Despite the title of this paper, I shall not attempt to present a straightforward
chronicle of the past twenty-five years of scholarship in the historiography of linguistics, a
topic too vast to cover in the space at my disposal. In any case, I can refer the interested
reader to a competent survey and evaluation of the secondary literature in a recent article by
Ayres-Bennett (1987). What I propose to do here instead is to raise the question of how the
tempo of research on the history of linguistics started to speed up in the 1960s, and why
more and more scholars began to devote their entire careers to it. I shall also examine some
of the issues discussed in that decade because in my judgment they are among the perennial
problems in linguistic historiography and in intellectual historiography in general.¹

I do not believe I need to demonstrate my initial premise, namely that there has been
an explosive growth in the field of linguistic historiography in the past quarter-century. This
increase of interest was in fact so spectacular that it was already being commented on by the
second half of the 1960s (see, for example, Malkiel & Langdon 1969:530-531). In how
many different ways, one may ask, has this explosion of interest in the history of linguistics
manifested itself? Most fundamentally there were institutional developments: the convening
of conferences and symposia, the founding of societies which hold regular meetings (there
is now, for example, an international society specifically devoted the history of linguistics,
which meets every three years), and the founding of special journals, monographic series,
and newsletters (the most important journal in the field is undoubtedly Historiographia
Linguistica, edited by E. F. K. Koerner, which started publication in 1974). We now also
have regular courses on the history of linguistics in linguistics departments and in summer
schools such as the Linguistic Institute organized by the Linguistic Society of America.

How an activity of this kind gained momentum is an interesting historical problem in
itself, which my colleagues in the field may not thank me for raising. One factor which
stimulated interest in the history of linguistics in the mid-20th century was the theoretical
fragmentation of the field after the advent of various new linguistic 'schools' in Copenhagen,
Prague, Moscow, and so forth. Surveys of the theoretical positions represented by these
groups of linguists may have been to some degree demanded by the politics of the
profession, since theorists were often unfamiliar with the ideas of other theorists but at the
same time wanted to be reassured that their own positions were the only ones that could be
justified. After all, the 'structuralist' schools of the 1930s (e.g. the Copenhagen and Prague
schools) had little in common theoretically and were sometimes unsympathetic toward each
other's theoretical assertions.² Describing the various competing theories made it possible
for a theoretical school to evaluate them and thereby to defend its own position more effectively. Moreover, especially after the Second World War, linguists also began to feel the need to explain and justify new theoretical developments to the general intellectual public. This type of historiography was admittedly limited to the delineation of doctrinal positions, but it sometimes stimulated genuine historical questioning.

At the same time, we should not forget that antiquarian interest in the past of the profession has always existed here and there among linguists. In some European countries, editions and anthologies of the works of famous linguists of the more distant past appeared from the 1930s on. Thus, we have the excellent work on Rasmus Rask done by Danish linguists (see Hjelmslev 1932-37, Andersen 1938, Hjelmslev 1941, Bjerrum 1959 and Diderichsen 1960), and the reprint of the writings of another Danish linguist Jakob Bredsdorff (1790-1841), which appeared in Copenhagen in 1933. In another part of Europe we may note the interest in the real as against the mythical Ferdinand de Saussure stimulated by Robert Godel's monograph of 1957, which was well utilized in the critical editions of the Cours de linguistique générale by Tullio De Mauro and Rudolf Engler (namely Saussure 1967 and 1968).

Further back still, of course, is the literature celebrating the achievements of 19th-century linguistics. Thus, Holger Pedersen's ever popular Linguistic Science in the Nineteenth Century appeared in its original Danish version in 1924 (the English translation dates from 1931). In the 19th century itself, one can point to Delbrück's introductory survey of linguistics (1880), which covers many aspects of the development of linguistics beginning with Franz Bopp.

Up to about 1955, however, American linguists had participated in this kind of historical research only to a limited extent. In the early 1960s one notes a gradual change in attitude toward the history of linguistics. An early sign of this change was the convening of a symposium on the history of linguistics at the 1962 meeting of the American Anthropological Association and the publication of the papers presented at that meeting in the journal Anthropological Linguistics in 1963. There then followed two conferences sponsored by the Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research, the first in Austria at Burg Wartenstein in 1964 and the second four years later at the Newberry Library in Chicago.

If one looks at the published results of the two Wenner-Gren meetings (see Hymes 1974a), one is struck by the extent to which outside influences were being brought to bear on linguists stimulating them to take an interest in the past of their own discipline. Two outside influences seem specially notable. One was the anthropological or social-science slant associated with both meetings just mentioned, in large part caused by the fact that the meetings were sponsored by an anthropological organization. The second outside influence, and an equally important one, was the historiography of science.
The Burg Wartenstein meeting of 1964 was specifically convened to consider the relevance of Thomas Kuhn's notion of scientific revolutions to the history of linguistics (the subtitle of the meeting was 'Revolution versus continuity in the study of language'). As we shall see in a moment, Kuhn had just published (two years earlier, in fact) a widely-acclaimed book entitled *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. As I can testify, Kuhn's ideas about the history of science were still a lively issue at the Newberry Library meeting four years later.

It is also significant that the Newberry Library meeting was chaired by an anthropological linguist Dell Hymes, and the publication of the Burg Wartenstein and Newberry Library papers was edited by him together with an introductory essay significantly entitled 'Traditions and paradigms' (Hymes 1974b). I think anybody writing the history of linguistic historiography will have to conclude that this conjunction of influences from natural science and anthropology played a significant role in stimulating linguists to take a keener interest in the history of their discipline.

In addition to these two influences, however, other motivating factors were noticeable at the Newberry Library meeting. There was, for instance, discussion of the problem of the many factual gaps in our knowledge of the history of linguistics, and the consequent need for basic research. But here a danger was to be avoided, it was emphasized, namely falling into antiquarianism or equating historiography with what was called 'chronicle.' The latter was a term borrowed from Benedetto Croce by way of the British philosopher R. G. Collingwood (see Collingwood 1946:202-14), which historians of linguistics took to mean an excessive preoccupation with factual accuracy and a neglect of theoretical understanding. At the same time, anybody who has tried to explore the linguistic past is aware that vast factual lacunae exist, perhaps most noticeably in periods like the Middle Ages and the Renaissance.

A second danger mentioned at the Newberry Library meeting was the temptation to use history in order to defend one's own linguistic persuasions. In actual fact, this apologetic tendency runs even deeper in that the historian of linguistics, like the practicing linguist, tends to feel a need to prove that the discipline as a whole has attained greater scientific respectability than other disciplines in the humanities and the social sciences. As we shall see in a moment when we examine Chomsky's contribution to the history of linguistics, this is a problem of considerable proportions.

In this period, many linguists on both sides of the Atlantic were deeply interested in the scientific status of their profession. In the United States, descriptivists indulged in much methodological and terminological stock-taking and soul-searching. Thus, in 1957 of Martin Joos published a collection of seminal articles by various American linguists entitled *Readings in Linguistics* with the significant subtitle *The Development of Descriptive Linguistics in America since 1925*, and that volume appeared under the aegis of the American Council
of Learned Societies. In the same year, there appeared Eric Hamp’s *A glossary of American technical linguistic usage 1925-1950*, which was designed to make American linguistic terminology accessible to Europeans.

To consider developments in Europe, two years later, 1959, was the publication date of the original Swedish version of Bertil Malmberg’s *New trends in linguistics*, and a number of surveys of recent linguistic trends appeared in the decade which followed by Lepschy (1967), Leroy (1963), and others. Before the Ninth International Congress of Linguists, which was the first meeting of that organization to be held in North America, the Comité International Permanent des Linguistes commissioned a volume of articles entitled *Trends in European and American linguistics, 1930-1960*.

In the 1950s in Europe and in the 1960s in North America, therefore, linguists were beginning to be interested in the idea of examining the history of their discipline in a more systematic fashion than hitherto. With this context in mind, let me us now examine three of the major new publications of the 1960s, namely Thomas Kuhn’s *The structure of scientific revolutions* (1962), Michel Foucault’s *Les mots et les choses* (1966), and Noam Chomsky’s *Cartesian linguistics* (1966). (In passing, I should like to emphasize that several other significant books appeared in that decade, e.g. Aarsleff 1967, Pinborg 1967, and Robins 1967.)

The subject matter of Kuhn’s book was the history of the natural sciences, and the history of linguistics is not mentioned in it even in passing! Kuhn’s attention was focused on the conceptual revolutions which have taken place over the centuries in fields like physical optics, electricity, and celestial mechanics, and which are associated with such names as Copernicus, Newton, Boyle, Cavendish, Maxwell, Priestley, and Einstein. Moreover, Kuhn raised the question as to what distinguishes the history of the mature sciences from the history of disciplines which have not yet become mature sciences. As Kuhn saw it, intellectual pursuits become sciences by acquiring what he called paradigms, which he defined as ’universally recognized scientific achievements that for a time provide model problems and solutions to a community of practitioners’ (1962:x). According to Kuhn, therefore, the non-scientific disciplines have remained in the pre-paradigm state, i.e. a state of affairs in which there is no universally recognized way of attacking problems. In this category Kuhn put the social sciences. Thus he wrote: ”[I]t remains an open question what parts of social science have yet acquired such paradigms at all. History suggests that the road to a firm research consensus is extraordinarily arduous” (1962:15).

Something else about paradigms which Kuhn was equally insistent upon was that the paradigms in each of the mature sciences periodically change. A familiar example from recent history is the shift in 20th-century physics from the Newtonian to the Einsteinian perspective. In addition to the fact of change, Kuhn also examined the question as to why paradigms are periodically discarded, and in precisely what way the scientific revolutions
mentioned in the title of his book take place. Thus, he not only had definite views on the nature of scientific as against non-scientific activity, but also offered a solution to one of the most difficult problems in scientific historiography, namely what is responsible for the development of new ideas by individual scientists and their eventual acceptance by all practitioners in the field.

There was a certain incongruity in the fact that Kuhn’s notion of paradigms and paradigm shifts in the mature sciences was treated with healthy disbelief by his own colleagues in the history and philosophy of science (see Lakatos & Musgrave 1970), while the same idea was uncritically endorsed by many scholars in the social sciences, the humanities, and even the arts, all of them fields which Kuhn did not regard as scientific. In part, the social scientists and the humanists welcomed Kuhn’s thesis because theirs are fields which undergo frequent changes of orientation and therefore resemble the picture of the mature sciences which Kuhn paints. We must remember also that many scholars outside the sciences had previously believed that the sciences are stable and differ from the humanities and the social sciences in developing cumulatively. At the same time, many non-scientists may have reasoned that if an eminent historian of science had successfully shown how the mature sciences are subject to periodic changes of basic perspective, then the same approach could equally well be applied to the history of the humanities and the social sciences.

Accordingly, scholars interested in the history of various non-scientific disciplines, including historians of linguistics, set about applying the framework of paradigms interspersed by periodic revolutions in their own work. The effect of applying the Kuhnian framework to the history of a field like linguistics is, perhaps inevitably, to attribute the doctrinal disunity of the field to the alternation of successive paradigms over time, because to admit that there were irreconcilable theoretical divisions among linguists in some period would be tantamount to admitting that linguistics was still in the pre-paradigm state of theoretical confusion and hence not a mature science.

Moving on now to Foucault’s book *Les mots et les choses*, we note that like Kuhn’s book, it was concerned with fundamental issues relating to intellectual history. Unlike Kuhn, however, Foucault had much to say about the history of linguistics, singling out two important historical junctures, namely the universal-grammar movement in 18th-century France together with a seminal work of the 17th century, the so-called Port-Royal *Grammar*, or *Grammaire générale et raisonnée* (Lancelot & Arnauld 1660), and German comparative philology of the early 19th century. This is all embedded in a far-reaching survey covering the development of what the French call the ’human’ sciences, which include natural history, cultural anthropology, economics, psychiatry, and linguistics. Foucault, therefore, unlike Kuhn, was not exclusively interested in the history of the sciences. Moreover, he saw all the human sciences in each period as working from a particular perspective, which he called an ’episteme.’
Epistemes are therefore, like Kuhn's paradigms, except that an episteme characterizes all the human sciences in a particular period. Furthermore, like Kuhn's paradigms epistemes change from period to period. Foucault distinguished three epistemes, the first being the episteme of the French Renaissance (i.e. the 16th century), the second the episteme of what the French call the Classical Age (i.e. the period from the mid-17th to the mid-18th century), and finally the modern episteme, which Foucault dates from about 1800 and associates which David Ricardo in economics and Franz Bopp in linguistics. However, Foucault did not attempt to offer a rationale for the shift from one episteme to the next and if I understand him correctly, seems not to have believed that any such rationale can be discovered. Perhaps the very notion of the episteme was so all-embracing that it did not admit of an external causal element, to which an intellectual historian can resort, if necessary, as an ultimate explanatory device. Paradoxically, however, one of the most stimulating aspects of Foucault's book was the fact that his analysis pointed beyond individual disciplines.

We must also remember that behind Foucault stood a French intellectual tradition in the history and philosophy of science. This field is called by the French épistémologie, although it has little in common with its namesake 'epistemology' in the English-speaking world. Moreover, this is an old tradition, which received impulses from a number of major thinkers such as Hegel, Comte, Marx, Nietzsche, and Husserl, and more recently in France from Gaston Bachelard, Georges Canguilhem, Dominique Lecourt, and others. It is not surprising, therefore, that when linguistic historiography entered the intellectual scene in France in the 1960s and 1970s the results were spectacular.

In Cartesian linguistics, Chomsky, like Foucault, focused attention on the Port-Royal Grammar and the universal-grammar movement of the 18th century, but unlike Foucault related this linguistic tradition to one of the stereotypical textbook philosophical positions, namely rationalism. He also suggested that there were analogies between this rationalistic approach to linguistics of the early modern period and his own transformational generative grammar of the 20th century. The similar features, according to him, are the belief in innate mental structures, the notion of the creative aspect of language use, the idea that grammar is rule-governed, and the discovery of underlying deep structures to account for sentence formation.

Unlike Kuhn and Foucault, Chomsky had a pendulum theory of history, in which the forces of darkness (i.e. empiricism, behaviorism, linguistic descriptivism) alternate with the forces of enlightenment (i.e. rationalism). Thus, the Port-Royal Grammar of 1660 represented the good, and it was preceded by a period of 'evil' descriptivism exemplified in a usage-manual like the Remarques sur la langue francoise by Vaugelas (1647). In our own century, Bloomfieldian structuralism of the 1940s and 50s represented the bad, and was followed by transformational grammar. There is, according to Chomsky, a fundamental discontinuity of development, which he at one point claimed has been harmful to linguistic theory (see Chomsky 1966:73). Unlike Kuhn and Foucault, therefore, Chomsky saw...
theoretical volatility in a negative light. Like Foucault, however, he anchored his linguistic orientations in the general intellectual climate. Thus, he created the term 'Cartesian linguistics' to label the linguistic theory of Port Royal and the universal grammarians of the 18th century, which he saw as an outgrowth of the Cartesian revolution.

Again, somewhat like Foucault, Chomsky did not attempt to account for the fact of change itself or the particular pendulum swings that he describes. Finally, one must conclude that Chomsky's interest in history was not disinterested, as he himself seems to have recognized. Thus in the last paragraph he says of his own book: '[A] certain distortion is introduced by the organization of this survey, as a projection backwards of certain ideas of contemporary interest rather than as a systematic presentation of the framework within which these ideas arose and found their place' (Chomsky 1966:73).

The motivation underlying Chomsky's venture into history is also of some interest. By re-interpreting such previously neglected works as the Port-Royal Grammar of 1660, he wished to show that transformational grammar was not a foreign body which had recently entered linguistics (as, for instance, mechanical translation had done), but that it had antecedents going back hundreds of years. From a historiographical point of view, the flaw in Cartesian linguistics was, as Chomsky himself realized, the tendency to back-project modern preoccupations into the past. Moreover, in positing a causal link between Port-Royal pedagogy and Cartesian philosophy, for instance, Chomsky was echoing a commonplace half-truth dear to generations of French intellectuals. His ascription of some kind of continuous identity to 'Cartesian linguistics' from the mid-17th century to the early 19th likewise rested on slender foundations.

On the positive side, Chomsky's book was pungent and entertaining, and certainly pointed the way to a more positive evaluation of traditional linguistics, which previous generations of linguists had condemned as unscientific. In this respect, Cartesian Linguistics can be compared with Kuhn's book, which had also argued for a more sympathetic treatment of past theories. However, because of the controversial character of the historical claims advanced in it the book polarized opinions, as important books often do. Chomsky's supporters tended to defend it, and some of them produced studies in a similar vein. Those who rejected the historical perspective offered by Chomsky dismissed the book brusquely as an example of intellectual incompetence (see, for instance, Aarsleff 1970, Joly 1977, Percival 1972).

Summing up, let me draw a number of (necessarily) tentative conclusions. First, within European linguistics the interest in linguistic historiography appears to have got underway in the 1950s, as witnessed by Verburg's 1952 monograph in Holland and the anthologies of Arens in Germany (1955) and Zvegintsev in the Soviet Union (1960). By the mid-sixties French scholars under the influence of the tradition of épistémologie historique began to tackle the history of linguistics--here Foucault is the prime example, but one might
also name Jacques Derrida, who in an influential book which appeared in 1967 examined Rousseau's treatise on the origin of language and Saussure's *Cours de linguistique générale*. The rediscovery of the Port-Royal Grammar in the 1960s had a stimulating effect on both sides of the Atlantic.

In the United States, the interest in linguistic historiography coincided with a period of theoretical upheaval caused by the collapse of Bloomfieldian descriptivism and was encouraged by contacts with historians of the social sciences and the natural sciences. Kuhn's influential monograph on the history of science (1962) with its emphasis on periodic theoretical upheavals appealed to American linguists of that period who were suddenly made aware of the ephemeral character of much of what they had been accustomed a few years before to regard as unalterable truth. Subsequent American work in linguistic historiography may not have had the same unified thrust as parallel developments in French intellectual circles. However, from the point of view of historiographical theory and methodology Anglophone and Francophone developments may have had more in common than meets the eye.

Let me close, therefore, on a note of ecumenical optimism. European and American scholars working on the history of linguistics have cooperated and kept in touch with each other ever since the field began to attract a sizeable following in the 1960s, witness the presence of participants from both sides of the Atlantic at the Burg Wartenstein and Newberry Library meetings. A glance at the names of the authors who contribute to *Historiographia Linguistica* reveals that this cooperation has continued over the past quarter-century. At the same time, some convergence of the French and Anglo-American intellectual traditions has been taking place with the vogue, for instance, of French philosophy among literary theorists in Britain and the United States. An example of the kind of symbiosis in linguistic historiography that we can expect to become more marked in the future is the new three-volume series entitled *Histoire des idées linguistiques*, edited by Sylvain Auroux, which will have chapters written by scholars from both sides of the Atlantic and which began appearing in 1989.
Evidence of the fact that the issues raised in the 1960s continue to be topical may be found, for instance, in a number of doctoral dissertations defended in the 1980s which deal with various aspects of historiographical theory, e.g. Amsterdamska 1987, Hörner 1981, Thilo 1989. See also Brekle 1985:1-26.

In a recent study of linguistic 'schools,' Amsterdamska even offers a general definition of a 'school of thought' as 'a group of scholars or scientists united in their divergence, both cognitive and social, from other schools in their discipline or specialty or from the discipline or specialty as a whole' (1987:9, emphasis mine). It is interesting to note that a number of different groups in the 1930s began to use the generic term 'structural linguistics' to refer to their respective brands of linguistics, while in fact they were united only by their opposition to the practitioners of comparative-historical linguistics. Structuralism never existed as a unified movement in linguistics. Another strategy which has been employed to create a semblance of theoretical consensus has been to claim that all the different schools take their inspiration from the same source, viz. Ferdinand de Saussure's Cours de linguistique générale (1916). For instance, Allerton (1979:5) makes the following sweeping assertion about the schools of linguistics: 'One unifying factor was their common heritage from Ferdinand de Saussure, the father of modern linguistics (if anyone was), whose planned Cours de linguistique générale was realized after his death by his pupils, in 1915 [sic].' In an elaborate diagram (1979:7), Allerton draws lines of influence connecting Saussure with Bloomfield, Sapir, Jespersen, Tesnière, J. R. Firth, and the Prague, Geneva, Copenhagen, and Moscow schools! On the Saussure myth, see Percival 1981.

In eastern Europe, one may mention, for instance, the two-volume selected works of the Polish linguist Baudouin de Courtenay, which were edited by a group of scholars at the Soviet Academy of Sciences (see Barkhudarov 1963).

The immediate impact of Godel's pioneering work and Engler's critical edition may be seen in De Mauro's comments in his Introduzione alla semantica (1965:11). See also the section headed 'Saussure inedito' (1965:112-122).

Thus in his article for the volume commissioned by the Comité international permanent des linguistes to commemorate the achievements of European and American linguists between 1930 and 1960, Hamp states with regard to American contributions to the 'history of the discipline of linguistics': 'It is clear ... that our period has not been characterized by a solicitude for the past' (1961:167).
Thus, R. H. Robins and Geoffrey Bursill-Hall, who both had worked on the medieval speculative grammars, were present at the Newberry Library meeting. Bursill-Hall's monograph on that subject, based on a 1959 doctoral dissertation, was to appear in 1971. The paper which Roman Jakobson presented at the Newberry Library meeting concerned the Middle Ages and appeared in the Festschrift for Benveniste in 1975. For a survey of Renaissance linguistics, see my 1975 article.

In fact, this apologetic tendency among historians of linguistics runs even deeper in that they feel a need to prove that the discipline as a whole has attained greater scientific respectability than other disciplines in the humanities and the social sciences.

I have discussed this bizarre phenomenon in my 1979 article. Part of the attraction of Kuhn's book was due to the superstitious reverence many social scientists, and even some practitioners of the humanities, have for the natural sciences. Kuhn himself, on the other hand, admitted (1970:208) that he had borrowed his paradigm idea from the history of the arts and the humanities! In some sense, therefore, he was reducing the stature of the sciences by insisting that they develop no differently from the non-sciences. Thus, scholars in the humanities in effect turned his theory round and used it to increase their own scientific status!

See, for instance, Verburg 1974, and compare Diderichsen's critical article (1974). Hymes discusses the 'use and abuse of the notion of "paradigm"' in his 1974b. Note that I am not using the words "non-scientist" and "non-scientific" disparagingly here.

I discuss the difficulties encountered in applying Kuhn's ideas to the history of linguistics and the social sciences in my 1976, 1977, and 1979 publications.

I make this suggestion with some hesitancy since Foucault's style is not quite perspicuous enough for one to be sure what he believed, but see Laudan's discussion of Foucault's historiographical approach (1977:241), which confirms my impression that Foucault had no answer to the question of what causes the transition from one episteme to another. For further discussion of this issue, see Greene 1967:138. For critiques of Foucault's work, see Piaget 1970:128-135, Rosiello 1967:168-170.

In brief, Anglo-Saxon epistemologists study what has traditionally been called Erkenntnistheorie in German, i.e. the logical foundations of everyday veridical knowledge (e.g., whether we are justified in believing that nothing happens without a cause), whereas the French épistémologie is aimed at what might be called in German Wissenschaftskritik, i.e. a metatheoretical critique of the sciences. Thus, it is possible in the French intellectual tradition to refer to the 'epistemology of physics,' a phrase which would make no sense to an Anglo-American philosopher. On the meaning of the term épistémologie, see Auroux 1976. Lecourt (1975:7-19) discusses the difference between the Anglo-Saxon and French traditions in the history and philosophy of science.
For preliminary orientation, see Bachelard 1971 and Lecourt 1975, which handles both Bachelard and Canguilhem.

An interesting document in this connection is Chomsky’s plenary session paper presented to the Ninth International Congress of Linguists, held in Cambridge, Mass. in 1962, in which he labels as incorrect the view “that current work in generative grammar is in some way an outgrowth of attempts to use electronic computers for one or another purpose, whereas,” he continues, “it should be obvious that its roots are firmly in traditional linguistics” (Chomsky 1964:922).

Note for instance, that the second chapter of Harnois’s monograph (pp. 19-28) is entitled ‘La Grammaire de Port-Royal ou la théorie rationaliste.’ Harnois also contrasts Vaugelas with the Port-Royal Grammar (p. 20), characterizing the former as descriptive and the latter as explanatory: ‘Ainsi la Grammaire de Port-Royal prétendait expliquer au lieu de constater, et rendre compte au lieu de décrire’ (20-21). Finally, the link between the Port-Royal pedagogues and Cartesianism is clearly asserted: ‘De plus l’esprit de Port Royal est très fortement imprégné de cartésianisme. Arnauld, Nicole, Lancelot sont résolument rationalistes parce que cartésiens’ (21). We have here all the essential features of the position that Chomsky was to defend forty years later. (Note that there is an entry for Harnois’s monograph in the bibliography at the end of Cartesian linguistics; see Chomsky 1966:115.)

Thus, Bloomfield’s evaluation of the Port-Royal Grammar was negative (1933:6). Compare Chomsky’s reaction to Bloomfield’s position (1966:101, n. 83). Moreover, Chomsky’s more positive attitude to traditional grammar is evident in his theoretical work. Thus in Aspects of the theory of syntax he asserts that “[t]he investigation of generative grammar can profitably begin with a careful analysis of the kind of information presented in traditional grammars” (1965:63).
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