De Pradt and Napoleon

by

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Introduction

The problem of this study is to assign to Abbe Dominique Dufour de Pradt his place in the history of the French Revolution and Napoleonic periods. It is impossible to take the estimates of Abbe de Pradt's contemporaries as to his contributions and his relative place of importance because of the conflicting opinions which have been expressed concerning him. It is necessary, then, to trace as accurately and as closely as possible the public career of Pradt in order that present day estimations may be made which, due to their removal in point of time, are more likely to be formed with the proper perspective and to be free from prejudices and jealousies.

An understanding of Pradt is desirable for an adequate understanding of the period in which he lived because he was one of the most stimulating political writers of his time. His pamphlets were very numerous and widely read so that he became an influential factor in the public thought of the times. In this respect he ranked along with such pamphleteers and publicists as Gentz of Austria, d'Ivernois of Switzerland, des Maistre of Savoy, d'Hauterive and Chateaubriand of France.
Pradt must also be taken into account because of his relations to the dominant figure of the period, Napoleon, whom he served in the varying capacities of chief almoner, first chaplain and diplomat, but whom he opposed, in the end, to the extent that he became one of the plotters for his downfall. This study is only a small part of the greater study of the diplomatic aspects of the fall of Napoleon. Pradt is distinguished for having served Napoleon in three of his major projects which, because of their failure, led directly to his ruin, namely, the dethroning of the Bourbons and the establishment of a Bonapartist regime in Spain, the attempt to deprive the Pope of his temporal power and the Russian campaign.

The plan of this study is, first, to investigate Pradt's career previous to his first contacts with Napoleon with a view to determining his original contributions through his writings to public thought. The second part is concerned with Pradt and his work in connection with Napoleon in order that Pradt's responsibility for the success or failure of the projects in which he engaged may be determined. The final part is devoted to Pradt, who, because of Napoleon's growing autocratic and arbitrary attitude toward his diplomats, became the opponent of the very man he served and at the final reckoning did not miss the opportunity to deliver retributive justice.
Chapter I
De Pradt: His Early Career

On 13 April 1759 in the village of Allanche in Auvergne a child was born who was burdened with the name, Dominique Georges Frederic de Riom de Prolhiaec Dufour de Pradt. For every individual and especially for one who was born before the advent of modern democracy there was a preparation which was bound to determine his destiny in life. For De Pradt there was a preparation which led him to give his life to the church, thus allowing him to drop his pretentious name for the simple Abbe de Pradt.

De Pradt's father, Barthelemy Louis Isaac de Riom, baron de Pradt was the son of Charles de Riom, seigneur de Prolhiaec and Marie Francoise Dufour de Pradt. Marie's uncle, colonel of the Camp of Dragons, had donated to her all his property on condition that she and her children should take the name de Pradt. Abbe de Pradt's mother, Madeline de Lastic, was the daughter of Hyacinthe de Lastic de Fournel and Simone de La Rochefoucauld-Langeac. It was Pradt's parentage on his mother's side which influenced him early in life to determine upon an ecclesiastical career.

Abbe de Pradt and his twin brother were the youngest of eight children. His youth was spent in the mountains between the ranges of Cantal and Cesalier in the
village of Allanche. Judging from his later career he must have been an intelligent and prudent child. He had a taste for riding and for arms and it is thought a peculiar disposition for tactics and strategy. But there is, evidently, some confusion, on this point, of Pradt with his twin brother, Dominique Antoine Hector, who received a military education, having entered the military school at Fleche 17 March 1868. Hence it is probable that this disposition for tactics and strategy rightfully belonged to his brother and has been erroneously attributed to the abbe. Georges Frederic de Pradt, at an early age, determined upon an ecclesiastical life, feeling sure of the support of his two uncles, his mother's brother, Dominique de Lastic, bishop of Conserans, and his grandmother's brother Dominique de La Rochefaucauld, then archbishop of Albi.

In 1771 at the age of twelve years De Pradt entered the seminary of Saint Flour to make his secondary studies. He was ordained priest in June, 1783 at the age of twenty-four at which time he went to the Sorbonne for his theological studies, living near Saint Sulpice. Assimilating his studies rapidly and possessing a curious intelligence of all things De Pradt was granted the degree of master of arts in 1784 and that of doctor of theology in 1785.

Dominique de La Rochefaucauld, Pradt's great uncle, in the meantime having become archbishop of Rouen, called
his nephew to him and named him canon and vicar general of the diocese in October 1785. In addition he named him archdeacon of Grand Caux and gave him the rich priory of Daumarie near Bar-le-duc. De Pradt worked diligently at his new occupation spending freely of his physical and mental energies. He read without doubt the writings of philosophers but preserved his Catholic faith intact.

Pradt wrote a number of mandates or pastoral letters which showed a great deal of intelligence and in this way brought himself into public notice. Both he and his uncle, Cardinal La Rochefoucauld were elected as deputies of the clergy of Normandy to the Estates General in 1789. Abbe de Pradt was then thirty years of age and without doubt would soon have been called to a bishopric had it not been for the decided turn of political events in France at this time. When the Estates General met 5 May 1789 De Pradt took the political role which he was to resume from time to time throughout his career. From the outset Pradt opposed the union of his order with the deputies of the Third Estate. When the three orders united in the National Assembly, he voted consistently with the minority, defending the rights of the church, the clergy and royalty. There is little to guide us concerning the part which Pradt played in the proceedings of the Assembly but it is
evident from the proceedings which are reported in the Moniteur that he rarely mounted to the tribune and probably contented himself with occasional interruptions. We have a record of a single motion which Pradt made at the sitting of the Assembly on 19 March 1790. The suppression of religious houses and monasteries being under discussion he proposed that the monks remaining in the cloisters should be allowed the use of moveable properties, ornaments of the cult, on condition that they exhibit them to the municipalities at any time it should be required of them.

On 12 July 1790 the Civil Constitution of the Clergy was voted by which the bishops and priests were reduced in number and were made a civil body, elected by the people, paid by the state and separated from the sovereign control of the Pope. On 27 November the Assembly determined to enforce the acceptance of the Civil Constitution. Every ecclesiastic holding preferment or exercising public functions was required to take an oath of fidelity to the Constitution of France, the terms of which included the measures regarding the Church. The king sanctioned this decree of the Assembly on 26 December but the Pope remained officially silent. On 4 January 1791 the ecclesiastical deputies were summoned to take the prescribed oath. When the Assembly refused to make a formal declaration that it meant no interference with the exclusive
domain of religion, the great majority of the clerical (5)
deputies declined the oath. Pradt was among these
non-juring clergy who constituted about two-thirds of
all the ecclesiasts of France. It was thought for a
while that the constitutional and the non-juring clergy
could get along amicably together and a moderate pension
was granted to the non-jurers. However disorder and
bloodshed followed and the non-juring clergy came to be
regarded as traitors and rebels. The Assembly accord-
ingly passed another decree on 29 November 1791 which
provided that all priests who did not take the oath with-
in a week were to be removed from their benefices by
the Directories of their respective Departments and their
stipends were to be confiscated for the Treasury. (8)
Still Pradt refused to take the oath and was forthwith deprived
of his income and position. Severe persecution followed
which drove most of the non-jurors from France.

Pradt, however, regarded emigration as an act of dis-
loyalty toward France so he remained in the country under
these adverse conditions for nearly a year after the
issuing of the above decree. On 26 August 1792 a law
was passed by the Assembly which provided for the deporta-
tion of all priests who had not taken the oath. (9) It was
just previous to the passage of this regulation that
Pradt, being threatened with forced removal from the
country, decided to emigrate which he did on 16 August 1792.

There is evidence to the effect that Pradt later regretted the course of action which he took at this time. In 1818 when he wrote his treatise, *Les quatre concordats*, he included a chapter on the clergy during the revolution to the time of deportation to the religious restoration. He expressed in them the opinion that the clergy committed a grave error in uniting themselves with the nobility and in emigrating with them. The affairs of the clergy and the nobility were not the same. "This deportation had the disastrous effect of throwing men together who did not have common principles of action. The clergy had nothing in common with those who wanted to take arms against France. The emigration was one of the worst faults that has ever been committed in policy." Then again he wrote, "The clergy who remained in the country are to be highly praised for their services and bravery." From these extracts one can infer that Pradt's regrets arose from the appearance which his emigration gave of disloyalty to France. The more commendable action would have been to have remained in the country and to have worked secretly, though precariously, against the revolutionary forces. The fatal weakness of the clergy he maintained was their division
among themselves, which was only aggravated by requiring the oath to the Civil Constitution.

In a two volume publication of 1824 entitled *La France, l'émigration, et les colons*, Pradt expressed still more emphatically his attitude toward those who emigrated from France. The question before the French people in 1824 was whether or not they would indemnify the emigres for their property which had been confiscated during their absence from the country. Pradt presented a strong argument opposing indemnification in which he regarded the conduct of many of the emigres as criminal. In making his criminal accusations he was careful to distinguish between the different classes of emigrations enumerating five in all: 1. the emigration for the sake of safety and precaution beginning on 17 July 1789; 2. the armed emigration; 3. the new emigration for safety which began after 10 August 1792; 4. the forced emigration; 5. the supposed emigration of men absent from France previous to 1789, in order that their property might be confiscated. He condemned as criminals those who took up arms against France, either with the foreigners or in the civil wars, waged by the campaigns of Champagne and by the attacks lasting ten years from 1790 to 1800. The rights to make war, to call upon foreigners, to cede territory and to engage military chiefs and troops,
according to Pradt, were rights pertaining to sovereignty, and the emigres were not sovereign.

Pradt made a special exception of the priests who had been forced to emigrate and who had lost both their ecclesiastical property and their pensions and yet were making no demands for compensation. In this writing he did not, as formerly, express his regrets concerning deportation although he may still have felt them. On this occasion he merely thought it a good opportunity to draw a distinction between those who emigrated and took up arms against France and emigres like himself who were either deported or threatened with forced removal.

Upon leaving France on 16 August 1792, Pradt went first to Maastricht in Belgium where he found company among men in similar circumstances. When Belgium was invaded by Dumouriez in November 1792 he retired to Westphalia. With the entrance of the Prince of Coburg into Belgium in 1793 after the battle of Neerwinden Pradt returned to Brussels. It was during this stay that he collected the material which he used in his publication of 1820, *La Belgique depuis 1789 jusqu'en 1794*. He became interested in the public affairs of this country and throughout his stay was in close contact with Count Mercy-Argenteau, former Austrian am-
bassador to France. Count Mercy was now charged with secret negotiations between the committee of public safety and the court of Vienna. Pradt was not introduced into the secrets of all this affair but he did learn something of that which was going on. When Belgium was evacuated in 1794 by the Austrians De Pradt took refuge with a band of emigres at Hamburg where he, Rivarol and some others occupied themselves with political publications. Rivarol was also an emigre, who had left France on 10 June 1792. He had first gone to Brussels, then to England and from there to Hamburg where he retired to his drawing room life and started a new dictionary of the French language.

Pradt remained in exile with these associates until 1802 when the Consular government began to show tolerance and when the settlement of the quarrel between the state and the Roman Catholic Church by the Concordat of 1801 became effective. Pradt's reaction to this arrangement at the time it was made is problematic and largely a matter of conjecture. We know that he must have shown himself favorable else he could not have received the almost immediate appointment to a church office. The reaction which is recorded in Les quatres concordats is revealing if one takes into account the lapse of time and the course of relationships between
Napoleon and Pradt from 1802 to 1815. Pradt in 1818 when writing the above mentioned treatise did not refrain from criticizing at length the Concordat of 1801. He said that the ignorance and inadvertence of the negotiators, the habit of mixing the spiritual with the temporal threw Napoleon headlong into the Concordat without suspicioning the outcomes, and prevented him from binding himself to toleration. He erred by not completely separating church and state. 'With the exception of the one (concordat) at Fontainebleau, which was corrected in this respect, none of them were well fitted to the needs of church and state.' In the other hand, we have in this same discussion a statement which at first seemed directly at variance with the former expression of opinion. The religious restoration was at the time a work of genius on the part of Napoleon, Pradt asserted, and how fortunate it was that the number of dissenters was too small to cause any effect. These inconsistencies can be explained by Pradt's change of position in 1818. By the beginning of 1814 Pradt had turned directly against Napoleon and thereafter criticized much to which he had formerly adhered. Then, too, by 1818 Pradt had back of him ten full years of intimate contact with bickerings between the Pope and Napoleon. He had started as early as 1804
advising the Emperor on the conducting of church affairs. In 1811 he had been appointed to two commissions to the Pope, at Savona, for the purpose of revising the arrangement of the Concordat of 1801 which had been totally disregarded with the result that many bishoprics were left vacant in France. These ten years of experience and observation had brought to light many defects in policy so that it was only natural to criticize in 1818 what had appeared to be a stroke of genius in 1802. We can then be comparatively certain that Pradt returned to Paris in 1802 rejoicing over the new arrangement between Napoleon and the Pope and hoping that he might once again take his place in the service of the Church. But two years elapsed before his hopes were realized, which period properly belongs to the discussion of the cultural contributions of Pradt for most of this time was devoted to writing.

A close study of the career of Pradt leads one to believe that he was primarily interested in a life of action and the number of major negotiations of state in which he participated during the rise and fall of Napoleon is really surprising. At times, however, he experienced reverses of political fortune and was forced to drop into the background. Much to his credit, Pradt did not fail to use such times as these to advantage and
invariably turned to writing. Several of his works not only proved to be contributions in themselves but aided in his own rehabilitation.

Pradt began to direct his talents toward writing soon after he had completed his education. While serving as vicar-general of the archbishopric of Rouen, it will be recalled, he wrote a number of mandates and pastoral letters which showed great intelligence. His writings of this nature were interrupted when he was elected to the Estates General. When he again took up his pen his works were permeated with entirely different motives and emotions.

Throughout his sojourn in foreign countries as an emigre Pradt employed his efforts in the interests of public policy in France especially in respect to the counter revolutionary attitude which should be assumed by the other powers of Europe. *L'Antidote au congrès de Rastadt* and *la Prusse et sa neutralité* were both written with this object. As mentioned above during his stay at Hamburg, where he was forced to take refuge in 1794, Pradt occupied himself with Rivarol in some political publications and collaborated in a biography of men of the revolution which was published in 1800. He also contributed articles for a periodical publication,
Spectateur du Nord, on military operations.

The principal work of this period was *l'Antidote au congrès de Rastadt*. Pradt had become much alarmed at the settlements of the Treaty of Campo Formio and the agreements proposed at the Congress of Rastadt. In a secret article of the former Austria promised to help France acquire the Rhine boundary. Austria in return was to get Salzburg and a part of East Bavaria. This treaty was negotiated between France and Austria in 1797.

By the end of that year the troops of the Republic had advanced to the left bank of the Rhine so that by the time the Congress of Rastadt opened on 16 December 1797 France was able to exercise material pressure. This congress was assembled for the purpose of compensating the German princes whose land on the left bank of the Rhine had been appropriated by France. The formal cession of the whole left bank of the Rhine was secured with slight reservations. The territorial indemnification of the dispossessed princes by the secularization of ecclesiastical states on the east bank of the Rhine became the object of considerable intrigue and was not finally settled until July, 1798 at conferences at Selz.

These settlements seemed dangerous and fatal to Pradt because they tended to bring about peace with a revolutionized France and even to accord to her the natural frontier of the Rhine and the Alps. In his hatred
for revolution Pradt did not wish to have peace until such forces had been crushed. He said of them in his poignant phrases that 'the treaties of Basle and Campo Formio and the Congress of Rastadt sanctioned disorder. Modern treaties tended to destroy. The Congress of Rastadt was going to sanction the stripping of the Empire and the increase of France to a degree which would leave no more hope for the liberty of Europe.' Pradt then set up as the purpose of his exposition that of offering an honest plan of policy to replace the one of the Congress of Rastadt. It was in this plan that Pradt gave evidence of his remarkable prophetic sense and forecast not only the settlements of 1814-15 but also sensed the necessity and the inevitable development of our present day League of Nations. He remarked that the revolution had shown him that in addition to the French Republic there was a European Republic. The French Revolution must be considered the enemy of this European Republic. Neutrality was no longer possible. Against this pest there must be an entente of all the powers.

The objective of this entente of powers, in Pradt's estimation, was to set up a new power balance in Europe to overcome the disproportion of France. Pradt then presented a plan which he believed would accomplish this
end. The essence of this plan was the reunion of Belgium with Holland and of Milan with Piedmont, thus placing at either extremity of France a power to act as a counterpoise. Many of the details of this plan which he presented were not fully realized by the territorial settlements of 1814-15 but the essentials were there. Holland and Belgium were united under the House of Orange as he had suggested. Although Milan was not united to Piedmont, the House of Savoy did make some notable gains in territory, namely, Genoa and Capraja Island, and regained Nice, part of Savoy and the protectorate of Monaco, all of which served to strengthen the prestige of that little state on the southern boundary of France.

After presenting his plan Pradt elaborated upon its advantages and gave advice on the political negotiations and the alliances necessary to make it effective. He even presented a plan of campaign to be waged against the revolutionary forces in France and compared the means of the two opposing forces for carrying on war, both as to men and money.

The book, L'Antidote au congrès de Rastadt, ended with a consideration of the colonies of the European powers. Pradt felt that the revolution if given time to strengthen itself, might extend its deadly activities to the colonies. He stated that: "Europe owed to her
colonies the opulence and accomplishments of her modern
life. As to the general state of colonies they "like
children in their infancy have need of maternal vigilance.
In their youth they seek to follow their own will and
desire independence." The authority of the mother
country should experience the same decline as that of
parents. He added that it was England's failure to make
this observation that had caused her to lose her American
colonies. Again Pradt gave evidence of his prophetic
qualities when he recommended the system now actually
employed by Great Britain with her dominions. He also
predicted that the next revolt would be that of the
Spanish colonies and he even announced a successful re-
volt of the natives of English India, which, however,
has not yet been realized.

L'Antidote was printed secretly in Paris and is
reported to have met with prodigious success in all
Europe. It was admired by Mallet du Pan, a contemporary
journalist, and the Journal of Free Men considered it as
'the most remarkable production which the genius of
counter-revolution had imagined.' Its influence was
not immediate but, as we shall see later, Pradt's plan
was considered at the time of the reconstitution of
Holland and Belgium.

This book, L'Antidote au congrès de Rastadt, was
followed by *la Prusse et sa neutralité*, written on much the same principles but which had less success.

Prussia in 1785 by the Treaty of Basel had withdrawn from the first coalition of powers thereby giving France a free hand on the left bank of the Rhine. As noted in the analysis of Pradt's work on the Congress of Rastadt this extension to the Rhine was, in his estimation, a dangerous upsetting of the balance of Europe. To be sure Pradt felt that Prussia was justified in withdrawing from the coalition since the war, contrary to the original objective, had been transformed from one of restoration to one of invasion and conquest. Nevertheless he believed that Prussia could not afford to remain neutral. In fact he felt that there was no such thing as neutrality when war was involved with revolution. It was the duty then of Prussia to furnish a central point, which had heretofore been lacking, for the deliberations of the coalition powers. It was her duty to demand the formation of a congress for "it is only in a congress that one is able to discuss common objects in a manner useful to the community." Pradt had a clear conception of the new policy which ought to be adopted by Prussia in such a congress. This policy should be based on the same principles as the plan which he proposed as an antidote for the Congress of Rastadt, that is, the
maintenance of the equilibrium of Europe by surrounding France with strong rather than weak states. The details were as follows: 1. As an initial step the barrier on the north should consist of the union of Holland and Belgium. The Empire should retain or recover its integrity. Austria should be compensated with Venice.

2. To complete the equilibrium it would be necessary to have a state in Italy which should serve as a barrier to France at the South. This state should be none other than Piedmont which ought to be formed from Lombardy, Genoa and the Duchy of Parma. This ought to form a sufficient base to guard Italy. 3. The third object of Prussia's new policy should be to make an ally of Spain. The military alliance of France with Spain was not only an imposition on France but on all Europe.

After outlining this policy for Prussia Pradt brought up a series of six objections which might be offered to the breaking of Prussian neutrality and refuted them all, to his own satisfaction. The answer to one of these objections is worthy of notice since it shows how advanced Pradt was in his thinking. Pradt did not desire that war should be the aim of the cessation of Prussian neutrality, although he admitted that it was a very probable result. Hence, the objection might be raised that Prussia could not meet the expenses of another war. There was a theory more or less common at the time that the wealth of a
state was measured by the amount of treasure she had stored up in her coffers and Prussia possessed no such treasure. Alexander Hamilton in outlining the national debt policy of the United States had directed the incorporation, by laws, of the device of the sinking fund either disregarding willfully or being ignorant of its fallacies. Pradt realized the economic loss of storing up metals in public coffers. He branded the possession of dead or inactive metals by hoarding as a great evil. 'Sleeping capital', he said, 'lost the advantages and products that circulation would make it bear.'

The latter portion of la Prusse et sa neutralité was interesting from still another standpoint. In considering the forces of strength which Prussia would have to meet in taking up arms against France Pradt did not overlook Napoleon Bonaparte and we have an early reaction of Pradt to the man in whose service he was to be so intimately employed within a few years. 'All government' he asserted 'was in the hands of Bonaparte. He was a man truly apart from the revolution. Up to now the revolution had been without a head; it had been reserved to Bonaparte to make it lose this distinction. It was necessary to analyze his situation and evaluate his influence in the place to which he had had the courage to mount. Bonaparte was more able, more hardy, more
fortunate, more considered than any of his predecessors." Such was Pradt's estimation of Napoleon at the close of the century, a man with a power to be feared and combatted by all the states of Europe not excluding Prussia.

The circumstances at the time of the publication of *la Prusse et sa neutralité* (1800) were much less favorable for the reception of this book than they had been for Pradt's previous work. By 1800 the First Coalition, from which Prussia had withdrawn in 1795, had been dissolved in 1797 by the Treaty of Campo Formio. Napoleon had become master in France and was conducting successful campaigns in northern Italy and southern Germany so that Prussia had sufficient reason for remaining neutral. On the other hand, it has been said, "If these two pamphlets (referring to *l'Antidote au congrès de Rastadt* and *la Prusse et sa neutralité*) did not determine the new coalition which formed then (1799) against the French Republic, at least they served to justify it in a large measure." At least to this writer Pradt's arguments were convincing and well received.

As pointed out in the above discussion Pradt returned to Paris early in 1802 after the agreement between church and state had been reached and the Consular government had begun to show tolerance. He stayed for a long time after reaching Paris in a fourth story room on the rue Canettes not far from the church of Saint-Sulpice.
He devoted his time to writing *Les trois ages des colonies*, ou de leur etat passe, present et a venir, which book was published in 1802. In this writing Pradt again revealed a remarkable ability to predict the future. He prophesied a long series of events which within fifteen years had come true, namely, the independence of San Domingo, the perpetuity of insurrections among the negroes, the successive and forced conquest of colonies by England, the uncontested superiority of the English marine over all those of Europe, the convenience and probability of the removal of the King of Portugal to Brazil, the tendency of the United States to acquire Florida, and the emancipation of Spanish America.

The success and influence of *Les trois ages des colonies* cannot be exactly estimated. Pradt's detractors made their assaults, asserting that the abbe was writing on subjects of which he knew nothing. The first edition of the book was printed by the Michaud printing establishment. In 1846 the younger Michaud in writing of Pradt gave his recollection of the public reception of this book. According to him it "had little success; it was a subject altogether new to Pradt and of slight interest for France. Recognizing himself that a large part of it was borrowed from Raynal, he boasted of having foreseen a great many things that have been realized since;
but one is able to say without exaggeration that the greater part of these predictions were easy and that there was no great merit in making them." (41) Having printed the book, Michaud was probably as good a source as any obtainable for securing data on its success as a seller. However, he was likely prejudiced in his criticism of its content. He was writing in 1846 at a time when people had greatly misprized Pradt, who had died only a few years before, in 1837. To men of those times who did not have the proper perspective Pradt appeared only as a vacillating self-seeking character, who could shift from the Napoleonist faction to the restoration faction, from the monarchist party to the liberal party without the least qualms. It is only recently that his real contributions and his sincerity have again been noticed. It must also be noted that it was the younger Louis-Gabriel Michaud who wrote the criticism and not the elder Joseph Francois who enjoyed a much greater reputation as a writer.

Pradt's next two publications concern entirely different subjects. In 1802 he published in two volumes De l'état de la culture en France et des améliorations dont elle est susceptible and in 1803, Voyage agronomique en Auvergne. The latter was prefaced by some general considerations on agriculture in some of the central departments in France. Pradt felt that, of all
the countries of Europe, France had the most favorable circumstances for the promotion of agriculture and he was trying to encourage its scientific development. De l'état de la culture en France received prominent contemporary notice in the Moniteur of 27 July 1802, where it was reviewed at length by Roussel. The article was mainly a summarization, including incidental criticism. The chapter on the influence of the revolution on agriculture was criticized as being prejudiced. Likewise the idea that France should attempt to produce a great variety of products so as to make herself independent of colonial and foreign productions was criticized as economically unsound. Aside from these remarks the article was very commendatory. It appeared at a time when agriculture was being given particular notice in the columns of the Moniteur and the review for this reason probably attracted considerable public attention. Further than that we cannot judge the influence which the book may have had. We have no evidence of contemporary notice of Voyage agronomique en Auvergne but we do have an indication that interest in the book was more than momentary. However, at least a second edition of it was published in 1828, to which Pradt added a description of the improvements introduced into Auvergne
during the intervening years.

The writing of the first edition of *Voyage agronomique en Auvergne* was the final effort of Pradt during this period from 1792 to 1804 in which he devoted his energy and time to journalistic endeavors. Desiring to return to a life of action Pradt began to seek out every influence he might have in order to gain the attention of the new government and bring himself recognition.
Chapter II
De Pradt and Napoleon

Part I. First Constructive Services (1804-1809)

From now on the narrative, which has thus far centered wholly about De Pradt, must be extended to take in the central figure of the period, Napoleon, since it is for him that Pradt served in various capacities up to within a year of the downfall of the Emperor of France. Either as an ecclesiast or a diplomat he rendered services which were intended, for the most part, to contribute to the execution of certain of the major events of the program of Napoleon. After the Emperor first recognized Pradt by receiving him into his household there were very few intervals during which he was not in intimate contact with Napoleon and he must have exerted some little influence for the Abbe was always fond of expressing his opinions which he formed quite readily on a great variety of subjects. It should be helpful to note that there was at first almost perfect accord between Pradt and Napoleon but that after the first few years there grew up unconsciously a gradual divergence of viewpoints which led them in the end into directly opposing camps.

Pradt's former means of influence for gaining an
ecclesiastical appointment had disappeared by 1803. His uncle Dominique de Lastic had died in 1795 and his great uncle Dominique de la Rochefcaucauld had died in 1800. He was therefore forced to make other points of contact with persons in influential positions. He renewed his friendship with Talleyrand, with Madame La Rochefcaucauld and with General Duroc, who was related to the Lastics and hence to Pradt. Christophe de Michel Duroc had known Napoleon in his youth, had become his aide-de-camp in 1796 and had followed him on his campaign into Egypt. On 8 May 1804 the Emperor in organizing his household had named General Duroc Marshall of the Palace. In this position he was in close contact with Napoleon and was able to gain his ear in the interests of Pradt and to obtain for him an introduction. "Napoleon was charmed with the conversation and the ingenious and profound views of Abbe de Pradt." (1)

At just what time this interview took place could not be determined but it was likely sometime during the year 1803. If so, one could then imagine on what grounds Pradt may have appealed to Napoleon at that time. The Emperor was trying to restore the Catholic religion along the old lines and Pradt, because of his previous position as vicar-general of Rouen, understood as well as anyone the old ecclesiastical
traditions necessary to a complete reestablishment. Then, too, it was very probable, although we have no definite evidence to that effect, that Napoleon's attention had been attracted to the recent publications of the abbe. Does it not seem reasonable that, at the very time at which he was determining to make a complete change in his colonial policy, Napoleon would have been interested in any such publication as *Les trois âges des colonies*? If it did not serve to influence Napoleon's decision to sell Louisiana in April 1803 the views therein were probably welcomed as confirmation of his chosen policy. Whatever the basis of appeal may have been there is no doubt but that Pradt won the desired attention. On 18 May 1804 the Senate voted to make Napoleon Emperor whereupon he proceeded to organize his imperial court. Pradt was now given the recognition he had sought. In sending some orders to Fouche, minister of police, on 1 September 1804 Napoleon included a request that, if Abbe de Pradt were at Paris, Fouche should send him to Aix-la-chapelle and to give him the necessary funds, adding that he would be very glad to see him. (3) Pradt evidently responded immediately to his summons for on 9 September 1804 at Aix-la-chapelle he was named Grand Almoner of Napoleon and was administered the oath by the Emperor himself. (4) This was
an office which first appeared during the reign of Charles VIII and was now revived by Napoleon. The duties of the Grand Almoner were the superintendence of the Chapel Royal and all religious ceremonies of the Court, the directing of the great hospital for the blind (Quinze-Vingts) and the nomination of the regius professors and readers in the College de France.

Holding this most favored position it naturally devolved upon Pradt to act as master of ceremonies for the clergy at the crowning of Napoleon as Emperor of the French on 2 December 1804. For practically every activity in which Pradt engaged he has left an account and in this instance his record is found in Les quatre concordats in a chapter entitled "The Journey of the Pope to Paris". As a rule, one cannot rely upon these accounts for absolute historical correctness especially in this case where the record was made fourteen years after the event. However, the account therein of the results of the Pope's journey to Paris has a value as contemporary opinion and confirms, in many respects, the analysis of the authoritative historian.

Desiring to gain the respect of the French people and of Europe without subordinating his own authority, Napoleon wished to be crowned by the Pope, but he wished that the Pope should come, at his will, to Paris
to perform the ceremony. According to Pradt, a part of the court at Rome was opposed to the journey of the Pope because they thought it injurious to Roman power and dignity. On the contrary, the political faction thought it was a good occasion to reestablish and to fortify Rome and they secured a verbal promise of the Legation in return for the concession the Pope would make by leaving Rome. Hence policy and not religion was the determining factor. The Pope came to Paris and the people everywhere greeted him on their knees. The court of Rome, however, was not at all imposing as compared with that of France and inspired slight consideration on the part of Napoleon. Pradt, there, inserted his generalization that it was rare that a prolonged visit by one court to another added to their mutual affection and that this was the case with the visit of the Pope to Paris. In Pradt's estimation the Pope failed to secure the Legations because the promise was only verbal and because he failed to impress Napoleon with the prestige and importance of the Roman Court. The journey of the Pope to Paris produced only spite and regret of the Pope for having wasted his steps and lost his objectives. The final determination of the Pope to go to Paris is sometimes attributed to an accusation, supposed to
have been made by Napoleon, that Pius VII had written to Vienna for advice. Whereupon the Pope immediately decided to go to Paris to prove his good faith. Pradt, in his analysis, has omitted any mention of this. Otherwise, his account is generally acceptable and the Pope's failure to secure the Legations is generally attributed, as it was by Pradt, to a lack of firmness and a humility on his part.

Because of the dangers of crossing the Alps during the winter months the Pope did not leave Paris on his return to Rome until March 1805. Pradt, in the meantime, was given notable recognition both by him and by the Emperor. By a decree rendered from the Tuileries on 15 December 1804 De Pradt, first almoner of his imperial majesty, was named Bishop of Poitiers. At the same time he was made a baron of the Empire and was given a dotation of 40,000 francs. Besides these favors, on 2 February 1805, the Pope appointed him prelate of Saint Sulpice. Pradt, soon after, went to his diocese but he had not been there long when Napoleon instructed him to go to Milan to aid in the crowning of the Emperor of the French as King of Italy. Napoleon left St. Cloud on 31 March 1805 shortly after the departure of the Pope and reached Lyons and Turin on the same days as the Papal party. Pradt has described
these stops and the welcome given both the Emperor and the Pope in Les quatre concordats so it is likely that by this time he had joined Napoleon, having come from his diocese at Poitiers. He followed the Emperor on to Milan where they arrived on 8 May. Again Pradt officiated for the clergy when, on 26 May 1805, Napoleon was crowned King of Italy by Cardinal Caprara. They made an extended stay in Milan, not leaving until 10 June. Pradt followed Napoleon from there to Genoa where they arrived 30 June. He is reported to have engaged in many long, intimate conversations with the Emperor, discussing the affairs of the clergy. Whether Pradt followed Napoleon any farther than Genoa cannot be determined. He may have gone to Poitiers but it is more likely that he went back to Paris with his monarch since we have evidence at a later date of his being in that city. If so he must have reached Paris about 17 July since that was the date of Napoleon's arrival.

Almost a year elapsed after this supposed return to Paris concerning which there is no available data pertaining to Pradt. Our next piece of information comes from Pradt himself to the effect that he left Napoleon at Paris on 1 June 1806 and did not see him again until April 1808. He does not say where he went but it was probably to his diocese of Poitiers.
because it was from there that Napoleon next called him into his immediate service.

This temporary retirement of Pradt from the active service of Napoleon during the years 1805-1808 can be accounted for by reason of the fact that Napoleon was at that time actively engaged in military campaigns in the East. In September 1805 he started his first offensive campaign against the Austrians which continued through the victory of Austerlitz in December. He returned to Paris in January 1806 and made preparations for his next campaigns against Prussia and Russia which he undertook in September 1806. Having finished with the Prussians by November, Napoleon turned against the Russians with whom he was occupied until the Peace of Tilsit in July 1807. Pradt's abilities were not applicable to the military services in which Napoleon was interested during this period of time so he once more resumed the execution of his duties as Bishop of Poitiers.

Pradt's departure from Paris brings to a close the first period of Pradt's life in the service of Napoleon. The duties required of him during this period were exacted of him as a churchman. In every case he performed them creditably and was amply rewarded.
This first period is furthermore distinguished by the way in which Napoleon, while at home in time of peace, kept Pradt almost continuously near him and engaged him often in intimate conversation. On what subjects they conversed we cannot be certain but it is probably through these contacts that Napoleon became confident that Pradt possessed outstanding abilities which he might find possible to subsequently use to advantage.

Pradt remained in his diocese at Poitiers until the spring of 1808. Again Napoleon felt need of his services, this time not as a churchman but as a diplomat in the negotiations with the Bourbons of Spain, whose family quarrels had reached a crisis. Napoleon had determined to induce both Charles IV and his son, Ferdinand, to come to Bayonne in southern France to submit their differences to him for arbitration, his ulterior purpose being to put an end to the Bourbon monarchy in Spain. Charles IV believing that there was no other way out of his difficulties, since the army and the people were both on the side of Ferdinand, had abdicated on 19 March 1808. A few days later, on the 24 March, Ferdinand made his royal entry to Madrid and was joyfully acclaimed by the people. However, on the previous day Murat, at the head of the French troops which had been pouring into Spain on the pretext
of being necessary to the conquest of Portugal, had entered the city. He complicated matters for Ferdinand by refusing to recognize him as king. With foreign troops in the capital it became evident to Ferdinand that his recognition by Napoleon was necessary to his own continuation. Napoleon had, in the meantime, given indications of an intention to restore Charles IV, who had entered communications with Murat and had secretly retracted his abdication. Both royal claimants were, thus, at the mercy of the French Emperor. Murat and General Savary acted as agents for Napoleon in inducing both Ferdinand and Charles IV to come to Bayonne. Murat informed Ferdinand that Napoleon was coming to see him and suggested that he go to meet him at Burgos. Ferdinand was not favorable to the idea at first so, on 8 April, he decided to send Don Carlos, his brother, in his stead to meet Napoleon. On 9 April Don Carlos departed with Hijar Vallejo, Don Macanaz and the Marquis of Feria in his company. However, due to the persuasions of Savary who had been sent by Napoleon to bring the Prince to Bayonne in spite of his own wishes in the matter, Ferdinand resolved, on 10 April, to go to Burgos and before leaving entrusted the government to his uncle Don Antonio. He was accompanied on his journey by the Duke of Infantado, the Duke of San Carlos, Don
Cevalhos, the priest, Don Escoiquiz, Musquiz and Labrador. General Savary was able to coax Ferdinand on as far as Vitoria where the prince and his party remained for three days while Savary went on to Bayonne, arriving there the day before the Emperor. When Napoleon came the next day he sent Savary back to Vitoria to bring Ferdinand on to Bayonne since it was his desire to treat with him on French soil. Savary did as he was directed and with the aid of Escoiquiz, who advised Ferdinand on all his affairs, persuaded him to go on to Bayonne. Escoiquiz still had a blind faith that Napoleon desired to dethrone Charles IV and establish the young Prince in his stead. Accordingly, the party advanced on to French soil where they were met by imperial guards under the command of Duroc. Between Vidento and Bayonne Ferdinand was met by Don Carlos who told him that Napoleon planned to dethrone the Bourbons but it was too late to turn back. He was escorted into Bayonne on 20 April.

Meanwhile Napoleon on 2 April had departed from Paris announcing that he was going to visit the departments of the South. He passed through Poitiers on his trip down to Bordeaux and Pradt has told us how, on the evening before Napoleon's arrival he received notice to get ready and to follow him on his trip to the South. Pradt did so and followed Napoleon to
Bordeaux where they remained for more than a week, not leaving until 13 April and arriving at Bayonne the next day. The Emperor had had time to get nicely settled in the chateau of Marrac by the time of the arrival of Ferdinand on 20 April. He welcomed the Prince at noon and invited him to dine with him at Marrac. That evening after dinner Napoleon had a long conversation with Escoiquiz, the ambitious canon who was charged by Ferdinand to handle negotiations for him.

This conversation initiated a ten day period of continuous conferences and negotiations during which Napoleon constantly manoeuvered in an effort to induce Ferdinand to voluntarily give up the Spanish throne. It is during this ten day period that Napoleon employed Pradt in the hope that his persuasive abilities might bring results. It is difficult to determine the accurate details concerning all the events of Napoleon's negotiations with Ferdinand previous to his father's arrival. Talleyrand was especially generous in his appraisal when he said that 'all that passed then (at Bayonne) was found described in detail, with exactness and interest, in the work of M. de Pradt; and therefore his object was simply to follow, as a mere thread, the special events of each of the days
that the young princes passed at Bayonne. Pradt in his Memoirs on the Spanish Revolution has given us a full story but he has woven in such voluminous commentaries that it has been difficult to single out what actually took place. His work has been valuable however for supplying details which were lacking in other accounts. These added to the thread of daily events which Talleyrand presented has made a fairly complete story possessing at the same time continuity. Since the memoirs of other men of the time were very brief on these proceedings at Bayonne it has been difficult to check for accuracy.

On 21 April Napoleon granted private audiences to the Duke of San Carlos, the Duke of Infantado and Escorial. At these conferences he told them of his determination to change the dynasty in Spain and offered to Ferdinand, in exchange, the Kingdom of Etruria and one of his nieces in marriage. As to the reaction of these three men to this proposal there seems to be a variation in the accounts of Pradt and Talleyrand. The latter has summarized their reaction saying that they reported their conferences to those in the confidence of Ferdinand and advised accepting Napoleon's proposal. On the other hand, Pradt has recorded that the Spanish were very displeased with Napoleon's plan. According to
him, Napoleon, wishing to repair the shock which the bluntness of his proposal had produced, called Pradt on 24 April and gave him instructions to confer with M. Escoiquiz. Pradt has claimed that he was absolutely ignorant, as was everyone else, of what was at the base of the affair which was being treated between Napoleon and the court of Spain. He said he did not even understand what Napoleon told him, for on this occasion, as when the emperor named him to the Embassy of Warsaw, Napoleon spoke so vaguely, that of all that he said, there remained in Pradt's mind only two things, first that he must see M. Escoiquiz, and second, that he must repair the shock which the imperial agent, Savary, had produced on the Spanish.

The variations in the two accounts can probably be accounted for in this manner. The reaction of which Talleyrand spoke was probably the one immediately following the conferences with Napoleon who undoubtedly presented his proposal in a most tactful manner. Pradt has told us of a lively wrangle which took place between M. Cevalhos and General Savary which greatly displeased the Spaniards. The bitter and repugnant outcomes of this wrangle probably extended to all the members of the Spanish delegation and caused the alteration in opinion of which Pradt spoke and with which
Napoleon wished him to cope.

Napoleon felt that Pradt would be especially suited to conferring with Escoiquiz since they were both priests and would have that common bond of interest. Pradt went to Escoiquiz whom he found all boiling with anger at the treatment of his prince. He then recited to Pradt all the proposals which had been made to Ferdinand concerning Etruria which Pradt insisted were entirely new to him. He said that he could do no more than partake of the sentiments of Escoiquiz portrayed by his ardent narration. After having expressed to Escoiquiz all the grief that this account had caused him to experience he asked him who had advised him to come to Bayonne, and how he intended to work out of the present situation. Escoiquiz frankly admitted his own responsibility for the journey and said he did not know how to find a way out and Pradt sympathetically added "nor did I". He frankly admitted that he was useless in persuading Escoiquiz to accept Etruria in compensation for the Spanish crown. Napoleon, Pradt said, was very anxious to hear the outcome of this conference with Escoiquiz and asked that he give him (26) an immediate account of it. In this account it is probable that Pradt intimated to Napoleon the futility of trying to get Ferdinand to accept his proposal by
means of the procedure being used but it is very unlikely that he reported the sympathies he had felt for Escoiquiz, else, without doubt, he would have been dismissed immediately from the negotiations. Many times a day, Pradt has reported, Napoleon sent to look for him and addressed him to Escoiquiz, from whom he always returned bringing the same harvest: complaints and refusals.

Don Cevalhos, as explained above, had become so adverse to Napoleon's plans that he proposed to the Spanish group that they refuse all verbal communication and that they resort to written notes. Don Infantado and Escoiquiz were appointed to inform Napoleon of this decision to name a formal plenipotentiary. Napoleon had previously had a conference with Cevalhos which proved to be quite a lively wrangle. His words appeared to produce no effect so he willingly agreed to the proposal to turn to formal negotiations and appointed Champagny, his minister of foreign relations, whereas the Spanish corps named Labrador as their agent. The outcomes of this arrangement were just as vain. The two plenipotentiaries had a conference at which Champagny demanded as a preliminary act the cession of the Spanish crown. Labrador replied that he did not have power to comply with the request and the conference
broke up. Before the final breakup Pradt was sent on the same sort of mission to Labrador as formerly to Escoiquiz and experienced the same results. (30)

Not being able to obtain the consent of Ferdinand to exchange his throne for that of Etruria Napoleon determined to use more drastic means to bring about the desired results. He began by questioning the validity of the abdication which Charles IV had retracted at the suggestion of Napoleon's agent, Murat. He thought that by weakening Ferdinand's rights to possession of the crown he might lead him to surrender it. Working through Murat who was still at Madrid he found it easy to induce Charles IV, Maria Louisa and Godoy to come to Bayonne. The Prince of Peace, Godoy, arrived on 26 April and Napoleon had a long conversation with him.

Finally on 29 April the emperor decided to resort to a threat. He called Don Escoiquiz to him and told him that if Ferdinand did not renounce the throne by 11:00 P.M. of that day he would treat with Charles IV who was expected to arrive on the morrow. Escoiquiz went back to the Spanish council with this ultimatum but did not return with a reply until the next day when Napoleon informed him that it was too late. (31)

Charles IV and Maria Louisa arrived at Bayonne about four o'clock on the afternoon of 30 April. (32)
At five o'clock the Emperor made them a visit which lasted for two hours. On 2 May Charles reclaimed the throne from Ferdinand on the grounds that he had been forced to abdicate. As the king and queen dined at the chateau of Marrac the next day Napoleon discussed with them the arrangement which he desired. Charles IV quickly fell into line and on 5 May signed a treaty ceding his rights to the throne to Napoleon. Ferdinand, unaware of this treaty, was warned that it was his duty to renounce the crown in favor of his father. He proposed that he do it at Madrid hoping that by returning again to Spanish soil he might be able to assert his sovereign rights. He was, however, faced with such serious threats that, on 6 May, he rendered back the crown, unreservedly, to his father after several disgraceful family scenes. On 10 May Ferdinand adhered to the treaty signed by his father on 5 May and Napoleon's purpose was accomplished. The Bourbons were removed from the throne of Spain.

Thus far we have taken account of Pradt in the Spanish negotiations in the capacity of a go-between for Napoleon with the task of cajoling the representatives of Ferdinand, especially Escoiquiz and Labrador. The situation in which Pradt found himself on this occasion is typical of the embarrassing positions in
which he invariably found himself during the remainder of his services for Napoleon. As on the occasion of the conference with Escoiquiz, he always went enthusiastically to perform his duty, only to discover before he had finished that he was engaged in a cause diametrically opposed to his own sympathies. Lacking a sincerity of purpose Pradt was unable to succeed in the task assigned to him at Bayonne. However, it is doubtful whether the persuasive powers of anyone, no matter how sincere, could have produced an effect upon Ferdinand. Napoleon fully realized the difficulties of the situation and appreciated to the fullest extent the efforts put forth by the Abbe de Pradt whom he generously rewarded with an ecclesiastical promotion. On 12 May 1808, two days after the completion of negotiations with the Spanish Bourbons, Pradt was named Archbishop of Malines.

The esteem with which Napoleon regarded the services of Pradt at the time of these Spanish negotiations is also made clear by an order issued from Bayonne to Bigot de Preameneu, minister of cults, on 11 May 1808. It was in reply to a request of Bigot for Napoleon to propose to him a means of corresponding with the court of Rome without the intervention of the legation which had just been suppressed. Napoleon, feeling that Pradt's advice on such a question would be more valuable than
his own ordered Bigot to ask "the Bishop of Poitiers to make a memorandum on this question: What means are there of having any communication with the Court of Rome as to what has happened concerning the concordat, that is to say the institution of bishops---?"

This serves as double evidence, first, that Pradt was located at Bayonne at that time and second, that he was being used in confidential communications on church matters.

There still remains one phase of Pradt's services in the negotiations at Bayonne which has not been touched upon. Napoleon, in disposing of the Spanish situation, necessarily had to consider the Spanish colonies in America and the effect which any disposition that he might make of Spain would have upon them. As we have already seen Pradt made a study of colonies and published his treatise on them in 1802. It may be that Napoleon called Pradt into his counsel with the idea that he could give good advice on the colonial aspect of the problem. At any rate, Pradt did offer just such advice.

In his Memoirs Pradt has told how the question of the independence of the Spanish colonies had often occupied him previous to this period. He felt that the moment when this project could be realized had
arrived. He also thought it appropriate to turn the mind of Napoleon toward another object than that of removing the Bourbons to Etruria so he went to him and advised that if he wished Spain he should place great barriers between himself and the Bourbons. He should keep the Old World for himself and have the Bourbons depart on the morrow with the title of Emperor of America and Peru. Napoleon, says Pradt, at first agreed to such a solution but after a few moments of consideration suddenly changed his mind and said that he had two ships in this country (America) and that he must have his part. "The wealth, the immense possibilities of Mexico and Peru were subjects, indeed, appropriate to inflame his imagination." One evening upon returning to his garden at Marrac, after a conference with Charles IV, Maria Louisa, Ferdinand and Godoy, (probably the conference of 5 May) Napoleon asserted that there was among these persons only one man of genius and that was Godoy who wanted to take Charles IV and Maria Louisa to America, (not as sovereigns, of course). "And thereupon he spoke or rather poetized, he ossianized for a long time on the immensities of the thrones of Mexico and Peru, on the grandeur of the sovereigns who would possess them, on the results that these establishments would have for the universe.--In
no circumstance have I seen him develop such wealth of imagination and language. He was sublime." (42)

In short, Pradt's advice on the question of colonies was welcomed if we accept his statement but was not allowed to take root and produce results.

Napoleon and his corps of advisors remained at Bayonne until 21 July 1808. During this interval following 10 May the Spanish Junta had met and drawn up a constitution and Joseph had arrived safely at Madrid. Napoleon then went back to Paris accompanied by his Grand Almoner, Pradt, who said mass for him at noonday (43) when they stopped at Auch on 24 July. They went back to Paris by way of Toulouse, Montauban, and Bordeaux, arriving at their destination on 14 August.

On 22 September 1808 Napoleon departed from Saint Cloud for his trip to Erfurt to see the Tsar, Alexander I. Whether or not the emperor took his first chaplain with him on this trip we do not know. He returned from Erfurt on 18 October and it was not long until he left Paris again for an expedition this time into Spain. Departing on 29 October he took the route through Bordeaux, Bayonne and Vitoria and arrived at Burgos 11 November. Meanwhile Napoleon had sent word for Pradt to join him which he did at Burgos 15 November 1808. From there on to Madrid Pradt followed
closely behind Napoleon and his troops, and was within watching distance of the encounter which took place between the Spanish and the French at Somma-Sierra Pass on 30 November. Napoleon arrived before the city of Madrid on 2 December and forced the city to capitulate on the second day after. Pradt probably entered the city soon after its capitulation and remained there until 15 or 16 January while Napoleon spent his time traveling about reviewing troops and gaining first hand information concerning the situation. It is probable that Napoleon left Pradt in Madrid to observe conditions there in order that he might report them to him. Pradt's notes on his sojourn there are very scant. He evidently associated with churchmen while there and was urged by a venerable Spanish ecclesiast, chief of administration of hospitals of the city, to take to Napoleon an account of their destitution.

After a trip to Benevente Napoleon arrived at Valladolid, 6 January. There he awaited the arrival of a deputation on 16 January, preceding its arrival by about three hours. As soon as Napoleon learned of his presence he called him and questioned him on what was happening at Madrid. Pradt did not disguise the discontent which he found there.
Napoleon was very impatient now to depart for France since he had received news of the arming of Austria and of the intrigues of Fouche and Talleyrand. He mounted a horse the next day, went to Burgos and from there on to Paris without stopping. Pradt returned to France at the same time and began to make preparations to take up his new duties as Archbishop of Malines.
Chapter II

Part II. Later Services (1809-1812)

In order to understand the position of Pradt at the time he went to his diocese of Malines it will be necessary first to understand the relationships which existed in the spring of 1809 between Napoleon and the Pope. The journey of the Pope to Paris, as has been pointed out, resulted in straining the good feelings which had formerly existed between the two sovereigns. In June of 1805 the Code Napoleon was extended to Italy and since the code permitted divorce it was a direct defiance of the authority of the Pope. In November of the same year French troops occupied the papal port of Ancona. The Pope, of course, protested, to which Napoleon replied that he did not wish to appropriate Ancona but that its occupation was necessary for the protection of the Holy See. Further antagonism was aroused in 1806 when Napoleon requested the Pope to recognize Joseph as king of Naples and also to close the ports of Rome to the English, neither of which requests were granted. Finally on 2 February 1808 the French General Miollis occupied the papal states and expelled the Neapolitan cardinals. The Pope's temporal authority was thus openly defied and a serious break between him and Napoleon was then impending.
Hence, it is not surprising that when the Pope delivered the bulls of institution for the new Archbishop of Malines, he omitted the name of Napoleon. Pradt was delegated to the consistory on 27 March 1809 by the Pope and the copies of the bulls were sent to the Minister of (1) Cults at Paris. Since they were not in accord with the requirements of the Concordat of 1801 the title of the mission was not delivered to Pradt. Napoleon had just departed on 13 April to conduct his second campaign in Austria so that Pradt had no means of redress. He had to set out on 15 May for Malines without his bulls of institution. Without them he could not be installed but he announced to the vicars general of the diocese that he was ready to exercise episcopal functions.

This course of action was considered a very serious offense by Napoleon who, during the war of 1809 declared Pradt guilty of high treason for having taken up his duties (2) without his approval. It did not take long, however, for Pradt to prove his loyalty to the Imperial Government. Soon after his arrival in Malines he began to cooperate with the police in chastising the priests suspected of indifference and of lukewarm loyalty to Napoleon. (3) When, by a decree of February 25, 1810, the Gallican Articles of 1682 were applied to all the churches of Belgium, Pradt subscribed to them completely. He also required the head of the professors of the seminar to
sign the Declaration and held the papers at the dis-
position of the procurer-general. He reported certain
of the mayors who were conniving with priests who did
not recognize the Concordat.

This conduct on the part of Pradt was greatly ap-
preciated at Paris. On 7 December 1809 Bigot addressed
a report to Napoleon on the difficulty with the clergy
in Belgium, but he excepted De Pradt. Through just
such reports as this the archbishop was gradually able
to work back into favor with Napoleon.

Pradt does not seem to have been very fond of his
residence in Malines and at the end of 1809 he secured
a leave to go to Paris. In the early part of 1810 he
made himself a candidate for the Senate hoping to have
a better pretext for absence from his diocese, but he
did not succeed in his ambition. During his sojourn
in Paris, Pradt placed himself in intimate communication
with officials of the government and was able to advise
them on the conduct of affairs in Belgium. He communi-
cated to Fouche, minister of police, "his adhesion,
without reserve, to a project which provided for re-
moval by the high police of four ecclesiastics from the
canton of Wavre". When Fouche was succeeded by
General Savary, the latter relied a great deal on the
advice of Pradt on affairs in Belgium. Savary proposed
to divide the priests into four groups, placing one of the groups in the old seminaries of France and putting the others under guard. He revealed in his report to Napoleon that he had consulted Pradt and that Pradt had replied that he not only partook of the sentiments of Savary, but that he thought that public tranquility would be assured only when they had removed from their dioceses a great number of these porturbers. Napoleon in reply to Savary's report ordered him "to arrest these thirty priests and to imprison them at Ham and at Bouillon." Pradt obtained pardons for four priests who were to be treated in this manner. In this we have evidence that Pradt's opinion was not only influencing Savary in his direction of affairs but that Napoleon was accepting his advice and issuing orders accordingly. From the state of having been accused of high treason he had worked entirely back into the confidence of the Emperor.

Pradt was in a sense the director of ecclesiastical affairs in Belgium during the year 1810. Bellmare in his report of the execution of imperial orders in Belgium said that the recognized character of the archbishop of Malines and the conduct that he followed in this circumstance did not allow any suspicion of him. Again he reported to Savary, concerning the cure de Holl, who had ceased to say prayers for the Emperor, that "the Archbishop
of Malines, whom I have consulted on this subject, has been of the opinion that this priest should be punished immediately, in order to prevent the effects and the contagion of his example." Pradt also desired the extension of vigorous measures to the department of Dyle.

Concerning the order of St. Francis in Belgium, Pradt communicated saying that "he did not know how to say enough to His Excellency about the vulgarity of the stubbornness of the members of this family." Such sentiments as these were common among Pradt's friends of the police and of the guard.

Pradt stayed in Paris during the early part of 1810 and must have returned to his diocese about the same time that Napoleon departed with the Empress, Marie Louise, for a trip through Belgium. Incidents which occurred on this trip give us evidence that Pradt held the first position among the clergy of Belgium. Napoleon left Paris on 27 April, 1810 and passing through Compiegne and Cambrai reached Antwerp on 1 May. The next day, for the Emperor's benefit, the Friedland, a vessel of 80 cannon, the first of its kind to be constructed on the banks of the Scheldt, was launched with great ceremony. Pradt played a prominent role in the procedure of the day.

"At 2:45 P.M. (of the 2 May) Their Majesties accompanied by the King and Queen of Westphalia arrived at the arsenal with all of their court. The minister of
the corps and the marine, the vice-admiral Missiessy, commander of the squadron and the Councilor of State, Malonet, former maritime prefect, received Their Majesties on their descent from their carriage, to the sound of music and reiterated discharges from all the vessels anchored before the city. A rich pavilion had been raised on the platform to the extreme right of the moorings. Their Majesties sat there with the King and Queen of Westphalia. The Archbishop of Malines, at the head of his clergy, after having presented them the Holy water, said the benediction of this vessel which, in the meantime had been separated from all its anchors, no longer reposed in its cradle, and held only by the lashings placed in front, began to enter the water by the stern. M. Sane, inspector general of the maritime engineering corps directed all the separations which were executed, with order and perfect precision.... The ropes were cut in an instant by blows of the hatchet and at precisely three o'clock, the vessel launched from her moorings and entered majestically on the floods to the noise and acclamations of the spectators."

Pradt probably followed Napoleon rather closely through Belgium. It is likely that he was present at the three addresses which Napoleon delivered to the clergy of Belgium on various occasions. He addressed
them at Antwerp sometime before his departure on 6 May. On the same day, after his arrival at Breda about three o'clock in the afternoon, he had a turbulent scene with the Catholic clergy who came to greet him. Later in the month while at Leuven he again addressed the clergy in much the same strain as at Antwerp, telling them that he wanted the religion of the Gallican Church. It is likely that Pradt, as head of the clergy in Belgium, arranged for these meetings.

The climax of the whole trip for Pradt and that incident which shows conclusively that he had again gained the favor and confidence of Napoleon occurred at Ostend on 20 May. On that day the Emperor issued a decree naming the Archbishop of Malines an Officer of the Legion of Honor. Shortly after he was named chamberlain and first chaplain of Napoleon. The reconciliation was thus completed and it was not long before Pradt was again taken into the active services of Napoleon, this time being sent on a mission to the Pope at Savona to regulate some discordances of opinion between him and the Emperor.

Thus far we have observed the progress of the quarrel between the Emperor and the Pope up to February of 1808 when General Mollis occupied the Papal states. To understand Pradt's mission to the Pope in 1811 it is necessary to follow through the relationships in the
time intervening. The Pope, finding himself surrounded by French troops sent out protests and forbade the bishops of the Legations which had been seized to take the oath to the Emperor. After his victories in Bavaria in April of 1809, Napoleon replied by issuing two decrees on 17 May divesting the Pope of his temporal power and declaring the papal states a part of the territory of the Empire. All protests failing, the Pope resorted to his final weapon and on 10 June issued the bull of excommunication against the authors, favorers, and executors of the acts of violence against him and the Holy See, not mentioning any names, but of course aiming it at Napoleon. The Emperor then sent instructions to Joseph, king of Naples to arrest the Pope if he preached rebellion. He sent a second note to Murat telling him to use no more leniency, that the Pope was a dangerous fool and must be locked up. On 6 July 1809 the Pope was arrested in the Quirinal and carried off to Savona. Cardinal Pacca, the papal secretary, was taken to Fenestrelle. Napoleon afterwards ordered the cardinals, the generals of the various orders, the Papal court and the archives to be transferred to Paris where he intended to summon the Pope.

Not knowing how to advance any further, Napoleon decided to summon an ecclesiastical commission made up of Fesch, Maury, Emery and others to advise the government on the questions at issue. In its advice it denied
the arbitrary power of the papacy in church affairs and distinguished between the spiritual and the temporal power of the Pope. Since the Concordat was a contract between Pius VII and Napoleon, Pius VII was bound to obey it in spite of the annexation of Rome. The commission demanded the liberty of the Pope, protested certain organic articles and claimed that a general council only under the presidency of the Pope could treat matters of all Christendom.

This advice did not satisfy the Emperor so he dismissed the commission in January 1810. He then undertook to regulate the doctrine of the Church by a Senatus Consultum issued 17 February 1810. It declared the annexation of Rome as a free imperial city, guaranteed the Pope an income of two million francs, declared that spiritual power could not be exercised by a foreign power within the Empire, and that the future Popes, on election, must swear not to contravene the Gallican Articles of 1632 hereby declared common to all the churches of the Empire. These articles established the independence of the French crown of any foreign ecclesiastical power, the fallibility of the Pope in matters of faith, and the superiority of the councils over the papacy as affirmed by the Council of Constance. The Emperor in this way meant to depend upon a council of churches to conquer the resistance of the Pope. In Italy the
bishops and priests refusing to adhere to these articles were to be sent to Corsica.

When the chancery, created by Napoleon, nullified his marriage with Josephine, and approved the one with Marie Louise, Pius VII refused to give his sanction, in consequence of which thirteen cardinals refused to attend the ecclesiastical ceremony. Napoleon transported these cardinals to various provincial towns and made them dependent upon charity. They were also deprived of their official robes and were thereafter known as the black cardinals. Pius would not consent to the investiture of any bishops appointed according to the terms of the Concordat nor would he make any concessions until his liberty was granted. Napoleon deprived him of all his advisors and toward the end of 1810 deprived him of all means of communication by letters.

Early in 1811 Napoleon again began to feel the need of advice on church affairs and Pradt as usual was looked to for counsel. On 5 January 1811, Napoleon, wishing to sound out a few bishops before the meeting of the national council, instructed Count Bigot de Preameneu to address to them a series of four questions for their response. Pradt was among the seven bishops who were (24) interrogated. Their opinions were asked as to whether the Pope had a right to excommunicate sovereigns and
their ministers for temporal objects, as to what means should be used for instituting bishops in case the Pope violated the Concordat, and as to other matters requiring a technical knowledge of church history.

Napoleon sought further advice from an ecclesiastical commission, similar to the commission of 1809, which he summoned in January of 1811. To this body he appointed Cardinals Fesch, Maury, Caselli; the Archbishop of Tours and Malines; the bishop of Nantes, Treves, Evreux, and (25) Abbe Emery. There was a slight variation in the personnel of this commission as recorded by Talleyrand in his Memoirs and the above personnel which was recorded by Pradt. Talleyrand omitted the name of the Archbishop of Malines and included the Bishop of Ghent. It is much more likely that Pradt's account was the more accurate account. Talleyrand had by this time fallen out of favor with Napoleon and had been dismissed from all official connection with the Imperial government so that his knowledge of affairs at this time had to be gathered indirectly. On the other hand, Pradt was being confidentially consulted at this time as we have seen by the questionnaire sent out by Napoleon. Furthermore, the subjects treated in the questionnaire were very similar to those discussed by the commission and it is likely that Pradt, being included in the former, was
called to the latter for consultation. It is obvious that Pradt's knowledge of affairs was gained much more directly than was that of Talleyrand. We must therefore accord the Archbishop of Malines his share of the credit which is due this commission for influencing and shaping Napoleon's ecclesiastical policy.

The principal objects of the commission summoned by Napoleon were to prevent the interdiction of communications with the Pope, to propose a new means of canonical institution, to return the Pope to liberty and to end the afflicting dissensions. Meetings were held until the end of March and the conclusion reached was that diocesan bishops were capable of granting dispensations. It suggested, if the Pope refused to institute bishops, that they should return to the Pragmatic Sanction of 1438 and it advocated a National Council of Churches rather than a General Roman Catholic council.

Napoleon then decided to summon a national council but before doing so he wished to make a final effort to gain the Pope's sanction of the Senatus Consultum of 17 February 1810. In April 1811, he sent one Italian bishop and three French bishops to Savona to announce to the Pope that a National Council was being convened on 9 June, and to expose to him the measures that the Church of France would be likely to take in accordance
with former precedents. They were to inform him that Napoleon would consent to maintaining the Concordat of 1801, providing the Pope would confirm the bishops already nominated and would agree in the future that the confirmations should be made by the archbishops in case he should not have confirmed them in three months. The Pope might return to Rome as head of the Catholic religion in case he should consent to the proposed modifications in the Concordat; he was to be offered two million francs a year and all was to be on condition that he promise to do nothing contrary to the Articles of 1682.

This deputation, sent with the understanding that it return before the opening of the council, arrived at Savona on 9 May. The Pope announced the impossibility of giving bulls or of performing any other functions without counsel and the necessary material for these acts. He said he would welcome conciliation as soon as he should be given his liberty. Negotiations continued for ten days and on 19 May the Pope finally gave his consent to the following propositions:

1. That he would accord canonical institution of bishops and archbishops nominated by the Emperor in the form agreed upon in the Concordats with France and Italy.

2. That he would extend the same conditions in Concordats with Tuscany, Parma and Pleisance.
3. That archbishops should give confirmation after six months unless the candidate be unworthy.

4. That he earnestly hoped for the restoration of liberty, independence and dignity to the Holy See and peace to the Church.

Although the Pope consented to these propositions, he did not give his formal signature so that the agreement was not at all definitive. However, he graciously accorded all that was asked of him except that he changed the three month period for confirmation to six months. He did not object to the convening of the Council; he consented to sign the first article of the four propositions of the clergy of 1682 and opposed the others only because of objections to form which would be easy to correct; he renounced all hope of returning to Rome and he did not insist on the bull of excommunication of Napoleon. The bishops returned to France convinced that if the Pope were given more liberty and good advice he might be persuaded to make further concessions.

The National Council of Churches was called for 9 June in the Cathedral of Notre Dame at Paris but because of the baptism of the King of Rome it did not open until 17 June. The chief object of the Council was to regularize the mode of canonical institution. There were over one hundred bishops present from France, Italy and
Germany. Scarcely had the council convened than Na-
poleon discovered that its temper was very much dif-
ferent than he had anticipated. He had counted strongly
on the attachment of the clergy but he found that they
were very much devoted to Pius VII. Pradt has attributed
Napoleon's failure to secure the support of the clergy
to his absolute silence on the affairs of the Church.
He suggested and it seems very probable, that if Napoleon
had preceded the calling of the Council by the successive
publication of the acts of the Pope, of his own and of
those of the commission which had secured such desirable
results he might have quieted much of the ferment aroused
by the captivity of the Pope. The attitude of the clergy
was soon made known to Napoleon by the oath of fidelity
which they took to Pius VII. On 5 July the Council de-
clared that nothing could be done unless the Pope had
given his consent to the convocation of such a body and
appointed a commission to learn of his intentions. Na-
poleon sent a message saying that the Pope had agreed to
the Emperor's demands but the message was dubiously ac-
cepted. On the night of the 9th or 10th May the com-
mission, delegated by the Council to investigate, reported
that the Council was incompetent to rule on the adoption
of the mode of institution. This was equivalent to the
dissolution of the Council since its purpose for meeting
was ruled out.

Napoleon, very much angered, ordered the Council to be dismissed and imprisoned three of the most prominent leaders at Vincennes, the bishops of Ghent, Troyes, and Tournai. He then summoned individually those members of the Council remaining in Paris and during the two succeeding weeks, with the support of the Minister of Public Worship and the Minister of Police, he converted these prelates to his own point of view and received their approbation of a decree which he was going to propose. On 5 August he called the Council for the second time in order that the decree might be sent to the Pope in its name. This time approval was given to Napoleon's propositions:

1. That the Council was competent to rule on the institution of bishops in case of necessity.

2. That archbishoprics and bishoprics were not to remain vacant for more than a year, during which time nomination, confirmation and consecration ought to take place.

3. That nomination should be by the Emperor and canonical confirmation by the Pope for the vacant sees, in accordance with the Concordats.

4. That the Pope should give confirmation within six months.
5. That six months having expired, confirmation should be given by the archbishop or the eldest bishop in the province.

6. That the present decree should be submitted to the approbation of the Pope and to this effect the Emperor was beseeched to permit a deputation of six bishops to go to His Holiness to beseech him to confirm the decree which alone could put an end to the misfortunes of the churches of France and Italy.

It was through this latter provision that Pradt again came into prominence in the course of these negotiations with the Pope. On 19 August the eighty-five bishops of the second council signed a letter to the Pope in which they asked him to confirm the decree. They then named nine deputies to carry it to him at Savona: the archbishops of Malines, Pavia and Tours; the bishops of Evreux, Nantes, Treves, Flaisance, Faenza and Foltrco. The Pope had claimed to the first deputation that his motive for refusing to grant the bulls was that he had been deprived of all council, so, to remove this complaint, five cardinals were sent to him, Bayanne, Ruffo, Roverello, Dagnani, Doria and the Archbishop of Edessa, chaplain of the Pope.

This deputation presented the appearance of being sent by the Council but it was actually chosen and
instructed by Napoleon. On 16 August he communicated a note to Bigot, minister of public worship, in which he gave the composition of the group to be sent to Savona. In this communication he mentioned only six persons, the archbishops of Malines, Tours; the bishops of Nantes, Feltre, Plaisance and the patriarch of Venice. He ordered Bigot to call them together to discuss these questions:

"1. How the Pope ought to give his approbation to the decree of the Council.

"2. That the decree of the Council takes in all the bishops of the Empire, even the Bishop of Rome."

He told him to have a conference that same day and to present to the Emperor on the basis of this discussion a project of instructions to the deputation, in order that it might depart not later than the 13 August.

In a letter of the next day, 17 August, Napoleon instructed Bigot to call the deputies for Savona together to give them their instructions. He said he desired that if the Pope approved the decree of the Council they should remain at Savona to serve as a council in later affairs and arrangements. If the Pope refused his approval, they were to return to Paris. From this note we can see that Napoleon did not choose this delegation merely as messengers to the Pope bearing the decree
but he chose them as diplomatic agents who should remain in the service until the final peace with the Church should be attained. It is significant that Pradt who had previously been used in diplomatic negotiations with Spain should again be called into the services of Napoleon as an envoy to the Pope.

In a supplementary note Napoleon instructed Bigot to increase the size of the deputation to nine bishops instead of six in order to give it a more solemn appearance. The bishops of Treves, Paris and Evreux were to be added to the six original appointees.

The deputies arrived in Savona toward the end of August and conferences with the Pope were commenced on 1 September. In order to understand the outcomes of the negotiations it is first necessary to take into account the instructions given by Napoleon. The deputies were to secure the unreserved approval of the Pope of the decree, which was to extend to all the bishops of the Empire. No reservations by the Pope were to be accepted except for the bishopric of Rome. The concordat was declared null and void. As soon as the Pope should approve the decree the deputies were to come to an understanding as to the boundaries of Rome which was not to consist of more than 100,000 souls.

By 20 September all the difficulties had been settled and the Pope agreed to the six articles of the
decree. He inserted them in a brief of that date which he addressed to the bishops 'with expressions full of paternal tenderness and without the least retraction. He recalled in the preamble, with touching gratitude, that God had permitted that, with the consent of his very dear son, Napoleon I, Emperor of the French and King of Italy, four bishops should come to visit him and to pray him to provide for the churches of France and Italy....He spoke of the affection with which he had received them, and with real joy of the manner in which they had reported his views and his intentions. He announced that after a new authorization from his very dear son Napoleon I....five cardinals and the archbishop, his chaplain, had returned to him, and that eight deputies (Feltre died on the way), while informing him that a general assembly of the clergy had been held at Paris, 5 August, had delivered to him a letter which related what had passed in this assembly, and which was signed by a large number of cardinals, archbishops and bishops, and that finally they had begged of him, in suitable terms to approve anew the five articles he had previously approved.

'The pope after having heard the five cardinals and his chaplain, the Archbishop of Edessa, confirmed all the acts they presented to him. He added, only in
brief, that the archbishops or the oldest bishops, when they should have to proceed with the confirmation, should give the customary information, exact the profession of faith, and confirm in the name of the sovereign Pontiff, and that they should transmit to him the authentic papers stating that these formalities had been faithfully accomplished.

The deputy bishops returned this brief to Napoleon feeling that they had achieved a great victory but he refused to accept it. He said that it savored of the language of the Gregories and the Bonifaces and it did not explicitly extend the French method of appointing bishops to the papal state. He was offended at the felicitations and praises that the Pope addressed to the bishops for their conduct and sentiments. On reading a phrase which testified that the bishops had shown, as was proper, toward him and toward the Roman Church, which is the mother and the mistress of all the other churches, a true obedience Napoleon could not control himself any longer. He was offended at the words mistress and obedience. He further criticized the brief for lack of mention of the Council and because it fell short of the prescribed instructions.

Pradt has defended the action of the deputation in accepting the brief on the grounds that the instructions
touched so many points that prudence prompted them to avoid. They considered themselves fortunate to secure the reinstatement of the Concordat and the granting of the bulls. They estimated that further questions on the episcopal seats of Rome and the states of the Pope and on the new sojourn of the pope, should be decided between the Pope and Napoleon. 

Without any public notice it was spread abroad that negotiations had been broken off with the Pope. The bishops were not called together to be informed of this but the news was sent to them in their dioceses telling them that, by fault of the Pope, negotiations had been broken off.

On 30 September Napoleon instructed Bigot to order the bishop deputies at Savona to return bringing with them the institution of all the bishops named in the vacant seats. He desired that they be in Paris upon his arrival in order that he might give them instructions on their next duties. Pradt, in the meantime, before the Pope had been informed of Napoleon's scorn for his brief, secured from the Pontiff a correction in his own bulls for Malines on which Napoleon's name had been omitted and also secured the delivery of bulls to the nominated bishops of Poitiers, Saint-Flour, d'Asti and Liege. The Pope did this with gracious compliance as
though all controversy were at an end. (44)

For some reason which is difficult to explain Napoleon revoked this first order for the return of the bishops from Savona. It may be that he still had in mind a general arrangement of the affairs of the church and the Pope and thought that this deputation would be useful. He also refused to make use of the bulls which were given to Pradt at this time. (45)

The winter of 1811-12 passed without any marked changes in the religious order. In the spring the bishops, without further orders from Napoleon began to leave Savona and return to Paris. Pius VII was again reduced to captivity and in May 1812, to prevent the British from carrying him off, he was removed to Fontainebleau where he arrived on 19 June. The next negotiations with the Pope, Napoleon undertook in person.

Again Pradt had conscientiously undertaken to perform the services required of him by Napoleon only to find that, at best, his efforts had only served to place him in an embarrassing position. Thier has remarked that "it was not in our opinion the character of the negotiators but the impossibility of the success of the mission which led to the check of the archbishop." (46)

Napoleon by this time probably had in view the arrangement for complete separation of church and state which
he finally effected in the Concordat of 1813 and he would have been ready to find fault with any arrangement which might have been made on the basis of the decree of 5 August, 1811.

Napoleon continued to withhold his approval of Pradt's bulls of institution and he had to return to his diocese in the role of administering archbishop, in fact, but subordinated in right to the vicars general.
Chapter II

Part III. Pradt, Ambassador to Warsaw

Pradt was not forced to remain in this unfortunate position in the archbishopric of Malines for very long. On the eve of the Russian campaign Napoleon again determined that he could make use of Pradt's abilities and appointed him this time to a newly created and important position in his diplomatic service, ambassador to the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. To accept a position in the department of state of the Empire in 1812 meant taking one's place in an excellently organized system. Napoleon had devoted a great deal of attention to the reorganization of his ministerial departments in an attempt to make them more efficient. The department of Exterior Relations was at this time under the direction of the Duke of Bassano. His duties were the preservation and execution of all treaties and conventions, political and commercial, and correspondence with the ambassadors, ministers, diplomatic and commercial agents, both of foreign powers to the Emperor of France and of the Emperor of France to foreign governments.

For the purpose of carrying on these functions (1) the service was organized into divisions: a political division of the North, headed by Besnardiere, for
keeping up the political correspondence of England, Holland, the Confederation of the Rhine, the courts of Vienna and Berlin, Denmark, Sweden and Russia; a political division of the South, headed by Roux, for keeping up the political correspondence with Spain, Portugal, Switzerland, the courts of the Italian states, the Ottoman Porte, the States of Persia and the United States; a division of commercial relations, headed by Donmarck, to handle such relations in Europe, America, the Levant and the Barbary states, to settle controversies over prizes, to legalize documents presented to the department, and to issue passports and information; a division of archives, under the direction of d'Hauterive with the title of Councillor of State to take care of the collection of treaties, manifestos, declarations, conventions, political and commercial regulations, correspondence, memoirs, manuscripts, books and geographic charts, to look after the demarcation of boundaries, the furnishing of information for the work of the other divisions and the research necessary for making certificates; a division of foundations and accounts headed by Bresson for the financing of the ministry, for the correspondence with the political and diplomatic agents on accounts; for dividing the funds and for the deposit of laws and imperial decrees.

This organized department of foreign relations
operating at home in 1812, maintained ambassadors, ministers, residents or charge d'affaires in twenty-two foreign countries. The ambassadors sent to three countries were: Otto to Austria, Caillard to Spain, and Lauriston to Russia. The ministers sent to fifteen countries were: Durand to the Two Sicilies, Hedonville to the Grand Duchy of Frankfort, Mercy Serra to Saxony, Reinhard to Westphalia, Nicolay to Baden, Vandeul to Hesse-Darmstadt, Semonville to Wurzburg, St.-Aignan to Saxony, Alquier to Denmark, Serurier to the United States, Asinari de Saint Marsan to Prussia, Sabathier de Cabre to Sweden, and Augusto Talleyrand to Switzerland. The residents sent to two countries were: Bignon to Warsaw and Lamoussaye to Danzig. The charge d'affaires sent to two countries were: Dosaugiers to Mechlenburg and Maubourg to the Sublime Porte. These were the appointments as they stood at the beginning of 1812. Some changes were made throughout the year.

The impression is somewhat prevalent that Napoleon's diplomatic service greatly deteriorated toward the end of his reign. It is claimed that he grew more and more arbitrary and desired only "passive obedience" from his ministers and consequently appointed only supple and (3) docile men as his servants. This impression is not only prevalent at present but it also existed
contemporaneously. Count Senfft, who was secretary of state and foreign affairs of Saxony in 1812, in a conversation with Pradt at the time he accepted his appointment of ambassador to Warsaw remarked to him "that the position of ambassador for Napoleon had become very easy for it was nothing more than the role of a courtier." (4)

It is probably true that Napoleon grew more arbitrary in the latter years of his rule and it may be that he intended to appoint men who would be servile in their obedience to him but the evidence shows that if this was his intention he did not succeed in accomplishing the desired results. Several of the men in his service were not only outstanding for their accomplishments but for the fearless manner in which they offered advice to Napoleon. Prominent in this respect among the men of the foreign service was d'Hauterive whom we have already taken into account as Councillor of State and chief of the foreign office archives. D'Hauterive often incurred the wrath of Napoleon with the advice which he offered but this did not intimidate him. He worked constantly in the foreign office archives and gained an historical background which enabled him to offer really valuable advice. As an example of his boldness, in 1811 he warned Napoleon that "England was a kind of universal power, that she ranked above
all at present and that her efforts, the success of her industry, the aim and tendency of her enterprises, finally the menacing action of her influence ought to be the constant object of the solicitude of all governments and of the vigilance of their ministers. D'Hauterive offered valuable information concerning the proper diplomatic usage to both Napoleon and to Maret, Duke of Bassano. In 1811 when a conflict arose between Austria and France over diplomatic immunities d'Hauterive gathered together some of "the arguments which he had used in many of his conversations to curb the ardor of Napoleon who wished to govern the world with canon, with imperial decrees and police." He had a single copy of them printed and placed on the desk of Napoleon the morning that the argument over immunities was to take place. These were enough to convince Napoleon of the errors of his contentions. "D'Hauterive established the true principles of the science of diplomacy."

Another prominent member of Napoleon's diplomatic service was Caulincourt, ambassador to Russia. He solicited his own recall in 1811 and was replaced by General Lauriston but remained in Russia until the end of 1812 when he returned to France with Napoleon. It may be said of Caulincourt that he was obedient but was not servile in his attitude toward Napoleon.
Mentor in writing the life of d'Hauterive gave an interesting example of the way in which he carried out his instructions in letter but not in spirit. Napoleon wished to attack Russia but he wanted to keep the Russians ignorant of his intent. He ordered instructions to be sent to Caulincourt to inform the Czar that the feeling of the government of France had never been more peaceful and that her troops had not been increased. Caulincourt did so and the Czar responded that this was contrary to all his information but he said "if you tell me Monsieur Caulincourt, that you believe it, in turn I will begin to believe it." Caulincourt retired, saying nothing. (10)

It may be that Napoleon was attempting to find "the best servant of his own thoughts" (11) when he appointed Pradt ambassador to Warsaw, but if Pradt over was such a faithful servant it will be seen from the following investigation of his services at Warsaw that he must have proved a keen disappointment to Napoleon in this respect. Early in May Pradt was informed of the new position to which he was delegated and on 10 May, the day after Napoleon left Paris for the eastern campaign, Pradt started on his way to Dresden where he had been told to go to get his instructions. He arrived there 17 May but it was not until the 24th that Napoleon
called Pradt and explained to him the mission to Poland upon which he was being sent.

In order to understand the purpose and task of this mission it is necessary to examine the position of Poland at this time. This Duchy owed its existence to the Peace of Tilsit of 1807 and to that of Vienna of 1809. By article 13 of the Treaty of Tilsit Prussia renounced all her provinces of Polish origin except Ermeland. The Austro-Polish provinces were gained in 1809. The rule over this newly established Duchy was conferred by Napoleon upon the King of Saxony and article 5 of the Treaty of Tilsit provided for rule by a constitution which was approved by Napoleon on 22 July 1807.

Napoleon in 1812 when on the point of engaging in war with Russia had admitted that one of the natural consequences of the war would be the reestablishment of Poland. Baron Fain, one of Napoleon's private secretaries has told how Napoleon explained to his ministers that the reestablishment of Poland had always appeared desirable to him for all the powers of the East. "Its reestablishment should not be the motive for a war but it could become the result of one." Napoleon, then, had no real intention of striking a blow for Poland. What he did intend to do was to excite Polish patriotic
emotions by means of which he hoped to obtain men and money for his greater purpose of subduing Russia. With this object he resolved to send some rather imposing person to Warsaw with the title of ambassador which would be equivalent to a declaration that he regarded the Grand Duchy of Warsaw as a new state capable of resuming the position of the ancient Kingdom of Poland. This person was to urge the Poles to confederate, to rise en masse, to form a general diet, and to triple the army of Prince Poniatowski. He was also to forestall the fulfillment of the rumor which ran abroad that Emperor Alexander was going to declare himself King of Poland. Napoleon began to feel that he could not delay any longer in sending an ambassador to Warsaw. He wished to have there a reliable man, who with the aid of a pretentious state house, with a large following, and with a well established reputation should dominate the Polish insurrection.

For this mission Napoleon at first selected Talleyrand "and the selection was a good one, for in addition to great personal qualities, which rendered him peculiarly fitted for such a mission, he was at this moment the confident even to infidelity of the court of Vienna, and he would therefore be able to cause less disquiet
than any other to this court in the pursuit of his delicate mission." But it was on these very grounds that Napoleon began to distrust him and so cast about for a new appointee. Through the influence of Duroc, who had previously interceded for his protege, Napoleon's choice fell upon the Archbishop of Malines. The main reason for Napoleon's choice in this instance was "that he had persuaded himself that the ecclesiastical dignity of Pradt would be a preservative which, while placing him outside of all rivalries, would assure him an ascendency less contested and consequently more useful." He also felt that an ambassador of his rank in the ecclesiastical hierarchy would be better able to dominate the generals, the ministers, and the nobles of the country than would a general officer. To this avowed motive one is also able to add that "the Emperor did not fail, on occasions which presented themselves, to bring back the customs of the old monarchy. More than one time ancient France had had prelates for ambassadors at Warsaw, notably Montluc, bishop of Valence, and Gilles of Moailles, abbe de Lille, under Charles IX, and abbe Polignac, later cardinal, under Louis XIV." As Bignon, Pradt's predecessor at Warsaw, suggests, the Emperor had also seen Pradt carry out his wishes in the negotiations at Bayonne. He "possessed a facility of elocution,
so remarkable on all subjects that he was even able to make the Emperor listen to him." All of these things combined, contributed to the appointment of Pradt.

In his interview with Pradt at Dresden on 24 May, Napoleon ordered him to go immediately to his post. The Emperor condensed all instructions by initiating him into his own views. "If I enter Russia, he said to him, I will go perhaps as far as Moscow. One or two battles will open the road for me. Moscow is the true capital of the empire. Having arrived there I ought to find peace. I think one campaign will suffice; but if the war draws out in length, it will be for the Poles to do the rest. I will allow them 50,000 French and a subsidy of fifty millims to aid them. Such is my plan. There are your instructions: act accordingly; your first care ought to be to arouse a great impulse; it is necessary then that this movement should be sustained by the most obstinate efforts, and I count on you to direct the seal and the good will of those brave people."

Napoleon instructed Pradt to seek more detailed instructions from Maret, duke of Bassano, who was Minister of Exterior Relations. Pradt then sought an interview with Maret and after waiting a long while finally received instructions of which he later complained on account of their brevity and lack of precision.
However, there is little sympathy for Pradt in this complaint for, after his arrival at Warsaw, he was sent a set of complete and definite instructions which had been dictated to the Duke of Bassano by Napoleon on 28 May. Through an examination of these instructions we can see exactly what was required of Pradt and will then have a basis for judging the success of his mission. Pradt was sent nominally as ambassador to the Duchy but practically to direct its government and to lead the Poles to take steps toward asserting their own independence. This dominating leadership was made possible by a recent decree of the King of Saxony by which he created a special sort of government for Warsaw and conferred on it extraordinary powers for all that pertained to administration. The eighth article of the constitution of 1807 had created a council of ministers with a president named by the king from within the members of the ministry. Affairs were discussed in this council and then presented to the King for his approbation. By the decree of May 1812 the scope and attributes of the council were extended in cases of urgency to powers attributed by the constitutional statute to the king himself. The extent of the influence which Pradt might exert was thereby effectually increased.
Pradt's first duty according to his instructions was to see that the resources of the country were employed for the use of the army. Particular attention and zeal was to be given to the organization, recruiting, completing, arming and equipping of all the services of the army and for this purpose the ambassador was to enter the details of administration, securing prompt execution of the demands of military authorities.

Pradt's next duty was to take steps toward the restoration of Poland as a nation and the reunion of all its parts. He should first direct the council of ministers to call a diet to meet at Warsaw on the 10th or 15th of June. It was desired that a special committee should make a long report on the misfortunes of Poland and the hopes of the rebirth of the country; that following this report the right to confederate for the safety of the country ought to be proclaimed and a decree ought to be proposed declaring the reestablishment of Poland and the constitution of a Diet of Confederation. The report should be European and Polish in tone but directed entirely against Russia without recriminations against Austria and Prussia. The central confederation, organized at Warsaw, ought to form committees in the different Palatinates which should make in their turn some proclamations and all these acts
ought to be printed and distributed not only in the Duchy but in all the provinces of Polish Russia so as to excite the whole nation to insurrection in case of Russian invasion. Throughout all of these movements the ambassador was not to be seen but he was to exercise "not only a grave influence, but real authority; to see all, to know all, to direct all, to animate all." When the confederation should have been formed it was to send a deputation to the Emperor to present the act of confederation and to ask his protection. Napoleon indicated in advance what his response to the delegation which should be sent to him would be.

The ambassador was especially recommended to further develop the military information service which was established by his predecessor, Bignon, and upon which Napoleon had based the plans for his campaign. Bignon was to be consulted for local information.

What may have been Pradt's reaction to these instructions at the time of their issuance one cannot be certain, but it was probably similar to though somewhat milder than his opinion as stated in his history of the Embassy to Warsaw written in 1813. "They were a complete discourse on clubism," he said. "It was only a matter of employing the revolutionary methods in use among the
perturbers of the human race: addresses, petitions and publications made in order to keep their spirits in continual fermentation." Pradt always had opposed himself to revolutionary methods especially as they were employed in France by the Constituent Assembly. Keeping this in mind will help to explain in a large measure his attitude toward the execution of Napoleon's instructions as given in the dispatch of the Duke of Bassano.

Pradt proceeded to Warsaw and arrived there on the morning of 5 June. From the start he busied himself with coordinating the military engagements already begun. By 20 June he was ready to open his house to ministerial callers and he soon began to busy himself with preparations for the movement toward restoration.

Pradt from the start assumed a most unfortunate attitude toward the majority of the Poles. As we have seen from the instructions he was to form a committee of information to advise himself. On 17 June Bassano wrote to Pradt asking why it had not been established and in the absence of this committee what plan he had adopted. Pradt replied on 23 June that it was impossible and useless to form a Polish committee because of the poverty in the kind of men that he had met. Such a committee would only open the way to cabals and
murmurs. In such a statement one can detect Pradt's fear of revolutionary tendencies. Fortunately he did not have this feeling toward the council of ministers with whom it was necessary that he work. The members of this cabinet, according to his own statement, "united all the qualities desired in men of state." He said he would have regarded it as cowardly to have used all the advantages which the position of his own country gave him in respect to these men.

With respect to the convocation of the Diet Pradt proceeded according to instructions but here again he had not gone far until he began to fear the disorders of revolution. Soon after the letters of convocation had been sent out by the council of ministers and the committees and orators had been chosen for the occasion, Pradt began to abhor the movement which he saw was fast gaining momentum. On 14 June he wrote to Bassano that 'the effervescence of spirits increased daily in the city and in the country and that he would have a great deal to do to restrain the explosion till the meeting of the Diet.' By the 16th of June his fears were increased to such an extent that he wrote again to Bassano saying that he felt it would be necessary to change the Diet into a commission. He gave two reasons for coming to this decision: first, that it was the
epoch of St. John at which time all the rents fell due, leases were renewed, and lands sold and that it was necessary that the deputies be at home at this time to look after their affairs; second, he said that judging from the increasing exaltation of spirits the Poles would advance too rapidly and there would be no way to stop them. In order to obviate these inconveniences Pradt asked if it would not be appropriate to reduce the confederated Diet to an intermediary commission, announcing at the same time the reunion of the Diet to approve the works of the commission. In a dispatch of a few days later Pradt said that he was occupied in confining the ardor of the members of the Diet, always ready to burst, and already impatient to return to their firesides at an epoch which required their presence.

The meeting of the Diet should have taken place on 22 June but due to the fact that Pradt felt it necessary to rewrite all the proclamations and public acts which the Poles had drawn up, he delayed the opening session for some days. Pradt was a fluent writer and he realized the inadequacy of the Polish literary attempts. Although he left an impression of contempt for Polish efforts, Pradt sincerely felt that it was for the good of the cause that he employ his literary talents. In a dispatch of 2 July he said that in
general 'all that emanated from the Poles was outside all rule of taste. We would cover ourselves with ridicule if we let such pieces appear in French.'

The Diet met on 26 June and rapidly performed its duties as required by Napoleon. A general confederation was established and Prince Adam Czartoryski, who was chosen president, proclaimed for the reestablishment of the kingdom of Poland. The confederation then voted to send a deputation to the Emperor to claim his protection and seven men were named for this task.

On the fourth day, 29 June, having received no definite instructions from Bassano, Pradt made use of his discretionary powers and dissolved the Diet retaining only an intermediary commission. In reporting his action to Bassano he said that the confederation had become a sort of insurrectional Junta with neither ministers nor administration. His greatest difficulty was "to place some bounds on the eruption of the sentiments of their discourse and their acts."

The dissolving of the Diet was a matter of such serious purport that everyone supposed that the instructions for this step came from the Emperor but it was in reality contrary to his desires. On 1 July Bassano heard of the opening of the Diet and four days later when he heard that it had been dissolved after the third
sitting, his first impulse was to reinstate the archbishop in his diocese immediately. He made this proposition to the Emperor who at first agreed and then changed his mind. Instead he directed Maret to write a letter of reprimand to Pradt which portrayed considerable irritation. In this letter of 6 July we have our first evidence of Napoleon's strong disapproval of Pradt's action and the opening of a gulf between the two men which from then on gradually widened till the bridging of the gap became an utter impossibility.

Pradt was reproved in the first place for having rewritten the act of confederation, thus causing it to lose its value because it was no longer Polish but was French. "A bad document, but Polish, has more value than such enunciations: the Emperor forbade the ambassador henceforth to redraft the acts." Reproof for dismissing the Diet was stated in no uncertain terms. "The ambassador ought merely to watch, to maintain, the enthusiasm of the Poles in the prescribed limits. There were only two meetings of the Diet; the acts of influence on opinion were not numerous. The ambassador acting in the name of France has engaged the Emperor in too decisive a manner."

Thus ended the first crisis in Pradt's career as ambassador to Warsaw. This crisis was not caused by
any intent of Pradt to misconstrue his instructions but rather by what he believed to be a conscientious performance of his duty. Although Pradt was deserving of reproval several times for having failed to execute the instructions of Napoleon, it must, nevertheless, be admitted that he was placed in a very difficult position. His prime duty was to arouse the Poles to a nationalistic movement for the restoration of their former kingdom and yet, when this had been accomplished, Napoleon responded in such a manner as to greatly cool the ardor which had been excited. Napoleon, ever since he had established the Grand Duchy of Warsaw in 1807, had led the Poles to expect a restoration as soon as the opportunity should present itself. Prince Adam Czartoryski, in writing to Alexander I of Russia, January 1811, concerning the possibility of Russian leadership of a regeneration movement in Poland, spoke of the hold which Napoleon had upon the country. "However just the grievances of the Poles against Napoleon may be, he has yet persuaded them that it was not want of good-will but absolute want of power, which prevented him from carrying the work of their regeneration any further...and that at the first rupture with Russia, Poland would be restored. To this feeling is added gratitude for what Napoleon has already done, and repugnance at the
idea of turning against him, just at the moment when
he most reckoned upon the cooperation of the new Polish
state which he has erected."

Napoleon continued to keep the Poles in this at-
titude of expectation. When he made his entrance to
Vilna in June of 1812 he said that he had come to re-
create Poland. "To a general audience at the Imperial
chateaux, Napoleon declared, in broken, vague and ob-
scure phrases that he had come to rehabilitate Poland;
that a diet was assembled at Warsaw for the election of
the king."

It was then with high hopes that the Polish Diet
sent their deputation to Napoleon to claim his pro-
tection. This deputation consisted of seven prominent
Poles who departed for Vilna on 2 July. They were re-
ceived by Napoleon on 12 July, when, surrounded by
ministers, grand officers and officers of the house,
Wybicki, head of the delegation addressed the Emperor in
the name of the Confederation. Napoleon then replied
with his evasive explanation in which he tried not to
discourage their hopes in spite of the fact that he did
not satisfy their demands. "'If I had ruled at the time
of the partitionings of Poland', he said, 'I would have
armed all my people in order to sustain you.' After
having recalled the restoration of Poland started in
1807 by him, he added: 'I applaud all that you have done, I authorize the efforts that you wish to make; all that depends on me to second your resolutions I will do.... But in countries so removed and so extended, it is especially in the unanimity of the population which covers them that you ought to found your hopes of success.'" Napoleon also added that he had guaranteed the Austrian Emperor his domains.

In this way the deputation was put off and the decree of reestablishment was not granted. According to Pradt this "cooling off of the deputation was communicated to all Poland and it never warmed up again." Whereas Pradt may have been guilty of dampening the zeal of the Poles by dissolving the Diet after a very brief sitting, Napoleon was at the same time guilty of producing a similar effect by his reception of the deputation. It must not be supposed, however, that Pradt was surprised or betrayed by the response which Napoleon gave. Napoleon had informed Pradt in his written instructions that he would reply to the Poles who were sent to him that "it was only in their efforts, in their patriotism, that they could bring about a rebirth of their country." It only serves to show the unfortunate position in which Pradt found himself from
the start relative to arousing a zeal for the restoration of Poland.

Pradt has been criticized rather severely and perhaps justly for the excessive fear which he at times displayed on account of rumors of the approach of enemy troops. About the middle of July he wrote to Bassano that some fifty or sixty thousand Russians menaced the frontiers of the Duchy. Pradt had become much frightened, and had prepared to depart from Warsaw, when he discovered that the army which he thought was being led by General Tormasow reduced itself to only a few Cossacks. In the meantime, as Pradt has told us in his account, the city of Warsaw was filled with consternation. The people wanted to stop the ambassador, the council of the confederation and all who were authors of these disorders and provocations against Russia. In his fright Pradt went so far as to write to Prince Schwartzzenberg, commander of the Austrian auxiliary corps, in order to ask his aid, an act which later prompted a reprimand from Napoleon. Schwartzzenberg was happy to have such a pretext and wasted much valuable time in a place where danger did not exist.

Bassano on 26 July wrote in reassuring terms to Pradt and expressed his hope that the fears in Warsaw
had been dissipated. He reproved him saying 'that in case of alarm the council of ministers ought to be the last to think of flight. The men who direct ought to give proof of courage. The Russians can send only insignificant detachments into the heart of the Duchy.' Bassano was quick to see wherein they might profit by this alarm. He urged Pradt to take advantage of the anxiety caused by this rumor to excite the Poles, to urge them on to levy troops, and to increase the number of agents of insurrection. On 28 July Pradt informed Bassano by a dispatch that the inquietude of Warsaw had been dissipated. He had since learned that the camping of the enemy on the border of the duchy was a part of the execution of another plan than a direct project against the country.

Maret, who again thought it an excellent occasion to send the archbishop back to his diocese, wrote to Napoleon concerning Pradt's conduct. Napoleon did not approve of the suggestion to remove Pradt but he was astonished that the archbishop had corresponded directly with the generals and instructed Bassano to communicate his disapproval to him immediately. On 3 August Maret wrote as follows: 'His Majesty has prescribed that I invite you not to correspond with the generals on military operations. He gave me this order on the occasion
of your letter to Prince Schwartzenberg. It would have been more agreeable and altogether natural if you should have addressed yourself to General Dutailly, military commander at Warsaw, who was authorized to make such communications.

Later in October Pradt was struck with the same excessive fear following the burning of Moscow and the retreat of Schwartzenberg. On 4 October Bassano was forced to write to Pradt in the same reassuring tones as before telling him that 'he must sustain the public spirit and avoid allowing the retreat of Schwartzenberg to cause any alarm.' He said he thought Pradt 'had been struck with the burning of Moscow and that he had too much allowed the impression to appear that he was responsible for this event, while his role was to present it under a point of view which would excite enthusiasm in place of throwing spirits into melancholy which leads to discouragement.' "When they see in your countenance and in your discourse a sustained security, they will model themselves after you and they will judge things more sanely."

This warning concerning the attitude Pradt should take toward the burning of Moscow did not suffice when rumors came concerning the project of a Russian invasion. On 12 October Pradt wrote in great alarm to
Bassano of the confirmation he had had that a Russian army was threatening at forty leagues distance and that he had been fifty-five hours without any communications. On 13 October Bassano again informed Pradt that "his role was to believe all that which ought to reassure and to repulse all fears, to sustain and excite the enthusiasm which had no more dangerous enemy than disquieted and (46) timid men. Although Pradt made an effort to follow Bassano's advice, he was not able to prevent the city from becoming panic stricken on the fifteenth when it was invaded by fugitives from all parts of the Duchy between the Bug and the Vistula Rivers. These people filled the city with such stories that everyone began to contemplate leaving, and probably would have, had it not been that General Dutaillis closed the gates for three days in order that a levy of 1200 horses might be made. The council occupied itself with measures to meet the circumstances and issued a proclamation to reassure the inhabitants. (48)

Pradt noted in his dispatch of 16 October to Bassano that the social life of the embassy was being carried on just the same in spite of the confusion. Pradt's theory seems to have been that he could best keep up the enthusiasm of the people by distracting their minds from the dangers about them and so he
planned numerous social events. The Countess Potocka, niece of Prince Stanislas Poniatowski of the former royal house of Poland, has told how Pradt's plans met with great difficulty. 'All the young men were in the army and the young women were scarcely in a mood to render themselves to the pressing invitations of his (50) eminence.' Countess Potocka's Memoirs show, better than any other account, the difficulties which Pradt had to face in executing the urgent instruction which repeatedly came from Bassano to keep up the enthusiasm of the Poles. The Countess has related how Pradt made every effort to conceal the news of the retreat from Moscow. "The ambassador took all measures, possible and impossible, in order to keep up the illusions that he wished us to conserve...de Pradt seemed to have taken for a motto: to amuse and to abuse; he gave balls and splendid dinners.

"But suddenly the news was not lacking completely, and it was soon impossible to hide what was happening. Faithful to the role that he had imposed upon himself, the ambassador wished to make us dance once more; but this last ball was so lugubrious that one would have thought himself assisting in a funeral ceremony rather than a festival.

"My father-in-law made me go but I wore a velour
robe so as to have a pretext for not dancing. De Pradt, affecting to show himself shocked at a costume so inappropriate to the circumstance, repeated to me several times that it did not become my age. But while he paid these honors with the most free air in the world, they whispered about that the embassy had just received at that instant the order to make themselves ready to depart, and that they were packing."

Countess Potocka passed a rather unfair judgment when she spoke of the "role that he had imposed upon himself" for it was not altogether of his own choice that he was trying to hide the reverses which the French armies had experienced. He was executing instructions which came from persons unfamiliar with the endurance of Polish enthusiasm for a cause from which they could gain nothing and for which they had lost practically all.

One of Napoleon's final charges against Pradt was that he had failed to furnish sufficient military support for his armies. Here again Napoleon must share some of the responsibility, due to the plan he adopted for making use of the Polish body of troops. His original plan had been to send the Polish forces into Volhynia, a Polish province in the hands of Russia, so that it might arouse an insurrection there and bring
about its union to the Duchy. In anticipation of such a movement Count Morski, a French representative, was sent into Volhynia to make preparations. Napoleon in the meantime, decided to use the Polish army to strike a blow at the Russians and left the Austrians to guard Poland and to arouse Volhynia. This made Count Morski's mission useless and discouraged the Poles profoundly. "The dispersion of the Polish forces," according to Pradt, "rendered administration impracticable. One never knew where to find them."

The formation of the Austrian corps into a separate contingent and giving it Volhynia for a field of battle also proved a rather serious blunder. This left Prince Schwarzenberg entirely to himself and he worked with laxity proving more an enemy than an aid. Prince Poniatowski would have been much better able to arouse the people to insurrection. "The Austrian army, on the contrary, did nothing useful: its immediate and unguarded contact with the Russians accelerated the communications which later led to open defection at the court of Vienna."

Napoleon's complaints against Pradt, which came through the Duke of Bassano, grew more frequent as time passed on and began to display a spirit of exasperation. At times he was criticized for inertia. On 27 June,
Maret wrote in the following strain: "...take account of all the detail; but act. If directions seem necessary to you for a particular case, ask them; but, if the case arrives and they have not reached you, act without awaiting them." Again he was criticized for assuming too much importance as on 7 July when Maret wrote "that you are more the viceroy than the ambassador, that finally you tend to dominate more by authority than by policy. His Majesty wishes that you hold yourself back on that which is purely Polish, while going ahead as far as possible in all that which interests the service of the army."

Frequently complaints came of the inexact and superficial information furnished by the ambassador on the number and the movements of both the Polish and the enemy troops. In a dispatch of 5 August Pradt was urged to enter into more detail, "details of the situation, army by army, garrisons, national guards, volunteers, and so forth, which are in the Duchy, and those which are placed in movement against Volhynia. Details do not fatigue the Emperor at all; they are indispensable to him in getting an idea of the situation of things."

When Napoleon showed a readiness to criticize Pradt for the failure of the Duchy to furnish sufficient supplies, the ambassador gained a great deal of sympathy...
even from the Duke of Bassano who was always ready to find fault. On 3 August he wrote to Napoleon advising him not to expect too much from the resources of this little country of Poland which possessed neither capitalists, bankers, rich entrepreneurs nor any confidence. The most that could be expected was that its resources should draw the various branches of government out of the state of suffering into which they had fallen.

Again on 4 October, at the order of Napoleon, Bassano wrote to reprimand Pradt for the lack of supplies, but he wrote in the most sympathetic strain saying that 'His Majesty had written him from Moscow on 27 September that he was little satisfied with what was happening at Warsaw, that there was no forage in the store-houses for the horses, that there was almost none of it in the capital, that all the services were in suffering, that the Polish army ought to receive horses and men in order to maintain itself.' Bassano asked Pradt to write a memoir in which he should establish the state of things in detail so that he could use it in responding to the Emperor. He told him to 'write in this memoir not only the scattered information of his various dispatches but all that he was able to assemble, to seize this occasion to present a true picture of the
burdens that the Duchy had experienced.'

Bignon and Pradt accounted for the economic exhaustion of the country in the same way. Bignon simply stated that "the granaries of the proprietors were full; their purses were empty." According to Pradt, 'the formation and support of an army of 35,700 men in the campaign of 1812 with 25,000 horses had drained the Duchy. The deficit of 1811 was twenty-one millions. The continental system closed their ports so that they died of hunger in the midst of useless riches.' The criticism heaped upon Pradt for his failure to raise the necessary supplies was undoubtedly unjust considering the state of affairs in Poland.

Napoleon's exasperation with the way in which matters were being conducted in the Duchy finally reached a climax early in December. Napoleon, on his return trip from Moscow to Paris, stopped at Warsaw on the morning of 10 December and arranged an interview with Pradt and a few of the ministers of the Duchy. Bignon and Pradt have both described this interview but probably the most impartial account is given by Caulincourt who was not interested personally in the conduct of affairs in the Duchy. Caulincourt up to this time had been the French ambassador to Russia. He now became esquire of the Emperor and accompanied him on a two weeks ride
from Smorgoni to Paris. Napoleon traveled incognito as M. de Rayneval, Secretary to Caulincourt. With them were the Duke of Frioul, Count Loban and Baron Paim. They started from Smorgoni, 5 December, and as mentioned above arrived at Warsaw 10 December. They left Warsaw in the evening of the same day and arrived in Paris 19 December. Caulincourt's Memoirs begin with the eve of the Russian campaign and a section of them is concerned with this trip.

Upon arriving at Warsaw Caulincourt visited the ambassador and arranged for the interview with Napoleon at the Hotel Angleterre, the interview which spelled the end of Pradt's services as a diplomat for Napoleon. Pradt immediately went to see the Emperor and found that he was much angered with him. Napoleon frankly told him that his language, his conduct, indeed nothing about him had been French. He reproached him for making plans for the campaign, for playing the military when he understood nothing of it and added that he ought to have 'bound himself to the political and to saying mass, having been sent by him to Warsaw in order to represent France honorably and not to practice economies and to arrange his fortune which would have been assured if he had served him well, but he had only done foolishness.'
"Pradt sought to justify himself, protested of his devotion, his zeal, his regrets that he had done wrong and of his desire to do better. He defended and justified the Duchy for not having done all that the Emperor would have wished for the success of the Russian campaign. He enumerated the sacrifices, the forces which it had furnished, and that it had supported more than 80,000 men. He attested that everyone was ruined, that one was not able to find a silver dollar in the country and that it was necessary to give him aid in money if he wished to draw a part of it. The more Pradt defended himself the more the Emperor was angered."

"Pradt tried to justify himself and placed the wrongs on all the French authorities, of whom he complained a great deal, such as the generals." Caulin-court, the disinterested auditor of the interview, commented that under some accounts it appeared to him that Pradt was not far from right, that, being aroused without doubt by the military controversies, he refuted Napoleon 'with some reason as it appeared to him.'

Pradt proceeded to tell Napoleon that he saw "safety only in that of which we have no more: in well organized, well paid armies, and assured him that there was not a horse, not a man to hope for from the Duchy
without money."

Napoleon, somewhat irritated, then asked Pradt what it was that the Poles wanted, exclaiming that it was for themselves that they fought and for them that he had dispensed the treasury. If they wished to do nothing for the cause it was useless to excite themselves, as they had done, for their restoration.

The ambassador responded with a sting that they wished to be Prussians and explained the motives of their attachment to this country.

Napoleon then called in some of the Polish ministers whom he interviewed together with Pradt. These ministers insisted upon the distress of the country and Pradt seconded their demand for money. Napoleon was not so harsh with these ministers and even promised that he would contribute some millions. Count Stanislas Potocki, president of the Council, was one of the three ministers called in. He went away all enthusiastic and visibly moved by Napoleon. He hurried home to his daughter-in-law, Countess Potocka and reported that Napoleon 'had not destroyed their hopes, but had encouraged their efforts, in a word had made to pass into the souls of those who listened to him the fire that was in his own discourse.' The Countess asserted that "the fascination that this extraordinary man exercised on all those who listened to him was so powerful that my father-in-law
who had left us all depressed, returned full of hope."

After Pradt and the ministers had left Napoleon told Caulincourt that Pradt "had frightened the Poles more than he had assured them during the campaign and that he had lost affairs for him in Poland." He also told him to direct Maret to dismiss Pradt immediately. Caulincourt pointed out to Napoleon "that this change would produce a bad effect upon the Council of Warsaw; Pradt would say that you had dismissed him for having defended the interests of the Duchy and that this would have a bad effect." Caulincourt then threw the orders into the fire.

"When they had gotten into the carriage and started on the way again, the Emperor spoke of Pradt's tone, of his manners as being little in accord with the education he had received, with the society in which he had lived and above all with the state that he embraced. The Emperor repeated that he had lost Poland, that he had caused his campaign to be wanting, that he had been wrong to bother himself with foolish intrigues and not to send Talleyrand there, who would have served him well."

When at Kovno, twenty-one leagues from Warsaw, the Emperor, at five o'clock in the morning, wrote the Duke of Bassano a letter of four pages with a commission for
the dismissal of Pradt. Napoleon wrote that 'one could not be more astonished than he had been at all the ridiculous things proposed by Abbe de Pradt during one hour, although he had not let him know how he felt. It appeared that he had nothing of what was necessary for the place that he filled. This abbe has only the spirit of books.' He instructed Bassano to recall him immediately upon his arrival at Paris.

A few days after the Emperor's visit to Warsaw, Bassano arrived and was delivered this letter left by Napoleon. Pradt, however, had sensed that his conversation was very displeasing to the Emperor and consequently drew up a long memoir which he sent to the Duke the day after his arrival. In it he enumerated his motives for accepting the position of ambassador to Warsaw, the disappointment he had experienced, and closed by demanding his recall. He said 'he had felt it his duty to accept the position when appointed by Napoleon although his health had pressed him strongly to refuse the burden; that he was named ambassador but was not sent to a sovereign; that he thought he was going to a country ready to raise itself while not possessing the means; that he had found exhaustion in a country suspended on the precipice of bankruptcy; that he
counted on the state of the Polish nobility while he found only ruined people; and that a week after his arrival his position had changed to that of a commissary requisitioner. Save for dispatches his occupation had been the furnishing of armies, hospitals, hay and oats. The people around him he complained were young, had different habits and did not sympathize with a priest. He had no authority over military officers and yet he was supposed to direct them.

Pradt explained that he had awaited this period, when the suspension of operations permitted him to return to reflections and to return everything to its proper place, to ask his dismissal. "The Poles," he said, "will accord as much to a requisitioner as to an ambassador, for it is to themselves, to the needs of their cruel situation that they respond, and not to the title of the one who asks of them." According to him there were two useless things which existed in Poland, the embassy and the confederation.

The Duke of Bassano, in receiving this memoir, was spared an unpleasant task, and Pradt by sending it escaped the disgrace of having been dismissed. Pradt received letters of appreciation from Potocki, president of the Council of Ministers and Senfft, minister of
foreign relations for the King of Saxony. He received proofs of affection and regret from the Poles, and departed 27 December 1812 for Paris. Upon arriving at Paris he found letters from the ministers of police and of cults inviting him to visit. The minister of police listened for a long time regarding the affairs of Poland. The minister of cults showed him the letter he had received from Napoleon authorizing him to order Pradt to return to his diocese.

A few of Pradt's contemporaries such as Bignon and Meneval were extremely bitter in their criticism of the ambassador and one cannot avoid feeling that there may have been jealousies involved. Meneval has said that 'when one has considered how Pradt behaved in his embassy, as proved by his own dispatches, by the Emperor's instructions and the correspondence of the minister of exterior relations, one is tempted to accuse this fatal person of treachery, but the frivolity and the inconsistency of his character excludes such an idea... All the evil he occasioned in the course of the mission to Warsaw was inspired by his overweening arrogance and vanity.' Pradt's History of the Embassy to Warsaw, he said, was a "monument of ingratitude and cowardice, to which history ought to do justice had it
ever occasion to deal with its author." (74)

Whereas one must recognize Pradt's shortcomings, such gross criticism is unwarranted. The fairer judgment is that he was, for a number of reasons, entirely unfitted for the position which he held. In the first place he unfortunately irritated the Polish people. Bignon has remarked that 'they saw in Pradt too much ceremonial exactness. He knew very little of Poland and he never listened.' (75) Countess Potocka, who was herself a Polish woman, complained that 'he spoke without ceasing, that he boasted very highly of his own people; that in any other country and especially in similar circumstances he would have completely run aground, but the Poles saw in the Archbishop of Malines only the one who had sent him, the one whose powerful hand would alone be able to aid Poland in raising herself again.' She concluded that 'the ambassador seemed to them little suited for the mission which he was confided.' (76) Pradt himself realized his failure to gain the sympathy of the people and remarked at the close of his mission that the "embassy at Warsaw ought to be filled by a married man of high birth and possessing great riches." (77)

Pradt was furthermore unfitted for the mission upon which he was sent because he hated revolutionary movements and yet his main duty was to arouse an
insurrection which should lead to revolution. Then too, his location at Warsaw placed him in the midst of military operations to which he was not accustomed and made it necessary for him to provide for the needs of the army, a task entirely out of his line.

There are a few things which may be said to Pradt's credit concerning the way in which he conducted himself. He did not become a supple tool in the hands of Napoleon who was gradually growing more and more dogmatic toward those in his service. Napoleon was undoubtedly emotionally unstable following his defeat in the Russian campaign and without a great deal of reason vented his anger and laid the responsibility on the nearest victim. Pradt did not lose the support of the Poles for the French, the charge which Napoleon laid against him in his conversations with Caulincourt. Bignon, who was appointed to fill Pradt's place maintained that "in spite of our (French) misfortunes, our wrongs even, the general affection was always for the French." (78) Fain has lauded the devotion of the Poles to the last moment. 'In the number of foreigners who always followed with the same alacrity the step and fortune of Napoleon, the Poles ought to be placed in the first rank.' (79)

At the close of 1812 the breach between Pradt and Napoleon was practically complete. In the short
space of seven months from May to December the former friendship and mutual regard for the other's ability had entirely disappeared. By blaming Pradt for the failure of the Russian campaign, Napoleon forced him into a defensive position which gradually developed into open opposition.
Chapter III
De Pradt versus Napoleon

Pradt returned to his diocese of Malines 27 January 1813 and took with him Abbe Ondernard whom he named (1) rector of the parish of Brussels. Pradt found that affairs in his diocese were in a state of disturbance. The bishops of Ghent and Tournai had been removed in the midst of the meeting of the Council of Churches in 1811. As there was some doubt as to the vacancy of their seats, the people would not recognize their removal as valid. Successors were named to the places and the people would not recognize them. The chapter of Ghent was divided and an attempt was made to incorporate that of Tournai with Malines, but this project was repulsed by the members of the chapter and finally had to be given up. To aggravate matters still further, more than one hundred students of the seminary of Ghent were sent to serve in the artillery, all of which tended only to enrage the people. Not long after a great many deacons and sub-deacons were treated in the same way as a result of an order which came from Dresden. This time Pradt's sympathies were with the Belgian people rather than with Napoleon. Every act which served to aggravate them also irritated Pradt to the point that he resolved to work for the downfall of Napoleon.
Meanwhile when not occupied with church matters Pradt was engaged in writing his diplomatic apologia, the History of the Embassy to the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. In this work he reviewed the story of events as they had taken place during the preceding year, which, as one would naturally expect, proved to be a rather biased account. The burden of the book was his defense against the allegation of Napoleon "which he repeated a thousand times that it was Pradt who had lost Poland."

Pradt claimed that Poland was lost because the Emperor never gained any true information concerning conditions there and that there were three reasons for Napoleon's illusions on the Polish question. First, there was the nature of his own character which disregarded obstacles in the face of illusions; secondly, there were the Poles who placed at his disposition "their pernicious talents, their recognized rights and their vast appetites"; in the third place, there was the Duke of Bassano, "who was a declared patron of the Poles", and yet he made himself the monkey of the Emperor and served the Emperor first rather than the Poles. (3)

This book was not published until 1815. Napoleon, upon reading Pradt's account while on St. Helena, said that 'it was a good spiteful work against himself which heaped him with wrongs, with injuries and with calumnies
and yet he pretended that the work had rather amused than made him indignant.

Since Pradt was still unrecognized by the Popo as Archbishop of Malines he was not very cordially received by the chapter, which made his position rather embarrassing. He was glad for a pretext to leave his episcopal town at the approach of the Cossacks on the night of 15 December 1813. Where Pradt sojourned for the next month is not certain. He arrived in Paris 14 January 1814 at the time of the crisis of the bank. He soon made friends with the Duke of Dalberg and with Baron Louis who were then closely associated with Talleyrand who was already plotting for the overthrow of Napoléon. From then until 31 March Pradt had frequent interviews with Talleyrand. He has told how, during the first of these interviews, the minister of police, Savary, Duke of Rovigo, came in while they were conversing and how he later expressed his regrets that he did not arrest them.

On 31 March 1814 Pradt played a decisive role in the negotiations which led directly to the restoration of the Bourbons. Up to this time the purpose of the allied powers had been wavering due to a disagreement among themselves as to what should be the new government of France. Alexander had, since January, actively supported the pretensions of Bernadotte to the French throne. Castlereagh, on the other hand, would not
support a war waged for the purpose of enthroning the Bourbon and insisted that peace must be made with Napoleon if he would consent to the "ancient limits" of France. He, however, did not expect the Emperor to consent and in that case he wished the return of the Bourbons but, at the same time, "would not be a party to any overt attempt to set up the Bourbons while the allies were still in negotiation with the Emperor, and he was confirmed in this view by the absence of any signs that the French people were ready of their own will to dethrone Bonaparte or welcome back the ancient family." Castlereagh furthermore used the Austrian objections to Bernadotte to bring about the abandonment of the proposal of a regency under Marie Louise. Metternich declared at the conference of Basle in the middle of January that, "while Austria was prepared to renounce all the advantages of her dynastic connection with Napoleon in favor of the Bourbons, if circumstances permitted, neither her pride nor her interests could allow a French general to be placed with the help of Alexander on the throne of France."

England and Austria were henceforth agreed that there was no middle course, that it must either be Bonaparte or the Bourbons. At the conference at Troyes on 12 and 13 February the representatives of Austria, Prussia and England agreed that the war should end with
the return of France to her former limits. If Napoleon gave his consent they should sign with him; if not the will of the whole country, not Paris alone, should determine the government of France; if the nation declared for the Bourbons, Louis XVIII should be placed on the throne. Russia did not fall in line with these conclusions but declared her opposition to Louis XVIII. She agreed that the French should be allowed to take the initiative but that the allies should be guided by the capitol, Paris. If Paris declared for Napoleon they should treat with him; if not, a governor for Paris should be appointed, preferably a Russian governor.

With the break up of the conference of Chatillon on 19 March they had bound themselves not to negotiate with Napoleon separately but to continue the war till France should be reduced to her pre-revolutionary limits. They were still unwilling to commit themselves openly concerning the return of the Bourbons feeling that the initial move should come from the French people themselves. This desired move came when Baron Vitrolles, a secret envoy of the Bourbons, appeared at the headquarters of the Allies on 22 March and asked for a hearing. Metternich supported by Castlereagh welcomed him heartily. They listened to his sincere plea and especially to the names of the high personnages under whose authority he acted. They questioned him as
to who would be able to execute the proposal of the restoration of the Bourbons which he was advocating since the king was in England, and with what type men the new prince would surround himself.

"'For example,' they said to me, (Vitrolles), 'Would he (Louis XVIII) have a dislike for Abbe de Pradt, author of l'Antidote au congrès de Rastadt? You know him, without doubt?'

'Certainly,' I said, 'intimately, for a long while. If it were not such a treacherous compliment, I would say of him what everyone says: it is not spirit (esprit) which he lacks.'

'Ah, well,' said Metternich, 'such men as this one offer us the best guarantee of what surrounds your princes."

'Mon Dieu,' I said to him, 'Abbe de Pradt and many others! Only help us to create an existence and a power, and you will see them flock from all sides, more than one would wish.'

Vitrolles was questioned in detail about the situation in Paris and was informed that the allies could not think of dethroning Napoleon or of enthroning the Bourbons until France had manifested a decided wish to that effect. Metternich and Castlereagh both urged Vitrolles to go back to Paris immediately and work to
win the people to the support of his cause. Alexander continued to stand out against the Bourbons and insisted that they were unfit to govern France.

This was the first important communication which the Allied Sovereigns had received and it gave them hopes that, upon reaching Paris, they would be welcomed by a party which would aid them to constitute a government and with whom they could negotiate. Castle-reagh, having determined to hasten things along, made preparations to bring the Bourbon princes to headquarters, and sent a mission to the Count d'Artois in Switzerland for this purpose. On 25 March the Vitry proclamation was issued which laid the blame for the continuance of the war on Napoleon and explained the motives for the rupture of negotiations at Chatillon. By this time it was well determined, though not openly declared, that there would be no more dealings with Napoleon. The Allies were not willing to make a declaration to this effect until they, and especially Alexander, were convinced that the French were through with Napoleon and ready to support the Bourbons. This was the real task of the conference of 31 March in which Pradt played a decisive role, and which opened the way for the restoration of the Bourbons by the
provisional government.

On the morning of 31 March after the capitulation of Paris to the allied sovereigns, a deputation of the municipality was sent out from Paris to confer with Alexander. Among them were Chabrol, prefect of the Seine, Pasquier, prefect of police, Alexander de Laborde and Tourton of the national guard. They were accompanied by two foreign officers who had signed the capitulation. When they reached the allied camp they were received by Alexander and Nesselrode, who treated them with the greatest courtesy. As soon as general conversations were finished, Alexander spoke to each of the members of the deputation individually, asserting that he brought only an honorable peace to Paris and that he would leave her a free choice of her government. Nesselrode immediately asked what the people of Paris wanted. Laborde replied that they were attached to the gains of the revolution and that they wanted the regency of Marie Louise if a change were necessary. He said that the Bourbons were only spoken of in the drawing rooms of the ancient nobility but he suggested to Alexander that he consult Talleyrand who would furnish him with more accurate information. Laborde was immediately sent back to Paris to detain Talleyrand there and to assure him that the allies held him in the highest esteem.

Talleyrand had been instructed to leave Paris for
Blois by the Duke of Novigo, who suspected that Talleyrand's services would be rendered to someone else than Napoleon. Affecting a willingness to follow the desires of the minister of police he had stepped into his carriage and toward the close of the day, 30 March, had presented himself without a passport at the barrier leading to the Orleans route. The barrier was occupied by national guards who had been irritated for the past two days by persons attempting to desert the city. A tumult was raised around the carriage of Talleyrand and his passport was demanded. He had none and, not wishing to defy the defenders of Paris, he returned to his home. It was on the next morning that Laborde delivered his message to Talleyrand who told him to impart the same to the Duke of Dalberg, Abbe de Pradt and Baron Louis who were conversing in a nearby room and to ask their opinions.

The allies entered the gates of Paris between ten and eleven o'clock in the morning. Laborde, representing the Tsar, went immediately to the home of Talleyrand and solicited an interview. He announced to him that Alexander would stay with him at Hotel St. Florentine while in Paris. Together they arranged for a conference to be held later in the day and prepared the matters which were to be discussed.

Meanwhile the allied troops as they marched through
the streets of Paris were greeted by throngs of people. There was a gathering of royalists wearing the white cockade at the place of Louis XV. They advanced along the Boulevard Madeline toward the sovereigns at the head of their armies and when they met them they cried, "Long live the Bourbons, sovereigns, and Emperor Alexander." Pradt who was then at the home of Talleyrand said that Dalberg called him to the window which opened on the place of Louis XV and there they saw a crowd of persons wearing white cockades and waving white flags. They went to the place where they were gathered and found about fifty persons. They advanced toward Madeleine Boulevard and persons of all classes joined them. Pradt learned of the reunion of the royalists from Botizy who invited him to join their meeting which was to be held that evening. When the troops had entered the city the people had interpreted the white scarfs which they wore on their arms to be the sign of French royalty. This mistake aided in the success of the day and served to win over many who had formerly been lukewarm about the return of the Bourbons. Outside this group, however, there were few evidences of royalist enthusiasm on the squares formed by the boulevards.

The troops marched on to the Champs-Elysee where they were reviewed by Alexander, Frederick William and
Prince Schwartzzenberg. The Emperor of Austria, Metternich and Castlereagh had stayed at Dijon, convinced that the steps already taken would result in a declaration for the Bourbons. The review took most of the afternoon after which Alexander went on foot from the Elysee palace to the hotel of Talleyrand, the passage to which "he found crowded with people waving their canes with white handkerchiefs on them and crying with a redoubling of energy, "Vive le roi! vivent les Bourbons!" This demonstration caught the eye of Alexander; it appeared to him as an expression of royalist sentiment, an innovation for the return of the Bourbons.

The Tsar had hardly become settled in his new lodging at the Hotel St. Florentine when the council was held which had been arranged previously by Nesselrode and Talleyrand to decide upon the political course that the allies ought to follow. It cannot be determined definitely at just what time the conference convened, for the reports vary on this point. Pradt was the only person who attended the council that has left an account of it and he has recorded that he went to the home of Talleyrand at five o'clock in the evening.

Pasquier, prefect of police, in his memoirs of this event recorded, in agreement with Pradt, that Alexander went to the home of Talleyrand at five o'clock in the
evening. Pasquier was informed concerning the meeting of this council, shortly after its break-up, by Nesselrode when he came, by request, to see Talleyrand, so that his data concerning it ought to be fairly accurate. Vaulabelle who has written a secondary account of the history of the Restorations has derived from some source that the council met at seven o'clock in the evening. Sorel, who has likewise written a secondary account, has complicated matters with the report that the declaration issuing from this council was published at three o'clock in the afternoon. In the absence of further verifications, the report of the contemporaries, Pradt and Pasquier, is the one which must be accepted. The time of meeting of this council will later be shown to be of vital importance in considering the responsibility of Pradt for the restoration of the Bourbons.

Eight persons were present at this gathering of rulers and diplomats: the Emperor of Russia, the King of Prussia, Prince Schwartzzenberg, the Prince of Lichtenstein, Prince Talleyrand, the Duke of Dalberg, Count Nesselrode and Pozzo di Borgo. Schwartzzenberg was authorized to exercise the powers of the Austrian monarch. He informed Dalberg that both he and Metternich thought that the continuation of the rule of
Napoleon was impossible, and that the restoration of Bourbons was the best solution. After some preliminary remarks they agreed to reduce the debate to the three following questions: Should they make peace with Napoleon while taking all securities against him? Should they maintain the regency? Should the House of Bourbons be recalled? Alexander prefaced the discussion by saying 'that they came not for conquest or vengeance but to combat Napoleon the enemy of French liberty.'

The King of Prussia and Schwartzemberg concurred in this. Alexander said a few more words and then submitted the first question to the council. It was hardly discussed and they decided unanimously that they would not treat with Napoleon. The question of the regency was then taken up. The Duke Dalberg pleaded the case of Marie Louise and expected Talleyrand to affirm his opinion but Talleyrand said nothing. Pozzo di Borgo combatted this proposal energetically and Alexander discouraged its acceptance so that it was discarded without further discussion.

The question of the reestablishment of the Bourbons was then before them. All the uncertainties of Talleyrand then ceased. He pronounced himself in favor of the recall of the old royal family, declaring that this combination was the only one which was agreeable, which
was desired, which could be accepted generally and which placed the desired end to tyranny." Prince Lich tenstein, representing Austria, allowed the rejection of the regency to go by without a word and now turned to the support of the Bourbons. He, however, asked Talleyrand if he did not think he was going a little far in affirming that the return of the Bourbons was desired by France and added that all the soldiers were loyal to Napoleon. Alexander did not conceal that he inclined to the return of the Bourbons but at the same time he pointed out all the objections. He said that no plan should be adopted without the general assent of the country, that appearances were against it, that royalist acclamations had been tardily given and that he doubted if the army could be won over. In fact none of the sovereigns or their diplomats contested the convenience of this latter proposal but they did doubt the existence of a desire for it, of which they had found no manifestation on all the route traversed by the army. The population had on the contrary given evidence of hostility to such a proposal. Talleyrand replied that the army was more faithful to its own glory than to Napoleon.

When Alexander asked Talleyrand what means he proposed to use for carrying out his suggestion, he responded that it should be through the constituted
authorities and 'that he strongly favored the Senate; that any impulse given it, would be followed by Paris (38) and by all France."

However the members of the council were not yet convinced and it was in order to overcome this opposition that Talleyrand determined to support his contention with the testimony of Pradt and Baron Louis. He told the Czar that he did not think he was mistaken, but in any case his error would be that of all the men who understood France best and the state of opinion there. He proposed then to call in these two men "who for several months had been occupied with these same interests (39) and with searching for means to manage them." The Czar consented to listen to them and Pradt and Louis who were in a neighboring apartment were introduced. Pradt has described the scene which followed. On the right side of the room were the King of Prussia, Schwarzenberg, Dalberg, Nesselrode and Pozzo di Borgo. At the left were Talleyrand, Baron Louis and Pradt. Alexander faced the assembly and repeated his speech saying that the Allies had come to free Paris from war. He asked the assent of the King of Prussia and Schwarzenberg of this statement and they acquiesced. Talleyrand quickly made known to the newcomers the service which was wanted of them and Alexander began to question them. When it
came time for Pradt to speak he burst forth with
the declaration that 'they were all royalists, that
all France was royalist; that if she had not shown it,
it was because of the continued negotiations at Chatil-
lon; that Paris was likewise royalist and that she would
make it known as soon as she should be called upon to
do so; that this would mean security for, since the Revo-
lution, Paris had exercised such an influence that her
example would be decisive and would be followed every-
where.' Baron Louis concurred, repeating with no less
vehemence that all France was royalist. 'She repulsed
Bonaparte, she wished no more of him, that this man was
only a cadavre which did not smell yet.'

Alexander was not acquainted with France and the
assertions of Pradt and Louis were sufficient to convince
him that France was ready to support the Bourbons. Con-
cerning this episode, Vaulabelle has drawn an interest-
ing comparison. Two priests and a lesser churchman had
played the most influential role in the advent of Napole-
on to the government of the Republic at the time of the
13 Brumaire, Sieyes, Talleyrand and Fouche. Three
priests, likewise, precipitated his fall, Talleyrand,
Pradt and Louis.

This latter group had brought Alexander to making
a decision. He declared at once that they would no
longer treat with Napoleon, but that it was not proper for foreigners to precipitate him from the throne and still less proper for them to call back the Bourbons. After some moments of silence Talleyrand responded that it was the place of the constituted authorities to charge themselves with these two tasks, and he himself offered to take the responsibility of obtaining the cooperation of the Senate. He further suggested that the Council should make an official report of its decisions in order to guide them in their advance. England was not represented at this council, and Prince Metternich and the Emperor of Austria were absent so that practically all depended on the Tsar Alexander. The declaration was drawn according to his wishes and contained the following statements:

"The armies of the allied powers occupy the capitol of France. The allied sovereigns are willing to promote the wishes of the French nation.

"They declare--

"That if conditions of peace necessarily involved the strongest guarantees when it was a question of restraining the ambition of Bonaparte, they need be less stringent when France herself, by again adopting the rule of a moderate government, will give the best pledge of peace.

"Whereupon the allies proclaim--"
"That they will not treat with Napoleon nor with any member of his family.

"That they respect the integrity of ancient France, such as it existed under her legitimate kings; that they even do more because they still maintain the principle that for the welfare of Europe, France ought to be great and powerful.

"That the allied sovereigns will recognize and guarantee whatever constitution the French nation will choose. They therefore invite the Senate to appoint a provisional government to discharge the functions of the executive, and prepare a suitable constitution for the French people.

"The intentions that I here express are shared with me by all the allied powers."

"Alexander"

"Count Nesselrode", (43) Secretary of State

Talleyrand demanded the printing and immediate publication of the declaration. A copy was sent to one of the Michaud brothers, printers, who since the beginning of the conference, had waited in a neighboring room, and an hour after it was posted on all the walls of Paris.

Talleyrand was authorized to consult the Senate and to provide a provisional government. He called
this body together 1 April and it met at four o'clock in the afternoon. He opened the meeting "by reading a speech in a hesitating voice. It had been written by Abbe de Pradt in obscure incorrect phrases and was read so hesitatingly by Talleyrand that it became pure mockery. Pradt has told that Talleyrand entered the Senate with two different discourses, one written by himself, the other by a person whom he does not name. If the Prince of Benevento read the project of the Archbishop of Malines, Pradt has added, it was not by any motive of preference, but uniquely because he placed his hand in his left pocket in place of putting it in his right." On 2 April the Senate announced the fall of the Empire and released the people and the army from obligations to Napoleon. On 3 April the Legislative Corps adhered to the acts of the Senate. The constitutional charter was adopted by the Senate on 6 April which provided for the establishing of a limited monarchy, called Louis-Stanislas Zavier of France to the throne, and stated the conditions of his return.

Meanwhile the Parisian members of the conference of 31 March made an effort to counteract the overtures which the negotiations for Napoleon were making to the Allies. If they could not prevent them from arriving to interview the Allied sovereigns, they at least sought to shorten their visits and to weaken the effects
of them. Through the military governor of Paris the royalists were able to get control of the press and employed a censor to inspect all publications and to give them a royalist tone. All of them announced on 1 April that the white cockade had been adopted by the people of Paris.

The task now remains of evaluating the part which Pradt actually played in the restoration of the Bourbons. Talleyrand, as might be expected, has minimized everyone's responsibility for this event except his own. The conceited tone of the following passage from his memoirs will suffice to show his attitude: 'I have known that all I have just said may have displeased a great many, for I have destroyed, I believe, the importance of all those little efforts that a number of persons faithfully devoted to the Bourbons have boasted of having made to lead to their restoration. But I have spoken my opinion, and my opinion is, that no one has caused the restoration, nor I, nor others. Though I was able to say to the Czar Alexander, whose confidence I had had during many years, 'Neither you, sir, nor the allied powers, nor I, whom you believe to possess some influence, not one of us could give a king to France. France was conquered - and by your arms, and yet even today, you have not that power. To force a king upon France, would require both
intrigue and force; one or the other alone would not be sufficient. In order to establish a durable state of things and one which could be accepted without protest, one must act upon principle. With a principle we are strong. We shall experience no resistance; opposition will at any rate vanish soon; and there is only one principle. Louis XVIII is a principle; he is the legitimate king of France.

'By the political relations I had preserved, and by those which I had newly established, I had the advantage of being able to tell the foreign sovereigns what they could do, and by my long acquaintance with politics I had been enabled to fathom and fully grasp the needs and the wishes of my sovereigns.'

Although Pradt's effort may have had the appearance of being slight to Talleyrand it nevertheless came at the psychological moment which made it decisive. Pradt's intervention and his enthusiastic assertions concerning the desires of the people caused all hesitations to cease. Alexander at once determined to make the declaration to be through with Napoleon and his family, thus leaving the way open for the return of the Bourbons. Talleyrand without the support of Pradt would have had a difficult time convincing the Tsar.

Michaud in his biographical account of Pradt has also denied him any of the responsibility for the return
of the Bourbons. In the following extract Michaud has stated his case: "It is in the *Recit historique* that he (Pradt) has published this great event, that one is able to see all that happened that day, and that one is able to judge what influence his advice and opinions had on the decisions of the monarchs assembled in council where he pretended that they did him the honor of consulting him. It is there that he tells that he dictated the bases of the famous declaration by which Napoleon was placed outside the law of nations and by which the Bourbons were indicated to the French as their only plank of safety. It is indeed true that the influence of the prelates in this circumstance has been contested and that we, who were charged with the printing of this important piece, received the manuscript of it not in the anti-chamber of Talleyrand where we never went, but in our domicile and from the hands of the provisional government which brought it to us 31 March before noon and not at 3:00 P.M. when Pradt pretends to have dictated it to us. --- The copy of this memorable piece had been drawn on the morning of 31 March between Talleyrand and Nesselrode who came directly from Bondi. The manuscript bore the title of proclamation, which we were permitted to change to that of declaration, a more agreeable term, and Talleyrand approved the first proof that we submitted
about one o'clock. It was necessary to bring him successively three proofs, and on the last, which was read at seven o'clock in the evening by Emperor Alexander, this monarch added this important phrase: 'The allies will respect the integrity of ancient France such as it has existed under her legitimate kings; they even do more, because they always profess the principle that, for the good of Europe it is necessary that France be great and strong.'

In the first place, Michaud has grossly misrepresented Pradt's account of what happened, as given in the Recit historique. Pradt made no pretense of having dictated the declaration in question. The only claim which he made was the one described in the account as given above. Furthermore, the fact that the declaration was drawn up in the morning by Nesselrode and Talleyrand does not diminish the contribution which Pradt made. Pasquier gave a similar account saying that "the proclamation had assuredly been drawn beforehand by Talleyrand or Pozzo di Borgo, for it would have been impossible, at so short a sitting as that of the council to draft, at a single stroke, a document where all essential points were so thoroughly touched upon." There is no claim whatsoever that Pradt's contribution was that of drafting the declaration but rather it was that of bringing the allied sovereigns to the decision to issue it.
was, after all, the more important contribution, for, as Talleyrand has said, the substance of the declaration was only a principle for which none of them were responsible.

Michaud has also stated erroneously that they received the manuscript from the provisional government. The provisional government was established by the Senate which did not meet until 1 April, the day after the meeting of the council. This government fully appreciated Pradt's services and by a decree of 6 April named him "commissionary to fulfill the functions attributed to the grand chancellor of the Legion of Honor and to the Chancellor and Treasurer of the order of the Reunion."(54) There was so much objection by those who were jealous of him as grand chancellor of the Legion of Honor that he resigned 13 February 1815 and was succeeded by Viscount de Bruges, Pradt receiving a pension of 3,000 francs. (55)

After Pradt had given freely of his services in the restoration of the Bourbons he returned to his diocese of Malines. Charged with the new office of Chancellor and Treasurer of the order of the Reunion, it became necessary for him to have a conference with Van der Goes, the former treasurer. After their business was transacted Pradt spoke to Van der Goes of the reunion of Holland and Belgium. He told him that he
was very much interested in it; that he did not know Holland and had not the honor of acquaintance with the Prince of Orange, but that he viewed this reunion as a whole and from a political point of view; that from 1798 it had been his favorite idea, and that he had written at this time *l'Antidote au congrès de Kastadt* and *De la neutralité de la Prusse* (in which he advocated the union of Holland and Belgium). Pradt added that perhaps he would be, at present, in a position to render service in this circumstance. Van der Goes replied that he had no power to discuss such matters but that he would arrange a conference for him with Van Spaen, a plenipotentiary of the Prince of Orange.

Pradt was thus enabled to come in direct contact with those who were doing the work of reconstitution in Belgium and Holland. From the letter which Spaen wrote to the Prince of Orange it is evident that Pradt left a very favorable impression and it is probable that his opinion exerted some influence. Spaen wrote that 'the archbishop was an exceedingly witty and well informed man and that it was a pleasure to listen to him speak.' Pradt told Spaen almost what he had told Van der Goes. He said in effect, that, if the projected reunion of Belgium came to pass, as he desired it would quickly for the general good of Europe, and as he trusted it
would after what Talleyrand and Metternich had told him of it, he wished him to assure His Royal Highness, Prince of Orange, that he would be entirely devoted and disposed to render him all the services in his power in case he should remain at Malines, which was his ardent desire, unless his health or a formal order from the new king prevented him from it. Finally, Spaen wrote, 'he entered into the question, always seeing things as a whole, and from this point of view considered this reunion as advantageous from all aspects. He put forward some extremely enlightened and liberal ideas, that, Spaen wrote, 'he would be charmed that His Royal Highness might hear from Pradt's own mouth. He did not conceal that the clergy in general had very limited ideas, a great many prejudices, superstitions and little whims from which this archbishop seemed very removed. He told him some very remarkable things on the unfortunate tendency that the persecution of the Pope by Napoleon, added to the astonishing events of the day, had given to spirits everywhere, even in France where they were formerly more enlightened, a tendency toward mysticism, ultramontane ideas and superstitions. He spoke of the manner in which, in the eventual case of reunion, the clergy ought to be treated.'

They talked some of the government to be applied
to Belgium in the case of reunion and Pradt informed Spaen of the prejudices of the Belgian people along this line. Spaen said 'it appeared almost impossible to make His Royal Highness a clear and exact report of their very interesting conversation: the rapidity of his discourse, the vivacity of his very enlightened ideas, and the great number of things of which they spoke had not allowed him the calmness of spirit and the leisure to organize his thoughts well. In all that concerned the clergy and the manner of directing ecclesiastical affairs,' it appeared to Spaen that he had said 'some very wise things and that he could be extremely useful to His Royal Highness in the case, which appeared little doubtful, that this country should pass for the most part under His domination.'

On 12 May 1814 Spaen wrote again to the Prince of Orange and told of another conference he had had with Pradt. This time he remarked that 'His Royal Highness would notice without doubt that the prelate tried to introduce himself and to make himself useful, perhaps even necessary; but since he was a man of a great deal of intellect, from whom one could draw a great deal and who, it would appear, desired to remain at Malines, it seemed to him that he was worth more to have for a friend than for an enemy.'

Pradt's abilities seem not only to have appealed
to Spaen but also to Fagel who wrote to the Prince of Orange 20 May 1814 'that he hoped that His Royal Highness would employ the Archbishop of Malines, considering the great part that he had to play there (in Belgium) with his intellect and his influence among his fellow countrymen.'

Pradt's influence might have been still greater and he might have played an active part in the reconstruction of Belgium had it not been that he was disliked in the locality of his own diocese. It was claimed there that he was not in legitimate possession of the archbishopric of Malines. Napoleon had installed him there without his institutions. Some casually claimed that they had been delivered since, whereas others claimed that they had never been given and that he could not take his seat again without subsequent confirmation from the Pope. The fact is that Beugnot had placed him in possession of his bulls and that Pradt had informed the capitular bishops that he was going to install himself. However, those who were most ardent against him addressed a denunciation to Rome against the archbishop. The Pope did not favor Pradt so he was forced to resign sometime in August 1815. In a letter from Binder to Metternich dated 16 August 1815 the notation appeared that Pradt,
administrator of the archbishopric of Malines had just given his resignation. He sold his rights to the archbishopric in return for an annuity of 10,000 francs which was paid for only a few years by the King of Holland.

Pradt, then, at the age of fifty-six, retired to Auvergne to the lands belonging to his family and devoted his time largely to writing. His pamphlets became quite profuse and were filled with opinions entirely at variance with his former stand, taking up the cause of the rights of the people. His publication on the law of elections which appeared in 1820 called attention to his opposition to the ministry and he was incriminated for provoking disobedience to the law, for a criminal attempt on the authority of the king and the chambers, and for the inciting of civil war. The jury, however, declared him not guilty and he was released.

Pradt placed himself as a candidate of the liberal party for deputy in 1820 but failed to secure election. He remained in Auvergne and wrote a number of pamphlets on Italy, Spain, Belgium, Greece, Russia, America, the affairs of the Orient and on all questions of exterior relations. As to interior policy he insisted on liberalism, advocated liberty of the press and democratization.
of suffrage and attacked the church and aristocracy. In 1826 he severely attacked the Jesuits in *Jesuitisme ancien et moderne*. In *Lettre a un electeur de Paris* (1817) and *Preliminaires de la session de 1817* he charged that faulty principles and intrigues always brought the wrong end.

In the elections of 1827 he ran as a liberal candidate and was elected for the second term of the Chamber of Deputies from the first department of Puy-de-Dome. He was forced to resign in 1829 on account of his health. His nomination as general councilor of Puy-de-Dome was accepted, February 1831, but he gave his resignation in 1833.

This terminated Pradt's public career and he spent the remainder of his life in retirement in Auvergne. He continued to write a great deal and kept his riding horses for recreation. He retained his interest in agriculture and the improvement of country life and in 1828 published a revised edition of *Voyage agronomique en Auvergne*. On his frequent trips to Paris his inexhaustible spirit continued to dazzle and to fatigue those with whom he associated. He was carried off by an attack of apoplexy 18 March 1837 at the age of seventy-eight.
Conclusion

Controversy is still engaged over the amount of credit for accomplishment which Pradt merits in the period of history with which this study has been concerned. By some he continues to be condemned as a 'blundering, presumptuous braggart.' It is unjust and inaccurate, however, to condemn him so summarily. Pradt has left a monument to himself in his abundant publications, the importance and value of which cannot be denied entirely. It is through these writings that we have been able to judge the contributions which Pradt made previous to his contacts with Napoleon and independent of him. Pradt's most conspicuous talent was the flair which he possessed for predicting the future. We have noticed in his different works statements which seemed to show nothing less than a gift of prophecy. These predictions emanated most commonly from the interest which Pradt had in colonies and they appeared most frequently in the two works, L'Antidote au congrès de Rastadt and Les trois âges des colonies. In the preface of his publication of 1816, Des colonies et la révolution actuelle de l'Amerique Pradt summarized the predictions which he made in the Three Ages, in 1802, which had been realized.
in that brief space of time, namely, the independence of Santo Domingo, the perpetuity of insurrections among the negroes, the successive and forced conquest of alien colonies by England, the uncontested superiority of the English marine over all those of Europe, the convenience and the probability of the removal of the king of Portugal to Brazil, the tendency of the United States to acquire Florida and the emancipation of Spanish America. In addition to these there were the predictions of the revolt of India, the establishment of a United States of Europe and the separation of church and state which he designated as the best possible arrangement in Les quatre concordats.

It should not be claimed that this gift of prediction was anything miraculous. It came merely as a result of a thorough, reasoned understanding of contemporary history and trends, and from a persistent faith, which guided him always, that 'the human race was on the march and was not able to turn back.' Therein lies Pradt's most essential contribution. He wrote abundantly and on such a great variety of subjects that his optimistic faith was able to reach and perhaps permeate a sufficient number of individuals as to produce an effect upon public thought.
Pradt's publications were by no means works of literary art. He wrote in an easy, somewhat lax, journalistic style, verbose and redundant at times, but usually animated enough to hold interest. His works, coming annually, semi-annually or even more frequently, as they did, could not have been carefully revised. Their popularity and interest rested upon the clarity of the reasoning and their incisive, oftentimes sarcastic style.

Besides these general contributions to public thought Pradt made some specific contributions through his writings. De l'état de la culture en France and the others of his agricultural dissertations were clearly intended to promote scientific agriculture. The phase to which he devoted most of his theoretical and practical efforts was animal husbandry, particularly the three principal farm animals, horses, cattle and sheep. Such efforts as these serve to show Pradt's breadth of interest and his progressiveness which merit a commendatory comment from the historian.

Another specific contribution of theory which Pradt made in his writing, and which proved to have influence in the end, was his suggestion concerning the reconstitution of Belgium and Holland which
appeared, first, in l'Antidote au congrès de Rastadt. Of its influence we have certain proof, for, there appeared in the Dutch correspondence of 1814, as collected by Colenbrander, long excerpts from the Antidote, used argumentatively in support of the new plan of reconstitution. Other references have been made to Pradt's influence in this connection previously.

Such are the enduring achievements of Pradt which give him prominence, independent of his contacts with Napoleon with whom his later career was so closely connected. A summary view of the history of Pradt's work in the service of Napoleon shows a gradual divergence from a common point of interest, mutual confidence and regard to directly opposing positions involving hatred and a desire for retaliation. The problem now is to account for this divergence and to determine in the face of it whether or not there were any net results of Pradt's services.

An examination of the various functions which Pradt performed has shown that as long as he confined his efforts to his chosen field of activity as a churchman he was not only able to get along well with Napoleon, but he was able to be of service to him. As Grand
Almoner and First Chaplain he performed ably the duties incumbent upon the holder of those offices, at the same time strengthening the bonds between himself and Napoleon through the confidential advice which he was able to offer on matters concerning the reestablishment of the church in France. Then again, when Pradt took up his duties as Archbishop of Malines in 1809-10, although he started with the condemnation of Napoleon because he served in spite of the incompleteness of his bulls, he was soon able to work his way back into favor by cooperating in executing Napoleon's desires relative to church matters in Belgium. In fact he was so loyal that he was condemned as one of those "priests who are in constant prostration before the civil authorities." But this devotion did not last as we have seen.

We must look to Pradt's diplomatic career to account for the gradual divergence in point of view of Pradt and Napoleon. Pradt's first diplomatic services were those performed at Bayonne and we can judge little of his abilities from what he did there because of the impossibility of the task he was assigned, that of persuading Ferdinand to accept Etruria in exchange for the throne of Spain. He accomplished nothing in the way of permanent results although he was generously rewarded with the archbishopric of
Malines. In these negotiations there is the first
evidence that the diplomatic policy adopted by
Napoleon was not the one conceived to be desirable
by Pradt. The fact that Pradt could not wholehearted-
ly put himself behind Napoleon's policy in this instance
accounts, in part, for the futility of his efforts,
although he did not allow Napoleon to become aware of
it.

Pradt's next diplomatic undertaking was the nego-
tiations with the Pope at Savona. These were not car-
rried on singlehanded by Pradt so that whatever may
have been the net results, the responsibility for them
was shared by all the members of the commission. In
these negotiations it was not a case of Pradt disagree-
ing with the policy adopted by Napoleon, for the com-
mission tried to follow as closely as possible their
instructions. On the other hand, these dealings did
offer an excellent example of Napoleon's growing ar-
bitrariness toward his diplomats. With practically
no explanation he flatly refused the outcome of the
dealings with the Pope which was, after all, very
nearly the outcome he had asked in his instructions.
It is very likely that, in the meantime, Napoleon
had changed his mind concerning what would be the
most desirable arrangement between the Church and
the State and rather than appear inconsistent he cast the responsibility for the failure to come to a settlement upon the deputation. Although there are no positive results of this diplomatic undertaking with which Pradt can be accredited, at least he cannot be held responsible for its failure. As to Napoleon's attitude toward him he was left in a position of uncertainty, the former friendship and mutual confidence having been shaken.

Pradt's next diplomatic position, that of ambassador to the Duchy of Warsaw, was the only one which really tested his abilities. This time he was given a task to be handled by himself alone with definite instructions for the execution of the job. Judged by Napoleon's standards of success Pradt was a complete failure, Napoleon having remarked that he could not have made a worse choice or confided his affairs to a man less capable. This was an opinion expressed by Napoleon on his return from his fatal Russian campaign when his spirits were low and when he was looking for a defense for himself. It is true that Pradt did not accomplish all that was desired of him by Napoleon and this again was mainly because Pradt did not approve of the diplomatic policy adopted by the Emperor. Napoleon wanted a confederation
established by means of insurrection but Pradt established it through a quiet, lawful procedure because he did not approve of anything which savored of revolutionary methods. Napoleon wished that the people should be violently stirred up by ardent patriotic appeals in order that their enthusiasm might be exploited in the Russian campaign. Pradt feared that such enthusiasm might lead to disorder so he carefully revised all speeches and manifestoes which were delivered or circulated over the country. But even so, it must be agreed that he was taking a great deal into his own hands when he undertook to make these alterations in policy. At the same time, Pradt was perfectly justified in certain of his contentions concerning the economic exhaustion of the country and he had the advantage over Napoleon of being in the locality when he formed his judgments. Pradt saw too clearly to believe in the success of a campaign waged by a prostrate country. He was not willing to camouflage his honest estimation of the situation to the extent necessary to bring himself into agreement with views of his master.

It is not necessary to minimize Pradt's ability as a diplomat to conclude that a less intelligent, but more supple, enthusiastic or even fanatic soldier would have been more successful in stirring up the
Poles and in obtaining from them the final sacrifice of their lives in protecting the retreat of the French army against the pursuit of the Russians. The battle front did not prove to be the proper setting for a peace loving, priestly diplomat. Pradt failed in the performance of his duty because he adopted the wrong method but Napoleon absurdly magnified the importance of the embassy to Warsaw when he held it accountable for the failure of the campaign which was due to a wide combination of circumstances. In this final episode of Pradt's services for his once honored master Napoleon's increasing autocracy clashed with Pradt's unalterable spirit of independence which clash proved to be the breaking point for the friendship between the two.

Aligning himself in opposing ranks, Pradt awaited an opportunity to avenge the wrongs and ingratiations resulting from his embassy to Warsaw. This opportunity came when the Allied Sovereigns, having entered Paris on 31 March, determined to hold a conference to decide what should be their future course of action. They had already agreed that it was no longer feasible to treat with Napoleon but they did not feel justified in making a declaration to that effect until they were assured that the French people were ready to
dethrone the Bonapartes and welcome back the Bourbons. Pradt gave the necessary confirmation to the contention of Talleyrand that France desired the rule of the Bourbons with the result that Alexander, in the name of the Allies, declared that they would no longer treat with Napoleon. Such was the retaliation Pradt dealt to the man whom, at one time, he had served so faithfully.

As a diplomat Pradt is a good illustration of the type of men who served Napoleon in that capacity during the latter years of the Empire. He was not a supple tool but a man with a reasoning mind and independence of spirit. He was unfortunate in that the negative results of his diplomatic undertakings usually cancelled the positive. But when refused the opportunity to lead a life of action Pradt distinguished himself in a manner which endures. He continued to write abundantly, his intelligence never weakening, and he thereby proved himself to be a remarkable theorist and perhaps a man of genius.
Notes

Chapter I

2. Ibid., p. 290.
3. Ibid., p. 291
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid., p. 171.
12. Ibid., p. 63.
15. Ibid., p. 162.
16. Ibid., II, pp. 320-324.
17. Michaud on "Pradt", in Biographie Universelle, v. 78, p. 4.
18. Caro, "Rivarol et le société française pendant la révolution et l'émigration", in Variétés littéraires, p. 86.
20. Ibid., p. 92.
22. Daupeyroux, op. cit., p. 231.
23. Ibid., p. 282.
26. Ibid., p. 37.
27. Ibid., p. 238.
29. Ibid., p. 264.
31. See ch. III p. 140.
34. Ibid., p. 448.
35. Ibid., pp. 405-422.
36. Ibid., p. 499.
37. Ibid., p. 569.
39. Pradt, Des colonies et la révolution actuelle de l'Amerique, preface. In this book which was printed in 1817 Pradt summarized some of the facts which he predicted in Les trois ages which had since been realized.
40. Ibid., p. 284.
42. Moniteur, 27 July 1802, p. 1264.
Chapter II.

Part I.


3. *Correspondence de Napoleon Ier*, IX, p. 662, #7973.


12. All of the dates which mark Napoleon's whereabouts during his journey in Italy were secured from Schuermans, *Itineraire général de Napoleon I, VI*, pp. 169-175.

13. Napoleon during this time was conducting a campaign against Austria.


20. Schuermans, op. cit., p. 227. Talleyrand in his Memoirs says that politics were not discussed that evening.


22. The following memoirs either give very slight mention or no mention at all of the negotiations at Bayonne: Beugnot, Mémoires, Broglie, Souvenirs, Moneval, Mémoirs, Mole, Life and Memoirs of Count Mole, Mollien, Mémoirs, Rochechouart, Mémoirs, Villele, Mémoirs, Vitrolles, Mémoirs.


24. Ibid., p. 282.

25. Pradt, Mémoires historiques sur la révolution d'Espagne, p. 98.


27. Ibid., p. 24.


29. Pradt, Mémoires historiques sur la révolution d'Espagne, p. 103.

30. Ibid.


32. Ibid., p. 285.


34. Fugier, Napoléon et l'Espagne, I, p. 448.


38. Lanzac de Laborie, La domination française en Belgique, II, p. 106.
39. Correspondence de Napoleon Ier, XVII, p. 116, n° 13863.

40. Pradt, Mémoires historiques sur la révolution d'Espagne, p. 131 f.

41. Fugier; op. cit., I, p. 386.

42. Pradt, Mémoires historiques sur la révolution d'Espagne, p. 131 f.

43. Schuermans, op. cit., p. 231.

44. Pradt, Mémoires historiques sur la révolution d'Espagne, p. 196.

45. Ibid., p. 220

46. Ibid., p. 224.

47. Ibid., p. 225-226.

Part II.


2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid., p. 220.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid., p. 221.

7. Ibid., p. 222.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid., p. 224.

10. Ibid., p. 227.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid., p. 228.

15. Lanzac de Laborie, op. cit., p. 231.


17. Lanzac de Laborie, op. cit., II, p. 221.


20. Moniteur, 26 June 1810, p. 697.


23. Pacca has described the invasion of the Quirinal and the arrest and removal of the Pope and himself on the night of 6 July 1809 in his Mémoires sur le pontificat de Pie VII, pp. 116-122. After his arrest he was taken to Fenestrella and kept as a prisoner there from 6 August 1809 to 5 February 1813. He was released at this time as a result of the negotiations between Napoleon and Pius VII on 25 January 1813 when a new concordat was drawn up. The whole of Part III of Pacca's Mémoirs is devoted to his sojourn at Fenestrella.

24. Correspondence de Napoleon Ier, XXI, p. 414, #17268.


26. Ibid., p. 464.


31. Ibid., p. 486.

32. Wickham-Legg, op. cit., p. 199.


36. Correspondence de Napoleon Ier, XXII, p. 479, #18037.

37. Ibid., p. 484, #18043.

38. Ibid., p. 486, #18044.

39. Talleyrand, Memoirs, II, p. 84.

40. Wickham-Legg, op. cit., p. 199


43. Correspondence de Napoleon Ier, XXII, p. 579, #18155


45. Ibid.


Part III.


2. Ibid., pp. 64-66


4. Pradt, Histoire de l'ambassade dans le grand-duche de Varsovie en 1812, p. 68.


6. Ibid., p. 303.

7. Ibid., p. 282.

8. Ibid.

10. Ibid., p. 307.


13. Ibid., p. 295.


15. Ibid., p. 74.


18. Ibid., p. 220.

19. Ibid.

20. Fain, op. cit., I, p. 75.


22. Correspondence de Napoléon Ier, XXII, pp. 516-523, #18134.

23. Ibid.


26. Ibid., p. 143, #410.

27. Pradt, Histoire de l'ambassade, p. 84.


29. Ibid.
31. Ibid., p. 157, #422.
32. Ibid., p. 151, #417.
33. Ernouf, Maret, Duc de Bassano, p. 388.
35. Czartoryski, Memoires, II, p. 220
37. Handelsman, op. cit., II, p. 167, #434
41. Correspondence de Napoleon Ier, XXIII, p. 516, #18734.
42. Pradt, Histoire de l'ambassade, p. 166.
44. Ernouf, op. cit., p. 405, and in Handelsman, II, p. 185 #453.
46. Ibid., p. 218, #489.
47. Ibid., p. 223, #492.
48. Ibid., p. 225, #494.
49. Ibid.
51. Ibid., p. 330.
52. Pradt, Histoire de l'ambassade, p. 162.
66. Caulincourt, *op. cit.*, p. 270
68. Ernouf, *op. cit.*, p. 475
73. Meneval, *Memoirs*, III, p. 34
75. Bignon, *Souvenirs*, p. 132
76. Potocka, *op. cit.*, pp. 306-307
Chapter III.


4. Daupeyroux, "La curieuse vie de l'abbé de Pradt", in *Societe des etudes historiques*, 1927-28, p. 292

5. Lanzac de Laborie, *op. cit.*, II, p. 267


7. Baron Louis was born 1755, emigrated to England 1791, returned with 13 brumières, became councilor of State under Napoleon in 1811, was made director of the Bureau of Disputed Claims, was named minister of finance by the provisional government in 1814 and continued in this office under Louis XVIII.


9. Webster, *Congress of Vienna*, p. 19


32. Pradt, *Recit historique*, p. 64.
41. Vaulabelle, *op. cit.*, p. 355
44. Vaulabelle, *op. cit.*, p. 357
49. Vaulabelle, *op. cit.*, p. 360
52. Michaud, *Biographie Universelle*, v. 78, pp. 8, 9
55. Daupeyroux, *op. cit.*, p. 294, except that Daupeyroux states that Pradt was succeeded by Marshall McDonald. According to *La Grande Encyclopédie*, XXI, p. 1151, McDonald was not appointed till 2 July 1815, following the Hundred Days.
56. Colenbrander, H. T., *Gedenkstukken der algemeene geschiedenis van Nederland van 1795 tot 1840; Gedenkschriften van Anton Reinhard Falck*, VII, Spaan to the Prince of Orange, 2 May 1814, p. 555. Falck was a Dutch statesman who in 1813 was one of the authors of the revolution which had for its aim the establishing of a provisional government of which he became the general secretary of state. Spaan was a diplomat of Holland and represented that country at the headquarters of the Allies in 1814.


59. *Ibid.*, 20 May 1814, p. 583 - Fagel was a Dutch statesman who, during the Napoleonic occupation of Holland went into exile with the royal family. He returned to his country in 1813 and in 1814 was sent as ambassador to London.

60. *Ibid.*, 19 May 1814, Capellan to Nagell, p. 581 - Capellan was royal commissary of the Prince of Orange located at Brussels.

61. *Ibid.*, 16 August 1815, p. 348 - Binder was envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of the Emperor of Austria to the King of Holland.


64. Daupeyroux, *op. cit.*, p. 299.

65. These books were as follows:
- *Du congrès de Vienne, 1815*.
- *Mémoires historiques sur la révolution d'Espagne, 1816*.
- *Des colonies et de la révolution actuelle de l'Amérique, 1817*.
- *Des trois derniers mois de l'Amérique méridionale et du Brésil, 1817*.
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- *Congrès de Carlsbad, 1819*.
- *L'Europe après le congrès d'Aix-la-Chapelle, 1819*.
- *De la révolution actuelle de l'Espagne et de ses suites, 1820*.
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- *Examen du plan présenté aux Cortes pour la reconnaissance de l'indépendance de l'Amérique espagnole, 1822*.
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66. Works on interior policy:
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67. Daupeyroux, op. cit., p. 302

68. Ibid.

69. Lanzac de Laborie, op. cit., p. 268

70. Daupeyroux, op. cit., p. 310

Conclusion

2. Daupeyroux, "La curieuse vie de l'abbé de Pradt", in Société des études historiques, 1927-28, p. 302

3. Pradt, l'Antidote au congrès de Rastadt, p. 40 f.

4. Ibid., p. 37

5. Pradt, Les quatre concordats, III, p. 16


8. See ch. III p. 140


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