

MISSIONARY AND MANCHU

by

Ernest Delbert Tyler, A.B.,

University of Kansas. 1928.

Submitted to the Department of His-
tory and the Faculty of the Graduate
School of the University of Kansas
in partial fulfillment of the require-
ments for the degree of Master of Arts.

Approved by:

W. W. Davis
Instructor in Charge

F. H. Hodder
Head of the Department

June 2, 1930.

MISSIONARY AND MANCHU

A study of the influence of the
Missionary in the diplomatic relations of
the Manchu Government with the Powers
from 1843 to 1912 inclusive

AN APPRECIATION

To Professor William Watson Davis whose splendid cooperation and faith in the author has made this volume possible. To know Professor Davis is a privilege; to work with him becomes one of those priceless memories of student days which make our Alma Mater so dear to us.

AN ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The author wishes first to acknowledge his debt to those members of the history department of the University of Kansas, who have at all times lent their optimistic support to this undertaking. Especially is he indebted to Dr. F.H. Hodder, head of the department, to Professor William Watson Davis under whom this thesis was written, Professor Frank E. Melvin, Professor James C. Malin, and Professor David L. Patterson.

While much of the source material for this work comes directly from the "Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States", and the British and Foreign State Papers", particularly, the author wishes to make these few acknowledgements.

In the historical field Payson I Treat's "The Far East", Tyler Dennett's "Americans in Eastern Asia", and P.H. Clement's "The Boxer Rebellion" are to be mentioned as especially helpful. Although dealing with a somewhat different period H.M. Vinacke's "Modern Constitutional Development of China" deserves mention. Then there are others including K.S. Latourette, E.T. Williams, H.H. Gowen, P.S. Reinsch, F.J. Goodnow, and J.W. Hall to mention a few whose works are foremost in the field, and to whom the author finds himself indebted.

From the viewpoint of the life of the court the author has found the several works of Princess Der Ling, and Katherine A. Carl's "With the Empress Dowager" of incalculable value.

Among the missionary historians whose delightful works enabled the author to picture conditions in China during the earlier period the author wishes to mention Samuel Wells Williams, and

W.A.P. Martin. Of the history of the later period the author finds himself indebted to A.H. Smith.

Lastly, the author wishes to mention that splendid volume by J.O.P. Bland and E. Backhouse entitled "China Under the Empress Dowager", Brought out when the Manchu dynasty was falling it gave the world its first intimate glimpse of that dynasty in its last phase and included in its text many new sources, chief of which is the colorful and invaluable "Diary of His Excellency Ching Shan". Of the Chinese historians the splendid historical works of Shuhsi Hsu must be mentioned. Hsu makes Western historians conscious, as perhaps no other historian has done, of the rational Chinese viewpoint.

In closing the author desires to state that while the viewpoints advanced in this thesis may conflict with those of his colleagues at times, that his criticisms are in no way intended to be unduly sharp or of a personal nature, but that he has merely sought that for which all true historians are seeking - the truth. In doing this he has incurred the possibility of being tiresome, perhaps, by enclosing not one or two documents but many. The trend of these documents, if followed closely, will itself set forth the thesis by showing the evolution of policies and the shifting of sympathies and viewpoints.

To the missionary readers he wishes to state that it is the least of his intentions to belittle their work. He has tried to give credit in the many cases deserving credit; on the other hand he has deemed it only common justice to bring out those facts of mistaken judgement and undeniable error where they occur.

University of Kansas,

Ernest Delbert Tyler.

June 2, 1930.

CONTENTS

I

Beginnings of Foreign Intercourse with China

Page
1.

An introductory glimpse of China's trade from the earliest times; the introduction of Christianity in 506; the "Franks"; Carpini and Rubriquis at the court of Ghengis Khan; Matthew Ricci to China in 1581; spasmodic persecution before the Manchus; missionary work under the Manchus; proscription of 1616 and 1718; Coming of European traders; rise of Macox; restriction of trade to Canton; early commercial missions to Peking; first Protestant missionary at Canton in 1807.

II

The First Period, 1843 to 1860

9.

The Opium War; key to Commissioner Lin's actions; Treaty of Nanking; the Cushing Mission and the treaty of Wanghia; Kiying's memorial submitting Lagrone's request for and edict granting toleration; British secure similar rights for Protestants; subsequent treaties.

III

A Period of Uncertainties, 1847 to 1860

21.

Basis for the Manchus lack of understanding of treaties; the necessity of "keeping face"; the charge of bad faith; the Taiping Rebellion; missionary interest in the Taiping rebels; Dr. Martin's attempt to reach Nanking; the Manchus suspect missionary meddling; a provincial edict; reasons for doubting the validity of the 1858 treaties; Kiying's opinion of treaties and treaty-makers; clash of occidental and oriental ideology; Chinese officials into the breach; war.

IV

The Missionary Official and the Treaties of 1858 to 1860

52.

The missionary official; the early Russian treaties; the reactionary Hien-Feng; Dr. Parker's plan; Humphrey Marshall lays basis for American policy; Williams doubts; the Reed Mission; Williams and Martin frame the toleration clause from Russian draft; the fall of Peking validates the treaties of 1858; the unique position of Russia; the Edict of Chien Lung.

V

The Last Son of Heaven

70.

Significance of 1860; the Concubine Yi begs Hien Feng to remain at Peking; death of the sacrosanct idea; death of Hien Feng; Prince Kung's negotiations with the foreigners; grateful Manchus; Kung on missionaries;

growing importance of the missionary.

VI

The Dilemma of the Diplomats

81

Burlingame's policy; diplomacy averts a second Arrow War; Vice Consul Lord on missionary situation; missionaries disregard treaties; the "Sixth Clause"; Robert Hart on the Burlingame Mission.

VII

Middle Ground and Difficult Diplomacy

93

Burlingame on the Chinese; French threats; causes of friction; the Tientsin massacre; Hamilton Fish sums up Chinese situation; Tsang Kwoh-fan's report to the Throne; Chinese suggest rules for missionaries; disregard for the dead and Shanghai riots; "fungshui"; first anti-foreign and anti-Manchu placards; pamphlets denounce Christianity; the first inkling of future policies.

VIII

Shaping of the Latitudinarian Policy

119

A shift from Burlingame diplomacy; making the most of China's weakness; Frederick Low on missionaries; Avery says missionaries "cannot be left in the lurch"; Fish voices Latitudinarian policy; British construction of treaties; Seward attempts to secure unity; the question of church and state; reason for French protection of Catholic interests; Low on French aims; Martin on local autonomy in China; the question of the missionary holding land in the interior; a daring Soochow magistrate; John Russell Young on the missionary situation; Charles Denby on the "Sixth Clause"; Denby on relation of religion to trade; silence of the Manchu Government.

IX

Behind the Curtain

152

"Keeping face"; a period of friendliness; the Manchu goes to school; Manchu ideas of church and state; Martin in place of trust; Robert Hart's influence; the Tung Wen college; Wujin unmasked; the Tsung Li Yamen; Dr. Williams serves with distinction; religious teaching not forbidden in Tung Wen college; toleration in appointments; Martin on Imperial Governmental procedure; Prince Kung is replaced by the more liberal Li Hungchang; toleration maintained in face of opposition; Reid on favors shown Christianity; Denby on Manchu toleration.

The missionary and social progress; economic problems; Seward on transportation as a cure for famine; Famine years; Li Hung chang fights famine; missionaries and famine; growth of Christianity; Dr. Martin on opium situation; Li on opium; anti-opium society in England; Williams and Martin condemn Reid policy in 1858; the Pethick report; British missionary activity; "the Cambridge Seven"; opium and English politics; missionary conference condemns British Government's stand; the Manchus and opium; other liberal Manchu customs.

XI

The Latitudinarian policy develops; dangers in the policy; Li Hung chang replaces Kung; Li's liberalism; Li before the Throne; apprenticeship of the Young Emperor; Tzu Hsi retires from Throne; Denby reviews Tzu Hsi's reign; Martin on Emperor's power and responsibility; foreign traders push up river valleys; first factories at Shanghai; Chinese discontent grows; the anti-Manchu riots of 1891; revolt in Mongolia; a subservient emperor and dominating powers; Denby writes Blaine of demands made on Throne in 1891; growing Manchu discontent with Young Emperor; Tzu-Hsi refuses to interfere; Kwang Hsu's toleration edict of Jan. 13, 1891; Kwang Hsu resents parental obligations to Tzu Hsi; alienating the Mandarin; the foreign demands of August 25, 1891; the "Hog Ancestor" placard; Gresham's ruling on foreigners holding land; American demands concerning missionaries; America second to France in efforts to protect missionaries.

XII

The United States in the Kutien outrage; Britain refuses to go so far; Manchu Government refuses U.S. demands concerning missionaries; consequential or remote claims collected by missionaries; blending of missionary and economic rights; mineral deposits of China; Richthofen report; tightening of Chinese opposition; riots commonly/anti-foreign and anti-Manchu; the evil of wholesale punishments; Germany seizes Kiao Chow; others follow lead; Kwang Hsu's grip on empire weakens; dangers of a second Taiping; the fatal eclipse; missionaries usurp official power locally; Tsung Li Yamen attempts to regulate.

An eclipse casts its shadow; fear in high places; Kwang Hsu's Reforms of the Hundred Days; Rumors of dethronement; Kang Yu-wei and the South China reformers; Kwang Hsu adopts Kang's wild plan; Yuan Shih-kai warns his "blood brother"; Tzu Hsi acts to avert a second Taiping; Kwang Hsu restrained; Tzu Hsi tries to pacify her empire while minimizing the possibility of further conflicts with foreigners; the Italians demand Sammen Bay; Tzu Hsi refuses and organizes her empire for defense against aggression; the fear of "partitioning"; foreign meddling; Tzu Hsi resents British slight; Tzu Hsi comes to hate foreigners, but not foreign methods.

XIV

Tuan capitalizes possibilities; uprisings not new; the weakness of the local officials; Tuan the charlatan; Tuan uses travelling troupes of players to weld opposition to the foreigner; why he centered on the Northeast; rumors of partitioning excites all China; Denby on the situation; the situation at Hong-Kiang; preferred passport status for American missionaries; Decree of November 21, 1899 reveals seriousness of situation; Tsung-li Yamen orders Chinese forces to resist any attempt at aggression; China prepares for war; the murder of Mr. Brooks; missionaries in a panic; Princess Der Ling describes Tuan; Tuan dares overstep authority; reluctance of Throne to repress all societies with reasons; the ministers resume policy of demanding by identic notes; von Kettler makes serious and unwarranted accusations; the Chihli and Shantung decrees; the Powers make demands for general publication of Chihli and Shantung decrees an ultimatum; China yields; a period of anxious waiting.

XV

Tuan sets his plan in motion; Boxers converge on Peking; terrified Legations call for aid; the Powers seize Tientsin; Americans refuse to cooperate declaring it an act of war; the Throne believes Powers landing on pretext to partition China; all China seething; Old Buddha demands safety of Legations; Tuan's forgery throws Tzu Hsi into a rage against foreigners; in anger she orders firing on Legations; Tuan gains control of Government and Peking; Tuan alienates Old Buddha five days later; back to reason; Jung Lu protects the Legations with-

out definitely breaking with hostile Boxers; Tzu-Hsi's attempts to get Li Hung chang back to Peking; her communications to riverine viceroys; clever stratgy at Peking to save city and Legations; Jung Lu refuses to surrender heavy artillery to Tuan; Tuan gains control of State seals; did Tuan dare forge hostile edicts? riverine viceroys condition non-participation in hostilities upon no show of hostile aggression by Powers; was there a state of war existing or not? the Hay Note of July 3, 1900 dooms Tuan's gigantic plans to failure; Favier and Hart had feared general uprising; was the Throne insincere? Chinese Missionary Alliance on missionary culpability; Dr. Matigon on responsibility of Powers for uprising; the basis of Tzu Hsi's traditional hypocrisy.

XVI

Measuring Reforms by the Ticking of the Clock

322

American State Department returns to rationality; why China could introduce reform after Boxer trouble; Tzu Hsi sees possibility of introducing reform to which she had been converted in the 80's; the necessity for haste; Treat on Tzu Hsi and reforms; reforms wisely initiated; French keep missionary claims out of Boxer indemnity; missionaries exact own indemnities locally; more remote or consequential damages; John Hay on missionary claims; Squires on missionary claims; toleration clause revised in Treaty of 1903; Regulations governing intercourse of missionaries and officials rescinded; Dr. H.C. Du Bose sets opium reform in action; flowering of missionary opposition to opium; Bishop Brent and the Opium Commission; International Congresses; the clock ticks; anti-Manchu resistance reasserts itself; renewal of anti-Manchu and anti-foreign riots; rebellion threatens Tzu Hsi's reforms; Manchu Government uses strong hand; Tzu Hsi's violence; death of Empress Dowager.

XVII

The Edifice Crumbles

355

Treat on Tzu Hsi's reforms; a weak Prince Regent; the need of a strong hand; "It will all soon be over, Son"; colorless succession edict; Manchu power crumbles; official speculation in rice; riots at Changsha show hostile hand; insubordinate national assemblies; the Yangtze Valley famine; violence at Canton; "Down with the Manchus!"; wily radical leaders; Calhoun on Chinese situation; the Manchu a saddle for all past ills; magnanimous Manchus; a penitent child emperor; Chinese Declaration of Independence of Jan. 5, 1912; J.O. Bland on Chinese Declaration.

XVIII

Conclusion

374

FOREWORD

Not even a casual student of Chinese history can fail to be impressed with the importance of the role played by the Christian missionaries in the political fortunes of the Empire from 1843 until its fall. This influence is unique in that it reveals itself in two powerful aspects, one for the good of that great nation; the other as one of the factors making for ill and the nucleus around which foreign aggression took on its most formidable and menacing form. If this thesis seems at times to rotate abruptly between these two extremes the reader must bear with the author in his attempt to see the problem in all its phases and not merely from the occidental point of view, and least of all merely the point of view of the Christian who sees no good in any thing oriental merely because it is by our Christian standards "heathen".

The second point which it is desirable to consider is the so obvious and continuous contradiction generally which our Chinese histories offer within themselves. Human nature is much the same the world over. It has been the very erroneous practise in the past to credit everything unfathomable to the peculiarity and not to be understood workings of the oriental mind. But not only has our estimation of the Chinese been faulty but also our interpretation of their

history reveals the same glaring faults. Some years ago an eminent historian in an address before the American Historical Society laid down briefly as a basis a few general laws/ which all history followed. He was loudly applauded and future historians have read them and treasured them up in their hearts as the great truths of history. It is a blessed thing to find the truth. But either these rules are erroneous or our Chinese histories are in error for they are too often inconsistent within themselves. The author prefers to follow ^{the premise of} the/ universal trends laid down by Professor Cheyney and to seek a solution for the historical distortions in the deep religious prejudices which has so dominated the Western view-point within the years in question. These ^{have been} / reflected first hand in international political affairs of the time and ^{and have} / disclosed and distorted to a considerable extent the very sources of our history dealing with the Chinese. We need to study the works of the Chinese themselves in order to understand their view-points and to know something of their ideology. If at times the author seems to go too far in the opposite direction from contemporary historians the reader is kindly asked to reduce his criticism by half and thus allow for his ^{own} / possible erroneous conception.

The purpose of this thesis on the other hand is most certainly not to minimize the influence of the great mission-

ary effort. Most certain it^{is} that for the first forty years following the signing of the Cushing treaty between the United States and China the missionaries as a class held the center of interest in American diplomatic dispatches. The missionaries were called to man the legation and consular offices, to help frame treaties, to interpret for the foreign diplomatic missions, and to serve in Peking as the officials of the Imperial Government.

The first vivid impression the Chinese were to have of the foreigners knocking at their gates in the nineteenth century was that of opium smuggling on the one hand and the missionary on the other. For years missionaries and opium, while varying widely in their fields of influence, were closely associated in the Chinese mind as typifying foreign civilization and presenting a sorry dualism. When Prince Kung was asked by Sir Rutherford Alcock, the British minister, how he could be of service to the Imperial Government on the occasion of his visit to England in 1869 that admirable old Manchu statesman slyly replied that Sir Rutherford might take with himself the missionaries and opium and obviously forget to bring them back on the occasion of his return.^{2.} What the Prince meant was that around opium and the missionary all the friction and difficulties China was having with the foreign powers seemed to arise. The repartee was clever,

but it is doubtful if Prince Kung himself would have been willing to see the Imperial Government deprived of the president of its Tung Wen college, who was Dr. W.A.P. Martin an American missionary, or the American legation forced to do without Samuel Wells Williams, its very capable secretary and also an American missionary.

The missionaries intent upon saving souls for Christ became identified in quite another way with the destinies of of the celestial Empire. Keenly awake to every pulsation of the great nation which might forward their work they took a keen interest in all the leading political events and changes. When the Taiping rebellion swept down upon China with all the suddenness of the dreaded typhoon, the missionary forces throughout China were electrified by the news that its leader, Hung Sui-tsuen had been taught by one of their number, and Hung professed a firm belief in the Bible and in Christianity. He proposed to put away or destroy the Confucian tablets, and wipe out all other heathen religions of China and substitute Christianity. Missionary interest was transformed into enthusiasm when they heard ^{that} Hung was himself preaching and baptising his followers. But as the rebellion became more and more political in its aspects and developed its excesses in rapine and blood the missionaries became more and more alienated ^{from the rebellion} where at the first ^{only} the severity of an American statute of 1848 kept them from actively aiding the Taiping ^{followers of the} Chao. On the other hand the Taiping Chao like ^{most} ~~the~~ bulk

of the Chinese of the time underestimated the strength of the foreigner and failed to make the contact with the foreigner which might have resulted in the recognition of the new dynasty in 1860. Quite contrarily they invested Nanking and cut the trade of that great region in two, much to the irritation and loss of the British. The result was that recognition never came and eventually Manchu forces led ^{by} the picturesque Frederick T. Ward and later by "Chinese" Gordon crushed the revolt. Its results were two-fold: (1) it diverted the spirit of rebellion to under-the-surface movements through secret societies whose resentment burned alike against Manchu overlord and foreigner with frequent rumblings and outbreaks through the ensuing years; (2) it left the Manchus unestimably more grateful, friendly and more liberal toward foreigners, their policies and their religious beliefs than historians have been accustomed to recognize. The Manchus were a foreign dynasty and a whole empire of subject peoples had to be contended with, humored, pacified, and kept at peace if the Manchu overlordship was to perpetuate itself. At the same time the change from centuries of exclusion with all of its eccentricities and pretention to world domination had to give way gradually to new ideas and participation in family of nations. Haste was impossible for on the one hand it would bring about a revolt at home with the possibility of success that was not to be hazarded;

on the other hand haste would likely invite aggression and a dictation of policy which would sweep away at once the sovereignty and dignity of the Manchu power. So China discreetly spoke from behind the screen, while the sharp but not unfriendly eyes of the servants high in the councils of the government looked forth to observe and to learn. They had much to learn.

The ignorance in high circles was appalling, the prejudice to be overcome in the masses was tremendous. The cupidity of the powers had to be guarded against at every move, the populace had to be kept quiet, territorial integrity had to be maintained as best they could in their weakened condition and the dynasty had to "keep face" in a nation where "keeping face" was the chief requisite to power and respect. But a more serious handicap prevailed, the ruling hand was supremely feeble; the dynasty was on the decline and its senility was a danger that must be constantly and discreetly hidden. Things might be left to develop but the dynasty could not contemplate for a moment anything that smacked of startling change or innovation. Lastly there was to be feared the literati and the gentry who exerted tremendous local power and who were constantly hostile to Manchu and foreigner alike.

During the sixties and seventies China did progress and in every line there was a constant show of development.

It is true that development might be considered negligible in Western eyes, so negligible in fact as to scarcely be noticeable, but for age-old China with her centuries of eccentricities and prejudice back of its conservatism the development was sufficiently fast for proper assimilation by a vast nation of many thousands of square miles and many millions of souls. Wise hands were at the wheel. At every turn the modernization of China came on like an infiltrating flood. The ruling motto of the Manchus may well have been "as much as the people are ready for and no more". The people, especially the gentry were to be feared. During these years China stood receptive to change but secretly so, so secretly so that her leaders and rulers dared scarcely to think their thoughts, while they listened intently for each ominous sound which might presage a second Taiping. Foreign powers were left to develop a policy of mild aggressiveness without protest. Anything which did not actually threaten the safety and integrity of the Empire and which the people would stand for locally was tolerated by the central government.

Thus it was that the chief aggressive agency within the Empire, the missionaries, intent upon the dissemination of their faith became the chief factors in modernizing the great nation, and bringing China into active relations with the outside world. To the missionary fired with the zeal of converting the heathens whom they found there treaties were indeed scraps of paper. They took all they dared under the existing treaties, and when treaty rights failed them they

dared go beyond their limits, so much so that they kept the diplomats constantly busy in trying to protect them and at the same time find some show of authority in the existing treaties, or as was more common, indeed, to ignore the existing treaties and fall back upon some established precedent, which too often was all but too recently established to be a precedent at all.

But while the Manchu Government developed a policy of patiently biding its time and allowing as much latitude as it dared under the circumstances while the door to outside influence was being gradually widened, they never once ceased to maintain the dignity of its station, or to resist vigorously any abuse of its policy for purely aggressive purposes. At the same time the spirit of the Taiping lived beneath the surface, breaking out in occasional riots. Secret societies kept up the spirit of revolt and in these germs hidden away in the vastness of the Empire lay the causes of the outbreak in 1899, and later in 1912.

It is significant that the movement which resulted in the overthrow of the Manchu dynasty in 1912 was both anti-Manchu and anti-foreign, so that during the period under consideration the destinies of the Manchu and the foreigner (who was in the majority of the cases a missionary) was, contrary to popular belief, closely interrelated. The missionary, the only foreigner free or nearly so to penetrate China

became synonymous in the Chinese mind with the foreigner generally. Thus wrath heaped upon the heads of foreigners generally, most often fell hardest upon the missionaries as a class for they were most easily available. Hating the Manchu as a vacillating overlord kow-towing to the foreigner it is for the student of history to lay down the first, ^{and} requisite premise that the spirit of conservatism/enmity toward foreigners lies inherent in the Chinese people and not with the Manchu dynasty with whom republican America would liked to have buried those two obstacles in 1912.

Having surveyed the situation existing throughout the period to be studied, attention can now be turned to the missionary as a determining factor in the political situation during these years. In his footsteps nations formulated their policies, and built up trade. Upon him foreign ministers leaned for advice and counsel, and upon him the Manchu Government secretly directed its diplomacy, quick to realize that he represented a strong section of popular opinion in his home country to which the diplomat at its court took cognizance. At the same time the missionary is the leaven which modernized China, and in leavening it contributed very greatly to the sum total of events and causes which precipitated the revolt that overturned the Manchu dynasty. Yet the devout quiet-working, earnest men who sought only the spread of their religious faith would, had they been accused of being the principals in such a role, have vehemently denied it,

and from their point of view rightfully so.

In order to limit the field and show the missionary influence in the framing of treaties this treatise will be limited largely to the development of American treaties and foreign policy with China, taking up the actions of other nations and their policies only as they bear upon the American policy. The time actually under consideration is the period from 1843 to 1912, but with the privilege of using relevant and pertinent facts outside of this period where they clarify points in question, provide a precedence or indicate a probable future trend.

BEGINNINGS OF FOREIGN INTERCOURSE WITH CHINA

It was not China's first acquaintance with Europeans when in 1841-42 the British in the so-called "Opium War" forced from China her first treaty with the outside world wherein it was explicitly specified but scarcely comprehended by the Chinese / that the second party to the contract was a sovereign and not a tributary power.

From the very earliest times China furnished the Greeks and the Romans with silks and other oriental wares through an elaborate series of transshipments by Chinese, Indian, and Arab merchants. Around 506 A.D. Nestorian Christianity had been introduced into China through the medium of this great inter-continental trade, and the Emperor T'ai Tsung of the Tang dynasty, who came to the throne in 620, received the Nestorians kindly. His successors were not unfavorable to Christianity and it continued in the kindly graces of the throne until 845 when Wu Tsung issued an edict commanding some 3,000 Nestorian priests to quit the observance of their religious rites.

After the year 1000 overland wanderers from the West seem to have become more common again, and were known generally as "Franks". The Western invasions of Ghengis Khan coupled with the earlier Crusades kindled anew the desire of the European to see far countries and to covet the rich wares which came from those countries far to the East. The

two first Catholic emissaries to enter China, so far as we know, were Friar John de Plano Carpini and William de Rubriques. Carpini reached Peking in 1246 bearing a communication to Ghengis Khan from Pope Innocent IV. Rubriques a few years later was sent upon a similar diplomatic mission by Louis XI. These two men while both clergymen attempted no missionary work. The first missionary sent out by the Church was John de Monte Corvino, who arrived in Peking in 1292 where he was kindly received by Kublai Khan, and was allowed to propagate his religion. In 1307 he was consecrated Bishop of Peking and is credited with 30,000 converts. During the eighty years the Mongol dynasty survived Christianity was tolerated, but on the accession of the Mings to the Imperial throne a stop was made to the coming of Christian missionaries from the West. Whether this prohibition was due to any fault of the missionaries or the Church we do not know. We do know however that unscrupulous European adventurers arriving in China during this period aroused the resentment and antagonism of the Chinese causing all foreigners to be regarded as "red-haired barbarians".

The Roman Catholic missions in China were started by the Dominicans in 1555. From 1555 to 1844 the Catholics were alternately tolerated and persecuted depending solely upon the immediate whim of the Emperor. Matthew Ricci reached China in

1581. He was a high type of scholar and missionary, and by means of his great tact and learning won the respect of the Chinese and succeeded in establishing missions at four places Peking being one of the four. Until Ricci's death in 1610 there was no persecution, but in 1616 a violent persecution broke out and all missionaries were ordered to leave China. In 1622 persecution ceased only to burst forth again in the 1644. In 1671 the Christian missionaries were again allowed to return to China, and in 1692 complete toleration was again granted. It is unfortunate that during this period the "term controversy" broke forth between the Jesuits and the Dominicans. The pope intervened to quiet the feud, but the fierce quarrel doubtless lowered the Church in the eyes of the Chinese. Shortly afterward the pope banned ancestor worship in China and completed the alienation of the princes and a large part of the population with the result that in 1718 Christianity was again proscribed. This proscription remained in effect until 1844. Successive emperors issuing edicts against Christianity. The criminal code of 1814 contained clauses providing for the punishment of Christians. During these years Christians suffered banishment, imprisonment, torture and even death, but Christianity was never fully stamped out. Priests were hidden in the villages of the interior, and the history of Catholicism is continuous from 1555. Williams estimates

that in 1839 there were 57 foreign priests, 114 native priests, and 303,000 Christian converts in China. ^{1.}

The first great merchant-traveller from the West to leave a record of his travels was Marco Polo, who arrived in Kia-pingfu in May 1275, and remained in China for seventeen years winning the favor of Kublai Khan and governing a large city on the Yangtze. ^{2.} It was not until 1514 that we have any record of the Europeans reaching China by sea routes. These intrepid seamen were Portuguese. In 1515 Rafael Perestrello reached Canton and was well received. This led to high hopes on the part of the Portuguese, who in 1517 sent Thome' Pires to Peking as an ambassador from the viceroy of India in the name of the king of Portugal. But before Pires reached Peking the news of the high-handed conduct on the part of some Portuguese captains reached the court with the result that Pires was looked upon as a spy, hustled back to Canton and thrown in prison. The Portuguese further alienated the ^{sensitive and justice-loving} Chinese by their cruel warfare upon Arab traders in Chinese ports. In 1545 the Portuguese trading post ^{an} near Ningpo was destroyed by ^{an} enraged populace. In 1549 their trading post at Amoy suffered a similar fate. In 1557 the Portuguese were suffered to settle about eighty miles from Canton on an island delta of the West River. This was the beginnings of the historic city of Macoa. For this privilege the Portuguese paid an annual tribute of 500 taels until 1848. Their sovereignty was not recognized until 1887. In 1575 the

Spaniards with Manila as their base reached China. The Dutch in 1624 established a trading base on the island of Formosa, and in 1642 expelled their enemies, the Spanish. In 1637 the English arriving at Canton were fired upon by the Chinese, and the captain opening fire silenced the forts, forced trading and silently sailed away. The English did not follow up this attempt until 1664 when peace with the Portuguese gave them entry into Macoa. The first Swedish ship arrived in 1731; the first Prussian in 1753; the first Danish in 1782; and the first American ship in 1784.

Russian envoys had visited Peking in 1667 and in 1619, but were refused audience because they brought no presents. A third envoy in 1655 refused to perform the kow-tow and so failed. A boundary dispute resulted in a clash between the Russians and the Manchus. This gave rise to the treaty of Nerchinsk in 1689, which seems to be the first treaty of any kind China had ever entered into with a foreign power. This treaty and subsequent treaties with Russia lacked much of being a modern treaty as we shall see later. Professor Treat tells us that during these negotiations the Chinese were advised by two Jesuit missionaries, who accompanied their envoys.

No sooner did trade begin to develop at Canton than the desire for treaty rights became a demand of first importance. The Portuguese, Spaniards, Dutch, and English sent missions

without success. The Lord Macartney mission of 1793 and the Lord Amherst mission of 1816 have become famous because the vessels carrying them up the Pei-ho from Tientsin to Peking were designated as "tribute-bearers".^{5.} Robert Morrison, the first Protestant missionary to China, served as interpreter for the Lord Amherst mission.

During these years Catholic infiltration had continued, and its congregations lay hidden away in the interior. With the eastward expansion of the Russians the Greek church had gained its first foothold. Protestant missions came late. Robert Morrison, an Englishman, was the first Protestant missionary. He came in 1807 to Canton as the representative of the London Missionary Society. Denied admittance to the city he began the mastery of the language of the country by bribing Chinese teachers to teach him, ^{even though} discovery meant death to the teachers. His efforts not only led to a mastery of Chinese, but led eventually to the publication of the first Chinese-English dictionary and the first New Testament Bible in Chinese. It is interesting to know that Morrison, although a British subject, had been unable to secure permission from the powerful East India company to go to China as a missionary, and so sailed to New York and then to China on an American vessel. Arriving at Canton he passed at first as an American under the kindly protection of the American consular agent. Eventually his services as interpreter and the usefulness of

his dictionary caused the East India company to close their eyes to their earlier scruples and fears and employ him as interpreter. In this capacity he served until 1834 when the East India company's charter expired. Shortly afterwards he became interpreter for Lord Napier, representing the British government at Canton. Morrison seems never to have forgotten the kindness of the American government during his first years at Canton/ ^{for} on several occasions he served as interpreter for the government. Other Protestant missionaries of this early period include William Milne, who was sent to China by the London Missionary society in 1813. Milne interested himself in translating the Old Testament, but spent most of his effort at Malacca where he was superintendent of the Anglo-Chinese college, the first Protestant religious educational institution in the Orient. Charles Gutzlaff, a Prussian by birth, was sent to China in 1826 by the Netherland Missionary society. Gutzlaff completed a number of translations of the various religious tracts. In 1839 Gutzlaff became interpreter for the British Government at Hongkong. The first American missionary to be sent out was Dr. Peter Parker, a medical missionary, who was sent out by the American Board of Missions in 1830. In 1832 Dr. Parker was joined by the Rev. E.C. Bridgman who started "The Repository", a missionary journal printed in China under the auspices of the American Board for the dissemination of missionary information. In 1833 Samuel Wells Williams, a young

printer, came to China to take charge of this journal. All three of these men were to play important roles in later Sino-American diplomatic relations. The following missionary societies sent missionaries to China before 1843:⁴ London Mission, 1807; Netherlands Missionary Society, 1826; American Baptist Union, 1834; American Episcopal, 1835; British and Foreign Bible Society, 1836; English Episcopal, 1837; American Presbyterian, 1838.

With all this bustle and trade China steadily stood by her intention to restrict trade to one port, that of Canton. All business with the foreign merchants was conducted through a guild of merchants known as the co-hong. This guild in return for the privilege of a monopoly of the trade stood as security to the Emperor for the good behavior of the foreign merchants. Legally the trade did not exist, but it was tolerated. There were no treaties in existence with the foreign powers regulating such trade by sea, and foreign governments whose ships plied in the Canton trade ^{found} themselves helpless to provide any regulations for the trade. Technically a box of furs landed at Canton was as much contraband as a chest of opium. Business of all kinds had no status or countenance in the eyes of the Chinese government.

The missionary situation was little better. The Christian religion had been proscribed for over a century.

Catholicism lived under the surface. Since 1807 Protestantism had encamped at its door (Canton), but by terms of the Imperial edicts could neither buy books nor secure teachers legally. In short the situation in 1840 was one charged with the necessity for change, and among those most anxious for that change were the missionaries.

THE FIRST PERIOD, 1841 to 1860.

The first great evidence of the impending change was the "Opium War". We are not here interested in the historical detail^s leading up to, and the events of that war. We are interested in certain aspects of that war. In the main we know ~~that~~ that the conflict was far wider in its aspects than merely the question of opium. From the European standpoint the Opium War was an attempt by Great Britain to secure by force those rights which she had repeatedly failed to secure by diplomacy. Upon the securing of these rights depended her ability to legalize trade with China and place it upon a proper basis for regulation. To the average Westerner China's failure to allow for the regulation of her trade through the usual commercial treaty and carried out by the usual ^{pride and} diplomatic negotiations' is the sign of stubborn, unreasonable resistance by the Chinese Government. There has been a tendency in later years to so completely minimize the opium element in the war as to make it seem highly probable that it should not be called the "Opium War" at all. A closer study of the war, and of the subsequent importance placed upon opium by the Government of India would indicate that the trend has probably been as much too favorable to the British in recent years as it was too unfavorable in earlier years.

There are two points in which we are here interested in particular: (1) the wide gulf between the Western and Oriental viewpoints of the time; (2) the attitude and part played by missionaries in the negotiations following the close of the war.

When the imperial high commissioner Lin Tse-su ordered the destruction of the opium at Canton his action indicated the serious and not to be doubted intention of the Chinese Government to check, even by drastic steps, the importation of opium, which had grown from some 5,000 chests in 1820 to 40,200 chests in 1839 to say nothing of quantities of smuggled opium of which there is no record. Commissioner Lin was not the blundering bigot we usually consider him. Lin was merely acting upon the only line of official action he knew, and the motives of this official as well as that of many subsequent officials can only be judged in the light of Chinese ideology. For China at this time there was no comity of nations. The world had been warped by the near-sightedness of their policy of exclusion so that for the Chinese the world was largely China. She had been for centuries the recognized cultural leader of all the world of which she knew. The claim of her emperors to be the son of heaven connoted in itself universal sway, and one has but to read the imperial edicts of the time to find how real this claim was in the minds of the Chinese. It is true that the Chinese conceived nations outlying their own with the status of semi-barbarous states over whom China claimed a kind of vague sovereignty if she but cared to exercise it. Chief of such countries was Russia, and Russia since the Treaty of Nerchinsk in 1689 had found it to her advantage to dissemble on such matters as the insistence of the kow-tow¹ so long as they

secured valuable trade concessions upon China's western border. The matter of trade by sea upon the coast was a matter of small moment to China generally. It had been restricted to one port, and the traders regarded more as barbarians and pirates who had come to their shores than as the representatives of great nations. It was only the increasing opium menace which had brought Canton ^{affairs} to the forefront at Peking. The entire basis for dealings with all matters not concerned with the domestic relations of China rested almost entirely upon the Emperor's prerogative. The Emperor in the past had chosen to permit the trade at Canton. In doing so he permitted the barbarians to trade as a special privilege granted directly to the barbarians and not ^{to} foreign nations whose subjects they claimed to be. When Captain Elliot stepped forward at Canton and assumed responsibility Lin merely followed Chinese custom and made him responsible personally. Such an action was as deeply established in Chinese custom and law as treaties, ministers, and consuls were with the British. To Lin, and to a large extent to the Chinese Government ~~the nations whose~~ subjects chose to trade at Canton were of secondary importance. Lin at no time recognized Captain Elliot's official position. To Lin the British Empire was inconceivable, most certainly not officially recognizable on anything like an equal footing with the great Celestial Empire. He dealt with the traders and merchants at Canton as the Imperial Govern-

ment would deal with a refractory gild or village.^{2.}

The treaty of Nanking signed August 29, 1842, was not a treaty to the Chinese in the sense that the Westerners looked upon it. To the Westerner it was significant for two reasons; (1) in negotiating this treaty China had recognized certain paramount rights for which the Europeans had been contending for better than a half century; (2) A great inland country was opened for the first time officially, if to a limited extent, for trade and exploitation. Great Britain was merely fitting her experiences in India to new conditions. To the Chinese the significance of the treaty was nil. She had not the background to conceive of such an arrangement. At the best it was but an instrument signed under duress when the barbarians had temporarily gained the upper hand. For a nation whose law dealing with foreigners depended upon the Emperor's prerogative, and that august individual, the Son of Heaven, the idea of a treaty was inconceivable.

The British treaties of 1842 and 1843 dealt in no way with the missionary and his interests. The only way in which he gained was in his status as a citizen whereby he might reside at certain ports and enjoy certain rights. It remained for the American treaty negotiated in 1844 to further this slender thread of privilege. When Caleb Cushing arrived at

Canton in February 1844 empowered to negotiate a treaty with the Chinese Empire he attached the Rev. E.C. Bridgeman and the Rev. Peter Parker to his staff as secretaries and translators.^{3.} After some weeks of fruitless negotiation he finally succeeded by threatening to proceed to Peking in having an imperial high commissioner in the person of Kiyong sent to Canton empowered to negotiate. At Wanghia just outside the Portuguese limits of Macoa the treaty was finally agreed to and signed July 3, 1844. From the Chinese viewpoint all this waste of time and signing of treaties was merely a further concession to the demands of the barbarian. Many of the provisions were in their eyes futile if not absurd. In this the Chinese were sincere. They entered into this treaty making like a statesman might if attacked by a gang or several successive gangs of bad boys on his way home. Except for the absence of actual force the American treaty as such, has little weight except that it shows certain trends which are to be characteristic of all American treaties and diplomatic relations with China. It clarified certain shipping regulations, placed responsibility for the protection of Americans and their property directly upon the Chinese, but for our purpose most important of all it provided that Chinese might be employed as teachers, and Chinese books might be purchased. Of this last provision Tyler Dennett has the following to say:^{4.}

The permission to employ Chinese teachers and purchase Chinese books, while of general advantage to the merchants and to foreign governments in that it made possible the development of a competent staff of interpreters and advisers, was of peculiar advantage to the missionaries who hitherto had been able to study the Chinese language and literature only surreptitiously.

The Treaty of Wanghia specifically mentioned ^{the} right of foreigners in treaty ports to land for churches, cemeteries and hospitals, but provided for the selection of the sites by joint action of the local authorities of both nations "having due regards for the feelings of the people (Chinese) in the location thereof." Of this provision Tyler Dennett says: ^{5.}

.... The provision for churches and hospitals, moreover, recalls the fact that Cushing was, at Macao, entirely in the hands of missionaries who were his only interpreters, and bears witness to the ascending missionary interest in China, which in later years increased so much faster than the commercial interest.

In another place Dennett gives us further insight into the framing of the treaty: ^{6.}

.... in 1844, due to ^{the} gratitude of one of the subordinate Chinese commissioners who had been a patient of Dr. Parker, the right to erect churches at

the open ports was inserted in Article 17 of the Cushing treaty, at the suggestion of the Chinese. The treaty, however, contained no stipulation conferring upon the missionaries any liberty to seek converts.

Certain parts of the treaty itself shows the undeniable missionary ^{7.} influence such as is found in Article 33:

Citizens of the United States who shall attempt to trade clandestinely with such ports of China as are open to foreign commerce, or who shall trade in opium or other contraband article of merchandise, shall be subject to be dealt with by the Chinese Government without being entitled to any countenance or protection from the United States; and the United States will take measures to prevent their flag from being abused by the subjects of other nations as a cover for the violation of the laws of the Empire.

It was a period of many paper concessions both by treaty and otherwise. Although they considered the treaties without a great deal of significance the Chinese were willing to grant these documentary favors to all alike. In October, 1844, they signed a treaty with the French at Whampoa whose main provisions closely resembled that of the American treaty, but France was prepared to ask for more. She

had long posed as the protector of the Catholic church. The French ambassador Lagrene¹ prevailed upon Kiyng to present the following memorial to Toakwang, the Emperor:

Kiyng, imperial commissioner, minister of state governor-general of Kwang-tung and Kwang-si, respectfully addresses the throne by memorial.^{8.}

On examination it appears that the religion of the Lord of Heaven is that professed by all nations of the West; that its main object is to encourage the good and suppress the wicked; that since its introduction into China during the Ming dynasty it has never been interdicted, that subsequently when Chinese, practising this religion, often made it covert for wickedness, even to the seducing of wives and daughters, even the deceitful extraction of the pupils from the eyes of the sick, government made investigation, and inflicted punishment, as on record; and that in the reign of Kiaking special clauses were first laid down for the punishment of the guilty. The prohibition, therefore, was directed against evil doing under the covert of religion, and not against the religion professed by the Western foreign nations.

Now the request of the French ambassador, Lagrene; that those Chinese doing well, who practise this religion be exempt from criminality, seems feasible. It

is right, therefore, to make the request and earnestly crave celestial favor to grant that henceforth all natives and foreigners without distinction, who learn and practise the religion of the Lord of Heaven and do not incite trouble by improper, be exempted from criminality As to those of the French and other foreign nations who practise the religion, let them only be permitted to build churches at the five ports open for commercial intercourse. They must not presume to enter the country.....

Toakwang added the following rescript giving Kiyang's memorial the force of imperial will:

Let be according to the counsel (of Kiyang).

This from the Emperor.

It is significant that this request by the French was framed in such a way as to follow Chinese legal custom and for this reason may be in some ways considered as of greater weight than the subsequent treaties. Only after the events of 1860 may treaties rightfully be considered of any great weight in China's international affairs. This edict tolerated the religion of "the Lord of Heaven" and thus recalled from exile many Chinese who had in the past years suffered the government's displeasure for the sake of their religion. It also removed some 300,000 Chinese Catholic converts from the perpetual fear of molestation and perhaps exile or worse. It is to be noted, however,

that it dealt primarily with the religion of "the lord of Heaven" which was the term applied to the Catholic faith. It did not legalize the propagation of the Christian religion by the foreign missionaries, and thus not only restricted any new arrivals from going beyond the open ports, but left the Catholic priests hidden away in the remote provinces still under the ban.

A year later at the request of the British government the same privileges were specifically granted to the Protestant religions in China, which were known in Chinese by the term "the religion of the Lord Jesus". The late forties and early fifties experienced a great wave of missionary activity in the area of the treaty ports. Especially was this true of the Protestant faiths, who having no congregations in the interior had no way of getting in touch with those areas beyond the treaty ports. As a result from 1844 to 1860 Catholicism doubled its converts while the Protestant missionaries, although active, had scarcely made themselves felt beyond very limited confines. Samuel Wells Williams is of the opinion, however, that too much significance may be attached to Taokwang's edict respecting Christianity for it is not likely that the Chinese regarded it with much seriousness. Provincial governors pursued their own individual policies in dealing with this matter as they did in nearly every other matter. They tolerated or persecuted as they saw fit guided largely by the

desires of the literati and gentry. Williams thinks it doubtful if the emperor or officials had any but very hazy notions of Christianity. The one matter ^{for} which they watched ^{was} with jealous eye any possible affiliation of new religions with political organizations. It is a fact, however, that such restrictions as there were, did to a large measure, keep the Protestant missionaries restricted ^{to} the narrow confines of the treaty ports, and thus added their powerful support to the demand for more free ports, and more privileges in the interior. It was this powerful wedge, supported as it was by an active public opinion in the home countries, that supplied that tremendous ^{force} by which China was opened to trade and commerce.

On March 20, 1847, a treaty between Sweden and Norway on the one part and China on the other contained the principal provisions of the American treaty. The only significance which can rightfully be attached to the treaties with China before 1860 was the meager fact that they had been negotiated and signed. If the Chinese provincial officials paid little heed to the imperial edicts they paid far less to the treaties negotiated with foreign powers of whom they knew little, and who were far removed from their little world filled with its provincial interests. It is quite likely that even the Emperor regarded the treaties with little more importance than an indication of his gracious pleasure. That he felt himself morally bound or for a moment seriously considered the treaties as binding upon himself is highly improbable.

A PERIOD OF UNCERTAINTIES, 1847 to 1860.

As auspicious as our historians usually paint the beginnings of China's relations with the foreign powers as evidenced by the treaties following the Opium War the fact remains that China faced a period of uncertainties in which the superficial character of the treaties stood clearly revealed. China has generally been charged with bad faith during these years, but the charge lacks foundation. China's lack of understanding of treaties and lack of centralized authority for carrying them out is a far more excusable thing than the ruthless show of force which the foreign powers made use of during the same years. This period with its complexity of forces; with civil war and foreign war raging at the same time is the period of incubation for the events of later Chinese history. There is scarcely a major force perceptible in later Chinese history which was not influenced and shaped largely by this period. Bloody civil war, practical outlawry along the Chinese coast, and a menacing foreign war with Europe's two leading powers ushered in what might be called the modern history of China. The Manchu ship of state obeying the one rule for ships in the time of the typhoon virtually "put to sea" and battled it out against the waves. But in this case the sea was the northern wastes of Jehol, where a chagrined emperor, the Son of Heaven, mounted on high leaving modernity as the fated heritage to his infant son.

But before these events just summarized were to take place there was much awaiting both Chinese and the foreign powers in the culmination of the immediate change which was to embark China upon the troublous seas of modernity. In the middle and late forties the Manchus were yet scarcely sufficiently subdued or impressed by the Western powers to consider their ancient sway jeopardized. Upon the death of Toakwang in 1850 Hien-feng came to the throne. Hien-feng lacked the tolerant spirit of Toakwang. He had been advised by a prophet to "restore the restrictions all along the coast".^{1.} The Manchus in order to "keep face" after the events following the Opium War were compelled, as speedily as possible, to resume the careless, indifferent attitude of those long accustomed to power as a divine attribute. If the throne had framed treaties whose clauses hinted at great concessions by the Son of Heaven their attitude should at least show their lack of concern for treaties. The opening of the five treaty ports was accompanied by difficulties which might have well been foreseen. China had always permitted wide powers to the many various localities making up her broad empire. The wishes of these various localities have always in a large measure been listened to and respected by the remote and highly decentralized government at Peking. It now happened that if the Chinese inhabitants of the cities now specified by treaty as open ports objected the Peking Government would find itself between two fires. In the latter case there could scarcely be

question that the Government would hesitate long before forcing the issue with the local authorities. It had no reason to regard with special friendship any one of the foreign powers. It had seen the worst of their merchants and traders. Missionaries coming from the West had long shown themselves in the light of meddlers. On the other hand the Western powers regarded the lack of understanding as arrogance, willful and irritating. Consequently this period is largely one of bad faith, free play of the ever present force, and lack of restraint. This is the period when such evils as coolie trading, opium smuggling, and conveying were introduced extensively into China to mar and blacken the record of the conduct of the Western nations. All of the powers, if not openly supporting the evils for mercenary reasons, were ^{at least} guilty of notorious acquiescence. It is significant that the one modifying influence in China, even at this early date, was the missionary. His objections were to have ^{as} far reaching effect in one direction as his blind zeal was to lead him astray in the other.

The first great wave of unrest and blood which was ^{in this late} period / destined to sweep China was the Taiping rebellion. This rebellion is remarkable in the annals of history for three reasons: (1) The suddenness and peculiar circumstances of its development; (2) the enormous loss of life; (3) that it happened to develop around the eccentric if not demented Hung Sui-tsuen who had studied under a Protestant mission-

24.

ary. It is probably safe to say that the world has never before or since experienced anything so peculiar, so full of possibilities for both good and evil, and so ruthlessly carried on. The whole phenomenon the world witnessed it, bears careful analysis. It was made up of several distinct and independent forces. Williams estimates the cost at more than 20,000,000 lives.^{2.}

Hung Sui-tsuen, an ambitious young Chinese youth, had passed the provincial examination in the Canton province. Further advancement he was unable to gain by reason of his inability to pass the higher examinations. Repeated failure preyed upon his mind. At this stage of his career the disappointed scholar secured some tracts from Dr. Gutzlaff's Union^{3.} and in 1847 he presented himself to Rev. Issachar Roberts of the American Baptist Mission in Canton. He requested instruction in the Christian religion, and was duly enrolled as a catechumen. Roberts, an eccentric individual in his own way, labored faithfully with his young pupil. For a period of two months Hung devoted himself to Roberts' instruction, and then returned home to Kwahien without seeming to have taken Roberts into his confidence. In his home province Hung began preaching Christianity as his very limited study had presented it to his fertile and somewhat deranged intellect. His advocacy of destroying idols and taking down Confucian tablets brought him under the suspicion of the Government for Confucianism was the state religion. Around

this center of opposition the political discontents of the southern provinces gathered. Chinese political thought conceived change only in a dynastic overthrow and the substitution of a new dynasty. In Hung they saw the possibility of a new dynasty to replace the Manchus. By 1853 the revolt had swept southeastern China and the Yangtze valley above Shanghai. They captured Nanking and there proceeded to establish their capital in the ancient seat of Chinese emperors. Their dynasty they called the Taiping Chao which means The Great Peace dynasty with Hung as the emperor under the name of Tien Wang.

John B. Little has the following to say of this colorful but sordid rebellion:^{4.}

The Taiping Rebellion, probably the most destructive war of modern times, was a gigantic protest against the weakness and conservatism of China's Manchu rulers, but it was more than that - it was a fanatical religious outburst, proclaiming Old Testament Christianity as its creed.

That it was anti-Manchu is unquestionable, but that it was anti-conservative is doubtful. The discontent of South China at this period was occasioned by the concessions which the Western nations had forced from the Manchus rather than any desire for further changes. That it became identified with Christianity was an incident, important indeed, but a factor

which needs to be carefully weighed. Had the Taiping rebellion been more than purely anti-Manchu the rebels would not have interdicted the rich trade of the Yangtze valley thus alienating the sympathies of the foreign traders and merchants, especially British. Had the Taiping Chao aimed at reform along modern lines it would have hastened to send envoys to open negotiations at Shanghai and Canton with the representatives of the foreign powers. At the outbreak of the Arrow War in 1857 the Taiping Chao was still blind to the possibilities of an alliance with France and England. None of these things did the Taipings do, and thus they seem to have been as characteristically Chinese as any of the other Chinese groups.

The bursting of the Taiping fury with its profession of a religion based upon the tenets and resembling Christianity could not fail to arouse the keenest interest among the Protestant missionaries. The Roman Catholic missionaries opposed⁵ the Taiping rebels because of their iconoclastic practises and their favoring of Protestant doctrines. Of the Protestants there were probably one hundred missionaries in China at the time and the majority of the missionary sentiment seems to have been with the rebels, especially in the early years. Hien-feng, the Manchu emperor, was known to be a reactionary desirous of reestablishing the old restrictions even to the closing of the treaty ports. The missionaries saw in the Taiping Chao a possibility of setting up in China

the Christian religion at one stroke. Among the ardent spirits favoring the rebels were: Isachaar Roberts; W.A.P. Martin; L.B. Peet; and J.W. Wiley. S.W. Williams, S.N.D. Martin, J.W. Quartermain, J.V.N. Talmage, and J.K. Wright were cautious in their judgement of the revolutionary movement. Shortly after the collapse of the revolt Dr. Williams wrote:

I had no faith in this rebellion from the first, as likely to prove a means of promoting the truth, for there was no adequate cause for securing such a result, while the conduct of the rebels during the last five years has shown a ruthlessness and fanaticism enormously greater than when they began their career of slaughter in 1850.

There were others like Dr. J.D. Ball and Dr. A.P. Hepper who were openly against the Taipings from the first, and who advocated intervention by the powers in behalf of the Manchus, but they seem to have been in the minority. Fortunately or unfortunately the affairs of state move more slowly than the varying moods and attitudes of men. On August 11, 1848 the Congress of the United States had passed an act inculcated to show the friendly attitude of the United States toward the Manchu Government of China. It stated that murder and insurrection or rebellion against the Chinese government, with intent to subvert the same was to be considered as a capital offense punishable by death. Despite the severity of the statute three of the more enthusiastic American missionaries are known to have undertaken the perilous task of reaching the rebel lines.

Dr. Charles Taylor after an unsuccessful first attempt ran the blockade of Manchu war junks with a carpet bag and coarse bag filled with New Testaments in Chinese. Taylor reached the rebel stronghold at Chinkiang and was greeted by the Taipings as "Yang shoong dee" or "foreign brother". On a third visit Taylor carried to Chinkiang a quantity of medicines and a small case of surgical instruments. Taylor was dissuaded from publishing his experiences by Humphrey Marshall, the American commissioner to China on the grounds that it would admit his guilt under the act of 1848. Isachaar Roberts had accompanied Taylor upon his first and unsuccessful attempt to reach the rebel lines after the Tae ping Wang (Hung) had sent for him. It might be noted in passing that this eccentric individual having severed connections with the Southern Baptists remained loyal to the last to his former pupil. When the Taiping Chao late in the history of their movement came to appreciate the support of the foreigner they sent Roberts to serve in Shanghai as their foreign minister, but with little results. The period of this service was from 1860 to 1862. Roberts himself was a careless dresser and uncouth in his person so much so that a fellow missionary once described him as "everything a missionary should not be". But although his appearance was not prepossessing his loyalty was admirable. He never seems to have lost faith in his pupil, who though ^{formally} never converted, set the world agog

with his religious doctrines, and moreover when he proposed to set up a new dynasty in China with himself as emperor. Had the missionaries on first appraisal not taken the deepest interest in the Taiping Chao they would have but shown themselves untrue to their calling. Through the Taiping Chao there appeared to be an opportunity to accomplish in a few years that which would ordinarily require years of patient endeavor. Moreover, it was the current opinion that the Manchu dynasty was already near its end and that it was only a question of time until a new dynasty would be established. In 1851 Dr. E.C. Bridgeman of the American Board in Shanghai wrote: "No doubt the empire has reached a ruinous condition and a revolution may not be remote. The state groans under its own weight."

Perhaps the ^{9.} best all known of those missionaries who professed to see in the Taiping revolt momentous possibilities for the future of Christianity in China was none other than W.A.P. Martin, in later years president of the ^{Imperial} Tung Wen college, and a kind of an un-official attorney-general for the Manchu empire. Martin came to China in the fifties and undertook his first labors at the picturesque old Chinese city of Ningpo below Shanghai. Here he met a young clerk of the British government by the name of Robert Hart with whom he was destined later to be closely associated. Three years ^{his arrival} after Martin left Ningpo with the resolve to reach the rebel lines. He describes his own adventures for us: ^{10.}

The fall of the old Capital (Nanking) into the hands of any body of insurgents would have been a matter of grave concern for the whole world; but when those insurgents were known to be Christians not simply fighting for an empire, but carrying on a crusade against the paganism of their country - the excitement knew no bounds. Merchants began to speculate as to the effect of their success on trade; missionaries discussed its possible bearings on the propagation of the faith; and diplomatists - the only class who were free to investigate for themselves - sought the earliest opportunity for ascertaining the facts by a visit to Nanking.

I too resolved to see for myself, though I had no man-of-war to wait on me or national flag to float over my head. Young and ardent, the danger of the attempt but served to render it more fascinating. Accompanied by a native Christian, I took passage in a small coasting vessel, and we encountered a storm, which compelled us for a time to seek shelter among the islands. At Shanghai I hired a native junk and purchased a skiff; the former to carry me as far as the imperial squadron below Chinkiang, the latter to enable me to run the blockade and enter the rebel lines. The preparations were made with the utmost secrecy, the American minister having forbidden his countrymen to hold communication with the rebels; and to elude the vigilance of the United States Marshall, I put to sea from Woosung in a thunder-storm.

After a rough night, in passing from one river to the other we found ourselves abreast the island of Dzungning.....

During the night my skiff had gone adrift, but I counted on obtaining another near my destination. After working our way against the current for two days we reached the neighborhood of Chinkiang which commands the transit of the Grand Canal. There we saw the war junks at anchor, and imperial batteries on the shore. Being hailed from a battery I ordered my boatman to give no heed to the summons but held on our way on the further side of the stream, and trust to its width for protection against any chance shot that might be sent after us. Instead of a shot a boat came in pursuit, and having many oars it soon overtook us. Leaping aboard the soldiers began to handle our boatmen roughly for their disobedience; but when I showed myself they desisted, and retired without asking a question, taking me for one of their foreign officers of the imperial fleet.

If they had taken the trouble to search, they might have found on my person a compromising document - nothing less, indeed, than a letter tendering my services to the rebel chief. No sooner were their backs turned than I promptly destroyed it, not choosing to hazard discovery in passing the next encampment.

Ascending a few miles farther I endeavored to induce some fishermen to carry me to the rebel outposts; but they refused to incur the risk at any price, being in danger from both parties. My own boatmen refused for the same reason. After lying concealed all day in the high reeds I reluctantly gave the word to drop down the stream under cover of night to avoid another visit from the batteries. We were hailed as before but owing to the darkness not pursued. A greater danger was encountered a little farther on. On shore a flambeau was waved to attract our attention, and a voice warned us not to proceed as there were "pirates in the offing". "More likely pirates on shore," I said to my boatmen; and dropping anchor a safe distance from both, we waited for day, when resuming our course we reached Shanghai without further molestation. My attempt to visit the rebel headquarters with no other means at my disposal was certainly foolhardy, and well it was that it failed.

.....

In the humor in which the insurgents then were - flushed with victory and wild with fanaticism - no foreigner could have exerted any beneficial influence.

Martin, however, never abandoned his original contention and professed to the end of his life to have seen great possibilities in the Taiping rebellion. Returning to Shanghai he

published a series of open letters to Caleb Cushing setting forth the possibilities of the Taiping rebellion for China and the world and "showing that the rapine and cruelty of the Ta Pings only conformed to the historic type of Chinese revolutionary bodies; and that in the principles they possessed lay the germ of the new order of things such as would be vain to expect from a superannuated dynasty running in the grooves of precedent; but asking from them (the United States) nothing more than the observance of strict neutrality".

Meanwhile it is interesting to note the political influence of the rebellion. The year 1853 marked the completion of the first half of the rebel program. The capture of Nanking was the high point in the history of the rebellion. The second half of the program called for the capture of Peking, and was destined never to be fulfilled. In 1854 acting under the pressure brought by the missionaries in China upon the popular opinion at home, and the possibilities of success of the Taiping Chao the United States commissioner, McLane, succeeded in having the Act of 1848 amended punishing participation in rebellion against the Manchu government by a fine of \$10,000 or imprisonment not to exceed three years. McLane was instructed secretly by the American government to use his discretion and if the situation seemed to warrant it to recognize the Taiping Chao as the de facto government of China. Had McLane recognized the rebel movement in 1854 it

would likely have meant the immediate downfall of the Manchu dynasty, and the partial dismemberment of the great empire. McLane seems to have recognized this danger of dismemberment and therein lies the key to his actions in failing to recognize the Taiping Chao. Humphrey Marshall, McLane's successor, went a step in advance in formulating the American policy with regard to the territorial integrity of China by enunciating the principle that "the highest interests of the United States are involved in sustaining China".

At the same time that the Taiping revolt was at its zenith of success a second catastrophe was about to sweep down upon the Manchus in form of a foreign war. In this the missionaries played scarcely a less important part than in the Taiping rebellion. The treaties of the forties had for reasons already set forth proved scarcely more than verbal sophs thrown to the powers by a nation in distress who had very little idea of international agreements while the decentralized government rested upon keeping peace in the provinces by allowing wide powers to the local officials. When local opposition showed itself as opposed to the terms of the treaties which the government had signed the result was nugatory to the treaties. In answer to this apparent lack of "good faith" the foreign governments responded with measures scarcely less deserving of the term "lack of good faith". All forms of lawlessness sprung up, and certainly if not with

their direct connivance at least with their acquiescence. Great Britain in 1857 begun direct hostilities upon the refusal of the viceroy of Canton, Yeh, to apologize for seizing a Chinese crew on board a Chinese junk because it was flying the British flag at the time of the seizure. (What irony of fate when we consider the refusal of Great Britain to accede to the American demands leading to the War of 1812). Shortly afterward the execution of Father Chapaldine in Kwangsi, a locality where he had no right to be ~~by~~ any existing treaty rights, gave France her reason for entering the war as an ally of Great Britain. Chapaldine had been arrested in Kwangsi, the very heart of the Taiping disaffection, and it is little wonder that the quaking Manchu power hurriedly made way with him - one Taiping revolt fanned by fanaticism aroused by a foreign religion was enough.

The Manchu government had good reason by the events of the fifties to regard foreign religions as dangerous to themselves, and to regard foreign missionaries as dangerous elements within the state. Added to this was the naturally conservative tendencies of the Emperor Hien-feng. From the fairly tolerant attitude of Toakwang in 1844 the pendulum had by 1859 completed its swing to the other extreme. ^{following} The scathing edict by a provincial official reveals all the hatred felt toward Christianity and ^{has} certain earmarks that the propagation of such edicts had the tacit consent of the Son of Heaven in

Peking. This edict reveals so much of the Manchu attitude at the time that it seems advisable to let it speak for itself:

By _____, Prefect of an Inferior Department (on vacancy), at present officiating chief magistrate of the district of Loo-ling (Kiang-si province).

Earnestly calling on the simple-minded people within his jurisdiction who practise (false) religions, betimes to awaken and repent of their errors, to come forward and make their submission, and thereby avoid the penalties of the law.

It would appear that the so-called religion of the Lord of Heaven It derives its origin from the occident. It was ^{only} toward the end of things that one Matteo Ricci opened the way for his proselytes to Peking; at first by means of his impositions and tracts they deceived and misled the Chinese people, and afterwards they employed lucre to gain over the inhabitants, scholars and officers of the State while the more ignorant respected that religion and believed in it more and more, and from that cause it has spread its venom throughout the land of China, and has paved the way to ruin. Under our exalted Bynasty rectitude and public morality are one and united. They consist in a respectful observance of the family precept of the sacred founder, namely to root out all false doctrines in order to

exalt correct principles.

The Imperial commands have been promulgated to the world in the most forcible language. On the 1st and 15th of each moon these precepts were read and propounded to the people. His Majesty Heuen-tsung-ching-huang-te (posthumous title of Taoukwang) did further command his court poets carefully to expound these principles, and put them into the form of rhymed verse, with the view to render them familiar by these means to every house and cottage, and to rescue the people from the snares of those pernicious doctrines, whereby they place themselves beyond the moral influence of this universal rule of peace, and incur the pains of death. Legal prohibitions have also been repeatedly enacted on the same subject. When the rebels of the Canton province (The Taipings) by birth depraved and by nature foul, dared to overthrow the precepts of the present holy rule, they imposed on the simple people by assuming the religion of the Lord of Heaven, and calling him their Heavenly Father. According to them Jesus suffered an ignominious death; but was, nevertheless, sent down by the Lord of Heaven amongst men, some thousand and a few hundred years ago, to be the father, the parent of rebels and malefactors. Only reflect! There is nothing greater than Heaven! Who can presume the lord and master of it? Yet what manner of individual is this

Jesus of theirs, who should have thus died (Referring to Christ's crucifixion between two thieves) and yet be worshipped as the "Lord of Heaven"? What extreme blasphemy! What excessive profaneness! Since Jesus then died the death of a criminal, by what sorcery did he descend on earth again; and what is more, become the parent of rebels and malefactors? As rebels and malefactors have no Lord, no parent, in that case their Jesus had been born of man, his spirit also would have been that of a human being.

Without discussing, however, whether it be possible or not for him to be born again from Heaven, how is it that he should have thus consented to become the Lord of rebels or the Parent of malefactors?

The least informed men possessing a particle of knowledge and discernment must at once see through this immense fraud without further explanation.

I, nevertheless, apprehend lest a few misinformed persons may be led away by the discourses they hold respecting a paradise in Heaven and a purgatory in hell, and by their persuading them that there is in reality no depravity on the part of those who profess the religion of the Lord of Heaven, their sole aim being to save their souls by seeking to ascend to heaven and by avoiding to fall into hell.

They ignore, then, that for dutiful and obedient subjects and children, the pleasures and toils of agriculture and honest

riculture and honest industry, domestic happiness, and contentment, are present enjoyment of a heavenly paradise, and that rebels are traitors, however much they may knell to Bhuda (ie., F.C.), and say their prayers, they cannot either dead or alive, escape hell. In the same manner criminals of our sacred reign condemned to and ignominious death, theirs are the spirit of demons, which supreme Heaven will not tolerate (for offenses against the Son of Heaven)

Where are the souls of these which can be saved? How absurd! How lamentable! Since the time of the Canton rebels (the Taipings) first broke out into rebellion, no less than 1,000,000,000 (?) of them have perished, or have been slain by the soldiery, and their confederates have, one after the other, been put to death by the troops or militia.

For them where is the Lord of Heaven? Who is to save their souls? Is it not surely a manifest retribution for their perverse opposition to the Divine law of Heaven, and for their rebellion against their prince and master, that Heaven has sent down calamities upon them on account of the wickedness they have done?

Simple people, may you awaken! I, the district magistrate, giving due effect to the Imperial mercy, cannot suffer to inflict punishment without previous admonition.

Considering that Tsang-che-shau and Tsang-che-yung, apprehended on this charge, having duly repented of their

errors and have apostatized, and since, upon the order in the open court to tread upon the wooden cross, they signified their willingness to do so, I have consented that they be liberated on the security of the local constable and of their respective neighbors.

There are those, however, who simple minded, may on account of their having therefore professed that religion, still be unwilling to make their submission; besides others who, although they may not yet belong to that sect, are not alive to the depth of the corrupt influences of the religion of the Lord of Heaven, compared with such instantaneous death by poison or the bite of a venomous reptile is as nothing. It is incumbent on me, therefore, to issue instructions to you. To this end I publish the present Proclamation for the express information and guidance of the military and inhabitants of this city.

You whom heavens overshadow above, and tread on the earth beneath, honour heaven and earth, honour your prince and your parent, honour the sages and the teachers of the past ages.

Give ear to no corrupt principles or false doctrines, but strive to drive them out and uproot them.

Those degraded and unprincipled converts to the religion of the Lord of Heaven who, without recognized prince

or parent, blaspheme the Lord on high and profane the gods, you should treat them as enemies, and no better than banditti and rebels.

As people of this holy reign, be honest and pure; then men will respect you, and the gods will prosper you.

If those who are unable to distinguish the corrupt from the moral and hence blindly adhere to that religion because they have imbibed those principles from the preceding generation, let, at all events, their children and grandchildren come forward after the passing of this time of the Proclamation, and make due submission at the tribunal. And I give to those who hereby know the prohibition against that religion an opportunity to repudiate their errors.

If, on examination, they show no symptoms of insubordination, and consent without hesitation, to tread upon the cross, they shall then be exempt from punishment. If, however, after the publication of this Proclamation, any should persevere in their errors and refuse to reform, they shall be suspected of rebellious tendencies, and will subject themselves to apprehension and punishment.

I hereby give you notice that ^{not} /only the miscreants who propagate that false religion, but those who also practise its tenents, shall be prosecuted with all the rigour of the law. Moreover, this being the period for

causing the organization of the local constabulary, notice is given that the constables who shall neglect to denounce the offenders shall be severally fined and otherwise punished according as to whether or not they are guilty of connivance or of concealment of the offense.

I, the district magistrate, have solely, in view the extirpation of corrupt principles and the safe maintenance of pure and orthodox doctrines. To attain this end I do not grudge to repeat frequently my admonition to you.

Military and people, let none among you regard them as empty words, it is my earnest wish; otherwise the penalties of the law will overtake you, and envelop your families in ruin. Let none say there has not been timely warning (Here follows an extract from Imperial Statutes): Any native of the Western Ocean, who shall propagate or teach the religion of the Lord of Heaven in the interior of China, or who shall clandestinely engrave or cause to be published any books on religion, or who shall establish places of meeting therein, to propound that religion or delude the people; and any members of the Eight Banners, or any of the Chinese people who shall receive the doctrine from a native of the West, and use it to convert the people, or who shall privately assume another title or degree (ie., the title of "Holy Father" or "Priest") to mislead the multitude, shall, on conviction, be sentenced

to be strangled, awaiting in prison the execution of the sentence.

And any who shall allow themselves to be converted and shall not reform, shall be sent to the cities in Turkestan and be given to the high and low orders of Begg, and those able to control them, to be their slaves; and bannermen shall be struck off the muster-roll of the banner.

If any persons spread evil and corrupt discourses the consequences of which are found dangerous, or by means of invocations and superstitious services shall impose upon the credulity of the people, shall be dealt with according to law in proportion to the gravity of the offense.

If any will respect and give themselves up to the authorities and will openly renounce the proscribed religion, and shall, in court, tread upon the wooden cross, and give proofs of sincere repentance, they shall not suffer punishment. But if any should persist in their errors, and should be so blinded as not to awaken to a sense of their faults, they shall in that case suffer the penalties of the law.

It has been strictly prohibited for natives of the West to acquire land and possessions in China. Therefore those civil and military authorities who shall

neglect to denounce any natives of the West who may be privately residing within the limits of the jurisdiction and there be spreading their religion, shall be denounced to the proper board, to be dealt with accordingly.

Proclamation dated Hien-fung, 9th year and 9th moon, 16th day (October 11, 1859).

In submitting the above Proclamation to the British Government their representative in China had the following to say:

Mr. Bruce to Lord J. Russell (Received May 11, 1860)

Shanghai, March 15, 1860.

I have the honor to inclose a copy of the Proclamation issued last October, by the chief magistrate of the district town of Loo-ling-heen, in the province of Kiang-si, against the preachers and professors of Christianity. It reprints the old law inflicting death against these two classes of offenders.

This Proclamation is dated about 3 months after the exchange of the American treaty (the treaty of 1858), which provides by one of its Articles, for the full toleration by the Chinese of the Christian doctrine.

(Signed) Frederick W.A. Bruce.

Christianity had not ceased to grow during this period of disorder, although the growth so far as the Protestant churches were concerned was limited to those ports open to

trade or seized by Great Britain in the course of the Arrow war. From 1845-1860 the following missionary societies were established in China: English Baptist, 1845; English Presbyterian, 1847; American Methodist Episcopal, 1847; American Southern Baptist, 1847; Rhenish Mission, 1847; American Methodist Episcopal (South), 1848; Wesleyan Mission, 1850; American Reformed (Dutch), 1858; American Woman's Union, 1859; American United Presbyterian, 1860; English Connecticut Methodist, 1860.

From 1859-1861 the Manchu power faced constant reverses. The policy of exclusion at which Hien-feng aimed was defeated only by the weakness of the imperial power. Men and ships under foreign flags proved the plague of a great nation, and these men were at no trouble to conceal their rapacious desires. History had taught the Chinese that foreigner and outlaw were synonymous. He prated about treaties, international law, and the Ten Commandments, but he seemed to the Chinese only to be able to cite and twist these sources of authority to suit his own ends. These ends within themselves would not stand close scrutiny. To the Chinese, law was precept; to the foreigner law was the agency to be used to attain his ends whether good or bad. The Ten Commandments became the basis for derision in China, and missionaries found the many inconsistencies between doctrine and practise of the Westerner one of the great obstacles to the spread of Christianity. There is no doubt that had Hien Feng been able he would have in his wrath driven all foreigners from China. The reason why he was destined never to be able to carry out his desire was not^{as} apparent to

the Emperor himself as to those very few of his counsellors who had faced the task of dealing directly with the perplexing problems arising out of the constant demands and aggressions of the foreigners.

The Emperor at Peking was not only sacrosanct in the minds of the people, but by virtue of his training believed himself to be the Son of Heaven and all-powerful. His officials who had been called upon to deal with the perplexing problems of the decade had come to regard the foreigner with a great fear, but instead of being able to frankly lay before the Emperor the true facts of the case they were constantly compelled to dissemble before the commanding presence of so great a personage whose powers were as pretentious on one hand as they were weak on the other. Had a high minister dared to intimate the basis ^{of equality} upon which the foreigners presumed to speak and negotiate it would have been treason, and when in later years foreigners approached the throne without the customary prostrations that fact itself became a source of wonder. Kiyung's memorial to Taokwang in 1844 following the framing of the Treaty of Wanghia shows the broad abyss between Western and Chinese systems of thought: ^{15,}

The original copy of the Treaty presented by the said Barbarian Envoy contained forty-seven stipulations. Of these some were difficult of execution, others were foolish demands, whilst several of the more important points of the Treaty were omitted on the list. The sense of it was ^{moreover} so meanly and coarsely expressed, the words and sentences ^{were} so obscure, and there were such

a variety of errors, that it was next to impossible to point them out.

We clearly pointed out whatever was comprehensive to reason in order to dispel their stupid ignorance, and to put a stop to (delusive) hopes whilst expatiating with strictness upon the most binding of the statutes, while we were obliged to polish those passages which were scarcely intelligible, so as to render the sense somewhat more obvious in order to remove all ambiguity; and only after four times altering the copies, we adopted (the paper).

Moreover the original copies of the treaty itself was never taken to Peking, but left at Canton, showing the insignificance with which these treaties were held. To the Chinese mind they were at best only agreements which at the will of the Son of Heaven had been granted to the foreign traders and affected only local conditions. Here the British found the treaties framed during the forties when they captured Canton in the early years of the Arrow war.

In constant fear of displeasing the Emperor, and at the same time pressed by the necessity of treating with the menacing foreigner, the course followed by the Chinese commissioners becomes a human enigma to the uneducated, with the result that his sincerity was constantly doubted.

If he were not to be presented with the silken cord, or worse, he must by any means fill in the great gap between the actual character of the foreign demands and the high pretention of him who sat upon the Dragon Throne. And, if this were not enough, a third equally dangerous element entered in. This element was to be found in the Chinese people themselves, who while inspired by a pride in Chinese institutions, hated the Manchu overlords. If during the fifties the Manchu overlords sought to do any one thing it was to keep the local provinces quiet while stamping out the Taiping Rebellion. It found itself involved in a foreign war scarcely before it was aware, and it was forced into this war largely by the necessity of choosing between local demands for exclusion, especially at Canton, and the demands of the foreign powers that treaty-provisions be carried out. It is almost beyond doubt that Hien-Feng was never fully acquainted with nor fully realized the significance of the Arrow war until he was forced to flee to Jehol in 1860, leaving his capital to the Barbarian invaders.

With the fall of Tientsin in 1858 the first negotiations for peace were begun. The Chinese envoys were still bridging that great gap between the demands of the foreign powers and the Emperor. The idea of any permanence of these treaties seems to have been as remote as ever to the Chinese mind. To temporize, to keep things steady at any cost was their basis of action. It is doubtful if they intended to treat

at all except in the last resort, ^{All the} while the Son of Heaven still sat on a tottering throne receiving misinformation as often as information; fearing the Taipings with a very great fear, but holding the foreign enemy as scarcely worthy of his sacred glance. Inferior and barbarians they might be temporized with but seriously regarded - never! The wide breach between foreign envoy and Emperor was as usual filled by his Manchu officials whom Samuel Wells Williams was quick to see in their real light and whom he touchingly describes as he saw them in the course of the negotiations leading to the American treaty of 1858: ^{16.}

I took leave of these high Chinese functionaries with a mixed feeling of respect and pity. They had had a struggle between their pride and their necessity, between their prejudices and their fear, on the one hand, and their consciousness of their impotence on the other, which cannot be fully understood by us, and of course not appreciated. They have in the providence of God been called to stand in their country's breach and take the risk life or death, and that, too, with Kiyung's fate before them (Kiyung had been presented with a silken cord after on the strength of his earlier endeavors he had been sent to Tientsin and failed). I do sincere-

ly pity them - coming thus in all conceit and ignorance to grapple with a vital question like that of the foreigner residing at their capital, in the sight of the Son of Heaven, and independent of his mighty authority. With these feelings it is extremely hard for the foreigner to sympathize, and perhaps it is best not to argue questions like them, but to ride over such points trusting to a further knowledge to show them that we know their interests better than they do. It is hard enough to give up old ideas and cherished prejudices when convinced by slow instruction, but to have them rudely blasted by power and arrogance, and obliged by force to yield, leaves a kind of a moral soreness which time alone can heal.

We have now to consider somewhat more fully the influence of the missionary official in China during the fifties and in the framing of the treaties of 1858-60.

THE MISSIONARY OFFICIAL AND THE TREATIES OF 1858-60.

The missionary official made his advent into Chinese diplomacy with the Merchinsk treaty. Morrison soon found himself in demand at Canton. The Cushing mission found the missionary indispensable, and subsequent diplomats found the missionary the one great aid upon which they could lean. On the other hand his view-points and his immediate objects have colored modern history ^{greatly influenced} and our diplomatic interchange with China. High officials from all nations coming to China were, on the whole, ignorant of the language and depended much upon the missionaries as interpreters, translators, and secretaries for their missions and legations. Merchants and traders, as a class, were ^{generally} useless for this service in that they customarily made use of the so-called "pidgin English", which while it served very well as a medium for bargaining was useless for official intercourse.

The missionary official continued prominent in official affairs in China during the fifties. The Rev. Peter Parker, who had been named secretary and interpreter to the Cushing mission, ~~was~~ named United States commissioner in 1845. It was during Parker's interim of office that the treaty of Wanghia, made in 1844, by terms of its own text was due for revision. All treaty relations with China had been found unsatisfactory, and the terms of the various treaties practically non-operative. Perhaps, too,

the learned doctor may have been smarting under the common stigma of "foreign devil", a term which the Chinese applied discriminately to all persons not of their nationality. At any rate the actions of Dr. Parker have come in for severe criticism from some sections. That Dr. Parker had any personal feelings in the actual recommendations seems highly improbable. He merely reflected Protestant missionary reaction during the fifties, which as we have seen, sought in its zeal almost any means for an entry into China even to the extent of actively allying themselves with the Taipings. Dr. Parker undertook his treaty revision as a matter of course and naturally enough got nowhere with it. Hien-Feng's last liberal gesture which in itself was mean enough, was in 1851, when in a treaty with Russia he had agreed that the Chinese government would impose no obstacles to "Russian subjects celebrating in their factory divine services according to the ritual of their own religion."² This very grudging concession was made before the Taiping rebellion burst out with the rebels professing to worship a Western god, or the execution of a priest in Kwangsi had brought on the embarrassing demands of France which rapidly led to war. By 1856 Hien-Feng had definite reasons to wish missionaries and other foreigners out of his empire forever. Only one thing could have led him to consider treaty revision and that was expediency. It was this condition of things

which Dr. Parker faced. The Chinese government while they dared not refuse to negotiate, doubtless wished to delay the actual signing of any new treaty as long as possible if at all. It had everything to gain by temporizing until it could thrust the foreigner's heavy boot from the partially opened door and close it forever. Dr. Parker consequently got nowhere with the revision which to his mind was necessary if China was to be opened to the evangelizing of its millions of heathen population. It is not to be forgotten that Dr. Parker was first of all a missionary. To attain this goal he was willing to go any length even to the forcible disruption of the Chinese empire, a thing which he recommended ^{3.} and for which he has been needlessly ridiculed. ^{fact that} They the American state department did not take kindly to the proposal ^{and} because it was entirely out of line with the policy later laid down by Humphrey Marshall, Dr. Parker's successor, does not make Dr. Parker any more ridiculous than the whole class of Protestant missionaries in China at the time. Likewise ^{his} his proposal that the French take Korea; the English, Chusan, and the United States, Formosa, as indemnities levied upon China for her failure to live up to her treaties with the foreign powers is no more ridiculous than events of like nature which ^{later} actually did happen. Dr. Parker's proposal to hold these until "satisfaction for the past and right understanding for the future are grant-

ed" doubtlessly included the right of missionaries to evangelize China for Christ. For the student of Far Eastern diplomacy Dr. Parker's action is significant because: (1) it sets in "bas relief" the missionary attitude during the period and shows how much the missionary official's action was consciously or unconsciously influenced by his belief; (2) for the first time we have a move toward a cooperative policy in the East which later became the guiding policy of Anson Burlingame. Dr. Williams writing during the same period says:

..... I do not hesitate to say that a new policy toward China ought to be initiated, and that the powers of the Western civilization must insist on what they know to be their rights, and give up dealing with Chian as a power to which any ordinary rules apply.

It seems pertinent to here note that the cooperative policy, which has since that time to a more or less pronounced degree been visible in the dealings of the Powers with the Far East, must be attributed very largely to a common interest of all nations in missionaries. To some extent the spirit of internationality itself has been found in the common ground of missionary activity.

Dr. Parker's effort blocked both ways came to naught, but the "eye doctor's" proposals were no more absurd nor contrary to international law than many subsequent events which the strong arm of force was to give authority. When

Humphrey Marshall succeeded the now thoroughly discredited Dr. Parker he faced the now well defined policy of the Manchus to temporize.

In November 1857, William B. Reed, the American Minister Plenipotentiary arrived in China to take up the task of revising the treaty of Wanghia. At Canton he tried to enter into the preliminary negotiations with the Chinese commissioner Yeh. Yeh refused upon the characteristic grounds that it was unnecessary. It is significant that at the time Yeh was in the city, which had specifically been opened to trade by a half dozen or more treaties with the powers, but which had in reality never opened its gates to the foreigner. A month later, however, British guns were destined to force that which treaty negotiations had failed to accomplish. In May Reed recommended his efforts at negotiation, this time at the mouth of the Pei-ho, below Tientsin. Conditions had by May completely changed. The foreign war had become serious. Canton was held by the British and everything bespoke troublous times. For the Chinese government treaties, no matter how lightly or absurd they held them, were again expedient. The Chinese high commissioner Tan was sent to negotiate with the American plenipotentiary. Tan was limited in his powers and messengers hastened between Tientsin and Peking bearing in bamboo containers messages and proposals for the sacred glance of the Emperor. Eventually Tan reported Hien-Feng favorable to four conditions: (1) the opening of seven new ports, five on the coast and two in Formosa; (2)

the toleration of Christianity;(3) a modification of the tonnage duties to the advantage of American bottoms;(4) and an inclusive most favored nation clause. The Emperor refused (1) to open the rivers to trade, and (2) residence of foreigners at Peking. The secret of the negotiations of 1858 are to be found in two matters which the Chinese considered imperative: (1) the Americans and the Russians must be kept from actively joining the English barbarians and the French barbarians with whom China was then at war; (2) there was always the great and very real fear that the foreign barbarians with their cannon might form an alliance with the Taipings, who professed to believe in the Western religion. To accomplish their ends and prevent the first the Dragon Throne permitted negotiations to be opened with the American plenipotentiary, while to prevent the possibility of the second the Chinese commissioner was not allowed to offer so very stubborn and prolonged objections to the American demand for religious toleration. In fact the ease with which they accomplished their purpose surprised the American negotiators as we shall see later.

... But too much attention cannot be attached to the treaties of 1858. For the most part they all proved abortive and it seems not too much to say that if the treaties of the forties were scraps of paper, little regarded or understood by the Chinese, the treaties of 1858 were little less than paper frauds. Hien-Feng had no intention of granting anything permanently and that he stooped to negotiate treaties at all

was because of the momentary expediency. Instead of foreign intercourse it is more probable that he had at the time the exclusion of all foreigners under consideration. The provincial edict of October 11, 1859 bespoke the attitude of the Manchu government toward Christianity and not the wording of this treaty signed over a year earlier. The only significance which can rightfully be attached to the treaties of 1858 is that they formed in 1860 a concrete basis for negotiation. In other words the "snow checks" given in 1858 became the basis of forced payment in 1860, when Peking was in the hands of the English and French and the paralytic Hien-Feng had gone on an "autumn tour of inspection" into the wastes of Jehol.

But if the treaties of 1858 are unimportant as documents with any force of good faith to make them binding, they are important because of the interest and honor attached to them by the Christian world. The first of these treaties to be ratified was that of Russia. Hien-Feng ratified this treaty June 2, 1858 (May 28th N.S.) after it had been negotiated at Aighoun. This is the first treaty to contain a clause concerning Christianity and furnished the example and precedent for the American negotiators although in point of time it was signed ten days later than the American treaty. Article VIII reads:^{5A}

Le Gouvernement Chinois ayant reconnu que la doctrine Chretienne facilite l'etablissement de l'ordre et de la concorde entre les hommes, promet

Chrétiens

de ne pas persécuter ses sujets pour l'exercice des devoirs de leur religion; ils jouiront de la protection accordée à tous ceux qui professant les autres croyances tolérées dans l'Empire.

Le Gouvernement Chinois considère les missionnaires chrétiens comme des hommes de bien qui ne cherchent pas d'avantages matériels, leur permet de propager parmi ses sujets, et ne leur empêchera pas de circuler dans l'intérieur de l'Empire. Un nombre fixe de missionnaires partant des villes ou ports ouverts sera muni de passeports signés par les autorités.

This provision, however, applied specifically to a limited number of Russian missionaries of the Greek Orthodox church. The knowledge of the presence of such an article in the proposed treaty then being negotiated between Russia and China emboldened Dr. Samuel Wells Williams and Dr. W.A.P. Martin, the two missionaries attached to the American minister's party to get some similar agreement in the American treaty. Dr. Williams writes of these negotiations:

. . . . The Russian minister was the first to formulate the article on this subject and in the discussions which ensued as to his draft of the treaty presented to the Chinese officials, they are said to have expressed their willingness to allow missionaries to travel through the country, inasmuch as these usually could speak the language, they opposed like permission to merchants, who could not do so, and this ignorance was sure to breed trouble.

These officials knew the

Russian priests in Peking to be quiet industrious men, and were doubtless willing enough to admit them to further privileges, but they could give no opinion on the Christian religion for they knew practically nothing of its general tenets.

The next day I got the Chinese text of this article and drew up a similar one for the United States treaty, leaving out the proviso that a certain number of missionaries would be allowed, and inserting the names of the Protestant and Roman Catholic churches, so as to bring the former distinctly before them as not the same as the Roman and Greek churches; it was otherwise different in phraseology but not in spirit. The night before the treaty was signed, a note was sent from the Chinese, rejecting the article altogether, on the ground that the Protestant missionaries had their families with them and must be restricted to open ports; the inference was therefore pretty plain that the novelty of foreign women travelling about the country had presented itself to their minds as an objection to allowing Americans to teach Christianity. As soon as I could do so I drew up another form of the same article, and started off the next morning to lay it before the Imperial Commissioners. It was quite the same article as before but they accepted it without further discussion or alteration; however, the word "whoever" in my English version was altered by Mr. Reed to "any person whether citizen of the United States or

Chinese convert, who" - because he wished every part of the treaty to refer to the United States citizens, and cared not very much whether it had a toleration article or not. I did care and was thankful to God that it was inserted. It is the only treaty in existence which contains the royal law. I have always regarded this present article as better than the discarded one, in that the British treaty was abridged from it, and I understood at the time that it would not have been inserted if ours had not contained such a clause. It must be said, moreover, that if the Chinese had at all comprehended what was involved in these four toleration articles they would not have signed one of them.

Thus it came about that on June 18, 1858, the American treaty was signed at Tientsin by Wm. B. Reed, Minister Plenipotentiary for the United States, and Kweiliang and Hwashana, Imperial High Commissioners delegated by the Manchu Emperor. Of the four articles referred to by Dr. Williams Articles XI, XII, and XXV refer only indirectly to the question of toleration, while the XXIX Article contains the "royal law" or Golden Rule.

These articles read as follows:⁷

XI All citizens of the United States of America in China, peacefully attending to their affairs, being placed on a common footing of amity and good will with the subjects of China shall receive and enjoy

for themselves and everything appertaining to them the protection of the local authorities of the Government, who shall defend them from all insult and injury of any sort. If their dwellings or property be threatened or attacked by mobs, incendiaries, or other violent or lawless persons, the local officials, on requisition of the Consul, shall immediately dispatch a military force to disperse the rioters, apprehend the guilty individuals and punish them with the utmost rigor of the law....

XII. Citizens of the United States residing or sojourning at any of the ports open to foreign commerce, shall be permitted to rent houses, places of business, or hire sites on which they can themselves build hospitals, churches or cemeteries Any desecration of the cemeteries by natives shall be severely punished according to law.

XXV. It shall be lawful for officers or citizens of the United States to employ scholars and people in any part of China, without distinction of persons, to teach any of the languages of the Empire, and to assist in literary labors; and the persons so employed shall not for that cause be subject to any injury on the part of the Government or individuals, and it shall in like manner be lawful for the citizens of the United States to purchase all manner of books in China.

XXIX, The principles of the Christian religion as professed by the Protestant and Roman Catholic churches

are recognized as teaching men to do good, and to do unto others as they would have others do unto them. Hereafter those who quietly profess and teach these doctrines shall not be harassed or persecuted on account of their faith. Any person whether citizen of the United States or Chinese convert, who according to these tenets, peaceably teach and practise the principles of Christianity, shall in no case be interfered with or molested.

Eight days later Great Britain signed a treaty with China at Tientsin, containing a restatement of the American Article. It reads:

VIII. The Christian religion as professed by Protestants and Roman Catholics, inculcates the practise of virtue, and teaches man to do as he would be done by. Persons teaching it or professing it, therefore, shall alike be entitled to the protection of the Chinese authorities, nor shall any such peaceably pursuing their calling, and not offending against the law be persecuted or interfered with.

In addition to Article VIII a second article, Article XII of the British treaty is of extreme importance because of the phrase "or other places"; otherwise it agrees in substance with Article XII of the American treaty. Around this wording the missionaries after 1860 sought to defend their right to hold property in the interior. It reads:

British subjects, whether at the ports or other places, desiring to build or open houses, warehouses, churches, hospitals or burying grounds, shall make their agreement for the land or buildings they require, at the rates prevailing among the people, equitably and without exactions on either side.

On June 27, 1858, France signed a treaty with the Chinese Government in which three articles dealt directly or indirectly with toleration and the missionary question:

VIII. Les Français qui voudront se rendre dans les villes de l'interieur, où dans les ports ou ne sont pas admis les navires étrangers pourront le faire en toute sûreté, à la condition expresse d'être munis de passe-ports rédigés en Français et in Chinois, légalement délivrés par les Agents Diplomatiques ou les Consuls de France en Chine, et visés par les autorités Chinoises.

En cas de passe-port, le Français qui ne pourra pas le présenter lorsqu'il en sera requis légalement, devra, si l'autorité Chinoise du lieu ou il se trouve se refuse à lui donner un permis de séjour, pour lui laisser le temps de demander un autre passe-port au consul, être reconduit au Consulat le plus voisin, sans qu'il soit permis de le maltraiter, ni de l'insulter en aucune manière.

Ainsi que cela était stipulé dans les anciens Traités, les Français résidant ou de passage dans les ports ouverts au commerce étranger pourront circuler, sans passe-port, dans leur voisinage immédiat, et y vaquer à leurs occupations aussi librement que les nationaux; mais ils ne pourront dépasser certaines limites qui seront fixées, de commun accord, entre le Consul et l'autorité locale.

Les Agents Français in Chine ne délivreront de passe-ports à leur nationaux qui pour les lieux ou les rebelles ne seront pas établis dans le moment où ce passe-port sera demandé.

Ces passe-ports ne seront délivrés par les autorités Françaises, qu'aux personnes qui leur offriront toutes les garanties désirables.

X. Les Français pourront, de la même manière établir des églises, des hospices, des écoles et des cimetières. Dans ce but l'autorité locale, après s'être concertée avec le consul, désignera les quartiers les plus convenables pour la résidence des Français, et les endroits dans lesquels pourront avoir les constructions précitées.

XIII. Le religion chrétienne ayant pour objet essential de porter les hommes à la vertu, les members de toutes les communions chrétiennes jouiront d'une entière sécurité pour leur personnes, leurs propriétés et le libre exercice de leur pratiques religieuses, et une protection efficace sera donnée aux missionnaires qui se rendront pacifiquement dans l'interieur du pays, munis des passeports reguliers dont il est parlé dans l'article.

Thus ended the drawing of the treaties of 1858. In these negotiations ^{those} of Russia are unique. Since the Nerchinsk convention of 1689 Russian and Chinese relations had been cordial. Russia was carrying out her policy of eastward expansion during these years and her emissaries were careful to give no offense at Peking. They performed the kow-tow and in every way conformed to the court ceremonial. The Russians were near enough oriental in their thinking to understand the attitude of orientals and herein lies the secret of her success in the Far East. Knowing the vast pretensions of the Chinese the Russians studiously applied themselves to winning favor. In 1727 at Kiahtka the Russians and Chinese signed two conventions and two protocols. Three of these defined the boundaries of the frontier while the principle treaty provided for the conduct of trade. This last treaty also provided that priests of the Greek orthodox church might study languages within the Empire. The Russians were careful that their relations in no way conflicted with the claim of China to universal power. A thriving trade in skins, broadcloth and furs

continued across the border. In 1768 and 1798 further agreements were drawn up regulating the thriving trade of the frontier. In 1806 when Russian ships arrived at Canton, however, the Chinese Government allowed them to dispose of their furs and take on cargo, but warned them that in the future Russian trade must be across the land frontier. In other words China's treaty with Russia was looked upon by the Chinese not as we look at treaties, but as a permission granted at the pleasure of the Emperor and which could be taken away at pleasure.

That brings the historian to a careful study of the probable Chinese conception of treaties. There is no sure ground for believing that the Chinese officials in any way considered a treaty as binding upon the Emperor. That the Emperor as Son of Heaven considered himself the ruler of the world is practically proven by every edict dealing with general questions of more than purely Chinese interest before 1860. This edict of the Emperor Chien Lung to George III of England on the matter of the Macartney mission of 1793 illustrates the point:

You (George III), O King, live beyond the confines of many seas. Nevertheless, impelled by your humble desire to partake of the benefit of our civilization, you have dispatched a mission respectfully bearing your memorial I have perused your memorial; the earnest terms in which it is couched reveal a respectful humility on your part, which is highly praiseworthy

... In consideration of the fact that your Ambassador and his deputy have come a long way with your memorial and tribute, I have shown them this high favour and have allowed them to be introduced into my presence. To manifest my indulgence, I have entertained them at a banquet and made them numerous gifts As to your entreaty to send me one of your nationals to be accredited to my Celestial Court and to be in control of your country's trade with China, this request is contrary to all usage of my dynasty and cannot possibly be entertained ... If as you assert that a reverence for our Celestial dynasty fills you with a desire to acquire our civilization, our ceremonies and code of laws differ so completely from your own, that, even if your Envoy were able to acquire rudiments of our civilization, you could not possibly transport our manners and customs to your alien soil. Therefore, however adept your Envoy might become, nothing would be gained thereby.

Swaying the wide world, I have but one aim in view, namely to maintain a perfect governance and to fulfill the duties of the State; strange and costly objects do not interest me. If I have commanded that the tribute offerings sent by you, O King, are to be accepted, this was solely in consideration for the spirit which prompted you to dispatch them from afar. Our dynasty's majestic virtue has penetrated into every country under

Heaven, and kings of all nations have offered their costly tribute by land and sea. As your Ambassador can see ^{for} himself, we possess all things. I set no value on objects strange or ingenious, and have no use for your country's manufactures.

Claiming to sway as he did a power which was both temporal and at the same time cultural and religious, the historian has the basis of the common opposition to foreign culture and foreign religions. If the foreign nations thought they were making treaties with the Emperor, the Emperor considered he was at the best graciously giving certain privileges. In this the Emperor and the Chinese were sincere. That which we usually charge to blind arrogance on the part of the Chinese rested upon centuries of past history. In fact the Chinese mind did not think in terms of treaties and international agreements. The Son of heaven represented a state to which the great Roman Empire at its height was in age and precedent a mere infant, yet it took the people of Europe one thousand years to get the imperial concept of the state out of their system of thought.

There is moreover evidence to show that the Chinese officials in direct negotiations found it to their necessity to never for a moment ^{to} picture to the emperor the basis for dealings and negotiations in any other light. A Chinese account of the period of the Opium war throws further light upon the matter and caters to the principle of "divisa et

impera" the underlying principle of universal rule:^{11.}

The English desired that the leaders of all nations should report to them first, and then pay duties; but the French and Americans indignantly exclaimed: We are no dependencies of England nor have we been treacherous and lying". On this some American ship-of-war entered port, and a few months later, some Frenchmen too. Both of them submitted letters, begging to pay tribute, and be allowed to express their devotion at an interview. They also requested to be allowed to leave their ships in the South whilst the tribute-envoys and a small suite went overland to Peking; for they wanted to make some confidential suggestions and assist us.

If it dawned upon the high officials negotiating with the foreigners before 1860 that they, the foreigner, was anything more than impudent barbarians and tributaries of the Dragon Throne the high officials kept their thoughts very closely hidden within their breasts. Moreover, every mission to Peking up to 1860 seems quite conclusively to have been plastered with huge banners declaring them as tribute-bearers, even including the American mission of 1859.^{12.} When the American Minister, John Ward, refused to perform the kow-tow on this occasion his party was sent back to Tientsin again without an audience.

THE LAST SON OF HEAVEN

The year 1860 is the key date in the modernization of China. Compelled to flee to Jehol with his court the real significance of the foreigner for the first time dawned in the minds of the Emperor and the princes of the blood. For nearly a decade high Chinese dignitaries had filled the wide breach between Emperor and foreigner, and if they had had misgivings as to the sacrosanct character of their Emperor or the minimization of the foreign barbarian it would have been treason to give expression to their opinions. But with the year 1860 that veil of ignorance so carefully thrown around the Emperor and his court had been swept rudely away, and the foreigner had loomed like a devastating cloud in the pathway of the Son of Heaven. With the flight to Jehol and the fall of Peking the sacrosanct character of the Emperor ended forever in the minds of the Emperor himself and his immediate family. With it fell the idea of universal sway.

Curiously as it may seem among the last of those close to the Throne to abandon this idea of the sacrosanct character of the Emperor was the Concubine Yi, or Yehonala, whose good fortune to bear an heir to the sickly Hien-Feng had brought her great prestige and power with the Emperor and people. This young woman's belief in the sacrosanct character of her lord is shown in these lines from a Hanlin diaryist of the time:

..... up to the very last the Yi concubine begged

him to remain in his Palace, as his presence there could not fail to awe the barbarians, and thus to exercise a protecting influence for the good of the city and people. How, said she, could the barbarians be expected to spare the city if the sacred chariot had fled, leaving unprotected the tutelary shrines and altars of the gods?

The future Tzu-Hsi was twenty-five years of age at this time, and while she is most often pictured as possessing all the shrewdness and knowledge of her later years, a kind of an oriental Athena, she was not an empress then, nor a woman experienced in the ways of the world. She was merely the Emperor's favorite concubine, confined large to the petty life of the palace. There is a very likely possibility that Yehonala, young as she was, realized that her friends would remain in Peking, and that at Jehol the Emperor would be surrounded by a faction unfriendly to herself. Between the danger of the foreigner and this danger of falling into the hands of a court faction unfriendly to herself, she quite probably chose the former. Her fears were amply justified by the bold Tsai Yuan conspiracy which followed.

But with 1860 it may well be said that the Emperor was dead. Used to nine prostrations in his presence, accustomed to issuing edicts which presupposed world-wide sway, carefully protected heretofore from the direct menaces of the foreigner, the Emperor had believed himself sacrosanct and all-powerful. With the rude awakening of the foreigner thundering at the very gates of the Sacred City the Chinese empire of the centuries vanished from the hearts of the dynasty like a golden dream. From 1860 to 1908 the Manchu dynasty faced a reality

in which there was no disillusionment. The year 1860 and not 1920 saw the last ~~invincible~~ Emperor, and in that year the famous Manchu dynasty entered into its last phase. In 1861 the weak Hien-Feng died and China saw seated behind the curtain the most powerful character that / the Manchu dynasty was to produce - the Empress Dowager Tzu-Hsi. None knew better than she that the sacrosanct character of the Emperor was hereafter a myth, and herein^{probably} lies the secret of her willingness in later years to manipulate the succession. The woman who pleaded with the Emperor to remain in Peking believed in the sacred character of the Son of Heaven; the woman whom they tried to assassinate on her return to Peking had no disillusionment as to the sacrosanct character of the Son of Heaven, and had on "the autumn tour of inspection" of the court mastered several hard lessons in political science - a la chinois.

The stern reality Tzu-Hsi faced may be summarized under two heads: (1) to maintain in the minds of China's great mass of people the sacrosanct conception of the emperor and the ancient glory of the empire as in the past; (2) and at the same time to maintain for China its peace and place among nations, now that it stood devoid of all its pretention, sacred adjuncts, and once boasted claim to world-wide sway. Under Tzu-Hsi's lead the Manchu dynasty for forty-eight years played this hazardous game only to lose when

on the point of winning in a game in which every odd was against it.

Returning for a moment to the Emperor Hien-Feng in Jehol before his death we see a paralytic and a weakling, but a man not without pride and ideas of his own, although he seems to have often allowed his prejudices to thwart his better motives. Born to believe he was ruler of Heaven's lands below by virtue of his title of Son of Heaven, he had found his dream rudely shattered, and his empire, already sadly torn by rebellion, seized ruthlessly by huge armies upon which he had foolishly chosen to look as sea-pirates. The tired, disappointed emperor now turned with slight hope to his younger brother, Prince Kung, probably at Kung's solicitation. This young prince, having never seen a foreigner as we are told, set out for Peking empowered to make a treaty with the barbarians in possession of the capital.

It is difficult to estimate the task set before this young prince handicapped as he was by centuries of misconception and ignorance. With quaking heart but calm face he reached Peking and entered the council chambers of the foreigners scarcely knowing what he might expect. Dr. W. A.P. Martin, who was later on very friendly terms with Prince Kung has this to say of him:

Prince Kung, a younger brother of the ill-fated Emperor Hienfung, has for twenty-five years first and

last been chief minister of foreign affairs and chancellor of the empire. This eminence he owes to the intelligence and courage that enabled him to come to the front at more than one critical moment in the fortunes of his house. His star rose in storm and darkness. The emperor had fled to Mongolia, and in default of any responsible person with whom to treat, the ambassadors (or one of them) were thinking of turning to the rival power (The Taipings) at Nanking, when in October, 1860, Prince Kung, then thirty years of age came forward with credentials empowering him to negotiate a peace. They were struck with the dignity and composure which he manifested in a very embarrassing situation. The prince had never seen a foreigner, and he was not backed by any visible force; the defenders of the capital having been routed, the summer palace sacked, and the city taken. Yet so far was he from giving way to demonstrations of grief, like Jules Favre on signing his treaty of peace, that he betrayed no sense of weakness and endeavored to obtain the best terms possible. He was fortunate in having to deal with men who were noted for moderation and who were as anxious as himself to set the prostrate empire on its feet again. The convention followed by a with-

drawal of the invading forces, brought him into great favor with the emperor, who required him to remain at Peking as his representative.

Hien-Feng died shortly afterwards, his death is generally credited to chagrin and the result of a dissolute life. Prince Kung intercepting a plot against his own life by Su Shun and Tuan Hua associated with Tsai Yuan in the Tsai Yuan conspiracy acted in concert with the two empresses in having the conspirators put to death and continued to exert such power in the regency as Prince Adviser to the Government that he has often been regarded as one of the regents of this earlier period acting in behalf of the child-emperor Tung-Chih. Tzu-Hsi shortly afterwards relieved him of his titles over a point of court etiquette and thus, while she shortly afterwards restored all of his emoluments except the title of Adviser to the Government, showed clearly that the Prince was not of the regency proper. Prince Kung remained, however, during this early period the most trusted man of the empire. Foreign affairs were almost entirely under his astute guidance during that first decade of China's new existence. Kung, ever an admirable character is described by Dr. Martin as "lank in figure, swart in complexion, and so near sighted that he appeared to squint kindly and gracious in demeanor, and his rapid energetic utter-

ance made an impression of independent strength which he was far from possessing".^{3.}

With the treaties of 1860 and the rise of Prince Kung to power the changing China first asserted itself. That change was, however, so very slow, so imperceptible as to hardly be noticeable. Safety for the dynasty lay in the appearance of imperturbability backed by the centuries of tradition. Yet beneath that inscrutable mask China moved. Treaties were no longer an outward show of the whims of emperors; they were respected. The Taiping rebellion was finally crushed in 1864 thanks to the efforts of Frederick T. Ward, an American adventurer from New England, and Charles Gordon, a British army officer. These friendly circumstances coupled with the fact that the foreign powers had in 1860 treated with the Manchus when they might have dispossessed them created at the Manchu court a feeling of friendliness secretly hidden, but too deep to ever entirely die out. Contrary to traditional belief it seems to have claimed as its adherents even the two empresses, and most certainly Prince Kung and Jung Lu. On the other hand safety from another Taiping lay in avoiding too friendly an attitude toward the foreigners for a deeply entrenched literati and gentry within China, and locally very powerful, necessitated caution and a middle course. This anti-foreign faction was not without representatives at the court itself. Then, too, the hands which moved the destinies of China had

no mistaken ideas of the aggressive nature of the foreigners, chief of whom was the missionary, who while thinking himself a very good boy was in reality the most troublesome element in China's relations with foreign nations.

During these years the missionaries were not inactive. The following Protestant societies entered the field from 1860-1876:^{4.} American United Presbyterian, 1860; English New Connecticut Methodist, 1860; Society for the Propagation of the Gospel, 1862; China Inland, 1862; Scotch United Presbyterian, 1863; Scotch National Bible Society, 1863; Female Educational Society, 1864; American Southern Presbyterian, 1867; English United Methodist Free Church, 1868; Irish Presbyterian, 1869; Basel Mission, (Some came in 1847) 1874; Canadian Presbyterian, 1874; American Bible Society, 1876.

The missionaries were not unmolested in the interior, but there is no direct evidence that they were ever after 1860 molested at the direct instigation of the Throne, notwithstanding the fact that the treaties^{of 1858, which had been temporarily} invalidated by the events of 1860 were very vague and uncertain as to the rights of foreigners of any calling beyond the confines of the treaty ports. It is around the constant encroachment of missionaries upon new mission fields without any real treaty authority that the American policy toward China and the policies of the other nations as well shaped themselves. Moreover, it was thr self-same impatient, zealous missionary

who helped shape Manchu foreign policy through the succeeding years. The missionary fired by a zeal that baffled astute politicians, and backed by a vast number of Christian adherents in their home countries were beyond the pale of the political jealousies of trade and nationalistic expansion, while at the same time their protests emanating from far away China often took on the deep roar of popular protest at home. The missionary forces from 1860 on began a steady trek across China from East to West. Not only were they beyond the petty jealousies of the powers, but very soon, to the dismay of politician and diplomatist, alike it was found their aggressive proselyting extended far beyond treaty rights as well. Any other class of people would have been promptly checked and kept within the bounds of the treaties, but no one dared abruptly check a missionary unless he dared risk the danger of prompt recall and considerable unpopularity at home after his return. The result was that the missionaries led and diplomacy followed trying frantically in one way or another to justify each new violation ^{of treaty law by zealots} or appealing directly to the missionaries themselves to be more discreet.

So important did this phase of diplomacy become that in 1871 Prince Kung said, "The missionary question affects the whole question of peaceful relations with the foreign powers - the whole question of their trade." Not only was all China their prospective field but as early as 1861 Dr.

Lockhart, of the London Missionary Society, unopposed by the Manchus opened a dispensary in Peking itself. Dr. J. Edkins joined him the next year. In 1863 Dr. W.A.P. Martin, whom we remember as ardently supporting the Taiping cause, and later came north as interpreter to the ^{Reed and} Ward Mission, opened a street chapel in Peking, and in 1865 he established a school. Did such bold measures lead to disaster as they might have been expected to do? Not at all. In fact Dr. Martin's attempt to open a school in Peking seems to have led to his recommendation by Sir Robert Hart to head the Imperial Tung Wen college in 1870 wherein high Chinese youth would be trained for positions in embassies of their country abroad when such should be established. Dr. H. Blodgett came to Peking in 1864 as a representative of the American Board Mission. He was followed a year later by Dr. C. Goodrich. In 1869 the American Methodist Mission began its work in Peking with Dr. H.H. Lowry and the Rev. Mr. Wheeler as its first missionaries. ^{6.} At the same time the trusted secretary of the American legation was the young printer who had come to Canton in 1833, Dr. Samuel Wells Williams. The Chinese Government had reason to be grateful to him for his strong hand had prevented American adventurers from engaging in the disgraceful coolie trade, and in 1859 he had personally released more than one hundred Chinese coolies from an American ship. Moreover, Dr. Williams had had printed at his own expense a pamphlet in Chinese

warning unwary Chinese against the dangers of the coolie
7.
decoy.

Thus on all sides the missionary loomed large upon the consciousness of both the foreign and Chinese diplomatists and officials. He became a factor which could not be ignored. In fact he all but monopolized the stage, and when one sets about today to carefully weigh the good and the bad chargeable to his account in the history of the time under consideration it is hard to sanely consider his achievements in one direction without great fear of doing grave injustice in the other. This may be said for him he was very rarely corrupt, but he was so blinded by his immediate ends that he often failed to see the difficulties which followed in his path. It may be said without contradiction that it was the missionary who pried open the closed door of China.

THE DILEMMA OF THE DIPLOMATS

The reshaping of the Manchu policy is not to be thoroughly understood without some consideration of the cooperative policy toward China by the Powers after 1860. For the active shaping of this policy credit must be given to Anson Burlingame, the first American minister to China. Dr. Peter Parker had in his own way approached this policy. Humphrey Marshall had definitely formulated the policy of the United States that the political and territorial integrity of China must be maintained. Burlingame now supplemented these contributions by a plan for cooperation of all the powers together and with China also, thus embodying Dr. Parker's plan and Marshall's under the same head but with the added wise conception that the cooperation was to be with China and not against her. This was statesmanship and was quickly recognized by all the nations as such. The result was that it was he who quickly became, because of his sterling worth and justness, the confidant of all the diplomats, and especially is it to Burlingame that the United States owes the fast friendship of China. Burlingame has himself briefly defined his policy for us in his own words:

1.
That policy was briefly this: An agreement on the part of the Treaty Powers to act together on all material questions; to stand together in defense of their treaty rights, but determined at the same time to give

those treaties a generous construction; determined to maintain the foreign system of customs, and to support it in a pure administration upon a cosmopolitan basis; and agreement to take no cession of territory at the treaty ports, and never to menace the territorial integrity of China.

It was Burlingame who acted as mediator between Great Britain and China and avoided a second Arrow war, when China refused to accept the fleet built for her in England at the orders of Sir Frederick Lay, who had obviously exceeded his powers. W.A.P. Martin describes the incident as follows:^{2.}

When they (the Chinese) addressed themselves to the British minister (Sir Frederick Bruce), complaining of Mr. Lay for having exceeded his powers, and expressing a determination to dismiss him and the fleet together, Sir Frederick Bruce warmly espoused Lay's cause. They refused to recede and he refused to consent. It was the "Arrow" case with variations and with improved prospects for a first class conflagration. Happily there was a peace maker on the ground. The Chinese laid their grievances before Mr. Burlingame, who being a man of tact and ability, succeeded in warding off the danger.

Wensiang solemnly assured him that "sooner than submit to having the fleet forced on them, the Man-

chu Government would retire beyond the Great Wall. He accordingly brought the question in all its gravity before Sir F. Bruce, and after three days of discussion the latter abandoned his position. Pacing the floor near midnight in the United States legation, he suddenly exclaimed, "The fleet may go". The crisis was passed.

From that time on Burlingame enjoyed the supreme confidence of Prince Kung and the Manchu Government as well as that of his fellow ministers at Peking. Prince Kung confided in him and the high esteem with which he was held resulted in his being chosen by the Manchu Government to head a delegation to present their position to the Powers for a better basis for future negotiations.

Burlingame early saw the importance and the danger of the missionary situation and in 1867 wrote of it in a letter to E.C. Lord, Vice Consul at Ningpo as follows: 3.

The "missionary question" as it is compendiously termed, no doubt contains the germ of much trouble and revolution in this country, and its success will be complete when the entire fabric of Chinese society and government has been changed and reconstructed. I suppose, too, that none of the foreigners, who are zealously engaged in advancing the work of evangelizing the Chinese, are aiming at anything short of this, whatever consequences may accompany the progress of change. Nor do I wish to conceal this aim for I

believe that the change will ultimately benefit the people of this land, and that they will themselves see, in their gradual development, that many blessings are springing up which more than compensate for whatever was good in the old order of things. It is an inestimable advantage, too, that this nation while undergoing this renovation of its institutions by the introduction of pure morality and true science, has the example of western nations to follow or shun, and need not go through their struggles in establishing free institutions nor make their costly experiments when learning the best way

In the progress of missionary labors, more and more opposition is like to be exhibited on the part of the literati and officials; for they no doubt instinctively feel that the triumph of such doctrines as christianity will materially weaken and imperil their standing and proscriptive influence. It is well they cannot call in the aid of an organized body of priests to crush the growing cause; but the native converts will doubtless find that, whenever occasion prompts, both gentry and rulers can find ways to harass and oppress them. Yet it is both undesirable and inexpedient that they should regard themselves as under a foreign protectorate; they would be aggrieved and disappointed to find, when they

needed it, that it could not rescue them from their enemies.

The missionary question was always to the forefront in diplomatic circles, and two troublesome questions presented themselves: (1) what rights had the missionary, if any, in the interior of China; could they legitimately hold land and at what moment would the Chinese Government demand their recall; (2) to what extent was it advisable and expedient to try to protect Chinese converts under the terms of the treaties? The missionaries themselves offered no great amount of aid, indeed, it was the missionary who was constantly creating the problem. So constantly was the missionary problem on the table in diplomatic conferences from 1860-1890, roughly, that ^{it} can rightfully be said to constitute the one standing problem ^{with which} each incoming minister had to wrestle with. The problem was unique because it was created by persons whose zeal brooked no obstruction, and because at home it had popular opinion solidly behind it. Europe and America rang with the cry "Convert the heathen!" To the popular mind the heathen during this period meant the "heathen Chinese." Any matter touching the missionary was settled before hearing in favor of the missionary by the public. Each retiring minister might well have said of the missionary question to his incoming successor, "Well, here it is; just try to work it out!" In Peking it became the duty of the diplomat to smooth the way; to find reasons to justify the presence of the missionary in

the interior and bolster up his case as far as possible, and yet not be called by the Manchu Government .

Just how slender the thread upon which the missionary question hung is attested that all during the early years the diplomatic representatives were constantly fearful of being called to time on the matter of fact basis of treaty stipulation; and yet so fearful of their ground were they that they never once dared during these years to ask the Manchu government for an expression of policy. On the other hand the Manchus were just as desirous of not forcing a dangerous question. An out-and-out expression of policy would very likely either cause a foreign war, or if favorable it would cause discontent and a probable outbreak at home. The situation fitted well into the now thoroughly adopted policy of the Manchus of saying nothing on issues which might force them from their Middle of the Road Policy. It is doubtful if in the sixties, seventies and even the early part of the eighties if the Manchu Government would have known how to reply to such a query had it been made.

From the treaty angle a peculiar situation presented itself to the foreign powers. The American treaty negotiated at Tientsin in 1858 could at the best hardly be interpreted as covering more than the rights of its citizens at treaty ports, and although it provided for the protection of christian converts it was insufficient when

questions arose in the interior. In this respect the British treaty was superior for its article XII provided that "British subjects whether at the ports or other places, desiring to build, or open houses, etc". But this treaty had no provision whatever concerning Christian converts. It remained for the French negotiations of 1860 to result in a situation peculiar in the history of modern treaties. The Chinese text contained an extra clause known among diplomats and historians as "The Sixth Clause", but the French text did not contain this clause, and the French text was specified in the treaty as the authoritative text. This debatable clause reads:

4.
 VI. It shall be promulgated throughout the breadth and length of the land, in terms of the imperial edict of the 20th of February 1846, that it is permitted all people in all parts of China to propagate and practise the teaching of the Lord of Heaven (Roman Catholic); to meet together for the preaching of doctrine; to build churches and to worship; further all such as indiscriminately arrest (Christians) shall be duly punished; such churches, schools, cemeteries, lands and buildings as were owned on former occasions by persecuted Christians shall be paid for, and the money handed to the French representative at Peking, for transmission to the Christians in the

localities concerned. It is ⁱⁿ addition permitted to French missionaries to rent and purchase land in all the provinces, and to erect buildings thereon at pleasure.

Such an article would have at once furnished a complete and incontestable basis for all that the diplomats were seeking, for rights accorded the Roman Catholics could have been secured to the Protestant churches and the Greek church. But the French text did not contain the clause, and the French text was the authoritative version in case of dispute. So again the harassed diplomats dared not act for fear the Chinese would not only disavow the spurious clause which was contained in their text, but make the missionary question an active issue. Subsequent events were to show that their fears were groundless, but the diplomats dealing with the question at the time did not know it. Dr. Martin writes of the incident:

Again it was ^{to} France that Christian missions were indebted for a signal extension of their privileges, though the manner in which it was obtained is open to the charge of being even more equivocal than the ordinary proceedings of diplomacy. A discrepancy is found to exist between the two texts of the French treaty. The Chinese contains a clause securing the Roman Catholic missionaries the right of buying land and building houses in the interior, though the French text has nothing of the kind. By

whom the attention of the Chinese authorities was first drawn to this disagreement I know not, but when twenty-five or twenty-six years ago (ca 1870), I was asked to translate the article for comparison, I supposed the Tsungli Yamen intended to disallow such privileges as were based upon that interpolation, the French text being declared authoritative on points of difference. To this day, however, they have never taken a step in that direction for the obvious reason that the interpolation being in Chinese, there was no ground to complain that they had been hoodwinked. Nor have they shown any disposition to withhold from Protestants what they conceded to Catholics. Missionaries of both confessions are allowed to erect permanent establishments wherever local opposition does not prevent their doing so. Sometimes, indeed, a local magistrate when asked by American or English missionaries to ratify a purchase in the interior, objects that nothing of the kind is provided for in their treaties. But that is ignorance or perversity on the part of the mandarin, not an authoritative interpretation of treaty rights. For on appeal to Peking, the Tsungli Yamen always admits the force of the most favored nation clause.

In its aspects the situation has points of absurdity. On the one hand we have the hesitating diplomats, who fear-

did not dare force the question for fear of a disavowal by the Chinese of the many rights the missionaries had already relegated to themselves, and such a disavowal would have probably been met with an ultimatum from the Christian world that China be opened to Christian influence even at the point of the sword. In such a case the American policy of territorial and political integrity for China would place her in a difficult position. On the other hand the Chinese referring to the treaty either had the humor to accept the situation, or had expected from the first to grant the missionaries the privileges they were so freely taking, while their diplomatic representatives in Peking were continually at their wits end to keep the situation from coming to a head. Then there is the missionary whose attitude is unique. As the good doctor's words above show he had no qualms of conscience in taking everything which could be secured in the way of privileges, and the "Sixth Clause" though ostensibly spurious is acknowledged as creditable to France.

But the fact is not to be lost sight of that it suited Peking as much as it did the diplomats of the foreign governments to let the matter ride. Peking did nothing unless appealed to directly by some magistrate, then the Tsungli Yamen evidently upheld the Sixth Clause interpretation and discouraged further inquiry. Thus it was that magistrates learned to work out their own problems in such matters in

the provinces wherein they arose. It was a simple process, that merely of finding whether the local gentry and literati would stand for the purchases of land or erection of buildings which the missionaries were asking for.

The true story of the famous and unique "Sixth Article", or "Sixth Clause" is yet to be told in its entirety. It is significant that the situation resulting after 1860 was such that the Chinese Government could avoid the necessity of having to declare a policy until they could arrive at and find the time more opportune to declare a policy - one which would insure peace abroad while maintaining peace at home. In fact the Burlingame mission had for its purpose to appeal to the nations of the world that they might understand the serious situation China faced at home and the necessity for that great country to change slowly. Of the purpose of the mission in 1876 Sir Robert Hart says:

The object with which the Yamen dispatched the Mission as I understood it at the time, was to cultivate and conserve friendly relations by explaining to each of the Treaty Powers the many difficulties that China cannot fail to experience in attempting to change existing conditions or to introduce novelties; to bespeak for forbearance, and to prevent in so far as possible any resort to hostile pressure to wring from China concessions for which the Government did not as yet feel ready, and to prepare the way gen-

erally for the day when China should not merely hear the words of foreign representatives in Peking, but should be able to address each Government in its own capital through a resident Chinese medium.

So far as newspaper reports go, the object of the mission has been misinterpreted, and the public have regarded it as promising on the part of China the immediate performance of those very things which China sent the mission to explain to the West are so difficult of performance.

Meanwhile the missionary question continued to keep the diplomats steadily at the conference table. It was not before 1890 that the Manchu policy became fully revealed. How the Manchu policy and the missionary question connected itself up with trade and commerce, and paved the way for the unfortunate aggressions of the nineties will be discussed later.

MIDDLE GROUND AND DIFFICULT DIPLOMACY

After the "Chinese Fleet" incident Anson Burlingame became the moderator at Peking, but it was, of course, not openly recognized. The representatives of other powers sought his advice, and ostensibly followed their own, but it was very often deeply influenced by Burlingame's opinions and advice. Most of all the Chinese sought him. Grievous questions were always coming to the front, and force was the most ready implement of European diplomacy at this no less than a later date. As has been shown the diplomacy of Europe in China from 1850-1860 had been written with the sword. It was a threat with which the Manchus were powerless to cope. Anson Burlingame writing to William H. Seward, the American Secretary of State under date of April 10, 1867,¹ speaks of the situation as follows:

When I came to China in 1861, the force policy was the rule. It was said, "the Chinese are conceited barbarians and must be forced into our civilization", or in the energetic language of the time, it was said, "You must take them by the throat!" Fortunately the representatives of the treaty powers did not listen to this view. Conspicuous among these was Sir Frederick Bruce, the British minister, who with his colleagues said if force was ever necessary the day for it was over; that we were in relations for the first time with the chiefs of the government, and that it

was necessary to proffer fair diplomatic action as a substitute for old views, and so bear ourselves as to secure the confidence of this people. Accordingly the policy was adopted of which you have been advised so often, and which you have approved so fully. Under this policy (the Cooperative policy) great development has occurred, missions have extended, trade increased three-fold, scientific men have been employed, "Wheaton's International Law" translated and adopted, military instruction accepted, nearly one hundred able men received into the civil service, steamboats multiplied, the way slowly opened for future telegraphs and railroads, and now we have this great movement for education.

In spite of the efforts of the broad visioned men like Burlingame, Sir Frederick Bruce, and others, force still lurked under the surface here and there showing its ugly face. Perhaps the most aggressive and overbearing of all foreign officials during the period up to 1890 were the French. The record of their relations with China are marred with many acts bordering on actual hostilities, for France had the extension of French Indo China continually in her mind. Least of all did France abandon the threat of force and least of all did she cooperate. Fear of the other powers was all that held her in check, and even such actions of

hers as might be considered laudable during the period are tinged with a deep spirit of selfishness and lack of breadth. Since the forties she had posed as the especial protector of the Roman Catholic church in China. It was her representative who had secured through Kiyong the Imperial edict of 1844. With the Revolution of 1848 France did not change her policy in China to uphold the Catholic faith. Her actions continued through the years so pro-Catholic as to hardly warrant the term tolerant at all. An incident related by Burlingame to Seward in a dispatch dated October 12, 1866 very well reveals her methods:^{2.}

After the usual formalities and felicitations, the Prince (Kung) dismissed with exception of his official suite, his attendants, and proceeded in a disturbed manner to speak of his relations with foreigners. He said they were excellent with all but the French, but these in spite of all he could do, they were not such as he desired. The cause of irritation were their claims on account of their missionaries, and the nature of a correspondence touching affairs in Corea; that the missionaries, not content to spread their faith, to which there was no objection, were political agents, and undertook to absolve their Chinese converts from obligation to their own government, and that they were supported in their pretensions by their diplomatic representatives at Peking; that when he had sought on behalf of a kindred

and once tributary people, in the interests of peace, an investigation into (the Korean) to secure the facts before proceeding to extremities, he had been charged with complicity, and his own people menaced with attack.

On this occasion Prince Kung made known to the American minister a letter dated November 11, 1866, from M. de Bellonet to himself in which the French official is insinuating, threatening and even insulting in his demands. The letter reads:^{3.}

In the first place, the massacre of French missionaries is one of the unpardonable crimes which nothing can excuse. It is of no consequence, therefore, for us to know the reasons which led the Koreans to commit this execrable offense; the deed is done; it is sufficient for us to know that they have thereby rendered themselves culpable, and may be punished for it in a singular manner: the ministers who gave the orders, and the mandarins who executed them, by loss of their heads and the confiscation of their property, which will be distributed among the families of their victims; the King who tolerated or commanded, or who did not even prevent the crime by loss of his throne, and perhaps still more

In the second place, I regret to declare to your

imperial highness that the reports that have reached us these five months and which have been sent to Paris, upon the events in Corea, force upon us very serious suspicion of complicity on the part of the Chinese government

In the third place we have been twice the dupes of an inquiry conducted ^{by} the Chinese authorities alone and we shall not be again.

.

In the fourth place your imperial highness is probably ignorant that war, which for us is pleasure, which the French passionately seek, is far from being detrimental to the people at large. . . . Our armies do not live like Chinese armies by pillaging the countryside they traverse, nor in maltreating the inhabitants, etc. . . .

Later when they learned ^{made} that these distastefully worded demands had been known to others the French went out of their way to upraid Prince Kung ^{for} revealing the contents ^{known}, but considerably modified their high-handed conduct.

Burligame had by 1867 altered considerably his opinions as to the possibility of the rulers of China seeking a pretext for harassing Christian missionaries and converts. In a dispatch to Seward dated May 27, 1867, he writes:

4.

The Chinese government favors toleration, and has

repeatedly informed me that it has no objection to Protestant missionaries for the reason that they never appeared to be political agents.

I have never year failed to secure from it a respectful hearing for the cause of Christianity, and such official action . . . as we required.

The moment it should be understood that Chinese Christians have forcible protection, as against their own authority, the question would become political, and the voice of the missionary could no longer be heard.

I have tried to prevent the question taking that form, and have been sustained in that view by the leading American missionaries.

These noble men, contenting themselves with all Christian means of spreading the Gospel, have won their way to the hearts of the people, and secured the central government for their cause.

During these years persecution of Christian missionaries and Christian converts continued spasmodically, but at no time was the Government at Peking slow to make such compensation as the Powers demanded, and at no time is the persecution traceable to the will of the rulers or Government. Friction in the interior between Christians and Chinese was usually traceable to the anti-foreign atti-

tude of the literati and gentry in the locality concerned, and manifested itself by their stirring the masses to violence by appealing to their deeply inborn prejudices. The most common immediate source of friction arose over the question of the location of and title to the land which the missionaries desired or had in their possession. A second cause of friction arose over the question of rights and exemptions of Chinese converts as specified in the treaties. A third cause of trouble was the antagonism of Christianity to Chinese precept and custom. It is noteworthy however that these outbreaks were not directed against missionaries as such but as foreigners.

Moreover the populace was very sensitive. Any friction of the Chinese Government with the foreign nations which became ^{the} knowledge of the masses was usually the signal for fresh outbreaks. That there were not more is to the credit of the Chinese Government itself for it often found its path difficult and the foreigner inclined to be overbearing. The centuries of local autonomy had made the local gentry practically supreme in their districts so that the central government had ever to conceal its weakness and bolster up its pretensions. If in difficult questions it acted without hesitation, even though slowly, it did mete out adequate punishment. This ^{establishes} the good faith of the Government. It acted slowly for two very good reasons: (1) it could not risk any danger of widespread revolution; (2) the ignorant Chinese who in their frenzy

committed the acts of violence had been stirred up by others on whom it was difficult for the Government to lay its hands.

In 1870 there occurred the most violent of all local outbreaks. This time the massacre which followed was traceable to prejudice and directed against the French Catholics. In many places in China the Sisters of Charity had established institutions each of which combined in itself a foundling hospital and an orphan asylum. Finding the Chinese were averse to placing their children in these institutions the managers hit upon the plan of offering a certain sum per head thinking this would encourage the bringing to them of homeless destitute children. It was understood that once the child was so placed within the asylum no parent, relative or guardian could claim or exercise any control over it. However there were ^{grave} possibilities for trouble in such a plan.

One of these institutions was located in Tientsin. Here the Chinese asserted and most of the non-Catholic foreign population believed that certain worthless characters were simply kidnapping children and bringing them to the Catholic institution. They also asserted that both the priests and sisters encouraged the bringing of children in the last stages of illness for the purpose of having them baptised in articulo mortis. In this way many of the children brought to the Tientsin establishment were

shortly afterwards taken away dead. This fact coupled with the secrecy and seclusion of the Catholic charitable institutions created in the minds of the Chinese a deep and sinister suspicion which promptly flamed with an awful hatred. Any rumor concerning the Sisters of Charity or their acts, however innocent in themselves, were made the most of by those who thought they had occasion to suspect them. Thousands of conscientious Chinese came to have an honest conviction that a great wrong was being perpetrated here under the cloak of religion. Prior to the outbreak an epidemic had increased the number of deaths. About the same time a report was bruited abroad that the Sisters were killing children to get their eyes and hearts for medicinal purposes; a thing which it must be said in passing was not unknown to Chinese medicine. Crowds assembled from time to time demanding that the children should be liberated. Finally the Sisters fearing violence consented to an examination of the premises by a committee. Unfortunately the French consul of Tientsin, hearing of the disturbance, arrived while this committee was in the buildings. He proceeded to drive the Chinese from the building with angry words.

On June 21, the mob assembled before the French consulate. The consul rushed to the Yamen of the local magistrate and demanded protection. As he was about to leave the build-

ing accompanied by mandarins he found his way blocked by an angry mob. Losing his wits, the available evidence is that he fired into the crowd with a small weapon. He and his clerk were immediately killed. The mob then proceeded to the Catholic orphanage, forced entrance and put all the priests and sisters to death with barbarous torture. They now tore down the buildings and set fire to the ruins. They then proceeded to kill all Frenchmen whom they encountered as well as three Russians whom they mistook for French.⁵ In all nineteen persons lost their lives. The incident was deplorable and greatly to be regretted by the Chinese Government as well as the foreign nations. Retribution came, however, but slowly, as the situation reveals at once all of the difficulties in not only this but hundreds of other cases of similar nature. Hamilton Fish, the American Secretary of State commenting upon the situation had the following to say:⁶

A careful review of all that has transpired in connection with this affair - the timidity and vacillation of the officials; the delay and uncertainty attending the arrest and trial of the offenders; the fear of trouble and riotous proceedings at their execution; the extreme caution exercised in the preparation for and the secrecy of the execution - illustrate most painfully the weakness of the Government when called upon to perform a duty in opposition to public opinion, and enables somewhat of a just

estimate to be made of the embarrassments which surround the prince (Kung) and his associates in their dealings with foreign nations.

Commencing with the Emperor and tracing the authority downward, nothing is seen but irresponsible autocratic power, which must of necessity make the government an absolute despotism; while if you begin at the bottom and go up through several gradations of society and governmental authority, democracy seems to be the principle deeply imbedded in the governmental structure, the popular will exercising a controlling influence over officials - the officers evidently being guided, to a great extent, by the will of the governed. The fact is, however, that it is neither one nor the other, but a strange mixture of both - of despotism and democracy; of absolute authority vested in the emperor to do all things according to his will, while his power is so hedged about by precedent and tradition that little can be effected except in obedience to the popular will.

China is divided into eighteen provinces, each having a separate government, the chief officials of which are the direct appointees of the Emperor. In theory the provincial governments are instituted for the convenience, to assist the imperial government in the exercise

of its jurisdiction and authority over the people, while in fact the provinces are to all intents and purposes independent tributary states in which the authority of the central power is scarcely felt through the provincial officials. The governments of the provinces in their workings appear to be a complete realization of the day-dreams of the more enthusiastic advocates of and believers in "States Rights" in the United States.

.

Those who do not succeed (in the civil service examinations) constitute by common consent a middle class, commonly known as the "literati or gentry". The people of this class occupy a medium position between officials and peasantry. They act as advisers to the lower classes, and their good offices are sought by the governing class in its management of local concerns. By their superior intelligence they are enabled to control most of the property, and yet few acquire such wealth as would enable them to oppress the people, were they so disposed.

This class creates the public opinion of the country, which exercises a controlling influence over the officials, and is usually powerful enough to thwart the intentions and nullify the actions of the officers, from the Emperor down, whenever popular rights are in

danger of being invaded, or the people unduly oppressed. So powerful is the influence of the literati that all officials endeavor to conform their action to the popular will, and in this view the Government of China is essentially democratic in practise . . .

.

In view of these adverse circumstances, instead of finding progress, it is a matter of surprise that the whole social and governmental fabric has not fallen to pieces of its own weight. With such independence on the part of the provinces the wonder is that the central government has been able to maintain any prestige or power. . . .

On June 26, the following Imperial Decree dealt with the Tientsin massacre at length:

Tsunghow has memorialized us concerning a riot among the people at Tien-tsin, and fighting with the religionists requesting that his guilt (in the affair) may be investigated, and local officers be severally examined with severity in reference to their degradation. It seems that some children were kidnapped, and some reckless villains implicated the Roman Catholic establishments in the practise, which led the people of Tien-tsin to suspect evil and incite strife; and further Mr. Fontanier, the French consul, fired his pistol when at the office of Tsunghow, and at the district magistrate of Tien-tsin which had irritated the crowd to such

an extent that they killed Mr. Fontanier and burned the Roman Catholic establishments. Tsunghow is in charge of the commercial affairs, and he therefore is not the one to keep the place quiet; but Chow, the intendant, is responsible for taking the lead, and yet adopted no precautionary measures; nor did the prefect Chang, or the district magistrate, Lin, at Tien-tsin, either of them act right at all in reference to it, whereby this very serious matter has attained such a pass. Their delinquencies admit no palliation.

Let Tsunghow and all the other officers be handed over to the board that their proper punishment may be decided. Let Tsang Kwoh-fan, as soon as he reaches Tien-tsin, investigate the whole thing most thoroughly, and report in a memorial. Let those lawless people who have kidnapped children, and the leaders in this riot, be all seized and dealt with severely according to law. And lastly let him (sic) and Tsunghow jointly search into the causes of the whole affair to the very bottom, and manage it equitably, without the least partiality. Respect this.

It should be noted here that Tsang Kwoh-fan was an ardent Confucianist and at heart opposed to the entry of foreign faiths into China. He had captured Nanking from the Taipings in 1864 and stood high in imperial favor. He was

at this time the highest in rank of the provincial governors-general of the empire and one of the most influential statesmen. His report is for these reasons worthy of study;

As to the charge that they (the Roman Catholics) kill children and mutilate their bodies for the purpose of concocting medicine out of their organs, it may be replied that even wild savages and fierce barbarians refuse to act thus; how much less than the English and the French, those mighty nations beyond the sea? Can it be supposed that they do such cruel and detestable deeds? It stands to reason that there has been nothing of the kind

. . . . The Roman Catholic faith teaches people to do good and his sacred Majesty the Emperor Humaue (Kanhi) long ago permitted missionaries to exercise and teach their faith. The hospitals of the Sisters of Charity are like our foundling hospitals or old men's asylums, having for their chief object to relieve the wretched and help the poor, in doing which they lay out large sums annually. Their name itself is jin-tsz, meaning human and kind, and should be sufficient to disarm the slander which accuses their managers of such horrid cruelties. It will be hard to appease the wrath of the foreigners.

Thus, if Tsang Kwoh-fan might wish for the good of

China that foreign faiths had never entered China he was statesman enough and just enough to flatly contradict any misconceptions however much they might further his own desires in the matter.

In these troublous years and the years which have followed it is something more than individuals which has^{lain} back of the friction in China; it has been the clash of two systems of thought or ideas. The friction engendered against Christianity due to the differences between occidental and oriental concepts is admirably shown in a set of suggested rules for the conduct of the Christian religion in China drawn up by the Chinese themselves and submitted February 13, 1871 by Wan-tsiang and Shin-kwei-fan. Space will hardly permit them to be reproduced in more than substance as follows:⁹

Rule 1, To close all foreign asylums or keep their records open to the public.

Rule 2, That Chinese women not be permitted to enter churches or chapels, or foreign women teach in China.

Rule 3, That missionaries ought to conform to the laws, and to the usages of the empire.

Rule 4, That the laws which govern foreigners and natives living together ought to be calculated to promote mutual peace and bear equally on all.

Rule 5, That whenever a French missionary goes to any province to preach, that his passport should show the province and the prefecture with great explicitness.

Rule 6, That before receiving men into the Church they should inquire into his character, and his purpose in becoming a Christian.

Rule 7, Missionaries in China should conform to her usages and regulations and carefully refrain from encroaching upon the rights of others, or overstepping their own proper functions.

Rule 8, That no Roman Catholic missionary shall of his own motion demand that a place shall be given up because that property was once a church.

There is an appeal to fairness in these proposed rules which might have gone far toward preventing friction in China in the years to come had the foreign nations been so inclined, but that was not the case. Frederick Low, the American minister to China, declared⁹¹⁰ Rule 1 did not apply to American missionaries as they conducted no orphan asylums. Rule 2 he declared unjust and contrary to the freedom of worship as provided for in the treaty. Rule 3 and 4 he declared unnecessary since missionaries had no rights which would entitle them not to conform to the laws, and that the laws were calculated to promote mutual peace. Rule 5 he concurred in. Rule 6 he declared useless, and Rule 7 and 8 contrary to the treaties and should be reported.

^{ii.}
The British declared Rule 1 did not apply to their subjects, since British missionaries had no orphanages in

China. Rule 2 they declared could not be conceded to, but suggests segregation of men and women in churches by means of a screen. Rule 3 and 4 are not concurred in, but they declared it the duty of every British subject to avoid giving offense. Rule 5 applied only to the French. Rule 6 they declared would make Christians a separate class. Rule 7 called for no official comment. Rule 8 did not apply to British missionaries since they had no ecclesiastical property in China. But here we are conscious that both nations were evading the demands rather than assisting in a movement which might have greatly relieved the Chinese Government of many of its embarrassments.

Another source of friction arose over the foreigners disregard for the dead. ^{12.} On May 3 and 4, 1874, trouble arose in the French concession of Shanghai with the Ningpo Guild, when the French proposed to lay off into streets a part of the French concession near the Ningpo Joss-House, which had once been used as a Chinese cemetery for indigent persons. The Ningpo Joss-House was used as a place where the coffins of the natives of Ningpo, who died in Shanghai, are kept until the necessary provision for their removal has been made. When the French started their work the Chinese objected to no avail. Finally a mob formed which set incendiary fires and beat several foreigners including French, Americans and Scotch. They aimed chiefly, however,

at the French. No foreigners were killed but six Chinese were killed outright and one was so severely beaten that he died later. The United States consul, Geo. F. Seward caused a force of Americans to be landed from the two warships in the harbor, who assisted the French troops restore order. From the western viewpoint they were, of course, wholly right, but one feels instinctively that the Chinese may have been no less right from their viewpoint. The American minister in reporting the affair in his despatches makes this comment, "It is only fair to say that the outbreak occurred after the Ningpo Men's Guild had petitioned the French Municipal Council to divert the proposed road so as not to disturb the populous and thickly occupied part of the cemetery."

Ownership and location of the land occupied by the missions was a very frequent cause of trouble during these years. In cases of disputes of this kind one can almost always detect the hand of the gentry behind the disturbance which follows. The first weapon was prejudice against a foreign faith, and it must be constantly kept in mind that it was not against Christianity per se, but the foreign character of Christianity. In practically all the cases the reason given by the Chinese in desiring a removal of the mission property was that the buildings interfered with "fungshui". The mission buildings so objected to usually occupied a high site quite often overlooking the Chinese

city itself while the land offered in exchange would be on lower and consequently usually less desirable ground. The missionaries, although they doubtless knew better, pretended to consider the "fungshui" a pretext for ousting them from their advantageous location. Later when more liberal men as missionaries encountered this question they gave credit to the Chinese contention and thus in many cases was trouble not only avoided, but good feelings between the two parties often ensued. Dr. Martin discussing just such a controversy which arose at Fuchau in Fu-kien, thoroughly explains the Chinese viewpoint:

Within the enclosure rises a hill, covered with trees and rocks, with here and there a small house hidden in the foliage. This is the palladium of the city, an elevation which draws propitious influences from the four winds and pours them down on the people below. The Chinese believe in this sort of geomantic influence as firmly as we do in the lightning rod (written in 1896). They call it "fungshui" (wind and water) from the elements that most frequently form the vehicle for good or evil luck. The notion probably originated in the observance that wind and water have much to do with commercial prosperity. But it has grown into a whole system of superstitious notions as complex as the cabala, and as pernicious as witchcraft. Our treaty contains an allusion to this

potent system of evil in a clause which provides that in the purchase of a site for a building "the local authorities shall not interfere unless there be some objection offered on the part of the inhabitants respecting the peace". Some years later, English missionaries built on that hill, and the populace became so excited lest their presence might disturb its good influences that they arose en masse, and demolished the church, school-house, and dwelling. In Hangchau, a magistrate having died suddenly, his death was believed to have been caused by a mission building on the hillside overlooking the Yamen, or official residence. The missionaries were courteously invited to accept another site in exchange, to which they readily assented. . . Instances of this kind of courtesy are too numerous to recount, but those just mentioned are sufficient to show what danger lies hidden under the name of "fungshui". It is a false science with libraries to expound it and professors to teach it. Nor is any Chinese bold enough to build a house or dig a grave without calling in a professor to decide whether or not the site is auspicious.

On August 5, 1873, the Chinese gentry at Hang-chou desirous not to have the mission buildings located upon a hill, after having unsuccessfully trying to obstruct the sale, appealed to the United States consul at Ningpo by petition

asking that they be allowed to purchase the site and build-
 ings from the American Southern Presbyterian Mission, and
 14.
 provide other suitable sites not on a hill.

such often
 If/ circumstances/ led to hostilities the complaints and
 the violence was directed/ at foreigners and Chinese who had
 become the followers of foreign ways rather than against
 15.
 Christians in these earlier years. In the trial of assault
 upon Rev. H. Corbett, an American missionary, at Chi-mi in
 1874 no evil conduct was charged against the native Christ-
 ians by their countrymen and no excuse was offered for
 cutting down their fruit trees, robbing their houses, or
 assaulting and often wounding them except that they were
 followers of a foreign faith, a thing which they naturally
 considered treasonable to the Chinese race and beliefs.

In a riot occurring at Chefoo on August 30, 1878, both
 anti-foreign and anti-Manchu hostility was manifested in
 the placards posted to incite the populace. One of these
 16.
 read:

The heroic and good men of the empire (Teen heu)
 all to assemble at the grand meeting to be held at
 Wu Shih Shan on the evening of the 14th of the 8th
 moon for the purpose of exterminating all foreign
 thieves residing in the province (Fohkien). They
 cannot be permitted to live (among our people) and
 (we must) recover our Feng Shui land, which they have
 encroached upon.

If the Mandarins (servants of the Manchus) interfere, they will be murdered - the official dogs! On recovering our Feng Shui land, then the state will be prosperous, the people peaceable, the winds moderate, and the rains favorable. Let all the people exert themselves.

You official dogs! you official dogs! Remember that the viceroy of the Kwang-Yang Wei Chen (?Yeh Ming Chen) fell into the clutches of foreign thieves. It was in this way: He was invited by the foreign thieves to an intertainment (led to drink wine on board of one of their vessels) and as soon as he got on board they sailed to the foreigners' country where they disemboweled him, and exhibited his entrails at the seven gates of their city. They are not brave! They are not brave!
- These barbarian thieves! These barbarian thieves!!

These placards were successful in removing the objectionable buildings of the English Church Missionary Society after eighteen months of negotiations had failed. The destruction was carried out under the eyes of the British consul, who had gone out to survey the premises preparatory to trying to effect an exchange of this offending property for more valuable property situated in the foreign settlement.

In 1886 disturbances broke out spasmodically throughout China. Probably the most serious of these occurred at Chungking. Here on July 1, all missionary property was destroyed, as well as the property of a Mr. Bourne, the English consular resident. Mr. Bourne himself had his chair smashed and

might have lost his life had not the hsien (magistrate) thrown his arms around him, and took the blows upon himself. A fine Catholic cathedral, just completed, and extensive foreign residences were given to the flames. Some of these were first looted and then pulled down and carried away piece by piece. The property of the Inland China Mission was destroyed. Foreigners took refuge in the magistrates office building. These disturbances were anti-foreign generally, and although the local officials representing Peking were more prompt than usual to render aid openly to foreigners, the disturbances arose as a Chinese protest against the French war, just closed, and the anti-Chinese attitude which had recently been shown by the American states of the Pacific coast. The guiding hand behind these disturbances was that of the Chinese gentry who were and still are intensely Chinese in feeling.

As an example of the skill used to stir up prejudice by this local scholarly class one scathing pamphlet called, "A Deathblow to Corrupt Doctrines" - A Plain Statement of Facts" purported to be published by the gentry and people, called forth this comment from a missionary journal of the time:

18.
Skillfully written by some of the literati it professes to give the history of the doctrines and practises of Christians, who are held up as monsters of lust and crime. Much of the book is too obscene in its representation to be quoted, intended to dis-

gust all decent people with the very idea of Christianity It treats Romanism as the real religion of Jesus, and Protestantism as only a disguise. It declares priests to be eunuchs, with whom the people practise sodomy, which is called "adding to knowledge". This book accuses worshippers with the wildest licentiousness at the close of services The men are all charged with adultery. The Christians are said to live by commerce and plunder . . . Baptism is declared to be performed in nudity and prostituted to the basest purposes. The eyes and hearts of the dying are cut out to be used in magical arts. Incest is practised, parents are dishonored, children are killed, converts are bribed, the cross is worshipped, and seizure of the whole land is intended.

During these years the diplomats had been busy with their very alert charges, the missionary. The missionaries' quarrels and their protests filled the despatches. But they were engaged in securing converts and the Western World, holding up her righteous skirts was determined upon converting the heathen. The missionary working first along the coast of China had now begun to work inland. The Chinese charged and with cause that their converts were more intent upon securing the protection the "toleration article" in the treaties provided, than any real understanding or desire for the Christian religion. At any rate there was rapidly forming ^{the troublesome nucleus of} a state within a state

in the already disorganized China which was to add greatly to the disturbance in the years to come. With the missionary went rights, and when the missionary had remained for a long enough time within the interior the foreign nations quoted precedent, a law of itself to the Chinese. By this gain of rights Christendom extended still further her standards, but the rights gained were rights gained for the foreigner, and although the other classes might be expected to hold off for awhile, eventually the manufacturer, the merchant and the trader could be certain to make use of these rights.

Meanwhile the diplomats at Peking had begun to fathom the Manchu policy. The tension of the earlier years died down and they were beginning to know that tomorrow would not bring a repudiation of the much abused treaties and a blotting out of Western gains overnight. Where they were ready before to work with the Chinese Government in the settling of puzzling questions in return for not being called for glaring disregard of all diplomatic conventions by the missionaries, they were now ready to assume a new attitude and gradually shape a new policy.

THE SHAPING OF THE LATITUDINARIAN POLICY

With the retirement and subsequent death of Anson Burlingame in Russia while on a mission for the Chinese Government to try to state China's difficult position to the world, the diplomacy at Peking gradually took on new aspects. To a large extent it was still cooperative so far as the Powers were concerned, and in some ways more so, but the diplomats more and more came to leave China out of the councils in which nearly all the Far Eastern questions concerning China were settled up until the Boxer outbreak. Its modus operandi gradually shifted to the policy, unadmitted of course, of making the most of China's weakness, and to seize upon every pretext found in the various treaties as well as ^{to} claim rights far beyond any stipulated in the treaties to force the door of China further and further open.

Ironical as it recurs again and again to the student, the missionary question lay at the bottom of this shift of policy, as it had in the first lay at the bottom of China's earlier difficulties. The Powers having from necessity in the first place found the modus operandi in, his case through what may properly be called the developing of the Latitudinarian Policy in diplomacy, ^{they} later found the means ^{well} fitted to their desires to desert, and moreover, as long as they could justify the new moves, they were gradually coming to embark upon,

with the least reference to the missionary, no matter how remote, they were almost sure of popular support at home. Around 1830 foreign industry gained its first definite foothold in China at the treaty ports, and by 1888 Imperialism showed unmistakable signs of mounting to the saddle by the methods diplomats had learned ~~to learn~~ during the seventies by the process of constant experimentation. When the powers began to consolidate their diplomatic ^{gains} ~~the~~ conservative forces in China became thoroughly awakened, and the opposition came to be more and more united. When one even casually reviews in his mind the sorry events of the nineties, even the fairminded imperialist must admit the just cause for ~~the~~ opposition. Disturbances broke out from time to time as formerly, but gradually they became more and more political. Aroused by the laying out of factory sites, the surveying of railroads, and the foreigner going hither and thither on one pretext or another, the natives manifested their displeasure, and as usual the most accessible foreigner was the missionary and his family. These disturbances were both anti-foreign and anti-Manchu in character for the foreigner finding the Manchu policy, though never worded in so many words, to be not, at least, unfriendly proceeded to make the most of it. By the end of the nineties the Manchus faced another Taiping and the Middle Road policy was no longer possible.

But in 1868, the period marking ^{the beginning of} ~~this~~ gradual shift of policy, all of these things were not known. Had they been

foreseen the Boxer debacle might have easily been avoided by the Powers upon whom the guilt unquestionably rests by reason of their bungling, wholly selfish diplomacy, coupled with religious zealotry. And with the avoidance of the Boxer trouble much of our twisted history about the arch-conservatism of the last phase of the Manchus^{would} have been left unwritten.

By 1868 the missionary was fighting in earnest for his considerable congregation of Chinese converts. He was still continuing into new fields, but with greater and greater strides. His missions were becoming more and more numerous, and he hesitated not at all to insist upon the use of the "Sixth Article". On Jan. 10, 1871, Frederick Low wrote in his dispatch:
1.

The masses must be educated through the labor and influence of the Christian missionaries chiefly, and the officials must be taught by wise, judicious, and energetic action of foreign governments, through their diplomatic representatives at Peking. . . .

I will do the missionaries the justice to say that their mode of reasoning leads them to honestly believe in the morality and humanity of war to accomplish the best results to this people. They believe that "the earth is the Lord's and the fullness thereof"; that they are simply agents in the hands of the Almighty to affect the christianization and regeneration of the

of the heathen; that the more speedily the work progresses the better it is for the Chinese and the world; that force is absolutely necessary to break down the barriers of ignorance, conceit and superstition, and that the use of armies to compel submission is only adding an auxiliary force to reason to accomplish the great work of the Master. The arguments against such a theory are so obvious that it is not necessary to repeat them here.

2.

Mr. Low in his dispatch of January 15, 1873 frankly stated that the treaties honestly construed would not permit the residence of any persons away from the treaty ports.

By 1875 the question was still more acute as the dispatch from Benjamin P. Avery, the American minister at Peking to R.M. Johnson, U.S. consul at Hankow, under date of June 11, 1875 shows:

3.

The difficulty is that our missionaries have advanced their stakes, and cannot be left in the lurch; yet it would be wrong to encourage them to make any new ventures beyond treaty limits in the present unsettled and somewhat threatening aspect of the question. Knowing the policy of their Government, they ought to abstain from forcing on it embarrassments by pursuing a course that would not be tolerated (by the Chinese Government) on the part of the traders for a moment, and it must be remembered that the Government can make no

distinctions, if its attention is ever formally called to the matter by the Chinese. Our position is already compromised by the missionary zeal, and it is certain that sooner or later will ^{the Chinese} make complaints on the subject.

On the same day Avery writing to Hamilton Fish voiced the Latitudinarian Policy with regard to the future construction of treaties:

On two occasions within a few months past I have been asked by consuls for an expression of my views upon questions affecting the rights of missionaries to reside and hold property, to open chapels, schools and hospitals, and to preach the doctrines of Christianity, beyond the limits of treaty-ports. . . . I expressed ^{the} opinion that whatever may be the ultimate decision as to remanding back to treaty limits missionaries who have established premises beyond them, citizens of the United States, wherever they may be in the empire, are entitled to protection against ill-usage so long as they are behaving peaceably and lawfully, and that if they transgress the law, exceed the limits of treaty privileges, or in any way act viciously or offensively, they are to be entitled under ex-territorial provisions of the treaty, to be dealt with only by officials of their own nation.

. . . . I was confronted by the fact that American missionaries, following the example of the French and relying on the immunity accorded to the latter, have pushed their pious operations to many places in the interior, where they generally win their way and secure native protection by prudent and conciliatory conduct; indeed they are apt to be more discreet without treaty limits than within them, and most of the difficulties they have had have arisen at places where the right to dwell and hold property is undisputed.

The Supplementary Treaty of Tientsin says in Article 5.
VII says:

The citizens of the United States may freely establish and maintain schools within the empire of China, at those places where foreigners are by treaty permitted to reside.

6.
The British held at this time that: (1) The British missionary has no rights of residence in China distinct from the right of other British subjects; (2) that the right of British subjects to residence could only be exercised at treaty-ports or in their immediate vicinity.

The first indication of the Manchu policy with regard to missionary establishments came in a special proclamation in the Province of Fuhkien, dated at Foochow, June 30, 1875, which stated:
7.

In reference to foreigners obtaining land in the interior of the Chinese empire, under a special perpetual lease on which to construct chapels, the lease should be handed over by the foreigner concerned to his consul, and by him transmitted to the local authority for inspection, and in order to receive the official seal, and then returned to the foreigner. And they are permitted to rent premises of the people for the use of chapels in all cities, towns and villages as they may choose. Let it be understood that their renting buildings for chapels is, in all respects the same as though the buildings were rented to merchants for shops, or families for places of residence.

When George F. Seward assumed the ministership he endeavored to secure some form of unity and urged restraint of missionaries by the various consuls in the following circular letter dated March 3, 1876:

Sir: Upon assuming the duties of ministership, I find that a majority of the grievances coming to me for representation to the imperial government are those of our citizens who are missionaries. This fact leads me to address to you, in common with our consuls in China generally some remarks as to this class of cases.

It is entirely true that a large part of the business of the legation in the past has been of this kind. At all the ports in China, Shanghai only excepted, the missionary residents coming from America largely outnumber all other citizens of the United States. Probably more than one half of our whole representation in China are messengers of the Christian system. These belong to a class who in pursuit of their work are likely to meet difficulties. They go into the interior to preach and reside, while our merchants confine their work essentially to the ports. Their business is to replace the existing religious system, and in doing so they must necessarily arouse antagonism. With them zeal is a duty, and the conservative^{ness} ^{which} grows up when property is at stake is wanting. In many of our mission establishments the central control is not strong, and each individual, be he discreet or not, is more or less free to work out the bent of his disposition.

.

In making these remarks I recognize fully, first, that the sympathies of the American people wait upon the efforts of the missionary; second, that their efforts tend undoubtedly to the moral and physical advancement of the people among whom they are so generously expended; and, thirdly, that in my observation our missionaries are thoroughly imbued with the American idea that church and state should be separate.

127.

weapons in conducting spiritual
and that the former should rely upon spiritual contests.

The fact remains, however, that missionaries do from time to time get entangled in difficulties. They are assaulted, their converts maltreated, their mission-houses, chapels, dispensaries, and book shops are pillaged and destroyed, or if none of these things happen, they find difficulty in securing houses and lands to carry on their work. In all these cases they appeal to the consuls, and as a last resort to the legations. It will be so, so long as the West is Christian and the East adheres to other systems.

We are all agreed, then, as to the facts, and in regretting the situation, which virtually establishes our political representation as the right arm of the propaganda of the Christian faith. What shall be done to make this condition of things as little awkward as possible?

I may say that the Government of the United States is not likely to forget that the missionary has the rights of an individual, and that while we do not bring the power of the state actively into the advocacy of the Christian system, we cannot consent that that power shall be exercised anywhere against our people, who are its adherents, because of their religion, or that they should be subjected to abuse for this reason.

on. We accord freedom of conviction to all within our borders; and within the bounds of a just discretion, we appeal to all mankind to favor the same principle.

But there is always this just discretion to be observed, whether it be on the part of the state, the officer, or the missionary. The missionary of right views would not readily pardon the officer who should fail to grasp a given case in all its bearings, and should by exercise of undue zeal, or undue caution, jeopardise his work. The liberal Christian desires only that the state shall give the religious element an open opportunity. And so in turn the state and the officer may ask the missionary to have some of the "wisdom of the serpent", to be forbearing and long-suffering, to avoid places which are dangerous, to deal respectfully with cherished beliefs, erroneous though they be, and generally carry on his work with such good management, good feeling and tact, as to arouse the least possible animosity, and draw the Government as little as may be into the arena of discussion and conflict.

The French after 1881, increased, if that be possible, their vigilance and pretensions as protectors of the Catholic faith in China. France was at this date less of a Catholic nation than she had been in previous years, and as the power of the republican party waxed stronger there came a further and further separation of church and state within

France itself. But this state of affairs at home, while it might be expected to, did not have any bearing whatever upon France's traditional policy of protector of Roman Catholicism in China. One had to look elsewhere for the cause. Dr. Martin in his "Cycle of Cathay" gives the following explanation:^{9.}

In 1881 I listened to a course of lectures on the relations of church and state, delivered in the "college de France" by the eloquent Professor Adolphe Francke. One was the relations of the government to Christian missions. Well do I remember the impassioned earnestness with which he denounced the proposal to abolish the concordat and cut the missions adrift. After setting forth the advantages which France derived from her sacred charge, he concluded with the most impressive peroration in which he declared, if France could be made mad enough to abdicate the post of influence and honor Protestant Germany stood ready to take her place as protector of Catholic missions.

It is a mistake, however, to believe France was ever slack in her sacred duty. In 1865 M. Berthemy obtained a convention with China making it unnecessary to refer to local officials prior to the conclusion of the purchase of land. In yielding to his wishes and defining the manner in which missionaries should exercise their rights the Tsung-li Yamen would rightfully have been said to have put to

rest all questions of validity of foreign missionaries hold-land in the interior. But the convention seems never to have become operative, probably because the Chinese statesmen were not fully decided upon the expediency of such a move at that time, and succeeded in convincing France that to carry out the terms of the convention would probably bring on serious trouble. The presence of the Berthemy convention does reveal one thing beyond question - the avowed disposition of the central government toward Christianity and its propagation in China.

But Catholicism was no little power in the land and they did not hesitate to use that power to secure favors. In 1862 they succeeded in getting their converts exempted from the taxes collected for the support of non-Christian festivals, temples, etc. Due to the different terms used to designate the Roman Catholic faith than those of the Protestants, this privilege did not directly accrue to the Protestants. In 1887 James B. Angell, the American minister, approached Prince Kung on the matter under Article XXIX of the treaty of 1858, and Prince Kung very readily assented to the same exemption being extended to Protestant converts, and sent out orders to all provinces to that effect.

10.

When in 1871 the French demanded a revision of their treaty so as to place consuls at any point in the Chinese Empire, either on the sea-coast or in the interior, Mr.

Frederick Low, the American minister wrote Hamilton
11.
Fish in his despatch of Feb. 10, 1871 as follows:

If the exact truth could be ascertained, it would be found, I expect, that the whole idea of the French charge in this scheme is the better protection of French missionaries; and were it possible to obtain the concession asked for, these additional consuls would be, to all intents and purposes, agents of Roman Catholic missionaries. Their official positions and influence would be used to sustain missionary claims and assumptions, some of which have been described in a former despatch.

On March 20, 1871, Mr. Low again takes up the matter
12.
of Sino-French relations:

Had they (the Chinese) stated their complaints in brief . . . they would have charged that the Roman Catholic missionaries, when residing away from the open ports, claim to occupy a semi-official position, which places them on an equality with the provincial officers, that they deny the authority of the Chinese
/ over native Christians (Catholic converts) which practically removes this class from the jurisdiction of their own rulers; that their action in this regard shields the native Christian from the penalties of the law, and thus holds out inducements

for the lawless to join the Catholic church, which is largely taken advantage of; that the orphan asylums are filled with children by the use of improper means, against the will of the people; and when parents, guardians, and friends visit these institutions for the purpose of reclaiming children, their requests for examination and restitution are denied; and lastly, that the French Government, while it does not claim for its missionaries any rights of this nature by virtue of treaty, its agents and representatives wink at these unlawful acts, and secretly uphold the missionaries. . . .

I do not believe, and therefore cannot affirm that all the complaints made against Catholic missionaries are founded in truth, reason, or justice; at the same time I believe there is foundation for some of their charges.

The spirit of local autonomy was undimmed, and if the nations were gradually coming to realize that they were all doing more or less winking where the missionary was concerned, the local districts could be expected to stand firmly in their contentions. Under the cooperative policy with men like Burlingame and Sir Frederick Bruce the Manchu Government could have hoped for some understanding of their difficult position, but under the new policy the Manchu Government clearly sat opposite the Powers across

the council tables at Peking. In such a situation the Middle of the Road policy would naturally become more and more difficult. If the Manchu Government came out openly favorable to the Powers she could not fail to immediately antagonize the local governments making up the state, and who were only exercising powers which they had for centuries held and exercised. Nowhere did this spirit of local autonomy show itself more clearly than in the cases involving the right of missionaries to hold land. Of the democratic character of the Chinese Empire, Dr.

13.

Martin says:

The legal imposts are not oppressive and if a greedy officer ventures to add too much to the burden, the people may petition for his removal, or in extreme cases band together for armed resistance. Resistance on a large scale becomes rebellion, which may lead to revolution. It is not a little singular that the very books that consecrate the rights of kings makes provision for the last remedy. The right of rebellion is taught and enforced by the example of the holy sages who took up arms to deliver the people from tyranny. The monarch rules by the will of Heaven, but Heaven's will is manifested through the people ("Heaven hears through the ears of my people", said the wise Shun). If through his miscon-

duct their hearts are alienated his commission is forfeited and their allegiance may be transferred to another. "rien ming wu chang" (The divine right does not last forever) say the holy books.

In another place Dr. Martin has this to say of the spirit of local independence:
14.

I once saw a procession of country people visit the yamens of the city mandarins . . . Shops were shut and perfect stillness reigned, as, twenty thousand strong, they wended their way through the streets, banners flying, each at the head of a company, and each inscribed with the name of the temple where the company held its meetings. "What is the meaning of this demonstration?" I inquired. "We are going to reduce taxes", was the laconic answer. Petitions had been tried in vain, and now driven to desperation, they were staking everything in last appeal with its alternative - revenge. The mandarins did not stay to hear them; and throwing into heaps the furniture of their oppressors - silken cushions, gauze curtains, carved chairs, and other objects of costly luxury - the rioters applied the torch and consumed the whole as inexorably as the spoils of Jerico.

Similar scenes were enacted at every yamen in the city, and, strange to say, the peaceful inhabitants were not molested save that business was

interrupted for the day. The conflict was with the mandarins only; the rioters were under strict discipline, and still professed loyalty to the supreme government.

The missionary in the interior faced this spirit of local determination, and the question evolved itself largely in accord with the good will or enmity of the inhabitants of the particular locality concerned. Some communities proved hostile, and some friendly. The first necessity of the missionary was to gain and hold the good-will of the community. Treaties could be counted for little in localities where their idea of government and justice rested upon the free use of the popular prerogative. But, moreover, in this period only a limited section of China came under the treaty interpretation. Eventually, as the policy now slowly formulating, had become strong enough for the foreign nations to make demands upon it upon the broad basis of the precedent of the past, serious trouble could be expected. Minister Seward did well to advise the missionaries to be "wise as serpents" at this period.

In 1881 James B. Angell wrote Mr. Elaine in a despatch dated July 25, regarding local opposition to a missionary receiving title to land in the interior:

Sir: I have the honor to submit to you some correspondence between Mr. Vice-consul Carrow and myself concerning the refusal of a district magistrate at Canton to stamp deeds to two lots of land, purchased by the

Rev. E. Z. Simmons for the Southern Baptist Mission.

You will observe ^{by} perusing the vice-consul's despatch (copy enclosed) that the magistrate refuses to stamp the deeds because, as he alleges, first, the foreigners have no right to hold land outside the foreign concession, and secondly, Mr. Simmons has no right to buy for the Society. Now, it is notorious that the missionaries have for years owned and occupied estates outside of the foreign concession. It is also well known that the clause inserted in the twelfth article of the British treaty of Tientsin, 1858, authorizes the purchase of property "in other places" than the open ports, was placed there in special reference to the unreasonable opposition which had been made at Canton to securing convenient places of business and residence.

Here we have the Latitudinarian Policy in action and it is asserted with something almost akin to righteousness. If the controversy raged around native converts the foreign powers used Article X of the American treaty. If residence in the interior was the question they cited article XII of the British treaty, while the missionaries themselves continued to insist upon the "Sixth Clause" of the French treaty. In short their policy meant simply taking the widest and most favorable construction of all the existing treaties plus any extra advantages they might claim, under the head of precedent without any regard for the embarrassment it ^{might} cause the Manchu

Government. It was legality if not justice being used to further the interest of the missionary in China, and paving the way for other demands in the future. More and more the attitude of the powers came to resemble that of the French in the earlier period. Probably the least insistent of all was Great Britain. Eventually in the nineties the United States was to make a decided gesture to assume the protection in China of all Protestants as France had of the Catholics.

The Manchu policy remained outwardly inscrutable. It paid indemnities promptly while it moved hardly at all in placing the blame for outrages. In the majority of cases the local authorities objected to the penetration of the missionary, and their objection served as a decided check. Now and then, however, a friendly section would permit the missionaries to reside and even to buy land. In the last privilege it was necessary for the local magistrate to stamp the deeds. Once that formality was concluded the missionary was fairly secure in his location, and the Manchu Government could with good face at any later date cite to the locality that they had themselves permitted the location of the missionary in the first place, and since they had permitted deeds to be stamped they must now abide by their original action.

Occasionally the district magistrate would attempt by means of a proclamation to do more, and cite treaty obligations as did the District Magistrate of Soochow in 1882 in the following proclamation:

When land is purchased and interferes in no way with the residence of the people

We accordingly issue this proclamation, and hereby instruct the constables of that place (Foochow), together with all the people of every class, to bear in mind that the renting or purchasing of land by foreign missionaries or building of houses in which to preach the doctrines of Christianity is in accordance with treaty stipulations; and henceforth should any rowdies or unprincipled persons take advantage of any cause to create disturbances in that vicinity (The vicinity of the Southern Methodist Mission), the constable is hereby permitted to give notice to the names of such persons to this office that they may be arrested and vigorously dealt with.

Whenever any magistrate risked exercising the tenets of his office in face of the powerful tradition that local sentiment^{is}/to rule in such cases, he greatly strengthened the claim of the Christian missionaries in their pretention to a right to reside and hold title to land in the interior - a question clearly not settled by the treaties of 1858-60. Such tolerance on the part of Chinese officials would come promptly to have the sanction of law. Thus another powerful wedge came into the hands of the treaty powers, which they could be expected to use upon the Manchu Government. This lever might well be used upon the central government at Peking, but it was of doubtful and even dangerous character

when used by the Manchu Government to enforce its will upon its subjects. In scattered localities the district magistrates might perchance "get away with it", but it would be suicide to attempt to generally expect such procedure for in China the power of law rests with the people rather than with any official as we have seen. Such assumptions as the district magistrate made above tended only to alienate the people, and once the people were alienated the Manchu Government became a rider without a horse - a thing which high Manchus instinctively felt, but which the foreign powers, outwardly at least, in their policy continually overlooked. Clearly the Manchu policy of leaving the local officials to stamp the deeds to land held by missionaries was far the more advisable policy than that of dictation from above which the foreign powers came to insist upon in the nineties with unfortunate results.

Of all the American ministers John Russell Young was perhaps the most sympathetic with the missionary view-point. Young would have considered the "Sixth Clause" of the French treaty valid. No minister has more clearly set forth the difficulties of the Christian faith in China than he. In one of his despatches under date of January 20, 1885, he says:

There are practical difficulties in the dissemination of the Christian faith, whether Roman, Greek, or Protestant form, worthy of consideration in looking at political or diplomatic aspects of such questions as this which comes from Canton (The Memorial of the Imperial Commiss-

ioner Pany Yu Lin in 1884). The conversion of a Chinaman means more than is understood in the accepted meaning of that word. The convert has so much to learn, so much to forget. If conversion were merely the acceptance of a new system of theological speculation, the labor of teaching would be simple. There are points of agreement in doctrine and tradition between the existing forms of faith in the West, which make easy the teaching of any special form of Christianity. Even in Islam you see dependence upon Hebrew scriptures. But I have found no vestige of that influence in the religious systems of China, and, more especially, nothing in the manners and customs of the people to make the Mosaic dispensation agreeable. For a Chinaman to accept Christianity involves so complete a surrender of all that belongs to his education, his theory of government and society, his views of nature, his ancestor worship, his domestic relations, and his modes of life, that it is a wonder that a convert is ever made.

So far as I can see the converts come from the humbler classes. I am gradually coming to the opinion that there are few instances where conversion is not associated with the sentiment of self-interest. The missionary does not come simply with a Bible in his hands. He brings other bread than the Bread of Life. He looks after the sick; he takes the maimed and halt into a hospital and nurses

them. He strives to avert pestilence and famine. The children are taken into the schools which practically means shelter, clothing, and food. The pious women at the mission stations have access to the Chinese homes, and gradually establish a practical influence of domestic character in Chinese family life. In a country so populous and so poor with the dread of famine ever present; where the question of mere subsistence for millions is paramount; where food and shelter are chief considerations; where even clothing is ^asecondary matter, a propaganda which offers not only food and shelter, but medicine, counsel and friendly aid, cannot but advance. I see no other way in which advancement is possible. Naturally, however, it is only the poor, the very poor who are converted.

I have made this digression for the purpose of establishing two points. The first is the difficulties attending mission work in China; and that Christianity seeking so radical a change in Chinese life, makes its advance, even in its mildest forms, and aggressive influence. The second is, that the ruling classes have no sympathy with it, and would regard with indifference the spread of the gospel so long as there was no fear that the new faith would be used for political purposes.

The only Chinese statesman within my knowledge who has

shown any interest in the mission work, or desire to aid it, is the viceroy Li (Li Hung Chang). This arose from the fact that a medical member of ^{one of} the missionary boards in Tien-Tsin was enabled at a critical time, when the viceroy's wife was ill, to save her life. This awakened in the mind of Li a sentiment of interest and gratitude. From this has come much good so far as the protection of the missionary interests in the north is concerned.

Young's Christian zeal was admirable from the Western point of view, but his diplomacy reflected more zeal than statesmanship. The Manchu Government's problem he saw not at all. Charles Denby, a man of considerable more diplomatic ability followed Young as minister to China, and in a despatch to T.F. Bayard, the American secretary of State, he has this to say of the "Sixth Clause" and of his predecessor:

The treaties with China which provide for the toleration of the Christian religion, with the Great Powers, Russia, the United States, Great Britian, and France, were concluded in 1858. The Russian and French treaties went farther than the others, in this, that they contained the provisions that missionaries of those countries might travel in the interior on passports.

In the other treaties the missionaries were allowed the same privileges as merchants who were confined

to open ports. In these ports they might purchase land and erect houses.

After the occupation of Peking by the French and English in 1860, a new clause, the celebrated sixth clause, was inserted in the Chinese text of the French treaty. The last sentence is this:

It is in addition permitted French missionaries to rent and purchase land in all the provinces and erect buildings thereon at pleasure.

No such words are contained in the French text. There are no similar words, no language, which by any construction can seem to have been made the basis of the actual translation from French to Chinese.

Our own missionaries have ^{often} cited the clause to me, and Mr. John Russell Young, in 1885, in one of his despatches, cites it as being a sort of a basis for the right to get into the interior. But my predecessors have very generally construed this clause differently. They have held that even if the Chinese text is authoritative it must apply to the rights which existed before it was adopted, thereby restoring to the French the right to return to the localities which they formerly occupied, but conferring no new rights.

The English government distinctly adopted this construction, and declined in any event to avail itself of the right to adopt this clause under the favored nation

clause, even if the right existed.

. . . The third article of the French Treaty of 1858 provides that the French text shall govern in defining the true meaning of the treaty. This rule . . . does away with the alleged Chinese text.

On November 17, 1886, Minister Denby in a despatch to Bayard says:

The foreign powers make no difference in China between the treatment of missionaries, and any other and all other classes. The missionary is simply a citizen, and the sacred character of his object and purposes does not enter into the question of the determination of his rights.

It is impossible for men to shut their eyes to the peculiar employment of their fellows, and as in Christian communities a large amount of sympathy is accorded to those persons who have exiled themselves to do "God's work" and not man's. It is probable that a considerable of the religious and charitable character of the missionary work might form the basis of some solution of the right of the missionary to go into the interior. Practically, these considerations do not enter into the treatment of the missionaries. No manufacturer or merchant would be allowed to settle in Kalgan or other points of the interior where there are missionary stations. If any distinction, therefore, between missionaries and other classes of cit-

izens were possible under the laws of the constitution of the United States the vexed question of residence in the interior might be solved. The first element of such a broad recognition of duties, obligations, and purposes of the missionaries would be the impression on the minds of the Chinese of the fact that there is no purpose in their coming to China save the honest open one of the spread of religious principle and the practise of pure charity. It should be mentioned incidentally that there are twenty-three great hospitals now in operation under the missionaries in China. Neither foreigner or Chinese disputes the patent fact of the great good which they accomplish. But the observer in China must recognize that there is great mistrust of the missionaries. To say, as is usually said, that this mistrust is confined to the literati and the gentry and does not extend to the common people, does not alter the fact. These two classes control all others.

Seward, Young, and Denby represent the new and different type of diplomat who now dealt with Chinese affairs and reported to Washington. They were conscientious, earnest men. They saw clearly the missionary was not to be checked, and although they had lost the close contact with the Tsungli Yamen, they still appreciated to some extent the Manchu Government's view of the problem and refrained from rushing

rough shod over the wishes and the fears of the Manchu Government. But there were new colors in the kleidoscope of events, and new notes might be heard in the medley of sounds. Denby in a despatch dated November 17, 1886 discusses the relation of religion to trade and the role to be played by the diplomats:

It may be asked, what has diplomacy to do with a question which is so largely confined to the spread of religious doctrine. The answer is that the diplomatic agent recognizes that the complete civilization of a people means the increase of trade and commerce with the rest of the world. Any line of conduct which throws open new continents to intercourse with the great producing and creating countries is beneficial to them. Here in China it cannot be denied that the educational labors of the missionaries, the preparation and publication of innumerable books, the introduction of new medicines and inventions in surgery have all tended to improve the natives. Civilization means commerce, trade, a market for manufactured articles.

It is idle to inquire whether war would have produced the same results, or the merchant alone would have done as much. The ardent zeal, the supreme self denial, the utter self sacrifice that characterize the missionaries are not found in the votaries of commerce.

Diplomacy, finding the representatives of various nationalities here, steps in to supplement their (the missionaries) labor. It has its field of education no less patent than theirs. It educates the diplomats of the country. It teaches international law. It insures protection of all honest labor. . . . In some cases . . . it antagonizes baleful commercial enterprise, like the opium traffic. And here again the missionaries by their influence aid the efforts of diplomacy. Diplomacy makes both the merchant and the missionary secure.

In my trip over China I visited every mission school and hospital, and made the acquaintance of every missionary. I am persuaded that their work is being pushed with diligence and intelligence. I demand of them the exercise of prudence and forbearance. I demand that they shall insist on no doubtful rights - that their zeal shall not outrun their discretion.

Here we have expressed very clearly "the white man's burden" theory of the time. Denby was not the type of a man to see the American Government pursue an aimless, even opportunist policy in China. It was apparent very soon that he would force the issue. On September 21, 1886 he wrote Secretary Bayard as follows:

Our treaties with China specifically guaranty to all citizens of the United States in every part of China entire immunity from every species of insult or injury, whether to persons or property. If, as in the Chungking case, the missionaries have settled in the interior with the consent of the local authorities, have bought property, had the deeds stamped by the magistrate, paid the fees for the transfer and the purchase price and erected buildings, the Government of the United States would not allow them to be ejected by violence or otherwise than due process of law.

In connection with the above question often involving the collection of damages it might be stated that because of the dependance of the missionaries in the interior upon local assent it had become the custom in China for damage claims other than those arising in the treaty port areas to be made to local consuls who presented them direct to local authorities. This custom provided the basis for considerable abuse following the Boxer uprising, when missionaries were left practically free to dictate their own terms.

A land dispute in Chi Nan Fu in the year 1887 brought out all of the points in the missionary situation as to the protection to be accorded missionaries. Denby's despatch to Bayard dated Dec. 20, 1887, reads:

The missionaries^{who} have demanded that their lease

should be sealed and protection accorded, should not, after a distinct notification that they could not be permitted to occupy that particular lot, have taken the law into their own hands by entering upon the disputed premises. . . .

The missionaries claim, however, that under the twelfth article of the British treaty of 1858, and the sixth article of the French treaty of October 25, 1860, they, by virtue of the favored nation clause, can settle and lease or buy property anywhere in China.

Diplomatic and consular officers in China are often put at a disadvantage. Their fellow-citizens cannot be abandoned even if not always exactly in the right. Hence there are always questions between the two Governments.

.

The twelfth article of the treaty of 1858 provides that citizens of the United States may, at the open ports "rent houses and places of business or hire sites on which they can themselves build houses or hospitals, churches, and cemeteries."

By gradual encroachment this right has been extended to the interior, and whether its exercise should be acknowledged and enforced or repudiated is the chief question in China, and possibly will remain the leading and most annoying question

From 1860 to 1890 the Department of State at Washington had left the interpretation of treaties to its minister at

Peking. In fact it rarely interfered in any way, and its silence was almost as remarkable as that of the Manchu throne. This silence often irked its servants as much as the uncanny silence of the Manchu Government. This case is one of the few in which the reply from Washington brought more than a mere formal approval in briefest terms. On this occasion Secretary Bayard wrote some ten or a dozen lines and practically formulated the American policy. His despatch reads:

23.

The views expressed by you in relation to this subject meet with the approval of the Department. It cannot be contended that the treaties grant to citizens of the United States an unlimited right to buy or lease land in the interior of China, and it is proper for the legation to inform those who apply to it for information of that fact. On the other hand, if as you say, the missionaries with the consent of the local authorities effect an arrangement, they should be protected.

Thus had the American Government arrived at its ultimate goal, the Latitudinarian Policy. It requires no deep pondering to see the difficulties likely to arise in the future. During the period under consideration there is one element conspicuously lacking and that is any semblance of cooperation of the powers with the Manchu Government. On the other hand the cooperation among themselves at Peking reached such a point of finesse that in most matters they practically

stood as a unified force, and their tone beginning with the nineties reflects their dictatorial attitude. By the time the Boxer trouble came along they were not educating the Chinese in diplomacy they were merely dictating to them. It was this uncalled for and unprecedented dictation following piratical seizures of land which precipitated the Boxer trouble.

During these years the Manchu Government in order to protect itself maintained a deep silence, which less able statesmen than Burlingame could not interpret. Silence was taken for hostility, arch-conservativeness, and unfriendliness. With this view-point in mind the ministers readily assumed that such gains as might be made in China, could only be made secure by a complete westernization in which a crusading Christianity was only the first step. Such an attitude was encouraged by the missionaries, and consequently the Latitudinarian Policy, starting in the ^{late sixties and early} seventies and attaining its end in 1888, when the Manchu policy became clearly defined, was ridden on to ^a less laudable goal in the rank imperialism of the nineties.

BEHIND THE CURTAIN

It seems well to digress somewhat at this point to study some of the available evidences to determine the real attitude of the Manchu Throne toward Christianity and Western influence after the stirring events of 1860. The Middle of the Road Policy inaugurated by Prince Kung, and the reasons for such a policy have been studied in one of the preceding chapters. The question remains was the Manchu Throne friendly or unfriendly to the Western Powers and Westernization during the years following the return of the court from Jehol.

The first thing of great consequence to the Manchu Throne growing out of 1860 was the bitter realization that the Emperor was not sacrosanct even though they did not hesitate for an instant to keep up all the appearances of the sacred character of the puppet successors who were to follow. The fact remained ^{that} for the throne and the high Manchus that the last Son of Heaven had "mounted on high" in the person of Hien Feng in 1861, but it was not well for the populace to ~~realize it~~ or realize it. Therefore the outward ceremonies instead of becoming of less importance were in reality more emphasized than ever. A dynasty which had lost its strength could not afford to lose its strongest hold upon prestige and power. It is pertinent to recall here, also, the peculiar character of the empire as we have seen it where in much of the governing, by precedent, was left to the local officials and the people. Lastly, in considering the difficulties of the missionaries it was found that the conservative, anti-foreign character of China so often attributed to the

Manchu Throne, was a characteristic, instead, of the literati and the gentry, who were in a position to sway the ignorant masses, and by this great power to unseat dynasties, and bring about such holocausts as China experienced in the Taiping rebellion.

The Manchu dynasty in 1860 faced oblivion. It was in fact so close to extinction that it practically ceased to function. It emerged largely as the result of fortunate circumstances/^{rather} than any inherent power within itself. Its emergence was distinctly revolutionary in that it brought to the forefront two of the most astute and able personages in the history of a long series of Manchu statesmen and rulers. These historic characters were none other than the Empress Dowager, Tzu Hsi and Prince Kung. But neither Prince Kung nor the Empress Dowager was blinded to the real circumstances of their rise to power. Prince Kung had gone to Peking armed with authority to treat, and had there bargained like a coolie with a lone piece of "cash". He had, by his ability to make the most of a bad situation, saved the dynasty. Shortly afterward by a clever stroke Tzu Hsi and Tzu An were installed as co-regents upon the Emperor's death, and Prince Kung was rightly the most important personage in the empire. But Prince Kung knew, as did the newly betitled Concubine Yi know, that the Manchus had been saved only by a toss of the coin. They knew that the dynasty had been allowed to live in 1860 by the toleration of the Powers alone; not for any especial love of the Manchus perhaps, but because there was no other alternative upon which the Powers

were as likely to agree. The most likely alternative was the Taiping power at Nanking, but to that alternative the French would likely never have agreed. At that the alternative was by no means remote, and in that case the Manchu court would have drifted on the plains in the north until it had ceased to exist.

When the court returned to Peking it had no little to be thankful to the Powers for and to the end of her life the Empress Tzu Hsi kept in her inner chambers of the imperial palaces many pictures of the English queen, Victoria. That does not mean, however, that they did not recognize at the same time ^{the} less romantic side and the more practical influences which had left the Manchus in control of the country. It does not mean also, that the newly formed Government at Peking threw itself supinely upon the mercy of a group of foreign nations of whose avarice they had reason to know very well.

While the whole view-point of the Throne had in a little over a year undergone a revolutionary change, the vast empire over which they ruled remained much the same as it had for centuries, excepting that great disaffected section under the temporary control of the Taiping Chao. Those accustomed to rule appreciate might, and the Manchus had felt the might of those Powers, as they had previously experienced the ruthlessness of what they had then considered pirate hordes upon their coasts. There was only one way out and the statesman Kung was instinctively awake to it almost from the moment he arrived in Peking to treat with the foreigners. It meant the

drawing a very fine line between the two opposing forces, either one of which might very easily overwhelm the Manchu Government. Like an acrobat walking a tight wire, a little to either side might bring on disaster. In short Kung's very wise solution was the Middle-of-the-Road policy. It was a modus vivendi, and if the female regents were by custom required to speak from behind the curtain, the counterpart of such procedure was very nicely carried over into diplomacy, where China also, by necessity, spoke from behind the curtain. This policy she continued for twenty-five years.

But the question remains, were the Manchus friendly to the aims of Western civilization? The answer should rightly be prefaced by the statement that for a good many years even the highest dignitaries of state were learning, and all they learned was not always flattering to the occident. Much that they learned was as curiously illogical to the oriental mind as was the Concubine Yi's belief strange to the occidental mind when in 1860 she firmly maintained that the Imperial Presence would save the city. But there is a more concrete side to the question. If in the restoration the Manchus had reason to be grateful to the foreigner, they now came to see an avenue to continued power through the foreigner's methods. Although the Throne might adopt western methods only slowly this one argument in the end would outweigh all others.

Secretly friendly to the foreigner in the sixties the Manchus began to learn his methods. The eighties saw the Throne fully converted to the wisdom of western methods through the instrumentality of Li Hung chang. With the nineties the dominating policy of the foreigner tended to alinate the firendly feeling toward himself, but the friendliness toward western methods remained. That the Manchus did not attempt to adopt these methods outright is explained by the delicate situation internally. What did Manchus like Prince

Kung and the Empress Dowager probably both hope to do? That question is the purpose of this chapter. After they had ended the Taiping in 1864, thanks again to the genius of Frederick Ward and "Chinese" Gordon who successfully introduced modern methods of warfare into China and with Chinese soldiery trained in modern warfare crushed rebels against the Manchu Throne. This was Westernization in terms which the Manchus could understand. From that time on a very sure change, even though very slow, was evident. But it was a change as fraught with peril as it was advisable. But because the span of life of one woman was not sufficient in length, and because a rash young emperor in the nineties, to say nothing of the Powers, forced a too rapid change, the result was revolution and downfall in 1911. Arch-conservatism did not cause the downfall of the Chinese Empire in 1911. It was caused by quite a contrary force - that of forced evolution.

What are the signs of friendliness and change on the part of the Manchu Government from 1860 to 1888? In the first place much of the official contact which the Manchu Government had had with the foreign nations throughout the period from 1840 to 1860 had been of an indirect character. After 1860 direct negotiations through the medium of one who was a prince of the blood and stood as one of the pillars of the throne itself did much to dispel ignorance in high places and disarm suspicion. In addition there appeared at Peking after 1860 the various ministers representing the foreign nations, and among the earliest of these were fortunately some characters who compelled the

admiration of the Chinese by their just dealings. Then there came the missionary officials who in their official dealings taught to the practical minded Chinese what creeds could not. This was fortunate, also, in the face of the distorted view the Taiping rebellion had given to high Chinese of Christians. Their presence as officials must have only served to accentuate in their minds the already close relationship of the ideas of religion and state. Confucianism, it is to be remembered, was at best only the arm of the Chinese state with high government officials acting as high priests. Deplorable as we hold the association of church and state in close relationship, the Manchus must have rather expected it so that they possibly viewed the French blusterings without great surprise. For twenty years most of their foreign affairs dealt directly with religious affairs. In both official circles and with the masses the words /Christian and foreigner were practically synonymous, so that which often we viewed as anti-Christian was in reality only anti-foreign. It is doubtful if they viewed the efforts of the Western Powers to protect their missionaries with any great surprise. We have pointed out already that the negotiations at Tientsin in 1858 showed conclusively that they regarded the insistence upon religion as inevitable, and pressed their opposition only so far.

It did so happen that the missionaries outnumbered all others in the empire, and for the obvious reason that they were better fitted for it they were, in the first years of

foreign intercourse at least, ^{the} most numerous in official positions of all foreigners. Especially was this true of American officials. Whether this fact greatly impressed the Chinese is not known; whether it had the least weight in the appointing of W.A.P. Martin to a position of high trust as a Manchu official is not known. Whether the fact that S. Wells Williams was a missionary had anything to do with the great confidence the Chinese came to have in him can never be known. It is known that they were chosen. The missionary official of all was the only one to have some idea of the interior, and he very often, in addition, could read and speak the various dialects. It is quite probable that Chinese confidence came upon the basis of recognized integrity and ability for fair dealing as well as ability. At the same time the presence of missionaries in places of high trust both for their own country and for the Manchu Government itself must have done much to shape the outward Chinese policy, and further the spirit of friendliness and tolerance on the part of the Manchu Government. It remains to the credit of such men as Martin and Williams that they never abused their high trust even though they continued in their high zeal toward the purposes of Christianity.

Another notable figure of a foreigner serving the Manchu Government with a loyalty which gained him the admiration of not only the Manchus, but also of the whole

world was that fair-minded Irishman, Robert Hart, who coming to China in the British civil service remained to serve his own country, China, and the world.

The willingness of the Manchu Government to continue the foreign administration of her customs was the first evidence of a change of attitude and policy. It is not correct to say she was forced to do this for she was not, moreover, she rapidly extended the foreign administration of her customs. The fact that she was hard pressed for money and did it in interest of efficiency is merely begging the question. With the retirement of Lay and the appointment of Hart the way was paved for the developing of those slender ties into great cords of amity and freindship. It gave the Powers a great friend at court who continually tempered his actions with a fine spirit of justice. It may be said of Sir Robert Hart, or Mandarin Hart if you wish, that in so difficult a place he was never compelled to resort to the hypocritical, nor is there any stain of dishonor in the entire history of his great^{work} of modernization. To those who see nothing but arch-conservatism in China up until the time of the ill-fated Hundred Days, it is recalled that Sir Robert Hart with the confidence and consent of the Manchu Government took over and completed projects as momentous and colossal for their time as any of those proposed by the Young Emperor in 1898. The perfection of a great customs service, a geodetic survey with the building of light-houses, and of an efficient postal

1.

system in China must be credited to him. A whole chapter in China's relations to foreign powers might be written around this interesting figure. He was behind every move for progress, yet he worked so quietly that never a ripple appeared on the surface occasioned by the momentous Hart reforms. But the fact remains that had the Manchu Government during these years have been anything but friendly and liberal in its innermost councils there would have been no opening for a Robert Hart in China.

W.A.P. Martin has already been mentioned, but it seems well to go a little more in detail into his relations with the Manchu Government. Dr. Martin was an American missionary, and the same Martin who fired with youthful zeal in the fifties had attempted to reach the Taiping lines. As a missionary who very often was called upon to serve the American Government he was quite naturally self drawn to Peking after 1860, where he not so very long afterwards found himself in the employ of the Government/^{which} he had at one time hoped to see overthrown. He describes his first visit to the Tsungli Yamen in Peking as follows: 2.

In November Mr. Burlingame introduced me to the Tsungli Yamen, with several members of which I had become acquainted during our treaty negotiations in 1858. The Chinese ministers expressed pleasure when I laid on the table my unfinished version of Wheaton (Wheaton's International Law), though they knew little of its contents. "Does it contain the twenty-four

sections?" asked Wensiang, referring to a selection of important passages made for them by Mr. Hart. Being told something of the extent and scope of the work he added, "This will be our guide when we send ministers to foreign countries." The translation, I explained, was not complete, but I intended to finish it without delay. All I asked them was to appoint a competent official to assist me in a final revision, and then print it at public expense. "You will of course give me a decoration for it? I ask no other pay." They paid me in due time with substantial appointments, much better than empty honors, and titles and decorations were not forgotten.

Dr. Martin had come to Peking originally with the idea of establishing a school to train preachers, physicians, and engineers, but the Board of Missions had failed to act. Mr. Hart hearing of it offered him 1500 taels per annum from a government fund, and from this nucleus the idea of the Tung Wen college eventually evolved. Dr. Martin accepted only such sums as he actually used during the first years, and not the full 1500 taels, when he found there would be difficulties in getting students from the good families. On November 26, 1869 he was formally inducted into office as president of Tung Wen college in the presence of several of the ministers of the Tsungli Yamen, and Dr. Williams, who was the United States charge' d'affaires at the time.

The English treaty had provided that English despatch-

es for three years should be accompanied by Chinese translations. After that the Chinese Government was to provide its own corps of translators. The Manchu Government found itself facing two difficulties: 1. general ignorance in international affairs; 2. a lack of scholars who understood foreign languages sufficiently well to supply the new need for translators and interpreters. At this juncture a very significant thing happened. They chose Dr. Martin, a missionary as we have seen, to head the new imperial college, to be known as the Tung Wen college, and in a way a sister institution of the old Imperial University or Hanlin Academy, the stronghold of Chinese conservatism. Anson Burlingame reports the significant move thus:

As long ago as 1862 the Chinese Government established the "Tung-Wan-Kwan", a language school, and invited English, French, and Russian teachers to give instruction in their departments. The pupils selected from the Manchu bannermen, lads not far from fourteen years old, have made respectable progress during the past five years. From those instructed in English by Dr. W.A.P. Martin were selected two to accompany Pin Chun to Europe for the purpose of making inquiries respecting Western improvements.

While this school is to be continued, the Chinese have wisely determined to establish a higher department or college, and to call upon the great scholars to come forward and compete in new fields for the high-

est honors of the Government. To this end Mr. Hart, inspector general of customs, with whom these progressive views originated, was instructed to procure eminent scholars as instructors.

He has done this, and the Chinese have now a body of distinguished savants in their service. Dr. W.A.P. Martin, the translator of "Wheaton's International Law", is the senior professor, and by courtesy the head of the college.

The institution is under the general direction of Sen-Ki-Yu. Sen you will recall as a distinguished member of the foreign office, who received his promotion for his geographical labors for which he had previously (under Hien-Feng) been degraded.

The opening of the new school for foreign learning was not without its difficulties. Its greatest opponent was the conservative Hanlin college. Dr. Martin has this to say of it:
4.

. . . The call for cadets (for Tung Wen) from Hanlin Academy was viewed as an indignity to Chinese learning; and Wojin, the president of the academy, protested ^{so} energetically as to keep them away. Nor did the enmity of Wojin stop here. During a severe drought . . . he instigated one of the censors to denounce the college as the cause of the calamity, and an abomination which must be removed before the clouds would send down their showers.

Prince Kung, who detected the face of Woin behind the mask, induced the emperor to issue a decree censoring him for "nonsensical babbling", and ordering him to establish a college to be conducted on his own principles in competition with the Tungwen. Not only did the old chauvinist decline to challenge, knowing that the native men of whom he boasted, were figures of speech, but he refused a seat in the Tsungli Yamen, which the prince offered him as a means of education, because it would bring him in contact with people whom he never called by any other name than "yang kwetsze" (foreign devils).

The incident is memorable for it shows some of the entrenched opposition which the Manchu Government had to face, and it shows Prince Kung as a powerful influence for wise liberalism.

Dr. Martin was chosen for more weighty ends than merely to head the Tung Wen college. In the course of his duties we find him often consulted upon international law, and his opinions sought by the ministers of Tsungli Yamen. On the other hand knowing his powerful influence with these ministers the foreign officials also often sought to bring him to see their view of the situation in hopes that he would convince the Chinese. This learned man with the candid nature of a child sought honestly to do always that which he thought right, and even minimized in his own estimation the fact that he had any great influence. The fact

remains that Dr. Martin, a missionary, during these early years of foreign intercourse and diplomacy stood much in the position of attorney-general to the Chinese empire, particularly of course in matters relating to foreign affairs. In Dr. Martin the Chinese had found an authority upon international law and a man in whom they could place confidence and trust. Of the cordial friendship of Prince Kung, Dr. Martin says:

5.
Three of the ministers (of the Tsungli Yamen) I had known before coming to Peking. With others, including Prince Kung, I had become very well acquainted through frequent interviews. In his treatment of me Prince Kung was uncommonly gracious, always taking both my hands in his, after the cordial manner of the Tartars, in marked contrast to the frigid salute of the Chinese, which even between intimate friends consists in shaking his own hand at a respectful distance. Impressed by acquaintance with native authors, Chinese scholarship being more rare than it is at present (1896), he conferred on me the title of "Quansi" - a high flown literary appellation, by which I have since been familiarly known among the Chinese.

For the uninitiated a word might be said of the Yamen, and of the Tsungli Yamen in particular. The Yamen is the term applied to the residence of a Chinese official both locally and at the capital. The Tsungli Yamen was virtually the State Department of the Manchu Government, established in

a separate building at Peking in 1861. Originally there were three Chinese ministers attached to the Tsungli Yamen, and more were added from time to time. Under the presidency of Prince Kung the administration of the Tsungli Yamen was noteworthy ^{even} ~~not~~ brilliant. Of the Tsungli Yamen Dr. Martin has the following to say:

Of all things in China nothing is stranger than the way in which this high tribunal (the Tsungli Yamen) recruits its membership. It is as Chenglin, one of the body expressed to me, an expedient for averting external opposition by substituting internal friction. "You know", he said, that the plans of the Tsungli Yamen sometimes goes down before the force of outside antagonism. A clever censor or a powerful viceroy gets the ear of the emperor and forthwith quashes our wisest schemes. In such a case Prince Kung has a way of his own to deal with the difficulty. He memorializes the throne to give his opponent a chair in his council of foreign affairs. The prince knows that once here, he will not be slow to find out that his highness's policy is the only possible way of getting along with foreign nations.

Dr. Martin, as we have noted above, became highly respected and trusted at Peking. To what extent the foreign representatives felt him to be influential he innocently reveals in these few lines wherein he speaks of Sir Thomas Wade for whom he felt a high regard:

At Peking we saw a good deal of each other. He often came to my house to talk over matters in dispute with the Yamen - not to get my views, but put me in possession of his, believing that I would convey them to the Chinese ministers, though he never asked me to do so.

At least one other minister besides the British official followed this scheme, and Dr. Martin's house was often the scene of informal discussions between Chinese and foreign officials.

Dr. Martin's duties were many. In addition to his routine work he translated De Martens' "Guide Diplomatique", Woolsey's "Elements of Diplomatic Law", Bluntschle's "Volkerrecht", and a Manual of laws of war compiled by the European Institute of International Law. In addition as president of the Tung Wen college he wrote a number of text books for the use of Chinese students. Of Chinese backwardness in education he says:

As soon as my hands were free from my first text book of public law I set about the preparation of a text-book on natural philosophy. The need was imperative. The system of education had been for ages confined to belles-lettres, ethics and politics. The highest scholars knew no more why a stone falls to the ground or why water rises in a pump than did

those of Europe before Newton and Toricelli. With them levity is a force as real as gravity; no less than light or heat. They find a ready explanation of all phenomena in the "play of dual forces". "Yin yang kiao kou" is a formula as good to hide ignorance as many a phrase in vogue with us. Their chemistry has not emerged from the chrysalis of alchemy. They count five elements instead of our ancient four - metal being added and wood taking the place of air, which is omitted as too subtle to suit their idea of substance.

Possessing a frankness of heart that seemed to have possessed no guile Dr. Martin with his learning served at the Manchu court as perhaps no other man could have served. Seeing as we do now the perilous condition of the Manchu Throne in its last phase it is not hard to see how this unique figure served so admirably to fit into the Middle of the Road policy which it behooved the Manchus to so carefully maintain. The history of the man and his achievements shows something too of the steady forging ahead of modern ideas in China even in the face of great difficulties. In the early years much of this must be credited to Prince Kung, and most certain it is that it always centered around the Tsungli Yamen. But that it had the support of the Throne through these years can not be doubted for it is notable that this steady march of progress did not cease in 1885 when Prince Kung was compelled to retire from the presidency of the Tsungli Yamen because of the

popular protest against the French aggressions in Annam, which placed the prince and the Tsungli Yamen in a bad light.

The friendly relations of Anson Burlingame and Prince Kung were used as an avenue toward disarming any feeling of enmity which the Manchu Throne might have against the Christian religion, as well as being the means of allaying any fears which might have carried over from the fifties from its relation to the Taiping rebellion. As early as 1862 Burlingame was using his influence to disarm any possible fear the Throne might feel toward Christianity. In a despatch of ^{9.} of August 23, 1862, he has this to say:

I presented a history of the United States in Chinese, by Dr. Bridgeman, to the Prince (Prince Kung). I presented through the Prince to the Emperor, a splendid edition of the Bible at the request of Bishop Bourne, and in behalf of the American Bible Society. It was accompanied by a little history of the book in Chinese by Dr. Williams.

The notable part played in these early years by Dr. Williams has already been touched upon. Dr. Martin has the following to say of him: ^{10.}

Still more distinguished (than Dr. Peter Parker, the medical missionary who had served as U.S. commissioner during the fifties) was the career of Dr. Samuel Wells Williams, missionary, diplomat, sinologue, his life was many sided and in every case he displayed a phenomenal power of systematic industry. Beginning as a printer to the American Board Mission, and entering the dip-

omatic service only when his printing office had been destroyed in a conflagration of the foreign settlement, he closed his life in China by being charge' d'affaires for the ninth time. The government might have honored itself by making him minister. "The fact is", said Secretary Seward, when asked why it had not done so, "we found him indispensable as secretary of the legation! Ministers might come and go, but he remained to pilot, and aid each by his wisdom and experience.

Dr. Williams besides serving as the right hand man for such men as Burlingame, did great service to China and the world by his tireless pen. His most notable works were: a "Syllabic Dictionary" of 1356 pages published in 1874 representing twelve years of ~~work~~ work on his part; a history of China entitled "The Middle Kingdom" first published in 1847 and revised in two volumes in 1881. The first work became of inestimable value in the commercial and diplomatic intercourse of the Powers with China, while the latter was the first comprehensible work upon China in English with the exception of Davis's "Chinese". Other works of the tireless pen ^{of} Dr. Williams were: Early Lessons in Chinese, 1842; Topography of China, 1844; English and Chinese Vocabulary, 1844; Commercial Guide, 1844; Anglo-Chinese Calendar, 1849-56; Tonic Dictionary, 1856. When after forty-three years of service Dr. Williams came to leave China on October 25, 1876, not only the high officials of the city, but three or four members of the foreign office (Tsunqli Yamen) including Prince Kung came to bid him farewell. Of their parting Dr. Williams

said modestly, "I really think they all entertain as genuinely friendly sentiments as I could wish".¹²

Sir Robert Hart, as Inspector General, was responsible for many missionaries' sons being taken into the service of the empire. These applicants in many cases had been born in China and had the advantage of knowing Chinese. "I take pleasure", he once remarked, "in favoring the sons of missionaries."¹³

Not only this but the Manchu Government at heart seems gradually to have come to understand the significance of Christianity and that, troublesome as it was, it could find in its ranks excellent men. Perhaps its contact with such men as Martin and Williams tended to make it more lenient toward foreigners and foreign beliefs, which it had earlier so closely connected with possible dangers to the empire.

The foreign religions were destined to be linked in a peculiar manner with the affairs of state. The advance of Christianity meant Westernization, and the Manchu Throne had long before 1898 become fully cognizant of the necessity of Westernization. Their tolerance during these earlier years was no idle boast of 1899 for effect only. Those who deny they were tolerant merely shut their eyes to the facts. This tolerant attitude had by the nineties become well known to the Chinese, and the Manchu Throne was linked with the foreigner as objects of common hatred. This does not mean the Manchus were Christian. Their one great aim was to continue their overlordship, and their one great necessity was

to seize every straw which would strengthen that hold. Westernization they had long since recognized as expedient, and the one question during these years was how fast to act. Of their tolerance Dr. Martin has left us this observation:

In the school-room when I first entered on duty there was a placard containing the sundry regulations and forbidding the teaching of the Bible. When I was called to the presidency this was removed by the proctors, leaving me free to use my own judgement. Though the nature of the institution precluded the regular teaching of religion I always felt at liberty to speak to the students on the subject, and requested professors not to allow their classes to skip religious lessons in their reading books.

In another place he speaks further upon the same subject as follows:

To the credit of the Chinese ministers be it said that the creed of the student never seemed to make any difference in his official prospects. Mr. Tching, who had a brilliant career in Europe, being more than once charge' d'affaires in Paris, is a Roman Catholic of an old family - a Christian in fact as well as in name. Two or three Mohammedans have obtained good appointments, one having been consul in Japan.

Here again it may be said the Tsungli Yamen led the way

but it could not have consistently been at a great variation with the wishes of the Throne. It may safely be said that for the most part from 1860 to 1898 the Tsungli Yamen did enjoy the favor of the Throne and that lack of confidence was the exception.

It is to be remembered that the crisis of 1860 did not change the outward character of the Manchu Government except to create the Tsungli Yamen and provide for the residence of foreign ministers at Peking. No changes of any moment were attempted in the machinery of government until 1898, and no real changes were made until Tzu Hsi began her reforms around 1901. There was wisdom in this even though it created a constant problem of no small moment. On the one hand one of the conditions of overlordship rested upon a large measure of local rule by the Chinese subjects; on the other hand every treaty made with the foreign powers presupposed a strong central government. In short the Manchu Government continually faced the embarrassment which our own government has on several occasions faced in its career. Even in this there was only one course - the Middle of the Road. The thing which so greatly alarmed Tzu Hsi and the high Manchus generally at Peking in 1898 when the Young Emperor proposed his reforms was the fact that these reforms meant an abrupt turning from the Middle of the Road policy in the very thing we have discussed above, and no one could predict the consequences.

It seems pertinent to here give a brief explanation of

the workings of the Government at Peking. Outwardly the sovereignty rested in the person of the emperor, but always with the right of revolution hanging like a club over his head. The government of the empire was carried on by six boards: the board of civil office; the board of military office; the board of rites (education and religion); the board of justice; the board of public finance; and the board of public works. Dr. Martin thus describes the governmental procedure of the time:^{165.}

Any question coming before the emperor, no matter through what channel, is not likely to be decided without many formalities and much deliberation. In ordinary matters he endorses, "Let the proper board take cognizance" in which its acts is definite. If the endorsement says, "Let the proper board report", a more careful investigation is assured, but the emperor almost uniformly sanctions advice of the board. The cases in which he departs from it are mostly those that relate to rewards or punishments, in which he displays his sovereign prerogative in acts of generosity and mercy. In matters of extreme moment all six boards are sometimes required to consult, aided by several other metropolitan tribunals. The collective judgment of this august parliament is never rejected; the emperor conforms to it as the best means for securing the support of his people. Besides responsibility to Heaven and the people he is taught to feel himself answer-

able at the bar of history, his daily words and acts being noted by official scribes, who dog his footsteps like a shadow.

To those who see in Prince Kung the sole reason for the early liberality on the part of the Manchu Government, however, it is recalled that he was succeeded in his powerful position as advisor to the Throne by Li Hung Chang, who instead of being a conservative was a more decided convert to Western ideas than ever Kung had been, and, also, that he was the one among all Manchu statesmen who had reason to be friendly to Christianity, and was in fact. That the Throne should see a more conservative man pushed into the background and such a convert of Western ideas as Li succeed him would indicate that at this period the Throne might be seriously considering the advantages of a more decided attitude, and events prove that it was.

It may be stated, however, even though Li was probably the most thoroughly converted to Western ideas of all high officials of his time, ^{that} he can not lay claim to the statesmanship with which posterity has clothed him. Where Prince Kung had kept the Manchu ship of state steady by his statesmanship, Li launched it upon a path which nurtured a too liberal young emperor and brought it into the storms of the nineties. Li was avaricious and precipitate in his actions in many cases, but he stood in firm favor with the Empress Dowager. The key to this favor was merely this - there would be no more French Annams, he

would show the Throne the way to prestige and power through the wise adoption of Western ideas. One has only to read his memorials of the eighties to find how often he finds the means of securing a favorable assent to his proposals for developing mines or railways, or what-not by merely judiciously coupling it with the necessary defenses of the empire.

But if Li was favorable to Westernization and championed Christianity there were other great officials in the empire who did not look with so favorable an eye upon the mischievous nature of Christianity. Among these was Tsang Kwohfan who, even though opposed to Christianity upon very feasible grounds, had the breadth to render the impartial decision upon the matter of the Tientsin riot. In 1868 Tsang in a memorial to the Throne upon the approaching period for the revision of the treaties wrote as follows:

In respect to affording facilities for the propagation of religion, I may be allowed to observe that the Roman Catholics began their work by tempting men to join them for mercenary motives; but latterly most foreign missionaries have been poor, and as they could not hold out so many advantages, their doctrines have not been believed. From the day of the Tsin and Han dynasties, the doctrines of Confucius and the sages have been rather obscured, so that Buddhism has got gradually the ascendant; yet Buddhism has been very greatly supplanted in India, its original country, by

Mohammedanism. So, too, Romanism, which arose in the Roman empire, and attained the supremacy; but consequently Protestantism has vigorously opposed it. From these facts it is evidently plain that all these different religions fluctuate, having their rise and fall; while the doctrines of Duke Chou and Confucius suffer no attrition during the lapse of ages, but still suffice to regulate the government of China, correct the manners of its people, and exalt the dignity and the institutions of the land. If, therefore, the adherents of these other doctrines take every method to promulgate them, they will after all get but few supporters and converts. As there are many churches in the districts and prefectures in every province already erected (1868), there can be no want for allowing them to erect any more. Should the foreigners, then, at the coming revision of the treaty (French), persistently press their demands on this head, it will be enough to promise them that, whenever occasion requires, protective orders will be issued in regard to this faith. It will not be necessary to add an additional article, and I think they will not ask further, or urge it.

In face of such strong opposition as Tsang's memorial here reveals, the Manchu Government maintained a policy of toleration toward Christianity, and in the nineties when

the imperial decrees continually called attention to the fact that the Throne had been tolerant, the decrees were although erroneously generally discounted as an illustration of the subtleties of Tzu Hsi. This attitude can only find support in prejudice. Rev. Gilbert Reid of Chi-man-fu in the "Missionary Review of the World", December 1838, has this to say of the favors shown Christianity by the Imperial Government:

Great favor has already been bestowed on the cause of Christianity by the toleration and protection from the Imperial Government. That much of this is due to the mediation of foreign powers is not to be denied; and yet, the Central Government, while resenting much the past treatment of the stronger nations, is in no way inclined to reverse its attitude toward either foreign missionaries or Christianity. Coming down to the lower officials, who have control of the many districts and departments of the eighteen provinces, there is oftentimes a glaring disregard of the imperial orders in regard to Christianity, and this spirit is largely intensified by the antagonism of the local residents. As the number of Christian converts increase we may expect frequent persecutions in certain sections . . .

Another evidence of a friendliness of the Manchu Government toward Christianity and Western culture can be

seen in the fact that missionary schools were tolerated and as the years passed by more and more attended by the Chinese youth. The first educational mission to the United States can be traced back to missionary influence. James S. Dennis in his "Christian Missions and Social Progress" gives the following information bearing upon the matter:^{19.}

Dr. Samuel Brown went out in 1838 to take charge of the work proposed by the "Morrison Educational Society" He first located a school at Macao, and afterwards at Hong Kong. The work was suspended in 1848. Dr. Brown on account of the failure of his wife's health, left China in 1847, bringing with him to America the first Chinese boys to be educated under Christian auspices. This was the beginning of the education of Chinese in America, which twenty-five years later in 1872 under Dr. Yung Wing, a graduate of Yale, resulted in the Chinese Government supporting one hundred twenty young men who were sent to America to be educated.

It must be observed in the case of the sending of the Chinese youth to America in 1872, that circumstances were such that very little ever came of this earliest attempt at a custom which has come to be generally followed in more recent years thanks to the generosity of the United States. In 1872 the move was more an indication of friendliness to Western culture than to Christianity. It was sponsored by Li Hung Chang and Tseng -Kwo-Fan. Tseng remained all of his life an ardent Confucianist, and Li had not in 1872 become friendly to Christianity. Of this mission

Frederick Low, the American minister, wrote to Hamilton
20.
Fish, then secretary of state:

In response the viceroy (Li Hung Chang, governor-general of Pe-chee-lee) said that it was doubtful if the imperial government would be willing to assume control of this matter; if not it would make little difference, for in that case it would be carried into effect by the joint efforts of himself and the viceroy Tseng-Kwo-Fan.

In November 1874, Viceroy Li further inquired whether or not the State Department would admit Chinese to the Military Academy at West Point, and remarked that his country would consider such admission a great favor and a mark of friendship.
21.

Minister Denby in a despatch dated March 19, 1888 sums up excellently the tolerant attitude of the Manchu dynasty. It is important at this time to take special note of this attitude in light of the events which are to follow in the nineties and warp our entire viewpoint with regard to the Manchus.
22.
This interesting despatch reads:

By Rule VIII of the English-Chinese customs tariff agreement of 1858:

"It is agreed that Art. IX of the treaty of Tientsin shall not be interpreted as authorizing British subjects to enter the capital city of Peking for the purposes of trade."

Yet by tolerance of the Chinese Government the Hong-Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation has a branch bank there. There are also two foreign merchants who do a gen-

eral business, buying what they please and selling all conceivable articles. One of them has a hotel for foreigners.

On the religious side we have the noted example that the Emperor last year, in exchange for the grounds of the old Pei Tang - the Catholic Cathedral - gave the Catholics a large and valuable tract of land in the imperial city, close to the prohibited city, to be used for churches, schools, convents, hospitals, and as the residence of the numerous clergy. The Emperor gave them also 400,000 taels

It is notorious that elsewhere in China official assent has been given to the acquisition of land and the erection of hospitals, churches, and residences both by Catholics and Protestants.

.
Leaving the treaties out of consideration what, then, is a fair conclusion from the actual condition in China?

It would seem to be this: The Imperial Government leaves the question of permanent residence to be solved by the local authorities, and the people. If foreigners can procure toleration in any locality, and is suffered without objection to locate therein, he by degrees may acquire vested rights, which his own Government and the Imperial Government, also, are bound to secure for him if attacked. If the foreigner is unable by tact and prudence to conciliate the natives so as to secure a permanent residence, he is not strictly entitled to demand either of his own Government or the Imperial Government insistence on a claim which has no treaty basis.

During these years under review the Government of China had been carried on behind the curtain. This was true in more than one way during the earlier years when the two empresses had reigned, and custom compelled them to sit behind a curtain prompting the child emperor and hearing the reports of state. The Middle-of-the-Road policy had depended largely for its success upon the Government's not committing itself. The years mark a period in later Chinese history which has lacked any definite interpretation, not because it was incapable of interpretation, but because we have permitted the unfortunate events of the nineties completely overshadow and color all that had transpired before.

If the gap between oriental and occidental modes of thought, and our religious prejudices have led us into historical follies, which the broader, more liberal minded missionaries of the time would have condemned, we owe it to ourselves to admit that in the main the Manchu Throne before 1890 had shown itself disposed to tolerance in religious questions; to Westernization generally it appeared friendly. If conditions changed during the nineties it will be due to factors in which the Powers were themselves largely to blame. The Chinese Empire had a problem upon the solution of which its very existence depended, and yet the diplomats of the nineties chose to disregard that problem in the press of their imperialistic designs.

Let us now consider some point of common ground for both missionary and Manchu during the period just discussed above.

COMMON AIMS OF MANCHU AND MISSIONARY

In face of the frequent disputes over title to land and mobs incited by the gentry and the literati with their occasional disasters, the missionary during these years continued his steady march across China from east to west with no hindrances laid in his way by the Manchu Government itself. His work during these years would fill volumes. Dogmatic and narrow he was at times, and trying alike to Chinese and foreign officials, but this work on the whole was in ^{the direction} of progress. It was marked by hospitals, schools, institutions for the blind, retreats for the lepers, and even colleges and universities. Moreover, he endeared himself to various localities throughout the empire by his acts of mercy. In fact he was, in many cases, the only active agency for charitable work. Especially in the work of famine relief is the missionary to be remembered. At times he showed his narrow spirit in this and tried to limit his aid to Christians only and very often lost his life. Famines were, and are still frequent and disastrous. They depopulated whole regions and caused the population to pack itself more and more into a few sections at the mouths of the great rivers, and lacking economic means for again going into the interior they remain there today forming one of the big questions for ^{modern} China to solve.

In a particular disastrous famine in Shan-tung, Chili, Shansi, Shensi, Honan, Szechuen, and Kansu in the years

from 1876 to 1878 missionary effort won world-wide recognition for itself. It was these famine years mentioned above which proved to be one of the great factors in converting the Manchu Throne to the necessity of adequate railroad transportation. With these years is inaugurated the first period of railway building in China. Then there was to come a second powerful reason which Li was always fond of using and that was simply this that the same railroads which moved food could also move troops in case of any threats upon the border.

With regard to inefficient transportation facilities as one of the causes of famines George F. Seward, the American minister, wrote to Evarts, the Secretary of State, in a despatch dated March 14, 1878:^{2.}

It is one of the most pitiable features of this famine that there is an abundance of food in the country, and that it is only the lack of transportation which is the cause of so much misery. The crops have been good in the districts surrounding the stricken region, but as food can be transported only on wagons or pack animals, it cannot be brought in sufficient quantities to save the lives of the people.

Not a few foreign missionaries have gone into the distressed districts provided with greater or less sums of money subscribed by foreigners, and are distributing relief as best they may. Opium and missionaries have been classes by some Chinese as the most unfortunate incidents of foreign intercourse; but the

latter have been of late winning golden opinions, and from this time henceforth will be accorded in North China, at least, a position more in accordance with the real merits of their labors. Looking merely to the political aspects of their presence, I may say that today their withdrawal would be a severe blow to the influence of the foreigners and the prospects of friendly intercourse.

A Peking newspaper estimated the number affected by the famine in 1878 alone as between 9,000,000 and 10,000,000 persons. The calamity was accentuated by a very cold winter in North China with the mercury ranging from three below to seventy above in January. At this period Li Hung Chang had already attained a position of great importance for his progressiveness, and was fast succeeding the more conservative but wiser statesmen Prince Kung in prestige before the Throne. As governor of Chihli, Li reported some 60,000 persons being fed in soup kitchens in his province, and requested the closing of all distilleries in Chihli so as to leave more grain available from imports for the starving populace. This request the Throne granted.^{3.}

The strength of the missionary followings during these years were constantly increasing, but there is every reason to believe the statement by the high Chinese that the motives on the part of the converts were often quite material. The wealthier the foundation the greater their corresponding increase in membership. In 1881 official reports gave to the Catholics the

following strength: 41 bishops; 664 European priests; and 1,092,818 converts. In addition to their schools and missions there were 34 colleges and 34 convents. ^{4(a)} The Protestant strength in 1887 was as follows: 1,040 foreign missionaries and 32,260 communicants, showing a gain of 4,260 for the year. The report showed also that there were 13,777 pupils in Protestant schools. Among the schools of higher learning established during these years the Ningpo Trinity College founded in 1880 and the Peking University established in 1888 should be mentioned.

During these years following 1860 the opium trade, although regulated by commercial treaties, continued to exert a baleful influence. The Manchu Government never ceased to deplore it, but they were hopeless to do anything. That they acquiesced cannot be laid against the Peking Government; while it ^{was} fact that in spite of the fact that the British Government had tried to justify its Opium War on the grounds that it was seeking to regulate trade and thus be in a position to regulate the opium evil, it continued to see hundreds of chests of opium from India pour into China. Dr. Martin ^{5.} has this to say concerning the opium situation:

The conflict that put an end to this cowardly policy, bears the malodorous name of the "opium war"; conveying the impression that it was waged by England for the sole purpose of compelling the Chinese to keep an open market for that product of her Indian poppy fields. Nothing can be more erroneous. Grievances had been accumulating which no self-re-

specting people can endure forever. . . .

Had England, after exacting due reparation (for the opium destroyed) introduced a prohibition clause, there can be no doubt that China might have been freed from that terrible scourge. . . .

In the treaties which followed with France and the United States (1844) the subject was likewise ignored. Had Mr. Cushing at that early date placed the abominable traffic under the ban of the law, and induced France to do likewise, the moral effect would have been excellent. But when Mr. Angell condemned it in his treaty nearly forty years later (1880) it was too late.

With 1860 the traffic may be said to have been legally regulated, but regulation did little to minimize the havoc the product was bringing upon China's population. Acquiescence China did, but she resented the wrong. Opium was one of the curses which she laid to the foreigner. It was one of the things which made the pretensions of the Western faiths to righteousness and justice appear in the oriental's eyes as a paradox and a hoax. Among the high Chinese who bitterly resented the countenancing of the opium trade was Li Hung Chang, the powerful viceroy. In a despatch of October 10, 1882, John Russell Young describes to the Secretary of State, Freulinghausen, an interview with the quick-minded Li:

His excellency said that China was very much indebted to the United States for the moral effect of the article signed by Messrs. Angell, Swift, and Trescot. He

was anxious to have some policy adopted by his Government that would be satisfactory to the English cabinet, and at the same time enable the Chinese authorities to control an evil that was menacing the happiness of the whole people.

I said in reply that the practical difficulty as to the opium trade was the question of India's revenue Imagination made India a rich country. It was poor. There was a large debt. The revenues came from three sources mainly - land, opium, and salt. . . . It was always a problem to balance an Indian budget. The last budget I had seen showed a revenue of about \$342,000,000 and an expenditure of about \$348,000,000. Of this expenditure \$70,000,000 went to England, and was really so much of a drain on India. Opium yielded \$50,000,000. . . .

The viceroy said he had looked to this aspect of the opium question, and recognized the embarrassments of the British Government . China was willing to make any concession that would assist England in India. What made the present situation so painful to China was that the opium vice had been nurtured as a source of revenue and was growing every day. China was compelled to admit opium or run the risk of another war.

In a communication to F.S. Turner, Secretary of the Anglo-Oriental Society for the Suppression of the opium

7.
trade Viceroy Li said:

Opium is a subject in the discussion of which England and China can never meet on common ground. China views the whole question from a moral standpoint; England from a fiscal. England would sustain a source of revenue from India, while China contends for the lives and prosperity of her people. The ruling motive with China is to repress opium by heavy taxation everywhere, whereas with England the manifest object is to make opium cheaper, and thus increase and stimulate the demand in China.

The presence in 1882 of an anti-opium society in England with Earl Shaftsbury as president, with its members including members of Parliament and other leading men, bespoke an activity that was not long to be disregarded by the Government. Missionaries had never ceased to condemn the part their country was playing in keeping China flooded with opium. S. Wells Williams and W.A.P. Martin had bitterly condemned the American plenipotentiary in 1858 when he had, after a consultation with the British minister, caused the article in the American treaty condemning the opium trade to be withdrawn to the great surprise of the Chinese. Public opinion in England had been fired by two things at this particular time: 1. continued condemnation by the missionaries of England's championing of the opium trade; 2. the famous Pethick Report.

Of that ability of the English people to take strong measures to remedy an evil once they fully recognize such an evil we need say nothing. The Pethick report needs some explanation. Pethick was a British subject who had gone to China following the disastrous famines of 1876-78 to advise the Manchu Government in the building of railroads. Pethick saw the evils of opium and utilized his idle time to compile a report brief, and as convincing as it was brief. His report showed the following startling importance of opium in Chinese trade totals:

IMPORTS into China from foreign countries

during the year 1879

1. Opium (from India under monopoly of the British Government)	\$50,700,000
2. Cotton Goods (from England and the United States)	31,400,000
3. Woolen Goods (chiefly from England)	7,000,000
4. Metals (chiefly from England)	5,700,000
5. Matches (chiefly from Europe)	550,000
6. Kerosene Oil (from the United States)	1,000,000
7. Sundries (from all countries)	<u>18,000,000</u>
Total value of all imports	\$114,000,000

EXPORTS from China to foreign countries

during the year 1879

1. Tea	265,000,000 lbs.	\$46,000,000
2. Silk	.	40,000,000
3. Sugar	.	3,000,000
4. Sundries	.	<u>18,000,000</u>
Total value of all exports		\$100,200,000

By this report the whole value of China's foreign trade for the year 1879 was in approximate numbers \$215,000,000. It showed that China's yearly import of opium required in payment more money than either her great silk trade or her tea trade yielded for the year; that only a little less than one half of the total value of her imports was taken up by opium alone; that one fourth of the value of her foreign trade for the year was absorbed by opium.

England during the eighties experienced a mighty wave of revivalism and missionary interest. The Victorian era was at its height, and the idea of the "white man's burden" had taken a great hold upon popular imagination. Imperialism was, as we here see, something more than a cold, calculating, crushing policy in many cases, and though we may lay many evils at its feet, it at least in the eighties had ^{the} semblance of a soul.

It might be mentioned here that in addition to their moral support in a great reform which stood to considerably diminish revenues from India if the opium trade from India to China was checked, the British people gave freely of their men and money to carry on missionary work in all countries. In 1884 her total contribution for the support of missionary societies reached the high total of \$9,414,000 distributed as follows:

Church of England Societies	.	\$3,125,685
Joint Societies of Churchmen and Nonconformists	.	945,105
English and Welsh Nonconformists		2,783,635

Scotch and Irish Presbyterian Societies	•	1,192,430
Roman Catholic Societies	•	<u>1,366,500</u>
Total contributions		\$9,414,355

In these years England sent out to China seven young men of high standing as missionaries known as "The Cambridge Seven", since five of the seven were Cambridge men. The missionary Review for May-June, 1885 contained this paragraph showing the enthusiasm which had taken hold of the people: ^{11.}

There have been held/as farewell services at parting with seven young men going out to the work of the China Inland Mission. Five of these are from the University of Cambridge, and two are from the Army; one of the latter from the Royal Artillery, the other from the 2nd Dragoon Guards. Two of these, in company with Mr. Reginald Radcliffe, took an evangelistic tour over portions of England and Scotland, holding meetings in Liverpool, Aberdeen, Edinburgh, Glasgow, Greenock, Newcastle, Leeds, Rochdale, Manchester, Bristol, and other places.

The Missionary Review for September-October, 1885, contains this stirring extract taken from the speech of B. Broomhall, Secretary of the China Inland Mission, in which he strikes a political chord: ^{12.}

If it were possible to tell this meeting the devastation and ruin caused in China by the use of opium, you would be horrified. We cannot give you any idea of it. It is something inconceivably awful, and in view of the

possible election ere long I feel that the people of England need to have this question before them . . . We have sinned against China in a manner beyond words to describe, . . . we have a fearful responsibility, and we ought never to cease our protest until the Indian Government ceases to manufacture, or encourage the manufacture of opium for sale in China.

About this time the entire question of the Opium War was fought over again in England, and the Rev. Hugh Price Hughes makes this scathing denouncement of it, evidently for political effect:

Nothing more scandalous, in the history of the human race, has ever been achieved than our wicked Opium War in the time of Lord Palmerston, for which, undoubtedly, the whole country was responsible . . . There are some persons who are very fond of describing the Russians as being particularly wicked. I defy any man to mention anything the Russians ever did that may be compared in its enormity with our Opium wars in China. The partition of Poland was not so frightful a crime against God and man . . . It is your duty to hound out of the House of Commons every man who dares support the opium trade and the curse we inflict on the Chinese.

Here, we have popular opinion exerted with a vengeance ^{the force of} which shows missionary influence exerted at home in a powerful manner for the benefit of China; here we have the

beginning of a movement which was some twenty years later to stir an opportunist Government to action. No doubt imperialistic trade has often made use of a crusading faith, in fact has encouraged such a movement with ulterior motives, but in the case of China the missionaries seem to have been very seldom in direct collusion with the traders, if at all. Yet the trader could not help viewing with satisfaction the gains of the missionary. At times the trader found missionaries who were willing to turn to him their proprietary rights.

Shortly, religious opinion took on world-wide disapproval of England's policy in China, as the following resolution passed by the Protestant Missionary conference in London in 1888 shows. This resolution was introduced Rev. J. Hudson Taylor, founder of the China Inland Mission:

That this conference, representing most of the Protestant Missionary Societies of the Christian world, desirous to put on record its sense of the incalculable evils, moral and social, which continue to be wrought in China through the opium trade - a trade which has strongly prejudiced the people of China against all missionary effort; that it deeply deplores the position occupied by Great Britain through its Indian administration in the manufacture of the product, and ⁱⁿ the promotion of the trade, which is one huge ministry of vice; that it recognizes clearly that nothing short of entire suppression of the trade, so far as it is in the power of the Government to suppress it, can meet the claims of the case, and now makes its earnest appeal to the Christians of Great Britain and

Ireland to plead earnestly with God, and give themselves no rest until this great evil is entirely removed; and further, that copies of this resolution be forwarded to the Prime Minister and Secretary of State for India.

There is a third aspect of the non-conservative character of the Manchu regime which is often overlooked. That aspect deals with the attempts made by the Manchus themselves toward reform in China. These attempts, although for the most part unsuccessful, were never given up completely, and are significant in the long chain of evidence combatting the common but erroneous belief that the Manchus were the conservative element in China, and not the Chinese. The Manchu Government issued decrees forbidding infanticide, and establishing foundling asylums. Some of these reforms were pushed even to the danger line of revolt, but with little avail. That the asylums were unclean and comfortless, and the children neglected must be laid to the Chinese more than to the Manchus. More persistent yet were the Manchus efforts to abolish the custom of footbinding. Dennis says:

The custom is entrenched in the social system of China, although it is acknowledged to have no support in Confucianism. The present Manchu dynasty even repudiates it in the royal palace and higher circles of Manchu society do not conform to it. Nevertheless, the effort of Kang He, as former emperor to abolish it by royal proclamation utterly failed, and he was advised by his councillors that any effort to compel its sup-

pression would occasion a wide-spread and dangerous rebellion.

Tzu-Hsi, the great figure of later Chinese history, had unbound feet. This remarkable woman had many characteristics utterly inconsistent with the ultra-conservative character with which we have erroneously clothed her. During the famines of 1876-78 Tzu-Hsi, the Empress of the West, and Tzu-An, the Empress of the East, ^{as a sympathetic gesture} deprived themselves of meat upon their tables, requesting that the sum saved be used to aid famine sufferers. ^{17.} More than that we have already shown that the Throne seconded Li's efforts in the famine districts.

CHINA DEPARTS FROM THE MIDDLE-OF-THE-ROAD POLICY

In the eighties the Latitudinarian Policy of the Powers came into full view. Dangerous as such a policy was to a weak country like China when not yet fully evolved, it might be expected to be doubly dangerous when such a policy came to be openly recognized by the Powers as a basis for action. The policy was doubly menacing, ^{primarily} too, ^{it} in the fact that ^{it} had by the peculiarity of its development the full strength of the missionary support behind it at a time when it was ripe to be used for other and more mercenary motives, secondly, the Manchu Government was now at a place where it was about to depart from its ancient Middle-of-the-Road Policy and under the guidance of Li Hung Chang and take on an unmistakably liberal attitude.

Latitudinarianism was in its very essence opposed to the traditional American policy of guaranteeing ^{the} territorial and political integrity of China, although it took a John Hay to point it out after the results of this dangerous policy of Latitudinarianism had all ^{but} wrecked the Chinese Empire.

The unmistakable turning of the Manchu Government ^{openly} toward modernization came with the crisis over Annam. Prince Kung retired from the Government and Li Hung Chang took his place of prestige and power. It is true Li did not become the president of the Tsungli Yamen, but he enjoyed the confidence of the Throne. His idea was to use modern methods to combat such occurrences as had just threatened in the Annam dispute. Li abandoned the statesmenlike tactics of Prince Kung for the more material

and practical expedient of developing China's latent potentialities of becoming^a/power alongside the other nations with a modern army, navy, transportation^{system}, and all of the reforms associated with such a program. In this Li was thoroughly Chinese in his attitude^{of nationalism if not in his methods}. There was the great stumbling block, of course, that the powerful elements of opposition which he would be compelled to overcome lay in the Chinese masses. It meant that such a program would require time. Li began his program with concessions. On June 9, 1885, he signed the treaty of Tientsin whereby China agreed to recognize the treaties between Annam and France, thus virtually making Annam a protectorate of France. In addition the treaty permitted France and her proteges to trade across the border with a proviso that if China should decide to build any railroads in that section of China bordering upon Annam she would call upon France for personnel. Thus Li began a career inauspicious at least so far as treaty-making was concerned. But out of the maze of railway building, training of troops, a start at the building of ships of war, developing of mines and various other industries Li hoped to see/victory/eventually shaped out of defeat.

Li, to be frank, while an admirable man in many ways, and one whom the occident is pleased to call the foremost Chinese statesman of the time, was never a statesman. He proceeded precipitately and without due regard for the many factors to be considered. He lacked the breadth of Prince Kung. Under his guidance China could be expected to leave

her modus vivendi, the Middle-of-the-Road Policy, and show in the place of quiet consistency, many extremes. More radically inclined toward nationalism per se he ^{was} more decidedly an entrepreneur in state-craft. If Prince Kung typified the period from 1860 to 1888, the historian must understand something of Li Hung Chang's characteristics to understand the alarms, the radical moves forward, and the embarrassing situations and reversals from 1888 to 1898. There may be this said of Li he was thoroughly converted to Western ideas, and he confidently believed that in the adoption of Western methods lay the secret of China's way out. Moreover, Li was known throughout China for his progressive ideas, and support of Li by the Throne was openly avowed support of his ideas.

There was only one road the Manchu Government could safely follow during these years and that was the one so unerringly laid out by Prince Kung. A more radical one would merely try extremes only to be forced in consequence to try quite the opposite extreme in remedy, and the result would be a zig-zag course. The history of the next ten years clearly reflects such swings from one extreme to another. Li could be expected to force modernization before China was ready for it, and thus court disaster at home and abroad. The Powers had reached the point where they could use the Latitudinarian policy for all it was worth. At Peking a young man soon destined to mount the Dragon Throne was just at the age when he was most susceptible to influence, and that influence was decidedly toward change.

As co-ruler with the Empress Dowager from 1885 Kuang-

Hsi had been initiated in his first attempts at wielding the royal scepter. The period at court from 1885 to 1889 was one of open-minded reception of the many new ideas which Li continued to present to the Throne. As ever the great argument to get action was for Li to interweave his scheme with the safety of the dynasty and its continuation. Railroads, mines, flood-control, famine relief, the necessity for defense were kept constantly before the Throne. Thus China under the Manchus took her second and almost disastrous step toward Westernization. Li and the Young Emperor shut their ears to all discordant sounds, but the Old Empress could not be expected to do this for had she not experienced the troubles of the fifties, and had she not been schooled through the years of diplomacy as ^{it had been} carried on by Prince Kung? But more liberal even than he she had replaced him with Li.

In 1888 after a series of edicts she retired from power upon the Young Emperor reaching his majority, leaving him in sole charge of the Manchu overlordship. Every evidence goes to prove that Tzu-Hsi had carefully trained this young candidate for the Throne, whom she herself had named, and that she did in 1888 completely turn the reigns of Government over to him. For ten years she busied herself about other things, and the fiction that she never fully relinquished her authority and jealously watched every move of the Young Emperor has ^{only a very slender} basis in fact. We have continually accused her of rank hypocrisy, but this rests upon the sec-

3.

and hand information of a querrulous old man. This only can be said in refutation of a too-much-made-of argument, that the major issues and contention of the Empress Dowager Tzu-Hsi show a consistence through all of her decrees, which are not characteristic of rank hypocrisy. Few women have ever been placed in a more difficult position than she. A censor who dared intimate in 1888 that she still receive memorials was severely rebuked.^{4.} Clearly it was a new day in China, but it remained to see what the new active attitude of the Manchu Government might bring. Could they safely forget that they were overlords; that internal China had, as yet, changed but little; that caution was the chief requisite of a government so imposed upon a people if it no longer had might?

In a despatch dated February 28, 1889 Mr. Denby reviewed Tzu-Hsi's reign as follows:^{5.}

. . . It may be said, with emphasis that the Empress Regent has been the first of her race to apprehend the problem of the relation of China to the outer world and to make use of this relation so as to strengthen her dynasty and to promote material progress. The imperial maritime customs service which was first inaugurated to provide means to pay damages claimed by foreigners has become under the control of Sir Robert Hart, a great fiscal institution. It has provided in the most complete manner for the lighting of the coast of China, has fostered navigation, and has produced great revenues.

During this reign a fine navy has been created, and

the army has been largely improved. The electric telegraph now covers the land. Arsenals and ship-yards have been located at Foochow, Shanghai, Canton, Taku, and Port Arthur. Western methods of mining have been introduced and two lines of railway have been built. Steamers ply on all the principal rivers. The study of mathematics has been revived and physical sciences have been introduced into the competitive examinations. The treatment of the progress of education, in which our own countrymen have largely figured, would require a separate article

The improvement and progress above briefly sketched are mainly due to the will and the power of the Empress Regent. . . .

Such an active course by the Manchus was in itself enough to stir the Chinese to opposition. But this aggravation was rendered more noxious by the fact that the foreign powers in the eighties were ready for their forward step, and the keynote of this step was to be imperialism accompanied by active aggression. During this decade the first factories were built across the river from Shanghai. In China was to be found virgin fields for the exploitation of labor and raw products. In the years that followed China began to feel the first friction connected with an industrial revolution. With the advent of factories trade could be expected to quicken

throughout China. Since the treaties protected foreigners, and the Latitudinarian Policy had safely stretched these treaties to favor missionaries, the mill-owner and the trader could, as foreigners, demand the same privileges. Moreover, with the influx of their countrymen the missionary attitude somewhat changed. They became more consciously foreigners, and the foreign settlements reflected the spirit of a world apart. Missionaries to a limited extent, at least, openly favored their fellow countrymen who were anxious to push their exploitation into the interior. In some instances they went so far as to turn to the traders and entrepreneurs, the deeds to land which bore the stamp of the local officials.

We may digress here to mention a circumstance, slight in our eyes but of grave concern to the people who had been born into an oriental world with its great mass of phantastic beliefs and prejudices. The Young Emperor, Kuang-Hsu, had no more than taken the reins of government into his own hands in February, 1889, when in the same year an inauspicious thing happened: the Temple of Heaven in Peking was struck by lightning and burned. Such an event was sufficient in China to cause a tremor of fear and distrust to pass through Chinese and Manchu alike, although no outward fear seems to have immediately been manifested. The butt for such fear and distrust would be the Young Emperor. Dr. Martin writes thus of the responsibility of the emperor as the Son of Heaven:

. . . How susceptible the Chinese are to such arguments

(discord of the elements) may be inferred from the fact that the emperor is held responsible for the course of nature as well as for the order of his people. Calamities from whatever cause are charged to his account. Even eclipses of the sun and moon are taken as indicating that there is something wrong in his conduct, or that of his consort.

Moreover, the training of the emperor had, in the past, imbued him with such a belief, but after 1860 there is great reason to believe that the Manchus nearest the throne fully realized that the sacrosanct aspects of the emperor were of no consequence except in the eyes of the populace, but the training doubtless followed the traditional lines. Of this training Dr. Martin ^{7.} says:

. . . Reigning by the will of Heaven, the emperor is of course absolute in theory, but in practise no ruler of any country is less capricious or tyrannical. In the absence of constitutional limitations, this is secured by ^acareful system of education, which aims at three things: first to imbue him with a sense of responsibility to the Sovereign of the universe, and to the spirits of his ancestors; second, to inspire him with a respect for existing institutions; third, to instruct him how to employ the machinery of Government.

Whether the Empress Dowager or the Young Emperor attached any significance to the inauspicious burning of the Temple

of Heaven is not known, but it deserves notice in light of the disastrous decade which followed to be climaxed by an eclipse upon the Chinese New Year, another inauspicious sign, which was followed in the same year by the Hundred Days and coup d'etat of the Empress Dowager. Certain it is that the Throne never discontinued the strict observance of all rites, although the Young Emperor during his ten years of power was known to be rather lax in these as he was in the matter of ceremony. Tzu-Hsi remained a stickler for rites and ceremonies until her death, although she did not hesitate to juggle custom and precedent if the necessity seemed to demand it.

As missionary effort continued to expand, traders in the nineties now penetrated the great river valleys where they had once feared to venture, and ^{had formerly} awaited the Chinese traders to bring their goods down the rivers to the great centers, the cities located at their mouths. The Manchu Government now openly tolerated foreign missionaries. Indeed, the Catholic clergy had long since relegated to themselves a certain official dignity corresponding to their churchly rank even to the extreme of assuming the mandarin's button. The local magistrates reflected to some extent the toleration of the central government as this proclamation by the Fuchau prefect, published in the "Chinese Times" of February 28, 1891, would indicate:

. . . Since the riot at Wuchang his excellency, the viceroy Liang Ku, Chang Chi Tung, has issued ord-

ers to all district magistrates where missionaries reside to issue special proclamations as a protection to those who profess the religion of Jesu or Tien-chu. The people are forbidden to post placards or assemble in crowds to bring about disturbances, or in any way to interfere with the good work of the Christians. Should any disobey this they are to be severely punished; for we want to keep on good terms with those who come here as doers and teachers of good. They are as a rule very orderly and peaceful people; therefore we do not want in any way to injure them. Recently some indecent and libelous placards have been posted against missionaries, and the magistrates desire to apprehend the authors to make an example of them. Let the people take heed of this proclamation for their religion contains all that is good, and their desire is to convert the people from bad to good. Their churches are placed where they go to worship; therefore, all that has been said of them is false. If anyone is caught slandering or libelling (them) in any way he shall be relentlessly punished.

But while Chinese officialdom was bolstering up under the new impetus given public affairs, the Chinese public was far from pacified. In 1891 the discontent broke out in a series of anti-Manchu, anti-foreign riots throughout the Yangtze valley. These riots began with Wuhu as a center and

extended outward. Riots occurred at Vanyang, Nanking, Yangking, Yangchou, Wusueh, Kiukiang, and Tankao. Denby in despatch of May 20, 1891 says of the Wuhu riot:

I have only received telegraphic accounts thereof, but it appears the buildings of the Roman Catholics were burnt, the English consulate was threatened, and some of the foreign customs buildings were injured. Wuhu is situated on the Yangtze in the province of Nganhui, half-way between Chinkiang and Kiukiang. It is a thriving town of 78,000 inhabitants. It is ⁱⁿ the consular district of the consul at Chingkiang. The American Methodist Episcopal church has a mission about a mile and a half below Wuhu on the bank of the river. No harm has befallen this mission, but a telegram sent by the British consul on the 16th instant, stated that the rioters had openly proclaimed that the mission buildings would be destroyed on the 31st instant. Grave fears are entertained in China that a preconcerted plot has been formed for a general uprising against the foreigners at the several ports. There were indications of this scheme several weeks ago at Tien-tsin, when inflammatory placards were posted calling on the populace to rise and destroy foreigners and then march on Peking and dethrone the present dynasty.

In short while the Wuhu riot made use of the same old pretense that orphan children in care of the Sisters of

the Catholic denomination were abused, its real instigators were the secret societies of the Yangtze valley. Their aim was to place a new emperor on the throne. Thus Li Hung chang with his forward ideas had by his open avowal of Western methods definitely liked the Manchus with the foreigner - a thing which the wise old Prince Kung had had the wisdom to avoid. From now on the question was political, and at no time from this date on was China free from the underground seethings of political societies who placed missionaries, foreigners and Manchus as the object of their hatred. If the Viceroy Li could show sufficient military strength behind the arbitrary tone the Manchu Government had assumed the unrest might be stifled and the Manchus emerge triumphant. But in China the military art as a profession is ranked very low in the scale, and military strength is more often a matter of paper muster-rolls of troops who have really received little or no discipline and training.

By Autumn 1891, the discontent had spread throughout the region, and the Government was faced with a serious revolt in a new section. Like the trouble in the Yangtze these disturbances were anti-Christian and anti-Manchu in character. A band of rioters, five hundred in number, on Nov. 17, 1891, belonging to the Tsai-li-ti, burned several houses belonging to the Christians thirty li east of San-che-Kiatsen, and killed all the men, women, and child-

ren . Then the band attacked San-che-Kiatsen and destroyed the village including the orphan asylum, the church, and the residence of the missionaries. Here some three hundred people were killed including a Catholic priest. Yin-men-tsen, Lao-hou-Keon, Chao-ton-tze, Niemen-tze, and Pakeow were sacked and burned. Church centers were especially sought out, and at Petze-chau-ho all orphans were burned alive in the asylum. A missionary was killed and disfigured . In addition to these troubles the news of an insurrection against the Manchu Government in Mongolia reached Peking. Of this Denby wrote on Dec. 4, 1891:

The rebels are said to have designated a young Mongol prince as the new Emperor. The inscriptions on their banners proclaim death to the foreigners and missionaries, and the overthrow of the existing dynasty. . The existing insurrection has tended to unite more closely the foreigners and the rulers of China. While China has not done its full duty in the way of affording protection to foreigners, still there is a better founded hope of securing protection from the Government than from secret societies and armed insurrectionists whose watchwords are the destruction of native Christians and foreigners, as well as the overthrow of the existing dynasty. Besides, in spite of sensational newspaper reports to the contrary, no foreigner here ever thought of advising that war be made on China (as punishment for the outrages).

These outbreaks were more than mere local riots. A second Taiping was possible even probable. In these disturbances antagonism to Christianity was, as in earlier riots merely one aspect of anti-foreign feeling. The flag of the rebels carried an embroidered cock. In all some 1200 Catholics were killed. In the fact that this disturbance aimed particularly at Catholics with its secularized clergy there enters in an evident element of jealousy between the Taoist organization of clergy and that of the Catholics. The fact that these Taoist priests accompanied the rebels and claimed to protect the rebel followers from the bullets of the enemy anticipates the peculiar and mystical rites of the Boxers at a later period and ^{partly} accounts for the presence of such rites in the Boxer program. Lastly we need to take account of the fact that antagonized Taoism lent itself in the general movement of opposition which too liberal and too tolerant a spirit on the part of the Manchus had engendered.

While the Manchus were struggling against insurrection to maintain their new claims to arbitrary power the attitude of the foreign powers needs some consideration. Just at the point in the situation where the foreign nations could have helped the Manchu Government most by a cooperative support, when it was in the midst of its attempt to assert its supremacy, they chose to consider the Manchus' claim to arbitrary power a settled question, settled beyond any doubt, and to make demands accordingly.

The Emperor sensing somewhat the danger his Govern-

ment faced wisely delayed issuing an edict, protecting
 foreigners until June 12, 1891, and then ^{issued it} only when forced to
 do so by the various foreign representatives at Peking.

The foreign representatives now embarked upon a method
 which was one of the prime causes if not the prime cause
 of the Boxer Uprising. They had perfected the Latitudin-
 arian policy to the point that they no longer felt any
 qualms on that score; they made the most of the fact that
 the Manchu Government of the time was decidedly liberal,
 even to the point of being subservient to the Powers. Their
 new departure in diplomacy at Peking, if it can be called
 diplomacy, was merely the expedient of demanding where all
 codes of international courtesy pointed to considerate
 requesting. They now presumed by the clever little system
 of identic notes to force from the Emperor certain edicts
 which they desired. In this adoption of a system of internal
 meddling from ^{outside} ~~the~~ we have a forward step in imperialism
 and one which caused a very great fear to seize upon the
 Manchus themselves, ^{so} that that great reactionary party began
 to take definite form at court. Faced with disaster on both
 sides there were Manchu nobles who now, in the case of a
 show-down, favored a reaction from the too-liberal policy
 to which the Emperor seemed committed. In short the native
 intelligence of the Manchus told them that a Rider is of
 little use without a Horse. On the part of the foreign
 nations public opinion at home, the same sanctimonious op-
 inion which had forced the Latitudinarian Policy now demand-

ed satisfaction of a Government which the diplomats must have known faced disaster. Of the foreign demands Denby in his despatch to Blaine of Aug. 29, 1891 writes:

These explanations not being satisfactory, further representations ^{are made} in the paper sent out, which may be summarized as follows: Guarantees against recurrence of similar outrages must be arranged by the Imperial Government and not by local authorities; the reasons given for the delay in circulating the Imperial edict are not satisfactory; important parts of the edicts have been omitted (from the edict as demanded) in publishing it; there has been negligence in punishing the rioters, and the publishers of defamatory placards; if these riots had been against the Chinese and not against foreigners (the greater number of those killed were, contrarily, Chinese converts) great diligence would have been used in suppressing them. The foreign representatives then repeat the demands that the edict be immediately published all over the Empire; that the rioters be arrested and punished; that official reports be made to the foreign representatives of the doings of the local officials; and that publication thereof be made in the Peking Gazette. The Yamen is informed that no discussion will be permitted as to the conduct of native Christians until sufficient guarantees are furnished of the future protection of foreigners.

The historian has only to try to place such a despatch as given above back into the time of Anson Burlingame and his cooperative policy to see vividly how far the foreign governments had forced the Manchu Government from a position of equality and respect among the various nations. The despatch of Denby's shows how far the ministers at Peking had departed from wise statesmanship, which had marked the ministry of Burlingame in particular. In this despatch we have all the characteristics of the brand of dictatorial diplomacy which brought about a distinct reactionary movement among the high Manchus at Peking. It is true that many of them were never converted to the wisdom of Westernization because many of them had fully adopted the Chinese point of view in the two hundred years of the Manchu overlordship, but more particularly they saw that with the present course of events the Manchus must eventually choose to go with Chinese or foreigner. Either choice probably meant a time of strife and danger for the Manchu hegemony.

For the brand of diplomacy used by the powers there is no justification in international law. Their preemptory tone and their method of action continually sounded as ultimatums without being given that dignity. Most of the demands had no foundation in existing treaty rights, and it could not be said that China was menacing their borders and creating a spirit of anarchy and unrest in

the territories of the nations concerned, an argument which has been advanced to justify the meddling in Poland in the eighteenth century prior to the partitioning. There is only one ground which explains the dictatorial tone assumed by the Powers in the nineties and that is aggressive imperialism.

While the Powers were working together to force subservient Peking to the limit in their demands, they were at the same time jealously watching for the first signal to secure beyond dispute their own particular selfish interests. Their constant tone of dictation could not fail to cause a just sense of resentment to be felt by the Manchus, even by the Throne, while the demands amounted to the rankest of internal meddling. If the subservient Kwang Hsu felt no resentment the proud willed old Empress Dowager did, and it is to her credit that she continued her "hands off" policy with regard to the Young Emperor during the nineties when a stronger and stronger faction at court urged that he be checked in a course, which by all ominous signs seen through the past few years meant nothing less than a revolution in China.

Briefly the policy of the Powers toward China during this period can be said to have the following characteristics: 1. A lack of understanding or appreciation of the Manchu Government's problem; 2. Close cooperation at Peking of all foreign representatives; 3. Continual joint demands upon the Manchu Government; 4. A tone of domination and dictation in all matters which amounted practically to internal meddling; 5. A spirit to take advantage of every

pretext for advancing their own interests; 6. Lastly, an almost slavish attention to the demands of the missionaries.

missionaries like the
The Powers had lost much of their moderation, and with this more open spirit on their part to defy tradition in whatever locality they were located, and to disregard even the central government wherever their Chinese converts were concerned, came on the part of the local Chinese with whom they dealt and lived a spirit of more open hostility. The more aggravated this hostility became, the more nervous the missionaries became. The more nervous the missionaries became the more frequently did they seek the consuls with their fears and woes, and with any clash their fears became mountainous and the ministers at Peking were bombarded with their fears, their complaints, and always that the Throne wasn't doing enough and ^{created} the possibility ^{of} enemies. that the Throne itself was secretly in collusion with their

The result was that the ministers at Peking made new demands upon the Manchu Government, and the knowledge of these demands added new converts to the gradually growing opposition at court, not as yet unified, but most certainly not voiceless. But it is to be marked that this party of opposition did not have the support of the Young Emperor, nor of the Empress Dowager who at this time was in retirement. If she heard them at all she maintained her "hands off" policy, and did as she characteristically did, pigeon-holed them for future reference which was similar to our pocket veto. But the point is this that the breach

was widening each day, and at the very time when the Throne was consciously exerting itself to maintain its friendship with the Powers, when it was beset daily with increasing difficulties which such a course entailed, the Powers instead of acting with due recognition of the difficulty which beset the Throne, actually increased the difficulties by their ill-timed demands, and a failure to cooperate intelligently. Moreover there were other signs that were not lost on the Throne entirely, and they were to the effect that the Powers after the Sino-Japanese war, especially, were expecting and quite openly predicting /the downfall of the Manchu Government, and were casting about for choice locations when the collapse came. But this is somewhat anticipatory.

Emperor Kwang Hsu in response to the urgent requests of the Tsungli Yamen, to whom the foreign ministers addressed their demands, on June 13, 1891, published in the Peking Gazette the first edict of toleration in the history of the last phase of the Manchu overlordship. It reads in part:

The propagation of Christianity by foreigners is provided for by treaty, and imperial decrees have been issued to provincial authorities from time to time to protect missionaries.

. . . Let the governors-general issue without delay orders to the civil and military offices under their respective jurisdiction to cause the arrest of the leaders of the riots and inflict capital punishment as a warning and example to others in the future.

The doctrine of Christianity has for its purpose the teaching of men to do good. Chinese converts are subjects of China and are amenable to local authorities. Peace and quiet should prevail among the Chinese and missionaries.

The local authorities must protect the lives and property of foreign merchants and missionaries and prevent bad characters from doing them injury. . .

Kwang Hsu was a liberal, even radically so. He was a product of the eighties and/of Li Hung Chang, and like Li he did not fully understand the great problem which lay underneath the surface. This problem and its possible dire consequences was fully recognized at all times by Tzu Hsi, Jung Lu, ^{and} Yuan Shih-kai, so that now even the more liberally inclined Chinese like Li, Yu Keng, and even the Young Emperor himself came to regard them as conservative. They were not conservative but formed ^{a party at court of} what we might term moderates, a party entirely in accord with the only policy that of the Middle-of-the-Road. ^{14.} But even the Old Empress had allowed herself to be drawn somewhat from the traditional path to the extent that she had been instrumental in seeing placed on the Throne a youth wholly inspired with the idea that with Western methods rapidly adopted he might rule as a modern monarch, but believing on the other hand that he had ^{need} only of his imperial prerogative in making that change. How far that youth could go the Old Empress had yet to see, and even he at this period must have had

a premonition of the great danger which hung over his house by the shaking heads around him including those of the admirable, but now aged Prince Kung. How great and deep-seated ^{were} /the difficulties/this erratic youth seems never to have fully realized. But the voices of caution were not wholly lost until several years later when the radical/^{South China} clique had gotten him completely in its power, so completely that even Li Hung Chang was not liberal minded enough for him, and some of the things which he not only had forced upon his contemplation, but was led rashly to act upon, violated every tradition of the Confucian code.

But in 1891 matters had not yet reached the crisis, and Kwang Hsu tempered his conduct with the necessity, so many at court told him, for moderation. Speaking of the edict of toleration given above Denby wrote on Aug. 15, 28, 1891:

Had there been no riots it is not probable that he (Kwang Hsu) would ever have issued an edict commanding toleration of Christianity; but as one of the steps toward securing protection to foreigners, the foreign representatives demanded of the Throne an edict which would specifically define the rights, under the treaties, of foreigners and particularly the missionaries, and should enjoin local officials under pains and penalties the duty of protection.

It is to be noted in these despatches how often the word demand is used, and how much assumption is placed

on the power of the central government. The representatives of the Powers must /have known that the steady conflict between the central and local governments still existed, and even if the Throne did demand under pains and penalties that certain orders be carried out it would merely shift the burden onto the imperial officials in the provinces. Here the clash between the central and local governments would take place first hand, and if the imperial official had not the power to carry out his orders by force, if necessary, he would be compelled to temporize or lose face entirely. But in these days it seems that every force was carrying China rapidly on to the crisis. And as the years passed no one felt the strangle-hold tightening about the neck of the Manchu overlordship any more keenly than the Empress Dowager, who, although she was a strong-willed woman and no doubt loved personal power, sought above all things else the continuation of the Manchu dynasty.

Under the Middle-of-the Road policy the imperial officials faced with difficulties in the provinces, could expect some understanding and sympathy from the Peking Government. Now the Peking Government had found itself with a new master, the Powers. The Powers demanded the punishment of the imperial officials in the provinces if they failed to protect missionaries. It was of little importance now if there were no treaties in existence which allowed the missionary to be there - there he was

the chief agent of imperialism, and not far behind him^{219.} were the merchants, the traders, and the entrepreneur. To keep him there they quoted not treaties but preced-ent, and the treaties were^{only} referred to in a remote way for effect. In short the Latitudinarian Policy was fait accompli in all respects.

With this new turn of events the burden of the mal-adjustment was again to fall where it had fallen during the forties and fifties - on the imperial official. The only difference was that in those days they filled the gap between Throne and foreigner, and in these days they were called upon to fill the gap between the Throne subservient to the foreigner on one hand and the local populace on the other. Moreover, he was to carry out his orders from Peking under pains and penalties. Of course even Peking did not know how he was going to do it, but the Manchu Government had been compelled to make its impossible demands. So the unhappy official stood between two alternatives, that of inaction which might result in his personal ruin, or of making the demands, and when they were not followed he in most cases could only fail to follow them up with more rigorous measures, for he had no dependable force with which to do it. In the latter case he would "lose /face" with the people whom he had been sent to govern, besides standing in the danger still of the foreign ministers at Peking demanding his recall and punishment. The result in the long run was this that the Government by assenting to the demands of the Powers tended to alien-

ate and render powerless ^{upon} the tie/which the Manchu dynasty rested the whole weight of its overlordship, ^{This tie} the Chinese mandarins or high Chinese officials, chosen by competitive examinations, and sent by the Manchu Government as imperial officials into the provinces.

But the ministers at Peking continued to get frightened reports from the missionaries in the provinces about a lot of things that were about to happen and some things which did, and so on August 25, 1891, not satisfied with the edict as published on August 12, they made the following joint demand:
16.

The undersigned can therefore only repeat their demands contained in their joint note of the 12th instant, i.e., the issue at once of telegraphic orders to provincial authorities for the immediate publication in extenso of the imperial edict at those places where it has not yet been published or not fully so; the employment of far greater activity and energy on the part of the authorities in the arrest and punishment than has hitherto been shown; the official communication to the foreign legations of the reports received from the provincial and local authorities on the disturbances with the result of subsequent inquiries; and the publication in the Peking Gazette without delay of punishments so far inflicted or to be inflicted upon rioters and officials, with reasons for these punishments precise-

ly as would unquestionably have been done if the case had been one of purely Chinese interest.

Thus the foreign powers presumed that the Manchus Govern-
ment possessed an arbitrary power ^{for} /action which it
did not possess ^{in fact} /They failed to take in consideration
the very nature of the Government itself. Moreover, they
backed the missionary in his demand for all of the pro-
tection for the convert which other Chinese enjoyed, but
none of the pains and penalties. To the world riots occur-
ed in China merely because the Imperial Government permitted
riots against Christians, and there gradually grew up the
rumor that it instigated them. And in this period there
came in that spirit of deep distrust which painted all
past history to suit its ends, and made out of the Boxer
Uprising a veritable conspiracy against all foreigners,
engineered by the Old Empress herself. Of the basis for
this common but fallacious belief we shall see later.

That the ^{foreign} /ministers themselves were losing their per-
spective and, due no doubt to the growing opposition of
various Manchus, and failed to distinguish between the
Manchu Throne and the Chinese people is shown in a des-
patch of Charles Denby dated August 14, 1891:
17.

The time is now appropriate for a definite settle-
ment of the rights of foreigners in China. If it comes
to be understood by the people that rioting may be in-
dulged in without fear of punishment, the residence
of foreigners must cease. It must not be imagined
that the Government of China favors or foments riots.

The Emperor thoroughly understands that these outrages are injurious to his dignity and power, and he is impressed also with the idea that the ring-leaders are looking to the destruction of the Manchu dynasty. Very excellent proclamations have been issued, but, as the inclosure states, there has been little actual repressive or punitive work done.

Somewhat, even Denby felt that the Emperor could stop this danger if he would, and in the same despatch he recognizes that foreigner and Manchu were alike the targets revolutionary movements intended to rid China of both. Denby makes no attempt to logically arrive at any conclusion why China did not act with the promptitude which the Powers were now making a demand. By such a policy of constant demands China must rapidly be divided into two camps - those favorable to the foreigner and Western innovations, and those who desired to return to the old policy of exclusion. When such extremes came to pass the Manchu Throne would stand on perilous ground indeed. Prince Kung was still at court, and the action of the Throne seems to reflect in places some of the old statesman's wisdom; but he was advanced in age and his hour was largely passed. He was called back temporarily to attempt to bring victory out of the certain defeat which awaited China at the hands of the Japanese, a task which he acknowledged as impossible. Before the Boxer fury burst he was in his tomb.

Local officials responded variously to this new turn of affairs. Some cast their lot with the Manchu Government; others turned openly anti-foreign, if not secretly anti-Manchu. Below is a sarcastic and slanderous placard from Hunan for which the unfortunate Chou Han, expectant taotai was cashiered without any show of justice merely because he could not apprehend the guilty parties or feared to:

Let all be informed that I, taotai, Han, Wang, Tao district, have been for years worshipping the "Hog Ancestor Jesus". Since my promotion to this office each of the western powers has paid me a salary of 10,000 taels per year, and various consular bodies have given my wife, concubines, and ^{the} female members of my household 10,000 taels for the expense of their toilets. Although my relations with the great western powers has been most friendly, yet it is due to the intimate relations existing between the different consular bodies and my wife, concubines, and female members of my household that we obtain this. But without the blessing of the "Hog Ancestor" how could we have reached such a prosperous state? There is a report abroad that you wish to injure and take violent measures against the "Hog Ancestor" and give preeminence to the names of Yao, Sung, Yu, Tan, Chow Kong, Wen, Whang, Wu Whang, Confucius and Mencius. This is most foolish and surpassingly so. I therefore hasten to issue this proclama-

ation so that all may know that, if you wish hereafter to become rich and prosperous you must take all your wives, concubines, and female members of your family to church every night and worship the "Hog Ancestor". You should not in the least degree give trouble to the consuls and missionaries, and in particular you should not injure Jesus the Hog Ancestor. If you do not desire to strive for wealth and prosperity and are not willing to enter the church, there will be no one to force you to do so. Now, let no one hereafter, again injure the "Hog Ancestor", and those disobeying this mandate shall be nailed upon the cross to die.

(Signed) Yang (goat) Taotai
 Taotai of Han, Wang, Tao District,
 (Hankow)

On February 11, 1893, the Tsai Taotai, and the Commissioners of the Bureau of Foreign Affairs at Nanking communicated with Consul Jones, the American consul, to the effect that frauds were often perpetrated in the purchase of land, and that to avoid these frauds in which missionaries used their privileges to purchase land and houses and securing stamped deeds turned them to merchants, and other foreigners generally, it would be necessary to lay down the rule that "henceforth when missionaries, or other citizens of the United States desire to acquire lands or houses, no matter where, they must first meet the gentry and elders of the place and agree with them, and then report to the bureau of local officials for an official survey of the ground." Such a course would have been in accord with the intention and the spirit of the treaties of 1858-60, but the Latitudinarian Policy now had the

force of precedent behind it and Minister Denby declared that Article XII of the Treaty of 1858 did not warrant it, and that the step if taken would mean the exclusion, practically of all foreigners since the gentry were the most opposed class.^{21.} That Denby greatly stretched the old treaties of 1858-60 to meet his view-point is evident when one re-reads the treaties. Moreover, if the Powers were going to abide by the treaties the foreigner would have no right in the interior at all. But China was not in a position to argue; she could only request, and if her requests were denied or not heeded at all, she could do nothing about it, except that her people remembered it, even an alert old lady who was building a Summer Palace. In these days China had no chance to demand anything for the Powers kept her too busy trying to comply with theirs, so that the Manchu Government was more than once sadly at loss of face with its own people.

The Latitudinarian Policy so far as America was concerned, now received its sanction from Washington when W. Q. Gresham,^{22.} Secretary of State, laid down this ruling:

The acquisition of land by foreigners outside of treaty ports being a matter of permission and usage fortified by long observance, it is desirable that transactions to that end should, so far as possible, be the same as in localities where the right is stipulated by treaty

Our study of the treaties of 1858-60 has revealed clearly the spirit and purpose of these treaties. They were framed in the light of China's peculiar conditions. On a pretense of using the most favored nation clause, the Powers might well have

rewritten the international usage to read "most favored nation phrase" for in China's case it was merely that and no more. When agreeable to do so they quoted treaties with a great deal of dignity, and when treaties failed to cover the privileges they wished to relegate to themselves, they quoted "usage and long observance". But the Chinese Government was held not only to support their claims arising under the treaties, but claims arising under usage. There remained one formality, and that was to force the recognition of the right of missionaries generally to reside in the interior - a step paramount to the right of all foreigners to go into the interior of China. W.W. Rockhill, Acting Secretary of State, on July 28, 1896, wrote Chas. Denby, Jr., charge d'affaires at Peking as follows:

It can not be expected that the uprisings of irresponsible and ignorant mobs can be definitely prevented in China any more than in any other country, but it is confidentially believed that a formal and categorical recognition on the part of the Chinese Government of residential rights of American citizens in the Empire and their determination to hold responsible and punish local officials upon the occurrence of the riot, must certainly produce far reaching and beneficial effect.

The American charge on September 21, 1896, intimated to the Tsungli Yamen the demands which the United States was about to make upon China for the protection of the rights of American citizens generally within the Empire wherever found.

To this intimation the Tsungli Yamen tartly and with justice replied:
24.

In reply the prince (Prince Ching) and the ministers have the honor to state that in the matter of missionaries preaching the gospel in the interior it is only necessary that both Chinese and foreigners should be commanded to observe the treaties, and thus there will be no cause for trouble.

But the time had passed when China's protests were to be of any avail. Shortly afterwards in a formal draft the United States demanded these things in substance:
25.

1. Recognition by the issuance of a formal declaration in an imperial decree that American missionaries have the right to reside in the interior of China.

2. The declaration in such a decree that American missionaries have the right to buy land in the interior of China; that they have all the privileges of the Berthemy Convention as amended in 1895, and that deeds taken by them shall be in the name of the missionary society or church which buys the land, as the convention provides.

3. The determination of and formal declaration of China by imperial decree to hold responsible and promptly punish not only all individuals or minor officials directly or remotely involved upon the occurrence of any riot whereby peaceable American citizens have been effected in person or property, or injured in their established rights, but also the viceroy or governor of the province in which it has occurred.

4. That the punishment of officials found guilty of negligence in the case of a riot, or connivance with rioters, shall not be simply degradation from or deprivation from office, but they shall be, in addition, rendered forever incapable of holding office, and shall also be punished by death, imprisonment, confiscation of property, banishment, or some other manner under the laws of China in proportion to the enormity of the offense.

5. That imperial decrees embodying the above provisions shall be prominently put up and displayed in every yamen in China.

America had come, thus, in the nineties to a point second to France in her demands upon China. These demands, while made primarily in favor of missionaries, could be expected to be extended speedily to every class of American citizens in China. The great lever by which the initial pressure was applied was in this case, as in every case, the missionary. Any manifest hostility to the missionary would raise a great cry of protest at home, and there is no where in the world where popular opinion is made so much of as in America.

FOREBODINGS OF DISASTER

Beginning with 1896 and lasting until the catastrophe in 1900 with which the whole world is familiar there came a series of events in China coupled with foreign diplomacy at its worst and barefaced aggression which we minimize in our histories, but in which we can readily find the cause of the Boxer outbreak. The blame cannot be heaped upon the heads of the Manchus any more than upon the heads of the Powers. With a friendly Manchu on the Throne at Peking, the Powers showed themselves at their worst; gave cause by their inexcusable acts for a powerful reactionary party to arise at the Manchu court, and finally by their course of continued aggressions and blunderings precipitated the deluge.

This situation was further complicated by the missionary. During this period he appears at his worst. He was too often bigoted, prejudiced, usually out of bounds and ever in a panic. He demanded all the protection which the Manchu Government could give his converts, but he protected them, right or wrong, from the force of the Chinese law. He demanded and received money on claims which can scarcely be justified. He had come apparently to believe that a heathen government had no rights which he was bound to respect. The Manchu Government was at this time particularly an anathema to him. He pretended to see behind it the dark hand of Tzu Hsi, and superimposed above all this Government and this woman were his arch-enemies, so he felt. It was a feeling and no more, and yet the feelings of this period have cast their shadow over all events before and after.

It was in this period when the United States backed by a strong popular feeling at home made a gesture to take her place as the protector of the Protestant faith in China as

France had long held forth as the protector of the Catholic faith. In 1896 the "Vegetarian Society" or the "T'sai Hui" set up a reign of terror and lawlessness in Kutien and Pingnan districts which resulted in the murder of eight British missionaries, three children and a servant, and the wounding of four others including Miss Mabel Hartford, an American. The United States, acting upon the basis of the new demands just made from China, stepped in and proceeded on the basis laid down not only to the extent of making demands in the case of Miss Hartford, but showed a willingness to go to lengths which the British Government was not willing to go. Mr. Olney, the Secretary of State, instructed Charles Denby to "urge immediate and exemplary punishment" of all guilty officials and the payment of not less than \$1,000 to Miss Hartford. This in the face of the fact that it was soon proven that the missionaries had been attacked at their summer camp in the hills where no protection could very readily be given, where they had gone and in direct opposition to the advice of the local officials who had warned them of the danger.

Denby on November 24, 1896, made the demand that eleven officials including viceroys, magistrates, and totais be punished, but reported to his Government that no claims on account of the English sufferers had been presented, and the whole matter of the Kutien outrage had been dropped by the British minister. In the investigation immediately following twenty-six persons had been beheaded. Here it was brought out that the authorities from Nanking had refused the request of the

missionaries to reside in the hills near Nanking during the hot months because of the great danger from hostile bands. The missionaries had hotly protested against the ruling, and the Tsungli Yamen had upheld the local authorities. The upshot had been that the missionaries had gone to the hills anyway. That the government officials could have had any connection with the murder would have practically made them guilty of treason to their own government. Of the Vegetarian Society the North China News, published at Shanghai, gave the following description:^{2,}

The Vegetarian Society with the red banner is a secret society. Its purposes are unknown. Some regard them as rebels, some as robbers. They have given much trouble in the Kucheng district the past year. They have attacked Christians and non-Christians alike, and they hated foreigners because they were foreigners, and not because they were missionaries. They had become so violent that on the 24th of July 300 soldiers were sent up to Foochow to hold them.

The ~~reporter of the~~ British consul, R.W. Mansfield, who was at Kutien during the investigation of the Huashan (or Kutien) massacre is quoted by Denby as stating in his report of September 13, 1895, that the Christians (converts) numbering over 2,000 in the Kutien district had been of great use to the commission in finding out the names of those concerned in the massacre, and that this conduct had created a soreness in the minds of the Chinese authorities, who had endeavored to show that the massacre was a result^{3.}

of the feud between Christian converts and Vegetarians. The consul reported that the Vegetarians were a political society seeking to overthrow the Government, and that unless the society was suppressed attempts at reprisal against the Chinese converts was to be expected. When in 1894 the sect had first made itself known the district magistrate, Wang Yu-Yang feeling his impotency in the face of so powerful a band had concealed from the higher authorities that his power was gone, dreading no doubt, as Mansfield reported, that blame would be attached to himself if the higher authorities were openly appraised of the fact.

If the Chinese Government would act upon the basis of the demands made upon it by the United States in this specific instance then "usage and observance" might be expected to grant the demands the United States had formally presented on November 24, 1896 (see pages 227-228) so after long deliberation the Manchu Government made direct reply to the formal demands under date of February 19, 1897⁴ as follows:

Point No. 1, they declared had already been provided for by treaty, and imperial decrees had already been issued commanding due protection to citizens of the United States under the treaties. On Point 2, they pointed out that while the treaties did not provide for residence in the interior, the American missionaries should be treated in this matter the same as the French missionaries. Point 3 was evaded. Point 4 was denied outright. Point 5 they declared was not necessary in view of the decrees already issued.

The stand taken by the Manchu Government had been just and dignified, and displayed a friendly feeling in face of the growing aggressive attitude of the Powers, and an internal situation in China which threatened in itself to tax to the utmost the feeble powers of the Government following the defeat of the Sino-Japanese War. The Kutien massacre revealed all the inherent weaknesses in the situation. It showed the Manchus gradually alienating themselves from their subject people, while vainly trying to meet the presumptuous demands of the Powers, who had now assumed a menacing tone and a spirit of internal meddling in Chinese internal affairs which constantly grew more pronounced. It revealed the fact that outlying provinces of China were continually more and more often in the grasp of outlaw bands, who were openly hostile to foreigner and Manchu alike, and who took the law into their own hands. It revealed what mischief could be expected by the Powers forcing the central government to hold its provincial officials to strict accounting under pains and penalties including attainder, if any harm befell foreigners especially missionaries. It showed also the difficulty local officials could be expected to have in trying to restrain in any way these same missionaries, who had not hesitated to disregard the local officials at Nanking after the local officials had been upheld by the Tsungli Yamen. It revealed that even under such circumstances as those at Kutien the Powers, in this case the United States, was ready to demand sweeping pun-

ishments. Lastly it revealed a real basis for an ever widening enmity between Chinese converts and native or ordinary Chinese. Riots, trials and punishments became more and more common.

The position of the magistrate was particularly pathetic. How could he cope with his handful of men with a situation which was daily becoming more and more acute, and where armed bands outnumbering his own many times over were the aggressors? But the Powers would not take "No" for an answer and Peking dared not gainsay them, and the local magistrate stood in a position all but untenable, he, the connecting link for centuries between Manchu overlords and the Chinese people!

In the Kutien affair the United States subsequently followed the good sense shown by the British Government and dropped the specific demands, but their spirit was far from willing even in that case and boded more arbitrary demands in the future for it was a thing which would be hard to explain at home.

In 1897 the United States had also taken another step in the line of the flowering Latitudinarian Policy and in accord with the imperialistic march of the times. This step was merely the one forecast by her formal demands for full protection of missionaries - similar rights for other citizens. American business desired to engage in business in the restricted parts of Soochow. Minister Denby upheld this particular right on the strength of Article VI, subclause 1, of the original Shimoneski Treaty, and Article IV of the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, which he claimed as not repugnant.

Missionary claims deserve attention as reflecting the

spirit of the times. In 1896 as a result of disturbances in Szechuan in May and July, 1895, three claims totalling \$16,180 were filed by the American Baptist Missionary Union on the grounds that the parties mentioned were compelled by riotous proceedings in Szechuan to leave their homes and go elsewhere to secure personal safety for which they were put to great expense. Some of these claims deserve study: ^{6.}

Su-chau-fu (Sui-fu)

Dr. C.H. Finch, wife and family:

Enforced travelling expenses to Shanghai	\$1,350.00	
Six months house rent and extra incidental expenses	500.00	
Six months lost time, salary \$125 per mo.	750.00	\$2,600.00

Robert Wellwood, wife and family:

Same as the French family		2,600.00
---------------------------	--	----------

Miss G.B. Forbes:

Enforced travelling expenses to Shanghai and return	175.00	
Six months house rent and extra incidentals	200.00	
Four months lost time, salary \$62.50	250.00	625.00

Geo. Warner and wife:

Enforced travelling expenses to Shanghai	350.00	
Six months rent and incidental expenses	270.00	
Six months lost time, salary \$75	450.00	
Six months rent on two houses at Suifu	85.00	1,155.00

Grand Total for Suifu		\$6,205.00
(losses on property not yet estimated)		

Kia-Ting Fu

C.F. Viking, wife and family:

Enforced travelling expenses to Shanghai and return	.	.	\$400.00	
Six months rent and extra incidental expenses	.	.	225.00	
Six months lost time, salary \$100			600.00	\$1,225.00

W.P. Beaman:

Enforced travelling expenses to Shanghai and return	.	.	400.00	
Six months rent and incidental expenses			225.00	
Six months lost time, salary \$75			450.00	1,075.00

C.A. Salquist:

Enforced travelling expenses to Shanghai and return	.	.	200.00	
Six months rent and incidental expenses			450.00	
Six months rent on houses destroyed at Kiuting Fu			250.00	875.00
Loss on property at Kia-ting Fu (estimated)			1,000.00	1,875.00
Grand Total for Kai-ting Fu				4,450.00

Ya-chou-Fu

G.W. Hill, wife and family:

Enforced travelling expenses to Shanghai and return	.	.	450.00	
Six months rent and extra incidental expenses	.	.	500.00	
Six months lost time, salary \$100			600.00	1,550.00

F.J. Bradshaw:

Enforced travelling expenses to Shanghai and return	.	.	225.00	
Six months rent and extra incidental expenses	.	.	225.00	
Six months salary, \$62.50	.	.	375.00	825.00

W.M. Upcraft:

Enforced travelling expenses to Chungking and return	\$100.00	
Six months rent and incidental expenses	225.00	
Six months lost time, salary \$75	450.00	\$775.00

H.J. Apenshaw:

Enforced travelling expenses to Chungking and return	100.00	
Six months rent and incidental expenses	225.00	
Six months lost time, salary \$75	450.00	
Two passages to America	700.00	1,475.00
Grand Total for Ya-chou-Fu		5,255.00
GRAND TOTAL		\$16,180.00

This is the first case of consequential or remote damages being asked of the Manchu Government. Again the missionaries felt justified as individuals, and doubtless were, but they did not stop to consider that they were asking damages of even a remote nature from a Government in whose territory there were no specific treaty rights guaranteeing any rights to them whatever. Such claims of course had powerful missionary feeling at home to back it up. Denby presented the claim as a general claim rather than by specific items, and on May 9, 1896, he reports \$16,180 having been paid Consul-General Jernigan (such indemnities by custom were always handled as local matters) Richard Olney, Secretary of State, passed upon these as "proper items" at Washington. 7.

On November 18, 1896, W.W. Simpson, a missionary residing at Tao Cheo, Kansuh, on the borders of Thibet, inquired of

Charles Denby whether treaty provisions would prevent him from engaging in agriculture, stock-raising, or trading in order to support himself while laboring as a missionary.

Simpson request

Denby referred to the ^{8.} in his despatch to Secretary

Olney of February 3, 1897, and declared that while the treaties said nothing about the right of foreigners to carry on any regular employment in the interior, it was in practise a common thing for missionaries all over China to engage in many species of employments, which were considered as adjuncts to their religious and charitable work. They had book-binderies, industrial schools, workshops, stores, dispensaries, he declared. They were doctors, colporteurs, newspaper correspondents, and one in Peking lodged and boarded strangers. In Peking, also, furniture was manufactured and sold by missionaries. This the Chinese Government had tolerated. The point is important only in the working out of a policy. In short the line between missionary callings and other callings tended to become less and less distinct. W.W. Rockhill, Acting Secretary of State, replying to Denby's query in behalf of the Thibetan missionary ruled:

. . . the case arising that the residential privilege embraces all normal uses to which the ground and its belongings can be applied. Residence upon a tract of agricultural land presupposes the devotion of the soil to its natural use. The permitted purchase of such land carries with it the right to till it for the owner's support and advantage.

Once more tolerance on the part of the Manchu Government had come to have the force of law, and the United States prepared to rule on the question in that light. It is remembered that by the wording of the treaties in 1858 there was no distinction made between missionary and foreigner. It had prepared in the first to back the missionary in the broadest of his contentions, and it can not be said truly that the United States had any mercenary intention, but it so evolved that what the missionary gained, citizens in other more gainful pursuits could be expected to claim. In fact the imperialism of the nineties had much of opportunism in it.

When Li Hung Chang had been forced to sign the disastrous treaty following the Sino-Japanese War, Li and his pro-Westernism stood discredited largely throughout China. Had Li been able to evade that conflict he might have retained a sufficient show of force to carry through to a successful close the claim to arbitrary power which the Throne was then making. But when China had allowed herself to be drawn into the conflict and failed so disastrously it was but a signal to those opposing forces, which we must consider from the very nature of things, her enemies, that the end was near. For the turbulent, restless elements within her population it was an invitation to revolt; to the foreign Powers it was a signal to begin laying out the spoils. Its effect was felt in other ways. For one thing it stopped railway construction by China herself, and the contracts to be let paved the way for avarice, greed, and continual friction between railway construction parties and natives. The circumstances of the treaty with Japan gave

Russia, France, and Germany the opportunity to step in, and under great pretention as to their friendship for China, wrest from Japan that which they desired for themselves while leaving China understand herself obligated to them for their services. As if with a preconcerted signal the struggle for concessions began, which was to lead eventually to the staking off of their respective inheritances when their benefactress should have expired.

It must not be thought, however, that the occasion of the Japanese War suddenly opened to the Western Powers the tempting vista of new and rich industrial and commercial fields, although it did sweep away almost at one great swoop nearly every obstacle which had hitherto stood in their way. But a steady and forward march of industrialization had begun during the eighties on the rise to power of Li Hung Chang, and only the great strength which China was supposed to have had held aggressions to the field of diplomacy, where a friendly Young Emperor might be made the most of.

Now the restraints were suddenly no more. About this time there was added to commercial and industrial plums to be gathered, a third and powerful factor inviting active aggression. It was the decade of imperialism when coal and iron were being recognized as the sinews of national power. China had been opened sufficiently for the Powers to learn that the vast country abounded in these key-minerals. This fact seems to have brought Germany, particularly, into active contention in the Far East; for Germany was now seeking a place in the sun. The Baron Richthofen report determined Germany to seize by

force if need be those districts most suited to her designs, and rich in coal and iron. Of the mineral deposits in China the China Mission Year Book for 1913 says:^{10.}

The coal and iron resources of China are probably the greatest of any country on earth. Coal has been found in almost every province in China and immense beds of anthracite and bituminous coal have been discovered separated only by slight ridges. Baron Richthofen whose report on the coal and iron resources of China is the best authority, estimates that the province of Shensi alone can furnish coal sufficient to supply the world at its present extravagant rate of consumption for 3,000 years. The coal area of the earth outside of China is estimated at less than 300,000 square miles, while Baron Richthofen estimates the coal area of China at 419,000 square miles Alongside of these vast deposits of coal in China, and especially in Shensi and Shansi, are almost inexhaustible supplies of iron ore, much of it of the finest quality. . . . Captain Robert Dollar reports that he can buy pig iron at Hanyang at \$13 per ton gold, carry it across the Pacific, pay the duty and sell it at a good profit below the cost of American iron. An English iron monger on a recent visit to China reports that with slight improvements the Chinese will produce pig iron at Hanyang at a cost of \$5 per ton gold.

Of Hunan's minerals the China Mission Year Book for 1918 has this to say:^{11.}

Hunan in the heart of China was the last province to

open its doors to foreign enterprise. It now commands 80% of the world's consumption of antimony. Besides antimony, coal, lead, tin, and zinc, and very recently wolframite, are appearing in the list of products exported from the province. . . . The Ping-siang Collieries, the property of the greatest industrial organization in China, the Hanyehping Iron and Steel Company, are located in Hunan, and are turning out daily 3,000 tons of semi-anthracite coal and 1500 tons of coke. . . . Yet Hunan was a few years ago the seat of conservatism, the hermit province, and its people were intensely anti-foreign.

The years 1894-95 had seen a steady tightening of local opposition to both Manchus and foreigners. In Hainan there was stubborn opposition to missionaries holding land. In Hu-peï placards denounced and threatened vengeance on all Chinese having intercourse with the "barbarians". In the Sung-pu district of Hu-peï inn-keepers were warned not to keep foreigners for more than a few days on threat of having their inns razed and property confiscated. The Chinese were directed not to buy foreigners' books, and those who should buy were threatened with being "dealt with by the people". Handbills threatened with death anyone who should sell land to foreigners . In the Sung-pu district the people frightened by the terrible calamities of the official investigations into the murder of the Swedish missionaries determined on a

12.

policy of non-intercourse with foreigners. This policy of the boycott of foreign goods was to become later a great weapon in the hands of an otherwise defenseless people. They used it against the United States with telling effect in 1905. The measures of the British officials in suppressing the plague by burning houses and forbidding Chinese to go to Canton and other Chinese cities brought out anti-foreign placards

13.

in Canton.

In 1895 anti-foreign riots had broken out in June at Chengtu, the capital of Szechuan at the time of the Ywan Yang or Dragon Boat Festival. The Catholic mission buildings and those of the China Inland and Canadian missions were destroyed. Denby held that the Szechwan riots were inexplicable except on the theory of official connivance, but admitted that the Imperial Government was doing what it could to check the disturbances. Denby warned the Imperial Government that if troops were not sent to restore order that the responsibility would rest

14.

with the Manchu Government. He charged that: 1. The local officials were responsible for the disturbances; 2. That the rioting was suffered to be done by the authorities who even excited and encouraged the rioters; 3. The troops in Chengtu made no effort to stop the rioters; 4. The viceroy, Liu, refused aid for thirty-six hours and during that time the rioting continued unchecked; 5. The telegraph operator refused to transmit messages for aid; 6. Soldiers and Yamen runners participated in the riots; 7. The local authorities did nothing to restore order until orders reached them from Peking; 8. There was concerted action between the rioters in Chengtu and

outlying towns.

A series of connected riots of such proportions and with evident cooperation of local officials was ominous for not only the foreigner, but also the Manchu. Much of it can be laid to the fact that the Powers themselves had by their demands for wholesale punishments alienated the very officials, of whom they have reason to now fear, from their service to the Throne. There was always the plausible thing to do - await orders from Peking. But the Powers were bent headlong upon their policy of making the Throne resort to more and more wholesale punishments. Denby promptly demanded: ^{15.} 1. Prompt punishment of the guilty officials of whatever rank; 2. An imperial edict proclaiming that foreigners be permitted to return to the city (Chengt'u) to take and occupy their property; 3. That the vice-roy issue a similar proclamation; 4. Prompt damages; 5. Suitable military force to protect foreigners in their lives and property.

As the years passed the friction became more acute. Practically all the riots though manifestly aimed at the Christians were at root more anti-foreign than anti-Christian due to the fact that the inciting motives were traceable to antagonisms occasioned by trade. The missionary in these years became more openly the tool of imperialism. He became more consciously foreign and in sympathy with his foreign brethren in the market and factories, and less and less sympathetic with the heathen whom he had come to show the light. The missionary troubles continued through the nineties with these marked character-

istics: 1. The antagonism and friction arose more and more from commercial aggression and industrial aggression of the foreigners; 2. They were both anti-foreign and anti-Manchu; 3. They were instigated and carried out by well organized bands, whose aims were political; 4. The foreign powers assumed the policy of holding the Manchu Government to strict accountability with no well defined treaty grounds for doing so; 5. The most common sufferer was the Chinese converts who were looked upon by the ordinary Chinese as being untrue to all Chinese tradition; 6. Continual meddling in local political affairs by missionaries.

During these years the mass of the Chinese people became more and more pronouncedly anti-foreign, and they were continually stirred to a frenzy by the encroaching foreigners. The Manchu Government with difficulty maintained its friendly intercourse with the foreign nations ^{although} ~~even~~ by doing so it was evident that it was alienating itself from the people. By acting upon the demands of the Powers it was surely severing the tie which held it to China.

On January 15, 1898, the Emperor issued the following decree giving with frankness the great lengths which the Manchu Government had gone in its attempt to remain at peace with the Powers upon the matter of tolerating Christianity: 16.

Since the removal of the prohibition of Western religion, Christian places of worship are found in almost all parts of the Empire, foreign missionaries proselytize in sight of each other, and the number of Chinese converts increase from day to day and month to month.

One false step by local officials in dealing with them gives rise to embarrassments at home and abroad. Beyond doubt this question has an important bearing on the peace of the State, and caution is absolutely necessary. . . .

The Manchu Generals-in-chief, Viceroys, and Governors are all recipient of imperial bounty, and should turn thoughts to reducing the State's misfortunes. Wherefore this special Decree is issued, calling upon them henceforth to bestir themselves and carefully guard against missionary troubles. . . . In litigation between the people and churches let them (District Magistrates) be warned to decide equitably, that the well disposed may not suffer injustice, and the wicked have no pretext (for stirring up strife).

This particular edict is the more important in that it was not issued due to any pressure by the Powers, and thus defines the Throne's stand upon the constant difficulties arising between Christian missionaries, their followers, and the ordinary Chinese. It was also issued at a time when the Western Powers were all set to begin that series of aggressions with which the world is familiar, and Germany was actually applying tremendous pressure to obtain a lease on Kiao-chow.

The lease she desired would place her in command of a strategic position in the Far East, and give her possession of a considerable strip of territory in a region extremely rich in coal and iron deposits. Her greatest lever was the murder of two missionaries by a mob at Kiachwang in Shan-tung. These fortunate or unfortunate murders, depending upon the

view-point, had occurred on the night of November 1, 1897. The Imperial German Government was so incensed that a band of Chinese bandits should murder two German priests that in two weeks the German squadron was in Kiaochou Bay and had taken possession of the best harbor in Shantung. She never relinquished her hold, and the Chinese were advised that they must yield. Payson I. Treat says, "It was not the last, but the most flagrant use of a missionary outrage for political and commercial profit." ^{17.} No wonder the Young Emperor had in his edict of January 15, 1898 warned against the possible serious international consequences of missionary troubles!

What followed is more than an incident in history, it is an outrage from which very few nations refrained. The coast of China was virtually staked off into claims forced from China by a show of naval and military force at the proper moment. It was the flowering of the Latitudinarian Policy, which the United States had helped along exceedingly by her cooperation around the conference table at Peking. That her diplomats now at this late hour begun to have misgivings, and to recall that several decades ago there had been a great deal said by American diplomats about the political and territorial integrity of China, was in a way small credit to her. What she saw now was that the door to China was undoubtedly open. In fact it looked much as if a family were moving out, a family which she had not thought about helping for a good many years. She eventually decided that she didn't really care to see the Manchus move out, nor did she appreciate, for reasons of her own, of having the door closed by the preemption of

the other Powers. What the United States Government would do about it was by no means clear to anyone at the time. What Mr. Hay did about it, although late, was to be one of the fortunate things in a period abounding in misfortunes. This was a period of extreme crisis for the Manchu Government. How deeply it shook the Manchu Throne and entire China, historians have always passed up too lightly. But these events, bad as they were, only presaged worse things to follow.

At this point it seems well to digress and recall the ominous incident of the burning of the Temple of Heaven six months after Kwang Hsu had begun his reign. His reign had been a turbulent one, as we have seen, with the conditions for/continuation^{the} of the Manchu Throne becoming more and more acute each year. With secret societies aiming at revolution, and the foreign powers, from whom he hoped to receive friendly cooperation, intent upon dictation and domination, the Young Emperor's position became each day less secure. Finally in the Fall of 1897 the court astronomers announced a coming eclipse of the sun. Its announced date set all China to quaking, for the date was January 22, 1898, the Chinese New Year. When we review in our minds what the year 1898 held in store for China, one may well smile grimly over this sign in the heavens.

In a decree of September 3, 1897, the Young Emperor, who was, so tradition said, responsible for both political and natural phenomena, issued the following decree:
18.

According to the ch'unch iu (Spring and Autumn Annals) it has been stated that an eclipse of the sun on the first day of the year betokens an impending calamity, hence the sovereigns of every dynasty which has

preceeded us, have always made it a point, whenever an eclipse of the sun is prognosticated, to undergo self-abasement and humble themselves before heaven in order to avert the wrath from above. In case of our own imperial dynasty, for instance during the reigns of Their Majesties K'ang Hsi and Ch'ien Lung (1662-1794) there were observed two eclipses of the sun which fell on New Years Day; and now according to the board of astronomy, the first day of the twenty-fourth year of our reign (22 January 1898) there will be yet another eclipse of the sun. We are filled with forbodings at this news and hasten to seek within ourselves for sins which may have brought the wrath of high heaven upon the land. We further command that the ceremonies of congratulations usually held on New Year's Day in the Taiho throne hall be curtailed and only ordinary obeisances be made, the place being changed to the Ch'ientsing throne hall. The banquet usually given to imperial clansmen on New Year's Day must also be stopped, and when the eclipse occurs let all members of the court wear somber garments and assemble in the inner palace before the altar set up to heaven, to pray for forbearance and mercy to the country at large. This so far shall concern ourselves to show our desire to propitiate high heaven; but Her Majesty the Empress Dowager is an elder and a senior, it is but right that full ceremonies be observed in paying the court's obeisances to Her Majesty on New Year's Day. Let all yamens concerned take note.

This was a period of extreme crisis for the Manchu Government. How deeply the events happening during the years of 1898 and 1899 shook the Manchu Throne is hardly to be rightfully estimated. They did not come, as we are sometimes inclined to think, out of the clear sky; contrarily there was nothing new in the Boxer uprising which should have surprised the world. Its roots lay deep in the very nature of the inherent clash of beliefs, ideals, aims and view-points. Up until 1890 there were possibilities that it might have been avoided, but after that year it seemed inevitable, and inevitable it probably was.

The point / ^{we lose sight} of is that there were many little uprisings before the middle of the decade which contained all of the elements present in the final catastrophe. The Powers had themselves accentuated every possibility of such a thing by their lack of foresight and judgment. It was only a friendly Throne which held off the clash as long as it was postponed, and this friendliness they abused by adding the final causes which was to alienate the Throne and precipitate the revolt. These causes were two; dictation to the Throne itself and rapacious aggression. When the final rupture threatened at Peking in the early months of 1899 they literally poured bucketful after bucketful of kerosene on the flames to put out the fire.

In the early months of 1898 the Powers were busily engaged in staking out claims, and agreeing among themselves as to spheres of influence. All of these new leases and spheres of influence tended to make China a mad-house with foreigners running hither and thither through the country.

Surveying, industrial development, railway construction, increased missionary activity were all carried on with frantic haste. Pushing and jostling they collided at every turn with the very elements of China's conservatism, the people themselves, the very people whom the Manchus had been at pains to keep at peace for these many years. The result was increasing clashes between Chinese and foreigners. All over China the people were aroused and merchants, surveyors, and missionaries felt their wrath, and the result was that Peking was flooded with demands for punishments. With every meting out of these demanded punishments, the wrath of the people increased, and the local official receiving his orders from Peking became more and more powerless to uphold the dignity of law, if he did not actually join the great wave of hostile feeling. Secret Societies became more open and robber bands held undisputed sway in many sections. Moreover there arose at Peking a powerful court party, including in its membership princes of the blood, who saw the break was inevitable and had decided it was best for the rider to go with the horse. But this powerful court faction, powerful as it was, did not have the support of either the Young Emperor nor the Empress Dowager. Nevertheless it became the nucleus for intrigue.

It was indeed a period of darkness for the Manchu dynasty. Under extreme stress various individuals act differently. Fortunate is he who can keep his head in such crises. The two figures upon which the pressure of the situation was eventually to exert its full force was the Young Emperor and the Empress Dowager. How each reacted we shall take up in detail in its

proper place. To render the proper background it seems advisable to paint other details into the picture. It was a picture of China in eclipse, an eclipse which brought on in fact and in extense riots, bloodshed, and suffering before the dread shadow again removed itself from the face of the sun and China was again bathed in sunlight.

For years the conduct of missionaries had been the cause of much trouble. By virtue of the treaty specifications which protected Chinese converts, there had been set up, in many localities, what is comparable only to a state within a state. The missionaries devoted their famine relief to converts or possible converts, they sought every protection for their charges which the law of China provided. On the other hand they protected their converts as far as they could possibly do so from complying with the terms of the selfsame law. It was a shame, they said, that converts should be subject to the barbarous Chinese laws, and the world said in turn that it was a shame that Christian converts should be subject to heathen law.

The churchmen became, by reason of the reading of the treaty stipulation regarding converts, a kind of an official in his duties, and long ago some of them, especially the Catholic clergy, had assumed the duties of their position with all the pomp and even the insignia and garb of the local Chinese officials. The situation was one of embarrassment for the Chinese dignitaries, and runners were continually carrying fresh complaints to the Tsungli Yamen. To remedy such a state of affairs the Tsungli Yamen in a memorial of March 15, 1899 ^{that intercourse} asked/between

Catholic missionaries and Government officials, be regulated as all other of /intercourse from years/precedent was carefully regulated in China. Certain officials designated by their rank could only address other officials whose rank paralleled his own. The memorial to the Throne is as follows:^{19.}

China has long ago given her consent to the establishment of Mission Stations of the Roman Catholic religion in the various provinces. With the desire of maintaining peaceful relations between ordinary Chinese subjects and the converts, and of facilitating protective measures, the following proposals as to the reception of missionaries by local officials are submitted:

1. To define the various ranks of missionaries.

Bishops rank with Governors-General and Governors. They may ask for an interview with these officers (also accorded to a priest acting for a bishop). Provinciales and head priests can ask for an interview with Treasurers, Judges, and Taotais.

Other priests can ask for interviews with prefects and magistrates.

2. Bishops must furnish provisional authorities with a list giving the names of priests deputed to transact international business with Chinese officials.
3. In cases in which the bishop lives away from the provincial capital he need not go to said capital to ask for an interview . . . may exchange cards.

4. Grave cases must be entrusted to the minister of the Pope (It should be said that in spite of French protest the Papacy now had its own representative at Peking).

5. Local officials must exhort and constrain the ordinary Chinese to look upon the converts as comrades.

Thus it was that in the midst of the aggressions of the foreigner China was still hoping to maintain peace, but the pressure being exerted upon the Throne/^{was from} two sources, quite opposite in character, and equally dangerous to be denied. The nineties, filled with difficulties and embarrassments were passing. The Young Emperor had begun his reign in the midst of a new spirit which during the eighties seemed to be moving China - a spirit potent both with progress and disaster. This may be said of the Young Emperor that his leanings toward Westernization were in perfect accord with the spirit in which he had been reared and succeeded to his Throne. It was a period when Li Hung Chang was at his best, and even the Empress Dowager had looked with friendliness upon Westernization, since Li assured her that by the adoption of many of its material benefits, and methods of government the Manchu dynasty could gather strength to itself. Of this decade of friendliness Kwang Hsu was the product. Li Hung Chang had long since come up against difficulties which had compromised his position, and accentuated the precariousness of the Manchu Throne. Tzu Hsi had retired in 1889 from the Government, and in face of all the rumors we hear of her meddling from her position of retirement, there seems to be

a preponderance of evidence to show that she did keep her hands out of the Government, and busied herself about the building of a summer palace. ^{This palace} magnificent it is true, but considerably overpainted for purposes of laying on the Empress Dowager the entire blame for the unpreparedness and lack of a navy to which China owed her disastrous defeat in the Sino-Japanese War. Unpreparedness, as we have shown, lies deeper in China than the mere failure of one woman to act, even though she be in a position of supreme power in the Empire. It was still an empire more akin to a loose federal organization than a unified machine for government, such as is characteristic of empires as we think of them. It was a country which held everything connected with war in low esteem.

The Young Emperor had followed the extreme course of being too friendly to the Powers with the result that they dictated to him, and plundered his possessions in the end. This veering by the Throne to the extreme brought reaction from the other direction, which we have already examined. In addition it crystallized opposing Manchu sentiment at the capital into a conservative party at court. The Young Emperor, trusting everything to the belief that his adherence to modern ideas would preserve his Throne chose to disregard this undercurrent of protest which buzzed around his ears. The leader of this party came to be no less than Prince Tuan, a member of the royal family.

During these years fraught with rumors, demands, uprisings the Empress Dowager, or "Old Buddha" as she is so often called both in respect and derision, seems to have avoided pretty largely taking sides in the controversies,

Li Hung chang and the Young Emperor ~~or~~ had her support. Most certain it is that the conservative party at court led by Prince Tuan did not have her support, and that support they knew they needed above all. There was one thing she resented whether coming from foreigner, Chinese, or even Manchu, and that was any stroke or movement against the Manchu dynasty which she had come to uphold by the very strength of her personality.

Tzu Hsi hated instinctively that innovator to the South, Sun Yat-sen and the small body of innovators and radicals which he represented; she hated every political society which flew a revolutionary banner, for had she not lived through the trying years of the Taiping rebellion? Lastly, she hated foreigners for this one thing - and evidence fails to reveal any other - she hated the foreigner who in the nineties at Peking began his shameful meddling into Chinese affairs coupled with his insolent demands. These demands the Young Emperor invariably obeyed, a fact which deeply angered the Empress Dowager. And yet, during all these years Tzu Hsi kept her hand from the wheel, ignored the fact that the Powers were demanding on all points with a spirit which amounted to little less than continual dictation. She refused to have anything to do with the Prince Tuan party. How much was left to the force of events, and the craftiness of Prince Tuan we have never fully appreciated, and can possibly never know to the fullest extent.

HURTS AND FEARS

The fatal year 1898 arrived as ominously as the soothsayers could have wished. It began with aggressions by the foreign powers; the midyear was marked by the inauguration of the Hundred Days of reform climaxed by the coup d'etat of the Empress Dowager; it closed with a calm which boded disaster. The eclipse had come to pass as prophesied. There was much fear accompanied by rioting and bloodshed throughout the empire.

But the great fear was not confined alone to the superstitious populace. It found itself in high places, where if they did not fear the ill-omens of an eclipse, they felt a fear no less real, the fear that an impotent Throne with a seething populace on one hand and an array of aggressive Powers on the other was about to enter into a period of total eclipse - destruction. At court this fear caused the forming of a powerful court party.

This powerful faction angered by the aggressions of the Powers and fearful at any moment of hearing the clarion cry of a second Taiping had determined to throw its lot with the Chinese people. It found its spokesman and unifying force in Prince Tuan, of royal blood. Tuan was crafty. Tuan had plans of his own. Successful in having his son named heir apparent to the childless Kwang Hsu he hoped by the same stroke to discredit Kwang Hsu and drive out the foreigners. If Tuan could secure the dethronement of Kwang Hsu his own son would be emperor. To do this he would first have to gain the support of Tzu Hsi, but it was a well known fact that she disliked Tuan and that he was very much out of personal favor.

But if Tzu Hsi disliked Tuan she could not ignore the fact that by right of birth he stood close to the Throne, nor could she remain entirely deaf to the complaints which reached her of Kwang Hsu whom the Manchus charged with subserviency to the Powers. Moreover while he had reigned little tales of his erratic ways had filtered through the court and nettled the Old Empress. She felt herself responsible for the conduct of this youth whom she herself had placed upon the Throne.

That the force of events had been lost upon Kwang Hsu is not supportable. His edicts prior to the seizure of various leaseholds in China by the Powers show that he did realize to some extent the dangerous ground upon which he was treading. The Young Emperor erred more in method for curing the ills of his empire than in his failure to completely recognize all the aspects of that danger.

But he too was afraid and in his own way under great stress he proceeded to work out his destiny. His cure was but a glorification of Li Hung Chang's early policy. With a false security in his position as emperor he fell back in his extremity upon the plan of modernizing his empire by a few clever strokes cleverly executed. Improbable as his plan was it soon quite obsessed him. To accomplish his purpose he sought to learn the foremost ideas of government as speedily as possible. To this end he surrounded himself with a group of radical thinkers, Chinese from the South, the innovators whom Tzu Hsi hated and whom she had good reason to both hate and fear. That these ultra-radicals represented the spirit of even South China at this time is not tenable. They represented a school of advanced

thinkers for whom China was no more ready in 1898 than she was for the decree of the Hundred Days. But they seemed to Kwang Hsu to offer the way out, and their solution coincided with the preconceived ideas of the Young Emperor. He would avert the danger to China by making China modern overnight, and face the Powers on their own ground. As for the opposition by the Chinese people, an equally great danger, he hoped somehow by the magic of his position to evade it; either that or he greatly minimized it.

All of this only tended to throw the conservative Manchu element more and more in a panic. It must have severely tried even the moderate element including the Empress Dowager, and such men as Jung Lu, Prince Ching and others, who realized the danger of China's position. The scarehead or "open secret", which our histories mention, drifted into the walls of the forbidden city and to the Throne.^{1.}

That this rumor that Kwang Hsu was to be dethroned by the Empress Dowager ever had any basis in fact outside of the secret hopes of the Manchu conservatives can not be proven. At the most it could have been no more than a subtle hint to the Young Emperor to caution. Lastly, it fitted excellently the purpose which his advisors had in mind for the Young Emperor. It is not unlikely that they themselves were back of the story. Only this much is history sure of: it was a time of extreme stress, and it was not the Empress Dowager who set in motion the events which led to the coup d'etat of 1898 in which Tzu Hsi again resumed active rule with the Young Emperor.

With his empire ready to tumble down around him the Young Emperor instituted his reforms. On the 9th of June 1898 the first one appeared. No move was made to check him from the Summer Palace. Gaining courage, once he had set his hand to the wheel, he, upon the advice of his radical advisors summoned Kang Yu-wei, widely, although not deeply versed in Western culture. Kang reached Peking shortly after the summons of June 14th, and the decrees were then issued in rapid order. By September 16, 1898 he had issued thirty-seven reform decrees. It is not denied that the decrees have merit in themselves, and doubtless they embodied the very reforms which the Empress Dowager would like to have seen instituted in China under more favorable conditions, but the moment was not auspicious. China was not ready for such abrupt change at a time when the empire was already seething internally, and the powers had shown their willingness to demand and to seize but not to cooperate. In May preceeding the first of the decrees Prince Kung had died, and on September 7, 1898, eight days before the final decree, Li Hung chang had been dismissed from the Tsungli Yamen and sent to Canton by the Young Emperor. The old lion of China was not advanced ^{enough} for the Young Emperor, and there were many sufficient reasons for which th retire Li to some unimportant post.

Kang Yu-wei now was prepared to play his trump card. He recommended that the Empress Dowager be imprisoned, and Jung Lu, her most trusted advisor and friend from her youth, be beheaded. This was more than a rumor. There are some things

in without disastrous social consequences which could not be done/China at this time/ and this was one of them. It struck at the very heart of the Confucian precepts for a son to dishonor the parent. Even from our Western point of view it violated all codes of loyalty.

Kwang Hsu falling back upon his faith in his position called in Yuan Shih-kai, sworn blood brother of Jung Lu although the Emperor seems not to have known it, and asked him to undertake the task. Yuan, whose rank did not entitle him in ordinary routine to imperial audience, dared not refuse the royal request made with the utmost secrecy, for his head would have been as good as his refusal. Hastening to Jung Lu he revealed the details of this last master stroke to him. Jung Lu went immediately to his royal mistress, and on September 22, 1898, the Empress Dowager left the Summer Palace in the Western Hills and proceeded to Peking where in a bitter interview she forced from the terrified emperor an admission of his guilt, and forced him to sign an imperial decree in which he requested her to again associate herself with him in the government. Around these events much controversy rages. Perhaps the most zealous defender of the Young Emperor is Princess Der Ling. It is a view-point which the Westerner would like to take, but on the solid basis of fact there is much to brand the Young Emperor's act as unwise if not as dastardly in purpose as any action the Empress Dowager could have taken.

Too much seems to have been made of his imprisonment in American histories. The average Westerner firmly believes the Young Emperor from this time on until his death was the most abject of prisoners. This is not true. He was imprison-

ed on Ying Tai island for a period of two years, but he was never deprived of his imperial right to wield the vermilion pencil, and when shortly after the Boxer disturbance had quieted down Miss Catharine Carl, an American artist, spent approximately a year as an inmate of the Forbidden City while she painted portraits of Her Majesty, her evidence is such as to show that the Young Emperor was not a prisoner in fact, nor were his movements restricted. In addition he carried out his functions as Emperor. ^{3.} The charge if sustained at all must be limited largely to that vague thing called mental cruelty.

Of this mental cruelty this much should be said. The Young Emperor, although an admitted weakling, continually resented the presence of the Empress Dowager in a position of authority over him, although for centuries ^{there} had been the traditional authority commanded by filial obedience, and not uncommon to all China. A nephew of the Empress Dowager, raised by her power to the position of Emperor, even in his youth he had shown preference for Tzu An, Empress of the East, a preference which galled the proud Tzu Hsi. To Tzu An's spoiling of the child by allowing him to secretly associate with the little eunuchs, a thing which Tzu Hsi had forbidden as not being good for the him, ^{in his later life.} seems to lie much of the secret of his lack of happiness/

After the Empress Dowager retired from the government, he seems to have resented that he owed her even so much as filial obedience and consultation, and shirked his duty or performed it grudgingly. This was not lost upon the Empress Dowager, and must have greatly widened the gap between them. He was continually at odds with the censors, he disregarded precedent, and aspired to be the emperor in a country rocking upon

its foundations.

Of this eventful period Shuhsi Hsu has the following to say:
4.

The Japanese War took place in spite of the conciliatory policy of the Grand Secretary Li Hung chang, and the scramble for leases and concessions followed closely on the heels of his appeal to the Western Powers to restore the balance of the Far East. Upon this superficial appearance of things his political enemies now insisted upon holding him responsible for all the disasters that had come to China since 1894. Finally the Young Emperor Kwangsu decided to dispense with his services by dismissing him from the Tsungli Yamen on September 7, 1898, the very moment when all was over, but when, indeed, reconstruction might have commenced.

The people who replaced the Grand Secretary - the so-called reformers - however, found themselves unable to do anything better than resort to a coup d'etat. History has yet to pass its final judgment when this interesting episode fades farther into the distance . . . There is no doubt that, had they cooperated with the elder statesman instead of ousting him, and more important still, had they also abstained from interfering with the natural relation of Tsuhsi and Kwangsu, of aunt and nephew, they would have saved China, if not from all ill effects of foreign aggression, at least from plunging into wilder chaos. However this may be, when the reformers resorted to a coup d'etat they were no match for a woman already forty years the ruler of the empire . . . Dis-

appointed in her ministers she instinctively turned toward her kinsmen. Deprived of Prince Kung by death, she instinctively turned toward Prince Tuan. But Prince Tuan had his own way of reform, even as the reformers had theirs. Hence the reorganization of the army became the enlistment of the Boxers; hence the resisting of aggression took the form of exterminating foreigners and things foreign. . . .

But the last of the quotation from this Chinese historian is anticipating events. The Young Emperor following his denouement at the time of the coup d'etat, in later years insisted to his friends that he had intended imprisoning the Empress Dowager only long enough for his reforms to have been accomplished, and that he had no designs upon her life.⁵ His explanation as to his intention toward Jung Lu is not known. But he must have known that a blow at the Grand Councillor to whom Tzu Hsi had reason to owe so much was equivalent to a design upon her own life. More than that the Empress Dowager and her suite in the Western Hills had just undergone a period of terror from an unnamed terrorist, who was finally captured before he could carry out his threat upon the Old Empress's life. Although flogged to death he would not reveal the names of those who sent him upon his mission.⁶ Tzu Hsi had good reason to suspect it came from the reformers around the Young Emperor if the Emperor was not directly implicated in it himself.

Lastly, the Old Empress had good reason to believe that the Young Emperor had let himself unwittingly become the

of the tool/reformers who aimed farther and deeper than Kwang Hsu's plans reached, and in this there seems to have been enough foundation to make it of historical importance.^{7.}

The incident further embittered Tzu Hsi against the meddling foreigners who, she had reason to believe, would have seen her imprisoned and disgraced if not actually murdered, and who now became extremely solicitous of the Young Emperor.^{8.} In addition most of the reformers who had been at the seat of the Peking conspiracy, for a conspiracy it was, had been educated in mission schools or abroad. Her execution of such of these men as she could lay hands upon savored of undue persecution to the Cantonese, who now replied with anti-Manchu activities to further complicate a complex situation.^{9.}

The Empress Dowager immediately took steps to quiet the tumult which had arisen all over China occasioned by the Young Emperor's reforms, and by the aggressive attitude of the Powers. There is no doubt that the coup d'etat was justified by the conditions under which China was laboring at the time. The steps she took to have the decrees of the Hundred Days reversed met with general favor, and the literati and gentry were not slow in voicing their pleasure. China could move toward reform only slowly or not at all, and the period, for reasons hitherto considered, was not auspicious to radical reform in 10, 1898.

That we regard the incidents of 1898 as whimsical and in line with our preconceived ideas of despotism; that we minimize the danger under which the Manchu Government labored is entirely beside the point. We can too easily lose ourselves

in the mazes of petty jealousy and intrigue within the palace walls to forget the outstanding dangers which faced China and of which she had just tasted to her humiliation. But for those who daily receive in audience memorials from all over the broad empire, the reports of conflicts between natives and foreigners, between natives and Chinese converts, of the new demands for this or that by the Powers, the greater dangers are ever present. Doubtless Kwang Hsu felt this danger, and he tried to meet it in his own way, a way no serious minded student of affairs would possibly adopt as likely to bring about a successful solution for either of the two great perils which threatened China.

Tzu Hsi was now again at the wheel, but the dangers are not passed. She took immediate steps to reinstate Li Hung chang whom Kwang Hsu had relegated to an unimportant post in September 1898. She made Li viceroy of the Kuang province with Canton as his capital where he might keep a close hand upon that section which threatened trouble over the executions of the reformers. As soon as she began to suspect the wisdom of Prince Tuan's advice she summoned Li to Peking. It is notable that she did this before the quick march of events which precipitated the Boxer trouble.

There is evidence that during these days the Throne and many high officials as well were laboring under extreme dread, a dread which explains much in the Boxer situation which has hitherto been inexplicable. That dread was nothing less than the expectation of a preconcerted attack upon China by the Powers on

the pretext of enforcing their various demands concerning missionaries and others, but in reality to complete what they had begun - the division of China. If it came, and it had been talked of quite openly during the nineties by the Powers under the guise of the polite wording of measures which the Powers should take when the Manchu Government should crumble of its own weight, the probable entering wedge would be the missionary. It was not a woman trying to ingratiate her seizure of the reigns of government upon the people who in the Autumn issued decree after decree trying to quiet the Chinese element in the situation on the one hand, and vainly trying to avoid a clash with the foreigners on the other. Some historians have preferred to see the whole of the coup d'etat from the view-point of a "cat playing with a mouse". But even cats do not play with mice in the presence of great danger. The Manchu Throne was eminent in danger and had been for some months past.

An imperial decree of October 6, 1898, by the Empress Dowager sought to minimize the possibility of aggression by the Powers, on the grounds of missionary outrage by the following edict:

From the opening of ports to foreign trade to the present time foreigners and Chinese have been as one family, with undivided interests, and since missionaries from foreign countries are living in the interior, not three or four times, but many times, that the local officials must protect them; that the gentry and people of all the provinces must sympathize

with our desire for mutual benevolence, that they must treat them truthfully and honestly, without dislike or suspicion, with the hope of lasting peaceful relations.

Recently there have been disturbances in the provinces which it has been impossible to avoid. There have been several cases of riot in Szechuan which have not been settled. The stupid and ignorant people who circulate rumors and stir up strife, proceeding from light to grave differences, are most truly to be detested. On the other hand the officials, who have not been able at convenient seasons to properly instruct the people and prevent disturbances, can not be excused from censure.

We now especially decree again that all high provincial officials, wherever there are churches, shall distinctly instruct the local officials to most respectfully obey our several decrees, to truly recognize and protect the foreign missionaries as they go to and fro, and treat them with all courtesy.

If lawsuits arise between Chinese and native Christians, they must be conducted with justice and speedily concluded. Moreover, they must command and instruct the gentry and people to fulfill their duties, that there may be no quarrels or disagreements.

Whenever there are foreigners travelling from place to place, they must surely be protected and the extreme limit of our hospitality extended.

After the issue of this decree, if there be any lack

of preparation and disturbances should arise, the officials of that locality will be severely dealt with. Whether they be viceroys or governors, they shall be punished, and it will not avail to say, "We have not informed you" (?).

This was Tzu Hsi speaking to her officials. There had not as yet been any pressure brought upon her comparable to that which the Powers had coerced Kwang Hsu. The coup d'etat had brought her a step nearer freedom from the danger from revolt which had threatened at home under Kwang Hsu. If she could further divert this unrest which shook the empire at times into orderly channels, much would have been accomplished on that score. To say that she had given up the hope of taking over those benefits of the Western nations seems hardly to be in accordance with the facts. But she saw change in terms of evolution and not the abrupt changing which Kwang Hsu had aimed at with all but serious consequences to the empire. In an edict in the early days of October she has this to say of the benefits to be derived from Western nations:

II.

The customs and government orders of Western nations are different from those of China. Although these differences exist, yet the adoption of Western methods in military affairs, agriculture and commerce have proved really beneficial. Therefore, if what is good is selected and carried out in order, the benefits will increase daily.

But if the Powers should take occasion to force the issue and prostrate China, then they would be in a position to fin-

ish the partitioning of China. In fact the history of the seizure of control in French Indo-China and of the British in India had been carried out by gradual encroachment. Tzu Hsi was well aware of this brand of imperialistic design. As late as March 1899, Italy supported by Great Britain, had requested a lease on Sammen Bay in Chekiang, and had been refused by the Empress Dowager because of the tremendous excitement the earlier concessions had caused among the Chinese people.

If it came to further aggressions there was only one thing which the Manchu Government could do, and that was to accept the challenge. From almost the very first days of Tzu Hsi's resumption of authority the Manchu Government began preparing for the possibility of hostile aggression. At this business two persons worked, but each in his own way with his own designs. The Empress Dowager prepared for the possibility of war; Prince Tuan prepared for the time when foreigners could be forcibly ejected from China.

In case of hostile invasion the Empress Dowager knew she would have the people behind her, and it was her attempt to husband their strength for such a day, that led her to issue the edicts which have been given so many interpretations. It was this situation which caused her to be charged with being in league with the hostile bands which were attacking missionaries and Christian converts. When the Powers demanded that all bands be compelled to disband the Throne had reason to believe it was a maneuver to deprive China of her ancient defenses - the only means, largely, which she had of defense in case of attack.

The building and consolidating of her defense for this possible aggression can be traced in a series of decrees. The first reads:

There has never been a time when the relations between Sovereign and people could safely dispense with a good understanding and certain general common objects. It is of course for the local Magistrates to initiate measures in all questions of local importance, but no successful national policy can be maintained unless the gentry and the lower classes co-operate with the Government. If we consider for example the question of food-supply reserves, the organization of police, the drilling of militia or train bands, and so forth; they may seem very ordinary matters, but if they are efficiently handled they may be made of the very greatest value to the nation; for by making due provision against famine, the people's lives are protected, and similarly, by the organization of local police, protection is afforded against bandits. As to train bands, they only require to undergo regular training for a sufficient period to enable us to attain to the position of a nation in arms. At any crisis in our country's affairs their services would then be available and invaluable.

We therefore decree that a beginning be now made in the Provinces of Chihli, Mukden, and Shantung, where all local authorities must admonish the gentry and common people, so that these measures may be carried out with utmost energy. Where any organization already exists for the purposes mentioned, it need only be re-

modelled, and brought into line with the general system. Let steps be taken first at the provincial capitals, and extended thence throughout the Provinces. Eventually it is our intention that the system adopted shall be enforced throughout the Empire, on the basis of the new regulations adopted in these three Provinces.

Such was the step taken for China's defense, and which was to be followed up with other decrees. It formed the whole basis for misunderstanding which was to follow. Tuan, ever a sharp fox, could use it to his own ends.

13.

In a second decree Her Majesty announces:

Recent events have caused me the greatest grief and anxiety; by day and by night, in the seclusion of my Palace, my thoughts dwell on these matters, and my one object is now to secure the tranquility and prosperity of my subjects by the organization of adequate military forces. My purposes, set forth in numerous Decrees, regarding the organization of a strong army, the improvement of communications, and the formation of trainbands and militia, aim all at strengthening the Empire and promoting the contentment of my people.

In these early decrees she shows clearly that her fears prompt her action:

14.

If in times of peace my people are prepared to face all possible dangers, and to put away from them selfish and ignoble ease, they will find that when the hour of trial comes, their common resolution is in

very truth a tower of strength, which shall not fail to bring about its due reward. By this means shall the foundations of our Empire be strengthened, and its prestige increased, and thus shall my purposes be fulfilled, for which I have issued to you this solemn admonition.

Historians have disagreed as to the purpose of these early edicts. Some have professed to see in them direct preparation for hostility against the foreigner, and others have pointed out that the Empress Dowager did not set her house in order, so to speak, ^{15.} and must not have attached serious significance to these edicts, except to impress on the country that she was again at the head of affairs. Subsequent events are to show that the Empress Dowager did not contemplate any offensive measures against the foreigner whom she had adequate reason to hate, and came to have more reason as time passed. On the other hand these edicts but initiate a series of edicts which culminated with the foreign powers taking Tientsin.

That these edicts were defensive in their character, and they were perfectly regular in every detail, attests to the fact that the Empress Dowager had no other motive than defense, and to work through the usual channels. That she did not set her house in order may be accounted for: 1. The shortness of the time; 2. The conservative element of the country still remembered the Hundred Days and would so soon thereafter only be alienated by any direct move to set in motion the machinery for a modern arm on the part of the Empress Dowager; 3. Things moved slowly in China, and the Chinese were not war-like. That she was impatient at the slowness of her officials in responding is attested to by her subsequent edicts. That she was not

in league with Prince Tuan is shown by her measures to get Li Hung chang near her again.

16.

It was the clever Tuan, somewhat of a charlatan himself, who saw in the edicts the possibility of giving his own schemes the force of imperial sanction, and it was around Prince Tuan that the Boxer movement formed. Tuan on the other hand * did not have the defense of China in mind, but the idea of driving out the foreigner. He knew, as did others who associated with him in his nefarious schemes, that it would take great pressure to swing the Empress Dowager to their support. They had been free to use their best logic following the coup d'etat and had not succeeded, for the Old Empress knew too well that China could not bring a world war upon herself and expect to win. Only in an extreme crisis when no other possibility remained would she try it. On the other hand in case of hostile aggression by the Powers she had no other idea than to resist. There was no alternative. She knew, however, that in such an extremity she would have a united China behind her.

Any support given the Powers by the provincial officials looking to peace following the laying down of the siege on the legations in Peking was conditioned upon the untoward acts of the Powers and would have been withdrawn in a moment had the Powers not assured these viceroys and others that they had no intention whatever of seizing Chinese territory. Thus had the march of events set the stage in the Autumn of 1899 for the denouement of events in the Boxer insurrection. That the trouble culminated in the crisis of the Summer of 1900 causing serious concern to the whole world can be laid directly at the feet of the Powers. Their rapacious seizures and their dictation

enabled Prince Tuan to swing a proud old Empress, smarting under the slights and dictation of foreigners, to his mad scheme, and thus gain control at one stroke of the government and Peking.

Years afterward the Empress Dowager in talking confidentially with her first lady in waiting, Princess Der Ling, still gave vent to these smarts, which the Princess has handed down to us as she recalls the conversation, the tenor of which deserves study:

"What right had they", she said, years later, in explaining many of the things which happened as an aftermath of this affair (ignoring by the British legation of her invitation to attend her garden party) "to be so rude to me?" This is not their country, and they have no voice in its affairs! Haven't I a right to punish my own subjects? Suppose my ministers were to ignore a royal invitation of the English sovereigns because they did not like something that had been done by English law? Would those sovereigns like it? Most assuredly not! Yet they allow their ministers to be guilty of the most unpardonable rudeness to me. They don't like our way of living, but it is our way and we like it. If they don't they should leave. We never asked them to come here. They are here on suffrance, yet they have the unbelievable affrontery to criticise my actions because they happen not to be ⁱⁿ accordance with the manner in which the same offense, such as that of Kao Yung Ming would be punished in their country!



"They (the foreigners) inoculate our people with the virus of Christianity and the Christian Chinese immediately lose all respect for our laws and customs. Most of the trouble in inland China is caused by Christian Chinese. They refuse to honor their rulers, all because of the teaching of foreign barbarians who would probably have plenty of reforming to do at home if only they were less prying, less eager to carry nonsensical religious doctrines to other countries intent on forcing them upon the people of those foreign countries whether or not those foreign countries approve.

"By treaty we have placed the foreigner in regular settlements, leased to them for a term of years, yet the missionaries buy up land outside the concessions, and strive to compel us to recognize property rights; and when we fail to do so, they call upon their governments to step in and protect their rights. If we invited missionaries here it would be a different matter; but we don't want them! Yet they come, disrupt our customs, scoff at our religion, strive to supplant it with a religion of their own, and are inexcusably rude to us when we refuse to be renade according to their pet ideas!"

It is to be noticed that the garden party to which she refers was probably the one held on Dec. 13, 1898, on the eve of critical events. The slight by the British hurt more than any other for the Old Empress had a very high regard for Queen Victoria.

THE EVE OF THE BOXER UPRISING

The Boxer Uprising is unique in all of its aspects. The prejudice of the Christian world has made it appear a great and terrific strike by the heathen at Christendom, headed by the Manchu dynasty with all of its prejudice and prestige which its centuries of successful reign had given it. What the Western nations had only a short year before had been pleased to regard as a tottering throne by the end of the year 1899 had become a great menace and symbol of great and awful power. But a tottering throne it was, still hedged around by great dangers at home and great dangers from abroad. In addition it was soon to find itself in the center, the very vortex of opposing forces. For the Western powers the Boxer Uprising came at the proper moment to hide, by completely overshadowing them, all of the rapacious seizures of territory, and all of the high-handed demands preceeding the Boxer outbreak which had played the major part in precipitating the unfortunate event itself. For the many societies of sedition and rebellion, which had, by the foreign aggressions of the nineties, been fanned into flame, it formed a great "club" whereby they could strike with all their hatred at the Western nations, and hope by a coup d'main to regain the old seclusion so dear to all the traditions of China; but if they failed it would still be possible to saddle off the entire matter onto the dying Manchu dynasty. In short there were ^{as} many possibilities lying back of Tuan's strategy in 1900 as there were behind the Kang Yu-we/ when by his advice to the Young Emperor he precipitat-

ed the Hundred Days with its paper reforms.

Most Chinese are yet today monarchists in the sense that a dynasty is the only form of government which they can clearly understand and comprehend. Even today Chinese leaders speak of the People's dynasty. Opposition to the Manchus has given the rebellion of 1911-12 a republican aspect which it has worn with very ill grace. It has clothed all those who opposed the Manchus with a kind of glamour of anti-conservatism and anti-anti-foreignism which is also not true to fact. The anti-foreign feeling in China rested ^{people and not merely} with the ~~with the~~ Manchu dynasty, ^{since 1927} a fact which many missionaries have been forced to admit much to their sorrow. Anti-foreignism is the result of a system of thought, religion and education, which through centuries has become inherent in the Chinese character.

Secret organizations and banditry were not new to China in the nineties. Secret organizations were usually left unmolested unless they showed signs of becoming political and then the central government acted to stamp them out. In the past, too, these bands and organizations had often stood in good use to the throne. Precedent had shown also that disaffected men banding together could often be enlisted in the militia, and thus given something to do and small pay, a danger ^{could} be averted. In a country as vast and as loosely organized as China the banding of people together for protection had not been discouraged by the Manchu Government in the past, but in fact encouraged. If the organizations tended to become political in their aims then the central government acted to stamp out the fire.

The events of the eighties had created a great restlessness in the minds of the people, who were by far and wide, the very inherent basis of conservatism, and had stirred an almost universal anti-foreign feeling (except for a very small minority largely Christian converts). The friendliness of the Manchu Throne to the Western Powers during the late eighties and during the nineties had caused this disaffection to become political, as we have seen, and it was both anti-Manchu and anti-foreign. Uprisings had begun as early as 1891, and these uprisings were easily traceable to secret societies. The disastrous Sino-Japanese war encouraged sedition. In 1895 the Plum Blossom Fists became a source of trouble in Shantung, and the governor tried to quiet them by enrolling them in the militia. Northeastern China was the ^{favored} setting for the incubation of such societies. It was the section where foreign imperialistic effort tended to center. Of great strategic importance and abounding in minerals, foreign irritation was ever-present, and increasingly so. In 1898 the Great Sword Society began an anti-foreign attack in the Province of Kiangsu and northeastern Shantung. The most likely, at least the most easily available point of striking an anti-foreign blow was ^{against} the missionary, his converts, and his property. To the Chinese mind he typified nearly all the evils the hated foreigner had brought upon China. Historically speaking he was right. The missionary had been the wedge which had pried open the door of China.

When the disturbances arose in the northeastern section as they invariably must, it was quite natural for the missionary to protest and receive the protection he had customarily

enjoyed through the medium of the foreign representatives at Peking. But there is not even a remote possibility for incriminating the Throne at Peking in conniving to stir up this trouble. There was an individual at Peking who did connive and a party of Manchus there who stood with him, as well as some high Manchu officials and Chinese officials in the Provinces, whose support has too often been used to make it appear that the Throne was behind the movements which led to the Boxer conflagration. Such contact as there was between these lawless bands committing outrages and local officials is chargeable to the individual official.

These local officials were compelled to make some sort of peace with the leaders of these disturbances ^{for} since 1895 they knew that not even a respectable show of force could be expected from Peking to help carry out the imperial mandates. Their only recourse lay in making the most of the situation locally. The Manchu Throne under Kwang Hsu had been under the domination of the Powers. They had demanded eye for eye and tooth for tooth, so to speak, and they had not been very particular whether the official paying the penalty had been really guilty or not. It is to be marked here that there was a difference between the accountability which the Powers demanded, and China acquiesced in, and the accountability which the Throne had in the past held its officials. In the first place the very source of the demanding authority was enough to antagonize the accused officials and all others. Secondly, the demands were blindly made and ruthlessly enforced. Third, the Powers which stood behind the demands offered ^{no} aid in avoid-

ing the difficulties, but upheld the foreigner in those acts which were surest to cause friction and strife. Fourth, all of the above reasons only emphasized the fact that the power of the Manchu Throne to act arbitrarily per se was gone. If the Manchu Government had any power now, it was either the power a united China could give it, such as it was, or the power the Powers could give it in their support, which they had no disposition to do in the nineties.

In 1898 a new society appeared in Northeastern China in the provinces of Shantung and Chihli. This secret society was anti-foreign and was known as the Ihochuan or Fists of Public Harmony. It advocated nothing new; it sought the extermination of foreigners and a return to Chinese exclusion. Evidence seems to show that it was in the beginning in opposition to the Throne, and that it was organized around troops of travelling performers, who did public exhibitions of trick juggling from place to place in return for the copper cash which the villagers showered upon them. Prince Tuan ^{had early} associated himself with them, ^{to him must be charged the} and ^{1.} welding these troops into a machine to fit his own machinations. Their belief in their invulnerability must have been known by these original jugglers themselves to be a farce, but not by the host of followers whom they organized. Further belief in their invulnerability seems to have come from Taoist priests, and encouraged by Buddhist priests, who had occasion to resent Christianity and the Young Emperor's reforms. At any rate the purpose of the new society was to restore China to her old position of prestige

and exclusion. That to the foreigner to whom Chinese converts related the contortions gone through by the jugglers to make themselves invulnerable, seemed or resembled boxing, caused them to be given the name of "Boxers", and their performances likened to athletic exercises. Their trickster ability converted the discontented natives by the hundreds who sought frantically to perform the prescribed ritual and make themselves invulnerable.

Famine fanned the flame of discontent throughout the Empire. To many the joining of a band or society was the only way out, and the band usually managed to live by plundering. The only Chinese who seemed to enjoy any measure of prosperity were the Christian converts, who enjoyed what bounty the missions had to offer, and who were, as a class, practically the proteges of the foreigner. The treaties protected them, and the missionaries interceded for them even in flagrant contravention of Chinese usage and law, not to say even justice. In consequence these converts had become a class apart. Even in the official papers of the time they are spoken of as "Christian converts" as opposed to "ordinary Chinese".

In the summer of 1899 the Ihochuan alone, and at times in conjunction with other societies, began robbing and plundering native Christians. The missionaries in the sections where the disturbances took place continually protested to the consuls and ministers at Peking. The movement spread fast fanned by the flames of continual foreign antagonism and famine, so that the magistrates of the districts concerned found themselves practically marooned with a handful of men amid

bands of armed men much larger in numbers than any force which the magistrates could muster. The magistrates could not hope for much aid from Peking because aid was not to be had from a powerless government; the anti-foreign feeling was growing practically universal; the Christian convert was hated for the exemptions which his conversion had secured him; there was at court a powerful party which would block and confound the Throne in every way possible; lastly fear of aggression made the Throne unwilling to further alienate its own subjects by rash punishments.

As early as April 2, 1898 Minister Denby in a despatch to Secretary Sherman wrote:^{2.}

. . . The public all along the Yangtze are excited over the rumors which reach them that China is to be partitioned, and unless local authorities act with vigor and promptness there is danger of disorder. There are hot-heads among our own people as well as the Chinese.

In 1898 on the occasion of the destruction of a missionary's boat by stoning and burning at Hong-Kiang in West Hunan, E.D. Chapin in a letter from Wuhu, China, to Mr. John Goodenow, consul-general at Shanghai under date of August 5, gives some interesting facts of this unrest which was virtually shaking all China:^{3.}

Hong-Kiang being neither a Fu or Hsien city, has only subordinate officials, and is governed by the magistrate of Huei-tong-hsien. This magistrate came down in person to investigate the difficulty and showed apparent readiness to suppress the trouble. . . . he contented himself with

exhorting the people not to molest us, and although in his proclamation he threatened the offenders with punishment, yet he made no arrests. We venture to suggest that more rigid measures than mere exhortation would be more effectual; but he said that to make any arrests, or use force at that time would cause a wholesale uprising, in which not only we, but also himself, would be killed; in fact the city was being nightly posted with placards to that effect. The magistrate claimed his forces were insufficient, but two garrisons were within call, if he had chosen to call them;

(After the destruction of the boat)

The secret society called the Ko-lao-huei is very strong in Western Hunan, and it is freely confessed that many of the soldiers, and even smaller officials themselves are members of it, which doubtless accounts in part for their unwillingness to do anything against their fellow-members. After dark that night the magistrate of Huei-tong-hsien came down the river and said that if we would not put the matter in the hands of our consul he would pay any amount of damages we chose to ask, and would guarantee that as soon as he could quiet the people we would be able to return in peace, and that he himself would rent us a house and protect us in it. . . .

Here we have illustrated clearly the two fires between which the local official, no matter how well meaning, found himself. It is to be noted that these regions are far removed

from the origin of the Boxer activities.

Under the Empress Dowager there was a stiffening of the policy of the Manchu Government in dealing with the Powers, but there was no evidence of reactionary measures. Its action in the face of aggressions by the Powers cannot be justly held as reactionary unless we expect to try to justify dictation, and the grossest kind of domination and blame a nation for not refusing to prostrate itself. That the ministers at Peking were keen enough to realize ^{that} the new hand at the wheel would not tolerate the dictation which the Young Emperor had contended with is indicated by the fact that the year 1899 saw the cessation at Peking of their demands. But making demands of weak states fitted the saber rattling policy of the decade and was not abandoned permanently in Peking diplomacy. Moreover, the governments at home had come to expect this mode of action. At this time there can only be one thing said of China, there was a woman upon the Throne who was a ruler, and who, in spite of all the calumnies heaped against her, knew how to rule her country. If she had scarcely a dependable corps of troops, her presence was worth a million men to China.

Under date of March 27, 1899 the United States Government through its State Department had issued a circular on passports which contained the following paragraph:^{4.}

The status of American citizens resident in a semi-barbarous country or in a country in which the United States has extraterritorial jurisdiction is singular.

. . . . Their residence may be indefinitely pro-

longed since obviously they can not become subjects of the native government without grave peril to their safety. The Department's position with respect to these citizens has uniformly been to afford them ^{the} protection of a passport as long as their pursuits are legitimate and not prejudicial to the friendly relations of this Government and the Government within whose limits they are residing.

In November, 1899, E.H. Conger, the American minister, refused to grant pass-ports to Logan H. Roberts and Oliver Tracey Logan, medical missionaries, on the grounds that they did not state their intention to return to the United States, but on the contrary expressed their intention to remain permanently in China. Under authority of the circular of March 27, 1899 John Hay, the American Secretary of State, instructed Minister Conger to issue the passports. In doing so he remarked:

. . . the pursuits of a missionary, properly conducted, are legitimate, and American missionaries of good standing have always enjoyed continuous protection from this Government.

Thus the missionary came to have what amounted to a preferred passport status. But rulings are in the wake of events and Conger probably sensed in refusing, what Hay in Washington could not know.

In March the Italians had made a strong claim for a lease on Sanmen Bay and had been refused. The Manchu Government had

decided to stop the further division of China at all costs. But the gesture and the pressure was not lost upon the Empress Dowager, and on November 21, 1899 she issued the following ^{secret} edict addressed to all viceroys, governors, Tartar Generals, and provincial commanders, as follows: ^{6.}

Our Empire is now laboring under great difficulties, which are becoming daily more serious. The various powers cast upon us looks of tiger-like voracity, hustling each other in their endeavors to be first to seize upon our innermost territories. They think that China having neither money nor troops, would never venture to go to war with them. They fail to understand, however, that there are certain things this Empire can never consent to (viz. the partitioning), if hardly pressed upon we have no alternative but to rely upon ^{the} justice of our cause, the knowledge of which in our breasts strengthens our resolves and steels us to present a united front against our aggressors. No one can guarantee under such circumstances who will be the victor and who the conquered in the end. But there is an evil habit which has become almost a custom among our viceroys and governors, which, however, must be eradicated at all costs. For instance whenever these high officials have on their hands cases of international dispute all their actions seem to be guided by the belief in their breasts that such cases would be eventually "amicably arranged". These words never seem to be out of their thoughts; hence when matters come to a crisis, they, of course, find

themselves utterly unprepared to resist any hostile aggressions on the part of the foreigner. We, indeed, consider this the most serious failure in the duty which high provincial authorities owe to the Throne, and we now find it incumbent upon ourselves to censure such conduct in the most severe terms . . .

It is now our special command, therefore, that should any high official find himself so hard pressed by circumstances that nothing short of war would settle matters he is expected to set himself resolutely to work out his duty to this end. Or perhaps it would be that war has already actually been declared; under such circumstances there is no possible chance of the Imperial Government consenting to an immediate conference for the restoration of peace. It behooves, therefore, that our viceroys, governors, commanders-in-chief throughout the whole Empire unite forces and act together without distinction of particularizing as to jurisdiction so as to present a combined front to the enemy, exhorting and encouraging their officers and soldiers in person to fight for the preservation of their homes and native soil from the encroaching footsteps of the foreign aggressor. Never should the word "peace" fall from the mouths of our high officials, nor should they even allow it to rest for a moment within their breasts. With such a country as ours, with her

vast areas stretching several tens of thousand li, her immense natural resources, and her hundreds of millions of inhabitants, if only each and all of you would prove his loyalty ^{to his Emperor} and love of country, what indeed is there to fear from any invader. Let our words be made known to each and all within our domains.

This was not the expression of hatred by proud hearted old Empress at Peking, it expressed the feelings of a large part of China. It expressed the feeling of all alike on the matter of aggression whether on other matters they were conservative or liberal in their attitude. It emphasizes the fact that must be borne in mind that China was preparing for active aggression by the Powers at the very time the Powers took Tientsin, and that these steps had been regular in every way; that the Throne had not stooped to subterfuge as charged, and that the conditions preceeding the Boxer outbreak justified the Manchu Government in taking this stand. Had John Hay issued his circular letter of July 3, 1900 before instead of after the Boxer trouble there would quite likely never have been a Boxer Uprising.

Immediately the Tsungli Yamen under Prince Cheng, ^{customarily} friendly to modern influence, issued the following decree or circular despatch to all viceroys and governors:

As the Italians have not had their ambitions gratified in respect to the cession of Sanmen Bay to them, it is apprehended that they may try to seek opportunity for seizing other portions of the coast. Moreover, arbitrary and aggressive actions of the French at Kuang-

chowán, where they are stirring up disturbances in order to obtain further pretexts for demanding concessions from the Imperial Government, may lead to actual hostilities between China and France. It behooves us therefore to exercise the utmost vigilance and watchfulness to guard against ^{sudden} aggression, and be always prepared to resist the enemy. Your excellency is enjoined to enjoin this upon the generals and commanders of troops garrisoning important points within your jurisdiction, and not only this, but be prepared also to give aid to your brother viceroys and governors, whose territories adjoin your own. It has been an evil practise among high provincial authorities to consider that the duty of any one of them lies only in guarding ~~safely~~ the region lying within his own jurisdiction, ignoring the crisis that may be taking place in the next adjoining provinces, forgetting that his neighbor being overcome his turn for overthrow becomes a near possibility. This lack of union is lamentable, but must not be continued from this date. This Yamen has received the special commands of Her Imperial Majesty, the Empress Dowager, to grant you full liberty to resist by force of arms all aggressions upon your jurisdictions, proclaiming a state of war, if necessary, without first acting for instructions from Peking, for the loss of time may prove fatal to your security and enable the enemy to make good his footing against your forces. Finally, your excellency will be held responsible for any repetition of indecision, or too great trustfulness in the declarations of the approach-

ing enemy such as happened, for instance, to General Kai-Yuan in Shantung.

If there are any doubt about the earlier decrees, there is here not to be denied evidence that China expected foreign aggression at the point of the bayonet, and prepared to resist as best she could. The means of resistance was in regularized acts of war. At the same time there is no indication of any proposed driving out of foreigners. There is in these decrees no appeal to the passions of the populace, or to the imperial officials to resort to such means. In like manner there is no appeal to outlaw bands. The spirit is one of resolution in case the worst came to worst. Even the Throne admits that the outcome of armed conflict is doubtful in the very wording of the edict. But the conclusion that China expected war to be made upon her cannot be denied. The Tsungli Yamen, the most friendly of all Manchu governmental institutions to foreign viewpoints, framed its decree in even more decisive words than that of the Throne. Its directions are specific. It reflected a spirit of resistance which, while present in the Boxer trouble, never came out, but had the Powers not assured China that their taking of Tientsin and march on Peking was with no thought of territorial aggression, the conclusion that they would have faced a united China, can not be lost sight of.

It is significant to note here that there were two things which the Manchu Throne constantly regarded as impossible to do regardless of the force placed upon it or the danger which it faced in refusing. These two things were: 1. The humilia-

ting of the imperial house by dethronement or imprisonment of any of its members; 2. the partitioning of the Empire.

The disturbances resulting in assaults upon foreigners and native Christians must be laid to the action of the gentry and secret societies. Assaults upon foreigners occurred in such widely separated provinces as Chihli, Szechuan, Kiangsi, Fukiens, Yunnan, Kwangai, Kweichow, and Shantung. It ^{is} indicative of the spirit of the people at the time, and not of any machinations of the Throne. That the unrest was the worst in the northern provinces was not due to their proximity to Peking, but rather to the fact that it had been the scene of China's defeat by the Japanese, and was now the scene of three extensive foreign leaseholds and much railway construction and other concessionary activity.

Shantung is the Holy Land of China in that this province is the birthplace of Confucius and of Mencius. The presence of the saber rattling Germans, and their surveying and labor parties busy upon their projected railways, was certain to give offense. Lastly, in 1899 and 1900 famine prevailed in Shantung, Shansi, and Chihli.

In the light of these decrees, one relating to the forming of the militia and the other two preparing ^{to resist} actively with force any further aggression, the traditional historical conclusion has been that the Manchu Throne in the person of Tzu Hsi sought to drive out the foreigner by making use ^{of} the Iho-chuan or Boxer society. Such was not the case. Contrarily, the reluctance to suppress all societies as the Powers demanded early in 1900 can be traced directly to the Throne's unwillingness to cripple its ancient defenses in the face of expected aggression. This is the basis of the Throne's stubborn resistance to issuing the

sweeping edicts which the Powers had the effrontery to demand, and which would have dissolved all societies, and the militia train bands which the Throne had already been at pains to encourage in case of aggression. That the Powers did it in somewhat of a panic is doubtless true, and we know now that they were seeking only to prevent trouble, but the Manchu Government had reason to see in it a bold step to deprive China at one blow of a large part of her potential forces and then strike during the confusion, and take over great stretches of China.

On December 31, 1899, a Mr. Brooks, a British missionary, was seized in Shantung, and eventually murdered by members of the Great Sword Society. After passing through several years of great strife, pillaging and plundering of the Chinese converts, this act set the missionaries in a panic, for now it seemed that this forward step in a policy of violence meant the destruction of foreigners. The missionaries in turn painted conditions in their darkest colors to the consuls, and that they gave vent to their fears in full is not to be doubted, it is only human nature. The result was that Peking was suddenly deluged with telegrams from the consuls in this region to their various ministers. Among these reports was one which was to find an immediate audience and gain great credence, a rumor which had no basis in fact, and which may or may not have been purposely made use of Prince Tuan and his secret organization. This rumor, which all subsequent events prove false, was merely this: that the Empress Dowager was secretly aiding the lawless bands in the northeast, particularly the

8. Boxers. The peculiar thing about the rumor was that/^{it} had enough of the earmarks of truth about it to appeal to the Boxer bands in the regions of the disturbances/^{to make use of it} to create a panic among the foreigners, and the/^{Boxers,} of course, would not hesitate to set afloat any lie which would serve their cause and purpose. The whole thing is clever enough/^{to be chargeable} to the unscrupulous Tuan whom Princess Der Ling describes as follows: 9.

I remember Prince Tuan very well. He was an evil visaged man; his face marked by smallpox scars, his eyes small and ferret-like. I have excellent reason to remember him, since my family were er mao tzu (Christians Number Two, or Christianized Chinese). My father, Lord Yu Keng, was very much afraid of Prince Tuan. He had learned of Tuan's activities among the Boxers, and when/^{Tuan} made some excuse to call upon my father - at which time I saw the pockmarked man - my father knew it was in the role of a spy that Prince Tuan called, and that he had come to examine our foreign built-house, and to discover if possible if our family was "Christian".

It was because of Prince Tuan, to escape certain death at his hands, that my father accepted an appointment as Minister to France . . .

But that all high officialdom understood Prince Tuan to be out of favor with Her Majesty is best shown by the conversation which Princess Der Ling in another volume, "Kowtow" gives as it must have taken place between her father and mother when the news of the trouble in China reached the Chinese Embassy in Paris: 10.

Father had received a laconic message from China, which read: "You are recalled. Return to China at once with your family. Prince Tuan."

.
 "There is something decidedly wrong in China", Father said.

Why should Prince Tuan send you such a message?" Mother asked.

"That is exactly what is wrong. Prince Tuan is a member of the royal family, but he is not in favor, and has absolutely no right to send me such a message. If I really were recalled, the word would come from the throne itself. There is a certain formality in recalling a minister, no matter what he has done or is supposed to have done. Prince Tuan is my bitter enemy. This is a trick to get us home for some evil purpose.

"Then cable Yung Lu", said Mother. . . .

This cable was speedily sent and Yung Lu replied;

"The court knows nothing of your recall. Remain where you are whatever happens. Letter follows."

The letter eventually arrived and this extract is given
 ll.
 by Princess Der Ling:

"Prince Tuan, as you know, is a worthless scoundrel, and Her Majesty herself has always believed it up to this time. But the Prince comes forward with his plans at a most opportune time - for him! Her Majesty has been for years consumed with a bitter hatred of and for-

eigners, who would divide China among them. The Prince claims that his Boxers are invincible, that bullets and knives will not blay them. You know that this is all nonsense as I do; but Her Majesty, in spite of my influence is inclined to listen. Prince Tuan is a trickster, and if his Boxers are received at court he will find some way with his trickery to convince Her Majesty that he has spoken the truth about his riffraff

. . . .

This letter is significant in that it shows so powerful a personage as Jung Lu as giving credence to the belief that the Powers would divide China among them, as we have just had occasion to see that the Tsung Li Yamen, headed by Prince Ching was disturbed at this possibility to the extent of giving orders for resistance. That Prince Tuan had not yet gained his ends paves the way for an understanding of the historical events which were to follow. I might state here that although Tzu Hsi, who took Princess Der Ling into her confidence, openly admitted to her that it was she who gave the order to fire upon the legations, she steadfastly denied any connivance, and herself placed the blame for the horror at the door of Prince Tuan,^{12.} a contention which historical evidence bears out. Take out two things: 1. The great fear of aggression by the Powers, and; 2. The hatred Old Buddha had come to have of foreigners by reason of their own untoward acts, which bent her to the designs of a trickster, and you have the sum total of responsibility which can be thrown upon the Empress Dowager.

But to return to China where beginning with the year 1900 a succession of events in Peking and elsewhere were to precipitate the Boxer Uprising. When the reports of the murder of the British missionary, Mr. Brooks, reached Peking, immediate representations were made by the Powers to the Throne. The British, German, and American ministers protested against this activity, as menacing to the foreign missionary establishments. As a result of this protest, the Chinese Government showed its good faith by removing Yu Hsien, the offending governor of Shantung, whom the missionaries accused of being in league with the Boxers, and correctly so. In his place the Government sent Yuan Shih-kai as acting-governor. The Viceroy of Chihli, who resided at Tientsin was ordered to suppress the disturbances in his section. When the high Chinese officials made their annual New Year's call upon the ministers of the foreign countries, they were especially authorized by the Empress Dowager and the Emperor to express their deepest concern, and inform them that an imperial decree was being issued enjoining the capture of the murderers.

In due course, on January 5, 1900, this imperial decree appeared. It reads:

13.

. . . The treaties provide that all nations may propagate their religions in China, and we have repeatedly issued Decrees ordering the Provincial Governments to direct local officials to afford efficient and constant protection. Notwithstanding our repeated orders, this murder of a missionary takes place in Shantung . . .

Let Yuan Shih-kai denounce to the Throne and pro-

pose punishment for all officials involved in this neglect of duty, and let him at the same time fix a date for the capture of the murderer, who must be caught and be brought to justice so as to restore peace to the district and preserve friendly relations with our neighbors.

This edict is in line with previous edicts, and it reflects the concern the Chinese Government felt about the ever-present possibility of just such an event as this ushering in the long expected partitioning. That they were not sincere, or that the Throne could have for a moment connived to bring about a situation where murder might result is not at all tenable. In fact they were even more disturbed than the Powers.

On January 9, 1900, came filtering through from the missionaries/ at Ping-yin a report which was to throw the legations into a panic. It was that bit of heresay evidence which was to mar and blacken the character of the Empress Dowager, and which had gone down in history as the truth per se. The telegram stated that the edict of January 5th had been published but that "troops present, but useless; officials complete inaction T'ai An Prefect blocks; secret orders from the Throne to encourage." It was to no avail that on the same day Yuan reported three murderers captured and held for trial. From that moment on the Powers seem to have worked upon the assumption that the Throne was in league with the Boxers.

On January 17, 1900 MacDonald, the British minister protested against the behavior of the Shantung officials, and charged Yu Hsien with encouraging the Boxers. MacDonald went

farther and gave vent to his suspicions in the veiled statement that until China dealt with the high authorities in such cases the outrages would not cease. This intimation of connivance was only the beginning. ^{15.}

In the meantime on January 11, 1900, a second decree had appeared. If the ministers of the Powers had given voice to their fears, here the Government at Peking ^eacted to suppress only such societies which were out of hand, and which were not the many train-bands, and societies on which China might be compelled to call almost at a moments notice if her worst ^{concerning the partitioning} fears should come to pass, and the Powers on the strength of the missionary outrages should attempt to seize the empire or parts of it. The edict reads: ^{16.}

. . . When worthless vagabonds form themselves into bands and sworn confederacies, and relying on their numbers, create disturbances, the law can show absolutely no leniency with them. On the other hand when peaceful law abiding people practise their skill in mechanical arts for the self-preservation of themselves and their families, or when they combine in village communities for the mutual protection, this is in accordance with the public spirited principle (enjoined by Mencius) of "keeping mutual watch and giving mutual help" . . .

Let them (high provincial officials) give strict orders to local authorities that in dealing with cases of this kind they should only enquire whether so-and-so is or is not guilty of rebellion, whether he has or has not stirred up strife, and should not consider whether he belongs to a society or not . . . or of a religion.

This edict by the Throne intended to undo any injury to their previous plans for defense by the recent edict only served to strengthen the fears of the ministers. On January 25, 1900, MacDonald on consultation with his French, and his German colleague, embarks upon a policy which was shortly lead to the resumption of the policy of dictation, which the Powers had used upon the Young Emperor, and which they wisely refrained from using upon the Empress Dowager so far. MacDonald on this occasion requested that a decree be issued suppressing the offending societies by name. Identic notes from other ambassadors accompanied the request. Such a spirit of dictation only served to increase the tension.

It is to be noticed that no more murders had occurred, but the missionaries remained in a highly nervous state, and on the part of the Chinese everything also tended to increase the tension. On February 24th the ministers at Peking agreed to demand a decree. This they did through the Tsungli Yamen. The Yamen ministers protested the sincerity of their Government, and pointed out the inconsistency of publishing a third degree in the Peking Gazette which would be issued all over China. It is to be said that the situation was only local, and that the Government had in good faith acted to suppress it. But the more the Powers insisted upon decrees to be issued throughout all China, the more suspicious the Chinese became on their part. Then as for demands, the Tsungli Yamen ministers knew that such tactics would not do. But the Powers, who had demanded before and got what they demanded from Kuang Hsu, resolved to carry their measure. MacDonald stated in his despatch that,

"None of the arguments of the Yamen convinced us that there was any real objection, beyond a dislike of obeying foreign dictation, to the publication of a Decree in the Gazette."^{16.} This should have been enough, but this the ministers regarded as an objection which they could override. Von Kettler, the German minister, had departed farther beyond his province to inform the Yamen officials that Yu Hsien was the head of the Big Knife Society; that he was in Peking at that moment, and instead of being handed over to the Board of Punishments, as he should have been (so the Powers thought at least) that he had been sent for by the Throne. This ^{direct intimation of connivance} further increased the tension.^{17.} The Yamen ministers earnestly denied connivance.

This last charge seems to be the only basis for the old story which we have so intimately linked with the Boxer story that the Empress Dowager recalled Yu Hsien, and decorated him. That Yu was an able official even the missionaries acknowledged,^{18.} and his only fault was that he hated the Christians. Doubtless the Throne desired to retain him. His removal from Shantung was a rebuke in itself. That he was decorated if it is to be sustained must stand upon documentary evidence.

The ministers at Peking now determined to act in concert, and by a series of identic notes pressure was directly applied upon the Manchu Government for an Imperial Edict.^{19.} This decision to resort to demands opened the way for the further alienation of the Old Empress, and for Prince Tuan to play his cards to his purpose.

The Imperial Edict was not forth-coming for publication throughout the Empire. The Government through the Yamen main-

tained that it did not affect the whole of China, and that the decrees already issued were enough.

This was all of the satisfaction which the Powers were to receive for a course which was certainly uncalled for, and among modern nations would have been the same as an ultimatum. All of this was not lost upon the Chinese Government, which believed that just such an opening was the thing they were seeking. On the other hand to tamely submit would have hardly been tenable. The resort was a clever one, and one entirely in line with every action they had taken in Shantung to suppress the disturbances. An Imperial Decree of February 21, was sent to the provinces of Chihli and Shantung, and ordered to be published in a proclamation by the viceroy of Chihli and the acting-governor of Shantung. The proclamation in every way accorded with all the wishes of the ministers of the Powers, except that it was not promulgated throughout the land. It commanded:

Let the Governor-General of Chihli and the Governor-General of Shantung issue most stringent Proclamations admonishing the people and strictly prohibiting (the Societies) so that our people may all know that to secretly establish Societies is contrary to prohibition, and a breach of the law.

The representative of Great Britain now demanded that the decree be published in the Gazette. Such a suggestion made China tremble. The Tsungli Yamen refused outright. But the Powers felt they were so near victory that they persisted. Their persistence, without much justification in fact, attests

to a strange inability to see further than a resumption of a dictatorial policy which had among other things brought on the coup d'etat in 1898. Accordingly on March 10th another demand is made by means of identic notes. MacDonald suggested the publication of the memorial of the Governor-General of Chihli and Governor of Shantung. This was to the Chinese mind dictation with a vengeance. To do it would considerably impair the potential defenses of the country. On April 4th the demand of March 10th was made a 48 hour ultimatum. To the Chinese there was no doubt but that this was the aim. It was a critical time for the Manchu Government. It neither agreed or refused to meet the demand, but on March 14th the edict appeared. The last bar was down and China reduced to the position of waiting to see what the next step of the Powers would be. Would it be invasion, and the march of foreign armies? In Peking there was a proud old Empress whose rage burned inwardly. Humiliated beyond the point of face, she had not yet subscribed to that great conservative element which now surged around her, and each day grew stronger and more audible.

In the meantime, the Boxers suppressed in Shantung and Chihli, instead of disbanding, moved gradually onto Peking, doubtless at the secret orders of Prince Tuan. Yu Hsien, a conspirator with Tuan, was in charge of a western province, and could be expected to act with him. As the Boxers began concentrating in Peking and vicinity the fears of the ministers changed from uneasiness to fear of actual attack. At their request they were allowed to increase the legation guard. To those men who had two short years before seen China

ready to crumble, and ^{to} those nations who had stepped in to seize concessions, and be prepared to protect their interests when the Manchu power crumbled, ^{there was} now sensed something of a united China behind this gigantic protest at their unscrupulous methods. Back of it all loomed the shadow of the one woman who could wield this power into a vast machine of destruction of life and property. Opportunist diplomacy emboldened by past successes had brought the state of affairs to this pass.

Indeed, at this time the Old Empress had not been swept off her feet in spite of the tremendous pressure constantly brought to bear aided and abetted by the unwise course of diplomacy the foreign ministers at Peking continued to follow. But if the Old Empress had not been swept off her feet the way had been paved, and it only remained for Prince Tuan to spring his trap.

Tuan sought a means of definitely throwing the Empress Dowager to the support of his schemes, and at the same time completely severing relations with the Powers. From Shantung, Chihli and the northeastern sections the Boxers had for some time been concentrating on Peking and Tientsin. If by this last and dangerous expedient he could throw the Empress Dowager ^{into the role} of actually supporting that vast tide of anti-foreign feeling which the fear of aggression and local conflicts had engendered, and if he at the same time could bring on an act of hostility by the Powers, then his plan for driving out the foreigners might be realized, and his own son raised to the Dragon Throne.

That in spite of his cleverness, he failed, and that the Boxer uprising became a farce in comparison to what it might have been, is the story of five eventful days.

FIVE DAYS OF MADNESS FOLLOWED BY CONFUSION

On June 10th Tuan's Boxers entered Peking. This was the first step in Tuan's desperate plan. The ministers in fear looked to their governments. The governments acted with the result that their fleets concentrated at Tientsin. To the Manchu Throne and the high officials, who had long expected aggression, this was the handwriting on the wall. On June 17th the Powers cooperating with the exception of the Americans, who rightfully held it to be an act of war, took the Taku forts guarding Tientsin.

Since the news of the concentrating of the fleet at Tientsin, and the entry of the Boxers into the city Jung Lu had counselled the Old Buddha to send the foreigners out to the coast. To this suggestion the Old Empress was not unfriendly, but she was not convinced that the situation warranted it until on June 19th, the hostile act of the Powers at Tientsin confirmed her worst fears. Tuan, who now became head of the Tsungli Yamen, was ordered to evacuate the foreigners, and charged that no harm should come to them. Yung Lu stood ready to escort them on the condition that the viceroy of Chihli would cooperate. This act of the Throne to evacuate the foreign representatives on the grounds that an act of war had been committed stands justified. But the foreigners feared trickery and delayed.

The Old Buddha still wavered, and on June 20, Tuan sprung his trap with all the ease of the trickster that he was. Just before a meeting of all the Boards, Tuan, as head of the Tsungli Yamen, handed the Empress Dowager a note, forged as we know now, in which the foreign Ministers demanded that she immediately abdicate; that the heir apparent be degraded; the Young Emperor be restored; 10,000 foreign troops be allowed to enter Peking. Even

those who loved her best have been free to admit that this proud woman was terrible in her anger. On this instance Kang Yi said that he had never seen Old Buddha ⁷ so angry. Ching Shan in his diary reports her as saying, ⁸ "How dare they question my authority! If I can bear this, what must not be borne? Let us exterminate them before we eat our morning meal." Just how clever this move of Prince Tuan's was deserves study for it strengthened his cause and his position from more than one angle. The heir-apparent was his son, who had already caused the Empress Dowager much grief by his presence within the Forbidden City, and whose rash conduct was to cause still more grief so that it was with a feeling of relief that Tzu Hsi had with the fatal ending of the Boxer uprising, good excuse to be rid of both Prince Tuan and his son. ⁹

The Old Empress/^{was} now thrown entirely into the hands of Tuan and his Boxers. Jung Lu's solicitations were for the time unheard. She told Jung Lu he might, if he wished, escort the foreigners to Tientsin, but she could give no guarantee of their safety. Even in her extremity she did not desire their death, but in view of this final insulting demand, she felt herself ill-requited for such acts as she had already granted favorable to their requests and demands. Her final judgment was, "It were better to go down in one desperate encounter than to surrender our just rights at the bidding of the foreigner". ¹⁰

That Tzu Hsi had no mistaken ideas of the seriousness of a war with the Powers is established beyond doubt. Her statement about "eating the foreigner before breakfast" was merely an apt quotation from the Book of Odes.

Prince Tuan was quick to seize the opportunity, and on the same day at his request a selected group of his Boxers demonstrated their invulnerability before the Empress Dowager at the Palace. It was with good effect. She dismissed Jung Lu from her presence, and on the same day agreed to a declaration of war. At a meeting of the Imperial Clan, Yuan Chang of the Tsungli Yamen questioned the authenticity of the demand for abdication. Tuan loudly called him a traitor and was himself rebuked^{11.} for his loud manner. She ordered Yuan to leave the hall. Whether Tzu Hsi ever learned the perfidity of Tuan is not known, but it shows to what hazards Tuan was ready to go. To dare such a thing would be decapitation for any but members of the imperial family, and even for them would be disgrace if found out. There is evidence that Tuan did go even farther than this, and that some of the hostile, later decrees and acts attributed to the Empress Dowager may have been the work of Tuan, the forger. In her anger Tzu Hsi ordered the firing on the legations, and the siege began.

But Tzu Hsi distrusted Tuan. Her better judgment seems to have soon gotten the better of her overwhelming rage. She feared the Boxer rabble in Peking almost as much as she feared the foreign armies. But she never for a moment ceased to be the Empress. Jung Lu denounced the Boxers, and the Empress protected Jung Lu, but for five days she gave herself over to the Boxer program. Then the turning away came quite as distinctly as she had been swept into their arms. On June 25, Prince Tuan led a party of Boxers to search the Palace itself for Christians. Probably he hoped to further implicate the Young Emperor.

At the gate Tuan allowed his Boxers to dencunce the Young Emperor and clamour loudly for him to come out. There is a very likely possibility that the trickster had actually arranged to plant some Chinese christians in the palace. He appreciated the possibility that he might persuade Tzu Hsi to compel Kwang Hsu to abdicate and make Ta-A-Ko, his own son, emperor, since he had in fact already been made heir apparent in January of 1900. But Tuan failed here. The Old Empress came out instead, abruptly asked Tuan if he had come to look upon himself as Emperor; if not, how dared he behave as he was doing. Instead of making his son emperor she threatened to wipe out his royal expectations. She bade them depart and to refrain from ever entering the palace precincts again except in the line of duty by imperial summons.^{13.}

From this date on the support of the Empress Dowager was withdrawn from the Boxers; nominally she countenanced them, but she allowed Jung Lu to use his forces as he saw fit. It was Jung's refusal to turn the heavy artillery on the legations, coupled with the presence of his friendly troops on one side of the legations which saved them and not any resistance which they offered themselves.^{14.} It is true Yung Lu kept up a clever semblance of attack for he did not care to directly engage the savage Kansu troops.

More than this the Empress Dowager upon the very day, when the Boxers had tried to enter the Palace, began unremitting efforts to get Li Hung chang to Peking. The Chinese historian, Shuhsi Hsu gives us the information concerning these efforts.^{15.} He says:

The attitude of the coastal and riverine viceroys and governors as shown in the understanding they established with the Powers, and the excess of the reactionaries - which culminated on June 25th in the invasion of the Palace itself - could not but cause the Empress Dowager to reconsider her decision. On the day of the invasion of the Palace itself - orders were given that the foreign envoys in Peking should be protected. On July 3rd appeals in the name of the Emperor were despatched to various heads of states, and an order was issued summoning the Grand Secretary (Li Hung chang) to proceed north "without the slightest delay". A little later another order was issued appointing the Grand Secretary to his old post, the viceroyalty of Chihli. . .

On arriving in Shanghai several days later, the Grand Secretary learnt that Tientsin, the seat of his viceroyalty, and the arsenal there, together with the stock of arms built up since the Japanese War, had fallen into the arms of the allies, leaving him neither the seat to exercise his authority or the means. Furthermore, he found that not only were the reactionaries opposed to him, but the entire foreign community, merchants, troops, and missionaries were hostile. . . .

In the meantime the Empress Dowager grew impatient and anxious, and by an edict dated July 23 . . . reprimanded him for his delay and ordered him to hurry north by land or sea. Shortly afterwards she repeated her command in reply to one of his memorials. . . . Throughout the

month of July the reactionaries were held more in check, but toward the end of the month, perhaps because of the unsettled state of affairs, they gradually got more and more out of control. It was at this time that there occurred the deaths of Yuan Chang, Hsu Ching-cheng and Chang Yin-huan . . .

. . . Prince Ching and Jung Lu had proposed to the envoys that the latter be safely escorted to Tientsin. This the Grand Secretary considered practical, for it would not only carry out what the Powers were trying to do, but would deprive the reactionaries of the most important lever through which they controlled the situation. He memorialized the Throne on July 27th, urging it to issue specific orders for the safe conduct of the envoys to Tientsin, and on the next day instructed the ministers at London and St. Petersburg to inform the respective governments of the step he had taken and to request them to cooperate by despatching no more troops and by halting the detachments already despatched.

The court promptly issued the order on August 2nd as requested. . . . The foreign envoys, however, rejected the overtures of the Chinese government to carry out the imperial order as they did with the proposal of Prince Ching and Yung-lu a little while earlier.

All of the actions of the Throne after June 25th in Peking seem to have been toward protecting the legations by any means which the dangerous situation would allow without actually dividing Peking in two hostile camps, the Kansu troops and the Boxers opposing Yung Lu and his loyal troops. As for the question as to whether a state of war existed there seems to have

been varying opinions. At Peking the existence of a state of war seems not to have been doubted immediately following the events of June 25th. On the other hand some of the viceroys and governors in the provinces which were in a position to come in more direct touch with the invading foreigner, the assurance became stronger and stronger that the Powers did not intend their invasion of China for any other purpose than to relieve the legations. In the main this surmise was correct, but later events were to show that there were among the powers those who were keenly awake to the advancement of their own future interests, as Russia for example.

From Peking the true state of affairs gradually reached the provinces with the result that many of the high officials, who, although they stood ready to resist with all their strength any hostile invasion for the purpose of partitioning China, at the same time chose to look upon the Tuan faction now in almost exclusive control of Peking by virtue of its Boxer following, as usurpers. Acting Consul-General Warren reported from Shanghai, July 3, 1900, "I am informed by the Viceroys and Governors that they consider Prince Tuan as a rebel, and have decided not to obey the decrees from Peking." ^{16.} This would indicate strongly that they had good reason to believe that either these decrees were entirely the work of the Tuan faction with a possible misuse of authority and seals, or that such imperial edicts were issued in order to avoid an abrupt rupture with the Tuan forces in Peking. Tzu Hsi during the interim between June 25th and July 3rd acted upon the assumption that an actual state of war existed. During these days she endeavored to turn the Boxer en-

ergy into regular military channels, and thus relieve Peking to some extent of its grave danger of falling entirely under this lawless element which threatened alike the city and the Throne. As for the edicts inciting the Boxers to out-and-out lawless acts after June 25th, there seems to be good reason to believe that these were products of the Prince Tuan faction.

During these days Tzu Hsi was not entirely out of communication with some of her more powerful envoys, especially the riverine envoys to whom she revealed her concern for the safety of Peking from the lawless Boxers, but stated that she saw no other way at the time than to let matters ride since to defy them would likely precipitate that which she feared most.¹⁷

All of this does not signify that she was repentant. The ground upon which the proud old empress stood was such that her acts were too well justified. Her resentment for the indignities offered her and her government remained with her until the end of her life. She had made a mistake she knew by allowing her anger to lead her to allow the Boxer faction to gain the upper hand under the unscrupulous Prince Tuan. But the circumstances would seem to justify even that, for Prince Tuan had been clever enough to act along the lines which the Ministers had so clearly left open for the playing of just such a trick and clothing it with all the probability of the truth.

As late as July 1st there remained the possibility of a tremendous, and all-embracing uprising of China in resistance to the Powers. If the Powers actually aimed at seizure of territory, then a large part of China would have undoubtedly fallen in line to offer a stubborn, and probably quite effective resistance. Not

only was the riverine viceroys and other high officials ready to fall in line, but the populace was so stirred that they were a concern of the viceroys and governors-general who were trying to keep things steady until they could ascertain the exact intentions of the Powers. You will note above that Li Hung chang had offered to safely get the foreigners out of Peking, but asked that the Powers land no more troops and recall those they had already landed. In this connection the communication of Viceroy Chang to the Taotai Ts'en is interesting: 18.

I (the viceroy) must therefore urgently instruct you (the total) to at once inform the British Consul-General (at Hankow) that I shall exert myself to protect (foreigners) within my jurisdiction, and to prevent bad characters from making trouble. If ^{any} lawless crew does create a disturbance before we are on our guard, the might of the regular troops will amply suffice to put them down and crush them immediately, nor will such a movement on any account be allowed to spread. Yesterday I was consulting with the Viceroy of Nanking by wire, and he informed me that he, too, everywhere issued stringent orders for the protection (of foreigners), his idea being that he and I should cooperate in looking after the lower Yang-tze. We both ask the British Consul-General to inform his Government that at present bad characters are being put down in the Yang-tze district, and that foreign assistance is not required. If the British fleet suddenly comes up the Yang-tze to assist, not only no advantage will be gained, but on the other hand the people will, we fear, become suspicious, and other countries

will follow Britain's example, thus rendering the readjustment of affairs impossible. As to the fear that other countries may take the initiative in entering the river to meddle, if the British Government does not make the first move, the other countries will not do so. Britain need therefore be under no apprehension.

Great Britain's interest in the Yangtze region is explained by the fact that it constituted her sphere of influence, which she intended to keep control of as against any other powers. At the same time the riverine viceroys virtually warn her here that they will resist any effort of Great Britain to take actual charge of the region.

Meanwhile on June 29th an imperial edict from Peking demanded the protection of the foreigners, and the legations under siege were undergoing the peculiar experience of having friendly troops on one side and hostile ones upon the other, and Peking was divided into two opposing camps. Luckily it was in those days that a break was averted, and the one man in Peking who could oppose Tuan successfully threw his influence for the protection of the legations, and the Empress Dowager protected him in his stand.

On July 3rd the United States acted to assure China that no territorial aggression was contemplated by that country nor would she look with friendliness of such acts by other Powers. This note reads:

. . . the policy of the Government of the United States is to seek a solution which may bring about permanent safety and peace to China, preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed to friendly powers by treaty or international law, and safe-

guard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire.

The date of July 3rd comes to have the foremost place in the history of the Boxer uprising. It was on this date that the Hay note was sent to the Powers, which embodied the tacit understanding that China would again be considered a nation, politically and territorially, whose entity it was desirable to protect and even more, promote. In short it meant simply this, that China would again be heard around the council table at Peking, and proper weight would be given to her problems. It was a return to the cooperative policy of Burlingame.

We are in error, however, to say that the cooperative policy was given up after Burlingame's time. It continued to function through the thirty years in a peculiar way. It was used to pry open and firmly wedge the door to China. At the same time while the Powers, through their ministers, sat around the conference tables at Peking working as a unit against China and backed by the powerful support of the Christian world, they were not in other ways upon a cooperative basis. Up until 1895 the one big problem had been to open China to foreign influence. After that year each party began to cast about for individual benefits, and jealousies and seizures were the result.

The United States had unwittingly been a party to the wedging open of the door to China, and a silent onlooker at the time of the seizures, but an onlooker with considerable misgivings. The American Government had for forty years given itself to a plan which in the end did not at all measure up to the policy laid down by Humphrey Marshall in the fifties. Then with the Boxer

uprising, the State department saw clearly how far it had gone astray. The Hay Note of July 3, 1900 was the result. This Hay Note crushed the Boxer uprising, and marks a complete change of attitude on the part of the Manchu Throne. It is ^{not} coincidental that on this same day the British Consul General, Warren, reported that the riverine viceroys declared they considered Prince Tuan a rebel, and had decided not to obey the decrees. It is ^{not} coincidental that on the same day the Manchu Throne in the name of the Emperor appealed to the sovereigns of the principal Powers. The Hay Note had assured the Manchu Throne and the high officials that the Powers were not intent upon seizures, and that instead of being in reality at war as everything had in the first led them to believe, there was in reality now no serious danger of the hostile aggression which they had to greatly feared. With that the huge potentialities of the Boxer cataclysm collapsed.

That the Boxer uprising did not become a great national uprising was due to the fact that while the Prince Tuan party had the Throne and Peking in their power, they did not intimidate it, and that it continued to consider all during the perilous days from June 20th to the 25th, the counsel of such level headed men as Jung Lu, Prince Ching, and the riverine viceroys. For the failure of the Boxer uprising to become the dread reality it might have become there is little credit to be given to either the foreign ministers besieged at Peking, nor the allied Powers seeking their relief. To ^a fortunate turn of events alone, and the presence of high Manchu officials who wisely counselled waiting, we owe the fact that all China did not arise after the unwise and undiplomatic seizure of the Taku forts. Had the Hay Note or any other

note advised wholesale seizures of Chinese territory on the ground that the Manchu Government had collapsed, the legations at Peking would likely have been destroyed; the very Manchu officials who had wisely counselled forbearance/^{would have} been seen at the head of such troops as a hostile nation could gather together; and China conquered by the sword after a period of hard, perilous conquest.

It was of such possibilities Bishop Favier and Sir Robert Hart, not to speak of others, had in May 1900, foreseen and feared. It is hardly the truth to say, however, that the people had ever been with the Boxers. It is much less the truth to say that the Manchu Throne had ever been with the Boxers, except for a period of five days which we have already discussed. All China ^{however,} was stirred against the foreigner and possible hostile aggression. This was the dangerous powder charge which the Boxer uprising had the immense possibilities of setting off, and in fact the very thing the scheming Tuan had counted upon, and failed due to the fact that the Throne distrusted and disliked him. ^{Empress Dowager} The contention of the/ in the following years that Tuan was to blame has much more truth in it than we have been hitherto willing to admit. The fact was the Boxer uprising was comparable to the burning of the powder train leading to a huge charge of dynamite, which largely due to circumstances, failed to ignite the charge. Had the Empress Dowager wholeheartedly headed the Boxer movement from the start as we have erroneously believed in the past, the whole dangerous situation would have been set off. But the Boxers from the first were too much the rabble, too much undisciplined plunderers despoiling both Chinese and foreigner alike to compel much confidence even/ on the part of the Chinese. The part they came to play is anomalous,

and they were in reality more nearly unscrupulous rebels than anything else, who had by the wiles of a crafty leader, cleverly playing his cards, won for a brief period of five days the sanction of the Throne, but never its whole-hearted and unreserved cooperation.

That the people were not with the Boxers is attested to by Bishop Favier in an interview published in the Peking Times for Jan. 11, 1901, quoted in part:^{20,}

The people, he (Bishop Favier) says, have not been with the Boxers for they have suffered still more than the Catholics. The Boxers at Peking killed 30,000 people who refused to follow them, and burnt 2,000 shops and 24 banks, altogether destroying a third of the city. Villages of 1500 souls counted four or five Boxers. Shantung was the only province which supported Tuan, this being on account of the irritation at the German occupation at Kiao-chou.

There can, on the other hand, be no doubt that the missionaries by the very peculiarities of their presence in China, and zealous protection of their converts, as well as their pronounced foreign attitude after 1900, were one of the deep underlying causes for the Boxer trouble. They were anxious, however, to clear their skirts of obnoxious charges, and the following explanation appeared in the London Times for July 19, 1901:^{21,}

The China Missionary Alliance has sent out under date of May 24 (1901) from Shanghai, an interesting and dignified statement in reply to the allegations frequently made that missionaries have been chiefly responsible for the recent uprising, and that they have manifested an un-christian

spirit in pressing for the punishment of the authors of last year's massacres. The Boxer movement which is ascribed (by the Alliance) to the following immediate cause(s) - the shortness of food, almost amounting to famine, which prevailed in those regions, the irritation caused by the industrial and economic changes created by railway construction and other foreign enterprises, the seizure of Kiao-chou, Port Arthur, and Wei-hai wei, which were bitterly resented as unwarranted aggressions, and the projection and forcible surveying of a railroad route through the province of Shantung, which produced intense local exasperation - "was anti-foreign rather than anti-christian. Native christians have suffered mainly because they have been reckoned as 'secondary devils', i.e., the allies of the foreigners. Moreover, the destruction of railways and the attack on railway engineers preceded the destruction of mission compounds and the slaughter of missionaries. . . . Among the facts of the outbreak are the seige of the Legations, the destruction of the property of the Imperial Customs, and the indiscriminate massacre of foreigners and of Chinese found in possession of foreign made articles". . . . With regard to popular resentment of missionary work by the Chinese, the Alliance declares that the amount of opposition has been much exaggerated, and adds with much force that the conciliating effect of the work done by the hospitals, colleges and schools, and famine relief has more than counterbalanced any prejudice raised by preaching the Gospel. "In spite of all that has recently taken place, it remains true that our position in China has

not been secured so much by treaty right as by the goodwill of the people themselves. And it is worthy to remark that those missionaries in the interior, who did reach the coast, owed their escape in a large measure to the friendliness of the officials and the people."

Much of their contention was doubtless true, but it can only be considered with a full knowledge of the facts, which the writer has tried to set forth in the preceding chapters. After 1890 there can be little doubt that the missionary was one of the prime irritants, not perhaps as a missionary but as a foreigner, who protected his converts, defied local officials, demanded indemnities and wholesale punishments for any injuries to himself and converts. He had been the avenue of approach for the aggressions, and lastly he was always present; of all foreigners he was the best known throughout China. Lastly, by the terms of agreement which the Powers decided upon as to indemnities, missionary indemnities had been omitted, largely due to France's stubborn reservation, to remain free to act without restraint in case of the Catholics, whom she still claimed to protect in spite of the presence of a papal legate at Peking. The result was, that the missionaries had been left free to take detachments of troops, and go into the villages where they had once worked, and levy upon the unfortunate populace such indemnities and punishments as they saw fit.

Lastly, as to the responsibility for the Boxer uprising, it is desirable to quote Dr. Matigon in F. Laur's "Siege de Peking":

23.

C'est l'Europe tout entière qu'il faut mettre en cause.

C'est parce qu'elle n'a pas compris les Chinois, c'est parce

qu'elle a cru ce peuple doux, somnolent, passif, pouvait, sans regimber, accepter toutes les innovations, toutes les humiliations, que l'Europe s'est laissée entraîner, et par ses missionnaires, et par ses ingénieurs . . .

Voilà pourquoi le mouvement Boxeur s'est produit. Ce mouvement c'est l'éveil du patriotisme Chinois, avec toute l'intransigeance d'un "nationalisme" aveugle, ignorant, mais légitime.

Thus ended a period in history which has through the years come to not only be highly colored itself, but to cast its distorted shadow upon the last phase of the Manchus both before and after its occurrence. The most powerful figure in the whole drama was the Empress Dowager herself, and because a certain quotation from the Chinese classics, which is attributed to her in the Diary of His Excellency Ching Shan, the Christian World, and the historical world as well, has been inclined to regard her not only as an arch conservative, but a hypocrite as well, who thoroughly at fault for the Boxer trouble, was by reason of a thorough chastisement, made into a reformer almost, we might say, overnight. This bit information upon which so serious a charge of hypocrisy rests reads:

Jung Lu asked Her Majesty yesterday what she would do if the Boxers were defeated, and if Peking were captured by the foreigners. In reply she quoted him the words of Chia Yi, a sophist of the Han dynasty, in reference to the Court's diplomatic dealings with the Khan of the Hans:-
 "If the Emperor wishes to gain the allegiance of the other

countries, he can only do so by convincing their rulers that he posses the three cardinal virtues of government, and by displaying the five allurements.

"These allurements are: ⁽¹⁾ Presents of chariots and rich robes, to tempt the eye; (2) rich food and banquets, to tempt the palate; (3) muscial maidens, to tempt the ear; (4) fine houses and beautiful women, to tempt the instinct of luxury; (5) the presence of the Emperor at the table of the foreign ruler, to tempt his pride.

"The three cardinal virtues of government are: (1) to simulate affection; (2) to express honeyed sentiments; and (3) to treat one's inferiors as equals."

Such a policy would have been Machiavellian in extreme, but it is to be remembered that while all historians must of necessity place great store on the old conservative Ching Shan's diary, which covers the entire period, that Ching Shan was old and in feeble health and never attended the councils but upon one occasion, and that he had to depend for much ^{in fact most} of his information upon what others told him as they came later to call upon him. In favor of the Boxers, he naturally credited their cause, and it is he who would have us believe that the Old Empress still supported Tuan after June 25, while much of the evidence which he gives, as well as information coming to light later, would show that at the most she was only playing a desperate game to save Peking and the Legations, if she ever in reality issued the edicts herself after June 25th. It must be remembered that Tuan was at no time playing anything less than a desperate game. If he would dare to stoop to forge a telegram, he would very likely stoop to forging anti-foreign edicts.

MEASURING REFORMS BY THE TICKING OF THE CLOCK

The return of the American State Department to rationality after years of aggressive diplomacy carried on at Peking in conjunction with the Powers gave a new lease on life to the now desperately weak Manchu dynasty. Had the American Government seen in the early nineties where the Latitudinarian policy would ultimately lead her, and have issued the Hay Note at the time when the Powers of France, Russia, and Germany were at such pains to check Japanese ambition in the Far East, there would have been little or no occasion for a Boxer uprising, for the aggressions of 1898 would never have been made, and England loath to move toward aggression even in the extremity would have likely have added her strength to the demand. Such a move would have quieted to some extent the fears and feelings of the gentry, and would have prevented the forming of a conservative party at court.

But as it happened^{there} was for the Manchu Dynasty a new day, a period when for the first time in its history it was relieved for a time at least of being definitely between two fires. The new stand taken by the United States, and the punitive expeditions made soon after by the Powers were both of unestimable aid to the Throne. In the first place it freed the Throne from the fear of aggression which had been present in high circles almost continuously since 1895, and restored diplomacy at Peking to its normal functioning of considering China again as a rightful member of the councils. Secondly, the punitive expeditions of the allies while severe did not fail to redound to the benefit of the Manchu regime. It completely destroyed the conservative court party, and its acts as well as its terms practically assured the central government at

Peking that there would be no seditious societies or armed risings for several years to come. The severity with which the allies had proceeded to punish all concerned, and many not fully proven to have been concerned in the Boxer uprising, had prostrated any idea or possibility of immediate resistance to either foreigner or Manchu. It was an opportunity not to be passed over lightly, and yet it might have been passed over had the Empress Dowager been the arch-conservative we have commonly and erroneously come to think of her as being. At least there was no cause for her throwing herself whole-heartedly into the matter of reform of her empire. Our western contention that we had whipped her into it hardly coincides with the character of the Old Empress. We have pointed out that Li Hung chang made his reforms in the eighties by and with the consent of the Empress Dowager. They were made not for the love of the foreigner and his ways, but for the good of the empire and the perpetuation of the dynasty. But they had come to naught for they had only served to force China from her Middle-of-the-Road Policy at a time when such a course was highly dangerous. In 1901, temporarily at least, the Throne was freed from the danger of internal opposition. In 1901 it was not a chastened Empress who turned to reforms, but one who saw in the possibility of speedy reform, the only hope of her beloved dynasty.

There was no longer any powerful conservative court party to check reform, national examinations had been suspended for five years in most of the provinces, the Wai-wu Pu, successor to the Tsungli Yamen, by terms of the treaty, took precedence over the other six boards, and the importation of arms ^{had been} largely forbidden. If any anti-foreign disturbance so much as showed itself the Pow-

ers would be as interested as the Throne in stamping it out. Where reform was by the nature existing conditions impossible in 1898, it was in 1901 the most obvious course to follow. At the end there lay, as always, the possibility of the continuation of the proud Manchu overlordship. Two dangers beckoned: 1. the shortness of the time before conservatism inground in the very fabric of China could recover and reassert itself so as to modify reform measures (unless the central government had in the meantime completely mastered the situation); 2. the advanced age of the Empress Dowager. Thus in 1901 we may say with truth that the possibilities for the survival of the Manchu overlordship was measured by the ticking of the clock. And by the ticking of the clock it fell. No one realized as clearly as Tzu Hsi the preciousness of each moment before she should "mount on high"; no one heard the tickings of the clocks more distinctly than she for her palaces were filled with clocks of all makes and designs.

The real power behind the reforms instituted in China in 1902 was not the Young Emperor, but the Empress Dowager. Professor Treat^{2.} says: "There is no question that any success of the new reform movement, in contrast to that of 1898, was largely due to the dominant personality of the Empress Dowager and sincere advocacy of reform as the only way of safeguarding the dynasty and China." If her personality could make reform real, there can be little doubt that had she been disposed that she might have made the Boxer uprising very real. Had she been disposed she would have had practically all China behind her. But the Old Empress had an eye for reading the times as well. She checked with good reason a wild Young Emperor in 1898; she instituted reforms in 1902.

It is to be noted here that the reforms of Tzu Hsi show a

reforming spirit plus wise state-craft, which those of the Young Emperor did not. She not only clearly saw that which she wished to do, but the difficulties which beset her path, so that not one of her reforms fail to provide for the most careful preparation and study before the reform itself is actually placed in operation. Education, education, always there is the provision for education, and then in the end the reform. In fact her carefully laid plans for education in the earlier years overshadow the reforms themselves. Lastly, there is apparent in all her reforms that urgent need for haste. The Province of Chihli under the redoubtable Yuan Shih-kai became a kind of work house for all kind of reforms, a proving ground so to speak for the Empire.

But Tzu Hsi was ^{growing weary} / ~~she~~ would death hold off his hand until she could make this one last desperate attempt for the Manchu dynasty; almost parallel with that fear was the fear that opposition within China itself would not hold off long enough for her to carry her reforms to a successful end. The year 1917 she set for the culmination of her empire into a limited monarchy. It is quite likely she had calculated her span of life as embracing that date. But it was too long. She reduced the period by necessity to 1913. Could it be done? But death came to a tired old Empress in 1908, and the opposition she dreaded swept away the dynasty in 1912.

From 1902 the perpetuation of the dynasty depended no longer on a continuation of the Middle-of-the-Road policy, the necessity of that policy was, at least temporarily past. Every effort was made ^{to} / bring about a revolution of the Chinese Empire from above.

In a report to W.W. Rockhill, who reported to the American State Department concerning the Boxer uprising, S.T. Williams, of the American

Embassy in Peking has the following to say concerning the natural linking of the final protocol and the subsequent reforms:^{3.}

By Article II of the final protocol of 1901 it was provided that all official examinations should be suspended for five years in those cities where foreigners had been massacred or subjected to cruel treatment during the "Boxer" uprising of 1900.

In accordance with this an imperial edict was issued on August 19, 1901, suspending for five years all civil and military examinations in forty-six cities blacklisted by the representatives of the foreign powers.

This action opened the way for the favorable consideration by the Chinese Government of a much needed reform of the whole educational system of the Empire.

The war with Japan served to demonstrate more conclusively that Chinese institutions were hopelessly antiquated, wholly unsuited to modern conditions. The Young Emperor and his advisers resolved upon reform, planned a complete school system for the whole Empire. But with the rashness of inexperience they antagonized the strongest elements of the nation. High officials who had given their lives to the service of the state were relegated to private life and the religious sensibilities of the people were shocked by the wholesale confiscation of temples for educational purposes. The coup d'etat followed which sent the Emperor's advisers to the execution ground or forced them to fly into exile. A strong reaction set in. There were many occurrences to justify antipathy to the foreigner, and all things for-

eign began to be taboo. The Boxer uprising was but an expression of this feeling. It failed of its purpose; but the attempt made shook the state to its foundations, and the walls of conservatism fell with a crash. Since that time there has been an unwavering determination on the part of the government to modernize all its institutions. . . .

.

At the same time a special commission on educational re- X
forms was appointed, the principle members being the two chan-
cellors of the Imperial University (Established in 1891 to
succeed the Tung Wen college), Chang Po-hsi (Chinese) and
Jung Ch'ing (Mongol). The provincial authorities throughout
the Empire took up the difficult task, but found themselves
hampered from the start, first by their own ignorance of the
modern curriculum; second, the lack of qualified teachers X
and superintendents, and thirdly, by the want of suitable
text-books. The teachers needed being secured in part from
the mission schools, in part by the employment of a very few
Europeans and Americans, but in a much larger measure by the
appointment of numerous Japanese instructors. . . .

The text-books needed are being supplied in part by trans-
lations of original works prepared by missionaries, or by var-
ious bureaus of translations which have been maintained by
several of the provincial governments for some years past.
These books are to be subject to revision, however, and new
books are being prepared under government supervision. . . .

With its arrival from Jehol the Manchu Throne resumed its
customary friendliness to the foreigners. Those who have chosen

to see in this nothing but Machiavellianism, fail to appreciate the effort under which the Throne had labored for the past decade. It was a conscious effort to be friendly to many who had well given cause to be hated. But so far as sincerity for reform, that is not to be doubted, and it links up with the period of the eighties when reform by the Government itself had really been inaugurated, ^{the period of reform inaugurated in 1901 to 1902} and was not the overnight changing from arch conservatism to reform with all the hypocrisy which such an abrupt turning connotes. Among the demands by the Powers was the one for posthumous honors for the three ministers of the Tsungli Yamen, whose opposition to Prince Tuan, led to his having them decapitated on the serious charge of changing the word "slay" to "protect" in an imperial edict. In this respect a Shanghai despatch under date of April 28, 1901 in the London Times is of interest: ^{4.}

Yesterday there arrived at Shanghai, enroute for Hang-chau, the bodies of Hsu Ching-cheng, Yuan-chang, and Hsu Yung-yi, three members of the Tsungli Yamen whose action in altering the edict last June resulted in their barbarous execution in Peking. The coffins were received with a guard of honor, the Taotai and numerous other Chinese officials attending . . . Today the bodies were conveyed through the settlements. The procession was fully a mile long, and the streets were densely packed.

The whole event was markedly impressive, and the spontaneous respect shown here to these martyred ministers supplies a significant comment on Sir Robert Hart's description of the Peking conspiracy as a national anti-foreign rising.

An imperial edict on October 7, 1902, independent of any outside pressure, made Tuan-fang, governor of Hupeh, the acting vice-

roy of Hu-kuang. Tuan-fang in 1900 was acting governor of Shensi, and upon receiving the fateful telegraphic edict of the Tuan party to exterminate all foreigners, locked it up without showing it to anyone, and gave out that he was instructed to protect the foreign missionaries of his province, and threatened dire punishment for any anti-foreign outbreak. He bade those who were on the side of the Boxers prove their courage by going to the sea-board and attacking foreign armies, and leave defenseless women and children alone. He then provided safe escort for the missionaries out to the South after showing them the instructions from Peking.^{5.}

On the same day Liu K'un yi, who as viceroy at Nanking in 1900 kept the southeast free from Boxer infection, and foreign invasion alike, was reared posthumously to baron with the title of Chung Ch'eng (loyal and sincere), and altar offerings were bestowed in his behalf. The promotion of Liu had not been demanded by the Powers. A study of the actions of both men reveal that they favored resisting armed invasion with arms, but that they did not favor the Boxer outrages and irregularities, which were properly neither war nor sincere support of the Throne. The promotions would further strengthen the fairly well established fact that they had followed the course which Tzu Hsi really sanctioned, and that she herself played desperately after June 25th to save Peking and the Throne.

With the ushering in of the period following the Boxer uprising, the situation had not only greatly cleared internally and abroad for a freer hand by the Throne toward reform, but there came in a second period like that of the eighties and even seventies when Manchu and missionary again worked to a common end of

freeing China from some of her most grievous burdens. In April Yuan Shih-kai addressed a letter to Dr. Timothy Richard asking him to draw up a list of suitable books for the candidates for official positions to study in anticipation of an examination as to their knowledge of foreign affairs. Yuan in establishing two colleges at Tsi-nan-fu, one military and the other scientific, named Watson Hayes, an American Presbyterian, as the president of the latter.

A party of English missionaries accompanied by an English major in travelling to Tai-yuen-fu, in Shansi, and from there to Singnan-fu in the Fall of 1901 with relief funds to relieve the stress of famine, reported that they travelled unarmed, relying on the promise of protection given by the Chinese, which was everywhere well fulfilled. They were everywhere well received by the officials and the gentry. But the spirit of revenge had not died out of the Christians' hearts, it seems, for in Sheo-yang-hsien they found a magistrate whom they accused of being implicated in the murder of English missionaries, and their angry protests added his name to the list of exiles.

The missionary following the Boxer uprising was that curious mixture of so much that is fine, and at the same time so filled with pettiness, that one must blame him almost in the same breath that one praises him. In short, he changed very little from what he had been in the past. He had done much good for China, doubtless, especially from the Western point of view. He had given her all kinds of schools, from kindergarten to college; from girls' school to medical schools; he had served in the face of famine and plague even to the giving of his life

in the service; he had established the first modern asylums in China for the blind, the insane, and the lepers; he had established orphanages; he had served in high places both for his home government and for the Manchu Throne, but his efforts were colored by every degree of personality. On the other hand there were many evidences that his labors were hedged in by a narrowness and pettiness which bordered upon meanness of soul. He made the most of the Boxer uprising for indemnities, and his voice was raised shrilly in the demands for punishments. The London Times of December 27, 1901, gives the following description of a funeral for murdered missionaries at Tung-chau:

The officials of Tung-chau gave a remarkable funeral on Friday to the Christians massacred last year in accordance with an arrangement with the missionaries, whereby the latter refrained from demanding punishment of the murderers, if the officials made public atonement and impressed upon the people that the missionaries and converts must be respected. Seventy coffins were borne in the procession, which traversed the principal streets of the walled city. Several hundred relatives of the victims attended, and a company of infantry, several bands and hundreds of men carrying gaudy funeral emblems lent pomp and picturesqueness to the ceremony. The procession occupied two hours in passing the reviewing stand where city officials, General Ma, commander of the troops who besieged Tientsin, Mr. Conger, and many British and American missionaries were assembled.

. . . Officials from fifty villages attended, bow-

ed before the banners, and eulogized the Christians for dying for the faith. They also signed documents guaranteeing the Christians protection if they returned to their homes.

The pressing of missionary claims and their subsequent record have revealed the same tendency to press for resultant losses as well as real damages, a practise which had been started in the nineties. This agreement by a local official in Taian Fu, Shantung, can be taken as illustrative:

I, Mao Shu-yun, agree to pay Messrs. Bostick and Verity, Dr. Barrow, and Miss Sture the sum of two thousand nine hundred ^(taels) and cents eighty-one (taels 2900.81), Taian K'uping, compensation in full for losses sustained on their respective mission places in Taian city by the theft and robbery during 1900. I agree to pay tael five hundred eighty-six and cents sixteen (taels 586.16) today and the balance not later than the 8th Moon of the year (Kuang Hsu, 27th year)

At the same time the missionaries presented a claim for extra expenses in living and moving incurred by reason of the Boxer troubles. Two claims will serve to illustrate:

Claim made by Dr. T.B. Crawford

Travelling expenses Chefoo to stopping place in

America and return to Taian (Mexican)	\$2,002.55
Rent, Greenville, S.C., eight months @ \$6	48.00
	<hr/>
	\$2,050.55

T.J. Hudson's Claim

Travelling expenses from Taianfu to Demoss-ville, Ky.

\$ 900.00

These claims were for the most part all promptly and un-

complainingly settled as they had been during the nineties. Of such claims John Hay in a despatch of July 17, 1901, wrote: ^{10.}

While regarding these separate compositions of claims as unsanctioned and not involving responsibility on the part of the Government to effect their execution; the Department must necessarily take equitable cognizance of them as matters of fact, if for no other reason than to bar any duplicate claim upon the international indemnity by reason of the same losses.

Of missionary claims generally H.G. Squires, American consul at Shanghai in a despatch to the Secretary of State, John Hay, dated May 28, 1901, says: ^{11.}

It seems to me unfortunate that the missionary owing to his peculiar status, can present and recover damages that an ordinary resident of the country will be precluded from doing under the rules recently adopted by foreign representatives. I have reference to travelling expenses to and from the United States, and extra living expenses while there.

Their settlements (of claims locally) has caused no end of criticism and ill-feeling, especially in this province, and among foreigners as well as Chinese. They have themselves gone into the country and assessed damages on various villages ^{where} Christians have been killed or their property destroyed. As they have generally been accompanied by soldiers, such settlements were in fact forcibly made, the presence of soldiers making them such whether they accompanied the missionaries simply as a guard or not. . . .

That the missionary had been allowed such wide powers in naming and collecting his own indemnities was due, as we have said previously, to the fact that French insistence had largely kept this class of claims from being settled under the indemnity fund.

When the treaty between the United States and China was revised in 1903 the XIV Article was revised somewhat to check the arbitrary actions of the missionary with relation to their converts, and giving recognition to the claims long made by the Manchu Government that many abuses were continually practised by the so-called converts under the cloak of Christianity.

12.
The Article reads:

XIV. The principles of the Christian religion, as professed by the Protestant and Catholic churches, are recognized as teaching men to do good and to do unto others as they would have others do to them. Those who quietly profess and teach these doctrines shall not be harassed or persecuted on account of their faith. Any person whether citizen of the United States or Chinese convert, who according to these tenets, peaceably teaches and practises the principles of Christianity shall in no case be interfered with or molested therefor. No restriction shall be placed on Chinese forming Christian churches. Converts and non-converts, being Chinese subjects, shall alike conform to the laws of China, and shall pay due respect to those in authority, living together in peace and amity; and the fact of being converts shall not protect them from the consequences of any offense they may have

committed before or may commit after their admission into the church, or exempt them from paying legal fees levied on Chinese subjects generally, except taxes levied and contributions for the support of religious customs and practises contrary to their faith. Missionaries shall not interfere with the exercise by native authorities of their jurisdiction over Chinese subjects; nor shall native authorities make any distinction between converts and non-converts, but shall administer the laws without partiality, so that both classes can live together in peace.

Missionary Societies of the United States shall be permitted to rent and lease in perpetuity, as property of such societies, buildings or land in all parts of the Empire for missionary purposes, and after title deeds have been found in order and duly stamped by local authorities, to erect suitable buildings as may be required for carrying on their good work.

This article embraces all of the developments of forty years of diplomacy, and in addition shows not only that the United States was acting to minimize the friction between ordinary Chinese and Christian converts that had been one of the causes of the Boxer uprising, but recognizes the contention of Prince Kung and other Chinese officials of the oftentimes mercenary motives of converts. But the most notable feature which it reflects is the gradual change of attitude toward the missionary following the Boxer trouble, tending to limit him in the wide powers which he had enjoyed in the past. He had used these wide powers to attain his zealous ends, but this had rebounded to the disadvantage of foreigners in many cases. Lastly, it reveals the new attitude the United States was adopting toward China. It smacks of the wisdom and cooperation of Burlingame.

this
 In connection it must be stated that Article XV of this same treaty agrees to give every assistance to judicial reform in China, and to relinquish extraterritorial right, when it has been satisfactorily shown that the state of the Chinese laws, and arrangement for their administration and other considerations warrant it. Other countries about the same time revised their treaties much in the same tenor, and it was evident that the Hay Note of July 3, 1900 had gone far toward settling the state of affairs in the Chinese Empire, and to bring China back into the circle of Powers on a basis somewhat comparable with the dignity of sovereignty. Great Britain agreed as did the United State concerning extraterritoriality. Sweden adopted the ^{Article} XIV of the American treaty in toto.

To some extent the practise of missionaries and missionary societies buying property, and after the deeds had been stamped by local officials, or at some later time, turning it to foreign merchants was continued. In 1907 to stop the practise of these transactions the Wai-wu Pu instructed all viceroys and governors of the provinces to warn their civil and military subordinates to insert the characters "kung tsan" or "public property" in the deed. After some discussion it was agreed to substitute the words "kung ch'an" meaning "real property" instead of public property so as not to confuse the title with that of the Chinese Government.

The ruling of the Tsungli Yamen of March 16, 1898, that the Catholic clergy be accorded rank according to their churchly offices, and thus be enabled to deal directly with Chinese and Manchu officials of equal rank, had not served to facilitate

dealings between officials and missionaries, but had only tended to give official recognition to a mischievous practise. On April 10, 1908, the Wai-wu pu presented the following memorial to the Throne ^{13.} praying for the rescinding of the Regulations of March 16, 1898:

The object of the Tsungli Yamen in arranging definite rules for the relations between territorial officials and missionaries was to facilitate the settlement of missionary questions. As, however, it can not be claimed that Bishops and others who are doing missionary work in China have in reality any official position, they can not be regarded as being of equal rank with Governors-general, Governors, and other officials. The attitude adopted by territorial officials in recent times, has, too, been of quite a different character from that existing at the time these regulations were laid down. Furthermore since these regulations were promulgated, there have been cases where missionaries have arrogated to themselves the use of the official insignia of territorial officials, and have given rise to misconceptions in the minds of the ignorant populace. This was certainly not contemplated when the regulations were issued, and the time is now opportune for introducing such modifications as will make them entirely satisfactory.

. . . that in the future it shall only be necessary that the relations between territorial officials and missionaries shall, in accordance with the Treaty provisions, be conducted with courtesy. . . .

If these treaty provisions and memorials tended to . . .

to narrow and restrict to some extent the activities of the missionary, there were many points in which the objective of the missionary and the objective of the Manchu Government were identical. The Manchus had never ceased to oppose opium, and although they had had little power to assert their wishes in the matter they had not by any means supinely submitted. We have previously studied the furore which the opium question had stirred in England following the submission of the famous Pethick Report. Li Hung chang had been an undefatigable enemy of opium, and would hear no excuses why Great Britain maintained she had to continue flooding China with opium simply because the Government of India needed ^{this} revenue to assist in balancing its budget.

The Pethick Report had struck a deep chord in England, and as the years passed it entered more and more into the criticisms hurled at the Government, and the Government accepted it as it did many other things, in its slow opportunist way, someday something would have to be done. Meanwhile Indian opium continued to enter China, and the evil increased. if it could not be kept out there was little ^{use} of trying to restrict the home production of it. So that in 1905 the customs officials reported 6,953, 905 pounds of opium imported into China ^{14,} besides that which was produced at home.

The Manchu Government watched this evil with uneasiness, and in this the strong lever of public opinion in other countries with which China had contact was to do much to bring about the much needed reform. The key to that public opinion was as always, the missionary.

In May 1906, Dr. H.C. Du Bose, a medical missionary of Soochow, and the president of the Anti-Opium League, had an interview with the Governor-General of the river provinces, H.E. Chou Fu, and was told that if a memorial signed by the missionaries of all nationalities ~~was~~ sent to the Governor-General, he would forward it to the Throne. Ruled sheets were sent out to 450 cities throughout China, and the returns showed 1,333 signatures. These were bound into a volume covered with yellow silk and sent to Chou at Nanking on August 19, 1906. The Governor-General forwarded the signatures to Peking accompanied by his memorial praying for a decree to check the grow-^{15.}ing opium evil. Dr. A.H. Smith, a missionary historian, says the result was the edict of September 20, 1906 providing for the suppression of opium selling and paving the way for a number of edicts as well as the opening of negotiations with foreign countries to check the evil, and resulted finally in the question of opium becoming an international one in the first decade of the twentieth century.

About the same time J.G. Alexander, secretary of the Society for the Suppression of the Opium Trade arrived from England thus linking up the two movements, the one in China, the other in England particularly.

On January 8th 1907, the Chinese Government ordered the viceroys and governors to reduce the poppygrowing area by half in the Spring 1908. On May 11, 1907 the opium dens of Foochow were closed; a week later those in Peking; and a week later the dens in the Shanghai native city were closed. On June 27, 1907 a second imperial edict for the year appeared.

This edict prohibited opium smoking and planting excepted from the smoking prohibition persons over sixty years of age. Slanderous tongues immediately recalled that the Empress Dowager was over sixty years of age, and on the strength of that alone it was accepted as proof that she herself used opium. So insistent was the rumor that historians have had to make note of it. On the other hand it seems to have no basis in fact.

After this rapid fire action by the Throne, the various treaty ports followed one after the other by closing their opium dens. The last to close was the Shanghai Foreign Settlement which continued to permit dens to run under licence until March 1908, and only closed then when it drew the direct fire of the missionary contingent of China. It acted to cancel one fourth of the opium licences in the settlement at the expiration of the first half of 1908, and one fourth each succeeding year until all were extinguished.

The Throne was diligent in its follow-up of the war on opium. Stringent measures were laid down to further restrict opium smoking and planting, and officials were compelled to break the habit if they themselves were users or give up their official positions.

In a number of cities public burnings of opium took place. These public demonstrations were the first stirrings of a demonstrative New China, which has since probably gone to excess in demonstrations. Missionaries everywhere were back of the movement and students added the enthusiasm. When the viceroy at Wuchang was slow in the matter of opium reform in his province the Hupeh Missionary association addressed a memorial

17.

to that dignitary.

The trend of circumstances were right for China to secure some understanding with the British Government and a working agreement with the Government of India. In December 1907 the Indian Government agreed to restrict the amount of Indian opium shipped to China 5,100 catties or chests each year for three years provided that China reduced her domestic production in the same proportion, i.e. one tenth. A further arrangement was now negotiated with Great Britain whereby the exports from India to China were to be continually reduced until 1917 when the trade would be entirely extinguished. This agreement contained the clause that if the production in the whole of China or in any province ceased before 1917 the Indian exportation would cease also. China's measures against opium were so effective that by 1913 importations from India ceased. The battle by the missionary and by Li Hung chang begun many years before had finally been won. From the first to the last the missionary had played a leading part, and the final reform had been given its original impetus by the action of the missionary body.

18.

In this connection it should be said that the United States had never lent itself officially to the trafficking in opium, although in the early days American ships engaged in the outlaw trade as did the others. In 1838 Dr. Williams and Dr. Martin had insisted on its being prohibited in the American treaty, but the clause had been struck out at the last moment by the Minister Plenipotentiary, Mr. Reed, much to the chagrin and displeasure of the two American secretaries. In 1880 by Article II of its commercial treaty the United States had agreed that its citiz-

ens should not engage in the opium trade. An act of Congress approved February 23, 1887, made the trafficking in opium by its citizens a misdemeanor punishable by fine or imprisonment,^{19.} or both.

But the United States had found with the acquiring of the Philippines that it had its own opium problem. Here the fight had been carried on largely through the missionary and public spirited citizens. In this connection the Right Reverend Charles H. Brent, missionary bishop of the Episcopal church for the Philippine Islands had headed the Philippine Investigating committee, and delivered a report which had wide circulation throughout the Orient. It resulted in the English bishops of the Anglican church in Hongkong petitioning the governor of Hong Kong against the system of farming.^{20.} Around the Philippine report the matter of the opium question had tended to come to a head, just as the Pethick report in 1880 had set a great agitation in motion.

Bishop Brent, who was a friend of President Roosevelt, was not content with local action, but on July 24, 1906, had written the President saying,^{21.} "I am going to make bold to suggest that which I venture to think might be fruitful of great good if you can see your way to initiate this movement (international action). It is this: Recently, as you are aware the question of England's share in the opium traffic has been reopened in official circles in the old country. My experience on the Philippine opium investigating committee leads me to believe that the problem is of sufficient merit to warrant an endeavor to secure international action."

The result of the bishop's endeavors was the calling of the International Opium Commission to meet in Shanghai on February

22.

1, 1909, with Bishop Brent presiding. The following nations participated: Great Britian; the United States; Frande; Germany; Austria-Hungary; China; Italy; Japan; Netherlands; Persia; Portugal; Russia and Siam. In a series of resolutions the commission condemned opium and redommended means for the alleviation of the vice, among these recommendations was one for the immediate opening of negotiations with China by the nations participating.

The United States acted promptly with an act restricting the importation of opium or its derivatives into the United States or its territories after April 1, 1909. In this action its interests were material as well as humanitarian, but the Government was prepared to go farther. It now suggested to the Powers that an International Congress be called to act internationally upon the findings of the International Opium Commission. Thus was started that great international movement against opium which resulted in international conferences being held in 1911, 1913, 1914 and 1924.

China's part after the Revolution was not so happy. Political chaos and the selfishness of China's leaders desroyed the effectiveness of the Manchu reform, and China speedily became a greater producer and user of opium than ever before. The Nationalist Government established an opium monopoly in 1927.

Sufficient emphasis can not be laid upon these reforms of the Manchu Throne from 1901-1911. Briefly they may be summed up as follows: 1. A closer relationship of the Throne and Empire - a change from traditional decentralization to centralization. Boards of education, finance, military affairs, police

and justice; 2. The study of affairs abroad by means of special commissions; 3. The preparation for the gradual shifting of the government from that of an autocracy or despotism, in theory to a centralized limited monarchy in fact; 4. The adoption of a complete system of education; 5. The complete reforming of the army along modern lines; 6. The instituting of modern subjects in the ancient civil service examinations; 7. The abolition of opium.

With peculiar significance the date 1917 catches the eye in these reforms. There was to be a new government by 1917, no more opium by 1917, an enfranchised population of 5% by 1917 who could read and write. As the many clocks ticked within the walls of the Forbidden City or at the Summer Palace sixteen miles away, it was almost as if the Old Empress had checked upon the calendar that year as the date of her death. But she soon found reason to try to hurry her reforms, and the date was subsequently placed at 1914, but even by 1914 neither the Empress Dowager nor the Chinese Empire would be in existence.

No one knew the necessity for gradual change in such a country as China so well as did the Empress Dowager. All the prejudice of the Chinese to change she fully understood; she fully recognized the great cloud of ignorance and illiteracy which she must dispel if a limited monarchy were to be successful. On the other hand she realized that, as fraught with danger as the path of reform in such a conservative country as China must be, that the events arising out of the Boxer uprising and the enunciation of the "Open Door" ^{by the United States} offered her dynasty its opportunity for reform and life, where before the open door had merely meant the blocking open of the door for the better and more certain spoilage of

China. Where the Powers had once appeared in the role of critics and aggressors, they now gave those evidences of support which strengthened instead of weakening the Manchu Government. Upon this shift of fortune of the Chinese State and her own increasing years the Empress staked her chances for reform from above. At the same time she tried to soften the abruptness by a gradual program change coupled with a carefully worked-out plan for educating the people. Illiteracy, prejudice, old age, and a tottering throne were her great enemies. If by 1917 China was to have a constitution, she planned that by 1914-15 one percent of the population should be able to read and write; two percent in 1915-16; and in 1916-17 a possible five percent. To this five percent she was willing to trust her dynasty under a limited monarchy.

But how far her plans were to go astray is shown by this statement concerning the Chinese (Christian) Church in 1918, whose members would naturally be expected to have received every advantage for an education:
27.

The Chinese Church is as yet predominantly illiterate. Although there has been an improvement in the literacy of Christians, it is yet a lamentable fact that possibly not less than three-fourths of the adult Christians of China are unable to read.

But if the increasing years of the Old Empress necessitated a hastening of reform before death claimed her, there was yet another reason for haste. The indemnities and punishments meted out by the Powers following the collapse of the Boxer movement had for the time being crushed the spirit of resistance

by the Chinese to Manchu and foreigner alike, and it was upon this brief interim allowed which the Empress Dowager had taken the opportunity of getting her reforms well under way, and the situation well in hand before this/^{internal}resistance could again become formidable. If the student is laboring under the impression that all China was during these years welcoming the reforms, and the new tide of Western culture which they brought, they need to dispel that disillusionment. China was as restless under the Manchus as before, and the presence of the foreigners no less galling than it had ever been. The only difference was the new prestige which the Manchu Government now enjoyed due to the unexpected turn in affairs following the Boxer uprising. This strength of the Throne and the enmity of the Powers to anything like a/^{secret}society together with the possibility that they would cooperate with the Manchus to check another disturbance served to keep this discontent underground for the most part.

In Kansu in the Fall of 1901 two Belgian priests and four native converts were murdered in a trouble stirred up, it was alleged, by the outlaw Prince Tuan and the "Boxer" general, Tung Fu-hsiang. The Throne promptly decreed punishment of the ringleaders by death, and local officials were given full cooperation and a specified length of time to seize them.
28.

In southern Honan in March 1902 considerable Catholic property was destroyed, and fifteen native Christians killed. No foreigners were injured. This section had not participated in the support of the Boxers, and resentment over their being taxed to pay the indemnities demanded by the Powers reveals how far local autonomy still ruled China, and how keen the Chinese

sense of justice. An edict demanded the punishment of the criminals, and the removal of six officials from office.^{29.}

^{30.}
In southwestern Chihli from April to May, 1902, Ching Ting-pin, a military graduate, headed a revolt by the people, due to unrest over high taxes collected for indemnity payments. A French priest was killed along with a number of Chinese converts. A season of poor crops and unequal distribution of missionary aid between converts and ordinary Chinese provided two other angles to the disturbances here. Yuan Shih-kai was ordered to suppress the uprising.

In the Fall of 1902 in Sze-ch'uan, near Chengtu, droughts and high-priced rice encouraged outlaw bands known as "The Hung Lantern Society", "Boxing Bandits", and "Spirit Boxers" to kill native Christians, and destroy chapels. For this Boxer echo the viceroy was removed, by an edict of August 2, 1902.^{31.}
^{32.}
In Hunan in September 1902, two British missionaries, J.R. Bruce and R.J. Lucas, were killed following a scourge of the cholera, when someone started the report that the foreigners were giving out poisonous medicines thus causing the deaths.

^{33.}
In 1901 a quarrel between Catholic and Protestant converts near Nan-chang led to serious fighting which required the presence of Chinese troops. In 1902 at Hsin-chin near Nanking, a riot resulted in Protestant and Catholic converts taking sides in a quarrel between two Chinese partners in a small business, one partner being a Protestant and the other a Catholic. This incident shows the tenacity of the old gild idea even among converts. A British missionary distributing relief at the village of Wha-nga-lo, ten miles west of Tung-ngan-hsien, was

murdered in March 1901. Unequal distribution seems likely to have been the cause.

Watts-Jones, an officer of the Royal Engineers, lent the Indian Government for railway survey work, was murdered on his way down the Yellow River at Kwei-hua-cheng in March 1901. On December 9, 1901, Ming, tao t'ai of the Kuang-Jao-chiu-nan circuit, declared that the establishment of churches and the propagation of the Christian religion was the affair of foreign missionaries, and demanded the recall of Chinese Christians engaged as evangelists in the interior. The Manchu Government refused to uphold his action, but it is interesting in that it was a new approach and a protest.

The uprisings against taxation for indemnities continued into 1903, and it seems likely that this protest never entirely died out and was one of the factors underlying the Revolution of 1912. In Chihli Boxer echoes continued, while West China continued to suffer from robber bands from which there was little protection except that of the organizing of the local inhabitants into bands for self defense. All of these societies it is to be noticed were not only anti-Manchu, but also anti-foreign. They kept the missionaries alarmed, and reports were continually reaching Peking of placards threatening hostilities; the presence of societies; petty persecutions of native Christians, etc.

The following extract is quoted from the despatch of E.H. Conger, the American minister, to Secretary Hay, dated December 4, 1904:

With regard to the various rumors of an anti-foreign

movement among the people of China, I have the honor to report as follows: During the past year I have received information at various times of the existence and activity of certain secret societies in the provinces of Shensi, Kansuh, Hupeh Kiangsi, Honan, Chihli, Shantung, Kuangtung, and Kuangsi. Such societies have existed under various names during the whole period of the Manchu rule. As a result local rebellions occur nearly ever year. At present such a rebellion exists in the province of Kuangsi. The aim of these societies is to overthrow the present Manchu dynasty. At times they have instigated attacks upon foreigners, either with a view to embroiling the Central Government in a conflict with the powers, as was attempted in 1891, or punish foreigners for what was believed to be a systematic planning to partition the territory of China among the Western powers, to exploit her resources, and subvert her religious, social and political institutions. Such was the Boxer uprising of 1900.

A recent memorial of the imperial commissioner T'ieh Liang, sent to central China to investigate financial and military conditions, declares the Empire is everywhere infested with these rebellious societies, the people being driven to their organization by the extra taxes levied to meet the indemnity due the powers.

Conger at the same time expressed the opinion that a general uprising was unlikely as the societies were scattered and unorganized, while the Central Government was alert and determined. In case of an uprising he thought the Chinese would undoubtedly

ly attack foreigners as well as imperial officials.

On October 28, 1905 at Lienchou in the Province of Canton,^{38.} a riot occurred when American missionaries refused to permit the Chinese to fire a cannon on the occasion of a celebration. The American mission was stormed by a mob and five Americans were killed. French missionaries were not disturbed. This local hostility couples itself up with the general boycott of American goods in 1905 as a nation wide-protest against the treatment of Chinese in California. For the occurrence \$49,896.40, Mexican, was collected for property destroyed; \$9,258.86 for losses incurred by Chinese converts; in addition \$25,000 was paid to the families of the victims

A Boxer disturbance at Chang-Pu in Fukien, and in Nanking shortly afterwards led to the destruction of the English and Catholic missions, but the American mission was spared. The Manchu Government gave prompt aid and protection to the foreigners. The Kiang-hu-Hui society at Lao-ho-k'ou, Hupeh, started a movement toward rebellion in 1906, which was both anti-foreign and anti-Manchu. The Government immediately suppressed the uprising. In February 1906 a riot at Nan-ch'ang Fu, the capital of Kiangsi, arising over difficulties between Catholic and Chinese local officials resulted in the death of six French missionaries, and two British missionaries. In the same month a fight occurred at Waioupu in Tai-chou between Protestant and Catholic converts over some arable lands. In 1906 a second rebellion of some consequence was begun when a secret society called "the fanners" organized in the neighborhood of Changpoo near Amoy. Its opposition was aimed at both Manchu and missionary, espec-

ially those of the Catholic faith. It was put down promptly by the Chinese Government.

The Imperial Edict of Sept. 2, 1905, had inaugurated a new system of examinations. The growing class of enlightened citizenry began to make itself felt. Memorials poured in to the Government at Peking from all parts of the Empire suggesting measures for raising school funds. The spirit in some respects had entirely changed. Private citizens made voluntary offerings, some as high as 10,000 taels each, for the support of the much needed schools. High Manchus generally sensed the time and the need for action, but the efforts of the Old Buddha received no less ardently the support of the high Chinese.

In Fukien and Kwangtung the provincial officials in their zeal tried to compel the Buddhist monks to surrender a part of their property. Kwang Hsu had tried to do this, and it was a dangerous expediency. An Imperial Edict was forth coming shortly to check such seizures, but not before Buddhist hostility to the Manchus and to reform had received added impulse. The Buddhist priests now held the new educational reforms to be foreign in their origin and forced on China by the Powers.

China during these years had been moving with a new spirit, a veritable revolution from above, and the one person who threw her powerful personality over all was the Empress Dowager herself. In her ears sounded during her waking hours the voices of the many hurrying clocks. In the little time of grace allotted to her by the peculiarity of the sit-

uation within China and abroad, as well as her own advanced age the Old Empress sought to preserve that which was dearest of all to her, the Manchu dynasty. She viewed with satisfaction the progress of reform. She hastened it, urged it, lived with it night and day, and yet without seeming to urge it, for things must move slowly when a great edifice is being changed brick by brick. But there was present always the hurrying clocks. In her necessity could she lengthen her years of life to fit those of her reform program?

Then there came a day when she felt intuitively the approach of death. It would come sooner than she had expected. How well she estimated her own span of life in these last days history eloquently tells in the dates of the death of Kwang Hsu and on the following day of the Empress Dowager herself. Kwang Hsu was a weakling in whom many of the Manchus and high Chinese had no confidence. The more liberal supported him, but even they admitted that Kwang Hsu was a weakling. Moreover, he had been possessed with a spirit to avenge himself upon those who had been instrumental, as he felt, in the betraying of his own unjustifiable coup of 1898, especially Yuan Shih-kai. ^{was} It/ as much as the Throne was worth the Old Empress seems to have felt to leave Kwang Hsu succeed her. There was perhaps no love lost between these two in the last days for the proud Old Empress could never forget that it was he who, as her own nephew and nominee for the imperial honors, ^{had} had worn imperial honors /with such ill grace, and who had outraged the Confucian canons. So as the day approached when Tzu Hsi saw she must surrender her beloved dynasty into other hands she resolved that it would not be Kwang Hsu. We in Republican America perhaps will

not justify this conclusion, but there seems to be many hard and not to be denied facts which do justify the conclusion that Kwang Hsu was not meant to rule a country whose Throne was tottering on the brink of ruin which only the possibilities of reform wisely carried out could prevent.

There are in the life of Tzu Hsi only two ^{fairly} well substantiated cases of violence within her own household. When the court ^{was} fleeing from Peking, at the very hours when the relieving columns were arriving, the Pearl concubine, the favorite consort of the Young Emperor had begged the Empress Dowager not to take the Young Emperor with her. The hapless maid doubtless made this request from purely personal motives, but to have done so would have amounted to the Empress Dowager's abdication in favor of Kwang Hsu. The concubine Pearl was already suspected as having encouraged the Young Emperor in his madcap venture of the Hundred Days, and had like himself been imprisoned. In her rage ^{against} the hapless woman Old Buddha turned her over to the implacable head eunuch Li Lien Ying, who had her thrown into one of the deep wells of the Palace grounds.

There seem to be evidences that in this and in other events following that the strain of the events of the nineties coupled with the strain of the Boxer trouble, that something within the nervous ^{given} system of the Old Buddha had ^{gone} away. To perpetuate the Throne and to show in some way her deathless respect for the noble Yung Lu seem in her last days to have become obsessions with her. When she felt death approaching in 1908 she turned to the chief eunuch Li Lien Ying again, and Li at her instruction, doubtlessly, fed Kwang Hsu a slow acting

poison. He must die before her was the resolve of the Old Empress, and he did. Hours before his actual demise they had dressed him grave clothes. When he ^{41.} died the Imperial litter was immediately sent to the house of Prince Chun, whose wife was Jung Lu's daughter, and in the middle of the night aroused a sleeping three-year old child, whom the Old Empress had herself named, and whom ^{42.} she now made Emperor. On the following day the Empress Dowager of China "mounted on high" leaving her beloved dynasty into the hands of Prince Chun as Prince Regent for the child emperor Pu Yi.

The clocks ticked on within the Forbidden City for three brief years more.

THE EDIFICE CRUMBLES

The years from 1901 to 1908 had been profitable ones for China. There seemed reason to believe that the revolution from above would be accomplished successfully. Of the movement during these years Prof. Treat has the following to say:^{1.}

The reform movement in China during the past six years had so encouraged the friends of China that they thought the peaceful development of the empire was assured. The new education would prepare the people for political responsibilities, constitutional reform would substitute a limited monarchy for the former absolute Manchu regime, financial reforms would improve trade and industry while lessening the burdens on the people, would increase the revenues of the state, and while military and naval expansion was to be regretted it would free China from any foreign aggression and maintain internal peace.

In 1908 the guiding hand and chief support of the Manchu Throne was gone. Had the Empress Dowager succeeded in successfully making the shift from absolute to limited monarchy? That question remained to be answered. That the Manchu Throne had not been sincere in these reforms is unworthy of any consideration. In 1908 there were four sources of danger: 1. The Prince Regent, while doubtless a reformer, was of a negative character, and imbued with Kwang Hsu's hatred for those whom his brother (Kwang Hsu) believed responsible for the radical coup d'etat of 1898; 2. Too much still depended upon the attitude of personal officials in the government of the Empire; 3. There was

in China in 1908 much anti-Manchu and anti-foreign unrest, which was no longer cowed by the Boxer punishments, and which would form a ready tool for the many ambitious young reformers, who saw possibilities of personal advancement in any change;

4. The Empire would need a strong hand to guide it through the period of actual transition from absolute to limited monarchy. That China did not have. The Prince Regent is said to have uttered the prophetic words at the coronation of his son,^{2.}
 "It will all soon be over, son."

Something of the good intentions of the Throne coupled with its colorless mildness is sensed in this Imperial Edict issued upon the event of the child Pu Yi mounting to the Throne^{3.}

We have inherited the great succession. The enthronement ceremony is finished. We earnestly reflect upon the methods of government which have been handed down by the sacred ones, among which there are none which do not show reverence for heaven, and respect for the ancestors, diligence in government, and love for the people.

In all the good works left incomplete by the preceding administration, there is nothing that we will not reverently carry forward.

On the 1st day of the eighth moon (Aug. 27, 1908), the late Emperor reverently received the excellent decree of the late Great Empress Dowager strictly ordering the officials to carry out completely by the ninth year all the preparatory work so that at the appointed time the constitution may be proclaimed. Also proclamations for the members of Parliament to assemble and other decrees bri-

ghtly manifested the sacred instructions, and all between the seas applauded. From ourselves down, the officials high and low, all must sincerely obey the excellent decree previously issued. The eighth year of Hsuan T'ung/is (Pu Yi's Imperial Title) the limit of time. Let there be no "reabsorption of sweat" in the matter. Our hope is that this will be carried out. Let the officials of Peking and the Provinces on no account look idly on, and procrastinate delaying the opportune time.

Let patriotism be shown forth! Exert yourselves that Constitutional Government may be established and court and 'wilds' (people) may have peace; and so we may comfort the spirits of the late great Empress Dowager and the late Emperor in heaven, and firm foundations of countless years of peaceful government.

Reverently received.

These were the words put into the mouth of the youthful Hsuan T'ung by the Prince Regent.

Events now marched swiftly in China. There always had been deep differences between Manchu and Chinese; between North and South China; between local and central governments. The reforms begun in 1901 could only at the best accentuate these differences. Their only hope of success lay with the possibility of the Central Government making itself supreme, or at least sufficiently powerful to carry through reforms. That it seems likely to have been able to do had the Empress Dowager been twenty or thirty years younger. If this failed, however, China would likely face chaos for there were within China too many conflict-

ing, not to say selfish interests and ambitions.

In the United States where anything under the Head of Republicanism is greeted with an open hand, the agitation of the young reformers was given a far more favorable view than history seems to have justified. The returning scholars from the United States, Japan, and Europe, as well as the many young men and women from the mission schools, had as their prime aim the overthrow of the Manchu dynasty. What they would do after that seems to have been but poorly digested by these newly returned students. A republic to them would be a kind of new dynasty in which they would wield the power. They seem not to have thought very deeply about the common masses; of their enlightenment and enfranchisement. To secure their end they would precipitate a revolution and throw China into chaos. The missionaries of course stood as sponsors for this new freedom, and anticipated somewhat erroneously as events have proven, that the New China would not only be eager to Westernize herself, but also be very favorable to Christianity.

That China in revolution has been sympathetic to foreign influence except to seize the ready tools which it offered, or that they were favorable to the cause of the missionary, has since 1922 conclusively not to be the case. Dr. Sun Yat-sen was a revolutionary whose unification of secret societies was with the purpose of overthrowing the Manchu dynasty. That Dr. Sun was a Christian or favorable at all to foreigners at heart seems open to doubt, although Dr. Sun was educated in the mission schools, and received refuge in foreign countries during his period of exile, is undoubtedly open to serious question since the events

4.
of 1925.

Although the revolution of 1911 swept away the Empire it is significant to note that it in no way swept away the anti-foreign feeling, which is as deeply imbedded in China today as it was in the time of the Manchus; it has only taken on new form, that of intense nationalism. From the friendliness of Yuan Shih-kai and other leaders of his time, the Protestant missions in China have reaped skepticism for their pains and keen interest in political reform.

It is necessary here to study the events of those three years which were to lead to the Manchu abdication. On May 13 and 14, 1910, riots broke out in Changsha extending throughout Hunan. These riots were both anti-foreign and anti-Manchu. Mission houses, foreign business houses and custom houses were destroyed. In Changsha the mob was comprised of some 30,000 Chinese, and was started by the scarcity and dearness of rice together with some official speculations by officials/ ^{for speculation 5.} in rice. Boxer leaders seem to have come from Hunan from Shantung with the deliberate intention of fomenting disturbances, and lost no time in making the most of the opportunity. Due to their influence the discontented mob was turned to their purposes. The North China Daily News for May 5, 1910 gives the following analysis ^{6.} of the riot which became rebellious in character and anti-Manchu:

. . . Three kinds of distinction can now be clearly made. First, the difference that occurred on the first night of the riot (in Changsha), and that of the two following days and nights; second, the difference between the treatment of property that foreigners had rented and that

which they had purchased; third, the difference between the treatment of foreign style property in which the Changsha gentry had monetary interest and that in which they had none. . . .

In other words on Wednesday night there was a hungry mob that had a grievance and no organized leader. On Thursday night there was a leader and the program was distinctly marked out beforehand. . . .

Next, there was a distinction made between property that had been rented and property that had been purchased by foreigners. To understand this distinction it is necessary to recall a few of the events of the past few years. It is doubtful whether a single case of land purchase by missionaries or merchants has been put through during these years with some amount of friction. The provincial assembly has gone to the extreme of officially advertising in the daily press a warning to land or house holders not to sell to foreigners. . . . There are eight pieces of property in the occupation of foreigners that escaped the riot. Seven out of the eight are rented places.

Death had deprived the Manchu dynasty of the Empress Dowager, and the Prince Regent had allowed his prejudice against Yuan Shih-kai to deprive the Throne of one of its most capable men just at the time when he was about to be most needed. Reform had been allowed to slow up and thus crippled, but not intentionally so. While there was no departure from the program of reform the Government soon began to reflect the ills of its

weakness, so that when it should have been strongest in order to effect the transition from absolutism to limited monarchy without losing control, it was weaker than it had been since 1900.

In 1907 the provincial assemblies had by definite plan been called for 1909.⁷ They met in October of that year. Their members were chosen by indirect election in which suffrage was limited by either property, education, or former service in an official capacity. These passed off without untoward incident. In most cases they reflected the feelings of the gentry of the particular provinces in which they met. With the summoning of a national assembly to convene in Peking in October 1910, the next step was entered upon. The assembly met only to promptly exceed its powers. Nothing was accomplished except that the Throne had consented to call a real elected parliament for 1913 instead of 1917 as the Empress/Dowager had planned. The national assembly called for January 1911 was dissolved. The second session convened on the eve of the revolution.

At the same time that the revolution from above was threatening to break down; there was a corresponding laxity revealed in the control of the provinces. Officials gambled in rice and rubber, and hesitated not to use their offices to their advantage. In addition the Yangtze valley for several years previous had suffered almost uninterrupted famine. Of the economic situation the China Mission Year Book for 1912 says:

In the Yangtze Valley there had for several years been a condition of almost interrupted famine, caused by successive floods. Millions of people had died from starvation

and millions more must die this year (1912) unless help came to them. A year earlier there had been trouble at Changsha, chiefly arising from the official cornering of rice, and the rice problem had been more or less acute ever since; at the time of the outbreak the rice problem in Shanghai was a very serious one. . . . As the result of heavy gambling in rubber in 1910 there was in Shanghai and to some extent throughout the country considerable financial stringency, with resulting increase in the cost of living.

At Canton in April 1911, the real revolutionary character of the reformers showed its hand in the outrages of the Tungmenhui upon the Manchu officials. Railroad construction in Szechuan by foreigners caused riots in the Autumn of 1911. About the same time the unrest in the Yangtze region broke into flame at Wuchang and Hankow under revolutionary tutelage. A fourth contributing cause was found in the action of the Imperial Government taking over provincial and private railway lines in which the gentry were heavily interested. Szechuan, Hunan, Hupeh, and Kwangtung sent in protests. Riots followed which required that troops be called from Wuchang. "Down with the Manchus" became the battle cry. Professor Treat
9.
says:

. . . It was a simple matter for the radical leaders to hold the Manchus responsible for all the ills which had befallen China without recalling that the Manchus at most numbered less than one percent of the total population, while the Chinese officials

held all the lower and most of the higher posts in the administration.

On June 5, 1911, W.J. Calhoun, the American minister, in his despatch reviewed the situation as follows: ^{10.}

Sir: At the present time there are not lacking signs of a renewed and somewhat widespread discontent among the Chinese toward their Manchu rulers. This feeling seems to have arisen from the evidences of the weakness of the central government in dealing with Russia and Japan over the territorial jurisdiction in Mongolia and Manchuria and with Great Britain in ^{the} Yunnan-Burma border delimitation dispute and in the opium trade arrangements. The organization of the Provincial and National Assemblies offers the people a new method of voicing their discontent, from which they soon drift into an attitude of antagonism to the Central Government. For several months past rumors have been in circulation all over the Empire to the effect that foreign powers were planning a partitioning of China (an expediency which was as sure to get a hearing as it was in 1899). These rumors have been circulated by the native press and from mouth to mouth in all parts of the country with a persistency which suggests some organized activity with the intention of stirring up the people against foreigners and against their own Government.

.

The movement to organize a militia among the people (kuo min chun) has for its ostensible motive the lend-

ing of assistance to the Central Government against the aggressions of foreign nations, but it is generally understood both by officials and the people that such a militia, if organized, would be used to intimidate the Central Government and enforce any demands which might be made by the people. The Government is therefore very wisely discouraging the movement. . . .

The strong stand taken by the Central Government in regard to the construction and control of all main lines of railway in the Provinces, the conclusion of foreign loans contrary to the wishes of the people, and the refusal to convene an extra session of the National Assembly for the discussion of the budget and loans, have exasperated the radical element of the people to an extreme degree.

There is a magnanimity about the ^{Emperor} ~~Emperor~~ even when the Empire was falling which compels our admiration, and which clearly reveals the Prince Regent accepting what he seems to have considered as inevitable from the time his son had ascended the Dragon Throne. When the National Assembly met on October 22, 1911, at Peking it demanded the punishment of the viceroys at Wuchang and Chegtu, and ^{of} the minister of communications for permitting the outbreak. This move instead of helping that Government which had made the creation of the Assembly possible only served to further paralyze its arm. But the Throne did not protest; it accepted all and on October 30, 1911, the six year old Emperor issued a penitential edict assuming the blame for all that had occurred. The edict reads:

I have for three years and a half acted conscientiously in the interests of the people, but I have not employed men properly, not having political skill. I have employed too many nobles in political positions, which contravenes the Constitution. On railway matters someone whom I trusted fooled me, and thus public opinion was opposed. When I urge reform the officials and gentry seize the opportunity to embezzle. When old laws are abolished high officials serve their own end. Much of the people's money has been taken, but nothing to benefit the people has been achieved. On several occasions Edicts have promulgated laws, but none of them have been obeyed. People are grumbling, yet I do not know; disasters loom ahead, but I do not see.

The Szechuan trouble first occurred; the Wuchang rebellion followed; now alarming reports come from Shan-si and Honan. In Canton and Kiangsi riots appear. The whole Empire is seething. The minds of the people are perturbed. The spirits of our nine late Emperors are unable to properly enjoy sacrifices, while it is feared the people will suffer grievously.

All these are my own fault and hereby I announce it to the world that I swear reform, and with our soldiers and people to carry out the Constitution faithfully, modifying legislation, developing the interests of the people. Old laws that are unsuitable will be abolished. The union of the Manchus and Chinese mentioned by the late Emperor I shall carry out. The Hupeh and Hunan grievances, though precipitated by the soldiers, were

caused by Jui-cheng. I only blame myself because I mistakenly appreciated and trusted him.

However, now finances and diplomacy have reached bedrock. Even if we all unite, I still fear falling, but if the Empire's subjects do not regard and do not honor Fate and are easily misled by outlaws, then the future of China is unthinkable. I am most anxious day and night. My only hope is that my subjects will thoroughly understand.

Penitential edicts by the emperors were traditional in China but this edict by the youthful Hsuan-T'ung (Pu-Yi) was more than a penitential edict, it was virtually an abdication.

It is not necessary to go into the details of the revolution itself. The Throne continued to show their eagerness to satisfy Chinese public opinion, a thing impossible of fulfillment. In the last extremity Yuan Shih-kai was recalled. Needless to say he should, as a matter of good statesmanship, never have been dismissed. The Prince Regent resigned his office. An edict permitted the Chinese to cut off their queues and introduced the Western calendar. When these measures failed to conciliate the revolutionaries, abdication alone was left. Yuan urged this, but some Manchu princes delayed this desperate step until January 28, 1912 when the imperial generals in the North memorialized in favor of abdication. On February ^{12th} / three edicts appeared.

The first edict announced the abdication of the Empress Dowager (Kwang Hsu's wife), and of the Emperor, and authorized Yuan to organize a provisional republican government.

The second edict dealt with the terms respecting the future state and condition of the imperial family, and the treatment of the non-Chinese subjects of the Empire. The third edict gave the reasons for the abdication. The Manchus went further and urged Yuan to accept the position of provisional president and thus join the North and South and avert the possibilities of a disastrous civil war.

In the meanwhile this unique document had been issued from Nanking on January 5, 1912, which is no exception as to the untruths and half-truths common to most declarations of independence including the one of July 4, 1775:^{12.}

Republican Manifesto to all Friendly Nations

from the Republic of China, from

Nanking, Jan. 5, 1912.

Greeting.- The hitherto irremediable suppression of the individual qualities and national aspirations of the people having arrested the intellectual, the moral, and the material development of China, the aid of revolution has been invoked to extirpate the primary cause, and we now proclaim the resultant overthrow of the despotic sway wielded by the Manchu Dynasty and the establishment of a Republic.

The substitution of a Republic for a Monarchical form of Government is not the fruit of a transient passion. It is the outcome of a long cherished desire for a broad-based freedom making for permanent contentment and uninterrupted advancement. It is the formal declaration of the will of the Chinese nation.

We, the Chinese people are peaceful and law abiding. We have waged no war except in self defense. We have borne our grievances through two hundred and sixty-seven years of Manchu misrule with patience and forbearance. We have by peaceful means endeavored to redress our wrongs, secure our liberty, and insure our progress, but we have failed. Oppressed beyond human endurance we deem it our inalienable right as well as our sacred duty to appeal to arms to deliver ourselves and our posterity from the yoke to which we have so long been subjected, and for the first time in our history inglorious bondage has been transformed to an inspiring freedom, splendid with the lustrous light of opportunity.

The policy of the Manchu Dynasty has been one of unequivocal seclusion and unyielding tyranny. Beneath it we have bitterly suffered, and we now submit to the free peoples of the world the reasons justifying the revolution and the inauguration of the present government.

Prior to the usurpation of the Throne by the Manchus the land was open to foreign intercourse and religious tolerance existed, as is evidenced by the writings of Marco Polo and the inscription on the Nestorian tablet of Sian-fu.

Dominated by ignorance and selfishness the Manchus closed the land to the outer world and plunged the Chinese people into a state of benighted mentality calculated to operate inversely their natural talents and

capabilities, thus committing a crime against humanity and the civilized nations almost impossible of expiation.

Actuated by a desire for the perpetual subjugation of the Chinese, by a vicious craving for aggrandizement and wealth, the Manchus governed the country to the lasting injury and detriment of the people, creating privileges and monopolies and erecting about themselves barriers of exclusion in national customs and personal conduct which have been vigorously maintained throughout the centuries.

They have levied irregular and unwholesome taxes upon us without our consent, have restricted foreign trade to Treaty Ports, placed likin embargoes upon merchandise in transit; obstructed internal commerce.

They have retarded the creation of industrial enterprises; rendered impossible the development of natural resources, and willfully neglected to safeguard vested interests.

They have denied us a regular system and impartial system of administration of justice; inflicted unusual and cruel punishments upon all persons charged with offenses whether innocent or guilty; and frequently encroached upon our sacred rights without due process of law.

They have connived at official corruption; sold offices to the highest bidder; and have subordinated merit to influence.

They have repeatedly rejected our most reasonable demands for better government, and have reluctantly conceded pseudo-reforms under most urgent pressure, making promises

without the intention of fulfilling them; and obstructing efforts toward national elevation.

They have failed to appreciate the anguishing lessons taught by foreign Powers in the process of years, and have brought themselves and our people beneath the contempt of the world.

It will be our constant aim and firm endeavor to build upon a stable and enduring foundation a national structure compatible with the potentialities of our long neglected country.

We will strive to elevate our people; secure them in peace and legislate for their prosperity.

To those Manchus who abide peacefully within the limits of our jurisdiction we will accord equality and give protection.

We will remodel our laws; revise our civil, criminal, commercial and mining codes; reform our finances; abolish restrictions to trade and commerce, and ensure religious toleration.

The cultivation of better relations with foreign peoples will ever be before us. It is our earnest hope that the foreign nations who have been steadfast in sympathy will bind more closely the bonds of friendship, that they will bear in patience with us the period of trial confronting us in our reconstructive work, and that they will aid us in the consummation of far-reaching plans which we are now about to undertake . . .

With this message of peace and good-will the Rep-

public of China cherishes the hope of being admitted into the family of nations, not merely to share their rights, and privileges, but also to cooperate with them in the great and noble task called for in the upbuilding of the civilization of the world.

(Signed) Sun Yat-sen, President,

(Countersigned) Wu Ting Fang, Minister
of Foreign Affairs.

13.

Of this document J.O. Bland says it is "an example of purely imaginative history. The voice is that of Sun Yat-sen, but the hand seems to be the hand of the American political missionary". But as the document did not speak true history neither did it speak the true spirit of the Chinese people. It may have spoken in a way what a few of the Chinese leaders like Dr. Sun wished for China, but even that seems questionable. It was from start to finish a political document intended to check as far as possible any possible intervention by the Powers or any one Power in the revolution by shifting off onto the Manchu all of the odium of the past. The missionary, whose proteges most of these advanced revolutionists were, accepted it all in good faith, and looked forward to a new China with a republican form of government, a reformed system of jurisprudence, religious toleration, and marked friendliness to foreigners. The delusion that China is a republic still persists ^{China} to day/with her multifarious governments and territorial/^{war} lords. The delusion of the friendliness of the Chinese to foreigners, or their toleration and welcoming of the Christian religion has crumbled. The world has found that which it should have

known years before from a study of Chinese history that the spirit of anti-foreignism, and the conservative nature of the Chinese Empire lay not in the Empress Dowager; nor in the Manchus but in the masses of Chinese people themselves.

Why then the highly colored Declaration of Independence of January 5, 1912? The outbreaks among the Chinese people right up until the revolution itself had been both anti-Manchu and anti-foreign. In reality it still remained so, but the revolution naturally fell into the hands of the more enlightened men like Dr. Sun, who realized well enough that the success of the Revolution depended upon the absence of foreign interference. This accounts for the sudden dropping of all anti-foreign propaganda, and the above appeal to the Powers in the name of all things dear to the Occident.

So successful were these assurances that the Powers hastened to make it known that they had no intentions of interference. This further assured the leadership of the men of Dr. Sun's type, who recognized the importance of not antagonizing foreign public opinion at such a time by attacks on foreigners, and missionaries particularly.

Under the surface China was and still is anti-foreign. Race prejudice of the past lives in the Chinese nationalism of today. China today provides constitutionally for religious freedom, but the people while ceasing to subscribe^{to} their ancient religions are not embracing Christianity. Realizing that a people without a faith are difficult to govern, the Nationalists are endeavoring to deify Dr. Sun, as Russia has attempted to make a nationalistic god of Lenin. Missionaries have contributed much for the good or ill of China, but among those

things they have not contributed a faith. Hu Shih, for example, readily acknowledges ^{New}China's debt to the missionaries, but questions the ability of Christianity to survive the extreme spirit of nationalism to be found in China today.

CONCLUSION

I remains in conclusion merely to capitulate briefly: that from the beginning of foreign intercourse there has been a great gulf between the East and West. Their systems of thought were different; the Manchu overlords claimed world wide sway, and regarded the presence of the foreigner on the coast as that of a barbarious sea pirate who was to be placated and dealt with as necessity demanded but never regarded as an equal of the Son of Heaven. Treaties made under such conditions were not treaties in fact.

After 1860 the Manchu Throne knew that it was not sacrosanct, and with that realization there came an entirely different attitude toward foreigners and treaties. Their safety law, however, in making their peace with the foreigner on the one hand, and pacifying on the other the great masses, who made up the Chinese Empire. Treaties presupposed a strong central government, yet the Powers must necessarily be held constantly in check in order that the populace might not be antagonized. The result was Prince Kung's Middle-of-the-Road policy, and the expedience of acting from behind the curtain. For outrages the Manchu Government paid promptly, but it was correspondingly slow to punish.

In the eighties Prince Kung antagonized the Chinese people by not acting promptly enough to check the aggressions of the French in Annam. A change was made. Li Hung chang, while a more aggressive man than Prince Kung, was more of an out-and-out liberal and less of a diplomat.

In the meantime the Powers following the sixties found

themselves faced with the necessity of following up and protecting the missionary zealot by whom treaties were given very little consideration besides "God's work of converting the heathen." But to check him the diplomats did/dare^{not}. The result was that on their part they seized upon every pretense to justify his presence in the interior where he had no right by treaty stipulation to be. To their surprise the Central Government objected hardly at all providing the missionary made his peace with the local inhabitants. The years from 1860 to 1890 saw the ministers at Peking evolve and perfect the Latitudinarian Policy, and by the close of the period they could quote precedent to a people who held precedent more inviolable than treaties which were foreign arrangements.

With the aggressive Li Hung chang and his proposals of railways for defense, the development of mines, a modern army and navy, the Throne for the first time stepped somewhat from behind the curtain and showed itself favorable to all reforms which linked themselves up directly with the welfare of the Manchu dynasty. Under such conditions and spirit of liberality Kwang Hsu grew up, reigned jointly with the Empress Dowager for a few years, and in 1839 assumed the Throne. Tzu Hsi retired to the background, and except for the natural relation of parent and child interfered but little with Kwang Hsu's rule. Kwang Hsu soon proved himself more than liberal, heady, and somewhat jealous of his position as Emperor, so much so that he irked to take any advice from the Empress Dowager.

Under the Young Emperor China speedily ^{departed} ~~entirely~~ from the Middle-of-the-Road Policy of Prince Kung. He was forgetful of,

if he had ever really appreciated, the precariousness of his position. He dreamed of reforming his Empire without taking into account the difficulties. Wholly sympathetic with Westernization he readily accepted the advice of the Powers until they had soon become accustomed to demand even on minor points. This surveillance to the Powers was galling to the conservative Chinese people. Secret societies spread rapidly, and they were both anti-Manchu and anti-foreign in their aims. This counter movement brought on visions of a second Taiping to the more conservative Manchus, who still remembered that disaster, and knew the precarious character of the Manchu overlordship. The disaster of 1895 welded it into a party at court who importuned the Empress Dowager to check the heady young Emperor.

This the Empress Dowager steadfastly refused to do until Kwang Hsu so far forgot himself as to dismiss Li Hung chang, and actually plan a coup de main against the person of Tzu Hsi herself and her most trusted friend and advisor Yung Lu. She then acted to reassert herself in the Government, and to attempt to check the aggressions/ⁱⁿ which the Powers had just taken occasion to force certain concessions and agreements from China. Fearing further forcible seizures, especially by the Italians, and alarmed by the deep rumble of discontent within the Empire, the Throne secretly prepared for war rather than permit any further seizures of Chinese territory under the head of concessions, or outright. Partitioning of China was not a myth, it was a reality in those days, and freely

talked of among the Powers; while rumors of this talk spread far and wide throughout China. For the Throne to permit any further seizures would be tantamount to inviting wholesale rebellion within the Empire.

At the same time the Boxer disturbances in Chihli and Shantung further complicated the affairs of the Chinese Empire, and the Throne's attempt to prepare to resist invasion resulted in decrees which the Powers looked upon with suspicion, and the report was set widespread that the Empress Dowager was secretly abetting the Boxers. Suspicion was further strengthened by the reluctance of the Throne to cause all societies to disband, since many of these societies were closely allied and tied up with the ancient defenses of the Empire. In the end the Throne yielded to the demand, and then awaited the springing of the trick which it supposed the Powers were specifically aiming at when they had demanded the dissolution of societies.

The intriguing Prince Kung had in the meantime wielded the Northeast together into a band determined to rid the country of the foreigners. This organization was completed through the aid of travelling troupes of entertainers who practised juggling and other arts. When the Throne had acted to suppress these in Shantung and Chihli, Tuan had them move on Peking. This concentration led the Powers to land troops for the protection of the Legations at Peking. In landing they were opposed by the local commandant under orders from Peking, as aggression was and had been expected for some time. Tuan unable to gain the support of the Empress Dowager, even after this apparent act of war, resorted to a

forged note in which the Powers demanded her abdication. This clever stroke threw the Empress Dowager into the arms of the Boxers; their further investiture of Peking was not resisted, and seige was laid upon the Legations at the command / of the Empress. Five days later the Empress Dowager had reason to learn of the truly lawless character of the Boxers when they attempted to enter the palace precincts. From that date on she attempted to protect the Legations as much as she dared through the instrumentality of Yung Lu and his friendly troops, and yet no precipitate an open break between Yung Lu's troops and the Boxers. In the meantime she ordered Li Hung chang to proceed to Peking with all haste, and entered into direct communications with the riverine viceroys, who counselled moderation until they could find the intentions of the Powers, whether it was really with the intention of seizing and dividing China, or merely to relieve the Legations. The Hay note relieved all China on that score, and the Boxer uprising instead of becoming an uprising of prime importance and extending to open resistance throughout China became instead a fiasco.

With the collapse of the Boxer movement and the subsequent punishments the possibility of internal revolt was checked for a number of years, while the Hay note had paved the way for a new and better understanding between China and the Powers. The Empress Dowager then set herself actively to reform, but with a necessity for haste due to her advanced age, and the fact that opposition within itself, although temporarily crushed, would in time gain strength and make itself felt and necessitate the checking of reform. The reforms credited to the Em-

press Dowager show both an understanding of reform and of the obstacles which reform would have to meet. Her span of life did not permit her reforms. She was followed in power by the Prince Regent for Puyi, who despaired of his task, and manifested a weakness of judgement and an inability to restrain his prejudice. Under Prince Chun the Government was unable to find the strength needed to brook the period of change from absolute to limited monarchy.

With such liberties as they gained the purely revolutionary faction within China made use of their new dignities as citizens and members of the National Assembly to confound the Central Government while actively backing revolt. The elements of opposition in the conservative masses having again had time to arise were used by the revolutionists, who adroitly switched them from anti-foreign and anti-Manchu to purely anti Manchu. Sun Yat-sen by the Declaration of Independence of January 5, 1912, not only assured the revolutionaries against non interference from the outside Powers, but even built up very active sympathy for them in some quarters. Especially the Protestant missionaries gave their sympathy expecting that gains for the revolution would be gains for the Christian faith. Most of the leaders of revolution had been at some time or another their proteges. A republican China, and the possibility of a Christian China drew a large support throughout the world for the revolution. All the evils they chose to let die with the Manchus as manifestly their fault, but those prejudices still walk today.

As a matter of fact China is hardly a republic today; most certainly it is not Christian, and the old anti-foreign prejudice still lives. And the Manchus, even the one we have chosen

to consider the arch-conservative of all; the one who had heavy reasons to hate the foreigner for his continual and unwarranted meddling, Tzu Hsi herself was not a conservative in the sense that the Chinese masses was conservative, but rather a moderate whose great care was not so much her overweening ambition, but her great desire to see the Manchu dynasty perpetrate itself.

REFERENCES

Introduction

1. Cheyney, Edward P.: Law in History, American Historical Review, Vol. XXXIX, No. 2 (January 1924).
2. Martin, Cycle of Cathay, pp 449.

Chapter I

1. Williams, S.W.: The Middle Kingdom, Vol. II, p 315.
2. The Travels of Marco, pp 113-261.
3. Treat, P.I.: The Far East, p 55.
4. Missionary Review, March-April, 1879.
5. Rockhill, W.W.: Diplomatic Missions to the Court of China, American Historical Review, Vol. II, No. 4 (July 1897), p 632.

Chapter II

1. Rockhill, W.W.: Diplomatic Missions to the Court of China, American Historical Review, July 1897; pp 627-631; 640.
2. Williams, E.F.: China Yesterday and To-day, pp 118-136; 184-204.
3. Dennett, Tyler: Americans in Eastern Asia, p 142.
4. Ibid., p 161.
5. Ibid., p 169.
6. Ibid., pp 559-560.
7. British and Foreign State Papers, Vol. 32 (1843-1844) p 800.
8. Dennett, Tyler: Americans in Eastern Asia, pp 167-168.
9. Ibid., p 560, footnote.
10. Williams, E.F.: Life and Letters of Samuel Wells Williams, p 165.

Chapter III

1. Martin, W.A.P.: The Awakening of China, p 168.
2. Williams, S.W.: The Middle Kingdom, Vol. II, p 264.

3. British and Foreign State Papers, Vol.44, 1853.1854, p 508.
4. Little, John B.: Missionary and Politics in China, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. XLIII, No. 4 (December 1928).
5. Dennett, Tyler: Americans in Eastern Asia, p 210.
6. Williams, F.W.: Life and Letters of Samuel Wells Williams, p 356.
7. U.S. Statutes at Large, Vol. IX (1845-1851), p 278, Sec. 15. Thirtieth Congress, 1st Session
Political Science Quarterly, Vol. XLIII, No.4.
8. Little, John B.: Missionary and Politics in China, December 1928.
9. Ibid.,
10. Martin, W.A.P.: Cyclé of Cathay, pp 129-131.
11. Ibid., p 133.
12. British and Foreign State Papers, Vol. 56 (1865.1866), pp 396-400.
13. Ibid., p 396.
14. Missionary Review, March-April, 1879.
15. Dennett, Tyler: Americans in Eastern Asia, pp 156-157.
16. Williams, F.W.: Life and Letters of Samuel Wells Williams, p 292.

Chapter IV

1. Dennett, Tyler: Americans in Eastern Asia, p 287.
2. Morse, H.B.: The Trade and Administration of China, p212.
3. Dennett, Tyler: Americans in Eastern Asia, p 288.
4. Williams, F.W.: Life and Letters of Samuel Wells Williams, p 288.
5. British and Foreign State Papers, Vol. 53 (1862.1863), p 968.
6. Williams, F.W.: Life and Letters of Samuel Wells Williams, pp 270-271.

7. British and Foreign State Papers, Vol.48 (1857.1858),
pp 609-611.
8. Ibid., p 49.
9. British and Foreign State Papers, Vol.51 (1860.1861),
pp 639-641.
10. Duggan, Stephen P.: Factors in the Chinese Situation,
Political Science Quarterly, Vol. XLIV, No.3, pp 381-382.
11. Pagoda Library No. 1 (trans. by E.H. Parker), p76.
12. Rockhill, W.W.: Diplomatic Missions to the Court of China,
American Historical Review, July 1897, p 638.

Chapter V

1. Bland, J.O. & Backhouse, E.: China under the Empress Dowager,
p 18.
2. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United
States, 1868, Pt. I, pp 519-521.
3. Martin, W.A.P.: Cycle of Cathay, pp 344-347.
4. Ibid.,
5. Missionary Review, March-April, 1879, pp 99-100.
6. China Mission Year Book, 1916, pp 467-468.
7. Williams, F.W.: Life and Letters of Samuel Wells Williams,
p 326.

Chapter VI

1. Williams, F.W.: Life and Letters of Samuel Wells Williams,
p 359 footnote.
2. Martin, W.A.P.: Cycle of Cathay, p 232.
3. Papers Relating to Foreign Relations of the United States,
1867, Pt.I, pp 488-489.
4. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United
States, 1885, Pt.I, p 149.
5. Martin, W.A.P.: Cycle of Cathay, pp 441-442.

6. Williams, S.T.: A History of China, p 319.

Chapter VII

1. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1867, Pt.I, p 473.
2. Ibid., p 419.
3. Ibid., p 422.
4. Ibid., 485.
5. Papers Relating to Foreign Relations of the United States, 1870, pp 355-357.
6. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1871, pp78-81.
7. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1870, p 360.
8. Ibid., pp 370-371.
9. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1871, pp 101-107.
10. Ibid., 108-109.
11. Ibid., 157-158.
12. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1874, pp 257-274.
13. Martin, W.A.P.: Cycle of Cathay, pp 41-42.
14. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1874, pp 234-235.
15. Ibid., p 276.
16. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1879, p 187.
17. Ibid., p 184.
18. Missionary Review of the World, February 1888.

Chapter VIII

1. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1871, p 84.
2. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1875, pp 119; 137
3. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1875, Vol. I, p 339.
4. Ibid., pp 332-333.
5. Ibid., pp 334-335.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid., p 404.
8. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1876, p 47.
9. Martin, U.A.P.: Cycle of Cathay, p 444.
10. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1881, pp272-275.
11. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1871, p 92
12. Ibid., p 98.
13. Martin, U.A.P.: Cycle of Cathay, p 336.
14. Ibid., pp 91-92.
15. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1881, pp 282-284.
16. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1882, p 133.
17. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, pp 149-150.
18. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1886, p 96.

19. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1886, p 98.
20. Ibid., pp 99-100.
21. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1887, p 161.
22. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1888, Pt. I, p 239.
23. Ibid., P 266.

Chapter IX

1. Latourette, K.S.: Development of China, p 157.
2. Martin, W.A.P.: Cycle of Cathay, pp 233-234.
3. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1867, Pt. 1, pp 472-473.
4. Martin, W.A.P.: Cycle of Cathay, pp 312-313.
5. Ibid., pp 294-295.
6. Ibid., p 341.
7. Ibid., p 428.
8. Ibid., p 237.
9. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1863, Pt. I, p 828.
10. Martin, W.A.P.: Cycle of Cathay, p 29.
11. Williams, F.W.: Life and Letters of Samuel Wells Williams, pp 244-245.
12. Ibid., p 417.
13. Martin, W.A.P.: Cycle of Cathay, 415.
14. Ibid., p 325.
15. Ibid., pp 326-327.
16. Ibid., pp 336-337.
17. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1868, pp 506-521.

18. Missionary Review of the World, December 1888.
19. Dennis, James S.: Christian Missions and Social Progress,
Vol. III, p 38.
20. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United
States, 1872, Pt. I, pp 130-133.
21. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United
States, 1875, Pt. I, p 227.
22. Papers Relating to the For. Rel. of the U.S., 1888, Pt.1, pp 270-72.
Chapter X
 1. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United
States, 1875, Pt. I, p 227.
 2. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United
States, 1878, Pt. I, pp 109-110.
 3. Ibid., pp 110-122.
 4. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United
States, 1889, pp 85-86.
Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United
States, 1888, Pt. I, pp 256-257.
 5. Martin, W.A.P.: Cycle of Cathay, pp 21-23.
 6. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United
States, 1883, pp 123-124.
 7. Ibid., p 128.
 8. Martin, W.A.P.: Cycle of Cathay, p 184.
 9. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United
States, 1881, pp 217-219.
 10. Missionary Review, May-June 1886
 11. Missionary Review, May-June, 1886.
 12. Missionary Review, September-October 1885, pp 401-402.
 13. Ibid.
 14. Missionary Review of the World, September 1888, p 678.

15. Barnes: Behind the Great Wall, p 94.
16. Dennis, J.S.: Christian Missions and Social Progress,
Vol. II, p 353.
17. Martin, W.A.P.: Cycle of Cathay, pp 262-263.

Chapter XI

1. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1885, 175-181.
Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1888, Pt. I, p 218.
2. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1888, Pt. I, pp 340-341.
3. Bland and Backhouse: China Under the Empress Dowager, pp 289-290.
4. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1889, p 102.
5. Ibid., p 100.
6. Martin, W.A.P.: Cycle of Cathay, p 313.
7. Ibid., p 336
8. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1891, p 392.
9. Ibid., p 393.
10. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1892, p 71.
11. Ibid., pp 72-73.
12. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1891, p 420.
13. Ibid., p 426.
14. Der Ling, Princess: Kowtow, pp 126-134.

15. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1891, p 426.
16. Ibid., p 430.
17. Ibid., p 422.
18. Der Ling, Princess: Kowtow, pp 130-131.
19. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1892, pp 125-126.
20. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1893, pp 230-231.
21. Ibid., pp 230-231.
22. Ibid., pp 233-234.
23. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1896, p 58.
24. Ibid., p 61.
25. Ibid., pp 63-64.

Chapter XII

1. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1896, p 64-65.
2. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1895, Pt. I, pp 115-116.
3. Ibid., p 159.
4. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1897, pp 62-63.
5. Ibid., pp 71-72.
6. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1896, pp 46-47.
7. Ibid., pp 51-52.
8. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1897, pp 105-106.

9. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1897, pp 106-107.
10. China Mission Year Book, 1913, p 90.
11. China Mission Year Book, 1918, p 18.
12. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1894, p 150.
13. Ibid., p 152.
14. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1895, Pt. I, pp 94-95; 99-99.
15. Ibid., 99-100.
16. British and Foreign State Papers, Vol. 90 (1897.1898), pp 341-342.
17. Treat, P.I.: The Far East, p 328.
18. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1897, p 110.
19. British and Foreign State Papers, Vol. 92 (1899.1900), p 173.

Chapter XIII

1. Williams, E.T.: A Short History of China, p 67.
2. Der Ling, Princess: Old Buddha, pp 198-216.
3. Carl, Katherine A.: With the Empress Dowager.
4. Shuhsi Hsu: China and Her Political Entity, pp 230-231.
5. Der Ling, Princess: Old Buddha, p 203.
6. Ibid., pp 190-197.
7. Bland and Backhouse: China Under the Empress Dowager, p 189.
8. Ibid., p 241.
9. Ibid., pp 229-230.

10. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1898, pp 230-231.
11. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1899, Pt. I, p 158.
12. Bland and Backhouse: China Under the Empress Dowager, pp 241-242.
13. Ibid., p 243.
14. Ibid., p 244.
15. Ibid.
16. Der Ling, Princess: Old Buddha, pp 239-240.
17. Ibid., pp 227-229.

Chapter XIV

1. Der Ling, Princess: Old Buddha, pp 240-241.
2. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1898, pp194.
3. Ibid., pp 213-214.
4. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1900, p 393.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid., pp 85-86.
7. Ibid., p 85.
8. British and Foreign State Papers, Vol. 94 (1900,1901), pp 1054-1055.
9. Der Ling, Princess: Old Buddha, pp 241-242.
10. Der Ling, Princess: Kowtow, pp 277-278.
11. Ibid., p 280.
12. Der Ling, Princess: Old Buddha, p 293.
13. British and Foreign State Papers, Vol. 94(1900,1901),pp1053-54.
14. British and Foreign State Papers, Vol. 94(1900,1901), pp 1054-1055.

15. British and Foreign State Papers, Vol. 94 (1900.1901),
pp 1055.
16. Ibid., pp 1057.-1058.
17. Ibid., p p 1073-1074.
18. China Mission Year Book, 1914, pp 406-407.
19. British and Foreign State Papers, Vol. 94 (1900.1901)
pp 1070; 1074.
20. Ibid., p 1067.-1070.
21. Ibid., pp 1070-1070; 1076-1077.
22. Ibid., pp 1079-1080.

Chapter XV

1. Treat, P.I.: The Far East, p 344.
2. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United
States, Pt. 1, pp 168-169
3. Bland and Backhouse: China Under the Empress Dowager(
Diary of His Excellency Ching Shan), p 264.
4. Ibid., 264.
5. Ibid., p 265.
6. Ibid., p 259.
7. Ibid., p 265.
8. Ibid., p 265.
9. Der Ling, Princess: Old Buddha, pp 234-237.
Bland and Backhouse:
10. /China Under the Empress Dowager (Diary of His Excellency
Ching Shan), p 265.
11. Der Ling, Princess: Old Buddha, pp 244-249.
12. Bland and Backhouse: China Under the Empress Dowager (Diary
of His Excellency Ching Shan) p 285.
13. Ibid., pp 290-295.
14. Carl, Katherine A.: With the Empress Dowager, p 266.
15. Shuhsi Hsu: China and Her Political Entity, pp 234-236.

16. British and Foreign State Papers, Vol. 94(1900.1901) p 1108.
17. Ibid., pp 1108-1109.
18. Ibid., p 1167.
19. Treat, P.I.: The Far East, p 350.
20. London Times, Jan. 11, 1901, p 21.
21. London Times, July 19, 1901, p 460.
22. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1901, Appendix giving the W.W. Rockhill Report, pp 104 (House Documents 57th Congress , 1st Session).
23. Carl, Katherine A.: With the Empress Dowager, footnote p 269.
24. Bland and Backhouse: China Under the Empress Dowager, pp 289-290.
25. Ibid., p 287.

Chapter XVI

1. Carl, Katherine A.: With the Empress Dowager.
2. Treat, P.I.: The Far East, p 423.
3. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1905, pp 197-204.
4. London Times, May 3, 1901, p 284.
5. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1902, p 268.
6. London Times, July 26, 1901, p 477.
7. London Times, December 27, 1901, p 829.
8. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, p 98.
9. Ibid., p 98
10. Ibid., p 99
11. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1901, pp 97-99.

12. British and Foreign State Papers, Vol. 97 (1903.1904),
pp 729-730.
13. British and Foreign State Papers, Vol. 101 (1907.1908),
p 960.
14. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United
States, 1906, p 360-361.
15. China Mission Year Book, 1910, p 398-399.
16. Treat, P.I.: The Far East, footnote p 419.
17. China Mission Year Book, 1910, pp 398-399.
18. Treat, P.I.: The Far East, pp 418-421.
19. United States Statutes at Large, ^{Vol. 24,} Forty-ninth Congress, 2d
Session, pp 409-410.
20. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United
States, 1906, Pt. I, pp 362.
21. Ibid., pp 361-362.
22. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United
States, 1909, Pt. I, pp 109-110.
23. United States Statutes at Large, Vol. 35, Sixtieth Congress,
2d Session, pp 614; 1148.
24. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United
States, 1909, Pt. I, p 111.
25. Treat, P.I.: The Far East, footnote p 421.
26. Ibid., Chap. XXXVI.
27. China Mission Year Book, 1918, p 219.
28. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United
States, 1902, pp 159-160.
29. Ibid., pp 160-161.
30. Ibid., pp 167-170.
31. Ibid., p 174.

32. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1902, pp 174-175.
33. London Times, July 19, 1901, p 460.
34. London Times, March 29, 1901, p 204.
35. Ibid., 204.
36. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1902, Pt. I, pp 202-203.
37. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1904, Pt., pp 200-203.
38. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1906, Pt.I, pp 308-324.
39. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1905, Pt. I, pp 199.
40. Ibid., p 202.
41. Der Ling, Princess: Old Buddha, pp 314-315.
42. Ibid., p 323.

Chapter XVII

1. Treat, P.I.: The Far East, p 438.
2. Der Ling, Princess: Old Buddha, p 331.
3. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1909, p 125.
4. Treat, P.I.: The Far East, p 487.
5. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1910, p 347.
6. Ibid., pp 350-351.
7. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1909, pp 129-144.
8. China Mission Year Book, 1912, pp 61-62.
9. Treat, P.I.: The Far East, p 429.

10. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1912, pp 46-47.
11. Treat, P.I.: The Far East, p 430.
12. Bland, J.O.: Recent Events and Present Policies in China, pp 52-55.
13. Ibid., p 52.
14. Forum, Vol. LXXVIII, No. 7 (1927).

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

I. Bibliographies

Cordier, H.: *Bibliotheca sinica; dictionnaire bibliographique des ouvrages relatifs a l'empire chinois*, 5 Vols., Paris, 1904-1924.

II Official Publications

British and Foreign State Papers, 1843-1912, inclusive.

Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1843-1913, inclusive.

United States Statutes at Large, 1843-1913, inclusive.

III Collections of Treaties

Hertslet, Edw.: *China Treaties*, 2 Vols., 3d Ed., London, 1908.

MacMurray, J.V.A.: *Treaties and Conventions with or Concerning China*, 1894-1919, 2 Vols., Washington, 1921.

Rockhill, W.W.: *Treaties and Conventions with or Concerning China and Korea*, 1894-1904, Washington, 1904.

IV Authorities in Special Fields

Bland, J.O. and Backhouse, E.: *China Under the Empress Dowager*, Philadelphia, 1910.

Clement, P.H.: *The Boxer Rebellion*, N.Y., 1915.

Cordier, H.: *Histoire des relations de la Chine les puissances occidentales*, 1860-1900, 3 Vols., Paris, 1901-1902.

Dennett, Tyler: *Americans in Eastern Asia*, N.Y., 1922.

Hornbeck, S.K.: *Contemporary Politics in the Far East*, N.Y., 1918.

Morse, H.B.: *International Relations of the Chinese Empire*, 1834-1911, 3 Vols., N.Y., 1918.

Morse, H.B.: *The Trade and Administration of China*, N.Y., 1920.

Bibliographical Notes cont'd

Reinsch, P.S.: Intellectual and Political Currents in the Far East, Boston, 1911.

Vinacke, H.M.: Modern Constitutional Development in China, Princeton, 1921.

Williams, F.W.: Anson Burlingame and the First Chinese Mission to the Foreign Powers, N.Y., 1912.

Willoughby, W.W.: Foreign Rights and Interests in China, 2d Ed., Baltimore, 1927.

V. Chinese Historians

Hsu, S.: China and Her Political Entity, N.Y., 1926.

VI. Biographies and Memoirs

Carl, Katherine A.: With the Empress Dowager, N.Y., 1905.

Der Ling, Princess: Kowtow, N.Y., 1929

Der Ling, Princess: Old Buddha, N.Y., 1928.

Der Ling, Princess: Two Years in the Forbidden City, N.Y.

Marco Polo: Travels of Marco Polo, many editions.

Martin, W.A.P.: Cycle of Cathay, N.Y., 1896.

Martin, W.A.P.: The Awakening of China, N.Y., 1907.

Stevens, Geo. B., and Marekwick, W.F.: Letters and Journals of the Rev. and Hon. Peter Parker, M.D., Boston & Chicago, 1896.

Thayer, W.R.: Life and Letters of John Hay, 2 Vols., Boston, 1915.

Williams, F.W.: Life and Letters of Samuel Wells Williams, N.Y., 1899.

VII General Accounts, Cultural, etc.

Bland, J.O.: Recent Events and Present Policies in China, Philadelphia, 1912.

Bibliographical Notes cont'd.

- Brown, A.J.: The Chinese Revolution (An account from the missionary viewpoint), Student Volunteer Movement, 1912.
- Cantile, James, and Jones, C.S.: Sun Yat sen and the Awakening of China (An account from the missionary viewpoint), N.Y., 1912.
- Dennis, James S.: Christian Missions and Social Progress, 3 Vols., N.Y., 1898-1906.
- Giles, H.A.: Civilization of China, N.Y., 1911.
- Goodnow, F.J.: China an Analysis, Baltimore, 1926.
- Smith, A.H.: Village Life in China, N.Y., 1899.
- Smith, A.H.: Chinese Characteristics, N.Y., 1894.
- Williams, E.T.: China Yesterday and To-day, N.Y., 1928.

VIII Texts and References

- Gowen, H.H., and Hall, J.W.: An Outline History of China, N.Y., 1927.
- Latourette, K.S.: Development of China, 3d Ed., N.Y., 1924.
- Latourette, K.S.: History of the Early Relations Between the United States and China, 1784-1844, New Haven, 1917.
- Treat, P.I.: The Far East, Harper & Brothers, N.Y., 1928.
- Williams, E.T.: A Short History of China, N.Y., 1928.
- Williams, S.W.: The Middle Kingdom, 2 Vols., N.Y., 1899.

IX Periodicals

- Cheyney, Edw. P.: Law in History, Ame. Historical Review, Vol. XXIX, No. 2, Jan. 1924.
- China Mission Year Book, 1910-1918, Shanghai.
- China Year Book, any on period, Tientsin & London.
- Hornbeck, S.K.: China To-Day: Political, World Peace Foundation Pamphlet, Vol. X, No. 5, Boston, 1927.
- Missionary Review, all available issues for period, N.Y.

Bibliographical Notes cont'd.

Duggan, Stephen P.: Factors in the Chinese Situation, Political
Science Quarterly, Vol. XLIV, No. 3.

Little, John B.: Missionaries and Politics in China, Political
Science Quarterly, Vol. XLIII, No. 4.

London Times, for period, London.

Missionary Review of the World, all available issues for the
period, N.Y.

Rockhill, W.W.: Diplomatic Missions to the Court of China,
Ame. Historical Review, Vol. II, Nos. 3 and 4.

Shih Hu: China and Christianity, Forum, Vol. LXXVIII, No. 1.