CITIZENSHIP CAPITAL & POLITICAL POWER IN ESTONIA

By

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Abstract

Citizenship is an underlying aspect of our geopolitical landscape and everyday political experiences. Citizenship is often accepted as a natural and universal form of legal and/or political membership that binds a nation to a territorial state; however, citizenship is a multidimensional and polyvalent construct that can be applied to critically examine the intersection of relational and spatial power. I operationalize citizenship as an embodied and enacted form of capital, a valued resource and form of distinction, whereby state-ascribed political power is relationally and spatially differentiated and fragmented. I utilize this critical interpretation by examining the ongoing Estonian citizenship dilemma. Drawing on my methodological engagement with Estonian Russian-speakers in Narva and Tallinn, Estonia, I examine the relationships among Russian-speakers’ embodied and enacted citizenship capital and political power in Estonia. Through a mixed-methodological approach that emphasizes descriptive citizenship narratives, I illustrate how and why Estonian Russian-speakers embody and enact citizenship through their own perceptions, practices, and identities. Although Estonia and Estonian Russian-speakers provide a unique research site to explore citizenship and political power, this geographic example brings to the fore much broader theoretical and practical implications by elucidating how minorities of disparate citizenship statuses and spatial communities engage with place, citizenship, nationalizing states, and democratic processes.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

I don’t think it’s right to give or not to give citizenship…For me, citizenship is connected to a civic attitude, that is, I belong to a particular society and I have interactions with it…A person can’t be alone. He is part of society. Therefore, to give or not to give citizenship is incomprehensible…I am already a part of this society. How can you turn me off or on? (Narva Interviewee 10, personal communication, October 3, 2013)

Citizenship is a multidimensional and polyvalent construct that inspires interdisciplinary scholarship in both theory and practice (Bauer, 2006, 2008, 2012, 2013; Bloemraad, 2006; Bosniak, 2006; Bourdieu, 2014; Ehrkamp & Jacobsen, 2015; Helbing, 2014; Isin & Wood, 1999; Isin, 2002; Preece & Mosweunyane, 2004; Shachar, 2009; Staeheli, 2011, 2013; Staeheli, Ehrkamp, Leitner, & Nagel, 2012; Walton-Roberts, 2015). Citizenship scholars broadly define citizenship as state-ascribed rights, responsibilities, identities, and membership that residents embody through a legal status and enact through civic or political practices (Ehrkamp & Jacobsen, 2015). Geographers, notably political geographers, are active contributors to this scholarship through geographies of citizenship (Barnett & Low 2004, p. 2). According to Ehrkamp and Jacobsen (2015), geographers illuminate citizenship’s normative spatial variations in policy approaches and spatio-temporal contingencies, but also critically bring to the fore, “the relational nature and uneven spatiality of citizenship – its spatial logics, its application, and the struggles to expand or reduce access to citizenship and rights across space” (p. 152).

Geographers and interdisciplinary citizenship scholars alike critically examine citizenship and citizens as social constructs. This social and political constructivist lens seeks to unravel the taken-for-granted view that citizenship and citizens are simply natural, universal, and part of a continuous democratic system dating back to European antiquity (Kostakopoulou, 2008; Kymlicka, 1995; Volpp, 2011). Citizenship and citizens are made and molded by the polities,
political elites, power relations, and populations that construct, challenge, and legitimize them (Bauder, 2006, 2008, 2012; Bourdieu, 2014; Bosniak, 2006; Brubaker, 1992a; Ehrkamp & Jacobsen, 2015; Staeheli, 1999). Citizenship engenders spatial and relational unevenness and innumerable contradictions, which highlight citizenship’s conceptual complexity and lack of uniformity. As Staeheli et. al. (2012) emphasize, “all aspects of citizenship are polyvalent” and instead of, “being constructed through an internally consistent and reinforcing set of legal frameworks, norms, practices, and subjectivities, citizenship is an amalgamation of each, converging in some respects and contradictory in others” (p. 639). These inconsistencies and polyvalence are highlight by the epigraph of this chapter. As the statement by the Estonian Russian-speaking interviewee quoted in the epigraph surmises, citizenship is a powerful mechanism of political belonging and interaction that can, incomprehensibly be “turned off and on” by a society or state (Narva Interviewee 10, personal communication, October 3, 2013). This critical understanding of citizenship highlights how citizenship is constructed and can be used as, “a strategy of inclusion and exclusion to achieve political aims” (Bauder, 2006, p. 25). Building upon relational and spatial approaches to citizenship and the citizen, I critically untangle relationships between citizenship and the territorial state by examining how and why citizenship and citizens are constructed as political “strategies” or “switches” that produce and reproduce inequitable political power relations and spaces.

Citizenship is relationally and spatially complex. According to Staeheli (2011), “citizenship is such a slippery concept and category that is it tempting to try to avoid it” (p. 393). Yet, regardless of citizenship’s conceptual and contextual slipperiness, citizenship remains a powerful democratic concept that warrants scholarly attention. Citizenship conceptually emerged alongside Greek and Roman polities (Pocock, 1998). As such, citizenship is part of a pantheon of influential concepts, most notably democracy. Democracy or rather democracies (Smooha, 1997,
2002, 2005) are, “best conceived not as an affirmative state – of formal equality, equal capacity, or shared freedoms – but as a historical process of negation of social negation, a never-ending effort to make social relations less arbitrary, institutions less unjust, distributions of resources and options less imbalanced, recognition less scarce” (Wacquant, 2005, p. 21). Thus citizenship in its idealized form evokes political and legal equality, justice, rights, and liberty (Kostakopoulou, 2008; Kymlicka, 1995; Pocock, 1998). While actualizing citizenship from an abstract and idealized concept remains challenging, as Bourdieu (2014) notes, “abstract citizenship must be brought about by political work,” notably by political practices (actions) and critical scholarly work that examines and makes visible the politicized construction and uneven lived inequities of citizenship (p. 351).

Much scholarly political work elucidates citizenship’s particularities, highlights how citizens and denizens (non-citizens) are constructed, and addresses why citizenship matters. Citizenship as a formal, state-defined legal and political status provides an array of rights, including political, civic, economic, and social rights, including the right to participate in political process and obtain social welfare (Howard-Hassmann, 2015; Marshall, 2009). Citizenship rights are mutually constitutive with political and civic obligations such as jury duty, paying taxes, and military conscription. Citizenship also can positively impact the quality of life and economic opportunities of individuals with vast spatial differences (Bauder, 2006; Shachar, 2009). Such rights, obligations, and benefits can foster a sense of shared responsibility, membership, identity, and active participation, which through citizenship practices inculcate what it means to be a citizen or member of a political community (Bloemraad, 2006; Preece & Mosweunyane, 2004). For minorities and immigrants in particular, citizenship facilitates political and civic incorporation and through political representation and accessibility fosters trust and belonging within a shared political space and process (Bloemraad, 2006, 2013; Bloemraad &
Schönwälder, 2013). While citizenship is broadly influential and can foster a sense of commonality and membership, citizenship is fragmented and differentiated among groups (Bauder, 2006; Eaton & McArdle, 2007; Holston, 2008). As Bloemraad (2006) emphasizes, “When residents of a country do not acquire citizenship or fail to participate in the political system, not only is the sense of shared enterprise undermined, but so, too, are the institutions of democratic government” (p. 1). This fragmentation and differentiation is problematic, particularly for nationalizing multinational states. I critically examine such fragmentation and differentiation within the nationalizing and democratizing multinational state of Estonia, by addressing Estonian state-constructed citizenship and its impacts on Estonia’s large Russian-speaking minority population. Estonian Russian-speakers primarily consist of Soviet-era migrants and their descendants, who have not integrated or been integrated wholeheartedly as equal members of the post-Soviet Estonian political community and citizenry (Aalto, 2003a; Järve, 2000, 2005; Laitin, 1998; Pettai & Hallik, 2002; Yiftachel & Ghanem, 2004). Estonian Russian-speakers include a fragmented mixture of Estonian citizens, Russian citizens, and Stateless residents with varied rights, responsibilities, and senses of belonging.

Today, citizenship is primarily understood as a relational and spatial power-laden state construct (Bauder, 2006, 2008; Bloemraad, 2006; Bosniak, 2006; Bourdieu, 2014; Howard-Hassmann, 2015; Shachar, 2009). As Bosniak (2006) states, “Citizenship is presumed, with little question, to be a national enterprise – a set of institutions and practices that necessarily take place within the political community, or social world, of the nation-state” (p. 23). This point is reiterated by Bourdieu, who posits, “the citizen is someone who is in juridical relations with the state, who has duties towards the state and has the right to demand an account from the state” (Bourdieu, 2014, p. 350). Citizenship is thus relationally bound to state politics and power dynamics and spatially bound to state political, legal, and civic spaces at a multiplicity of scales.
The state’s influence is reflected in the distinct forms of formal citizenship that have emerged alongside the modern state system that are spatially bound to state territory, including the common *jus soli* [soil, place of birth], *jus sanguinis* [blood, ancestry, heritage], and naturalization (examination process) (Brubaker, 1992a; Helbing, 2014; Shachar, 2009). Additionally, alternative forms have also emerged questioning the equitable and democratic construction of common citizenship forms. These alternative forms include *jus domicile* [principle of residency] (Austin & Bauder, 2010; Bauder, 2012, 2014) and *jus nexi* [attachment and affiliation] (Shachar, 2009, 2011). Numerous scholars continue to critique the relationship between citizenship and the territorial state (Balibar, 2004; Ong, 2006; Sassen, 2002; Soysal, 1994). While the state is a major harbinger of citizenship and citizen construction, citizenship in its broad conceptual sense is not solely impacted or shaped by the state. While a plethora of non-state actors, processes, and relations reinforce, alter, and/or challenge state-constructed and territorially-embedded citizenship, citizenship and citizens alike are subject to change. Thus the assumed denationalization, postnationalization and/or deterritorialization (Balibar, 2004; Ong, 2006; Sassen, 2002; Soysal, 1994) of citizenship is not entirely unbinding citizenship from the territorial state, but rather going through a process of, “reconfiguration and relocation” (Staeheli, 1999, p. 60).

As state constructs, citizenship and citizens are formed as reflections and manifestations of politicized, ethnicized, racialized, gendered, and nationalized discourses, practices, processes, spaces, and relations (Bauder, 2006, 2008; Brubaker, 1992a; Ehrkamp & Jacobsen, 2015; Helbing, 2014). Thus, citizenship isn’t part of continuous democratic legal status or ideal, but rather a mechanism of distinction, that delineates citizens and denizens (non-citizen residents) (Bauder, 2006, 2008). Building upon relational and spatial approaches to citizenship, I operationalize the innovative conceptualization of citizenship as a form of capital, a valued
resource that structures and is structured by politicized power relations and spaces, particularly those relations and spaces associated with the state (Bauder, 2006, 2008; Bourdieu, 1986, 1998, 2005a, 2005b, 2014). For Bourdieu (1996), the state is not a monolithic entity but, “the central bank of symbolic credit,” (capital) comprised of a myriad of social agents or actors who collectively constitute a state political (administrative, bureaucratic, elected, party, etc.) field (social space) and political elite (p. 377). Bourdieu (2014) emphasizes that while the state is often assumed to consist of social agents with uniform backgrounds, interests, and power, in reality the state is “not a bloc” but, “a space structured according to oppositions [or opposing views, interests, and capitals of social agents] linked to specific forms of capital with different interests” (p. 20). The embodied and enacted oppositions or antagonisms within the state as a whole allows for potential change and/or revolution (Bourdieu, 2014; Kuus, 2014). The state itself emerged as, “the culmination of a process of concentration of different species of capital” and is comprised of social agents with their own accumulated forms of capital, that provide them legitimacy and ability to work within the state apparatus (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 41). According to Bauder (2008), this robust conceptualization, “corresponds to the treatment of citizenship as strategic concept not only in association with constructions of identity, belonging, struggles over recognition, and the politics of participation and contribution, but also in relation to regulating access to scarce resources and institutionalizing difference” (p. 316). As a form of capital, citizenship is comprised of enmeshed formal (legal status with rights and responsibilities) and substantive (practice, recognition, and identity) aspects (Bauder, 2006, 2008). With this robust conceptualization, I can spatially and relationally examine both citizenship and citizen (Staeheli, 2011, 2013; Staeheli et. al., 2012) and elucidate how and why citizenship is constructed, manifested, and reflected as a form of capital in embodied and enacted citizenship statuses, perceptions, practices, and identities. By highlighting the politicization of citizenship and citizen
by the state (Bourdieu, 2002; Wilson & Swyngedouw, 2014) through a theoretically-informed contextual approach, I critique the assumed naturalness and universality of state constructed citizenship and the state itself.

Citizenship is spatio-temporally contingent, which infers that context matters; however, what can be revealed within one context regarding citizenship and citizens can provide relational and spatial insights regarding how citizenship and citizens are constructed and how the state, citizens, denizens, and other actors (and/or processes) support, maintain, challenge, and/or alter citizenship and citizens as constructs. The Republic of Estonia is a distinct case study and regional example within citizenship scholarship (Aalto, 2003a; Fein & Straughn, 2014; Feldman, 2000; Laitin, 1998; Thompson, 1998; Trimbach, 2014a). During the illegal Soviet occupation of Estonia (1940-41, 1944-1991), the Estonian population underwent dramatic demographic shifts due to the state incentivized migration of multiethnic Russian-speakers from other Soviet republics to the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic (ESSR), primarily as laborers (Kasekamp, 2010; Light, 2012; Raun, 2001). During the occupation, the ethnic Estonian population decreased approximately from 97.3% (1945) to 61.5% (1989), while non-Estonians, primarily consisting of Russian-speakers and ethnic Russians, increased from less than 3% (1945) to over 30% (1989) (Raun, 2001). This population shift was not solely the consequence of Soviet state-incentivized migration of Russian-speakers to the margins of the Soviet Union’s constituent republics, but was also the violent result of World War II and Soviet occupation (Light, 2012; Raud, 2004; Raun, 2001). World War II (including its battles, invasions, occupations) and Soviet occupation included deportations (of ethnic Estonians to Siberia and other parts of the Soviet Union), refugee/evacuee migration, civilian and military war casualties, mass politicized purges/killings, territorial (boundary) shifts, and controlled internal (Soviet) migration (Kasekamp, 2010; Laitin, 1998; Light, 2012; Plakans, 2011; Raun, 2001).
The majority of Russian-speakers resettled in ethno-linguistically segregated urban areas and tended to live within their own ethno-linguistic social spaces, which included Russian-language media and education (Brown, 2013; Jõesaar & Rannu, 2014; Thiele, 2003). Additionally, “all organizational and professional hierarchies involved daily and constant communication in Russian, locally and centrally, and the Russian speakers, wherever they lived, showed little desire to learn the local languages” (Plakans, 2011, p. 375). Since the majority of Russian-speakers were labor migrants, military personnel, and political elites from other parts of the Soviet Union arriving in a rapidly industrializing, urbanizing, and Sovietizing ESSR, the newcomers, “became over-represented” in newly constructed housing, neighborhoods, and cities/towns (Kährik & Tammaru, 2010, p. 204). Thus, Russian-speakers tended to live (and continue to reside) in modern Soviet-era housing estates, while the native Estonian population lived in pre-Soviet housing and neighborhoods. According to Kährik and Tammaru (2010), “the allocation of housing in the central planning system, with certain population groups, such as managers, politicians, the military, the intellectual and cultural elite, workers in high-priority enterprises, people with higher education, etc. having better access to better urban housing” was common in socialist states, including the ESSR; however, Soviet urban housing was more ethno-linguistically segregated than other European socialist housing allocation processes (p. 204). This segregation cemented what would later be called a, “one state, two societies” (Berg, 2001; Hallik, 2003; Pettai & Hallik, 2002). The transrepublic and nonviolent Singing Revolution (roughly 1988-1991) brought about Estonian independence (1991) and contributed to the overall collapse of the Soviet Union (1992) (Kasekamp, 2010; Šmidchens, 2014).

While the Singing Revolution propelled Estonian political, economic, and democratic shifts, the Revolution fostered the reconstruction of the Estonian state, power relations, citizenship, and citizenry (Aalto, 2003a; Trimbach, 2014a). Through the legal philosophy of
restorationism, based on the legal principle of *ex iniuria jus non oritur* [illegal actions are illegal and therefore cannot create laws] (Visek, 1997), the illegal Soviet occupation and its laws were declared illegal, and the Estonian state restored its political institutions, laws, and nation-state. Additionally, Estonian nationalizing processes have been equated with ethnic democracy or ethnocracy (Järve, 2000, 2005; Pettai & Hallik, 2002; Yiftachel & Ghanem, 2004), which are democratic states that appear democratic and feature many liberal democratic characteristics, but whose citizenship, power relations, and identity are inequitably differentiated by a politically dominant ethnic group (Peled, 2014, p. 2). As a consequence of restorationist and ethnocratic logic, the Estonian state also restored its pre-Soviet citizenship policy, which emphasizes ethnicized *jus sanguinis*, and citizenry, which included only those individuals and their descendants who had been legal citizens of Estonia prior to the first Soviet occupation of 1940 (Aalto, 2003a; Järve, 2000, 2005; Trimbach, 2014a; Visek, 1997; Yiftachel & Ghanem, 2004). This restored citizenry and legal members of the post-Soviet Estonian political community consisted overwhelmingly of ethnic Estonians. This reconstruction of citizenship in turn classified Russian-speaking Soviet-era migrants and their descendants as third country nationals (illegal immigrants) and non-citizens (stateless residents) (Fein & Straughn, 2014; Feldman, 2000; Trimbach, 2014a). This reconstruction of citizenship and the citizen has had wide-ranging impacts both foreign and domestic (Järve, 2005; Pettai & Hallik, 2002; Stserba v. Holder, 2011; Thompson, 1998; Trimbach, 2014a; Trimbach & O’Lear, 2015), including the fragmentation of Russian-speakers into differentiated citizenship status groups with marginal political power compared to their Estonian-speaking counterparts. As such, Estonia is contextually ripe for a relational and spatial examination of citizenship.

Through the relational and spatial approach to citizenship outlined above, specifically the conceptualization of citizenship as a form of capital and the theoretically-informed context, I
critically examine relationships between citizenship and the territorial state by addressing a blend of conceptual, contextual, and analytical questions. These questions provide an array of insights into citizenship’s spatiality and relationship with the territorial state. By addressing these overarching relationships, I examine how the state constructs citizenship and citizenship spaces. By addressing these relationships, I also explore how citizenship as a form of capital can be used to gauge state-constructed citizenship and political power relations between Estonian Russian-speakers and the Estonian state. Additionally, I also examine the role of citizenship spaces and scales of the everyday citizen in order to understand how citizens themselves embody and enact citizenship via perceptions, practices, and identities and how *jus domicile* (Austin & Bauder, 2010; Bauder, 2012, 2014) and *jus nexi* (Howard-Hassmann, 2015; Shachar, 2009, 2011) may offer equitable democratic citizenship alternatives. The research questions I address include:

1. How can citizenship geography (re)spatialize citizenship?
2. How is citizenship as capital constructed and embedded within territorial state spaces and processes?
3. How do minority communities of disparate citizenship statuses valorize citizenship?
4. How do minority communities challenge, reinforce, or alter state constructed citizenship?
5. How is citizenship practiced and perceived by minority populations of disparate citizenship statuses and spatial communities?
6. How do local perceptions and practices of citizenship influence communities’ perceptions and practices of multiscalar political processes, relations, and spaces?
7. How does citizenship and place of residence impact spatial identity among Russian-speaking Estonians?

Building upon the relational and narrative turns within human geography (Cameron, 2012), I address these questions by constructing narratives through accumulated data from...
descriptive interviews with Estonian Russian-speakers. The narratives are complemented by survey data that illustrate how Russian-speakers embody and engage both formal and substantive citizenship through their own perceptions, practices, and identities. Such mixed-method approaches that integrate both surveys and interviews have been used by other citizenship geography scholars (Torres & Wicks-Asbun, 2014) and highlight how citizens themselves maintain, alter, and/or challenge state constructed citizenship and power relations.

I operationalize my research questions and methods in practice by engaging citizenship capital among Estonian Russian-speakers throughout this monograph. The remainder of this monograph consists of six chapters, each contributing to my overarching purpose and questions. Chapter 2 provides a discussion of relevant literature and social theories concerning citizenship. This chapter elucidates the proposed Bourdieusian framework and its conceptualization of citizenship and the state. Chapter 3 highlights the theoretically-informed context of Estonia, with an emphasis on Estonian nation-building, Estonian Russian-speakers, and the primary spatial communities Russian-speakers reside (Tallinn/Harju County and Narva/Ida-Viru County). Chapter 3 also includes truncated and altered components of context-related publications (Trimbach, 2014a, 2014b) that were published during the monograph completion process. Chapter 4 elaborates on the mixed-methodological approach and research design. This chapter describes all associated available literature, data, descriptive statistical analysis, and qualitative methods utilized for the project. Chapters 5 and 6 provide the analysis and results of formal citizenship (Chapter 5) and substantive citizenship (Chapter 6). These chapters synthesize the descriptive interview narratives with empirical survey data (in addition to other data sources) obtained during my 2013 fieldwork. The final chapter (Chapter 7) integrates the previous chapters and provides concluding analysis, remarks, and implications.

As highlighted above, each of my monograph’s mutually constitutive chapters contribute
to answering my research questions; however, I begin with an overview of citizenship as a concept and highlight how it can be operationalized to relationally and spatially examine state constructed citizenship. As a critical scholar, I understand the importance of combining theory and practice, thus in the following chapter I outline the conceptual development of citizenship, its application within the burgeoning field of citizenship geography, and my own Bourdieusian-inspired approach. This approach untangles the broad conceptual complexity of citizenship and critically unravels the contextually distinct spatial and relational particularities of Estonian citizenship, with an emphasis on Estonian Russian-speakers’ citizenship embodiments and enactments. By emphasizing Estonian Russian-speakers’ interactions with Estonian citizenship, I illustrate the current trajectory of Estonian citizenship and its implications for Russian-speakers and the Estonian state, but also provide potential openings for reimagining and respatializing citizenship as an equitable and democratic construct.
Chapter 2: Conceptual Framework

Citizenship...has largely replaced class as a means of analyzing the political struggles of the poor. (Roberts, 2004, pp. 195-196)

…the definition of citizenship is strategic, suiting the political and economic agendas of those who define it. (Bauder, 2006, p. 51)

Introduction

Citizenship’s depoliticized universality conveys a sense of legal uniformity and naturalness; however, citizenship is a multidimensional political construct with a multiplicity of philosophical traditions, meanings, and contextual variations. Citizenship emerged as a democratic concept during European antiquity (Pocock, 1998) and has evolved in tandem with the territorial state system (Bourdieu, 2014; Brubaker, 1992a; Kofman, 2008). Today, citizenship is broadly understood as a relationship that binds a nation (people) to a territorial state (government) through political-legal rights, responsibilities, actions, and membership (Brubaker, 1989, 1992a; Marston & Mitchell, 2004). Neoliberal globalization tends to herald the end of state-centered or constructed citizenship (Balibar, 2004; Ong, 2006; Sassen, 2002; Soysal, 1994); however, citizenship’s relational and spatial aspects highlight citizenship’s underlying place-contingencies, spatial and group differentiation, and relationship with state-centered political power.

The issue of citizenship has witnessed resurgence within interdisciplinary scholarship, including within geography (Barnett & Low, 2004; Bauder, 2006, 2008, 2012, 2013, 2014; Erhkamp & Jacobsen, 2015; Kofman, 2008; Staeheli, 1999, 2011; Torres & Wicks-Asbun, 2014; Trimbach, 2014a). While citizenship geography expands in popularity and interest, it remains marginal and fragmented within the subfields of political, migration, legal, and urban geographies, all of which have their own concepts, methods, and vocabularies. Topically,

In order to address this question, I critically explore citizenship as a spatial and relational construct. By spatial and relational construct, I am referring to the spatial and relational aspects of citizenship that bind individuals together through spatially embedded citizenship construction, embodiment, and enactment. I examine citizenship as a spatial and relational construct because this type of conceptual excavation elucidates the multiscalar social and political actors, institutions, and processes that form and alter citizenship over time and space. In this chapter, I examine citizenship’s philosophical traditions, conceptual development, and its utilization within citizenship studies and geography. Building upon this base of knowledge, I also outline my conceptual framework. I address citizenship as a form of capital (Bauder, 2006, 2008, 2012; Bourdieu, 1977, 1986), a valued resource, which consists of enmeshed formal and substantive aspects (Bauder, 2006, 2008; Isin & Wood, 1999; Staeheli, 1999). Following my framework, I provide a summarized conceptual overview that describes how and why citizenship as capital is illustrated by the contextual particularities of my Estonian case study.

**Major Citizenship Traditions**

While it is not the primary goal or within the limits of this project’s scope to contribute to the broader philosophical debate related to citizenship, it is important to acknowledge the primary European philosophical traditions and their impacts on citizenship scholarship and politics. Most major citizenship policies and forms, including those that are outlined in this
scholarly work (particularly Estonian) are ontologically grounded in three major European political philosophies and traditions. The major traditions include, but are not limited to: liberalism, communitarianism, and civic republicanism (Isin & Wood, 1999; Janoski & Gran, 2002; Preece & Mosweunyane, 2004). All three philosophical traditions inform how states construct and understand citizenship in both theory and practice (Holston, 2008; Janoski & Gran, 2002; Kostakopoulou, 2008).

Liberalism is considered the dominant political philosophy and practice within, “Anglo-Saxon” states, including the United States (Janoski & Gran, 2002, p. 197). Liberal citizenship emphasizes individual rights, interests, and choice. Liberalism broadly, “denotes those theories that consider the individual as preceding polity and citizenship as specific rights that protect the individual” (Isin & Wood, 1999, p. 7). The specific rights are often defined as negative rights or “rights from” rather than “rights to” (Isin & Wood, 1999). Liberal citizenship foregrounds the individual as the embodiment of rights and the state as a potential impediment of rights, thus the state is often perceived as an entity that requires limitations.

Communitarianism challenges liberalism and its emphasis on the individual by advancing the notion that individuals are not atomistic or isolated, but rather embedded within mutually interdependent communities with shared collective responsibilities and obligations, that are promoted and/or enforced by the state (Isin & Wood, 1999; Janoski & Gran, 2002). Communitarianism goes beyond rights and emphasizes citizenship as a shared identity and form of participation, particularly at the local community level (Preece & Mosweunyane, 2004). Communitarianism is often understood as an antithesis or major rival to liberal citizenship.

Civic republicanism bridges dualistic liberalism and communitarianism. Civic republican citizenship emphasizes the importance of civil society (non-governmental community organizations, institutions, and social networks) to foster civic literacy, virtue, and participation.
(Isin & Wood, 1999; Preece & Moswuenyane, 2004). Civic republican citizenship anchored by civil society provides a space for public dialogue and interaction between collectivized individual citizens and the state.

Liberalism tends to be a dominant and expanding political and philosophical thought informing citizenship formation today (Lee, 2014; Schuck, 2002). Liberal citizenship’s dominance is largely due to the diffusion of liberal democracy and liberal democratic discourses and practices, particularly related to human rights and individualism. Liberalism’s expansion as both a political-legal framework and philosophical lens, is also connected to colonialism, post-colonialism, and economic globalization, which promote(d) western notions of democracy, individualism, citizenship, and consumerism (Lee, 2014; Levinson & Sutton, 2008; Sussman, 2010). Additionally, western (mainly American) liberal democratization promotion (often entwined with national or international developmental aid programs) and civic education policies can foster liberal politics, state formation, and citizenship, regardless of local and/or indigenous understandings and practices of politics, power, and membership (Lee, 2014; Levinson & Sutton, 2008; Sim, 2015; Stevick 2008). Stevick (2008) notes that such liberal-infused policies have spatially varied impacts throughout the world, including in Estonia.

Although liberalism and liberal citizenship are expanding in theory and practice, liberalism is challenged and critiqued. Kostakopoulou’s (2008) aptly named, “the cartography of citizenship” argues that, “the complicity between liberal citizenship and nationalism was such that it was simply taken for granted that the nation-state was the natural locus of democracy and human welfare, and that national unity could not be fractured by the existence of, often defiant, minorities” (p. 27). Liberal citizenship merged with European nationalism and was an important mechanism to delineate territorial state boundaries and define political membership (Kostakopoulou, 2008). Although liberal citizenship emphasizes individual rights, individuals
must fit an exclusive state-informed ethnic and/or civic form of nationhood and citizenry (Brubaker, 2004b; Kostakopoulou, 2008). Kymlicka (1995, 1998, 2000) argues that traditional notions of liberal citizenship are problematic because they actively promote a depoliticized naturalness and universality of citizenship, which ignores the heterogeneity and power imbalances among a polity’s population. According to Kymlicka (1995), modern states are multicultural (multinational states and polyethnic states) and are challenged by minority groups’ (ethnic groups, national/homeland groups, and metics, or residents without citizenship) desires and actions for greater recognition and accommodation (p. 10). Kymlicka (1995, 1998, 2000) advocates for states to recognize the group-differentiatedness of citizenship and to form multicultural or multinational citizenships. According to Kymlicka (1995), multicultural states should adopt certain steps which, “might include polyethnic and representation rights to accommodate ethnic and other disadvantaged groups within each national group, and self-government rights to enable autonomy for national minorities alongside the majority nation” (p. 194). Multicultural or multinational citizenship has led to contentious debates, including the formation of policies and projects aimed to equitably integrate minority communities but also recognize and respect their differences. While multiculturalism remains a major political and legal notion within liberal citizenship theory, scholars question multiculturalism’s broader applicability to non-indigenous contexts (Kostakopoulou, 2008) and to populations that reject their immigrant status and position (like Russians/Russian-speakers in Estonia) (Kymlicka, 2000). State governments have also in recent years declared an end to multiculturalism and its policies because of political pressures and/or policy failures (Korteweg & Triadafilopoulos, 2015; Weaver, 2010).

The philosophical traditions and critiques of liberalism bring to the fore the complex assemblage of power-laden social and spatial relations, actors, and processes that inform, alter,
and challenge citizenship. Citizenship continues to evolve in both theory and practice alongside the aforementioned (and additional) traditions and critiques. While citizenship remains a contentious topic of political-philosophical debate, the broader fields of citizenship studies and citizenship geography have elucidated citizenship’s conceptual formation, social construction, and underlying power relations through conceptually informed and empirical research. In the following subsection, I highlight citizenship geographies’ major contributions to the study of citizenship and the conceptual origins of citizenship.

Citizenship Geographies

multidimensionality, consisting of a formal status (with numerous rights) and a substantive position with entwined practices and form of state membership or identity.

Citizenship scholars recognize that citizenship is not stable or fixed, but rather is temporally or historically contingent. As Marston and Mitchell (2004) note, citizenship should be recognized, “as a non-static, non-linear social, political, cultural, economic, and legal construction that is best rendered in terms of citizenship as a process of formation” (p. 95). Citizenship formation is not only a social construction entwined with a myriad of complex processes, citizenship is also spatial (Desforges, Jones, & Woods, 2005; Staeheli 1999; Staeheli et. al., 2012). Geographic (Desforges et. al., 2005; Staeheli, 1999) and non-geographic scholars (Blank, 2007; Kostakopoulou, 2008; Walton-Roberts, 2015) alike have incorporated the geographic notions of space and scale to highlight and the mutually constitutive relationship between citizenship and space (McCann, 2002). This mutually constitutive relationship between space and citizenship is what some geographers call the, “spatiality of citizenship” (Staeheli, 1999; Staeheli et. al., 2012; Trimbach, 2014a).

The spatiality of citizenship is reflected in the political and non-political spaces in which citizenship takes shape and in turn shapes (Desforges et. al., 2005; Painter & Philo, 1995; Staeheli, 1999; Staeheli et. al, 2012). Staeheli et. al. (2012) state that, “citizenship is located in multiple sites, some of which are material places, some of which are symbolic, and some of which are institutional” (p. 3). In this sense, citizenship is reflected and located in the spaces it is formed in and performed by citizens and denizens (non-citizen residents). This notion also illustrates the “place-rootedness” and place-contingency of citizenship (Desforges et. al., 2005, p. 440). While space has a multiplicity of meanings, it is important to remember that, “space is not a neutral container of natural and man-made objects but is produced through social, historical, political, and economic processes, practices, and changes” (Walton-Roberts, 2015, p. 241). Thus
space, like citizenship, is understood in a social, political, and relational constructive sense. Citizenship and space are mutually produced and reproduced overtime by a multiplicity or assemblage of actors, processes, practices, and discourses. Examples of citizenship spaces abound, including but not limited to: states, supranational polities and organizations, cities, transnational communities, neighborhoods, local communities, public spaces, households, clubs, shared-linguistic spaces, virtual spaces, and bodies (Bauder, 2006; Isin, 2002; Kofman, 2008; Leitner & Strunk, 2014a, 2014b; Lynn-Ee Ho, 2006; Painter, 2008a; Staeheli & Clarke, 2003; Valentine & Skelton, 2007).

Place or the “place-rootedness” of citizenship also informs citizenship construction and what it means to be a citizen within a political community (Desforges et. al., 2005, p. 440). Like space, place is not considered a, “passive container but as a productive force in political practice,” which informs through place-based experiences and imaginations, “how the work works or ought to work and how this affects places,” (Kuus, 2014, p. 36). Agnew (1987, 2005, 2009) provides a highly influential (Diener, 2004; Kuus, 2014; Staeheli, 2008) tripartite constructivist interpretation of place and its mutual-constitutive relationship with space. According to Agnew (2009), place consists of three overlapping aspects, which include: location, locale, and sense of place. Location or site is, “where an activity or object is located and that relates to other sites or locations because of interaction and movement between them,” (p. 36). Locale refers to the, “setting where everyday-life activities take place,” which may include an array of locales that individuals socially engage, including businesses, religious structures, and homes. As Diener (2004) suggests, locale, “affects and is affected by broader geopolitical or socio-economic forces,” (p. 14). Sense of place is the strong subjective feeling of place-belonging, which informs and reinforces local particularities, identifications, and the formation of place-based communities (Agnew, 2009; Staeheli, 2008). Agnew (1987) emphasizes that each
aspect of place are enmeshed and that, “the local social worlds of place (locale) cannot be understood apart from the objective macro-order of location and the subjective territorial identity of sense of place,” (p. 28). Places are not isolated but are connected to broader contexts in which they are embedded and other places (Agnew, 2009).

According to Merrifield (1993), “place is not merely abstract space: it is the terrain where basic social practices – consumption, enjoyment, tradition, self-identification, solidarity, social support and social reproduction etc. are lived out,” and, “where everyday life is situated,” (p. 522). Thus, place matters and local particularities matter and inform citizenship (Desforges, et. al., 2005). As Desforges, et. al. (2005) note, citizenship was historically connected to place-based communities and senses of belonging, which reinforced local particularities and embedded citizenship to a particular place, political and civic context, and power relations. Additionally, Staeheli (2010) emphases the role of place in the construction of citizens and what is means to be a socialized political actor within a polity by noting that, “citizens are ‘made’ in different ways, in different places, reflecting the range of ideas about responsibility, rights, and about who is a legitimate member of the public,” (p. 397). I recognize the importance of place in inculcating citizenship practices, perceptions, and identities that are embodied and enacted. I outline the role of place, specifically of the place-based communities of Narva and Tallinn, Estonia later in this monograph.

The spatiality of citizenship is also reflected in and manifested through a multiplicity of scales (Blank, 2007; Kofman, 1995; Staeheli, 1999; Walton-Roberts, 2015). According to Desforges et. al. (2005), a geographic lens advances the notion that, “citizenship is formed through scalar configuration” (p. 440). Staeheli (2003) reiterates this point by stating that, “citizenship is multiscalar in that its legal and substantive components are shaped by conditions, processes, and institutions at the local, national, and international scales“ (p. 99). While
citizenship is formed or shaped through scale, scale is not a natural given or taken-for-granted notion, but rather a social, political, jurisdictional, and territorial construct that is deeply entwined with the politics of scale (Cox, 1998; Howitt, 2008). Scale is not approached as nested, horizontal, or hierarchical, but rather a relational construct in which scales of politics or citizenship overlap as hybrid and plural. Like space, scales of citizenship are not fixed or static. Citizenship not only exists in a plurality of spaces and scales, but also can be reflected and manifested in alternative spaces and scales that are not entwined with traditional spaces and scales associated with state politics and power. As Leitner and Strunk (2014a, 2014b) suggest, individuals, especially those on the political margins and urban periphery, use and mobilize through existing political, jurisdictional, or legal spaces and scales, but also (re)create their own through insurgent citizenship. In this sense, citizenship and spaces of citizenship are first and foremost constructed via a plurality of legal, political, and territorial scales (Blank, 2007; Desforges et. al., 2005; Staeheli, 1999; Walton-Roberts, 2015). Citizenship and citizenship spaces are differentiated by scale (Blank, 2007; Staeheli, 1999). Furthermore, groups struggle to construct citizenship by topographically “jumping scales” (Cox, 1998) or topologically through “powers of reach” (Allen & Cochrane, 2010). Scales are interconnected, thus struggles for citizenship at one scale also has a direct impact on citizenship at other scales (Blank, 2007; Staeheli, 1999). According to Marston and Mitchell (2004), various actors, institutions, and processes, including those of the state, “can interact at all levels of social life – from the local to the global – such that the discourses and practices of citizenship can derive from one scale and be effective at another” and, which scales are important for citizenship formation, “is dependent upon the particularities of different historical-geographical moments” (p. 10).

While citizenship is impacted by and in turn impacts an array of non-political spaces, actors, relations, and processes, citizenship is recognized first and foremost as political,
territorial, and legal, which all reflect the underlying power-ladeness of citizenship as a construct. According to Blank (2007), “three meaningful territorial spheres currently structure the various aspects of what is understood to be citizenship” which are sub-national, national, and supra-national (p. 421). Blank (2007) addresses three distinct legal interconnected “spheres” or scales of citizenship based on jurisdictional spaces and territories. Critical legal geographers (Blomley, 1994, 2003; Kedar, 2003; von Benda-Beckmann, von Benda-Beckman, & Griffiths, 2009; Whitecross, 2009) also support the legal or jurisdictional scalar understanding of citizenship. Advancing the notion of legal pluralism, von Benda-Beckman et. al. (2009) note how, “actors on varying scales ranging from international or transnational agencies, to state organizations, down to local actors utilize legal constructions of space in their struggle for power” and how, “legal spaces are embedded in broader social and political claims” (p. 22). While Blank and other legal scholars (Walton-Roberts, 2015) emphasize jurisdictional scales that are interconnected through legal structures, institutions, and actors, citizenship is also impacted by and is reflected in other scales, particularly in the local scales of everyday life (Staeheli et. al., 2012). In this sense, territorially embedded legal and political structures, actors, processes, and relations construct and embed citizenship and citizenship spaces at various scales (Blank, 2007; Staeheli, 1999; Staeheli et. al., 2012; von Benda-Beckman et. al., 2009; Walton-Roberts, 2015).

While space and scale are fruitful geographic lenses and notions to address the complex formation of citizenship as a political, territorial, and legal construct, it is important to recognize that space and scale are taken-for-granted, presupposed, and/or implied, particularly at the national/state, global, or even local levels (Valverde, 2008). Traditional or normative spatial and scalar assumptions can lead to the “territorial trap” (Agnew, 1994) or “local trap” (Purcell, 2006), both of which overemphasize one scale over another, which in turn ignores other scales or spaces that may impact the phenomena, process, or pattern in question. As Purcell (2006) argues,
“Scales are not independent entities with pre-given characteristics” but rather, “they are socially constructed strategies to achieve particular ends” (p. 1921). Citizenship as viewed and approached through a multiplicity of spaces and scales, which are differentiated, uneven, and contradictory, highlights how, “all aspects of citizenship are polyvalent” in that citizenship is an inconsistent amalgamation that is constructed and reconstructed by a plurality of interconnected processes, practices, discourses, and relations (Staeheli et al., 2012, p. 639).

**Citizenship’s Conceptual Development**

Building upon the geographic contributions to the study of citizenship, particularly the notion of citizenship as a multidimensional process that is constructed with/through polyvalent political, territorial, and legal processes, scales, and spaces, I outline the conceptual evolution of citizenship over time and space. I outline citizenship’s conceptual development in order to highlight citizenship’s formation process, particularly in conjunction with the various polities and political spaces/scales in which it has been entwined. In order to examine citizenship as a concept, I incorporate a range of interdisciplinary citizenship studies and geography scholarship.

Citizenship scholars argue that citizenship’s conceptual roots are in the Greek *polis* [city-state] and Roman *res publica* [state, republic] and *imperium* [empire] (Burchell, 2002; Pocock, 1998). Greek *polites* [citizens] and Roman *civis* [citizens], respectively, forged the political notion that the, “citizen rules and is ruled” by her citizen equals (Pocock, 1998, p. 33). Early citizens were ascribed the ability to participate is self-governance (R. M. Smith, 2002). Greek and Roman forms of citizenship varied. Greek citizenship was marked by political participation among citizens of equal status and membership; while Roman citizenship evolved more into a formal status of political membership and rights, rather than participation due to the elite political structure of the Roman *imperium* (Pocock, 1998).
While western scholars and politicians alike tout citizenship’s historic and inherent political equality as part of an overarching western exceptionalism and democratization (Pocock, 1998; Sim, 2015), in actuality, the western notion and practice of citizenship in antiquity was highly differentiated, exclusionary, and existed alongside alternative (non-western) forms of political membership (Burchell, 2002; Isin, 2002; Isin & Wood, 2002; Pocock, 1998). According to Pocock (1998), Greek and Roman notions of citizenship incorporated prerequisites and only afforded an elite minority the ability to acquire citizenship and the ability to participate fully in political life. Isin and Wood (1999) argue that western scholars tout citizenship as uniquely western because those same scholars constructed non-western forms of political membership, status, and identity as such, thus ignoring alternative forms of citizenship that existed elsewhere. This western notion would later evolve and globally diffuse through nationalism, colonialism, and globalization, which naturalized and historicized citizenship as universal aspects of modern state politics and geopolitics (Isin & Wood, 1999).

Citizenship as a European political notion was later incorporated into other pre-modern European state political systems and structures, notably medieval and renaissance cities/city-states. Although the interpretations of citizenship and their specificities varied, medieval and renaissance urban citizens, including burghers and bourgeoisie were ascribed and embodied differentiated rights, statuses, responsibilities, and (limited) political powers denied to most European peoples by their sovereigns and political (or religious) elites (Isin, 2002; R. M. Smith, 2002). Citizenship at the time was constructed and practiced at the local level or scale, with local communities and political elites determining who belonged and didn’t based on local particularities and social relations (Bauböck, 2003; Bauder, 2012; Helbing, 2014; Isin, 2002). Although ancient Greek citizenship was also deeply entwined with the city and locality, it was later that European medieval and renaissance cities became the spatial locus, “where modern
constructions of liberty” emerged and were fought over (Bauböck, 2003, p. 139). The relationship between the city and citizenship is still examined today (Bauböck, 2003; Isin, 2002; Staeheli & Clarke, 2003; Staeheli & Dowler, 2002). According to Staeheli and Dowler (2002), “the city – its spatial forms, social practices, and power relationships – is integral to the construction of citizenship and of the public” (p. 73). This localized system still lingers today in Switzerland’s cantons and their respective citizenship policies (Helbing, 2014) and within US states that maintain racialized and ethnicized differentiated rights (Eaton & McArdle, 2007; Holston, 2008).

Citizenship in its contemporary or modern sense emerged and evolved in tandem with the European nation-state system (Bourdieu, 2014; Brubaker, 1992a, 2004a, 2004b; Helbing, 2014; Isin & Wood, 1999; Kostakopoulou, 2008). Medieval and renaissance cities’ notions of citizenship were later harnessed by European nationalists, elites, and/or revolutionaries alike to make claims and justify their political actions for societal change and greater political equity (Bauböck, 2003; Brubaker, 1989; R. M. Smith, 2002). This process was especially true following the Treaty of Westphalia in the seventeenth century (R. M. Smith, 2002). The formation of the European state/nation-state system necessitated the defining of relations among a territorial state’s populace and its government. As Kostakopoulou (2008) notes, “territories were transformed into national homelands and became the object of identification and exclusive loyalty” during this period of nation-building and citizenship formation (p. 26). The nation-state evolved into a territorial social organization of membership or, “associations of citizenship” (Helbing, 2014, p. 27). Municipal and urban constructions of citizenship were incorporated into the state system and institutions (Bauböck, 2003; Bauder 2012; Helbing 2014). As Helbing (2014) notes, “citizenship status was no longer restricted to the urban elites but was thrown open to rural folk” (p. 31). Although citizenship expanded to the demarcated borders of a state’s
territory, citizenship remained exclusionary and often out of reach for minorities, women, non-landed classes, and the poor (Brubaker, 1992a; Helbing, 2014). Kymlicka (1995) notes that the birth of the modern state and citizenship, particularly the liberal democratic state (in Western Europe and North America) saw the emergence of state-constructed citizenship as a set of individual and universal rights. Kymlicka (1995) notes that, states perceived their own citizenship construction practices as universal and politically (and nationally) neutral; however, state-centered citizenship tended (and still tends) to, “privilege the majority nation in certain fundamental ways—for example, the drawing of internal boundaries; the language of schools, courts, and government services; the choice of public holidays; and the division of legislative power between central and local governments” which in turn, “dramatically reduce the political power and cultural viability of a national minority, while enhancing that of the majority culture” (p. 51-52). Thus while citizenship shifted and was rearticulated from urban areas to modern territorial states, citizenship remained exclusive and disempowering to certain populations within a given polity. While citizenship expanded along with state sovereignty and territoriality, the French and American Revolutions and German nationalizing (nation-building) process sparked a dramatic break with how citizenship is conceptualized and constructed by political communities (Brubaker, 1992a; Isin & Wood, 1999; Kofman, 2008; Kostakopoulou, 2008).

Brubaker (1992a) and subsequent scholars (Bauder, 2006; Helbing 2014; Holston, 2008; Isin & Wood, 1999; Kostakopoulou, 2008; Soysal, 1994) have marked the significance of French, German, and/or American conceptualizations of citizenship and their impacts elsewhere. As Brubaker (1992a) notes, “France and Germany have been constructing, elaborating, and furnishing to other states distinctive, even antagonistic models of nationhood and national self-understanding” (p. 1). While the nation, nationhood, and nationalism often manifest or are reflected through ethnocultural and ethnodemographic characteristics, all three interwoven
constructs are political claims or idioms (Brubaker, 2004b). While citizenship took on different forms in different nation-states overtime, citizenship’s dominant forms were primarily introduced by the French and German states and later replicated and altered elsewhere (Brubaker, 1992a, 1998). According to Brubaker (1992a), France and Germany formed divergent understandings of nationhood and citizenry because of their nationalist particularities and territorialities.

Citizenship was a central feature of the French Revolution and state building. In France, in order to rectify the deep legal and political inequalities of the *ancien-régime* and the lack of a clearly defined citizenry, the revolutionary elites and subsequent governments developed an inclusive and open form of citizenship primarily based on the legal principle of *jus soli* [soil, place of birth] (Brubaker, 1989, 1992a; Kostakopoulou, 2008). The inclusivity of French citizenship reflected the entwined egalitarian, democratic, nationalist, and statist discourses, philosophies, and actions within the territorially stable French state (Brubaker, 1989, 1992a, 1998). This also reflected the statist and political essence of French nationalism, which advocated the incorporation of immigrants and other marginalized groups as equal members of French society through the process of becoming French (via state constructed citizenship and integration) (Brubaker, 1992a). According to Scott, Tehranian, and Mathias (2002), the French Revolution gave rise to the emancipatory individualistic notion of, “subject/citizen” who shifted from being understood as part of a, “community, manor, guild or parish” but rather, “as an individual” with equal rights (p. 16). Accompanying this new form of citizenship were extensive state administrative practices and discourses related to systematically classifying, identifying, and legitimizing individuals as citizens (and denizens), first through a complex naming processes (the enforcement of surnames, particularly among ethnic and religious minorities) and later passportization (Scott et. al., 2002).
German citizenship formed primarily as, “an instrument of territorial closure” based on a narrow understanding of nationhood and belonging (Brubaker, 1998, p. 151). According to Brubaker (1992a, 1998) citizenship went through a process of ethnicization and nationalization in Germany, advancing an exclusive form of membership primarily based on the legal principle of *jus sanguinis* [blood, ancestry, heritage] (Brubaker, 1992a, 1998). The territorial German state was solidified in 1871; however, the German notion of citizenship based on blood or ethnicity didn’t emerge until 1913 (Brubaker, 1992a). The dominance of *jus sanguinis* reflected the underlying ethnocultural/linguistic characteristics of German nationalism and state formation. Although Germany existed as a territorial state, a large community of *Auslandsdeutsche* [German ethnolinguistic group] resided outside of German sovereign territory, particularly in the Baltic region and Hungary (Brubaker, 1992a). In order to maintain inclusion of these Germans, citizenship was constructed as an exclusive form of ethnic membership and political equality among co-ethnics. According to Brubaker (1992a), this 1913 nationalist and ethnicized construction of citizenship aimed to equate *Reichsdeutsche* [citizens of the German state] with *Volksdeutsche* [ethnic Germans] and greater *Deutschtum* [German]. This form of citizenship promoted return migration for Germans to the German homeland, potential territorial expansion into German irridenta, and easily excluded othered populations who did not meet the strict standards of being of German blood or ancestry (Brubaker 1992a, 1998).

Brubaker’s works (1989, 1992a, 1998, 2004) on French and German citizenship formation processes and their distinctions cannot go underestimated. French *jus soli* and German *jus sanguinis* have traversed the globe as forms of politicized and nationalized citizenship practice and discourse with distinct political, economic, social, and spatial impacts and variations. Conceptually, Brubaker (1992a) advances the constructivist notion that citizenship is a form of (Weberian) social closure that, “distinguishes between open and closed social
relationships” and this conceptualization, “illuminates large-scale structures and patterns of interaction as well” (p. 23). The notion of social closure coalesces well with Bourdieu’s notion of capital, which incorporates this relational nature (as defined later in this chapter). Based on this social constructivist understanding of citizenship, the French *jus soli* form of citizenship advocates for a state for and of a *demos* [residential community of a territorial state], while the German *jus sanguinis* promotes a state for and of an *ethnos* [community of shared origins, most often ethnic or national] (Duvold & Berglund, 2014; Helbing, 2008; Kedar, 2003). Within Brubaker’s social closure approach, citizenship most often reflects underlying social, political, economic, and legal divisions or distinctions within a given territorial polity. For Brubaker (1992a) and subsequent scholars (Bauder, 2006, 2008; Blitz, 2006; Duvold & Berglund, 2014; Holston, 2008; Isin & Wood, 1999; Kostakopoulou, 2008; Kymlicka, 1995; Shachar, 2009, 2011), although citizenship is a democratic notion, its political and social construction illustrates its undemocratic inequity and differentiated-ness.

While most states have a multidimensional conceptualization of citizenship and citizenship requirements, each state’s citizenship notion (illustrated through state discourse and practice) could be understood as existing within a complex spectrum of forms ranging from a more pure form of *jus sanguinis* (as exemplified by many Arabic-speaking states that have very strict *jus sanguinis* forms of citizenship that are often based on rigid interpretations of group membership and gender) (Mohamed, 2014) to *jus soli* (as exemplified by states with long histories of migration and immigrant incorporation, like the United States and Canada) (Bloemraad, 2006). Additionally, alternative and/or newer forms of citizenship and/or citizenship ascription continue to emerge that reflect the ebbs and flows of social, economic, political, and spatial relations, actors, and processes. These additional forms or notions include, but are not limited to: naturalization (Helbing, 2014), *jus domicile* (Bauböck, 2003; Bauder, 2012), dual
citizenship (Marston & Mitchell, 2004), citizenship-by-investment (Džankić, 2015), deprivation (revocation) (Bauböck & Paskalev, 2015), and e-citizenship/residency (only in Estonia currently) (Kängsepp, 2014).

Rather than focus on state impacts on citizenship formation (Brubaker, 1992a, 1998; Marshall, 2009) which problematically emphasizes the role of states and state elites in citizenship formation through discourse and practice, Holston (2008) advances the notion that residents (socio-economic minorities who reside spatially and relationally at the margins or urban peripheries in particular) themselves challenge, alter, and construct new forms of citizenship from below. This broad notion is referred to as insurgent citizenship or insurgency (Holston, 2008; Leitner & Strunk, 2014a, 2014b). According to Leitner and Strunk (2014b), insurgent citizenship, “describes not only discourses and practices that challenge existing laws, policies, and institutions, but also those promoting alternative criteria for membership, and claiming and enacting new forms of citizenship and rights” (p. 945). Holston (2008) acknowledges the role of the state and political elites in the, “politicization of daily life” and how state constructed citizenship deploys, “a politics of legalized differences to reduce the lives of the vast majority of their citizens to persistent inequality and misery” (p. 312). For Holston (2008) and others (Garmany, 2012; Leitner & Strunk, 2014a, 2014b), citizenship is a heterogeneous construct that reflects state politics and power, but also simultaneously can be countered, destabilized, and transformed by citizens or denizens themselves.

This emphasis on local, urban, or community citizenships is also supported by scholars advocating for the scaling-down of citizenship to local or urban communities (Austin & Bauder, 2010; Bauböck, 2003; Bauder, 2012, 2014; Howard-Hassmann, 2015; Shachar, 2009, 2011). Building upon citizenship’s historic relationship to the city and local attachments and identities, Bauböck (2003) advocates for political reforms to “return” citizenship and sovereignty to local
communities and cities. Citizenship from below has the potential to foster emancipatory self-government, democracy, and within the context of transnational migration the promotion of alternative and more inclusive forms of citizenship, such as *jus domicile* and *jus nexi*. *Jus domicile* refers to, “citizenship based on place of residence” and is “neither necessarily granted at birth nor permanently but rather based on the *de facto* belonging in a territory and the associated community” (Bauder, 2012, p. 187). This territorial and social justice-oriented alternative form of citizenship emphasizes belonging, membership, engagement, and attachment, particularly at the local scale (Bauder, 2012, 2014). *Jus nexi* on the other hand, “establishes a tie between citizenship and the *social fact of membership* rather than blind reliance upon the accident of birth [*ie: jus soli and/or jus sanguinis]*” or national territory by creating a form of political membership that emphasizes, “connection, union, or linkage,” (Shachar, 2009, p. 165). While both alternative constructs vary in conceptual details, both *jus docimile* and *jus nexi* bypass and challenge national constructions of membership, identity, and rights, while simultaneously reimagine and respatialize citizenship with an emphasis on the local relations and spaces of everyday life and community (Bauböck, 2003, 2011; Bauder, 2012; Howard-Hassmann, 2015; Kostakopoulou, 2008; Shachar, 2009, 2011; Volpp, 2011).

State constructed citizenship is not only challenged and countered from below, but also challenged by economic globalization, supranationalism, and non-state actors (Balibar, 2004; Ong, 2006; Sassen, 2002; Soysal, 1994). Some scholars even question the conceptual relevance of state-centered or -constructed citizenship and territorialized citizenship as promoted by the modern state system (Sassen, 2002; Soysal, 1994). State-centered citizenship is perceived by these scholars as antiquated because of neoliberal globalization and state decline (Ong, 2006; Sassen, 2002). Such questions and assumptions advance an understanding that citizenship is undergoing a process of denationalization, postnationalization and/or deterritorialization.
(Balibar, 2004; Ong, 2006; Sassen, 2002; Soysal, 1994). Although each of the aforementioned processes differs, all promote the notion that citizenship is becoming disentwined with the territorial (nation-)state and state political, territorial, and legal power. It would be incorrect to dispute the historically contingent condition of citizenship and unwise to reject the claim that non-state actors and neoliberal globalization are not altering global political power structures, governmentality, citizenship regimes and senses of belonging (Balibar, 2004; Ong, 2006). However, it would be imprudent to completely accept the despatialization of citizenship without critique.

Citizenship is shifting with the myriad and multiplicity of processes in which it is entangled; however, citizenship is what binds the nation (broadly defined) to the state and this relationship has gone through a process of “reconfiguration and relocation” rather than complete relational disintegration (Staeheli, 1999, p. 60). Kofman (1995) notes that this shift reflects a “new geometry” of citizenship (p. 133). This “new geometry” of citizenship is evinced by the increase in and expansion of supranational organizations associated with international human rights, transnational minorities and migrants, and tightly controlled national citizenship and border regimes (Kofman, 1995; Staeheli, 1999; Staeheli et. al., 2012). Citizenship’s spatiality is thus shifting with the broader political, legal, and territorial ebbs and flows of multiscalar state practice and discourse.

**Citizenship as Capital**

My conceptual approach complementarily contributes to the outlined citizenship geography scholarship and advances the notion that space and the state still matter. I acknowledge that citizenship, “is multiscalar in that its legal and substantive components are shaped by conditions, processes, and institutions at the local, national, and international scales” (Staeheli, 2003, p 99). I also recognize that citizenship is place-contingent and is embedded
within a plurality of territorial, legal, and political spaces (among others) (Bauder, 2006, 2008, 2012; Isin, 2002). While citizenship is embedded and constructed by territorial, legal, and political spaces, processes, and actors, particularly those connected to the state, citizenship as a construct is also challenged, altered, and critiqued by both citizens and denizens (Holston, 2008; Leitner & Strunk, 2014a, 2014b). While citizenship is spatial, it is also relational. It is this relationality that brings us to address citizenship as capital. Rather than focusing solely on citizenship as an isolated legal category, state-based identity, system of rights and responsibilities, or sense of belonging, I deploy citizenship as a form of capital, a relational valued resource composed of formal and substantive aspects (Bauder, 2006, 2008, 2012; Staeheli, 1999). This conceptualization supports the noted polyvalence of citizenship (Staeheli et al., 2012) and incorporates the Bourdieusian concept of capital (Bourdieu, 1977, 1986, 2014; Bauder, 2006, 2008). For clarity and comprehension, I divide up this section into the following subsections: Bourdieu and Bourdieusian scholarship; capital; and the state. Following this chapter, I provide an overview of my conceptual framework.

**Bourdieu & Bourdieusian Scholarship.**

By conceptualizing citizenship as a form of capital, I am drawing upon the works of seminal French sociologist and social theorist Pierre Bourdieu (Bourdieu, 1986, 2014; Swartz, 2013a). Bourdieu is most often associated with sociology, anthropology, cultural studies, communications, and education (Gorski, 2013; Swartz, 2013a). According to Swartz (2013a), over the past 15 years, “Bourdieu has become the most internationally cited sociologist” whose works continue to gain influence on a global scale (p. 12). According to Grenfell (2008), Bourdieu’s growing popularity since his death in 2002, largely stems from the broad, “applicability and adaptability” of his approach to theory and practice in addition to his concepts, including capital, habitus, and field (p. 2). Others suggest (Webb, Schirato, & Danaher, 2002),
that Bourdieu’s popularity stems from his research eclecticism (he dabbled in a wide array of topics and fields) and emphasis on utilizing both theory and empirical practice. As Bourdieu (1988) notes (reiterating Kant), “theory without empirical research is empty, empirical research without theory is blind” (pp. 774-775). Additionally Bourdieu’s public intellectualism and his “activist science” (use of social science to further larger social justice goals) also contribute to his popular usage and growth (Wacquant, 2008).

Geographers have been slow to integrate Bourdieu and Bourdieusian approaches into the discipline, while his French contemporaries including Foucault, Deleuze, Latour, and their associated concepts and frameworks have become mainstays of the discipline (Bridge, 2004; Painter, 2000). Geography is not alone in its slow incorporation of Bourdieu into scholarship (Gorski, 2013; Swartz, 2013a, 2013b). The lack of interest in or reluctance to draw upon Bourdieu has been recognized as a shared pattern within broader English-speaking academia (Gorski, 2013; Swartz, 2013a). Swartz (2013a) argues that English-speaking scholars and political scholars in particular have been late to adopt Bourdieu for an array of reasons, including, but not limited to: Bourdieu’s focus on France and French case studies; slow and fragmented translation of his works into English; Foucault’s influence and dominance; and American academic specialization (which conflicts with Bourdieu’s broad inter/anti-disciplinary approach). According to Gorski (2013), such reluctance and misconceptions of Bourdieu largely stem from, “how Bourdieu’s work were received, especially by English-speaking audiences and, more specifically, of the order in which they were read and the impact which this had on how they were read” (p. 1).

While Bourdieu has remained marginal within English-speaking academia and particularly within political research, Bourdieu’s impacts are growing, “well beyond faddish ceremonial citations” (Swartz, 2013a, p. 13). Recent political works in history (Gorski, 2013),
linguistics (Grenfell, 2011), political sociology (Swartz, 2013a, 2013b), international relations (Alder-Nissen, 2013; Loughlan, Olsson, & Schouten, 2015; van Der Ree, 2014), and human rights (Walton-Roberts, 2015) demonstrate the recent and growing interest in Bourdieu in other fields. This growing interest stems from broader relational, critical, and practice turns within interdisciplinary political scholarship (Adler-Nelson, 2013; Gorski, 2013; Loughlan, Olsson, & Schouten, 2015; Kuus, 2014; Swartz, 2013a, 2013b). As Adler-Nelson (2013) notes, “Bourdieu helps us rediscover the everyday practices, symbolic structures and arenas of conflict that bring many other actors into perspective, rather than just focusing on nation states that produce (what we call) international politics” (p. 1).

Bourdieu is increasingly being seen as an innovative political scholar. According to Swartz (2013a), Bourdieu, “proposes a theory of symbolic power, violence, and capital that stresses the active role that symbolic forms play as resources that reflect, constitute, maintain, and change social hierarchies” since, “power stands at the core of Pierre Bourdieu’s sociology” (p. 30). Like Swartz (2013a, 2013b), Adler-Nissen (2013), and others (Bauder, 2006, 2008; Gorski, 2013; Lane, 2006; Loughlan et. al., 2015; Wacquant, 2004, 2005; van Der Ree, 2014), I promote the perspective that Bourdieu first and foremost is a political scholar, whose underlying aim is to disentangle and make visible inequitable power relations within societies through excavating their origins and complex relationships (Alder-Nissen, 2013; Bourdieu, 1994, 2014; Lane, 2006; Swartz, 2013a; Wacquant, 2004, 2005). I also promote the perspective that Bourdieu and his conceptual frameworks and/or tools have the potential to highlight and explore social (and political) reproduction (particularly that of the state and power) and change (Swartz, 2013a). In order to excavate inequitable political and power relations, Bourdieu brought to the fore a unique post/anti-positivist and social constructivist conceptual approach and unique vocabulary (Swartz, 2013a, 2013b). I incorporate Bourdieu’s emphasis on politics and power by
deploying Bourdieusian concept of capital to examine citizenship within the context of Estonian state politics.

Although Bourdieu did not take up citizenship as a major interest during his career (Bourdieu, 2014), citizenship scholars have harnessed his concepts and various interpretations of his framework to directly or indirectly explore citizenship (Brubaker, 1992a; Goldberg, 2013; Helbing, 2014; May, 2011; Uitermark, 2012). Citizenship geographers have also used Bourdieusian concepts and approaches to examine citizenship (Bauder, 2006, 2008; Isin, 2002; Isin & Wood, 1999; Friedmann, 2005). In this project, I incorporate migration geographer Bauder’s (2006, 2008) Bourdieusian conceptualization of citizenship as a form of capital, a valued resource. Citizenship as capital has thus far been defined in vague terms and requires conceptual elaboration. I descriptively outline citizenship as capital and to a lesser extent the other interdependent concepts of field and habitus, in order to unpack how I operationalize this conceptualization and framework in practice to address citizenship and political power.

**Capital.**

Expanding upon the Marxian economic notion of capital, Bourdieu broadly defines capital as, “accumulated labor (in its materialized form or its incorporated embodied form) that, when appropriated on a private, that is exclusive, basis by agents or groups of agents, enables them to appropriate social energy in the form of reified or living labor” (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 241). Bourdieu innovatively transforms the Marxian notion of capital by rejecting, “Marxist and non-Marxist forms of economic reductionism” and instead posits that there is, “as wide variety of valued resources that he calls forms of capital” that impact and help form power and domination (Swartz, 2013b, p. 21). Capital in other words is a valued resource or asset that results from human labor and activity. According to Bourdieu (1986, 2014), capital is both objectified (physical objects), embodied (internalized dispositions and habitus, which in turn inform
practices or actions), or institutionalized (social, political, economic institutions that help construct and reify capitals and their values) forms. Capital when accumulated, exchanged, or embodied can provide a social agent (or group) with access or opportunities to other valued resources including those that are not purely monetary or economic, including political power (Bauder, 2006; Bourdieu, 1977, 1986, 2014; Swartz, 2013a). Bourdieu illustrates capital or concentrations of capital within various social, economic, cultural, and political struggles, particularly in state and political spaces (Swartz 2013a, 2013b).

Bourdieu (1977, 1986) initially defined four types of capital, which include: cultural (knowledge, education, information); economic (commodities, property, money); social (relational networks, acquaintances, and group memberships); and symbolic (honor, prestige, and legitimation) (Bourdieu, 1977, 1986; Ho & Bauder, 2012; Swartz, 2013a). Bourdieusian capital has inspired, but should not be confused with other notions of social capital that are derived from Coleman and Putnam (Tzanakis, 2013). Symbolic capital can be understood as an amalgamation of the other capital forms and a form of power when recognized as legitimate by others (Bourdieu, 1986; Fogle, 2011). Symbolic capital is a form of (symbolic) power (Bourdieu, 2001, 2014; Swartz, 2013a). Symbolic capital can only be legitimized and practiced if it is recognized via active consent or doxa [the unquestioned acceptance of domination, inequalities, and social relations as natural or universal] (Bourdieu, 1986; Fogle, 2011; Swartz, 2013a). According to Bourdieu (2001), symbolic power is, “a gentle violence, imperceptible and invisible even to its victims, exerted for the most part through the purely symbolic channels of communication and cognition (more precisely misrecognition), recognition, or even feeling” (pp. 1-2). Thus those agents or groups with the symbolic capital to legitimate and dominate how forms of capital are defined, valued, and exchanged also exercise power. Forms of capital are not isolated resources, but rather interconnected and can be exchanged for other types of capital. For example an
individual can use their cultural capital (education, credential) to obtain a job and access economic capital (money, financial wealth) (Painter, 2000).

Capital is understood as an elastic and multidimensional concept and has expanded to include political, military, technological, scientific, academic, linguistic (language) and citizenship (Bauder, 2006, 2008; Ho & Bauder, 2012; Painter, 2000; Shin, 2013). Forms of capital (and their associated relational concepts) are place-contingent, meaning regional contexts matter in how forms of capital are constructed, valued, accumulated, exchanged, and utilized (Bauder, 2006; Shin, 2013). Each form of capital can be converted into any of the other forms; however, conversion and accumulation of capital are differentiated and illustrate the position (in relation to others and power) of the holder of capital. For example one's accumulation of higher education can lead to a prestigious high salaried position (cultural capital is converted into economic capital).

While I emphasize Bourdieu’s concept of capital, I recognize that capital is mutually constitutive and interdependent with the concepts of habitus and field. Although I primarily focus on capital in order to build upon Bauder’s (2006, 2008) work on citizenship, I briefly highlight the notions of habitus and field. According to Kuus (2014), “forms of capital converge to form a habitus: a socially constructed system of dispositions that makes possible the production of thoughts, perceptions, and actions in the social field” (p. 42). Fields are the relational-social spaces or social contexts in which capital is accumulated, exchanged, lost, and struggled over (Bourdieu, 2014; Kuus, 2014; Swartz, 2013a, 2013b). According to Swartz (2013b) fields are defined as a, “network, or configuration, of objective relations between positions” and, “areas of struggle” over capital (p. 26). The term field is not only social, it is spatial in immaterial and material or physical senses (Fogle, 2011; Isin, 2002). As Fogle (2011) notes, “physical space is a distorted or ‘blurred’ translation of social space” and those individuals
or groups with accumulated valued capital (whether economic, cultural, or citizenship), “have the power to impose their own vision of the social world on the ground” (p. 53). Fogle’s (2011) innovative interpretation of field and its influences on place construction blends well with the works of other spatial scholars (Agnew, 2005, 2009; Diener, 2004; Kuus, 2014) who interpret places as, “invariably parts of spaces and spaces provide resources and the frames of reference in which places are made,” (Agnew, 2005, p. 90). The notion of field thus coalesces well with the spatiality of citizenship, particularly the recognition that different territorially-linked political-legal spaces and scales embed citizenship (as capital) and individuals and groups (with habitus) into relational positions within those spaces.

As suggested, capital is understood as a social and relational form of power. Power is vested in particular forms of valorized (valued) capital, which help structure social and political relations (Bourdieu, 1996, 2014; Kuus, 2014; Swartz, 2013a, 2013b). As Bourdieu notes, capital functions as a, “social power relation” (1996, p. 264). Swartz (2013a) elaborates on this notion by stating that capital has a powerful, “differentiating and stratifying effect between individuals and groups” and that an object, asset, or resource relationally evolves into a form of capital, “when it establishes a social relation of power that differentiates the holder from the nonholder, when it establishes some degree of social closure [building upon Weber and Brubaker] – a relation of inclusion and exclusion” (p. 51). Differentiated individuals and groups constantly struggle over monopolizing, defining, and valorizing capital. Individuals and groups struggle over capital and its legitimation within a social or relational space, known as the field of power. The field of power is most often associated with the state.

notion of capital. Allen (2003) suggests that power is not a resource or asset that can be accumulated, possessed, or stored. Rather, Allen (2003) notes that power, “is a relational effect of social interaction” (p. 2). For Bourdieu (1977, 1986, 2014) forms of capital are resources or assets that are constructed, legitimized, monopolized, and act as a form of power and structure power relations (dominant vs. dominated). While Bourdieu’s capital (1986, 2014) appears to conflict with Allen’s approach (2003), forms of capital are also understood as relational concepts, which position individuals or groups within social spaces (fields). Individuals and groups with differentiated levels of capital and power relationally form a, “constellation of interlinked institutions within which the holders of various species of capital (economic, religious, legal, scientific, academic, artistic, etc.) vie to impose the supremacy of the particular kind of capital they wield” (Wacquant, 2005, p. 16). Thus capital is a relational construct, which helps connect individuals and groups within various capital-specific social spaces can contribute to Allen’s (2003) approach.

Bauder (2008) notes that citizenship through its formal (legal category) and substantive (practice or action) aspects, “serves as a strategy of accumulation that is deliberately deployed and can be exchanged into other forms of capital” (p. 316). Citizenship as a form of capital is also a mechanism of distinction, which limits ones access and recognition within certain social spaces (or relational fields – including political institutions, parties, or bureaucratic states). Forms of capital are also place-contingent and are subject to temporal and spatial change (Bauder, 2008).

Capital is one of Bourdieu’s most commonly applied concepts, often used independently from his other concepts and conceptual framework (Eyal, 2005; Eyal, Szelenyi, & Townsley, 1998; Greenspan, 2014; Kauppi, 2003; Kuus, 2014). For example, Eyal et. al. (1998) have illustrated how pre-communist, communist, and post-communist states were defined by different
dominant forms of capital (social, cultural, and economic). Accordingly as the states changed from one political regime to another, forms of capital and their values also changed and in order to cope or survive, individuals (political elites in particular) converted their accumulated capitals to other forms in order to maintain power and influence (Eyal et. al., 1998). Kauppi (2003) examines the use political capital to analyze European politics and integration. Political capital which includes, “specific social skills, the capacity to mobilize individuals around a common goal, to formulate collective policies, or to win seats for one’s party” are fought over by individuals and groups within the political field, which can be interpreted as a political social space such as a political party, political organization, or a territorial state (Kauppi, 2003, p. 778).

Estonian political geographer Kuus (2014) illustrates how civil servants working within the transnational field of European policy development in Brussels (European Union) use capitals (particularly cultural capital) to influence how geopolitics and geography are constructed, understood, and politically integrated into transnational policy formation. Thus individuals or social actors with accumulated valued forms of capital regulate, maintain, challenge, and manipulate fields and power relations within fields. By approaching citizenship as capital, I understand citizenship as a relational construct that is subject to temporal and spatial change related to political power, particularly power exercised by state actors.

Citizenship as a form of capital is conceived as a social construct produced, reproduced, and contested by various social agents and political institutions. Citizenship accessibility and accumulation is dictated by political process, state legal systems, bureaucratic structures, and power mechanisms. Bauder’s (2006, 2008) conceptualization of citizenship of capital was deployed to broadly examine how citizenship impacts international migrant laborers and strategically regulates their movement and labor. Bauder (2006, 2008) addresses citizenship as capital within the targeted case studies of Vancouver, Berlin, and Ontario in order to highlight
how place-contingent citizenship inequitably influences migrant’s daily lives and economic opportunities. While Bauder (2006, 2008) places emphasis on economic processes and relations, I am focusing on political relations and spaces, particularly those associated with the territorial state.

As a form of capital, citizenship contains two enmeshed aspects (Bauder, 2008; Staeheli, 1999). Formal citizenship (passive citizenship) is the first enmeshed aspect. Formal citizenship refers to a legal classification and category (Bauder 2006, 2008; Swartz, 2013a) defined by the state (Staeheli, 1999). Formal citizenship entails a bundle of legal benefits, such as free speech, political participation (voting, political party membership, running for public office), labor opportunities, social welfare, and/or free speech. Entitlements coincide with legal responsibilities, such as taxes, jury duty, voting, and/or military service. Entitlements and their interpretations vary by context; however, formal citizenship does assist in inculcating a greater sense of political, legal, and territorial belonging and membership (Bloemraad, 2006). Formal citizenship also facilitates civic and political literacy (and understanding of how politics works, who has access, etc.). Formal citizenship also provides access and opportunities to state and non-state political and civic spaces, including electoral spaces (as part of an electorate), public sector (state) employment, and positions of political power (elected and unelected).

Substantive citizenship (active citizenship) is the second enmeshed aspect. As I have noted elsewhere (Trimbach, 2014a), substantive citizenship broadly refers to, “the ability of a citizen to act [actions themselves], be recognized, and respected as a citizen both by others and the nation-state [or territorial state].” (p. 2). Substantive citizenship also incorporates and emphasizes citizenship practices or actions among citizens and non-citizens alike. This multidimensional approach coalesces well with the work of political sociologist and naturalization specialist Irene Bloemraad (2006). While Bloemraad (2006) does not use
Bourdieu’s capital as an overarching conceptual lens, she does integrate the multidimensionality of citizenship, by addressing citizenship’s enmeshed formal and substantive aspects. This interpretation and her seminal analysis on citizenship and political incorporation in the United States and Canada coalesce well with the works of Bauder (2006, 2008). According to Bloemraad (2006), the process of immigrant (or minority) political incorporation includes both formal citizenship and naturalization, but also substantive citizenship, which includes political participation and attachment.

Both aspects are complementary, highlighting their conceptual incongruencies, inconsistencies, mutual constitution, and shared influences on citizenship construction. Formal and substantive citizenships’ incongruencies illustrate citizenship’s conceptual polyvalence and multidimensionality (Staeheli et al., 2012). An individual may acquire formal citizenship and not engage as a substantive citizen within a polity. Examples of polyvalence abound. For example, although women were active in the French Revolution and entitled to certain rights following the formation of the post-revolutionary French state, women were not recognized or permitted to engage as equal substantive citizens until the twentieth century (Brubaker, 1992a; Siim, 2000). Conversely, many European Union member states, including Estonia, allow non-citizens (individuals without formal citizenship) to vote and engage as substantive citizens in local elections (Cianetti, 2014; Trimbach, 2014a). These incongruencies and inconsistencies reinforce how citizenship is group differentiated (Kymlicka, 1995) and liminal (Skeiker, 2010).

One major influence is how formal and substantive citizenship relate to identity construction, particularly state-constructed identities (Isin & Wood, 1999). While Bauder (2006, 2008) does not emphasize citizenship-identity connections in his conceptualization of citizenship as capital per se and Brubaker and Cooper (2000) call critical scholars to move “beyond identity” in their research, citizenship and identity are mutually-informative. Citizenship as a
form of identity or citizenship’s role in informing identities is not to be confused with spatial identity, which is highlighted in greater detail later in this monograph. Like citizenship, “identities have never been fixed or static,” (Miller, 2004, p. 230). Identities tend to be interpreted through a variety of conceptual lenses, most notably primordialist and constructivist. While both major lenses include a plethora of sub-lenses and approaches, they both tend to embody distinct interpretations of identity formation. Primordialists perceive identities as natural and universal givens that are historically anchored in pre-modern societies and manifested among contemporary groups (Herb, 1999; Raun, 2003). Constructivists conversely perceive identities as socially constructed and neither natural nor universal (Diener, 2009; Dittmer, 2010; Herb, 1999). Through a critical social constructivist lens, identities and the “sense of identity” are not understood as uniformly primordial or sociobiological (Diener, 2009), but rather, “something that arises from the continuous processes of creating and granting intelligibility and coherence in the course of relationship with others,” (Dittmer, 2010). Dittmer (2010) suggests that both our perceived self-identity and collective identities in which we as humans are socialized to embody and enact are polyphonic, meaning identities are plural, hybrid, and inconsistent (subject internal and external conflict). Although it is, “a mistake to conflate citizenship and identity, it is also a mistake to see them as autonomic,” (Isin & Wood, 1999, p. 20). While this approach builds upon the work of Bauder (2006, 2008) in order to emphasize citizenship as capital, Bauder does not discuss citizenship’s relationship with state identities. Citizenship and identity inform one another (Isin & Wood, 1999).

Constructivist and critical scholars recognize the role of the state in constructing identities around citizenship that often are influenced by nationalized, ethnicized, and politicized notions, ideologies, and practices that reinforce what it means to be part of a state’s political community (Fein & Straughn, 2014; Kolossov, 2008; Unwin, 1999). The formation of the
modern liberal modern democratic state and state-centered citizenship deeply eroded previous forms of identity that were bound to ethnicity or nationality and other group distinctions (Kymlicka, 1995; Kymlicka & Norman, 2000). According to Kymlicka and Norman (2000), the liberal democratic state is premised on a civic state-centered identity that seeks to, “prevent ethnic identities from becoming politicized by rejecting any minority rights or multiculturalism policies that involve the explicit public recognition of ethnic groups,” (p. 10). Through this interpretation national or ethnic populations and their non-state identities are understood as problematic to state cohesion, political stability, and territorial integrity (Kymlicka & Norman, 2000). While Kymlicka (1995, 2000) emphasizes the conceptual potential of liberal democracies to incorporate multiculturalism and national identities (as discussed earlier in this chapter), many states are wary to address minority ethnic identities or rights altogether. As a formal legal category and form of group identification, the state constructs and interprets certain groups within a state’s population as entitled citizens or denizens, which inculcates a sense of belonging and membership to the state (Bloemraad, 2006; Kymlicka, 1995). According to Fein and Straughn (2014), “citizenship has been seen as socially significant by engendering affective attachments and collective identities that potentially cut across the boundaries of ethnonational communities and sovereign states,” (p. 4). Thus, state-constructed formal citizenship engenders attachments and collective or group identities, which can influence a group attitudes towards the state and one another. Additionally, substantive citizenship, which includes social recognition and action informs through practice civic and political literacy (through education and participation) and identity.

The role of the state in identity formation has been noted by other geography and non-geographic scholars, particularly through the notion of nation (people), which is highlighted in greater detail in the subsequent chapter (Bennett & Layard, 2015; Brubaker, 1992a, 2002, 2004b;
Dittmer, 2010; Huxley, 2008; Kymlicka, 1995). Legal geographers, who have noted how legal institutions and spaces inform human behavior and norms, support this formal or legalistic understanding of citizenship and identity formation (Bennett & Layard, 2015). Urban geographers and planners also stress the influence of formal political process and planning policies on identity and group-based inequalities (Huxley, 2008). Formal and substantive citizenship are thus not solely related to legal and participatory aspects of citizenship, but embody a conceptual richness that allows for the robust critical examination of citizenship as a form of Bourdieusian capital.

Both enmeshed citizenship aspects coalesce well with Bourdieu’s concepts of field, habitus, and his relational notion of groups, in that citizenship as capital is extended and/or denied based on defined groups that embody and enact citizenship. Some groups dominate the political citizenry and are able to freely exercise their citizenship, while other groups struggle to obtain formal and/or substantive citizenship.

The State.

Bourdieu (1994, 2014) acknowledges the power and influence of the state on capital formation and regulation. According to Bourdieu, the state is not a monolithic territorial entity, but rather, “the central bank of symbolic credit” (capital) that among other actions, “guarantees and consecrates a certain state of affairs, a relationship between conformity between words and things, between discourse and reality” (Bourdieu, 1996, p. 377). For Bourdieu (1994, 2014), modern states form following a process of capital (variety of capitals) accumulation and concentration by societal and polity elites. In order for a state to function and exercise legitimacy and sovereignty over its territory and population, the state had to gain monopoly over capital, which in turn produces statist capital (Bourdieu, 1994; Swartz, 2013a, 2013b). Statist capital is a form of “meta-capital” that, “enables the state to exercise power over the different fields and
over the different particular species of capital, and especially over the rates of conversion between them (and thereby over the relations of force between their respective holders)” (Bourdieu, 1994, p. 4). The state with its collective “meta-capital” becomes, “meta, that is a power above powers” (Bourdieu, 2014, p. 197). In this sense, the state is a major collective actor that constructs, maintains, and exercises power over citizenship as a form of capital.

This conceptualization perceives the state as a major actor in the construction and valorization of capital, including citizenship capital (Bauder, 2006, 2008; Beasley-Murray, 2000). The state is also the dominant actor or rather set of actors that construct the political and bureaucratic fields. I primarily examine citizenship capital within the political and bureaucratic fields as equated with the Estonian territorial state. I incorporate Kauppi’s (2003) aforementioned understanding of political field, as the political social space that is bound to Estonian territorial state politics at the local, national, transnational, and supranational levels, and incorporates political parties, civil society organizations (CSOs), political organizations or parties, and even territorial state politics. I also examine citizenship’s relationship with the bureaucratic field, which Wacquant (2005) defines as, “the set of impersonal public institutions officially devoted to serving the citizenry and laying claim to authoritative nomination and classification” (such as formal citizenship status or any type of educational credential) (p. 17). These two fields are not mutually exclusive, but overlap and construct citizenship as capital, while also maintaining and reflecting social/political relations within those fields.

Additionally state laws reflect and reinforce power relations within a state or political and legal field. According to Bourdieu (1977), law and legal process, “does no more than symbolically consecrate – by recording it in a form which renders it both eternal and universal – the structure of power relation between groups and classes which is produced and guaranteed practically by the functioning of these mechanisms” (p. 188). While the state is a dominant force
in the construction of capital and maintenance of social order and inequalities within the political field, the state is not a monolithic entity, but rather comprised of an array of individuals, groups, organizations, and bureaus with varying habituses, levels of capital, and relations which impact the state internally and externally. Additionally, multiscalar and transnational forces and political actors also impact the state’s role in the maintenance and reproduction of fields and forms of capital. While the state is not isolated and is instead relational, the state is considered the primary force that helps territorially embed and politically situate citizenship capitals and individuals/groups within the political field.

**Conceptual Overview**

Citizenship is a messy concept. While citizenship often appears universal and natural, citizenship is a multidimensional and polyvalent construct with a multiplicity of meanings, approaches, and manifestations. In this chapter, I have outlined various overlapping philosophical, geographic, and conceptual conversations associated with the excavation of citizenship. My own conceptual approach builds upon and directly and/or indirectly contributes to these overlapping scholarly conversations and approaches. My conceptual approach advances citizenship as both a relational and spatial concept that can help (re)spatialize and untangle citizenship as a relational form of political power.

Building upon the outlined Bourdieusian notion of capital (Bauder, 2006, 2008; Bourdieu, 1986, 2014), I examine citizenship as a capital, a valued resource or asset that acts as a relational form of power. Although citizenship is constructed, challenged, perceived, and enacted at a multiplicity of spaces and scales, I am primarily interested in addressing citizenship as a state construct that can be understood as impacting and being impacted by an array of state and non-state spaces or scales. Based on this outlined approach, citizenship is understood as being polyvalently constructed by Estonian state actors, institutions, and processes. As a state
construct, citizenship capital is formed and valorized alongside state political and geopolitical processes, including processes associated with nation-building, territorialization, and ethnicization. Based on this understanding, state-centered politicized, nationalized, and ethnicized ideologies, notions, politics, and geopolitics impacts that state’s role as the “central bank” of capital or legitimizer and monopolizer of capital. This linkage impacts how citizenship is formed and distributed among heterogeneous populations that may or may not fit the state’s idealized *ethnos* or *demos* mold. Although I recognize the state as the primary “bank” of citizenship capital, I also seek to examine how other spaces and scales maintain, challenge, and transform citizenship capital, particularly at the local scale of everyday life.

I also approach citizenship as capital by addressing minority Estonian Russian-speakers’ embodied and enacted citizenship via their perceptions, practices, and identities. By highlighting the relational and spatial aspects of citizenship capital among Estonia’s Russian-speaking population, I can untangle how the Estonian state has constructed citizenship and how citizenship is utilized as a form of capital to maintain power relations within Estonian state political fields. I map relations among Estonian Russian-speaker positions within the Estonian state (comprising two overlapping fields – political and bureaucratic) by examining citizenship as capital (which positions the individuals and groups in question) consisting of formal and substantive aspects. I also examine citizenship as capital from this local minority perspective in order to descriptively illustrate how individuals and groups who are marginalized by the state maintain, misrecognize, challenge, and/or transform citizenship capital through their own embodied and enacted citizenship perceptions, practices, and identities. If state legitimized and valorized capital is not accepted, accumulated, or valued by populations, but challenged and devalued, this may illustrate power relations’ instability and the potential for political or social change or upheaval. I incorporate a multisite and multimethod approach that builds a plurality of citizenship narratives.
With these narratives, supported by complementary survey data, I explore underlying spatial and relational power of citizenship within Estonian state politics and geopolitics from a local minority Russian-speaking perspective.

The next step in this process is to excavate Estonian state politics and geopolitics and citizenship capital construction. In the following chapter, I outline Estonian political spaces, actors, institutions, processes, relations, and citizenship capital by integrating the critical notions of ethnocracy (Järve, 2000, 2005; Peled, 1992, 2011, 2014) and restorationist geopolitics (Aalto, 2000, 2003a, 2003b). Thus the following chapter provides a theoretically-informed interpretation of Estonian politics, geopolitics, and citizenship capital formation. It is within this critical context that I seek to examine how citizenship as capital is constructed and embedded within power-laden national-territorial spaces, processes, and relations.
Chapter 3: Estonian State & Russian Minority Context

Ethnic divisions constitute special hindrances for democracy because of structural incompatibilities and sharp disagreements between the constituent segments of society. (Smooha, 1997, p. 198)

…Estonia remains home to two quite separate societies living side by side but with only superficial connections between them. They reside in separate information spaces and hold divergent perceptions and perspectives not just about each other, but also about the Estonian state and its history, its threat environment, and its national security policies. (Jermalavicius, 2014, p. 2)

Introduction

During October 2014, the Estonian state was rocked by policy changes, political scandal, and calls for the reconstruction of a national community ideal and identity. The events and their impacts are direct manifestations of Estonian nation-building processes and a decades’ long citizenship dilemma. The events and impacts of October 2014 illustrate the ongoing necessity to critically examine the ever-changing Estonian political field in which citizenship as capital is produced and reproduced as both a relational and spatial construct. The events also highlight how citizenship is not universal or natural, but rather a polyvalent resource that transforms with the ebbs and flows of political actors, processes, relations, and spaces, particularly that of the state.

In early October 2014, the Riigikogu [Estonian Parliament] overcame the first hurdle to alter the longstanding kodakondsus [citizenship] and statelessness (Estonian state classification of stateless persons: määratlemata kodakondsusega [undetermined citizenship]) dilemma that has become a common feature in international media (Evans, 2014; Lannin, 2008), scholarship (Aalto, 2003a; Duvold & Berglund, 2014; Fein & Straughn, 2014; Feldman, 2000; Laitin, 1998),
and diplomatic contention (Amundsen, 2014; “Russia emphasizes non-citizenship issue in human rights talks with EU”, 2014). Although the bill does not address stateless, if passed, the new bill would provide citizenship to thousands of stateless vulnerable groups (particularly children and elderly) adults (“Rare Praise from Russia over Estonian Citizenship Bill”, 2014). Estonia currently ranks tenth in statelessness (among states) in the world (Human Rights Watch, 2015) and the issue of statelessness are largely the consequence of Estonian citizenship policy and the underlying politics and geopolitics of that policy towards Estonia’s Russian-speaking minority population (Venelased, [ethnic Russians]; Eesti venekeelne elanikkond [Russian-speaking population in Estonia]) (Aalto, 2003a; Trimbach, 2014a; Yiftachel & Ghanem, 2004). Simultaneously Estonian President Toomas Hendrik Ilves made an impassioned speech in Narva, Estonia to reconceptualize Russian-speakers within political and popular discourse, by reconstituting Estonia’s largest minority population as non-citizen members of Estonian society, rather than simply othered muulased [non-Estonians, aliens, or foreigners] (“Ilves: No Room for word ‘Non-Estonian’ in my Vocabulary”, 2014; Raud, 2004). Within the same month, a political spat developed between the now former Estonian Minister of Finance Jürgen Ligi and Minister of Education and Research Jevgeni Ossinovski (“Miks er: Ossinovski Could be ‘Estonia’s Obama’”, 2013) following a heated discussion of the Soviet occupation (“Ligi Submits Letter of Resignation”, 2014). Although the debate concluded without devolving into confrontation, Ligi later posted a politicized and nationalized rant on social media stating that Ossinovski was, “an immigrant's son from the pink party” and, “rootless and ignorant” because of his Russian-speaking background (“Ligi Submits Letter of Resignation”, 2014).

The events of October 2014, anecdotally illustrate the polarization and contradictions underpinning the Estonian political field. These events also foreground ethnicity and nationality as positioning factors with Estonian politics and illustrate how Estonian nation-building
inequitably impacts minority Russian-speakers. These events also tangentially highlight the relationship between Estonian national processes and multiscalar geopolitical events and actors, including the ongoing Ukrainian crisis and potential military threat of neighboring Russia (Biersack & O’Lear, 2014; Conley & Gerber, 2011; Lanoszka, 2016; Maigre, 2015).

In this chapter, I address the broader context of post-Soviet Estonian nation-building and citizenship dilemma. By addressing the broader context, I highlight the place-contingent particularities of Estonian state politics and geopolitics that construct citizenship capital within the Estonian political field. While other political actors, institutions, processes, and spaces influence citizenship capital, I describe how the post-Soviet Estonian state, as the legitimate sovereign power within Estonian state territory and political field, constructs citizenship capital. I excavate citizenship capital by highlighting how Estonian ethnocratic politics and restorationist geopolitics inform its construction and how that impacts Estonia’s minority Russian-speaking population. In order to critically address this context, I approach Estonian nation-building through a theoretically-informed lens that incorporates place-specific theories associated with Estonian politics and geopolitics. While this theoretically-informed context contributes an additional layer to the overarching approach to citizenship capital, I question the assumed depoliticization and normativity of context and the state (Bourdieu, 2002; Wilson & Swyngedouw, 2014) by incorporating critical understandings of Estonian nation-building, Russian-speaking minority, and citizenship formation. This theoretically-informed lens underscores the underlying processes and ideologies that impact Estonian nation-building and policy formation. I approach this context in three stages. First, I explore the historical processes, actors, and factors that led to Estonian nation and nationalism, particularly in the nineteenth century. Second, I outline the contextual particularities of Estonian nation-building by drawing upon the critical notions of ethnocracy and restorationism. The context will provide a critical
foundation to better understand how Estonian politics and geopolitics inform citizenship and impact Russian-speakers. I then position Estonian nation-state formation and citizenship policy development in relation to these underlying particularities. Last, I provide background on the Estonian Russian-speaking population and their spatial communities. By providing background on my population and my population’s associated spatial communities within Estonia, I address how this population and their residential/everyday spatial communities fit within the larger contextual frame. Population and spatial backgrounds also provide a frame of reference for the citizenship status and residency groups or clusters that are under analysis and are explained in greater detail in Chapter 4.

**Estonian Nation & Nationalism**

The contemporary Republic of Estonia is a territorial state that is imagined within a range of regionalization schemes and geographical frames (Piirimäe, 2011). Estonia is often recognized as a constituent country of Eastern Europe, Northern Europe, and Baltic Sea Region (as a Baltic state or Nordic state), and former Soviet Union (as a Baltic State) (Berg & Oras, 2000; Kasekamp, 2010; Piirimäe, 2011; Unwin, 1999). Estonia’s inconsistent regional associations are largely the result of the ebbs and flows of regional political, territorial, and geopolitical forces including an array of foreign occupying powers and expansionist states, including: Danish, Baltic German, Swedish, Polish, Russian, Nazi, and Soviet (Kasekamp, 2010; Trimbach, 2014b; Wulf, 2016). This cadre of competing Baltic geopolitical powers and a succession of forced occupations deeply influenced Estonia and its population, ultimately informing Estonian nation formation and nationalism (Kasekamp, 2010; Piirimäe, 2011; Plakans, 2011; Raun, 2001; Trimbach, 2014b). In this section, I highlight key processes, factors, and actors that inform Estonian nation formation (particularly in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries) and nationalism. By understanding how the Estonian nation and nationalism formed during the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, I can then critically examine Estonian restorationism and ethnocratic state construction during the post-Soviet era.

**Nation.**

Like citizenship and the state, the concept of nation is complex and problematic (Brubaker, 2002, 2004b; Penrose & Mole, 2008). Broadly, a nation is a group of people, “with a common identity, shared cultural values, and a commitment and attachment to a particular area,” (Short, 2015, p. 248). A nation often shares a perceived and enacted common history, language, race, ethnicity, cultural practices, religion, symbols, political ideology, and/or territorial affiliation (Brubaker, 2004b; Herb, 1998; Penrose & Mole, 2008; Short, 2015). A nation differs markedly and is often conceptually misinterpreted with the state (as highlighted in the previous chapter), but both a nation and state inform and influence one another.

Like identities, nations tend to be interpreted and defined differently by those who ascribe to primordialist (sociobiological) or constructivist (interpretativist, modernist, instrumentalist, and situationalist) lenses (Laitin, 1998; Penrose & Mole, 2008; Tuisk, 2012). Primordialists tend to view nations as, “natural phenomena that have existed for centuries, if not millennia,” (Penrose & Mole, 2008, p. 272). Primordialist understandings have been heavily influential in nationalist ideology formation and political movements. While many scholars perceive primordialism as essentialist, simplistic, and subject to critique (Anderson, 1983; Brubaker, 2004b; Herb, 1998; Laitin, 1998; Penrose & Mole, 2008), primordialism continues to influence Estonian nation formation and nationalism (Annus, 2000; Raun, 2001, 2003; Unwin, 1998; Virkkunen, 1999). Constructivists on the other hand (as noted in the identity discussion in the previous chapter), “view nations as modern entities that were conceptualized and constructed to achieve particular socio-economic and political ends,” by a particular group that shares political claims (Penrose & Mole, 2008, p. 272).
This understanding blends well with Anderson’s (1983) seminal constructivist work on “imagined communities.” According to Anderson (1983) a nation is not a natural given or primordialist group, but rather, “an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign,” (p. 49). A nation is imagined in the sense that, “even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion,” (Anderson, 1983, p. 49). Anderson’s (1983) approach blends with Foucault’s critical interpretation of identities, like national identities. According to Foucault (2007), “the individual is not a pre-given entity which is seized on by the exercise of power” but rather, individuals and nations are constructed as, “the product of a relation of power exercised over bodies, multiplicities, movements, desires, forces” (p. 180). A nation is often used interchangeably with this notion of group, which are interpreted and reified by scholars and national (or state) elites as, “substances or things or entities or organisms or collective individuals— as the imagery of discrete, concrete, tangible, bounded and enduring ‘groups’ encourages us to do” (Brubaker, 2002, p. 167). Brubaker (2002) cautiously notes that instead of approaching nations as discrete and conflated groups, we should understand nations, like races and ethnicities, “in relational, processual, dynamic, eventful and disaggregated terms” which include, “practical categories, cultural idioms, cognitive schemas, discursive frames, organizational routines, institutional forms, political projects and contingent events,” (p. 167). Brubaker (2002) emphasizes addressing nations through contingent and fluctuating, “ethnicization, racialization and nationalization as political, social, cultural and psychological processes” which examine not groups, but rather groupness via practices or performances rather than as discrete or tangible beings (p. 167).

Nations inform and are informed by nationalism, which is a shared nationalized political ideology (Anderson, 1983; Brubaker, 2004b). Brubaker (2004b) emphasizes that nations are
politicized socially constructed categories (of groupness) that can be utilized by nationalists and political elites to instrumentally claim nationhood and polity formation. According to Brubaker (2004b), the notion of nation can also be used to transcend or appeal to an ethnoregional, ethnolinguistic, or ethnoreligious national identity or, “to assert ‘ownership’ of the polity on behalf of a ‘core’ ethnocultural ‘nation’ distinct from the citizenry of the state as a whole, and thereby to define or redefine the state as the state of and for that core ‘nation’” (p. 117). As such the notion of a nation is one of many shared (plural and simultaneous) group identities as highlighted in the previous chapter (Dittmer, 2010; Kymlicka, 1995). As Kymlicka (1995) notes, allegiance or a sense of group identity related to a nation is a national identity, which is distinct from allegiance or sense of group identity to the state (defined as a form of state patriotism); however, often nationalistic states and political elites blur these distinctions. Based on this conceptual understanding of the nation and nationalism, what came to be Estonia, Estonian nation, and Estonian nationalism emerged over centuries and was shaped by a myriad of geopolitical powers and occupations, which helped form the Estonian nation (as a fluctuating process of groupness and identification), Estonian national context, Estonian dominant national narrative, and national geopolitical imagination. To understand Estonia’s post-Soviet socio-spatial context, it is necessary to delve into how this national community and its supporting nationalist ideology evolved over time and space.

**Estonian Nation Formation & Nationalist Ideology.**

What would evolve into the modern state and national community of Estonia evolved from a network of loosely settled pagan peoples to a minor trading region centered on trading settlements under Danish occupation in the thirteenth century, most notably Reval (later renamed Tallinn, meaning “Danishburgh” or “Danishtown”) and Narva (Kasekamp, 2010; Plakans, 2011). Titular Estonian peoples primarily consisted of a rural ethnolinguistic population who shared
Finno-Ugric (Uralic) languages and dialects (there is debate about whether or not dominant *Kirderannikumurre* [northern coastal or northeastern coastal Estonian] is a distinct language or dialect in relation Seto, Võro, and Estonian island dialects/languages) (Koreinik, 2007; Raun, 2001). The Danes utilized the Narva River as their demarcated border between their northern Estonian territories and that of the expanding Russian-speaking polities east of the River. The Livonian Order (comprised of German-speaking Teutonic Knights, who later developed into a Baltic German community) soon replaced Danish rule following a series of crusades that sought to Christianize and dominate the greater Baltic region through religious-political control during the thirteenth century (Kasekamp, 2010; Plakans, 2011). This series of crusades was initiated by Pope Innocent III (1198-1216) in attempt to Christianize some of greater Europe’s last pagan communities (Wetherell & Plakans, 1999). It is during this medieval period that the etymology of Estonia and an Estonian people or nation is most often traced (Raun, 2003). According to Raun (2003), although Estonians tended to self-identify as *maarahvas* [country folk] up until nineteenth century because of the entrenched ruralness of Estonian society and culture, “Outsiders used the word ‘Estonians’ as early as the thirteenth century as a general term for the inhabitants of the region, as seen in Henry of Livonia’s medieval chronicle where he uses the Latin *Estones*” (p. 132).

The Livonian Order gave rise to the Baltic German population. This population overtime emerged as a dominant ethnolinguistic minority population that would eventually control urban (and urban trade) and rural areas through distinct political, economic (feudalistic), religious, and territorial systems of power (Kasekamp, 2010; Plakans, 2011; Wulf, 2016). As part of the Livonian Order and later Baltic German geopolitical and ethnolinguistic space, Estonia was later incorporated into the expansive Hanseatic League (German-dominated European trading network) in the fifteenth century (Kasekamp, 2010). According the Wetherell and Plakans
Baltic German political class, “organized itself into four separate nobilities (Ritterschaften) and for the next seven centuries continued to dominate Baltic social, economic, and political affairs,” (p. 67). This political organization was also manifested territorially through various border demarcations overtime among the Baltic states (consisting of contemporary Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) and locally with Baltic German feudal rural estates (Raun, 2001; Wetherell & Plakans, 1999).

While the ruling Baltic German elite solidified their power, the larger ethnolinguistic Estonian (broadly defined and incorporates other minority Finno-Ugric groups) population was enslaved as agricultural serfs, who were subjects of their German landowners and bound to their landowner’s estate (Wetherell & Plakans, 1999; Wulf, 2016). According to Raun (2003), the Estonian, “native elites either became assimilated or declassed, and the Estonian-speaking population was relegated to the status of underclass, mainly in the countryside and to some extent towns,” (p. 141). While Estonian lands and peoples would trade hands over centuries through various wars and occupations, it is important to remember that local Baltic German domination remained constant up to the twentieth century (Kasekamp, 2010; Plakans, 2011; Wetherell & Plakans, 1999; Wulf, 2016). Baltic Germans largely regarded Estonians as a cultureless rural population and maintained distinct social boundaries between German nobles and Estonian agricultural servants (Annus, 2000; Raun, 2003; Wulf, 2016).

Livonian occupation was subsequently replaced by Russian (1555 to 1581) and then Swedish (1581 to early 1700s) (Kasekamp, 2010; Smith, 2002). Under the leadership of King Gustav II Adolf (ruled from 1611 to 1632), the Swedish Empire solidified its control in the Baltic region (Kasekamp, 2010). Swedish occupation dramatically altered Estonia's landscape and geopolitical position in the region. For example, Narva became Sweden's second imperial capital during the seventeenth century (Hansar, 2009). The legacies of Swedish investment and
interest are noted as a “golden era” within contemporary Estonian national narratives (Burch & Smith, 2007; Kaiser & Nikiforova, 2008; Piirimäe, 2011; Smith & Burch, 2012). Although the Swedish period is understood as an era of imperial investment and Baroque urban development and architecture, the Swedish period ended in the early eighteenth century.

Estonia was incorporated into the Russian Empire during the Great Northern War (1700 to 1721) and would remain politically and territorially entwined with Russia for the next two hundred years (Latenko, 2004; Kasekamp, 2010). Under Russian occupation and rule, what are now known as Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were politically-territorially divided into five large provinces, which included: Estonia (roughly the northern half of present day Estonia; Estland); Livonia (roughly the southern half of present day Estonia and northern half of present day Latvia; Livland); Kurland or Courland (roughly the southern half of present day Latvia); and the Russian provinces of Vitebsk and Kovno (Kasekamp, 2010; Wetherell & Plakans, 1999). As part of the Russian Empire, the local Baltic German political elite maintained control over everyday political and economic affairs. The Russian imperial government allowed and supported high levels of local sovereignty among the Baltic Germans until strong waves of nation formation and nationalism began to spatially diffuse to the western provinces of the Russian Empire (Wulf, 2016).

The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries witnessed political upheaval among many European polities and throughout the Russian Empire. Baltic Germans and Russians both began to experience waves of nationalism and greater senses of nationhood. This increase in nationhood and nationalism between both German-speaking and Russian-speaking populations dramatically impacted the Estonian-speaking people (Wulf, 2016). According to Wulf (2016), Estonia’s juxtaposition to two large ethnolinguistic nations (notably Germans and Russians) deeply informed Estonian nation formation and nationalism because of what she notes is
Estonia’s “double other” (p. 36). Wulf (2016) notes, Estonia’s juxtaposition to and ethnolinguistic domination by both Germans and Russians defines Estonia’s geography not as a regional borderland, but rather a shadowland, “a land marked by the experience of double occupation – Soviet communist and Nazi German [in addition to prior Russian and Baltic German domination] – and overshadowed still by unresolved memories of subordination and collaboration resulting in conflicted identities,” (p. 36). German and Russian notions of nation, nationhood, and nationalism are deeply imbricated in Estonian nation, nationhood, and nationalism, both past and present (Wulf, 2016).

As Baltic Germans (and German-speakers more broadly) began to discuss and define their own nationhood, culture, and nationalist political aspirations, notions like nationhood and nation began to be incorporated into the nationalistic discourses and practices of a growing ethnolinguistic Estonian intellectual and cultural elite, particularly in the university town of Tartu (Annus, 2000; Raun, 2003; Wulf, 2016). While the Estonian word eestlane [ethnic Estonian] began being used by Estophile Baltic German intellectuals (who began to study Estonians as a unique ethnolinguistic nation) and Estonian elites during the eighteenth century, the term and its underlying nation formation and nationalistic connotations began to spread during the nineteenth century (Annus, 2000; Raun, 2003; Wulf, 2016). Estonian-speakers began to self-identify as part of a distinct ethnolinguistic nation, rupturing past feudal notions of identity that were highly fragmented and localized. German-speaking philosophers and scholars, notably Johann Gottfried Herder who emphasized the importance of language as a form of nationhood and national distinction, began to influence and inform Estonians and their own collective notions of national identity and belonging (Raun, 2003; Wulf, 2016). Initially, Estonian intellectuals and elites emphasized cultural nationalism and ethnolinguistic nationhood without any claims to sovereignty or independence (Wulf, 2016). This cultural focus was exemplified by the rise of
Estonian song festivals, cultural traditions (costumes, calendars, and other practices), literature, newspapers, cultural organizations, language unification (uniting under the northern Estonian language/dialect as the language of the nation), and nationalist mythologies (Annus, 2000; Raun, 2003).

Russian state fears of Baltic German nationalism and territorial claims forced the Russian government to clamp down on Germanization (of Estonians) and German nationalism at the local scale, which positively and negatively benefited the Estonian nationalists who saw Baltic Germans as their primary other and threat to their cultural and ethnolinguistic survival (Wulf, 2016). It was during this time that the Russian government ended serfdom for Estonians in 1816 (which didn’t take place in the larger Russian Empire until 1861) and ascribed Estonians as citizens with the potential benefit of owning land and engaging in politics (although land and political reform remained slow because of entrenched Baltic German control) (Wulf, 2016). As a result of Russian interventions and later Russification in the nineteenth century, the Estonian cultural and nationalist elites were able to pursue what became known as the ärkamisaeg [national awakening] without fears of German reprisals (Raun, 2001, 2003; Wulf, 2016). Through the end of serfdom and emancipation of Estonians, a literate rural middle class formed which began to organize and create a greater sense of groupness and rahvas [people or nation] among Estonian-speakers (Wulf, 2016). Although the Russian imperial government was perceived positively as an external other by the Estonian population in comparison to Baltic Germans who were negatively interpreted as a dominant internal other, Estonian nationalist claims for territorial sovereignty and political representation emerged during the short-lived 1905 Russian Revolution. The 1905 Revolution dramatically changed Estonian nationalism and shifted focus from cultural nationhood and ethnolinguistic nationalism focused on nation-building to Estonian nationhood, ethnolinguistic nationalism, and nationalizing state-building
As a result of nearly a century of nationalism and nation formation, the Estonian political elites and population as a whole was ripe for the 1917 Revolution, which would propel Estonians to declare independence. This declaration led to the Estonian War of Independence, which included armed struggles against Baltic Germans (attempting to create a Prussian duchy) and Bolshevik Soviet Union (Wulf, 2016). Taking advantage of the collapse of both expansionist Tsarist regime and German Reich, the Estonian political elites achieved recognition and armistice with the volatile Soviet Union through the signing of the 1920 Treaty of Tartu (Trimbach, 2014b; Wulf, 2016).

During the next roughly twenty years the Estonian national political elites sought to establish an independent nation-state premised on ethnolinguistic nationalism and nationhood that were inculcated during the cultural awakening. Estonian nationalizing state and sense of nationhood largely emphasized Estonia’s ruralness and natural landscape, which influenced Estonian language, culture, and economy (Unwin, 1999). This state building process was abruptly interrupted by World War II and the 1939 Nazi-Soviet Molotov Ribbentrop Pact, which divided Eastern Europe between Nazi and Soviet spheres of influence (and territorial-political annexation) (Kasekamp, 2010; Raun, 2001). While Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union would quickly end their military agreements, Estonia, like much of Europe would be engulfed in a war that would end with Estonia’s annexation and occupation by the Soviet Union (Kasekamp, 2010).

The Soviet Union incorporated Estonia as a constituent Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR), through military threats to the Estonian state during a chaotic (and some scholars note a quasi-fascist) political period and the Bolshevik manipulation of Estonian parliamentary procedures (Virkkunen, 1999; Woods, 1999). The birth of the ESSR, coalesced well with Soviet policies related to ethnolinguistic nationhood, national polities, and territoriality (Hirsch, 2005; Martin,
While the Soviet government attempted to Sovietize the Estonian state, territory, and population through a plethora of policies and initiatives, the Soviet occupation only solidified Estonian nation formation and nationalism (Virkkunen, 1999). Many Estonians themselves inculcated a strong sense of local national ethnolinguistic identity in juxtaposition to Soviet identity (Virkkunen, 1999; Wulf, 2016). The dominant Soviet Russians emerged as Estonia’s new other and reinforced Estonian national distinctions and particularities (Wulf, 2016). According to Virkkunen (199), the Estonian population was incorporated into the Soviet nation as a national minority and internal Soviet other, which engendered a local, “‘bottom up’ nationalism and various strategies of national survival: armed resistance, symbolic actions of everyday resistance, social networks and under-ground publicity, and even direct political action” (p. 85). This sense of nationhood and ethnolinguistic community was maintained through local everyday acts of overt and covert resistance, but also by post-Stalinist ESSR political elites who supported Estonian language and cultural preservation (Virkkunen, 1999). By the Gorbachev reform era, Estonian political elites and nationalists began criticizing the Soviet occupation, state, and narod [people or nation].

Through what became known as the Singing Revolution (roughly 1988-1991) (Šmidchens, 2014), Estonia initiated a new national awakening based on pre-Soviet national notions of national identity, nationhood, and nation-state formation. Estonia’s national reawakening and subsequent independence from the Soviet Union engendered a severe cleavage between post-Soviet Estonian and Russian perceptions of Estonian nationhood, nationalism, and state (Mole, 2012; Wulf, 2016). While both constituent Soviet republics gained independence while challenging Soviet identity, communist political ideology, and statehood, both post-Soviet states perceive the Soviet period and national identity through divergent nationalist lenses and narratives (Mole, 2012). Although the Russian national and geopolitical narrative has changed
overtime (Liik, 2007), the current (Putin era) Russian geopolitical narrative tends to view the
Soviet period positively and as a period of national liberation from Nazi fascism and a return of
Bolshevik Estonia (short-lived political movement – mostly in Narva - during the Russian Civil
War and War of Independence) to the greater Soviet nation (Mole, 2012; Wulf, 2016). The
Estonian state tends to perceive the Soviet period as an era of forced occupation, Russification
(through language, politics, migration), and denial of Estonian ethnolinguistic nationhood and
sovereignty (Wulf, 2016). These divergent narratives of the Soviet era inform and influence both
Russian and Estonian geopolitics and relations between the two states (Liik, 2007; Mole, 2012).
These nationalized, ethnicized, and politicized understandings of state and political power would
inform Estonian restorationism and ethnocracy, which are discussed in greater detail in the
following section.

**Estonian Ethnocracy & Restorationist Geopolitics**

Since the collapse of the former Soviet Union, the Republic of Estonia has undergone
nation-building processes aimed at returning Estonia to the west and restoring its political,
economic, legal, territorial and socio-cultural systems, institutions, policies (Aalto, 2003a;
Brubaker, 1995, 2011; Kasekamp, 2010). Although all nation-states are entwined with complex
multiscalar nation-building processes (Agnew, 2009), Estonia and other post-socialist countries
are understood as nationalizing states and provide illustrative examples of the relationality,
spatiality, and complexity of nationalist nation-building processes and political power
consolidation within diverse multiethnic and/or multinational state contexts (Brubaker, 1995,
1996, 2011; Diener, 2004, 2009). This understanding coalesces well with my conceptual
approach by highlighting the relationship among the state, political field, and citizenship capital
construction.
Nationalism emerged as a major catalyst and state foundation for an array of late twentieth century European post-socialist states (Brubaker, 1996, 2011). This wave of nationalism was both, “polity-seeking” and, “polity-based” in that nationalist notions and practices aimed to either form new states and/or nationalize an already existing state (Brubaker 1996, p. 79). Although nationalism is an old phenomenon, the nationalism that propelled post-socialist state independence continues to impact their nation-building processes, particularly the power relations within those states (Brubaker, 1996; Semjonov, 2002). Nationalism is a major underlying ideology exercised through state discourse and practice that informs Estonian politics, geopolitics, and citizenship formation.

Estonia, like all nationalizing states are, “ethnically heterogeneous yet conceived as nation-states, whose dominant elites promote (to varying degrees) the language, culture, demographic position, economic flourishing, and political hegemony of the nominally state-bearing nation” (Brubaker, 1995, p. 109). As a nationalizing state, Estonian political elites are nationalizing various political and social positions within Estonia, but also nationalizing Estonian state territory through territorialization or roughly the exclusive national construction of the Estonian national territory as being a homogenous social space and territorial identity associated with the dominant national community (Aalto, 2003a; Berg & Oras, 2000; Diener, 2004, 2009). Through nationalization and territorialization, Estonian political elites and nation-building processes purport an exclusive Estonian national community, citizenry, political field, and territory that simultaneously others the Russian national minority and their associated spatial communities (Brubaker, 1996, 2011; Trimbach, 2014a; Trimbach & O’Lear, 2015; Virkkunen, 2002). Based on this politicized and nationalized understanding, the Estonian political field, individuals’/groups’ positions within that field, and citizenship capital are dramatically skewed and inequitable, favoring titular Estonians, while marginalizing Russian-speakers.
In order to better understand Estonian nation-building and citizenship, I critically approach Estonia as an ethnocratic state with restorationist geopolitics. This critical approach stems from the works of political and geopolitical scholars that conceive Estonia not as a depoliticized and natural nation-state, but as a nationalized, territorialized, and ethnicized state. This approach coalesces well with the relational conceptualization of the state of Bourdieu (1994, 1996, 2014). According to Bourdieu (1996), the state is not a monolithic territorial entity, but rather, “the central bank of symbolic credit” (capital) that among other actions, “guarantees and consecrates a certain state of affairs, a relationship between conformity between words and things, between discourse and reality” (p. 377). This conceptualization perceives the state as a major actor in the construction and valorization of capital, including citizenship capital (Bauder, 2006, 2008; Beasley-Murray, 2000). Both ethnocracy and restorationism are unique Estonian national particularities that provide a better theoretically-informed contextual understanding of Estonian nation-building, political power, and Russian-minority population. Following my outlined description, I apply both concepts to my contextual overview of Estonian nation-building and citizenship policy formation.

**Ethnocracy.**

Ethnocracy and ethnic democracy are two strands of interpretation of ethnic nation-building and political power (Peled, 2014). According to Smooha (2005), democracy, like the territorial nation-state (Agnew, 2009) and capitalism (Eyal, Szelenyi, & Townsley, 1998) are not monolithic or homogeneous constructs, but are constructed and manifested as hybrid pluralities. This plurality of democracies is a consequence of multiscalar forces, “from above” including regionalization, globalization, supranationalization and, “from the bottom” including democratization and minority marginalization (Smooha, 2005, p. 5). As a result, former and traditional understandings of nation-states as homogeneous national communities that are
reflected in state structures, territorialities, and political power have been eroded and replaced by a multiplicity of democracies (Peled, 2014; Smooha, 1997, 2002, 2005). Smooha (2005) argues that democracies can be roughly defined as: liberal democracies (state does not actively engage in ethnic segmentation or conflict); consociational democracies (ethnicity is incorporated as a factor in state organization and institutions, but not used to marginalize groups); Herrenvolk democracies (democracy and democratic processes are guaranteed solely to one particular ethnicity or race and actively denied through authoritative means to all other groups within a state); and ethnic democracies (p. 199).

According to Smooha (2005), ethnic democracy, “is a system that combines the extension of civil and political rights to individuals and some collective rights to minorities, with institutionalization of majority control over the state” (p. 199). Ethnic democracy maintains some aspects of democracy, yet varies from other democratic systems and processes. Ethnic democracies incorporate incongruent and contradictory characteristics including equal rights, nationalization, and ethnic homogenization of the territorial nation-state and political power structures (Smooha, 1997).

Other scholars (Peled, 2014; Yiftachel, 2006) critically expand upon Smooha’s notion of ethnic democracy by suggesting that ethnic democracy is conceptually weak and inherently contradictory. Such scholars (Peled, 2014; Yiftachel, 2006) argue that ethnic democracy is too broadly defined by rights, ignores underlying ethnicized political power relations, neglects spatial aspects of nation-states, and is an inherently undemocratic construct. Yiftachel (2006) advances the notion of ethnocracy as a state political regime rather than ethnic democracy to illustrate how ethnocracies are undemocratically founded on a perceived *ethnos* rather than a *demos* (Peled, 2014; Yiftachel, 2006; Yiftachel & Ghanem, 2004). Yiftachel (2006) notes that states cannot make claims to be ideal democracies or democratic (even traditional liberal
democracies), since no perfect democracy exists (or has ever existed). Rather, democracies are constructs that are historically and spatially contingent, and vary in form and composition.

I use ethnocracy rather than ethnic democracy as part of the theoretically-informed contextualization of Estonian nation-building and citizenship. While both ethnic democracy and ethnocracy are primarily applied to an Israeli state context and ethnic politics (Peled, 2011, 2014; Smooha, 1997, 2002, 2005; Yiftachel, 1999), other political scholars have harnessed this critical approach to examine the Estonian ethnocratic state (Duvold & Berglund, 2014; Järve, 2000, 2005; Yiftachel & Ghanem, 2004). I incorporate aspects and Estonian examples from both constructs because as Peled (2014) notes, ethnic democracy and ethnocracy share many commonalities and largely differ in subtle semantics and definitional issues (p. 12). Ethnocracy or an ethnocratic regime refers to a particular political regime that “promotes a central (political-geographical) project of ethnicizing contested territories and power structures” by a dominant ethnic community (Yiftachel & Ghanem, 2004, p. 648). Ethnocracies also regulate ethnic conflict within heterogeneous nation-states by increasing political and legal hegemony to dominant ethnic groups (Peled, 2014). Ethnocratic regimes develop in a wide array of contexts and encompass a variety of forms (Peled, 2014; Yiftachel & Ghanem, 2004). Ethnocracies appear democratic and feature many liberal democratic characteristics; however, ethnocracies are understood as, “diminished democracies” in that democratic characteristics such as citizenship, political power, and identity are inequitably differentiated by a politically dominant ethnic group (Peled 2014, p. 2).

According to Yiftachel (1999, 2006), ethnocracies, like democracies are comprised of a plurality of forms and political structures. Ethnocracies are understood as a distinct regime type existing within a pantheon of other political categories including democratic and authoritarian regimes (Yiftachel & Ghanem, 2004). Although ethnocratic regimes vary, they tend to share
similarities including: demographic control and regulation by the dominant ethnic community; nationalization of the state’s territory by the dominant ethnic community; nationalization and ethnicization of the state military and police; economic hegemony by the dominant ethnic community; depoliticization and legitimization of ethnic power through legal process; and promotion of a public culture and popular geopolitics that foregrounds the dominant ethnic community and degrades or neglects other communities (Yiftachel, 2006; Yiftachel & Ghanem, 2004).

Contextualizing Estonia as an ethnocratic regime is crucial to understanding Estonian nation-building, citizenship, and political power. According to Yiftachel and Ghanem (2004), the post-Soviet Estonian state has adopted a political agenda of, “Estonization (de-Russification), designed to reinstate the ethnic and national situation existing during a previous period of independence (1918-1939)” (p. 660). Yiftachel and Ghanem (2004) pinpoint an array of Estonian laws or policies that illustrate Estonian ethnocratic politics and state practices. For example, the Estonian state implemented strict language and national media policies that emphasized Estonian linguistic and cultural dominance and preservation (Jõesaar & Rannu, 2014; Vetik, 2011; Yiftachel & Ghanem, 2004). The Estonian state also implemented cultural minority autonomy policies that only recognize official minorities as those with citizenship, thus hindering non-citizens from obtaining special recognition for their cultural/linguistic population (Yiftachel & Ghanem, 2004).

For Järve (2005), ethnic dominance and control is enshrined in the Eesti Vabariigi põhiseadus [Estonian Constitution], including in its Preamble and articles regarding citizenship. According to Järve (2005), the Eesti Vabariigi põhiseadus, preambul [Constitution of the Republic of Estonia, Preamble] emphasizes that, Estonian “citizens (all ethnic groups together) establish a state and adopt a constitution to preserve one ethnic group—the Estonians—and its
culture,” meaning that all groups regardless of ethnicity or language must support a core national ethnic group (p. 68). Järve (2005) suggests that the Estonian state initially formed a “control system” which is premised, “on the principle that one ethnic group takes over the state, imposes its culture on society and takes measures to prevent the non-dominant group from organizing politically and upsetting the status quo” by restricting non-ethnic Estonian access to state formation and political process (pp. 63-64). The Estonian ethnic control system (Järve, 2005; Pettai & Hallik, 2002) was a precursor to ethnocratic (or ethnic democratic) state formation. One of the major aspects and consequences of ethnocratic politics and state formation is Estonian citizenship (capital) formation. While this is outlined in greater detail later in this chapter, Estonian citizenship was formed on the basis of ethnic control and ethnocratic state formation, which in brief excluded non-ethnic Estonians from acquiring Estonian citizenship, which in turn limited, primarily minority Russian-speakers’ rights to political process, power, and positions within the state political field (Duvold & Berglund, 2014; Järve, 2000, 2005; Pettai & Hallik, 2002; Yiftachel & Ghanem, 2004).

While not overtly violent, the Estonian ethnocratic state, “structurally discriminates against most of its long-term Russian residents, and actively facilitates the Estonization of institutions, politics, culture and territory” (Yiftachel & Ghanem, 2004, p. 663). The ethnicization of the Estonian state and political field, promotes a state and citizenry consisting of an *ethnos* rather than and *demos* (Duvold & Berglund, 2014). Estonian ethnocratic practices in addition to restorationist geopolitics form the basis of citizenship as capital within the Estonian state political field. Restorationist geopolitics is considered complementary to ethnocracy and is outlined in the following section.
Restorationist Geopolitics.

Like ethnocracy, restorationist geopolitics stems from critical constructivist political and geopolitical scholarship (Aalto, 2003a, 2003b; Aalto & Berg, 2002). Restorationist geopolitics is understood as a particular type of critical geopolitics. Geopolitics has a long contested history within the wider field of political geography and embodies a multiplicity of traditions, meanings, discourses, and practices (Dittmer, 2010; Kuus, 2014; Ó Tuathail, 1996). Traditional geopolitical scholars incorporated normative apolitical purviews and Cartesian perspectivalism in which allegedly objective observations were produced about political power and place (Ó Tuathail, 1996). Normative geopolitical assumptions often tinged with broad superorganic, environmental deterministic, and nationalist underpinnings, resulting in biased and often conflicting results (Dittmer, 2010; Kearns, 2008; Ó Tuathail, 1996).

Critical geopolitics is a current post-structuralist and constructivist form of interdisciplinary geopolitical scholarship (Aalto, 2003a; Kuus, 2014; Ó Tuathail, 1996). Critical geopolitics, “approaches geography not as a given variable but as a question” that actively examines, “the ways in which political actors conceive and practice international politics in spatial terms – how they represent places as particular kinds of places to be approached in particular ways – critical geopolitics elucidates the modes of analysis that make certain geopolitical practices legible and legitimate” (Kuus, 2014, p. 33). I incorporate restorationist geopolitics as a form of critical geopolitics practiced and constructed by the nationalizing Estonian state and political elite in order to elucidate how citizenship is constructed within the Estonian political field. Unlike ethnocracy, restorationist geopolitics is Estonian-centered and I incorporate more Estonian contextual information in my elaboration.

Restorationist geopolitics is anchored in critical geopolitics and is understood as a unique form of geopolitics associated with the Estonian nation-state (Aalto, 2003a, 2003b). While
restorationist geopolitics and the concept of restorationism could be applied to other states (particularly Latvia) that are “restored” following occupations, restorationist geopolitics was constructed and has only been applied to Estonia (Aalto, 2003a, 2003b, 2006; Aalto & Berg, 2002; Trimbach, 2014b). Restorationist geopolitics evolved during the Estonian Singing Revolution (late-1980s) (Šmidchens, 2014) and emerged as the dominant geopolitical ideology and logic of the restored Estonian state in 1991 (Aalto, 2003a; Aalto & Berg, 2002; Visek, 199). Restorationism is premised on the legal principle of *ex iniuria jus non oritur* [illegal actions are illegal and therefore cannot create laws] (Visck, 1997). Thus, post-Soviet Estonia is legally and ideologically understood as restored, independent, and a continuation of the pre-Soviet Republic of Estonia with restored political structures, legal processes, territory, borders, and citizenry.

Restorationism interprets Russia as a former occupying force and the Soviet era as a period of illegal occupation (1940-41, 1940-1991) (Aalto, 2003a; Kasekamp, 2010; Raun, 2001). As such, Soviet-era institutions, migrant population, and policies, including border agreements and citizenship, are considered illegal and illegitimate. Restorationism also interprets the *de jure* borders declared in the 1920 Treaty of Tartu as Estonia’s “birth certificate” and legitimate borders of the Estonian state (although this has changed recently) (Aalto, 2000, 2003a; Aalto & Berg, 2002; Berg, 2003). During the Estonian Singing Revolution, restorationism became entwined with the Estonian national narrative, nationalization, and territorialization (Aalto, 2003a). This ideology evolved into the dominant geopolitical and legal logic of the new Estonian state.

Aalto (2003a) emphasizes that restorationist geopolitics, “is identical to the project of "Estonianization"” and focuses on the complete the restoration of the pre-Soviet Estonian state (p. 28). Following restoration, the Estonian state initiated numerous internal and external restorationist policies (some overlap with policies outlined in the previous subsection).
internal policies focused on restoring the pre-Soviet Estonian population (demographic characteristics), military, national identity, political elite, laws/politics, institutions, and state territory. Such politics targeted language, employment (public sector), residency, border demarcation, education, and most important for this analysis citizenship and political power. Most external policies focused primarily on restoring and securing Estonian national security, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. Such policies included Europeanization (EU integration, policy harmonization), border securitization, and the conceptual othering of Russia (including Russians/Russian-speakers and anything associated with the Soviet occupation) within state geopolitical discourse and practice (Aalto, 2003a). Restorationist geopolitics is entangled with the nationalist interpretation of a pre-Soviet ethno-linguistically homogenous Estonian state, identity, culture, citizenry, narrative, and territory.

During the early 2000s and Estonia’s EU accession process (accession occurred in 2004), many scholars surmised that Estonian restorationism and policies were shifting and normalizing because of international and supranational (EU) pressures (Aalto, 2000, 2003a; Berg & Aalto 2003; Jääts, 2000; Thompson, 1998). Other scholars suggested that EU expansion and subsequent Frontex border harmonization also were directly influencing national(ist) geopolitics and processes among all EU member states (Bigo, 2006; Neal, 2009). Although restorationist geopolitics are challenged by internal and external pressures, policies, actors, institutions, and processes, restorationist geopolitics persist and are understood as being reinforced by Estonian ethnocratic state practices and discourses. Thus, restorationism set in motion the ethnocraticization of the Estonian state, nation-building, and citizenship. Both ethnocracy and restorationism are outlined in practice via Estonian nation-building and citizenship formation in the following subsection.
Estonian State Formation & Citizenship

Unlike other former Soviet Republics, the Republic of Estonia pursued independence through restorationism rather than secession (Aalto, 2003a; Feldman, 2010). After nearly fifty years of illegal Soviet occupation, the Republic of Estonia restored its state sovereignty, legitimacy, territory, and citizenry in 1991. Understanding the specificities of Estonia’s restorationist and ethnocratic trajectory are crucial to grasping Estonian nation-building, political field, power, and citizenship. Restorationism set in motion a specific set of legal, political, territorial, and jurisdictional processes that laid the foundation for the Estonian ethnocratic state and Estonian citizenship (Feldman, 2005; Gelazis, 2004; Yiftachel & Ghanem, 2004).

The Estonian Singing Revolution & Restorationism.

In order to understand restorationism’s influence on the Estonian ethnocratic state, it is crucial to understand how restorationism became embedded within Estonian state politics and geopolitics. During the Estonian Singing Revolution (roughly 1988-1991) (Šmidchens, 2014) and immediately following independence, two major Estonian nationalist groups, the Estonian Popular Front (EPF) and Estonian Citizens Committees (ECCs) struggled over control of the Estonian independence path and overarching movement (Pettai & Hallik, 2002). Although both groups sought independence, the groups had divergent policy approaches, narratives, ideologies, and strategies (Laitin, 1998; Pettai & Hallik, 2002; Trimbach, 2014a). This divergence was most apparent among the groups’ approaches to the Estonian Russian-speaking population.

The EPF led by Edgar Savisaar (ESSR, Estonian politician, later Centre Party leader), emphasized an inclusive approach towards Estonia’s Russian-speaking population. The EPF aimed to work with the Soviet state system and broader Soviet population (regardless of nationality or language) to achieve independence and secession from the Soviet Union. This approach nearly came to fruition, particularly after the EPF electoral victory in 1991. The EPF’s
inclusivity was reflected by the EPF-organized independence referendum in which over 1,144,309 Soviet citizens took part (Russians, Russian-speakers, and Estonians) (Järve & Poleshchuk, 2010, 2013) and the Savisaar administration's 1990 proposal to automatically grant post-Soviet Estonian citizenship based on residency (jus domicile). If enacted, all Estonian residents, regardless of nationality, ethnicity, or origin, would acquire citizenship following independence (Järve & Poleshchuk, 2010; Khrychikov & Miall, 2002; Trimbach, 2014a).

The ECCs approach differed markedly from that of the EPF. The ECCs emphasized a nationalist ideology of legal restorationism based on the legal principle of *ex injuria jus non oritur* (Pettai & Hallik, 2002; Visek, 1997). The ECCs claimed that the Estonian state was illegally annexed and occupied by the Soviet Union, thus, all Soviet institutions, laws/policies, Soviet-era immigrants/migration policies (Light, 2012), and Soviet citizenship (Golfo, 2006; Lohr, 2012) were illegitimate. Under restorationist logic, Estonia’s pre-occupation citizens and their descendants were the legitimate citizenry and entitled to political power over the restored state. Restorationism sparked a popular ECCs-led initiative to officially register all pre-occupation Estonian citizens in order to reconstitute Estonia’s citizenry (in juxtaposition to the ESSR’s Soviet citizenry) and political elite. The ECCs registered approximately 600,000 legitimate citizens by 1989 (Pettai & Hallik, 2002).

Both political groups fought over legitimacy and power during the Singing Revolution and final years of Soviet occupation. In 1991, the ECCs organized an election for an independent Estonian Congress to challenge the legitimacy and sovereignty of the Estonian Supreme Soviet (ESSR legislative body). During this election, approximately 500,000 registered legitimate (pre-Soviet) citizens participated. Soon after in a separate election, the EPF secured a majority in the Estonian Supreme Soviet. During that brief time period, Estonia simultaneously consisted of two legislative bodies under the power of two divergent groups and ideologies (with some overlap).
Both entities simultaneously sought Estonian independence; however, the ECCs and their associated representatives in the Supreme Council successfully secured restorationism as Estonia’s official independence ideology and narrative.

While the ECCs secured restorationism as the Supreme Council’s official ideology, the EPF held the majority of power over the overarching independence movement and the Supreme Soviet. The EPF nearly passed its pro-Russian-speaking citizenship policies; however, the attempted August 1991 coup in Moscow and immediate disintegration of Soviet state legitimacy sparked an increase in popularity for the ECCs and their nationalist hardline approach. This movement shift hindered all prospects for inclusive citizenship policies and inter-ethnic political collaboration (although there were exceptions). Following the attempted coup, the ECCs and EPF collaboratively announced the, “continuity of the Republic of Estonia as subject of international law” and, “the restoration of diplomatic relations” (Pettai & Hallik, 2002, p. 512). Additionally, a Constitutional Assembly was established, merging the two legislative bodies and political elites. While international law guarantees formal citizenship to all secessionist state residents following secession (Feldman, 2008), the restored Estonian state ultimately did not pursue this approach.

**Estonian Citizenship Formation.**

attempts to form an inclusive citizenship policy approach or incorporate the interjections of Estonia’s Soviet-era Russian-speaking community (p. 281). This “restored state model” of citizenship emphasizing *jus sanguinis* conversely rendered approximately 500,000 Soviet-era Russian-speakers stateless (Aalto, 2003a, Järve, 2005, Trimbach, 2014a). It should be noted that this legal logic and practice differed markedly from that of the pre-occupation Republic of Estonia following its secession from the collapsing Russian Empire, which, “applied the so-called ‘zero’ option, to constitute its citizenry” allowing all permanent residents legal citizenship (Kalev & Ruutsoo, 2007, p. 218). This legal logic and practice also differed from that of Soviet Estonia.

Post-Soviet Estonian citizenship differed from Soviet constructions of *grazhdanstvo* [citizenship], which emphasized political membership anchored by a distinct transnational political ideology (Alexopoulos, 2012; Lohr, 2012). According to Alexopoulos (2012), Soviet citizenship, like other state-centered citizenship constructs, was differentiated and fragmented; however, unlike other states, Soviet citizenship incorporated allegiance to Soviet political ideology, participation in political and/or civic activities, and accruement of political capital or prestige as necessary to becoming *polnopravnye grazhdane* [citizens with full rights]. Soviet citizenship also emphasized, “the assertion of material security as constituting the principle right or fundamental privilege of Soviet citizenship, as well as the disproportionate emphasis on obligations over rights,” with severe penalties for Soviet citizens who did not engage or support the Soviet system (Alexopoulos, 2012, p. 527). Thus, the Estonian state restored a form of citizenship that was distinct to the Estonian population, which upended long-held understandings of citizenship and citizen, particularly for Soviet-era Russian-speakers.

After the restoration of Estonian citizenship, Russian-speakers were categorized as illegal immigrants and given the following options: apply for legal Estonian residency (permanent or
temporary), Estonian citizenship (via naturalization), Russian citizenship (or other state citizenship), remain stateless, or leave the country. According to Jöesaar and Rannu (2014), Estonian political elites held negative perceptions of non-Estonians and, “believed that the majority of non-Estonians would immigrate to Russia” and those that remained would fully integrate; however, this was not the case with the majority of Russians and Russian-speakers remaining in an independent Estonia (p. 215). While the Estonian state adopted naturalization, a two-year residency and subsequent one-year waiting period were required for non-citizens to begin naturalization. Additionally, the Estonian state instituted strict Estonian language and citizenship requirements for public sector employment, rendering many Russian-speakers unemployable by the state (Kallas, 2008). These policies dramatically impacted Russian-speaker naturalization, electoral participation, political party development, civic/political engagement, political incorporation, and ability to participate during a key period in Estonian state formation (Berg, 2001; Gelazis, 2004; Trimbach, 2014a). Additionally, the 1938 (1992) Citizenship Law also noted that a limited minority of non-ethnic Estonians could be ascribed citizenship as a state award for their service or allegiance to the state (bypassing naturalization) (Järve, 2005).

Estonian citizenship policies have changed since the enactment of the restored 1938 Citizenship Law; however, any gains by Estonia’s minority Russian-speaking population have been limited (Human Rights Watch, 2015; Järve, 2005; Trimbach, 2014a). The 1992 Eesti Vabariigi põhiseadus [Constitution of Estonia] states that it guarantees, “the preservation of the Estonian nation and its culture throughout the ages” with no reference to minorities or minority rights (Eesti Vabariigi põhiseadus, preambul). The Constitution also claims that the “supreme power of state” is embodied in “the people” (meaning citizens) (Eesti Vabariigi põhiseadus, 1 peatükk, 1§). The Estonian Constitution also specifies the required legal conditions of citizenship ascription (Eesti Vabariigi põhiseadus, 2 peatükk, 8§), which are elaborated in greater detail in
the 1995 *Kodakondsuse seadus* [Citizenship Act]. Järve (2005) also notes that the constitution emphasizes that the citizens are constitutionally entrusted to protect and preserve the core nation of the state, or ethnic Estonians. Thus, restorationist logic became codified in Estonia’s supreme legal document and laid the foundation for an ethnocratic state.

In 1993, the *Riigikogu* enacted the *Välismaalaste seadus* [Aliens Act] (later amended and replaced with the *Välismaalaste seadus* [Aliens Act] of 2009) and *Vähemusrühvuse kultuuriautonoomia seadus* [Cultural Autonomy of National Minorities Act] (Gelazis, 2004; Yiftachel & Ghanem, 2004). While these particular Acts highlight various rights and benefits associated with minorities and immigrant populations in Estonia, these laws prioritize the benefits and rights of citizens (ignoring at the time of enactment the large stateless Russian-speaking population). Additionally in 1996, the *Riigikogu* instituted the *Mittetulundusühingute seadus* [Non-Profit Act]. This Act highlights civil society organization (CSO) regulations and omits any citizenship or nationality restrictions related to CSO formation and activities (although there are legal residency requirements). Thus, citizens and non-citizens alike can create CSOs and participate in their associated activities (as long as they are not political parties or threatened the state).

The *Riigikogu* passed an updated Citizenship Act in 1995 (*Kodakondsuse seadus*, 1995). The *Kodakondsuse seadus* describes in detail formal citizenship ascription and naturalization. The *Kodakondsuse seadus* (it has been amended since its adoption) declares that Estonian citizenship is:

1. Obtained at birth (*jus sanguinis*);
2. Obtained through naturalization process;
3. Reacquired by an individual who lost her Estonian citizenship as a minor;
4. Lost through state revocation (state revoking citizenship from a citizen), personal
release from citizenship (individual applies to be released), and/or acquiring of citizenship elsewhere (dual citizenship is illegal) (Kodakondsuse Seadus, 1 peatükk, 2§).

The Kodakondsuse seadus also notes the requirements for naturalization and participation. Naturalization includes: an age requirement of 15 years; having a consistent legal income; legal residency of 8 years, with at least 5 years permanent residency; a legal place of residence in Estonia (address); the completion of a language proficiency exam with written and oral components with a minimum B1 level (based on European language exam standards); an Estonian constitutional competency exam, that includes the Citizenship Act; and the completion of a state allegiance oath (Eesti Vabariigi põhiseadus, 2 peatükk, 8§; Integratsiooni ja Migratsiooni Sihtasutus Meie Inimesed, 2015; Järve & Poleshchuk, 2013; Kodakondsuse Seadus, 2 peatükk, 6§; Sannik, 2012). There are some language exam exemptions, including for individuals with Estonian language education background (primary or secondary education) (Järve & Poleshchuk, 2013). Dual citizenship is also not permitted in theory, although (anecdotally I discovered that) legal loopholes do exist in practice. Non-citizens are restricted from voting in national elections, voting in EU elections (unless they are EU citizens), running as a candidate, holding official public office, and political party membership (Berg, 2001; Trimbach, 2014a). Non-citizens are allowed to engage in local elections; however, non-citizens are not able to run for local public office or work in the local public sector (Cianetti, 2014; Kohaliku omavalitsuse volikogu valimise seadus, 1996, 2002; Trimbach, 2014a; Yiftachel & Ghanem, 2004). Although Russian-speakers can naturalize and become formal citizens of the Estonian state, citizens-to-be can be refused citizenship. According to Järve (2005), the Citizenship Act of 1995 states six categories of persons who can be refused citizenship by the state. These six categories include:
1) those who knowingly submit false information in applying for citizenship; (2) those who do not observe the constitutional state system of Estonia; (3) those who act against the state of Estonia and its security; (4) those who have been sentenced to imprisonment for a period exceeding one year for a criminal offence and who are not considered rehabilitated with a spent sentence or who have been punished repeatedly for an intentional criminal offence; (5) those who were or are employed by the intelligence or security service of a foreign state; and (6) those who have served in a career position in the armed forces of a foreign state and their spouses. (Järve, 2005, p. 71)

The 1995 Citizenship Act was fraught with domestic and international contention. Following the Act’s approval, the Estonian state disputed with the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), European Union, Russian state, international human rights organizations, and Estonian Russian-speaking CSOs and groups (Feldman, 2010). Although these organizations and actors differed in motivation, interpretation, and discourse, all agreed that Estonia’s citizenship laws harbored potential for minority discrimination and regional instability.

Although the Estonian state remains steadfast in maintaining its restorationist geopolitical logic and ethnocentric state practices, domestic and international pressures have influenced the Estonian state to amend the Citizenship Act and Constitution (Aalto, 2000, 2003a; Commercio, 2008; Järve, 2000; Järve & Poleshchuk, 2013). The EU accession process mandated that the Estonian state introduce (stateless/immigrant) integration initiatives and programs (Feldman, 2010; Järve & Poleshchuk, 2010, 2013). As part of EU accession, the Estonian state initiated a process of developing an integration program based on cultural pluralism that met European accession requirements (Feldman, 2005, 2006). This entailed the formation of an official integration project and the *Mitte-eestlaste Integratsiooni Sihtasutus* [Non-Estonians Integration...
Foundation], now called the Integratsiooni ja Migratsiooni Sihtasutus Meie Inimesed [Integration and Migration Foundation Our People, MISA]. While the integration program was approved by the European Commission, “roughly 80% of the programme’s budget is dedicated” to integration by ensuring the, “reproduction of the Estonian language and culture” (Feldman, 2006, p. 47). MISA and its associated CSO partners do implement an array of integration projects, including Estonian language learning throughout the country; however, these projects are constrained by budget issues, bureaucracy, and party politics (Tallinn Interviewee 7, personal communication, September 6, 2013).

While most states and supranational governmental agencies remain silent on Estonian policies and programs, the Russian state (Evans, 2014) and international human rights organizations remain vocal in their critiques (Human Rights Watch, 2015; Zdanoka, 2013). For example, a 2013 citizenship conference held in Tallinn, Estonia hosted by the European Association for the Defense of Human Rights intentionally snubbed Estonian human rights agencies because of what they saw were discriminatory policies and practices by Estonian-state backed agencies (Zdanoka, 2013). Another externally informed action was the updated 2002 Kohaliku omavalitsuse volikogu valimise seadus [Local Government Council Election Act] (later updated in 2003 and 2004) that highlights legal conditions for local elections and non-citizen electoral participation. Since Estonia’s accession to the European Union in 2004, additional alterations were instituted to ease naturalization requirements but were largely related to stateless and/or orphaned children, disabled persons, and the elderly (Human Rights Watch, 2015; Järve & Poleshchuk, 2010, 2013; “Rare Praise from Russia over Estonian Citizenship Bill”, 2014).

Estonia’s accession to the European Union was a breakthrough for the restored Estonian state. As a member of the EU, all Estonian citizens became official EU citizens. EU citizenship entitles its bearers to freedom of mobility/residency within EU member states, EU labor
opportunities, and participation within the EU political system (Gelazis, 2004; Trimbach, 2014a). Since EU accession, major critiques of Estonian citizenship have decreased. According to Järve and Poleshcuk (2010) “Estonia interpreted the admission to the EU as the ultimate international approval of its citizenship policies” (p. 13). Although the Estonian state has enacted minor adjustments to formal citizenship policy (Feldman, 2010; “Rare Praise from Russia over Estonian Citizenship Bill”, 2014), Estonian citizenship and its impacts on the Russian-speaking population remain unaltered. Järve (2005) states that the Estonian ethnocratic state consistently presents Russian-speakers and Russia as the major threat to the Estonian ethnic nation. As such, minority Russians and Russian-speakers are, “habitually perceived as ‘the hand of Moscow’ or ‘the fifth column,’” which contributes to a consistent conservative attitude among ethnic Estonians towards citizenship or citizenship policy change (Järve, 2005, p. 65). As noted by a contentious recent Human Rights Watch report (2015), although the Estonia state has made progress with how it relates to its Russian-speaking population, Estonia remains tenth in the world in statelessness and many Russian-speakers encounter perceived ethno-linguistic discrimination related to politics, citizenship, economics, and education.

As a result, the Estonian restorationist and ethnocratic construction of citizenship or citizenry continues to impact how the Estonian state constructs and engages with the Russian-speaking population and how citizenship is embodied and enacted by Russian-speakers. Estonian citizenship policies have disproportionately impacted the Russian-speaking population. Although some Russian-speakers left Estonia following independence (Raun, 2001), most remained in a state of legal limbo (statelessness) hoping to be integrated into the Estonian state, political community, and citizenry. The broad impacts of citizenship and Russian-speakers (as a group) are outlined in the following subsections.
The Broad Impacts of Citizenship on Russian-speakers.

Estonia’s restorationist and ethnocratic citizenship policy has had a wide array of broad impacts on Estonia’s Russian-speaking population (these broad impacts are examined in greater detail in the analysis chapters). Today, the Russian-speaking population is comprised of a fragmented citizenry. Russian-speakers no longer consist of a large stateless population, but rather Estonian citizens (188,959), Russian citizens (92,207), Ukrainian and Belarusian citizens (7,979), and Stateless residents (85,034) (available citizenship data is based on combined rough estimates) (Eesti Statistika, 2014; Siseministeerium, 2015). When compared to the Estonian population as a whole, Russians and/or Russian-speakers comprise the largest groups among Estonia’s stateless and non-Estonian citizenry, which (as of January, 2016) consists of Estonian citizens (84.2%), non-Estonian citizens (9.7% total, of which 6.8% are Russian citizens), and stateless residents (6.1%) (Siseministeerium, 2015).

Russian-speakers are also underrepresented in elected and unelected public office and party politics, (Feldman, 2005; Järve & Poleschuk, 2010, 2013; Khrychikov & Miall, 2002; Smith & Wilson, 1997; Trimbach, 2014a). Those Russian-speakers with Estonian citizenship and who hold political or public office (including teachers) also must meet strict national (Estonian) language standards set by the controversial Keeleinspektsioon [Language Inspectorate] (Levy, 2010). Russian-speakers as a political and/or electoral bloc are fragmented and Russian/Russian-speaking political parties are of marginal influence (Auers & Kasekamp, 2009; Khrychikov & Miall, 2002; Krupavičius, 2005; Smith & Wilson, 1997). The Russian-speaking electorate and political actors have been successful at the local political scale (particularly in Tallinn and Narva) (Khrychikov & Miall, 2002; Sikk, 2006; Trimbach, 2014a); however, Russian-speaking electoral engagement is on the decline (Kallas, 2008). All of the aforementioned broad impacts and additional influences are elaborated in greater detail in the analysis chapters (Chapter 5 &
Chapter 6). In the analysis chapters, I examine the noted broad impacts (and more) by integrating additional available data, survey data, and Russian-speakers’ citizenship narratives. In order to understand Russian-speakers’ narratives and relationships with the Estonian state and citizenship, I highlight the Russian-speaking population in the following subsection.

**Estonian Russian-speakers**

The Estonian Russian-speaking community is not a homogenous monolithic ethno-linguistic community, but rather a non-titular heterogeneous population comprised of a wide range of ethnicities, nationalities, religions, interests, and spatial or migratory origins (Brubaker 1996; Laitin, 1998). I use the term community loosely in reference to shared language. Russians within the regional context of the former Soviet Union are broadly understood through a wide range overlapping yet subtly differing group terms and classifications. In this section, I outline how Russian-speakers are defined and provide contextual background on the Estonian Russian-speaking population.

“Russian-speaker” (русскоязычный, russkoyazychnyi) as a group term should not be confused or misinterpreted with other overlapping classifications including: Russian (русские, russkie) ethno-cultural nationality (in the Russian sense) or ethnicity; Russian (россияне, rossiyanie) or Russianness associated with the Russian state and/or territory; Russian (русских, russkikh) affiliation related to one's country of residence or homeland (родина, rodina); Russian compatriots (соотечественники, sootchestvenniki) who reside within the former Soviet territory but outside of the Russian Federation and have some connection to Russia; and Russian citizens (граждане, grazhdane) or citizens of the former Soviet Union (Aleksakhina, 2007; Laitin, 1999; Lynn & Bogorov, 1999). The term Russian-speaker is an encompassing group term that is recognized and well researched within interdisciplinary scholarship associated with politics, geopolitics, and regional area studies focused on Estonia and other former Soviet Republics.
Russian-speaker refers to those individuals who utilize Russian as their primary everyday language (Aleksakhina, 2007; Brubaker, 1996; Lynn & Bogorov, 1999). According to Laitin (1998), Russian-speaker is a pervasive and significant linguistic identity that has emerged within multinational and multiethnic non-titular communities since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Estonian Russian-speakers share a language that helps define them. This linguistic community maintains complex hybrid and plural identities (Assmuth, 2012; Kostø, 2011; Laitin, 1998; Raun, 2009; Smith & Burch, 2012). The plurality of hybrid identities and identity-related classifications or groupings impact how Estonian Russian-speakers are understood by researchers, media, states, and themselves as a linguistic community. Estonian Russian-speakers also tend to share media spaces (Jakobson, 2002; Vihalemm & Masso, 2002) and multiscalar segregated spatial communities (Küün, 2008; Marcinczak, et. al. 2015; Tammaru & Kulu, 2003). Russian-speakers primarily obtain news and information from Russian-language news sources, particularly from the Russian Federation or local news (Jõesaar & Rannu, 2014). Since Soviet times, Russian-speakers have tended to concentrate in segregated communities at both the national (Tallinn, Narva) and local scales (Mustamäe and Sillamäe neighborhoods in Tallinn). Estonian Russian-speakers also embody and enact nuanced localized (related to the Baltic region, Estonian territorial state, and/or their local towns/cities of residence) identities that differ from other Russian-speaking communities within the former Soviet space (Assmuth, 2012; Fein, 2005; Kolstø, 2011; Smith & Burch, 2012).

I focus on the Estonian Russian-speaking population, which is an amalgamated and diverse linguistic community (in a broad sense) because language and linguistic identification is an integral aspect of how they are defined in both scholarship but also Estonian nationalization and territorialization processes (Fein & Straughn, 2014; Kolstø, 2011; Laitin, 1998; Smith &
Burch, 2012; Vihalemm & Masso, 2002). Although Estonian Russian-speakers are a heterogeneous community that shares a common primary language, Estonian Russian-speakers are constructed within Estonian nationalizing processes, practices, and discourses as a homogenous “Russian” other in juxtaposition to the homogenous ethno-linguistic (and cultural) Estonian nation (Fein, 2005; Feldman, 2000; Keller, 2007). This othered maulased [non-Estonian, also used in a derogatory sense by some Estonians to mean “foreigner,” and/or “stranger,” and/or “Soviet”] population is often characterized as rootless, alien, and/or foreign within Estonian nationalization and territorialization processes (Isakov, 2009; Laitin, 2005; Raud, 2004). This othering and group homogenization (or generalization) is part of broader nationalization process associated with ethnonocraticization and restorationist geopolitics.

Russian-speakers are often defined through Estonian national and geopolitical lenses as a relatively new othered homogeneous minority population linked to the illegal Soviet occupation; however, Russian-speakers are a heterogeneous community and have a lengthy history and spatial association with what would emerge as the territorial Estonian state (Berg, 2001; Isakov, 2007, 2009; Tender, 2008). The earliest Russian (or Eastern Slavic) settlements on Estonian territory date back to the eleventh century (Isakov, 2009). Representatives from the Russian Orthodox Church also settled and evangelized in Estonia as early as the fourteenth century (Isakov, 2009). During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, small communities of Russian Old Believers (minority Orthodox religious community) settled along Lake Peipus (on the Estonian side) in order to escape religious persecution in the Russian interior (Kasekamp, 2010; Potashenko, 2009). As part of the Russian Empire, Russian tsarist political elites and merchants settled in Estonian urban areas and working with the Baltic German nobility (relationships between Russian political elites and local Baltic Germans elites fluctuated overtime) maintained political sovereignty and territorial integrity of the strategic tsarist region (Plakans, 2011; Raun,
Russians elites were particularly noticeable in the sizable urban areas of Tallinn and Narva (Isakov, 2009; Raun, 2001).

Russian-speaker migration and settlement in Estonia was limited; however, during the late nineteenth century, tsarist Russification policies increased Russian language usage, Russian Orthodoxy worship, and Russian (and Russian-speaking) migration to Estonia and other Baltic territories (Kasekamp, 2010; Raun, 2001; Šmidchens, 2014). Russification also sought to incorporate and assimilate Estonians into the Russian socio-linguistic, imperial political, and cultural space and thwart any potential for Germanization (stemming from the Baltic German elite and nobility) and Estonian national awakening (Kasekamp, 2010; Šmidchens, 2014). Russification and Russian migration was altered because of the Estonian War of Independence and associated Russian Civil War. Although Russian-speaking migration was not a major issue during the brief period of Estonian independence (roughly 1917-1939) and the Estonian nationalist state implemented restrictive migration policies for non-Estonians (both new immigrants and post-war returnees), small numbers of Russian war refugees did resettle in Estonia (Kasekamp, 2010; Rohtmets, 2012).

Although relatively small communities of Russian-speakers resided in Estonia (or what would become the independent Estonian Republic) prior to Soviet occupation (1940-41, 1944-1991), Russian-speakers comprised the largest national or ethno-linguistic minority population in Estonia (Kasekamp, 2010). World War II altered the demography of nearly all national and linguistic communities in Estonia; however, the Russian-speaking population dramatically increased following Soviet annexation (Berg, 2001; Raun, 2001). Although census data related to the pre-occupation Russian-speaking population are not available, Russian population (nationality/ethnicity) data are available. Estonia’s ethnic Russian population increased from approximately 8.2% in 1934 to 30.3% in 1989 (from approximately 26,000 to 602,000 by the
end of Soviet occupation) (Raun, 2001; Vetik & Helemäe, 2011). Although the policy rationale
behind Soviet-era Russian-speaker migration is a highly contentious topic (Allik 2004; Light,
2012; Plakans 2011; Raun 2001), the majority of Russian-speaking migrants arrived to the ESSR
as labor migrants through an internal Soviet system of migration policies and controls (i.e: internal passport/propiska) (Aarelaid-Tart, 2012; Kasekamp, 2010; Light, 2012). These labor
migrants participated in the rapid urbanization and industrialization of the post-World War II
ESSR and perceived their movement/resettlement not as occupation but as internal Soviet
migration (Laitin, 1998; Kasekamp, 2010).

Although Russian-speakers were part of a large diverse migrant population and like
titular Estonians were Soviet citizens, the Russian-speaking community and the Soviet policies
and/or controls enabling their internal (Soviet) migration and relocation, formed cleavages
among titular Estonians and non-titular Russian-speakers within Soviet Estonian society (Berg,
2001; Kasekamp, 2010; Laitin, 1998; Leetmaa, Tammaru, & Hess, 2015; Light, 2012; Vetik &
Helemäe, 2011). Although Russian-speakers and Estonians shared Soviet citizenship, both
populations lived in two segregated ethnolinguistic societies or social spaces within the ESSR
(Leetmaa et. al., 2015; Plakans, 2011). Russian-speakers tended to work for state-run (Union-
wide) industries, while Estonians tended to work for local (ESSR) industries (Vetik & Helemäe,
2011). Russian-speakers and Estonians participated in parallel yet linguistically defined
education systems (Estonian and Russian-speakers had and continue to have relatively separate
yet equal school systems in which the language of instruction differs) (Brown, 2013; Jõesaar &
Rannu, 2014; Thiele, 2003; Vetik & Helemäe, 2011). Russian-speakers also resided in newer
Soviet-era housing and neighborhoods (and towns/cities) because Soviet era housing was more
easily accessible for Russian-speaking labor migrants compared to local populations (Kasekamp,
2010; Kährik & Tammaru, 2010; Leetma et. al. 2015; Plakans, 2011). Although local politics
were inclusive, yet dominated by the titular Estonian population, Russian-speakers dominated particular political and economic institutions and posts that were bound to all-Union ideology, policies, institutions, and plans (Vetik & Helemäe, 2011).

During the Singing Revolution and subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian-speaking population was divided among those desiring to remain with the Soviet Union and those preferring independence for Estonia. Following the restoration of the Estonian state, Russian-speakers outside of the Russian Federation numbered approximately 25 million, with approximately 475,000 residing in Estonia (Laitin, 1998). Russian-speakers are often grouped as a diaspora community and/or “stranded minority” population (Diener, 2009; Engelhardt, 2015; Kolstø, 2011; Laitin, 1998); however, although Estonian Russian-speakers share a common language with Russian-speakers elsewhere and may have familial connections to the Russian Federation or other former Soviet republics, Estonian Russian-speakers tend to have a strong local identity related to the Estonian territorial state or their localized towns, cities, or even neighborhoods (Fein, 2005; Kolstø, 2011; Laitin, 1998; Smith & Burch, 2012; Trimbach & O’Lear, 2015).

As Estonia’s largest minority population, Russian-speakers consist of a range of ethnic or nationalities including, but not limited to: Russians, Ukrainians, Belarusians, Poles, Tatars, and Jews (Jews are conceived as an ethnicity in Russian and Estonian interpretations) (Berg, 2001; Eesti Statistika, 2014; Laitin, 1998). This diversity in ethnic, national, and religious population composition is related to past political, territorial, and national relations among the multiethnic and multinational Russian Empire and Soviet Union (Bremmer, 1993; Laitin, 1998; Kasekamp, 2010; Plakans, 2011). Although both respective states were heterogeneous and the Soviet Union as state policy sought to maintain nationality-based republics and territorialization, both incorporated monolingualistic nationalization processes, as manifested through Russification and
Sovietization with the Russian language being emphasized as the language of the centralized state and *lingua franca* of the larger political community (Bremmer, 1993; Kasekamp, 2010; Raun, 2001). Russification and Sovietization continue to be contentious and disputed historic processes (Mertelsmann, 2003; Plakans, 2011; Raun, 2001; Wulf & Grönholm, 2010); however, regardless of interpretation, a lasting demographic legacy of both tsarist and Soviet periods is the linguistic homogenization or hegemony of the Russian language among a wide array of ethnic and linguistic communities (Laitin, 1998).

*Figure 1. Russian-speaking population distribution by county (Eesti Statistika, 2011).*

Today, Estonian Russian-speakers make up approximately 28% of the total Estonian population (374,179 people) and are spatially concentrated in Harjumaa [Harju County] (Tallinn metro region) and Ida-Virumaa [Ida-Viru County] (Narva and surrounding communities) (Eesti Statistika, 2014) (Figure 1). Russian-speakers roughly comprise 80% (116,258 people) of Ida-
Viru County’s total population (149,483 people) and 95% (57,000 people) of Narva’s population (60,000 people) (Eesti Statistika, 2014). Russian-speakers also roughly comprise 36% (205,885 people) of Harju County’s total population (572,103 people) and 42% (172,585) of Tallinn’s total population (411,063 people) (Eesti Statistika, 2014).

While Russian-speakers comprise 28% of Estonia’s total population, Russian-speakers tend to differ markedly from majority ethnolinguistic Estonians, particularly when social, economic, psychological, religious, health, and political characteristics and indicators are examined (Feldman, 2010; Leinsalu, 2004; Pettai & Hallik, 2002; Schulze, 2011; Semjonova, 2014; Tammaru & Kulu, 2003; Uusküla, Kals, Rajaleid, Abel, & Talu, 2008; Vetik, 2011; Yiftachel & Ghanem, 2004). Russian-speakers tend to have lower incomes and higher rates of unemployment than their ethnic Estonian counterparts (Pavelson & Luuk, 2002; Tammaru & Kulu, 2003). Russian-speakers tend to be less mobile and reside in less affluent coethnic or colinguistic housing estates and neighborhoods (Leetmaa et. al., 2015; Marcinczak et. al., 2015). Russian-speakers tend to have worse physical and mental health (Leinsalu, 2004), have higher suicide rates (Varnik, Kolves, & Wasserman, 2005), and are disproportionately impacted by drug use and HIV/AIDS (primarily caused by drug use) (Cockerham 1999; Downes, 2003; Kunst, Leinsalu, Kasmel, & Habicht, 2002; Leinsalu, 2002; Uusküla, Kals, Rajaleid, Abel, & Talu, 2008). Russian-speakers are also overrepresented in Estonians prisons (Semjonova, 2014). Estonians and Russian-speakers tend to have low rates of inter-ethnic marriages and everyday interactions (Nimmerfeldt, 2011; Schulze, 2011; Van Ham & Tammaru, 2011). Additionally, while ethnic Estonians tend to be considered as one of the least religious populations in the world (Ringvee, 2011), Russian-speakers tend to be slightly more religious, with around 13.7% identifying as members of the Estonian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (Engelhardt, 2015, p. 29). Broadly, Russian-speakers also tend to be less civically and politically

Some socio-economic differences or disparities between Estonians and minority Russian-speakers can be explained through economic interpretation. Russian-speakers’ employment and labor expertise was disproportionately impacted by the collapse of the Soviet Union and state owned enterprises (Pettai & Hallik, 2002; Tammaru & Kulu, 2003). Although the post-Soviet Estonian economic transformation is one aspect of the aforementioned disparities, political, civic, and socio-cultural (ethno-linguistic) marginalization are also integral catalysts. Such differences and disparities are partially linked to citizenship and underlying Estonian restorationist and ethnocratic nationalization processes (Aalto, 2003a, 2003b; Järve & Poleshchuk, 2010, 2013; Trimbach, 2014a).

If not directly linked, Estonian citizenship and marginalizing nationalization processes exacerbate and are exacerbated by the aforementioned disparities and multiscalar spatial segregation (and concentration) (Küün, 2008; Marcinczak et. al., 2015; Tammaru & Kulu, 2003). Combined, the variety of disparities have formed what some scholars call a “one state, two societies” system, which continues to thwart social and economic integration and political and civic incorporation of the Russian-speaking community in Estonia (Berg, 2001; Hallik, 2003; Pettai & Hallik, 2002). The two dominant Estonian Russian-speaking spatial communities are described in greater detail in the subsequent sections of this chapter.
Northeastern Estonia & Tallinn Metropolitan Area

Northeastern Estonia: Ida-Viru County & Narva.

Northeastern Estonia is a borderland region that includes Ida-Viru County and the City of Narva. Ida-Viru County forms a physiographic isthmus wedged between Lääne-Viru County (west), the Russian Federation (Leningrad Oblast) (east), the Gulf of Finland (Baltic Sea) (north), and Lake Peipus (south) (Figure 2). Ida-Viru County is roughly 3,364 square kilometers (1299 square miles) and is currently Estonia's third most populous county (approximately 149,483 residents) after Harju and Tartu counties (Eesti Statistika, 2014; Terk, 2000a). Ida-Viru County had long been Estonia’s second most populous county, but has suffered massive outmigration since the disintegration of the former Soviet Union and only recently (2013) was surpassed by Tartu County (Eesti Statistika, 2014; Leppik, 2013; Nikolajev & Rikken, 2015).

Figure 2. Map of Ida-Viru County, Estonia (Terk, 2000a, p. 78).

This region is also considered Estonia's historical industrial core (Joenniemi & Sergunin, 2011; Lunden & Zalams, 2000). The region’s industrialization stems from the location of a
large oil shale deposit and its associated energy and chemical industries (Holmberg, 2008; Joenniemi & Sergunin, 2011; Lunden & Zalamans, 2000, 2002; Ryden, 2002; Terk, 2000a). Northeastern Estonia is considered a major energy rich region and numerous occupying forces have sought out its resources (Russians, Nazis, and Soviets). The region’s oil shale continues to be an economic mainstay and political factor for the region (Holmberg, 2008; Ryden, 2002).

Both Nazi German and Soviet occupying regimes extracted oil shale resources, and the Estonian state owns *Eesti Energia* [Estonian Energy], whose subsidiary *Eesti Energia Kaevandused* [Estonian Energy Mines] extracts oil shale in the region today. Ida-Viru County’s massive oil shale wealth has directly contributed to Estonia’s post-Soviet energy independence and self-sufficiency (Evans-Pritchard, 2013).

Estonian state geopolitical discourse constructs and (internally) others Ida-Viru County and Narva (Kaiser & Nikiforova, 2008; Trimbach, 2014b; Trimbach & O’Lear, 2015; Virkkunen, 2002). The othering process is largely associated with the region’s geographic proximity to the Russian state, the border disagreement between Russia and Estonia (resolved in 2014), economic decline, post-Soviet autonomy referendum, and predominant Russian-speaking population (Kaiser & Nikiforova, 2008; Lunden & Zalamans, 2002; Trimbach 2014b; Trimbach & O’Lear, 2015; Virkkunen, 2002). Although Ida-Viru County and Narva are often overdramatized and oversimplified as being a borderland crossroads between monolithic conflicting civilizations and cultures (Huntington, 1993, 1996; Kivimäe, 2004), the historical contingency, multiscalar geopolitical construction, and political relationality of this borderland region within the larger Estonian, European, and Russian state contexts cannot go unstated or underestimated. Northeastern Estonia, like other borderland regions, is rife with historical, geopolitical, and political hybridity and ripe for critical scholarly engagement (Berg, 2000; Berg
Northeastern Estonia is not only othered within Estonian state and popular discourse, but suffers from a wide range of demographic, political, social, and economic issues. The region currently suffers from high rates of unemployment (Lunden & Zalamans, 2000), outmigration (Leppik, 2013; Nikolajev & Rikken, 2015; Tooman, 2012), public health crises (drug use, HIV/AIDS) (Downes, 2003; Kunst et. al., 2002; Laisaar, Avi, DeHovitz, & Uusküla, 2011; Leinsalu, 2002; Lunden, 2004; Uusküla et. al., 2008), violent crime (Ceccato, 2008), economic decline (Ahas, Koduvere, & Mark, 2001; Cave, 2004), and environmental troubles (Kahru & Põllumaa, 2006; Raukas & Punning, 2009). The aforementioned issues continue to reinforce the state’s othering of the region and the disconnection between Ida-Viru County (notably Narva) and the rest of Estonia. These issues also have a wide array of impacts on the region’s residents, the majority of which are Russian-speakers.

Although northeastern Estonia has a rich history associated with Danes, the Livonian Order (Baltic Germans), Swedes, Russians, Nazis, Soviets, and Estonians (Ida, 2008; Kasekamp, 2010; Kochenovskii, 1991; Maiste, Rodin, & Roosalu, 2005; Plakans, 2011; D. Smith, 2002), only the Soviet and post-Soviet periods are addressed in this chapter because of their relational importance to this overarching analysis and the scope of this research endeavor. As mentioned prior in this chapter, the Soviet Union illegally annexed Estonia and redemarcated the borders between the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) and ESSR with the Narva River (located in close proximity to the City of Narva) as the adjusted border (Thompson, 1998). The annexation of Estonia invalidated the 1920 Treaty of Tartu, Estonian sovereignty, Estonian territorial integrity, and the pre-annexation Soviet-Estonian border agreement. Following annexation, Estonia and Ida-Viru County in particular underwent tremendous shifts associated
with Soviet migration, urbanization, industrialization, and Soviet state formation (Ida, 2008; Kasekamp, 2010; Latenko, 2004; Lunden & Zalamans, 2000; Maiste et. al., 2005; D. Smith, 2002).

Northeastern Estonia’s post-annexation transformation impacts its post-Soviet position within Estonia and the larger region (Andreyeva, Bulatnikov, Vester, Kabadetyseva, Klimina, Sinyakova, Smirnova, Smolokyro, Solodova, & Chudinova, 2000; Berg & Oras, 2000; Joenniemi & Sergunin, 2011; Latenko, 2004; Lunden & Zalamans, 2000; Maiste et. al., 2005). The Soviet occupation’s legacies remain integral for understanding the region and its associated issues. Two vital legacies are the Soviet-derived demographic and boundary shifts, both of which are manifested and exacerbated in Ida-Viru County (and Narva) (Berg & Oras, 2000; Kasekamp, 2010; Thompson, 1998; Trimbach, 2014b; Virkkunen, 2002).

Northeastern Estonia like many urbanizing and industrializing territories on fringes of the former Soviet Union saw a massive population increase following World War II and annexation. The majority of ethnic Estonian (and other) inhabitants of Narva were prohibited from returning to the city following WWII and subsequent Soviet occupation. It is suspected that the Nazis forcefully evacuated the region’s (particularly Narva’s) residents, while remaining inhabitants were deported (primarily to Siberia) by the Soviets (Joenniemi & Sergunin, 2011; Raun, 2001).

Post-annexation urbanization and industrialization managed from Moscow triggered an influx of Russian-speakers to Estonia as a whole, Ida-Viru County, and Narva (Ida, 2008; Lunden, 2004; Raun, 2001; Trimbach, 2014b; Zalamans, 2004). Russian-speakers primarily came from the Russian, Ukrainian, and Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republics. The titular population of Estonia dramatically declined during WWII and immediately following occupation, particularly among laborers. In response the lack of workers (among other rationales), the Soviet state incentivized Russian and/or Russian-speaking labor migration to the
ESSR through a tightly controlled internal migration system (Light, 2012). Russian-speakers were particularly channeled to Ida-Viru County’s manufacturing industries and energy sector in Narva and surrounding industrial towns/cities, such as Sillamäe and Kohtla-Järve (Ida, 2008; Kochenovskii, 1991; Raun, 2001).

The Soviet policies propelling Russian-speakers’ immigration en masse are still considered divisive (Light, 2012). Some scholars suggest Russian/Russian-speaker migration and resettlement was an aspect of intentional Sovietization and Russification; while others consider this phenomenon as purely economic (Lunden, 2004; Raun, 2001). Regardless of interpretation, roughly 500,000 Russian-speakers migrated to the ESSR during occupation, the majority of which settled in Harju County, Tallinn, Ida-Viru County, and Narva (Kasekamp, 2010; Raun, 2001). The region’s aforementioned oil shale and chemical industries were a vital economic mechanism for Narva and Narva's new Russified and Sovietized population. Narva's oil shale industrial sector was integrated into the Soviet command economy and the region’s electricity was channeled to Leningrad (St. Petersburg).

Not only did the Soviet state move people through migration policies and alter the ESSR’s demography (Light, 2012), but the Soviet state also moved the political boundary between the RSFSR and ESSR (Thompson, 1998). Following Estonian independence, the internal Soviet border became an international border between the independent Russian Federation and Republic of Estonia. Like citizenship, the Estonian state sought to restore the pre-Soviet border, which was outlined in the 1920 Treaty of Tartu (Aalto, 2003a; Aalto & Berg, 2002; Berg, 2003; Thompson, 1998). The pre-Soviet 1920 Treaty of Tartu de jure border and the post-Soviet de facto border were incongruent, triggering diplomatic rows and contention (Berg & Oras, 2000; Thompson, 1998). The Estonian-Russian border discrepancy disproportionately burdened the northeastern and southeastern borderland communities (Berg & Oras, 2000).
Although Estonian-Russian relations soured because of the border discrepancy and local residents suffered as a result of border policy shifts, the border dispute was resolved with a new border treaty in 2014 (“Estonia, Russia Sign Border Treaty”, 2014; Trimbach, 2014b).

Following the Soviet occupation, Estonia’s northeastern region emerged as the Estonian state’s internal other (Berg & Oras, 2000; Virkkunen, 2002). Ida-Viru and Narva alike were (and are) often defined as an ethnic Russian enclave within a homogenous Estonian nation-state (Berg & Oras, 2000; Simson, 2013; D. Smith, 2002; Smith & Burch, 2012). Narva's or Narvan's (Narva demonym) spatial identity and identity construction process has also been highly contentious (Fein, 2005; Kaiser & Nikiforova, 2008; Smith & Burch, 2012). Kaiser and Nikiforova (2008) state that, “Narvan-ness, Estonian-ness, Russian-ness, European-ness, Western-ness, and Eastern-ness are made, unmade, rank ordered, and rehierarchized” in Narva and northeastern Estonia by a plurality of multiscalar political (and geopolitical) practices and discourses (p. 545). During the Soviet occupation, the northeastern region was completely remade with only minor remnants or memories of the pre-Soviet past. Russian-speaking Soviet citizens replaced the region’s Estonian population and Soviet towns/cities, monuments, and culture largely replaced the region’s “Estonian-ness” (Kaiser & Nikiforova, 2008, p. 545).

Narva's Soviet-era citizenry and political elite also informed the region’s geopolitical position and path following independence. As independence campaigns swept across the Baltic republics and the Singing Revolution took hold in Estonia, “Narva gained a reputation as a bastion of support for the maintenance of Soviet power” (Burch & Smith, 2007, p. 922). Narva and neighboring Sillamäe (former Soviet closed-town) actively sought regional (local) autonomy immediately following Estonian independence (Effron, 1993; D. Smith, 2002). This autonomy campaign was sparked following Narva's rapid post-Soviet economic decline (with the closure of state-run industries) and Estonia's restorationist citizenship policy enactment (D. Smith, 2002).
This divisive campaign halted Estonian state nationalization and territorialization processes. Thus in 1993, Narva’s municipal government held a local autonomy referendum. The referendum obtained 97% approval for autonomy with a voter turnout of roughly 55% (Burch & Smith, 2012). While the local referendum was successful in its aims, the referendum was ultimately declared unconstitutional and the issue of autonomy was dropped. While regional autonomy is no longer part of the local or regional political agenda or discourse, the region’s instability and desire for autonomy caused additional economic decline and regional othering (Trimbach, 2014b; Trimbach & O’Lear, 2015).

The region’s otherness and incidences of separatism continues to be consistently considered a major threat to the Estonian national narrative, state sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national, European, and NATO security (Berg & Oras, 2000; Burch & Smith, 2012; Joenniemi & Sergunin, 2011; Kaiser & Nikiforova, 2008; Trimbach & O’Lear, 2015). Ida-Viru’s divergent trajectory is problematic since the region depends on regional integration and financial (public and/or private) investment in order to increase (demographic and political) stability and economic growth. The region is a reflection of the complicated multiscalar factors that impact Estonia; however, the region remains peripheral and othered within Estonian state formation and political processes, spaces, and relations.

**Tallinn Metropolitan Area: Harju County & Tallinn.**

While this project primarily focuses on the uniqueness and spatial otherness of Narva and Ida-Viru County within the larger national and geopolitical context of contemporary Estonia, I also examine Russian-speakers residing in Tallinn and surrounding Harju County for comparison (Figure 3, p. 103). This subsection focuses on Tallinn and Harju County is less descriptively robust; however, it is considered crucial to the overall analysis of citizenship capital among Estonia Russian-speakers because it provides spatial context that allows for better comparative
understanding of the major spatial communities or localities that Russian-speakers reside and engage on a daily basis. Compared to Narva, Tallinn is more pronounced throughout Estonian history and national, political, and geopolitical discourse (both past and present). Although Estonia’s northeast is considered Estonia’s othered region, while Tartu is understood as Estonia’s national-cultural core, Tallinn has always been the center of political power and national political elites in Estonia (Raun, 2001; Kasekamp, 2010; Plakans, 2011).

Figure 3. Map of Harju County, Estonia (Terk, 2000b, p. 68).

Estonia’s capital city region is Estonia’s primary economic and political center. This region encompasses Harju County, Estonia’s second largest county (after Pärnu County) and most populous county with approximately 572,103 (Eesti Statistika, 2014). Harju County also includes Tallinn, Estonia’s primate and capital city with a population of 411,063 (Eesti Statistika, 2014). Minority Russian-speakers comprise 36% of Harju County and 42% of Tallinn (172,585) respectively (over 50% of the total Estonian Russian-speaking population) (Eesti Statistika, 2014). The region is approximately 4333 square kilometers (1673 square miles) and is bordered by the Gulf of Finland (Baltic Sea) (north) and the Estonian administrative regions of Lääne County (west), Rapla County (southwest), Järva County (southeast), and Lääne-Viru County.
Harju County is also comprised of a range of peninsulas and islands. Although the county’s and capital city’s population has declined since the collapse of the Soviet Union, it is the most popular destination site for internal Estonian migration, particularly from Estonia’s northeastern region (Leppik, 2013; Tammaru & Sjöberg, 1999).

Tallinn (meaning “Danishburgh” or “Danshtown”) has historically been Estonia’s and Estonia’s state predecessors’ political, economic, and demographic core (Gerner, 2002; Kasekamp, 2010; Raun, 2001; Terk, 2000b). Tallinn, previously known as Reval, was established as a Danish fort town during the thirteenth century and evolved into the most important port town and political center in Estonia (Gerner, 2002; Kasekamp, 2010). Tallinn emerged as the primary regional seat of political, economic, religious, and military power for a wide array of occupying and/or native geopolitical forces and elites (including: Danes, Swedes, Baltic Germans, Russians, Nazis, Soviets, Estonians) (Kasekamp, 2010; Plakans, 2010; Raun, 2001).

Like Narva and Estonia’s northeast, Tallinn’s urbanization, industrialization, demography, and overall development dramatically shifted during and after the Soviet occupation of the twentieth century (Kasekamp, 2010; Raun, 2001; Terk, 2000b). Although Tallinn did not suffer from the massive devastation that the northeast had experienced during the World War II (97% of Narva’s buildings were destroyed), around 50% of Tallinn was severely damaged and required massive reconstruction (Raun, 2001). Tallinn also witnessed massive outmigration and the dramatic loss of the Estonian national political elite during the sequence of Nazi and Soviet occupations during World War II (Kasekamp, 2010; Terk, 2000b).

Following Estonia’s illegal annexation by the Soviet Union, Tallinn was redeveloped as a major urban center within the larger state planned urban system. Major state-owned industries and military facilities were constructed and a network of smaller industrial towns and military settlements were developed around Tallinn’s metropolitan periphery (Terk, 2000b). Unlike
Narva and the northeast, Tallinn’s local economy was less dependent on energy production and state-planned primary sector and maintained a wider variety of industries (Raun, 2001). Although Tallinn was a major economic center in the ESSR, its industries and economic importance were less than other major Soviet cities, including Riga (Terk, 2000b).

Tallinn’s redevelopment as a Soviet city propelled massive migration from other parts of the ESSR and the USSR (Raun, 2001; Kasekamp, 2010; Tammaru & Kontuly, 2011). Tallinn, like all other Estonian cities and industries, suffered from a massive labor shortage as a result of World War II and Stalin-era deportations, evacuations, migrations, and executions (Raun, 2001). According to Raun (2001), the ESSR had the highest rate of urbanization in all of the Soviet Union in 1959 (tied with the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic, LSSR) and this rate was particularly high in Tallinn (p. 206). Although urbanization and industrialization increased all over Soviet Estonia (although growth changed after independence), particularly in Narva and Kohtla-Järve which saw their populations double in two decades, Tallinn’s population grew from approximately 281,700 in 1959 to 458,300 in 1984 (Raun, 2001). Tallinn’s population grew as a result of natural increase, internal Estonian rural-urban migration, but most significantly from immigration from other Soviet republics (non-Estonian population tended to be more urban than Estonians in the ESSR) (Raun, 2001). Raun (2001) also notes that Tallinn’s population increase was undesirably high, exceeding expectations and housing plans. Tallinn’s rapid expansion led to the rapid development of entirely new urban districts, including Lasnamäe, which continues to be predominantly Russian-speaking (Raun, 2001). Estonian cities, Tallinn in particular, were considered highly desirable cities to relocate because they were conceived of as more “western” or “European” compared other Soviet cities and republics (Kulu, 2003; Leetmaa, et. al, 2015).

Tallinn played a major role during the disintegration of the Soviet Union and Estonian Singing Revolution (Kasekamp, 2010; Šmidchens, 2014). Major independence and anti-
independence movements and protests converged in Tallinn during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Although no major outbreaks of violent unrest took place, the spatial concentration of Estonia’s political and national elite in Tallinn (although additional elites and movements existed elsewhere, particularly in Tartu) ensured its connection to post-Soviet state formation and nationalization processes.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Tallinn retained its political and economic position in the restored Republic of Estonia; however, Tallinn continues to undergo tremendous economic, political, demographic, and spatial changes (Leetmaa et. al., 2015; Raun, 2001; Terk, 2000b). Tallinn as the political center and economic core, has propelled Estonia into the European Union and global marketplace. Although Tallinn has a wide range of social problems, including high rates of drug use and HIV/AIDS (Laisaar et. al., 2011), Tallinn has economically fared better than other Estonian cities and regions (Terk, 2000b). Tallinn revamped its local (and regional) economy, received foreign investments, and incorporated innovative economic development strategies, including agglomerating high tech industries and education (Follath, 2007; Leetmaa et. al., 2009; Terk, 2000b). Tallinn has suffered from post-Soviet population decline and unemployment; however, these issues continue to be more pronounced in the northeast and among the Russian-speaking population (Leetmaa et. al., 2015; Terk, 2000b). The capital city region has witnessed dramatic transformations from a Soviet industrial and military region to a vibrant European city with a diversified economy, modern skyscrapers, suburbs, and popular tourist sites (Leetmaa et. al., 2009; Leetmaa et. al., 2015; Terk, 2000b). Tallinn continues to illustrate Estonia’s striking, “return to the west” and Estonia’s “westernness”. Tallinn as a spatial and political community also remains the center of Estonian political power, nationalization processes, and a large Russian-speaking community. While Tallinn repositions
itself within Estonia, Europe, and even NATO, the Russian-speaking community continues to fall behind the rest of the Estonian population.

The predominantly Russian-speaking Tallinn neighborhood of Lasnamäe in particular represents a major place-based and spatial community that reflects the ongoing issues related to Tallinn’s Russian-speaking population. Lasnamäe is Tallinn’s largest district with approximately 118,271 residents (Kaer, 2014) of which 57.8% are ethnic Russians (Dautancourt, 2010). Lasnamäe houses around 41.9% of Tallinn’s total Russian population (Dautancourt, 2010). As aforementioned, Lasnamäe was constructed as a Soviet-era housing estate (peripheral suburb) consisting of large apartment blocks to house Russian-speaking labor migrants (primarily in the 1960s) (Dautancourt, 2010; Kaer, 2014; Raun, 2001; Saar, 2015). Lasnamäe was constructed partly to house workers for Dvigatel (Soviet mental industry) (Saar, 2015). At the time of its construction, Lasnamäe was seen as new and modern with many apartment amenities that most Soviet residents lacked (Saar, 2015). Although Lasnamäe was modern for Soviet standards, the residents were near-exclusively Russian and Russian-speaking, causing many Estonians (many lacking modern housing and amenities) to develop negative perceptions of the neighborhood and its residents (Dautancourt, 2010; Saar, 2015). Unlike other more ethnically-mixed neighborhoods, Lasnamäe become a place-based communal and spatial embodiment of Soviet occupation and Russian-speaking migration (Dautancourt, 2010; Kaer, 2014; Saar, 2010, 2015). According to Saar (2010, 2015), Lasnamäe’s exclusive Russian-ness and association with the Soviet occupation inculcated as sense of Lasnamäe became perceived as a symbol of Soviet oppression and independence. Since independence, Lasnamäe, like Narva, has become an interal ethnicized and politicized other (Saar, 2010, 2015) and perceived as, “depressive and dangerous” (Kaer, 2014). During the early independence era, Lasnamäe became deeply associated with the anti-independence movement and Soviet occupation (Saar, 2010, 2015). This negative
association is illustrated by the song entitled, “Stop Lasnamäe,” which symbolized Soviet occupation and made this community an emblem of Soviet power (Saar, 2015, p. 87). Since independence, Lasnamäe has, “become a synonym for various social, political, and architectural problems” and, “a byword of lawlessness and violent crime” in Tallinn (Kaer, 2014). Kaer (2014) notes that Lasnamäe is considered Tallinn’s “final frontier” and represents one of the last districts to undergo urban redevelopment, economic reinvestment, and social integration. Lasnamäe, like Narva, provides a distinctly othered place-based community and context to examine Estonia’s Russian-speaking population (Saar, 2010, 2015). Although I did not target Lasnamäe per se, I can surmise that Lasnamäe residents participated in this project since such a large share of Tallinn’s Russian-speaking reside in this district.

Although Estonia and Tallinn have remained relatively stable and peaceful, Tallinn was the location of the only major ethno-linguistic tension and outburst to take place since Estonian independence. The outburst also referred to as the “war of monuments” or “monument crisis” occurred following the controversial removal of a Soviet era monument (known as the Bronze Soldier or “Alyosha”) in central Tallinn and its relocation to a cemetery in the outskirts of the city center, Estonian Russian-speakers violently reacted (Duvold & Berglund, 2014; Legal Information Centre for Human Rights, 2007; Lehti, Jutila, & Jokisipilä, 2008; Smith & Burch, 2011). The violent protests became known as the Bronze Nights or Bronze night riots and as a result 1 person was killed, 150 people were injured, 1,000 people were arrested, the Russian Federation engaged in the first cyber war in retaliation, and minority Russian-speaker -Estonian majority relations soured (Duvold & Berglund, 2014; Kaiser, 2015; Smith & Burch, 2011). The events of 2007 continue to be a hotly debated topic in media, policy circles, and scholarship (de Pommereau, 2014; Duvold & Berglund, 2014; Legal Information Centre for Human Rights, 2007; Kaiser, 2015; Smith & Burch 2011), yet Russian-speaking – Estonian community
reconciliation and open equitable discussions of the underlying triggers behind the massive upheaval have not taken place. As the political and economic center of Estonia, Tallinn is emblematic and a manifestation of political power, state formation, community relations, and nation-building processes.

Citizenship Capital in an Estonian Context

In this chapter, I have illustrated through a thorough theoretically-formed contextual description how the ethnocratic and restorationist Estonian state has constructed citizenship since independence and how the Estonian state relates to the Russian-speaking population and the spatial communities of Narva, and Tallinn. The purpose of this chapter is to highlight how the Estonian state formed (and forms) citizenship as capital, which in turn forms the Estonian political field and impacts Estonian Russian-speakers. As elucidated in this chapter, the Estonian state and political elites through the ideological logics of restorationist geopolitics and ethnocracy have formed an exclusive citizenship capital and political field. Citizenship capital, through accumulation and exchange within the Estonian political field, provides to a wide array of political positions, spaces, relations, and power. As an exclusive form of capital, Russian-speakers have largely been denied the ability to accumulate and exchange citizenship, which in turn has led to the fragmentation of Russian-speakers into various citizenship status groups (Estonian citizens, Russian citizens, Stateless residents), who are also spatially concentrated and segregated in predominantly Tallinn (and Harju County) and Narva (and Ida-Viru County). While both spatial communities embody their own regional particularities and localisms, both spatial communities share the distinction of possessing large Soviet-era Russian-speaking populations.

In order to understand how citizenship capital and the political field relates to and/or impacts the Estonian Russian-speaking population, I examine Russian-speakers’ embodied and
enacted citizenship via their own perceptions (includes habitus), practices, valorizations, and identities. I examine Russian-speakers through cluster or group analysis, which takes into account citizenship status (Estonian citizens, Russian citizens, and Statelessness) and residency (Tallinn and Narva). By exploring minority Russian-speakers’ understandings of and engagements with citizenship capital, I elucidate their positions within the broader Estonian political field and the (in)stability of Estonian state dominance within the political field and legitimacy over the construction of citizenship capital. In the following chapter, I outline my methodological approach, which supports my critical analysis and elaborates on how and why I methodologically examine citizenship capital among Estonia’s Russian-speaking population.
Chapter 4: Methodology

How we are positioned in relation to various contexts of power (including gender, class, 'race', sexuality, job status, etc.) affects the way we understand the world. (Clifford, French, & Valentine, 2010, p. 534)

…it is impossible for anyone to abstract themselves from their subjective identity in order to conduct objective research. (Dittmer, 2010, p. 7)

Introduction

My methodological framework is primarily informed by my overarching research questions and complements both the Bourdieusian conceptual framework and my own personal research expertise. Understanding citizenship, as capital embedded within a power-laden political field, requires a critical and reflexive multi-dimensional research approach. Elucidating citizenship as embodied and enacted capital through practices, perceptions, and identity among minority Russian-speakers in Estonia necessitates a methodological framework that bridges theory with empirical practice. In this chapter, I descriptively outline the methodological approach undertaken and include the following interlocked components: positionality and reflexivity; methodological background and rationale; research design; and major research challenges. Each outlined component is considered equally crucial to my overarching methodological framework.

Positionality & Reflexivity

Positionality and reflexivity within a field of inquiry coalesces with literature, concepts, theory, and other methods to contribute to a researcher’s overall intellectual project. Positionality and reflexivity critically challenge positivism as a methodological and empirical mainstay within social science research by highlighting the positioned relationship between scholar and research field. I incorporate positionality and reflexivity in order to advance the relational, narrative, and
interpretive turns in both geographic theory and practice (Adcock, 2006; Cameron, 2012; Case & Haines, 2014). I also aim to foreground positivism not as an asocial or apolitical natural given, but rather as a, “misunderstanding and an oversimplification of methodological principles” that consistently privileges a logic of rationality and researcher objective independence (Case & Haines, 2014, p. 58). By incorporating positionality and reflexivity, I reconstruct research as a reciprocally social and relational scholarly process that binds my subjective self to my field and participant community.

Positionality recognizes how researchers actively participate, experience, and interpret knowledge, phenomena, processes and power (England, 1994; Louis, 2007; Madge, Raghuram, Skelton, Willis, & Williams, 1997; Smith, 2010). I incorporate a rather broad definition of positionality, referring to the recognition of a researcher’s complex situated position within the field and the complex relational strings-attached to that particular position (Crang, 2002; England, 1994). As Crang (2002) suggests, a researcher’s position is more nuanced than traditional positivist notions of insider vs. outsider and researcher vs. researched. A researcher’s position is rather multilayered and involves, “ambiguities, productivities, and difficulties” (Crang, 2002, p. 497).

As Clifford et. al. (2010) and Dittmer (2010) suggest, our positionality or situatedness impacts how we understand and engage the wider community and our own research. As England (1994) notes, positionality and researcher self-reflection produces, “more inclusive, more flexible, yet philosophically informed methodologies sensitive to the power relations inherent in fieldwork” (p. 87). By reflexively and critically bringing to the fore our own positions situated within our field of inquiry and relations, we can attempt to provide legitimacy to our research claims and increase the utilization of such methods by advancing critical geographic and
Bourdieusian calls for a more reflexive post-positivist social science (Braverman, 2014; Swartz, 2013a).

Positionality is complementary to this project’s Bourdieusian conceptual approach and its emphasis on reflexivity within social science research (Bourdieu, 1999; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992; Deer, 2008; Swartz, 2013a; Webb et. al., 2002). The Bourdieusian notion of reflexivity primarily aims to critically address scientific method and critical discourse or philosophy (Deer, 2008, p. 200). I integrate a Bourdieusian conceptualization of reflexivity that refers to the critical acknowledgement and cognizance of researcher habitus and socialization-informed research practices (Deer, 2008; Glisch-Sanchez, 2014; Webb et. al., 2002).

Reflexivity is crucial to understanding how researchers are embedded and involved in the reproduction of the very fields or processes in which are empirically and conceptually explored (Bourdieu, 1999). Reflexivity as social practice, “enables the recognition of a researcher’s a priori epistemologies and ontologies” and allows researchers to recognize our own relational dynamics, power, and socialized positions (Glisch-Sanchez, 2014, p. 127). Webb et. al. (2002) suggest that reflexivity necessitates, “a ‘reflexive’ relation to our own practices” with an emphasis on our own social origins and categories, position within our field of inquiry or research, and our own potential for, “intellectual bias” (p. 50). A Bourdieusian conceptual approach not only requires a reflexive methodological practice that forces the researcher to defend against positivist logic that tends to depoliticize and naturalize power-laden social processes and relations (Bourdieu, 2002; Swartz, 2013a), but also to critically question our own socialized academic and intellectual languages, concepts, approaches, techniques, and tools because they too impact the what, how, and why of our research (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992; Glisch-Sanchez, 2014).
I recognize the importance of my own position within my chosen geographic, political, and conceptual field of inquiry and I aim to outline my own positionality and reflexivity in order to situate my place within this analysis and also to contribute to the utilization of positionality and reflexivity within the broader discipline of geography. The following paragraphs reflexively position myself as researcher within the contextual particularities of this research endeavor. Some aspects of my own positionality and reflexivity also overlap with and are noted as research challenges subsequently in this chapter.

Like many Americans born during the Cold War Era, I maintained a peripheral interest in the former Soviet Union and its associated geopolitical events. My peripheral interest was coupled with my own Eastern European heritage, having lived with my grandfather who had fled the Polish Corridor region during the early twentieth century and himself of Russian heritage. However, it wasn’t until my masters’ program and non-profit experience that I cemented my interest in citizenship and former Soviet Union.

During my masters’ program, I researched the often-overlooked former Soviet Russian-speaking immigrant community of the Pacific Northwest. Building upon the works of other geographers (Hardwick, 1993; Hume & Hardwick, 2005) and political social scientists (Bloemraad, 2006; Putnam, 2000), I conducted a rough qualitative research project on the political and civic incorporation of Russian-speaking minorities within Portland, Oregon’s vibrant civic culture. It was during my masters’ program that I become acquainted with the critical political sociology and conceptual framework of Bourdieu and additional Bourdieusian scholars.

My interest in the Russian-speaking immigrant community and issues of minority political equity and power, led me to work in various capacities with immigrants and refugees including as a refugee resettlement specialist in Austin, Texas and later as a citizenship teacher.
working with Russian-speakers in Chicago, Illinois. It was during my time as a citizenship teacher that I learned about citizenship issues among Russian-speakers in Estonia and Latvia directly from my students. Through their personal citizenship narratives, I decided to research citizenship in its broad conceptual sense and study the Russian language at Tallinn University in Estonia in 2010. Teaching citizenship in the U.S. and exploring citizenship in Estonia propelled me to critically question the social construction of citizens by territorial nation-states and citizenship as an often normative or depoliticized natural given within polities. My experiences ultimately led me to pursue my PhD in geography at the University of Kansas, which I perceive as a direct continuation of my past scholarly work on political and civic incorporation of minorities but with a different conceptual, contextual, and methodological frame.

I entered my PhD program with a solid research agenda focused on citizenship among minority Russian-speakers in Estonia. During my doctoral program, I incorporated a more critical scholarly perspective grounded in critical geopolitics, Bourdieusian scholarship, and critical legal geographies. Although I maintained a research interest in Estonia at a national scale of analysis, it wasn’t until the summer of 2012, that I decided to focus my attention on the City of Narva in comparative juxtaposition to other Estonian regions. As a PhD student studying citizenship geography and the Baltic region, I frequently encountered Narva as a popular city of interest both in interdisciplinary research and in Estonian/Baltic news sources; however, I never considered it a central component of my ongoing research. This changed after I began to ask critical questions about Narva during a Baltic studies conference and subsequently during my Estonian language studies at the University of Tartu. The apparent political divisiveness and regional stigmatization or othering of Narva that I encountered, led me to invest more time and intellectual energy into examining this obscure Estonian place that simultaneous seemed completely out of place.
During the summer of 2012, I ventured to Narva and made contact with scholars from Narva College (a branch campus of the University of Tartu). My aforementioned personal experiences in addition to my upbringing in the U.S. rustbelt reinforced my deep appreciative connection to Narva's bleak post-industrial landscape, political marginality, and residents' complex habituses. During that relatively brief excursion, Narva evolved into a central spatial component of my graduate research and I made arrangements with Narva College to conduct my doctoral fieldwork through their institution.

Roughly a year later from August to November of 2013, I returned and conducted my fieldwork in Narva. I was housed in a Narva College dormitory in the Kuressaare District of Narva, not far from the city center. The Soviet era dormitory housed students, faculty, and even a small church. The dormitory was adjacent to the former and now abandoned Narva College building and a large vacant field, which was once a park. Navigating Narva and Estonian-Russian relations at the local scale as an American researcher, who stuck out in a city with few foreigners was challenging on a daily basis. I recorded my personal and research experiences in a field log in an effort to record and reflect on my position and my evolving relational space. I attempted to remain cognizant of my position and place as researcher, as other, and as community newcomer within my field and my daily interactions.

Personal fieldwork highlights include, but are surely not limited to meeting civically-minded Narvans working to make their community better through nonprofit and public service, participating as an international election observer during Narva’s dynamic local elections, being both written about and interviewed by local news agencies, and being considered one of the only international researchers to spend more than a week in Narva. I could easily write at length about my personal experiences living in Narva, traveling back-and-forth to Tallinn to conduct my fieldwork, and my complex relationship-building process among Narvans both Estonian-
speaking and Russian-speaking communities alike; however, this project’s ultimate aim is to explore citizenship among minority Russian-speakers through their voices and narratives, thus I hope that my attempt to reflexively position myself within my field offers insight and greater understanding of where I am coming from and where I seek to go with this research project. I also hope that my positionality and reflexivity advances and inspires more personal position exploration within critical geographic scholarship.

Methodological Background & Rationale

My ultimate methodological aim is to provide narratives of the Estonian Russian-speaking community’s embodied and enacted citizenship via their perceptions, practices, and identities that are descriptive, interpretive, and empirical. These overarching descriptive narratives are enhanced by a mixed-methodological approach that includes participant-observation, surveys, interviews, descriptive statistics, and available data/literature. Although a dearth of interdisciplinary and critical geographic scholarship has tangentially informed this project’s research design, a select sample of projects and their respective methodological models inspired the ultimate research framework that I utilize for this project. It would obviously be unrealistic and exhaustive to provide a thorough overview of methodological or research approaches related to this project’s conceptual and contextual foci, thus an illustrative sample is provided. I incorporate a mixed-methodological approach in order to construct robust glimpsed citizenship narratives among Russian-speaking Estonians. Mixed-method approaches can triangulate and extrapolate more descriptive and empirically rich narratives. Mixed-method approaches have been utilized to approach citizenship from a wide range of conceptual angles and within a variety of contexts (Bloemraad, 2002, 2006; Preece & Mosweunyane, 2004; Staeheli & Clarke, 2003; Torres & Wicks-Asbun, 2014). This section outlines key examples of how mixed-method approaches, particularly those that address citizenship have been broadly
used and highlights why I utilized such an integrative approach for this research project. This section also provides additional elaboration on citizenship narratives.

The mixed-methodological approaches of Laitin (1998), Bloemraad (2002, 2006), and Preece and Mosweunyane (2004) in particular have illustrated that a mix of surveys, interviews, and available data/literature concerning citizenship (and in Laitin’s (1998) case additional variables including ethno-linguistic identity) can elucidate how and why communities construct and interpret their own respective citizenship statuses, perceptions, practices, and identities. Laitin’s (1998) seminal political ethnographic work on the Russian-speaking community in the greater Near Abroad (Kazakhstan, Estonia, Latvia, and Ukraine) illustrates how a mix of methods (surveys, available data/literature, descriptive statistics, ethnographic fieldwork) can critically highlight how minority populations navigate and form complex identities within a tumultuous and ever-changing geopolitical region. Laitin’s (1998) multimethod approach constructs a nuanced portrait of the transnational Russian-speaking community in flux and the particularities of their identity formation processes that might otherwise have been hidden if singular or quantitative-heavy approaches had been utilized.

Bloemraad’s (2006) seminal comparative work on citizenship in the United States and Canada conveys how an array of methods or tools (surveys, interviews) can provide an empirically rich analysis of citizenship and naturalization among targeted minority populations in both countries. Preece and Mosweunyane’s (2004) rich multimethod analysis on citizenship among Botswana youth provides complex narratives of citizenship perceptions, practices, and identities among an often overlooked target population and region. Both works illustrate the methodological strength of multimethod approaches in untangling the complexity of citizenship in practical research. Both works also highlight how citizenship can elucidate the broader political, social, regional, spatial, and relational contexts in which citizenship as a construct is
embedded. Current trends in multimethod approaches to citizenship convey the increased usage of narratives and stories to bind normative quantitative methods with rich qualitative data (Fein & Straughn, 2014; Torres & Wicks-Asbun, 2014).

Narratives or stories are a novel form of inquiry and interpretation used to understand the relationality and complexity of political power, particularly among diverse populations (Cameron, 2012; Naughton, 2014; Preece & Mosweunyane, 2004). Although there is no definitive or singular approach (Naughton, 2014), narratives are a popular form of methodological inquiry and interpretation in both theory-heavy and practice-oriented research (Dodge, Ospina, & Foldy, 2005). The rise in narrative usage also reflects the ongoing narrative and relational turns within human geography and other social sciences (Cameron, 2012; Dodge et. al., 2005; Riessman, 2002). According to Cameron (2012), narratives or stories can be used to address, “the relationship between personal experience and expression, and the broader contexts within which such experiences are ordered, performed, interpreted, and disciplined” (p. 573). Narratives provide opportunities for new, alternative, and neglected voices or interpretations within research or broader fields (Dodge et. al., 2005; Reissman, 2002). Narratives can advance a more localized, personal, and everyday understanding of complex political phenomena, relationships, and processes (Cameron, 2012; Reissman, 2002). Such understandings can also be used to advocate or emphasize change within the very political spaces, relationships, and processes researchers seek to investigate (Cameron, 2012).

Narratives have become a useful and innovative inquiry and interpretative methodological approach (Bevir, 2006; Miller & Jaja, 2005; Ospina & Dodge, 2005) to understand citizenship, particularly communities’ citizenship perceptions, practices, and identities (Fein & Straughn, 2014; Nagel & Staeheli, 2005; Nordberg, 2006; Preece & Mosweunyane, 2004; Torres & Wicks-Asbun, 2014; Tubb, 2013). Narratives have explored how
minority communities experience citizenship and form nuanced citizenship understandings and identities (Fein & Straughn, 2014; Nagel & Staeheli, 2005; Torres & Wicks-Asbun, 2014). Narratives have also explored how state practices emphasizing citizenship can impact local communities and potentially reduce rates of everyday violence in Colombia (Tubb, 2013). Preece and Mosweunyane (2004) illustrate how narratives can provide a much-needed window into understanding how Botswana youth perceive and practice citizenship within a national context that is often exemplified by poverty, inequality, HIV/AIDS, corruption, and the pressures of economic globalization. Fein and Straughn (2014) in particular have used narratives to critically investigate, “citizenship choice” among minority Russian-speakers in Tallinn, Estonia and why they decide to naturalize or remain stateless (p. 690). Based on the noted literature, citizenship narratives are understood as a strong methodological form of inquiry and interpretation that can incorporate the everyday voices and experiences of the Estonian Russian-speaking community. I incorporate narratives and I construct them through rich descriptive interview and survey data. The narratives formed are interpreted as citizenship (as capital) narratives and are constructed through the grounded everyday perceptions, practices, and identities highlighted in the stories and responses of Estonian Russian-speakers. Interview and survey data are analyzed based on citizenship status groups (formal citizenship), citizenship practices, perceptions, and identities (substantive citizenship), and residency groups (location). I outline my narrative construction process in greater detail in the following section.

The aforementioned works and their methodologies have been supported by recent endeavors aimed at forming citizenship narratives from mixed-method approaches (Fein & Straughn, 2014; Torres & Wicks-Asbun, 2014). Torres and Wicks-Asbun (2014) have illustrated how citizenship narratives of immigrant minors in the United States can be strengthened by empirical methods such as surveys and available data. Fein and Straughn (2014) incorporate
qualitative narratives, ethnographic fieldwork, and available data/literature to examine citizenship among Russian-speakers in Tallinn, Estonia. Methodological approaches that seek to bind descriptive qualitative analysis with rich empirical data have deeply informed my project’s research design in order to increase the methodological strength and overall generalizability of the results. This project’s research design is outlined in the following section.

Research Design

This research project incorporates a mixed-methodological approach that is participant community-centered, in that it is designed to explore and form glimpsed narratives of the Estonian Russian-speaking community’s citizenship perceptions, practices, and identities. The Russian-speaking community’s engagement with formal and substantive citizenship all provide a rich tapestry of voices that help construct how citizenship as capital and the political field in which it is embedded are continuously maintained, reproduced, and/or transformed. Given the complexity of the labyrinthine power-laden socio-spatial relations and processes that impact the Russian-speaking community’s position and citizenship as capital within the Estonian political field, I utilized a multi-method approach that included both qualitative and quantitative techniques, which are outlined in this section.

Since I am more interested in building local substantive citizenship narratives, qualitative methods are considered primary. I use qualitative methods in order to triangulate around the how and why of Estonian Russian-speaking communities’ citizenship practices, perceptions, and identities. The methods were also utilized and informed by my overarching research agenda and questions. Qualitative methods blend participant-observation, surveys (open-ended question in particular), and semi-standard interviews, which were put into practice during my fieldwork.

Fieldwork took place between August and November 2013 in Narva and Tallinn, Estonia. This time period was chosen because of academic year time constraints of Narva College, which
this project was partially conducted through, and accessibility of Narva College community research participants (staff, faculty, and students). Although this project primarily took place in Narva, fieldwork was also conducted in Tallinn in order to produce a multisite comparison that would increase generalizability among my target population. Narva and Tallinn and their respective surrounding regions (counties) were chosen because of the high concentration of Estonian Russian-speakers in their respective local communities (as discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3).

Some preliminary literature (particularly concerning Narva geopolitical history, demography, Estonian citizenship policy development, and Narvan Russian-speaking identity) was collected to assist with previous research and this research project. The methods utilized to form citizenship narratives are widely acceptable and utilized in geographic research focused on Eastern European borderlands (Kabachnik, Regulska, & Mitchnek, 2010; Mitchneck, Mayorova, & Regulska, 2009); Estonia (Fein & Straughn, 2014; Kaiser & Nikiforova, 2008); and citizenship (Preece & Mosweunyane, 2004; Torres & Wicks-Asbun, 2014). The various methods are discussed in the following subsections and are subdivided in order to provide additional clarity and substance for each research design aspect.

**Narrative.**

The overarching methodological objective of this project is to provide descriptive and interpretive narratives as constructed by minority Estonian Russian-speakers’ citizenship perceptions, practices, and identities. The citizenship narratives are both temporally and contextually contingent and are thus understood as a scholarly glimpse of a much larger and ongoing process. Narratives emphasize the importance of context and the recovering of, “beliefs or meanings that make actions and practices possible” (Bevir, 2006, p. 283). Although the Estonian Russian-speaking community is divided into clustered groups (by citizenship status and
place of residency) for internal and external comparative analysis, this target community is not considered monolithic or homogenous. As a community of plurality and hybridity, multiple overlapping narratives are constructed rather than a singular collective narrative. As such, this project does not consider generalizability or transferability as paramount; however, it is addressed in subsequent sections of this chapter in relation to broad generalizability and comparability with other Russian-speaking communities. The use of narrative for this project reflects the noted “narrative” and “relational” turns within geography and interdisciplinary social science, particularly narratives that attempt to foreground participant perceptions, practices, and daily lives with particular concepts or issues and embedded within particular contexts (Dodge et. al., 2005; Cameron, 2012). The citizenship narratives are primarily constructed from recorded, translated, and transcribed interview and open-ended survey data. The interview and survey processes are outlined later in this chapter.

**Preliminary Research.**

Overall project feasibility was assessed and preliminary contact made with Narva College personnel during the summer of 2012 via electronic communication and subsequent face-to-face contact in Narva. An agreement was established between Narva College personnel and myself over the purpose and procedures of this project. Narva College Director Katri Raik officially approved this proposed research project, methods, and access to Narva College staff members, faculty, students, and facilities. Narva College staff also agreed to help provide easy access to potential participants, although this project’s overall targeted sample population expanded well beyond the Narva College community. Additional preliminary arrangements were made with additional Estonia-based contacts including individuals associated with Tallinn University, University of Tartu, and the Legal Information Centre for Human Rights (Tallinn-based non-
governmental organization). Preliminary research and arrangements produced a relatively smooth and highly productive fieldwork experience.

**Target Population, Sampling, & Generalizability.**

Population sampling and generalizability are key issues of ongoing contention within qualitative research (Schofield, 2002). Since the 1980s, interdisciplinary social science has experienced a boom in qualitative methods adaptation, which has been further advanced by the more recent “relational” and “narrative” turns (Cameron, 2012; Dodge et al., 2005; Schofield, 2002). Some qualitative researchers rightly question and critique the applicability of traditional methodological constructs and constraints such as population sampling and generalizability to contemporary qualitative methods or tools (Schofield, 2002). Although I acknowledge and recognize the importance of these ongoing critiques, I do incorporate normative population sampling and generalizability techniques in order to form an empirically sound narrative analysis that is both theoretically informed and participant-community-centered. The incorporation of normative population sampling and generalizability techniques do not hinder the Bourdieusian post-positivist emphasis because this project acknowledges the political, social, and relational aspects of methodological practice (Webb et al., 2002). This project also concedes the inseparability of the empirical and theoretical within social science research and that this relationship challenges traditional positivist research approaches (Webb et al., 2002). Webb et al. (2002) note that by incorporating theory, empirical data, and contextualization through qualitative methods, researchers can overcome positivist constraints while simultaneously maintaining empirical support.

I focus broadly on the Estonian Russian-speaking population, which currently comprises approximately 28% of the total Estonian population or 374,179 people (Eesti Statistika, 2011). Estonian Russian-speakers are a multiethnic and multinational linguistic community, primarily
consisting of ethnic Russian, Ukrainian, Belarusian, and other Soviet era migrants and their
descendants (Laitin, 1998). Estonian Russian-speaker is an encompassing term that highlights
the increase in Russian-speaking population as a specific identifying moniker for former Soviet
citizens residing outside of the Russian Federation (Laitin, 1998). This project targets Russian-
speakers in two particular regional contexts, which include Narva (and surrounding Ida-Viru
County) and Tallinn (and surrounding Harju County). Both communities were chosen because of
their large concentrated, yet spatially segregated (regional and local) Russian-speaking
communities (as described in greater detail in Chapter 3). In order to extract and construct
descriptive narratives from the Estonian Russian-speaking community, this project targets
primary and secondary participants within the larger target population.

I contacted and included participants through snowball sampling method (SSM) using
community gatekeepers in Narva, Tallinn, and elsewhere in Estonia. Snowball sampling differs
markedly from other sampling techniques in that it relies on direct participant and community
interaction and participant chain referrals (Cohen & Arieli, 2011; Singleton & Straits, 2005).
SSM has successfully been utilized as a sampling technique within human geography (Eldarov,
Holland, & Kamilov, 2015; Kar, Crowsey, & Zale, 2013) and interdisciplinary social science
research (Cohen & Arieli, 2011; Larkey & Hecht, 1995). SSM like all sampling methods is
subject to critique, particularly when it comes to population sample bias linked to undersampling
of particular groups within a target population and sample characteristic overrepresentation (like
education and economic status) (Kar et al., 2013). SSM is an exploratory sampling technique
(Kar et al., 2013) that was considered appropriate for my research project’s overarching
questions and needs. I chose SSM specifically because it is an exemplary method for targeting
marginalized or vulnerable populations and minority communities and researching contentious or
conflict-oriented topics (Cohen & Arieli, 2011; Larkey & Hecht, 1995). SSM is
methodologically used to integrate a researcher into an unfamiliar population, build trust between a researcher and population, and gauging public perceptions among targeted groups (Eldarov et. al., 2015; Kar et. al., 2013). SSM is also successful at enlarging sample sizes within populations that might be difficult to engage (Larkey & Hecht, 1995; Singleton & Straits, 2005). SSM’s emphasis on the aforementioned qualities integrates well with the project’s focus on the Estonian Russian-speaking minority population and the contentious topic of Estonian citizenship. SSM also coalesces well with my emphasis on community-oriented research and researcher positionality and reflexivity. SSM was used to solicit participation and gain footholds in both primary and secondary research participant groups.

Primary research participants consist of Russian-speaking college students from Narva, Ida-Viru County, Tallinn, and Harjumaa County that currently attend Narva College and/or Tallinn University. These students are considered primary because of researcher-participant accessibility, post-Soviet socialization (Nikolayenko, 2011), the high likelihood of post-graduation outmigration (from Narva and/or Tallinn) (Nikolajev & Rikken, 2015), and the specific college policy that all students must enroll in citizenship courses prior to graduation. Primary research participants are included in both the survey and interview process. Primary research participants were primarily contacted and incorporated into the project through SSM.

Secondary research participants include local political office holders, members of a local community advocacy groups and political parties, college staff members and faculty, immigration advocates, and members of the broader Russian-speaking community. I directly contacted the secondary research participants primarily through SSM techniques. Since my project incorporated electronic accessibility through a web-based survey, respondents from outside of the intended sites were also acquired. Those respondents (N=421) were incorporated into the Tallinn/Harju County sample (or Non-Narva/Harju County sample) because of their
limited numbers and for better Narva/Ida-Viru County - non-Narva/Harju County (Tallinn/Harju County) comparison. This inclusion is largely based on the premise that Russian-speakers from the Estonian northeast have a heightened local and regional identity compared to other Russian-speakers (Fein, 2005; Feldman, 2000; Kaiser & Nikiforova, 2008; D. Smith, 2002; Trimbach, 2016). I also contacted immigration advocates (N=2) at MISA and the Legal Information Centre for Human Rights (non-governmental organization), headquartered in Tallinn, Estonia. Secondary research participants were also surveyed and interviewed using the same procedures as with the primary research participants.

Generalizability was an initial concern during the developmental stages of this research project. I addressed generalizability by broadening my sample size (Cameron, 2012). I initially intended on focusing on the Narva College community consisting of students, but enlarged the sample to include the larger Russian-speaking community through participant-observation, SSM, and the assistance Narva and Tallinn community contacts. Surveys and face-to-face interviews were conducted with this wider sample of Russian-speakers. Since research participants tended to be chosen because of their experience with the topic of inquiry (Cameron, 2012; Singleton & Straits, 2005) (in this case citizenship and politics), I focused on the Russian-speaking population rather than the Estonian-speaking population.

I also addressed generalizability by utilizing a multisite approach (Schofield, 2002). A multisite approach was incorporated into this project in order to increase the sample size and highlight spatial (regional) variation and comparison of citizenship practices, perceptions, and identities among different Russian-speaking communities within Estonia. The same methods were utilized and concentrated on the Tallinn University community and wider Tallinn Russian-speaking community (with whom I have established contacts).
Generalizability was also enhanced by the incorporation of secondary comparative descriptive data produced by the New Baltic Barometer (NBB) focused on Russian-speakers in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania (but also provides data on other European national populations). A small sample of the survey and interview questions (particularly on questions associated with citizenship, political processes, political inclusivity, and democracy) were created with the questions of the New Baltic Barometer, in order to make broader multiscalar and multitemporal comparisons among Russian-speakers in Estonia.

**Participant-Observation.**

Participant-observation was primarily conducted at and through Narva College (classrooms, library, cafe, campus-college events, electoral events), within the larger Narva community, and secondarily in the City of Tallinn. Participant-observation is a method of choice for researchers incorporating Bourdieusian approaches and was highly advocated by Bourdieu as a mechanism that forces the researcher to become cognizant of their position, power, bias, and reflexivity (Deer, 2008). Particular locales and situations were chosen in order to engage in participant-observation, including, but not limited to: local political entities/events, local community advocacy group gatherings, and community gatherings. It should also be noted that I also primarily lived and interacted daily with my participating target community in Narva. Narva College personnel helped provide easy access to potential participants (within and outside the Narva College environment), although Narva College personnel were not the only gatekeepers or primary snowball sampling mechanisms participating in this project.

Participant-observation entailed, using my senses, experiencing, and recording my observations (and interactions) primarily with the larger Narva community and their everyday lives (Robinson, 1998). As a researcher-participant (Robinson, 1998), I was able to access potential participants by assuming an active role in my research setting. While engaging as a
participant-observer, I simultaneously maintained an awareness that my experience privileges the localized interactions over other non-localized experiences, relations, assemblages, and processes (Kearns, 2005). Participant-observation provided me with an immersion experience that allowed more experiential information and data collection, that otherwise would be absent (Kearns, 2005). Participant-observation also provided me with the opportunity to increase my sample size beyond the Narva College community and provided the opportunity to use SSM. Participant-observation also permitted opportunities to survey and interview potential participants through face-to-face interaction and conversation both within the Narva College community and wider Narva community, including but not limited to the Narva Municipal Library, two Narva-based (and Russian-speaking) non-profit organizations, Narva community events, Narva municipal and election events.

**Surveys & Interviews.**

The ultimate goal of this methodological amalgamation is to provide citizenship narratives that foreground how Estonian Russian-speakers enact and embody citizenship as capital within the Estonian political field. Mixed open-ended and closed-ended surveys and interviews were implemented in order to facilitate narrative accumulation, formation, and construction. The survey and interview process consisted of a methodological protocol that was initiated by participant-observation, SSM, and consisted of 2 key overlapping stages. The overarching critical research questions and additional methodological tools inspired these protocol stages.

The survey/interview protocol consisted of 2 key stages. The first stage consisted of participant-observation in accessible research-related locales (classes, college events, college café, other college-related spaces/areas) (after obtaining instructor permission to observe) and at community-wide events (as aforementioned). After multiple participant-observation sessions
Closed-ended and open-ended research questions were developed and informed by the relevant literature related to citizenship (as a form of capital), spatial identities, and the particularities of the (local, national, regional) context. In order to develop my research pertinent questions, I used relevant literature to operationalize my concepts (and foci) from conceptual, flexible, and abstract to concrete, observable, and empirical (Singleton & Straits, 2005, p. 7). By grounding my concepts in both theoretical and practical scholarship, I was able to construct thorough operationalizable questions that targeted citizenship (as a form of capital), spatial identities, and context. Some questions were borrowed and altered from the New Baltic Barometer for comparison. The questions also emphasize the social ontology (Benjaminsen, 2003; Bourdieu, 1985) of this research project, which focuses on elucidating relationships (and homologies) among groups (Russian-speaking cluster groups and relationships between Russian-speaking population and Estonian-speaking political elite) and the broader (political, civic, and spatial) contexts (and power-laden relational positions) in which they are entwined. Additionally, since I incorporate a mixed-methods approach that focuses on narratives but integrates closed-ended survey questions, I also integrate descriptive statistics, which are highlighted in the analysis subsection of this chapter.

Closed-ended questions solicited demographic and geographic background information, including but not limited to: age, sex, place of birth, place of residence, education, occupation, marital status, language, nationality and citizenship status. Additional closed-ended questions solicited responses related to the project’s overarching research questions, including: political interest, citizenship value, citizenship criteria, civic participation, political participation, political
accessibility, political representationality, and spatial identity. Open-ended questions solicited responses that highlighted the overarching research questions in order to build citizenship narratives. Open-ended questions purposefully solicited responses related to political concerns and spatial identities. In order to maintain confidentiality, participant names were not solicited during either stage of the survey/interview protocol; however, research participant characteristics (as already noted) are used to describe the participants in the analysis section (and Appendix C) of this monograph and to construct respondent groups (by citizenship status and residency) for comparison.

Survey questions were initially composed in the English language and later translated into the Russian-language. In order to secure relatively seamless research question and response translation and multilingual comprehension, I enlisted the generous support of Russian Lecturer, scholar, and native Russian-speaker Dr. Irina Six of the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures at the University of Kansas. Dr. Irina Six provided incomparable Russian-language comprehension and grammatical edits prior to survey/interview question utilization during my fieldwork.

Final survey and interview drafts were compiled in both Russian and Russian-English language formats (Appendix A, B). Survey language choice was largely determined by context and research participants’ language proficiency and preference. Although this particular project focuses on Estonian Russian-speakers, Russian-English language surveys were used in particular surveying contexts because of the high prevalence of English among Estonian Russian-speakers, particularly in Ida-Viru County where English is the most commonly spoken language after Russian (Estonian is considered the third most common language in Ida-Viru County) (“Linguist: Estonian is only the 3rd-most spoken language in Ida-Viru County”, 2014)
The survey peripherally contained a cognitive mapping (Kitchen & Blades, 2002; Medzini, 2012; Troffa, Mura, Fornara, & Caddeo, 2009) section aimed at soliciting the participants' imagined “homeland” or “home” through a prompt (such as, “what would you consider your homeland?”) that allowed participants to either draw their mental map or choose from a series of multiscalar maps (political-territorial scales ranged from the European Union to Estonian Counties, if deemed necessary by the research participant’s conceived homeland or home construction). This mapping exercise prompted participants to mentally connect identity and place. Although this particular research project does not incorporate all data accumulated through this cognitive mapping aspect, it does integrate some responses in order to illustrate the research participants’ spatial identities in relation to citizenship and/or nationality (for a more thorough analysis of the cognitive mapping component of my project, please see Trimbach, 2016).

Finalized surveys were implemented in both face-to-face and web-based formats or contexts. Face-to-face hardcopy surveys were distributed at Narva College (public areas and classrooms), Narva non-governmental organizations, Narva municipal government offices, and Narva Central Library (after permission was provided). Other surveys were distributed through online communication and SSM. Web-based surveys were initially integrated into the project in order to increase the sample generalizability, and for comparative analysis of Russian-speakers in a multisite research model (Bayart & Bonnel, 2012).

Electronic (also known as web-based and online) surveys are relatively new and have emerged as a dynamic and innovative method or technique to sample a target population (O’Lear, 1996; Umbach, 2004). Web-based surveys tend to be cost effective and increase sample size, participant accessibility, and overall response rates (Bayart & Bonnel, 2012; Singleton & Straights, 2005). Electronic surveying or questionnaires have gone through a gauntlet of critiques
and challenges since their initial reception (Couper, 2000). During their initial emergence as an innovative social science tool, Couper (2000) notes that electronic surveys were problematic because they varied in quality and error (coverage, sampling, nonresponse, and measurement), yet beneficial because they offer cost effective, accessible, and a “democratized” survey process.

Many critiques and major challenges associated with electronic surveys have subsided or been undermined by their extensive interdisciplinary utilization and proliferation (Bayart & Bonnel, 2012; Goldenbeld & Craen, 2013; Porter, Whitcomb, & Weitzer, 2004; Umbach, 2004). As Goldenbeld and Craen (2013) suggests, electronic surveys and their associated results no longer differ significantly from face-to-face surveys and their associated results. Goldenbeld and Craen (2013) compared responses and population samples between identical face-to-face and web-based surveys and found no major significant differences among populations that have high rates of web/internet penetration (Netherlands), except that respondents tended to be less socially desirable (positive) in their responses. This runs counter to previous research on web-based responses (Bayart & Bonnel, 2012) and provides impetus for more web-based research among populations with high levels of web/internet penetration.

Web-based surveys were integrated into this project for greater generalizability, wider methodological reach, cost effectiveness, time constraints, and the exceptionally high rate of internet and smartphone access among Estonian residents (both Russian-speaking and Estonian-speaking) (Siim & Ahas, 2014). According to the World Bank (2013), Estonia’s internet penetration rate was approximately 80% (and continues to increase), slightly less than the United States’ 84% and markedly higher than Estonia’s former Soviet neighbors of Latvia (75.2%), Lithuania (68.5%), and Russia (61.4%). Internet access and usage is so pervasive and state-supported, that Estonia is touted as one of the most wired countries in the world (Charles, 2009).

Since independence, the Estonian government has purposefully fostered the development of an
innovative “e-conomy,” “e-government,” (or e-state), “e-democracy,” and most recently “e-residency,” (or e-citizenship) which has drawn investors, researchers, and entrepreneurs from all over the world to the country (Charles, 2009; Friedman, 2014). Estonia is one of the only countries in the world to allow e-voting and online census participation (Charles, 2009). Estonia is considered a prime location for the use of web-based methods, including surveys, interviews (via Estonian-created Skype), and mobile data (Murakas, Soidla, Kasearu, Toots, Rämmer, Lepik, Reinomägi, Telpt, & Suvi, 2007; Silm & Ahas, 2014). Although I recognize the high rates of internet penetration, access, and usage in Estonia, I also acknowledge that there may be slight discrepancies between web-based and non-online survey responses or sampling techniques (although none were initially detected during the analysis).

Web-based surveys were created, disseminated, and later analyzed using the Qualtrics electronic survey software system. Qualtrics is an electronic survey software system that is available through the University of Kansas and has been utilized in an array of interdisciplinary social science projects (Sams, Rozier, Wilder, & Quinonez, 2013; Weller & Monroe-Gulick, 2014). Qualtrics was used compared to other electronic survey software because of its prior usage in social science research, availability, user-friendly design (for researcher and survey participant), mobile phone compatibility, multi-lingual capability, and data analysis features. Web-based surveys were disseminated via SSM among known community members and I later discovered that the web-based survey was electronically posted and shared among the online Estonian Russian-speaking community on a wide range of community, news, portals, and academic websites.

All finalized surveys, both electronic and non-electronic were later cleaned, coded, and merged into the Qualtrics survey software for a cohesive analysis. I acknowledge that some respondents may have experienced survey fatigue (Porter et. al., 2004) during the surveying
process. Survey fatigue may have contributed to some non-responses or partially completed surveys. Survey data provides descriptive statistical data used to support the citizenship narratives. Descriptive statistics’ data stem from response rates and percentages related to demographic, geographic, and content-specific questions.

In order to form cohesive and descriptive citizenship narratives, semi-standardized interviews were conducted with 22 interviewees from both Narva and Tallinn. The outlined survey process propelled snowball sampling for the interview process. Primary and secondary research participants interested in taking part in interviews contacted me directly (appropriate contact information was provided to all survey participants as part of the consent process prior to the survey process) or were recommended by other interviewees. Although there is not uniform understanding of saturation within direct sampling (Guest, Bunce, & Johnson, 2006), after conducting 22 interviews, I recognized interview saturation among my population and their response patterns.

Interviews were primarily conducted in public spaces or places of employment, although three interviews were conducted over Skype because of travel and/or time constraints of the interviewees. Skype, having been invented in Estonia and the high internet penetration in the country facilitated smooth interviews with those that required non face-to-face interviews. After obtaining a mutually agreed upon time and location with the participants, extensive 41-157 minute long semi-standardized interviews were conducted. Interviews took place in either the Russian or English language, depending largely on the research participant and their language preference. The semi-standardized interviews consisted of a series of closed-ended and open-ended questions aimed at expanding upon the issues addressed with participants during the survey process.
Acquired interview data is utilized to provide grounded glimpsed citizenship narratives. Interviews were audio recorded using a recording device and notes were either hand-written or typed (depending on the circumstance and location of the interview). Recorded interviews were subsequently translated and fully transcribed. Interviews requiring additional translation support were translated or reviewed by a professional translator (Debbie Brigmond) for additional clarity. In order to maintain confidentiality, participant names were not solicited; however, descriptive demographic information is provided in order to provide interviewee context, including sex, age group, occupation, and place of residence.

Consent was obtained from all survey and interview participants prior to their participation and all participants were informed of their ability to withdraw from the research process at any time. Consent was provided either orally or by completion of the survey following a consent statement. All data was securely saved and stored on an external hard-drive and later deidentified and integrated into either the Qualtrics or Dedoose software systems.

**Secondary Available Data.**

All accumulated secondary available literature/data and descriptive statistics enhances the overarching citizenship narratives that this project constructs. Available literature/data are analyzed in order to elaborate on the overall demographic, historical, economic, political, and geopolitical context of the local scale. For example, data extracted from the New Baltic Barometer is also included to provide multiscalar comparisons with the data accumulated from the surveys and interviews. Such comparisons highlight population variation, multiscalar political and citizenship perceptions and practices, and spatial differentiation.

Secondary data and information were extracted from a wide range of resources, available literature, and archival data to elaborate on my target population (Russian-speakers in Narva, Tallinn, Estonia, and other former Soviet Republics), regional context (local, regional, national,
etc.), and conceptual foci (citizenship). These data include academic, governmental, and non-governmental resources (in addition to any other types of marginal background information gathered during the survey/interview processes). Academic literature and data were drawn from the following complementary fields: political geography, citizenship geography, Baltic studies, border studies, political science, citizenship studies, and sociology. Academic literature and data were available through the University of Kansas and Narva College academic library systems (Narva College authorized the utilization of their library resources prior to my fieldwork). Additional location-specific literature and data were also acquired through The National Library of Estonia (located in Tallinn), Narva Central Library, Narva City Archives, and Narva Museum during my fieldwork.

Another academic resource includes the New Baltic Barometer (NBB). The NBB is a longitudinal survey series produced as part of a much larger study known as Baltic Voices by the Centre for the Study of Public Policy at the University of Strathclyde (Glasgow, Scotland) (Rose, Maley, Lithuanian Market & Opinion Research Center, Latvian Social Research Centre, & EMOR, 1994; Rose, Lithuanian Market & Opinion Research Centre, Baltic Data House, & EMOR, 1995; Rose, Lithuanian Market & Opinion Research Centre, Baltic Data House, & Saar Poll, 1997; Rose, 2000, 2002, 2005). The New Baltic Barometer is a longitudinal study that solely focuses on the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania). The New Baltic Barometer is of particular interest because it contains data and previous research on Estonian (and Latvia) Russian-speakers’ political perceptions and opinions (starting in the early 1990s). This particular study is utilized to make multiscalar and multitemporal comparisons. Although this study focuses on Russian-speakers primarily in Narva and Tallinn, the New Baltic Barometer data and information are incorporated in order to add an additional comparative layer to this project and promote greater generalizability among my targeted community of interest.
Non-governmental resources primarily include the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX), Integratsiooni ja Migratsiooni Sihtasutus Meie Inimesed [Integration and Migration Foundation Our People], EUDO Observatory on Citizenship (based at the European University Institute in Florence, Italy), Eesti Mittetulundusühingute ja Sihtasutuste Liit (EMSL) [Network of Estonian Nonprofit Organizations, (NENO)], and the Legal Information Centre for Human Rights (LICHR). Although these five non-governmental organizations differ in focus and scope, all produce substantial up-to-date research on Estonian (and European) citizenship, naturalization, and Estonian legal processes. MIPEX is an international organization that examines and produces data on global citizenship (national variations in policies and policy impacts) and migrant populations. The Integration and Migration Foundation Our People and the Legal Information Centre for Human Rights are two well-known Estonian non-governmental organizations that research (and advocate for) Estonian Russian-speakers’ citizenship and integration, although the former is funded by the Estonian government while the latter is often in direct opposition with Estonian state initiatives. Interviews (2/22 interviewees) were also conducted with representatives from both opposing aforementioned non-governmental organizations about their respective missions and work within the Estonian Russian-speaking community. NENO is another Estonian non-governmental organization that aims to foster civic involvement among Estonian residents and provides a professional network that allows civil society organizations (CSOs) to collaborate and promote their CSO activities.

Governmental resources include: Riigikogu [Estonian Parliament] (specifically legal documents archived at: Riigi Teataja [State Journal]), Eesti Statistika [Statistics Estonia], Siseministeerium [Ministry of the Interior], Politsei-ja Piirivalveamet [Estonian Police and Border Guard Border], Vabariiri Valimiskomisjon [National Electoral Committee], Narva Museum. All aforementioned public agencies contain statistical census (demographic, economic,
housing, etc.), naturalization, citizenship status, political, legal, and/or integration data. All sites also provide data that are easily accessible online, available in the English-language (and in Estonian and Russian), and require no fees. The aforementioned governmental resources provide basic statistics and are incorporated to provide descriptive statistics highlighting the quantitative specificities of Russian-speakers in Narva, Tallinn, and Estonia. Narva Museum contains a plethora of historical literature, records, maps, images, and data (only available in the Museum and the Museum’s archives). Most available data is accessible online as noted; however, some literature and data were collected during my fieldwork.

**Analysis.**

The heterogeneous and complementary methods allowed the extraction of a wide array of data resulting in rich descriptive yet empirically supported narratives. All collected survey and interview data have been cleaned, coded, and analyzed via the assistance of two methodological software programs. Survey data was cleaned, coded, and analyzed with the assistance of Qualtrics, while translated and transcribed interview data was cleaned, coded, and analyzed with the assistance of Dedoose, an online, affordable, interview data software program. Although Dedoose is not available through the University of Kansas, the software was highly recommended by faculty at the University. Like, Qualtrics, Dedoose is a widely used, easily accessible, and web-based interdisciplinary qualitative software (LeBaron et. al., 2014). Dedoose also provides data storage, security, and privacy (for a thorough description of Dedoose’s terms of service and benefits see: http://www.dedoose.com/terms/#SECURITY). Rather than survey data, Dedoose focuses primarily on interview transcription, storage, recording, analysis, and data visualization. Dedoose was used because it provided an online, affordable, intuitive, and analytical component to further my interview transcript analysis.
The coding process occurred upon my return to the University of Kansas post-fieldwork. Key factors for analyzing surveys and interviews with primary and secondary participants are participants’ citizenship status, primary language, place of birth, and place of residency. Survey and interview data collected from immigration advocates are analyzed for overall citizenship policy implementation background and are not included identically in the overall coding process. Both web-based software programs allowed for seamless and complementary coding and analysis of survey and interview data.

Primary and secondary research participant survey (open-ended questions in particular) and interview data (with the exception of the immigration advocate group) are broadly analyzed and interpreted via qualitative comparative analysis and cluster analysis (Singleton & Straits, 2005; Staeheli & Clarke, 2003). This approach seeks to analyze data interaction rather than (variable) isolation in order to convey the complex relationship between Estonian Russian-speakers and citizenship. Additionally, I integrate descriptive statistical analysis to highlight my survey data (particularly the closed-ended questions and their associated responses). Descriptive statistics are, “quantitative measures derived from a set of data that describes how values are distributed within that data series,” and are for the purpose of this project represented primarily as percentages (Castree, Kitchen & Rogers, 2013, p. 100). Descriptive statistics are incorporated into this analysis in order to organize and summarize my survey data (Lindsay, 1997; Singleton & Straits, 2005). All descriptive statistics are highlighted in a variety of chapter and section pertinent tables. The descriptive statistics are meant to provide additional richness and empirical support to the citizenship narratives. Although inferences may be made related to the larger Russian-speaking population (Lindsay, 1997), the quantitative data and their analysis largely provide inferential and descriptive spatio-temporal glimpses at my sample Russian-speaking population that participated via SSM. The survey and interview (narratives) data are
complementarily organized and analyzed via cluster (group analysis) for quality and consistency. The data is organized in two clusters or respondent groups. First, the respondent groups are differentiated by current citizenship status of the participant, which includes: (#1) Estonian citizen, (#2) Russian citizen, and (#3) Stateless resident (temporary or permanent resident). Second, the respondent groups are differentiated and analyzed by current place of residence, which includes: (#1) Narva/Ida-Viru County and (#2) Tallinn/Harju County/Other.

Data is classified and selectively grouped in this manner to emphasize the relationship between citizenship status (formal citizenship) and citizenship perception, practice, and identity (substantive citizenship) differentiation both external to each status group and internally. This is also done in order to illustrate geographic or spatial comparisons and differences among these groups. Cluster analysis delineates groups and allows the elucidation of patterns or themes within each group and among groups (Staeheli & Clarke, 2003).

Anticipated themes and relational impacts concerning citizenship and residency among Russian-speakers included: citizenship status and citizenship perceptions and practices; place of residence and citizenship perceptions and practices; place of birth and citizenship perceptions and practices; citizenship status and spatial identity; citizenship perceptions and practices and spatial identity. The three clusters of citizenship status groups and two clusters of place of residence groups are analyzed in descriptive, interpretive, and empirical detail in the forthcoming analysis chapters. Complete cluster summaries (descriptive tables) are provided to highlight shared and differentiated themes, patterns, and particularities within each cluster and among the clusters. Each analysis chapter contains a cluster summary (table) related to that particular chapter’s foci (formal and substantive citizenship) and a complete amalgamated cluster summary (table) is also provided in the following chapters. The inclusion of cluster summary tables as a tool of visualizing condensed comparative survey and interview data was inspired by the work
on citizenship, work, household, and identity by Staeheli & Clarke, (2003). Within each analysis chapter, the data is illustrated through the construction of rich descriptive citizenship narratives that incorporate a wide range of group comparative data and information. The analysis chapters also blend descriptive narrative (interview and survey) excerpts (via text blocks) and empirical data (descriptive statistics and additional supportive data derived from interviews, surveys, and available data/literature).

**Research Challenges**

I encountered numerous challenges during my fieldwork, particularly related to methods and project logistics. Prior to my doctoral fieldwork, I had experienced some anticipated minor community access, rapport, and trust issues because of my own otherness and my critical interest in citizenship within my field of inquiry. During the summer of 2012, I made contact with scholars from the University of Tartu, Tallinn University, and Narva College regarding my research and potential collaboration. Although I did make excellent research contacts, relationship development and management was complex and difficult, particularly as a national and scholarly outsider.

I also experienced a range of challenges during my fieldwork experience in 2013 in both Tallinn and Narva. Fieldwork challenges primarily were associated with my own positionality. First, foreigners let alone Americans are relatively rare in northeastern Estonia and Narva in particular. As a researcher who sought to blend into the crowd and the urban milieu of Russian-speaking Narva, I found it challenging. Most Russian-speakers assumed I was Estonian, Swedish, and/or German if they saw or spoke to me. If I mentioned my nationality or country of origin, I encountered two dominant reactions from respondents or community members at large. Reactions included either increasing interest almost to the point of celebrity or spectacle and cautiously suspect.
As a foreign researcher, it was difficult to fit in appropriately into my surroundings and community, which may reflect Narva and northeastern Estonia’s relative isolation from developments in the rest of Estonia (such as immigration and foreign tourism) and the European Union. It also may reflect the Russian-centered social, cultural, linguistic, and media sphere that most Russian-speakers find themselves apart of in contemporary Estonia (Dougherty & Kaljurand, 2015; Jakobson, 2002). Examples of this mix of interest and suspicion abounded during my fieldwork experiences. For example, I was provided more than one occasion to either speak to a large community group or the local media because of my nationality and my interest in Narva, conveying my own outsider status and the spectacle of being a foreigner in a monolingual and isolated community.

Conversely, I encountered negative reactions to my foreign presence, research, and nationality. For example, respondents or community members on numerous occasions inferred negative assumptions of me because of my nationality and assumed that I was probably working with the U.S. government (CIA in particular) to spy on the Estonian Russian-speaking community. Although I was pleased to see my research spreading among the Estonian Russian-speaking community online (through various websites and portals that target this particular community), I did encounter negative comments and reactions (including here: http://www.baltija.eu/news/read/32897), which may have been shared among research participants, the target community, or may solely have been the opinions of online pro-Russian/anti-American “trolls” which have been a ongoing issue in Estonia and other former Soviet Republics (Sindelar, 2014).

Although I personally bore the brunt of these interactions and misconceptions of my research agenda and background, I also acknowledge that my outsider status and nationality may also have impacted my research and accumulated data. I understand that my own identity and
position may impact how my target community perceives, interacts, and responds to my research questions and sampling techniques; however, I also understand that it is important for researchers to maintain transparency and legitimacy of their situated position and project. Regardless of my own otherness or feelings of inadequacy, I blended into the community to the best of my ability, encountered a wide range of community members, and was able to acquire an appropriate and more than anticipated amount of survey and interview data from my respective target population. Overall, I feel a strong affinity with and appreciation for the Estonian Russian-speaking community, particular in Narva and I hope that this work illustrates to them my hard work and reflects their own voices and interpretations of citizenship within contemporary Estonia.

Other than my nationality, another issue that arose associated with my positionality was my sexuality. Although the Estonian government has recently made progressive strides to combat homophobia through policy-making (“Estonia first ex-Soviet state to legalize gay marriage”, 2014), at the local scale, homophobic perceptions and behaviors persist in Estonia, Eastern Europe, and Russian Federation (Lasala & Revere, 2011; Mole, 2011; “Russian Duma passes law banning ‘gay propaganda’”, 2013; Walsh, 2006). Living in a homophobic or perceived homophobic environment as a foreign researcher, heightened my own feelings of being an outsider. Although I only heard homophobic comments or statements in passing and not directed towards me, the high rates of homophobic attitudes in the areas and communities I encountered, forced me to hide that side of my identity and in turn limited some of my interactions. The limiting of my interactions allowed me to maintain my researcher – participant relationship boundaries, but it also limited my relationships, experiences, and encounters because of fearfulness and wariness on my part. The limiting of my interactions with research participants and potential participants challenged my sampling, surveying, and interviewing processes, because it restricted my experiences. I acknowledge that my sexuality did potentially
impede or challenge my research; however, I limited my interactions and relationships on a case-by-case basis and remained cognizant of my personal safety throughout my fieldwork experiences.

I recognize that my otherness (related to my foreign researcher status, nationality, and sexuality) may have impacted my generalizability, sampling, interview process, and surveying among my target population. As an outsider asking critical questions about relatively divisive political, civic, ethnic, national, regional, and local issues, some respondents may have responded differently compared to if the same questions were being asked by perceived insiders. My otherness may have also impacted the snowball sampling technique and trajectory that my project took. If I had been an insider, the individuals solicited or attracted to my project may have differed or may have been more generalizable and/or open to sharing their perspectives.

Post-fieldwork challenges primarily related to analysis and political and geopolitical shifts in my research area. Following my return from Estonia, I began the arduous task of organizing, cleaning, editing, translating, and transcribing my survey and interview data. As a non-native speaker of the Russian language, translating survey and interview data was time intensive, since I had to rely on my own acquired language proficiency skills and expertise. Since some surveys were conducted by face-to-face interactions and involved hardcopy paper surveys, some of the translations were quite difficult because of the illegibility of some responses.

Following survey organizing, cleaning, and translating, I began interview translating and transcribing. Since all interviews were recorded, I had multiple opportunities to listen, translate, and transcribe. Some interviews were more difficult to translate and transcribe than others, particularly those conducted in loud public environments (cafes) or over Skype (poor connections and sound). I sought additional translation assistance from a professional translator
whom I have a scholarly relationship for additional auditory review with for those interviews considered the most challenging. Out of the total interviews, only 5 required additional support from a professional translator. Although, adding an additional translator added time to the translation and transcription process, it also provided clarity and legitimacy to the interview data, since the professional translator and myself both had reviewed the data.

Additional post-fieldwork challenges include recent political and geopolitical events that may have altered the Russian-speaking community’s citizenship embodiments and enactments in Estonia. Notable national, regional, and local events include, but are not limited to: European Union elections of 2014; national political reorganization (long-time Prime Minister Andrus Ansip stepped down to enter EU politics); decline in Centre Party dominance in northeastern Estonia (Ammas, 2014); Estonian state’s adjusted Russian-language media policies (Luhn, 2015); and the Estonian parliament’s easing of restrictive citizenship regulations for vulnerable Russian-speakers (elderly, orphans, children) (“Rare Praise from Russia over Estonian Citizenship Bill”, 2014). Noted geopolitical events that may have altered my research field include but are not limited to: the early 2014 Estonian-Russian border agreement (Salu, 2014); ongoing conflict/crisis in Ukraine; Russian annexation of Crimea; and the heightened irredentist militarization of the Russian Federation within NATO air and cyber space (“NATO military chief Breedlove warns of Russian incursion”, 2014; Sindelar, 2014). One particular event continues to impact Estonian-Russian relations and that included the kidnapping and imprisonment of an Estonian security service officer along the southeastern Estonian-Russian border by the Russian Federal Security Service (which has since been resolved) (Galeotti, 2014). As Russian-Estonian, Russian-NATO, and Russian-EU diplomatic relations continue to widely ebb and flow, the Estonian Russian-speaking community and their citizenship narratives are undoubtedly impacted. I recognize that the political and geopolitical fields or landscapes
continue to shift and that my own project provides a glimpse at ever-changing citizenship narratives among this volatile community and region.
Chapter 5: Analysis of Formal Citizenship

When I lived in Russia in the Soviet Union, we never thought about citizenship, it was never nurtured in us. Because it was the Soviet Union, what sort of citizenship was there? No one thought about that. I only started to think about it when I was living in Estonia and had to choose either Russian or Estonian citizenship. Naturally, I chose Estonian citizenship only because I was going to live here…Citizenship means belonging to the country where I live…When people ask me where I am from, I say Estonia…And I am proud of that, that I am from Estonia. (Narva Interviewee 9, personal communication, October 6, 2013)

Introduction

In this chapter, I examine citizenship capital in its formal sense. Citizenship in its formal sense refers to a legal category and classification with entangled rights and responsibilities as primarily defined by the state (Bauder, 2006, 2008; Staeheli, 1999; Trimbach, 2014a). Formal citizenship, “is a mechanism of legal distinction” that delineates groups who legally, politically, and territorially belong and denizens who do not (Bauder, 2006, p. 49). Formal citizenship is often defined as passive citizenship, since it is equated with legal citizenship status and the passive entitlements that citizenship embodies; however, by conceptualizing formal citizenship as passive, one ignores the activeness and politicized actions underlying formal citizenship’s construction, differentiated-ness, inequitable impacts, and the challenges it faces from both citizens and denizens alike (Ehrkamp & Jacobsen, 2015). Formal citizenship also, “varies across place, across time, and for different people” and, “is inseparable from the geographies of communities and the networks and relationships that link them, with their attendant inequalities, imperfections, and opportunities” which include those made by the state and the “hidden spaces”
of everyday life that reinforce, alter, and/or challenge formal citizenship (Staeheli et. al., 2014, p. 641).

As evinced from the epigraph of this chapter, Estonian state constructions of formal citizenship and citizenship’s impacts deeply influence the lives of Estonian Russian-speakers. According to this interviewee and others voiced in this chapter, citizenship provides a sense of belonging, membership, and identity that is imbricated with place. Although this interviewee naturalized and identifies with Estonia, variations in and challenges to formal citizenship status could alter and transform Estonian citizenship making it more accessible and equitable for all residents of Estonia regardless of ethnicity, heritage, or language. Such challenges and alterations would not only impact citizenship capital, but also influence power relations between Estonian-speakers and Russian-speakers who have for over two decades existed within one state with two societies and social spaces. Based on the conceptual premise that citizenship capital is primarily constructed by the state and is legally and politically buttressed by nationalized, ethnicized, spatialized, and politicized logic and geopolitical discourse and practice, I examine the formal citizenship among the Estonian Russian-speaking population. I seek to unravel is the relationships among citizenship (in its formal sense in this chapter), residency, and political power. By examining these relationships, I illuminate the spatial and relational aspects of Estonian state-centered citizenship. Within this larger context of Estonian ethnocracy and restorationism, I seek critically unravel this relationship by answering the following analytical research questions:

1. How do minority communities (Russian-speakers) of disparate citizenship statuses valorize (value) citizenship?
2. How do minority communities (Russian-speakers) challenge, reinforce, or alter state constructed citizenship?
3. How is citizenship practiced and perceived by minority populations of disparate citizenship statuses and spatial communities?

4. How do local perceptions and practices of citizenship influence communities’ perceptions and practices of multiscalar political processes, spaces, and relations?

I examine these analytical questions (for a complete list of questions see Chapter 1) in relation to formal citizenship (and substantive citizenship in the following chapter). Based on politicized context of how, who, and why the Estonian state constructs (formal) citizenship capital, I hypothesize that Estonian Russian-speakers embody and maintain a strained relationship with citizenship and the state. If Estonian restorationist and ethnocratic logic informs citizenship capital construction impeding Russian-speakers from accumulating and exchanging it (capital) for other valuable resources and opportunities, like political opportunities, positions, and power, I posit that Estonian Russian-speakers perceive formal citizenship with apprehension, suspicion, resentment, and/or passive ambivalence. I also posit that Russian-speakers devalue or embody negative valorizations of formal citizenship, since formal citizenship continues to be a divisive mechanism of distinction and inequitable form of capital between Estonian-speakers and Russian-speakers, particularly in relation to the state and political power. Additionally, Russian-speakers’ formal citizenship perceptions are complicated by their otherness within the Estonianizing society, the geographic proximity and ethnolinguistic connections to the Russian Federation, and their attachments to place (Estonia, locality). I also explore whether or not formal citizenship status and place of residency matter when it comes to how Estonian Russian-speakers perceive and engage formal citizenship with the understanding that formal citizenship status and residency may impact how Estonian Russian-speakers maintain, alter, and/or challenge current state-centered constructions of formal citizenship.
I examine formal citizenship among Estonian Russian-speakers through a combination of multisite (Narva and Tallinn) and multi-group interview and survey responses. In this chapter, I highlight various components of formal citizenship including: citizenship status and the rationale behind status acquisition; valorization (value-making process) of citizenship; the role of language in naturalization and citizenship; who should and/or shouldn’t be (formal) citizens; perceptions of citizenship acquisition difficulty; and lastly the relationship between citizenship and state politics. I highlight these components by integrating survey and interview data that addresses each component by large group (all Russian-speakers) and then by cluster group (by citizenship status and residency). I also blend survey and interview data to form descriptive citizenship narratives. The overall findings are described in the final section, which includes a group (cluster) analysis table. All demographic data and information related to both analysis chapters are outlined in the Appendix (Appendix C).

**Formal Citizenship Status**

Estonian Russian-speakers consist of differentiated citizenship status groups (Table 1) with varied perceptions of formal citizenship (Tables 2-6). Since the disintegration of the former Soviet Union and restoration of the Republic of Estonia, Estonian Russian-speakers have either acquired citizenship (primarily Estonian or Russian), stateless residency, or emigrated; Kolstø, 2011; Laitin, 1998). According to Kolstø (2011), Russian emigration was much lower than most experts and politicians predicted during the early 1990s. During the early post-independence period, the three former Soviet Baltic republics saw a 10%-15% decrease in Russians (ethnic) via emigration (Kolstø, 2011).

While a minor portion of the population emigrated, the remaining Russian-speakers acquired Estonian citizenship, Russian citizenship, and/or Stateless (permanent) resident status (most often associated with a grey or “Alien” passport). Citizenship and/or stateless residency
have been acquired through various means, including: automatic ascription following independence (because of the restoration of Estonia’s pre-Soviet citizenry); ascription as part of an Estonian state award for service to the state; ascription as an award for participation in early Estonian independence movements (who also registered as a citizen); and naturalization or official registration (Feldman, 2005; Järve & Poleshchuk, 2013; Police and Border Guard Board, 2013; Visek, 1997; D. Smith, 2002).

Survey respondents embody a mix of citizenship statuses including Estonian citizens, Russian citizens, and Stateless residents (Table 1). As illustrated by these responses, survey participants primarily consisted of Estonian citizens (in both Tallinn and Narva) with slightly more Russian citizens and stateless residents in Narva than in Tallinn. These numbers vary from official state records and as emphasized elsewhere (Chapter 4 and Appendix C), Stateless residents and Russian citizens were difficult to engage and solicit participation compared to their Estonian citizen counterparts. There are many potential reasons for this, including, but not limited to: divisiveness of citizenship, citizenship status stigmatization (Belton, 2011), age of respondents (Eesti Statistika, 2011), gender imbalance (Appendix C), and distrust of the researcher/project (Chapter 4).

Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Citizenship Status of Survey Respondents</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Formal Status</td>
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<tr>
<td>Estonian Citizens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Citizens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stateless Residents</td>
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Official statistics on Russian-speakers’ formal citizenship statuses are somewhat difficult to untangle, particularly because statistics vary when it comes to those who identify as Russian and/or as Russian-speaking (Russian as “mother tongue”) in the Estonian census. According to the most recent Estonian census (Eesti Statistika, 2011), Estonian Russian-speakers comprise 152
approximately 28% of the total population and primarily consist of ethnic Russians, Ukrainians, Belarusians, and other smaller minority groups (all numbering less than 2,000 individuals each). The three primary ethnic groups that use Russian as their primary language consist of Estonian citizens (52%), Russian citizens (24%), and Stateless residents (listed as individuals with Määratlemata kodakondsus [undetermined citizenship]) (22%) (remaining 2% consist of unknown or citizenship of another country).

Since census data concerning primary language or “mother tongue” and location does not include Narva (only Tallinn at the municipal level), I incorporate census data related to ethnicity because of the aforementioned relationship between certain ethnic or nationality groups and the use of Russian as a primary language. According to the most recent Estonian census data (Eesti Statistika, 2011), those who identify as Russian consist of Estonian citizens (54%), Russian citizens (24%), Stateless residents (21%), and other or unknown (1%). When the particular locations in question are taken into account, the percentages vary. In Tallinn, more Russians are Estonian citizens (57%) than in Narva (41%). Russian citizens and Stateless residents also vary in Tallinn (20%, 23%) and Narva (39%, 16%). Additionally the citizenship statuses of other nationalities (ethnic groups) that are primarily Russian-speaking (particularly Ukrainians and Belarusians) are lumped into one category (“other ethnic nationalities”). Thus, it is highly likely that when addressing citizenship among “other ethnic nationalities” that these percentages primarily relate to Ukrainians and Belarusians who also comprise the Russian-speaking population. Out of the other ethnic groups, most consist of Estonian citizens (41%), in addition to Russian citizens (16%) and Stateless residents (24%). When the two locations in question are taken into account, there are slight differences. In Tallinn, the other ethnic minority groups consist of Stateless residents (50%), Estonian citizens (37%), and Russian citizens (15%). In
Narva, the other ethnic minority groups are comprised of Russian citizens (39%), Estonian citizens (35%), and Stateless residents (17%).

As a part of the Estonian restoration process, Estonia initially reinstituted its 1938 citizenship law and decided that, “all citizens of Estonia in June 1940 and their descendants, regardless of ethnic background, were automatically considered citizens” (Raun, 2001, p. 246). Following the restoration of the 1938 law, a minority of Russian-speakers qualified for Estonian citizenship. Although interethnic marriage rates are low among ethnic Russians in Estonia compared to other former Soviet Republics (van Ham & Tammaru, 2011), those Russian-speakers who married an Estonian who qualified for citizenship under the 1938 law, also were able to acquire citizenship (Järve & Poleschchuk, 2013). This group of early ascribed citizens consisted of between 75,000-90,000 Russian-speakers (Feldman, 2005; Järve & Poleschchuk, 2013; Police and Border Guard Board, 2013). This process was not immediate and required an official process, which took multiple years to unfold (1992-2001). When asked about citizenship status, Russian-speakers’ tend to acknowledge whether or not they are associated with this group of early post-independence citizens, particularly since this group comprises roughly 15% of the Russian-speaking population (Eesti Statistikaamet, 1995) and this group is not associated with the divisive Soviet occupation. As one Tallinn interviewee noted, “my grandmother was living here before that [1940],” so, their parent and they themselves were automatically entitled to Estonian citizenship (Tallinn Interviewee 5, personal communication, September 10, 2013). Although I did not directly observe any perceived distinctions among this group compared to other Russian-speakers, it is important to point out that those who fit this minor category noted this distinction.

While a small minority obtained Estonian citizenship status immediately after restoration, the vast majority of Russian-speakers (approximately 500,000 people) either acquired formal
citizenship or stateless residency through naturalization or a some sort of legal process associated with the Russian or Estonian states (or other states) (Eesti Statistikaamet, 1995). Naturalization is the legal process of acquiring formal citizenship and is an important aspect of becoming fully politically incorporated into a state and state political process (Bloemraad, 2002, 2005, 2006). Naturalization requirements, level of difficulty, and state promotion (including outreach, funding, programs, and official staff trainings) vary by state with most naturalization procedures integrating an official examination related to national (state) history/culture, government/laws, and language (Bloemraad, 2006; Helbing, 2014). Naturalization rates illustrate how politically and civically incorporated migrant and minority populations are within a state and how they valorize citizenship (Bloemraad, 2005, 2006). By going through the naturalization process individuals essentially become citizens and members of a shared political community and citizenship spaces. Thus, by going through the naturalization process (regardless of restrictions and challenges), Russian-speakers convey how they valorize citizenship (Estonian or Russian) and their level of incorporation into Estonian politics and political power.

The Estonian Politsei-ja Piirivalveamet [Police and Border Guard Board] is the primary state agency responsible for official naturalization procedures, examinations, and records. I formally requested and obtained naturalization records from the Police and Border Guard Board to help examine how citizenship acquisition rates and the degree of political incorporation of minority Russian-speakers overtime. Naturalization, primary language, and/or ethnicity are not directly associated in official naturalization records; however, prior citizenship status is provided from 2000 onwards, which can help determine ethnicity and/or language group. Since independence, Russian-speakers have been the largest minority group and largest group that emerged as stateless following the restoration of independence, it is clear that the majority of naturalization figures relate this population. According to the Police and Border Guard Board
between 1992 and 2014, 158,014 individuals went through the Estonian naturalization process. The years with the highest figures of naturalized persons include 1993 (20,370), 1994 (22,474), 1995 (16,674), and 1996 (22,773) (Police and Board Guard Board, 2015). While naturalization rates were relatively high during the immediate post-independence period, naturalization rates have since 1996 been on a steady decline with a minor uptick in figures in 2004 (6,523) and 2005 (7,072) (Police and Board Guard Board, 2015). Since 2000 (to 2014), 47,675 persons naturalized, with the majority of naturalized persons consisting of former Stateless residents (94%) and Russian citizens (5%) (Police and Border Guard Board, 2015). Between 1996-2013 the naturalization processes of 8,477 applicants (may include duplicates) was stopped either by the applicant or the state, including 819 state refusals of naturalization because the applicant was perceived as a threat or the applicants’ submission of false information (Police and Border Guard Board, 2013). While municipal level naturalization data do not exist, limited (2011-2013) county level data does exist and since Tallinn and Narva are the largest municipalities in their respective counties (Harju County, Ida-Viru County) some comparisons can be made. According to the Police and Border Guard Board (2013), their agency naturalized 2,463 Harju County residents (Tallinn) and 1,021 Ida-Viru County residents between 2011-2013, with the majority of naturalizations occurring among residents under 40 years of age and with more females naturalizing compared to males in both counties (for a more thorough discussion of gender and citizenship, see Appendix C).

When asked about why Russian-speakers opted to obtain Estonian citizenship through naturalization, one Tallinn resident stated that, “I didn’t have any hesitations about that you know” and that the process, “wasn’t difficult, but it was very long. It was very very long” (Tallinn Interviewee 8, personal communication, September 24, 2013). The low sense of difficulty was associated with language proficiency and the age of the interviewee. Interviewees
who noted that the naturalization process was relatively easy or smooth commented on their prior knowledge of the Estonian language (learned in school) and prior engagement with Estonian within their communities. Another Narva resident and Estonian citizen emphasized that the naturalization process isn’t necessarily challenging for Russian-speaking youth, but definitely an obstacle for older generations (Narva Interviewee 12, personal communication, October 4, 2013). When asked about the naturalization process, the same Narva resident stated that:

I passed these exams and well for people who are studying in school – it is not a problem actually because we are all studying Estonian and the level is okay for those children in school – it is normal to pass. But maybe it is difficult for elderly people because not many people speak Estonian here in Narva. (Narva Interviewee 12, October 4, 2013)

While roughly half of Russian-speakers have gone through the Estonian naturalization process, the other half opted for either stateless residency or Russian citizenship. Most scholars and politicians agree that statelessness in Estonia is on the decline; however, the decline is connected to a mix of naturalization, migration, and mortality (Poleshchuk, 2004). As one interviewee and non-governmental organization advocate noted:

The situation is different than it was 20 years ago. Let’s see and in which sense…half of Russian-speakers they have managed to get citizenship, despite of all of the obstacles and considerable objective difficulties. We still have stateless people, which is absolutely intolerable in my mind, but as I told you the situation for these people in regards to citizenship, means that…that political participation of minorities is not adequate and at the national level, this permits to organizing society and a society without paying attention to the basic needs of minorities, and there is a conflict between nationalistic policies and Party of Centrists [Centre Party]…so, minorities have very poor chances. (Tallinn Interviewee 4, personal communication, September 5, 2013)
As the interviewee highlights in the above statement, citizenship is perceived and constructed as an obstacle that inequitably denies Russian-speakers the ability to have a voice in political process and in turn allows the state to deny or ignore the needs of Estonia’s largest minority population. Although Russian-speakers are naturalizing and acquiring citizenship, statelessness remains a major issue for the Estonian state and Russian-speaking population. Statelessness or stateless status in this context refers to *de jure* statelessness, although *de facto* statelessness may also be present (Blitz, 2006). *De facto* statelessness is exemplified by those residents with formal citizenship who may perceive formal citizenship as differentiated and substantive citizenship as restrictive, powerless, and/or incongruent with its formal legal aspect. Stateless residents’ official status is primarily determined by the Estonian Aliens Act (1993), which has been amended since its adoption and does not make any clear distinctions between Soviet-era migrants and their descendants with other foreign nationals who are legal residents, although there is a special clause that provides certain protections because of their association with the Soviet occupation (Poleshchuk, 2004). Soviet-era military personnel and their relatives are denied the aforementioned protections (Poleshchuk, 2004). While most stateless Russian-speakers preferred Russian citizenship to Estonian citizenship in the past (Tubalkain-Trell, 2008), recent surveys suggest a shift in attitudes towards Estonian citizenship with language requirements being perceived as the biggest difficulty (Vetik, Kallas, Kruusvall, Saar, Helemäe, Leppik, Kirss, Seppel, Kivisitik, Ubakivi, & Hadachi, 2015). When asked about why stateless individuals hadn’t gone through either Estonian nor Russian naturalization processes, most were very candid as to the underlying reasons behind their decision to maintain their stateless status. One stateless Narva resident noted that:

> I had a B2 evaluation of the Estonian language that I need for work and for school. But I do not use this language, only for language inspection – when they come and that is all.
But I…I don’t want a Blue passport…Estonian or European passport. I do not want. Why do I need it? (Narva Interviewee 11, personal communication, October 4, 2013)

When asked about their nationality and/or citizenship status, another Narva stateless resident jokingly responded that, “From the moon or somewhere else because my passport says ‘Alien’s’” (Narva Interviewee 14, personal communication, October 14, 2013). While joking about their passports, they were very open when it came to why they chose to remain stateless, with many suggesting frustration, anger, and lack of naturalization motivations (like benefits).

When asked about the naturalization process, the same Narva resident noted that:

Actually, I have not tried…it is just internal anger because I have had a green card, it was issued in 1990 and it says that the holder of this card has a right to Estonian citizenship but the local staff has said that this is fake and that they can’t offer something and so, no problem. As a result, I said come on, I will never pass through this process and so many other people say the same thing that they will not pass through this process just because right now we see no reasons to obtain Estonian citizenship. Now we can cross the border into Russia without any problems, but if you obtain an Estonian passport, then you have to obtain a visa to go to Russia...For me, it is not an important thing, I am visiting Russia maybe two times a year, but being just next-door [from Narva] I really have no time to visit Russia. Well…and people have no, how to say…have no kind of motivation to make the steps towards getting European citizenship or Estonian citizenship just because they don’t see any changes with that. (Narva Interviewee 14, personal communication, October 4, 2013)

As a consequence of citizenship policy shifts during the early independence period, Russian citizenship was an option for any former Soviet citizen, including those reclassified as “immigrants” and “stateless” in the restored Estonian state (Feldman, 2010; Laitin, 1998; Visik,
Many Russian-speakers, particularly those residing in Narva just kilometers away from the Russian Federation, opted for Russian citizenship. Russia’s citizenship policy approach to the former Soviet Russian-speaking population is not all encompassing or straightforward. The Russian Federation citizenship approach during the immediate post-Soviet period, “generally coincided with former Soviet law whereby a person’s respective citizenship was determined according to the republic in which the person permanently resided,” thus if Russian-speakers in Estonia desired to acquire Russian citizenship, they would need to register for Russian citizenship and not obtain citizenship of another state (Visek, 1997, p. 351). Additionally, those who were born in the RSFSR or were the descendants of individuals born in the RSFSR were entitled to Russian citizenship; however, under the framework of, “international law, a state simply cannot go about conferring its nationality on the nationals of other states without those persons’ consent” (Visek, 1997, p. 351). Thus, those Russian-speakers who were entitled to Russian citizenship did not automatically acquire Russian citizenship because citizenship cannot be ascribed without an individual’s consent (with the exception of jus sanguinis). Unlike Estonia, the Russian Federation offered a citizenship registration process that allowed those entitled with citizenship and a legal status that allowed many to remain permanently in Estonia. While Russian citizenship does not provide the same benefits or opportunities as Estonian citizenship, it does provide opportunities to obtain a Russian state pension (to those entitled), participation in Russian political/electoral processes, consular services, and travel to Russia without a visa (Feldman, 2010; Laitin, 1998; Trimbach, 2014a; Visek 1997). As suggested by a Narva resident with stateless status, Estonian citizenship restrictions allowed the Russian state to intervene through eased naturalization services and passportization of stateless residents (Narva Interviewee 14, personal communication, October 14, 2013).
I interviewed two older Russian-speakers with Russian citizenship residing in Narva. Both individuals are active members of a Narva-based CSO that seeks to foster community, citizenship, professional development, and self-advocacy among Russian-speakers over 50 years old in Narva. Most members are female, unemployed or retired, and receive social welfare assistance from the Estonian state or are unable to because of their citizenship statuses. The CSO invited me to their meetings and two of their members agreed to be interviewed. Both initially sought Estonian citizenship, but could not pass the language exam. One of the elderly interviewees maintained a sense of optimism about the process, by noting that:

I’ve been studying Estonian and got a level 2 on the exam, but [I] want to get a level B1 in order to get citizenship. I want to study English too. My daughter lives in England, but three times they have denied me a visa. They wouldn’t even give me a visa to go to her wedding. I am studying Estonian so I can get my citizenship and be able to go visit my daughter. She has [been] working there for 5 years, but they won’t let me go because I am unemployed. (Narva Interviewee 2, personal communication, October 21, 2013)

While the language exam is understood as a major barrier, this interviewee is optimistic that over time their language abilities will improve thus ensuring their ability to obtain formal Estonian citizenship. Conversely the other elderly interviewee noted the stressful nature of naturalization. This interviewee stated that, “I’m done with it all, for me it’s too much stress. I am too emotional. I can’t do it. I was the same way in school. I was just too emotional and couldn’t answer questions” (Narva Interviewee 3, personal communication, October 21, 2013).

What can be drawn from the citizenship statuses of Estonian Russian-speakers? Although Russian-speakers have had over two decades to go through the Estonian naturalization process; only roughly half of Russian-speakers have actually completed the process. The other half of the Russian-speaking population has either opted for Russian citizenship or stateless residency, both
with their own attached benefits and responsibilities. This is reflected in the latest Estonian census (Eesti Statistika, 2011) and through my survey and interview responses. As indicated in the survey responses, Russian speakers are comprised of differentiated citizenship status groups in both Tallinn and Narva. While Estonian citizenship tends to comprise around half of Russian-speakers in Tallinn and Narva, Tallinn is comprised of a larger share of stateless residents than Russian citizens, while Narva has a larger share of Russian citizens than stateless residents. The disproportionate number of Russian citizens in Narva highlights the concentration of Soviet-era Russian-speaking migrants and their descendants in the area, Narva’s close proximity to the Estonian-Russian (Narva-Ivangorod) border, and the daily cross-border activities of Narva residents. This variation also illustrates the familial, economic, and spatial attachments of Narva’s residents in relation to the nearby Russian Federation. As illustrated by the cited interviewees, Russian-speakers have various rationales as to why they embody varied citizenship statuses, with most interviewees noting that Estonian citizenship is a goal, yet naturalization poses many challenges. This “citizenship choice” as outlined by the survey and interview data coalesces well with recent scholarship related to citizenship status ascription and naturalization among Estonian Russian-speakers (Fein & Straughn, 2014). According to Fein and Straughn (2014), Estonian Russian-speakers tend to “choose” their citizenship status or non-citizenship status based on pragmatic/utilitarian, normative/territorial, and/or affective/symbolic bases or framings. Pragmatic/utilitarian framings include those choices made in relation to practical impacts of citizenship status, such as legal residency (and its entwined benefits), travel/mobility, and employment opportunities. Normative/territorial framings refer to political and territorial attachments residents of a country possess such as birthplace or residency length that propel them to make their associated citizenship status choice. Affective/symbolic bases include those choices that are based on nationalized, ethnicized, and politicized notions of, “citizenship,
territory, culture, or ethnic heritage” (Fein & Straughn, 2014, p. 8). Thus, Russian-speakers’ decision-making processes vary and incorporate a multiplicity of pragmatic, normative, and symbolic understandings and attitudes towards citizenship and the state.

While agency or “choice” is an integral part of citizenship acquisition, as illustrated by the survey and interview responses, citizenship construction and naturalization policies (as mechanisms of distinction) often restrict citizenship choice and trajectory. Additionally, the persistence of statelessness highlights the mutually constitutive-ness of citizenship in juxtaposition to “denizenship” in modern nation-states, whereby both citizens and denizens belong to the state with differentiated rights (particularly social and economic) and positions of political power (Brubaker, 1989). The findings presented in this section support this claim that Russian-speakers do not solely choose formal citizenship status solely on the types of pragmatic/utilitarian benefits and rights associated with that status. Rather, there are overlapping reasons, rationales, and restrictions that contribute to why Russian-speakers naturalize or not. These rationales and their underlying perceptions and understandings of citizenship are highlighted in the subsequent section related to how Russian-speakers valorize citizenship.

**Perceptions of Citizenship’s Value**

Estonian Russian-speakers embody various ascribed formal citizenship statuses; Estonian Russian-speakers also maintain various perceptions and understandings of citizenship. One such perception is that of citizenship’s importance or value. The question of citizenship’s importance and/or value is meant to solicit how Russian-speakers valorize citizenship, why, and what that means for citizenship as a state-constructed form of capital. When asked to determine citizenship’s “importance” Russian-speakers overall consider citizenship to be primarily “Important” (36%) or “Not very important” (29%) with distinct group patterns and differences (Table 2). While all groups illustrate this pattern, Russian citizens and Narva residents tend to
have lower responses to “Important” and “Not very important” compared to other groups’ responses. As is illustrated by this response pattern, Estonian citizens, Tallinn residents, and Stateless residents perceive citizenship more important than Narva residents and Russian citizens. This pattern indicates that Russian-speakers perceive citizenship’s value differently with slight group differences related to their place of residence and citizenship status.

Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Very important</th>
<th>Important</th>
<th>Not very important</th>
<th>Not at all important</th>
<th>Difficult to answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Estonian Citizens</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Citizens</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stateless Residents</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tallinn Residents</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narva Residents</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Groups</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This response pattern is also reflected in the interviews. Those Estonian Russian-speakers who perceived citizenship as important varied in their understandings and valorizations. One Estonian citizen and Tallinn resident stated that:

Well, for me it is quite important. You know, when you are becoming a citizen, you are basically – to promise on paper that you will be loyal to the country and that is a lot. That is a big responsibility. You know I took it [naturalization] very seriously. You know for me it was an important step. And I never had – you know – I always felt and I still feel it now that this is my country. That is why for me, it was not a question between Russian citizenship and Estonian citizenship – yeah, for me it was always my intention from the very beginning. (Tallinn Interviewee 8, personal communication, September 24, 2013)
This perception of citizenship’s value was reiterated by other interviewees as well, particularly citizenship’s relation to travel opportunities and state-based identities or attachments. One Narva resident and Estonian citizen noted that:

Well I think it is kind of important because uh well Estonian citizenship gives you a lot of opportunities and you know – to go to countries of the European Union, and uh, yeah, it is uh, if you feel like it…identify yourself with the country that you’re a citizen in. (Narva Interviewee 8, personal communication, September 19, 2013)

Estonian Russian-speakers with Russian citizenship and stateless residency shared similar perceptions of citizenship’s worth in their interview responses. One Narva resident and Russian citizen noted that:

Yes, it’s important to me of course. For me, I go periodically to Russia to see my parents’ graves and my brother who lives there. My Russian citizenship allows me to go freely to Russia so it’s okay. Of course it would be nice to have citizenship in both countries. (Narva Interviewee 2, personal communication, October 21, 2013)

Conversely, nearly as many Russian-speakers noted how citizenship was “not very important” or “not at all important” when asked to valorize citizenship. One Narva resident and Estonian citizen noted that:

Citizenship is not important because I received citizenship and I am a citizen of Estonia and I have no problems in Estonia. I can carry out my business in Estonia and in the European Union. But many of my friends do not have citizenship. They have good enough jobs, but they still don’t have any citizenship. (Narva Interviewee 9, personal communication, October 6, 2013)

This interviewee notes that many individuals live relatively normal lives and can work without citizenship, just like they go about their own life and work with citizenship. Another Narva
resident with stateless residency shared this attitude in relation to Estonian citizenship. This resident noted the difficulty of defining citizenship’s value or importance, particularly when statelessness offers certain benefits that citizens of Estonia or Russia may not recognize. This Narva resident stated that:

It is important and also it is not important actually. It is important just because you feel like you belong to the state; it makes you more active in some decisions. It is not important in that you feel yourself free from the obligations of the state and come on I am free – I do not care about politics and everything you do, you do yourself. It is not like taking part in it. Well actually, to see the situation in Estonia, it was important maybe since the first grey passport [Alien or Stateless Passport] has been issued – it is a strange document with no obligation to the holder or no protection…(Narva Interviewee 14, personal communication, October 14, 2013)

As is evinced from the amalgamated outlined survey and interview responses, Estonian Russian-speakers maintain varied valorizations of citizenship with noted differences between Tallinn residents, Stateless residents, and Estonian residents who tend to perceive citizenship as more valuable compared to Russian citizens and Narva residents. When asked to elaborate on their respective perceptions of citizenship’s value, response patterns also emerged. Many Russian-speakers recognized the various benefits or rights attributed to having certain citizenship statuses, such as Estonian citizenship providing a sense of belonging or membership to the state or Russian citizenship providing an ability to travel to Russia to see family or the land of one’s ancestry. Even stateless residents noted the benefits associated with their own non-citizenship statuses, which includes not being attached to any particular state or being weighed down by any state responsibilities.
Additionally, certain perceptions foregrounded obstacles and/or challenges to naturalization and citizenship acquisition, particularly those associated with Estonian citizenship.

The primary reason is language acquisition and the strict national language requirements for naturalization as dictated by the Estonian state. Language emerged as a major perceived obstacle or challenge to Estonian naturalization. The issue of language is addressed in more detail in the following subsection.

**Language & Citizenship**

This emphasis on the Estonian language proficiency as a major aspect and/or perceived obstacle to naturalization emerged as a recurring pattern among both survey and interview participants. This emphasis on language also coalesces well with the question, “Should people who want to become citizens have to pass an examination in the national language?” (Table 3).

Although most interviewees suggested that knowledge of the national Estonian language is a challenge or obstacle to naturalization, when it comes to whether or not individuals who want to become Estonian citizens should have to pass a national language exam, the majority of Russian-speakers, regardless of targeted group stated that individuals who seek to become official citizens, should (“yes”) have to pass an exam in the national language (61%). Some slight differences did emerge among survey respondent groups, particularly among Russian citizens.

Table 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language Examination for Naturalization</th>
<th>Groups</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Estonian Citizens</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Citizens</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stateless Residents</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tallinn Residents</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narva Residents</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Groups</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This shared sentiment illustrated in the survey responses is echoed in the interviews. Most interview participants acknowledge the universality of national language proficiency in
relation to citizenship and naturalization processes; however, nearly all respondents suggested that local and demographic particularities should be taken into account. A Tallinn resident exemplified this point by stating, “I think that is a common thing in all countries. You know if you want to have English citizenship, you will have this type of examination as well” (Tallinn Interviewee 5, personal communication, September 10, 2013). This point was reiterated by another Narva resident and Estonian citizen who noted, “Yeah, I think language determines you as a – you know a citizen of a group. So a, if you want to be a citizen, then you should know the language” (Narva Interviewee 13, personal communication, October 7, 2013). While most interview participants shared this perception, most were skeptical of the specific language requirements and rules. The majority of interviewees had caveats and/or broader concerns regarding the perceived hardline unrealistic language proficiency requirements in Estonia. A Tallinn resident and Estonian citizen noted the outdated attitude towards language and national ideal of the state. This interview respondent noted, that:

I absolutely agree. The explanation is very simple. Well, our country still thinks that we live in the age of nation-states, yeah, obviously the age of nation-states is over, but the whole policy of this nation is based on this illusion that nation-states still exist. (Tallinn Interviewee 8, personal communication, September 24, 2013)

Other interview respondents suggested that Russian-speakers who resided in Estonia prior to independence and those subsequent generations born in Estonia should be exempted from national language examinations. According to these interview participants, only new post-independence immigrants should be required to pass a national language exam. As one Narva resident and Estonian citizen noted:

The other thing is that considering people like our parents who are living here for a long time and living here when the Estonian Republic started to exist – for these people they
have to give citizenship – that is my point of view – so, they are not somebody that came from abroad, they were here already and they know much about the history and everything about this country. Why not? Why do they have no rights to be a citizen?

(Narva Interviewee 12, personal communication, October 4, 2013)

The relationship between language proficiency and citizenship is a major concern for Estonian Russian-speakers and scholars of Estonian language policies and integration (Brubaker, 2011; Migrant Integration Policy Index, 2014; Schulze, 2014; Vetik et. al., 2015). Most notably, the age (particularly older residents) of residents and regional/local linguistic differences (including the dominance of Russian in Narva and other Russian-speaking social, cultural, media, and education spaces) have consistently been of the utmost concern. Older residents have tended to have the most difficulty with Estonian language acquisition and some exemptions have been made (Berg, 2001; Gelazis, 2004). Additionally, Narva and its surrounding communities primarily consist of Russian-speakers (over 90%) and the daily usage of Estonian language is minimal (Berg & Oras, 2000; Tammaru & Kulu, 2003). As Tammaru and Kulu (2003) suggest, “non-Estonians, who constitute a large majority in northeastern Estonia, have little or no incentive to learn Estonian” perhaps with the exception of naturalization (p. 117). The UK-based Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX), which measures and evaluates integration policies (including citizenship) consistently ranks Estonia low compared to other EU states when it comes to “access to nationality,” “anti-discrimination” policies, and “political participation” indicators, which includes citizenship (2007-2014). Vetik et. al. (2015) suggest that the perceived language barriers need to be overcome, potentially through more state-funded/promoted programs or projects that provide more opportunities for Russian-speakers to use and strengthen their Estonian language skills in practice.
Perceptions of Who Citizens Should/n’t Be

In addition to the perceived value of citizenship and whether not language proficiency should be an aspect of naturalization, participating Russian-speakers were also asked who should be a citizen of Estonia. In response to the multi-answer (closed) question regarding who should be ascribed or entitled to citizenship in Estonia (or how citizenship should be determined in Estonia), participating Russian-speakers provided a plethora of responses. Respondents were able to respond with more than one answer to the question, which is why a table is not provided. With regards to who should be ascribed or entitled citizenship, a response pattern did emerge. This particular question and potential closed responses were borrowed and altered from the New Baltic Barometer (NBB) (Rose, Maley, Lithuanian Market & Opinion Research Center, Latvian Social Research Centre, & EMOR, 1994; Rose, Lithuanian Market & Opinion Research Centre, Baltic Data House, & EMOR, 1995; Rose, Lithuanian Market & Opinion Research Centre, Baltic Data House, & Saar Poll, 1997; Rose, 2000, 2002, 2005) for comparative purposes (although exact wording of the question and answers vary). The NBB is a major longitudinal research project aimed at examining public opinions among various nationalities/ethnicities residing in the three former Soviet Republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. The Centre for the Study of Public Policy at the University of Strathclyde (Glasgow, Scotland) produced the NBB. The project lasted roughly between 1994-2005, with reports coming out in 1994, 1995, 1997, 2000, 2002, and 2005. The NBB solicited responses to a wide array of questions related to shifting political, economic, and social systems and conditions within the three Baltic states. The NBB also solicited information from titular groups (Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians) and non-titular Russian-speakers. While the NBB addresses Russian-speakers in all three Baltic states, it doesn’t delineate or address any group particularities or differences (such as citizenship status or residency).
As a whole, participating Russian-speakers emphasized one particular response compared to the other potential responses. Based on the potential responses available, Russian-speakers overwhelmingly responded that citizenship should be ascribed to, “All who are born in Estonia” (49%). This response rate is higher than that recorded by the NBB (33%) (Rose, 2005). Russian-speakers as a whole also responded to a lesser degree to the other potential answers, which include: “Families who were citizens before 1940” (3%); “All who lived in Estonia more than 10 years” (18%); “All residing in Estonia at the time of independence” (13%); and “All citizens of the USSR who now live in Estonia” (24%). When Russian-speakers were divided among the five groups in question, most shared the overall response of, “All who are born in Estonia” with slight variations among Estonian citizens (50%), Russian citizens (48%), Stateless residents (39%), Tallinn residents (42%), and Narva residents (54%). This response rate varies from those recorded by the latest NBB report (Rose, 2005), in which the response of, “Everyone living here at the time of independence” received the highest response rate (35%).

This response pattern and understanding of who should be entitled or ascribed citizenship in Estonia is reflected in the interviews. A Tallinn resident and Estonian citizen reiterated this response pattern by noting that:

Well, frankly speaking, I believe anyone born on the Estonian soil. Well, I will try to make a joke. – Like the number of people willing to live in Estonia is actually shrinking. So, we should be thankful to any woman who gives birth to a child in Estonia. – It must be logical to give [citizenship]. (Tallinn Interviewee 8, personal communication, September 24, 2013)

All interviewed Russian-speakers consider the denial of birthright citizenship to children of stateless parents or Russian citizens as a major problem for the Estonian state. Russian-speakers see the denial of birthright of citizenship as more of a problem than statelessness. Many
interviewees voiced criticism and/or frustration at this state policy. A Narva resident and Estonian citizen voiced such frustration by responding:

    I think, everybody – who was born here. Like every child – it doesn’t matter what citizenship his mother or father has. Why…because who are they then? They were born here. They have all the rights to have citizenship. You know they are living here and their parents are paying taxes. You know for schools and kindergarten. I don’t understand those with residence passports [stateless residents] – like who are they? Do they belong to space? How is it possible to not belong to any country? And it is only the Baltic States that have this strange situation. (Narva Interviewee 6, personal communication, September 9, 2013)

This perception and attitude was also shared among those interviewees who were not Estonian citizens. This shared perception illustrates to a certain extent the desire to obtain Estonian citizenship, but the perceived challenges and obstacles for those who have stateless residency or Russian citizenship. When two Narva residents and Russian citizens were asked this particular question both answered that those born in the country should automatically obtain citizenship (Narva Interviewee 2 & 3, personal communication, October 21, 2013). This point was reiterated in greater detail by a Narva and Stateless resident, who noted that:

    I think that everyone who was born here in Estonia. – Just because there is an issue here, we need more citizens…At this time, the political fear has been passed and we need a developed country that is not dividing people by who are citizens and who are not citizens. In a sense there are many serious things in Estonia connected to this policy…we have strange situation…when residence permits for the most people in Narva had to be changed to permanent residence [1999-2000] and there were huge lines at the immigration office and people would spend weeks in the line in order to change the
papers and during those weeks. We had lost the rights for a residence permits and became illegals and the Russian consulate controlled the situation and issued Russian citizenship to those people, to take them away from the illegal status and gave them the right papers...We have now a large army of Russian citizens in Narva who must follow and have kids who become Russian citizens and then their kids become Russian citizens and so on. So we have a growing army because of the Estonian immigration policy. It is a problem. (Narva Interviewee 14, personal communication, October 14, 2013)

This shared perception, which is particularly more prevalent among Narva residents, Estonian citizens, and Russian citizens, is pertinent to how the Estonian state defines and constructs its citizenry. Building upon restorationist logic and ethnocratic practice, the Estonian state primarily defines citizens based on the ethnicized legal principle of *jus sanguinis*. Non-Estonians do have the option of obtaining citizenship through naturalization; although as already noted, Estonia tends to be criticized for its strict naturalization requirements (Gelazis 2004; Human Rights Watch, 2015; Järve & Poleshchuk, 2013; Migrant Integration Policy Index, 2007-2014; Trimbach 2014a; Visek 1997). The survey responses challenge Estonian official policy of *jus sanguinis* by emphasizing that *jus soli* should be the primary legal principle that defines an Estonian citizen. Thus, participating Russian-speakers overwhelmingly perceive and discursively desire a more encompassing Estonian *demos*, rather than an exclusive Estonian *ethnos*.

**Perceptions of Citizenship Acquisition Difficulty**

When asked to evaluate the associated difficulty of obtaining or acquiring citizenship in Estonia, most Russian-speakers, regardless of group noted that citizenship acquisition is easy in principle or theory, but not in practice (Table 4). When divided up into groups, response patterns emerge with Russian citizens and Stateless residents perceiving citizenship acquisition more difficult than others and only a small fraction viewing citizenship as easy.
Table 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perceptions of Citizenship Acquisition Difficulty</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonian Citizens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Citizens</td>
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<td>Stateless Residents</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

This response pattern illustrates the perceived difficulty and challenges that naturalization poses to Estonia’s Russian-speaking population. These shared perceptions and understandings of citizenship acquisition coalesces well with the aforementioned responses related to other aspects of formal citizenship and are echoed in the interview responses. When asked to describe citizenship acquisition’s level of difficulty, most interviewees’ responses paralleled those of the survey respondents. Most interviewees suggested that citizenship acquisition was either “easy in principle,” “difficult,” or “very difficult,” with only one individual straying from this response pattern.

For those individuals who have successfully completed the citizenship acquisition process, meaning those who have acquired Estonian citizenship either through naturalization or other means (as outlined earlier in this chapter), most agree that citizenship acquisition either through personal experience or the experiences of others they know is “difficult” or at least “easy in principle,” but no in practice. As a Narva resident and Estonian citizen remarked:

It depends on the category of people. Here there is a very narrow path to obtaining citizenship. If you know the language and you know the constitution, you can become a citizen of this country. But that doesn’t mean that this person is loyal to the state. This is
a very narrow way of thinking of citizenship. It’s even dangerous. Just because I know the language and the constitution, doesn’t mean that I won’t become involved in criminal activity. And this is dangerous. I think that not only should a person know the language and the constitution, every person should know the constitution, even those who aren’t citizens so that they know what kind of interaction they can have with the government on this territory and be sure they are obeying the law. In this case, this has nothing to do with citizenship. Every person who is civilized should know the laws and rules that exist in a given place. As far as language, that is something more specific that has to do with education level. But it has nothing to do with their mentality or their loyalty to a certain government. To become a citizen of Estonia is easy and difficult at the same time. Easy if you know the language and it’s not important how you feel about the present government or to what extent it is close to your soul. On the other hand, is difficult if a person doesn’t know the language well enough, but at the same time their efforts are to help the state to grow and improve. That is a societal unfairness. (Narva Interviewee 10, personal communication, October 3, 2013)

The interviewee quoted above conveys the complexity of citizenship acquisition and citizenship’s associated meanings. While citizenship acquisition is bound to naturalization requirements like knowledge of the national language and constitution, formal citizenship status should not be used or equated with a knowledgeable and loyal citizen and vice versa. The interviewee challenges the citizen(nation)-state relationship by critiquing the relationship as a naive falsehood. The interviewee suggests that all residents regardless of citizenship status should know how to be citizens or law-abiding residents. The interviewee brings to the fore the unfair contradictions and incongruences of formal citizenship, which are perpetuated by the state. Similar points about citizenship acquisition and difficulty were reiterated and emphasized by a
Tallinn resident with Estonian citizenship. This individual runs a CSO focused on similar issues related to this project and is often cited or a contributor to research projects on citizenship, integration, and civic life among Russian-speakers in Estonia. According to this interviewee:

Many people think it is not easy. For me it was easy - my mother took an exam in Estonian when I was under 15 and I became a citizen due to this fact automatically. For my mother it was not easy, and first of all not easy in a moral and emotional way - she was born in Estonia and did not live for a long time abroad and then she had to prove to the people she lived with, to Estonians, that she was worth to live with them. (Tallinn Interviewee 9, personal communication, November 9, 2013)

Those Russian-speakers who have attempted to or have at least contemplated going through the naturalization process but have not been successful in acquiring Estonian citizenship espoused similar sentiments. Another Narva resident with Stateless status stated that:

If you see with the process, the official process, it is not so hard, but if you try to proceed it is hard, it is very hard – because first of all you need to spend maybe 1 year studying the Estonian language if you have a lower level basis and you need to study all of the simple information like the constitution and rights and stuff because it is different exam for this stuff and constitution. So, you need to spend a lot of time, so you need to take this free time away from your family, from your free time and for many people it is very hard because you need to work hard, to support your family, to spend your free time with your family, you have no free time for language courses or other courses for the exams. Officially it is easy, but actually it is not so easy. (Narva Interviewee 14, personal communication, October 14, 2013)
For those Russian-speakers who have not gone through the naturalization process and have not acquired Estonian citizenship, but an alternative formal legal status, citizenship is still perceived as difficult. As a Tallinn resident with Stateless status noted:

I cannot say that it is very difficult, but first you can ask me why I didn’t apply for Estonian citizenship and I can answer it – this is my civil protest of this situation. I speak Estonian. I studied in university and the teacher of Estonian language said that I do not need to prepare for exams...So, language is not the problem. Let’s understand the situation – so, for me this is civil protest. I do not want to pass this examination and ask for citizenship because I think it was just pure discrimination to separate people by blood.

(Tallinn Interviewee 6, personal communication, October 4, 2013)

As is evinced by this Stateless resident, naturalization and Estonian citizenship is not necessarily perceived as difficult or an obstacle, but rather perceived as an overt form of discrimination by the Estonian state that has disproportionately impacted the Russian-speaking population via jus sanguinis. Thus in response, this individual has opted not to participate in the citizenship or naturalization process as a form of civil protest. This individual was not the only interviewee to voice such an opinion. An additional Narva resident with stateless status (previously quoted above) noted that:

Actually, I have not tried [to naturalize], just as I said before, it is just internal angerness...It as a result, I said come on I will never pass through this process and so many other people say the same thing that they will not pass through this process just because right now we see no reasons to obtain Estonian citizenship. Now we can cross the border into Russia without any problems, but if you obtain an Estonian passport, then you have to obtain a visa to go to Russia – come on it is a problem especially because so many people are connected to Russia. For me, it is not an important thing, I am visiting
Russia maybe two times a year, but being just next-door I really have no time to visit Russia. Well…and people have…no kind of motivation to make the steps towards getting European citizenship [Estonian citizens are automatically citizens of the EU] or Estonian citizenship just because they don’t see any changes with that. (Narva Interviewee 14, personal communication, October 14, 2013)

What can be gleaned from the responses regarding the perceived level of difficulty of citizenship acquisition? Overall, Russian-speakers are in agreement when it comes to citizenship acquisition and naturalization. Most Russian-speakers, regardless of status or location of residency, responded that citizenship acquisition is difficult to some extent; specifically that citizenship is easy in principle or in theory but not in practice. When given the opportunity to elaborate during interviews, Russian-speakers noted numerous barriers or perceived obstacles that make citizenship acquisition challenging, notably language requirements, time commitments to go through the process, and personal resentment and anger towards the Estonian state and its policies that emphasize *jus sanguinis* citizenship, which many perceive as discriminatory and unfair.

**Perceptions of Citizenship & Politics**

Table 5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Interest in Politics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Group</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonian Citizens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Citizens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stateless Residents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tallinn Residents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narva Residents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Groups</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Citizenship is entwined with politics and political process. Not only do political systems, institutions, and agents participate in the construction of citizenship as capital, but citizenship also provides access and opportunities for residents of a state to be political beings and active participants in the construction of the nation-state (Isin, 2002). When asked the level of interest Russian-speakers have in politics (Table 5), the majority of survey respondents noted that they are either “somewhat interested” (35%) or “not very interested” (43%) in politics with slight response pattern variations when groups are taken into account. Although the majority of survey respondents noted that they are either “somewhat interested” (35%) or “not very interested” (43%), more interviewees actually voiced more of an interest in politics and political process. This shared interest might partially be why these particular individuals were interested in participating in this research project related to Estonian citizenship and politics. This interest is reflected in the interview responses among the various groups. One Narva resident with Estonian citizenship who runs a CSO noted that they were interested in politics because, “I want to influence it” (Narva Interviewee 10, personal communication, October 3, 2013). Other Narva residents with negative perceptions of national or local politics and political parties shared this active and change-oriented sentiment. A Narva resident with Stateless status stated that their interest was also entwined with a need for change. This individual noted that:

I want to change it [politics] and I think – I did debates – I think when only one party [Centre Party] in a city has solutions…when a city only depends on one party it is not right. They [city/politics] waste money, they steal money…I know all of this because I am connected with City Hall, with city workers and workers who work for the city…bureaucrats…and I know how all of these people do this. It is not right. Not right. (Narva Interviewee 11, personal communication, October 4, 2013)
A Tallinn resident and Estonian citizen who is an active member of the Sotsiaaldemokraatlik Erakond (SDE) [Social Democratic Party (SDP)] also emphasized this sentiment. This interviewee stated that:

I am very interested, but I…maybe I am maybe part of this politics too. I don’t know, maybe you have heard about the crisis – in 2007 in Estonia? Yes, the bronze night. And I don’t know. It was interesting for me. I was wondering why so many Russians were so negative. Why they have so much negativity for Estonia and stuff. And I started to read newspapers and I started to monitor the political news and so on and so on. Then I decided to join the Social Democratic Party of Estonia. Yeah, I am very interested in Estonian politics. (Tallinn Interviewee 3, personal communication, September 6, 2013)

While this particular interviewee illustrates an active attitude of citizenship towards politics, most other interviewees suggested that their interest was solely an interest and not necessarily associated with action or citizenship in practice (substantive citizenship). One Narva resident with Stateless status remarked that:

Actually, doing my job [journalist], I am involved in politics. I am involved in everything that has to do with politics, but I am not a member of any political party because my citizenship. Yes, I can’t [vote] and actually I don’t vote for or belong to any parties. I like the party situation in the United States compared to here in Estonia because in the United States you have a choice – you can be a democrat today and a republican tomorrow – you have your free choice, but in Estonia if you belong to a party, it is strict in the state. (Narva Interviewee 14, personal communication, October 14, 2013)

This halfhearted or passive interest in politics was more widely shared among the interviewees in both Tallinn and Narva and among the various formal citizenship status groups. This passive attitude and approach to politics stems from a shared perception of Estonian
political culture as out of reach (this point is addressed in greater detail in the following chapter), divisive, corrupt (particularly in relation to the Centre Party in Narva, which has seen its popularity wane in recent years), and challenging. As two different Narva residents with Estonian citizenship suggested, “I am very much interested in politics, but I do try to stay out of it” (Narva Interviewee 5, personal communication, September 10, 2013) and, “I am, but I am not a fan” (Narva Interviewee 6, personal communication, September 9, 2013). The findings illustrate that having an active or passive political interest doesn’t necessarily equate to supporting the political system or parties in power. Those with active political interests seem to want to change a system they perceive as corrupt, negative, and/or obstructive, particularly when it comes to issues related to the Russian-speaking population. Those Russian-speakers with passive interests appear to be interested in the goings-on of Estonian national and local politics but are uninterested in taking an active role or being active citizens or denizens.

Although the majority of Russian-speakers are not very interested in politics, Russian-speakers do embody and voice specific political interests. In response to the open-ended question regarding what are Russian-speakers’ most important political issues, a plethora of responses were provided. Although respondents were able to describe more than one issue or concern, a table is provided that addresses the top or most commonly shared interests (Table 6). Respondents outlined an array or political issues and response patterns did emerge, with most responses overlapping and sharing characteristics or overarching connections, both as a large group and among groups.

As a whole, Russian-speakers do share political issues. In response to an open-ended question concerning Russian-speakers’ most important political issues/concerns, patterns and group variations did emerge (Table 6). The most common responses among all groups include:

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education (18%), nationalism (16%), foreign affairs (16%), corruption (15%), economy (14%), democracy (14%), and Russian-speaking population (14%)

Table 6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Most important political issues</th>
<th>Estonian Citizens</th>
<th>Russian Citizens</th>
<th>Stateless Residents</th>
<th>Tallinn Residents</th>
<th>Narva Residents</th>
<th>All Groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economy</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalism</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian-speaking population</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonian-Russian relations (external)</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Welfare</td>
<td></td>
<td>23%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inequality</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Top 5 political issues included with % (tied issues are also included for some groups)

While these perceived major political concerns or issues vary, many overlap. This overlap and linkage among these political concerns are illustrated more descriptively in the interviews. Among interviewees, nationalism, Russian-speaking population, and government/state were the most commonly addressed political issues or concerns, often overlapping among one another and incorporating other issues, such as education and perceived inequalities. A Narva resident with Estonian citizenship stated that:

Of course the relationship of Estonia and the Russian minority, and the people who right now are left with no citizenship. They are left with no citizenship simply because after the fall of the Soviet Union, these people found themselves in the territory of Estonia. This is their home, their place of work and there was nowhere for them to go. Many of
them couldn’t pass the Estonian language exam, especially those who lived in areas with high concentrations of Russians, like in the city of Narva. I know this very well since I myself live in the city of Narva. Therefore, there are people now without citizenship. Also students can’t receive all their education in their native language. 60% of instruction in schools is in Estonian and 40% in Russian. Does this give them a high level of education? In this country they don’t look at part of the [Russian-speaking] population favorably. This makes it difficult for young people after finishing high school and they leave Estonia. (Narva Interviewee 9, personal communication, October 6, 2013)

This focus on overlapping issues related the Russian-speaking population and inequalities was reiterated by a Tallinn resident with Estonian citizenship, who stated that:

I am worried about this economic situation in Ida-Virumaa [Ida-Viru County] and the social inequality in Estonia. And the position of Russian-speakers or Russian-speaking population in both Ida-Virumaa and in Tallinn because all of the statistical – you know monitoring – they truly reflect how this inequality is and these years of economical crisis it has gotten worse and you know the more liberal parties they have no interest in changing something. I see these more as critical issues that I see right now. (Tallinn Interviewee 3, personal communication, September 6, 2013)

The overlapping issues brought up by these interviewees, particularly issues of economic decline (particularly in Ida-Viru County and Narva), inequality (ie: economic, political, social), and Russian-speakers were common themes among the interviewees. As the interviewee above suggests, some Russian-speakers perceive their political concerns as either ignored and deprioritized by mainstream political parties and the Estonian state. The interviewee also infers that the complex overlap of ethnicized (political and social) inequalities faced by Russian-speakers is exacerbated by steep economic decline in the northeast (Ida-Viru County and Narva)
and may lead to additional problems, including an increase in those issues already faced in Narva (unemployment, drug use, HIV/AIDS, crime, suicide, etc.) and/or perhaps a recurrence of riots as witnessed during the bronze night in 2007 (as this interviewee notes earlier in this section). A Narva resident (and city official) with Estonian citizenship reiterated these points and noted that:

Well, it is the issue that my city [Narva] is facing – we are losing population. I mean you can talk to the graduates at their graduation ball, every single year, to every single one of them – Narva needs you back, but what does our city have to offer? Not really that much. We don’t really have workplaces. This has actually been our concern. I mean it is happening everywhere particularly in Eastern Europe. (Narva Interviewee #4, personal communication, September 10, 2013)

Additionally education, particularly the ending or phasing out of the two ethno-linguistic education systems in Estonia, was also a major concern brought up by the interviewees, often overlapping with the aforementioned issues of inequality and Russian-speakers. The issue of Russian education was quite pertinent at the time since there had been recent protests related to education policies and the election season. As one Narva resident with Estonian citizenship stated:

The language of education – you know we have these problems with the Russian schools and they want to make – not they, but the government wants to make the Estonian language the language of instruction, but maybe it is a good idea, why not? You know we are in Estonia. You know when you go to England and you ask teach me in Russian…But we don’t have enough teachers that are capable of teaching in Estonian…because here in Narva we have mainly Russian people…and of course all of the teachers are also Russian and we don’t have enough native speakers to teach different subjects in Estonian. (Narva Interviewee 6, personal communication, September 9, 2013)
While many respondents voiced particular issues or concerns of interest, others responded with broader concerns related to perceived flaws or problems with the political process and/or political party system. A Narva resident with Estonian citizenship that often works with government agencies through their CSO noted that, “Co-operation, co-working is on a way worse level than it should be. Many fears, and manipulation is a favorite tool of governing” (Narva Interviewee 10, personal communication, October 3, 2013). This attitude was shared by a Tallinn resident with Estonian citizenship, who remarked:

I think the most important thing is – that people and government will understand what problems there are in the City and within the people – not about the money, not about the...anything. Just about the people and what problems they have. And well my opinion on this vote and the elections [interview took place during 2013 election season] – I am going to choose those people who do not say we are going to do this, this, this, and this because usually when political people say they will do this, this, this, and this, after elections – they never do that. So, I am going to choose those people who say they will try to do their best to make this city better… (Tallinn Interviewee 5, personal communication, September 10, 2013)

Overall, Russian-speakers embody and maintain a diverse array of political concerns, mostly related to their own ethno-linguistic population. Such concerns include education, nationalism or nationalistic policies and their impacts, inequalities, economy, and issues related to the government/state such as corruption, political process, and/or democracy. The highlighted concern for democracy coalesces well with recent research on low satisfaction with democracy among Estonian Russian-speakers (Ehin, 2013; Rikken, 2012). While most interviewees shared the aforementioned similarities in their responses, the Russian citizen interviewees primarily addressed issues related to language acquisition and citizenship (Narva Interviewee 2, personal
communication, October 21, 2013; Narva Interviewee 3, personal communication, October 21, 2013). Thus, although most Russian-speakers responded that they are only “somewhat interested” (35%) or “not very interested” (43%) in politics, nearly all Russian-speakers do have political concerns or issues that contribute to their political and civic attitudes, opinions, and behaviors.

**Overview of Formal Citizenship Findings**

The embodied perceptions and interpretations of formal citizenship outlined in this chapter illustrate the nuance and complexity of citizenship capital (in its formal sense) and its ethnicized and nationalized legal, political, and territorial construction within a post-Soviet Estonian context. The amalgamated responses (surveys and interviews) and the various themes and patterns are condensed and described in the cluster (group) table (Table 7). While Russian-speakers as a whole do indeed share some response patterns and perceptions towards formal citizenship, distinct patterns did emerge among and between the various cluster groups.

Table 7

**Formal Citizenship Cluster Table**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cluster Group</th>
<th>Formal Citizenship</th>
<th>Group Demographics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Estonian Citizens | Estonian citizens have acquired their formal citizenship status through various means, particularly naturalization.  
Most value formal citizenship as important.  
Most want birthright citizenship (*jus soli*).  
Most agree with having a language exam as part of naturalization; although most argue that language requirements are difficult or unrealistic.  
Most see naturalization as easy in  
Estonian citizens are the largest group.  
The majority of Estonian Citizens are female.  
Ages vary from ~18-79, with the largest shares consisting of 20-39 years of age.  
Most are either single or married (equal %).  
Most have secondary or post-secondary education.  
Around half are students (that also might be employed). |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cluster Group</th>
<th>Formal Citizenship</th>
<th>Group Demographics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>principle, but difficult in practice.</td>
<td>Most have professional occupations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Most are not interested in politics.</td>
<td>More Estonian citizens reside in Tallinn than in Narva.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Most cited political concerns include education, economy, and corruption.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Citizens</td>
<td>Russian citizens acquired their status as either a last resort for legal residency in Estonia and/or because of a Russian connection (family, heritage, travel). Some would rather have Estonian citizenship.</td>
<td>Russian citizens are the second largest group.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Most perceive citizenship’s value as not very important.</td>
<td>The majority of Russian Citizens are female, with slightly more males than the Estonian Citizen group.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Most want birthright citizenship (jus soli).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Most do not agree with having a language exam as part of naturalization.</td>
<td>Ages vary from ~18-79, with the largest age groups consisting of 20-24 and 50-59 (correlates with typical ages of Russian citizens).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Most see naturalization as easy in principle or very difficult.</td>
<td>Most are married.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Most are not very interested in politics, but embody various political issues.</td>
<td>More have upper secondary education than higher education.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Most cited political issues include nationalism (in Estonia), issues related to Russian-speakers, and foreign affairs.</td>
<td>Most have professional occupations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stateless Residents</td>
<td>Stateless residents have not acquired citizenship because of exam difficulties, benefits of statelessness, or resentment of the state and citizenship process.</td>
<td>More are non-students than other groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stateless residents value citizenship more than any other citizenship status group.</td>
<td>More reside in Narva than in Tallinn.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ages range from ~18-69, with the largest age groups being 20-24 and 45-49.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cluster Group</td>
<td>Formal Citizenship</td>
<td>Group Demographics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Most want birthright citizenship (jus soli).</strong></td>
<td>Most are married.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Most agree with having a language exam, although most challenge the strict language requirements.</td>
<td>Most have upper secondary education or higher education (~equal %).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Most view naturalization as easy in principle but also difficult.</td>
<td>Largest share are professionals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stateless residents have the highest interest level in politics.</td>
<td>Most are not students.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Most cited political concerns include citizenship, social welfare, and education.</td>
<td>Nearly equal participants reside in Narva and Tallinn.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tallinn Residents</strong></td>
<td>More Tallinn residents are Estonian citizens than Narva residents.</td>
<td>Tallinn residents comprise around half of participants.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tallinn residents place a higher value on citizenship than any other group.</td>
<td>Most Tallinn residents are female.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Most want birthright citizenship (jus soli).</td>
<td>Ages range from ~18-79, with the largest age groups consisting of 20-24 and 25-29.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Most agree with having a language exam as part of naturalization, although most challenge the strict language requirements.</td>
<td>More Tallinn residents are single than any other marital status group.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Most either view citizenship as easy in principle or difficult.</td>
<td>Nearly equal numbers have upper secondary education and higher education.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Most are not very interested in politics.</td>
<td>Have the largest share of professional occupations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Most cited political concerns include economy, nationalism, corruption, and education.</td>
<td>Slightly more are students than non-students.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Narva Residents</strong></td>
<td>More Narva residents are Estonian citizens than other statuses, but have higher numbers of Russian</td>
<td>More Tallinn residents are Estonian citizens than other citizenship status groups.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Narva residents comprise around half of participants.
While Russian-speakers remain largely absent from formal citizenship’s construction by the Estonian state and/or were made stateless as a result of post-independent restorationist and ethnocratic state shifts in citizenship construction, most Russian-speakers have obtained some legal status that allows them to legally reside in Estonia. Around half of Russian-speakers have acquired Estonian citizenship (through various means), while the other half have either acquired Russian citizenship and/or Stateless status, both of which have limited rights in Estonia. Underlying rationales behind citizenship acquisition and status vary, although most argue that it is difficult to obtain Estonian citizenship or only easy in theory and not in practice. The perceived difficulty is often connected to the strict language requirements associated with the naturalization process, which many Russian-speakers (particularly those who are older or live in
Narva) see as stressful and a major obstacle to citizenship. Regardless of perceived difficulty, Russian-speakers overwhelmingly view citizenship as a status that should automatically be ascribed at birth (*jus soli*) with Estonian citizens and Narva residents having the highest response percentages. When it comes to the value or valorization of citizenship, the majority of Russian-speakers perceive citizenship as somewhat important ("Important" (36%) and "Not very important" (29%)) with more Narva residents and Russian citizens emphasizing the later and Estonian citizens, Stateless residents, and Tallinn residents emphasizing the former. While formal citizenship status and values vary, most Russian-speakers are wary of politics with limited political interest, but do share political concerns and interests, often related to their ethno-linguistic population and perceived ethnolinguistic inequalities. Additionally, Russian-speakers’ responses highlight their critiques and/or rejection of citizenship *doxa* and illustrate how and why Russian-speakers recognize (rather than misrecognize) the various relational and spatial inequities of Estonian formal citizenship. The shared perceptions and divergent response patterns of formal citizenship contribute to and coalesce with citizenship practices and identities associated with informal or substantive citizenship. While I delineate formal and substantive here, it is important to recognize their mutually constitutive-ness as enmeshed aspects of citizenship capital. In this following chapter, I build upon the noted findings and address how and why Estonian Russian-speakers embody and/or engage citizenship’s substantive form.
Chapter 6: Analysis of Substantive Citizenship

Citizenship means a great deal to me…I can go freely to England to visit my daughter without a visa because a visa is very expensive. I only participated in the voting for the first time this year because earlier you couldn’t vote if you weren’t a citizen. I want to actively participate in life in Estonia. So I want to get citizenship. (Narva Interviewee 3, personal communication, October 21, 2013)

Introduction

In this chapter, I explore citizenship capital in its substantive sense. Substantive citizenship is also referred to as informal and/or active citizenship. Citizenship in its substantive sense tends to be equated with action and citizenship practices; however, this interpretation ignores the underlying actions associated with the construction of citizenship and denies its dynamism (Preece & Mosweunyane, 2004). Thus, citizenship is not just formal and bound to legal, political, and territorial spaces and/or relations. Substantive citizenship refers to the ability of a citizen to act, be recognized, and respected as a citizen both by others and the nation-state (Bauder, 2006, 2008; Staeheli, 1999). According to Ehrkamp and Jacobsen (2015), this multidimensional and polyvalent understanding of citizenship that incorporates both formal and substantive aspects, “expands the concept to include also social practices, thereby shifting the focus from the state’s influence on people’s everyday lives to the ways in which people themselves become political and frequently challenge the state” (p. 155). This conceptualization of substantive citizenship incorporates citizenship practices and identities that are inculcated and performed through citizenship. This multifaceted conceptualization highlights the state construction of citizenship and also how citizens (and/or denizens) practice and engage through substantive or active citizenship (whether it reinforces or challenges that state). Formal citizenship as outlined in the previous chapter is a mutually constitutive aspect of citizenship and
impacts and is impacted by substantive citizenship. Additionally, while formal citizenship spatially embeds citizenship and citizens in particular spaces of citizenship, substantive citizenship positions or locates citizenship, “in communities and everyday practices of citizenship” (Staeheli et. al., 2012, p. 638). Building upon this practice and identity-oriented aspect of citizenship, I examine how Estonian Russian-speakers practice, engage, and identify themselves in relation to citizenship and the state. Like my analysis of formal citizenship, citizenship practices and identities incorporate understandings, dispositions (habitus), underlying literacies, opportunities, and accessibilities of citizenship and state political processes (Bauder, 2006, 2008; Bloemraad, 2006). By examining substantive citizenship, I bring to the fore how and why Russian-speakers engage as citizens and non-citizens through their own practices and identities. This differs from my examination of formal citizenship in that substantive citizenship highlights the variety of ways in which citizens and non-citizens alike participate and function as political agents in their everyday lives, and (spatial and relational) political communities (Ehrkamp & Jacobsen, 2015; Staeheli, 1999). Thus, substantive citizenship offers insights into how and why individuals actively inculcate citizen-selves (Janoski & Gran, 2002) and practice citizenship, which may challenge, alter, or reify state-centered formal citizenship. Substantive or active citizenship also allows for challenges, alternatives, and critiques through embodied and enacted individual and/or group citizenship practices and identities. Through an examination of citizenship practices and identities, I critically untangle how citizenship as a form of capital is manifested and illustrated by Russian-speakers’ substantive citizenship.

Estonian independence was achieved through substantive citizenship and various practices associated with the Singing Revolution (Šmidchens, 2014). Substantive citizenship played a key role in how Soviet citizens, regardless of nationality, protested, organized, and fought for Estonian independence and conversely for Soviet unity (Kasekamp, 2010; Šmidchens,
Active citizenship continues to propel post-Soviet Estonian politics and civil society (O’Lear, 1997; Schulze, 2014; D. Smith, 2002; Trimbach, 2014a; Trimbach & O’Lear, 2015). Substantive citizenship is embedded in Estonian political and civic history and institutions and continues to propel post-Soviet Estonian social movements and civil society formation (Berg, 2002; O’Lear, 1997; Sikk, 2006). Thus, this chapter and its findings can be understood as a critical examination of Estonian substantive citizenship and its politicized and ethnicized manifestations among Estonia’s Russian-speaking population.

As illustrated by the epigraph of this chapter, residents, regardless of citizenship status, recognize the multidimensionality of citizenship, which includes citizenship’s substantive aspect. Although this particular interviewee is a Narva resident with Russian citizenship, this Estonian resident acknowledges the power and resources Estonian citizenship can provide, including participation in political process and the benefit of traveling to other European states without burdensome regulations. Additionally, although this individual is a Russian-speaker and Russian citizen residing just across the Narva River from the Russian Federation, they emphasize their involvement in Estonian citizenship practices and spaces and voice their interest in Estonian formal citizenship rather than Russian. This Russian-speaker’s statement challenges and conflicts with Estonian state ethnocratic and restorationist constructed citizenship capital as a valued resource for, of, and by an ethnicized Estonian population. This individual’s understanding of citizenship highlights the heterogeneity of Russian-speakers’ citizenship perceptions and practices and brings to the fore the notion that Russian-speakers who are formal Russian citizens and reside near Russia, still maintain political and spatial attachments to Estonia and the local spaces of everyday life. This interviewee among others elucidated in this chapter, convey through multisite (Narva and Tallinn) and multi-group (Estonian citizens, Russian citizens, and Stateless residents) surveys and interviews, how and why Russian-speakers substantively or
actively embody and enact as citizens. Based on the conceptual premise that citizenship capital is primarily constructed by the state and is legally, politically, and territorially buttressed by nationalized, ethnicized, and politicized logic and geopolitical discourse and practice, I examine the substantive citizenship among the Estonian Russian-speaking population. By addressing the substantive citizenship of Russian-speakers, I critically untangle how Estonian state constructed citizenship capital is manifested and impacts the Russian-speaking population and is illustrated through Russian-speaking citizenship perceptions, practices, and identities. In order to critically examine the relationships among citizenship, residency, and political power, I address the following research questions, some of which are also examined in the previous analysis chapter:

1. How is citizenship practiced and perceived by minority populations of disparate citizenship statuses and spatial communities?
2. How do minority communities (Russian-speakers) of disparate citizenship statuses valorize (value) citizenship?
3. How do minority communities challenge, reinforce, or alter state constructed citizenship?
4. How do local perceptions and practices of citizenship influence communities’ perceptions and practices of multiscalar political processes, relations, and spaces?
5. How does citizenship and place of residence impact spatial identity among Russian-speaking Estonians?

I critically examine these analytical questions (for a complete list of questions see Chapter 1) in order to illuminate the spatial and relational aspects of substantive citizenship, particularly in relation to the state. Based on the politicized and ethnicized context of how, who, and why the Estonian state constructs (formal) citizenship capital, I hypothesize that citizenship capital impacts or factors into the substantive citizenship of Estonian Russian-speakers. I am particularly interested and expect that citizenship capital has an array of multifaceted impacts on
substantive citizenship that in turn reinforce, alter, and/or challenge Estonian state constructed citizenship. I hypothesize that citizenship capital impacts or factors into Estonian Russian-speakers’ citizenship practices in civic and political opportunities and spaces, perceptions of substantive citizenship and substantive citizenship’s valorization, and spatial identities. I also explore whether or not formal citizenship status and place of residency impact how Estonian Russian-speakers maintain, alter, and/or challenge current state-based constructions of substantive citizenship. Overall, if Estonian restorationist and ethnocratic logic informs citizenship capital construction, this ethicized and politicized logic should also be evident in how substantive citizenship is manifested and reflected by Estonian Russian-speakers’ embodiment and enactment of citizenship, with an emphasis on practices and identities.

In this chapter, I highlight various components of substantive citizenship including: citizenship practices; valorization (value) of substantive citizenship; state/political representativeness at multiple political scales; state/political accessibility at multiple political scales; and lastly the relationship between citizenship and spatial identity. I illustrate these components via citizenship narratives that coalesce survey and interview data that address each component by large group (all Russian-speakers) and then by cluster group (by citizenship status and residency). The overall findings with a cluster table are described in the final section.

Citizenship Practices

Estonian Russian-speakers enact an array of citizenship practices (Table 8). Formal citizenship does delineate groups and limits certain citizenship practices to particular groups (Estonian citizens, Russian citizens, Stateless residents) in a differentiated system, including, but not limited to: public sector employment, holding public office, belonging to a political party, engaging in civil society, forming CSOs, and participating in local, national (Estonian and/or Russian), and supranational (European Union) electoral politics (Eesti Vabariigi põheseadus;
Kodakonduse seadus; Feldman, 2005; Gelazis, 2004; Human Rights Watch, 2015; Järve, 2005; Järve & Poleshchuk, 2010, 2013; Mittertundusühingute seadus; Visek, 1997; Välismaalaste seadus). While there are certain limitations, the majority of surveyed Russian-speakers do engage in some sort of citizenship practice or set of practices. Formal status limitations illustrate one of many ways in which formal and substantive citizenship overlap; however, as illustrated by the results and narratives outlined in this section, formal and substantive citizenship are incongruent and polyvalent. This incongruence and polyvalence allows for the forming of alternative citizenship spaces and engaging in practices detached from the state.

Table 8

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Citizenship Practices</th>
<th>Estonian Citizens</th>
<th>Russian Citizens</th>
<th>Stateless Residents</th>
<th>Tallinn Residents</th>
<th>Narva Residents</th>
<th>All Groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I vote in local Estonian elections</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I vote in national Estonian elections</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I vote in national Russian elections</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I vote in EU elections</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I read or watch political news</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I participate in social organizations</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I protest</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I write letters to political leaders or officials</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I engage in political party activities</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am a member of a political party</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am a member of a political organization</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am a government official</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I work for the government</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I do not participate in political or social life</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Survey respondents were asked to respond to the closed-ended question, “How do you participate in politics or public life?” with the option for multiple responses in addition to an “other” option where they could list other actions that they perform. As illustrated by Table 8, the most commonly shared citizenship practice among all Russian-speakers is voting and participating in electoral processes, particularly at the local and national levels. Other commonly shared practices include passively reading/watching political news and participating in social organizations (civil society organizations, CSOs). A minority of Russian-speakers noted that they do not participate in politics or public life, notably Russian citizens and Stateless residents. The results indicate that electoral participation is the most common citizenship practice among Estonian Russian-speakers, regardless of group. The types of practices highlighted in Table 8 are described and reiterated by additional data sources and the interviewee narratives. As such, I address and expand upon the variety of citizenship practices in greater detail in the following subsections.

**Electoral Politics & Practices**

The variation in voting patterns and responses is partially bound to Estonian electoral politics and formal citizenship (Crowther & Matonye, 2007; Khrychikov & Miall, 2002; Laatsit,
Estonian local elections are open to all citizenship status groups and all legal residents of Estonia are automatically registered to vote in elections (with limitations depending on status) (Tolvaišis, 2011; Laatsit, 2013). Non-citizen local voting rights were adopted in 1992 in the Estonian Constitution; however, the policy was open to differing legal interpretations, which required additional legal provisions (Cianetti, 2014). This policy was rearticulated in the Kohaliku omavalitsuse volikogu valimise seadus [Local Government Council Election Act] in 1996 (Laatsit, 2013; Cianetti, 2014) (later replaced by an updated version in 2002) and coalesces well with current shifts in European Union electoral policy norms (Groenendijk, 2008). As of 2008, Estonia was one of 17 countries with local voting policies that target non-citizens (Groenendijk, 2008). While local elections are open to non-citizens (as voters and not as candidates), national and EU elections are limited to Estonian citizens (national and EU elections) and other EU citizens (only EU elections). These limitations are partially reflected in the survey results, with Russian citizens and Stateless residents participating less in elections.

While, it is challenging to analyze electoral data and draw targeted conclusions based on groups, it is possible based on county (residency groups) and election type (since every election type is limited to particular citizenship status groups). Based on electoral data gathered from the Vabariiri Valimiskomisjon [National Electoral Committee] (2012, 2015) from 1992-2015, electoral patterns emerge that parallel the response patterns of the survey respondents (Table 9; this Table does not include votes from abroad or e-votes). Citizens/residents participate in greater numbers in local and national elections than in EU elections. Ida-Viru County (Narva) saw the highest percentages of voter turnout in the first two local elections with subsequent decline and saw the lowest percentages of voter turnout in the past 4 national elections compared to any other county. The National Electoral Committee data (2012, 2015) also reflect the overall national trend in voter decline among the Estonian electorate and a shared distrust of political parties.
(Saarts, 2015; Tolvaišis, 2011; Toomla, 2005), but also illustrate local distinctions. The steep decline in voter turnout overtime in Ida-Viru County partially reflects the outmigration of Ida-Viru residents (voters), naturalization of Russian-speakers and increase in a non-participatory electorate, and disinterest and/or distrust of electoral party politics, particularly at the national level.

Table 9


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election</th>
<th>Harju County</th>
<th>Ida-Viru County</th>
<th>Country Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local Election 1993</td>
<td>54.2%</td>
<td>65.9% (highest)</td>
<td>52.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Election 1996</td>
<td>55.1%</td>
<td>67.8% (highest)</td>
<td>52.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Election 1999</td>
<td>54.2%</td>
<td>48.2%</td>
<td>49.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Election 2002</td>
<td>56.8%</td>
<td>50.8%</td>
<td>52.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Election 2005</td>
<td>51.1%</td>
<td>50.4%</td>
<td>47.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Election 2009</td>
<td>64.1%</td>
<td>57.9%</td>
<td>60.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Election 2013</td>
<td>60.1%</td>
<td>51.6%</td>
<td>57.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Election 1992 (voting districts 1-5 (Harjumaa only))</td>
<td>70.9%</td>
<td>70.9%</td>
<td>67.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Election 1995</td>
<td>69.8%</td>
<td>66.5%</td>
<td>68.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Election 1999</td>
<td>58.2%</td>
<td>57.9%</td>
<td>57.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Election 2003</td>
<td>59.7%</td>
<td>52.2% (lowest)</td>
<td>58.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Election 2007</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>51.7% (lowest)</td>
<td>61.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Election 2011</td>
<td>68.9%</td>
<td>56.1% (lowest)</td>
<td>63.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Election 2015</td>
<td>69.8%</td>
<td>55% (lowest)</td>
<td>64.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Election 2004</td>
<td>28.2%</td>
<td>23.7%</td>
<td>26.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Election 2009</td>
<td>48.4%</td>
<td>46.1%</td>
<td>43.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Election 2014</td>
<td>39.9%</td>
<td>30.7%</td>
<td>36.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992 Referendum (Constitution)</td>
<td>71.4%</td>
<td>75.2% (highest)</td>
<td>66.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003 Referendum (EU Accession)</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>55.9% (lowest)</td>
<td>64.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This low interest in national electoral politics and political parties, is also reflected in the low response rate associated with political party membership (4%) and political party activities (3%) (highest among Estonian citizens (5%) and Tallinn residents (5%)). According to the Estonian National Electoral Committee (2012), 106 political parties, organizations, and associations have participated in local, national, and EU elections. Based on a rough assessment...
of the list (National Electoral Committee, 2012) with the assistance of Estonian political party analyses (Bennich-Björkman, 2011; Khrychikov & Miall, 2002; Krupavičius, 2005; Lansford, 2015; Pettai & Hallik, 2002; Pettai & Toomla, 2003; Saarts, 2015; Tolvačiūs, 2011; Toomla, 2005) and given the limitation that many political parties or organizations have emerged, merged, collapsed, and been renamed since 1992, an estimated 8 Russian-speaking political parties and 2 mainstream political parties with considerable Russian-speaking inclusivity and favorability have formed since independence (Table 10).

Table 10

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Parties with Russian-speaking Inclusivity &amp; Favorability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Russian-speaking Political Parties</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonian United People’s Party (Eestimaa Ühendatud Rahvapartei)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constitution Party (Konstitutsioonierakond)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Our Home is Estonia (Meie Kodu on Eestimaa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Party of Estonia (Vene Erakond Eestis)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian People’s Party of Estonia (Eesti Vene Rahvapartei)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Democratic Movement in Estonia (Eestimaa Vene Demokraatlik Liikumine)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Baltic Party in Estonia (Vene Balti Erakond Eestis)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Unity Party (Vene Ühtsuspartei)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mainstream Political Parties with Russian-speaking Inclusivity &amp; Favorability</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centre Party (Eesti Keskerakond)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Democratic Party (Sotsiaaldemokraatlik Erakond)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although Russian-speaking political parties achieved marginal electoral successes during the 1990s (particularly at the local level in Tallinn and Narva), these parties have declined in influence and/or have withdrawn from the local and national electoral landscape. This withdraw or collapse is largely due to high official party membership requirements (1,000) required by law (highest in the Baltics), national electoral threshold (5%) needed for party representation in a legislative body, cooptation of Russian-speaking political parties and groups by mainstream political parties (particularly the Centre Party), and infighting among a weak Russian-speaking political elite (Khrychikov & Miall, 2002; Krupavičius, 2005; Pettai & Toomla, 2003; Saarts,
2015; Toomla, 2005; Trimbach, 2014a). As a partial result and factor in Russian-speaking party decline, the majority of Russian-speakers have voted for the mainstream Centre Party, led by controversial leader and mayor of Tallinn Edgar Savisaar (Lansford, 2015; Pettai & Toomla, 2003; Saarts, 2015). While the Centre Party continues to incorporate Russian-speakers and their respective votes, minor shifts are taking place among the Russian-speaking electorate. Firstly, the Social Democratic Party is becoming more inclusive and engaging as a potential rival to the Centre Party (Ammas, 2014). Secondly, a new local faction of the Centre Party has formed in Narva aimed at addressing local Narva concerns and interests (Värk, 2015). United Narva (Единая Нарва, Ühtne Narva) was formed in November 2015 and its platform and any potential association with Russian political party United Russia remains to be seen (Värk, 2015). Russian-speakers distrust of and lack of party membership highlights Estonia’s “anti-party” political system; however, this distrust of political parties may be exacerbated among the Russian-speaking minority (Schulze, 2014).

I experienced firsthand Russian-speaking electoral politics and participation on October 20, 2013, as an official independent election observer for Narva’s local elections (Figure 4, p. 202). As part of my participant observation experience, I was able to observe electoral processes at 7 polling stations, including 4 schools, 1 Soviet-era recreation center/club, 1 municipal community center, and lastly 1 youth activity center where I observed ballots being counted (post-voting). As an observer with local colleagues enmeshed within the community and local electorate, I had opportunities to witness the dynamism of electoral processes that primarily consisted of Russian-speakers voting for local candidates of their choosing. While it would be exhaustive to go into great detail about my experiences, I did observe and participate in some notable occurrences and activities that contribute to the survey response patterns and highlight local citizenship practices among Russian-speakers in Narva.
During my time as an election observer in Narva, I recognized the diverse range in gender and age of the Russian-speaking electorate, which reflected that of the population at large. I also recognized the utilization of the Estonian language in the voting process (as illustrated by Figure 4) and Russian language as the primary language of conversation (and public life in Narva). Russian-speakers in Narva have adopted strategies to fully participate in an electoral process that utilizes a language (Estonian) many people do not use as a first and/or second language. Many Russian-speakers memorize, write down (on hands or paper), or even discuss (at the polling station) the candidate’s associated number (candidates are numbered on candidate/party lists in Estonian elections) prior to voting. Voters who forgot their candidate’s number would ask others with similar party leanings while voting (making for an awkward
voting environment). While language limitations did not appear to be a major impediment to most voters because of these strategies, one Russian-speaking voter did become irate at one polling station (Estonian language school). The voter asked and later yelled about not understanding the ballot and voting instructions since all materials were in the Estonian language (repeating, “I don’t understand!” and “I don’t know the Estonian language!”). The polling station workers called the police to arrest the voter; however, the voter left prior to their arrival. This occurrence illustrated the frustrations of voting in the national and official language of politics and citizenship in a region and among a population that utilizes Russian as a primary and everyday language.

Other notable occurrences include: observing completed ballots being counted/recorded; completed ballots being lost/missing (and not reported in the media); a Centre Party candidate angrily observing the counting of their own ballots (and same candidate not wanting independent observers present at the polling station); and the improper and potentially illegal exchange of a “packet” or bagged item(s) (possibly ballots) through a window (after the polling station was closed and no longer open to the general public) at the counting polling station (in an off-limits office), which required the halting of ballot counting and the investigation by the Estonian police (who interviewed all witnesses, including me) and National Electoral Committee. Following the voting observations, I was able to attend three political party parties (from across the Estonian political spectrum) held by successful and unsuccessful parties following the results.

The interviewee citizenship narratives also support the noted electoral/political data, survey responses, survey response patterns, and my own participant-observation experiences. Most interviewees noted that they do vote, especially at the local and/or national scales. One Narva resident with Estonian citizenship stated that, “Uh, well I voted in elections once…it was local” (Narva Interviewee 13, personal communication, October 7, 2013). This point was
reiterated by another Narva resident with Estonian citizenship, who opined that, “I am going to vote [in upcoming 2013 elections], so I vote in the national elections…” (Narva Interviewee 7, personal communication, October 16, 2013). While most Russian-speaking interviewees mentioned their electoral participation, some Russian-speakers voiced criticism of local voting policies and national election laws. One Tallinn resident with Stateless status noted that:

> You must understand that one falsification that the Estonian government makes, they always say, it is not a problem because people with Alien passports [stateless status] can participate in local elections, but this isn’t true. What does it mean by participation? I think participation is when I can be elected…I can put my candidacy towards elections and I can be elected or work in administration. I can vote in local elections, but I cannot be elected because we have a law which blocks and makes forbidden that I work in the administrative system because I only have an Alien passport and that I have permanent residency…So, I can say that we cannot fully participate in Estonian elections and politics. Full participation. So, I publish my articles in newspapers, that is one way. A second way is in different round tables [discussions]. I participate in many conferences that have very big public advertisements. In this case, every time I show what the Russian-speakers are thinking and how they see. And how in the opinion of Russian-speakers, something should change…So, I say that the new generation will change it. This is just a political game of the old generation. (Tallinn Interviewee 6, personal communication, October 4, 2013)

Overall, this interviewee and my own participant-observation experience highlights the impacts of national ethnic politics and restorationism on local politics and electoral process, particularly the strategies/practices used by Russian-speakers to stay engaged as citizens or residents in electoral processes and the frustration and/or democratic deficiencies of a locality.
that consists of a population marginalized within the national political landscape and positions of political power. While Narva’s election was smooth and evinced the vibrancy of local electoral politics, the notable incidences I encountered illustrate the challenges and obstacles Russian-speakers, particularly in Narva face within the broader political and electoral processes, relations, and spaces created for and by the state. While local voting laws at first glance undermine Estonian restorationist geopolitics and ethnocratic nationalizing processes and citizenship construction (Cianetti, 2014), Estonian electoral policies in their entirety have been understood by the above interviewee (Tallinn Interviewee 6, personal communication, October 4, 2013) and other scholars as forms of institutional control (of ethnic politics) (Pettai & Hallik, 2002), conflict prevention (Khrychikov & Miall, 2002), political party cooptation of minority political issues and voters (Tolvaïšis, 2011), all of which coalesce with citizenship as a form of capital. Additionally, mainstream political parties have slowly incorporated Russian-speakers into party organizations and positions of power, most notably the Centre Party. While the incorporation of Russian-speakers and Russian-speaking agendas into mainstream politics is a positive sign, Pettai and Hallik (2002) state that the majority of Estonian politicians, “view the Russians as a largely peripheral force to be used when a few extra votes were needed, but not to be relied upon for the longer term” (p. 514). Thus, the lack of political incorporation can be interpreted as an affect of citizenship capital construction and the inability of Russian-speakers to access and exchange citizenship as a resource for other resources, like electoral participation opportunities and political capital.

Civil Society Organizations & Non-State Practices

Although Russian-speakers are active in political spaces and practices associated with the state (such as electoral spaces and practices), Russian-speakers also engage in and/or have created their own alternative non-state citizenship spaces, which include civil society
organizations (CSOs), informal groups/clubs, and/or virtual spaces used for civic dialogue and engagement (O’Lear, 1996, 1997, 1999; Tallinn Interviewee 9, personal communication, November 9, 2013; Tiidenberg & Allaste, 2016; Trummal & Lagerspetz, 2004). While non-citizens are barred from forming and/or joining political parties, legal residents regardless of citizenship have the ability to form CSOs (Kaldur, Sutrop, & Kallas 2011; Mittetulundusühingute seadus, 1996; Pettai & Toomla, 2003). Legally, Estonian CSOs are categorized as: non-profit associations, foundations, and non-profit partnerships (informal and do not require official registration) (Trummal & Lagerspetz, 2004). As of 2009, there were over 28,000-registered CSOs (includes defunct organizations) (Eesti Mittetulundusühingute ja Sihtasutuste Liit, 2009). Data and research on Russian-speaking CSOs is limited (Lagerspetz, Rikmann, & Ruutsoo, 2004; Tallinn Interviewee 9, personal communication, November 9, 2013); however, Russian-speakers have formed a wide variety of registered and unregistered CSOs (clubs/groups) catering to Russian-speakers and their local, religious, cultural, social, religious, and political interests (Kaldur et. al., 2011; Lagerspetz, 2005).

While the Registite ja Infosüsteemide Keskus [Centre of Registers and Information Systems, an agency of the Ministry of Justice], which maintains a list of officially registered CSOs is not (completely) publicly accessible, other CSOs and CSO networks do provide a glimpse at the quantity and types of Russian-speaking organizations that are active in Estonia. There are numerous online CSO networks listing Russian-speaking organizations; however, for the purpose of this study, I am solely examining those organizations listed on the Eesti Mittetulundusühingute ja Sihtasutuste Liit (EMSL) [Network of Estonian Nonprofit Organizations, (NENO)] recommended network Etnoweb, which caters specifically to Estonian minority communities and their associated CSOs, additional CSO research/resources, and my own fieldwork experiences with Russian-speaking CSOs (Eesti Mittetulundusühingute ja
According to Etnoweb (2012), there are over 138 CSOs that cater specifically to Russian-speakers (CSOs included cater to Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians, all of which comprise the largest Russian-speaking ethnic groups in Estonia), most of which are located in Tallinn and surrounding Harju County. Such organizations include the Russian Cultural Club in Tallinn, which seeks to foster Russian cultural practices and pride among Estonian Russian-speakers and the cultural and educational group called Sophia in Narva, which seeks to promote Russian culture and language among Russian-speaking youth (Etnoweb, 2012). Most Russian-speaking organizations are cultural or educational; however, alternative CSOs are also active in realms of minority rights (such as the Legal Information Centre for Human Rights based in Tallinn), civic and/or political participation (such as Narva MTÜ based in Narva), and minority inclusion and advocacy (such as EMSL) (Etnoweb, 2012; Kaldur et. al., 2011; Lagerspetz, 2005;).

In addition to the aforementioned CSO types and organizations, I interacted with two Narva-based CSOs, including an organization that seeks to foster community, citizenship, professional development, and self-advocacy among Russian-speakers over 50 years old in Narva (primarily women) and an organization that defines itself as a social-psychological center that works with individuals with substance abuse problems and/or HIV/AIDS, both of which are major issues in Narva and the surrounding region. Although there is limited research on Russian-speaking CSOs and Russian-speakers overall tend to engage less in CSO activities than their Estonian counterparts (Kaldur et. al., 2011; Schulze, 2014), Russian-speakers are creating and participating in a variety of citizenship spaces and processes, some of which have already been described (Lagerspetz et. al., 2004, p. 41). Such citizenship spaces and processes include those that are material (real, physical), virtual (cyberspace), and/or hybrids (Delanty, 2002; Dougherty
Virtual and/or hybrid spaces include but are not limited to: individual CSO websites (like the Russian Cultural Club); CSO networking sites (like Etnoweb and EMSL); social media sites (particularly Facebook and VKontakte); e-mail and other forms of electronic discussion such as forums or portals (including Russian-language Delfi and Baltija) (Dougherty & Kaljurand, 2015; Narva Interviewee 6, personal communication, September 9, 2013; Narva Interviewee 11, personal communication, October 9, 2013; Narva Interviewee 12, personal communication, October 9, 2013; O’Lear, 1996, 1997, 1999; Tiidenberg & Allaste, 2016). Multiple interviewees mentioned virtual spaces and practices. A Narva resident with Estonian citizenship noted that she is often, “…talking about [politics] on Facebook. Like if people are discussing [politics], like now the elections…” (Narva Interviewee 6, personal communication, September 9, 2013). Two additional Narva residents, one with Estonian citizenship and the other with Stateless status said that virtual spaces, especially blogs and Facebook, impact their citizenship practices and political attitudes (Narva Interviewee 11, personal communication, October 9, 2013; Narva Interviewee 12, personal communication, October 9, 2013). According to Tiidenberg and Allaste (2016), virtual spaces, like Facebook and Twitter, are becoming increasingly popular among Estonians (both ethnic Estonians and Russian-speakers). Tiidenberg and Allaste (2016) also note that Russian-speakers are more apprehensive about virtual participation (such as commenting on Facebook or signing online petitions) than ethnic Estonians, which illustrates their perceived lack of comfort and safety in Estonian society.
Virtual and/or hybrid spaces are impacted by and reinforce the growth of the Estonian e-state (Charles, 2009; Friedman, 2014), the generational Russian-speaker internet usage trends (younger Russian-speakers tend to use the internet for information and interaction more than older Russian-speakers), and the linguistic (Russian-Estonian) bifurcation of media and information spaces that influence and divide Russian-speakers and Estonian-speakers (Dougherty & Kaljurand, 2015; Kaun, 2013; Küün, 2015; Vetik et. al., 2015). As part of the, “Virtual Russian World” (Dougherty & Kaljurand, 2015) Estonian Russian-speakers’ virtual spaces and activities are impacted by often hostile Russian state overtures and narratives related to Estonia, Estonian politics, and other transnational issues, which influence how Estonian Russian-speakers discuss and engage Estonian political and civic topics in both virtual and material spaces (Küün, 2015; Ummelas, 2015). While virtual hostile and critical discussions take place, such virtual discussions rarely translate into material spaces and actualized practices that challenge the Estonian state. As a Narva resident with Estonian citizenship stated:

People would talk about this [critical politics and political practices] and you would see some funny pictures about this [critical politics and political practices] on the internet or Facebook or other portals or many [online] articles, but you wouldn’t see people storming the building of the government. (Narva Interviewee 4, personal communication, September 9, 2013)

As this Narva interviewee suggests, many Russian-speakers actively challenge the Estonian state and its policies in virtual spaces; however, these same individuals are not likely to actively challenge or topple the government. Although this interpretation is largely accurate in practice, the Russian state does influence Estonian Russian-speaker citizenship practices and perceptions of Estonian state politics.
Russian state influence is not only partly evinced through the Bronze Soldier riots of 2007 (Duvold & Berglund, 2014; Kaiser, 2015; Kaitsepolitsei amet, 2007; Legal Information Centre for Human Rights, 2007) and divergent political views among Estonia’s Russian-speaking population (Dougherty & Kaljurand, 2015), but also the emergence of alternative (Estonian-based and transnational) (material, virtual, and/or hybrid) organizations or initiatives that actively challenge the Estonian state or politics (Kaitsepolitsei amet, 2011). According to the Kaitsepolitsei amet [Estonian Internal Security Service], the Russian state actively funds and fosters civic and political mobilization among Russian-speakers in Estonia including through the full or partial funding of CSOs (Kaitsepolitsei amet, 2008, 2010, 2011). Such organizations include Nochnoi Dozor [Night Watch] (not to be confused with the Russian films of the same name), Russian School of Estonia, and the Legal Information Centre for Human Rights. While each organization differs in their purpose and methods, each organization has actively challenged Estonian state politics and citizenship policy (among other policies and issues) through protests, fostering critical dialogue, advocacy, and other forms of collective action. Night Watch in particular was formed by Estonian Russian-speaking activists in response to the potential and later actual removal of the Soviet era World War II monument from central Tallinn (also known as the Bronze Soldier) to a peripheral military cemetery (Mijnssen, 2014). Although the degree of Russian state influence is highly politicized and up to interpretation, the Internal Security Service has declared these organizations, among others, as a potential, “fifth column” threat to Estonian state security and stability (Kaitsepolitsei amet, 2008, 2010, 2011; Bulakh, Tupay, Kaas, Tuohy, Visnapuu, & Kivirähk, 2014; Kivirähk, 2014).

The noted responses and data are also reflected and supported by additional interviewee narratives. The interview data helps fill in the gaps when it comes to how and why Russian-speakers engage in civic activities. While Russian-speakers are considered less active than their
Estonian counterparts (Schulze, 2014), Russian-speakers create and participate in material, virtual (as already noted), and/or hybrid civic and political spaces. This was supported by an active Narva resident with Estonian citizenship (referencing the local elections) noted that:

I participate in debate [through debate CSOs and schools]. I teach the subject of debate and have participated in debate in Estonia for 13 years. Of course topics come up like social-political topics and to discuss these topics, of course you have to have your own point of view and I have one. Right now with these elections, I have been invited to be a public observer. For the elections on the 20th October in Estonia, I was invited to be a public observer. I can go to the elections and see if they are carried out honestly. So in one way or another I participate in social struggles. I participated in a meeting last year when the teachers were picketing for higher salaries. So if I feel it is my obligation, I take part. I am not very active, but I do participate. (Narva interviewee 9, personal communication, October 6, 2013)

This interviewee describes in detail the various ways in which they are active in civic and political process. They also acknowledge the feeling of participation as an obligation and necessity, which highlights the relationship between formal and substantive citizenship. While Estonian citizens may have more opportunities to engage in formal political and electoral processes, Russian-speakers with alternative statuses noted that they vote and participate in local elections and other forms of engagement. A Narva resident and Russian citizen explained that:

I participate very actively. I’m an officer for the…club [CSO]…I always vote, I never miss an election, I am not indifferent to the issues here in Estonia, so I always vote. I study the issues and candidates. (Narva Interviewee 2, personal communication, October 21, 2013)

Additionally, a Narva resident with Stateless status noted that:
Actually I do not participate in any political organization, but I am supporting some NGOs [CSOs] and always, I am involved at the middle level of the Estonian politics that are not controlled by the parties…I am also writing some columns and some opinions. I am taking part in some discussions. (Narva Interviewee 14, personal communication, October 14, 2013)

The two noted interviewees highlight that formal citizenship cannot necessarily be equated with participation and that Russian citizens and Stateless residents are politically interested and engaged within their communities.

Thus, although there are formal limitations and restrictions for official state sanctioned citizenship practices and spaces, Russian-speakers are still active citizens and/or residents. All interviewees mentioned that they participate in some form with no interviewee suggesting that they do not participate in politics or public life. Additionally, although Russian-speakers are considered less active within civil society and CSO activities (Schulze, 2014; Tiidenberg & Allaste, 2016), Russian-speakers do participate in virtual, material, and/or hybrid citizenship spaces and activities, some of which are associated with formal and/or informal CSOs that reinforce, alter, and or actively challenge the Estonian state. These findings suggest more robust research is needed on Estonian Russian-speakers’ alternative citizenship practices (particularly related to Russian-speaking CSOs), virtual citizenship spaces/activities, and for more civic and political opportunities for those who want to engage.

Substantive Citizenship’s Value

Citizenship practices, regardless of citizenship status, partly illustrate how Estonian Russian-speakers perceive and value the political spaces, processes, and relations they are apart and embody. While many citizenship practices overall appear to be restricted and curtailed by the Estonian state, Russian-speakers do engage or participate. Citizenship practices are an
essential aspect of democratic processes and civil societies (Bloemraad, 2006; Canache, 2012; Hays, 2007; Holston, 2008; Isin, 2002; Preece, J., & Mosweunyane, 2004). In order to unravel how Estonian Russian-speakers perceive and value substantive citizenship, substantive citizenship was broadly defined as, “participation in politics and civic life” in both survey and interview questions for clarity. When asked to valorize or place a value of substantive citizenship the vast majority of surveyed Russian-speakers stated that substantive citizenship is either “very important” (40%) or “important” (45%) (85% combined) (Table 11). When groups were taken into account, minor response patterns emerged, including Stateless residents perceiving substantive citizenship as more important (93% combined) than other groups and conversely, Russian citizens perceiving substantive citizenship as less important (76% combined) than other groups.

Table 11

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Very important</th>
<th>Important</th>
<th>Not very important</th>
<th>Not at all important</th>
<th>Difficult to answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Estonian Citizens</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Citizens</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stateless Residents</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tallinn Residents</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narva Residents</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Groups</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This response pattern differs markedly from how Russian-speakers value and perceive formal citizenship. As noted in the previous chapter, when asked to determine formal citizenship’s “importance” Russian-speakers overall consider citizenship to be primarily “Important” (36%) or “Not very important” (29%) with distinct group patterns and differences (Table 2). This noted difference illustrates the conceptual polyvalence of citizenship and how
individuals perceive and value the various aspects differently. The survey results suggest that Russian-speakers perceive and value substantive citizenship more than formal citizenship. This is an interesting finding in that substantive citizenship is only partially constructed and impacted by the state, since residents regardless of formal legal status can engage as citizens or in citizen-like activities and create their own citizenship spaces disconnected from the state, like local CSOs.

Similar response patterns and valorizations were expressed during the interviews. The majority of interviewees voiced that substantive citizenship is valued with varying levels of importance. This sentiment was shared by a Tallinn resident with Estonian citizenship who also actively works with the Russian-speaking population to foster a greater sense of civic and political responsibility through the work of a national CSO. This Tallinn resident stated that, “It is very important because they [people in general] all are important parts of a society and their participation is needed for a balanced social life and its balanced sustainable development” (Tallinn Interviewee 9, personal communication, November 9, 2013). This sentiment of substantive citizenship having value highlights the relationships among residency, being a part of society, and political participation. A Narva resident with Russian citizenship also expressed this shared attitude:

Of course it’s important that people say how the government leaders are doing. Earlier you would meet with leaders, but not anymore. A person would be elected and you could meet with them and ask questions and see how they were doing. Before the elections they always make promises and then there’s no contact with them afterward like there used to be. You can’t say, ‘You promised such and such. Did you do it or not?’ They should have that connection with us again. (Narva Interviewee 2, personal communication, October 21, 2013)
Although most interviewed Russian-speakers shared a perception of substantive citizenship’s value or importance to Estonian society and politics, many voiced skepticism and critiques of substantive citizenship in Estonia. Such skepticism and critique was voiced by a Narva resident and Estonian citizen who noted that:

It is important because…they [citizens/residents] can change something…Here [Estonia] it doesn’t work like that…They don’t know who they are. They are not active enough. They are not self confident…Here, it is another way. People are a bit afraid to go to the streets because you know this…soldier [Bronze soldier incident in 2007]…there were lots of accidents and some people disappeared actually after all of these things because the Estonian government and police were actually striking back very hard. This was…everyone remembers from this example from our [Russian population] side. On the other, I guess they are just not confident enough because they think if I don’t go, nothing will change, then…or if I go there will only be 15 other people and that is how it happens actually. If they want to strike or do something like that, not many people gather together. They are not active enough and that is the point. So they should be. And maybe they are not active enough because they don’t know their positions, are they Russians, are they Estonians, and the government is not this national identity or idea it doesn’t exist. (Narva Interviewee 12, personal communication, October 4, 2013)

This interviewee emphasizes the importance of substantive citizenship, but at the same time criticizes this aspect of citizenship in Estonian society and political life. This interviewee was not alone in stating that while active citizenship is valued and important, in reality and through practice, Estonian Russian-speakers and Estonian residents as a whole are not as engaged as other Europeans. This sentiment was shared and reflected by another Narva resident with Estonian citizenship, who opined that:
Naturally if we have an active society, then ideas of democracy will spread throughout the country. But right now I can say that in Estonia, an active citizenship is not very developed. People don’t believe in the local government, they don’t believe in the government in Tallinn. Because they [government] don’t listen to any of their [people’s] concerns. They don’t carry out referendums. For example, important questions like transitioning students from Russian to Estonian in school, these questions were never discussed with the population. Everything is done by the higher authorities. People don’t believe in the trade unions because the trade unions are very weak and after the fall of the Soviet Union, their powers were taken away. So if people were active, life would be better. I don’t mean it would be ideal, but it would be better for people. There aren’t enough young people in Estonia because many of them are leaving the country [internal EU migration]. The people who are staying are already retirement age and don’t want to participate anymore. So there is very little activity among the young people. People have food, have a place to live, so they think, ‘I’ll just keep living like I am.’ In order to actively participate, you have to sacrifice something, like sacrifice some of your free time for others. Not everyone wants to do that. (Narva Interviewee 9, personal communication, October 6, 2013)

What do these findings indicate? While formal citizenship has more variation in how it is valued, Russian-speakers perceive and engage substantive citizenship as a valued aspect of political life and process. Although Russian-speaking Estonians do not necessarily engage in alternative non-state civic or political activities, most consider citizenship practices as important. This shared valorization of substantive citizenship is supported by the variety of Russian-speakers’ citizenship practices outlined in the aforementioned subsection and challenges other scholarship that equates Russian-speakers with a lack of political and civic understanding and
engagement (Lagerspetz, 2005; Schulze, 2014). Additionally, although Russian-speakers value substantive citizenship, most are critical and skeptical of citizenship opportunities, processes, and spaces that are entwined with the Estonian state. Thus, although Russian-speakers value substantive citizenship, most consider substantive citizenship as weak and problematic in Estonia.

**Citizenship & State Representativeness**

The representation of immigrants and other minority groups in state politics and power matters (Bloemraad, 2006, 2013; Bloemraad & Suchönwälder, 2013). Minority representation in state political process, and power illustrate minority political equity, acceptance and integration of minority groups, substantive citizenship and decision-making power of minorities, and the time-space contingency of minority-majority relations and research (Bloemraad, 2013). According to Bloemraad and Suchönwälder (2013), “Immigrant and minority representation also carries important symbolic and normative implications related to the legitimacy of political parties and, more broadly, the entire political system of the state” (p. 565). Tolvaišis (2011) notes that minority representation, “can have important implications for the country’s stability” and if ethnic minority concerns, “remain salient and both ethnic and no ethnic parties prove limited representedness of the ethnic group, the latter can demonstrate loss of interest in participating in elections and look for alternative nonelectoral forms of political participation (exit, protest and violence)” (p. 110). Minority representation also highlights the accessibility of citizenship capital, state politics, and power in practice, which in turn may influence how minorities perceive the state. I examine representativeness of state politics, positions, and power at multiple political/state scales (emphasis on local, Estonian national, Russian national, and EU) by analyzing how Russian-speakers perceive state representativeness and accessibility at a multiplicity of political/jurisdictional scales of citizenship. When asked to evaluate the
representativeness (“How representative are the following levels of government or politics?”) of multiscalar state political spaces, response patterns emerged among Russian-speakers as a whole (Table 12) and among groups (Tables 13-17). Russian-speakers regardless of citizenship status or place of residency, tend to embody negative perceptions overall of state/political representativeness, with the majority of responses following under “Adequately to some extent representative,” “Inadequately representative,” and/or “Not representative.” Similar mixed, yet negative perceptions of representativeness emerged in relation to Estonian national and European Union politics/state processes; while Russian-speakers overall tend perceive local state/political spaces and processes as more representative than any other political spaces at other scales. Russian-speakers also perceive Russian national state/politics as the least representative compared to all other state/political spaces and processes.

Table 12

Perceived State Representativeness of All Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Very representative</th>
<th>Adequately representative</th>
<th>Adequately to some extent representative</th>
<th>Inadequately representative</th>
<th>Not representative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local Estonian</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Estonian</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Russian</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 13

Perceived State Representativeness of Estonian Citizens

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Very adequately representative</th>
<th>Adequately representative</th>
<th>Adequately to some extent representative</th>
<th>Inadequately representative</th>
<th>Not representative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local Estonian</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Estonian</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Russian</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

218
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Very adequately representative</th>
<th>Adequately representative</th>
<th>Adequately to some extent representative</th>
<th>Inadequately representative</th>
<th>Not representative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local Estonian</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Estonian</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Russian</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 14
Perceived State Representativeness of Russian Citizens

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Very adequately representative</th>
<th>Adequately representative</th>
<th>Adequately to some extent representative</th>
<th>Inadequately representative</th>
<th>Not representative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local Estonian</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Estonian</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Russian</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 15
Perceived State Representativeness of Stateless Residents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Very adequately representative</th>
<th>Adequately representative</th>
<th>Adequately to some extent representative</th>
<th>Inadequately representative</th>
<th>Not representative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local Estonian</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Estonian</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Russian</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 16
Perceived State Representativeness of Tallinn Residents
Table 17

Perceived State Representativeness of Narva Residents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Very adequately representative</th>
<th>Adequately representative</th>
<th>Adequately to some extent representative</th>
<th>Inadequately representative</th>
<th>Not representative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local Estonian</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Estonian</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Russian</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When citizenship status groups and place of residency are incorporated into the analysis of representativeness, minor response patterns emerged among the groups (Tables 13-17). Like Russian-speakers overall, all groups responded with a mix of perceptions of representativeness, with the majority or surveyees responding in the middle (“Adequately to some extent representative”) or negatively (“Inadequately representative” or “Not representative”). All groups perceive local state/politics as the most representative when compared to other state/political spaces. Russian citizens and Stateless residents tend to share the most negative perceptions of Estonian national state/politics representativeness, while Russian citizens perceive Russian national state/politics that most favorably or representative compared to Stateless residents and all other groups. While all groups responded with mixed and negative perceptions of representativeness, Estonian citizens tend to perceive Estonian national state/politics more favorably than other citizenship status groups and Russian citizens tend to perceive Russian national state/politics more favorably than all other groups. This suggests that formal citizenship to a certain extent may influence how Russian-speakers perceive and understand the representativeness of the political and state bodies and actors that “represent” their interests. The Russian-speaking interviewees more descriptively elucidated the negative and critical
perceptions of state/political representativeness provided by the survey responses. One Narva resident and Estonian citizen in particular summed up representativeness by noting:

> Whatever they say in politics. I mean, I am enjoying lots of rights here and I guess I am fairly happy with the economic situation. But you cannot ignore things that are obvious and for me these things are what you call a ‘glass ceiling’ [in politics] and the second thing is the underrepresentation of minorities in the parliament. (Narva Interviewee 4, personal communication, September 10, 2013)

This interviewee elaborated on their notion and perception of a “glass ceiling” in Estonian state politics by stating, “I think that it [Estonian state politics] is fairly representative, but with the exception that one-fourth of the population is not given the right to vote” (Narva Interviewee 4, personal communication, September 10, 2013). Additionally, this particular interviewee went on to describe how this “glass ceiling” impacts Russian-speakers in Estonia by stating:

> Well, I don’t see any improvement in the situation in Estonia so, this [‘glass ceiling’] is also one of the factors. You know living in a true democracy sort of minding your own business letting everybody speak their mind without poking fun or pointing fingers…In Estonia, this is not possible. As straight forward as that. This is not possible. They [Estonia] will screw his [Russians’] mind. Lots of [Russian] kids have already screwed their minds. They are embarrassed that their parents are Russians and they don’t speak a word of Estonian. They change their last names into something that sounds more Estonian. (Narva Interviewee 4, personal communication, September 10, 2013)

This critical interpretation of Estonian society and politics as consisting of an ethnicized and politicized “glass ceiling” that prevents Russian-speakers from substantively engaging as full and equal members is striking and was reiterated by other interviewees. An interviewee that is
involved in party politics (active member in a mainstream party) and an Estonian citizen who resides in Tallinn suggested that, “I think not [representative]. In parliament of Estonia there are some 8 or 10 Russian-speakers, but in government no one” (Tallinn Interviewee 3, personal communication, September 6, 2013). This interviewee elaborated and noted that, “If you can do some research all these ministers are Estonians and you know all of these workers for ministers are alike. I don’t know, I don’t have any information that some important or big worker is a Russian-speaker” (Tallinn Interviewee 3, personal communication, September 6, 2013). This shared understanding highlights how ethnicized citizenship and other political processes impacts how minority communities perceive state politics and state-minority relations. While representativeness was overwhelmingly perceived as mixed or negatively, many interviewees voiced their concerns that although the Estonian state and political system incorporated democratic principles and institutions, Russian-speakers continue to be underrepresented and left out of the political process, most notably at the national level. Out of all of the interviewees, only one (Russian citizen and Narva resident) suggested that state/political spaces were representative; however, this might be the result of social desirability or courtesy bias and preference falsification among my interviewees (Hantrais, 2009; Krosnick & Presser, 2010), which is a noted research concern in the former Soviet Union (Gel’man, 2015; Kalinin, 2015; Kaplowitz & Shlapentokh, 1982). While most interviewees were skeptical with mixed or negative perceptions of state/politics, many did suggest that the local level was the most representative, working with/for their interests. One Narva resident with Estonian citizenship noted that:

The local government tries to some degree to protect the Russian-speaking population and Russian schools from this mass Estonianization. They try to do this. But they try to do this at the last minute...Local politicians resist Tallinn. They don’t do much
themselves, but they actively resist the ideas that come from Tallinn. So they represent my interests somewhat, but not completely. But they are closer than those in Tallinn. Now Estonian politics, naturally they are interested in preserving their Estonian culture, their language. They are not very flexible in their plan…They only think about preserving the Estonian language. Of course they probably feel the historical enmity that existed during the Soviet Union. So Russian speakers here are like hostages…But here there is already a generation that doesn’t even remember who Stalin is or the Soviet Union and that for 22 years since the fall of the Soviet Union, haven’t ever seen the Soviet Union or been part of the Soviet system. But nevertheless for some reason, they are having to pay for these mistakes. Paying in that they can’t use their own language, they have to leave the country to find work and that is very hurtful. The European Parliament doesn’t do much to protect our interests. Observers come from Brussels; many people come to discuss problems. They see these problems with citizenship but the Estonian government explains it differently, they respond by saying, ‘We’ve made corrections. We are going to keep working on the problems of citizenship and will not stop working toward our goal.’ But they don’t really listen to the European observers who come here and point out our mistakes. (Narva Interviewee 9, personal communication, October 6, 2013)

While Russian-speakers engage in various citizenship practices and place a relatively high value on substantive citizenship, most surveyed and interviewed Russian-speakers perceive state institutions, spaces, and processes with skepticism and critique. Russian-speakers overall perceive representation as either somewhat representative or inadequately representative. Their perceptions mirror descriptive representation of Russian-speakers at the local, national, and EU scales. Locally, Russian-speakers have more adequate representation (particularly in Tallinn and Narva); while nationally and supranationally Russian-speakers have inadequate representation
(Järve & Poleschuk, 2010, 2013; Kallas, 2008; Migrant Integration Policy Index, 2014; Pettai, 2004; Pettai & Hallik, 2002). Since independence, the Estonian Parliament included 5-6 Russian-speaking members (1995-2007), while Russian-speakers have garnered large shares of local government seats/positions in Tallinn and Narva (Kallas, 2008). Additionally, minister appointments (part of the national cabinet) have rarely represented the Russian-speaking population, with the notable exception of “Estonia’s Obama” Jevgeni Ossinovski and others (Kallas, 2008; “Mikser: Ossinovski Could be ‘Estonia’s Obama’”, 2013). The perception and actualization of inadequate representation illustrates one of the major politicalized and ethnicized cleavages and impacts of citizenship capital in Estonia. According to Crowther and Matonyte (2007), “As far as minority representation is concerned, the situation is most problematic in Estonia, the Achilles heel of the region” (p. 297).

**Citizenship & State Accessibility**

Practices, perceptions, and valorizations of substantive citizenship are not enacted or informed in isolation of the state and state political process. State-constructed institutions, spaces, and processes impact the socialization and mobilization of their citizens and denizens alike (Bloemraad, 2006). As noted by Bloemraad (2006), states that provide access and opportunities to minority populations (particularly immigrants) foster and structurally mobilize those populations, which increases their civic and political incorporation into mainstream political processes and political power. According to Juska (1999), access and opportunities to engage in state politics and government processes, which provide political power, resources, and prestige status, have undergone tremendous ethnicized shifts in the former Soviet Union, including Estonia. Thus, gauging and assessing how Russian-speakers perceive state (government and politics) accessibility and representativeness can assist in examining Estonian citizenship capital and its impacts on Russian-speaker perceptions and practices of substantive
citizenship. In order to understand Russian-speakers’ perceptions and practices of substantive citizenship in relation to the state, Russian-speakers were asked to assess the accessibility of varying levels or scales of government and politics (“How accessible are the following levels of government or politics?”) (using the same scales as representativeness). Accessibility in this context is broadly defined in order to gauge a plural understanding of accessibility among Russian-speakers based on their experiences with government and politics. This broad understanding is incorporated to highlight how Russian-speakers broadly perceive their ability to access government and politics, including but not limited to: officials and politicians; state resources; government and political positions and prestige; and opportunities to engage with state institutions, elites, and processes at a multiplicity of scales through citizenship practices. Russian-speakers provide more narrowly defined examples of accessibility and accessibility issues through their narratives, which underscore the plurality of understandings and lived experiences related to state accessibility.

When survey respondents were asked to assess the accessibility of various levels of government and politics, an overarching response pattern emerged (Table 18). The majority of surveyed Russian-speakers responded that local government/politics are overall more accessible than any other scale with responses of “Readily accessible” (14%), “Accessible” (22%), and “Accessible to some extent” (43%) (79% combined) (Table 18). The shared perception of local state/political accessibility was reiterated among the groups, with all groups perceiving local state/political institutions, processes, actors, and spaces as more accessible than all other scales. Additionally the majority of Russian-speakers, regardless of group perceive the Russian national and EU scales of politics as the least accessible.
Table 18

**Perceptions of State Accessibility of All Groups**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Readily accessible</th>
<th>Accessible</th>
<th>Accessible to some extent</th>
<th>Inaccessible</th>
<th>Completely inaccessible</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local Estonian</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Estonian</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Russian</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 19

**Perceptions of State Accessibility of Estonian Citizens**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Readily accessible</th>
<th>Accessible</th>
<th>Accessible to some extent</th>
<th>Inaccessible</th>
<th>Completely inaccessible</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local Estonian</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Estonian</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Russian</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 20

**Perceptions of State Accessibility of Russian Citizens**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Readily accessible</th>
<th>Accessible</th>
<th>Accessible to some extent</th>
<th>Inaccessible</th>
<th>Completely inaccessible</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local Estonian</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Estonian</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Russian</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 21

**Perceptions of State Accessibility of Stateless Residents**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Readily accessible</th>
<th>Accessible</th>
<th>Accessible to some extent</th>
<th>Inaccessible</th>
<th>Completely inaccessible</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local Estonian</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 22

Perceptions of State Accessibility of Tallinn Residents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Readily accessible</th>
<th>Accessible</th>
<th>Accessible to some extent</th>
<th>Inaccessible</th>
<th>Completely Inaccessible</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local Estonian</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Estonian</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Russian</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 23

Perceptions of State Accessibility of Narva Residents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Readily accessible</th>
<th>Accessible</th>
<th>Accessible to some extent</th>
<th>Inaccessible</th>
<th>Completely Inaccessible</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local Estonian</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Estonian</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Russian</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While all groups illustrated this shared pattern emphasizing the local (Tables 19-23) as the most accessible state/political scale, the local scale was not overwhelmingly or positively perceived as accessible, highlighting critical perceptions of even the most accessible scales of the state/politics. Additionally, minor distinct response patterns also emerged among the groups. Estonian citizens and Stateless residents tend to perceive Estonian local and national state scales as more accessible than Russian citizens. Stateless residents also perceive local Estonian politics/state as more accessible compared to any other group. Russian citizens perceive Russian
state/politics as more accessible than their group counterparts, although they perceive local
Estonian state/politics as more accessible than Russian state/politics. Narva and Tallinn residents
shared similar response patterns overall, with most considering the local Estonian state/politics
as the most accessible (comparatively); however, Narva residents tend to perceive Russian
national state/politics and European Union slightly more accessible than their Tallinn resident
counterparts.

Although slight differences emerged, overall the findings suggest that local state and
political spaces or processes are perceived as the most accessible when compared to other scales
or spaces of state politics and power. This emphasis on the local suggests that local voting laws
and the influence of local citizenship practices are an important element in how minority
Russian-speakers engage as citizens and political actors in addition to inculcating a sense of
citizenship and civic/political understanding. This local finding also highlights the influence of
the local scale and local political processes on citizenship and how residents inculcate a sense of
what it means to be and act as a citizen. Such emphases on the limited accessibility of Estonian
national state/politics, local accessibility, and the inaccessibility of other state/political scales and
processes were reiterated among the interviewees. More interviewees perceived a sense of
inaccessibility of state/political spaces and processes rather than accessibility. One Tallinn
resident with stateless status noted that, “Well, I think that technically they [state/politics in
general] have good possibilities to be accessible but in a real life they are not always that helpful
as they should be” (Tallinn Interviewee 6, personal communication, October 4, 2013). This
perception of accessibility in theory but not in practice was reiterated by a Narva resident with
Estonian citizenship, who suggested that, “It is possible to go and say [to access or talk to a
representative or political body], but it doesn’t mean that they will solve it” (Narva Interviewee
elaborated on the various political scales and spaces by stating that:

The local level is quite accessible and at the national level is it covered by the Estonian language only – and is not open for 1/3 of the population that are not familiar with the Estonian language. The European Union is highly closed – it is in the Estonian language, and in English, but not in Russian. (Narva Interviewee 14, personal communication, October 14, 2013)

While most interviewees agreed that Estonian state and political process was accessible to a certain extant, particularly at the local scale, most were skeptical and critical of accessibility. One Narva and Stateless resident argued that:

Here there are two ways [to access politics/state]. One way is to be an Estonian [ethnicity] and then people get an Estonian surname. I have a friend…because he goes to Tartu [university] and he wants a good career [state/politics], so he gets an Estonian surname. And they [Estonians] think that this is not nationalism. They talk like, ‘Oh you are Estonian, no we are Estonians’ and they don’t understand that this is nationalism. (Narva Interviewee 13, personal communication, October 4, 2013)

This critical and skeptical perception of state/politics accessibility highlights the multiscalar plurality of Estonian politics and citizenship construction. While some Russian-speakers, like the Narva interviewee above (Narva Interviewee 13, personal communication, October 4, 2013) were highly critical and skeptical of the Estonian state and Estonian politics that provide opportunities and spaces to engage as citizens, most Russian-speakers recognized that accessibility varied by scale. State and political spaces and processes, as outlined above in the survey results, are largely perceived as inaccessible or accessible to a certain extent, with the exception of local political/state spaces and processes. In both the survey and interview data,
Russian-speakers voiced relatively positive attitudes of local politics and political processes, while maintaining negative or apprehensive attitudes of other political scales and spaces in addition to the dominance of nationalist party politics at all levels. This emphasis on the local political and citizenship spaces supports Staeheli’s (1999) point that, “citizenship may be experienced most at the local level” (p. 64). The dominance and emphasis on local political and citizenship spaces and processes associated with the state illustrates the relatively openness and impacts of local citizenship politics (like voting and CSOs) and highlights the everyday-ness of local citizenship practices and their spatial embeddedness within everyday life.

**Citizenship & Spatial Identity**

While there are a plethora of identity studies associated with the former Soviet Union (Biersack & O’Lear, 2014; Brubaker, 1994; Diener, 2004, 2009; Kaiser, 2002; Kaiser & Nikiforova, 2006; Kolossov, 1999; Kølstø 1996, 2011) and Russian-speaking Estonians in particular (Aalto, 2003a, 2003b; Aleksakhina, 2007; Downes, 2003; Duvold & Berglund, 2014; Fein, 2005; Fein & Straughn, 2014; Keller, 2007; Küü, 2008; Laitin, 1998; Raun, 2009; Solska, 2011; Trimbach, 2016; Unwin, 1999; Vihalemm & Masso, 2007), most privilege or emphasize the national scale and national-territorial identity constructions. This limited spatial or scalar understanding of identity ignores alternative or local scales or spaces of identification and attachment that have been acknowledged by other spatial scholars (O’Lear, 1997, 1999; O’Lear & Whiting, 2008). Spatial identities connected to national territory are just one of many spatial and non-spatial identities and are not mutually exclusive (Diener, 2009; Herb & Kaplan, 1999). Homelands are an example of a spatial identity that is, “referent to a portion of the Earth’s surface rendered significant by the interrelation of historical, political, economic, and sociocultural contingencies” (Diener 2009, p. 19). Homelands tend to be politicized, ethnicized, primordialized, mythologized, and emotionally charged territories that spatially embed a
populations’ identities and sense of rootedness (Diener, 2009; Herb, 1999; Kaiser, 2002). While equated with national and state bounded territories and manipulated by national and/or state elites, narratives, membership conceptions, and political power, homelands are like other spatial identities plural, hybrid, and challenged by the complex lived spatial experiences and attachments of populations. Populations are spatially socialized within the variety of differentiated spaces they embody, engage, and they themselves help to construct; although national spatial identities tend to be dominant (Herb, 1999; Kaplan, 1999; Popescu, 2012). National-territorial identity is constructed, inculcated, maintained, and/or challenged through formal and substantive citizenship (Aktürk, 2011; Bauder, 2013; Blitz, 2006; Choe, 2006; Desforges et. al., 2005; Fein, 2005; Fein & Straughn, 2014; Piller, 2001; Purcell, 2002; Solska, 2011; Unwin, 1999).

While formal citizenship affords an attachment and embodied identity affiliated with national territory and spaces associated with the nation-state, substantive citizenship conversely as practice and participation, “proposes a political identity (inhabitance) that is both independent of and prior to nationality” and, “the right to participation opens up decisions beyond the state” (Purcell, 2002, p. 103). Citizenship and its associated scales, spaces, or landscapes (Desforges et. al., 2005) both create, maintain, alter, and/or challenge nation-state identities through formal and/or substantive citizenship. Thus, it is imperative that I examine and untangle the relationship between citizenship and the various spatial identities in which Estonian Russian-speakers are affiliated through formal citizenship and construct or practice through substantive citizenship. While two particular spatial identity questions are described and analyzed in this section, additional spatial identity-related questions were also asked in order to untangle how Russian-speakers understand the spaces they inhabit and engage and the spatial identities that they embody and enact; however, due to the limitations of my project and of those particular
questions and/or methods, only two particular questions are included in this section (for a full list of questions, see Appendices A & B). Russian-speakers embody and enact an array of plural and hybrid spatial identities (Smith & Burch, 2012) with varying perceptions of each identities’ importance (Table 24). When asked to assess the degree of importance of a series of multiscalar spaces (from local to global) a response pattern emerged among Russian-speakers overall and with distinct variations among the various groups (Tables 25-29). As a whole, Russian-speakers tend to identify first and foremost at/with the local scale (cities/towns) (60% “Very Important”) in which they inhabit and feel a strong spatial or communal attachment. This acknowledged strong attachment to the local scale or spaces of identification was followed in importance by Estonia, the world, and then regional scale (county). The overall and notable least important scalar or spatial identity was Russia.

Table 24

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Spatial Identity of All Groups</th>
<th>Not Very Important</th>
<th>Not Important</th>
<th>Somewhat Important</th>
<th>Important</th>
<th>Very Important</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(City/Town)</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When groups are taken into account with regards to Russian-speakers’ spatial identities and attachments, distinct response patterns and trends emerge. Most strikingly, local spatial identities are perceived as the most important among all groups, most notably among Narva residents, Estonian citizens, and Russian citizens. When it comes to national identities or identities associated with the national scale, a distinct trend emerges among the groups. While
each group illustrated a complex plurality of spatial identities, formal citizenship status does to a certain extant influence or explains perceptions of national spatial identities with Estonian and Russian citizens alike. Both citizenship status groups convey the strongest national spatial identities for their respective nation-states of formal membership compared to all other groups. Although Russian citizens do appear to have stronger Russian spatial identities, Russia does appear to be the least important spatial identity among all other groups, including Stateless residents and Narva residents who tend to reside closest to the Russian Federation.

Table 25
Spatial Identity of Estonian Citizens

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Spaces of Attachment</th>
<th>Not Very Important</th>
<th>Not Important</th>
<th>Somewhat Important</th>
<th>Important</th>
<th>Very Important</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local (City/Town)</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region (County)</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 26
Spatial Identity of Russian Citizens

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Spaces of Attachment</th>
<th>Not Very Important</th>
<th>Not Important</th>
<th>Somewhat Important</th>
<th>Important</th>
<th>Very Important</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local (City/Town)</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region (County)</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 27

Spatial Identity of Stateless Residents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Spaces of Attachment</th>
<th>Not Very Important</th>
<th>Not Important</th>
<th>Somewhat Important</th>
<th>Important</th>
<th>Very Important</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local (City/Town)</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region (County)</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 28

Spatial Identity of Tallinn Residents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Spaces of Attachment</th>
<th>Not Very Important</th>
<th>Not Important</th>
<th>Somewhat Important</th>
<th>Important</th>
<th>Very Important</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local (City/Town)</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region (County)</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 29

Spatial Identity of Narva Residents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Spaces of Attachment</th>
<th>Not Very Important</th>
<th>Not Important</th>
<th>Somewhat Important</th>
<th>Important</th>
<th>Very Important</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local (City/Town)</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region (County)</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
These highlighted response trends and patterns related to spatial identities and attachments are described and untangled in greater detail among the Russian-speaking interviewees. The majority of interviewees foregrounded and emphasized local and/or national spatial identities more than any other spatial identity or attachment. A Narva resident with Estonian citizenship noted that:

I think it [spatial identity] is my city and country. I don’t make a difference between if it is a village or a city or country. It is like a total. About the EU, again I don’t know. Maybe, because it was not so long ago that we were not part of the EU and I still don’t feel myself like I am part of all Europe, and just my country. (Narva Interviewee 13, personal communication, October 7, 2013)

The above interviewee’s emphasis on local and national Estonian spatial identities and attachments was reiterated by other interviewees as well, including those individuals who were born outside of Estonia and migrated to Estonia during the Soviet era. A Narva resident and naturalized Estonian citizen stated that:

I consider myself a part of the city of Narva and a part of Estonia. For me, Russia is a historical motherland, it’s a cultural center, I visit there often since my relatives and friends still live there. But more than anything, I feel like I am a part of Estonia. Even though I have lived here for 22 years and that is not even half of my life, I still feel that I am part of Estonia. My life is in Estonia. (Narva Interviewee 9, personal communication, October 6, 2013)

While many Russian-speakers emphasized a blended hybrid mix of local and national spatial identities others solely responded with local spatial identities and affiliations. For example, a Tallinn resident with Estonian citizenship explained that, “Well, I think local. – Just it [identity] is Tallinn and the village where my dacha is” (Tallinn Interviewee 8, personal
communication, September 24, 2013). This Tallinn resident highlights the importance of the local spaces they engage and interact with as important to their spatial identity. While most Russian-speakers emphasized locality along with other spaces of identification, Narva residents’ responses indicated a higher likelihood to focus on locality and local spaces when articulating their spatial identities and attachments. A Narva resident with Russian citizenship simply responded that, “The city is the most important. Probably the city since we live in the city” (Narva Interviewee 2, personal communication, October 21, 2013). This emphasis was rearticulated again by another Narva resident with Estonian citizenship who noted that, “Narva [as spatial identity] definitely. Estonia as I said…is sometimes hostile to me, but Narva is the place that I cherish, that I love…I think that Narva stays separate from the rest of the country” (Narva Interviewee 5, personal communication, September 10, 2013). Another Narva interviewee suggested that how they articulate their spatial attachment varies depending on the audience (Narva Interviewee 6, personal communication, September 9, 2013). This Narva resident with Estonian citizenship elaborated that:

It depends…who will ask me. In England – of course I will answer Estonia not Narva and of course not everyone knows where Estonia is…‘Like Estonia? What is that? Does that exist? Oh, near Russia, oh ok that makes sense.’…But if I talk to people who know where Narva is, then I will tell them I am from Narva. I am not sure about the EU, but it is important that I live in the EU. (Narva Interviewee 6, personal communication, September 9, 2013)

The above interviewee highlights an interesting aspect of spatial identity and the rationality and spatial literacy of others and how that may impact how Russian-speakers articulate and discuss where they are from or where they locate their identities. This emphasis on locality and local spaces of everyday life and engagement as crucial aspects of Russian-speakers’
spatial identities and attachments also emerged when examining homeland perceptions (Table 30) among Russian-speakers.

Table 30

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Estonia</th>
<th>Non-geographic response</th>
<th>Narva</th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>No homeland</th>
<th>World</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Estonian Citizens</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Citizens</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stateless Residents</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tallinn Residents</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narva Residents</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Groups</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Homelands listed include those most commonly described in survey responses.

When asked to describe their respective homelands in the context of the wider world (open-ended question), Russian-speakers’ responses partially mirrored those spaces indicated in the other survey and interview results. Approximately half of all surveyed Russian-speakers noted that Estonia is interpreted as their homeland (*rodina*) (50%), while other responses included non-geographic responses (20%) (includes abstract descriptions of homeland), Narva (9%), Russia (7%), and no homeland (6%). When groups are taken into account, it is apparent that Estonia is the most common response for all groups with Estonian citizens (55%) and Tallinn residents (59%) having the highest response percentages. Additional notable response patterns that emerge include: Russian citizens having a higher response of Russia (17%) and Narva (15%); Estonian citizens having the lowest response of Russia (3%); and Narva residents having the highest response of Narva (16%) as a local homeland.
This primary emphasis on Estonia among the survey respondents coalesces well and is supported by the interviewees. A Narva resident with Stateless status briefly noted that, “...in the Russian language you have an exciting expression [rodina, homeland]. You never choose your homeland. You never choose to be here. So it’s Estonia” (Narva Interviewee 14, personal communication, October 14, 2013). Other interviewees reiterated the relationship between birthplace, daily life, and homeland. A Tallinn resident with Estonian citizenship also emphasized Estonia as their homeland and stated:

…my reasons are very simple. I was born here [Estonia], my dad built a house here…and my parents, my grandparents lie next to each other at the very same cemetery and that is why for me [it is] Estonia. It [homeland] is about me and the world around me. It is not about some slogans or abstract notions. Not even the national anthem. (Tallinn Interviewee 8, personal communication, September 24, 2013)

While homeland is often equated with birthplace and a particular bounded national and/or state territory, including in the Russian-language as one of the interviewees suggested, not all Russian-speakers viewed homeland in this sense. This alternative perception reflects how homelands can be, “stretched beyond not only traditional boundaries of the nation-state system but also into the realm of subjective identity” (Diener, 2009, p. 320). This shared perception underscores the notion that homelands are not necessarily singular or bounded national or state territories, but can be understood as dual or plural and influenced by individuals’ everyday lived experiences with the own spatial communities. One Narva resident with Russian citizenship opined that:

A person’s homeland is where they live. I was born in Belarus, but I didn’t live there for long. So for me, Estonia is a second homeland. I already told you how I got married here,
my daughter was born here, I studied here, worked, and when I became unemployed I got help here. (Narva Interviewee 3, personal communication, October 24, 2013)

Most Russian-speaking interviewees recognized Estonia as their homeland, regardless of whether or not they were actually born there. This response pattern suggests that homeland isn’t necessarily equated or totally restricted to birthplace, but is rather formed through a mix of ancestry, birthplace, citizenship, and everyday experiences or interactions. As evinced in the survey data, a minority of interviewees and Narva residents also stated that Narva was their homeland. As one Narva resident with Estonian citizenship noted, “Oh, it [homeland] is Narva isn’t it? I don’t know. I really like where I live. You know, several times with my wife, we have discussed the idea of immigration…And you recognize that no matter where you go, you will still be considered a second rate person” (Narva Interviewee 5, personal communication, September, 10, 2013). Another Narva resident with Estonian citizenship also reiterated this emphasis on Narva:

Narva. It [homeland] is just like an abstract thing. Or perhaps my street – where I lived or have been living for 22 years. And actually the same street where nothing has changed…I know it is pretty funny when you tell other people from Estonia, Estonians, that you are from Narva. It just explains everything! Like all your deeds, all your thoughts, all your sayings, it just explains everything. You don’t need to say sorry or anything. I’m just from Narva. (Narva Interviewee 6, personal communication, September 9, 2013)

This heightened sense of local identity and/or homeland described by this interviewee coalesced well with my anecdotal experiences and conversations with Narva residents. Many Narva residents perceive the spaces outside of Narva as “Estonia,” while Narva tends to be perceived and recognized as “Narva.” This perception of spatial distinction or uniqueness of Narva illustrates a sense of spatial separation, which delineates what is/n’t “Estonia” and
“Narva.” For many Narva residents, spaces external to Narva almost embody a sense of being foreign or distinctly Estonian. This localized affiliation and spatial understanding highlights the spatial significance of Narva and Narva’s predominantly Russian-speaking population. This also brings to the fore how Narva residents construct Narva as a unique locale and homeland in juxtaposition to Estonian, Russian, and European Union. Although Narva’s emergence as a perceived spatial identity and homeland among Russian-speakers’ survey and interview responses, overall Russian-speakers embody and discursively acknowledge a hybrid plurality of spatial identities and attachments, which highlight the complexity and local distinctiveness of spatial identities and challenge Estonian and Russian nationalized and politicized discourses and identity constructions that are often placed upon Estonia’s Russian-speaking population. The complex spatial identities of Russian-speakers have consequences and political entanglements. From the results, it appears that spatial identities problematize how Russian-speakers identify and engage with a plurality of multiscalar political and territorial spaces, while also reifying the significance of localisms and local community attachments.

**Overview of Substantive Citizenship Findings**

Table 31

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cluster Group</th>
<th>Substantive Citizenship</th>
<th>Group Demographics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Estonian Citizens</td>
<td>Estonian citizens engage in citizenship practices more than any other group, particularly in voting which is partially restricted.</td>
<td>Estonian citizens are the largest group.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Most value substantive citizenship as important.</td>
<td>The majority of Estonian citizens are female.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Most are critical of state/political representativeness.</td>
<td>Ages vary from ~18-79, with the largest shares consisting of 20-39 years of age.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Most are critical of the accessibility of state/political spaces and processes. Perceive local</td>
<td>Most are either single or married (equal %).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Most have secondary or post-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cluster Group</td>
<td>Substantive Citizenship</td>
<td>Group Demographics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Citizens</td>
<td>Russian citizens engage in citizenship practices less than other groups, particularly in voting, which is partially restricted. Russian citizens vote more in Estonian local elections than in Russian national elections. Russian citizens value substantive citizenship, but less compared to all other groups. Most are critical of state/political representativeness. Perceive Russian state/politics as more accessible compared to other groups.</td>
<td>Russian citizens are the second largest group. The majority of are female, with slightly more males than Estonian citizen group. Ages vary from ~18-79, with the largest age groups consisting of 20-24 and 50-59 (correlates with typical ages of Russian citizens). Most are married. More have upper secondary education than higher education. Most have professional occupations. More are not students. Most reside in Narva.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stateless Residents</td>
<td>Stateless residents participate less overall than other groups. Stateless residents vote less, which is more than half consider Estonia their homeland.</td>
<td>Stateless residents are the smallest group.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

More than half consider Estonia their homeland. More than half consider Estonia their homeland. More than half consider Estonia their homeland.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cluster Group</th>
<th>Substantive Citizenship</th>
<th>Group Demographics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stateless residents</td>
<td>partially restricted. Stateless residents do engage in some alternative practices more than other groups, including protesting and writing/contacting political leaders/officials.</td>
<td>Most are female, but includes more males than other groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stateless residents value substantive citizenship the most compared to all other groups.</td>
<td>Ages range from ~18-69, with the largest age groups being 20-24 and 45-49.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Most are critical of state/political representativeness. Stateless residents are more critical than all other groups.</td>
<td>Most are married.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Most are critical of the accessibility of state/political spaces and processes. Perceive local state/political spaces as more accessible than other spaces and other groups.</td>
<td>Most have upper secondary education or higher education (~equal %).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Most embody a plurality of spatial identities with the local and national Estonian being the strongest.</td>
<td>Largest share are professionals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>More perceive Estonia as their homeland than other spaces. A notable minority also perceives Russia as their homeland.</td>
<td>Most are not students.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tallinn Residents</td>
<td>Tallinn residents participate more than most other groups. More than half of Tallinn residents vote in local and national elections. Tallinn residents also protest and engage in party politics more than other groups. Tallinn residents are less active in social organizations than other groups.</td>
<td>Tallinn residents comprise around half of participants.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Most value substantive citizenship.</td>
<td>Most Tallinn residents are female.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Most are critical of representativeness. Tallinn</td>
<td>Ages range from ~18-79, with the largest age groups consisting of 20-24 and 25-29.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>More Tallinn residents are single than any other marital status group.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Nearly equal numbers have upper secondary education and higher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cluster Group</td>
<td>Substantive Citizenship</td>
<td>Group Demographics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>residents perceive local state/politics as more representative compared to other spaces/processes.</td>
<td>Have the largest share of professional occupations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Most are critical of state/political representativeness. Narva residents perceive local state/politics as more representative compared to other spaces/processes.</td>
<td>Slightly more are students than non-students.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Most embody a plurality of spatial identities with the local and national Estonian being the strongest.</td>
<td>More Tallinn residents are Estonian citizens than other citizenship status groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tallinn residents</td>
<td>Tallinn residents perceive local state/politics as more accessible than other spaces/processes.</td>
<td>Narva residents comprise around half of participants.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narva Residents</td>
<td>Narva residents engage in a variety of citizenship practices. Narva residents vote more in local elections than any other group.</td>
<td>Most Narva residents are female.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Most value substantive citizenship.</td>
<td>Ages ranges from ~18-79, with the largest share consisting of age groups 20-24, 25-29, and 30-24.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Most are critical of accessibility. Tallinn residents perceive local state/politics as more accessible than other spaces/processes.</td>
<td>More Narva residents are married than other marital statuses.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Most embody a plurality of spatial identities with the local and national Estonian being the strongest. Narva residents have the strongest local and regional spatial identities compared to all other groups.</td>
<td>More Narva residents have upper secondary education than higher education.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Less than half of Narva residents perceive Estonia as their homeland.</td>
<td>Slightly more are non-students than students.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>More Narva residents are Estonian citizens than other citizenship status groups.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
While Russian-speakers are considered less active than their Estonian counterparts (Schulze, 2014) and are fragmented among various formal citizenship status groups with their own limitations and associated opportunities, Russian-speakers do engage in a plethora of citizenship practices in both state and non-state citizenship spaces at an array of political scales. Russian-speakers do participate in local, national (Estonian or Russian), and supranational (European Union) electoral politics and processes. Russian-speakers tend to vote more at the local level than any other level, which is partly the result of formal citizenship status restrictions (local elections are open to all groups). Russian-speakers are critical and skeptical of Estonian political parties and although Russian political parties have emerged since independence, most Russian-speakers prefer the mainstream Centre Party with a growing interest in the SDP. Although there are some data and scholarship limitations, Russian-speakers are creating and engaging in alternative citizenship spaces. This creation and engagement is evinced through the variety of CSOs that have formed and remain active on the political and civic landscape. The formation and activities of Russian-speaking CSOs, particularly those addressing local and community-specific needs while simultaneously challenging the state or providing alternative political and citizenship spaces, highlight a potentially emerging insurgent citizenship (Holston, 2008; Jaffe, 2012; Leitner & Strunk, 2014a, 2014b; Runciman, 2014). Insurgent citizenship broadly refers to, “discourses and practices that challenge existing laws, policies, and institutions; promote alternative criteria for membership in a polity; and lay claims to and enact new forms of citizenship and rights” (Leitner & Strunk, 2014a, p. 350). The potential emergence of insurgent citizenship among Estonian Russian-speakers as evinced through their substantive citizenship supports the overarching patterns that Russian-speakers are critical, skeptical, and do
challenge Estonian state-centered citizenship. While more research is needed to address how and why Russian-speakers’ CSOs and citizenship practices are examples of insurgent citizenship, the results illustrate that alternatives and challenges to state-constructed citizenship and forms of membership are occurring among Estonia’s Russian-speaking communities.

The activities and practices of Russian-speakers convey the perceived value and importance of substantive citizenship that most respondents recognized in the survey and interview responses. Russian-speakers tend to valorize substantive citizenship overall more than formal citizenship, highlighting how Russian-speakers understand citizenship, participation, and their roles within Estonian civil society and politics. Although Russian-speakers are engaged and do value substantive citizenship, most Russian-speakers are critical and skeptical of Estonian (and Russian and EU) state/political representativeness and accessibility. Most Russian-speakers consider all state and political spaces and processes as unrepresentative and inaccessible, with the local being perceived more positively than others. This critical attitude highlights how citizenship capital and its associated limitations are manifested in the perceptions of Russian-speakers towards the state/political institutions, processes, actors, spaces, and relations. This shared perception holds implications for how Russian-speakers embody, engage with and/or disengage from Estonian politics at all political scales.

When it comes to spatial identity, Russian-speakers embody and perform an plurality of spatial identities, particularly local and national (Estonian) spatial identities. This highlights how Russian-speakers navigate and relate residency, citizenship, everyday life, and identity. Notably, there seems to be a relationship between formal citizenship and spatial identity, in that Estonian citizens and Russian citizens both were more likely to associate with Estonia and Russia respectively than other groups. Additionally, the majority of Narva residents responded that Narva (local town/city) is the most important spatial identity and perceived homeland. This
response pattern was also anecdotally expressed by many Narvans, who explained Narva as being spatially distinct (and separate) from both Estonia and Russia.

This emphasis on the local scale for identity construction, embodiment, coupled with the emphasis of local citizenship practices and local state/politics as more accessible and representative foregrounds the importance of the local everyday citizenship spaces and relations in which that Russian-speakers engage and are active. This emphasis on locality also brings to the fore the polyvalent incongruence or disconnect between formal and substantive citizenship. While citizenship capital is constructed and inequitably enacted at the national scale by national out-of-reach (“glass ceiling”) political spaces and positions of power, it is overwhelmingly and primarily the local citizenship practices, perceptions, and identities that most Russian-speakers construct, embody, and enact. This incongruence or disconnection highlights the complex mutual constitution of formal and substantive citizenship, but also raises the question of descaling or reconstructing citizenship as a local form of capital that is constructed for and of local residents who identify and engage at the local scale of the everyday nominally detached from the divisive nationalizing, ethnicizing, and politicizing processes of the state at the national scale. Although the potentiality and limitations for returning citizenship back to the local scale are problematic, a reconstructed citizenship built upon the alternative theoretical notions of jus domicile [principle of residency] (Bauböck, 2003; Bauder, 2012) and/or jus nexi [connection or attachment] (Bauböck, 2011; Ehrkamp & Jacobsen, 2015; Howard-Hassmann, 2015; Shachar, 2009; Volpp, 2011) offer alternatives that embrace local embodied and enacted citizenship and formal-substantive incongruences that are ignored or reproduced within current state-centered constructions of citizenship that dominate Estonia and elsewhere today.
In Estonia, it [citizenship] is a big issue - [because] nationality is ethnicity. But this conception is common for one nationality, that all Estonian people who have Estonian citizenship are Estonians. Out of Estonia, there are, if people like Russian-speakers from Estonia go to Russia they are Estonians. They can explain like yeah I live in Estonia and have Estonian citizenship but for ethnic Estonians I am Russian and a Russian-speaker. It is very hard to explain in Europe that you live in Estonia and have Estonian citizenship, oh then you are Estonian, but not really. (Tallinn Interviewee 3, personal communication, September 6, 2013)

Citizenship is neither a natural nor neutral construct. By critically questioning citizenship’s naturalness and neutrality within an Estonian state context, I have highlighted citizenship as a polyvalent reflection and multidimensional manifestation of state politics, power relations, and spaces. By conceptualizing citizenship as a form of capital and critically examining formal and substantive citizenship perceptions, practices, and identities, I have illustrated how citizenship can untangle the plurality and hybridity of political relations and spaces citizens and non-citizens embody and enact. Bauder (2008) states that citizenship capital, elucidates how citizenship, “is a mechanism of distinction between migrants and non-migrants based on associations of place, origin, and national community” (p. 319). By employing citizenship as capital, this relational conceptualization, “corresponds to the treatment of citizenship as a strategic concept not only in association with constructions of identity and belonging, struggles over recognition, and the politics of participation and contribution, but also in relation to regulating access to scarce resources and institutionalizing difference” (Bauder, 2008, p. 316). Citizenship as capital, foregrounds citizenship like other forms of capital as a, “social power relation” that relationally and spatially differentiates and stratifies groups.
Citizenship capital is strategically constructed to form and reproduce particular social, economic, cultural and in the case of Estonia political relations and spaces (Bauder, 2006, 2008; Bourdieu, 1977, 1986, 1998). As such, citizenship capital, like other forms of capital (Bauder, 2008; Bourdieu, 1977, 1986; Swartz, 2013a), structures and legitimizes power relations, including access and opportunities to engage within the Estonian political field or relational space. Citizenship capital in its formal sense is also a state constructed classification, an example of state symbolic violence, “that finds expression in everyday classifications, labels, meanings, and categorizations that subtly implement a social as well as symbolic logic of inclusion and exclusion” and allows the dominant group to naturalize their own power via *doxa* [assumed pre-reflexive taken-for-granted naturalness and order] and misrecognition (Swartz, 2013, p. 39). As Bauder (2006, 2008) has illustrated, citizenship capital can strategically be used by states and by differentiated populations alike to construct spaces, relations, and opportunities for distinct groups based on formal and informal (substantive) citizenship, particularly related to the labor market. Bauder (2006, 2008) suggests that migrants are constructed through naturalized and misrecognized constructions of citizenship capital, which in turn produces inequitable labor markets of dominated masses of migrant laborers who maintain yet challenge citizenship capital as constructed from above. Similarly in this monograph, I have illustrated how and why the territorial state and Russian-speaking minority population constructs, maintains, and challenges citizenship within the various political and citizenship spaces which relationally bind them together as a multinational political community.

By examining Estonian citizenship formation, I have highlighted how citizenship as capital is constructed and embedded within territorial state spaces, relations, and processes. The Estonian political community through restorationist (Aalto, 2003a, 2006) and ethnocratic (Järve, 2000, 2005; Yiftachel & Ghanem, 2004; Duvold & Berglund, 2014) logic, discourses, and
practices have “restored” citizenship primarily based on pre-Soviet ethnicized *jus sanguinis* understandings of citizen and membership and have cemented the ethnicized, “one state, two societies” relational and spatial order (Hallik, 2003; Pettai & Hallik, 2002). The restoration of Estonian citizenship and citizens initially created and reproduced two distinct ethnicized political communities, ethnic Estonians (and Estonian-speakers) and ethnic Russians (and Russian-speakers); however, as illustrated by Russian-speaker naturalization and citizenship practices, Russian-speaking minorities no longer consist of stateless non-citizens but rather a fragmented political community comprised not of a conflated ethnic political bloc, but of a multiethnic monolingual community with various formal citizenship statuses, substantive engagements, and spatial communities. While Estonian citizenship maintains its ethnicized and politicized logic as exemplified by state practices and discourses related to naturalization and political process, minority Russian-speakers do embody and enact a plurality of citizenship perceptions, practices, and identities. Estonian Russian-speakers not only embody and engage through formal and/or substantive citizenship, but also as illustrated through their own narratives and responses, challenge and alter state constructed citizenship. The overall cumulative response patterns and themes are highlighted in Table 32. The cumulative responses are divided and summarized by citizenship status and residency groups in order to illustrate similarities and differences among the Russian-speaking population.

Table 32

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cluster Group</th>
<th>Formal Citizenship</th>
<th>Substantive Citizenship</th>
<th>Group Demographics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Estonian Citizens</td>
<td>Estonian citizens have acquired formal citizenship through various methods, notably naturalization.</td>
<td>More engaged than all other groups, particularly voting. This is largely due to formal restrictions.</td>
<td>Estonian citizens are the largest group.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Most value formal citizenship as important</td>
<td>Most value substantive citizenship and</td>
<td>The majority of Estonian Citizens are female.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ages vary from ~18-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>and perceive formal citizenship as having importance.</td>
<td>perceive it as being an important aspect of public and political life. Substantive citizenship is perceived as more important than formal citizenship.</td>
<td>79, with the largest shares consisting of 20-39 years of age.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Most desire birthright citizenship (<em>jus soli</em>) and disagree with the current emphasis on <em>jus sanguinis</em> in Estonian citizenship policy.</td>
<td>Most are critical and skeptical of state/political representativeness and accessibility. Local state/political spaces are perceived as more accessible than others.</td>
<td>Most are either single or married (equal %).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Most agree that a national language exam is necessary for naturalization; however, most also perceive the current exam as an obstacle.</td>
<td>Most embody a plurality of hybrid spatial identities. The local and national Estonian spatial identities are the strongest and pronounced.</td>
<td>Most have secondary or post-secondary education.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Naturalization is perceived as easy in theory, but difficult in practice.</td>
<td>More than half perceive Estonia as their homeland.</td>
<td>Around half are students (that also might be employed).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Most are not interested in politics.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Most have professional occupations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Most common political concerns include: education, economy, and corruption.</td>
<td></td>
<td>More Estonian citizens reside in Tallinn than in Narva.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Russian Citizens**

Russian citizens acquired formal citizenship in order to maintain non-stateless legal residency in Estonia and/or because of a Russian connection. Some Russian citizens would prefer Estonian citizenship but perceive Estonian naturalization as too challenging, particularly because of the language exam.

Russian citizens are less engaged in citizenship practices compared to all other groups. Lack of engagement is partially the result of state restrictions, particularly when it comes to voting. Russian citizens do vote more in Estonian local elections than in Russian

Russian citizens are the second largest group.

The majority of Russian Citizens are female, with slightly more males than Estonian citizen group.

Ages vary from ~18-79, with the largest age groups consisting of 20-24 and 50-59
<table>
<thead>
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<tr>
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<td>Most perceive formal citizenship as lacking value or as not very important.</td>
<td>Most desire birthright citizenship (<em>jus soli</em>) and disagree with the current emphasis on <em>jus sanguinis</em> in Estonian citizenship policy.</td>
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<td>Most are not very interested in politics.</td>
<td>Most have a stronger Russian spatial identity than all other groups.</td>
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<td>Most common political concerns include: Estonian nationalism, Russian-speakers’ issues, and foreign affairs.</td>
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<td>Most perceive Estonia, Russia, and/or Narva as homeland.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stateless Residents</td>
<td>Stateless residents have not acquired formal citizenship of neither Estonia nor Russia (or another state). Lack of formal citizenship is primarily related to exam difficulties (particularly in <em>jus sanguinis</em>)</td>
<td>Stateless residents engage less than all other groups. Lack of citizenship practices are partially restricted by the state. Stateless residents do engage in some alternative citizenship practices.</td>
<td>Stateless residents are the smallest group.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Most are female, but includes more males than other groups.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ages range from ~18-</td>
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Cluster Group  | Formal Citizenship | Substantive Citizenship | Group Demographics  
---|---|---|---  
language), stateless benefits, lack of state attachment, and/or resentment of the state and naturalization process.  
Value formal citizenship status more than any other citizenship status group.  
Most desire birthright citizenship (*jus soli*) and disagree with the current emphasis on *jus sanguinis* in Estonian citizenship policy.  
Most agree that a naturalization language exam is necessary, but also challenge the language exam requirements.  
Most perceive naturalization as easy in theory, but difficult in practice.  
Stateless residents have the highest political interest level.  
Most common political concerns include: citizenship, social welfare, and education.  
 practices including protesting, writing/contacting political leaders/officials.  
Stateless residents value substantive citizenship more than all other groups.  
Most are critical and skeptical of state/political representativeness. Stateless residents are more critical than all other groups.  
Most are critical and skeptical of state/political accessibility. Stateless residents perceive local state/politics as more accessible than others and than other groups.  
Most embody a plurality of spatial identities with the local and national Estonia perceived as the strongest.  
More perceive Estonia as homeland than other spaces. A minority perceives Russia as homeland.  

Tallinn Residents  
Tallinn residents consist of more Estonian citizens than other citizen groups when compared to Narva residents.  
Tallinn residents engage in a multiplicity of citizenship practices. More than half of Tallinn residents vote  
Tallinn residents comprise around half of participants.  
Most Tallinn residents  
69, with the largest age groups being 20-24 and 45-49.  
Most are married.  
Most have upper secondary education or higher education (~equal %).  
Largest share are professionals.  
Most are not students.  
Nearly equal participants reside in Narva and Tallinn.
Cluster Group | Formal Citizenship | Substantive Citizenship | Group Demographics
---|---|---|---
Narva Residents | Narva residents consist of more Estonian citizens than other citizenship status groups; however, Narva residents also consist of more Russian citizens and Stateless | Narva residents engage in a multiplicity of citizenship practices. More Narva residents vote in local elections than any other group. | Narva residents comprise around half of participants.
 | | Most value substantive | Most Narva residents are female.
Tallinn residents lack political interest. | | Ages range from ~18-79, with the largest age groups consisting of 20-24 and 25-29.
Most common shared political concerns include: economy, nationalism, corruption, and education. | | More Tallinn residents are single than any other marital status group.
Tallinn residents lack political interest. | | Nearly equal numbers have upper secondary education and higher education.
Most common shared political concerns include: economy, nationalism, corruption, and education. | | Encompass the largest share of professional occupations.
More Tallinn residents are Estonian citizens than other citizenship status groups. | | Slightly more are students than non-students.
Most are critical and skeptical of state/political accessibility. Tallinn residents perceive local state/politics as more accessible than others. | | More Tallinn residents are Estonian citizens than other citizenship status groups.
Most embody a plurality of spatial identities with the local and national Estonian perceived the strongest. | | Ages ranges from
Most are critical and skeptical of state/political accessibility. Tallinn residents perceive local state/politics as more accessible than others. | | Ages ranges from
Most perceive naturalization as easy in theory, but not in practice. | | Ages ranges from
Tallinn residents lack political interest. | | Ages ranges from
The amalgamated narratives, survey responses, and available data reveal Estonian Russian-speakers not as a monolithic population, but rather a population that embodies and enacts a heterogeneous array of formal and substantive citizenship perceptions, practices, and
identities. Russian-speakers’ embodiment and active engagement with citizenship, identity, and place diverges markedly from how this population is often interpreted and portrayed. Russian-speakers are often conflated and monolithized through Estonian and Russian state geopolitical discourse and practice (Aalto, 2003a; Conley & Gerber, 2011; Laitin, 1998).

Estonian restorationist and ethnocratic logic posits that Russian-speakers are the descendants of illegal immigrants or occupiers. Russian-speakers have been equated with muulased and a potential “fifth columnist” threat to Estonian security, sovereignty, and territorial integrity (Aalto, 2003a; Raud, 2004; Trimbach & O’Lear, 2015). This is most evident in Estonian state constructed ethnicized and politicized citizenship policy and its fragmentation and differentiation among Estonian Russian-speakers. As noted by the interviewed resident and citizen in the epigram of this chapter, citizenship continues to be a, “big issue - [because] nationality is ethnicity” (Interviewee 3, personal communication, September 6, 2013). This statement highlights the ethnicization and politicization of nationality (citizenship) and that citizenship within an Estonian context is equated with ethnicity. This interviewee also illustrates how citizenship remains a problematic and inequitable resource that hinders Russian political and civic incorporation.

Conversely, Russian state discourse and practice imagines Estonia’s Russian-speakers as passive victims of a geopolitical nationalist game perpetrated by the Estonian state (Evans, 2014). Russian-speakers, regardless of citizenship status, are perceived as part of an all-encompassing Russian-speaking sootechestvenniki [compatriots] or diaspora that requires Russian state protections (Bulakh, et. al., 2014; Conley & Gerber, 2011; Laitin 1998). According to Conley and Gerber (2011), the Russian state portrays Russian-speakers as a, “politically reconstructed diaspora community of ‘compatriots’” requiring linguistic, cultural, social, and legal protections (p. 13). The Russian state has sought to influence Estonian Russian-speakers by
a wealth of policies and initiatives including fostering a return to the Russian homeland through incentivized resettlement programs, promoting dual citizenship (which is illegal in Estonia), and relaxing naturalization processes (Conley & Gerber, 2011; Bulakh et. al., 2014). While Estonian and Russian state discourses and practices construct their own imagined Estonian Russian-speaking population, Estonian Russian-speakers themselves embody and enact their own imagined citizenships and identities that are plural, hybrid, and polyvalent.

The results illustrate a major divergence from and challenge to Estonian and Russian state constructions of citizenship and membership, which carry serious regional implications. The findings highlight how and why citizenship remains a major crux from the Estonian state, Estonian Russian-speaking population, and Estonian-Russian relations. Estonian state citizenship and carte blanche refusal to ease citizenship and naturalization policies for Estonian Russian-speakers has consequentially created the tenth largest stateless population in the world by state (Human Rights Watch, 2015), reified the, “one state, two societies” system (Hallik, 2003; Pettai & Hallik, 2002), and formed an inequitably marginalized political community. Russian-speakers’ political marginalization and citizenship differentiation is problematic not only for Russian-speakers’ civic and political incorporation, civic literacy, and sense of belonging, but also for Russian-speakers’ fealty for the Estonian state, European Union, and liberal democracy. While Estonian citizenship is supported partly by the legal principles of jus sanguinis and ex iniuria jus non oritur to restore and maintain its ethnicized citizenry and political community (Visek, 1997), Estonian Russian-speakers challenge and alter Estonian citizenship in their embodied and enacted citizenship perceptions, practices, and identities. Such challenges and alterations delegitimize Estonian citizenship and call into question the Estonian state formation, democracy, and citizenry.
Estonian Russian-speakers’ challenges remain relatively minor, legal, and non-violent; however, major, illegal, and violent challenges or incidences have taken place in Estonia. Notable examples of such incidences include: the non-violent autonomy campaign in Narva and Sillamäe (Laitin, 1998; D. Smith, 2002; Thompson, 1998; Trimbach & O’Lear, 2015); Bronze Soldier riots in 2007 (Burch & Smith, 2007; Legal Information Centre for Human Rights, 2007; Lehti et. al., 2008); the failed 2011 Russian nationalist-inspired terrorist attack on the Estonia Ministry of Defense by Karen Drambjan (Sivonen, 2011); and the activities of the, “passport mafia” who facilitated the illegal acquisition of citizenship and residency among Russian-speakers and ethnic Russians (Berendson, 2015). Additionally, the emergence of provocative Russian-speaking civil society organizations (CSOs) highlights the potential for collective organization and mobilization of Russian-speakers with the potential for advocacy, but also political volatility and instability. Such challenges also pose considerable transnational threats to Estonian security, territorial integrity, and sovereignty.

Fluctuating Estonian-Russian state relations, Russian accusations of Estonian hostility to its Russian-speaking population, and recent Russian irredentist overtures in Russian-speaking regions of Ukraine exacerbate the urgency to address or alter Estonian citizenship. Estonia and Estonia’s predominantly Russian-speaking northeastern borderland (where Narva is located) have emerged as potential sites of conflict and geopolitical discord (Trimbach & O’Lear, 2015). Russian militarization and military activities, including the invasions of Georgia (2008) and Ukraine (2014-present), annexation of Crimea (2014), deployment of Iskander-M ballistic missiles to the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad (Trimbach & O’Lear, 2015), and military exercises in the Baltic Sea region (Felgenhauer, 2015a, 2015b, Bērziņa, 2015) exemplify growing regional anxieties among not only Estonia and Russia, but also Estonia’s Baltic neighbors, European Union, United States, and NATO. Russian military actions in Georgia
(2008) and Ukraine (2014-present) in particular represent the potential and problematic role citizenship has played in Russia’s irredentist overtures in the region. In the Georgian separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (2008), and Ukrainian regions of Crimea (later annexed by Russia), Donetsk, and Luhansk, Russia partially predicated its military interventions (both invasion and hybrid warfare) on Russian compatriot policies and its ability to legally “defend” Russian citizens *manu militari* [military aid or means] beyond Russian territorial borders regardless of international norms of state territorial integrity or sovereignty (Artman, 2013; Biersack & O’Lear, 2014; Laruelle, 2015). While the details of both military conflicts contextually vary, the Russian state emphasized citizenship and passportization as rationale to “defend” its Russian-speaking compatriot diaspora from foreign aggressive state policies. Such irredentist policies and their potential in the Baltics and Kazakhstan have drawn considerable academic, media, and diplomatic attention (Bērziņa, 2015; de Pommereau, 2014; Diener, 2015; Dougherty & Kaljurand, 2015; Fein & Straughn, 2014; Galeotti, 2014; Higgins, 2014; Kalb 2015; Luhn, 2015; “NATO military chief Breedlove warns of Russian incursion”, 2014; Trimbach & O’Lear, 2015). While Russia has not taken direct military action (in a traditional sense) against the Estonian state or on Estonian territory, the Russian state has made hostile statements regarding Estonia’s treatment of Russians and Russian-speakers (Amundsen, 2014; Evans, 2014; “Russia emphasizes non-citizenship issue in human rights talks with EU”, 2014) and conducted cyber and hybrid warfare against the Estonian state (Kaiser, 2015; Maigre, 2015; Nemeth, 2015; Lanoszka, 2016). Thus, Estonian citizenship policy has conflict potential; however, as elucidated by the findings, Estonian Russian-speakers may not be keen on Russian military intervention and annexation or Estonian militarization in predominantly Russian-speaking areas, particularly in Narva.
As illustrated in this volume and my incorporation of clustered groups, Russian-speakers coalesce and diverge when it comes formal citizenship, substantive citizenship, politics, and the territorial state. Such group response fragmentation highlights the incongruences among citizenship, residency, spatial identity, and territorial state politics. Russian-speakers embody various valorizations of Estonian citizenship with most Russian-speakers voicing criticism and skepticism, particularly concerning the legal emphasis on *jus sanguinis* and Estonian language proficiency. When divided into formal and substantive aspects, more Russian-speakers actually perceive substantive (as action) citizenship as more important than formal citizenship, with most noting its inherent value to society and politics. While substantive citizenship is perceived as valued, the critical perceptions of formal citizenship highlights a shared recognition (not misrecognition) and challenge to formal citizenship (and its underlying doxa) as an ethnicized and politicized state construct. Russian-speakers’ mixed valorization of citizenship is not only evinced by their perceptions of citizenship’s importance, but also their critical and often negative perceptions of Estonian naturalization, *jus sanguinis* policy emphasis, and state/political accessibility and representativeness. Russian-speakers’ varied citizenship practices also reinforce, alter, and challenge citizenship. While citizenship practices vary by group, most notably citizenship status that entails numerous practice limitations, Russian-speakers do engage in a variety of practices including those that help construct and shape state-centered (electoral, political, civic) and non-state-centered (CSOs) citizenship spaces and relations, including virtual spaces and illegal spaces and processes (Berendson, 2015).

The noted citizenship perceptions and practices coupled with state instituted limitations on citizenship status, foreground the local scale, spaces, and places as influential sites of citizenship and impacts how Russian-speakers perceive and practice citizenship at other scales. Since Russian-speakers primarily engage as citizens or denizens at the local scale, it is not
surprising that Russian-speakers value substantive citizenship more that formal and perceive local state/politics as more accessible and representative than all other state/political scales and/or spaces. Additionally, the local scale, places, and local citizenship spaces reinforce and impact the strong local spatial identities of Russian-speakers, particularly for Narva residents, some of whom noted Narva as their perceived homeland. The relationship between formal citizenship and spatial identity also elucidates the complex hybridity and plurality of identities, particularly among minority place-based communities. The role of place-based communities and place, including the predominantly othered Russian-speaking areas of Narva and Tallinn (particularly Lasnamäe), highlight how the “place-rootedness” of citizenship and everyday life informs Russian-speakers’ embodied and enacted citizenship (Desforges et. al., 2005, p. 440). Place-based distinctions in relation to identities and citizenship more broadly were reiterated among Russian-speakers and illustrate how citizenship and place interact and inform one another. While Narva and Lasnamäe are both considered othered Russian-speaking communities with shared characteristics, Narva residents tend to be more critical of formal Estonian citizenship, the Estonian state, and emphasize their local Narvan-ness or distinctiveness compared to Tallinn residents. Although Russian citizens have a stronger Russian spatial identity and Estonian citizens have a stronger Estonian spatial identity, Estonian Russian-speakers also embody a layered mix of other spatial identities, most notably local spatial identity. A resident with Estonian citizenship notes this spatial identity hybridity and plurality by stating:

I never know who am I exactly. Am I Estonian? Am I Russian? I am like half Estonian and half Russian [linguistically and culturally] and I am really lucky and I really like it…and it is hard. You are stuck and you don’t really feel like a person. You feel yourself like a half-broken person. (Tallinn Interviewee 5, personal communication, September 10, 2013)
As gleaned from this resident, ethnicized and politicized Estonian citizenship impacts how Russian-speakers perceive and understand not only citizenship, politics, and the state but also their identities and communities. Democratic citizenship is meant to be a reflection and manifestation of a political community’s democratic political relations and spaces; however, as evinced from the Estonian context and Russian-speakers’ responses, citizenship as capital is undemocratically constructed by the Estonian state as a strategic mechanism of distinction that restricts capital accumulation and exchange within political spaces.

State-centered citizenship in Estonia and elsewhere is thus bound to state-centered political, legal, and territorial constructs and logics that are often deeply enmeshed with national particularities and ideologies. While states continue to be the dominant force in citizenship construction, legal and citizenship scholars have offered critical alternatives to state-centered citizenships that can reimagine and respatialize citizenship. Jus domicile [principle of residency] (Austin & Bauder, 2010; Bauder, 2012, 2014) and jus nexi [community attachment and affiliation] (Bauböck, 2011; Ehrkamp & Jacobsen, 2015; Shachar, 2009, 2011) are two legal and political principles that aim to reimagine and respatialize our relational and spatial understandings of citizenship. While both concepts differ, both emphasize the local scales, spaces, and communities in which citizens and denizens alike engage and embody everyday. While there are limitations to respatializing citizenship to the local scale and spaces of everyday citizenship and life, both concepts do offer legal, political, and territorial alternatives and challenges to the current state-centered and –dominated relational and spatial entanglements that inequitably construct citizens and denizens alike. Both concepts also coalesce with the non-state insurgent citizenships that local communities, particular those left out of state political and legal space, create to provide a shared sense of belonging, identity, and cohesion. By descaling and/or respatializing citizenship to the local scale and spaces of everyday citizenship, scholars, policy-
makers, and communities alike can deter inequitable ethnicization and politicization of citizenship that inequitably muffles the cacophony of voices, citizenships, and strong localisms of minority communities. Additionally, by respatializing citizenship to the local scale and spaces of everyday citizens and non-citizens, the political power over how citizenship is naturalized, legitimized, and universalized will be challenged and altered to reflect the actualized relationalities and spatialities of citizenship and the localities in which it is enacted and embodied. Thus, congruencies will form between formal and substantive citizenship, citizenship and spatial identity, and lastly citizenship and power relations.

As Garmany notes (2012), citizenship is ultimately, “a category – a very spatial one in fact – that tends to “other” and exclude rather than acknowledge multiple differences and include” (p. 18). This othering and exclusionary categorization and capital blurs and conflates citizenship, nationality, ethnicity, and political groups and membership. This blurring and conflation causes not only de facto statelessness for those groups lacking formal citizenship, but also de jure statelessness for those minorities and groups (ethnic, racial, religious, linguistic, gender, sexual, etc.) unable to accumulate, exchange, and utilize citizenship capital within political and citizenship spaces, which in turn cements their position within the inequitable field of power relations (Blitz, 2006; Fein & Straughn, 2014). By reimagining citizenship at the local everyday scale and spaces of embodied and enacted citizenship, citizenship can be spatially and relationally, “emancipated” from the monopolies of national sovereignty, state geopolitics, de facto-de jure statelessness, and homogenous territorial nationalization, and reconstruct more equitable democratic communities and landscapes (Bauböck, 2003, p. 139). Citizenship’s spatiality is thus not just a lens or an approach to understanding citizenship and its inherent politicized inequities and relations, but can emancipate, reconstruct, and challenge citizenship and political power.
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Appendix A

Survey Questions (Russian/English)

Пожалуйста, ответьте на все вопросы. Спасибо. / Please, answer all of the questions. Thank you.

Пол / Sex: Мужской / Male Женский / Female

Год рождения / Year of birth: .................................................................

Семейное положение / Marital status: .............................................

Профессия / Occupation: .................................................................

Студент/ка? / Student?: Да / Yes Нет / No

Na каком курс? / What year?: ............................................................

Уровень образования / Level of education: .................................

Национальность / Nationality: ......................................................

Национальность матери / Nationality of mother: ..............................

Национальность отца / Nationality of father: .....................................

Основной язык / Primary language: .............................................

Другие языки / Other languages: ..................................................

Место рождения / Place of birth: ....................................................

Место жительства / Place of residence: ...........................................

Как долго? / How long?: .................................................................

Ваше гражданство (выберите: (X)) / Your citizenship (choose: (X)):

( ) Эстонское гражданство / Estonian citizenship

( ) Российское гражданство / Russian citizenship

( ) Постоянный резидент (Эстония) / Permanent resident (Estonia)

( ) Временно проживающий (Эстония) / Temporary resident (Estonia)
( ) Другое (объясните, пожалуйста) / Other (please explain): ..............................................

Интересуетесь ли вы политикой? (выберите: (X)) / How interested are you in politics? / (choose: (X)):

( ) Очень интересуюсь / Very interested
( ) Интересуюсь / Somewhat interested
( ) Не очень интересуюсь / Not very interested
( ) Совсем не интересуюсь / Not at all interested

Какие проблемы политической жизни представляются вам наиболее важными?
(Пожалуйста, напишите 3) / What for you are the most important political concerns? (Please write 3):

Важна ли для вас проблема гражданства? (выберите: (X)) / How important is citizenship for you? (choose: (X)):

( ) Очень важна / Very important
( ) Важна / Important
( ) Не очень важна / Not very important
( ) Совсем не важна / Not at all important
( ) Затрудняюсь ответить / Difficult to answer

Кто должен быть гражданином Эстонии? (выберите:(X)) / Who should be a citizen of Estonia? (choose: (X)):

( ) Семьи, которые были гражданами до 1940 года / Families who were citizens before 1940
( ) Все, кто родился в Эстонии / All who were born in Estonia
( ) Все, кто жил в Эстонии более 10 лет / All who lived in Estonia more than 10 years
( ) Все проживающие в Эстонии со времени независимости / All residing in Estonia at the time of independence

( ) Все граждане бывшего СССР, которые теперь живут в Эстонии / All citizens of the USSR who now live in Estonia

Должны ли люди, которые хотят стать гражданами, сдавать экзамен по государственному языку? (Выберите "да" или "нет") / Should people who want to become citizens have to pass an examination in the national language? (Choose yes or no)

Да/Yes

Нет/No

В работе каких органов управления вы участвуете? (выделите все, что относится к вам/выберите(X)) / Which levels of government do you participate? (mark all that apply to you/choose: (X))

( ) В местном самоуправлении (Нарва/Таллинн) / Local government (Narva/Tallinn)

( ) В национальном правительстве (Эстония) / National government (Estonia)

( ) В национальном правительстве (Россия) / National government (Russia)

( ) В Европейском Союзе / European Union

( ) Не участвую ни в одном из них / None of them

Какое участие вы принимаете в политической и общественной жизни? (выделите все, что относится к вам, и напишите, как часто или в течение какого времени вы это делаете/выберите:(X)) / How do you participate in politics or public life? (select all that apply to you, and write down how often or how long you do it/choose: (X)):

( ) Голосую на выборах в органы местного самоуправления Эстонии / I vote in local Estonian elections

( ) Голосую на выборах в органы государственного управления Эстонии / I vote in national Estonian elections
( ) Голосую на выборах в органы государственного управления России / I vote in national Russian elections

( ) Голосую на выборах в Европейский Союз / I vote in European Union elections

( ) Являюсь членом политической партии / I am a member of a political party

( ) Участвую в акциях протеста / I protest

( ) Участвую в деятельности политической партии / I participate in political party activities

( ) Являюсь членом политической организации / I am a member of a political organization

( ) Посылаю письменные обращения к политическим лидерам или должностным лицам / I write letters to political leaders or officials

( ) Являюсь членом правительства / I am a member of government

( ) Работаю в правительственной организации / I am a government official

( ) Читаю или смотрю политические новости / I read or watch political news

( ) Участвую в работе социальных организаций / I participate in social organizations

( ) Другие формы участия / Other ways (explain:)

( ) Не участвую в политической и общественной жизни / I do not participate in political or social life

С вашей точки зрения, насколько участие граждан в работе государственных, политических, общественных и местных организаций важно для жизни общества? (выберите: (X)) / From your point of view how important is the participation of citizens in government, politics, public and local organizations for the society? (choose: (X)):

( ) Очень важно / Very important

( ) Важно / Important
С вашей точки зрения, насколько политики и чиновники разных уровней осведомлены о проблемах населения, откликаются на их обращения и доступны для населения? (1-вполне доступны; 2-доступны; 3-до некоторой степени доступны; 4-недоступны; 5-совсем недоступны) / From your point of view, how accessible are the following levels of government or politics? (1-readily accessible; 2-accessible; 3-to some extent accessible; 4-not accessible; 5-completely inaccessible):

Местные политики (Нарва/Таллинн) / Local politics (Narva/Tallinn)
1 2 3 4 5

Эстонские политики / Estonian politics
1 2 3 4 5

Российские политики / Russian politics
1 2 3 4 5

Политики Европейского Союза / Politics of European Union
1 2 3 4 5

Легко ли стать гражданином Эстонии и получить гражданство? (1–очень легко; 2–легко; 3–в принципе несложно; 4–нелегко; 5–очень трудно) / How easy is it to become a citizenship of Estonia and receive citizenship? (1-very easy; 2-easy; 3-easily in principle; 4-not easy; 5-very difficult)
1 2 3 4 5

Насколько адекватно следующие уровни власти представляют ваши интересы? (1-вполне адекватно; 2-адекватно; 3-адекватно до некоторой степени; 4-неадекватно; 5-совсем не
представляют) / How representative are the following levels of government or politics? (1-very adequate; 2-adequate; 3-adequately to some extent; 4-inadequately; 5-not represent)

Местные политики (Нарва/Таллинн) / Local politics (Narva/Tallinn)
1 2 3 4 5

Эстонские политики / Estonian politics
1 2 3 4 5

Российские политики / Russian politics
1 2 3 4 5

Политики Европейского Союза / Politics of European Union
1 2 3 4 5

Оцените степень важности для вас следующих регионов (1-совершенно неважно; 2- неважно; 3- важно до некоторой степени; 4-важно; 5-очень важно) / Assess the degree of importance to you the following regions (1-not very important; 2-not important; 3-somewhat important; 4-important, 5-very important):

Город / City/Town
1 2 3 4 5

Область / Region/County
1 2 3 4 5

Эстония / Estonia
1 2 3 4 5

Россия / Russia
1 2 3 4 5

Европейский Союз / European Union
1 2 3 4 5
Считаете ли вы, что Нарва уникальный регион? (Выберите "да" или "нет") / Do you consider Narva a unique region? (Choose yes or no)

Да / Yes   Нет / No

Почему (опишите)? / Why (describe)?:

Пожалуйста, напишите 3 слова, которые в наибольшей степени подходят для описания Нарвы / Please, write 3 words that suitably describe Narva:

Пожалуйста, напишите 3 слова, которые в наибольшей степени подходят для описания Эстонии / Please, write 3 words that suitably describe Estonia:

Пожалуйста, напишите 3 слова, которые в наибольшей степени подходят для описания Европейского Союза / Please, write 3 words that suitably describe the European Union:

Ниже опишите, как вы представляете себе весь мир и какое место в нем занимает ваша редина. / Below describe, how you imagine the whole world and what your homeland is.

Ниже нарисуйте, как вы представляете себе весь мир и какое место в нем занимает ваша редина. / Below draw, how you imagine the whole world and what your homeland.

Мир / World
1 2 3 4 5

Другое место / Other place
1 2 3 4 5

(пожалуйста, напишите, какое / please write):.................................................................................................
Appendix B

Interview Questions (Russian/English)

Пол / Sex: Мужской / Male Женский / Female

Год рождения / Year of birth:.................................................................

Семейное положение / Marital status:....................................................

Профессия / Occupation:......................................................................

Студент/ка? / Student?: Да / Yes Нет / No
На каком курс? / What year?:..............................................................

Уровень образования / Level of education:...........................................

Национальность / Nationality:..............................................................

Место рождения / Place of birth:..........................................................

Место жительства / Place of residence:.................................................

Ваше гражданство (выберите: (X)) / Your citizenship (choose: (X)):
( ) Эстонское гражданство / Estonian citizenship
( ) Российское гражданство / Russian citizenship
( ) Постоянный резидент (Эстония) / Permanent resident (Estonia)
( ) Временно проживающий (Эстония) / Temporary resident (Estonia)
( ) Другое (объясните, пожалуйста) / Other (please explain):.....................

Интересуетесь ли вы политикой? / How interested are you in politics?
Почему? / Why?

Какие проблемы политической жизни представляются вам наиболее важными? / What for you are the most important political concerns?
Почему? / Why?

Важна ли для вас проблема гражданства? / How important is citizenship for you?
Почему? / Why?

Кто должен быть гражданином Эстонии? / Who should be a citizen of Estonia?

Почему? / Why?

Должны ли люди, которые хотят стать гражданами, сдавать экзамен по государственному языку? (Выберите "да" или "нет") / Should people who want to become citizens have to pass an examination in the national language? (Choose yes or no) Да/Yes Нет/No

В работе каких органов управления вы участвуете? / Which levels of government do you participate?

Почему? / Why?

Какое участие вы принимаете в политической и общественной жизни? / How do you participate in politics or public life?

С вашей точки зрения, насколько участие граждан в работе государственных, политических, общественных и местных организаций важно для жизни общества? / From your point of view how important is the participation of citizens in government, politics, public and local organizations for the society?

Почему? / Why?

С вашей точки зрения, насколько политики и чиновники разных уровней осведомлены о проблемах населения, откликаются на их обращения и доступны для населения? / From your point of view, how accessible are the following levels of government or politics? Почему? / Why?

Легко ли стать гражданином Эстонии и получить гражданство? / How easy is it to become a citizenship of Estonia and receive citizenship? Почему? / Why?
Насколько адекватно следующие уровни власти представляют ваши интересы? / How representative are the following levels of government or politics? Почему? / Why?
Оцените степень важности для вас следующих регионов (1-совершенно неважно; 2-неважно; 3-важно до некоторой степени; 4-важно; 5-очень важно) / Assess the degree of importance to you the following regions (1-not very important; 2-not important; 3-somewhat important; 4-important, 5-very important):
Город / City/Town
1 2 3 4 5
Область / Region/County
1 2 3 4 5
Эстония / Estonia
1 2 3 4 5
Россия / Russia
1 2 3 4 5
Европейский Союз / European Union
1 2 3 4 5
Мир / World
1 2 3 4 5
Другое место / Other place
1 2 3 4 5
(пожалуйста, напишите, какое / please write):..................................................................
Считаете ли вы, что Нарва уникальный регион? (Выберите "да" или "нет") / Do you consider Narva a unique region? (Choose yes or no)
Да / Yes Нет / No
Почему (опишите)? / Why (describe)?:
Опишите, как вы представляете себе весь мир и какое место в нем занимает ваша родина. / 
Describe, how you imagine the whole world and what your homeland is.
Почему? / Why?
Что “гражданство” означает для вас? / What does citizenship mean to you?
Почему? / Why?
Что “гражданское общество” означает для вас? / What does civil society mean to you?
Почему? / Why?
Что “правительство” означает для вас? / What does government mean to you?
Почему? / Why?
Что “демократия” означает для вас? / What does democracy mean to you?
Почему? / Why?
Appendix C

Sample Demographic Data Elaboration & Tables C1-C13

In this Appendix, I highlight overall demographics of my population sample. While my population initially centered on Narva College’s student population, I was able through SSM to attract non-college students and non-Narva residents as participants. Overall, I was able to survey (N=421) and interview (N=20) Russian-speakers residing in both Narva (51%, 60%) and non-Narva (primarily Tallinn and Harju County) (49%, 40%). I also interviewed integration and citizenship experts (N=2), both on opposite sides of the integration debate, including one individual who works for a human rights agency that focuses on advocating for the Russian-speaking population (who is also widely published on the issue in both Russian and English languages) and the other is an individual who is an ethnic Estonian who works for an integration non-governmental organization (that is primarily funded by the Estonian state). These interviews were conducted in order to obtain additional information regarding current state discourses and practices related to citizenship and the Russian-speaking population in Estonia.

Overall, the survey sample population consisted of a mix of males (25%) and females (75%) and various age groups (18-79), with the largest age group consisting of college-aged individuals (20-24, 22% of respondents) (Appendix C, Table C1, C2). Respondents also consisted of varying education levels, occupations, and marital statuses (Appendix C, Table C3, C4, C6). Out of those that responded, 54% had upper secondary education (secondary and/or some sort of vocational/skills training), while 46% had academic higher education. This reflects the high levels of upper secondary and post-secondary skills/training among Russian-speakers (roughly over 50%) (particularly female Russian-speakers) (Eesti Statistika, 2011). The sample contains individuals with higher levels of higher education, which is partly explained by the gender imbalance among Russian-speakers, overall educational attainment, and the primary
focus on college students/community. Occupations also varied, with the largest group consisting of professionals (40%), managers (14%), students (16%) and/or craft and related trade workers (based on Estonian census and International classification systems). The occupations of the Russian-speaking respondents varied compared to the overall population, with professionals being over-represented. The particular question related to employment was open-ended and responses varied in interpretation and understanding of occupation/employment, which made coding based on Estonian census standards challenging (Eesti Statistika, 2011). Additionally, approximately half (50%) of respondents were students, while the other half (50%) were not students (included students who are also employed) (Appendix C, Table C5). Out of the respondents, most either stated that they were married (legally married) (43%) or single (never legally married) (41%). This differs from the general Russian-speaking population, which consists of married (between 45-50%) and single (roughly 20%) individuals (Eesti Statistika, 2011). This difference can be explained by the high prevalence of students and those 20-24 who participated in the survey process.

When it comes to questions of *natsional’nost*’ [nationality or ethnicity, *национальность*], the majority of respondents stated that they were Russian (80%), Estonian (10%), or of dual/mixed nationality (10%). When prompted to list the ethnicity of their parents, respondents responded that most had mothers (78%) or fathers (75%) who were Russian (Appendix C, Tables C8, C9). Also, place of birth varied among survey respondents. When asked about their place of birth, respondents stated Narva (38%), Russia (during Soviet era) (19%), and/or Tallinn (18%).

While I do not emphasize generalizability or transferability as paramount, any imbalances or differences that may impact comparability should be considered and acknowledged. It is apparent that there is a difference and/or imbalance between males and females among my
survey respondents. According to Eesti Statistika (2011), Russian-speaking females (55%) nationally outnumber males (45%), with similar patterns in Harju County (55%, 45%), Tallinn (56%, 44%), Ida-Viru County (55%, 45%), and Narva (56%, 44%). This difference explains other differences and issues with generalizability as noted in the preceding demographics. Additionally, since my primary population consists of college students, some respondent demographic patterns can be explained by this overrepresentation. This sex/gender imbalance can partially be explained by the variety the broader social, economic, and health-related disparities that are both ethnicized and gendered among the Russian-speaking population. This sex/gender imbalance can also be partly explained by the gendered aspects of citizenship and Estonian naturalization processes.

As aforementioned in previous chapters, Estonian Russian-speakers nationally tend to have lower incomes and higher rates of unemployment (Pavelson & Luuk, 2002; Tammaru & Kulu, 2003), worse physical and mental health (Leinsalu, 2004), overrepresented in prisons (60% of incarcerated persons are ethnic minorities – primarily Russians and/or Russian-speakers) (Semjovona, 2014), and are disproportionately impacted by drug use and HIV/AIDS (Downes, 2004; Uusküla et. al., 2005). While Russian-speakers as a whole tend to be inequitably impacted by these social and health problems, these issues are also gendered with Russian-speaking males being inequitably impacted more than females. Russian-speaking men tend to have lower qualities of life (Väljaots, 2013) and also have the highest mortality rate (and rate decline post-independence) than any other demographic group in Estonia (Cockerham, 1999; Kunst et. al., 2002). According to the Estonian census (Eesti Statistika, 2011), Russian-speaking men (over 25%) are also more likely to experience long-term health problems. Additionally, Russian-speaking males have higher rates of unemployment and are less educated than their female co-ethnics (Eesti Statistika, 2011). Russian-speaking men also tend to be more likely to live in
institutionalized housing (2%) or be homeless (2%) (Eesti Statistika, 2011). While these socio-economic, health, and demographic trends are national, they are exacerbated in the City of Narva and Ida-Viru County, largely because of the high concentration of Russian-speakers in this region.

Additionally, there are gendered differences and patterns when it comes to education and citizenship among Russian-speakers, which can partially explain the demographic particularities among my survey respondents. According to the latest Estonian census (Eesti Statistika, 2011), around 36% of Russian-speaking women have obtained higher education (university), compared to 25% of Russian-speaking men (Eesti Statistika, 2011). Citizenship status also differs and is gendered among Russian-speakers. More Russian-speaking women are Estonian citizens (57%) and have gone through the naturalization process compared to males (49%). This pattern is not unique to Estonia (Bass & Casper, 2001; Caiazza, 2002; Owen & Zerilli, 1991) and has furthered my interest in the gendered aspects of Estonian citizenship, naturalization, and political power, all of which offer (at this point in time) limited scholarship with room for expansion (Bego, 2014; Horn, 2008; Moreland, 2014; Voorman, 2005) and innovation. Additionally, my initial primary focus on college students, which later snowballed or expanded out of the college/college-educated community, also contributed to this imbalance. While I cannot state with certainty as to why there was such a gender imbalance, the outlined disparities and demographic differences do provide a deeper explanation.

While my survey respondents included more females than males, I also conducted interviews to increase generalizability and comparability among my target population. Among my interview participants, I surveyed slightly more males (12) than females (10) with ages ranging from (18-70 among age groups) (includes 2 integration/citizenship experts). Interview participants also included a mix of Stateless residents (3), Estonian citizens (16) and Russian
citizens (3). Interview participant residency locations also varied and were complicated by the high outmigration patterns among Russian-speakers in Narva and Ida-Viru County (Nikolajev & Rikken, 2015). Interviewees included individuals permanently residing, partially residing, previously resided and/or maintains a close relationship to Narva (14) or Tallinn (8) and their surrounding areas. These residency distinctions vary and are complicated because mobility and migration patterns among Estonian Russian-speakers change over time and space.

Table C1

Sex of Survey Respondents (Total)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>All Groups (N=421)</th>
<th>Male 25%</th>
<th>Female 75%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Table C2

Age Groups of Survey Respondents (Total)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Groups</th>
<th>All Groups (N=411)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18-19</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-24</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-29</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-34</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-39</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-44</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-49</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-54</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55-59</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60-64</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65-69</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70-74</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75-79</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table C3

Marital Status of Survey Respondents (Total)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Marital Status</th>
<th>All Groups (N=409)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Never Legally Married</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consensual Union</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legally Married</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divorced</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Widowed</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common-law Marriage</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table C4

**Occupations of Survey Respondents (Total)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation Classification</th>
<th>All Groups (N=410)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professionals</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managers</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technicians and associate professionals</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craft and related trade workers</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service and sales workers</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical support workers</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plant machine operators and assemblers</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary occupations</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homemakers</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table C5

**Student Status of Survey Respondents (Total)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All Groups (N=416)</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table C6

**Education Level of Survey Respondents (Total)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education Levels</th>
<th>All Groups (N=409)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary education</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper secondary education</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academic higher education</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table C7

**Nationality of Survey Respondents (Total)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>All Groups (N=408)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonian</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dual/Mixed Nationality</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table C8

**Mother Nationality of Survey Respondents (Total)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>All Groups (N=404)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonian</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dual/Mixed Nationality</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table C9

**Father Nationality of Survey Respondents (Total)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>All Groups (N=404)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonian</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dual/Mixed Nationality</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table C10

**Primary Language of Survey Respondents (Total)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language</th>
<th>All Groups (N=413)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>97%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonian</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table C11

**Multi-/Dual-Lingualism of Survey Respondents (Total)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>All Groups (N=413)</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Most common languages include: Estonian, English, and/or German.*

Table C12

**Place of Birth (City, Country) of Survey Respondents (Total)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place of Birth</th>
<th>All Groups (N=410)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Narva, Estonia</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tallinn, Estonia</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kohtla-Järve, Estonia</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tartu, Estonia</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sillamäe, Estonia</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other, Estonia</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other, Russia</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other, Non-Estonia/Non-Russia</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table C13

**Place of Residence (Narva vs. Non-Narva Areas) of Survey Respondents (Total)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place of Residence</th>
<th>All Groups (N=406)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Narva</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Narva</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Responses may include individuals who live in more than one location. Non-Narva respondents primarily include Tallinn, other smaller communities in Harju County, and a small number of respondents from elsewhere in Estonia.*