THE PHILOSOPHY OF PÍO BAROJA
With Special Reference
to the
Influence of Nietzsche.

by

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Head of Chairman of Dept.
To

Arthur L. Owen

this volume is respectfully and gratefully dedicated.
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Explanatory.

To avoid needless repetitions, the works of Nietzsche referred to are abbreviated as follows:

WP The Will to Power,
BT The Birth of Tragedy,
TI The Twilight of the Idols,
A The Antichrist,
Z Thus Spake Zarathustra,
BG Beyond Good and Evil;

and those of Baroja are numbered as follows:

1 Humano Enigma, 1928, 1928, Madrid.
2 Las Horas Solitarias, 1918, 1920, Madrid.
3 La Venta de Mirambel, 1930, 1931, Madrid.
4 El Laberinto de las Sirenas, 1923, 1923, Madrid.
7 El Aprendiz de Conspirador, 1912, 1920, Madrid.
8 Los Confidentes Audaces, 1930, 1931, Madrid.
9 Los Amores Tardíos, 1926, 1927, Madrid.
10 Aventuras y Mixtificaciones de don Silvestre Paradox, 1901, 1919, Madrid.
11 Mala Hierba, 1904, N.D., Madrid.
12 El Gran Torbellino del Mundo, 1926, 1926, Madrid.
13 Las Veleidades de la Fortuna, 1926, 1926, Madrid.
14 Los Últimos Románticos, 1906, 1906, Madrid.
15 El Arbol de la Ciencia, 1911, 1918, Madrid.
16 Nuevo Tablado de Arlequin, 1917, 1917, Madrid.
17 César o Nada, 1910, 1910, Madrid.
18 Momentum Catastróphicum, 1919, 1919, Madrid.
19 La Caverna del Humorismo, 1919, 1920, Madrid.
20 Divagaciones sobre la Cultura, 1920, 1920, Madrid.
21 La Sensualidad Perversa, 1920, 1920, Madrid.
22 Tablado de Arlequin, 1909, N.D., Madrid.
23 La Nave de los Locos, 1925, 1925, Madrid.

La Casa de Alzgorri (1900, 1911, Madrid) and Páginas Esco-gidas (1918, 1918, Madrid) will be referred to by name, as there will not be much occasion to mention them.

Dates immediately following the titles are to the best of my knowledge the dates of writing. The second
date in each case indicates the date of the edition used.

In most of the references there is given the portion of the page on which the quotation is to be found, marked "a" for top, "b" for middle, and "c" for bottom, with intermediate "ab" and "bc." Thus, 12p93bcf indicates a reference beginning near the bottom of page 93 of El Gran Torbellino del Mundo, and continuing to the next page.
Introductory

A doctor is well equipped to spy on human nature; add to being a doctor, with an interest in and first-hand acquaintance with every sort of particular, being a philosopher, with the metaphysical interest in synthesis and generality, and you have the rare combination of qualities that is Pío Baroja.

Philosophy has been one of his highest interests ever since his "philosophical initiation," as he calls it, many years ago, in spite of the fact that the first impressions were discouraging, as they would be to a person bold enough to undertake the first plunge with Fichte. Anyone who disdains philosophy as impractical is persona non grata with Baroja; Goethe stated that he "did not care ... to inhabit the Cimmerian nights of speculation," and Baroja retorts, "However confused and obscure those nights may be, in their shadows is found the greatest thing man has created," and never since has cared much for Goethe. And as to the impracticability of philosophy, he says that where philosophy has flourished, invention has also flourished; that both come with a high degree of civilization. Even during the World War, when every tranquil pursuit was discountenanced and everybody had turned maniac, he held to his opinion that philosophy is of first importance,

1. 2p200
2. 5p247b
of yet more importance than war. "Slaughter of thousands and hundreds of thousands of men we have always had with us; the Critique of Pure Reason was written but once." "I cultivate with affection this intellectual and timeless love, and this deafness to the present. I write as if the world were at peace." Even in the course of narrative one finds a bit of philosophic parlance inserted, as when he speaks—more than once—with apparent inadvertence, of the "phenomenal world." And the number of times he mentions philosophers goes beyond counting, index to his broad acquaintance with philosophic thought.

Philosophy with Baroja is more than a hobby; it is a second vocation. He refers to himself as one of the "old intellectuals, mired in the routine of thinking, people for whom the external world is no more than a problematical reality; ... who believe that the important matter is understanding things and that the rest makes no difference ..." He is unswerving in his rationality; if we hear him one moment assail the Jesuits, for instance, and the next defend them, that is not because he is fickle in his enmities, but because what concerns him more than enmity is irrationality. If someone else attacks the Jesuits on grounds as untenable as that the Jesuits themselves often stand on, then he will defend them. It is the untenable

1. 5p10c
2. 5p10c
3. 1lp312c, e.g.
4. 2p331b
ground that he objects to. He is relentless with superstitions; morality, Masonic lodges, the worship of fecundity, spiritualism, cubism, the sanctity of art, every fond notion of human prejudice and self-deception is a challenge to the scalpel he learned when young to ply. One feels he must have been reared to believe the world was reasonable, and then disappointed, so trenchant and recriminating are his words at times. But he is just as relentless with himself. He admits that he has not the schoolman's thoroughness in his criticism, and that often he beats around a subject instead of driving to the heart of it. This truthfulness is characteristic of him (it is exemplified in his disrelish for spies); he may pause to wonder what value truth has, or whether there really is such a thing as universal truth; but as his spiritual and philosophical guide, he never relinquishes it.

Baroja is perhaps the only Spanish writer, except Ortega y Gasset, whom a genuine philosopher could meet on common ground without reserve—the only one of whom it cannot be said, as he himself says of Unamuno and Valera and Menéndez Pelayo, that he is provincial. He is thoroughly capable of handling philosophical subjects. Little escapes the lynx-eye of his observation, for observing people is his business. He follows in his writing pretty
much the procedure of the naturalists, save that he takes his notes in leisure time after the event rather than on the spot, thinking thus to get better perspective. Every one of his books is a microcosm; the number of characters in his average novel possible exceeds that in the average novel of any other writer of importance today. With this capacity for observation it can scarce be charged against him, as it was charged against Spencer, that his "idea of a tragedy was a theory killed by a fact." What few theories he has are pretty well substantiated with facts; but he is a fearful person with others' theories. He is not a great constructive thinker; in fact, great constructions are among the things he most eschews; he is a more or less unsystematic, albeit perspicacious and shrewd, observer—better fitted to clear the ground than to put up the building.

"Of the philosophers, those who most attract me are Schopenhauer and Nietzsche," wrote Baroja in 1918. His predilection for Kant, however, is almost as great. He makes his mouthpiece, Larrañaga, say, "That man ((Kant)) is as it were the soul of cultured Europe, the highest thing in thought that the modern world has produced, a summit which no one will likely now surpass." In another place he writes of one of his characters, "Olsen knew Kant very well, for whom he felt great admiration, above all for the metaphysical

1. Páginas Escogidas, p9
2. 12p66bc
part of his system. The moral and political part of the
great philosopher did not interest him. The theory of rela-
tivity he considered as a Kantian consequence." I suspect
that Baroja as he grows older is leaning more and more
toward Kantian subjectivism and farther from the Nietzschean
views he held as a younger man. To regard the world as
representative rather than as presentative is a more con-
genial view for a man who has grown a little old and tired
of the conflict; it is easier to withdraw from an illusory
battle than from a real one. In Baroja's comments on Dio-
mysianism it will be brought out that he does not consider
himself quite so much a Dionysian as he once did. So from
1918 to 1931 he has had time to change somewhat his opinion
about Nietzsche. One must not infer that Nietzsche has
wielded less an influence on this account; Baroja may simply
have reached the stage when he dislikes to admit influences—
where he, like Aristotle with Plato and like Nietzsche himself
with Darwin, finds the safest way out of being accused as a
borrower in repudiating his creditor. A personal letter to
the writer expresses his present regard for Nietzsche (Note I),
which I take the liberty to reproduce:

I have received your letter with your question
about the influence that Nietzsche has had in me. When
I first knew anything of Nietzsche, more than thrity
years ago, I saw in him principally an iconoclast, an

1. 12p13cb I. The same views may also be found in
Las Veleidades de la Fortuna, pl71cf.
anarchist who went farther than other anarchists. That is to say, he was a super-anarchist. For me at first he was an extreme Darwinist.

I believe that the first thing of his that I read was the Twilight of the Idols, which surprised and pleased me. What I read afterward, beginning with Thus Spake Zarathustra, I did not care for at all; it seemed to me turgid and somewhat shallow literature. (Note I.) His trait of Hellenism and classicism I have not cared for either, as I am by temperament an anti-Hellenist and anti-classicist.

Today I do not like Nietzsche. His theatrical style seems unbearable to me. Perhaps it may be that I am, but I do not believe I am a Nietzschean. I surmise that of Nietzsche’s influence there has been left in me the idea that there may be, in the opposition to Christian morality and conventional morality, something that is good.

Nietzsche’s influence is most apparent in the volumes of non-fiction written between 1917 and 1920. I do not believe that this is because Baroja was most Nietzschean at that period, but that it is because at that time he began to record his philosophical ideas. The earlier novels are somewhat marked by restraint in the field of ideas—restraint compared to the proportions philosophy has reached in his later works. What few philosophical impressions seep through the earlier works are strongly Nietzschean; this is easy to understand when one considers that they are anti-social, and that Nietzsche is opposed to modern society. Apparently Baroja has felt that he exhausted the possibilities of his earlier novelistic principles, and has tried to create a new type in the philosophical novel. At any rate, since he began writing

I. This is not precisely Nietzsche’s fault, as Thus Spake Zarathustra preceded The Twilight of the Idols by several years.
philosophy Nietzsche and Dionysus have gradually been retreating before the advance of Kant and Apollo. It is possible that the war has been in some degree responsible for his accentuated Nietzscheanism about 1918, when he was feebly pro-German, and the later decline when German bigness slumped and undeceived him. I shall mention this again when speaking of the war.

It is interesting to remember that Nietzsche will not lose so much at the hands of Schopenhauer and Kant as he might at others', for Schopenhauer was his own favorite philosopher, though he later shanked him, and his first book was written in Kantian terminology, though he later said that he regretted it. There is a vinculum between Kant, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche.

Another reason for his dispassion toward Nietzsche is that the newness has worn off. Speaking of The World as Will and Idea, he says that on later reading it did not produce the surprise that it produced at first. Naturally! He has so far absorbed Nietzsche's and Schopenhauer's beliefs that they no longer surprise him, being his own.

The question of Nietzsche's influence has its limitations. In the first place, Baroja is primarily a literary man, and except in his non-fiction he will not necessarily bother to present his views in coherent form; so objections may be raised which he could easily have attended to in an essay; then he is at his best as a delineator of character,
so that one must be on guard not to utter a character's statements unequivocally as his; it is fairly safe to infer the author's beliefs from those of the protagonist, who is generally an adventurer or an outcast, chosen so, I believe, partly because such a person can best see with impartial and perspective eye. A further difficulty is that of the diffusion of culture. The same may be true with Nietzschean ideas Baroja has got as he himself says is true with Comte's ideas, "which perhaps in their day were very novel, but which today are incorporated in current ideology." That Baroja appears Nietzschean does not necessarily signify that he became so by direct contact. Furthermore Baroja may have acquired some of his Nietzscheanism from the atmosphere that produced Nietzsche—from Nietzsche's roots rather than from Nietzsche's bud. Something similar to this diffusion happens within Baroja himself, and constitutes a third problem: "my ideas are commingled, and the time comes when I do not know the genesis of my thoughts, when they seem to me completely original." In another place he says, ":... the books of Dostoevsky, Stendhal, Nietzsche, and many others have become events within me. The same occurs with me, in painting, with some canvases
of El Greco and Goya; they seem things that have happened within me." So there will be some Nietzschean ideas for which Nietzsche has not been given credit. Baroja has pointed out the fourth difficulty. It is that in a short work devoted by the author expressly to himself, there is apt to be something of pose. If we wish to know the man, we must catch him off his guard when he is writing about something else, in the mood of outness, "because there, where the man who writes has least intended it, he has disclosed himself." Resemblances will be easy to signalize, but not so connections.

There are four recurring points of view in Baroja, knowing which to begin with may aid in understanding him. First, anti-traditionalism. Age, he says, has always seemed to him an equivocal glory. Second, a distaste for frippery, bigness, artificiality, and bombast--for anything that means pretentiousness, display, or sham. This dislike of showiness has reached even Nietzsche, as may be seen in the letter quoted above. It is manifested in the dislike for anachronism in architecture and the desire for appropriateness and reasonableness in everything: music

1. 2p398a
2. 5p17
3. 2p245a
and architecture should suit their settings, national divisions should fit racial differences, style should fit idea, etc.; in his own practice he makes the locale of a novel suggest the type. It is evidenced in his distaste for things organized on a huge scale—modern war, for instance: "... the organized army seems to me a hateful thing," he says; in his distaste for American bigness and German ponderousness; in his aversion to ineptitude masked under a battology of words and twaddle; in his dislike of Ibsen; in his individualism and interest in the small, particular thing; in his preference for humble people; and in his emphasis upon the inner life, which has no need for show. When he calls a thing kolossal (he uses the term generously), he damns it utterly. Third, a tendency toward disunity (related to his dislike of organization); he is an individualist, and wants discontinuity—wants each thing to be sui generis; this is evident in his disunified style, his disunified polity, and his sharply delineated, discrete characterizations. This, of course, is pluralism in philosophy. He emphasizes racial and cultural differences, and seems to want things as they are, in all their infinite variety (N. I), opposing the influences that would uniformize them—religion, state, and every other dogma. Fourth, fascination with the abnormal and

1. 12p156b I. Cf. the idea of Eternal Recurrence, WP sec. 361, e.g.
unfortunate among people, partly perhaps because of a
feeling of kinship. The taste for outlawry appears
in his earliest writings. Consider this, written in
1902:

I have not felt in a long time so deep an
impression as when seeing Le Bargy in the role of
Gringoire, declaiming the impeccable verses of
Theodore de Banville. The poet was poor, aban-
doned, sad, humble, starveling, with a soul
filled with dreams; at times sadly comical, at
times tragically terrible. Before that breath
of poesy, before that so tender ballad of the
unfortunate, of the pariahs, of the humble, the
memory of . . . . the comedy earlier given was
dimmed . . . .

In short, anything that pertains to society and its
rules, regulations, and formalism, and anything that
modern society likes, from finance to football, you
may be sure Baroja will condemn.

In order to present a tenable argument without
bias, I shall first need to guard against any impu-
tation of special pleading; to do this I shall state
Baroja's position entire, and leave conclusions and
inferences to the last; only when a similarity is
obvious, or a comparison might be illuminating, will
reference be made to Nietzsche in the statement of
Baroja's philosophy. This procedure of not laying
undue stress on Nietzsche's influence will have the
further merit of showing it in its true proportions.
If the discussions are sometimes piecemeal and in-
consistent, it should be remembered that they were

1. 6p202cf
gathered passim, and that one who treats a subject summarily here and picks it up for another summary treatment elsewhere is liable to oversight.
PART I

The Man and the Artist
The Man Baroja

Pío Baroja y Nessi was born in San Sebastián, December 28, 1872—against his will, if we are to believe him when he says he should have preferred being born in a little mountain village or a village on the coast. He is glad enough to be a Guipuzcoan, but dislikes having as his native town a place of such plebeian and parvenu interests, with so little taste for culture, as San Sebastián.

He is one of a family of three. His father, Serafín Baroja y Zornoza, was a mining engineer and for a time a teacher of natural history; he received some note as a writer of Basque verse. Although Pío somewhere mentions a certain opposition to his father, there is nothing to indicate that it amounted to more than the usual father-son rivalry, which, indeed, is the way he classifies it. His mother, Carmen Nessi y Goni, was a Madrid girl; she was still living a few years ago, keeping the little Basque house that is, or was then, still home to Pío. He professes great affection for her.

His predecessors for many generations were called Martínez de Baroja, Baroja being a village in Alava.
His great-grandfather Rafael de Baroja, a man evidently of liberal sympathies, left his village, abridged his surname, and set up as a pharmacist in Guipúzcoa. There were also other liberal ascendants in the family; and his paternal grandmother, Doña Concepción Zornoza, was, he tells us, a woman of political interests. He counts among his relatives at least one noted figure in Spanish politics—the conspirator Aviraneta. "My great-grandfather Sebastián Janacio de Alzate," he writes, "was one of those who gathered at Zubieta in 1813, to rebuild San Sebastián, and this great-grandfather was the uncle of Don Eugenio de Aviraneta, my worthy relative and protagonist of my latest books."

The Nessi, his mother's family, were from Lombardy, whence they fled from the Austrian dominion; his great-grandfather Nessi he believes came from Italy as a deserter.

He does not set much store by family traditions and legends, some of which he writes about; but he does set considerable store by being a Basque. "Of my eight surnames, four are of Guipúzcoa, two of Navarre, one of Alava, and one is Italian"; he is seven-eighths Basque. He will tell later of the birth of this Basque feeling.

1. 5p173ff
2. 5p185ff
3. 5p172bc
4. 5p173ff
5. 5p212
6. 5p169ff
"He whose childhood begins badly is already lost." The remembrance of a happy childhood is half of life's battle; and Pío's childhood is of just this importance to him in retrospect. "It is curious," he says, "that, having had an insignificant childhood, I pass all my life thinking about it. The rest of my existence seems to me drab and unleavened."

From San Sebastián the family moved to Madrid, and thence, while Pío was yet a very small boy, to Pamplona, the historic town built by Pompey, whose frowning walls impressed him deeply. He was rather pugnacious as a small boy, though he lost the trait by the time he began to study medicine; so at Pamplona he did some rowdying with his fellow-students; some of their pranks show up here and there in his writings.

Gloomy things held a sort of fascination for him at Pamplona. He was deeply affected by the execution of a certain felon, and slipped away in the evening to the scaffold to see him dangling; then couldn't sleep that night and spent many wakeful hours on later nights. He tells of two idiots who for a long time occupied his childish thoughts; and remembers one of his Pamplona chums who died after jumping from a wall. Perhaps

1. 12p90ab, Larrañaga
2. 2p24a
3. 5p192
4. 5p196f
5. 5p192f and 196f
6. 5p189
7. 5p194
his interest in abnormality was already taking root.

(N. I.)

His religious sensibilities received some early jolts. He tells of a Protestant who once lived near him, and who fed and protected the swallows that had nested nearby. After the Protestant left, the landlord destroyed the nests. "So in the dictionary of my childhood I had these definitions: Protestant, a man who reads a book and likes swallows' nests; Catholic, a man who reads nothing and destroys swallows' nests."

Another occurrence was even more telling:

Another impression, terrible to me, was one I received in the Cathedral. I was studying first-year Latin and was nine years old.

We had left the school and had been watching a funeral. Afterward, three or four of us boys, among us my brother Richard, entered the Cathedral. The catch of the responsory was running in my head, and I went along humming it.

Of a sudden out sailed a black shadow, from back of a confessional, pounced upon me and gripped me by the neck with his hands to the point of choking me. I was paralyzed with fright. It was a fat, greasy canon, whose name was Don Tirso Larequi.

"What's your name?" he demanded, shaking me.

I could not reply for terror.

"His name is Antonio García," said my brother Richard, coldly.

"Where does he live?"

"14 Curia Street."

Naturally, there was no such place.

"Now I'm going to see your father," cried the canon, and left the Cathedral on a run.

My brother and I escaped through the Cloister. That bloodthirsty, fat, fierce canon, who sallies out to destroy nine-year-old boys, is for me the symbol of the Catholic religion.

I. It is conceivable that his father's death may have had something to do with this. "Why should these things be?" he seems to have asked himself even as a child. In Silvestre Paradox is this passage: "At night, mother and son
That scene was for me, as a boy, one of the reasons for my anticlericalism. I remember Don Tirso Larequi with odium; and if he lived (I don't whether he does or not) I should not stick at going on dark nights to the roof of his house and moaning down his chimney in a cavernous voice, "Don Tirso, you're a wicked beast."

In these two experiences it is easy to see the incunabula of a lifelong aversion. He was a sensitive child; things that were as they should not be, that is, for him, as he had been taught to believe they were, soon caught his mind by their inconsistency. If religion is thought to be a thing of love and turns out to be an instrument of hate, the consequences for a tender mind are not far to seek. In other ways he manifested this taste for logicality which has bided with him his whole life. He could never comprehend how the people of Pamplona could enjoy the barbaric spectacle of a bullfight, and then forget their blood-fest to acclaim Sarasate, the violinist. Having this trace of the visionary mixed with boyish pugnacity give him "traits hardly in good accord." He has kept both of them: a disposition to see the incongruity and energy enough to fight back at it.

Reading stories of adventure fired him with the desire to be different from other people; probably other

1. 5p194f talked in a low voice about the dead man,
2. 5p196 Silvestre's father; but the memories, which
3. 5p196f in her brought tears of resigned sadness, in Silvestre caused a silent rebelliousness toward everything." (10p436, cont'd from p15.)
causes contributed—he will mention some when he speaks of his individualism; but he has always liked to take his lone path. "For a long time (N. I.) I resisted the belief that I should have to live as the rest of the world does; at last there was nothing to do but conform." His conformity, however, has been kept pretty close to a minimum. The lonely life of a sailor must have attracted him as a boy, for he mentions it often.

He liked books, as a child, and regrets that he was unable, moving so often, to keep a store of them during the period of from twelve to twenty, "most important for the formation of the mind"; on this account he has been kept from having many favorite books. But as for studying, he has never been fond of it. He studied languages for two years, he says, without knowing what "preterite" means. "... Sacred History and other history, Latin, French, rhetoric, and natural history I have never liked at all. Only geometry and physics have I cared a little for." He studied for his profession "like one who takes a bitter potion." Though he attributes some of his lack of interest to laziness, one is apt to suspect that most of it was due to improper motivation. He says he never had a single professor who knew how to teach; that either he was abysmally stupid or was put through a deplorable
educational system; and calls the Spanish professor the "quintessence of vacuity." In the *Arbol de la Ciencia*, supposed to be autobiographical, are described several such instructors, with whom it would be a tragedy to begin any study.

Boroja gives us to understand that he suffered considerable repression during his youth; but from the fact that he speaks with affection of his mother and brother, and gives no intimation of restraint imposed by any particular person, I judge he must regard the repression as a social rather than as an individual one. The following citation serves to confirm this:

If I could have followed my instincts freely in that momentous age between fifteen and twenty-five, I should have been a peaceful man, perhaps a bit sensual, perhaps a bit cynical, but surely never a frenzied man.

The morality of our society has upset and unbalanced me.

Because of that I hate it cordially and repay it whenever I can with all the venom at my disposal ((and Nietzsche was at hand with a ready-made anti-moral philosophy)). Still, occasionally I like to give an artistic vehicle to that venom.

Society offers prostitution, with alternative of unbalance. "I since my youth have seen the dilemma clearly, and I have always said, 'No; rather illness, rather hysteria, than submission.'" Having, as he has had, to live without means, he should have preferred

1. 5p208ff
2. 5p84
3. 5p81ff
impotence; but that could not be, and he has had to fight the battle alone, which has perhaps slightly hyperesthetized him sexually. He has been victorious against himself, however; speaking of an incendiary female who tried to lure him after her, he admonishes himself that he was never a Don Juan in his youth and need not become one in middle age. The upshot of the struggle has been apparently to make him inquisitive in matters of sex—a kind of implicit satisfaction of the impulse, I suppose. Scarcely one of his novels lacks some account of sexual abnormality; homosexuality, especially the blonde and brunette affinity among women, is a favorite theme. (N. I.) Whether it is just to accuse him of putting more sex into his novels than a purely dispassionate writer would put in, I hesitate to say; but I believe there is a slight disproportion. At least, compared to the writings of many other Spanish authors, his cannot be called pornographic.

Baroja divides his pre-literary life into three periods: eight years as a student, two as a physician, and six as a baker.

As a student he took his baccalaureate degree at Valencia and his doctorate at Madrid. He confesses he

1. 5p87
2. 2p49
3. 5p237
4. 5p215b
5. 5p216b

I. See, e.g., 14p109; similar episode in 10. He claims that "woman and love are an obsession" for the man of his generation. (Entretenimientos, p157cf.)
failed in several examinations until he learned the mechanical university system (about which he will air his views later), and then succeeded remarkably. The Bohemianism and rioting which has been so common in University life, young Baroja considered degrading and never practised.

After receiving his degree he went to Burjasot, a town near Valencia, where he lived pleasantly for a time with his family. Then hearing that the position of titular physician in Cestona was vacant, he applied and got the place. He lived there at the house of the sexton, where he came in contact with one of the few women for whom he has expressed unconditional admiration, the sexton's wife, his landlady. The fact that his irreligiousness made no difference in her esteem for him was naturally with Baroja a cause for high regard. (N.I.) The two years at Cestona were hard years. "I was first a village doctor. Life was hard in the country. I earned too little; besides, I hadn't enough strength to travel the roads night and day, enduring rain and snow. I was often rheumatic." Coming into touch with human ills and poverty must have stimulated the interest that later made him write so much about them. A young physician, I should surmise, in

1. 5p215f  I. Compare the landlady in the Arbol de la Ciencia.
2. 5p238
3. 5p219f
4. 5p221f
5. 5p23
the first year of his practice, before familiarity has
bred indifference, would suffer deeply from the contacts
he has to make. Baroja left his practice before this
sensitivity had time to wear away, if indeed, in him it
could have worn away. (N.I.) He makes Silvestre Paradox
regret the callousness of a young interne; there must
be some basis of sensitivity to start with. Baroja,
like any other physician with a sense of poetic justice,
has reserved his sympathies for the socially unfortunate;
those of the gouty tribe did not touch his feelings.

Sometimes in the summer, when I went to make my
visits in the hamlets, I would meet on the cart-
road and on the highway sickly-looking passers-by,
hepatic invalids who were taking the waters at the
nearby baths.

These leather-colored people did not cause me
the least curiosity or sympathy. The bourgeois
merchant or employee from a great city, well or ill,
disgusts me. I would exchange a grudging salute
with those hepatic types and draw away mounted on
my old nag.

From doctoring he went to baking. His great-uncle
by marriage owned a bakery in Madrid, which, on the
uncle's death was left in debt. Richard and Pío took
over the business, lost considerable, and then began to
play the Bourse; luckier than some in their speculations
they presently had enough to make their business solvent;

1. 10p225b 1. He intimates that he enjoyed a measure
2. 17p9 of indifference as an interne (v. 22p
of indifference as an interne (v. 22p
125ff); but I have an idea that those
under his attention and care were in part
the soil from which his interest in mis-
fortune grew; he was sensitive enough
to remember them.
but after changing their location, their trade fell off and they retired. "It is not strange that a bourse should to me seem a philanthropical building, and on the other hand, a church appear a somber place, where from behind the confessional springs a black canon to grab you by the neck and strangle you."

After the baking venture, he "tried being a tradesman and journalist." Then, "realizing that through one's own efforts one never arrives anywhere, I began to be a novelist to employ my activity at something, though without hope of success or effect." This fear that he would never amount to anything seems to have harassed him constantly. He said in 1917 that he was convinced he would never be a great success, in money, fame, honors, or anything else. "Baroja, you will never amount to anything," says Ortega y Gasset, and Baroja half humorously agrees, after he has on one occasion been persuaded to run for office and received numerous rebuffs.

So many false starts would hardly sweeten anyone's nature. At thirty he wrote, in facetious seriousness, "Every night, when I go to bed, I murmur by way of prayer, 'Let us abominate civilization! Civilization

1. 5p225ff
2. 5p23f
3. 5p70ff
4. 2p156b
has invented the night-cap!" Most ills he was coming to regard as social ills, and the resentment against society was appearing which was later to produce the greatest amount of comment he has made on any one subject, the kind of society that would eliminate those ills. He says that metaphysics interests him more than practical philosophy; but he deceives himself there. What he has voiced about metaphysics is nothing compared to what he has voiced about politics.

It was at some time before he began writing that Baroja discovered philosophy. We may as well hear from his own lips the story of his find:

The desire to enter the philosophical world was aroused in me, when I was a student, by reading Dr. Letamendi's book of Pathology; to this end I bought, in an economical edition directed by Zozaya, the books of Kant, Fichte, and Schopenhauer. I read first Fichte's Science of Knowledge, and understood none of it. This made me truly indignant against the author and against the translator. Could philosophy be a mystification, as artists and business-clerks believe?

Reading the book Parerga et Paralipomena reconciled me with philosophy. Afterward I bought, in French, the Critique of Pure Reason, The World as Will and Idea, and some other works.

Why have I, a man of scant tenacity, had the necessary perseverance to read several difficult books for which I had no preparation? I do not know; the fact is that I have read them. Years after my philosophical initiation I began to read the works of Nietzsche, which had a great effect on me.

Since then I have gone nibbling here and there, to see if I could renovate my philosophical culture; but I haven't managed it. Some books and authors have gagged me; others I haven't had the
courage for. I have had for some time a volume with Hegel's Logic on the table; I've eyed it, sniffed it, but haven't dared.

Nevertheless, metaphysics is what most attracts me; political, sociological and practical philosophy less((see above)). I have never cared at all for Hobbes, Locke, Bentham, Comte, and Spencer. Even their Utopias, which seemingly ought to be entertain- ing, have bored me deeply, from Plato's Republic down to Kropotkin's Conquest of Bread and Wells' Modern Utopia. Neither has anarchistic pseudo- philosophy engaged me in any wise; and one of the books that have most taxed me was Max Stirner's The Ego and its Own.

Kant and Schopenhauer appear to have been Baroja's first loves, and have longest held his affection. In Silvestre Paradox he writes, "At the end of three months of reading, Silvestre was convinced that Kant was Kant and Schopenhauer was his prophet." (N.I.)

We come now to the events of Baroja's literary career. His first literary efforts were articles, published in El Liberal, El País, El Globo, La Justicia, La Voz de Guipúzcoa, Revista Nueva, and other papers. In 1900 came Vidas Sombrías, his first book, of which barely a hundred copies were sold, and then, in the same year, La Casa de Aizgorri, with fewer than fifty. These books show a preoccupation with diction and plot that is not at all like the Baroja of today. Undaunted by the meager success of these two, the following year he published the Invén tos, Aventuras y Mixtificaciones de Silvestre Paradox, by his own confession woefully disjointed, but

1. 5p151ff
2. 10p131a
3. 10p131ff
4. 5p249

I. Silvestre excogitates a fantastic system of philosophy based on the nous, which we can hardly suppose to be Baroja, but which may be a satire on systematic philosophies.
which must have met with some success; he tells us it has been translated into Russian and liked by its Russian reviewers (which is not surprising considering its somberness; Baroja has had considerable success in Russia, probably because of his somewhat Russian gloominess; his relationship with Dostoievsky I shall mention later). This book possible inspired him to continue his development of the episodic style, which is, I think, his chief contribution to literary theory. It is not the first book written piecemeal that has achieved success; Don Quixote was another. In 1902 Baroja wrote several dramatic criticisms for El Globo, but his labors lasted only about a month. His writing was too independent, too much ruffling to the douse, conventional, theater-going public long to be acceptable, says Azorín. After the publication of Camino de Perfección in 1902, his reputation was established. He has since produced over thirty novels and collections of articles and stories, and six volumes of non-fiction. Pecuniary success came a little later, in 1903, with El Mayorazgo de Labraz.

Several stimulating friendships helped him at the beginning of his literary career. He mentions Martínez Ruiz, Azorín, the Swiss Paul Schmitz, who opened up fields of interest to him outside Spain, and Ortega y

1. 6p181ff
2. 5p237
Gasset, whom he regards as the only promise of philosophy in Spain.

Baroja is often classified among the writers of the "Generation of 1898." To him this is a fictitious classification. In the first place, he did not begin publishing until 1900; then there probably is, he says, no germene group anyway. The "Generation of 1898" was merely an accidental association, as there was no unity of ideas; each author has followed his own road and emulated his own chosen masters. The real generation of 1898 was that of the writers who were flourishing then, and who did have points in common—such as a "morbid vanity, a pathological megalomania," and who "declared themselves immortal," putting up memorials to themselves over the whole country. One thing the writers of Baroja's time did have in common was their revolt against this group, being drawn together by the feeling of a need for change—an occurrence common in revolutions. The fact that he and his literary fellows came to the world, "denying right and left," has aroused them their magnum of enmities, of which Pío has had his share among the clergy, which has perhaps solidified them. But as for common ideals, he repeats, his epoch has had none; it was the "characterless epoch."

1. 5p241ff
2. 5p239 and 6p26ff
3. 5p253
4. 13p214
He is satisfied with his final choice of writing as his vocation. As a writer he has not made much money, but has managed to support himself, buy a few knick-knacks, and travel a little.

Baroja has never married. I do not believe the reason for this is simple enough to state easily, for many things can contribute; he gives his "reasons," although probably his celibacy is rather emotional than rational. Perhaps he has fought too good a fight against sex, so that it became with him a call to retreat. One of the characters of the Azonías de Nuestro Tiempo, Pepita, reproaches Larrañaga, the protagonist, for being too "timid and shy" in the matter of marrying; probably the author here writes of himself. In this whole series he seems possibly to be reproaching himself for not having had more enterprise. There is of course one real reason that would contribute to his or to anyone else's timidity—the economical one. And here is cause for another score against society—that it should force the man who would mate, and has little money, to give up all his ideals of what a family should be—well-tended and provided for—and make him into a moral criminal, marrying on insufficient funds, driven into

1. 5p237
2. 9p71a
a squalid partnership; or give him the alternative of virtual sterilization, making him spend the sexual years in laying by enough on which to live well and taking him post youth, when and only when glamoring oneself, the first requisite to love, is possible.

"The best that love possesses is the eagerness for the future, the idea of the child; and the old man has no future. For that reason it is best to retire promptly, so as not to be retired." And again in Los Amores Tardíos he says "No" to love that comes late.

Perhaps in this maze of influences there has been a mother-fixation, although I doubt it.

The myth of the reasonable world, that I have mentioned before, taught to children, making them believe that life is rational, and causing them, if they are lucky and meet few hardships, to see rationality in mature and be idealists, or, if they are unlucky, to see the inconsistencies and either grow discouraged or try to make the desired rationality or both, (Baroja is of this last), and be any of various brands of empiricists, has had some bearing, I think, on Baroja's celibacy. He has, as I have stated, put rationality first; this means that every act must be implicitly

1. l2p42
2. Cf. 2p412b
tested before it is performed; nothing is more deadly to spontaneity. "He did not come to have a moment of abandon, and this vigilance over himself, this spying on his instincts and inclinations, wore him out."

"This excessive critical sense destroys the soul's warmth." One tries to rush ahead regardless, but knowing one is doing turns one again regardful and nips spontaneity.

He gives several reasons for not having married. He believes he is not fitted to be a husband. "An intelligent, unsociable, and nervous man is certainly not the ideal husband." He would even like to persuade himself that singleness was the best thing for him:

"... those rare men for whom relative solitude may be useful and productive—to celibacy." Then he has never found a woman whose conversation is interesting, few women having intellectual concerns, and he feels that family life in the meanness and narrowness of cities is repugnant. If he could not stand living with an ordinary woman, living with an extraordinary woman would be still more terrible; having a George Sand as witness to one's vulgarities would be horrible; so Baroja contrives himself a dilemma with no escape between the horns. Robert

1. 9p127ab
2. 9p127c, Larrañaga
3. 9p75c, Larrañaga
4. 9p75ab, Larrañaga
5. 2p606ff
6. 13p233c
O'Neil, the hero of the *Laberinto de las Sirenas*, is apparently the object of some speculation about what would have happened had Baroja married. O'Neil is of independent means, and so is able to separate from his wife, who, woman-like, is too fond of domination and display. (In all respects O'Neil is the embodiment of Baroja's own characteristics.)

But I can imagine him sometimes thinking wistfully of what might have been. The hero of the *Arbol de la Ciencia*, though one of the "intelligent, unsociable, and nervous" men who are not fitted to build families, is transformed completely and finds a tranquillity and heartsease he had never known before after his marriage (which ends tragically by pure accident). In *Silvestre Paradox* he writes, "That joy that the girl radiated upon Silvestre's life filled him at times with sadness on thinking of his objectless existence, of his mistake and great cowardice in not having made a family." Among the rhapsodies of Joe, the author's speaking-trumpet in the *Aconías*, are two: Speaking of a peaceful, rather colorless Danish cemetery, he writes, "In such a place, dear friend, . . . when the supreme moment comes, I should like to sleep the eternal sleep by your side. You with your jewels and your gowns, I with the poor clothes of an
unsuccessful workman." Speaking again of his "dear friend," he dreams of a voyage with her to the earth's romantic corners. He is resigned to his bachelorhood, however; in a conversation with Silverio Lanza he says, "... as to women, we'll take something of them if they care to give it to us--though I fear me they won't give much to you or me ... ."

Out of his own house he is the "man of a certain age who tries at times to be friendly and pretends to be a reasoner." He is economically independent, has made friends, and stands on the threshold of old age, but is ready to meet it; he would need two hundred years, he says, to fulfill his life-program, but he submits to necessity. "I don't much notice having lost youth," and Pio says for himself that he is not sorry now to have life's pleasures closed to him, for he has passed the age when isolation hurts. "These young girls, who show their joy of life in the sparkle of their eyes and in their smiles, a few years ago would have made me feel sad; but not now; now they impart a little of their gaiety to me."

1. 12p168cf
2. 12p316
3. 5p271a
4. 2p183b
5. 5p335ff
6. 12p40b
7. 2p187ab
He has not quite the peace of mind he could have hoped to have in his later years. He has gone so far with his work that he cannot now enjoy rest; like the horse in the *Pickwick Papers*, he says, he cannot get himself out of harness for fear of falling down.

Ataraxy, ataraxy! Serenity, serenity! What the devil are you doing that you don't come to my spirit?

What further qualities are necessary for entering the salon of Madam Euphrosyne? Have I not always looked with disdain upon the base Semitic rabble, worshippers of blood and miracles? Have I not always put agnostic and philosophical doubt first? Have I ever desired crosses, medals, insignia, or any other gewgaw of honorific tin-ware? Have I preached the mawkish myths of democracy, like the Gauls, or the barbaric cult of the Army and the Fatherland, like those tenacious (they were still fighting) Chinamen of Central Europe? No, and yet that ataraxy does not come.

Ataraxy! Ataraxy! Can you, too, be a myth? Serenity! Serenity! If you exist, why do you forget me so?" (N.I.)

Baroja intimates he would like tranquillity and a cessation of his urgent curiosity. "A little income to live, a mental limitation (N. II.), would be my ideal," and elsewhere: "these men who live contented in their

1. 2p416cf  
2. 9p30b

I. "Most men never rise above viewing things as objects of desire—hecny their misery; but to see things purely as objects of understanding is to rise to freedom," says Durant speaking of Schopenhauer. Baroja here refutes Schopenhauer's statement that not desiring gives contentment. But he has tried to put Schopenhauer to practice, compromising with his discontent by not wanting much. (21p295.)

II. "Limitation," a Schopenhaurian and Nietzschean concept.
village . . ., who find in it the woman they love, have home, children, and expect to sleep beside their wife in the village cemetery, perhaps are happy people."

Buddhism, with its ideal of passivity, has attracted him. I suspect, however, that passivity would presently become unbearable if he could achieve it; probably all this pining for security and rest is only the curiosity of a spirit that has never known rest, nor could abide it if it had it.

The taste for gloom has not left Baroja with the years. "I . . . am everything by halves. A little misanthropic and solitary, a little social, a little good, a little bad, and always calamitous," says Larrañaga. "And always severe with yourself too," says Pepita, to which Larrañaga agrees. "I do not react with violence before happenings; my most constant reaction is depression. . . . Many times I think I must be very perverse, because every sort of crime, brutality, and horror occurs to me; but is it imagination, which invents them unbidden, or is it instinct, which is truly criminal?" (N. I.) These feelings are surely not peculiar to Baroja. He seems to recognize that he is morose in his attitudes towards many things.

1. 9pl94c I. As this is punctuated we are left to infer that instinct is always criminal.
2. 12p102b
3. 2p77, e.g. Probably he means, "or is it an instinct which is truly criminal?"
Unadapted to the environment, I have led a rather solitary life, which perhaps has exacerbated my discontent. So it is not strange that I should have spoken ill of everything close to me and well of what was farthest away; it is not strange that I should have been anti-Catholic, antimonarchic, and anti-Latin, for having lived in a Latin, monarchic, and Catholic country undergoing decomposition, in which the old precepts of life, on the basis of Latinism and with monarchic and Catholic meaning, served for nothing but a decorative element.

It is not strange that I should have been an abominator of oratory and rhetoric in a country like Spain, supersaturated with rhetoric and oratory, which do not let one behold reality.

Hence appears the old conflict that has ridden him all his life long: wanting to find his country good and reasonable, because he was taught to expect it so, and besides, it is his country; and disappointment at not finding it so, and with a society that has not protected but injured him. So he is both monarchic and antimonarchic, likes Catholicism and assails it, and dislikes humanity collectively and likes it individually. "What would you have? I am a Spaniard, and despite that it seems to me prejudicial, I have a hidden love for black, for the somber, for the mysterious, the sacristies with their bloody Christs charm me; I like to see the nuns, the monks, the courtiers, and I even have sympathy for the Carlists themselves," says López del Castillo, one of the characters of Los Confidentes Audaces; Aviraneta replies, "The same occurs with me."
It would seem that Spain's lowering culture has been partly to blame. Somewhere Baroja has made one of his characters complain that there is too much dismal bell-tolling Spain. His sadness is not resigned. "There is a wide difference between active sadness, which protests and is irritated against things and men, and passive sadness, which is resigned and accepts all."(N.I.)

Could Baroja have had a tragedy in love that swelled this stream of sadness? "The death of that girl touched me deeply: I felt misanthropic and thought that all the people about me were egoistic, stupid, and mean, except a few unfortunates who became the propitiatory victims of general cruelty." Add to these another reason: Baroja has long suffered from arthritis. And then the one great reason of his over-developed sensibilities; he admits that society is good for those who have just the right amount of sensitivity, but that an overdose of sensitivity will make one an invalid; and he implies that he has had an overdose. "We must suffer" is the imminent thing that makes Baroja shaky; he makes Larrañaga say, "... I recognize that I am cowardly as to suffering. I prefer to have an armor of indifference for everything and not let myself be carried away by sentimentality, which has always had bad effects on me. One must have a kind of isolating wall in the face of

1. 6p218
2. 9p65b
3. 5p59
4. 2p414

I. This is the "tragic sense of life."
others' brutality." But either the armor would not fit or the wall was too poorly built, for neither has had any protective value. "If Mephisto had to buy my soul, he'd not buy it with a decoration or a title; but if he had a promise of sympathy, of affection, of something sentimental, I believe he could make off with it very easily." He tells in another place that the greatest pleasure is to be in sympathy with something. And if he has been scornful with some things, perhaps his analysis of scorn will explain why—that it is only a decomposition of sentimentality. The gloom, like the scorn, is principally external.

I write in sad vein because the surrounding atmosphere annoys me, the sun confuses me, what I say irritates me, but in the bottom of my heart I love life ardently.

"You," Pardo Bazán said to me, "have not for some time been an intellectual. You are a sensual man."

And it is true . . .

If Baroja is the same in his conversation as he is in his writing, and as he represents himself to be when telling personal anecdotes, he must be a very uncomfortable person to have near with his incessant Socratic canvassing of everything said; it is another instance of his putting rationality first. "I have never pretended to be engaging," says one of his various proxies; "it

1. 9p76b
2. 5p67
3. 21p10bc
4. 21p393
5. 22p131a
6. 8p125c
seems to me as natural to produce indifference and antipathy in others as to have others produce the same or similar feelings in me." I am afraid, however, that he is making himself appear rather less amiable that he really is; probably this is the pose he speaks of striking to prevent being hurt by his excessive amiableness. Others speak of him with an affection that could be evoked only by a lovable person. (N.I.) "When a man gazes long at himself he becomes unable to distinguish his face from his mask," he says, speaking of his belief that he is not humble; this gruffness is another mask.

Now we come to the aspect of Baroja's character which is most important to the student of Nietzsche--his "Dionysianism." The term has been somewhat expanded by Baroja to include nearly any kine of turbulence and non-conformity; but he has not taken it too far, for turbulence is essential to Dionysianism, and non-conformity is a consequence of the first degree.

Baroja, like most of the rest of us, was reared in a Christian family; that is to say, he was brought up in a social group that believed in free will, and likely found in free will one of his fondest beliefs. An impercipient person can live a lifetime without
suspecting determinism; but one as intelligent as Baroja must find sooner or later that actions are determined as rigidly as the diurnal motion of the earth. the first result of the discovery is a feeling of having been cheated of one's birthright, and of rankling and resentment against the immutable weight of events that forces one down the zigzag, fixed, but too complex to be predicted, path. It goes without saying that one could be conditioned so as to be satisfied with such a state of affairs; but the fact is that one isn't. Such, I believe, is Baroja's feeling toward society, the most immediate congeries of determining factors; and it accounts for his withdrawal from society, that is, for his individualism and for his Dionysianism. Naturally, with advancing age one becomes more reconciled, more desirous of leaving matters settled and at rest when one is gone; so Baroja will speak of his abating Dionysianism.

One of the first requisites of Dionysianism is youthfulness; youth can best stir the world out of its complacency. "There is in my soul, 'mid brambles and thickets, a tiny Fountain of Youth," he says, and believes that all his works are youthful. Pepita says

1. 5p55
to Larrañaga, and he admits she is right, "You will always be like a big boy, even though you have gray hair and appear grouchy and misanthropic." Inertia is the youth's *bête noire* and the antipode of Dionysianism; Nietzsche was pathologically restless, and Baroja is restless to the point of nervousness; he says there is hardly a single book he has read word for word, and the aphoristic style of writing that both of these men use is indicative of a temperament that cannot hold itself to a task for long at a time.

Corollary to restlessness is the need for change. "Let us change all we can. My ideal would be constantly to change life, house, food, and even skin." "... the fear of public opinion ... to me seems contemptible. Not to change because of the fear of others is one of the lowest forms of slavery." Changing one's beliefs broadens one; "... even though we don't find the truth, at least we see that it is fitting to change,"

The fact that he is changing his Dionysian views is, from this point of view, another proof of his Dionysianism. "It is true; he wrote in 1917, "that I am withdrawing from the Panic festivals and the cult of Dionysus." But

1. 12p40b
2. 5p110
3. 5p110
4. 9p20ab, Larrañaga
5. 5p63ff
that does not signify that he is getting religion. "I have no enthusiasm for the Semitic traditions; no, no."

If his ideas are changing, he is not ashamed of the fact; he would like to change just to prove he can do it. He wonders whether he is really in the polite society of the drawing-room, with his Dionysianism only mock bravado, and answers himself in this way:

Am I rimming the environs of Apollo's temple unwittingly?
My literary life perhaps is but a journey from the valley of Dionysus toward the temple of Apollo. Someone may think that here, on the first step of Apollo's temple, the artist begins. Precisely, here, on the first step, I stop.

So he has never entered Apollo's temple; rather he combines the virtues of Apollo and Dionysus in his "tragic sense of life." A year later he wrote, under the caption "Dionysian or Apollonian?" the following lines:

Heretofore ... I was convinced that I was a Dionysian. I felt impelled to turbulence, dynamism, drama. Naturally, I was an anarchist. Am I still? I think so. Then I had enthusiasm for the future and hated the past.

Little by little the turbulence has subsided; perhaps it never was great; little by little I have seen that if the cult of Dionysus makes the will move by bounds, the cult of Apollo makes intellect rest upon the harmony of lines eternal, and in both the one and the other there is a great attraction.

From the point of view of Destiny there are two classes of men; the one follow the trail blazed by parents, family, and atmosphere; the

1. 5p63ff
2. 5p56f
3. 5p33
other try to change their destiny. The one take the broad highway; the other the rude and tortured path.

The first, vulgar and obscure, do not distinguish themselves; the others, if they succeed, pass for famous; but if they fail they are ridiculous, because after their failure they have to march with the rest and in mass on the highway.

Such a broken figure Baroja gives us in César o Nada, his greatest exposition of individualism.

"I do not know, to tell the truth," he says, "whether this individualism is good or bad. I have always had it; I have always been equally individualistic and equally versatile. Before, like many others, I felt myself in favor of universality, a citizen of the world; since then I have been doubling back on myself, and today it seems to me too broad to be a Spaniard, and even to be a Basque; and my ideal is now to found the Republic of Bidassoa with this legend: "No flies, no monks, and no carbineers." His individualism is largely a movement away from society. Replying to Pepita's remark, "I believe you do ill in isolating yourself," Larrañaga says, "Why? It is natural for anyone to want to defend himself against the vulgar and unpleasant touch." Vulgarity impels one to aloofness.

"All of this takes some of us to a somewhat savage individualism; others to charlatanism," argues

1. 9p129a
2. 6p31
3. 13p241
Larrañaga. "Some say, 'We'll put up a hut, we'll shout at the top of our lungs, and even the deaf will hear us.' The rest of us say, 'We'll go far enough away from the hut not to hear the racket of the cymbals and the drum.'"

This charlatanism, or pretense, that association with others forces one to use, wounds Pío's sense of truth. "One wants to live for oneself, and the public, the mass, prevents one. So one passes to egoism. On the other hand, if one wishes to live for that public, for those masses, one makes oneself somewhat an actor."

Playing a part dulls one's keenness for truth; but solitude restores the lost impartiality and clarity of mind. "... when one lives with clear ideas ... it seems that the spirit is steadily braced, and one loses the feeling of the mass and thinks one ought to rely only on oneself." The world seen as a whole is not attractive. (N.I.) "This great whirlwind of the world ... gives me a taste of fright ... all that whirligig, with its follies, its lusts, its vanities, and its vices ... all together gives me terror ... and at times somewhat of loathing too." Not loathing from moral reasons, but as a matter of taste ((perhaps the morality accounts for the taste)). One must take part in the game to find it

2. 12p78b, Larrañaga
3. 13p73b, Larrañaga
amusing; seen as a spectacle it is a bedlam. Such is Larrañaga's opinion; but the difficulty is that once having seen the spectacle with an eye sharpened to perceive its true nature, one has no desire to become an inmate of the bedlam. So it has gone with Baroja. There is probably still another reason for this individualism, to which I suppose Baroja is no more immune than the rest of us: it is a prop to vanity. If one has a low opinion of others in general, separating from those others will give one a better opinion of oneself. Though Larrañaga says that Aristocracy does not exist for him, in the next paragraph, speaking of his intimacy with the duchess, the author writes that "they felt they were of the same race." One gathers that there is a feeling of cultural aristocracy.

There is a certain further exclusiveness in being a Basque. "In the Basque village where I was as a physician I discovered, observing myself, that there was within my spirit, as if dormant, a racial element that had not yet awakened." This had been slumbered, he says, by his having lived away from Vasconia for a long time, and was reawakened on returning there when he went to Cestona. "I could feel how the physical atmosphere of my country, and somewhat also of the moral atmosphere, was

1. 12p59
2. 13p191
enveloping me, and how I was recapturing, bit by bit, this lost thread of race." He is proud of his race, moreover: "... I am glad not to have anything to do with either of those two great branches, the Aryans and the Semites. Slavery, the abominable rule of caste in India, Phoenician slave-traders, killers of helots among the Greeks. I feel no enthusiasm for them .... I should prefer to spring directly from a simple hunter or fisher who lived in his Pyrenean cave in the Stone Age." When he speaks of "feeling Basque" and in other places talks about the lack of individuality in flat countries (N.I.), I believe he identifies his Basque individuality with Vasconian mountains. There may be some substance to the statement that the Basques are an individualistic people, as any mountaineering, more or less solitary tribe would be; but as for this reawakening of innate Basqueness, I regard it as a bit of mysticism, perhaps a remnant of patriotism.

Among his personal tastes and preferences, the highest are intellectual. "I believe that one can tire of anything except knowing. I, at least, tire of people; I believe I should tire of wealth and of women; but of knowing, of comprehending the reason of things, I believe I should never tire." His idea of glory is a

1. 6p25cf. Repeated in 5p222c  I. See his Anthropology
2. 13p177a, Larranaga
3. 8p289bc, López del Castillo
pleasant after-dinner conversation. Intimacy with intelligent people is what he likes best; let others have the trappings. He even likes to treat in an intellectual way with Jews (N.I.), which, for him, is an extent of magnanimity that denotes an overwhelming interest in discussion. His later Apollonian tendency is even bringing him a belated interest in Greek culture (see above: his anti-Hellenism):

It is possible that if I were young and unoccupied I should begin to study Greek.

As I feel now, there are, so to speak, two sides to Greece: one, that of the statues and temples, which always has seemed academic and somewhat cold to me; the other, that of the philosophers and tragedians (N.II.), which gives me a stronger impression of life and humanity.

Though he expressly puts his intellectual interests first, from what I have quoted it is evident that much even of them depends on his interest in people. His philosophy is largely written in dialogue, and serves to characterize the persons who utter it. Interest in a

1. Somewhere he speaks of liking to chat with a Jew de perfil aguileno; and in another place the printer Jesus says to his Jewish fellow, "You already know, Yaco, that an abyss of ideas separates us; but in spite of this, if you want to accept a Christian's invitation, I invite you to a glass." (11p42). This willingness to parley with the enemy is characteristic of Pio.

II. I imagine Baroje is thinking here of the Birth of Tragedy; there is even something of Dionysianism and Apollonianism in this division.
man and interest in a man's ideas are simultaneous with him. Pure metaphysics, though he claims to like it, does not occupy much of his attention; ideas are personalities, not abstractions, with him. "I am not a pundit; philological and grammatical questions do not interest me--indeed, I am not even acquainted with them. What interests me is my life, the life of the people about me and art, as a reflection of life." Even in philosophy he cares as much for the personality of the great Greek philosophers, and presumably also of others, as for their systems. "... I should prefer, if such existed, a few letters, a few haberdasher's or washerwoman's stories about one of them, to the Lives of Diogenes Laertius ((this statement is quite a fortiori, for he speaks many times of Diogenes Laertius with estimation)) and Plutarch."

Those Pío likes best are modest people and people who, if they are superior, are humble or unaffected in their superiority. "I am not entertained," says Larráñaga, "hearing two commissioners talk--it is such a common thing; but I like to hear two farmers or two sailors." Larráñaga prefers the modest woman. Speaking of a poised young aristocrat who was sure enough of his

1. 5p159
2. 13p241b
3. 9p72c
position not to feel a need to impress others with it, Larrañaga says, "That is going ahead. One needs firmness and assurance to proceed so. What I like to observe is that when I see someone who has progressed, but progressed well, I feel no antipathy." It is the rarity of these types that draws him; even abnormal rarity has, as I have pointed out, an attraction for him. When he can see an individual apart from the mass that he detests—can see him as an individual—, then his interest and sympathy are aroused. So he can with perfect logic say that for him men are repellent in mass and attractive as individuals—another aspect of his individualism. Naturally those easiest to see apart from the mass are the more anomalous types. The ordinary complacent burgher he cannot endure; we have seen that complacency is foreign to his nature.

After having known and lived with people of politics and of police, usurers, soldiers, mimes, adventurers of every sort and of the worst stamp, do you know whom I despise most? The ordinary man, the one they call a good family man. What miserable underlings! Him, really, I'd squash, I'd squelch him like a louse

I understand the pleasure one can have in cannonading a city of merchants and notaries; it is like wrecking a nest of vipers of a hive of wasps.

1. 13p255c
2. Cf. 12p106bc
3. 8p185cf
López del Castillo is perhaps too vehement to be expressing the author's true sentiment; but we know that Baroja feels pretty intensely on the subject. Though he has "great antipathy for a war like this latest one, huge, cumbersome, stupid," yet he says, "... it gratifies me to have as fellow countrymen the Duke of Alba and his men"; such men are preferable to the "merchant, the peaceful man, the Jew."

His love of truth I have already mentioned; this specifically takes form in a disgust with hypocrisy. "That a favor produces a disfavor, what is one to do about it!--such is man; that friend discredits friend--one need not be astonished; that woman esteems the fool more than the great soul--that is nothing to wonder at; what disgusts me is falsehood-seeing black and saying it is blue, acting like a swine and pretending to be an angel--this revolts me even though it, too, is natural." It is but another article in his rational constitution.

His distaste for bigness can also be easily integrated into his feeling for rationality. He says somewhere that men cannot go beyond themselves, cannot produce anything bigger than they. Hence anything that touts bigness is in reality telling a lie. "Big states,

1. 9p43off, Larrañaga
2. 8pl05ab, López del Castillo
big captains, big kings, big gods, leave me cold." Big things are for the people who live on the plains, where nature is big—the Chinese, Indians, Germans, and French. Those who live in the little states of the Pyrenees and Alps like things on a modester scale. Mechanization in the modern state has this same flavor of bigness, and he loathes it.

Among his minor tastes is a dislike of excessive affability and personal inquisitiveness. He prefers cats to dogs for this reason. The dog, he says, "seems an animal of the Christian era; the cat, however, is completely pagan," and more aristocratic and independent; the dog is too affectionate. Books he keeps to use, not to mander over. His reclusiveness and individualism appear once more, with their aversion to sentimental attachments. He is fond of the sea with its impersonality and prefers autumn to other seasons and a gray day to a day with strong sunshine; but he still delights in night fireworks. In music he likes the modest best. He does not care for the philharmonics, especially the wagnerites; but he likes waltzes, preferring Weber's and Strauss's; he cares less for Chopin, whom he calls "lachrymose and melodramatic" in his waltzes. "Chopin is the height of the sublime for the good burgher. For my
taste he is too gesticulative." Melancholy is his
dominant mood with music, "I do not understand why joyful
and brilliant music fills me with something akin to
sorrow, like an inward aching. Surely it is something
that does not depend on the music itself, but on the
sinuous pathways of the soul." His father was a musician
of sorts, which probably accounts for Baroja's interest
and possibly even for the melancholy reminiscence. He
has a fondness on a small scale for antiquities, having
collected some old papers and curious stamps, and if I
remember rightly, a few rare books.

He has already hinted that he is an anarchist in
politics; that does not mean he is a dynamiter. It is
an anarchism directed against modern uncivilized so-
ciety. One of his characters gives as his reasons for
anarchism, "Since I have seen the atrocities that are
committed in the world; since I have seen how a piece of
humanity is handed coldly over to death; since I have
seen how men die helpless in streets and hospitals."
And the same man gives his dream of what he would like
to see in the world: harmony, with the law of love
superseding the law of duty, and "the horizon of hu-
manity every day broader, every day bluer," no more

1. 2p408
2. 2p409b
3. 5p336a
4. 1lp257bc
5. 1lp358cf
soldiers nor powers. From another point of view Baroja is as much conservative as revolutionary, as he himself indicates speaking of Larrañaga, who disliked to see the oncoming standardization and mechanization of society. As for his own personal conduct, probably no better, more decorous citizen ever lived than he; seeing how little profitable goodness and honesty are, however, is one of the reasons for his spleen (N.I.). Though organized religion gets much of the invective he aims at modern barbarism, it is plain that Baroja is not far from primitive Christianity; he says of Silvestre Paradox that he was "half-Christian." As for the cult of the army, he hates it. "I am an anti-militarist by inheritance. The Besques never have been soldiers in the regular army. Probably my great-grandfather Nessi came from Italy as a deserter. I have always had a deep loathing for the barracks, the mess-room, and officers." He has assiduously kept out of the army. But anarchists, like everyone else, have to make shift to live; and for that reason, if for none other, are not flagrant violators of law. His anarchism is partly mixed with monarchism: "... in politics, with my extremes, I feel an anarchist and a monarchist, and in religion an atheist and a Catholic." "I believe that monarchy, above all the

1. 12p43cf
2. 5p212ff
3. 5p270c

I. Cf. 12p103bc
House of Austria, contributed in Spain to keeping her
European and to eliminating Semitic and African ele-
ments which would have ruined her."

In religion as well as in politics the middle
ground has no charms for him; Protestantism as well as
democracy and socialism is the butt of many mordant
criticisms. Baroja is half-Catholic. "When I am in a
Spanish town and the weather is suffocating and I
enter a cathedral, I find myself so cool, so to my
liking, that Catholicism seems to me then very wise." 2
There is another reason, of course: it is a momentary
restful gravitating back to the beliefs of his childhood,
to the old familiar stimuli.

I believe that with the advancing years, though
the old hostility against society is still alive, Baroja
has become more resigned to the uselessness of trying to
check the tide. In his later books he is more occupied
with finding reasons for things as they are than in
contending against them.

1. 13p54, Larrañaga
2. 13p55, Larrañaga
Baroja as a Novelist (N.I.)

Though an inconsiderate critic might lay the statement at the door of "occupational centrism," Baroja assures us that the day of the novel is by no means past. "That there is a need for the modern man to read it, there is no doubt." For some it is a door open to new experiences; for others it is an anodyne; but there is a need for it. It may take a hundred Protean forms; "it is quite possible, even probable that it will vary, evolve, and change radically"; but there is no other form of literature to replace it; it is a "seek that everything fits in." "One may write today the same as a hundred years ago--a hundred years from now the same as today," says Larrañaga. Lacking a definite quantitative basis, a fixed metrics, novelism must, however, always be somewhat insecure and unscientific.

He believes in the novel of pure art, and gives it an existence rather like that of a Platonic idea.

There exists the possibility of making a clear, limpid, serene novel of pure art, without philosophical disquisitions, dissertations, or psychological analyses, like a Mozart sonata; but it is only possibility, for we know of no novel that approaches that ideal.

Such a novel would need to have not one superfluous word.

1. 22p145
2. Páginas Escogidas, p101
3. 17p141a. Cp. 23p17eff
4. 23p45f

I. For the novelistic principles, the best exposition is to be found in the introduction to Páginas Escogidas and in the introduction to La Nave de los Locos.
Naturally for a generation preoccupied with social questions it is impossible.

It is regrettable, however, that the novel and other forms of art and literature have had to be prostituted to so many ulterior uses. Literature has been turned into commonplace journalism—made a trade, dependent on the freaks of the buying crowd, like the reputation of an actor. Writers are salaried like shoe-clerks; and "the salaried writer has never been anything but a disguised lickspittle." On this account he believes that the book, and not the journal, will be the literary form of the future:

Literary art will be realized in the newspaper or in the book. I believe it will be the book. The individual stands above the mass. In the newspaper the writer directs himself to the public; in the book the public directs itself to the writer.

Art has been industrialized and socialized to the point of extinction as art; and the critics have been largely to blame for it. He speaks of a "Society half industrial, half commercial, directed principally by Jewish dealers, artists of scanty learning, journalists, collectors, materialists, and critics, who manage this art question and turn it into a great international business."

The critics receive the first volley, I suppose because their disapproval is the first to be voiced, and likely the least sincere, since they must keep one ear attuned

1. 23p21
2. 13p209, Larrañaga
3. 22p145
to public opinion while they are passing judgment. Those upright gentlemen who cry in a loud voice defending ideals and traditions he says are like the house-servants who noisily shoo away a tramp to show their dutiousness. He complained against criticism in 1902 "because it takes away the public's spontaneity." Besides, it has no really critical value: "... there is such a quantity of commonplaces on the idea of style that one would have to examine the meaning of the words, and in the end it is possible we should not understand each other," he says, speaking of criticisms of his style. In order to criticize an author it is first necessary that the critic be amply conversant with the author's works; but since most critics essay everything from Greenland to Genesis and are limited by their personal interests to boot, their opinions can scarcely be authoritative.

But skirmishes with critics have always been in the day's work with a novelist. The larger fact of Baroja's international success among the literati is reasonable proof of the value of his method.

He belongs to the school of the realists, and verges, in the somewhat accentuated minor note of his novels, on that of the naturalists. In a defense of realism he

1. 5p126
2. 6p217b
3. 5p101
4. 19p162f
he attacks the theories of Ortega y Gasset, who upholds a dualism in literature, dividing the "patrician" and "plebeian" types from each other. This is illogical, he says (through Guezurtegui): one type is no more worthy than another; realism is not necessarily slavish, arising from the subversive impulses of the servant, but is equally as creative as the vapid chivalric literature which is no longer read. (N.I.) To be a realist, furthermore, it is not necessary, as some assert, to be disinterested—in fact, total detachment is impossible; for the author to like one character, dislike another, speak through the mouth of a third, and interpolate editorial comments ad libitum is all quite legitimate.

His mode of writing, as he has already said, differs from that of the naturalists in that he takes his notes some time after the event. If he omits one side of reality, the life of the wealthy, it is because he finds it lacking in variety; the rich all have the same occupation amusing themselves; but the poor take a thousand ways to live and earn. One of the principal reasons for his fondness for Dickens is the fact that Dickens writes of the poor and lowly, seeing in them artistic worth. In

1. 19p68ff. Cp. 23p41f
2. 23p44bf
3. 2p78ff
4. 12p72b, Larrañaga
5. See 4p283b & 13p218b

I. In this he is defending himself also against Nietzsche, who could easily be the source of this idea of Ortega y Gasset.
another way he differs from naturalistic practice, though perhaps not necessarily from naturalistic theory; he never writes for effect, never "idealizes downward" to be striking, never exaggerates an incident because it is spectacular. I do not recall a single description of a battle in any of Baroja's novels that I have read; at times this avoidance of efectismo gives a feeling of anticlimax; one comes on an incident that another writer (Blesco Ibáñez, for example, as Baroja himself points out) would have dwelt upon, and finds it dismissed as if quite inconsequential. This is, as he puts it, being a "private," not a "public" novelist. He scorns to turn any trick with the purpose of commercializing his art; he writes for the "love of the things themselves," and not for gain.

"I believe that in literature and in art everything is possible for the sincere man." There is no part of reality which is unworthy of being represented in literature, and no form nor period of literature that has not left some monument of lasting value. "I do not believe it may be considered indispensable for a literary work to be realistic or idealistic in order to amount to something. . . . from all these periods important works have remained, which demonstrates that with any

1. 2p78ff
2. 23pl1a
3. 2p19. Cp. 23p15
tendency something, and something very good, can be pro-
duced;" and strangely enough, though himself a realist,
Baroja prefers the work of other schools. He says that
he does not care for realistic books, but has too little
imagination to write the other kind. "As to books, I
... prefer the invented literary work to that copied
from reality or from ancient works; anything that is no
more than imitation undoubtedly has little value."
Mathematical novels with maps and other apparatus, that
appear very realistic to the uninitiate but are really
like complicated clock-work, he has never written. The
same is true of what he calls the "limited" novel—one
excessively immured and final. (N.I.) "Limitation seems
all right to me to the point of coming to enjoy the
visual perspective of the mole, but always with the hope
of being able to have at times the scope and eye of the
eagle."

Baroja's realism is best and most evident in his
terse delineations of character. Accentuating the dif-
f erences among men, he offers an array of persons that
are hard to forget because of the clarity with which he
outlines them. Taking them one at a time he flashes them
before us in a way that drives the impression deep. It
is wrong and inartistic, he believes to amplify characters,

1. Páginas Escoridas, p23 I. Cf. Appendix, "Apollonian and
Dionysian," for this concept of
limitation.
for to do so one must depend too much on rhetoric and fancy. There are no collective pictures in Baroja's writings. Mob-scenes, armies, socials, and congregations of other kinds are almost entirely absent. He emphasizes the individual. If a company are gathered together, usually he treats the individuals one at a time and lets them talk one at a time. "Classical art," he writes, "attemptsto make one believe that man does not change."

For that reason it deliberately ignores character, attributes, the picturesque, in order in order to give an impression of continuity.

On the other hand, romanticism is based on the sum total of differences, affirming the misunderstanding of the man of one epoch for the man of another, for the man of one nation for the man of another--which I believe truer at bottom.

In this tendency to descreteness he becomes sometimes too categorical: he dismisses a character with too commmatic a treatment, or endeavors to characterize a whole people in a few words, though recognizing that that will not do--a bent for utterness. For the reason he has stated, the misunderstanding of one period for another, he finds it more realistic to write novels of nearly contemporary times. Though the romanticist rightly viewed his characters individualistically, as discrete and impervious, most of his novels were put at too remote a

1. 23p34ff
2. 6p35ab
time for him to understand their characters. It is further almost impossible to write realistically of long ago because of the plethora that has already been written--one has two lines of text for two pages of gloss. But when Baroja does write of a historical figure, he prefers to know the man as he really was, not as he has been represented to us in his writings, for instance, for that side is but a fraction of his personality. Baroja has spent years gathering the material for his Memorias de un Hombre de Acción; and in none of the series I have read does he represent a character in the light of his political significance; the data are all brought to bear on the man as a man. This fact he expressly states as true of his interest in historical figures "rather than in their decrees." The fact that he likes to use unusual characters is not unrealistic, but is the sensible choice of a field that interests him and that has not been rendered effete by too much exploiting. He copies all but his principal type (whom he says he "invents") from reality, though he realizes how difficult it is to penetrate the mask behind which most people live. He finds "inventing" a difficult task, for the invented character must be synthetic and universal, and demands great imagination of his creator; the greatest writers are those who have produced these

1. 6p35ff
2. 5p163
3. Páginas Escogidas, p18
immortal types—Cervantes, Shakespeare, Defoe.

He has been accused of lacking psychological penetration in his characterizations; but he retorts, effectively I think, that it cannot be shown that any modern writer has drawn characters whose psychology and conduct are in perfect accord—whose actions can be deduced from known psychology is really simpler than that of the normal one, can a measure of consistency be attained—and the greatest of our heroes have been mad: Quixote, Hamlet, Raskolnikof. Baroja has chosen normal characters.

One who has never read Baroja is apt, on first taking up one of his books, to regard the style as unduly fragmentary. To the person who is accustomed to novels with painstakingly lucubrated plots, Baroja seems to be putting down ideas just as they jostle through his head. Part of this is due to his dislike of over-emphasizing any incident, which leads him to accumulate events in rather rapid succession. More of it is due to his attention to details. "I believe that at present in literature the only possible originality is in the details," he says, other phases having been exhausted. "A book which begins with this intention cannot have an architectural plan, and this does not have one," is an apology which would fit most of his books. "I am not a
partisan of academic and well-composed books; so I like Diogenes Laertius better than Plutarch. Plutarch gives me the impression that he composes and arranges his narratives; no so Diogenes Laertius . . . ." He further justifies this episodic arrangement by sustaining that it is less boresome and more suitable for the person who has to read intermittently, as most of us do when reading novels: "One goes along, one is amused, one is bored, and on to the next"; but the idea came after the inclination, I suspect, for I do not recollect any of his fiction, long or short, after the very earliest attempts, that is not in this style. I do not know whether Baroja has imitated anyone in this respect or not. He mentions again and again the Pickwick Papers (N.I.), which certainly are episodic, though their author said he "could perhaps wish now that these chapters were strung together on a stronger thread of general interest."

There might even possibly be an imitation of Nietzsche, whose aphoristic style is noteworthy; in fact, Baroja says of Juventud, Ecolatria, "I do not know whether there are imitations in this book. The tone appears patterned on Nietzsche, but the fact is that it has happened that way without my intending it." I rather believe, however,

1. 5pl58b
2. Páginas Escogidas, p476

I. Páginas Escogidas 11, e.g.,'in this
same connection.
that the reason is a temperamental one with Baroja—his dislike of staying long with a single task.

His unburnished style is jarring to a good many readers. Except possibly in some descriptions, where he can still polish a phrase with the care he took when he first began to write, his concern is with what he says and not how he says it. It is his aim to make his writing as logical as possible, which often makes it necessary to sacrifice elegance, though not beauty, necessarily, if one considers logic "as it were, the support of all the beautiful." He shuns the turns of phrase that are used merely for adornment or effect, and those which are stereotyped and habitual but meaningless; but he does not categorically condemn writing for effect. It is all right for those who have been brought up in a culture that sanctions it, and with whom in such a way comes naturally, to use rhetorical language; but for him, a Basque, it is not right to put on Castilian airs, (N.I.) He rejects embellishment of any sort in his writing. He dislikes the "frilled butterfly-dance" of Heine's style. He considers classical allusions as trite.

I. Páginas Escogidas, p24 I. No two things could be more antipodal than the style of Nietzsche and the prose style of Baroja. A grammarian might toil for hours to diagram one of Nietzsche's sentences, so involved and full of by-paths they are; but Baroja is straightforward, even brusque. Yet
"Rhetoric in minor tone" is his literary ideal—language without bombast and solemnity, unless there be occasion for solemnity, and without presuming familiarity—a style in short, without affectation, designed to suit the idea it expresses, sustaining his desire for appropriateness in all things. In one way he carries his precision perhaps a trifle too far; he introduces many scientific, especially medical, terms. "Brachycephalic" and "dolichocephalic" are two of his favorites, and are to be met with frequently. Then the terms "Dionysian" and "Apollonian" are apt to be confusing to one unfamiliar with Nietzsche's terminology. I have already mentioned the fact that philosophical terms are used quite freely; "phenomenal world," for instance. (N.I.)

Those who are accustomed to the rhythmic flow of idiom are apt to find Baroja's style discordant, as he himself points out. "People believe they think when they are using the mechanics learned from language." One who violates these mechanics in an effort actually to think

Note I cont'd from p. 63: there is one similarity—the piling up of synonyms and complements, which Baroja justifies, (see Logic) and Nietzsche consistently uses, as in this sentence: "... for all life rests on appearance, art, illusion, optics, necessity of perspective and error." (BT 10.) Consider what Baroja says of music lovers: "... lovers of music are people a bit common, envious, soured, and subdued." I. See 10p 69b
exposes himself to the criticism of not knowing how to use the language; but anyone can repeat platitudes.

Baroja would rather sacrifice rhythm and fit the cloak of language to his measure than to fit his measure to the cloak; to the independent writer language is a means, not an end.

The movement away from stylistic language has been gradual; the earlier writings all show a regard for rhythm and cadence, and Baroja has reserved to himself a kind of "poetry" where he may still be as rhythmic as he pleases. He is very modest about it—insinuates his "verse" under the signature of one or another of his characters, and turns attention from himself by alleging that his memory is too bad for him to poetize. This "poetry" is a kind of poetic prose, and may possible be an imitation of Nietzsche's dithyrambic style (Baroja calls Zarathustra a poem). Consider this example from El Laberinto de los Sirenas, which, besides sounding like Nietzsche, takes the nucleus phrase, "The great Pan has died," from an anecdote in The Birth of Tragedy (N.I.), and is a sort of elegy of the Dionysian Spirit:

The sons of Sem have forever conquered the men of other races; the desert has overame the wood and

1. 5pl01
2. 5pl01
3. 2p78ff

1. "Even as certain Greek sailors in the time of Tiberius once heard upon a lonesome island the thrilling cry, 'great Pan is dead': so now as it were sorrowful wailing sounded through the Hellenic world: 'Tragedy is dead! Poetry itself has perished with her! . . . ". (Sec. 11)
the forest; the dune, the pure fountain; narrow
practicality, ideal fervor; unity, variety;
slavery, freedom; rancor, the calm and equable
spirit; rude and universal monotheism, the
smiling local cults.

The Great Pan has died!

... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.We shall behold our bodies with loathing.
(N.I.) We shall prove the vacuum of nature and
pass our gaze with sadness and horror over all
the emptiness of the earth, saddened by the de-
luded hierophants of the lands of the South . . .
The GreatPan has died!

There are many more of these in the same book; there is
one at the lastof the Caverna del Humorismo; and there
are a few elsewhere. Many descriptions, too, are in
poetic vein; I take a fragment from Horas Solitarias:

I have approached the fire, which is now
dying out. The moon has appeared in the sky.
Great, murky clouds of reddish smoke rise from
the fire and drag heavily along the ground until
finally they rise into the air.

The mood of this passage as a whole is definitely pen-
sive. In the same volume (367ff) is a whimsical picture
of autumn, Baroja's favorite season.

Poetry is a kind of music of language. The general
idea corresponds to harmony, the words to rhythm. But
words by themselves as sounds, unless onomatopoetic, have
no musical value; for in order to be musical they would

1. 4p263f
2. 2p285
3. 19p147f

I. An oft-repeated idea in Nietzsche.
have to produce some emotion, which they never do as sounds but only as symbols—i.e., to a person who does not understand the language their emotional value is zero, whereas to one who understands the symbolism, it is very high.

I conceive a poetry on the basis of a strong impression and a parallel rhythm to serve it as a complement.

The words and ideas would come after the impression and the rhythm.

For me poetry is at one extreme of the intellectual, almost on the borderland of music; for that reason I conceive of poetry without concepts; what I do not understand is poetry without tempo. It seems to me that in poetry the concept is almost always superfluous.

Like much aesthetic theorizing, this is a bit nubilous; but I believe that in the main Baroja's poetic prose measures up to the definition. As will appear in the general discussion of his aesthetic, he has small dealings with the modernists.

Then an elegant, very effeminate youth read a poem, or something like a poem, giving the impressions of an airplane trip. They were such fleet impressions that there was no noticeable relationship among them. One thing went to another with telegraphic celerity. It spoke, besides, of dizzy immobility, joyful desperations, artless irony, blessed blasphemies, friendly terrors, and the holiness of the wicked poets.

That is the aesthetic of waggery, says Larrañaga. Poetry has outlived its social mission; the poetic oracle is a bit ridiculous.

1. 19p142ff
2. 2p45a
3. 13p258ab
4. 23p 41a
I have already said that Baroja's descriptions are oftentimes lyric; they are furthermore always laconical. The prolix descriptions of another day have left no impression on his writings. Description is integral with character: "... be it mannerism or habit, I could not speak of any person whatever if I did not know where he lived and in what atmosphere he moved." And it is useful as a kind of punctuation, to separate one part from another. The Azonías de Nuestro Tiempo are exemplary of this use: at the beginning of each chapter is an excerpt purporting to come from some unfinished writing of the author; it is generally description.

Jocularity is not one of Baroja's specialties. While still in the experimental stage he tried to imitate Dickens's humor in Silvestre Paradox, but without great success. He is adept with irony, however; and with a whimsical humor in treating of his own experiences. Book II of the Horas Solitarias, for instance, of which Baroja himself is the hero, is quite genially humorous; perhaps the writer who said Baroja never learned to smile (N.I.), has not encountered this. It is true that he pricks oftener than he tickles; but that, I surmise, is because in his capacity of impartial critic he has been made the target of considerable billingsgate; if his rebuttals have been vigorous, or even at times vituperative, it

1. Páginas Escocidas, p21 I. History of Spanish Literature, Mérimée and Morley, p559c
is not hard to account for. But still Baroja follows Nietzsche's counsel in being grateful to his enemies. He welcomes opposition: "... in literature, personality has to be considerably beaten to egest its scoria." He is glad of this generous beating from others, to be rid of his dross.

Severe as Baroja may be with conventionalism, he never himself slips the leash of propriety in his speech. He generally minces his oaths with abbreviations (N.I.), he never writes pornography, and when he speaks of disagreeable subjects he never has, as Nietzsche said Zola had, the "love of stinking"; he does not appear to want the stench so he may have something to write about, but only deplores it, as a doctor speaks with regret of his patient's malady; it is something that should not be; he never takes it for granted.

What stylistic tricks one finds are those that fit his general scheme of appropriateness. In the Gran Torbellino del Mundo, for instance, is a letter from a girl, in which he imitates a feminine style, repeating such expressions as "enchanted," "precious," "superb plaza," "magnificent park," etc. He is an artificer on occasion.

1. 5pl13  
2. 12p266ff  
I. 2pl46, e.g.
One little habitue is sometimes annoying, and, in view of his worship of logicality, quite out of place—his frequent use of sobriquets. He will speak one moment of Nietzsche, and the next refer to him as "the author of Zarathustra." Here is an example: "Of course the same thing occurs in the works of Zola; but the author of Les Rougon-Macquart, being an honorable . . . ", etc. He should read (supposing it is translated) that brilliant little essay of Arthur Quiller-Couch, "On Jargon."

How far Baroja regards himself as an artist may be gathered from what he says above of stopping on the first step of Apollo's temple. His Dionysianism somewhat overshadows his artistry. Like most other artists he would like to evolve in his art, but finds it hard to do so. Most artistry, if it is to be present at all, must be present to begin with. The "life, fiber, energy, or romanticism" that an author has must be his ab initio, for they are not acquired. One learns very little in novel-writing. So rules for the edification of others are not of much value. Indeed, rules of any sort are not to Baroja's fancy. Though he understands the reasonableness of the editor's demand for definite form and

1. 22p95bc
2. 5p58f
3. 2p78ff
convention in a book, nevertheless he would like one
"which has neither beginning nor end." The novel should
be complete in itself, but overflow its bounds; it
should have "a finality without end."

I believe his novels may be divided into two
major types: the novels of customs, dealing with life
in city slums, being mainly the earlier novels, and the
philosophical novels, with barely a thread of narrative
to sustain the conversations about all and sundry. The
protagonist in either class is a man who has suffered
social disaster; in the first he is generally an outcast,
in the second a failure. Those of the first group are a
kind of modern picaresque novel.

He says all his literary inspirations come from Vas-
conia and Castile, and that he is to this extent a re-
gionalist.

Aside from novels he has not written a great deal.
He has never undertaken the drama except in a very small
way (N.I.) because it does not allow him the freedom he
requires for writing. With novels he never feels a need

1. 9p7
2. 23p20b
3. 5p75

I. His play Adiós a la Bohemia was enacted in
1923 (see note to page 560, Mérimée and Morley's
History). In 1926 he published two gainetes,
Chinchín, Comedianta, and Arlequín, Mancebo de
Botica; in the prologue to the volume (Entre-
tenimientos) a third is mentioned, Los Libreros
de Viejo, with some depreciation, but not pub-
lished. La Leyenda de Jaun de Alzate, 1922,
is dialogued. The Mayorazgo de Labraz has been
dramatized, presumably by Baroja himself (see
González Ruano, Azorín, Baroja, p139f).
to consider his public; but when he attempts to write
drama the public is so imminent and so exacting, that he
is too much restrained to write effectively. Besides, he
cares little for the theater of any period. He did ex-
press certain opinions about drama, however, in his
short career as dramatic critic in 1902. A drama should
spring from the dramatist's understanding of human nature
rather than be excogitated; plot and characters should
grow side by side—not be separately invented and then
coadjunated. This is consistent with his ideal of fit-
ness; so we may infer he still believes it. More lately
he has begun to think that drama may be at the end of its
rope.

Creating anything new in the theater seems to me impossible.

The theater, as a pure art, just like painting, sculpture, architecture, and perhaps also music,
is a closed, circumvallated, complete art, which has exhausted its material; an art that has passed
from the period of culture to that of civilization, as Houston Stewart Chamberlain and the modern
author of the Decline of the West would say. The theater a long time ago stopped inventing, in order
to repeat.

He has already said that the only possibility of original-
ity in literature is in the details; but drama is at a
worse pis aller because things there have to be writ
large--details are out of the question. Invention is
still possible in the novel, but not in the drama.

1. 6p230f
2. 2p400bc
3. 6p190bc
4. 60228b
5. 60229
6. 23p22
Should literature have an ulterior purpose? When Baroja was more under the influence of Nietzsche than he likes to think he is now, he declared that literature should "immoralize." (N.I.) Immoralizing, that is, presenting in a favorable light facts thought by convention to be immoral, as a sort of catharsis, is a good thing. "I believe that immoralizing is a beneficial task, a meritorious task, above all in societies like ours, replete with stale prejudices and archaic preoccupations." This may be done in literary works, which will then be "suitable to throw a little this cold, harsh life that we all suffer because of respecting a parcel of conventionalisms and a parcel of follies that serve for nothing but to embitter existence." In the novels of customs this program was largely carried out, and produced Baroja's most virile books. The Struggle for Life series I think will lay surest claim to permanence. Whether he changed his mind, or felt that he had exhausted the possibilities of immoralizing, I do not know. At any rate he now seems to feel that literature should not bother about morality nor have an ethical purpose. "Nor thesis, nor conclusions, nor the great moral, nor the little moral...." In practice, however, he continues to immoralize on occasion, although perhaps the instancy

1. 6p205ff. This term is, I suspect, borrowed from Nietzsche, who repeatedly speaks of himself as an "immoralist"; Ti, maxim 36, for example. The tone of this quotation is Nietzschean also.
of his immoralizing is not so great as it once was.
More recently he has said that the morality of literature should be "play-morality"—the kind of clean, chivalrous morality that is free to be genuinely moral because it is divorced from the need for egoism and partiality that is present in a hurly-burly world scrambling for bread.

As to possible influences wielded by other writers I have already mentioned Nietzsche and Dickens. (N.I.) The type Silvestre Paradox, although it bears little resemblance to Pickwick, is reminiscent of the latter in that Baroja speaks of Silvestre as the "famous man," "great scientist," etc., in the same humorous way as Dickens. We know he had already read the Pickwick Papers, as it is mentioned on page 99. Also the idea for the comic title of H. Pinkis, Esq., P.F.B.C.S. (President of the Football and Cricket Society) in the Nuevo Tablado de Arlequín very probably is copied from Samuel Pickwick, Esq., G.C.M.B.C. But these influences are more or less incidental. I do not believe that there is any strong impress of any fellow writer on the totality of Baroja's works. Another name, that of Galdós, has been mentioned in connection with the

1. 5p125a, Cp. 25p10b
2. 10p93b, e.g.

I. The type of novel represented by the Struggle for Life series has, he says, one of its antecedents in Dickens. (Páginas Escogidas, p136ab.)
Historical novels; but he scouts the suggestion. (N.I.)

There remain a few opinions on other writers to consider. Nietzsche he calls a "great poet." Ruben Darío is a man "of talent purely verbal," an "unimaginative snob." Becquer and Espronceda he considers the only poets of true feeling in Nineteenth Century Spain. He also ventriloquizes through Larrañaga that he likes Dostoeievsky for his depiction of extra-social types (possibly an influence there?), and dislikes Anatole France because he is "academic and mannered."

The value of Dostoeievsky . . . is in his mixture of exquisite sensitiveness, brutality, and Sadism, in his morbid and yet powerful fantasy in which all the life which he represents in his novels is integrally pathological for the first time in literature, and in which this life is flooded with the strong, eluded light of an epileptic and a mystic.

The French as a whole have had to take their models from outside in portraying outlanders (because they are the social nation par excellence, I suppose; Baroja will

1. 6p32ff I. Prof. Berkowitz has copies of letters from
2. 5p36 Baroja to Galdós with the greeting, "Dear
3. 12p25c Master." Also it appears that Baroja's novels
4. 12p69cf were with one or two others' almost the only
5. 12p45a contemporary Spanish novels in Galdós's li-
6. 23p32cf brary that were not left uncut; Prof. Berkowit-
7. 6p32ff z suggests that Galdós may have regard-
8. 5p36 ded these two or three as his closest dis-
9. 12p25c ciples. The two men are on about the same
10. 12p69cf intellectual plane; they are of the same race
11. 12p45a and not far apart in years; they have attemp-
12. 23p32cf ted, perhaps by chance, kindred subjects;
13. 6p32ff Galdós has unquestionably influenced broadly
14. 5p36 the whole of literate Spain; but beyond this
15. 12p25c I think the special parallelism does not
16. 12p69cf extend far.
resume this later).

You wish to be fantasists or mad or anomalous decadents? Then here is the prototype of fantasy, decadence, anomaly, or madness. Sometimes it is Dickens, others Poe, others Goya, others Wagner, others Dostoevsky, others Nietzsche.

As for Spanish novelists of the Nineteenth Century, they have never appealed to him; this is perhaps related to his feeling of the impassable gulf between one age and another. He also feels that in the past thirty years little or nothing truly new or original has come into the novel. He has expressed himself about Gorki, Bret Harte, Rudyard Kipling, and others, but always summarily; he has nowhere attempted a detailed criticism.
PART II

The Philosopher.
The Philosophy.

I suppose we may call it the search for truth. one needs a certain temerity to venture that venerable definition with its initial predication; but for this purpose it will serve tentatively.

Searching for the truth is the goal of science, and is "intellectualism." Is intellectualism worth while?

"Intellectualism is sterile. Germany itself, which has had the scepter of intellectualism, today apparently renounces it. In present-day Germany there are hardly any philosophers; everybody is eager for practical life." (N.I.)

So thinks Iturrioz in El Arbol de la Ciencia, in which Baroja seems to be dissociating his personality into two men, Iturrioz and Andrés, the one sustaining the "human" point of view, the other the scientific.

Analysis should be pushed to every field, says Andrés; but that, according to Iturrioz, is anti-biological. Both men agree that falsehood is probably a condition of life:

The appetite for knowing is awakened in the individuals who appear at the end of an evolution, when the instinct to live is languishing. (N.II.)

... The hale, vigorous, strong individual does not see things as they are, for it doesn't suit him to. He lives in a hallucination. Don Quixote, whom Cervantes wished to give a negative sense, is a symbol of the affirmation of life. (N.III.)

1. p195 2. p184a

1. "The Germans—they were once called a people of thinkers: do they really think at all at present? Nowadays the Germans are bored by intellect; politics have swallowed up all earnestness for really intellectual things..." (TIP51)

II. This is probably from the Birth of Tragedy.

III. A Nietzschean phrase.
The great defense of religion is in falsehood. Falsehood is the most vital thing man possesses. This great Maia of fiction sustains all the soffits of life, and when some fall it raises others.

If there were a solvent for falsehood, what surprises shouldn't we mortals have! Almost all the men we now see erect, stiff, with chest thrust out, we should see limp, dejected, and pathetic.

Falsehood is much more bracing than truth, almost always more tonic, and even more healthful. I learned that late. For utilitarianism, for practicality, we ought to seek falsehood, arbitrariness, limitation. And yet we do not seek them. Can we unwittingly own somewhat of the hero? (N.I.)

The Jews perceived this need for delusion and desiring strongly to live, deliberately chose it instead of truth.

The fruit of the tree of knowledge in their religion is not to be partaken of; that of life may be freely used.

How plainly one sees the practical sense of that Semitic rascality!... How those good Jews smelled out, with their hook-noses, the fact that the state of consciousness could compromise life! (N.II.)

In these dialogues Baroja appears to be telling us that even though science is destructive of all illusion, including the vital one and even life itself, he will follow it to the end.

1. 5p30
2. 15p185bc,

I. "Limitation" is a Nietzschean concept, and "Maia" used in this sense might come either from Schopenhauer or from Nietzsche.

II. This idea of a deliberate choice by the Jews is borrowed from Nietzsche. "The Jews are the most remarkable people in the history of the world, because when they were confronted with the question of Being or non-Being, with perfectly weird deliberateness, they preferred Being at any price: this price was the fundamental falsification of all Nature. . . ." (A, Sec. 24.)
Beroja is an eclectic. It may be somewhat of a task, therefore, to blend the sometimes apparently alien elements of his belief.

There will be two divisions, metaphysic and practical philosophy.
I. Metaphysic.

1. Ontology.

The most distinctive part of Baroja's philosophy is his pluralism, or "individualism" as he calls it. Its principles are most clearly set forth in the introduction to César o Nada, of which I here cite portions:

The individual is the only reality in nature and in life. Species, genus, race, at bottom do not exist; they are abstractions, means of designation, artifices of science, useful but not absolutely exact syntheses. With these artifices we discourse and compare; these artifices constitute a norm within ourselves, but have no external reality.

Only the individual exists a se and per se. I am, I live, is the only thing that man can affirm.

The groupings and separations formed by classification are like the squares that a sketcher puts before a figure to copy it better. The lines of the squares divide the contour of the sketch; but it divides them, not in reality, but only in the visual field of the sketcher.

In things human, as in all nature, the individual is everything. Only the individual exists in the field of life and in the field of the spirit. The individual is ungroupable and unclassifiable. The individual cannot absolutely fully enter a classification, especially if the classification has had an ethical principle for its norm. Ethics is a poor tailor to drape the figure of reality. (N.I.)

The ideas of the good, the logical, the just, the consequent, are too generic to be fully represented in nature.

The individual is not logical nor good nor just; he is simply that—by virtue of the fatality of things, by the influence of the aberration of the Earth's axis, or by any other equally amusing thing whatsoever. Everything individual invariably shows itself mixed, with absurdities of perspective and picturesque contradictions, contradictions and

I. "There are no moral phenomena, but only a moral interpretation of phenomena." WP, Sec.258 and BG, Apothegm 108.
absurdities that shock us, because we try to subject individuals to principles that are not their own.

This he follows by an analysis of the source of our synthetic tendencies, which he says are due to our living in a sort of moral alter mundus that detaches us from the world of the individual; we are brought up to believe in moral harmony, and accordingly look for it in nature, and overlook or explain away the strident discord of the individual.

But along with this pluralism is a tendency to monism:

Schelling's principle, "all is one and the same," is united in Haeckel's system with the materialistic principle, "all is matter." If I were told to choose between the two principles, I should elect the first as being nearer the truth; but neither of the two can be offered as scientific.

To say that "all is matter" would be tantamount to "closing the circle of knowledge," a thing that science has no right to do. One finds, furthermore, many references to the "Great All," especially relating to Baroja's Dionysianism. Now it is evident that any kind of monism is inferential; Baroja stresses the fact that man cannot go beyond himself; and to assert that all things form a unity is to assert what can never be proved, and what furthermore is a contradiction is one affirms the infinity of the universe: the unity of infinity is antilogical. But I believe that pluralism pushed to its
logical conclusion is no less inferential: one may affirm an individual only to find that the individual may be analyzed, and that its particles may be analyzed ad infinitum; one therefore runs into an infinite regression, which is inferential, or must posit the existence of the atom, which is also inferential. Thus one is brought to agnosticism, which is a third view of Baroja's. I shall take it up later.

What I wish to demonstrate is that pluralism and monism, like the two ends of a broken ring, though at opposite extremes, are not far apart. There is a certain observational basis and relative certainty, too, for both of them: one can see things functioning as a unit, and at the same time see their illimitable variety. They are things that can be touched, seen, and felt. Baroja essays a reconciliation. Meditating about a river, he says,

Of course this milennial river is not really a monadical thing. The water that flows by is always different. It is true that in everything the same occurs—everything is many and one at the same time, whether living or lifeless; only in the living thing does consciousness feel itself one.

The greatest advantage and converging point of pluralism and monism, is their common denial of dualism, which postulates a division that cannot be seen, touched, and felt. Pluralism and monism may ultimately be indeemonstrable, but we anti-dualists believe that dualism can be disproved.

1. 2p191a
Baroja takes up this question from the point of view of materialism. He recognizes that materialism is a dogma, and that we have no right to affirm matter as the absolute reality; but materialism as a method is impregnable. It "is more than a philosophical system: it is a scientific procedure that does not accept fantasies or caprices." We insist on materialism, he says, "Not because we believe that matter exists just as we see it, but because it is the way to annul stupid fancies, the mysteries that begin with great circumspection and end by filching the money from our purse." In nature either everything or nothing is miraculous; there is no dualism of natural and supernatural. "To try by the ordinary cognitive means to find the supernatural is as absurd as to try to make lines without points or polygons without lines." Rather than explaining the problems of nature, supernaturalism adds one more problem.

It is safe to say that Baroja, if not a materialist, is at least a naturalist. In so far as he attemptsto explain the world, he explains it in terms of itself. Anything that savors of mysticism or supernaturalism he avoids. When he says that he rejoices to call himself, in Horace's words, a "pig of the Epicurean herd," I do not believe we have a right to call him an atomist and therefore a materialist; his Epicureanism does not go so far.

1. 5p29
2. 5p29
3. 5p108
4. 12p109
He sees a resurrection of the old dualism in the dichotomy of life and non-life, and he rejects that also.

The hyena that strips the bones of a corpse, the spider that sucks a fly, do neither more nor less than the kindly tree drawing up from the earth the water and salts necessary for its life. He would say of course that there is a dualism of degree, but would deny that there is a dualism of kind. But he himself has slipped into a dualism with his Dionysianism and Apollonianism; this I shall treat more at length under "Humorism."

As will appear from the quotation at the beginning of this section, Baroja's individualism has its source in the human individual. "I am, I live, is the only thing that man can affirm." He has said that the individual cannot go beyond himself. "In man there is neither more nor less than man. 'More' isn't anything, because we cannot suppose anything more than ourselves . . . ." For that reason anything new is impossible in human affairs; "a new life, a new politics, a new art, all these are illusions," says the Count of Spain. If we could change ourselves, that is, change our bodies, then there might be some chance for newness.

How he makes the human individual the basis not only for his pluralism but also for a kind of Kantian Subjectivism, will appear in his epistemology. It is only a

1. 15p134c
2. 16p141a
3. lp317b
short step from an individualism that affirms that all things are *sui generis*, to an individualism that asserts that, since the individual cannot go beyond itself nor enter into any classification nor itself be subordinate to any higher order, the individual must therefore, as far as it is concerned, be the universal centric, the one and only point of reference. If all I can affirm is, "I am," then all other things are the phantasmagoria of my imagination; "the world is my idea," to use the Schopenhaurian phrase. Thus though Baroja holds to an objective, pluralistic universe, he defers to the egocentric predicament by admitting that all we can know apodictically is that we exist. (N.I.) This step from individualism to subjectivism is apparent in the following quotation:

> The order of Nature is nothing but a series of mental fantasmas, a series of methodized hallucinations. We live in a dream, combining images from other dreams. The world, from a subjective point of view, is not one world, but many worlds, as many as there are on the planet human heads with psychic reflections.

I have pointed out how both pluralism and monism may lead to agnosticism. "This agnostic position," he says, is the most decent one a person can take. Now not only religious ideas are decomposed, but also what is most

1. l2p209b I. Nietzsche pointed out some pitfalls in this *cogito, ergo sum*, which we cannot discuss here. It is sufficient to recognize the logical relationship of Baroja's subjectivism with his pluralism.
solid and indiscernible. Who now believes in the atom? Who believes in the soul as a monad? Who believes in the infallibility of the senses?" The safest thing is to say with Dubois-Reymond, *Ignoramus, ignoscimus*. But Baroja's agnosticism is more or less occasional, when he carries it to this extreme; he is too much at home with things to hold to it constantly. In another place he defines agnosticism as "the affirmation of the ignorance of objectives in the universe and in humanity," which gives the term the more common acceptance relating to teleology and religion. As will be seen in his cosmology, his agnosticism in this connection is quite positive.

2. Cosmology

Is the world purposive? Baroja answers roundly, No: neither in whole nor in part. There is no teleology in nature; man must create his own. "From a critical point of view all teleology is a human illusion. Where are the aims of nature, or even of humanity?" "Teleology is incapable of pointing out where divine or transcendental purpose begins. All it can do is disguise human purpose and lend it artificially to nature."

1. 5p27
2. 2p30f
3. 12p210bc, the Norwegian.
4. 2p30
Another of the things that spring to view when one lives in the country is the indifference of Nature. Nature is not teleological—she has no ends nor ultimate intentions; the bad seed as well as the good grows in her; toad and swan, tares and wheat equally find shelter in her bosom.

This great builder, this great prodigal, is also monstrously destructive. A freeze kills millions of buds which are, in their way, perfect; similarly an earthquake demolishes artistic cities.

Everything in Nature is perfect, because it is necessary; the brain of Plato and the brain of a mosquito are equally perfect; the loveliest Venus or the handsomest Adonis and the tubercular bacillus are equally perfect.

The indifference of Nature frequently shocks us, us who cannot disregard human aims. When one sees a huge tree with magnificent foliage, and sees it wasted by a thousand parasites that will end by destroying it, one feels like looking to right and left and shouting, "Hey, Mrs. Nature! Be careful. You're doing this thing pretty badly."

Baroja defines agnosticism as the antithesis of teleology:

Teleology tends toward religious or human mysticism. Man has come to the world to suffer and achieve heaven (religious teleology). Man has come to the world to realize progress (human teleology).

Agnosticism affirms that man has not come to the world, but that he is in the world, and that it is not demonstrable that he has a definite objective, that he may have the same importance as a zoophyte or a lichen.

The problem of evil is not to be banished by excusing it on the basis of some larger purpose. "I have never thought that my life might have a political or religious object."

Some believe that this humanity is going toward something and has some object. That is what the philosophers call teleology. I doubt it greatly. I believe that this business is not going anywhere in particular.

1. 2p192f
2. 2p30
3. 8p104bc, López del Castillo
4. 12p55c, Larrañaga
Even in the human body, where untutored souls are wont to point out design in every part, there is neither design nor purpose; vestigial structures are evidence enough of this. Sex was an afterthought.

Baroja rejects universal harmony on the same grounds. Though the fact that Nature wastes her seed is most consequential to us—the individual seeds—it is nugatory with her; compensation is a "ridiculous thesis"; we need not hope to find the waste accounted for or recompensed.

The spider eats up the fly. God be praised! The pompilus the spider. Allah is great! The bird the pompilus. Jehovah is eternal! The cat the bird, and sometimes man eats the cat, intentionally or because it is palmed on him as a rabbit. What a sum of wisdom and compensation! (N.I.)

God is a poor builder. Probably Baroja was thinking of the teleologists and harmony-mongers when he made O'Neil say that in nature one should see what is unconfused with what ought to be.

It would be unjust, after these statements, to accuse Pío of personifying Nature when he capitalizes her name; it is only rhetorical with him to do so, although his monism might tempt her to regard her, if not a person, at least as an entity.

1. 12p182f I. See especially 13p7ff for teleology
2. 9p199, and preestablished harmony.
   Larrañaga
3. 13p9ab, Joe
4. 8p112b, López del Castillo
5. 4p286c
He has already said that all in nature is necessary; therefore he favors determinism, which, he says, "the majority of us reasoning men consider as logical." In the field of psychology, for instance, he consistently subordinates ideas to external factors such as climate and terrain. Criticizing *Time and Free Will*, he convicts Bergson of special pleading, saying he "is not always quite fair" in his arguing to establish freedom. Some critics of free will have pointed out that though one may do what one will, one may not will what one will; Baroja criticizes "indeterminism" as a whole in this way: indeterminism is, if it exists, itself determined. Speaking of the phenomenal world (with Kant again uppermost) he says,

Plainly everything makes us believe, with respect to the understanding, that the world is singular, that there is no other, and that it has always existed with one same set of laws. And this gross of ideas about necessity impels us to determinism. In a singular, eternal, necessary, almost fatal world, we are imprisoned, bound; but the soul soars over these walls and barriers and forcibly affirms that there is another horizon, a subjective horizon where freedom reigns. Thus this feeling of freedom is embodied with the determinism of the world; it is a freedom which is also necessary, is as it were the human tint of universal fatality.

In a somewhat bantering tone he speaks of the devout apologists who eat out of the scientists' hands:

1. 2p378b
2. 2p219ff
3. 12p209b, the Norwegian
With Hugo de Vries (N.I.), Mendel, and the applications of their discoveries to philosophy, the devotees have again been made to think that there is, if not the great theoretical and absolute freedom, a little practical freedom, a certain spiritual spontaneity that they call "indeterminism."

But though indeterminism does not ontologically exist, there is a semblance of it, a kind of pragmatical indeterminism: we act as if we were free; things look to us as if they were not determined. Man is the measure of both existent and one-existent things, as Protagoras said; even luck, for those who believe in it, has a certain status in that it operates for them as if it existed. Speaking of a youth who bought books on how to fascinate women, Baroja writes, "The procedure was doubtless absurd; but at times it operated as if it were real." Somewhat the same thing happens with freedom or indeterminism.

That the difference between life and non-life is one of degree and not of kind was implied in the statement I quoted to show that Baroja does not believe in this dualism (p 84). He recognizes that one has to take a great deal on faith when positing abiogenesis;

1. 13p161a, Joe
2. 2p378f
3. 4p354ab

1. Baroja thinks that De Vries's discovery has necessitated a revision of evolutionary ideas (2p 212a). But Ganger states (New Views of Evolution, p92) that "the giant evening primrose discovered by De Vries which was once thought to be a new species, is now classified rather as a mutant or variety."
but he feels that abiogenesis is far preferable to creation by fiat; anything is better than religious mysticism. Baroja is an evolutionist; he discusses the various theories, making the observation on abiogenesis and another on polygenesis:

Polygenesis seems more logical to me ((than monogenesis)) and I believe that the majority of ancient races were born in the region where they lived.

He calls Darwinism "the most profound and most documented doctrine that the Nineteenth Century had produced in biology"; but he adds that the notion of the struggle for existence needs a certain modification on account of observed cases of alliance, consortism, etc. "Creative evolution" he says "has a basis of fantasy."

Although Baroja realizes from science that nature is neither good nor evil, that there are no "moral phenomena", I think Schopenhauer has inclined him to pseimism—at least as far as human life is concerned. Thus he can write, "We human beings are naturally fault-finding and ill-starred. Whilst we accomplish things, some of them bore us because they are long, hard, and uncomfortable; then others tire us because they are short, easy, and comfortable." And even more gloomily, "the only truths that impress themselves on us are misery, sickness, and death." He seems to like Schopenhauer's view of life as blind and remorseless.

1. 2p207c
2. 5p29
3. 2p211c
4. 2p254a
5. 13p119
6. 12p29b, Larrañaga
7. 13p197c, Larrañaga
8. 15p187
The concepts of time and space, being more or less subjective and Kantian with Baroja, will be treated under Epistemology.

3. Epistemology.

We shall find that Baroja's views on this head are in a somewhat internecine conflict. It is to be kept in mind that he is, or was, a physician, and would consequently be inclined to realism; I believe furthermore that his pluralism would bend him in the same direction. While a universe at the same time pluralistic and idealistic is conceivable, most idealists, from Plato to the present, have been synthesizers, and have some kind of cement, whether it be a hierarchy of ideas, as with Plato, or preestablished harmony, as with Leibniz, to stick the pieces together. Truepluralists are to be found generally, I think, in the camp of the realists.

In Baroja, however, there is to be found a somewhat superimposed Kantianism. He has as it were been fascinated by the subjective criticism of realism, making much of the egocentric predicament, but is as far as I can ascertain unfamiliar with the dogmatic criticisms of Kantianism. Realism as a systematic philosophy has apparently escaped his notice. Combining the two points of view, dogmatic and critical, he is in a large measure Kantian, but is quite positive of the existence, if not
of the apprehensibility, of a noumenal world—a thing no genuine Kantian, if pushed to the verge of his logical platform, could easily be. I imagine he is arguing with himself in *El Arbol de la Ciencia*, page 176f, where he presents Kant's views.

"Nature is for us but the sum of the data we have of the knowable... An order discovered slowly by observation and experiment." We must be careful not to take him too literally, for like most persons who do not use mathematical precision in their language, he is free in his use of words. But two in this quotation stand out: knowable and discovered, which affirm the existence of an external reality that is both in part unknown and at the same time knowable, and that is independent ontologically of the human understanding—that does not, in other words, require the cognitive process to validate and ratify it. This positive noumenal world appears again in his opinions about space:

"...the idea of space has been created by the senses, principally by the eye." Elsewhere he speaks of the auricular labyrinths in conceiving space. Leaving to one side the *petitio principii* contained in positing the existence of two organs, eye and ear, which occupy space, it is clear he believes in some noumenon of space

1. 12p209a, the Norwegian, with Larrañaga agreeing.
2. 2p2548b
3. 2p376b
to act on the eye or for the eye to act on, a conception fundamentally un-Kantian. Space is empirically, not aprioristically, conceived.

But in his explicit statements, where we must quote and not infer, he is very loyally Kantian:
"...even though the laws of nature exist outside man, a thing which we do not know, they have had to pass through human intelligence to exist in the capacity of laws." "The world is my idea," he quotes from Schopenhauer.

Nature does not have laws so long as man has not discovered them; that is to say, the law is a cognitive, human concept emanating from the mind; that for a non-human being, for a possible inhabitant of another planetary system, it might be quite something else, or simply not be anything. (N.I.)

Then he quotes Protagoras again: "Man is the measure of all things: of things that are that they are, and of things that are not that they are not." "'Man is the measure of all things,' said a Greek philosopher. In a broad sense all is human. Man is the measure and the things." Axioms of geometry have validity only in so far as they have been made by men; they are "disguised definitions": Baroja means, for example, that men have created the right triangle and |ipso facto| defined the relationship of legs and hypotenuse. Pepita reproaches

1. 2p205bc
2. 2p206
3. 12p328c, Joe
4. 2p291bc

1. An objection to this subjective view of natural law is that nature has to cooperate: the mind cannot impose just any law on nature.
Larrañaga for always coming to rest in some subjectivism—for making it appear that all we can understand is what passes in our mind. "And in an absolute way," Larrañaga replies, "even that is hard. . . ."

The extent to which Einstein has upborne Kant gives Pío a great satisfaction. That he considers Einstein's theories as a consequence of Kantianism I have already mentioned; and no doubt he is largely right. Especially he delights to see "the classical ideas about Space and Time" called to account. Relating to time he has the following passage, whose terms we must not examine too closely, as they are plainly unanalytical:

The present is the kingdom of the child, and perhaps of the unreflecting woman; the future, that of youth; and the past, that of age. The present is a very small matter.

One awaits a thing, it arrives, and then it passes swiftly and is remembered afterward. The moment of passing is the shortest and at times that which has least reality and least satisfies us. (N.I.)

At least it indicates the relativity of the three divisions of time.

The subjectivist who, in my opinion, is most consistent, Berkeley, is barely mentioned. In the Caverna

1. 13p69a
2. Cf. 12p125
3. 12p28cf, Larrañaga

I. To me this means that the individual has too complex an implicit organization to be able to respond properly to a peripheral stimulus. It is what Nietzsche laments as excessive "consciousness."
is this statement:

I of course do not believe, as Bishop Berkeley did, that things do not exist when we do not perceive them; neither do I believe that they exist just as we perceive them.

In the Laberinto Berkeley and Hylas and Philonous are spoken of, but without comment. What he says of laws as being discovered is suggestive of the noumenal world and Kant; but when he speaks of the law as "emanating from the mind" he is verging on Berkeley and esse est percipi.

Science he evidently considers a source of valid knowledge, to judge by the observations above on nature as the sum of the data of the knowable, gathered by the scientific method, that is, by observation and experiment. But—-and this is a further commentary on his noumenal world—-it is a source of valid knowledge only in so far as it goes.

Science can do no more than retire the eternal enigma. Beside every new fact that is discovered appear several unknown ones; and so it goes forever in the same progression, each time with a greater number of data and each time with a greater number of unknowns.

The enigma, then, we have always with us; knowledge will never be adequate to grasp this scheme of things entire.

A philosopher ought always make exception for the insufficiency of our means of knowledge and

1. 12p42b
2. 4p228ab
leave fixed the affirmation, expressed by no one better than by Kant, that the human mind prescribes laws to nature.

Concerning the validity of knowledge, Baroja's views are eminently Kantian, and by the same token idealistic. But Baroja as I have indicated is not be temperament an idealist. As to the sources of knowledge, he plainly inclines to empiricism, positing the senses (as, supra, the eye and ear) as receptors; this means that he leans away from rationalism, which is about the same as saying that he leans away from idealism; his materialism will not let him go so far toward asserting the priority of mind. One might call his point of view a kind of Kantianism adapted, for better or worse, to modern physiology, with the senses replacing space, time and modality. There is an external world, to understand which only our senses are capable; but of the reliability of our senses we never can be thoroughly certain; they both intermediate and interfere between us and reality, like a window that is dim and is at the same time the only window we possess. Hence we can conclude but one thing regarding what we know: That it is only relatively true—defining "truth" as the perfect correspondence of the thing and our understanding of it, or, more roughly, as any idea which has an objective counterpart.

1. 2p105
Is there a truth? Is there evidence? We don’t know. Mathematics and geometry once seemed to us the acme of the evident. They are no longer. They cannot be. In the embryo we are enveloped by the blastoderm; then thrust into a skin; and in our cosmos we have another skin that encompasses us, another blastoderm, that of our senses, which creates and at the same time reduces the sensible horizon.

"...the truth is almost inaccessible..." Our knowledge is all very insecure, says Larrañaga, and asks,

...where is the sole truth? In history things slowly change; there are periods in which it is believed that those of one side are right, and periods in which the contrary is believed; but probably neither in the one period nor in the other does one hit entirely aright or go entirely amiss.

There are two ways in which those of us who have been wont to believe in the certainty of truth can palliate this uncomfortable relativity: by re-defining truth and becoming pragmatists, or by surrendering our virtue and deserting to the side of falsehood. There is a little of both these answers in Baroja, although he gives us to understand that he prefers other norms of truth than mere practicality. The following, however, is rather pragmatic:

...what imports the reality of things if they behave as if they were real?

I, at least, am one of those who are content with relativity in life.

1. 12p204b, Joe
2. 6p168
3. 13p206
4. 9p19bc
5. 2p277c
6. 2p290b
And elsewhere he says,

I have shunned being dogmatic and have come, as a reader of the pragmatists, to believe that a theory in the majority of cases is worth more because of its results and its future than for its possible approach to the truth.

Also he suggests, through Iturrioz, the norm of utility in those places where we need to act and do not yet have enough certainty to tell exactly what course to take—that is, in fields where science has not yet penetrated.

As to falsehood, the other answer, he has already expressed the opinion that it is requisite to life.

"There are those who believe that falsehood is not to be eternal. It is an affirmation a bit suspicious," thinks Joe. "The fact is that at present the world of charlatans lives with the same vigor as ever. When they're not in religion, they're in politics, art, and science."

"True it is," he says, "that men believe seriously only in myths."

4. Logic.

"Logic" and "logical," especially "logical," are terms so outrageously misused that we must redden them up a little before going on; "logic" is sorely in need of a logical housecleaning. "He flew into a fit of perfectly illogical anger," and other such expressions are commonly heard; but whether or not the anger was illogical will

1. 23pl0ab
2. 15pl92ff
3. 13p91a
4. 12p125, Joe.
depend on the definition of "logical." "The two tendencies . . . are doubtlessly logical and human. . . .," Baroja says, referring to agnosticism and teleology, and illustrates another slipshod use of the word in the sense of "to be expected." It is often used broadly to blanket the whole world of cause and effect; but "cause" is often confused with "because," to the glory of jumbled thinking. There are always two answers to the question, "Why?" "Because God wills it" or "Because I want to" or "Because it is the expedient thing" (teleologic) and "Because the conditions were right to produce that effect (etio-logic (N.I.)), for instance. (N.II.) This kind of cause-and-effect logic Baroja recognizes when he says that the true often seems strange and the fabricated true (the difference, for instance, between the apparent guilt of a man who is caught in a rare chain of circumstances and the carefully planned testimony of a man who is really guilty), because logic exists mainly in the invented thing—is put in, in other words: "...the real occurrence has a subterranean, unpredictable logic" (etio-logic, if I may continue to vivisect this word). This "subterranean logic" is often the

1. 2p30f
2. 8pl43ab, Aviranzeta, with López del Castillo agreeing.

1. But even here anthropomorphism is implied in assuming the power to predict.
2. I do not mean that these are unrelated. From my point of view, determinism, etiology subsumes teleology.
wellspring of much formal logic; that is, formal logic often has a wish at the bottom of it, and is more or less just rationalization. Baroja asks about Bergson's work, "What is its intent?" convicting him of an ulterior, extra-logical (logical-formally logical) motive, that of smuggling freedom into the deterministic world. The reason is a handmaid to the will, as Schopenhauer would say.

With these cautions made, we may attempt some sort of definition; I venture the following (in which I confess behaviorism is highly visible): logic is stimulus and response in the verbal sphere; formal logic is that part which pertains to discursive reasoning, following certain prescribed rules. Most of what follows will relate to formal logic.

With Baroja's love of rationality, one may be sure he will assign reason a high place. What claims to be esoteric and bars the door to reason is likely a fraud. Haller, the specialist in nervous diseases in Las Veleidades de la Fortuna, says that there is nothing new in Einstein's method, above all nothing supra-rational.

I do not believe that there is a theory of which a rational summary cannot be made. . . . In Einstein's theory, what is deduced for the reason is not at all new. It is the subjectivism of the primal notions of time, space, and causality, something
already very well explained in Kant. (N.I.) The rest, the mathematical part, I do not understand.

Larrañaga interposes that Einstein's theory might be "exclusively physico-mathematical," to which Haller replies,

Without the possibility of a rational explanation? That would be strange. It is the same thing that Steiner, the cheat of anthroposophy, asserted; according to him one had to know special mathematics to understand his doctrine of super-worlds, which in practice came down to getting money for his temple and dancing.

Consistency in thinking, like all other forms of appropriateness, is an irrecusable need. Baroja supports an opinion I have long held, that the person who pretends to be very broad-minded is likely not a person of logical probity; the chances are that he will desire things, as in art, for example, that are mutually contradictory.

The academic part of formal logic, the non-discursive steps such as definition, immediate inference, classification, and division, will we may accurately guess, with their formalism not be to Baroja's taste. There is the following little essay, which, if he had chosen to title it, might be called "On Definition":

Classical definitions are almost always useless. Definition may have some utility when particular, artificial, and concrete things, things created with a human aim, are treated of; but when one treats of general, natural, or abstract...
things or facts, it serves for nothing.

One may very well define a pair of pincers, a hammer, a participle, a triangle; but to define cause, effect, horse, or mountain is impossible.

The definition of general things may avail somewhat when one accumulates a series of synonyms to clarify the meaning of a word, but that is all.

As to natural things, a tree, a horse, a worm cannot be defined; all one can do is describe. Those classical, teleological definitions, with which people still amuse themselves in schools and universities, are gymnastics without any value.

To say that "man is a rational animal" is not to say anything; one must forthwith define what an animal is and what being rational is.

When one treats of ideas as extensive as those of space, time, and causality, definition does as much good as an umbrella to cover the Cathedral of Toledo.

Definitions given about such extensive ideas are but a circumlocution, what in logic is called tautology, that is, an artifice in which the thing to be defined is more or less surreptitiously slipped into the definition.

Many axioms are nothing but examples of tautology. There is no effect without a cause.

Naturally! Effect presupposes cause. A thing cannot be and not be at the same time. Obviously! "Thing" presupposes being.

Another tautologism is that of those who tell us that two and two are four on Sirius as well as on the earth, as long as the idea of unity exists on Sirius. This cannot be doubted; but it is because all the numbers are comprehended in unity.

No doubt formal logic deserves this attack, for it is in many ways sterile. But I should make some exceptions.

While tautology is reprehensible in rhetoric, it is not altogether so in logic; one might as well accuse the mathematician of being tautological for carrying a mass

1. 2p223ff (Note cont'd from pl01) "mathematicians had exploded these Kantian opinions on space and time many years ago." He goes on to quote from Einstein's Princeton lectures, which ridicule all a priori concepts. Science is empirical.
of quantities in his equations that he can just as well simplify; it is tautology to solve for X after stating an implicit equation; but it is an indispensable convenience. Immediate inference is necessary to explicate many propositions. As sterile as formal logic is at times, it is the arch-enemy of muddlers and demagogues; and these things that Baroja inveighs against are its necessary tools. Another point he has apparently missed is that at the beginning of any discussion a verbal definition is absolutely necessary; two debaters must agree on what they mean by causality, for instance, or they will never reach a conclusion. The illuminating and amusing example of this is James's story of the two friends who debated long and ardently on whether or not they had "walked around" a squirrel that kept the tree always between himself and them--they failed to give a verbal definition of what they meant by "walking around." The very vagueness that Baroja makes a reason for not defining can with more justice I think be made an imperative reason for defining. Also his making a disjunction between definition and description shows an unfamiliarity with the different kinds of definition; he best illustrates himself this need for strictness when he fails to define what he means by "definition." The logical comprehensive type of definition should suit him perfectly.
I have already mentioned his fondness for piling up synonyms; in the discussion quoted above he justifies it. Abstract and general concepts are only approximately accurate, and hence the only way to approach them is to approximate them with numerous Synonyms. "...we do not know strictly what imagination is... we have an approximate idea that suffices for our conversation; but in all exactness, in all precision, we do not what imagination is." "Or whether it is an entity of any kind," he forgot to add; there is a fallacy of initial predication in saying "we do not know what it is." He says that our idea "suffices for our conversation." To be sure, we converse about it; but it takes very little to suffice for conversation; one can prattle on with sheer wind. The difficulty with accepting a vague concept is that one cannot cross swords with another and come to any satisfactory issue, for the swordsman with nimble feet will always shift his grounds. Verbal swordplay amounts to slashing the air unless it takes place on definite grounds and with definite rules. One must not infer that Baroja advocates vagueness, but rather that he feels that vagueness is inevitable indifining general concepts, and is therefore somewhat disposed to resign himself to it. He too ridicules such

1. 4p13b
fluffy, attractive phrases as this: "One must let oneself be carried on, live the best and most agreeable way possible—that's all," and calls them useless, and, he might have added, meaningless. I suppose that to one whose business it is to talk profusely on paper the loss of general terms would be a real calamity.

As with definition, so with classification. But he objects to it on different grounds—his individualism: "Species, genus, race... are abstractions, means of designation, artifices of science...," he has already said. "There always exists a love for assembling, for giving the appearance of a group and school to what does not intrinsically, naturally have it." Baroja ridicules those downright people who arbitrarily classify everything in the world.

Even words themselves in general are more or less artificial denominations for the living idea—mummified ideas, they might be called: "... that conglomeration of words that forms a sentence," he says, "is to the substance of which ideas are made what rubble is to arable land." It is hard, he points out, for some people to understand the element of conventionality and arbitrariness in words and their accepted meanings. "Nuance"

1. 9p77b, Larrañaga
2. 6p26bc
3. 1lp15bc
4. 14p65ab
will seem better than "shading"; but this arises from the setting that the word has in the language of its origin. There is no absolute relationship between the word and the thing signified. The same thing is true of words and sentiments—the meaning is got from the setting. This that he has recognized is of course the fallacy of division; nothing has the same meaning both in and out of context, except these very limited and specific names that he has mentioned, and not even they altogether. "Unspeakable" and "ineffable" mean literally about the same; but their implicative systems forbid their interchange. All this it is plain enforces what he has said about the inevitable vagueness of most terms. The word, he might say, is in its way just another classification: it attempts to delimit a certain field and does not fully succeed in doing it. Thence arises what Baroja is so fond of signalizing, the misunderstanding of one person for another, the same concept not having quite the same implicative system for both. People are too apt to treat words as things, he implies (65). The science of psychology has been addicted to this vice.

We may now briefly consider Baroja's own logic, always remembering that he is primarily a novelist, and therefore not troubled about being too exact.

1. 190145f
2. 5p38c
He is not afraid to call a spade a spade, and, in Quiller-Couch's words, to double spades and redouble. He is an enemy of apologies and all such superfluous expressions. He grows impatient with the euphemisms of a certain courtesan regarding her vocation. Whatever else he may be, he is not diffuse. This I have stressed in treating of his style.

But there is a slight tendency to verbalism. This shows itself in several ways: in the use of "unanalyzed epithets." He speaks for instance, of the man with the "soul of a chief waiting-maid" (p157). He calls Darío an "unimaginative snob" (p75). While such phrases doubtless have some meaning, it is very ambiguous, and one might as well say "bounder" or "wall-eyed imbecile," because what they mean is hardly more than just "I don't like you." (N.I.) It shows itself in the use of undefined or insufficiently defined terms; with the discussion on teleology and agnosticism given above he calls agnosticism more "intellectual," apparently defining the word so that the great teleologists, Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, and many others, are left outside.

1. Cf. 2p155c
2. 2p390b

I. This perhaps comes from the fact that Baroja is rather categorical in his likes and dislikes. He does not feel that reasons are necessary, and is possibly right. "I have for some people the instinctive antipathy of one dog for another. I do not need reasons for feeling hatred: type, glance, expression are enough." (López del Castillo, 8p168a).
Ane he says that the "degeneration of the agnostic type produces the cynic." How does anagnostic degenerate? What are the differentiae between an agnostic and a degenerated agnostic? A good "teleologist" would assure that allagnostics are degenerates. These terms would not be objectionable if only he would elucidate. It is present furthermore in certain nebulous expressions which Baroja uses even though he has condemned them: "...the cult of Apollo makes intellect rest upon the harmong of lines eternal." This is very melodious and just as unsubstantial.

He is honest in what he has said about classification, for he makes no attempt to follow it in his own works. The short chapters, separate captions, and subdivisions variously indicated (N.I.) show an unwillingness to articulate his works, an individualism that refuses to submit to docket and file.

5. Humorism.

Somewhere Nietzsche has said that the one fact of the total absence of humor from the Bible is enough to condemn it as literature. Nietzsche is replete with summons to laughter. "Since humanity came into being, man hath enjoyed himself too little; that alone, my
brethren, is our original sin!"...I myself will sing...a dance-song and satire on the spirit of gravity my supremest, powerfulest devil, who is said to 'lord of the world'. It is significant that in this most original part of Baroja's metaphysics the influence of Nietzsche is most apparent.

Laughter and sleep, the psychologists tell us, are the two least-understood of human acts. Many philosophers have approached the subject with metaphysical explanations of our ticklishness, which may be suggestive but can hardly be termed scientific. Bergson, Kant, and other thinkers have made attempts with indifferent interest and indifferent success, Baroja says, the one calling it the psychological effect of the substitution of bodily free-play for bodily rigor, the other hinging it upon antclimax.

The only effective approach to the subject, it seems to me, would be through the laboratory, provided the experimentalist could keep one eye on the larger social implications. The social aspect of humor is tremendous; it suggests three possible avenues—the functional: how does society use laughter?; the evolutionary: what survival value has it had?; and the structural: what are the cause and manner of the physiological

1. Z XXV
2. Z XXXII
3. 19p49
workings of laughter—its connection with the respi-
atory organs, the reflexes and stimuli involved, and
the origin and development of the act in the child?
Our laughter is always related to some kind of incon-
gruity, directed against some type of behavior opposed
to our pattern, which is, of course, a reflection of
the social pattern. But we do not laugh, generally
speaking, at the things which injure us. A member of
the herd who commits an anti-social act is reprimanded,
ostracized, or destroyed. It is only the a-social act
which is made the butt of ridicule—perhaps from the
necessity of the herd always to keep its members in
line for united action (one must be careful not to
slip purpose or design into the explanation). The
man who imagines himself "free" and attempts to exer-
dise this freedom is very soon informed of just how
potent a weapon ridicule is. Let him try walking zig-
zag up the street, or wearing a straw hat (even on a
warm day) in January, and if some other emotional ele-
mentsuch as his illness or poverty does not inhibit
the crowd's reactions, it will laugh on no more provo-
cation. Contrary to censure, laughter does not tend
toseparate the victim from the group, but only to
humiliate him within the group. It is as if the group
said, "You are still one of us, but be more careful next time." The individual who is ostracized can derive some strength from the opposition into which he is driven, above all if in his ostracism he becomes a member of another group; but laughter tacitly embraces its object and hence as suasion is triply powerful. The social aspect of laughter is further exemplified in the fact that it is non-social to laugh alone; one who reads a comic skit and laughs aloud to himself becomes immediately the uncomfortable object of inquiring looks from those about him, and generally feels constrained to let the others in on the joke. I know a person who in his reading invariably chuckles to himself; it is most annoying. Laughter is always done in company; even when we are entirely alone and feel free to laugh aloud if we please, we are still, I surmise, in imagination at least, laughing with someone. A person who walks alone and passes a laughing group (above all if they be girls --the social group par excellence) is certain that they are laughing at him; if he is accompanied, the feeling is not nearly so sharp. The butt of laughter, therefore, is the person who in some way is separated from his fellows: the pompous man, the eccentric, and even (for the use of the weapon is biological and not rational) the lunatic.

This brings the objection that not all laughter is
aimed at something, but that one may laugh for pleasure, and that laughter is, as Baroja says, to some extent just a sign of good health. We must be on our guard against making an entity of pleasure; "we tend to do a thing because it is pleasant" may as easily be verbalized as "a thing is pleasant because we tend to do it." It is perhaps erroneous to say that people laugh "because of" pleasure; but at any rate the intimate association of the two is obvious. This side of humor brings us closest to the biological part of the question. Experiment has demonstrated beyond cavil that laughter in babies is the response to caressing—especially to caress the erogenous zones. In all children and in most adults (some, alas, are sadly calloused) laughter may be caused by stimulating certain parts of the body, especially the thorax. The biologically adequate stimulus is tickling. The response, along with the laughter (which, we begin to see, is only a kind of interrupted respiration that later becomes a conditioned stimulus) is complete relaxation, the obvious sexual significance of which it is not necessary to point out; suffice it to say that the thorax is the easiest object for the prehensile organs. Also even here the necessity for a social situation is apparent: let a person try to produce laughter by tickling himself. Now here the refinements set in: the most familiar example is that of the child who starts

1. 19p112
to squirm and laugh when one only makes as if to
tickle him. Laughter becomes a stimulus for more
laughter, the person who does the tickling also joining
in. And finally by a series of complex conditionings
we may be "tickled" at a joke, at seeing someone, or
at almost any pleasant stimulus.

Baroja says that humor in its more elaborate forms
is a comparatively recent thing. This is doubtless
true, if we define humor as laughter in its social
aspects. It would be wrong, however, to say that laug-
ther in its physiological part is recent; the "solemnity
of the savage" is largely, I surmise, an idea based on
the comparative absence of the savage's response to
incongruities. The transition from physiological
laughter to laughter as a social instrument is to be
found I think exactly here. Only in well-regulated and
above all, complex, societies is the awareness of incon-
gruity great and humor possible. Baroja recognizes this,
as I shall presently show. The tribe suffers most from
external opposition, and furthermore, any act—and there
needs be sundry—which makes for self-preservation is
justified. In more complex societies, however, the ex-
ternal opposition is decreased, but the chances for
internal disruption are maximized; a need for some
powerful cohesive element accordingly rises. The pos-
sibilities for non-conformity are also increased in
l. 19p39f
proportion as life becomes vastly more ritualistic. It is absurd to taunt the savage for his taboos; civilization has incalculably more, from shaving (who would dare to use that most effective means--plucking the hair?) to the proper way to hold a fork. By some means the transition was made, and laughter became the cement of social cohesion; perhaps the substitute stimulus is to be found again in the child, who learns to laugh at the silly antics of those who play with and tickle him--anything out of the ordinary becomes an invitation to play(observe with what readiness the child discerns peculiarities). Perhaps the relationship of physical contact and laughter explains in part its kinship with social feeling.

The humorless person is he who cannot descry inconsistencies. The genial humorist--a Dickens--is he who extends his discernment beyond mere variance from ritual--beyond those acts, I mean, which the majority of human beings are conditioned to conceive as inconsistent--and turns it to the countless inconsistencies that underlie all our acts, even those which most of us take for granted. A Baroja and a Nietzsche go yet farther--and laugh at themselves. "The child laughs for joy; that is the first step. The humorist laughs with sadness; that is the last step. Dawn and dusk."

1. 19p112
Baroja's little treatise on humorism--the Caverna del Humorismo--contains considerable foreign matter and is rather metaphysical than scientific; he admits, in fact, that its business is chiefly that of tacking ideas together to see how they'll run. They are all so integral with Baroja's philosophy, however, that even the digressions fit the larger scheme. The humorist is the chemist who tests all forms of nature with every imaginable reagent, trying them with or without this or that to see how they fit together--a kind of hash of Mill's methods, I take it.

From this point of view Poe, Dostoevsky, and Nietzsche are humorists; Poe and Dostoevsky markedly so. Of course the tone of Nietzsche is not one of humor; the creator of the caparisoned Zarathustra seems rather a warrior of Genghis Khan or Attila than a man of humor; but when he undertakes to explain pity by rancor he is a humorist without intending it. Nietzsche has the humorism to defend the classical with romantic arguments, as an imp out of the Christian hell might defend the Gospel.

We are supplied at the outset with two principles, which from the manner of presentation one would fain call universal, and earn Baroja's hearty disapproval: humorism and rhetoric. They smack of a pantological dualism, but probably they were not intended to be all of that. The division is deeply ingrained in his mind, however, for it appears elsewhere: the ogre known as Rhetoric we have met before. It would almost be sufficient to say that whatever

1. 19p50f
2. 19p180
Baroja likes is humorism, and whatever he dislikes is rhetoric.

The dualism is avowedly almost the same as Nietzsche's Apollonianism and Dionysianism. (N.I.)

Religious peoples have had a greater tendency to humorism that philosophical peoples. Fear predisposes to laughter, and fear joined to laughter can create humor. Dionysus is at times a humorist; Apollo, always a philosopher.

"In humorism are also mixed rational and irrational elements: Apollo and Dionysus." "Humor is Dionysian; rhetoric, Apollonian. . . .," says Baroja's spokesman Guezurtegui.

The source of humorism is the non-logical in a logical setting, or in a setting that pretends to be logical. So when Dr. Werden maintains that music is humoristic, "Dionysianism, dynamism, humorism, music, all the same," Guezurtegui replies that music is too much withdrawn from logic. Death and crime are often the subject of jest, probably because their contrast with orderliness is evident. Whatever breaks with the established order of things is a starting-point for humor. It is here that Baroja's love for all things in their limitless variety appears. In the light of prior concepts the innovator is a humorist--Newton, Darwin,

1. 19p39b
2. 19p62, Werden
3. 19p84a
4. 19p266f
5. 19p286f
6. Cf.19p60bcf

I. See Appendix.
Paracelsus, Stephenson, Lobatchewski, Riemann. Multiple personality is another root of humorism—it represents conflict within our self. "The person who fits perfectly in the square which on the social checkerboard belongs to him can hardly have a sense of humor. Humor comes in part from disharmony and maladaptation."

Chance, too, is illogical and humorless; history as seen in the eyes of the casual historian has laughed with the Kaiser's aborted arm and Cromwell's calculus, and done no end of mischief with those and similar freaks.

Religion as we have seen is another source:

Modern Catholicism lends itself marvelously to jest. Its Christ, who perspire and move their eyes, its holy fetiches, from whom one begs advice for getting a wealthy fiancée, and for winning in the lottery, give abundant food to laughter.

Humorism has Christian blood in its veins. Christianity made the souls of men ferment. The irony of Aristophanes and of the Greeks does not smack of humorism. It was necessary to pass through the Middle Ages for humor to be developed.

If man had been a complete pagan, tranquil, serene, equable, he would not have felt mysticism or intimacy or pity. The sharp and sensitive consciousness of today was formed by pain and sadness, brought by Christianity. (N.I.)

Pain and sadness from other causes also contribute, especially certain diseases which produce excitation: arthritis (here Baroja, of course, includes himself), gout,

1. 19p57
2. 19p202f
3. 19p197a
4. 19p275cf
5. 19p39ab
6. 19p236bcf
tumors of the frontal lobe, and certain psychoses.

Humor is perhaps what makes this contrast and discord endurable. According to Werden's "theory of surpassment,"

Humorism... is the synthesis where the apparently infusible is fused; the reciprocal penetration of the finite with the infinite; the crucible in which is effected the transmutation of values (N.I.) and where all is at once great and small.

The professional humorist looks to these means for creating the effect he desires. Above all he uses contrast: not the studied, blocked-out contrasts of the romanticists, but contrasts of a more spontaneous sort. The contrasts are achieved in these ways: writing staidly, so that the humorism when detected is more striking; writing in great detail without ulterior design; reducing the solemn to the natural, as boys remarking a bald head at a religious observance; using metaphors to convey the indescribably; and eulogizing the low while detracting the lofty—mild irony. Most authors mix their elements of humor and seriousness. This adds piquancy to their works, but detracts from the unity that the exclusive use of either major or minor mode would lend; it is now so prescribed to mix, however, that a plain diet would be insipid.

1. 19p232ff  I. This sounds suspiciously like the "transvaluation of values."
2. 19p65bc
3. 19p263ff
4. 19p259ff
5. 19p54bcf
"Rhetoric" is the antipode of humorism and embraces virtually all the customs, habits, and actions which repel Don Pío: tradition, display, Judaism, conventionality, and masquerade. Rhetoric is our heritage of formulas from the past; its eyes are in the back of its head and it tends to stagnation, regarding things from the point of view of immutability. Humor is Heraclitean, inventive; under each new sun everything is new; for it there are still possibilities of things to come; it is intuitive, instinctive, and non-mechanistic. Rhetoric is formalizing and sterilizing; it is fertile in the man who writes for technic, but the reverse with one who puts substance in what he says. Stendhal, for instance, would not have been improved by being passed through the hands of a rhetorician; but "a work of Stendhal might have been improved if Machiavelli, St. Ignatius, Chamfort, Benjamin Constant, Dostoevsky, or Nietzsche could have made observations upon it." Since the business of rhetoric is to formalize, its concern is with the collectivity; humorism seeks out the individual; it is not amenable to either the laboratory or conventional morality, and ends are for it to be attained by emotional means. The humorist's paths are all thwart paths; he follows his compass, not the crowd—prefers to meander rather than to reach

1. 19p83ff
2. 19p137ff
3. 19p280ff
a goal ill accompanied. The rhetorician, on the other hand, is like the doctor who would rather die than not follow Hippocrates; (N.I.) the humorist's path is a perilous path--a child's groping in a stencilled world. Toward all things revered by rhetoric humorism strikes the attitude of a small boy--disparaging.

O'Neil showed himself somewhat cool and ironical toward the hallowed works of literature and art; he fled from everything sensual, and with the years, a bias of humorism stood out in him. Humorism therefore tends somewhat toward "bad taste." Respectability in art has led at one time or other to a species of impotence and inappreciation--as when Voltaire censured Shakespeare's characters for being too chummy with their betters; "good taste" is apt to stifle individuality. The attitude of the child is paramount in humorism; imagination and melancholy; (N.II.) are roots of it--relics of a day when men were warmer and more childish; the humorist is an infantile person, over whose head the years pass without leaving a trace of adulthood. Aristocratism is another type of rhetoric, leaning toward false display. The

1. 19p292ff
2. 4p225a
3. 19p152ff
4. 19p200f

1. Nietzsche somewhere lodges a similar complaint against those who would rather go through fire for the faith than let their faith be forged by the fire.
2. Pain and melancholy, here several times denominated sources of humorism, strongly suggest its relationship with Nietzsche's "tragic perception"; see Apollonian and Dionysian, Appendix.
aristocrat, whether cultivating a pharisaical moral attitude or merely pose, tries to set himself up as a dignitary; the comedian then ridicules him. Neither comedy nor pretense is desirable in its extreme; but surely the aristocrat is more absurd. "Respectful people, even Nietzsche, are too much concerned about being fair in their admiration"; having great respect for any personage can be overdone. The same is true in writing: "nobility" in style attains mostly to pomposity; it is more pose than grace. Humorism tends rather to simplicity and familiarity. Most princes have been pompous, but "those most intelligent and most suggestive, Marcus Aurelius, Julian, Frederick of Prussia" were not; even Goethe with all his courtliness was in his writing a Dionysian. Life of course has its serious aspects, and respectability without ostentation is good and will impress us: Louis the Fourteenth will not, but "perhaps Tolstoi in his school, or Pasteur in his laboratory, or Nietzsche in his sanitarium might impress us." Satire has a basis of rancor, and accordingly belongs rather to rhetoric than to humorism. Humor lacks acrimony that characterizes satire. The satirist is really a moralist, a preacher, and belongs to the class of dogmatists. Rancor is evident above all in the

1. 19p106ff
2. 19p165ff
3. 19p102ff
4. 19p95ff
downtrodden race of the Jews—in Heine, for instance,—and is a sign of the sense of inferiority. Humorism is unknown to Jew and woman. Women are too vitally interested in affairs to see them from the spectator’s seat, which is what the humorist must do.

The nations of the greatest individualists are naturally those which have offered most to humorism. As we shall see in the Anthropology, the most individualistic nations of Europe are those on the outskirts: Spain, England, and Russia; as yet, however, we have no right to assign the quality to any particular anthropological type. It is not necessarily Germanic, although it has reached its most brilliant development in modern England. Rome is the capital of rhetoric, London the capital of humorism. The Germans, properly speaking, are a little too studious to be humorists in the English style. The Italians are too much interested in political affairs, and the Germans, though indisputably the leaders in the realm of pure thought, are the same: there is an unsubstantial glitter about their proudest productions—"It is a blade made of tin, with a few glass gems. Even Nietzsche's Zarathustra seems to me as if it had come from a tin shop."

1. 19p99f
2. 19p115ff
3. 19p221f
4. 19p224ff
The individualist, the man who surveys all things from his eyrie, the man who by nature or misfortune has been infinitely sensitized, will be the wise man and the humorist. "...the humorist appears at a moment of crisis when the energies of action are lost and reflection begins." From sensitiveness are born humorism and discontent in viewing the inequalities of nature, a discontent rather intellectual than real, for "to depress a man or elate him, no argument bears on the individual life a thousandth part as hard as a toothache." To humorism defined in this fashion it is unquestionable that Baroja belongs, and Nietzsche with him.

1. 19p232
2. 19p185
II. Practical Philosophy

1. Ethic

There is no justice in the universe. It exists only in the human head. Perhaps there may be no justice anywhere, but only, in some places, the simulacrum, to comfort timid ladies. Any plan for the good life is one we have made for ourselves; it is not in the substance of nature. "The people of today, withdrawn from nature and nose-rings, live in the artifice of a moral harmony that does not exist except in the imagination of those ridiculous priests of optimism who preach from the columns of the newspapers." Seeing a scorpion sting and paralyze other animals would, Larrañaga admits, have given him the desire to intervene and establish justice in the world, which, he says, is hardly an intellectual ambition, and absurd besides. Nature is neither good nor bad; this point Baroja has mentioned in his cosmology. Although in one place he becomes Schopenhaurian and calls living an evil, and proposes the remedy of action for those for whom action is congenitally possible, in another he speaks of "that stupid phrase about the impurities of reality."

Good and evil are relative.

In general, there is always something good in the bad, and vice versa.

1. 21p48c    4. 5p93
2. 4p238a    5. 8p150ab
3. 12p305cf
The philosopher's honor is in taking account of that.

They are not only relative with respect to consequences, but with respect to the individual about whose head they pivot: "...I don't divide the world into good and bad, into foolish and shrewd, and put myself in the group of the good and the shrewd." As to the hoary old "problem of evil," Baroja solves it when he sees that good and evil are spun of the same wool; when he realizes, with Nietzsche, that there are no moral phenomena, but only a moral interpretation of phenomena. Of the stock answers he gives only one: that perhaps misfortune, if not too intense, is necessary to enrich our existence. But that is not casuistry; it is fact.

There is the physiological determination. To make a man "good," from the standpoint of Christian morality, you have first to make him contented. Hunger of any sort does not conduce to Christian goodness. "It is unjust, but it is the truth: well-being tends to make people better than misery does." The problem of good and evil arises from the non-satisfaction of one's biological needs. When one is satisfied, there is no problem.

"Morality! It is a stomach question, Don Eugenio. . .

One has a bad stomach, so one is moral, because one has

1. 2p249a
2. 9p89c, Larrañaga
3. 12p354a, Larrañaga
4. 9p176
5. Cf. 8p104bc, López del Castillo
no appetite; but with a good stomach, one is necessarily immoral," says Leguía. With age comes a waning of appetite: "...every vicious man becomes moral as he ages...."

López del Castillo, speaking of a sudden resolution to work, hastens to explain that the cold weather was the cause of it—"he had been "immorally lazy" before."

In another place the same character calls deceiving and lying a "question of nerve rather than morality," implying that the moral person is moral because he lacks the self-control necessary for deceiving—"his looks, blushes, confusion, etc., will betray him. (N.I.)

There is the social determination. Brushing against others is what shapes the moral figure. Certain "moral, pleasant, peaceful qualities...are to be found only in men who have not had to struggle, who have not had to develop their aggressive instincts." After the struggle has abated somewhat and adaptation set in, good qualities (always with social reference) again appear. "Courtesy and friendliness are the virtues of age, of adaptation." The type of country and kind of business culture determine the ethos; morality is a

1. 7p157a I. Compare Nietzsche's concept:
2. 14p51b "Morals as Timidity," BG Sec. 197-8.
3. 8p90b
4. 8p137c
5. 9p176ab
6. 13p214cf, Larrañaga
...product of many little-understood things. Morality does not have fixed beginnings. It is rather a creation of each people. We Spaniards have the morality of the dry, arid countries, and these, Hollanders, Belgians, and Germans, have the morality of the countries of commerce, humid and fertile. They do not, so much as we, feel the wounds of self-esteem, nor have so much sensitiveness to bourgeois opinion and to what relates to public, commercial, and financial honor. They are, in general, more honorable, and above all, there is lacking the man with the buffoon's soul, so common in the South. The Southerner often has the soul of a chief waiting-maid or a vaudeville artist. The people of the North are doubtless more phlegmatic but more loyal.

Every country has its own morality, says Larrañaga. Morality is like food—if you have been reared on one kind, you'll not like another, as with the sailors who had fed on suet so long that they couldn't bear olive-oil. "If instead of wearing a cravat and a beaver we wore feathers and a ring in our nose, all of our moral notions would change." The concept of duty has a social origin: "Morality is found only in superior races"; there only does the idea of duty appear. Not only is the morality socially implanted, but the relish for it also: "...nature not only makes the slave, but gives him besides the spirit of slavery." (N.I.)

"As yet there has not been a society that has attempted a system of distributive justice, and in spite of that the world—let us not say that it

1. 12p118ab
2. 9p17f
3. 17p6bc
4. 1p105c, Horacio
5. 15p312
advances--but at least drags along, and women are still disposed to bear children."

"It is idiotic."

"Friend, it is that nature is very wise. She is not content with just dividing men into fortunate and unfortunate, rich and poor, but gives the rich the spirit of richness, and the poor the spirit of misery. You know how the worker-bees are made; the larva is sealed in a tiny alveolus and given a deficient diet. This larva is developed in an incomplete way; it is a worker, a proletarian, that has the spirit of work and submission. So it goes with men, with worker and soldier, with rich and poor."

So we can understand why Larrañaga should say, "My moral conditions seem to me so inevitable that I find it impossible to modify them."

Though from an extra-human point of view men are neither good nor bad, but simply are ("human" is not synonymous with "base," says Joe in the Gran Torbellino), from the moral point of view that has for so many centuries been drilled into us, men are essentially bad. Christian morality has led us to expect certain qualities in men, the lack of which makes us condemn them as "bad"; and to one as discerning as Pío Baroja, these qualities, when they are present at all, do not spring from innate nobility but from necessity--the need for preserving the organism. Baroja with his individualism sees a fundus of selfishness in

1. 276bf
2. 13p205
3. 12p328
human beings and in their moral systems. He, like Nietzsche, views morality less as something final and universal than as something symptomatic of the type of race it roots in. "I never have believed much in the noble intentions of the majority of people. I do not say that everything in man is bad, but that the bad exceeds the good seems evident to me." "I have tried to see clearly into the motives of people's actions and when I have seen something evident it has seldom been anything generous and strong. Naturally egoism, interest, vanity move us all." "As to justice, I believe that at bottom the just is what suits us."

From our need to preserve ourselves in the conflict with others we develop the opportunistic type of morality that Baroja has dubbed "morality of work."

I have the theory that there are two moralities: the morality of work and the morality of play. The morality of work is an immoralistic morality: it teaches one to utilize circumstances and to lie; the morality of play, for the very reason that it concerns itself with something useless, is cleaner and more chivalrous."

The fact that selfishness is the basis of our morality is most plainly manifested in the fact that we demand "justice" in those things that we have found easiest

1. 8pl24c & 8pl25b, López del Castillo
2. 15pl35b, Iturrioz
3. 5pl24c
to obtain by curbing our cruder egoism and by setting up a situation of justice (that is, where we have found it to our interest to be just), whereas we demand not justice, but favor, in those things that are dearest to our hearts and easiest to be won by headlong conquest—"all's fair in love and war." "One does not reproach destiny for being unjust; what one does reproach it for is its not having been unjust in one's favor..." "We do not want what we deserve, but what we do not deserve. Achieving this is what inflates us, what puffs up our conceit." "In politics, in literature, in work, to ask for favor is shameful; but in love, in religion, in the things that seem most serious we do not ask justice, but favor—that is, casual and undeserved luck." "If only the criminal, the thwarting, sanguinary, and perverse man is called bad, it is plain that such people do not abound; but if the egoistic, conceited man, the lover of success, capable of any villainy in order to win and insusceptible to anoble impulse is called bad, then almost all humanity is bad."

Human wickedness, in so far as it is not self-interest, is largely "Sedism, the bloodthirsty and cruel instinct we carry deep within us." If there were public

1. 2p43
2. 12p60bc
executions and gladiatorial combats we should attend them just as they were attended before. Under the caption "The Root of the Unconscious (N.I.) Wickedness," is found the following: "Tell a man that his intimate friend has suffered a great misfortune. His first impulse is of joy. He himself does not mark it clearly, does not know it; yet the fundus is one of satisfaction." Though he may be eager to do anything for his friend, yet there is this feeling. This unconscious wickedness is observable in family relationships. "At times it is not only unconscious, but suppressed." This kind of badness has no recognition nor status; "... naturally, for the judge only acts count; for religion, which delves deeper, intentions count; for the psychologist, who aims to go even deeper, the germinative processes of intentions count." (N.II.) What is the basis of this unconscious badness? "Probably it is an ancestral residue. Man is a wolf for man, as Plautus said

I. Be "interested" wickedness Baroja means "conscious" wickedness. So I have translated Interesada as conscious, desinteresada as unconscious, and contrainteresada as suppressed.

II. Is this only a remarkable coincidence? See BG Sec. 32 for the three stages in the evaluation of an action: evaluation with consequences as criteria, evaluation with intentions as criteria, and evaluation with bases of intentions as criteria.
and Hobbes repeated." This unconscious badness finds little expression in literature, for the very reason that it is unconscious. Shakespeare and Hugo used it, but they bungled it by motivating it; only Dostoeievsky has been able to give voice to this inactive badness, along with its counterpart, "inert goodness, that is fast to the soul and does not serve as a basis for anything." (This last is rather ambiguous, I must say.) It is this residue of badness that music lulls." (N.I.) Conversely, happiness in others is sometimes annoying—not momentary happiness: anyone is glad to see another person laugh, unless he at the moment happens to be glum—but sustained happiness, that makes one feel that another's lot is better than one's own. "One has to believe that men are very bad when another's happiness irks them so," says the old violinist in Los Últimos Románticos. But in the main men are not so much contemptible and bad as simply indifferent and inert. Others' sufferings, for instance, do not affect us deeply because we are not immediately aware of them; and we can eat our breakfast tranquilly even though five hundred miners have been trapped under ground. (N.II.)

Seen in their totality, "All peoples are brutal. . . .

1. 5p38ff
2. 14p20lecf
3. 12p122bc

I. See p. 16 VII.
II. See "La Condenada Forma," pl23ff of El Tablado de Arlequín, for an amusing treatment of this rather gruesome fact.
only individuals can be good." Put men together and one or the other of the social wickednesses, selfishness or Sadism, will show its fangs.

Is it possible to make men collectively good? "I do not believe much in the moral progress of mankind. The material and scientific are seen, are felt; but not the other. There is more policing, true. There is less chance of committing crimes now than before. But that's as far as we go." In another place Baroja takes the same view, seeing more the cheerful side of what has been accomplished:

**Human Wickedness and Rousseau's Chinaman.**

I do not believe in the great human wickedness; neither do I believe in the great goodness, nor believe that one can situate the questions of life "Beyond Good and Evil." We shall surpass, we already have surpassed, the idea of sin; the idea of good and evil we shall never surpass; that would amount to overleaping the cardinal points in geography. Nietzsche, great poet and psychologist extraordinary, believed that we could take this leap stepping on his spring-board of the Beyond Good and Evil.

Not with this spring-board, nor with any other, shall we escape that north-south of our moral life.

Nietzsche, risen from the bitterest pessimism, is at bottom a good man; in this he is the opposite pole of Rousseau, who, in spite of always talking about virtue, tender hearts, the sublimity of the spirit, turns out to be a low, mean being.

The philanthropist of Geneva from time to time shows his stripes: "If it sufficed," he says, "in order to become the rich heir of a man whom

1. 14p270c, Yarza
2. 12p61, Larrañaga
one had never seen before, of whom nothing had ever been heard, and who inhabited the remotest corner of China, to press a button to make him die, who of us would not press that button?"

Rousseau believes that we should all press the button, and he is mistaken; for the majority of genuinely civilized men would not do it. This does not mean, to me, that man is good; it means that Rousseau, both in his enthusiasm and in his hostility for mankind, has poor aim. Man's wickedness, is not active, theatrical, and conscious wickedness, but passive, sluggish wickedness that is born from the bottom of the human animal—a wickedness that almost is not wickedness.

But it will be an arduous task, if anything more can be done:

Is one to grow indignant because a spider kills a fly? ... very well, let us grow indignant. What are we to do? Kill it? Let us kill it. That will not prevent spiders from keeping on eating flies. Are we to deprive man of those ferine instincts that revolt you? Are we to erase that sentence of the Latin poet: Homo hominis lupus, man is a wolf for man? All right. In four or five thousand years we can accomplish it. Man has made of a carnivore such as the jackal an omnivore such as the dog; but many centuries are needed for that...

A later view is less hopeful: "In this war such horrors have been committed in the Balkans, and above all with such delectation...that one can be sure that man will never be made a gentle, sweet type."

So men are immoral from the standpoint of Christian morality. There are, as it were, two kind of morality: the idealistic, or verbal, and the pragmatic, or active. Christian morality largely appertains to this verbal

1. 5p36f
2. 15pl35cf, Iturrioz
3. 13pl00ab, the army physician
half; it is a kind of stop-gap for immoralistic actions. Thus it is wrong to steal; but a lawyer of rich and impartial experience will tell you that the embezzler never steals—-he only borrows. There is every kind of extenuating circumstance for individual slips. "I said to myself: we shall use every weapon: falsehood, intrigue, flattery. Probably the rest use them, only, when they use them, they don't recognize it, and I do recognize it to myself very clearly." It is a rare person who can see the inconsistency between this professed and the acted morality. Aviraneta and López del Castillo agree that using "all that rhetoric about honor and dignity" is a common trait. "Many," says López, "theoretically are partisans of a caparisoned, showy morality, and in the practice of daily life it seems very natural and logical to them to be base flatterers and posers." The thing we grow most horrified and incensed over is having someone attack this institutionalized, verbal morality, for it is there we are most sensitive. It is worse for a man to say, "I believe in evil," though like Nietzsche he had never harmed a gnat, than for him to commit grand larceny. Since no one believes in evil, it is necessary constantly to persuade oneself that one's actions do conform to

1. Sp910
2. Sp150ab
3. Cf.7p17a
this standard, or institution, of goodness. The one who is the best casuist, therefore, is the one who can deviate the most. The priest's sophistry gives him a better field for misconduct than the rigid logic of another person. It is this duality that is in part responsible for the grotesque confusion of moral views. Thus Baroja tells of a youth who carried around with him a twisted idea of morality, and was willing to accept any story about a certain female relative except that her grandmother sold sardines.

But even Christian morality, the institutionalized morality, is highly equivocal. Here Baroja swings in very close to Nietzsche again. It is amorality of ends that Nietzsche maintains, irrespective of the immediate consequences; a morality that will produce a higher type of man, or if you like his paradoxes, the morality that a higher type of man would produce. Baroja does not go all the way with him; Baroja is, I think, himself a battleground on this point—he is Christian enough not to want a morality that will injure the helpless, and Nietzschean enough to want a morality that will further the interests of noble men. Speaking of a sick pullet killed by her companions, he says, "Hatred of the sick and feeble is normal in Nature;"

1. 21p220c
2. 2p397f
Nietzsche is right; but it was necessary to do whatever possible to prevent it being the same with man," and speaking of the "ridiculous humanitarianism" of Anatole France and others, he ventriloquizes through Larrañaga. "At bottom these people believe that there are men who are as it were works of art, artistic chalices, repoussé plates, tapestries, canvases, and others who are pots in common use, who can be exploited unscrupulously. Given a case, we should be asked, "May people who are simple, of whom nothing to others' gain can be expected, be sacrificed?" We should say roundly, 'No!" But let us consider the Nietzschean side of his morality.

First there is the strongly Nietzschean hue of those words about "immoralizing" written in 1902. (N.I.) "Amorality is the highest form of intellectuality; this amorality, joined to the sincere expression of thought, makes of a man something superior to his race and even to his species." "We must immoralize ourselves. School-days are over now; now we must live." (N.II.) And it is intensified by what he says about the amoral man's not being a sad man: "Sadness is Christian; he should be

1. 2p249bc I. See p73.
2. 22p60b II. This is from about 1902, being one of the articles in the Tablado de Arlequín, the date of which Baroja himself does not remember exactly. He puts it in 1903 or 1904.
composed, joyful, serene, and strong, like a son of Apollo." (N.I.)

Then there are many of Baroja's heroes. A more unhesitant lot could hardly be found (I refer to those of the earlier "novels of customs"). Caesar Moncada (N.II.)--willing to utilize any means to attain his goal of a politically purified Spain. Aviraneta--intriguing right and left to achieve the same end. The undeviating Roberto of *Le Lucha por la Vida*, who says, "Knowing how to desire strongly is the first thing that ought to be learned," and even the faltering, discursive Larrañaga, speaking of interfering in some others' plans, says, "Clearly we have no right whatever, but that is the matter of least importance." These men have all acted more or less "Beyond Good and Evil."

Then there are ideas Baroja has expressed about Christian "goodness": "... good traits have been the retarding ones: simplicity, honesty, good faith. It is stupid and cowardly that one should have to live respecting rigidly the norms invented by a past that

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1. 11p23b  I. The "joyful wisdom" (*gai saber*) is a phrase one finds repeatedly in Nietzsche. Joyfulness was a supreme condition of his noble men.

2. 9pl22a  II. He is patterned on Caesar Borgia. It is quite possible that Baroja may have got his liking for Caesar Borgia, or at least his admiration for the man's intrepidity, from Nietzsche, who likes to think of him as Pope. (A Sec. 61, e.g.)
rots in the graveyard, and yet it is so." He has said above that goodness is a characteristic of weak, aged, or infirm men, in whom desire no longer burns strongly.

And the belief that the masses need to be jockeyed and even lied to. The Count of Spain in the Humano Enigma sustains that lying is justifiable and necessary in pursuing an objective one hopes to gain; success must be exaggerated in report and failure minimized—one's followers, that is, must be lied to; the masses have to be lied to. They need a hand that appears firm, even though it needs resort to falsehood to hide its trembling. Textually the author then states,

This bad idea of the Count about the people probably came very near the truth. Naturally, to think that a complex thought, in part contradictory, could be foisted on a multitude, was an illusion.

A multitude could be given only a phrase, a countersign, a cheer, something that would be very simple and very elemental.

And what he says about the world as a hospital:
"...that Christian spirit of protection for what isn't worth anything nauseates me."

And about slave morality: "...the stumbling-blocks of custom and routine were not a means to channel energies, but obstacles invented in favor of

1. 21p16c
2. 1p315ff
3. 8p83c, López del Castillo
simpletons and cowards to the detriment of people of strong and noble character. ..." "...in life...
the mediocre, the insincere, the low, always triumph over the sincere, the good, and the original." "Gen-
erally," perhaps we should substitute for "always"; the author has a right to exaggerate his own moody thoughts in his protagonist. Speaking, I surmise of morality as we now know it, he says it is a sign of degeneracy; for only the degenerate needs a morality, that is, a means of bettering himself:

Morality should be only an unconscious in-
stinct of the human mass that wishes to grow better--why, we do not know. Moral principles, from this point of view, are butscientific insight obtained a priori by intuition.
The moral instinct is as natural, as germane to man as the instinct of self-preservation or that of reproduction; morality is a recourse of the organized to aid its betterment. Hence only in the degenerate, in the criminal is morality found, as also in this condition one finds the suicidal instinct and the inversion of the sexual instincts, because, since these human types have no assurance of proper reproduction, being rotten fruits, it is suitable for them to disappear. (N.I.)

And about war: "...it is possible that man needs to kill, burn, and trample, and that brutality consti-
tutes a symptom of collective health."

1. 21p147c I. Here Baroja, the anti-teleologist, has
   relaxed his guard, and teleology has stolen upon him. He has personified nature, giving
2. 9p14lb, Larrañaga
3. 22p219
4. 5p319f

her the foresight to provide the rotten branches with a desire to be pruned.
And lastly the intimation that for a good end a rule should be broken. It is priestly casuistry, he says, that makes the breaking of a rule, whether it leads to good or evil, equally bad.

There is a need for some morality, even for all kinds of morality in their respective spheres; for the fact that they have existed proves that they have fulfilled a need. Even the basic egoism has brought incalculable good: "I believe that civilization owes more to egoism than to all religions and philanthropic utopias. Egoism has made the path, the road, the street, the railway, the boat, everything." He even calls a certain lack of egoism, a soldier's loyalty to his side in the face of a personal danger caused by his blunder, a "literary scruple." Bourgeois morality is good for the bourgeoisie: "If these people ((the Bohemian artists)) had an exceptional talent, they might be useful and make their way, but they don't have it; on the other hand they have lost the moral notions of the bourgeoisie, the stanchions that support the vulgar man's life." The man in power should, where the law is discretionary, err on the side of mercy--the principle of pity should guide him. And the two great concepts of good and evil he has

1. 21p219c
2. 15p276ab
3. 1lp167a
4. 1lp23cf
5. 5p315f
called the north-south of our moral life. We may, if we thrum the old tune long enough, make man's behavior merge with the idea of rightness he carries in him.

A certain amount of moral freedom to the greater ennoblement of humanity (if there is not too much glitter and too little substance to these words) would satisfy Pío Baroja. But, as in religion, to see this moral freedom in the hands of tradespeople, and morality turned to coinage and the glory of the inglorious, is too much for him to stomach.

"It's the old song: Be good, they tell us; and men don't think about anything but amassing and appropriating all they can and clambering over each other, and when one sees that society is a nest of vipers and everything rotten with corruption, again one says to oneself as if giving a new and definitive remedy: Be good. Ha, Ha! What a comedy!"

The norms are imposed by the class that is in the saddle; they delude their servants into regarding "duty," "goodness," and other virtues as things of a priori value. "The rich demand that the miserable be heroes or martyrs, not to admire them, but only to pity them." And it has come about that success is the great justifier. To recall the misdeeds of a successful man is frowned upon as an impertinence. In the soldiery the same thing has occurred; the military virtues of submission and duty are only for the betterment of the few.

1. 14p201cf, the violinist.
2. 10p288a, Silvestre
3. 19p299ff
The ancient nobles, the ancient merchants, talk to them about the fatherland; they talk to them about discipline, about military honor, and form from them an enormous force, a marvelous force that serves to defend the world of the privileged against the attacks of those who have no birthright but hunger and desperation.

Aristocracy has no more right to immorality than any other class. But the fact is that most aristocrats take all the latitude they can, and when the morality they impose on others enmeshes them, they find many ways to free themselves. So justice is really their palladium against inroads from below.

...the law is the defense of the strong, of the cunning, and of the selfish. The law is what protects Mr. X, the Secretary of the Treasury, in accomplishing a swindle of millions of francs; the law is what protects the landlord in expelling the poor tenant....

The law is inexorable, like the dogs: it doesn't bark except at him who goes poorly clad.

Speaking of a courtroom there is this textual paragraph:

What admirable machinery! Those shysters and pettifoggers, from first to last knew how to exploit the humble, the poor in spirit, to protect the sacred interests of society by making the needle of justice dip always on the side of money--.

"Trading and robbing, are the same, my boy. The only difference is that trading, you're a decent body, and robbing, you're carried off to jail." "Furthermore, I believe that there are two ranks of men in the world: the one, that live well and rob work or money; the other,

1. 22p87b
2. 15p19cf, Andrés
3. 22p57b
4. 11p331a
that live ill and are robbed." Only a low spirit would consent to be an instrument of those exploiters: ". . . to be a judge or magistrate one must have great presumption or great stupidity." (This accompanies an account of perverted justice.)

Social injustice is most plainly figurate in the persons of those who have reaped most from society; their harvest, money, has come to Baroja to stand for them and all their miscreancy; he has a horror of it. Money is dirty, dirtier as it exists in larger quantities, he says. " . . . money is the great dissolvent of all the virtues. One starts out selling chocolate or slippers, one continues with selling actions of societies, and one finishes with selling everything, though it be one's wife and children. . . . Money is the great social putrefier, the great dissolvent." By extension, trading is another black beast. "Robbing has always been a noble thing; conquering and robbing are the same. But buying a slave or a woman is unworthy." A world of commerce, where the highest wish is to buy and sell, such a world as France, Galdós, and Sainte-Beauve pined for, would be detestable. (N.I.)

1. llp262bc, Vidal I. It is interesting to observe the with Manuel agree- complex of things that Baroja does not like: Jew-merchant-money-modern ing.
2. 4p238b society. There is a sort of chain reflex: any of these is a trigger
3. 2p251ef to shoot off any of the others.
4. 9p16bc,Larrañaga The linkage is certainly illustra- tive of how the things that produce a retrocessive reaction in us are interrelated.
5. 13p216b
Though Baroja explains morality as a kind of egoism, and covers the whole field of morality with self-interest, it is the unventuresome, plodding, unproductive self-interest that for him is really bad. The Dionysian in him demands a morality that will not tether men to tried conventions, but will allow them to make new things, even, I think, if those new things should be a disappointment and a detriment in the end—newness for the sake of newness; anything but tradition, stagnation, and ruts. It is the great unwieldy mass of humanity, so vast that if it is to move anywhere it must have a bell-wether and a path, that makes adventurousness in morality so nearly out of the question; and hence his loathing for mankind in mass—another aspect of his individualism; and hence also his concurrence with Nietzsche in the detestation of slave-morality. "...man in mass is a bad vermin everywhere. It is what we have left of animality."

Individualism he seems to regard as more civilized. But he takes a humanitarian step that Nietzsche omitted to take—detests not only the slave-morality but those who are immediately responsible for it—the enslavers. (N.I.)

1. 13p64bc, Larrañaga
   I. Nietzsche did detest bourgeois morality: "We are seeking conditions which are emancipated from the bourgeois, and to a greater degree from the priestly, notion of morality." (WP Sec. 119.) But he did not abjure enslavers as enslavers.
Enslaving might not be so bad if it were for anything but personal aggrandizement—squandering all one’s powers on fribbles. But even then I feel that Baroja wants all of humanity in his moral brotherhood. I feel that both Baroja and Nietzsche—Nietzsche in spite of his "Eternal Recurrence"—are disappointed believers in progress. Repeatedly Nietzsche cries, "A straight line, a goal!" It is this movement around and around, with "progress" an ingenious political sham, that wrenches their hearts. So they counsel anything, if only to be on the move.

But if he dislikes mankind in mass, his dislike is not extended to men in particular. The dislike may in part be related to his powerlessness to move the mass—his seeing that it must always be a dead weight on his ideals. In his advocacy of individualism we see him trying to break lethargic groups up into more mobile individuals; in his mind Spencer’s "integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion" seems at last to have come true. This will appear again in his polity, with his disunified state. With individuals his early-implanted Christianity appears; he calls this Christian morality (I mean, Christian as taught by Jesus Christ—brotherhood) by the rather broad name "human." Perhaps he modifies this Christian view in one
particular—that though we should help others, we should not submit to others—purges it thereby of its slavish element, its turning the other cheek. If he says, "Sacrifice your neighbor," as he does say in one place, he does not mean to sacrifice him as an instrument for a special class, but to sacrifice him for his own betterment. (N.I.) He would like to see all of humanity move up, and dislikes it for its refractoriness.

About this "human" point of view he speaks as follows: "... the feeling of human brotherhood is now congealed within us."

There may be social or scientific hierarchies, but not human ones. We are in a besieged city, standing in line in a bakery, and in the line there is a wise man or a distinguished woman. We do not step aside. We are waiting at a doctor's house, and we don't yield our place there, either, and invite the richest or wisest man or the handsomest woman to go first. Perhaps we would give up our place and make room for the unluckiest one, because for that we take a human point of view which has nothing to do with intellectual or social category. I believe that there is no more than this: either all of us equal in a human way (not in a legal way, which is a cold and valueless thing, suitable for political programs), or, if not that, then society with hierarchies, with police that flog, with an army that kills when there are uprisings, right or wrong, with Machiavellian politics that can annul the people for utilitarian reasons.

All that pertains to the morals of this latter state of society, its ignobility, falsehood, sham, and duplicity,

1. l6p202 I. "Sacrifice" here does not mean to kill, but to dedicate to some noble purpose, for instance.
2. l3p218b, Larrañaga
3. l3p219, Larrañaga
he abhors. Gross "sins" don't count; the ambidexter is the real sinner. Larraágaga defends being, with one's individual conscience as the point of reference, against appearing or posing for the benefit of others. The slaverer is for Baroja a worm that ought to be crushed; for he adds slavishness to deceit.

Whether or not one will agree with my synthesizing of Baroja's moral view as semi-Christian, I think one will join with me in regarding him, here as elsewhere, as a man of contrasts. Perhaps he follow Nietzsche—at least he concurs with him—, who fairly made a regimen of being full of contrasts, and would create a God out of his besetting devils.

There remains an attack on one form of immorality, intemperance, that seems to be the only conventional one he ever crusaded against, in his only novel that moralizes—the Casa de Aizgorri. It was conceived immediately following his medical career, and the didactic part, one may imagine, came naturally from the young doctor's need to warn against physically injurious things. Perhaps he had been reading Nietzsche, who calls Christianity and alcohol "the two great means of corruption." I suppose he still feels the same; at least he himself has never been intemperate.
2. Aesthetic

Aesthetic in General

There are two kinds of beauty, natural and human. Natural beauty, the "panoramic beauty of sea, sky, etc.," is "indifferent, generous; does not produce appetence for possession," but at most a desire to merge with nature. Human beauty, however, is always accompanied by a desire for possession and a promise of bliss; it is directly connected with the sex-organs. To be sure, human beauty may have a greater or less degree of sexual import, but "an asexual beauty is impossible" in human beings. There is even a homosexual beauty in some works of art, as in Leonardo da Vinci. There is somewhat of the Dionysian-Apollonian division in this dualism.

There are in our hearts as it were two impulsive forces: one, constructive, clear, Apollonian, which attempted to create a work seperating it from Nature. This force impels us toward science, toward art; it makes us put a mark on things to separate them from a cosmos blind and rules by fate.

The other force is the Dionysian, Panic tendency, which longs to fuse things into the Great All, to destroy markings and undo the artificial to naturalize it again.

The Bacchus that we carry within us does not like to have his field limited, just as a boar or a bear, if it could talk, would not like this limitation of Nature.

Apollo may desire intricacy, art, limitation, and measurement; Pan, the Great Pan, the essence of the forces of Nature, the Great All, has to seek simplicity, extension, unity. (N.I.)

1. 2p316 ff
2. 2p272

I. This of course is Nietzsche pure and simple. How much critical value it has is a question.
Thus ruins, which are wont to evoke a feeling of the past, are pleasant to some spirits possibly because they dislike the human works that limit their horizons. Dionysianism in art as elsewhere is always youthful. "The feeling of nature is born from a pantheistic tendency." The taste for nature is strongest in youth, for the contemplative arts—painting, sculpture, etc.—in age. The feeling for nature is also more or less modern, ancient culture having loved nature less as beauty than as a source of wealth. To confuse these two tendencies is to Baroja an egregious error. "One of the Goncourt brothers, not exactly an eagle for thought, said that he did not see anything in Nature that did not recall some already realized artistic work. This in part occurs to all of us who are mannered and vulgar, but surely it ought not happen to the one who has great gifts of artistic creation." And in literature: "Great nature never recalls literature; but the city's corner recalls literature good and bad." "Every landscape is a series of motives for the spirit. It is like a written symphony; for him who understands the poetry of it, full of interest; for him who does not understand it, nothing."

Baroja in another place writes of tranquil beauty.

1. 2p273
2. 13p45ab, Fischer
3. 13p171b
4. 9p32bc, Larrañaga
Though Dionysianism is hardly conceivable as tranquility, this may yet savor of the old dualism; for the Dionysian is tranquil in that he is not concerned or fretted about himself—-one of the conditions of Dionysianism is unconsciousness.

There are, doubtless, several kinds of beauty... but serene harmonious beauty is not found except in the people who do not work nor suffer. The intelligent man who thinks forcefully, the sage who seeks something, the artist who strives with expression, the woman inflamed with sensuality or with mysticism, have at times a sort of beauty; but it is a tormented, violent, and dolorous beauty. Only youth, composure, and good fortune (N.I.) give that tranquil and at the same time proud beauty that has somewhat of the young colt.

As for criteria in art, there are no fixed ones,

"... sympathy and antipathy are almost the essential in art."

Is this landscape beautiful or ugly? Is it extraordinary or common? I do not know. I like it; another does not like it; this man finds it strange; that man finds it unsightly.

I do not believe in the precision of criticism nor in there being an aesthetic value as there are mathematical values.

A thing as complex as aesthetics cannot be reduced to quanta. Even "good taste" is not a sure measure; for besides being indefinite, it is not always desirable. Respectability in art has led at one time or other to

1. 9p32bc, Larrañaga I. All of these are conditions of Nietzsche's free spirit.
a species of impotence and inappreciation; Voltaire, for instance, censured some of Shakespeare's characters for being too familiar with their betters. "Good taste" is apt to stifle individuality. But there are guides to beauty, however, One is popular instinct. "I don't like any of these avenues, of Paris and of other cities, with their monument in the background. . . . They are things planned on paper, by an architect. Such cités are cities without surprises; cities in which the vital, popular instinct is replaced by intelligence." (N.I.) (Which amounts to saying that intelligence on a small scale, or for ends other than beauty, is nearer instinct.) Another is the degree to which the useful and the useless have been combined: "This present-day mixture of the superfluous and the utilitarian is not pretty; it has something base, ignoble, which smacks of industrialism." The useless cultivated for its own sake is all right; but the mixture is a "false luxury," says Larrañaga, speaking specifically of the modes in clothing.

Baroja makes several psychological subordinations of art. Speaking of the "sad" odor of chrysanthemums, he says he believes there is a "sensorial reason" for it: "That these flowers have an odor similar to that of

1. 19p152ff
2. 13p284ab, Larrañaga
3. 12p73ab

I. Unconsciousness of itself, of producing beauty—Dionysianism.
chamomite, which, naturally, is taken for a bad stomach. Hence this relation of sadness." Not much else is said about conditioning in aesthetic tastes, although the fact that a person's own region influences his concepts of natural beauty, that the plainsman dislikes the mountains for example, is pointed out; not, however, with any special reference to conditioning.

The subjectivity of liking and disliking in art is explained by a kind of interaction between the object and the observer. "Every work of art is a series of affirmations and negations that harmonize or do not harmonize with those one inwardly makes."

Art is in large measure recapitulation. The work of art or the piece of music that achieves success is the one that follows the beaten path; the less there is of the new, the better the public will like it. One does not care for an unfamiliar melody. An original work does not seem beautiful until it has become familiar. "Every literary work is in its essence a recapitulation."

(Baroja has already spoken of how hardly one may find originality in literature.) At a given moment, however, it is harder to say what is original than when seeing it in its temporal situation in retrospect.

1. 2p412a
2. 2p40a
3. 2p400
4. 2p403f
There is a sort of instinct for art: "...the feeling of balance and of harmony that we carry within us" (referring to a certain form of architecture as distasteful). In another place Larrañaga mentions a "natural sense of art."

But though art may own an instinct, it is not therefore a thing apart. "Pure art" does not exist. "There is no art without social intentions." Artists have been interested in making themselves an esoteric sect, and simpletons have been willing dupes.

The literati and art critics, who are a hybrid product like the mule, have turned the painters' heads a little, making them think that what they do is very transcendental. It is always easier to eulogize the painter, whose work anyone understands, than the philosopher or scientist, whose work is hard to understand.

Artists are in general "the quintessence of the crude." They are self-sufficient and boresome. The artist has his place, but it is not at the head of the philosopher or scientist. "Art, at the side of philosophy, always seems child's play." As for their ideal of "art for art's sake," it is absurd; art as an amusement or as a commentary on life is good; but as an end in itself it is nothing. The connection between art and leisure is an

1. 6p130a
2. 9p62ab
3. 2p400ab
4. 12p99c, Larrañaga
5. 12p99b, "
6. 12p100b, "
7. 2p200
8. 19p104cf
"Art has always been the birthright of cities...", for only there does a leisure class exist. Art is a means of display for the wealthy, says Larrañaga.

"That bourgeois epoch of the Nineteenth Century will be an epoch which, with the passage of time, will be considered by artists as the Golden Age. But that cannot return."

"You think not? Why?"

"For many reasons. First, because the bourgeois are decaying and losing the means to have palaces full of works of art. On another hand, the State is usurping everything and will not let a writer or an artist, above all a writer, be an independent kinglet."

"It is a pity."

"One must remember those French painters of the Nineteenth Century, the majority middling—how they lived! Feasted, garlanded, getting much money, disdaining the bourgeoisie; demigods in truth. That has passed now and cannot return. The people are little interested in art and do not understand science."

So art is in rather a bad way in modern barbarism, along with all other spiritual values: "...mechanics is triumphing over all. In another day, in an Italian city, a painting of Michael Angelo's or of Raphael's was an event; today even if such geniuses lived, the people wouldn't understand them and would even regard them with contempt; today mechanics and sport are triumphant."

Doubtless art once counted for much in life. Now, little..." But art still has potentialities, and may once more come to the lead. The artist who would

1. 12p97bc, Larrañaga
2. 12p10lab
3. 13p209f, Larrañaga
4. 13p200b, Larrañaga
5. 13p211, Larrañaga
exalt his work and its value must know how to obey
Nietzsche—dissimulate his true motives. (N.I.) "In the
sphere of art, the man who can launch an absurd theory
for the fools, like the one who tosses meat to beasts,
and afterward work modestly in his corner, will prove
that he is a sage. He will have the work and the success.
But is there anyone so wise and at the same time so good 1
an actor that he can do this?" Use an absurd theory as a
sop for the fools; then follow your own course. This is
Nietzschean ethics.

The lack of appreciation for beauty manifests itself
in the spoliation of landscape by tree-grubbers and others
who turn every log to lumber and every river to mill-
wheels. "Soon, now, there won't be any trees here....
There will be only telegraph poles and instead of grass
there will be grease-spotted newspapers and a few odd
bolts." Today's world is not for wild life; "it's for
monkeys."

In keeping with his own modest tastes, Pío values
the little things in art and beauty most highly. In land-
scapes the artificial and spectacular, as is to be expected,
do not attract him. He does not demand mountains and
great expanses and cataracts—"a spot of green to rest my
gaze on seems enough." He likes water as it flows, and
dislikes the tranquil pond, especially the pond with

1. 13p288a, Joe
2. 2p346
3. 2p362b

I. My insertion.
emergent bronze figures. "The countryside with a little water, a little greenage, is enough for me." There is something offensively pretentious about strong light, also: "When strong light disappears, colors are sprightlier, purer." Strong light mars. He admits through one of his characters, however, that though modest shades are more to his liking, another may be right in regarding intense color as more beautiful. This liking and disliking is identified in his mind, I think, with the hallowed dualism of "natural and artificial." He is consistent in his realism, preferring those artists who go closest to nature in their artistry. Nor does "nature" mean to him that dubious preserve of things untouched by human hands; for "outside Nature there isn't anything." Rather it is everything except the gimcrack impertinences of "artists" who think themselves capable of deliberately evolving something new by piecing here and piecing there--claptrap.

Of course the decuman of his scorn rolls on the new schools of artists: "...artist does not mean to us today the acme of intelligence and understanding, but rather a man of mannerism and worthlessness...." It is doubtful that they succeed in contriving anything new: "from so old and much rehearsed a thing as art anything

1. 2p241f
2. 2p289b
3. 4p284a, O'Neil
4. 13p290
5. 4p47bc
new can hardly come. It is like finding a new way of mounting a horse or peeling apples." "He (the painter Regoyos)) tried to convince me that art nowadays is different from older art; I believed and still believe that it is no such thing." And probably their prating is only a mask for incompetence; "Manuel... often thought that the theories of the sculptor seemed rather screens to hide his defects than convictions..." (The sculptor was a "symbolist."). As for the cubists, "If all those artistic manifestations such as cubism were sincere... they would be very curious as monstrousities; but they're not. They are the falsifications of sly people who count on the stupidity of the surrounding environment." "A cubist is compared to an inventor; anybody's dauber, who has a measure of forwardness and can barely sign his name, to a sage who has passed his life studying. All of this utterly ridiculous. We're told of the painter's palpitating soul. It's comical. These bread-winners of the brush want to show that they are exclusive spirits and that the stupidness of Cubism is a sublime madness."
"There must be intelligent men among them, too, beyond a doubt."
"Yes, it's possible; but the majority ought not pass beyond painting doors."
"Still, Cubism is an advance," said the duchess. "Yes, it's a ridiculous advance. It's an advance for snobs, for vulgar people, for German professors stuffed with pedantry, for Jewish critics, and for bluestockings. To come to sketch figures ruder and less graceful than the paintings that exist in the bottoms of caves, drawn twenty or

1. 12p99ab, Larrañaga
2. Páginas Escogidas, P183
3. 11p20b
4. 12p100ab, Larrañaga
thirty thousand years ago, is a comical progress." As to the neo-impressionists, they "have a rather confused aesthetic; in colors, the main thing is nature, the complementary things harmony, etc.; but in perspective nature is not superordinate; and one sees a tavern with twisted bottle and cup out of balance; and they say, 'That makes no difference.'" All this does not mean that Baroja demands mathematical exactitude; there might reasonably be some question as to the time of a picture, for instance. While a painting may treat a historical subject, the value of the conception is not necessarily commensurate with its historical value.

Apart from a society unfavorable to art, and schools of upstarts who are doing their best to discredit it, there is a third harmful tendency: the centrifugal motion of ideas. In the time of Michael Angelo men of ideas were content to put them to artistic uses; now they turn elsewhere and art becomes a thing of feeling and nothing more.

"Art I believe ought to be sensation more than anything else. Five hundred years ago that wasn't so. Art had idea and sensation; but today the idea element has been embodied in science, and the element of violence and passion has been left to the domain of art, above all of music. A Da Vinci or a Michael Angelo would today prefer working in a laboratory to working in a painter's studio..."

"So for you the art of today is an unworthy thing, something like drinking wine or smoking opium."

"Yes, something like that."

1. 2p107b
2. 16p144b, conversation between Baroja and a Frenchman.
But art will persist.

...considered not as a collection of rules but as an aspiration toward the ideal, it will be eternal. However much humanity may climb the spiral of time ever higher and higher, it will forever have an inaccessible beyond, toward which all great souls will turn their eyes; and to satisfy this urge for the ideal Art will always exist.

**Architecture**

"Modern architecture is something pestiferous."

It is grotesque because it desires to be individualistic instead of collective, whereas architecture is essentially a collective art. The passion for exotic forms has led to the transplanting of architectural forms to climes where they do not belong. The resulting anachronism is highly offensive, for the climate of the locality is what should determine the form. "I believe that architecture is a purely social art, an art in which neither the caprice of the architect nor the eagerness of the bourgeoisie to dazzle may happily interfere." The artist has no right to try for individualism for he will end by creating something inappropriate to its setting. It is all right for architecture to have individuality, but it should be the individuality of the setting.

One measure of the suitability of a work of architecture to its setting is its harmony with ideas of hygiene.

1. 22p145
2. 13p65bc, Larrañaga
3. 2p308f
4. 6p129ff
"I do not believe that architecture ought to be modern science, fused, for better or worse, with ancient art; I believe that architecture ought to be modern science, that seeks for harmony within itself and that may come to create a new art."

But science has in another way done architecture an irreparable disservice. Industrialization as well as individualism has led in its attempt to standardize to the use of incongruous forms; it is another evil result of mass production. Architecture, nowadays, says a landscapist in \textit{The Labyrinth of the Sirens}, is an "industrial architecture," stereotyped. "I believe that the ideal of architecture...is to build in accord with the nature of the country..." he declares.

Baroja evidently regards Roman architecture as concordant with its surroundings. "Every trace of Rome is magnificent; aqueducts, bridges, amphitheaters such as that of Mérida; then, the Romanesque, the Gothic churches, the plateresque, the baroque, and the Escorial." The Gothic art—the art produced by the Saxons before the Frankish peoples Romanized themselves—is the only great work in architecture that France has produced. It springs from the racial genius of the Germanic people, which is evidenced by the fact that it is more abundant

1. 6p129ff
2. 4p150f
3. 13p226ab, Larrañaga
4. 14p274c, Yarza
among Germanic than among Gallic or Roman peoples (in this opinion Baroja is sustaining Vasari, he points out). Arabic art, on the other hand, is an importation, and so contemptible. "It is a tinsel art, an art that manipulates painted plaster and stucco, that shuns the human figure. Insignificance. The Alhambra might be a good refreshment stand."

What Baroja demands of architecture may be summarized in this phrase: it must be an outgrowth and not an ingraftment.

Music

Music is "the most social art and the one with the greatest future." Its chief advantage is that it is entirely withdrawn from conflict and dispute; it does not tax the brain, and it has no connection with philosophy or politics, as has painting, which is an "art of wretched philosophical concepts." There may be little controversies among musicians, but they are private and draw no blood. "Another great advantage music has--it slumbers that fundus of dim, unconscious wickedness in the spirit." Since music is non-intellectual, we shall expect their respective devotees to show the same characteristics; hence, "as the majority of lovers of painting

1. 2p89
2. 13p225c, Larrañaga
are second-hand dealers and disguised Jews, so the lovers of music are, in the main, people a bit common, envious, soured, and subdued." "So it is explained how the Greek people could go so high in philosophy and remain so low in music." Hurtado, in the Tree of Knowledge, thinks that "the vagueness of music makes the envious and the canaille, when they hear the melodies of Mozart or the harmonies of Wagner, rest with delight from the inner virulence that causes in them their evil sentiments, like a dyspeptic when a neutralizing substance is introduced. This seems to imply that music is the recourse of intellectually defeated people; a palliative for them and an opiate for those who are to be kept down.

Music frightens me a little. It is like a dark doorway I can't make up my mind to enter. It is something like a pathway that leads to a fen. This pointless excitation I don't altogether like. (N.I.) It is as it were opium for this strong and brutal people of Central Europe. Those men, such as the Germans, accustomed to music and beer, cannot have individuality. (N.II.) They cannot be of use except as employees or soldiers; that is, to obey.

That music is put to this work of fusing people into an unthinking mass is too much for Pío's individualism. He prefers to hold off.

But music that grows from the life of a people is another matter. There are two kinds of music; the universal

1. 5p41f 2. p42cf 3. 13p74, Larrañaga

I. An idea of Wm. James, who advised one to make the excitation purposive by doing some good turn after hearing a concert. We know Baroja has read James, and this same idea recurs in 2lp308b.

II. "Recently a third opiate was added to the
and non-regional, exemplified by Mozart and Beethoven, and the popular, the antipode of the universal, born of the sod, carrying with it all the relationships of home. Though "a bit barbaric," if one or the other had to go, Baroja would keep the popular.

Like architecture, music needs to be indigenous. "Nietzsche, who likely had a musical temperament, in opposing Bizet to Wagner showed himself a systematic backbiter. 'Music must be Mediterraneanized,' said the German psychologist. This is absurd. Music ought to have the geographic parallel of the place where it is born—ought to be Mediterranean, Baltic, Alpine, and Siberian...."

Wagnerian bigness repels him, as may be expected. "As to the hostility which Nietzsche feels for Wagner's theatocracy, I share it. That business of putting up a theater for a church and of teaching philosophy by singing seems to me an absurdity. Also I dislike wooden dragons, swans, flames, and theatrical thunderstorms." Decoration is a hindrance; it incrusts rather than enucleates the idea. 3 "That mythology that pretends to explain what life, love, God, etc., are, with canticles, is completely stupid." 4

1. 13p73, Larrañaga (Note II cont'd from p.163)...list, one
2. 5p45
3. 5p45f
4. 9p197, Larrañaga and daring intellectual animation; I speak of music, our costive and constipating German music. How much peevish ponderousness, paralysis, dampness, dressing-gown languor, and beer is there not in German intelligence!" TI p51.
"Wagnerism annoys me as much as Protestantism," because of being Kolossal. Baroja often throws kolossal at Wagner.

When he speaks of popular music he by no means speaks of the kind of music that now masquerades as "popular." "What a sum of cheap sentimentality there is in these songs! . . . The lover, the sweetheart, the reliquary, the manola, the miller's wife whose love has been taken off to war, the sentimental merry-andrew. . . When I was young there was not this namby-pamby sentimentality. Songs were rugged and more bantering."

Baroja wonders whether it is necessary to have a marked tempo in music: "if so, only danceable music could exist. To be sure, in its inception music was joined to the dance, but enough millennia have passed for both of these arts to become independent." Music has, I understand, been written without tempo, but not with signal success. As long as people are conditioned by rhythmic music to like rhythmic music, so long will rhythm be as indispensable as time-value, temperament, and harmony. Music is not an entity, to have one limb amputated at will; it depends "on the sinuous pathways of the
soul," as Baroja himself says; it is a set of ingrained conditionings. (N.I.)

Painting

The gift of artistry is unanalyzable and inborn; it is not acquired. "As to the statement that technique gives individuality, it looks false to me. . . . . of course there is an unconscious technique born of temperament that can be found and developed; but conscious, acquired technique cannot give individuality if the artist lacks it." "On what does the charm of these landscapes depend? On their being realistic? No. On their having a more exact delineation than others? No. On their being better than that of other landscapes? Not that, either. It is an inexplicable charm, a mixture of

I. "If music, as it would seem, was previously known as an Apollonian art, it was, strictly speaking, only as the wave-beat of rhythm, the formative power of which was developed to the representation of Apollonian conditions. . . . The very element which forms the essence of Dionysian music. . . is carefully excluded as un-Apollonian; namely, the thrilling power of the tone, the uniform stream of the melos, and the thoroughly incomparable world of harmony." (BT Sec.2.) At least Baroja's idea of un-rhythmic music is in accord with his Dionysianism. Precisely this idea as here expressed by Nietzsche may be found in 23p24. Apollonian signifies limitation and Dionysian non-limitation (see Appendix). Baroja speaks of two types of novels, the limited and the non-limited, calling the one "like melody with very marked rhythm" and the other "like long melody." The presence of rhythm therefore signifies the Apollonian. Elsewhere after defining
subtlety, ingenuity, engaging grace, guileless love for things, voluptuousness with life. For that there is no technique that avails." "If there were recipes, methods in literature and art, they would be common property and on that account valueless. There are no secrets. There is only the fact that men are different, that one is like an orange tree and another like a black poplar... A painter like Goya in one day paints a great picture; another like Gerard Dow takes a month to paint a broomstick." "Explaining" works of art is useless because the "explanations" are generally false; the subject is too complicated.

Though he says he prefers other literature than that of the realists, I gather from the number of times he favorably mentions Goya, El Greco, and others, that he prefers realism in painting. He has said that painting is "an art of wretched philosophical concepts"; the realists, having nothing to explain or preach, would be most apt to escape this. "To say that painting ought not approach Nature...is simply foolishness..." The greatness of Velásquez and Shakespeare partly consists in their having no moral to teach. "They are extra-religious, extra-political, as it were mirrors of Nature that do not subject images to any prior idea. They represent life.

1. 13p290f I. cont'd from p.166: humorism as "Dionysian" Larrañaga he says, "The work of the humorist...is...that
2. 13p290cf infinite melody that Wagner wished to implant Larrañaga ...." (19p90). Wagner's music was largely the inspiration of The Birth of Tragedy.
almost just as indifferently as the river reflects the
trees on its shore." Michael Angelo and Dante moralize,
and discredit themselves proportionately. It is not
necessary for painting to be purely sensual, as some
painters claim it should be; it may profitably have a
historical lemma, for instance.

In painting, too, art springs from the soil. The
softness of the Holland landscape, for instance, with
its water and mist, has produced the sensuous, mystical
paintings of the great Dutch masters.

Baroja shows himself to be a good artist by be-
coming uncritical the moment he takes up the subject of
art. Consider this, for instance: Western art is gray;
only the orientals give color to their work. The
Western artist may shade, but never color. Western at-
mosphere is gray, and Western literature and painting
are the same. "I believe one could defend the thesis
that of all colors gray is the minor one, the most sub-
jective, the least realistic, the most intellectual,
because it is, finally, the intonation that the retina
transmits to the brain when the eyes are closed." In
other portions of his discussion of art one restrains
one's wonder with difficulty. This is the great disad-
vantage of being an eclectic; Baroja is not nearly so
logical as he thinks he is.

1. 2p106af
2. 9p31b, Larrañaga
3. Polity.

In Platonic language, this is Baroja's Republic. It is a conspectus of all his opinions, for a man's theory of what ought to be will naturally embody his beliefs about reality, morals, religion, esthetics, and everything else under the sun.

His mostconspicuous vein in this discussion will be his individualism. It will become apparent that anything tending to collectivism, whether it be the common worship of tradition, the over-development of democracy, the mechanization of society, or the pre-digested food dispensed by newspapers, is unacceptable to him. And as these prime agents are very active in modern society, most of his comments one will expect to be negative. He realizes that his opposition is not necessarily due to intrinsic badness in the things he condemns, but very largely to his own inadaptation to them. Society "is like Nature, necessary," good for those who are accustomed, bad for those who are not. The Basques, he implies, have 1 had civilization more or less foisted on them; but they, "not a social type," are mistrustful of it. His is a 2 rather steady-burning individualism that hates to be dictated to; and all modern societies of whatever label

1. 5p29
2. 2p373b
are dictatorships of one kind or other.

Not only is he unadapted; he would have us believe that he chose to go athwart society. He wishes now only that the path had not been quite so hard.

When I come to Pamplona, where I passed a few years of my childhood, I think, even without intending it, about my boyhood life, and this makes me reflect on the wavering of that dim period of waking personality and on the two great roads which may be taken in life: one, the usual one, that of adaptation to the environment; the other, the rarer, that of breaking with environment and marching to good fortune on one's own inspiration. The one leads to limitation, the other to the desert; the one is of the adorers of the law, adoration of Semitic and Roman stamp, the other is that of the children of the great Pan, who have seen the fauns and bacchantes race on the Dionysian fields and have made the world tremble with the hammer of Thor.

The road of limitation is more comfortable, easier. Old laws, old customs, old theocracy, woman, who, old or young, has always been reactionary and domesticating—all these drive us toward it; and to-morrow socialism will drive us in the same direction.

Traveling this road one enjoys some realities, reaps a certain tranquillity, has some means, some more or less apparent respectability; but one does not have inward satisfaction. Why? Because one must often in modern social life make peace with what inwardly repugns; because one must live in hypocrisy and falsehood; because one must commit a few ignobilities by action or omission. He who submits completely to the practice of his time has to have as his gospel, at least in the Spain of today, the gospel of man's paltriness, and not believe in the austerity of Socrates or the courage of Giordano Bruno on the serenity of Goethe or the science of Darwin or the good faith of Lenin. A gloomy thing is this negation of the greatest human values in the interest of mediocrity. One attempts to achieve peace by shutting the doors and windows of one's hut; vain industry; one does not manage to be more than a mummy, which begins its mummy life with an ablution in a baptismal font and ends by sinking into the
great tragic cavern in a respectable fashion, receiving the Holy Sacraments and the blessing of His Holiness.

He who follows the second road, and flees from the limitation imposed by environment, satisfies his pride, his Panic impulse, breathes lungfuls on the Dionysian fields, breathes, but is not nourished. If he has a cloak, he leaves it shred by shred on the brambles, and when, after exhilarating himself with the air of freedom, he wishes to seize the fruit of life, on clasping it in his hands he finds that it is empty, because the fullest ones are reserved for others, and because without the help of the rest it is not possible to achieve anything in our social surroundings, which makes the lone man not, as Ibsen says, the strongest, but the weakest and most miserable of all the animals on the planet.

So when one reaches cold and advanced age, and begins to feel a failure, on contemplating life, which goes by like a confused river of things that pass eternally and cascade into nothingness, on feeling the darkness that surrounds us and that no one will ever fathom, one believes that this existence of ours is a shadow that is spun of the stuff of dreams.

In my youth I thought I was strong enough to follow the steep path of those who part from limitation. And without paying attention to old laws, to old customs, and to old theocracy, I was also an eleutheromaniac and Dionysian. I do not regret it now; but I see that going against the vital lie, as a Bergsonian would say, is going toward ruin.

As I did many years ago, other youths of today and tomorrow will find themselves at the beginning of life with this rigid alternative: either complete adaptation or absolute inadaptation: the narrow city or the desert, the flock or the wild state, limitation or solitary and Panic liberty. To abolish this ruthless alternative, which produces only mechanized people or energumens, it will be necessary for society, with more benevolance and less dogmatism, to give, in time, to him who seeks reality a bit of horizon, and to him who seeks horizon a bit of reality.

1. 6p234ff
His anti-traditionalism deserves to be elevated to the footing of his individualism; both spring from his dislike for society as it is. But still he realizes that if tradition is a heavy wheel that we bear, it is a balance-wheel that keeps intelligence from whirling to pieces. And one cannot say that he is unpatriotic. He is a utilitarian in his patriotism; he wants the best for his country, but is not a falsifier in his love for it. There are nationalist liars and internationalist liars; he would be neither, for that is "rhetoric." "National truth, warmed by the desire for welfare and sympathy, I believe is what patriotism ought to be." Unfortunately it is this very rhetoric that will not let Spain see the truth.

In 1920 Barója published a lecture, Divagaciones sobre la Cultura, which treats in a general way his opinions about culture at large and culture in Spain; from reticence or a need for formality in a public speech (Barója's speeches are all marked by restraint), this monologue does not succeed in giving all his opinions, especially the more pessimistic and subversive ones, about the subject. In order not to break the sequence of this analysis, I shall append a syllabus of it, and

1. 21p366ab
2. 5p73f
3. 6p24ab
then proceed to his other views gathered passim, which
I arrange in four divisions: Opinions on Political
Theory, Opinions on European Culture, Opinions on
Spanish Culture, and As It Ought to Be.

Divagations on Culture.

He announces two parts, observations in general on the
subject of Culture, and Culture in its relations to
Spain.

"Culture," as a term, has derived its popularity
principally from German thinkers, those especially who
have desired to represent life as self-sufficient, with
power and motivation immanent and automatic, as opposed to
the medieval theological view.

There is a difference between "culture" and "civi-
lization." Both terms were variously employed, more or
less recently, by different peoples; in Spain it was more
customary to speak of "progress" and "refinement," and the
terms were until lately employed without a very definite
connotation. Now, however, they have come to have the
following intension: "Culture" is scientific achievement
in its intellectual relations; "Civilization" is this
same culture in its practical--ethical, artistic, etc.,
--relations.

Culture is a means to knowledge, the instrument by
which our state is perpetuated, is made cumulative.
Answer the question, What is there to know in the world?
and its corollary, What is one to do with what one knows?
and you will have the content of Culture. In accordance
with these two questions, there are two points of view
as to the nature of Culture: 1. Intellectual--it is an
attempt to explain the universe. 2. Practical--it is a
guide, a means to orientation, in the world of possibil-
ities; it affords a sense of proportion and equilibrium.
These two points of view have their implications for
theories of values: 1. For Plato and Kant the highest
good was a knowledge of the nature of being--the ontolo-
logical problem. 2. For Comte and the positivists the
instrumental problem ranked higher.

Culture has four major aspects: scientific, ethic,
artistic, and practical ("progress"). While it would be
absurd to suppose any of these existing to the exclusion
of others, it will be observed that in certain peoples
one or another predominates. As to the value of culture,
we have three points of view: 1. Culture for happiness
sake; 2. Culture for Culture's sake; and 3. Culture for the enrichment and intensification of life; this last is Nietzsche. The first is least promising, having all the limitations of hedonism. The second is more commendable, being heroic, but hardly more valuable. The third, although apparently anti-intellectualistic, is verily the essence of intellectualism.

Excessive specialization is one of the greatest dangers that beset Culture, especially contemporaneous Culture in Spain—specialization of the sort that leads some men to say that philosophy is an obscure explanation of the obvious. If Culture is to provide a means for invention and progress, it must not be of the sort that leads to intellectual myopia. It is absurd to make subdivisions of Culture ad infinitum, to the point where a histologist no longer knows zoology, nor a geologist botany; the chiefest risk is that such specialization leads men to drudge without any special object: the paleographer might copy innumerable manuscripts, and utterly waste his time. To be sure, there is an equal danger in dilettantism.

Is Culture to be general or confined to a small group? Considering the late advancements of science, many of which are incomprehensible to the average mind, it would appear that there must be an aristocracy of Culture. The general diffusion of primary education will in no way provide for the conservation of what we have or for further advancement. The Aristocrat of Culture, although seemingly a revolutionist in his ideas, is really a conservator; it is his affair to see that the cultural heritage is preserved.

"Indefinite progress" is a Nineteenth Century dogma which we cannot accept categorically. Whether Culture is linear or circular or spiral, as Goethe said, is not for us to discover. The vague concepts of Bergson and others do not help in the solution of the problem; they presuppose what we are trying to discover. What might be of greater concern is the caloric death of the world, which seems to be gaining wide acceptance as a scientific principle; but that prospect is sufficiently remote not to alarm us.

To discover the ideal type of cultured man one has far to go. Most great men, that is, men whom the world has acclaimed as great, belong rather to the domain of teratology than to that of normal men. All are more or less monstrosities. We might take as our beau ideal one Leon Bautista Alberti, an Italian whose contemporaries
celebrated him as the most perfectly developed man of the time. His intellectual curiosity was insatiable, and not only did he essay almost every human vocation, but also produced some very remarkable work; nor was he wanting in the homelier virtues.

Culture bears definite relationships to nationality. There are certain phases of Culture, such as the more or less abstract sciences, which are international in scope; but on the other hand are philology, history, folklore, are—in short, all of those aspects which a nation sees fit to cultivate within its own borders; these may, of course, by their beauty have such an interest as to become international. Let us call the two groups by the Nietzschean names: the scientific, international portion we shall designate "Apollonian"; the artistic, national portion, "Dionysian."

Culture also bears definite relationships to ethnology, although just what ethnic characteristics bear upon susceptibility to different types of Culture is not yet clear. Some anthropologists have undertaken to maintain that racial differences are negligible—that a European, for example, put among Bedouins would become a Bedouin (if young, of course); but Baroja avers his variance from this belief—regards it as another Nineteenth Century legacy, another aspect of the gospel of equality.

There are two distinct types of European Culture: Germanic and Latin. It is obvious that all the great cities of the world are at the crossroads—they are populated by people of all races, and embody all cultures. But a temperamental difference exists, nevertheless. Rome has been from the first the imperialist, earlier temporal, later eternal. The nations that have been Romanized evince a passion for conquest, for absolutism, and for unity; those which have escaped Romanized, even the non-Germanic peoples, exhibit characteristics of independence, tolerance, and diversity. For one reared in the hectic atmosphere of the South, passing to the Northern atmosphere is indeed refreshing.

Culture in Spain

Just what claim Spain may have to a place in European culture has been a question that once time raised considerable dust. While it cannot be denied that Spain has made invaluable contributions to art and colonization, we see her now barely stirring from a century-old lethargy. The accomplishments of former days need to be capped; and they aren't being capped.

Spain's future lies in modernizing herself on the basis of her own peculiar Culture. In this work the Basque element, vigorous and non-Latin, can do its part.
Spain needs a large city that can be the emporium of ideas. Madrid can not claim to be this, although perhaps it may some day be. This lack gives Spain a perpetual air of provincialism; there is no great center from which Culture may be disseminated. The Basque groups need a similar converging place; more than anything else they need to stop living on the defensive. At the foundation of Culture we must have truth; in spite of the fact that Nietzsche said, in Human, All Too Human, that the illogical is necessary in civilization we cannot expect a soldier, for instance, to derive benefit from outworn falsehoods.

When falsehoods are wrenched up, naturally somewhat of the picturesque goes with them; but we can spare that

Unamuno's dictum: "Let them invent," is a dishonorable point of view, and one that has long lamed Spain. To relinquish invention is to abandon the right to belong to civilization; it is as suicidal as the old scholastic phrase, "Far from us be the pitfalls of debate."

Culture may be an end in itself; but the practical things that it reveals as attainable, a nation should bid for. What the technic of intellect finds, let the technic of action put into effect.

Literature and art may spring up almost spontaneously. But science requires an organon of technological equipment. Without it the savant is crippled. It is not astonishing that Spain has produced little of scientific value when it lacks the laboratory.

We need leaders, a greater social solidarity, a more efficient society, a system capable of training individuals for their positions, and giving them the necessary interest and endurance for their work.

To undertake such a Culture in Spain is a duty but a prodigious task. Our language is Latin; it will be more profitable, however, to look to the northern nations for scientific instruction. Literature and art can take care of themselves, as they have in the past; but for any prestige in the world nowadays, science is indispensable.

What Spain needs is a policy of aggression; anything but this supine lethargy that has been holding her. It is necessary to live in danger, to welcome war and hazard. "Let us be hard, friends, as Nietzsche says... following the magical instruction of the author of Zarathustra, who counsels us to live in danger."
Opinions on Political Theory.

Baroja is not a zealot for any dogma, political or otherwise. When a movement reaches the stage where it begins to have creed and ritual, then he leaves it alone; he is not one who would make humanity over on one pattern, but, as I have already said, one who loves things as they are in all their infinite variety. (N.I.) No single faith should ransom every soul; there should always be room for heterodoxy:

At one side are, and will be ever, those who believe that the Church is the truth and that the truth ought to have the power; at the other are we who believe that the truth is almost inaccessible and that even though it were accessible it ought never to have force.

The truth with executive power is the ideal of fanatics. That is what the Inquisition and the Convention, Torquemada and Robespierre, desired to be. We, the liberals, love and shall always love the heterodoxy, be the dogma what it may, old or new, religious or democratic. Even though the existence of God and the Devil were demonstrated in a rational and scientific manner, even though both had an objective exactitude, we should not always give all our votes to God, should not deliver him all the power; some division of the army we should reserve for the Devil. It shouldn't happen that he per chance be in the right and be overridden.

Let do, let pass. This has been the device of true liberalism. One must let not only the gods, but also the devils, pass.

Political movements are furthermore generally sterile. Their foundation is seldom rational; often they are based on a catch-word; and the brute force that they
marshal behind them usually acts blindly. "The majority of political enterprises are stupidities, which have no more foundation than a word. If anything impels them, it is madness, or wrath, or interest; on that account political movements are so sterile."

The leaders of the new movements, which, in their inception, are of course rebellious, are not driven by reason: the great rebels "give the impression of envy, haughty, of being resentful people, injured by something that has ruffled their self-esteem." Uprisings are generally "farce and masquerade." But occasionally the eleventh-hour adherents, without a clear idea of what the issue is, give it impetus.

In their more theoretical aspects, the various brands of politics are based on some philosophical system or other. The representation of the philosophical system may be only fragmentary, but it is there: ultramontanism represents religious mysticism; liberalism represents individualism; socialism represents Hegelian pantheism and Marxian materialism. With so many claimants to political truth we have no alternative but to assume that some of them are wrong; but it is doubtful that the value and efficacy of philosophical systems in politics depend

1. 2p116bc, López del Castillo
2. 12p79b, Larrañaga
3. 8p126ab
4. 18p17b
on their truth. "From a social point of view falsehood has at times more value than truth. In practice, myths live as much and are worth as much as realities." There may be a pragmatic value in these systems whether they are ontologically true or not. Nationalism has prospered with pragmatism. Baroja means, I suppose, that the nationalistic governments now holding sway justify themselves on the fact that "they work." He will show that nationalism has not worked tolerably.

(1) Democracy.

Democracy is perhaps only a temporary expedient, an interregnum with the people as regent. "Democracy to my way of seeing is no more than the level plot that the collapse of the ancient social edifice has caused; but I do not believe that this means there is not to be built, in time, another edifice with its storeys and its categories."

Baroja has no quarrel with the kind of democracy that means friendliness and comity; but he has with democracy as a political program.

There is something that is called democracy; a species of benevolence of man to man which is as it were the expression of the present state of humanity ("all of us equal in a human way," he has said, p147)), and that cannot be impeached; that democracy is the result of progress.

1. 13, p17bcf
2. 18p24
3. 18p59
The other democracy, of which I have the honor to speak ill, is the political one, the one that tends to the lordship of the mass, and which is an absolutism of number, as socialism is an absolutism of the stomach.

It has its basis in a selfish desire for command, which Baroja deplores, a desire grown so universal that it has defeated itself—has come to the stage where everybody's good is nobody's good:

That the government of many is coming more and more—doubtless. Naturally in a region and in a city there is daily a larger number of the wealthy, of professors, of high officials, of industrials, and of merchants. Each one wants to command, and as this cannot be, all of them join in certain common interests. This is called democracy. Very well; the more rich men there are, the more important and influential persons, the more this method of government will be broadened.

The Count of Spain maintains that the autocratic leader is the true democrat, for he thinks in terms of the masses. Those who are called democrats really are not, but rather selfishs, for they are not thinking of crowd action but of their own individual pleasure and initiative. Our reason for wanting democracy is that we want to have as much as we can get for ourselves; it is not altruism, but the wish to pull someone else down if we cannot pull ourselves up. There is just as much desire for high rank as before.

1. 22p48ab
2. 12p163c
3. 13p198b, Larrañaga
4. 
We all believe ourselves socially equal to our superiors and above our inferiors; if we pay court to a duchess it occurs to us to think: In love there are no classes; but if the portress's boy wants to flirt with our sister or our daughter, oh! then there are classes, you bet!

Listen to those socialists and democrats when they reason in the bosom of confidence; all their arguments hinge about their I like a satellite about a planet. . . .

I distrust the poor democrats and socialists; I believe that if they were rich they would not be democrats.

In a high position the democrat would be quite as autocratic as anyone else in power—even more so if the domineering air of most straw-bosses is any indication. He who would stand in the democratic stirrups must be a good performer.

In present-day democracy there are but two approvals—vote and applause. There is no more than this, which brings it about that as men before committed a series of meannesses to satisfy the kings, now they commit a like one to satisfy the plebs. . . . Democracy comes down to histrionism.

Everything must pander to the bourgeois crowd:

In these perfect democratic countries one must pay court to all the little burghers, all the employees and industrials of flat and vulgar spirit.

Baroja at one time ran for office as a republican candidate. He afterward concluded that his want of dramatic ability must keep him out of politics. "One will have to say, 'Our kingdom is not of this world,'" he says to

1. 22p50cf
2. 5p291f
3. 13p119
4. 5p292

1. 22p50cf
2. 5p291f
3. 13p119
4. 5p292
Azorín of his political venture. He is not enough of a windbag: "... the majority of Spanish republicans have the mania for oratory. . . ."

With impostors at the head, to manipulate the ballot as they see fit, it is not surprising that democracy is a failure." "... I have believed for a long time that suffrage, in practice, is a farce. . . ." The majority is usually wrong: "I have had, systematically, the tendency not only to doubt, but also to believe the contrary of, the general opinion. . . . . . almost always . . . I was right." The people are sadly deceived if they think they will ever command:

... I believe... that the people never have ruled even in the most revolutionary times, and that neither will they rule in the future.

Democracy is contrary to natural inequalities of intellect:

One of the tendencies which the democratic idea and with it the socialistic idea seems to involve is that of equity and justice. To each according to his capacity, to each capacity according to its works, a socialistic has said, and this formula would be surpassingly logical if Nature were also equitable and just. But Nature has made the sick and the well, the strong and the weak, the talented and the foolish, just as society has made rich and poor, noble and plebian.

In practice, democracy tends to political despotism. "Another of the consequences of democracy and socialism, fatal, to my way of seeing, is that of trampling and subjugating the individual to the benefit of society and the
Man is turned into a machine in the hands of the State and run by the newspaper. The State becomes the thing called on to dictate what can be believed and what cannot be believed. That's what democracy comes to: a tyranny of the State, conservative or demagogical. The State, Father; the State, Son; and the State, Holy Ghost. The President of the Republic of the United States, that of Switzerland, that of France, and that of the Soviets, will not be long in being ordained Popes. Lenin has been Pope in life.

Let us consider a state of terrible automatism. In the United States a professor has lately been punished for explaining Darwinism. I can understand the professor's being punished if he forced others to believe, but for explaining it! It is excessive brutality and means that the State is going to attempt to compel people to have its ideas. It is a stupid reversion to the Inquisition. And to think that Kant, the destroyer, the dissolver, long before the French Revolution and with an absolute king, lived respected and honored, as a professor, and today one cannot explain a scientific theory in a democratic republic! And the newspapers will prate of what the world has gained in liberty and progress with democracy.

Naturally a state vitiated of all personal initiative, in which one's most insignificant acts are inquisitorially pried into, is not one to inspire the adventurous spirit.

It is something automatic but nothing to stir deep enthusiasm. Today geography has more enthusiasts than democracy; an explorer will risk his life to go to the Pole or to the top of Everest; for democracy nobody dies, and does well in not dying for it.

As it has taken away adventure, so it has taken away spiritual interests. Art and science both have gone into

1. 22p50a
2. 13p119cf, Haller
3. 13p198, Larrañaga
a decline under democratic influence, being made dependent on the state: "In proportion as democracy increases, all these spiritual activities will be made dependent on it." Spiritual freedom has no need of democracy.

Liberty is very beautiful and very great; in the soul of the free and emancipated man there is a Religion, a Fatherland, a State, a Justice, all; and this suffices the free man, who has no need whatever of a social protection based on interests like his own. Consciences stand for freedom; stomachs stand for Democracy and Socialism.

Democracy is so insecure that in times of stress it has to abandon its principles for imperialistic and autocratic ones. "When the need for defense comes, then it forsakes its ideals. So its politics is a lie and a farce."

For most people, aside from the democrats and socialists themselves, the rule of the aristocrats is better than democracy, for they at least have refined appetites and good manners.

Baroja offers an interesting hypothesis: that democracy may culminate in matriarchy. It has already put filling-stations in most of the corners where a man one had a chance to be a hero, and since in the ordinary, everyday, un-heroic way the female occupies a seat of much more importance socially that the male, "the day when war and adventure can be made to disappear, government

1. 13p209, Larrañaga
2. 22p52cf
3. 13p199a, Larrañaga
4. 22p52b
by the mothers, matriarchy, will come."

Since Europe is nowadays in the main democratic, Baroja will have more to say on this subject when he speaks of European culture.

(2) Socialism.

Some of the opinions about democracy, especially those about the tyranny it leads to, will also apply to socialism, the logical conclusion of democracy.

The fact that Pío has the reputation of being a radical has led some undiscriminating individuals to think he must therefore be a socialist. "...I have never talked effusively about the worker," he protests; "then, I don't feel so slavish as not to dare to take from life what it offers me. I take what seems good to me, and what I don't take of it, I don't take because I am unable." He has never cared for socialists. He speaks of "that type which is to be found among socialists, people of narrow head and inflated vanity." I suspect that as a baker he had some difficulties with the unions, which perhaps was partly the basis for his dislike. (N.I.) The inquisitiveness he so dislikes about democracy reaches pragmatism in socialists.

"Whether John Smith travels first-class or third-class

1. 13p234c, I. He tells the same story twice, with variations, once about himself and again under Larrañaga
2. 5p303 the guise of a character. In the latter version the difficulty with workers' unions is mentioned: Hence my inference. See 5p228ff and 22p19ff.
has been one of the most serious causes for discussion among the socialists and their enemies.

"Socialism is being realized daily, above all in countries like Switzerland, without great outcry or revolutions," said the poet; "everything is coming clear by virtue of statistics and police."

"Why, the meshes of the police net and the statistics net have shrunk so that mystery is now impossible," asserted Larrañaga; "the steps of the most insignificant persons are known. It would suffice to have the light of the reflector come to any one of us for all the insignificant tracks one has left in one's life to stand out. Where one was born, where one has lived, in what hotels one has been, all the vulgar story would shine clear."

"And that seems bad to you?" asked Pepita.

"Very bad; repugnant. The State is going to create the men it needs by education, which today is a prepotent mold. Heretofore the complete man was more a product of nature than of pedagogy, and in proportion as socialism increases statistics and school, the complete man will be found less and the specialist more. For the man fashioned by these schools is a specialist, and at the same time he is a pedant."

"You are right," affirmed Stolz.

"The socialistic state, with its pedagogy," Larrañaga continued, "will make of men what breeders make with their hornless cattle. Griffins, greyhounds, or deerhounds it will make in its laboratories, which for men will be the schools. Perhaps they may be able to employ, along with lectures, the cinema, and books, injections of serum, and ingraftings of glands."

"Who would have believed," added Stolz, "that all the fury for liberty, the enthusiasm of the eleuthеромaniacs would end in so prosaic a thing as democracy and socialism, in life channelled by economics and statistics!"

This condition has already been largely realized in our cities.

After the corpse was buried, Silvestre strolled

1. 5p303
2. 15p158bcf
among those tombs, thinking of how ugly it is to
die in a great city, where one is catalogued like
a document in an archive. . . .

There is altogether too much stereotyping. But the great
ecumenical drama of the Middle Ages, "accompanying the
man from cradle to grave," will not be "recreated on the
basis of philosophical ideas or political dogmas." So-
cialism may catalogue, but it will never homologize.

There are two flaws in socialistic logic: First,
the notion of communal luxury. Luxury ceases to be
luxury when it becomes communal. Second, the hypostati-
zation of the concept "worker." The "worker," Baroja
says, "is a false and hypocritical platitude." "As during
the Eighteenth Century the 'citizen' or the 'simple
heart' was talked about, so today the 'worker' is talked
about. The word 'worker' will never be anything but a
grammatical common denominator." It covers a multitude
of classes--there are workers and workers, and there is
not a great deal of difference between workers and burghers,
as the two classes are very fluid and spiritually speaking
a partition hardly exists. And for all their protested
allegiance to the worker, our revolutionaries probably
have at heart little sympathy for them. As for the rose-
water socialism of some gentlemen, Baroja says there is a
long way between it and the workers it champions. I

1. 10p231a
2. 2p280
3. 19p172ff
4. 5p304f
5. 5p306f
suppose that socialism in its shirt-sleeves is the form least of offensive to him.

There are two kinds of socialists: the intellectuals, "a collection of pedantic professors,... soporific geniuses, who write very big books and very weighty articles, to say in a vulgar and plodding way what others have said well and gracefully," and the workers, "the bourgeoisie of the future," who are the same in their morality and selfishness as the present bourgeoisie. Already their societies are victimizing the small industrial.

Socialism on a grand scale is of course Soviet Russia. Baroja seems to have admired it in its early stages. Referring to what he has said above about everybody's good being nobody's good, he admitted, in 1919, that with the universalization of beauty and property and what-not, luxury in Russia will inevitably disappear, but added that the Bolshevists are to be admired for their courage. He liked their threat to the bourgeoisie, and at the last of the Caverna put his rhapsodic ballad, "The Good Burghers"; in it he exhorts them to fling and revel. What matter if they have squeezed their luxury out of other lives? What if they have been

1. 22pl9ff
2. 9pl75
embezzlers? Their confederates—newspapers, capitalists, lawyers, politicians, etc.—will defend them against Bolshevism. This attitude and his later volte-face are both of them aspects of his Dionysianism: as long as a movement gives promise of stirring things up, Baroja favors it; but when once it is settled in power, he turns his back. Nietzsche felt the same way about socialism in general—that it is a good discipline because it keeps men in suspense—although in other ways it was an "attack of illness." Here is a later opinion of Baroja's, voiced in 1925:

This time, subsequent to the war, has an air of horrible chill and gloom. The world seems a waste of ashes, while that sinister flame of the Russian Revolution burns, a flame that warms not, and that instead of leaving in History a bloody, human drama, like that of the French Revolution, does not leave open to view, in the midst of its unheard-of horrors, anything but the doctrinaire disputes of Marxist pedants, a cold cruelty of Chinese mien, and the hateful avidity of the Jews, who act the part of worms for dead nations. (N.I.)

He has small tolerance for the socialist revolutionists who platitudinize about some Elysium to be got in a day:

This revolution ((that of the Hungarian Communists)) was nothing but the tumult of a handful, a series of bugle-horns or loudspeakers repeating platitudes in every tone and every way. The eter-

1. WP Sec. 125 I. I suspect that the French Revolution
2. 6pl5b has been hallowed by distance.
A new absolute morality that will commence tomorrow! As if tomorrow didn't have to be like today, and as if men were on a fixed date to leave enmities, envy, egoism, and vanity to one side."

And speaking of the revolutionary schemers in Paris, he says, "...those Bohemians wanted to make Humanity advance a few centuries in one lone swoop." (N.I.)

(3) Anarchism.

Though Baroja has classified himself as an anarchist, anarchism as a system, with all the furbelows of political dialectic, does not appeal to him: "Neither has anarchistic pseudo-philosophy engaged me in any wise," I have already quoted him as saying. Speaking of Spain, he says, "...the only present revolutionary philosophy among the masses is the anarchistic philosophy; but that is an instinctive, sentimental philosophy that assumes the character of a religious dogma, which is an absurd and infantile thing." It is absurd because it is inconsistent. "'Revolutionary tradition' is a contradiction."

"The man capable of changing would have to disregard all tradition. Plainly with this exacting there would not be revolutionaries. But what would be lost with that?...

It would be magnificent if the anger and irritation of

1. 13p37a, Stolz
2. 14p163c
3. 6p145bc

I. Nietzsche counted as an advance the fact that we are "Ever more decided, more anti-idealistic, more objective, more fearless, more industrious, more temperate, more suspicious of sudden changes, anti-revolutionary." WP Sec. 118.
the rebel should appear only in the head of a man with
a strong, new idea. The worst of it is that this irri-
tation and this choler bud always in a cretin's head and
around a much-handled and well-known chicanery."

Baroja has known a few famous anarchists, among
them Reclus and Malatesta. "Today it is plain to be
seen," he writes, "that anarchism after the manner of
Reclus and Kropotkin is old and a thing of the past. This
tendency will reappear, it is evident, with another
form and with other aspects."

Let us consider his kind of anarchism:

I have always been a radical, individualistic,
and anarchistic liberal. Enemy first of the Church,
then of the State; while these two great powers are
at war, a partisan of the State against the Church;
as soon as the State predominates, enemy of the
State.

In the French Revolution I should have been
one of Anacarsis Clootz's internationalists; in
the period of the liberalist struggles, I should
have been a Carbonaro.

All that liberalism has as leveller of the
past appeals to me; its struggle against religious
and aristocratic prejudices, its community exprop-
riation, its inheritance taxes, anything that means
pulverizing past society, gives me great glee; but
what liberalism has as constructive--universal suf-
frage, democracy, parliamentarianism--to me seems
ridiculous and ineffectual.

Even today I find value in liberalism in those
spots where it has to be aggressive; in the local-
ities where it is accepted as an achieved fact it
gives me neither interest nor enthusiasm.

Baroja was for a time a member of Lerroux's
revolutionary party; but he left it when it began to be

1. 12p250, Joe
2. 5p308f
3. 5p289f
too dogmatic. Lerroux, he says,

...wanted to make of his party a party of order, capable of governing, friend of the army. I believed it ought to be a revolutionary part, not to raise barricades, but to arraign, to agitate, to protest against injustices. Lerroux wanted a party of orators to talk at public assemblies, a party of councilmen, regional deputies, etc..., wanted to aristocratize...the radical party.

There are two aspects to Baroja's anarchism: the Dionysian, anti-tradionalistic side, that takes form in an opposition to all existing powers and to all movements that, though revolutionary to begin with, acquire power—an opposition to the idea of power itself; and a cultural side, on the order of the anarchistic theories, tending to internationalism. These two sides appear in another way. "Agnosticism," he writes, "as a doctrine of unsystematic skepticism, tends, in politics, to pragmatism, to opportunism." "Teleology leads to absolutism and to theocracy on one extreme; to socialism and to anarchism on the other." He has called himself an agnostic, and in the persons of various of his heroës has practised this "agnostic opportunism" with relation to society as it now stands. In his desire to make Spain teleological he shows the other side.

About other movements he has not expressed himself

1. 5p299f
2. 2p31a
so much at length. Monarchism he is grateful to for having saved Spain for Europe and freed her of Semitic domination. (N.I.) "I am a monarchist in part, but a monarchist without the slightest sympathy with royal persons." The story of European monarchy has been a story of cowardice and ignobility. The only noble gesture made by any of the later kings was the Czar's folly in holding too long to his throne. Then for the people, monarchism is not suitable: "Governments of perfection and divine right are most parlous for the demos; it is more suitable for it that they be imperfect, of earthly provenance, completely vulgar." Mussolini's dictatorship is very unpalatable for Pío. Mussolini himself is a "poor actor, without originality, made on the foundation of D'Annunzian, peccant literature," and the "Italy of Mussolini is of the most grotesque imaginable." (N.II.)

1. l3p196f, Larrañaga
2. l1p170bc
3. l3p153, Larrañaga
4. l3p152c, Larrañaga

I. Is this a sort of cum hoc ergo propter hoc reasoning? Perhaps monar-
chism merely happened to be in power when this came about.
II. One must notice again the fond-
ness for calling names. He issel-
dom disposed to analyze.
Opinions on European Culture

Baroja does not limit "European" to the geographical division when he discourses on culture. "If 'Europe' were a synonym of civilization and culture, Albania and Servia would not be Europe, but, on the other hand, Boston or Melbourne would be."

(1) Nationalism

Positively as we may assert that we are citizens of the world, the internationalism of today is small compared to that of another age. "The only true internationalism is that of culture, and that was more profound and deep-rooted in the time of the Renaissance and of the Reformation that in this epoch of stupid nationalism in which we live."

Nationalism tries to establish itself on a rational basis by claiming to represent racial divisions. "Pure" American, "pure" German, "pure" Spaniard, etc., are current shibboleths. Although it is impossible to demonstrate the existence of pure races, provincial self-feeling has made copious use of the idea nevertheless. Or if the race-fetish will not do, the nationalist pretends to have some peculiar "culture"; but in Spain, for instance, there are no foci of culture—the Basque even imports a French gardener, and then, desiring autonomy

1. 13p162cf, Larrañgga
2. 2p295a
3. 18p25ff
for Vasconia, harps on "Basque culture." There are regional differences, to be sure, but they have no political significance. A third nationalistic fetish is the "national heritage," "tradition;" but it is as hard a concept to pin down as "race"; what is decried as too new is no newer than the traditions were when they were first introduced. Age is no infallible criterion of goodness. It is furthermore hard to find just what these peculiar "traditions" are.

"The State, Father, the State, Son, and the State, Holy Ghost," he has said. Nationalism is trying to turn the State into a religion. "You French and Germans want to replace Religion with the idea of Fatherland and Church with State. The worst of it is that you influence other countries."

Nationalism, I infer, is weak: first, because of its need to hypnotize itself with these shibboleths; second, because of its need to police itself with a strong military.

In anemic, weak societies, one does not live with reality; one may lay hand on anything except the symbols and the forms. So, kings and conquerors have come to laugh at things human and divine; but they have had to respect the ceremonies and the rites. Cynicism toward the ceremonial is what may least be condoned.
In order to support its military plan, the government must needs resort to propaganda—"preparedness," and so on. The campaign is carried on largely with our youth, in order properly to inspire them with the high ideals of bloodshed. The organization of the boy scouts is one medium of instruction. Baroja calls their maneuvers "patriotico-military mummery." But it begins even earlier: "...the dolls--that teach girls to think about future broods, and the lead soldiers--that show boys the pleasant prospect of burning, bombing, and lopping heads with a lovely sword."

Nationalism cannot be the future drift if men are to become citizens of the world. Its only justification would be where there are sharp racial demarcations. (N.I.)

(2) Progress

The war has demonstrated that mankind is as brutish as ever, that fanaticism and prejudice have not been one whit abated, and that belief in "progress" is relative to individual temperament. The two types of temperament, morose and sanguine, are evident among historians--the great detailers and the great synthesizers, the former inclined to doubt, the latter to optimism, in the matter of progress. Baroja, belonging with the detailers, we

1. 3p357 I. Here appears again the desire for
2. 12p254bc, Joe fitness or naturalness.
3. 18p73ff
shall expect to be pessimistic. "The doctrine of progress itself is a fraud to the devotee of truth," he says.

The only true and calculable progress occurs in science. It is ridiculous to affirm, as Valera and other traditionalists do, that every modern scientific discovery was contained in the works of the ancients. Pío gives at Valera in a tale, "as true as what Valera asserts," which is too delicious to resist including:

A man who had been in Egypt was telling in Seville what he had seen in the land of the Pharaohs.

"And in the basement of an Egyptian tomb," he said, "was found a bundle of copper wire, which makes one suspect that the ancient Egyptians understood telegraphy."

"Why, here in Seville," replied someone who was listening to him, "in the basement of a very old house not a thing was found, which makes one suspect that the ancient Sevillians understood wireless telegraphy."

Science has made the world better: "We of all mankind have our treasure that no one can despoil us of; this treasure is science; she makes our life better, keeps our child free from smallpox, makes him well if he is sick from diphtheria." Nothing avails against science. Her dissolvent ideas destroy fetishes. "Better!--one fewer lie." "... Science is pure light. Science is the solid edifice of humanity, the only well-doer; little by little,
in proportion as it advances, it is giving us the bread of body and spirit, and is removing diseases and death from our side." Telling of a mother whose child was saved by an injection, he writes,

The child was now safe, and that woman looked at the instruments of the doctor's office with a sort of transport, thinking, doubtless, that if God is anywhere he is first of all in laboratories.

Yes, science is sacred; we may understand it or not; it may be above us, but that makes no difference—it is our protector, our mother.

But the intervening years have brought a change. I suspect that the war taught Baroja that science can not only create but also destroy; that she has become, as Ayres would say, the False Messiah. "Science, which is, by and large, the only thing with a religious air that we have left, crushes us with its coldness." Science is becoming cold, indifferent, more technical, and withdrawn from people. It is progressing, but progressing alone:

Undoubtedly the idea of progress is one more illusion. Only science progresses, and that is precisely what the people cannot understand because it is too complicated; so science is withdrawing so far from the general ways of knowing that it is going to arrive at a height inaccessible to the majority. The day will come in which a species of savants will have all the science in their brains. The rest of humanity will be the crowd of stupid and vulgar people who will be led like a herd. In any of these cities, if the majority of us who walk through the streets are asked how this automatic telephone, the electric tram, or the radio works, we'll be unable to say. One
engineer will calculate one thing, another another; one founder will make needles, another shuttle-cocks, another will fit up the apparatus, and so we shall create those manufactures which are above us, because the majority of us don't know how they work.

Even before the war Baroja regretted the tendency in science that he has already deplored in democracy, that, though it has abolished terrors, it has also made life less interesting and more stereotyped. Practical science, or technic, has not lived up to our hopes. It has taken away the breadth of science and departmentalized it: "Science, which seemed to be consolidating itself and advancing with assurance, has divided and subdivided itself and has also begun to limp." Before the war, discouraged with other ways, we had given ourselves over to technic; "...but technic has turned out to be as lying and false as democracy. Above all in politics there is no technic." In its present state it has been so stereotyped that anyone can follow it: "Science is nothing but method and technic... It does not require unusual capacities." Charlatanry and rhetoric have buried science:

"And you believe that what present-day science produced is not worth much?" asked Larrañaga.

"I believe it is daily worth less. The Germans are ponderous, and now one doesn't find in them examples of genius so abundant as at the beginning of the past century. The French had, if not great

1. 15p198f
2. 13p208f, Larrañaga
3. 13p198ab, Larrañaga
4. 13p158b, Stolz
inventiveness, that clear, sharp eye of people of mathematical spirit, but now they are losing it; the Italians, now that they form a great nation, have only little men."

"And does that depend on something?"

"It is the torrent of charlatanry, of industrialism, and of Judaism, that is flooding everything. How much folly they have invented! How much verbiage! The whole world, and above all the French, appears to want to reach, in confusions, glossalgy, and bad taste, the height of the Germans. Today I saw a French book entitled Introduction to the Study of Metaphysics. Introduction to what? To a thing that does not have reality. In science and art everything today is verbiage: expressionism, Dadaism, metaphysics, psychoanalysis, Pirandellism; all of that is nothing but verbiage; it doesn't hold a gram of new facts or new concepts."

In a material way we probably have progressed. Americanization has brought a host of material goods, and is making Europe over with the alembic of bigness. "This old Europe is being steadily Americanized and is losing character."

But whether material progress has advanced us spiritually is very doubtful. Industrialization is all right if it improves culture, but it doesn't appear to be doing so. Civilization has not improved our manners.

I have been in a town with electric lights and on a well-planned street, with no less a name than "Sanz del Río Street," where a few children regaled me with stones and the sexton would not let me enter the church.

Also I have been in a camp near Tangiers, where a few poor Moors, without knowing me, offered me hospitality and a plate of alcuza. But that camp was not civilized.

1. 13p102f, Presumably Haller
2. 12p83a, Larrañaga
3. 2p346bc
4. 22p218cf
In the artistic world "mechanics is triumphing over all." Mechanization is both a cause and a result of too few spiritual interests; having failed to achieve a spiritual ideal, we are now idealizing every kind of mechanical motion--sports particularly.

In the face of powerlessness to create an ideal, or at any rate a utopia, our epoch turns back on itself and attempts to give as a desirable norm what is the result of its own barrenness.

Hence the sour-grapes depreciation of all the human ideals it has tried to attain and failed--widespread culture, spiritual values of all sorts; hence the implicit acceptance of anything to alleviate the pain--the replacement, for instance, of spiritual unrest by mechanical, senseless motion, in the form of sport and what-not, and the swallowing of nostrums innumerable--spiritualism, theosophy, cubism, psychoanalysis, and magic of every description.

So Baroja, who in his youth was regarded as a revolutionary, is an old fogey and visionary in a present that has no interest in ideas. This is an "age in which one no longer talks, because there is nothing to say; one rides an automobile, kicks a football, even flies. What don't fly are ideas." Democracy has also been partly to blame, giving people a desire for outward advance and a carelessness of inward development.

1. 13p200b, Larrañaga
2. 6pl6f
3. 13p191bc, Larrañaga
4. 22p50ab
We have not progressed morally. "Silvestre recognized progress and civilization and was enthusiastic about their material perfections, but it was not the same with moral evolution. . . ."

We have not progressed toward truth.

"The terrible thing is that the truth eludes us. If all of the organization and discipline of Catholicism had been based on a truth, what wouldn't they have done with the world? The very work of Jesuitism, if instead of basing itself on dead formulas had found a strong truth, where wouldn't it have attained? As it is now, falsehood has as much strength as, or more than, truth. All the invocations of truth, all the Renan-style prayers before the Acropolis, are exercises of professors of rhetoric. As it is now, it is doubtless that not Kant, nor Darwin, nor Pasteur has drawn the masses as has General Booth with his Salvation Army, or as other generals and other orators have done. Falsehood always produces much more enthusiasm than truth; hence a devilish confusion. On the other hand religion, with all its hosts, beholds with sympathy whatever may be confusion in the field of non-religious ideas, a thing very natural after all. There are people who believe that Spiritualism is scientific and archeology false, others suppose that 'metaphysics' is a science and microbiology not; there are some who suppose that cubism is a great invention and that Darwinism is a mystification."

"Who is going to orient the people?"

"No one. Besides, what would be the use? . . . It's just as well for the masses to live in error. We used to know that we were ridiculous in a serious nature, in an immutable space. Now it seems we are grotesque in a comico-lyrico-danceable space. When in the full course of the Nineteenth Century a man like William Booth can create the Salvation Army, in a country like England, which considers itself one of the most civilized countries, everything has been said. This time is the time of mysticism and madness. What is an epoch like ours, which has been
passed with consulting the mediums, going to be?" These amusements of retired soldiers and of employees of capitals of provinces are typical of the time. Kant, Pasteur, and Darwin miss; the mediums always hit the white."

"Who knows whether what those Kants and Pasteurs say is the truth?"

"No one; it is a relative thing, like everything human. Not an absolute thing. All the work of humanity is within the relative, except religion, which has aimed to seek the absolute. Man doubts in the midst of scientific progress, because many times it has been supposed that the vital, mystical problems will not be resolved, but will be suppressed, and since in spite of this they return, man stands perplexed. I, like the majority of the people of my time who are not dogmatic, begin to wonder whether a religious or metaphysical theory may not be worth as much as a scientific discovery, because if the religious theory passes and is forgotten, the same happens to the scientific theory; it, too, passes, is forgotten, and is replaced by another. There is advance in civilization, but not in every sense. What is gained in one direction is lost in another. When the balance of an epoch is struck, one does not see that things have integrally advanced, but that they have advanced in one direction and regressed in another." (N.I.)

With everyone mechanically doing the same thing, there comes about the state of collectivism that Baroja so abominates. The mass becomes afraid of exceptional worth, and makes it hard for men to stand above their class. "A great part of the collective antipathy for the individual arises from fear. Above all in our southern

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1. 13p201ff, I. "Progress... Mankind does not advance, it does not even exist. The aspect of the whole is much more like that of a huge experimenting workshop where something in all ages succeeds, while an incalculable number of things fail; where all order, logic, coordination, and responsibility is (sic) lacking... Man is not an example of progress as compared with animals..." WP Sec.90
countries strong individuals have been restless and tempestuous. The herds above, like those below, do not want the seeds of Caesars or Bonapartes to flourish. Those herds crave spiritual levelism; want no distinction between one man and another except a colored button on the lapel or a title on the business-card." Naturally, in such a society the one who can align himself best with others is the one who will do best.

It is adaptation, not strength nor goodness, that makes for success in our society. Influence, friendships, advantageous marriages, scheming, and "pull" are what count far more than anything else. Then success, once achieved, justifies everything. The old fictions about industry and honesty are made for simpletons. "Whoever wants to prosper in present-day society must have cynicism and effrontery." Exceptional persons are so few as to be entirely isolated: "In our world the people who count do not know each other; he who works, he who thinks, does not know where his companion is. But the good burghers know each other very well; they have a Moloch, or a Jahveh, the God Argent, Gold, Denero, Dinero, Money." (3) The Bourgeoisie.

Modern society has been delivered up body and soul

1. 17p7cf
2. 12p103ff, Larrañaga
3. 13p102, Haller
to this class. Those who are not bourgeois in fact are so in spirit, for the burghers have inspired other classes with their ambitions. Wealth is so much more ostentatious nowadays than formerly that every peasant imagines that the rich man's state is enviable, and accordingly wealth and display become his ambition.

He who lacks the grace of their god Money is a negative quantity. Jesús, in Mala Hierba, says bitterly,

Civilization is made for him who has money, and he who doesn't have it can go and die. Before, the rich man and the poor man lighted themselves with the same kind of lamp; now the poor man goes on with the lamp and rich man lights his house with electric light; before, if the poor man walked, the rich man rode a horse; today the poor man keeps on walking and the rich man goes in an automobile; before, the rich man had to live among the poor; today he lives apart, has made himself a cotton wall and hears nothing. If the poor shriek, he doesn't hear; if they die of hunger he is not aware of it...

Or if they are aware, like the man beside his hearth in stormy weather they snuggle deeper in their chair and feel comfortable.

If you take from the rich man the satisfaction of knowing that while he sleeps another freezes and while he eats another dies of hunger, you take from him half of his happiness.

1. 12p61c, Larrañaga  I. See "Dulce Egoísmo," 22p65ff,
2. 11p227b, Jesús  for an ironical treatment of this
3. 11p210ab, Jesús  idea.
They try to mitigate their ruthlessness with "charity," continues Jesús, but that is symptomatic treatment. Speaking of a woman who has received a bit of alms, he says, "Now this woman is happy...; she was going to die tomorrow and she'll die the day after. What more can she wish?"

The bourgeois morality, a kind of sublimated banditry, Baroja has already discussed. "Between a bandit and a great merchant," he adds, "I almost prefer the bandit. The one robs on the royal highway and the other robs with the account-book." "...the majority of fortunes come from theft." Only a few come from honest toil and saving; the rest from "theft, susry, fraud, privilege, etc."

In their strongholds, the cities, the bourgeois have brought about a caste system of two classes, themselves and the outsiders, white and black, the touchables and the Chandala. "The great city is a monstrous fruit of perdition and vice. Above, glittering luxury, below putrefaction; it seems one cannot have the one without the other." And speaking of Spain, he says, "At present clericalism, snobbery, and plutocracy are the only things that dominate in our cities." They have so identified themselves with the city that—in Spain at least—there

1. llp166a
2. 6p128b
3. 8p156ab, López del Castillo
4. 13p287b, Larrañaga
5. 12p92c, Larrañaga
is a kind of city-worship. Their "civic pride" extends to the aversion that the burgher feels for anyone who tries to stand out above his fellow, but it does not deter him from climbing. Between this slavish cultivation of the municipality and the worship of great men, Baroja chooses the latter: better hero-worship than worship of an anonymous mediocrity. There is an atmosphere of strain and stiffness about Spanish city-life that rules out easy and familiar social intercourse.

The great voice of bourgeois mediocrity, the Press, has done the utmost to suffocate ideas and originality. Though "the press today is a brutal force," it has not put its force to any noble use. Journalism, together with democracy, has brought us to the age of charlatanry and catch-words in which we live. "Writing in the newspapers is a business of cretins—of cretins who govern the world by dint of commonplaces." "The newspaper has to be the servant of that narrow bourgeois spirit, and at the same time its brain. The newspaper serves as gray matter for the good burgher; it perceives for him, reasons for him." (N.I.)

Those who are not adjusted to bourgeois society, especially humble souls, Baroja much prefers to the

1. 2p305ff  I. "We mistrust any form of culture that tolerates newspaper reading or writing." WP 132.
2. 2p312b
3. 11024bc, Roberto
4. 13p119, Haller
5. 12p85c, Larrañaga
6. 13p119c, Haller
officials, merchants, and "educators" who constitute it.

Silvestre felt a great sympathy for everything humble; he loved children, untutored souls

... He believed that if a senator is not necessarily wont to be an imbecile, generally the majority of them didn't miss it far, and between talking with a Tasmanian savage and a deputy, an academician, or a journalist, he would always have preferred the first, finding him much more instructive and agreeable.

... he was enthusiastic about all the great virtues of the poor people, of the humble people...

As for those who are resting on their possessions, "elegant society," the rich, cold unintelligent, and sophisticated, Baroja has no use for them.

\(4\) Whither Bound?

It gladdens our anti-traditionalist's heart to see that the time is here when age ceases to be a guarantee of worth.

"... the best that our age has: the taste for newness and youth. To be sure, present-day youth is not responsible for everything, but that of tomorrow will be."

"Never, up to now, in politics, in life, in art, have youths and even children wielded such an influence as they wield now. A Dutch landscapist told me that he had exhibited his canvases in Paris. An American girl had wanted to buy one, and when the author was pointed out to her and she saw that he was old, she said that she didn't want it. A few years ago the opposite would have occurred; being old would have seemed a guaranty."

"That seems more logical to me," said the duchess.

"Why? There are historical epochs of patriarchs, of solemnity, a bit pedantic, and epochs of youth, turbulence, infantilism. Also there are epochs in which women rule. Now we are trying to
be in a juvenile epoch. I believe that the epoch of my father was an epoch of old men. Mine wasn't anything: a characterless epoch; this present age is an epoch of youths. Youth imposes itself more daily. The more the dominion of youth is imposed, the more insignificant age will become. We see it in the theater. If young women cannot last beyond thirty, those who pass that age have to become character-actresses."

But though the worthless will have to go, our youthfulness and newness will not eclipse what is good in the old:

"...Riemann does not eclipse Euclid: Darwin does not blank out Linnaeus, nor do Mendel and Hugo de Vries erase Darwin. The fauna of Australia doesn't prevent that of the Old World from being true."

We are losing our faith in all those things which have turned out to be snares and delusions. "One observes that the surge of the Nineteenth Century is ebbing; that all those topics about democracy, parliamentarianism, art as a cult, Press as the lever of progress, human brotherhood, internationalism, are going down. We see we are leaving the familiar places; but whither we're bound, we don't see."

With youth in the ascendant and old idols dethroned, shall we be able to continue on our new-found reasonableness, or must we enthrone new idols? "It is evident that reason, good sense, have not sufficed for peoples to live; up to now, at least, they have needed madness, the intoxication of certain spiritual alcohols. From now on

1. 13p213cfr, Larrañaga
2. 12p163a, Larrañaga
will reason and common sense suffice? That is what we
don't know." The distillation of utopias has stopped
temporarily, at least:

I believe that it ((the War)) has been the
ruin of all humanitarian utopias, beginning with
Christianity, because if in twenty centuries of
preaching it hasn't been able to educate the people
and prevent so bestial a butchery as this, it is
undoubtable that it has been of no use. Then the
Russian Revolution has been an utter disenchanted.
I believe that with this revolution the cycle of
social utopias has ended, for the present at least.

But Baroja is not hopeful of our ability to do
without our illusions. "Just now we don't believe in
anything, but shortly we'll invent some reasonable or
stupid utopia. We are great builders of illusions--
then we do everything possible to wreck them." "Our
age, which used to seem so stable to us, was, like all
ages, based on ephemeral ideas without eternal value."
So the next age will probably be the same. If humanity
is to move at all, it must move after a chimera.

A collectivity will never be moved by having
said to it, "There may be a better form of soci-
ety." It is as if one were to say to a woman, "If
we marry, maybe we'll get along tolerably." No,
woman and collectivity must be assured paradise. . .
The Semites invented a materialistic (in the bad
sense) paradise at man's starting-point; Christi-
anity, another form of Semitism, situated paradise
at the end and beyond men's life; and the anar-
chists, who are only a lot of neo-Christians, that
is, neo-Semites, put their paradise in life and on
earth.

1. 13p225ab, Larrañaga
2. 12p239bc, Larrañaga
3. 9p20b, Larrañaga
4. 13p200bc, Larrañaga
5. 15p197c, Iturrioz
Suppose we could keep our rationality; should we be better off? If we hold to nothing transcendent, and make man the author of his own destiny, we'll have no one to blame for failure but ourselves. Then perhaps what Silvestre Paradox dreaded will come to pass:

Never as in that time of progress will there have been greater hatreds or greater sorrows. The consolation of laying the blame on something, something outside us, will disappear, and suicide will have to be the only solution for fallen humanity.

Opinions on Culture in Spain.

There is a kind of conspiracy abroad to blacklist Spain, Baroja says.

The Spaniard who travels through Central Europe gets the impression that there is a queer interest in blackening the face of the Spanish. To this there have contributed the French and English as old rivals; the Italians and Flemish, as old vassals; the Protestants, the Jews, the Masons, the Portuguese, and the Americans. (N.I.)

"Spain's discredit depends in part on the poverty of the soil; in part on us; and in part on a methodical campaign waged by the Protestants, the Jews, and the democrats." The fact that Spain has been made the victim of propaganda is due largely to the difference in the Spaniard's way of life from that of other peoples--others resent the difference--and the difference depends chiefly

1. 10p102
2. 13p221a, Joe necessarily, means Spanish Americans.
3. 13p223, Larrañaga
on Spain's climate, so unlike that of lower and more humid countries.

Catholicism, too, separates Spain from Protestant Europe, and, besides it, "that paltriness, that avarice, that meanness that is the characteristic of all Germanic and civilized Europe." So in its isolation Spain has more or less been a country of provincials, albeit of provincials with some talent; universal values have generally been wanting, although in some works of genius, as in the Quixote, they have been present combined with the provincial elements.

Baroja has seen Spain pass through three periods--the first, when she was barely coming out of her medievalism, with old Church rites and practices that might have been of four hundred years earlier; the second, that of a degeneration because of incompetence and immorality, the beginning of modernization, like an old woman with a rouged face, when skepticism began its spring tide; and the third the present period of mechanization and nostrums, with modernization at least superficially accomplished. In the second period there was total disunity in political effort; no one group was willing to combine with any other--socialists, anarchists, and republicans

1. 13p223cf, Larrañaga
2. 9p45ab, Larrañaga
3. 5p282f
were all running counter, each thinking itself the salt of the earth; and the government in power was conducted altogether on the spoils system. The present (1925) dictatorship has temporarily rectified these abuses, but the government will probably swing back again to the old oligarchy. Perhaps if he writes again he will add a fourth period, although I doubt it, for the fact that Spain has sloughed off monarchy does not necessarily mean that the flesh beneath has changed; perhaps the present status is fulfilling Baroja's prediction of a "return to oligarchy." (N.I. In another way he demonstrated

1. 6pl4ff I. This prediction appears to have been verified. In an article "published in El Sol for November 11, 1931, . . . he says that he does not expect Spain under the new constitution to be greatly different from what she has been. There have been thirteen new constitutions already without changing her much. Asked if he expected socialism to triumph soon in Spain, he replied: 'I don't think so. Socialism is too much concerned with forms, and in Spain a dictatorship is necessary in order to govern. . . . I should not be alarmed at a socialistic dictatorship if it were properly established. We of the middle class would not live worse than we do. In Andalusia one does not know what may happen; perhaps communism, perhaps anarchy. If we are going to make the experiment of a communist dictatorship, let's make a good job of it. If we are going to be ruined, let's have a certain dash about it.' He thinks the woman's vote will strengthen the clerical party and so the cause of reaction in general, and that the new divorce laws will not make much difference one way or the other, as few people will apply for divorce, atleast until they have become accustomed to the idea." Prof. A. L. Owen in Hispania, Vol. XV, No. 1, p. 23cf.
his perspicacity, although he was too conservative—he set the date for the revolution at 1948.

Spanish "decadence" is a widely accepted, but not apodictic, opinion. The question is whether Spain has had much to decay from. "Spain has probably never been a center of culture; our country has always been on the frontier of civilization." The great men whom those who wish to prove decadence are wont to cite, Loyola, Vives, Servet, etc., left their country, probably for no other reason than the paucity of culture there. Spain "has, to be sure, an artistic inferiority with respect to former days, but that is all." (N.I.)

But there is room aplenty for improvement. "...this order of Spanish society is the order of the dead. Somewhat repugnant." Spain is even inert in her vice: "I believe that a vicious people, a disorderly people, is capable of something; an outworn people isn't capable of anything." Five things have principally contributed to Spain's low estate: deficiencies in the Spanish genius, a poor educational system, lack of science, corrupt and inefficient officialdom supported by a selfish bourgeoisie, and Catholicism. These will be taken up in turn.

1. 21p7
2. 16p192cf
3. 1p141bc, Max Museum and the ignorance of self-styled critics, 22p189ff.
4. 22p17c
Spaniards have been too little disposed to cooperate.

"The Spaniard has a savage's individualism," says the Count of Spain. A community of sympathies is wanting in Spain. "We are thus; we do not have the social sense that other races have. We feel individualistic atomism more than social solidarity." National feeling is very low--a fact that was demonstrated when soldiers after campaigning in Cuba, making their great sacrifice, were received with chilly indifference when they disembarked in their own country. Three things have contributed to this lack of social feeling: the press, which has stifled oral report; religion, with its embargo on conversation; and tourists, who seldom come with spiritual interests, if indeed they have them at all. So it is that the lower classes in Spain are really more civilized and congenial than the upper, for they are free from influences which might isolate them.

Then there is the traditional mañana. "How Spanish that is! Waiting for something to turn up," says Roberto in Mala Hierba.

There is too little spirit of originality. Spain is

1. lp257bc
2. 4p59bc
3. 22p102b
4. 1lp240
5. 2p309ff
6. 1lp12ab
still worshipping her past. "I, who have had the pre-
occupation of thinking about the present and the future
more than about the past, an absurd thing in Spain, where,
just now, what least abides is present and future. . . ."

"Isolated from the rest of the world, Spain has never come
in close contact with the great revolutionary movements
of the past--Reformation, French Revolution, etc.--and the
only present revolutionary philosophy among the masses is
the anarchistic philosophy," which is a sentimental dogma. 2
She has had no revolutionaries, except Ferrer, and he
mainly just in action. She has had in this very individu-
alism of hers, great possibilities for originality, but
she is foregoing them now to imitate other nations.

Spain which has never been a complete social
medium, and which has developed its life and art by
spiritual convulsions, while it has burgeoned men of
vigor and action, feels now defeated in its eruptive
life, and is trying to compete with other countries
in the love for the general and the regulated and
the hatred for the individual.

In Spain, where the individual and only the
individual has been everything, the collectivistic
aspirations of other peoples are being accepted as
indisputable dogmas. Today our country beings to
offer a brilliant future to him who can exalt general
ideas and sentiments, although these ideas and senti-
ments may militate against the genius of the race.

Baroja laments that all present-day Spanish society can do

1. 7pl1bc
2. 6pl48bc
3. 5p296f
4. 17p8
is imitate. Spanish professors are learned but not wise; their encyclopedic memories do not serve their understanding. Baroja tells how the assignments to the medical students were made in sections—one to study infections, another nervous diseases, etc. "This would be inexplicable anywhere but in a Spanish professor, who generally is the quintessence of vacuity." In education and culture men should have the spirit of true investigators; they should have the "tragic sense of culture," (N.I.) and efface all personal enmity and interest. Baroja tells the story of Kant and one of his critics, who, in a spirit of harmony, were "like two travelers before a Nature full of mysteries"—a nobility that "these cold, these mannered Latin saltimbancos cannot have." The system of examinations is a farce, he says. "Silvestre took his examinations in September, and, strange to tell, passed, although he knew less than in June ((when he failed)). . . ." The schools train for smug optimism, by deliberately withholding motives for pessimism; all topics are taught but vital topics. Externalities do not make for education. Travelling, for instance, has little or no value for broadening one.

1. 2p72f I. A nietzschean phrase, probably. When the limits of knowledge are reached, and life in its great mystery looms before us, "then the new form of perception discloses itself, namely, tragic perception. . . ." (BT Sec.15, last.)
2. 5p208ff
3. 5p216c
4. 10p52bc
5. 5p48f
6. 13p74, Larrañaga
Universal education perhaps cannot be attained; Baroja rallies the perseverance of the pedagogues in "edifying the people."

Science and philosophy are negligible in Spain. "The spiritual problem of Spain is to give a Spanish stamp to modern scientific civilization—to have a voice in it. And for this she needs principally to load up with science." Science is culture in its universal form; so Spain need feel no shame if she takes the seed of it from somewhere else: that kind of borrowing is necessary.

Intelligence is at low ebb in Spanish politics and among the Spanish bourgeoisie. The word "intellectual" has been a bugbear to them. Anyone who uses it has been looked upon as a posturer (with no more justice than there would be in thinking that a man is putting on airs because he calls himself a physician or a diplomat). "That anyone should want to separate himself from the flock and mark out his own life in his own way is something that stirs great umbrage among our bourgeoisie. The presumption is considered an affront." Baroja mentions this to show how perfectly the burghers have always been in accord with Spanish politics and at the mental level of Spanish politicians.

1. 4p10b
2. 6p134a
3. 16p69
4. 6p20ff
The feeling of rank manifests itself in a similar way:

In aristocratic societies there are things that cannot be condoned, and one of them is the having had talent, energy, perseverance, of luck for getting a fortune. In these societies, and in the Spanish above all, which is one of the most uncultured, formalistic, and metaphysical, the only strong passions are the passions of vanity: envy and contempt. Goodness, beauty, grace, delicacy, distinction, all that has genuine natural value, is in our society insignificant beside the artificial categories of rank; hence the envy and the contempt; envy from the one beneath, contempt from the one above. Bourgeois society is so far lacking in intelligence and originality that all it can do is ape the actions of the aristocracy, imposing on itself all manner of sheepfold rules in order to be people of tone; they're social climbers, all of them, with an eye only for externalities.

Naturally this state of mind does not make for competence. Baroja tells of a government clerk who, when he and Richard submitted their plans for the new bakery, insisted that they should include a mule stable, because required it, in spite of the fact that the machinery was electrically operated.

The one overmastering political ability is rhetoric. Spanish politicians are mostly actors and orators. "Politics is a thing made almost always on the basis of vulgarities and commonplaces." Unwisdom that is simple and untaught is pardonable; but "ornate and rhetorical" stupidity is disgusting. 

1. 14p71a
2. 22p35ff
3. 5p293ff
4. 8p101c, López del Castillo
traditionalist orator defending the past with rhetorical fire, then we perceive how odious is embellished stupidity." Aviraneta, I suppose, is Baroja's ideal politician; he had none of this characteristic. "...Aviraneta was one of those personally integral men who seek results without concerning themselves about the means; Aviraneta was a politician who believed that everything has its name and that the truth needs not be hidden, nor even embellished."

Not only are they ranters, but often dishonest ranters. "...that type of Sicilian, Calabrian, or Andalusian politician, a great barrister, an eloquent man who orates in the court and afterward has an understanding with bandits and ruffians." The patriotism of most politicians comes from the plunder they can get—they are willing to "serve their country" (by collecting salaries) and supply the army (for a fat price). The difference between conservatives and liberals is that "the conservatives make off with a great deal at one time, and the liberals make off with a little a good many times." As for "morality," there is not much odds between the two.

Honest, upright men who obey only their conscience cannot thrive in politics, nor are they useful nor do they serve for anything.

1. 5p76f
2. 7p16c
3. 5p162ab
4. 8p118ab, López del Castillo
There is needed a certain amount of misapprehension, of ambition, of craving for glory to win. This is the least bad that is needed.

The political life of the parties, even of those which seem purest, rests and is sustained on a huge foundation of boodlers, grafters, and blackmailers. Each deputy represents, to say the least, a parcel of ruffians, a parcel of bandits, a parcel of exploiters; and the least bad thing he can represent is a parcel of political bosses.

The worst of it is that the Spaniard expects corruption; his individualism leads him to mistrust others, and hence to shrug his shoulders and say "I told you so," when some political knavery is accomplished. Baroja tells of a chief of police caught accepting bribes, and who "was transferred with promotion. So it goes in Spain!" The ballot in Spain has been considerably smirched. Baroja tells of a village plutocrat who cast the proper number of ballots all himself. And such offenders are seldom apprehended.

It was a long time ago that laws were likened to spiderwebs; they snare little flies and let the gadflies go through.

Our politicians, very severe, very rigid with the little flies, are very friendly toward the gadflies.

Those who call themselves liberals are as dogmatic a crew as the conservatives.

1. 5p310f
2. 22p218
3. 22p102cf
4. 8p121bc, López del Castillo
5. 2p147c
6. 5p315f
One thing that seems paradoxical and is quite exact is the intransigence, the fetishism, of the liberals and those who in Spain are called "advanced."

Religious fanaticism and liberal fanaticism cannot but be a huge obstacle for the redemption of Spain. The fanatics in religion will prevent the evolution of the religious sense; the fanatics of democracy, considering suffrage, freedom of the press, and parliamentarianism as impreciscriptible, will prevent the evolution of the political idea.

There are two liberalisms: one condemned by the Pope, which is the logical, the natural, the necessary one; the other accepted by the Pope, which is the stupid one. The first involves the freedom of thought, the only freedom that can exist with every tyranny and every despotism, because neither reason nor will is exposed to thieves.

The second liberalism involves all those false and ridiculous liberties that are expressed in political programs; freedom of association, universal suffrage, freedom of the press, inviolability of the home. All that is stupid and of no use whatsoever.

If I'm to be arrested, it's the same to me whether I'm arrested with a warrant as without one; I know that a judge can condemn me or acquit me as he pleases; that if I should sometime appear before him, I should be tied hand and foot, and that he could manage it whether I had liberties or not.

And are we going to defend these liberties? No; devil take them. Liberty we all carry in our soul; she governs there; the outward liberty, that of acting, we shall never gain.

"Justice" is a doubtful term applied to law as it is administered. Baroja said rather drastically in 1906, writing of Paris, "... the Cathedral, the Palace of Justice, and the Morgue: Church, Justice, and Death;
three venerable harpies alavering for blood." There is a certain inevitable injustice in the nature of law itself--in its relativity. It can nowhere be strictly and integrally fulfilled. Except with a few major crimes such as theft and murder, the sum of punishment meted is entirely fortuitous and discretionary. It is also relative in the other direction--in its infraction as well as its administering; the rebel who succeeds is exalted as a hero, and the one who fails is hsot; the difference between the two is the degree of success, not the degree of legality. "To me the lawyer and pettifogger type is a national calamity." Pity should be the guiding principle, Baroja says, when the law is notexplicit; but unfortunately this is too seldom true. He gives the following account of a police court scene:

Suddenly the door opened, and a young woman in a mantilla came in with anxious eyes.
She approached the two clerks.
"Could someone go--to my house--a doctor? My mother fell down and her head is broken."
The clerk puffed out a mouthful of tobacco smoke and did not reply; then, turning and surveying the woman from top to toe, he said with epic grossness and bestiality:
"That's for the Charity House. We have nothing to do with that"; and he turned his head and resumed his smoking. The woman turned her frightened eyes about the station; she decided to go, said good-night

1. 14pl40b
2. 5p312f
3. 18p47b
4. 5p315f
in a faint voice, to which no one replied, and left."

This callousness is rather common among police and bourgeoisie. Baroja tells of a certain burgher and his family who were demanding the death of the insurgents; he would like to fight such wolves.

The Spanish press is the most backward in the modern world. It has no philosophic, no international, no national interests, and few interests of any worthy sort.

The journalists are plebeian and ignorant. And worst of all they are corrupt.

We ought to consider suppressing all that outfit of famished and ambitious journalists who talk in the name of liberty, and who behind the back of the public live on chantage and on the most infamous manipulations with the Government, so cowardly and wretched that it fears those journalists....

I know that if tomorrow I find myself beset by an enormous injustice, I shall not find a press that will defend me, unless I have friendships among journalists or should happen to point out something to expose which would beneficial to the interests of the newspaper.

Social class to exist ought to offer some advantage. So with the capitalistic class: "Capital in Catalonia, like capital in all the rest of Spain, does

1. 11p230f
2. 5p341
3. 5p275ff
4. 5p282ff
5. 22p75cf
6. 22p77ab
7. 2p337ff
not fulfill the mission that it ought to fulfill in a society that is given over to it; capital serves only to roll luxurious automobiles and to display jewels and gowns." Spain is losing trade because of this myopia. Immediate gain is the only object of its industry—as with books, which are carelessly edited and printed.

Disgruntled with his failure to find a certain plant, Baroja said, "This is a country where nothing is known but the cultivation of curacy." The priest is actually the ruler in certain small communities with a weak civil organization. The pernicious influence of the Church in Spain will be discussed under Religion.

But clergy and aristocracy are coming to be the figureheads of bourgeois society. Asked whether Spain is really the country dominated by clergy and aristocracy, Larrañaga replies, "Bah! Priests and aristocrats are only decorative figures. Arabesques.... Pure frippery."

"What we want is for Spain to mend, to grow strong, to become a serious and intelligent nation, to realize justice in the greatest possible degree, to have a vast, original, and multiple culture."

1. 6p133c
2. 2p302c
3. 13p224a
4. 2p100b
"Spain needs but one dictatorship: that of justice, intelligence, freedom. Nothing of force, nothing of soldiers who try to imitate Napoleon. Civil power ought always be above military power. The army ought to be but the arm of the nation, never its head." The Spanish problem is "a question of freedom and culture." There is much delusion of persecution in politics--the enemies' forces are always exaggerated, and people lend willing ear to reports, often untrue ones, about attempts against the public safety. Hence the mistaken idea of a need for armed force.

Spain will have to overtake the rest of the world.

For the majority of Spaniards, Ferdinand VII and Calomarde, closing universities and opening the schools of bullfighting, probably are they who best understand the country; but nowadays in the world a country isn't allowed to live as it pleases with its school of bullfighting or dancing. It is necessary to play in tune with the world-orchestra, or, if you prefer, with the hurdy-gurdy of the civilized countries. The country that tries to play its clarinet or guitar solo in its little corner the others will beat unmercifully. . . .

And the best way, he has said, is to imbibe as much science as possible. This does not mean that Spain must give up her own peculiar art and morality.

I believe that Spain ought to aspire to incorporate her scientific work to the universal work; I believe that she ought to collaborate with the other peoples of Europe in everything generic;

1. 7pl69a, Aviraneta
2. 6p124a
3. 8p118b, López del Castillo
4. 9p22bcf
but that she ought to aspire to differentiate herself, in artistic and literary matters, from other countries and to become independent in the sphere of morality.

Science is natively universal, art individual; and as for morality, that of Spain is individually hers; though it is not perfect, neither can other nations claim to have reached moral perfection.

In these generic matters, France should be the social, and Germany the cultural, guide.

I have already many times said that to me France is the first people, the best situated, that has one of the best of European climates; that, furthermore, may have the most complete conditions of nutrition, life, and general culture.

I do not believe that France is an exemplar in art, literature, or anything individual; but I do believe she ought to be followed in everything social, above all in her politics, which is the greatest manifestation of French genius.

France has set the example of logic and anti-mysticism in politics, keeping alive the heritage of Rome.

Faith may have covered Spain with glory, reason and logic may have covered her with ruins. It matters not. Reason should be above all else. Logic should and will triumph. And when it triumphs, the Spaniard will be able to clasp hands across the centuries with citizen of ancient Rome and consider himself his son and heir.

Perhaps illogicality may do for England; it is a comfortable tolerant policy; but Spain and the Latins need logic, and it is to be had from France. Germany, on the other

1. 16p65
2. 16p67
3. 2p86a
4. 16pl30f
hand, is culturally international.

There is a very significant fact, and it is that in almost all countries, including the Latin, greater civilization corresponds to greater Germanization.

Spain needs to make for a goal. An alliance with Germany, however, would be of doubtful value, as it would be apt to bring German militarism rather than German culture.

The old burdens that Spain has been cumbered with will have to be cast off. Those who can see Spain in the aspect of universal culture and in the light of what she might have been would like "to make the trial of the race freed of two factors that have been its ruin: Catholicism and America." (N.I.) Though the political bonds have been severed, yet there are many who would like to see commercial and cultural interdependence. Blasco Ibáñez, for instance, has said that the "future of Spain is in Argentina," which is as sensible, Pío assures us, as to "assert that the future of Cadiz is in Bilbao and that of Santander in Cartagena." The sooner all ties are cut the better. "Spain has been for centuries a leafy tree, with branches so strong, so turgid, that they stole all the sap from the trunk." And as for the rest

1. 5p45ab
2. 16p209ab
3. 2p192f
4. 16p209f
5. 2p103a
6. 16p219a
7. 22p69cf
of the burden of tradition, the Spaniard should be willing to relinquish it, even in government: "If we could, we should make every sort of experiment from dictatorship to anarchy." Though other countries have probably exaggerated the Spaniard's insensitivity and torpor, it must be recognized that the situation in Spain breeds barbarity. The whole organism must be revised from top to bottom. Spain has too many prenotions and "prior images"; (N.I.) she needs to amplify and differentiate them.

Government, he says, should be experimental, not idealistic. If we could have those good men and wise men that he wished for, the reins of the state should be in their hands. Having to consult the herd is at best too dilatory, and generally leads to error.

Hence would arise an absolutism of the intelligent over the unintelligent, of those spirits which have reached a state of consciousness over the dormant or torpid ones.

That would be an attack on liberty, someone will say. Of course. But in Spain we ought not be liberals. Louis Veuillot has put his finger on the sore spot with this or a similar phrase aimed at the liberals: "We, the reactionaries, ask you for liberty, because it is in your principles; we deny it to you, because it is not in ours."

On that account, desiring to be strong we

1. 2p103
2. 22p181ff
3. 5p78ff
cannot be liberals; we ought to be authoritarian and evolutionary, to aim and direct our efforts toward attaining the maximum of perfection, of kindness, of intelligence, of bountifulness compatible with the race. Desiring to be strong we cannot be romanticists, because the falsification of truth leads to hallucination.

Following an experimental politics we should never make any reform unless the absolute need for it were seen and it made for progressive evolution. We should march straight, without deviation, to the suppression of such democratic institutions as Congress, Jury, and the rest that have no more foundation that the law of the majority and the crushing number that represents the strength of a drove of barbarians.

Experimentally we should see that the mass is always the infamous, the cowardly, the law.

The great advantage that government by one has, when that one is good, is that he can know men, a thing that an Assembly can never do, and can besides work outside the law when it is suitable to do so. He lists some of the things that a government by a wise autocrat would undertake:

And if there could come a government with a human rather than a doctrinal criterion, what a relief wouldn't all Spain feel! Everything perturbed by democracy would return to its natural channel. Restoring the picturesque would be undertaken; old convents would be restored; but building new convents of brick near the most populous cities would be prohibited. The number of bishoprics and parishes would be decreased. The money from one would be used for the enhancement of another. The parish priests would not be allowed to have power in their churches; all of the artistic wealth of corporations and individuals would be catalogued, and selling a work outside the country would be prohibited, with a heavy fine as punishment for anyone who did it.
A mercenary army would be formed, with fewer officers and they better paid. Prelates would be advised to sell jewels without artistic merit. Negotiations would be opened with other countries so as to have them send us all our paintings in exchange for theirs, and the Spanish church, feeling itself the forceful power, would make itself independent of the Romish one.

Our legislatures and Councils ought to strive to restore what of the old can be harmonized with the country's manner of living, and to adapt what of the new has the same quality, always having a progressive criterion for guide.

Thus the best of the old Spain would be preserved, and the best of the new ingrafted.

But this is hardly more than a dream. "That this is all talking, that the redemption of Spain is very hard, and, more than hard, arduous, I already know. As I have said before, we travel so far from that road that I believe we have not managed even to discover Spain."

Though it will mean a loss of some of the old vigor and individuality that Baroja would like so well to see rediscovered and revived, democracy is probably inevitable.

Unquestionably she was once a Quixotic country that believed herself different from what she was. Arid, she believed herself fertile, poor, she believed herself owner of great resources, and she had such confidence in herself that almost without resources she materialized extraordinary things.

Now there is no longer any possibility of confusions or illusions. Things are being seen clearly. We Spaniards of today are not to blame for not being able to have confidence in ourselves.

1. 22p77cf
2. 22p81
Once, in Spain's day of adventure, Don Quijote led her; from now on Sancho Panza will have to lead her. A genteel, polished, and democratic Sancho Panza.

... it is a loss in the chapter of the picturesque, but it can't be any other way.

Surely it would be a dismal witticism to protest against the democratic, bourgeois tendency of today; what is, is because it has to be and because it has its determination and its moment, and to rebel against facts is beyond question childish.

The day will come, relatively soon, when the population of Spain will have become dense, when the cities will be overflowing, when peace will be assured and there will be no danger of uprisings or insurrections.

At the same time, the North of Africa will have become civilized and the Peninsula will be a pass from one continent to the other.

Then Spain will be a nation of central culture, her statistics will be irreproachable, her schools will be perfectly organized, she will produce her science in her laboratories and her art work in her factories.

Perhaps then some recalcitrant Spaniard may complain and say, "How much better it must have been to live in that disorganized Spain of yore!"

But such a complaint could as easily come from a malcontent in Mohammed's paradise or Buddha's Nirvana.

Baroja says nay to the separatists, both Catalanian and Basque. They base their claims on the groundless supposition of racial distinctness. Furthermore in Spain the regions are interdependent, bound by many ties, above all by geography, and cannot live apart.

1. 13p224bcf, Larrañaga
2. 17p8
3. 16p194bcf
4. 6p139f
Catastrophicum is largely a discussion about the projected Basque secession. Baroja does not favor it, for he sees that only as a separate center of culture would an independent Vasconia be justified, and with the Catholicism prevalent there that is hardly feasible. The desire of the separate regions for their traditional language is also foolish; Castilian should be the national language if only for practical reasons.

As It Ought To Be

"What use to think what ought to be?" queries Larrañaga. "It is veritably a pastime." Baroja has spent considerable time thinking about the subject, useless though it may appear to be.

He seems to be hopeful of something new that will come about.

We find ourselves, although perhaps we are not worthy of it, before a new historical and literary period. This period must bring forth its flower. It will delay long in giving it; perhaps a hundred years, like the century plant; but it will give it. He who first puts that flower in the buttonhole of his coat or jacket will give proof of his perspicacity and modishness.

The thing to keep in mind when examining Baroja's state is his desire for naturalness. How subjective the measure of naturalness may be he does not venture

1. 6pl37ff
2. 12p79c
3. 12p9cf, Joe
to say; but he holds to the belief, nevertheless.

Though he claims to have abandoned his former ideal of the "world for mankind," only seven years intervene between that declaration and an emphatic assertion of the old position. (N.I.) And in another place he says that sometimes he takes the position of internationalism so that his spectators may see him in a new light; he then "ceases temporarily to feel a Spaniard and a Basque." Are the two views necessarily contradictory? I fail to see a wide difference between internationalism and a group of freely intercommunicating, independent city-states, especially when the "internationalism" does not mean, as I as sure it never meant with Baroja, a vast government with a powerful central machine.

Nationalism needs to go first of all.

I am not only an enemy of nationalism, but even of the notion of a native country. "The world for all mankind,"—that would be my motto; and if this should seem too broad, I should be content with this other: "Europe for Europeans."

War, he says, is caused by the ambition for command; and I suppose he feels the same about governments. The idea of command should be exterminated, says Olsen in the Gran Torbellino: "...there is no doubt that the sense of command, joined to laziness and the taste for

1. 5p73
2. 2p85b

I. 6p31 and 2p85b respectively.
battening off others, are what produce the soldier and the priest, and they eternize war." The army is the most reactionary of institutions. It harks back to the age of serfdom, when vassals were chattels; it has merely substituted the ideal of the state for the ideal of the overlord.

Our society is still barbarous, and must be perfected—the sooner the better. The fact that it is barbarous is present in the mind of everyone; a society that needs the priest, the soldier, the executioner, the title of nobility, the prison, and the gallows, is a primitive, embryonic, and absurd society. Fundamentally we are still at the height of the Middle Ages.

On that account there is no need to hearken to those puny, ridiculous, bigoted moralists who tell us that it is necessary to conserve. No: it is necessary to destroy.

Whilst the rebel born in the bourgeoisie destroys, the attent, disciplined, studious worker builds.

Some day this that now seems parallel action will meet in a point; the bourgeoisie will have lost their preëminence, the proletariat will have possessed itself of its rights, and all, turned into workers, will be able to toil for the common ideal, which will be the free expansion of human life in the bosom of nature.

Baroja, as I have pointed out, would like to see all of mankind on the same high plane. "I should not care to be a prince among slaves nor a wise man among idiots, but a prince among princes and a wise man among wise men." But this would be asking too much of Nature, who makes men unequal in abilities and strength. The

1. 12p163bc
2. 22p193ff
3. 16p26f
4. 2p293
best we can do, therefore, is go as far as Nature will let us—make our hierarchies conform to natural differences. The aristocracy of Nature, he says, should be the only aristocracy—youth, beauty, intelligence, and strength.

That there are unusual types one must recognize—capable of sacrificing themselves for distant things: to go to the Pole, to solve a difficult problem, to find out what is going on in Lake Tanganyika, to analyze the sweat of a plague victim or the excrement of a sick rat. That is great humanity.

A nobility of such men as Pasteur, he adds, would be a fine thing. There is all the more need for a noble nobility because they must lead those whom nature has not gifted.

It is logical that the tendencies toward renovation and change in a country should come from the cultured element and not from the people. The people take the ideas when they have already fermented, and give them violence, strength, so they may be generalized; but the first contagions always commence among the cultured minority.

The old kind of leader will not do.

What Is Needed

Some romanticists suppose that in a society the only meritorious directors of the people are the military, that defends the land, the priest, who appeases divine wrath and implants morality, and the poet, who sings the glories of the country.

The present-day man no longer wants leaders. He has seen that no man, just because he wears a

1. 2p337ff
2. 12p42
3. 19p80a
4. 7p205b, Aviraneta
pair of red pantaloons, or a black cassock, or writes phrases in short lines, is worth more than he, or is braver than he, or is more moral than he, or more sensitive than he.

The man of today does not want wizards, nor hierophants, nor mysteries. He can be, when it suits him, priest, soldier, or fighter. He needs no specialists in valor, morality, or sentimentality. The only thing that he needs is good and wise men.

The state in its arrangement should have the same guiding principle of naturalness. Baroja's individualism again impels him to regard inter-racial understanding as impossible to attain. The political group should therefore be reduced to the point of maximum understanding, which means it ought to follow racial lines. But with present conglomerates of races that would be hard to manage; the next best thing will be states on a small scale.

The city-state was once a possibility in Spain.

... Italy has felt, more than anything else, the city; Italy is the civilized representation of the Mediterranean. ... Spain would have oriented her life in a way perhaps similar to that of Italy if she had not been interrupted in her progress by the discovery of America, which, undoubtedly, disturbed and wrecked it.

In 1910 Baroja suggested the city-state. More logical than nationalism, he wrote, "much more within modern life, life without history (i.e., without the tradition that forms the basis of our nationalistic

1. 5p327
2. 16p207bc
governments), would be the rule of great municipalities, of huge city councils formed of other common councils, that would unite and separate at will." For instance, if some town in Aragon or Valencia had its center of trade in Barcelona, it could unite with Barcelona, forming one large municipality, and remain so as long as it desired.

And in 1926 he suggested such a program for Vasconia, which proves it is pretty well fixed in his mind. "...I should leave Bilbao and San Sebastián as free cities. ... Then all the genuinely Basque part of the Vasconian provinces and Navarre I should reunite and make one single province: Vasconia, with its capital in Vergara or Toulouse." Thus the two important cities would be free to follow their own course "without the dead weight of the rural element and officialdom and soldiery." And incidentally the condition of racial fitness would be in so far as possible satisfied.

One will remember his Republic of Bidassoa, with "No flies, no monks, and no carbineers," which though half in jest, ticks with his other comments. This program, he continues,

...is not more stupid than the programs of other republics or monarchies.

1. 6p145f
2. 12p92b, Larrañaga
A people without flies means a clean people; a people's being without monks shows it has good sense; and a people's having no carbiners indicates that its state does not have force—all of them things that seem excellent to me.

With such a more or less loosely organized government perhaps that state of perfection, of possibilities for the individual, of which he writes in César o Nada, would be attained:

From a human point of view, perfection in a society would be its knowing how to defend general interests and at the same time understanding the individual; its giving the individual the advantages of communal work and the most unconditional freedom; its increasing his work and allowing him isolation. This is what would be equitable and good.

The opposite picture is to be had in Swiss democracy.

In these little Swiss towns, I feel that there is a social pressure that is as it were white terrorism. I do not believe that the citizens of these towns are very free.... It is possible that freedom as I, a Spanish individualist, imagine it, is an unattainable utopia—at least not attainable with democracy.

It would make for Dionysian freedom and more rapid advancement. Science, he says, has demonstrated the possibility of sudden change; the Darwinists formerly desired to convince us that since all change is infinitely slow, man could not hope to change his society in a brief time; but De Vries has controverted that in biology, and much more is it controverted in so unstable a thing as thought. So revolution is possible. Let us, therefore,
be constantly destroying and creating in the field of ideas.

I do not call wounding or killing, revolution; I call transforming, revolution. For this reason it is necessary to declare war on everything existent. War and the struggle for life are the principles that preserve the virile and noble qualities in man. (N.I.) Struggling, warring; that ought to be our policy.

Work for the expansion of the revolutionary spirit, which is the scientific spirit, diffuse it, widen it, propagate it.

Deny and affirm passionately. Destroy and create at one time... Destroy and create alternately.

If the land is to belong to all mankind and timid, selfish souls are not to partition it and fence it off for fear of intrusion and conflict with someone else,

The remedy is one: destroy, destroy always in the sphere of thought. Nothing must be accepted without scrutiny; everything must be subjected to criticism—prestiges, intentions, faculties, reputations.

The way to come to have the necessary men ((leaders)) consists solely in keeping them always on probation, in not letting anything be sanctioned by routine or by sloth, in having everything checked up at every moment.

A society where there is this conflict of ideas is preferable to one where there are only converters and converted.

This critical spirit is the very heart of science.

Science must be our goal.

1. 6p147b
2. 2p402ff

I. This Nietzsche with a vengeance.
History and politics are traitorous; not so science; science is honorable, human, international. Science unites all men; history would separate us into castes, into rancid categories. We must leave history; we must let the dead bury their dead, as the Gospel says; we must march on to science as swiftly as possible.

In the religious sphere, in the moral sphere, in the social sphere, all may be falsehood; our philosophical and ethical truths may be the imaginings of a humanity with an unsettled brain. The only truth, the only vouchsafement is Science; and toward it we must go with open-eyed faith.

Though we cannot be sure that science will give us our promised land, yet we should try it. "...the good thing, to me, would be to organize it ((life)) in a natural and scientific manner. That is, to take advantage of it." Invention and the great conceptions of philosophy are the most desirable things in a culture. Especially must they be fostered now, in a culture where money is the only currency, for the day may come when men of intellect will "be the guides...like miners who carry the light of the spirit into the dim bowels of unconscious, mechanized, and brutal life."

Perhaps somewhat of war and religion should be retained, if only as discipline. Besides, they provide necessary fuel for the desired conflict. The same is true of certain social evils. To reform all of society we should have either to exterminate the delinquents or educate them; but if we chose to exterminate we might find

1. 6p146b
2. 6p148a
3. 2p405ab
4. 2p72f
that the disease is too deeply rooted, and destroy the entire organism; and if we chose to educate, we should find ourselves sadly lacking in a worthy objective. Besides, the ills may be useful.

The golfo is a serious evil; but he may be useful. Evil at times is useful; humanity makes use of pain to rise above; life uses the microbe and the worm for its purification.

The golfo is the microbe of social life; he pours his ideas and his subversive acts into the organism of society; if society is healthy, strong, and resistant, the microbe does not thrive; where vitality is lost, the microbe is decomposed and its toxins pierce to the heart of the social body. Population will probably need to be limited. "Fecundity cannot be a social ideal. Not quantity but quality is needed." No one has a right to children unless they can be properly reared. Larrañaga says he is a Malthusian with respect to marriage. The over-fecund pair is a social menace. He adds that society ought to have its specialists—men of physique for marriage, men of rare abilities for solitary labor.

Silvestre Paradox believed in euthanasia for failures; whether we can say Baroja does, I do not know.

"Thinking about the opposition made to the good inclinations of children, I have come to believe that in time children will be better cared for and educated by the State than by the family." Perhaps, however, the

1. 22p166cf
2. 17p327
3. 9p74bc
4. 9p75ab
5. 21p59b
time is not yet ripe. At least the following opinion has been expressed:

The State and the Child.

It is evident that marriage by ravishment or by the purchase of the woman, as practised among savage peoples, has been succeeded by marriage by dowry, which does not produce selection, and furthermore impairs the progress of the species. But it is also certain that, even granting the possibility of a communistic, regulative, and all-maintaining social order, the question would not by solved in an evolutionary sense, for although the State might rear and feed the child, it could not surround it with the atmosphere of the family, which is as important as food and education.

Naturally the human animal will have to be radically changed before such a goal can be reached. Perhaps Iturrioz's "Company of Mankind" could begin the work:

"If I felt strong enough, do you know what I'd make?"
"What?"
"A militant order like the one Loyola invented, with a character purely humane. The Company of Mankind."
"The Basque in you is peeping out."
"Maybe."
"And for what purpose would you establish that company?"
"This company would have the mission of teaching valor, calmness, repose; of eradicating every leaning toward humility, renunciation to sadness, deception, greed, sentimentalism—"
"The noblemen's school."
"That's it, the noblemen's school."
"Iblerian noblemen, of course. Nothing of Semitism."

1. 22p220
"Nothing; a nobleman unsoiled with Semitism, that is to say, unsoiled with Christian spirit, would seem to me a complete type."

In other words, supermanhood for all men.

All this is hardly more than a dream with Baroja. Some of the dream may nevertheless be realized, for modern youth has more cheerful prospects than had either of the two preceding generations; the pomposity of their grandparents and the dejection of their parents have given way to a sane, practical, vigorous outlook not dimmed with vapors.

It is evident that the youth of today are coming to have a somewhat deeper and worthier attitude before life than that of their grandfathers, and a somewhat more cheerful one than that of their fathers; our youth who stand before us strong-fisted and level-headed will someday enter social life, without regard for traditional dead weight, with an energy which may be the salvation of the country.

He is too consistent a pessimist, however, to feel secure in the promise of a roseate future; but hope is a condition of life: "Marching ever forward, that is life; planting the vision in the future, though experience teach us, with the fallibility and unkindness of the present, the inauspiciousness of the future; dreaming of a lush to come beyond a barren now; living in hope, always cheated and always courageous." (N.I.)

1. 15p200f
2. Entretenimientos p182c
3. 4p515ab, in one of O'Neill's prose poems.

I. See 22p197f for a lyrical statement of the kind of social harmony Baroja would like to see.
Anthropology.

Many of the questions of anthropology, the most subsumptive of the humanistic sciences, will be found under its subordinate headings—Polity, Religion, etc.; indeed, virtually all that Baroja has said might be included under this heading.

He of course nowhere enters upon a technical discussion, and generally avoids certain of the more generic problems such as evolution and diffusion; but he turns his attention frequently to questions of race—indeed, the ethnological part is by far the greatest. In the following quotation anthropology means merely ethnology:

Anthropology says very little, just now: it points out a great ethnic variety on the (Iberian) Peninsula, but a variety of types so vicinal that no consequences can be deduced from it. It will be a long time before the science of races (the fantasy of races, according to some) will be able to reach conclusions, and it may be that, when it does get them, they will not solve anything, practically speaking—such with time will be the ethnic mixture among all peoples.

The most potent agent in the formation of racial temperament is the terrain.

The national type has not been formed by the aboriginal race, but by the country where it has lived: the French have derived character from their flat, fertile, and well-irrigated land; the Italians from their narrow peninsula full of inlets; the Spaniards from the high central plateaus, dry, and of rugged climate.

1. 16p190b
2. 16p205cf
One suspects that Baroja may even believe the land responsible for physical differences, especially when he says, as I have already quoted,

Polygenesis seems more logical to me ((than monogenesis)) and I believe that the majority of ancient races were born in the region where they lived.

We recall his experience on returning to Vasconia:

I could feel how the physical atmosphere of my country, and somewhat also of the moral atmosphere, was enveloping me, and how I was recapturing, bit by bit, this lost thread of race.

Which seems to indicate a hereditability in these temperamental qualities. Once ingrained they are transmitted, some of them as "instincts," active or latent:

In the Basque village where I was as a physician... I discovered, observing myself, that there was in my spirit, as if dormant, a racial element that had not yet wakened.

This "racial memory" appears several times:

Tonight at dusk, in the road in front of my house, some children have built a bonfire with sticks and have been jumping over it. This, which seems so natural and spontaneous, is also the vestige of an ancient ceremony of purification.

Racial differences are mainly physiological; and though their source may ultimately be the same as that of the temperament of a region, the two do not have direct bearing on each other. Though Baroja admits a relationship between appearance and mentality, he denies

1. 2p211c
2. 6p25cf. See also 5p222c
3. 2p285a
that it is a fixed one, and ridicules phrenology.

Apparently twitting the German craniognomists, he speaks of the "blond dolichocephalic man of Germany, the superior type of Europe, according to the German anthropologists." Perhaps when he makes a character speak of certain "... uncouth impressions, worthy of a brachycephalic man...," we are to interpret the term merely as representative of the Southern type, and not as the cause of the uncouthness. He goes on to speak of the cultural source of temperament:

... nothing, absolutely nothing, is known about Spanish ethnology; furthermore it is not believed that a pure race exists; the most one can suppose is that there are types which somewhat arbitrarily are classified and designated by a name. There is not a Catalonian race nor a Castilian race nor a Galician race nor a Basque race, and we may also say that there is not a Spanish race. There is, indeed, a spiritual form in every country and in every region, which tends to disintegrate, to break up, when the State is declining; it tends to strengthen when the country is rising and flourishing.

In our age of nationalism ethnic pride has been developed to such an absurd extent that everybody has cast a backward look toward his forebears, thinking that perchance from them and from their remote influence something reassuring might come.

So, in an epoch destructive par excellence ..., in which geometry and physics have been decomposed and changed, and even the classical ideas about space and time, we can seriously believe in such vague myths as race and blood.

The purity of blood is a "myth," though a vigorous one,

1. 13p23f, the physiognomist
2. 5p331b
3. 4p18a
4. 6p139f
5. 12p125a, Joe
since it gave rise to feudalism. To Larrañaga ethnography is "fantasies without any foundation," and will never grow out of diapers. In the same vein Baroja states that all men are pretty much alike:

Men are the same everywhere, in Europe, in America, and in Oceania.

Man is almost the same everywhere, and only at times by an effort manages to surpass himself.

But as usual Baroja prefers to point out differences; if biologically men are much alike, or at least unaffected in their temperament by the differences, culturally the divergence is enormous. "...the misunderstanding of two different races," using "races" now in the cultural sense, is a phrase constantly recurring, as we have seen. Says Larrañaga,

...I remember that the geographer Elisée Reclus says that none of the Europeans who live in China...can say, "I have known to the core what a Chinaman is."

Pepita asks, "They are so impenetrable?" and he replies, "They have a soul distinct from ours." Baroja is even uncertain that brotherhood and understanding would be a good thing.

Let us consider the geographic influence on the development of character. Civilization comes with rain:

In the damp and rainy countries is where the most civilized and also the most beautiful types are
to be found, types like that of your daughter, with her blue eyes, her white skin, and her fair hair.

Level country leaves its mark, and has left it above all on the French:

For me these flat countries, these great cities also flat, have more of school than of individualities.

This matter of "general ideas" is a reflection of level countries; in these level countries, intellects stand in extension rather than in intensity. It cannot be believed that in customs, in tastes, in opinions there are some who are right and others not.

Democracy is always developed better on the fertile plain; aristocracy, on the other hand, with its clerics, its soldiers, and its nobles, defends itself on the ridges and hills surrounded by barren flats.

The mountain imparts broadness:

To find simple friendly, and spiritual people, one must go to the kind that live in high regions, who have been able to measure the distance between their height and the plain and that between their elevation and the infinite.

Height is what invariably gives the impression of smallness in things. To him who lives in the narrow valley anything appears large; to him who abides on the mountain-top everything appears small. (N.I.)

There are other less admirable traits:

In Catalonia, as in all other regions where there are mountain and sea, the man of the mountain does not resemble the man of the coast. The man of the mountain is serious, suspicious, grasping, with a tendency to surly; on the other hand the seashore type is light, superficial, gesticulating, exuberant, and passionate.

1. 1lp109bc, Horacio
2. 12p70c, Larrañaga
3. 9p19, Larrañaga
4. 8p21lbc, López del
5. 2pg194cf Castillo
6. 1lp141c

I. Zarathustra dwelt on the mountain and counselled his followers to live there. Cf. Z XXVIII.
We have already seen how the terrain affects morality (N.I.) and personal tastes. (N.II.) Whatever else may be got from these opinions, it is evident that Baroja believes in a thoroughly naturalistic racial and cultural determinism.

It must be hard for Baroja to cleave to his proposition of no basic racial differences when he writes and thinks of the Jews; we have seen how he likes to relegate the Semitic races to an inferior place, and disjoin Hebrew and Aryan. If brought to a stand he would probably affirm the cultural origin of those differences, but he could hardly escape calling them hereditable.

Aryan and Semite are the first of a series of comprehensive ethnic dichotomies, bisecting the racial map of Europe in several directions. The following is obviously persiflage, but shows his fondness for the division:

Bicycling! Typical habit of the Aryans, according to the somewhat comical classifications of Otto Ammon and Vacher de Lapouge. Perhaps the Semites...pedal too, copying the Aryans with cynical impudence; but it is a falsified, mystified pedaling, for which they do not have vested rights. The Aryan, the bicycle; the Semite, the camel.

The Carlist general, Santa Cruz, is called "not an Aryan," but a Semite, (N.III.) Zoroaster is a Semite because of his belief in the absoluteness of good and evil, Nietzsche is Semitic because of his "rabid optimism"; there are many others similarly designated. The great

1. 99p9cf  
2. 13p175b

I. Page 126.  
II. Page 49.  
III. Page 347.
difference between Aryan and Semite is that of religion, in which "a ragged Moor" is an adept, and Calvin a babe in arms. It is possible that the Aryan is the poised man, as Chamberlain asserts; "but such people don't invent religion." (N.I.) "The pure Moor has never been a heretic nor a freethinker...." In other passages Baroja denies the duality. "Aryan" and "non-Aryan" are baseless divisions, says Larrañaga. Perhaps Baroja's own uncertainty is illustrated in the dispute between Stolz and Larrañaga; speaking of Nietzsche, Stolz says, "He was an Aryan." Larrañaga replies,

Friend Stolz, you know very well that this matter of Aryans and Semites is a fantasy that seems to have nothing but a comparative linguistic value.

And Stolz,

... I believe that it has ethnic, and above all, spiritual, value.

It may be that Larrañaga is the colder Baroja of later years; but much of Stolz's belief holds on. These matters will be resumed under Religion and Anti-Semitism.

"Central" and "Outlying" is another dualism we have already met in the discussion of humorism. The Central Europeans are ponderous, well-ordered, practical,

1. 15p167, Larrañaga
2. 2p33bc
3. 12p173a
4. 15p172

1. What he would say of Buddha and the Aryan Way is not clear.
mediocre, and "extensive"; England, Spain, and Russia are "intensive" and individualistic, and own a facile ingenuity that the others lack.

The German and the Latin, or the North and the South, divide Europe in another way. Hugo classifies the Count of Spain as more German than Latin because of his "love of force, loyalty to king, very Germanic mixture of idealism and realism, love of discipline, of formalization," his cruelty of pure human barbarism, more spontaneous, more genial" than Latin cruelty, which is "doctrinaire, superlogical, pedantic."

Latin cruelty is apparently that of fanatics; German cruelty is rather that of energumens.

Souther Europe is, without dispute, charlatan and exaggerative, as the North is ponderous and hypocritical; the races of the North tend to be brutal and gross, as those of the South tend to be envious and deceitful. And the rest, outside Europe, counts for little or nothing in spiritual matters. (N.I.)

The Northerner is interested in precepts and rules, the Southerner in people; the one in abstractions, the other in particulars; the Northerner is richer in imagination and fantasy. As to the less seemly qualities,

The meanness of the Southerner is more concentrated in the Jewish race than in any other, and the meanness of the people of the North in the German.

1. 19p221f & 2p87cf & 91cff I. See BG Sec.50 for a similar description relating to religion.
2. 1p263 and passim
3. 1p152c
4. 12p22a, Nelly
5. 4p13ab
6. 12p248c, the German violinist
poisonous animals, and man is one of them, are the more poisonous the farther south they are.

The North is perhaps hypocritical about its sexual morality, but it is in Mediterranean communities that one encounters "constitutional immorality." The South is also more histrionic: Baroja speaks of "theatrical peoples such as Italy, Spain, and the South of France," and of "an eloquent Mediterranean, born to speechify in a country of sunshine."

Baroja may for a time have been influenced by the pan-Germanic movement, and especially his great esteem for Kant would have led him to an admiration for the North; but if he ever believed in "Nordic supremacy" he has repudiated it now.

There are no privileged races. We have deceived ourselves greatly with those theories about Aryans and non-Aryans, dolichocephals and brachycephals.

The defeat of Germany has upset many fond beliefs.

In this latter period we have deceived ourselves in our enthusiasm for the people of the North. We have believed that they had the qualities lacking in the Southerners. Naturally it wasn't so.

We have in different periods, Larrañaga adds, attributed the greater intelligence to either Northerner or Southerner; this change of views at least helps us to understand

1. 12p143c, Larrañaga
2. 4p82b
3. 5p162ab
4. 5p267c
5. 13p200, Larrañaga
the different peoples better. He continues with the story of the King of Sweden who engaged in embroidering.

Among the Scandinavians there are cotqueans just as there may be among the people of the South, and among the people of the South there are persons of as ponderous and phlegmatic an intelligence as in the North.

The Northerners have had natural resources to depend upon—coal and water. "If they did not have these elements, they would languish, however Aryan they might be."

It is a sad discrepancy for "a rabid Germanistic anthropologist such as Houston Stewart Chamberlain," but nevertheless true, that the despised Agotes are the only authentic Aryans in Vasconia.

Of course this characterization is typical of Baroja, and is often too summary to do proper justice; and at times it is far-fetched. Thus Aviraneta could discover Basque characteristics in López del Castillo (the clue was his mother, who had a Basque name), even though López said, "My mother did not know her Basque ascendants nor had heard them spoken of. My maternal grandfather was already Andalusian." As before, he denies a racial unity to nations:

The candid and simple man... believes that when one says a word, such as French, English, Russian, or Spanish, this word indicates something; but the anthropologist shows, or tries to show, the inanity of these words. For him "French" is

1. 9p19bcf
2. 9p59ab
3. 16p163b
4. 8p108a
not "French" but Celtic, Kimri, or Germanic; the Englishman is Saxon, Pict, or Angle; the Spaniard, Iberian or Ligurian. We all apparently have the tickets changed, with which there is a devilish confusion.

But he goes on to characterize the nations from the cultural or temperamental point of view:

The English, cold, correct, tending to the simple and the comfortable; the French, affected and friendly; the Italians, by preference dedicated to the esthetic, speaking momentarily of bellezza, of the ideale; the Yankees, with a marked tendency to candor and barbarism.

The English, he has told us, are humorists by virtue of their distal position. They are also persistent: of a certain man he says, "He had a bulldoggish air, common among the English." A certain woman "lived always dominated by feelings of depression and melancholy." One of the characters observes, "The fact is that this woman is, fundamentally, English."

Spain comprises a good many types.

If instead of being Catalonians those in the coach had been Basques, none of them would have been interested in the conversation of strangers; they would have talked among themselves about their own affairs; if they had been Castilians or Andalusians, they would have joined in the conversation. These Catalonians listen, and listen with suspicion. (N.I.)

One fraternizing trait is the love of words, common to all Latin peoples. The Spaniard is content to have his nation called noble, whether it is or not. "Taking

1. 13p42bc, Stolz
2. 4p26b
3. 4p141a
4. 1p162bc, Hugo
5. 2p158b

I. All this conclusion about Catalonians is, so far as the text indicates, based on the eavesdropping of one Catalanian. Of course it may be true.
rhetorical phrases as accomplished facts is a characteristically Southern trait." "... orators, like all Mediterraneans..." "Letamendi... like Unamuno, a phrase-juggler, a man of verbal genius, as Southern poets are." In Don Fausto, as in every good Spaniard, was the germ of an orator." Hyperbole is a Spanish quality. Another shared trait is the love for the somber.

The Basques we have learned are not a social type, and they have fewer conversational and oratorical gifts than the rest of Spain. The Basque is a man of action: what he wants is to be given the idea, then not to think about it further, but "organize, direct, command." This is a "dynamic and hardly intellectual pragmatism proper to a rural country, one of scanty culture." Speaking of Galardi's extreme individualism and independence, Baroja says, "Galardi was a decisive and brave Basque." This character embodies the qualities of intrepidity, unconcern, and love of independence that we may imagine Baroja attributing to his race. On the temperamental side, the Basque has an excessive ardor that "sends to his head vapors in which are formed these melancholy imaginings

1. 6p24c
2. 6p134f
3. 14p64c
4. 2p229b
5. 8p189b
6. 6p167ab
7. 4p137c
8. 4p234bc and passim
that he takes for speculative reflections and inspirations of the Holy Spirit." So said Richelieu, and hit the mark. The fact that Castile is in many ways similar to Vasconia is that Vasconia was her birthplace.

The Germans go to extremes in everything—nobility and paltriness alike.

The German mass is much more neutral and torpid than that of a Latin people; but from time to time in that mass there appears a man who is the one who has informed himself most, who has put most energy and genius into studying a thing. Kent, for instance. The Germans have been great in the life of the spirit, and mean in their social life, exalting the vulgar military. German thoroughness is beyond reproach: speaking of a certain doctor, Baroja says, "...probably it was his Germanic ancestry that had given him this great love for investigation." But there has been a want of understanding and psychology, which in one way has manifested itself by the fact that Germany has not known how to produce novels; great speculative ability, but not so much intimacy with human beings, one infers.

Contrast French intellectual precision and quiddity with Spanish love of action.

Through France have passed Descartes and Gassendi; on the other hand, in Spain... germinates the seed of St. Ignatius Loyola.

1. 6p39bc
2. 12p94a, Larrañaga
3. 12p248cf, the German violinist
4. 13p66b, Larrañaga
5. 12p139, Joe
6. 2p280c
7. 12p252ab
8. 5p135c
French shortcomings are largely due to the geographical condition, with few peaks and a great deal of expanse. They "give...the impression of a level race. They make everything in extension and nothing in intensity."
The men of France have been talented, ingenious, brilliant—have had every extensive gift; but they have lacked the one intensive one--genius. (N.I.) Even Victor Hugo was a "great rhetorician, an unruly man with rules, a species of genius-pretender." The French are much preoccupied with their society, and accordingly regard it as a kind of European Eden with Paris the New Jerusalem.

There is always in the Frenchmen that ridiculous patriotic presumption and lack of humanity which has never let them have natural heroes.

When the Count of Spain looked aslant "with a marked expression of astuteness and malice," Hugo's thought was, "He is a Frenchman." The French "suppose they possess general ideas, the universal, the measure, the norm," and it is impossible to convince them otherwise. "There are no people so imbecile as those of these towns who think themselves the brains of the world." But they are all rather ordinary; even the French tongue is the "fittest language for commonplaces."

Let us consider some more broadly social questions.

1. 14p275f, Yarza  
2. 2p253a  
3. 1p250bc  
4. 9p19a, Larrañaga  
5. 10p75bc  
6. 13p85bc

I. This appears to be contradicted by the statement that the French are hard-working, intelligent, strong, honorable people, but, like most other Central Europeans are ponderous—lack facile ingenuity. (2p91bcff.) This may perhaps
Masses of men affect Baroja as does the massive in all things: he dislikes their bigness, their pretense of being more than they are, their power to impose stupid norms on spirits such as he, and above all their leaders who symbolize this strength and organize it—the bourgeoisie. All this has been stated or implied in the Polity, and reappears here where the matters of society are more generalized. The common opinion is commonly wrong, he has said. People admire most what they understand best; and as the level of intelligence is not above a child's reach, a popular hero is always held in greater esteem than a man of genuine merit. Referring to the ridicule with which ignoramuses greet technical words (of which, we have seen, Baroja uses a good many), he says, "Plainly I care nothing for the opinion of the doltish Boeotians who go to bullfights and hear mass with devotion." Though customarily generous with rural folk, he condemns their superstition. Rural people are superstitious everywhere, says Olsen; the countryman still believes as men believed a thousand years ago: he is readier to adopt a charm than any scientific advice—proof that this is ingrained may be found in the fact that through all the years they have had ample opportunity to

1. 2p281
2. 2p30a
3. 12p158bc

(Note I cont'd from page 257).... indicate what such generalities are worth.
ascertain what influence the moon has on crops, and yet still cling to the superstition. It is foolish to idealize the country. "The rustic is almost always egoistic, quarrelsome, vindictive, and fanatical." He habitually exaggerates; this for him is a biological necessity, for he must give importance to the things he does. But the most contemptible class of men in mass is the bourgeoisie. "...the honorable man, that thing that is called the honorable man, stands for the utmost moral wretchedness, cowardice, and vileness."

After the arrest of Macbeth and his wife, Silvestre, who had found no other friendship than theirs, wondered,

If Macbeth and his wife were thieves, could it be that thieves were the only good and charitable people in the world? And when he thought of his aunts and uncle, who enjoyed the reputation of impeccability and honor, he asked himself whether being honorable weren't synonymous with being selfish, miserable, and base.

The burgher best incarnates our modern ornate ignorance:

The burgher in general despises the one who writes and respects what is written in printer's ink. It is one of the most imbecile formulas of the fetishism in our modern civilization. . . .

Priest and soldier are as bad: "these people with a habit, with a uniform, or with a blouse, whom we meet on the streets, are poor animals with a human figure."

1. 2p193bff
2. 8p185ab, López del Castillo
3. 10p80b
4. 14p66c
5. 5p106f
The only pose a man of strength and sense can take in front of these animals is distinctly Nietzschean.

The strong man can have but two movements before the sovereign mass: one, dominating and subjecting it as one would a beast, with his hands; the other, inspiring it with his ideas and thoughts—another form of domination.

I, who am not a strong enough man for either of these two actions, retire from the sovereign mass, so as not to feel close at hand its collective brutality and ill temper.

If necessary to lie to them in order to lead them, well and good, for there is little rationality in them; nothing so capricious as an army, says the Count of Spain: one day it is skittish, the next it fights swervelessly.

As to institutions, enough has already been said of them in the sections on Sex, Religion, Polity, etc. Baroja hates them most for their coerciveness. Those who follow the social institutions (here marriage is referred to) wield a sort of "social terrorism" over those who would be different, who do "not wish to accept the ideals of the rest without prior examination." The herd is determined not to let anyone live his own life. It is always interfering. In practical life adaptation counts for more than understanding. Probably don Pío feels much the same about all other institutions as he appears here to feel about the family:

1. 5p92
2. lp313ff
3. lp321b
4. 9p74b
5. 12p105ab and passim, Larrañaga
6. 21p169c
The family! ... The first thing one ought to do is forget it. Fathers and brothers, uncles and cousins are not worth anything except to disgruntle one. The first thing a man ought to learn is to disobey his parents and not believe in the Eternal.

Social practices, many of them, that go by the name of "culture," are a confection to keep our eyes blindfolded from things as they are. "... the elegant world, the literary world, upper society" are "nothing. At most a mystification." "Society has made of man an exclusively social product, removed from Nature." Perhaps it had been better to say that society has made men think they are removed from nature; civilization, except in its material, structural aspects, is largely imaginary. Larrañaga, seeing the fetishism in Pepita's removing her ring to show she no longer is bound by wedlock, remarks, "How close we are to the savages!" And elsewhere he says, "In the matter of amusements there has been no advance from the Stone Age to now."

Fashion is really the only element of culture within the grasp of most people.

People do not understand anything but the vogue, which comprises all that is illuminated with the strong light of the moment. The rest they do not understand nor care about.

The pundits, he adds, know no more than others about the rest; they are too much absorbed in their work. All are

1. 11p141b
2. 2p401c
3. 5p90bc
4. 9p164b
5. 12p52b
conspicuously lacking in the inner life, which is Baroja's idea of genuine culture; but as this vouchsafed to few, he admires next to it the homelier kinds of culture; among the arts, he says music is truly the social one, for it is non-intellectual. (N.I.)

Perhaps as a result of over-crowding and excessive bigness in its own organization, modern society has developed a megalomania. It has also evolved a tendency to sentimentality, which very possibly is germane to civilization.

Baroja recognizes no social classes--horizontal strata--except those or work and worth:

...it is not the parenthood of Father Adam, very problematical for anthropologists, that will achieve the disappearance of the division between Agote and Perluta. (N.II.) It is civilization and culture that are making all men become equal and that impel us to have among ourselves no more distinction that that which work and intelligence produce.

As for groups in the vertical direction, or groups in general, their only raison d'être consists in their having some strong common objective or sentiment; otherwise there is nothing but heterogeneity. One of our greatest actual difficulties is the lack of such a common bond and goal; but social groups have a way of concocting

1. 12p52bf, Larrañaga
2. 2p45b
3. 12p46b
4. 2p262a
5. 1p320b, Count of Spain

I. See page 163.
II. Two racial types in Vasconia.
high aims whenever needed, and we shall probably not have long to wait.

Among peoples it is the little variations that make the biggest differences and conflicts; a Castilian resents the language of Catalonia, which is close kin to his own, more than he resents Basque, which is entirely distinct. Portuguese and Spaniard ruffle each other more than Spaniard and Swede. I take it that this is because among kindred people there is a common property of emotional conditionings. What is entirely apart from our own cannot provoke us, for we are not conditioned to it one way or another; but those who fall partly within our classifications and partly outside, seem ungraciously insubordinate to the norms we have been conditioned (and often have had to fight hard) to respect. Each of us has the feeling of the majority--carries with him the social ambient of his nurture; and when another does something that misfits that ambient, our resentfulness springs from the need of the crowd to ostracize the non-conformist, the one who balks our action and self-interest.

But total misunderstanding, as well as partial understanding, leads to conflict--though usually on a larger scale and not just fretful squabbling. "This misunderstanding in a man of one country for the people of another is endless, and perhaps will always be so, however

1. 9920b, Larrañaga
2. 1p323, Count of Spain
much cosmopolitanism may progress."

In reality, no one understands other countries... It seems as if we did, but it is an illusion; the most one can do, finding oneself face to face with strange cultures, with ways of living different from ours, is to describe them with the minimum of prejudices.

Strange customs and language still produce a nascent antipathy in us. We do not accustom ourselves easily to the fact that others feel and speak in a foreign way. If we could understand each other wholly, the causes of war would have disappeared, because the fact that one likes rain and another sunshine, that one prefers olive-oil to lard and another lard to olive-oil, that one believes a guttural sound is pretty and the other believes that what is pretty is the nasal sound, all these little tastes and inclinations that we have as opposed to those of our neighbor make us see him deformed.

These antipathies, however, are not necessarily racial in origin. It is impossible to demonstrate the existence of pure races; but provincial self-feeling has taken the concept "race," exalted it into a credo, and made it embody the delusions of persecution, jealousies, etc., from which the group suffers. (N.I.)

1. 4p199ab
2. 13p43, Fischer
3. 13p68bc, Larrañaga
4. 18p25ff

I. It is extremely difficult to tie Baroja down to one consistent allegiance in this wrangle between the "racial" and the "social" factors that determine the divergencies among races; now he declares for one, now for the other. As has appeared, he ascribes many racial differences to topographical differences; but he makes no attempt critically to examine whether racial features are actually altered thereby or only the social heritage changed, or whether the characters are even capable of transmission. The tendency among modern anthropologists seems
Our information is not deep enough to allow us to extend Darwinism to social conflict.

As to the extension of the concept of the struggle for existence to the social question, it is not yet scientific. The theories of Novicow, Loria, and Kropotkin are no more than humanitarian literature.

But of course selfishness obviously applies. "Among individuals and countries alike stands the law of fraud"—fraud to further one's own selfish interest.

The personality of the individual is largely the pattern of behavior imposed upon him by his position in society. "If it were for only our natural instincts, if not for the feeling of our neighbor's watching us, wars would last but a moment—'we'd give each other a few wallops and the thing would be ended.' But the necessity to appear well, in the officer the need to prove his decisiveness and in the soldier the need to follow the crowd, drags them on and on. People act for the approval of their fellows; they "have so little originality, so little character, so little strength of spirit that if they were alone and without observers they wouldn't do anything." A person accepts the social status imposed on him:

By the suggestion of ideas in the atmosphere, an erotic woman, even though she be of good instincts, is believed bad and ends by being bad.

1. 2p213
2. 9p42c, Larraga
3. 1p317c
4. 2p319b

N.I cont'd from p. 264. . .to be to minimize racial differences, that is, apart from mere externalities such as size and pigmentation. This seems to me the more justifiable assumption, being well
When the acceptance is total, there appears the "spirit of the slave," who believes it is actually moral to grovel in the dust. Another feature of this social conditioning is the individual's occupation. The Jews' pecuniary sense comes from living "hundreds of years as merchants."

The sailor cannot stand alone, like the farmer who looks on Nature; he is talkative, needs an interlocutor; he has not the egoism of the solitary man, nor his intelligence; he can guard neither his money nor his words. The sailor is like the man of the desert, proud and straightforward. The sailor, more generous than the landsman, more prodigal, less comprehensive, in spite of his apparent cosmopolitanism is much more limited in thought. The sea broadcasts the seed of culture; but it germinates in the valleys, at the foot of the mountains.

Beroja as well as Nietzsche gives a high place to animal spirits. He speaks of the degeneration of the Dutch kermis: "The brutal, popular, dizzy gaiety has turned into a gaiety correct, vulgar, and characterless."

Simple unwisdom is pardonable, and untaught cruelty—the cruelty of the sphex—though it may surprise us, does not revolt us as does the cruelty of a bullfight. So the common people are much more lovable than their city brethren. Life he believes was pleasanter in the rural Middle Ages than in Greece—Greek life was too "ingenious." In Spain, at least, the common people are much

1. 9p46bc, Larrañaga
2. 4p130bc
3. 9p102b
4. 5p76f
5. 4p70a

Note cont'd from 265... grounded in behaviorism and capable of experimental verification.
more friendly than the urbanites. Spanish cities have been too generally Americanized; they tend toward plutocracy; so a person who has no other assets than his abilities finds himself forced into exile, unless he cares to be a nonentity. "We are all like gamblers, interested in nothing but our winnings." Social life is desirable and may yet be found in Spanish villages and in cities of France and England, where other things than money are prized. Many live in solitude, not because they are self-sufficient, but because "things are so unintelligently arranged as not to leave a tiny niche for grace, benevolence, and sympathy." The insignificance of the city type, his lack of seriousness, social feeling, and moral sense, his provincialism, and his intolerable standardization and cataloguing of every walk of life, to the point that all interesting uncertainty is gone, are topics already treated under the Polity.

The extent to which Christianity has been responsible for the present state of society--its myth of the "purity of blood," its slavish and Semitic ideals, etc.--has already been considered. What factors for social change remain? Baroja enumerates three: fashion, luxury, and the moving-picture ((at this time, 1918, the radio was

1. 2p11a and passim
undeveloped). The classical machinery for change, books, press, and school, does not count for much in modern cities; people read very little and the press is conservative. Fashion is very powerful, but as it is impermanent and confined to external things, it leaves small trace on ideas. There was a time when there were fashions in ideas, when women read widely to know Chateaubriand, Dumas, and others; but not now. Just now freedom, especially emancipation for women, is in vogue; but it has too little to do with freedom for the inner life, freedom that is interesting because of its possibilities for inward conflict. It may be, however, that women in their new sex-freedom, realizing as they do the impostance of the genetic life, may transform Spanish urban society. Luxury has brought a taste for the baroque and expensive. Jewelry is not made as a work of art, but as an index to its owner's opulence. The moving-picture, though it nowise taxes the brain, will be one of the greatest factors of divulgement and culture.

1. 2p325ff
That Baroja regards Nietzsche as a great psychologist appears in the quotations I have elsewhere given. But Nietzsche was a psychologist mainly in a very comprehensive way: I mean that he took whole, extensive movements, of races and almost of humanity entire, as the subject for his study. His psychology is more speculative than experimental, more of the study than of the laboratory. It is true that his analyses are often razor-keen; but their originality comes, I think, rather from new integrations of material already at hand--startlingly new interpretations of data we had long known, but had not seen in quite his way--than in the collection of new material; they are too sweeping to admit of experimental verification; they have to do with a recasting of history. Baroja, too, is fond of this sort of speculation, and admires Nietzsche for it; (N.II.) some will appear in the pages to follow; but as a physician, and as a man in touch with the modern sort of specialized investigation, he is interested also in the more specific, limited, particularized problems of psychology, and has expressed himself about many of them. It is they to which I wish to devote most of this space.

I. The sub-title of Las Horas Solitarias is Notes of an Apprentice in Psychology. It may with profit be consulted; I shall quote freely from it.
II. Cf. page 3.\textsuperscript{4}
Baroja is an occasional psychologist. This means that he changes his point of view nearly every time he takes up the subject, which gives a crisscross of terms and classifications that is very confusing; it does not so much invalidate the observations as hamper the reader in understanding them: there is wanting the unifying point of view, the logical *summum genus*. So it is that I shall have to do here more perhaps of what I have had in some degree to do elsewhere: interpret. The references are the bricks, which may be laid to form almost any imaginable dwelling; but I shall try to attend to what I imagine would be his wishes.

I have said that there is no unifying point of view; I feel, however, that Baroja, if he were to systematize his psychology, would take somewhat that which I believe is Floyd Allport's--the preservation of the ego. This means spreading selfishness over the entire field of psychology, as we have have already seen him spread it over the entire field of ethics. This is not strictly Nietzsche's manner, but neither is it contradictory; everything for Nietzsche is turned to the advantage of the unconscious will, or vital force, which is simply the physical body; Baroja, too, seeks for a physical basis for psychic phenomena. Naturally selfishness is another aspect of individualism.

All that he says is furthermore integrated by a
consistent determinism. Character he will call a social structure--hence beyond the "control" (whatever that may be) of the individual; he will speak of heredity, which is likewise undirected; and even the preservation of the ego is generally, if not always, according to him, automatic. He goes so far as to convict those who vouch for indeterminism of resorting to it as a means of inflating their ego--they are underdetermined, and hence different from the rest of nature.

Let us take first the matter of egoism. Every act springs from self-interest. The organism will not, given the circumstances, do anything prejudicial to itself. This does not mean that it will never injure itself; a drug addict when he takes his stint is certainly injuring himself, but to resist that urge would tax him more severely for the moment than to surrender to it. We are driven back, I suppose, to the Gestaltists' "line of least action": the organism does what is for the moment the thing that makes for the best condition in himself. It is clear that many things may happen to complicate the situation: our drug-addict may verbalize to himself about the wreck that his continuous use of the drug will make of him--that is, he will react implicitly to a situation that repels him, which may be strong enough to make surrender harder than resistance. The difficulty with any such generalization as this is that it has no
value for prediction to anyone less omniscient than God; the criticism levelled at the whole configurational hypothesis is that it has no foresight. But the concept of self-interest if used broadly, to cut a wide swath and not a hair-line, has much predictive value.

Men do what most inflates their ego. Making themselves the center of attention, given the "fundamental desire" for recognition, is one means of self-aggrandizement. Baroja speaks several times of the "desire to be interesting at all costs." Anthropomorphism--men's putting their ideas into nature--is another form of self-exaltation. The forms in which human ideas have existed shame the variety of Paris costumes, he says: animals have been regarded as religious symbols, as omens, as personifications; religious rites have been built around such obscenity as circumcision; all these things spring from man's desire to make himself interesting. Our self-interest makes it impossible for us to be disinterested. It is our own affairs that occupy us, and only when another's impinges upon our own does it affect us.

I am convinced that we are all inaccessible islands with scarped cliffs. When someone tells me his intimate matters, I pretend to be interested; then when in a moment of illusion I begin to

1. 21p91a and 18p31bf
2. 19p193f
talk about my affairs, I immediately notice indifference in my interlocutor, until I hastily cut short my confidences, and think, "Now I have fooled myself again."

... We are spiritually impermeable. Only interest and vanity can join us.

But, to be sure, "between man and woman there are other interests and the possibility of fusing two egoisms into one. That is different." (Someone has expressed this as "selfishness for two." ) "The generous, well-intentioned man is verily rare." The disinterested man is, like the good man Baroja mentioned in the Ethic, the man with no appetite.

There is a period in our life in which our neighbor frets us because he is our rival; then, after we've lost this idea of rivalry, rather because we do not aspire to anything (N.I.) than for any other reason, we understand that our neighbor, like ourself, is not a rare copy, but a common, ordinary copy from an edition of millions.

We are like the leaves on a tree, Pepita adds, all alike and yet all different. So our evaluations are colored by our desires; we over-estimate the man who thwarts us. Even the accuracy of our senses is affected by our egocentrism: we perceive to our advantage. The individual is in his own eyes always right and consistent, however ill-assorted he may seem to others. Thus character is the unification of the individual.

1. 13p88b6ff, Larrañaga
2. 13p90a
3. 15p192c

I. The disinterested person is the one who does not will, as Nietzsche would say.
Character, though it be illogical, divided, with instincts hardly homogeneous, desires rationally to conserve its unity, explain itself, and give the sensation of homogeneity and permanence. Spiritually what is heterogeneous appears the insane, the absurd, and above all the eccentric, the irrational; and all of us pretend to be logical, to proceed impelled by clear, rational, and confessable motives.

There is as it were a kind of appetency in the singling out of stimuli to our benefit. Thus when Pepita asks Larrañaga whether he is trying to corrupt Soledad with his gloom, he says to Soledad:

"You are imputrescible."
"From torpidness?"
"No; rather from innate wisdom."

This "innate wisdom" is, I gather, this appetency. As men haste to things that are good for them, by the same token of selfishness they flee from danger: ". . . all men except madmen are naturally cowards. . . ." It is only when one has to do a thing that cannot be avoided that one does it, cowardly or valiantly. In all this discussion there seems to be somewhat the Nietzschean and Schopenhaurian idea of the vital substratum, pursuing its way quite without the comprehension of most people, and entirely beyond the control of any.

Mind is more or less an epiphenomenon, a faint corporeal on the masthead of physics. Baroja watches for a physical basis for human motives. (N.I.)

1. lp282cf
2. 13p287b
3. 3p255c, Roquet
4. 21p271b

1. I. "... the extent to which man is understood today goes only so far as he has been understood mechanistically." (A Sec. 14.)
In the depths of our being, all the fountain of happiness or woe springs from the organic life, from the latest accounting sent to consciousness by the senses, not from adverse or happy occurrences, shadows without reality, nor from ideas, either, which are the skeletal images of things. That inward wheelworks of the organs gives the tone of joy or sadness to our consciousness.

The reader will remember the ode to ataraxy, in which he wonders whether after all it is not simply a matter of good health. Pessimism and optimism are organic. Life is not turned on the lathe of mind; it is the physical proximity of danger, for instance, and not the knowledge of it, that gives us fear.

"We seem to will, to be free. . ." says Larrañaga,
"and the most important acts of our lives we perform in total unconsciousness, almost like somnambulists."

An excess of consciousness may even be injurious to us, for it will tend to thwart our actions, as it did for Hamlet. To act, one must affirm; but the intellectual man is a doubter: ".. .affirming and doubting, the two tendencies, are logical and human; affirming is more biological, doubting more intellectual." The

1. 14p18a
2. 15p167c
3. 2p413c
4. 9p162b
5. 21p102a
6. 2p3lb
disintegration of personality may come from just this doubting—it generates a neural conflict; the man of strong will is the one whose neura are dominated by one strong impulse. Even our interests, rational as we like to pretend to be, are seldom intellectual; most people are more interested in bullfights than science and prefer noise to logic. "At bottom every opinion, every thesis is an allegation and defense of oneself . . . ." Naturally with such a slender mental equipment the workings of most people's minds are quite simple, once one has got hold of the leading strings. One has only to consider the vast network of involuntary actions to understand how little "control" there is in our lives. The voice, perhaps, is obedient, giving the "momentary synthesis," or ourselves as we want to appear; but the face is indicative of a man's persistent traits, for only habits of long standing can leave a trace there; besides, the involuntary muscles of the eyes, capillaries, etc., give reactions that cannot be disguised. Our intelligence is not impartial, but acts to the advantage of the rest of our organism. There is an element of unconscious preconception even in scientific reasoning—even the scientist has his animus and prejudices. When the Count of Spain said that no

1. 19p212ff  
2. 13p210ab, Larrañaga  
3. 13p211b, Larrañaga  
4. 23p12bc  
5. 8p137à, López del Castillo, with Aviraneta agreeing  
6. 2p298ff  
7. 15p190ab and 190bc  
8. 19p250bcf
new intellectual thing is possible unless we can change our bodies, he was making, as Hugo saw, the intellectual rise from the physical. Plainly this is Baroja's own opinion.

Character is a configuration of socially implanted reactions. It derives from the social conditions of the time.

Does character exist? We know not, nor whether it be a fantasy or a result of occurrences acting upon temperament. Character seems somewhat like the word of the mystics, something which does not manifest itself until it is revealed; whether it exists, whether it has a reality prior to manifesting itself in acts, is a doubtful matter.

History may perhance come some day to dominate psychology, and then one of its most curious manifestations will be that of marking the proportion or disproportion between the character of persons and the role they play in their time....

Now, what effects occurrences produce, given a character, is hard to ascertain. What would Napoleon or Robespierre have been a hundred years earlier or a hundred years later? Does a clear intelligence modify a temperament? What is a hero when historical circumstances are not lent to task him?

xxx

Temperament, apparently, is what is innate, the plot of destiny, the concourse of tendencies, of instincts, of vanities, of unconscious things. Whence impulses are born we know not. That would be knowing the quality of life and will. (N.I.)

Impulse is blind—tends toward action like a bull toward a red rag. If the clarity of reflection appears in the road, impulse is weakened and may come to check the movement or action.

1. lp317b

I. This is a reflection of Kant, with the impulse as the noumenon.
All these divisions into temperament, character, and personality may perhaps be, rather than psychological facts, only metaphysical distinctions.

Temperament presumably is the purely biological, the innate, the impulsive, the warmth or cold of our vitals.

Character seemingly is temperament steered by spirit and domesticated by it. They are the horses and the chariot and charioteer.

Personality, then, is character in history, in the social world—a thing realized. It is the chariot and charioteer that have shone and excelled in the race.

Here follows the statement about character as unification that I quoted above. Temperament, then, is the biological given quantity. Under the whiplash of mind it becomes character. The only thing that is not clear about this is where the mind comes from. Apparently Baroja does not regard it as innate, at least not entirely so, for he says, "When we see a fly pounce with gusto on the pyrethrum powder that will mean its death, we think that neither the fly nor man has innate knowledge," and mentions "the age which seems to me the most important for the formation of the mind, from twelve to twenty." Also, in a statement that I shall presently quote, he makes intuition an activity with an empirical origin. Thus while certain of our mental characteristics do arise from our inherited organism

1. lp280cff
2. 5p76bc
3. 5p111
(and there is much interplay, I am sure he would admit, between mind and what he has called temperament), mind itself is largely a social product. So we are back at our starting-point, and have very nearly equated mind and character. It is hard to keep these terms separate, for they are, as he has indicated, largely metaphysical. But at any rate we can say, whether we call it mind, character, or personality, that it is principally a social thing. One tends, Baroja says, to be in any given group what the group expects one to be, funny, sad, grouchy, etc. This form of autosuggestion works even with one's self—often when alone, thinking that at last he is face to face with his real self, a person finds he is only play-acting, fitting himself into his opinion of himself. (N.I.) Everyone has his part to play:

...how few are the men with human faces!
In how few eyes gleam sincerity, loyalty, and benevolence! Airs solemn, grave, authoritarian, types pedantic, professorial. Presumption, interest, and pride everywhere, and human pan-foolishness.

Our life is history, not alone our outward acts, but also our inward personality. We all imitate ourselves. We are plagiarists of our Ego. If in our mind the history of our personality were erased, we should know neither what to do nor what to say on any occasion. But as we

1. 2p61cf
2. 9p24b

I. Observe the logic: "real" person ≠ opinion of himself.
are, we have our replies, in words or in action, prepared for anything that may be asked of us from outside. We have taken a spiritual and material posture, and that is what we are, willy-nilly.

We ply back and forth over this path:

In external facts, too, we are historical. As to good and bad recollections we have somewhat of the ruminant, and it's in the second or third chewing that we often discover their real zest.

So we infer that it is the person in the most stimulating social environment who will develop the best mentality, being called upon for frequenter and more complex responses--having more problems set him, in other words. Baroja tells of a "troglodyte," as he calls him, a yokel who by chance has a "moment of curious introspection";

this is the other extreme. So also a man accustomed even to an uncomfortable social niche finds himself disoriented and more uncomfortable still when he has to change to a comfortable one that he is not accustomed to. "The majority of...hypochondriacal men...are so accustomed to reacting to misfortune and bad luck that a moment of good fortune upsets them and leaves them perplexed." So it is that he who occupies the position of the slave soon has the spirit of the slave. So it is that our position in society becomes all in all to us, and one who consistently follows a single career

1. 12p30ab, Larrañaga
2. 2p50bc, Larrañaga
3. 2p140a
4. op163b
eventually sees the universe as if tinged by it--assigns it cosmic importance. Our role in society consists not only in making our own speeches, but also joining in the chorus when that is part of the program; so boredom in the country is endurable, even pleasant; but in the city, with much activity going on about one, it is exasperating. "Doubtless it is the sadness of abeyant forces." We must do as others do and as they want us to do.

Baroja lives up to the literary tradition in making free use of the term "instinct"; he either is unaware of, or does not care to mention, the numerous assaults that modern psychology has made on it--at least I have been unable to discover any mention of them. The preservation of the ego, that I have dealt with above, he doubtless regards as an instinct, for, he says, "Without doubt his instinct of self-preservation did not warn him of what was threatening him." He calls anarchism, as we have seen, an "instinctive philosophy." He speaks of the "instinct of persecution" in dogs. He has spoken of the sweetness of men "who have not had to develop their aggressive instincts." He says that "Fashion is an outcome of the instinct of imitation that all men have. . . ."

1. 21p131b
2. 2p176f
3. 2p295b
4. 1lp541c
5. 2p325c
He would say that there is a play-instinct, for he does say that playing at buttons is the same as playing at billiards, in spite of the fact that some urbanites may think differently. He has spoken of a "natural sense of art," which is instinct under another name, and again of "the feeling of balance and of harmony that we carry within us." The criticism of the instinct psychology is too well-known to concern us here; it is that the subdivision may be carried to the point where we have an instinct for eating beans, and also that to think of "having" an instinct, that is, of carrying one around, is inaccurate. Baroja uses the term to apply to those activities which are, or which he regards to be, inherited.

I do not think that one can say he is unaware of the verbal difficulty involved in "having instincts."

"...psychology is not made so much on the basis of the phenomenon as on the basis of language," he says. (N.I.)

What he has already said of temperament, character, etc., as "metaphysical distinctions," and of most people's

1. 2p356b 2. 5p38c

I. Nietzsche said much the same of philosophy. Philosophies, he said, revolve from one generation to the next in the same orbit. There is quite a definite scheme of possible philosophies. The interrelation is due to similarities in linguistic forms—in conceptions, say, of the subject. These language forms are in turn the outcome of biological and racial needs. (BG Sec.20.)
thinking as "using the mechanics learned from language," is proof enough that he appreciates the problem.

... a youth of today, in a large city, educated in modern style, does not believe in words -- supposes that they are *flatus vocis*, that they are but noise; but... the primitive masses believe in words. They do not suppose that they are only noises or signs, but that they are forces of Nature.

His belief in heredity seems to hinge on the inheritance of acquired characters. "I must be of a race that has always lived in verdant countries," he writes, "because arid, barren lands stir a great sadness in me." This is a kind of racial memory. "It is not easy to understand why the contemplation of uncultured nature affects one's soul so deeply. There is doubtless in this a residuum of something instinctive and remote." And more significant still, he makes a woman who is half English by descent enjoy the humor of the *Pickwick Papers*, while others of the same household find it harlequinade. He says of himself that his interest in newspapers is probably due to the fact that his father, his grandfather, and his great-grandfather all published small papers; I suppose he is serious, but even so this could be true for other reasons than heredity. We have already considered his opinion about geography as a source and alembic for ideas. The fear of the

1. 1p321cf, Count of Spain
2. 1p79cc
3. 2p375c
4. 1p134
5. 5p275a
supernatural takes two forms, he says: fear of God and fear of the adverse forces of Nature. The one has arisen in a desert people, the Semites, because their living in open spaces gave the idea of unity with a single God ruling over all; the other arose among the Celts, who were a woodland people, neighbors to varied forms of nature, and led to magic, an effort to render malefic forces harmless. (N.I.) Then—and this is what appertains to our present discussion—he adds that he still vaguely fear the things that frightened the Celts: caves, fountains, etc. He says of one of his characters that he "felt the influence of his Irish and French forebears" in his sympathy toward Catholicism. Again he speaks of inheriting religion, strength of character, etc. "Verily all of us have dormant activities in our consciousness from the best to the banefullest. Passion awakes those activities, those slumbering germs, and there is a possibility of new life." Hence we have latent possibilities waiting to be stirred from their sleep; what he says above about "developing aggressive instincts" implies that they, too, are in us and dormant. But he appears to regard those qualities that differentiate us one from another as empirical.

1. 2p351ff  I. This is the sort of broad analysis
2. 4p201c that I refer to as resembling Nietzsche.
3. 4p201ab
4. 9p160b
One sees that every person is a world, as the adage says. Everything is alike to begin with, and yet there is such variety, not only in the accidents, but also in the nature of the problems, that the experience of one person is perfectly useless for the rest.

This differentiation, he implies, takes place principally during childhood.

The years which are for the rest of the world the important ones, the years of serious and grave social life, leave no trace; but those of infancy, those which for the world are naught, leave ineradicable traces.

Intuition, too, is empirical; Haller says of intelligence and intuition,

Essential difference I do not believe there is. At first sight there appears to be; it seems that intelligence is more systematic, more motivated, more considered, and intuition more spontaneous, swifter. Thus of the doctor who makes an exact prognosis it will be said that he has intelligence, and of the nurse of Sister of Charity who makes the same prognosis it will be assured that she possesses intuition; but the two prognoses come from the same source, the background of sharpness of observation which in the professional constitutes a business and in the non-professional a hobby. I, however much I look, do not see any difference between intuition and understanding; the datum of intuition seems to me simpler, less reasoned, not turned into an idea; and the datum of understanding more reasoned and more logical. The one is less elaborate than the other, but the two proceed from the same source. These divisions, these ornate concepts, are the wish to give mysterious appearances to things. (N.I.) The work of intelligence that is not clearly conscious is called intuition. In the man who knows, in the one

1. 9p144ab, Larrañaga
2. 9p191a, Larrañaga

I. Also perhaps because of the feeling that a thing named is a thing understood?
who has read and who has many data of learning garnered in his memory, this supposed intuition appears and is worth something. If he did not know nor had read anything, we should see what this intuition would amount to.

Intelligence in all its forms, however subtle, he evidently believes to be acquired; emotions and impulses to be part of our instinctive, inherited equipment.

But this leads to a dualism, and brings us once more to the door of Immanuel Kant. He agrees with Kant's idea of the mind and the thing-in-itself as separate. Mind is separate from the instinctive, noumenal world, and can therefore never fully understand it. The Count of Spain maintains that the human being is an impenetrable *enigma* (the title of the book is *Humano Enigma*)—that no one can ever know man's true nature or why he exists, much as Locke, Adam Smith, Malthus, and Bentham have philosophized about it. "One doesn't know oneself," says López del Castillo. "For me my sensations have been a constant surprise." It is impossible for one to know oneself—one's aptitudes are always deceptive, says Larrañaga. Instinct is always right, whether it succeeds or fails, says O'Neil; hence a fitness in the order of things, exemplified by instinct, man's most "natural" component. Neither pessimistic nor

1. 13p118f
2. 2p205b
3. 1p324b
4. 8p263bc
5. 12p96c
6. 4p332c
optimistic reasoning can alter the life-urge—it is too fundamental. "In spite of all pessimistic reflections, in spite of seeing that there is no order nor harmony, that all goes by chance, one wants to live, to go on one more day, to see the sun, the clouds, the sky, the stars." In the face of eternity "It is strange that the highest consciousness that there is in the world, which is that of man, should be so swift and fugitive." "There are doubtless as it were purely physical jealousies and other spiritual ones." "One sees how physical memory does not always accompany intellectual memory. Intellectually one knows that in these narrow valleys there is less light than in Madrid, that the vegetation is greener, and nevertheless the reality gives one a surprise." No one but would agree with the fact, but the analysis is open to much question. This dualism of will, or thing-in-itself, and reason, is a reflection of Baroja's three favorite philosophers, Kant, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche; with all three of them so fully in accord on this point it is not strange that he is inclined in the same direction. (N.I.)

Understanding a thing, moreover, is relative to our degree of participation in it. To the person who

1. 12p355b, Larrañaga I. Cf. 15p189b and 190ab.
2. 13p286a, Larrañaga
3. 2p190c
4. 13p181ab
5. 2p171b
inflames himself with action, things appear distorted out of their true proportions (true from the dispassionate point of view). The apperceptive mass functions best for him who is in a quiet mood.

In general, the event when it is recalled is seen completer and smaller than in the moment when it befalls; but one sees that it is necessary, that it is indispensable to see things much magnified and distorted in order to intervene in them energetically; the ideal thing would be to have an alcohol to produce enthusiasm, feverishness, and action, afterward to leave it and retire to solitude and compose the commentary.

Much understanding is a sign of decadence.

When man sees himself with delight—he will hardly regard himself with indifference—he considers himself as a rare and precious copy, full of contrasts; very noble and very base, very angelic and very bestial.

When he begins to behold himself without enthusiasm as an ordinary copy, it is not because of having better and clearer sight, but of having lost illusions and youth.

For the same reason it is easier for others to judge us than for us to judge ourselves; one is seldom aware of one's general character—that is, of the general impression one makes, whether it be one of sadness, mysticalness, or what-not.

On the other hand our apperceptive mass may hinder our understanding a thing. We try when approaching an unfamiliar object to fit it to our prenotion, or "prior image," as Baroja calls it. "Man rejects what does not

1. 2p17
2. 15p112a, Joe
3. 9p119c, Larrañaga
fit his interior scheme of things." To one who has had little experience, say, with mountains, this image is apt to be very limited; and any kind of upland will be just mountain—that is, one will lack the differentiation and discrimination that comes with intimacy.

Here Baroja invokes Wundt's theory or retinal projection. Our notions about people of other nations is a humorous manifestation of these prior images.

I suppose that a Russian is a man with a great beard and a caftan, whi, in case of necessity, eats tallow candles and drinks vodka; that a German is a blond, freckled youth, with dangling legs, with glasses and an aluminum trinket at his belt, or a fat, bearded, and professorial man, and that an Englishman has long teeth and square-cut trousers, and that he says at every step, "Aoh, yes." . . .

Baroja values the inward life and the man of sufficient spiritual enrichment not to be in need of constant peripheral excitation. "That banal type in the city that believes itself intelligent because it repeats the ideas of the newspaper article, and believes itself droll because it knows the jokes of the current musical comedy" is lost in the country. The man who leads "an intense inward life" ((the man who can supply stimuli to himself)) and the churl ((the man who finds in the country all the stimuli he has ever known)) are at home there. Some persons are bored in solitude.

1. 5p78ff
2. 13p152b, Larrañaga
3. 2p19lc
"because they carry their boredom within them." Youth prizes material above spiritual goods--lacks foresight in preferring the evanescent to the everlasting. Had he gone a step farther he might have come out where he did when he spoke of youth as not being so disinterested as age. There he vindicated the preference of youth; here he could do the same: for he could just as easily say that a man by the time he reaches advanced age has had to give up all hope of material gain or pleasure, and so must content himself with immaterial goods.

He recognizes, implicitly, the vividness of recollections stimulated through the olfactory nerves. This arises, I should say, from the comparative rarity of olfactory stimulation--in the human being the nose has become so atrophied in its function that only when the stimulation is extraordinarily strong does any considerable reaction occur. Hence there is not nearly so much interference as with optical stimuli, which are constantly occurring in great intensity. Also perhaps there is another reason--that olfactory stimulation is conditioned by that other most powerful of human stimuli, physical contact.

He attacks a number of psychological superstitions. Genius and madness have no necessary connection, he says.

1. 2p16bc
2. 2p46b
3. 5p106a
In Los Confidentes Audaces he apparently twits the phrenologists, and he does the same with physiognomists who pretend to read character from the eyes. He ridicules the pseudo-psychology that nowadays is vexing our courts of law.

They are ideas that cajole the intellectual populace. Constant transformation, creative evolution, indeterminism—all is very pretty, but has a basis of fantasy. These ideas projected on practical life are somewhat absurd. The bandit who is punished is not the same man who killed or assassinated; neither is the great poet who is laureated. Unfortunately or fortunately, we do not change so rapidly, either in good or in evil. Psychoanalysis belongs to the same lot.

I believe it is nothing; pure verbiage. ... Freud has published books which are collections of anecdotes, stretching them to give them a meaning; with a bit of ingenuity one could give them a different and even contrary meaning.

For me this psychoanalysis has nothing new except the name; it is a long interrogatory, like any other. That the images of dreams, that delusions are motivated, we know. Everything has its motive; but how the motive operates is what we don't know.

... of a hundred dreams one may be interpreted and not the rest. Besides, for diagnosis and treatment that interpretation is worthless.

With psychoanalysis, it is aimed to make of the physician a species of Catholic confessor. The one who invented this thought more about the power the procedure can give than in its therapeutic usefulness. Jewish physicians use every means to attain success. To turn the physician into a priest is quite a logical tendency in a theocratic race like the Jews.

1. Bk. I, Ch. V.
2. 21p169
3. 13p119, Haller
4. 13p113f, Haller
5. 13p117ab, Haller
The analysis of the psychology of the family is of all this what has the strongest Nietzschean flavor. This is how he takes it: There comes first an unexpected upward impetus. The family bends all its energies, consciously or unconsciously, to the attainment of social position. It lives in an illusion of grandeur, which eventually leads, with its continually acting the part of importance, to its being looked up to as important. It makes good marriages and good business alliances, and executes any member that balks it. It "has no caprices nor sentimentalities; it lives to attain its end, with a special strong morality." Then there is the downward-moving family. It loses the morality of its caste--the lady tires of being the queen's lady-in-waiting, the lord cares no more for ceremony and becomes a socialist, the children want to follow their inclinations in mating and in choosing an occupation; in all this the family has become critical of its former morality.

The first part of this might as well be titled "The Will to Power in Families"--the unanalyzed impetus, the purposive morality, and the pretense of greatness all are Nietzschean. The latter part embodies the symptoms of decadence as stated by Nietzsche: criticism, desire for "reality," and non-purposive morality.

1. 12p87ff, Larrañaga
There is another similar generalization:

From what I have seen and read I have thought I observed as it were two extreme positions about life, above all about social life: one, of admiration for the rich, the powerful, the strong; the other of distaste for the rich, the powerful, and the strong. They are like two opposite poles. The first impulse produces the sentiment of aristocracy; the second, that of protest. With the first, one sees that adulation, servility, disdain for justice and equity are joined. This sum of conditions makes the courtier. With the second, with the feeling of protest, are united envy, rancor, haughteur, wrath. This sum of feelings makes the anarchist. I believe that the majority of men, excepting many ordinary people who are as it were the herd, have somewhat of the two impulses.

1. 12p78c, Larrañaga
Sex.

"For the man the two strong drives are food and a satisfactory sex-life." This is a psychological commonplace. But sex in man is at a far remove from the comparatively simple relationships among animals. Fundamentally, "sexual life in man does not differ greatly from the sexual life of other mammals. What complicates it in man is the moral and religious ideas, imagination, and economics." It is with these social implications rather than with a critical or scientific analysis of sex that Baroja is mainly concerned.

He has gleaned more, I surmise, from Schopenhauer than from any other on these matters, and even is willing to concede some reason to Freud, perhaps because Freud follows Schopenhauer. The idea of life as a subliminal force, cardinal in Schopenhauer and Nietzsche and revived in Freud's "subconscious," appeals to him; and sex is the aspect of this life which attends to the business of perpetuating it, and to that end thimblerigs us in the interests of reproduction. Despite our efforts to bridle it, by some fetch it contrives to elude the bit, obtrudes itself in the most unexpected corners, and demands the most perceptive and (I am proclive to think) sometimes the most imaginative eye to spy it out. There

1. 2p 323bc
2. 13p108bc, Haller
is a tendency among Freidians to hypostatize sex, which Baroja has in the main avoided, though he admits he is "convinced of the repercussion of the sexual life in all the phenomena of consciousness." He is not blind to the genuine manifestations of the impulse, however, subtle though they may be. Thus he says of fathers and sons,

These enmities between father and son have a remotely sexual reason; it's the old rooster against the young cockerel.

So it happens that daughters, in whom there is none of this veiled rivalry, have an easier affection for their fathers than sons do.

The presence of sex in art he has already discussed. (N.I.)

Society has done a thorough job of defiling what is not intrinsically bad. "Everything that relates to the sex question in our society is altogether badly organized." It is impossible for the ordinary youth to remain celibate from fourteen to twenty-three. Society gives him prostitution, with the alternative of unbalance. We have seen how fiercely Baroja declared in favor of unbalance: "rather illness, rather hysteria than submission." Morality is easy for the man of means, who can buy prostitution that does not offend the nose. For others there is only mire, and afterward a marriage that is hardly more respectable--

1. 5p81ff
2. 2p412c

I. Page 149.
a continual debasement, a relinquishment of one's personality, a fawning upon one's superior—all this if there is to be sexual satisfaction.

It is society's guardian of the morals, Religion, which has been the chief offender, the real immoralizer: "...the world of vice is ridiculous! If it weren't for religion, that has made vice attractive, it would be so disgraced that everyone would laugh at it." As Nietzsche says, "The preaching of chastity is a public incitement to unnatural practices. Every depreciation of the sexual life, every sullying of it with the concept 'impure,' is the essential crime against life—is the essential sin against Life's Holy Ghost."

Ducks are given a trough of water "which they quickly befoul by wallowing in it, and then drink—a procedure which men frequently employ in their sentimental affairs." But though religion has attempted to repress sex, sex has played a few tricks on religion. Thus we have seen how St. Theresa was the dupe of her ethereal passion, and how many of the tender religious emotions are Eros in disguise:

That road of mystic, Platonic love is a mysterious road. It bears a strange light for guide. For the persons who travel it, reality, proofs, all

1. 5p81ff
2. 2p386c
3. Eccle Homo, Ch. 3, Sec. 5
4. 19p254b
that convinces others, have no existence. Those dupes of love find other higher reasons, other nobler motives to act on, than the rest.

Love will find a way: no truer words were ever spoken.

Sex in its institutionalized form, marriage, is largely a failure. It is, more than this, immoral; for if, as the moral canons hold, the child is the aim of marriage, man and wife should cohabit until pregnancy, and thereafter not again for two years, until the period of lactation is past. It is immoral because it ties two human beings together with an indissoluble knot, and is often the cause of untold misery; in such circumstances, especially in Spain where divorce is almost unprocurable, adultery may be a virtue. It is contrary to nature: the three factors which weigh upon the married couple, "one, the most pressing today, the economic; another, also very important, the social; the third, which hourly is losing its importance, but which still counts greatly, the religious; these three "endeavor to mold nature to their pleasure." Nature, however, favors polygamy, which with these restrictions, is out of the question--male sexuality is uniform, female periodic. There is one answer within marriage itself to the problem--contraception. "Today all the citizenry is beginning to accept this latter point of view. Marriage is leaving its morality to the bushes --and well it may." In order to come to this practice

1. 9pl10a
2. 22pl17ff
3. 5p88ff. See also 15p328
society will have to abandon its immemorial worship of fecundity, which to Baroja is but another superstition. Doubtless it has its raison d'être. Doubtless it and all rigid sexual morality have their justification in social economy; all these maskings and poetizings have come from a social need. But for an individualist like Baroja, for "us who stand for the individual against the state," it is abhorrent. He prefers the individualism of the Malthusians to the race-consciousness of the population enthusiasts.

There has been a modern attempt to change the status of sex, but it has been a reaction, and like most other reactions has gone too far in the opposite direction. In France, especially, with the loss of mystic concepts has come a kind of neo-phallicism, a worship of Eros naked. Larrañaga asks,

"...why this modern cult of Eros?"
"It is not altogether modern. Carlyle, speaking of the French novelists of his time, said that they were aiming to restore the phallic cult. It is natural. It is the road which a non-Christian society has to travel. For the Christians, the entire sexual life is sin, allbad, is wholly inspired by the Devil and has no lawful escape other than marriage. For our present-day erotomaniacs, the real thesis is the contrary: all the sexual life, and even its aberrations, is respectable and full of splendor and interest..."

"With this dignification of eroticism it would be necessary to change the norms of modern life, above all that of honor," said Larrañaga.
"Oh, naturally."

"Then prostitution itself would cease to be the cause of dishonor and opprobrium and would be changed to an almost honorable institution. There might be a prostitution of men for old and ugly women, as there are barbers and bootblacks. Why not?"

"Probably all that erotomania has a fundus of lying and chicanery, and the professor who sings us lyrically the sexual life, if he should find his daughter with a student or with the baker's boy would rouse a scandal."

"With such an extraordinary conception of physical love the opposite ought to occur," replied Larrañaga. "The father ought to be overjoyed to see his daughter with child by anyone."

"That very thing I am accustomed to say to some Freudian acquaintances; and they are wont to answer me that I am behind the times. I reply that I am trying to reason and that phraseology does not convince me."

French eroticism is deliberate:

It seems to me that all that French eroticism is very deceptive. ... In that amatory life of the French there is a background of sensuality, but there is, probably, more curiosity, and desire to give life a bit of spice. Paris at first sight gives the impression that its pleasures are spontaneous, capricious; but at bottom all is quite foreseen, prepared, and combined.

Speaking of Gide's Corydon, Haller says,

It is ridiculous, completely ridiculous. Pederasty offered to Society as a recourse. As if the houses of prostitution were full! The pederasts, offering their bodies to the fatherland. ... I do not believe that it is necessary to kill or brand inverts, but from that to glorification, to the striking of a medal for Pederastic Merit, there is a small gulf.

Spain is for the most part an honorable country.

One clear proof of the small sexual concurrence

1. 13p108f, Haller
2. 13p107bc, Haller
3. 13p106cf
and the honor of women in Spain is the horrid ugliness of our prostitutes. In a country with free sexual relationships, prostitutes like those of Madrid couldn't live; they'd have to devote themselves to the work of honorable women.

Baroja deprecates the attempt of Felipe Trigo to glorify sensuality; speaks of Trigo's "ponderous, labored eroticism" and "total want of grace"; and does not believe he understands female psychology.

In order to devise the proper treatment, it is indispensable to know something more about the nature of the thing we are dealing with.

First and most important of all, it is necessary to realize that sex is purely physiological at bottom; so true is this that the rational side of our nature not only contributes nothing, but is verily an impediment, and needs somehow to be stupefied and removed from the path before sex can have free play.

I believe that, in the majority of cases, with friends and women alike, if one knows them well one doesn't love them; on the other hand, if one loves them one does not know them, and is exposed to grim jest and undeception. Now, which is better? That no one knows.

Without the power of deluding and being deluded, "all sexual relation is somewhat ugly; ...without a little imagination love is nothing but physiology." Though thought and other emotions may hinder it, says Larrañaga, "at bottom one is a sensual man." So self-deception is

1. 22p17a
2. 5p279f
3. 8p94ab, López del Castillo. See also 15p320b
4. 12p42, Larrañaga
5. 9p172c
essential; the thing to guard against is the evil after-effects.

Sexual facts must be recognized and accepted for what they are worth; if unpleasant, we should accustom ourselves to them and not despise or cloak them. "I believe that there is a background of barbarism and cruelty, that is, of health, in every sensual manifestation. But it is not necessary to contemn it." Good and evil have nothing to do with the matter; hygiene and not prayer is the proper purgative for sexual "sins." Society, with this myth of sin, has put the strongly erotic woman in the same class with the strumpet; and accordingly she becomes one. It must be admitted that there are some women whose whole attraction is sexual. "This sexual aura that some women have is but an irradiation of the function of the ovary; it exists also in the females of animals. These uterine women usually are aware of their power and like to inflame the opposite sex." But there is nothing sinful about them. (N.I.)

Finally we must remember that the sex-life means more to women than to men; "woman bends all her energies toward the love-life, but man, on the other hand, by education has other preoccupations, ambitions, and desires

1. 9p75bc, Larrañaga
2. 2p318cf

I. Another psychologist might demand an explanation a little less mysterious than "irradiation" and "aura."
for glory." Women embark on the sexual life more energetically than men, says Larrañaga. A man truly in love is anomalous.

It is now our concern to make the best plan we may, given these limitations; and for once Baroja intermits his criticism and composes a program. Sex, he says, should be naturalized and de-poetized; since sex is really physiological, and Baroja, as we have many times seen, ex-chews hypocrisy and demands appropriateness and naturalness, this is evidently his only possible consistent stand. Cut away the scarf-skin of falsehood and glamor, he says; let the time come when sex can be regarded as dispassionately as alimentary hygiene.

At present there rest on the sexual life first the idea of sin; then the idea of honor; then the fear of syphilis and other sexual diseases; and all this is enmeshed with mystical and literary fictions.

Strip off both the chivalresque trappings and the shabby coat bestowed by modern erotomania.

...neither ought we build on the basis of illusions, such as fidelity and constancy in love, for example; for by thus destroying the free play of the passions, trying to make durable what cannot and ought not be more than transitory, we are also opposing our inward way of life.

Love should become physiological and idealism follow other things. Better frankness in sex than deception. (N.I.)
The answer is free love. Baroja declares he follows Buffon in matters of love: by concentrating on sentimentality man creates a void he can never fill; universal chastity is absurd. As a temporary expedient divorce will have to be made easy (he ought to like Article 43 of the new constitution); easy divorce, then,

"...will be able to pave the way to free union, the most perfect, most ideal form of sexual union, the most favorable for the selection of the species and for the well-being of the individual."

Seen historically, it is evident that the trend of love is toward this prosing of it. In ancient Greece, very great cultivation of friendship led to homosexuality. This tendency to friendship was strengthened by the fact that the woman's status was low, and accordingly heterosexuality was disfavored. With the breaking up of society in the Middle Ages, the social group shrank to the family, and love was substituted for friendship.

Love has been coming to earth since the Eighteenth Century, and now takes the physiological and realistic direction; for this reason (the reason of naturalness) homosexuality is banned. The romantic movement fanned the chivalric flame, but only briefly. Love has become practical, and carries with it social and economic considerations. The sexual function, but no longer chivalric

1. 21p103
2. 22p121c
love, has a high place in a young man's life. I imagine Baroja sees the passing of the old heroic passions with somewhat of regret, when he says disparagingly that modern love and friendship are "pastimes."

The task of emancipating love will be an almost insuperably difficult one. In the first place, it is almost impossible to subject sex in its larger social aspects to laboratory tests and experiment--people are unwilling to have their privacies tampered with. Then it will encounter the opposition of long-established and unfriendly institutions--especially religion. But religion has tried to improve love, and only corrupted it:

It is truly extraordinary that in a world where there are so many horrible things as in ours, the most fearful thing that the priests find to amend is the fact that some girl wears too noticeable a décolletage, or that two sweethearts have kissed in a cornfield.

Besides, they ought to feel that sermonizing is bootless enough, since from the time of Pithecanthropus Erectus to now man's way of being born hasn't varied much.

Baroja has already stated, in speaking of himself, that men of his nervous temperament are not fitted to reproduce. That office should be reserved to healthy men.

1. 2p321f
2. Cf. 5p81f.
3. 2p356a
Women.

From remarks thrown out here and there it will be
tathered that Baroja regards women more as the materi-
alization of sex than as highly differentiated individ-
uals, and that he has in himself, if not misogyn, at
least a trace of gynephobia. In fact, he ridicules (or
did ridicule at an early date) the misogyny of De Mau-
passant, calling a certain work of his "gross, sad,
cynical; it seems written by an irreconcilable woman
hater." And elsewhere,

There is always that ridiculous malice of
reproaching women for being female. It is as if
somewhere on the planet men reproduced themselves
like worms, by fissiparity.

As a rule he is less generous, seemingly resentful of
the position of unimportance which he, as a man, must
occupy; for he is too good a scientist not to realize
what a subsidiary place men hold in the biological sense.
There is a suggestion of this sense of subordination in
the query which he makes as to whether admiration or
compassion for their men is in women the more womanly,
and the conclusion that "it is hard to tell." Hence,
perhaps partly from wounded pride and partly from this
disappointment of having got little at women's hands,
his representations are not usually flattering. Only
occasionally will deep friendship make him say, as of

1. 6p206a
2. 12p115b
3. 4p246b
Dr. Juaristi and his wife, that they are a "perfect pair," and that she is a "lovable wife"; or deep regard for—manly, he would probably say—intellectual qualities make him admire a woman such as his landlady at Cestona. In most of his opinions he is at one with Nietzsche and Schopenhauer.

There are two kinds of women, he says: those men desire to possess and those men like to talk to. We infer from the following quotation that the conversative women are rare to the point of non-existence:

I as a youth in Madrid regarded a young woman of the neighborhood, who was called Lola, as the type of useless, idle, intriguing, erotic, and lickerish woman. Lola was a brunette, olive-skinned, with her face covered with rice powder; whenever she saw a boy and talked with him she caught a fancy, lost her decorum; she was always at the balcony, tossing a note to this one or that one. She treated her father and mother badly, with a rudeness and disdain that made one rebel; with the servants she had some close friendships, alternating with fierce quarrels. I do not believe she ever read anything, except a few society items. She had an enthusiasm for rich men that amounted to vice.

On the street it was all looking hither and yon, and smiling at her pursuer; if, when she was out with her mother, some swanky invited them, Lola showed herself the spirit of over-eagerness and sponging.

After her marriage,

... Lola had had lovers, and her husband, poor devil, knew it. ...

I believed then that this Lola type was an exception in the female kind; afterward I believed it was a variety; today I believe it is almost the entire genus, with some exceptions.

The force of sex levels all women. That instance of the ovary and womb is so strong that it does not let them differentiate themselves well.

1. 2p185cf
2. 2p318b
Baroja then largely agrees with an acquaintance of his
who says, "... between a cocotte and a high lady there
is no difference but this: that when one goes to bed
with a cocotte one pays, and when one goes to bed with
a high lady one doesn't pay."

Certainly it is not strange that married
women who have lovers can be identified with cour-
tesans; neither is it odd that our young women are
so little different from kitchen maids; what is
strange is that the madcap girls of a sanctimo-
nious citizenry like ours should be spiritually
equal to the women of brothels.

The "uterine women" discussed under "Sex" are far in the
majority. Not even with age is this sexual bias lost.
The grotesqueness of elderly women's efforts to appear
young, says Larrañaga, comes from the fact that the
sexual question is of such importance with women as to
require those who still have a taste for the fling to
exert themselves immoderately. Baroja intimates that
many women were nurses during the war to get Sadistic
gratification. (N.I.)

The type of man that women prefer is also proof of
their sexuality; incidentally, that man is totally dif-
ferent from Pío Baroja. With women, he says, success

1. 2p327ff
2. 12p57b
3. 12p275ab
for a man is not of his choosing; either they like him or they don't. But consider whom they are most apt
to like:

Schopenhauer has already said it: the fools
are those who have the greatest success with women.

Plainly, being a bit humble is not the way to
conquer women. It is glitter, power, command, that
seduces the majority of them; the politician, the
general, the orator, the winning citizen, the tenor;
all that attracts attention and brings applause.

A soldier, for you women, isn't a bold and
valiant man, but a blusterer who dresses well and
cuts a pretty figure and has a good-fitting uniform.

"One sees that the simian qualities are qualities appre-
ciated among women," says López del Castillo, speaking of
a certain woman's taste for an apish man.

It is strange... how women feel sympathy and
enthusiasm for bestial, egoistic, and purely animal
men. One sees that they justify them; perhaps be-
cause they find them very much like themselves.

The hero of La Sensualidad Pervertida found that to have
a way with the ladies he lacked the beard and the disdain.

In fine, it is not a man's conversation that interests
them, nor his ability, nor his gallantry; it is his fitness
to reproduce; the rest is merely admixture. But these
faults are not peculiar to women: rather they inhere in
the nature of sex.

1. 1p1lab
2. 1lp28b, one of the Bohemians
3. 12p77cf, Larrañaga
4. 9p118b, Larrañaga
5. 8p81c
6. 13p299, Larrañaga
7. 21p392
8. 2p60c
the majority (of us women) are ridiculous, egoistic, stupid, vain, always imagining to ourselves that the man who looks at us from whim or for diversion is a hero, above all if he is handsome. We are completely foolish, says Pepita; to which Larrañaga replies,

Bah! Same as men. We also are egoistic, stupid, and vain; we also believe that a woman we like, because her eyes are blue or black, is an angel. They are the same sexual mirages, and beyond these sexual mirages there is nothing but chill, haze, and ash.

Female philosophy centers around the umbilicus. Woman is that "volatile sex which, in another day, according to Schopenhauer, had long hair and short ideas, and which, from then to now, if it hasn't visibly increased in ideas, has plainly decreased in hair." Women have no talent for ideas.

I have never believed much in the culture of women. Scrape away at the duchess or at the aristocrat and there appears the same woman as the washerwoman or the fishwife, with the same spirit and the same combination of good and bad things. Baroja always seems to pine for a woman of good conversation, but they are much too few. "...like other women, ...discussing little or badly," says Larrañaga. Women cannot play the game of disinterested argument as men can; if worsted they take their defeat personally to heart, and if they admit they have made mistaken premise it is for other reasons than a desire to be logical.

1. 13p70
2. 2p393
3. 12p66b, Joe
4. López del Castillo, 8p159c
5. 9p35
6. 9p34bc
They do not know how to play the game and abide by the rules:

As for women in Spain and in full youth, one can't tell what they are. You put on the air of a disdainful princess and one can't tell whether your disdain hides pride, insignificance, or simply stupidity.

They are all for expediency: "It is evident that women have't an idea of dignity," thinks Larrañaga after seeing Pepita's willingness to make up with her contumelious husband. They prefer faith to reason: "Only a woman can believe in that way, on someone's word," says Roberto, speaking of a certain woman's willingness to subsidize a man of whose ability she knew nothing.

Pepita, the heroine of the Agonías, is made to differ at every step from Larrañaga, the author's prolocutor; she has few or no intellectual interests, and we may regard her as Baroja's conception of the typical female. Women's interest is in trifles:

They ((the Bohemian artists)) had, like women, the fondness for complicating life with trifles and pettinesses, the need to live and grow in an atmosphere of murmuring and intrigue.

But by this same token they are often able to deliver a saner judgment than men: not drawing their conclusions from premises, but from things, they are less apt to go wide of the truth, especially in little matters. Thus

1. 12p27bc, Larrañaga
2. 13p184ab
3. 11p31b
4. 11p22c
when Larrañaga mentions his disappointment at discovering that not every porter and chambermaid in Paris was interested in art, Pepita replies, "What absurdities men think of at times! Such a thing as that would never have entered a woman's head."

Larrañaga agrees: "That is true. You are planted more in the center of life...that instinctive sense of living, that poise that you have, many men lack."

Woman's attitude toward woman is an instance: she idealizes womankind, and derogates women; men are more logical and derogate both in generalities and in particulars. But after all, women do not need to depend on their intellectual gifts; face and figure are at a higher premium:

I realize that a pretty woman is somewhat superior to a man even though he be talented. Beauty is one of the most evident, most palmary things. The man if he has talent has to demonstrate if others are to believe it, and does not always find the happy occasion. Not so a handsome woman.

Spanish women (and the tone of these remarks implies others, too)

...are principally instinctive, and all that is a side from their function seems to them useless and risky. That is why they are so reactionary and conservative. Their ideal is to make a nest, and for that one needs a strong bough. An unsteady and upturned society is for them uncongenial; and what could be so unsteady and upturning as thought! They vastly prefer

1. 12p31
2. 12p56cf
3. 12p26c, Larrañaga
The emancipation of women has brought a good many changes, but no improvements, culturally speaking. They "are dispensing with old formulas of courtesy and politeness and taking on a freer air, but they are not substituting something new for what they leave behind."

There is another field of culture besides the intellectual, for which women are reputed to have greater aptitudes—the artistic; but Baroja questions even this. If artistic ability is based, as it generally is, on sensitiveness, women are not so responsive as men, for contrary to popular belief they are less sensitive than men.

All that refinement of the women of the great cities is foolishness, superstition. Eating, dressing, and having a lover. The truth is that collectively women are nowpoetical.

Individually there are admirable exceptions; but the sex in block is a bit terre a terre. Writers, of course, need to poetize women collectively. All of us instinctively poetize them, whether we will or not. It is the natural impulse; but it is not the truth. ... The romantic man forges a type of woman that he never verifies.

"It is strange how small an amount women understand about beauty," says Larrañaga. It is mode rather than beauty with them.

Much as Don Pío assails the shortcomings of women,

1. 2p60cf
2. 2p326c
3. 19p185bc
4. 12p41, Larrañaga
5. 12p45a
it is plain he would not have them other than they are; there is here that same \textit{amor fati}, the love of things as they are and must be, that permeates the whole of his thought. It is not so bad, he says, for men to care for insignificant women as for women to care for insignificant men.

In home life, generally speaking, the woman does not need to have either much worth or much intelligence; but the man does; he needs to have them in some cases. I believe that a woman can make her home with a fool, with an untalented man, and with an extraordinary man. On the other hand a man can make his home with a foolish woman and with an untalented woman, but with an extraordinary one—that is impossible.

We remember what he said about the dreadfulfulness of having a gifted woman as witness to one's vulgarities. Literary women "are, in general, garrulous, pedantic; they lack simplicity." Pardo Bazán was "a woman of talent; but ponderous, without originality, without grace. Her spirit was as slim and sprightly as her body." It maybe all right for women to have intellectual curiosity; but poetry as the only outlet is banal.

To what extent men may be culpable for forcing women into the faults they condemn, as Sor Juana Inés says is true, he does not consider. It is the vogue among contemporary anthropologists to minimize the in-born differences between the sexes, and attribute what dissimilarities do develop to the social medium. Baroja

1. 13p233, Larrañaga
2. 12p69a
leans to the other interpretation: there is a fundamental, intrinsic lack of understanding between men and women, he says; the inference is obviously that their natures are entirely disparate. (N.I.) He recognizes that women are not to blame for their faults, but would probably lay the blame at the door of their nature rather than at that of the environment.

For Baroja the converse is true--women retain their characteristics despite the environment.

...women accustomed from childhood to submitting and concealing their desires have, when they disclose their hidden energies, an extraordinary power and vigor.

"That women should be afraid of adventure seems all right to me; but that they should be afraid of passion seems bad." "Because that is contrary to Nature." Society does ill in attempting to restrain the impulse--not that the social and economic demands are to be ignored, however; men do not ignore them, in spite of the prevailing notion that "when a man looks with enthusiasm on a woman, if she were to say, 'Let's go where you will,' the man, without ado, mad with joy, would open his arms." Society has imposed economic factors which have to be recognized. It is understandable, says Baroja, why women wage such a war of conquest in love--marriage settles so many question, economic, sexual, social, etc.

1. 21p317  I. In part contradicted, 19p185.
2. 11p126b
3. 13p191f, Larrañaga
4. 2p324b
Religion with women is an offshoot of egoism: they prepare for the hereafter as they prepare for a trip to their summer villa. But more than egoism, sex is foremost here, as elsewhere. The Jesuit, he has already said, manages women, through his control of the strings of the sexual life. Mysticism is also sexual: in Spanish women love outside marriage becomes mystic and idealistic or sensual and tragic. There is a conflict even among more practical women. They try to dance to the priest's tune and at the same time live up to the modern standards of attracting the male. So they display their charms to youths who are not interested in display but in the economic aspects of marriage, and try to be flirts and pietists at the same time. Spanish women take their flirting with the usual religious seriousness.

Women are, we conclude, because of their function, their want of intellectuality, and their egoism, closer to nature than men. They are more "immanent" than men:

This means, to my way of thinking, that woman's end is in herself, she serves for herself, and we. (men) devote ourselves to things and make ourselves as it were their servants. The woman who feels she is pretty does not feel any social degradation in the company of a negro, while a man, on the other hand, feels belittled if he accompanies a negress.

1. 2p327b
2. 5p183bc
3. 2p324bc
4. 2p334ff
5. 12p56b, Larrañaga
This closeness, and with it the supreme justification of whatever woman may be, is, as I have said, what Baroja seems to resent; it dashes his ego. "In general," he admits, "the life of the woman is much more serious and strong than that of the man." The life of the genius may be more intense than that of any woman, but with ordinary couples the woman holds much the higher place—her parturition, for instance, is much more an event than anything that happens in her husband's life. It is for this reason that Baroja believes matriarchy may be the outcome after all opportunity for masculine heroism is gone. Up to now woman's social strength has consisted chiefly in her being compelled, in her relegation to the kitchen and the nursery, to wield a furtive and evasive power. Secularize her, he says, and give the force a chance to work in daylight.

1. 13p234, Larrañaga
2. 22p11ff
Religion.

The first trick of the religionist, and indeed of anyone who has a theory to peddle, is to make his view transcendent, to make its values subsume all other values, to make it appear the form and substance of the universe. In this treatment it will be seen that Baroja subordinates religion to various other points of view—social, historical, pragmatic, and so on; he makes it step down from its pedestal. He shows furthermore that even the religionists use religion for extraneous ends; that it is ancillary even with them.

I think Baroja admires the Christianity of the first Christian; he is humanitarian, and all that Christianity holds of brotherhood, care for the sick and lowly, and interest in humble things, would naturally attract him (though he deprecates humility, he is nevertheless attracted by it). One catches him off his guard when he speaks of there being no necessary relation between religion and morality: "Neither religion nor irreligion brings, in itself, goodness, love, or benevolence toward others." This tells plainly what he considers to be morality. There is little in the state of affairs he would like to see on earth that conflicts with Christianity; Christian individualism and insistence

1. 2p277b
on inner peace are both his own doctrines. There is only a slight tinge of aristocracy, of desire for an intellectual caste, that interferes; and even with it one feels that he would like to see all men belong to that caste. In the Gran Torbellino del Mundo he makes Larrañaga say that if all were like Soledad, willing to share their possessions with the poor, the social problem would disappear. But he will show how Christianity has been perverted to other ends and made the instrument of classes and cabals fundamentally un-Christian, by men who, like Fausto's friends in The Last Romanticists, have "professed a special kind of militant Catholicism that had in it more vestry than church and more church than faith, and of whom it could be said beyond a doubt that they were anything but Christian."

The basis of his enmity toward the Christianity that goes by that name is to be found, I think, in his own troubled emotional experiences, especially those relating to Christian morality and its repressive effect on him, which we have considered in the discussion of his life. He since then has found another reason, the disennobling influence of Christianity, especially on his own Basque race. He is happy that Vasconia withstood

1. 12p74b
2. 14p153bc
the surge of Christianity as long as it did: "It is an honor for us." "If the Basque race, instead of receiving in its heart a ruinous, caduous, and dead doctrine such as Catholicism, had breathed an atmosphere of freedom and thought, perhaps it would have given ripe fruits to civilization." In this he is one with Nietzsche: in pining the things that might have been had the world not encumbered itself with a weight that could only drag it down; and here, in religion and its famulus morality, Baroja shows most plainly the effects of Nietzsche, especially the Nietzsche of the Antichrist, which I have no doubt he has read thoroughly. In Spain as a whole he sees decadence for which Catholic fanaticism has been largely responsible. But he is not blind to the fact that if Christianity is to be blamed for the world, the world is no less to be blamed for Christianity. "If the Spanish priest is fanatical and despotic, it is because the Spaniard is"; and "...underneath the Spaniard the priest always peeps out."

His wrath spends itself against the doctrine, however; it does not reach to personal animosity. He says he is not a violent anticlerical; he asks only to be let alone by the clericals. Priests "may be hypocrites,

1. 16p147bc
2. 16p168ab
3. 2p277cf
4. 2p336c
boors, charlatans, lovers of domineering; but not tipplers. Their defects are the defects of the country and of the dogmas they defend." He is too good a determinist to censure individuals, although naturally he has less liking for the clergy than for others, they being higher on the scale of responsibility for Christianity.

As to his own religion, Baroja classifies himself as a pagan. Speaking of a Protestant parson, he says, "when one approaches spirits of this class, that is when one discovers all the pagan one is without intending to be"; and after making some observations about Christianity he was misquoted, and wrote the following letter:

Bilbao, December 16, 1917.

Don Francisco Villanueva, Director, The Liberal, Bilbao.

Dear Friend:

In the "Cuartillas de un alaüe," which The Liberal publishes, there is the erratum, to me important, of saying "sensitive myths" where I had put "Semitic myths." If it were sensitive myths, I should certainly not be an enemy of it. Of the Semitic myths, and particularly of the Christian myth, I am hardly a partisan. About that one Nietzsche said—and his phrase gives me great inward satisfaction—that it was not European or noble. When I think about christianism there come to my imagination the Ghetti, scrofula, mange, and priests. I remain your affectionate friend and pagan.

1. 2p245ff  2. Cf. 1p227  3. 2p37bc
I. I surmise, from this remark and others about Roman culture, that he admires it deeply. So did Nietzsche, who regarded the Roman empire as the grandest effort of mankind to affirm the noble and manly traits of its nature, and to whom Rome's corruption by Christianity was one more score against a religion that already had too many to its discredit. "The Romans! Instinctive nobility, instinctive taste, methodic research, the genius of organization and administration, faith, the will to the future of mankind, the great yea to all things materialized in the imperium Romanum, become visible to all the senses, grand style no longer manifested in mere art, but in reality, in truth, in life.--And buried in a night, not by a natural catastrophe! Not stamped to death by Teutons and other heavy-footed vandals! But destroyed by crafty, stealthy, invisible anaemic vampires!" (A Sec.59)

But Baroja does not feel that the Latin peoples have been irreclaimably corrupted. Though Christianity, to dominate the heroic races of Southern Europe, the "most mettlesome, energetic, hardy races on earth," from which "all the great heroes have sprung," had to "inoculate them with its Semitic virus," this virus did not sap them, but became a weapon for their greater strength. It is only the interpenetration of German and Slav that has mollified their spirit--which will be completely mollified "when Slavic predominance comes to Europe." But they are yet capable of burning a Bruno. Though these men commune, yet "they are human, all-too-human, as Nietzsche would say." "There is yet much fire in the hearts of these God-eaters."

(5p61f) I have a suspicion that Baroja here simply had a bright idea and put
Now to his definitions:

"I believe that religion is an interpretation of Nature with its subsequent discipline. I do not believe that it honors, nor do I believe either that it detracts." ((Larrañaga.))

"Hm! Seems to me you are in the company of the atheists," ((Stolz)).

"Rather among the agnostics, It is undoubtable that no one can look above himself. Religion seems at times to be very high; at times one sees it very low. I do not know whether it is perfectly exact, but I have framed a theory about historical religions which I suppose, naturally, is probably not new."

"Let's have it."

"I suppose that there are two branches in mature, philosophical religions: One, which has as its foundation pantheism and monism. The first discovers great contrasts: God and the devil, good and evil, light and dark, spirit and matter, soul and body; the second fuses everything, and hardly owns a God. The first it seems to me is born in the peoples of Oriental Europe and Asia near Europe, in countries where the Semites predominate. It is an ardent, optimistic religion of men of action, with a God who commands and exacts. The other is born in Central Asia: it is a colder, more philosophical, pessimistic religion of contemplative people, and it may be said that it does not have a God, because Nature in it is as if divine."

"There is no question that you, if you were to profess some religion, would be with the second."

"Surely."

As to Zoroaster, Larrañaga says he is midway.

The strong, exigent, and demandant God of the Semitic religions is not found, but the exaggerated dualism of good and evil does exist. The monistic

1. 13p173b Note cont'd from page 321. It down; for it is certainly not consistent with the recriminations that Christianity elsewhere suffers at his hands. Perhaps he might consistently say that Christianity absorbed the German and Slavic spirit, and then did its deviltry. That was in part Nietzsche's opinion.
tendency, in which the natural and the divine are commingled and considered as one same thing, I believe spontaneously produces magic and afterward science; on the other hand the dualistic tendency: above, God, below, the earth, at one side the light, at the other, darkness, produces dogmatic, fanatical religion, the idea of the dependence of man on his God.

I hardly need to point out how much of Dionysianism there is in this monistic religion. Buddhism I think is unquestionably the Asiatic religion he has in mind; and Buddhism was the closest approach to Dionysianism; it was the "tragic culture." (N.I.) It "hardly owns a God," says Baroja. "The concept 'God' was already exploded when it appeared," says Nietzsche. It is "colder, more philosophical," says Baroja. "... it is part of its constitutional heritage to be able to face problems objectively and coolly, it is the outcome of centuries of lasting philosophical activity," says Nietzsche. It is "pessimistic," says Baroja, and Nietzsche tells of the "excessive 'objectivity'" in the race, that Buddha had to mend by a return to egoism.

And Christianity for both is a religion of contrasts and passions. Buddha "invents means whereby the habit of contrary ideas may be lost," says Nietzsche. Now there is nothing remarkable, if Buddhism really is all these things, in their being discovered by two men; but

I. See BT Sec.18.
that this brief summary of Pío's should coincide with an equally brief summary in the Antichrist (one paragraph, Sec. 20), does constitute somewhat of a parallel. Let us continue the consideration of origins:

When the author of Zarathustra compares Christianity with Buddhism, he makes one of those observations of his that are always full of his great psychological penetration. Buddhism, according to him, was developed in an excessively elaborated race, of hyperaesthetic sensibility, a late and old race that turned good, sweet, and spiritual. (N.I.) It did not happen the same with Christianity; arisen from the subterranean, as Nietzsche says, (N.II.) from the den of slaves and of races held as degraded, it had to make itself mistress of the barbarian hordes of central Europe, it had to sway them, and to inculcate into the society of the time the morbid fanaticism of the Semite, his cruelty and his materialism, had to accept from the barbarian Goths his pride of caste, brutality, and insensitiveness. (N.III.)

Africa is the cradle of religious fanaticism, which has been propagated by the Semite:

... the European is doubtless a skilled mechanic, a good scientist, an excellent watchmaker, a perfect cyclist; but in the matter of religions he cannot compete with the Semites. Luther, Calvin, St. Ignatius, General Booth, are ridiculous beside Moses or Mohammed. ... The European is all right in his sense of the relative; of the scientific; but when he waxes enthusiastic and tries to press on to the dogmatic, to the absolute, and to become grandiloquent, he turns ridiculous. In that matter a ragged Moor is better than he. (N.IV.)

1. 4p320b
2. 13p175b, Larrañaga
Christianity emphasizes, but adds nothing to, Judaism. (N.I.) "Neither do I understand," says Larrañaga, "how the good, enlightened Christian can be an anti-Semite. It is like a man's being an enemy to his father." (N.II.) Christianity has Semitized the world. The worst part of Christianity "is the Judaic sediment it carries—that putrid mire of a sensual and fanatical race."

In the compromise with the barbarian races many pagan elements had to be retained. Thus Baroja speaks of a "pilgrimage, in the height of summer," which "is seen to be a remembrance of the Cult of the Sun."

From the first, Christianity has thriven on falsehood—from the first, because Christianity began with the Jews, and the Jews were the arch-falsifiers of everything. "Religion lives on falsehood." He has already mentioned in the letter above the "Semitic myths." In another place he says, "We carry too much useless ballast to be light, agile, and inventive; we bear the weight of all the Semitic myths, those myths which, as

1. 2p89bc, Larrañaga
2. 13p176cf.
3. 2p351a
4. 4p282a
5. 2p281bc
6. 5p30

I. Christianity "is not a counter-movement against the Jewish instinct, it is the rational outcome of the latter, one step further in its appalling logic." (A sec. 24.)

II. "...their ((the Jews')) ultimate influence has falsified man kind to such an extent that even to this day the Christian can be anti-Semitic in spirit, without comprehending that he is himself the final consequence of Judaism." (A Sec.24.)
Nietzsche says, are neither European nor noble. . . ."

(N.I.) The whole corpus of Christianity is, for Baroja and morality, even its literature—an enormous inversion and perversion of all true values. Take one of its old wives' tales, for instance; "Jesus died for me." Baroja calls it "religious verbiage." Nietzsche says, "He died for his sins—and no matter how often the contrary has been asserted there is absolutely nothing to show that he died for the sins of others." Another is miracle-working; Baroja says that theurgy "won't do for anyone but Bushmen, Hottentots, and Catholics—who are in the main honorable Hottentots." And it retains its mendacity in the form of hypocrisy. (N.II.) Nietzsche felt that the priests of today were too wise to believe the fables they taught; so they were compelled to pretense. Baroja speaks of "...the habit of hypocrisy acquired in the Seminary," and writes of a priest who was director of a house of prostitution.

He attacks some of the lies separately.

There is the sanctity of the Bible. Nietzsche did retain some admiration for the Old Testament; but Baroja despises it all; "...the Bible and its disagreeable

1. 2p72b I. This is Nietzsche's "burden-bearer," concept.
2. 2p83bc II. Where the Church is powerful the people
3. A Sec.27 are hypocrites. (2lp108.)
4. 2p208a
5. 6p160c
6. 15p299ab
7. 4p208c
Belief in a future life is wish-thinking, and the assurance and security with which religion would surround so hazardous a thing as life is pure fiction.

"But you are sure that there is not another life?" asked Pepita.
"How could I be! Neither am I sure that there aren't men on the moon or on the sun."
"But then, don't you believe in another life?"
"Not I."
"But if there isn't another life we're playing the fool."
"Bah! Not so. You haven't done so ill here. For many centuries there have been men who have realized that all their ideas and all their concepts were but human measures."

Here Larrañaga repeats Protagoras, and continues,

"All that is done by man and for man. So having a great idea of man seems to me a naiveté."
"Speaking with you one feels dizzy."
"You are right," said the duchess to Pepita.
"The fact is that everything is chaotic. Our ideas are made of the same stuff madness is made of. We are crossing an abyss on a loose rope. We are surrounded with chaos and do not know how to leap from it."

Universal harmony is another of the legends.
"There are people who have hunger and nothing to eat, and people who have something to eat and no appetite . . . . This great harmony of life leads some to believe that there is a Providence and others to make conservative politics so that such a gratifying state of

1. 2p37
2. 13p205f
affairs may not be lost."

When he spoke to me of the Great Architect of the Universe I said to him that probably the only one in the heavens was a modest and besides very slothful dabbler in masonry."

The idea of sin is another essential lie. Moral conditions are social and inevitable; in a deterministic world the whole scheme of repentance and atonement is a ridiculous delusion. "I do not feel a Christian, because I do not feel a sinner," says Larrañaga; "I do not believe in sin. To tell the truth, my head won't hold the idea that I can be better or worse. My moral conditions seem to me so inevitable that I find it impossible to modify them." (N.I.) Knowing more about "sins" than men formerly knew, we are beginning to understand that their basis is physiological, not moral. Sexual sins and other sins are coming to be treated by hygiene instead of prayer and preaching. (N.II.) "We shall

1. 12p34cf.
   Larrañaga
2. 8p112b
   López del Castillo
3. 13p205a
4. 2p519b

I. "Men were thought of as 'free' in order that they might be judged and punished--in order that they might be held guilty. . . ." (11p42)

II. "He ((Buddha)) understands goodness--being good--as promoting health. Prayer is out of the question, as is also asceticism. . . ." (A Sec.20.)

"What is Jewish morality, what is Christian morality? Chance robbed of its innocence; unhappiness polluted with the idea of 'sin'; well-being interpreted as a
surpass, we already have surpassed the idea of sin..." says Baroja. One thing he cannot understand about Protestants is their interest in sin: "...like all Protestant parsons...much inspired by the Bible. They like Biblical personages because they sin and repent." But why, he asks, since we do not believe in sin, should we be unduly interested in sinners? Nietzsche answers the question: "From the psychological standpoint, in every society organized upon a hieratic basis, 'sins' are indispensible: they are the actual weapons of power, the priest lives upon sins, it is necessary for him that people should 'sin.'" And in another place Baroja agrees in regarding religion and the concurrent idea of sin as the weapons of the priest. The priest has his back to the wall, he says; he sees science killing religion inch by inch, and desires to enforce his command as long as he may; so he preaches ignorance, and his flock, not knowing how to read, keep up the old superstitions of heaven and hell, and not understanding hygiene, suffer from disease. That sin is the priest's weapon is nowhere better evidenced than in his horror of the ethical heretic. "Vicious, but completely normal"—that is "the kind of anticlerical the priests like." Godly atheists are too devilishly

1. 5p36 Note cont'd from page 328. danger, as a 2. 2p37 'temptation'; physiological indisposition 3. A Sec. 26 poisoned by means of the canker-worm of 4. 2p275ff conscience. ..." (A Sec. 25.) 5. 2lp83
unmanageable. The religious "experiences" touted by illuminists and other self-dupes Pío disposes of quite summarily. Many of them are sexual. "I believe that in mystic love the same thing occurs, and that St. Theresa thought about Jesus more with her ovaries than with her head."

On an altar in the transept, sculptured in marble, is seen a group which represents the ecstasy of St. Theresa. Caesar contemplated the group reflectively. The saint is a precious child, leaning backward in a sensual spasm; her eyes are closed, her mouth half-open, and her jaw slightly contorted. Before the swooning saint stands a little angel who smilingly threatens her with a dart.

"Well, how does it look to you?" said Kennedy.

"It's admirable," exclaimed Caesar. "But this is a bedroom scene with the lover slipped away." (N.I.)

The priest unhesitatingly improves this sexual advantage. "The Jesuit manages the women (of San Sebastián)—a thing which is not difficult, holding the strings of the sexual life...." The non-religiousness of men is due to this lack of sexual attraction. (N.II.)

1. 2p317b
2. 17p177
3. 5p183
4. 21p55

1. "The passion for God!... In many cases it appears curiously enough, as the disguise of a girl's or youth's puberty; here and there even as the hysteria of an old maid, also as her last ambition. The church has frequently canonized the woman in such a case. (BG Sec. 50.)

II. In order that love may be possible, God must be a person. In order that the lowest instincts may also make their voices heard God must be young. For the ardour of the women a beautiful saint, and for the ardour of the men a Virgin Mary has to be pressed into the foreground." (A Sec.23)
The basal untruth of Christianity is also to be found in its sophistry, in its willingness to shift its grounds, gathering up the crumbs from the table of science. It has tried, for instance, to turn the modern notion of immateriality in science to its own account, thinking thereby to enhance the value of "spirit."

Vain hope. Materialism "is more than a philosophical system; it is a scientific procedure that does not accept fantasies or caprices."

The jubilations of the friarkins, thinking that matter may not exist, also turns against their own theories. For if matter didn't exist, what could God have created?

Catholicism has capitalized ignorance, which is not surprising, considering the illiterate and boorish crew that most priests are. After being insulted by one of them, Baroja says, "What is always to be praised is the sentiment of delicacy, tact, and courtesy that the people of the church always show."

It is a religion for children. Hugo, one of the characters in the Human Enigma, thought, on seeing the soldiers make a rude cross of a knife and bread crusts, that "the mentality of these men was likely not much different from that of the soldiers of the Middle Ages."

There are many child-minds left: "...to me, all that about heaven, hell, and sin seems childishness, but I

1. 5p29
2. 2p76b
3. 1p243bc
understand its being accepted," says Larrañaga. Baroja has already spoken (N.I.) of how the priest sees that keeping his flock in ignorance is to his advantage.

Ignorance and accompanying self-delusion are necessary qualities in the religionist. "Religions are unquestionably created by types of visionaries, the hallucinated, feterish, exalted." "He ((Hume)) said that they were the *phantasmagorical imaginings of semi-human monkeys." "The woman or the man clausured in the convent is a sorry mummer who sacrifices himself to do something that seems right to him... how horrible for woman! The sham of charity and goodness with the heart cankered with rancor and envy... the footsteps of the nuns who leave their cells to foregather and repeat a few senseless words..."

So asceticism is another thing of religious gulls. But conventual life need not be so dull for the woman of great faith, for possibly one carries within oneself what imprisonment one suffers.

Christianity is a religion of contrasts and conflict. Perhaps Baroja's feeling this so keenly is caused by the inner conflict that Christianity bred in him. He appreciates Nietzsche's analysis of Christianity as the

1. 9p208b
2. 13p176, Larrañaga
3. 3p43
4. 3p43ff
religion of envious slaves, and often repeats Nietzsche's phrase, "Christian rancor." "Also in asceticism and in Christian morality there is a basis of rancor, not altogether, as Nietzsche has alleged, but certainly to some extent." Writing in 1902 of Benavente's *Alma Triunfante*, he says, "Christian life originates conflict. If among all the personages there were one genuinely 'triumphant soul,' the conflict would be resolved forthwith." I have no doubt he was thinking of Nietzsche when he punned on the title of the Nietzschean "free spirit" who is above clash and strife. In their attitude toward their enemies the priests never think of persuasion, but only of expulsion; they have forgotten the example of St. Francis of Assisi.

Christianity is and has been in many ways a pernicious influence in society.

It has stolen away happiness. "Irún is a happy town, with pretty girls who laugh a great deal." But as one goes toward Navarre, "the girls do not laugh so much and the influence of the priest is greater." He has spoken elsewhere of the gloom that hangs about the Church--its bell-tolling and somberness. "The executioner has been a hero, somewhat somber, but nevertheless a hero for monarchy and for Religion."

How much misery have religious wars not caused!

1. 1p197c
2. 6p221b
3. 2p76
4. 2p188a
5. 1p170b
It has polluted sex. (N.I.) It considers all physical love as lust, and so has corrupted it. It has led to innumerable misfits, since the question of eugenics does not trouble it at all. What it wants is some sacrament to conceal the thing it has condemned; so it invents marriage. "From the moment the priest bestows his blessing on the married couple, the spermatozoon is bishoped, ceases to be an outcast, and marches with frock-coat, white cravat, and operahat to fertilize the ovum in a respectable way." But much as the Church has done to reprobate the sexual impulse, it has not fully succeeded; some of the older ideas hand on. "...everybody laughs at spinsters, and would laugh at bachelors if he weren't aware that for a man it is easy to vault a good many things without injury to reputation." So a conflict is induced—celibacy is both good and bad; this confusion of ideas on the subject of sex is rampant.

It bars the door to progressive thought. For science, the problem of origin may always be opened anew; for religion, a new idea is something to oppose. There are no heretics in science.

It has accentuated unjust social divisions,

1. 2p319f I. Christianity gave Eros poison to drink; he did not die of it, certainly, but degenerated to Vice." (BG Sec. 168.)
To be sure, segregation has existed in all races, but in none so strong as in the Aryan. The feeling of aristocracy, the cult of the purity of blood, both are Aryo-Christian.

Feudalism, a condition of this way of thinking, has dominated solely the countries inhabited by the central European hordes converted to Christianity. The exaltation of some peoples, through so fantastic a notion as the purity of blood, naturally had to bring contempt for other peoples. So, while the medieval Christian world filled with counts, barons, knights, and nobles, at the margin was being formed the heap of detritus with the despised races, the Moriscoes, the Gypsies, the Agotes, the Cagots, the Chuetas, the Marranos, the Colliberts, the cowherds.

The brilliant world and the horrid world both came from the same Aryo-Christian myth: the purity of blood.

"Only a religious fanaticism," he says, could lead to the implacable enmity of Basque for Agotes.

How many ignoble ends Christianity has subserved! It has been a handy mask for many men's villainy. Politicians, for instance, get all the plunder they can, and then later all they need to do is "have a little conversion...and give a little money to the priest," and even their having stolen from the Church will be forgiven.

(N.I.) Speaking of liberals and Carlists, he says, "The same atrocities were committed whether in the name of the Constitution or in the name of Our Lord Jesus Christ."

The state has exploited it unconscionably. Catholicism,

1. 2p256ff I. "...the principal Catholic faith
2. 2p263b is money." (21p170c.)
3. 8p118ab, López del Castillo
4. 8p229bc, López del Castillo
especially in the Latin countries, seems only to dye
nationalism a deeper hue; and absolutism in particular
has used it. It makes its devotees meek and docile.
Freedom of thought destroys this transigence: "...an
atheist may be a sage, but not a good soldier," remarks
the Count of Spain, himself a general and in a position
to know.

But worst of all its thraldom has been its subserviency to the despised bourgeoisie. What disgusts Pío
is the turning of the religious ideas of heaven, hell,
and sin into a weapon for this class, "stolid, egoistic,
and rapacious."

Are they to kill an innocent? There you go to pacify him so he won't cry out or complain, or disturb the digestion of our esteemed proprietors. Is there a war? There you (he is talking to a Jesuit) are to bless the machine-guns and the poison-gases and sing the Te Deum...; the only thing you accomplish is that the manure isn't disturbed and that temporarily there is less fetor; but in the long-run the mess stinks. (N.I.)

They have so usurped religion that a tramp is no more welcome in a church than in a business-house. "In the house of God, where all are equal, it is a crime to go in and rest...," says Manuel, in Mala Hierba, after being handed over to the police by a sexton.

1. 13p104. Lópe del I. Christianity is an ingenuous at-
tempt at bringing about a Buddhistic
2. 6p161b. movement in favor of peace sprung
3. 1p259b. from the very heart of the resenting
4. 9p208c. Larrañaga mass... but transformed by Paul
5. 1p232b. into a mysterious pagan cult, which was ulti-
mately able to accord with the whole of State
organization... and which carries on war,
Occasionally Baroja engages in calm dispute with religious doctrines, treating them as he would any other philosophic idea. In such a mood he approaches mysticism, to refute it. It is based, he says, on the belief in final causes, which has no support in positive science. Proving God and religion is another. It is absurd to attempt it, he says. Time, space, and causality have received such telling blows that the "proofs" based on them--the "watch argument," for instance--have been upset. Faith spreads by contagion, not by proof. One example is worth more than a mountain of books on theology.

Anti-Catholicism does not at all mean pro-Protestantism with Baroja; he is even disposed to defend Catholicism when in Protestant company. He resents especially the fact that Protestantism has perverted the history of the North, so that every Spanish misdeed is written in blood against Spain, while the atrocities of the Protestants are ignored or justified." "...Protestantism seems distasteful to me; it is the most Judaic

1. 2p30
2. 9p205c, Larrañaga
3. 9p208b, Larrañaga
4. 9p42, Larrañaga

Note cont'd from page 336. . .

condemns, tortures, conjures, and hates." (WP Sec. 167.)
of the Christian sects..." (N.I.)

Protestantism is a flabby sort of Christianity willing to compromise with anything. Theology without the mother-idea, that is, God, is a "form of thought that exists among Protestants, and which cannot be had among us who have the Catholic and Latin traditions." Pío confesses it is hard for him to understand how theology can survive if supernaturalism is taken away, or understand the logic of a certain young Swedish theologian who, when asked if theology would fall were all things supernatural disproved, replied, "No; why so?" (N.II.)

One of the pet phrases of the Protestants is that they "don't want people dressed in masks, as if the frock-coats and gorgets of their pastors weren't just as much masked apparel" as anything a Catholic wears. There is formality in Protestantism as much as in Catholicism.

1. 12p205c, Larrañaga
2. 2p36
3. 9p44cf, Larrañaga

I. That Nietzsche believed the same about Protestantism is revealed in his vision of "Caesar Borgia as Pope." Catholicism was in a fair way of being saved by the humanism of the Renaissance, when along came Martin Luther and ruined it all, bringing Christianity back to its Judaism. (A Sec. 61.)

II. Protestantism is a "half-measure," a "spiritually unclean and tiresome form of decadence," a "very humble Christianity" that is totally without vigor. (WP Sec. 78-79.)
That greatest of Protestant organizations, the Masons, has also come down in the world. It is a "society of hypocrites."

One aspect of Protestantism would appeal to the Dionysian in Baroja: the fact that in its early stages it bustled affairs. Asked whether he sympathizes with it, he replies,

With present-day Protestantism, not at all. As a historical occurrence, when it served to combat Catholic tyranny and affirm freedom of conscience, it was all right; now, left without a foe, it is nothing or almost nothing. And the fact is that the origin is what in religions has no exactitude nor guaranty of any sort. How is a partisan of free inquiry going to stay inside the Bible? Because it is as if a person were to be told, "Traverse this valley and see naught but it." No. When he knowsit he will want to explore the next valley, and, if he has time and curiosity, the whole world. I now have no sympathy with the Protestants. When I am among Protestants and Jews I feel a Catholic; then when I'm among Catholics I feel an enemy to them.

Religions do have some pragmatic value.

Faith is good for some people. "To have a strong faith must be pleasant. To believe that the world and life have their object, that Religion is something serious, is very fine." The one lam entable fact is that the majority of us have ceased to believe. Then within the limits of what one physically can do, faith is a great facilitator to action—although this is faith rather broadly defined. Much, too, can be done with belief in a

1. 8p109bc, López del Castillo
2. 13p203bcf
3. 13p197bc, Larrañaga
4. 15p193f
hereafter: "It is still explicable why some follow, like
the saints, pain and martyrdom with a religious purpose.
In them is the mirage of a super-earthly life. . . ."

The church has been a great unifying agent. Like
everything else that has come out of Rome, it has had won-
derful powers of organization. "That discipline, that
accompanying the man from the cradle to grave, the festi-
vals, the ceremonies, nothing of that can be recreated on
the basis of philosophical ideas or political dogmas."

Whether true or not, religious beliefs have been capable of
solidifying a people, as they did in Spain during Napo-
leon's rule, leading to his defeat.

Then the disciplinary side is good. O'Neil, defending
the need for discipline in life, says, "...what is least
bad in Catholicism is its discipline. . . ." (N.I.)

1. 2p36a I. He expresses a similar view about war, calling
2. 2p280 it a good school for men ((3p153a)). Both of
3. 2p277 these ideas are Nietzschean. "The long bondage
4. 4p282a of the spirit, the distrustful constraint in
the communicability of ideas, the discipline
which the thinker imposed on himself to think
in accordance with the rules of a church or a
court, or conformable to Aristotelian premises,
the persistent spiritual will to interpret
everything that happened according to a Chris-
tian scheme, and in every occurrence to rediscov-
er and justify the Christian God:--all this
violence, arbitrariness, severity, dreadfulness,
and unreasonable, has proved itself the dis-
ciplinary means whereby the European spirit has
attained its strength, its remorseless curiosity
and subtle mobility. . . ." (BG Sec. 188) What is
absent in this pragmatic view of Baroja's, how-
ever, is the Nietzschean idea of religion as an
anodyne for underlings--religion deliberately
The idea of God is, or was, a glorifying thing.

"A God in his right mind occupied with building the Earth with its little mountains, its little trees, its little bugs, its sun to light it, and its moon to be sung about by the poets, seemed to him ((Silvestre Paradox)) a bit candid; but a Humanity so imbecile that, having an admirable belief like that of a God who takes the form of a babe, destroys it and obliterates it to replace it with stupid legends that flatter the rabble, was to him idiotic, mean, and repugnant." (N.I.)

Apart from Catholicism Baroja seldom expresses

1. lopl0lf I. cont'd from page 340. . . used by an intelligent class to content those who were to be exploited. It will appear that Baroja does not follow Nietzsche far on the road of the Superman. Hence this difference.

I. "When the pre-requisites of ascending life, when everything strong, plucky, masterful, and proud has been eliminated from the concept of God, and step by step he has sunk down to the symbol of a staff for the weary, of a sheet-anchor for all those who are drowning; when he becomes the pauper's God, the sinner's God, the sick man's God, the symbol of excellence, and the attribute, "Saviour," "Redeemer," remains over as the one essential attribute of divinity: what does such a metamorphosis, such an abasement of the godhead imply?—Undoubtedly 'the kingdom of God' has thus become larger." (A Sec. 17.)
himself about particular sects. He does, however, call spiritualism a "ridiculous superstition."

Catholicism has come to its last days. Once it numbered virile adherents. Pío admires the old Jesuits --draws a parallel between Caesar Borgia and Loyola, and says, "Those old Jesuits were very intelligent and in part very liberal." But they have degenerated. "At the side of modern Jesuitism--mystic pomade, perfumed with rose-water--the ancient Jesuits had lineaments of steel."

Christianity has failed to implant its constitutional precepts, and comes to judgment. "In these matters of luxury I see symptoms that Christianity is definitely sinking." "A salon like this ((modiste's parlor)) is a little temple where pleasure, luxury, sensuality are glorified. Fortunately men, by constraint of law more than by sentiment, have gained in benevolence, and gentleness of customs; if not, it would beterrible, because the powerful would buy even the blood of the poor. Christian brotherhood appears nowhere." "The world was once a vale of tears. Now, for the majority, it is a sinecure."

It might be possible to salvage something from the general wreckage; but apparently it will not be done.

Christian sentiment is dead. Probably the pure thing has never been the birthright of any except unusual individuals, because it has always appeared mystified by the official Church. The mass

1. 2p234a
2. 17p223
3. 9pl56ab, Larrañaga
4. 12pl30b
5. Larrañaga, 12p73c, 73cf, 74ab.
have never been able to feel strongly the idea of charity and love for others. They have always lived within the most unbridled egoism. I believe that the Christian religions are going down. They give the impression that they have erred on the two chief roads they have taken. The Protestants have said: No formulas; let us go to the essence of Christianity. The Catholics have made this consideration: The safest way is to accept all the inheritance and follow it to the letter. The Protestants have found that in that essence of Christianity there are some very poor, very unconving concepts and a history which attempts to be universal and is no more than the narrow and limited history of such a people as the Jews, of low and somewhat contemptible morality. The Protestants have evolved to a sweetish rationalism with no value. The Catholics have seen that, by virtue of trussing themselves with formulas, they have lost mental limberness, and are not content now with jettisoning the ship's ballast, but want to dump the whole cargo into the sea.

I have not been able to discover any substitute for religion that Baroja recommends. He speaks of Feuerbach and Comte as "advocates of a vague humanitarian religiousness," "limiting the cosmic horizon and approaching everything to man." Evidently he does not favor "humanism."

1. 12p75cf, Larrañaga
2. 2p215
Anti-Semitism.

The distaste for everything that has even the remotest connection with Jews and Judaism is written plain over Baroja's entire philosophy; and it appears that at times he links entirely discrepant antipathies with this one, making the Jew the author of evils that no one else would think of imputing to him. What can be the reason for his hatred is hard to say; Baroja himself gives reasons, but as Professor Owen has justly pointed out, they are too reasonable; they do not account for the virulence. Undoubtedly there is an emotional disturbance at the bottom of it, an injury or grievance, real or fancied, at the hands of some Jew or Jewess; but what it may be I cannot venture to say. True it is, however, that he misses no opportunity to cover the Jews (and their brothers in Semitism, the Moors) with obloquy, speaking of the "Semitic rascality," and averring that "The only sympathetic suggestion that Arabic civilization produces in me is the figure of Averroes, and although there is not a solitary datum for believing it, I imagine to myself that Averroes was not a Moor."

One rather extended discussion passes in review his various opinions about the Semites. Larrañaga, Haller, and several others are talking; Haller begins,

1. 15p185bc
2. 2p33bc
"The Jew does not love Europe's past, in which he has scarcely partaken; so he is a modernist, attuned to the age. Furthermore, the Jew has always held himself aloof from the immediate life of the European countries. This in part favors them, in part prejudices them."

"Besides, it is something they cannot be blamed for," said Larrañaga.

"The European Jew will always have two homelands: one, the natural one, where he was born; the other, Zion, Jerusalem, the spiritual fatherland of his race."

"Much of the clarity of concept of the Spinozas, of the Karl Marxes, of the Heines, depends on their having severed themselves from the ideas and prejudices of their immediate fatherland."

"In part the same thing happens with Catholic ultramontanists. Their spiritual fatherland is Rome," said the old Physician.

"In Germany perchance there may be a certain dualism between the German citizen and the Catholic," rejoined Stolz, "but not in the Latin countries. The French, Spanish or Irish Catholic, the more Catholic he is, considers himself and is considered more French, more Spanish, or more Irish; but not the Jew; the more Jew he is, the less German, less Polander, or less Russian."

"There is no doubt," added Haller, "that there is in them a solidarity that is not found in other religious confessions. None of these Bolshevik Jews attack each other. They have co-operated in enormous butcheries, but they haven't bitten each other."

Lenin, however, was different, according to Haller:

He was a tartar of the race of Genghis Khan and Tamerlane. As for these Jews, the majority are very versatile, very serpentine. The Jewish race is a histrionic, optimistic, and social race. For playing the monkey and attracting attention, nobody like them. Ideas make no difference to them. In Russia they will be Bolsheviks; in England, conservatives; in France, radicals. This is nugatory with them. The question is one of attracting attention and making money. It is a caste for comedians, vaudeville artists, journalists, kings' pets, dancers, and bankers."

"Yes, but this cynicism is not uniquely and privately Jewish."
"No. That is true; but in them it is more marked. The Jew to have valor must be among people. Then he stands out with his characteristic impertinence; but put a Jew by himself, like a Spanish conquistador in America or like Livingstone in Africa, and then he isn't anything, because all his monkey-shines and all his impertinence are no longer of any use."

"I don't know whether you can believe in those ethnic particularities," objected Larrañaga.

"They are not absolute, of course," replied Haller. "The Jew has a materialistic and sensual sense of life. He does not appreciate the ideals of the ancient Europeans, austerity, chivalry, heroism, valiance in war. He sees our things as things of strangers."

Family name means nothing to him; he changes it as easily as he changes his hat (admitted, of course, that he has often been forced to).

"They are optimists, pacifists, believe that one must have pleasure; they have thirst for money, jewels, great eroticism and great curiosity toward sexual aberrations."

"And yet they are of a rigid morality."

"Yes, within their community, but not outside it. This sympathy for homosexuality, which is discernible in the works of modern psychiatry and literature, was born among the German Jews. All that has anything snobbish and in bad taste has that half-German, half-Jew stamp. In France, for example, Proust, who manifests a slightly professorial and pedantic delight in what is aberrant, is half-Jew in race."

There is eroticism elsewhere, Haller adds, but it is not so systematic.

We may take as the nub of his anti-Semitism (though to do so is purely verbal and expediential, I confess) the opinion, previously stated, that in no race is the instinct to live so lush and thriving as in the Jews;

1. 13pl03ff
anything, therefore, that will knit and bind them together, enable them to present a united front to the world, and purvey to their strength and interest, they will not scruple to use.

First they cast a veil over Nature. They wish to live fully and strongly; to do this they must see things not as they are but as they would like them to be—to behold the world in its indifference takes all the wind out of vanity and kills enterprise. This means that the Jews have renounced true intellectuality; they are the patrons and devotees of painting and sculpture, the quasi-intellectual arts, and, as he says above, they have no interest in ideas. Their intelligence is mainly cunning—that is practical intelligence. Speaking of Trotsky, Baroja says, "He has that mechanical, astute intelligence very common in the Jew." Hence in all their dealings this deception and falsehood creeps out, and they live at the cost of truth.

Their will to live is served by their unbounded optimism; and—oh, profanation!—"I shouldn't be surprised if even Nietzsche were a Jew in disguise. . . . It would not be at all remarkable that that rabid optimism had come from some Ashkenasin hailing from some Polish ghetto," he says.

1. 5p41f
2. 13p93bc, Stolz
3. 15p308b
4. 15p185bc
5. 13p175b
They have done many things to solidify their strength; they perhaps more than any others have practised that trick of making themselves interesting, which formed, as we have seen, the central of Baroja's psychology. To this end they have created many cults—been, in fact, the germinating bed for nearly all the cults—especially their cult of themselves, their worship of themselves as the "chosen people." "Ah, Yaco, I see that the law of Moses makes you people very egoistic, Yaco!" says Jesús to his fellow-printer. Mysticism is Judaic, and relates to the Jew's love of falsification; hence the obscurantist cults: "The cult of the word seems to me an Oriental, Semitic thing," says Hugo. "Have I not always looked with disdain upon the base Semitic rabble, worshipper of blood and miracles?" pleads Baroja in his ode to ataraxy. The unnatural interest in sex he has already mentioned; circumcision among the Jews is a religious rite—"These dogmas on the basis of physiology, virginity, circumcision, etc., are easily explained in the Jews, a sensual, materialistic race of low intelligence...." And later another cult has been added: that of money. With the Jew, money is "an entelechy, a symbol"; it is more than an instrument: it is an invariable entity, a kind of idealistic unity.

1. 11pl35c
2. 1p321cf
3. 19pl95a, Larrañaga
4. 9p46, Larrañaga
With this full measure of cult-ism, it is not surprising that the Semites have perpetrated most of our religions; and this is the deed in them that Baroja most despises (or so he would persuade us)—their grandest hoax, Christianity. (N.I.) The ideal of the truth with power, which he has sodeplored, is very Semitic: He wants to earn immortality defending with arms the law of God. He is not an Aryan; he is a Semite," declared Baroja of Santa Cruz, the Carlist general. He can never forgive them for having destroyed paganism, that "glorious religion" which "had to die in the present of a

1. 6p167b I. One may be surprised to read that Nietzsche in one place denied the Jews this distinction—apparently one of his frequent contradictions. He somewhere says that the Jews have been given more prominence than they deserve, and must have wondered whether he were not guilty of this himself in all the invective he hurled against them; so he claimed that religion is Aryan, and that the Jews, prime imitators, only perpetuated it. See WP Sec. 142, 143.
somber religion, evolved in such a despised, vile race as the Jews." Christianity, in so far as it has absorbed the qualities of nobler races, is good; but "the worst part is the Judaic sediment it carries, that putrid mire of a sensual and fanatical race." Protestantism in its attempts to cut back to "first principles" has only been reviving Judaism—the Renaissance, as we have seen, had almost redeemed Christianity; so he calls it "the most Judaic of the Christian sects."

Perhaps we might add that the Protestants love their Bible, and Baroja abominates it—whether he dislikes the Jews because they give us the Bible, or dislikes the Bible because it came from the Jews, I cannot say; but that both are on the lowest rung of his esteem is quite plain. Finally, Baroja is a philosopher, and regards Semitic religion as most foreign to philosophic detachment.

The racial strength of the Jews is further braced by the cohesion they derive from their traditions. Love for tradition and law is characteristically Judaic. Pío's reverence for these two things we already know. The crime of it is that the Jews have not been content to bear their
burden alone, but have acted as Christians are ex-
horted to act toward Christ, casting it on us--Chris-
tians become the tradition-bearing Christus, or, as
Nietzsche would say, the camel. Pío carries his load
neither comfortably nor cheerfully, and chafes under
the weight of those Semitic myths that are "neither
European nor noble."

The Jew is utterly materialistic, for to live well
one must be always practical and not have too many scrup-
les. This explains his unexcelled capacity for living
off other people--at his worst, battening off their mis-
fortunes. At his best he is a merchant, at his worst
he is a parasite and a vulture.

Our age has lived off illusions, off mad illu-
sions put in the future. The stuff of which illu-
sions and hopes are spun has dwindled at last and
the liquidation of dreams and hopes has come; and
for this liquidation, as for every commercial li-
quidation, the Jews have appeared.

And elsewhere: "...the hateful avidity of the Jews,
who act the part of worms for dead nations." The indis-
soluble connection (almost a neural connection in Baroja's
brain, I should say) between Jew and merchant I have al-
ready pointed out.

Stolz spoke of what for him constituted super-
iority in races. Such superiority was manifested by

1. 13p30a, Joe
2. 6p15
love for nature, disinterestedness, and enthusiasm for the noble and the daring. Hence Stolz disliked the Jews, who saw in the world principally the material and the economic: buying cheap and selling dear.

They and their brother-merchants stick at no means to make a profit.

I have said that in Catalonia there is a Jewish spirit...; this Jewish spirit exists in many rich Catalan men merchants; exists in many of those men who have pushed Spain into an idiotic war in Melilla; it exists in those who, after exploiting hapless corners of our country, have had the stupidity to want Spain to disappear and to cry "Death to Spain," as if the death of a noble and unlucky country could be desirable.

Anything is fit to be commercialized—Jewish critics of late have found art a highly negotiable prize, and have adjusted public opinion so as to get the highest turnover.

Even psychoanalysis is only another form of this mercantilism—prying into people's private affairs, disrespecting the right to secrecy, pulling every lever within reach that may coin a shekel. "Jewish physicians use every means to attain success."

People who are in love with life naturally want to get as much enjoyment out of it as possible; hence the sensuality of the Jews. (N.I.) This same psychoanalysis, that is so profitable, has with Freud been completely smeared with sex.

1. 13p44a
2. 6p127b
3. See 13p208ff
4. 13p117b, Haller
For our present-day erotomaniacs... all the sexual life, and even its aberrations, is respectable and full of splendor and interest. The Jews, who never have defended asceticism, behold something congenial, anti-Christian, in this modern erotomania.

Baroja connects, I surmise, the Jew's sensuality with his love of family, for Jesús, badgering Yaco, says,

The family!... The first thing one ought to do is forget it. Fathers and brothers, uncles and cousins are not worth anything... and so on, about as close to sacrilege as one could come with a Jew.

What Judaism has brought us is out of keeping with the spirit of our race, violating Baroja's principle of fitness. The Jew is an outsider.

The Jews are not like us. The Catholic, above all the priest, is somewhat hard and somber, but is of one's own household; the Protestant has a very unpleasant garb of hypocrisy, but he is one's neighbor; not so the Jew: he is an exotic thing.

The races of Southern Europe resisted the alien Judaism, in the form of Christianity, that was being imposed on them, and had to be "inoculated with the Semitic virus" before the job could be accomplished. As Nietzsche says, it was necessary to make these noble men sick before they would accept the teachings of an ignoble, slavish race.

Their long bondage is in part what makes them so different

1. 13p109, Haller
2. 11p141b
3. 9p44b
4. 5p61
from us, for it has led to compensatory acts that we cannot understand. Speaking of Cabrera, López del Castillo says, "Perhaps he had a certain sense of former humiliation, like the Jews, which makes them eager for power."

Baroja never wearies of quoting Nietzsche's words about the Semitic myth, that it is "neither European nor noble." (N.I.) He pictures the ancestors of the Celts, the "sons of Aitor," as fleeing before the advance of Semitic religion and Greek voluptuousness and slavery, and raising their cry of "We want only land and freedom." So he is grateful to monarchy for having saved Spain, in part at least, from the pestilence of the Jews.

Semitic rule is here to stay, he laments, unless the men of the North rid us of it; but even that hope we have almost abandoned now.

Baroja mentions a point himself that should have enlightened him as to the source--cultural and not congenital--of Jewish characteristics. Dr. Praetorius, the army physician, observed that in the fighting "...the Arabs showed hardihood and indifference, and the Jews, supposed racial brothers of the Arabs, showed themselves hysterical

1. 8p236ab  I. 2p72b and 2p74b, e.g.
2. 4p307ff, O'Neil
3. 15p186b
and at times childishly cowardly." He is certainly aware of the power of enveloping culture to alter a racial heritage:

The influence of culture and of environment is daily greater. Only those peoples in whom a relative ethnic purity is joined with a special form of religion and culture, such as the Jewish people, can contend with exterior spiritual influences and resist assimilation.

All in all I believe that the extremity of his aversion, in this as in other things, is being reduced as he grows older.
Conclusion.

Perhaps it has been an affront to an individualist like Baroja, a man for whom with Nietzsche the "will to system" is abhorrent, to endeavor to co-ordinate and synthesize his ideas; to look for consistency in a man affected with the _amor fati_, an admirer of Heraclitus, a Dionysian, is easily an offense. But unfortunately for the would-be irrationalist, the sentence is logically composed of subject and predicate, and human beings demand coherency if only just to remember what they hear and read. The deliberate self-contradictor is the only true anti-rationalist, and no one listens to him; the rest of us mortals are all logical units; and if we contain seeming contradictions, that is because we are enthymemes: the part of us that would close the breach remains concealed and subauditory.

It was my purpose from the first, as I have elsewhere stated, to present Baroja's philosophy entire, neither obtruding Nietzsche except where parallels were too obvious to excuse omission, nor attempting to combat the opinions expressed except where fallacy seemed flagrant. The work of tracing influences other than Nietzsche's, which of course are apparent, has been barely touched upon; I hope, however, that I may have provided some leading strings to anyone who might care to attempt it. That
influences there are we must admit have been assimilated well; there is no conspicuous foreign matter in his organism.

Let us try to survey the site and illumine in a total way the passages that Dr. Baroja has searched out with his clinical flashlight.

The cosmology reduces to one main point: the denial of dualism in nature. Life and non-life are at the same level; there is no purpose in nature, and only illusory purpose in human beings; there is neither compensation nor universal harmony, and hence no heaven and, I am tempted to say, no God—certainly neither in the orthodox sense; and freedom is a dream. The great stress which Baroja puts, or did put, before the war, on science, leads him to its methodological approach: materialism. In ontology he tends to materialistic pluralism; but his deep admiration for Kant leads him to an egocentric position and almost to solipsism. But the apparent incompatibility of these two views, pluralism and egocentrism, is resolved by taking the world as a pluralistic grouping of individuals, each of whom conceives the universe in his peculiar way. Thus though my world is my idea I am willing to admit the existence of other individuals with theirs; but toward these things outside my own experience I must be neutral: hence a leaning toward agnosticism. Naturally this involves a dialectical
question that could not be settled on a ream of foolscap. Science is so far as it goes the source of valid knowledge; but "truth" as the schoolmen used the term is beyond human reach, and possibly we should be thankful, since falsehood is necessary to life; there is a suggestion of the pragmatical conception of truth.

Formal logic is sterile; one cannot get from the conclusion more than one puts into the premises; classification, syllogism, and definition are good gymnastic but poor means for new knowledge. The logic of nature, however, which treats of the genesis of our acts and ideas, is inexorable and always true. Baroja's contribution to the terminology of metaphysics is his dualism of humorism and rhetoric, which he might as well have labelled Baroja and non-Baroja, and which are cousins german to Dionysianism and Apollonianism. Humorism derives from the non-logical in a logical setting; it is the intrusion of Dionysus into the art-world of Apollo. Rhetoric encloses all the powers of stiffness, formality, tradition, pompousness, and "good taste"—the sphere of the burgher, the woman, and the Jew.

We see that Nietzsche, the man who has cut the deepest groove in Baroja's philosophy, has had little or no effect on the formal part, except in this dualism, whereas Kant has had a profound influence. The idea of
the substratum of life, espoused by Nietzsche, is here present; but since it was first enounced by Kant, and found its way to Nietzsche through Schopenhauer, we must look to all three of these men for the reason of its presence in Baroja. The philosophical influences in Baroja may be tabulated roughly as follows: in metaphysics, Kant almost exclusively; in the general emotional outlook and in the opinions on sex and women; Schopenhauer with evidence of Nietzsche; and in the dualism of Dionysian and Apollonian, in opinions on Semitism, religion, and ethics, and in the creation of certain supermannaish heroes, Nietzsche. Questions more in the current of the times, such as politics, psychology, aesthetics, and anthropology, are freest from those influences. Among the literary preferences may be mentioned Dickens, Dostoievsky, and stendhal. I may say as an afterthought that the relation with Stendhal is perhaps significant, since Stendhal was Nietzsche's most admired favorite, whom he called "one of the happiest accidents of my life," "quite priceless, with his anticipatory psychologist's eye. . . ." (Ecce Homo, II, 3.)

In his ethics Baroja leans somewhat to the special morality of Nietzscheism, but his desire for a universal brotherhood, for human beings who would be princes all, impedes the more ruthless application of Nietzsche's principles. It is nevertheless true that morality in the designs of nature is a figment, and that what we
now possess is an expression and codification of selfish interests—which at present means the interests of the class in power, the bourgeoisie. Christianity has prostituted itself to this class, attempting to sicken and enslave mankind; the weakling and the under-dog are moral men. If nature is indifferent to morality, and hence in the human eye immoral by virtue of its indifference, still good and evil are two poles of human conduct that cannot be abolished, though they may be re-interpreted and revised from age to age. The need for revision just now is most pressing. Among evil things in Baroja's opinion falsehood is the vilest.

It is in his consideration of art that Baroja is least critical. He does recognize that wealth and economic stability are necessary for the highest artistic achievement, but he is vague as to the sources, and indulges in some classifications that are not above reproach: "natural" and "human" beauty, "universal" and "popular" music, the "grayness" of Western and the colorfulness of Eastern art, and so on. We are not on uncombatable ground when we say that art is an instinct and that artistic technique is unanalyzable; but we feel safer when art is called mainly recapitulation and when the wild flings of modernism are assailed. Popular instinct is the best aesthetic guide, and hence music,
being the most social of the arts, has the greatest promise; hence also art of every type must avoid anachorism and ally itself as closely as possible to the region and the people whence it springs.

Baroja's own politics consists of a mild and not very definite intellectual anarchism. Anarchism with a program of action he repudiates; his is we feel only an anarchism which means the disruption of society as it now stands. Monarchism at one time saved Spain, and is to be honored for the rescue; but it is better for the people to have some voice in their government. Conservatism is bad, embodying as it does all the particularly detestable muniments of tradition and stagnation. Democracy tends to the selfsame muzzling of intellect and to a dreary levelism that is exterminating what little adventurousness is left to us; the mobocrat is worse than the autocrat. Socialism is only the logical conclusion of democracy, and suffers from the same ills; luxury can never be common property, the homogeneity of the Middle Ages can not be regained in the complexity of modern life, and an officious state that presumes to interfere in the private lives of its subjects--for subjects they would be--is worse than no government at all. The bourgeoisie are in the stirrups, and having bribed or intimidated officialdom and the Church, are driving to suit themselves. Nationalism is the present-day
fetish, and exacts allegiance to a social order that is corrupt inside and out. Spain is above all in a bad way: her press is ignorant and subservient, her politicians are jackals or simpletons, her policy is verbiage, she is provincial and uncooperative, and her leaders are seldom more than mere orators. She is barely reviving from medieval apathy, and needs a copious dose of science and good and wise doctors to administer it. Within her own cultural, moral, and artistic personality, which should never be sacrificed, she must contrive to imbibe what other nations have to offer in technic; she can no longer afford to remain aloof. Other nations are afflicted with the same stupid nationalism and militarism, the natural outcome of worshipping the demos. In modern society it is adaptation, not goodness nortalent, that counts; the world has become so industrialized and Americanized that men no longer look to their soul's welfare, but only move mechanically among externals; ideals have disappeared. There is one great hope: this is the age of youth, when more than ever before young people are able to impose their will, and may, we shall hope, do away with petrified tradition and superstition. The national organism should keep the principle of fitness above all else; if by breaking up into smaller units it can better adapt itself racially to its citizens, or facilitate its action and liberate itself from cumbrances, then this course should be followed; there is nothing to be gained
from bigness for bigness' sake. Neither should a government attempt to create a goal which tramples human happiness; there should be in a government nothing superordinate to human beings. A brotherhood of mankind would be the real utopia.

Societies, like individuals, are hermetic units. They have their own special characteristics, derived mainly from physiographical peculiarities, and perhaps, though the miscegenation of modern nations makes the fact unverifiable, somewhat from race. It is to the terrain we must look for racial peculiarities also, however; so there resides the ultimate determinant. Inland and sea, mountain and plain, lowland and desert, all have their proper influences on their inhabitants. The Basque is a mountaineer and individualistic; the Frenchman is a plainsman and superficial; the Central European is a citizen of an agricultural and industrial state, and sociable and provincial. These distinctions come to be part of the cultural hereditaments, so that human beings, though born with almost identical physiological features, promptly have them lifted. The myth of Nordic Supremacy, to which we long fondly held, is passing, along with the fairy tales of physiognomy and craniology. Furthermore like individuals, social groups tend to preserve the status quo, and accordingly exercise a mighty compulsion on their individual members. They stoop to trickery and
delusion with many of their institutions, such as religion, the social graces, and art, hoodwinking men to the verities of existence, in the interest of perpetuating the herd. Mass action is generally undirected and bungling, aimed at some notional foe of the public safety. Genuine homogeneity in society can be achieved only through the communal possession of some strong sentiment. The individual, under social automatism, becomes a sorry mummer who acts for applause, accepts the social status imposed on him, and, if the subjection reaches its extreme, becomes a slave in the fullest Nietzschean sense, exalting his servitude, and paying homage to a twisted and inverted code of morality.

In the opinions on psychology we find a consistent determinism, based on the preservation of the ego; psychology is the study of human selfishness, albeit of selfishness tempered by certain concessions demanded by other egos, and by something which in the sexual relation amounts almost to altruism. Our attempts to be disinterested and objective are frustrated, for facts which do not accord with our interests simply refuse to register. By the same token all men are cowards, and do brave deeds only through ignorance of danger, or, with inward quaking, because of high-handed compulsion from outside. The reason is handmaid to the will; to live, one must act; but to act, one must
affirm; hence the doubter, the intellectual man and
skeptic, is a rarity and an abnormality. Personality
and character are social products, the temperament with
which we are born after it has been hammered and molded
into the desired social shape. There are certain bio-
logical given quantities which we may term instincts,
got from immemorial racial experience or simply em-
bodied in the organism (but we must not infer that
Baroja is unaware of the verbal difficulties besetting
the instinct hypothesis and other psychological problems.)
The haze of magic that has been made by obscurantists
to envelop intuitionism must not blind us to the fact
that both intuition and intelligence are at bottom
chiefly empirical. Intelligence, however, is eternally
debarred from the subsistent reality; we may apprehend
exterior things, but ourselves we may never fully know:
homo homini mysterium. Here is full agreement with the
substratum of Kant, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche, with
intelligence the Veil of Maya. Much understanding is
not only an impediment to action, but also a sign of
decadence; the world where forces interplay and action
goes forward is a distorted world; the world under the
lens of the intellect is lifeless and still. Among modern
psychological theories psychoanalysis with its case-
histories and its verbiage has brainged to unjustified
lengths, and the "masters" of the courts of law have only succeeded further in befuddling our already desperately intricate judiciary.

The managing agent of the substratum of life is sex, which hides in all the corners of consciousness and is present implied or expressed in every human activity. What in other animals is a relatively simple fact, has in the ticklish organism of society become a power to conjure with. And society has done a notoriously bad job with it; through the agency of religion it has so covered sex with smut that it is not fit to show itself outside bawdydom, and dares not appear among decent folk except in the starched clothes and behind the scrubbed and hypocritical face of marriage. Marriage as practised has been a failure; but men and women are happily coming to the one alternative and escape from an intolerable emotional situation: contraception. But to swing to the other extreme and make Eros the god of a new phallic cult is as bad or worse. To better the condition of sex in modern society we must recognize that it is physiological, that the individual under its influence is temporarily the dupe of his passion, and not on this account condemn him to a lifelong expiation of the crime of having loved, by chaining him to someone for whom he may cease to care;
rather, following always the code of naturalness, we should leave him free to dissolve the attachment.

Men may enjoy periods, at least, of comparative freedom from the promptings of sex; but with women the impulse is omnipresent, and brings all of them, high and low, to pretty much the same level. The man they prefer is the egoist, the fop, and the dolt, the man always who is best fitted to reproduce and the easiest to manage. Being jealous of the protection and upbringing of their brood, they are incorrigible selfists, and have few capabilities outside the field of immediacy and trifles; abstractions count for nothing; naturally, for any expediential judgment a woman's opinion may be better than a man's. Twentieth Century emancipation has changed a few externals, but wrought no sweeping cultural improvements. Even in art, conventionally regarded as woman's especial field, she is rather affected by fashion than by beauty. She is closer to nature than man; her function is superior to that of the average man. Hence when levelism is complete and all men are average men, we may look for gynecocracy.

There are two types of religion: the Buddhistic, which tends to contemplation and monism, and the Semitic, which tends to conflict and dualism. Christianity is of the latter, and is but an extension of Judaism. It bears all the prejudices, fallacies, and myths bequeathed to
it by the Semites, and thrives, like the Jews, on falsehood. The Bible is not even literature, much less inspired; future life is a piece of wish-thinking; universal harmony is moonshine; sin, repentance, and forgiveness are the ridiculous weapons of the priesthood; religious emotion has a physical, mainly sexual basis which the priest does not hesitate to use. The sanctity of these things is religion's hoax, the holy lie. Christianity is designed for children, illuminists, and fools; it was born of slaves and continues slavish. Its malignancy in modern society is manifold: it has destroyed happiness, polluted sex, dampened the scientific spirit, and raised social barriers. The blackest mark on its score of many iniquities is its abandonment of itself to the bourgeoisie; churches have become business institutions. Protestantism, with its emphasis on faith, sin, and the Bible, is more distasteful still than Catholicism; it pretends to be rationalistic, and succeeds in being hypocritical and apologetic. For Baroja as for Nietzsche the last Christian died on the cross. Religion has had some value: it has been good for some people, it did unify the world during a dim period, its discipline was strengthening, and its idea of God was noble; but its time has passed.

The race which has progressed farthest in the
direction of sentimentalism and intellectual meanness is that of the Jews. The impulse to live and prolong their social solidarity has led them to falsify every truth that might disturb their aim, to exalt the procreative act (the Jews have been the systematizers of most sexual propaganda), to advocate unbounded optimism, and to worship their own people. Thus they have the guiltiest hands when Baroja speaks of the lengths to which human beings will go to make themselves interesting: they are our business men, our modernists, and our actors—anything to be in the limelight. Productive of illusions and barren of truth as they are, we can understand why they have produced the greatest religions. Their talent for living at others' expense is unexcelled; they never root to the sod of any country, but move in the unstable realm of commerce and parasitism, and when it is advantageous to do so, encourage social upheaval. The Jew is not one of us.
APPENDIX
Dionysian and Apollonian (N.I.)

Pursuant to his constant policy of inverting old valuations, Nietzsche does the same in the consideration of these two concepts, which he says are his own invention. Optimism has heretofore been the symptom of life and pessimism that of decay; rather, says he, optimism is the sign of decay, and pessimism the sign of life.

Comprehending life in its entirety could mean but one thing for an individual—suicide; and even perhaps the destruction of others out of pity: for the undercurrent or reality, regarded from the point of view of the individual life, is terrible and too much to bear. To comprehend that the individual life has, in the great totality of things, in the "Primordial Unity", no value as an individual, could mean nothing but annihilation for one who sees the justification for life in individuality.

This Primordial Unity is the great artist of the universe—artist, for "only as an aesthetic phenomenon is existence and the world eternally justified." If, now, man could himself exist as a work of art, as the unindividuated object of this artist, the pain and absurdity of his position would not oppress him, for he

1. Prologue I. This is an attempt at synopsis of the Birth of Tragedy.
would not be conscious of them; and thus it would be possible for him to be the clay in the hands of the eternal experimenter, to be molded or discarded at will. Does man ever exist in this state? He does, when he has achieved the **Dionysian** condition of obliviousness of self, which Nietzsche analogizes with drunkenness. This ecstatic state the Greeks, in their earliest Dionysian revels, attained. But with returning consciousness, that is, with returning individuation, the absurdity, hopelessness, and horror of the individual's position in such a collective mass dawns upon him; and without something to mitigate the blinding reality, he would be led to self-destruction.

It is well to recognize that the undercurrent of life, the Primordial Unity, or whatever he chooses to call it, is all in all with Nietzsche. Every phenomenon of the vital world is a function of it— is meaningful only in so far as it preserves this life. Since now life threatens to destroy itself through individuation, something must happen to rescue it.

The rescuer is Apollo. He casts the veil of art over reality, makes the world of the individual (the phenomenal world, in Kantian parlance) appear tolerable. Man, who was before but a work of art, becomes now himself an artist-creator; through art he turns awfulness to sublimity and absurdity to comicalness; in this way
life is redeemed through art and man has been saved from self-destruction for life's further designs. The Dionysian world is a world of no limitation; Apollo, however, to make individual experience appear justified, departmentalizes the world—marks it off from reality: "that measured limitation, that freedom from the wilder emotions, that philosophical calmness of the sculptor god."

Since the Dionysian state is the greatest good, and Apollo lives but to preserve men for Dionysus, that part of Apollonianism is best which approaches nearest to Dionysianism. The fusion is accomplished in the tragedy: 

"...the mystery doctrine of tragedy: the fundamental knowledge of the oneness of all existing things, the consideration of individuation as the primal cause of evil, and art as the joyous hope that the spell of individuation may be broken, as the augury of restored oneness." Tragedy is Apollo's nearest representation of Dionysus. In tragedy the individual is enabled to contemplate the image (all imagery is Apollonian) of the mythical hero, destroyed through forces superior to his own, and yet with the destruction redeemed through art. As a work of art, the destruction of the hero is justified.
Of all the aspects of tragedy, its music is the most powerfully Dionysian. Pure music, when heard with the comprehending ear, must needs lead to the dissolution of the individual into universal oneness. But this power, while irresistible along, is alleviated in the tragedy. Music is there applied to the tragic myth, and loses much of its powerful Dionysianism. The tragic myth "shares with the Apollonian sphere of art the full delight in appearance and contemplation, and at the same time it denies this delight and finds a still higher satisfaction in the annihilation of the visible world of appearance." The tragic sense of life is necessary, therefore, to the preservation of Dionysianism in a world of individuals; but in our modern society it has gone, at least temporarily, into abeyance.

The damage began with Socrates and his confreres. The tragedy still retained many unintelligible, i.e. Dionysian (for the Dionysian world is extra-intellectual) elements. An unintelligible world is not a cheerful world; the world was still bounded by the veil of Maya; man could go so far, and then must run against the unknown, the infinite. So Socrates, and others with him, further to blunt the tragic pain of life, invented the creed of scientism, an essentially cheerful creed, for
it upholds the intelligibility of the world—maintains that though a thing is unknown it is not therefore un
knowable—and thereupon sets to work on investigations, demarcating a little positivistic sphere, blithely en-
joying the "search for truth." A man who grows up in such a society naturally believes that the universe is rational at core; but sooner or later, if he be noble, he reaches logic's periphery; "then the new form of perception discloses itself, namely **tragic perception**, which in order to be endured, requires art as a safe-
guard and remedy." This is the hope for the re-birth of the tragic art—that science will inevitably reach the end of its rope. The insatiableness of science, its ability for documentation and history, are evidence of the Dionysian hunger that lies behind it—which science itself can never satisfy.

The most insidious result of science has been the oblitera- 
tion of myth, and thence of religion, which is based on myth. Our modern religions have become but systems of dialectics—scientific religions. (N.I.) It is the great generalities of myth, myth being the highest art-form, that come nearest to the spirit of Dionysianism.

I. So much for Nietzsche's religiousness.
The Superman. (N.I.)

This, being the most clear-cut proposition in the whole of Nietzsche's philosophy, will be the easiest one on which to make comparisons.

Baroja, it will be recalled, disavows belief in the affirmative part of Nietzscheanism; this particularly holds true with the superman. "One can surpass himself. Aren't you one of those who believe in the superman?" the priest asks Larrañaga, who replies, "Not I. I have never believed in miracles of any sort." In La Sensualidad Pervertida he writes:

I about that time had bought some books of Nietzsche, in French, and while mother and daughter strolled I awaited them reading. What a descent my soul made from those tragic lyricisms of the superman down to the pitifully human situation I was in! He seems to regard the height as inaccessible.

But earlier opinions were more favorable. Pérez del Corral, in Silvestre Paradox, says, "That bourgeois morality seems to me frankly swinish. My morality is that of the superior men." In the Tablado de Arlequín is a section on the cult of the Ego," which is strongly suggestive. I quote portions.

I believe that a rebirth, not in science nor in art, but in life, is possible. The first rebirth began when the Latin peoples found under the sprue of a civilization apparently dead the beautiful,
still pulsing Hellenic world; the new rebirth can come about because underneath the heap of old, stupid traditions, of senseless dogmas, the sovereign Ego has been discovered again.

I do not believe that there is anything else so beautifully expressed as this theory of Darwin, which, with Shakespearean brutality, he named struggle for life. (N.I.)

All animals find themselves in a state of perpetual warfare with respect to the rest; the place that each of them occupies a hundred others dispute; it has to defend itself or dies. It defends itself and kills; that is its right.

The animal employs all its resources in the combat, but man does not; he is tangled in a dense mesh of laws, customs, prejudices—. That mesh must be sundered.

Nothing must be respected; one must not accept traditions that so oppress and sadden.

One must forget forever the names of the theologians, of the poets, of all the philosopphers, of all the apostles, of all the mystifiers who have begloomed our lives by subjecting them to an absurd morality.

We must immoralize ourselves. School-days are over now; now we must live.

....................

The man of today is worth more in every sense than the man of yesterday; but to arrive at his state of perfection he needs to return to natural law; to sanctify egoism, to utilize all its resources in order to win in the struggle for life.

....................

We never ought to sacrifice our personality to anything or to anyone; and if necessity drives us to sacrifice, let us do it with mental reserves, biding the day of settlement.

....................

One should never distrust oneself; whatever is desired strenuously deserves to be attained.

I. The Struggle for Life series was evidently germinating in this admiration for Darwin.
There are men who are not sufficed with personal victory in the struggle for life and who need to influence others' wills; they have to turn their particular law into a general law. These men who try to change the atmosphere of others because if they did not life would be impossible for them, are the reformers in politics, religion, and art.

So that the acts of these men may be useful, they ought to disregard all law.

They are going to realize their lives; their morality cannot be just anyone's morality.

If for the realization of their end they have to sacrifice others, the moral thing is that they should sacrifice them; they should not recoil before contingency when their idea is transcendent.

The same thing occurs with them as occurs with him who goes in search of happiness. He who, borne aloft by a great passion of love, overleaps the law, must not be vituperated but applauded. . . .

Yes, I believe a rebirth in life possible. I believe that without the weight of traditions our existence could be more spirited; I believe that we could expend the forces of life more decently. That ought to be our desire: to drain all our instincts dry, to squander all our energies.

But there is a world that prevents it; it is a world of impotents, of wan specters, who monopolize women and don't fertilize them, who monopolize money and don't use it, who monopolize everything and keep everything.

It is a shame; we who have the world of desires, of unsatisfied instincts, ought to league together to bury alive all those impotents who prevent us from realizing our desires for power, for love, for pride—.

After burying them we should have time to devour each other.

Perhaps the last sentence strikes a discordant note; even here he seems to be doubting a little; but given his anti-traditionalism, we know the passage as a whole.

1. 22p59ff
expresses the belief he then held.

Let us consider seriatim the parallels in Nietzsche.

First, the allusion to the Renaissance. The Renaissance was for Nietzsche the great lost opportunity, where man could have made something of himself had he not blundered and overstepped. (N.I.)

Secondly, egoism. A return to egoism, says Nietzsche, was the means that Buddha used to combat the mental fatigue of his people; and though writers have pointed out the inconsistency of Nietzsche's call for such a return when he also asked for altruism in creating the superman, he does, consistent or not, insist upon it. I take this passage at random:

"Ye creating ones, ye higher men! One is only pregnant with one's own child.

"Do not let yourselves be imposed upon or put upon! Who then is your neighbor? Even if ye act 'for your neighbor'—ye still do not create for him!

"Un learn, I pray you, this 'for,' ye creating ones: your very virtue wisheth you to have naught to do with 'for' and 'on account of' and 'because.' Against these false little words shall ye stop your ears.

"'For one's neighbor,' is the virtue only of the petty people: there it is said 'like and like,' and 'hand washeth hand': they have neither the right nor the power for your self-seeking!

"In your self-seeking, ye creating ones, there is the foresight and the foreseeing of the pregnant! What no one's eye hath yet seen, namely, the fruit—this, sheltereth and saveth and nourisheth your entire love.

"Where your entire love is, namely, with your child, there is also your entire virtue! Your work, your will is your neighbor': let no false values impose upon you!"

1. A Sec. 20 I. See note page 338.
2. Z, LXIII 11. See also ibid. LIV 2
Thirdly, Darwin. Speaking of the superman, Prof. Perry says, "That there is a deep affinity between this teaching and that of the Darwinians is not, I think, open to question." The ethic of the strong man and the ethic of the survival of the fittest are, if not brothers, at least close of kin.

Fourthly, anti-traditionalism. Nietzsche tags the traditionalist the "burden-bearer." Man is bearing an overwhelming load of rubbish from the past that ought to be unloaded once and for all; it has no value except as discipline.

Fifthly, immoralizing, which has already been considered. (N.I.)

Sixthly, the need to impose one's strength on others. This is the fundamental difference between Nietzsche and Darwin (or at least so Nietzsche would have us believe); not merely struggle to live, but struggle to inflict, he says.

A living thing seeks above all to discharge its strength—life itself is Will to Power; self-preservation is only one of the indirect and most frequent results thereof.

Seventhly, the need for a special morality. This special morality was what most of Nietzsche's writings aimed to give. In Baroja there is another opinion, voiced

1. The Present Conflict of Ideals, p154 I. See page 73.
2. Cf. Z, I
3. BG Sec. 13
at about this time, which adds that while the strong man should not be deterred by pity, neither should he be impelled by bloodlust. The whole matter of good and evil, pity and ruthlessness, is all set to one side of the road that leads to the goal. Speaking of Lavedan's Le Marquis de Priola, he says,

Neither is this Priola a superman; generally cruelty does not appear anywhere but in the weak. The strong man crushes him who obstructs his path; but he does not humiliate him. What would be the use?

Lastly, the likening of the strong man to the man in love. Nietzsche draws this parallel frequently, as in the quotation from Zarathustra given above. "What is done out of love," he says, "always takes place beyond good and evil."

Surprising as it may seem, in 1902 Baroja admired the aristocracy. "Surely there is no class that has so much tolerance, so much spirit of Jemenfichisme, as the French say, as our aristocracy." The select audience at a certain play of De Maupassant were not all shocked, which to him, he said, "seems a sign of superiority," of the amoral man. In the Tablado he laments that democracy is thwarting progress: "for the progress of the species it would be better to open the field to the energies of the strong."

1. 6p211b
2. BG Sec. 153
3. 6p204cf
4. 22p49c
But with later years and growing humanitarianism, Baroja has turned his attention and affection to the whole of mankind.

"So democracy for you is a farce?"
"Yes, somewhat of that."
"And social justice, a lie?"
"For the present, I believe so."
"And morality, a mystification?"
"Something of the sort."
"Then what is left?"
"Man is left; man, who is above religion, democracy, light and short-hand writers (N.I.), the verses of Núñez de Arce and the hallelujahs of Cam- peamor. . .; man is left—that means, the hero, who in the midst of tempests, hatreds, recourses of mediocrity, the envy of jaundiced men with calculous blisters, sets others a hard pace; yes, man is left, the hero. . . .

"O thou, young reader! If thou feelest thyself a man, if thou feelest thyself a hero, if thou feelest thyself strong enough to be one, pause not, heed not the sirens of hepatic men whom thou meetest on the streets; hearken not to old mummies and Christian superstitions; sacrifice they happiness, sacrifice they neighbor, sacrifice all that is sacrificable --for it is worth while." (N.II!)

After all, this is not so far different from the superman; the difference is mainly one of naming. Perhaps

1. 16p20lbcf I. Refers to a conversation in which it is said that progress will come about through stenography, etc.
II. "But attend also to this word: All great love is above all its pity: for it seeketh --to create what is loved!"
""Myself do I offer unto my love, and my neighbor as myself"--such is the language of all creators." (Z, XXV.)
Nietzsche undertook in a franker and more definite way what Baroja is here verging upon. As long as an idea is hazy it will not provoke many enemies; but as soon as its author begins to formulate it clearly and labels it with a name that can become the rallying-point for friend and foe, then the quarrel begins; so it was the easier for others, and among them Baroja, to attack Nietzsche—"superman" became a call to combat. But Batoja will not out with precisely what he desires; so we must refrain from indicting him. (N.I.)

For Baroja there is nothing and can be nothing above man; it is as impossible for man to make or conceive something bigger than himself as it is for him to leap out of his skin. Here recurs his idea of man as a sort of air-tight container—the impossibility for the man of one nation to understand the man of another, for the man of one age to understand the man of another, and for a man to understand a woman—that he has repeated so often. It is another phase of his individualism. If man cannot aim above himself, he has no right aim beneath; that would be unworthy. There is left only man to cultivate. This is at least within hailing-distance of

I, May I interpret? The hero is Pasteur. But Pasteur vanquishes disease, and the tribe of un-heroic men teems and swarms. The hero is Nobel. But Nobel invents explosives, and men of intellect die on the battle-field. Where does our logic lead us? Do not the ideas nullify themselves? Oh, Baroja! Be more specific!
Nietzsche's philosophy. It is also the chief theoretical difference--verbal, I repeat--between the two men. If man cannot go above himself, plainly he cannot create above himself, and the superman is out of the question. There is that other humane difference, that Baroja would like to see all men in the superior class. It is possible that Nietzsche would have, too; but seeing the impossibility of it made him turn to the only alternative if there were to be advancement at all--the advancement of a few. Busy with his plans for the few he left off lamenting the loss of the many; Baroja laments.
Statistics.

Some notion of the influence of Nietzsche may be gathered from the frequency with which mention or use is made of Nietzschean terms, or Nietzsche is referred to. Especially their apparently unconscious use in some places shows that they weigh upon Baroja's mind. I shall tabulate some of these references, many of which have already been remarked.

I. Mention of Nietzsche.

1. 2p18b: "Nietzsche, who in literary opinions seems to me somewhat a philistine. . . ."

2. 2p72b: "...those myths which, as Nietzsche says, are neither European nor noble. . . ."

3. 2p74b: a repetition of (2).

4. 2p202c: merely mentioned.

5. 2p232a: merely mentioned.

6. 2p235a: mentioned as an important man.

7. 2p236: speaking of those who on religious grounds reproach atheism, Baroja says, "How much more exact and profound the manner of Nietzsche when he speaks of the pale atheists and chides them, not for their anti-Christianity, but because he considers them too Christian!"

8. 2p239c: merely mentioned.

9. 2p249bc: "Hatred of the sick and feeble is normal in Nature; Nietzsche is right. . . ."

10. 2p256: "...Christianity...arisen from the subterrane, as Nietzsche says. . . ."
11. 2p400: "...the books of Dostoevsky, Stendhal, Nietzsche..."

12. 5p24ab: referring to a fit of anger, calls it, facetiously, "anarchistic and Christian rancor, as Nietzsche would say."

13. 5p36: discussed in connection with Rousseau.

14. 5p41f: opinion on music discussed.

15. 5p61b: "...human, all-too-human, as Nietzsche would say."

16. 5p152ab: first contact with Nietzsche mentioned.

17. 5p153: mentioned as a psychologist.

18. 5p278c: speaks of lending a volume of Nietzsche to a friend; indignant that the friend did not care for it.

19. 5p281bc: in same connection as (18).

20. 5p285c: remarks the absurdity of Unamuno's derogating Nietzsche and in the same breath extolling some mediocre poet.

21. 6p16ab: "Zola, France, Ibsen, Nietzsche, Tolstoi... The works of those great writers, that so stirred us twenty years ago, have grown cold and seem a bit old and fatigued."

22. 6p29bc: merely mentioned.

23. 6p123b: merely mentioned.

24. 10p299c: "But the German watchmaker, who had heard Nietzsche spoken of, did not stand for that ((defending death)), and defended Life, the tragic sense of life, and
Bismarck and Prussia."

25. llp145bc: a character in this book is nicknamed the Superman"because he was always speaking of the advent of Nietzsche's superman."

26. llp176bc: merely mentioned.

27. 12p70b: mentioned as a prototype of anomaly.

28. 12p167c: Larrañaga, speaking of Ibsen, says he does not like him so much as formerly. Olsen says, "Yes; he is also the kolossal of the Nineteenth Century. Wagner, Nietzsche, Rodin, Ibsen—. They're all of a feather. Much paraphernalia and not always much of a foundation."

29. 12p195b: merely mentioned.

30. 12p242a: a young Russian, telling of his aversion for everything past, says, "...of Nietzsche one could say only what the Russians say: Nietzsche, nitchevo; that is, Nietzsche, nothing."

31. 13p150b: merely mentioned.

32. 13p171cf: speaking of Sils Maria: "There, it seems, Nietzsche had been inspired to compose his poem Thus Spake Zarathustra. Stolz was a partisan of the German philosopher; Larrañaga found him very kolossal."

"The Russians," said Larrañaga, "are wont to say, Nietzsche, nitchevo. That is to say, Nietzsche, nothing."

"But that is not right," replied Stolz. "Much of Nietzsche remains. His critique has great importance."

"I never have been a Nietzschean," replied Larrañaga. "all the affirmative part of Nietzsche: aristocraticism, classicism, superman-ism, has seemed
to me caparisoned, addle, tinware-ish, tending to the kolossal. I don’t care at all for Zarathustra; it is like an opera of Wagner. The critical part of Nietzsche is what at times has seemed good to me."

"From Nietzsche’s Zarathustra they passed on to talk of the ancient, real Zoroaster."

33. 13p174bc: "Old Zarathustra utters almost as many absurdities in the original as in Nietzsche’s rhapsody."

34. 13175b: rabid optimism mentioned.

35. 18p13c: Juan de Itzea explains that he is a dilettante, not being a "definer nor a dogmatizer; for that one needs a certain Will to Power, as Nietzsche would say. . . ."

36. 18p80: mentioned as one of Germany’s most brilliant products.

37. 19p38ab: mentioned as giving importance to etymologies.

38. 19p104b: mentioned as inspiring respect.

39. 19p109a: "Respectful people, even Nietzsche, are too much concerned about being just in their appraisal of others."

40. 19p141: mentioned as one of those who might have improved Stendhal.

41. 19p179: called a humorist.

42. 19p197c: "basis of rancor" in Christian morality," as Nietzsche has averred. . . ."

43. 19p228a: "Even Nietzsche’s Zarathustra seems to me as if it came from a tin-shop."
44. 21p148: Nietzscheanismo mentioned.

45 21p150: same as (44).

46. 21p268c: hero mentions having bought some books of Nietzsche.

47. 22p97: Nietzschean morality and Gorki.

48. 22p161b: "He ((the golfo)) is a partisan of Nietzsche without knowing it"—because he has no morality.

49. 23p22a: merely mentioned.

50. Páginas Escogidas, p9b: "Of the philosophers those who most attract me are Schopenhauer and Nietzsche."

51. Páginas Escogidas, p476: says "tone" of Juventud, Ecolatría "seems an imitation of Nietzsche. . . ."

There is one entire section in 22 on "The Success of Nietzsche." It reads as follows:

In a bookstore I recently say Nietzsche's Anti-

Christ, translated to Spanish, and I asked the book-
seller, "Do you have a sale for this book?"

"A large one," he replied.

The success of Nietzsche is strange. Everywhere--
in reviews, books, and periodicals, above all in the
foreign ones--nothing is done but quote the name of
the famous Prussian philosopher. On what does this
vogue, this great enthusiasm depend? That is what I
am trying to find out.

I ask a German literateur his opinion, and he
says to me, "Among us Nietzsche's style explains it
all, or most of it. Beforehand, if one were inter-
ted in knowing philosophy, one had to read tedious
works, written in stupid jargon.

"Schopenhauer introduced sprightliness and grace
into philosophy. Nietzsche did more; into his philo-
sophical works he put passion.

"Nietzsche's style sparkles like a precious stone;
his language is musical as none other ever was; his
prose produces an effect similar to Wagner's harmonies:
it intoxicates, it excites the nerves, but it in-
spirits as well. As I have told you, Nietzsche's
style justifies the greater part of his success."
An intellectual, a man who is well informed in modern ideas, says to me, "I do not believe that Nietzsche is a great metaphysician as Kant or Hegel was; but that does not matter. He did not speak solely to cold intellect; he was not exclusively a man as exposition, or if he was, it was a volitional exposition.

"He affirmed that the masses and the crowd are always wretched; he understood that the world is due only to the elect."

A paganizing poet confesses that if he has respect for Nietzsche, it is rather because of his anti-religiousness than anything else." He fearlessly avowed what thousands of men of our time have felt, what was in the moral atmosphere of this age, what no one dared to confess: that Christianity is an evil.

"Since Goethe no one has so energetically as he declared war on all asceticism; no one has condemned more forcibly the absurd doctrine of sin in man. For me there have been two men since the beginning of Christianity: Julian the Apostate and Nietzsche. Nietzsche was a Greek—he deserved not to be a German; on that account we poets love him."

Consider the explanation which an anarchist gives me of his sympathy with Nietzsche. "Nietzsche is one of our number. His hammer has broken in a thousand pieces this heavy, imbecile slab of bourgeois notions. To the silly ideal of the mediocre man, sung and extolled by socialism, he has opposed the ideal of the superman, the voluptuous carnivore wandering through life. The books of Nietzsche are the bomb of Ravachol in the world of ideas."

It is curious that Nietzsche's enthusiasts are most enthusiastic over what other equally fervent admirers decry. Even so, I fully understand the admiration of those who live in a purely intellectual sphere; the strange thing is that the zone of admiration reaches those who are nowise concerned with philosophical questions.

A politician who speaks from time to time of the superman, and who though he calls himself a politician is rather a business-man, gives me the following reason for his Nietzscheanism:

"He is a philosopher congenial to me, though if you want me to tell you the truth, I don't know
his books; but I believe he was a man who understood life. It was high time for the paper-scribblers to write something logical without sentimentality and foolishness. I, you know, when I happen on some strong man, try to associate him with my business.

"Humanity has always done the contrary, protecting the weak; so it goes. The strong man eats the weak, doesn't he? Who spoke that truth? Darwin or Nietzsche? I don't know. The concern is to be strong."

An egoist reasons his sympathy thus: "The cult of the ego seems excellent to me. Pity is very pretty. But why must I sacrifice myself for anyone? I was not born to be a saint; I have no duty whatever toward anything or anyone.

"That all the sick, wretched, lame, and crippled must be exterminated, you say? It seems all right to me. It is so annoying to see all that mob about the streets--!"

Lately a bold highwayman, who I think has committed a barbarous number of excesses, and who is a speaking acquaintance, said to me:

"Since I read an article in a paper about that philosopher now in fashion I am satisfied; I had stupid ideas in my head, twinges--. Think how foolish! When I saw this maxim written, 'Nothing is true, all is admissible,' I said, 'Here's my man.' What difference that I have done this and that and that everyonder? There are high and low men, proud, cowardly, luxurious, stupid men. I'm a man who has no morality. That's all."

Perhaps it would be necessary to write a complete psychology of the present time to be able logically to explain Nietzsche's success, which nowadays fills the whole world of thought.

I have heard a friend say that Juan Valera is intending to write something about Nietzsche and the philosophy of the superman.

Don Juan's comments on the ideas of the Prussian philosopher promise to be most interesting. Valera, who is the shrewdest spirit in present-day Spain, and who has, as an Apollonian man (to use Nietzsche's phrase), great antipathy toward all that comes from the North, will certainly find new points of view when he examines the doctrines of the philosophy of the superman.

I am waiting with genuine curiosity for those comments of Don Juan.
II. Apollo and Dionysus

1. 2p18b: calls himself a Dionysian
2. 2p35bc: calls Kierkegaard a Dionysian.
3. 2p273bcf: Apollo and Dionysus the two impulsive forces.
4. 2p408ab: (in a purely descriptive passage) "...an orchestra which plays something brisk and Dionysian."
5. 5p33: the caption "Dionysian or Apollonian?" with discussion.
6. 5p56f: Baroja's movement from Dionysianism to Apollonianism.
7. 5p63: The movement away from the "Cult of Dionysus."
8. 6p206ab: Apollo mentioned, but probably not in connection with Nietzsche.
9. 6p234ab: limitation contrasted with Dionysian freedom.
10. 6p236bc: says was a Dionysian as a youth.
11. 19p39b: Dionysus the humorist, Apollo the philosopher.
12. 19p62: both Dionysus and Apollo in humorism.
15. Páginas Escogidas, p8b: same as (10).
III. Miscellaneous

1. Affirming life: 2p31b

2. Human, all-too-human: 9p65c, Larrañaga uses this phrase speaking of the expression love in a certain picture (not necessarily an allusion to Nietzsche); 21p275c and 288, "the all-too-human"; see also above, I, 15.


4. Surpassing oneself: 9p208a; 13p60c.

5. Superman: 6p20ab, "ridiculous supermannishness," speaking of the snobbery of a certain political group; 6p211b, the superman does not humiliate his victim; 9p208a, the superman a miracle; 10p179bc, the "superior" men; 11p149ab, "superwoman"; 12p36bc, "Pepita is of the race of the masters"; 21p268c, "The tragic lyricisms of the superman"; 22p43c, ironically calls social climbers "veritable supermen"; see also above, I, 25.

6. Tragic sense of life or culture: 5p210b, "that tragic sense of culture"; see also above, I, 24, the "tragic sense of life." Used with the word "culture" the reference is plainly to the Birth of Tragedy and not to Unamuno; the second, which is Unamuno's phrase, comes twelve years too soon to be Unamuno.

7. Zarathustra: see above passim, and 22p15bc, "Zarathustras of the gambling dens."