

Aristotle

Nicomachean Ethics

Books 1 and 5

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THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE.



BOOK I.

THE END.

1 1. EVERY art and every kind of inquiry, and like- In all he does
man seeks
some good
as end or
means.
wise every act and purpose, seems to aim at some
good: and so it has been well said that the good is
that at which everything aims.

2 But a difference is observable among these aims or
ends. What is aimed at is sometimes the exercise of
a faculty, sometimes a certain result beyond that
exercise. And where there is an end beyond the act,
there the result is better than the exercise of the
faculty.

3 Now since there are many kinds of actions and
many arts and sciences, it follows that there are many
ends also; *e.g.* health is the end of medicine, ships
of shipbuilding, victory of the art of war, and wealth
of economy.

4 But when several of these are subordinated to

some one art or science,—as the making of bridles and other trappings to the art of horsemanship, and this in turn, along with all else that the soldier does, to the art of war, and so on,*—then the end of the master-art is always more desired than the ends of the subordinate arts, since these are pursued for its sake. And this is 5 equally true whether the end in view be the mere exercise of a faculty or something beyond that, as in the above instances.

THE end is
THE good ;
our subject is
this and
its science
Politics.

2. If then in what we do there be some end which 1 we wish for on its own account, choosing all the others as means to this, but not every end without exception as a means to something else (for so we should go on *ad infinitum*, and desire would be left void and objectless),—this evidently will be the good or the best of all things. And surely from a practical point 2 of view it much concerns us to know this good ; for then, like archers shooting at a definite mark, we shall be more likely to attain what we want.

If this be so, we must try to indicate roughly what 3 it is, and first of all to which of the arts or sciences it belongs.

It would seem to belong to the supreme art or 4 science, that one which most of all deserves the name of master-art or master-science.

Now Politics † seems to answer to this description. 5

* Reading τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ.

† To Aristotle Politics is a much wider term than to us ; it covers the whole field of human life, since man is essentially social (7, 6) ; it has to determine (1) what is the good ?—the question of this treatise (§ 9)—and (2) what can law do to promote this good ?—the question of the sequel, which is specially called "The Politics : " cf. X. 9.

6 For it prescribes which of the sciences a state needs, and which each man shall study, and up to what point; and to it we see subordinated even the highest arts, such as economy, rhetoric, and the art of war.

7 Since then it makes use of the other practical sciences, and since it further ordains what men are to do and from what to refrain, its end must include the ends of the others, and must be the proper good of man.

8 For though this good is the same for the individual and the state, yet the good of the state seems a grander and more perfect thing both to attain and to secure; and glad as one would be to do this service for a single individual, to do it for a people and for a number of states is nobler and more divine.

9 This then is the aim of the present inquiry, which is a sort of political inquiry.*

1 3. We must be content if we can attain to so much precision in our statement as the subject before us admits of; for the same degree of accuracy is no more to be expected in all kinds of reasoning than in all kinds of handicraft.

Exactness not permitted by subject nor to be expected by student, who needs experience and training.

2 Now the things that are noble and just (with which Politics deals) are so various and so uncertain, that some think these are merely conventional and not natural distinctions.

3 There is a similar uncertainty also about what is good, because good things often do people harm: men have before now been ruined by wealth, and have lost their lives through courage.

4 Our subject, then, and our data being of this

* *i.e.* covers a part of the ground only: see preceding note.

nature, we must be content if we can indicate the truth roughly and in outline, and if, in dealing with matters that are not amenable to immutable laws, and reasoning from premises that are but probable, we can arrive at probable conclusions.*

The reader, on his part, should take each of my statements in the same spirit; for it is the mark of an educated man to require, in each kind of inquiry, just so much exactness as the subject admits of: it is equally absurd to accept probable reasoning from a mathematician, and to demand scientific proof from an orator.

But each man can form a judgment about what he 5 knows, and is called "a good judge" of that—of any special matter when he has received a special education therein, "a good judge" (without any qualifying epithet) when he has received a universal education. And hence a young man is not qualified to be a student of Politics; for he lacks experience of the affairs of life, which form the data and the subject-matter of Politics.

Further, since he is apt to be swayed by his 6 feelings, he will derive no benefit from a study whose aim is not speculative but practical.

But in this respect young in character counts the 7 same as young in years; for the young man's disqualification is not a matter of time, but is due to the fact that feeling rules his life and directs all his desires. Men of this character turn the knowledge

* The expression τὰ ὅτι ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ covers both (1) what is generally though not universally true, and (2) what is probable though not certain.

they get to no account in practice, as we see with those we call incontinent; but those who direct their desires and actions by reason will gain much profit from the knowledge of these matters.

8 So much then by way of preface as to the student, and the spirit in which he must accept what we say, and the object which we propose to ourselves.

1 4. Since—to resume—all knowledge and all purpose aims at some good, what is this which we say is the aim of Politics; or, in other words, what is the highest of all realizable goods? Men agree that the good is happiness, but differ as to what this is.

2 As to its name, I suppose nearly all men are agreed; for the masses and the men of culture alike declare that it is happiness, and hold that to “live well” or to “do well” is the same as to be “happy.”

But they differ as to what this happiness is, and the masses do not give the same account of it as the philosophers.

3 The former take it to be something palpable and plain, as pleasure or wealth or fame; one man holds it to be this, and another that, and often the same man is of different minds at different times,—after sickness it is health, and in poverty it is wealth; while when they are impressed with the consciousness of their ignorance, they admire most those who say grand things that are above their comprehension.

Some philosophers, on the other hand, have thought that, beside these several good things, there is an “absolute” good which is the cause of their goodness.

4 As it would hardly be worth while to review all the opinions that have been held, we will confine ourselves to those which are most popular, or which seem to have some foundation in reason.

We must reason from facts accepted without question by the man of trained character.

But we must not omit to notice the distinction 5 that is drawn between the method of proceeding from your starting-points or principles, and the method of working up to them. Plato used with fitness to raise this question, and to ask whether the right way is from or to your starting-points, as in the race-course you may run from the judges to the boundary, or *vice versâ*.

Well, we must start from what is known.

But "what is known" may mean two things: "what is known to us," which is one thing, or "what is known" simply, which is another.

I think it is safe to say that *we* must start from what is known to *us*.

And on this account nothing but a good moral 6 training can qualify a man to study what is noble and just—in a word, to study questions of Politics. For the undemonstrated fact is here the starting- 7 point, and if this undemonstrated fact be sufficiently evident to a man, he will not require a "reason why." Now the man who has had a good moral training either has already arrived at starting-points or principles of action, or will easily accept them when pointed out. But he who neither has them nor will accept them may hear what Hesiod says *—

"The best is he who of himself doth know;
Good too is he who listens to the wise;
But he who neither knows himself nor heeds
The words of others, is a useless man."

The good cannot be pleasure, nor honour, nor virtue.

5. Let us now take up the discussion at the point 1 from which we digressed.

* "Works and Days," 291-295.

It seems that men not unreasonably take their notions of the good or happiness from the lives actually led, and that the masses who are the least refined suppose it to be pleasure, which is the reason why they aim at nothing higher than the life of enjoyment.

For the most conspicuous kinds of life are three: this life of enjoyment, the life of the statesman, and, thirdly, the contemplative life.

The mass of men show themselves utterly slavish in their preference for the life of brute beasts, but their views receive consideration because many of those in high places have the tastes of Sardanapalus.

Men of refinement with a practical turn prefer honour; for I suppose we may say that honour is the aim of the statesman's life.

But this seems too superficial to be the good we are seeking: for it appears to depend upon those who give rather than upon those who receive it; while we have a presentiment that the good is something that is peculiarly a man's own and can scarce be taken away from him.

Moreover, these men seem to pursue honour in order that they may be assured of their own excellence,—at least, they wish to be honoured by men of sense, and by those who know them, and on the ground of their virtue or excellence. It is plain, then, that in their view, at any rate, virtue or excellence is better than honour; and perhaps we should take this to be the end of the statesman's life, rather than honour.

But virtue or excellence also appears too incomplete to be what we want; for it seems that a man

might have virtue and yet be asleep or be inactive all his life, and, moreover, might meet with the greatest disasters and misfortunes; and no one would maintain that such a man is happy, except for argument's sake. But we will not dwell on these matters now, for they are sufficiently discussed in the popular treatises.

The third kind of life is the life of contemplation: 7 we will treat of it further on.*

As for the money-making life, it is something 8 quite contrary to nature; and wealth evidently is not the good of which we are in search, for it is merely useful as a means to something else. So we might rather take pleasure and virtue or excellence to be ends than wealth; for they are chosen on their own account. But it seems that not even they are the end, though much breath has been wasted in attempts to show that they are.

Various arguments to show against the Platonists that there cannot be one universal good.

6. Dismissing these views, then, we have now to 1 consider the "universal good," and to state the difficulties which it presents; though such an inquiry is not a pleasant task in view of our friendship for the authors of the doctrine of ideas. But we venture to think that this is the right course, and that in the interests of truth we ought to sacrifice even what is nearest to us, especially as we call ourselves philosophers. Both are dear to us, but it is a sacred duty to give the preference to truth.

In the first place, the authors of this theory them- 2 selves did not assert a common idea in the case of things of which one is prior to the other; and for this

* Cf. VI. 7, 12, and X. 7, 8.

reason they did not hold one common idea of numbers. Now the predicate good is applied to substances and also to qualities and relations. But that which has independent existence, what we call "substance," is logically prior to that which is relative; for the latter is an offshoot as it were, or [in logical language] an accident of a thing or substance. So [by their own showing] there cannot be one common idea of these goods.

3 Secondly, the term good is used in as many different ways as the term "is" or "being:" we apply the term to substances or independent existences, as God, reason; to qualities, as the virtues; to quantity, as the moderate or due amount; to relatives, as the useful; to time, as opportunity; to place, as habitation, and so on. It is evident, therefore, that the word good cannot stand for one and the same notion in all these various applications; for if it did, the term could not be applied in all the categories, but in one only.

4 Thirdly, if the notion were one, since there is but one science of all the things that come under one idea, there would be but one science of all goods; but as it is, there are many sciences even of the goods that come under one category; as, for instance, the science which deals with opportunity in war is strategy, but in disease is medicine; and the science of the due amount in the matter of food is medicine, but in the matter of exercise is the science of gymnastic.

5 Fourthly, one might ask what they mean by the "absolute:" in "absolute man" and "man" the word "man" has one and the same sense; for in respect of manhood there will be no difference between them;

and if so, neither will there be any difference in respect of goodness between "absolute good" and "good."

Fifthly, they do not make the good any more good by making it eternal; a white thing that lasts a long while is no whiter than what lasts but a day.

There seems to be more plausibility in the doctrine of the Pythagoreans, who [in their table of opposites] place the one on the same side with the good things [instead of reducing all goods to unity]; and even Speusippus * seems to follow them in this.

However, these points may be reserved for another occasion; but objection may be taken to what I have said on the ground that the Platonists do not speak in this way of all goods indiscriminately, but hold that those that are pursued and welcomed on their own account are called good by reference to one common form or type, while those things that tend to produce or preserve these goods, or to prevent their opposites, are called good only as means to these, and in a different sense.

It is evident that there will thus be two classes of goods: one good in themselves, the other good as means to the former. Let us separate then from the things that are merely useful those that are good in themselves, and inquire if they are called good by reference to one common idea or type.

Now what kind of things would one call "good in themselves"?

Surely those things that we pursue even apart from their consequences, such as wisdom and sight

* Plato's nephew and successor.

and certain pleasures and certain honours; for although we sometimes pursue these things as means, no one could refuse to rank them among the things that are good in themselves.

If these be excluded, nothing is good in itself except the idea; and then the type or form will be meaningless.*

- 11 If however, these are ranked among the things that are good in themselves, then it must be shown that the goodness of all of them can be defined in the same terms, as white has the same meaning when applied to snow and to white lead.

But, in fact, we have to give a separate and different account of the goodness of honour and wisdom and pleasure.

Good, then, is not a term that is applied to all these things alike in the same sense or with reference to one common idea or form.

- 12 But how then do these things come to be called good? for they do not appear to have received the same name by chance merely. Perhaps it is because they all proceed from one source, or all conduce to one end; or perhaps it is rather in virtue of some analogy, just as we call the reason the eye of the soul because it bears the same relation to the soul that the eye does to the body, and so on.

- 13 But we may dismiss these questions at present; for to discuss them in detail belongs more properly to another branch of philosophy.

And for the same reason we may dismiss the *Even if there*

* For there is no meaning in a form which is a form of nothing, in a universal which has no particulars under it.

*were, it
would not
help us here.*

further consideration of the idea; for even granting that this term good, which is applied to all these different things, has one and the same meaning throughout, or that there is an absolute good apart from these particulars, it is evident that this good will not be anything that man can realize or attain: but it is a good of this kind that we are now seeking.

It might, perhaps, be thought that it would nevertheless be well to make ourselves acquainted with this universal good, with a view to the goods that are attainable and realizable. With this for a pattern, it may be said, we shall more readily discern our own good, and discerning achieve it. 14

There certainly is some plausibility in this argument, but it seems to be at variance with the existing sciences; for though they are all aiming at some good and striving to make up their deficiencies, they neglect to inquire about this universal good. And yet it is scarce likely that the professors of the several arts and sciences should not know, nor even look for, what would help them so much. 15

And indeed I am at a loss to know how the weaver or the carpenter would be furthered in his art by a knowledge of this absolute good, or how a man would be rendered more able to heal the sick or to command an army by contemplation of the pure form or idea. For it seems to me that the physician does not even seek for health in this abstract way, but seeks for the health of man, or rather of some particular man, for it is individuals that he has to heal. 16

The good is

7. Leaving these matters, then, let us return once 1

more to the question, what this good can be of which we are in search. *the final end and happiness is this.*

It seems to be different in different kinds of action and in different arts,—one thing in medicine and another in war, and so on. What then is the good in each of these cases? Surely that for the sake of which all else is done. And that in medicine is health, in war is victory, in building is a house,—a different thing in each different case, but always, in whatever we do and in whatever we choose, the end. For it is always for the sake of the end that all else is done.

If then there be one end of all that man does, this end will be the realizable good,—or these ends, if there be more than one.

2 By this generalization our argument is brought to the same point as before.* This point we must try to explain more clearly.

3 We see that there are many ends. But some of these are chosen only as means, as wealth, flutes, and the whole class of instruments. And so it is plain that not all ends are final.

But the best of all things must, we conceive, be something final.

If then there be only one final end, this will be what we are seeking,—or if there be more than one, then the most final of them.

4 Now that which is pursued as an end in itself is more final than that which is pursued as means to something else, and that which is never chosen as means than that which is chosen both as an end in itself and as means, and that is strictly final which

* 2, 1. See Stewart.

is always chosen as an end in itself and never as means.

Happiness seems more than anything else to answer 5 to this description: for we always choose it for itself, and never for the sake of something else; while honour and pleasure and reason, and all virtue or excellence, we choose partly indeed for themselves (for, apart from any result, we should choose each of them), but partly also for the sake of happiness, supposing that they will help to make us happy. But no one chooses happiness for the sake of these things, or as a means to anything else at all.

We seem to be led to the same conclusion when we 6 start from the notion of self-sufficiency.

The final good is thought to be self-sufficing [or all-sufficing]. In applying this term we do not regard a man as an individual leading a solitary life, but we also take account of parents, children, wife, and, in short, friends and fellow-citizens generally, since man is naturally a social being. Some limit must indeed 7 be set to this; for if you go on to parents and descendants and friends of friends, you will never come to a stop. But this we will consider further on: for the present we will take self-sufficing to mean what by itself makes life desirable and in want of nothing. And happiness is believed to answer to this description.

And further, happiness is believed to be the most 8 desirable thing in the world, and that not merely as one among other good things: if it were merely one among other good things [so that other things could be added to it], it is plain that the addition of the least

of other goods must make it more desirable; for the addition becomes a surplus of good, and of two goods the greater is always more desirable.

Thus it seems that happiness is something final and self-sufficing, and is the end of all that man does.

9 But perhaps the reader thinks that though no one will dispute the statement that happiness is the best thing in the world, yet a still more precise definition of it is needed. *To find it we ask, What is man's function?*

10 This will best be gained, I think, by asking, What is the function of man? For as the goodness and the excellence of a piper or a sculptor, or the practiser of any art, and generally of those who have any function or business to do, lies in that function, so man's good would seem to lie in his function, if he has one.

11 But can we suppose that, while a carpenter and a cobbler has a function and a business of his own, man has no business and no function assigned him by nature? Nay, surely as his several members, eye and hand and foot, plainly have each his own function, so we must suppose that man also has some function over and above all these.

12 What then is it?

Life evidently he has in common even with the plants, but we want that which is peculiar to him. We must exclude, therefore, the life of mere nutrition and growth.

Next to this comes the life of sense; but this too he plainly shares with horses and cattle and all kinds of animals.

13 There remains then the life whereby he acts—the

life of his rational nature,* with its two sides or divisions, one rational as obeying reason, the other rational as having and exercising reason.

But as this expression is ambiguous,† we must be understood to mean thereby the life that consists in the exercise of the faculties; for this seems to be more properly entitled to the name.

The function of man, then, is exercise of his vital 14 faculties [or soul] on one side in obedience to reason, and on the other side with reason.

But what is called the function of a man of any profession and the function of a man who is good in that profession are generically the same, *e.g.* of a harper and of a good harper; and this holds in all cases without exception, only that in the case of the latter his superior excellence at his work is added; for we say a harper's function is to harp, and a good harper's to harp well.

(Man's function then being, as we say, a kind of life—that is to say, exercise of his faculties and action of various kinds with reason—the good man's function is to do this well and beautifully [or nobly]. But the function of anything is done well when it 15 is done in accordance with the proper excellence of that thing.) ‡

* *πρακτική τις τοῦ λόγου ἔχοντος.* Aristotle frequently uses the terms *πρᾶξις*, *πρακτός*, *πρακτικός* in this wide sense, covering all that man does, *i.e.* all that part of man's life that is within the control of his will, or that is consciously directed to an end, including therefore speculation as well as action.

† For it might mean either the mere possession of the vital faculties, or their exercise.

‡ This paragraph seems to be a repetition (I would rather say a re-writing) of the previous paragraph. See note on VII. 3, 2.

If this be so the result is that the good of man is exercise of his faculties in accordance with excellence or virtue, or, if there be more than one, in accordance with the best and most complete virtue.*

*Resulting
definition of
happi-ness.*

16 But there must also be a full term of years for this exercise; † for one swallow or one fine day does not make a spring, nor does one day or any small space of time make a blessed or happy man.

17 This, then, may be taken as a rough outline of the good; for this, I think, is the proper method,—first to sketch the outline, and then to fill in the details. But it would seem that, the outline once fairly drawn, any one can carry on the work and fit in the several items which time reveals to us or helps us to find. And this indeed is the way in which the arts and sciences have grown; for it requires no extraordinary genius to fill up the gaps.

18 We must bear in mind, however, what was said above, and not demand the same degree of accuracy in all branches of study, but in each case so much as the subject-matter admits of and as is proper to that kind
19 of inquiry. The carpenter and the geometer both look for the right angle, but in different ways: the former only wants such an approximation to it as his work requires, but the latter wants to know what constitutes a right angle, or what is its special quality; his aim is to find out the truth. And so in other cases we must follow the same course, lest we spend more

* This "best and most complete excellence or virtue" is the trained faculty for philosophic speculation, and the contemplative life is man's highest happiness. Cf. X. 7, 1.

† Cf. 9, 11.

time on what is immaterial than on the real business in hand.

Nor must we in all cases alike demand the reason why; sometimes it is enough if the undemonstrated fact be fairly pointed out, as in the case of the starting-points or principles of a science. Undemonstrated facts always form the first step or starting-point of a science; and these starting-points or principles are arrived at some in one way, some in another—some by induction, others by perception, others again by some kind of training. But in each case we must try to apprehend them in the proper way, and do our best to define them clearly; for they have great influence upon the subsequent course of an inquiry. A good start is more than half the race, I think, and our starting-point or principle, once found, clears up a number of our difficulties.

8. We must not be satisfied, then, with examining this starting-point or principle of ours as a conclusion from our data, but must also view it in its relation to current opinions on the subject; for all experience harmonizes with a true principle, but a false one is soon found to be incompatible with the facts.

Now, good things have been divided into three classes, external goods on the one hand, and on the other goods of the soul and goods of the body; and the goods of the soul are commonly said to be goods in the fullest sense, and more good than any other.

But "actions and exercises of the vital faculties or soul" may be said to be "of the soul." So our account is confirmed by this opinion, which is both of long

This view harmonizes various current views.

standing and approved by all who busy themselves with philosophy.

3 But, indeed, we secure the support of this opinion by the mere statement that certain actions and exercises are the end; for this implies that it is to be ranked among the goods of the soul, and not among external goods.

4 Our account, again, is in harmony with the common saying that the happy man lives well and does well; for we may say that happiness, according to us, is a living well and doing well.

5 And, indeed, all the characteristics that men expect to find in happiness seem to belong to happiness as we define it.

6 Some hold it to be virtue or excellence, some prudence, others a kind of wisdom; others, again, hold it to be all or some of these, with the addition of pleasure, either as an ingredient or as a necessary accompaniment; and some even include external prosperity in their account of it.

7 Now, some of these views have the support of many voices and of old authority; others have few voices, but those of weight; but it is probable that neither the one side nor the other is entirely wrong, but that in some one point at least, if not in most, they are both right.

8 First, then, the view that happiness is excellence or a kind of excellence harmonizes with our account; for "exercise of faculties in accordance with excellence" belongs to excellence.

9 But I think we may say that it makes no small difference whether the good be conceived as the mere

possession of something, or as its use—as a mere habit or trained faculty, or as the exercise of that faculty. For the habit or faculty may be present, and yet issue in no good result, as when a man is asleep, or in any other way hindered from his function; but with its exercise this is not possible, for it must show itself in acts and in good acts. And as at the Olympic games it is not the fairest and strongest who receive the crown, but those who contend (for among these are the victors), so in life, too, the winners are those who not only have all the excellences, but manifest these in deed.

And, further, the life of these men is in itself 10 pleasant. For pleasure is an affection of the soul, and each man takes pleasure in that which he is said to love,—he who loves horses in horses, he who loves sight-seeing in sight-seeing, and in the same way he who loves justice in acts of justice, and generally the lover of excellence or virtue in virtuous acts or the manifestation of excellence.

And while with most men there is a perpetual 11 conflict between the several things in which they find pleasure, since these are not naturally pleasant, those who love what is noble take pleasure in that which is naturally pleasant. For the manifestations of excellence are naturally pleasant, so that they are both pleasant to them and pleasant in themselves.

Their life, then, does not need pleasure to be added 12 to it as an appendage, but contains pleasure in itself.

Indeed, in addition to what we have said, a man is not good at all unless he takes pleasure in noble deeds. No one would call a man just who did not

take pleasure in doing justice, nor generous who took no pleasure in acts of generosity, and so on.

13 If this be so, the manifestations of excellence will be pleasant in themselves. But they are also both good and noble, and that in the highest degree—at least, if the good man's judgment about them is right, for this is his judgment.

14 Happiness, then, is at once the best and noblest and pleasantest thing in the world, and these are not separated, as the Delian inscription would have them to be:—

“What is most just is noblest, health is best,
Pleasantest is to get your heart's desire.”

For all these characteristics are united in the best exercises of our faculties; and these, or some one of them that is better than all the others, we identify with happiness.

15 But nevertheless happiness plainly requires external goods too, as we said; for it is impossible, or at least not easy, to act nobly without some furniture of fortune. There are many things that can only be done through instruments, so to speak, such as friends
16 and wealth and political influence: and there are some things whose absence takes the bloom off our happiness, as good birth, the blessing of children, personal beauty; for a man is not very likely to be happy if he is very ugly in person, or of low birth, or alone in the world, or childless, and perhaps still less if he has worthless children or friends, or has lost good ones that he had.

17 As we said, then, happiness seems to stand in need of this kind of prosperity; and so some identify it

with good fortune, just as others identify it with excellence.

*Is happiness
acquired, or
the gift of
Gods or
of chance?*

9. This has led people to ask whether happiness 1
is attained by learning, or the formation of habits, or
any other kind of training, or comes by some divine
dispensation or even by chance.

Well, if the Gods do give gifts to men, happiness 2
is likely to be among the number, more likely, indeed,
than anything else, in proportion as it is better than
all other human things.

This belongs more properly to another branch of in- 3
quiry; but we may say that even if it is not heaven-
sent, but comes as a consequence of virtue or some
kind of learning or training, still it seems to be one
of the most divine things in the world; for the prize
and aim of virtue would appear to be better than
anything else and something divine and blessed.

Again, if it is thus acquired it will be widely 4
accessible; for it will then be in the power of all
except those who have lost the capacity for excellence
to acquire it by study and diligence.

And if it be better that men should attain happi- 5
ness in this way rather than by chance, it is reasonable
to suppose that it is so, since in the sphere of nature
all things are arranged in the best possible way, and 6
likewise in the sphere of art, and of each mode of
causation, and most of all in the sphere of the noblest
mode of causation. And indeed it would be too
absurd to leave what is noblest and fairest to the
dispensation of chance.

But our definition itself clears up the difficulty; * 7

* Cf. *supra*. 7. 21.

for happiness was defined as a certain kind of exercise of the vital faculties in accordance with excellence or virtue. And of the remaining goods [other than happiness itself], some must be present as necessary conditions, while others are aids and useful instruments
 8 to happiness. And this agrees with what we said at starting. We then laid down that the end of the art political is the best of all ends; but the chief business of that art is to make the citizens of a certain character
 9 —that is, good and apt to do what is noble. It is not without reason, then, that we do not call an ox, or a horse, or any brute happy; for none of them is able to share in this kind of activity.

10 For the same reason also a child is not happy; he is as yet, because of his age, unable to do such things. If we ever call a child happy, it is because we hope he will do them. For, as we said, happiness requires not only perfect excellence or virtue,
 11 but also a full term of years for its exercise. For our circumstances are liable to many changes and to all sorts of chances, and it is possible that he who is now most prosperous will in his old age meet with great disasters, as is told of Priam in the tales of Troy; and a man who is thus used by fortune and comes to a miserable end cannot be called happy.

1 10. Are we, then, to call no man happy as long as
 he lives, but to wait for the end, as Solon said? *Can no man
be called
happy
during life?*

2 And, supposing we have to allow this, do we mean that he actually is happy after he is dead? Surely that is absurd, especially for us who say that happiness is a kind of activity or life.

But if we do not call the dead man happy, and if ³ Solon meant not this, but that only then could we safely apply the term to a man, as being now beyond the reach of evil and calamity, then here too we find some ground for objection. For it is thought that both good and evil may in some sort befall a dead man (just as they may befall a living man, although he is unconscious of them), *e.g.* honours rendered to him, or the reverse of these, and again the prosperity or the misfortune of his children and all his descendants.

But this, too, has its difficulties; for after a man ⁴ has lived happily to a good old age, and ended as he lived, it is possible that many changes may befall him in the persons of his descendants, and that some of them may turn out good and meet with the good fortune they deserve, and others the reverse. It is evident too that the degree in which the descendants are related to their ancestors may vary to any extent. And it would be a strange thing if the dead man were ⁵ to change with these changes and become happy and miserable by turns. But it would also be strange to suppose that the dead are not affected at all, even for ⁶ a limited time, by the fortunes of their posterity.

But let us return to our former question; for its ⁶ solution will, perhaps, clear up this other difficulty.

The saying of Solon may mean that we ought to ⁷ look for the end and then call a man happy, not because he now is, but because he once was happy.

But surely it is strange that when he is happy we should refuse to say what is true of him, because we do not like to apply the term to living men in view

of the changes to which they are liable, and because we hold happiness to be something that endures and is little liable to change, while the fortunes of one and
8 the same man often undergo many revolutions: for, it is argued, it is plain that, if we follow the changes of fortune, we shall call the same man happy and miserable many times over, making the happy man "a sort of chameleon and one who rests on no sound foundation."

9 We reply that it cannot be right thus to follow fortune. For it is not in this that our weal or woe lies; but, as we said, though good fortune is needed to complete man's life, yet it is the excellent employment of his powers that constitutes his happiness, as the reverse of this constitutes his misery.

10 But the discussion of this difficulty leads to a further confirmation of our account. For nothing human is so constant as the excellent exercise of our faculties. The sciences themselves seem to be less abiding. And the highest of these exercises* are the most abiding, because the happy are occupied with them most of all and most continuously (for this seems to be the reason why we do not forget how to do them †).

11 The happy man, then, as we define him, will have this required property of permanence, and all through life will preserve his character; for he will be occupied continually, or with the least possible interruption, in

* The "highest exercise of our faculties" is, of course, philosophic contemplation, as above, I. 7, 15; cf. X. 7, 1.

† We may forget scientific truths that we have known more easily than we lose the habit of scientific thinking or of virtuous action; cf. X. 7, 2; VI. 5, 8.

excellent deeds and excellent speculations; and, whatever his fortune be, he will take it in the noblest fashion, and bear himself always and in all things suitably, since he is truly good and "foursquare without a flaw."

But the dispensations of fortune are many, some 12 great, some small. The small ones, whether good or evil, plainly are of no weight in the scale; but the great ones, when numerous, will make life happier if they be good; for they help to give a grace to life themselves, and their use is noble and good; but, if they be evil, will enfeeble and spoil happiness; for they bring pain, and often impede the exercise of our faculties.

But nevertheless true worth shines out even here, in the calm endurance of many great misfortunes, not through insensibility, but through nobility and greatness of soul. And if it is what a man does that deter- 13 mines the character of his life, as we said, then no happy man will become miserable; for he will never do what is hateful and base. For we hold that the man who is truly good and wise will bear with dignity whatever fortune sends, and will always make the best of his circumstances, as a good general will turn the forces at his command to the best account, and a good shoemaker will make the best shoe that can be made out of a given piece of leather, and so on with all other crafts.

If this be so, the happy man will never become 14 miserable, though he will not be truly happy if he meets with the fate of Priam.

But yet he is not unstable and lightly changed: he

will not be moved from his happiness easily, nor by any ordinary misfortunes, but only by many heavy ones ; and after such, he will not recover his happiness again in a short time, but if at all, only in a considerable period, which has a certain completeness, and in which he attains to great and noble things.

15 We shall meet all objections, then, if we say that a happy man is "one who exercises his faculties in accordance with perfect excellence, being duly furnished with external goods, not for any chance time, but for a full term of years:" to which perhaps we should add, "and who shall continue to live so, and shall die as he lived," since the future is veiled to us, but happiness we take to be the end and in all ways perfectly final or complete.

16 If this be so, we may say that those living men are blessed or perfectly happy who both have and shall continue to have these characteristics, but happy as men only.

1 11. Passing now from this question to that of the fortunes of descendants and of friends generally, the doctrine that they do not affect the departed at all seems too cold and too much opposed to popular
 2 opinion. But as the things that happen to them are many and differ in all sorts of ways, and some come home to them more and some less, so that to discuss them all separately would be a long, indeed an endless task, it will perhaps be enough to speak of them in general terms and in outline merely.

3 Now, as of the misfortunes that happen to a man's self, some have a certain weight and influence on his life, while others are of less moment, so is it also with

Cannot the fortunes of survivors affect the dead?

what happens to any of his friends. And, again, it ⁴ always makes much more difference whether those who are affected by an occurrence are alive or dead than it does whether a terrible crime in a tragedy be enacted on the stage or merely supposed to have ⁵ already taken place. We must therefore take these differences into account, and still more, perhaps, the fact that it is a doubtful question whether the dead are at all accessible to good and ill. For it appears that even if anything that happens, whether good or evil, does come home to them, yet it is something unsubstantial and slight to them if not in itself; or if not that, yet at any rate its influence is not of that magnitude or nature that it can make happy those who are not, or take away their happiness from those that are.

It seems then—to conclude—that the prosperity, ⁶ and likewise the adversity, of friends does affect the dead, but not in such a way or to such an extent as to make the happy unhappy, or to do anything of the kind.

*Happiness as
absolute end
is above
praise.*

12. These points being settled, we may now inquire ¹ whether happiness is to be ranked among the goods that we praise, or rather among those that we revere; for it is plainly not a mere potentiality, but an actual good.

What we praise seems always to be praised ² as being of a certain quality and having a certain relation to something. For instance, we praise the just and the courageous man, and generally the good man, and excellence or virtue, because of what they do or produce; and we praise also the strong or the swift-

footed man, and so on, because he has a certain gift or faculty in relation to some good and admirable thing.

3 This is evident if we consider the praises bestowed on the Gods. The Gods are thereby made ridiculous by being made relative to man; and this happens because, as we said, a thing can only be praised in relation to something else.

4 If, then, praise be proper to such things as we mentioned, it is evident that to the best things is due, not praise, but something greater and better, as our usage shows; for the Gods we call blessed and happy, and "blessed" is the term we apply to the most god-like men.

And so with good things: no one praises happiness as he praises justice, but calls it blessed, as something better and more divine.

5 On these grounds Eudoxus is thought to have based a strong argument for the claims of pleasure to the first prize: for he maintained that the fact that it is not praised, though it is a good thing, shows that it is higher than the goods we praise, as God and the good are higher; for these are the standards by refer-
6 ence to which we judge all other things,—giving praise to excellence or virtue, since it makes us apt to do what is noble, and passing encomiums on the results of virtue, whether these be bodily or psychical.

7 But to refine on these points belongs more properly to those who have made a study of the subject of encomiums; for us it is plain from what has been said that happiness is one of the goods which we revere and count as final.

And this further seems to follow from the fact that 8
it is a starting-point or principle: for everything we
do is always done for its sake; but the principle and
cause of all good we hold to be something divine and
worthy of reverence.

*Division of
the faculties
and result-
ing division
of the
virtues.*

13. Since happiness is an exercise of the vital 1
faculties in accordance with perfect virtue or excel-
lence, we will now inquire about virtue or excellence;
for this will probably help us in our inquiry about
happiness.

And indeed the true statesman seems to be espe- 2
cially concerned with virtue, for he wishes to make
the citizens good and obedient to the laws. Of this 3
we have an example in the Cretan and the Lacedæ-
monian lawgivers, and any others who have resembled
them. But if the inquiry belongs to Politics or the 4
science of the state, it is plain that it will be in ac-
cordance with our original purpose to pursue it.

The virtue or excellence that we are to consider is, 5
of course, the excellence of man; for it is the good of
man and the happiness of man that we started to
seek. And by the excellence of man I mean excel- 6
lence not of body, but of soul; for happiness we take
to be an activity of the soul.

If this be so, then it is evident that the statesman 7
must have some knowledge of the soul, just as the
man who is to heal the eye or the whole body must
have some knowledge of them, and that the more in
proportion as the science of the state is higher and
better than medicine. But all educated physicians
take much pains to know about the body.

As statesmen [or students of Politics], then, we 8

must inquire into the nature of the soul, but in so doing we must keep our special purpose in view and go only so far as that requires ; for to go into minuter detail would be too laborious for the present undertaking.

- 9 Now, there are certain doctrines about the soul which are stated elsewhere with sufficient precision, and these we will adopt.

Two parts of the soul are distinguished, an irrational and a rational part.

- 10 Whether these are separated as are the parts of the body or any divisible thing, or whether they are only distinguishable in thought but in fact inseparable, like concave and convex in the circumference of a circle, makes no difference for our present purpose.

- 11 Of the irrational part, again, one division seems to be common to all things that live, and to be possessed by plants—I mean that which causes nutrition and growth ; for we must assume that all things that take nourishment have a faculty of this kind, even when they are embryos, and have the same faculty when they are full grown ; at least, this is more reasonable than to suppose that they then have a different one.

- 12 The excellence of this faculty, then, is plainly one that man shares with other beings, and not specifically human.

And this is confirmed by the fact that in sleep this part of the soul, or this faculty, is thought to be most active, while the good and the bad man are undistinguishable when they are asleep (whence the saying that for half their lives there is no difference between the happy and the miserable ; which

indeed is what we should expect; for sleep is the cessation of the soul from those functions in respect of which it is called good or bad), except that they are to some slight extent roused by what goes on in their bodies, with the result that the dreams of the good man are better than those of ordinary people.

However, we need not pursue this further, and may 14 dismiss the nutritive principle, since it has no place in the excellence of man.

But there seems to be another vital principle that 15 is irrational, and yet in some way partakes of reason. In the case of the continent and of the incontinent man alike we praise the reason or the rational part, for it exhorts them rightly and urges them to do what is best; but there is plainly present in them another principle besides the rational one, which fights and struggles against the reason. For just as a paralyzed 16 limb, when you will to move it to the right, moves on the contrary to the left, so is it with the soul; the incontinent man's impulses run counter to his reason. Only whereas we see the refractory member in the case of the body, we do not see it in the case of the soul. But we must nevertheless, I think, hold that in the soul too there is something beside the reason, which opposes and runs counter to it (though in what sense it is distinct from the reason does not matter here).

It seems, however, to partake of reason also, as we 17 said: at least, in the continent man it submits to the reason; while in the temperate and courageous man we may say it is still more obedient; for in him it is altogether in harmony with the reason.

The irrational part, then, it appears, is twofold. 18

There is the vegetative faculty, which has no share of reason; and the faculty of appetite or of desire in general, which in a manner partakes of reason or is rational as listening to reason and submitting to its sway,—rational in the sense in which we speak of rational obedience to father or friends, not in the sense in which we speak of rational apprehension of mathematical truths. But all advice and all rebuke and exhortation testify that the irrational part is in some way amenable to reason.

19 If then we like to say that this part, too, has a share of reason, the rational part also will have two divisions: one rational in the strict sense as possessing reason in itself, the other rational as listening to reason as a man listens to his father.

20 Now, on this division of the faculties is based the division of excellence; for we speak of intellectual excellences and of moral excellences; wisdom and understanding and prudence we call intellectual, liberality and temperance we call moral virtues or excellences. When we are speaking of a man's moral character we do not say that he is wise or intelligent, but that he is gentle or temperate. But we praise the wise man, too, for his habit of mind or trained faculty; and a habit or trained faculty that is praiseworthy is what we call an excellence or virtue.

BOOK V.

THE SAME—*concluded.* JUSTICE.

Preliminary
Two senses
of justice
distin-
guished (cf.
justice (1) =
accordance to
law, = com-
plete virtue.

1. WE now have to inquire about justice and in- 1
justice, and to ask what sort of acts they are concerned
with, and in what sense justice observes the mean,
and what are the extremes whose mean is that which
is just. And in this inquiry we will follow the same 2
method as before.

We see that all men intend by justice to signify 3
the sort of habit or character that makes men apt to
do what is just, and which further makes them act
justly * and wish what is just; while by injustice
they intend in like manner to signify the sort of
character that makes men act unjustly and wish what
is unjust. Let us lay this down, then, as an outline
to work upon.

We thus oppose justice and injustice, because a 4
habit or trained faculty differs in this respect both
from a science and a faculty or power. I mean that
whereas both of a pair of opposites come under the
same science or power, a habit which produces a

* A man may "do that which is just" without "acting justly:"
cf. supra, II. 4, 3, and *infra*, cap. 8.

certain result does not also produce the opposite result; *e.g.* health produces healthy manifestations only, and not unhealthy; for we say a man has a healthy gait when he walks like a man in health.

5 [Not that the two opposites are unconnected.] In the first place, a habit is often known by the opposite habit, and often by its causes and results: if we know what good condition is, we can learn from that what bad condition is; and, again, from that which conduces to good condition we can infer what good condition itself is, and conversely from the latter can infer the former. For instance, if good condition be firmness of flesh, it follows that bad condition is flabbiness of flesh, and that what tends to produce firmness of flesh conduces to good condition.

6 And, in the second place, if one of a pair of opposite terms have more senses than one, the other term will also, as a general rule, have more than one; so that here, if the term "just" have several senses, the term "unjust" also will have several.

7 And in fact it seems that both "justice" and "injustice" have several senses, but, as the different things covered by the common name are very closely related, the fact that they are different escapes notice and does not strike us, as it does when there is a great disparity—a great difference, say, in outward appearance—as it strikes every one, for instance, that the κλεις (*clavis*, collar-bone) which lies under the neck of an animal is different from the κλεις (*clavis*, key) with which we fasten the door.

8 Let us then ascertain in how many different senses we call a man unjust.

Firstly, he who breaks the laws is considered unjust, and, secondly, he who takes more than his share, or the unfair man.

Plainly, then, a just man will mean (1) a law-abiding and (2) a fair man.

A just thing then will be (1) that which is in accordance with the law, (2) that which is fair; and the unjust thing will be (1) that which is contrary to law, (2) that which is unfair.

But since the unjust man, in one of the two senses 9 of the word, takes more than his share, the sphere of his action will be good things—not all good things, but those with which good and ill fortune are concerned, which are always good in themselves, but not always good for us—the things that we men pray for and pursue, whereas we ought rather to pray that what is good in itself may be good for us, while we choose that which is good for us.

But the unjust man does not always take more 10 than his share; he sometimes take less, viz. of those things which are bad in the abstract; but as the lesser evil is considered to be in some sort good, and taking more means taking more good, he is said to take more than his share. But in any case he is 11 unfair; for this is a wider term which includes the other.

We found that the law-breaker is unjust, and 12 the law-abiding man is just. Hence it follows that whatever is according to law is just in one sense of the word. [And this, we see, is in fact the case;] for what the legislator prescribes is according to law, and is always said to be just.

13 Now, the laws prescribe about all manner of things, aiming at the common interest of all, or of the best men, or of those who are supreme in the state (position in the state being determined by reference to personal excellence, or to some other such standard); and so in one sense we apply the term just to whatever tends to produce and preserve the happiness of the community, and the several elements of that
14 happiness. The law bids us display courage (as not to leave our ranks, or run, or throw away our arms), and temperance (as not to commit adultery or outrage), and gentleness (as not to strike or revile our neighbours), and so on with all the other virtues and vices, enjoining acts and forbidding them, rightly when it is a good law, not so rightly when it is a hastily improvised one.

15 Justice, then, in this sense of the word, is complete virtue, with the addition that it is displayed towards others. On this account it is often spoken of as the chief of the virtues, and such that "neither evening nor morning star is so lovely;" and the saying has become proverbial, "Justice sums up all virtues in itself."

It is complete virtue, first of all, because it is the exhibition of complete virtue: it is also complete because he that has it is able to exhibit virtue in dealing with his neighbours, and not merely in his private affairs; for there are many who can be virtuous enough at home, but fail in dealing with their neighbours.

16 This is the reason why people commend the saying of Bias, "Office will show the man;" for he that

is in office *ipso facto* stands in relation to others,* and has dealings with them.

This, too, is the reason why justice alone of all the virtues is thought to be another's good, as implying this relation to others; for it is another's interest that justice aims at—the interest, namely, of the ruler or of our fellow-citizens.

While then the worst man is he who displays vice both in his own affairs and in his dealings with his friends, the best man is not he who displays virtue in his own affairs merely, but he who displays virtue towards others; for this is the hard thing to do.

Justice, then, in this sense of the word, is not a part of virtue, but the whole of it; and the injustice which is opposed to it is not a part of vice, but the whole of it.

How virtue differs from justice in this sense is plain from what we have said; it is one and the same character differently viewed: † viewed in relation to others, this character is justice; viewed simply as a certain character, ‡ it is virtue.

2. We have now to examine justice in that sense in which it is a part of virtue—for we maintain that there is such a justice—and also the corresponding kind of injustice.

That the word is so used is easily shown. In the case of the other kinds of badness, the man who displays them, though he acts unjustly [in one sense of the word], yet does not take more than his share:

* While his children are regarded as parts of him, and even his wife is not regarded as an independent person: cf. *infra*, 6, 8.

† Or "differently manifested:" the phrase is used in both senses.

‡ Putting comma after ἀπλῶς instead of after εἴς (Trendelenburg).

Of justice (2) = fairness, how related to justice (1). What is just in distribution distinguished from what is just in correction.

for instance, when a man throws away his shield through cowardice, or reviles another through ill temper, or through illiberality refuses to help another with money. But when he takes more than his share, he displays perhaps no one of these vices, nor does he display them all, yet he displays a kind of badness (for we blame him), namely, injustice [in the second sense of the word].

3 We see, then, that there is another sense of the word injustice, in which it stands for a part of that injustice which is coextensive with badness, and another sense of the word unjust, in which it is applied to a part only of those things to which it is applied in the former sense of "contrary to law."

4 Again, if one man commits adultery with a view to gain, and makes money by it, and another man does it from lust, with expenditure and loss of money, the latter would not be called grasping, but profligate, while the former would not be called profligate, but unjust [in the narrower sense]. Evidently, then, he would be called unjust because of his gain.

5 * Once more, acts of injustice, in the former sense, are always referred to some particular vice, as if a man commits adultery, to profligacy; if he deserts his comrade in arms, to cowardice; if he strikes another, to anger: but in a case of unjust gain, the act is referred to no other vice than injustice.

6 It is plain then that, besides the injustice which

* This is not merely a repetition of what has been said in § 2: acts of injustice (2) are there distinguished from acts of injustice (1) by the motive (gain), here by the fact that they are referred to no other vice than injustice.

is coextensive with vice, there is a second kind of injustice, which is a particular kind of vice, bearing the same name * as the first, because the same generic conception forms the basis of its definition; i.e. both display themselves in dealings with others, but the sphere of the second is limited to such things as honour, wealth, security (perhaps some one name might be found to include all this class †), and its motive is the pleasure of gain, while the sphere of the first is coextensive with the sphere of the good man's action.

We have ascertained, then, that there are more 7 kinds of justice than one, and that there is another kind besides that which is identical with complete virtue; we now have to find what it is, and what are its characteristics.

We have already distinguished two senses in 8 which we speak of things as unjust, viz. (1) contrary to law, (2) unfair; and two senses in which we speak of things as just, viz. (1) according to law, (2) fair.

The injustice which we have already considered corresponds to unlawful.

But since unfair is not the same as unlawful, but 9 differs from it as the part from the whole (for unfair is always unlawful, but unlawful is not always unfair), unjust and injustice in the sense corresponding to

* Before (1, 7) the two kinds of injustice were called *διδόνημα*, i.e. strictly, "things that have nothing in common but the name;" here they are called *συνόνημα*, "different things bearing a common name because they belong to the same genus," as a man and an ox are both called animals: cf. *Categ. I. 1*.

† *τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῆ* is the name which Aristotle most frequently uses, sometimes *τὰ ἄλλως ἀγαθῆ*, as *supra*, 1, 9.

unfair will not be the same as unjust and injustice in the sense corresponding to unlawful, but different as the part from the whole; for this injustice is a part of complete injustice, and the corresponding justice is a part of complete justice. We must therefore speak of justice and injustice, and of that which is just and that which is unjust, in this limited sense.

- 10 We may dismiss, then, the justice which coincides with complete virtue and the corresponding injustice, the former being the exercise of complete virtue towards others, the latter of complete vice.

It is easy also to see how we are to define that which is just and that which is unjust in their corresponding senses [according to law and contrary to law]. For the great bulk, we may say, of the acts which are according to law are the acts which the law commands with a view to complete virtue; for the law orders us to display all the virtues and none of the vices in our lives.

- 11 But the acts which tend to produce complete virtue are those of the acts according to law which are prescribed with reference to the education of a man as a citizen. As for the education of the individual as such, which tends to make him simply a good man, we may reserve the question whether it belongs to the science of the state or not; for it is possible that to be a good man is not the same as to be a good citizen of any state whatever.*

- 12 But of justice as a part of virtue, and of that

* The two characters coincide perfectly only in the perfect state: cf. Pol. III, 4, 1276^b16 f.

which is just in the corresponding sense, one kind is that which has to do with the distribution of honour, wealth, and the other things that are divided among the members of the body politic (for in these circumstances it is possible for one man's share to be unfair or fair as compared with another's); and another kind is that which has to give redress in private transactions.

The latter kind is again subdivided; for private transactions are (1) voluntary, (2) involuntary. 13

"Voluntary transactions or contracts" are such as selling, buying, lending at interest, pledging, lending without interest, depositing, hiring: these are called "voluntary contracts," because the parties enter into them of their own will.

"Involuntary transactions," again, are of two kinds: one involving secrecy, such as theft, adultery, poisoning, procuring, corruption of slaves, assassination, false witness; the other involving open violence, such as assault, seizure of the person, murder, rape, maiming, slander, contumely.

Of what is just in distribution, and its rule of geometrical proportion.

3. The unjust man [in this limited sense of the word], we say, is unfair, and that which is unjust is unfair. 1

Now, it is plain that there must be a mean which lies between what is unfair on this side and on that. And this is that which is fair or equal; for any act that admits of a too much and a too little admits also of that which is fair.

If then that which is unjust be unfair, that which is just will be fair, which indeed is admitted by all without further proof. 3

But since that which is fair or equal is a mean between two extremes, it follows that what is just will be a mean.

- 4 But equality or fairness implies two terms at least.*

It follows, then, that that which is just is both a mean quantity and also a fair amount relatively to something else and to certain persons—in other words, that, on the one hand, as a mean quantity it implies certain other quantities, *i.e.* a more and a less; and, on the other hand, as an equal or fair amount it involves two quantities,† and as a just amount it involves certain persons.

- 5 That which is just, then, implies four terms at least: two persons to whom justice is done, and two things.

- 6 And there must be the same "equality" [*i.e.* the same ratio] between the persons and the things: as the things are to one another, so must the persons be. For if the persons be not equal, their shares will not be equal; and this is the source of disputes and accusations, when persons who are equal do not receive equal shares, or when persons who are not equal receive equal shares.

- 7 This is also plainly indicated by the common phrase "according to merit." For in distribution all men allow that what is just must be according to merit or worth of some kind, but they do not all adopt the same standard of worth; in democratic states

* If this amount be equal, it must be equal to something else; if my share is fair, I must be sharing with one other person at least.

† A's share and B's.

they take free birth as the standard,* in oligarchic states they take wealth, in others noble birth, and in the true aristocratic state virtue or personal merit.

We see, then, that that which is just is in some sort 8 proportionate. For not abstract numbers only, but all things that can be numbered, admit of proportion; proportion meaning equality of ratios, and requiring four terms at least.

That discrete proportion † requires four terms is 9 evident at once. Continuous proportion also requires four terms: for in it one term is employed as two and is repeated; for instance, $\frac{a}{b} = \frac{b}{c}$. The term b then is repeated; and so, counting b twice over, we find that the terms of the proportion are four in number.

That which is just, then, requires that there be 10 four terms at least, and that the ratio between the two pairs be the same, *i.e.* that the persons stand to one another in the same ratio as the things.

Let us say, then, $\frac{a}{b} = \frac{c}{d}$, or *alternando* $\frac{a}{c} = \frac{b}{d}$. 11

The sums of these new pairs then will stand to one another in the original ratio [*i.e.* $\frac{a+c}{b+d} = \frac{a}{b}$ or $\frac{c}{d}$].

But these are the pairs which the distribution joins together; ‡ and if the things be assigned in this manner, the distribution is just.

* Counting all free men as equals entitled to equal shares.

† *e.g.* $\frac{a}{b} = \frac{c}{d}$.

‡ Assigning or joining certain quantities of goods (c and d) to certain persons (a and b).

12 This joining, then, of a to c and of b to d is that which is just in distribution; and that which is just in this sense is a mean quantity, while that which is unjust is that which is disproportionate; for that which is proportionate is a mean quantity, but that which is just is, as we said, proportionate.

13 This proportion is called by the mathematicians a geometrical proportion; for it is when four terms are in geometrical proportion that the sum [of the first and third] is to the sum [of the second and fourth] in the original ratio [of the first to the second or the third to the fourth].

14 But this proportion [as applied in justice] cannot be a continuous proportion; for one term cannot represent both a person and a thing.

That which is just, then, in this sense is that which is proportionate; but that which is unjust is that which is disproportionate. In the latter case one quantity becomes more or too much, the other less or too little. And this we see in practice; for he who wrongs another gets too much, and he who is wronged gets too little of the good in
 15 question: but of the evil conversely; for the lesser evil stands in the place of good when compared
 16 with the greater evil: for the lesser evil is more desirable than the greater, but that which is desirable is good, and that which is more desirable is a greater good.

17 This then is one form of that which is just.

1 4. It remains to treat of the other form, viz. that which is just in the way of redress, the sphere of

Of that which is just in correction, and its rule of arith-

*metical
proportion.*

which is private transactions, whether voluntary or involuntary.

This differs in kind from the former. 2

For that which is just in the distribution of a common stock of good things is always in accordance with the proportion above specified (even when it is a common fund that has to be divided, the sums which the several participants take must bear the same ratio to one another as the sums they have put in), and that which is unjust in the corresponding sense is that which violates this proportion.

But that which is just in private transactions * is 3 indeed fair or equal in some sort, and that which is unjust is unfair or unequal; but the proportion to be observed here is not a geometrical proportion as above, but an arithmetical one.

For it makes no difference whether a good man defrauds a bad one, or a bad man a good one, nor whether a man who commits an adultery be a good or a bad man; the law looks only to the difference created by the injury, treating the parties themselves as equal, and only asking whether the one has done, and the other suffered, injury or damage.

That which is unjust, then, is here something 4 unequal [or unfair] which the judge tries to make equal [or fair]. For even when one party is struck and the other strikes, or one kills and the other is killed, that which is suffered and that which is done

* In the way of redress, as given by the law-courts: later on (cap. 5) he gives as an after-thought the kind of justice which ought to regulate buying and selling, etc. See note on p. 152.

may be said to be unequally or unfairly divided; the judge then tries to restore equality by the penalty or loss which he inflicts upon the offender, subtracting it from his gain.

- 5 For in such cases, though the terms are not always quite appropriate, we generally talk of the doer's "gain" (*e.g.* the striker's) and the sufferer's
6 "loss;" but when the suffering has been assessed by the court, what the doer gets is called "loss" or penalty, and what the sufferer gets is called "gain."

What is fair or equal, then, is a mean between more or too much and less or too little; but gain and loss are both more or too much and less or too little in opposite ways, *i.e.* gain is more or too much good and less or too little evil, and loss the opposite of this.

And in the mean between them, as we found, lies that which is equal or fair, which we say is just.

That which is just in the way of redress, then, is the mean between loss and gain.

- 7 When disputes arise, therefore, men appeal to the judge:* and an appeal to the judge is an appeal to that which is just; for the judge is intended to be as it were a living embodiment of that which is just; and men require of a judge that he shall be moderate [or observe the mean], and sometimes even call judges "mediators" (*μεσιδίους*), signifying that

* The *δικαστής* at Athens combined the functions of judge and jury.

if they get the mean they will get that which is just.

That which is just, then, must be a sort of mean, 8 if the judge be a "mediator."

But the judge restores equality; it is as if he found a line divided into two unequal parts, and were to cut off from the greater that by which it exceeds the half, and to add this to the less.


But when the whole is equally divided, the parties are said to have their own, each now receiving an equal or fair amount.

But the equal or fair amount is here the *arith-* 9
metic mean between the more or too much and the less or too little. And so it is called *δίκαιον* (just) because there is equal division (*δίχα*); *δίκαιον* being in fact equivalent to *δίχαιον*, and *δικαστής* (judge) to *διχαστής*.

If you cut off a part from one of two equal lines 10 and add it to the other, the second is now greater than the first by two such parts (for if you had only cut off the part from the first without adding it to the second, the second would have been greater by only one such part); the second exceeds the mean by one such part, and the mean also exceeds the first by one.

Thus we can tell how much to take away from 11 him who has more or too much, and how much to add to him who has less or too little: to the latter's portion must be added that by which it falls short of the mean, and from the former's portion must be taken away that by which it exceeds the mean.

- 12 To illustrate this, let AA' , BB' , CC' be three equal lines:—



From AA' let AE be cut off; and let CD [equal to AE] be added to CC' ; then the whole DCC' exceeds EA' by CD and CZ [equal to AE or CD], and exceeds BB' by CD .

And this* holds good not only in geometry, but in the arts also; they could not exist unless that which is worked upon received an impression corresponding in kind and quantity and quality to the exertions of the artist.

- 13 But these terms, "loss" and "gain," are borrowed from voluntary exchange. For in voluntary exchange having more than your own is called gaining, and having less than you started with is called losing (in buying and selling, I mean, and in the other trans-

* The point to be illustrated is, that in these private transactions what one man gains is equal to what the other loses, so that the penalty that will restore the balance can be exactly measured. Of this principle (on which the possibility of justice does in fact depend) Aristotle first gives a simple geometrical illustration, and then says that the same law holds in all that man does: what is suffered by the patient (whether person, as in medicine, or thing, as in sculpture or agriculture) is the same as what is done by the agent. This paragraph occurs again in the next chapter (5, 9): but it can hardly have come into this place by accident; we rather see the author's thought growing as he writes. I follow Trendelenburg (who omits the passage here) in inserting δ before $\epsilon\tau\omicron\lambda\epsilon\iota$, but not in omitting $\tau\delta$ before $\pi\acute{\alpha}\omicron\chi\omicron\nu$.

actions in which the law allows free play); but when the result to each is neither more nor less but the very same amount with which he started, then they say that they have their own, and are neither losers nor gainers. That which is just, then, is a mean between a gain and a loss, which are both contrary to the intention,* and consists in having after the transaction the equivalent of that which you had before it.

Simple requital is not identical with what is just, but proportionate requital is what is just in exchange; and this is effected by means of money. We can now give a general definition of justice (2).

5. Some people, indeed, go so far as to think that 1 simple requital is just. And so the Pythagoreans used to teach; for their definition of what is just was simply that what a man has done to another should be done to him.

But this simple requital does not correspond either 2 with that which is just in distribution or with that which is just in the way of redress (though they try 3 to make out that this is the meaning of the Rhadamanthine rule—

“To suffer that which thou hast done is just”);

for in many cases it is quite different. For instance, 4 if an officer strike a man, he ought not to be struck in return; and if a man strike an officer, he ought not merely to be struck, but to be punished.

* For the aim of trade is neither profit nor loss, but fair exchange, i.e. exchange (on the principle laid down in ch. 5) which leaves the position of the parties as the state fixed it (by distributive justice, ch. 3). But when in the private transactions of man with man this position is disturbed, i.e. whenever either unintentionally, by accident or negligence, or intentionally, by force or fraud, one has bettered his position at the expense of another, corrective justice steps in to redress the balance. I read *αὐτὰ δι' αὐτῶν* and accept Stewart's interpretation of these words, and in part Jackson's interpretation of *τῶν κατὰ τὸ ἐκούσιον*, but cannot entirely agree with either as to the sense of the whole passage.

5 Further, it makes a great difference whether what was done to the other was done with his consent or against it.

6 But it is true that, in the interchange of services, this is the rule of justice that holds society together, viz. requital—but proportionate requital, and not simple repayment of equals for equals. For the very existence of a state depends upon proportionate return. If men have suffered evil, they seek to return it; if not, if they cannot requite an injury, we count their condition slavish. And again, if men have received good, they seek to repay it: for otherwise there is no exchange of services; but it is by this exchange that we are bound together in society.

7 This is the reason why we set up a temple of the graces [charities, *χάριτες*] in sight of all men, to remind them to repay that which they receive; for this is the special characteristic of charity or grace. We ought to return the good offices of those who have been gracious to us, and then again to take the lead in good offices towards them.

8 But proportionate interchange is brought about by "cross conjunction."

For instance, let A stand for a builder, B for a shoemaker, C for a house, D for shoes.*

* We had before (3, 11, 12) as the rule of distributive justice $\frac{A}{B} = \frac{C}{D}$, and the distribution was expressed by the "joining" (*σύζευξις*) of the opposite or corresponding symbols, A and C, B and D. Here we have the same two pairs of symbols, ranged opposite to each other as before; but the *exchange* will be expressed by joining A to D and B to C, i.e. by "cross conjunction" or by drawing diagonal lines (*ἢ κατὰ διάμετρον σύζευξις*) from A to D and B to C.

The builder then must take some of the shoemaker's work, and give him his own work in exchange.

Now, the desired result will be brought about if requital take place after proportionate equality has first been established.*

If this be not done, there is no equality, and intercourse becomes impossible; for there is no reason why the work of the one should not be worth more than the work of the other. Their work, then, must be brought to an equality [or appraised by a common standard of value].

This is no less true of the other arts and professions [than of building and shoemaking]; for they could not exist if that which the patient [client or consumer] receives did not correspond in quantity and quality with that which the agent [artist or producer] does or produces.†

* *i.e.* (as will presently appear), it must first be determined how much builder's work is equal to a given quantity of shoemaker's work: *i.e.* the price of the two wares must first be settled; that done, they simply exchange shilling's worth for shilling's worth (*ἀντιπαιονθός*); *e.g.* if a four-roomed cottage be valued at £100, and a pair of boots at £1, the builder must supply such a cottage in return for 100 such pairs of boots (or their equivalent).

Fixing the price of the articles is called securing equality, because, evidently, it means fixing how much of one article shall be considered equal to a given quantity of the other. It is called securing *proportionate* equality, because, as we shall see, the question that has to be determined is, "in what ratio must work be exchanged in order to preserve the due ratio between the workers?"

† Benefit to consumer = cost to producer; *e.g.* if £100 be a fair price for a picture, it must fairly represent both the benefit to the purchaser and the effort expended on it by the artist. I follow Trendelenburg in inserting δ before *εποιεί*, but not in omitting *τὸ* before *πράχον*. Cf. note on 4, 12.

For it is not between two physicians that exchange of services takes place, but between a physician and a husbandman, and generally between persons of different professions and of unequal worth; these unequal persons, then, have to be reduced to equality [or measured by a common standard].*

10 All things or services, then, which are to be exchanged must be in some way reducible to a common measure.

For this purpose money was invented, and serves as a medium of exchange; for by it we can measure everything, and so can measure the superiority and inferiority of different kinds of work—the number of shoes, for instance, that is equivalent to a house or to a certain quantity of food.

What is needed then is that so many shoes shall bear to a house (or a measure of corn) the same ratio that a builder [or a husbandman] bears to a shoemaker.† For unless this adjustment be effected, no dealing or exchange of services can take place; and it cannot be effected unless the things to be exchanged can be in some way made equal.

11 We want, therefore, some one common measure of value, as we said before.

This measure is, in fact, the need for each other's services which holds the members of a society together; for if men had no needs, or no common

* The persons have to be appraised as well as their work; but, as we soon see, these are two sides of the same thing: the relative value at which persons are estimated by society is indicated by the relative value which society puts upon their services, and this is indicated by the price put upon a certain quantity of their work.

† See note on § 12.

needs, there would either be no exchange, or a different sort of exchange from that which we know.

But money has been introduced by convention as a kind of substitute for need or demand; and this is why we call it νόμισμα, because its value is derived, not from nature, but from law (νόμος), and can be altered or abolished at will.

Requitil then will take place after the wares 12 have been so equated [by the adjustment of prices] that the quantity of shoemaker's work bears to the quantity of husbandman's work [which exchanges for it] the same ratio that husbandman bears to shoemaker.* But this adjustment must be made,† not at the time of exchange (for then one of the two parties would get both the advantages‡), but while they are still in possession of their own wares; if this be

* *e.g.* suppose the husbandman is twice as good a man as the shoemaker, then, if the transaction is to follow the universal rule of justice and leave their relative position unaltered, in exchange for a certain quantity of husbandman's work the shoemaker must give twice as much of his own. The price, that is, of corn and shoes must be so adjusted that, if a quarter of corn sell for 50s. and three pair of shoes sell for the same sum, the three pair of shoes must represent twice as much labour as the quarter of corn. Aristotle speaks loosely of the ratio between the shoes and the corn, etc., but as their value is *ex hypothesi* the same, and as the relative size, weight, and number of articles is quite accidental (*e.g.* we might as well measure the corn by bushels or by pounds), the ratio intended can only be the ratio between the quantities of labour. He omits to tell us that these quantities must be measured by time, but the omission is easily supplied. He omits also to tell us how the relative worth of the persons is to be measured, but he has already said all that is necessary in 3, 7.

† Lit. "they must be reduced to proportion," *i.e.*, in strictness, the four terms (two persons and two things).

‡ *i.e.* have his superiority counted twice over. His (*e.g.* the husbandman's) superiority over the other party (the shoemaker) has

done, they are put on an equal footing and can make an exchange, because this kind of equality can be established between them.

If A stand for a husbandman and C for a certain quantity of his work (or corn), B will stand for a shoemaker, and D for that quantity of shoemaker's work that is valued as equal to C.

If they could not requite each other in this way, interchange of services would be impossible.

- 13 That it is our need which forms, as it were, a common bond to hold society together, is seen from the fact that people do not exchange unless they are in need of one another's services (each party of the services of the other, or at least one party of the service of the other), as when that which one has, *e.g.* wine, is needed by other people who offer to export corn in return. This article, then [the corn to be exported], must be made equal [to the wine that is imported].*

- 14 But even if we happen to want nothing at the moment, money is a sort of guarantee that we shall be able to make an exchange at any future time when we happen to be in need; for the man who brings money must always be able to take goods in exchange.

been already taken into account in fixing the price of a quarter of corn as equal to three pairs of shoes: this is one advantage which is fairly his; but it would be plainly unfair if, at the time of exchange, the husbandman were to demand 50s. worth of shoes for 25s. worth of corn, on the ground that he was twice as good a man: *cf.* Munro, *Journal of Classical and Sacred Philology*, vol. ii. p. 58 f. In the text I have followed Trendelenburg's stopping, throwing the words *εἰ δὲ μὴ . . . ἔκρον* into a parenthesis.

* *i.e.* each must be valued in money, so that so many quarters of corn shall exchange for so many hogsheads of wine.

Money is, indeed, subject to the same conditions as other things: its value is not always the same; but still it tends to be more constant than the value of anything else.

Everything, then, must be assessed in money; for this enables men always to exchange their services, and so makes society possible.

Money, then, as a standard, serves to reduce things to a common measure, so that equal amounts of each may be taken; for there would be no society if there were no exchange, and no exchange if there were no equality, and no equality if it were not possible to reduce things to a common measure.

In strictness, indeed, it is impossible to find any common measure for things so extremely diverse; but our needs give a standard which is sufficiently accurate for practical purposes.

There must, then, be some one common symbol for this, and that a conventional symbol; so we call it money (*νόμισμα, νόμος*). Money makes all things commensurable, for all things are valued in money. For instance, let A stand for a house, B for ten minæ, C for a bed; and let $A = \frac{B}{2}$, taking a house to be worth or equal to five minæ, and let C (the bed) = $\frac{B}{10}$. We see at once, then, how many beds are equal to one house, viz. five.

It is evident that, before money came into use, all exchange must have been of this kind: it makes no difference whether you give five beds for a house, or the value of five beds.

Thus we have described that which is unjust and

that which is just. And now that these are determined, we can see that doing justice is a mean between doing and suffering injustice; for the one is having too much, or more, and the other too little, or less than one's due.

We see also that the virtue justice is a kind of moderation or observance of the mean, but not quite in the same way as the virtues hitherto spoken of. It does indeed choose a mean, but both the extremes fall under the single vice injustice.*

We see also that justice is that habit in respect of which the just man is said to be apt to do deliberately that which is just; that is to say, in dealings between himself and another (or between two other parties), to apportion things, not so that he shall get more or too much, and his neighbour less or too little, of what is desirable, and conversely with what is disadvantageous, but so that each shall get his fair, that is, his proportionate share, and similarly in dealings between two other parties.

18 Injustice, on the contrary, is the character which chooses what is unjust, which is a disproportionate amount, that is, too much and too little of what is advantageous and disadvantageous respectively.

* The mean which justice aims at (the just thing, the due share of goods) lies between two extremes, too much and too little; so far justice is analogous to the other virtues: but whereas in other fields these two extremes are chosen by different and opposite characters (*e.g.* the cowardly and the foolhardy), the character that chooses too much is here the same as that which chooses too little,—too much for himself or his friend, too little for his enemy. (The habitual choice of too little for oneself is neglected as impossible). *Cf.* II. 6, especially § 15-16.

Thus injustice, as we say, is both an excess and a deficiency, in that it chooses both an excess and a deficiency—in one's own affairs choosing excess of what is, as a general rule, advantageous, and deficiency of what is disadvantageous; in the affairs of others making a similarly disproportionate assignment, though in which way the proportion is violated will depend upon circumstances.

But of the two sides of the act of injustice, suffering is a lesser wrong than doing the injustice.

Let this, then, be accepted as our account, in 19 general terms, of the nature of justice and injustice respectively, and of that which is just and that which is unjust.

(One can act unjustly without being unjust.)
That which is just in the strict sense is between citizens only, for it implies law.

6. But since it is possible for a man to do an act 1 of injustice without yet being unjust, what acts of injustice are there, such that the doing of them stamps a man at once as unjust in this or that particular way, *e.g.* as a thief, or an adulterer, or a robber?

Perhaps we ought to reply that there is no such difference in the acts.* A man might commit adultery, knowing what he was about, and yet be acting not from a deliberate purpose at all, but from a momentary passion. In such a case, then, a man 2 acts unjustly, but is not unjust; *e.g.* is not a thief though he commits a theft, and is not an adulterer though he commits adultery, and so on.†

* It is in the state of mind of the doer that the difference lies, not in the particular things done: *cf. infra*, cap. 8.

† This passage, cap. 6, §§ 1, 2, seems to have quite a natural connection with what goes before, though the discussion is not carried on here, but in cap. 8. Again, the discussion which begins with

3 We have already explained the relation which
4 requital bears to that which is just. But we must not fail to notice that what we are seeking is at once that which is just simply [or without any qualifying epithet], and that which is just in a state or between citizens.* Now, this implies men who associate together in order to supply their deficiencies, being free men, and upon a footing of equality, either absolute or proportionate.

Between those who are not upon this footing, then, we cannot speak of that which is just as between citizens (though there is something that can be called just metaphorically). For the term just cannot be properly applied, except where men have a law to appeal to,† and the existence of law implies the existence of injustice; for the administration of the law is the discrimination of what is just from what is unjust.

But injustice implies an act of injustice (though an act of injustice does not always imply injustice) which is taking too much of the goods and too little

the words *πῶς μὲν οὖν*, cap. 6, § 3, though it has no connection with § 2, comes naturally enough after the end of cap. 5, *τὸ ἀπλῶς δίκαιον* corresponding to *τοῦ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου καθόλου*. We have, then, two discussions, both growing out of and attached to the discussion which closes with the end of cap. 5, but not connected with each other. If the author had revised the work, he would, no doubt, have fitted these links together; but as he omitted to do so, it is useless for us to attempt, by any rearrangement of the links, to secure the close connection which could only be effected by forging them anew.

* These are not two distinct kinds of justice; justice proper, he means to say, implies a state.

† Only the citizen in an ancient state could appeal to the law in his own person; the non-citizen could only sue through a citizen.

of the evils of life. And so we do not allow an individual to rule over us, but reason or law; for an individual is apt thus to take more for himself, and to become a tyrant. 5

The magistrate's function, then, is to secure that which is just, and if that which is just, then that which is equal or fair. But it seems that he gets no advantage from his office, if he is just (for he does not take a larger share of the good things of life, except when that larger share is proportionate to his worth; he works, therefore, in the interests of others, which is the reason why justice is sometimes called "another's good," as we remarked before).^{*} Some salary, therefore, must be given him, and this he receives in the shape of honours and privileges; and it is when magistrates are not content with these that they make themselves tyrants. 6 7

That which is just as between master and slave, or between father and child, is not the same as this, though like. We cannot speak (without qualification) of injustice towards what is part of one's self—and a man's chattels and his children (until they are of a certain age and are separated from their parent) are as it were a part of him—for no one deliberately chooses to injure himself; so that a man cannot be unjust towards himself. 8 9

We cannot speak in this case, then, of that which is unjust, or of that which is just as between citizens; for that, we found, is according to law, and subsists between those whose situation implies law, *i.e.*, as we found, those who participate equally or fairly in governing and being governed.

^{*} *Supra*, 1, 17.

The term just, therefore, is more appropriate to a man's relations to his wife than to his relations to his children and his chattels, and we do speak in this sense of that which is just in a family ; but even this is not the same as that which is just between citizens.*

- 1 7. Now, of that which is just as between citizens, part is natural, part is conventional. That is natural which has the same validity everywhere, and does not depend on our accepting or rejecting it; that is conventional which at the outset may be determined in this way or in that indifferently, but which when once determined is no longer indifferent; *e.g.* that a man's ransom be a mina, or that a sacrifice consist of a goat and not of two sheep; and, again, those ordinances which are made for special occasions, such as the sacrifice to Brasidas [at Amphipolis], and all ordinances that are of the nature of a decree.
- 2 Now, there are people who think that what is just is always conventional, because that which is natural is invariable, and has the same validity everywhere, as fire burns here and in Persia, while that which is just is seen to be not invariable.
- 3 But this is not altogether true, though it is true in a way. Among the gods, indeed, we may venture to say it is not true at all; but of that which is just among us part is natural, though all is subject to change. Though all is subject to change, nevertheless, I repeat, part is natural and part not.
- 4 Nor is it hard to distinguish, among things that may be other than they are, that which is natural

It is in part natural, in part conventional.

* Which alone is properly just.

from that which is not natural but dependent on law or convention, though both are alike variable. In other fields we can draw the same distinction; we say, for instance, that the right hand is naturally the stronger, though in any man the left may become equally strong.

And so, of that which is just, that part which is 5 conventional and prescribed with a view to a particular end * varies as measures vary; for the measures of wine and of corn are not everywhere the same, but larger where the dealers buy, and smaller where they sell.† So I say that which is just not by nature but merely by human ordinance is not the same everywhere, any more than constitutions are everywhere the same, though there is but one constitution that is naturally the best everywhere.

The terms "just" and "lawful" in each of their 6 several senses stand for universal notions which embrace a number of particulars; *i.e.* the acts are many, but the notion is one, for it is applied to all alike.

"That which is unjust," we must notice, is different 7 from "an act of injustice," and "that which is just" from "an act of justice:" for a thing is unjust either by nature or by ordinance; but this same thing when done is called "an act of injustice," though before it was done it could only be called unjust. And so with "an act of justice" (*δικαίωμα*); though in the latter

* τὸ ξυμφέρον, which is usually rendered "expedient," means simply that which conduces to *any* desired end; as the end varies, then, so will the expedient vary: *cf.* III. 1, 15, note.

† *e.g.* the wine-merchant may buy in the cask what he sells in bottle (Stewart).

case we rather employ *δικαιοπράγημα* as the generic term, and restrict *δικαίωμα* to the correction of an act of injustice. But as to the several species of acts of justice and injustice, we must postpone for the present the inquiry into their nature and number and the ground which they cover.

- 1 8. Now that we have ascertained what is just and what is unjust, we may say that a man acts unjustly or justly when he does these things voluntarily; but when he does them involuntarily, he does not, strictly speaking, act either unjustly or justly, but only "accidentally," *i.e.* he does a thing which happens to
- 2 be just or unjust.* For whether an act is or is not to be called an act of injustice (or of justice) depends upon whether it is voluntary or involuntary; for if it be voluntary the agent is blamed, and at the same time the act becomes an act of injustice: so something unjust may be done, and yet it may not be an act of injustice, *i.e.* if this condition of voluntariness be absent.
- 3 By a voluntary act I mean, as I explained before, anything which, being within the doer's control, is done knowingly (*i.e.* with knowledge of the person, the instrument, and the result; *e.g.* the person whom and the instrument with which he is striking, and the effect of the blow), without the intervention at any point of accident or constraint; *e.g.* if another take your hand and with it strike a third person, that is not a voluntary act of yours, for it was not within your control; again, the man you strike may be your father, and you may know that it is a man, or perhaps that it is one of the company, that you are striking

The internal conditions of a just or unjust action, and of a just or unjust agent.

* Cf. § 4.

but not know that it is your father; and it must be understood that the same distinction is to be made with regard to the result, and, in a word, to the whole act. That then which either is done in ignorance, or, though not done in ignorance, is not under our control, or is done under compulsion, is involuntary; besides which, there are many natural processes in which we knowingly take an active or a passive part, which cannot be called either voluntary or involuntary, such as growing old and dying.

An accidentally unjust act and an accidentally just 4 act are equally possible; *e.g.* a man might restore a deposit against his will for fear of consequences, and then you could not say that he did what was just or acted justly except accidentally;* and, similarly, a man who against his will was forcibly prevented from restoring a deposit would be said only accidentally to act unjustly or to do that which is unjust.

Voluntary acts, again, are divided into (1) those 5 that are done of set purpose, and (2) those that are done without set purpose; *i.e.* (1) those that are done after previous deliberation, and (2) those that are done without previous deliberation.

Now, there are three ways in which we may hurt 6 our neighbour. Firstly, a hurt done in ignorance is generally called a mistake when there is a misconception as to the person affected, or the thing done, or the instrument, or the result; *e.g.* I may not think to hit,

* *i.e.* he willed the act not as just, but as a means of avoiding the painful consequences; the justice of it, therefore, was not part of the essence of the act to him, was not among the qualities of the act which moved him to choose it, or, in Aristotle's language, was "accidental."

or not to hit with this instrument, or not to hit this person, or not to produce this effect, but an effect follows other than that which was present to my mind; I may mean to inflict a prick, not a wound, or not to wound the person whom I wound, or not to deal a wound of this kind.

7 But [if we draw the distinction more accurately] when the hurt comes about contrary to what might reasonably be expected, it may be called a mishap: but when, though it is not contrary to what might reasonably be expected, there is still no vicious intention, it is a mistake; for a man makes a mistake when he sets the train of events in motion,* but he is unfortunate when an external agency interferes.†

8 Secondly, when the agent acts with knowledge but without previous deliberation, it is an act of injustice; *e.g.* when he is impelled by anger or any of the other passions to which man is necessarily or naturally subject. In doing such hurt and committing such errors, the doer acts unjustly and the acts are acts of injustice, though they are not such as to stamp him as unjust or wicked; for the hurt is not done out of wickedness.

9 But, thirdly, when it is done of set purpose, the doer is unjust and wicked.

On this account acts done in anger are rightly held not to be done of malice aforethought; for he who gave the provocation began it, not he who did the deed in a passion.

* which leads by a natural, though by him unforeseen, sequence to his neighbour's hurt: negligence, or error of judgment.

† and gives a fatal termination to an act that would ordinarily be harmless: accident.

Again, in such cases as this last, what men dispute 10
 about is usually not whether the deed was done or
 not, but what the justice of the case is; for it is an
 apparent injustice that stirs the assailant's wrath.
 There is a difference between cases of this kind and
 disputes about contracts: in the latter the question
 is a question of fact, and one or other of the parties
 must be a vicious character, unless his memory be at
 fault; but in these cases they agree about the facts,
 but differ as to which side is in the right (whereas
 the deliberate aggressor knows very well the rights
 of the case), so that the one thinks that he is wronged,
 while the other thinks differently.*

But if a man hurt another of set purpose, he acts 11
 unjustly, and acts of injustice (*i.e.* violations of what
 is proportionate and fair), when so done, stamp the
 doer as an unjust character.

In like manner a man is a just character when he
 of set purpose acts justly; but he is said to act justly
 if he merely do voluntarily that which is just.

Of involuntary injuries, on the other hand, some 12
 are pardonable, some unpardonable. Errors that
 are committed not merely in ignorance but by reason
 of ignorance are pardonable; but those that are
 committed not through ignorance but rather in
 ignorance, through some unnatural or inhuman pas-
 sion, are not pardonable.†

* Throwing the words $\delta \delta' \epsilon\pi\iota\beta\omicron\upsilon\lambda\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\sigma\alpha\varsigma \omicron\upsilon\kappa \delta\gamma\upsilon\omicron\epsilon\acute{\iota}$ into a paren-
 thesis. The passage is easier to construe without the parenthesis,
 but with a stop after $\acute{\alpha}\mu\phi\iota\sigma\beta\eta\tau\omicron\upsilon\sigma\iota\nu$.

† In strictness, of course, such acts cannot be called involun-
 tary ($\acute{\alpha}\kappa\omicron\upsilon\lambda\iota\alpha$) at all: *cf. supra*, III. 1, where the conditions of an
 involuntary act are stated more precisely.

- 1 9. But it may be doubted whether we have sufficiently explained what it is to suffer and to do injustice. First of all, are these terms applicable to such a case as that which is described in those strange verses of Euripides?—

A. I slew my mother: that is all my tale.

P. But say, did both or neither will the deed?"

Is it really possible, I mean, to suffer injustice [or be wronged] voluntarily? or is suffering injustice always involuntary, as doing injustice is always voluntary?

Again, is suffering injustice always one way or the other (as doing injustice is always voluntary), or is it sometimes voluntary and sometimes involuntary?

- 2 Similarly with regard to having justice done to you: doing justice is always voluntary [as doing injustice is], so that one might expect that there is the same relation in both cases between the active and the passive, and that suffering injustice and having justice done to you are either both voluntary or both involuntary. But it would surely be absurd to maintain, even with regard to having justice done to you, that it is always voluntary; for some that have justice done to them certainly do not will it.

- 3 Again we may raise the question in this [more general] form: Can a man who has that which is unjust done to him always be said to suffer injustice [or be wronged]? or are there further conditions necessary for suffering as there are for doing injustice?

Both what I do and what I suffer may be (as we saw) "accidentally" just; and so also it may be "accidentally" unjust: for doing that which is unjust is not identical with doing injustice, nor is

*Sundry
questions
about doing
and suffer-
ing injustice*

suffering that which is unjust the same as suffering injustice; and similarly with doing justice and having justice done to you. For to have injustice done to you implies some one that does injustice, and to have justice done to you implies some one that does justice.

But if to do injustice means simply to hurt a man 4 voluntarily, and voluntarily means with knowledge of the person, the instrument, and the manner, then the incontinent man, who voluntarily hurts himself, will voluntarily suffer injustice, and it will be possible for a man to do injustice to himself—the possibility of which last is also one of the questions in dispute.

Again, a man might, through incontinence, volun- 5 tarily suffer himself to be hurt by another also acting voluntarily; so that in this case also a man might voluntarily suffer injustice.

I think rather that the above definition is incorrect, and that to "hurting with knowledge of the person, the instrument, and the manner," we must add "against his wish." * If we define it so, then a 6 man may voluntarily be hurt and suffer that which is unjust, but cannot voluntarily have injustice done to him. (For no one *wishes* to be hurt,—even the incontinent man does not wish it, but acts contrary to his wish. No one wishes for anything that he does not think good; what the incontinent man does

* *βούλησιν* is used perhaps for will, as there is no abstract term corresponding to *ἐκόν*. I bracket the last two sentences of § 6, as (in spite of the ingenuity of Jackson and Stewart) the statement seems to me hopelessly confused.

7 is not that which he thinks he ought to do.) But he that gives, as Glaucus gives to Diomedes in Homer—

“Gold for his bronze, fivescore kine's worth for nine,”

does not suffer injustice; for the giving rests with him, but suffering injustice does not rest with one's self; there must be some one to do injustice.

8 It is plain, then, that suffering injustice cannot be voluntary.

There are still two questions that we purposed to discuss: (1) Is it the man who assigns or the man who receives a disproportionately large share that does injustice? (2) Is it possible to do injustice to yourself?

9 In the former case, *i.e.* if he who assigns and not he who receives the undue share does injustice, then if a man knowingly and voluntarily gives too much to another and too little to himself, he does injustice to himself. And this is what moderate persons are often thought to do; for the equitable man is apt to take less than his due. But the case is hardly so simple: it may be that he took a larger share of some other good, *e.g.* of good fame or of that which is intrinsically noble.

Again, the difficulty may be got over by reference to our definition of doing injustice; for in this case nothing is done to the man against his wish, so that no injustice is done him, but at most only harm.

10 It is plain, moreover, that the man who makes the unjust award does injustice, but not always he who gets more than his share; for a man does not always do injustice when we can say of what he

does that it is unjust, but only when we can say that he voluntarily does that which is unjust; and that we can only say of the prime mover in the action, which in this case is the distributor and not the receiver.

Again, there are many senses of the word "do," 11 and in a certain sense an inanimate instrument, or my hand, or again my slave under my orders, may be said to slay; but though these may be said to do what is unjust, they cannot be said to act unjustly or to do an act of injustice.

Again, if a man unwittingly gives unjust judgment, he does not commit injustice in the sense of contravening that which is just according to law, nor is his judgment unjust in this sense, but in a certain sense it is unjust; for there is a difference between that which is just according to law and that which is just in the primary sense of the word: but if he knowingly gives unjust judgment, he is himself grasping at more than his share, in the shape either of favour with one party or vengeance on the other. The judge, then, who gives unjust judgment 13 on these grounds, takes more than his due, quite as much as if he received a share of the unjust award; for even in the latter case a judge who awards a piece of land would receive, not land, but money.

Men fancy that as it is in their power to act 14 unjustly, so it is an easy matter to be just. But it is not so. To lie with your neighbour's wife, or to strike your neighbour, or to pass certain coins from your hand to his is easy enough, and always within your power, but to do these acts as the outcome of a certain

character is not an easy matter, nor one which is always within your power.*

15 Similarly men think that to know what is just and what is unjust needs no great wisdom, since any one can inform himself about those things which the law prescribes (though these things are only accidentally, not essentially, just): but to know how these acts must be done and how these distributions must be made in order to be just,—that indeed is a harder matter than to know what conduces to health; though that is no easy matter. It is easy enough to know the meaning of honey, and wine, and hellebore, and cautery, and the knife, but to know how, and to whom, and when they must be applied in order to produce health, is so far from being easy, that to have this knowledge is to be a physician.

16 For the same reason, some people think that the just man is as able to act unjustly as justly, for he is not less but rather more capable than another of performing the several acts, *e.g.* of lying with a woman or of striking a blow, as the courageous man is rather more capable than another of throwing away his shield and turning his back and running away anywhere. But to play the coward or to act unjustly means not merely to do such an act (though the

* You can always do the *acts* if you want to do them, *i.e.* if you will them; but you cannot at will do them in the spirit of a just or an unjust man; for character is the *result* of a series of acts of will: *cf. supra*, III. 5, 22. The contradiction between this and III. 5, 2, is only apparent: we are responsible for our character, though we cannot change it at a moment's notice.

doer might be said "accidentally" to act unjustly),* but to do it in a certain frame of mind; just as to act the part of a doctor and to heal does not mean simply to apply the knife or not to apply it, to give or to withhold a drug, but to do this in a particular fashion.

Justice, lastly, implies persons who participate in 17 those things that, generally speaking, are good, but who can have too much or too little of them. For some—for the gods perhaps—no amount of them is too much; and for others—for the incurably vicious—no amount is beneficial, they are always hurtful; but for the rest of mankind they are useful within certain limits: justice, therefore, is essentially human.

Of equity

10. We have next to speak of equity and of that 1 which is equitable, and to inquire how equity is related to justice, and that which is equitable to that which is just. For, on consideration, they do not seem to be absolutely identical, nor yet generically different. At one time we praise that which is equitable and the equitable man, and even use the word metaphorically as a term of praise synonymous with good, showing that we consider that the more equitable a thing is the better it is. At another time we reflect and find it strange that what is equitable should be praiseworthy, if it be different from what is just; for, we argue, if it be something else, either what is just is not good, or what is equitable is not good; † if both be good, they are the same.

* Cf. *supra*, 8, 1-4.

† Οὐ δίκαιον I have omitted (after Trendelenburg) as obviously wrong. We may suppose either that the original οὐ σπουδαῖον was altered into οὐ δίκαιον, or (more probably) that οὐ δίκαιον or δίκαιον was inserted by a bungling copyist.

2 These are the reflections which give rise to the difficulty about what is equitable. Now, in a way, they are all correct and not incompatible with one another; for that which is equitable, though it is better than that which is just (in one sense of the word), is yet itself just, and is not better than what is just in the sense of being something generically distinct from it. What is just, then, and what is equitable are generically the same, and both are good, though what is equitable is better.

3 But what obscures the matter is that though what is equitable is just, it is not identical with, but a correction of, that which is just according to law.

4 The reason of this is that every law is laid down in general terms, while there are matters about which it is impossible to speak correctly in general terms. Where, then, it is necessary to speak in general terms, but impossible to do so correctly, the legislator lays down that which holds good for the majority of cases, being quite aware that it does not hold good for all.

The law, indeed, is none the less correctly laid down because of this defect; for the defect lies not in the law, nor in the lawgiver, but in the nature of the subject-matter, being necessarily involved in the very conditions of human action.

5 When, therefore, the law lays down a general rule, but a particular case occurs which is an exception to this rule, it is right, where the legislator fails and is in error through speaking without qualification, to make good this deficiency, just as the lawgiver himself would do if he were present, and as he would

have provided in the law itself if the case had occurred to him.

What is equitable, then, is just, and better than 6 what is just in one sense of the word—not better than what is absolutely just, but better than that which fails through its lack of qualification. And the essence of what is equitable is that it is an amendment of the law, in those points where it fails through the generality of its language.

The reason why the law does not cover all cases is that there are matters about which it is impossible to lay down a law, so that they require a special decree. For that which is variable needs a variable 7 rule, like the leaden rule employed in the Lesbian style of masonry; as the leaden rule has no fixed shape, but adapts itself to the outline of each stone, so is the decree adapted to the occasion.

We have ascertained, then, what the equitable 8 course is, and have found that it is just, and also better than what is just in a certain sense of the word. And after this it is easy to see what the equitable man is: he who is apt to choose such a course and to follow it, who does not insist on his rights to the damage of others, but is ready to take less than his due, even when he has the law to back him, is called an equitable man; and this type of character is called equitableness, being a sort of justice, and not a different kind of character.

11. The foregoing discussion enables us to answer 1 the question whether it be possible or not for a man to act unjustly to himself.

That which is just in one sense of the word we

Can a man wrong himself?

found to be those manifestations of the several virtues which the law prescribes : *e.g.* the law does not order a man to kill himself ; and what the law does not
2 order it forbids : and, further, when a man, contrary to the law, voluntarily inflicts hurt without provocation, he acts unjustly (voluntarily meaning with knowledge of the person and the instrument). Now, the man who kills himself in a rage voluntarily acts thus against right reason and does what the law forbids : he acts unjustly therefore.

3 But unjustly to whom ? To the state surely, not to himself ; for he suffers voluntarily, but no one can have an injustice done him voluntarily. And upon this ground the state actually punishes him, *i.e.* it pronounces a particular kind of disfranchisement upon the man who destroys himself, as one who acts unjustly towards the state.

4 Again, if we take the word unjust in the other sense, in which it is used to designate not general badness, but a particular species of vice, we find that in this sense also it is impossible to act unjustly to one's self. (This, we found, is different from the former sense of the word : the unjust man in this second sense is bad in the same way as the coward is bad, *i.e.* as having a particular form of vice, not as having a completely vicious character, nor do we mean to say that he displays a completely vicious character when we say that he acts unjustly). For if it were possible, it would be possible for the same thing at the same time to be taken from and added to the same person. But this is impossible ; and, in fact, a just deed or an unjust deed always implies more persons than one.

Further, an act of injustice, besides being voluntary, 5
if not deliberate, must be prior to hurt received (for
he who, having received some hurt, repays the same
that he received is not held to act unjustly); but he
who hurts himself suffers that very hurt at the same
time that he inflicts it.

Again, if it were possible for a man to act unjustly
to himself, it would be possible to suffer injustice
voluntarily.

Further, a man cannot act unjustly without doing 6
an act of injustice of some particular kind; but no
one commits adultery with his own wife, or burglar-
iously breaks through his own walls, or steals his
own property.

But the whole question about acting unjustly to
one's self is settled (without going into detail) by the
answer we gave * to the question whether a man could
voluntarily suffer injustice.

(It is plain that to suffer and to do injustice are 7
both bad, for the one is to get less and the other more
than the mean amount, which corresponds to what is
healthy in medicine, or to what promotes good con-
dition in gymnastics: but, though both are bad, to do
injustice is the worse; for to do injustice is blamable
and implies vice (either completely formed vice, what
we call vice simply, or else that which is on the way
to become vice; for a voluntary act of injustice does
not always imply injustice), but to have injustice done
to you is no token of a vicious and unjust character.

In itself, then, to be unjustly treated is less bad, 8
but there is nothing to prevent its being accidentally

* *Supra*, cap. 9.

the greater evil. Science, however, does not concern itself with these accidents, but calls a pleurisy a greater malady than a stumble; and yet the latter might, on occasion, accidentally become the greater, as, for instance, if a stumble were to cause you to fall and be caught or slain by the enemy.)

- 9 Though we cannot apply the term just to a man's behaviour towards himself, yet we can apply it metaphorically and in virtue of a certain resemblance to the relations between certain parts of a man's self—not, however, in all senses of the word just, but in that sense in which it is applied to the relations of master and slave, or husband and wife; for this is the sort of relation that exists between the rational and the irrational parts of the soul.

And it is this distinction of parts that leads people to fancy that there is such a thing as injustice to one's self: one part of a man can have something done to it by another part contrary to its desires; and so they think that the term just can be applied to the relations of these parts to one another, just as to the relations of ruler and ruled.*

- 10 We may now consider that we have concluded our examination of justice and the other moral virtues.

* Whereas, says Aristotle, we cannot speak at all of justice or injustice to one's self, and it is only by way of metaphor that we can apply the terms even to the relations of parts of the self—not strictly, since the parts are not persons.

Aristotle

Politics

Books 1, 2 and 3

Aristotle, *Politics*. Translated into English with introduction, marginal analysis, essays, notes and indices by Benjamin Jowett. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1885. 2 vols. Vol. 1

THE POLITICS.

BOOK I.

Ed.
Bekker,
1252 a.

EVERY state is a community of some kind, and every community is established with a view to some good; for mankind always act in order to obtain that which they think good. But, if all communities aim at some good, the state or political community, which is the highest of all, and which embraces all the rest, aims, and in a greater degree than any other, at the highest good. I. 1.

The state being the highest community aims at the highest good.

2 Now there is an erroneous opinion ^a that a statesman, king, householder, and master are the same, and that they differ, not in kind, but only in the number of their subjects. For example, the ruler over a few is called a master; over more, the manager of a household; over a still larger number, a statesman or king, as if there were no difference between a great household and a small state. The distinction which is made between the king and the statesman is as follows: When the government is personal, the ruler is a king; when, according to the principles of the political science, the citizens rule and are ruled in turn, then he is called a statesman. Plato treated the difference between household, royal, and political rule as a difference only of degree.

3 But all this is a mistake; for governments differ in kind, as will be evident to any one who considers the matter according to the method ^b which has hitherto guided us. As in other departments of science, so in politics, the compound should always be resolved into the simple elements or least parts of the whole. We must But it is really a difference in kind, as will be clear if we resolve the state into its elements.

^a Cp. Plato Politicus, 258 E foll.

^b Cp. c. 8. § 1.

I. 1. therefore look at the elements of which the state is composed, in order that we may see ^ain what they differ from one another, and whether any scientific distinction can be drawn between the different kinds of rule^a.

2. He who thus considers things in their first growth and origin, whether a state or anything else, will obtain the clearest view of them. In the first place (1) there ² must be a union of those who cannot exist without each other; for example, of male and female, that the race may continue; and this is a union which is formed, not of deliberate purpose, but because, in common with other animals and with plants, mankind have a natural desire to leave behind them an image of themselves.

(1) Union of male and female.

(2) Of ruler and subject.

And (2) there must be a union of natural ruler and subject, that both may be preserved. For he who can foresee with his mind is by nature intended to be lord and master, and he who can work with his body is a subject, and by nature a slave; hence master and slave ³ have the same interest. Nature, however, has distinguished between the female and the slave. For she is not niggardly, like the smith who fashions the Delphian knife for many uses; she makes each thing for a single use, and every instrument is best made when intended for one and not for many uses. But among barbarians no ⁴ distinction is made between women and slaves, because there is no natural ruler among them: they are a community of slaves, male and female. Wherefore the poets say,—

‘It is meet that Hellenes should rule over barbarians^b;’

as if they thought that the barbarian and the slave were by nature one.

The family the first stage of society.

Out of these two relationships between man and ⁵ woman, master and slave, the family first arises, and Hesiod is right when he says,—

‘First house and wife and an ox for the plough^c;’

^a Or, with Bernays, ‘how the different kinds of rule differ from one another, and generally whether any scientific result can be attained about each one of them.’

^b Eurip. Iphig. in Aulid. 1400.

^c Op. et Di. 405.

for the ox is the poor man's slave. The family is the association established by nature for the supply of men's every day wants, and the members of it are called by Charondas 'companions of the cupboard' [*ῥμοσιπίους*], and by Epimenides the Cretan, 'a companions of the manger^a' [*ῥμοκάπους*]. But when several families are united, and the association aims at something more than the supply of daily needs, then comes into existence the village. And the most natural form of the village appears to be that of a colony from the family, composed of the children and grandchildren, who are said to be 'suckled with the same milk.' And this is the reason why Hellenic states were originally governed by kings; because the Hellenes were under royal rule before they came together, as the barbarians still are. Every family is ruled by the eldest, and therefore in the colonies of the family the kingly form of government prevailed because they were of the same blood. As Homer says [of the Cyclopes]:—

'Each one gives law to his children and to his wives^b.'

For they lived dispersedly, as was the manner in ancient times. Wherefore men say that the Gods have a king, because they themselves either are or were in ancient times under the rule of a king. For they imagine, not only the forms of the Gods, but their ways of life to be like their own.

When several villages are united in a single community, perfect and large enough to be nearly or quite self-sufficing, the state comes into existence, originating in the bare needs of life, and continuing in existence for the sake of a good life. And therefore, if the earlier forms of society are natural, so is the state, for it is the end of them, and the [completed] nature is the end. For what each thing is when fully developed, we call its nature, whether we are speaking of a man, a horse, or a family.

^a Or, reading with the old translator (William of Moerbek) *ῥμοκάπνους*, 'companions of the hearth.'

^b Od. ix. 114, quoted by Plato Laws, iii. 680, and in N. Eth. x. 9. § 13.

- I. 2. Besides, the final cause and end of a thing is the best, 9
and to be self-sufficing is the end and the best. 1253a.

The state
exists by
nature.

Hence it is evident that the state is a creation of nature, and that man is by nature a political animal. And he who by nature and not by mere accident is without a state, is either above humanity, or below it; he is the

'Tribeless, lawless, hearthless one,'

whom Homer^a denounces—the outcast who is a lover of 10
war; he may be compared to a bird which flies alone.

Man, hav-
ing the gift
of speech
and the
sense of
right and
wrong, is
by nature
a political
animal.

Now the reason why man is more of a political animal than bees or any other gregarious animals is evident. Nature, as we often say, makes nothing in vain^b, and man is the only animal whom she has endowed with the gift of speech^c. And whereas mere 11
sound is but an indication of pleasure or pain, and is therefore found in other animals (for their nature attains to the perception of pleasure and pain and the intimation of them to one another, and no further), the power of speech is intended to set forth the expedient and inexpedient, and likewise the just and the unjust. And it is a 12
characteristic of man that he alone has any sense of good and evil, of just and unjust, and the association of living beings who have this sense makes a family and a state.

The whole
is prior to
the part,
the state to
the family
and indi-
vidual.

Thus the state is by nature clearly prior to the family and to the individual, since the whole is of necessity 13
prior to the part; for example, if the whole body be destroyed, there will be no foot or hand, except in an equivocal sense, as we might speak of a stone hand; for when destroyed the hand will be no better. But things are defined by their working and power; and we ought not to say that they are the same when they are no longer the same, but only that they have the same name. The 14
proof that the state is a creation of nature and prior to the individual is that the individual, when isolated, is not self-sufficing; and therefore he is like a part in relation to the whole. But he who is unable to live in society, or who has no need because he is sufficient for himself, must

^a Il. ix. 63.

^b Cp. c. 8. § 12.

^c Cp. vii. 13. § 12.

15 be either a beast or a god: he is no part of a state. A I. 2.
 social instinct is implanted in all men by nature, and
 yet he who first founded the state was the greatest of
 benefactors. For man, when perfected, is the best of
 animals, but, when separated from law and justice, he
 16 is the worst of all; since armed injustice is the more
 dangerous, and he is equipped at birth with the arms of
 intelligence and with moral qualities which he may use
 for the worst ends. Wherefore, if he have not virtue, he
 is the most unholy and the most savage of animals, and
 the most full of lust and gluttony. But justice is the
 bond of men in states, and the administration of justice,
 which is the determination of what is just^a, is the prin-
 ciple of order in political society.

Seeing then that the state is made up of households, 3.
 before speaking of the state, we must speak of the <sup>The family
or house-
hold.</sup>
 1253b. ^b management of the household^b. The parts of the ^{Its parts.}
 household are the persons who compose it, and a com-
 plete household consists of slaves and freemen. Now
 we should begin by examining everything in its least
 elements; and the first and least parts of a family are
 master and slave, husband and wife, father and children.
 We have therefore to consider what each of these three
 2 relations is and ought to be:—I mean the relation of
 master and servant, of husband and wife, and thirdly of
 parent and child. [I say *γαμικὴ* and *τεκνοποιητικὴ*, there
 being no words for the two latter notions which ade-
 3 quately represent them.] And there is another element
 of a household, the so-called art of money-making, which,
 according to some, is identical with household manage-
 ment, according to others, a principal part of it; the
 nature of this art will also have to be considered by us.

Let us first speak of master and slave, looking to the <sup>Master
and slave.</sup>
 needs of practical life and also seeking to attain some
 4 better theory of their relation than exists at present. For
 some are of opinion that the rule of a master is a science,

^a Cp. N. Eth. v. 6. § 4.

^b Reading with the MSS. *οἰκονομία*.

I. 3. and that the management of a household, and the master-ship of slaves, and the political and royal rule, as I was saying at the outset^a, are all the same. Others affirm that the rule of a master over slaves is contrary to nature, and that the distinction between slave and free-man exists by law only, and not by nature; and being an interference with nature is therefore unjust.

4. Property is a part of the household, and therefore the art of acquiring property is a part of the art of managing the household; for no man can live well, or indeed live at all, unless he be provided with necessaries. And as in the arts which have a definite sphere the workers must have their own proper instruments for the accomplishment of their work, so it is in the management of a household. Now, instruments are of various sorts; ² some are living, others lifeless; in the rudder, the pilot of a ship has a lifeless, in the look-out man, a living instrument; for in the arts the servant is a kind of instrument. Thus, too, a possession is an instrument for maintaining life. And so, in the arrangement of the family, a slave is a living possession, and property a number of such instruments; and the servant is himself an instrument, which takes precedence of all other instruments. For if every instrument could accom- ³ plish its own work, obeying or anticipating the will of others, like the statues of Daedalus, or the tripods of Hephaestus, which, says the poet^b,

‘of their own accord entered the assembly of the Gods;’

if, in like manner, the shuttle would weave and the plectrum touch the lyre without a hand to guide them, chief workmen would not want servants, nor masters slaves. Here, however, another distinction must be drawn: the in- ^{1254a.} ⁴ struments commonly so called are instruments of production, whilst a possession is an instrument of action. The shuttle, for example, is not only of use; but something

^a Plato in Pol. 258 E foll., referred to already in c. 1. § 2.

^b Hom. Il. xviii. 376.

else is made by it, whereas of a garment or of a bed I. 4.
 there is only the use. Further, as production and action
 are different in kind, and both require instruments, the
 instruments which they employ must likewise differ in
 5 kind. But life is action and not production, and therefore
 the slave is the minister of action [for he ministers to
 his master's life]. Again, a possession is spoken of as a
 part is spoken of; for the part is not only a part of
 something else, but wholly belongs to it; and this is also
 true of a possession. The master is only the master
 of the slave; he does not belong to him, whereas the
 slave is not only the slave of his master, but wholly
 6 belongs to him. Hence we see what is the nature and
 office of a slave; he who is by nature not his own but
 another's and yet a man, is by nature a slave; and he
 may be said to belong to another who, being a human
 being, is also a possession. And a possession may be
 defined as an instrument of action, separable from the
 possessor.

His
 master's
 life is a life
 of action, to
 which he
 ministers.

Who is the
 slave by
 nature?

But is there any one thus intended by nature to be a 5.
 slave, and for whom such a condition is expedient and
 right, or rather is not all slavery a violation of nature?

Is there
 a slave by
 nature?

There is no difficulty in answering this question, on
 2 grounds both of reason and of fact. For that some
 should rule, and others be ruled is a thing, not only
 necessary, but expedient; from the hour of their birth,
 some are marked out for subjection, others for rule.

And whereas there are many kinds both of rulers and
 subjects, that rule is the better which is exercised over
 better subjects—for example, to rule over men is better
 3 than to rule over wild beasts. The work is better which
 is executed by better workmen; and where one man rules
 and another is ruled, they may be said to have a work.
 In all things which form a composite whole and which
 are made up of parts, whether continuous or discrete, a
 distinction between the ruling and the subject element
 4 comes to light. Such a duality exists in living creatures,
 but not in them only; it originates in the constitution of

I. 5. the universe ; even in things which have no life, there is a ruling principle, as ^ain musical harmony^a. But we are wandering from the subject. We will, therefore, restrict ourselves to the living creature which, in the first place, consists of soul and body : and of these two, the one is by nature the ruler, and the other the subject. But then 5 we must look for the intentions of nature in things which retain their nature, and not in things which are corrupted. And therefore we must study the man who is in the most perfect state both of body and soul, for in him we shall see the true relation of the two ; although in bad or corrupted natures the body will often appear to rule 1254b. over the soul, because they are in an evil and unnatural condition. First then we may observe in living creatures 6 both a despotic and a constitutional rule ; for the soul rules the body with a despotic rule, whereas the intellect rules the appetites with a constitutional and royal rule. And it is clear that the rule of the soul over the body, and of the mind and the rational element over the passionate is natural and expedient ; whereas the equality of the two or the rule of the inferior is always hurtful. The same holds good of animals as well as of 7 men ; for tame animals have a better nature than wild, and all tame animals are better off when they are ruled by man ; for then they are preserved. Again, the male is by nature superior, and the female inferior ; and the one rules, and the other is ruled ; this principle, of necessity, extends to all mankind. Where then there is such 8 a difference as that between soul and body, or between men and animals (as in the case of those whose business is to use their body, and who can do nothing better), the lower sort are by nature slaves, and it is better for them as for all inferiors that they should be under the rule of a master. For he who can be, and therefore is 9 another's, and he who participates in reason enough to apprehend, but not to have, reason, is a slave by nature. Whereas the lower animals cannot even apprehend

^a Or, 'of harmony [in music].'

reason ; they obey their instincts. And indeed the use made of slaves and of tame animals is not very different ; for both with their bodies minister to the needs of life. 10 Nature would like to distinguish between the bodies of freemen and slaves, making the one strong for servile labour, the other upright, and although useless for such services, useful for political life in the arts both of war and peace. But this does not hold universally : for some slaves have the souls and others have the bodies of freemen. And doubtless if men differed from one another in the mere forms of their bodies as much as the statues of the Gods do from men, all would acknowledge that the inferior class should be slaves of the superior. 11 And if there is a difference in the body, how much more in the soul ? but the beauty of the body is seen, whereas 1255 a. the beauty of the soul is not seen. It is clear, then, that some men are by nature free, and others slaves, and that for these latter slavery is both expedient and right.

But that those who take the opposite view have in a certain way right on their side, may be easily seen. For the words slavery and slave are used in two senses. There is a slave or slavery by law as well as by nature. The law of which I speak is a sort of convention, according to which whatever is taken in war is supposed to belong to the victors. But this right many jurists impeach, as they would an orator who brought forward an unconstitutional measure : they detest the notion that, because one man has the power of doing violence and is superior in brute strength, another shall be his slave and subject. Even among philosophers there is a difference of opinion. The origin of the dispute, and the reason why the arguments cross, is as follows : Virtue, when furnished with means, may be deemed to have the greatest power of doing violence : and as superior power is only found where there is superior excellence of some kind, power is thought to imply virtue. But does it likewise imply justice ?—that is the question. And, in order to make a distinction between them, some

I. 5.

There are slaves by nature and freemen by nature, but the difference is not always marked.

6.

The view that slavery is contrary to nature examined.

Might and right, how related.

- I. 6. assert that justice is benevolence: to which others reply that justice is nothing more than the rule of a superior. If the two views are regarded as antagonistic and exclusive [i. e. if the notion that justice is benevolence excludes the idea of a just rule of a superior], the alternative [viz. that no one should rule over others^a] has no force or plausibility, because it implies that not even the superior in virtue ought to rule, or be master. Some, 5 clinging, as they think, to a principle of justice (for law and custom are a sort of justice), assume that slavery in war is justified by law, but they are not consistent. For what if the cause of the war be unjust? No one would ever say that he is a slave who is unworthy to be a slave. Were this the case, men of the highest rank would be slaves and the children of slaves if they or their parents chance to have been taken captive and sold. Wherefore Hellenes do not like to call themselves 6 slaves, but confine the term to barbarians. Yet, in using this language, they really mean the natural slave of whom we spoke at first; for it must be admitted that some are slaves everywhere, others nowhere. The 7 same principle applies to nobility. Hellenes regard themselves as noble everywhere, and not only in their own country, but they deem the barbarians noble only when at home, thereby implying that there are two sorts of nobility and freedom, the one absolute, the other relative. The Helen of Theodectes says:—

Slavery
of captives
taken in
war.

Greek and
barbarian.

‘Who would presume to call me servant who am on both sides sprung from the stem of the Gods?’

What does this mean but that they distinguish freedom 8 and slavery, noble and humble birth, by the two principles of good and evil? They think that as men and 1255 b. animals beget men and animals, so from good men a good man springs. But this is what nature, though she may intend it, cannot always accomplish.

We see then that there is some foundation for this 9

^a Cp. § 2.

difference of opinion, and that all are not either slaves I. 6.
 by nature or freemen by nature, and also that there is
 in some cases a marked distinction between the two
 classes, rendering it expedient and right for the one to
 be slaves and the others to be masters: the one practis-
 ing obedience, the others exercising the authority which
 10 nature intended them to have. The abuse of this au-
 thority is injurious to both; for the interests of part and
 whole^a, of body and soul, are the same, and the slave
 is a part of the master, a living but separated part of
 his bodily frame. Where the relation between them is
 natural they are friends and have a common interest,
 but where it rests merely on law and force the reverse
 is true.

The previous remarks are quite enough to show that 7.
 the rule of a master is not a constitutional rule, and
 therefore that all the different kinds of rule are not, as
 some affirm, the same with each other^b. For there is
 one rule exercised over subjects who are by nature free,
 another over subjects who are by nature slaves. The
 rule of a household is a monarchy, for every house is
 under one head: whereas constitutional rule is a govern-
 2 ment of freemen and equals. The master is not called
 a master because he has science, but because he is of a
 certain character, and the same remark applies to the
 slave and the freeman. Still there may be a science for
 the master and a science for the slave. The science of
 the slave would be such as the man of Syracuse taught,
 who made money by instructing slaves in their ordinary
 3 duties. And such a knowledge may be carried further,
 so as to include cookery and similar menial arts. For
 some duties are of the more necessary, others of the
 more honourable sort; as the proverb says, 'slave before
 4 slave, master before master.' But all such branches of
 knowledge are servile. There is likewise a science of
 (1) The science of the slave.
 (2) The science

^a Cp. c. 4. § 5.

^b Plato Polit. 258 E foll., referred to already in c. 1. § 2.

I. 7. of the master. the master, which teaches the use of slaves; for the master as such is concerned, not with the acquisition, but with the use of them. Yet this so-called science is not anything great or wonderful; for the master need only know how to order that which the slave must know how to execute. Hence those who are in a position ⁵ which places them above toil, have stewards who attend to their households while they occupy themselves with philosophy or with politics. But the art of acquiring slaves, I mean of justly acquiring them, differs both from the art of the master and the art of the slave, being a species of hunting or war^a. Enough of the distinction between master and slave.

8. Chrematistic, or the art of money-making. How related to the art of managing a household? Let us now inquire into property generally, and into ^{1256 a.} the art of money-making, in accordance with our usual method [of resolving a whole into its parts^b], for a slave has been shown to be a part of property. The first question is whether the art of money-making is the same with the art of managing a household or a part of it, or instrumental to it; and if the last, whether in the way that the art of making shuttles is instrumental to the art of weaving, or in the way that the casting of bronze is instrumental to the art of the statuary, for they are not instrumental in the same way, but the one provides tools and the other material; and by material I mean the ² substratum out of which any work is made; thus wool is the material of the weaver, bronze of the statuary. Now it is easy to see that the art of household management is not identical with the art of money-making, for the one uses the material which the other provides. And the art which uses household stores can be no other than the art of household management. There is, however, a doubt whether the art of money-making is a part of household management or a distinct art. [They appear to be connected]; for the money-maker has to ³ consider whence money and property can be procured;

^a Cp. vii. 14. § 21.

^b Cp. c., I. § 3.

but there are many sorts of property and wealth:— I. 8.
 there is husbandry and the care and provision of food
 in general; are these parts of the money-making art
 4 or distinct arts? Again, there are many sorts of food, Why men
lead differ-
ent kinds
of lives.
 and therefore there are many kinds of lives both of
 animals and men; they must all have food, and the
 differences in their food have made differences in their
 5 ways of life. For of beasts, some are gregarious, others
 are solitary; they live in the way which is best adapted
 to sustain them, accordingly as they are carnivorous or
 herbivorous or omnivorous: and their habits are deter-
 mined for them by nature in such a manner that they
 may obtain with greater facility the food of their choice.
 But, as different individuals have different tastes, the
 same things are not naturally pleasant to all of them;
 and therefore the lives of carnivorous or herbivorous
 6 animals further differ among themselves. In the lives
 of men too there is a great difference. The laziest are Nomadic
life.
 shepherds, who lead an idle life, and get their sub-
 sistence without trouble from tame animals; their flocks
 having to wander from place to place in search of pas-
 ture, they are compelled to follow them, cultivating a
 7 sort of living farm. Others support themselves by hunt- Hunting.
 ing, which is of different kinds. Some, for example, are
 pirates, others, who dwell near lakes or marshes or rivers
 or a sea in which there are fish, are fishermen, and
 others live by the pursuit of birds or wild beasts. The Agriculture.
 greater number obtain a living from the fruits of the
 8 soil. Such are the modes of subsistence which prevail
 among those ^a whose industry is employed immediately
 upon the products of nature^a, and whose food is not
 1256b. acquired by exchange and retail trade—there is the
 shepherd, the husbandman, the pirate, the fisherman, the
 hunter. Some gain a comfortable maintenance out of
 two employments, eking out the deficiencies of one of
 them by another: thus the life of a shepherd may be

^a Or, 'whose labour is personal.'

I. 8. combined with that of a brigand, the life of a farmer with that of a hunter. Other modes of life are similarly 9 combined in any way which the needs of men may require. Property, in the sense of a bare livelihood, seems to be given by nature herself to all, both when they are first born, and when they are grown up. For some 10 animals bring forth, together with their offspring, so much food as will last until they are able to supply themselves; of this the vermiparous or oviparous animals are an instance; and the viviparous animals have up to a certain time a supply of food for their young in themselves, which is called milk. In like manner we may 11 infer that, after the birth of animals, plants exist for their sake, and that the other animals exist for the sake of man, the same for use and food, the wild, if not all, at least the greater part of them, for food, and for the provision of clothing and various instruments. Now if 12 nature makes nothing incomplete, and nothing in vain, the inference must be that she has made all animals and plants for the sake of man. And so, in one point of view, the art of war is a natural art of acquisition, for it includes hunting, an art which we ought to practise against wild beasts, and against men who, though intended by nature to be governed, will not submit; for war of such a kind is naturally just^a.

The natural mode of acquiring property.

Of the art of acquisition then there is one kind^b which 13 is natural and is a part of the management of a household^b. Either we must suppose the necessaries of life to exist previously, or the art of household management must provide a store of them for the common use of the family or state. They are the elements of true wealth; 14 for the amount of property which is needed for a good life is not unlimited, although Solon in one of his poems says that

‘No bound to riches has been fixed for man^c.’

^a Cp. c. 7. § 5, and vii. 14. § 21.

^b Or, with Bernays, ‘which by nature is a part of the management of a household.’

^c Bergk, Poet. Lyr. Solon, iv. 12. v. 71.

But there is a boundary fixed, just as there is in the
 15 arts; for the instruments of any art are never unlimited,
 either in number or size, and wealth may be defined as
 a number of instruments to be used in a household or
 in a state. And so we see that there is a natural
 art of acquisition which is practised by managers of
 households and by statesmen, and what is the reason
 of this. I. 8.

There is another variety of the art of acquisition which
 is commonly and rightly called the art of making money,
 1257 a. and has in fact suggested the notion that wealth and
 property have no limit. Being nearly connected with
 the preceding, it is often identified with it. But though
 they are not very different, neither are they the same.
 The kind already described is given by nature, the other
 is gained by experience and art. 9.

The non-natural mode, or money-making.

2 Let us begin our discussion of the question with the following considerations:—

Of everything which we possess there are two uses:
 both belong to the thing as such, but not in the same
 manner, for one is the proper, and the other the im-
 proper or secondary use of it. For example, a shoe is
 used for wear, and is used for exchange; both are uses of
 3 the shoe. He who gives a shoe in exchange for money
 or food to him who wants one, does indeed use the shoe
 as a shoe, but this is not its proper or primary purpose,
 for a shoe is not made to be an object of barter. The
 4 same may be said of all possessions, for the art of ex-
 change extends to all of them, and it arises at first in a
 natural manner from the circumstance that some have
 too little, others too much. Hence we may infer that
 retail trade is not a natural part of the art of money-
 making; had it been so, men would have ceased to ex-
 5 change when they had enough. And in the first com-
 munity, which is the family, this art is obviously of no
 use, but only begins to be useful when the society in-
 creases. For the members of the family originally had
 all things in common; in a more divided state of society

Value in use and value in exchange.

I. 9. they ^a still shared in many things, but they were different things^a which they had to give in exchange for what they wanted, a kind of barter which is still practised among barbarous nations who exchange with one another 6 the necessaries of life and nothing more; giving and receiving wine, for example, in exchange for corn and the like. This sort of barter is not part of the money-making art and is not contrary to nature, but is needed for the satisfaction of men's natural wants. The other 7 or more complex form of exchange grew out of the simpler. When the inhabitants of one country became more dependent on those of another, and they imported what they needed, and exported the surplus, money necessarily came into use. For the various necessaries 8 of life are not easily carried about, and hence men agreed to employ in their dealings with each other something which was intrinsically useful and easily applicable to the purposes of life, for example, iron, silver, and the like. Of this the value was at first measured by size and weight, but in process of time they put a stamp upon it, to save the trouble of weighing and to mark the value.

Invention
of money

and of coin.

Retail
trade.

Two views
about
money.

When the use of coin had once been discovered, out of ^{1257 b.} the barter of necessary articles arose the other art of ⁹ money-making, namely, retail trade; which was at first probably a simple matter, but became more complicated as soon as men learned by experience whence and by what exchanges the greatest profit might be made. Originating in the use of coin, the art of money-making ¹⁰ is generally thought to be chiefly concerned with it, and to be the art which produces wealth and money; having to consider how they may be accumulated. Indeed, wealth is assumed by many to be only a quantity of coin, because the art of money-making and retail trade are concerned with coin. Others maintain that ¹¹ coined money is a mere sham, a thing not natural,

^a Or, more simply, 'shared in many more things.'

but conventional only, which would have no value or use for any of the purposes of daily life if another commodity were substituted by the users. And, indeed, he who is rich in coin may often be in want of necessary food. But how can that be wealth of which a man may have a great abundance and yet perish with hunger, like Midas in the fable, whose insatiable prayer turned everything that was set before him into gold? I. 9.

12 Men seek after a better notion of wealth and of the art of making money than the mere acquisition of coin, and they are right. For natural wealth and the natural art of money-making are a different thing; in their true form they are part of the management of a household; whereas retail trade is the art of producing wealth, not in every way, but by exchange. And it seems to be concerned with coin; for coin is the beginning of exchange and the measure or limit of it. And there is no bound to the wealth which springs from this art of money-making^a. As in the art of medicine there is no limit to the pursuit of health, and as in the other arts there is no limit to the pursuit of their several ends, for they aim at accomplishing their ends to the uttermost; (but of the means there is a limit, for the end is always the limit), so, too, in this art of money-making there is no limit of the end, which is wealth of the spurious kind, and the acquisition of money. But the art of household management has a limit; the unlimited acquisition of money is not its business. And, therefore, in one point of view, all wealth must have a limit; nevertheless, as a matter of fact, we find the opposite to be the case; for all money-makers increase their hoard of coin without limit. The source of the confusion is the near connexion between 15 the two kinds of money-making; in either, the instrument [i. e. wealth] is the same, although the use is different, and so they pass into one another; for each is a use of the same property^b, but with a difference: accumulation is the end in the one case, but there is a further end in the

Distinction between natural wealth and the mere acquisition of coin.

In the arts the means are limited by the end, the end is unlimited: so in money-making, but not in household management.

^a Cp. c. 8. § 14.

^b Reading *κρήσεως χρήσις*.

I. 9. other. Hence some persons are led to believe that making money is the object of household management, and the whole idea of their lives is that they ought either to increase their money without limit, or at any rate not to lose it. The origin of this disposition in men is that they ¹⁶ are intent upon living only, and not upon living well ;^{1258a.} and, as their desires are unlimited, they also desire that the means of gratifying them should be without limit. Even those who aim at a good life seek the means of obtaining bodily pleasures ; and, since the enjoyment of these appears to depend on property, they are absorbed in making money : and so there arises the second species of money-making. For, as their enjoyment is in excess, ¹⁷ they seek an art which produces the excess of enjoyment ; and, if they are not able to supply their pleasures by the art of money-making, they try other arts, using in turn every faculty in a manner contrary to nature. The quality of courage, for example, is not intended to make money, but to inspire confidence ; neither is this the aim of the general's or of the physician's art ; but the one aims at victory and the other at health. Nevertheless, some men turn every quality or art into ¹⁸ a means of making money ; this they conceive to be the end, and to the promotion of the end all things must contribute.

Thus, then, we have considered the art of money-making, which is unnecessary, and why men want it ; and also the necessary art of money-making, which we have seen to be different from the other, and to be a natural part of the art of managing a household, concerned with the provision of food, not, however, like the former kind, unlimited, but having a limit.

10. And we have found the answer to our original question ^a, Whether the art of money-making is the business of the manager of a household and of the statesman or not their business?—viz. that it is an art which is presupposed by them. For political science does not make

^a Cp. c. 8. § 1.

men, but takes them from nature and uses them ; and nature provides them with food from the element of earth, air, or sea. At this stage begins the duty of the manager of a household, who has to order the things which nature supplies ;—he may be compared to the weaver who has not to make but to use wool, and to know what sort of wool is good and serviceable or bad and unserviceable. Were this otherwise, it would be difficult to see why the art of money-making is a part of the management of a household and the art of medicine not ; for surely the members of a household must have health just as they must have life or any other necessary. And as from one point of view the master of the house and the ruler of the state have to consider about health, from another point of view not they but the physician ; so in one way the art of household management, in another way the subordinate art, has to consider about money. But, strictly speaking, as I have already said, the means of life must be provided beforehand by nature ; for the business of nature is to furnish food to that which is born, and the food of the offspring always remains over in the parent ^a. Wherefore the art of making money out of fruits and animals is always natural.

Of the two sorts of money-making one, as I have just said, is a part of household management, the other is retail trade: the former necessary and honourable, the latter a kind of exchange which is justly censured ; for it is unnatural, and a mode by which men gain from one another. The most hated sort, and with the greatest reason, is usury, which makes a gain out of money itself, and not from the natural use of it. For money was intended to be used in exchange, but not to increase at interest. And this term usury [*τόκος*], which means the birth of money from money, is applied to the breeding of money because the offspring resembles the parent. Wherefore of all modes of making money this is the most unnatural.

^a Cp. c. 8. § 10.

I. 11.

Practical
classifica-
tion of
money-
making.

(1) The
natural
kind.

(2) Ex-
change.

(3) The
inter-
mediate
kind.

Enough has been said about the theory of money-making; we will now proceed to the practical part. ^aThe discussion of such matters is not unworthy of philosophy, but to be engaged in them practically is illiberal and irksome^a. The useful parts of money-making are, first, the knowledge of live-stock,—which are most profitable, and where, and how,—as, for example, what sort of horses or sheep or oxen or any other animals are most likely to give a return. A man ought to know which of these pay better than others, and which pay best in particular places, for some do better in one place and some in another. Secondly, husbandry, which may be either tillage or planting, and the keeping of bees and of fish, or fowl, or of any animals which may be useful to man. These are the divisions of the true or proper art of money-making and come first. Of the other, which consists in exchange, the first and most important division is commerce (of which there are three kinds—commerce by sea, commerce by land, selling in shops—these again differing as they are safer or more profitable), the second is usury, the third, service for hire—of this, one kind is employed in the mechanical arts, the other in unskilled and bodily labour. There is still a third sort of money-making intermediate between this and the first or natural mode which is partly natural, but is also concerned with exchange of the fruits and other products of the earth. Some of these latter, although they bear no fruit, are nevertheless profitable; for example, wood and minerals. The art of mining, by which minerals are obtained, has many branches, for there are various kinds of things dug out of the earth. Of the several divisions of money-making I now speak generally; a minute consideration of them might be useful in practice, but it would be tiresome to dwell upon them at greater length now.

Those occupations are most truly arts in which there

^a Or, 'We are free to speculate about them, but in practice we are limited by circumstances.' (Bernays.)

is the least element of chance; they are the meanest I. 11.
 in which the body is most deteriorated, the most
 servile in which there is the greatest use of the body,
 and the most illiberal in which there is the least need
 of excellence.

- 7 Works have been written upon these subjects by Works on
economic
subjects.
 various persons; for example, by Chares the Parian, and
 Apollodorus the Lemnian, who have treated of Tillage
 1259a. and Planting, while others have treated of other branches;
 any one who cares for such matters may refer to their
 writings. It would be well also to collect the scattered
 stories of the ways in which individuals have succeeded in
 8 amassing a fortune; for all this is useful to persons who
 value the art of making money. There is the anecdote Story about
Thales.
How a phi-
losopher
once made
a fortune.
 of Thales the Milesian and his financial device, which
 involves a principle of universal application, but is attri-
 buted to him on account of his reputation for wisdom.
- 9 He was reproached for his poverty, which was supposed
 to show that philosophy was of no use. According to
 the story, he knew by his skill in the stars while it was
 yet winter that there would be a great harvest of olives
 in the coming year; so, having a little money, he gave
 deposits for the use of all the olive-presses in Chios and
 Miletus, which he hired at a low price because no one
 bid against him. When the harvest-time came, and many
 wanted them all at once and of a sudden, he let them
 out at any rate which he pleased, and made a quantity
 of money. Thus he showed the world that philosophers
 can easily be rich if they like, but that their ambition
 10 is of another sort. He is supposed to have given a
 striking proof of his wisdom, but, as I was saying, his
 device for getting money is of universal application, and
 is nothing but the creation of a monopoly. It is an art Monopoly.
 often practised by cities when they are in want of money;
 they make a monopoly of provisions.
- 11 There was a man of Sicily, who, having money de- Story about
a man of
Sicily.
 deposited with him, bought up all the iron from the iron
 mines; afterwards, when the merchants from their various

I. 11. markets came to buy, he was the only seller, and without much increasing the price he gained 200 per cent. Which when Dionysius heard, he told him that he might ¹² take away his money, but that he must not remain at Syracuse, for he thought that the man had discovered a way of making money which was injurious to his own interests. He had the same idea ^a as Thales; they both contrived to create a monopoly for themselves. And ¹³ statesmen ought to know these things; for a state is often as much in want of money and of such devices for obtaining it as a household, or even more so; hence some public men devote themselves entirely to finance.

Monopoly applied to finance.

12.

Different kinds of rule within the household:
 (1) rule of master over slaves;
 (2) of father over children;
 (3) of husband over wife.

Of household management we have seen^b that there are three parts—one is the rule of a master over slaves, which has been discussed already^c, another of a father, and the third of a husband. A husband and father rules over wife and children, both free, but the rule differs, the rule over his children being a royal, over his wife a ^{1259b} constitutional rule. For although there may be exceptions to the order of nature, the male is by nature fitter for command than the female, just as the elder and full-grown is superior to the younger and more immature. But in most constitutional states the citizens ² rule and are ruled by turns, for the idea of a constitutional state implies that the natures of the citizens are equal, and do not differ at all^d. Nevertheless, when one rules and the other is ruled we endeavour to create a difference of outward forms and names and titles of respect, which may be illustrated by the saying of Amasis about his foot-pan^e. The relation of the male ³ to the female is of this kind, but there the inequality is permanent. The rule of a father over his children is royal, for he receives both love and the respect due to age, exercising a kind of royal power. And therefore Homer has appropriately called Zeus 'father of Gods and men,' because he is the king of them all. For a king

^a Reading *εὐρημα* with Bernays. ^b Cp. c. 3, § 1. ^c Cp. c. 3-7.

^d Cp. ii. 2. § 6; iii. 17. § 4. ^e Herod. ii. 172, and note on this passage.

is the natural superior of his subjects, but he should be of the same kin or kind with them, and such is the relation of elder and younger, of father and son. I. 12.

Thus it is clear that household management attends more to men than to the acquisition of inanimate things, and to human excellence more than to the excellence of property which we call wealth, and to the virtue of freemen more than to the virtue of slaves. A question may indeed be raised, whether there is any excellence at all in a slave beyond merely instrumental and ministerial qualities—whether he can have the virtues of temperance, courage, justice, and the like; or whether slaves possess only bodily and ministerial qualities. And, whichever way we answer the question, a difficulty arises; for, if they have virtue, in what will they differ from freemen? On the other hand, since they are men and share in reason, it seems absurd to say that they have no virtue. A similar question may be raised about women and children, whether they too have virtues: ought a woman to be temperate and brave and just, and is a child to be called temperate, and intemperate, or not? So in general we may ask about the natural ruler, and the natural subject, whether they have the same or different virtues. For a noble nature is equally required in both, but if so, why should one of them always rule, and the other always be ruled? Nor can we say that this is a question of degree, for the difference between ruler and subject is a difference of kind, and therefore not of degree; yet how strange is the supposition that the one ought, and that the other ought not, to have virtue! For if the ruler is intemperate and unjust, how can he rule well? if the subject, how can he obey well? If he be licentious and cowardly, he will certainly not do his duty. It is evident, therefore, that both of them must have a share of virtue, but varying according to their various natures. And this is at once indicated by the soul, in which one part naturally rules, and the other is subject, and the virtue of the ruler we maintain

I 3.

Has a slave virtue?

How far have women and children virtues?

The virtues of ruler and subject different.

Psychological parallel.

I. 13. to be different from that of the subject;—the one being the virtue of the rational, and the other of the irrational part. Now, it is obvious that the same principle applies generally, and therefore almost all things rule and are ruled according to nature. But the kind of rule differs; 7 —the freeman rules over the slave after another manner from that in which the male rules over the female, or the man over the child; although the parts of the soul are present in all of them, they are present in different degrees. For the slave has no deliberative faculty at all; the woman has, but it is ^awithout authority^a, and the child has, but it is immature. So it must necessarily be 8 with the moral virtues also; all may be supposed to partake of them, but only in such manner and degree as is required by each for the fulfilment of his duty. Hence the ruler ought to have moral virtue in perfection, for his duty is entirely that of a master artificer, and the master artificer is reason; the subjects, on the other hand, require only that measure of virtue which is proper to each of them. Clearly, then, moral virtue belongs to 9 all of them; but the temperance of a man and of a woman, or the courage and justice of a man and of a woman, are not, as Socrates maintained^b, the same; the courage of a man is shown in commanding, of a woman in obeying. And this holds of all other virtues, as 10 will be more clearly seen if we look at them in detail, for those who say generally that virtue consists in a good disposition of the soul, or in doing rightly, or the like, only deceive themselves. Far better than such definitions is their mode of speaking, who, like Gorgias^b, enumerate the virtues. All classes must be deemed to 11 have their special attributes; as the poet says of women,

‘Silence is a woman’s glory^c;

but this is not equally the glory of man. The child is imperfect, and therefore obviously his virtue is not relative

^a Or, with Bernays, ‘inconclusive.’ ^b Plato Meno, 71-73.

^c Soph. Aj. 293.

Different degrees of virtue.

Plato criticised.

I. 14.

to himself alone, but to the perfect man and to his
 12 teacher^a, and in like manner the virtue of the slave is
 relative to a master. Now we determined that a slave
 is useful for the wants of life, and therefore he will obvi-
 ously require only so much virtue as will prevent him
 from failing in his duty through cowardice and intem-
 perance. Some one will ask whether, if what we are
 saying is true, virtue will not be required also in the
 artisans, for they often fail in their work through mis-
 13 conduct? But is there not a great difference in the two
 cases? For the slave shares in his master's life; the
 artisan is less closely connected with him, and only
 attains excellence in proportion as he becomes a slave,
 [i.e. is under the direction of a master]. The meaner
 1260b. sort of mechanic has a special and separate slavery; and
 whereas the slave exists by nature, not so the shoemaker
 14 or other artisan. It is manifest, then, that the master
 ought to be the source of excellence in the slave; but
 not merely because he possesses the art which trains
 him in his duties^b. Wherefore they are mistaken who
 forbid us to converse with slaves and say that we should
 employ command only^c, for slaves stand even more in
 need of admonition than children.

15 The relations of husband and wife, parent and child,
 their several virtues, what in their intercourse with one
 another is good, and what is evil, and how we may
 pursue the good and escape the evil, will have to be dis-
 cussed when we speak of the different forms of govern-
 ment. For, inasmuch as every family is a part of a state,
 and these relationships are the parts of a family, the
 virtue of the part must have regard to the virtue of the
 whole. And therefore women and children must be
 trained by education with an eye to the state^d, if the
 virtues of either of them are supposed to make any
 difference in the virtues of the state. And they must
 16 make a difference: for the children grow up to be

Has the
artisan
virtue?Mechanic
and slave.Plato criti-
cised.Virtues in
the family
relations.^a 'His father who guides him' (Bernays).^b Cp. c. 7. § 4.^c Plato Laws, vi. 777.^d Cp. v. 9. § 11-15; viii. 1. § 1.

- I. 14. citizens, and half the free persons in a state are women^a.

Of these matters, enough has been said; of what remains, let us speak at another time. Regarding, then, our present enquiry as complete, we will make a new beginning. And, first, let us examine the various theories of a perfect state.

^a Plato *Laws*, vi. 781 B.

BOOK II.

OUR purpose is to consider what form of political community is best of all for those who are most able to realise their ideal of life. We must therefore examine not only this but other constitutions, both such as actually exist in well-governed states, and any theoretical forms which are held in esteem; that what is good and useful may be brought to light. And let no one suppose that in seeking for something beyond them ^a we at all want to philosophise at the expense of truth ^a; we only undertake this enquiry because all the constitutions with which we are acquainted are faulty.

II. 1.
Reasons for examining model forms of government actual or ideal.

² We will begin with the natural beginning of the subject. Three alternatives are conceivable: The members of a state must either have (1) all things or (2) nothing in common, or (3) some things in common and some not. That they should have nothing in common is clearly impossible, for the state is a community, and must at ^{1261 a.} any rate have a common place—one city will be in one place, and the citizens are those who share in that one ³ city. But should a well-ordered state have all things, as far as may be, in common, or some only and not others? For the citizens might conceivably have wives and children and property in common, as Socrates proposes in the Republic of Plato ^b. Which is better, our present condition, or the proposed new order of society?

What should be common in a state? The logical alternatives.

The communism of Plato.

There are many difficulties in the community of ^{2.} women. And the principle on which Socrates rests the necessity of such an institution does not appear to be established by his arguments. The end which he ascribes

The community of women.

^a Or, as Bernays, taking *πάντως* with *σοφίζεσθαι βουλομένων*, 'we are anxious to make a sophistical display at any cost.'

^b Rep. v. 457 c.

II. 2. to the state, taken literally, is impossible, and how we are to interpret it is nowhere precisely stated. I am speaking of the premiss from which the argument of Socrates proceeds, 'that the greater the unity of the state the better.' Is it not obvious that a state may at length attain such a degree of unity as to be no longer a state?—since the nature of a state is to be a plurality, and in tending to greater unity, from being a state, it becomes a family, and from being a family, an individual; for the family may be said to be more one than the state, and the individual than the family. So that we ought not to attain this greatest unity even if we could, for it would be the destruction of the state. Again, a state is not made up only of so many men, but of different kinds of men; for similars do not constitute a state. It is not like a military alliance, of which the usefulness depends upon its quantity even where there is no difference in quality. For in that mutual protection is the end aimed at; and the question is the same as about the scales of a balance: which is the heavier?

In like manner, a state differs from a nation; for in a nation the people are not distributed into villages, but live scattered about, like the Arcadians^a; whereas in a state the elements out of which the unity is to be formed differ in kind. Wherefore the principle of compensation^b, as I have already remarked in the Ethics^c, is the salvation of states. And among freemen and equals this is a principle which must be maintained, for they cannot all rule together, but must change at the end of a year or some other period of time or in some order of succession. The result is that upon this plan they all govern; [but the manner of government is] just as if shoemakers and carpenters were to exchange their occupations, and the same persons did not always continue shoemakers and carpenters. And it is clearly better

^a Or, 'dispersed in villages, but are in the condition of the Arcadians.'

^b Or, 'reciprocal proportion.'

^c N. Eth. v. 8. § 6.

(1) Plato is wrong in making the greatest unity the end of the state.

The state is a unity in difference.

A state, unlike a nation, is composed of different elements;

and freedom is preserved by the interchange of them.

that, as in business, so also in politics there should be continuance of the same persons where this is possible. II. 2.

1261b. But where this is not possible by reason of the natural equality of the citizens, and it would be unjust that any one should be excluded from the government (whether to govern be a good thing or a bad^a), then it is better, instead of all holding power, to adopt a principle of rotation, equals giving place to equals, as the original rulers gave place to them^b. Thus the one party rule and the others are ruled in turn, as if they were no longer the same persons. In like manner there is a variety in the offices held by them. Hence it is evident that a city is not by nature one in that sense which some persons affirm; and that what is said to be the greatest good of cities is in reality their destruction; but surely the good of things must be that which preserves them^c.

Excessive unity would ruin the state.

8 Again, in another point of view, this extreme unification of the state is clearly not good; for a family is more self-sufficing than an individual, and a city than a family, and a city only comes into being when the community is large enough to be self-sufficing. If then self-sufficiency is to be desired, the lesser degree of unity is more desirable than the greater.

But, even supposing that it were best for the community to have the greatest degree of unity, this unity is by no means proved to follow from the fact 'of all men saying "mine" and "not mine" at the same instant of time,' which, according to Socrates^d, is the sign of perfect unity in a state. For the word 'all' is ambiguous. If the meaning be that every individual says 'mine' and 'not mine' at the same time, then perhaps the result at which Socrates aims may be in some degree accomplished; each man will call the same person his own son and his own wife, and so of his property and of all that belongs to him. This, however, is not the way in which people would speak who had their wives and children in

3.

(2) Communism will not be the means by which unity is to be attained.

^a Cp. Pl. Rep. i. 345-6.

^b Cp. i. 12. § 2; iii. 17. § 4.

^c Cp. Pl. Rep. i. 352.

^d Pl. Rep. v. 462 C.

II. 3. common ; they would say 'all' but not 'each.' In like 3
 manner their property would be described as belonging
 to them, not severally but collectively. There is an
 obvious fallacy in the term 'all': like some other words,
 'both,' 'odd,' 'even,' it is ambiguous, and in argument
 becomes a source of logical puzzles. That all persons
 call the same thing mine in the sense in which each does
 so may be a fine thing, but it is impracticable ; or if the
 words are taken in the other sense [i.e. the sense which
 distinguishes 'all' from 'each'], such an unity in no way
 conduces to harmony. And there is another objection 4
 to the proposal. For that which is common to the
 greatest number has the least care bestowed upon it.
 Every one thinks chiefly of his own, hardly at all of the
 common interest ; and only when he is himself concerned
 as an individual. For besides other considerations, every-
 body is more inclined to neglect the duty which he expects
 another to fulfil ; as in families many attendants are often
 less useful than a few. Each citizen will have a thousand 5
 sons who will not be his sons individually, but anybody
 will be equally the son of anybody, and will therefore be 1262 a.
 neglected by all alike. Further, upon this principle,
 every one will call another 'mine' or 'not mine' accord-
 ing as he is prosperous or the reverse ;—however small a
 fraction he may be of the whole number, he will say of
 every individual of the thousand, or whatever be the
 number of the city, 'such an one is mine,' 'such an one
 his' ; and even about this he will not be positive ; for
 it is impossible to know who chanced to have a child, or
 whether, if one came into existence, it has survived. But 6
 which is better—to be able to say 'mine' about every
 one of the two thousand or the ten thousand citizens, or
 to use the word 'mine' in the ordinary and more re-
 stricted sense? For usually the same person is called by 7
 one man his son whom another calls his brother or cousin
 or kinsman or blood-relation or connexion by marriage
 either of himself or of some relation of his, and these
 relationships he distinguishes from the tie which binds

Fallacy in
 the word
 'all.'

What is
 common
 least
 cared for.

Present
 arrange-
 ments
 better.

him to his tribe or ward; and how much better is it to be the real cousin of somebody than to be a son after Plato's fashion! Nor is there any way of preventing brothers and children and fathers and mothers from sometimes recognizing one another; for children are born like their parents, and they will necessarily be finding indications of their relationship to one another. Geographers declare such to be the fact; they say that in Upper Libya, where the women are common, nevertheless the children who are born are assigned to their respective fathers on the ground of their likeness^a. And some women, like the females of other animals—for example mares and cows—have a strong tendency to produce offspring resembling their parents, as was the case with the Pharsalian mare called Dicaea (the Just)^b.

II. 3.
The real relationship will often be discovered.

Other evils, against which it is not easy for the authors of such a community to guard, will be assaults and homicides, voluntary as well as involuntary, quarrels and slanders, all which are most unholy acts when committed against fathers and mothers and near relations, but not equally unholy when there is no relationship. Moreover, they are much more likely to occur if the relationship is unknown, and, when they have occurred, the customary expiations of them cannot be made. Again, how strange it is that Socrates, after having made the children common, should hinder lovers from carnal intercourse only, but should permit familiarities between father and son or between brother and brother, than which nothing can be more unseemly, since even without them, love of this sort is improper. How strange, too, to forbid intercourse for no other reason than the violence of the pleasure, as though the relationship of father and son or of brothers with one another made no difference.

4.
Evils of concealment.

This community of wives and children seems better suited to the husbandmen than to the guardians, for if they have wives and children in common, they will be bound to one another by weaker ties, as a subject class

Communism a source of weakness.

^a Cp. Herod. iv. 180.

^b Cp. Hist. Anim. vii. 6, p. 586 a. 13.

II. 4. should be, and they will remain obedient and not rebel^a. In a word, the result of such a law would be just the 5 opposite of that which good laws ought to have, and the intention of Socrates in making these regulations about women and children would defeat itself. For friendship 6 we believe to be the greatest good of states^b and the preservative of them against revolutions; neither is there anything which Socrates so greatly lauds as the unity of the state which he and all the world declare to be created by friendship. But the unity which he com- 7 mends^c would be like that of the lovers in the Symposium^d, who, as Aristophanes says, desire to grow together in the excess of their affection, and from being two to become one, in which case one or both would certainly 7 perish. Whereas [the very opposite will really happen;] in a state having women and children common, love will be 8 watery; and the father will certainly not say 'my son,' or the son 'my father^e.' As a little sweet wine mingled with 8 a great deal of water is imperceptible in the mixture, so, in this sort of community, the idea of relationship which is based upon these names will be lost; there is no reason why the so-called father should care about the son, or the son about the father, or brothers about one another. Of the two qualities which chiefly inspire regard and 9 affection—that a thing is your own and that you love it—neither can exist in such a state as this.

Instead of self-de-
stroying
unity

there will
be watery
friendship.

Difficulties
in the trans-
fer of
children
from one
rank to
another.

Again, the transfer of children as soon as they are born from the rank of husbandmen or of artisans to that of guardians, and from the rank of guardians into a lower rank^f, will be very difficult to arrange; the givers or transferrers cannot but know whom they are giving and transferring, and to whom. And the previously men- 10 tioned evils, such as assaults, unlawful loves, homicides, will happen more often amongst those who are transferred to the lower classes, or who have a place assigned to them among the guardians; for they will no longer call

^a Cp. vii. 10. § 13. ^b Cp. N. Eth. viii. 1. § 4. ^c Cp. c. 2.

^d Symp. 189-193. ^e Cp. c. 3. ^f Rep. iii. 415.

the members of any other class brothers, and children, and fathers, and mothers, and will not, therefore, be afraid of committing any crimes by reason of consanguinity. Touching the community of wives and children, let this be our conclusion. II. 4.

Next let us consider what should be our arrangements about property: should the citizens of the perfect state 5.
 2 have their possessions in common or not? This question may be discussed separately from the enactments Should property be common?

1263a. about women and children. Even supposing that the women and children belong to individuals, according to the custom which is at present universal, may there not be an advantage in having and using possessions in common? Three cases are possible: (1) the soil may be appropriated, but the produce may be thrown for consumption into the common stock; and this is the practice of some nations. Or (2), the soil may be common, and may be cultivated in common, but the produce divided among individuals for their private use; this is a form of common property which is said to exist among certain barbarians. Or (3), the soil and the produce may be alike common. Possible modes of common property.

3 When the husbandmen are not the owners, the case Difficulties.
 will be different and easier to deal with; but when they till the ground themselves the question of ownership will give a world of trouble. If they do not share equally in enjoyments and toils, those who labour much and get little will necessarily complain of those who

4 labour little and receive or consume much. There is always a difficulty in men living together and having things in common, but especially in their having common property. The partnerships of fellow-travellers are an example to the point; for they generally fall out by the way and quarrel about any trifle which turns up. So with servants: we are most liable to take offence at those with whom we most frequently come into contact in daily life.

5 These are only some of the disadvantages which attend the community of property; the present arrangement, if improved as it might be by good customs and

II. 5. laws, would be far better, and would have the advantages of both systems. Property should be in a certain sense common, but, as a general rule, private ; for, when every 6

Better private possession and friendly use.

one has a distinct interest^a, men will not complain of one another, and they will make more progress, because every one will be attending to his own business. And yet among the good, and in respect of use, 'Friends,' as the proverb says, 'will have all things common^b.' Even now there are traces of such a principle, showing that it is not impracticable, but, in well-ordered states, exists already to a certain extent and may be carried further. For, although every man has his own property, 7 some things he will place at the disposal of his friends, while of others he shares the use with them. The Lacedaemonians, for example, use one another's slaves, and horses, and dogs, as if they were their own ; and when they happen to be in the country, they appropriate in the fields whatever provisions they want. It is clearly 8 better that property should be private, but the use of it common ; and the special business of the legislator is to create in men this benevolent disposition. Again, how immeasurably greater is the pleasure, when a man feels a thing to be his own ; for the love of self^c is a feeling im-1263 b. planted by nature and not given in vain, although selfishness is rightly censured ; this, however, is not the mere 9 love of self, but the love of self in excess, like the miser's love of money ; for all, or almost all, men love money, and other such objects in a measure. And further, there is the greatest pleasure in doing a kindness or service to friends or guests or companions, which can only be rendered when a man has private property. The advan- 10 tage is lost by the excessive unification of the state. Two virtues are annihilated in such a state : first, temperance towards women (for it is an honourable action to abstain from another's wife for temperance sake) ; secondly, liberality in the matter of property. No one, when men have all things in common, will any longer set an

Illustration from Sparta.

The magic of property.

Communism destroys the two virtues of liberality and of temperance.

^a Cp. Rep. ii. 374. ^b Cp. Rep. iv. 424 A. ^c Cp. N. Eth. ix. 8. § 6.

example of liberality or do any liberal action ; for liberality consists in the use which is made of property ^a. II. 5.

11 Such legislation may have a specious appearance of benevolence ; men readily listen to it, and are easily induced to believe that in some wonderful manner everybody will become everybody's friend, especially when some one ^b is heard denouncing the evils now existing in states, suits about contracts, convictions for perjury, flatteries of rich men and the like, which are said to

The speciousness of universal friendship.

12 arise out of the possession of private property. These evils, however, are due to a very different cause—the wickedness of human nature. Indeed, we see that there is much more quarrelling among those who have all things in common, though there are not many of them when compared with the vast numbers who have private property.

The real cause of existing evils, not private property, but the wickedness of men.

13 Again, we ought to reckon, not only the evils from which the citizens will be saved, but also the advantages which they will lose. The life which they are to lead appears to be quite impracticable. The error of Socrates must be attributed to the false notion of unity from

Plato's false ideal of unity.

14 which he starts. Unity there should be, both of the family and of the state, but in some respects only. For there is a point at which a state may attain such a degree of unity as to be no longer a state, or at which, without actually ceasing to exist, it will become an inferior state, like harmony passing into unison, or rhythm

15 which has been reduced to a single foot. The state, as I was saying, is a plurality ^c, which should be united and made into a community by education ; and it is strange that the author of a system of education which he thinks will make the state virtuous, should expect to improve his citizens by regulations of this sort, and not by philosophy or by customs and laws, like those which prevail at Sparta and Crete respecting common meals, whereby

The true unity can only be given by education.

1264 a. the legislator has [to a certain degree] made property common. Let us remember that we should not dis-

^a Cp. N. Eth. iv. 1. § 1.

^b Rep. v. 464, 465.

^c Cp. c. 2. § 2.

II. 5. regard the experience of ages ; in the multitude of years these things, if they were good, would certainly not have been unknown ; for almost everything has been found out, although sometimes they are not put together ; in other cases men do not use the knowledge which they have. Great light would be thrown on this subject if we ¹⁷ could see such a form of government in the actual process of construction ; for the legislator could not form a state at all without distributing and dividing the citizens into associations for common meals, and into phratries and tribes. But all this legislation ends only in forbidding agriculture to the guardians, a prohibition which the Lacedaemonians try to enforce already.

Difficulties. Again, Socrates has not said, nor is it easy to decide, ¹⁸ what in such a community will be the general form of the state. The citizens who are not guardians are the majority, and about them nothing has been determined : are the husbandmen, too, to have their property in common ? Or, besides the common land which he tills, is each individual to have his own ? and are their wives and children to be individual or common ? If, like the ¹⁹ guardians, they are to have all things in common, in what do they differ from them, or what will they gain by submitting to their government ? Or, upon what principle would they submit, unless indeed the governing class adopt the ingenious policy of the Cretans, who give their slaves the same institutions as their own, but forbid them gymnastic exercises and the possession of arms. If, on the other hand, the inferior classes are ²⁰ to be like other cities in respect of marriage and property, what will be the form of the community ? Must it not contain two states in one^a, each hostile to the other ? ^b One class will consist of the guardians, who are a sort of watchmen ; another, of the husbandmen, and

All experience against men.

How about the dependent classes ? are they to be educated and to have wives in common ?

If not, there will be two states in one.

^a Cp. Rep. iv. 422 E.

^b Or (with Bernays), 'He makes the guardians into a mere occupying garrison, while the husbandmen and artisans and the rest are the real citizens ;' see note.

- 21 there will be the artisans and the other citizens^b. But II. 5.
 [if so] the suits and quarrels, and all the evils which
 Socrates affirms^a to exist in other states, will exist
 equally among them. He says indeed that, having so
 good an education, the citizens will not need many laws,
 for example laws about the city or about the markets^b;
 but then he confines his education to the guardians.
- 22 Again, he makes the husbandmen owners of the land
 upon condition of their paying a tribute^c. But in that
 case they are likely to be much more unmanageable
 and conceited than the Helots, or Penestae, or slaves
- 23 in general^d. And whether community of wives and pro- Omissions.
 perty be necessary for the lower equally with the higher
 class or not, and the questions akin to this, what will be
 the education, form of government, laws of the lower
 class, Socrates has nowhere determined: neither is it
 easy, though very important, to discover what should
 be the character of the inferior classes, if the common
 life of the guardians is to be maintained.
- 1264 b. 24 Again, if Socrates makes the women common, and re- More diffi-
 tains private property, the men will see to the fields, but culties,
 who will see to the house? ^e And what will happen if Who will
 the agricultural class have both their property and their look after
 wives in common^e? Once more; it is absurd to argue, the house?
 from the analogy of the animals, that men and women
 should follow the same pursuits^f; for animals have not
- 25 to manage a household. The government, too, as con- Danger
 stituted by Socrates, contains elements of danger; for from the
 he makes the same persons always rule. And if this rulers being
 is often a cause of disturbance among the meaner sort, always the
 same.
- 26 how much more among high-spirited warriors? But
 that the persons whom he makes rulers must be the
 same is evident; for the gold which the God mingles
 in the souls of men is not at one time given to one, at
 another time to another, but always to the same: as he

^a Rep. v. 464, 465.^b Rep. iv. 425 D.^c Rep. v. 464 C.^d Cp. c. 9. § 2.^e These words are bracketed by Bekker.^f Cp. Rep. v. 451 D.

II. 5. says, 'God mingles gold in some, and silver in others, from their very birth; but brass and iron in those who are meant to be artisans and husbandmen ^a.' Again, he ²⁷ deprives the guardians of happiness, and says that the legislator ought to make the whole state happy ^b. But the whole cannot be happy unless most, or all, or some of its parts enjoy happiness ^c. In this respect happiness is not like the even principle in numbers, which may exist only in the whole, but in none of the parts; not so happiness. And if the guardians are not happy, who ²⁸ are? Surely not the artisans, or the common people. The Republic of which Socrates discourses has all these difficulties, and others quite as great.

How can the whole state be happy if happiness is denied to the guardians?

6. The same, or nearly the same, objections apply to Plato's later work, the Laws, and therefore we had better examine briefly the constitution which is therein described. In the Republic, Socrates has definitely settled in all a few questions only; such as the community of women and children, the community of property, and the constitution of the state. The population is divided ² into two classes—one of husbandmen, and the other of warriors; from this latter is taken a third class of counsellors and rulers of the state. But Socrates has not ³ determined whether the husbandmen and artisans are to have a share in the government, and whether they, too, are to carry arms and share in military service, or not. He certainly thinks that the women ought to share in the education of the guardians, and to fight by their side. The remainder of the work is filled up with digressions foreign to the main subject, and with discussions about the education of the guardians. In the ^{1265 a.} Laws there is hardly anything but laws; not much is said ⁴ about the constitution. This, which he had intended to make more of the ordinary type, he gradually brings ⁵ round to the other or ideal form. For with the exception of the community of women and property, he supposes everything to be the same in both states; there is to be the

The Laws a later work.

Brief summary of questions not settled in the Republic,

and they are not settled in the Laws, which

^a Cp. Rep. iii. 415 A. ^b Rep. iv. 419, 420. ^c Cp. vii. 9. § 7.

same education ; the citizens of both are to live free from servile occupations, and there are to be common meals in both. The only difference is that in the Laws, the common meals are extended to women ^a, and the warriors number about 5000 ^b, but in the Republic only 1000 ^c.

II. 6.
begins with a more ordinary type of constitution, but soon reverts to the ideal.

6 The discourses of Socrates are never commonplace ; they always exhibit grace and originality and thought ; but perfection in everything can hardly be expected. We must not overlook the fact that the number of 5000 citizens, just now mentioned, will require a territory as large as Babylonia, or some other huge country, if so many persons are to be supported in idleness, together with their women and attendants, who will be a multi-
7 tude many times as great. [In framing an ideal] we may assume what we wish, but should avoid impossibilities ^d.

Plato, with all his genius, has sinned against probability in creating so large a state.

It is said [in the Laws] that the legislator ought to have his eye directed to two points,—the people and the country ^e. But neighbouring countries also must not be forgotten by him ^f, if the state for which he legislates is to have a true political life ^g. For a state must have such a military force as will be serviceable against her
8 neighbours, and not merely useful at home. Even if the life of action is not admitted to be the best, either for individuals or states ^h, still a city should be formidable to enemies, whether invading or retreating.

Foreign relations neglected.

There is another point : Should not the amount of property be defined in some clearer way ? For Socrates says that a man should have so much property as will enable him to live temperately ⁱ, which is only a way of saying 'to live well ;' this would be the higher or
9 more general conception. But a man may live temperately and yet miserably. A better definition would be that a man must have so much property as will enable him to live not only temperately but liberally ^j ; if the

How much property should a citizen hold ?

So much as will enable a man to live temperately and

^a Laws, vi. 781.

^b Laws, v. 737 E.

^c Rep. iv. 423 A (but see note on this passage).

^d Cp. vii. 4. § 2.

^e Perhaps Laws, 703-707 and 747 D (?).

^f Cp. c. 7. § 14.

^g Cp. vii. 6. § 7.

^h Cp. vii. c. 2. and 3.

ⁱ Laws, v. 737 D.

^j Cp. vii. 5. § 1.

II. 6. two are parted, liberality will combine with luxury; also liberally. toil will be associated with temperance. For liberality and temperance are the only virtues^a which have to do with the use of property. A man cannot use property with mildness or courage, but temperately and liberally he may; and therefore the practice of these virtues is inseparable from property. There is an inconsistency, too, in equalizing the property and not regulating the number of the citizens^b; the population is to remain unlimited, and he thinks that it will be sufficiently equalized by a certain number of marriages being unfruitful, however many are born to others, because he finds this to be the case in existing states. But [in Plato's imaginary state] greater care will be required than now; for among ourselves, whatever may be the number of citizens, the property is always distributed among them, and therefore no one is in want; but, if the property were incapable of division [as in the Laws], the supernumeraries, whether few or many, would get nothing. One would have thought that it was even more necessary to limit population than property; and that the limit should be fixed by calculating the chances of mortality in the children, and of sterility in married persons. The neglect of this subject, which in existing states is so common, is a never-failing cause of poverty among the citizens; and poverty is the parent of revolution and crime. Pheidon the Corinthian, who was one of the most ancient legislators, thought that the families and the number of citizens ought to remain the same, although originally all the lots may have been of different sizes; but in the Laws, the opposite principle is maintained. What in our opinion is the right arrangement will have to be explained hereafter^c.

There is another omission in the Laws; Socrates does

^a Omitting *ἐξέως* and reading *ἀπεραι* with the MSS., or, reading with Bekk. *ἐξέως ἀπεραι*, 'eligible qualities.' ^b But see Laws, v. 740.

^c Cp. vii. 5. § 1; 10. § 11; 16. § 15; but the promise is hardly fulfilled.

not tell us how the rulers differ from their subjects; he only says that they should be related as the warp and the woof, which are made out of different wools^a. He allows that a man's whole property may be increased five-fold^b, but why should not his land also increase to a certain extent? Again, will the good management of a household be promoted by his arrangement of homesteads? for he assigns to each individual two homesteads in separate places^c, and it is difficult to live in two houses.

II. 6.

How do the rulers differ from their subjects?

The two households.

The whole system of government tends to be neither democracy nor oligarchy, but something in a mean between them, which is usually called a polity, and is composed of the heavy armed soldiers. Now, if he intended to frame a constitution which would suit the greatest number of states, he was very likely right, but not if he meant to say that this constitutional form came nearest to his first or ideal state; for many would prefer the Lacedaemonian, or, possibly, some other more aristocratic government. Some, indeed, say that the best constitution is a combination of all existing forms, and they praise the Lacedaemonian^d because it is made up of oligarchy, monarchy, and democracy, the king forming the monarchy, and the council of elders the oligarchy, while the democratic element is represented by the Ephors; for the Ephors are selected from the people. Others, however, declare the Ephoralty to be a tyranny, and find the element of democracy in the common meals and in the habits of daily life. In the Laws^e, it is maintained that the best state is made up of democracy and tyranny, which are either not constitutions at all, or are the worst of all. But they are nearer the truth who combine many forms; for the state is better which is made up of more numerous elements. The constitution proposed in the Laws has no element of monarchy at all; it is nothing but oligarchy and democracy, leaning

The constitution a mixture of democracy and oligarchy.

Sparta, also a mixture, is praised and blamed.

The best constitution is said to be that which includes most elements.

^a Laws, v. 734 E, 735 A.^b Laws, v. 744 E.^c Laws, v. 745, but cp. *infra*, vii. 10. § 11.^d Cp. iv. § 7; 7. § 4; 9. § 7-9.^e vi. 756 E; cp. iv. 710.

II. 6. rather to oligarchy. This is seen in the mode of ap-¹⁹
 Election of magis- pointing magistrates^a; for although the appointment of
 Election to the Council. them by lot from among those who have been already
 selected combines both elements, the way in which the
 rich are compelled by law to attend the assembly^b and
 vote for magistrates or discharge other political duties,
 while the rest may do as they like, and the endeavour to
 have the greater number of the magistrates appointed
 out of the richest classes and the highest officers selected
 from those who have the greatest incomes, both these
 are oligarchical features. The oligarchical principle pre-²⁰
 Election to the Council. vails also in the choice of the council^c; for all are com-
 pelled to choose, but the compulsion extends only to the
 choice out of the first class, and of an equal number out
 of the second class and out of the third class, but not in
 this latter case to all the voters of the third and fourth
 class; and the selection of candidates out of the fourth
 class^d is only compulsory on the first and second.
 Then, he says that there ought to be an equal number²¹
 of each class selected. Thus a preponderance will be
 given to the better sort of people, who have the larger
 incomes, because many of the lower classes, not being
 compelled, will not vote. These considerations, and²²
 others which will be adduced when the time comes for
 examining similar polities, tend to show that states like
 Plato's should not be composed of democracy and mon-
 archy. There is also a danger in electing the magistrates
 out of a body who are themselves elected; for, if but a
 small number choose to combine, the elections will always
 go as they desire. Such is the constitution which is
 described in the Laws.

Danger in
 double elec-
 tion.

7. Other constitutions have been proposed; some by
 private persons, others by philosophers and statesmen,
 which all come nearer to established or existing ones
 than either of Plato's. No one else has introduced such
 novelties as the community of women and children, or

^a Laws, vi. 755, 763 E, 765.

^b Laws, vi. 764 A; and Pol. iv. 9. § 2; 14. § 12. ^c Laws, vi. 756 B-E.

^d Omitting either τοῦ τετάρτου or τῶν τετάρτων.

public tables for women: other legislators begin with
 2 what is necessary. In the opinion of some, the regula-
 tion of property is the chief point of all, that being
 the question upon which all revolutions turn. This
 danger was recognized by Phaleas of Chalcedon, who
 3 ought to have equal possessions. He thought that in
 1266b. a new colony the equalization might be accomplished
 without difficulty, not so easily when a state was already
 established; and that then the shortest way of com-
 passing the desired end would be for the rich to give
 and not to receive marriage portions, and for the poor
 not to give but to receive them.

4 Plato in the Laws was of opinion that, to a certain
 extent, accumulation should be allowed, forbidding, as
 I have already observed^a, any citizen to possess more
 5 than five times the minimum qualification. But those
 who make such laws should remember what they are
 apt to forget,—that the legislator who fixes the amount
 of property should also fix the number of children; for,
 if the children are too many for the property, the law
 must be broken. And, besides the violation of the law,
 it is a bad thing that many from being rich should
 become poor; for men of ruined fortunes are sure to
 6 stir up revolutions. That the equalization of property
 exercises an influence on political society was clearly
 understood even by some of the old legislators. Laws
 were made by Solon and others prohibiting an indi-
 7 vidual from possessing as much land as he pleased; and
 there are other laws in states which forbid the sale of
 property: among the Locrians, for example, there is a
 law that a man is not to sell his property unless he can
 prove unmistakably that some misfortune has befallen
 him. Again, there have been laws which enjoin the pre-
 servation of the original lots. Such a law existed in the
 island of Leucas, and the abrogation of it made the con-
 stitution too democratic, for the rulers no longer had the

Phaleas first
 proposed
 the equal-
 ization of
 property.

But
 population
 must be
 equalized as
 well as pro-
 perty.

The ac-
 quisition or
 sale of land
 should be
 limited.

^a c. 6. § 15.

II. 7. prescribed qualification. Again, where there is equality of property, the amount may be either too large or too small, and the possessor may be living either in luxury or penury. Clearly, then, the legislator ought not only to aim at the equalization of properties, but at moderation in their amount. And yet, if he prescribe this moderate amount equally to all, he will be no nearer the mark; for it is not the possessions but the desires of mankind which require to be equalized^a, and this is impossible, unless a sufficient education is provided by the state. But Phaleas will probably reply that this is precisely what he means; and that, in his opinion, there ought to be in states, not only equal property, but equal education. Still he should tell us what will be the character of his education; there is no use in having one and the same for all, if it is of a sort that predisposes men to avarice, or ambition, or both. Moreover, civil troubles arise, not only out of the inequality of property, but out of the inequality of honour, though in opposite ways. For the common people quarrel about the inequality of property,^{1267 a.} the higher class about the equality of honour; as the poet says,—

‘The bad and good alike in honour share^b.’

Evils arise not merely from inequality of property but from inequality of honour

and from the desires of men.

The real cure moral.

There are crimes of which the motive is want; and for these Phaleas expects to find a cure in the equalization of property, which will take away from a man the temptation to be a highwayman, because he is hungry or cold. But want is not the sole incentive to crime; men desire to gratify some passion which preys upon them, or they are eager to enjoy the pleasures which are unaccompanied with pain, and therefore they commit crimes.

Now what is the cure of these three disorders? Of the first, moderate possessions and occupation; of the second, habits of temperance; as to the third, if any desire pleasures which depend on themselves, they will find the satisfaction of their desires nowhere but in philosophy; for all other pleasures we are dependent

^a Cp. c. 5. § 12.

^b Il. ix. 319.

13 on others. The fact is that the greatest crimes are caused by excess and not by necessity. Men do not become tyrants in order that they may not suffer cold; and hence great is the honour bestowed, not on him who kills a thief, but on him who kills a tyrant. Thus we see that the institutions of Phaleas avail only against petty crimes. II. 7.

14 There is another objection to them. They are chiefly designed to promote the internal welfare of the state. But the legislator should consider also its relation to neighbouring nations, and to all who are outside of it^a. The government must be organized with a view to military strength; and of this he has said not a word. Foreign relations not considered.

15 And so with respect to property: there should not only be enough to supply the internal wants of the state, but also to meet dangers coming from without. The property of the state should not be so large that more powerful neighbours may be tempted by it, while the owners are unable to repel the invaders; nor yet so small that the state is unable to maintain a war even against

16 states of equal power, and of the same character. Phaleas has not laid down any rule; and we should bear in mind ^b that a certain amount of wealth ^b is an advantage. The best limit will probably be, not so much as will tempt a more powerful neighbour, or make it his interest to go

17 to war with you. There is a story that Eubulus, when Autophradates was going to besiege Atarneus, told him to consider how long the operation would take, and then reckon up the cost which would be incurred in the time. 'For,' said he, 'I am willing for a smaller sum than that to leave Atarneus at once.' These words of Eubulus made an impression on Autophradates, and he desisted from the siege.

18 One advantage gained by the equalization of property is that it prevents the citizens from quarrelling. Not that the gain in this direction is very great. For the nobles will be dissatisfied because they do not receive Equal property has some advantages, but they are not great.

^a Cp. c. 6. § 7. ^b Or reading ὅ τι, 'what amount of wealth.'

II. 7. the honours which they think their due; and this is often found to be a cause of sedition and revolution^a. And the avarice of mankind is insatiable; at one time ^{1267b.} two obols was pay enough; but now, when this sum ¹⁹ has become customary, men always want more and more without end; for it is of the nature of desire not to be satisfied, and most men live only for the gratification of it. ^b The beginning of reform^b is not so much to ²⁰ equalize property as to train the nobler sort of natures not to desire more, and to prevent the lower from getting more; that is to say, they must be kept down, but not ill-treated. Besides, the equalization proposed by Phaleas ²¹ is imperfect; for he only equalizes land, whereas a man may be rich also in slaves, and cattle, and money, and in the abundance of what are called his moveables. Now either all these things must be equalized, or some limit must be imposed on them, or they must all be let alone. It would appear that Phaleas is legislating for ²² a small city only, if, as he supposes, all the artisans are to be public slaves and not to form a part of the population of the city. But if there is a law that artisans ²³ are to be public slaves, it should only apply to those engaged on public works^c, as at Epidamnus, or at Athens on the plan which Diophantus once introduced.

From these observations any one may judge how far Phaleas was wrong or right in his ideas.

8. Hippodamus, the son of Euryphon, a native of Miletus, the same who invented the art of planning cities, and who also laid out the Piræus,—a strange man, whose fondness for distinction led him into a general eccentricity of life, which made some think him affected (for he would wear flowing hair and expensive ornaments; and yet he dressed himself in the same cheap warm garment both in winter and summer); he, besides

^a Cp. § 10.

^b Or, reading with Bernays ἀκη, 'the remedy for such evils.'

^c Putting a comma after εἶναι and removing the comma after ἐργαζομένους.

Hippodamus the first political philosopher.

aspiring to be an adept in the knowledge of nature, was the first person not a statesman who made enquiries about the best form of government.

- 2 The city of Hippodamus was composed of 10,000 citizens divided into three parts,—one of artisans, one of husbandmen, and a third of armed defenders of the state. He also divided the land into three parts, one sacred, one public, the third private:—the first was set apart to maintain the customary worship of the gods, the second was to support the warriors, the third was the property of the husbandmen. He also divided his laws into three classes, and no more, for he maintained that there are three subjects of lawsuits,—insult, injury, and homicide. He likewise instituted a single final court of appeal, to which all causes seeming to have been improperly decided might be referred; this court he formed of elders chosen for the purpose. He was further of opinion that the decisions of the courts ought not to be given by the use of a voting pebble, but that every one should have a tablet on which he might not only write a simple condemnation, or leave the tablet blank for a simple acquittal; but, if he partly acquitted and partly condemned, he was to distinguish accordingly. To the existing law he objected that it obliged the judges to be guilty of perjury, whichever way they voted. He also enacted that those who discovered anything for the good of the state should be rewarded; and he provided that the children of citizens who died in battle should be maintained at the public expense, as if such an enactment had never been heard of before, yet it actually exists at Athens^a and in other places. As to the magistrates, he would have them all elected by the people, that is, by the three classes already mentioned, and those who were elected were to watch over the interests of the public, of strangers, and of orphans. These are the most striking points in the constitution of Hippodamus. There is not much else.

His three-fold division of the citizens, of the land,

and of the laws.

Court of appeal.

Verdicts not to be limited to a simple 'guilty' or 'not guilty.'

Rewards for inventions.

Maintenance of children of citizens slain in battle.

Magistrates, how to be elected :

^a Cp. Thuc. ii. c. 46.

II. 8. The first of these proposals to which objection may be taken, is the threefold division of the citizens. The 8
(1) Three-
fold division
of the
citizens
criticised. artisans, and the husbandmen, and the warriors, all have a share in the government. But the husbandmen have no arms, and the artisans neither arms nor land, and therefore they become all but slaves of the warrior class. That they should share in all the offices is an im- 9
possibility; for generals and guardians of the citizens, and nearly all the principal magistrates, must be taken from the class of those who carry arms. Yet, if the two other classes have no share in the government, how can they be loyal citizens? It may be said that those who have arms must necessarily be masters of both the other classes, but this is not so easily accomplished unless they are numerous; and if they are, why should the 10
other classes share in the government at all, or have power to appoint magistrates? Artisans there must be, for these are wanted in every city, and they can live by their craft, as elsewhere; and the husbandmen, too, if they really provided the warriors with food, might fairly have a share in the government. But in the republic of Hippodamus they are supposed to have land of their own, which they cultivate for their private benefit. Again, as 11
to this common land out of which the soldiers are maintained, if they are themselves to be the cultivators of it, the warrior class will be identical with the husbandmen, although the legislator intended to make a distinction between them. If, again, there are to be other cultivators distinct both from the husbandmen, who have land of their own, and from the warriors, they will make a fourth class, which has no place in the state and no share in anything. Or, if the same persons are to cul- 12
tivate their own lands and those of the public as well, they will have a difficulty in supplying the quantity of produce which will maintain two households: and why, 1268 b.
in this case, should there be any division, for they might find food themselves and give to the warriors from the same lots? There is surely a great confusion in all this.

- 13 Neither is the law to be commended which says that II. 8.
 the judges, when a simple issue is laid before them, should distinguish in their judgment; for the judge is thus converted into an arbitrator. Now, in an arbitration, although the arbitrators are many, they confer with one another about the decision, and therefore they can distinguish; but in courts of law this is impossible, and, indeed, most legislators take pains to prevent the judges from holding any communication with one another.
- 14 Again, will there not be confusion if the judge thinks that damages should be given, but not so much as the suitor demands? He asks, say, for twenty minae, and the judge allows him ten minae, or one judge more and another less; one five, another four minae. In this way they will go on apportioning the damages, and some will grant
- 15 the whole and others nothing: how is the final reckoning to be taken? Again, no one who votes for a simple acquittal or condemnation is compelled to perjure himself, if the indictment is quite simple and in right form; for the judge who acquits does not decide that the defendant owes nothing, but that he does not owe the twenty minae. He only is guilty of perjury who thinks that the defendant ought not to pay twenty minae, and yet condemns him.
- 16 To reward those who discover anything which is useful to the state is a proposal which has a specious sound, but cannot safely be enacted by law, for it may encourage informers, and perhaps even lead to political commotions. This question involves another. It has been doubted whether it is or is not expedient to make any changes in
- 17 the laws of a country, even if another law be better. Now, if all changes are inexpedient, we can hardly assent to the proposal of Hippodamus; for, under pretence of doing a public service, a man may introduce measures which are really destructive to the laws or to the constitution. But, since we have touched upon this subject, perhaps we
- 18 had better go a little into detail, for, as I was saying, there is a difference of opinion, and it may sometimes seem de-

(2) Proposed verdict in detail condemned.

(3) To reward political information dangerous.

Should laws be changed at all?

II. 8. Changes in the arts beneficial, desirable to make changes. Such changes in the other arts and sciences have certainly been beneficial; medicine, for example, and gymnastic, and every other art and science have departed from traditional usage. And, if politics be an art, change must be necessary in this as in any other art. The need of improvement is shown by the fact ¹⁹ that old customs are exceedingly simple and barbarous. For the ancient Hellenes went about armed ^a and bought their wives of each other. The remains of ancient laws ²⁰ which have come down to us are quite absurd; for ex-1269 ample, at Cumae there is a law about murder, to the effect that if the accuser produce a certain number of witnesses from among his own kinsmen, the accused shall be held guilty. Again, men in general desire the good, ²¹ and not merely what their fathers had. But the primeval inhabitants ^b, whether they were born of the earth or were the survivors of some destruction, may be supposed to have been no better than ordinary foolish people among ourselves ^b (such is certainly the tradition ^c concerning the earth-born men); and it would be ridiculous to rest contented with their notions. Even when laws have been written down, they ought not always to remain unaltered. As in other sciences, so in politics, it is im- ²² possible that all things should be precisely set down in writing; for enactments must be universal, but actions are concerned with particulars ^d. Hence we infer that sometimes and in certain cases laws may be changed; but when we look at the matter from another point of view, great caution would seem to be required. For ²³ the habit of lightly changing the laws is an evil, and, when the advantage is small, some errors both of law-givers and rulers had better be left; the citizen will not

but the case of laws is not quite analogous to that of the arts.

^a Cp. Thucyd. i. c. 5 and 6.

^b Or, referring *ὁμοίους* to *γηγενείς*, 'whether they were born of the earth or were the survivors of some destruction, who were no better (*ὁμοίους*) than earth-born men, may be supposed to have been ordinary foolish people.'

^c Cp. Plato, Laws, iii. 677 A; Polit. 271 A; Tim. 22 C.

^d Cp. Plato, Polit. 295 A.

gain so much by the change as he will lose by the habit of disobedience. The analogy of the arts is false; a change in a law is a very different thing from a change in an art. For the law has no power to command obedience except that of habit, which can only be given by time, so that a readiness to change from old to new laws enfeebles the power of the law. Even if we admit that the laws are to be changed, are they all to be changed, and in every state? And are they to be changed by anybody who likes, or only by certain persons? These are very important questions; and therefore we had better reserve the discussion of them to a more suitable occasion. II. 8.

In the governments of Lacedaemon and Crete, and indeed in all governments, two points have to be considered; first, whether any particular law is good or bad, when compared with the perfect state; secondly, whether it is or is not consistent with the idea and character which the lawgiver has set before his citizens^a. That in a well-ordered state the citizens should have leisure and not have to provide for their daily wants is generally acknowledged, but there is a difficulty in seeing how this leisure is to be attained. [For, if you employ slaves, they are liable to rebel.] The Thessalian Penestae have often risen against their masters, and the Helots in like manner against the Lacedaemonians, for whose misfortunes they are always lying in wait. Nothing, however, of this kind has as yet happened to the Cretans; 9.

Two questions to be asked about governments: (1) Is the end which they propose good? and (2) do they fulfil it?

Defects of Lacedaemonian state. (1) The Helots a constant trouble.

the reason probably is that the neighbouring cities, even when at war with one another, never form an alliance with rebellious serfs, rebellions not being for their interest, since they themselves have a dependent population^b. Whereas all the neighbours of the Lacedaemonians, whether Argives, Messenians, or Arcadians, are their enemies [and the Helots are always revolting to them]. In Thessaly, again, the original revolt of the slaves occurred at a time when the Thessalians were still at war with the neighbouring Achaeans, Perrhaebians, and

^a Or 'himself' (Bernays).

^b Cp. c. 10. § 5.

II. 9. Magnesians. Besides, if there were no other difficulty, 4
the treatment or management of slaves is a troublesome
affair; for, if not kept in hand, they are insolent, and think
that they are as good as their masters, and, if harshly
treated, they hate and conspire against them. Now it is
clear that when these are the results the citizens of a
state have not found out the secret of managing their
subject population.

(2) The
women;
their dis-
order and
pernicious
influence.

Again, the licence of the Lacedaemonian women de- 5
feats the intention of the Spartan constitution, and is
adverse to the good order of the state. For a husband
and a wife, being each a part of every family, the state
may be considered as about equally divided into men
and women; and, therefore, in those states in which the
condition of the women is bad, half the city^a may be
regarded as having no laws. And this is what has 6
actually happened at Sparta; the legislator wanted to
make the whole state hardy and temperate, and he has
carried out his intention in the case of the men, but
he has neglected the women, who live in every sort of
intemperance and luxury. The consequence is that in 7
such a state wealth is too highly valued, especially if the
citizens fall under the dominion of their wives, after the
manner of all warlike races, except the Celts and a few
others who openly approve of male loves. The old 8
mythologer would seem to have been right in uniting
Ares and Aphrodite, for all warlike races are prone to
the love either of men or of women. This was exempli-
fied among the Spartans in the days of their greatness;
many things were managed by their women. But what 9
difference does it make whether women rule, or the rulers
are ruled by women? The result is the same. Even in
regard to courage, which is of no use in daily life, and is
needed only in war, the influence of the Lacedaemonian
women has been most mischievous. The evil showed 10
itself in the Theban invasion, when, unlike the women in

^a Cp. i. 13. § 16.

other cities, they were utterly useless and caused more confusion than the enemy. This licence of the Lacedaemonian women existed from the earliest times, and was only what might be expected. For, during the wars of the Lacedaemonians, first against the Argives, and afterwards against the Arcadians and Messenians, the men were long away from home, and, on the return of peace, they gave themselves into the legislator's hand, already prepared by the discipline of a soldier's life (in which there are many elements of virtue), to receive his enactments. But, when Lycurgus, as tradition says, wanted to bring the women under his laws, they resisted, and he gave up the attempt. They, and not he, are to blame for what then happened, and this defect in the constitution is clearly to be attributed to them. We are not, however, considering what is or is not to be excused, but what is right or wrong, and the disorder of the women, as I have already said, not only of itself gives an air of indecorum to the state, but tends in a measure to foster avarice.

The licence allowed to them fosters avarice.

The mention of avarice naturally suggests a criticism on the inequality of property. While some of the Spartan citizens have quite small properties, others have very large ones; hence the land has passed into the hands of a few. And here is another fault in their laws; for, although the legislator rightly holds up to shame the sale or purchase of an inheritance, he allows any body who likes to give and bequeath it. Yet both practices lead to the same result. And nearly two-fifths of the whole country are held by women; this is owing to the number of heiresses and to the large dowries which are customary. It would surely have been better to have given no dowries at all, or, if any, but small or moderate ones. As the law now stands, a man may bestow his heiress on any one whom he pleases, and, if he die intestate, the privilege of giving her away descends to his heir. Hence, although the country is able to maintain 1500 cavalry and 30,000 hoplites, the whole number of Spartan citizens [at the time of the Theban

(3) Accumulation of property in a few hands; an evil aggravated by the number of heiresses.

II. 9. invasion] fell below 1000. The result proves the faulty nature of their laws respecting property; for the city sank under a single defeat; the want of men was their ruin. There is a tradition that, in the days of their 17 ancient kings, they were in the habit of giving the rights of citizenship to strangers, and therefore, in spite of their long wars, no lack of population was experienced by them; indeed, at one time Sparta is said to have numbered not less than 10,000 citizens. Whether this statement is true or not, it would certainly have been better to have maintained their numbers by the equalization of property. Again, the law which relates to the procreation 18 of children is adverse to the correction of this inequality. For the legislator, wanting to have as many Spartans as he 1270 b. could, encouraged the citizens to have large families; and there is a law at Sparta that the father of three sons shall be exempt from military service, and he who has four from all the burdens of the state. Yet it is obvious that, 19 if there were many children, the land being distributed as it is, many of them must necessarily fall into poverty.

(4) The Ephors chosen from the people and often corrupt; they have too much power. Yet the office keeps the state together.

The Lacedaemonian constitution is defective in another point; I mean the Ephoralty. This magistracy has authority in the highest matters, but the Ephors are all chosen from the people, and so the office is apt to fall into the hands of very poor men, who, being badly off, are open to bribes. There have been many examples at 20 Sparta of this evil in former times; and quite recently, in the matter of the Andrians, certain of the Ephors who were bribed did their best to ruin the state. And so great and tyrannical is their power, that even the kings have been compelled to court them; through their influence the constitution has deteriorated, and from being an aristocracy has turned into a democracy. The 21 Ephoralty certainly does keep the state together; for the people are contented when they have a share in the highest office, and the result, whether due to the legislator or to chance, has been advantageous. For if a 22 constitution is to be permanent, all the parts of the state

must wish that it should exist and be maintained^a. This is the case at Sparta, where the kings desire permanence because they have due honour in their own persons; the nobles are represented in the council of elders (for the office of elder is a reward of virtue); and the people in the Ephoralty, for all are eligible to it. The election of Ephors out of the whole people is perfectly right, but ought not to be carried on in the present fashion, which is too childish. Again, they have the decision of great causes, although they are quite ordinary men, and therefore they should not determine them merely on their own judgment, but according to written rules, and to the laws. Their way of life, too, is not in accordance with the spirit of the constitution—they have a deal too much licence; whereas, in the case of the other citizens, the excess of strictness is so intolerable that they run away from the law into the secret indulgence of sensual pleasures.

II. 9.

Childish mode of electing them.

They are above the laws.

(5) Council of elders.

Life tenure of judges bad.

The elders corrupt and imperfectly controlled.

Childish mode of electing them.

Again, the council of elders is not free from defects. It may be said that the elders are good men and well trained in manly virtue; and that, therefore, there is an advantage to the state in having them. But that judges of important causes should hold office for life is not a good thing, for the mind grows old as well as the body. And when men have been educated in such a manner that even the legislator himself cannot trust them, there is real danger. Many of the elders are well known to have taken bribes and to have been guilty of partiality in public affairs. And therefore they ought not to be irresponsible; yet at Sparta they are so. But (it may be replied), 'All magistracies are accountable to the Ephors.' Yes, but this prerogative is too great for them, and we maintain that the control should be exercised in some other manner. Further, the mode in which the Spartans elect their elders is childish; and it is improper that^b the person to be elected should canvass

^a Cp. iv. 9. § 10; v. 9. § 5.

^b Reading τὸ αὐτόν, not τόν, as Bekker, 2nd edit., apparently by a misprint.

II. 9. for the office; the worthiest should be appointed, whether he chooses or not. And here the legislator clearly indicates the same intention which appears in other parts of his constitution; he would have his citizens ambitious, and he has reckoned upon this quality in the election of the elders; for no one would ask to be elected if he were not. Yet ambition and avarice, almost more than any other passions, are the motives of crime.

(6) Mistrust of the kings. Whether kings are or are not an advantage to states, I will consider at another time^a; they should at any rate be chosen, not as they are now, but with regard to their personal life and conduct. The legislator himself obviously did not suppose that he could make them really good men; at least he shows a great distrust of their virtue. For this reason the Spartans used to join enemies in the same embassy, and the quarrels between the kings were held to be conservative of the state.

They should be appointed by merit.

(7) The common meals ill arranged.

Neither did the first introducer of the common meals, called 'phiditia,' regulate them well. The entertainment ought to have been provided at the public cost, as in Crete^b; but among the Lacedaemonians every one is expected to contribute, and some of them are too poor to afford the expense; thus the intention of the legislator is frustrated. The common meals were meant to be a popular institution, but the existing manner of regulating them is the reverse of popular. For the very poor can scarcely take part in them; and, according to ancient custom, those who cannot contribute are not allowed to retain their rights of citizenship.

(8) The admiral another king.

The law about the Spartan admirals has often been censured, and with justice; it is a source of dissension, for the kings are perpetual generals^c, and this office of admiral is but the setting up of another king.

(9) The end of Spartan legislation a part of virtue only.

The charge which Plato brings, in the Laws^d, against the intention of the legislator, is likewise justified; the whole constitution has regard to one part of virtue only,

^a Cp. iii. 14 foll.

^b Cp. c. 10. §§ 7, 8.

^c Reading *αἰδίους*.

^d Laws, i. 630.

—the virtue of the soldier, which gives victory in war. II. 9-
 And so long as they were at war, their power was preserved, but when they had attained empire they fell^a, for of the arts of peace they knew nothing, and had never
 35 engaged in any employment higher than war. There is another error, equally great, into which they have fallen. Although they truly think that the goods for which they contend are to be acquired by virtue rather than by vice, they err in supposing that these goods are to be preferred to the virtue which gains them.

36 Once more : the revenues of the state are ill-managed ; (10) Finance. Impatience of taxes and laxity in collecting them.
 there is no money in the treasury, although they are obliged to carry on great wars, and they are unwilling to pay taxes. The greater part of the land being in the hands of the Spartans, they do not look closely into one
 37 another's contributions. The result which the legislator has produced is the reverse of beneficial ; for he has made his city poor, and his citizens greedy.

Enough respecting the Spartan constitution, of which these are the principal defects.

The Cretan constitution nearly resembles the Spartan, IO.
 and in some few points is quite as good ; but for the most part less perfect in form. Cretan institutions older than Spartan. The older constitutions are generally less elaborate than the later, and the Lacedaemonian is said to be, and probably is, in a very great
 2 measure, a copy of the Cretan. According to tradition, Lycurgus, when he ceased to be the guardian of King Charilaus, went abroad and spent a long time in Crete. For the two countries are nearly connected ; the Lyctians are a colony of the Lacedaemonians, and the colonists, when they came to Crete, adopted the constitution which
 3 they found existing among the inhabitants. Even to this day the Perioeci, or subject population of Crete, are governed by the original laws which Minos enacted. The island seems to be intended by nature for dominion in Hellas, and to be well situated ; it extends right across

^a Cp. vii. 14. § 22.

II. 10. the sea, around which nearly all the Hellenes are settled ; and while one end is not far from the Peloponnese, the other almost reaches to the region of Asia about Triopium and Rhodes. Hence Minos acquired the 4 empire of the sea, subduing some of the islands and colonizing others ; at last he invaded Sicily, where he died near Camicus.

Cretan and Spartan institutions compared.

The Cretan institutions resemble the Lacedaemonian. The Helots are the husbandmen of the one, the Perioeci 5 of the other, and both Cretans and Lacedaemonians have 1272 a. common meals, which were anciently called by the Lacedaemonians not 'phiditia' but 'andria ;' and the Cretans have the same word, the use of which proves that the common meals [or syssitia] originally came from Crete. Further, the two constitutions are similar [in many par- 6 ticulars] ; for the office of the Ephors is the same as that of the Cretan Cosmi, the only difference being that whereas the Ephors are five, the Cosmi are ten in number. The elders, too, answer to the elders in Crete, who are termed by the Cretans the council. And the kingly office once existed in Crete, but was abolished, and the Cosmi have now the duty of leading them in war. All classes share in the ecclesia, but it can only 7 ratify the decrees of the elders and the Cosmi.

The Cretan common meals better managed than the Spartan.

The common meals of Crete are certainly better managed than the Lacedaemonian ; for in Lacedaemon every one pays so much per head, or, if he fails, the law, as I have already explained, forbids him to exercise the rights of citizenship. But in Crete they are of a more 8 popular character. There, of all the fruits of the earth, of cattle, of the public revenues, and of the tribute which is paid by the Perioeci, one portion is assigned to the gods and to the service of the state, and another to the common meals, so that men, women, and children are all supported out of a common stock^a. The legislator has 9 many ingenious ways of securing moderation in eating which he conceives to be a gain ; he likewise encourages

^a Cp. vii. 10. § 10.

the separation of men from women, lest they should have too many children, and the companionship of men with one another—whether this is a good or bad thing I shall have an opportunity of considering at another time^a. But that the Cretan common meals are better ordered than the Lacedaemonian there can be no doubt. II. 10.

On the other hand, the Cosmi are even a worse institution than the Ephors, of which they have all the evils without the good. Like the Ephors, they are any chance persons, but in Crete this is not counterbalanced by a corresponding political advantage. At Sparta every one is eligible, and the body of the people, having a share in the highest office, want the state to be permanent^b. But in Crete the Cosmi are elected out of certain families, and not out of the whole people, and the elders out of those who have been Cosmi.

But the Cosmi a worse institution than the Ephors.

11 The same criticism may be made about the Cretan, The elders. which has been already made about the Lacedaemonian elders. Their irresponsibility and life tenure is too great a privilege, and their arbitrary power of acting upon their own judgment, and dispensing with written law, is dangerous. It is no proof of the goodness of the institution that the people are not discontented at being excluded from it. For there is no profit to be made out of the office; and, unlike the Ephors, the Cosmi, being in an island, are removed from temptation.

13 The remedy by which they correct the evil of this institution is an extraordinary one, suited rather to a close oligarchy than to a constitutional state. For the Cosmi are often expelled by a conspiracy of their own colleagues, or of private individuals; and they are allowed also to resign before their term of office has expired. Surely all matters of this kind are better regulated by law than by the will of man, which is a very unsafe rule.

Injudicious remedies of political evils.

14 Worst of all is the suspension of the office of Cosmi, a device to which the nobles often have recourse when they will not submit to justice. This shows that the Cretan

^a vii. 16 (?).

^b Cp. *supra*, c. 9. § 21.

II. 10. government, although possessing some of the characteristics of a constitutional state, is really a close oligarchy.

The Cretans have a habit, too, of setting up a chief; they get together a party among the common people and gather their friends and then quarrel and fight with one another. What is this but the temporary destruction 15 of the state and dissolution of society? A city is in a dangerous condition when those who are willing are also able to attack her. But, as I have already said, the island of Crete is saved by her situation; distance has the same effect as the Lacedaemonian prohibition of 16 strangers; and the Cretans have no foreign dominions. This is the reason why the Perioeci are contented in Crete, whereas the Helots are perpetually revolting. But when lately foreign invaders found their way into the island, the weakness of the Cretan constitution was revealed. Enough of the government of Crete.

Crete saved from revolution by her insular position.

II.

Merits of Carthaginian institutions :

The Carthaginians are also considered to have an excellent form of government, which differs from that of any other state in several respects, though it is in some very like the Lacedaemonian. Indeed, all three states—the Lacedaemonian, the Cretan, and the Carthaginian—nearly resemble one another, and are very different from any others. Many of the Carthaginian institutions are excellent. The superiority of their constitution is proved by 2 the fact that, although containing an element of democracy, it has been lasting; the Carthaginians have never had any rebellion worth speaking of, and have never been under the rule of a tyrant.

wherein they resemble the Spartan.

Among the points in which the Carthaginian constitution 3 resembles the Lacedaemonian are the following:—The common tables of the clubs answer to the Spartan phiditia, and their magistracy of the 104 to the Ephors; but, whereas the Ephors are any chance persons, the magistrates of the Carthaginians are elected according to merit — this is an improvement. They have also their kings and their gerusia, or council of elders, who correspond to the kings and elders of Sparta. Their kings, unlike the 4

Spartan, are not always of the same family, whatever that may happen to be, but if there is some distinguished family they are selected out of it and not appointed by seniority — this is far better. Such officers have great power, and therefore, if they are persons of little worth, do a great deal of harm, and they have already done harm at Lacedaemon. II. 11.

5 Most of the defects or deviations from the perfect state, for which the Carthaginian constitution would be censured, apply equally to all the forms of government which we have mentioned. But of the deflections from aristocracy and constitutional government, some incline more to democracy and some to oligarchy. The kings and elders, if unanimous, may determine whether they will or will not bring a matter before the people, but when they are not unanimous, the people may decide whether 6 or not the matter shall be brought forward. And whatever the kings and elders bring before the people is not only heard but also determined by them, and any one who likes may oppose it; now this is not permitted in 7 Sparta and Crete. That the magistracies of five who have under them many important matters should be co-opted, that they should choose the supreme council of 100, and should hold office longer than other magistrates (for they are virtually rulers both before and after they hold office)—these are oligarchical features; their being without salary and not elected by lot, and any similar points, such as the practice of having all suits tried by the magistrates^a, and not some by one class of judges or jurors and some by another, as at Lacedaemon, are characteristic of aristocracy. The Carthaginian constitution deviates from aristocracy and inclines to oligarchy, chiefly on a point where popular opinion is on their side. For men in general think that magistrates should be chosen not only for their merit, but for their wealth: a man, they say, who is poor cannot rule well,—he has not the 8 leisure. If, then, election of magistrates for their wealth 9

The constitution has (1) some democratical,

(2) some oligarchical features.

^a Cp. iii. 1. §§ 10, 11; and see note at end.

II. 11. be characteristic of oligarchy, and election for merit of aristocracy, there will be a third form under which the constitution of Carthage is comprehended; for the Carthaginians choose their magistrates, and particularly the highest of them—their kings and generals—with an eye both to merit and to wealth.

Need of leisure and therefore of wealth in the official class;

But we must acknowledge that, in thus deviating from aristocracy, the legislator has committed an error. Nothing is more absolutely necessary than to provide that the highest class, not only when in office, but when out of office, should have leisure and not demean themselves in any way; and to this his attention should be first directed. Even if you must have regard to wealth, in order to secure leisure, yet it is surely a bad thing that the greatest offices, such as those of kings and generals, should be bought. The law which allows this abuse makes wealth of more account than virtue, and the whole state becomes avaricious. For, whenever the chiefs of the state deem anything honourable, the other citizens are sure to follow their example; and, where virtue has not the first place, there aristocracy cannot be firmly established. Those who have been at the expense of purchasing their places will be in the habit of repaying themselves; and it is absurd to suppose that a poor and honest man will be wanting to make gains, and that a lower stamp of man who has incurred a great expense will not. Wherefore they should rule who are able to rule best [*ἀρισταρχεῖν*]. And even if the legislator does not care to protect the good from poverty, he should at any rate secure leisure for those in office^a.

but the sale of offices a gross abuse and a bad example.

Pluralism among the Carthaginians.

It would seem also to be a bad principle that the same person should hold many offices, which is a favourite practice among the Carthaginians, for one business is better done by one man^b. The legislator should see to this and should not appoint the same person to be a flute-player and a shoemaker. Hence, where the state

^a Cp. c. 9. § 2.

^b Cp. Plato, Rep. ii. 374 A.

is large, it is more in accordance both with constitutional and with democratic principles that the offices of state should be distributed among many persons. For, as I was saying, this arrangement is more popular, and any action familiarised by repetition is better and sooner performed. We have a proof in military and naval matters; the duties of command and of obedience in both these services extend to all. II. 11.

15 The government of the Carthaginians is oligarchical, but they successfully escape the evils of oligarchy by their wealth, which enables them from time to time to send out some portion of the people^a to their colonies. This is their panacea and the means by which they give stability to the state. Accident favours them, but the legislator should be able to provide against revolution
16 without trusting to accidents. As things are, if any misfortune occurred, and the people revolted from their rulers, there would be no way of restoring peace by legal methods.

Emigration
a panacea
against
revolution.

Such is the character of the Lacedaemonian, Cretan, and Carthaginian constitutions, which are justly celebrated.

Of those who have treated of governments, some have never taken any part at all in public affairs, but have passed their lives in a private station; about most of them, what was worth telling has been already told. Others have been lawgivers, either in their own or in foreign cities, whose affairs they have administered; and of these some have only made laws, others have framed constitutions; for example, Lycurgus and Solon
2 did both. Of the Lacedaemonian constitution I have already spoken. As to Solon, he is thought by some to have been a good legislator, who put an end to the exclusiveness of the oligarchy, emancipated the people,

12.

Political
writers and
law-givers.

Solon
praised by
some
because he
broke up
the oli-
garchy,

^a Or, removing the comma after *πλουτείν*, and adding one after *μέρος*, 'by enriching one portion of the people after another whom they send to their colonies.' Cp. vi. 5. § 9, which tends to confirm this way of taking the words.

II. 12. established the ancient Athenian democracy, and harmonized the different elements of the state. According to their view, the council of Areopagus was an oligarchical element, the elected magistracy, aristocratical, and the courts of law, democratical. The truth seems to be that ^{1274a.} the council and the elected magistracy existed before the ³ time of Solon, and were retained by him, but that he formed the courts of law out of all the citizens, thus creating the democracy, which is the very reason why he is sometimes blamed. For in giving the supreme power to the law courts, which are elected by lot, he is thought to have destroyed the non-democratic element. When ⁴ the law courts grew powerful, to please the people, who were now playing the tyrant, the old constitution was changed into the existing democracy. Ephialtes and Pericles curtailed the power of the Areopagus; they also instituted the payment of the juries, and thus every demagogue in turn increased the power of the democracy until it became what we now see. All this is true; ⁵ it seems however to be the result of circumstances, and not to have been intended by Solon. For the people having been instrumental in gaining the empire of the sea in the Persian War^a, began to get a notion of itself, and followed worthless demagogues, whom the better class opposed. Solon, himself, appears to have given the Athenians only that power of electing to offices and calling to account the magistrates, which was absolutely necessary^b; for without it they would have been in a state of slavery and enmity to the government. All the ⁶ magistrates he appointed from the notables and the men of wealth, that is to say, from the pentacosio-medimni, or from the class called zeugitae (because they kept a yoke of oxen), or from a third class of so-called knights or cavalry. The fourth class were labourers who had no share in any magistracy.

Mere legislators were Zaleucus, who gave laws to the

^a Cp. v. 4. § 8; viii. 6. § 11.

^b Cp. iii. 11. § 8.

blamed
by others
because he
founded the
democracy.
In reality
he only
established
the law
courts.

Things
afterwards
grew worse
and worse,
but this was
not his
fault.

Epizephyrian Locrians, and Charondas, who legislated for his own city of Catana, and for the other Chalcidian cities in Italy and Sicily. Some persons attempt ^a to make out that Onomacritus was the first person who had any special skill in legislation^a, and that he, although a Locrian by birth, was trained in Crete, where he lived in the exercise of his prophetic art; that Thales was his companion, and that Lycurgus and Zaleucus were disciples of Thales, as Charondas was of Zaleucus. But their account is quite inconsistent with chronology.

There was also a Theban legislator, whose name was Philolaus, the Corinthian. This Philolaus was one of the family of the Bacchiadae, and a lover of Diocles, the Olympic victor, who left Corinth in horror of the incestuous passion which his mother Halcyone had conceived for him, and retired to Thebes, where the two friends together ended their days. The inhabitants still point out their tombs, which are in full view of one another, but one looks towards Corinth, the other not. Tradition says that the two friends arranged them in this way, Diocles out of horror at his misfortunes, so that the land of Corinth might not be visible from his tomb; Philolaus that it might. This is the reason why they settled at Thebes, and so Philolaus legislated for the Thebans, and, besides some other enactments, gave them laws about the procreation of children, which they call the 'Laws of Adoption.' These laws were peculiar to him, and were intended to preserve the number of the lots.

In the legislation of Charondas there is nothing remarkable, except the laws about false witnesses. He is the first who instituted actions for perjury. His laws are more exact and more precisely expressed than even those of our modern legislators.

Characteristic of Phaleas is the equalization of property; of Plato, the community of women, children, and property, the common meals of women, and the law

^a Or (with Bernays), 'to make out an unbroken series of great legislators, Onomacritus being considered the first.'

II. 12. about drinking, that the sober shall be masters of the feast^a; also the training of soldiers to acquire by practice equal skill with both hands, so that one should be as useful as the other^b.

Draco. Draco has left laws, but he adapted them to a constitution which already existed, and there is no peculiarity in them which is worth mentioning, except the greatness and severity of the punishments.

Pittacus. Pittacus, too, was only a lawgiver, and not the author of a constitution; he has a law which is peculiar to him, that, if a drunken man strike another, he shall be more heavily punished than if he were sober^c; he looked not to the excuse which might be offered for the drunkard, but only to expediency, for drunken more often than sober people commit acts of violence.

Androdamas. Androdamas of Rhegium gave laws to the Chalcidians of Thrace. Some of them relate to homicide, and to heiresses; but there is nothing remarkable in them.

And here let us conclude our enquiry into the various constitutions which either actually exist, or have been devised by theorists.

^a Cp. Laws, ii. 671 D-672 A.

^b Cp. Laws, vii. 794 D.

^c Cp. N. Eth. iii. 5. § 8.

BOOK III.

HE who would enquire into the nature and various kinds of government must first of all determine 'What is a state?' At present this is a disputed question. Some say that the state has done a certain act; others, no, not the state^a, but the oligarchy or the tyrant. And the legislator or statesman is concerned entirely with the state; a constitution or government being an arrangement of the inhabitants of a state. But a state is composite, and, like any other whole, made up of many parts;—these are the citizens, who compose it. It is evident, therefore, that we must begin by asking, Who is the citizen, and what is the meaning of the term? For here again there may be a difference of opinion. He who is a citizen in a democracy will often not be a citizen in an oligarchy. Leaving out of consideration those who have been made citizens, or who have obtained the name of citizen in any other accidental manner, we may say, first, that a citizen is not a citizen because he lives in a certain place, for resident aliens and slaves share in the place; nor is he a citizen who has no legal right except that of suing and being sued; for this right may be enjoyed under the provisions of a treaty. Even resident aliens in many places possess such rights, although in an imperfect form; for they are obliged to have a patron. Hence they do but imperfectly participate in citizenship, and we call them citizens only in a qualified sense, as we might apply the term to children who are too young to be on the register, or to old men who have been relieved from state duties. Of these we do not say simply that they are citizens, but add in the one case that they are

III. 1.
What is a state?

A question which leads to another, who is a citizen?

Neither residence nor merely legal rights are sufficient to constitute perfect citizenship.

^a Cp. c. 3. § 1.

III. I. not of age, and in the other, that they are past the age, or something of that sort; the precise expression is immaterial, for our meaning is clear. Similar difficulties to those which I have mentioned may be raised and answered about deprived citizens and about exiles. But the citizen, whom we are seeking to define, is a citizen in the strictest sense, against whom no such exception can be taken, and his special characteristic is that he shares in the administration of justice, and in offices. Now of 6 offices some have a limit of time, and the same persons are not allowed to hold them twice, or can only hold them after a fixed interval; others have no limit of time,—for example, the office of dicast or ecclesiast^a. It may, 7 indeed, be argued that these are not magistrates at all, and that their functions give them no share in the government. But surely it is ridiculous to say that those who have the supreme power do not govern. Not to dwell further upon this, which is a purely verbal question, what we want is a common term including both dicast and ecclesiast. Let us, for the sake of distinction, call it 'indefinite office,' and we will assume that those who share in such office are citizens. This is the most comprehen- 8 sive definition of a citizen, and best suits all those who are generally so called.

But we must not forget that things of which the underlying notions differ in kind, one of them being first, another second, another third, have, when regarded in this relation, nothing, or hardly anything, worth mentioning in common. Now we see that governments 9 differ in kind, and that some of them are prior and that others are posterior; those which are faulty or perverted 1275 b. are necessarily posterior to those which are perfect. (What we mean by perversion will be hereafter explained^b.) The citizen then of necessity differs under each form of government; and our definition is best 10 adapted to the citizen of a democracy; but not neces-

The citizen is he who shares in 'indefinite office.'

This definition, strictly taken, suits only democratic states,

^a 'Dicast' = juryman and judge in one: 'ecclesiast' = member of the ecclesia or assembly of the citizens.

^b Cp. c. 6. § 11.

sarily to other states. For in some states the people are not acknowledged, nor have they any regular assembly, but only extraordinary ones; and suits are distributed in turn among the magistrates. At Lacedaemon, for instance, the Ephors determine suits about contracts, which they distribute among themselves, while the elders are judges of homicide, and other causes are decided III. 1.
and must be modified when extended to others.
 11 by other magistrates. A similar principle prevails at Carthage^a; there certain magistrates decide all causes. We may, indeed, modify our definition of the citizen so as to include these states. [But strictly taken it only applies in democracies.] In other states it is the holder of a definite, not of an indefinite office, who legislates and judges, and to some or all such holders of definite offices is reserved the right of deliberating or judging
 12 about some things or about all things. The conception of the citizen now begins to clear up.

He who has the power to take part in the deliberative or judicial administration of any state is said by us to be a citizen of that state; and speaking generally, a state is a body of citizens sufficing for the purposes of life.

But in practice a citizen is defined to be one of whom both the parents are citizens; others insist on going further back; say to two or three or more grandparents. This is a short and practical definition; but there are some who raise the further question: How this third or
 2 fourth ancestor came to be a citizen? Gorgias of Leontini, partly because he was in a difficulty, partly in irony, said—‘Mortars are made by the mortar-makers, and the citizens of Larissa are also a manufactured article, made, like the kettles which bear their name [*λαρισσαῖοι*],
 3 by the magistrates^b.’ Yet the question is really simple, for, if according to the definition just given they shared in the government^c, they were citizens. [This is a better definition than the other.] For the words, ‘born of a
2.
Practically the citizen is the son of a citizen.
But how about the first citizen?

^a Cp. ii. 11. § 7.

^b An untranslatable play upon the word *δημιουργοί*, which means either ‘a magistrate’ or ‘an artisan.’

^c Cp. c. 1. § 12.

III. 2. father or mother, who is a citizen,⁷ cannot possibly apply to the first inhabitants or founders of a state.

There is a greater difficulty in the case of those who have been made citizens after a revolution, as by Cleisthenes at Athens after the expulsion of the tyrants, for he enrolled in tribes a number of strangers and slaves and ^a resident aliens. The doubt in these cases is, not ⁴ who is, but whether he, who is, ought to be a citizen; and there will still be a further doubt, whether he who ^{1276a.} ought not to be a citizen, is one in fact, for what ought not to be is what is false and is not. Now, there are ⁵ some who hold office, and yet ought not to hold office, whom we call rulers, although they rule unjustly. And the citizen was defined by the fact of his holding some kind of rule or office,—he who holds a judicial or legislative office fulfils our definition of a citizen. It is evident, therefore, that the citizens about whom the doubt has arisen must be called citizens; whether they ought to be so or not is a question which is bound up with the previous enquiry ^b.

3. A parallel question is raised respecting the state whether a certain act is or is not an act of the state; for example, in the transition from an oligarchy or a tyranny to a democracy. In such cases persons refuse ² to fulfil their contracts or any other obligations, on the ground that the tyrant, and not the state, contracted them; they argue that some constitutions are established by force, and not for the sake of the common good. But this would apply equally to democracies, for they too may be founded on violence, and then the acts of the democracy will be neither more nor less legitimate than those of an oligarchy or of a tyranny. This question runs ³ up into another:—when shall we say that the state is the

^a Inserting *καί* before *μετοίκους* with Bekker in his second edition. If *καί* is omitted, as in all the MSS, we must translate—‘he enrolled in tribes many metics, both strangers and slaves:’ or, ‘he enrolled in tribes many strangers, and metics who had been slaves.’

^b Cp. c. i. § 1.

Is the citizen *de facto* also citizen *de jure*?

When is an act the act of the state?

same, and when different? It would be a very superficial view which considered only the place and the inhabitants; for the soil and the population may be separated, and some of the inhabitants may live in one place and some in another. This, however, is not a very serious difficulty; we need only remark that the word 'state' is ambiguous, meaning both state and city. III. 3.
The identity

It is further asked: When are men, living in the same place, to be regarded as a single city—what is the limit? Certainly not the wall of the city, for you might surround all Peloponnesus with a wall. But a city, having such vast circuit, would contain a nation rather than a state, like Babylon^a, which, as they say, had been taken for three days before some part of the inhabitants became aware of the fact. This difficulty may, however, with advantage be deferred^b to another occasion; the statesman has to consider the size of the state, and whether it should consist of more than one nation or not. and the
unity of a
state de-
pend not so
much on
place,

Again, shall we say that while the race of inhabitants, as well as their place of abode, remain the same, the city is also the same, although the citizens are always dying and being born, as we call rivers and fountains the same, although the water is always flowing away and coming again? Or shall we say that the generations of men, like the rivers, are the same, but that the state changes? For, since the state is a community and a community is made up of citizens, when the form of the government changes and becomes different, then it may be supposed that the state is no longer the same, just as a tragic differs from a comic chorus, although the members of both may be identical. And in this manner we speak of every union or composition of elements, when the form of their composition alters; for example, harmony of the same sounds is said to be different, accordingly as the Dorian or the Phrygian mode is employed. And if this is true it is evident that the sameness of the state consists chiefly in the sameness of the constitution, and may be called or nor yet on
race,

but mainly
on the same-
ness of the
constitu-
tion.

^a Cp. ii. 6. § 6.

^b Cp. vii. c. 4 and c. 5.

III. 3. not called by the same name, whether the inhabitants are the same or entirely different. It is quite another question, whether a state ought or ought not to fulfil engagements when the form of government changes.

4. There is a point nearly allied to the preceding: Whether the virtue of a good man and a good citizen is the same or not^a. But, before entering on this discussion, we must first obtain some general notion of the virtue of the citizen. Like the sailor, the citizen is a member of a community. Now, sailors have different functions, for one of them is a rower, another a pilot, and a third a look-out-man, a fourth is described by some similar term; and while the precise definition of each individual's virtue applies exclusively to him, there is, at the same time, a common definition applicable to them all. For they have all of them a common object, which is safety in navigation. Similarly, one citizen differs from another, but the salvation of the community is the common business of them all. This community is the state; the virtue of the citizen must therefore be relative to the constitution of which he is a member. If, then, there are many forms of government, it is evident that the virtue of the good citizen cannot be the one perfect virtue. But we say that the good man is he who has perfect virtue. Hence it is evident that the good citizen need not of necessity possess the virtue which makes a good man.

The same question may also be approached by another road, from a consideration of the perfect state. If the state cannot be entirely composed of good men, and each citizen is expected to do his own business well, and must therefore have virtue, inasmuch as all the citizens cannot be alike, the virtue of the citizen and of the good man cannot coincide. All must have the virtue of the good citizen—thus, and thus only, can the state be perfect; but they will not have the virtue of a good man, unless we assume that in the good state all the citizens must be good.

^a Cp. N. Eth. v. 2. § 11.

Is the virtue of the good man the same as that of the good citizen?

The virtue of the citizen differs in different states, and therefore cannot always be the same as that of the good man.

Even in the perfect state, though all are good citizens, they are not necessarily good men.

1277 a.

6 Again, the state may be compared to the living being : III. 4.
 as the first elements into which the living being is
 resolved are soul and body, as the soul is made up of
 reason and appetite, the family of husband and wife, pro-
 perty of master and slave, so out of all these, as well as
 other dissimilar elements, the state is composed ; and,
 therefore, the virtue of all the citizens cannot possibly be
 the same, any more than the excellence of the leader of
 a chorus is the same as that of the performer who stands
 7 by his side. I have said enough to show why the two kinds
 of virtue cannot be absolutely and always the same.

The citizens
 differ
 among
 themselves,
 and there-
 fore cannot
 all have
 the same
 virtue.

But will there then be no case in which the virtue of
 the good citizen and the virtue of the good man coin-
 cide? To this we answer [not that the good citizen,
 but] that the good ruler is a good and wise man, and
 that he who would be a statesman must be a wise man.
 8 And some persons say that even the education of the
 ruler should be of a special kind ; for are not the children
 of kings instructed in riding and military exercises? As
 Euripides says :

The good
 ruler is the
 good man.

‘No subtle arts for me, but what the state requires.’^a

As though there were a special education needed by
 9 a ruler. If then the virtue of a good ruler is the same as
 that of a good man, and we assume further that the sub-
 ject is a citizen as well as the ruler, the virtue of the
 good citizen and the virtue of the good man cannot be
 always the same, although in some cases [i.e. in the per-
 fect state] they may ; for the virtue of a ruler differs
 from that of a citizen. It was the sense of this difference
 which made Jason say that ‘he felt hungry when he was
 not a tyrant,’ meaning that he could not endure to live
 10 in a private station. But, on the other hand, it may be
 argued that men are praised for knowing both how to
 rule and how to obey, and he is said to be a citizen of
 approved virtue who is able to do both. Now if we sup-
 pose the virtue of a good man to be that which rules,

But are
 not all the
 citizens
 rulers in
 turn?

^a Fragment from the *Aeolus*, quoted in *Stobaeus*, 45. 13.

III. 4. and the virtue of the citizen to include ruling and obeying, it cannot be said that they are equally worthy of praise. Seeing, then, that according to common opinion the ruler ¹¹ and the ruled must at some time or other learn the duties of both, but that what they learn is different, and that the citizen must know and share in them both; the inference is obvious^a. There is, indeed, the rule of a master which is concerned with menial offices^b,—the master need not know how to perform these, but may employ others in the execution of them: anything else would be degrading; and by anything else I mean the ¹² menial duties which vary much in character and are executed by various classes of slaves, such, for example, as handicraftsmen, who, as their name signifies, live by the labour of their hands:—under these the mechanic is ^{1277b} included. Hence in ancient times, and among some nations, the working classes had no share in the government—a privilege which they only acquired under the extreme democracy. Certainly the good man and the ¹³ statesman and the good citizen ought not to learn the crafts of inferiors except for their own occasional use^c; if they habitually practise them, there will cease to be a distinction between master and slave.

This is not the rule of which we are speaking; but ¹⁴ there is a rule of another kind, which is exercised over freemen and equals by birth—a constitutional rule, which the ruler must learn by obeying, as he would learn the duties of a general of cavalry by being under the orders of a general of cavalry, or the duties of a general of infantry by being under the orders of a general of infantry, or by having had the command of a company or brigade. It has been well said that ‘he who has never learned to obey cannot be a good commander.’ The ¹⁵ two are not the same, but the good citizen ought to be capable of both; he should know how to govern like a

Yes; by obedience they learn to rule.

The obedience is not such as that of slaves or mechanics,

but the obedience of freemen in a constitutional state.

^a Viz. that some kind of previous subjection is an advantage to the ruler. Cp. *infra*, § 14.

^b Cp. i. 7. §§ 2-5.

^c Cp. viii. 2. § 5.

freeman, and how to obey like a freeman—these are the III. 4.
 16 virtues of a citizen. And, although the temperance and
 justice of a ruler are distinct from those of a subject, the
 virtue of a good man will include both; for the good
 man, who is free and also a subject, will not have one virtue
 only, say justice,—but he will have distinct kinds of virtue,
 the one qualifying him to rule, the other to obey, and differ-
 17 differ^a. For a man would be thought a coward if he had
 no more courage than a courageous woman, and a woman
 would be thought loquacious if she imposed no more
 restraint on her conversation than the good man; and
 indeed their part in the management of the household
 is different, for the duty of the one is to acquire, and of the
 other to preserve. Practical wisdom only is characteristic
 of the ruler^b: it would seem that all other virtues must
 18 equally belong to ruler and subject. The virtue of the
 subject is certainly not wisdom, but only true opinion;
 he may be compared to the maker of the flute, while his
 master is like the flute-player or user of the flute^c.

Practical
 wisdom is
 the virtue of
 the ruler.

From these considerations may be gathered the answer
 to the question, whether the virtue of the good man is
 the same as that of the good citizen, or different, and
 how far the same, and how far different^d.

There still remains one more question about the 5.
 citizen: Is he only a true citizen who has a share of
 office, or is the mechanic to be included? If they who
 hold no office are to be deemed citizens, not every citizen
 can have this virtue of ruling and obeying^e which makes
 a citizen^e. And if none of the lower class are citizens,
 in which part of the state are they to be placed? For
 they are not resident aliens, and they are not foreigners.

Is the
 mechanic a
 citizen?

^a Cp. i. 13. § 9. ^b Cp. Rep. iv. 428. ^c Cp. Rep. x. 601 D, E.

^d Cp. c. 5. § 10; c. 18. § 1; iv. 7. § 2; vii. 14. § 8.

^e Or, 'for this man (i. e. the meaner sort of man) is a citizen
 and does not exercise rule' (see below, § 3, *εἰ δὲ καὶ οὗτος πολίτης*).
 According to the way of taking the passage which is followed in
 the text, *οὗτος* = ὁ ἔχων τὴν τοιαύτην ἀρετὴν: according to the second
 way, it refers to βάναισος.

III. 5. To this objection may we not reply, that there is no^{1278a} more absurdity in excluding them than in excluding² slaves and freedmen from any of the above-mentioned classes? It must be admitted that we cannot consider all those to be citizens who are necessary to the existence of the state; for example, children are not citizens equally with grown up men, who are citizens absolutely, but children, not being grown up, are only citizens in a qualified sense. Doubtless in ancient times, and among³ some nations, the artisan class were slaves or foreigners, and therefore the majority of them are so now. The best form of state will not admit them to citizenship; but if they are admitted, then our definition of the virtue of a citizen will apply to some citizens and freedmen only, and not to those who work for their living. The latter class, to whom toil is a necessity, are either⁴ slaves who minister to the wants of individuals, or mechanics and labourers who are the servants of the community. These reflections carried a little further will explain their position; and indeed what has been said already is of itself explanation enough.

He is necessary to the existence of a state, but not a part of it, and

therefore in the best state not a citizen at all.

Citizenship relative to the constitution.

Since there are many forms of government there must⁵ be many varieties of citizens, and especially of citizens who are subjects; so that under some governments the mechanic and the labourer will be citizens, but not in others, as, for example, in aristocracy or the so-called government of the best (if there be such an one), in which honours are given according to virtue and merit; for no man can practise virtue who is living the life of a mechanic or labourer. In oligarchies the qualification⁶ for office is high, and therefore no labourer can ever be a citizen; but a mechanic may, for many of them are rich. At Thebes^a there was a law that no man could⁷ hold office who had not retired from business for ten years. In many states the law goes to the length of admitting aliens; for in some democracies a man is a citizen though his mother only be a citizen [and his

^a Cp. vi. 7. § 4.

father an alien]; and a similar principle is applied to III. 5.
 8 illegitimate children; the law is relaxed when there is a dearth of population. But when the number of citizens increases, first the children of a male or a female slave are excluded; then those whose mothers only are citizens; and at last the right of citizenship is confined to those whose fathers and mothers are both citizens.

9 Hence, as is evident, there are different kinds of citizens; and he is a citizen in the highest sense who shares in the honours of the state. In the poems of Homer [Achilles complains of Agamemnon treating him] 'like some dishonoured stranger^b;' for he who is excluded from the honours of the state is no better than an alien. But when this exclusion is concealed, then the object is to deceive the inhabitants.

The true citizen shares in the honours of state.

1278b.
 10 As to the question whether the virtue of the good man is the same as that of the good citizen, the considerations already adduced prove that in some states the two are the same, and in others different. When they are the same it is not the virtue of every citizen which is the same as that of the good man, but only the virtue of the statesman and of those who have or may have, alone or in conjunction with others, the conduct of public affairs.

Final answer to the question 'whether the good citizen is the good man.'

Having determined these questions, we have next to 6.
 consider whether there is only one form of government or many, and if many, what they are, and how many, and what are the differences between them.

A constitution is the arrangement of magistracies in a state^c, especially of the highest of all. The government is everywhere sovereign in the state, and the constitution 2 is in fact the government. For example, in democracies the people are supreme, but in oligarchies, the few; and, therefore, we say that these two forms of government are different: and so in other cases.

Constitutions vary with the governing power and in relation to the end.

First, let us consider what is the purpose of a state, and how many forms of government there are by which 3 human society is regulated. We have already said, in

What is the end of the state?

^a Cp. v. 4. § 16. ^b Il. ix. 648. ^c Cp. c. i. § 1; iv. i. § 10.

III. 6. the former part of this treatise^a, when drawing a distinction between household-management and the rule of a master, that man is by nature a political animal. And therefore, men, even when they do not require one another's help, desire to live together all the same, and are in fact brought together by their common interests in proportion as they severally attain to any measure of well-being. This is certainly the chief end, both of 4 individuals and of states. And also for the sake of mere life (in which there is possibly some noble element) mankind meet together and maintain the political community, so long as the evils of existence do not greatly overbalance the good^b. And we all see that men cling 5 to life even in the midst of misfortune, seeming to find in it a natural sweetness and happiness.

The various kinds of rule.

There is no difficulty in distinguishing the various kinds of authority; they have been often defined already in popular works^c. The rule of a master, although 6 the slave by nature and the master by nature have in reality the same interests, is nevertheless exercised primarily with a view to the interest of the master, but accidentally considers the slave, since, if the slave perish, the rule of the master perishes with him. On the other 7 hand, the government of a wife and children and of a household, which we have called household-management, is exercised in the first instance for the good of the governed or for the common good of both parties, but essentially for the good of the governed, as we see to be the case in medicine, gymnastic, and the arts in 1279a. general, which are only accidentally concerned with the good of the artists themselves^d. (For there is no reason why the trainer may not sometimes practise gymnastics, and the pilot is always one of the crew.) The 8 trainer or the pilot considers the good of those committed to his care. But, when he is one of the persons taken care of, he accidentally participates in the ad-

Rule is primarily intended for the good of the governed,

^a Cp. i. 2. §§ 9, 10.

^c Or, 'in our popular works.'

^b Cp. Plato Polit. 302 A.

^d Cp. Pl. Rep. i. 341 D.

vantage, for the pilot is also a sailor, and the trainer III. 6.
 9 becomes one of those in training. And so in politics:
 when the state is framed upon the principle of equality
 and likeness, the citizens think that they ought to hold
 office by turns. In the order of nature every one would
 take his turn of service; and then again, somebody else
 would look after his interest, just as he, while in office,
 had looked after theirs^a. [That was originally the
 10 way.] But now-a-days, for the sake of the advantage
 which is to be gained from the public revenues and from
 office, men want to be always in office. One might
 imagine that the rulers, being sickly, were only kept in
 health while they continued in office; in that case we
 may be sure that they would be hunting after places.
 11 The conclusion is evident: that governments, which
 have a regard to the common interest, are constituted
 in accordance with strict principles of justice, and are
 therefore true forms; but those which regard only the
 interest of the rulers are all defective and perverted
 forms, for they are despotic, whereas a state is a com-
 munity of freemen.

and is per-
 verted
 when exer-
 cised in the
 interests of
 the ruler.

Having determined these points, we have next to con- 7.
 sider how many forms of government there are, and
 what they are; and in the first place what are the true
 forms, for when they are determined the perversions of
 2 them will at once be apparent. The words constitution
 and government have the same meaning, and the govern-
 ment, which is the supreme authority in states, must be
 in the hands of one, or of a few, or of many. The true
 forms of government, therefore, are those in which the
 one, or the few, or the many, govern with a view to the
 common interest; but governments which rule with a
 view to the private interest, whether of the one, or of the
 few, or of the many, are perversions^b. For citizens, if
 they are truly citizens, ought to participate in the ad-
 vantages of a state. Of forms of government in which one
 3 rules, we call that which regards the common interests,
 (a) The true forms.
 (1) Royalty, or the rule of one.

Forms of
 govern-
 ment, true
 and per-
 verted.

^a Cp. ii. 2. §§ 6, 7.

^b Cp. Eth. viii. 10.

III. 7. kingship or royalty; that in which more than one, but not many, rule, aristocracy [the rule of the best]; and it is so called, either because the rulers are the best men, or because they have at heart the best interests of the state and of the citizens. But when the citizens at large administer the state for the common interest, the government is called by the generic name,—a constitution [πολιτεία]. And there is a reason for this use of language. One man or a few may excel in virtue; but of virtue there are many kinds: and as the number increases it becomes more difficult for them to attain perfection in every kind, though they may in military virtue, for this is found in the masses. Hence, in a constitutional government the fighting-men have the supreme power, and those who possess arms are the citizens.

(2) Aristocracy of a few.

(3) 'Polity' of the citizens at large.

(But all for the sake of the governed.)

(b) The perversions.
(1) tyranny,
(2) oligarchy,
(3) democracy.

Of the above-mentioned forms, the perversions are as follows:—of royalty, tyranny; of aristocracy, oligarchy; of constitutional government, democracy. For tyranny is a kind of monarchy which has in view the interest of the monarch only; oligarchy has in view the interest of the wealthy; democracy, of the needy: none of them the common good of all.

8. But there are difficulties about these forms of government, and it will therefore be necessary to state a little more at length the nature of each of them. For he who would make a philosophical study of the various sciences, and does not regard practice only, ought not to overlook or omit anything, but to set forth the truth in every particular. Tyranny, as I was saying, is monarchy exercising the rule of a master over political society; oligarchy is when men of property have the government in their hands; democracy, the opposite, when the indigent, and not the men of property, are the rulers. And here arises the first of our difficulties, and it relates to the definition just given. For democracy is said to be the government of the many. But what if the many are men of property and have the power in their hands? In like manner oligarchy is said to be the government

The division however must not be made to depend merely on a principle of number (quantity).

of the few ; but what if the poor are fewer than the rich, and have the power in their hands because they are stronger? In these cases the distinction which we have drawn between these different forms of government would no longer hold good. III. 8.

4 Suppose, once more, that we add wealth to the few and poverty to the many, and name the governments accordingly—an oligarchy is said to be that in which the few and the wealthy, and a democracy that in which the many and the poor are the rulers—there will still be a difficulty. For, if the only forms of government are the ones already mentioned, how shall we describe those other governments also just mentioned by us, in which the rich are the more numerous and the poor are the fewer, and both govern in their respective states?

Wealth and poverty (quantity) must also be considered.

6 The argument seems to show that, whether in oligarchies or in democracies, the number of the governing body, whether the greater number, as in a democracy, or the smaller number, as in an oligarchy, is an accident due to the fact that the rich everywhere are few, and the poor numerous. But if so, there is a misapprehension of the causes of the difference between them. For the real difference between democracy and oligarchy is

The qualitative is the essential and the quantitative the accidental difference, though in fact they generally coincide.

1280 a. poverty and wealth. Wherever men rule by reason of their wealth, whether they be few or many, that is an oligarchy, and where the poor rule, that is a democracy. But as a fact the rich are few and the poor many: for few are well-to-do, whereas freedom is enjoyed by all, and wealth and freedom are the grounds on which the oligarchical and democratical parties respectively claim power in the state.

Let us begin by considering the common definitions of oligarchy and democracy, and what is justice oligarchical and democratical. For all men cling to justice of some kind, but their conceptions are imperfect and they do not express the whole idea. For example, justice is thought by them to be, and is, equality, not, however, for all, but only for equals. And inequality is

Justice is equality to equals,

III. 9. thought to be, and is, justice; neither is this for all, but only for unequals. When the persons are omitted, then men judge erroneously. The reason is that they are passing judgment on themselves, and most people are bad judges in their own case. And whereas justice implies a relation to persons as well as to things, and a just distribution, as I have already said in the *Ethics*^a, embraces alike persons and things, they acknowledge the equality of the things, but dispute about the merit of the persons, chiefly for the reason which I have just given,—because they are bad judges in their own affairs; and secondly, because both the parties to the argument are speaking of a limited and partial justice, but imagine themselves to be speaking of absolute justice. For those who are unequal in one respect, for example wealth, consider themselves to be unequal in all; and any who are equal in one respect, for example freedom, consider themselves to be equal in all. But they leave out the capital point. For if men met and associated out of regard to wealth only, their share in the state would be proportioned to their property, and the oligarchical doctrine would then seem to carry the day. It would not be just that he who paid one mina should have the same share of a hundred minae,^b whether of the principal or of the profits^b, as he who paid the remaining ninety-nine. But a state exists for the sake of a good life, and not for the sake of life only: if life only were the object, slaves and brute animals might form a state, but they cannot, for they have no share in happiness or in a life of free choice. Nor does a state exist for the sake of alliance and security from injustice^c, nor yet for the sake of exchange and mutual intercourse; for then the Tyrrhenians and the Carthaginians, and all who have commercial treaties with one another, would be the citizens of one state. True, they have agreements about

inequality to unequals, but people in general leave out of sight the persons, and put relative in the place of absolute justice.

The state exists not for the sake of wealth or security or society, but for the sake of a good life.

^a Nicom. *Ethics*, v. 3. § 4.

^b Or, with Bernays, 'either in the case of the original contributors or their successors.'

^c Cp. c. 1. § 4.

imports, and engagements that they will do no wrong to one another, and written articles of alliance. But
 1280b. there are no magistracies common to the contracting parties who will enforce their engagements; different states have each their own magistracies. Nor does one state take care that the citizens of the other are such as they ought to be, nor see that those who come under the terms of the treaty do no wrong or wickedness at all, but only that they do no injustice to one another.
 8 Whereas, those who care for good government take into consideration [the larger question of] virtue and vice in states. Whence it may be further inferred that ^avirtue must be the serious care of a state which truly deserves the name^a: for [without this ethical end] the community becomes a mere alliance which differs only in place from alliances of which the members live apart; and law is only a convention, 'a surety to one another of justice,' as the sophist Lycophon says, and has no real power to make the citizens good and just.

It is more than a mere alliance designed for the protection of life and property.

9 This is obvious; for suppose distinct places, such as Corinth and Megara, to be united by a wall, still they
 10 would not be one city, not even if the citizens had the right to intermarry, which is one of the rights peculiarly characteristic of states. Again, if men dwelt at a distance from one another, but not so far off as to have no intercourse, and there were laws among them that they should not wrong each other in their exchanges, neither would this be a state. Let us suppose that one man is a carpenter, another a husbandman, another a shoemaker, and so on, and that their number is ten thousand: nevertheless, if they have nothing in common but exchange, alliance, and the like, that would not
 11 constitute a state. Why is this? Surely not because they are at a distance from one another: for even sup-

It implies not only inter-marriage, intercourse, exchange,

a common locality,

^a Or, 'virtue must be the care of a state which is truly so called, and not merely in name.'

III. 9. in a manner his state, and that they made alliance with one another, but only against evil-doers; still an accurate thinker would not deem this to be a state, if their intercourse with one another was of the same character after as before their union. It is clear then that a state is not a mere society, having a common place, established for the prevention of crime and for the sake of exchange. These are conditions without which a state cannot exist; but all of them together do not constitute a state, which is a community of well-being in families and aggregations of families, for the sake of a perfect and self-sufficing life. Such a community can only be established among those who live in the same place and intermarry. Hence arise in cities family connexions, brotherhoods, common sacrifices, amusements which draw men together. They are created by friendship, for friendship is the motive of society. The end is the good life, and these are the means towards it. And the state is the union of families and villages having for an end a perfect and self-sufficing life, by which we mean a happy and honourable life^a.

but much more than these, viz. a community of well-being.

Those who contribute most to such a society have the greatest claim to power.

Our conclusion, then, is that political society exists for the sake of noble actions, and not of mere companionship. And they who contribute most to such a society have a greater share in it than those who have the same or a greater freedom or nobility of birth but are inferior to them in political virtue; or than those who exceed them in wealth but are surpassed by them in virtue.

From what has been said it will be clearly seen that all the partisans of different forms of government speak of a part of justice only.

10. Who are to have supreme power?

There is also a doubt as to what is to be the supreme power in the state:—Is it the multitude? Or the wealthy? Or the good? Or the one best man? Or a tyrant? Any of these alternatives seems to involve disagreeable consequences. If the poor, for example,

^a Cp. i. 2. § 8; N. Eth. i. 7. § 6.

because they are more in number, divide among themselves the property of the rich,—is not this unjust? No, by heaven (will be the reply), for the lawful authority [i. e. the people] willed it. But if this is not injustice, pray what is? Again, when [in the first division] all has been taken, and the majority divide anew the property of the minority, is it not evident, if this goes on, that they will ruin the state? Yet surely, virtue is not the ruin of those who possess her, nor is justice destructive of a state^a; and therefore this law of confiscation clearly cannot be just. If it were, all the acts of a tyrant must of necessity be just; for he only coerces other men by superior power, just as the multitude coerce the rich. But is it just then that the few and the wealthy should be the rulers? And what if they, in like manner, rob and plunder the people,—is this just? If so, the other case [i. e. the case of the majority plundering the minority] will likewise be just. But there can be no doubt that all these things are wrong and unjust.

Then ought the good to rule and have supreme power? But in that case everybody else, being excluded from power, will be dishonoured. For the offices of a state are posts of honour; and if one set of men always hold them, the rest must be deprived of them. Then will it be well that the one best man should rule? Nay, that is still more oligarchical, for the number of those who are dishonoured is thereby increased. Some one may say that it is bad for a man, subject as he is to all the accidents of human passion, to have the supreme power, rather than the law. But what if the law itself be democratical or oligarchical, how will that help us out of our difficulties^b? Not at all; the same consequences will follow.

Most of these questions may be reserved for another occasion. The principle that the multitude ought to be supreme rather than the few best is capable of a satis-

III. 10.
Difficulties: any class having the power may act unjustly, is its authority to be deemed just?

The rule of the good men will exclude the other citizens.

Even the rule of the law may only represent a party.

^a Cp. Plato Rep. i. 351, 352.

^b Cp. c. 11. § 20.

III. II. factory explanation, and, though not free from difficulty, yet seems to contain an element of truth. For the many, of whom each individual is but an ordinary person, when they meet together may very likely be better than the few good, if regarded not individually but collectively, just as a feast to which many contribute is better than a dinner provided out of a single purse. For each individual among the many has a share of virtue and prudence, and when they meet together they become in a manner one man, who has many feet, and hands, and senses; that is a figure of their mind and disposition. Hence the many are better judges than a single man of music and poetry; for some understand one part, and some another, and among them, they understand the whole. There is a similar combination of qualities in good men, who differ from any individual of the many, as the beautiful are said to differ from those who are not beautiful, and works of art from realities, because in them the scattered elements are combined, although, if taken separately, the eye of one person or some other feature in another person would be fairer than in the picture. Whether this principle can apply to every democracy, and to all bodies of men, is not clear. Or rather, by heaven, in some cases it is impossible of application; for the argument would equally hold about brutes; and wherein, it will be asked, do some men differ from brutes? But there may be bodies of men about whom our statement is nevertheless true. And if so, the difficulty which has been already raised, and also another which is akin to it—viz. what power should be assigned to the mass of freemen and citizens, who are not rich and have no personal merit—are both solved. There is still a danger in allowing them to share the great offices of state, for their folly will lead them into error, and their dishonesty into crime. But there is a danger also in not letting them share, for a state in which many poor men are excluded from office will necessarily be full of enemies. The only way of escape is to assign to them

Why the many should have power. They are wiser than any one man,

in many cases, though not always.

some deliberative and judicial functions. For this reason III. 11. Solon^a and certain other legislators give them the power of electing to offices, and of calling the magistrates to account, but they do not allow them to hold office
 9 singly. When they meet together their perceptions are quite good enough, and combined with the better
 class they are useful to the state (just as impure food
 when mixed with what is pure sometimes makes the
 entire mass more wholesome than a small quantity of
 the pure would be), but each individual, left to himself,
 10 forms an imperfect judgment. On the other hand, the
 popular form of government involves certain difficulties.
 In the first place, it might be objected that he who can
 judge of the healing of a sick man would be one who
 could himself heal his disease, and make him whole—
 1282a. that is, in other words, the physician; and so in all pro-
 fessions and arts. As, then, the physician ought to be
 called to account by physicians, so ought men in general
 11 to be called to account by their peers. But physicians
 are of three kinds:—there is the apothecary, and there is
 the physician of the higher class, and thirdly the intelligent
 man who has studied the art: in all arts there is such a
 class; and we attribute the power of judging to them
 12 quite as much as to professors of the art. Now, does not
 the same principle apply to elections? For a right elec-
 tion can only be made by those who have knowledge; a
 geometrician, for example, will choose rightly in matters
 of geometry, or a pilot in matters of steering; and, even
 if there be some occupations and arts with which pri-
 vate persons are familiar, they certainly cannot judge
 13 better than those who know. So that, according to this
 argument, neither the election of magistrates, nor the
 14 calling of them to account, should be intrusted to the
 many. Yet possibly these objections are to a great extent
 met by our old answer, that if the people are not utterly
 degraded, although individually they may be worse

Their
wisdom
collective.

But should
not the
expert be
chosen by
the expert?

Answer:
the people
may be able
to judge

^a Cp. ii. 12. § 5.

III. 11. judges than those who have special knowledge—as a
 though they have no special knowledge. body they are as good or better. Moreover, there are some artists whose works are judged of solely, or in the best manner, not by themselves, but by those who do not possess the art; for example, the knowledge of the house is not limited to the builder only; the user, or, in other words, the master, of the house will even be a better judge than the builder, just as the pilot will judge better of a rudder than the carpenter, and the guest will judge better of a feast than the cook.

This difficulty seems now to be sufficiently answered,¹⁵ but there is another akin to it. That inferior persons should have authority in greater matters than the good would appear to be a strange thing, yet the election and calling to account of the magistrates is the greatest of all. And these, as I was saying, are functions which in some states are assigned to the people, for the assembly is supreme in all such matters. Yet persons of any age,¹⁶ and having but a small property qualification, sit in the assembly and deliberate and judge, although for the great officers of state, such as controllers and generals, a high qualification is required. This difficulty may be solved in the same manner as the preceding, and the present practice of democracies may be really defensible.¹⁷ For the power does not reside in the dicast, or senator, or ecclesiast, but in the court and the senate, and the assembly, of which individual senators, or ecclesiasts, or dicasts, are only parts or members. And for this¹⁸ reason the many may claim to have a higher authority than the few; for the people, and the senate, and the courts consist of many persons, and their property collectively is greater than the property of one or of a few individuals holding great offices. But enough of this.

The laws when good supreme. But what are good laws?

The discussion of the first question^a shows nothing so¹⁹
 clearly as that laws, when good, should be supreme; and that the magistrate or magistrates should regulate those matters only on which the laws are unable to speak with^{1282b.}

^a Cp. c. 10. § 1.

precision owing to the difficulty of any general principle III. 11.
 20 embracing all particulars^a. But what are good laws has
 not yet been clearly explained; the old difficulty re-
 mains^b. The goodness or badness, justice or injustice, of
 laws is of necessity relative to the constitutions of states.
 21 But if so, true forms of government will of necessity
 have just laws, and perverted forms of government will
 have unjust laws.

In all sciences and arts the end is a good, and especially 12.
 and above all in the highest of all^c—this is the political
 science of which the good is justice, in other words, the
 common interest. All men think justice to be a sort of Justice is
equality.
 equality; and to a certain extent^d they agree in the
 philosophical distinctions which have been laid down by
 us about Ethics^e. For they admit that justice is a thing
 having relation to persons, and that equals ought to
 2 have equality. But there still remains a question; But
equality
in what?
 equality or inequality of what? here is a difficulty
 which the political philosopher has to resolve. For
 very likely some persons will say that offices of state
 ought to be unequally distributed according to superior
 excellence, in whatever respect, of the citizen, although
 there is no other difference between him and the rest of
 the community; for that those who differ in any one
 3 respect have different rights and claims. But, surely, if Not in any-
thing and
everything.
 this is true, the complexion or height of a man, or any
 other advantage, will be a reason for his obtaining a
 4 greater share of political rights. The error here lies
 upon the surface, and may be illustrated from the other
 arts and sciences. When a number of flute-players are
 equal in their art, there is no reason why those of them
 who are better born should have better flutes given to
 them; for they will not play any better on the flute, and
 the superior instrument should be reserved for him who
 is the superior artist. If what I am saying is still obscure,
 5 it will be made clearer as we proceed. For if there were

^a Cp. N. Eth. v. 10. § 4.

^b Cp. c. 10. § 5.

^c Cp. i. 1. § 1; N. Eth. i. 1. § 1. ^d Cp. c. 9. § 1. ^e Cp. N. Eth. v. 3.

III. 12. a superior flute-player who was far inferior in birth and beauty, although either of these may be a greater good than the art of flute-playing, and persons gifted with these qualities may excel the flute-player in a greater ratio than he excels them in his art, still he ought to have the best flutes given to him, unless the advantages of wealth ^{1283a.} and birth contribute to excellence in flute-playing, which they do not. Moreover upon this principle any good ⁶ may be compared with any other. For if a given height, then height in general may be measured either against height or against freedom. Thus if A excels in height more than B in virtue, and height in general is more excellent than virtue, all things will be commensurable [which is absurd]; for if a certain magnitude is greater than some other, it is clear that some other will be equal.

Differences of quality have no common measure.

What kinds of superiority give a claim to political power?

But since no such comparison can be made, it is evident ⁷ that there is good reason why in politics men do not ground their claim to office on every sort of inequality any more than in the arts. For if some be slow, and others swift, that is no reason why the one should have little and the others much; it is in gymnastic contests that such excellence is rewarded. Whereas the rival ⁸ claims of candidates for office can only be based on the possession of elements which enter into the composition of a state, [such as wealth, virtue, etc.] And therefore the noble, or free-born, or rich, may with good reason claim office; for holders of offices must be freemen and tax-payers: a state can be no more composed entirely of poor men than entirely of slaves. But if wealth and ⁹ freedom are necessary elements, justice and valour are equally so ^a; for without the former a state cannot exist at all, without the latter not well.

13. If the existence of the state is alone to be considered, then it would seem that all, or some at least, of these claims are just; but, if we take into account a good life, as I have already said ^b, education and virtue have

^a Cp. iv. 4. §§ 12-16.

^b Cp. c. 9. §§ 14, 15.

superior claims. As, however, those who are equal in III. 13.
 one thing ought not to be equal in all, nor those who
 are unequal in one thing to be unequal in all, it is
 certain that all forms of government which rest on either
 2 of these principles are perversions. All men have a claim The claims
of wealth,
 in a certain sense, as I have already admitted, but they
 have not an absolute claim. The rich claim because they
 have a greater share in the land, and land is the common
 element of the state; also they are generally more
 trustworthy in contracts. The free claim under the same of birth,
 title as the noble; for they are nearly akin. And the
 noble are citizens in a truer sense than the ignoble,
 since good birth is always valued in a man's own home
 3 and country^a. Another reason is, that those who are
 sprung from better ancestors are likely to be better
 men, for nobility is excellence of race. Virtue, too, may of virtue,
 be truly said to have a claim, for justice has been ac-
 knowledged by us to be a social^b virtue, and it implies
 4 all others^c. Again, the many may urge their claim of numbers.
 against the few; for, when taken collectively, and com-
 pared with the few, they are stronger and richer and
 1283b. better. But, what if the good, the rich, the noble, Concurrent
claims.
 and the other classes who make up a state, are all
 living together in the same city, will there, or will there
 5 not, be any doubt who shall rule?—No doubt at all
 in determining who ought to rule in each of the above-
 mentioned forms of government. For states are cha-
 racterized by differences in their governing bodies—one
 of them has a government of the rich, another of the
 virtuous, and so on. But a difficulty arises when all these
 6 elements coexist. How are we to decide? Suppose the
 virtuous to be very few in number: may we consider
 their numbers in relation to their duties, and ask whether
 they are enough to administer the state, or must they be
 so many as will make up a state? Objections may be
 7 urged against all the aspirants to political power. For
 those who found their claims on wealth or family have

^a Cp. i. 6. § 7. ^b Cp. i. 2. § 16. ^c Cp. N. Eth. v. 1. § 15.

III. 13. no basis of justice; on this principle, if any one person were richer than all the rest, it is clear that he ought to be the ruler of them. In like manner he who is very distinguished by his birth ought to have the superiority over all those who claim on the ground that they are freeborn. In an aristocracy, or government of the best, a like difficulty occurs about virtue; for if one citizen be better than the other members of the government, however good they may be, he too, upon the same principle of justice, should rule over them. And if the people are to be supreme because they are stronger than the few, then if one man, or more than one, but not a majority, is stronger than the many, they ought to rule, and not the many.

None of these claims to power strictly just.

The many may be better or richer than the few.

The equal is limited by the common good.

All these considerations appear to show that none of the principles on which men claim to rule, and hold all other men in subjection to them, are strictly right. To those who claim to be masters of the state on the ground of their virtue or their wealth, the many might fairly answer that they themselves are often better and richer than the few—I do not say individually, but collectively. And another ingenious objection which is sometimes put forward may be met in a similar manner. Some persons doubt whether the legislator who desires to make the justest laws ought to legislate with a view to the good of the higher classes or of the many, when the case which we have mentioned occurs [i. e. when all the elements coexist^a]. Now what is just or right is to be interpreted in the sense of 'what is equal;' and that which is right in the sense of being equal is to be considered with reference to the advantage of the state, and the common good of the citizens. And a citizen is one who shares in governing and being governed. He differs under different forms of government, but in the best state he is one who is able and willing to be governed and to govern with a view to the life of virtue. 1284a.

^a Cp. § 4.

13 If, however, there be some one person, or more than III. 13.
 one, although not enough to make up the full com-
 plement of a state, whose virtue is so preeminent
 that the virtues or the political power of all the rest
 admit of no comparison with his or theirs, he or they
 can be no longer regarded as part of a state; for justice
 will not be done to the superior, if he is reckoned only
 as the equal of those who are so far inferior to him in
 14 virtue and in political power. Such an one may truly
 be deemed a God among men. Hence we see that
 legislation is necessarily concerned only with those who
 are equal in birth and in power; and that for men
 of preeminent virtue there is no law—they are them-
 selves a law. Any one would be ridiculous who
 attempted to make laws for them: they would prob-
 ably retort what, in the fable of Antisthenes, the lions
 said to the hares [‘where are your claws?’], when in the
 council of the beasts the latter began haranguing and
 15 claiming equality for all. And for this reason democratic
 states have instituted ostracism; equality is above all
 things their aim, and therefore they ostracise and banish
 from the city for a time those who seem to predominate too
 much through their wealth, or the number of their friends,
 16 or through any other political influence. Mythology tells
 us that the Argonauts left Heracles behind for a similar
 reason; the ship *Argo* would not take him because she
 feared that he would have been too much for the rest of
 the crew. Wherefore those who denounce tyranny and
 blame the counsel which Periander gave to Thrasybulus
 17 cannot be held altogether just in their censure. The
 story is that Periander, when the herald was sent to ask
 counsel of him, said nothing, but only cut off the tallest
 ears of corn till he had brought the field to a level. The
 herald did not know the meaning of the action, but came
 and reported what he had seen to Thrasybulus, who
 understood that he was to cut off the principal men in
 18 the state^a; and this is a policy not only expedient for

The true
king or
hero an
anomalous
person who
is not part
of a state :

such
persons are
ostracised
in demo-
cracies
which, like
tyrannies,
act on the
advice of
Periander
to Thra-
sybulus.

^a Cp. v. 10. § 13.

III. 13. tyrants or in practice confined to them, but equally necessary in oligarchies and democracies. Ostracism^a is a measure of the same kind, which acts by disabling and banishing the most prominent citizens. Great powers¹⁹ do the same to whole cities and nations, as the Athenians did to the Samians, Chians, and Lesbians; no sooner had they obtained a firm grasp of the empire, than they humbled their allies contrary to treaty; and the Persian^{1284b.} king has repeatedly crushed the Medes, Babylonians, and other nations, when their spirit has been stirred by the recollection of their former greatness.

Imperial states ostracise dependent states.

Illustration taken from the arts.

Ostracism when applied a sad necessity, but it should not be necessary.

The problem is a universal one, and equally concerns²⁰ all forms of government, true as well as false; for, although perverted forms with a view to their own^{20a} interests may adopt this policy, those which seek the common interest do so likewise. The same thing may²¹ be observed in the arts and sciences^b; for the painter will not allow the figure to have a foot which, however beautiful, is not in proportion, nor will the ship-builder allow the stern or any other part of the vessel to be unduly large, any more than the chorus-master will allow any one who sings louder or better than all the rest to sing in the choir. ^cMonarchs, too, may practise compulsion²² and still live in harmony with their cities, if their government is for the interest of the state^c. Hence where there is an acknowledged superiority the argument in favour of ostracism is based upon a kind of political justice. It would certainly be better that the legislator should²³ from the first so order his state as to have no need of such a remedy. But if the need arises, the next best thing is that he should endeavour to correct the evil by this or some similar measure. The principle, however, has not been fairly applied in states; for, instead of looking to the public good, they have used ostracism for

^a Cp. v. 3. § 3.

^b Cp. v. 3. § 6; 9. § 7; vii. 4. 10; Rep. iv. 420.

^c Or, 'Monarchies do not differ in this respect (i. e. the employment of compulsion) from free states, but their government must be,' etc.

24 factious purposes. It is true that under perverted forms III 13.
of government, and from their special point of view, such
a measure is just and expedient, but it is also clear that
it is not absolutely just. In the perfect state there would
be great doubts about the use of it, not when applied to
excess in strength, wealth, popularity, or the like, but
when used against some one who is preeminent in
25 virtue,—what is to be done with him? Mankind will
not say that such an one is to be expelled and exiled;
on the other hand, he ought not to be a subject—that
would be ^aas if in the division of the empire of the Gods
the other Gods^a should claim to rule over Zeus. The
only alternative is that all should joyfully obey such a
ruler, according to what seems to be the order of nature,
and that men like him should be kings in their state
for life.

Can we
ostracise
the one
best man?

No: Then
he must be
king.

The preceding discussion, by a natural transition, leads I 4.
to the consideration of royalty, which we admit to be Royalty.
one of the true forms of government^b. Let us see
whether in order to be well governed a state or country
should be under the rule of a king or under some other
form of government; and whether monarchy, although
2 good for some, may not be bad for others. But first we
must determine whether there is one species of royalty or
1285a. many. It is easy to see that there are many, and that the
manner of government is not the same in all of them.

kinds of.

3 Of royalties according to law, the Lacedaemonian is (1) The
thought to answer best to the true pattern; but there the
royal power is not absolute, except when the kings go
on an expedition, and then they take the command.
Matters of religion are likewise committed to them.
Lacedaemonian
kings not
sovereigns,
but generals
for life.

4 The kingly office is in truth a kind of generalship, irre-
sponsible and perpetual. The king has not the power
of life and death, except^c when upon a campaign and in

^a Or, 'as if in the division of offices among the citizens, mankind,'
etc. Or, with Bernays, 'as if in accordance with the principle of
rotation in succession to offices, mankind,' etc. ^b ii. 9. § 29.

^c Omitting *ἐν τινι βασιλείᾳ*, which is bracketted by Bekker in
his 2nd edit.

III. 14. the field ; after the manner of the ancients which is described in Homer. For Agamemnon is patient when he is attacked in the assembly, but when the army goes out to battle he has the power even of life and death. Does he not say?— 5

‘When I find a man skulking apart from the battle, nothing shall save him from the dogs and vultures, for in my hands is death ^a.’

This, then, is one form of royalty—a generalship for life : and of such royalties some are hereditary and others elective.

(2) Barbarian kings have despotic power, but are legal and hereditary.

(2) There is another sort of monarchy not uncommon 6 among the barbarians, which nearly resembles tyranny. But even this is legal and hereditary. For barbarians, being more servile in character than Hellenes, and Asiatics than Europeans, do not rebel against a despotic 7 government. Such royalties have the nature of tyrannies because the people are by nature slaves^b; but there is no danger of their being overthrown, for they are hereditary and legal. Wherefore also their guards are such as a king and not such as a tyrant would employ, that is to say, they are composed of citizens, whereas the guards of tyrants are mercenaries^c. For kings rule according to law over voluntary subjects, but tyrants over involuntary; and the one are guarded by their fellow-citizens, the others are guarded against them.

(3) Aesymnetes or dictators.

These are two forms of monarchy, and there was a 8 third (3) which existed in ancient Hellas, called an Aesymnetia or dictatorship. This may be defined generally as an elective tyranny, which, like the barbarian monarchy, is legal, but differs from it in not being hereditary. Sometimes the office is held for life, sometimes 9 for a term of years, or until certain duties have been performed. For example, the Mitylenaeans elected Pittacus leader against the exiles, who were headed by Antimnides and Alcaeus the poet. And Alcaeus himself says 10

^a Il. ii. 391–393. The last clause is not found in our Homer.

^b Cp. i. 2. § 4.

^c Cp. v. 10. § 10.

in one of his ^airregular songs^a, 'They chose Pittacus III. 14. tyrant,' and he reproaches his fellow-citizens for

'having made the low-born Pittacus tyrant of the spiritless and 1235 b. ill-fated city, with one voice shouting his praises.'

11 These forms of government have always had the character of despotism, because they possess tyrannical power; but inasmuch as they are elective and acquiesced in by their subjects, they are kingly.

(4) There is a fourth species of kingly rule—that of the heroic times—which was hereditary and legal, and 12 was exercised over willing subjects. For the first chiefs were benefactors of the people^b in arts or arms; they either gathered them into a community, or procured land for them; and thus they became kings of voluntary subjects, and their power was inherited by their descendants. They took the command in war and presided over the sacrifices, except those which required a priest. They also decided causes either with or without an oath; and when they swore, the form of the oath was 13 the stretching out of their sceptre. In ancient times their power extended to all things whatsoever, in city and country, as well as in foreign parts; but at a later date they relinquished several of these privileges, and others the people took from them, until in some states nothing was left to them but the sacrifices; and where they retained more of the reality they had only the right of leadership in war beyond the border.

14 These, then, are the four kinds of royalty. First the monarchy of the heroic ages; this was exercised over voluntary subjects, but limited to certain functions; the king was a general and a judge, and had the control of religion. The second is that of the barbarians, which is an hereditary despotic government in accordance with law. A third is the power of the so-called Aesymnete or Dictator; this is an elective tyranny. The fourth is the Lacedaemonian, which is in fact a generalship,

(4) The hereditary ruler over willing subjects.

The king's power gradually declined, the office of priest or general alone remaining to him.

Re-enumeration of the kinds of royalty. To the four above-mentioned

^a Or, 'banquet-odes,' *σκόλια*.

^b Cp. v. c. 10. § 3.

III. 14. hereditary and perpetual. These four forms differ from ¹⁵ one another in the manner which I have described.

is added
(5) absolute
royalty.

There is a fifth form of kingly rule in which one has the disposal of all, just as each tribe or each state has the disposal of the public property; this form corresponds to the control of a household. For as household management is the kingly rule of a house, so kingly rule is the household management of a city, or of a nation, or of many nations.

15.

Only the
two extreme
forms need
be con-
sidered.

Of these forms we need only consider two, the Lacedaemonian and the absolute royalty; for most of the others lie in a region between them, having less power than the last, and more than the first. Thus the en- ²quiry is reduced to two points: first, is it advantageous to the state that there should be a perpetual general, and if so, should the office be confined to one family, or open to the citizens in turn? Secondly, is it well that a ^{1286a} single man should have the supreme power in all things?

The Lacedaemonian royalty is an office, not a constitution; the absolute royalty raises many questions.

Should the best laws or the best man rule?

Laws are general,

The first question falls under the head of laws rather than of constitutions; for perpetual generalship might equally exist under any form of government, so that ³this matter may be dismissed for the present. The other kind of royalty is a sort of constitution; this we have now to consider, and briefly to run over the difficulties involved in it. We will begin by enquiring whether it is more advantageous to be ruled by the best man or by the best laws ^a.

but they are passionless, and the rules too must have general principles.

The advocates of royalty maintain that the laws ⁴speak only in general terms, and cannot provide for circumstances; and that for any science to abide by written rules is absurd. Even in Egypt the physician is allowed to alter his treatment after the fourth day, but if sooner, he takes the risk. Hence it is argued that a government acting according to written laws is plainly not the best. Yet surely the ruler cannot dispense with the ⁵general principle which exists in law; and he is a better

^a Cp. Plato Polit. pp. 293-295.

ruler who is free from passion than he who is passionate. III. 15.
Whereas the law is passionless, passion must ever sway the heart of man.

6 Yes, some one will answer, but then on the other hand an individual will be better able to advise in particular cases. [To whom we in turn make reply:] A king must legislate, and laws must be passed, but these laws will have no authority when they miss the mark, though in all other cases retaining their authority. [Yet a further question remains behind:] When the law cannot determine a point at all, or not well, should the one
7 best man or should all decide? According to our present practice assemblies meet, sit in judgment, deliberate and decide, and their judgments all relate to individual cases. Now any member of the assembly, taken separately, is certainly inferior to the wise man. But the state is made up of many individuals. And as a feast to which all the guests contribute is better than a banquet furnished by a single man*, so a multitude is a better judge of many things than any individual.

But how about particular cases which cannot be determined by law?

Should the one best man or the many decide them?

The many are collectively wiser,

8 Again, the many are more incorruptible than the few; they are like the greater quantity of water which is less easily corrupted than a little. The individual is liable to be overcome by anger or by some other passion, and then his judgment is necessarily perverted; but it is hardly
9 to be supposed that a great number of persons would all get into a passion and go wrong at the same moment. Let us assume that they are freemen, never acting in violation of the law, but filling up the gaps which the law is obliged to leave. Or, if such virtue is scarcely attainable by the multitude, we need only suppose that the majority are good men and good citizens, and ask which will be the more incorruptible, the one good ruler,
1286b. or the many who are all good? Will not the many? But, you will say, there may be parties among them, whereas the one man is not divided against himself. To

less corruptible,

freer from passion,

and not more subject to faction.

* Cp. supra, c. 11. § 2.

III. 15. which we may answer that their character is as good as his. If we call the rule of many men, who are all of them good, aristocracy, and the rule of one man royalty, then aristocracy will be better for states than royalty, whether the government is supported by force or not^a, provided only that a number of men equal in virtue can be found.

Ancient monarchies

passed into aristocracies, these into oligarchies ;

then came tyrannies,

lastly, democracies.

Should monarchy be hereditary ?

Should the monarch have a military force ?

The first governments were kingships, probably for this reason, because of old, when cities were small, men of eminent virtue were few. They were made kings because they were benefactors^b, and benefits can only be bestowed by good men. But when many persons equal in merit arose, no longer enduring the pre-eminence of one, they desired to have a commonwealth, and set up a constitution. The ruling class soon deteriorated and enriched themselves out of the public treasury ; riches became the path to honour, and so oligarchies naturally grew up. These passed into tyrannies and tyrannies into democracies ; for love of gain in the ruling classes was always tending to diminish their number, and so to strengthen the masses, who in the end set upon their masters and established democracies. Since cities have increased in size, no other form of government appears to be any longer possible^c.

Even supposing the principle to be maintained that kingly power is the best thing for states, how about the family of the king ? Are his children to succeed him ? If they are no better than anybody else, that will be mischievous. But [says the lover of royalty] the king, though he might, will not hand on his power to his children. That, however, is hardly to be expected, and is too much to ask of human nature. There is also a difficulty about the force which he is to employ ; should a king have guards about him by whose aid he may be able to coerce the refractory ? but if not, how will he administer his kingdom ? Even if he be the lawful

^a Cp. *infra*, § 15.

^b Cp. c. 14. § 12.

^c Cp. iv. 6. § 5 ; 13. § 10.

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sovereign who does nothing arbitrarily or contrary to law, still he must have some force wherewith to maintain the law. In the case of a limited monarchy there is not much difficulty in answering this question; the king must have such force as will be more than a match for one or more individuals, but not so great as that of the people. The ancients observed this principle when they gave the guards to any one whom they appointed dictator or tyrant. Thus, when Dionysius asked the Syracusans to allow him guards, somebody advised that they should give him only a certain number.

III. 15.
Yes; but he must not be too powerful.

1287 a. At this place in the discussion naturally follows the enquiry respecting the king who acts solely according to his own will; he has now to be considered. The so-called limited monarchy, or kingship according to law, as I have already remarked ^a, is not a distinct form of government, for under all governments, as, for example, in a democracy or aristocracy, there may be a general holding office for life, and one person is often made supreme over the administration of a state. A magistracy of this kind exists at Epidamnus ^b, and also at Opus, but in the

16.
The royalty of Sparta is only a life generalship, which may be found in any kind of state.

latter city has a more limited power. Now, absolute monarchy, or the arbitrary rule of a sovereign over all the citizens, in a city which consists of equals, is thought by some to be quite contrary to nature; it is argued that those who are by nature equals must have the same natural right and worth, and that for unequals to have an equal share, or for equals to have an unequal share, in the offices of state, is as bad as for different bodily constitutions to have the same food and clothing or the same different. Wherefore it is thought to be just that among equals every one be ruled as well as rule, and that all should have their turn. We thus arrive at law; for an order of succession implies law. And the rule of the law is preferable to that of any individual. On the same principle, even if it be better for certain individuals to govern, they should be made only guardians and ministers

But absolute monarchy is often thought to be contrary to nature.

Equals should be under the impersonal rule of law.

^a Cp. c. 15. § 2.

^b Cp. v. 1. §§ 10, 11; 4. § 7.

III. 16. of the law. For magistrates there must be, — this is admitted; but then men say that to give authority to any one man when all are equal is unjust. There may indeed be cases which the law seems unable to determine, but in such cases can a man? Nay, it will be replied, 5 the law trains officers for this express purpose, and appoints them to determine matters which are left undecided by it to the best of their judgment. Further it permits them to make any amendment of the existing laws which experience suggests. [But still they are only the ministers of the law.] He who bids the law rule, may be deemed to bid God and Reason alone rule, but he who bids man rule adds an element of the beast; for desire is a wild beast, and passion perverts the minds of rulers, even when they are the best of men. The law is reason unaffected by desire. We are 6 told that a patient should call in a physician; he will not get better if he is doctored out of a book. But the 7 parallel of the arts is clearly not in point; for the physician does nothing contrary to reason from motives of friendship; he only cures a patient and takes a fee; whereas magistrates do many things from spite and partiality. And, indeed, if a man suspected the physician of being in league with his enemies to destroy him for a bribe, he would rather have recourse to the book. Even phy- 8 sicians when they are sick, call in other physicians, and 1287 b. training-masters when they are in training, other training-masters, as if they could not judge truly about their own case and might be influenced by their feelings. Hence it is evident that in seeking for justice men seek for the mean or neutral^a, and the law is the mean. Again, cus- 9 tomary laws have more weight, and relate to more important matters, than written laws, and a man may be a safer ruler than the written law, but not safer than the customary law.

Again, it is by no means easy for one man to super-

Law is
passionless
Reason.

The analogy of
medicine
is adduced
in support
of personal
government, but
the cases
are not
parallel.

^a Cp. N. Eth. v. 4. § 7.

intend many things ; he will have to appoint a number of III. 16.
 subordinates, and what difference does it make whether
 these subordinates always existed or were appointed by
 10 him because he needed them? If, as I said before ^a, the
 good man has a right to rule because he is better, then
 two good men are better than one: this is the old
 saying,—

‘two going together ^b ;’

The one
 must always
 have the
 assistance
 of many :
 then is it
 not better
 that the
 many
 should rule
 from the
 first?

and the prayer of Agamemnon,—

‘would that I had ten such counsellors ^c !’

And at this day there are some magistrates, for example
 judges ^d, who have authority to decide matters which the
 law is unable to determine, since no one doubts that the
 law would command and decide in the best manner what-
 11 ever it could. But some things can, and other things
 cannot, be comprehended under the law, and this is the
 origin of the vexed question whether the best law or the
 best man should rule. For matters of detail about which
 men deliberate cannot be included in legislation. Nor
 does any one deny that the decision of such matters must
 be left to man, but it is argued that there should be many
 12 judges, and not one only. For every ruler ^e who has been
 trained by the law judges well ; and it would surely seem
 strange that a person should see better with two eyes, or
 hear better with two ears, or act better with two hands
 or feet, than many with many ; indeed, it is already the
 practice of kings to make to themselves many eyes and
 ears and hands and feet. For they make colleagues of
 those who are the friends of themselves and their govern-
 13 ments. They must be friends of the monarch and of his
 government ; if not his friends, they will not do what he
 wants ; but friendship implies likeness and equality ;
 and, therefore, if he thinks that friends ought to rule,
 he must think that those who are equal to himself and

^a Cp. c. 13. § 25. ^b Il. x. 224. ^c Il. ii. 372. ^d ὁ δικαστής.

^e Cp. for similar arguments c. 15. § 9.

III. 16. like himself ought to rule. These are the principal controversies relating to monarchy.

17. But may not all this be true in some cases and not in others? ^afor there is a natural justice and expediency in the relation of a master to his servants, or, again, of a king to his subjects, as also in the relation of free citizens to one another; whereas there is no such justice or expediency in a tyranny^a, or in any other perverted form of government, which comes into being contrary to nature. Now, from what has been said, it is manifest that, where ^{1288a.} men are alike and equal, it is neither expedient nor just ² that one man should be lord of all, whether there are laws, or whether there are no laws, but he himself is in the place of law. Neither should a good man be lord over good men, or a bad man over bad; nor, even if he excels in virtue, should he have a right to rule, unless in a particular case, which I have already mentioned, and to which I will once more recur^b. But first of all, I ³ must determine what natures are suited for royalties, and what for an aristocracy, and what for a constitutional government.

Natural fitness of constitutions.

A people who are by nature capable of producing a race superior in virtue and political talent are fitted for kingly government; and a people^c submitting to be ruled as freemen by men whose virtue renders them capable of political command are adapted for an aristocracy: while the people who are suited for constitutional freedom, are those among whom there naturally exists^d a warlike multitude^e able to rule and to obey in turn by a law which gives office to the well-to-do according to their

^a Or: 'for there are men who are by nature fitted to be ruled by a master, others to be ruled by a king, others to live under a constitutional government, and for whom these several relations are just and expedient; but there are no men naturally fitted to be ruled by a tyrant,' etc.

^b C. 13. § 25, and § 5, *infra*.

^c Omitting the words *πλήθος ὃ πέφυκε φέρειν*, which appear to be a repetition from the previous clause.

^d Omitting *καὶ ἔν*.

^e Cp. c. 7. § 4.

5 desert. But when a whole family, or some individual, III. 17.
 happens to be so pre-eminent in virtue as to surpass all
 others, then it is just that they should be the royal family
 and supreme over all, or that this one citizen should be
 6 king of the whole nation. For, as I said before^a, to give
 them authority is not only agreeable to that ground of
 right which the founders of all states, whether aristocratical,
 or oligarchical, or again democratical, are accustomed to put
 forward; (for these all recognize the claim of excellence, although
 not the same excellence),
 7 ^bbut accords with the principle already laid down^b. For
 it would not be right to kill, or ostracise, or exile such a
 person, or require that he should take his turn in being
 governed. The whole is naturally superior to the part,
 and he who has this pre-eminence is in the relation of a
 8 whole to a part. But if so, the only alternative is that he
 should have the supreme power, and that mankind should
 obey him, not in turn, but always. These are the conclusions
 at which we arrive respecting royalty and its various forms,
 and this is the answer to the question, whether it is or is not
 advantageous to states, and to whom, and how.

When one man is pre-eminent in virtue he ought to rule.

We maintain that the true forms of government are 18.
 three, and that the best must be that which is administered
 by the best, and in which there is one man, or a whole family,
 or many persons, excelling in virtue, and both rulers and
 subjects are fitted, the one to rule, the others to be ruled^c,
 in such a manner as to attain the most eligible life. We
 showed at the commencement of our enquiry^d that the virtue
 of the good man is necessarily the same as the virtue of the
 citizen of the perfect state. Clearly then in the same manner,
 and by the same means through which a man becomes truly
 good, he will frame a state [which will be truly good] whether
 aristocratical,

The best government may be either the rule of the one, or of the many virtuous.

State and individual both become virtuous in the same manner.

^a Cp. c. 9. § 15.

^b Or: 'but differing in the manner already laid down.'

^c Omitting *καὶ ἀρχεῖν*, which is inserted, without MS. authority, in Bekker's 2nd edit.

^d Cp. c. 4.

- III. 18. or under kingly rule, and the same education and the same habits will be found to make a good man and a good statesman and king.^{1288b}

Having arrived at these conclusions, we must proceed to speak of the perfect state, and describe how it comes into being and is established. He who would proceed with the enquiry in due manner. . . .^a

^a Retaining the words of the MSS, Ἀνάγκη δὲ τὸν μέλλοντα περὶ αὐτῆς ποιήσασθαι τὴν προσήκουσαν σκέψιν, which are omitted by Bekker in his 2nd edit.