

POPULARISM VS. BONAPARTISM

A Study of Certain Initial Phases of the
Mobilizing of Nineteenth Century Liberalism


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CHAPTER I

Introductory.....The Problem

This study is a test of popularism and popular factors in the Wars of Liberation against Napoleon. While the composite of popularism varied somewhat in the various European countries, certain elements usually characterized it, such as nationalism and democracy. Certain social, economic, cultural and religious forces assisted in the moulding of popularism, along humanitarian lines, such as agitation for the abolition of the Slave Trade, but this study is primarily concerned with political popularism as defined.

This investigation of popularism has been made at this crucial period of the Liberation Wars where it was mobilized, an era which was the bridge between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, since it was the climax of the forces of the eighteenth century, which controverted the Ancient Regime, and the preparation for the consummating achievements of the nineteenth century. The understanding of the origin, nature, and development of popularism is essential to the proper comprehension of the nineteenth century, which was the age of popularism. This early period is the place where it should be investigated, for here it was first

mobilized effectively, and assumed the characteristics which were to be the keynotes of the century. Furthermore, this period was a testing ground for these imponderable forces, and presented the best opportunity for their evaluation, since definite appeals through varied media were made to the people for the specific purpose of mobilizing public opinion to accomplish liberation from tyrannous restriction, and the realization of popular aims. These appeals were successful in arousing public opinion which expected certain popular accomplishments from the settlements which were made at the close of the Wars. This suggests the question as to whether or not the reality of the enacted peace programs was in harmony with the promises made in the appeals, and also in harmony with the expectations of the people, which were largely based on these appeals.

This subject is especially stimulating because it deals largely with the means of popularizing, i.e. with the types of propaganda used to mobilize public opinion, and with the specific promises made to the people through these modes of stirring up popular forces. Interesting parallels could be drawn between the propaganda of the Liberation Wars and that utilized to mobilize public opinion a century later in the World War, or in any similar situation where propaganda is an effective weapon to secure popular support.

It has been the object of this study to investigate the nature of popularism in the various countries

concerned in the Liberation Wars as well as its general European character, and to determine how it was stirred, and focused to bring about the consummation of the war aims of the Allies which were developed into peace programs. Then, what was the response of the people to the appeals that were made? A further step involves the consideration of the extent to which the popular expectations were aroused, and recognized in the avowed peace programs and actual settlements, which proposes the idea of whether or not popular forces were aroused to bring about certain objectives to be embodied in the reconstitution of Europe, and then betrayed because of the character of the settlements. While considerable research has been done relative to the evolutionary peace programs of the individual belligerents as well as those of the Coalition and their realization in the settlements, it has been found impractical to complete this phase, and has forced its delimitation to a summary. In as brief a study as this has been, it has been impossible to consider in an adequate manner social, economic, cultural, and religious contributions to popularism, but this can be easily done in a larger piece of work, since the political, and that portion of the international segments which have been dealt with, are basic, and the other lines can be built around this investigation. Lack of time and data have limited the inclusion of material derived from contemporary newspapers, pamphlets, sermons, and lectures.

Two propositions that have been stated, demand further explications. First is the fact that the Liberation Wars completed the work of the dynamic forces in the eighteenth century which controverted the Ancient Regime with all its ramifications. Second, the eighteenth century presaged the nineteenth century with its emphasis of popularism, and consummation of the civilization of the three preceding centuries. To understand how the elements of popularism were derived and developed, it is necessary to comprehend the revolutionary nature of the eighteenth century as pertaining to all phases of culture. The society of the Ancient Regime was an unstable composite of traditional, medieval "estates" based originally upon community functions, and of modern classes based upon the abilities of individuals which had originated in the sixteenth century. All other classes were discriminated against in the matter of political rights and duties, economic burdens, and social distinctions in favor of the privileged Estates, the clergy and the nobility. Hence, the task of the eighteenth century was to upset this complicated, artificial society, which had been re-formed in the sixteenth century, ossified in the seventeenth century. For discrimination and privilege the eighteenth century substituted equalitarianism and civil rights for the masses which ceased to exist solely to be exploited by the State and more favored groups. Coincident with this, and partially due to the religious awakening,

came the humanitarian movement which was to be one of the basic elements of nineteenth century popularism. Beccaria, the Milanese penologist, wrote the monumental work, "Crimes and Punishments", which profoundly contributed toward the reform of national criminal codes and conditions in prisons throughout Europe. About the same time Howard, was agitating for similar reforms in England. Anti-Slavery societies developed in England under the leadership of men such as Clarkson and Wilberforce, and in France Les Amis des Noirs was organized. An organized campaign was conducted to bring education to the masses. Its methods became more rational, practical, and hence more effective, in harmony with the other tendencies of the age. In this connection, Pestalozzi's schools in Switzerland, Rousseau's writings such as Emile, the Realschule in Germany and the influence of Basedow and Francke, as well as the Ragged Schools and monitorial teaching developed by Lancaster in England, and Robert Raikes' Sunday Schools assisted in making equalitarianism a reality for the lower classes. The work of Sicard in France in training defectives was also significant. Vocational and agricultural schools were developed, especially in England, France and Germany, and national popular education laws were enacted, especially in France.

The "direct-Power-Economy" of the Ancient Regime made absolute during the seventeenth century and inherited by the eighteenth, was characterized by theories of Statism, which

rigidly restricted the nature and extent of all economic activities by paternalistic, despotic regulation. "Statism" was the result of the attempt to secure conformity and uniformity in the absolute application of the theories of mercantilism, which dealt with the national economy, and by kammeralism, which dealt with the administration of government finance. This economy was controverted by the relaxations of the "enlightened despots" from 1740 onward, and by the unlimited "renovation" of the later period. This was due to the advance in science which transformed industry, and to the writings of economic thinkers such as Quesnay, Gournay, Adam Smith and Malthus. In this process, governmental restriction was removed, and the policy advocated by Gournay was adopted: "laissez faire, laissez passer." New processes were developed in metal working and textiles, new material such as kaolin for ceramics, and new inventions as a result of scientific progress, in musical instruments, dye-stuffs, food products, blast furnaces. But above all mechanics aided in the establishment of an indirect Power-Economy of released ingenuity. The steam engine worked out by Newcomen and developed by Watt was the most important factor in this economic advance. The result was the founding of an economy based upon complex machinery, steam, specialized labor, and high capitalization. Transportation facilities were also greatly expanded.

These great changes which took place in industry and

agriculture brought about a new emphasis upon the keynote of individuality, characteristic of modernity, but subordinated to the interests of the State through the conformity dominant in the seventeenth century. The thorough going economic re-vamping of the eighteenth century is sometimes spoken of as the Agrarian and Industrial Revolutions, but these terms are misnomers, inasmuch as these movements did not revolve, as every true revolution does. They are more accurately described by the term "avolution" which involves a turning away from that which has proved itself insufficient for the needs of humanity and a turning to new economic achievements which can successfully cope with altered conditions.

The attempt to make religious beliefs and practices absolute by means of uniformity and conformity resulted in the religion under the Ancient Regime in the State denominations and sects being characterized by deadening insincerity, by ritualism from which the spirit had departed and by hardened repulsive theology. The churches had to be awakened from the apathy into which they had settled, and this was the work of the eighteenth century. During the earlier part of the century they were stabbed awake by cultural rationalism, which led to a re-examination of their functions and contributions to society. This was followed by a movement of spiritual revivalism which swept across Europe and America, eradicating meaningless forms and re-stating religion in a vital and

practical manner. The devotional background was largely supplied by pietistic books, and especially by hymns written by men such as Cowper, Ferronet, Doddridge, Toplady, Isaac Watts and the Wesleys, and also by passions, masses and oratorios composed by Bach, Handel, Mozart, Haydn, and others. Count Zinzendorf led the Moravian movement, and Jonathan Edwards in America and George Whitefield in England led the Calvinistic revivals. The Anglican Methodist movement, originated by the Wesleys, by means of circuit riding established religious services for the neglected country folk and the rapidly developing city proletariat. Whitefield went out into the fields and preached to these people when forbidden to hold services in the towns. The result of this was that religious as well as educational privileges began to be extended to the hitherto untouched groups. Similar movements aided in the awakening of Catholicism and Judaism. The Redemptorists and Passionists in Italy sought the miserably poor and served their religious needs, at the same time trying to ameliorate their economic and social position. Among the Polish and Lithuanian Jews, Chassidism resulted in the re-statement of Judaism on more spiritual, vital bases.

From the mobilization of religious forces by means of ardent revivalism, developed their practical expression through philanthropic movements such as charities, hospitals, jail work, peace societies, missionary societies, anti-slavery societies, work for defectives, as well as educational

societies and Sunday Schools. Seminaries were organized at Berlin and Basle to train missionaries, Bible and tract societies to spread Biblical literature were started in England, the British and Foreign Bible Society being organized in 1804. The results of these controversions were the quickening of the old church organizations, and the development of new sects which vied with each other to appeal to the people and provide that which they needed to make their lives happy and alleviate their misfortunes.

The culture of the Ancient Regime was characterized by the obscurantism of academism. This deadening heritage was controverted through the "Enlightenment." Inductive was substituted for deductive reasoning as the commonly accepted basis of knowledge. This cultural avolution affected not only the forms and spirit of expression but also the ideas and aims. The early period of the century was marked by waning academism, conventionalism, and cynicism, the middle period from 1720 to 1790 approximately, was marked by rationalism, naturalism, and sentimentalism, and the later period by romanticism, practicalism and idealism. Everywhere the trend was toward the abolition of artificial restrictions. Science became not merely natural philosophy but inductive science and separated into the individual sciences. Experiment was followed by systematic classification and general hypotheses. Music was made more scientific. New forms were developed such as the sonata, and new instruments were used, such as the

piano first invented by Christoforo early in the century. Man's ideas of the universe were overturned, for La Place developed the nebular hypothesis. This new knowledge was popularized by journals, schools, societies, and exhibits. In this way did science and the arts, as well, contribute toward the formation of the popular forces which were to dominate the succeeding century.

The political problem of the eighteenth century was to controvert dynastic absolutism which interpreted the sovereignty of the state in absolute terms of divine right kingship. This had become an effective barrier to civilization progress and had to be overcome by a re-definition of state theories, and by the reforming and regenerating of the entire structure of the state. The realms were imperfectly integrated, the rule well illustrated the contradictions between the theories and actual workings of absolutism, and the regime presented innumerable examples of inherent contradictions between those institutions that had first developed during the Middle Ages, and those that had been called into being since that time. Political liberty did not exist to a great extent and civil rights were confined to the few. In France and the other European countries political liberty and civil equality were gradually extended by "enlightened despotism". Over most of the European continent this was a gradual process extending to the mobilization of popular forces during the Liberation Wars. In France, the Ancient

Regime was swept away entirely by the Revolution which passed through the successive stages of aristocratic (1763-39) mesocratic (1789-92) and "mobocratic" (1792-5) reforms, and swung back through the Directory, and Consulate to a plebiscitary Empire. During this process, popular forces were regenerated and mobilized, whereas in the other European countries these stages did not come until the Liberation period, 1808-15. Meanwhile, the British nation was passing through a period of gradual readjustment, abolishing such objectionable features of the Ancient Regime as existed there. Throughout Europe the Ancient Regime was controverted but the process varied with the country and the conditions.

The European Power-Balance, conceived in the sixteenth century as a successor to the Holy Roman Empire idea, was confirmed in the seventeenth century, and had to be broken in the eighteenth century because it was productive of "constant conflicts" and "dirty dealings." Whenever the balance was upset, it was restored through an attack on weaker countries such as Poland, or the attempted partition of states as repeatedly occurred during the eighteenth century, e.g., Spain (1702-13), Austria (1740-8), Prussia (1756-63) Bavaria (1777-8), Turkey (1788-92), and the actual Polish partitions of 1772, 1792, and its final extinction in 1795. Hence the Power-Balance, instead of providing for the security of all States, actually menaced their existence. It was condemned by legal principles developed,

by the controversions in other lines which produced revolution, the victories of the French Revolutionary wars, the forces of nationalism, and by the propagandas for peace and a new World Order of men such as Abbe St. Pierre, Bentham, Kant, Alexander I., and groups like the Quakers. As the Ancient Regime had been overthrown in other phases of civilization, so the Power-Balance was decisively controverted, and was superseded in 1814-15 by the Concert of Powers.

The achievements of science were utilized during the French Revolution to arouse the people. Music was an important factor, the Marseillaise was composed, revolutionary songs for the armies and people to sing, patriotic motifs for operas were selected and pamphlets and newspapers were broadcast, while at the same time the cheap soup of Count Rumford, and the progress of military science helped to solve the commissary and equipment problems.

In the other European countries from 1808 to 1815, as in France earlier, the cultural regeneration preceded the mobilization of popular forces, the elements of which had been developed during the eighteenth century, as has been pointed out, but had not been called into activity for the achievement of certain avowed aims. This study deals with the popular expectations and war attitudes aroused through various means of propaganda for the purpose of liberating the European countries from the despotism of Napoleon, as well as the attaining of popular desires such as further democracy.

Such propaganda was largely in the form of declarations and proclamations, published through the pulpit, the press (pamphlets and newspapers), and the platform in lectures and parliamentary debates and discussions. The war aims of the Allies were also expressed in the preambles to the treaties of alliance which formed the framework of the Coalition.

CHAPTER 11

BRITISH POPULAR APPEALS AND RESPONSE

There are two factors which enter into the development of British war attitudes which enable us partially to determine the question of whether or not the people were betrayed by the settlements when they are compared to the promises made to them. The Whigs were proud of their reputation for being the advocates for civil liberty, (removal of disabilities of Catholics and Dissenters), political and social liberty, (abolition of Slave Trade, improvement of conditions among the laboring classes). As the self acclaimed champions of Popularism, they eagerly sought, and published, all evidence which tended to show that the interests of the people had been bartered or betrayed by the Tory Government.

The other factor which is important to consider to understand the development of Popularism in England, is the influence of the groups, actuated by religious and humanitarian motives, which promoted Sunday Schools, week-day schools, missionary societies, Bible societies, anti-slavery societies, peace organizations, and in every way sought to ameliorate the conditions of the unfortunate and unenlightened in Great Britain and throughout the world. The Dissenters, Methodists, Baptists, Congregationalists, and Presbyterians were especially active in England, but far more energetic

and influential were the Quakers, although Wilberforce accuses them of being somewhat doctrinaire and not sufficiently practical. Among the Quakers who profoundly aided in the development of liberal organizations in England and Europe were Stephen Grellet, William Allen, and John Wilkinson. Wilberforce was one of the outstanding exponents of Popular interests within the Anglican Church, and was instrumental in the British abolition of the Slave Trade in 1807. Did these men believe that the Whigs adequately represented Popularism, and that the peoples of England and of Europe were betrayed into the settlements which closed the Liberation Wars?

The aims of the British nation during the Napoleonic wars varied somewhat according to their mode of expression, according to the group which formulated them, and according to the time in which they were proposed. The Tory Government at all times stressed the fact that its very existence and that of the British nation was threatened as long as Napoleon was permitted to exercise his overweening ambition. The merchant classes loudly proclaimed that their ruin was imminent as long as the Emperor of France as dictator of Europe was able to proscribe British manufactures. The lower classes which were to a great extent inarticulate, and many of the devout, philanthropic Dissenters such as the Quakers, as well as certain leaders of the Whig party joined in the chorus which reached its highest pitch in

the winter of 1812 and 1813 and gradually subsided in volume as a result of the Allied successes of September and October, 1813. The heavy taxes, incident to the construction and financing of the Coalition by Great Britain, became a source of great burden to the merchant classes, but they loyally supported the Government as long as they believed that they had more to gain by the continuance of the war, and the further opening of European markets.

Not only were the war attitudes and aims expressed by the Opposition party, by the different classes of people, and by the Government in their public speeches and declarations in Parliament important in the moulding of British opinion, but also the opinions of the public and the Opposition as to the nature of the war aims which the Government had not made public. These war aims became indissolubly associated with the peace programs of the British Government in the process of forming and consolidating the coalition, hence will be dealt with under that category. Throughout the period of 1812, 1813, and the spring of 1814, the Whigs and the public were asking the question, "When and under what conditions will the Government plan to make peace with Napoleon, and in what ways have these conditions been predetermined by secret agreements?" However, in spite of uncertainty due to the secret war aims which merged with contemplated peace programs, in spite of the radical propaganda and violence of the lower classes within

the country due to the economic dislocation, the British people rallied to the support of the Government.

It has been pointed out that public opinion is appealed to through the press, the pulpit, and the platform, the latter particularly in Parliament. The response of the people to these appeals is expressed by leaders of public thought in Parliament, or more widely, by means of petitions to Parliament especially at this time, respecting the abolition of the Slave Trade and the desire for peace. Lord Holland speaks of the sources of information of the British public as being the newspapers, the Parliamentary reports, and the Annual Registers.² The subject matter of the last periodical is very similar to that of the Parliamentary reports. Hence, the most efficient means of learning the British war attitudes in their primary expression, which is the object of this study, is by examining the Parliamentary Reports.

In considering this data, it must be remembered that there are two points of view constantly being expressed on every national issue. The Ministry of these years, recruited from the Tory party, expressed the official attitudes of the issues before the Government, while the Opposition Whigs sought to undermine the policies and position of the dominant party. Because of this situation, in many of the debates vital issues were involved but incidentally, the important fact being the manoeuvring of each party for position.

Especially is this true of the Whigs, since they were the Opposition party. Their tactics were condemned by one of their most sincerely liberal members, Francis Horner, who refused to participate in the debates except where issues involving important principles, were involved.

The opinions of the Government were expressed on certain definite occasions: in connection with the speeches of the Prince Regent at the opening and closing of the Sessions of Parliament, or whenever a special address was delivered; 2d, when hostilities were undertaken, or treaties were presented for ratification, or supply bills to be passed, and the Opposition demanded explanations; 3d, when Parliament was presented with faits accomplis i.e. obligations assumed and engagements entered into from which there was no retraction, of which the majority of the treaties and oral engagements which formed the framework of the Coalition, were examples.

The opinions of the Opposition were expressed concurrently with those of the Government under the above circumstances. On the first two occasions they might be able to influence possible legislation favorably or otherwise, and on the last occasion their only opportunity was to approve or condemn in part or as a whole. However, they possessed one means of preventing the formation of extended secret engagements, to be presented later as faits accomplis.

They could move that an address be made to the Prince Regent

to submit the official papers in explanation of certain policies of the Government. Nevertheless it did effectively fulfil the essential function of an opposition by focusing critical public attention upon the policies of the Government. It did not operate very effectively to hinder the development of secret engagements in this instance, because the Government maintained a sufficient majority in Parliament so that all of these inconvenient addresses were voted down.

This study is primarily interested in the allied war aims as they were formulated in the period, 1803-05, developed during the later coalitions until they reached their fruition in their statement in the Wars of Liberation, because the Peace of Amiens in 1802 closes the first period of the wars. At that time a radical change was taking place in the nature of the French Government which reached its consummation in 1804 when Napoleon became the Emperor of the French. Prior to 1802, the war aims of the Allies had centered around the idea of the maintenance of the stability of their national regimes against the subverting influences emanating from revolutionary France which had been experiencing the various phases of a revolution. From 1802 to 1804 France swung back to enlightened despotism where she started and a stable regime was once more re-established, hence the Allies had no further cause to fear the instability of the internal regime in France. A re-statement of war aims became necessary and this was formulated from 1803-05.

These war aims became directed against Napoleon who seemed to be threatening that national existence of the European states as he trampled upon their sovereignty and arbitrarily disposed of their territories. Great Britain felt that her national existence was threatened by the establishing of governments dominated by France in Switzerland and Holland and the enhancing of French influence in Spain. On 7 March 1803, His Majesty informed Parliament that in view of the military preparations going on in the ports of Holland and France, it was necessary to mobilize and organize the English military forces. Great Britain had refused to evacuate Malta and Egypt by the terms of the Treaty of Amiens, and negotiations were carried on relative to this evacuation from March to May, 1803³. When England demanded that she be permitted to occupy the island for at least ten years, the negotiations were broken off, Whitworth, the English Ambassador leaving France May 12 on the same boat by which the French Ambassador returned.

On May 16 George III. announced to Parliament that relations with France had been severed because of the conduct of the latter, and on June 17 he declared war on the Batavian republic (Holland), stating that England had offered to recognize her neutrality if France would have withdrawn her troops which they had refused to do. To summarize, there were two war aims on the part of Britain, first, the kingdom was threatened by invasions, and second, the maritime and commercial interests were threatened by French violation⁴

of neutral territories and demands that England evacuate strategic commercial points such as Malta. French despotism was now the enemy which had superseded French revolution. This despotism was incarnated, in British eyes, in the person of Napoleon. The statement of British war aims from that time to 1812 was a reiteration of the shibboleths of British foreign policy such as the maintenance of maritime rights and the furthering of her commercial interest which necessitated the diminishing of the power of the French "usurper."

The animosity was intensified by the attempt of Napoleon to ruin Great Britain by means of his Continental System originated in 1807. The situation was complicated by the friction with the United States over neutral rights. In 1805-06, 1808 and 1810, Napoleon made peace proposals which proved abortive because England refused to recognize his control of the Continent, and he refused to recognize British supremacy on the sea. They served only as opportunities for each party to justify its position before European public opinion. From 1808 to 1812 the liberation of Spain from the tyrant was an avowed war aim to be sure. but the Spanish war had been undertaken primarily because of selfish motives this being an opportunity to weaken Bonaparte and further British trade interests. It is true that the necessity of the Allies winning the support of the peoples of Europe had been appreciated before, and urged by Russia as early as the Novosiltsov special mission to England in 1804 for the purpose of forming the Third Coalition

but no effective appeal to popularism was made until 1808 in Spain.⁵ In 1812 the example of Russia stirred the countries throughout Europe, as had the example of Spain. A broad, altruistic conception of the English opportunity to advance European welfare formulated itself as a driving power in the foreign policy in the 1812 crisis for the first time.

The cause of the change of principles and policies of Great Britain which took place in 1812 could be summarized as follows: First, there was the change in the ministry. The Murder of Perceval, the leading figure of the Administration, made it necessary that the ministry gain some new support or resign. Being a time of stress, the Grey-Grenville clique of Whigs were invited to participate in the new Ministry but refused because Catholic Emancipation was not to be an avowed measure.⁶ The ministry was reconstituted on Tory lines but constantly threatened by instability until the successful issue of the War. A second cause was also domestic; the wide spread social unrest among the lower classes which resulted in violence and intimidation. Turning to the foreign motives that made a restatement of the war aims imperative, a third factor was the American War, and a fourth, the Russian campaign of Napoleon, in which Great Britain was an ally of Russia.

One of the best summaries or indeed forecasts of these war aims which actuated Great Britain during the period, 1812-14,

was the statement by a most esteemed younger member of the Opposition Party, Francis Horner. On 18 January 1811, he wrote to Francis Jeffrey, the editor of the Edinburgh Review, regretting not only that he had parted company from some of his best advisors, his friend Jeffrey among them, but now was at variance with the views of the leaders of his party. It is remarkable how closely this conception of British war aims coincides with the policy of the leaders of the reorganized Ministry of 1812, Lords Liverpool, Bathurst, and Castlereagh. He further declares there can be no proposal of peace unless France evacuates Spain and withdraws Joseph, Napoleon's puppet king. This grows out of a principle, which carries me a great deal farther, and compels me almost to make up my mind to what you will call an indefinite prospect of war; a prospect never to be avowed, however, even when it appears most certain." ⁷ Because of the general European situation and the responsibilities of England, there can be no peace of any duration, Horner asserts, without which there can be no peace with France. Bonaparte cannot be trusted because his interests are for the maintenance of a continental despotism, which Great Britain cannot permit. ⁸ He suggests the probability that Germany, Austria and Spain will endeavor to throw off the yoke, and Great Britain must assist them since she is a part of Europe. Peace is futile to consider unless it can be on a stable foundation. ⁹

AS to the principles upon which the Government should base its conduct during these wars by which Europe will be liberated, Horner declares that: "The point to be considered is, by what mode, and upon what principles the war may be conducted, so as to afford the best chance of contributing to the ultimate restoration of independence to some of these kingdoms, which never can be incorporated with France, from the diversity of race and languages. In my judgment, we have only to act upon the principles by which Elizabeth was guided, and afterwards King William; forbearing all little bye objects of gain and aggrandisement, and keeping steadily in view, through all fortunes and in the lowest depth of our despair, the ultimate partition of the Continent into independent states, and the revival of a public law in Europe. For such conduct, looking so far forward, much patience, and constancy, and public integrity will be required; but it is a part worthy of this nation, and no more, in proportion to its present means, than it has done before."¹⁰

On the eve of his Russian Campaign, Napoleon made a move for peace with England. He asserted that the objectives of France now involved peace to end the calamities in Spain and Spanish America, and stated his propositions¹¹: "The integrity of Spain shall be guaranteed. France shall renounce all idea of extending her dominions on the south side of the Pyrenees. The actual dynasty shall be declared independent, and Spain governed by the national constitution of the Cortes.

"The Kingdom of Naples shall remain in the possession of the King of Naples. The independence and integrity of Portugal shall also be guaranteed, and the House of Braganza shall remain on the throne." These territories shall be evacuated by French and British troops. The other objects of discussion should be negotiated upon the basis of each power retaining that which the other could not deprive it by war, or uti possidetis . This letter was dated 17th of April 1812.

Lord Castlereagh replied on the 22d of April that the statement as to Spain was not clear and inquired if that involved the retention of the throne by Joseph.¹² If so, that was inadmissible by Great Britain. The British reply under a flag of truce was fired upon at Calais, and had to proceed to Morlax.¹³ By that time Napoleon had left for the East.

The consequent debate in the House of Commons dealt with the necessity of peace, the general European situation, and especially the question of maritime rights. The Whigs led by Whitbread declared that the overture had not been given sufficient attention, and demanded that all of the correspondence with the Duc de Bassano be submitted.¹⁴ He further declared that Great Britain was seeking the overthrow of the French Government, and inquired how she could have one brand of international law and the rest of the world another. On such grounds he denounced the American war and the renewal of the European war.¹⁵

The Tory position was presented by Sheridan and Castlereagh. The former designated Bonaparte's overture as being insidious, because he desired to overthrow British maritime superiority after he crushed Russia who had refused to help undermine Britain and cooperate in the Continental System. "These rights cannot be surrendered" declared Sheridan, "for I, and others in the House would rather scuttle this island of England and allow it to be overwhelmed by the surrounding ocean, than I would surrender one iota of that charter which has appended to it the seal of nature herself; and which--I speak with reverence- enjoys the guarantee of Providence, manifested in the high glory and prosperity of this renowned nation." ¹⁶ Castlereagh stated that he did not wish to oppose the motion (for the submission of the correspondence), but wished to point out how the preceding speaker had misinterpreted the facts about English policies. He denounced the French overture as being insincere. ¹⁷

The Prince Regent's speech at the close of the parliamentary session, 30 July 1812, declared that Wellington's activities would be continued in order to assure the independence of the Peninsula. The usurpations of Napoleon must not be submitted to, as the events in Northern Europe reveal, and the importance of the struggle in which the Emperor of Russia is engaged, will be recognized by the Parliament, the Address continues, so that His Royal Highness can "afford to those powers who may be united in the contest, every degree of

cooperation and assistance, consistent with his other engagements, and the interests of His Majesty's dominions." ¹⁸

In the Address delivered at the opening of the Session 30 November 1812, the treaties with Russia and Sweden were communicated and the Emperor Alexander is praised for opposing the military power of France and its allies alone. "By the gallantry, firmness and intrepidity of his forces, the presumptuous expectations of the enemy have been signally disappointed. The enthusiasm of the Russian nation has increased with the difficulties of the contest, and with the danger with which they were surrounded. They have submitted to sacrifices of which there are few examples in the history of the world; and I indulge the confident hope...that this contest, in its results, will have the effect of establishing, upon a foundation never to be shaken, the security and independence of the Russian empire." ¹⁹

Thus was the War of Liberation recognized in Russia, as was the case in Spain, as a war of the people, whose victories were the people's victories. On 17 December, the Earl of Liverpool presented a message from the Prince Regent, expressing a desire to aid the people of Russia, suffering from the French invasion, requesting that the House concur. ²⁰ The House resolved itself into a Committee of Supply on 13 December. Lord Liverpool, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, explained that the grant had not been proposed before since the French troops were still on Russian soil, and they did not want the aid to be used by the French. Although the manufactures of England

were hit by the American war, the Russian success would open up a vast European market. Furthermore, Russia was suffering in the British cause and 200,000 pounds would be a great help in the relief of suffering.²¹ Lord Castlereagh declared its purpose was to supplement a fund raised by the Russian government and nobles to enable the peasantry and lower classes to resume their occupations and rebuild their homes.²²

The Whigs ridiculed their measure even though they thought it unwise to oppose it. Ponsonby, an important floor leader, exclaimed that he would vote for it even though it would not go to the Russian peasants. They would not need it when it reached them for they would be starved or frozen by that time. He catechized it as being "hypocritical begging" and a present to Alexander. It should be spent on the English sufferers, and was nothing more than a subsidy to Russia. However, he would vote for it because of the manufacturer's needs.²³ Whitbread declared, "it was not just to this country to take money out of the pockets of our starving manufacturers, to apply it to sufferers to whom, unhappily, it could be of no use."²⁴ Sir Francis Burdett opposed the measure because Great Britain was subsidizing the Dutch, French and American loyalists and could not relieve the economic pressure within the country.²⁵ Lord Holland, the titular leader of the Whig party, concludes that the chief object attained by this grant was to stir up the national feelings of the Continental peoples. It would have been "invidious" for the Whigs to have opposed it,

although it was an unwise measure, since "It was said to mortify the pride rather than conciliate the goodwill of the Russian Government. It was, moreover, so much diverted from its destination in its progress to the sufferers, that it enriched agents and jobbers in a much larger proportion than it relieved the objects of compassion."²⁶ Thus did the Whigs for political reasons oppose a humanitarian measure.

Wilberforce, one of the most important leaders in the Anti-Slave Trade agitation, who was independent in his politics, expressed the opinion that the gentlemen who opposed the grant "found it hard to reconcile their conduct to themselves. They could only do it by inventing some other object of humanity which appeared to claim the preference, or by denying that the measure before the House would operate effectually to the relief of the sufferers."²⁷ This grant would go a long way in Russia, but most of all "it would be setting an example, and opening a channel, into which the charitable and liberal feelings of others would naturally flow," and finally, it would cement the friendship between the two countries.²⁷

During the spring of 1812 petitions for peace were presented to Parliament. These increased in number as the Liberation Wars progressed. These petitions were similar in content, lamenting the evils which had increased with the length of the war: the heavy burdens of taxation, the loss in markets which had resulted in the accumulation of

manufactured products and the subsequent closing of the factories resulting in great misery to the lower classes; the resultant violence on the part of the unemployed in the nature of destruction of property and murders of the factory owners. Furthermore, the Quakers regarded war as a sin against God, hence exerted all efforts to bring it to a speedy conclusion from humanitarian as well as religious motives.

At the Annual Meeting of the Society of Friends, a petition to the King was adopted 27 May. This petition affirmed that the welfare of the country was deeply concerned with this subject. The mingling of the religious and the humanitarian motives is clearly recognized, for they declare that: "It is now many years since war has been spreading its desolation over a great part of the civilized world; and as we believe it to be an evil, from which the spirit of the Gospel of Christ would wholly deliver the nations of the earth, we humbly thee to use the Royal Prerogative, now placed in thy hands, to take such early measures for the putting a period to this dreadful state of devastation, as we trust the wisdom of thy councils, as they seek for Divine direction, will be enabled to discover."²⁸

In the spring of 1813, the petitions for peace became more insistent. They were seized upon again by the Whigs. On 10 May General Ferguson presented a petition from citizens who, as "lovers of their country, as lovers of humanity, and more especially as the professed followers of the Prince of Peace" that the blessings of peace be secured.

The war has wasted blood and treasure, injured commerce and manufactures, had a baneful influence on the moral and religious interests of the community; people have suffered great privations; and they hope that the last French defeat may bring peace on a "safe and honorable basis; and that, whatever be their confidence in the character of the ministers of the Crown for all the commendable qualities of statesmen, the petitioners are not ignorant that they partake of the fallibility, and are not uninfluenced by the passions, of our common nature....." In conclusion they request that all opportunities be taken to restore peace. ²⁹ Whitbread, while admitting the time inopportune, agreed with the petitioners as to the fallibility of the present ministers. "No opportunity, however, he believed, had hitherto been lost...."³⁰

In the House of Lords, Lord Holland presented petitions for peace 2 April, 1813. They were from all parts of the country: Derby, Asby de la Zouch, Loughborough, and other places including nine from Nottingham, all begging for peace, and eloquently picturing the evils of war. He would not make a motion to the effect that peace be made, he asserted, but believed that the ministers would utilize every opportunity to bring that about. ³¹ He stated further that at least it seemed an opportune time for an explicit statement of the war aims to be embodied in peace programs, inasmuch as Louis XVIII had issued a declaration from Hartwell in February, 1813 asserting his right to rule France.

Of course Spain should be a sine qua non of the negotiations. "He trusted, however, that they entertained no chimerical notion of wresting from France what she had acquired during the last twenty years, or of humiliating the great prince who now ruled that country. He could have wished, however, that some declaration had been put forth, explicitly stating the objects for which we were at war, and which, if properly expressed, must, he conceived, have had a manifestly good effect, not only in satisfying the people of this country, but in indisposing the people of France to make further sacrifices for the continuance of the war."³²

When the report of the Committee of Ways and Means was brought before Parliament in May 1813, the objectives of the Allies, including Great Britain, as to the future status of Norway became the subject of the debate. This question was agitated by the Whigs throughout 1813 and 1814, and occasionally alluded to in 1815. It was considered by them to be one of the greatest, if not the greatest, betrayal of the interests of the European peoples which took place in the settlements. At this time Ponsonby pointed out how Parliament had granted three millions for foreign wars, and 3 or 400,000 pounds had been advanced to Sweden. The Danish minister had been withdrawn. There was supposed to be an engagement favoring Sweden, and harmful to Denmark. If its nature could not be disclosed, Lord Castlereagh should make it known. It was said that Russia had guaranteed Sweden the

possession of Norway for her assistance, but all Sweden had done was to reoccupy Pomerania. Was England obligated? Castlereagh replied that the policy of the Government would be vindicated at a future period.³³

On 11 June the Treaty between Great Britain and Sweden, signed at Stockholm 3 March was described to the House of Commons. This Treaty guaranteed Norway and Guadaloupe to Sweden.³⁴ Messrs Whitbread and Ponsonby demanded that the Russo-Swedish Treaty be produced (which the British Treaty confirmed) for their perusal. Lord Castlereagh refused, declaring that this would be breaking faith.³⁵

In the House of Lords, Earl Grey, Whig leader, asked Lord Liverpool on 14 June what the conditions of the Russo-Swedish Treaty compelling Denmark to surrender Norway were, and what the consequences were if she failed to accede. How would this action be justified to those who abhorred dismemberment? What were the circumstances of the Danish negotiations? Denmark had sent a minister to England and had been ready to join the Allies. Why had they not dealt with her? Why had the Treaty been concealed since its signing 3 March? What had Sweden done for the Allied cause?³⁶

Lord Liverpool replied that the Cabinet was unable to reveal the substance of further engagements under existing circumstances. The Treaty had arrived 10 May. Denmark's propositions had been unacceptable. As to the money advanced to Sweden, information would be given. As yet, no

subsidy treaties with Russia and Prussia had been signed.³⁷
 The debate on the question came on 18 June. Lords Grey and Grenville attacked the Treaty while Lord Liverpool defended it. Lord Holland proposed an address to the King advocating its disavowal because of its injustice.³⁸ Fonsónby gave a long address denouncing the Treaty as contrary to the interests of man and of the world. Whitbread joined in the denunciation, and Canning and Castlereagh defended the Government.³⁹

Norway continued to be the subject of intermittent discussion throughout the winter, 1813-14. A new turn was given to the debate after the abdication of Napoleon, and the negotiation of a Treaty of peace at Paris, (Apr 23 to May 30) The Whig tactics aimed at the discomforture of the Government. On 29 April 1814, Lord Holland asked Lord Liverpool if the cessation of hostilities included Norway. When the latter replied "No," Lord Holland asked if Great Britain was at war with Norway. Liverpool replied that the Admiralty was blockading the Norwegian ports with the other Allies. Grenville demanded that the order be produced,⁴⁰ which Lord Liverpool said was impossible. Norway was considered a recalcitrant and outlaw state because Denmark had surrendered her rights to Norway to Sweden in exchange for continental territories, by the Treaty of Kiel in January, 1814. Norway had refused to submit and an independent Government had been established under Prince Christian

of Denmark, the former viceroy.

On 5 May Lord Grey asked Lord Liverpool if commissioners had not been sent to Norway and Denmark. Were they going to demand the submission of Norway to Sweden as a sine qua non or recognize Norway's independence? If the latter was the case, he would suspend his motion asking for information concerning the blockade until the mission terminated. Lord Liverpool refused to state the sine qua non of the negotiation.⁴¹

On 6 May Lord Bathurst was asked for information relative to the troops furnished to the coalition by Sweden from time to time. He replied that all information was confined to the forces furnished the 6 of June, 1813.⁴²

When the debate on the proposed address relative to the Norwegian blockade opened in the Commons, Wynn, a Whig, argued that the Treaty had been carried out for Denmark had done her part. Norway desired peace. By what right could she be subjugated? Sweden could not give Norway a constitution that would be an assurance against despotism after occupying the country. The independence of Norway would benefit Great Britain because she would supply food and naval stores. Sweden's natural ally was France. Hence, he moved an address to the Prince Regent to mediate in behalf of the Norwegians.⁴³

Lambton, in seconding the motion, said that he was one of those, who, venerating the great principles which their ancestors had bled in maintaining, could not look on calmly, and behold a magnanimous people offered up on the altar of

diplomatic convenience." ⁴⁴ Canning wished that Great
 Britain could get rid of the obligation but she could not. ⁴⁵
 Ponsonby declared that it was an act of oppression. ⁴⁶

Wilberforce voted against the motion from sense of
 duty like Canning. The ministers had good intentions, but
 the Norwegian policy was unjust. "On those principles which
 he had ever observed, and on which he had formerly deprecated
 the Slave Trade, he considered the partition of states
 against their will a most despotic sacrifice of public rights."
 He hoped that the ministers would help avert Norwegian calamities. ⁴⁷

A similar Whig manoeuvre by Grey whose motion in the
 House of Lords was based on the following arguments: ⁴⁸

"First, whether under a plain construction of the Treaty
 with Sweden such obligations can be urged as must be contended
 for to justify the measures that are now pursuing;

Secondly, whether the obligations themselves are such as
 can be vindicated, according to the established principles of
 the law of nations, and the political rights of mankind;

Thirdly, whether the King of Sweden by the faithful
 performance of his part of the contract, was entitled to call
 upon us for the full discharge of our part of it; and

Lastly; whether the maxims of sound policy could justify
 such a measure as we are now pursuing in regard to Norway."

The motion for the address was defeated in both Houses
 by overwhelming majorities, yet the Whig aims had been gained
 for the Norway policy had received great publicity in England
 and was usually bitterly condemned. Its conclusion will be
 explained in connection with the discussion of Sweden. ⁴⁹
 and its evaluation in analyzing the settlements. ⁵⁰

Meanwhile the ministry was recognizing the need of

popular support. From the spring of 1813 until the following year, Lord Castlereagh, the Foreign Minister, and the others of the Cabinet were engaged in arousing popular support for the Liberating Coalition. When the news of Wellington's great victory over the French at Vittoria, 21 June 1813, reached England it was broadcast over the country by means of the current periodicals. The Gazette was translated into Dutch, French, and German and thousands of copies sent to the Continent which suggests the aeroplane publicity of the Allies over a century later. The motive is revealed by a letter of Lord Liverpool to Wellington, congratulating him on the effect of the news of his victory: "I have no doubt it will produce a state of feeling not less gratifying on the Continent, and I only hope it will arrive in time to counteract the political machinations of the enemy. We calculated that Bonaparte would receive the intelligence at Dresden nearly about the time that we received it in London; and he will certainly have some days to avail himself of his own knowledge of your success, and of the ignorance of the Allies and of Austria respecting it. Every precaution was, however, taken to transmit the Gazette in French, Dutch, and German to the different parts of the coast with as little delay as possible, besides a messenger being sent to Stralsund, and to the headquarters of the Russian and Prussian armies. The event therefore, will I hope, be known before any prolongation of the armistice can have been settled."

The aims of Great Britain as to the pursuit of the war, the conduct of negotiations, and the stirring up of the nations, are set forth by Lord Castlereagh in a letter to Lord Cathcart, 21 Sept 1813. While recognizing the fact that Metternich is fond of negotiating, Castlereagh declares that the British Government deprecates ineffectual negotiations, since these tend to relax the spirit of the Allies, and enables the enemy to call forth new resources. ⁵² "I have heard of a suggestion of Napoleon" continues Lord Castlereagh, "that whilst the war is going on, there should ⁵³ be a sort of concurrent negotiation on neutral ground, I am sure this idea can not have received any countenance; it would be fatal to all military exertion. How could M.de Metternich hope to invigorate his own nation, to rouse them to exertion, or to animate them to great pecuniary sacrifices whilst the white flag was flying? Can he suppose that any oppressed nation will join them, that the Tyrol will rise, that Holland or Italy will attempt to emancipate themselves, or the Confederacy of the Rhine throw off its allegiance if they suppose that a peace may surprise and sacrifice them at the very outset?" The Coalition should be perfected by a Treaty of Alliance before Napoleon is given an opportunity ⁵⁴ to repair his blunders by negotiations.

In another letter to Cathcart on 14 October Lord Castlereagh fears that Metternich does not understand the true issue. The Austrian nation should be aroused to its

very extremities, as well as the other nations. This war in which they are engaged has become "a contest of nations to all intents and purposes and not a game of statesmen."

If Metternich proceeds on any other principle, he will play into Napoleon's hands. The Coalition is lost unless sustained by the united efforts of their peoples. This is the situation: ⁵⁵

"The three great military Powers of the Continent start with immense advantages---armies, the most magnificent in numbers, spirit and discipline, conscious of their own superiority gloriously re-established-- but this may perish before numbers unremittingly poured forth, if the whole is not sustained by a national sentiment, and by that impulse, which is alone to be communicated by calling the mass of the people into action. If this is done in Austria with the spirit it was done last year in Russia, and with which it has recently been done in Prussia, and if the councils of the Allies can be once inseparably united in the common cause, and all determined at whatever sacrifices to maintain the contest in that spirit of steady, patient, and determined perseverance, by which originally with small means we have progressively rescued the Peninsula, we shall triumph," even though the struggle be great.

The publication of British war aims for the last stages of the Liberation Wars was made in Parliament in the Prince Regent's speech at the opening of the Session, 4 November 1813. It is an exaltation over the campaign and the credit for the successes where it is due. "The public spirit and national enthusiasm which have successively accomplished the deliverance of the kingdoms of Spain and Portugal, and of the Russian Empire, now equally animate the German people; and we may justly entertain the fullest confidence that the same perseverance on their part will ultimately lead to the same glorious result." ⁵⁶

There is said to be no disposition "to require from France sacrifices of any description inconsistent with her honor or just pretensions as a nation" on the part of the Allies.⁵⁷ The aims of England are the restoration of peace based upon justice and equality, the independence of all nations and the security of Europe. The perseverance in the war will bring this about, after Europe has been delivered and will be largely due to the firmness of Great Britain.⁵⁸

Lord Holland describes the situation in Parliament before and after the Prince Regent's speech. The news of Leipsic arrived on the eve of the meeting of Parliament. Great moderation was shown in the Speech. Neither Lord Grey nor Ponsonby came to the opening of the Parliament. Lord Grenville wanted the war pushed farther, while Whitbread was going to move for peace but the Throne speech disarmed them both. An open breach between the two branches of Whigs was prevented by both supporting the ministers on questions of subsidies, militia, and war.⁵⁹

On 17 November Lord Castlereagh addressed Parliament to secure the final ratification of the foreign alliance treaties, though all the terms could not be revealed.⁶⁰ He gave Bernadotte the credit for saving Berlin from the French, praised Russia for her liberality and ardor, Prussia for her unparalleled exertions, raising an army of 200,000 equal to that of Russia; and Austria for her fair mediation and entrance into war when that failed.⁶¹ He moved that three

millions be granted to defray the expenses of war. ⁶²

Whitbread, always the outspoken critic of the Ministry's policies, said that he had some corrections to make. He disclaimed the idea of advocating a dishonorable peace, but wished that France should be dealt with honorably. ⁶³ Some opportunities for peace had been lost. The Liberation Wars differed from preceding coalitions in that, "formerly we had offered subsidies to the continental powers to coalesce against France; in the present instance, these powers had themselves coalesced against France; and we were called upon to advance subsidies to enable them to continue their efforts in the common cause, and for the attainment of peace on a permanent basis." He admittedly had changed his position in that formerly he had "expressed a wish that the same terms of peace might be granted now, as were offered at the commencement of the armistice. He had then corrected himself by saying, that he had hoped the same basis of negotiation might be adopted. He would correct himself still farther, and say, instead of the same basis, the same principle of negotiation." A general principle of pacific arrangement should be agreed upon by the Allies. The people were on the side of the Allies. Since Sweden had done so nobly, he heartily agreed to vote for her subsidy, in spite of his abhorrence to the disposition of Norway. ⁶⁴

On 14 December the question of the nature of the Dutch Government came before the House of Commons. Sir James

Mackintosh asked Lord Castlereagh if the Prince of Orange had assumed the title of King and manifested a determination not to re-establish the ancient government of Holland "with the approbation of His Majesty's government, and with the concurrence of his allies."⁶⁵

Lord Castlereagh replied that he had been unaware of the Prince of Orange's plans or of any determination of his relative to the government to be established, nor did he think there was any previous determination, for he had been invited by a provisional government. "The form of government was the result of the spontaneous and unanimous wish of the people of Holland of all parties; as much as those who were formerly the enemies of the House of Orange, and who were now among its most zealous partisans, as of those who had always been attached to it." The credentials of Lord Clancarty, who was to be the British Minister to The Hague, were delayed until it could be seen what type of Government Holland would set up.⁶⁶

Parliament adjourned in December 1813, and did not reconvene until March, 1814. On the 4th of April Lord Liverpool tried to satisfy the Parliamentary curiosity as to the Allied negotiations. He announced the dissolution of the Congress at Chatillon, which had taken place 15 March, and explained that the Allies had submitted a declaration to Europe, and to the world, in which they explained the principles by which they were guided, and justified themselves of all blame in the

failure of the pacific attempt. Nothing further could be
 said.⁶⁷ This proclamation issued 15 March was directed
 specifically to the French, and will be treated later as such.
 It was followed speedily by Napoleon's abdication (3 April 1814)
 at Fontainebleau and negotiations for peace were carried on
 with the Government of Louis XVIII during April and May and
 concluded 30 May with the signing of the first Peace of Paris.

Another test of popularistic motives in the meantime
 was afforded by a movement for the relief of the war destitute
 Germans. In January 1814, Wilberforce had raised a fund for
 German relief. On the 27th of January a meeting was held
 in the City of London Tavern. The respectable were not very
 well represented, so a meeting was arranged for in the West
 End of London. Wilberforce wrote the Archbishop of Canter-
 bury to be there, and petitioned Lord Sidmouth to ask a
 grant from the Prince Regent. The meeting was held on the 25
 of March. Some leading noblemen refused to attend from party
 feeling.⁶⁸ The meeting was held at Freeman's hall, and was
 attended by the Archbishops, the Duke of York (who was in the
 Chair) many bishops, Lords Harrowby, Liverpool, Buckinghamshire
 Sir James Mackintosh, and Madame de Stael, as well as Lords
 Gambier, Kenyon and Walsingham. Not one opposition
 lord, and only one commoner, Mackintosh, represented the Whig
 party.⁶⁹ Over 100,000 pounds were raised by this group
 for the relief of the Germans.⁷⁰

On 14 July 1814 a message was read to Parliament

from the Prince Regent appealing for aid for the German sufferers from devastation⁷¹. The Earl of Liverpool moved that a grant of 100,000 pounds be made⁷². Lord Holland opposed, citing precedent experiences. "The grant of the Portuguese was made in the spirit of justice and sound policy. The grant to the people of Russia might be founded on policy." This measure could not be justified on either basis for the British people were suffering from the burdens of war, and the Germans would not receive much help from this grant.⁷³ The Archbishop of Canterbury retorted that the British poor had been carefully attended to. Their condition was not comparable to that of the German sufferers. The blessings of the Portuguese and Russian grants were well known.⁷⁴

Again, nevertheless the Whigs oppose a humanitarian measure for political reasons seeking to prevent the passage because of its Tory advocacy, setting forth the ostensible reason that the money was needed for poor relief at home, and declaring it would never achieve its purpose. They used the same tactics as they had in the Russian relief measure, which brought upon them the reproof of Wilberforce for their partisan point of view.

The settlements of the First Peace of Paris and their completion at the Congress of Vienna were the principal subjects of discussion in Parliament during the summer of 1814 - and winter, 1814-15 and will be treated below, as they do not concern war aims.⁷⁵

When Napoleon returned for the Hundred Days in March 1815, war again was threatened between the Allies and France. On 6 April the Prince Regent authorized a message to Parliament requesting that the augmentation of the land and sea forces be approved by the voting of funds as well as the concerted action with the other Allied powers.⁷⁶ On the same day Lord Castlereagh proposed an address approving that of the Prince Regent.⁷⁷ Whitbread moved an amendment, inquiring if "Bonaparte was emperor of France by the will of the people, or by the will of the soldiery, or by their combined will?" If the last, was it right to seek to overturn his throne? He contrasts the decree of Napoleon abolishing the Slave Trade with the action of "Louis le Desire."⁷⁸ He lamented the fact that the misdeeds of the Congress of Vienna had given rise to a state of paralysis among the States. Aggression would consolidate the parties in France. Furthermore, "the French had had an experience of the Bourbons; and whatever their virtues in other respects might be, he was strongly of the opinion that they were not persons who could maintain themselves on the throne of France."⁷⁹

He implored the members to vote for his amendment and avert a war of aggression. The amendment read thus: "And at the same time we earnestly implore His Royal Highness the Prince Regent, that he would be graciously pleased to exert his most strenuous endeavors to secure to this country the continuance of peace, so as long as it can be maintained

consistently with the honor of His Majesty's Crown, the security of his dominions and the faith to be preserved with His Majesty's Allies." ⁸⁰

Again on 28th of April Whitbread moved that an address be made to forestall the war. Lord Castlereagh replied that Great Britain would not treat with Bonaparte because he was incapable of maintaining peace and amity. Both the French nation and Bonaparte had violated the treaty. The latter could not be trusted, so his power must be ended. However, the restoration of the Bourbons was not a sine qua non of peace. ⁸¹

A petition from the City of London early in May describes the bitterness of the people, largely due to the post-war depression, the persistence of heavy taxes, and the desire to sever as much possible European relationships, especially entangling alliances. The petitioners judge that the previous petitions have been ignored because of "the corrupt state of the representation, and of the want of sympathy in the House with the feelings and opinions of the people." Because of the great crisis resulting from the Allied treaties and declarations, the petition is made. ⁸²

It is asserted that Great Britain has no right to interfere in the French mode of government, and a war for that purpose is denounced. The heavy tax burdens, the corn laws, income and property taxes are lamented. After Britain's expenditure of men and money, "after all our sacrifices and all our exertions in the common cause, we failed to procure from one

sovereign that tribute to humanity, the abolition of the Slave Trade, and beheld another monarch commence his career by reestablishing the Inquisition, persecuting the best patriots of the country, and even prohibiting the introduction of English manufactures into his dominions. ⁸³

In Great Britain, as in the United States immediately after the World War, there was a reaction against the Allies and their peace programs. A very important factor in the situation was the fact that the crippled British manufactures were not perceptibly relieved due to the fact that the Germans were too impoverished to purchase British products, and Prussia, France, Russia and Spain erected tariff walls which varied in effectiveness. It was felt throughout England that the Allies had not cooperated in the purchase of English manufactures, while England had financed and subsidized the individual nations, as well as freely using her fleet and soldiers. Hence, British public opinion strongly favored an isolationist policy. This explains to a large extent the opposition which developed to the waging of war in 1815 against Napoleon.

FOOTNOTES for CHAPTER II

- 1 The Life of William Wilberforce, by his sons, Robert Isaac Wilberforce, M.A. and Samuel Wilberforce, M.A. 5 vols. IV, pp 293-4
- 2 Foreign Reminiscences by Henry Richard, Vassall Fox, Third Baron Lord Holland: Edited by his son, Lord Holland. Page 202.
- 3 Annual Register, 1803 Page 646
- 4 Ibid., Page 647
- 5 Annual Register 1808 Page 299
- 6 Annual Register 1812 Pages 251-253, also Historical MSS. Commission: Report on the MSS of J.B. Fortescue, Esq., preserved at Dropmore, Vol. X, Pages 269-72
- 7 Horner, Leonard, Editor of Memoirs and Correspondence of Francis Horner, M.P. Vol. 1 pp 48-9
- 8 Ibid., pp 49
- 9 Ibid., pp 49,50
- 10 Ibid., pp 51-52
- 11 Hansard, Parliamentary Debates vol. 23, pp 1159,1160
- 12 Ibid page 1161-62.
- 13 Ibid., page 1125
- 14 Ibid., page 1128
- 15 Ibid., page 1122
- 16 Ibid., pages 1130-37
- 17 Ibid., pages 1137-40
- 18 Ibid., page 1286
- 19 Hansard, vol. 24, page 13
- 20 Ibid., page 317
- 21 Ibid., pages 324-8
- 22 Ibid., pages 332-4

- 23 Ibid., pages 328-30
- 24 Ibid., pages 331-2
- 25 Ibid., pages 334-5
- 26 Holland, op.cit., page 166
- 27 Hansard, vol.24 op.cit, page 335
- 28 Annual Register, 1812 op.cit., pp 378,379
- 29 Hansard, vol. 25, pages 1157-8
- 30 Ibid., page 1158
- 31 Ibid, page 517
- 32 Ibid., pages 517-18
- 33 Ibid., pages 1134-36
- 34 Hansard, vol. 26 pp.565-569
- 35 Ibid., pages 569-570
- 36 Ibid., pages 606-609
- 37 Ibid., pages 609-614
- 38 Ibid., pages 715-742
- 39 Ibid., pages 746-782
- 40 Hansard, Vol.27, pages 586-588
- 41 Ibid., pages 653-655
- 42 Ibid., pages 727-729
- 43 Ibid., pages 834-42
- 44 Ibid., page 842
- 45 Ibid., pages 850-853
- 46 Ibid., pages 858-62
- 47 Ibid., page 862
- 48 Ibid., pages 167,808

- 49 See below page 189,191-192
- 50 See below page 205, 211-214
- 51 Yonge, Charles Duke, The Life and Administration of Robert Banks, Second Earl of Liverpool, K.G. Compiled from original documents by Yonge. 3 vols. Liverpool to Wellington 7 July 1813. page 471
- 52 Webster, C.K. Editor of British Diplomacy, 1813-1815 Castlereagh to Cathcart, 21 Sept 1813 p.30
the
- 53 In reply to ^{the} Austrian declaration of war, Napoleon issued a declaration 21 August 1813 which embodied this suggestion. He further stated that peace would be possible since Austria had definitely declared itself. The Allies refused to consider such an overture.
- 54 Webster, Br. Dip. op. cit. page 30
- 55 Ibid., Castlereagh to Cathcart 14 Oct. 1813
56. Ibid., page 5
- 57 Ibid., pages 5,6,
- 58 Ibid., page 6
- 59 Holland, op. cit., pages 183-84
- 60 Hansard, vol. 27, op. cit., page 135
- 61 Ibid., pages 136-140
- 62 Ibid., page 143
- 63 Ibid., page 153
- 64 Ibid., pages 154-5
- 65 Ibid., pages 282-3
- 66 Ibid., page 283
- 67 Ibid., pages 411-412
- 68 Wilberforce, IV, op. cit., page 157
- 69 Ibid., pages 158-9
- 70 Hansard, vol.23 op.cit., pages 706-08
- 71 Ibid., pages 701-02

- 72 Ibid., page 708
- 73 Hansard, vol. 28, pages 716-725
- 74 Ibid., pages 658-9
- 75 Infra, pages 205-223
- 76 Ibid., page 349
- 77 Ibid., pages 417-435
- 78 Ibid., page 444
- 79 Ibid., pages 448-9
- 80 Ibid., pages 450-1
- 81 Ibid., pages 960-982
- 82 Hansard, vol. 30, op. cit., page 1007
- 83 Ibid., pages 1009, 1010

CHAPTER III
SPANISH, RUSSIAN, and
POLISH POPULAR APPEALS AND RESPONSE

The Wars of Liberation differed from the previous coalition wars against the French Revolution and Napoleon in that popularism, which had been on the side of the French in the early wars shifted to the support of the Allied cause. Not only were the early wars popularistic on the part of the French people, but the sympathy of European peoples was inclined toward them in their struggle. During the Liberation Wars, not only were the European peoples aflame with the fervor of popular sentiments, but through Napoleonic despotism the French had lost the dynamic force of the early Revolutionary wars.

The necessity of securing the support of the people had been reluctantly appreciated by Allied statesmen. To be sure the Russian special envoy to England in promoting the "third" coalition apparently urged that popular opinion be utilized. "The most powerful arm used until the present by the French alone, with which they menace all countries, is universal opinion which they have rallied on the ground that their cause is that of the liberty and the prosperity of the peoples. It would be unfortunate for humanity if a cause so beautiful should be considered as the property of one government which

does not merit being known as the defender of it." It is necessary that the Allies seize this formidable weapon from the French and utilize it against them.¹ Such were the ideas of the Secret Instructions of 11 Sept. 1804 given Novosiltsov by Czar Alexander and his minister Prince Adam Czartoryski, but they do not seem to have acted upon at that period. Hence, it required the Spanish uprising to start the Liberation Movement.

In speaking of this "war for liberation" which began in 1808, the Annual Register declares it to be the great event of the year. "Spain is the center around which we arrange all the countries of Europe; and we take more or less interest in them, according to the relation in which they stand to the theatre, on which the contest between liberty and tyranny is to be determined." Though the peasant levies have consulted their safety in flight, yet if some character preeminently energetic and great should be produced by the present contest, and the patriots place him at their head, and trust themselves entirely to his direction, the Great Peninsula might be saved, and the tide of fortune turned against the tyrant."²

The circumstances which led to the entrance of Napoleon into Spain and the resultant war for liberation from his control, are as follows: In 1807 Portugal was considered one of the most notorious "leaks" in Napoleon's Continental System inasmuch as her ports were freely used by the British

for trade purposes. When Portugal refused to close her ports, Napoleon determined to bring her under his control. A secret project for the partition of Portugal was agreed upon with Godoy, the Spanish favorite, and by this arrangement the French troops marched through Spain into Portugal. As they reached Lisbon, the House of Braganza, the ruling Portuguese family, embarked on a ship for Brazil, which they made their home. The British thereafter landed a force in Portugal to defend the interests of the rightful rulers.

Due to the despicable weakness of Charles IV., the affairs of Spain were directed by the Queen's lover, Godoy called the Prince of the Peace. The oppression of the Court and the shameless scandal becoming intolerable, Prince Ferdinand was urged by his friends to head the popular cause and all other means of destroying the position and influence of Godoy having proved unavailing, to demand the abdication of his father and to become the reigning sovereign. Thereafter the controversy between the father and the son became very bitter. Finally on 18 March 1808, due to popular demand for Ferdinand, the King abdicated. Under the pretext of bringing about a reconciliation between the warring factions of the family, Napoleon met them at Bayonne, and 10 May 1808 persuaded the father to confirm his abdication in favor of the son, and the son to abdicate in favor of the father, each unaware of the action of the other. With these abdications in his hands, he proclaimed his brother Joseph

king of Spain. Ferdinand was taken to the chateau at Vallencay in France where he was held a virtual prisoner.

The French troops were ordered to occupy the leading Spanish cities, but the masses of the people were not at all friendly to the invaders. Even before the abdication of Ferdinand, the French troops quartered at Madrid had almost been driven out of the city by an infuriated populace on 2 May 1808 (Dos de Mayo). The action had such an important effect on the Spanish people that it is still celebrated as a national holiday. Before June the people all over Spain were in revolt. A Liberal group organized a Junta to carry on Ferdinand's Government at the city of Aranjuez. Guerrilla warfare against the French was organized among the people to repel the invasion. When Joseph entered Madrid on 20 July he was supported by Murat commanding 120,000 French troops. On 1 August England landed Sir Arthur Wellesley with an expeditionary force at Lisbon to cooperate with the Spanish patriots against the French.

Throughout the years from 1808 until the final liberation in 1813, the brunt of the warfare was borne by the British troops led by Sir John Moore (died) who was followed by Wellesley, later made the Duke of Wellington. The efforts of the Spanish were spasmodic, only at times, being very effective. Their contribution would have been very limited but for the organizing genius of Wellington. The liberal constitutional movement in Spain was confined to a small

section of the higher clergy, bourgeoisie, and students who had imbibed to a more or less degree the liberal principles emanating from France and England. The liberal minority, therefore, sought to strengthen their insecure leadership of the revolt by issuing stirring popular appeals. The Junta was composed of men who were inclined to be doctrinaire and theoretical, and for that reason the Constitution finally promulgated by them in 1812 proved to be quite unworkable.

On the 26 October 1808 the self-constituted Supreme Junta of Spain made a proclamation from Aranjuez, to the people who were declared to be the cause of the overthrow of the corrupt favorite, and the placing on the throne of Ferdinand.

"Spaniards! The supreme junta of Government...has devoted the first moments which succeeded its formation, to the urgent measures which its situation, and the circumstances of the time prescribe..... The oppressor of Europe saw that the time was arrived for carrying into execution the plot he had long been forming, and adding the richest and most wealthy to his bloody crown." Because the royal family had been divided, the Government corrupted, and the public forces disorganized, 60,000 French troops had been able to march into the capital. It was at this critical moment the people awake from their slumber. Deprived of their King, by the French, the Spanish had risen in revolt. It was necessary to have a central government, so by the will of the people "juntas...

were created..in the provinces, which collected in themselves, the whole authority of the nation in order to expel the public enemy and maintain the peace of the interior." By the "decision of the public voice" deputies were nominated by the provincial juntas to form the central junta.⁴

The corruption of the last government was deplored, and the savings through the suppression of the royal household, discontinuance of sums to the favorite, confiscation of estates of unworthy nobles, were pointed out. There would be further savings from the free navigation and commerce with America. The aim was to develop a well arranged administration of the public revenue and distribution of contributions to reform projects.⁵ Popular support was asked for this task in the making and executing of the proposed reforms in government: "reforms which are to be made in the civil, criminal, and commercial codes; projects to meliorate public education, which, among us, is so greatly in decline; a system of regulated economy for the better distribution and collection of national revenue; all these claim your attention, and form a vast series of problems and objects of meditation, in which you may manifest your talents and your acquirements."⁶ Committees(juntas) were to be formed among the people dwelling with each of the contemplated reforms. To these the people should address their suggestions;"so that each contributing by his exertions to give a just and enlightened direction to public opinion,may enable the nation to establish solidly and tranquilly

its internal felicity." ⁶ The proclamation concluded with a comparison between the Spanish and French revolutions. The Spanish revolution began to repel the invader-- the French in the internal intrigues of courtiers. The Spanish revolution is determined to base itself upon hereditary monarchy, while the French displayed differing opinions. The Spanish revolution began by the orderly formation of juntas-- the French in anarchy and by the shedding of blood. ⁶

By such dramatic appeals, did the Spanish junta seek to arouse the latent nationalism and direct it through liberal channels to produce the power necessary to expel the invader, to consummate the movement for liberation, external as well as internal.

On the third anniversary of the declaration of independence by the nation 2 May 1811, the Council of Regency issued a proclamation to the Spanish people to try to convince them of the magnitude of the achievements of the Junta during that time.

"What were you before the second of May? Grief to recollect it, and shame to utter it!-- Slaves, bending under the yoke of tyranny...What are you now?-- At the solemn voice of your representatives, in Cortes assembled, the imperishable rights of the people are revived, which despotism had usurped; arbitrary government has disappeared, by the three powers no longer being confounded in one; the political balance is reestablished; the liberty of thought is secured by that of the press; the execution of justice is at this moment founding on the eternal basis of natural equity; and the constitution which is preparing for you, will be the key stone of that grand arch, on which the throne of the re-organized monarchy will be erected."

Thus the Spaniard is the freest of the free in matter of life

person, property, expression of opinions, with all the opportunities of "knowledge, glory, and of fortune, opened to his activity and industry."⁷

The British prototype of the Spanish reforms can be understood from the conclusion of this proclamation. The Spaniard is declared to have no equal in freedom on the continent, "where the iron rod of oppression holds men degraded, and where all are his inferiors. You must search for his equals in that island alone, his generous ally and heroic compeer in this great contest, in that island, the happy sanctuary of liberty, the grand seat of laws, and the eternal model of human civilization."⁷

January twenty three eighteen twelve, another appeal was made to the Spanish nation for the support of the constitutional regime, and the "annihilating of the enemy's legions, by the President of the new Spanish Regency, Joaquin Mosqueray Figuera. The wish of the Spaniards is said to be the consolidation of the Government and the establishment of order, "which can alone be the fruit of a constitutional system, dictated by the representatives of the nation."⁸

In Spain there were two groups attempting to direct this force of popularism which had been aroused through a different channel to expel the invaders. The members of the Juntas and the small group of liberals from the middle classes which supported them were trying to force the fervent popularism through a liberal constitutional channel for the purpose of

liberating Spain from the intruder and developing a government similar to the British. The clergy and the land holding nobility were striving to guide the popular forces through a conservative channel, utilizing the pressure of popularism to drive out the French, focusing popular demand on the restoration of the King, the nobility and the clergy with their ancient prerogatives. The clergy were the most important of these conservative influences seeking to mould public opinion.

While the clergy also stirred up the people against the French invader they likewise consistently opposed the liberal measures of the Junta. It is to be recalled that the dominating influence in the unification and nationalization of Spain from the 12th to the 16th centuries was that of the clergy. Zealotry, stirred up in the wars to drive the Moors from the Peninsula, became indissolubly linked with Spanish nationalism. The rulers became known as "Their Catholic Majesties" and the Pope regarded Spain as his most loyal and faithful daughter.

The opposition of the Church and the majority of the lower clergy who clung to the symbols of the Ancient Regime, was probably the strongest factor in turning the undercurrent Popularism of Spain into a powerful force for Conservatism and even reaction. The literacy of the masses of the people was very low, hence there could be no truly representative government. These masses looked to their spiritual advisors for guidance in political affairs.

The propoganda of the Church against the Junta was directed by the Papal Nuncio. Among the measures which he opposed was the establishment of Tribunals for the protection of the Faith to fulfil the function of the Inquisition which had been abolished. Public documents were made known to their flocks by the local parish priests, as the educational and religious leaders of the communities, and because the cathedrals were the centers of community life. Hence the priests were ordered by the Junta to publish the acts creating the Tribunals. Whereupon The Papal Nuncio, Peter Gravina,, titular Archbishop of Nicaea, wrote letters to the Archbishops, bishops, and deans, forbidding the use of the cathedrals for publishing the acts of the Junta.

Among those communicated with by the Nuncio, were the dean of the chapter at Malaga, addressed 5 March, the bishop of Jaen, the chapter of Granada sedes vacante and the chapter of the cathedral at Cadiz. As a result of this action, the chapter of the Cadiz cathedral, with their capitular vicar, and military and ordinary vicars, "pretending the defense of religion, and a fear of acting against their own consciences, opposed themselves to the publication in the parish churches" of the Cortes manifesto establishing Tribunals for the protection of the Faith. This action was followed by cathedral chapters throughout Spain.

In a letter to the Nuncio serving as a manifesto to the prelates and chapters of Spain, Louis de Bourbon, Cardinal of

Scala, Archbishop of Toledo, the Primate of Spain, states that he had adopted strenuous measures to see that the decrees of the Junta were duly enacted. that Spain "might be preserved from the convulsions which threatened her at that moment. To those measures, equally tending to maintain the dignity of the holy church and the tranquillity of the state, we owe the extinction of a flame which might have consumed the kingdom." The effect of the Nuncio's action, according to Cardinal Scala is that it "compromises the honor of the National Congress, the security of the kingdom, the authority of the Episcopal Order, the true rights of the Roman Pontiff, and respect which is due to the church," whereby the country is brought to the verge of civil war.¹⁰

The propaganda of the clergy and other reactionary groups was indeed most effective, for when Ferdinand VII, returned to Spain, having signed the Treaty of Valencay with Napoleon in the fall of 1813, he was met by throngs of people, begging that he terminate the rule of the Junta and abolish the Constitution, although he had been willing to compromise with it, if the people demanded that it be continued.¹¹

From Valencia on 4 May 1814 Ferdinand proclaimed the abolition of the Junta. He expressed his appreciation of the display of love and loyalty given by the people, especially those at Madrid. He declared that the Junta had dispossessed him of his sovereignty by sanctioning the Constitution of 1812. Such acts violating the prerogatives of the King were made

laws by the intimidation of those who were in the galleries of the Cortes. Innovations were made in the forms of the ancient constitution. By the copying of "the revolutionary and democratic principles of the French constitution of 1791, they sanctioned, not the fundamental laws of a moderate monarchy, but those of a popular Government, with a chief... their mere delegated executor, and not a King, although they gave him that name, to deceive and seduce the unwary and the nation...." These facts he had learned from observation and public papers.

Then Ferdinand proposed the principles which should govern his reign. "I abhor and detest despotism--- neither the intelligence and cultivation of the nations of Europe could endure it, nor in Spain were its kings ever despots." Of course, abuses have crept into the Constitution, but this can not be wholly guarded against. He promises that "order being restored.....everything that relates to the good of my kingdoms shall be solidly and legitimately enacted, in Cortes legitimately assembled, as soon as it may be possible to do so, in order that my subjects may be prosperous and happy, in one religion, and under one government, strictly united by indissoluble ties." ¹³ The liberty and security of persons and property will be secured by laws. His philosophy of conservatism, if not reaction, is introduced subtly in his description of the relationship to be maintained between liberty and authority:..."..just liberty all likewise shall

enjoy, in order to communicate through the press their ideas and thoughts, within those limits, however, which sound reason imperiously prescribes to all, that it may not degenerate into licentiousness ; for the respect which is due to religion and government, and that which men mutually owe towards each other, can under no civilized state be reasonably permitted to be violated and trampled upon with impunity."¹⁴

An appeal was made to the people when Ferdinand announced the accession of Spain to the alliance against Bonaparte, 2 May 1815.¹⁵ It presented the just motives, importance and necessity, by which the King found himself obliged to oppose the aggression of the Usurper Bonaparte, to restore the repose and tranquillity of Europe, and to protect the rights of humanity and religion; in alliance with the Sovereigns at Vienna who signed the Declaration of the 13th of March.¹⁶ The last part closed with a stirring appeal: "Spaniards! this is a war commanded by Law; it is innocent and perfectly just, because it is based on the well being of Peoples and on the good faith of the Sovereigns called by Providence and by the Fundamental Laws which govern them."¹⁶

Whether or not the restoration in Spain should be deemed a popular betrayal depends upon one's conception of the whole question. There were two diverse types of expectation aroused, the one by the propaganda of the clergy and allied interests, the other by the proclamations of the juntas and the pamphlets of their adherents, and this suggests another consideration

as to whether the Spanish people had been actually represented in or by the juntas.

The second nation to respond to the appeals for their liberation was in another portion of Europe. Russia, like Spain, possessed a Government which had been characterized by autocracy. The religion of Russia, the Greek Orthodox was a national religion, as was the Roman Catholic in Spain. The Russian peasant venerated "Holy Mother Russia" as did the Holy Church, and the Tsar, the "Little Father" and Protector of both. The Tsar was the foremost defender of Greek Catholic interests for the majority of other peoples who had adopted that religion were under the domination of the Sultan in the Balkan and Asia Minor regions.

As the character of popularism assumed a very conservative, Iberian character in the Peninsula, so too the popularism of Russia lacked the constitutional, democratic elements found in the majority of the other European countries. Such abstractions were not understandable by the masses of Russian peasantry. Hence, when the time of Russia's peril came, when Napoleon with his army of over half a million invaded the Russian steppes and plains and seemingly threatened the existence of the massive Empire, appeals were made to the people to rally to support of the Holy Christian Religion, to defend their Tsar and their nation, to protect their hearths, to resist the invader. Later on a lower plane, an appeal was made to their more savage instincts; to cut off the straggling

invaders as they retreated, and to seize the spoil within reach.

It is the object of this study, not to describe the details of the Russian campaign, but to point out some of the appeals made to the people and the response elicited. The promises made in these proclamations, if they might be considered such, were on the whole implied. Their Tsar would continue to grant them the protection of the Church and the Government, to recompense them for their losses and benevolently care for them as he had done in the past. No further obligations were undertaken than those he had already assumed as Russian autocrat.

The propaganda was largely directed by Baron von Stein, a councillor of Czar, who, as we have seen already had been forced to leave Prussia, and later Austria due to the antipathy of Napoleon. He published "little pamphlets, proclamations, manifestoes, answers, and refutations of Napoleonic and French accounts and proclamations; come out and measured in the Russian style and Russian way of speaking; but most from the German, may I say, the Stein, point of view." Some of these were the result of his own impulses, while others were ordered by the Cabinet. The German poet, Arndt, who had left Germany for a reason similar to that of Stein, was employed by the latter as a publicist and pamphleteer, and made the above statement relative to Stein's propaganda. In connection with this work, Arndt cooperated with Admiral

Schischkov, the Minister of the Interior. Together they worked out proclamations to be made to the Russian people, though Arndt knew no Russian, and Schischkov little German. Another of Arndt's responsibilities was the editing of essays, papers, and pamphlets of other writers, among whom were two Germans from the Rhine region, Von Anstett, an Alsatian and Count Nesselrode, a native of the Cologne region. Both of these men were to become important as ministers of Alexander.¹⁹

St. Petersburg became the headquarters for Allied propaganda during the early phases of the Liberation War. This propaganda was directed not only to the Russians but also to the Germans, and even to the French. It was printed in their languages and intended to be sent out from Russia. These appeals "were blown about like scattered sparks," and "it was hoped that they might light upon some heart here and there and kindle in it as in a powder magazine, from which the conflagration might spread further," Arndt asserted. When Stein had announced Arndt's arrival to Alexander, he had urged that the German poet be immediately "employed in composing songs and writings, which may be distributed among the Germans, to correct their ideas; he will be attached to the German legion, that, by his writings and all the resources of popular eloquence, he may inspire them with enthusiasm, and such a spirit of devotion as we have witnessed in the corps of the Duke of Brunswick and Schill." Arndt's previous works such as the "Spirit of the Age" were therefore republished

and distributed throughout Germany. While at St. Petersburg, he also wrote a book which mightily stirred Germany: "The Catechism for the German Warrior and Defender of his Country." ¹⁹

The propaganda appeals within Russia began with the formal opening of war. When at Vilna on 6 July 1812 the Emperor of Russia officially declared war against France, he declared that Napoleon had forced him into war when he desired peace. Napoleon had attacked the Russian troops near Kovno, so all Russia was called to mobilize. "It is not necessary to recall to the commanders of the corps, to the chiefs and to the soldiers their duty and their bravery. The blood of the courageous Slavs runs in their veins. Warriors, you are defending your religion, your country, and your independence! I will be with you! God is against the aggressor." ²⁰

Later in July in a proclamation General Bennigsen counselled the Russians not to openly oppose Napoleon, but let him march to Moscow. How could he, "by the temporary possession of that city, conquer the empire of Russia, and subjugate a population of thirty millions? Distant from his resources eight hundred miles, he would, even if victorious, not escape the fate of the warrior Charles XII. When, pressed on every side by hostile armies, with a peasantry sworn to its destruction, rendered furious by its excesses, and irreconcilable by difference of religion, of customs, of language, how would he retreat? Russians!.....this cruel necessity will not exist long. Already our allies are preparing to menace the rear

of the invader; while he, inveigled too far to retreat with impunity, shall soon have to combat with the seasons, with famine, and innumerable armies of Russians....." ²¹ In this way was the strategy of the campaign made known to the people and their cooperation solicited.

At his camp at Polotsk, the 30th of July, Emperor Alexander issued a proclamation to his people on the occasion of the French further penetration into the interior of the country. "The enemy hopes to destroy the tranquillity of our Empire," says Alexander. "Our safety is founded upon the force and the courage of our brave soldiers." It is necessary to form a second line of defense, a new army within the country to defend "our property, our women, and our children." An address has been made to Moscow, now one is being made to subjects of all conditions and positions, the lay and the ecclesiastical to assist in the enterprises against the enemy. "May the enemy find in each noble a Pojarski, in each ecclesiastic a Palitzirn, and in each citizen, a Minin! Russian Nobility, it is you who in all times have saved the country! The Clergy should send up prayers-- And you-Russian Nation, illustrious descendants of heroic Slavs, often you have made the tigers and the lions tremble when ready to devour you." ²² In this way did he appeal to their nationalism as Estates, to their folklore and heroic tales.

On 24 June, Napoleon had crossed the Niemen with 650,000 men, the Russians retiring before him and on 28 June still

unresisted the French entered Vilna. The smaller Russian force of 250,000 men under General Kutusov retreated to Smolensk which was carried by a French assault 17 August after the Russians had started a fire, and retreated. Napoleon had intended to winter at Smolensk, but his advance had been so rapid that he desired to utilize the good fighting weather ahead, hence continued on to Moscow. While there had been little fighting, the French had lost about one hundred thousand men through straggling, fatigue, desertion, disease and hunger. Napoleon's speed was so rapid that a large part of his army and supplies were left behind. The Russians blocked his advance at Borodino with 130,000 troops. On 28 August one of the bloodiest battles ever fought occurred there, 60,000 Russians fell and 30,000 Frenchmen. Napoleon pushed on to Moscow which he reached 14 September 1812. The burning of the city by the citizens turned his hopes to ashes and on 15 October he ordered a retreat. Harassed by bands of Cossacks and Russian regulars, traversing the same country devastated in the advance, freezing, starving, and drowning the retreat became a rout. Marshal Ney protected the survivors as best he could by forming a rearguard. By 15 December, the survivors had crossed the Niemen, numbering less than one hundred thousand.

In August Alexander had appealed to the peasants and merchants in the zone to be occupied by the French to sell all their extra provisions to the Government and to destroy

their crops and receive compensation from the Government, Prince Rostopchin, the governor of Moscow issued proclamations to the people of the city on the 11th and 12th of September, stating that Kutusov had occupied a fortified spot near the city with his troops. He, Kutusov, said that he will defend Moscow with the last drop of his blood, and that he is ready to fight, even in the streets of the city. "In two or three days I will give the signal. Arm yourselves well with the hatchets and picks, and, if you wish to do better, take some forks with three tines (Fr. "dents"): the French are not tougher than a blade of wheat."²³

At St. Petersburg, 25 October, the Czar in a proclamation exults that the invader who thought himself invincible and invulnerable, after his successful march into the country found that to be a vain, presumptuous hope. This is due to the fact that "a population of forty millions, attached to their sovereign and country, and devoted to their religion and laws, the least brave man of whom is superior to his confederates and victims cannot be conquered by any heterogeneous force which he could muster."²⁴ Thus are the people given the credit for the liberation of Russia. However, the work is not completed, and it is the people's responsibility to do that. "Let the line of his retreat be rendered memorable by your honest indignation: destroy everything which can be of service to him, and our commanders have orders to remunerate you. Render your bridges, your

roads, impassable. In fine, adopt and execute the suggestions of a brave, wise and patriotic heart, and show yourselves deserving of the thanks of your country and your sovereign." ²⁴ And how his people responded!

Like an Israelitish king rejoicing over a victory over the Philistines or Moabites, does Alexander on 14 November at St. Petersburg, again give thanks to God and his people for the rout of the enemy, "who forced himself like a pestilential and murderous tempest, into the heart of Russia," seeking to subvert the faithful subjects by cunning. Now, "he flies from Moscow with as much fear and depression as he advanced against it with pride and insolence," discarding baggage, cannons, and provisions in flight. Thousands of fugitives daily expire. "In such manner does the just ²⁵ vengeance of God punish those who insult his temples."

Alexander continues this proclamation of the 14th of November by thanking those who are responsible for the liberation of Russia, first God, then all the loyal sons of Russia.

"All have unanimously joined in the work. Our valiant have everywhere defeated the enemy. The higher nobility have spared nothing by which it could contribute to the increase of the strength of the state. The merchants have distinguished themselves by sacrifices of all kinds. The loyal people, the burghers, and peasantry, have given such proofs of fidelity and love for their country, as can only be expected of the Russian nation. They have zealously and voluntarily entered into the hastily raised levies, and have shown a courage and resolution equal to veteran warriors..... So high a purpose, and such invincible perseverance in the whole nation, does it immortal honor, worthy of being preserved in the minds of posterity....Meanwhile we hold it to be our bounden duty, by this general publication to the world to express our gratitude to the valiant, loyal, and religious Russian nation." ²⁶

The Czar sent forth another paean of praise from Vilna, the 6th of January, 1813. The burning of cities and the ferocity of Napoleon's soldiers only inflamed the people's love of country. All classes and states of the Empire rallied from love of country and God. Napoleon had the support of twenty countries and nations, 500,000 soldiers, 1500 cannon infantry and cavalry. This brings to mind the words of the Holy Psalmist: ²⁷ "I have seen the wicked in great power, spreading himself like a green bay tree. Yet he passed away, and, lo, he was not: yea, I sought him, but he could not be found."²⁸ That described Napoleon in Russia.

The achievements have surpassed the fondest hopes for there is not a single enemy on Russian territory, except the dead, wounded, or prisoners. More than one thousand cannon have been captured, Alexander asserts. The event is beyond human accomplishment and could only be the work of Divine Providence. "We proceed by the justice of our actions, and the purity of our sentiments, and our wishes on the only road which leads to Him, marching to the temple of His Holiness.. we thank Him for the benefits rendered us; we address to Him our ardent prayers that He will continue to bless us and bring an end to the war, according us victory after victory, a satisfactory peace, and the desired tranquillity."²⁹

Such public declarations as the above would tend to indicate that Alexander was the incarnation of popularism. However, there were forces arrayed against popularism which

acted upon the hesitation of Alexander and obstructed the full expression and realization of the desires and patriotic effort of the people. Sir Robert Wilson, the British military attache' with the Russian army declared that "in Russia there is great selfishness, in the public service; and the defects of governmental institutions are sensibly felt to the prejudice of the public interests--by this cause the motives of action are contracted and not expanded, individualized not nationalized."³⁰ Without the pressure of a popular driving force, it is doubtful whether Russian victories would have been possible. Not only the organization of the army, but the intrigues of the court helped to obstruct the popular forces. The court was arrayed against the desires of the people, the majority of the factions wishing to end the war as soon as possible. For this reason, the army instructed Wilson to tell Alexander that it would recognize no truce or peace, but would regard it as extorted by treachery, and as an act of Count Romanzow, the foreign minister, not of Alexander.³¹ Baron von Stein, a Prussian statesman who had been banished by demand of Napoleon from Prussia and Austria because of his anti-Napoleonic attitude, and was at the time advisor of the Czar, and Prince Adam Czartoryski, a Polish statesman and friend of Alexander, now persuaded him to become the leader of the popular movement in Europe, thus assuming the role of liberator and popular idol. Convinced that such was his mission, the Czar ordered his troops into

the Napoleonic Duchy of Warsaw and made some proclamations to the Poles, declaring that his mission now was to liberate the oppressed peoples of Europe, and incidentally attach Poland to his dominions, though the latter was not publicly avowed because of the hostile state of public opinion in Russia and tender susceptibilities of Austria and Prussia.

In December 1812 the Russian armies marched into East Prussia and the armistice concluded with General Yorck, the Prussian general, led to the participation of that power in the war as an ally of Russia. This is considered below.³²

After the Coalition had been completed, and Napoleon had been overthrown, the Emperor Alexander issued a proclamation to the peoples of Europe on 28 June, 1814, which significantly illustrates Alexander's appreciation of the popular motif in the Liberation struggle. "The Most High has armed Russia to restore liberty to the peoples and to the States, which have succumbed to oppression." The year 1812 involved Russia in a great war because of an ambitious enemy. It resulted in a great degree of glory to Russia in the eyes of the world, and established the foundations of the liberty of Peoples. All classes of Russia sacrificed for her welfare, for "slavery is a sentiment unknown to the Russian heart."³³ When the year 1813 started the people were ready to listen to the voice of truth. The peoples united in spirit drove the enemy to the border of the Rhine. Then France opened her eyes from the abyss which surrounded her,

and wiped the illusion from her eyes. The voice of the country dethroned the tyrant and called her legitimate ruler to the Throne. "France desires peace: she has been accorded a generous and lasting peace. That peace is the guarantee of security of each People in particular, as well as the permanent tranquillity of all, protecting the independence which makes liberty possible, assures the well being of Europe, and prepares the recompense of the works and the dangers which we have so courageously surmounted.

34

One of the most crucial areas in the Napoleonic wars was that of Poland. Its people had been successively betrayed and its territories partitioned by its neighbors, hence they had little faith in Russia, Austria and Prussia. Napoleon, therefore realized, as did Czartoryski, a Polish advisor of Alexander, that Poland could be a powerful weapon in the hands of Bonaparte in the struggle with the Allies. For both realized, too, that the psychology of the Poles made them particularly susceptible to propaganda. They were stirred to a high pitch of enthusiasm by visualizing the lofty abstract principles of popularism. This was followed by the reaction of great despondency. There was a certain lack of balance in the people as a whole which prevented them from translating their lofty emotional concepts into constructive, practical reforms. There existed great divergence of opinion among them except when they were united in periods of emotional stress such as was the case in the

early summer of 1812. Ignorance characterized the peasantry who looked to their priests for guidance as did the Spanish and Russian peasantry. The educated groups were mainly the nobles who had been largely responsible for the anarchic conditions which had led to the partition of Poland. The commerce was carried on mainly by the Jews who formed a large percentage of the population of the towns. A large group of the nobility were vain, self-seeking, ready to sacrifice the interest of the country for their own personal advancement. ³⁷ Another group were genuinely patriotic, willing to sacrifice themselves for the good of their country such as Prince Poniatowski and the Czartoryskis.

On 5 December 1806 when the fourth coalition was being formed Prince Adam Czartoryski, Russian minister of Foreign Affairs, submitted a paper to the Czar, "On the necessity of restoring Poland to forestall Bonaparte," stating that: "In the struggle which is to decide on the fate of Russia and of Europe, Poland has at this juncture of affairs become a principal object of consideration with the two Empires which are about to come into immediate collision with each other; but she is looked upon by each of them in an entirely different manner. For the French, she is a source of safety, an object which animates their courage and strengthens their perseverance; it is in Poland that Bonaparte sees his foothold for fighting Russia and penetrating within her old frontiers." For it could be assumed that the Poles would

support the French if they thought their honor and liberties were involved, with the highest efforts of the civil population and contribute experienced officers and soldiers, money and provisions.³⁸ But for Russia the Poles were a source of "continual anxieties and suspicions." The Russians feared to make use of the Poles for they might turn against them. The Poles as an ally of Napoleon augmented his forces to a great extent, thus further weakening Russia. It was obviously desirable, in the Russian interest, to reverse this state of things: and to obtain such a result there was only one way "to proclaim Poland as a kingdom, the Emperor declaring himself King on behalf of himself and his successors forever." The advantages of this step and the effect that it would produce would be incalculable, Czartoryski declared. "The general enthusiasm it would excite in all the Poles, the gratitude which would rally all Polish hearts and arms around the throne, would entirely change Russia's situation and that of her enemies."³⁹

Czartoryski hoped that the Emperor Alexander would forestall Napoleon in the creation of Poland as a political entity and join it to the Empire of Russia. The immediate steps that should be taken to bring this about, the Polish patriot continued, would be to enter into negotiations with the other Powers concerned, Prussia and Austria. Then measures would be taken to stir public opinion in Poland. The Russian generals would be instructed to issue proclamations to the

Polish people, "circular letters to influential personages in the country, and instructions to governors and commanding officers, to show a friendly attitude to the Poles, to insure discipline in the troops, and to levy recruits: and the despatch of intelligent and zealous agents to the Polish provinces."⁴⁰

The Czar replied that Czartoryski's scheme was impossible and useless, "as our fundamental principles are so diametrically opposed to each other."⁴¹ The result was that when Napoleon entered Warsaw on the 18th of December 1806 he was welcomed with enthusiasm. Deputations came to him from the various Polish provinces, a provisional government was established, and volunteers formed a large Polish unit in the French army.⁴²

Czartoryski was not certain that in his former appeals, he had made sufficiently clear to the Czar the measures that should be adopted to stir up the Poles against the menace of Bonapartism and convince them by measures of propaganda that their true friend and protector was Alexander, so he submitted another memoir in December 1806: proposing that:⁴³

1. Public sentiment should be stirred up to the point of exaltation in the Russian Polish provinces before the enemy sought to do so with his agents.
2. In the Prussian provinces, public opinion should be moulded to favor their retention by Prussia, or annexation to Russia, whichever is the desired objective. Napoleon should not be permitted to dispose of them.
3. If tranquillity was to be maintained in Russian Poland, and insurrections were to be prevented, the chief

general of the army should issue proclamations opposed to those of Napoleon; second, strict orders should be issued to prevent excesses on the part of the soldiers against the life, liberty or property of the inhabitants; third, a friendly feeling should be cultivated between the Russian armies and the Polish people, looking toward the reunion of the Slav nations: fourth, proclamations, conforming to those of the governors and generals, should be issued by orders of the bishops, and in connection with the sermons of the village priests. All means should be taken to employ the ministers of the Gospel. Fifth, writings in the form of journals, periodicals and pamphlets to direct public opinion and destroy the effect of the publications which appeared on the part of the enemy, should be broadcast. They should not neglect to engage the rabbis of the Jewish synagogues and organize the important men of that nation against the enemy. Sixth, circular letters to the governors and important people in Russian and Prussian Poland should be sent declaring that Alexander would never permit Napoleon's establishment in the latter region. Seventh, trusted agents, intelligent and zealous, should be charged to work up the public spirit, distributing circular letters with wisdom and to good effect. Finally, levees en masse should be organized which could cooperate with the troops of the line. As to the contents of the proclamations and circular letters which should be issued: Alexander would declare himself king of Poland and would outline a plan for a firm constitution, which would conciliate the rights of the monarchy with the institutions and forms of the Polish nation, conserving the sovereignty of the Caar. ⁴⁴

Thus was a comprehensive program of war aims drawn up by Czartoryski. He assured Alexander it would be successful for the earnest cooperation of the people would be obtained. Probably this was the best worked out plan of propaganda presented and considered during the course of the Liberation Wars. While it was not actually to be carried out as thoroughly as had been planned, the rapid retreat of the French eliminating certain proposed steps, still it formed the basis of action in 1812.

In 1807 as predicted by Czartoryski Napoleon set up the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, composed of the King of Prussia's Polish dominions. Proclamations had been issued by the French, agents had covered the territory promising that Polish nationality would be restored, for during the earlier coalition wars, Napoleon was the master of propaganda and won the people to his support. This situation did not change until the process of the allied conciliation of the forces of popularism forecast by the events of 1808-09 in Spain and Austria, was brought to fruition in 1812-13. In 1809 when the Grand Duchy of Warsaw was threatened by the Allies the French made appeals to the Poles and when the war was over Frederick Augustus, the pro-French King of Saxony and Duke of Warsaw, issued a proclamation to the Poles 24 June 1809. He called them to rejoice for the restoration of tranquillity and constitutional government, affirming that "Our great solicitude shall be to endeavor to heal the wounds the war has occasioned, reward merit, and restore order..."⁴⁵

The Poles were not so enthusiastic for Napoleon that they did not deplore his treatment of the Spanish, but the French Emperor was the only one who had attempted to regenerate their nation and in a memoir to Alexander Czartoryski, under date of 20 June 1810 declared that "a characteristic trait of the Polish nation is to love one's country above everything, and to be ready to sacrifice everything to recover it."⁴⁶ While they were friendly to Alexander, and "had done everything to

prove their ardent wish to owe their national existence" to him, he had rejected all their overtures, while the French had encouraged them with their interest, support, and hope. Poland was ready stated Czartoryski, "to do the will of any Power that would help her."⁴⁷

On 25 December 1810 the Czar wrote Czartoryski that the time had come to prove to the Poles that Russia was their true friend and desired their restoration as a nation. This was his favorite idea, but he had been compelled to abandon it twice from force of circumstances. However, the propitious moment for its realization was about to arrive. Before taking any definite measures, Alexander requested his Polish friend to determine certain facts about the state of Polish public opinion.⁴⁸ He concluded this letter by declaring that if Napoleon should be overthrown and Poland should continue to be his ally the consequences would be disastrous, but if she should join the allied forces to overthrow the power of France, Europe would be delivered from her yoke, and the existence of Poland established with unshakeable solidity.⁴⁹

Czartoryski's reply on 30 January 1811 was straight forward," So far as I have been able to observe the public feeling in this country," he wrote, " I see a unanimity of intentions on objects both in the army and among the inhabitants of the Duchy of Warsaw. Their sole wish and object is the restoration of Poland---the reunion of all its parts into a single national body, under a national and constitutional

regime....but it would be necessary to convince everybody that the salvation of the country and realization of greater and more solid advantages demand a total change of policy and the abandonment of the only supporter that the Duchy has as yet possessed. ⁵⁰ To win the Poles to his cause, it would be necessary for Alexander to promise the restoration of the constitution of 3 May 1791, the reunion of the whole of Poland under one ruler, the re-establishment of the outlets of trade, and a reasonable prospect of success in the war with Napoleon. Well-defined declarations should state these promises. ⁵¹

To this Alexander replied on 31 January that proclamations should be made concerning his intentions when the arrangements for the war had been matured. If the Poles joined Russia, there would be certain infallible results: 1st. The regeneration of Poland would be paramount and not postponed. 2d. This regeneration would comprise the Duchy of Warsaw, as well as the Russian provinces, and probably Galicia. 3d. the theater of war, instead of being Polish territory would be transferred to the Oder. ⁵² The probable results of the war would be: 1st, a complete revolution in the opinions of Europe; 2nd, a marked diminution in Napoleon's forces; 3rd, the deliverance of Europe from the oppressive yoke; 4th, Poland would be defended by all the resources of a large Empire; 5th, "the revival of trade and prosperity, a liberal constitution, and a public revenue based on the real wants of the country, and not, as now, applied solely for the

maintenance of a too large army destined to serve the ambitious plans of Napoleon." ⁵³ He did not wish to start the war without Polish cooperation, and if they would give indubitable proofs of their intentions he would depend upon Czartoryski for all papers necessary to stir up the Poles, i.e. proclamations, a constitution, and other indispensable acts. ⁵⁴ Thus did Alexander indicate his willingness to re-establish Poland upon a liberal basis.

In the spring of 1812, again war appeared to be imminent between Russia and France. The Czar inquired of Czartoryski what would be the proper moment to announce the regeneration of Poland, whether it would be at the time of the rupture or after the military operations had procured major advantages for Russia? Should Lithuania be given a separate constitution or its regeneration included in that of Poland proper? ⁵⁵

Before this letter could be answered and the plans of Alexander to announce the independence of Poland under his tutelage could be consummated, the Poles were rallied to the standards of Napoleon, who proclaimed the restoration of their ancient kingdom. Leading Poles felt that Napoleon had already fulfilled a large part of the hopes of Poland. Wise rulers had been appointed, a council of ministers with a president, and a resident from France, "a veritable pro-consul who exercised a power almost without limits." ⁵⁶ Now when Napoleon came to Warsaw in the spring of 1812, he

promised that Poland would be gloriously re-established, with
⁵⁷
 the return of its Russian provinces.

A Diet, representing all the population was established
⁵⁸
 26 June 1812 at Warsaw. A proclamation was issued declaring
 a war of liberation from Russia. All Poles in the service
 of Russia were summoned to quit that service, and all Poles
 whose provinces were ruled by the Czar were commanded to
 arise and join their fellow-countrymen.
⁵⁹
 This measure evidently was directed against Prince Adam Czartoryski and
 his influence in Poland. Napoleon wrote Matuszewicz,
 interior minister of the Grand-Duchy, that the Prince Adam-
 Casimir Czartoryski should be given a prominent position
 to offset the influence of his son, Prince Adam. The
 former's acceptance of the appointment of Marshal of the
 Diet did in effect rally the country to the cause of national
 independence under the newly promised federal act.

In the fall when news of the burning of Moscow and
 the great retreat reached Warsaw, the French resident, de
 Pradt, who was still in Poland representing Napoleon,
 adopted for his device: "Amuser et abuser-- donnait des bals
 et des diners splendides." He was seeking to cover up the
 anxiety and sorrow of every one. Warsaw fell into a stupor,
 especially those who had brothers, husbands or fathers in the
 army, were characterized by it. Prince Poniatowski, Napoleon's
 Marshal, had tried to gather the remnants of the Polish corps
 together, but had not been very successful. The news was care-

fully concealed, but slowly reached the public. Desolation became general for "no one was easily consoled seeing the final evaporation of the last chance for the re-establishment of Poland."⁶⁰

On 1 October 1812 General Dutaillis tried to animate the Poles to prevent the capitulation of Warsaw, since the enemy were at its gates. He urged them to take up their arms and fight bravely in defense of their country and Emperor. De Pradt characterized this proclamation as being burlesque in style, and baroque in ideas.⁶¹ As the resistance was weak, the Russians had little difficulty in capturing the city.

Czartoryski, 27 December 1812, petitioned the Czar to make known his intentions relative to Poland under these circumstances, so they would know whether or not his attitude was to be one of vengeance. Alexander replied 13 January 1813, stating that he understood that unauthorized proclamations had been issued by Tchitchagow, signed by the minister of the interior, Mostowsky. Vengeance was a sentiment unknown to him, hence he had not changed his intentions in regard to Poland. Orders had been given to the Russian generals to treat the Poles as friends and brothers. As to Polish nationalism, however, he was unable to declare himself at the time because of certain difficulties that existed, in spite of his brilliant position. Public opinion in Russia was opposed to his intentions because of the revival of old hatreds due to the sacking of Smolensk

by the Polish troops and the general devastation of the country. The second reason for secrecy was because Austria and Prussia, which were favorable toward joining the Allied cause, would be thrown into the arms of Napoleon by a public declaration relative to Poland.⁶² For these reasons, and because of the rapid march through Poland, due to Polish demoralization, few proclamations were issued by the Prussians to the Poles, though secret propoganda was encouraged.

The Russian whispering campaign in Poland was largely based on a solemn guarantee secretly given to Czartoryski in January 1813, promising that Alexander would not lay down his arms until the independence of Poland was assured in harmony with the ideas long discussed by them, i.e. a separate kingdom under the rule of Alexander. During the spring of 1813, Alexander made an overture to Prince Poniatowski, the Polish noble and French marshal, offering him advantageous conditions for Poland as well as for himself, if he would desert the French cause. Poniatowski replied, "I would not accept the most well founded hopes, if they were bought at the price of dishonor."⁶³ About this time, moreover Hardenberg informed Metternich that Prince Radziwill, a Prussian Pole, was planning to make a trip to Warsaw to propose a proclamation in the name of Alexander, promising the Poles an independent existence under the protection of the Czar.⁶⁴ While at Warsaw, Radziwill tried to persuade Poniatowski to aspire to the elective throne and break with

France. The latter replied that he was determined not to separate the cause of his country from that of Napoleon, and told Radziwill to leave Warsaw within twenty-four hours, which he did.⁶⁵

That the Russian secret propaganda in Poland was successful to a certain extent is undeniable, for, on 13 February 1813, Metternich wrote Bubna, the Austrian agent to Russia, that peace was necessary to thwart the rising tide of nationalism. It was asserted that Russia had stirred up the spirit of the Poles, and latest reports from Galicia stated that without any doubt the Russian cause was more popular there than that of France.⁶⁶

Sir Robert Wilson, the British military observer with the Russian army observed after a trip to Warsaw that the fate of Poland was a subject of animated discussion in the society groups in Warsaw. He visited with Beningsen, Novosiltzov, Lanskoil, Doctorow when a political conversazione was held one evening. "As usual" he wrote, "the ladies were the greatest orators, for I believe they take most interest in the fate of their country."⁶⁷ Among the men who sacrificed themselves for their country's welfare was the high spirited Prince Poniatowski and the statesman, Czartoryski, who was largely responsible for Alexander's assumption of the role of liberator of Poland and Europe.⁶⁸

Czartoryski, meanwhile was deploring the apathy of Poland, which impressed him most at this time.

He believed it was due to the fact that no statement as to the nature of their future political existence had been made to the Poles by the Allies. Therefore, on 23 April 1813, he asked the Czar in a letter why the two sovereigns of Prussia and Russia could not issue a joint proclamation to the Poles, as they had done to the Germans. He advised that the proclamation be in vague terms "to permit all interested parties whoever" they might be, and all imaginations, the faculty of finding that which they wished and sought. In this way the spirits of the people would be calmed and the army be induced to participate on the side of the Allies.⁶⁹ Nothing came of this until the winter of 1813-14.

The protection of Polish liberties was promised in further proclamations made to the Poles at the time the settlements were made at Vienna, and will be considered in that connection. Poland, as had been pointed out, was one of the most fertile regions for propaganda in the form of proclamations, speeches, pamphlets to the middle classes, and agitation by the clergy and nobility among the miserably poor peasantry. The securing of popular support in that unfortunate country was necessary to both Napoleonic and Russian success, hence the battle of propaganda from both sources. As was the case in Italy, no belligerent could rally all of the forces of popularism to its support, though Napoleon was able to secure the adherence of the most assertive elements and groups of Polish popularism during the Liberation War,

as he had previously done. Hence, instead of helping to conquer a successful and durable peace and obtain national entity by their own efforts, the Poles expended their energies in a futile struggle to uphold their own liberties, even though they did this they were assisting in the suppression of the liberties of other nations such as Spain, Holland, and the Germanies. For this reason, the Polish people had no reason to cherish great expectations from the settlements, and the benefits secured for them were due to the insistence of England, France, and to a lesser degree, Austria, and the magnanimity of Alexander.

FOOTNOTES for CHAPTER III

- 1 Mazade. Memoires du prince Adam Czartoryski et Correspondance avec l'Empereur Alexandre Ier, pp 28-29
- 2 Annual Register, 1808 Preface page 1
- 3 Gottschalk, Louis R. The Era of the French Revolution (1715-1815) pp 379-80
- 4 Annual Register, 1808 op.cit., State Papers page 344
- 5 Ibid., page 347
- 6 Ibid., pages 349-350
- 7 Annual Register, 1811, State Papers, pages 322, 323
- 8 Annual Register, 1812, State Papers, page 417
- 9 Annual Register, 1813, State Papers, page 399
- 10 Ibid., pages 401, 402
- 11 La Forest. Ambassadeur de France en Espagne, 1808-13., edited by Geoffroy de Grandmaison, p. tome VII Aout, 1812-Avril, 1814, published 1913, pp. 307-10
- 12 Annual Register, 1814, State Papers, pp.404
- 13 Ibid., pp.402-403
- 14 Ibid., page 404
- 15 British and Foreign State Papers Vol II, page 877 The proclamation was probably written by Pedro Cevallos
- 16 Ibid., page 881
- 17 Seeley, Life of Arndt page 207
- 18 Ibid., pages 207, 208
- 19 British and Foreign State Papers, Vol. I, Part II, p.1043
- 20 Annual Register, 1812, op.cit., pages 431, 432
- 21 British and Foreign State Papers, 1, 11, op.cit., pp.1044-45
- 22 Annual Register 1812, op.cit., page 432
- 23 Fain. Manuscrit de Mil Huit Cent Douze contenant des evenemens de cette annee pour servir a l'Histoire de l'Empereur Napoleon. Vol. II pp 78, 79

- 24 Annual Register, 1812 op.cit., page 185
- 25 Br. and For. State Papers, I,II, op.cit., pp.449,450
- 26 Ibid., pp. 450,453
- 27 Ibid., pp.1047-48
- 28 Psalms 37:35,36
- 29 Br. and For. State Papers, I,II, op.cit., pp.1048-49
- 30 Wilson, op. cit.,II pp.7,8,
- 31 Holland, op. cit., page 168
- 32 See page below 101-104
- 33 Br. and For. State Papers, I,II, op. cit., p.1051
- 34 Ibid., pp. 1051, 1052
- 35 Stryiński, Casimir. Memoires de la Comtesse Potocka.
1794-1820 pages 355-56
- 36 Gielgud, Adam. Memoirs of Prince Adam Czartoryski and his
Correspondence with Alexander I., vol.II pages 165,166
- 37 Ibid., pages 166,167
- 38 Ibid., page 170
- 39 Ibid., pages 170,171
- 40 Ibid., 172,173
- 41 Mazade. Memoires du Prince Adam Czartoryski et Corres-
pondence avec L'Empereur Alexandre I.,II pp.179-81
- 42 Ibid., pp 181-2
- 43 Annual Register, 1809, page 767
- 44 Gielgud, op.cit., page 208
- 45 Ibid., page 209
- 46 Mazade, op.cit., pages 250,251
- 47 Gielgud, op. cit., Pages 216-7

- 48 Mazade, op.cit., page 256
- 49 Mazade, op. cit., Pages 260-2
- 50 Ibid., page 276
- 51 Gielgud, op.cit., page 227
- 52 Mazade, op. cit., page 277
- 53 Gielgud, op. cit., pages 230-1
- 54 Stryiński, op. cit., pp.292-3
- 55 Ibid., page 294
- 56 Mazade, op. cit., page 285
- 57 Gielgud, op.cit., page 232
- 58 Stryiński, op.cit., pp.330-1
- 59 De Pradt. Histoire de L'Ambassade Dans le Grand Duché de Varsovie en 1812 page 298
- 60 Mazade, op. cit., pp. 303⁷ 304
- 61 De Pradt. Histoire de L'Ambassade Dans le Grand Duché de Varsovie en 1812, op. cit., page 198
- 62 Mazade, op.cit., pages 303-04
- 63 Stryiński, op. cit., page 348
- 64 Oncken, W. Oesterreich und Preussen in Befreiungskriege I, pp.447
- 65 Stryiński, op. cit., pp.348-9
- 66 Oncken, I, pp. 430-1
- 67 Wilson, op. cit., II, page 59
- 68 Ibid., Page 81 Under date 15 August 1813, Wilson wrote:
 "I went away with low spirits, for I had to separate from Czartoryski who, from the misfortunes of his country, has become quite melancholy, and who inspires these feelings in his friends from love of him as well as of his cause. He is certainly one of the most highly gifted of the human race, and the more I see of him the more I attach myself. He possesses a playfulness of temper in his moments of indulgence that is congenial to his natural character, and fits most aptly to his natural mildness of disposition."
- 69 Mazade, op. cit., pages 310-311

CHAPTER IV

THE REGENERATION OF POPULAR FORCES IN THE GERMANIES.

Although the Germans seemed to have been apathetic under the rule of Napoleon, the examples of less enlightened countries tended to arouse all of the popular forces in the Germanies. A contemporary historian, quoted by Carlo Botta in his history of Italy during this period, declared that the Germans were greatly influenced by the Spaniards;

for: "The Spaniards," they said, "a people latterly unused to war, had risen against the common tyrant,--the martial Prussians tamely and ignominiously crouched before him. Those, Catholics used to servile obedience, rose to combat, these, Protestants used to freedom, were patient of subjection. There was in Spain no mighty name to support; in Prussia most had seen, and all revered, the glory of Frederick the Second: his sword, which had fallen into the power of the conqueror, had been taken by him and treated with ridicule--the mean triumph of an uncivilized warrior; that sword waved them on to vengeance; the voice of the injured Louisa spoke from her tomb, and reproached the Prussians with their supineness. Nor was the rest of Germany tranquil, Austria, herself, though her energy had been so much diminished, thrilled at the prospect of a propitious hour, Even Bavaria, who, from envy and fear of Austria, had always been the adherent of France, was now influenced by the common spirit of enmity:--so oppressive and irksome had Napoleon's dominion become to his friends, as well as to his foes, and perhaps most so to the former. As to Hesse, besides the common slavery, it was indignant at the puerile and arrogant conduct of Jerome, the brother of Napoleon." I

Thus none were willing to stand aside as spectators and each and all of the German states only waited a favorable opportunity to declare themselves.

The German States had been involved throughout the struggle of the coalitions against the French Revolution and Napoleon. Austria had been one of the members of the First Coalition, and as a result, was compelled to renounce Belgium, the left bank of the Rhine, and Lombardy at the peace ratified at Campo Formio, 17 October 1797. She had received compensation from the ancient territories of the Venetian Republic which Napoleon had seized. Austria was also a member of the Second Coalition which was defeated by Napoleon. At Luneville, 9 February 1808, Austria made peace which confirmed the Campo Formio terms. By joining the Third Coalition, she surrendered Illyria, Carinthia, Carniola, Trieste, Fiume, Salzburg, and the Tyrol at the Treaty of Schonbrunn or Vienna, 14 October 1805. Prussia, who had entered the war in 1792 with Austria and made peace in 1795, had been neutral until 1806. Prussia and Russia were the leading members of the Fourth Coalition, but Prussia paid for the losses of the Allies at the Peace, and Russia became a favored ally of Napoleon.

Prussia had been crippled and abased since the Treaty of Tilsit in 1807 by which she had surrendered New East Prussia and South Prussia, her share of the spoil of the Polish partitions of 1793 and 1795, as well as all her

provinces west of the Elbe river.² Furthermore, during the early months of 1808 all the rest of her territories Except East Prussia and a small section of West Prussia had been occupied by French troops until an agreement was reached on the amount of the indemnity to be paid to France.³ In order to free her territories from these troops, Prussia forced to submit to the Convention of 8 September 1808, which provided that her army must be reduced to 42,000 men until she had paid an indemnity of 140 million francs. The course of Queen Louisa tended to stimulate an intense feeling of nationalism, which attracted wise direction and leadership from all the Germanic lands. Realizing that the humiliation of Prussia was the humiliation of Germany, such notable leaders as Stein, Arndt, Fichte, Hardenberg, Niebuhr, Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Yorck and Blucher contributed to civil, economic, and military reforms and the regeneration of public sentiment, although the majority of these men were not Prussians.⁴

Baron vom Stein was called to his second term as Prussian Chief Minister, 4 October 1807, despite his having quarreled with Frederick Williams and been dismissed the preceding January. The King's Council and Ministry was reorganized. Feudal institutions which prevented the free development of agriculture and commerce were abolished and the peasants emancipated by an edict of 9 October 1807. An edict of 19 November 1808 reformed local self-government

of cities and towns. In 1809 Von Humboldt as Minister of Public Instruction reorganized the school system, consummating his work by promoting the establishing of the Universities of Berlin and Breslau. A Commission for Military Reorganization under the leadership of Scharnhorst undertook the reform of the army, eliminating abuses, providing for the promotion of worthy young men, and introducing the Landwehr system of passing the trained men into the reserve ranks and training recruits, thus multiplying the available troops.⁵

The patriotic Germans organized themselves into the Tugendbund (League of Virtue) or Moral and Scientific Union (June 1808) and Jahn organized his open-air gymnasia, called the Turnverein, to instill patriotic devotion and promote physical development. Arndt aided in the regeneration of national ideals by writing Die Geist der Zeit, and Was ist der Deutsche Vaterland? Fichte inspired the faculty and student of the University of Berlin with his famous Reden an die Deutsche Nation. Schläiermacher did likewise by his fiery sermons.

Thinking that the regeneration of Prussia was complete, in the midst of its active stages, Suevern, a member of the patriotic party, sketched a stirring proclamation to be published when the war should begin.⁶ This was presented to the King 12 October 1808, who laid it aside, because the time was not ripe for war, and the French party at the Court was

very influential.

Napoleon meanwhile had intercepted a letter of the Baron Vom Stein, praising the Spanish revolt and its German repercussion, which he published in the Moniteur, 8 September 1803. He immediately used this letter to sustain his demands for a large indemnity from Prussia, and in December issued a decree of proscription against Stein, who fled into the Austrian dominions in January 1809.⁷ During the Austrian War of 1809, the brave young soldier Schill and the young Duke of Brunswick-Cels led bold raids against the French across Germany which proved abortive, for the time of German's liberation had not arrived. The regeneration movement was thereafter forced underground by the censorship of Napoleon from 1809 to 1813.

Sparks from the Russian Liberation War falling upon Germany fired anew the popular forces. Stagemann a Prussian councillor wrote 29 September 1812, "the burning of Moscow is the subject of all conversation....Each one reasons about his event in his own fashion. Through this heroic action is furnished the demonstration of the national war. A fearful blow at the heart of the conqueror is delivered."⁸ The Germans were so stirred up by the news that it was all the governments could do to keep public opinion in check for the rest of the year. Especially was this true in Prussia.

Early in 1812, Stein with Arndt organized a committee

at St. Petersburg to further propagandize the Germans against Napoleon. Later (1813) Hardenberg, the Prussian Chancellor, cooperated with them. Kotzebue wrote the majority of the manifestoes and proclamations of German liberty issued by Wittgenstein. Niebuhr, former Governor of the Bank of Copenhagen, published the Preussische Korrespondent, in conjunction with George Reimer, as a phase of the Government's attempts to stir up the people. On 15 April Niebuhr requested Arndt to send all information that could be used, and urged him to ask Gneisenau to send regular information dealing with the movements of the army. ⁹

Through the Tugendbund and Gymnasia the youth were mobilized. Arndt described a typical Actus of a Gymnasium where the boys were training to be good patriots and soldiers. The scholars recited Klopstock's odes, the lyrics of Gleim, the Hermann-Schlacht and other German and Russian poems. ¹⁰ Arndt's works that were most important in stirring up the people were the Soldiers' Catechism and a little volume of Songs for Soldiers. Probably the most famous song in the latter work was Der Gott, der Eisen wachsen liess, which is very spirited, and is as follows:

II

Who underground the iron stored
 Cared not to see a slave
 Therefore to man the spear and sword
 Into his hand He gave.
 And gave therewith the valiant mood,
 The speech-tide highly raging,
 And bade him shed his dearest blood,
 And die the battle waging.

Then we're but Heaven's own will and way
 In honest faith maintaining,
 We do not earn a tyrant's pay
 Our brother men by braining;
 But whose fights for sluggard shame
 To pieces all we'll cleave him,
 In German soil and German name
 No portion will we leave him.

O sacred German Fatherland,
 O German honor true,
 To thee, revered beloved land
 We swear our faith anew.
 We hale a curse on caitiffs all,
 To feed the kite and crow,
 And, like old Hermann once, we call
 For vengeance, and we go.

Now roar and lighten whatso can,
 And blaze up bright and clear
 And all you Germans, man by man,
 To guard your homes appear!
 Appear, and lift your hearts on high,
 And lift your hands to heaven,
 And man by man in chorus cry,
 The tyrant's yoke is riven!

Prince Hardenberg, the Prussian Chancellor, praised Arndt especially for a pamphlet written during the progress of the war, which had been a rallying cry for the Germans since that time, and led to the composing of Die Wacht am Rhein. This pamphlet was entitled, The Rhine a German River, not a German boundary.¹²

Arndt described the spirit of the Germans during the days of February and March preceding the War, in this way: "Those were sublime days--those days so full of anxiety. Every one was carried away and raised above himself by the universal enthusiasm. I, too, was elevated by it, though I cannot claim to have been worthy of the pure and noble spirits who surrounded me."¹³

St. Marsan, the French Minister, reported to Maret, 4 March that the public voice clamored for war. The ideas that were being proclaimed were not only liberal, but even revolutionary. He stated, 12 March, that the fire of aroused public opinion was spreading throughout Germany, and the spirits of all were exalted over the prospects for a new order of things.¹⁴ The spark which had already kindled this tinder of enthusiasm was dropped by a Prussian General, Von Yorck.

Prussia, as an ally of Napoleon, had provided a corps of 13,000 troops under the command of General Yorck, which formed a part of the French army that invaded Russia. The Governor of Riga tried to convince Yorck he should unite with Russia against Napoleon. Yorck replied that he had no assurance of Prussia securing favorable terms of settlement if she abandoned France. Late in December the Czar wrote the Prussian general that he would make a treaty with Frederick William promising not to lay down his arms until Prussia had gained "an aggrandizement of territory such as to enable her to resume the place among the Powers which she had before 1806."¹⁵ At the same time Yorck learned that the Czar was being urged by the Russian peace party to make peace on the basis of the Vistula, hence it was necessary to act quickly to insure the continuation of the war. At Tauroggen, on 30 December 1812, an armistice was agreed to by General Yorck representing the Prussians, and Major-General Diebitch the Russians. The Prussians were to occupy

a certain territory without molestation, and were not to fight Russia for two months, although this was not to interfere with their orders from the King or affect the Czar's order to his troops.¹⁶

Prince William of Prussia has described the air of satisfaction which overspread the King's countenance when he announced to the family the, "distressing news that Yorck had capitulated with his corps and that they were prisoners of the Russians."¹⁷ However, the King took immediate steps to placate the French party at Court as well as Napoleon, and disavowed Yorck's action by appointing Kleist to assume his command, gave immediate orders for his arrest, placed his troops under the control of the King of Naples, and declared that these measures should be published at Berlin,¹⁸ Potsdam, Colberg, Graudenz, and in Silesia in the gazettes. In reply, Yorck issued a public declaration, 27 January 1813, stating that in Prussia no gazette was considered official, and it was not customary for a general to receive orders through a gazette,¹⁹ hence he was ignoring it. Eventually an ordinance absolving Yorck of all blame in concluding the convention of Tauroggen was issued by the King, 11 March 1813.²⁰

During January and February, secret negotiations were being conducted between Russia and Prussia. These culminated in the secret Treaty of Kalisch, 27 February, which provided for the adhesion of Prussia to a Russian

alliance. The avowed objects of the war were stated as being the establishment of a just peace, based upon the independence of Europe, the liberation of the Germanies from all external influence, and the re-establishment of Prussia on substantially the same basis which existed prior to the Treaty of Tilsit.

A movement to strengthen the army for the impending war was also started by Yorek 2 February 1813 in a proclamation from Koenigsberg: "Citizens of Prussia, form this corps to serve as an example to the other provinces of this monarchy, let us reunite all our efforts to show Europe, whose eyes are fixed on us, what the love for our king, and independence of our country can produce."²¹ Chancellor Hardenberg issued proclamations dated 2d and 9th of February providing for enlistment. Those between 18 and 24 were to be drafted with certain exemptions.²² Patriotic spirit and courageous devotions however, motivated many more than twenty four years of age to volunteer, so that on 10 February Hardenberg issued another proclamation statingg that they would be taken care of in the organization of the army.²³ The desire to enlist was great. Niebuhr, a Dane, who had entered the Prussian service, wrote from Berlin the middle of February that "the crowd of volunteers is as great today in front of the town hall, as it is before a baker's shop in a famine."²⁴

On 16 March came a public declaration of war against France. This stated that the King of Prussia had attempted

to bring tranquillity to his peoples, no matter how onerous the exactions had been, since the peace of Tilsit. In accordance with the Treaty of 24 February 1812 Napoleon had refused to recognize the neutrality of a part of Silesia, while Russia had agreed to recognize this. ²⁵ In as much as his provinces were partitioned, their inhabitants oppressed and in despair, it was necessary for the King to take immediate steps to restore the independence of the monarchy which would assure future prosperity. These conditions had necessitated of the conclusion of a treaty of alliance with Russia as the only means of consummating "a peace on equitable bases and suitable to augment" and solidify the monarchy. ²⁶ These were published in the Prussian war aims.

On 17 March 1813, one of the most historic appeals to popularism "An Mein Volk", was made in the name of Frederick William of Prussia. It served to rally these forces not only in Prussia and in the Germanies, but also throughout northern Europe. The introduction states that it was not necessary to justify the war in the eyes of "my faithful people", nor to the Germans, for its causes were known to all Europe. The domination of France had not brought the benedictions of peace, but had only served to intensify conditions which would result from a disastrous war. "The forces of the Country have been dissipated; the principal fortresses are in the hands of the Enemy; agriculture has been undermined; the industry of our cities has languished;

the sources of our prosperity have been dried up. The King had tried to keep peace with Napoleon but he had been so insolent and perfidious that the time had come to banish the illusion of peace. The Brandenburgers, Pomeranians, and Lithuanians were, therefore, challenged to rise and regain the liberties first assured by the Great Elector and Frederick the Great: "liberty of conscience, honor, independence, commerce, industry, and the sciences." They were asked to think of the Valorous examples of the Russians, the Spanish, and the Portuguese, as well as those of the small nations who had fought against tyranny in the past, the brave Swiss and the inhabitants of the Low Countries. Victory would be assured as the people sacrificed, expressed confidence in God, and relied upon the perseverance, courage and assistance of their allies. War was declared to be necessary to decisively insure Prussian existence, liberty and independence, since there would be no other choice than an honorable peace or a glorious death.

This appeal did not stress nationalism and democracy, unlike the majority of German propaganda of the period. The Prussians were appealed to as Brandenburgers, Pomeranians, Lithuanians, and inhabitants of the East and West Prussia rather than as citizens of one nation. They were urged to insure the liberties which they had gained in the past, and not promised further civil, political, economic, and social liberties in the future. The religious factor was introduced,

as it had been in Russia and Spain, for God was on their side, they declared. Another predominant element in this proclamation was loyalty to the dynasty. The spirit of nationalism and the desire for democracy were the characteristics of popularism to which the primary appeal was directed in other German propaganda. This was well illustrated by the declaration of Prince Kutusov to the Germans, 25 March considered below.

The response of the people was astonishing. It was the general opinion of observers that the King would have been dethroned if he had not declared war against France, and if he should withdraw from the war without great concessions, he would be faced with internal revolt.²⁸

The specific war aims, without which peace was impossible for Prussia, were stated diplomatically by Baron Krusemarck, the Prussian minister at Paris, in a note to the Duc de Bassano, 27 March 1813. European independence was primary, which would insure a stable equilibrium for all powers, and prevent the abuse of force, guarantee justice, establish each nation in its national rights. The specific objective of the King of Prussia was the heritage of his fathers. In defense of the throne, the country, the independence of Europe, and the security of the firesides, Prussia de-
²⁹clared war.

The war aims of the Coalition jointly represented by Russia and Prussia in the Germanies, were announced in

frequent proclamations to the Germanies. In the spring of 1813 these were directed in general to all the German states, and specifically to Saxony. Saxony would have joined the coalition but for the prompt action of Napoleon, who had returned from Paris to use Saxony as his base of operations. On 15 February 1813 Prince Kutusov Smolensko issued a proclamation to the German peoples inviting them to rise against the tyrant, and join the Czar who was actuated by a desire for the restoration of the peace and independence of Europe. While this appeal was directed to the peoples it was primarily addressed to the governments whose responsibility it was to take advantage of the opportunity "to reconstruct the great work of the equilibrium of Europe, and thereby to insure public tranquillity and individual happiness."³⁰

This was followed five days later by Prussian proclamations to the Saxons. The striking feature of these proclamations was the assertion of common German nationality and aspirations. The Saxons were hailed as brothers for the peoples were united by ties of blood, language, and common oppression. They were urged to march for the liberty of Germany, to conquer or to die as they fought the modern Charlemagne. Since they were free men, all distinctions³¹ of blood, rank and country were abolished.

About 25 February 1813, the Russian general, Wittgenstein, appealed to the Saxons to rise against the modern Charlemagne

as their king Witikind had done a thousand years before. The proclamation closed with a threat, for they were given the choice of the Allied fraternal embrace or the point of the sword.³² He concluded by stating that their choice might compromise the throne of Saxony.³³ In a second proclamation, Wittgenstein declared that Saxons and Prussians alike were flying to combat in the sacred cause which was obliterating all class differences between laborers and princes, for both were contending for the grand ideas of king, liberty, honor, and country.³⁴

What were the reactions of the Saxons and the other Germans to these challenging proclamations? Early in March the Saxons protested against provisioning the French army. The Saxon general, Thielman, who occupied the fortress of Thorgau refused to recognize the authority of Prince Eugene and desired to come to terms with the Allies.³⁵ The spirit of the Germans was described by the Prussian Cabinet in a declaration 17 February 1813. The fever of liberty was said to have transported all hearts. "The agents of authority were disguised as popular chiefs, and the chiefs of the armies were joining their cries to those of insurrection. Many proclamations were inundating Germany, addressed to those passions easily aroused, to inflame the hate and vengeance already fermenting, in the name of country calling all the Germans to combat." The popularistic spirit was

spreading from village to village and each citizen was doing what he could to aid in national defense. The battalions were selecting their own officers and arming themselves as best they could with forks, swords, sabres, muskets, or any convenient weapon. At the approach of the French the villagers would flee to the woods, destroy food supplies, and bridges and harrass the enemy's flanks.³⁶

It was the desire of the Allies to utilize these forces of popularism in the most effective manner by causing them to focus upon the attainment of certain war aims to be the basis of peace programs, so on 25 March Prince Kutusov issued a proclamation to the Germans on behalf of Alexander and Frederick William, announced the return of their liberty and independence and the dissolution of the Confederation of the Rhine. National enthusiasm was being aroused to liberate the Germans from the yoke of oppression, in the name of honor and country. The appeal was direct to each German worthy of the name, to act with promptitude and vigor whether he were a prince, noble or in the ranks of the common people, employing his intelligence, his blood, his body, his life, his heart and his spirit for the liberating projects of Russia and Prussia. Each German prince was expected to faithfully cooperate, for their cause was supported by public opinion.³⁷

The latter part of the proclamation stated the coalition

war aims of Germany as well as for France, but seemed to be primarily based upon the ideas of the Czar for after it stated that the Confederation of the Rhine would be dissolved, "His Majesty, the Emperor of Russia announced at the same time that he wished to see Germany regenerated and with a constitution, foreign influence annihilated, and the peoples and princes of Germany determine their own government. Furthermore, the bases and the principles of that work would be modeled after the ancient spirit of the German people; Germany more rejuvenated, vigorous and united would be able to reappear with advantage among the nations of Europe. Their Majesties and their allies were in perfect agreement relative to their intentions and projects..... France would be permitted to retain her natural limites and no nation would trouble her internal prosperity." ³⁸

While these proclamations helped to further arouse German popularism no more states joined the coalition at the time. The armistice at Pleschwitz was signed the 4th of June and the abortive Congress of Prague terminated, with the armistice, 10 August. Austria had declared her intention of declaring war if the Congress' deliberations came to nought. On 11 August she declared war against France. The other German states joined the Coalition after the battle of Leipzig and the decisive defeat of Napoleon in the middle of October. Hence, it is necessary for the purpose of this study that the war aims in August when Austria declared war

and in the fall when the other German states joined the Coalition and issued proclamations in justification of their action, be considered still.

In Austria after the humiliating Treaty of Pressburg (26 December 1805), which deprived her of Venetia, Istria, Dalmatia, as well as of her Swabian possessions and the Tyrol and Vorarlberg, conditions were as in Prussia after the analogous Treaty of Tilsit in 1807. Governmental administration and public opinion had to be regenerated. The governmental bureaucracy had been characterized by rottenness and inefficiency. From 1805 to 1808 reforms were carried out in the army by retiring surplus inefficient officers and by the introduction of the Landwehr, and the governmental administration was reformed. The majority of the members of the Imperial Council resigned, and a new government was appointed, headed by the German-minded Count Philip Stadion, who became the Foreign Minister.

The rigid restrictions imposed on the press by Francis after 1792 were liberalized as a basic preliminary.³⁹ For before Austria could be liberated, it seemed necessary primarily that the public opinion be aroused and mobilized. This took place between 1805 and 1809. It was noted by the French charge d' affaires, who writing to the French Foreign Minister, Champagny, 18 March 1809, contrasted Austrian attitudes of 1805 and 1809. In 1805, he said, the war was desired by the Government, but not by the army nor by the

people, while in 1809 it was desired by the Government,⁴⁰
by the army and by the people.

The Government utilized certain stimuli which they thought would be effective in arousing the popularistic forces. Count Stadion emphasized the value of propaganda, and desired the production of pamphlets and broadsides in great quantities. He notified the skilled propagandist, Friedrich Gentz, in August 1808 that his services would be needed and called him to Vienna 13 February 1809. Stadion hoped to gather pamphlets, proclamations, speeches, poems, dramas, and songs into an anthology to be broadcast to the people. Furthermore, he kept in touch with the rest of Germany to insure their cooperation in the final liberation from the foreign yoke.⁴¹

The use of the printing press and the works of literary men was another important factor. While the Government first employed this means of propaganda, it was carried much farther by the enthusiasm of the people, as was the case with the other forms. Metternich, Austrian ambassador to France, was keenly observant of the importance of newspapers and pamphlets for the purpose of rallying popular forces. Writing from Paris, 23 June 1808, to Stadion, he declared that the fault of the Allied governments since the commencement of the French Revolution, had been that they had regarded the appeal to public opinion as useless, beneath their dignity, or dangerous. In this, they had made

a great mistake for the French had been able to monopolize this powerful weapon to use against the allies.

Napoleon's newspapers, he declared, were worth more than three hundred thousand soldiers, which could not frighten the foreign Powers as much as half a dozen of Napoleon's paid pamphleteers.⁴² He pleaded with Stadion not to ignore public opinion. "Public opinion is the most powerful of all means; like religion, it penetrates the most hidden recesses, where administrative measures have no influence. To despise public opinion is as dangerous as to despise moral principles; and if the latter will rise up even when they have been almost stifled, it is not so with opinion, it requires peculiar cultivation, a continued and sustained perseverance. Posterity will hardly believe that we have regarded silence as an efficacious weapon to oppose to the clamours of our opponents, and that in a century of words."⁴³

Metternich's opinions were shared by other Austrian leaders. Therefore the Vaterlandische Blätter für den oesterreichischen Kaiserstaat was founded, 10 May 1808, by order of the Kaiser. This was to be a national semi-official newspaper. Two other papers were also founded⁴⁴ at the time, for the purpose of stirring up the people. Since these did not electrify the people sufficiently, writers were directed to prepare pamphlets. These were addressed "To the Germans", or "To the German Nation,"⁴⁵ Caroline Pichler, who had helped aroused the women,

encouraged the literary men to write also battle song in lyric form which became very popular.⁴⁶ Patriotic poetry was written and enthusiastically received. Baron Rothkirch wrote a poem "To the German Language" which became very popular.⁴⁷ Dramas, plays and music were other media through which popularism was aroused and expressed. They were rejected if they were not illustrative of the enthusiasm of the people. Tragedies were forbidden, assuming they were not conducive to optimism for the coming war.

A musical program was repeated at Vienna for several consecutive weeks in the spring of 1809. Its first performance was 25 March 1809. Among the numbers on the program, there were:

A Military Symphony, by Joseph Haydn.
 The War Oath by H.J. von Collin, music by
 Joseph Weigl, Imperial bandmaster,
 March by Collin
 A Spanish Rondo for Violincello, by Romberg.
 The Militiaman's Farewell to his Parents
 by Castelli, Music by Weigl
 Oesterreich uber Alles by von Collin,
 chorus by Weigl.

Dodun, the French Charge d'Affaires, reported that "the enthusiasm of the audience was unbounded. Few selections were not called for a second time, and the patriotic listeners could not restrain themselves from joining their voices to those of the regular chorus in singing the refrain."⁴⁸ When they played Oesterreich Uber Alles, one man from the gallery yelled that Austria would be victor over all.

The Archduke John aided in organizing the campaign of

propaganda with the assistance of his friends, the Swiss historian, Johannes Müller who desired to arouse his people, the publicist Friedrich von Gentz, and the patriot Josef von Hormayr who was specially interested in the Tyrol. One of the most important means of propaganda was the use of proclamations. These were drawn up by Gentz, Schlegel, Hormayr, and Carpani, and flooded the country. John travelled throughout the country arousing the Austrians as he went.⁴⁹

The Archduke Charles, also, assisted in Austrian regeneration, first by reorganising and reforming the army from 1805-08, and secondly, by issuing proclamations to his soldiers and the people on the eve of the war and after it had been declared. On 6 April 1809 before leading his armies against the French, he issued a fiery proclamation written by Friedrich Schlegel, though it undoubtedly expressed his sentiments. It stated that the protection of the country demanded great achievements. Peace had been maintained as long as it had been possible. War was being declared against the insatiable ambition of one who disregarded the rights of nations and peoples. This threatened the universal subjugation of European states including Austria. The proclamation placed great responsibility upon the soldiers. "On you, my dear brother soldiers, are fixed the eyes of the universe, and of all those who still feel for national honours and national prosperity. You shall not share the disgrace of becoming the tools of oppression.

You shall not carry on the endless wars of ambition under distant climes. Your blood shall never flow for foreign fleets and foreign covetousness; not on you shall the curse alight to annihilate innocent nations, and over the bodies of the slaughtered defenders to pave the way for a foreigner to the usurped throne. A happier lot awaits you; the liberty of Europe has taken refuge under our banners. Your victories will loose its fetters, and your brothers in Germany, yet in the ranks of the enemy, long for their deliverance. You are engaged in a just cause....."⁵⁰

This proclamation was followed by one to the German nation on 8 April in which Schlegel stated that Austria aimed "to regain for Germany its independence and national honor. United with Austria Germany was free and happy.... The Austrian troops regard you as brothers....Only the German who forgets his identity is our enemy."⁵¹ At the same time Schlegel wrote another appeal to be delivered to the Bavarians: "Mark well, ye Bavarians! all those who are imbued with a true German patriotism will be powerfully supported, and, they, so deserve, richly rewarded, by their former emperor, who did not resign his German heart along with his German crown. On the other hand, punishment and shame will fall upon those who forgetting their German name disregard the proffered assistance, and prefer to serve the common enemy rather than the native liberator."

Later, he wrote an appeal "To the Germans: A German's Appeal for the Breaking of the Heavy Chains that Bind us!"⁵²

Austrian popularism had been effectually regenerated, but the deliverance did not come until the later Liberation War in 1813-14. Even though the outlying Austrian and Hungarian territories ignoring French nationalistic intrigues, rallied to the defense of the Empire, Napoleon again defeated Austria and the Treaty of Schonbrunn was drawn up, further humiliating Austria. The unfortunate outcome of the war reacted unfavorably on the men and the means which brought it about. Francis was convinced that Austria should conciliate Napoleon, so the Archduke Charles was retired and Metternich replaced Stadion. All pamphlets and writings of 1809 directed against France were to be withdrawn from circulation.⁵³

When Metternich assumed office after the disastrous campaign followed by the humiliating peace of Vienna in 1809, he found the Austrian monarchy "at the lowest ebb," as he told Stewart, the British Minister to Prussia in August 1813.⁵⁴ He arranged the marriage in order to extricate Austria from the ruin which seemed to be pending. He made an alliance with France in 1810, which was consummated by the marriage of the Emperor's daughter Marie Louise, to Napoleon. This alliance was re-stated in a treaty concluded early in March 1812, which provided that Austria maintain a force which could be used to cooperate with the

French troops in the war which was soon to start between France and Russia, though later this was interpreted as enabling Austria to use this as an army of observation to defend Austrian frontiers. This alliance resulted in the suppression of propaganda directed to the expatriated Tyrolese, and Anti-French propaganda within Austria. Likewise the intrigues of the British agent King, in the Austrian regions which had been ceded to Bavaria were opposed. As he directed Austrian foreign relations during the year 1809-13, Metternich was motivated by two purposes: to restore Austria to the position she had occupied as a first-rate power, and to bring peace to Europe and the world.

In 1810 meantime, the newspapers came back as strong as ever. In 1811 and 1812 historical works and plays tended to foster German nationalism. In January 1812 Friedrich Schlegel began to publish the Deutsches Museum to uphold and strengthen the German spirit and thought.⁵⁵ On 23 December 1812, the French minister, Otto, reported to the Foreign Minister at Paris, Maret, that an influential war party headed by Stadion was attempting to discredit Metternich as the author of the French Alliance and was declaring that Poland, Saxony, the north of Germany, Bavaria, and Italy were awaiting Austria's action to fight for their independence.⁵⁶ Metternich, himself, pointed out the magnitude of the popularistic forces in a letter to Floret, the Austrian agent to Napoleon, 18 February 1813. The effect of Napoleon's

defeats has been electrifying. Everywhere the peoples had been aroused, as a result of the disastrous Russian campaign, to such an extent that their enthusiasm might endanger the existence of their own governments. Austria should be careful not to embarrass neighboring countries by her propaganda. If the war should spread, the Tyrol and the Illyrian provinces would be aroused.

57

During the early summer of 1813, the Government decided to organize a definite campaign of propaganda to inflame the people against Napoleon, and cause them to forget earlier failures.

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The papers carried regular reports of French losses in Spain and elsewhere and also reports of Austrian strength. Pamphlets were printed to be held in reserve until the outbreak of hostilities. This time, in contrast to the attitude it took in 1809, the Government intended to "avoid all passionate outbursts;" to, "influence the reason rather than to inflame the imagination" of the public; to "make lasting rather than transitory impressions;" and to "outline clearly and logically the necessity for war." German liberty, particularly, in the sense employed by the Tugendbund, was not to be mentioned. Such pamphlets as were issued, therefore, were much more moderate in tone than those of 1809. This was true, also of the plays, The German House-wife, German-Mindedness, and German Loyalty, which were produced, to assist in the mobilization of popular forces.

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The person held responsible historically, for the modification of the tone of the propaganda in 1813 as compared with that of 1809, has been Metternich. Yet it has been pointed out how in 1808 he wrote to Stadion urging that Austrian public opinion as well as that of Europe be aroused in favor of the contemplated Liberation War.⁶⁰ Moreover, on 4 December 1808, he praised the stirring up of the popular forces in Spain and stressed the fact that if "ever a war was national," it was the war the Spanish were fighting, for they had "honor, national sentiment, religion, pecuniary and commercial interests" on their side. He believed that Napoleon had encountered a force which he had not come in contact with previously and would not know how to deal with.⁶¹

Metternich, in fact, was a conservative reformer, and thought that popularism should be directed and controlled so that it did not threaten the existence of that which had called it into being. Furthermore, he was primarily interested in peace and extensive propaganda threatened the success of the negotiations he was conducting to insure peace on equitable bases. The Emperor Francis was bitterly opposed to the use of propaganda, largely as a result of its failure to bring Austrian re-establishment and European peace in 1809.

After the Congress of Prague dissolved, 11 August 1813, Austria publicly joined the allies the 12th, she issued a public declaration the 19th, which was written by Gentz. This declared that the Austrian objective was the reconstruction

of a solid and durable peace. Austria had abandoned the French alliance only when she realized that would not accomplish this aim. Her sacrifices and sufferings were enumerated and her final resource was said to be war in concert with the Allies--a war which would be consummated by a peace guaranteed by the association of independent states. ⁶² This proclamation seemed to put everyone in the best of spirits. The streets of the cities were plastered with patriotic handbills and proclamations. Meanwhile the songs of Korner, Max von Schenkendorf, Arndt, and Rueckert, non-Austrian Germans, were lustily sung throughout Austria, ⁶³ for all Germans were felt to be one.

The brotherly spirit of the Austrians and the moderate conduct of the Austrian Government was largely responsible for the response of the German states, expressed in their affiliation with the Coalition. Aberdeen, who was made the British minister to Austria in August and assumed his position in early September, declared that popular feeling and exertion were the basis of allied success. Austria's generous conduct had won the south German states which were aroused to fight for German independence. By November an army of 400,000 men under the Austrian Marshal Schwarzenberg was raised to be thrown into France via Switzerland. It was made up of south Germans who were "animated with the best spirit, and with the enthusiastic feeling of German independence." A feature of it all was their attachment to

Austria, for Bavaria, Wurtemberg and even Baden (which possessed a Russian connection) had thrown themselves into the arms of Austria.⁶⁴

On 8 October 1813 Bavaria and Austria signed the Treaty of Ried, which bound the former to the Coalition. On 17 October Bavaria issued a proclamation in defense of her action, stating that she had fulfilled her obligations to France, and had been compelled to sever relations with the latter because of Napoleon's illegal extension of power.⁶⁵ On 4 November the Hanoverian Privy Councillors, Decken and Bremer, in the name of their ruler the Prince Regent of Great Britain, announced the restoration of their former government and urged the people to aid in the expulsion of the foreigner.⁶⁶ On 6 November the King of Wurtemberg issued a manifesto against France stating that he had sacrificed for Napoleon 1809, 1812, and 1813 but this had not brought peace, therefore, on the 2 November he had joined the common cause to work with the Allies for the realization of a sure and durable peace.⁶⁷

The Wiener Zeitung joyously hailed the dissolution of the Confederation of the Rhine and the uniting of its members to the Coalition, 21 November 1813, by proclaiming that all Germany was filled with one spirit:

"the conviction that only by such united exertions can freedom, independence and peace be secured.... Nations imbued with such a spirit have never been crushed. Germany after long years of suffering, has finally re-emerged as a nation! 68

FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER IV

- 1 Botta, Carlo. History of Italy during the Consulate and Empire of Napoleon Bonaparte, II pp. 358, 359
- 2 Bourne. Revolutionary Period in Europe, pp 337-8
- 3 Ibid., page 368
- 4 Gottschalk, op.cit., pp 392-3
- 5 Ibid., pp 393-4
- 6 Seeley, Stein p. 441
- 7 Bourne, op. cit., 378-9
- 8 Ruhl, Franzosenzeit, p.232
- 9 Seeley, Arnät, op. cit., pp 255-7
- 10 Ibid. p 243
- 11 Ibid., pp 266-7. Translated by Seeley
- 12 Ibid., p. 283
- 13 Ibid., p.248
- 14 Stern Geschichte der Preussischen Reformzeit. 1807-15
pp 406-7
- 15 Ibid., page 426
- 16 Fain, 1813, op. cit., pp.198-200
- 17 Bourne, op. cit., page 426
- 18 Fain, 1813, op.cit., pp.205,206
- 19 Ibid., page 217
- 20 Ibid., pp 218-19
- 21 Ibid., pp 217-18
- 22 Ibid., pp 224-30
- 23 Ibid., pp 230-31
- 24 Bourne, op. cit., p.430

- 25 Fain, 1813, op. cit., pp.241-45
- 26 Ibid., pp. 245-7
- 27 British and Foreign State Papers, I,II, op. cit., pp.1042-3
- 28 Wilson, II op. cit., pp.76-80 and Bourne,op.cit., p.430
- 29 Fain, 1813 I, op.cit., pp 272-3
- 30 Annual Register, 1813 pp. 388-9
- 31 Fain, 1813, vol. I, op. cit., p. 104
- 32 Ibid., pp.105,106
- 33 This was confirmed by the Convention of Breslau, between Russia and Prussia, 19 March 1813
- 34 Fain, 1813, I, op.cit., pp. 106,107
- 35 Ibid., pp. 120,121
- 36 Fain, 1813, I, op. cit., pp. 103,104, 107-108
- 37 British and Foreign State Papers, Vol I, Pt. II p 1050
See also D'Angeberg. Congres de Vienne, vol.I pp.7,8.
- 38 Idem., pp. 1050-51
- 39 Langsam, German Nationalism in Austria during War of Liberation pp. 30,32
40. Ibid., page 31 Dr. Langsam fully states the steps in this regeneration of public opinion. Much of the data cited is not wisely utilized.
- 41 Ibid., pp.33-39
- 42 R. Metternich. Memoirs of Prince Metternich,1773-1815
Vol. II, pp. 225-227
- 43 Idem., p. 226
- 44 Langsam, op. cit., pp. 58-9
- 45 Ibid., p. 64
- 46 Ibid., pp. 102, 104
- 47 Ibid., p. 90

- 48 Ibid., p. 101
- 49 Ibid., pp. 49,50
- 50 Annual Register, 1809, State Papers pp. 749,750
- 51 Langsam, op. cit., p. 66
- 52 Ibid., p. 67
- 53 Ibid., p. 143
- 54 Webster, Br. Dip., op. cit., Stewart to Castlereagh
20 August 1813. p. 79
- 55 Langsam. op. cit., pp 150-53
- 56 Fain, 1813, op. cit., pp. 288-91
- 57 Oncken, I, pp.435-6
- 58 This occurred about the time of the Armistice of Plöschwitz
4 June 1813
- 59 Langsam, op. cit., pp. 159-163
- 60 Supra., p . 113
- 61 Metternich, op. cit., pp 304-05
- 62 Annual Register, 1813 State Papers complete citation 422-33
Text in French: D'Angeberg, op. cit., pp.44-47
- 63 Langsam, op. cit., pp. 171-72
- 64 Aberdeen, op. cit., I page 158
- 65 Annual Register 1813, op. cit., pp 439-41
- 66 Ibid., pp. 437, 438
- 67 Br. For. State Papers I,II, op. cit., p.1181
- 68 Langsam, op. cit., p. 176

CHAPTER V

ITALY: THE BATTLEGROUND OF PROPAGANDA

Italy might be designated: the battleground of propaganda during the wars of liberation inasmuch as there were more opposing forces using propaganda to stimulate Italian popularism than in any other European country. This propaganda was focused in time of active warfare, such as the Austro-French war of 1809, and the Liberation-War - Fall of 1813 to April of 1814. But in the interim there was a constant barrage of appeals to the people due to the nominal state of war existing between certain states from 1808-14-15.

In northern Italy, the House of Savoy had been driven from their Piedmontese territories to the island of Sardinia. Savoy and Nice had been annexed during the Revolution and Piedmont was divided into military districts until its annexation to France in 1802. The King of Sardinia was allied with Great Britain. Lombardy was the nucleus of the Cisalpine Republic of 1796-7, which became the Italian Republic in 1800, and in 1805 the Kingdom of Italy. Napoleon became the King with Prince Eugene Beauharnais, his stepson, the viceroy. Venetia, Istria, and Dalmatia were ceded to the Italian Kingdom by Austria in 1805 by the

Treaty of Pressburg. In 1809 the Illyrian provinces and part of the Tyrol were contributed to the Italian Kingdom by Austria. Genoa had been under French control since 1797, and was annexed to France in 1804.

In central Italy, Modena and Parma had been incorporated into the Kingdom of Italy. Tuscany had been designated Etruria, and, like Lucca and Piombino, was ruled by a sister of Napoleon. These territories were officially annexed to France in 1810, though the sisters of Napoleon retained administrative control. Napoleon's relations with Rome and the Pope were never friendly. He usually sympathized with Napoleon's foes and did not support his Continental System. When Napoleon demanded that one third of the College of Cardinals should be Frenchmen, he was refused. As a result, French troops occupied Rome in February 1808. When the Pope excommunicated Napoleon 10 July, Napoleon ordered his arrest and his imprisonment at Savona and later in France. The states of the church were formally annexed to the French Empire, 17 May 1809.

Napoleon had recognized the position of the Bourbons in the Two Sicilies during the negotiations 1800-02. However, in 1805 Ferdinand was forced to flee from Sicily and Napoleon's brother Joseph became the king of Naples. In May 1808 Napoleon informed Joseph that he was designated the King of Spain and Joachim Murat, the brother-in-law of Napoleon became the King of Naples. Meanwhile the

Russians had occupied the Ionian Isles across the Adriatic, and the British had concluded a treaty of alliance with the King of Sicily, as they had with the King of Sardinia, from which centers they influenced Italian events.

The Bourbon King of Sicily never lost sight of the reconquest of Naples, and Murat never forgot that his position on the throne of Naples was insecure as long as the Bourbons ruled in Sicily. Because of this insecurity, Murat was always an opportunist. He desired the support of the soldiers and nobles as well as that of the people, though he was more successful in securing the adherence of the first two groups. The clergy never fully recognized his rule. Proclamations were frequently issued to the people to secure their loyalty. In the early proclamations which Murat issued he appealed to popular devotion to the august Napoleon (1808 -12). In the later proclamations (1812-14), he appealed to them not as Frenchmen, but as Italians, striving to utilize their popular enthusiasm for his own benefit. Napoleon he no longer mentioned.

On his accession to the throne in 1808, Murat had issued a proclamation, as King of the Two Sicilies, which stated that his heart would be divided between gratitude to Napoleon and a desire to benefit his subjects. He appealed to the officials to perform their duties, faithfully and he promised to preserve the constitution granted by his predecessor, though the Italian Botta

declares that no constitution had been granted.¹ Before the soldiers assaulted the island of Capri, at the entrance to the harbor of Naples, which was held by the English and Sicilians, 3 October 1808, he appealed to the soldiers as French and Neapolitans, members of the Grand Army, to free Capri from the yoke and their country from the menace² which existed from foreign occupation of the island.

Secret societies soon became a potent complicating element in the Neapolitan situation. This was because of the administration of Murat, according to a contemporary historian. He declared that Murat permitted the soldiers to oppress the inhabitants. Furthermore, he levied heavy taxes and introduced the irksome French conscription laws. Civil war broke out in Calabria and the Abruzzi. Murat's soldiers were opposed by adherents of former King Ferdinand as well as by radical republicans who desired a republic with a constitution, and also they were opposed by the brigands or racketeers who loved pillage and bloodshed. No common bond united these groups. The republicans hated Murat because of his persecutions, and because he was a King and a Frenchman. At the same time they hated Ferdinand also because he was a king.³ Because many of them were charcoal burners, the group was called Carbonari.

The appeals to the soldiers were made to stimulate them to conquer these insurrectionary groups within the country. In a proclamation to his soldiers, 24 June 1809,

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Murat urged them to free the land from the pillagers. On 29 May and 17 July 1810 were issued proclamations to the marines who had captured the isle of Capri, in which they were praised for their bravery in behalf of King and Emperor, and their next task was indicated as the driving of the English from Sicily.⁵

The situation in Austria which made war with France inevitable in 1809 has been discussed in part.⁶ The loss of the Tyrol and Vorarlberg to Bavaria in 1805 by the Treaty of Pressburg had been one of the primary causes of the war. There was very close relationship during these years 1806-09 between the King of Bavaria, Maximilian, and Prince Eugene, the Viceroy of the Italian Kingdom, inasmuch as the latter had married the former's daughter, Auguste. The Tyrolean territories of both states were adjacent, hence both were interested in the maintenance of order, though this function seems to have been assumed by Eugene. The friendship between the two men seemed to be great, for even after Maximilian had joined the Allies, on 31 December 1813 he wrote his daughter that she should be proud to be the wife of as brave and loyal a man as was Eugene.⁷ By the Pressburg Treaty, Bavaria had agreed to maintain without alteration the Tyrolean laws and institutions. This had not been carried out, for the territory had been divided into three circles, their religious privileges had been violated, and the names of their national monuments had been changed. The Austrians were

friendly to the Tyrolese, the Archduke John and Baron Hormayr maintaining constant communication with them from 1805-09 and after.

Tyrolese patriotism was fostered by a book written by Andreas Dipauli: History and Statutes of Tyrol.³ He was in the service of Bavaria, but was still Tyrolean in sympathies. Proclamations, declarations and war songs were circulated in the Tyrol by messengers, with the assistance of Andreas Hoffer a native leader. The Austrian plan of campaign was to follow up this preparatory propaganda by having the army march through the Tyrol into Italy where proclamations would be made to the Italians. In April 1809 John issued a proclamation to the Tyrolese written by Hormayr, assuring them that "never yet has Austria entered the lists with such overwhelming might....Encouraged by the knowledge of our united strength, supported by the knowledge that this is the most righteous of causes for which the sword has ever been unsheathed, I hereby once again raise the Austrian eagle over the Tyrolese soil in which the sacred remains of so many of my glorious ancestors repose." The Austrian general von Kolb also issued proclamations in April urging the Tyrolese to rise to maintain their proscribed customs, laws and liberties, "the very marrow and blood of the land."⁹

The war aims of Austria in regard to Italy, based on the protection of all their Italian liberties were presented to the Italians in a stirring appeal made 9 April 1809.

He declared that the Kingdom of Italy was only a name, for they were only the slaves of France, whose lives and wealth were sacrificed by the conscription, the heavy imposts, and general oppression. Their political existence and independence were both delusions and they could not call themselves Italians. The Emperor Francis had sent a mighty army into Italy not for conquest but "to restore the independence of so many European nations, whose servitude was so evident and cruel. If God would but second the virtuous endeavors of the Emperor Francis and of his potent allies, Italy would again be happy in herself." The head of the church would be restored to his states. They would be given a constitution suitable to their nature and political state to promote their prosperity and secure their national existence. ¹⁰ The proclamation closed with a challenging appeal to popularism: "Hasten, Italians, hasten, whosoever you are, by whatever name you are called, whatever party you espouse, provided that you are in truth; Italians, come without fear to us... If...you resolve to join the forces of your liberators, and march on with them to victory, Italy will gain a new existence.. to..rise..again to be the first of nations...Milanese, Tuscans, Piedmontese, Italians of every race, reflect on your past, reflect on your ancient glory.. Such times and such glory may return; they may even return with greater prosperity, greater lustre, if you prefer general cooperation to listless expectation...." ¹⁰

Prince Eugene issued a proclamation on the same day, which declared that war had been made by Austria alone, the enemy of his father Napoleon, France and Italy. He appealed to the Italians in his absence to maintain the loyal spirit they had hitherto demonstrated and show themselves worthy of their sovereign and the Italian people.¹¹

The French and their allies were so successful that after the battle of Wagram 5 July (a drawn victory for Napoleon) Francis was tired of the war and concluded an armistice 12 July. The Treaty of Schonbrunn or Vienna was signed 14 October. Austria surrendered Carinthia, Carniola and the cities of Trieste and Fiume to the Kingdom of Italy and Salzburg and the Inn Quarter to Bavaria, and part of Galicia to the Grand Duchy of Warsaw.

On 25 October 1809, Prince Eugene announced to the Tyrolese who were still in revolt that peace had been made, and promised that if they would voluntarily lay down their arms, no measures would be taken to punish those who had participated in the rebellion.¹² Andreas Hoffer, their leader, determined to make peace on the basis of the declarations, of Eugene and issued proclamations to the Tyrolese ordering the 80,000 soldiers and the people to disarm. All the deputies were ordered to meet at Villach to consult with the Viceroy. Submission was necessary to their well-being for they could not fight against Napoleon alone.¹³ On the basis of these proclamations a liberal amnesty was announced

by Eugene for the protection of all who had revolted. This was issued at Villach, 12 November 1809.¹⁴ Encouraged by a minor victory, however, Hoffer decided to continue the war and issued a proclamation to the Tyrolese 22 November urging to rally to their headquarters at Passever and fight for their Kaiser, for Austria would not desert them. But he was deceived. Austria did not come to their aid. On 7 January 1810, Hoffer was captured and executed and the movement collapsed.

Italy, meanwhile was fairly quiet under French rule from 1809 to 1812 except for the activity of the secret societies in Central and Southern Italy and opposition of the Neapolitan bourgeoisie. During this time, as Webster puts it, an "amazing drama" was taking place on the island of Sicily.¹⁵ The British Government had intended that Sicily should be a point of defence for the central Mediterranean, and not a base of attack. Due to the character of the British agent sent to Sicily in 1811, their intentions were controverted. Lord William Bentinck possessed great energy, a masterful mind, an intense Whig faith closely associated with immense vanity and rashness. His theoretical idealism combined with his unbalanced egotism was responsible for his evolution of grandiose plans for the future of Italy, which were in contradiction to the desires of his Government and greatly embarrassed Castlereagh in his plans for the reconstruction of Europe on an equitable basis.¹⁶

Bentinck was given wide powers, being the Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean, except Malta, as well as the Minister to the Sicilian Court. When he arrived he found Sicily ruled by the sensual, incapable King, and his fierce, drug-maddened wife, Marie Caroline, the daughter of Maria Theresa. In 1811 the Queen had attempted to override the rights of the Estates (nobles, clergy, towns) by the assessment of special taxes. The nobility had protested and the five liberal leaders led by Prince Belmonte had been incarcerated in a horrible dungeon. Bentinck found that he did not have sufficient powers to cope with the situation so returned to England. His new instructions enabled him to interfere with internal Sicilian affairs to the extent that he could insure participation of the people in the Government. He arrived a second time in Palermo, 7 December 1811, with three purposes: the overthrow of Queen Caroline, the regeneration of Sicily, and the creation of an Italian state under British protection. After working for a year and a half he was successful in shipping the Queen to Vienna, via Constantinople, in April, 1813. His attempt to secure the second object resulted in the promulgation of the Sicilian Constitution at the instance of the Hereditary Prince Ferdinand to forestall Bentinck. This was modeled after the British Constitution in every respect, hence was thoroughly unworkable when applied to an unenlightened people such as lived in Sicily.

His third aim resulted in the struggle with Murat, which eventually brought about Austrian supremacy in the Italian Peninsula.¹⁷ Early in 1812 Bentinck wrote the Government about the advisability of making an expedition to the Italian Peninsula, Lord Liverpool replied, 4 March 1812, that while there existed a certain degree of dissatisfaction and ferment throughout Italy, there was no reason to believe that there was a settled or systematic plan of operations organized among the people to throw off the French yoke, hence such an action was inadvisable.¹⁸ Apparently Bentinck adopted the recommendation of Liverpool, and did nothing more during 1812.

Botta, the Italian historian, stated that there was no mobilized public opinion against Napoleon in Italy even after the disastrous Russian campaign which aroused the popularistic forces of the rest of Europe. In Italy opinions differed. In Upper Italy the peoples had become accustomed to Napoleon's rule, while in Lower Italy the people had been alienated from their former rulers by their cruelties, and even though the lower classes disliked Murat, the nobles loved him. "The central division, comprising Rome and Tuscany fretted in impotence. The Piedmontese, a warlike race, rejoiced in being called to share the martial toils of France. Of the kingdom of Italy, the Milanese territory rather rejoiced in, than lamented its dependence on the unconquered chief; for it had a splendid capital, a name,

and an army of its own, native magistrates and officers, and an appearance of independence: besides, the military glory of Napoleon had there commenced, had there reiterated its triumphs, the public monuments were magnificent, a sort of national pride had sprung up. The Venetian part, on the contrary, was averse to Napoleon: but what had the Venetians to hope? Or for whom should they combat? They knew this only, that for themselves it was vain to struggle; they had nothing to expect for their noble country - ever the booty of the conqueror, or the ransom for the spoil."¹⁹

The absence of organized popularism in Italy is accounted for by Lord Bathurst, Secretary of War, in a letter to Bentinck 20 April 1813. While he admitted that widespread and great dissatisfaction existed in Italy, he declared that no confidence could be placed in the cooperation of the inhabitants because of their distaste against returning to their former status under their old rulers, hence there existed no unifying common objective around which the popularistic forces could be rallied. He regarded this as being responsible for the lack of response or demonstrations of public opinion such as had occurred in Germany and England.²⁰

Nevertheless Murat complained to Napoleon, 12 April 1813, about the effects of the declarations of the English agents in his kingdom. He begged Napoleon to make peace because

public opinion in Italy was not satisfactory for many hotheads were advancing projects for a republic and independence. Agents of the enemy were stirring up Italian hatred against foreign domination.²¹

Bentinck was not so sure that he would favor the advancement of the interests of the Sicilian Royal Family on the Peninsula because of their former cruelties. The Hereditary Prince Ferdinand in June 1813 begged him to be permitted to accompany the contemplated expedition, but Bentinck wanted the Italian peoples to be able to freely choose their ruler, so he denied this request. On 20 June Bentinck submitted to King Ferdinand a paper which would govern his actions on the expedition to Italy proper. The most important objects were: "That the independence of the whole of Italy and not the partial conquest of any particular province or state should be the acknowledged object. That such portions of the territory of the Continent as were relieved from the yoke of France, should be left to the free choice of their own constitution and their own chiefs," guaranteed to them by the British Commander. Bentinck promised to try to persuade the Neapolitans to accept Ferdinand as their ruler.²² The response of the Hereditary Prince naturally was not very enthusiastic. The expedition was delayed until February, 1814, after Bentinck had decided there would be no expedition at all, except possibly

to Spain.

During the summer of 1813 there was no warfare in Italy because of the armistice signed at Fleschvitz between the belligerents. The Congress at Prague adjourned 11 August having accomplished nothing and the war broke out anew. Murat had hurried home after the disastrous Russian campaign and had opened negotiations with the Austrians relative to a treaty of Alliance by which they would guarantee his throne. These negotiations were somewhat in abeyance during the summer of 1813. Prince Eugene went to northern Italy to rally his territories for further war after the signing of the armistice. The war was pushed by the Allies after the dissolution of the Prague Congress. Austrian Generals and Nugent and Bellegarde were sent with an army into Italy in September, though their progress was slow since they were cooperating with forces conquering Istria and Dalmatia.

After the treaty of Ried the Allies made overtures through Maximilian of Bavaria which were refused by Eugene. Instead Eugene made appeals to his people to resist the invader, and the Austrians made counter-appeals to the people to rise to recover their liberties.

Eugene appealed to the peoples of the kingdom of Italy as Italians, not as Frenchmen, as he had done in previous proclamations, 11 October 1813, at Verona. He appealed to their national sentiment, for had not Napoleon restored their ancient kingdom and been crowned with the iron crown of Lombardy? The purpose of the enemy it was said was to destroy their Italian nationality, and to bring about their

division into separate states. The hand that had given them their independence and institutions now sought their support against the enemy. "Italy! Italy! that sacred name which produced such wonders in antiquity has become our rallying cry today." The young warriors bear that name. It has been always invincible, for our brave men fight for their firesides, families, glory, and the independence of the country, and the enemy will be driven from our territories.
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Bellegarde, the Austrian general, issued a proclamation to attach the Italians to the Austrian cause 4 October 1813. He asked them to turn their eyes on the benefits of independence, and denounced that the soldiers who entered their country were friends and liberators.
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Nugent, another Austrian general, not to be outdone, issued a proclamation 10 December 1813 from Favenna, entitled, "Independent Kingdom of Italy." He asked that the Italians adopt measures signifying their cooperation with the liberating armies, throw off the yoke, and make their new independence a reality. He used a phrase which Murat hesitated to use for he stated that Italy ought "to be an independent nation." If they would faithfully cooperate this would be brought about,
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he assured them.

Gabriele Pepe, the Neapolitan general reported the highly agitated state of public opinion in Italy. The people detested the French and aspired for liberty.

The thinking men wished that Naples would raise the flag of a united and independent Italy. If Murat would have been quicker, he would have mastered the country. It was probable that the enthusiasm would have evaporated by the time Naples would become active. The people were uncertain which they should choose to follow: their hatred for France or fear of Austrian dominion. The priests were scheming in favor of the Pope. At Faenza the people had declared in favor of Austria.²⁶

The French official Fouche wrote to Napoleon 27 December 1813 from Rome that one of the reasons Murat was going to join the coalition was because the English were stirring up the Neapolitans against French influence. Relative to the situation in Rome, he stated that they were burdened with privations, vexations, conscriptions, and great irritations. Furthermore, "here, as in all Italy, the word 'independence' had acquired a magic virtue. Under that banner range without doubt divers interests, but everybody, all the peoples wish a local government. Each complains that he has to go to Paris for the settlement of the least business."²⁷

Murat sent an imploring appeal to Napoleon 28 December 1813 begging him to be permitted to proclaim the independence of Italy with the Po as a limit, otherwise Italy would be lost to them and a Napoleon's dream of a united Italy would be shattered by allied dismemberment. Italy desired

its freedom and if Murat did not act quickly he would lose public opinion. When he lost that he was lost. In a post-script he begged the Emperor to make peace pointing out if he lost the next campaign all would be gone.

The primary battle of propaganda, however, was the period following the signing of the Treaty of Naples 11 January 1814. Murat had issued a proclamation abolishing the Continental System 11 November 1813 to conciliate the English.²⁹ At that time he had sent the Marquis St. Elie to Sicily to negotiate with Bentinck. Bentinck refused to deal with St. Elie because Murat had failed to carry through negotiations begun the preceding spring.³⁰ Prince Carletti was sent to Vienna at the same time and the Austrian Count Nlepperg arrived in Naples, 30 December, with instructions to conclude the treaty.

In February 1814 the Neapolitan troops were marching into central Italy toward Tuscany, the British and Sicilian troops landed at Leghorn and issued proclamations to the Tuscans and Italians. The Austrians were north of the Mincio and the French troops were between the Austrians, the Neapolitans and the British. Each one of these groups were issuing proclamations to the Italians to either recover or protect their liberties depending upon the source.

General Carasco, in the name of King Joachim, initiated the barrage of proclamations. From Modena, 31 January, 1814 he summoned the peoples of Central and Northern

Italy to rise to the defense of their common country after so many decades of feebleness and disunion. He urged them to abandon their oppressors and unite with the peoples of Naples which had demonstrated their disinterested Patriotism. In this way Europe would be saved from witnessing the deplorable spectacle of Italians of the north arrayed against those of Central Italy. He concluded with an appeal that they choose between the continuance of their slavery and their liberation in cooperation with the Allied Powers. In another proclamation issued the next day it was stated that peace was the primary object of the war. To bring this about and prepare for Italian independence, the Neapolitan troops planned to occupy the states south of the Po river. All means would be taken to conserve their interests, for Italy was the country of Joachim and his people as well as the country of the northern Italians. "The union of the spirits, the love of order, the just confidence in the wisdom, the disinterestedness, and the moderation of the Allied Sovereigns would render Italy independent and would bring to its people a durable peace...."³²

The Neapolitan general, Count Joseph Lechi, appealed to the Tuscans in a proclamation from Florence, 4 February 1814, preparatory to the projected military occupation of the country. As Commander-in-chief of the Tuscan States, he issued the proclamation to assure them that the sole purpose of the occupation was to re-establish their

independence and well-being. Their nationalism was appealed to, for they were promised an Italian government, adapted to their soil, climate, customs, and usages. Arbitrary taxes would not be levied for the benefit of foreigners nor would their children be sacrificed in interminable and distant wars. Furthermore, the durable peace that would be attained, would be guaranteed by the Powers of Europe. The proclamation closed with an appeal to rally to King Joachim and maintain order and religion and put down agitation and unrest.

The basis of Neapolitan occupation of Central Italy was stated by Baron Foezio at Bologna, 9 February, in a proclamation to the Central Italians. This action had been agreed upon by Austria and Naples when they had concluded the treaty of alliance early in January. Joachim desired the loyalty of the ministers of religion, public officials, and the people, and promised to protect the liberty of commerce by land and sea, to fill vacant public offices with candidates from the territories concerned, and not to levy any new taxes, but to reduce those existing. Their political independence would be dependent upon the way in which they supported the Allied forces.

Prince Camille Borghese reported to Napoleon, 7 February 1814, that the Neapolitan generals were proclaiming "the ideas of the independence of Italy reunited into a single nation." He had not been able to judge the results

but would not be surprised if in the departments of the Taro, Genoa and the Apennines this would be sufficient to undermine the obedience of a large part of the conscripts 1815.

Prince Eugene tried to revive the flagging energies of the peoples of the Kingdom of Italy. On 1 February 1814 he appealed to his peoples "to live and die faithful to their sovereign and their country, their duties, and their honor." He declared that his difficulties had been cruelly augmented by the treacherous defection of the Neapolitans who had marched into the Kingdom as friends and proved to be enemies. In another proclamation of the same day directed to his soldiers, he praised them for their valor, and denounced the unfaithfulness of the Neapolitans. "Soldiers, I have read in your hearts all your indignation.. Frenchmen! Italians! I am counting on you. Count on me. You will always find me defending your interest....here is my device: Honor and Fidelity. That device is also yours; with that and the aid of God, we will triumph again over our enemies." In a proclamation to the Italians, 3 February, Eugene called them to support their Emperor and country as honorable and loyal men. On the same day he evacuated Verona with his army, and issued a proclamation to the Veronese, which stated his appreciation for their sacrifices and generosity during the three months he had made Verona his headquarters.

By 3 February, the Austrian Marshal, Bellegarde, had advanced with his army to the banks of the Adige and was ready to march into Verona as Eugene and his army marched out. Preparatory to occupation of the city, Bellegarde issued a proclamation to his soldiers. He announced that part of their brothers-in-arms who had founded the liberty of Germany with their courage, had arrived to re-enforce the Italian army, and aid in the liberation of Italy. Before the day closed, they were to enter Verona in pursuit of the enemy which had been compelled to leave Verona. They were to remember that the peoples of Italy were their friends, and the Austrians had come to deliver them from foreign oppression and also to protect them. Since the Allied cause was one of justice, they were to remember to keep good order and to be moderate, for "the abuse of force such as pillage and theft were beneath the honor of a warrior." Each man was called upon to do his duty, and every one would be generously rewarded by their Kaiser.

Bellegarde issued a proclamation to the Italians, 4 February, embodying the war aims and intimations of the peace programs of the Allies relative to Italy. He declared that the immortal days of Leipzig had decided the destinies of Europe. The Allies had intended to strike the first blows in Germany and this had been done. Freedom had been secured for the peoples of the North and the Allies wished to extend this to the peoples of Italy. An alliance had been

concluded with the King of Naples. The Austrian troops were occupying northern Italy as friends and liberators, to protect their rights and reestablish that which force and ambition had destroyed. He summoned the people of Piedmont to rally to the support of their flag and their King of the ancient House of Savoy. The faithful and industrious Tuscans, he urged to unite their forces with the Austrians, and their beloved Prince would be restored to them and their paternal government would be re-established. "Peoples of Italy! The Allies desired to restore, as much as changed conditions would permit, the antique political edifice of Europe on the same bases which insured for a long time, its well-being and glory." Those territories ruled over by the House of Este would be returned to their former allegiance and Rome would cease to be second in a foreign empire and become again the Christian capital of the world. Their territories would be delivered from foreign aggression and their governments reestablished without violence, with the modifications which the localities, circumstances and needs required.

Thus it can be seen, that while the Neapolitans had used the term 'national independence' to designate a unanimity of sentiment and perhaps government, the Austrians used this term to designate the reconstitution of Italy with necessary modifications of her eighteenth century political structure. In the first case the forces of popularism were appealed to

by Naples to strengthen Murat's position and stimulated to demand the union of Italy with Murat at the head, while Austria wished to stir up the popular forces to bring about the return of the families ruling before the changes brought about by the French Revolution and Napoleon. It was in this sense of the term that Bellegarde appealed to the soldiers of the Kingdom of Italy from Modena, 25 February, and exhorted them in the name of their country to "sustain in the eyes of the entire world the sacred cause of national independence."⁴²

In the meantime Bentinck was planning to launch his deferred expedition to the Italian Peninsula. As early as 27 September 1813, Bathurst had instructed him to furnish Italian groups in revolt against France with necessary arms or provisions, if he thought this was desirable, and to cooperate in every way with the "Common Cause." However, he warned him against raising a large Italian army at British expense.⁴³ On 23 December Lord Bathurst advised Bentinck of the defenceless state of the enemy in Genoa and Piedmont and authorized him to encourage the peoples of those territories to revolt against France and assist them in every way he could. Furthermore, he should take possession of Genoa in the name of and on behalf of His Sardinian Majesty, provided the inhabitants concurred in this action.⁴⁴ Bentinck refused the Neapolitan overtures for a treaty because Murat had failed to negotiate a

treaty with him the preceding June (1813) at Ponza.

However, on 3 February 1814, through the influence of Sir Robert Wilson and the Austrian minister to Naples, Neipperg,⁴⁵ an armistice was concluded at Naples. Having consummated his plans for the expedition, Bentinck left Sicily with a British and Sicilian army, and disembarked at Leghorn in Tuscany, 8 March.

The government of Sicily had issued a proclamation to the Sicilian soldiers, 20 February 1814, at Palermo before they embarked. The King had urged them to cooperate in this great work of liberation. He had further instructed them to aid in the restoration of Naples to its lawful Sovereign.⁴⁶ The Sicilian soldiers broadcast copies of this proclamation in Tuscany after their arrival there. It was insulting and hostile to Murat and antagonized him further. Another cause of distrust between Bentinck and the Neapolitans was the fact that the former refused to treat Murat as an ally and nullified the agreement between the Austrians and Murat as to territory to be occupied by seizing Tuscany, which Austria had agreed that Naples should administer. This seizure of Tuscany severed the Neapolitan line of communications. Murat, uncertain about his position, wrote compromising letters to Fouché and the Viceroy. The Austrians were in despair, since joint action with Bentinck was impossible.⁴⁷

On 14 March Bentinck issued a proclamation to the

Italians from Leghorn. Great Britain, he declared, intended to do for Italy, what she had done for Portugal, Spain, Sicily, and Holland-- free them from the yoke of tyranny. He asked if the Italians "wished to fight against other Italians, in favor of the tyrant and the slavery of their country? Italians! Hesitate no longer! Be Italians!" He stated that the liberties of their country were in their hands to be disposed of by their actions. If they joined the Allies, he intimated that Italy would be free, united,⁴⁸ and with a constitution modelled after that of England.

At the same time Colonel Cattanelli of Naples issued proclamations to the Tuscans and urged them to regain their⁴⁹ national independence under the leadership of King Joachim. Sir Robert Wilson, the British military observer, has described the Italian war situation at this time:⁵⁰

"The Austrians, who have proclaimed the ancient order of things, cannot be supposed to give several thousand men, from a force already far too weak, to join in an enterprise which, according to the device of the banner, pledges 'Italianism' and 'National independence'; and that at a time when the proclamations confirm the views of Buonaparte (sic) in every respect, leaving only the nomination of his new dynasty to future arrangement. I do not enter into the merit of the question--if I did, I should be an advocate for nationalization; but I only note the absurdity of expecting concert (except from the enemy with the British) under such discordant systems of policy. I should have hoped that Sicily would have been a warning against constitutional crusades to paralyse military operation." 51

As a result of this conflict in Tuscany between Bentinck and the Neapolitans, the Foreign Minister of Naples, the

Duc de Camprochiaro drew up a memoir which complained of Bentinck's proclamations promising Italian union and regeneration and a constitution modelled after that of Sicily. This was sent to Metternich and Castlereagh who refused to receive it. On 3 April Castlereagh wrote Bentinck that if the King of Sicily issued any more proclamations like the one of 20 February, Great Britain would conclude a treaty of peace with Naples. "In your lordship's proclamations there may perhaps be found an expression or two, which, separately taken, might create an impression that your views of Italian liberation went to the form of the Government as well as to the expulsion of the French;" but taken as a whole, this interpretation could not be understood. After warning Bentinck against advocating ideas which ran counter to the "arrangements understood between the Great Powers of Europe," Castlereagh concluded by stating that what was desired in Italy, or elsewhere, was "not insurrection...but...disciplined force under Sovereigns we can trust."

In spite of the express instructions of Castlereagh, Bentinck landed with a force at Genoa, and proclaimed the restoration of their ancient government, 26 April 1814. "Considering that the general view of the Genoese nation was to return to its ancient government under which it enjoyed its liberty, prosperity, and independence; considering equally that this desire conformed to the

recognized principles of the Allied Powers, to return each country to its rights and privileges," he restored the constitution of Genoa as it existed in 1797 with modifications necessary to the changed circumstances. He stated his reasons for this action in a dispatch written 27 April, 1814. He had received two addresses from the people of Genoa representing the unanimous opinion that they should recover their ancient form of government.

"As it was necessary that a provisional government should be established; that his government should be entirely Genoese; that it should be so conformable to the wishes of the People, as to receive their general support, and thus to render unnecessary the interference of British Authority, or the presence of British force; I have no hesitation in proclaiming the Old Form of Government..The Genoese universally desire the restoration of their ancient Republic. They dread, above all other arrangements, their annexation to Piedmont...The people of Savona form an exception to the general feeling. They desire to belong to Piedmont; their trade is direct with that country; and it was the policy of the ancient Republic to sacrifice their commercial interests"for the benefit of those of Genoa. 57

Castlereagh wrote him 6 May 1814, that:

"With respect to the arrangement your lordship has made for the provisional government of Genoa, it is material that it should not be considered as prejudging the future system which it may be expedient to apply to that part of Europe. Your lordship will adopt such measures as may conciliate the feelings of the people; but you will avoid referring to the ancient form of government in terms which may excite disappointment, should considerations arising out of the general interests induce the adoption of a different arrangement." 58

Bentinck's actions were regarded with distrust by the Austrians because they menaced the Coalition and its plans for Italy. Count Mier wrote to Metternich from Bologna,

6 April 1814, that Bentinck was an irreconcilable enemy of Joachim, and threatened the coalition policies in Italy. The British Government should be warned, for "his conduct has been inexcusable and dangerous for Italy...It has fomented a spirit of insurrection among the inhabitants, for he has preached the reunion of the Italians under a single chief and promised them a constitution based on that of England."⁵⁹ The Russian agent, Pozzo di Borgo wrote to Count Nesselrode, the Foreign Minister, deploring Bentinck's actions at Genoa as contrary to the peace programs of England. He further characterized Bentinck's actions as being inconsiderate throughout, for he had upset both Sicily and Italy to no advantage.⁶⁰

Prince Eugene made a proclamation to his soldiers, 17 April 1814, in which he urged them to go home, and thanked them for their loyalty to him during the twelve years he had ruled over them.⁶¹ 24 April he made known the convention with the Allies which provided for the evacuation of Italy by the French troops.⁶² On 26 April he issued a farewell proclamation to his peoples thanking them for all kindness to him.⁶³

The response of the people to the varied propaganda was noted by observers. Sir Robert Wilson decided that the Italians were not much concerned as a people, but desired repose and pleasure, and said from the heart: "for forms of government let fools contest."⁶⁴ After the Austrian

proclamations had been issued, Wilson, who accompanied Bellegarde reported 12 February at Villa Franca that: "We are told that we shall find aid among the Italians. We receive none. We have not an individual who voluntarily gives the slightest intelligence; much less a body of friends active in our favour."⁶⁵ After the war had been won by the Allies, Wilson reported that certain groups of the people of Lombardy such as the men of letters, the army, and the people desired independence. The Austrian party he declared to be quite limited, and the French were bitterly hated. Relative to independence: "Although the spirit of nationalization is omnipotent, I think that time must elapse before a sober patriotism can be established. Passions are more likely to direct measures than state considerations."⁶⁶

The Austrian observer, Baron von Hugel, reported to his Government, 22-29 March that the English(Bentinck) were stirring up the Italian Jacobins in Tuscany and other parts of Italy to create a state of things contrary to Austrian interests. There existed in Italy a large number of people who desired a united, independent Italian nation. Great Britain and Naples were trying to win this group, which would always be contrary to Austria. Another group desired the restoration of the ancient order of things in Italy, but they lacked the energy to effectively cooperate, as did the parties opposed to them. As a result, von Hugel concluded that the only party in Italy that Austria was sure

was their army, "and God knew how feeble a party that was.." ⁶⁷

Bellegarde wrote Metternich 23 April 1814 that a petition had been circulated in Rome against the government of the Pope and demanding a Neapolitan government. This petition had been signed by twenty or twenty five thousand people. The Papal government was regarded as odious in the legations and Romagna. Murat was despised in Modena because of his extortion of vast sums. ⁶⁸

Captain Sardagna and Count Ficquelmont wrote to the Archduke Ferdinand d'Este, 2 April 1814, from Verona that the political situation in Italy was very complicated. While many of his friends would like to see him restored to his territories, almost no one desired the restoration of the ancient order of things, which he had announced should be re-established. While the people did not like Napoleon, they liked the idea of the Kingdom of Italy, which had made a great impression on them. Both Prince Eugene and Murat had secretly nourished this idea. ⁶⁹

The keynotes of the popular appeal in Italy were peace and national independence. Each of the nations which appealed to the people stressed its own version of them. Austria interpreted "national independence" as signifying the re-construction of Italy under its former rulers, with governmental modifications to meet the changed conditions. Prince Eugene and the French interpreted "national independence" as being the maintenance of the Kingdom of Italy and

the institutions and reforms introduced by France. King Joachim interpreted "national independence" as being the integration of Italy as a unified state under his rule, or the inclusion of as much of Italy as could be secured. Bentinck regarded "national independence" in general as involving the choice of a government by its people, but specifically in Italy as involving independence from foreign rule, the unification of the Peninsula under a constitution analogous to that of the British. It must be remembered, as observers have repeatedly pointed out, that the great masses of the people were apathetic as regards their political destiny. Even those who were interested were willing to make but few sacrifices to insure the realization of their desires.

This apathetic uncertainty as to its future political status was prevalent in Italy from the Spring of 1814 until the following year. The public opinion which was vocable had conflicting desires and even shifted its position. While, during the Spring of 1814, many of the active citizens of Lombardy and Venetia were favorable to the establishment of an Italian kingdom independent of foreign influence, by November Wilson reported that they were favorable to the permanent establishment of Austrian rule. ⁷⁰ In Central Italy, the public opinion that was active oscillated between favoring the Pope and the King of Naples. The clergy carried on an intensive propaganda to bring about

the enlargement of Papal territories in that region. Murat's position was rendered difficult due to the persistent opposition of the Sicilian, Spanish and especially the French Bourbons. This situation tended to enhance the inconsistency of his acts.⁷¹ Lord Holland wrote to Francis Horner, 1 March 1815, that Murat boasted about keeping the treaty with Austria, though Austria's obvious weakness and unpopularity tempted him to do otherwise. In the kingdom of Naples, the nobility, business and educated people were for him, though the heavy taxes and conscription tended to alienate the bourgeoisie. The priesthood, rabble, and Tories favored Ferdinand.⁷² Murat continued to dangle the principles of national union and independence before the eyes of the peoples of Southern and Central Italy to bolster up his position.⁷³

Convinced that the Allies would not assist him in maintaining his position on the throne of Naples, but might, in fact, work to undermine it, Murat welcomed the return of Napoleon from Elba to France as an opportunity to firmly establish himself on the Neapolitan throne, or lose it altogether, which the Allies would manage sooner or later. On 31 March 1815, he marched his troops into Central Italy, and issued a proclamation which stated that the moment had come when they should become an independent people. He declared that but one cry reverberated from the

Alps to the Straits of Scylla--the independence of Italy. He demanded by what right strangers robbed them of their independence and appropriated their wealth. He appealed to them to banish foreign domination of twenty centuries, and regain control of their territories marked out by nature, the sea, and the inaccessible mountains. In his appeal the Italians of all countries, the enlightened men of all countries, the nations which are worthy of a liberal government, the Princes who are distinguished by the greatness of their character will rejoice in your enterprise.. England, can she refuse you her suffrage?- that nation which holds out to all others the model of a national and constitutional government; that free people whose finest title to glory is to have shed its blood and treasures for the independence and liberty of nations! Hitherto, the propitious moment has not come. Now, they realize the tyranny of their rulers. "Italians!- you must put a period to so many calamities; arise, and march in the closest union. At the same time that your courage shall assert your external independence, let a government of your choice, a true national representation, a constitution worthy of you and the age, guarantee your internal liberty and protect your property. I invite all brave men to come and combat with me; I invite all brave men who have reflected on the wants of their country, that in the silence of the passions, they prepare the constitution and the laws which

must in future govern happy and independent Italy." ⁷⁴ Such was the nature of the bombastic proclamations, Murat issued to the peoples of Italy.

What response did these proclamations evoke? Edward Cooke, a British agent at Rome, wrote Castlereagh, 13 April, that the Pope and Cardinals did not trust Murat and had left Rome. However, even though the Government had fled, the people remained tranquil. "...Murat's proclamations for the independence of Italy, and his invitation to the Italians to enlist under his banners have been treated hitherto with ridicule. The Romans in general are attached to their ecclesiastical government, and the few who wish a new order of things do not look up to such a regenerator as Murat. It will require many victories by him in Upper Italy, before he will be able to make an impression here, or, I believe, in any other part of Italy." ⁷⁵

Austria declared war and issued a proclamation which recounted the history of her relations with Murat on 12 April 1815. ⁷⁶ Austria defeated the Neapolitan armies, and Murat after jumping from one side to another was captured by the Allies and shot as a traitor. His government collapsed and Ferdinand returned from Sicily to assume control. He issued a proclamation to the people of Naples from Palermo, 1 May and another from Messina, 20 May. He gave the following guarantees as a bases of the laws: Civil and individual liberty would be guaranteed, property

would not be confiscated and a general amnesty would be issued to all participating in the war.⁷⁷

The 1815 appeals by Murat hardly made a ripple on the surface of Italian life. The people were not ready for unifications, and they were not sufficiently educated to appreciate democratic institutions, as the Sicilian fiasco had demonstrated. It was not until thirty three years later that the successful Sardinian Statute came into being, which formed the basis of the Italian Kingdom unified under the leadership of the House of Savoy.

FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER V.

- 1 Botta, II, op.cit., pp. 30,31
- 2 Weil. Joachim Murat,vól. VII p. 325
- 3 Botta, II, op.cit., pp. 39-41
- 4 Weil. Joachim Murat, VII, p.334
- 5 Ibid., pp.319-20, 460-61
- 6 Supra., page 111-117
- 7 Weil,Le Prince Eugene et Murat III, page 320
- 8 Langsam, op.cit., pp.119-121
- 9 Ibid., page 125
- 10 Amyot. Recueil des Traités. Austria-Italy,pp.11,12
- 11 Botta, II op.cit., pp. 102-103
- 12 du Casse. Memoirs of Prince Eugene, VI pp.165-66
- 13 Ibid., pp. 174-6
- 14 Ibid., pp.180-1
- 15 Ibid., pp. 182,186
- 16 Webster, C.K. The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh,1812-1815
pp.74-5
- 17 Ibid., p.76
- 18 Br. & For. State Papers, II pp.309-10
- 19 Botta, II, op. cit., pp.360-61
- 20 Weil. Joachim Murat, I, Annex XVI, Appendix,pp.429-32
- 21 Br. & For. State Papers, II, op. cit., pp.311-12
- 22 Webster, For. Pol.op. cit., p.81
- 23 du Casse. IX, op. cit., pp. 319-21
- 24 Weil. Murat, I p. 14

- 25 Amyot, op. cit., p. 13
- 26 Weil, Le Prince Eugene et Murat, VIII, App., Ann. XXX
p. 580
- 27 Weil, Le Prince Eugene et Murat, III, pp. 298
- 28 Ibid., pp. 291-4
- 29 DeKoch et Schoell, Histoire abreegee des Traites de Paix
entre les Puissances de l'Europe, vol. 10, p. 457
- 30 Betta, II op. cit., pp. 366-68
- 31 Ibid., pp. 634-5
- 32 Ibid., p. 635
- 33 Weil, Le Prince Eugene et Murat, V. op. cit., App. Annex I,
pp. 1, 2,
- 34 Weil, III, op. cit., pp. 635-6
- 35 Weil, V. op. cit., p. 12
- 36 Weil, III pp. 637-8, also, Casse, X, op. cit. pp. 9, 10
- 37 Weil, III pp. 636-7, also Casse, X pp. 7-9
- 38 Weil, Ibid., p. 646
- 39 Ibid., p. 645
- 40 Ibid., pp. 646-7
- 41 Ibid., pp. 647-8
- 42 Weil, Murat, King of Naples, op. cit., p. 14
- 43 Br. & For. State Papers, II, op. cit., pp. 312, 313
- 44 Ibid, p. 313
- 45 Webster, For. Pol. of Castlereagh, op. cit., p. 258
- 46 Weil, V op. cit., p. 34
- 47 Webster, For. Pol. of C., op. cit., pp. 258-9
- 48 Weil, V, op. cit., p. 385 also Br. For. S.P., II, p. 316
- 49 Wilson, II, op. cit., p. 338

- 50 Wilson demonstrated great bias in his reports of the Continental situation. He was inclined to be carried away by the vehemence of his own enthusiasms and prejudices, Webster, pp.32,40,41 In this case in spite of his Whiggism, he recognized the futility of premature constitutionalism in Italy.
- 51 Wilson, II, p. 339
- 52 Weil, V, op.cit., pp. 103-05
- 53 C.C., IX, op. cit., Castlereagh to Bentinck, Apr. 13, 1814
p. 438
- 54 Ibid., pp. 432-4
- 55 Ibid., March 30, Apr. 3, 1814, to Bentinck, pp.409,427,435
- 56 Weil, V. op. cit., pp. 151-2
- 57 Br. & For. S. P. II, op. cit., p. 317
- 58 C.C., op. cit., p. 15
- 59 Weil, P.E. et M., V op. cit., p. 102
- 60 Weil, Murat, I op. cit., pp. 548-9
- 61 Weil, V. op. cit., pp. 140-1
- 62 Ibid., pp. 177-8
- 63 Ibid., pp. 178-9
- 64 Wilson, II, op. cit., p. 299
- 65 Ibid., p. 315
- 66 Ibid., pp. 364-5
- 67 Weil, V. op. cit., pp. 97,98
- 68 Weil, Murat, I, p. 12
- 69 Weil, V, p. 124
- 70 Wilson, II, op. cit., p. 209
- 71 Weil, III, op. cit., p. 341

- 72 Horner, II, op. cit., pp. 232-7
- 73 Weil, V. op. cit., pp. 92-7
- 74 Annual Register, 1815, vol. 57, pp. 369-71
- 75 C.C., X, op. cit., p. 308
- 76 Er. & For. S.P. II, op. cit., pp. 297-9
- 77 Ibid., pp. 1107-09

CHAPTER VI

FURTHER USE OF POPULAR APPEAL:

MINOR AND GENERAL

In certain European countries the mobilization of popular forces was belated and comparatively ineffective. Among these countries were Switzerland, Holland, Belgium, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway. The tide of popularism had swept from Russia in 1812 across the Polish plain through the German forests even to the Rhine. In Germany while the main stream was directed toward France, diverging streams went southward through Austria into Italy. Another went north through Denmark into Norway, still another went down through Holland and Belgium, and another passed through Switzerland.

Switzerland had been under the control of France and Napoleon since 1798, when it had become the Helvetic Republic. Its neutralized status had been recognized by the Powers since 1648. In November 1813, when the Allies decided to carry the war into France, they outlined the campaign planning that Bernadotte and one army should advance through Belgium, Blucher and the main army through Lorraine, and Schwarzenberg and his army composed of Austrians and South

Germans should advance through Switzerland. They argued the Switzerland had forfeited its neutrality by becoming an ally of Napoleon.

The Swiss did not regard the entrance of Scharzenberg and his army into their territories with favor, so on 18 November 1813 The Diet at Zurich issued a proclamation of neutrality which called upon the Swiss to support their frontier troops against any attempted breach of their neutrality.¹ On 20 November Reinhard, the Swiss Landamann, appealed to both warring groups in the name of the Diet to respect Swiss territory.² Napoleon agreed to recognize Switzerland's neutral position but the Allies matured their plans to send an army into France via Switzerland. Before these troops entered the country, the Austrian and Russian Plenipotentiaries issued a declaration to the Landamann and the Diet, 20 December 1813. This stated that the existing Swiss government was a creation of Napoleon's and as such could not be considered as being in a position to declare itself neutral. They agreed to recognize its neutrality from the day when it would be free and independent. The principles which animated the Allies were well known; they desired for Switzerland the restoration of its national rights and its re-establishment in its ancient territorial limits.³

On the occasion of their entry into Switzerland, 21 December 1813, the Allied Powers issued a declaration

from Loerrach, which stated that when peace was concluded Switzerland would be reconstituted and neutralized, and promised compensation for their assistance in the campaign.⁴ Prince Schwarzenberg issued a proclamation to his soldiers forbidding any of the customary excesses. He also issued one to the people of Switzerland which informed them that the army came as friends to restore their ancient independence, glory, prosperity, and federal constitution. He requested their assistance and promised to pay for all provisions needed by the army. Their great objectives were the restoration of Swiss liberty and the peace of the world.⁵

Lebzelter, the Austrian minister to Switzerland, wrote in November that the people were ready to welcome the Allied troops. "The landwehr, in particular, had given great satisfaction. The people were still more enthusiastic than had been expected, and were with difficulty restrained until the arrival of the troops."⁶ There is no doubt, however, that part of the people considered the unopposed march of the Allied troops through Switzerland as a betrayal of their neutrality by the Diet at Berne.⁷ This was a source of financial benefit to the people, for they disposed of their provisions with profit. The failure to arouse the popular forces here was greater than in any other country where propaganda was a factor. On 24 March 1815, the Diet issued a proclamation to the people

to arm themselves against the "Tyrant," while largely this was a gesture for the benefit of the Allies., It enabled the Swiss to make further gains by the second treaty of Paris, 20 November 1815.

Another ally of Napoleon and the French, was Holland. In 1798 this state had become the Batavian Republic, and in 1806 to unite its destinies the more closely with those of France, Napoleon made it a Kingdom, and appointed his brother Louis as King. In 1810, because Louis had permitted the Dutch to evade the Continental System, Holland was annexed to France. When the Napoleonic Empire began to crumble, in November 1813, the Dutch organized a provisional government and sent an invitation to the Prince of Orange in England, to come to Holland and assume control. He landed near The Hague when he issued a proclamation to the people of Holland which declared that "the moment had arrived for them to recover their existence as a nation... Each Hollander should be inflamed with courage... Liberty and national independence-- such should be the cry of each one... From this moment our chains are severed..as.. we renounce irrevocably.. the servile submission to the common Enemy of Europe, Destroyer of the Peace, prosperity and independence of nations....Recall the exploits of our brave ancestors, especially the heroic William I." who freed Holland from the Odious Spanish yoke."

In another proclamation, issued 1 December, William

stated that he wished to forget all the evils of the past years and restore Holland to her ancient splendor by re-generating the government and commerce and to insure Dutch independence. ¹⁰ William formally accepted the sovereignty of the Netherlands from the States General on 2 December. In a public declaration he promised to sacrifice his opinion to the wishes of the people and to undertake the Government only with the guarantee of a wise constitution, which would secure their freedom from abuses. ¹¹

Belgium had been conquered from Austria by France during the Revolution and incorporated into the French state. In 1814 French agents were seeking to maintain the connection, while British agents were using propaganda to stir up the people against France. Deputies were selected and sent to the Allied Powers early in 1814 to petition that Belgium be restored to Austria. Castlereagh wrote to Clancarty, the British Minister to Holland, 4 March 1814, that the Kaiser Francis did not feel that he could rule over them in justice to himself, as well as to them, since they were so distant from his other dominions. Their separate establishment under an Austrian Prince would be inconsistent with the maintenance of their independence, Castlereagh asserted, for, to be free, "they must be strong; and to be strong, they must be incorporated into a large system; and under proper arrangements and securities; Holland is the connection, which, failing their being reclaimed by

Austria, there is every reason to suppose will be the most acceptable and congenial to the sentiments of the people." ¹²

The Allies issued a declaration to the Belgian deputies and the Belgian people 14 March, which stated that their object was the re-establishment of peace on principles which would assure the prosperity of all classes of people. They promised to secure the maintenance of their religion, protect their commerce, and assure the Belgian people a liberal Government suitable to their customs and resources. ¹³

The well-being of Europe demanded that they be united to Holland which would adequately defend their independence and liberties. The chief difficulty that arose in the adjustment of the interests of the two countries was relative to religion. On 28 July 1815, the Belgian prelates protested against the provision in the Constitution which guaranteed religious toleration, for, they declared, that was incompatible with "the free and entire exercise of our official duties. We are bound, Sire, incessantly to preserve the people entrusted to our care, from the doctrines which are in opposition to the doctrines of the Catholic Church." ¹⁴ Their agitation was destined to prevent the successful union of the two states.

During the Liberation Wars, another drama was being enacted, involving Scandinavian rivalries. Sweden and Denmark were interested in these Liberation wars only to the extent that they affected their own interests. Prior

to 1807, Denmark had been a neutral Power.¹⁵ In August 1807 England, at the instance of Canning had seized the Danish fleet in the Copenhagen harbor to prevent its being of use to Napoleon. As a result of this action, Denmark allied herself with Napoleon. At Tilsit, the Czar Alexander had agreed to induce Sweden, an ally of England, to join in the Continental System. If she refused, he promised to attack her and seize Finland. This actually took place in 1809. The angered Swedish people dethroned their King, and put a distant relative in his place. The new King had no heirs and the Swedish leaders suggested that he adopt one of Napoleon's marshals, Bernadotte, as his successor. This done, Bernadotte hoped to make himself popular with the Swedish people by recovering Finland, or else by securing Norway, preferably the latter. If Finland were the objective, the logical course would have been an alliance with France against Russia; on the contrary, if Norway, were the objective, an alliance with Russia and England against France and Denmark (its owner) was the logical course. In 1812 and 1813, the latter course was taken and Sweden was promised Norway as well as Guadeloupe by the treaties of Stockholm, Abo and Orebro.

When the King of Denmark learned of this system of alliance which had for its objective the acquisition of Norway by Sweden, he continued to negotiate with the Allies to determine the basis on which he might join them. However,

Napoleon marched into Danish territory in the spring of 1813 and compelled the Danish King to make a closer alliance with him. As a result, the Allies refused to negotiate further with Denmark. So Denmark declared war on Sweden, 23 April 1813, in a proclamation issued at Copenhagen stating that he was unwilling to cede Norway and receive compensation in German lands bordering Holstein. "Accustomed to see his subjects' willingness to sacrifice their lives and welfare in a long continued defensive war, his Majesty is assured that a readiness to defend his States' independence will always be found in all the Danes, Norwegians and Holsteiners." ¹⁶ The Danish newspapers were used to broadcast appeals to the people. The Copenhagen Gazette for 5 June 1813, printed the following appeal: "It is the King's unalterable determination to maintain the union of his kingdoms. Fellow Countrymen! we will support His Majesty's incessant exertions for the independence and welfare of the country! We will with him encounter every danger, and our banner shall be, 'God and a just cause'." This reflected the national attitude although insuperable obstacles had been placed in the way of the corn trade to Norway, the Norwegians were loyally supporting their King and country. ¹⁷ But the victories of the Allies in the fall of 1813 forced Napoleon to withdraw all support from Denmark and her territories were occupied. Forced to make peace at Kiel with the Coalition early in

January, 1814, King Frederick of Denmark declared war on France 17 January at Middelfaart. He stated his reasons for declaring war as being because Napoleon had failed to protect Danish territories as he had promised to do; the French Continental System had ruined the Danish trade; in order to maintain his remaining states he had been compelled to cede Norway to Sweden, and now sought in cooperation with the other Allies a "General Peace" so badly needed by Denmark.¹⁸

The King of Sweden immediately after this addressed a proclamation to the Norwegians which reserved to them all their rights and liberties, and "engaged himself expressly to leave to the nation the faculty of establishing a constitution analogous to the wants of the country, and founded chiefly upon the two bases of national representation and the right of taxing themselves."¹⁹ Prince Christian, their governor, then refused to observe the command of his father's, the King of Denmark, to surrender Norway to Sweden and declared the independence of Norway, but his action was immediately disavowed by King Frederick. Thereafter the Allied Powers turned to an economic blockade around Norway to induce that country to accede to the provisions of the Treaty of Kiel.

A delegation representing the four principal Allied Powers visited Norway in June and July 1814, at which time a proclamation was issued to the people of Norway

from Christiania (Oslo) 26 July. This affirmed that the union of Sweden and Norway was "one of the bases of the new system of equilibrium, as a branch of the indemnities which it is impossible to replace by any other." It proposed that Christian surrender his rights into the hands of the representatives of the nation assembled, the occupation of Norwegian fortresses by the Swedes, and the neutralization of frontier territories. If the Norwegians did not submit, blockade and warfare were threatened.²⁰

On the occasion of the annexation of Norway to Sweden, 10 July, 1814, King Charles of Sweden warned the Norwegians that their political existence was irrevocably decided by the grand results of the War sanctioned by solemn treaties. Sweden had fulfilled her part of the Treaty of Kiel by ceding her continental possessions to Denmark. Prince Christian's action in proclaiming Norway's independence was futile and contrary to their best interests. A new representative Diet was ordered to meet in the name of the King.²¹ In August Prince Christian acceded to the Allied demands and in October surrendered his powers to the Diet. A constitution was drawn up by the Norwegians and approved by the Swedish King in November.

War aims were expressed not only by appeals to the people, but also in the preambles of the treaties of alliance, concluded between the powers of the Coalition. The Czar of Russia and the King of Prussia expressed their objectives

in treaties negotiated at Kalisch, 28 February 1813, and at Breslau, 19 March. The former treaty stated that the purpose was to establish an offensive and defensive alliance to continue throughout the war for the purpose of delivering Europe from the French yoke, and it was agreed that the war should not end until Prussia could be re-constituted in its proportions of 1806.²² The Convention signed at Breslau pertained to the Allied occupation and administration of the conquered German states, and provided for the issuing of proclamations to the German peoples to solicit their support against the French, so that Germany might be liberated and peace restored.²³

Great Britain and Sweden reaffirmed the alliance formed by the treaties of Abo, Stockholm, and Orebro between Russia, Sweden, and Great Britain, in a treaty concluded at Stockholm, 3 March 1813. The purposes of the alliance were said to be the assurance of the maintenance of the independence of the North, and the acceleration of the time when a general peace could be concluded.²⁴

Further conventions of alliance and subsidy were signed at Feichenbach, 14, 15 June between England on the one hand, and Russia and Prussia on the other. The convention with Russia stated that the two states would make every sacrifice to put an end to the disastrous projects of the enemy in Europe. "At a time when Providence has so manifestly blessed their arms, their majesties, animated by the desire

to restore to the peoples their independence, peace and well-being and having the intention of employing all means to insure their objectives," They desire by a convention to regulate the contributions of each nation to the expense of the war.²⁵ "The independence of Europe" was said to be the objective of the Allies in the Convention signed between Prussia and Great Britain.²⁶

The entrance of Austria into the war on the side of the Allies necessitated a re-statement of war aims, and a series of treaties was made to bind the Coalition together for the purpose of making it effective. This was done at Toeplitz, 9 September 1813, Austria, Prussia, and Russia being the participants. The preambles described the war aims of the Allies, declaring that each nation, "animated by the same desire to put an end to the sufferings of Europe, and to assure its future repose by the re-establishment of a just equilibrium among the Powers, had resolved to continue with all forces furnished by Providence, the war in which they were engaged to bring about a salutary peace, wishing at the same time to extend the beneficial effects of the concert to the time when, the actual objective of the war having been attained, their reciprocal interest would dictate the maintenance of the order of things ~~introduced~~ introduced by the successful issue of the war."²⁷ Thus did the Allies bring to extend their objectives beyond war aims to include the protection of the benefits to be conquered by their arms.

Austria and Great Britain concluded a preliminary treaty of alliance at Toeplitz. 3 October 1813, for the purpose of renewing the friendship between the two nations and to cooperate to bring about a "general peace" and to establish a "just equilibrium" between the Powers on "solid and durable bases."²⁸ The objectives of Austria and Bavaria, as stated in the preamble of the treaty signed at Ried, 8 October, were very similar to those stated in the preceding treaty.²⁹ The objects of the treaty of alliance between Austria and Naples signed 11 January 1814, were to cement the relations of the two states and to assure for Europe, "and in particular the peoples of Italy, a state of durable peace, founded on the independence and equilibrium of the Powers."³⁰ Peace and the independence of the Germanies on equitable bases were the avowed war aims of the Treaties signed at Frankfort in November, 1813 with the minor German states. The restoration of the peace of the North was the objective of the Treaty of Peace and Alliance signed at Kiel early in January, 1814.

Metternich had failed to weld the Allies together into a unified coalition for the best prosecution of the war. Castlereagh had urged the necessity of a treaty to bind the Coalition together in his despatches to the British ministers during the autumn of 1813. When this was not secured, Castlereagh went to the Allied headquarters, January 1814, to take charge of the British interests. Through the

cooperation of Metternich and Castlereagh the Treaty of Chaumont was concluded between the four principal Allied Powers, 1 March 1814. The preamble stated that the Allies had made certain propositions to France. If these were refused, they intended to vigorously continue the war for the purpose of bringing about European peace and repose on just bases, and furthermore, to determine the means that should be taken to conserve the benefits won by the war. The first article reiterated their enthusiastic desire to cooperate in every way to procure for Europe a general peace which should guarantee the rights and liberties of all nations. The second article provided for the negotiation of peace in common. Article V. bound the Allies to concert together for the mutual protection of their states after peace with France had been secured. The other articles dealt with the means of carrying on the war with the view of eliminating Allied friction. The fact that this alliance was not a makeshift affair for the duration of the war was clearly brought out in Article XVI: "The present treaty of defensive alliance, having for its object the maintenance of the equilibrium in Europe, to assure the repose and the independence of the powers, and to prevent the recurrence of the tyranny which has desolated the world for many years, the high contracting parties have agreed among themselves to extend its duration to twenty years from the date of signature," to be renewed if desired during the three years

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thereafter.

On the basis of the engagements entered into at Chaumont, the Allies, during the Hundred Days, again entered into treaties, 25 March 1815, to engage in war against Napoleon as the disturber of the peace of Europe. At that time they stated that their purposes were, first, "to renew the engagements of the Treaty of Chaumont, thus to maintain the order of things in general, determined by the Treaty of Paris which protects their respective states, and those of their allies; and then, to abide by the consequences of the system initiated at Chaumont."³²

It can be seen that the war aims as stated in the preambles were general, their specific interpretation being carried out in the arrangements for the peace programs entered into in the main part of the treaty. The extent of these war aims were largely dependent upon the situation existing at the time. The Czar was enthusiastic about the favorable prospects at Kalisch and readily promised Prussia her restoration to the extent enjoyed by her in 1805. The maintenance of French control in Saxony and part of Silesia and the insistence of Metternich on limited war aims resulted in the diminution of Russian war aims as embodied in the Treaty of Reichenbach, 27 June. At Toeplitz in September, the outcome of the war was so uncertain that war aims embodying peace programs were limited and somewhat inconsistent, although the Treaty of Chaumont was presaged. At Frankfurt

in November, Alexander was averse to peace and desired to push the Allied advantages as far as possible. France was offered her natural limits, which Napoleon refused. When the congress at Chatillon dissolved with no result, the war having been pushed into France, the Allies stated that their aim was the dethronement of Napoleon as the enemy of European peace. Allied success expanded Allied war aims and peace programs.

In their official declarations to the French people, the Allies similarly stated their war aims. While these were issued for the purpose of undermining Napoleon's position in France, the Allies also intended that these should justify their course of procedure to the European peoples in general. They were published after the coalition had been strengthened by the confirmation of engagements in treaties, or after negotiations between the belligerents had come to nought. The proclamation of Kutusov, on 25 March 1813, directed primarily to the Germans but incidentally to the French, was made public after Russia and Prussia had concluded the Treaties of Kalisch-Breslau in February and March 1813. Declarations later were made by the Allies directly to the French people from Frankfort after the failure of negotiations through St. Aignan; and also from Vitry, 15 March 1814, after the dissolution of the futile Congress at Chatillon.

The concluding paragraph of Prince Kutusov's

declaration stated that France would be permitted to maintain a strong position in Europe and determine her internal prosperity. "No foreign Power would trouble her and no hostile enterprise would be directed against her legitimate limits. The other Powers aspired to conquer a durable peace for their peoples from France, and would not lay down their arms until the bases of the independence of all the peoples of Europe should be established and assured.³⁴

On 1 December 1813, the Allies published a proclamation to the French from Frankfort, because the French Government had made a new levy of 300,000 conscripts, and the time had come for the Allies to state the principles which motivated them. They stated that they did "not make war upon France, but against that preponderance, haughtily announced,.... to the misfortune of Europe, and of France, the Emperor Napoleon has too long exercised beyond the limits of his empire." Victory had carried the Allies to the banks of the Rhine where they had offered peace terms to Napoleon- which he had rejected. The Allied Sovereigns did not desire that France be weak, but "great, powerful, and happy; because the French power, in a state of greatness and strength, is one of the foundations of the social edifice of Europe.....The powers confirm to the French empire an extent of territory which France under her kings never knew: because a valiant nation does not fall from its rank,

by having in its turn experienced reverses in an obstinate and sanguinary contest, in which it has fought with its accustomed bravery. But the Allied Powers also wish to be free, tranquil, and happy themselves. They desire a state of peace which, by a wise partition of strength, by a just equilibrium, may henceforward preserve their people from the numberless calamities which have overwhelmed Europe for the last twenty years....They will not lay down their arms, until the political state of Europe be re-established anew,- until immoveable principles have resumed their rights over vain pretensions,--until the sanctity of treaties shall have at last secured a real peace to Europe."³⁵

Until the dissolution of the Congress of Chatillon, there was no general conviction among the Allies that Napoleon's dethronement was essential to the realization of their war aims. At Frankfort these war aims were confined to the demand that France resume her natural boundaries, permitting her to retain Napoleon as Emperor if she so desired. However, when France desired peace and the Allies desired the same and Napoleon's ambition thwarted the negotiations at Chatillon, the Allies became convinced that a durable peace could be obtained only if Napoleon ceased to be the French ruler. The revised war aims were incorporated in a declaration issued at Vitry, 15 March 1814. The French Government was accused of parleying from 1 February in

order to secure a military advantage, without intending to make peace. "France has to blame its Government alone for its sufferings. Peace alone can heal the wounds which a spirit of universal dominion, unexampled in history, has produced. This peace shall be the peace of Europe: no other can be accepted. It is at length time that Princes should watch over the welfare of the people without foreign influence, that nations should respect their natural independence, that social institutions should be protected from daily revolutions, property respected, and trade free." As long as this unbridled ambition continued to rule France, no peace could be obtained for Europe, hence the appeal was made to the will of the French nation, to check this desolating system. Then would the peace of Europe be insured, and nothing should disturb it.

As the Allies entered Paris, 31 March 1814, Alexander issued a proclamation to the French people in the name of the Allies which stated that they would not deal with Napoleon or any members of his family; that they would respect the territory of ancient France; inasmuch as a powerful France was necessary to European well-being; "they would recognize and guarantee a Constitution drawn up by the French Nation. In consequence, they invited the Senate to form a Provisional Government to care for the administrative needs, and a Constitution which would be submitted to the French People."

On the same day Schwarzenberg appealed to the people of France

and especially Paris to rally to the Allies and not create civil war in the country. He promised that their interests would be cared for and not abused, and the troops would respect their rights and property. ³⁸ Napoleon abdicated 3 April and a Provisional Government was set up in which Talleyrand was a leader., a charter having been drawn up, which Louis XVIII agreed to give to the people, when he took charge of the Government the last of April. Peace was concluded and signed 30 May 1814. The Congress of Vienna followed.

Napoleon, who meanwhile, had been exiled to Elba, escaped late in February 1815 and landed in France. The Bourbon Government crumbled, and the King fled to Belgium, When the Powers, signatory to the Peace of Paris, heard of the events which were transpiring in France, they issued a proclamation against Napoleon, 13 March 1815, from Vienna, where the Congress was assembled. "They declared that firmly resolved to maintain intact the Treaty of Paris of 30 May 1814 and the dispositions sanctioned by it.... they would employ all their means and reunite all efforts for the general peace.." ³⁹ Although war was engaged in against Napoleon who menaced the peace of Europe, it was not with the view of restoring Louis XVIII. or "imposing on France any particular government," Castlereagh declared ⁴⁰ 25 April, and the other Allies made similar declarations.

FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER VI.

- 1 Br. For. S.P., I,II, op. cit., pp. 1160-61
- 2 Annual Register, 1813, op. cit., pp.441-2, also B.F.S.P.
I,II, pp.1161-2
- 3 Br. For. S.P., I,II, op. cit., pp. 1162-3
- 4 Ibid., pp. 1165-9
- 5 Ibid., pp. 1163-4
- 6 Balfour. Aberdeen, I, pp. 1164-5
- 7 Wilson, II, op. cit., p. 278
- 8 Br. For. S.P., II op. cit., pp. 1114-16
- 9 Br. For. S.P., I,II, op. cit., pp. 1027-28
- 10 Ibid., p. 1029
- 11 Annual Register, 1813, op. cit., p. 443
- 12 Colenbrander, H.T. Gedenkstukken der Algemeene Geschiednis
van Nederland van 1795 to 1840 vol.23, p.91
- 13 Ibid., pp. 92-3
- 14 Annual Register, 1815 op. cit., pp. 398-400
- 15 Annual Register, 1808, op. cit., pp. 6, 296, 307
- 16 Annual Register, 1813, op. cit., pp. 398-9
- 17 Ibid., pp. 419,420
- 18 Br. For. S.P. I,II, op. cit., pp. 919-20
- 19 Annual Register, 1814, op. cit., p. 394
- 20 Annual Register, 1814, op. cit., pp. 430-2
- 21 Br. For. S.P., I,II, op. cit., pp. 921-4
- 22 De Koch and Scholl, op. cit., 10 , pp. 193, 545
(Text of Treaty)
- 23 De Martens, Nouveau Recueil de Traites' de L'Europe
Ser II,I, 1808-1814 p. 564

- 24 Ibid., p. 558
- 25 Ibid., p. 568
- 26 Ibid., p. 571
- 27 Ibid., pp. 596, 600, 604
- 28 Ibid., p. 607
- 29 Ibid., p. 610, also Neumann, Recueil des Traites conclus par l'Autriche, II, pp. 381-5
- 30 Ibid., p. 660, for Naples, Ibid., p. 403
- 31 Ibid., pp. 683-8
- 32 Annual Register, 1815, op. cit., p. 357
- 33 D'Angeberg, Congres de Vienne, II, p. 970
- 34 Br. For. State Papers, I, II, op. cit., p. 1051
- 35 Annual Register, 1813, op. cit., pp. 442-3
- 36 Annual Register, 1814, op. cit., pp. 315-8
- 37 DeClercq, Treaties of France, II, pp. 400-401
- 38 Br. & For. State Papers, I, op. cit., p. 130
- 39 D'Angeberg, op. cit., II, p. 970
- 40 Annual Register, 1815 op. cit., pp. 368-9 also Br. & For State Papers, pp. 450-2

CHAPTER VII.

WHAT DID IT AVAIL?

This study has proved that the forces of popularism were effectively regenerated and mobilized to bring about the attainment of the objectives of statesmen, sovereigns, and subjects, which involved the re-constitution of Europe upon durable bases essential to peace. The despotism of Napoleon prevented popularism, hence was the object of popular attack during the Liberation Wars, which culminated with the establishment of a new order in Europe under the guardianship of the Concert of Powers.

The question arises whether or not popularism was effective, if it realized its objectives. This can be determined by considering the avowed peace programs of the individual nations engaged in the Wars, their combination in the Coalition peace programs, and the final statement by the four Great Powers which formed the Quadruple Alliance. Furthermore, were the settlements which were actually made, in harmony with the promises made to the people during the progress of the Wars and with the avowed peace programs? By tracing through the war aims as expressed by peace programs and their fruition in the settlements made at Paris and Vienna in 1814-15, one can determine whether or not the people cherished expectations which had good foundation,

but were not fulfilled, or in other words, whether or not there was a betrayal of the interests and desires of the people. Because of the limited scope of this study, it has been impossible to do this in an adequate manner but certain facts will be pointed out to indicate the trend of the peace programs and settlements.

First, it will be necessary to consider the peace programs of the individual nations. The primary object of Spain was the restoration of Ferdinand VII to the throne. Under the Cortes, but later especially under Ferdinand, after his restoration in the spring of 1814, demands were formulated which embodied the return of Louisiana from the United States to Spain, as well as other territories lost by Spain even before the French Revolution, some of them dating as far back as the conquests of Louis XIV. The impossibility of the Spanish demands, and the stress upon minor features of the settlements such as opposition to Marie Louise in Italy, and diplomatic precedence emphasized that isolation of Spain from the other Powers, which reactionary internal policy of Ferdinand had started.

The most important feature of the Russian peace program, aside from keeping her recent conquests, was formulated by frequent correspondence between Czar Alexander and Prince Adam Czartoryski, from 1805-14. It was the re-establishment of the independence of Poland as a separate nation with the Czar as King. Due to the volatile temperament

of the Czar, he, momentarily advocated various measures such as the placing of Bernadotte, the Crown Prince of Sweden, on the French throne, but he was effectively checkmated by Metternich and Castlereagh. He was instrumental in the restoration of the French Bourbons with the proviso that they accept a constitution. He also insisted on an enlarged neutralized and liberalized Switzerland. Alexander desired an equilibrium in Europe and was very receptive to the ideal of liberalism.

The obsession of Bernadotte, the Swedish Crown Prince and ex-French Marshal, was the acquisition of a territory which would enhance his popularity with the Swedish people. Sweden had lost Finland to Russia in 1809, and Bernadotte in 1812, had the choice of uniting with France to regain Finland, or with Russia against France and her ally Denmark to gain Norway in case the war was successful. He decided to follow the latter course and by the treaties of Abo (or Petersburg) and Stockholm, signed early in April, 1812, Sweden was guaranteed Norway. England guaranteed Sweden not only Norway, but also the island of Guadeloupe by the treaty concluded at Stockholm 3 March 1813.

Prussia desired to be reconstructed on a scale equivalent to that of 1806.

The peace program of Austria was stated in the secret treaty of Reichenbach with Russia and Prussia of 29 June 1813. This provided for the reannexation of the Illyrian

provinces and the Tyrol and Vorarlberg and a suitable frontier in Italy. The independence of the German states was declared to be one of the objects of the war, especially the re-establishment of the House of Brunswick-Luneburg in Hanover, and the recognition of the independent status of the old Hanseatic towns, such as Hamburg. Bavaria was promised an increase of territory by the Treaty of Ried concluded with Austria, 8 October 1813, and the re-constitution of the other German states was provided for in treaties concluded with them at Frankfort and other cities in October and November, 1813.

Murat, the King of Naples, negotiated with the Allies and Napoleon, fighting with the latter until after the battle of Leipzig. Hoping to consolidate his position in Naples and Europe, he made a treaty with Austria early in January 1814, which provided for his continuance on the throne of Naples, or a suitable indemnity, and the enlargement of Neapolitan territories. As there was little fighting done by the Dutch, and their independent position was largely due to Great Britain, her foreign affairs were conducted by the latter nation at Paris and Vienna, though the Dutch maintained agents there. The restoration of their colonies and annexation of Belgium were due to the interest of the British. Denmark joined the Allies 14 January 1814, when she signed the treaty of Kiel with Sweden, in which she surrendered Norway in return for Swedish Pomerania and an

indemnity, and in another treaty was given back her colonies by Great Britain, with the exception of Heligoland.

Both Austria and England were specially interested in the general peace and were willing to make sacrifices to bring that about. Metternich manoeuvred Austria from the status of a French ally into the position of armed mediator. When France would not treat satisfactorily, the Congress of Prague dissolved, 11 August 1813, and Austria joined the Allies to conquer a stable peace. England was willing, not only to subsidize the Allies, but also to surrender part of the colonies conquered by her to insure peace on the Continent, and the abolition of the slave trade by the European countries, which she made contingent upon the return of certain colonies. She retained only the colonies which were valuable to her for strategic purposes.

The individual national peace programs were incorporated in the general plan for the reconstruction of Europe which developed by the process of accretions. They were not brought together into a uniform plan, but nevertheless formed the framework of the Coalition because they obligated the Allies to work together for the realization of certain objectives. It was to be the work of the Quadruple Alliance of 1814 to co-ordinate these amalgamated Allied peace programs into a coherent plan for reconstruction.

Sweden was assured her peace objectives by a series of treaties between that country and Russia and Great Britain

as has been pointed out. In the spring of 1812 Russia endeavored to strengthen her position, since she was on the verge of war with France. On 5 April she signed the treaty with Sweden at Petersburg and a similar treaty with Stockholm 8 April. These treaties guaranteed Norway to Sweden and provided for a defensive and offensive alliance against France.¹ Through the intervention of Great Britain, the war with Turkey was concluded by the treaty of peace negotiated at Bucharest, 28 May. By the terms of this treaty, Russia conceded her Asiatic conquests during the war as well as the Danubian principalities, though she retained Bessarabia. Russia insisted upon a treaty of alliance between the two states.² The state of nominal war existing between England on the one hand, and Russia and Sweden on the other, was brought to a close by the treaties signed at Orebro, 18 July.³ Russia and Spain were united against France by the Treaty of Weliki-Louky, signed 20 July between the two states. Commercial relations were restored, and Alexander recognized the Cortes and the constitution which it had established.⁴ Later, 13 January 1813, Spain concluded a similar treaty with Sweden at Stockholm.

The treaty at Kalisch, signed 28 February 1813, brought Prussia into the Coalition. An offensive and defensive alliance was concluded between Russia and Prussia for the duration of the war. The chief agreed purpose was to reconstitute Prussia in "the statistical, geographical and financial

proportions" it had possessed before the war of 1806.⁵

Other Russo-Prussians conventions such as the one signed at Breslau 18 March, provided for the administration of conquered territories, and the issuance of appeals to the German peoples.⁶ Treaties of subsidy and alliance were concluded between Great Britain and Prussia, 14 and 15 June, at Reichenbach.⁷ The Prussian treaty provided for the cession of the former Prussian possession of Hildesheim to Hanover, and reiterated the clause in the Kalisch treaty providing for the reconstruction of Prussia on a basis equivalent to that of 1806.⁸

At the same time secret negotiations were being carried on between Russia, Prussia and Austria which resulted in the secret Treaty of Reichenbach, signed 27 June. Metternich explicitly stated that knowledge of this was being concealed from Napoleon, and he desired that England and Sweden, especially the former, know nothing of these discussions. This secret Treaty of Reichenbach provided for contingent Austrian support of the Allies on four points: The dissolution of the Duchy of Warsaw, and its partition between the three neighboring Powers, the enlargement of Prussia, the restitution of the Illyrian provinces to Austria, and the re-establishment of Hamburg, Lubeck, and the other territories in northern Germany annexed by France in 1810. Austria was to make war if Napoleon refused these terms. While Austria regarded the dissolution of the Confederation of the Rhine and Prussian restoration to a status equivalent to 1806

as desirable, Metternich refused to make these points. The Coalitz was further strengthened by the treaties of Toeplitz, signed 9 September, between Austria, Russia and Prussia. Secret articles provided for the reconstruction of the Austrian monarchy as it existed prior to 1805; the dissolution of the Confederation of the Rhine, and the independence of the German states; the restoration of the house of Brunswick-Luneburgh to its German possessions; and an arrangements between the three Courts for the territories of the Duchy of Warsaw. Britain's protest against the failure to provide for the reconstitution of Spain and Holland has been pointed out.¹⁰ The Allied position at this juncture was not so strong, hence their peace programs were more moderate. A treaty of alliance and subsidy was concluded by Metternich and Aberdeen, 3 October, at Toeplitz, which became the model for Great Britain's other subsidy treaties.

Meanwhile Austria was negotiating with minor German States, especially Bavaria, and with the King of Naples, for the purpose of bringing them into a Coalition. A treaty of peace, friendship, and alliance was concluded with Bavaria at Ried, 8 October. This provided for immediate Bavarian participation in the war against Napoleon in connection with the Austrian army. Bavarian territories were guaranteed by Austria. Bavaria agreed to cede to Austria the Tyrol and Vorarlberg provinces, which had formerly been a part of her dominions, and in return Austria promised to secure for Bavaria

a suitable indemnity. Austria would occupy the Tyrol immediately. The Confederation of the Rhine was to be dissolved¹¹ and its component states declared to be independent.

Wurtemberg signed a similar treaty with Austria at Fulda, 8 November, which provided for the guarantee of its¹² territories with an enlargement which might be arranged. The Duke of Saxe-Weimar acceded to the Grand Alliance 1 November, the Grand-Duke of Darmstadt 2 November, and the Prince of Nassau 3 November. The Grand-Duke of Baden signed a treaty 30 November at Frankfort-on-the-Main with Prussia. These treaties provided for the dissolution of the Confederation of the Rhine, and the establishment of the independence of the German States. Suitable provision for a confederation¹³ was to be made later. Austria concluded a Treaty with the Elector of Hesse, who had been dispossessed by the Treaty of Tilsit in 1807. Provision was made for the restoration of his territories.¹⁴ The princes of Germany acceded to the alliance except the king of Saxony, the Grand-Duke of Frankfort, and the princes of Isenberg and Leyen. These were exempted because of their attachment for France.¹⁵ Prussia and Spain entered into a treaty of alliance at Basle, 20 January 1814. Unlike the treaties Spain had concluded with Russia and Sweden in 1812-13, this treaty ignored the Cortes, Ferdinand VII alone being designated as representing Spain.

The negotiations between Austria and Murat were concluded by a treaty of alliance signed at Naples, 11 January

1814. This provided for the continuation of the alliance until lasting peace was brought in Europe. The secret articles guaranteed Naples to Joachim and stated that Austria would secure its renunciation by the King of Sicily and a suitable indemnity for the latter. A cessation of hostilities between Naples and Great Britain would be brought about. Austria agreed to use its influence to secure for Murat an indemnity for the 400,000 souls in the Roman State, which would be surrendered to the Pope.¹⁶

Meanwhile Metternich was conducting secret negotiations with Bernstorff, the Danish diplomat, to attach his country to the Allies. Austria never favored the Allied engagement with Sweden relative to Norway. Bernadotte wished that the Allies would have no dealings with Denmark. In spite of Bernadotte's attitude, negotiations continued, and culminated 14 January with the Treaty of Kiel, by which Denmark ceded Norway to Sweden in return for the cession of Sweden's continental possessions. Treaties were concluded at this time with Russia and Great Britain, the latter restoring to Denmark all her colonies except Heligoland. Denmark joined the alliance and declared war on France.¹⁷

The ultimate basis for the peace program for the reconstruction of Europe was adopted by the Quadruple Alliance at Chaumont, 1 March 1814. This has been traced back for its sources to the negotiations which took place between the Russian special envoy, Novosiltsov, and the British Prime

Minister, 1804-05, Novosiltsov having been sent to England to negotiate a treaty of alliance against Napoleon and to agree as a preliminary upon the common bases of peace. ¹⁸

The secret instructions of Novosiltsov were nominally drawn by Alexander and countersigned by Czartoryski. The necessity of the Allies securing public opinion on their side, which up to that time had been solely a French weapon, was stressed. Both countries should agree that their conduct would be guided by the principle that they were averse to the restoration of the Ancient Regime in any of its forms, and did not desire the re-establishment of "old abuses in the countries....to be emancipated from the yoke of Bonaparte, but they should, on the contrary, be assured of liberties founded on a solid basis." Proclamations should be issued stating this principle. ¹⁹

As to the specific political and territorial re-constitution to be effected, Poland should be reconstituted as an independent kingdom with the Czar as King. The King of Sardinia should be restored to his Piedmontese territories which should be increased. At the same time he would be urged to grant his people " a free and wise constitution, " which would be according to his best interests. Switzerland should be reconstituted with a defensible frontier, administered by a Government, based on the desires and needs of the people, but lacking the errors of the old system, so that its neutrality would be respected. The people of Holland should determine the form of Government

which would meet their needs, and select a Stadtholder with requisite power. Their territories should be enlarged so that the state would be strong enough to take its place in the European states system. The Germanies should be re-constituted either as three Germanies centering around Prussia, Austria, a Federal Government for the remaining states, or in some other way which would strengthen them. ²⁰

Relative to France, "we should declare to the French nation that our efforts are directed not against her, but only against her Government, which is as tyrannical for France as for the rest of Europe; that our only object is to deliver from its yoke the countries which it oppresses..... to emancipate France from the despotism which she is suffering and to make her free to choose any government she may herself prefer." The question of a rule would be a secondary matter-- "if the Bourbons, which of them, and what conditions he should be called upon to subscribe to, the most essential of which would be that he should submit to the constitution which would be adopted by the nation." ²¹

In general, the principles should undoubtedly everywhere be the same, and it would be above all things necessary to agree as to that point. Everywhere public institutions should be founded on the sacred rights of humanity, and so as to produce the order which is their necessary consequence..... But the application of the same principles may vary according to locality...The adoption of the course above indicated

in intimate concert with England would not only be the true and perhaps the only means of restricting French power within its just limits, but would also contribute to fix the future peace of Europe on a solid and permanent basis. The object should be, first, to attach nations to their Governments, by making it only possible for the latter to act for the benefit of their subjects; and secondly, to fix the relations of the various States towards each other on more precise rules, which would be so drawn up as to make it the interest of each State to respect them.....When peace should be made, a new treaty should be drawn up as a basis for the reciprocal relations of the European States. Such a treaty might secure the privileges of neutrality, bind the Powers who take part in it never to begin a war until after exhausting every means of mediation by a third Power, and lay down a sort of new code of international law, which being sanctioned by the greater part of the European States, would, if violated by any one of them, bind the others to turn against the offender and make good the evil he has committed.....In short, the peace of Europe should be maintained by means of a league under the auspices of Russia and England.

Further contributions to the maintenance of European peace could be made by the revision of the British maritime code, and by the adoption of a system which would more effectively protect the Christian populations in the Turkish Empire. Such essentially were the principles upon which

the reconstruction of Europe was based in 1814-15.

Pitt's reply reduced the Russian suggestions to three general objects with which he concurred: "(1) To rescue from the dominion of France those countries which it has subjugated since the beginning of the Revolution, and to reduce France within its former limits as they stood before that time. (2) To make such an arrangement with respect to the territories recovered from France as may provide for their security and happiness and may at the same time constitute a more effectual barrier in future against encroachments on the part of France. (3) To form at the restoration of peace, a general agreement and guarantee for the mutual protection and security of different Powers, and for the re-establishing of a general system of public law in Europe."²⁴

This program necessitated the co-operation of Austria and Prussia to bring about the complete overthrow of Napoleon. Even though they did not co-operate and the liberation was only partial, Pitt maintained that Holland should be given Antwerp and a suitable "barrier" to protect her from French encroachments. In other parts of Europe, there were states which had been subjugated by France, whose independence it would be impossible to restore since it would endanger their own security as well as that of Europe, he pointed out. Among these he mentioned the Italian republic, the three Legations, Parma, Placentia, and on the other side of Europe, the Austrian Netherlands and the territories on the left bank

of the Rhine. Spain had forfeited her rights in Italy by the maladministration of her territories, Genoa was not known for her just rule, Austria had abandoned the Netherlands, and the Ecclesiastical states in Germany had disappeared for ever.

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These territories could be used to induce the Great Powers to join the Coalition against France, and through their equitable distribution could assist in attaining a just and permanent peace. First, it was necessary to remove the cause of rivalry between the German Powers. Austria should be induced to turn her attention toward Italy and Prussia toward the Rhine and the north of Europe. In each area, a smaller Power should be strengthened so that it might successfully oppose French desire for aggrandisement. Piedmont should be enlarged by the acquisition of Genoa, and possibly by part of the Milanese, and Parma and Placentia. Austria would gain the rest of the Milanese, the three Legations, and the Grand Duke of Tuscany would be restored to his dominions. Thus Austria would dominate the north of Italy.

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In the north, Holland was the first barrier against France, and was to be strengthened by the annexation of at least part of the Belgian Netherlands. Prussia was to be enlarged by territories on the Rhine, and would provide a second line of defense against France. The independence of Switzerland, Sardinia, Naples, and Modena was to be

restored as essential to the security of Europe. To maintain European peace, it would be advisable, Pitt stated, to form a confederation of the German states, and one for the Italian states. Novosiltsov's vague suggestion as to the stabilization of the settlements, Pitt transformed into a concrete guarantee which each of the European Powers should enter into.²⁷ Furthermore, Britain and Russia as the two most disinterested Powers should conclude a special treaty to guarantee the possessions of the European states and to maintain order and peace. The restoration of the Bourbon family, Pitt declared, should not be a primary objective to the Allies. Pitt ignored the questions of maritime rights and the Ottoman Empire, since these were subjects upon which the two Powers disagreed. On the subjects of colonial conquests, Pitt showed himself liberal-minded, for he offered to return these conquests to France and her allies if the British peace program were accepted,²⁸ and Castlereagh followed this precedent later.

The continued successes of Napoleon prevented the realization of these peace programs of the two Powers, but, on 8 April 1813, Castlereagh wrote the British minister Cathcart to remind Alexander, whose armies were on the Oder and the Elbe, of the Pitt-Novosiltsov scheme for the reconstruction of Europe. He stated that Pitt talked over its details with him before he wrote it, and while some of its suggestions might be inapplicable, the outline was so masterly, that it should be presented to Alexander for his

consideration.²⁹ Similar references to this document were made by Castlereagh in his dispatches to Stewart, the minister at Prussia, and to Aberdeen who was appointed in August to be the minister to Austria.

A projet which formed the basis of the Treaty of Chaumont was sent to Cathcart by Castlereagh, 18 September, 1813. This was to be a treaty signed by the four chief Powers, to which the other Powers would be invited to accede. Its territorial provisions were practically the same as those of the 1804-05 memorandums, with the exception of the provisions for a suitable indemnity for the King of Sicily in case Murat retained Naples, and the annexation of Norway by Sweden, both of which were situations which had arisen after 1805.³⁰

This plan of territorial reconstruction was reiterated in the memorandum of the Cabinet, which were the instructions of Castlereagh when he left for the Continent to act as British agent. These were drawn up in December 1813. The disposition of the British maritime conquests was determined. For strategic reasons, Malta, the Mauritius and the Isle of Bourbon, Guadeloupe, and Les Saintes were to remain British. The Cape of Good Hope, Ceylon, and part of Guiana were also to be retained. Of the Danish conquests, all would be restored except the island of Heligoland. All of the rest of the conquests would be returned, provided a satisfactory peace were established.³¹

The Treaty of Chaumont signed 1 March 1814, bound the four Great Powers together as a permanent Concert of Powers, to continue the war until peace on equitable bases was established. This Concert was not to terminate with the war but to continue for twenty-five years thereafter, at which time it could be renewed. Secret articles confirmed their decisions as to Germany, Switzerland, Italy, Spain, and Holland, and invited Spain, Portugal, Sweden and Holland to accede to the Treaty.

These Coalition peace programs were enacted into settlements in Preliminary Peace of Paris, April, the first Treaty of Paris, 30 May 1814, the General Act of the Vienna Congress, June 1815, and the Second Peace of Paris, 20 November 1815. The latter treaty was necessary because of the return of Napoleon during the Hundred Days during the spring of 1815, and the brief campaign against the Allies which closed with Waterloo. The fact that all France seemed to rally to Napoleon convinced the Allies that punitive measures were necessary.

In turning to a consideration of the settlements, it is only to determine the extent to which the popular expectations were betrayed, and if they were, was there a basis for the conviction that popular interests had been ignored. First the settlements will be briefly considered, second, the criticism of them, and finally, their justification.

The territorial reconstitutions were as follows:

France was permitted to retain her limits of 1 January, 1791 with the addition of certain enclaves, by the First Peace of Paris. By the Second Peace of Paris, she was reduced to the limits of 1790 with the addition of certain enclaves. She surrendered Savoy to Sardinia and Landau and the Saar to the Germans. The Netherlands gained Belgium-Luxemburg and regained most of her colonies on the basis outlined in the British memorandum of 26 December 1813.³³ Switzerland gained territories from France and Savoy, part of Valtelline, and three new cantons: Geneva, Basle, Valais. Great Britain retained the part of French, Spanish (Trinidad), Danish (Heligoland), and Dutch colonies, needed to strengthen her control of the sea. Denmark lost Norway to Sweden, and by an exchange with Prussia and Hanover gained Lauenburg and indemnities. Russia gained all of Poland except Galicia (to Austria), Cracow (independent), and western Poland which Prussia gained. Prussia also acquired two-fifths of Saxony, the Saar Basin, Rhineland, Westphalia, and Western Pomerania. Hanover, Bavaria, Hesse, Weimar, Baden, and Wurtemberg were also enlarged. Austria ceded Belgian, Swabian, and Italian territories which were detached, but gained part of the Valtelline (by the popular will), Venetia, and Salzburg. She regained Galicia, Tyrol, Vorarlberg, Milanese and Dalmatia. In the Italies, Sardinia gained Genoa, and regained Nice and Savoy. The other Italian states were restored to their rulers, although both Maria Louisa of Spain and Marie Louisa

of Spain and Marie Louise of Austria gained territories: ³⁴

Other features of the settlements will be considered in connection with their justification. The Whigs in England stirred up popular clamor against them, fulfilling their opposition role. They attacked these features because they alleged that nationalism had been disregarded in the cases of Genoa, Saxony, Poland, Belgium and Norway. They declared that the Allies had forced the Bourbons on France and especially deplored the war in 1815 against Napoleon and the final settlement in France, as being illiberal. They claimed that constitutionalism had been betrayed, and the humanitarian interests of the people had been disregarded, especially with respect to the slave trade.

It is not possible to appraise the settlements made in 1814-15 in a detailed manner, but merely to point out certain typical features. ³⁵ There are three tests which might be applied to these settlements: the theoretical, the practical, and the historical. The theoretical these involves the question of whether or not the statesmen were guided by principles, the "imponderables." Practically, were actual conditions taken into consideration, and historically, what were the precedents upon which action was based. When a conflict arose between two sets of "imponderables", such as was the case in the Germanies where the sentiment for confederation clashed with that of popularism, it was necessary to compromise.

Briefly, the political and territorial features will

be dealt with. Italy was one of the greatest targets of the critics. It was asserted that the forces of nationalism and liberalism had been betrayed by the restoration of Ferdinand in the two Sicilies, the other rulers including the Pope in Central Italy, and the King of Sardinia to his Piedmontese possessions with the addition of Genoa, as well as by the Austrian annexation of the Milanese and Venetia. If reaction followed there was no reason for surprize. The Italian peoples were not ready for unity nor democracy.

In Sicily Bentinck had conducted a disastrous constitutional experiment. When Ferdinand was restored to the Neapolitan throne, after the death of Murat in 1815, he speedily disregarded the constitution. According to Botta, this excited no commotion and no regrets among his subjects. "People," he declared, "generally estimate the degree of liberty they possess by the sums they have to pay, rather than by the right of giving their votes at elections..... Not high sounding words, but the realization of immediate happiness, is necessary to form a stable foundation for national constitutions. The people are not metaphysicians; they measure their happiness, not by what they hear, but by what they experience."³⁶

Lord Aberdeen, a liberal Tory and a shrewd observer, in speaking of Sicily, declared that to think of giving the British constitution to any country was nonsense. "You must first create the people, the state of society, the whole system by which the British constitution is kept alive. Give

the people more liberty as you see they are fit for it; break the power of the nobles; destroy commercial monopoly; introduce justice in taxation, banish venality and corruption from the judicature, all by specific measures, as fast as you please; but to give them a fine-sounding name will not carry much real good along with it. The thing, if anything is meant by it, must be greatly modified, and by talking of it difficulties are only created which need never have been heard of."³⁷

Throughout Italy, there was a militant educated minority who stressed the importance of Italian unification, but it was only a fraction of the population. The strongest faction, in Northern and Central Italy, favored Austria, while a weaker faction favored France, and the majority of the population was apathetic. As Botta significantly remarked, "nations, not factions, change the condition of states in important and unprecedented situations."³⁸ The Milanese and Venetians favored Austrian rule over that of any other Power. The people of the Valtelline vigorously protested to the Congress of Vienna against being annexed to Switzerland, as had been planned, and the Congress permitted them to pass to Austria, whose rule was known to be liberal. Thus did the statesmen recognize the principle of self-determination.

The wiping out of the Republic of Genoa was strongly but illogically condemned by English Whigs posing as liberals. Genoa had never been known as a liberal state, and in any case, its old liberties were guaranteed by the settlements. There

was no national issue involved since it was joined to an Italian state. The security of Italy demanded the strengthening of Piedmont. Genoa in the past had been the door into Italy for alien invaders, especially the Spanish and French. Finally, time was to demonstrate that this was an important step in the final realization of Italian unification and actual liberalization.

Popularism was also said to have been betrayed by the union of Belgium and Holland. The only expressed sentiment which existed at the time in Belgium, desired the reunion with Austria, who absolutely refused to consider such a settlement. There was little desire for independent status, and if there would have been, it would have been constantly threatened by France, who was reluctant to relinquish the Belgian provinces in 1814. Hence, the natural settlement was a union of the two Netherlands to make a compact state which would be a barrier to French as well as German aggression. All of the rights of the Belgians were protected by the Allies, as had been the case in Italy. The chief difficulty arose from the fact that the Catholic clergy of Belgium, one of the most reactionary of such groups in the world, refused to acquiesce in the granting of religious liberty in the new state. The fact that the revolution of 1830 resulted in Belgian independence was largely an accident. The weakness of Belgium was demonstrated by the World War, and by the later Flemish movement.

Polish independence had been tested for centuries before 1795. The Poles had proven their inability to maintain order in their territories and had repeatedly forced the neighboring states to intervene. By the Vienna Settlements, the rights of the Poles were carefully safeguarded by a Constitution granted by Alexander in May 1815. Similar protection was promised the Poles under Prussia and Austria. The Poles were not averse to reconstitution under the Czar. Madame Potocka, a French sympathizer, whose husband had been a marshal in Napoleon's army, stated that the union would have been successful if the Arch-duke Constantine, appointed by the Czar to rule Poland, had possessed the character of Alexander.³⁹ The ardent Polish patriot, Czartoryski, who had assisted Alexander in working out the reconstitution of Poland, wrote to him 12 July 1815, that the first difficulties had been overcome and the administration had been perfected in all its branches, conforming to the bases of the constitution. The public spirit he described as being excellent, and people believed that "good times" were ahead. Harmony and happiness prevailed among the Polish and Russian troops, and also among the people.⁴⁰ He was to agree with Madame Potocka that Poland's difficulties grew out of the maladministration of Constantine.

The addition of two-fifths of Saxony to the Prussian Monarchy strengthened it so that later it might unify Germany. Saxony had been warned that it would be punished for maintaining the French alliance, which the King was

compelled to do through force of circumstances. As in the similar case of Genoa, old rights were guaranteed.

Throughout Germany, the settlements confirmed the elimination of feudal survivals which Napoleon had decreed, and the remaining states were made more compact. The princes and cities petitioned for a general constitution which had been promised during the war. This, they declared, would aid in the re-establishing of order in Europe and peace in Germany. It was drawn up in the Spring of 1815, and included protection of civil, religious, political, commercial, social, and economic rights, and provided for the free navigation of rivers such as the Rhine. Constitutions were recommended to all the German states. Wurtemberg, Baden, Bavaria, and Saxe-Weimar adopted Constitutions and provisions for them were made by Prussia and the other states.⁴¹

In the Swiss settlements, Alexander, supported by the other Powers, demanded that the constitution of the Canton of Berne be liberalized to provide for the representation of the different groups. This policy was applied to other cantons. Talleyrand wrote to Louis XVIII. from Vienna, 7 March 1815, that this was in harmony with the "ideas of the times."⁴² The Swiss constitution was democratically revised. Its territory enlarged by the addition of Geneva and the annexation of intervening French and Sardinian territories was neutralized under international guarantee.

The attack of the British Whigs was directed especially

against the union of Norway and Sweden, because of the alleged violation of Norwegian nationalism, and also because they feared an alliance of the Scandinavian Kingdom with France against England. Denmark had surrendered Norway to Sweden in exchange for the latter's Pomeranian possessions, at Kiel, early in January 1814. Orders were given to Prince Christian to turn Norway over to Sweden. He refused and declared Norway independent, having been elected King by the Diet. Great Britain was importuned to recognize Norwegian independence, but she stated she would stand by her engagements with Sweden. In order to save the situation, the Allies intervened. Early in June, 1814 a mission from the Allies arrived in Norway and issued a declaration to Prince Christian and the Norwegians.

Christian had replied to the Allied note of 13 July 1814, stating that he would surrender his sovereignty to the Diet from which he had derived it, and reiterated his stipulations.⁴³ The Allied mission replied that his answer was unsatisfactory, however, the King of Sweden was the one to either accept or reject his stipulations.⁴⁴

On 14 July 1814, Christian wrote the Swedish King that he chose to save Norway rather than to reign over her. Before surrendering his rights, he wished to secure their happiness by presenting certain bases of their union with Sweden, such as the guarantee of a Constitution. These conditions he planned to make known to the Diet and the Nation, warning them of the

dangers inherent in opposition to the will of the Powers. If the Norwegians accepted the conditions, he promised to abdicate immediately, but if they rejected them, he would not separate his fate from theirs. He took this action on two conditions: "First, that the bases of the union be accepted by Sweden, under the guarantee of the four Powers whose envoys were present.....Secondly, that the deliberations be free and mature, and to this end..a suspension of hostilities be agreed on..."⁴⁵

Augustus Foster, the English Minister to Denmark wrote Lord Bathurst, 14 July, that the Norwegian people were so English in their sentiments that they would welcome becoming a part of His Majesty's dominions. He declared that "the best that could be done....would be to get the Crown Prince (Bernadotte), to agree to the terms proposed, or to any condition which would allow Sweden to retreat with credit from the step she had taken, if it were by obtaining only a nominal annexation, and it is not unlikely that this may be effected, as I am impressed with the idea that he would be glad to get out of the difficulty, if he could.".... Every exertion was made to bring about an arrangement that would leave Norway almost an independent state.⁴⁶

The solution anticipated by Foster, was consummated. The King of Sweden accepted the Danish Prince's terms, and a convention was concluded between the Prince Royal of Sweden and the Norwegian Government at Moss, 14 August. This provided

for the convocation of the Diet and the Swedish King promised to accept the Constitution drawn up by it, making only the changes necessary for the union of the two kingdoms. The civil and military departments as well as the Governments were to remain separate, the union between the kingdoms being personal.⁴⁷ Prince Christian issued a proclamation 10 October, stating that their liberties and nationality would be protected by their Constitution, and reluctantly bade farewell to the Norwegian people.⁴⁸ The King of Sweden was elected the Constitutional King of Norway, 11 November 1814.⁴⁹ In this way Norway gained a much more liberal Government under the rule of Sweden than she would have had as an independent state. The wisdom of this settlement was vindicated by the continuance of this relationship until 1905, at which time a peaceful separation took place.

Thus without further discussion, it can be seen that territorially, the settlements aided in making the states of Europe more compact, hence more secure. National interests were not ignored, but favored by the settlements. Austria renounced Belgium to gain neighboring Italian territories. Sweden renounced her Continental territories to gain Norway as a sister kingdom.

The restoration in France was another object of criticism by the self-styled liberals of Europe. The French Senate on 14 April 1814, asked the King to accept a Constitution,

which the Allies had insisted upon as a basis of government. The Comte d'Artois accepted this in principle, and the King, Louis XVIII., "granted" this "Charter" to his people, when he arrived in France. It stated the public rights of the French, declared them to be equal in the eyes of the law, regardless of rank, equally admissible to civil and military employments, and contributing in proportion to their property to the state. It guaranteed personal liberty, freedom of worship, though the Catholic was the State religion, freedom of the press within prescribed limits, amnesty for previous acts and opinions, and established the form of government based largely on the work of the Revolution.

The French Government and the French people recognized the fact that a new order of things had been established. When the appeal was made through General Lavaysse to their former colony, Hayti, which had become a negro kingdom, to return to their former allegiance, the proclamations stated that a profound difference existed between the Government of the Restoration and those of the Ancient Regime and Napoleon's despotism. The wisest and most talented men of France, who had supported the Revolution, were now active in the Monarchy. Among these were Talleyrand-Benevent, Deasole, Dupont, Marmont, and Ney. The basis of the Modern Regime was a free and liberal Constitution granted by their philosopher-king, Louis XVIII. Those who had been active in the government under the Ancient Regime,

such as Rohan , Perigord , Montmorency , supported the Restoration as much as did the modern "Corinthian columns":

Key , Suchet , and others. Anyone who read the Charter and the Acts of Government could see how absurd was the accusation that the Ancient Regime had been restored in France, declared the proclamation issued 6 September 1814. ⁵¹

When Napoleon escaped from Elba and was again acclaimed Emperor by the French people early in March 1815, Alexander concluded that the French Government of Louis XVIII had not been sufficiently liberal. Hence 23 April 1815, he suggested that the duc d'Orleans, a cousin of Louis XVIII., be made King, since he had fought at Valmy in the Revolutionary armies, was a Frenchman and a Bourbon, and was attached to the constitutional cause and the tricolor. ⁵² This plan was rejected as not being feasible. The people seemed to be willing to accept Louis XVIII., but the Allies insisted upon new guarantees from France that would insure her keeping the peace, and the full protection of the rights of the people. The day that the Second Peace of Paris was signed, 20 November 1815, the Allied representatives, Metternich, Castlereagh, Hardenberg, and Capo d'Istria stated that they perceived that the first guarantee of the stability and prosperity of France was the hope that the King would be actuated by enlightened principles and magnanimous sentiments. They further declared that in a state which had been torn by revolutionary movements, force alone could not reproduce calm in the

minds, "confidence in the hearts. and equilibrium in the different parts of the social body." They believed that the King would manifest his attachment to the constitutional laws promulgated under his auspices.

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In defence of the Second Peace of Paris, the Duc de Richelieu told the Chamber of Deputies on 25 November 1815, that the rigorous measures which had been adopted had been forced upon the Allies by the force of public opinion in their countries. This had resulted in the return of most of the art works stolen by the French during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars.

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Since public opinion was more vocable in England than in any other country in Europe, the test as to whether or not popularism was betrayed can be applied with more certainty there than elsewhere. The expectations of the British people had been greatly aroused so the first Treaty of Paris of May 1814 was anxiously anticipated. On the first of March, Thomas Grenville wrote to Lord Grenville that he and other Whigs were wondering if the dejection of the Earl of Liverpool was due to a possible negotiation over the maritime question or the difficulty to gain the Prince Regent's consent to negotiate. He describes the people's expectations in this way:

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"In truth, the newspapers have so much inflamed the public with the belief of our having conquered the world, and of its belonging to us to parcel it out as we wish, that Lord Castlereagh will not find it easy to satisfy the expectations

that the Courier and the Times have taught the people to indulge: this is in some respect a just judgment upon the Ministers, who have tacitly favored this monstrous fallacy in order to make themselves the heroes of this golden age."

Lord Liverpool voiced general public opinion when he said, "no peace with France could be secure or lasting, which did not maintain the honor and independence of that country inviolate," hence it was necessary to strengthen the Bourbons and permit France to retain Avignon, Netherland territories, Landau, and Savoy above 1792 limits.⁵⁶

The great objects of the war had been realized: First, the restoration of Dutch independence; second, the reduction of French power, third, the possession of Malta important; fourth, the restorations of the Bourbons because a satisfactory peace could not be concluded with Bonaparte.⁵⁷

When the actual treaty was known the approbation was almost universal, except for a general disappointment that more had not been accomplished for the abolition of the slave trade. For the British people regarded the question of the abolition of the slave trade the most important measure which was considered during the peace negotiations. One of the chief reasons that Great Britain was willing to make such great colonial sacrifices was to appease British popularism which demanded the general slave trade abolition.

On June 27 1814 Wilberforce presented a petition signed by 38,000 inhabitants of London, lamenting the revival of the

slave trade incident to the French recovery of her African colonies. Twenty-four other petitions from other parts of England were also presented. He made a motion for an address to the Prince Regent on the slave trade, asking that immediate abolition be inserted in peace treaties, and protesting because the preliminary articles had not been given to the House. As a result of the settlement, 500,000 people of St. Domingo would be plunged into unhappiness, and between two and three million Africans would be wrested from their homes.
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During July there were petitions from all over the British Isles praying that the Trade be immediately abolished. On 6 July, the Quakers petitioned; on the 11th Lords Dundas, Erskine, Buckinghamshire and Sidmouth presented a variety of petitions; on the 14th, Lord Stanhope presented a great number, Lord Holland presented several, one with 1700 signatures; Lord Grenville a number, one from the Irish Quakers, and one from Bristol with 12,455 signatures.
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Wilberforce presented petitions throughout the month, one of 14,000 names from Glasgow. Missionary societies petitioned that the Government bring about the abolition of the slave trade.
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This serves to indicate the international subject the people of Great Britain were primarily interested in, for on no other question of foreign policy were petitions made, except that of peace itself.

Were the hopes and expectations of the people of Great Britain betrayed in the settlement of this question?

Lord Castlereagh stated the Government position, that morality could not be taught at the point of the bayonet. The French were not educated against the traffic, but their Government had voluntarily agreed to abolish the slave trade after five years. They could do no more because of public sentiment.⁶² The growth of sentiment against the trade in France was very slow, although Louis XVIII. opposed it.⁶³ When Bonaparte was restored in March, 1815, one of the first acts was to abolish the slave trade in order that he might ingratiate himself with Great Britain. In the meantime, Castlereagh had made great progress at the Congress of Vienna, so that all European nations were committed to immediate abolition except France, Spain, and Portugal, and these nations after a brief term of years.

When Louis XVIII was again restored after Waterloo, he was not permitted by the Allies to restore the slave trade. Castlereagh wrote to Wilberforce 31 July: "I have the gratification of acquainting you that the long desired object is accomplished, and that the present messenger carries to Lord Liverpool the unqualified and total abolition of the slave trade throughout the dominions of France."⁶⁴ When Lord Castlereagh had reported what had been done at the Congress of Vienna relative to this subject on 20 March 1815, Wilberforce expressed satisfaction.⁶⁵ After the receipt of this letter 31 July, he declared that nothing was left to be desired on the subject, and it was the result of the earnest

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efforts of the Prince Regent's ministers.

The treaties of reconstruction embodied not only political and territorial adjustments, and condemnation of the slave trade, but also social, economic, religious, cultural, and general provisions. Minority rights (Jews at Frankfort) amnesties, equal opportunities for different groups were taken care of. Religious liberties were guaranteed in Holland, Belgium, Cracow, and Germany. Feudal survivals were abolished in Saxony, Prussia, Hanover, and Switzerland, the droit d'aubaine terminated, and the mediatization of the petty German knights which had taken place 1803-1807, was confirmed. Only in Spain was there a revival of certain abuses of the Ancient Regime, and these were demanded by the people. An international river regime was established, the Rhine was made a free river; Genoa and Antwerp were declared free ports. Experts were used by the Vienna Congress, diplomatic precedence was regulated, and the attempt made to establish a stable European regime.

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It is frequently alleged that Castlereagh and Metternich, who were prominent in the peace discussions, were reactionary. However, they were actuated by desires for the securing of a just and permanent peace, and progress based upon actual conditions. Castlereagh wrote to Bentinck 7 May 1814, that, "it is impossible not to perceive a great moral change coming on in Europe, and that the principles of freedom are in full operation. The danger is that the transition may

be too sudden to ripen into anything likely to make the world better or happier.⁶⁸

Friedrich Gentz, the director of propaganda for Austria during the Liberation Wars, later the Secretary of the Congress of Vienna, wrote a discriminating evaluation of the work of the Congress, 26 June 1815, to the Hospodars of Moldavia and Wallachia, Caradja and Soutzo. He stated that never had public opinion been so aroused, as it was before the Congress opened. It expected a general reform of the political system of Europe, some guarantees for eternal peace, and finally the return of the golden age. The Congress had for its object the revamping of Europe on a basis that would insure future equilibrium and peace. To carry this out, it had been necessary to arbitrarily dispose of the territories of some of the smaller states.⁶⁹ In spite of jealousies among the Powers which had hampered the work of the Congress, the Final Act had been drawn up, approved and signed 9 June 1815. The Constitution of the German Confederation was not all that it should have been to satisfy the actual and future needs of Europe, due largely to the independent attitude assumed by the South German States. It was full of imperfections, yet possessed the incontestable merit of facilitating the formation of sentiment for a more perfect political constitution.⁷⁰

As to the general European reconstitution, Gentz concluded his letter by expressing the hope that: "If ever the

Great Powers were reunited to work out a political system sufficient to consolidate and maintain the public order in Europe, to prevent the catastrophes which the wars of ambition and conquest prepared for nations, and to assure the rights of each State by universal sanction and measures for general protection,--if ever a comparable task was to be accomplished, the Congress of Vienna, considered as a preparation and precedent, might not be without value...in the reconstruction of a better social edifice."⁷¹

Certain phases of this study have not been fully treated, such as the individual and Coalition peace programs which were consummated by the settlements. Several studies could be made from various phases of these, the Pitt-Novosiltsov negotiations would be a very interesting investigation. Furthermore, the French propaganda has not been treated, as well as only certain forms of propaganda in the other European countries. This study might have been considerably broadened by the study of pamphlets, the press, the pulpit, opera, music and other means of moulding public opinion which have been only partially dealt with.

Further studies could be made not only of other forms of propaganda, but of other forms of liberalism, and its development beyond 1815 as the century of popularism advanced. Further aspects of popularism might be investigated in individual countries, for its nature varied according to the country; or general studies might be made over certain

periods, for its concepts varied as the century proceeded. Liberalism in the early nineteenth century in the social, economic, cultural, and religious lines of civilization might be subjects for further research. These lines could be considered individually, or as they contributed to the civilization of a restricted period of time.

Analogous studies might be made of similar situations where forces of popularism have been mobilized, especially in the case of the World War where peace and security, the rights of small nations, the principle of self-determination, and the slogan of "a war for democracy" or "a war to end war", were used to arouse the peoples as they had been used one hundred years previously.

FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER VII

- 1 De Koch et Schoell X op. cit., pp. 101-102
- 2 Ward and Gooch, Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, I, pp.592-3, and Martens XI op.cit. pp.156-162
- 3 De Koch et Schoell, X, op. cit., pp. 206,207
- 4 Text of treaty of Weliky-Louky, DeKoch et Schoell, X, Appendix, No. 2, pp. 543-544
- 5 Ibid., pp. 545-550. Text of treaty given in Appendix, not printed in full in Martens.
- 6 Martens, Series II, I, op, cit., p. 564
- 7 Ibid., pp. 571-573
- 8 De Koch et Schoell, X, op. cit., pp. 254-255. For secret treaty of Reichenbach, see Webster, Br.Dip., cit. p.6
- 9 Martens, II,I, cit., pp.596-604
- 10 See above, page 176
- 11 Neumann, II, op. cit., pp. 381-385
- 12 De Koch et Schoell, X, op. cit., pp.334-334
- 13 Ibid., pp. 335-337
- 14 Ibid., pp. 337-343
- 15 Ibid., pp. 343-347
- 16 D'Angeberg, I,II, op.cit., and Br. &For. State Papers,II op. cit., pp.228-233
- 17 Webster, For Policy of Castlereagh op. cit., page 306
- 18 The British historian Webster has contributed largely to the clearer understanding of the importance of the Pitt-Novosiltsov negotiations, though his stress has been especially upon the Pitt influence in the formulation of the plan for the reconstruction of Europe.
- 19 Gielgud, op. cit., pp. 42-43
- 20 Ibid., pp. 43-45

- 21 Ibid., pp. 45-46
- 22 Ibid., pp. 47, 48, 51
- 23 Ibid., pp. 49-51
- 24 Webster, Br. Diplomacy op. cit., page 390
- 25 Ibid., pp. 390-391
- 26 Ibid., pp. 391-392
- 27 Webster is inclined to give Pitt the most credit for the plan to reconstruct Europe, worked out in these negotiations between Pitt and Novosiltsov in 1804-1805. He characterizes the Novosiltsov instructions as being vague and theoretical, and states that Pitt is responsible for making the Russian suggestions suitable as a basis of practical procedure. Perhaps his research has not extended fully enough to the Russian sources, that he would realize that while Pitt stated the Russian plan, in more logical concise statements, having abbreviated certain sections, the basic ideas of the two plans were the same.
- 28 Webster. Foreign Policy of Castlereagh op. cit., pp.61,62
- 29 Castlereagh's Correspondence,VIII, p. 355
- 30 Webster. British Diplomacy,op. cit., pp. 19-27
- 31 Ibid., pp. 123-128
- 32 Martens, Recueil, III p. 163
- 33 Melvin, F.E. Nineteenth Century Outlines,
"The work of Reconstitutions," pp. 1,2
- 34 Idem.
- 35 Ranson. Herbert R. The Legend of the Congress of Vienna.
Master's Thesis, University of Kansas, 1926
- 36 Botta, II, op. cit., pp. 352, 353
- 37 Balfour,I, op.cit., pp. 67,68
- 38 Botta, II, op. cit. p. 439
- 39 Strylenski, op. cit., pp. 380,381
- 40 Mazade, op. cit., p. 335

- 41 For Prussian promises see Br. & For. State Papers, II
pp.1057-64
and Annual Register 1815, op.cit., pp.384-387
For petitions of German princes and cities, D'Angeberg.
Congres de Vienne, II, pp. 951-952, 986-987, and
Br. and For. S.P. II, op. cit., pp. 680-684, 812-814
Relative to Wurtemberg, Br. &For. S.P. op.cit., pp.1155-71
Other German States, Br. &For. S.P., III, op.cit., pp.747-51
842-871
- 42 Pallain. Talleyrand, p. 322
- 43 Annual Register, 1814 op. cit., pp.433-434
- 44 Br. & For. State Papers, I,II, op. cit., pp. 925-926
- 45 Annual Register, 1814, op. cit., pp. 435-436
- 46 Bathurst MSS.p pp. 280-281
- 47 Annual Register, 1814 op. cit., 438
- 48 Br. & For. State Papers, I,II, op. cit., pp.925-926
- 49 Ibid., pp. 944-945
- 50 Original version in French: Br. For. S.P., I,II, op. cit.,
pp.955-957. Summary in English: Annual Register, 1814
pp.420-422
- 51 Br. & For. S.P., I,II, op. cit., pp. 1053-55
- 52 Pallain, op. cit., pp.397-413, e.g. p. 402
- 53 Annual Register, 1815, op. cit., pp. 420-422
- 54 D'Angeberg, II, op. cit. pp. 1644-50
- 55 Historical MSS. Commission, Fortescue Papers op.cit., pp.381
382
- 56 Hansard, vol. 28, op. cit., Page 370
- 57 Ibid., p. 372
- 58 Ibid., pp.265-275
- 59 Ibid., p. 655
- 60 Ibid., 699-700
- 61 Ibid., pp. 801-802

- 62 Ibid., pp. 278-287
- 63 Wilberforce, op. cit. pp. 222-223
- 64 Ibid., p. 224
- 65 Hansard, vol. 30, page 305
- 66 Wilberforce, op. cit., p. 224
- 67 Melvin, F.E. Nineteenth Century Outline MSS., I, see
"The Work of Reconstitutions," p. 3
- 68 Castlereagh's Correspondence, X, op. cit., pp.1053-1055
- 69 Prokesch-Osten. Lettres Inedites de Gentz a Caradja...
I, p. 153
- 70 Ibid., p. 168
- 71 Ibid., p. 169

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