer months made it appear that a sense of normalcy would soon return. Continued rationing and price fluctuations, however, dampened their collective mood.

Continued tension between American and Bavarian officials also remained. In the eyes of most military government officials, the Bavarians got complacent at the first sign of prosperity. According to this line of thought, the rapid improvement in the food situation during the summer convinced the Bavarians that the worst of the food situation was over and now American authorities had to remind the German population that food problems remained. American complaints about Bavarian complacency began as early as the end of September. On 29 September Ingwalson warned that the food situation remained “critical” because military government still imported sixty percent of the grain required in western Germany. Potato shortages the following spring also threatened if the excellent potato harvest was not properly stored for the winter.151 A month later the American again sounded alarm. “Deep roads are being made into Bavaria’s food supply,” Ingwalson explained, and rations could drop to 1,300 or 1,400 calories. Yet key Bavarian figures appeared not to take the situation serious. Food Minister Schlögl, for example, proclaimed, “The former manner of compulsory…controls can no longer be maintained.” Additionally, the president of the Bavarian Farmer’s Association wrote to

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Schlögl: “Don’t run after controls – you can’t catch them any longer.”\textsuperscript{152} Comments such as these demonstrated to Ingwalson that Bavarian officials were complacent and unprepared for the approaching winter.

Unlike Baumgartner, however, Schlögl did not aggressively push back against this American conceptualization of the food problem. In late October, the Food Minister addressed a crowd at a meeting in Nürnberg. He recognized the growing concerns with the new Deutschmark, particularly the uneven circulation of the new currency, and criticized the Bizonal agencies in Frankfurt for not consulting the ministers in each Land before issuing their directives. Schlögl even explained his distaste for government controls, but acknowledged their necessity at the present. Since the “welfare of the State” was at stake, the situation required the “severest rationing.”\textsuperscript{153} The new Food Minister clearly possessed his own reservations about the food shortages, but he did not embrace the rebelliousness associated with his predecessor and limited the scope of the renewed tension between the Americans and the Bavarians.

Nevertheless, American frustration with the Bavarian population grew yet again. An Ingwalson speech circulated to MGOs in early November gave voice to this tension. In the speech, given at a series of reorientation meetings addressing the food situation, Ingwalson was blunt. Addressing his German audience, he said: “Many Bavarians have come to believe that the really serious food shortage ended with currency reform. Right now I want to say in very plain language to all Bavarians that the food shortage is not over.” Expressing his frustration, he emphasized that while the United State continued to import food to Bavaria many Germans

\textsuperscript{152} “Status of Food Situation and Action Required,” 26 Oct 48, to Land Director, OMGB, from Kenneth W. Ingwalson, Pg. 1 & 3, Food & Agriculture 1 Folder, Box 5, 628 (A1): Gen. Rec., 46-48, Rec. of Land Dir., RG 260, NARA.

\textsuperscript{153} “Food and Agriculture Meeting in Nürnberg,” 26 Oct 48, Pg. 2-3, Subsistence Stores Folder, Box 1431, 824 (A1): Corres. & Rel. Rec., 45-49, LSO Nürnberg, RG 260, NARA.
participated in the black market, thereby exacerbating food shortages.\footnote{154} As the Food, Agriculture, and Forestry Branch explained to MGOs in December, “M[ilitary] G[overnment] has done its part; it is now up to the Bavarians.”\footnote{155}

Several other factors drove American frustration and posed problems to the food situation in Bavaria. German resentment of and resistance to American-sponsored food collection programs continued. Farmers and Bürgermeisters still criticized the delivery quotas for grain, potatoes, and meat as unrealistic and unfair. One meeting in Nürnberg lambasted the tendency of American officials to make promises about improving the food situation but then shift the blame to the Bavarian government when their promises fell through. “If the Bavarian government is unable to meet the promises made by Military Government,” the meeting’s attendees concluded, “it should feel compelled to resign and leave the administration of Germany to American Military Government.”\footnote{156} Farmers also complained about their position vis-à-vis other trades and industries. Rural Bavarians felt it unfair that Bizonal agencies required them to export food to northern Germany, but did not require German industries in cities like Hamburg to send farming equipment to Bavaria.\footnote{157} In a similar vein, E. Hans Krista reported from Mallersdorf in late November that the local farmers resented that their work remained under strict controls while other industries were granted “certain liberties.”\footnote{158}

\footnotetext[154]{“How can You be Assured of 1800 Calories this Year?” in “Facts for Your Forums,” 4 Nov 48, OMGB, Pg. 3, Food & Agriculture 1 Folder, Box 5, 628 (A1): Gen. Rec., 46-48, Rec. of Land Dir., RG 260, NARA.}
Lagging food deliveries, despite an excellent crop, undermined the progress made during the summer months and contributed to the American frustration with the Bavarian population. Food deliveries and collections skyrocketed in the immediate aftermath of currency reform, but as the end of 1948 approached collections plummeted. In some cases, they even lagged behind the rates for 1947. Delivery problems first appeared in the meat supply during September. During the month, voluntary deliveries of meat declined to just 4,000 tons, as compared to the 8,700 tons delivered during July. The problem hit all regions of Bavaria and contributed to the rising meat prices that led to a strike of butchers in Berchtesgaden. Yet the problem even impacted agricultural communities. In Mallersdorf the supply of meat “almost collapsed” by the middle of October and few butchers could get meat at “halfway normal prices.” Military government attributed the shortages to renewed black market activity, which swallowed up enormous quantities of meat and diverted the supply away from legal channels.

Bread grain and potato deliveries also proved particularly problematic. On 15 November collections stood at an estimated 490,000 tons of potatoes and 135,905 tons of grain. These numbers appeared promising but were, in fact, already behind schedule. Bavarian farmers had delivered just 18 percent of the yearly grain quota of 763,295 tons, compared to the expected total of 30 percent. To remedy the situation, Food Minister Schlögl implemented new measures to secure deliveries of food. Bavarian inspectors, controlled by Munich, would identify the farmers with the worst delivery records in each Kreis. The inspectors would then make “examples” of the farmers by confiscating their quota, imposing a fine, and then publicizing their

case locally.\textsuperscript{161} Within the first two weeks of December the Food Ministry confiscated 1,000 zentners of grain and imposed 30,500 DM worth of fines. Deliveries improved somewhat but still lagged far behind stated goals. By 26 December an estimated 324,328 tons of grain and 36,005 tons of livestock arrived at Bavarian collections points. These totals represented 42 percent of the quota for both grain and meat, but Bavarian plans called for delivery of 70 percent of the grain quota and 58 percent of the meat quota by 31 December.\textsuperscript{162} As deliveries lagged, many Americans feared a repeat of the crisis from the previous winter and increased the indirect pressure on Bavarian officials and farmers.

In January 1949, the Bavarian Food Ministry, prodded by military government, introduced yet another new program to spur deliveries of much-need foodstuffs. Ministry investigators held meetings with \textit{Bürgermeisters} to review the delivery records of local farmers. Each \textit{Bürgermeister} was then given three to four days to raise the deliveries for those farmers delinquent on their quotas. If the farmers still lagged after that, a new round of confiscations would begin. Additionally, the Ministry began a new incentive program. Farmers meeting 80 percent of their quota could purchase corn as fodder for their animals at a ratio of one ton of corn for every two tons delivered. Those farmers who delivered their entire quota received a far more favorable ratio: they could buy 1.25 tons of corn fodder for each ton of wheat delivered.\textsuperscript{163} Despite the efforts of the Bavarians and the Americans, food deliveries never reached their stated goals. In \textit{Landkreis} Wolfstein Lieutenant Robert Rivet, warned that a mere 60

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item[\textsuperscript{162}] “Collections Progress,” 27 Dec 48, to Land Director, OMGB, from Vernon W. Darter, Food & Agriculture 1 Folder, Box 5, 628 (A1): Gen. Rec., 46-48, Rec. of Land Dir., RG 260, NARA.
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percent of the grain quota would be met that year. In Mallersdorf the 31 December goal of 70 percent delivery of the grain quota was not met until the end of February, which was the original deadline for full delivery of the bread grain quota in Bavaria. By the end of March, bread grain deliveries in Bavaria totaled 648,600 tons. This number represented 74 percent of expected deliveries from July 1948 through March 1949 and 68 percent of the assigned yearly quota. The results of the food collection drives of 1948 and 1949 appeared disappointing yet again. Yet compared to past crises, the situation had improved. The new deliveries represented 130 percent of the total grain delivered during the crisis months of 1947-1948. Compared to the worst of the postwar food shortages, the problems of 1948 and 1949 appeared relatively mild. Americans, however, still predicted dire shortages if Bavarians did not fully comply with their delivery quotas. Kenneth Ingwalson, for example, warned that the fat ration could drop from 625 grams a week to 400 if Bavarian farmers did not fulfill their responsibilities. Yet the threatened shortages never materialized and the lagging collections did not hamper the food situation. Instead, the threat of new shortages was used as a tool by some Americans, especially Kenneth Ingwalson, to pressure Bavarians into greater compliance with the food delivery programs. Ingwalson, after all, had been one of the loudest voices in OMGB criticizing what he perceived as Bavarian complacency after currency reform in June 1948. Therefore, the warnings of pending food shortages served more as a motivational tool to encourage officials and the population to take the food situation serious even as conditions improved significantly.

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166 “Collections Progress,” 25 March 49, to Land Director, OMGB, from Kenneth W. Ingwalson, Food, Agriculture, and Forestry Division Folder, Box 283, 643 (A1): Land Director’s Records Relating to OMGBY Units, 1948-1949, Rec. of Land Dir., RG 260, NARA.
By the spring of 1949 the overall food situation was far more stable than it had been eighteen months before. Collections still lagged, but rations never made a significant drop again and actual consumption steadily increased as more food appeared on the market. During April, for example, the meat ration increased to 600 grams per week. Meanwhile, “abundant” supplies of potatoes meant that urban residents could buy fifty kilograms for as little as 4 DM.\footnote{168} April also represented the ninth consecutive month that the official ration met or exceeded 1,800 calories. During the month, all rationed items were supplied “without difficulty” and the average Bavarian could purchase an additional 300 to 500 calories from non-ration fruits, vegetable, poultry, or eggs, driving actual consumption to approximately 2,100 calories.\footnote{169} By the time the West German \textit{L"{a}nder} approved the Basic Law in May 1949 and the Federal Republic of Germany came into existence the food situation in Bavaria reached a new normal. In June, the official ration remained above 1,800 calories for the twelfth consecutive month. Potatoes existed in “unlimited” quantities and the fat ration stood at 800 grams per week, compared to the meager 100 grams in May 1948.\footnote{170} Bavarian farmers embraced the return of some sort of normalcy, but also pushed for a complete return to normal. Throughout Bavaria they continued to criticize ration controls and official prices. While rationing remained and shortages would continue for several years, the occupation of shortages was no longer as desperate is it once had been.

\textbf{Conclusion}

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\item[169] “April Food Situation,” 22 April 49, to Land Director, OMGB, from Kenneth W. Ingwalson, Food, Agriculture, and Forestry Division Folder, Box 283, 643 (A1): Land Dir. Rec. Rel. to OMGBY Units, 48-49, Rec. of Land Dir., RG 260, NARA.
\item[170] “Food Rationing Situation,” 23 June 49, to Land Director, OMGB, from Kenneth W. Ingwalson, Food, Agriculture, and Forestry Division Folder, Box 283, 643 (A1): Land Dir. Rec. Rel. to OMGBY Units, 48-49, Rec. of Land Dir., RG 260, NARA.
\end{footnotes}
In 1949, the food crises of 1945 through early 1948 appeared far away. Bavaria, and occupied Germany as a whole, still faced problems, but no longer did the desperate shortages of the early years of the occupation impact day-to-day life in Bavaria. Yet it had been a difficult four years for all involved. Urban residents, obviously, faced crippling food shortages that largely remained beyond their control. Bavarian farmers struggled to make ends meet in a country where low official prices limited their ability to buy desirable and expensive consumer goods. They also faced near unrelenting pressure to increase their production since Bavaria was now the key to feeding all western Germany. German officials, too, faced a challenging situation. Stuck between two separate groups – the Americans and the Bavarian population – they were forced to walk a fine line between the two, sometimes pushing back against American demands and other times pressuring the population to meet the latest delivery quotas.

Finally, the food crisis presented the American occupiers with a problem they were little prepared to deal with. The depth of the initial crisis, coupled with the punitive aspects of American policy towards Germany, nearly overwhelmed military government during 1945 and 1946, but American authorities ultimately worked out a consistent response to the crisis. Faced with a decidedly unmilitary task but sympathetic to the plight of the Bavarian population, military government officials placed most of the responsibility for solving the food shortages directly in the hands of the Bavarians themselves. Embracing the American policy of returning authority to German officials as rapidly as possible allowed MGOs to work around the more constricting aspects of US policy. In the name of promoting Bavarian responsibility American officials in Bavaria could encourage a minor form of agricultural reconstruction, even before US policy shifted. This approach often led to tension between the empowered Germans and their occupiers, yet combined with the efforts of policy elites in Frankfurt, Berlin, and Washington,
D.C., it successfully stabilized the situation by 1949. The stubborn persistence of American military government officers in Bavaria did not solve the problem of food shortages; those would exist for several more years. But their efforts did help create a sense of stability that allowed the other aspects of the occupation, particularly economic reconstruction and reorientation, to take off.
Chapter 3: Rebuilding Bavaria: The Limits of Military Government

“While no extensive economic survey has been possible it is known that extraordinary hardships and suffering on the part of the civil population will undoubtedly occur with resultant widespread epidemics and political upheavals…”
- Lt. Col. Eugene Keller, 22 June 1945

“The efficiency and industriousness of the Germans had already produced great changes in the past months…Hard work, initiative, and the desire to emerge from the ruins of war were in evidence wherever one looked. The Germans were bringing their country out of chaos.”
- Sgt. Walter Krause

While American occupation officials coped with the task of feeding the beleaguered Bavarian population, they simultaneously faced the arduous task of promoting the economic reconstruction of Bavaria. As outlined in the first chapter, the war left the German economy in shambles. Years of aerial bombardment and then some six months of intense ground combat devastated the foundation of economic life in occupied Germany. Industrial factories throughout the country were in ruins. Ravaged transportation networks meant that what little production existed could not be transported and that the mutually-dependent regions of the German economy did not remain in contact with each other. Without food from the east or Bavaria, the industrialized Ruhr faced starvation. And without the coal and basic industrial production from the Ruhr, Bavaria confronted economic crisis. Non-existent foreign trade meant that few funds existed to pay for the imports of food and raw materials desperately needed to simply ward of disaster, let alone rebuild a functioning economy. Coupled with the widespread destruction of urban housing and the significant increase in population due to refugees and ethnic German

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expellees from Eastern Europe, these issues posed a major problem to the Americans tasked with overseeing the occupation in Bavaria.

From the beginning, however, the avenues of action available to occupation officials were circumscribed and what actions they could take often produced limited, or even contradictory, results. Early in the occupation, American policy, as outlined in JCS 1076, constrained American actions. American policymakers had not yet embraced reconstruction and accepted the resuscitation of economic life only to avoid “disease and unrest.” Military government officials in Bavaria, however, again circumvented official policy to ward off imminent crisis. Convinced that some form of economic reconstruction was necessary to rebuild Bavarian society, American officials promoted the revival of basic economic activity and pushed production by those industries that could provide needed supplies for the occupying army. These activities, nonetheless, were curbed by the American desire to turn over responsibility to the Bavarians as quickly as possible. The early efforts at restarting the Bavarian economy, therefore, proceeded at fits and starts. While most occupation officials recognized the importance of providing basic economic services and consumer goods, the demands of the regular Army often undermined the supply of such goods. Additionally, the Americans grew increasingly frustrated with the actions of Bavarian officials during this initial period of the occupation, even though they wanted Germans to take responsibility for solving their own economic problems. Along with the growing problem of refugees and expellees, continued labor shortages, and constant rumors that undermined Bavarian morale, economic recovery was minimal during the first eighteen months of the occupation, despite the efforts of Bavarian military government officials.

Beginning in 1947, with the change in Anglo-American policy, new, more vigorous efforts at economic reconstruction appeared. Secretary of State James Byrnes’ “Speech of Hope”
in Stuttgart in September 1946 embraced reconstruction and policy, while the economic merger of the British and American zones on January 1, 1947, and the announcement of the Marshall Plan in April 1948 provided more effective means at rebuilding the German economy. In Bavaria, this provided occupation officials with more avenues for reconstruction, but their options still remained fairly limited, particularly since the goal of turning over responsibility to German officials remained. American frustration with their Bavarian counterparts, therefore, remained and even mounted with minimal economic improvement. Additionally, occupation officers still faced the sometimes-contradictory effects of reconstruction efforts. The introduction of a new currency in June 1948 provided immediate short-term benefit, but its effects quickly began to wear off. Throughout late 1948 and early 1949 a growing money shortage and declining confidence among Bavarians threatened to undermine recent success. The continued issues surrounding labor, expellees, and housing also demonstrated the limited impact of American efforts to rebuild the economy of Bavaria.

Ultimately, the Germans themselves were responsible for the *Wirtschaftswunder* (“economic miracle”) of West Germany. They pursued reconstruction throughout the 1950s and into the 1960s, well after the American military occupation ended. For the Americans, however, efforts at economic reconstruction proved particularly frustrating. American policy, for nearly two years, limited the options available to MGOs inclined to challenge official policy. Even after 1947 economic growth advanced in fits and starts, while new and old issues seemingly undermined whatever success was achieved. Military government officials consistently grappled with the economic issues plaguing postwar Bavaria and they struggled to see the positive outcomes of their actions. American efforts at economic reconstruction in Bavaria clearly demonstrated the limits of military government in occupied Germany.
Crisis and Limited Reconstruction, 1945-1947

The Bavarian economy encountered by Americans in May 1945 had virtually ceased functioning. Years of aerial bombardment and then months of ground combat pummeled economic life into pieces. The horrific economic conditions throughout 1945 presented American military government officers with a massive, and sometimes overwhelming, challenge. In order to fully understand the challenges facing American officials, therefore, one must examine the economic conditions plaguing Bavaria throughout the first six months of the occupation. Doing so will provide some glimpse into the enormity of the obstacles facing Americans and Bavarians alike.

The greatest economic difficulty facing Bavaria throughout 1945 – which would continue to haunt the occupation for several years – was the critical shortage of coal. Almost immediately, military government officials warned of pending calamity due to the shortage of the fuel that was the lifeblood of the Bavarian economy. In June, the G-5 Section of the Third U.S. Army warned that “the most critical item of civilian supply” was coal. During the month, approximately 20,000 tons of coal was available for civilian use in Bavaria, well below the minimum requirements of 120,000 tons. Without sufficient quantities of coal, nearly all aspects of the Bavarian economy struggled to recuperate. In Munich, for example, the municipal gas plant could not function without a steady supply of coal. Without the gas plant, Lt. Col. Eugene Keller reported, “many of the basic [essentials] of healthful life” in Munich would not exist. The plant fueled some seventy percent of the city’s bakeries, provided heating to nearly 8,000 hospital beds, and served as the primary cooking fuel for much of the city under normal conditions. Additionally, the city received just fifty-eight percent of the coal required to maintain “minimum civilian necessities.”

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3 G-5 Section, Historical Report, May-June 1945, Pg. 16-17, Reports of Operations 9 May 45-30 November 45 Folder, Box 1, 42823 (A1): Reports of Operations, 1945-46, RG 338, NARA.
Bakeries received 1635 tons compared to requirements of 2360 tons and the city’s restaurants received approximately one-quarter of needed coal. Meanwhile, hospitals in Munich required some 1790 tons of coal to operate at a minimal level, yet they received just 1372 tons during the months of June. Keller warned that “extraordinary hardship and suffering on the part of the civil population will undoubtedly occur” without a steady supply of both coal and gas.4

By early July, however, Bavarian officials added their voices to the warnings of a dire fuel shortage. The Oberbürgermeister of Munich, Dr. Karl Scharnagl, warned that the supply of coal to the city was the cause of “much anxiety” and that “the sorrows with respect to the fuel supply are increasing daily.” The allotment of twenty pounds of coal for each member of a household was “absolutely insufficient,” while the domestic supply of coke threatened to run out by the end of July. Scharnagl “begged” that the Americans restart production at the city’s gas plant and that they release parts of the large coal reserve held by the Third Army to increase the fuel supply as rapidly as possible.5 The Munich Wirtschaftsamt (Economic Office) also painted a grim picture of the fuel situation. Prewar deliveries of coal and coke amounted to approximately 1.1 million tons per year. The Wirtschaftsamt estimated that some 653,000 tons of coal and coke were required to provide “nearly normal heating” in postwar Munich. Deliveries, however, dropped steadily during the war, from 857,111 tons in 1942/43 to 456,018 tons in 1944/45.6 By the middle of August those deliveries had “ceased almost entirely.” Coal mines in Upper Bavaria

produced 50,000 tons each month, less than half of their prewar output of 110,000 tons per month. The Third Army seized some 30,000 tons of that production, leaving a mere 20,000 tons for civilian needs each month. Production in the Ruhr mines, which provided most of Bavaria’s coal, was in even worse shape. Monthly production plummeted from ten million tons per month to just 1.5 million tons in July 1945. Additionally, the number of employed miners dropped from 510,000 to 145,000, while thirty to fifty percent of work shifts were often missing.  

Together with widespread war destruction and ravaged transportation networks, the fuel shortage in 1945 crippled the Bavarian economy. Industries throughout the Land operated at a minimal level, if they even operated at all. In Kreis Eschenbach, for example, the activity of many major companies and factories slowed to a crawl. The Maximilianshütte, which produced brown iron ore in Auerbach, normally employed 400 to 500 individuals. Even though the plant was in order, however, it only employed some twenty to thirty people due to a lack of transportation and machine oil. Similarly, a men’s clothing factory in Auerbach employed a mere fifty workers when their normal workforce numbered 600 and the lack of raw materials threatened to shut down what minimal production existed. Finally, the Broncefärbwerke A.G. in Rothenbruck employed just one-quarter of its usual workforce of 120.  

Nürnberg industry, meanwhile, possessed a mere ten percent of normal peacetime capacity at the end of the war and operated at a miniscule eight percent of regular capacity.  

Kreis Eschenbach and the city of Nürnberg reflected the reality of economic stagnation throughout Bavaria, and Germany at large. Shortages of fuel, rolling stock, and personnel

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hampered transportation. Dwindling coal stocks crippled economic activity. American observers quickly noted the now nonexistent integration of the German economy. Julian Bach wrote, “This flow and integration no longer exist…Communications and transportation are either bombed out, lacking or short of fuel, and neither raw material nor finished goods as yet flow freely or even perceptibly between the Zones.” On October 31 the city of Regensburg possessed a mere two days’ supply of coal. November coal allocations for Bavarian industry amounted to 69,300 tons, approximately twenty percent of prewar use, and total allocations were just sixteen percent of “normal” consumption. The result was a nearly non-existent economy. Bavarian steel factories produced just 125 tons a day during the month of October. In September 1945 shoe production – an industry vital for equipping workers with the necessary supplies to work – reached a mere thirty percent of normal. 225,000 pairs of shoes were produced in the Land, a total that reached thirty percent of normal production. The Bavarian economy was at a standstill and posed a major challenge to the Americans tasked with overseeing the occupation of the Land.

To address these challenges, however, military government officials possessed few options during the early years of the occupation. Official policy, the requirements of the Army, and attempts to turn responsibility over to the Bavarians as quickly as possible constrained their actions. The result was some economic recovery, but American actions possessed limited effects as persistent problems plagued the Bavarian economy. American policy represented the clearest constraint on action in Bavaria. As discussed in Chapter 1, U.S. policy possessed a significant punitive tone, despite some of the loopholes crafted within JCS 1067. American commanders in Germany, particularly General Lucius Clay, stretched the confines of this directive to the

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10 Bach, America’s Germany, 106
maximum to ward off catastrophe, but its negative tone seemingly limited the prospects of economic reconstruction in Germany.

American military government officers, however, increasingly favored some form of economic recovery throughout Germany, including Bavaria. As was discussed in Chapter 1, the Army’s long-term planning for another postwar occupation, which occurred throughout the interwar period, and the service’s institutional culture emphasized short-term military objectives, particularly “military necessity” and the quick restoration of civil government. This culture engrained a noticeable strain of pragmatism in regard to economic reconstruction in any potential military occupation. For many MGOs, therefore, the most important task was avoiding catastrophe and the revitalization “normal” civic life. Faced with the monumental challenges of feeding a defeated populace, providing shelter, caring for displaced persons, reestablishing basic transportation services, and many other issues, American officials saw recovery as more important than the punitive aspects of U.S. policy.

At the same time, the growing sympathy for the German populace that led military government officials to mitigate the effects of American policy in regard to the food crises also influenced attitudes towards economic reconstruction. As historian Petra Goedde demonstrated, GIs increasingly identified the German populace as a weakened, feminized population in need of protection. This feminization of Germany led to individual acts that circumvented US policy towards their former enemy. American GIs provided badly needed food, clothing, and other goods to both German girlfriends and children. In addition, participating in the black market,

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while it often undermined the official economy, helped circulate otherwise rare goods in Bavaria. Some Americans also admired the ability of Germans to survive and slowly rebuild in the chaos that characterized postwar Bavaria. “The efficiency and industriousness of the Germans had already produced great changes in the past months…” Sergeant Walter Krause wrote. “Hard work, initiative, and the desire to emerge from the ruins of war were in evidence wherever one looked. The Germans were bringing their country out of chaos.”¹⁵ This sympathy, much like it had it dealing with the food shortages, led many military government officials to question the vindictive tone of American policy in Germany. Julian Bach explained, “…there is a growing and very serious doubt as to just how far industry can be removed from or destroyed in Germany…”¹⁶

In Munich, Lt. Col. Eugene Keller reflected this early sympathy towards segments of the Bavarian populace and a tendency towards reconstruction. An engineer in civilian life, Keller traced his descent from Alsatian immigrants to the United States and, unlike many MGOs, spoke fluent German. Additionally, he was a practicing Roman Catholic, which helped him fit in to predominantly Catholic Bavaria.¹⁷ From the beginning of the occupation Keller adopted the pragmatic approach to military government that the Army had cultivated during the interwar era. He appointed pre-Nazi Oberbürgermeister Karl Scharnagl as Munich’s first postwar Oberbürgermeister, hoping that an experienced official would facilitate the recovery of the city. The MGO also emphasized the practical experience of his fellow detachment officers. According to Keller, each had been “chosen from civilian volunteers with experience in the problems of civil government and administration…”¹⁸ Ever concerned with pragmatism, the Army had

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¹⁵ Krause, So I Was a Sergeant, 54-55.  
¹⁶ Bach, America’s Germany, 130.  
¹⁷ Boehling, A Question of Priorities, 110 & 112.  
¹⁸ Quoted in Boehling, A Question of Priorities, 109.
assigned some of its most qualified military government officials to Munich to address the many problems that plagued the city in the aftermath of the war. Combined with the growing sympathy for the civilian population, this pragmatism pointed towards a willingness to challenge official policy in postwar Bavaria.

Despite the growing support for some form of reconstruction, American officials in Bavaria possessed few options when it came to rebuilding Bavaria throughout 1945 and 1946. One such option focused largely on providing basic services and supplies to the occupation forces. The occupying Army required large supplies of replacement parts for vehicles, materials to repair potential barracks, and even beer. To meet the Army’s demand, the Production Control Agency supervised the resumption of production in Bavaria for the Army’s needs. The PCA tracked down “every local industry capable of producing anything needed for Army supply.” If the industry could produce anything useful, the PCA set them to work by providing priority access to raw materials and labor. During May 1945, for example, eight industrial firms received approval to produce materials for the Army and “essential civilian needs” and they were joined by eleven additional firms by the end of June. Similarly, much of the operating industry in Nürnberg was tied up in work for the Army. During the summer of 1945 Machinenfabrik-Augsburg-Nürnberg (MAN) was reconditioning over 2,000 truck engines for the Third Army and then had to refurbish an additional 200 Ford engines. Similarly, Süddeutsche Apparatan Fabrik (SAF), which manufactured telephones, received instructions to give priority to Army needs or German requirements.¹⁹ The PCA was not concerned about the rehabilitation of the German economy and remained focused on providing goods for the Army in Bavaria. Nevertheless, the organization was “in fact responsible for the rehabilitation of German

¹⁹ Bach, America’s Germany, 107.
industry.” The G-5 Section also encouraged reconstruction for Army usage, but more openly operated on the assumption that “the more economic rehabilitation there was, the better.”

The primacy of American demands extended to the trickle of coal coming out of Bavarian mines during the summer of 1945. Occupation forces required substantial amounts of coal to fuel Army power stations, fire American bakeries, heat barracks, or provide fuel to Bavarian businesses producing for Army requirements. To provide the necessary fuel, the Upper Bavarian coal mines operated under the control of the quartermaster of the Third Army. Army needs encouraged the resumption of mining and limited economic recovery, but simultaneously exacerbated the coal shortage. Under occupation regulations, the Army received as much as eighty percent of the production from Bavarian coal mines, which left limited amounts for civilian use.

During July 1945, for example, some seventy-six percent of coal production from Upper Bavarian mines – 41,100.3 tons – went to occupation forces, while the Bavarian Economic Office (Landeswirtschaftsamt) received 12,350.85 tons, approximately twenty-three percent of production. With the Army taking the vast majority of Bavarian coal and transportation difficulties limiting the arrival of coal from the Ruhr, the existing shortages became even worse. The Munich Wirtschaftsamt warned that the city faced a deficit of 201,509.5 tons for just the five main consumer groups: hospitals, bakeries, small local industry, households,

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and laundries. While Army requirements sometimes rehabilitated some local industries and military government entities like the PCA saw their tasks, at least somewhat, as a means to restart the German economy, these limited American actions also inhibited recovery. The ever-present demands of the occupying Army funneled desperately needed materials and production away from the Bavarian economy.

As American demands both supported and limited economic reconstruction, military government officials pursued the other limited means available to them to circumvent U.S. policy and restart Bavarian economic life. Reflecting the institutional culture that emphasized pragmatism and restoration of normal civic society, MGOs turned responsibility over to local Bavarian officials as rapidly as possible. In June 1945, for example, Bavarian officials were ordered to take over responsibility for key repairs to road transportation in the Land. They were to secure all stocks of spare parts for vehicles, to reopen civilian garages and repair shops, and to begin the repair of vehicles as rapidly as possible.

The following year American officials similarly pressured their Bavarian counterparts to collect sufficient firewood to cover the expected coal shortages during the upcoming winter. On July 20, 1946, high-ranking military government officers met with the Bürgermeisters of Nürnberg and Fürth to discuss the supply of wood to the Nürnberg-Fürth Enclave. The enclave commander, one Colonel Williams, emphasized that the collection of wood had to begin immediately and then outlined the procedure for supplying the alternative fuel. Bavarian officials retained responsibility for the program. The local Bürgermeister would make a request to the appropriate Forest Master, who would then cut the necessary wood with labor on hand. The wood would then, under German

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24 “Status of Civilian Road Transport in Germany,” 26 June 45, to Dr. C.B. Hoover, from Lt. Col. J.L.S. Snead, Pg. 1-2, Economy-Germany Folder, Box 1009, 368: Foreign (Occupied) Area Reports, 1945-1954, RG 407, NARA.
supervision, be shipped to the city and distributed. Williams proclaimed that the Army would try to acquire equipment to aid the civilian program, but emphasized that Bavarian officials should plan to work with the equipment on hand.\textsuperscript{25}

The MGO of Nürnberg, Lt. Col. A.T. Callicott, diligently followed Williams’ instructions. He reminded local officials that they, not military government, were ultimately responsible for the supply of fuel wood to the city, all while he repeatedly informed military government headquarters in Munich that the Bavarians lacked basic tools to carry out the program, including 1100 axes and thirty-eight power saws. Callicott was optimistic that prompt action on the part of the Bavarians, coupled with the supply of tools, would collect enough firewood for the winter.\textsuperscript{26} The MGO’s optimism, however, was misplaced. By late September, Callicott requested significant American assistance with the program. German labor cut significant amounts of wood, but problems with rail and road transportation left much of it sitting in the forests and just fourteen percent of the 325,000 cubic meters needed for the winter had arrived in the city. Although Callicott had previously followed the American policy of handing responsibility over to German authorities, he now argued that it was better for the Army to give assistance now instead of when the situation became an emergency. Therefore, he encouraged OMGB to provide Army trucks to haul wood into Nürnberg during October and November while


the days were longer and the weather remained tolerable. American officials ultimately agreed and by mid-October, authorized Army trucks to meet the needs of Nürnberg.

Much like the response to the food crises of the postwar years, military government officers sought economic recovery by forcing Bavarian officials to administer most attempts at economic reconstruction. By placing responsibility in the hands of local officials, efforts at economic reconstruction would, in part, look like the efforts of Germans themselves, not their American counterparts. This provided an indirect means to mitigate the effects of US policy towards Germany. Additionally, the practice reflected the Army’s broader institutional preference, developed during the interwar years, to return responsibility to local civic officials as rapidly as possible. Military government officials would not directly intervene in their decisions, except for emergencies. When disaster threatened, however, that intervention was limited, such as providing transportation for the shipment of badly-needed fuel.

Beyond working through local officials, military government officials used other methods to circumvent American policy and rebuild Bavaria. They often conducted surveys to determine the problems facing the Bavarian economy or served as mediators between German businesses and the government. During August 1945, Bavarian military government headquarters established an Economics and Supply Branch to oversee such activities. Their activities were limited during 1945 as the immediate crises of food and fuel or needs of the occupation army took precedence. Yet beginning in early 1946 military government officials used the limited options available to them to promote greater levels of economic reconstruction.

29 G-5 Section, Historical Report, August 1945, Pg. 1, Reports of Operations 9 May 45-30 November 45 Folder, Box 1, 42823 (A1): Rpts of Ops, 45-46, RG 338, NARA.
Specifically, the Americans focused their efforts on reviving exports, which they saw as the most effective way to pay for the imports required to keep Bavaria from starving, while also lessening the financial burden for the United States. During January military government officers met with Bavarian officials and representatives of different trades and industries to promote production and exports. Businessmen were hesitant due to “uncertainty of the future… and the problem of supply.” To assuage their concerns, the Americans promised to organize a program whereby companies that produced for export would receive preferential treatment for resupply and raw materials. Additionally, military government offices surveyed major Bavarian industries to determine possibilities for exports. The porcelain industry, for example, was viewed as particularly attractive. An American survey estimated that the industry, for approximately 2.5 million Reichmarks (RM) needed to purchase raw materials and fuel, could produce some 52 million RM worth of exports.30 This American emphasis on reviving exports in early 1946 culminated with the opening of an export exhibition for Bavarian arts and crafts in Munich. Located at the Haus der deutschen Kunst (House of German Art) in Munich, the Americans promoted the exhibition and Bavarian arts and crafts as “the first bridge to the world.” The “renowned standards of precision” and “famed Bavarian supremacy in nice things” would “win back satisfaction and confidence for Bavarian art-goods all over the world” while bringing in much needed dollars to pay for the imports that kept Bavaria, and Germany, from collapse.31

However, the options for American officials inclined to challenge U.S. policy remained limited. Unless they were willing to blatantly flaunt Washington directives or incur the wrath of

the American populace, MGOs did not possess many significant avenues to promote economic recovery. Exacerbating the limits on American options for Bavaria’s postwar economic recovery were a series of serious issues that plagued the German economy throughout 1945, 1946, and into 1947. Labor shortages, a severe housing crisis, and the influx of ethnic German expellees from Eastern Europe all piled on to an already stressed Bavarian economy. These persistent issues constrained American actions and limited the impact of the efforts at reconstruction that did occur.

As early as May 1945, some Americans in Bavaria complained about the lack of labor and the perceived unwillingness of Germans to carry out needed work. Captain August Hill, the labor office for Detachment E1B3 in Nürnberg, chastised that city’s Arbeitsamt (Labor Office) about the labor situation just five days after the end of the war. According to Hill there had been “a failure of the German people of this city to provide the labor required” for Army needs and the task of reconstruction.32 In Munich a few weeks later Army engineers requested 1,000 men from city officials to assist in their reconstruction efforts, but only 300 showed up for the assigned labor. By August 1945 the labor shortage had grown so severe that the military government office in the city authorized the arrest and imprisonment of any worker who did not to report to their jobs.

Despite these initial complaints, the Army’s large appetite for German labor often exacerbated these labor shortages and undermined the civilian economy. Sometimes Army demands facilitated recovery, notably when engineering units requisitioned labor to help repair bridges or railroads. Other times, however, Army labor requirements took badly needed workers out of the civilian economy. From November 15 to 22, for example, the Army demanded 2,300

32 Letter, 13 May 45, to Head of Arbeitsamt, Nürnberg, from Capt. Augustus B. Hill, Correspondence Local Government Folder, Box 1438, 826 (A1): Civil Affairs Records, 1945-46, LSO Nürnberg, RG 260, NARA.
skilled workers for its requirements in the Munich area, including construction, auto repair, and other critical occupations. Some 800 of those workers were provided “by stripping and closing down civilian repair shops” which created a “critical situation” in the city’s economy. The problem was that the Army’s incessant demands for labor overburdened the civilian economy as local businesses were often “stripped…below the point necessary for [them] to function.” Before November 15 Munich’s 220 civilian auto garages employed 623 mechanics, but by the end of the week approximately 400 of those skilled laborers were transferred to military projects. The demands of the U.S. Army threatened a Bavarian economy already overburdened by the scars of world war. As with early attempts to restart some level of production, the Army became military government’s own worst enemy; labor desperately needed in the civilian sphere was often tied up with the Army which only exacerbated the labor shortages.

Throughout 1946 the labor problems remained a thorn in the side of military government and its attempts to resuscitate a basic level of economic activity in Bavaria. In January OMGB reported an “acute shortage” of skilled workers and agricultural labor. To mitigate the shortages, the Bavarian ministries of Labor and the Interior organized labor offices in the five camps receiving refugees in the Land. To make “maximum use” of the refugees’ skills, the camp offices would register, interview, and classify the incoming refugees according to their occupation. The offices would then assign them to areas where their skills were most needed. Nevertheless, the cries of labor shortages continue throughout Bavaria. In Landkries Rothenburg a large demand for farm labor continued because “almost all these refugees are not fit for any kind of work.”

34 “Historical Report for Land Bavaria, 1 to 31 January 1946,” OMGB, Pg. 96, Box 260, 636 (A1): Hist. Rpts, 44-48, Rec. of Land Dir., RG 260, NARA.
The arriving civilians were largely old men, women, and children unsuited for heavy labor. Even those adult men who did arrive were often in poor shape due to malnutrition or injuries sustained in the war. Additionally, refugees and expellees usually lacked the necessary clothing, such as boots, required for physical work.\textsuperscript{36}

At the same time of significant labor shortages, Bavaria faced another problem: high unemployment. By October 1946 total employment in the \textit{Land} had increased by 651,000 over the previous twelve months. That increase, however, was largely confined in a few sectors of the economy. By September 1946 agricultural work employed some 368,000 people, compared to 220,000 in 1938. Similarly, public service employment increased by 100,000 from 1938 and nearly 118,000 Bavarians found jobs with the occupation forces. On the other hand, construction employed 79,000 fewer people in September 1946 (219,000 versus 298,000) and the number of people working in textiles dropped from 76,000 to 44,000. As a result, unemployment numbers spiked. From June to September 1946 the number of unemployed workers rose by 61,000 to a total of 316,000, the result of languishing economic conditions and the influx of expellees from Eastern Europe.\textsuperscript{37} From January through October approximately 754,000 ethnic Germans entered Bavaria and these expellees comprised nearly forty percent of the unemployed in the \textit{Land}.\textsuperscript{38}

At the same time, however, there were 131,000 job openings in August and 127,000 in September, including 40,000 in construction, 18,400 in metal industries, and 13,000 in


\textsuperscript{37}“Labor and the Economy in Bavaria during September 1946 (Report of the Bavarian Ministry of Labor),” 23 Oct 46, Pg. 1-3, Laender-Labor-Bavaria Folder, Box 1088, 368: Foreign Area Rpts, 45-54, RG 407, NARA.

\textsuperscript{38}“The Labor Market in Bavaria October 1946 (Report of the Bavarian Ministry of Labor),” 4 Dec 46, Pg. 9, Laender-Labor-Bavaria Folder, Box 1088, 368: Foreign Area Rpts, 45-54, RG 407, NARA.
agriculture. By the end of October there were still 123,000 open jobs in Bavaria. The problem, identified by the Bavarian Ministry of Labor, was largely due to the maldistribution of available jobs and the labor pool. More than half of all job openings existed in Munich and Nürnberg, the Bavarians noted, and two-thirds were in the five cities of Munich, Nürnberg, Augsburg, Würzburg, and Regensburg. However, most expellees settled in rural areas because that was the only place where accommodations were possible. Yet these rural communities possessed few employment possibilities and inadequate transportation facilities to move would-be workers to available jobs. American and Bavarian officials also faced an increasingly depressed labor force. On December 23, 1946, the Landrat of Wolfstein warned of “a critical depression leading to a certain degree of anxiousness” among workers. A month later, Lt. Col. James Kelly of Munich recorded a similar complaint. He explained, “The willingness of the population to work is very low. General complaints are heard, that those persons willing to work are burdened beyond measure…” Together, the reports of the Bavarians and Americans identified a crucial component of the labor problem in postwar Bavaria: it was interconnected with other issues plaguing the occupation. The supply of food, housing shortages, the influx of expellees, and several other problems all influenced the twin issues of labor shortages and high unemployment. With the options available to military government officials in Bavaria limited, there was little, at this point, that they could do to address the problems.

Beyond labor problems, Americans also faced the persistent housing shortage that plagued postwar Bavaria. From the very beginning of the occupation, housing posed on the most significant problems faced by American military government officers. The most immediate issue was wartime destruction. In June 1945, for example, the military government detachment stationed in Munich reported that twenty-four percent of all dwellings in the city were a “total loss” and an additional 8,000 dwellings – including over 62,000 apartment flats – were “heavily destroyed.” Although some 300,000 residents fled the city during the war and, for the time being, made the housing situation tolerable, the Americans warned that the return of both residents and former soldiers would strain the housing situation in the Bavarian capital.\(^{42}\) By February 1946 the Housing Department of the Ministry of Labor reported that an average of two people lived in each available room in Munich. The city of Würzburg, meanwhile, reported an average of 3.5 persons per room.\(^{43}\)

Exacerbating the shortage of housing brought on by the war was the arrival in Bavaria of large numbers of refugees and ethnic German expellees. Already in December 1945 approximately 905,000 German refugees resided in Bavaria, most of whom had fled either Allied bombing or the advancing Red Army.\(^{44}\) The arrival of the Volksdeutsch from Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary – which the western Allies had quietly supported at the Potsdam Conference – was scheduled to begin in 1946 and would further burden the already critical


\(^{43}\) Weekly Summary No. 40, OMGB, 7-14 February 46, in “Historical Report, Military Government for Land Bavaria, 1 February to 28 February 46,” MG for Bavaria Historical Report February 1946 Folder, Box 1, 42823 (A1): Rpts of Ops, 45-46, RG 338, NARA.

housing situation. By February 1946 these expellees, who were just “beginning to trickle into Bavaria,” already posed problems to American and Bavarian officials alike. In Landkreis Hammelburg, located to the north of Würzburg and to the northwest of Nürnberg, the arrival of expellees caused “a great deal of anxiety.” Some 1,260 expellees arrived in the Kreis by the end of February – out of a scheduled 9,000 – and the local population avoided housing these Volksdeutsch whenever possible. The locals justified their aversion on the grounds that their houses were too small and space was limited. Native resistance in Hammelburg was so pronounced that local police, at times, employed “forceful methods” to ensure that the local population took in expellees.

The influx of ethnic Germans continued throughout 1946. As ethnic Germans “continued to pour into…Bavaria” during the summer, housing shortages became one of “the most acute” worries facing American occupation officials. Arriving Volksdeutsch lived in “crowded, unsanitary conditions” that could not be used during the upcoming winter “without great suffering.” Even communities that avoided significant war damage could not accommodate the rising tide of expellees. Landkreis Wertingen, with a population of 22,000, faced the prospect of housing as many as 18,000 expellees. In such a case, it would “not be possible” to house so many additional people “without living conditions being subnormal.”

In addition, Army practices in the Land routinely exacerbated the already major housing crisis. To quarter occupying forces and the large numbers of dependents arriving from the United States, Army units requisitioned substantial amounts of German housing. Military government

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46 “Historical Report, Military Government for Land Bavaria, 1 February to 28 February 1946,” Pg. 104, MG for Bavaria Historical Report February 1946 Folder, Box 1, 42823 (A1): Rpts of Ops, 45-46, RG 338, NARA.
detachments participated in the practice, but regular Army units took the most German residences. The mere practice of requisitioning worsened the housing situation, but Army units often took the nicest housing left standing, leaving the homes and apartments in the worst condition for German civilians. Julian Bach, a former occupation soldier, explained, “Most men agree that they have never lived so well while in the army…With few exception, what is most comfortable and still standing…is being lived in or used by us.” Similarly, Richard Berlin described “liberated” Bavarian houses in which occupation forces lived. They possessed “lovely decorative paintings” and included gables that were “quaint, artistic sights.” By late October 1946 the Munich Military Community, which oversaw all the military units stationed in and around the Bavarian capital, had already requisitioned approximately 1,000 houses. Now the military community submitted requisitions from an additional 300 houses and apartments within the city. In Forchheim requisitions by the Erlangen Military Community displaced 988 civilians and raised housing density from 2.59 persons per room to 2.9 per room.

While MGOs recognized the necessity of requisitioning some Bavarian housing, the scope of the practice produced growing frustration. Peter Christen, a German military government employee, described the rising anger of the unnamed captain in charge of the detachment where he worked. One morning, Christen recalled, the captain “cursed in a most horrid, highly objectionable fashion.” The captain had just received another request for fifteen more houses to requisition and had cursed “to stiffen his soul against his consternation and

48 Bach, America’s Germany, 31.
50 “Historical Report Military Government for Land Bavaria, 1 October to 31 October 1946,” OMGB, Pg. 231, Box 261, 636 (A1): Hist Rpts, 44-48, Rec. of Land Dir., RG 260, NARA.
MGOs in Munich and the surrounding area similarly struggled with the reality of the housing crisis and the impact of American requisitions. Responding to the requests for more dependent housing at Neubiberg, one American voiced his dislike for a new round of requisitions and insisted that “to approve these requisitions would mean a terrific impact in the communities involved.” Similarly, Eugene Keller warned from Munich that there was “an increasing amount of discontent” among Germans due to the “dangerously critical” housing situation that American requisitions only exacerbated.

As requisitioning continued and took up valuable housing space, German opposition to the practice emerged and took on a variety of forms. Beginning in December Bavarian officials at both the local and Land level pushed back against requisitions in the town of Grünwald, which was located just outside Munich. On December 10, the Bavarian Minister of the Interior, Josef Seifried, asked the military government detachment in Munich to stop a new wave of confiscations. The town’s population, Seifried explained, expanded from 1,800 in 1939 to 4,800 by the end of 1946. Grünwald already faced a significant housing shortage and these new requisitions would impact up to 2,000 people. According to the Bavarian minister, the confiscations produced an “increasing lack of comprehension” among the populace and contributed to “the feeling of…bitterness.” In early January 1947 the town’s Bürgermeister warned that town’s inhabitants were “overwhelmed by an extraordinary excitement.” Some made threats to German officials cooperating in the requisitions and other planned a protest in front of

54 “Confiscation of 200 estates at Grünwald for purposes of the Occupying Forces,” 10 Dec 46, to OMGB, Munich, from Josef Seifried, Pg. 1-2, Housing Grünwald Folder, Box 430, 669 (A1): Gen. Rec., 45-49, LSO Munich, RG 260, NARA.
Brigadier General Walter Muller’s house, the Director of OMGB.⁵⁵ Even the newly appointed Bavarian Minister-President, Hans Ehard, wrote General Muller to ask that the requisitions in Grünwald stop. Additionally, Ehard asked Muller to investigate the housing situation in Bavaria more broadly, particularly reports that requisitioned houses sat empty for weeks or months while their former residents struggled to find housing. The Minister-President also warned of an increasingly frustrated Bavarian populace. According to Ehard, “the situation and the state of mind within the population [has] become very serious and the Government can no longer assure that utterances and manifestations of resentment may not arise amongst the population.”⁵⁶ Requisitioning, then, both exacerbated the housing crisis and caused resentment among Bavarians.

In response to German resistance and their own frustration, military government officials tried to limit the scope of housing requisitions. Ultimately, this path of action represented the most viable option for most MGOs to tackle the housing crisis. On September 21, General Muller issued an order that housing density would not exceed 2.4 persons per room and MGOs used this number to push back against regular Army requests for additional German housing. During late October and early November, for example, military government officials and regular Army officers clashed over additional requisitions in the towns of Ansbach and Forchheim, both communities surrounding Nürnberg. On October 17 Lt. Col. W.R. Whitaker, head of Detachment B-228 in Ansbach, cited the military government order to cap housing density at 2.4 persons per room as justification for rejection of twenty-five requisitions made by the Ansbach Military

⁵⁵ “‘Action GRUNWALD’ here: report about the feeling (opinion) of the population,” 3 Jan 47, to MG Munich-Land, from Dr. Eberl, Pg. 1-2, Housing Grünwald Folder, Box 430, 669 (A1): Gen. Rec., 45-49, LSO Munich, RG 260, NARA.
Similarly, Major Harold Zurn of the Forchheim detachment returned sixty-one requisitions to the Erlangen Military Community. Housing density in Forchheim, Zurn argued, already exceeded the maximum allowed by Muller’s directive at an average of 2.58 persons per room. He insisted that the requisitions made by the military community in Erlangen would have raised the housing density to 2.81. For that reason, Zurn explained, “this office cannot approve of or concur in any further requisitions of property in this city.”

The resistance of military government officials to further requisitions frustrated their regular Army counterparts, who thought that German officials had duped the MGOs. In response to Lt. Colonel Whitaker’s rejection of the requisitions in Ansbach, Colonel J.P. Kirkendall, the commanding officer of the Ansbach Air Force Station, argued that more rooms were available than German officials reported. Additionally, he insisted that the maximum density of 2.4 persons per room did not reflect the standards outlined by Army engineers; instead it should be three persons per room. Kirkendall also dismissed the notion that the military community look for dependent housing in other, less crowded communities. Most were over twenty miles away, which was, supposedly, too far and would require a “tremendous increase” in drivers, guards, cooks, and other personnel. Army officers also objected to Major Zurn’s rejection of additional requisitions in Forchheim. Citing many of the same reasons as Colonel Kirkendall in Ansbach, Colonel Wendell McCoy, the commanding officers of the Erlangen Air Force Station, insisted

that the German figure of 2.58 persons per room was vastly inflated. Based on an independent housing survey, McCoy argued that the true housing density in Forchheim was just 1.366 and only slightly higher – 1.6 persons per room – in the villages surrounding the city.\footnote{“Requisitions for Dependent Housing,” Memo, 30 Oct 46, to Local Resources Board (Attn. Capt. B.F. Kushen), from Col. Wendell B. McCoy, Pg. 1-2, Land Resources Board Folder, Box 358, 656 (A1): Gen. Rec., 46-49, Rec of Dist I (Branch E), RG 260, NARA.} Similarly, Lt. Colonel R.H. Thorn from Erlangen pushed back against the housing density figure provided by Major Zurn and the German officials. The true housing density, he argued, was at most 1.56 persons per room and, most likely, even lower. With the additional sixty-one dwellings requested by the Erlangen Military Community removed from civilian use, Thorn explained that housing density in Forchheim would climb to 1.73, well below the maximum of 2.4.\footnote{“Requisitions for Dependent Housing,” Memo, 4 Nov 46, to Local Resources Board, Nürnberg-Fürth Enclave (Attn: Capt. B.F. Kushen), from Lt. Col. R.H. Thorn, Pg. 1-2, Land Resources Board Folder, Box 358, 656 (A1): Gen. Rec., 46-49, Rec of Dist I (Branch E), RG 260, NARA.}

Ultimately, military government and regular Army officers reached a sort of compromise solution for the housing problems in Ansbach and Forchheim. The requisitions for Forchheim received approval, while the Ansbach requests were held in a sort of limbo. The Ansbach requisitions did not receive immediate approval, but it was agreed to move displaced persons and refugees living in the city to make room for Army requirements.\footnote{“Meeting of Local Resources Board (Case No. 11, Housing Conditions of Ansbach, Bamberg and Forchheim),” Memo, 13 Nov 46, to Land Resources Board for Bavaria, HQ, from Nürnberg-Fürth Enclave Local Resources Board, Pg. 1-3, Land Resources Board Folder, Box 358, 656 (A1): Gen. Rec., 46-49, Rec of Dist I (Branch E), RG 260, NARA.} The entire dispute, however, highlighted many of the problems facing the Americans, particularly occupation officials, in dealing with the housing crisis. First was the fact that the Army acted as its own worst enemy at times. As was the case with the Army snatching up skilled workers throughout 1945 and 1946, Army requisitions of German housing only exacerbated the shortage of housing. The influx of hundreds of thousands of refugees and expellees into Bavaria meant that even communities that suffered minimal wartime damage faced significant shortages which the Army made worse by
requisitioning sorely needed dwellings. On top of that, the requisitions often took some of the
nicest homes available – the homes of former Nazis were particularly popular – which
contributed to the “crowded, unsanitary conditions” that characterized large swaths of postwar
housing.63 Second, the dispute highlighted the limited options available to military government
in their attempts to mitigate the effects of American policy towards Germany. In this case,
MGOs engaged in open opposition to an aspect of U.S. policy in Bavaria. Yet even such open
opposition could not completely stop the Army from taking more German housing.

By early 1947 the actions of military government produced some economic recovery, but
it remained limited and proceeded in fits and starts throughout the first few years of the
occupation. For MGOs, increased exports provided some evidence of an improved economy.
The sale of 1,032 tons of hops to the United States during the last week of February 1946 (a sale
valued at 2,858,000 RM), supposedly painted an “optimistic picture” of the export program. Yet
during the same month just nineteen percent of the total requirements for the woodworking
industry were met. Shortages of wood and skilled labor, the demands of the Army, and the needs
of German refugees all stretched the industry to the breaking point, which threatened to
undermine American plans to employ artistic woodworking as one of Bavaria’s main exports.
Persistent fuel shortages also limited economic recovery. On February 19, the Land had received
just thirty-seven percent of the 183,100 tons of coal and coke allocated from the Ruhr, Saar, and
Cologne areas. Additionally, a meager 756 tons of gasoline (out of an allocated 4,422 tons) and
2,791 tons of diesel (out of an allocated 8,950 tons) had arrived in Bavaria.64 In Regensburg, the
coal supply for the city’s Gas Department rapidly declined. The emergency stock of coal

63 “Historical Report Military Government for Land Bavaria, 1 Aug 46-31 Aug 46,“ OMGB, Pg. 168, Box 261, 636
   (A1): Hist Rpts, 44-48, Rec. of Land Dir., RG 260, NARA.
64 “Historical Report, Military Government for Land Bavaria, 1 February to 28 February 1946,” OMGB, Pg. 82, 87,
   & 96, Reports of Operations 9 May 45-30 November 45 Folder, Box 1, 42823 (A1): Rpts of Ops, 45-46, RG 338,
   NARA.
declined from 2,376 tons in January to 860 tons on April 20, 1946. Without an adequate supply of coal, American MGO Hyman Gilberg warned, the city would have to reduce the consumption of gas below its already low levels.\textsuperscript{65}

The economic problems continued into the summer and fall months. Bavarian steel production increased significantly during May, from 2,300 tons in April to 12,754 tons. Additionally, American economic officials found roughly twenty-five manufacturers capable of producing toys for export. Such a program, they hoped, would produce 400,000 to 500,000 RM worth of exports.\textsuperscript{66} But such progress was quickly undermined by the persistent fuel shortages plaguing Bavaria. On August 7, 1946, Maj. Albert Snow warned from Dachau that there was “no coal available” for household heating during the approaching winter and that industrial activity remained “subnormal” due to a lack of raw materials and coal.\textsuperscript{67} A month later the head of the Munich \textit{Wirtschaftsamt} reported that the city faced “a serious deterioration in the fuel situation” during the next few months. Deliveries of coal briquettes from Cologne and the Russian Zone had dropped by sixty percent, while coal arriving from Upper Bavaria fell ten percent. And the situation only promised to get worse as collecting and distributing the fall harvest ate up massive quantities of transportation.\textsuperscript{68} Two months later, the \textit{Wirtschaftsamt} repeated its dire warnings. Coal and coke stocks in Munich were “entirely eaten up” and if deliveries did not increase the city’s coal supply could run out by the beginning of December. The situation was so severe that

\textsuperscript{65} “Monthly Historical Report,” 4 May 46, to Director, OMG for RB Niederbayern-Oberpfalz, Det. E-204, from 1\textsuperscript{st} Lt. Hyman Gillberg, Pg. 4, Correspondence 1946-47 Folder, Box 834, 735 (A1): General Records, 1945-1949, LSO Regensburg, RG 260, NARA.

\textsuperscript{66} “Historical Report Military Government for Land Bavaria, 1 May 1946 to 31 May 1946,” OMGB, Pg. 123, Box 260, 636 (A1): Hist Rpts, 44-48, Rec. of Land Dir., RG 260, NARA.


German officials called for temporarily halting coal deliveries to industrial firms and rerouting that coal to households.\textsuperscript{69}

Meanwhile, the Bavarian population possessed little confidence in the postwar economy. This lack of confidence manifested in the proliferation of rumors throughout Bavaria. The most persistent rumor was that the Reichsmark would soon be devalued to stabilize the economy. As a result, Germans throughout the Land tended to hoard small bills and coins due to the belief that such denominations would be kept in circulation after any readjustment to the currency. They also, American officials observed, deposited funds in banks on the hope that funds in banks would be preserved during any currency manipulation. During 1946, these normal rumors took on added detail. In January 1946, for example, rumors of currency devaluation hit Landkreis Landsberg with two additional details. According to the rumors all cash money would be stamped by a bank and after readjustment would be worth just one-tenth of its former value. Bank accounts, on the other hand, would retain forty percent of their former value. Acting on these new rumors, the residents of Landsberg deposited their money in local banks as quickly as possible.\textsuperscript{70} The presence of such rumors hampered economic recovery in postwar Bavaria. Most obviously, it painted a picture of economic chaos and damaged the population’s confidence in the Bavarian economy. Rumors also had immediate practical affects. They encouraged hoarding of money which meant that Germans did not spend their Reichmarks at Bavarian businesses desperately in need of income.

By early 1947, over eighteen months into the occupation, economic recovery remained fleeting. Munich reported 159,248.95 RM worth of “exports” during December 1946, but such


\textsuperscript{70}“Historical Reports for Land Bavaria, 1 to 31 January 1946,” OMGB, Pg. 75, Box 260, 636 (A1): Hist Rpts, 44-48, Rec. of Land Dir., RG 260, NARA.
exports did not include any shipments outside Germany. Only by expanding “exports” to include trade to the other zones of occupation could the city report such figures. In Dachau, meanwhile, small businesses shut down for lack of coal. According to Lieutenant Jerome Walker, bakeries and hospitals “are the only spaces having any hope of obtaining any coal in the near future.” Even city officers faced closures, which were open for just two hours in the morning and two hours in the afternoon. Instead, most city workers conducted their business at home. The effects of the fuel shortages plagued the city of Regensburg, as well. Major George Ganer warned that an “extreme shortage of coal” existed in the city, one that severely hampered the generation of electricity. Each Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday saw significant electricity rationing. The current was cut off for four hours each morning and another four and a half hours in the afternoon.

Throughout 1945, 1946, and early 1947, therefore, military government efforts to circumvent American policy in Bavaria had a limited effect. There were some positive effects, but a considerable number of problems remained. Nürnberg, like most urban areas in Bavaria, faced considerable labor shortages during the early spring of 1947. Lack of transportation, as it had for months, prevented large numbers of rural unemployed from filling the available jobs. Additionally, the city lost skilled labor to administrative jobs and other work with a regular monthly salary. As a clerk with a monthly salary, a Bavarian worker could earn at least 265 RM

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per month instead of the 180 RM per month as a skilled laborer. Nevertheless, the city’s Chamber of Industry and Commerce reported some notable economic success. The regional toy industry, centered in Nürnberg, made “considerable headway in the reconstruction of their plants” by early 1947. Shortages of fuel, raw materials, and labor remained, but the industry now possessed export orders worth approximately two million dollars. Smaller communities also experienced some economic recovery. From Landkreis Wolfstein, located southeast of Nürnberg, Captain Robert MacWhorter optimistically reported that the town’s small industrial firms maintained production “fairly well” during the winter despite the persistent shortages gripping the Bavarian economy. The Kreis’ largest industry, a carbide factory, maintained “high level” production throughout 1946 and into 1947, with its output of carbide and synthetic stones shipped to the French zone of occupation.

This progress, however, remained minor. Major shortages of coal, labor, and housing stock severely limited the scope of economic recovery in the US-occupied Land. Additionally, American actions remained limited as long as U.S. policy refrained from actively rebuilding postwar Germany. Military government officials were often limited to reporting on the severity of the crisis or encouraging local Germans to take responsibility for restarting basic economic life. When the Americans could take action directly related to the Bavarian economy, they often made the situation worse. Requisitions of buildings for Army use exacerbated the housing crisis. The Army’s high demand for labor pulled desperately needed workers away from Bavarian

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74 “Weekly Intelligence Report covering period Thursday, 17 April 1947, 2400 hours, to Thursday, 24 April, 2400 hours,” to Director, OMGB, Intelligence Branch, from Maj. W.B. Morrell, Pg. 5, Historical Reports Folder, Box 1426, 824 (A1): Corres. & Related Rec., 45-49, LSO Nürnberg, RG 260, NARA.
75 “Weekly Intelligence Report covering period Thursday, 20 May 1947, 2400 hours, to Thursday, 27 March, 2400 hours,” 28 Mar 47, to Director, OMGB, Intelligence Branch, from Lt. Col. A.T. Callicott, Pg. 3, Historical Reports Folder, Box 1426, 824 (A1): Corres. & Related Rec., 45-49, LSO Nürnberg, RG 260, NARA.
76 “Annual Historical Report,” 18 July 47, to Director, OMGB, Attn: Historical and Reports Section, from Capt. Robert MacWhorter, Pg. 21, Historical Reports Folder, Box 966, 753 (A1): Corres. & Rpts, 45-49, LSO Wolfstein, RG 260, NARA.
industries as they tried to rebuild. And the Americans’ requirements for coal and basic industrial production diverted precious resources away from the Bavarian economy. At this point in the occupation the limits on military government had become clear. Even when MGOs actively resisted U.S. policy, as in the controversy over requisitions in Grünwald, their actions had only minor effects. Sympathetic military government officials wanted to mitigate the impact of American policy in Bavaria, but possessed few tools to do so during the first years of the occupation.

**Efforts at Reconstruction, 1947-1949**

While economic activity in western Germany languished throughout the second year of the occupation, policymakers in the United States reconsidered the policies put in place by JCS 1076 and the Morgenthau Plan. Increasingly a policy of economic reconstruction replaced the old policy of deindustrialization, even if that policy, as carried out in Bavaria, did not truly limit German industry. On September 6, 1946, Secretary of State James Byrnes signaled the growing shift in American policy. Speaking in Stuttgart, Byrnes criticized the practice of treating each zone of occupation as “self-contained economic…units” and called for the economic unification of Germany. Additionally, the Secretary of State emphasized that European recovery would be hampered “if Germany with her great resources of iron and coal is turned into a poorhouse.”77 Byrnes’ speech demonstrated a growing shift in American policy towards Germany, but it was also primarily concerned with criticizing the obstructionism of the Soviet Union and France in implementing the Potsdam Agreement. As such, the official economic unification of the American and British zones of occupation on January 1, 1947, was both an attempt to carry out the principles of the Potsdam Agreement and a move to support economic reconstruction in Germany. The merger, announced on December 2, 1946, set up bizonal economic agencies and

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77 “Restatement of Policy on Germany,” 6 Sept 46, James Byrnes, in *Documents on Germany*, Pg. 155 & 156.
promised to support “the expansion of German exports...as rapidly as world conditions permit.”  

For American policymakers, one way to revise current economic policy in Germany was to promote the full implementation of the Potsdam Agreement between the victorious Allies, but they were also willing to chart their own course in western Germany.

Further revision of overall American policy occurred in March 1947 when former president Herbert Hoover released his report on economic conditions in Germany and Europe. His report reinforced the growing belief that the economic reconstruction of Germany was vital to the well-being of Europe as a whole. According to Hoover, “The productivity of Europe cannot be restored without the restoration of Germany as a contributor to that productivity.” War damage, border changes, plant removals for reparations, and policy caps on the level of industry, however, had severely limited the capacity of the German economy. For example, the most recent level of industry plan – announced in March 1946 – limited the production of heavy machinery to thirty-one percent and automobiles to ten percent of 1938 production levels. Hoover also criticized the “illusion” that Germany, after its loss of territory to Poland and the Soviet Union, could be left as a pastoral state without killing or removing some twenty-five million people and that Europe could recover without Germany. To do so, the Americans and British should free German industry from current controls, end the removal of industrial plants for reparations, and ensure that the Ruhr remain a part of Germany. If the United States and Britain could not get such an agreement from France and the Soviet Union, Hoover argued, the two allies should act unilaterally to make the necessary changes.  

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78 “Agreement between the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States on the Economic Fusion of their Respective Zones,” 2 Dec 46, in Documents on Germany, Pg. 195-199.
On August 29, 1947, British and American policymakers did just that when they announced a new level of industry plan for the bizonal economic area. The new plan allowed combined economic production up to 1936 levels, whereas the previous plan called for industrial production at seventy to seventy-five percent of levels in 1936. Without raising the levels of heavy industries like metals, machinery, and chemicals, military government argued, it was impossible to create a self-sufficient bizonal area. The new plan retained eighty percent of the 1936 heavy machinery industry in the combined US and UK zone. Additionally, enough production capacity would remain to produce approximately 160,000 passenger cars and 61,500 commercial vehicles each year, compared to the existing caps of 40,000 and 38,000, respectively.\(^80\) By raising the level of industrial production, the financial burden on the American and British taxpayers would, hopefully, be lowered. Increased German production could be used to both rebuild Europe and to pay for the imports necessary to sustain the combined British and American zones, particularly food. Even before the announcement of the Marshall Plan, then, American policy in Germany shifted toward the active reconstruction of the German economy.\(^81\)

Within Bavaria this policy shift meant that MGOs no longer had to indirectly mitigate the effects of American policy towards Germany. Instead, they could openly push for economic reconstruction. Military government officials expressed a growing interest in the reconstruction of the Bavarian economy. More of their correspondence addressed reconstruction and they now worked in conjunction with American policy to encourage economic activity throughout the

\(^{80}\) “Three R’s of Germany: Rebuilding a Peaceful Industry, Rehabilitating a Peaceful Economy, Re-educating a Defeated Enemy,” undated, Public Information Division, Department of the Army, Pg. 2 & 11, Economy-Germany Folder, Box 1010, 368: Foreign Area Rpts, 45-54, RG 407, NARA.

Yet the impact of military government activities remained limited. Even when American officials took a more active role, it was difficult to see any immediate results. Nagging economic problems and a continued policy of transferring responsibility to Bavarian officials and refusing direct intervention limited American influence. Instead, their options for promoting economic recovery were much the same as they had been for the first two years of the occupation: conducting economic surveys, reporting on local conditions, and meeting with German officials and businessmen.

One example of these indirect American methods were military government efforts to promote new economic organization like the Joint Export-Import Agency (JEIA) and painting an optimistic picture of the economic situation in Bavaria, as if emphasizing positives could outweigh the continued problems. The Economics Division of OMGB, for example, circulated a report on foreign trade in Bavaria in early 1948. The report optimistically predicted a balance of trade by 1949. During 1947, the Land imported over one billion dollars’ worth of goods while exporting products worth $350 million. This deficit of nearly $700 million would, supposedly, achieve a balance of $935 million worth of both exports and imports within two years. In May 1948, Paul Nevin, the director of foreign trade for the JEIA in Bavaria, acknowledged that “a gigantic task faces German industry, labor, and government” to revive foreign trade. Nevertheless, Nevin painted a positive picture of the export program in Bavaria. By the end of April, export sales for Bavarian businesses in 1948 totaled $16,169,736.05, including $4.5 million in sales during April alone. The year 1947, on the other hand, saw total export sales just

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exceed $53 million, while sales during 1946 failed to reach $20 million.\textsuperscript{83} These numbers, Nevin insisted, were a significant increase over the previous years of the occupation and demonstrated that progress had been made on reconstruction, even if much work remained. A positive American attitude could only reach so far. What recovery truly needed was German participation in the restructured postwar economy.

Another method of indirect reconstruction was facilitating German participation in the postwar economy. Even before the shift in American policy towards Germany, U.S. officials in Bavaria had encouraged German businessmen to take an active role in resuscitating Bavarian economic life. This usually took the form of meetings, letters, and public exhortation. After the United States embraced a great degree of reconstruction, however, another tool of indirect recovery emerged: using new military government economic institutions to promote economic activity. The JEIA, most prominently, provided financial aid to help businessmen travel abroad. Additionally, the agency decentralized the process for exporting Bavarian-made goods throughout 1947. Local offices issued export licenses as the final measure of control over the process, but businesses negotiated their own deals.\textsuperscript{84} The following year American officials added further incentives for Bavarian businesses to export their goods. Exporters were given priority access to international telephone and telegraph lines along with airmail. Additionally, they obtained licenses to import sorely needed raw materials to support production for export and received priority allocations of domestic materials such as coal.\textsuperscript{85} By incentivizing foreign trade, American officials worked indirectly to revitalize the Bavarian economy.


With these familiar and new options for promoting economic recovery, the Bavarian economy show some signs of life. Economic conditions remained precarious throughout 1947 and into 1948, but the situation was not as critical as during the first two years of the occupation. The steadily expanding volume of exports from Bavaria demonstrated the return of some semblance of normalcy. In 1946, Bavarian businesses signed export contracts worth approximately $19.9 million. However, the following year saw significant improvement, particularly during the last half of 1947 as American policy shifts became reality. That year saw total export sales of over $53 million, including $43 million worth in the last six months of the year. This significant jump represented an increase of 410 percent during the final half of 1947. The increased sales throughout 1947 included $7.9 million for the Bavarian china industry, $7.5 million worth of Bavarian hops, and $6.9 million in textiles. Additionally, actual shipments of exports increased significantly throughout 1947. During 1946 export shipments totaled just under $5.4 million. That figure, however, rose to $21 million by the end of the next year, including nearly $2.9 million alone in December. American economic officials congratulated themselves for the improvement in the Bavarian economy. The Bavarian office of the JEIA argued that American promotion activities, which stressed “the vital role Bavarian export manufacturers must play in the reconstruction of Germany and Europe,” played a vital role in the surge of exports.86

Despite these improvements, significant difficulties remained. Shortages of raw materials, electricity, coal, and other basic supplies hampered reconstruction. On August 29, 1947, Dr. Karl Scharnagl, Oberbürgermeister of Munich, complained to the military government detachment about electricity rationing. The rationing, Scharnagl warned Lieutenant Colonel

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James Kelly, would have “serious consequences to the households, the economy, and to theaters, cinemas, and similar institutions.”\textsuperscript{87} Kelly forwarded Scharnagl’s complaint to H.A. Taylor in the Economics Division of OMGB. While sympathetic to the problem of electricity rationing, Taylor insisted the issue could not be avoided. Interruptions were a necessary evil since the supply of electric power was “so critical that service cannot be guaranteed even to top priority customers.”\textsuperscript{88} Electricity rationing was, in part, a product of continued fuel shortages throughout Bavaria. Transportation difficulties from the Ruhr and Army requirements still limited the supply of coal available for Bavarian businesses. Additionally, coal briquettes, used to fire bakeries and warm homes, remained dangerously low. In \textit{Landkreis} Lohr am Main the delivery of briquettes was “barely sufficient” to meet the needs of bakeries due to looting during transport.\textsuperscript{89}

Additionally, the German populace remained wary. Hoarding of resources and money by Bavarians limited the already minor effects of reconstruction. Even as Bavarian exports surged during 1947 and early 1948, many businessmen in the \textit{Land} demonstrated notable recalcitrance. Despite incentives from the JEIA and the threat of laws requiring them to sell their goods, the Americans faced considerable resistance from Bavarian businessmen. Indeed, the resistance appeared “to be increasing daily,” particularly as rumors of currency reform circulated and the inefficacy of German economic agencies grew.\textsuperscript{90} In January 1948, for example, Captain Wayne Farrington wrote to Munich that the economic situation in \textit{Landkreis} Lohr am Main had deteriorated despite the relative stability of labor and production for several months. The only

\textsuperscript{87} “Restriction of electric current,” Letter, 29 Aug 47, to Director, OMG, Munich, from Dr. Alois Scharnagl, Housing Reports 46-47 Folder, Box 406, 669 (A1): Gen. Rec., 45-49, LSO Munich, RG 260, NARA.  
\textsuperscript{89} “Weekly Intelligence Report for week ending 2400 hours, 25 March 1948,” 25 March 48, to MG for Bavaria (Attn: Intelligence Branch), from Capt. Wayne Farrington, Pg. 2, Karlstadt 45-48 Folder, Box 1534, 854 (A1): Corres. & Rec. w/ Rel. Units, 46-50, Rec. of Dist. IV (Branch A), RG 260, NARA.  
explanation, Farrington insisted, was that “manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers are hoarding on an increasingly large scale.”

Then in early April Farrington repeated his warnings about hoarding of resources. Hoarding, he explained, kept raw materials from industry and meant that little prospect for economic recovery existed until a currency adjustment took place. The Landrat in Lohr occurred. He blamed newspaper reports that currency reform would happen soon, which produced hoarding on an ever-larger scale. The local economic office possessed few options and was mostly limited to “appeasing and consoling the public.” Yet even those efforts failed as the local populace grew “more irritated every day.”

The result was a significant shortage of badly-needed goods and materials, even as production slowly recovered. Throughout the Land Bavarians received a trickle of consumer goods, particularly when compared to prewar levels. In 1947, for example, Bavarians got just one-tenth of the tobacco, shoes, and textiles they had before the war, while a mere one-twentieth of the prewar supply of soap existed. These tiny amounts only partially covered the needs of “high priority individuals” like displaced persons, former victims of Nazi persecution, and ethnic German expellees from Eastern Europe. The average Bavarian, however, “received practically nothing.”

Germans, both officials and normal civilians, grew increasingly frustrated with the situation. The Landrat of Lohr am Main complained, “What is the use of all the planning, what is the use of all directives covering the life of the economy when there is practically nothing.”

91 “Weekly Intelligence Report for week ending 2400 hours, 8 January 1948,” 8 Jan 48, to OMG for Bavaria (Attn: Intelligence Branch), from Capt. Wayne Farrington, Pg. 1-2, Karlstadt 1945-48 Folder, Box 1534, 854 (A1): Correspondence & Records with Related Units, 1946-1950, Records of Dist. IV (Branch A), RG 260, NARA.
92 “Weekly Intelligence Report for week ending 2400 hours, 1 April 1948,” 1 April 48, to OMG for Bavaria (Attn: Intelligence Branch), from Capt. Wayne Farrington, Pg. 1-2, Karlstadt 45-48 Folder, Box 1534, 854 (A1): Corres. & Rec. w/ Rel. Units, 46-50, Rec. of Dist. IV (Branch A), RG 260, NARA.
These major shortages were, in part, a product of the wartime destruct wrought by American and British bombers. Transportation networks remained precarious and the intricate links that had connected the different regions of the prewar German economy were still incomplete. More significantly, however, civilian confidence in the Reichsmark evaporated during the occupation. Without a stable currency, Bavarians of all stripes either hoarded goods or participated in the informal, often illegal, economy. Bavarian economic life showed some signs of improvement, but still felt the effects of wartime destruction and postwar partition by spring 1948.

In response, the western Allies, without consulting the Soviets, decided to introduce a new currency into their zones of occupation. Negotiations between the four occupying powers previously tried to reach an agreement on the introduction of a new currency, but hit a snag on where the money would be printed. Throughout the spring American, British, French, and German officials hammered out the details of the conversion from Reichsmarks to Deutschmarks (DM). Although occupation officials did not announce currency reform until the day of its implementation – June 20, 1948 – rumors circulated throughout Bavaria. Newspapers and local officials all expected an adjustment to the currency and publicly speculated about what form it could take. The proliferation of rumors and newspaper speculation exacerbated the hoarding of goods that occurred throughout the spring. During May and June economic activity in Bavaria effectively ceased. In Mallersdorf, located outside of Regensburg, the rumors of currency reform “created a nervousness within the Landkreis.” Businessmen refused to sell many items and even local government officials encouraged the hoarding of goods on the belief that they could then be thrown onto the market after currency reform to stimulate the circulation of a new currency.

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94 “Weekly Intelligence Report for week ending 2400 hours, 1 April 1948,” 1 April 48, to OMG for Bavaria (Attn: Intelligence Branch), from Capt. Wayne Farrington, Pg. 2, Karlstadt 45-48 Folder, Box 1534, 854 (A1): Corres. & Rec. w/ Rel. Units, 46-50, Rec. of Dist. IV (Branch A), RG 260, NARA.
Additionally, many Bavarians were reluctant to work. They did not want to work for money that would soon lose most, if not all, of its value.\(^95\) By June 17 it was “absolutely impossible to buy anything except essential food items” in Mallersdorf. Many retail shops closed as owners either took “vacations” or claimed they had nothing to sell.\(^96\)

When currency reform and the introduction of the Deutschmark was finally announced by the western Allies, Bavarians “felt a great relief.” The payment of the first 40 DM to individual Germans occurred on June 20 and introduced some stability to the Bavarian economy. Although some complained that 40 DM was not enough money, the “uncertainty and excitement which took possession [of] the people” had now ceased.\(^97\) Within days, currency reform seemingly solved many of the economic problems plaguing communities throughout Bavaria. In Mallersdorf the Landrat reported that currency reform “had a revolutionary effect on the economy.”\(^98\) Similarly, German officials in Freising reported that the new currency eliminated black market activity “immediately.”\(^99\)

With a new currency, military government officials now worked within American policy, instead of circumventing it, to actively promote reconstruction. In particular, Americans emphasized the economic developments unleashed by currency reform. Throughout the rest of 1948 military government officers, particularly those working within economic agencies,
highlighted the success of American programs and the positive effects of the new Deutschmark. Just a few weeks after currency reform, Paul Nevin, the director of JEIA Foreign Trade Division in Bavaria, reported that the Deutschmark now provided a “legitimate medium of exchange” for international trade. While the instability of the Reichsmark had provided no incentive to German manufacturers to export, Nevin argued that the new currency ensured greater economic incentive for German exporters. ¹⁰⁰ For American officials, growing export sales demonstrated the positive developments described by Nevin. Bavarian exports, for example, rose significantly after the introduction of the Deutschmark in June. Export contracts in the Land totaled $4.6 million during April 1948. By mid-October the JEIA reported that the value of export contracts surged to $8.3 million in August and $9.5 million in September. ¹⁰¹ Rising export shipments also demonstrated the growing success of economic reconstruction in the eyes of many occupation officials. Export shipments out of Bavaria reached $9.7 million in both September and October 1948, an increase of twenty-five percent over August. ¹⁰² Finally, Americans also eagerly reported major trade agreements reached between Bavaria and various countries around the world. JEIA announced new trades deals with Czechoslovakia, Egypt, and Italy in November and a tentative trade deal with France, valued at $300 million, in December. ¹⁰³ Such trade deals not only served as proof of Bavaria’s economic recovery, but they would also provide badly needed raw materials, coal, and foodstuff to facilitate further recovery.

¹⁰¹ JEIA Bavaria Newsletter, Issue No. 2, 15 Oct 48, Pg. 1, Letters Folder, Box 318, 652 (A1): Administrative Correspondence with Other OMGUS Units, HQ Records, Records of the FOD, RG 260, NARA.
¹⁰² JEIA Bavaria Newsletter, Issue No. 3, 15 Nov 48, Pg. 1, Letters Folder, Box 318, 652 (A1): Admin. Corres. w/ Other OMGUS Units, HQ Rec., Rec. of FOD, RG 260, NARA.
¹⁰³ JEIA Bavaria Newsletter, Issue No. 3, 15 Nov 48, Pg. 5-6, Letters Folder, Box 318, 652 (A1): Admin. Corres. w/ Other OMGUS Units, HQ Rec., Rec. of FOD, RG 260, NARA; JEIA Bavaria Newsletter, Issue No. 4, December 1948, Pg. 7, Letters Folder, Box 318, 652 (A1): Admin. Corres. w/ Other OMGUS Units, HQ Rec., Rec. of FOD, RG 260, NARA.
By December 1948 American occupation officials throughout Bavaria proved decidedly optimistic about the economic situation in the Land. This positive attitude was best captured by a sprawling report written by Harold Taylor, the economic advisor to OMGB headquarters in Munich. While Taylor recognized that significant room for improvement remained, he argued that the record of improvement since the start of the occupation “holds forth much encouragement for the future.” Specifically, June’s currency reform was “the greatest economic event in Western Europe in recent years.” It provided greater economic incentives to both industrialists and labor and facilitated the steady recovery of production throughout Bavaria. The average monthly value of industrial production, for example, rose from 209 million RM in 1946 to 510 million DM in October 1948. Steel production in Bavaria increased from an average of 12,326 tons per month in 1946 to a monthly average of 24,772 tons through the first three-quarters of 1948, which nearly equaled the 1936 average of 25,260 tons. Additionally, greater production of consumer goods, Taylor argued, demonstrated the improvement of the Bavaria economy. October 1948 production of radios and bicycles both exceeded their prewar monthly averages. Finally, Taylor repeated the usual American emphasis on rising exports as evidence of economic recovery. The total value of Bavarian export sales rose from $20 million in 1946 to $60 million through ten months of 1948. Similarly, the value of actual export shipments rose from $5 million to $27 million over the same period.\footnote{“Bavarian Economic Situation,” 13 Dec 48, H.A. Taylor, Pg. 1-6, OMGB Reports Folder, Box 318, 652 (A1): Admin. Corres. w/ Other OMGUS Units, HQ Rec., Rec. of FOD, RG 260, NARA.} For many American officials and military government officers, then, the Bavarian economy was well on its way to recovery. Indeed, the introduction of a new, stable currency was ultimately a key factor in the reconstruction of the West German, and Bavarian, economy.
Despite these notable improvements, currency reform brought its own challenges to American efforts at reconstruction in Bavaria. Even as the supply of consumer goods and much-needed materials grew, soaring prices and a shortage of the new Deutschmarks posed another threat to economic recovery. After weeks of speculation and hoarding, currency reform released large numbers of previously unavailable consumer goods. In addition, Bizonal agencies lifted rationing regulations on many consumer goods shortly after currency reform. Shop owners, previously reluctant to sell goods for essentially worthless Reichsmarks, now sold goods to acquire as many Deutschmarks as possible. Germans throughout Bavaria embraced this influx of consumer goods, even if many, particularly farmers, resented store owners for the practice of hoarding. After years of shortages, civilians snatched up badly needed consumer goods, such as shoes, clothing, and basic household products. While the supply of these goods was large enough for the first several weeks after currency reform, the pent-up demand of the Bavarian populace produced a run on consumer goods that led to another shortage. Perhaps most significantly, high demand quickly drove up prices, often far beyond the ability of an average Bavarian to pay.

As a result, many Bavarian officials and civilians soon grew frustrated with currency reform. In Freising, MGO Robert Annis reported, the population was in a “distressed condition” and “very discontented” due to rising prices by the end of July. German officials in Mallersdorf, meanwhile, were “gravely worried” about the tendency of businessmen in the community to raise prices beyond what the average worker could afford. They argued that the practice undermined public confidence in the Deutschmark and produced rumors that the new

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currency was on the same trajectory as the failed Reichsmark.\textsuperscript{106} The Landrat in Freising expressed similar concerns at the end of August. “The increase of prices after the currency reform,” Dr. Phil Held explained to the local military government office, “is considered unbearable by the population.” Rising costs of living questioned the supposed benefits of currency reform and undermined public confidence in the new currency.\textsuperscript{107}

The problems associated with currency reform continued throughout the fall and early winter of 1948. While many businessmen and industrialists appreciated the gradual abolition of most rationing restrictions, many workers were “terrified” by rising prices. Textiles, shoes, and other household goods, sorely needed by many Bavarians after years of rationing and inflation, were “now as unattainable…as before…currency reform.”\textsuperscript{108} Throughout the fall, rapidly rising prices priced many Bavarians out of the market for basic consumer goods. Farmers suffered since price controls still existed on most agricultural products and those official prices remained low. As explained in the previous chapter, farmers throughout Bavaria grew increasingly frustrated by the imposition of economic controls while other areas of the Bavarian economy saw their controls lifted. The inability to purchase basic consumer goods exacerbated the perceived inequity of continued economic controls on farmers. Therefore, rural Bavarians were particularly frustrated by the rapid rise in prices initiated by currency reform. By late December the military


government officer in Berchtesgaden even reported rumors of yet another currency conversion brought on by complaints about soaring prices and low wages.\(^{109}\)

American officials recognized that some problems remained after currency reform. Rising prices for consumer goods was one such challenge, as was the growing difficulty of obtaining credit for Bavarian businesses. In November, F.F. Egger explained that “the paramount difficulty” for industry in Landkreis Bad Tölz was securing credit from local banks, particularly long term loans. Businesses often carried out their activity “on a hand to hand cash basis” and when they could secure credit it was usually accompanied by an interest rate of eight to ten percent. Local businessmen and government officials, Egger reported, blamed “everything…on currency reform and Bizonia.”\(^{110}\) The complaints of Bavarian businessmen, officials, and workers, however, frustrated many American officials in Bavaria. In response, some military government officers reminded local officials and inhabitants that the United States paid for a significant percentage of Bavaria’s recovery. At the opening of a trade exhibition in Bad Reichenhall on December 4, for example, the local MGO gave a speech that summarized all the policies designed to improve economic life in Bavaria, while also reminding the audience that fifty percent of the food used to feed the American zone of occupation was paid for by US taxpayers.\(^{111}\)

American officials also shifted blame for the economic problems still plaguing Bavaria. Harold Taylor, in his long report December 1948 report, blamed the Nazis for the “most


controversial matter” of rising prices for consumer goods. The strict price controls and subsidies instituted by the Nazi government and then kept in place by the Army after the war, Taylor argued, meant that few items sold before currency reform bore little relationship to their actual cost. Additionally, Taylor laid the phenomenon of increasing prices at the feet of “natural economic laws.” Pent-up demand after six years of war and a population increase of fifty percent in Bavaria produced a “tremendous market” and until that demand was satisfied prices would not decline. For Taylor and many American officials, military government accomplished all it could to rebuild the Bavarian economy. The Bavarian people should not “despair of the future” because of the notable improvement in the economy of the Land. Instead, ultimate success at reconstruction, Taylor insisted, depended “upon the German people and the support that they and their leaders render the program.”

For military government officials, currency reform had accomplished its goals, mainly stabilizing an unstable German economy. The result was significant economic improvement and the promise of full recovery. Rising prices posed a challenge, but the Americans had done their part and now they wanted the Bavarians to pull their own weight. However, the experience also demonstrated the limits of American military government in Bavaria. For one, even though the decision to introduce a new currency was American and Allied-driven, occupation officials still limited their participation. Instead, primary responsibility belonged to German officials and American MGOs would assist when needed. In June 1948, for example, Captain Albert Rutledge, the executive officer for the Regensburg military government area, forwarded a memo to all regional military government offices. The memo, originally distributed by the headquarters

of OMGB’s Branch D, explained that currency reform was “basically a German action.” Additionally, the problems unleashed by currency reform, particularly rapidly rising prices, highlighted the limits to military government. While the introduction of the Deutschmark ultimately stabilized the West German economy, the decision produced significant challenges for American officials in Bavaria, problems that they expected the Germans to address. Even the most important economic reform of the occupation created significant challenges for military government. Nevertheless, occupation officials remained positive about the economic situation and insisted that major recovery lay just around the corner.

Despite American optimism about the economic situation in the aftermath of currency reform, major problems still plagued the Bavarian economy. Many of these issues were the same as those that had constrained military government efforts to circumvent U.S. policy from 1945 to 1947. Specifically, notable labor problems limited recovery, while the housing crisis, coupled with the influx of additional ethnic German expellees, provided another major challenge. Much like the obstacles of the first two years of the occupation, these challenges limited the ability of military government officials to promote economic reconstruction. As long as MGOs still transferred primary responsibility for the Land’s economic problems to German officials and refused to take direct action, the impact of military government on economic recovery was minimized. These Americans sought Bavarian reconstruction, but the nagging issues of postwar Germany and the scope of military government limited their ability to control economic recovery.

When it came to labor shortages, the rural areas of Bavaria represented a persistent problem for military government officials. These largely agricultural Kreise often lacked

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sufficient labor to meet the demands of local farmers, particularly during planting and harvest seasons. The problem lay not with insufficient populations in these agricultural regions; in fact, population numbers skyrocketed as ever larger numbers of ethnic German expellees arrived in Bavaria. These expellees, however, were often former industrial workers and refused to take up agricultural work, instead hoping for an industrial job in a nearby city. For example, Landkreis Dachau was approximately sixty-five percent agricultural. However, the expellees assigned to the region by the Bavarian government were almost sixty-five percent industrial workers. The military government officer in Dachau, Captain George Jacobson, complained to OMGB that expellees were assigned to the Kreis without any consideration of their economic skills or local requirements.\footnote{“Quarterly Historical Report, Period 1 October-31 October 47,” 15 Jan 48, to OMGB, Attn: Intelligence Branch, Historical Section, from Capt. George Jacobson, Pg. 9, Monthly Historical Report Folder, Box 367, 660 (A1): Gen. Rec., 46-49, LSO Dachau, RG 260, NARA.} Similarly, Major Leonard Day reported from Wasserburg that “There are still many persons who are unwilling to take up employment…because the work offered is undesirable.”\footnote{“Quarterly Historical Report, 1 October-31 October 1947,” 19 Jan 48, to Director, OMGB (Attn: Historical Section), from Maj. Leonard Day, Pg. 12, Correspondence Folder, Box 509, 680 (A1): General Records, 1947-1949, LSO Wasserburg, RG 260, NARA.} These displaced industrial laborers refused agricultural work, but they also could not get the factory work they desperately wanted. As was the case for the first two years of the occupation, transportation difficulties limited that ability for unemployed industrial workers to reach the available industrial jobs. As a result, labor shortages continued throughout the Bavarian economy despite a surplus of available labor.

In addition to the familiar problem of the maldistribution of labor, the introduction of the Deutschmark in June 1948 also produced its own challenges. During the weeks after currency reform, many American officials closely watched the labor market for any significant developments. Writing from Munich, Frantz Loriaux, the head of OMGB’s Manpower Division,
observed on June 30 that unemployment due to currency reform “has not been significant to date.”\(^{116}\) Officials in military government offices throughout Bavaria, however, were not quite as optimistic as Loriaux. Instead, they warned of rising unemployment and a declining demand for labor. In Mallersdorf, the director of the local Labor Office reported just three days after the introduction of the Deutschmark that industrial enterprises started dismissing workers due to a “dire shortage of money.” The Labor Office encouraged employers to defer such decisions by lowering the hours worked per week, but the local office warned that increased unemployment was unavoidable.\(^{117}\) Indeed, by early August approximately one-quarter of the 1,322 unemployed workers in Mallersdorf had lost their jobs in the weeks since currency reform.\(^{118}\) From Berchtesgaden Lieutenant Colonel Stanley Place reported similar developments. Unemployment in the *Kreis* rose from 650 on June 20 to 1,450 on July 30. Additionally, employers cut back significantly on their hiring. According to Place, approximately 1,100 job openings available before currency reform had been cancelled in the intervening weeks. Coupled with a “very considerable” increase in applications for employment, the supply of labor in Berchtesgaden was far greater than demand.\(^{119}\)

Although military government officials refrained from categorizing the rise in unemployment as a renewed crisis, the drop off in demand for labor after currency reform did frustrate portions of the Bavarian populace. German workers were particularly frustrated. Many


had expected “a period of unemployment” after currency reform, but never believed that the introduction of a new currency would produce “such distressing conditions.” As a result, according to one local Bavarian official, the “simple man” now held the Americans responsible for his hardships and believed that the U.S. “intended to destroy the German economy.” Of course, the Americans were committed to the reconstruction of economic life in Bavaria by late 1948. Yet their insistence on a relatively hands off approach meant that they could not respond to every problem in the Land. Therefore, as economic problems continued, particularly labor displacement, apparent American inaction became an easy target for German complaints.

While the labor market remained volatile, American officials also faced continued housing problems, particularly due to the influx of ethnic German expellees. Throughout Bavaria the housing situation, especially for expellees and refugees, remained critical. The average number of people per room in Nürnberg, for example, remained as high as 2.21, even though nearly 11,000 rooms had been reconditioned since the end of the war. The same situation existed throughout Bavaria. Cities that had experienced major bombing raids still possessed housing stock that was either destroyed or damaged during the war, even as their populations increased. The persistent economic shortages of the postwar years, coupled with damaged transportation networks, meant that cities could not acquire the necessary materials to repair all their prewar housing or build new housing to accommodate new arrivals. The problem, however, was not confined to the cities. Communities that had escaped widespread destruction, even in the remote corners of Bavaria, faced major housing shortages due to the influx of ethnic German

expellees from Eastern Europe. German officials, cognizant of the urban shortages, funneled the new arrivals into the only regions that possessed undamaged housing stock. Yet what undamaged housing that existed in Bavaria’s rural regions was soon overwhelmed as hundreds of thousands of new people arrived in the Land.

Germans civilians and expellees both suffered due to the crisis. The full extent of that suffering could easily hide behind statistics until military government officials inspected the housing situation in their local communities. Peter Christen, a German employed by military government, observed, “The unspeakable misery of a completely overcrowded town with innumerable small and gross tragedies was brought out into the open” during inspections. “Unbelievable” rumors became “reliable facts.” Christen recalled one housing inspection of an old, ramshackle building that housed six families. On the first floor lived a single mother with four children and a prostitute residing in Bavaria illegally. The second floor included a war-disabled veteran with tuberculosis and his wife and a divorced couple forced to live together for lack of space. Finally, the third floor held an elderly woman caring for babies that were the result of American-German relationships and a room crammed with eight people. The MGO, Christen remembered, got visibly angry at the terrible housing conditions in which these Germans lived.122

As bad as German civilians often suffered, expellees bore the brunt of the crisis. Lacking sufficient housing in communities, German and American officials often housed new arrivals in camps, many of them former concentration camps. At a camp outside Freising, refugee and expellee families crowded into small, poorly-constructed rooms. One 120 square meter room in the camp housed forty-three people from seventeen families, yet its only heating source was a small homemade stove. Thirteen women, eight men, six children, and a two-week-old baby

122 Christen, From Military Government to State Department, 77-79.
occupied a similar 105 square meter room, where they had lived for more than a year. Additionally, the effects of currency reform hit expellees particularly hard. Many of the recently arrived ethnic Germans could not find work in their previous occupations and they faced significant challenges in establishing their own businesses, such as acquiring credit from local banks. Meanwhile, farmers and other individuals housing expellees effectively price gouged them, collecting the “maximum possible” rent whenever possible.

As the housing crisis persisted, ethnic Germans struggled to integrate into German society. The expellees faced this problem throughout western Germany, but it was particularly pronounced in Bavaria, a traditionally conservative, inward-looking Land. During the war, many Bavarians resented the evacuation of urban residents from Berlin or the Rhineland to escape Allied bombs. Such resentment only grew, and took on aspects of xenophobia, with the arrival of millions of ethnic Germans from Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. Sergeant Walter Krause experienced this disdain for non-Bavarians during his time in Bavaria. According to Krause, he met a woman named Ilse, a refugee from the Soviet Zone, at an enlisted man’s club in Munich. When he tried to find her in a nearby village, however, he found the civilians “largely uncooperative” due to their visceral dislike for refugees. When confronted by Krause, many residents explained, “These people come to take our jobs; they work for less pay than we do; they get government jobs and the government looks after them. Our homes and rooms in our homes are requisitioned and they live with us. We have to feed them, and they are a drain on our

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124 “Position of Expellees since Currency Reform,” 21 Sept 48, to Director of Intelligence, OMGB, from Walter Owens, Pg. 1, General Folder, Box 380, 666 (A1): Gen. Rec., 46-49, LSO Miesbach, RG 260, NARA.
Ethnic Germans, already suffering from deplorable housing conditions, also faced significant opposition from the very society in which they were trying to live.

American officials recognized the severity of the problem facing them and used their limited options to address the situation. Shortly after currency reform, Murray van Wagoner, Director of OMGB, wrote General Lucius Clay about the shortage of housing throughout Bavaria. Housing, he explained, “still evokes many complaints from German civilians.” Van Wagoner believed that the best solution to the problem was for Americans to “interfere as little as possible.” In part, this meant encouraging German solutions to the housing shortage, but it also meant limiting American requisitions of housing to help create “normal economic conditions.” To make his point, the Bavarian military governor highlighted large buildings throughout the Land that sat empty under American requisition. In Deggendorf, for example, three hotels with a total capacity of 700 sat vacant for nearly a year. Similarly, the Prinz Leopold Kaserne, which comprised four buildings in Regensburg, was also empty since July 1947. Clay agreed that “we must not have idle property under present conditions in Germany.” However, he insisted that it was the responsibility of military government officers to identify empty buildings and to secure their release through the local Army commander. MGOs also compiled a “housing index” to record the average number of people living per room throughout Bavaria. These actions reflected many of the “unimaginative” methods used by military government to address the housing crisis. As long as the Americans remained committed to turning responsibility over to Bavarian authorities, MGOs possessed few direct options for

125 Krause, So I Was a Sergeant, 154.
128 Christen, From Military Government to State Department, 77.
addressing the severe housing crisis, no matter how sympathetic they were towards the plight of expellees. They could address misuse of requisitioned property, but that was the extent of direct American involvement.

As MGOs grappled with these persistent issues and economic recovery remained fleeting, American officials throughout Bavaria grew increasingly frustrated with both German officials and the local population. Some military government officials now looked upon the Bavarians with suspicion, questioning their reports and hostility towards the expellees that now comprised nearly a quarter of the Bavarian population. Meanwhile, the Germans also started to push back against the Americans, criticizing their understanding of the housing situation and their approach to economic reconstruction in Bavaria. The result was a process quite similar to the confrontations surrounding the food crises of the postwar era. Reluctant to take direct action, American officials instead prodded their Bavarian counterparts to address the housing shortage. These Bavarians, however, saw the housing problems, in part, as a byproduct of American actions and pushed back against military government efforts. As with the confrontations over food, this clash highlighted the limits on military government. Even though the negative policies were gone, MGOs possessed few options and faced an increasingly frustrated Bavarian populace.

For American MGOs, the Bavarians were too lax in their efforts to address the shortage of housing, failing to adequately distribute available rooms, favoring rich members of the community, or ignoring the plight of expellees. From Munich, Lieutenant Colonel James Kelly rebuked the Bürgermeister of Pullach for the actions of local housing officials. Kelly cited a few supposedly unused rooms to support his argument that the Bavarians were not adequately addressing the housing problem. For example, he referenced a house on Baumstrasse that included seven rooms, but housed just four people. Similarly, Kelly also mentioned another
house on *Sollnerstrasse*, where two people supposedly lived in four large rooms. For the American MGO, this represented an unnecessary waste of space. “In view of the very critical housing shortage,” he wrote, “and so many poor people seeking shelter, it is indeed very tragic that Germans, particularly German officials, should favor one section of the community, when others suffer for lack of shelter.”

The officials of Pullach, however, did not accept Kelly’s rebuke and pushed back against the American’s effort to define the scope and severity of the housing crisis. Addressing each case of wasted housing referenced by Kelly, the city’s Bürgermeister refuted the argument that city officials were not adequately addressing the issue. The house on *Baumstrasse*, for example, actually housed seven adults, not four as Kelly insisted. An additional family had also lived in the house until recently, but housing officials recently moved them to better dwellings. In addition, the house on *Sollnerstrasse* also contained a women’s tailor that employed five people. Therefore, the rooms were not wasted, but used for the benefit of the local economy. Americans, the Bürgermeister insisted, did not fully understand the complexity of the housing situation in Bavaria. “Short, superficial inspections” of houses, the kind favored by MGOs, revealed “no clear picture” of the situation. Additionally, it was often “absolutely necessary” to let Germans work out of their homes, lest they have to close their business. Local housing officials, the Bürgermeister insisted, “deserve thanks and protection” for their work in a “nerve-shattering” field. Such individuals “stand continually in the midst of uncontent persons…one whom they must impose dwelling restrictions.”

Military government officials, the German mayor argued

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to Kelly, did not fully understand the complexity of the situation, including the economic and political considerations behind housing.

The rising tension over housing also emerged around the issue of American requisitions of Bavarian property. Bavarian officials often complained about excessive requisitions, particularly for use by American families. In response, military government officials investigated the reports of unnecessary requisitions. Although many were sympathetic and frustrated with the pace of Army requisitions, several also grew frustrated with the German complaints. During late September 1948, for example, Jesse Ott of Mindelheim investigated a complaint from the Land government that American requisitions in the resort town of Bad Wörishofen took up too many of the 5,000 beds available in the town’s hotels. Ott rejected that argument, however. He insisted that the Army requisitioned only thirteen percent of those beds – a total of 672. Of those, dependent families occupied just half. Ott did not doubt that requisitions dislocated many Germans and that they had to live in more “primitive” conditions as a result. Yet he insisted that those complaining about their housing deserved their plight, especially for the treatment of expellees and refugees. Ott explained:

It should be born in mind, however, that some of these people are the ones who have forced the refugees to live in primitive, unsanitary, vermin-infested camps and barracks for the past three years by their refusal to give sanctuary to the refugees in their fine homes. There is little sympathy due this category. They are but now [experiencing] some of the hardships which they have smugly watched the refugees endure from the aloofness of their own homes.\(^{131}\)

Most MGOs did not express such a vengeful attitude, although many grew annoyed with their Bavarian counterparts during the last year of the occupation. American officials, particularly those sympathetic to the plight of DPs and expellees, saw Bavarian complaints as hypocritical.

\(^{131}\) “Complaint of Bavarian Government Concerning Hotels in Bad Wörishofen,” 20 Sept 48, to Area Commander, Area Kempten, from Jesse Ott, Pg. 2-3, Housing Folder, Box 1543, 858 (A1): General Records, 1945-1949, Rec. of Dist. V (Branch G), RG 260, NARA.
Overall, the growing confrontations reflected the antagonism over the food crises. MGOs wanted Germans to take specific actions, but these German officials vehemently disagreed with the American perspective and resisted military government efforts to define the severity of the crisis.

Somewhat related to continued housing problems, American and Bavarian officials also clashed over other economic matters, particularly in relation to refugee and expellee businesses. After the introduction of the Deutschmark, the shortages of money and credit that threatened German enterprises also reached those operated by ethnic Germans expelled from Eastern Europe. In September 1948, the MGO of Wolfratshausen, M.A. Weightman, met with eighteen local businessmen of the Industriegemeinschaft, an organization of expellee small businesses. The most severe problem facing them was the lack of credit. Banks in both Munich and the community had “consistently refused loans.” Without half a million Deutschmarks, these businesses faced closure. It was clear that Bavarian banking officials did not consider the refugee firms good credit risks. However, Weightman was sympathetic to the plight of the expellee businessmen. He argued, “It is my opinion that some consideration should be given to the fact that these businesses were built up from literally nothing.” This fact, he insisted, should positively impact the credit rating of the expellee firms. Additionally, Weightman criticized government officials for their inactivity. The Bavarian Landtag allocated ten million Deutschmarks for bank loans to businessmen like those of the Industriegemeinschaft in Wolfratshausen. However, “administrative red tape has prevented a single Pfennig of this fund from being so used.”

To Weightman, Bavarian officials dragged their feet because of hostility towards expellees and refugees. The German insistence that not enough credit existed in the

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132 “Special Intelligence Report – Refugee Business Firms,” 8 Sept 48, to Director, Intelligence Division, OMGB, from M.A. Weightman, Pg. 1-2, General Folder, Box 380, 666 (A1): Gen. Rec., 46-49, LSO Miesbach, RG 260, NARA.
Landkreis to meet the “excessive” demands of the expellees was hollow when some ten million Deutschmarks existed, somewhere in the Bavarian government, for such a purpose.

Bavarian treatment of prospective refugee and expellee business owners also annoyed American officials. According to the Americans, Bavarian officials issued business licenses if a prospective business was “needed by the community.” To MGOs, who grew up in the American economic model, this practice was out of sync with proper economic practices. Perhaps most importantly, however, American officials saw the practice as a means to further discriminate against refugees and expellees. Gerald McMahon, the MGO of Berchtesgaden, dismissed official assurances that all business applications received fair consideration. Such assurances, McMahon wrote, “cannot be accepted lock, stock, and barrel” since complaints of discrimination against expellees and the actions of the Landrat “has taught this office to be highly [skeptical] of such one-sided reports.” McMahon cited the experience of one “Herr D,” a refugee from Silesia who wanted to open a textile business in Berchtesgaden. The licensing committee rejected Herr D’s first application because he did not yet possess a “suitable shop” to house his business. The Silesian sought out a place for his business, but was told that he first must possess a business license. Herr D ultimately found a building, but was then told by the licensing committee that “sufficient stores of that kind [textile] have been opened.” The American observed, “This is a case of a dog chasing his own tail and getting nowhere.”

Military government officials experienced significant frustration with their German counterparts over Bavaria’s economic problems. As with the rising tensions over feeding the Land, Americans and Germans clashed over who got to define the scope and severity of the issues facing the occupation. MGOs also expressed their sympathy for refugees and expellees

living in Bavaria and attacked what they saw as discriminatory practices by their Bavarian counterparts. Coupled with continued labor and housing shortages, the tensions between American and Bavarian officials further demonstrated the limits of American military government. The Americans could promote their vision of postwar Bavaria and policies of economic reconstruction, but they could not solve the nagging problems of the Bavarian economy. This was especially true so long as military government avoided direct interference in the economic life of Bavaria. More significantly, Bavarian officials, by pushing back against American actions, limited the impact of military government. They forced consideration of their views by American officials throughout Bavaria. This often frustrated MGOs, but it meant that they had to carefully consider the Bavarian perspective and could not simply impose an American vision.

Despite continued economic challenges and American-German tension, the Bavarian economy made noteworthy progress in the months before the creation of the Federal Republic of Germany in May 1949. Undoubtedly, significant problems remained. Money and credit shortages, which had cropped up in the months after the introduction of the Deutschmark, remained. Gerald McMahon warned that Berchtesgaden faced a “serious economic crisis” due to credit shortages.\(^{134}\) Similarly, the communities of Kelheim and Mallersdorf described growing economic issues brought about by the money and credit shortages. In Kelheim several furniture factories faced the prospect of closing, not because they lacked orders, but because their customers could not pay for their orders due to a lack of cash.\(^ {135}\) Mallersdorf, meanwhile,

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\(^{134}\) “Summary of Civil Activities in Landkreis Berchtesgaden,” 18 Feb 49, to Area Commander, MG Area Rosenheim, from Gerald McMahon, Pg. 4, Corres. 1949 Folder, Box 366, 659 (A1): Gen. Rec., 45-49, LSO Berchtesgaden, RG 260, NARA.

experienced a “dire shortage of money” and increased complaints about the “impossibility” of obtaining credit. Without credit, a local food factory temporarily closed its doors because it could not employ its workers.\textsuperscript{136} Military government also faced confusion over changing American economic policies, such as the decision to introduce “free trade” and lift strict licensing requirements in most trades, occupations, and businesses. OMGB dispatched several memos to clarify the policy to confused MGOs while many Bavarian officials insisted that they should be able to consider “public need” while making licensing decisions.\textsuperscript{137}

Despite these continued challenges, the Bavarian, and German, economy showed significant signs of recovery in the early months of 1949. By early January prices for consumer goods showed some signs of stabilization for the first time since currency reform the previous June. The reintroduction of some price controls, in part, steadied the price of goods in the Bavarian economy, but most importantly the population also gained some confidence in the Deutschmark. In particular, the population overcame “its original desire to effect often irrational purchases thus expending all of its money.”\textsuperscript{138} The rush to buy up sorely-missed textiles, radios, and other household goods had driven up prices. After this months-long rush ended, however, prices finally showed signs of levelling out. Such confidence in the new currency produced a


sense of normalcy in the economy. No longer did chaos characterize economic activities in Bavaria. Instead, a stable currency led to renewed confidence in official economic channels. Civilians, no longer fearful of runaway inflation, increasingly purchased through regular channels. With more disposable capital, Bavarian businesses could increase production to meet rising demand. This ultimately produced more jobs and stable sources of income that allowed civilians to purchase more consumer goods.

Growing confidence in the formal economy finally achieved what American and Bavarian officials had sought for years: the mortal wounding of the black market. Since it was easier to buy food, textiles, and other goods in stores, and without ration coupons, the impetus for most black market activity disappeared. With a stable currency, cigarettes no longer served as the de facto currency of postwar Bavaria. The black market served an important purpose during the years of food and economic crisis immediately after the war; it allowed many civilians to ward off catastrophe by either bartering their own goods for food or by participating in the informal economy surrounding the occupying American army. For this reason, along with the lucrative profits to be made in the illegal economy, military government failed to eliminate the black market in postwar Bavaria. The incentives for participation were simply too great, no matter the punitive measures for participation. As economic conditions improved, however, the vital need for this function disappeared when civilians could purchase food and consumer goods in normal channels. Ultimately, the best counter to the black market was economic recovery, which finally emerged during the last nine months of the occupation.

Another sign of the improving Bavarian economy was increasing export and import activity. In late March, the MGO in Cham, Riley Gilley, reported that a local program from imports from Switzerland made considerable progress. Two businessmen from the town of
Roding submitted a check to the JEIA for DM 180,000 to cover textiles and rice imported from Zurich. The JEIA also reported significant improvement in Bavarian export activity. March export shipments total $6,437,000, an increase of over $1.1 million from February. All told, Bavarian exports during the first quarter of 1949 reached $19,213,000. That total, for just three months, nearly equaled the total volume of exports for 1947 ($21 million) and was over half of the 1948 total ($37 million). American export officials contributed the rise in exports to the growing stability of the economy since Christmas 1948, even though some Bavarian industries had trouble selling on domestic markets due to persistent shortages of Deutschmarks. Such shortages forced camera, china, and chemical producers to seek “a substantial expansion of exports” to counterbalance lost domestic revenue. Essentially, the problems of small, local economies became a positive for the overall Land economy, at least to American officials at JEIA.

By the creation of the Federal Republic of Germany in May 1949, the Bavarian economy showed significant signs of life. The shortage of money constrained recovery, but the market for consumer goods stabilized after months of rising prices. In addition, rising exports provided another sign of some sort of economic normalcy. Nevertheless, these developments demonstrated the limits of American military government in Bavaria. American policy had changed and MGOs no longer sought ways to mitigate its effects in the Land. However, American officials faced many of the same limits on their sphere of action as they had earlier in the occupation when they challenged official policy. Even though Washington promoted

reconstruction, MGOs exerted little direct control over this economic recovery. Still focused on promoting German responsibility, military government actions were largely limited to explaining American policy, reporting on economic conditions throughout Bavaria, and pushing back against German resistance. The creation of the Federal Republic further curtailed their options. American policy set the stage for recovery by early 1949, but military government officials in Bavaria possessed few direct options for promoting recovery. The economic situation undoubtedly improved over four years, but the Americans in military government faced many of the same constraints on their actions in 1949 as they did in 1945.

Conclusion

By 1960 the Wirtschaftswunder was essentially complete. West Germany, along with the rest of Western Europe, recovered from the overwhelming devastation of the Second World War. That recovery represented one of the greatest economic turnarounds in modern history. Yet when the American occupation of Bavaria began in 1945, the severity of the economic situation seemingly made the Economic Miracle unlikely, if not impossible. Due to the war, Bavarian economic life was, essentially, nonexistent. Bombed out cities, ravaged transportation networks, and crippling shortages of nearly all basic materials limited the prospects for recovery. The Americans and their military government institutions in Bavaria faced the reality of economic collapse. They addressed the difficulties of high unemployment, limited resources, sagging civilian confidence, and shifting American policy. The Bavarian economy represented a crisis of the highest order.

To address this crisis, however, American military government officials in Bavaria possessed limited options. At the start of the occupation, American policy, still influenced by Henry Morgenthau’s calls for deindustrialization, circumscribed their options. Military
government officers – living amidst the chaos of a devastated economy and increasingly sympathetic to the Bavarian populace – sought ways to circumvent official policy in the name of pragmatism. The most direct means of reconstruction available to Americans early in the occupation was rehabilitating Bavarian industries to produce goods – plates, beer, coal, etc. – for the occupying U.S. Army. Such action helped to an extent, but they also undermined overall recovery by pulling badly-needed consumer goods out of the market and funneling scarce labor out of the normal market. Beyond that relatively direct method, American officials possessed largely indirect options for reconstruction. They reported on economic problems, surveyed the major economic activities in their regions, and offered moral encouragement to both Bavarian officials and civilians. In particular, the Americans’ desire to transfer responsibility German authorities as rapidly as possible constrained their potential avenues of action. Additionally, the persistent problems of postwar Bavarian acted as another check on military government. Labor issues, a major housing crisis, and the influx of ethnic German expellees from Eastern Europe all exacerbated the already significant challenges facing the Bavarian economy and limited in the impact of American officials. The result was an economic recovery that proceeded by fits and starts during the first eighteen to twenty-four months of the occupation.

Prospects for recovery improved as American policy shifted in late 1946 and early 1947. Secretary of State James Byrnes’ speech in Stuttgart signaled a changing American approach to economic reconstruction, which the merger of the U.S. and British zones in January 1947, the repeal of JCS 1076, and the announcement of the Marshall Plan cemented. By the summer of 1947 American policy firmly embraced reconstruction of western Germany’s economy, yet the options for military government officials remained few. Most notably, the American commitment to transferring responsibility to German officials continued. MGOs in Bavaria
wanted their German counterparts, not the Americans, to promote economic recovery, a practice deeply engrained in the Army’s approach to postwar occupations. Instead, Americans in Bavaria persisted with their indirect methods. They encouraged German businessmen to expand their economic activities, offered incentives for exporting goods abroad, and generally sounded a positive message about Bavarian recovery. The most direct American intervention in the economy, at this point, was the introduction of the Deutschmark in June 1948. Even then, however, military government officials in Bavaria insisted it was fundamentally a German operation. After currency reform the Bavarian economy showed signs of improvement, but familiar problems remained and the new currency brought its own troubles. The supply of both labor and housing proved problematic, particularly as more ethnic Germans flooded into Bavaria. The Land government settled them in rural regions since the major cities could not house many more residents. Yet this left expellees far away from the available jobs, which were largely in cities. Currency reform also produced rapidly rising prices and a shortage of credit that could undermine the prospects of recovery. Additionally, Americans grew increasingly frustrated with their Bavarian counterparts. American and German officials, then, clashed over who got to define the severity of the economic crisis, much as they did over the food supply.

Nevertheless, the Bavarian economy showed significant signs of life by early 1949. Prices for consumer goods declined and export activity recorded a significant increase. The prospect of an economic collapse was the smallest since the start of the occupation. American officials in Bavaria, however, possessed limited influence on this recovery. They certainly hoped for and promoted economic reconstruction, but they deployed few direct options. Instead, the quest to rebuild Bavaria demonstrated the limits of American military government, at least as practiced in postwar Bavaria. Early American policy acted as one check on military government.
MGOs mitigated the effects of that policy as much as possible, but they possessed few tools to do so. In addition, the American preference for German officials to take responsibility further constrained the avenues open to MGOs, even as it produced tension between Americans and Bavarians. The Americans played an important part in the rebuilding Bavaria. Yet their influence was limited and, ultimately, the Germans were the most influential figures in the Economic Miracle of West Germany.
Chapter 4: Importing America: Democratization and Reorientation in Bavaria

“The German people have no understanding of what democracy means in practice, either as to rights or obligations…”
- Office of Military Government for Bavaria, 19 May 1947

“These two evenings of discussion should result in a complete understanding that if the Bavarians expect to have their civil rights, they must constantly defend them as we do in the United States.”
- C.S. Wright, 12 May 1949

Although the crises of the first years of the occupation and the challenges associated with reviving the Bavarian economy posed major challenges to American officials in Bavaria, one of their most important tasks remained the creation of a democratic Germany. A democratic Germany – a unified, democratic Germany for those who still held such hope – would rejoin the community of nations and serve as the foundation for peace and stability in the heart of Europe. Democratized, Germany would no longer start deadly world wars, and with a reconstructed economy, the country could lighten the financial burden of the American taxpayers who funded the occupation. The rising threat of the Soviet Union and the emerging Cold War provided a greater sense of urgency to the task. As the Cold War took shape, only democratization and reorientation of the Bavarian, and German, populace could truly halt the spread of communism. Just as the Soviet Union imposed its political system in the East, so too would the United States import its democratic practices to Bavaria, although without the blatant use of coercive state power.

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2 “Special Report on Amerika Haus Week in Bavaria,” 12 May 49, to Land Director, from C.S. Wright, Pg. 5, ISD Folder, Box 283, 643 (A1): Land Director’s Records Relating to OMGBY Units, 1948-1949, Records of the Land Director, RG 260, NARA.
Like other aspects of the occupation, however, early American policy limited the democratization efforts of military government officials. Of course, the food and economic problems of postwar Bavaria presented a major obstacle. The first few years of the occupation, characterized by persistent shortages and repeated crises, were not conducive to the spread of democracy. Yet policy presented another stumbling block. The policy of nonfraternization, which lasted until the fall of 1945, limited interactions between Americans and Germans, while undergirding the concept of collective German guilt and the need for a harsh peace. Additionally, one of the earliest forms of democratization, albeit a negative form, remained contentious. Americans and Bavarians both struggled to define the scope and intent of denazification. The inherently negative aspect of denazification, destroying Nazism through the removal of Nazis and Nazis symbols, also produced tension with the more positive aspects of democratization, which theoretically sought to build democracy from the ground up. The contrast between promoting democratic practices while some Bavarians were systematically removed from their positions due to membership in the Nazi Party highlighted a tension between goals and means that American officials strove to reconcile in the face of mounting German criticism over denazification.

Beyond the struggle over denazification, Americans in Bavaria experimented with exactly what reorientation would entail. The most prominent forum for experimentation was the German youth program. From the earliest months of the occupation, American officials targeted Bavarian youth, who had spent much of their formative years in Nazi Germany, as key figures in democratization efforts. Through youth groups, organized sports, discussion groups, seminars, and education reforms, Americans worked to impart the ideals of modern democracy and mature democratic citizenship to Bavaria’s youth. Ultimately, the youth programs served as a testing
ground for the larger reorientation mission. It was in the youth program that Americans
developed the methods, language of modernity and backwardness, and the definitions of success – namely looking like US democracy – that characterized the larger democratization campaign of 1948 and 1949.

Even with the practice afforded by the youth programs, however, once military government officials turned their attention fully to the reorientation program a wide array of different programs all aimed for the reorientation of Germans living under American occupation. The *Amerika Haus* program, the reorientation film program, programs promoting cultural exchange, and the organization of discussion groups and town hall meetings reflected the different bureaucracies of Bavarian military government and produced a diverse approach to reorientation. Despite the diversity, American efforts at reorientation reflected a rather consistent goal: the democratization of Bavarians, and Germans in general, through a campaign of political modernization. Military government officials like William Moran, the Deputy Director of OMGB’s Field Operations Division, circulated ideas about the political backwardness of Bavarians and maturity of the American occupiers. These immature Germans would therefore receive an education in modern and mature democratic ideas from their American teachers. Military government officials sometimes went out of their way to proclaim that they were not imposing American standards on the Bavarians. However, the Americans who implemented the program naturally drew from the democracy with which they had the most experience: the United States. As a result, American democratic thought and ideals served as the backdrop against which German democratization was assessed. When their German pupils behaved in ways familiar to their American mentors, reorientation was viewed as a success.
While Americans judged success by the emulation of American practices, the Germans used reorientation for their own purposes. Some Germans embraced the language of political modernization to advance their political prospects. Others used the language to appeal to military government and challenge the authority of local, regional, and Bavarian officials. Most significantly, however, Bavarians also adapted the language of democratization to challenge their supposed teachers. Early on Germans pointed out the tension between denazification and democratization, but criticism intensified as Americans spread the language of political modernization. Bavarian officials, newspapers, and individuals used the language of democratization to critique what they viewed as military government’s undemocratic actions. Unpopular education reforms, in particular, were criticized as undemocratic as OMGB tried to force the Bavarian government to go along with its reforms. Bavarians of all stripes, then, co-opted the language of reorientation to suit their own needs and goals.

Democratization and reorientation were among the most important missions for American military government officers. Without their success, the goal of a democratic Bavaria, and Germany, would be difficult to reach. Although it received less attention during the first years of the occupation, Americans viewed democratization as just as important as feeding and rebuilding Bavaria. Unlike the food and economic crises, however, MGOs in Bavaria did not specifically challenge American policy regarding reorientation. Many viewed the early nonfraternization directive as impractical, but high-level American officials also recognized its failure early on and ended the strict order. What American policy did do was limit the range of options available to military government officials in the realm of democratization. The more punitive aspects of economic policy meant that MGOs focused on economic problems, not
democratization, during the first years of the occupation. Therefore, negative policies in one field often made their effects felt in different spheres.

Ultimately, American officials in Bavaria implemented a reorientation campaign that was a program of political modernization. Falling back on the democratic ideas they were most familiar with, MGOs believed that modern and mature American ideas should replace the backward and immature ideas of the Germans living in Bavaria. This program was not new in American foreign policy and its basic ideas would continue into the Cold War. During the interwar era, Congress agreed to the eventual independence of the Philippine Islands after the Americans had finished educating the population in the ways of modernity. Then during the 1950s and 1960s, modernization theory, including political modernization, was exported to the so-called developing world. Reorientation in American-occupied Bavaria represented both a continuation of older American practices and a preview of early Cold War policy, but applied, in this case, to politically backwards Europeans in the center of the Old World.³

Prelude to Reorientation

From early on, reorientation formed a key aspect of American policy in occupied Germany. Democratization and denazification formed half of the so-called “Four Ds” – the other two were demilitarization and deindustrialization – that the victorious Allies would pursue in their respective zones of occupation. However, the early crises of the occupation relegated democratization, a positive program, to the back burner and denazification remained perhaps the most visible, and most contentious, aspect of military government’s quest for reorientation.

Indeed, the tensions inherent in pursuing a negative policy (denazification) while simultaneously calling for the more positive creation of democratic life in Germany produced significant challenges for the American occupiers. Germans, as will be seen later in this chapter, readily coopted American language of democratization to criticize U.S. policy and to contend for control over denazification.

Early attempts at democratization, however, ran into a variety of obstacles. Most obviously, the crippling food and economic crises of the early postwar years limited the scope of democratization efforts. American officials, while they sought the spread of democracy, focused the bulk of their attention of addressing the major food shortages and economic chaos that characterized postwar Bavaria. German officials were also distracted by the enormity of the crises and saw democratization as of secondary importance. Beyond the distractions for both groups of officials, however, the plight of the Bavarian populace acted as a check on any early efforts towards reorientation. Even if MGOs had been inclined to start a large-scale campaign of democratization in late 1945 or early 1946, large swaths of the population were not interested. Instead, Bavarians focused on the day-to-day quest for survival, such as repairing homes, traveling to barter for food, or participating in other aspects of the informal economy. Faced with starvation, learning about democracy would have been of little importance.

In addition, the policy of denazification acted as another limit on any potential campaign of democratization during the early years of the occupation. As will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter, denazification was wildly unpopular throughout Bavaria. Right-wing politicians criticized the policy as too strict. Left-wing parties, particularly the communists, insisted the campaign was too lenient. Meanwhile, large swaths of the Bavarian population saw the policy as unfair, with minor Nazi Party members receiving harsh punishments early in the
occupation and major figures getting relatively light sentences in the rush to end denazification as the program dragged on. Denazification also presented potential problems for any campaign of democratization or reorientation contemplated by military government. The disconnect between the inherently negative, and rather undemocratic, process of removing Nazis from positions of power was hard to reconcile with the language of democratization, particularly when military government removed officials who had been elected by their communities. Similarly, the Army ruled postwar Bavaria in a fundamentally undemocratic manner while simultaneously proclaiming the goal of democratization. This disconnect was something that would challenge MGOs throughout the occupation.\(^4\)

Perhaps most significantly, however, was the challenge posed by the early policy of nonfraternization. Any early efforts at democratization, such as they informally existed, had to account for this widely publicized American policy. High-level Army and military government officials had worried about fraternization between Americans and Germans since before the end of the war. Specifically, many worried, particularly those who favored a harsh peace, that friendly interactions between the two populations would undermine American policy by eroding the idea of collective German guilt.\(^5\) Many Army officials feared that the soldiers’ hatred to Germans was only temporary and would quickly change after the war. To preempt that possibility, the Army published the *Pocket Guide for Germany*. Distributed to occupation forces before the entered Germany, it described all German society as unrepentantly militaristic and

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responsible for the war. Industrialization and economic modernization, the handbook argued, finally allowed “the German…to contemplate…his dream of enslaving the world.” Beyond fears of undermining American policy, yet still based on the foundational idea of Germany as a totally militarized society, nonfraternization promised to keep US soldiers from being corrupted by Germans. If Americans could not socialize with civilians, then undemocratic German attitudes would not corrupt the occupation forces.

Due to nonfraternization, limited options existed for any early efforts at democratization. By, in theory, severely minimizing the amount of interactions between Americans and Bavarians, the policy constrained any attempts to spread the ideas of democracy. Only able to interact with German officials during work hours and prohibited from informal interactions, the policy threw up an additional roadblock to reorientation. For example, the constraints on American actions meant that most early actions in the sphere of reorientation were largely negative, such as the removal of Nazi party members and “militarists” from official positions or the elimination of other symbols of the Third Reich like street names and statues. Such efforts made some progress in removing major vestiges of Nazism, but they could not promote new democratic values. Even if MGOs had not been preoccupied by the food and economic crises, nonfraternization would have made it hard to spread democracy in postwar Bavaria.

However, the nonfraternization band quickly broke down, despite the wishes of high-level Army officials. Soldiers, including MGOs, entering Bavarian found civilians who did not fit into the wartime image of a warlike population universally in support of the war. Instead, they found a population tired by six years of war and morose after years of living under the rain of Allied bombs. Bavarians, above all, wanted peace. Additionally, many Americans identified a sense of socio-cultural familiarity between American and German society. German houses

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6 Ibid., 48-49.
reminded Americans of home, individual Germans behaved in a familiar manner, and many Bavarians had even incorporated major aspects of American culture, including jazz and a fondness for the mythological Wild West. Therefore, many soldiers, not just German-Americans, “found it exceedingly difficult to hate people who reminded them so much of their own friends and family at home.”\textsuperscript{7} Beyond this sense of familiarity, an ardent desire for female companionship led many Americans to flagrantly violate the nonfraternization order. This aspect of fraternization became so prevalent that it feminized the concept. As originally issued, fraternization included to interactions with all Germans, but it was soon synonymous with relationships between American men and German women. As discussed in Chapter 2, this produced a growing sense of sympathy for the Bavarian populace. In the realms of food and economics, it pushed MGOs to mitigate the effects of American policies. When it came to democratization, such sympathy opened the door for more positive policies of reorientation and a move away from reliance on predominantly negative policies.\textsuperscript{8}

\textbf{Ideas of Reorientation}

When it came to reorientation and democratization, American military government officials in Bavaria did not operate in vacuum. Instead, they drew, at least in part, on contemporary academic research about how best to restructure undemocratic societies along democratic lines and from early writings on modernization theory. Most notably, American intellectuals across multiple disciplines drew on psychology and psychiatry to analyze the “German mentality” and to describe “the principle of re-education as a policy of cultural and

\textsuperscript{7} Ibid., 58.

political democratization.”\textsuperscript{9} Fundamentally, this argument centered on the idea that such a thing as a unified “national character structure” existed and that it could be changed. Based on new research methods in psychology, psychiatry, and other disciplines, many academics believed that the national character structure was a product of traditions passed on from generation to generation and that “manifested…in all aspects of national, social, and psychic life.”

For Columbia neuropsychiatrist Richard Brickner, the German national character displayed the symptoms of paranoia, including megalomania, the need to dominate, a persecution complex coupled with projection, and retrospective falsification. According to Brickner, “Murder is the logical dénouement of its [paranoia’s] special outlook on the world.”\textsuperscript{11} While Brickner identified paranoia in the German national character, child psychoanalyst Erik H. Erikson saw German society as stuck in a protracted state of immaturity in which “simple patterns of hypnotic action and freedom from thought” replaced the “complicated conflict of adolescence.”\textsuperscript{12}

Ultimately, however, these intellectuals believed that German national character could be changed. Brickner argued that Germany’s paranoia could be cured through a process of re-education, but that process could not begin from within German society. “Resources or imagination to put into effect a programme of psychiatric rehabilitation,” he explained, “must come from outside – from among the victors.”\textsuperscript{13} Meanwhile, anthropologist Margaret Mead built upon her thesis that war was a social invention to argue that national character could be changed through education, or in the case of Germany re-education. In \textit{And Keep Your Powder Dry}, Mead

\textsuperscript{12} Erik H. Erikson, “The Legend of Hitler’s Childhood,” in \textit{Childhood and Society} (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1950), 337 & 342; Fay, \textit{Theaters of Occupation}, 4-5. Erikson’s essay was originally published during World War II as part of a study on Nazi character conducted for the U.S. government.
\textsuperscript{13} Gerhardt, “A Hidden Agenda of Recovery,” 310; Brickner, \textit{Is Germany Incurable?}, 304.
wrote that America’s greatest asset was its national character, which both supported a democratic culture and was the product of that culture. Citing the process by which immigrants became Americans, Mead argued that national character was a product of citizenship, not race or ethnicity. Therefore, the German national character – or any nondemocratic national character – could be changed “if cultural value standards were carefully…re-adapted.” Ultimately, Mead believed, “[W]e must accept the responsibility of trying to eliminate in other cultures and our own those particular habits and institutions which lead to war, to separatism, and to a desire to dominate or exploit.”

These differing ideas about how to fix Germany’s national character came together in 1944 during a conference organized by Brickner and sponsored by the State Department and War Department. At the conference – titled “Germany After the War” – physicians, sociologists, psychologists, and anthropologists discussed how to modify the German national character during the postwar occupation. Generally, the participants agreed that change could be wrought, yet disagreed on how to achieve that change. Mead and psychoanalyst Thomas French believed that changing the institutions of German society would help the “constructive elements” of German mentality to overcome the destructive ones. Another group of academics led by Lawrence Kubie, however, insisted “that nothing but repression could control German aggressiveness.” Ultimately, Mead and French’s perspective largely won out and the conference’s report, later published in the Journal of Orthopsychiatry, called for long-term institutional change to German society.

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The arguments of Brickner, Mead, and other academics interested in German national character gained significant traction among both postwar planners and in society at large. The wartime Committee to Reeducate the Axis Powers drew on these academic theories to argue that Germans would have to “unlearn” Nazi doctrine before learning about liberal democracy. Additionally, the Committee reinforced ideas about immature Germans advocated by Erikson. The “industrious, well-disciplined, peace-loving” German, according to the Committee, would be found when individuals “had a chance to grow from childhood outside the direct or indirect influence” of German militarism.\footnote{Fay, \textit{Theaters of Occupation}, 33.} Beyond postwar planning, the film \textit{Tomorrow – the World!} (1944) popularized the idea that Germans in general, and Nazis specifically, existed “in a state of protracted adolescence.” In the film, a German boy indoctrinated in Nazi propaganda, Emil, arrives in the United States to live with his uncle. The movie then chronicles Emil’s unlearning of Nazi ideology and his acceptance of American society. Ultimately, the film equates German national character with adolescence and the American national character with maturity.\footnote{Ibid., Ch. 1.}

Beyond debates about national character, American sociologists, anthropologists, and other intellectuals laid the foundations of modernization theory during the 1940s. For modernization scholars, historian Michael Latham explained, the theory “promised to unite different branches of social analysis” around a grand theory that could explain how states developed from “primitive” to “advanced” status, why Western society dominated the world, and provide a roadmap for “new states” embarking on the journey towards modernization.\footnote{Michael E. Latham, \textit{Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and “National-Building” in the Kennedy Era} (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 30.} Ultimately, modernization theorists promoted the American consensus that dominated the country during the middle of the twentieth century, namely support for liberal values, capitalist
forms, and pluralist institutions. The United States, they argued, could serve as a model for "backward" peoples around the globe and help states on the road to modernity.

Modernization theory first appeared in the field of sociology; in particular, sociologist Talcott Parsons, who also participated in the academic debate about the German national character, played a key role in developing foundational ideas. Parsons’ 1937 work *The Structure of Social Action* drew distinctions between “primitive” societies, in which family and community institutions played the most important roles in constraining individual action, and “advanced” societies, where formal legal systems and the nation-state had the greatest impact on individual agency.19 Building off Parsons, many American sociologists developed ideas about what constituted a “modern” personality. An appropriately modern individual was characterized by attributes such as “openness to new experience,” “readiness for social change,” an ability to trust others, and respect for the dignity of fellow humans. Meanwhile, a “traditional” person was passive and fearful of change. Ultimately, modernization sociologists saw the theory as an “analytical structure through which an entire process of social change, encompassing both the past of the West and the future of the ‘developing’ world, might be understood.”20

Sociologists, however, were not the only academics to embrace modernization theory. Political scientists developed ideas about “political development” and economists highlighted structuralist thinking regarding economic stagnation. In this vein of thought, economic problems originated not from trade relations but from “deficiencies in social values and political leadership.” However, English-speaking countries possessed no such problems. Americans and other Anglo-Saxons, Walt Rostow argued, possessed ideas about “individualism, democracy, and


economic opportunity that facilitated a ‘natural’ and rapid climb toward ‘modern’ social organization and living standards.” Striking a similar chord to scholars of national character, modernization theorists argued that backward societies required some kind of cultural planning to correct these deficiencies. Modern states and societies, therefore, could provide guidance to those states on the road towards modernization.

This belief that modern states would guide the backward towards modernity produced language like old imperial justifications for conquest, even though most modernization theorists voiced significant opposition to formal imperialism. Like imperialists from the nineteenth century, intellectuals of the 1940s and 1950s argued for the intrinsic superiority of the West and the duty of Western societies to lift backwards peoples towards that superior standard. For example, many intellectuals argued “that the history of nations was analogous to the growth of organisms.” In their mind, movement towards Western civilization was a natural process; the only difference was the speed in which societies reached that end point.21 Additionally, the United States was held up as the peak of modernity and its history promoted as a kind of guide on how to reach that lofty level. Sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset argued that other countries “would learn a great deal if they sought to acquire the same ‘key values’ of equality and achievement that ‘stem from our revolutionary origins.’” America, Lipset insisted, “was democratic and equalitarian before industrialization” and had “led the way in these patterns.”22 By following the American example, modernization scholars argued, the backward regions of the world could reach modernity.

Although the ideas behind modernization theory did not reach maturity until the late 1950s and early 1960s, early formulations existed during the American occupation of Bavaria

21 Latham, Modernization as Ideology, 62.
22 Ibid., 64; Seymour Martin Lipset, First New Nation: The United States in Historical and Comparative Perspective (New York: Basic Books, 1963), 2 & 130.
and built upon the ideas regarding national character that academics had debated throughout the war. Occupation officials in Bavaria drew on the language of modernization and national character to describe both the civilian population and their plans to instill democracy in their defeated foe. In many ways, the United States experimented with the earliest ideas about modernization not in a “developing” country, but in the heart of the old world. MGOs in Bavaria would encourage the civilian population to borrow and imitate “modern” American practices, a practice that would later characterize the modernization campaigns of the Cold War. Within Germany, this practice extended beyond the purview of democratization. The Marshall Plan, for example, was in part based on “assumptions that America’s own historical experience might be replicated abroad.” The full extent of modernization theory had not yet been achieved, but the basic tenets emerged in occupied Bavaria.

While many debates about national character and modernization theory took place in intellectual circles, they gained influence among military government officials in a variety of ways. First, many MGOs and other occupation officials possessed academic backgrounds. Students at the School of Military Government, for example, included doctors, government employees, and professors who possessed familiarity with contemporary academic debates. In addition, training for occupation during often included instruction on the concepts of national character. Yale University’s Arnold Wolfers, for example, lectured MGO students on “how to handle Germans.” Wolfers then proceeded to describe distinctive features of the German national character. Germans, he argued, saw “self-restraint, politeness or even kindness as a sign of weakness.” Instead, only “fairness, decency and humanity” combined with “unyielding

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23 Latham, Modernization as Ideology, 25.
“firmness” would reeducate the population successfully. Occupation officials, therefore, possessed some background in the ideas that would undergird OMGB’s efforts at democratization. Beyond the experiences of MGOs, civilian academics were a common feature of postwar Germany. OMGB hired numerous civilian experts to help with various aspects of the occupation, including reorientation and school reform. These civilians brought with them academic theories about German national character and democratization. Beyond travel at the behest of military government, American academics went to Europe as part of events to spread American intellectual ideas. The Salzburg Seminar in American Studies, organized outside the purview of military government and held in 1947 and 1948, attracted major figures, including Margaret Mead, to introduce American beliefs to the continent and to model democratic behavior.

Ultimately, the language that would surround the reorientation campaign demonstrated the prevalence of these intellectual ideas. German backwardness and immaturity, some of the defining characteristics of the German national character identified by American academics, would be eradicated by the shining example of American modernity. American practices, customs, and ideas – the foundation of the United States’ national character – would serve as a model for Bavarians to imitate. Borrowing from the American academe, occupation officials in OMGB set out to democratize Bavarian society.

The Youth Program: Rehearsal for Democratization

The first major reorientation campaign conducted by MGOs focused on Bavarian youth. From the earliest months of the occupation, American officials in Bavaria targeted youth for special democratization projects. Bavarian youth had spent most of their formative years in Nazi

Germany and therefore needed special attention to return them to the path of democracy. As a result, military government and regular Army officers oversaw a wide variety of programs that specifically targeted German youth. Combat units worked with military government detachments to organize youth sporting events to teach these young Bavarians the principles of democratic society through sport. Military government oversaw the recreation of German youth groups, sponsored by both Americans and Germans, and prohibited any nationalistic or militaristic influences on these groups. Finally, American military government officers worked to introduce young Bavarians to modern and mature democratic practices, often synonymous with American traditions. To do so, they cooperated with combat units and Bavarian officials to sponsor youth forums where young Bavarians could learn from their American teachers. In the final years of the occupation German youth affairs often merged with the broader program of reorientation, particularly in the arenas of cultural exchange and film. Nevertheless, in the first few years of the occupation, while many military government officers were distracted by the economic crises plaguing Bavaria, the German youth programs served as a rehearsal for the larger democratization program that would come later. The Bavarian youth programs, essentially, served as a testing ground for approaches to reorientation. In their attempts to democratize Bavarian youth, American officials introduced many of the same practices and ideas about political modernization and maturity that would characterize their drive to democratize the wider German populace.

Early interactions with Bavarian children by military government officials produced the same sense of sympathy that had led to challenges to American food and economic policies. Many Americans in Bavaria, both regular troops and occupation officials, saw youth as victims of both Nazism and the war. The experience of seeing Bavarian youth battle starvation in the
immediate postwar months led many officials to sympathize with these seemingly helpless children and youth. Sergeant Walter Krause recalled watching a twelve-year-old boy trying to steal food from a parked jeep. Although Krause initially felt he should stop the boy, he quickly changed his mind. “Who am I to pass judgment on this boy?” he wrote. “How do I know what desperation has compelled him to stoop to an act of pilferage? What really lies behind his act?”

In response to circumstances like this, American soldiers quickly ignored the nonfraternization order and reached out to Bavarian youth. They distributed chocolate or bubble gum, shared comic books, and organized informal sporting events. These informal interactions were so popular that it contributed to the collapse of the nonfraternization order when the ban on relationships with German children was lifted in early fall 1945. This process also reinforced the growing sense of paternal responsibility for the Bavarian populace then emerging among military government officials in the Land because of the food and economic crises. Not only would MGOs care for the physical needs of Bavarian youth, many also saw themselves as potential instructors in the ways of democracy.

However, American officials did not construct a coherent youth campaign for the first nine months of the occupation. As a result, occupation troops and military government detachments organized uncoordinated youth programs that lacked any kind of coherent approach to democratization. These youth programs, it was hoped, would “foster democratic principles” in young Germans. In particular, MGOs drew a direct connection between American athletics and the country’s democratic tradition. Youth sports would do the same in Bavaria, supposedly combatting Nazism and instilling democratic values. Military Government Detachment I-364,

28 Goedde, GIs and Germans, 141.
stationed in Schrobenhausen, reported to Munich the organization of two softball and two basketball teams by Sargent Matzen and Corporal Williams of the detachment. Captain Henry Bierman, the detachment commander, believed that “a good athletic program for boys and girls would give the coming generation a different out look in life and might prevent future wars.”

Another military government official, James Pollock, similarly proposed teaching German youth the American version of football. “If the Germans could understand its contributions in giving us some qualities the Germans have always lacked,” Pollock explained, “their younger Generation might be improved.”

American officials also supported youth activities organized by the Germans themselves. Military government detachments and combat units provided excess war materiel for camping trips, loaned out sport equipment, and even offered transportation to and from youth events, a luxury in a period of major shortages. At this point in the occupation American officers like Bierman were not clear how these youth programs would promote democracy, but they continued nonetheless.

Such uncoordinated youth programs continued into April 1946, when OMGUS officials ordered the creation of official American-sponsored youth activities. This new directive did not represent a fundamentally novel approach to the relationship between German children and American soldiers. Instead, it "elevated to an official level what had already existed before, namely the informal interaction between American soldiers and German children.” Sporting activities continued, as MGOs imported their favorite sports into Bavaria, particularly baseball and football. Beyond sports, however, Americans organized other youth activities throughout

30 Quoted in Goedde, GIs and Germans, 141.
32 Goedde, GIs and Germans, 136.
Bavaria. In July 1946, for example, soldiers in the Bavarian town of Coburg held a festival for 1,000 German children. The Americans drove children around town in Army jeeps, held a variety of competitions, and provided food and chocolate to the participating children. Similarly, MGOs organized local recreation centers for Bavarian youth and held large numbers of Christmas parties during the upcoming winter.33 As with the early, non-official youth activities, Americans had a challenging time justifying exactly how these activities would promote democracy. It was unclear how attending American-sponsored festivals and Christmas parties would make Bavarian children democratic. That lack of a coherent framework, however, did not keep the programs from growing in scope and size.

Despite official sanction, several challenges plagued the nascent youth program. Military government officers complained of the lack of participation by local combat units. In one survey, only four of eleven detachments reported the active participation of nearby Army units. Additionally, demobilization and the rapid turnover of smaller units provided little stability in the youth program, as regular soldiers often promised assistance but were then moved to another region of the U.S. Zone of Occupation.34 The lack of coordination was exacerbated by shortages of equipment necessary for the youth program. Footwear, tents, hiking gear, and sport equipment was sorely lacking and military government detachments struggled to acquire the materials needed by local German groups. In August 1946, the detachment in rural Landkreis Feuchtwangen, complained that it was “unable to procure any sport equipment whatsoever.” Less than a month later, a survey of the Bavarian youth program reported that only ten of twenty-four detachments had received any sport equipment and in Griesbach, two requisitions by Detachment D-378 had gone unanswered for five weeks. For occupation officials on the ground,

33 Ibid., 147.
the shortages represented a major obstacle to the success of the early youth program. These Americans wanted to promote the democratization of Bavarian youth, but the lack of coordination and equipment severely inhibited their ability to do so.

During the summer of 1946, military government worked to provide greater coordination in youth affairs. At the end of May, a Bavarian-wide committee – the Bavarian Land Youth Committee – was established to oversee youth groups and to coordinate affairs between Bavarians, military government officers, and combat units. In addition, Americans encouraged Germans to organize more effective local control. New Kreis Youth Committees coordinated the activities of local Bavarian youth groups. OMGB also sped up the process of licensing these German youth groups. Detailed licensing applications sought to weed out undemocratic organizations and offered one way, even if it was largely negative, to promote democratization. Potential groups had to explain their activities between 1933 and 1945, along with any connections to the Nazi Party or its subsidiary youth organizations. In addition, youth groups were prohibited from political activity, from wearing uniforms, and from anything that resembled paramilitary activity. “Severe punishment” awaited any youth organization that “glorifies militarism or nationalism” or that sought to “revive or justify the doctrines of national socialist leaders.” Military government officials were optimistic about the success of the better-coordinated youth program. Hans Thomsen, the Youth Activities Specialist in OMGB, predicted a massive increase in youth participation to Brigadier General Walter Mueller. Approximately 175,000 Bavarian youth were involved in youth groups in the middle of August 1946. Yet by the end of the year Thomsen envisioned over 500 groups and as many as 1 million participants.35

Considering the shortages that still plagued Bavaria – not only in equipment for youth affairs, but

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also in food, fuel, and transportation – Thomsen’s estimates were overly optimistic. But the moves to better coordinate the diverse aspects that made up the youth program in the summer of 1946 set the stage for the creation of a coherent program of youth democratization.

In October and November 1946 Army and military government officials finally developed a framework in which the Bavarian, and larger German, youth programs could operate and which provided some kind of argument for how Bavarian youth would be democratized. On October 5, the U.S. Army’s European headquarters ordered the creation of Youth Affairs Officers at all levels – divisional, regimental, battalion, and company – to coordinate activities with military government offices and local German youth groups. In American eyes, German youth were “disillusioned, frustrated and confused” after defeat and therefore needed American guidance and instruction to transition to a proper democratic society.36 Sports would continue to play a key role in the youth program, as they had since the beginning of the occupation. However, they would adopt a distinctly American perspective and Army officials now put forth an argument about how sports would serve democratization. Whereas Nazi sports “were highly regimented mass activities” used “as preparation for military discipline and war,” American-sponsored sports would offer “training in fair play and teamwork.”37 American sport, therefore, was viewed as a valuable tool of democratic socialization. Militaristic sports like fencing, shooting, and parachuting would be replaced by those that supposedly inculcated the values necessary for a successful democracy.

However, the youth program would also have to transition beyond its primary focus on athletics and adopt a clear “ideological goal,” specifically democratization. Many Americans assumed that German youth were ignorant of the most fundamental democratic concepts. Under the Nazi regime German children were supposedly “trained to give unconditional loyalty to absolutes.” Therefore, they needed “training in critical thinking, in tolerance and in intellectual fair play.” American personnel would provide this instruction by “demonstrating and teaching democracy to German youth.”

To do so, military government offices and regular Army units would introduce Bavarian youth to democratic concepts and provide practical experience through forums, discussions, lectures, and public meetings. Such events would introduce youth to “modern American materials and methods” and provide a chance to act out the basic concepts of democracy in a friendly setting. These basic ideas produced an image of infantile Bavarian youth, which ultimately fed into a general image of a backward, immature Bavarian population. After using this language to describe their efforts to democratize German children, military government officials found it easy to use that same language to describe the political maturity of the population writ large. Just as Bavarian youth were immature, the adult population “had to be taught how to use the power of citizenship, morally, responsibly, and democratically.” In this manner, the youth program ultimately previewed the general reorientation campaign of 1948 and 1949.

Within this new framework, American military government officers worked to democratize the youth living in their areas of responsibility. Throughout Bavaria, American officials established German Youth Activities (GYA) coordinating committees to provide

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39 Goedde, GIs and Germans, 128.
guidance and support throughout the region. After U.S. tactical forces were reorganized into military posts in January 1947, post commanders were ordered to establish contacts with the major military government offices in their command areas. Indeed, Major General Frank Milburn, commander of the First Military District which comprised all of Bavaria, ordered his post commanders to form coordinating committees, explaining that it was desired that “all units…give strong impetus to the German Youth Activities Program…” Such committees provided a forum for military government officers, regular Army officers, and German officials to coordinate larger programs and to provide assistance to smaller military government offices that perhaps lacked the resources, particularly personnel, to oversee the local GYA program.

Through such coordinating committees and on their own initiative, military government officers used the youth program to promote democratization in Bavaria by introducing young Germans to democratic ideas and practices. Again, Americans operated on the assumption that Bavarian youth were ignorant of the fundamentals of democracy and, therefore, required American instruction. In particular, youth were criticized for a lack of civic and social responsibility. During interactions with their Bavarian pupils, Americans reminded them that civic responsibility was “one factor which distinguishes a community in a real sense from a number of people merely living close together in a certain area.” To correct this deficiency, American officials brought together youth from throughout Bavaria to address pressing local and regional issues. A youth conference in Dachau from November 22 to 29, 1947, provided one such opportunity. One of the avowed goals of the conference was to teach “self-help measures” that youth could use in their own communities. Captain Alexander Hogg reported that youth

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from throughout the German Land discussed pressing issues, most notably the refugee crisis that plagued Bavaria as ethnic Germans expelled from Eastern Europe poured into occupied Germany. According to Hogg, this discussion “started many of the young people thinking along lines of social and civic responsibility hitherto comparatively unexplored.” While Hogg’s report noted the success of the conference in starting a new discourse about Bavarian problems among the youth in attendance, it also operated under the assumption that German youth possessed little in the way of civic responsibility. Americans viewed the totality of Nazi indoctrination as an indisputable fact. As a result of living under Nazi rules for years, Bavarian youth needed extensive democratization; an effort that required American education and instruction.

Democratization efforts, however, were not limited to large conferences designed to teach civic responsibility. Military government officers also provided practical experience with the institutions and forms of democracy, forms that often reflected American traditions. The Dachau youth conference in November 1947, held discussion groups on a range of topics including economic reconstruction, the role of the central government, and importance of a free press. Participants could ask questions of their American mentors and express opinions on “debatable question[s],” which “furnished a valuable social experience and afforded much-needed practice in parliamentary procedure.” American officials also promoted local events to introduce Bavarian youth to the practices of a democracy, even after military government’s reorientation campaign kicked into high gear. In late 1948, Lieutenant Slade Smith organized a “Youth Day” in the town of Kronach. Approximately sixty German youth shadowed town

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officials for a day and were then asked to make decisions on the issues facing the town.\textsuperscript{44}

Similarly, in May 1949 the Ansbach city council – with the support of the American military government officer, Frederick Roessler – started inviting students of the local secondary school to council meetings.\textsuperscript{45} Then in July 1949 the American office in Wolfstein held a “model discussion” in advance of a youth leader training camp. According to one military government officer, William Boyer, the model would “show youth leaders what can be achieved through a well-led, clear-cut discussion.”\textsuperscript{46}

For occupation officials, these conferences, public discussions, and youth days were a success once Bavarian youth apparently embraced the language and ideas of democratization. At the end of the 1947 Dachau youth conference it was reported that participants “stressed the need for greater tolerance, less emphasis on representation of party or church, and more pulling together as members of the same community and state.” Since Americans assumed that Bavarian youth possessed little sense of civic responsibility, this development was “no small accomplishment.”\textsuperscript{47} In a similar vein, a regional youth forum held in Hof in December 1948 and sponsored by military government ignited “a new spirit of civic consciousness…among the students.”\textsuperscript{48} Under American guidance, therefore, these Bavarian youths finally learned the value of civic responsibility. The actual actions of youth after they left these conferences and forums apparently mattered less than the language they used to describe their newfound commitment to

\textsuperscript{46}“Youth Affairs,” 15 July 1949, to Branch Chief, Branch D, FOD, OMGB, from William A. Boyer, Deputy MGO, Wolfstein, Sport & Youth Activities Folder, Box 966, 753 (A1): Correspondence and Reports, 1945-1949, LSO Wolfstein, RG 260, NARA.
democracy. American reports, on occasion, mentioned the civic activities of German youth and youth groups, such as plans to establish a youth newspaper or organizing collection drives for blockaded Berlin during the winter of 1948-1949. However, success of the youth program was more often defined by youth adoption of the language and practices modeled by their American instructors.

As a result, the youth program in Bavaria took on a decidedly American tone, reflecting American ideas, traditions, and structures. Military government officers and their superiors dotted their writings with references to U.S. political culture, compared Bavarian political life to its American counterpart, and actively promoted ideas imported from across the Atlantic. Debates over the role of the central government in a nation-state often adopted American language. At Dachau, for example, youth debated the dichotomy between federalism and centralism. The youth, Captain Hogg happily reported, approached the topic from the perspective of what limits could be placed on the central government without endangering its effectiveness instead of what powers of the individual states should be sacrificed to the national government. The Bavarian youth could have easily framed their debate in this manner; Bavaria possessed a long tradition of opposition to central authority. If so, this debate, framed in rather American language, represented a success in the eyes of Captain Hogg because of the incorporation of American ideas. Yet even if Hogg was merely rephrasing a German debate in language his superiors would understand, it was symptomatic of a tendency, which became even more pronounced during the larger reorientation campaign, to frame German political culture in comparison with its counterpart in the United States.

Beyond reporting on the political language used by Bavarian youth, military government officials also promoted distinctly American ideas and structures. In May 1948, Elmer Warnke, head of the Field Operations Division branch headquartered in Regensburg, encouraged MGOs in his branch to promote the construction of municipal playgrounds for local children. A campaign to build a playground would bring together adults and youth in individual communities and create some semblance of civic pride by accomplishing a shared goal. According to Warnke, “What better way to get across the American democratic spirit?”

A few weeks later Warnke again forwarded a proposal to his subordinates. This time he suggested that American officers to consider establishing a program similar to Junior Achievement, Inc. in the United States. Junior Achievement provided business training for American high school students and Warnke believed that something similar might work in Bavaria, particularly if it emphasized civic and social responsibility.

However, Warnke was not alone in promoting American practices. Military government officers encouraged German youth to adopt American ideas, traditions, and groups. In the rural community of Zwiesel and the surrounding Landkreis, for example, John Greeley promoted ten new Jungbaärmgruppen, modeled after the American 4-H Club. While Greeley explained that he worked behind the scenes and was “careful not to superimpose any ideas upon the young farmer which are distinctly American,” his program was clearly inspired by the American example. Greeley solicited literature donations from the major agriculture universities in the United States and hoped that the youth groups would teach “modern methods” from America.

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50 “Promotion and Integration of Kreis Youth Activites by MGO’s”, in “Addendum to Branch SOP – ‘Kreis Youth Activities’”, 4 May 1948, to All Directors, Branch D, from Elmer F. Warnke, Branch Chief, Miscellaneous Correspondence Folder, Box 828, 734 (A1): General Records, 1948-1949, LSO Regensburg, RG 260, NARA.
On the surface, the creation of American-inspired Bavarian youth groups and the promotion of American ideas, particularly those not directly related to democratization, appear insignificant. However, 4-H Clubs and the adoption of American political ideas and language demonstrated the tendency to judge the youth program by how well it reflected American civic life. German youth were deemed civically responsible when they proclaimed the need to rise above partisan or denominational differences to solve local issues. Political debates over the role of government received tacit American approval when they incorporated U.S. language. And even youth groups that were non-political on their face aimed to introduce Bavarian youth to American methods. Although many military government officers like John Greeley proclaimed that they were not forcing Americanization upon Bavarian youth, it was impossible to escape the influence of American ideas and practices on the youth program, at least from the American perspective. Outright Americanization was not the goal, but the democratization of youth in Bavaria proceeded along ideas and practices exported from the United States.

Besides youth conferences and American-inspired groups, the youth program included several other programs designed for democratization. The sports program continued, as occupation officials saw athletics as a way to draw in large numbers of youth and as a way to promote perceived democratic values. Soccer, baseball, softball, and basketball were particularly popular team sports, but U.S. officials encouraged individual activities as well. After months of planning, in summer of 1949 a zone-wide soap box derby would teach German boys “fair play…and good sportsmanship.”

Beyond athletics, the youth program included youth centers in individual communities where children could play ping pong and other games, read books, and meet for discussion groups. Bavarian youth were also some of the main targets of the

reorientation film program that gained steam in 1947 and 1948. As will be discussed in greater
detail later, military government officers worked with local German government and school
officials to show a wide array of films, both commercial movies, like Mickey Mouse, and films
made in Germany for the expressed purpose of democratization. Discussion of the reorientation
films were viewed as particularly important, for it was through discussion that youth would see
the true message of the movie and learn the requirements of democratic society. The discussions
also served as yet another form of citizenship training; they were how “interest is generated and a
competent public is created.” Just as youth conferences and hands-on experience would teach
democratic values, so too would nearly all aspects of Bavarian childhood.

From the American perspective, the youth programs in Bavaria represented a notable
success. Athletic events, film showings, and festivals attracted significant numbers of children.
By April 1949 an estimated 600,000 youth used GYA facilities per month in the American zone
of occupation. Total membership had increased from 200,000 to 1.4 million. These figures, in a
vacuum, seemingly demonstrated the program’s success. However, when properly
contextualized, a new picture emerged, one in which GYA had a somewhat limited impact, both
in terms of total participation and in the goal of democratization. Large numbers of German
children undoubtedly participated in American-sponsored programs, but even greater numbers
took part in non-American activities. Approximately forty percent of all youth involved in youth
programs participated in church groups, particularly in religious Bavaria, and another thirty-two
percent played in athletic clubs. Some surveys even showed that less than half of German youth
even knew of the American programs. Indeed, American surveys captured a variety of reasons

54 I.P. Paczkowski, “Youth Film Club”, in “Kreis Youth Affairs Bulletin No. 2”, 19 May 48, to All Directors,
Branch D, from Emer F. Warnke, Pg. 3, Miscellaneous Correspondence Folder, Box 828, 734 (A1): Gen. Rec., 48-49,
LSO Regensburg, RG 260, NARA.
55 Goedde, GIs and Germans, 155.
for German participation in GYA and related activities. One such study found that forty percent of participants in American programs attended because they could get candy or food, while twenty-six percent participated to play sports and games. Just six percent of children answered that they came to the American-sponsored activities to learn about democracy. Additionally, the programs’ democratization efforts were of dubious value. In one Bavarian survey of schoolchildren in Regensburg, Weilheim, Pirkensee, and Burglengenfeld forty-eight percent had no opinion about what characterized democracy, while ten percent named Adolf Hitler as one of three greatest Germans in history. Not only were American programs less popular than their Bavarian counterparts, their success at spreading democracy among German youth was unclear.

Ultimately, the youth program in Bavaria served as a prelude to the more expansive reorientation campaign of 1948 and 1949. It served as a testing ground in which military government officers tried out the language, practices, and ideas that they would then apply to the entire Bavarian population. The program was based on the same assumption that Americans held about most Germans, namely their general ignorance on anything related to democracy. It also introduced similar methods for spreading the message of democratization. Lectures, forums, and discussions were all used by Americans to teach the fundamentals of democracy to the Bavarian population, particularly through the Amerika Haus. The Americans were also concerned with providing practical experience for their pupils. Whereas Bavarian youth shadowed German officials or conducted faux-political proceedings, the later reorientation campaign promoted the use of town hall meetings, almost to the point of religious fervor. Occupation officials also promoted American-inspired groups (4-H Clubs) or ideas (the federal-central dichotomy).

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56 Ibid., 155-156.  
Finally, the tendency to judge the success of the youth program by how well Bavarian youth reflected American democratic life previewed the trend of judging reorientation in American terms. For many Americans, youth were democratized when they adopted American language and practices. Similar attitudes would influence the later attempts to democratize the larger Bavarian populace. Just as German youth were politically immature and in need of instruction in the ways of modern democracy, MGOs adopted the same attitude towards the parents and grandparents of these Bavarian children and would implement many of the same programs to teach the supposedly modern practices of American democracy.58

In many ways, American attitudes were perfectly reasonable; occupation officials merely drew on their experiences in the democracy of which they had the most knowledge: the United States. The progress of democratization among Bavarian youth had to be measured some way and the most obvious measuring stick was the home country of the military government officers. Yet Americans in Bavaria had taken the first steps in a campaign of political modernization in the heart of supposedly modern Europe. In the coming months and years, American instructors would bring Bavaria into the modern world of democracy.

The Rise of Reorientation and Political Modernization

The major crises of the first years of the occupation attracted the attention of most military government officers. The crises of the first years of the occupation and the problems associated with economic reconstruction (as covered in earlier chapters) held the attention of American officials. Occupied by the tasks of feeding Bavaria, reviving the economy, and mitigating the effects of American policy, there was little extra time for reorientation activities. Even the German population appeared uninterested. Youth participated in the American-

sponsored youth program, but most adults remained concerned with Überleben, the quest for survival, as they had been during the war itself.\textsuperscript{59}

As these crises passed, however, military government officers increasingly turned their attention towards the tasks of democratization and reorientation, the most basic objectives of the occupation. In their efforts, Americans operated on the assumption that the Bavarian population was completely ignorant of democracy, both in theory and in practice. While many Germans resented “totalitarian methods” and the foundation of civil society existed in American-occupied Bavaria, individual Germans of all classes completely lacked any “understanding of what democracy means in practice, either as to rights or obligations.” Germans were submissive to authority, a tradition which grew from the “psychological and sociological patterns established over generations of German life.”\textsuperscript{60} As a result, American personnel needed to teach their naïve pupils the way of democracy. To do so, officials drew from their familiarity with American democracy and their experiences in the postwar German youth programs. Using similar programs and language as to what existed in their attempts to democratize Bavarian youth, MGOs promoted modern American beliefs and practices to overcome the political backwardness of Bavarians. Through lectures, discussion groups, films, town meetings, and education reform, American military government officers imported aspects of American political culture into Bavaria. Ultimately, the success of reorientation, as judged by military government officials, was determined by the willingness of Germans to adopt American forms and their ability to replicate American political culture.

\textit{The Amerika Haus and the Film Program}


One of the most visible forms of early reorientation efforts were the U.S. Information Centers. These buildings, along with their smaller branch offices, existed throughout Bavaria and were designed to “increase the effectiveness…of reorientation through scientific, literary, historical and technical materials, lectures, discussion groups, and related activities…”61 Located in major urban areas like Munich, Nuremberg, Regensburg, and six other Bavarian cities and towns, these Information Centers, later called Amerika Haüser (Amerika Haus in the singular), possessed libraries and rooms for lectures, discussions, and other meetings. The Amerika Haus program served several distinct functions for reorientation. Ideally, each location would be a place where Bavarians of all social classes could interact and help break down the traditional social barriers of German society. It was even hoped that the Amerika Haüser would combat any negative beliefs about American culture and show that Americans possessed “pride, tradition and good taste.”62 Most importantly, however, the program introduced Bavarians to American practices, beliefs, and traditions. By importing aspects of America into Bavaria, the Amerika Haüser played a key role in the step towards political modernization.63

Each Amerika Haus – along with the smaller Reading Rooms that developed in rural communities – held lectures, discussion groups, and classes on American political society. Such meetings introduced American beliefs and practices and connected democratization with democracy as practiced in the United States, both directly and indirectly. In Munich, for example, nine of eleven lectures on “democratization” that occurred from August 12 to September 11, 1948, directly concerned the United States. Two lectures on August 12 dealt with

63 For a more detailed history of the Amerika Haus program, including its continuation throughout the 1950s, see Kathleen Hooper, Designing Democracy: Re-education in the America Houses (1945-1961) (Frankfurt-am-Main: Peter Lang GmbH, 2014).
“Schools in Amerika” and “The Press in [the] USA.” Another lecture two weeks later highlighted “The Jury System in [the] USA.” The Amerika Haus even held a class on the “Principles of American Civics” which drew 672 participants. Lectures, discussion groups, and classes were not limited to the institutions of American democracy; they also incorporated major figures from American history as examples of democratic citizenship. During March 1949, the Amerika Haus in Regensburg and the Reading Rooms in towns of Auerbach, Neunburg von Weld, and Waldmünchen all held discussions and exhibitions on the life and work of the great American figures George Washington and Abraham Lincoln.64 Visiting American “experts” were also brought into Bavaria to share their knowledge on a wide array of subjects. In late August 1948 Dr. Carl Loewenstein of Amherst College presented a lecture in Munich on the American constitution to an audience of over two hundred. Several weeks later one Mrs. Harper-Sibley, President of the Women’s Organization of the Council of Churches in America, discussed “Women’s Church Work in America.” Then in late January 1949 Wilfred Puttkamer, Professor of Criminal Law at the University of Chicago, lectured on “The Organization and Administration of American Colleges and Universities.”65

Local military government officials, while not directly overseeing the activities at the Amerika Haïser, did participate in the activities hosted by the centers. Each Amerika Haus or Reading Room often shared a building with the local military government office. As a result, MGOs were physically close to the activities. Additionally, superiors within OMGB expected active participation on the part of detachment officials. A draft memo on the MGO’s

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responsibilities, likely written by William Moran of the Field Operations Division, insisted, “The Military Government officer participates in all of the activities of these centers.”66 Beyond local MGOs, however, American officials also encouraged participation by regular Army troops, higher level military government officials, and even American families living in Bavaria. For example, OMGB routinely asked for the donation of additional books, magazines, and newspapers to the Amerika Haüser and Reading Rooms. Such donations could either come from a personal library or from special subscriptions purchased for the local information center. OMGB even created a system to award individuals who donated to the program. William Moran, for example, received a certificate for the VIP (Vigorous Information Program) Club of the Amerika Haüser in Bavaria. The certificate and club were to thank those “patriotic Americans, voluntarily assisting the democratization program in Bavaria.”67

These lectures, discussions, and exhibitions connected democratization in Bavaria with the American version of democracy, both directly and indirectly. The very titles of presentations drew more explicit connections between the two. More subtly, however, few activities on democratization adopted a non-American perspective. Compared to discussions of American practices, the democratic practices most common to Europe received little attention. Additionally, the liberal tradition of Germany, particularly during the middle of the nineteenth century, was largely shoved to the background. The legacy of Nazism and the Weimar Republic fed the American assumption that Germans were ignorant of modern democratic practices. Additionally, official encouragement of widespread American participation promoted an American perspective on the democratization programs. As a result, the distinctly American

66 Untitled draft memo, Personal Papers of William J. Moran.
67 VIP Club membership card, No. 255, Personal Papers of William J. Moran.
flavor of reorientation programs at the *Amerika Haüser* insinuated that only American
democracy was the model for successful democratization.

While occupation officials promoted an Americanized version of democratization,
attendance at the *Amerika Haüser* and the Reading Rooms rose significantly throughout 1948
and 1949. The buildings were genuinely popular, attracting large numbers of Bavarians who
either sought a distraction for the daily struggle to survive or who simply wanted a warm place to
spend a few hours during the day. James Clark, the Director of Bavaria’s Information Control
Division, eagerly reported in May 1948 that several of the *Amerika Haüser* were "moving to
bigger and better quarters" because of their growing popularity. The Munich center moved into
its new location on June 14, followed by Würzburg on June 18 and Regensburg on July 1.  
Attendance continued to climb over the last half of 1948. The Munich *Amerika Haus* reported
just over 53,000 visitors from August 12 to September 11.  
Just two months later nearly 84,000
Bavarians visited the Munich center in a single month.  
From November 25 to December 20,
1948, overall attendance reached 244,099 Bavarians, compared to approximately 55,000 visitors
during the same period the previous year. The approach of winter undoubtedly sent more
Germans to their local *Amerika Haus* or Reading Room. Coal remained difficult to come by and
the centers promised warmth during the winter months. Nevertheless, attendance continued to

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of Land Dir., RG 260, NARA.
69 "Monthly Report of the Munich Amerika Haus" – 12 Aug 48 to 11 Sept 48, 13 Sept 48, Pg. 1, ICD Folder, Box 2,
70 "Report for Commanders Conference", 19 Nov 48, to Land Director, from C.S. Wright, ICD Folder, Box 2, 628
71 "Report of activities", 27 Dec 48, to Land Director, from C.S. Wright, ICD Folder, Box 2, 628 (A1): Gen. Rec.,
46-48, Rec. of Land Dir., RG 260, NARA.
climb as spring approached. March 1949 saw 349,810 total visitors throughout Bavaria, a massive increase over the 59,000 that attended in March 1948.\textsuperscript{72}

Despite American enthusiasm and the rapid spread of the \textit{Amerika Haus} in Bavaria, significant problems faced the program. Financial shortages were particularly acute. While attendance climbed during the summer months of 1948, Lambertus Wartena, head of the Munich \textit{Amerika Haus}, complained of continued financial difficulties. No funds were provided “for conducting a program of this magnitude” and local employees rarely received their pay on time. Additionally, bills sometimes languished for six months without being paid for lack of funds. Wartena believed, “The resultant adverse publicity reflects upon American integrity.”\textsuperscript{73} C.S. Wright, director of the \textit{Amerika Haus} program in Bavaria, also complained of budgetary shortfalls. Without additional funding, many buildings, particularly the smaller reading rooms, faced closure. Wright, too, believed that closing many buildings so soon after opening would “seriously affect the prestige of Military Government in Bavaria” and harm the reorientation program.\textsuperscript{74} The financial problems grew so problematic that on October 25, 1948, military government headquarters in Munich suspended the opening of new Reading Rooms throughout Bavaria.\textsuperscript{75}

Due to the continued financial problems, the \textit{Amerika Haus} program was plagued by a lack of materials. In particular, books and other reading materials were always in short supply.

\textsuperscript{72} “Special Report on Amerika Haus Program in Bavaria”, 22 April 49, to Land Director, from Exhibitions and Information Centers Branch, ISD Folder, Box 283, 643 (A1): Land Dir. Rec. Rel. to OMGBY Units, 48-49, Rec. of Land Dir., RG 260, NARA.
\textsuperscript{74} “Information for Military Governor’s Conference,” 21 Sept 48, to Land Director, from C.S. Wright, NARA, RG 260, 628 (A1), Box 2, ICD Folder; “Report for Commanders Conference,” 19 Nov 48, to Land Director, from C.S. Wright, ICD Folder, Box 2, 628 (A1): Gen. Rec., 46-48, Rec. of Land Dir., RG 260, NARA.
\textsuperscript{75} Untitled memo, 25 Oct 48, to Mr. Moran, FOD, from James A. Person, OMGB- Interoffice Memos Folder, Box 319, 652 (A1): Administrative Correspondence with Other OMGUS Units, HQ Records, Records of the FOD, RG 260, NARA.
The libraries, in theory, provided another way to introduce Bavarians of all stripes to American democracy through books, magazines, and newspapers written in both English and German. Yet financial problems and the continued effects of the war produced a significant shortage of reading materials, particularly in German. This was a significant problem in smaller communities throughout Bavaria. According to James Clark, “The smaller the town the less is the number of those who speak or read English.” The result was a near “constant cry” for more German-language books. In the town Burglengenfeld the American Reading Room possessed a mere fourteen books in German for the town’s 7,000 inhabitants.76 Similarly, of the 600 books held by the Reading Room in Mallersdorf in late March 1949, just fifty-five were written in German.77 Some Americans officers tried to spin the shortage of German-language literature as a positive. In the opinion of Charles Pearce, the prevalence of English-language books helped Bavarian students in Koetzting with their English studies.78 Despite Pearce’s attempts to portray such shortages as a positive, the lack of German-language literature limited the impact of the Amerika Haus program. After all, it would be difficult to teach Bavarians democratic practices if they could not read the available books, magazines, or newspapers.

Occupation officials worried about the shortage of democratic literature and took significant steps to remedy the problem. Some MGOs reached out to German communities in the United States or purchased German-language publications printed across the Atlantic. In the small community of Weiden, for example, on American official, a Mr. Lanziano, used personal

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76 “Rough Notes on Trip to Hof and along the Border to Regensburg”, undated, by James Clark, Pg. 2-3, OMGB Reports Folder, Box 318, 652 (A1): Admin. Corres. w/ Other OMGUS Units, HQ Rec., Rec. of FOD, RG 260, NARA.
funds to purchase subscriptions to German newspapers in the United States. Occupation officials also called on Americans living in Bavaria to contribute literature to the democratization program. In May 1949 William Boyer asked military dependents to contribute pictorial magazines to the Reading Room in Passau. Since most Bavarians could not read English, Boyer thought that pictures of the U.S. would be more effective at spreading democracy than the written word. Additionally, as relations with the Soviet Union deteriorated, Americans officials placed the search for books within the framework of “ideological war.” When C.S. Wright asked all Americans living within Bavaria to donate reading materials, he declared that a donation to an *Amerika Haus* was “an investment in permanent peace.” Wright urged individuals to contribute “ammunition for democracy” by donating any books, periodicals, or newspapers they could spare.

Despite these difficulties, American occupation officials continued to promote the *Amerika Haus* program. Although it was not within the official responsibilities of individual military government officers, they used their position within OMGB to promote the importation of American democracy. They encouraged Germans to attend *Amerika Haus* activities, helped organize lectures, coordinated their own activities with the local center, and brought the attention of their superiors to the problems facing the program. When the town meeting program developed in late 1948 and early 1949, MGOs often used the local *Amerika Haus* or Reading Room as a location for these meetings.

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79 “Rough Notes on Trip to Hof and along the Border to Regensburg”, undated, by James Clark, Pg. 3, OMGB Reports Folder, Box 318, 652 (A1): Admin. Corres. w/ Other OMGUS Units, HQ Rec., Rec. of FOD, RG 260, NARA.


81 “Fellow Americans”, undated, from C.S. Wright, Letters Folder, Box 318, 652 (A1): Admin. Corres. w/ Other OMGUS Units, HQ Rec., Rec. of FOD, RG 260, NARA.
Perhaps the most popular activity associated with the Amerika Haüser, however, was the reorientation film program. From the beginning of the occupation, military government officials throughout Germany circulated American-made films throughout the U.S. occupation zone, including in Bavaria. Feature films, documentaries, and newsreels, according to American thought, would demonstrate to Germans the “military and moral superiority” of the United States while offering “American culture as a model for imitation.” Much like the town meeting program that would follow, Germans were then expected to demonstrate their democratization “by behaving like their wardens.” For military government officials, democracy was more than the mere act of voting; it was a “type of behavior” and “a public attitude” grounded in the culture of a society. Therefore, reorientation in Germany and Bavaria would be a success, in the eyes of MGOs, when their pupils engaged in the forms and actions that these Americans associated with the democratic culture of the United States.

To provide this model of democratic culture, military government officials worked with major American movie studios to import films to Bavaria. Within a few months of the end of the war, film exchanges existed in Munich, Berlin, and Frankfurt to facilitate such efforts. Hollywood features like The Human Comedy (1942) and Shadow of a Doubt (1943) were distributed throughout Bavaria to demonstrate the supposed benefits of American immigrant culture. As tensions with the Soviet Union mounted, other films such as Ninotchka (1939) served as anti-communist propaganda by framing communism as “the suppression of desire, affect, and appetite” in comparison to the consumer paradise of capitalism. In addition, war films made the rounds, although they were, not surprisingly, rather unpopular with the Bavarian population. Germans resented movies that portrayed all Germans, and not exclusively Nazis, as war

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82 Fay, Theaters of Occupation, ix.
83 Ibid., 40.
84 Ibid., 90-91.
criminals and butchers, which most war films imported into Germany tended to do. Military government also distributed documentaries, the most famous being Die Todesmühlen (The Death Mills). The documentary highlighted the horrors of the concentration camps for all Germans and Americans saw the film as a way to discredit the Nazi party and Nazi ideology. In some parts of Bavaria, attendance at the documentary was even required to get ration cards.85

By 1947 and 1948, however, military government also started production of movies specifically designed for reorientation.86 Ranging in length from ten to forty minutes, OMGUS often made these films within Germany. Hueter der Gesundheit (Journey into Medicine), for example, told the story of a young American boy’s quest to become a doctor. The film was highly recommended for reorientation because the “young man’s development” represented “a universal theme, artistically treated, with a universal appeal.” Other films combatted what Americans perceived as European misunderstandings of the United States. Freie Horizonte (Free Horizons) told the story of the American national parks system. Its reorientation value was deemed “very good” because it showed Americans as “people who enjoy the simple beauties of their great outdoors…contrary to many of the European’s set ideas about us.” And still others, like Ich und Mr. Marshall (I and Mr. Marshall), flirted with traditional propaganda. The film “honestly” portrayed the development of the Marshall Plan, including “the violent opposition of Russia.”87 The newsreel Welt im Film (World in Film) also served as significant propaganda tool. Shown before all feature films, the newsreel increasingly differentiated between the American (and Western) vision for Germany from the Soviet “in distinct binary terms.” The heavy-handed

85 Ibid., 42-44.
87 “16mm Reorientation and Reeducation Film Program”, 26 Nov 48, to Director, FOD, from Richard N. Meyer, Pg. 1 & 4, OMGB- Interoffice Memos, Box 319, 652 (A1): Admin. Corres. w/ Other OMGUS Units, HQ Rec., Rec. of FOD, RG 260, NARA.
propaganda was quite unpopular with German audiences, however, even though many disliked the Soviet Union. Numerous reports indicated that audiences, particularly in Bavaria, did not arrive at the theater until after Welt im Film played.\(^{88}\)

Despite the unpopularity of some films, the distribution of both American-made features and specially produced reorientation films attracted ever larger numbers of Germans throughout Bavaria. From October 1 to October 15, 1948, there were 855 film screenings in Bavaria with an attendance of 109,273.\(^{89}\) By the middle of January 1949 1,680 showings over the previous month had attracted over 209,000 visitors.\(^{90}\) Attendance for the film program soon dwarfed other aspects of reorientation. On May 20, 1949, Charles Winning, Director of the Special Reorientation Staff Unit for Bavaria, reported 4,375 movie screenings from April 15 to May 15 with 478,908 Bavarians in attendance. At the same time 702 speeches and lectures attracted just 66,319 people. In total, film attendance represented over fifty-seven percent of the reorientation activities for that month (4,375 out of 7,589) and an impressive sixty-five percent of attendance (478,908 out of 729,503).\(^{91}\)

Early in the reorientation film program, particularly 1947 and 1948, American MGOs expressed widespread support. Edward Garrison of the Regensburg office believed “that the re-education/re-orientation film program…will no doubt be of great benefit to the population of Landkreis Regensburg.”\(^{92}\) American officials in Munich recommended that the films be shown

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\(^{88}\) Fay, *Theaters of Occupation*, 102 & 112.
\(^{91}\) “Reorientation 15 April-15 May 49,” 20 May 49, to Director, OMG, from Charles D. Winning, Education and Cultural Affairs Division Folder, Box 283, 643 (A1): Land Dir. Rec. Rel. to OMGBY Units, Rec. of Land Dir., RG 260, NARA.
to all segments of Bavarian society, from trade unions and political parties to schools and women’s organizations.⁹³ The reorientation films, sent out in packages of fifteen to eighteen, presented the best opportunity to reach large numbers of Germans with the message of democratization. Bavarians would come to repeated movie showings and help impart the knowledge of democracy that the American reorientation program assumed most Germans lacked. They would learn universal lessons like the value of hard work and see the values of democratic citizenship portrayed on the silver screen. The films could also support American policy in Germany or work to combat resentment of the occupation. Motion pictures attracted large crowds, as demonstrated above, and seemingly provided visible success of the reorientation program as a whole. Further evidence of success came from positive German reaction to the films. In Kaufbeuren one anonymous German wrote to MGO John Houston, “The appearance of the movie care in our small village caused great enthusiasm on the part of the school youth…teachers and pupils will definitely be happy if our small and isolated school can be visited frequently with such films.”⁹⁴ In the eyes of many American MGOs, letters like this proved the success of the reorientation films.

The letter, however, hinted at another phenomenon: the films were exceedingly popular because they were films. In a devastated Bavaria, movies, even ones specifically designed for reorientation, provided a respite from the travails of everyday life. Shown in heated buildings, the movies offered a chance to escape harsh conditions, particularly in the winter. And in the rural areas of Bavaria they also attracted large crowds because of their rarity. American officials, for their part, increasingly recognized alternative explanations for the popularity of the

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⁹³ “16mm Reorientation and Reeducation Film Program”, 26 Nov 48, to Director, FOD, from Richard N. Meyer, OMGB- Interoffice Memos, Box 319, 652 (A1): Admin. Corres. w/ Other OMGUS Units, HQ Rec., Rec. of FOD, RG 260, NARA.
reorientation films. Edward Garrison, after explaining the usefulness of the films to the Landrat of Landkreis Regensburg, acknowledged that the films would be popular with rural Bavarians “who seldom have an opportunity to see current events.”95 The very popularity of the medium, in essence, diluted the impact of the reorientation films. In urban areas, the movies represented an escape from the ruins and continuing challenges of postwar life. For rural regions less touched by the war but more geographically isolated, the films offered an opportunity to hear of the outside world. American officials eagerly reported large attendance figures, but the figures belied the varied reasons for such high German participation.

The film program, like the Amerika Haüser and the Reading Rooms, was also plagued by significant difficulties. Financial shortages, a lack of equipment and personnel, and growing German dissatisfaction steadily challenged the support for the program. The instability of reorientation funding meant that military government officers could not hire enough trained personnel to operate the projectors and show the films. Additionally, the lack of consistent financial support meant that projectors and films were often worn out from heavy usage. Bavarian projectionists often had to make significant personal investments in the program, including paying for transportation to travel from town to town. Indeed, some Bavarians, particularly those employed as projectionists, increasingly criticized the reorientation film program. The program was a success despite the lack of adequate financial resources and the fact that many of the films “were not too good” because of the “the efficient work of the projectionists, which saw in this program not only a job but a task to be fulfilled.”96 Because of these difficulties, some military government officials started questioning the usefulness of the

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film program. From Zwiesel, John Greeley recommended that OMGB stop showing films related to the war. According to Greeley, “Most people do not want to be reminded of the war anymore.” In April and May 1949 the Reorientation Staff Unit at OMGB headquarters in Munich began “reviewing the 16 mm Film Program in order to determine its true value as a medium of reorientation and education.” If it could not contribute to the reorientation mission, “money for its support should be diverted to more critical needs of the reorientation program.” A program that had begun with such high hopes was now apparently on the chopping block due to a growing suspicion that it was ineffective.

Nevertheless, the film program survived and continued well into the summer of 1949. Despite their complaints about the program, German projectionists recognized wavering American support and worked to prove the continued utility of the reorientation films. Bavarians had grown use to the program and enjoyed it, regardless of its problems. According to Karl Oliva, who worked to organize the Bavarian projectionists, “Everybody will recognize what possibility this film program in [the] future can have, and what a loss it would be for the public if one day this program would discontinue.” American MGOs also increasingly turned the focus of the reorientation films to children and students. Most screenings occurred in schools because younger Bavarians showed far more interest than their parents and grandparents. Whereas older

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98 “Reorientation 15 April-15 May 49”, memo, 20 May 49, to Director, OMGB, from Charles D. Winning, Pg. 1, Education & Cultural Affairs Division Folder, Box 283, 643 (A1): Land Dir. Rec. Rel. to OMGBY Units, Rec. of Land Dir., RG 260, NARA.
generations “would rather see a film with more entertainment,” students showed far more interest in “the American way of life.”

Combined, the Amerika Haus and film programs represented one of the most important aspects of reorientation in Bavaria. Both programs served primarily to introduce Bavarians to American ideas, practices, and traditions. Drawing on the democracy with which they had the most experience, military government officers directly and indirectly linked democratization with the ideals of American democracy. Although the Americans were careful to avoid outright Americanization, the prevalence of American ideas in this stage of reorientation established the expectation that successful democratization would mean that Bavarian political life would reflect political life across the Atlantic. This expectation was only reinforced when MGOs took a more active role in teaching “modern” American practices to their “backward” pupils.

**MGOs and German “Backwardness”**

The Amerika Haüser and the film program were both beyond the official responsibilities of military government officers, even though they actively participated in both programs. Nevertheless, American MGOs also introduced American ideas and practices through their own reorientation activities. Bavarians were still assumed ignorant of modern democratic practices, even after initial democratization efforts. According to James Ott in Mindelheim, “Present indications are that the average German citizen in Bavaria is not fully aware of his individual rights and responsibilities under the Bavarian constitution.”

Due to such ignorance, military government officers took a more active role in teaching democratic practices to their German pupils during the last few months of 1948 and into 1949. Unlike their attempts to address the

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food crises or promote economic reconstruction, military government officials now avoided indirect methods as part of the reorientation program. Since it was assumed that Bavarian civic life was backward, MGOs could not leave democratization to the hands of the Bavarians. Instead, American officials abandoned the well-engrained practice of indirect occupation and directly participated in reorientation efforts. MGOs both taught their communities the fundamentals of democratic society to combat “immaturity” and provided practical experience in democratic governance through the organization of town meetings. Throughout it all, MGOs sought the eradication of Bavarian backwardness and immaturity through the introduction of American modernity. Ultimately, success was judged by the ability of Germans to accept and replicate traditional American practices at the grassroots of Bavarian politics.

Many of these ideas about Bavarian backwardness and immaturity circulated in *News and Views*, the official publication of OMGB’s Field Operations Division (FOD). The publication was written, at least in part, by Deputy Director William Moran. Moran worked with military government for the entirety of the occupation and ultimately continued in Bavaria under the civilian Office of the High Commissioner that succeeded OMGB in 1949. Before joining military government, Moran earned a law degree from West Virginia University and worked for the F.B.I. during the war. In 1945 Moran rejoined the Army for military government service in Germany. He worked in a variety of different detachments in Bavaria before spending the last year of the occupation as the Deputy Director of FOD, where he oversaw key aspects of the reorientation campaign. It was FOD that exercised immediate authority over the MGOs who carried out the policy of democratization. Therefore, the division played a key role in developing the ideas that characterized much of the process. *News and Views* disseminated suggestions for reorientation activities or novel approaches to spreading the ideas of democracy. The publication

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also shared stories of successful, at least from the American perspective, democratization efforts. Most significantly, however, *News and Views* helped spread ideas about the political backwardness of the Bavarian population and how to counter it with supposedly modern American practices.

To combat Bavarian ignorance and immaturity, Americans throughout Bavaria introduced their communities to American ideas and practices. By introducing Germans to American practices, occupation officials believed that they could end the Germans’ political immaturity and lead them into democratic modernity. As a result, occupation officials instructed the population in proper way to behave in a democracy, from how to hold a meeting and write your representative to the proper way to behave in a democratic society. In late November 1948, for example, Gerald McMahon, MGO in Berchtesgaden, held a public forum “on the rights and responsibilities of the citizenship.” In a similar vein, reorientation officials in Munich encouraged American officials throughout Bavaria to share a list of “Things Every Chairman Should Know” in February 1949. Heads of local meetings were encouraged to “never start a meeting without an agenda,” “keep the meeting moving,” “stop aimless discussion,” and “don’t argue with the speaker.”

A few weeks later *News and Views* circulated guidance on how to write your local representative in the legislature. “The political maturity of a nation can often be determined by the number and kind of letters written to governmental representatives by citizens,” explained the publication. For that reason, Munich was passing on the advice of Congressman Walter Judd of Minnesota. According to Judd, representatives liked short but “intelligent, well thought-out letters which present a definite position, even if he does not agree with it.” Additionally, they

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appreciated knowing “when he has done something of which you approve.” Representatives, on the other hand, did not like “letters that mere[ly] ‘demand’ or ‘insist’ that he vote for or against a certain bill” or which “threatened…defeat at the next election.” In these instances, military government officers assumed that Americans had to teach Germans about the proper structure of modern democracy. Additionally, if the German population was to be politically mature they had to mimic the superior American system, writing letters to their representatives and conducting town meetings in a certain manner.

The publication’s authors did not confine themselves to importing the basic structure of the American political system. Military government officers worked to create a proper democratic personality. The March 1949 edition of News and Views published “Personality for Democracy” by Alice V. Keliher of New York University and encouraged all military government officers to share the essay with the local population. Democracy was “a positive faith,” according to Keliher, and “one must be a mature person to be a democratic citizen.” The mature democratic citizen supported the institutions of democracy, respected the opinions of his neighbors, and recognized that he could not be right all the time. Yet again American military government officers facilitated the spread of ideas about political maturity. Instead of focusing on political structures and activities, however, maturity also included individual personality and attitudes towards the larger society. While few Americans called Germans immature outright, the prevalence of language about maturity demonstrates that occupation officials considered Bavarians, at the least, politically naïve and in need of American guidance. The adoption of supposedly superior American ideas and practices, therefore, became the rubric which


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determined German backwardness and maturity. Behaving like Americans and adopting the forms of American politics proved that Bavarians had escaped from their immaturity.

For Bavarians to act on their new democratic practices and to provide some sort of practical experience, American military government officers promoted town hall meetings throughout occupied Bavaria. Occupation officials had held local meetings for several years to “answer questions…on the myriad of problems in Germany today,” but there had been no clear reorientation objective behind them. Now, however, the meetings became a barometer by which Americans determined the success of the reorientation program. According to one draft memo, these meetings “have been valuable in demonstrating the democratic approach to responsible self-government.”106 In Landkreis Mallersdorf, a visiting MGO, one Captain Rutledge, argued the program “was intended to awaken as a civic enterprise the civic and political consciousness of the population.” Town meetings were “very popular” in the United States, Rutledge explained, “this program…if properly conducted would also have a strong reaction among the Germans.”107 Envisioning the idealized town meeting of US politics, military government officers operated under the assumption that Bavarian political life had to look like its American counterpart. A successful meeting might include active participation by the German population or solving a pressing local issue. Additionally, the willingness of Bavarian officials to participate in the meetings and the eagerness of Bavarian communities to participate in them would also prove the success of democratization.

Beginning in September 1948, MGOs promoted German-led town meetings to facilitate reorientation. While American officials were not opposed to organizing meetings in the initial

106 Untitled draft memo, Personal Papers of William J. Moran.
stages, they hoped that Germans would soon take the reins. As a result, some occupation officials organized local committees of “energetic, farsighted, and liberal” Bavarians to take responsibility for the meetings in their communities. 108 While the MGO might provide some assistance to this small nucleus of community leaders, the setup obscured any direct American involvement and, American officials hoped, would make Bavarians more likely to adopt the concept of the town meeting. “When the MGO remains anonymous,” explained Dewey Campbell in Altötting, “the German people believe the idea is their own…and they have indicated an eagerness, enthusiasm, and willingness to work hard…to establish a forum where the things of immediate interest and concern in their local lives may be discussed, problems solved, and projects initiated.” 109

Town meetings soon became the measuring stick of the reorientation program. Reports of local Bavarians either requesting town meetings or attending them in large numbers were interpreted by American officials as a sign that Bavarians had embraced modern democratic practices. In addition, meetings that solved pressing local issues were viewed as “concrete results” and “factual evidence of re-orientation progress.” 110 In Passau, for example, the local population was initially suspicious of American promotion of town meetings. Yet the population quickly adapted to the new import. By early December 1948 the meetings were “freely planned” within the community and “the attitude of the persons attending the meetings has changed

108 “Reorientation Program on a Kreis Level”, 31 Aug 48, to All MGOs of Area Freising, from F. Karel Wiest, Miscellaneous Correspondence 1948 Folder, Box 370, 662 (A1): General Records, 1947-1949, LSO Freising, RG 260, NARA.
110 Memo, 30 Dec 48, to FOD, attn.: Mr. Moran, from Jack M. Fleischer, OMGB- Interoffice Memos Folder, Box 319, 652 (A1): Admin. Corres. w/ Other OMGUS Units, HQ Rec. Rec. of FOD, RG 260, NARA.
considerably.” According to Charles Pearce in Koetzing, the meetings provided Bavarians with “a good impression about the democratic way of life.”

Yet meetings were a true success when they reminded Americans of their idealized experiences in the United States. For example, Russel Wickman, MGO at Traunstein, reported a successful town meeting during February 1949. At the meeting, local and refugee businessmen promised to contribute supplies and labor to finish construction of a new school. The building had languished since the introduction of the new West German currency the previous summer, but would now be completed. According to Wickman, it reminded him “of a community session back home.”

Wickman’s report even worked its way up the chain of command to the desk of Murray Van Wagoner, Land Director for Bavaria, as evidence “that Germans are beginning to understand and realize the possibilities of town meetings.” Similarly, Lieutenant Robert Rivet happily reported from Wolfstein that the local community and council had finally revolted against “the dictatorship of the Bürgermeister.” After the Bürgermeister had refused to call meetings, unilaterally raised his own salary, and “generally performed like a little tyrant,” the council finally intervened against the erstwhile official. According to Rivet, the “Revolt in Ort” demonstrated the “positive results” of the reorientation campaign. In both cases, success was not measured by German standards, but by how well the Bavarians imitated the American ideal.

111 “Attitude toward Democratization Program”, 6 Dec 48, to Area Commander, Area Passau, from Marvon Glossop, Correspondence 1948 Folder, Box 771, 729 (A1): General Records, 1948-1949, LSO Passau, RG 260, NARA.
Despite these apparent successes, military government officers also criticized Bavarians as backward when they failed to imitate modern American practices. For the Americans, the political immaturity of the Bavarian population was seen in their failure to participate in town meetings and the failure to question elected officials. Vincent Hurst reported from Würzburg in January 1949, for example, that the first town meeting held under a newly-elected mayor was “especially discouraging.” According to Hurst, “The audience was exceedingly apathetic” and failed to adequately question their new mayor.116 Indeed, a failure to participate in town meetings according to American standards was viewed as “backward” by military government officers. Occupation officials also praised Germans when they lived up to the “modern” American tradition. F.L. Roessler proclaimed from Ansbach that active local participation demonstrated “that the population is not backward in criticizing or speaking their mind in public.”117 The residents of Ansbach, therefore, were deemed modern because their actions imitated American practices. Adoption of the American-style town hall meeting and active participation in those meetings demonstrated Bavarian modernity in democratic politics.

The efforts of military government officers, then, made the connection between democratization and American traditions even more explicit. American officials promoted “mature” practices such as writing elected representatives in a certain fashion or adopting a proper democratic personality. By learning these modern aspects of American democracy, Bavarians were on their way to political maturity. In addition, the town hall meeting, based on the idealized American image, offered an opportunity to instruct Bavarians on the modern methods of democracy. Backwardness represented a failure to meet American standards or to

participate in the meetings. Meanwhile Bavarians demonstrated modernity by using the meetings in a fashion familiar to their American occupiers, particularly by solving pressing local issues. Ultimately, the town meetings became a key benchmark for Americans measuring the success of reorientation. The embrace of these meetings supposedly represented the adoption of American democratic practices. By holding meetings on their own, the Bavarians had embraced political modernity. Additionally, the growing number of town hall meetings provided occupation officials with visible evidence of success. The larger the number of meetings held, the more successful democratization.

*Education Reform*

The youth program of the first years of the occupation had provided a testing ground for the later reorientation program. In particular, occupation officials rehearsed ideas about the superiority of American traditions and instituted practices like public meetings. While the larger reorientation campaign targeted the larger adult population, the youth program continued in Bavaria. Youth groups continued to expand and Americans of all stripes still worked with German youth in their area. However, the push for significant education reform in Bavaria tied the youth program with the general reorientation mission. American officials viewed the Bavarian education system as backward and inherently incompatible with modern democracy. Therefore, they proposed reforms to the system. As with other aspects of reorientation, the Americans imported ideas about education from across the Atlantic, particularly the notion that public education should contribute to democratic socialization and create good, democratic citizens. The proposed American reforms did not replace the Bavarian system with a direct copy of public education in the United States, but occupation officials did borrow heavily from the American tradition, much like in other areas of reorientation.
In the eyes of most Americans, the Bavarian education system was incompatible with the modern democracy they were trying to create. Bavarian education followed a two-track system, where only a small minority (usually the children of the upper classes) attended the college preparatory Gymnasium and even fewer students attended universities. The vast majority of students received only eight years of required education before attending vocational training schools or directly entering the workforce. Additionally, the minority of students selected for the university track were pulled out of the common elementary schools after four years. For the Americans, this created significant problems. The “democratic process” in Germany had been “severely retarded” under the Nazis, in part because of the faults in the education system.  

Occupation officials identified several major faults with Bavarian education. The two-track system established “a sense of class distinction which permeates all Bavarian society.” By separating the future leaders of German society (the university students) from their colleagues, Bavarian education, according to the Americans, reinforced the class distinctions between officials and their constituents, thereby contributing to German political backwardness. Additionally, education was too narrow in scope. Outside of the university track, there was little that contributed toward “a broader preparation for good citizenship and effective living.” Much to the dismay of the Americans, there were few classes, such as social studies or civics, to teach Bavarians how to be good democratic citizens. This system was fundamentally “incompatible with a truly democratic way of life” and educational opportunities had to be equalized to successfully democratize Bavaria.  

To reform Bavarian public education, American officials proposed a series of reforms based on American attitudes towards public education, particularly the view that the goal of public education was to create good, democratic citizens. “We believe that all of the people in a democracy,” OMGB proclaimed, “must be trained to think straight, to develop a sense of values.” The reforms advanced three main goals. First, provide equal education opportunities for all Bavarian children. Second, “to lift the educational level of the average citizen so that he is better equipped to exercise intelligently the rights and responsibility of citizenship.” Finally, the reforms were supposed to break down the class distinctions in education. To achieve those goals the American reforms extended compulsory education from eight to nine years (including six years of common elementary school for all students), eliminated tuition for all public schools, and opened secondary education to all by dividing it into three separate tracks (vocational training, commercial training, and traditional college prep). These reforms would, OMGB argued, assure “good citizenship training” for all Bavarian students.

The Bavarians, however, stridently opposed the proposed American reforms. Although American officials in Munich tried to work through the Bavarian government to make it look like a Bavarian reform program, the population and the government itself both put up fierce opposition. As historian James F. Tent chronicled, Alois Hundhammer, the conservative Bavarian Minister of Culture, organized fierce opposition to the American plans, citing Bavarian traditions. Following Hundhammer’s lead, Bavarian officials stalled in implementing the reforms, blaming financial shortfalls. Then in September 1948 military government revised its

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120 “The Bavarian Education System – As We Want It”, in Education and Cultural Relations Division Information Bulletin No. 3, Education Branch, 13 Sept 48, Pg. 6, Education and Cultural Relations Division Folder, Box 180, 630 (A1): Pub., Dir., & Rel. Rec, 45-49, Rec. of Land Dir., RG 260, NARA.

reforms to allow for gradual implementation of free public school tuition. Not until the 1950-51 school year would the Bavarian government have to cover the entire cost of public education. Nevertheless, Bavarian opposition to the reforms, still fomented by Hundhammer, remained. By February 1949 the *Landtag* appropriated a small amount of funding “to pacify the schools” but there were no plans to implement school reform “in the near future.” When visited by local Bavarian school officials, government officials in Munich took the position that the American reforms proposed the previous summer were a “wish” and not an order. The wider German populace also opposed the American reforms as an attempt to trample on long-established Bavarian traditions. Indeed, school reform was “the butt of many jokes” and many Bavarians believed that OMGB had tried to do something against superior advice.

American officials continued to press of education reform for several months, but Bavarian resistance continued. The attempts to reform Bavarian education failed. Nevertheless, the widespread incorporation of traditional American ideas about education demonstrated the influence of U.S. practices on the reorientation and democratization campaign. Military government officers compared the Bavarian education system to its American counterpart and found it wanting. To correct its perceived deficiencies, they imported American attitudes towards public education, highlighting its role in creating democratic citizens. The Americans even insinuated German backwardness in education by comparing the fight over public education in postwar Bavaria to the American campaigns for free public education during the middle of the

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nineteenth century. Just as modernizing reforms fought for better education in the United States during the mid-1800s, military government would fight for modern, democratic education in occupied Bavaria.

As Bavaria transitioned towards partial sovereignty in the new Federal Republic of Germany, many Americans took stock of the progress of reorientation over the previous four years. In their eyes, the program of democratization had been highly successful. Whereas basic survival dominated the first two years of the occupation, the last two years of reorientation seemed a noticeable success. Bavarians were still viewed as politically immature and timid. Speaking to a German audience, Clarence Bolds, Deputy Director of OMGB, proclaimed, “You listening to me now owe it to yourselves, your children and your country to follow your own government closely in order that your basic rights are not violated. In my country that policy comes as natural to every man as breathing. Here you still must learn it.” Nevertheless, they had made major progress. Bavarians, MGOs believed, now routinely criticized government officials in public and realized that members of the government were servants to the public, not their master. Yet the ever-present American standard remained. The success of reorientation was judged by the ability and willingness of Bavarians to adopt the ideas and practices of American democratic society. Successful political modernization occurred when Bavarian political life replicated, at least partially, political life across the Atlantic.

Bavarian Reactions

124 “The Bavarian Education System – As We Want It”, in Education and Cultural Relations Division Information Bulletin No. 3, Education Branch, 13 Sept 48, Pg. 6, Education and Cultural Relations Division Folder, Box 180, 630 (A1): Pub., Dir., & Rel. Rec., 45-49, Rec. of Land Dir., RG 260, NARA.
Bavarians reacted in diverse ways to the American campaign of reorientation and democratization. Many were apathetic early on as they struggled for survival and remained so throughout the occupation. Others remained hostile to the language of American democracy. Many, however, embraced the campaign and co-opted it for their own needs. Despite American criticisms that Bavarians had not yet reached political maturity, many Bavarians proved quite adept at adopting the language and forms of American democracy for their own purposes. Often, they co-opted American language and ideas about democracy and the threat of militarism to support their own partisan agendas. In other cases, Bavarians turned the language of democratization around to criticize the actions of their American occupiers. In this way, many Bavarians under U.S. control adapted to American language, talking back to their occupiers by appropriating the language of OMGB’s democratization campaign.127

Many Bavarians used the language surrounding reorientation to promote their own specific goals. Politicians and political parties were particularly adept at doing so. The small, but active Communist Party (KPD) redefined democracy to call for economic democracy in Bavaria. More noticeably, the other major political parties used reorientation language to their partisan benefit. Both the center-right Christian Socialist Union (CSU) and the center-left Social Democratic Party (SPD) invoked the promise of democracy or the threat of militarism and hyper-nationalism. The CSU, for example, vigorously protected the autonomy of Bavaria and opposed centralized political authority. To gain American support, the party often explained that “a centralized Germany might result in the re-birth of militarism, even if it happens within 50 years

127 This is not a unique phenomenon in postwar Germany. Historians have increasingly identified ways in which occupied or conquered peoples have adapted the practices and language of their conquerors for their own purposes. For example, historian Robert D. Crews examined how the Russian Empire transformed Islamic institutions in Central Asia into a tool of imperial control, letting the state govern with increased consensus and less violence. The Muslim community, however, then “captured the state” and used state language and institutions to solve doctrinal disputes within the Islamic communities of the region. See Crews, For Prophet and Tsar: Islam and Empire in Russia and Central Asia (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006).
from now.” The CSU also played on the American tradition of federalism to explain their political position. Instead of a strong central government, the CSU explained that it favored a “federalistic Germany” with “a few central agencies” like finance, foreign politics, and foreign trade.\(^{128}\)

Some Germans, particularly those who had spent time in the United States, also adopted the language of American modernity compared to German backwardness. This was not a new development in postwar Bavaria. As historian Mary Nolan noted, significant numbers of Weimar-era businessmen looked to the United States as the beacon of modernity. These businessmen emulated American practices such as the assembly line or “scientific management” throughout the 1920s to “modernize” German industry.\(^{129}\) The practice, in some ways, continued during the occupation. Writing to Sidney White, director of the Würzburg military government office, in January 1949, Hubertus zu Loewenstein proclaimed the superiority of American standards. Trying to create a “Public Health and Welfare office” in Lower Franconia, Loewenstein complained that German standards in public health were far behind the American. According to him, “To attack the problem vigorously, with the benefit of the American example, would serve as an important medium for educating the German population towards democratic initiative and self-government in the field of social responsibility.” He even spoke of modernizing German agriculture in Bavaria by importing “modern ways of farming” from the United States.\(^{130}\) Loewenstein could have legitimately believed in Bavarian backwardness or he could have simply adopted the language of the occupier. Regardless, his discussion of American

\(^{128}\) “Interview with Dr. Schedl, CSU Secretary”, 25 March 47, Pg. 5, CSU Folder, Box 833, 735 (A1): Gen. Rec., 45-49, LSO Regensburg, RG 260, NARA.


\(^{130}\) Prince Hubertus zu Loewenstein to Sidney White, Würzburg, 29 Jan 1949, NARA, RG 260, Medicine and Health Folder, Box 317, 651 (A1): General Correspondence & Other Records, 1949, HQ Rec., Rec. of FOD, RG 260, NARA.
modernity demonstrates the prevalence of the language in postwar Bavaria. It was not limited to a few American officials but had expanded, at least somewhat, beyond the boundaries of military government. Loewenstein used American language to help draw attention to his proposal.

Meanwhile, Bavarians also co-opted the language democratization to criticize the actions of American military government in Germany. The right-wing Bayernpartei raised the specter of renewed dictatorship to oppose the Anglo-American bizonal economic policies. Bizonal agencies, according to one Dr. Fischbacher, “effectively tried to replace former Reich agencies.”¹³¹ From the left wing, Bavarian communists insisted that democratization efforts did not go far enough. In addition to elections, the communists included major land reforms and state ownership of major industries in their definition of democracy. Many Bavarians also used the language of democratization to attack what they viewed as the imposition of American values at the expense of traditional Bavarian practices. Most notable was the reaction to OMGB’s proposed school reforms. Officials and civilians throughout the Land lambasted American efforts to force through their reforms as “undemocratic.” Military government, many Bavarians argued, preached about the benefits of democracy while simultaneously ignoring democratic practices in the administration of the occupation. In January 1949, the Landrat of Berchtesgaden explained that “the noble objectives of the reorientation program are senseless in that the will of the people actually appears to have no weight when Military Government imposes its theories upon the

Similarly, surveys of German communities highlighted the belief among the general population “that there can be no real democracy in an occupied country.”

Many Bavarians also pushed back against the American argument that democratization represented a significant improvement for German society. For more cynical Germans, the concept of democracy became inseparable from the depravations that characterized the postwar era. Writing in the magazine *Der Ruf*, Hans Werner Richter described the irreverence with which Germans at a train station spoke of democracy. According to Richter, “They equate it with everything which in their opinion is incompetent. For them, democracy equals defeat, hunger, poverty, corruption and bureaucratism.” Instead of freedom and liberty, democracy meant “the cutting of fat ration, the registration form, the identity card, [and] the queues.” “Now we are democrats,” Richter wrote, “now we can starve.” For many Bavarians, therefore, democracy meant something quite different than what it meant for the Americans. They defined it as privation amidst the ruins of total defeat. In those circumstances, democratization met both resistance and apathy from the Bavarian civilians supposedly in need of democratic instruction.

Initially American officials tried to place these criticisms at the feet of “nationalistic elements” who sought to undermine the occupation. However, military government officers were soon forced into somewhat awkward territory to defend their actions as consistent with the goal of democratization. In December 1948 Charles Lafollette argued that Germans should not

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135 Ibid.
judge democratization by how the U.S. was unable to extend to Germans all the rights associated with democracy within the United States. He explained:

> The value of the democratic ethic as a way of living should be measured by the German people, not by the degree in which the victors are unable to extend as victors all of the standards to which they adhere within their own national boundaries but rather by the degree to which they extend to the German people the benefit of the ethic to which they subscribe within the boundaries of their own nations.\textsuperscript{136}

In a similar vein, Murray Van Wagoner responded in March 1949 to criticisms in from the publisher of the \textit{Sueddeutsche Zeitung} in Munich, Werner Friedman. Friedman contended that the actions of OMGB that overturned democratically-passed laws simply because they were “undemocratic” were in themselves undemocratic. Van Wagoner responded that the Bavarian \textit{Landtag} had improperly handed its legislative powers over to the executive. Military government’s actions, therefore, were necessary to preserve the “proper system of checks and balances so vital to a democratic government structure.”\textsuperscript{137}

> Bavarians of all stripes, then, took the language of democratization and political modernization promoted by the Americans and reframed it for their own purposes. In some cases, the language was used to promote partisan political agendas or personal projects by appealing to ideals of American democracy. On the other hand, many Bavarians turned the language of democratization around and criticized the American occupation, forcing military government officials to respond. Either way, Bavarian responses to reorientation demonstrated the quick adoption of the American language that pervaded the reorientation campaign. Many Bavarians were not slow learners, as their occupiers believed, but quickly incorporated the language of democratization to suit their own ends.


\textsuperscript{137} Letter, 22 March 49, to Werner Friedman, from Murray Van Wagoner, Pg. 2, Theater of Operations Folder, Box 316, 651 (A1): Gen. Corres. & Other Rec., 49, HQ Rec., Rec. of FOD, RG 260, NARA.
Conclusion

For American military government officers, reorientation was perhaps the most important objective of the occupation. If successful, it promised the elimination of German militarism and the inclusion of a democratic Germany, or at least a portion of it, in the free world. Democratization would be achieved by importing America into Bavaria. American tradition would guide Germans from the backwardness of their political culture to true modern democracy. The youth program during the first two years of the occupation provided an important testing ground for the broader reorientation program. Youth groups, conferences, and discussion groups developed the ideas and practices that American military government officers would implement on a wider scale. Once the general program took off, lectures, movies, and discussion groups at Amerika Haüser throughout Bavaria served as an introduction to ideas about American political culture. This way the German population could learn about the US constitution, the role of universities in political society, and women’s involvement in politics. Meanwhile, occupation officials also circulated ideas about how best to raise the political maturity of the towns and cities in which they operated. Local town hall meetings provided Germans the opportunity to put these ideas into practice and served as a measuring stick of the progress of the reorientation program. The more Germans adopted the town hall meeting, in the eyes of the Americans, the more modern they became and the more successful democratization was.

The result was a campaign of political modernization conducted in what became the heart of the so-called first world. After years living under Nazi rule, many Americans assumed that the German population needed guidance on the road towards democracy. To provide that guidance military government officers drew on the most important democratic model with which they had
experience: the United States. As a result, reorientation in Bavaria operated on the belief that success meant democratic life in Germany would emulate democratic life across the Atlantic. Reporting on a two-evening discussion at the Regensburg Amerika Haus of civil rights in America and Bavaria, C.S. Wright declared, “These two evenings of discussion should result in a complete understanding that if the Bavarians expect to have their civil rights, they must constantly defend them as we do in the United States.” Political maturity was therefore determined by adoption of American practices, such as writing legislative representatives and questioning public officials at town meetings. Meanwhile, a failure to participate in public meetings or to adequately question local officials was evidence of backwardness and immaturity. Unlike the Soviet Union in eastern Germany, the United States did not deploy blatant, coercive state power to leave their mark. Nor did Americans actively deride the German population. Nevertheless, reorientation in Bavaria operated on the assumption that the politically immature Germans needed guidance from mature Americans to emulate American democracy and create a truly democratic society. Reorientation was a necessity after 1945, yet in Bavaria it operated as a program of political modernization.

138 “Special Report on Amerika Haus Week in Bavaria,” 12 May 49, to Land Director, from C.S. Wright, Pg. 5, ISD Folder, Box 283, 643 (A1): Land Dir. Rec. Rel. to OMGBY Units, Rec. of Land Dir., RG 260, NARA.
Chapter 5: The Occupation and the Early Cold War

“The range of ideology among the [Communist] leaders was surprisingly wide and sometimes included recognition of private enterprise in commerce and, to a considerable extent, in industry.”
- G-5 Section, Office of Military Government for Bavaria, October 1945

“We…propose to attack communism and the police state before the German people…We are engaged in political warfare and we might as well recognize it now.”
- Gen. Lucius Clay, 30 October 1947

The tasks of feeding Bavaria, reconstructing the German economy, and democratizing Bavarian populace represented three of the most important goals of American occupation officials. These duties, however, did not occur within a vacuum. While military government officers oversaw those tasks, the deteriorating relationship with the Soviet Union and the emergence of the Cold War complicated the American occupation of Germany. At the highest levels of military government concern about communism and potential Soviet subversion of western Germany represented a major concern after 1947. General Lucius Clay, long a proponent of American and Soviet cooperation, became an ardent cold warrior over the last two years of military occupation. As this happened, the central offices of OMGUS grew every more hostile to communism. The emerging Cold War, therefore, increasingly influenced the high-level American responses to problems within Germany.

At the lowest levels of the occupation hierarchy, however, the deteriorating relationship between East and West elicited little major concern among MGOs. During the first two years of the occupation, American officials in Bavaria focused on other more pressing issues, such as feeding a starving populace. When political activity did rise to their attention, many Americans


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complained about the political apathy of Bavarians. Indeed, military government officers were more concerned about the return of individual Nazis and the lingering influence of Nazism than they were about the influence of German communists. Although instances of anti-communist activity took place, the German Communist Party (KPD) maintained relatively good relations with American officials from 1945 through the summer of 1947. In largely rural Bavaria few MGOs dealt with significant numbers of communists and the party remained a minor factor in the Land. If anything, the Germans themselves, particularly the officials appointed by military government detachments, were the more ardent anti-communists and wanted the Americans to take more active measures against the KPD. This general pattern of activity reflects high-level concern, or lack thereof, about communism. For several years, Army officers, including General Clay, held out hope that cooperation with the USSR remained possible. As a result, anti-communism was relatively limited during the first two years of the occupation.

Beginning in the summer of 1947, however, high-level American attitudes changed as tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union mounted. As Americans and Soviet clashed over reparations, the fusion of the American and British zones, currency reform, the Marshall Plan, and the ultimate creation of the Federal Republic of Germany, military government officials at OMGUS headquarters adopted ever more strident anti-communist views. Military government officials in Bavaria reflected these high-level developments as anti-communist sentiment increased and relations with the Land’s communists deteriorated. For MGOs in Bavaria, however, the emerging Cold War was a relatively distant phenomenon and exerted limited impact on their official duties. As with the food crises and matters of economic reconstruction, MGOs proved willing to question, if not challenge, the dominant themes of American policy in Germany. Relations with the KPD undoubtedly deteriorated and antagonism
increased on both sides, yet the KPD’s few bastions of strengths remained in the major cities and beyond the purview of most MGOs. American officials repeatedly explained that the KPD possessed little noteworthy influence in Bavaria and insisted that lingering Nazism remained a problem in the highly conservative Land. Yet even when the Cold War did rear its head, it remained relatively remote. Cocooned within their small local offices, many MGOs had little direct connection to the major international events that dominated the Cold War. The Berlin Blockade, widespread rumors of imminent war, German POWs returning from the USSR, and rising tensions on the border with Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Zone represented the most significant connections American MGOs had with the emerging America-Soviet conflict. In general, however, the conflict that would come to dominate the globe for over four decades possessed limited impact on the lowest levels of American military government in occupied Bavaria. As a result, MGOs could, to a limited extent, resist some of the pressure to become ardent cold warriors.

1945-1947: The Non-Existent Cold War

For the first two years of the occupation, anti-communism and other features of the emerging Cold War were unimportant to American military government officers in Bavaria. For the most part, the tasks of feeding the Bavarian populace, reconstruction, and democratization represented more pressing goals. Dealing with the day-to-day struggles of the average Bavarian, American MGOs, in their official duties, were little concerned about the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. Whenever political activity did occur, the Americans were not particularly worried about the influence of the KPD. Instead, the lingering influence of ex-Nazis and Nazism remained of primary concern, particularly their potential influence on the center-right parties of Bavaria, including the Christian Social Union (CSU), the Economic
Reconstruction Party, and the Bayernpartei. Such limited concern about the influence of the KPD reflected the views of high-level military government officials, who sought cooperation with the Soviet Union and retained hope that some kind of agreement between the victorious powers could be worked out in Germany.

From the beginning of the occupation in Bavaria political activity was limited for a variety of reasons, including American policy and general German apathy about political issues in the face of starvation. Until August 27, 1945, military government strictly enforced a ban on political activity in Germany under the guise military necessity. As a result, the nascent political movements of the immediate postwar period were either shut down by the Americans or co-opted by Bavarian administrative officials. In Munich, the Freiheits-Aktion-Bayern (FAB) launched an uprising as American armies approached and after the fall of the city provided names of prospective government employees to the newly-arrived military government detachment headed by Lt. Col. Walter Kurtz and Major Eugene Keller. The ban on political activity was quickly subjected to the ban on political activity, however. On May 17, the detachment ordered FAB to cease all activities and sent out officers to shut down other nascent political organizations such as Freis Deutschland. The Americans based ban on political activity on the concept of military necessity, arguing that political activity in the immediate aftermath of the war threatened the operations of occupying units. Many German conservatives agreed with the prohibition and even wanted the moratorium to last for several years while the problems of food, housing, and fuel were addressed. Meanwhile, more “radical elements” wanted the ban on political activity lifted as soon as possible.³

The ban on political activity was lifted on August 27, 1945, and the formation of political parties authorized at the local level in the fall. Yet even then political apathy was noticeably present, as many Bavarians were slow to embrace the return of political organizations. In general, however, the pre-Nazi political parties quickly reemerged as the general building blocks of political life in Bavaria. The Catholic-dominated Bavarian People’s Party transformed into the Christian Social Union, but the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the KPD both returned in their old forms. Nevertheless, the only parties showing interest in political activity were the “left-wing” parties, notably the SPD and the KPD. By October 31 military government authorized forty-five local political parties, including thirty-three combined from the Social Democrats and Communists. The two leftist parties also “monopolized authorized political assembly.” In Fürth the KPD held a rally of 5,000 people in October, while both parties rallied 2,500 each in Augsburg. The overwhelming preponderance of left-wing political activity was so notable that military government reports proactively cut off criticism that American officials were discriminating against the old center-right. In both October and November, American MGOs insisted that the dominance of the SPD and KPD “was the result of no discrimination” against conservative parties in Bavaria, but instead due to “the disinclination of such groups to organize.”

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Despite the reorganization efforts of the old left-wing parties, many Bavarians remained apathetic about politics. An informal survey conducted Captain William Conklin and Louis Lochner, the chief of the Associated Press’ Berlin Bureau, found that most German officials opposed the early local elections that OMGUS was proposing. Additionally, local military government detachments reported that the population was “averse to political activity of any kind at the moment.” Apathy was particularly noticeable in rural areas, with more than one authorized political party in just one-quarter of all Bavarian Kreise by the end of November. Bavarians cared little about political issues while they lacked the basic necessities of life.

Nevertheless, and despite reservations by German officials, military government proceeded with plans to hold local Gemeinde elections on January 27, 1946. Following the lead of General Clay, MGOs believed that the best way to teach Germans the principles of democratic self-government was to have them practice it through local elections. For many Americans, high voter turnout in the January elections demonstrated the success of their strategy and the growing political awareness of the Bavarian population. Nearly 2.1 million voters, some eighty-seven percent of eligible voters, participated in the Gemeinde elections, which were labeled as “an almost complete success.” From Würzburg the American MGO reported that the “interest of the people everywhere was at a high pitch, but they were very serious and earnest…” However, occupation officials from other communities complained of continued German apathy. In Wolfstein, Captain Raymond Douglass reported, “In general, the population…was apathetic to politics, fearful of engaging in politics, [and] worried as to consequences of [choosing] the

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7 G-5 Section, Reports of Operations, November 1945, OMGB, Pg. 8, Reports of Operations 9 May 45-30 November 45 Folder, Box 1, 42823 (A1): Rpts of Ops, 45-46, RG 338, NARA.
8 Historical Report for Land Bavaria, 1 to 31 January 1946, OMGB, Pg. 27-30, Box 260, 636 (A1): Hist Rpts, 44-48, Rec. of Land Dir., RG 260, NARA.
‘wrong’ party.” Similarly, First Lieutenant Hyman Gilberg warned from Regensburg that “the German people have not been able to absorb democratic elections at this time.” Additionally, widespread political activity in Bavaria nearly disappeared after the January elections. The detachment in Dachau, for example, reported minimal political activity in February. According to Major Albert Snow, the detachment commander, the decline of activity was because “There is little or no genuine interest in parties at this time.” The only parties that maintained something resembling regular political activity were the SPD and KPD, which both possessed a more dedicated core of supporters.

Ultimately, a regular pattern settled into Bavarian politics throughout 1946 and into 1947. Beyond a relatively small group of politically minded Bavarians, most of the population remained ambivalent about politics at best and increasingly apathetic at worst. Bavarians turned out in large numbers to vote in the elections scheduled by military government, including the Landkreis elections in April 1946, the Stadtkreis elections in May, the elections for the Land constitutional assembly in June, and the Landtag elections in December. For example, OMGB reported that 86.56 percent of eligible voters participated in the May city elections. Political activity picked up in the run-up to each election, but quickly disappeared afterwards. The Social Democrats and Communists continued some activities, but the rest of the parties, including the

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12 Historical Report for Land Bavaria, 1 to 31 May 1946, OMGB, Pg. 6, Box 260, 636 (A1): Hist Rpts, 44-48, Rec. of Land Dir., RG 260, NARA.
Major W.B. Morrell complained from Nürnberg that the average Bavarian farmer was apathetic, poorly informed, and generally followed the political dictates of the Catholic and Lutheran churches. Interest in politics, Morrell explained, “has dropped considerably.” Combined with the conservative leanings of most Bavarians, there were few reasons to worry about the KPD or to connect Bavarian communists with the larger policy disagreements occurring among the occupation powers. Even in its urban “strongholds,” the Bavarian KPD performed poorly in the 1946 elections. The Munich Communists won a single seat on the city council and just 6.2 percent of the vote in May, while the Regensburg KPD earned just one seat on the council. Then during the December Landtag elections, the Munich KPD did not win a single seat in the Land parliament.

Throughout the first year of the occupation – and well into the second year – American MGOS had little reason to fear the influence of the KPD or the emerging Cold War. The Bavarian communists were a weak political force and even if they were stronger, most Bavarians remained apathetic about politics. Instead, American officials focused their efforts on the more urgent tasks of feeding a starving population, housing an expanding population, and restarting some semblance of economic life in Bavaria. These concerns over providing basic necessities to

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13 The Regensburg KPD held twenty-one meetings in August 1946, while the local SPD held twenty. In comparison, the CSU held just two meetings. See “Monthly Historical Report,” 4 Sept 46, Det. D-212, to HQ, Co. D (Attention: Reports Section), from Capt. J.W. Bossert, Pg. 1, Correspondence 1946-1947 Folder, Box 834, 735 (A1): Gen. Rec., 45-49, LSO Regensburg, RG 260, NARA.

14 “Annual Historical Report,” 20 July 47, SK-LK Nürnberg, to Dir., OMGB, Historical and Reports Section, Intelligence Branch, from Maj. W.B. Morrell, Pg. 5-6, Military Histories Folder, Box 1425, 824 (A1): Correspondence & Related Records, 1945-1949, LSO Nürnberg, RG 260, NARA.


the population occupied a significantly greater proportion of the reporting from individual offices than did concern about the influence of communism.

Instead of communism, military government officials were often more concerned about the lingering effects of ex-Nazis and Nazism in their communities. Denazification was, at least theoretically, a major goal of the U.S. occupation. Several historians, however, have demonstrated the limits to the American policy and MGOs themselves expressed significant frustration with the implementation of denazification. Rebecca Boehling argued that military government officials at all levels, while paying lip service to the principle of denazification, were actually more concerned about the efficiency within the German bureaucracy and the material recovery of Bavarian society. As a result, they appointed career administrators or conservative politicians who promised to get the local government operating efficiently as quickly as possible, even though many had willingly cooperated with the Nazi regime. The focus on efficiency and recovery, therefore, undermined a thorough denazification of German society and pushed democratic reformers to the sidelines in postwar Germany.

Nevertheless, American MGOs in Bavaria were not completely indifferent to concerns about the influence of ex-Nazis in German society. As denazification dragged on and it was steadily weakened throughout the occupation, military government officials in Bavaria still expressed trepidation about the lingering impact of Nazism. Meanwhile, the influence of communism and the KPD remained a minor issue for the first two years of the occupation. During the summer of 1945, for example, official reports emphasized the prominent role of denazification military government activities. OMGB reported in August that “denazification was a prime determinant in all efforts to reestablish civilian governmental agencies, industry, and

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trade.” After the announcement of Military Government Law No. 8, which prohibited former Nazis from any type of work above manual labor, Captain Douglass of Wolfstein insisted that implementation of the law represented the most pressing issue in the Landkreis. Finally, the military government detachment in Munich reported that they shut down the operations of the local Portuguese consulate, which was supposedly helping ex-Nazis escape to Brazil. Such reports, of course, do not capture the full reality of denazification in postwar Bavaria. American MGOs often did turn a blind eye to cooperation with the Nazi regime in the name of efficiency. Nevertheless, the goal of denazification retained a prominent place in the early actions of military government detachments throughout the Land. Ultimately the policy may have failed, as historians like Boehling have persuasively argued, but the Americans remained concerned about the issue in the initial stages of the occupation, far more so than they feared the influence of communism in Bavaria.

Beyond the actual process of denazification, MGOs in Bavaria worried about the possible influence of former Nazis on the center-right political parties of the Land, in particular the Christian Social Union, and the general conservatism of the Bavarian population. As early as November 1945 OMGB speculated that the CSU’s strength was due to “its silent exploitation by various conservative forces on which the former Nazis and their [sympathizers] were the most sinister.” Specifically, the Americans worried about the influence of former Minister-President Fritz Schäffer and the faction of the CSU known as the Bavarian People’s League, which comprised the far right of the party. Military government officials warned of Schäffer’s “over-

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18 G-5 Section, Historical Report, August 1945, Pg. 1, G-5 Section Reports of Operations 9 May 45-30 November 45 Folder, Box 1, 42823 (A1): Rpts of Ops, 45-46, RG 338, NARA.
20 G-5 Section, Report of Operations, November 1945, OMGB, Pg. 9, G-5 Section Reports of Operations 9 May 45-30 November 45 Folder, Box 1, 42823 (A1): Rpts of Ops, 45-46, RG 338, NARA.
conservative tendencies” and hoped that the more moderate factions of the party, led Josef Müller, could moderate the far-right influence. Meanwhile, American MGOs expressed worries about the conservativism of the Bavarian populace. After the CSU’s resounding victory in the April 1946 election, Major Albert Snow explained, “It appears to the undersigned that the election victory was more than social, as the majority of people in this Kreis are not only extremely conservative but ardently Catholic and reactionary.”

American concern about the CSU culminated during the late spring and early summer of 1946. In May OMGB speculated that some of the center-right party’s strength “springs from the favor it has carried with former Nazis and their cohorts.” Fritz Schäffer remained a problem since his speeches had “strong national socialist leanings” and was ordered to “discontinue political activities.” Yet other controversies raised American concern about the lingering influence of Nazism in Bavaria. On May 24, the local detachments suspended chairman of the CSU in Würzburg because he appointed a man who had been a member of the Nazi Party since 1933 and had joined the SA in 1937. Despite the suspension, the local party unanimously re-elected the party chairman. Local military government, therefore, suspended the Würzburg CSU for endorsing actions that contradicted the denazification laws. Similarly, the MGO in Landkreis Schwabmünchen warned of a divided CSU. On the one hand, the left-wing of the party included liberals, or even socialists, who did not want to join the Social Democratic Party for religious reasons. However, the other wing was far more conservative, including “‘reactionary’ middle class entrepreneurs, farmers soaked in tradition, and Nazis who are permitted by current politics to join a political party.” In Schwabmünchen the CSU “seems to include only people of the latter

21 Historical Report, Military Government for Land Bavaria, 15 Nov 45-15 Dec 45, OMGB, Pg. 3 & 5-6, Box 260, 636 (A1): Hist Rpts, 44-48, Rec. of Land Dir., RG 260, NARA.
kind.” As evidence, the detachment cited the activities of the Landrat, Max Weis. He provided jobs to Nazi relatives, had used concentration camp labor in his business during the war, and opposed denazification. Even the more moderate members of the Land party proved frustrating. Dr. Müller and other CSU leaders “stubbornly resisted” the implementation of strict denazification laws throughout Bavaria and had refused to share clear membership lists for months.23 For many Americans in OMGB, the reluctance of the moderate CSU leadership demonstrated that they too approved of former Nazis joining the party.

Beyond the activities of the CSU, American MGOs also cautioned about the conservative influence of the Catholic Church. For example, Bavarian bishops composed a pastoral letter that was then read from all Catholic pulpits over Eastern weekend in 1946. According to OMGB, the letter was a “thinly veiled defense of Nazis” and a direct contradiction of the U.S. policy of “purging the German national life of Nazis.” While many Bavarians disliked political speeches coming from the pulpit, former Nazis had supposedly become regular church attendees “since they have discovered in the Catholic Church such a strong ally.”24 The conservatism of Bavarian Catholicism, therefore, represented a significant concern for American military government. Combined with the CSU’s ambivalent, if not welcoming attitude, towards former Nazis, MGOs feared that former Nazis would regain positions of power in postwar Bavaria.

Beyond the CSU, however, other political parties also presented concerns to military government officials. The Economic Reconstruction Party, under the leadership of Alfred Loritz, rose to prominence in several communities during the summer of 1946. In Dachau, the party denounced the major parties and politicians, although it did not gain significant support in the

23 Historical Report for Land Bavaria, 1 to 31 May, 1946, OMGB, Pg. 9-13, Box 260, 636 (A1): Hist Rpts, 44-48, RG 260, NARA.
24 Historical Report for Land Bavaria, 1 to 31 May, 1946, OMGB, Pg. 20-21, Box 260, 636 (A1): Hist Rpts, 44-48, RG 260, NARA.
city. According to Major Snow, the ERP was unpopular because its “abuse, slander, and vilification is reminiscent of the early rants of the Nazis.”25 Meanwhile, Lieutenant Colonel Eugene Keller and the Munich detachment addressed the impact of Loritz and the ERP in August. Keller described a meeting of the ERP with approximately 5,000 attendees where Loritz launched broadsides against the city’s Oberbürgermeister Karl Scharmagl and the CSU in a “Hitler style” of promising “everything to everyone.” At another meeting on August 20 Loritz again used the “Hitlerian method” of speaking, which the MGO described as an “impersonation of Goebbels.” Loritz and the ERP, Keller warned, were “greatly similar to the NSDAP.” The party was “critical of every person, critical of every establishment of the state” but possessed “no basic program for work and reconstruction.”26 The ERP represented another facet of American concern about the lingering influence of Nazism in postwar Bavaria. Beyond the conservative beliefs of many Bavarians, Keller, Snow, and MGOs worried about the impact of “Nazi methods.” Such right-wing populism could potentially undermine efforts at denazification and democratization.

Throughout the early years of the occupation, then, communists and the KPD remained of minor concern for military government officials in Bavaria. When the KPD was a problem, it was due to reports that former Nazis or former officeholders joined the party in an attempt to regain power.27 Instead, MGOs fretted about the continuing influence of former Nazis in Bavarian society, the general conservatism of Bavarians, and the practice of populist, Nazi-like methods. Such developments received significantly more attention in military government

27 Historical Report for Land Bavaria, 1 to 31 May 1946, OMGB, Pg. 13-14, Box 260, 636 (A1): Hist Rpts, 44-48, Rec. of Land Dir., RG 260, NARA.
reports than did any concerns about Bavarian communism or the emerging Cold War. American military government ultimately favored center-right “experts” and administrators due to their preference for material recovery and efficiency in local government. However, that does not mean they were indifferent to fears about former Nazis regaining political power. MGOs repeatedly expressed their concerns about Nazi influence in Bavarian society throughout the first stages of the occupation.

Meanwhile, Bavarian communists and the KPD did not receive significant attention from military government. The party was not immediately viewed negatively by many MGOs and while there were instances of anticommunism, most Americans expressed little concern about the party during the first two years of the occupation. The KPD was not a particularly strong political party in Bavaria, with its strongest support coming from urban areas. As a result, MGOs in rural areas often had few interactions with communists. In fact, German officials and the Bavarian population expressed greater distrust towards the KPD than did the Americans. After years of warfare against the Soviet Union and anti-communist propaganda, Bavarians remained suspicious of communists and feared a new war between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union at an early date.

From the beginning of the occupation, American officials in Bavaria expressed little concern about the state of communism in the Land. As early as July 1945 OMGB recognized that Bavarian politics tended towards the center-right and that the KPD’s only notable strength came from a handful of industrial centers. The observation was borne out in the local elections conducted throughout Germany in the first six months of 1946. Even in Munich and Nürnberg, major industrial cities, the communists polled poorly, often failing to win more than a single seat.

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G-5 Section, Historical Report, July 1945, Pg. 3, G-5 Section Reports of Operations 9 May-30 November 1945 Folder, Box 1, 42823 (A1): Rpts of Ops, 45-46, RG 338, NARA.
on the city council. In Regensburg, the KPD earned just 1,626 votes out of a total nearly 38,000 total votes and won just one council seat.\footnote{“Monthly Historical Report,” 4 June 46, LSO Regensburg, Det. D-212, to Dir., HQ Co. D, from 1st Lt. Hyman Gilberg, Pg. 1, Correspondence 1946-1947 Folder, Box 834, 735 (A1): Gen. Rec., 45-49, LSO Regensburg, RG 260, NARA.} In more rural areas, the party fared far worse. For example, Major Snow reported from Dachau that the KPD made no significant gains in the April 1946 elections because the KPD was “distrusted” and “linked with [Russia] in the minds of the people.”\footnote{“Monthly Historical Report, April 1946,” 10 May 46, Det. I-367, to Dir., OMG for Upper Bavaria, from Maj. Albert Snow, Pg. 3, Monthly Historical Reports Folder, Box 367, 660 (A1): Gen. Rec., 46-49, LSO Dachau, RG 260, NARA.} Additionally, communist party membership remained minimal in communities beyond the major urban centers. In January 1946, the KPD of Landkreis Karlstadt possessed a mere thirty-seven members. By the following November, the local party had increased its membership, but to just sixty-five members.\footnote{“Monthly Political Activity Report,” 31 Jan 46, Det. I-338, LK Karlstadt, from Capt. Walter Brayden, Pg. 2, Karlstadt 1945-1948 Folder, Box 1534, 854 (A1): Correspondence & Records with Other Offices, 1946-1950, Records of District IV (Branch A), RG 260, NARA; “Monthly Political Activity Report,” 30 Nov 46, Det. A-338, LK Karlstadt, from Maj. James Breland, Pg. 2, Karlstadt 1945-1948 Folder, Box 1534, 854 (A1): Corres. & Rec. w/ Other Offices, 46-50, Rec. of Dist. IV (Br. A), RG 260, NARA.} Similarly, the KPD in Altdorf, located near Nürnberg, possessed sixty members out of a total population of approximately 5,000.\footnote{“Illicit Solicitation of Funds by the Communist Party Altdorf, LK Nürnberg,” 14 Sept 46, to Director, OMGB, Intelligence Branch, Attention: Maj. Peter Vacea, from Lt. Col. A.T. Callicott, Politics Folder, Box 1415, 824 (A1): Corres. & Rel. Rec., 45-49, LSO Nürnberg, RG 260, NARA.}

While MGOs recognized the limited influence of the KPD, they also initially expressed either ambivalence about the party or, in some instances, admiration. Many early reports centered on the relationship between Bavaria’s communists and social democrats. For example, they both seemed committed to the “elimination of Nazism and militarism” and the reconstruction of Germany “on democratic principles.”\footnote{Historical Report, Military Government for Land Bavaria, 15 Nov 45-15 Dec 45, OMGB, Pg. 8, Box 260, 636 (A1): Hist Rpts, 44-48, Rec. of Land Dir., RG 260, NARA.} This apparent commitment to working with the SPD limited concern about communism among many military government officials in Bavaria. In October 1945 OMGB noted, “The range of ideology among the leaders was
surprisingly wide and sometimes included recognition of private enterprise in commerce and, to a considerable extent, in industry.”

Similarly, the detachment in Munich described Bruno Goldhammer, the Secretary of the local party, as “a powerful, proletarian figure” who promoted democratic collaboration among all anti-fascist political parties. The Nürnberg party made similar calls of democratic unity in the name of improving the lives of workers. MGOs did not always accept these professions at face value. In Nürnberg, for example, the detachment questioned, “How much of this liberal view was spontaneous and how much was a matter of disguised Party policy, dictated possibly by higher headquarters, remains to be seen.” Nevertheless, many MGOs “were inclined to accept the professions of Communist loyalty to democratic principles as no less sincere than those of the Social Democrats.”

This is not to say that American military government officials embraced the KPD in Bavaria or that no instances of anti-communism occurred during the first two years of the occupation. Before the ban on political activity was lifted and political parties approved, intelligence reports warned about the “secret” activity of left-wing parties, including the KPD. Additionally, MGOs viewed the Antifa (Anti-Fascist) committees that operated during the first months of the occupation with suspicion, in large part because communists made up sizable portions of the committees. More specifically, Americans sometimes targeted communist officials for removal. In Munich, for example, military government forced the removal of Dr. Alfred Kroth from the cabinet of Minister-President Wilhelm Hoegner and from a position in the city’s administration. Kroth, a long-time KPD member, had joined the Nazi Party as spy before the war. Military government officials confirmed the story, but the communist was still removed.

34 G-5 Section, Report of Operations, October 1945, Pg. 6, G-5 Section Reports of Operations 9 May 45-30 November 45 Folder, Box 1, 42823 (A1): Rpts of Ops, 45-46, RG 338, NARA.
from his position. Nevertheless, communism and the KPD remained a relatively remote concern for MGOs in Bavaria. For those officials interacting with German society on a daily basis, the limited party membership and unsuccessful elections demonstrated the clear limits on communist influence in conservative Bavaria.

In fact, it was the Bavarians themselves who expressed the more ardent anti-communism in the early years of the occupation. Bavarians of all stripes expressed fear and distrust of the KPD and American officials took note of their repeated denunciations of the party. If anything, the Bavarians, during the first two years of the occupation, pushed the Americans to embrace a harder line in dealing with the Land’s communists. As early as August 1945 German conservatives in Munich warned that denazification would drive nominal Nazis “into the ranks of the communists” and ultimately undermine American policy. A month later the Munich detachment again reported that churches in the city were urging their parishioners to be politically minded, largely out of fear “that Communists would benefit from the general political apathy of the people.” The official American recognition of the KPD brought a new wave of questions to the MGOs in Munich, such as “What is the best party to join to fight the Communist?” and “How can I found an Anti-Communist Party?” For conservatives throughout Bavaria, then, communism posed an early threat to Bavarian society. The KPD, they feared, would take advantage of the postwar chaos to advance their agenda.

The rout of the KPD in the elections of 1946, however, did not ease fear about the influence of the party among Bavarians. In fact, German anti-communism expanded throughout 1946 and 1947. Early returnees from Soviet prisoner of war camps shared their often-horrific experiences with their communities and the stories quickly gained “a wide circulation among the populace.” Additionally, news stories from the Soviet zone of occupation inflamed anti-communist sentiment. The Süddeutsche Zeitung published “Behind the Iron Curtain,” which painted a stark picture of life to the east, just days before the May 1946 elections. Most significantly, the growing assertiveness of the KPD, particularly in pushing for a union of communists and social democrats, instilled greater fear of communism. The KPD labeled Bavaria the “breeding place” of fascism and “the powerhouse of opposition toward socialism.” They also launched numerous broadsides against SPD leadership for not making common cause with the KPD against the Nazi regime. In response, Bavarian conservatives stepped up their denunciations of communism. Speaking to a meeting of the CSU in March 1947, Alois Hundhammer proclaimed, “We have to make up our minds whether we want Europe to be dominated by the Hold Cross or by the Red Flag. It is our duty to oppose Communism.” Social Democrat leadership joined the growing German anti-communist chorus as well. Speaking at a conference in Nürnberg, Kurt Schumacher, the head of the West German SPD, vowed that “Germany will [never] adopt Russian ideology” and that “the suppression and persecution” of

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39 Historical Report for Land Bavaria, 1-31 May 1946, OMGB, Pg. 7, Box 260, 636 (A1): Hist Rpts, 44-48, Rec. of Land Dir., RG 260, NARA.
the SPD in the Soviet zone was “a question of world democracy.” Bavarian leaders, then, saw the KPD as a significant threat from the earliest days of the occupation and ramped up their anti-communism well before American MGOs would embrace the dichotomy of the Cold War struggle.

These local developments – American concern about denazification and relatively good relations with German communists – reflected the higher-up concern, or lack thereof, about communism. For the elites within American military government, the Soviet Union was not a significant threat to U.S. goals in Germany for the first two years of the occupation. Instead, the other allies, most notably the French, posed the greatest headache and American commanders like General Clay believed they could reach an agreement with the USSR. One of Clay’s goals in restarting German political life was to set up a centralized German administration under the authority of the Control Council. However, Clay’s plans ran in to stiff opposition from the other occupying powers, particularly France and the Soviet Union. At the Potsdam Conference, the leaders of the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain discussed a wide array of postwar issues, but focused primarily on the treatment of occupied Germany. On paper, the Potsdam Agreement adopted several aspects of Clay’s vision. The allies agreed to the uniform treatment of the German populace “so far as is practicable” and promoted the rapid restoration of local self-government. Additionally, the agreement declared that “central German administrative department…shall be established, particularly in the fields of finance, transport, communication, foreign trade and industry.” Along similar lines, the allies proclaimed that occupied Germany would be treated as single economic unit. While the Americans made several concessions to the

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Soviet Union, particularly in the field of reparations, the Potsdam Agreement, at least on paper, bore a remarkable resemblance to Clay’s hopes for Germany.  

When the Allied Control Council finally formed on August 30, however, disagreements limited the effectiveness of the council. All decisions required unanimous approval of the four occupying powers and it became apparent that the occupiers had diverging goals and policies in Germany. Clay, who often represented Eisenhower at meetings, found French obstructionism especially frustrating. The French vehemently opposed any kind of centralized administration of occupied Germany. Instead, the French representative on the council favored the decentralization of Germany and even the removal of economically important regions, such as the Rhineland, to destroy German militarism. By late 1945 American officials in Germany saw France, and not the Soviet Union, as the primary impediment to the creation of a centralized administration. The differing opinions on the treatment of defeated Germany, coupled with poor economic conditions and a “hurt complex,” produced, in the eyes of most Army officers, noticeably strained Franco-American relations. In fact, Clay repeatedly complained to the Department of State about French hostility and to request that American diplomats put pressure on Paris to cooperate. The State Department, however, applied little pressure on the French due to concern about domestic politics in France. OMGUS subsequently complained, “Inside Germany, Russian cooperation seemed a continuing probability, with all the rich implication for the unity of Europe and peace.

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of the world. Yet despite their dependency on the United States, the French were being allowed to destroy the project.”\textsuperscript{45}

On the other hand, Americans initially saw Soviet actions as merely the continuation of the traditional Russian goal of securing a defensive buffer zone along its borders. In the wake of two world wars, Army intelligence analysts argued, Soviet policy was perfectly reasonable. Eisenhower even hoped that American officials could do “something” so that U.S. personnel “may understand…what the Russians have been through.”\textsuperscript{46} Additionally, American commanders in Germany maintained a strong relationship with their Soviet counterparts. Eisenhower and Clay were close with Marshal Georgy Zhukov, built in part on a mutual respect for their wartime accomplishments. Clay, in particular, chose to ignore the revolutionary ideology of the USSR and instead focused on their shared interests in Germany.\textsuperscript{47} Concerned with the day-to-day challenges of administrating a devastated nation-state, Clay and other military government elites were generally less worried about the influence of the Soviet Union and communism in Germany.

Nevertheless, American and Soviet disagreements over policy slowed the initial work of the Allied Control Council and frustrated Clay’s goal of establishing a central administration in Germany. Part of the problem, Eisenhower told George Marshall, lay with the rigid policies of the home governments, which limited the ability to convince the other representatives of the soundness of propositions. As a result, only by a “spirit of joint accommodation” – which was increasingly rare – could the Control Council agree on any policy of substance. Eisenhower and

Clay both agreed that the United States had to prepare for the possibility that quadripartite government would fail. However, Clay remained wary of taking any definitive steps towards autonomous or tripartite administration of Germany because it could “lead to practical if not actual dismemberment.” Despite opposition, Clay continued to press for a centralized administration. When the Level of Industry Committee, for example, could not reach an agreement on German steel production, Clay pushed for a compromise solution in the Control Council. After several contentious meetings, Clay brokered a compromise of 5.8 million tons of production with a capacity of 7.5 million tons. The steel agreement, however, was one small success amidst a larger pattern of failure.\footnote{Eisenhower to Marshall, 13 Oct. 1945, Box 80, DDE: Papers, Pre-Presidential, 1916-1952, Principal File, DDE Presidential Library; Monthly Report of the Military Governor, U.S. Zone, 20 Oct. 1945, Box 44, Walter Bedell Smith: Collection of WWII Documents, DDE Presidential Library; Eisenhower to War Department, 24 Sept. 1945, in Clay Papers, Vol. I, 85; Backer, Winds of History, 95-98.}

Despite these disagreements, Clay worked for years to achieve some kind of agreement with the USSR in Germany. Following Clay’s lead, OMGUS believed that economic concessions, specifically over reparations, would push the Soviets towards more moderate positions on political and social issues. After all, the western zones possessed most German industry, so any significant reparations would have to come from the American, British, and French zones of occupation. Negotiations on a final reparations deal, however, collapsed during the spring of 1946 and Clay responded by stopping the delivery of reparations from the American zone. Yet even now the American general tried to maintain good relations with the USSR by painting the French as the main culprits. Even as the United States and Great Britain hammered out the details for the merger of their two zones, and took the first major step towards the division of Germany, Clay refused to sever the relationship with the Soviet Union. He approved informal discussions between his deputy William Draper and Soviet officers over
reparations and uniform level of industry in postwar Germany. Clay still believed that the Russians were so desperate for reparations that they would make significant concessions on their economic and political agenda in Germany.  

Clay’s generally accommodating attitude toward the Soviets spread throughout much of OMGUS, even as the USSR imposed more radical political and social policies within their zone. After the sound defeat of the KPD in U.S. zone elections in early 1946, the Soviets embarked on an increasingly authoritarian control of their zone of occupation. Most famously, they forced the merger of the SPD and the KPD into the Socialist Unity Party (SED). The Russians also stepped up harassment of centrist and center-right political figures, particularly those from the Christian Democratic Union, and exerted more control on the press. Within OMGUS there was some concern to these Soviet measures, but it was not extensive. For the most part, Clay and his immediate subordinates blamed the Russian actions on the immobilized Allied Control Council and believed that an active council would moderate the situation in the Soviet zone by providing an incentive to cooperation. On the other hand, State Department officials, including George Kennan, saw Soviet actions in Germany as a threat. Kennan insisted that the United States faced two choices in Germany: unification of the country within the Soviet sphere of influence or division of the country to maintain American influence. Clay and other high-level military government officials, however, did not quietly accede to the State Department’s wishes. Instead, he insisted throughout 1946 and in to 1947 that an accommodation with the Soviets over Germany was possible. While many in Washington, especially within the Department of State, increasingly embraced the Cold War, military government officials in Germany refused to do so well in to 1947.

49 Eisenberg, Drawing the Line, 212 & 243.
50 Eisenberg, Drawing the Line, 216-218 & 224.
Therefore, the experiences of military government officials at the lowest levels in Bavaria reflected the attitudes of their superiors in the OMGUS bureaucracy. Communism was of little concern throughout the first two years of the occupation. American MGOs quickly recognized the limited influence of the KPD in conservative Bavaria. Even if Bavarian communists had possessed more influence, U.S. officials were either ambivalent about the KPD or even expressed limited admiration for the left-wing party. Additionally, MGOs focused more on the lingering influence of Nazism in Bavaria, particularly within the center-right political parties and through the existence of “Nazi methods” in political activity. Perhaps most importantly, the persistent food and economic crises dominated the activities of most American officials during the initial stages of the occupation. As described in previous chapters, MGOs used whatever, limited, means available to them to feed the Bavarian populace and revive economic activity. During a period when starvation threatened, concern about communism was relatively unimportant. Instead, it was the Bavarians themselves who expressed the greatest fear of communism, often warning of its potential influence while the Americans remained unperturbed.

Even if MGOs had been inclined to embark on an active anti-communist campaign in 1945, 1946, or early 1947, the inclinations of their superiors served as a check on their behavior. As long as Clay believed an agreement with the Soviet was possible, open anti-communism was not accepted within OMGUS or OMGB. At times MGOs did discriminate against members of the KPD, but there was no “active, consistent, or aggressive anticommunist campaign in the US zone during the critical opening years, from 1945 until at least early 1947.” Faced with immediate crises and leadership that maintained good relations with their Soviet counterpart, “political ideology was far less important than the pragmatic requirements of military
government."\textsuperscript{51} The State Department and civilian officials in Washington moved towards the Cold War framework, but it remained relatively unimportant in the American zone, including Bavaria, during the first two years of the occupation.\textsuperscript{52}

\textbf{1947-1949: The Remote Cold War}

By the middle of 1947, the emerging Cold War was harder to ignore. Deteriorating relations with the Soviet Union and rising international tensions signaled the breakdown of the old wartime alliance. At the highest levels of military government this development elicited a rapid turn of direction. Once the loudest voice defending the relationship with the Soviets, General Clay became one of the most vocal cold warriors. Within OMGB, however, the emerging Cold War was of little concern to most MGOs. Fear of communism was most pronounced in cities like Munich, Nürnberg, and Regensburg, but the weakness of the KPD elsewhere in Bavaria limited concern about the Cold War. When the Cold War did rear its head, it often did so through indirect or minor channels. Rumors of imminent war almost constantly circulated throughout Bavaria, particularly in rural areas close to the border with the Soviet zone. The clash over Belin during the blockade did provide a stark example of the Cold War, but its impact on Bavaria was limited. The return of German prisoners of war from Soviet camps fed anti-communist sentiment and was interpreted by MGOs as evidence of Russian malevolence. Finally, the increased tensions along the borders with the Soviet zone and Czechoslovakia produced a series of minor border incidents, which were the most direct experience most MGOs had with the Cold War. Nevertheless, the Cold War remained a relatively remote development

\textsuperscript{51} Hudson, \textit{Army Diplomacy}, 185.

for American officials at the lowest levels of military government. Focused on reconstruction and democratization, there was little they could do to influence the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union.

General Clay had spent much of the first two years of the occupation defending the American-Soviet relationship in Germany, despite increased Soviet hostility and opposition from civilian policymakers. The events of 1947 and 1948, however, transformed Clay and other high-level military government officials into ardent cold warriors. For many Americans at the top of OMGUS, the event that precipitated the conversion to anti-communism was the Moscow Council of Foreign Ministers during the spring of 1947. Concerned about economic recovery in Western Europe above all, American policymakers, particularly those from the State Department, had effectively embraced the division of Germany. Marshall, Kennan, and other civilians believed that the economic reconstruction and integration of Western Europe, including western Germany, was of fundamental importance to the United States. As a result, they made their own position nonnegotiable and refused to consider Soviet demands, particularly for reparations from industrial production in the western zones. The Moscow conference ended in acrimony, in large part due to the hardline American negotiating stance, and State Department officials returned to the United States blaming the Soviets for its failure.53

Clay and the Army initially pushed back against this anti-Soviet turn in American policy; even conservatives in OMGUS believed a deal was still possible with the Soviet Union. Ultimately, however, Clay acquiesced and embraced the Cold War framework, particularly after Secretary of State George Marshall called for economic assistance to Europe in his commencement address at Harvard University on June 5, 1947. The failure of the Moscow CFM and Marshall’s address also produced more provocative Soviet behavior, which further moved

53 Eisenberg, Drawing the Line, 278 & 302.
Clay and OMGUS towards the Cold War framework. The Cominform, organized in September 1947, seemed to prove that the Soviets were indeed committed to the export of revolutionary ideology to Western Europe, including Germany. Additionally, increased suppression of the center-right parties within the Soviet zone, notably the Christian Democrats and the Free Democrats, and interference in the Berlin city government provided another example of apparent Soviet aggression. As the historian Carolyn Woods Eisenberg noted, “For those Americans who were seeking confirmation of Russian malevolence, the evidence was ample.”

Clay was, increasingly, one of those Americans. By the fall of 1947 he worried incessantly about the threat of Soviet propaganda throughout all western Germany, not just in the U.S. zone. He feared a slow American response to communist propaganda and called on Washington to increase the supply of newsprint to western Germany. Clay explained, “We…propose to attack communism and the police state before the German people…We are engaged in political warfare and we might as well recognize it now.” Clay feared the effects of Soviet propaganda to such an extent that he pleaded with Washington to take no actions that had the possibility of making the German populace more susceptible to communism. In May 1948, for example, he urged Washington to return German artwork, which was removed in the aftermath of the war, to Germany. According to Clay, “Any failure to return these articles now…would play into the hand of the Communists with their constantly reiterated propaganda of American exploitation.” When a group of senators proposed a delay in returning the artwork, Clay again stressed his fear that doing so would undermine the U.S. occupation.

Beyond concern about communist propaganda, high-level military government officials also perceived a Soviet threat to the American goal of economic reconstruction of both western

54 Eisenberg, Drawing the Line, 347-352.
Germany and Western Europe. While many within military government had long supported some basic level of recovery due to their preference for practical solutions to serious issues, they now embraced the State Department’s call for full-fledged reconstruction. Economic recovery in Germany was important, many economic officials believed, because it would save western Germany from “chaos and communism” and because “a communistic Germany is almost certain to result in a communistic Europe.” Increasingly, Americans viewed relations with the Soviets in Germany and Europe more broadly as “a war of nerves.”\(^\text{57}\) The United States could not give in to Soviet demands, the argument went, because it would produce a new round of appeasement and doing so would make the reconstruction of Germany even more difficult. According to Clay, “subtle changes” in the Soviet attitude during April 1948 led him to conclude that war in Europe “may come with dramatic suddenness.”\(^\text{58}\) The Soviets were no longer considered a problematic nuisance in the administration of occupation. Instead, communism was now perceived as one of the most significant threats, along with food and fuel shortages, to the zones of the western allied powers.

Disagreements over currency reform provided one impetus for the new perceptions of a Soviet threat. By late August 1947 Clay reported the growing necessity of a new currency. Financial reform had become an “inescapable necessity” to avoid economic chaos in western Germany. “The dam may break at any time,” Clay ominously warned.\(^\text{59}\) Discussions of currency reform between the western allies and the Soviets held earlier in the year produced little agreement. The Americans wanted to print the new currency in Berlin, while the Soviets sought

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to print the new marks within their own zone at Leipzig. February 1948 saw new negotiations on currency reform and on February 12 Clay reported that the Soviet agreed to print the new currency in Berlin with sixty days to work out the details. Clay, however, remained pessimistic and expected the negotiations to fail. Ultimately, Clay’s pessimism was proven correct when the negotiations broke down in the following months. As a result, the western allies moved quickly to introduce their own marks in the western zones. On June 18 OMGUS announced the new currency for western Germany. Jack Bennett, financial adviser to Clay, stretched the truth when he announced that the decision for a western currency was made only after quadripartite negotiations failed. Nevertheless, Bennett expected that “there is no reason why we should not see immediately a great stimulation in productive activity” throughout Germany. As many American occupation officials saw it, Soviet obstructionism in currency reform proved that communism was indeed a threat to Western Europe.

If the battle of currency reform did not convince all occupation authorities of the Soviet threat, then the restriction of access to and from Berlin, which began in April 1948, was the proverbial straw that broke the camel’s back. The so-called “mini-blockade” did not limit the importation of foodstuffs and fuel. Instead, it primarily targeted incoming American, British, and French military transport, while also limiting nearly all traffic outbound from Berlin. The Soviets claimed the right to board US Army trains to “insure the safety of freight shipments.” Following orders from Washington, Clay held all U.S. trains for the time being, but he emphasized, “There is no middle ground which is not appeasement.” Ultimately, Clay believed that the U.S. could effectively supply Berlin, although it would require a “substantial increase” in air lift capacity.

61 Text of speech for Jack Bennett, over AFN, Frankfurt, 18 June 48, Box 5, Tenebaum Papers, Subject File, Truman Library.
The cost of maintaining the American presence in Berlin, however, was immense. OMGUS officials estimated that costs for Berlin went beyond $150 million per year, including $75 to $100 million for food and $33 million each for coal and other commodities. Nevertheless, Clay argued, the United States could not abandon western Berlin. “If we mean that we are to hold Europe against communism, we must not budge,” he explained. “We can take humiliation and pressure short of war…without losing face.”

When the Soviets shut off access to the entire city, Clay pushed Washington to take a hardline against the Russians. He pushed for an expanded airlift into the city, which gained quick support among civilian policymakers. More aggressively, he called for armed convoys to challenge the blockade on the ground, a proposal which even the most ardent cold warriors in Washington were loath to accept. Perhaps most significantly, OMGUS also increased its support for the Parliamentary Council drafting a constitution for a West German government in Bonn by smoothing over the differences between the CDU/CSU and the SPD, while also keeping anxious European governments (especially the French) at bay. High-level military government officials, in addition, believed “the most vital force in western Germany” – the leadership of West Berlin – could strengthen “the wobbly Bonn experiment.” As Eisenberg observed, “Thus to U.S. Military Government, the division of Berlin had become nearly as attractive as the division of Germany itself. And as they were making no concessions to avoid the latter, they were becoming increasingly firm about the former.” Berlin, in the eyes of Clay and other American officials, had become a symbol of American intent throughout Europe and abandoning the city

65 Eisenberg, Drawing the Line, 412-427.
67 Eisenberg, Drawing the Line, 465-466.
would severely damage U.S. credibility. The hard progress made by military government could not be abandoned in the face of the perceived Soviet threat.68

Throughout the final two years of the military occupation, high-level officials within the military government bureaucracy, particularly General Clay, embraced the Cold War. Their vision of cooperation with the Soviet Union gone, reports from Germany now warned of numerous Russian misdeeds in Germany. Suppression of center-right political parties, interference in the Berlin city government, opposition to the Western-style currency reform, and the blockade of Berlin all served as evidence of Soviet aggression and malevolence. If the United States truly sought economic reconstruction, these events convinced Clay and his colleagues of the need for a divided Germany. Once the most ardent defender of allied cooperation and a united Germany, Clay now emerged as “the most zealous Cold Warrior of all.”69

Despite the overwhelming priority of the emerging Cold War for high-level military government officials, the West-East conflict was relatively remote for most MGOs in Bavaria. The KPD remained a minor party in the conservative Land, with little strength in rural regions. As a result, the spread of communism was only an issue in urban centers like Munich, Nürnberg, and Regensburg. Even then, the KPD possessed little noteworthy influence in Bavarian politics or society. Nevertheless, tensions with Bavarian communists did increase throughout the last two

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years of the occupation as Americans, non-communist Germans, and communists developed increasingly antagonistic relations.

The KPD, in particular, ramped up its attacks on the United States and its defense of the Soviet Union as Cold War tensions mounted. Bavarian communists attacked American policy in Bavaria, including denazification, and the nagging food crisis that plagued the western zones. The Nürnberg KPD was particularly active. For example, the city party ordered all party members to resign their posts on the city’s denazification tribunals, the Spruchkammern, to protest “an unjust implementation of the Denazification Law.”70 In a similar vein, the city’s communists insisted that fascism was on the rise due to American actions. Ignoring long-standing U.S. policy, the KPD argued that youth groups in the U.S. Zone supposedly wore uniforms and carried rifles as an “industrial police.”71 Yet much of their effort was devoted towards defending Russian practices in eastern Germany. On November 6, 1947, Otto Buchwitz, a member of the SED and president of Saxony’s Landtag, answered questions from party loyalists in Nürnberg. Addressing the issue of forced labor at the uranium mines in Saxony, Buchwitz insisted that conditions had improved and that food rations were so high for the miners that they had to turn away volunteers. He also attacked Germans fleeing to the western zones as “former SS guards” and people who “do not want to work.” Buchwitz then concluded his time in

Nürnberg by insisting that food rations “are still better with us than they are here” and that “every factory which was dismantled is again on the way to its reconstruction.”

As tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union mounted, the KPD seemed more active and the attacks of Bavarian communists grew more strident. There were, for example, renewed calls for the merger of the KPD and SPD in the American zone. On March 14, 1948, a KPD-dominated conference met in Nürnberg to call for “socialist unity.” For Lieutenant Colonel James Barnett, the conference was clearly “a new attempt to create some sort of unity party” after the prohibition of the SED. Beyond the particularly active Nürnberg KPD, other local parties followed a similar path. In the rural town of Mallersdorf, for example, the local chairman attacked the influence of capitalist “money-sacks” in the bizonal administration and argued that stories of Soviet aggression and the threat of war were an invention of anti-USSR propaganda. According to the Mallersdorf office, the local KPD exploited the “strained political and economical conditions” in an attempt to discredit the Western powers. In addition, the Burglengenfeld party criticized Ludwig Erhard, the minister of economics for the bizon as “nothing but a willing tool of the world capitalism who wants nothing but [to] colonize Germany.”

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American military government officials responded to the increased hostility of Bavarian communists with a campaign of anti-communism. As previous scholars have noted, military government increasingly used its power to favor the mainstream democratic parties throughout Germany, including in Bavaria. In addition, the military government bureaucracy attacked anything that smacked of communism, whether big or small. On January 23, 1948, for example, OMGB forwarded a message from OMGUS to its subsidiary offices that forbid the authorization of any political activities by the Volkskongress, a political movement that originated in the Soviet Zone. According to OMGUS, the Volkskongress represented “a deliberate attempt to the organizers to circumvent the policies of Military Government to ensure that political activities are conducted honestly and openly.” It was also “the same kind of deception” that had been tried in the attempts to form the SED in the American zone.76 A strike staged by the Bavarian Trade Unions on the same day in the Landkreis of Lohr worried military government officials, who thought the strike “was mainly propagated by communists.”77 In a climate of rising tensions, any communist activity could look malevolent to the Americans in Bavaria, whether it as a movement originating in the Soviet zone or a more mundane strike.

American MGOs also warned of both overt and subversive political activity by communists throughout Bavaria. Increased communist activity often brought dire warnings from military government officials, especially from communities where political apathy reigned supreme. In Landkreis Wolfstein, Captain Robert MacWhorter reported that the KPD had gained the most influence among all political parties due to the “apathy and self-confidence” of the CSU

and SPD. MGOs worried that the apathy of many Bavarians would enable the more committed communists to gain considerable influence in Germany. Additionally, military government reports throughout 1948 and 1949 increasingly referenced “subversive political activities.” For example, in Mallersdorf the KPD employed “all kinds of secret propaganda and agitation” such as spreading rumors, threatening employers who may dismiss communists, and blaming the Western Allies for the current conditions in Germany. In Sulzbach, meanwhile, the MGO warned of a possible KPD spy at the local Reading Room. One Josef Wimmer, MGO Sherwyn Ehrlich reported, had visited the Reading Room, which was in the same building as the military government offices, “virtually every day” for two months. Wimmer was a member of the local KPD, supposedly a close friend to party chairman, and was a refugee from the Russian zone. For those reasons, Ehrlich warned that “it is at least possible” that Wimmer “has been coming to the American Reading Room for the specific purpose of spying on Military Government.” In response, the Americans rearranged the Reading Room to guard against the possibility that Wimmer had been spying. Even when no “subversive activity” existed to report, MGOs still noted so in their reports, demonstrating that it was a growing concern for military government officers.

For American officials, then, Bavarian communists seemed a significant threat to the occupation. The increasingly strident criticisms of American actions in Germany and the perceived threat of communist subversion led to suspicious attitudes towards anything

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78 “Cumulative Annual Historical Report, 1 July 46 to 30 June 47,” 18 July 47, Det. D-310, to Dir., OMGB, Attn: Historical & Reports Section, from Capt. Robert MacWhorter, Pg. 4, Historical Reports Folder, Box 966, 753 (A1): Corres. & Rpts, 45-49, LSO Wolfstein, RG 260, NARA.
80 “Spot Intelligence Report,” 1 Sept 48, to Land Director, OMGB, Attn: FOD, Intelligence Division, from Sherwyn Ehrlich, Pg. 1-2, Intelligence Reports 1949 Folder, Box 831, 734 (A1): Gen. Rec., 48-49, LSO Regensburg, RG 260, NARA.
communist or Soviet-leaning. At the headquarters of the Munich Military Post, Army officers identified five major security threats, four of which were related to the Soviet Union or communism. The most significant threat were KPD groups, especially if they penetrated other organizations, such as labor unions, and fomented strikes or demonstrations. Displaced persons were also a potential threat since they could be scattered with “foreign agents.” Similarly, refugees at nearby Dachau might undermine the occupation, since many originated from the Soviet Zone and the satellite states of Eastern Europe. Finally, returning POWs constituted another potential security concern as they may “have been thoroughly [indoctrinated] with the Communist ideology.” The only potential threat that was not at least tangentially related to communism were former Nazis.  

Despite this vocal concern, MGOs also recognized the limited influence of communism in postwar Bavaria. While warning about communist subversion, American officials simultaneously highlighted the weakening position of the KPD even as the Cold War escalated. In particular, military government officers throughout the Land noted the stagnating and often declining membership of local communist parties. By late 1947 and early 1948 MGOs recognized the languishing membership numbers of the local KPD. Even in Nürnberg, with its active party, membership peaked at approximately 5,000 in August 1947 and then slowly started to decline. Communist propaganda efforts, Lieutenant Colonel Barnett observed, no longer got much of a response from the populace.  

Similar patterns emerged throughout Bavaria. During the last three months of 1947 KPD membership declined from 173 to 167 in Dachau and from

643 to 626 in Regensburg.\textsuperscript{83} By early to mid-summer 1948, local parties showed no signs of stopping, let alone reversing, the decline in membership figures. The Regensburg party saw its membership decline by nearly ten percent from July 1947 through June 1948. The KPD in Landkreis Wolfstein suffered even more severe drops. It lost forty-seven members in the past twelve months, roughly twenty-two percent of its membership.\textsuperscript{84} Then in early 1949 the KPD of Landkreis Miesbach lost nearly six percent of its members, including a communist Kreistag member, in just one month from January 27 to February 27.\textsuperscript{85} The hemorrhaging of members continued throughout the rest of the occupation. As the Cold War developed and anti-communist sentiment emerged, the Bavarian KPD struggled to retain existing members, let alone attract new ones.

One significant reason for the KPD’s exacerbated struggles in Bavaria after 1947 was the attitude of large segments of the Bavarian population. As discussed earlier, the Land was already conservative and not inclined to accept communism. The rise of the Cold War simply exacerbated this tendency. Even German newspapers, which had previously been a bastion of the more liberal aspects of Bavarian society, expressed significant anti-communist sentiment.

Writing in the \textit{S"uddeutsche Zeitung} in late November 1947, Werner Friedmann attacked Soviet propaganda while also trying to find a third way for Germany. The Soviets, Friedmann argued, started a propaganda war to which the Americans were forced to respond, enlisted newspapers in


\textsuperscript{85} “Communist Withdrawals,” Letter, 4 March 49, to FOD, from William Corbett, Miscellaneous Correspondence 1948 Folder, Box 377, 666 (A1): General Records, 46-49, LSO Miesbach, RG 260, NARA.
their own zone in the struggle, and interfered with the free distribution of Western newspapers in the East. Nevertheless, Friedmann sought a third way for a united Germany. Recognizing that “the front-lines of both propaganda drives run straight through the heart of our country,” he called on West German newspapers to maintain German unity and promote a way out of the emerging ideological struggle. For Werner, then, Soviet aggression represented a significant challenge, but he remained committed to the unification of Germany.

Other Bavarians, however, possessed less nuanced views about communism. Instead, many took increasingly strident anti-communist positions, including left-wing social democrats. After a KPD meeting in Nürnberg on March 5, 1948, for example, SPD members in attendance accused the communist speak of lying about conditions in the Russian zone of occupation, pointing to documented stories about mistreatment of workers, poor economic conditions, and discrimination against non-communist parties. Stories about the “numerous crimes committed by Russian soldiers” including “tales of rape and robbery and even murder” fed significant anti-communist sentiment in Bavaria. In particular, rural communities grew increasingly antagonistic towards the KPD. The military government office in Mallersdorf reported that most Germans “were sufficiently enlightened” about Bolshevism by reports of Russian conduct and therefore resisted communist propaganda. Similarly, young anti-communists in Riedenburg

attended a KPD meeting at the end of July 1948 for the sole purpose “to contradict everything the KPD speaker would say.” Unemployed Bavarians and a handful of refugees sometime expressed sympathy with communist ideas, but a significant majority of the population remained suspicious, if not outright hostile, to the machinations of the Bavarian communists.

With Bavarians rejecting the KPD by themselves, MGOs continued to fret the return of former Nazis and far-right politics. At this point in the occupation, however, concern about the right-wing Bayernpartei replaced the fear of potential Nazi influence on the Christian Social Union. The party held its first Land-wide convention in Passau on June 19, 1948, where it elected Josef Baumgartner, the former antagonistic Minister of Agriculture, as president. A series of speeches by prominent leaders repeated the same attacks: “centralism” was dangerous to Europe, the CSU was not protecting Bavarian interests, Bavaria should have more independence, and non-Bavarians should be removed from Bavaria. Military government observers warned that the Bayernpartei represented a continuation of far-right politics and made not-so-subtle comparisons to the Nazi Party. According to one report, the party would attract “those radical elements who are busy nursing revenge and power feelings.” The conference also revived “the hatreds and prejudices” of the Nazis: “One gullible delegate who [dared] to use ‘Bavarian and German’ in one breath was almost kicked out. ‘German’ here had the same effect on a group of organized beings as ‘Jew’ on the hatred-laden masses listening to [Julius] Streicher. There was very little difference.” The persistence of far-right politics, even as Cold War tensions

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increased, worried American MGOs. The existence of “Nazi methods” and rampant nationalism represented a significant concern. However, the American-Soviet rivalry subsumed this concern under the more pressing needs of anti-communism; it remained, but was less important than the new Cold War struggle.

The early years of the Cold War, then, saw a rise in anti-communist sentiment among American MGOs. An increasingly antagonistic Bavarian KPD played a significant role, as the party stridently attacked many facets of the U.S. occupation. As a result, military government officials adopted an open policy of anti-communism and worked against the activities of the KPD. Nevertheless, fear of communism operated within a specific context. The Bavarian communist party had never possessed significant strength in the rural, conservative Land, a reality that MGOs had noted since the beginning of the occupation. The apparent communist threat, therefore, remained limited. Some Bavarians expressed a general fear of the KPD, but most rejected communist propaganda and developed an antagonistic relationship towards the party. Additionally, the local parties experienced significant drops in membership as the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union heated up. For American officials at the lowest levels of military government in Bavaria, the threat of communism was not as pronounced as it was for those at the top of the hierarchy like General Clay. This is not to say that MGOs ignored the KPD or did not embark on a campaign of anti-communism. On the contrary, they warned about communist influence and took actions to stymie the Bavarian party. Yet they also recognized the limited influence of the KPD and its minimal impact in Bavaria.

In a similar vein, as tensions between the United States and the Soviet mounted, the emerging Cold War remained remote for most American officials in Bavaria. Ensconced in small communities in southern Germany, there was little direct connection to the major international
events that characterized the early Cold War, apart from the Berlin Blockade. Instead, the Cold War initially manifested itself through the spread of rumors among the Bavarian populace, particularly the persistent rumor that war between the former allies would break out at any moment. War rumors existed at times in the first years of the occupation, but as relations between the former allies deteriorated rumors of imminent conflict grew more prevalent. In Landkreis Mallersdorf, for example, the military government office reported widespread war rumors throughout late spring and early summer 1948. The local population exchanged stories that Soviet divisions mobilized along the Czechoslovakia border and would invade within four weeks or that the Russians produced new rockets that would destroy London and New York in a matter of days. Overall, the population was “very much afraid of a Russian invasion.”

The German clerk for the Mallersdorf Office, E. Hans Krista, was not sure who to blame for the spread of war rumors. On the one hand, he blamed the communists for spreading the rumors. At the same time, however, he criticized the press for “greatly contributing” to the “war-psychosis” of the population. “Even minor events or differences among the Allied,” Krista explained, “are being inflated by the press so that they appear as being at least a new cause for war.”

Rumors of imminent war persisted throughout 1948 and into 1949. In late October 1948 Mallersdorf was again gripped by the rumor that Russian units massed along the Czechoslovakia border and would invade within four weeks. Then in early February 1949 the military

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government office in *Landkreis* Eschenbach reported rumors that Bavaria was to be surrendered to the Soviets in the event of war. Instead of defending the *Land*, the Western Allies would establish their defensive line behind the Rhine River. Bavaria, in that case, would become “General Clay’s nobody land.”96 This fear of abandonment in the event of war manifested throughout Bavaria. Some wealthy citizens in Mallersdorf, for example, tried to win over the sympathy of the local KPD by donating to the party. According to their rationale, they wanted “to be secured when the Bolsheviks…come.”97 In other communities, dark humor expressed the expectation of abandonment. The MGOs of Kelheim and Neunburg vorm Wald both reported the circulation of a joke about a teacher asking her students what foreign language they wanted to learn. The first student wants to learn English to visit an aunt who lives in England (or America). The second says they want to learn French because an uncle (or a father) works in France and wants to visit. The final student replies, “Russian, because I want to remain in Germany.”98 American military exercises seemingly reinforced this concern. Maneuvers by the First Infantry Division at Grafenwöhr in September 1948 to see if one division could resist an attacking army while retreating to the Rhine frightened the populace. Local residents interpreted the exercises as evidence that the United States would surrender Bavaria in the event of war.99

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In addition to the spread of war rumors, military government officials also worried about German attitudes towards the declining relationship between the occupying powers. The crisis over Berlin represented a particular point of concern for MGOs. Warnings from German officials, such as the Landrat of Freising, made it clear that events in Berlin caused “uneasiness among the people” who thought that “another war would be the worst disaster.” \(^\text{100}\) In Munich the city police described significant pro-Western sentiment among the population. The population followed events in Berlin with “very great interest” and hoped that “the political and economic strength of the US will enable the Western Powers to stop the powerful Russian drive for expansion.” \(^\text{101}\) Negotiations with the Soviets were “generally appreciated” but Munich residents, according to the police, also worried that any concessions to the Russians would come “at the cost of the German people.” \(^\text{102}\) As with the spread of war rumors, fear of abandonment by the Western Allies, at least as interpreted by the Americans, comprised a key aspect of the Bavarian attitude towards the Cold War.

American officials also worried that this fear of abandonment would benefit communists in Bavaria, especially among those segments of the population still suffering from postwar conditions. William Corbett warned that a “great deal” of unrest existed among refugees and expellees in Miesbach due to poor living conditions and a lack of work. As a result, the local KPD had succeeded in fomenting “dissatisfaction” with the Bavarian government and the actions of the Western Allies. Refugees supposedly welcomed a Russian invasion and claimed that the


\(^{101}\) “Weekly Report for the Period from 22\textsuperscript{nd} to 28\textsuperscript{th} July 1948,” 31 July 48, Police Presidium Munich, Chief of Schutzmannschaft, Pg. 15, Police Activity Reports 1947-1949 Folder, Box 416, 669 (A1): Gen. Rec., 45-49, LSO Munich, RG 260, NARA.

Bürgermeister would “be the first to hang.”\textsuperscript{103} Similarly, the sudden proliferation of pamphlets by the so-called Society for Prevention of World War III in late 1948 and early 1949 worried military government officials. Donald Shea, the director of OMGB’s Intelligence Division, requested that MGOs offer their thoughts on the pamphlets, including if they consider the literature “communistic” or “detrimental to the Occupation.” From Miesbach MGO Corbett reported that the pamphlets “indirectly…lean to Communism” and “undermine confidence in the present leadership.” As a result, it would be dangerous if the pamphlets got into Bavarian hands.\textsuperscript{104} The MGO in Wolfstein, First Lieutenant Robert Rivet, agreed with Corbett. The pamphlets did attempt “to promote communism” and were “definitely detrimental to the occupation.”\textsuperscript{105}

Therefore, one of the most pressing concerns about the early Cold War for American officials at the local level in Bavaria was the impact that it would have on the local populace. Fear of renewed war and the prospect of increased communist influence seethed through the Bavarian society. MGOs tried to counteract such anxiety by demonstrating US commitment to the reconstruction and democratization of Germany, particularly by touting the Marshall Plan. However, it was not until the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization that Bavarian public opinion calmed down. According to many MGOs the Atlantic Pact represented, in the eyes of many Germans, a clear commitment to defend Europe and was therefore met with “great

\textsuperscript{103} “Communism,” 21 Oct 48, to OMGB, Attn: Intelligence Division, from William R. Corbett, Miscellaneous Correspondence 1948 Folder, Box 377, 666 (A1): Gen. Rec., 46-49, LSO Miesbach, RG 260, NARA.
relief” by the population. Similarly, Riley Gilley, the MGO for Landkreis Cham, reported that the local populace viewed the pact as “the most formidable block to avert war.” In Kötzing locals, according to MGO Charles Pearce, believed that the pact had neutralized the Soviet threat to Western Europe and that they had no reason to fear a “reign of terror” in Bavaria.

American MGOs, then, had to face an increasingly fearful Bavarian populace as tensions escalated between the United States and the Soviet Union. After six years of war, the experience of aerial bombardment, and living amidst the reality of total defeat, Germans were understandably wary of a new conflict. In addition, many quickly understood that they would have the most to lose in the event of war, as fighting armies would once again ravage Bavaria. Military government officials noted the rising unease of the local populace, but there was little they could do about it. Far from the halls of power, they observed the early Cold War from the cities and rural communities of Bavaria and continued their efforts at the reconstruction and democratization of postwar Germany.

Beyond the prevalence of war rumors and concern about the views of the German public, the emerging Cold War remained relatively remote for most American officials in Bavaria. With a few exceptions, however, these MGOs did experience elements of the American-Soviet rivalry. For example, OMGUS tasked military government officers with overseeing the implementation of periodic bans on the sale and distribution of Soviet-authorized publications in the American zone. On May 20, 1948, OMGUS temporarily shut off the flow of newspapers, books, magazine,
pamphlets, and other literature produced in the Soviet zone of occupation. The move was a response to Soviet discrimination against Western publications. Enforcement lay with German officials, but MGOs would observe the process and report any violations to higher headquarters. This initial ban was short-lived. On June 4 OMGUS revoked the prohibition after Soviet authorities gave “assurances” that they would ensure the “free exchange of publications” between the zones. However, the ban was reinstated at the end of September as the crisis over Berlin dragged into its fourth month.

American officials also experienced the Cold War through local efforts to assist the residents of West Berlin during the Berlin Blockade. By late July 1948, MGOs in the Augsburg area had made several requests about how to send food to Berlin at the request of the local populace. Donald Root, the area commander, expressed his satisfaction at “the interest shown by the people” of the nearby communities and encouraged the donation of rational coupons and money to assist the beleaguered Berliners. In Landkreis Kempten the local MGO, Joseph Montgomery, assisted local Germans and Air Force officers in the organization of a “Help Berlin” week from November 8 through 14 to provide aid to Berlin children. During the week, all deer killed in the community were turned over the German Youth Activities for shipment to Berlin. Additionally, a benefit dance raised DM 2,130 for relief, while nearby Kaufbeuren Air

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112 “Food for Berlin,” 29 July 48, Area Augsburg, to All Offices, from Donald Root, Correspondence Outgoing 1948 Folder, 860 (A1): General Records, 1947-1949, Box 1534, LSO Augsburg, RG 260, NARA.
Base donated another DM 2,300. Approximately 900 pounds of food and clothing was collected from the local populace and ten tons of potatoes purchased for shipment to the city.\footnote{“GYA-MG ‘Help Berlin’ Benefit Stadt Kempten,” 29 Nov 48, to Area Commander, Area Kaufbeuren, FOD, from Joseph Montgomery, Letters Branch G Folder, Box 322, 652 (A1): Administrative Correspondence with Other OMGUS Units, HQ Records, Records of the FOD, RG 260, NARA.}

The two most significant ways in which American officials in Bavaria interacted with the Cold War, however, were the return of German prisoners of war from the USSR and escalating border incidents along the boundary with both the Soviet Zone and Czechoslovakia. German POWs had slowly returned over the first two years of the occupation, often bearing horrific stories of their treatment at the hands of their Soviet captors. Such stories played a key role in fomenting early anti-communism amongst the Bavarian populace. As tensions between the former allies escalated, however, military government interest in their stories spiked. Returning prisoners often reported to the local military government office to acquire the papers (ration cards, residence permits, etc.) necessary to live in postwar Bavaria. At these meetings MGOs and their German assistants sometimes interviewed the POWs on their experiences in the Soviet Union. During the summer of 1948 reports of these interviews suddenly took up significant space in the weekly reporting of several local offices. These reports emphasized the horrific treatment of German POWs in Soviet camps, highlighting terrible living conditions, wretched food, and hard labor. In the context of the early Cold War, here were supposedly concrete examples of Soviet malevolence that could be used to rally opposition to communism in postwar Germany.

Military government offices throughout Bavaria made these reports, but two of the most committed offices were Riedenburg and Kelheim, both located near Regensburg. Beginning in early July both offices spent weeks forwarding the experiences of numerous German prisoners as they arrived at their homes. One POW returning to Riedenburg, for example, was captured in
1944 and confined near the Ural Mountains with some 15,000 to 17,000 other prisoners. Within the first six months, thousands had succumbed to malnutrition, illness, and the cold, yet the Soviets still forced the prisoners to work at blast furnaces around the clock.\textsuperscript{114} In Kelheim returning German soldier Johann Meier, captured in 1943 near Kiev, reported that he had worked for years in a factory producing cement. The German prisoners had to sleep on boards, were given just one blanket for three men, and were infested with lice. Meier himself lost thirty-five pounds due to malnutrition over the course of his imprisonment.\textsuperscript{115} Martin Kohlmann returned to Kelheim on August 7 and described his time in two separate Soviet camps. The first camp, located near Riga, held 12,000 prisoners even though the normal capacity was just 4,000. In 1946 Kohlmann was transferred to a second camp near Katiewka to work in a coal mine. The camp held 1,500 Germans when he arrived but approximately 1,100 had died since then. According to Kohlmann, most died due to malnutrition; however, the camp commandant also ordered POWs beaten to death when they collapsed. Similarly, Albert Hoffmann claimed that at the coal mine he was sent to each prisoner had to dig six tons of coal per day and that Russian guards beat any prisoner that did not accomplish their daily quota. As a result, up to one hundred POWs died per day at the worst part of his imprisonment.\textsuperscript{116}

The experiences of these former prisoners were not unique in the reports of military government offices. Reports throughout Bavaria emphasized the horrific treatment of German POWs at the hands of the Soviets, whether it was horrific living conditions, the proliferation of

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disease, malnutrition, or abuse by Soviet soldiers. These stories all carried a common theme: the malvolence of the Soviet Union. The proliferation of these reports during the summer of 1948 offers a few insights into how the early Cold War operated in postwar Bavaria. First, it shows that the Americans in military government possessed interest in the experiences of POWs, most likely as evidence of Soviet misdeeds and to use as part of the American anti-communist campaign. Second, it also demonstrates how Bavarians still shaped American attitudes about the USSR. During the first two years of the occupation, the German populace and government officials embraced a more ardent anti-communist line than the United States. Even now, as Americans and military government embraced the Cold War, some German employees of military government used the experiences of former prisoners to push a narrative of suspicion towards the Soviet Union. German employees conducted many of the interviews and composed many of the reports that emphasized Russian malevolence. By choosing to emphasize the horrific experiences of German POWs, these employees were continuing the pattern set during the first two years of the occupation: Bavarians pushing their Americans overseers to take a harder line against communism.

Beyond looking for examples of Russian malevolence, the return of POWs also touched the Cold War in another way, namely concern that returning prisoners were indoctrinated with communist ideology. This fear emerged from reports that the Soviet authorities forced German POWs to attend political courses during their imprisonment. Often the classes were taught by German collaborators, such commanding officers, or members of Russian intelligence. The courses talked “disdainfully” about Americans and emphasized the success of Soviet communism. In Munich it “[could not] be denied” that many returning POWs made pro-Soviet

comments due to their “corresponding training.” There was some concern that such comments would undermine the American occupation or popular support for the Bavarian government. Yet it was largely accepted that the prisoners returning to Munich “only plead for the communist idea because they fear the power of Russia.” Military government offices in other regions of Bavaria also reported reluctance from former prisoners to spread the Soviet line. Most had shown little “Communist minded attitude” and believed that any German with communist sympathies would be disabused of those ideas if they worked in the Soviet Union for a month. As a result, concern about the impact of communist-trained POWs remained minimal. The return of German prisoners, then, was one way in which the early Cold War did reach American military government officials, even though its impact was limited.

Heightened tensions along the borders with both the Soviet zone and Czechoslovakia represented the final way in which MGOs experienced the Cold War. Border tensions had existed since the beginning of the occupation; American officials within OMGUS, for example, often complained that Soviet authorities did little to stem the flow of refugees and expellees arriving in the U.S. zone of occupation. However, as Cold War tensions escalated between the former allies, clashes at the border became more common. For military government officials in border Landkreise these incidents, as well as dealing with civilians illegally crossing the border


to flee the Soviets, were the most concrete way American officials at the local level interacted with the Cold War.

Border tensions increased noticeably during late 1947 and early 1948, even before the Berlin Blockade solidified the split between the United States and the Soviet Union. On December 5, 1947, First Lieutenant Paul Wakeman, the Public Safety Office in Landkreis Wolfstein, reported that a new Russian garrison at Schwarzenberg, Austria, had essentially closed the border. The lone Soviet officer ordered that only passes bearing Soviet approval be accepted at the border checkpoint.\(^{120}\) Similar complaints emerged in July 1948 during the early weeks of the Berlin crisis. After the start of the blockade Soviet authorities would not recognize round trip interzonal passes issued in the American, British, or French zones for travel to West Berlin. Instead, Russian officials insisted that all individuals traveling through the Soviet zone possess a travel pass approved by Soviet military government. OMGB, however, ordered its officials not to comply with Soviet demands, citing quadripartite agreements. Instead, they were to keep issuing interzonal passes while warning individuals that they may experience difficulties crossing the border.\(^{121}\)

The Cold War at the border, however, was not limited to administrative disputes between American and Soviet authorities. A series of escalating clashes at the border between American, German, and Soviet forces provided concrete evidence of the deteriorating relationship between the former allies. On August 5, 1948, for example, Russian soldiers temporarily detained two military government officials for briefly crossing into the Soviet zone of occupation. On the day in question First Lieutenant Sherman Turner, MGO of Bad Kissingen, and Rowland Myers of the

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\(^{120}\) "Closing of Border by Russian Authorities," 5 Dec 47, LSO Wolfstein, to Public Safety Field Supervision Team D, RB Niederbayern-Oberpfalz, from 1st Lt. Paul Wakeman, Pg. 1, Public Safety Reports Folder, Box 969, 754 (A1): Gen. Rec., 45-49, LSO Wolfstein, RG 260, NARA.

\(^{121}\) Memorandum, 20 July 48, to All Office, Regensburg Area, from Allen Willis, Miscellaneous Correspondence Folder, Box 828, 734 (A1): Gen. Rec., 48-49, LSO Regensburg, RG 260, NARA.
Nürnberg office approached the border crossing near the town of Eußenhausen in Landkreis Mellrichstadt during a routine inspection. Turner and Myers exited their car inside the U.S. zone and walked roughly twenty-five meters into the Russian zone. At that point, the two Russian soldiers surprised the American officials, searched them for weapons, and led them to the town of Meiningen.\textsuperscript{122} The incident bothered American officials, but there was little they could do about it, especially since Turner and Myers had passed two clear signs that marked the border. Other incidents drew more concern, particularly when it was Czechs, Germans, or Soviets violating the border of the American zone. On October 20, 1949, two Czech policemen illegally crossed in to Landkreis Wolfstein and were spotted approximately two and a half kilometers inside Bavaria. Two German policemen approached the Czechs and ordered them to surrender. One complied and was jailed in the town of Freyung. The other Czech, however, fled towards the border, assaulted the pursuing German officers, and fired a warning shot before crossing back into Czechoslovakia.\textsuperscript{123}

As the Berlin crisis dragged on into 1949 and the Western zones moved towards the creation of the Federal Republic, reports of Soviet activity along the borders grew more antagonistic. On February 17, 1949, a railroad engine guarded by two Russians and six East German border policemen entered Bavaria and stole thirty-one damaged freight cars near the town of Burggrub in Landkreis Kronach. According to MGO Lynn Keck, the freight cars were located approximately 150 meters inside the U.S. zone when stolen by the Russians. Additionally, the Soviets then ordered the removal of 120 meters of track inside their zone,

\textsuperscript{122} “Incident Report (Serious),” 9 Aug 48, from Vincent Schuster, FOD Incidents File Folder, Box 324, 652 (A1): Admin. Corres. w/ Other OMGUS Units, HQ Rec., Rec. of FOD, RG 260, NARA.
thereby severing that railroad link between the two zones of occupation.\textsuperscript{124} Around the same time Edward Garrison, the MGO of Regensburg, was threatened by Soviet soldiers during a visit to the border crossing at Kappel. Accusing Garrison of taking pictures of them, four Russians crossed into the U.S. zone, threatened the American official with loaded pistols, and ordered him to accompany them across the border. The whole incident lasted for approximately thirty minutes before the Soviets backed down and Garrison resumed his journey.\textsuperscript{125} For American officials far away from the major center of power, such increased antagonism along the border represented one of the few ways in which they interacted directly with the emerging Cold War.

Additionally, military government reports from throughout Bavaria warned of an increasingly militarized border. Russians and Czechs, according to MGOs, were fortifying the border with machine guns, mines, and road blocks. In late March 1949, for example, Riley Gilley reported from \textit{Landkreis} Cham that Czech soldiers were closing border crossing points and laying mines along the border. A few weeks later Gilley again warned that Czech soldiers cut down trees and erected a barricade at a border crossing near the Bavarian town of Furth im Wald. The testimony of a fleeing refugee seemingly confirmed reports that the Czechs and Soviets blocked all paths leading into Bavaria with felled trees and barbed wire.\textsuperscript{126} Then in late April Bavarian border police reported a new camouflaged machine gun nest near the Hof border.

\textsuperscript{125} Memo, 28 Feb 49, to FOD, from Public Safety Branch, Border Control Folder, Box 312, 651 (A1): Gen. Corres. & Other Rec., 49, HQ Rec., Rec. of FOD, RG 260, NARA.
crossing, which brought the total up to eight nests.\textsuperscript{127} American officials did not express any significant alarm at the increased militarization of the border. Instead, such reports largely served as a concrete reminder of the rapidly deteriorating relations between the former wartime allies. Minefields, barricades, and machine gun nests made it clear that the Cold War was in full swing, at least along the borders of Bavaria.

The border provided another way for American military government officials to interact with the Cold War: through so-called “illegal border crossers” fleeing the Soviet zone of Germany or other countries in Eastern Europe. These border crossers and refugees fulfilled much the same purpose as returning German prisoners of war, namely by providing evidence of Soviet malevolence in the regions under the control of the Red Army. Usually MGOs reported such border crossers in general terms. First Lieutenant Rivet, for example, explained why twelve Czechs and twenty-four Germans illegally crossed the Bavarian border in October 1948. According to the Czechs, “The pressure from the Communist party became too strong. All persons refusing to join the Communist party are apt to [lose] their job or even their liberty.” Meanwhile, the Germans fleeing the Soviet zone of occupation did so to avoid deportation to the uranium mines in Saxony.\textsuperscript{128} Such explanations for crossing the Bavarian border became so commonplace that they were soon called the “typical reasons.”\textsuperscript{129}

Other times, however, military government officials highlighted the experiences of individual refugees, as when Captain George Jacobson of Dachau reported the experience of one Siegried Sobieski, who was found passed out on the streets of Dachau in late March 1948. Frau

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\textsuperscript{127} TWX, 27 April 49, to FOD, OMGB, from Branch B, Border Control Folder, Box 312, 651 (A1): Gen. Corres. & Other Rec., 49, HQ Rec., Rec. of FOD, RG 260, NARA.  \\
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Sobieski’s husband, Thaddeus Sobieski, had worked as an interpreter for Russian military government in Silesia for several years after the war. Both husband and wife were arrested in November 1947 for allegedly providing information to Western intelligence agencies. Her husband was executed in the following February as Soviet soldiers forced Frau Sobieski to watch. In her interview with American military government Sobieski recounted numerous horrors visited upon her during her imprisonment, which Captain Jacobson reported in detail to OMGB. According to Sobieski five to six Soviet soldiers raped her nearly every day of her imprisonment. They also allegedly killed her seven-year-old niece in front of her before she finally escaped. Captain Jacobson whole heartedly believed Sobieski. Writing to OMGB he explained, “The undersigned frankly believes that if there is no truth to these statement then Frau SOBIESKI is the greatest actress the world has ever seen.”

Whether the experiences of Frau Sobieski and other border crossers were true was almost beside the point. Their stories of communist mistreatment and malevolence provided evidence to counter the KPD message that conditions in the Soviet zone were superior to those in Bavaria. Stories of mistreatment at the hands of Russian soldiers, of forced labor, or of political discrimination helped local MGOs counter communist propaganda. Additionally, dealing with border crossers and others fleeing Eastern Europe represented one of the few direct interactions most military government officials had with the emerging Cold War. While much of the Cold War occurred at the highest levels of policy, collecting and reporting the experiences of these refugees, along with addressing growing border tensions and the return of German POWs, allowed some MGOs to more actively participate in the new conflict between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union.

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Even then the Cold War remained remote for most military government officials in Bavaria. The deliberations at Bonn for the creation of a West German government, for example, were of little concern to local MGOS. One of the most momentous events of the Cold War was largely absent for the reports of military government detachments until the spring of 1949. Beginning in April 1949, however, officials within OMGB significantly expanded their reporting on the activities in Bonn. According to Donald Shea, the director of OMGB’s Intelligence Division, most the Bavarian press appeared “to favor a federal West German republic.” In addition, military government officials tracked growing Bavarian frustration with the social democrats over their resistance to a weak federal government and limits to “popular sovereignty.” There was some concern that the SPD could torpedo the Bonn negotiations and that their failure “would be considered a victory of Moscow.” Such reports, however, were the limit of American interaction with the work of the parliamentary council in Bavaria. This is not to say that MGOS were unaware of the constituent assembly at Bonn; far from it. Yet the negotiations for a West German constitution remained a remote event for most military government officials in OMGB. At the lowest levels of military government, far from the policymakers of Berlin, Washington, or London, these Americans had little reason to interact with this major event of the early Cold War.

Over the last two years of the occupation, then, rising tensions between the former allies took a more prominent place in the responsibilities of American MGOS in Bavaria. Mirroring the transformation that took place among OMGUS elites like General Clay, military government

officials in OMGB adopted a harsher line towards Bavarian communists. Supported by the German officials and the populace, an overt campaign of anti-communism took place in the US-occupied Land. Even then, however, the early Cold War remained a remote phenomenon for many American officials. The Bavarian KPD, despite warnings to the contrary, was a weak political party and MGOs recognized this reality even as they embarked on an anti-communist campaign. Additionally, the major events of the Cold War, such as the Berlin Blockade, had little direct impact on American officials in Bavaria. Instead, the Cold War manifested through a variety of minor events. Persistent rumors of war among the Bavarian population, for example, highlighted the rising tensions between East and West. The return of German POWs from Soviet camps and the experiences of refugees escaping communist rule in Eastern Europe represented another avenue by which MGOs interacted with the early Cold War. Stories of Soviet depravity and mistreatment circulated in reports from military government detachments, cited as evidence of Russian malevolence and aggression. Finally, incidents along the borders with the Soviet zone and Czechoslovakia offered another opportunity for some MGOs to participate in the rising tensions between the former allies. Nevertheless, the Cold War was a remote phenomenon for most American officials in OMGB. Located in small local offices, they possessed few, if any, opportunities to interact with the larger framework of the emerging Cold War.

Conclusion

For the many American military government officials in Bavaria the early Cold War was a remote development, one that was acted out in the halls of power in Moscow, Washington, London, and Berlin, but not in the small offices of military government detachments. Ensconced in their cities, towns, and Landkreise, the American-Soviet drama, while certainly important in the broader context, possessed limited influence on the lowest levels of Bavarian military
government. Compared to the pressing tasks of feeding a starving population, rebuilding Bavarian cities, restarting economic life, and overseeing a campaign of democratization, the relatively remote events of the early Cold War seemed far away and less important. Additionally, MGOs at the bottom of the military government hierarchy simply possessed minimal influence on the course of events that led to the Cold War, further contributing to the remoteness of the emerging struggle.

During the first two years of the occupation, the Cold War, which many civilian policymakers in Washington and London had already embraced, was largely nonexistent in Bavaria. Reflecting the attitude of their OMGUS superiors, who still clung to the wartime alliance and hoped for an agreement with their Soviet counterparts, MGOs in Bavaria cared little about communism or any Soviet threat that civilians in the Department of State perceived. The Bavarian populace, wracked by hunger and living amidst ruins, cared little for politics and widespread apathy existed. When Germans did participate in party politics or vote, it was quickly clear that the Bavarian KPD was a weak party, even in its supposed strongholds. As a result, American officials ambivalently tolerated the KPD and in some cases cautiously admired for its long track record of anti-Nazism. The potential return of ex-Nazis and the persistence of “Nazi methods” drew considerably more concern in the conservative Land, especially fears that former Nazis could take over the center-right Christian Social Union or far-right parties like the Bayernpartei. Discrimination against Bavarian communists did occur from 1945 through 1947, but there was not yet a coordinated campaign against the KPD from the Americans. The Bavarians themselves, both officials and the general populace, were more ardently anti-communist than their American occupiers at this point in the occupation. The rising tensions
between the former allies identified by civilian policymakers, therefore, had a minimal impact on the Bavarian occupation during the first two postwar years.

The emergence of the Cold War during the second half of the military occupation, however, was difficult to ignore. General Lucius Clay and other high-level officials in OMGUS quickly transformed from defenders of the American-Soviet relationship to the most zealous cold warriors of all. Bavarian MGOs mirrored this changing attitude and embarked on a campaign of overt anti-communism. American officials, with German assistance, harassed communists, openly favored the non-communist parties, and spread anti-communist propaganda. Citing increased KPD antagonism, many MGOs felt the campaign justified. At the same time, however, these military government officials challenged the dominance of the Cold War paradigm on policy in Germany. These officials recognized, and consistently reported, the continued weakness of the KPD in Bavaria. The real worry was not a communist takeover, but the KPD subverting American goals and civilian morale. Even as American officials both expressed more concern about Bavarian communists and questioned aspects of American policy, the rising tensions between East and West remained a remote phenomenon. MGOs possessed few opportunities to directly interact with the early Cold War. Most of the major events of the Cold War, such as the Berlin Blockade, occurred far away from the small towns and villages of Bavaria. As a result, the most prominent sign of rising tensions was the proliferation of war rumors and a general sense of dread among the Bavarian populace. American officials in Bavaria participated in the early Cold War in few minor ways. For example, MGOs interacted with returning German prisoners of war and refugees escaping communist rule in Eastern Europe. Americans highlighted their stories of Soviet brutality and oppression as evidence of Russian
malevolence. Additionally, military government officials in border Landkreise dealt with border incidents as relations between the former allies deteriorated from 1947 to 1949.

The early Cold War was undoubtedly more important during the last two years of the military occupation; it would have been impossible to ignore its emergence. However, the Cold War remained remote for most American officials in Bavaria. Working in small Bavarian communities, the events of Berlin, Moscow, or London appeared far away. These military government bureaucrats also possessed limited agency in the struggle. They interacted with the new conflict in a few minor ways, but could not fundamentally alter the course of relations between the wartime allies. Instead, MGOs focused their attention on more practical issues, first feeding the population and restarting economic activity, then spreading democratic values. The emergence of the Cold War was simply a process far beyond the limited scope of their offices.
In the seventy-plus years since the creation of the Federal Republic of Germany, the undeniable success of the democratic experiment that originated in Bonn shapes our view of the past. The emphasis on the end result makes the occupation look like a pre-determined success, as if a democratized West Germany was destined to emerge from the horrors of the Second World War and then be unified after the conclusion of the Cold War. This perspective can obscure the challenges that accompanied the birth and maturation of the Federal Republic. It also produces a focus on the major policy decisions and important policymakers who helped create a democratic West Germany, from Germans like Konrad Adenauer and Ludwig Erhard to Americans like General Lucius Clay. Such a focus makes sense; after all, Adenauer, Erhard, Clay, and other policymakers were some of the most important individuals in the successful creation of West Germany. They also represented some of the most important institutions in postwar Germany, such as the Christian Democratic Union and the American Office of Military Government. Yet this also obscures the actions of other individuals. In the case of OMGUS, Clay was the dominant figure, but low level bureaucrats and officials also played a significant role by shaping the implementation of the policy derived by American, British, French, and German policymakers. These military government officers faced the challenge of reconciling policy directives with the major crises of postwar Germany, the proscribed and un-proscribed limits on their authority, and a changing international political situation. One cannot adequately understand American policy towards Germany from 1945 through 1949 without examining how those tasked with implementing it put that policy into action.

In the case of the U.S. Army’s occupation of Germany, this means a focus on the military government officials who staffed the Land and Kreis offices of the American military
government bureaucracy. The occupation of Bavaria offers one opportunity to explore such a bottom-up institutional history. Bavaria, the largest Land of the American occupation zone, was in many ways both unique and representative of the challenges facing the U.S. occupation. The Land contained major industrial centers and was often the first stop for ethnic Germans expelled from Eastern Europe and other refugees entering West Germany. It was also predominantly agricultural, which made it overwhelmingly important to feeding not just the American zone, but all Western Germany. Conservatives dominated Bavarian society, complicating and shaping attempts at democratization. Finally, Bavaria bordered Soviet-controlled territory, a reality that grew in importance with the onset of the Cold War. Through the challenges of occupying postwar Bavaria and the American response to such difficulties, however, one can see how MGOs interacted with and implemented American policy in Germany.

This dissertation argued that American officials interacted with official policy in a variety of ways. Early in the occupation, many MGOs quickly recognized the major problems plaguing Bavaria and tried to mitigate the effects early American policy towards Germany, which was based on the assumption of collective German guilt and was inherently deconstructive. Military government officials worked to feed the Bavarian populace and promoted early forms of economic reconstruction. As the occupation progressed, however, MGOs took fewer steps to push back against official policy, in large part because civilian and military policymakers had finally changed policy and embraced the reconstruction of West Germany. Occupation officials in Bavaria now largely worked within the confines of policy, but still adapted those policies to meet the requirements of the Land. This attitude emerged somewhat in the democratization program, but truly developed during the rising tide of anticommunism. For example, MGOs in Bavaria towed the OMGUS anti-Soviet line, but in largely conservative Bavaria they remained
more concerned about the revival of far-right politics. In the end, therefore, Bavarian military
government carried out a changing relationship with U.S. policy, first challenging its broad
outlines and then implementing new policy based on the somewhat unique context of Bavaria.

To limit the effects of U.S. policy in the first half of the occupation, military government
officials possessed limited options. Most obviously, American policy and their location within
the institutional hierarchy of military government acted as a constraint on MGO action. Located
largely in the lowest levels of OMGB/OMGUS, these officials could not directly challenge
American policy, no matter how sympathetic they were towards the Bavarian populace. Beyond
that, however, an institutional cultural preference for indirect means of governance further
constrained the avenues of intervention open to MGOs. Years of prewar military planning for the
next occupation and the Army’s built-in dislike for nonmilitary tasks produced an approach to
military government that emphasized indirect rule and returning authority to local, regional, and
national officials as rapidly as possible in Germany. This approach meant the Army did not have
to administer every detail of the occupation, but it also limited the means available to address the
major crises that characterized postwar Bavaria. Unwilling to intervene directly, MGOs relied on
the actions of their Bavarian counterparts, a process that often produced tensions and conflict
over the direction of the occupation.

The quest to feed both Bavarians and the population of the western zones demonstrated
both the willingness to challenge American policy by MGOs in Bavaria and the constraints on
their ability to do so. Local MGOs grew increasingly sympathetic to the plight of the civilians
living in their Landkreise. They expressed alarm at the prospect of widespread starvation and
frustration with the early American policy that opposed economic reconstruction. Living
amongst a people suffering from food shortages, economic disaster, and ruined housing, many
military government officials, like Kenneth Ingwalson, worked to mitigate the effects of American policy and to feed the Bavarian populace. Their methods, however, were quite limited. Committed to turning over responsibility to Bavarian officials as rapidly as possible, MGOs rarely intervened directly to address the food crisis. Instead, they preferred indirect methods, such as observing and reporting on the food situation from their detachment offices. Many also took personal actions to alleviate the suffering of local Bavarians, such as providing food to German girlfriends or children and participating in the informal economy, which included the black market. High-level American officials may have decried the black market as a diversion of goods away from the formal economy and issued orders against participation in this informal economy, but individual Americans, both regular soldiers and MGOs, eagerly participated. They often possessed ulterior motives such as personal enrichment, but many also saw it as a means to alleviate the suffering of some Bavarians.

American policy towards Germany changed by 1947, as civilian officials embraced German reconstruction as a step towards European recovery and a valuable tool in the emerging Cold War. Despite the change in policy, notable limitations remained on military government actions. The Army’s institutional preference for turning over authority to local officials as rapidly as possible continued. MGOs still avoided direct intervention in the Bavarian economy, instead promoting German responsibility for solving the persistent food shortages. When Americans did intervene more directly, it usually produced a backlash from Bavarians. Among American and German officials there was significant competition to define the scope and severity of the food crisis. American military government representatives believed the crisis so severe that Bavaria had to make significant contributions through food exports. Bavarian officials, on the other hand, pushed back and insisted that too much was asked of Bavaria while
other Länder did not pull their own wait. Farmers also resented delivery quotas and low official prices, which limited their purchasing power. As a result, many Bavarian farmers resisted both indirect and direct American involvement by withholding food deliveries and participating in the black market. Frustrated with the seemingly endless crises, Bavarian officials and farmers possessed their own views on the severity of the food shortages and challenged American conceptions of the problems. This further limited American actions in Bavaria, even though the biggest inhibition towards reconstruction, American policy, had been removed. No matter how sympathetic to the plight of Bavarian civilians, MGOs could only do so to address the food crises that plagued Germany throughout the occupation.

Economic reconstruction also represented an arena where military government officials sought the mitigation of American policy but possessed limited means to do so in Bavaria. The same general sense of sympathy drove MGOs towards economic reconstruction, yet many obstacles stood in the way. Much like the response to the food crisis, American policy and the location of MGOs within the OMGB hierarchy represented the most significant obstacle. No matter how sympathetic to the plight of Bavarians, military government officials could take only a handful of tentative steps towards reconstruction. Military government, and the Army more broadly, accepted economic reconstruction as a matter of military necessity. As a result, MGOs took steps to restart basic economic life but avoided any actions that could be interpreted as full-blown reconstruction. For example, they reopened businesses to serve the needs of the occupation army, employing Bavarians to repair American trucks or produce needed goods like telephones or beer. Yet even that limited recovery was constrained by the demands of the occupying forces. Army demands for Bavarian production and labor often diverted valuable resources away from the regional economy at a time when they were badly needed. Additionally,
the continued desire to turn responsibility over the German officials as rapidly as possible restrained the actions of MGOs, while a series of interrelated challenges – labor shortages, the housing crisis, and the influx of ethnic Germans – further limited the impact of military government. Beginning in 1947 U.S. policy towards German recovery changed, yet the constraints on low-level military government remained. American officials were largely confined to indirect methods of promoting economic reconstruction. They reported problems, offered moral encouragement, encouraged German businessmen, and generally sounded a positive message. Perhaps more than anything else, however, economic reconstruction highlighted the limits on American military government, particularly at the lowest levels of the military government hierarchy. Constrained by both external forces and internal decisions, MGOs could do little to promote economic recovery and implement American policy.

While military government officials sought the mitigation of American policy regarding the food crises and economic reconstruction, they largely worked within the confines of official policy when it came to democratization and the early Cold War. Democratization and reorientation represented the most direct method of military government involvement in Bavaria. In one major way MGOs challenged U.S. policy regarding democratization. Early in the occupation American officials and GIs both undermined the official policy of nonfraternization, which was supposed to limit contact between occupying forces and the German populace. This policy, however, came crashing down as Americans largely ignored the order and began relationships with large numbers of Bavarians, particularly women and children. Besides that challenge to American policy, MGOs largely worked within the structures of official policy regarding democratization. Military government detachments actively participated in denazification early on and even retained influence over the program after Germans took control.
Most significantly, American officials also participated in democratization efforts targeted at several different segments of the Bavarian population. Youth programs were the first major arena of reorientation. German Youth Activities organized youth groups, sporting events, discussion groups, youth centers, and other activities for Bavarian children. Often coordinated by Army or military government officials, GYA viewed Bavarian youth as fundamentally naïve and in need of American instruction in the ways of modern democracy. OMGB also pressed for full-scale reforms to the Bavarian education system. Hoping to make the system more “democratic,” military government officials pushed for free school tuition, free books, and changes to the two-track system. These youth programs ultimately served as a testing ground for the general democratization campaign. It was here that MGOs developed the methods and language they would apply towards the Bavarian populace as a whole. Finally, MGOs embarked on a general campaign of reorientation during the last year-and-a-half of the occupation. Through the *Amerika Häuser* and town hall meeting programs OMGB officials promoted the adoption of “modern” American practices by the “backwards” Bavarians.

Yet even with democratization limits existed on military government. Low-level officials did not want to come across as imposing American practices. Instead, MGOs spent considerable time trying to convince Bavarians of the superiority of the U.S. system. Even when they ran into opposition, military government officials resisted using force to impose American ideas. Many officials recognized the inherent tension between a fundamentally undemocratic military occupation and attempts to democratize Bavarian society. Additionally, Bavarian resistance to American-led reorientation also limited the impact of military government. Perhaps most notably, Bavarians of all stripes voiced major opposition to American plans for school reform. Politicians, bureaucrats, priests, professionals, and even some workers rallied to defend the
traditional education system for American involvement. By dragging their heels German officials stalled OMGB’s major reform effort. Ultimately the changes mandated by military government were relatively minor and fitted into the postwar pattern of German elites slowly opening society to more democratic participation. Bavarians also co-opted American language of democratization to promote their own agenda, whether it was to gain American support or to criticize military government action as undemocratic. Therefore, even in the arena of democratization, where military government took its most direct role, notable limits of military government existed. The actions of MGOs aided democratization to an extent. Yet ultimately success rested with the Bavarian officials and population that embraced democracy after years of Nazi rule.

When it came to the early Cold War, military government officials generally followed official policy instead of challenging it as they had done when it came to the food and economic crises of the immediate postwar years. At times, however, MGOs adapted Cold War policy to meet the context of Bavaria. Nevertheless, the nature of the nascent conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union produced significant constraints on the actions of military government. For most American officials in Bavaria the Cold War was a remote phenomenon. Generals and major civilian policymakers decided key points in places like Berlin, Washington, and London. Ensconced in the rural Landkreise of Bavaria, the American-Soviet rivalry seemed far away and possessed little direct impact on the MGOs. Americans viewed communism as a threat and subsequently embarked on an anti-communist campaign, but they also recognized that the Bavarian KPD possessed minimal influence in the overwhelmingly conservative Land. As a result, the communist threat was minor. Instead, many American officials expressed concern
about the revival of far-right politics in Bavaria, even as OMGUS ratcheted up the anticommunism in 1948 and 1949.

MGOs ultimately interacted with the Cold War through a variety of limited methods: anti-communism, persistent war rumors, returning German prisoners of war, and escalating incidents along the border with the Soviet zone and Czechoslovakia. American officials did not necessarily make decisions to limit their involvement in the new Cold War. Instead, the fundamental structure of the American-Soviet clash placed the key developments well outside the purview of the average military government official. As a result, little could be done to challenge that remote structure, so MGOs worked within that framework, adapted policy to meet the Bavarian context, and did their part to fight the Cold War within the confines of military government.

American military government officials, then, sought to mitigate what many saw as the worst effects of US policy in Bavaria while working within the confines of those policies that they saw as vital to the occupation mission. Increasingly sympathetic to the postwar plight of Bavarian civilians, many MGOs viewed official policy that limited economic recovery as impractical from the earliest days of the occupation. However, their ability to challenge American policy was often limited, whether by institutional culture, a preference for indirect rule, or other problems that emerged in the Land. Nevertheless, the MGOs of OMGB worked within these limits as best they could to lessen the impact of negative U.S. policies during the first two years of the occupation. After official policy changed, most military government officials transitioned to working within the parameters of those policies but still experienced notable limitations. When it came to economic recovery, for example, MGOs openly promoted the goal of reconstruction but still refrained from direct intervention due to the continued
preference to transfer responsibility to Bavarian officials as rapidly as possible. In other policies, such as reorientation or anticommunism, Americans in Bavaria rarely challenged policy but instead reflected the priorities of higher level occupation officials.

What remained consistent throughout the occupation, however, were the limits on American military government. At times, they imposed such restraints willingly, as with their preference for indirect rule. Other times the constraints came from outside forces such as overall American policy or the basic framework of the early Cold War. Many worked within these limitations as best they could, driven by their sympathy for a Bavarian populace that lived through years of bombing and then faced a postwar world in which many lacked basic housing and faced the prospect of starvation. Sometimes American officials took steps towards direct intervention, but they remained largely committed to hand responsibility over to their German counterparts. Instead, MGOs served as a liaison between Bavarian officials and citizens and the larger military government bureaucracy, explaining the American position to bewildered or confused Bavarians. They implemented American policy as best they could based on their local conditions, reported on the progress of the occupation, and encouraged their German counterparts. Throughout the occupation low-level military government officials in Bavaria recognized the limits of their power. They knew that the success of the occupation rested on the actions of the occupied. American MGOs played a significant role in the success of the West Germany, but it was the commitment of nearly all segments of German society that made the Federal Republic a true success.

The experience of low-level military government officials implementing policy in Bavaria demonstrates the importance of possessing a well-rounded understanding of policy formation and implementation. Familiarity with the decision-making process among elite
officials is undoubtedly important. Such individuals wield the most power in institutions; they make key decisions, shape institutional culture, and interact with key individuals from other organizations. Therefore, it is understandable why most policy histories of the American occupation focus on this perspective. These histories have provided valuable analysis of the shifting goals behind U.S. policy towards Germany, who shaped that policy, and what impact those decisions had on American foreign affairs, particularly with the Soviet Union. Yet a focus on elites, even on an issue like policy where elites possess outsized influence, does not provide a complete picture. High-level officials can make important decisions and set the general outline of a policy approach, but it is up to the individuals at the bottom of the bureaucracy to implement those decisions.

For that reason, it is important to understand how low-level officials put policy into action. Non-elites do not possess as much power as their superiors, but they remain fundamentally important to the implementation of policy. They are, after all, the individuals charged with taking the broad directives of their superiors and putting them into action. As a result, they possess the ability, however limited, to challenge, influence, and shape official policy. From 1945 through 1949, MGOs in Bavaria used their positions to adapt some policies to the Bavarian context, while mitigating the effects of others. They were not always successful and often faced significant obstacles throughout the occupation. Regardless of success, studying the bureaucratic actions of low-level officials is important to understanding how policy was implemented. Policymakers cannot simply make decisions, order their decisions be carried out, and expect complete success. Institutions filter those decisions through numerous layers of bureaucracy before a low-level official is tasked with implementation. Therefore, it is vitally important to understand not just what policy decisions are made, but how those policies are put
into action. By doing so, one can gain a better understanding of how the lower levels of an institution shaped the outcome of certain decisions or how relatively minor officials challenged the dictates of their superior. This perspective provides better insight into the implementation of policy; it demonstrates the influence of institutions, the limits on the power of decision makers, and how policy is often shaped and influenced by those outside the bureaucratic elite.

Consideration of non-elite perspectives in policy histories is particularly important due to the limits of historical memory surrounding the American occupation of Germany. The success of the Federal Republic – during both the Cold War and as a unified country – warps historical memory. It is easy to look at the success of postwar Germany and conclude that the imposition of democracy can occur elsewhere with little trouble. After all, before American occupation Germany was decidedly undemocratic, militaristic, and expansionist. Under the Nazi regime, the country plunged the world into a global war that killed tens of millions. Seventy years later, however, the country serves as a bastion of liberal democracy in Central Europe. Clearly, the argument may go, the United States can, and should, impose democracy on recalcitrant countries or former enemies. During the early 2000s, many individuals in the George W. Bush administration, including the president, promoted such an argument regarding Afghanistan and Iraq. Undersecretary of State John Bolton, for example, promoted “a kind of de-Nazification” of Iraq after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and the Ba’ath Party.¹ President Bush promoted the Iraq-Germany comparisons in a March 2003 speech to the American Enterprise Institute:

Rebuilding Iraq will require a sustained commitment from many nations, including our own. We will remain in Iraq as long as necessary, and not a day more. America has made and kept this kind of commitment before – in the peace that followed World War II. After defeating enemies, we did not leave behind occupying armies; we left constitutions and parliaments. We did not leave behind permanent foes; we found new friends and allies.

There was a time when many said that the culture of Japan and Germany were incapable of sustaining democratic values. They were wrong. Some say the same of Iraq today. They, too, are mistaken. The nation of Iraq – with its proud heritage, abundant resources and skilled and education people – is fully capable of moving toward democracy and living in freedom.²

Based on this line of thinking, the ultimate success of Germany – and of Japan – proved that the United States could impose the values of democracy and liberalism on other countries around the globe. Democratization succeeded in Germany; therefore, it would succeed in Iraq.

Yet a critical study of history and the context of the postwar occupation demonstrates the limits of such thinking. Germany suffered total defeat; with its cities destroyed and the country occupied by millions of Allied troops – contrary to President Bush’s assertion – there was no questioning the country’s loss in war. Additionally, Germany possessed a modern industrial economy that would facilitate recovery after it was rebuilt. Despite the years of militarism and Nazi rule, the country also possessed considerable experience with democracy and the intellectual traditions of liberalism. Finally, the exigencies of the Cold War provided further incentive to accept democracy. These factors did not exist in either Iraq or Afghanistan, yet the expectation of easy success reigned supreme. Historical memory within the Bush administration and American society focused solely on the result, ignoring the laborious steps required to reach that result.

This failure of historical memory originated from a variety of avenues. Susan Carruthers’ The Good Occupation explored the process by which the postwar occupations were “made good.”³ After years of frustration with the occupations, Carruthers argued, Americans increasingly saw the occupation as a net positive. Visions of American altruism and

² Quoted in Carruthers, The Good Occupation, 2.
³ Ibid., 10.
domesticated bliss, in part a product of the rising Cold War, quickly outweighed the unpopular dimensions of occupation, such as disdain for Army life and homesickness after years overseas. This, Carruthers insisted, let American society ignore the widespread unpopularity and concern about the occupations that dominated the immediate postwar years. Yet historical memory also failed, in part, due to the focus of policy analysis on elite-centric methodologies. By focusing on the policy debates and decisions dominated by key decision makers such as General Lucius Clay or John J. McCloy, these methodologies relegate the actual implementation of policy to the backburner. Based on this approach, elites make policy decisions, communicate those decisions to the appropriate institutions, and those institutions implement the policy. This approach, however, often ignores how the lower levels of institutions, and the people who comprise them, implemented the decisions of their superiors. In the case of Bavaria, MGOS and other American officials in the Land faced a variety of challenges that complicated their attempts to execute U.S. policy. As a result, they pushed back on policy when necessary and towed the line when possible. Without understanding how policy was carried out, it is difficult to understand what made the occupation of Bavaria, and Germany, work. It also provides an incomplete historical record, one that misses the many difficulties experienced by military government officials and that makes the task of occupation seem simpler than it was.

Therefore, institutional and policy histories that move beyond an elite perspective provide a more complete historical memory. Beyond the intellectual goal of telling a more complete history, important practical considerations exist. If nation-building and democratization remain a possibility in the future of American foreign policy, it is vital to provide a thorough understanding of one of the most cited examples of success. Looking to the past for guidance on current policy issues is commendable. However, that guidance will be incomplete if it is based
on a white-washed version of history and, as was seen with the war in Iraq, can produce tragic results. For that reason, it is important to move beyond the level of policymaking and to better understand how Americans in Bavaria interacted with and implemented the policies made in Washington, Berlin, and Frankfurt.

Ultimately, the postwar occupation of Germany was a success, as judged from the perspective of seven decades distant. A stable, liberal Federal Republic of Germany emerged in central Europe, just as American policymakers hoped. High-level officials within both civilian agencies and the Office of Military Government played a significant role in the occupation. However, military government officers at the bottom of the American bureaucracy contributed to that ultimate success. These MGOs faced major food crises, economic catastrophe, limits on their authority, questions of how to democratize the German populace, and rising tensions between the former Allies. In their daily interactions with U.S. policy, these challenges shaped their responses, enforcing policy when required, molding it to meet their circumstances, and challenging it when they believed necessary. Nevertheless, the final success of the occupation rests upon the shoulders of the occupied. After twelve years of Nazi rule and six years of ruinous war, Germans embraced reconstruction and created their own form of democracy. American officials played a key role as the vehicle of U.S. policy, but the ultimate importance of German officials and civilians provided the most significant demonstration of the limits on military government.
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