THE EFFECT OF DAUGHTERS ON PARTISANSHIP AND SOCIAL ATTITUDES TOWARD WOMEN

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ABSTRACT

Washington (2008) finds that daughters promote liberal voting (at least with respect to women's issues) among U.S. Congress members and attributes this finding to socialization. However, daughters' influence could manifest differently for elite politicians and the general citizenry either due to self-selection or the Trivers-Willard Hypothesis, which suggests that parents invest differently in male and female children depending on their social status. Using nationally-representative data from the General Social Survey, this study asks whether *biological* daughters affect political party identification, traditional views of women, or opinions about abortion and teen sex. We find that female offspring promote identification with the more conservative Republican Party, but this effect depends on social status. There is no evidence that daughters promote liberal views of women and less consistent evidence that they influence views of abortion or teen sex. Overall, evidence supports the Trivers-Willard Hypothesis, but with a more complex interaction by social status.

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Introduction

Previous research finds that daughters make their parents more liberal (Warner 1991; Warner and Steel 1999; Oswald and Powdthavee 2006). Even among members of the U.S. Congress, daughters are associated with views more liberal voting (Washington 2008). However, results could be misleading because this research faces several methodological limitations. First, several studies include non-biological children (adopted and step-children), which could bias results because the sex of non-biological children is not random. If liberal individuals prefer girls over boys, results could be spurious. Second, most research relies on a select sample, limited to either a local sample or a particular group such as U.S. Congress members, among whom the effect of daughters could differ. For both of these reasons, previous results could be driven by selection.

We may expect different results for theoretical results as well. Evolutionary arguments predict that parents will invest differently in male and female children depending on their social status. Congress members, investigated by Washington (2008), are socially and politically elite. If evolutionary arguments are correct, it is likely that the behavioral responses of congress members to having more daughters would differ from the general public. Furthermore, while evolutionary research has investigated the relationship between sex of children and a variety of behaviors (e.g., parental time spent with adolescents [Kanazawa 2001]; financial support for college attendance [Steelman and Powell 1991]; wealth bequests [Smith, Kish, and Crawford 1987]; and spacing of children and breastfeeding [Gaulin and Robbins 1991]), the effect on political views has largely been overlooked.

To address these methodological and theoretical concerns, we exploit the random nature of the sex of biological children in the U.S. to investigate the relationship between sex of

children and political preferences in the general population using data from the General Social Survey.

Theoretical and Empirical Background

Contact theory suggests that social exposure to individuals of a given group generally makes us more sympathetic to the culture, tendencies, needs and so on of said group if that interaction takes place in a non-hierarchical context. Support for this exposure effect on values and beliefs has been found in any number of contexts—such as neighborhoods and dorm rooms—and across many demographic dimensions—ranging from race to age (Deutsch and Collins 1951; Wilner et al. 1955; Caspi 1984; Herek and Capitanio 1996; Desforges et al. 1991; Werth and Lord 1992). The family is no exception to this rule: If we have family members of different groups (age, race, gender, and so on), we should, ostensibly, be more favorably disposed toward other individuals in those groups. Likewise, socialization effects aside, we should expect that individuals' incentives are at least somewhat aligned with those in their family. Indeed, on a range of political and social attitudes, within family correlations are high (Glass et al. 1986; Niemi et al. 1977).

For both of these reasons, we might expect that men and women who spend much of their lives cohabiting with women—sisters, daughters, and others—should have political views that are more in line with those of national political women's organizations as compared to those who do not. Indeed, several studies before us have found that the more daughters or sisters an individual has, the more "progressive" his/her views on women's issues. For example, some research finds that daughters increase parents' feminist views (Warner 1991) and preference for gender equalizing policies – including work, education, and childcare/leave

policies (Warner and Steel 1999). However, this research is limited by the use of a local sample and a blunt measure of presence or absence of daughters as opposed to a finer scale indicating the proportion of daughters.

More recent research by Oswald and Powdthavee (2006) based on the nationally representative British Household Panel Survey (1991 to 2004) finds that, other things held constant, each additional daughter increases a parent's intention to vote liberally (for the Labor or Liberal Democrat Parties as opposed to the Conservative Party) by about 2 percentage points. They exclude those intending to vote for smaller parties, such as the Green or Scottish National Party, and those who are undecided. They argue that daughters make parents subconsciously more sympathetic to leftist policies. However, the data are limited to children who live at home, do not include information on those who have left home, and include step-children. Non-biological children could drive their results since they are not randomly "assigned" so to speak. The same is true for adult children not covered by the household census since there is a slight chance they may selectively migrate out of the parental home in response to parental gender attitudes. In other words, their results could be driven by selection: Parents who are more left-leaning may be more willing to marry into a family with female offspring; left-leaning adults may be more likely to adopt girls than right-leaning adults; and female offspring may desire to leave the parental household sooner when their parents hold less female-friendly political views.

Washington (2008) estimates the effect of number of daughters on Congressional voting, controlling for total number of children. She finds that daughters promote liberal voting among Senators and members of the House of Representatives and attributes this effect to socialization: Daughters make their parents (mostly their fathers) more sensitive to women's issues, she claims. It is unclear, however, whether this effect can be generalized to the general population

for both methodological and theoretical reasons. Methodologically, members of congress are a select group and, as in the case of Oswald and Powdthavee, the effect of daughters on congressional voting could result from selection. Namely, Washington (2008:7) gleans her data on child gender from the *Congressional Directory* or, in case of gender-ambiguous names, from on-line public biographies or telephone conversations with the member's office or a newspaper in their district. She therefore examines the sex of children without distinguishing between adopted, step, and biological offspring. (Washington [p. 5] explicitly notes that, of the 828 congressional representatives for whom she has data, 75 experienced a change in number of children from 1997 to 2004 due to birth, adoption, marriage, divorce, or death.) Here selection is an even more direct problem: While the sex of biological offspring may be random, the sex of adopted or even step children is most certainly not. Further, liberal individuals who have daughters might spend less time with their families and devote more time to political ascension; or they may be particularly motivated to ascend the political ladder as compared to liberal individuals who only have sons. Or, it could be the case that liberal voters tend to elect politicians who have daughters while conservative voters are more likely to elect politicians who have sons. Given the extent to which politicians use their families as "props" to send signals about their views and character, this seems plausible. On the other hand, among the general citizenry there is no selection gradient to filter out the less-motivated from the super-motivated in simply expressing their political preferences. Given stark differences between a highly-selected group of politicians and the general population, the effect of daughters on political preferences may be very different between the two groups. (Even if these selection arguments do not explain the extant pattern of results, at the very least, they suggest that there may be heterogeneous treatment effects even if selection is not at work.)

Despite existing evidence (and relevant theory) suggesting that additional daughters should lead to more politically liberal attitudes, there is adequate reason for pause. The evidence does not all go in the direction of additional daughters leading to more liberal views. For instance, research using national survey data from the National Survey of Families and Households found that sons increase the egalitarian views of married women with children ages 3 to 18 in the home (Katzev, Warner, and Acock 1994).[1] Conservative policies—anti-abortion, pro-traditional family structure and so on—seem to constrain the freedom of women. So why would parents of daughters want to hem in the life choices of their offspring? In fact, the rise of women's rights has been attributed elsewhere to the shift from men's interests in constraining their wives in favor of their interests in preventing their daughters from being exploited as property (Fernandez 2009).

In contrast to the argument that women promote liberal political views – maintained in much of the existing relevant empirical and theoretical work – if one takes an evolutionary perspective, alternative and more complex predictions ensue. One such counter-argument is the Trivers-Willard hypothesis (TWH), which suggests that parental investment in sons and daughters depends on parental status (Trivers 1972; Trivers and Willard 1973). Specifically, in order to maximize reproductive fitness (i.e. number of grandchildren), higher status individuals

[1] However, this study focuses on explaining mothers' perception of marital instability, with traditional family roles as a mediator, and it studies the effect of offspring sex on traditional gender roles in the family – such as the appropriateness of mothers' employment, marriage, divorce, and cohabitation – rather than opinions about broader gender roles that are more relevant to political views and policy.

will devote more resources to sons while lower status individuals will favor daughters. In other words, parents with *low* status should favor females, whose reproductive chances are less risky and depend less on external conditions (Hopcroft 2005). In contrast, parents with *high* status should favor males according to this hypothesis, because their sons will have an advantage in competing for mates and should be able to produce more children than high status daughters. If these strategic preferences manifest in political preferences, the TWH would expect daughters to produce different political responses depending on parental status.

Since sons can potentially generate high numbers of grandchildren if they have a competitive edge against other men, they may induce preferences for more libertine social norms and policies—ones where paternal investment is low and restraints on male fecundity are minimal. Meanwhile, daughters may elicit grandparental preferences for a world in which male sexuality is constrained and paternal investment in offspring is greater. In summary, in contrast to much previous research we hypothesize that daughters may increase preference for conservative policies in the general population. In the U.S., because the Republican Party is generally more conservative than the Democratic Party with respect to family values as well as social and fiscal policies, we predict that daughters will increase parental identification with the Republican Party.

However, according to the TWH, this relationship should be conditional on parental social status. Among low status parents (and the general population in contrast to Congress members), more daughters should promote Republican identification. Among high status parents, daughters should yield no effect unless parents have no sons and expect no further children (which is difficult to measure, but could shift their strategy to favor daughters).

To complicate the idea of conservatism, reproductive arguments suggest that women

have an interest in constraining male sexuality and increasing paternal investment in children. For these reasons, reproductive theory may imply that daughters should be associated with less traditional views of women but conservative views of teen sex (consistent with constrained sexuality and greater investment in children). Socialization theory also predicts that daughters will reduce traditional views of women, but does not predict a particular relationship between daughters and views of teen sex. Important to note is that whether or not conservative policies actually reduce teen sex is not important (and there is adequate evidence that they, in fact, do not succeed [Guttmacher Institute 2010]).

In summary, we hypothesize that parental reproductive investment strategies manifest in political views. In contrast to much previous research we hypothesize that daughters may increase some aspects of conservatism among general citizens, but decrease those that hinder female reproductive fitness. Specifically, we predict that daughters will increase parental identification with the Republican Party, the more conservative of the two main political parties in the U.S. At the same time, however, daughters should have a different effect on views of abortion and traditional gender norms. Consistent with both socialization and reproductive arguments, daughters should be associated with pro-choice views of abortion and less traditional gender views. However, reproductive theory also implies that daughters should increase conservative views of teen sex.

Finally, these relationships should differ by social status according to the TWH so we investigate interaction effects by occupational socioeconomic index score. We also investigate potential interaction effects by gender and age. Socialization explanations for the effect of daughters may predict a declining effect with age. As parents get older, they probably spend less time with their children and any socialization effects may have lost potency over time.

Alternatively, men may be more susceptible to socialization from daughters because they would otherwise have less exposure to women and their interests. Socialization explanations might expect a weaker effect of daughters for women than men. While the general population is lower status than members of congress, the Trivers-Willard hypothesis could equally predict different responses to daughters by social status among respondents in the GSS. Unlike socialization theory, reproductive theory suggests the effect of daughters on political views could depend on social status. While sample sizes are adequate for the main analyses, results may be less convincing for the interaction analyses due to smaller sample sizes and self-selection into occupational status (SEI score).

To preview our results, our findings contradict those of Washington, supporting the TWH that effect of daughters depends on social status. With or without controls for gender, religion, age of eldest biological child, education, marital status, size of city of residence, and generation age gap, the proportion of (biological) girls significantly increases Republican Party identification in the United States. However, this effect holds only for high status parents. In addition, we find that daughters are related to more pro-choice abortion attitudes and disapproval of teen sex, but these results are less consistent than those for party identification. These results are most consistent with but complicate the Trivers-Willard hypothesis.

Data and Methods

In a society where antenatal sex-selective abortion is rare, the sex of a particular biological child is a random variable. This study uses nationally representative data from the 1994 General Social Survey (GSS) to estimate the effect of the proportion of daughters on political views. The 1994 GSS is the only year with information about the sex of respondent's

children. Now more than 15 years old, the 1994 survey remains valid for our analysis because the two party system has not changed in the US. However, there may have been some slight changes in the interim, so our findings should be interpreted as valid in 1994.

To increase internal validity, the sample excludes individuals without children and limits analysis to biological children. The models shown include individuals with biological children who may also have non-biological (adopted, step, or cohabiting children) because those with a particular party preference also prefer female children or other family members. While excluding individuals with any non-biological children could therefore bias results, regressions excluding them yield similar results but often provide less precise estimates. Regressions shown below estimate the effect of having a greater proportion of female biological children compared to parents with a lower proportion of daughters (they do not compare parents and non-parents).

The GSS data are cross-sectional, but because the sex of each individual child is random, this is a case where one can make causal inference from cross-sectional data. Ideally, we would also like to have data on partisanship before and after the birth of a child to observe change over time, but because the sex of biological children is random, we do not anticipate any bias due to cross-sectional data. If we were using daughters as an instrumental variable to estimate the effects of partisanship on some other outcome, we would be concerned about the exclusion restriction (i.e. that daughters may also be related to the outcome through fitness or some factor other than political identification). However, since we are estimating the "first stage" effect only, results have internal validity.

Another potential concern is that characteristics of the parents may influence the sex ratio of their children (e.g., one aspect of the Trivers and Willard 1973 hypothesis suggests that

a nutrient rich maternal diet can increase the likelihood of male children), which would make child sex non-random. This is not testable but it would be completely surprising if, indeed, political conservatism (or liberalism) led to skewed sex ratios. Even if this were the case, it would be important to document. That said, given the limited evidence for facultative sex selection in humans (individuals changing the sex ratio of their offspring), it would appear to be a slim possibility. Even if we had longitudinal data, it would be impossible to distinguish whether political leaning is causing the sex of offspring or whether, as we posit, it is the result, since we would need to know the exact timing of the change of political views vis-à-vis the pregnancy, knowledge of the sex of the offspring (even if while still in the womb via ultrasound) and, ultimately, the birth of the child and any socialization effect she might have on her parents. In other words, while we cannot fully address this potential concern, it is highly unlikely. To help reduce the possibility, we show that results remain unchanged with and without controls included and we investigate the relationship between the sex-mix of biological children and a variety of measures that are included as controls (see Table S3, Panels B and C). We find no relationship, suggesting that sex mix of children is random, at least with respect to the control measures. However, when all other controls are included, we find a small but significant relationship between years of education and sex of the first biological child. The causal arrow could go in either direction, with education slightly encouraging first-born males or eldest daughters encouraging or enabling parents to gain more education. Controlling for education helps to address this potential non-random relationship.

If parents have a preference for boy or girl children, the proportion of daughters may be related to total number of children. In fact, Angrist and Evans (1998) and Conley and Glauber (2006) have used the sex-mix of children as an instrument for total number of children because

parents who have two children of the same sex are more likely to have a third child. To address this concern, we also investigate the relationship between party identification and first-child sex, which is unrelated to family size. In these regressions, we limit the sample to those whose first child is biological.

To further address concern that the proportion of daughters is related to family size, in Table S3, Panel A we regress total biological children on daughters. We do not find a relationship between the sex-mix of children or sex of first child and total number of children. As a further measure, we also run all regressions using Washington's approach, which involves controlling for the total number of children, and find similar results. All of these steps reduce any concern that family size is related to the sex-mix of children. Finally, Table S3, Panel B shows mean characteristics of individuals in the sample by sex of first child. Aside from proportion daughters (which is expected), none of the differences are significant between those who had a boy versus a girl first. These results are not conclusive but suggest there is not an underlying difference driving both sex-mix of biological children and political partisanship.

Measures

Control variables include gender, religion, age of eldest biological child, generation age gap between parent and eldest biological child, education, size of the respondent's place of residence, and marital status,[2] all factors that are related to political party identification. Age is

[2] Marital status is a potential confounding factor. Early work by Morgan et al. (1988) found that sons decrease the likelihood of divorce, conditional on total number of offspring. Research by Lundberg and Rose (2003) and Dahl and Moretti (2004) also argues that sons reduce the risk of divorce and increase the likelihood that single parents will marry. Lundberg and Rose (2002,

also related to party identification, but is equal to age of eldest biological child plus generation age gap, so it drops out of regression models when those controls are included. Note that the sex of biological children is random so the estimated effect would be valid without controlling for even these basic characteristics and results are similar without controls. Female, Protestant, and currently married are measured with indicators. Child age, generation age gap, and education are measured in years. Size of place is measured in (hundred thousand) residents.

Party identification is measured as an indicator for Democrat or Republican identification and also on a scale (called Republican Scale below) from strong Democrat (-3) to strong Republican (3) with Independents in the middle (0). Results presented below hold with no controls, controlling for total number of children, and regardless of how party identification is measured.

We also investigate the effect of daughters on traditional views of women and opinions about abortion and teen sex. Views of women are measured using several outcomes and an index of 6 indicators of conservative views of women. "Women should tend home" is a scale from 0 to 3 (strongly disagree to strongly agree) that it would be better for everyone if the man is the achiever outside the home and the woman takes care of the home and family. "Women should help husband" is a similar scale from 0 to 3 that it is more important for a wife to help her husband's career than to have one herself. "Women not political" is an indicator for the view that women are not suited for politics. The index of conservative views is the sum of indicators for belief that: women should stay home; women should not work: would not vote for

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2004) attribute this to higher leisure time fathers spend with families when they have a son, and the higher utility received from those marriages by fathers. Marital status is controlled in all models below but, given endogeneity concerns, results are similar when excluding it.

a woman president: women not political; women should help husband (strongly agree or agree dummy); and women should tend home (strongly agree or agree dummy) (Cronbach's $\alpha = 0.74$).

Views of abortion are similarly measured using several indicators and an index of pro-choice views. "Abortion OK for health" indicates a belief that abortion should be legal if the woman's health is seriously endangered by the pregnancy. "Abortion OK if poor" indicates abortion should be legal if the family has very low income and cannot afford more children. "Abortion OK if single" indicates it should be possible to obtain a legal abortion if the woman is single and does not want to marry the man. The pro-abortion index is the sum of indicators that abortion should be okay for: health, poverty, single, strong chance of serious defect in the baby, married and does not want more children, and pregnant due to rape (Cronbach's $\alpha = 0.87$). For views of women and abortion, both the index and individual indicators are regressed separately on the sex mix of children to see whether only certain views are related to the proportion of daughters. Finally, "teen sex always wrong" indicates the belief that premarital sex in one's early teens is always wrong, as opposed to almost always wrong, sometimes wrong, or not wrong at all.

Results

The association between daughters and political identification is illustrated in Figure 1. It shows the proportion identifying as Republican or Democrat by proportion of female children for a two-child family. Out of concern about a potential relationship between daughters and family size, larger families are not illustrated in the figure, but they are included in the regression sample and they show the same general relationship but not necessarily linearly. Figure 2 shows the relationship between sex of first child and party identification. In both

figures, daughters are positively related to Republican identification. Table 1 shows results for linear probability models predicting party identification. Having a higher proportion of daughters significantly reduces the likelihood of Democratic identification and significantly increases the strength of Republican Party identification. Compared to those with no daughters, parents with all daughters are 14% less likely to identify as a Democrat, whether or not we include controls for gender, religion, age of eldest child, generation age gap, education, size of place, and marital status. Parents who had a daughter first are 6% less likely to identify as a Democrat. Similarly, parents who had a daughter first are 6% more likely to identify as Republican and parents with all daughters are 11% more likely to identify as a Republican than parents with no daughters.

[Table 1 here]

When specifying Republican identification as a continuous measure, Republican identification for those with all daughters is half a point higher than those with none. Parents whose first child was a girl score a quarter of a point higher than others. These effects would push borderline independents to be Republicans. Across all three measures, daughters significantly strengthen conservative identification. This relationship holds when controlling for total number of children or using an alternative specification of at least one daughter. Meanwhile, deploying Washington's method – that is, estimating the effect of number of daughters while controlling for total children – yields similar results, although the effects are smaller. Results are also consistent when excluding non-biological children. The estimates are nearly identical with and without controls included, which supports our contention that sex mix of biological children is random. In summary, regardless of model specification, daughters consistently increase conservative party identification in the United States.

[Tables 2 and 3 here]

Table 2 provides effects of daughters on traditional views of women. Whether specifying proportion of daughters, having a girl first, or having at least one daughter, female children nearly always have a negative relationship with traditional views, but the effect is never significant.

Table 3 shows results predicting pro-choice abortion and teen sex views. The proportion of daughters significantly increases the likelihood that parents believe teenage sex is always wrong. Effects are positive for pro-choice views of abortion, but do not reach significance at the 95% level. Similarly, parents who have a daughter first are more likely to have pro-choice and anti-teen sex views, but these differences are not significantly different from parents who have a son first. Parents with at least one daughter are significantly more likely to report pro-choice abortion views. Compared to parents with all sons, parents with at least one daughter are 6% and 10% more likely to state that abortion should be legal if the woman's health is endangered or if the woman is single and does not want to marry the man, respectively. These parents score significantly higher (0.38 points) on the index of pro-abortion views and are more likely to agree that abortion should be legal if the family cannot afford more children (although this last effect is only significant at the 90% level). The presence of daughters therefore seems to have a slight liberal effect on pro-choice views and a higher proportion of daughters increases conservative views of teen sex.

Finally, Table 4 shows interaction effects between daughters and parent's socioeconomic index (SEI) score. Regressions in Panel A find that, among high SEI parents (SEI above 65, which is the 80th percentile in the sample), the proportion of daughters significantly reduces Democrat identification and increases Republican identification. For

example, compared to high SEI parents with no daughters, high SEI parents with all daughters are 19% more likely to identify as Republican. Among low SEI parents (SEI score of 65 and below), however, the coefficients are much smaller and in the same direction, but there is no significant relationship between daughters and party identification. This suggests that the sex mix of children only influences party identification among high SEI parents. Panel B compares the relationship between SEI score and party identification by sex of first child. Parents who had a son first are slightly more likely to identify as Republican for each additional SEI point. Parents who had a daughter first show no such relationship. Results in both Panels A and B are similar when including controls (not shown).

Thus, consistent with the TWH, Table 4 shows that parental strategic response to the sex mix of children is conditional on parental status. However, the TWH predicted that daughters should promote Republican identification most among low status parents. We only find this relationship among high status parents. Similarly, TWH may suggest that having a son first should reduce Republican identification among parents with higher SEI scores and increase it for those whose first child was female. Instead, we find that having a son first makes SEI score positively related to Republican identity but having a daughter first produces no association between SEI and party identification. These results are intriguing and could suggest that having a daughter first generates a more complex relationship between SEI and party identification, given the distinction we discuss above between political party, abortion views, and traditional gender norms, for example. Thus, while the broad pattern is consistent with the TWH prediction that effects are conditional on social status, the specific results are less consistent. These results could reflect the complexity of political views.

To test socialization theory, we also investigated interaction effects of daughters with

parental sex and age. In only one case – whether predicting party identification, views of women, or beliefs about abortion or teen sex – does the effect of daughters significantly differ by gender. Compared to men, daughters make women less likely to agree that women should not be involved in politics. However, this interaction does not hold when predicting any other measures. In two cases, age significantly moderates the effect of daughters. Those with any daughters are less likely to believe that it is more important for a wife to help her husband's career than to have one herself. But as an individual ages, having any daughters begins to increase agreement that a wife should help her husband's career. Similarly, the effect of having a daughter first on Republican identification turns positive with age. Despite these few moderating effects, in general, the effect of daughters holds regardless of individual sex or age. This pattern holds when excluding those with non-biological children. Thus, the overwhelming absence of interaction effects suggests results hold across gender and age.

Finally, the above results address party identification. Voting patterns may differ from identification or political views. Table S4 investigates the effect of daughters on vote in the 1992 presidential election. Consistent with the results above, daughters consistently decreased the likelihood of voting Democrat (Clinton), although this effect is only significant at the $p<0.1$ level in three out of four models. In model 4, compared to a parent with no daughters, a parent with all daughters was 10% less likely to vote for Clinton ($p<.05$). In contrast, the proportion daughters or having a daughter first is positively associated with voting for Bush, but never reaches significance and is only marginally significant in one model.

Discussion

Results contradict both Washington (2008) and Oswald and Powdthavee (2006). If daughters affect political views by socializing parents, the effect of daughters should be similar for both politicians and general citizens. On the other hand, if parental investment strategies in children (and therefore political interests) depend on social status as predicted by the TWH, daughters may increase conservative party identification among the general population but not among high status members of congress. We find support for the latter interpretation and, while highly speculative, evidence for at least the plausibility of evolutionary theories of inclusive fitness as they relate to sex-specific reproductive strategies.

While daughters slightly increase the likelihood of identifying with the Republican Party (and voting for the presidential candidate affiliated with that party in 1992), this is certainly not the only or most important factor predicting party identification. Our results suggest that sex mix of children is one of many factors contributing to party identification. Furthermore, we only investigate the effect of the sex of children, not other members of the household or family. The sex mix of a variety of other groups (such as the sibship with whom the respondent was reared during his/her formative years) may have important implications for party identification as well, but this study is limited to children.

The general lack of interaction effects by gender or age, especially coupled with significant interaction effects by SEI, further contradicts socialization explanations for the effect of daughters. Warner (1991) found different effects of daughters on feminist views for men and women in the U.S. In contrast, our results for daughters' influence on views of women are not significantly different for men and women. Finally, there is a small amount of evidence that daughters are related to anti-teen sex views, which is consistent with the reproductive explanation for effects of daughters. Anti-teen sex views among parents of girls are consistent

with efforts to reduce male promiscuity and thus increase the bargaining power of female offspring in sex and mating dynamics.

Pro-choice views are consistent with greater investment in children taken to term and greater control and selectivity of reproduction on the part of mothers. That is, by having the option of an abortion, a woman can terminate a pregnancy conceived with a man who shows signs of abrogating expectations of paternal investment (be that time or money). While pro-choice views are not consistent with reproductive fitness arguments, the limited evidence suggesting a relationship between daughters and pro-choice views further supports the idea that the sex mix of children influence parents' political views. In this case, however, parents seem to value the interests of their children (specifically daughters) over increasing their number of grandchildren. Surprisingly, we do not find any evidence that daughters promote liberal views of women. This suggests that the effect of daughters on party identification is not mediated by an effect on views of women and counters socialization arguments.

Finally, consistent with the Trivers-Willard hypothesis, results show that the effect of daughters on party identification is conditional on occupational status. However, the specific interaction results are slightly different from what the TWH predicts. While TWH expects daughters to increase conservative preferences most among *low* SEI parents, we find that daughters increase Republican identification, but only among *high* SEI parents. Similarly, we find that having a daughter first produces no association between SEI and party identification, while having a son first makes SEI positively related to Republican identity, which is different than the relationship implied by the TWH. Thus, while the broad pattern is consistent with the TWH prediction that effects are conditional on social status, the specific results are less

consistent. Results could complicate the TWH but could equally reflect the complexity of political preferences.

One implication of our findings is that if individuals seek to maximize their chances of passing on genes to future generations ("inclusive fitness"), both men and women may desire more conservative policies when they have more female genetic kin. There is an inherent conflict between parents that is particularly acute in species that invest heavily in offspring (so-called K-strategy organisms). Males' optimal reproductive strategy is to sire many offspring with a range of mates and push the parenting requirements onto the mothers. Meanwhile, the mother seeks to maximize not only the genetic fitness of the sire, but also to induce more post-conception investment in rearing the offspring from the father. Seen in this light, more conservative policies that increase the cost of promiscuity—particularly for males—will enhance the reproductive bargaining power of women. If individual interests lie in genetic endurance, both men and women with more daughters should prefer socially conservative policies favored by the Republican Party: an emphasis on family and teen abstinence, which stress investment in children.

Women are certainly not a homogeneous group and have diverse views and priorities. However, from a biological point of view, women share reproductive interests. In short, we find that parents of daughters favor the Republican Party. Evidence suggests this is partly because Republican policies support the genetic fitness of women by reducing promiscuity and increasing paternal investment in children. Such policies may impinge on the freedom of parents' immediate offspring, but they increase the expected number of grandchildren via daughters. While evolutionary arguments such as these can often be ad hoc and untestable, we think that in this case they merit attention given the pattern of effects our analysis reveals. We

welcome, of course, replication tests of our findings with other datasets that combine information on political views with a census of offspring sex just as we hope that others will test the Trivers-Willard hypothesis and other sex-specific reproductive strategy arguments using other creative approaches.

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Table 1: Effect of Daughters on Party Identification – Linear Probability Models

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	Democrat				Republican				Republican Scale			
1st Child Female	-0.06+		-0.06*		0.06*		0.06*		0.25*		0.26*	
	(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.10)		(0.09)	
% Daughters		-0.14*		-0.14*		0.11*		0.11*		0.51*		0.50*
		(0.06)		(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.21)		(0.19)
Female			-0.03	-0.04			0.02	0.03			0.07	0.08
			(0.03)	(0.03)			(0.03)	(0.03)			(0.10)	(0.10)
Protestant			-0.07*	-0.06*			0.09*	0.08*			0.26*	0.24*
			(0.03)	(0.03)			(0.03)	(0.03)			(0.09)	(0.08)
Education in Years			-0.01	-0.01			0.02*	0.02*			0.07+	0.07
			(0.01)	(0.01)			(0.01)	(0.01)			(0.04)	(0.04)
Married			-0.15**	-0.15**			0.12**	0.11**			0.59**	0.59**
			(0.03)	(0.03)			(0.03)	(0.03)			(0.12)	(0.12)
Size of Place (100k)			0.00	0.00			-0.00**	-0.00**			-0.01+	-0.01+
			(0.00)	(0.00)			(0.00)	(0.00)			(0.01)	(0.01)
Age Eldest Bio Child			-0.00	-0.00			0.00+	0.00+			0.00	0.00
			(0.00)	(0.00)			(0.00)	(0.00)			(0.00)	(0.00)
Generation Age Gap			-0.00	-0.00			0.01	0.01			0.02	0.02
			(0.00)	(0.00)			(0.00)	(0.00)			(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant	0.50**	0.54**	0.91**	0.94**	0.37**	0.34**	-0.26*	-0.27*	-0.27**	-0.39**	-2.33**	-2.42**
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.49)	(0.51)
Observations	1,051	1,051	1,051	1,051	1,051	1,051	1,051	1,051	1,051	1,051	1,051	1,051
R-squared	0.004	0.010	0.034	0.040	0.003	0.007	0.052	0.054	0.004	0.008	0.043	0.047

** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1; Robust standard errors in parentheses

All models are weighted and limited to those with biological children. Proportion of daughters excludes non-biological children. Models predicting Republican Scale are traditional OLS not linear probability models.

Results are similar with other specifications, including at least one daughter and Washington's approach (estimating the effect of number of daughters and controlling for total number of children). However, number of biological children may be endogenous, so our approach is preferred.

Table 2: Effect of Daughters on Traditional Views of Women – Linear Probability Models

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	Women Should Tend Home			Women Not Political			Women Should Help Husband			Conservative Views of Women		
% Daughters	-0.07			-0.04			0.04			-0.03		
	(0.11)			(0.05)			(0.09)			(0.20)		
1st Child Female		-0.05			-0.02			-0.02			-0.07	
		(0.06)			(0.04)			(0.05)			(0.10)	
At Least 1 Daughter			-0.12			-0.06			-0.08			-0.18
			(0.10)			(0.04)			(0.09)			(0.13)
Female	-0.18+	-0.19+	-0.19+	0.02	0.02	0.02	-0.23*	-0.23*	-0.24*	-0.16	-0.17	-0.17
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)
Protestant	0.19**	0.19**	0.19**	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.07	0.08	0.08	0.25*	0.25*	0.25*
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Education in Years	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.02*	-0.02*	-0.02*	-0.04**	-0.04**	-0.04**	-0.12**	-0.12**	-0.12**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Married	0.11*	0.11*	0.12*	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.07	0.07	0.08
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.09)
Size of Place (100k)	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	0.00**	0.00**	0.00**	0.00**	0.00**	0.01**	0.01**	0.01**	0.01**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Age Eldest Bio Child	0.01**	0.01**	0.01**	0.00*	0.00*	0.00*	0.02**	0.02**	0.02**	0.03**	0.03**	0.03**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Generation Age Gap	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01+	0.01+	0.01	0.01**	0.01**	0.01**	0.03**	0.03**	0.03**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	1.13**	1.13**	1.18**	0.26+	0.26+	0.29+	0.94**	0.97**	1.01**	1.18*	1.21*	1.28*
	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.24)	(0.40)	(0.42)	(0.43)
Observations	651	651	651	651	651	651	651	651	651	651	651	651
R-squared	0.163	0.163	0.166	0.041	0.040	0.044	0.198	0.198	0.200	0.195	0.196	0.198

** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Women Should Tend Home: much better for everyone if the man is the achiever outside the home and the woman takes care of the home and family – strongly disagree to strongly agree (0-3)

Women Not Political: women not suited for politics indicator

Women Should Help Husband: more important for a wife to help her husband's career than to have one herself – strongly disagree to strongly agree (0-3)

Conservative Views of Women Scale = index of indicators for: women should stay home, women should not work, would not vote for woman president, women not political, women help husband, and women tend home; Cronbach's α= 0.74. These models are traditional OLS not linear probability models.

Table 3: Effect of Daughters on Pro-Choice Views of Abortion and Anti-Teen Sex – Linear Probability Models
Panel A

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	Abortion OK for Health			Abortion OK if Poor			Abortion OK if Single		
% Daughters	0.06+			0.09			0.09		
	(0.03)			(0.06)			(0.05)		
1st Child Female		0.04+			0.05			0.05	
		(0.02)			(0.06)			(0.03)	
At Least 1 Daughter			0.06*			0.08+			0.10**
			(0.02)			(0.04)			(0.03)
Female	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01	0.07	0.07	0.08	0.05	0.05	0.06
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Protestant	0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.06	-0.06	-0.06	-0.06	-0.06	-0.06
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Education in Years	0.01**	0.01**	0.01**	0.02**	0.02**	0.02**	0.02*	0.02*	0.02*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Married	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02	-0.04	-0.04	-0.04	-0.08	-0.08	-0.08
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Size of Place (100k)	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00+	0.00*	0.00*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Age Eldest Bio Child	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Generation Age Gap	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	0.00	-0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Constant	0.77**	0.78**	0.75**	0.13	0.15	0.12	0.10	0.12	0.08
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.21)
Observations	661	661	661	661	661	661	661	661	661
R-squared	0.012	0.011	0.016	0.033	0.031	0.034	0.035	0.033	0.038

Robust standard errors in parentheses
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1

Panel B

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Pro-Abortion Index			Teen Sex Always Wrong		
% Daughters	0.37			0.11*		
	(0.20)			(0.04)		
1st Child Female		0.22			0.04	
		(0.15)			(0.04)	
At Least 1 Daughter			0.38*			0.12
			(0.13)			(0.07)
Female	0.23	0.22	0.23	0.12+	0.12+	0.13+
	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Protestant	-0.14	-0.12	-0.14	0.14**	0.14**	0.14**
	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Education in Years	0.09**	0.09**	0.09**	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Married	-0.17	-0.17	-0.17	0.09+	0.09+	0.09+
	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Size of Place (100k)	0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.01**	-0.01**	-0.01**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Age Eldest Bio Child	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Generation Age Gap	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Constant	2.63**	2.70**	2.56*	0.74**	0.76**	0.72**
	(0.78)	(0.74)	(0.79)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.12)
Observations	661	661	661	333	333	333
R-squared	0.027	0.026	0.030	0.124	0.118	0.132

Robust standard errors in parentheses

** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1

Abortion OK for Health: abortion should be legal if the woman's health is seriously endangered by the pregnancy

Abortion OK if Poor: abortion should be legal if the family has very low income and cannot afford more children

Abortion OK if Single: should be possible to obtain a legal abortion if the woman is single and does not want to marry the man

Pro-Abortion Views: index of abortion should be okay for: health, poverty, single, strong chance of serious defect in the baby, married and does not want more children, pregnant due to rape; Cronbach's $\alpha = 0.87$. These models use traditional OLS rather than linear probability models.

Teen Sex Always Wrong: premarital sex in early teens is always wrong

Table 4: Interaction Effects by Socioeconomic Status

Panel A: Effect of Daughters on Political Party Identification by SEI

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	High SEI			Low SEI		
VARIABLES	Democrat	Republican	Repub Scale	Democrat	Republican	Repub Scale
% Daughters	-0.31**	0.19**	1.03**	-0.09	0.08	0.35
	(0.069)	(0.054)	(0.264)	(0.064)	(0.050)	(0.208)
Constant	0.59**	0.37**	-0.43*	0.53**	0.34**	-0.38**
	(0.047)	(0.045)	(0.178)	(0.027)	(0.024)	(0.073)
Observations	244	244	244	824	824	824
R-squared	0.049	0.018	0.031	0.004	0.004	0.004

Panel B: Relationship between SEI and Political Party Identification by Sex of First Child

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	First Child Male			First Child Female		
VARIABLES	Democrat	Republican	Repub Scale	Democrat	Republican	Repub Scale
SEI Score	-0.002	0.004**	0.017**	-0.001	0.002	0.003
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.006)
Constant	0.594**	0.162**	-1.123**	0.526**	0.341**	-0.229
	(0.049)	(0.039)	(0.159)	(0.073)	(0.059)	(0.303)
Observations	532	532	532	478	478	478
R-squared	0.005	0.028	0.025	0.003	0.003	0.001

Robust standard errors in parentheses

** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1

The high SEI cutoff is 65, which is approximately the 80th percentile. Results are similar including controls.

Figure 1: Observed Party Identification by Proportion Girls and Sex of First Child



Family size may be related to proportion girls, so larger family sizes are not shown.



Table S1. Descriptive Statistics: GSS 1994

Variable	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
% Daughters	1051	0.47	0.36	0	1
1st Child Female	1051	0.47	0.50	0	1
At Least 1 Daughter	1051	0.73	0.44	0	1
Total Bio Daughters	1051	1.15	1.03	0	7
Total Bio Children	1051	2.44	1.38	1	9
Democrat	1051	0.48	0.50	0	1
Republican	1051	0.39	0.49	0	1
Republican Scale	1051	-0.18	2.05	-3	3
Female	1051	0.62	0.48	0	1
Protestant	1051	0.64	0.48	0	1
Education (years)	1051	12.92	2.93	0	20
Married	1051	0.62	0.49	0	1
Size of Place (100k)	1051	3.09	10.83	0	73.23
Age Eldest Bio Child	1051	25.04	16.16	0	75
Generation Age Gap	1051	24.28	5.16	11	52
Age	1051	49.32	16.20	19	89
Women Tend Home	634	1.29	0.81	0	3
Women Not Political	634	0.22	0.42	0	1
Women Help Husband	634	1.04	0.74	0	3
Conserv. Views of Women	634	1.20	1.50	0	6
Abortion OK for Health	661	0.88	0.32	0	1
Abortion OK if Poor	661	0.45	0.50	0	1
Abortion OK if Single	661	0.44	0.50	0	1
Pro-Abortion Views	661	3.81	2.05	0	6
Teen Sex Always Wrong	333	0.77	0.42	0	1

The sample excludes those without any biological children or missing values for other measures.

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Table S2. Correlation Matrix

	Republican	Democrat	Republican Scale	Female	Protestant	Education (years)	Married	Size of Place (100k)	Age Eldest Bio Child	Generation Age Gap
Republican	1									
Democrat	-0.76*	1								
Republican Scale	0.89*	-0.89*	1							
Female	0.00	-0.01	-0.01	1						
Protestant	0.09*	-0.06*	0.07*	0.07*	1					
Education (years)	0.12*	-0.07*	0.11*	-0.02	-0.12*	1				
Married	0.12*	-0.12*	0.13*	-0.20*	-0.02	0.15*	1			
Size of Place (100k)	-0.06*	0.05	-0.07*	0.01	-0.08*	0.05	-0.04	1		
Age Eldest Bio Child	0.05	-0.02	0.03	0.08*	0.17*	-0.27*	-0.14*	-0.03	1	
Generation Gap Eldest	0.09*	-0.06	0.08*	-.26*	-.14*	0.29*	0.13*	-0.01	-.15*	1
Age	0.08*	-0.04	0.05	0.00	0.12*	-0.18*	-0.10*	-0.03	.95*	.17*

* p<.05

Table S3: Investigating Family Size, Sex Mix of Children, and Sex of First Child

Panel A: Family Size by Sex of Children

VARIABLES	Total Biological Children			
	(1)	(2)@	(3)	(4)@
% Daughters	-0.02	-0.07		
	(0.10)	(0.10)		
1st Child Female			0.02	-0.02
			(0.09)	(0.08)
Constant	2.51**	3.07**	2.49**	3.05**
	(0.08)	(0.36)	(0.07)	(0.35)
Observations	1,051	1,051	1,051	1,051
R-squared	0.000	0.220	0.000	0.220

** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1; Robust standard errors in parentheses

@Includes controls for: Female; Protestant; Education; Married; Size of Place (in 100,000s); Age of Eldest Biological Child; Generation Age Gap

All models are weighted and exclude individuals with no biological children.

Panel B: Mean Comparisons by Sex of First Biological Child

	Female	Male
Total Bio Children	2.47	2.42
% Daughters *	0.75	0.23
Female	0.60	0.64
Protestant	0.65	0.62
Education (yrs)	12.84	12.99
Married	0.62	0.61
Size of Place (100k)	3.28	2.93
Age Eldest Bio Child	25.41	24.70
Generation Gap Eldest	24.34	24.24
Age	49.75	48.94
N	492	559

* Indicates a significant difference in means (p<.05). Only % daughters is significantly different by sex of first child.

Panel C: Predicted Sex Mix of Children

VARIABLES	(1) 1st Child Female	(2) % Daughters
Female	-0.04	-0.04
	(0.03)	(0.02)
Protestant	0.03	0.04
	(0.04)	(0.03)
Education in Years	-0.01*	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Married	0.01	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.03)
Size of Place (100k)	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Age Eldest Bio Child	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Generation Age Gap	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Constant	0.50**	0.43**
	(0.09)	(0.06)
Observations	1,051	1,051
R-squared	0.007	0.010

** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1; Robust standard errors in parentheses
All models are weighted and exclude individuals with no biological children.

Table S4: Effect of Daughters on Presidential Vote in 1992 – Linear Probability Models

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Voted for Clinton				Voted for Bush			
1st Child Female	-0.07+		-0.08+		0.05		0.05	
	(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.04)		(0.04)	
% Daughters		-0.10+		-0.10*		0.10		0.11+
		(0.05)		(0.04)		(0.06)		(0.05)
Female			-0.00	-0.00			0.06*	0.06*
			(0.03)	(0.03)			(0.03)	(0.03)
Protestant			-0.05	-0.05			0.05	0.05
			(0.03)	(0.03)			(0.04)	(0.04)
Education in Years			-0.01	-0.01			0.01	0.01
			(0.01)	(0.01)			(0.01)	(0.01)
Married			-0.14**	-0.14**			0.11*	0.11**
			(0.02)	(0.02)			(0.03)	(0.03)
Size of Place (100k)			0.01**	0.01**			-0.00**	-0.01**
			(0.00)	(0.00)			(0.00)	(0.00)
Age Eldest Bio Child			-0.00	-0.00			0.00	0.00
			(0.00)	(0.00)			(0.00)	(0.00)
Generation Age Gap			-0.00	-0.00			0.00	0.00
			(0.00)	(0.00)			(0.00)	(0.00)
Constant	0.47**	0.48**	0.79**	0.80**	0.35**	0.33**	-0.09	-0.12
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.13)	(0.14)
Observations	737	737	737	737	737	737	737	737
R-squared	0.005	0.005	0.047	0.047	0.003	0.005	0.035	0.038

** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1; Robust standard errors in parentheses
All models are weighted and exclude individuals with no biological children.