Crossing Germany: Eastern European Transmigrants and Saxon State Surveillance, 1900-1924

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Abstract

This dissertation investigates migrant registration and control stations in Germany that served as a pre-"screening system" (Dorothee Schneider) to US immigration checkpoints such as Ellis Island. In the late-nineteenth, early-twentieth centuries, large numbers of eastern Europeans passed through Germany on their way to northern European ports to sail to the Americas. Studying transmigration, the "process of migration" as Gur Alroey defines it, gives insight into the economic and state mechanisms that controlled migration and which routes migrants took as they travelled overseas. In 1894 due to health concerns and costs incurred by transporting rejected immigrants back from the United States, the Prussian state and German shipping companies set up control stations along the Prussian-Russian border. Here steamship agents reviewed both the travelers' health and financial capability. The stations gave preferential treatment to German steamship customers, yet the German government also had a vested interest: these checkpoints prevented 'undesirable immigrants' from entering its territories. Sizeable eastern European transmigration appeared not only in Prussia, but also in another eastern German province, Saxony. This dissertation focuses particularly on a transmigrant registration station (opened in 1904) at the railroad hub of Leipzig and checkpoints (opened in 1905) on the Saxon-Bohemian border. The growing literature on transmigration has focused on the influence American immigration policy and German steamship companies had over these stations. Instead, I emphasize the vital role the German state played in migration surveillance, with health officials and policemen managing the movement of the travelers. This research challenges the historiographical notion of lax state migration control prior to World War I and enriches understanding of the journey European migrants undertook before arriving in the New World.

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Introduction

Ellis Island has endured as the recurrent historical example of an immigrant inspection station. Its 1892 opening outside of New York City coincided with a large wave of Russians and Austro-Hungarians who traveled across the Atlantic to seek their fortunes. These incomers stood in line and waited as doctors checked for signs of contagious disease. In the registry room officials wrote down the migrants' names, homelands, and other demographics. Authorities asked migrants how much money they were carrying, a stipulation to prevent newcomers from becoming a public charge. If they passed muster, the migrants could leave the island and continued with the next leg of their journey in the United States.[1] Though a notable hurdle, Ellis Island was not the first time these migrants had been asked about their finances, undergone a medical inspection, or had their names written into a registry. For many migrants, this "screening system" began even earlier on the European continent at checkpoints, control stations, and registration stations along the German borderlands.[2]

In the decades before World War I, continental and English steamship companies helped incite millions of eastern European emigrants to travel to the New World via northern European harbors such as Rotterdam, Antwerp, Le Havre, Bremen and Hamburg. Historians refer to this journey as "transmigration," or the "process of migration."[3] Many of these transmigrants[4]

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[1] Barry Moreno, *Encyclopedia of Ellis Island* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2004), 148-151.

[2] Dorothee Schneider, "The United States Government and the Investigation of European Emigration in the Open Door Era," in *Citizenship and Those Who Leave: The Politics of Emigration and Expatriation*, ed. Nancy L. Green and François Weil (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2007), 209.

[3] Gur Alroey, *Bread to Eat and Clothes to Wear: Letters from Jewish Migrants in the Early Twentieth Century* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2011), 1.

(*Durchwanderer*) crossed German territory to reach their harbor destination. In a response to an 1892 cholera outbreak in Hamburg, supposedly introduced by eastern European migrants, German shipping companies, with the blessing of the Prussian state, set up control stations along the Prussian-Russian border. Here shipping company employees and German authorities screened the emigrants' finances and health. Similarly to Ellis Island, these stations checked only steerage passengers; first- and second-class cabin travelers were believed to be financially secure and healthier.

Recent scholarship on these under-researched inspection stations has emphasized the big business aspect of transmigrant surveillance. Indeed, the system worked wonderfully for German shipping companies as agents at the stations gave preferential treatment to customers of Hamburg-America (HAPAG), Norddeutscher Lloyd (NDL), or their allies, incentivizing transmigrants to buy German or German-concessioned tickets. The implementation of control stations in 1894 gained Hamburg and Bremen, which heretofore had serviced mainly indirect routes to the Americas via England, massive pull in direct transatlantic traffic (e.g., Hamburg directly to New York). The inspection stations, run by steamship agents thus gave the businesses great power over border control. Tobias Brinkmann argues that Germany "ceded decisions" on who could pass through the state "to two private companies."[5] As fears of cholera diminished into the twentieth century, the capitalistic purpose behind the stations became more apparent.

While scholars have acknowledged the interest the German state had in the transmigrant control system, thousands of archival letters and reports exchanged by state officials suggest a

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[4] German authorities referred to transmigrants as "emigrants" as well. All translations done by Schmidt unless otherwise stated.

[5] Tobias Brinkmann,"Why Paul Nathan Attacked Albert Ballin," *Central European History* 43 (2010), 65.

great governmental preoccupation. It was part of state interest to have its employees (e.g., policemen and railroad conductors) direct transmigrants to these checkpoints. Steamship companies would only take financial responsibility for its transmigrant customers if they passed through a control or registration station. Otherwise, the German state would need to cover any unexpected costs (e.g., transportation, burial) incurred by impecunious or unhealthy travelers. Thus, the German state took an indirect role in migrant identification and registration, but it was still a substantial role. This dissertation investigates the nature of German state involvement in the transmigration network as well as the larger historiographical question of how pre-World War I European states responded to the cross-border process of migration. It builds on research from the last decade that has suggested that the portrayal of the long nineteenth century "as a liberal era without state restrictions on mobility" is "no longer tenable."[6] Using the province of Saxony as an example, this dissertation argues that the German state had its own vested interest in monitoring eastern European transmigration of the early twentieth century and that the involvement of the German state was vital to the functioning of this system.

The concerns of the German state regarding eastern European transmigrants were similar to those of another major state player in the screening system, the United States. American "remote control," the influence of US immigration regulations abroad, held considerable sway on nineteenth- and twentieth-century emigration policies in Europe.[7] US officials argued that the German control system abroad allowed for a low rejection rate at Ellis Island. German officials sometimes grumbled that their elaborate inspection measures were due to US policies. Steamship

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[6] Cliff Rosenberg, *Policing Paris: The Origins of Modern Immigration Control between the Wars* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006), 2.

[7] Aristide Zolberg, *A Nation by Design: Immigration Policy in the Fashioning of America* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006), 9.

companies wanted to avoid or diminish the costs of transporting migrants rejected at Ellis Island and the earlier in the journey the better. Though the specter of US regulations loomed over the screening system in Germany, European states had their own domestic concerns in regard to these people in transit. Newcomers could introduce disease to indigenous populations (though this potential was often exaggerated) or fall burden to the local governments. On the other hand, registration and control stations helped generate money for the German state and its domestic businesses. Transmigrants took trains run by the Saxon government, stayed overnight in city emigrant hostels, and traveled via continental steamship lines. For the German government, the main point of the registration station was to keep transmigrants moving and keep them moving preferably toward German steamships or allied foreign lines.

Focusing on the province of Saxony highlights the tension between imperial policies and localized state response. Transmigrant surveillance in Saxony differed from Prussian controls, the emphasis of research thus far, in a number of ways. Initially, in 1888 Saxon officials adopted Prussian border policy of allowing transmigrants passage only if they had proof of finances (400 Marks per adult, 100 per child) or German steamship tickets.[8] In late 1903, due to competition between German and English steamship companies and the rejection of transmigrants (who had traveled unchecked through Saxony) at the Dutch border, Saxon officials instigated stricter borderland surveillance.[9] On 3 March 1904, German shipping companies opened a registration station in the Saxon city of Leipzig, through which all foreign, overseas-bound migrants in the province needed to pass. Steamship companies chose the inland Leipzig instead of a Saxon-Bohemian borderland location because the city was a major Saxon (and European) railway hub.

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[8] Dr. Bernhard Karlsberg, *Geschichte und Bedeutung der deutschen Durchwandererkontrolle* (Hamburg : Gebrüder Enoch, 1922), 32.

[9] HStAD, MdI 11731: 27.

Borderland police could then send transmigrants to Leipzig instead of screening them at each border crossing.[10] As far as major differences from Prussian control stations, the Saxon registration station appeared nearly a decade after the first Prussian stations, contained no bathing or disinfecting facilities, and gave transmigrants notable freedom to move about the city. However, a cholera outbreak in Russia in 1904 spurred authorities to instigate cholera checkpoints at Saxon-Bohemian borderland stations. A lull occurred in emigration to the Americas during World War I, but for a short window afterward until the restrictive US Quota Act of 1924, Saxon officials continued their lookout for transmigrants. In the end, transmigrant monitoring in Saxony differed from Prussian policies due to the lingering belief that hygienic conditions and poverty levels in Austria-Hungary (the major transmigrant source for Saxony) were better than in Russia (the major transmigrant source for Prussia), the changing relations between steamship companies, and a growing knowledge of how cholera actually spread.

Eastern European Transmigration

Literature on eastern European transmigration during its peak years (ca. 1890-1914) has burgeoned within the last decade as scholars seek to explain how and why migrants traveled to the New World. Michael Just set a precedent in 1985 by using sources located in the transit harbor cities of Hamburg and Bremen.[11] Several monographs on US immigration, using mainly US-published reports and memoirs, have mentioned the eastern Europeans' journey and German

[10] HStAD, MdI 11731: 60.

[11] See Michael Just, *Ost- und südosteuropäische Amerikawanderung, 1881-1914: Transitprobleme in Deutschland und Aufnahme in den Vereinigten Staaten* (Stuttgart: F. Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden, 1988).

borderland stations.[12] As Tobias Brinkmann and James Retallack have pointed out, the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 created opportunities for scholars of the former West and East to collaborate and expand their studies to include sources from countries of both emigration and immigration.[13] Interest in transnational and transatlantic history has encouraged scholars to look beyond the realm of experience of immigrants within a nation-state and focus on the journey itself.

This dissertation examines a global migratory phenomenon by telling a local history. As Helmut Walser Smith points out, historical narratives should focus on movement in addition to "stasis" to expand notions of local history.[14] In order to understand why officials and transmigrants behaved the way they did in Saxony, one must look at the larger global context of migratory patterns, economics, transportation, communication, contagious diseases, and state policies. Moreover, global concerns become tangible when following the reports of Saxon police and health officials on transmigrants within the province. Through this localized approach, this dissertation delves into the logistics and mechanisms of transmigrant traffic and its control and surveillance. State bureaucrats, steamship agents, and Saxon police worked together to guide transmigrants entering Saxony from Austria-Hungary.

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[12] For example: Dominic A. Pacyga, *Polish Immigrants and Industrial Chicago: Workers on the South Side, 1880-1922* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 32-36.; George J. Prpic, *South Slavic Immigration in America* (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1978), 220.

[13] Tobias Brinkmann, "Introduction," in *Points of Passage: Jewish transmigrants from Eastern Europe in Scandinavia, Germany, and Britain 1880-1914*, ed. Tobias Brinkmann (New York: Berghahn Books, 2013), 4; James Retallack, "Introduction," in *Saxony in German History: Culture, Society, and Politics, 1830-1933*, ed. James Retallack (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000), 8.

[14] Helmut Walser Smith, "The Boundaries of the Local in Modern German History,"in *Saxony in German History: Culture, Society, and Politics, 1830-1933*, ed. James Retallack (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000), 69.

During years of peak migration, 3 million Austro-Hungarians, 2.3 million Russians, and 46,000 Romanians set sail via German ports (this does not take into account the transmigrants in Germany who sailed through Belgian, Dutch, and French harbors).[15] Emigrants had various reasons behind this venture: to make money, to find adventure, to avoid military service, or to escape political persecution. Agents representing steamship companies and American industries visited villages and promoted life overseas. Word of mouth from friends and relatives who earned money in Coloradan coalmines and Chicago stockyards encouraged a series of chain migrations from Europe.[16] By studying the journey of transmigrants, scholars can gain further insight into the personal motivations behind migratory movement and the physical and psychological hurdles individuals needed to pass in order to reach destination countries. Scholars can also gain a deeper understanding of the social, economic, and transportation structures of early twentieth century Europe. By asking why Croats, close to the Adriatic Sea and the port of Fiume, would choose instead to sail via Bremen, one comes to understand the infrastructure of railroad networks that made long distances surmountable, the emigration policies of Hungary, and the power of reputation for steamship companies.

Strides in transportation and communication affected the nature of European emigration in its speed, cost, and capacity. The Industrial Revolution's iron and steam replaced sailing ships with faster and safer steamers. From 1840 to 1910, European rail network "multiplied eighty

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[15] Just, *Ost- und südosteuropäische Amerikawanderung*, 36; Thomas Mergel, "The Kaiserreich as a Society of Migration," in *Imperial Germany Revisited: Continuing Debates and New Perspectives*, ed. Sven Oliver Müller and Cornelius Torp (New York: Berghahn Books, 2013), 276.

[16] Thomas G. Andrews, *Killing for Coal: America's Deadliest Labor War* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2008), 117.

times," connecting rural areas, urban centers, and corners the European continent together.[17] The cost and *durée* of travel, especially over long a distance, decreased immensely, which made a move overseas even more appealing. As the twentieth century progressed, automobiles could play an additional role in the transportation of migrants and expand potential routes across Europe (ironically, in 2012 a car sales lot replaced the remains of the former emigrant train station at Ruhleben[18]). Railroad migration hubs such as Leipzig served as nodal points between lands of emigration and immigration. By using inspection stations such as the Saxon border checkpoints and the Leipzig registration station, shipping companies and state officials attempted to create a "transit corridor," where they could survey transmigrants along specific routes.[19]

The final destination and temporality of stay in the *Kaiserreich* differentiated the transmigrants from seasonal workers or more permanent immigrants in Germany. Transmigrants lingered only for a short time (from several hours to several days when detained) in Germany en route to steamship harbors, while seasonal workers stayed longer. Emily Balch in her study on Slavic migrants stated that with seasonal migration "the house may be simply shut up and left for the time being" while overseas emigrants would "sell their property."[20] As far as identification, transmigrants needed to show either shipping tickets or enough money to fund their journey,

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[17] Theodore S. Hamerow, *The Birth of a New Europe: State and Society in the Nineteenth Century* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1983), 14.

[18] "Auswandererbahnhof musste Autoverkäufern weichen," *Mein Spandau*, January 24th, 2013, http://www.mein-spandau.info/auswandererbahnhof-musste-autoverkaeufern-weichen_id5178/.

[19] Tobias Brinkmann, '"Travelling with Ballin": The Impact of American Immigration Policies on Jewish Transmigration within Central Europe, 1880-1914'," *International Review of Social History* 53 (2008): 465.

[20] Emily Greene Balch, *Our Slavic Fellow Citizens* (New York: Charities Publication Committee, 1910), 81.

whereas seasonal workers travelling to other parts of Germany appeared to not require identification. However, the differences between seasonal and overseas migrants were oftentimes ambiguous. Overseas migrants sometimes practiced a long-distance form of circular migration: they spent a few years working in America and then returned to their home country.[21] Saxon authorities on the ground also had trouble visually identifying seasonal migrants from transmigrants.

Finding the voices of the transmigrants is difficult. Austro-Hungarian emigrant letters to their families and friends rarely mention the railway journey or Saxon checkpoints. Memoirs of immigrants and autobiographical fiction sometimes mention the journey, but years or decades pass before they are written, enough time to gain a different perspective or forget. The journey to northern ports in third class, sometimes in designated emigrant railcars, was often uncomfortable and short. Saxony did not require bathing and disinfecting of transmigrants, unlike the control stations along the Prussian-Russian border, nor did Saxon officials require transmigrants to linger at the station. This made possibly for a less harrowing and thus less memorable situation. Even more difficult to ascertain is the reaction of local citizens to the Saxon registration station and cholera checkpoints, though according to newspaper articles, the locals expressed concern that the transmigrants would introduce diseases.

Christiane Reinecke argues that emigration history needs to include the subaltern voices of migrants and asserts that bureaucratic documents can reveal emigrant agency. [22] By choosing to travel north via Saxony as opposed to through Austro-Hungarian ports, emigrants evaded the

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[21] Drew Keeling, *The Business of Transatlantic Migration between Europe and the United States, 1900-1914* (Zurich: Chronos Verlag, 2012), 221-226; Mark Wyman addresses circular migration to America in *Round-Trip to America* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993).

[22] Christiane Reinecke, *Grenzen der Freizügigkeit: Migrationskontrolle in Großbritannien und Deutschland, 1880-1930* (München: R. Oldenbourg, 2010), 15-16.

emigration quota of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Saxon police reported that emigrants without approved tickets sometimes hid amongst tourists or seasonal workers while crossing the Saxon-Bohemian border. The travelers lied to the police about their intended destinations and sometimes plainly refused to walk to the Leipzig registration station. Later they gave advice to friends and relatives bound for the Americas on how to avoid inspection points. However, Nicole Kvale Eilers notes that many transmigrants willingly passed through the control and registration stations. They knew that the legitimacy cards distributed at the stations verified their travel through Germany, and "migrant agency played an important role in the efficacy of the system."[23] Adam McKeown also warns against viewing bureaucracy as purely a naysayer to migrant rights: often authorities negotiated with other states on how to finance travelers and investigated migrant complaints against steamship agents.[24]

The Role of the State in Transmigration

The Saxon state's monitoring of transmigrants seemed to clash with the historiographical notion of "freedom of movement" within Europe during the latter half of the long nineteenth century.[25] However, John Torpey points out that "the loosening of states' control over *movement* did not…mean the abandonment of its right and capacity to identify persons for purposes of

[23] Nicole Kvale Eilers, "Emigrant Trains: Jewish Migration through Prussia and American Remote Control, 1880-1914," in *Points of Passage: Jewish Transmigrants from Eastern Europe in Scandinavia, Germany, and Britain 1880-1914*, ed. Tobias Brinkmann (New York: Berghahn Books, 2013), 70.

[24] Adam McKeown, *Melancholy Order: Asian Migration and the Globalization of Borders* (NewYork: Columbia University Press, 2008), 17.

[25] John Torpey, *Invention of the Passport: Surveillance, Citizenship, and the State* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 58.

administration and policing."[26] Indeed, migration checkpoints for foreign field laborers opened on eastern Prussian border around the time of the transmigrant stations.[27] In her seminal work on European migration, Leslie Page Moch argues that "states have long articulated policies toward moving peoples, rejecting some and welcoming others."[28] Over the last three decades, scholars have analyzed Imperial Germany as a "society of migration," where the constant coming and going of foreign workers, immigrants, and emigrants meant a government accustomed to movement.[29]

A number of scholars have set historiographical precedents on European state response to transmigration. Camille Maire examines the policies of France toward transmigrants sailing from Le Havre and Marseilles.[30] Beginning with 1820, she focuses on emigrants from the Alsace, Swiss cantons, and south German provinces. Maire mentions that comparatively more emigrants from Le Havre came from outside French provinces, similar to the eastern Europeans sailing from German harbors.[31] The experiences of French officials and transmigrants mirror closely those of a nearly a century later on the eastern border of Imperial Germany: border control, passports, and proof of money out of fear that local charities would have to support any

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[26] Ibid., 78.

[27] Sebastian Conrad, "Wilhelmine Nationalism in Global Contexts," in *Imperial Germany Revisited,* ed. Sven Oliver Müller and Cornelius Torp (New York: Berghahn Books, 2013), 290.

[28] Leslie Page Moch, *Moving Europeans: Migration in Western Europe Since 1650*, 2nd ed. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003), 10.

[29] Mergel, "The Kaiserreich as a Society of Migration," 267.

[30] Camille Maire, *En route pour l'Amérique : l'odyssée des émigrants en France au XIXe siècle* (Nancy: Presses Universitaires de Nancy, 1992), 11.

[31] Ibid., 16.

impoverished travelers.[32] Torsten Feys and Frank Caestecker have investigated the responses of the Belgian state to eastern European emigrants, especially as an expression of domestic power. They argue that the Belgian government preferred its Red-Star-Line employees (as opposed to US authorities) to conduct screening at the port of Antwerp as a statement of "national sovereignty."[33] During the cholera scare of 1905 Belgian authorities set up medical screening of emigrants at the Antwerp central railway station to prevent disease from spreading into the city.[34]

To illustrate state involvement, this study relies upon documents from police, health officials, and bureaucrats on the transmigrant registration station in Leipzig and the cholera checkpoints along the Saxon-Bohemian border. The Saxony Ministry of the Interior, in charge of Saxon police, often acted as a middleman between the steamship companies, state railways, the imperial offices, foreign embassies, and the police on the ground. Such bureaucracies had, according to the sociologist Max Weber, "*jurisdictional areas*, which are generally ordered by rules, that is, by laws or administrative regulations."[35] Saxon bureaucrats worked to spread the knowledge of transmigrant regulations, most noticeably the ordinance of 24 February 1904, which stated that all transmigrants in Saxony needed to pass through the Leipzig registration station. A marker of Weber's bureaucracy is "the management of the modern office is based

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[32] Ibid., 47.

[33] Frank Caestecker and Torsten Feys, "East European Jewish Migrants and Settlers in Belgium, 1880-1914: A Transatlantic Perspective," *East European Jewish Affairs* 40, no. 3 (2010): 271.

[34] Ibid., 272.

[35] Max Weber, *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*, ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, trans. Ephraim Fischoff (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 956.

upon written documents."[36] These thousands of documents, located in Dresden, Berlin, Leipzig, Hamburg and Bremen archives, reflect German officials' anxieties regarding transmigrant movements.[37] While Saxon officials corresponded about eastern European emigrants, these authorities were simultaneously contemplating their own strengths, weaknesses, and definitions of the relationship between migrant and state. As technology affected the traveling capabilities of emigrants, developments in faster communications made bureaucratic correspondence even more efficient. Weber argues, "the precision of [bureacracy's] functioning requires the services of the railway, the telegraph, and the telephone." [38] Steamship company employees and Saxon officials could thus correspond and react within hours of urgent situations. Saxon bureaucrats sought to gain "domination through knowledge," and the constant communication with Saxon police, health officials, and steamship employees attempted to create an effective surveillance system.[39]

The focus on Saxon bureaucracy allows the opportunity to perform a comparative study with Prussian policies. Imperial German historiography over the last years has sought to frame history outside the ubiquitous "Prussian perspective."[40] It is difficult not to place Saxony within a teleological framework, that the province was eventually destined to cede many of its local governmental powers, such as police ordinances and health policy, to federal offices, especially after World War I. Prussian policy certainly had great influence over other provinces in Imperial

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[36] Ibid., 957.

[37] For further reflection upon the "epistemological worries" of people in power, see Ann Stoler, *Along the Archival Grain: Epistemic Anxieties and Colonial Common Sense* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 3.

[38] Weber, *Economy and Society*, 224.

[39] Ibid., 225.

[40] Cornelius Torp and Sven Oliver Müller, "Introduction," in *Imperial Germany Revisited*, ed. Sven Oliver Müller and Cornelius Torp (New York: Berghahn Books, 2013), 9.

Germany, yet some aspects of governance, namely police, welfare, and health regulations, were run on the provincial level. The Prusso-centric historiography of migration from eastern Europe stems not only from the lack of access to Saxon sources during the Cold War, but also from the assumption that after Imperial German unification, provincial policies became centralized under Prussia. Comparing provincial policies toward transmigration "undermines the uniformity of German history" and adds a different perspective to German historical relations with eastern Europe.[41]

In regard to specific "identities" of transmigrants in the transit corridor, scholars have focused on the experience of eastern European Jews. This has partly to do with the demographics of the Russian transmigrants, the largest group traveling through Prussia. Half of Russian emigrants were Jews (the rest were mainly "ethnic minorities" of the empire).[42] Prussian officials oftentimes interchangeably used the terms "Russians" and "Russian Jews." Saxon officials, however, rarely referred to the ethnicity of the travelers unless the travelers were sponsored (or had the potential to be sponsored) by a Jewish charitable organization. This may have reflected the fact that very few Austro-Hungarian and Russian Jews traveled through Saxony, as opposed to Prussia. Austro-Hungarians made the bulk of transmigrants in the province, and in 1905, statistics show six percent of the total number of Austro-Hungarian emigrants as Jewish.[43] Even in sources regarding cholera, a disease that many European associated with Russian Jews, Saxon authorities preferred the term "Russians." The transmigrant control system also hired Jews,

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[41] Retallack, "Introduction," 3.

[42] Mihaela Robila, *Eastern European Immigrant Families* (New York: Routledge, 2010), 21.

[43] Tara Zahra, "Travel Agents on Trial: Policing Mobility in East Central Europe, 1889-1989," *Past & Present* 223, no. 1 (2014): 171.

including the Leipzig station's leader, Hermann Meyer.[44] Prejudice toward eastern European Jews may have been more class-based, yet this dissertation cannot make an argument from silence on the treatment Jewish transmigrants within Saxony. Anti-semitism certainly existed at the time. How individual policemen or doctors felt about the transmigrants' ethnic background, one cannot be absolutely certain from these bureaucratic sources. Emotionless legalese could the racist and nationalist undertones of migration policy.[45]

However, these Saxon bureaucrats seemed to have prioritized imperial and provincial origins of transmigrants over ethnicity. Caitlin Murdock notes that "the Saxon central government refused to differentiate foreigners by nationality" until World War I and police detail on transmigrants certainly reflected this in general.[46] Saxon authorities tended to use descriptions such as "Austro-Hungarian" or "Galician" instead of "Pole." For example, in August 1905, the Leipzig station registered 1300 Croatians, 1600 Hungarians, 400 Bohemians, 200 Lower Austrians, 150 "Krainer" (from the historical duchy of Carniola, "Krain," in Austria-Hungary), 450 Romanians, 400 Galicians, and 500 Russians.[47] Leipzig station authorities sent Russians, regardless of religion, to Ruhleben for bathing and disinfecting. The more relaxed transmigrant control in Saxony as compared to Prussia appeared to reflect the less strict German-Austrian political border. German officials also tended to keep tougher controls on the Russian borders due to the outbreak of cholera from its provinces but were willing to reconsider when the disease

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[44] See Michael Schäbitz, *Juden in Sachsen-jüdische Sachsen?: Emanzipation, Akkulturation und Integration 1700-1914* (Hannover: Hahnsche Buchhandlung, 2006).

[45] McKeown, *Melancholy Order*, 9.

[46]Caitlin Murdock, *Changing Places: Society, Culture, and Territory in the Saxon-Bohemian Borderlands, 1870-1946* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2010), 46.

[47] HStAD, MdI 11748: 76.

appeared in Austrian Galicia. As much as racial concerns pervaded political rhetoric and writing, the concern of the tranmigration surveillance seemed to be that of health and the potential for a public charge.

Steamship Companies, Circumnavigation, and Disease

The first three chapters of this dissertation examine three stages of transmigrant control in Saxony before World War I: the development of the registration station in Leipzig, the circumnavigation of the Leipzig registration station by customers of the Cunard steamship line, and the response of the Saxon state to outbreaks of cholera in Russia and Galicia. Each of these stages highlights an aspect of governmental involvement in the screening system: protection of domestic business, dispatch of police, and concern for public health. The first chapter shows the interaction between the Saxon state and steamship companies from 1900 to 1904 as Saxon transmigrant regulations became a tool for continental steamship companies to monopolize eastern European customer traffic. It also looks at non-governmental religious charities that sponsored Jewish transmigrants from Romania and Russia. This chapter also examines the economic reasons behind eastern European transatlantic migration "as one part of a worldwide movement of men and women in a global labor force."[48]As far as shipping companies were concerned, they attempted, to summarize Michel Foucault, to maintain the maximum amount of power at the lowest economic cost, whether that meant negotiating expenditures with the Saxon state or making sure checkpoints seemed surmountable enough so as not to scare off migrant customers.[49] The Saxon state played a major role in supporting German steamship companies

[48] Moch, *Moving Europeans*, 104.

[49] Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (New York: Vintage Books, 1995), 218.

and their allied partners (about 40% of transmigrants registered at Leipzig sailed with sanctioned Dutch and Belgian lines).[50] This chapter argues that German steamship companies, supported by the state, opened the registration station in Leipzig as a response to a competing company, Cunard, which had its customers circumnavigate Prussian controls by going through Saxony. The second chapter explains how the Saxon state became further involved in the screening system when Saxon policemen actively directed transmigrants to the Leipzig registration station. Some transmigrants, especially customers of non-sanctioned English steamship line Cunard, had been avoiding the station. This circumnavigation became more apparent as steamship companies engaged in fare-slashing wars the summer of 1904. German steamship companies, desperate to curb competitors, asked Saxon officials to make sure every transmigrant registered and did not take alternate routes. The state justified police action against migrant circumnavigation for "security, medical, and welfare" reasons."[51] The chapter also demonstrates conflicting interests of state institutions as the Saxon customers railroad complained it was losing customers due to the transmigrant control and asked for exceptions to be made.

The third chapter looks at the increased monitoring of eastern European transmigrants in Saxony in response to 1904 cholera outbreaks in Russia and Galicia. State officials attempted, not always successfully, to isolate transmigrants from the rest of the population. The state limited migrant traffic to three Bohemian borderland train stations (Bodenbach, Tetschen, and Voitersreuth), implemented borderland cholera checkpoints at these stations, and discussed changing the Leipzig registration station into a control station by adding bathing and disinfectant facilities. Eventually the steamship companies and German authorities chose not to convert the

[50] StAB: 3-A 4 Nr 289, report to the Senate of Bremen and the Senate of Hamburg, 20 June 1906.

[51] HStAD, MdI 11731: 28.

station as they acknowledged bathing did little to prevent the spread of cholera. Shipping companies also worried that a control station at Leipzig would cost extra money and turn away customers.

The fourth chapter stretches the history of eastern European transmigration through World War I until the Quota Act of 1924. Most transmigration studies quite understandably end with 1914 as mass overseas European emigration halted and never quite recovered its previous numbers. To prevent military youth from leaving during the war the passport, transit visa, and destination visa became a necessity for eastern and southeastern Europeans to cross Germany. Passports continued after World War I as newly formed nation-states protected their national identities and economies.[52] Instead of giving a strong travel referral, police now arrested transmigrants trying to cross the Saxon-Bohemian border. However, there were similarities between transmigration control before and after the war. For example, postwar passports and visas procured through consulates were similar to the shipping tickets or proof of money the Saxon-Bohemian border checkpoints and later the Leipzig registration station. Each set of documents could both "facilitate and block certain kinds of mobility."[53] This chapter thus seeks to bridge migration policies within Europe before and after the Great War, acknowledging both differences (i.e., the WWI-induced universal requirement of passports) and parallels (i.e., the need for some sort of documentation).

This dissertation seeks to bring to light a vastly under-researched area of migration history: the journey itself. While eastern European transmigrants' passage through Saxony

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[52] John Torpey, "Birth of the Modern Passport System," in *Documenting Individual Identity: The Development of State Practices in the Modern World*, ed. Jane Caplan and John Torpey (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001), 269.

[53] McKeown, *Melancholy Order*, 3.

normally only lasted hours, their experience says much about the political, economic, and social conditions of the world between 1900 and 1924. Research on transmigration also allows for comparative study of migrant inspection stations: from the German checkpoints, to harbor city barracks, to the immigrant station Ellis Island. Many purposes and mechanisms behind migrant inspection and registration transcend historical eras and even continue into today.

Chapter 1: Border Business: Shipping Competition at a Local Level

During the height of eastern European transatlantic emigration (1880-1914) British and continental steamship lines courted millions of Austro-Hungarian and Russian customers. Shipping companies set up a network of agencies and agents across Europe to promote their lines and spurred waves of eastern European transmigration to northern European harbor cities. Because slashing ticket prices to attract customers proved economically risky, by 1900 shipping companies had instead tentatively agreed upon market shares, or percentages of the emigrant market.[54] The continental lines found border control an effective method to enforce these market shares (or sometimes increase their own) as migrants travelled across Europe. These eastern European transmigrants would only be allowed passage through Germany if they had valid shipping line tickets or presented sufficient cash in hand to prove they could afford the journey.

This chapter investigates the intersections between business and the state in regard to the process of transmigration especially as competition between shipping companies and their economic forces affected state policy toward transmigrants in the German province of Saxony. Moreover, under the economically protectionist cooperation of the German state, its two domestic steamship lines, Hamburg-Amerika (HAPAG) and Norddeutscher Lloyd (NDL), received competitive advantages over foreign lines. This chapter argues that the transmigrant control on the Saxon-Bohemian border and registration station in Leipzig was pushed by German shipping lines to tighten their grip on the eastern European market. With the station the German companies wanted to prevent competing companies from encouraging their customers to use routes through Saxony to circumnavigate Prussian controls. German states supported and

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[54] Drew Keeling, *The Business of Transatlantic Migration between Europe and the United States, 1900-1914* (Zürich: Chronos Verlag, 2012), 17.

justified this control system as a means to prevent impoverished transmigrants from falling to the care of local municipalities, in addition to health reasons.

This chapter begins with an overview of the "emigration enterprise" of transatlantic shipping companies and the methods they used to attract eastern and southeastern Europeans to northern harbors before 1903.[55] Agents and agencies for the main continental lines HAPAG, NDL, Holland-Amerika Lijn (HAL), and Red Star Line (RSL) encouraged Austro-Hungarians to take well-traveled railways to steamships in northern harbors: respectively in order of importance Bremen, Hamburg, Antwerp and Rotterdam. These trains inevitably approached state boundaries. The second section of this chapter looks at transmigrant crossing of the Saxon-Bohemian border and how German shipping companies encouraged state officials to enforce border controls and grant privileges to customers of their lines. Saxon officials made allowances for emigrants sponsored by religious charities, though German shipping companies suspected competing lines used the organizations as a ruse to send their passengers unimpeded through Saxony. Lastly, German shipping companies, in attempt to stop competitors' customers traveling through the Saxon city of Leipzig, opened a transmigrant registration station at the railway hub in 1904. For the first year that the registration station was in operation, police at train stations on the Saxon-Bohemian border directed migrants toward Leipzig, where steamship agents would screen and register them.

Emigration Enterprise

During the age of transatlantic migration from Europe in the 19th and 20th centuries, shipping company agencies and migrant agents represented and promoted their respective lines

[55] Dr. Bernhard Karlsberg, *Geschichte und Bedeutung der deutschen Durchwandererkontrolle* (Hamburg : Gebrüder Enoch, 1922), 109.

at various travel points throughout Europe.[56] Steamship posters boasting "Hamburg-Australia" or "New York-Liverpool" lined railroad stations and agencies in countries where the steamship lines had governmental allowance. The agent-network distributed flyers and pamphlets extolling the speed and convenience of their employer's steamships. As transmigrants arrived at major traveling hubs, shipping company agents immediately approached the travelers to either convince them to take certain lines, to guide their customers to the appropriate trains or, if late in the day, to lead them to their overnight hostels, also run by the respective steamship company.

While many earlier transmigrants had traveled via Prague, by the early 20th century Vienna had become a major center for emigrants from eastern and southeastern Europe.[57] Hamburg police inspector Kiliszewski (first name is heretofore unknown) reported that "in no other place in the world can more shipping companies be represented."[58] Vienna, like Leipzig, was a major railway hub and connected lines from across the Austro-Hungarian Empire. In the novel *Peter Menikoff*, the titular young Bulgarian emigrant visits the steamship agency office once he arrives in Vienna. Hoping someone at the office can speak Bulgarian, Menikoff buys his ticket to America from an agent's window with the help of a sister and brother who could speak German to the agent and Russian to him.[59] Aside from buying steamships tickets at agencies in cities or towns, transmigrants had the option of purchasing a prepaid ticket from an individual

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[56] Thank you to Alison Frank Johnson for advising me on this section.

[57] Report by police inspector Kiliszewski, StAH, Auswanderungsamt I, II EI 1b, Teil 2 von 2, pg 366.

[58] StAH , Auswanderungsamt I, II EI 1b, Teil 2 von 2, pg 450.

[59] Peter D Yankoff, *Peter Menikoff* (Nashville, Tenn: Cokesbury Press, 1928), 131. As an autobiographical novel. *Menikoff's* events are purportedly based on the life experiences of the author, also an emigrant from Bulgaria.

agent or receiving one from friends and relatives in the New World. The transmigrant could then exchange this voucher for the actual ticket at the departure port city.[60]

Cautionary tales involving deceptive agents and credulous emigrants bilked of their money transmigrants were widespread and sometimes rightly so, yet agents also aided customers along the journey, guiding them through unfamiliar lands and languages and helping them navigate border regulations. While such controls could be a hindrance, they also lent a certain amount of security. Transmigrants traveling well-worn routes sometimes felt a sense of solidarity with other emigrants who were undergoing the same process. In another passage from *Peter Menikoff* Peter travels with the emigrant Hasse, the sister who had helped him at the Vienna office, until they lose each other in the crowds in Leipzig (never fear, they see each other again years later in America).[61] Additionally, many transmigrants had been forewarned, either by relatives already in America who had already run the transatlantic gauntlet or from agents of their respective shipping line, of the presence of potential con men along the way.

Travel agents representing non-Austro-Hungarian ports campaigned heavily in the empire's provinces, despite disapproval from Austrian authorities. For example, the travel agency of Friedrich Missler in Bremen surreptitiously worked for years to convince 200,000 Austro-Hungarians annually to sail with NDL, HAL, and RSL.[62] Missler had established such an influential persona in Russia and Austria-Hungary that advertising sometimes simply

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[60] Torsten Feys, *The Battle for the Migrants: The Introduction of Steamshipping on the North Atlantic and its Impact on the European Exodus* (St. John's, Nfld.: International Maritime Economic History Association, 2013), 73.

[61] Yankoff, *Peter Menikoff*, 131.

[62] Gunther Peck, "Feminizing White Slavery in the United States," in *Workers Across the Americas: The Transnational Turn in Labor History*, ed. Leon Fink (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 227. Though a few authors have referred to F. Missler's surname as "Frank," most primary sources assert it is "Friedrich."

displayed just his picture and name to attract customers. This proved especially useful if ads were not allowed to mention the non-sanctioned shipping line.[63] Missler courted Austro-Hungarian customers through local "sub-agents," recruited from or disguised under the occupations "clerks, teachers, and local priests."[64] As Torsten Feys points out, this recruitment method proved effective as potential migrants gave credence to these locals as opposed to an unknown stranger who advertised travel and jobs in the New World.[65] The agents for German steamship companies proved effective. Even with the option of twelve different European ports, 1,294,687 out of 2,038,233 Hungarian overseas emigrants during the age of mass migration departed from Hamburg or Bremen.[66]

Eastern Europeans destined for the Americas usually began their journey with a cart ride to the nearest town or city with a train depot (into the 20th century, railway depots became increasingly common across Europe). For example, the Galician emigrant Josef Kozlowski paid a wagoner 4 kronen to take him from the small town Podhajce and transport him 24 km to the nearest train station at Potutory.[67] From the train station transmigrants would buy tickets to the end of the railway line (usually a major railway hub such as Vienna or a border town), where they would buy another rail ticket to continue their journey. Some emigrants traveled via third class. Others traveled on special emigrant trains or fourth-class railcars that separated the

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[63] United States, Senate, 61st Cong., 2nd sess., Immigrant Commission (Dillingham Commission, DC), *Reports* (41 vols., Washington DC, 1911), IV, 98.

[64] Peck, "Feminizing White Slavery," 227.

[65] Feys, *Battle for the Migrants*, 81.

[66] Thank you to William Klinger for sending me his paper "Cunard's Adriatic Operation: the Fiume-New York Route (1904 – 1914)," Paper presented at the Workshop:"Migration im späten Habsburger-Imperium," *Universität Tübingen*, December 13th-15th, 2013, 9.

[67] Kozlowski's testimony sworn at Cunard offices in Liverpool, HStAD, MdI 11731: 109.

migrants from the rest of the passengers. Transmigrants were usually not permitted to enter Germany via waterway, but some instances still occurred. Agent Robert Watchorn from the United States Industrial Commission reported that a number of Russian Jews had been smuggled via steamship into the city of Stettin ("Szczecin" in Polish) to emigrate via Bremen[68]

The Saxon-Bohemian Border

The mid-nineteenth century saw mass migrations mainly from Northern Europe (e.g., Ireland, England, Germany), yet some eastern Europeans made their way across the Saxon-Austrian border en route to the Americas. In May 1866 the Bohemian emigrant Peter Šafařík sent to his cousin Jakub in Dayton, Ohio, a letter describing his journey from Bohemia, through Bremen, and to the United States. Departing by train from Prague, Šafařík first crossed the Bohemian-Saxon border at the town of Bodenbach ("Podmokly" in Czech), where the emigrants stopped to "drink black coffee" and to undergo an inspection (Šafařík did not elaborate on what this entailed). Arriving in Leipzig station in the morning, the emigrants met with an agent, Mr. Stadský, likely of NDL, who took them to a hostel to spend the day until their night train left for Bremen.[69]

Despite the relative freedom of movement for Europeans in late nineteenth century as compared to post-World War I, state border controls played a role in the transmigrant journey. Border regulations on transmigrants had international ties beginning deep within the nineteenth century. The US Steerage Act of 1819 required statistical data of passengers to the United States, not to prevent foreigners from becoming a responsibility of the state but to prevent merchants

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[68] US Industrial Commission, *Reports of the Industrial Commission on Immigration* 15 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1901), 687.

[69] Oldřich Kašpar, ed., *Tam za Mořem je Amerika: Dopisy a Vzpomínky Českých Vystěhovalcu do Ameriky v 19. Století* (Praha: Ceskoslovensky spisovatel, 1986), 55.

and shippers from overcrowding and neglecting people in the lower decks.[70] Gradually the American government shifted emphasis to preventing 'undesirable immigrants' and paupers from entering the United States, racially targeting Chinese and eastern European immigrants. In 1891 the United States forced shipping companies to take responsibility for the sending back of undesirable immigrants. Indeed, as the destination of the majority of European emigrants, the United States greatly influenced the transmigration regulations within Germany as the German shipping companies and state wanted to avoid responsibility for those rejected by Ellis Island. Tobias Brinkmann applies Aristide Zolberg's concept of "remote control" of US immigration laws to European emigration control as early as the 1880s.[71]

Prussia, as a transit land for both the outgoing and returning eastern European transmigrants took measures to screen migrants at its eastern border. Prussian authorities had domestic reasons for transmigrant control, as they feared transmigrants without means would become the responsibility of local welfare systems. In 1884 authorities checked transmigrants for money and proof of destination address and, at the Prussian-Russian border, a passport, though often travelers could not afford the latter.[72] Beginning in 1886, the proof of 400 Marks for adults and 100 Marks for children under 10 years took effect on the Silesian-Austrian border.[73] Prussian authorities also wanted to promote the business of German steamship lines. In 1887 authorities would permit border passage without the proof of money if these emigrants had tickets from HAPAG or NDL. This persuaded many transmigrants from eastern and southeastern Europe to

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[70] Karlsberg, *Geschichte und Bedeutung*, 8.

[71] See Tobias Brinkmann, "Why Paul Nathan Attacked Albert Ballin," *Central European History* 43 (2010), 79-83.

[72] Karlsberg, *Geschichte und Bedeutung*, 15.

[73] Ibid., 24.

take German lines over English competitors.[74] These regulations guided German border control until 1892 when a cholera epidemic in Hamburg spurred the creation of control stations to along the Prussian-Russian border, where transmigrants additionally were required to bathe and undergo disinfection, and registration stations along the Prussian-Austrian border.[75]

Transmigrants in Germany sometimes travelled to Antwerp, Rotterdam, or Le Havre but often headed to the major German port cities of Hamburg and Bremen. The two German lines were HAPAG, based in Hamburg, and NDL, based in Bremen. Hamburg-Amerika had gradually become the more common name for its original HAPAG, "Hamburg-Amerikanische-Packetfahrt-Aktien-Gesellschaft" or, as people sometimes quipped, "Haben alle Passagiere auch Geld?" (Do all passengers also have money?). The "Packet" part of the name came from the original common use of ships to deliver packages and mail across the Atlantic, though this purpose soon faded as migrants began to constitute the primary cargo. "Amerika" in its name had also become a misnomer as the company's shipping routes had expanded worldwide.[76] Albert Ballin ran the Hamburg-Amerika Linie and had much influence on transmigration control through Prussia and dominated the Russian market. NDL, given the prominence of its agents in Austria-Hungary, had the most interest in transmigration from that empire. Saxon authorities thus conducted much of its transmigrant business correspondence with NDL.

As German shipping companies vigorously courted the emigrant market in Austro-Hungary, the number of transmigrants crossing Saxony to reach harbor cities increased exponentially. Bernhard Karlsberg claimed that in 1886 approximately 4000 Austrian

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[74] Ibid., 27.

[75] Ibid., 45-46.

[76] D. Haek, *Der Geschäftsreisende: Handbuch für deutsche Geschäftsreisende im Deutschen Reiche und im Auslande* (Berlin: Druck und Verlag von C. Regenhardt, 1906), 3.

transmigrants traveled through Saxony, though transmigration increased for that province as well as in Prussia, thus making it difficult to ascertain if these Austrians were merely avoiding Prussian border checks. In 1888 Saxony began enforcing the same regulations as those in place on the Prussian border.[77] After Prussian control stations appeared in 1894, German authorities feared even more that people were circumnavigating the Prussian controls by traveling through Saxony. According a report from the Saxon Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Saxon Ministry of the Interior, in 1901 a total of 37,000 transmigrants took the route of Tetschen-Dresden-Leipzig and in 1902 the numbers grew even more, to 48,000 transmigrants.[78]

Even with regulations on transmigrants, the Saxon border was quite permeable, especially for solitary travelers. The Slovenian emigrant Tony Pletsetz of the novel *Two Worlds* crossed the Saxon-Austrian border in 1900 on his way to Bremen:

> This was the most difficult part of the journey. The boundary must be crossed. Will it work? Tony tried composure and equilibrium amidst his fright.
>
> The train stopped at the boundary between Austria and Germany; all the passengers must detrain. The end of the railway line. The next station would be at the end of the other side of the bridge, in Germany. On the bridge, the guard. A large group of tourists mostly students, set out to cross. Tony fell in with these young, carefree, jocular people, and swung along. He was empty-handed, and looked straight ahead courageously, laughing lightly. He was one of them. He crossed the boundary as easily as buying himself a box of matches for a Kreutzer at the tobacconist's.
>
> And when he sat down in the train compartment on the other side of the boundary, lightened from worry by a hundredweight, he was surprised at having been so afraid of the boundary. By God's will, how easy it is to slip over! Would that it'll be that easy to get rich in America…[79]

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[77] Karlsberg, *Geschichte und Bedeutung*, 32.

[78] HStAD, MdI 11731: 21.

[79] Ivan Molek, *Two Worlds*, trans. Mary Molek (Dover, Del.: M. Molek, Inc., 1977), no page numbers.

Pletsetz crosses the border easily, partly due to his concealment among tourists but also because the Saxon-Bohemian border was, in comparison to the Prussian-Russian border, still fairly easy to cross. Pletsetz had initially feared crossing from Austria because of his military age but found, like many other young male Austro-Hungarian citizens, that the Saxon-Bohemian border gendarmes had difficulty differentiating them from everyday cross-border laborers and tourists or just did not care. As a result of this ease, some Russian emigrants avoided passing through the Prussian-Russian border and instead passed through Saxony, causing a "stretching" of Russian traffic into Saxony.[80]

Beginning in 1900, Romanian Jews began crossing Saxony to reach northern European harbor cities and concerns of migrant patronage arose. Severely oppressed within their homeland, many Romanian Jews looked to migration to alleviate their circumstances. As the Austro-Hungarian and German Empires hesitated to take on the impoverished Romanians, the refugees chose to migrate overseas, encouraged by American and Canadian Jewish charitable organizations.[81] The sponsors needed to ensure that the Romanian Jews could complete the journey to the Americas because the once the refugees left, Romania would not allow them to return.[82] A 1900 charitable organization conference decided that the Israelitische Allianz in Vienna would take the reins in organizing Romanian Jewish transmigration from Romania to Hamburg or Rotterdam. Another Jewish charity, the Alliance Israelite Universelle, covered the transatlantic shipping to the United States. Despite the international cooperation between charitable organizations, the Saxon-Bohemian border, with its requirements of proof of money or

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[80] HStAD, MdI 11731: 21.

[81] Björn Siegel, *Österreichisches Judentum zwischen Ost und West: Die Israelitische Allianz zu Wien 1873-1938* (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 2010), 191.

[82] Ibid., 194.

German shipping tickets initially proved a hindrance for Romanian travelers, who oftentimes had neither.[83] Jewish charitable organizations, though frequently bound within the parameters of the state, cooperated on a transnational level in order to mitigate the flow of Jewish migrants across borders and the Atlantic. Tobias Brinkmann illustrates describes these charities as precursors to present-day NGOs.[84] From the Iraelitische Allianz in Vienna to the Jews' Temporary Shelter in London to receiving charities in the United States and Canada, these charities united to ensure Jewish travelers would complete the journey and avoid burdening local governments.[85]

The Saxon-Bohemian borderland became a problem area for nation-based charitable organizations that hoped to sponsor eastern European transmigrants across borders. In 1900 the Israelite Allianz in Vienna had successfully sponsored Romanian Jews crossing the Austro-Hungarian Empire and thus had permission to continue this patronage in 1901.[86] However, the legal power of the charity remained tied to the Austro-Hungarian state and had little jurisdiction within Germany. In 1901 the Israelite Allianz in Vienna contacted the German Central Committee for Russian Jews, hoping that the latter organization would sponsor Romanian Jews who crossed into Saxony.[87] A Ministry of the Interior representative in Berlin worried that the foreign Allianz may not be able or would not cover "contentious cases" of Romanian

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[83] Ibid., 197.

[84] Brinkmann, "Paul Nathan," 51.

[85] Klaus Weber, "Transmigrants between Legal Restrictions and Private Charity: The Jews' Temporary Shelter in London, 1885-1939," in *Points of Passage: Jewish Transmigrants from Eastern Europe in Scandinavia, Germany, and Britain 1880-1914*, ed. Tobias Brinkmann (New York: Berghahn Books, 2013), 91.

[86] Verbal note from Austro-Hungarian embassy in Berlin to the Imperial German Foreign Office in Berlin, HStAD, MdI 11731: 10.

[87] Note from the Foreign Office in Berlin to the Saxon Ministry of Foreign Affairs, HStAD, MdI 11731: 9.

transmigrants within Germany and asked whether the German Central Committee for Russian Jews would apply coverage for the Romanians in Germany.[88] As of December 1902 the Austrian Ministry of the Exterior had no word whether the two charities had come to any sort of agreement.[89] Eventually, Saxon authorities began to recognize the Allianz's patronage and allowed Romanian Jews traveling under the organization to pass through without German shipping tickets or the financial requirements. Catholic charities never reached the financial extent or involvement of Jewish charities in regard to the control and registration stations.[90] In 1909 the Austrian Catholic charity St. Raphael's Verein published a on a "study trip to Leipzig, Bremen, Hamburg, Rotterdam, and Antwerp" by an Austrian police commissioner.[91] The investigation aimed to inspect the protection measures Austro-Hungarian transmigrants needed while traveling through Europe. Thus, a form of welfare patronage beyond the state existed during the early 20th-century as shipping lines took financial responsibility for ticketholders and religious charities sponsored many Jewish and Catholic travelers.[92]

Emigration from eastern Europe became the main source of revenue of German steamship companies after 1900. Agents enticed potential customers in the various provinces. Railroads to Hamburg and Bremen were generally extensive and in some cases faster than geographically closer ports. Lastly, northern European ports had well-established routes and ready-made infrastructure on their side. The great British, Irish, German, and Scandinavian

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[88] Letter to Ministry of Foreign Affairs (presumably Saxon), HStAD, MdI 11731: 13.
[89] Note, HStAD, MdI 11731: 19.

[90] Brinkmann, "Paul Nathan," 68.

[91] StAH Auswanderungsamt I, II F 3, Akte betr. St. Raphaels-Verein zum Schutze katholischer Auswanderer, *St. Raphaels-Blatt: Organ des St. Raphaels-Vereins zum Schutze katholischer deutscher Auswanderer, E.V.*, pg. 233.

[92] Thank you to Nathan Wood for suggesting this idea.

migrations of the early to mid-nineteenth century had made Hamburg, Bremen, Rotterdam, Antwerp, Liverpool and other northern harbors popular departure points. When emigration from those countries subsided due to industrialization, the English and continental shipping companies looked to eastern Europe to fill its boats and had the capital weight and infrastructure from earlier emigration waves to attract migrants to their harbors.

Enforcing Market Shares at a Local Level

In the early 20th century until World War I, the four largest steamship companies controlling transatlantic European emigrant traffic were the UK-based Cunard and White Star Lines and the German-based HAPAG and NDL lines.[93] Before 1900 steamship companies had reacted to competition by slashing ticket prices, yet as Drew Keeling argues, dropping ticket prices proved a risky venture. If shipping companies cut prices during a recession, the companies risked losing even more money because emigrants "were reluctant to move from Europe to America during recessionary periods of low labor demand" and would not respond to the price decrease anyway.[94] Instead, around 1890 shipping companies began to agree upon market sharing instead of rate wars to maintain business. They formed various alliances accordingly but split mostly as continental and UK-based lines. The Norddeutscher Dampfer Linien Verband (North Atlantic Steamship Line Association) or NDLV, formed in 1892, consisted of the continental-based lines HAPAG, NDL, RSL, and HAL. In 1896 the NDLV reached a somewhat steady agreement of market sharing with UK-based lines. The NDLV would court the continental and Mediterranean emigrant market while the UK-lines targeted the British and

[93] Keeling, *Business of Transatlantic Migration*, 17.

[94] Ibid., 64.

Scandinavian domains.[95] The British conference was allowed a small percentage of the other continental passenger market, which meant some eastern Europeans purchased UK-line tickets (via Liverpool) and departed on steamships from Rotterdam.

German authorities became concerned about unscreened transmigrants slipping past Prussian control stations via Leipzig, not only because the travelers could pose a health threat and fall burden to the state, but also because competing steamship lines had found an alternate route to send customers. In 1903, a number of emigrants were stopped at the Holland border and sent back into Prussia for not having proper tickets. These Russian and Galician transmigrants had very little money to support themselves during this unforeseen interruption of their journey.[96] On 14 October 1903, Count von Dönhoff at the Prussian embassy in Dresden reiterated that these migrants did not have the necessary papers or money to cross into Holland and in turn fell to the charity of the local Prussian districts. He stated that in 1902, 400 transmigrants had been denied entry to Holland at Oldenzaal and stranded in Bentheim, Prussia. When interviewed at the hostels in Bentheim, these transmigrants claimed to have circumnavigated the Prussian control stations via Leipzig. They traveled with lines not concessioned in Germany, and government officials as well as the German shipping companies believed their competition was encouraging its customers to take the Leipzig route.[97]

German shipping lines became increasingly convinced that competing lines used the relatively relaxed border control in Saxony as a way around Prussian border controls. Authorities brainstormed the potential culprits. While the Prussian ministers believed Dutch companies

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[95] Ibid., 98.

[96] Letter from the Ministry of the Interior, Berlin, to Prussian district presidents, HStAD, MdI 11731: 23.

[97] HStAD, MdI 11731: 25.

spurred these travelers without concessioned-line tickets, NDL and HAPAG believed the Beaver Line, a Liverpool-based company, encouraged travel through Leipzig.[98] A 1922 dissertation by Bernhard Karlsberg on eastern European transmigration control reiterated this suspicion:

> [The Beaver Line], which had permission neither in Germany, nor in Austria, nor in Russian to conduct the business of an emigration enterprise, could proceed unhindered from any contractual limitations, after it had turned its back to the existing agreements. It chose Saxony as its main transit province, and it succeeded in sending a great number of passengers chiefly via Antwerp and Rotterdam but also via Hamburg. So this company, which was called Bieber-Linie in Germany, expedited 7000 emigrants via Antwerp and Rotterdam between January 1st and November 1902. Naturally, the North Atlantic Steamship Line Association heavily fought this outsider line.[99]

To avoid having their own borderland regulations undermined, Prussian authorities put further pressure on Saxon officials to not accept tickets outside the cartel. Count von Dönhoff at the Prussian embassy in Dresden reminded the Saxon Minster of the Interior von Metzsch that the Prussian border regulations had also applied to Saxony and that provincial officials should not accept non-concessioned tickets for passage.[100]

In addition to customers of the suspected Beaver Line, customers of the English company Cunard Line sometimes went through Saxony to circumnavigate the ticket requirements of the Prussian control stations. The Galician emigrant Josef Kozlowski was one such case. In February 1903 Kozlowski initially attempted to pass through Prussia with his Cunard ticket, bound from Bremen via Liverpool to New York. Agents and constables denied him further passage at the control station in Ruhleben, and Kozlowski was detained for several days at his own expense. He sent his Cunard-line ticket to the NDL Office in Bremen as proof that he was associated with a

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[98] Letter from Ministry of the Interior, Berlin, to Foreign Office, Berlin, GStA PK, I. HA Rep. 77 Ministerium des Innern, Tit. 226 Nr. 124 Bd. 15, pg. 110.

[99] Karlsberg, *Geschichte und Bedeutung*, 109.

[100] HStAD, MdI 11731: 25-26.

steamship company, but the office, which was in competition with the English line, returned it.[101] Sent back to the Prussian-Austrian border, Kozlowski arrived at Oswiecim ("Auschwitz" in German), where a police commissioner (or perhaps in actuality an agent for a competing line) advised him to go through Germany via Leipzig instead. From Leipzig, Kozlowski bought a train ticket to Bremen without further trouble but with only two Marks left in his pocket.[102]

Marcus Braun, an immigration inspector sent by the United States in spring 1903 to investigate emigration conditions in Europe, reported on the circumnavigation of Prussian emigrant stations via Saxony. At the Austrian-German border train depot of Oderberg ("Bohumín" in Czech), Braun encountered "a crying emigrant with his wife and seven children."[103] The emigrant, Johann Büchler. had received from a HAPAG agent in Odessa (part of Russia at the time) a receipt that he had paid steamship tickets and transportation from Hamburg to Halifax in Canada to North Dakota, where his brother waited. After spending 200 rubles for the train from Odessa, the Büchler family was rejected by police and steamship agents at the Ratibor emigrant station and sent back into Austria. Why they were not accepted is not entirely clear. Braun believed that a NDL agent was responsible, which hinted at a border rivalry between the two German steamship companies. An acquaintance of Braun, an Austrian police detective named Goetz, added that migrants needed to pay 10 florins to agents at Ratibor. Goetz informed Braun that agents at Ratibor had frequently denied migrants travelling via Hamburg and sent them back across the German-Austrian border. The rejected transmigrants such as the

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[101] From district president of Potsdam to Ministry of the Interior, Berlin, GStA PK, I. HA Rep. 77 Ministerium des Innern, Tit. 226 Nr. 124 Bd. 17, pg. 22.

[102] Testimony of Kozlowski at Cunard in Liverpool, HStAD, MdI 11731: 109-110.

[103] IHRC. Microfilm of *Records of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, Series A: Subject Correspondence Files, Part 4: European Investigations, 1898-1936*, ed. Alan Kraut (Bethesda, MD: University Publications of America, 1997), reel 7, pg. 72.

Büchler family instead took an alternative route from Prague across the Saxon-Bohemian to Hamburg. Braun believed the Odessan emigrants would now complete their journey unhindered[104]

Given the overwhelming majority of emigrants came from eastern Europe at the beginning of the 20th century, the UK lines, especially Cunard, found the division of the market, with NDLV claiming continental emigrants, lopsided in NDLV's favor. Tensions increased as Cunard avoided working with the International Mercantile Marine Company (IMM), the financier JP Morgan's attempt at putting an American foothold on the steamship market. Many other steamship companies, except Cunard, joined or cooperated with the trust. The historian David Haek argued in 1905 that the Morgan-Trust shafted Cunard as the Morgan-Trust felt the English company was too small, but given the trust had tried courting Cunard, this assessment seems unlikely. [105] More likely, British patriots felt uncomfortable relinquishing Cunard's shipping to American control and the British government subsidized the company as a result.[106] By June 1903 Cunard had broken away from "both the British and the UK-NDLV conference pacts" and no longer had to adhere to the agreed upon market shares of passengers from Britain or the continent. [107] The company set into motion plans that would shift the playing field of the steamship market.

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[104] Ibid., pg. 72-73.

[105] D. Haek, *Der Geschäftsreisende*, 40.

[106] Most historians take this stance: for example, see Gerhard A. Ritter, "The Kaiser and His Ship Owner," in *Business in the Age of Extremes: Essays in Modern German and Austrian Economic History*, ed. Hartmutt Berghoff et al. (Washington, D.C.: German Historical Institute; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 23.

[107] Keeling, *Business of Transatlantic Migration*, 95.

In early 1903 Hermann Friedrich Hans von Budde from the Ministry of Public Works, Berlin, lamented that Cunard planned to take over and promote migrant shipping from the Mediterranean port of Fiume ("Rijeka" in Croatian), part of Hungarian lands.[108] The Hungarian politician Baron Lajos Lévay orchestrated plans to create a direct line from Fiume to New York. Ironically a turn to economic protectionism had Hungary look to a foreign company to create the steamship connection. Hungary had initially asked the German steamship lines, but the companies did not want to divert part of their business to a Mediterranean port.[109] Though a local agency, Adria Limited, fronted the venture, in reality the much more powerful Cunard provided the steamships [110] This opening of the Fiume-New York line would take a sizeable chunk of the Austro-Hungarian emigrant market away from German railroads and shipping lines.[111] By late October 1903 Cunard had commenced its New York service from Fiume. The Hungarian government and Cunard reached an agreement by March 1904 and enforced a law that for each emigrant shipped, Cunard paid 10 crowns to the Emigrants' Fund, a program that provided patronage to Hungarians abroad. A similar deal in 1903 occurred between Cunard and the Austrian government in regard to the port of Trieste.[112] By 17 March 1904, Hungary and Cunard had brokered a deal where Cunard had "exclusive rights to Hungarian passengers departing from

[108] HStAD, MdI 11731: 22.

[109] Feys, *Battle for the Migrants*, 170.

[110] Klinger, "Cunard's Adriatic Operation," 10.

[111] Keeling, *Business of Transatlantic Migration*, 99.

[112] Klinger, "Cunard's Adriatic Operation," 12.

these two ports."[113] In return the government needed to ensure at least 30,000 passengers for Cunard each year or pay 100 crowns for every passenger fewer.[114]

For a government that ostensibly feared the loss of its population and had ambivalent feelings toward emigration, the deal with Cunard for a steamship line to New York seemed on the surface juxtaposition. For example, if relatives in America or American agents mailed prepaid tickets to Austro-Hungarians, authorities would sometimes screen mail for steamship tickets.[115]As Tara Zahra argues, the many Austro-Hungarian politicians and activists feared their citizens would face exploitative, dangerous working conditions in the New World or that emigrant women would be forced into brothels. They also feared that the flight of people would be seen as a result of poor socio-economic conditions within imperial territories.[116] After 1903, Austro-Hungarian the government preferred emigrants to leave from their own port of Fiume if at all. The reasoning behind the policy was multifold. If imperial citizens were determined to emigrate overseas, the Austro-Hungarian railways, inns, and harbors could at least profit. By encouraging emigration through its own port, the imperial government could loosen the ties that foreign agents (especially from NDL) held in its provinces. Also, authorities wanted to keep track of young men for potential military service and could screen them at the port. In the novel *Two Worlds*, just before the Slovenian emigrant Tony Pletsetz begins his journey by rail to the port of Bremen, a friend suggests that he buy a return-ticket for show while traveling along a

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[113] Keeling, *Business of Transatlantic Migration*, 99.

[114] Klinger, "Cunard's Adriatic Operation," 13.

[115] Feys, *Battle for the Migrants*, 90.

[116] Tara Zahra, "Travel Agents on Trial: Policing Mobility in East Central Europe, 1889-1989," *Past & Present* 223, no. 1 (2014): 169.

heavily patrolled route. In this way authorities on the lookout for "boys of military age running away" would assume Pletsetz was making a short round trip and not travelling to America.[117]

Though Cunard campaigned for the New York connection in the Mediterranean, it still sent customers through Germany while the company negotiated the Fiume-New York line. Austro-Hungarians had a number of reasons for choosing northern ports over Mediterranean ports. As Nicole M. Phelps points out, the Austro-Hungarian ports "were located far to the south of the empire" and Bohemians, Galicians, and Austrians looked to the more accessible northern ports, despite the presence of border controls.[118] The transoceanic journey from Trieste or Fiume to the Americas took much longer than from northern ports (17 days as opposed to 10 days).[119] Tickets from Austria-Hungary were generally more expensive as well, partly due to the added fees of Emigrants Fund and Adria, the local agency for Cunard.[120] The facilities at Mediterranean ports were also underdeveloped, and receiving countries such as the United States feared that emigrants from Fiume were not as well screened as those departing from northern Europe.[121] The northern European port cities had reputation and longevity on their side, so while Cunard developed a line from the Adriatic, it continued to persuade eastern Europeans to travel through Germany, particularly through the less-guarded Saxony, and on to Rotterdam. Phelps estimates that "approximately 20,000 people emigrated through Fiume in the period between 1903 and

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[117] Ivan Molek, *Two Worlds*, no page numbers.

[118] Nicole M. Phelps, *US-Habsburg Relations from 1815 to the Paris Peace Conference: Sovereignty Transformed* (New York: Cambridge University Press 2013), 119.

[119] Thanks to Tara Zahra for advising me on this section.

[120] Klinger, "Cunard's Adriatic Operation," 13.

[121] Brinkmann, " 'Travelling with Ballin,'" 480.

1906."[122] In comparison, 87,166 transmigrants passed through Leipzig onward to northern harbors in 1905 alone.[123]

If German shipping companies could not control how Cunard conducted business outside of German borders, they could try to do so within their state's boundaries. NDL and HAPAG turned attention to the traffic of Cunard customers who were crossing Germany to reach Rotterdam and Antwerp, particularly Austro-Hungarian and Russian citizens traveling unchecked through the province of Saxony. Thus, under the pressure of the German shipping lines and the Berlin central government, Saxon authorities released an official list of transmigrant regulations to its borderland and municipal police on 22 October 1903. While border control had existed before this date to vacillating degrees, these new official restrictions on transmigrants came in direct response to the Cunard negotiations with Hungary. All transmigrants crossing into Saxony from Austria needed to have either a) shipping tickets from German lines and train tickets to the respective harbor city, b) proof of sponsorship from the "German Central Committee for Russian Jews", or c) proof of financial means by showing 400 Marks for each "healthy and non-criminal" adult and 100 Marks for each child under the age of ten.[124] This last stipulation supposedly proved the migrants without steam-line sponsorship could afford to travel and would not fall burden to the local government.

The Saxon border regulations allowed only German shipping-line tickets and failed to include foreign lines of the NDLV cartel, namely HAL and the RSL. In November 1903 the RSL agent Georg Friedrich Otto, based in Leipzig, asked if the city would excuse passengers of his

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[122] Phelps, *US-Habsburg Relations*, 119.

[123] StAB 4,21—506, 1905 table of emigrants organized by steamship line and province of origin.

[124] HStAD, MdI 11731: 27.

line from the financial requirements.[125] The Belgian delegation in Berlin argued on behalf of the RSL that the Saxon border regulations of 1903 closed passage to customers on their way to sail from Antwerp and that no eastern Europeans could possibly have 400 Marks on hand.[126] Embassies within Saxony wrote to excuse the steamship lines of their respective countries from the regulations. On 8 November 1903, the English embassy in Dresden, representing an English steamship line bought by the Canadian Pacific Railway Company, sent a letter to the Saxon Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The company had received word of the requirements at the Saxon-Austrian border. Similar to the Belgian delegation, the English embassy complained that customers of the Canadian Pacific Railway Company needed to show financial proof. The company claimed that it would take on costs and responsibility for its migrants until Canadian borders and asked that Saxon border authorities honor their tickets the same as the German shipping lines.[127] Interestingly, British newspapers took a stance against the Canadian Pacific Railway as the company had "bought an English shipping line between Liverpool and Canada."[128] The newspapers reflected the nationalistic blowback that could incur from some of these transnational mergers. The Saxon government waited to respond to the English embassy and decided to enforce regulations at Bodenbach "mildly."[129] Albert Ballin recognized the Canadian Pacific Railway could greatly influence traffic to Canada and decided to make a

[125] Letter from Kreishauptmannschaft of Leipzig to the Saxon Ministry of the Interior, HStAD, MdI 11731: 50.

[126] HStAD, MdI 11731: 94.

[127] HStAD, MdI 11731: 33-34.

[128] HStAD, MdI 11731: 35.

[129] HStAD, MaA 1649: Response letter from Saxon MdI, 17 December, 1903, to MaA.

competitor a friend. NDLV and Canadian Pacific reached "a mutual compromise."[130] By March 9th, 1904, customers of the Canadian Pacific Railway could pass through Saxony without the 400 Marks of financial proof.[131]

Embassies of Great Britain and Belgium continuously pressed Saxony to do away with the border regulations from 22 October 1903.[132] Given the protest raised by the British government and shipping companies, Prussian officials in a 16 December 1903 memorandum asked Saxon officials to recognize tickets from foreign, licensed companies as proof of travel.[133] On 18 December 1903, George W. Buchanan of the British embassy in Berlin wrote to Baron von Richthofen that "His Majesty's Government has been called by the Cunard Steamship Company."[134] Buchanan mentioned that emigrants who had traveled with non-concessioned lines such as Cunard needed to pass through Bodenbach on the Saxon-Austrian border, though for many travelers this proved a longer, more expensive, and inconvenient detour. Buchanan pointed out that recently an "Examination Station" had been set up at Bodenbach, which intercepted this traffic.[135] He claimed this stopping of Cunard-line customers was unfair because the German government had given permission for the company to set up an agency in Hamburg for 5000 pounds.[136] He claimed British companies would guarantee return passage for any transmigrants

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[130] Keeling, *Business of Transatlantic Migration*, 115.

[131] HStAD, MaA 1649: Letter from Saxon MdI, 9 March 1904, to Saxon MaA.

[132] HStAD, MdI 11731: 79.

[133] HStAD, MdI 11731: 43.

[134] HStAD, MdI 11731: 89.

[135] HStAD, MdI 11731: 89.

[136] HStAD, MdI 11731: 90.

deemed undesirable at Canadian ports and asked that these customers receive the same treatment as German-line customers at the Saxon border.[137]

The letters and memorandums from foreign embassies to German authorities responsible for border control reflect a European-wide protectionist (government intervention for the sake of businesses within the state) trend, especially in regard to the steamship business. Robert Millward argues that Germany was at the forefront of economic protectionism in Europe from the 1870s into the Weimar Republic.[138] Germany was certainly not alone in wanting to protect its respective businesses: Britain, Belgium, and the Netherlands each had their own economic interests in the migration business. The rise of Germany since its unification in 1871 as a competing industrial power with Britain and Belgium meant Germany held great sway in the European migration market, and Britain felt the need to compete. Much of British policy during the nineteenth century relied on liberalism and a *laissez faire* economy, but liberal philosophy made room for necessary government intervention. "Extensive" British state intervention came later in the century and coincided with the rise of Germany.[139]

The Leipzig Registration Station Opens

The 22 October 1903 regulations on transmigrants crossing the Saxon-Bohemian border proved difficult to enforce. Saxon police attempted to systematically screen transmigrants at several borderland train stations, yet the openness of the facilities, where migrants could hide amongst other travelers or "scatter in the town," coupled with the sheer number of transmigrants

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[137] HStAd, MdI 11731: 90.

[138] Robert Millward, *The State and Business in the Major Powers: An Economic History, 1815-1939* (New York: Routeledge, 2013), 89.

[139] Ibid., 202.

traveling without German steamship tickets made proper screening impossible.[140] On 24 November 1903, HAPAG and NDL suggested the "construction of a registration station" to the Saxon Ministry of the Interior.[141] There steamship company agents would screen the migrants to make sure all requirements were met and steamship agents registered the travelers, any and all responsibility fell to the companies and not the state (or local congregations or aid associations).[142] The steamship companies would then cover any potential costs incurred by transmigrants incurred during their overseas travel: hotels, hospitalization, return trips due to rejection, and even burial costs in the case of death while in transit. Additionally, the German shipping companies would cover emigrants shipping with RSL or HAL, which were part of the NDLV cartel.[143] The Saxon Ministry of the Interior claimed that once the station at Leipzig opened, migration control at the Bohemian-Saxon border stations could be "entirely eliminated."[144] Despite the initiative, German shipping companies proceeded with caution while setting up the Leipzig station. They feared that if border controls became too strict, the English government would provide even more subsidies to English lines to help them against German competition. Their fears had basis as the English parliament had given a sizeable subsidy to the Cunard line, which had made it "a formidable competitor to White Star and German lines."[145]

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[140] Letter from the border police at Bodenbach to the Saxon MdI, HStAD, MdI 11731:30. See chapter 2 for more on police work and transmigration.

[141] HStAD, MdI 11731: 37.

[142] HStAD, MdI 11731:38.

[143] HStAD, MdI 11731:38.

[144] HStAD, MdI 11731: 45.

[145] Keeling, *Business of Transatlantic Migration*, 91.

One of the most glaring questions (raised occasionally by even German officials themselves) was why a registration station for eastern European emigrants was set up in Leipzig, a city far from the Saxon-Bohemian border. Transmigrants would be well within German territory before they were screened. German authorities and the steamship companies justified the decision in a few ways. First, while the Saxon-Austrian border had remarkably fewer miles compared to the Prussian-Russian border, overseas immigrants could still initially cross via train at three main points of entry: Eger ("Cheb" in Czech), Tetschen ("Děčín" in Czech), and Bodenbach. Setting up stations at each of these places outside the Saxon border would have been expensive and a diplomatic hassle as many of the borderland stations, though hosting the beginnings of Saxon railroad lines, were on Austrian territory. German shipping companies chose the migration hub of the Saxon province where these routes crossing from Austria eventually connected. Hamburg police inspector Kiliszewski reported that "Leipzig has always been a large assembly point for travelers to America."[146] NDL, HAPAG, and other shipping companies had representative offices in the city. [147] Transmigrants who had not yet purchased steamship tickets could be inundated in Leipzig by advertising and agents for shipping lines, eager to convert the migrants into customers.

Registration stations, located along German-Austrian borders, were a less stringent variation of their Prussian-Russian border control stations. These borderland checkpoints appeared in 1893 as response to assertions that eastern European, namely Russian, transmigrants had introduced cholera to Hamburg. Prussia temporarily closed its borders to the travelers. Fearing the loss of their lucrative business, HAPAG and NDL proposed a series of control

[146] StAH, Auswanderungsamt I, II EI 1 b, Teil 2 von 2, pg. 430.

[147] StAH, Auswanderungsamt I, II EI 1 b, Teil 2 von 2, pg. 430.

stations along the Prussian-Russian border, which only transmigrants with shipping tickets could pass after undergoing a health inspection, a bath, and disinfection.[148] On the other hand, registration stations appeared along the Prussian-Austrian border in Myslowitz and Ratibor. Unlike control stations, these checkpoints did not conduct bathing and disinfection. Austria had not yet undergone outbreaks of cholera as in Russia, and authorities believed that conditions in Austria-Hungary were more hygienic than in Russia.

Though steamship companies set up control stations on the Prussian-Russian border in 1894 to compromise with the Prussian state on fears of cholera and impecunious transmigrants, the NDL and HAPAG initially constructed the Leipzig station as a way to encourage transmigrants to travel with German steamship lines and their continental partners. Many contemporaries believed Leipzig registration stations arose initially not because of health concerns but mainly because of competition between the continental and UK shipping lines. The Social Democrat representative Hugo Haase argued in the Reichstag that control stations served a purpose during the cholera scare of 1893 but now had the opposite effect as they "crammed together a mass of people" under unhygienic conditions.[149] He argued that the control and registration stations in general had now become machines for German business to monopolize transmigrant traffic.[150]

On February 24th, 1904 the Saxon Ministry of the Interior outlined the logistics of the materializing Leipzig registration station. HAPAG and NDL would cover the costs, including that of a police security guard. The station would screen all overseas-bound emigrants traveling

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[148] Karlsberg, *Geschichte und Bedeutung*, 63.

[149] Report on the 166th sitting on 17 March 1905, HStAD, MdI 11732: 21.

[150] Report on the 166th sitting on 17 March 1905, HStAD, MdI 11732: 21.

from or through Austria into Saxony, and all transmigrants who wanted to travel further needed to have their names in the register. All "healthy" and "unobjectionable" immigrants needed to fulfill the following requirements, which were very similar to the October Saxon-Austrian border regulations: (1) Agents at the station checked for shipping tickets from HAPAG, NDL, or approved partners and train tickets to the harbor. Other ship tickets would only be recognized if the companies guaranteed patronage of their customers; (2) Agents would also recognize sponsorship by the German Central Committee for Russian Jews; (3) If transmigrants could not fulfill the first two regulations, they needed to demonstrate they had 400 Marks per adult and 100 Marks per child, enough to make the journey; (4) Russians needed to display a passport. [151] On 3 March 1904 the Leipzig registration station opened.[152]

At each train station in Leipzig, translators gathered the incoming emigrants and guided them to the registration station.[153] The autobiographical novel *Peter Menikoff* describes the confusion of a Bulgarian emigrant who first encounters the Leipzig registration station. After the train enters the city on a moonlit night, the conductor orders all transmigrants off the train to have their documents examined.[154] The titular character feels simultaneously mesmerized and overwhelmed by the situation:

> […] In whatever direction he turned, he saw nothing else but incoming trains filled to capacity with other fortune seekers like himself.

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[151] HStAD, MdI 11731: 59.

[152] HStAD, MaA 1649: Letter sent from MdI, Dresden, to MaA, 9 March 1904.

[153] StAH, Auswanderungsamt I, II EI 1b, Teil 2 von 2, pg. 431.

[154] Yankoff's claim that authorities split the group into men and women is the only mention of this in regard to the Leipzig station and somewhat questionable. The bathing and disinfecting in the Prussian control stations spurred this separation, yet in Leipzig, the medical examination was superficial. Doctors ushered patients into a separate room if undressing was necessary.

> It seemed that Leipzig was the converging point of every railway in the world, and apparently every emigrant train they controlled made that city their final destination. As soon as he and his fellow travelers arrived and had left their car, they became lost among the surging waves of restless humanity. It was a scene both picturesque and pitiful. Husbands were separated from their wives, children from their parents, and friends from their friends.[155]

The novel paints a particularly bleak, dehumanizing picture of the registration process. While it is difficult to garner how migrants felt about the experience at the time, the unexpectedness of the registration seems likely. During the first months of the station not all sub-agents or agents in the Austro-Hungarian territory had the knowledge or gave forewarning on the new registration station in Leipzig.

The ad hoc structure of the building emigrants encountered reflected the speed that the new stopping point appeared. The Hamburg police commissioner Kiliszewski described the registration station from a bird's eye-view as "an irregular triangle with a broken-off corner."[156] It was a "very provisionally set-up" one-room building with wooden separators for the registration the medical inspections and a break room for the doctors.[157] The building measured about 25 meters long, 15 meters wide, and 3 meters high.[158] Two ovens and a ventilator heated the facility. On 17 March 1904, a Dr. Fraustadt inspected the station for the Saxon government:

> It is located across from the entrance of the departure hall of the Dresdner train station, is very spacious, practically laid out and makes a thoroughly clean impression: good circulation, good heating, sufficient space for the emigrants to sit and put down their luggage, an isolation room for medical inspection. The

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[155] Yankoff, *Peter Menikoff*, 141.

[156] Kiliszewski report, StAH, Auswanderungsamt I, II EI 1b, Teil 2 von 2, pg. 435.

[157] Kiliszewski report, StAH, Auswanderungsamt I, II EI 1b, Teil 2 von 2, pg. 435.

[158] St. Raphael's quarterly brochure, July 1909, StAH, Auswanderungsamt I, II F 3, Akte betr. St. Raphaels-Verein zum Schutze katholischer Auswanderer, pg. 234.

> room for registration is pragmatically partitioned off by a barrier that's only passable by individuals. [159]

The newness of the Leipzig station meant, at least for that time, relatively clean facilities. Once registered, the emigrants could sit upon benches and purchase bread or tea, though unlike in other control stations they could not purchase alcohol.[160] Authorities may have avoided selling alcohol not only to monitor behavior of passengers and prevent them from loitering but to monitor the habits of their own employees as well. US inspectors reported later that the canteen keeper, watchmen and porters at the Myslowitz registration station were intoxicated during their night shifts.[161]

Because of the fear that poor transmigrants could become an economic burden to the state, the screening was class-based. Registration stations dealt with all passengers traveling in *Zwischendeck*, (steerage), the cheapest accommodation aboard steamships.[162] HAPAG, NDL, HAL and RSL all had offices in Leipzig but these mainly took care of their respective passengers traveling in first and second-class cabins. The Leipzig registration station checked only steerage passengers and not upper-class passengers.[163] Much of the time the steamship companies sold the railway and steamship tickets as a package, so authorities could assume steerage passengers would take third or fourth-class rail carriages.

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[159] HStAD, MdI 11731: 81.

[160] Kiliszewski report, StAH, Auswanderungsamt I, II EI 1b, Teil 2 von 2, pg. 435.

[161] United States, Senate, 61st Cong., 3rd sess., Immigrant Commission (Dillingham Commission, DC), *Reports* (41 vols., Washington DC, 1911), XXXVII, 30.

[162] StAH, Auswanderungsamt I, II EI 1b, Teil 2 von 2, pg. 430-431.

[163] StAH, Auswanderungsamt I, II EI 1b, Teil 2 von 2, pg. 430-431.

Initially authorities planned for each shipping company to have an agent at the Leipzig registration station, but after April 8th, 1904, one agent represented HAPAG, NDL, and RSL.[164] Hermann Meyer (whom the Hamburg police commissioner Kiliszewski identified as Jewish) led the station with six assistants. Hamburg officials tended to mention "Jewish" identity whenever steamship employees or emigrants practiced belonged to the religion. This could reflect a strand of anti-Semitism through the *othering* of Jews but also could deflect any accusations that the control system targeted and humiliated particularly Jews, especially when someone of Jewish identity ran the station. Meyer represented HAPAG, NDL, and RSL but supposedly was meant to be impartial. The majority of German-line passengers through Leipzig were associated with NDL.

Once emigrants arrived at the station, Meyer and his assistants asked each "where he wanted to travel and which harbor he wanted to use."[165] Station officials asked the migrants for the proof of tickets or finances, and if the migrant seemed unhealthy, consulted the doctor. At the registration station authorities recorded the first and last name of the travelers, day and year of birth, the city of birth and its province, whether they were married or single, religion, last city and province of residence, and, if any papers were to be had, and a certification from a police bureau (it is unclear whether this meant the bureau from the traveler's home province or from the Saxon bureau).[166] Officials recorded the personal information about the immigrants, keeping one copy at the station and giving the other to the Leipzig city council in order to make sure the

[164] HStAD, MdI 11731: 86.

[165] StAH, Auswanderungsamt I, II EI 1 b, Teil 2 von 2, pg. 432.

[166] Example of registry columns, HStAD, MdI 11732: 18-19.

shipping companies fulfilled their obligations.[167] Once officials entered the immigrant into the register, the German shipping companies became responsible "for all costs" that the immigrant caused "the state, the parish, or the charitable organization" through "maintenance, subsistence, transport, or burial" for "any reason."[168]

The novel *Peter Menikoff* gives an emigrant's perspective of the registration process in 1905, a year after opening of the station:

> The examination of each person and certification of each passport took but a few minutes, because there was a whole army of doctors, nurses, and state officials, and the work was done quickly and with exactness. As each one was examined, that one was let out through a back door, which made the reunion of friends and families a very difficult problem, especially for those who were ignorant of the German language.[169]

The "whole army" of station employees seems exaggerated, and technically only Russian subjects needed to display passports. Despite these errors, the novel captures the speed and efficiency of the registration system in Leipzig. Each emigrant who successfully passed through the registration station received a "legitimation card" with a number matching the entry within the register book, the name of the traveler, family members, date, signature of an NDL or HAPAG shipping agent, and the stamp of the police. This card would prevent authorities along the transmigrant route from stopping them and sending them back to Leipzig to pass through the

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[167] Letter from Saxon MdI to HAPAG and NDL, HStAD, MdI 11731: 59-60.

[168] Letter from Saxon MdI to HAPAG and NDL, HStAD, MdI 11731: 60.

[169] Yankoff, *Peter Menikoff,* 141.

station.[170] The card expired three days after issue to prevent transmigrants from lingering within Germany.[171]

If emigrants were entered into the Leipzig registry but were rejected because of health issues or at any point during the further journey, the German steamship companies would cover the costs of transporting the transmigrants back to their homelands. If emigrants for any reason did not pass the station requirements and were not entered into the registry, they would be transported back to just the Saxon-Austrian border.[172] This occurred in 1905 with a brother and sister named Leopold and Marie Ronbinek who had tickets with the English line Dominion but who did not posses the required 400 Marks. The siblings of "Polish" origin had lived in Vienna for eight years before emigrating to join their sister, Joseffa, who lived in Chicago.[173] Sent back to the Saxon-Bohemian border, the siblings claimed that the borderland station at Bodenbach hosted hundreds of rejected migrants, transported to the German border, abandoned hungry and with no means to return home. Employees at the registration station vehemently denied these accusations and declared that at most they monthly sent back 12-15 out of the 6,000-8,000 transmigrants. In an effort to assuage the Austrian embassy in Saxony, registration station

[170] Letter from HAPAG to Saxon MdI, HStAD, MdI 11731: 70-71.

[171] Example of the transit permit, HStAD, MdI 11731: 83.

[172] HStAD, MdI 11731: unnumbered source, letter from MdI, Dresden, 24. Februar 1904, to the Hamburg-Amerika-Linie in Hamburg and the Norddeutschen Lloyd in Bremen.

[173] National Archives and Records Administration; Washington, D.C.; Manifests of Passengers Arriving at St. Albans, VT, District through Canadian Pacific and Atlantic Ports, 1895-1954; National Archives Microfilm Publication: M1464; Roll: 33; Record Group Title: Records of the Immigration and Naturalization Service; Record Group Number: 85.

employees claimed that most of the rejected migrants were Russian Jews and not Austrian citizens like the Ronbineks.[174]

An employee of the shipping lines guided migrants from the Bayerischer train station on the southern edge of the city center to the Leipzig registration station. A registration official accompanying the migrants on the streetcar collected 20 Heller per person as well as 20 Heller for luggage, which agencies in Trieste, Vienna, etc. sometimes covered. In at least one instance, confusion ensued. A group of 10 Montenegrins, who had passed through the station on June 11th, 1912, complained that they had paid 10 Heller per person for the carrying of their luggage, a "rip off" which they hoped would not occur in the future.[175] The Leipzig official answered the Hamburg Emigration Office that, despite conversing in Serbian with the migrants, they had mentioned nothing at the station and that their guide, Ladislaus Ursic, could not remember if the immigrants "had had luggage and paid something or not." He mentioned it was unlikely that a train station official had "ripped them off" as Ursic solely escorted emigrants to the registration station.[176] A June 20th, 1905, telegram from the registration station to the Business Office in Leipzig stated that they required migrants to take the tram to the station as a fifty-minute window was left for a connecting train at the Berliner train station in Leipzig. The accompanier charged either 20 Heller or 10 Kreutzer per person with an additional 10 Kreutzer for luggage transport. HAPAG and NDL paid for the luggage of passengers from Agram, those from Laibach or Trieste

[174] HStAD, MdI 11732: 70.

[175] StAH, Auswanderungsamt I, II E I 1, pg. 81.

[176] StAH, Auswanderungsamt I, II E I 1, pg. 81-82.

paid for it themselves.[177] A note from the registration station mentioned that firstly, the letter of complaint had mistakenly said 10 Heller instead of 10 Kreuzer and that given the circumstances, the Montenegrins had probably thought that the 10 Kreuzer they paid for streetcar tariff was for luggage transport.[178] It is possible that the Montenegrins from the Trieste area, in hearing how passengers from Agram had their luggage transport paid, assumed the same applied to them and that they had unnecessarily paid 10 Kreuzers each. This situation highlighted how both registration officials and emigrants could become confused by the constant changing of rules. Registration officials saw hundreds of faces a day and, though the register had names, officials had trouble remembering the stories attached with each. Emigrants, despite information given to them by agents in their homeland, encountered various requirements along the way.

Left-leaning political parties found the registration station an instrument of xenophobia and the epitome of capitalistic greed. The Social Democrats in particular did not look kindly upon German steamship companies because HAPAG's director Ballin opposed workers' unions and strikes, although the company took a "paternalistic" approach in providing employee benefits.[179] The *Leipziger Volkszeitung*, a Social Democrat mouthpiece, condemned German steamship agents who preyed upon unsuspecting transmigrants in the city. A Russian-Jewish woman, en route to Rotterdam, was just about to buy a connecting ticket at the Dresdner train station in Leipzig when she was sent to the registration station. There "she fell into the hands of

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[177] StAH, Auswanderungsamt I II E I 1, Die Behörde für das Auswandererwesen Hamburg Akte, betr. Grenzkontrollstationen und Registrierstationen, Auswanderer-Registrier-Station am Dresdner Bahnhof, Telephon No 5474 Telegramm-Adresse: Auswanderung, Leipzig, Leipzig den 20. Juni 1912, an das Gewerbeamt Leipzig, 83a.

[178] Ibid., Auswanderer-Registrier-Station am (crossed out Dresdner) Haupt Bahnhof, Eing. F., Telephon No. 5474, Leipzig den 20 Juni 1912, 84.

[179] Ritter, "The Kaiser and His Ship Owner," 17.

an agent of Ballin," who discerned from private letters that she desired "to travel first to family in London, but if she found no accommodation there, wanted to emigrate to America."[180] Like some transmigrants, instead of taking a direct route from Hamburg or Bremen to the United States, she opted for a less expensive, segmented journey from continental harbors, via English ports to the Americas (imagine the modern equivalent in the oftentimes cheaper alternative of transferring flights instead of flying nonstop).[181] The agent decided to change the tickets' destination to America, and, after taking her last 60 Marks, told her to remain in Leipzig until he finished arranging the tickets. Taken to the NDL and HAPAG guesthouse *Zur Goldenen Sonne*, the woman broke into tears. A businessman took pity on her and both went back to the agent, demanding the return of her money. The agent became offended and acted as if "he had done the woman a favor" by procuring tickets to America.[182] The newspaper mentioned how, supported by the police, the agent could have easily sent the woman back to Russia against her will and scolded police for enabling the agent's scam. With the help of police, the agent acted as if he had "state-approved absolute power."[183]

Steamship agents and government officials at the Leipzig station cracked down on customers of Cunard, the British competitor that had left the cartel agreement. The transmigrant Samuel Bauer and his family from Szatmar, Hungary, passed through the Leipzig registration station a few days after its opening. A translator at the station noticed they had tickets with Cunard and demanded that Bauer pay 80 Kronen for a ticket with HAPAG or be sent back to his

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[180] HStAD, MdI 11731: 184.

[181] Weber, "Transmigrants between Legal Restrictions and Private Charity", 85-86.

[182] HStAD, MdI 11731: 184.

[183] HStAD, MdI 11731: 184.

homeland. Bauer acquiesced and the translator gave him receipt, so the migrant could obtain a refund once in Hamburg. HAPAG and the Emigration Office in Hamburg refused to refund the 80 Kronen but took the receipt. When Bauer reached Liverpool, he filed a complaint through Cunard. The HAPAG office had no record of Bauer's transaction at the registration station but the company later agreed to pay if Bauer had his receipt.[184] The city council of Leipzig confirmed that Bauer payed 80 Kronen to HAPAG at the registration station, though given the chaos surrounding the opening days of the station, had no details.[185]

German shipping companies feared that Cunard used Jewish charitable organizations as a guise to pass customers through the Leipzig registration station. On 12 August 1904, the NDL representative Syndikus Ortwein wrote to the Saxon Ministry of the Interior that Allianz Jews had been passing through the Leipzig registration station and were traveling to Rotterdam to sail with its competitor, Cunard Lines. Ortwein claimed that German shipping companies lost 77 Allianz Jews to the English company in one day because of Leipzig's allowances.[186] He asked if authorities could only accept German steamship tickets from the Alliance Jews, a stipulation he believed already existed.[187] Saxon officials began halting Allianz Jewish transmigrants with non-German tickets. On 25 August 1904, the Allianz in Vienna sent a telegram demanding to know why groups of emigrants headed to Rotterdam with "legitimate cards" had been stopped.[188] On the same day the Montefiore Verein, a Jewish charitable organization in Rotterdam, sent a

[184] HStAD, MdI 11731: 115.

[185] HStAD, MdI 11731: 117.

[186] HStAD, MdI 11731: 176-177.

[187] HStAD, MdI 11731: 177.

[188] HStAD, MdI 11731: 179.

telegram to Dresden and demanded that "the poor Romanian emigrants," who were sent back to the Saxon-Bohemian border be allowed to continue their journey.[189] Ortwein from NDL wrote to Berlin with skepticism "that clever agents….bring their illegal passengers through Germany under the flag of this Jewish charity."[190] The tension between the German shipping companies and the charity continued, though eventually the Allianz switched to telling its passengers to sail with the German ally Red-Star Line.[191]

The heated messages from North German Lloyd reflected the tense North Atlantic fare war of 1904 that had hit a high point in the summer. As aforementioned, steamship companies until early 1904 maintained passenger quotas through market shares and avoided attracting customers through reduced fares. However, Cunard's maverick attempts to attract continental customers prompted NDLV and its affiliates to reduce fares in some regions.[192] German shipping companies also put even more pressure on the registration station officials and Saxon police (see chapter 2) to prevent Cunard customers from avoiding transmigrant controls.

The Case of Harry Cohen

In late summer 1905, a number of Russian transmigrants passed through Leipzig (sometimes even sent back from Gera, Erfurt or Kassel) and were found carrying flyers that read "Leipzig closed."[193] This implied that the registration station, due to an illness outbreak, had

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[189] HStAD, MdI 11731: 179.

[190] GStA PK, HA Rep. 77 Ministerium des Innern, Tit. 226, Nr. 124, Vol 16. (1 April 1904 to 30 September 1904), 155.

[191] StAH, 373-7, II E I 1 b Beiheft 2: Akte betr. Dienstreisen, Reiseberichte usw., 434.

[192] Keeling, *Business of Transatlantic Migration*, 116-117.

[193] StAB: 3-A 4 Nr 289, report from Bányász, representative of Nordd. Lloyd and Hamburg-Amerika-Linie at the registration station in Leipzig, 16.02.06.

been sealed with no transmigrants allowed to enter or leave. The flyer suggested that travelers take a route to Rotterdam that completely bypassed control stations and recommended the transmigrants instead pass through Thuringia, a German province west of Saxony. This information was false; someone had printed the flyers to convince their customers to circumnavigate Leipzig. German officials and NDL suspected their competition, the Anglo-Continentale agency of Rotterdam, and its practicing agent in Bremen, Harry Cohen.[194] Much to the chagrin of the German emigrant commissioner, Cohen had long- orchestrated the shipping of migrants to and via England, yet Cohen, at the same time, represented Red-Star-Line and the America-Line, partners of the continental cartel. Germany authorities had at least since 1901 attempted to shut down the business of Cohen, yet German authorities had worried that prosecuting Cohen would hurt foreign relations.[195] Given the English and Belgian embassies' protest at Saxon border regulations, this supposition had basis. Authorities suspected that Cohen worked for UK lines. Cohen had numerous agents stationed in Galicia and Russia, thus inflaming suspicion when Russians carried the flyer.

German authorities and shipping companies suspected the English lines White Star and other English lines as the initiators of the flyers. White Star, Anchor, and Allan had withdrawn from the UK-NDLV conference in August 1905 because of the 1904 fares war and general monopoly of German lines on the eastern European market.[196] A Leipzig registration authority named Bányász (no first name available) stated that he found the flyers in envelopes containing

[194] Despite the English-sounding name, Cohen was a German national, as required by law since 1897. See Feys, *Battle for the Migrants*, 87.

[195] Industrial Commission, 687.

[196] Keeling, *Business of Transatlantic Migration*, 210.

tickets from the Glasgow lines Anchor, and Allan, and the Liverpool line Dominion.[197] Hamburg-Amerika angrily wrote to Ismay, Imrie & Co., the Liverpool association that housed the White Star Line and claimed that its agent Harry Cohen had been sending immigrants materials on how to avoid the control stations on their way to Rotterdam.[198] Though Ismay, Imrie & Co. asked Cohen for details, Cohen replied to Imrie that he had no idea what they were talking about and that he made sure emigrants passed the German control stations, and, above all, the medical examinations.[199] In early 1906, the Bremen Senate and Prussian authorities became involved with the Cohen case. The Bremen Authority for Emigration Matters sent a report to the Prussian State Minister that both Cohen and his employer, Anglo-Continentale in Rotterdam, claimed they had no knowledge of the flyers. Continentale suggested that American agents "had sent the flyers with prepaid tickets to immigrants."[200] NDL had no direct evidence to condemn Cohen but claimed it was highly likely he had a part in the circulation.[201]

Bremen authorities could not find enough evidence to condemn Cohen for sending the "Leipzig closed" notices yet sent the case from the Criminal Division to the District Attorney's Office to see if Cohen had violated any German laws by encouraging immigrants to go through

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[197] StAB: 3-A 4 Nr 289, report from Bányász, representative of Nordd. Lloyd and Hamburg-Amerika-Linie at the registration station in Leipzig, 16.02.06.

[198] StAB: 3-A 4 Nr 289, extract from letter from Hamburg Amerika to Ismay, Imrie & Co.

[199] StAB: 3-A 4 Nr 289, statement from Harry Cohen, Bremen 21 Dezember 1905 to Ismay, Imrie & Co., Liverpool.

[200] GStA PK, I. HA Rep. 77 Ministerium des Innern, Tit. 226 Nr. 124 Bd. 20, pg. 90.

[201] StAB: 3-A 4 Nr 289, from the Direction of Norddeutschen Lloyd, Bremen, to the Behörde für das Auswanderungswesen z.H. des Herrn Senator Stadtländer, 13 February 1906.

non-German harbors.[202] The Bremen Criminal Division in December 1906 came to the conclusion that the "legitimacy of imperial law" could only extend to the borders of the empire, not beyond.[203] Had Cohen been in the business of encouraging Imperial Germans to go through Rotterdam, there would have perhaps been a case. However, encouraging Russians within their homeland to go through Rotterdam was an act out of the court's control.[204] The office for emigration in Bremen also pointed out Cohen's "impeccable" behavior for years as further proof against the accusation.[205]

This confrontation between the White Star Line and NDL showed the difficulty and almost impossibility of enforcing business practices outside of state borders. Cohen operated within Germany, yet his propaganda originated in Russian and Austro-Hungarian provinces and left the hands of the German legal system tied. This of course assumes that Cohen had his on-the-ground agents spread flyers in outside provinces. American lines, as the White Star Line suggested, could have sent the flyers with the prepaid tickets.

Conclusion

The competition amongst steamship companies transformed Saxon-Bohemian border control in the early twentieth century. The decisions migrants made as far as which port to depart from or which train route to take often reflected larger economic forces during this age. The prospect of a better life in America, well-established steamship lines, and transportation infrastructure drew eastern and southeastern Europeans across German borders to the port cities

[202] GStA PK, I. HA Rep. 77 Ministerium des Innern, Tit. 226 Nr. 124 Bd. 21, pg. 72.

[203] GStA PK, I. HA Rep. 77 Ministerium des Innern, Tit. 226 Nr. 124 Bd. 21, pg. 74.

[204] GStA PK, I. HA Rep. 77 Ministerium des Innern, Tit. 226 Nr. 124 Bd 20, pg. 74.

[205] GStA PK, I. HA Rep. 77 Ministerium des Innern, Tit. 226 Nr. 124, Bd 22, pg. 143.

of Hamburg, Bremen, Rotterdam, and Antwerp. Initially Saxon border control proved spotty, though generally in favor of transmigrants traveling with German steamships. However, tension between the NDLV and the Cunard line led to greater focus on border regulations by October 1903 and eventually, from the suggestion by German steamship companies, a transmigrant registration station in March 1904. Competition between English and continental lines for continental European customers continued during the Atlantic fare war of 1904 and beyond.

While German businesses pushed the Saxon to exert transmigrant control, the actual enforcement of this control extended beyond agents of the steamship companies. Hired translators and agents could guide, encourage, threaten, or even con transmigrants into taking specific routes, yet their numbers were relatively few and their legal capacity limited. Much of this transmigrant control depended on the action of Saxon state police. The next chapter will explain the state's justification for police involvement and the issues police encountered as they attempted to monitor eastern European transmigration in Saxony.

Chapter 2: Policing Transmigrants

On a fall day in 1904, a Dresden police officer encountered a group of 64 eastern Europeans at the train station.[206] Given the size of the group, he identified them as transmigrants on their way to a northern European harbor to sail to the Americas. The undoubtedly tired, harried travelers wanted to make a train connection to the German city of Falkenberg, yet the officer had his orders: direct every transmigrant going through Saxony to the registration station in Leipzig. The plainclothes policeman tried to explain the regulations. Either unable to understand German or thinking the officer was a swindler, the travelers maintained their distance. Eventually, a railroad conductor stepped in and convinced the group to take the train to Leipzig.[207] This situation illustrated some of the difficulties police encountered as they attempted to send transmigrants to the registration station: language barriers, trouble asserting state authority, and attempted circumnavigation of Leipzig.

This encounter between a policeman and transmigrants also begs the question why police became involved with the registration station, something that, as demonstrated in Chapter 1, was largely a business tactic of German steamship companies to monopolize eastern European emigrant traffic. Behind the concern for public welfare, police ordinances on transmigration undoubtedly benefited German shipping companies. Saxon police redirected eastern Europeans headed for non-German harbors, disrupting business for competing shipping companies and agents. State authorities were well aware of this preferential treatment toward Norddeutscher Lloyd (NDL) and Hamburg-Amerika (HAPAG) customers. Since German shipping companies in the past had fulfilled their promise to financially cover their clients once registered, the Berlin

[206] Sources do not say whether this encounter took place at the Dresden central station or the Dresden-Neustadt station.

[207] Letter from police directorate to Saxon MdI, HStAD, MdI 11731: 208.

Ministry of the Interior wrote in 1901 that state authorities should "secure" the monopoly of NDL and HAPAG on transmigration.[208] The press noticed the capitalistic influence on police as well. The Social-Democratic paper *Vorwärts* once referred to a border regulation as a "Ballin-police ordinance" after the director of the HAPAG line.[209] The boundaries between state policy and big business became blurred. Theoretically, Saxon police fulfilled their duty to the state and abetted state costs by assisting German shipping companies.

The historiography of police surveillance of foreigners in the twentieth century has focused on immigrants within the state, particularly on people who did not comfortably fit into an idealized version of the nation-state.[210] As these sources demonstrate, police kept watch over transmigrants, who were not expected to settle within German territory, as well. Police assisted shipping company agents at migration hubs throughout Europe. Even in the 1840s police in Antwerp helped supervise the flow of migrants from the train to emigrant hostels.[211] Various governments' desire to control the movement of transmigrants seemed to clash with the general "freedom of movement" seen within Europe during the latter half of the long nineteenth century.[212] However, John Torpey points out that "the loosening of states' control over

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[208] Letter to Ministry of Foreign Affairs (presumably Berlin), HStAD, MdI 11731: 12.

[209] "Polizei gegen russische Auswanderer" from Nr. 33, 16 February 1906 edition, HStAD, MdI 11732: 73.

[210] See Jennifer Illuzzi, *Gypsies in Germany and Italy, 1861-1914*: *Lives Outside the Law* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2014); Cliff Rosenberg, *Policing Paris: The Origins of Modern Immigration Control between the Wars* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006).

[211] Torsten Feys, *The Battle for the Migrants: The Introduction of Steamshipping on the North Atlantic and its Impact on the European Exodus* (St. John's, Nfld.: International Maritime Economic History Association, 2013), 82.

[212] John Torpey, *Invention of the Passport: Surveillance, Citizenship, and the State* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 58.

movement did not…mean the abandonment of its right and capacity to identify persons for purposes of administration and policing."[213] By directing transmigrants to the steamship company-run registration station in Leipzig, Saxon police engaged in a form of migrant monitoring. Saxon police did not create or control the system of transmigration; the sheer economic power of the shipping companies set up this network. However, the transmigration surveillance system in Saxony, pushed by German steamship companies, could only function with police assistance. They prevented disorder within the transmigration system and guided emigrants back to the preferred route. Saxon police, as far as these sources show, did not arrest or criminalize wayward transmigrants prior to World War I.

This chapter demonstrates how Saxon police, state employees, were integral to the directing of transmigrant movements and the functioning of the Leipzig registration station, especially during its first year of operation. Scholars of eastern European transmigration have not yet focused on police as an apparatus of migrant control as their roles were subservient to the demands of steamship companies, yet, at least in Saxony, the steamship companies needed police in order to make the system work. The Saxon police's role in transmigration evolved in a number of ways. First, this chapter explores the political and societal concerns about the transmigrant and his or her potential financial drain upon the Saxon state. These anxieties catalyzed police assistance with directing the transmigrants to the Leipzig station. Second, the chapter looks at the police relationship with the railroad, as train stations were loci where police encountered and conducted transmigrants. The third section looks at police methods for identifying transoceanic migrants. Police had difficulties in differentiating them from *Saisonarbeiter* (seasonal foreign workers), who traveled through Saxony to work in German brickyards, fields, and mines. The

[213] Ibid., 78.

police monitoring of transmigrants embodied a system of both order and chaos. Emigrants oftentimes obeyed policemen, yet sometimes they did not. They would refuse to follow or openly challenge authorities. Sometimes the travelers did not even notice the police, and likewise, the police had trouble determining who was bound for harbor cities. Even when transmigrants broke or ignored regulations, police expected some nonconformity. A 24 August 1904 letter from the Saxon Ministry of the Interior to the Saxon Ministry of Finance explained a few migrants who "slipped through" were likely.[214]

Keeping Transmigrants Moving: Fear of the Idle Migrant

Following police history of Britain, the historiography on German police has expanded within the last couple decades.[215] Scholars have turned an eye toward the institution and bureaucracy behind police activity, as well as examining the police's relationship with the public. The police within Saxony operated largely on a regional level. Despite growing centralization in Imperial Germany, each federal state still had its own provincial police force (*Landespolizei*), "subdivided into administrative areas, " which in turn reported to the Ministry of the Interior (*Ministerium des Innern*) in each state's capital.[216] Though Saxon police answered to the Saxon government, they operated across the German border as well. For over 50 years, Austria had allowed Saxony to use the railroad line from the Saxon-Bohemian border to Bodenbach ("Podmokly" in Czech).[217] Indeed, Saxon border police (*Grenzpolizei*) served at

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[214] HStAD, MdI 11731: 168.

[215] Herbert Reinke, "The Politics of Police History in Germany since the 1990s: A Participant Observation" *Crime, Histoire & Sociétés* 16 (2012): 99.

[216] Jennifer Illuzzi, *Gypsies in Germany and Italy*, 54.

[217] Erich Preuß and Reiner Preuß, *Saechsische Staatseisenbahnen* (Berlin: Transpress, 1991), 23.

train stations in a number of Bohemian towns. Their duties included regulating the transmigrants from Austro-Hungarian territories as they entered into the bordering German territory.[218] Police in Saxony operated in three forms: the gendarme, the communal police, and the state police (under which the gendarme and the communal police both operated). Though each institution originated for different reasons, by the late-nineteenth century they largely cooperated together. The gendarme operated in cities, borders, and (especially important in regard to transmigrants) train stations.[219] Communal police worked, as the name suggests, within towns and cities. During the time of the emigrant registration station in Leipzig, these institutions communicated and worked together to the point where constant distinction of position or institution would prove cumbersome and unnecessary.

According to rhetoric, Saxon authorities enacted border regulations for transmigrants and eventually the registration station for "security-, medicinal-, and poverty-police reasons."[220] Saxon police had a duty to fulfill these three areas and thus took part in the transmigration surveillance system. To some extent, Saxon officials watched for "healthy and non-criminal" emigrants traveling with a non-German shipping line.[221] State authorities believed migration intertwined with criminality in various ways. The migrants were sometimes extremely poor and

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[218] Though the Saxon state built the line from Dresden to Bodenbach, many of the rail lines within Germany had been privately built. When the federal states took over, this resulted in many state-owned lines crossing their respective borders. A good example of this would be the competition between Prussian and Saxon railroads within the city of Leipzig.

[219] Reinhold Müller and Dieter M. Vetters, *Im Dienste Sachsens: Zur Geschichte der Uniform und reglementierten Dienstbekleidung sächsischer Institutionen* (Dresden: Verlag der Kunst, 2001), 87. Unlike Prussian and many other European gendarmes, the institution did not report to the military but instead remained a "civil state service."

[220] Letter from Saxon MdI to Saxon districts, HStAD, MdI 11731: 27.

[221] Letter from Saxon MdI to Saxon districts, HStAD, MdI 11731: 27.

authorities associated poverty with desperation and criminal inclination. The foreigner also represented the unknown and unfamiliar and was often blamed as "the principal menace" to society.[222] A famous example would be the Jack the Ripper case, where several foreigners, especially Jews, were suspected for the horrific murders of five prostitutes in London's Whitechapel district.[223] On the author hand, authorities sometimes considered transmigrants to be potential victims to local criminals in an unknown land. The Leipzig popular press *Illustrirte Zeitung* argued that the Leipzig registration station protected emigrants from the stereotypical "dangers of the big city," which included robbers, swindlers, and pimps (though ironically German steamship agents at the station sometimes pressured migrants into buying tickets with their lines).[224] The second justification for police direction, medicinal-police concerns, had to do with the belief that outsiders would bring disease, which will be discussed more thoroughly in Chapter 3. Beyond security and health concerns, the fear of impoverished transmigrants, who could burden the state and local welfare programs, featured prominently in Saxon police ordinances.

Saxon police monitored transmigrants so that shipping companies instead of local state welfare programs would sponsor disadvantaged travelers. Rising industrialization and urbanization in the nineteenth century had associated poverty with systemic ills instead of personal failings. Simultaneously, welfare states formed not only to aid the poor but also to

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[222] Clive Emsley, *Crime, Police, and Penal Policy: European Experiences 1750-1940* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 211.

[223] Paul Knepper, *The Invention of International Crime* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010), 70.

[224] Volkmar Müller, 'Die Auswanderer-Registrierstation in Leipzig', *Leipzig Illustrirte Zeitung*, 17 May 1906, 782.

prevent "working classes from falling into poverty."[225] Industrialization brought in labor migrants, who crossed boundaries of governmental patronage but were not work idle. Transmigrants proved a unique category of potential public charge. They were neither vagabond nor extremely poor (after all, they had the money for the journey), but they had no residence in Germany and often did not have the budget if waylaid by illness or conmen. According to a report from the Saxon Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Ministry of the Interior, in 1901 a total of 37,000 emigrants went the route of Tetschen-Dresden-Leipzig and in 1902 the numbers increased to 48,000 emigrants.[226] How many of those actually required help from the German state was not said, though likely it was very few. However, these numbers and individual stories gave Saxon authorities rhetorical fuel to justify its releasing further ordinances on transmigrants.

One of the first major streams of overseas-bound transmigrants that Saxon officials viewed as a potential financial burden to the state came from Romania. According to a letter from the Berlin Foreign Office to the Saxon Ministry of Foreign Affairs, newspapers had been reporting a strong stream of Romanian Jews going across the Saxon border in 1900. While the Romanian Minister of the Interior claimed to not actively pursue policies to cause the Jews to emigrate, a German ambassador in Bucharest felt the Romanian minister desired "a little of the overflow of Jews from the countryside would make its way to the United States."[227] The Jews came from the regions of Moldavia and Wallachia, which had suffered under economic crisis and state anti-Semitic policies. The migrants reportedly set out on foot, but given the increased

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[225] Beate Althammer, "Transnational Expert Discourse on Vagrancy around 1900," in *The Welfare State and the "Deviant Poor" in Europe*, *1870-1933*, ed. Beate Althammer et al. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 104.

[226] HStAD, MdI 11731: 21.

[227] HStAD, MdI 11731:2.

mileage of Romanian railroad tracks in the period from 1870 to 1913, it is possible they relied on rail as well.[228] A letter from the German consulate in Bucharest to the German Chancellor stated that the Romanian Jews "departed in groups from 40 to 50 people apparently in order to travel by foot through Germany to Hamburg" and then by ship to America.[229] Despite the intention to travel overseas, many of these migrants, whether because of dwindling money or exhaustion, ended up simply traveling to the Hungarian border or to other parts of Romania, where locals claimed the migrants' lack of resources was a burden. Under domestic pressure, the Austro-Hungarian government asked Berlin under what conditions Romanian transmigrants could enter German territory, whereupon the German government responded that it would only allow migrants with German shipping tickets, as these companies financially sponsored their customers.[230] Police enforced this policy in the Saxon-Austrian borderlands.

Narratives of impoverished Jews as dependents of the state occasionally bubbled to the surface in Saxon authorities' writing. Two early police reports on transmigrant individuals emphasized the "Jewishness" as well as the "poverty" of the travelers. On 22 December 1900, a fifty-one-year-old man wandered into the police station at Bautzen (in Saxony) and asked for a loan because he had no money. Leib Stieglitz was a middle-aged Jewish Galician tradesman. He had purchased NDL ship tickets from an American agent and was making his way through

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[228] HStAD, MdI 11731: 1. Romania, though still not quite the railroad network of England or Germany, managed to increase its "length of track" between 1870 and 1913 from 248 to 3,549 kilometers, see Theodore Hamerow, *The Birth of a New Europe: State and Society in the Nineteenth Century* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1983), 14. Lara Rabinovitch is skeptical that the *fusgeyers* walked the entire distance to port cities, see Lara Rabinovitch, "'The Gravest Question': Romanian Jewish Migration to North America, 1900-1903 (PhD diss., New York University, 2012), 168.

[229] HStAD, MdI 11731: 2.

[230] HStAD, MdI 11731: 4.

Germany to Bremen in order to meet his wife already in New York. The man had been living off donated food and in desperation went to the police station.[231] After the founding of the registration station, police encountered a Galician Jew in Dresden who had hoped to travel through Falkenberg and avoid Leipzig. He had already been rejected by the registration station three days prior on grounds of "insufficient funds" and as a result was "sent back to the border." The report even mentioned that he asked a rabbi for money.[232]

Despite occasional mention, the nationality or ethnicity of transmigrants played a small role in Saxon police correspondence concerning the travelers. Oftentimes Saxon authorities and police often only referred to transmigrants as "Jews" when they discussed whether Jewish charities could sponsor them at the border. Caitlin Murdock points out in her work on the Saxon-Bohemian borderlands how Saxon authorities until World War I avoided placing foreigners into national categories. [233] Police detail on transmigrants certainly reflected this conclusion. Authorities tended to use geographical terms of migrant origin such as "Bohemian" or "Galician." The lack of reference to religion may have also reflected the fact that a very small percentage of transmigrants in Saxony were Jewish, as opposed to the large number of Russian Jews who traveled through Prussia. Even in sources regarding the prevention of cholera, which many European associated with Russian Jews, Saxon authorities preferred using the term "Russians."

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[231] Report from city council of Bautzen to Kreishauptmannschaft at Bautzen, HStAD, MdI 11731: 7.

[232] Letter from police directorate to Saxon MdI, HStAD, MdI 11731: 171.

[233] Caitlin Murdock, *Changing Places: Society, Culture, and Territory in the Saxon-Bohemian Borderlands, 1870-1946* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2010), 46.

Naturally, border police responsibilities rose as Saxony released its 22 October 1903 ordinance on transmigrant screening. For entry into the state, the foreign, overseas-bound needed either a) German shipping line tickets, b) proof of cash in hand (i.e., 400 Marks per adult, 100 Marks per child), or c) a sponsorship from the German Central Committee for Russian Jews. [234] The border regulations seemed simple enough on paper. Implementation was another matter. The 400 Marks financial security requirement was a steep price for migrants traveling with non-sanctioned steamship lines, and if carrying such tickets, the transmigrants avoided going through the Leipzig station, sometimes even Saxony. Even if emigrants carried that amount of money, they would often hide it or sew it into their clothing, as they feared finagling travel agents would confiscate it.

Looking at communications between Saxon authorities, police, and railroads provides valuable insight into the workings of state institutions beyond the ordinances they issued. Andrew Wakefield's *The Disordered Police State* extols the reading of "secret discourse" amongst authorities as opposed to just normative ordinances. [235] This discourse provides insight into what officials believed were their concerns and successes. As an example, the police inspector at Bodenbach wrote to Dresden officials on 1 November 1903 about the chaos at the train station due to the border ordinance. He described a scene where few migrants understood or could be understood and scattered as soon as they stepped upon the platform. Many eastern Europeans had tickets with Dutch companies and few had the required 400 Marks per adult. Those who had any currency needed to exchange their "Russian, Austrian, Italian and German

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[234] HStAD, MdI 11731, 27. The third stipulation soon fell by the wayside when The German Central Committee for Russian Jews disintegrated.

[235] Andrew Wakefield, *The Disordered Police State: German Cameralism as Science and Practice* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), 21.

monies" first.[236] In large groups, the delegated person in charge of money sometimes disappeared. If migrants felt the tide was turning against them, the travelers used tactics to evade authorities and avoid being sent back to their respective homelands. They would simply "walk to the next [train] station" or go into the city, and wait for a night train or a steamboat on the Elbe River to cross into Saxony.[237] There was confusion amongst borderland police about the exact rules for passing into Saxony. On 18 January 1904, NDL sent a frantic telegram from Bremen to the Saxon Ministry of the Interior claiming that the police at Voitersreuth ("Vojtanov" in Czech) were not allowing a "transport" of their emigrants to pass on account of lack of proof of money.[238] The ministry immediately sent a telegram to Voitersreuth to "allow the further travel" of the emigrants.[239] An event likes this shows the disparity between the regulations and their actual implementation. Misunderstandings, lack of communication, or even individual temperaments of the policemen could mean different outcomes. In late 1903, as officials continued to debate whether passengers with English tickets passed muster, the Saxon Ministry of the Interior instructed the border police at Bodenbach to take the regulations "mildly until further notice."[240]

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[236] HStAD, MdI 11731: 29-30.

[237] HStAD, MdI 11731: 30.

[238] HStAD, MdI 11731: 52.

[239] HStAD, MdI 11731: 53.

[240] HStAD, MdI 11731: 36.

German authorities and steamship lines began preparing to open the Leipzig registration station on 3 March 1904. The Saxon Ministry of the Interior notified police districts and policemen at border stations to send all transmigrants going into Saxony to the Leipzig station:[241]

> With entry of an emigrant into the registry, the Hamburg-Amerika-Line and Norddeutscher Lloyd take on…all costs…which the registered person has cost the state…through room, board, transportation, return transportation in the case of rejection…, burial, or anything given for that reason.[242]

As mentioned in Chapter 1, Saxon authorities approved of a Leipzig registration station because German shipping companies covered registered transmigrants, including those sent back, thus absolving the state of financial responsibility. The shipping companies profited, as they needed to build only one station in Saxony instead of many at various border-crossing points. The shipping companies claimed they would pay for the costs incurred by Leipzig city police who directed transmigrants to the station.[243] In a 30 January 1904 letter to the Saxon Ministry of the Interior, NDL swore that as far as its company was concerned, it would pay for Leipzig police directing migrants to the station:

> Even if we do not fully share your view that the city of Leipzig has little or no interest in the construction of a health and welfare-station,…we do recognize that transportation from the Bayerischer train station to the registration station as well as the long shifts…of a security guard at the station would incur more costs.[244]

By using the common state rhetoric of "health" and "welfare," the shipping companies hinted that the registration station would benefit the state as well by singling out sick or poor emigrants.

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[241] HStAD, MdI 11731: 60.

[242] HStAD, MdI 11731: 59.

[243] HStAD, MdI 11731: 59.

[244] HStAD, MdI 11731: 48-49.

HAPAG agreed to pay for a security guard at the station as well.[245] However, they vaguely worded the potential costs as "additional costs" to the Saxon state, insinuating they would pay for an extra hire, though not for police already on the job.[246] It was also not clear whether the shipping companies would pay for police work outside of the Leipzig district. According to an 11 November 1904 letter, authorities in the Saxon city of Plauen asked what to do about the costs incurred from sending transmigrants to Leipzig. These authorities stated that if the shipping companies did not "defray" the costs, the expenses would be considered "police costs."[247]

The registration station at Leipzig seemed to relieve the state of the problem of fiscal responsibility for the transmigrant. Saxon police at the borderland stations of Voitersreuth, Bodenbach, and Tetschen ("Děčín" in Czech) now sent the travelers to Leipzig for screening instead of checking right away if the migrants fulfilled Saxon border stipulations. If the Leipzig station rejected any transmigrants, the shipping companies would cover the costs in sending them back to the Saxon-Austrian border (there was no mention of how rejected migrants returned home from the border). However, when the Leipzig registration station opened on 3 March 1904, Saxon police soon discovered new obstacles in the revised control system.

"The Long March Through Leipzig": Directing Transmigrants to the Registration Station[248]

On 15 November 1905, Hamburg police inspector Kiliszewski, on a mission to inspect transmigrant stations, took a train from Bavaria to Leipzig. At the train station in Reichenbach he

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[245] HStAD, MdI 11731: 57.

[246] HStAD, MdI 11731: 72.

[247] HStAD, MdI 11731: 226.

[248] Kiliszewski report, StAH, Auswanderungsamt I, II EI 1 b, Teil 2 von 2, pg. 430.

"noticed ten Russian Jews" exit the train.[249] A railroad employee informed him that the group was traveling to the Saxon capital of Dresden. Kiliszewski encountered these migrants yet again in Leipzig where they explained why they had taken such a roundabout route to the city. Had they stayed on the train from Bavaria, they would have arrived at the Bayerischer train station, located far at the south end of Leipzig. By traveling via the line from Dresden, they landed at the Dresdner train station, right across from the registration station. Switching train lines saved them an hour-long walk through the bustling city to the registration station on the north side.

Fortunately these transmigrants had been told ahead of time, either by their travel agent, a policeman, or a railroad employee, about the long walk between the Bayerischer train station and the registration station. Especially during the first year of operation, not every transmigrant traveling via Leipzig knew about the registration requirements or the walk through the city to the registration station. Not everyone was willing to adjust his or her journey accordingly. Even emigrants arriving or catching a train at terminals directly across from the registration station hesitated to take the time to register, especially as they raced against time to make the next train, and accordingly, the next boat.

Leipzig, a major railway hub, had no fewer than six train stations when the registration station opened in 1904: the Bayerischer, Berliner, Eilenburger, Magdeburger, Thüringer, and the Dresdner. Throughout Europe, railroad lines, whether financed through private means or the government, would "spontaneously" set up end stations.[250] As a result, larger cities often had an ad hoc system of several stations. In Leipzig the name of each train station took the name of whatever city or region with which it connected: the Dresdner train station hosted the line to

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[249] Kiliszewski report, StAH, Auswanderungsamt I, II EI 1 b, Teil 2 von 2, pg. 430.

[250] H. Heinker, *Leipzig Hauptbahnhof. Eine Zeitreise* (Leipzig: Lehmstedt, 2005), 45.

Dresden, the Bayerischer train station line ran to Hof, a town in Bavaria, and so on. The registration station was set up across from the Dresdner train station given the heavy traffic of eastern Europeans travelling via Dresden to Leipzig. At the end of the nineteenth century, urban centers across Europe began to connect these improvised railways by building central stations within the city. However, construction on the Leipzig central station (which eventually encompassed the Dresdner, Thüringer, and Magdeburger stations) first began in 1909 and finally finished in 1915.[251] One can imagine the emigrants gazing at the massive project as they walked toward the registration station. One can also imagine the relative chaos as police and steamship agents tried to direct people from six train stations.

The Leipzig city council agreed to provide "police support" in directing emigrants from the Bayerischer train station to the registration station across from the Dresdner train station. [252] The shipping companies and state officials decided set up the registration station at the Dresdner train station as many of the emigrants traveling across Saxony would first travel through the provincial capital of Dresden. Officials soon encountered a problem as some travelers arrived in Leipzig through other train stations or needed to make a connecting train not departing from the Dresdner station. The Saxon-Bavarian Railway Company (*Sächsich-Bayerische Eisenbahn Compagnie*), which created the rail line between the German provinces Saxony and its southern neighbour, Bavaria, likely gave little thought to eastern European transmigrants when it opened the terminal in 1842. Price and available space determined the placement of train stations just as

[251] Heinker, *Leipzig Hauptbahnhof*, 243.

[252] HStAD, MdI 11731: 61.

much as accessibility and convenience to travellers.[253] Initially the company considered placing Bavarian line next to the Dresdner and Magdeburger terminals, located northeast of the city center.[254] In the end, there was little place to build and expand next to the two train stations, and the prospect of saving 400,000 taler by placing the Bavarian station on the south side of Leipzig rather than in the expensive location in the city centre cemented the decision. The Saxon-Bavarian Railway Company believed the 1.9 km distance between the Bayerischer and three northern stations surmountable.[255] To some extent, this was justified: travellers were used to a walk in-between their arrival and destination. Railroad stations, as opposed to the direct service of a horse-drawn coach, had "terminated that intimate relationship between the means of transport and destination."[256]

The Bayerischer train station proved particularly problematic for transmigrant traffic because the terminal was a distance from the Dresdner train station within a thriving city. Urbanization had increased the population of Leipzig increased over five-fold from 1871 to

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[253] Jack Simmons, *The Railway in Town and Country* (North Pomfret, Vt.: David & Charles, 1986), 26-27.

[254] Manfred Berger, *Hauptbahnhof Leipzig: Geschichte, Architektur, Technik* (Berlin: Transpress, 1990) 10.

[255] Rolf Bayer and Gerd Sobek, *Der Bayerische Bahnhof in Leipzig: Entstehung, Entwicklung und Zukunft des ältesten Kopfbahnhofs der Welt* (Berlin: Transpress VEB Verlag für Verkehrswesen, 1985), 13.

[256] Wolfgang Schivelbusch, *The Railway Journey: The Industrialization of Time and Space in the Nineteenth Century* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1987), 171.



Map of Leipzig in 1910: Transmigrants arriving at the Bayerischer train station (quadrant 5D) walked or rode a tram to the registration station across from the Dresdner train station (3D). Map from Karl Baedeker, *Northern Germany as far as the Bavarian and Austrian frontiers: Handbook for travellers* (Leipzig: Karl Baedeker, 1910), 239. Image courtesy of University of Texas Libraries. Schmidt drew the red line from the Bayerischer train station to the Dresdner train as possible transmigrant route.

1910: 106,225 to 589,850.[257] Suburbs enfolded the train stations that had been once located on the very outskirts of the city. Railroads also "increased the volume of traffic" within cities, especially apparent to the travellers transferring "between the various main terminals of a metropolis."[258] The 1.9 km walk between south and north stations became much slower when masses of tired travellers tried to make their way with luggage. Police inspector Kiliszewski reported that in 1905 a steamship agent led emigrants "through the whole city by foot" and that the trip took approximately one hour.[259] Women with children had the option of taking an omnibus or a cabby.[260] The trip eventually did become faster as a June 1912 report mentioned the use of an electric streetcar that took transmigrants from the Bayerischer train station to the registration station for a fee.

For the most part, Saxon police and German shipping company employees successfully directed transmigrants from the various Leipzig train stations to the registration station. The city council of Leipzig reported on July 10th, 1904, that the majority of emigrants arriving at the Dresdner train station listened to authorities:

> Most emigrants arriving into the Dresdner train station willingly allow themselves to be directed to the registration station, where they are inspected by a doctor and written into the register.

Some emigrants hesitated to interrupt their journey:

> A few, despite attempts at understanding and reasoning, refused. They would have only been brought by force. However, in order to avoid a scene, these

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[257] Berger, *Hauptbahnhof Leipzig*, 35.

[258] Schivelbusch, *The Railway Journey*, 180-181.

[259] StAH, Auswanderungsamt I, II EI 1 b, Teil 2 von 2, pg. 430-431.

[260] StAH, Auswanderungsamt I, II EI 1 b, Teil 2 von 2, pg. 431.

> emigrants were allowed to continue their journey via the Magdeburg station, without having gone through the emigrant registration station. [261]

In this case, the appearance of calm and order was more important than the actual registration of the transmigrants. The police might have also wanted to avoid the headache of complaints filed with the shipping companies due to treatment of their passengers. In one instance police described the behavior of emigrants, when told to go to the register station, as "threatening," and once again, authorities let them go to avoid a scene.[262] The police obviously felt the need to justify its own hesitations by emphasizing the potential for a public disturbance and their uncertainty of how to enforce the ordinances. The police at one point asked whether they were allowed to use force upon migrants who did not comply.[263] If the Saxon Ministry of the Interior did allow force, permission was not found within the available sources. The question of force shows a limitation in the power police had over the transmigrants. Recommendations to register could only go so far. German authorities believed that the problem would solve itself once a central train station, with a more permanent registration station inside, opened. Once major railway lines in Leipzig were rerouted to the new train station, police would no longer need to direct migrants outside the terminals.

The various railway stations became loci of contact between Saxon police and transmigrants. While some Bohemians may have crossed the border on foot, many Croatians, Hungarians, and Galicians took the fastest and cheapest way to cross Europe: the train. In some respects, the railway made things easier for authorities to locate the travelers. The limitations of

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[261] HStAD, MdI 11731: 142.

[262] Report from Leipzig city council to Saxon MdI Dresden, HStAD, MdI 11731: 128.

[263] Report from Leipzig city council to the Leipzig Kreishauptmannschaft, HStAD, MdI 11731: 142.

the train tracks and where they went in some regard limited migrants' spatial ability to move, especially compared to traveling by foot or by cart. As Wolfgang Schivelbusch mentions his seminal work *Railway Journey*, "route and vehicle became technically conjoined on the railroad."[264] Police knew from train schedules when the emigrants would arrive and, if registration went well, when emigrants would depart and no longer be within their jurisprudence.[265] Train stations became equivalent to "traveler's destinations" for whatever leg of journey they embarked.[266] Within police reports, the routes of the migrants were oftentimes described as a series of railway stations (e.g., Tetschen-Bodenbach-Dresden-Leipzig) because police could keep track of the emigrants in that manner. While the limited number of railroad stations made tracking transmigrant destinations easier for police, the sheer number of transmigrants once they arrived instead added to the difficulty. With the increase of speed came a direct correlation of volume: eastern European emigrants could move *en masse*.[267] Police reported large groups such as the 64, at the beginning of this chapter, who avoided the policeman in civilian clothing. Due to the dropping prices of travel, the poorer classes could travel quickly and long distances, putting people from thousands of miles away very quickly into contact with new territories and laws.[268]

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[264] Schivelbusch, *The Railway Journey*, 16.

[265] Daily schedule of the police constable at the registration station, StAL, Stadtpolizeiamt 437, Akten den Dienst der Ratswache im Hauptbahnhof Bd. 1 Ergangen vor dem Rate der Stadt Leipzig 1911: 13.

[266] Schivelbusch, *The Railway Journey*, 39.

[267] Hamerow, *Birth of a New Europe*, 16.

[268] Ibid., 16.

As the transportation of transmigrants in Europe at this time greatly involved the railway, it was only a matter of time until the Royal Saxon State Railways (also like the police, a regional institution) added its perspective on the ordinances. On May 30th, 1904, the Saxon Ministry of Finance, as the "seat of the state's railway bureaucracy" began a series of concerned letters and to the Ministry of the Interior.[269] First, the Saxon Ministry of Finance scolded the Saxon Ministry of the Interior for not sending immediate word about the registration station:

> Because the State Railway Administration also has a noticeable interest in this emigrant traffic, it would have desirable to the Ministry of Finance if, before to the enactment of that regulation, it had the opportunity to be able to express its opinion from the standpoint of the State Railway business. The Ministry of Finance would have then had time to draw the concerns, which are in several ways to be asserted against the respective facility.[270]

The Saxon Ministry of Finance expressed concern that the new registration station would affect business for the Saxon railroad lines. The Leipzig station was inconvenient, not just for those traveling through Saxony, but also for migrants who needed to reroute their travels to the city in order to pass through the station. The Royal Saxon Railways initially worried if migrants arrived at the other stations within Leipzig, the necessity for them to interrupt their journeys to go to the registration station would make the trip through Saxony seem even less appealing. Wanting to catch a train to the northern ports of Bremen or Hamburg, the emigrants saw no point in going to the registration station at the Dresdner train station. For many emigrants who arrived at the Bayerischer station, they needed to make a connecting train at the Berliner station, which did not even come into contact with the registration station.[271] The railroad claimed they only heard about the registration station because Saxon police had prevented a troop of Bohemians from

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[269] Allan Mitchell, *The Great Train Race* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2000), 221.

[270] HStAD, MdI 11731: 121.

[271] HStAD, MdI, 11731: 121.

travelling with a connecting train on the opening day. Having arrived at the Bayerischer station, the group adamantly resisted going to the registration station undoubtedly for fear of missing their connection or skepticism at the new regulations. Police "refused to let them travel further" without registering, and as a result, "the emigrants spent the whole night in the Bavarian train station."[272]

Within the same May 30th, 1904, letter, the railway gave word that some transmigrants had been avoiding taking Saxon railways because of the registration station. Initially they had been taking the train from Eger ("Cheb" in Czech) in Bohemia via Gera in Thuringia to Dutch harbors, crossing Saxon territory yet completely bypassing Leipzig. The Saxon railroad did not want to disrupt this "advantageous route" by sending its customers out of their way to Leipzig.[273] The Saxon railroad claimed that now these emigrants, in order to keep their Dutch line tickets and avoid the hefty financial proof, would instead bypass Saxony altogether by take a route via Aschaffenburg in the southern province of Bavaria. Saxon state railways would then lose money to Bavarian railways.[274] The Saxon railroad feared the proof of financial capability that the Saxon state required would dissuade emigrants from traveling through Saxony even more.[275]

The Saxon Ministry of Finance included a train personnel report from the Bayerischer train station inspector on May 9th, 1904 that seemed to support the claim of the Saxon railroad that traffic had slowed considerably. Travel agents had protested against the hassle of the station and threatened, "If we are bullied here in Leipzig, we'll travel through Aschaffenberg [in

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[272] HStAD, MdI 11731: 122.

[273] HStAD, MdI 11731: 121.

[274] HStAD, MdI 11731:121.

[275] HStAD, MdI 11731: 121.

Bavaria]". [276] The inspector mentioned immigrant groups from Eger were travelling through Gera/Halle instead of through Leipzig. [277] He also added that a group of about 15 transmigrants, on their way via Zerbst, having all papers in order, could not be brought to the registration station.[278] Ideally, the Saxon Ministry of Finance wanted the "regulations of the station" abolished but asked that authorities at least "limit emigrant registration to only those passing through the Dresden train station," while others going through the Bavarian train station could pass unimpeded.[279]

The Saxon Ministry of Finance's worry that transmigrants would take train lines outside of Saxony reflected the tense competition between federal states for railroad customers. The Saxon railroads had a strong-headed sense of autonomy (though as an institution wanting to survive in an increasingly interconnected and industrializing Europe, it occasionally formed deals and agreements with surrounding states). Tensions had festered between Saxony and the bordering Prussia and Bavaria from the early days of railroad until the unification of German railroads. The Prussian-Saxon "railway war" (*Eisenbahnkrieg*) concerned the control of railways and lucrative rail traffic through Central Europe.[280] The Saxon Ministry of Finance's reaction to the registration station reflected another tension that had built shortly before the opening of the registration station. Saxon authorities had heard rumors, "very soon confirmed, that Prussia was

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[276] HStAD, MdI 11731: 123.

[277] HStAD, MdI, 11731: 123.

[278] HStAD, MdI, 11731: 123.

[279] HStAD, MdI 11731: 122.

[280] Mitchell, *The Great Train Race*, 44.

conspiring with Bavaria to deprive Saxony of its pivotal role in north-south transit."[281] The Berlin-Rome express ran through Leipzig, but Prussia and Bavaria planned to reroute the train through Halle, thus bypassing Saxony. Prussia and Bavaria claimed that the rerouting would decrease travel time, but Saxon officials argued that Leipzig clearly the most convenient route. Though the matter remained "unresolved," Saxony demonstrated a very headstrong, independent attitude toward the powerful Prussian railroad.[282]

On 17 June 1904, the Ministry of the Interior finally answered the Ministry of Finance in regard to the Saxon railroad losing customers. They first expressed surprise that the Ministry of Finance had not heard of the station earlier as the general directorate of the state railways and the shipping companies had signed a deal. They claimed the registration station was "first and foremost a state police matter," yet the Ministry of the Interior had also taken fiscal matters in to consideration.[283] They also counter-argued that the "guarantees" by NDL and HAPAG to amass migrants in Leipzig would naturally bring business to Saxon railroads.[284] Presumably no costs would be incurred for the state and the shipping lines would take care of registered emigrants.[285] The Ministry of the Interior claimed it could not abolish the station, as the Saxon railroad had hoped but would take the financial losses suffered by the railroad due to the station "into consideration."[286]

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[281] Ibid., 221.

[282] Ibid., 221.

[283] HStAD, MdI 11731: 137.

[284] HStAD, MdI 11731: 137.

[285] HStAD, MdI 11731: 138.

[286] HStAD, MdI 11731: 139.

As a final suggestion of why the railroad was incurring losses, the Ministry of the Interior pointed out that thanks to a contract, which had made Austro-Hungarian city Fiume another base for the Cunard Line, "the emigrant traffic through Germany must have experienced a noticeable decrease since Hungarian emigrants made approximately a third of the total continental emigrant traffic."[287] Lastly the Ministry of the Interior asked for numbers from the Ministry of Finance in order for the latter to prove its point.[288] On 13 August 1904, the Ministry of Finance replied that it had only become aware of the "content" of the station regulations when police officers had stopped the troop of Bohemians.[289] Other than that small scolding, the Ministry of Finance sent statistics to the Ministry of the Interior and seemed to admit that the decrease of transmigrants through Saxony had reasons aside from the registration station. From March to June 1904 transmigrant traffic from Eger-Leipzig had fallen about half, even though the non-transmigrant traffic through Saxony had increased. The Ministry of Finance admitted that the decrease in number to Leipzig might have stemmed from the creation of the New York steamer connection from Fiume.[290] They did not dare ask Bavarian railways the number of overseas emigrants traveling via Aschaffenburg as not to raise the suspicion of their competitor. While the number of 3rd and 4th class tickets from Eger to Leipzig had decreased fifty percent for the first half of 1904, the number of tickets from Eger to Gera had increased ten percent.[291] The Ministry of Finance also admitted that the increase along the railroad to Gera might have been primarily

[287] HStAD, MdI 11731: 139.

[288] HStAD, MdI 11731: 139.

[289] HStAD, MdI 11731: 151.

[290] HStAD, MdI 11731: 151.

[291] HStAD, MdI 11731: 151-152.

been caused by seasonal workers, going to the Rhineland or Westphalia, and not transmigrants. The railroad decided not to press for a registration point on the Bayerischer train station but instead asked if Prussia and the shipping lines could start holding Bavaria to the same control standards because many emigrants taking Dutch lines went through the bordering state instead.[292]

The Atlantic Rate War of 1904

Saxon police interference with emigrant circumnavigation of Leipzig increased not when the railroads mentioned the possibility of the detour, but when the shipping companies complained. Indeed, in an internal note, the Saxon Ministry of the Interior seemed surprised about the railroad's protest since the "German shipping lines would have mentioned something."[293] Two months later, the companies did. In summer and fall 1904, a number of steamship companies, encouraged by HAPAG director Albert Ballin engaged in cutting fare prices for steerage passengers in retaliation against the rogue British line, Cunard. Rate wars had damaged steamship companies financially in the late nineteenth century, and shipping companies had set up a market-share system to avoid a repeat situation. [294] However, the withdrawal of Cunard from market-share agreements fueled an antagonistic German response. As demonstrated in Chapter 1, the 3 March 1904, opening of the Leipzig registration station came out of this rivalry. In summer and fall 1904, steamship companies asked Saxon police to stop Cunard customers from circumnavigating Leipzig and the registration station. According to 13 August 1904 letter from NDL, the B. Karlsberg office in Hamburg had been advising its customers to

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[292] HStAD, MdI 11731: 152.

[293] HStAD, MdI 11731: 124.

[294] Keeling, *The Business of Transatlantic Migration,* 111.

take the Bodenbach-Dresden-Elsterwerda-Falkenberg route in order to bypass Leipzig. The majority of these eastern Europeans were sailing with Cunard. NDL emphasized that all transmigrants needed to go through the city. Of course this insistence was an attempt to block a very profitable traveling route for a competing steamship company.[295] The Saxon city of Dresden, as the point where Cunard customers diverged from the Leipzig railroad route, seemed the perfect place for an intervention. NDL asked for police surveillance of transmigrants going through Dresden to increase and sent its employee Hugo Bolz to help.[296]

NDL had already asked Berlin authorities in June to increase the number of gendarmes along train routes. The steamship company mentioned Leipzig and other registration and control stations that eastern Europeans were bypassing asked that police "would bring non-registered emigrants to the next station."[297] The shipping company believed it knew exactly who was responsible: the clever, competing emigrant agents who suggested the travelers circumnavigate the stations. This letter demonstrates not just the fierce competition between shipping lines but also the sway economic powerhouses had over police work. The German state may have justified its police work with security and poverty concerns, but companies had enough gumption to ask for dispatches. Again in August, NDL claimed that the Cunard Line "smuggled" emigrants past

[295] In another move of retaliation against Cunard, continental steamship opened a steamship line from Stettin that called at Scandinavian ports, traditional dominions of British lines. See Per Kristian Sebak, "Russian-Jewish Transmigration and Scandinavian Shipping Companies: The Case of DFDS and the Atlantic Rate War of 1904-1905," in *Points of Passage: Jewish Transmigrants from Eastern Europe in Scandinavia, Germany, Britain,* ed. Tobias Brinkmann (New York: Berghahn, 2013), 135.

[296] HStAD, MdI 11731: 158.

[297] GStA PK, I. HA Rep. 77 Ministerium des Innern, Tit. 226 Nr. 124 Bd. 16, pg. 107.

Prussian and Saxon authorities.[298] Reportedly, transports of "30-50 persons passed through Frankfurt" without having gone through registration or control stations.[299]

The police inspector at the Saxon-Bohemian border station in Bodenbach reported that he saw no evidence of circumnavigation. Some migrants only had tickets to Bodenbach or Tetschen and would then buy tickets for further travel. Third class tickets were sold only to Leipzig, yet fourth-class tickets were sold to Dresden. This raised the possibility of Karlsberg customers buying tickets to Dresden and then circumnavigating the registration station by traveling to Falkenberg. However, the police inspector had only seen emigrants who either had or had purchased tickets to Leipzig.[300] The inspector's report contradicted the worries of NDL. Police at Bodenbach likely could only scan the hundreds of transmigrants departing for Saxony and undoubtedly missed the few buying tickets for Dresden. The numbers circumnavigating Leipzig may have also been relatively small in the beginning. Still, NDL felt the need to nip the problem in the bud and sent the agent Hugo Bolz to intercept Karlsberg customers in Dresden.

The steamship company agent Hugo Bolz worked with the Dresden police, and with a direct witness to transmigrant traffic in Dresden, the shipping company became even more sensitive to the circumnavigation. In late August, Bolz reported to NDL that he had caught three emigrants, who had just arrived from Tetschen, on a train headed to Falkenberg instead of Leipzig. The company emphasized to authorities in Dresden how this was not just "an isolated incident" but that the agent Karlsberg had been telling his customers to take the Dresden-

[298] GStA PK, I. HA Rep. 77 Ministerium des Innern, Tit. 226 Nr. 124 Bd. 16, pg. 139.

[299] GStA PK, I. HA Rep. 77 Ministerium des Innern, Tit. 226 Nr. 124 Bd. 16, pg. 139.

[300] HStAD, MdI 11731: 160.

Elsterwerda-Falkenberg route.[301] A few days later, NDL sent a telegram to Dresden, stating that Bolz had seen 27 emigrants headed to Falkenberg.[302]

While Bolz relayed the urgent situation to Norddeutscher Lloyd, the Dresden police reported on Bolz's actions to the Saxon Ministry of the Interior. The police explained they had not noticed the circumnavigation earlier because the train station gendarmes, with all their duties "were not able to pay attention" to the trains that carried transmigrants.[303] When Dresden police did catch transmigrants not going to Leipzig, the patrolmen faced more obstacles. Similarly to the police in Leipzig, the Dresden police felt ineffective and uncomfortable using force on the transmigrants because the order to Leipzig was just a "referral."[304] Additionally, most of the eastern Europeans they encountered could not speak German, and the police could not order them to take the train to Leipzig.

On 24 August 1904, a constable "capable of Polish and Russian," dressed in civilian attire, began assisting Bolz in Dresden.[305] Given many of the migrants knew little or no German, foreign language capability became necessary for police direction. Jakob Zollman explores the relationship between language and the police in his article on police in South-West Africa during Imperial Germany's reign. Like the police in colonial Africa, the police in Germany knew that they would have more effective control if they learned the language of the people they wanted to

[301] HStAD, MdI 11731: 162.

[302] HStAD, MdI 11731: 165.

[303] HStAD, MdI 11731: 166.

[304] HStAD, MdI 11731: 166.

[305] HStAD, MdI 11731: 166.

control, engaging people's trust and understanding more clearly people's intentions.[306] The shipping companies also knew this and employed Slavic-language speakers at the registration station. In 1912 one of the men accompanying eastern Europeans the Bayerischer train station to the registration station was named Ladislaus Ursic (a Slavic name), and an employee at the station could speak Serbian.[307]

Migrants demonstrated agency when evading police controls along the railways to Leipzig. In a 6 September 1904 letter from NDL to the Ministry of the Interior, the shipping company claimed that many emigrants had been "getting off the train" before reaching Leipzig and instead buying tickets via Falkenberg.[308] NDL mentioned how a similar problem had occurred in Prussia years ago. The Prussian government had police assist railroad and control station officials in directing emigrants to the control stations. NDL suggested a similar measure for Saxony.[309] Even when transmigrants in Dresden agreed to venture to Leipzig, they did not always follow through. On 26 August, twelve emigrants stopped by police in Dresden, said they had originally intended to travel via Falkenberg to Antwerp. They agreed to travel to the Leipzig station "without protest."[310] However, when Bolz telephoned the Leipzig registration station, he

[306] Jakob Zollmann, "Communicating Colonial Order: The Police of German South-West Africa (c. 1894-1915)," *Crime, Histoire et Sociétés* 15 (2011): 48.

[307] StAH, Auswanderungsamt I, II E I 1, pg. 82.

[308] HStAD, MdI 11731: 185.

[309] HStAD, MdI 11731: 185.

[310] HStAD, MdI 11731: 170.

found out the migrants had never arrived. He surmised the emigrants had stopped at a town between Dresden and Leipzig called Riesa and took the train to Falkenberg instead.[311]

Saxon police even bordered trains between Leipzig and Dresden to intercept circumnavigation. Bolz had gotten word of some troublesome agents, who were potentially from a competing company:

> Between Leipzig and Dresden, two men board the train and advised the traveling emigrants not to show their shipping tickets in Leipzig but instead be sent back to the border from Leipzig. On their way back, they should exit the train and travel further via Falkenberg or Eilenburg to Halle, where they would have no controls to fear. On that account, [Bolz] asked for us to send a gendarme to travel with him on trains and support him as he searched for these persons. [312]

The direction of the police took the actions of these agents as a violation of an immigrant law of June 9th, 1897. As a result, they had constables on the lookout for such persons on trains between Dresden and Leipzig with orders to send them to the "District Attorney's Office."[313] After a few weeks of riding the train from Dresden to Leipzig, the gendarmes, unable to find the two agents, resumed watch at the Dresden central station.[314]

As Bolz and policemen tried to cut off the Dresden-Falkenberg line, they received word that the agent Karlsberg, who worked for Cunard, had begun instructing emigrants to go through Weischlitz, a Saxon town near the border of Bohemia. NDL asked if constables at Weischlitz would direct emigrants to Leipzig.[315] The company sent Bolz to the town, yet local authorities did not receive notice in time. NDL asked on 21 September 1904 if the Saxon Ministry of the

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[311] HStAD, MdI 11731: 170.

[312] HStAD, MdI 11731: 172.

[313] HStAD, MdI 11731: 172.

[314] HStAD, MdI 11731: 197.

[315] HStAD, MdI 11731: 192.

Interior could create some sort of identification for Bolz as a Weischlitz constable, unsure of Bolz's position, did not assist him with directing 10 Bohemian migrants from Weischlitz to Leipzig.[316] Other gaps in communication between police, state bureaucrats, and the shipping companies occurred. The gendarmes in the Saxon towns of Adorf and Plauen hesitated to help Bolz as they "had no instructions" to reroute transmigrants.[317] NDL begged Saxon authorities to "publish and circulate" the regulations to area authorities.[318]

Some emigrants rejected by the Leipzig registration station would evade authorities on their way home. They would exit the train at Riesa and take another train to Falkenberg.[319] According to police authorities on 13 September 1904, in Dresden, eight expected transmigrants, rejected by the registration station, had not arrived; two of which fled the train into a nearby wood (no further information had been found).[320] As with many institutional histories, it is difficult to find the perspectives of transmigrants themselves when they dealt with police. Whatever the emigrants felt; annoyance, fear, gratitude, or indifference; cannot be known from these sources, only the police's perceptions of the migrants' behavior. What emerges is an ingenuity and resilience on the part of transmigrants in dealing with authorities. While certainly limited in choices when confronted with a hybrid state-economic control system, the travelers could comply, partially comply (then later disobey), or outright defy police commands.

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[316] HStAD, MdI 11731: 204.

[317] HStAD, MdI 11731: 194.

[318] HStAD, MdI 11731: 194.

[319] HStAD, MdI 11731: 170.

[320] HStAD, MdI 11731: 197.

On 27 August 1904, the Saxon Ministry of the Interior asked the Ministry of Finance (i.e., Saxon railway employees) for help with stopping transmigrants who were taking the Dresden-Elsterwerda-Falkenberg route. The former claimed that the "monitoring by police bureaus alone seemed not sufficient to fully prevent the evasion of the Leipzig station."[321] They asked that train personnel "support" policemen and only sell tickets for overseas migrants to or through Leipzig:

> Of course this is not meant to be an embarrassing interrogation of customers to find out if they are emigrants or not. It is also not to be totally avoided if one or two slip through. In general, however, emigrants will be easily recognized by their language, appearance, clothing, tendency to travel in massive groups, and type of luggage. [322]

The Ministry of the Interior knew it needed to present its request for help in an appealing manner. The railway did not like its customers hassled by police and, therefore, Ministry of the Interior took a more humble approach than it had in June.

On 20 September 1904, the Ministry of Finance responded that, according to railway regulations, employees could neither deny the purchase of tickets for routes outside of Leipzig nor stop migrants who had already purchased such tickets. The ministry did say that railroad employees would inform any overseas-bound emigrant that requesting a train booking outside of Leipzig would not be possible. If "the understanding remained unsuccessful" or the emigrant had difficulty with German, the railroad ticket dispatcher would then ask the police to step in.[323] Railroad employees would willingly support the police in whatever provisions the latter needed to take. Essentially, with the heavy-handed referral by train personnel, supported by police, the

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[321] HStAD, MdI 11731: 168.

[322] HStAD, MdI 11731: 168.

[323] HStAD, MdI 11731: 205.

Royal Saxon State Railways fulfilled the request of the police. Berlin even received word of this agreement between the two institutions as its Ministry of the Interior wrote to its Foreign Office that the Royal Saxon State Railways that it would "in every way support the police regulations."[324] While the Saxon Ministry of the Interior and the Royal Saxon State Railways at first butted heads over the station's existence, eventually the latter agreed to assist police with directing migrants to Leipzig. David Kent examines the interconnections of police and railroads in his article on crowd control in Victorian England. He argues that railroads (and telegrams) allowed for faster and stronger police response to crowd disorder and violence. Though with different players and setting, Kent's article provides a framework for explaining the police relationship with populations. Additionally, this chapter adapts Kent's method of connecting police and railroad but expands upon it by giving institutional perspective of the railroad, as opposed to just its use as a means of transportation.[325]

Police sometimes had difficulty distinguishing overseas emigrants from foreign seasonal workers, who did not need to register at the station. Police identified transmigrants by "language, appearance, clothing," and the tendency to travel in families or "massive groups." However, many seasonal workers also fit these criteria.[326] Every year, thousands of workers from Bohemia, Italy, Galicia and other lands came to Germany in order to work as field workers, miners, brickmakers, etc.[327] These circular migrants for the most part freely crossed into German borders

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[324] GStA PK, I. HA Rep. 77 Ministerium des Innern, Tit. 226 Nr. 124 Bd. 18, pg. 139.

[325] David Kent, "Containing Disorder in the 'Age of Equipoise': Troops, Trains, and the Telegraph," *Social History* 38 (3): 308-327.

[326] Letter from Saxon MdI to the Ministry of Finance, HStAD, MdI 11731: 168.

[327] For more on seasonal workers in Germany see Brian McCook, *The Borders of Integration: Polish Migrants in Germany and the United States* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2011), 19; and Murdock, *Changing Places*, 33-56.

and then returned to their homelands when the season ended. They provided a much-needed, cheap labor force for Saxon factories, Ruhr valley mines, or Prussian fields. A June 15th, 1904, report from the Leipzig city council mentioned that some brick workers and harvesters with the destination of Westphalia had been accidentally stopped. More frequently, they admitted, migrants would claim to only be going to North Germany, while in reality going overseas. Officials, afraid to make a scene, would let them bypass the registration station.[328] Police also had difficulties identifying transmigrants based on the amount of luggage because many migrants had already sent their luggage to ports of departure.[329]

In fall 1904, a series of reports from districts in Saxony and Bohemia stated that many eastern European migrants passing through were seasonal workers. The border police inspector at Voitersreuth, Robert Werner, could not report any circumnavigation of overseas emigrants via Eger-Weischlitz-Gera. He stated that many Austrian and Italian workers crossed the border from Eger and traveled via Weischlitz and Gera in order to work in Kassel or Westphalia.[330] Only one Austrian emigrant family with Holland-Amerika tickets had wanted to travel in the direction of Gera but complied with authorities to instead travel to Leipzig.[331] The border police at Voitersreuth did suggest however, that overseas migrants could have traveled with the masses of seasonal workers to avoid the Leipzig station and just "not stated their intention to emigrate" to

[328] Report from the Leipzig city council to the MdI Dresden, HStAD, MdI 11731:129.

[329] Report from the border police at Bodenbach to the MdI Dresden, HStAD, MdI 11731: 31.

[330] HStAD, MdI 11731: 227.

[331] HStAD, MdI 11748: 71.

authorities.[332] District administration at Plauen mentioned that overseas migrants came through mostly as families, assuming then that the seasonal workers were often single, and "traveled via Plauen-Reichenbach to Leipzig."[333]

Despite initial vexations, railway personnel, policemen, and steamship agents created a working migrant control system in Saxony. On 22 November 1904, the police directorate in Dresden sent the Saxon Ministry of the Interior an update:

> Since the monitoring of emigrant traffic has…gone smoothly after the entrusted law enforcement officers made their duties known, the direction of police feels it is no longer necessary to send continuous reports, except for special occurrences in emigrant traffic.[334]

The police found that the majority of transmigrants either already had train tickets to Leipzig or willingly purchased them. Authorities had almost stopped a major route of circumnavigation via Dresden and Falkenberg. Be that as it may, pressure from English lines was strong and with Dresden blocked, other safety valves sprang. In early 1905, the president of police in Berlin announced that if emigrants entering Prussia from Saxony did not have pass from the registration station in Leipzig, they would either need to "pass through the control station in Ruhleben or be sent back home."[335] The Saxon Ministry of the Interior mentioned that English-line passengers had instead been taking another route through the Prussian city of Breslau and then on to Antwerp and Rotterdam.[336]

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[332] HStAD, MdI 11731: 228.

[333] HStAD, MdI 11731: 230.

[334] HStAD, MdI 11731: 233.

[335] GStA PK, I. HA Rep. 77 Ministerium des Innern, Tit. 226 Nr. 124 Bd. 18, pg. 150.

[336] HStAD, MaA 1649: letter from MdI to MaA, 28 November 1904.

Rhetorically, Saxon police worked against circumnavigation during the first year of the registration station to prevent welfare costs to the state. Unregistered migrants who ran into trouble could fall burden to the German state, whereas registered migrants became wards of the steamship companies. Medicinal and criminal concerns seemed comparatively minimal as transmigrants traveled far into Saxon territory before authorities screened them for health and disease. As fears of cholera arose in Germany in 1905 (see Chapter 3), Saxon police continued to deal with transmigrant avoidance of the registration station and now focused on medical as well as welfare concerns. On 16 September 1905, the Saxon Ministry of the Interior ordered police at the border station of Voitersreuth to send all transmigrants to Leipzig via Reichenbach. Many travelers had been using the Weischlitz-Gera route, and the Ministry of the Interior emphasized the importance of sending transmigrants via the first route because of the "danger of cholera."[337] Migrants bound for Gera needed to show to authorities at Eger train tickets to Reichenbach-Leipzig essentially as another stipulation of their cholera test.[338] Saxony was making plans at the time for setting up cholera checkpoints at borderland stations so why would the transmigrants need to take the train to Leipzig and be screened again? To some extent, Saxon authorities wanted to keep migrants in the "transit corridor," as Brinkmann suggests, in order to prevent the spread of cholera.[339] Authorities could concentrate police and medical forces on these specific routes and keep watch over travelers. Additionally, German shipping companies still wanted to hold a monopoly on traffic, and Leipzig was on the way to German ports. Saxony had received

[337] HStAD, MdI 11748: 26.

[338] Letter from Saxon MaA, HStAD, MdI 11748: 35.

[339] Tobias Brinkmann, '"Travelling with Ballin": The Impact of American Immigration Policies on Jewish Transmigration within Central Europe, 1880-1914',' *International Review of Social History* 53 (2008): 465.

word from Prussia that the Anglo-Continentale Travel Agency was telling migrants, particularly Russians, to take the Prague-Karlsbad-Eger-Weischlitz-Gera-Erfurt route.

The red-lettered flyer "Leipzig Closed" (see Chapter 1) sent by an unknown source also caused trouble for Saxon police. On 21 September 1905, a police inspector asked a train conductor to accompany a group of thirteen Russian transmigrants to the Plauen train station, where they would buy new tickets to Leipzig. Originally, they had planned to go the Eger-Gera route as suggested by the red-letter flyer. En route to Plauen, the Russians stepped off the train at an in-between stop, took the train back to Eger and hoped to take their original route again. However, the police inspector caught them and did not believe the story that they were just trying to return to Russia.[340] On 23 September, the police inspector encountered a solitary Russian transmigrant who similarly held a printed note with the red route supposedly from the Rotterdam-Amerika-Line. The migrant claimed to have received it from his children waiting for him in America. The police inspector surmised that a "shipping companies or agents" were circulating the warning "Leipzig closed" in order to take advantage of Russian migrants and direct the profitable traffic to their own harbors.[341] The inspector investigated where transmigrants received the cards (on Saxon trains or in Austria) the first group remained silent and the solitary man repeated that his children sent the card.[342] The Voitersreuth police inspector stated that afterward he encountered no more Russians.[343]

Conclusion

[340] HStAD, MdI 11748: 64.

[341] HStAD, MdI 11748: 65.

[342] HStAD, MdI 11748: 65.

[343] HStAD, MdI 11748: 66.

The Saxon police's battle with transmigrant circumnavigation of Leipzig demonstrated how invested in and elemental the police force was in the Saxon eastern European transmigrant monitoring system. Saxon police did not discipline or arrest divergent transmigrants but pressured them to head to Leipzig to register. Though obviously aiding a protectionist policy for German steamship companies, the Saxon state justified the use of police for security, health, and welfare reasons. Police encountered and adapted to a few impediments in migration surveillance. In Leipzig, six different train terminals at opposite ends of the city made it difficult to refer every transmigrant to the registration station. The travelers sometimes worried they would miss the connecting trains. Police adapted by asking the railroads to make sure transmigrants bought tickets to Leipzig and waited for construction on the central station, which would nullify the trek into the city, to finish. Police intervention worked on a provincial level because police redirected migrants, especially English-line customers, who avoided passing through Leipzig because of the requirement of financial proof. Though police helped create a largely successful "transit corridor," it was not impermeable, nor did authorities expect it to be. Police continued to deal with circumnavigation, such as the incident in 1905 when competitors circulated flyers that the registration station in Leipzig was closed. Just as police duties shifted in 1904 from checking transmigrants at borderland stations to instead directing them to Leipzig, the role of Saxon police changed once again in 1905. Border police again enforced checks at borderland stations but this time to look for signs of dreaded cholera.

Chapter 3: Saxony in the Time of Cholera

In 1886, the German physician Dr. Robert Koch released a report on one of the most feared diseases of the nineteenth century, cholera. The disease's etiology was only fully understood at the end of the century when Koch identified the culprit as the *Vibrio cholera* bacillus. Victims contracted the bacterium most often by drinking water contaminated by the fecal matter of other human carriers. After an incubation period of fourteen hours to five days[344], the bacteria spurred "gastroenteritis" characterized by vomiting and diarrhea with an onset more sudden and violent than that of food poisoning. The disease "sometimes threw people down in the middle of the street" and killed over half of those infected.[345] Formerly healthy specimens could, in the worst cases, die within a day or even a few hours due to massive dehydration:

> Finally the bodily evacuations stop above and below. The sick person, who had until then anxiously tossed and turned, becomes now still and stupefied. His skin is damp and chilly, the eyes deeply sunken in and half open, the breath stagnates, and death enters, while in other cases, fear, uneasiness, pain, and frequent bodily evacuations last until death.[346]

A confounding and visually horrifying illness, cholera became a concern not only for society during the nineteenth century, but also for governments. In 1892 cholera erupted within the port city of Hamburg, where more than 8,000 people lost their lives. [347] After finally quelling the outbreak in 1893, German officials sought reasons for the outbreak and preventative measures.

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[344] Myron Echenberg, *Africa in the time of Cholera: A History of Pandemics from 1817 to the Present* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 7.

[345] Robert Koch, *Die Cholera auf ihrem neuesten Standpunkte* (Berlin: Verlag von Martin Hampel, 1886), 2.

[346] Ibid., 4.

[347] Tobias Brinkmann, "Why Paul Nathan Attacked Albert Ballin: The Transatlantic Mass Migration and the Privatization of Prussia's Eastern Border Inspection, 1886-1914" *Central European History* 43 (2010): 57.

Though many contemporaries rightly attributed the amplification of the disease to Hamburg's poor sanitation, crowdedness, and political mismanagement, others blamed eastern European transmigrants, namely Russian Jews, who had supposedly carried the disease to the port city while en route to the Americas. The ease of blaming outsiders rather than poor infrastructure, lingering uncertainty concerning the mechanisms of cholera's spread and causes, and the desire to prevent future outbreaks led to increased state control of transmigrants in Germany. Thus in 1894 German shipping companies opened control and registration stations along the Prussian border as a compromise with the German government. Eastern European and Russian steamship customers, which German authorities feared could carry cholera, were only allowed to pass into German territory via these stations, where they were disinfected and examined for diseases.[348]

Many German politicians cited the prevention of cholera as the first priority of these Prussian stations, yet as the years progressed and the cholera pandemic ebbed, other politicians, especially Social Democrats, believed the stations served more as a business ploy than a shield against disease. [349] In many respects they were. The stations gave preference to customers of sanctioned shipping companies. On-site shipping agents encouraged or even forced emigrants to buy tickets from their respective lines. The origins of the Leipzig registration station certainly reflected the Social Democrats' suppositions that business purposes outweighed health concerns. The station appeared more than a decade after the Hamburg cholera outbreak and during the 1904 conflict between German steamship companies and the English shipping company, Cunard. However, in late 1904 the fear of contamination weighed heavily on the minds of German officials as cholera outbreaks flared not only in Russia, but also in the Austrian province of

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[348] Article from *Leipziger Tageblatt*, No. 493 from 27 September 1904, HStAD, MdI 11731: 200.

[349] Notes on the 166th sitting of the Reichstag, 17 March 1905, HStAD, MdI 11732: 20.

Galicia. Given Saxony's border with the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the possibility that Russian and Galician transmigrants would choose a less-controlled route than through Prussia, the German state increased medical surveillance in Saxony to prevent the spread of cholera by transmigrants in its territories.

This chapter investigates the steps taken by state officials to further hone the "transit corridor," routes of eastern European transmigrant traffic through Saxony in response to cholera and other diseases.[350] The first section of the chapter explores the historical context of the cholera pandemics and the disease's association with foreigners. The second section focuses on the attempts made at separating transmigrants from the native population as the transmigrants traveled through Saxony. State and shipping company employees tried to isolate the travelers via special emigrant trains and train compartments, emigrant overnight hostels, and cholera barracks and hospitals for the potentially infected. The third section looks at the establishment of borderland cholera checkpoints in October 1905. State authorities further limited the emigrant transit corridor through Saxony by confining railway traffic across the Saxon-Bohemian border to three Bohemian borderland train stations (Voitersreuth, Tetschen, and Bodenbach), where Saxon doctors checked emigrants for signs of cholera. This medical surveillance reestablished the Saxon-Bohemian borderland checkpoints that had fallen by the wayside when the Leipzig registration station appeared in 1904. The last section examines debates among German officials and shipping companies during this time whether to turn the Leipzig registration station into a control station similar to those on the Prussian-Russian border. Control stations required bathing and disinfecting transmigrants in addition to registering them. Officials eventually decided

[350] Tobias Brinkmann uses the term "transit corridor" in regard to transmigration in "'Travelling with Ballin': The Impact of American Immigration Policies on Jewish Transmigration within Central Europe, 1880-1914," *International Review of Social History* 53 (2008): 465.

against this step as disinfection incurred more expenses, frightened customers, and proved ineffective in preventing cholera.

As shown in these discussions and actions to prevent cholera, this chapter argues that, even with the increased vigilance, the transit corridor through Saxony was at times quite permeable. Transmigrants sometimes rode trains amongst German passengers, could spend time wandering Leipzig after registration, and underwent relatively superficial medical inspections. This occurred partly because of the impossibility of controlling all movement in Saxony. German authorities believed that Austro-Hungarians, the majority of the travelers through Saxony, were generally more hygienic than Russians, and thus state officials and shipping employees emphasized "monitoring" as opposed to "control" of these transmigrants.[351] The Foucauldian biopolitics of the German state (as well as other states) made eastern European transmigrants the subject of the "medical and bureaucratic gaze."[352] The state exercised power over a disease by having authorities observe bodies. The use of "monitoring" (*Überwachung* in German, literally "watching over") meant that authorities believed the migration system in Saxony posed less of a health threat than in Prussia and, in a way, that emigrants were already self-regulating their separation.

Cholera, Transmigrants, and the German State

The disinfection and bathing requirements at emigrant control stations had their roots in earlier theories of cholera etiology. Prior to Robert Koch's discovery of the *Vibrio cholera*

[351] Letter from NDL to Saxon MdI, HStAD, MdI 11748: 159.

[352] Chin-Ee Ong et al., "Disciplined Mobility and the Emotional Subject in Royal Dutch Lloyd's Early Twentieth Century Passenger Shipping Network," *Antipode* 46 (2014): 1332.

bacillus in 1884,[353] medical professionals widely believed cholera spread through toxic miasmas, the vapors of filth and refuse. Thus, during times of outbreak, authorities at port entries and commerce points would have travelers disinfect their clothes or belongings. Some places would fumigate passengers in boxes or in waiting rooms to prevent cholera from supposedly transmitting by air. Miasmatic theorists associated cholera with poorer areas of cities due to bad smells and uncleanliness. Because impoverished quarters often had poorer water sanitation than richer areas, cholera spread quickly in those sectors, supporting the erroneous miasmatic theory. In 1854 the physician John Snow connected drinking water with the transmission of cholera. By the time cholera reached Germany again in 1904, Koch's germ theory had validated Snow's hypothesis, and Koch suggested "quarantine, isolation, disinfection, and the policing of the water supply."[354] Sanitary environment was the most important determinant as faulty sewage systems, where infected fecal matter mixed with drinking water, played a key role in severe outbreaks. However, contaminationists argued that the government should watch foreigners, namely poor emigrants, who could bring the disease into territories. Monitoring transmigrants gave German authorities a feeling of control over a disease that at times seemed uncontrollable, and the state was "seen" as doing something about the outbreak.[355]

What historians now refer to as the "sixth pandemic" of Asiatic cholera began in Bengal in 1899 and traveled in two branches: along a southern route to North Africa (German health officials emphasized that Muslim pilgrims returning from their *hajj* had slipped pass control

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[353] The Tuscan scientist Filippo Pacini discovered the bacillus in 1854, though his work went unnoticed. See Echenberg, *Africa in the Time of Cholera*, 32-33.

[354] Echenberg, *Africa in the Time of Cholera*, 38.

[355] Christopher Hamlin, *Cholera: The Biography* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 105.

stations and brought cholera to Egypt) and "northwards" through Afghanistan, Persia and eventually Russia in 1904.[356] There is little research in European historiography on the sixth pandemic because of its smaller magnitude on the continent, which had gone through urban sanitation reforms in the late nineteenth century.[357] Despite these measures, cholera entered Europe during the sixth pandemic, and governments responded accordingly. A cholera outbreak in Prussia in 1905, supposedly spread "through Russian rafters on the Vistula [river]," led to 139 cases within the province, 46 of which proved deadly.[358] Health officials pushed for increased surveillance of river traffic from Russia and also of Russian transmigrants traveling through Germany. On 5 September 1905, the Leipzig newspaper *Tägliche Rundschau* (Daily Review) ran a story on the transmigrant control station Ruhleben near Berlin. Guarded by gendarmes, the station was on lockdown due to a potential cholera outbreak. Guards prevented transmigrants from leaving the station, fountain water was forbidden, water was boiled, and only authorities could enter and leave the station.[359]

In 1905, the port city of Hamburg reported three cases of cholera. The first victim was a Russian transmigrant. [360] Oddly enough, the victim did not display traditional symptoms of

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[356] Minutes of the 9 September 1905 stting on the fight against cholera, HStAD, MdI 11748: 92; Charlotte Henze, *Disease, Health Care and Government in Imperial Russia: Life and Death on the Volga 1823-1914*, BASEES/Routledge Series on Russian and East European Studies (London and New York: Routledge, 2011), 124.

[357] Frank Snowden, *Naples in the Time of Cholera* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 1.

[358] Letter from Saxon Provincial-Medicinal-Collegium to Saxon MdI, HStAD, MdI 11748: 6.

[359] HStAD, MdI 11748: 2.

[360] Minutes of the 9 September 1905 sitting on the fight against cholera, HStAD, MdI 11748: 100.

cholera (e.g., vomiting and diarrhea). Only through the autopsy did doctors confirm the disease. The transmigrant might have contracted the disease from contaminated water in Hamburg and not in his homeland, but the case prompted Hamburg authorities to take action.[361] City officials thoroughly disinfected transmigrant barracks, what they referred to as the "unclean side" of the city, and searched for the 82 people who had taken the same train as the choleric Russian.[362] Authorities managed to locate 33 aboard a steamship of a thousand passengers while the other 49 had already sailed for South America via London. Doctors kept the ship under quarantine for six days as a precaution, though no signs of cholera surfaced. The second case was a man who had lain next to the first victim in the hospital. Cholera bacteria rarely transmit through direct human contact, yet officials did not mention if the men had drunk from the same contaminated water source. Medical professionals named the third case of cholera as a prostitute of "the lowest sort," presumably a common prostitute, who loitered amongst Russian sailors.[363]

The reported cases of cholera in 1905 Hamburg echoed the allegations that Russian Jewish emigrants first brought the disease to the city in 1892. Scholars continue to debate how the disease that spurred the 1892 epidemic came to the harbor waters. Richard J. Evans in *Death in Hamburg* adopts Koch's theory that eastern European emigrants introduced the disease, though Evans emphasizes that poor sanitation and slow government response greatly amplified

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[361] Letter from Saxon Provincial-Medicinal-Collegium to Saxon MdI, HStAD, MdI 11748, 6.

[362] Minutes of the 9 September 1905 sitting on the fight against cholera, HStAD, MdI 11748, 100.

[363] Minutes of the 9 September 1905 sitting on the fight against cholera, HStAD, MdI 11748, 101.

the outbreak.[364] Katja Wüstenbecker highlights another theory that a French sailor or ship dumped sewage in the harbor, since there was also an outbreak in Le Havre at the time. Thus, this supposed threat from the East might indeed have come from the West.[365]

The profiling of eastern European transmigrants at German borders demonstrated a "tension" that, as Alan Kraut points out, has existed in regard to migration and health policy: newcomers have the potential to introduce disease yet domestic policies often play into xenophobia.[366] Authors have suggested that transmigrant surveillance showed prejudices against transmigrants from the East, and against Russian Jews in particular. Nicole Kvale has argued that the placement of the registration stations along the Austrian border as opposed to the control stations, where transmigrants were bathed and disinfected, along the Russian border "highlights the assumption shared by Prussian administrators and the shipping companies that disease and poverty were tied to ethnicity and especially to Russian Jewish origins."[367] In bureaucratic documents concerning Saxony and cholera, officials mostly referred to the political-geographical ties of the transmigrants (e.g., referring to them as Russians) as opposed to ethnicity (e.g., referring to them as Jewish). The profiling of citizens of Russia was based on the belief that cholera followed travel networks. Cholera reappeared in Russia in 1904, killing thousands. When

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[364] Richard J. Evans, *Death in Hamburg: Society and Politics in the Cholera Years* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), 283.

[365] Katja Wuestenbecker, "Hamburg and the Transit of East European Emigrants," in *Migration Control in the North Atlantic World: The Evolution of State Practices in Europe and the United States from the French Revolution to the Inter-War Period*, ed. Andreas Fahrmeier et al. (New York: Berghahn Books, 2003): 227.

[366] Alan M. Kraut, *Silent Travelers: Germs, Genes, and the "Immigrant Menace"* (Basic Books: New York, 1994): 9.

[367] Nicole Kvale, "Emigrant trains: Migratory Transportation Networks through Germany and the United States, 1847-1914" (PhD diss., University of Wisconsin-Madison, 2009): 153.

signs of cholera appeared in Austrian Galicia, Saxon officials took this factor into consideration.[368] Cholera did follow migration routes, though the crux of the matter is that local water and sewage infrastructure played the largest factor in the magnitude of outbreaks.[369] As demonstrated by the laxer restrictions in Saxony compared to Prussia, German officials clearly believed transmigrants from Russian lands carried more diseases and were less hygienic than transmigrants from Austria-Hungary. In a 16 May 1906 letter the steamship company Norddeutscher Lloyd (NDL) argued that the majority of overseas transmigrants who passed through the Austrian borderland stations rarely differed from the Germans traveling in the same class. Russians, however, they purposely exempted from the description.[370] Of course, as most of NDL's customers came from the Austro-Hungarian Empire, they would emphasize that their customers were healthy.

As much as German officials feared cholera, closing the borders to transmigrants was not a viable answer. German shipping companies and the state railways had great economic interest in continuing the mass migration to its harbors. German authorities gave three additional political reasons for not forbidding the travel of Russian transmigrants through its provinces. First, as the Bremen Senate pointed out, cholera had appeared in Austrian Galicia as well as Russia, and a regulation against only Russians made little sense.[371] Second, officials feared Russians would still attempt to cross the border despite the prohibition:

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[368] Letter from Saxon consulate in Bremen to Saxon MaA, HStAD, MdI 11748: 28.

[369] As aforementioned victims contract cholera not through person-to-person contact but by ingesting food or water that had been contaminated by another victim's fecal matter.

[370] HStAD, MdI 11748: 147.

[371] Letter from Saxon consulate in Bremen to Saxon MaA, HStAD, MdI 11748: 28.

> Stopping the transmigrant traffic appears not recommended as that would lead to incalculable border crossings, which can only increase the danger of an epidemic introduction. It is much more preferable to let the emigrants pass at certain border locations under the supervision of authorities.[372]

Germany had encountered this problem of cross-border smuggling of persons when Prussia had closed its border to Russia in response to the outbreak of 1892. Thus, authorities concluded that, instead of preventing transmigration, monitoring transmigration along designated routes served the best means to avoid cholera outbreaks in Germany. Even if Russians slipped past control stations, Germany had the resources to "recognize individual cases of the disease in time" and prevent cholera from becoming a greater problem.[373]

Isolation and Quarantine: Maintaining the Transit Corridor through Saxony

In late 1904, Berlin communicated to Saxony the potential danger of cholera brought by transmigrants.[374] In a letter sent to Saxon authorities, the Secretary of the Interior, Count von Posadowsky, warned of the "advancement of cholera in Russia" and its potential threat to "Western Governments."[375] Though health regulations normally fell under the responsibility of individual federal states, Berlin pushed toward tougher health control of traffic between Saxony and Austria. The capital claimed the lack of border surveillance on the Saxon-Austrian border had allowed Russian transmigrants to bypass the control stations along the Prussian-Russian border.[376] To back its central authority, Berlin authorities referred to a June 20th, 1900, law on

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[372] Letter from Imperial Office of the Interior, HStAD, MdI 11748: 33.

[373] Letter from Saxon consulate in Bremen to Saxon MaA, HStAD, MdI 11748: 28.

[374] HStAD, MaA 1649: letter from Der Reichskanzler, Reichsamt des Innern, Berlin, 13. Februar 1905 to Saxon MaA.

[375] Ibid.

[376] Letter from Imperial Office of the Interior, HStAD, MdI 11748: 33.

the prevention of "diseases that pose a public danger."[377] Prussian authorities and to some extent Saxon authorities felt they neighbored an "epidemiological frontier" and feared the speed at which these emigrant trains could bring disease.[378]

On the Prussian-Russian border, "special sealed emigrants trains" carried Russian transmigrants either to the inland control station Ruhleben or harbor cities.[379] Saxony had adopted a similar method by June 1905. In a report to officials in Dresden, the Saxon railway (run by the province's Ministry of Finance) outlined the actions it took to transmigrants on trains:

> Foreign emigrants traveling through Saxony are already, as far as possible, transported in special railcars or isolated from other passengers by a partition wall that reaches to the railcar's ceiling. Special trains, running ahead or behind, will be discharged as necessary.[380]

Authorities would then "thoroughly clean" the railcars or sections after use.[381] German officials adapted the idea of isolation, quarantine, and disinfection to emigrant trains, which separated transmigrants from the German populations. If emigrants exited at a train station while traveling through Prussia, officials sometimes went so far as to clear and disinfect the stop.[382] The state railways certainly projected the intention to keep foreigners isolated from Germans and

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[377] HStAD, MdI 11748: 9.

[378] Peter Baldwin, *Contagion and the State in Europe, 1830-1930* (New York: Cambridge Universtiy Press, 1999), 218.

[379] Nicole Kvale Eilers,"Emigrant Trains: Jewish Migration through Prussia and American Remote Control, 1880-1914," in *Points of Passage: Jewish Transmigrants from Eastern Europe in Scandinavia, Germany, and Britain*, *1880-1914*, ed. Tobias Brinkmann (New York: Berghahn Books, 2013): 69.

[380] HStAD, MdI 11732: 41.

[381] HStAD, MdI 11732: 41.

[382] Evans, *Death in Hamburg*, 280.

succeeded to some extent. Still, as Nicole Kvale reveals in her work on emigrant trains through Prussia, not all transmigrants traveled separately from Germans. She calculates that "several thousand eastern European emigrants arrived unsupervised in Bremen each year."[383] Indeed, Saxon authorities expected a few transmigrants would slip past officials and ride amongst other passengers. Even if Saxon authorities attempted to isolate the transmigrants from other travelers, some cars and compartments, unlike those in Prussia, were apparently not locked. The emigrants could exit the trains at stops on the way to Leipzig (as mentioned in Chapter 2, some transmigrants used these stops to circumnavigate the Leipzig registration station in its first year), mingle amongst Germans on the train platforms, and then take alternate routes.[384]

Once the emigrants arrived in Leipzig, the urban layout of city made the complete separation between the indigenous German population and transmigrants en route to the registration station impossible. If transmigrants arrived at the Bayerischer train station on the southern end of the city center, they walked half-an-hour to an hour to the registration station on the northern edge of the city center. They would then walk to whichever of the six train stations hosted their connecting train.[385] Given the numerous emigrants, the multiple train stations, and relatively small registration station staff, the travelers certainly came near the German population in the bustling city.

Once transmigrants arrived at the registration station, the full-time doctor Christoph Ferckel and an assistant briefly inspected every person. Ferckel worked at the station from its opening in 1904. The doctors' fee comprised of 4400 M per annum, the second highest amount

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[383] Nicole Kvale Eilers, "Emigrant Trains," in *Points of* Passage, 74.

[384] MdI 11732: 41.

[385] MdI 11732: 41.

for doctors at German control and registration stations, next to the Ruhleben. This may have been due to the sheer number of transmigrants inspected in Leipzig (for 1905 alone, some 87,166 travelers).[386] The doctors checked primarily for eye sicknesses, especially the infectious disease trachoma, and skin, looking especially at the hands and forearms of the patients for any signs of rashes or bumps. [387] If they worked uninterrupted, doctors at Leipzig could inspect 100 people in half an hour. A barrier separated the doctor and patient from the rest of the station, yet those travelers suspected of illness would go into a separate room for further inspection. Russians destined for Hamburg were sent to Ruhleben (near Berlin) for disinfection, though they did not always travel in sealed cars.[388] Authorities chose the city hospital St. Jacob for people who had come into contact with choleric transmigrants. The hospital "provided six rooms and altogether 30 beds and the necessary measures for isolation of these barracks and nursing staff."[389] The city still looked for a location for actual choleric patients. As of 1906, authorities sent infected adults to the St. Joseph and university hospitals and sick children to the children's hospital.[390]

The problem with the superficial medical examination for signs of cholera in both Leipzig and eventually borderland checkpoints was that cholera had a pattern of sudden onset, often after a relatively long incubation period. Few symptoms other than a general feeling of

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[386] Report from Dr. Nocht, Dr. Tjaden, and Dr. Sthamer to the Bremen and Hamburg Senates, 21 July 1906, StAH, Auswanderungsamt I, II E I 1 b, Teil 1 von 2, pg. 88.

[387]Report from Dr. Nocht, Dr. Tjaden, and Dr. Sthamer to the Bremen and Hamburg Senates, 20 July 1906, StAH, Auswanderungsamt I, II E I 1 b, Teil 2 von 2, pg.517.

[388] StBr, 4, 21, Nr. 506, Besichtigung der Auswandererkontrollstationen an der russischen Grenze (Bajohren, Tilsit, Insterburg, Eydtkuhnen, Prostken, Illowo, Ottlotschin, Posen, Ostrowo), der Auswandererzentralkontrollstation Ruhleben, sowie der Auswandererregistrierstation Myslowtiz, Ratibor und Leipzig 1906, report on the Leipzig station.

[389] Report by the Leipzig municipal doctor, HStAD, MdI 11748: 76.

[390] StBr 4, 21, Nr. 506, Besichtigung, report on the Leipzig station.

unease appear before the body begins to purge itself. The transmigrant could contract the disease in Russia or Galicia but not show any symptoms until he or she had passed the Saxon checkpoints. The transmigrant could travel all the way to Hamburg or Rotterdam without raising alarm. As aforementioned, incubation of the bacteria lasted from fourteen hours to five days before symptoms appeared. [391] At times, the United States government, as a receiving country of the emigrants, ordered Russian transmigrants to remain in isolation at port cities for at least five days so that the disease could show itself.

Transmigrants who arrived at the registration station in the evening or who needed to stay longer were taken to Leipzig guesthouses or hostels, specified for each shipping company, and placed in a separate section from the rooms of other travelers.[392] The sum of 1.50 Marks per night reserved a room in these "emigrant hotels."[393] According to an inspection in 1906, sanitation in the Leipzig hostels, each run by a different shipping companies, varied. Inspectors noted how the *Amerikanischer Hof*, run by the Holland America Line (HAL), was generally clean with "automatic flushing when the water closet door was opened."[394]A Mrs. Händler owned the fair to middling *Goldene Sonne*, which housed both Hamburg-Amerika (HAPAG) and NDL customers.[395] *Rother Stern*, run by the Red-Star Line (RSL), was more than wanting: bed linens were not changed with each new occupant.[396]

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[391] Echenberg, *Africa in the time of Cholera,* 7.

[392] Report from Kiliszewski, StAH, Auswanderungsamt I, II E I 1 b, Teil 2 von 2, pg. 433.

[393] Report from Kiliszewski, StAH, Auswanderungsamt I, II E I 1 b, Teil 2 von 2, pg. 443.

[394] StBr 4, 21, Nr. 506, Besichtigung, report on emigrant hostels in Leipzig.

[395] List of accommodations by the Leipzig city council, HStAD, MdI 11748: 62.

The lack of sanitation in the emigrant hostels showed two flaws of the cholera containment system. First, while the system ostensibly limited the possibility of contaminating German populations, authorities sometimes neglected hygiene and cleanliness within the transit corridor. Authorities feared the supposed squalor and dirtiness of populations from the East, yet the emigrant trains and stations in Germany lapsed into filth and neglect. In 1908 the US Immigration Commission sent a group of agents, disguised as emigrants, to report on traveling conditions within Europe and on steamships. One agent, forced to spend the night at the Myslowitz control station, described walls "alive with vermin" and worried that baggage would become infected.[397] In a letter to Albert Ballin, director of HAPAG, emigrants held for a number of days at the Prussian control stations Illowo complained that they waited "in filth" and their children contracted lice and scabies."[398] Second, the dirtiness of the facilities demonstrated that the efforts at disease prevention were not as much in the interest of the emigrants themselves but more greatly of the native population. Indeed, keeping the travelers within the transit corridor could increase the chances of emigrants contracting diseases, as shown when they stayed in the same squalid barracks or drank the same contaminated water.[399]

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[396] StBr 4, 21, Nr. 506, Besichtigung, report on the Leipzig station.

[397] United States, Senate, 61st Cong., 3rd sess., Immigrant Commission (Dillingham Commission, DC), *Reports* (41 vols., Washington DC, 1911), XXXVII, 29.

[398] In *Bread to Eat, Clothes to Wear: Letters from Jewish Migrants in the Early Twentieth Century*, ed. Gur Alroey (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2011), 100.

[399] Howard Markel looks at the intersections of class, sanitation and cholera on steamships in *Quarantine! East European Jewish Immigrants and the New York City Epidemics of 1892* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 103-104.

The three registration stations along the Austrian-German border varied in policy where transmigrants spent the night:

> …[E]migrants in Myslowitz were not allowed to leave the station, even after inspection….In Ratibor the emigrants staying there overnight are brought to a hostel in the city, which they are not allowed to leave. In Leipzig they similarly lodge in the city and are allowed to move about.[400]

The fact that transmigrants in Leipzig could leave the hostel and roam the city showed a relative leniency on cholera control as opposed to stations closer to Russia. Myslowitz, right on the corner of Russia, Germany, and Austria-Hungary, had stricter regulations on overnight stays than Ratibor, which only bordered Austria-Hungary. This undoubtedly reflected the belief that Austro-Hungarian transmigrants carried fewer diseases and supposedly came from more hygienic regions.

Volkmar Müller, a reporter for the Leipzig popular press *Illustrirte Zeitung* ("Illustrated Newspaper") in a 1906 article seemed little worried that the station brought transmigrants in contact with the city. The reporter reassured readers that the two doctors at the station kept a close watch on emigrants for illness. He described the building as clean, well-lit, and well-ventilated, marks of a good hygiene that resonated with a number of people who still believed that disease arose from miasmas or dirty environments. According to the 1906 inspection by Hamburg and Bremen officials, the Leipzig registration station, the newest of all the German stations, seemed generally in order. A woman and her adult daughter cleaned regularly, sweeping twice a day and mopping two to three times a week. The station had good light and ventilation,

[400] Report by police inspector Kiliszewski, StAH, Auswanderungsamt I, II E I 1 b, Teil 2 von 2, pg. 516.

sinks with running water in the main hall, and three men's and five women's lavatories without flushing.[401]

For a year and a half after its inception, the Leipzig registration station operated as the sole checkpoint for disease amongst overseas-bound emigrants within the province of Saxony. In the fall of 1905, as cholera spread in Russia, more and more politicians and health officials voiced concern that transmigrants were not immediately inspected at the Saxon-Bohemian border but instead traveled miles inland to Leipzig before a doctor checked them for cholera. Berlin suggested to Saxony that it instead "assemble transmigrants immediately at border points of entry" and conduct them to ports via Leipzig in "special trains or wagons."[402] For many authorities, the transit corridor through Saxony was not enough to separate the potentially infected emigrants from the local population; they wanted to prevent illnesses from even entering Saxon territory by instigating cholera checkpoints at Austrian borderland stations.

Saxon-Bohemian Borderland Cholera Checkpoints

The idea of border cholera checkpoints was not unique to Germany. Before cholera broke out in Russia in 1904, Russian officials nervously watched as the disease spread within neighboring Persia. Instead of having the military close the border, which would alarm populations, Russia implemented "medical observation points."[403] On 10 September 1905, Dr. Buschbeck, president of the Saxon Provincial-Medicinal-Collegium, relayed to Saxon authorities the results of a discussion amongst Imperial German health officials to do something similar. The medical experts concluded that Prussia, Saxony, and Bavaria should only allow eastern

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[401] StBr 4, 21, Nr. 506, Besichtigung, report on the Leipzig station.

[402] HStAD, MdI 11732: 38.

[403] Henze, *Disease, Health Care and Government in Imperial Russia,* 128.

European emigrants to cross the border at a limited number of railway stations, where authorities could inspect them and isolate those with illness. Buschbeck outlined the plan for the Saxon-Bohemian border:

> …[I]t will be necessary to allow emigrants entry into Saxony at the Austrian border only at the two railway stations and Voitersreuth, to block the other crossing points of Austria into Saxony, and to construct control stations at Bodenbach and Voitersreuth to inspect the emigrants and detain those with cholera or suspected of having the disease.[404]

Though Buschbeck suggested "control stations," where emigrants would be inspected for signs of cholera and be held if they displayed symptoms. Buschbeck and others chose the railway stations at Bodenbach ("Podmokly" in Czech) and Voitersreuth ("Vojtanov" in Czech) as they were both situated on popular transmigrant routes toward Leipzig and, though within Austrian territory, the beginnings of the Saxon railways. Limiting transmigrant traffic to these two stations also ensured the travelers would continue to Leipzig, where they would register.

NDL employees and Saxon police on the borderland, who often had better insight on local logistics than the ministers based in Dresden, gave their opinion on locations of the potential borderland checkpoints. The train station at Bodenbach was situated across the Elbe from another train station at Tetschen ("Děčín" in Czech). Police and shipping employees argued that the majority of transmigrants traveled via Tetschen and that the one policeman stationed there would have difficulty convincing transmigrants to walk from Tetschen to the Bodenbach train station for inspection and further travel. [405] The Saxon border police inspector at Bodenbach even discussed the issue with an Austrian official, who suggested that the inspection take place in Tetschen instead of Bodenbach. The train station at Tetschen also had better facilities to

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[404] HStAD, MdI 11748: 7.

[405] HStAD, MdI 11748: 14.

accommodate the doctor: a large, enclosed space where potential cholera cases could be further inspected (Bodenbach, on the other hand, had very little accommodation) and a public hospital nearby where they could isolate any cases.[406] The Saxon police and shipping companies asked if emigrants could additionally be checked and cross at the Tetschen station.[407] Officials in Dresden complied and allowed crossing only through Tetschen, Bodenbach, and Voitersreuth and closed all other points of entry to emigrants.[408] This policy change illustrates the importance of adaptation and spontaneity in applying nation-state policies on the provincial level.

Policemen at the border stations raised concerns about the new regulations. They pointed out that transmigrants with direct tickets to Leipzig would have trouble when stopped for medical inspection. If they missed their connection, they would need to buy third class tickets from the borderland station or wait until the next day for a train to honor their fourth-class tickets. They would then spend the night as families on the train platform. The police at Bodenbach emphasized that arriving migrants had "very little money" to buy new tickets and "were hardly in the position to be sent back to their homeland," having taken all of their possessions with them.[409] The police also worried that emigrants not allowed into Saxony because of health concerns would become a "burden" to the Austrian state, straining relations

[406] HStAD, MdI 11748: 14-15.

[407] HStAD, MdI 11748: 15.

[408] HStAD, MdI 11748: 19.

[409] HStAD, MdI 11748: 15.

between the two empires.[410] Austrian officials also argued against Bodenbach as a place for stopping sick transmigants as they had no proper hospital in the area.[411]

By 1 October 1905 Saxon doctors and police had begun inspecting emigrants at the three Bohemian borderland stations. If emigrants thought to be choleric did not comply with the doctor, the police would step in. Train personnel also needed to report any potential signs of cholera to the border police inspector. [412] In a 29 September 1905 letter, the Saxon Ministry of the Interior also expected the Bodenbach police to communicate "immediately per telegraph" if the doctor found any cholera or potential choleric cases.[413] The police worked with Dr. Hollmatz at the Bodenbach train station and Dr. Philipp at the Tetschen train station. Additionally, the police at Oelsnitz (near Voitersreuth) were told to contact Dr. Sonntag in Brambach if anyone found signs of cholera among the emigrants.[414] Sometimes the police served the only role in cholera checking at the border. At the train station stop before Voitersreuth, a town in Bohemia called Eger ("Cheb" in Czech), as of 6 October 1905, only a "police watch" looked for potential cholera cases. A similar example occurred in British-ruled Sri Lanka as constables contained contagious diseases and organized treatment during outbreaks.[415]

Saxon authorities often relayed updates to their Austrian counterparts about their operations, as the cholera checks occurred on the Austrian side of the border. The police

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[410] HStAD, MdI 11748: 15.

[411] HStAD, MdI 11748: 47-48.

[412] HStAD, MdI 11748: 52.

[413] HStAD, MdI 11748: 39.

[414] HStAD, MdI 11748: 51-52.

[415] S.A. Meegama, *Famine, Fevers, and Fear: The State and Disease in British Colonial Sri Lanka* (Sri Lanka: Sridevi Publication, 2012), 85.

inspector at Bodenbach served as an intermediary between the Saxon Ministry of the Interior at and Austrian authorities. In reference to the 1 October inspections of emigrants at Tetschen, the police inspector relayed that Austria was aware of the conditions:

> The ambassador-inspector of the Austro-Hungarian State Railway Company, Herr Czech, shared with me that he informed the higher office in Prague about this new development, which was immediately reported to the director in Vienna. [416]

The Bodenbach inspector also relayed information to the local regional director, who then reported to his superiors in Prague.[417] The popular press got word of the checkpoints by 1 December 1905 when the Prague-based newspaper *Národní listy* notified overseas emigrants of the change in border-crossing protocol.[418]

On July 9th, 1906, Dr. Fraustadt in Dresden asked NDL whether it would be better to replace the Leipzig station with two control stations directly on the border at Schandau and Adorf.[419] However, NDL claimed that there was not enough space at either train station.[420] The reasons why Saxon officials chose stations on the Bohemian instead of the Saxon side of the border are not completely clear. Indeed the Hamburg police inspector Kiliszewski suggested the towns Schandau and Brambach on the Saxon side as border control stations for Saxony.[421] The Saxon health official Dr. Buschbeck was also concerned that Saxony might run into problems

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[416] HStAD, MdI 11748: 47.

[417] HStAD, MdI 11748: 47-48.

[418] Reference to article found on "O čem se psalo? (První výběr z periodik 19. a 20. století)," last modified 2013, http://ozubavci-decane.webnode.cz/news/o-cem-se-psalo-prvni-vyber-z-periodik-19-a-20-stoleti-/. "Důležité pro vystěhovalce do Ameriky," *Národní listy* 1.12.1905, Nr. 331, pg. 2, http://kramerius.nkp.cz/kramerius/handle/ABA001/9159196.

[419] HStAD, MdI 11748: 140.

[420] HStAD, MdI 11748: 142.

[421] StAH, Auswanderungsamt I, II E I 1 b, Teil 2 von 2, pg. 441.

with Austria as the borderland stations were within the latter's borders. However, given the tendency for state-owned rail lines to extend to towns right outside the border, both Bodenbach-Tetschen and Voitersreuth marked the beginning of Saxon state railways. Saxon officials also undoubtedly founded cholera checkpoints on the Austrian side of the border to prevent infectious diseases from entering into Saxon territory.

On 16 October 1905, the Bodenbach border police inspector reported they still had no place to inspect transmigrants because the Austro-Hungarian State Railways had not taken any steps toward building a separate location to inspect transmigrants:

> The emigrants arrive mixed with other travelers in coupé cars…, must exit the train, and the inspection still just takes place among the other passengers on the train platform. There is also still no instigation for the construction of an inspection hall.[422]

Thus, the police and doctors felt they needed an immediate facility to house potentially ill transmigrants. A hall would create some physical separation of the bodies of the overseas-bound from the rest of the population. This distinction was not apparent when the migrants mixed with other third- and fourth-class passengers on the platform. This lack of separation not only made doctors' inspections difficult, but it also undermined the authorities' claims that the bodies of the overseas-bound were different and somehow more likely to carry cholera.

Eventually, given the circumstances, Saxon officials considered relaxing the borderland checkpoint surveillance. On 4 November 1905, given the relative quietness of the cholera situation in Germany and abroad, the Saxon Provincial-Medicinal-Collegium suggested the inspection of transmigrants at the border station could at some point fall by the wayside.[423] The police inspector at Bodenbach claimed on 12 November 1905 only one "doubtful case" had

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[422] HStAD, MdI 11748: 82.

[423] HStAD, MdI 11748: 83.

appeared during the month-and-a-half of inspection and asked if the doctors needed to continue checking transmigrants.[424] He found the inspection rather pointless because transmigrants arrived seated amongst other passengers, exited the train, and stood with other passengers on the platform. He claimed the doctors barely had a chance to look at the travelers and they boarded the train, once again mixed with other passengers. He felt the focus on overseas passengers too limited as Polish field workers came from the same areas. At one point the Saxon Ministry of the Interior considered stopping doctors' inspections at the borderland stations.[425] However, Berlin released a statement in December 1905 that 18 deaths due to cholera had appeared the first week of November. The government feared that if Saxony halted its checkpoints, transmigrants would avoid the Prussian stations and take the roundabout route through Saxony.[426]

Discussions about the Leipzig registration station and the Saxon-Bohemian borderland cholera checkpoints reflected the "tension between local and translocal knowledge."[427] Saxon authorities knew about the spread of cholera in Russian lands, yet as for transmigrant cases, encountered none. Part of the registration station's plan was to intercept Russian transmigrants who circumnavigated the Prussian-Russian border stations, yet in comparison to other transmigrants, Russians were very few. These discussions also highlighted the tensions between German provinces and the central government in Berlin as the latter tried to implement imperial-wide policies for very localized issues.

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[424] HStAD, MdI 11748: 110.

[425] HStAD, MdI 11748: 111.

[426] HStAD, MdI 11748: 86-87.

[427] Linda Nash, *Inescapable Ecologies: A History of Environment, Disease, and Knowledge* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006), 10.

People engaged in everyday trade and migration between Bohemia and Saxony considered the limiting of railway border traffic to the three train stations an overestimation of the actual cholera threat. The Hamburg police inspector Kiliszewski described the reactions of two people he met while on an inspection trip of borderland stations. An Austrian "farmer, butcher, or cattle smuggler" complained about the difficulties presented by the lockdown of the Saxon-Bohemian border. Instead of taking cattle directly into Saxony, he now needed to take a roundabout route by first crossing the Bavarian-Bohemian border and then traveling from Bavaria into Saxony. During a later train ride, Kiliszewski engaged in a conversation with a factory owner from the Saxon industrial city of Chemnitz. The businessman complained about the closing of the border and the "exaggerated fears of cholera that Saxons had."[428] Formerly his workers, all Bohemians, would travel from Weipert ("Vejprty" in Czech) Bohemia into Saxony. Now they inconveniently had to cross at Voitersreuth, Bodenbach, or Tetschen.[429] Given his conversations with these two locals, the police inspector reported how Germany would do better to have Austria "close its border to Russia" if authorities really wanted to regulate migration from Russia and that the "closing of the Saxon border" was "a great loss" to the transborder trade.[430]

Some locals of Bodenbach, Tetschen, and Voitersreuth believed that the border surveillance increased the potential for outbreak in their respective towns. Indeed, in an article from 17 December 1905, the *Dresdner Anzeiger* called the Bodenbach train station "the problem child" of the Austrian town. The train station featured prominently in emigrant traffic from the

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[428] StAH, Auswanderungsamt I, II E I 1 b, Teil 2 von 2, pg. 425.

[429] StAH, Auswanderungsamt I, II E I 1 b, Teil 2 von 2, pg. 424.

[430] StAH, Auswanderungsamt I, II E I 1 b, Teil 2 von 2, pg. 427.

East, and, as the newspaper reported, lacked the proper facilities to keep emigrants separated from the locals. "The emigrants camp in the waiting rooms, hallways, next to the ticket counters, and everywhere else" as they waited for their trains, sometimes for hours.[431] A doctor called in to address a case of typhus Bodenbach the previous year pointed out that the train station was an arrival point for diseases. The newspaper blamed the state railways for still not responding to the inadequate conditions at the station. Even though the railway planned to build a barrack for the transmigrants, the newspaper pointed out that the neighboring residents disapproved.

For each of the Saxon-Bohemian border checkpoints, authorities wrote back and forth about the possibility of opening barracks, or some form of isolated locations to take choleric cases and other people in contact with the infected. There was further talk about an emigrant hall in the form of a "corrugated sheet iron barrack" at Tetschen:

> This, approximately 6 m long and 4 m wide, would suffice to serve the doctor for inspection of potentially infected patients. Those travelers would be at arrival here, without coming into contact with the rest of the public, as quickly and discretely as possible, brought into this room and inspected by a doctor. If signs of the disease were detected, those inflicted would be brought immediately to the hospital, while unsuspected travelers could be allowed to travel farther on.[432]

Once again, authorities emphasized the isolation of potentially ill travelers from the general public. The police inspector also mentioned a "disinfecting apparatus" could be set up next to the barrack, and a locomotive would provide the steam needed to clean any infected belongs.[433] The Ministry of War had a barrack for use, yet the cost to take down the barrack and rebuild it on-site

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[431] HStAD, MdI 11748: 122.

[432] HStAD, MdI 11748: 170.

[433] HStAD, MdI 11748: 170.

would reach 2500 Marks-3000 Marks or more.[434] The steep price and the realization that the land where they want to build the barrack technically belonged to Austria eventually caused talks to dissipate. [435]

Some German officials discussed the possibility of opening registration stations at the borderland checkpoints instead of requiring transmigrants to register in Leipzig. Ultimately authorities rejected this idea due to money, time, and German-Austrian political relations. Shipping companies did not want the expense of three stations in Saxony as opposed to one in Leipzig where the railways converged. Second, because the waiting time between trains in Leipzig was longer; transmigrants would have more time to register in Leipzig than at the borderland stations.[436] Third the borderland train stations were set on the Bohemian side of the border and German authorities worried about straining relations by having German-run facilities on Austrian land.

Limiting emigrant border traffic to the three stations encouraged travelers to take the transit corridor to Leipzig and then ultimately to Hamburg and Bremen. A Hamburg senator named Roeloffs believed that German shipping companies used border controls more as a tactic to gain a monopoly on transmigrant traffic than as a shield against infectious diseases.[437] Roeloffs supposition was reinforced when a "Leipzig closed" handbill circled amongst transmigrants. The red-lettered flyer instructed emigrants to avoid the Saxon railway lines entirely by having them travel from the Bohemian station at Eger, to the Bavarian town of Hof,

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[434] HStAD, MdI 11748: 179.

[435] HStAD, MdI 11748: 185.

[436] HStAD, MdI 11748: 159.

[437] StAH, Auswanderungsamt I, II EI 1b, Teil 1 von 2, pg. 45.

and on to Rotterdam.[438] HAPAG sent a furious letter in English to the White Star Line, a competitor they suspected had circulated the flyers:

> During the last few months in which cases of Cholera have occurred, your agent and representative Mr. Harry Cohen has been forwarding large quantities of printed instructions to Emigrants which show these people how they can pass through Germany and reach Rotterdam without the examinations in a Control Station prescribed by the Law. Whereas, owing to the Cholera separate trains were being despatched [sic] from all Control Stations to prevent the emigrants from coming into contact with the population, your agent has been inducing such people, who possibl(y) have been the germ of the desease [sic] in them, to travel through Germany by illegal ways. We sincerely hope you will experience no unpleasant consequences on account of this imprudent proceeding, but after the above explanation, you will certainly understand into what an unpleasant situation such reprehensible dealings may place us who did our best to take care of your interests.[439]

Even though Hamburg authorities emphasized the risk to public health, the circumnavigation of Saxon controls ultimately meant that a competing line had found an alternative route for its customers. These Russians would then not feel the pressure at control points to purchase tickets with German-sanctioned lines.

Registration Station into Control Station?

As Saxony enforced the borderland checkpoints, German authorities debated whether to take another precaution against cholera by turning the Leipzig registration station into a control station. Control stations required transmigrants to undergo a doctor's inspection, to bathe and disinfect themselves, and to disinfect their belongings. Registration stations, on the other hand, mandated only a short examination by a doctor. The location of control stations along the German-Russian border versus the registration stations along the German-Austrian border reflected a belief that Russians were less clean than Austro-Hungarians. One official argued that

[438] HStAD, MdI 11748: 52.

[439] StAB: 3-A 4 Nr. 289, copy of letter from Ismay, Imrie, & Co., Liverpool 20th December 1905 to Harry Cohen, Esq.

control stations sanitized "particularly dirty populations" (i.e., Russians) who made their way through Germany.[440] However, as cholera surfaced in Austrian Galicia, German officials began to rethink their regulations of the German-Austrian borderlands.

As early as December 1904, the president of the Imperial Office of Health in Berlin suggested the possibility of setting up a control station in Saxony.[441] Berlin authorities worried that the more relaxed regulations in Saxony prompted transmigrants to travel through Germany to Dutch harbors without having undergone a medical examination. In November 1905, one Hamburg senator mentioned the costs of turning registration stations into control stations and believed the Saxon state could assist the shipping companies with costs. [442] He also stated that, while Leipzig needed better control, authorities need not control the Saxon-Bohemian border as strongly given the "orderly conditions" in Austria Hungary.[443] In December 1905 the Hamburg Senate wrote to Berlin that the "health-police control of the large stream of emigrants through Leipzig was not enough," especially considering the lack of bathing and disinfection facilities.[444] In 1906 the Hamburg Senate began discussions with Bremen regarding cholera and German borderlands, including the possibility of turning the registration stations of the Austrian borderlands into control stations. Leipzig's Prussian-Austrian sister stations, Myslowitz and Ratibor, already had bathing and sanitization facilities to use at discretion by 1905.[445]

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[440] StAH, Auswanderungsamt I, II EI 1b, Teil 1 von, pg. 90.

[441] HStAD, MdI 11732: 39.

[442] StAH, Auswanderungsamt I, II EI 1b, Teil 1 von 2, pg. 13-14.

[443] StAH, Auswanderungsamt I, II EI 1b, Teil 1 von 2, pg. 13-14.

[444] StAH, Auswanderungsamt I, II EI 1b, Teil 1 von 2, pg. 5.

[445] HStAD, MdI 11748: 99.

The control station process of bathing transmigrants and disinfecting their belongings was a hassle for authorities and a harrowing experience for the travelers. The Russian Jewish transmigrant Maschke Antin described the process of disinfection she underwent while traveling through the Ruhleben station in 1894:

> [We found] ourselves driven into a little room where a great kettle was boiling on a little stove; our clothes taken off, our bodies rubbed with a slippery substance that might be any bad thing; a shower of warm water let down on us without warning; again driven to another little room where we sit, wrapped in woolen blankets…[446]

Given the confusion and humiliation that came with the disinfection process, it is little wonder Russian transmigrants sometimes preferred to smuggle themselves across the Prussian border or travel southwards to pass through the registration stations instead. Antin acknowledged that the bathing purposed to eradicate "all suspicions of dangerous germs," yet deeply resented the treatment.[447] Big business also heavily protested the changing of registration stations into control stations. In communiqués to the Saxon Ministry of the Interior, NDL claimed sanitation in Austria and the Balkans was better than in Russia.[448] In reality, the company feared that more borderland restrictions would send potential customers to foreign competitors.

After Hamburg and Bremen health officials conducted a tour of the control and registration stations in 1906, they advised against turning the Leipzig registration station into a control station. They agreed that these restrictions would cause transmigrants to avoid traveling through Germany, and state railways and German shipping companies would lose a sizable number of customers. They additionally concluded that the extra precautions of the control

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[446] Mary Antin, *From Plotzk to Boston* (Boston: W.B. Clarke, 1899), 42.

[447] Ibid., 43.

[448] HStAD, MdI 11748: 159.

stations made little difference in preventing illness. In 1905 the control stations sent 8,827 ill emigrants back their homelands, yet 2,838 more were rejected once they reached Hamburg and Bremen. Aside from sanitation, the bathing and disinfecting had little effect on diseases already in incubation. The registration and control stations saved the state and shipping companies 250,000 Marks annually by having unfit migrants sent back to from the border as opposed to port cities, yet bathing and disinfecting facilities also incurred expenses. The Hamburg and Bremen inspectors suggested a more centralized policy of health for all stations in order to increase efficiency. They acknowledged that stations would not stop disease already in incubation but believed the transit corridor still had a purpose:

> The value of the stations applies to other areas. They protect Germany first and foremost through their role as a collecting point that direct the traffic in closed trains and, through avoiding contact with the German population, prevent the spread of germs. [449]

The report concluded that 1) the control and registration stations made very little difference in the prevention of disease in harbor cities 2) the benefits to "the rest of Germany" in disease prevention were that transmigrants kept to distinctive routes 3) increased controls would increase circumnavigation of the stations 4) the transit corridor needed more medical control by the individual states, unhampered by shipping company interests.[450]

While talk of cholera busied the pens and typewriters of German bureaucrats, on the ground, police and health officials encountered other diseases. A September 1907 an outbreak of the pox in Vienna prompted doctors at Bodenbach and Tetschen to check accordingly for

[449] StAH, Auswanderungsamt I, II EI 1b, Teil 1 von 2, pg. 90.

[450] StAH, Auswanderungsamt I, II EI 1b, Teil 1 von 2, pg. 91.

symptoms.[451] In 1905 Leipzig hospitalized one transmigrant for the measles, two for pneumonia (one died), one for a stroke (another fatality), one for chronic blood poisoning, and one for delirium tremens. The station additionally sent other transmigrants back to their homelands: one with mental illness, one with skin disease, one with the scalp disease favus, and 106 with trachoma. [452] According to Krista Maglen, the infectious eye disease was "highly visible, easily detectable and disgusting," and, like cholera, became an illness associated with immigrants.[453]

The Social Democratic newspaper *Vorwärts* released a story on how the health codes and unfortunate circumstances led to tragedy, with the fault placed on the supposed ignorance of the transmigrants. On 24 September 1905, officials at the Ratibor registration station stopped five transmigrants from travelling farther into Germany. A 27-year old Galician woman, Pauline Kopecz, and her three children; Johann (age 8), Marie (6) and Stanislaus (4); showed symptoms of trachoma. A 55-year old woman from Kassa[454] named Marie Blaczonsky showed signs of disease on her face and legs. The police held them in a detention cell overnight to be sent back to their respective homelands the next morning. The supervisor left them to sleep on sacks of hay and when he returned early the next morning to wake them, all were lifeless. A petroleum flame left on during the night had blown out, thus filling the room with gas. Authorities took the bodies outside and tried to revive them. Only the young boy showed any sign of life but died the next

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[451] Letter from Saxon MdI to border police at Bodenbach, HStAD, MdI 11748: 194.

[452] StAB 4,21—506, 1905 table of emigrants organized by steamship line and province of origin.

[453] Krista Maglen, "Importing Trachoma: The Introduction into Britain of American Ideas of an 'Immigrant Disease', 1892-1906" *Immigrants & Minorities* 23 (2005): 96.

[454] Another report listed Blaczonsky as 54 years old. At that time Kassa was in Hungary, today it is the city Košice in Slovakia

day still unconscious in the hospital.[455] Because trachoma increases sensitivity to light, authorities believed one of the victims had blown out the flame during the night. Authorities surmised the emigrants would have only used candlelight or lamplight in their homeland and thus not know to turn off the gas pump.[456] The newspaper demanded a further investigation.[457]

The police at Ratibor claimed authorities had no culpability with the deaths. The police stated that the travelers had suffered from trachoma along with various other diseases, which would prevent them from staying in a hostel. In contrast to other reports, the emigrants had not asked to stay in a hostel. The police would not have been able to grant this request anyway given the circumstances of health and lack of money. Authorities had initially brought the transmigrants to the station, as they did not have the required 400 Marks needed to avoid passing through the registration station. However, the mother likely feared someone would take her money as authorities later found the funds sewn into her dress. The police claimed that due to a police ordinance that stated detention rooms needed to be lit when dark. A detainee in the room above had heard around 4 in the morning a child talking and the mother responding, "Go to sleep, there is still some time," whereupon, the police assumed, the mother blew out the flame.[458] The officer emphasized in his report that doctors inspected the room for any potential drafts but could find none and that the transmigrants were responsible for their own deaths.

While this case was ruled a tragic accident, deeper prejudices and unacknowledged preventative measures existed within the report. Authorities assumed the foreigners had a little

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[455] GStA PK, I. HA Rep. 77 Ministerium des Innern, Tit. 226 Nr. 124 Bd. 20, pg. 298.

[456] GStA PK, I. HA Rep. 77 Ministerium des Innern, Tit. 226 Nr. 124 Bd. 20, pg. 297.

[457] GStA PK, I. HA Rep. 77 Ministerium des Innern, Tit. 226 Nr. 124 Bd. 20, pg. 297.

[458] GStA PK, I. HA Rep. 77 Ministerium des Innern, Tit. 226 Nr. 124 Bd. 20, pg. 298.

understanding of gas lighting given their less-advanced geographical origins. However, placing an extinguishable gas lamp in a closed, unventilated space demonstrated a lack of understanding of the danger of the technology on the part of German authorities. Even if ordinances required the lighting of prison cells, authorities could have taken the hypersensitivity of trachoma-afflicted eyes into consideration. Indeed, though officials' language mostly remained neutral, sometimes bluntness in attitude toward the migrants appeared in correspondence. Heinrich Wiegand, the director of NDL, pointed out that "anyone suspected of carrying disease can be readily be deported across the border and the cities of Ratibor and Leipzig feel obligated to take the sick persons in their hospitals."[459] Hamburg officials sometimes referred to transmigrants that did not pass through the stations as "wild emigrants."[460] Scared by the strict policies, they instead "mixed amongst other travelers" outside of monitoring.[461]

Conclusion

On April 19th, 1907, health officials in Berlin decided to discontinue the bathing and disinfection of transmigrants (with the exception of extreme cases) at control stations. Berlin justified its decision:

> In general the keeping of the universal requirements of bathing and disinfection seems no longer necessary because through the bathing a hygienic safety against the introduction of a disease is not guaranteed and not all things of the emigrants can be seen as harboring germs and needing disinfection.[462]

If an emigrant requested a warm bath, authorities needed to provide one free of charge. Doctors could still require bathing and disinfection if the emigrant appeared to have a contagious disease

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[459] HStAD, MdI 11748: 147.

[460] StAH, Auswanderungsamt I, II E I 1 b, Teil 2 von 2, pg. 520.

[461] StAH, Auswanderungsamt I, II E I 1 b, Teil 2 von 2, pg. 520.

[462] HStAD, MdI 11748: 153.

that showed symptoms on the skin such as typhus or smallpox. Doctors still were required to inspect every transmigrant:

> The examination must extend to the neck, the skin, the eyes and the hair. Additionally every emigrant should be checked if the body temperature is high and an, albeit superficial, inspection of lungs and heart should be conducted. Undressing of the patient, in order to avoid feelings of shame, should only take place when the doctor in individual cases finds it necessary to take required measurements.[463]

The Prussian government likely issued this order less in consideration of transmigrant welfare than to assist German shipping companies as the controls spurred emigrants to take competing lines.[464] Though second certainly to business interests, halting transmigrant bathing may have also reflected a gradual knowledge that water sanitation and a separated sewer system affected the possibility of a major outbreak more than the entry of a carrier into German borders. As Linda Nash states, "sanitation was not a new concept in the twentieth century, but it achieved new importance and much more widespread application in the century's early decades."[465] Even in 1905, German officials prided themselves that the water sanitation system was much better than it had been in the 1890s and that such measures would prevent a massive epidemic.[466]

Though German authorities discontinued the bathing and disinfection at control stations, facilities still enforced the transit corridor and the rejection of unfit transmigrants. Records on medical surveillance in Saxony continued at least until 1913, and the medical surveillance of transmigrants at harbor cities continued until World War I. According to 1913 recommendations from Berlin, doctors checked specifically for infectious diseases, disabilities, mental illness,

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[463] HStAD, MdI 11748: 154.

[464] HStAD, MdI 11748: 157.

[465] Nash, *Inescapable Ecologies*, 93.

[466] Minutes of the sitting on the fight against cholera, HStAD, MdI 11748: 99.

illegitimate pregnancies, and unkemptness.[467] The latter items on this list show that not only the fear of contagions but also the fear of any condition that would be rejected at Ellis Island (thus costing the shipping companies return transportation) underlined German medical policies.

Beginning in 1905, German authorities and shipping company officials exerted a great amount of paperwork and energy to sharpen medical surveillance of overseas-bound migrants traveling through Saxony. Though transmigration control in Saxony started largely as a shipping company initiative, German government officials instigated the borderland cholera checkpoints and discussions whether to turn the Leipzig registration station into a control station. Associations of cholera and other diseases with foreigners caused officials to enforce emigrant trains, hostels, and medical inspections. However, the belief that Austro-Hungarians were more sanitary than Russians made the transit corridor regulations in Saxony generally more relaxed than in Prussia. Shipping companies worried stricter regulations would decrease business and increase expenditures and thus decided not to enforce bathing and disinfecting at Leipzig. While the medical surveillance may have made comparatively little difference on cholera outbreaks than water sanitation systems, the medical surveillance of transmigrants that officials orchestrated gave the German government a feeling of control over the disease.

[467] GStA PK, I. HA Rep. 77 Ministerium des Innern, Tit. 226 Nr. 124 Bd. 27, pg. 227-228.

Chapter 4: Effects of the Great War on the Transmigrant Network

In early 1913, workers rerouted the last of the railroad tracks to the new Leipzig central station and connected most of the city's rail tracks from the original six separate train stations to one location. Within the west wing of the Leipzig central station operated the new transmigrant registration station, which in 1912 had replaced the temporary structure outside the city's Dresdner train station. In the new facility steamship company employees continued checking overseas-bound eastern European emigrants for sanctioned steamship tickets (or proof of 400 Marks per adult), and good health. Leipzig officials had looked forward to the new location within the main train station, which minimized eastern European travelers' contact with the rest of the population. Transmigrants arrived at the west side of the train station, walked down a flight of stairs, underwent inspection in the registration facilities, and walked back upstairs to the train platforms to depart. Though still an interruption in the transmigrant journey, the new station location proved more convenient for travelers en route to port cities. Transmigrants traveling by rail from Bavaria no longer arrived at the Bayerischer train station, located in the southern part of Leipzig, and thus no longer needed to walk or take the tram to register. This new development in migration control through Saxony lasted only for a short time, however. On 28 July 1914, Europe entered World War I, which disrupted the massive transmigration from eastern Europe to northern European harbors.

Recent histories on mass eastern European transmigration end with 1914 and logically so.[468] World War I wrecked transportation hubs and made traveling dangerous (though emigrant-carrying ships still steamed out of northwestern harbors throughout the war). After the war,

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[468] Tobias Brinkmann, ed., *Points of Passage: Jewish Transmigrants from Eastern Europe in Scandinavia, Germany, and Britain 1880-1914* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2013); Guy Alroey, *Bread to Eat, Clothes to Wear: Letters from Jewish Migrants in the Early Twentieth Century* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2011).

emigration to the United States, the main destination, picked up but was soon restricted by the US Quota Acts of 1921 and 1924, which put nation-based limits on the numbers of immigrants accepted. Postwar changes on the European continent also affected eastern European transmigration. Due to new stipulations, passengers could show any steamship ticket at the Germany border as opposed to just tickets for lines concessioned in Germany. This dampened the potential profitability of a German-run border control system. While options for steamship tickets relaxed, requirements of state-issued identification became stricter. The widespread requirement of nation-state, government-issued passports both altered and limited transborder movement. In 1921 once postwar confusion and repatriation of refugees had ebbed, European countries strictly required state-issued passports and visas to cross borders.

Despite these changes, many aspects of eastern European transmigrant surveillance in Germany continued or echoed prewar protocols. After all, many postwar eastern Europeans emigrants desired to cross the ocean and needed to leave their landlocked countries for port cities on the coasts. This chapter analyzes parallels in transmigrant control before, during, and after the war to demonstrate patterns in the mechanisms of surveillance, while still taking into account the uniqueness of events surrounding the war. As with the first three chapters, this chapter uses the province of Saxony to explore wider implementations of state transmigrant regulations. The first part looks at the effects of World War I on the transmigrant control system in Germany, the United States, and Europe in general. Though war damages and the ordered reparations of Versailles Treaty altered the power German steamship companies had over the migration market, the German state and steamship companies attempted to resurrect aspects of the transmigrant control system after the war in order to gain profitability. Of course, German steamship companies had had to “decolonize” and relinquish much of its economic hold in the now

independent Second Polish Republic.[469] The second part of this chapter looks at the continuation of American remote control in the form of the state-issued passport and visa, now required of all transmigrants. Just as prewar authorities required migrants to have money or approved steamship tickets, postwar police similarly allowed or denied entry (or even deported) based on required documents. The Quota Acts of 1921 and 1924 put limitations on the number of eastern Europeans entering America. Entrance visas were difficult to obtain, yet still a surplus was issued at consulates across Europe. Crossing Europe became an economic gamble as migrants risked being sent back from US harbors once quotas were full. The third part of this chapter examines a police concern that increased once state-issued visas and passports were required for transmigrants: human smuggling across the Saxon-Czechoslovakian border. Once required only of Russian citizens, the passport spurred a criminal business that paralleled smuggling on the Prussian-Russian frontier before the war.

World War I and Transmigrant Control

Transmigration through Germany from Russia and Austria-Hungary diminished considerably during World War I. The tense political situation after the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the Austro-Hungarian imperial throne, on 28 June 1914 erupted into war a month later. Germany, once at the center of a trans-European network of human migration, was now the political wartime foe of other important state players of the business: Russia, Britain, and France. German border controls tightened on 31 July 1914 as the

[469] A number of scholars have referred to the colonial attitudes toward Polish lands held by the German and Russian empires. I have adapted the concept of "decolonization" of the Polish borderlands during and after the war from Joshua A. Sanborn, *Imperial Apocalypse: The Great War and the Destruction of the Russian Empire* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 3-7.

government required passports of "anyone entering the Empire from abroad."[470] On 1 August 1914, the Central Administration Board of Control Stations wrote to the Berlin Ministry of the Interior:

> … due to the turbidity of the current political situation, transportation of emigrants via Hamburg and Bremen currently does not take place…the emigrant control stations on the Russian border have also received instruction to discontinue their operation.[471]

Political relations before the war had certainly not been ideal, yet total war altered everyday life. The eastern fronts in Russia and the Austro-Hungarian province of Galicia cut off the travel networks and supply of migrant customers. Western battlefields in Belgium and France and naval warfare in British seas limited opportunities for departure. The business of transmigration slowed as war blurred the "places where soldiers fight and where civilians maintain social norms."[472]

European border control during World War I focused on making citizens stay put. Governments needed as many of their civilians to remain in order to serve in the army and, especially in the case of women, support the war effort on the home front. Patriotic nationalist ideology emphasized that citizens remain loyal to their state. Across Europe authorities required passports of both foreigners and nationals to prevent espionage and sabotage within the homeland.[473] Despite the increased restrictions, some eastern Europeans managed to emigrate overseas from northern ports such as Oslo and Rotterdam. Especially in eastern Europe, borders

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[470] John Torpey, *The Invention of the Passport: Surveillance, Citizenship and the State* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 112.

[471] GStA PK, I. HA Rep. 77 Ministerium des Innern, Tit. 226 Nr. 124 Bd. 27, pg. 373.

[472] Maureen Healy, *Vienna and the Fall of the Habsburg Empire: Total War and Everyday Life in World War I* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 3.

[473] Torpey, *The Invention of the Passport*, 111.

shifted so often that emigrants could travel illegally through the confusion.[474] In 1916 a Russian girl from Białystok was sent by her family to the port of Rotterdam in order to escape the heavy fighting in her town.[475] When the steamship had set sail, she recalled that officials requested to see passengers' documents on deck, though the choppy waters made most passengers too seasick to stir from their bunks.[476] In mid-1916, the German government required in addition to passports a German-issued visa or *Sichtvermerk* "from everyone, German or foreign, entering or leaving the territory of the empire as well as certain occupied areas."[477] By using visas authorities could confirm the motivations of the travelers and whether or not they proved a threat to the nation, though regulations were not always perfectly implemented on the ground.

With the disruption of the eastern European transmigration networks, former emigrant control buildings in Germany turned into hospitals, housing for soldiers, and storage rooms. These facilities were located on major railroad crossings, where armies could easily dispatch soldiers or treat those injured at the front.[478] The buildings, once used for inspecting and disinfecting transmigrants, contained changing rooms, common rooms, beds, sinks, and wash closets, perfect accommodations for makeshift hospitals. The Ballinstadt halls in Hamburg, which, before the war, had hosted thousands of Hamburg-Amerika (HAPAG) emigrant

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[474] Libby Garland, *After They Closed the Gates: Jewish Illegal Immigration to the United States, 1921-1965* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014), 92.

[475] David M. Brownstone, Irene M. Franck, and Douglass L. Brownstone, *Island of Hope, Island of Tears* (New York: Rawson, Wade Publishers, Inc.), 79, 113-114.

[476] Ibid., 114.

[477] Torpey, *The Invention of the Passport,* 113.

[478] Given injured soldiers were transported from the front via rail, temporary hospitals opened in train stations in Austria-Hungary as well. See "The establishment of a hospital at the train station was not unusual," *Europeana*, last access date 27 April 2015, http://exhibitions.europeana.eu/exhibits/show/14-18-collections-en/the-train-station/item/888.

customers waiting to depart overseas, became a marine military hospital that could take up to 2,500 people daily.[479] Across the Atlantic, the US immigrant control facility Ellis Island turned into a hospital for American soldiers who had fought in France.[480] Authorities also used the island to house "suspected spies and saboteurs," keeping with the tradition of separating potentially infectious outsiders from the rest of the population.[481]

In Saxony, the registration station in the Leipzig central station was used during the war for "hospital purposes"[482] Along the Saxon-Bohemian border, the German Red Cross housed soldiers in the former transmigrant inspection barrack in the Bohemian border town of Bodenbach ("Podmokly" in Czech). The economic desperation of the war and rebellious feelings of the populace showed in early 1918 when someone broke into commode at Bodenbach and stole bedding, towels and even two doctor's coats. Officials suspected that a soldier who had stayed in the barrack had committed the crime but because the Red Cross kept no record of the lodgers' soldier identification numbers, the search for the suspect proved futile.[483] Benjamin

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[479] Styliani Tsaniou, *Die Ballin-Stadt auf der Veddel: Ein sozial- und wirtschaftsgeschichtlicher Beitrag zur Erforschung der Entstehung und Funktion der Auswandererhallen* (Hamburg: Diplomica Verlag, 2008), 102.

[480] Barry Moreno, *Encyclopedia of Ellis Island* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2004), 7-8.

[481] Ludmila K. Foxlee, *How They Came: The Drama of Ellis Island from 1920-1935* (1968) IHRC Archives, University of Minnesota, pg. 4.

[482] Rothe et al., "Die Umgestaltung der Leipziger Bahnanlagen durch die Preußische und die Sächsische Staatseisenbahnverwaltung" in *Zeitschrift für Bauwesen* 71 (1921): 187.

[483] Letter from border police at Bodenbach to Saxon MdI, HStAD, MdI 11749: 152, 152/1.

Ziemann argues that "hardships and discontent in the army" reached their height in 1918, and the thievery from the barrack reflected this disillusionment.[484]

German steamship companies, the economic force behind the prewar transmigrant control process, lost their eastern European emigration market. Atlantic warfare put both customers and shipping infrastructure at risk. In 1915 German submarines torpedoed the Cunard-company ship *Luisitania*, which included steerage transmigrants among its passengers. HAPAG and Norddeutscher Lloyd (NDL), once the forerunners of the migration business, found their passenger ships blocked by the British fleet, sunk, or coopted in sudden enemy territory (for example, German steamships that had just dropped passengers off in the New York harbor when war was declared).[485] Albert Ballin, director of HAPAG, accordingly lobbied for peace in order to continue his international trade and feared that that the neglect of German shipping infrastructure would put his company behind international competitors once the war ended (increasingly distressed by circumstances, Ballin died in 1918 from an overdose of sleeping pills).[486] English steamship companies managed to continue some migration traffic from the Netherlands (thus the Russian woman who departed from Rotterdam in 1916). Of course, the effect of wartime on transatlantic migration business extended beyond the level of big business

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[484] Benjamin Ziemann, *War Experiences in Rural Germany, 1914-1923*, trans. Alex Skinner (New York: Berg, 2007), 73.

[485] Keeling, *The Business of Transatlantic Migration*, 260.

[486] Gerhard A. Ritter, "The Kaiser and His Ship Owner," in *Business in the Age of Extremes: Essays in Modern German and Austrian Economic History*, ed. Hartmutt Berghoff et al. (Washington, D.C.: German Historical Institute; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 31-32.

to local business. The Slovak-American Dorta in the novel *Out of this Furnace* laments that the war put a stop to potential immigrant boarders she could house in order to make money.[487]

Victorious in 1918, the Allied Powers demanded that Germany pay for pushing toward the detrimental war. Under the postwar reparations payment plans, Germany lost many of its ships or had lines taken over by competitors. In 1921, the Royal Mail Line, a British shipping company, hoped to capitalize off the resurgent eastern European emigrant market and assumed the shipping line from Hamburg to New York. [488] Royal Mail additionally acquired another steamship from Bremen.[489] The war damaged or destroyed other migratory infrastructure: railways and city offices, though Europe very quickly repaired these blows. Reeling under losses, HAPAG and NDL looked for ways to rebuild their economic empire and, like their British competitors, focused on the potential emigrant market of Central Europe. [490] HAPAG came into agreement with American merchants on sharing lines and ship construction, though the compromise simultaneously stunted the German company's independent growth.[491]

After the war, the steamship market reorganized, as did European states. Nationalism and the Wilsonian philosophy of self-determinism redrew political borders within Europe. France gained the Alsace-Lorraine region, and the nation state of Poland arose from the pieces of three former empires: Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Russia. The Austro-Hungarian Empire broke apart; Saxony now bordered the Czechoslovakian state instead of the Bohemian province of the

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[487] Thomas Bell, *Out of this Furnace* (New York: Liberty Book Club, Inc., 1950), 215.

[488] T.A. Bushell, *"Royal Mail": A Centenary History of the Royal Mail Line 1839-1939* (London: Trade and Travel Publications Ltd., 1939), 231.

[489] Ibid., 232.

[490] Ibid., 231.

[491] Ritter, "The Kaiser and His Ship Owner," 37.

Austro-Hungarian Empire. The new nation-states did not mean ethnic homogeneity.[492] Indeed, most had a hodgepodge of nationalities, yet attempts were made to create ethnic uniformity by forcing people to move. The repatriation of thousands and displacement of people from war-damaged regions created a market of refugees who, with no home in Europe, would seek new opportunities or join relatives overseas. Emigrants who feared the outbreak of another continental war also took their chances in the Americas.[493]

Immediately after the war a wave of women and children, separated from their husbands in America by the sudden turn of events in 1914, emigrated to join their spouses. This movement followed similar patterns of prewar emigration when husbands found work in the Americas, and their families joined them later. The Ellis Island social worker Ludmila Foxlee estimated that "in 1920 sixty percent of the immigrants were women and girls."[494] The fear that scammers would prey upon the women when deposited on the docks of New York strengthened social workers' arguments for the reopening of Ellis Island as an immigrant station. Talk of European migrant inspection stations also arose.

European steamship companies hoped for a sizeable number of emigrants after the war and for some type of continuation of prewar transatlantic migration. From 1919 to 1921 emigration from Europe to the United States began to pick up despite the 1917 requirements of visa-stamped passports.[495] German state officials discussed preparation for more transmigration and noted that reinstated control stations along railroad routes would serve not only the state's

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[492] Sanborn, *Imperial Apocalypse,* 5.

[493] Foxlee, *How They Came*, 29.

[494] Ibid., 14.

[495] Dorothee Schneider, *Crossing Borders: Migration and Citizenship in the Twentieth-Century United States* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), 56.

sanitary interests, but also the business interests of German steamship companies.[496] In the aftermath of a destructive war, transmigration provided an opportunity for German ships, railroads, and businesses to make money. Berlin officials in April 1921 expected a wave of transmigrant refugees as the Polish-Soviet War had just ended a few weeks prior. Ironically, total war had almost destroyed the German steamship companies, but regional violence, as had occurred before World War I in Russia's Pale of the Settlement, created an opportunity to recruit refugee emigrants.

Similar to its actions as a prewar imperial power, the German nation state treaded carefully about control structures set in the borderlands. Officials discussed resurrecting the Prostken control station, which Russian troops had destroyed during the war,[497] as an emigrant hostel. The problem was that many of the former control stations, which had once been on the Prussian-Russian border, were, after 1918, now located on the Prussian-Polish border. So as not to upset the Allied powers that feared the encroachment of the German state in Poland, German officials emphasized the status of the Prostken emigrant hostel as a private business venture.[498] After 1921 the Polish Corridor, giving Poland access to the port of Gdańsk (*Danzig* in German) separated East Prussia from the rest of the Weimar Republic and complicated the process of transporting people from the eastern province to Hamburg and Bremen.

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[496] Letter from district president in Alleinstein to the Berlin Ministry of the Interior, 12 April 1921, GStA PK, I.HA Rep. 77 Tit. 226 Nr. 146 Bd. 1, pg. 19.

[497] As points of transit for soldiers and supplies, train stations were often the targets of offensive maneuvers. See "The Train Station – The station concourse," *Europeana*, last access date 27 April 2015, http://exhibitions.europeana.eu/exhibits/show/14-18-collections-en/the-train-station/the-station-concourse.

[498] GStA PK, I. HA Rep. 77 Tit. 226 Nr. 146 Bd. 1, pg. 23.

Some European inspection points along railroad routes continued the bathing and disinfecting of transmigrants. A Slovak woman recounted her 1920 journey to a Dutch border city:

> Three days and three nights were spent riding in local trains from Prague to Rotterdam. We waited an hour at the Netherlands border where our passports were examined. At Oldesaal [sic], four stations distant from Rotterdam, all our baggage was taken from us without an explanation why this was done. We were marched to the barracks near the railway station and there were told to undress. Our dresses were put on hangers and sent to the disinfection plant. We walked to another room wrapped in blankets. These were taken from us so that we all stood there naked. A woman with a bucket and large brush such as is used in whitewashing brushed our bodies from neck to feet with a strong carbolic disinfectant. It occurred to no one to ask how we felt about having to expose our bodies to the eyes of thirty-nine women and girls of all ages. [499]

The women stayed in barracks infested with vermin, which soon spread to their hair. As before the war, the transit corridor, in an effort to clean transmigrants and keep them separate from the indigenous population, instead created a path of filth and an environment prime for contagions.

The relocation of ethnic Germans who had lived within the Soviet and Polish states, provided an opportunity to encourage overseas migration with German steamships. In 1922/23 Hamburg-Amerika and Norddeutscher Lloyd set up emigrant sanitation and lodging facilities near the Eydtkuhnen (a former transmigrant control point) *Heimkehrerlager* in East Prussia.[500] These transit camps hosted "refugees without a destination" or without "family or other contacts within the new German borders."[501] While steamship companies looked for opportunities to attract migrant overseas, the political emphasis on nation-states caused a massive level of

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[499] Foxlee 30. "Oldesaal" is likely a misprint of "Oldenzaal."

[500] GStA PK, I.HA Rep. 77 Tit. 226 Nr. 146 Bd. 1, pg. 31.

[501] Annemarie H. Sammartino, *The Impossible Border: Germany and the East, 1914-1922* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010), 103.

movement within Europe, where ethnic minorities and war refugees moved to countries deemed appropriate. Civil wars and violence from state restructuring into the early 1920s generated more waves of refugees.[502] Before the war eastern European emigrants had by far dominated the Hamburg and Bremen market. Overseas emigration now consisted of many German citizens and ethnic Germans from eastern states who might have felt they belonged just as well overseas as in a German state within which they had never resided. The Prussian government announced intentions to disband the Eydthkuhnen *Heimkehrerlager* in 1923 due to costs (most *Heimkehrerlager* were closed by 1924[503]) but agreed to leave the facilities built by the German steamship companies to the East Prussian government's discretion.[504]

In Saxony, whether the Leipzig emigrant registration station was ever resurrected for its initial purpose of screening eastern European transmigrants is not completely clear. A 1921 edition of the *Zeitschrift für Bauwesen* (Journal of Civil Engineering) claimed the facility at the time served as a storage room. German steamship companies hoped the transmigration business would revive, and the registration station could revive its original purpose.[505] The 1922 edition of *Zeitschrift für Bauwesen* gave a description of the transmigrant inspection facilities in the present tense.[506] Despite this mention, no HAPAG, NDL, or state documents discussing the Leipzig registration station after 1914 have yet been found. Additionally, very few postwar documents

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[502] Peter Gatrell, *The Making of the Modern Refugee* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 52.

[503] Jochen Oltmer, *Migration und Politik in der Weimarer Republic* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2005), 111.

[504] GStA PK, I.HA Rep. 77 Tit. 226 Nr. 146 Bd. 1, pg. 32.

[505] Rothe et al., "Die Umgestaltung der Leipziger Bahnanlagen," 187.

[506] Rothe et al., "Die Umgestaltung der Leipziger Bahnanlagen durch die Preußische und die Sächsische Staatseisenbahnverwaltung" in *Zeitschrift für Bauwesen* 72 (1922): 41-42.

refer to the former Saxon-Bohemian checkpoints originally set up in 1905 due to the cholera scare. In 1920 the Bodenbach train station management tentatively took over two rooms at the station designated for emigrant inspection but agreed not to change the rooms and to relinquish them if transmigration picked up again.[507]

Just like the competition between Cunard and German lines in 1903, tension over potential customers traveling through Saxony arose between English and German lines, though after the war English lines had the upper hand. State-sponsored identification, instead of German steamship tickets as authorization, undermined the former German domination of the transmigrant market. On 13 August 1921, the English embassy in Berlin wrote to the Reichsminister of the Interior that police at the Leipzig central station had instructed a group of transmigrants from Bucharest to report to a German steamship company office. The group had been en route to Antwerp where they would sail with the Royal Mail Steam Packet Company, an English competitor.[508] According to Article 322 of the Versailles Peace Treaty, customers of "allied and associated powers"(including the Royal Mail Steam Packet Company) could travel through Germany as long as they had steamship tickets and visas to their destination land ready at the German border. This echoed the pre-World War I requirements of a steamship ticket and, for Russian travelers, a passport. This time, however, any steamship ticket as opposed to steamship tickets from the continental cartel sufficed.

The police office at Leipzig defended itself by claiming that officers at the train station knew about the Versailles regulations and that likely the person who told the transmigrants to travel with the German company was not a policeman. The office suggested that a railroad

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[507] HStAD, MdI 11749: 155.

[508] HStAD, MdI 11751: 17.

official or employee from another steamship line (the Royal Mail Steam Packet Company did not have a representative in Leipzig) possibly directed the transmigrants:

> The numerous transmigrants, who travel through here almost daily, at this point assail anyone at the train station who wears a uniform with the most diverse questions. Thereby [these transmigrants] probably halted a railroad employee whose uniform is very similar to the local police uniform.[509]

The willingness of transmigrants to approach men in uniform demonstrated that the travelers felt their documents secured their ability to travel through Germany and that authorities would not send them back. As stringent as the visa, passport, and steamship ticket requirements appeared, these papers also represented a right to safe passage. Healthy Austro-Hungarian and Russian customers of German-cartel steamship companies had this reassurance when crossing Saxony prior to 1914. Now any steamship ticket and proper documentation (along with good health) qualified the travelers. In this era the state had the upper hand in allowing passage because state documentation was a necessity.

Based on Article 322 of the Versailles Peace Treaty, the Reichsminister in Berlin expected transmigrants to travel in closed transports, similarly to the sealed emigrant trains that transported eastern Europeans through Prussia and Saxony prior to the war. These closed transports ensured that private companies and individuals would not interfere with the transmigrants, and that the foreigners would not bring radical discord or contagions into the local population. Authorities and travelers seemed to not always heed the transport regulations as police in Leipzig reported on free-traveling transmigrants in the train station.[510] This paralleled prewar reports of migrants who arrived in Hamburg or Bremen independently without crossing Prussia in sealed trains.

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[509] HStAD, MdI 11751: 18.

[510] HStAD, MdI 11751: 16.

After the confusion between Royal Mail Steam Packet Company and the Leipzig police, a representative of the Reichsminister of the Interior in Berlin, Bruno Dammann, asked for details on how Saxony handled transmigration, especially through Leipzig. Dammann wanted to ascertain whether transmigrants were checked by police at the border for visas for their destination land and steamship tickets. He asked if transmigrants traveled through Germany in sealed transports with an accompanying translator. He inquired how authorities dealt with individuals and small groups who did not have all the aforementioned items and how shipping company representatives approached these lone transmigrants at the Leipzig central train station.[511]

On 18 November 1921, the Leipzig police office replied that large transports of transmigrants usually passed through the train station without trouble. A steamship company employee traveled with the emigrants and handled the journey. Shipping company representatives approached transmigrants traveling in small groups or as individuals. Many transmigrants arrived with night trains, and if a representative of their steamship company was not present, a representative of another company ushered them to the next leg of their journey. Given the terms of the Versailles Treaty, these representatives could not act as "agents," however, by persuading or even forcing travelers to book steamship tickets.[512] This differed from the prewar steamship agents who had demanded that customers of competitors purchase NDLV cartel-affiliated tickets. The migrant control in Saxony thus acted no longer as a mechanism to promote German steamship lines because the terms of World War I legitimized foreign steamship tickets for passage. State officials also encountered return transmigrants, either

[511] HStAD, MdI 11751: 19.

[512] HStAD, MdI 11751: 22.

rejected from port cities, visiting family, or repatriating back from the United States to Europe. On 8 November 1921, the police in Dresden reported that they had not yet encountered "emigrant transports" arriving from eastern Europe but had dealt with two transports of "returning migrants," Czechs sent back to their homeland after being rejected either at Ellis Island or in Rotterdam. The German consulate in Rotterdam provided the transport with attendants and papers to travel through the country. The Czechs spoke German, so the police did not look for a group guide.[513]

German border police were responsible for checking transmigrants, including the travelers' steamship tickets as proof of transit. The involvement of Saxon police in border control echoed their participation in emigrant checkpoints in Voitersreuth ("Vojtanov" in Czech), Bodenbach, and Tetschen ("Děčín" in Czech) prior to World War I, though officially German-cartel steamship employees had screened migrants at the registration and control stations. Near the Czechoslovakian border, Saxon police districts responded that they had not often encountered transmigrants without proper documentation, and district responses varied. The border gendarme at Markersdorf-Hermsdorf replied to Dammann that they sent back any transmigrants without proper paperwork.[514] The border gendarme at Johanngeorgenstadt sent transmigrants without the necessary documents to the local municipal court. The border gendarme inspector at Weipert rejected transmigrants who lacked the proper documents.[515] Police at Zittau, Annaberg also sent back transmigrants.[516] The border gendarme inspector at the

[513] HStAD, MdI 11751: 21.

[514] HStAD, MdI 11751: 23.

[515] HStAD, MdI 11751: 25.

[516] HStAD, MdI 11751: 28-29.

Saxon town of Ebersbach gave a detailed report of what would happen to transmigrants without the proper paperwork (as police had not yet encountered transmigrants in small groups or individually, this was a tentative plan). If transmigrants did not have the necessary documentation, Ebersbach police would hand them to the nearest Czechoslovakian border gendarme post. The Czechoslovak gendarme ensured that the travelers returned to their homeland, instead of trying another route, by taking the documents and then only returning them once the travelers reached their hometown. If the travelers had no money to return home, the police sent them to the city council of Georgswalde (Jiříkov) or to the town of Schluckenau (Šluknov) in Czechoslovakia. Police at Ebersbach mentioned that the same thing occurred with those trying to enter Czechoslovakia from Saxony without paperwork. [517] Police at Pirna required transmigrants to have a transit pass useable for 48 hours before they encountered border checks on either side of the Saxon-Bohemian line.[518] The police at Sayda pointed out the legal difference between migrants without paperwork who wanted to cross the border versus those who already had. Police sent back the first group but for those who already crossed, would take them to the local court on account of "forbidden border crossings."[519]

The Visa, the Transit Visa, and the Quota: US Remote Control

The border requirement of state-issued identification arose from the policies of postwar European states, and also from polices of the (initially) primary receiving country, the United States. German authorities during the early twentieth century emphasized how US immigration regulations influenced eastern European transmigrant control within Germany, and historians

[517] HStAD, MdI 11751: 30.

[518] HStAD, MdI 11751: 33.

[519] HStAD, MdI 11751: 35.

have supported this assertion.[520] Talk of nation-based quotas (or limitations) placed on eastern and southeastern European emigration to the United States began as early as 1910 when the Dillingham Commission reported that these immigrants were less desirable and had problems assimilating into American society.[521] The 1917 Immigration Act required, with some exceptions, emigrants to read in their native language when examined at Ellis Island. The US social worker Cecilia Razovsky told of a forty-year old Ukrainian woman who was rejected by Ellis Island because she could not read. Unable to return home, she relocated instead to Constantinople where she had neither friends nor work.[522] The historian Dorothee Schneider argues, however, that the law was not as discriminatory as it seemed, given many migrants could read at least in their native language.[523] In 1920, given the disruption of schooling in eastern Europe due to the war, US law eased restrictions on reading for young illiterates who showed they had the mental capacity to learn to read. The 1921 US quota law, however, once again strictly excluded illiterates. [524]

After the war, social workers at Ellis Island petitioned European governments to again screen emigrants before departure to save the travelers from losing time and money. The social workers seemed frustrated that European ports allowed the departure of migrants who stood no

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[520] Tobias Brinkmann applies Aristide Zollberg's framework of US "remote control" to the prewar German border transmigrant control system in "'Travelling with Ballin": The Impact of American Immigration Policies on Jewish Transmigration within Central Europe, 1880-1914," *International Review of Social History* 53.3 (Dec. 2008): 469.

[521] Garland, *After They Closed the Gates*, 33.

[522] Cecilia Razovsky, *What Every Emigrant Should Know: A Single Pamphlet for the Guidance and Benefit of Prospective Immigrants to the United States* (New York: Council of Jewish Women, 1922), 9.

[523] Schneider, *Crossing Borders*, 56.

[524] Foxlee, *How They Came*, 18.

chance at entry. The lack of communication and knowledge of the US regulations in Europe added to this tumult. The social worker Ludmila Foxlee believed control of migration into the United States was needed, and she asserted that migrants needed to understand and undergo exact regulations before they departed from their homelands.[525] She gave a number of examples of naïve emigrants. The young Czechoslovakian Peter J. was, after twelve weeks of traveling through Prague, Antwerp, and Liverpool to New York, deported for illiteracy.[526] A fifteen-year-old Slovak, Irena K., prepaid 500 crowns to an agent for a Red Star ticket, yet "this money was not counted as part [sic] payment when she claimed her ticket in Antwerp."[527] The resourceful young woman wired her sister in Pueblo, Colorado, for money to pay the remainder of the ticket and lodging in Antwerp while she waited for the ship. In addition she worked in a hotel kitchen to help pay for room and board in the port city.[528]

The 1921 US Emergency Quota Act limited "immigration to a small percentage of those nationalities represented in the US population in the 1910 census."[529] A number of reasons stood behind this law, including a growing obsession with desirable races in the United States.[530] Nativists believed eastern Europeans posed a threat to their perceived American (i.e., Anglo-

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[525] Ibid., 42.

[526] Ibid., 25-26.

[527] Ibid., 26.

[528] Ibid., 27.

[529] Torpey, *The Invention of the Passport*, 119.

[530] Patrick Weil, "Races at the Gate. Racial Distinctions in Immigration Policy: A Comparison between France and the United States," in *Migration Control in the North Atlantic World: The Evolution of State Practices in Europe and the United States from the French Revolution to the Inter-War Period*, ed. Andreas Fahrmeir et al. (New York: Berghahn Books, 2003), 276.

Saxon) identity. When the 1917 war effort required mobilization, US officials had noticed pockets of non-English speakers who seemed separated and unassimilated. Worried nationalists feared an influx of Communist anarchists. There was also an increasing belief that post-World War I immigrants would take jobs from Americans in a slowing economy.[531] The growing labor movement emphasized that immigrants would accept lesser-paying jobs and thus pushed for limitations on immigration.[532]

John Torpey points out two issues US officials encountered when they first implemented the quota. First, "defenders of white America" or those in favor of more Anglo-Saxon, Nordic immigrants noticed that 1910 had seen waves of eastern and southern Europeans arrive. These quota proponents then suggested the 1890 census (i.e., before the masses of Russians, Austro-Hungarians, and Italians) as the standard for ethnic percentages. Second, the limitations placed on immigrant entry took place immediately at US points of entry, but the European countries of emigration had not yet ironed out the procedures:

> [T]he restriction of incoming persons along these lines was easier said than done. Because the 1921 law had mandated a quota system without adequate provision for its implementation, hundreds of excess visas were issued abroad to steamship passengers making their way to the US.[533]

As a result the steamships raced their customers to United States before monthly quotas were filled.[534] Because all US ports shared the quota and the limits were usually filled within five

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[531] Weil, Migration Control, 276.

[532] Foxlee, *How They Came*, 38-39.

[533] Torpey, *The Invention of the Passport*, 119.

[534] Ibid., 120.

days, thousands of immigrants were deported from Ellis Island.[535] Social workers on Ellis Island pitied the arrivals, who had sold their belongings and homes just to be sent back, and pressured steamship lines to conduct stricter exit controls, which they eventually did.[536] As Libby Garland points out, the everyday workings of these quota laws proved contingent for individual migrants, and the migration processes of these individuals on the ground played a great role in forming the "laws' meanings."[537]

Due to the excess number of visas handed out, European transmigrants, if they were aware of the US regulations, calculated whether they would reach the United States before the quota was filled or risk being stranded at a harbor. Marie Strítecký, who moved with her husband, Vavrín, prior to World War I from Šaratice (near Brno) to South Dakota, kept in touch with their family and former neighbors through letters. On 4 March 1923, Marie sent her aunt advice regarding neighbors who planned to emigrate from Czechoslovakia to the United States:

> We have received your letter, Auntie, and I am answering it right away. I really don't know how best to advise you on this matter with Horák. We can't pay his way for him, even if he sent the money here, because in the event that he was not permitted to enter the country the money would be lost. I am warning you now, and tell or read this letter to Horáks, so that they know how strict conditions are here now. Perhaps you know that now only 3½% are admitted, so he couldn't come now, not until June, because Czechoslovakia has already used up its percentage - I think it was as early as September - so they won't start coming again until June. And now no one can leave secretly, as for example our husbands did. You have to have all your papers in order and you must personally apply for a passport from the consulate in Prague.[538]

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[535] Foxlee, *How They Came*, 39.

[536] Ibid., 40.

[537] Garland, *After They Closed the Gates*, 2.

[538] Marie Strítecký, Letter from Marie Spacil Stritecky, 4 March 1923, in *Life Anew for Czech Immigrants: The Letters of Marie and Vavrin Stritecky, 1913-1934*., ed. Marilee Richards, in *South Dakota History* 11 (1981): 283.

The Stríteckýs emphasized the increased strictness of American immigration policy, both in the quota and necessary travel paperwork. Even pre-paid tickets sent from America proved risky due to the country's strict quotas. Vavrín, who had "secretly" emigrated from the Austrian Empire to escape conscription, had required no state identification, but this time immigrants did.

Just like the prewar requirement of steamship tickets, postwar documentation for travel took additional shape in the form of the visa and passport. Social worker Cecilia Razovsky wrote a pamphlet for emigrants via the Council of Jewish Women in New York. She warned emigrants to never travel without passports and to obtain birth certificates for the children to facilitate enrollment in US public schools, work, and eventual US citizenship.[539] In addition to passports, transmigrants needed a visa from the nearest American consulate, which the council listed for all major European cities. The council warned people who did not have pre-purchased steamship tickets to not buy tickets until they had obtained a visa.[540] Eastern European emigrants needed to keep a number of newer regulations in mind if destined for the United States.

In addition to an entry visa, transmigrants needed a transit visa for European countries they crossed during their journey. Many of the transmigrants stopped at police-inspection stations on the Saxon-Bohemian border had the necessary paperwork. However, the requirement of both an entrance visa for the destination country and a transit visa for Germany confused some emigrants. Border police tended to be more lenient with regard to the transit visa. If transmigrants had at least passport, officials seemed a little more accommodating than toward those without. Police at Voitersreuth planned to send transmigrants missing only the transit visa

[539] Razovsky, *What Every Emigrant Should Know*, 26-27.

[540] Ibid., 30.

to the German passport office in Eger ("Cheb" in Czech).[541] Police at Schwarzenberg mentioned that oftentimes, German citizens who wanted to travel to Czechoslovakia had their passports but not the necessary visas from consulates. The travelers claimed they had not known about the stipulation of the visa.[542] Police at Auerbach would provide transmigrants with a transit visa if they had a passport with an entrance visa for their destination land. If transmigrants had a passport and a transit visa but no entrance visa for their destination, Auerbach police would send the migrants to destination country's local representative office and "if necessary, would send them back."[543] Those who wanted to travel via German harbors needed to either have steamship tickets or procure them if stopped. [544]

While obtaining a transit visa through Germany was difficult for some, for others Germany was an easier route than other countries. In 1922 a Russian-born woman and her brother sought transit visas because their brother living in the United States had sent them steamship tickets for Hamburg.[545] The Polish government refused to grant transit visas because the brother was of conscription age, so the siblings chose to travel instead through Hungary and Austria, where they had permission to travel, and then on to Germany, which granted them transit visas.[546] Just as many young men prior to World War I, this migrant saw the route through Germany as a means to avoid the limitations of army conscription. Though the passport and visa

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[541] HStAD, MdI 11751: 38.

[542] HStAD, MdI 11751:40.

[543] HStAD, MdI 11751: 45.

[544] HStAD, MdI 11751: 45.

[545] Brownstone, *Island of Hope*, 95, 111.

[546] Ibid., 95.

laws became more stringent, moments of contingency, individual agency, and state leniency add nuance to the picture of state-controlled movement.

Even with the initial excess of immigration visas, some eastern Europeans had not the resources to obtain them in their homeland or could only obtain the entrance visa but not the transit visa. Some believed they would have an easier time obtaining an entrance visa to the United States from their respective homeland's consulate in Berlin.[547] Transmigrants who did not have visas and other required papers used surreptitious methods to cross the Saxon-Czechoslovakian border. A report from the Saxon border town of Marienberg described the routes of irregular transmigrants:

> They use the train from Czechoslovakia only until Sebastiansberg, the last train station before Reitzenhain und conversely the inlanders [German citizens] take the train only to Gelobtland, the last train station situated before Reitzenhain in order to cross the border under the protection of sprawling forests. In the current year reports against 75 persons on account of forbidden crossing have arrived. Besides that, 2 Russian refugees without documents were led before the local court of Marienberg.[548]

The passport and visa requirements brought up questions of legality and criminality that pre-World War I regulations had foreshadowed.[549] Saxon police had helped direct transmigrants to registration points and either intercepted or returned renegades to the border. Now transmigrants without proper documentation were treated as illegal immigrants, taken into custody, and brought before court.

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[547] For more on Berlin as a city of transit see Tobias Brinkmann, "From Immigrants to Supranational Transmigrants and Refugees: Jewish Migrants in New York and Berlin before and after the Great War," in *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 30:1 (2010), 47-57.

[548] HStAD, MdI 11751: 34.

[549] Garland, *After They Closed the Gates*, 44.

Caught Without Documents: Nabbing a Smuggling Ring

The postwar secret Saxon-Bohemian border crossings echoed the pre-World War I smuggling of Russian transmigrants across the Russian-Prussian border. These inhabitants of imperial Russia crossed the border illegally because they lacked passports or did not want to undergo the bathing and disinfecting at control stations. A young woman who emigrated from Polish-Russia to join her brothers in the United States in 1912 related how her group "traveled from the village through the forest preserve at night."[550] A (likely bribed) Russian soldier, put a board across the trench that signified the Prussian-Russian borderland, and the transmigrants crossed into Germany. Collaboration between smugglers and local officials naturally were not reported in police reports, though eyewitnesses such as Sophia hint that such operations may have existed, perhaps even along the Saxon-Bohemian border. Though no reports on collaboration between police and Saxon-Czechoslovakian smugglers have appeared, the starker lines of legality seemed to feed the potential for criminal collaboration.

Networks of steamship company agents advised and guided transmigrants before and after the war. Prior to World War I surreptitious agents from non-German, competing lines encouraged and aided travelers in evading authorities. Though competing lines now had the legitimacy of international law to send their customers through Saxony, another network of businessmen operated outside state regulations: smugglers of migrants without identity papers. The line between agents and smugglers were sometimes obscure. An agent could legally sell a steamship ticket to Mexico but disclose to the travelers that border controls between the United States and Mexico were porous. Just as the lucrative business of human migration fueled smuggling networks of the early 20th century, this business contributed to these illegal networks

[550] Brownstone, Franck, and Brownstone, *Island of Hope, Island of Tears*, 54-55.

after 1921. Human smuggling increased on an international level with the US quotas of 1921 and 1924. Eastern European migrants unable to obtain a quota number or visa sought alternative routes of entry into the United States beyond control ports. Steamship agents encouraged migrants to sail from the Netherlands to Veracruz in Mexico, where they headed north to cross into Texas.[551] Other migrants slipped across the US-Canadian border, and smugglers took eastern Europeans on boats from Havana to Miami.[552] Some migrants traveled immediately into the United States while others bid their time for months or years in "in-between places" for more opportune moments.[553] The business of smuggling, whether of migrants, foreign factory workers, or rum, attracted a number of Saxon-Bohemian borderland inhabitants. Caitlin Murdock mentions a Saxon border fence constructed during World War I that needed repair due to smuggling, and then the fence disappeared thereafter.[554] Methods of smuggling varied from creating false documents to personally escorting transmigrants around checkpoints. Sometimes these smugglers operated alone, and other times smuggling organizations created an international network. Some networks had connections that spanned from start to finish: from the migrant's homeland, to the Mexican border, and to the United States.[555] Invidual incidents of illegal border crossing pointed to a larger black market phenomenon.

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[551] Garland, *After They Closed the Gates*, 43.

[552] Ibid., 90.

[553] Elizabeth Sinn

[554] Caitlin E. Murdock, *Changing Places: Society, Culture, and Territory in the Saxon-Bohemian Borderlands, 1870-1946* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2010), 119.

[555] Peter Andreas, *Smuggler Nation: How Illicit Trade Made America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 223.

German police discovered an extensive network when they halted illegal migrants traveling through Saxony. During the night of 6 November 1922, Plauen police stopped a car of foreigners without transit visits en route to the upperside train station in the town. Police had gotten word that a car had been transporting foreigners from the German border town of Bad Elster to Plauen in order to catch a 2:50 AM night train bound for Berlin. The group consisted of Leo Zwilling, a Polish businessman; Abraham Semmel, a Polish profiteer; Max Semmel, a Polish salesclerk; Rudolf Grjek, a Czechoslovak wallpaperer or upholsterer; Michael Michavitz, a Ukrainian carpenter; Sandor Pribek, a Hungarian businessman; and Israel Kanner, a Polish furrier. Only two out of the seven, Max Semmel and Michael Michavitz, had passports, though without the German transit visa.

The leader of the group, the twenty-eight-year-old Zwilling, eventually told authorities about the situation. He had for a while accompanied people who wanted to go to the Americas by foot across the German border. Just as before the war, border train stations were loci of contact between police and travelers, thus these illegal travelers crossed the border on foot instead of by train. Zwilling then took the smuggled migrants by car from Bad Elster to the Plauen upperside train station, and then by train to Berlin. In the capital a contact of Zwilling named "Chsskel [sic] Schwalb" would obtain Ukrainian passports from the consulate. Rumor had it that one could obtain Ukrainian passports in Berlin without problem, and indeed, Berlin proved a popular destination for transmigrants attempting to sail to the United States. Plauen asked the State Criminal Police Office in Dresden if they could follow up on Schwalb, the Berlin contact for Ukrainian passports, and the Ukrainian consulate in Berlin.[556] Police could not say whether the foreigners really intended to travel to Americas or if they would just remain and work within

[556] HStAD, MdI 11751: 48.

Germany. The Hungarian within the group, Sandor Pribek , admitted via translator that he believed Zwilling smuggled foreigners to Berlin to make money and then left the emigrants in the capital to their own devices.[557]

The report included the background of the smuggled Hungarian migrant, Pribek, and how he arrived at the Saxon-Czechoslovakian border. Pribek claimed to have owned a plot of land in Hungary but was convinced by "all kinds of promises" of a "Jew" to sell his land and travel with him to America. The agent took him to Prague, where another Jew took responsibility for Pribek and demanded 11 000 Czech kronen for steamship tickets, passport, and service. The man from Prague then took Pribek to Karlsbad (the German name for the Czechoslovakian town of Karlovy Vary) where Zwilling took over.[558] That Pribek did not mention the name of the first two men hints that he possibly forgot their names in the stress and confusion, did not want repercussions from people associated with the network, had personal associations with the men, or was given pseudonyms. The report does, however, identify both men as Jews. Saxon government reports on transmigrant agents before World War I had not described agents by their ethnicity, though steamship company correspondences mentioned the "Jewishness" of agents. The emphasis on the "Jewishness" of the agents could have reflected a growing tendency for Saxon authorities to identify outsiders via ethnic versus provincial origins. Libby Garland points out that American authorities often tied smuggling rings with ethnicity as a basis for identification. Sometimes smuggling rings did use ethnic networks and connections when beneficial, yet on the other hand, such rings did not operate exclusively within ethnicity.[559]

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[557] HStAD, MdI 11751: 48.

[558] HStAD, MdI 11751: 48.

[559] Garland, *After They Closed the Gates*, 99-100.

Perhaps Plauen police simply wanted to quote Pribek directly, yet the economic disaster of the war had also fanned the flames of anti-Semitism throughout Europe. Pribek's story portrayed the Jews as the initial seed of discord in this tale of human trafficking. Anti-Semitism could have fueled this particular focus of authorities and Pribek on the Carpathian agents' "Jewishness." Tara Zahra, Nancy Wingfield, and Keeley Stauter-Halsted point out the long-held portrayal of Jewish agents as victimizers of unsuspecting eastern European migrants.[560] The victim narrative certainly continued in this incident.

This uncovered network of human trafficking across the German-Czechoslovakian border extended beyond Leo Zwilling and his route to Berlin. Zwilling asserted that a man with the last name of Guss (no first name was mentioned), who lived in a Karlsbad hotel called the *Golden Steed* (Goldenes Ross) in Czechoslovakia, had "inducted him into this business."[561] He claimed that Guss was a seasoned smuggler of people. Despite Zwilling's information, police were unable to locate the trafficker, but they did find another promising lead. The owner of the *Golden Steed*, Markus Billet, and his son Samuel, a former tradesman of raw products, ran an even larger

[560] Tara Zahra, "Travel Agents on Trial: Policing Mobility in East Central Europe, 1889-1989," *Past & Present* 223, no. 1 (2014): 169; Nancy M. Wingfield, "Destination: Alexandria, Buenos Aires, Constantinople; 'White Slavers' in Late Imperial Austria *Journal of the History of Sexuality* 20:2 (May 2011): 292; Keely Stauter-Halsted, "'A Generation of Monsters': Jews, Prostitution, and Racial Purity in the 1892 L'viv White Slavery Trial" *Austrian History Yearbook* 38 (2007): 26.

[561] HStAD, MdI 11751: 48.

migrant smuggling ring. [562] German police apprehended the son, Samuel Billet, while he was returning from a transport ("of migrants" is inferred though not completely clear) to Berlin.[563]

The Billet smuggling business included Samuel's sixteen-year-old brother, Jacob, whom police caught on 11 November 1922 transporting four "Carpatho-Russians" (Ruthenians) by car.[564] Police stopped Jacob in the Saxon city of Reichenbach and suspected he was enroute to Berlin. In the further report, police described the smuggled migrants as "Czechoslovakian citizens" without passports, though three had a Czechoslovakian identity card with photograph. These three travelers, Fedor Halinec, Ivan Halinec, and Stephan Petrisec, had been farmers, and at the convincing of an agent that there were better work opportunities in Berlin, sold their belongings and made way to the Saxon-Bohemian border. In a town called Aš (Asch) they "coincidentally" met the Czechoslovak Jzak Reizmann, who led them over the border by foot. The four met with Jacob Billet, who organized a car from Plauen to Reichenbach by collecting 20, 000 Marks from all. They would then take the train from Reichenbach to Berlin. Reizmann and Billet had not yet collected payment for their services (authorities suspected this would have taken place in Berlin). Billet claimed he "acted out of pure human kindness and demanded nothing for his troubles" and likely attempted to downplay any transaction of illegal business.[565]

Plauen police suspected economic reasons were spurring the illegal migration:

> Apparently the employment opportunities in Czechoslovakia, especially on the border near Poland and the Ukraine, are especially bad. Unscrupulous agents use

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[562] Years before police had suspected Markus Billet of harboring "dubious" foreigners in his hotel. Dresden sent detectives to conduct surveillance on the hotel but found no condemning evidence. HStAD, MdI 11751: 49.

[563] HStAD, MdI 11751: 48.

[564] HStAD, MdI 11751: 49.

[565] HStAD, MdI 11751: 50.

> this to convince gullible and inexperienced locals to emigrate and to take them with payment secretly over the border to Germany…there are many people involved in this…[566]

This report demonstrates some sympathy for the smuggled emigrants or transmigrants caught in Germany. They appear desperate and naïve, and, while technically criminals in the eyes of the law, the travelers lack the devious intentions of serious criminals. The smugglers, on the other hand, are portrayed in these reports as conmen who willfully opposed the law and took advantage of the helpless. During the investigation, Plauen authorities additionally arrested a twenty-four year old businessman named Major Adler (born in once Austrian now Polish town of Ciessenow-Lubaczow) for organizing illegal border transports.[567]

Even when functioning within the legal boundaries of the nation-state, authorities sought crossborder methods, as they had before the war, to enact migration control and surveillance. Plauen police suggested sending out warnings in the Esperanto-language police magazine "La policisto" against smuggling throughout eastern Europe and mentioned contacting Polizeiesperantogruppe Kriminalhauptwachtmeister (Police-Esperanto-Group main constable) Pohle. Authorities had to work together on an international level as much as the smugglers did. On 5 December, the gendarme commando at "Velka Lucka" [sic] in the Subcarpathian Russian district of Czechoslovakia, an economically impoverished area, wrote about a connection between their district and the arrests in Plauen. Police in Velka Luka had arrested Salamonn Stern, who had recruited people to emigrate without passports and passed them on to an agent named Max Adler. The latter supposedly worked for an unnamed steamship company and accompanied the emigrants further. The emigrants paid 12 000 Kc for these services. Authorities

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[566] HStAD, MdI 11751: 50.

[567] HStAD, MdI 11751: 50.

believed Max Adler was an accomplice of the Billet family, the hotel owners who ran the larger smuggling ring. Police found from the inquiry that other men from the Subcarpathian region had also sent the Billet family a few thousand Kc, though it was unclear. Authorities from Velka Luka looked into connections between the arrests in Germany, emigration agents in Czechoslovakia, and the money transfer.[568] Whether any connections were found, the sources do not say.

After the Quota of 1924

When US nativists realized that the Quota Law of 1921, based on the US census of 1910, meant "New Immigrants" had proportionately substantial quotas due to the high numbers of eastern and southern European immigrants in 1910, they worked to adjust the law to the preferred nationalities from northern Europe. The Quota Act of 1924 was based on the US census of 1890 when Germans and Anglo-Saxon immigrants were in greater numbers and the wave of eastern Europeans had just begun. This greatly diminished the flow from nations such as Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Italy. When the 1924 Immigrant Act came into effect, many transmigrants, forced to wait for "permission to enter the United States," lingered in Germany and England, oftentimes without receiving a successful visa.[569]

The control and registration stations, or at least the hope of resurrecting the prewar system, no longer proved economically viable. As levels of eastern European emigration to the United States decreased, the cost to send rejected migrants back from Ellis Island to their home country was infinitely smaller than resurrecting and maintaining these borderland and railroad hub facilities. This demonstrates that the control station system was indeed a form of pre-

[568] HStAD, MdI 11751: 51.

[569] Bushell, *"Royal Mail"*, 233.

screening and remote control for the United States. However, the waning system showed changes within Europe as well. Correspondence regarding transmigration decreased after 1924. In some respects the disintegration of the eastern control stations were due to the weakening of the German state, not the postwar strengthening of the nation-state. The postwar Versailles regulations recognized any steamship ticket as valid for transmigration. With the restricted quota in 1924 the German government and steamship companies knew eastern European emigrants the United States would never reach the same prewar numbers to justify the costs of the border control system.[570]

Conclusion

This chapter has illuminated the parallels and similar mechanisms of migration control in the German province of Saxony and on a broader worldwide scale before, during, and after World War I. While it acknowledges the changes (e.g., the American consulate-approved visa) that came with the war, it seeks to show continuities, or even universalities, that bridged 1914. During the war, the transmigrant registration station in Leipzig fell by the wayside as the need for citizens to remain dampened eastern European emigration overseas. The station served the needs of the German state as a hospital for soldiers. After the war, the remote control of US immigration policies continued with the Quota Acts of 1921 and 1924. Though now facing limitations on numbers, many emigrants still underwent health inspections at port cities and were expected to carry approved documents (similarly to the required steamship tickets before the war). Migrants needed not only US entrance visas, but also transit visas in order to pass through Germany. Lastly the emphasis on the passport and visa forced Saxon officials to deal with a type of criminality that had existed on the Prussian-Russian border before the war: migrant

[570] The US quotas on various nationalities existed until 1965 when the act was abolished.

smuggling. With the Quota Act of 1924, the prominence of eastern European ports such as Danzig, and the stability of political and economic systems, the web of migrant control and registration stations no longer proved profitable, pragmatic, or even possible.

Conclusion

Eastern European transmigrant registration and control stations emerged as a part of a compromise between the German state and German steamship companies. Norddeutscher Lloyd and HAPAG faced losing business because of the 1892 closing of the German-Russian border due to the fifth cholera pandemic. Thus, the steamship companies set up transmigrant control stations along the Prussian-Russian border to check migrant health. The stations also ensured a large share of the transmigrant market for HAPAG and Norddeutscher Lloyd because steamship agents would only let migrants pass if they had approved steamship tickets or proof of finances (i.e., show 400 Marks per adult and 100 Marks per child, sums much too large for most travelers). The German state supported this system because registered migrants fell under the patronage of the shipping companies and would not fall burden to local governments. The influence of German big business and the willingness of the German state to protect it became more apparent when HAPAG and NDL opened a transmigrant registration station in the Saxon railroad hub of Leipzig on 3 March 1904. State and steamship officials once again justified the station by arguing that by screening the transmigrants would prevent them from being rejected at later checkpoints and then falling burden to the state. Incidentally, the German steamship companies opened the station at a time when an English competitor, the Cunard Lines, had broken from a market-share pact and was sending its customers around the Prussian control stations via Saxony.

Police officers, employees of the Saxon state, were integral to the functioning of the Saxon transmigrant monitoring system. Steamship employees and translators guided transmigrants from the train stations in Leipzig and registered the travelers at the registration station. However, police officers enforced these policies by referring migrants to the registration

stations, and on a provincial level, making sure that transmigrants entering Saxony took trains to Leipzig. Police took a very active role during the rates war of 1904 when competing steamship companies encouraged their customers to circumnavigate the Leipzig registration station. The first year of the registration station also created conflict between the Saxon Ministry of the Interior, which ran the Saxon police, and the Saxon Ministry of Finance, which ran the Saxon railways. The latter argued that transmigrant regulations discouraged eastern European customers from traveling by rail through Saxony and at one point asked that the regulations be lifted. Eventually both ministries came to an understanding, but this episode demonstrated that not all state agencies were in agreement about transmigrant surveillance.

State involvement with the transmigration monitoring system in Saxony became especially apparent when the six pandemic of cholera reached Russia and Galicia in late 1904 and early 1905. Fearful that eastern European transmigrants could bring the disease to Germany, Berlin authorities pushed for cholera checkpoints at the Bohemian borderland train stations of Tetschen, Bodenbach, and Eger. Influence of the business aspect of transmigration became apparent when health officials decided against turning the Leipzig registration station into a control station with bathing and disinfecting facilities. Steamship companies believed that more stringent measures would scare away potential customers. Growing acceptance that disinfecting and bathing did little to prevent major outbreaks of cholera reinforced this decision. Cholera checkpoints along the Saxon-Bohemian border continued at least until war broke out in 1914.

World War I and its aftermath drastically transformed eastern European migration to the United States, yet there were similarities between pre- and post-war monitoring systems. The universal requirement of state-issued passports and visas echoed the prewar requirements of sanctioned steamship tickets at the control and registration stations. German steamship

companies for a few years hoped to take advantage of the refugee emigrant situation caused by war destruction and ethnic displacement. There was even brief talk of resurrecting control stations. As Tobias Brinkmann has pointed out, the American "remote control" of European emigration through the Quota Acts of 1921 and 1924 had its forerunner in the migration policies before the war. American immigration policy dictated the organization of German borderland control and registration stations. Saxon police began to focus on smuggling rings for illicit migration due to the war-implemented requirement of the passport on the Saxon-Bohemian border. Police searched for agents behind the smuggling of eastern European migrants, supposedly bound for the United States, without documents, just like the police had attempted to intercept migrants without German steamship tickets before the war. While recognizing the uniqueness of pre- and postwar migration systems, states implemented similar mechanisms or repertoires to monitor migrants.

Numbers of non-Germans sailing from German harbors increased steadily from 19,422 in 1921 to 51,934 in 1923 and then, with the US Quota Act of 1924, sank to 18,184 that year.[571] The quota starkly limited the number of eastern Europeans who could emigrate overseas to the United States, the heretofore main receiving country. The landscape within Europe of in-migration and out-migration also shifted. For example, the newly-formed state Czechoslovakia, with territories that once produced many overseas emigrants, instead accepted many refugees of the post World-War I era. While nothing compared to World War I levels, a steady stream of non-German emigrants did leave via Hamburg and Bremen until the 1930s.[572] They sailed to less restricted places such as South America. Arguably the greatest factor in the decrease of European

[571] Harmut Bickelmann, *Deutsche Überseeauswanderung in der Weimarer Zeit* (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1980), 143.

[572] Ibid., 143.

emigration to the Americas was the worldwide economic depression in the 1930s. Transatlantic economic depression tended to make citizens less likely to risk the financial investment of moving and overseas employers less likely to hire. During difficult economic times states became more protectionist of their economies and less likely to accept foreign laborers.

Perhaps the *Zeitgeist* of the dynamic Industrial Revolution, which produced novel ways of movement and communication, had passed and along with it the phenomenon of the transmigrant control system. A 1946 report by the League of Nations argued that, by the 1930s, European countries had passed through the growing pains of industrialization and urbanization that would produce such massive emigration.[573] Changes in travel technology during the 1930s and 40s denied the practicality of a railway-based transmigrant control system. The growing investment in airpower over steamships, the decreasing costs of flight, and the shortening of travel duration made flying more attractive than train and steamship travel. Ironically, a number of scholars have pointed out that airports have become the new 'transit corridors' that keep travelers separate from the local populations and screen them for permission to travel and entry.[574]

The Leipzig registration station was just one hurdle to pass in a series that led to the Ellis Island inspection. In the novel *Peter Menikoff* the protagonist continues the train journey from Leipzig to the German port city of Hamburg where the transmigrants "were herded onto a train

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[573] Dudley Kirk, *Europe's Population in the Interwar Years* (Geneva: League of Nations, 1946), 95.

[574] Tobias Brinkmann, "Introduction," in *Points of Passage: Jewish transmigrants from Eastern Europe in Scandinavia, Germany, and Britain 1880-1914*, ed. Tobias Brinkmann (New York: Berghahn Books, 2013), 18.

of flat cars pulled by street motors."[575] Peter recalls that reporters photographed this parade of sorts on the clear and sunny day. The emigrants were transported to Ballin-stadt ("Ballin City"), which, as its name suggests, was holding center on the edges of the city for emigrant customers of the HAPAG line. The emigrant halls included barracks, sanitation facilities, eating facilities, and even a synagogue. At the time Peter arrived in the Ballin-Stadt, conditions had been bursting to the point where HAPAG housed emigrants on ships in the harbor and in provisional wooden buildings near the emigrant halls.[576] Authorities began expanding the facilities in 1906 to house 4 to 5000 emigrants in total.[577] *Peter Menikoff* paints a less than favorable view of the emigrant checkpoint before these renovations. The protagonist describes Ballin-stadt as overcrowded, the beds full of lice and insects that "it would tax the talent of a skilled entomologist to classify the varieties represented in this bloodthirsty colony."[578] Physicians inspect transmigrants every day yet are "utterly indifferent to the condition of the emigrant lodgings."[579] Menikoff undergoes a similar examination process to the ones in Leipzig and Hamburg once he landed on Ellis Island. Once he arrives in New York harbors, steamships drop steerage emigrant passengers off at "an old wooden structure," which contains immigrants from around the world and bears "a close

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[575] Peter D Yankoff, *Peter Menikoff* (Nashville, Tenn: Cokesbury Press, 1928), 142.

[576] Styliani Tsaniou, *Die Ballin-Stadt auf der Veddel: Ein sozial- und wirtschaftsgeschichtlicher Beitrag zur Erforschung der Entstehung und Funktion der Auswandererhallen* (Hamburg: Diplomica Verlag, 2008), 48.

[577] Ibid., 52-53.

[578] Yankoff, *Peter Menikoff*, 144.

[579] Ibid., 145.

semblance to a hive of angry bees or the famous tower of Babel."[580] Emigrants are assigned by number a boat to Ellis Island:

> At the entrance of the Ellis Island building several health officers were stationed whose business it was to examine each immigrant as he passed by. Inside this huge structure the new arrivals were directed into separate wire cages, in groups according to their numbered cards.[581]

Though the Ellis Island bore a larger, more permanent structure than the original Leipzig registration station, many of the experiences (e.g., inspection, registration) were the same. Officials ask Menikoff his nationality, whether he knows English, and how much money he has. He carries $11, a lower amount than the usual requirement of $25, which first give officials pause, but after questioning his intentions, they let him pass.[582] Officials usher Menikoff out, and now the Bulgarian is officially in the United States. As trying as the emigrant screening structure is, Menikoff reaches his ultimate goal. Once emigrants such as Menikoff passed this system, they faced a new challenge: living in a different land.

With all the bureaucratic emphasis placed on the screening system, some observers saw hollowness behind the network. After 21 years of living abroad in Europe, the American author Henry James returned to the United States in 1904 and toured his home country, including New York City. At Ellis Island, the "two or three hours" he observed the screening "were but a tick or two of the mighty clock, the clock that never, never stops."[583] He describes the process:

> Before this door, which opens to them there only with a hundred forms and ceremonies, grindings and grumblings of the key, they stand appealing and waiting, marshalled, herded, divided, subdivided, sorted, sifted, searched,

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[580] Ibid., 156.

[581] Ibid., 158.

[582] Ibid. 157.

[583] Henry James, *The American* Scene (New York: Penguin Books, 1994), 66.

> fumigated, for longer or shorter periods—the effect of all which prodigious process, an intendedly "scientific" feeding of the mill…[584]

While James had ambiguous feelings regarding the immigrants themselves, his description of their screening hints at a sort of irrelevance or unimportance to what the actual inspection results were. What was important was that screening processes, these ceremonies and certificates, existed in themselves. These bureaucratic hoops and Ellis Island existed assured officials and supposed 'natives' of the United States that newcomers would not introduce a disease or be an unproductive member of society. Supposedly this system let in desirable immigrants, but to one extent, the migrant simply had not gotten sick along the way and had done enough research to procure all documents and finances he or she needed to present. Thus, while the bureaucratic documents used in this dissertation express a well-thought-out, well-organized system, contingency, arbitrariness, and luck played their roles as well.

There are certain limitations from drawing conclusions from police and bureaucratic documents. Police reports usually document problems or complaints and rarely incidents that progressed smoothly. The number of correspondences and reports about transmigration through Saxony noticeably fell after 1908, though some form of a Leipzig registration station and Saxon-Bohemian borderland checkpoints definitely existed at least until 1914. Either by 1908 authorities had worked out most of the kinks in the system, emigration agents had become more aware of the monitoring and advised travelers accordingly, or more documents dating between 1909 and 1914 are currently in an unknown location. It is also still not entirely clear how Austro-Hungarian emigrant trains were organized. Saxon bureaucratic sources rarely mention what happened to transmigrants rejected by the Leipzig registration station or Saxon-Bohemian border checkpoints. Though this number was very small, sources simply state that police took the

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[584] Ibid., 66.

transmigrants back to the Austrian border, with no mention of what happened to the travelers afterward. Perhaps sources from Czech or Austrian archives could paint a clearer picture of the rest of the return journey or whether the migrants decided to instead remain someplace else in Austria-Hungary.

While eastern European mass overseas emigration has ebbed, other transmigrant experiences have occurred in the 21st century. The journey of Central American migrants who travel by train through Mexico in order to enter the United States has garnered media attention through the film *Sin Nombre* and the journalistic accounts of Óscar Martínez. Refugees from war-torn parts of the Middle East or Africa have recently gained media attention for their boat journeys from North Africa to Europe. Sometimes they undergo part of their journey on land, whether by foot or vehicle.[585] These present-day cases parallel in many ways with the eastern European transmigration of the past: agents and smugglers, land and boat journeys (now including flight), and state controls. As this dissertation emphasizes, the final destination of migrants is only part of the journey.

[585] See Alessandro Triulzi, and Robert, Lawrence McKenzie, eds., *Long Journeys: African Migrants on the Road* (Leiden: Brill, 2013).

Bibliography

Abbreviations
GStA PK Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz
HStAD Hauptstaatsarchiv Dresden
IHRC Immigration History Research Center
MaA Ministerium des auswärtigen Angelegenheiten
MdI Ministerium des Innern
StAB Staatsarchiv Bremen
StAH Staatsarchiv Hamburg
StAL Stadtarchiv Leipzig

Archives
Hauptstaatsarchiv Dresden
Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz
Immigration History Research Center and Archives
Staatsarchiv Bremen
Staatsarchiv Hamburg
Stadtarchiv Leipzig

Libraries Consulted
Columbia University Libraries
Ellis Island Bob Hope Memorial Library
Národní knihovna České republiky
Sächsische Landesbibliothek – Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Dresden (SLUB)
Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin Preußischer Kulturbesitz
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