

THE MYTH OF THE METTERNICHIAN ERA.

by

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INTRODUCTION.

Foreign Minister of Austria from Wagram (1809) to the March days of "Forty-Eight," president of the Congress of Vienna (1814-5) and of those lesser congresses of Troppau, (1820) Laibach (1821) and Verona (1822), Metternich enjoyed a long and conspicuous position in European politics, a position enhanced to a great degree by Austria's peculiar situation in Germany and Italy. All the great movements of the first half of the nineteenth century, whether, they were popular or reactionary, crossed his path, sometimes to join it for a short distance, sometimes to follow its general course and often to strike it at right angles. Bonapartism and its aftermath, German Nationalism and Italianism, liberalism, and constitutionalism were the most significant, but not at all the only forces with which he was concerned. Robert Owen did not despair of winning Metternich to the ranks of socialism,¹ but it was the wildest of his dreams. Indeed it is difficult to imagine how Owen expected to find sympathy from the man who fought "the Revolution" in 1820, in 1830 and in 1848.

Stranger still is the paradox that Metternich who detested the doctrinaires, both Ultras and Radicals, acquired, partly in truth and partly in error, the reputation of both a tyrant and a doctrinaire. He is usually depicted by writers

- learned and otherwise - as the archetype of reaction, the antipodes of progress.

The strangest achievement of the great majority who have written about Metternich is to name the period 1815 to 1830 to 1848 after him.² In fact history is perverted by the legend of Metternich dominating his age - of a Metternichian era. Therefore a critical examination of this myth is the purpose of this study.

A typical statement of the Metternichian Legend is that by which Edmund Maurice introduces his Revolutionary Movements of 1848-9: "In the year 1814 Napoleon Bonaparte ceased to reign over Europe, and after a very short interregnum, Clement Metternich reigned in his stead. Francis of Austria, though in agreement with Metternich was really his hand rather than his head; and thus the crafty minister easily assumed the real headship of Europe, while professing to be the servant of the Emperor of Austria."³

The origins of the legend of a Metternichian era are not obscure. His enemies, the Liberals, hated him, and unconsciously exaggerated his importance, for it offered something tangible at which to strike. His friends the Conservatives were eager to give credit to his supposed position, but their efforts have not been so important,

because most of the histories (in America) have been written by Liberals. Then, too, Metternich himself is as much to blame for the Legend as any one. His vanity, which pervades his Memoirs and distorts the truth, causes his own writings to give a false conception of his position. His son, likewise, in his introduction to the Memoirs, appearing in 1881, perpetuates the idea of a Metternichian era. "The reader will in this work hear the voice which once made itself heard in all the courts and cabinets of Europe, and see the man who had the honor of leading for many years the Conservative party of the Austrian Empire.... The reader must not expect from the Chancellor's son a history of this period nor a picture of the terrible wars or of the long era of peace which followed them, an era which, ambitious as it may sound, bears the name of the illustrious Chancellor."⁴

These conceptions have been taken over and amplified by later historians and biographers. One of the most notorious factors in the development of the historical misconception of Metternich has been the Prussian school of historians as represented, not by Ranke but by von Sybel and Treitschke. Of all the writers the Prussians had ulterior nationalistic motives. By debasing Metternich they hoped to glorify Prussia, for they were making

history by their own writings. Von Sybel confessed, "I am four-sevenths politician and three-sevenths professor."⁵ Treitschke was one hundred per cent Prussian; far from being impersonal in his bitter criticism of Metternich he actually wrote his German history with hatred of the dead in his heart.⁶ G. P. Gooch, in History and Historians of the Nineteenth Century says of Treitschke: "He spoke of Frederick William III like a courtier and of rulers like a republican."⁷ The Metternichian Legend has come down also in the biographies by Malleson (1888) and by Mozade (1889), the tenor of whose book is indicated by its very title - A Chancellor of the Old Regime. It is kept alive by Paleologue in his Romantisme et Diplomatique, by Strobl in his "Metternich", and by Cresson in his Diplomatic Portraits.

Fortunately some critical historians no longer accept the story of the Metternichian era at face value. Besides Sandeman's rather inaccurate "Life of Metternich"⁸ there are the contributions of W. Alison Philipps in the Cambridge Modern History and his Confederation of Europe, C. K. Webster in his Congress of Vienna and his Foreign Policy of Castlereagh Notably those of Heinrich von Srbik. These have all broken with the traditional narrative in many details, but no one has as yet definitely exposed the myth of a Metternichian Era.

Most stimulating for the study of Metternich is the present controversy between two distinguished professors of the University of Vienna, Srbik and Bibl. The occasion for the controversy has been the opening of the State Archives of Vienna after 1918. Dr. Victor Bibl published his Zufall Österreichs in two volumes, appearing successively in 1922 and 1924, placing the responsibility for the misfortunes of the Austrian Empire in 1918 upon Metternich. His argument is quite far-fetched: the system of Francis Joseph was a continuation of Metternich's, and the failure of Metternich to reform Austria was accordingly the principal cause of her collapse in 1918.

Srbik, who did not share Bibl's rash judgment published his "Metternich, der Staatsmann und der Mensch" in two volumes in 1925. It is the most exhaustive and most complete biography that has appeared and by far the most significant.⁹ In many respects it is a psychological study, combining the analysis of the "new biography" with a sound historical view point and accuracy. Srbik's purpose was simply "to understand" Metternich. He neither condemns nor praises, but explains by attempting to tell Metternich's own ideas. In many respects Metternich is placed in a new and far more favorable light, particularly

his affable and delightful personality. However, Srbik cannot be considered to be presenting an "apology" in the derogatory sense into which the word has fallen. Far from trying to cover up Metternich's faults and misdeeds he exposes many that were not generally known before such as the expulsion of the Zillerthal Inklinanten in 1837 in violation of the article on religious toleration of the German Bundesact of 1815 which Metternich himself had written.¹⁰

Three years later (1928) Bibl answered Srbik with a volume entitled Metternich in neuer Beleuchtung, which repeats and enlarges upon the ideas of the earlier work, Der Zufall Oesterreichs. The first part is devoted to interpretation: the second contains a collection of letters from Metternich to Count Wrede, the Bavarian, dating from 1831 to 1834. These newly discovered letters reveal Metternich at a period in which he was employing the most reactionary measures of his whole career.¹⁰ It does not follow, surely, that Metternich was a reactionary ipso facto, yet Bibl is prone to judge Metternich primarily on the basis of his actions of 1831-1834, when he was at his worst. The judgement of Srbik makes Metternich a "hoch konservativ";¹¹ that of Bibl makes him a reactionary.¹² Both fail to see any marked change in Metternich himself. Srbik himself is a conservative and a member of the nobility,

whereas Bibl is a thorough going radical. 'What the liberals of Metternich's time were, the Bolsheviks represent today,' is Bibl's declaration.¹⁴ Srbik, also, alludes to the same controversy of the present time, and asks if Metternich was right, that Liberalism is only outside of radicalism.¹⁵ Both Bibl and Srbik find inspiration in Goethe.

In the upper right hand corner of page one of Bibl's "Metternich" is his motto and the source of his theory, the words of Goethe to Eckermann, 4 Jan. 1824, "I was completely convinced that a great revolution is never the fault of the people but of the Government. Revolutions are altogether impossible, so long as the governments are continually just and continually awake to prevent them by "zeitgemasse verbesserungen".¹⁶ At the very end of his last volume, Srbik in his chapter entitled "Aussicht", after alluding to Leninism to which democracy tends, quotes Goethe: "Far better is it for men to limit themselves to being children. Only believe a people never becomes old and wise, it remains forever foolish."¹⁷

In as much as the works of Bibl and Srbik are tinged with partisan bias, both fail to understand the position of Metternich.

CHAPTER I - METTERNICH - THE MAN.

Part I. His Life.

"Metternich," says Sandeman, "was the high priest of the Eighteenth Century tradition."¹ A child of the Aufklärung, he was one of the few who represented it in the Nineteenth Century - whose Zeitgeist, as it found expression in the more impulsive movements of the time, he could approach only in moderation. Temperamentally alien to his century he was also by birth alien to Austria, where his public career was spent. Never was he affected with sentiment for his adopted land, or for the city of Vienna. The Rhineland was his motherland; there were the scenes most dear to him; there the days of his childhood were passed. Not until he was twenty years old did he visit Vienna. The only Austria that Metternich valued was the Metternichian Austria.² Circumstances made him an actor on a stage where he was not by nature at home, and at an unfavorable time as he himself realized. "My life has fallen at a hateful time, I have come into the world either too early or too late. Now, I do not feel comfortable; earlier I should have enjoyed the time; later, I should have helped to build it up again; today I give my prop to a mouldering edifice. I should have been

born in 1900 and I should have had the twentieth century
3.
before me."

Clemens Wenzel Nepomuk Lothair Metternich was born at Coblenz on 15 May 1773. His father, Francis George, served in the diplomatic service of the ecclesiastical court of Treves. The family belonged to the Rhenish aristocracy linked by tradition to Austria by reason of services in the Thirty Years War. Among Metternich's ancestors were three electors of Mainz and an elector of Trier.⁴ Count Francis George, his father, entered Austrian service and was appointed commissioner at Liege in 1791. Later in the same year he served as Austrian plenipotentiary at the Hague, which post held until 1794. The death of his friend and benefactor, Count Kaunitz, in 1795 prevented for two years an advancement in the service. Emperor Francis chose him as head of the Austrian delegation to the Congress of Rastadt of 1797. Although he himself was not involved in the affair, the fateful murder of the two French envoys at Rastadt by Austrian troops discredited both Francis George Metternich and Thugut, the Austrian Foreign Minister. When Metternich, the elder, was forced to retire from diplomatic service, his son, inheriting his father's taste in diplomacy, was already preparing to follow the paternal footsteps.

Francis George Metternich, to be sure, had few distinguishing qualities to transmit to his son. He was a diplomat in the fashion of his times, more or less an epicurean in the perverted sense of the word, a spend-thrift and a devotee to the fair sex. His son inherited the most of these characteristics and even went beyond his father in the last respect. His mother's gifts were more significant and more liberal. She was not buried in family tradition as his father was. She was a proud cosmopolitan gifted with intellect, beauty, and social adaptability. From her came the more charming features of the personality of Clemens Metternich, to which even his political opponents were glad to do justice.

Young Metternich was nurtured in cosmopolitanism. Germany at the time of his youth was only a name, and national sentiment was dormant. It is true that Herder was one of its early prophets but Metternich evidently was not acquainted with his works. Joseph Friedrich Simon expressed the keynotes of his education in the sentence: reflection and experience are the only grand masters of the human spirit. Six years of study under Simon were years of intense intellectual activity for him. Simon's teachings were a curious mixture of theism and Voltaire.⁵ Varnhagen von Ense, who was

acquainted with Metternich at the time knew him as a free thinker.⁶ His mother was not passionately religious and succumbed to Jesuit sentimentalism only in her old age. The whole background of Metternich's youth was the spirit of the Aufklarung, the universal awakening and cosmopolitanism.

Possessing such a philosophic background, his attendance at the University of Strassburg in 1788, 1789, and 1790 failed to awaken in him the urge of German nationalism. On the contrary, Strassburg gave him French culture. Natural and political history, experimental physics and medicine were studies which attracted his attention, but his principal study was diplomacy under Christoph Wilhelm Koch, the diplomatic historian. The years 1791 to 1793 were spent for the most part at Mayence where he continued his study of diplomacy with Nicholas Voyt. Life at Mayence introduced him to the French emigres, and their hatred of the Jacobins. He was present at the coronations of Leopold II in 1790 and Francis II in 1792, participating in the ceremonies. Perhaps these influences held him still to traditionalism. Perhaps the emigres filled him with horror of the sans-culottes. Metternich was gradually adjusting himself to the old order of things. "From the school of the radicals I fell into that of the emigres

and learned to value a middle course."⁶

The winter of 1794-5 was spent at London in company with the Treasurer of the Netherlands. "Tall, dignified, he moved with easy grace and attracted all eyes to him."⁷ Acquaintancehip was formed with Burke, the younger Pitt and Charles James Fox. Burke's influence on Metternich was both great and lasting, for his later political philosophy was essentially that of Burke's "Reflections of the Revolution in France". These few months in England were Metternich's only practical acquaintancehip with parliamentary government. Though very brief it allowed him to study in general the advantages and weaknesses of a legislature. There is nothing to indicate that he was opposed to parliamentary government at this time. On the other hand, in view of what happened afterwards it is reasonable to suppose that he was greatly impressed by the British Constitution and Parliament.

The success of the armies of the French National Convention in 1792-3 caused his father to lose his lands along the Rhine by confiscation, and the family went to Vienna, in a precarious financial condition but still possessing Konigswart, an estate in Bohemia. Their only friend was Count Kaunitz, but he was enough. The recourse of the family was an advantageous marriage for Clemens

with Leonore Kaunitz, the grand daughter of the Chancellor. She was not beautiful, but quite wealthy,⁸ and her family influence was an even greater asset.

Clemens accompanied his father to Rastadt in 1797, and for the first time met the French revolutionary diplomats with their unshined shoes, blue hose, kerchiefs, long dirty hair and red feathers in their hats.⁹ Metternich's real diplomatic career began in 1801 with his appointment as Austrian ambassador to the Court of Saxony. During his stay at Dresden he made the acquaintance of the publicist Friedrich Gentz, who later became his secretary. From 1804 to December, 1805, he represented Austria at Berlin, where his active social life was typical of the man and prophetic of the future.¹⁰ Where there were beautiful women, he was in attendance. His next advancement was to Paris, 4 July 1806, where he obtained an insight into Napoleonic statesmanship, Napoleonic methods, and institutions, many of which he was later to try to imitate in Austria. In 1809, after Austria's defeat at Wagram¹¹, was selected as foreign minister of Austria, because of circumstances rather than his own merit, for Stadion's prestige had been shattered. The new foreign minister assumed his duties without blame for what had happened before, and his hands were practically free. One of his first acts was to arrange the marriage of the Archduchess

Marie Louise with Napoleon, which helped to maintain peace between France and Austria until August 1813, when Austria joined in the War of Liberation.

Metternich was now at the height of his career. The cleverest of his moves had been to extricate Austria from an Alliance with Napoleon so as to enter the war against him. After peace feelers had been tried and good offices proffered he tried armed mediation which Napoleon had to accept. At Dresden during the negotiations for this proposed conference, occurred the dramatic conference of 28 June, 1813 during which Napoleon four times challengingly threw down his hat and Metternich refused to pick it up. Thereafter Napoleon bluffed at the Prague Congress and the Allies called his bluff. Austria entered the coalition against him, and his power was crushed in the Battle of the Nations at Leipzig. During the winter of 1813 and the spring of 1814, Metternich with the monarchs and the other leading ministers was with the army. There Castlereagh, foreign minister of Great Britain-- who now assumed the effective leadership of the Alliance for the rest of his life-- first formed his acquaintanceship with Metternich. The two were destined to work together for several years, and both appreciated the other's ability.

Between the First Peace of Paris and the Congress of Vienna, Metternich in company with the monarchs and

ministers visited London. Afterwards they returned to Vienna for the Congress which was to make a fundamental reconstruction of Europe. Metternich was chosen its president. The Count de la Garde gives a striking description of him at this time. "It was still possible to take M. von Metternich for a young man. His features were pleasing and entirely regular; his smile was seductive; his face expressed shrewdness and a kindly disposition. He was of middling stature, well built, and his stride had something noble and elegant about it. At the first glance one was pleasantly surprised to find in him one of those men whom nature has richly endowed in order to insure them success in society. If, however, his physiognomy was carefully scrutinized, a certain malleability, and yet firmness became noticeable; and upon observing his penetrating glance no one could have any doubt of his extraordinary political talents. In him was recognized the statesman who was used to leading men and affairs of the greatest import."¹¹

Since the Congress was held at Vienna largely in recognition of Metternich's achievements in the War of Liberation, he was naturally its president. It was to enhance his prestige but also to detract from his reputation. Stein who was at the Congress in the suite of Alexander thus sized up the course of Metternich:

"His frivolity did not lessen despite the crises in important affairs. He occupied himself with the arrangements for court fetes, tableaux, up to the smallest detail, watching the dancing of his daughter, while Castlereagh and Humboldt were waiting to confer with him, and rouged the women who were to appear in the tableaux. Metternich^h has commonsense, versatility, and graciousness; he lacks depth and seriousness for carrying on transactions in a great and simple manner. He often creates complications by his frivolity, his aversion for business, and his untruth, without wishing to do so. He is cold and therefore averse to giving men credit for noble feelings. This was the reason why the Austrian Army lacked enthusiasm, which alone leads to self-sacrifice and to perseverance in misfortune. His faults have kept him from attaining and using the great influence and strong position in the eyes of the world, which he needs to nullify the weaknesses and prejudices of the former and to destroy the numerous secret influences and to rule the latter with firmness. He has to negotiate with the one and with the other and take a middle course which for the most part is disastrous."¹²

Alexander said of Metternich: "C'est le meilleur maître des cérémonies du monde mais c'est le plus mauvais

ministre qui se puisse trouver."¹³ "Le Congres danse, il ne marche pas" expresses a widely held opinion of the Congress, and at least one of its most conspicuous features. There were many fetes, and one in particular is famous - that of the anniversary of Leipzig. There was humour as well as dancing. On All Fool's day 1815, Metternich played a joke on Gentz, his secretary, by preparing a manifesto in which Napoleon was represented as offering a great reward to the person who should deliver Gentz to him, dead or alive." "The manifesto was placed in a newspaper copy that had been specially printed and then delivered to the bed side of the faint hearted man at his morning coffee. To the great joy of his superior, this almost paralyzed the unfortunate secretary."¹⁴

There had to be to complement the fêtes and the frivolity, amours, for there were many ladies present. Metternich had more than his share of the attention of the fair sex, and his amours were the gossip of the Congres. "Die Frau war ihm Bedürfnis."¹⁵ Princess Bagration, the Russian, received the most of his attention, but he had other love affairs with the duchess of Sagon, a princess of Naples, and Julie Zichy. Gagern declared that Metternich knew not the difference between a boudoir and a babinet.¹⁶ So devoted was Metternich to his loves,

and so much of his time did they absorb that he neglected affairs of state. Gentz, at the most critical time of the Congress, complained of the difficulty of getting a serious talk with Metternich whose mind was always on that mendite femme, Bagration.¹⁷

There arose a host of adverse criticisms. According to Wilhelm von Humboldt, Metternich talked to no one on earth and was entirely inaccessible.¹⁸ The King of Bavaria appraised him thus - "Metternich a de l'esprit, des talents, de la grace, et de la finesse, mais il ne faut pas croire que tout le monde soit des aveugles."¹⁹ Napoleon at Elba expressed the opinion: "Metternich se croit un diplomate. Il ne l'est pas. C'est un menteur, un grand menteur."²⁰ Talleyrand wrote to Louis XVIII, "Metternich has no character to sustain."²¹ It was a just judgment, for Metternich was personally immoral. He was a libertine destined later to become the champion of the social - or as he expressed it - the "moral order."

It was widely believed that Metternich would lose his position and many were actually working toward such an end.²² Archduke John noted in his diary, — 11 Dec. 1814 - "At last, it seems as if a great storm were about to break over Metternich; his frivolity, his lies, his partiality - these are the principal accusations."²³

Even Jaucourt, the Foreign Minister ad interim of France heard at Paris of the imminent overthrow of Metternich, and that Talleyrand was cooperating with those seeking his downfall.²⁴ Among the latter actually were the Czar and King of Prussia, who having openly broken with him over the Polish Saxon issue asked Emperor Francis to dismiss him. But the intrigue had the directly opposite result of strengthening his position.

After all the frivolities and dissipations of Metternich, and the Congress, were largely superficial. Behind the screen of the fetes great issues were being fought out and great settlements reached. The map of Europe was being changed, new governments were established for Germany, Switzerland, Poland and the Netherlands, measures were adopted for the freeing of rivers, steps were being taken against the slave trade, diplomatic precedence was settled, and Napoleon was outlawed. In fact, Metternich was president of a great Congress, one of the greatest in history.

After the Hundred Days and the Second Peace of Paris Metternich looked back regretfully on his part in the struggle with Napoleon. "I passed the grandest years of my life with Napoleon or near him. I think few men have known him better than I."²⁵ At Teplitz

on the Leipzig Anniversary in 1819 he lamented that he was dealing with pygmies. "To hear people talk one would think they were giants; follow them and you soon perceive that you have only to deal with phantoms. The one giant produced by the eighteenth century is no longer of this world; all that moves that world at present is of a miserable character. It is very difficult to play

²⁶
with bad or indifferent actors."

According to the introspective comments upon himself left to posterity,

²⁷
the strongest force in Metternich now became, the past.

"I love the ashes, and the ancients were right to love and reverence them. Death is opposed to life, the past to the present, what is not to what is. To preserve the remains, while the form and substance are altered, is a beautiful idea, and the only one which suits my way of

²⁸
thinking. Perhaps, it was only a pose.

When Metternich attended the Congress of Aix la Chapelle in the fall of 1818 he met and became enamoured of the Princess Lievin. The statesman was forty five and had seven children, Dorothea Lievin was thirty three and had four children." "He had the phrases of religion and morality on his lips, but he was notoriously an unfaithful husband, and scandal had already touched his name in connection with Queen Caroline of Naples, with the Princess Bagration and with Madame Junot."²⁹ Between

16 Nov. and 21 Nov. (1818) he wrote her nine letters, all in French. Not only do they reveal how passionate a lover the man could become, but they also unfold his political ideas.³⁰ He writes in a fashion typical of the age of romanticism, and he poses his sentiments like a "Werther" - "J'ai toujours voulu n'être rien de ce que je suis," but he is more true to himself when he said "Je suis tout pratique, tout terre à terre, tout simple."³¹

In his letters he said, "My character does not lead to opposition. I am too positive and I do not like to occupy myself with criticism. I have twenty faults but never that of presumption."³² ^{'Mon esprit va toujours vers le}
 moyens. "I have aged twenty years since the Holy Alliance."³³ "I detest court (life) and all which relates to it."³⁴ "The Emperor always does what I wish, but I only wish what he must do."³⁵ The letter of 1Feb. 1819 told her why he had chosen in 1814 his motto of "Kraft im Recht" instead of Vorwärts which he had previously intended. This motto - "Power in the Right" was put on the arms of his family. "Si tu veux savoir quels sont mes principes politiques, tu en lis le manifeste dans ce trois paroles."³⁶

"It is clear that she could not make herself believe that his heart was entirely hers, and that the knowledge gave her some pain. The romance seems to have been one of those which was bound to end unromantically". For it was between two disillusioned worldlings, each of whom knew that the other would one day seek consolation elsewhere."³⁷ She continued to correspond with him, but at Verona in 1822 they met for the last time until his own exile. Already they had become more interested in intrigue with each other than affection. In the course of three more years their correspondence ceased and the Princess Lievin joined his arch-enemy Canning to turn her intrigues against her former lover.

The years 1829, 1830 and 1831 mark a crisis in Metternich's life, for he suffered one personal loss after the other. His first wife had died in Paris in 1824. His second marriage with Antonie Leykam, November, 1827, was a secret wedding. It was a real love match. When she died after two brief years, Metternich wrote his son Victor. "My life is over, and nothing remains to me but my children. Indeed I am again left alone in this great wide world."³⁸ Then in December the same year, this son, Victor, died. And Gentz, always mercurial, went over to the Liberals. He not only changed his politics

but old as he was, fell in love with a young actress. Gentz, who so often had urged Metternich to adopt repressive measures, who was himself the draftsman of the Carlsbad censorship decrees, began now to write in behalf of freedom of the press. Yet Metternich kept him in office, although he was utterly disgusted with the Chancellor's policies. In 1832 Gentz, notorious spendthrift, beggar of numberless gifts from the monarchs and ministers of Europe, and in particular from the Rothschild bankers, died at last a pauper, and Metternich paid the funeral expenses.

Hormayr, ~~a~~ historian whom Metternich had allowed to use the archives, disgusted with Metternich's anti-Liberal position, left Austrian service and began to condemn the Chancellor. Count Kolowrat, who had been appointed to the ministry in 1826, now became a dangerous rival, and soon acquired the dominant influence in internal affairs. Around him as leader gathered the many who were discontented with Metternich. The latter was above personal grudges and treated Kolourat with great consideration.³⁹ Jarcke was brought to Vienna to take the place of Gentz, but he failed to fill his predecessor's place to the degree expected.

On 30 Jan. 1831 Metternich married for a third

time. His bride was Melanie Zichy, only twenty six years old, a Hungarian and an ardent Roman Catholic. Under her influence Metternich took more interest in religion, and she noted that her confessor was struck "by her husband's uncommon goodness."⁴⁰

Balzac visited Metternich in 1835, and George Ticknor, the American man of letters, the next year. Ticknor's Journal contains some interesting reports on the conditions in Vienna, and the leading men. Jarcke, Gentz's successor and a Catholic convert, denied being an absolutist in politics and founded much of his theory on the sound preservation of property. Metternich disclosed to Ticknor his aversion to democracy, in Europe. "You have always been democrats, and democracy is therefore a reality, une verite, in America. In Europe it is a falsehood, -En Europe c'est un mensonge." He asked Ticknor who would be the next president. "I told him that it will be Van Buren; and that as I do not desire it, he might at least consider my opinion unprejudiced. He answered, "Neither should I be of Mr. Van Buren's party if I were in America. I should rather be of the old party of which Washington was originally the head. It was a sort of conservative party, and I should be a conservative almost everywhere, certainly in England and America."⁴¹ Kaltenbaeck, editor of the Austrian periodical

for History and Statistics, complained to Ticknor of the restraints imposed by the censorship. Count Auersperg, or Anastasius Grün, whose liberal poetry was censored, had just written a poem called "Schutt", "Rubbish", dedicated to one of the Austrian officials.⁴²

The storm of revolution broke upon Vienna 13 March, 1848 and Metternich as "Mr. Smith" was obliged to hasten to England for cover. A liberal revolt at the start, it passed through a cycle of liberalism, radicalism, anarchy, and reaction.⁴³ Szechenyi, the Hungarian patriot, recalled the words of Metternich of 1825- "Ruhren sie nicht an die Grundlagen des Gebaudes, sonst sturzt das Ganze zusammen."⁴⁴ If one stone of the foundation is removed, the whole structure falls. His fall was sudden and decisive, and Metternich accepted it as the work of fate. His system had become a deadened thing, and the revolutionists found it easy to overthrow. He whom Charivari called "der ministre fossile" was "so lebensmude."⁴⁵

The flight to England and the sojourn there was provided for by a loan of 100, 000 rubles from the Tsar,⁴⁶ who had forgotten his earlier animosities. "England", Metternich on his visit declared, "is the freeest land in the world because it is the most orderly."⁴⁷ -- a real tribute to the Parliamentary system. In England, too,

Metternich found a sympathetic follower and student, Benjamin Disraeli and the gloomy thought of the exiled Austrian must have been lightened by consoling joy to hear Disraeli denouncing the diplomatic opponent of his latter years, Lord Palmerston, in the House of Commons.

Metternich returned to Austria in 1851 and spent the rest of his life at a country estate. Maintaining an active interest in politics he managed to keep the Emperor and his ministers constantly supplied with letters of advice, which they privately disregarded. Bismarck, Frederich William IV and Francis Joseph were among those who partook of his hearty hospitality. Only Humboldt of his earlier friends was alive--with whom he corresponded.⁴⁸ Even in his old age he retained the art of living. His life long optimism mellowed with resignation, somewhat stiff and almost deaf, he spent eight years at his estate, of which his grand daughter has left a happy description. His death occurred just before the war of 1859 with Napoleon the Third and Sardinia. "Die zeit wuchs über Metternich hindus und seine uhr lief ab."⁴⁹ "Eminently winning and elegant" in his ways, he possessed an unusual gift of conversation and humor. His hospitality knew no limits of economy. Free from personal vindictiveness and marked by self control, he fought ideas rather than individuals. He was fond of Byron, recited long passages from the Childe

Harold and considered Heine a great poet.⁵⁰ Looking facts in the eye he was at his best in condemning and declaiming against exultation and enthusiasm.⁵¹

His faults were many. He lacked criticism, and believed that he was always acting in the right. He identified justice and morality with himself. At the time of his fall in 1848, he wrote Count Hartiz, "I have no spoken or written word ever to take back."⁵² The Liberals he accused of presumption, but no man was more presumptuous and vain than he was. He described his early education in this fashion, "Inaccessible to prejudice, and seeking only the truth in everything, my modesty did not allow me to find fault with persons in power, if I was not satisfied with what I saw."⁵³ Not only did he believe that his deeds were right but that they would be justified in the eternal order of things, and by future historians, a belief which must have been a consoling illusion of his old age, in defeat and retirement. His greatest defect was the lack of constructive powers--he belonged to those who attempt to preserve and conform rather than to those who create.

A patron of letters and of the arts, he was acquainted with many of the geniuses of the age, although Goethe was only an acquaintance. He preferred the air and sun of Italy to the cold cloudy weather of the north,

and with the sea he was enchanted. Italian music was his preference, in old age, Rossini's operas particularly. At his villa a room was filled with statues, including works of Thorwaldsen and Rauch. For a long time he abhorred the romantic movement, but by 1834 he had opened up to emotionality. At this time he wept over Goerres's "Jung frau von Orleans", for Heine's poetry and Fuhrlich's "Triumph of Christ".⁵⁴ Zedlitz was the only Austrian poet he could appreciate. The greatest Austrian poets did not frequent his salon, for Grillparzer, Lenau, and Anastasius Grün were liberals. Their works were censored and suppressed whenever they seemed "anti-social" and "dangerous".

History was perhaps his chief interest, but he patronized research only in so far as it became detached from the present. He was suspicious of political motives behind the Monumenta Germanica. Ranke was a personal friend. His personal interest in science kept him in correspondence with Alexander von Humboldt. Due to his efforts the Austrian "Jahrbücher der Literatur" was established in 1817, but Metternich reserved for his own direction the writing of political articles. Friedrich Schlegel proposed and urged an Austrian Academy, but, although Metternich took up the idea, it was not established until 1847. The Austrian foreign minister was the sponsor and author of an Austrian scientific expedition to Brazil (1817-1820)⁵⁵

Vienna was host to a meeting of scientists in 1832.

In the forties Metternich himself became displeased at the censorship and desired more freedom for the authors, but it was his misfortune to desire great cultural progress without political. ⁵⁶

In Sorel's judgement "Metternich remains by exterior grace, by the excellence of tone, the perfection of attitude, and the subtle knowledge of the properties, and incomparable master. The great comedy of the world, the high intriguing of the European stage, has never had so fertile an author, an actor so consummate."⁵⁷

II. HIS PRINCIPLES.

The greatest contribution of Metternich and his greatest importance Srbik finds explained in his political theory.¹ Without a doubt this judgment savours of partisan sympathy since Srbik is himself a conservative, but it suggests that Metternich was something more than a traditional reactionary. Regardless of its little importance in the history of political thought, it is necessary to understand Metternich's theory in order to understand his policy. For Metternich was very much of a rationalist and his policies in general were not isolated phenomena, but expressions of a rather comprehensive philosophy. The essence of his thought was the conception of a balance - a path midway between extremes. "Mon esprit va toujours vers le moyens," he was fond of uttering.² Moreover, in his philosophy there was a prevalent dualism,³ a mingling of the moral and the natural, the universal and the individual, the abstract and the concrete. He was prone to emphasize the moral order whereas in reality he retained the Machiavellian distinction between politics and ethics.

While his particular applications were ingenious, Metternich's ideas were not original. He had gone to

school to Koch and Vogt, and what he did not learn from them he picked up in reading Hobbes and Burke. From Hobbes came the idea of sovereignty, but Metternich did not push the idea to its ultimate conclusion.⁴ At least his sense of the necessity of a balance would not have permitted him to vest absolute authority in one man. The idea of a balance implies a certain relativism. Metternich had some appreciation of the give and take, the correlation and reciprocity between rights and duties. With respect to European diplomacy, he held practically the same idea as the modern internationalist - that no nation can live by itself and what one nation does involves the rest.⁵ Koch and Vogt gave him a European mind: they taught the necessity of a Malande of Power. Christian universality influenced Koch's conception of a Balance of Power - to defend the weak from oppression; to create a wall against the ambitious and lustful.⁶ Vogt taught an inner balance of body and spirit, heart and reason, the State and the individual. Opposed to a universal monarchy he urged a European Republic in which the aristocratic element was to hold the balance in behalf of moderation.⁷

To Burke, Metternich owed his conception of gradual, "step by step" evolution, the opposite of

revolution; the abhorrence of abstract theory; the ideal of a landed aristocracy; the practical nature of the State; and the maintenance of tradition.⁸ Srbik lays too much emphasis on similarities in Kant and Metternich,⁹ the only similarity was the use of the word "moral." For the author of the "categorical imperative" would never have approved of what Metternich did in the name of the moral order. Metternich's political philosophy found expression in the works of Vogt, Heeren and Roscher. The latter compared politics to anatomy and disease. The malady of the State was anarchy; the cure was "preventive" measures.¹⁰ After 1815 Vogt gave up many of his earlier ideas and accepted in general the viewpoint of his former student. His "Primary Powers," published in 1819 won the approval of the Austrian foreign minister.¹¹

Metternich's personality offers the best key to many of his political ideas and to his political program. He was a lover of law and order. He hated all disturbances, all unrest, all invitation, all trouble. He carried repose and quietism to the verge of fanaticism, so easily was he irritated by signs of unrest.

The heart of Srbik's interpretation of Metternich's political philosophy is a passage from Gentz. - "Two principles constitute the moral world. The one is

eternal progress and the other is limitation of this progress. If they existed alone the world would be a play of winds and waves. If they prevailed all would be turned to stone or rot. The best time is when they are in a balance. Men must take part and restore the balance; when one is outweighed by the other - one must be a partisan.¹² Srbik's judgment is misleading. Metternich did not change sides to keep the balance in equilibrium. He was too lethargic.

Of the other side of his character Wilhelm von Humboldt's description of Metternich at the Congress of Vienna is typical. "Today Metternich came with several insertions that said nothing, and so for an hour long the matter was chewed over, tested, and altered, without the least progress being made. I was silent, because it makes a person indignant to be at such an affair. When finally nothing was accomplished and all the attempts and starts of Metternich brought nothing to paper, I was forced to speak and to write, and when this pretty work was completed, Metternich arose, filled with pride, and said, "We need not despair, we are always making progress. Children could not do worse."¹³

There was a Metternichian policy; but whether it deserves the name of a system is a question. Metternich himself denied any system save one of peace, and decried the expression "Metternichian System"¹⁴ as a "shibboleth." Metternich alone did not have enough power to create a system. His policy was based on the preservation of Austria. In external affairs it meant a Balance of Power and the Peace of Europe. How natural and befitting his own temperament and the position of Austria, the "polyglot polyarchy" of indefensible boundaries, heterogeneous population, and surrounded by aggressive neighbors. Austria he wished to make the pivot of the Balance of Europe, a check to France and to Russia, the means - between extremes. War would be disastrous for war would upset the balance. In 1813 he explained the essence of his European program to Aberdeen: "The Alliance has not been rightly judged abroad. Austria has never lost sight of the good cause. Austria has been oak or reed as conditions compelled, but yielding or resisting, we have always kept in view the good cause of Europe, we have at all times looked forward to a State of repose founded on a due equilibrium of the great powers of Christendom."¹⁵

Austria was the center; Germany and Italy were buffer States- subsidiaries- like the marks of Charlemagne on the kingdoms that Napoleon erected. In both Italy and Germany, Metternich intended for Austria to play a peculiar but leading role as president of confederations. Beyond the buffer States was European politics in which Austria aided by her subsidiaries would play the mediatory role and stabilize the balance of the continental Powers. On the whole his policy was an original and clever application of the theory of balance.

Wider than diplomacy and politics, his theory was applied to the internal polity of Austria and to the social order as well as the political order.¹⁶ Law and order, stability and gradual progress held. The State must have authority; the State was justified by inner necessity.¹⁷ Monarchy was not divine but rational- a symbol of unity and coherence.¹⁸ Aristocracy was the pivot of the internal balance- a step between the monarch and his subjects and a counterpoise to urban mesocracy.¹⁹ Aristocracy also was not romantic, but a practical expedient in maintaining a social balance.

The real ideas of Metternich one might expect to find in his ^{discursive} love letters to the Princess Lievin. They are somewhat disappointing. At one time he says he stands for immobility- the only known instance of such a statement

from Metternich himself. "Mon ami, j'ai la conviction de ne jamais avoir bougé de ma place. Le premier élément moral en moi c'est immobilité. L'Empereur ou me trouvera toujours et ce sera toujours là où il m'aura quitte."²⁰

In view of the fact that this is his only statement of immobility and in view of his own explanation, it must be considered as referring to his dependability, his steadfastness to the Emperor and not referring to progress. This letter is more than balanced by another in which he wrote: "Tu crois que je suis liberal dans le fond du coeur? Oui, mon amie, je le suis et même au dela."

There follows an extraordinary eulogy of "free" institutions in Austria, as if there were some in actual existence. "Notre pays, ou plutot nos pays, sont les plus tranquilles, parce qu'ils jouissent sans revolutions anterieures de la plupart des bienfaits qui incontestablement ressortent de la cendre des empires boulverses par les tourmentes, politiques. Notre peuple ne conçoit pas pourquoi il aurait besoin se livrer à des mouvements, quand dans le repos, il jouit de ce que le mouvement a procure aux autres. La liberte individuelle est complète, l'égalité de toutes les classes de la société devant la loi est parfaite, toutes portent les mêmes charges; il existe des titres, mais point de priviléges. Il nous manque un Morning Chronicle."²¹

It would seem as if Burke himself were speaking.

Metternich's political theory was liable to the same natural defect as Burke's--it intended to glorify traditions and existing institutions, and to deify the existing political and social order. Metternich was too concerned with the present institutions and he failed to appreciate those that were as yet merely conceived or only in the process of being built. His philosophy failed to grasp "the becoming", and the will of man to do the impossible. This defect led him to believe that there could not be a national German State and a United Italy.²² He lacked vision. While fond of pointing out the differences between the historical English Constitution and a doctrinaire charter, he refused to take those steps which enabled England to dispense with written constitutions and declarations of the rights of man.²³ Radicalism he preferred to liberalism--which he considered a hollow name, a disguise of radicalism, "das reine nichts".²⁴ The natural consequence of popular sovereignty was for him, communism. Nationalism was a Wortschall and behind it ^{was} revolution.²⁵ It is fair to say that he never believed in immobility and that he believed, though with a host of qualifications, in progress. Actually, he was the exponent of stability. In every period of his life there are evidences in his own letters and conversations of this belief. The following conversation with Ticknor is typical.

"There is nothing more important for a man than

to be reasonable and moderate in his expectations and especially not to wish to do anything he cannot accomplish. I am myself moderate in everything, and I endeavor to become more moderate. I have a calm disposition, a very calm one,-J'ai l'esprit calme, tres calme. I am passionate about nothing,- Je ne suis passionné pour rien. Therefore I have no foolish mistakes to reproach myself with,- Ainsi je n'ai pas de sottise à me reprocher. But I am very often misunderstood. I am thought to be a great absolutist in my policy. But I am not. It is true that I do not like democracies: democracy is everywhere and always-partout et toujours-a dissolving, decomposing principle; it tends to separate men, it loosens society. This does not suit my character. I am by character and habit constructive,- Je suis par caractère et par habitude constructeur.²⁶

CHAPTER II. METTERNICH: THE STATESMAN.

Part I. AUSTRIA.

"Though Francis I was a commonplace character, he possessed in his chief minister, Prince Metternich, a man far out of the ordinary, a man who appeared to the general public that lived between 1815 and 1848 as the most commanding personality of Europe, whose importance is shown in the phrases "era of Metternich," "system of Metternich." He was the central figure not only in Austrian and in German politics but in European diplomacy-dominating his age as Napoleon had dominated his, though by a very different process."¹

"Metternich's reputation was based on his long and tortuous diplomatic duel with Napoleon. Claiming to have correctly read that bewildering personality from his earliest observation of him, and to have lured him slowly yet inevitably to his doom by playing skillfully upon his weaknesses, Metternich considered himself the Conqueror of the Conqueror. An achievement so notable imposed upon many, nor did Metternich do aught to dim the brilliancy of the exploit. His imperturbability, his prescience, his diplomatic dexterity were everywhere praised. He came to be considered the one great oracle,

whose every word was full of meaning, if only you could get it. Diplomats bowed like acolytes before this master of their craft, and rulers also made their obeisance, though somewhat more slowly, as obviously befitted those who ruled by nothing less than divine right."²

This study offers two criticisms of the tradition which the foregoing quotations well illustrate. The first is that Metternich was not ipso facto reactionary. For a short period after 1815, he not only cooperated with the Liberals in Germany but actually tried to secure representative institutions in Austria. Later his policies became quite ultra-conservative and at times decidedly reactionary, but he always judged himself to be pursuing a moderate course. The second criticism is the fact that Metternich's influence fluctuated greatly and that he never had the power which the tradition attributes to him. Chapter II is a discussion of Metternich's position and policy as shown in his relations with Austria, Italy, Germany and international diplomacy, respectively.

The policy of Metternich was based upon the preservation of Austria - of the Hapsburg realms. There were two bulwarks, Germany and Italy, in which Austria

held a preferred position. In the German Confederation Band, Austria was in theory only primus inter pares, but her prestige gave her great influence. For Italy, Metternich proposed another Confederation, a Lega Italica, on the model of the German Bund, but Sardinia, backed by Russia, the Papacy and Tuscany refused in 1816. Failing to secure an Italian League Austria had to rely upon special treaties and eventually upon espionage and force to maintain her power.

The diplomatic policy of Austria under Metternich was the preservation of peace by means of a balance of power. Danger seemed to threaten Austria from Russian expansion and French revolutionary uprisings. By an unofficial but close entente with Great Britain, and with Prussia, Metternich hoped to maintain a European balance with Austria as the pivot. The interests of Great Britain and Austria for a few years after 1815 were practically the same, and the resultant policies were alike. But herein Metternich did not play the leading role, rather he followed closely the leadership of Castlereagh. Indeed contrary to the general tradition, the only time Metternich may be considered to have been the dominant leader of Europe was but a few months of 1813.

It is a rather common mistake to confuse the policies of Francis I of Austria and those of his Foreign Minister Metternich. The policies of Francis I were ipso facto reactionary. "Since 1809 he had lost his faith in the living justice of new ideas. It now seemed to him to be a God given duty to maintain what had been snatched from the Revolution." He ruled the State in the same patriarchal manner as his family. His was a shrivelled, dried up nature lacking any feeling whatever for art and science. He recognized no right of his subjects, no progress, no development. Bureaucratic, pedantic, static, mechanistic, legalistic, obstinate and distrustful, he considered himself a bar to all usurpations of the present. The widest vision of his dreams was his belief in the traditional patriarchal mission of his family. His ambition, as he loved to say himself was to be a good Aulic Counsellor.⁴ This was the type of an Emperor Metternich had to serve and adopt his will to, particularly in governmental affairs. Metternich himself explains his relations with the Emperor: "L'Empereur fait toujours ce que je veux, mais je ne veux jamais que ce qu'il doit faire."⁵ For the internal administration the Emperor kept closely under his own thumb. Metternich as Chancellor was naturally interested

in reforms and suggested changes to Francis I from time to time, but he dared not intervene. Metternich's ideas and those of the Emperor, in fact, were by no means always in harmony.

Francis I and his foreign minister, however, had in common, to the sure, the preservation of Austria, and in addition a profound hatred of all that related to Jacobism. Again, Metternich, supposedly, had more or less a free hand in foreign affairs; yet he was necessarily confined to accepting, in general, the principles of his monarch. For the Emperor brought pressure to bear on Metternich in several instances, and in 1819 he disagreed with what Metternich had done at Carlsbad.⁶ Metternich, whom the Legend calls the dictator of Europe did not even dictate policy at home! The Emperor ruled and Metternich was only a directing minister.

Metternich was always convinced of the need for reform in the Austrian Empire. "He was often heard to deplore the fact that the Empire was administered but not governed," says Sandeman, "But Metternich refused to let anything be done by the people. Moreover, his yielding, pliant nature was not proof against opposition, and so long as Francis or even after his death, a strong party at court, opposed all reform Metternich could not harden his heart to carry out what he knew to be right and necessary."⁷

There was, indeed, an Austrian regime for Austria, but it was not the work of many men. Much that is called the Metternichian System was not only not his own but had existed long before he came into office. Repression was preMetternichian in the Hapsburg lands. Censorship and the police systems, these were not new creations after 1815.⁸ Count Pergen, the first police minister of Emperor Francis, who had organized an Austrian police in the reign of Joseph II spoke of a system on 1 September 1790 and used many expressions that were common to Metternich's vocabulary in 1819 and afterwards. "All that disturbs the Peace - die Ruhe - must be suppressed." At the time of Metternich's term of office Sedlnitzky was minister of police and he, rather than the foreign minister was responsible for its activities.⁹

The internal policy of Francis I was practically a continuation of the essential features of Joseph II, namely Febronianism, centralization and Germanization. Metternich was at variance with all three. Joseph II had sought to abolish local assemblies and eliminate the differences of the nationalities. Metternich, too, was a representative of Enlightened Despotism, but he was not a king, let alone a "philosopher king." Pragmatic

in his policies he was willing to recognize the various nationalities and their customs.¹⁰ His ultimate plans for Austria were federal in character, based upon the ideal of "unity in diversity."

Francis I abolished in 1809 the only semblance of unity in administration - the Council of State. A few months after Metternich became foreign minister, he presented to Emperor Francis a plan for reviving the Council of State with full power to carry on deliberations (formerly only written reports were submitted to the Emperor without deliberation in council). Metternich's model was Napoleon's Council of State. In addition to reviving the Council of State in his plans Metternich urged the Emperor to call a Reichsrat composed of men from all the states of the Empire for the purpose of deliberations. The Emperor was to preside, and discussions were to be limited to the business laid before it. Ministers were to be members ex officia. No distinction was to be made in the Reichsrat between representatives of the German and Hungarian provinces. Four sections of the Reichsrat were contemplated: legal, internal, finance, and military, and each section was to cooperate with the ministry.¹¹ His plan failed - perhaps he being a new minister of foreign affairs, he had meddled in internal affairs too soon.

In 1810 an effort was made to destroy the Hungarian constitution in order to assimilate Hungary with Austria. Gentz was the foremost spokesman for the plan, which Metternich opposed.¹² Hungary kept her own constitution, on the basis of which the Liberals afterwards were able to agitate for reform in Hungary. The next year when Austria and the Allies were supporting a charter for France, Metternich revived his Reichsrat plan of 1809 with the name of Reichsrat changed to Staatsrat. It was modelled not upon the proposal of Kaunitz of 1760 but upon Napoleon's Legislative Body.¹³ The Staatsrat was to have power to advise only on matters laid before it. The plan provided for seven sections: law-giving, justice, internal affairs, finance, war, German provinces and Hungary. To the last all questions between Hungarians and non-Hungarians were to be referred. There were to be ministerial conferences of the ministers under the presidency of the monarch. Emperor Francis examined the plan and commissioned Metternich to elaborate upon it. An international crisis caused it to be laid aside. Meanwhile great opposition had developed to Metternich's plan. During the last weeks of the War of Liberation (on 15 Feb. 1814) Count Wallis, Minister of Finance sketched a plan of a wholly different character, by which the Staatsrat

and the Ministerial Conference became one. The sections were not to represent historic lands such as Hungary, - but phases of administration. In general it amounted to a plan for the establishment of a centralised bureaucracy reducing the duties of ministers to merely giving information. In August 1814, the Emperor, returning from the campaign of France criticised the plans of Count Wallis.

At the same time Metternich, having returned to Vienna, after the Peace of Paris - subsequent negotiations in London, submitted again his plan of 1811 aiming against strict centralization and the drawing of strict lines between departments. The Ministerial Conference and the Staatsrat were to be separated. Some of the distinctive parts of the plan of 1811 were omitted, such as sections for Hungary.¹⁴ Metternich's plan was now more like that of Wallis - in its abandonment of sections to represent the several realms.

This plan was adopted by the Emperor, but it did not work as anticipated. It quite disappointed Metternich's expectations because of conflicts between the Staatsrat and the Ministers. Metternich by altering his plans in a conservative fashion had been nominally successful, but it was no great victory as the opposition to broader reforms was great.

This opposition consisted of four elements: 1 - There was the Emperor, because of whom he had had to compromise his plans. There was Stadion, leader of the aristocracy, and Metternich's predecessor in the Foreign Office, jealous of his successor and exercising very great power until his death in 1823. 3. Metternich had many opponents among the Austrian politicians, such as Sturmers and Franttmansdorf. 4. The established and privileged bureaucracy represented by Souran resented any of Metternich's attempts to reform it. However, Souran, a Josephist, did not at this time enjoy the Emperor's confidence. Jancourt, French Foreign Minister ad interim at Paris, wrote in Dec. 1814 to Talleyrand that he had heard from people on the inside of Vienna that "tout le monde" was equally tired of Prince Metternich, and wished to have him replaced by Stodion.¹⁵ There were other rumors of dissatisfaction with Metternich in Austria, and machinations against him.¹⁶ Metternich, the president of the Congress of Vienna, the supposed arbiter of Europe was threatened by a cabal of internal and foreign opposition aiming at his overthrow. Indeed Metternich could not be absolutely sure of the Emperor.¹⁷ He wanted to become Chancellor of the Empire at this time, but the opposition

was so great that he was unable to obtain this honor for six more years.

Two years later Metternich had somewhat stronger position. He proposed the creation of a High Chancellor of the Interior to unify internal administration. After working for a year on the plan he presented it 27 Oct. 1817. It was entirely his own work, as Gentz was a rather thorough reactionary at this time.¹⁸ This proposal is entitled the "Organization of the Central Administration in Austria,"^{19 and 100} but it was far more radical than the name suggests. The administration was to be divided into seven great branches: 1. Foreign Affairs, 2. Internal, Administration, 3. Finance, 4. Military Affairs, 5. Administration of Justice,²⁰ Police and 7. Board of Trade. The head of the department of Home Affairs was to receive the title of High Chancellor and Home Minister. Under him were to be four Chancellors forming with the High Chancellor the Ministry of Home Affairs. Their spheres were to be based upon a recognition of nationalities, viz:

1. A Chancellor for Bohemia, Moravia, and Galacia.
2. An Austrian Chancellor - for the provinces above and below the Enns, Styria, the Inwartel, Salzburg and Tyrol.
3. An Illyrian Chancellor, over Illyria and Dalmatia.

4. An Italian Chancellor, over Lombardy and Venetia.

In regard to Hungary and Transylvanie, where Metternich had in mind gradual reforms the proposal read: "Since in the present work I do not wish to confuse the real and immediate improvements, easy of accomplishment with the far more extensive and difficult reforms required in Hungary and Transylvania, I will enter no further into the matter." The most significant feature of the paper was a proposal for a central representative body for Austria- an elaboration of the Reichsrat plan of 1809. A very liberal, if not radical, project-Metternich essayed to conceal the "appearance of novelty" with such assurances as: "Your Majesty knows from long experience that all desire for unnecessary alteration and dangerous disturbances is far from me. In my Report there is nothing glowing, nothing revolutionary, not a single dangerous principle. I uphold order, because from an administration internally too complicated, disorder must ensue. No time is less suited than the present to bring forward in any State, reforms in a wide sense of the word."

In other places in the document Metternich speaks more like a reformer. "Everything that I now bring before your Majesty, I bring as the result of a conviction

which standing the test of a long self-imposed probation has grown in my mind from the strongest evidence... That Government as it is at present, rests in its daily working too entirely upon the principle of centralisation. That by the carrying out of my proposals every evil will be avoided in the future, I am far from expecting. But that a reliable Government, resting on enlightened principles, set forth in the clear words which are the necessary consequence of clear ideas, smooths the way for all good, while, on the contrary, a confusion of ideas in the Government stands in the way is not to be denied. Besides, there is no human institution which, if it rests on clear fundamental principles, does not improve as it progresses."

For the solution of the problem of the various nationalities there were two solutions:

1. Fusion - attempted and unsuccessful under Joseph II, which Metternich describes as an empty and dangerous hypothesis.

2. A careful regulation of the reasonable long standing differences sanctioned by speech, climate, manners and customs in the various districts of the monarchy under a strong well-organised central government.

...Since something of the kind is now necessary,

I desire to bring forward the idea of a central representation of the nation."²⁰

The importance of Metternich's proposal for a Parliament for Austria cannot be over estimated in view of the traditional story that he was a reactionary. It is all the more significant in that it was made after the radicalist Wartburg Festival of 18 October 1817, which alarmed so many German states. In other words, long after Prussia had turned reactionary,²¹ Metternich was actually urging reforms for Austria Hungary involving a form of representative government. He wished to preserve the local estates or assemblies and have new ones created where none existed. It suggested a federal scheme²² such as that of the United States; the central body resembling the United States' Senate, which until 1912 was composed of men selected by State Legislatures. The proposal of Metternich was in a sense more revolutionary for Austria than the calling of the Estates General in France at the time of the great Revolution. For Austria had never had a national legislature, and apparently this was the first actual proposal of a central legislature by a high official. No wonder Metternich tried to mask the revolutionary character of his proposal.

What happened? Francis I had long before made up his mind against Constitutions. In Jan., 1816, he actually forbade any public discussion over a Constitution for Austria.²³ In March 1818 Munster of Hanover wrote to Castlereagh: "Metternich is having a hard time getting representatives government in Austria."²⁴ There is both external and internal evidence to prove that Metternich intended and wanted central representation in Austria at the time.²⁵

Emperor Francis put away Metternich's proposal in his chest.²⁶ The only practical result was the creation of a Home minister and High Chancellor.²⁷ Under him were:

1. A Bohemian- Moravian- Silesian Chancellor. Count Lazansky.
2. An Austrian Illyrian- Greiherren Geiszherrn.
3. A Lombard- Venetian- Count Mellerio.
4. A Gallician.

The practical working of the System was hampered by the appointment of Count Saurau, an opponent of Metternich, and a bureaucrat as High Chancellor and Home Minister. The Royal Patent is a very paternalistic document. "This Supreme Central Home Ministry shall, in accordance with our system of unity, lead all countries and peoples to the same individual and general welfare, bring the public obligations into equal proportions, spread culture and education on just and uniform principle, and at the same time observe and foster with the

greatest tenderness, the various peculiarities and differences in speech, manners and customs, climates and hereditary distinctions."²⁸

The establishment of an Austrian Reichsrat was not the only reform being sought by Metternich in these years, however. He had been instrumental in restoring the local constitutional bodies (*Stände*) in Hapsburg lands, e.g.

Tyrol, 1816, Galicia, 1817, and Carinthia, 1818.²⁹ Meanwhile a general reaction was setting in all over Europe.

It was marked in England, as it was in Prussia, and not least in Austria. On 2 January, 1818, Emperor Francis decreed a strict censorship at Vienna for foreign news-

papers.³⁰ In August an even tighter censorship was created for Lombardy-Venetia.³¹ All political discussion-especially public consideration of constitutional changes-was shut off. It would have been useless for a man of

real liberal principles to persist in a reform program under the circumstances, and Metternich was an easy-going cautious opportunist, loving his position, its prestige and rewards. On practical grounds- perhaps convictions too- he yielded to exigencies and reversed his position on representative government. This was between March and

August. In November, 1818 he advised Frederick William of Prussia against carrying out his promise of a central representative assembly for Prussian lands, anything beyond

provincial diets meant revolution. "Austria would herself be more suited for a pure representative system than Prussia. How can that which is impossible to be carried out in Austria succeed in Prussia"? ³²

Having thus shifted his position Metternich assumed the role of special conservator of the moral order, of law and legally derived institutions. It was the role which was to make him more and more the traditional leader of the war upon "revolution." His self-justification of his shifted role is hereafter reflected egotistically in his correspondence. Having become ill in June 1818 he retired to Carlsbad for a rest. From Königswart, 26 August 1818, he wrote significantly to his wife: "Few lives are so fatiguing as those which are spent in the higher walks of life, and in the midst of important and intricate affairs. How many difficulties there are in my career and how different are they from those of former ministers, and perhaps even from those to come."³³ Thus he covered his retreat. Again on 4 September, at Frankfort, just before the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, he wrote her in the spirit of engrossing egoism of his later life. "You have no idea of the effect produced by my appearance at the Diet. I have become a species of moral power in Germany, and perhaps even in Europe, a power which will leave a void when it disappears."³⁴ Thus he seems to be trying to

justify his retreat from his position in 1817, the year of his greatest "liberalism." The reward came in 1821 when the Kaiser Francis showed him his special favor by giving him the much desired title of Haus-Hof-und Staatskanzler.

In 1825 the Hungarian Diet or Reichstag which had not met since its dissolution in 1812 was again called in order to collect taxes and levy soldiers.³⁵ Metternich spoke disparagingly of the character of the Diet. At the same time to influence the populace by ceremonies, the fourth wife of Francis I - Charlotte of Bavaria was crowned queen.³⁶ The Diet met at Pressburg and lasted two years. In 1826 the Salzburg Stände were revived by Austria. Count Stefan Szechenyi led the Hungarian, nationalist movement and helped to awaken Hungarian culture. When the Reichstag dissolved in 1827 it had won a victory for states rights. In 1830, Ferdinand was crowned King of Hungary in the Emperor's life time in order to attach the Hungarians more closely to the throne. Hungary was always the Ireland of Austria and even Francis was extremely careful to respect its institutions and its Reichstag.

altho
In 1826 and 1827 the Emperor was very ill, and summoned Metternich, promising as soon as all was well to set up a commission to apply Metternichs proposed reforms

of 1817. When the Emperor became well, he apparently forgot his promise.³⁷ About the same time Count Francis Anton Kolomot, a Bohemian nobleman was made State and Conference Minister, to take the place of the deceased Count Zichy. He was a man of ordinary ability, without clarity, and without vision, but with an excellent head for administration.³⁸ Fickle, self-conscious and ambitious his special ambition was to shave Metternich from his position and to step into his place himself.³⁹ He was thus playing the role which Stadim had played till 1824, but far more effectually. In 1830 - 1831 there was a scare of a French invasion and Metternich urged a large army. Kolowrat opposed, won the score of the wretched state of Austrian finances. He advised the Emperor to let Europe shift for itself and to devote all his energies to rehabilitating finances. Apparently he was aiming to make himself indispensable to the Emperor,⁴⁰ by stressing the sorry plight of Austrian finances and that he, Kolowrat was the only man capable of saving them. For as Kübeck, who was a follower of neither Metternich nor Kolowrat, pointed out that the Austrian finances at this time were not in such a bad plight.⁴¹ Metternich won out. Kolowrat threatened to resign but Metternigh, being victorious,

was conciliated and allowed him to stay in the ministry.

This was the first serious conflict between Metternich and Kolowrat. There were to be many more.

Kolowrat secured the dismissal of Count Souran and Nasody, who was succeeded by Klebelsburg, a cousin of Kolowrat. Austria now had a triumvirate of Metternich, Kolowrat, and Sedlnitzky.⁴² The Hungarian Diet met in 1830 and carried through a great many reforms in its own interest regarding punishment, division of taxes, and use of the Hungarian language. In 1832, Kolowrat obtained the budget which he wished, and succeeded in eliminating Kübeck from the ministry.⁴³ There were demands for reforms from such men as Chotek⁴⁴ and Pillersdorf⁴⁵ but Emperor Francis replied - "I will have no innovations. Justice is in all our laws." Metternich told Pillersdorf he was not a reactionary - "man muss vorwärts schreiten."⁴⁶ In 1834, Eichhoff, friend of Kolowrat was raised to a high position in internal affairs. Kübeck gives a trenchant criticism of Metternich, "He did not know the inner needs of a monarchy - he saw them all from the salons. Metternich himself was unaware that he was salon-minded."⁴⁷ Sometime later Kübeck lamented the impotency of Metternich. "Metternich has risen to the position of a world statesman. He makes a mistake in

neglecting the administrative interests of Austria, which he considers to be petty. He is too often the tool of flattery and intrigue."⁴⁸

In 1834, Kolowrat won another victory in internal affairs when his follower Eichoff was raised to a high place. He even began to intervene in foreign relations.

⁴⁹ He condemned Metternich's friendship with the July Monarchy. Personally Kolowrat was not a liberal - he used "progress" for personal ends. He condemned Metternich for his "stability system," accused him of Jesuitism, backwardness and the ruin of Austrian finances.

Kolowrat was a Josephist to the core. Srbik says ⁵⁰ he was a misfortune for Austria. Insistent became the demands for reform. Grillparzer and Bauernfeld, the great dramatists, had welcomed the revolutions of 1830. Gentz, until his death in 1832, Prokesch Osten, Pilat, the editor of the Austrian Beobachter, and Kübeck urged reforms. There were demands for the removal of Metternich and Sedlnitzky,⁴⁷ and Cassandras were fortelling the doom of Austria.

"As long as I live" the Emperor Francis had declared, "things shall remain as they are." But even he began to yield to the pressure. According to Metternich's own account, as he was calling on the Emperor to

wish him a happy new year, 1835, Francis promised before the year ended to set up a commission to put into effect the reforms Metternich had suggested back in 1817. "Your work rests still in my chest. I give you today my word of honor that the year of 1835 will not end without the work coming to life."⁵¹

Two months later the Emperor died. The will, made sometime earlier, 1831, or 1832, was reactionary in character. It urged his successor, Ferdinand, to rely upon the Grand Duke Louis and Metternich, "My dearest servant and friend," and in accordance with Metternich's own wish it expressed a desire of a concordat with the Papacy. "On the foundations of the State move nothing, rule and do not change. Hold firm to the indestructable principles and the traditional rights."⁵²

A new period began with the reign of Ferdinand - a rule of the Aristocracy, - whom Francis had held in check. The Emperor was both intellectually and politically weak. Ticknor describes him - "The King is a stout, dark-complexioned, sallow young man of six-and-twenty, a little awkward in his manners and address, with black eyes, and not an agreeable expression of countenance, but still not a very bad one. He is said to be vulgar and ill tempered. Among other things that are reported of

him, a diplomatic gentleman told me he knew it to be a fact that he had been rude to his late queen, a Princess of Sardinia, - he pulled out a chair from under her, so that she fell to the floor. She had the spirit to turn upon him and say, 'I thought I had married a gentleman, but I find that I have married a Tazzarone.'⁵³ The ministers quarreled over the inheritance of the regime and every member of the royal family interfered with the government. "Austria was an absolute monarchy without a monarch."⁵⁴

The testament of Francis was at once disregarded. Kolowrat was angered because his name had not even been mentioned, and this disregarding of Kolowrat is the foundation of the accusation which Bibl stresses that this will was a fraud, the work of Metternich.⁵⁵ There seems to be little to justify this attitude as the will was probably written, as Bibl himself suggests, in 1831 or 1832, and at the Emperor's own instigation. It was natural for Francis to rely upon Metternich with whom he had worked so long, rather than upon Kolowrat, a new man, so to speak. Metternich intended to have Kolowrat retire but the latter raised such a protest that Metternich allowed him to remain in his position. The royal family began to assert itself, and most of the members were unfriendly

to Metternich, especially the Archduke Charles and John Charles, who became field marshall of the Empire considered the resistance of Metternich to the Zeitgeist to be foolish.⁵⁶ Palmerston supported Archduke Charles. The second son of Francis I, Francis Charles was not provided with an office because of tradition. His wife, Sophia, was very active - and very intimate with the reigning Queen Caroline Augusta. The issues were sharply drawn. Metternich favored return of the Jesuits, not merely to Galicia, but to all Austria.⁵⁷ His opponents condemned the Jesuits and urged a reduction of the army.

Metternich, while Kolowrat was ill in 1836, proceeded to initiate reforms. He revived the Staatsrat of his plan of 1814 - dividing the administration into four sections, which were to report to a Staats-konferenz which was to have as president Metternich himself. The Reichsrat or representative idea of 1817 was not revived. Metternich succeeded in having his reforms introduced in 1836. By so acting , he, himself was violating the will of Francis that he should change nothing. But had not the Emperor changed his views later? The consent of Archduke Louis was won 31 October 1836 and he warmly urged his friends to support the changes as a matter of patriotism.

At this juncture Archduke John, Metternich's long-standing enemy took up the cause of Kolowrat, who was very popular. Metternich was charged - and with justice - of furnishing the Carlists in Spain with financial assistance. The result of the contest was a compromise. Metternich's scheme was preserved, but he was given a greatly reduced role. Archduke Louis, not Metternich, became the president of the Staatskonferenz. Kolowrat was chairman of the Staatsrat and director of finance and internal police. Metternich had had little control over the police until 1831, from which time until 1836, he exerted considerable influence over Sedlnitzky's department.⁵⁸ Members of the Imperial Family became members of the Conference.⁵⁹ Thus Metternich was given an absolute check in internal affairs in Austria. He was not even president of the ministerial conference, his own creation. His only accomplishments were the continuations of the policy of frequent coronations in the various parts of the Austrian Empire. In 1830 Ferdinand had been crowned king of Hungary. In addition to the imperial coronation of 1835, he was crowned King of Bohemia, 7 Sept. 1836 and King of Lombardy-Venetia at Milan in 1838. These coronations were practically the

limit Metternich allowed himself in conciliation of nationalism. At any rate, they were recognitions of the national complexes of the Empire.

Metternich was now alone, without henchmen in the supreme council, where Kolowrat held the ascendancy.⁶⁰ If he had persevered in his original purpose to eliminate Kolowrat from the administration he could probably have succeeded in securing further reforms, but he lacked steadfastness. Even when Kolowrat was restored, Metternich could have defeated him if he had formed a party, but he refused to be a partisan. He lacked courage and his nature abhorred a fight. Time after time in his career he abandoned plans of reform for fear of opposition. Moreover, Austrian affairs were too petty to become involved in party politics, he thought; for a violent party conflict would injure his prestige abroad. Finally he was too old; at the age of 65 (1837) he had lost the enthusiasm which he must have had, in some degree, earlier in his career. Clam-Martinitz and some of his friends wished that he would form a party, but he considered the interests of the state, of the whole, above himself.⁶¹

He was paying the price of his own weaknesses, his self complacency. He was completely isolated. Clam-Martinitz told Kubeck, 8 Jan. 1838: "The whole

power lies in the hands of one minister - Kolowrat. Metternich fights upon unequal terms. He is careful of the end and seeks to preserve the State. Kolowrat disregards the means!⁶² Metternich whom the legend calls the master of kings was impotent in his own land! In 1838 he stirred himself to a protest. It was in vain. Dejected and disillusioned, Metternich became ill and selected Count Fiquelmont as his successor.

Grillparzer said of Metternich in 1839: "Denn ob nicht ist tot, er lebt doch auch nicht mehr."⁶³ Authorities quarreled among themselves; the administration was in confusion. Kübeck in alarm declared, "The Austrian Government is on the road to revolutionary anarchy."⁶⁴

In the forties religion became more than ever the important issue in Austrian internal politics.⁶⁵ In order to understand the situation it is necessary to trace Metternich's religious attitudes and policy. Personally Metternich was not at first illiberal in his beliefs, as was natural for one nurtured by the Aufklärung. However, his religion was of a negative character.⁶⁶ While desiring to be a good Catholic, social peace was the more important. To Catholicism he adhered because it was authoritative, whereas in his mind Protestantism was revolutionary.⁶⁷ His philosophic

rationalism taught him the unalterable rule of natural law which led him practically to fatalism.⁶⁸ He made a complete distinction between reason and feeling.⁶⁹ "Religion ist vernunft religion, moral ist vernunftmoral."⁷⁰ these were his beliefs, and they were opposed to religious idealism.

At the Congress of Vienna Metternich was instrumental in securing article XVI of the Bundesrat which guaranteed toleration to both Roman Catholics and Protestants on equal terms.⁷¹ In 1816 the question of a general concordat of the German States through the Bundestag was discussed and Metternich gave his hearty support.⁷² When the matter was brought before the Bundestag later in the same year a decision was made that the Bund had no jurisdiction, Consalvi; the Papal Secretary, was then free to make concordats with the individual German States. Dalberg, one of its strongest supporters died and Montgelas, one of its other supporters, was summoned to Rome and forced to retract. Montgelas, who as prime minister, had resisted ultra-montanism in Bavaria and had demanded a separate national church for Bavaria, was suddenly dismissed in Feb. 1817, due to the pressure brought to bear by the Crown Prince of Bavaria by Count Wrede, by Metternich, and the Church influences. Metternich proposed as a compro-

mise that separate concordats be drawn up by the separate states on a common plan.⁷³

In Austria Metternich was comparatively liberal in his attitude toward the Protestants and the Jews.⁷⁴

When the Jesuits sought readmittance to the Hapsburg realms in 1814, Metternich fought the idea and succeeded in having them excluded.⁷⁵

For the Ultra-montanists and the romanticists Metternich had no sympathy. He

objected strongly to being considered the protector of Schlegel's Ultra-montane paper, Concordia;⁷⁶

However, despite all his condemnations of the Ultras he preferred them to the Liberals - Chateaubriand to Benjamin Constant.⁷⁷

At Vienna the ecclesiastics exercised a great influence over public affairs in a most illiberal fashion, and Metternich's influence was checked in its liberal aims.

An Archbishop almost controlled the theatre censorship.⁷⁸

The production of Lessing's "Nathan der Weise" was forbidden, and even two Biblical plays - "Abraham" and "Jacob", were forbidden.⁷⁹ Three magazines devoted to theatre criticism were subjected to the censorship.⁸⁰

Any innovations, any non-authoritative discussion was discouraged, and the Emperor supported the Churchmen.

The Bible Society problem is an excellent illustration of the interference of the Austrian clergy in

politics. Originating in London it spread rapidly abroad; and it was strongly supported by the Russian Czar. In 1816 it appealed to the Austrian Government for admission and Metternich was quite favorable- August, September, 1816.⁸¹ Although earlier in 1816 the Pope had condemned the Bible Society for Poland, Metternich assured the Bible Society's representative that he would support its case before Emperor Francis, directed him how to present his case and even arranged for Stadion's support of it. Everything was favorable-even the censorship. Nevertheless, the petition failed for the bishops of Hungary protested against the Society to the Emperor that its activities were contrary to Papal regulations. The Emperor was won over by the ecclesiastics, and Metternich per force changed his position. He now formally disapproved of the Society as a secret mystical sect.

Metternich visited Italy in 1817, and although he did not go on to Rome as was expected, he exchanged cordial letters with Consaliv. He apparently found evidence of the work of various sects and secret societies and voiced a stern disapproval.⁸² When the Czar complained of the expulsion of the Bible Society from Austria Metternich explained to Nesselrode, the Russian minister, the constant opposition of Emperor Francis to the "maladie biblique". "For myself", he declared, "I read only Luther's translation,

the best which has ever been made in any country, and in a living language."⁸³ By 1819 relations of Austria and the Papacy became closer; the explanation was a mutual fear of the Carbonari, the Free Masons and the "sects". Metternich accompanied the Emperor to Rome. Having gone farther away from his tolerant views of 1815, Metternich upon hearing of the murder of Kotzebue blamed on Luther all the liberal and radical agitation, for Luther had struck at authority.⁸⁴

Consaliv died in 1824, following his master, Pius VII who died the preceding year. Leo XII (1823-1829) was chosen against the will of Austria. The new Pope repudiated tolerance and was a thorough monastic reactionary. He died 10 February, 1829, hated by all the people. Pius VIII (1829-30) lived only twenty months after his election. Gregory XVI (1830-46) appealed to Austria for assistance in putting down the revolt^x in Romagna in 1831. The Powers in 1831 demanded reforms in the Papal States.⁸⁵ The Austrians retired but were recalled in 1832 by Cardinal Albani. Then Casimir Perier sent a French fleet and occupied Ancona until 1838. Metternich declared the invasion was a breach of international law, but Palmerston supported it. On the death of Casimir Perier, the French Government changed its policies and expelled the Liberals from Ancona. The Papacy supported by Metternich refused all other reforms

on the theory that they could only be granted by a government which is absolutely free.⁸⁶ Under the influence of the Sanfedists, the Papacy hired 5,000 mercenaries who instituted a reign of terror which D'Azeglio pronounced a disgrace to mankind and to religion.

While the Zelanti party were at the height of their power in Rome, Metternich was approaching religious reaction. Gentz wrote on 5 December, 1830: "The prince (Metternich) believes the catechism like a child. Melonie, his third wife, and her mother Molly were friendly to the Jesuits. Metternich heard mass daily in his private chapels."⁸⁷ The liberals considered him a fanatic; and indeed marvelous changes had taken place in the former Weltmann, the Freigeist. There were several reasons: the Jesuit connections of his wife, the reaction from the 1830 revolutions, the tendency of retreat, to become an apostle of conservatism. He looked upon himself almost as an instrument of God.⁸⁸ By 1829 Metternich seemingly had quite lost his earlier ability to compromise.

"Ein umgekehrter Talleyrand

Obwohl sonst gegen seine Affe,

Fangt er mit dem minister an

Und endiget als Pfaffe."

"Mit Gott stand ich sonst nicht

Nun möch ich mich intim

Er ist doch wahrhaft absolut

Und hochlich legitim."⁸⁹

Thus Grillparzer scoffed at the piety which Metternich the former "Weltman", had acquired.

Metternich's increasing sympathy for the Jesuits was soon revealed in deed. In 1833 the Zillerthaler Inklinanten were warned to leave the land; and in 1837 they were actually expelled,⁹⁰ -in violation of the toleration provisions in the Bundesoct of which Metternich was the author.⁹¹ The will of the Emperor of 1835 was a complete abandonment of Josephism. There were two testaments and the second or religious one was in the handwriting of Archbishop Wagner, whom Bibl accuses of having the dying Emperor sign without knowing its contents.⁹²

Having failed in his attempts to secure vital changes in the political administration of the Empire in 1836-7, Metternich by 1839-40 turned to the issue of church relations. The Jesuits were recalled. An arrangement was made in 1841 by which Roman Catholic clergy were given charge of the education of children. Kolowrat fortunately secured a modification of the arrangement to allow their parents to have charge of their education.⁹³ Also another revision

was made for mixed marriages. Metternich in fact practically abandoned the principles of toleration. This was reactionary.

These reactionary moves were not due to any principle or conviction. They were due to political exigencies. Metternich never believed in tradition as did Chateaubriand, de Maistre and de Bonald. His nature was not essentially religious. An opportunist par excellence the moral world was relative in his point of view. In common with his Jesuit friends he believed that the end justifies the means. Thus in 1844, he did not hesitate to urge the Emperor to break with the Papacy if necessary. Religion with Metternich was an instrument of policy- as it was for Napoleon- to keep the masses in intellectual subjection and political servitude. There were other reasons for Metternich's ecclesiastical reaction: a desire to prevent Bavaria from becoming the leading Catholic State and a desire to unite South Germany under the banner of Catholicism to check Prussia's expansion.⁹⁴ Again Metternich was defeated by wonder of wonders- a liberal Pope, Pius IX, elected in 1846. It is no marvel, then, that the Revolution of 1848 was Josephinat in its origin; a revolution in favor of toleration, directed against Metternichian intolerance and reaction.

The religious issues merged into others of a more distinctly political nature. The only remaining Liberal tendencies of Metternich were economic. Consequently he supported a mid European Taffiff Union.⁹⁵ The Liberals, who thus found Metternich their opponent in everything else, carried on their agitation against him both openly and under cover. Literary societies were formed for political purposes, such as the Shakespeare Society. Bauernfeld, though an Austrian official, openly condemned the government and Kollowrat encouraged him.⁹⁶ Indignant at Metternich's policies, his opponents expressed their disapproval in a song:

"O Metternich, O Metternich,
Ich wollte dass das Wetter dich
Tief in den Boden schläge."⁹⁷

Metternich now turned to organize a party, principally in Hungary, under Szechenyi. Its program was reactionary - aiming to take away from the Hungarian Diet the privilege of initiating legislation.⁹⁸ The Government was in chaos, condemned by its own employees. At last Metternich, feeling the need for constitutional reform sent Archduke John in 1847 to England to study English institutions.⁹⁹ Palmerston urged the Chancellor to

conciliate the Zeitgeist and grant representative institutions. On the birthday of Francis Joseph, March 13, 1848, the revolution began attacking Sedlnitzky and Metternich, who was just on the point of drafting a plan for a Constitution. He was too late. Already upon hearing of the February Revolution in France, he had remarked - "eh bien, mon cher, tout est fini." How soon the prophecy had been fulfilled.

Part III. Italy.

Austrian influence in Italy was exercised in various ways. Lombardy-Venetia was a possession of Austria and was ruled directly by the crown. Some of the Italian States as Tuscany, Parma, Modena and Lucca were closely bound to Austria by family ties. Others as Naples and the Papal States and even Sardinia, awhile independent were influenced by Austria. Metternich's own influence in Italy was primarily limited to the last two groups. Therefore his hands were not as free in Italy as in Germany. However, Italy's importance in his polity was very great, for Italy was an outpost of Austria. Metternich's Italian policy was in its essence one of preservation.

Italian nationalism, although it received its nurturing from the French Revolution and Napoleon, found encouragement at that period also from Austria. At the time of the war of 1809 Archduke John of Austria harangued the Italians: "Hear me, Italians and engrave on your hearts what truth and reason demand of you. You are slaves of France; for her wealth, for her your lives are sacrificed... If God will but second the virtuous en-

deavors of the Emperor Francis and of his potent allies, Italy may again be happy in herself. A Constitution suited to the nature of the Italian provinces, to their true political state, will be given to promote their prosperity, and to secure them from every insult inflicted by a foreign power."¹ The call had little success; the Italians were not certain that an Austrian victory would give Italy her liberty. Four years later during the War of Liberation (1813) the same appeal was made, this time by General Nugent, also ² but it failed for similar reasons.

The First Peace of Paris (30 May 1814) provided that Lombardy-Venetia would go to Austria, without definite boundaries, both because of Austria's historic claims and former paternal rule there. Genoa even asked to be annexed to Austria rather than Sardinia.³ The Lombard delegation itself was divided; one of the two factions wished Austrian rule restored. At the Congress of Vienna on the request of the people themselves, the Vattelline was added to Lombardy-Venetia, and the province was given fixed boundaries.

In the summer of 1814, Wessenberg was sent to Lombardy to investigate the situation and to make a report.⁴ This document favored retaining the national Italian idea,

and the Napoleonic institutions in North Italy as far as possible - even the name, the kingdom of Italy.

Metternich not only approved of the plan but made preparations to go ahead on this basis. He was already in 1814 at work on a plan for the future government of Lombardy-Venetia.⁵ When Metternich allowed the Papacy to regain the Legations at the Congress of Vienna, he did so on the condition that they must have liberal government. Consalir, the Papal Secretary, retorted - then you will have to give a government comparable - a constitution - to North Italy. Metternich replied that his plans were essentially such.⁶

Emperor Francis, however, rejected all such plans for the Kingdom of Italy. Contrary to the promises of Austria of 1809 and 1813 Emperor Francis was resolved to treat Lombardy-Venetia like all the other parts of his realm and not to recognize its national status.⁷ He was even intent on sweeping Germanization. He also intended to apply the Church policy of Austria, which was Josephist and Febronian. The Pope appointed the bishop of Chioggia in 1814 without consulting Austria. Emperor Francis, feeling greatly offended repaid in like coin, when he appointed a German and Febronian as bishop

of Milan (1816). The Pope was compelled to yield the next year in respect to the bishop of Chioggia.⁸ The Emperor's policy antagonized every class in Lombardy-Venetia: the clergy, and the business interests in particular, - for these normally would have supported Austrian authority. Saurau and Strassoldo, successors of Bellegarde, the first governor, were faithful exponents of the Emperor's policy. A close censorship was established and even Dante corrected.⁹ Foreigners were closely watched and correspondence in the mails read. There was no Austrian of first rank in the administration.¹⁰

Francis told the French ambassador, one day: "My people are foreigners to one another; so much the better. They will not catch the same illnesses at the same time. In France when you are attacked by a fever you catch it all on the same day. I send Hungarians to Italy, and Italians to Hungary, and each one looks after his neighbor. They do not understand one another, they hate one another, but their antipathy gives birth to order, and their mutual hatred secures the general peace."¹¹

Count Bellegarde, who first served as governor of Milan, protested against the Germanizing policy of the Emperor, and incurred great hostility at Vienna because of his desire to govern for the benefit of the Italian people. Metternich also protested against the "fatherly" regime in North Italy. In a memorandum of 3 Nov. 1817, even though it was after the Wartburg festival and student demonstration in Germany, he advised tolerance for the time to secret societies.

"In design and principle divided among themselves these sects change every day and on the morrow may be ready to fight against one another. The surest way of preventing any one of them from becoming too powerful is to leave these sects to themselves."¹² He assured the Emperor that there was much dissatisfaction with Austrian rule, especially "with the design attributed to your majesty of wishing to give an entirely German character to the Italian provinces. Metternich urged the Emperor "to remove as soon as possible these defects and shortcomings of the administration to quicken and advance the progress of business, to conciliate the national spirit and self-love of the nation by giving to these provinces a form of a Constitution which might prove to the Italians

that we have no desire to deal with them exactly as with the German provinces of the monarchy."¹³ It was the same time that Metternich was urging a Constitution for Austria. He also wanted abolition of the internal tariffs. It is needless to say that Metternich's counsel was not followed and as usual he yielded.

In August 1818 an extremely strict censorship was established at Milan.¹⁴ In August 1819, the law of high treason was proclaimed.¹⁵ Various plots were discovered some aiming at a world revolution. Two of the agitators, captured, became famous. Silvio Pellico, a phantastic poet and a Carbonoro, and Frederico Confalonieri, who was introducing the Lancaster school method into Italy.¹⁶ The Emperor wished to have both executed. Marie Louise of Parma and others wished to have them pardoned. The police directors of Milan and Venetia interceded in their behalf. They were imprisoned in the Spielberg fortress. In 1824 Confalonieri was allowed to go to Vienna in chains to confer with Metternich and Francis. The Emperor offered to pardon him if he denounced his friends. He refused. Metternich, time after time, asked the Emperor to mitigate their punishment.¹⁷ In prison in 1832 Pellico wrote his famous book, Le Mie Prigioni, which aroused sympathy for them all over Europe. Metternich agreed that the story of their sufferings, although exaggerated in popular accounts,

had a basis of truth. One of his first acts, therefore, after the death of Francis I in 1835, was to secure their pardon by Ferdinand.

The reign of Ferdinand was beneficial in material advantages for Austrian Italy. In the early 1840's Metternich and Kubeck secured a railroad from Vienna to Milan and Venice.¹⁸ Seven million florins were spent by Austria, in developing the port of Venice, and the dying commercial city again became a significant centre of trade.¹⁹ The Austrian administration encouraged widely education. In 1846, of 2, 247 townships only 50 lacked elementary schools for boys.²⁰ The great misfortune about this system of education was political manipulation, and the attempt of the administration to follow the reactionary will of Emperor Francis whose views on education were expressed in a speech to the professors of the Gymnasium at Laybach—"Keep yourselves to what is old, for that is good; if our ancestors have proved it to be good, why should we not do as they did? New ideas are now coming forward, of which I do not, nor ever shall, approve. Mistrust these ideas and keep to the positive. I have no need of learned men; I want faithful subjects."²¹

The Austrian regime in Lombardy-Venetia promoted material prosperity but the spirit of Italy was stifled. True it promoted literature and the arts. It offered

prizes for poems and paintings "of which the subject and even the colour was to be dictated by the Government." Menz, a police agent, proposed an Academy of Poetry under the direction of the Austrian Government so that the intellectual movement could be controlled. Menz also suggested large subsidies to the theatre of La Scala.²² No wonder Young Italy was rebellious. Giorgio Pallovicino, one of the released Spielberg prisoners, described Milan as the "Land of the Dead".²³

It is self-evident from the foregoing that the blame for misrule in Lombardy-Venetia belongs to the Emperor rather than to Metternich. The responsibility of Metternich is rather for the general Italian policy of Austria in this era.

Believing a united Italian nation to be hopeless, and Italy "a mere geographical expression"²⁴ - as it was at the time- Metternich attempted a sort of federal scheme for Italy. In the autumn of 1814, he proposed his Lega Italiae, or Italian Confederation plan, which was more or less a concession to Italian nationalism. The League was to be a band of sovereign Princes to maintain the inner and outer security of Italy. The Assembly was to be under the presidency and chairmanship of Austria.²⁵ The police were to be under Austrian directorship. Bellegarde, the Austrian governor of Lombardy-Venetia wanted the police of

all the States to be under a like regime. Sardinia, backed by Russia, refused to join the Lega Italica; Tuscany and the Papal States also refused, by 1816 and 1817.²⁶ Metternich's alternative was a system of alliances. He sought offensive and defensive alliances with England and Sardinia in 1811, relative to Italian affairs, but failed in both instances. Metternich when at Florence in 1817, urged his Lega Italica scheme most strongly--but to no effect. Consalir, the eminent papal secretary was willing to help Austria in putting down the Carbonari,²⁷ but would go no farther. Metternich cherished his Lega Italica idea many years, and tried to secure its adoption, as late as 1829. By 1820 he found himself in a position where he had to employ force rather than persuasion to secure his ends. As long as Consalir, was Papal secretary, the Papal States pursued a policy of moderation. Consalir, like Metternich, loved the via media. He himself was in favor of liberal government and objected to the censorship of Alfieri's works.²⁸ He thus incurred the hostility of the Sanfedists. Pacca, leader of the Ultras, was the chief opponent of Consalir in the Papal States.

In Naples, Austria had a special position by the alliance treaty of 2 June, 1815.²⁹ This treaty provided that Naples was to grant no forms of government which did not exist in Lombardy-Venetia. It was probably meant to

be a check against the Ultras and a White Terror.³⁰ The 1820 revolution at Naples in imitation of the Spanish revolution was a surprise to Europe. Austria by the special nature of the treaty of 1815, had a right to intervene. Metternich secured a general confirmation of Austrian intervention as a treaty right at the Laibach Congress. At Laibach most of the Italian States were very subservient to Austria. Some of them were reactionary and Metternich urged upon them reforms. The Papal States, however, made strenuous opposition to the march of the Austrian troops across their land. The Austrian victory at Rieti recovered Naples for King Ferdinand and a bitter reaction set in, although Metternich urged moderation, and even a sort of constitution.³¹

Naples paid the expenses of the Austrian army of intervention, and through the influences of Metternich the Rothschilds floated a loan for Naples. The Austrian army of intervention was not withdrawn until 1827.³²

Piedmont suppressed her own revolution but consented to Austrian assistance. Austrian troops occupied Turin and Alessandria with the consent of King Charles Felix. As a result of the reaction, which followed, the Universities of Turin and Genoa were closed for a year. The Papal States alone of the Italian States sought to pursue an independent policy in 1821, and they, too, had to yield. 1821 was the

year of Metternich's greatest influence in Italy. Austrian preponderance was supreme, and there was no danger of French intervention. Metternich planned a central Investigation Commission similar to the Mayence Commission in Germany. Modena was eager to have it, but the opposition of the Papal States defeated the measure.³²

In 1831 there were revolts in Parma, Modena, and the Papal States. Austria crushed the revolutionary movements- which were not as dangerous as in 1820. There was no occasion for intervention elsewhere. Austrian influence in the Papal States was greater than in 1821, but Austrian preponderance generally was not as great as in 1821. Moreover, it was challenged by the French, who occupied Ancona, until 1837.³⁴

In 1838 Metternich succeeded in having a crowning of the Emperor Ferdinand with the ancient iron crown as King of Lombardy. The rulers of all the States of Italy were present, except the King of Sardinia and the Pope, who were indisposed.³⁵ The assembly of princes gave the appearance of an Italian Bund under Austrian presidency. This was the last attempt of Austria to conciliate Italian nationalism. Metternich, who attended the ceremony, was greeted with demonstrations and cheers, which brought pain to Mazzini. Despite the applause, however, the Italians were unfriendly in reality to Austria.³⁶ Manzoni refused

to meet Metternich.

In 1841 Kubeck proposed an Italian Zollverein, but it met with Metternich's disapproval.³⁷ The election of "Pio Nono", a reputed Liberal, as Pope in 1846 was a severe blow to Austrian prestige in Italy.³⁸ Although Austria seemed to have a strong hold over Sardinia by reason of the marriage of the heir, Victor Emenuel, with the daughter of the Archduke Rainer, the Austrian Viceroy of Lombardy-Venetia, nevertheless, the weakness of Austria was known by the Liberals. It is significant that Sambuy, the Sardinian envoy at Vienna declared that only Metternich held the Austrian Empire together.³⁹ Also in 1843 Mazzini wrote, "Austria is a terrible fantasy only to those who do not look her in the face."⁴⁰ A tariff struggle between Sardinia and Austria in 1846 alienated even Sardinia from Austrian influence.⁴¹ Radetzky, the Austrian general occupied Romagna in 1847.⁴² Russia and Prussia approved, but Guizot supported the independence of the Italian States. Mazzini and Garibaldi offered the Pope their aid. In October 1847, Metternich insisted that there was no choice or compromise: that reform was destruction and progress anarchy.⁴³ Then the revolutions of 1848 commenced.

The rise of Italian Nationalism gave Metternich the reputation of being their supreme foe. He was in truth the opponent of a free and united Italy, but he was

not as powerful as they imagined. While he had succeeded in controlling the German confederation, he miserably failed in Italy. His plan of a Lega Italica was defeated. The Italian States were more belligerent than the German, and Metternich was obliged to resort to force to gain his ends. His greatest influence was in 1824, but even then the Papacy acted independently. After 1831, France threatened his position from without. Sardinia and the Papal States were both free from his influence by 1846. A commercial league between Rome, Sardinia, and Tuscany was planned and Lord Minto representing England,²⁴ was sent to encourage it. Indeed, the Western Powers came to the aid of the Italian Nationalists and this support forecast the doom of Metternich and his Italian policy. Impatient and passionate young Italy unjustly laid all the blame for the Austrian System upon Metternich and Robert Browning could write his poem, "The Italian in England" in 1845 with those frightful lines,

"I could grasp Metternich until
I felt his red wet throat distil
In blood through these two hands."

Part III. Germany.

A typical present-day statement of the tradition by outstanding English historian runs thus:

"The German Federation established by the Powers in 1815, was intended to hand out Germany to the management of Austria and Prussia. Metternich quickly assumed the lead. His aims, though concealed with much art beneath a cloud of pompous phrases were simply and brutally realistic. He believed that the one necessity was to crush Liberalism, Constitutionalism, and Parliamentarism in Germany. Prussia was militaristic at any rate. So long, therefore, as Austria pursued this reactionary policy, Prussia would be obliged to follow in her wake. Metternich trusted to win her gratitude and support by discouraging the feeble constitutional experiments made by the rulers of Bavaria, Wurtemberg, Saxe-Weimar. He was to prove completely successful."¹

A primary basis for the Metternich Legend has been his German Policy. This policy, it insists, was a consistent reaction against Liberalism and Nationalism, and the German Confederation (Bund)-1815-1867- was the creation and tool of Metternich."

A recent American text enlarges upon this legend: "All Europe joked about this 'Center of Inertia' in which

delay was easier than action"..."Germany was at the mercy of a union of jealousy, selfish princes. Since Metternich had regarded a United German Nation as the 'infamous object', he now held a divided Germany under his thumb. The Confederation was to do for Germany what the Quadruple Alliance was to do for Europe, namely, preserve the existing social and political institutions unchanged. Absolutism generally prevailed; and Metternich grinned in mockery at the disappointments of the Liberals. Progressive newspapers and societies were suppressed and even the display of the black-red-gold national emblem was proscribed. The surest way to be thrown into prison was to appear in the streets in a blackcoat, red vest, and a straw hat. With the triumph of autocracy, the German people increased their efforts to overthrow it. The enforcement of the Metternich system seemed to be a victory for the old order and ancient Institutions."²

These are only typical of the many writers who follow the story of the Metternich Legend. In order to see what in reality Metternich's policy was, a review of the creation and workings of the German Bund from 1815 to 1835 is necessary. Only by a detailed study of the correlations of the situation and the man, is it possible to go behind the Legend to the facts.

The tradition when analyzed can be reduced to three points. First, the German Bund was essentially

illeberal; second, Metternich was responsible for its lack of liberalism; third, by means of the Bund Metternich forced upon the other States reactionary measures. These indictments require a careful study of German history.

In 1806, the year Metternich went to Paris, the Holy Roman Empire which had theoretically, at least, united "Germany" finally came to an end. Actually, the Empire was a mere symbol of departed power. Germany since 1648 had been practically a League of sovereign Princes-Napoleon erected in place of the Empire a Rhenish Confederation from which both Austria and Prussia were excluded. The policy of Napoleon encouraged the particularism of the South German States, and accustomed the Germans to a vigorous censorship and police system.³

The revolt against Napoleon took the form of the Regeneration Movement which stressed national sentiment. It found expression especially in the work of Stein in Prussia, in the songs of Arndt, and in such organizations as the Tugendbund (Virtue League), the Tuflverein and Germany Society. In Austria likewise there was a regeneration movement with war fetes, stirring songs and military reforms. The enthusiasm vented itself in another unlucky war with Napoleon in 1809, which had a tragic aftermath-the capture and execution of Andreas Hofer, the Tyrolean patriot, by French troops. The culmination of the

Regeneration Movement was the popular war of Liberation of 1813 in which Czar Alexander posed as the Liberator of Europe. At Leipzig in October 1814, Napoleon was crushed, the Rheinbund (Confederation of the Rhine) dissolved and some new form of organization was required for Germany.

The first step in the direction of a new form of government for Germany was the central commission created by Prussia, and Russia in the treaty of Breslau 7-19 March 1813.⁴ Von Stein, who was at the time adviser to the Emperor of Russia was selected as director of the Council of Administration- a sort of a provisional president of Germany. Thus Stein held the key position, but his arbitrariness won him many enemies and probably caused the defeat of his plans at the Congress of Vienna.⁵

The second step was the anticipatory negotiations. When the question was raised among the allies as to the future form of government, Emperor Francis absolutely refused to revive the Holy Roman Empire. Metternich declared: "Austria desires not to fight for things crumbled away but merely to fight for German independence. Austria desires neither empire nor ascendancy but the natural influence of a great European state."⁶ Of great importance were the Treaties of Alliance by which the smaller German States acceded to the Alliance against Napoleon. The treaties with Wurtemberg 2 Nov., 1813,

Baden, 20 Nov. and Hesse, 22 Nov. all provided specifically for a new form of a territorial arrangements in Germany at the time of the general settlement.⁷ These treaties provided specifically for a new arrangement for Germany. They were reciprocal in nature. The Sovereignty of the South German states was recognized but the guarantee committed them to the future Bund.

The third feature of the anticipatory negotiations were the agreements between the Allies themselves at Chaumont at the first Peace of Paris and in London, where Austrian and Prussia came to an understanding between themselves regarding the Constitution of Germany before the time of the Congress in Vienna.⁸

When the Representatives of the various German States came to consider the form of the new Constitution of Germany at the Congress of Vienna, they were not at a loss for ideas as no less than six had already been proposed. The first was Gagerns of 27 April, 1813, which was Republican in character.⁹ Other plans were those of Count Munster of Hanover 13 May;¹⁰ vom Stein of 1st Oct. 1813, providing for a division of Germany between Austria and Prussia;¹¹ and another proposal of Gagern, of 21 Oct. for a Republican Federation.¹² Arndt

suggested a plan very similar to the one afterwards adopted by Bismarck.¹³ Gersdorf of Saxe-Ewimar advocated a plan on the model of Frederick The Great's League of Princes.¹⁴ Most important was a plan of Stein's drafted on March 10, 1814, and submitted to Alexander, Hardenberg, Munster and Humboldt, dividing all Germany into seven circles and providing for a joint Directorship of Prussia and Austria.¹⁵

When the Congress of Vienna met, the question of Germany was referred to a special Commission of five States of Prussia, Austria, Hardenberg and Humboldt of Metternich and Wessenberg¹⁶ of Austria, Prussia, and Munster of Hanover were all Members. Stein's plan of 10 March which had already been sent to Metternich on 15 September, was submitted by Metternich in the form of twelve articles on 16 October.¹⁷ Following Stein's ideas, the twelve articles provided not only for a division of Germany into Seven Circles, but for freedom of speech, immigration and complaint for redress before the Federation. Every German citizen was to have the right to study at any German University he wished. Each State was to be compelled to have a representative constitution.¹⁸ Bavaria opposed the plan altogether. At the same time, Gagern, on behalf of the smaller States, protested on 14 October against the monopoly of

deliberation upon the Constitution exercised by the five major German courts.¹⁹ He afterwards assembled at his house, nineteen of the Representatives of the smaller States, and a manifesto was drafted on 16 November, demanding that all the German States be allowed to take part in the deliberations. It was signed by thirty-one states.²⁰ Gargen's protest and the opposition of Bavaria and Wurtemberg caused the activities of the Committee of major German States to end.²¹ Nevertheless, during the winter months, there were informal discussions. The only significant contribution was a so-called Austrian plan of the 31 December, credited sometimes to Wessenberg or again to Metternich himself. It was quite liberal in its provisions and included the compulsory establishment of representative assemblies in all of the German States.²²

On 15 February, 1815, Prussia brought forward a new proposal, and at the same time Humboldt presented a plan of his own retaining the division into Circles.²³ In May, Metternich brought forward again the Proposal of 31 December.²⁴ When the regular conferences on Germany were reopened on 23 May, a different Commission was established. After the first two sessions, the whole body of plenipotentiaries from all the German States were

admitted.²⁸ The regular Conferences lasted until 10 June. Wurtemberg took no part in any of them and Baden soon withdrew.²⁶ On 30 May, the article on representative institutions received its final form, because of Bavaria's insistence on her sovereignty, the imperative was removed. The general provisions of the Bundesakt were on the whole quite liberal. The German Bund was constituted as thirty-eight states. Austria and Prussia were members only for those of their possessions, which belonged to the old Holy Roman Empire. The central authority was the Bundestaat, which met at Frankfort. The Assembly ordinarily consisted of seventeen representatives. However, for matters relating to the changing of the constitution, a special session, a plenum, was required, in which every State had at least one vote, and Austria,
Prussia, Bavaria, Hanover and Wurtemberg had four each.²⁸

The Confederation was perpetual. All its members, as such, had equal rights.²⁹ The Bundestag was given power to decide upon certain fundamental questions, for which there was no time at Vienna to discuss, such as regulation of commerce, a general law on liberty of the press and the guarantee of the rights of office.³⁰

Article XVI guaranteed the rights of both Catholics and

Evangelical Protestants. The Bundestag in a plenum session was expressly given power to make constitutional amendments.³¹ There was no suggestion of requiring foreign powers, who were signatories of the Treaty of Vienna to intervene, in order to ratify changes. Thus, it was somewhat like the British Constitution. The acts of the plenum, like the acts of Parliaments became parts of the Constitution. Thus, the Bund could adapt itself to changing conditions. It could be used to spread widely representative institutions, or it could be made the agent for carrying on repressive measures. It was a young pliant maple; and those who controlled it, in its first years were to bend it in the direction in which it was to remain for the fifty-two years of its life.

There are several accusations against the Bundesakt which must be answered. First, it is charged that what good there was in it was purely a product of the Hundred Days adopted on the spur of the moment as a sop to hold Liberals.³² Secondly, Sybel and other Prussian writers declared that Austria's part was one of consistent hostility to liberal measures and that she never took the lead herself.³³ Thirdly, there is the charge that Article XIII on representative institutions was too vague and indefinite, without a time limit and a

general norm.³⁴ The Fourth accusation is that of Gagern, that Austria was not sincere in supporting Article XIII at the Congress of Vienna.³⁵ The first indictment is a grotesque deception. Napoleon did not leave Elba until 26 February, 1815. Yet representative institutions were provided for in Vom Stein's plans as presented , by Metternich, in October, and also in the Austrian Project of 31 December 1814. The latter plan is evidence enough of Austria's leadership in urging Liberal Institutions. It is true that Article XIII was only a wish, and not a command. The blame for this defect was not Austria's. It was that of Bavaria, Wurtemberg and Baden. Bavaria forced the removal of the imperative "Soll-shall-" to "Wird - will-" so that the final version read: "In allen Bundesstaat wird eine landstandische Verfassung stattfinden."³⁶ The particularism of the South German States, therefore, prevented the Bund from requiring constitutional assemblies in every State in the Confederation. It is quite true that Emperor Francis was little fond of representative institutions. But it is possible that Metternich was using Article XIII as a means to compel Francis to grant reforms in Austria.. If so, naturally he would never have revealed his underlying intentions.

Any book which credits the failure of the Vienna Congress to provide for more liberal measures upon Metternich, is in the wrong. The Bundesakt was comparatively liberal and Metternich shared in making it so. It was so understood by the people of the time. The Annual Register which reflects the more liberal tendencies in England declared: "The general tenor of these Articles afford proof of the great advance of liberal principles in this part of Europe."³⁷

The Bundestag was not received with full favor from the very start. Disgruntled factions wished to substitute programs of their own. The Prussian Military party was decidedly jealous of Austria. Indeed, Prussia was one of the first States to hedge on the provisions of the Bundesakt. She refused to submit other than legal questions for arbitrations, before the Austragalordnung, or Judicial Commission.³⁸ Furthermore, she objected to the right of citizens of one State to migrate and become citizens of another.³⁹ On the other hand, Wurtemberg was reluctant to co-operate with the Bundestag. Her King proposed the South German Bund, to oppose Prussia and Austria. Stein, the leader of the Liberals, refused his sympathy.⁴⁰ Although offered the leadership of both

the Prussian and Austrian delegations, and the presidency of the Bund, he refused them. Austria herself tried to carry out the provisions of the Bundestaat. Landstände were restored in three provinces.-Tyrol, Galicia, and Carinthia, and initiatory steps were taken elsewhere.⁴¹ Count Buäl-Schauenstein declared that "we wish the edifice of our German Bund to be sacred but never final."⁴² This was a repudiation of the principle of immobility. However, Austria did not support Gagern's proposal for passing a law requiring the observance of Article XIII. The policy of Austria was based on the theory that Germany was not a Bundestaat, but a Staatenbund.⁴³ In May, 1816, Karl August, Grand Duke of Saxe-Weimar, gave his subjects a Constitution. The Assembly which met early in 1817, was the first to be instituted under Article XIII. When the Saxe-Weimar Constitution was brought before the Bundestag for guarantee, Metternich gave his report and the other States concurred.⁴⁴ The Austrian envoys congratulated Karl August.

The general reaction in Germany after the Congress in Vienna, started in Prussia. Reform was a phase of the War of Liberation. The Rhineland Provinces were particularly insistent upon Liberal reforms. King Frederick William conciliated the Movement for a time by promising a Central Representative Body for Prussia,

and by establishing at Bonn a University in which Arndt, and Gorres, the fiery editor of the Rhineland Mercury, were given positions.⁴⁵ Also, on 5 April, 1815, the King actually granted the Rhenish Provinces a Charter.⁴⁶

Just three months after the end of the Congress of Vienna, September 15, 1815, Schmalz, a Prussian privy councillor, condemned the Tugendbund and other secret societies. He made the surprising statement that there had been no popular feeling in the War of Liberation, and that the soldiers were serving only in obedience to the command of the King. Schmalz condemned the people for even asking the King for a Constitution.⁴⁷ A vigorous controversy set in. The King forbade any discussion, either for or against Schmalz, and himself decorated the reactionary with the Order of the Red Eagle.⁴⁸ Gorres was bitter in his denunciation of the policy of Frederick William. As a result, the Rhineland Mercury was suppressed on 3 January, 1816.⁴⁹ Gorres, uncompromising, continued his agitation and circulated petitions asking the King to fulfil his promise of a Constitution.⁵⁰

On 8 June, 1816, the Jena Burschenschaft was organized and it proposed a celebration at the Wartburg castle the next year. The first suggestion of this festival, however, came from Arndt himself two years earlier. A paper of his at that time, entitled "A word over the celebration

of the Battle of Leipzig", proposed festivals all over Germany when the Germans were "to wreath their heads in green oak leaves and their hearts with green thoughts." There were to be church assemblies, and a Thanksgiving to God. At dusk, fires were to be lit on the mountain sides to burn until midnight.⁵² The year 1817 brought matters to a climax. It was a year of famine. Riots occurred at Breslau in August over conscriptions.⁵¹ The religious phase of the proposed festival was primarily to celebrate the union of the Reformed and Lutheran Churches, which had been proclaimed in Prussia, 30 June, 1817; and in Nassau 14 August,⁵² The Prussian announcement proclaimed a secular festival in commemoration of the Reformation. The celebration was apparently to be at the Wartburg, on the 300th anniversary of Luther's ninety-five theses. Later, in September, the students connected the occasion with the third Anniversary of the Battle of the Nations at Leipzig, and all Protestant Universities in Germany were invited to send deputations to the secular festival of the Reformation at the Wartburg castle. On October 11, Frederick William III announced the union of the Reformed and Lutheran Churches as the Evangelical church. Thus originally a religious occasion, the ideas fitted into both ideas, Luther and German Constitution. For the Wartburg Castle was in Saxe-Weimar which now had a Constitution.

The official program of the 18th and 19th of October proceeded with dignity and moderation. Addressed were made by professors from Jena and some 200 delegates partook of the Lord's Supper.

On the evening of the 18th, the wilder spirits broke loose and stayed in "unauthorized rally". Into a blazing bonfire, were thrown the books of Schmalz, Kotzebue's history of Germany, a copy of the Code of Napoleon, a copy of the Constitution of the Bund, and some of the works against the new gymnastics. In addition, a corporals' staff and a pigtail, "symbols of the old military tyranny", were burned.⁵³ It was a boyish "pep" rally, harmless in itself, but its boldness frightened the rulers. It violated the sanctity of the German Constitution; the youths had lost respect for authority. One can imagine what would happen if a group of students at some American university should hold a rally and burn with gusto the Federal Constitution. It was this student celebration which led ultimately to the Carlsbad decree. However, it must not be forgotten that the students had something real about which to protest.

The blame for the Wartburg bonfire, and the Carlsbad decrees rests ultimately on the Prussian Government, which had promised liberal Constitution and had become threatening to those who were eager to have its early establishment. Prussia had repudiated the very idea

she had supported in the war of Liberation, and at the Congress of Vienna. Prussia had encouraged the student nationalism in its revolt against Napoleon. The students were now asking for what had been promised and which Hardenberg, Humboldt, and Stein, at one time or other, had themselves urged. Metternich had nothing to do with the Wartburg. In fact, he was little affected by it, for it did not cause him to adopt repressive measures. After the Wartburg festival had already occurred, he was asking the Emperor for a Central Representative Assembly for Austria, and a Constitution for Lombardy-Venetia.⁵⁴

It is true that Prussia, Austria and other Powers protested to Charles Augustus, but this was done on the initiative of Kamptz, the Prussian Minister of Police.⁵⁵ Weimar apparently checked the newspapers a few weeks, but on June 2, 1818, the opposition paper was allowed to resume publication without the words "with the Grand Ducal privilege."

The day of the Wartburg festival was one for repression of general dissatisfaction in Prussia. In Hamburg, the Anniversary of Leipzig was celebrated by five hundred students.⁵⁶ On the same day, the inhabitants of Coblenz drew up a petition to Frederick William III to fulfil his promise of a Constitution. The King took his time, but finally on April 25, 1818, returned a haughty answer. There is no date fixed for Article XIII. "All times are not equally propitious

to introduce changes into the organization of States. Those who allow themselves to remind the Sovereign of the execution of a promise freely given, thereby express a blameable doubt of his fidelity... The right of petition exists, but the excitement of petition cannot be tolerated. This excitement exists when a petition is hawked about the whole province and the inhabitants are invited to sign it... It is for these reasons that the petition which was presented to me a few days ago, in the name of the City of Coblenz, as well as of the Communes which compose its districts has given me just displeasure."⁵⁷

On April, 1818, Gagern, the most conspicuous Liberal in the Bundestag was recalled, after Prussia had long protested at his activity. A student of Montesquieu's works, and staunch Republican in sentiment, he insisted the Bund was a *Bundestaat*, rather than a *Staatenbund*, which he called a "chimera". Only Hanover, Mecklenberg and the Free Cities supported his resolutions for compulsory enforcement of Article XIII. He complained that while the rest of Europe was going forward, Germany was going backwards. The causes of Gagern's removal are somewhat of a mystery. Stern in his "Geschichte Europas" asserts that Metternich was responsible for his removal. If he was, Gagern was not aware of it, for he visited Metternich at Johannisberg in July.⁵⁸ Gentz, in his letter to

Pilat of 11 September, 1818, said: "His, Gagern's influence, has scarcely affected the German Bund; of this I have a number of proofs. Russia had no part at all in his recall; this was decided upon at the Hague alone and for a very different reason."⁵⁹ It is probable that the King of the Netherlands recalled him on his own account.

Gentz was a consistent opponent of the Bund. In June, 1813, he had written: "The work, the wish and the hope of a great number of Germans is devoted to a plan of a Constitutional Bund which would have a central authority—either one head or a legislative assembly: Leidor ist jedoch dieser Plan nur ein Traum. A Federative Constitution is impossible in Germany."⁶⁰ On 16 April, 1816, he wrote: "The only thing which troubles me is that 'Maudite Diète' of Frankfort... which I detest from the bottom of my heart."⁶¹ Again 14 October, 1817, he wrote, four days before the Wartburg Festival: "You cannot imagine how we are tormented and agitated... by the unbridled license of the press and by the ever-growing audacity of instigators and by our own critical position face to face with that malheureuse Diète de Frankfort, of which I have foretold all the dangers. Especially, apropos of it, I have felt the fate of Cassandra."⁶²

In 1817, Hardenberg presented a memorial to the Bund, urging the enactment of a censorship law providing complete freedom for scientific works, but effective censorship for journals and newspapers.⁶³ The Diet appointed a commission to consider the question, but it came to no decision, because Metternich considered that censorship was a question for the individual State to settle for itself. Afterwards, Metternich changed his mind and at Carlsbad in 1819, secured the very measures which Hardenberg wanted in 1817. Metternich adopted af Carlsbad Hardenberg's distinction between scientific and political works.

In November and December (1815) especially, Hardenberg urged Austria to take the lead in regard to his proposal for a law of the Bund on censorship and suggested that Gentz draw up a law. Gentz was already engaged at the task. On 14 November, he discussed with Pilat the attack of the Bremen Zeitung against the Vienna Beobachter.⁶⁴ On November 17, he talked with Metternich about the Bremer-Zeitung, and the condition of the inner administration of Austria.⁶⁵ On November 25, he prepared an article for the Beobachter about the Wartburg Festival and read English works on liberty of the press.⁶⁶ On 5 December, he discussed the affairs of the Bund with Metternich.⁶⁷

On 22 December, he prepared a second article for the
Wiener Beobachter concerning the Wartburg. On 29
December, he drew up a paper which would serve for a
conference over the German Press, and at the same time
a proposition for the introduction of a bill before the
Bundestag against the abuse of the press.⁶⁹ He completed
the paper on Jan. 2, and read discussions in the French
newspapers over freedom of the press.⁷⁰ On 14 January,
he prepared an article for the Wiener Zeitschrift over
freedom of the press. His efforts were futile for the
time being, as Metternich 14 January, 1818, again rejected
Hardenberg's proposal.⁷¹ In March, 1818, however, Metternich
allowed Gentz to write an anonymous pamphlet against the
German newspapers.⁷² This is the last mention of press
freedom in Gentz's Tagebucher for a few months. Gentz
had to write of his own accord. It is clear thus that
Metternich was opposed to the Bundestag enacting a general
law against censorship even as late as the early months
of 1818.

The change in Metternich's attitude toward the
Bund, toward the press, toward the constitutions, toward
liberalism, came in 1818. He came gradually over to
the ideas of Gentz. From 1815 to the summer of 1818
his attitude toward the German Bund was one of moderation,

and cooperation with moderate liberalism. He supported the movement for representative assemblies, and sought to secure one in Austria. He, though personally disposed towards censorship, believed that it should be left to the individual States, so that those who did not want it, would not have to adopt it.

The change came very gradually. First, there was the removal of Gagern, April 14, 1818, for which Metternich may have been indirectly to blame, but this had no connection with the problem of Press Freedom.⁷³ We know from positive evidence that Metternich supported the constitutional movement in Germany in 1817.⁷⁴ On 1 August, 1817, Gentz writing to Hospodar of Wallachia, described the movements in Germany for Constitutional Government. Austria, the only country capable of resisting the movement, was supporting it, he said, directly and indirectly. Gentz had disagreed with Metternich, who believed it was the wisest policy not to strike at men who showed him the most profound deference and who had permitted no hostile affront to the Austrian Government. In short, he thus sought to remain on good terms with the Liberals by not opposing them.

The next summer Metternich reversed his position after his failure to secure reforms in Austria. At

the Congress of Aix la Chapelle, Humboldt found his old friend Metternich quite changed. ⁷⁵ Metternich discussed with the Prussian Minister of State, Prince Wittgenstein, the question of representative government in Prussia. Metternich advised the minister that the King of Prussia should not fulfil his promise of a central representative assembly for Prussia, "According to my full conviction the King ought to go no further than the formation of provincial Diets in a very carefully considered circumscribed form. Beyond this all is pure revolution. Will these very limited ideas not also lead to revolution? This question the King should ponder deeply before he decides... Political repose rests on fraternisation between monarchs, and on the principle of maintaining what is. To oppose these fundamental principles would be to shake the edifice to its very foundations... ...of the two kingdoms Austria would herself be more suited for a pure representation system than Prussia, if the differences of her population in language and habits were not too important. How can that which is impossible to be carried out in Austria succeed in Prussia?" ⁷⁶

At this time, several months before the murder of Kotzebue, a general program for measures against the gymnastic establishments and the freedom of the press were

planned. There would have been repressive measures had there been no Karl Sand. Austria and Prussia agreed that "no State could remain in the Bund which does not possess some efficient law on this subject, whether it be preventive or repressive." These projects were not forced by Metternich upon Prussia, for the latter had already neglected her promise of a constitution, had laws of her own against the universities and the press, and had been urging general measures of the Bundestag against the press for more than a year, which Metternich had opposed.⁷⁷ In short, Metternich, it would seem, was merely coming over to the Prussian viewpoint.

A few months later a fanatic, Karl Sand gave Austria and Prussia provocation and excuse for putting into effect the measures they had already planned. He stabbed Kotzebue, the reactionary Russian agent in his own house at Jena. It was an act of despair. Disheartened by the loss of Alexander of Russia, whom they had considered their patron, the Burschenschaften were disposed to take revenge on his agents. The deed was done in the name of liberty. Metternich at the time was in Rome. Gentz, who had long distrusted the Liberals, sent his chieftan news of the affair. He commented significantly: "Kotzebue's blood will cry for vengeance somewhat longer than today or

tomorrow. My earnest desire is that on this important matter nothing be brought before the Bundestag; nothing may be said or written by authority before the first German courts (Austrian Prussia, Bavaria, Saxony and Hanover to the exclusion of all others) have arrived at a decided and mutually binding understanding on the measured to be adopted. The greatest evil of all would be hasty, undigested, feeble, measures. When we lifted our first warning voice against the excesses at the Wartburg our mouths were stopped with allusions to the "innocent, virtuous efforts of German youth; and their meritorious teachers, and this is what they have come to!"⁷⁸

Metternich assured Gentz in reply that he had already decided upon a like course. He leisurely proceeded to Naples and watched the beautiful sunset from Mt. Vesuvius, instead of rushing back to Germany, as he is usually depicted. He did not return for four months. Gentz at home made arrangements for the Carlsbad Conferences. Meanwhile the aftermath of the murder of Kotzebue was hard on the Liberals. Oken had to suspend his newspaper, Isis. Frederich William ordered a close investigation of the Prussian Universities. On 22 July Gentz met Metternich at Carlsbad. Four days later Metternich went to Teplitz to confer with the King of Prussia and the two reached a

preliminary agreement as to the principles of the Carlsbad decree.⁷⁹

This is wrongly called the "Teplitz Punctuation." Metternich did not force the repressive measures on Frederick William III, for the latter had favored them much earlier than Metternich himself.

After the decrees had been approved by the Bundestag in Sept. 1819, his program of Constitutional changes was carried out at the Vienna Ministerial Conference, Dec. 1819 to June 1820. The Constitution of the Bund was entirely revamped in favor of monarchical principles. Article XIII was kept but in a qualified form. Every state was assured of the support of the Bund in case of revolution. Article LVII definitely forbade the Assembly in any of the states from becoming supreme. Any changes similar to the English Revolution of 1688 would have been opposed.⁸⁰ A great bar was placed for the development of republican institutions. Those that already existed were not destroyed. A thorough application of the principles of Article LVII relative to the existing constitutions was prevented by the attitude of Wurtemberg and other South German States who forced many concessions.⁸¹

The Carlsbad decrees had been largely the work of Hardenberg and Gentz. The Vienna Conference was largely

the work of Metternich himself. He was more powerful here than at the time of the Carlsbad decree but Wurtenberg was a constant thorn in his side. Metternich's comments upon this Final Act of Vienna are significant. "Everybody thought we were going to overthrow all that is connected with the forms, which unhappily have been transplanted to the German soil (that soil so historical, so classical and so great), in the course of the two or three last years. Some have thought we were right to do so, others have raised a great outcry. Now we are not doing what they expected, and I declare frankly that in my soul and conscience, I do not allow myself to regret it, because I cannot regret what is impossible."⁸²

In 1824 the Carlsbad decrees were renewed, in a large part, due to the insistence of Prussia.⁸³ The Mayence Commission was dissolved in 1828, however. The July Revolution in France and its aftermath in Belgium, Poland, and other places, during 1830 and 1831, revived demands for reform in Germany. Apparently, Prussia was the first to suggest specifically a revival of the notorious methods of the Carlsbad decrees. Metternich and Ancillon worked hand in hand in securing reactionary measures to defeat Liberalism and Constitutionalism, not by destroying the forms but by removing the reality behind the forms. In 1832 there were adopted the "Six Acts", the "July

"Ordinances" of Germany. Only "pure" monarchial governments were recognized. The Bund was empowered to prevent the assemblies from refusing money grants which the Princes wanted. (Article III) The most reactionary feature was a commission set up to see that the state assemblies were held in check. (Article IV)⁸⁴ The opposition of Bavaria caused a limitation of the duration of these decrees to six years.⁸⁵

Metternich in these years did not urge that the Bund was only a Staatenbund. He was creating a centralized government founded on oppression. At the same time in International affairs he was instrumental in forming the "New Holy" Alliance in 1833 at Munchengrätz-a revival of the Eastern group of Troppau, Laibach and Verona. The powers involved mutually agreed to aid one another in combatting revolts.

The next year, 1834, the German States passed the "Sixty Acts" further diverting the governments from constitutional reform; and checking progress. On the whole these articles were little more than a confirmation of those of 1832. The newest provision was a strict uniform regulation of Universities. Any student could be dismissed on the suspicion of belonging to a secret society.⁸⁶

Meanwhile there was taking place in Germany, and economic struggle for more important to the future history

of Germany than all the repressive measures Metternich and Ancillon could adopt. The Prussian tariff began to expand in 1818. At the time of the Vienna Conference of 1819-20 Metternich had been won over by Fredrich. List to free trade. In 1828 Bavaria and Wurtemberg negotiated with Prussia in regard to entering the Prussian Zollverein. Saxony asked Austria to form a counter Zollverein.⁸⁷ In 1829 Metternich appealed to the Emperor to form a Central German Zollverein, but Emperor Francis, blinded by Austrian industrial agents, refused. Thus, Metternich's attempts to win Bavaria and Wurtemberg by offering privileges on the Danube and by lessening their tariff barriers were futile. Then, Prussia won over to her system Gotha-Meiningen in 1831 which spoiled any further attempt at a Central German Zollverein. Therefore, December, 1831, the Deutsche Zollverein was formed from which Austria was left out. To offset this, Metternich worked for a tariff union with Hanover, but again he appealed to the Emperor, in vain. Thus, 1833, Austria had lost her commercial position in the Bund and the balance in Germany was broken.

Thus Metternich passed through three stages of his German policy from 1815 to 1835: cooperation with liberalism, 1815-March, 1818; repression, 1818-1828, and reaction, 1832-1834. Metternich was not by any means solely responsible.

The initiative was usually Prussian. Even at that, Wurtemberg was a persistent hindrance and Baden and Bavaria were almost as bad. The Vienna Conference and its Final Act represented more influence of Metternich himself than the Carlsbad Decrees. The years 1822-24, and 1832 represented Metternich's greatest power in Germany.

INTERNATIONAL.

"Though Francis I was a commonplace character he possessed in his chief minister, Prince Metternich, a man far out of the ordinary, a man who appeared to the generation that lived between 1815 and 1848 as the most commanding personality of Europe, whose importance is shown in the phrases, "era of Metternich", "system of Metternich". He was the central figure not only in Austrian and German politics, but in European diplomacy dominating his age as Napoleon had dominated his, though by a very different process. Metternich was the most famous statesman that Austria produced in the nineteenth century."¹

Thus Hazen speaks of the international influence of Metternich, and he further discusses the bases of his characterization:

"Metternich's reputation was based on his long and tortuous diplomatic duel with Napoleon. Claiming to have correctly read that bewildering personality from his earliest observation of him, and to have lured him slowly yet inevitably to his doom by playing skilfully upon his weaknesses, Metternich considered himself the conqueror of the conqueror. An achievement so notable

imposed upon many, nor did Metternich do aught to dim the brilliancy of the exploit. His imperturbability, his pre-science, his diplomatic dexterity were everywhere praised. He came to be considered the one great oracle, whose every word was full of meaning, if only you could get it. Diplomats bowed like acolytes before this master of their craft, and rulers also made their obeisances, though somewhat more slowly, as obviously befitted those who ruled by nothing less than divine right.^{"2} Such is the traditional view. Let us now consider the facts.

The keynote of Metternich's foreign policy was stability,³ -involving preservation of the Hapsburg realms and peace for all Europe. It happened that this policy coincided with that of Castlereagh and of the Quadruple Alliance of Chaumont⁴ (March, 1814) and Paris (20 Nov. 1815). The inheritance of the Alliance against Napoleon and of the Congress of Vienna was founded upon the principle of moderation, and a balance of power. Primarily a revolt against the super-state aims of Napoleon, it intended to take care that Napoleon had no successor-in France.

In pursuance of this policy of peace, ambassadorial conferences were established at London, Frankfurt and Paris. The Conference at Paris was concerned with the questions relating to the army of occupation. Here Pozzo Borgo posed as the special protector of the Bourbon monarchy

and the French Constitutions. At Frankfurt matters relating to the German Bund and territorial questions such as those between Bavaria and Baden were treated. At London means were discussed to secure the abolition of the slave trade and the abuses of the Barbary pirates.

Some were not content with the simple basis of the conservative alliance and wanted a sort of a European tribunal of the greater Powers to settle questions relating to the internal disturbances and difficulties of the smaller Powers. Castlereagh was opposed to this policy. Another tendency was the demand of several men for a general guarantee of the status quo. This was perhaps primarily an expression of the war-weariness of the times, but it also was an expression of the principle, of immobility. Castlereagh himself had suggested such a guarantee at Vienna e.g. that there should be a general alliance against the Power that should first break the peace, but he very quickly abandoned the scheme, as repugnant to his principles of the independence of his state.

In 1816 Ancillon of Prussia prepared a paper for the Prussian cabinet which urged a guarantee treaty for all the large Powers which the smaller ones would be invited to join in order that disputes might be settled by arbitration at a Congress.⁵ It also proposed "a guarantee of legitimate sovereignty against forceful

changes from beneath." The powers were to bind themselves through their intervention to "maintain the social order, if anywhere the legitimate authority was threatened by unrest and an appeal for aid was made." A change in the Constitution by a sovereign, however would never justify intervention. It was Ancillon, be it noted, not Metternich, who proposed this guarantee of legitimacy.

The Holy Alliance, so often confused with the Concert of Powers was nothing tangible. It was only a "voeux"⁶ and at that the "wish" of one man, Alexander.⁶ Metternich and his fellow "practical statesmen" had no use for sentimentalities. Metternich described it as a "piece of pious verbiage"⁷. Though it was a far fetched application of the brotherhood of man, there was nothing illiberal or reactionary in it. The reactionary Holy Alliance is a myth--there was no active alliance of the Eastern Powers-Prussia, Austria, and Russia at this time. Each was pursuing her own policy, and these policies quite often worked counter to each other.

Metternich was concerned particularly with three problems in these years 1815-1818: The intrigues of radical English tourists in France, rabid spirit of Belgian journalists, and Russian intrigues in Italy and elsewhere. In Jan. 1816 Metternich urged Wellington to refuse English tourists social recognition because they

were encouraging restless spirits in France.⁸ In 1817 Metternich proposed the erection at Paris of a European police centre, which Webster calls "a sort of a clearing house for authority in its efforts to put down those who challenge it."⁹ Tied up with this problem was the question of the activities of the Ambassadorial Conference at Paris in its attitude to the unrest in Belgium. Wellington had long complained of the Brussels press. The Paris Ambassadorial conference of 11 April 1817 decided to urge the King of the Netherlands to banish those dangerous exiles from Brussels. Wellington succeeded in obtaining the King's consent, Castlereagh assented to this course.

Vincent, the Austrian ambassador at Paris, thereupon suggested that the Conference at Paris should become the organ of the Great Powers in putting down the intrigues of the revolutionaries all over Europe.¹⁰ The Conference itself approved, but Castlereagh sent a decisive refusal: "The Allied Ministers must be kept within the bounds of their original institution and not be suffered to present themselves as an European Council for the management of the affairs of the world."¹¹ Metternich tried to change the plan so as to make it agreeable to Castlereagh, but in vain.¹² Castlereagh's refusal is significant in that it reveals the marked divergence in principles which was beginning to appear between him and the other members of

the European Concert. But far more significant is the proof it offers of how Metternich took Castlereagh's advice.

According to Prof. Webster, the best authority on this question: "The relations between Austria and Britain were very close and to the very day of his death in spite of the differences that arose at Troppau and Laibach, Castlereagh was on more intimate terms with Metternich than with any other European statesman. During the final struggle with Napoleon, Castlereagh had found Metternich easier to deal with than any other great personage of the Alliance. The Austrian minister had a keen appreciation of facts, he showed moderation, he had the faculty of compromise. These were Castlereagh's own special qualities and thus the two statesmen had got on well together from the first moment they met in the early days of 1814. At Vienna they had established a close alliance against the Czar and the militant Prussians, and though at the Second Peace of Paris, Metternich had to oppose Castlereagh, he had yielded as soon as he could, and had not shewn the obstinacy of his other German colleagues."¹²² Thus time had confirmed what Aberdeen had written to Castlereagh on Nov. 1813, before the latter had ever met Metternich: "In short, Metternich is the man above all others whom I should choose to deal with and I should do it without fear."¹²³

With such mutual understanding and essential agreement in principle, Castlereagh and Metternich approached the Russian question. Russian agents were at work in Naples, Spain, the Balkans and Turkey. Tatischeff, the Russian ambassador at Madrid, was in great favor with the King of Spain. There were rumors of an Alliance between Spain and Russia and the exchange of Russian fleet for Minorca, but the Alliance was denied by the Czar. Metternich urged upon Castlereagh, incessantly, the danger from Russia. He hoped for a break between Russia and England, in which he could become arbiter of the continent.¹⁴ Castlereagh saw through his plan and sought to meet the issue by conciliating rather than antagonizing Alexander. Metternich followed Castlereagh's advice and was finally successful.¹⁵

At Aix la Chapelle, Alexander proposed a guarantee of the existing order: both thrones and territories.

Metternich was personally favorable¹⁶, but Castlereagh defeated the plan declaring that to "guarantee the status quo would be to ratify existing internal institutions and prevent reforms."¹⁷ Another similar proposal at an earlier date (1816) had emanated from the Prussian military party which feared a French invasion of Germany. Hardenberg and Ancillon now were behind the plan which was presented. Metternich supported the project with certain limitations.

Castlereagh was influential enough against Prussia, Russia, and even Metternich to have the whole plan of guarantee laid aside.¹⁸ The congress of Aix la Chapelle was a great victory for Castlereagh.¹⁹ The ambassadorial conferences were brought to an end; the army of occupation in France withdrawn, and the Concert of Powers was confined to the narrowest interpretation of Article VI of the treaty of Alliance of 20 November, 1814- "maintenance of Peace as established and consolidated by the treaties therein enumerated."

The period of moderation ended with Aix la Chapelle, but the period of repression did not fully begin until 1820. The year 1819 was one of transition not alone for Metternich, but also for Castlereagh, for it was the year of the Six Acts in England. Castlereagh approved of the Carlsbad decrees.²⁰ Alexander at first gave a partial approval, although later in December, 1819, he criticized them severly.²¹ Alexander, never consistent was becoming disillusioned. The ingratitude of the Poles for their granted Constitution annoyed him. By 1819, also he was working through his agents-Stourdza and Kotzebue-against the German students.²² Also, Tatischeff in Spain, and soon Pozzo di Borgo in France, were working against the Liberals. At the same time, however, his agents in Italy were supporting the Carbonari. Upon

learning of the murder of Kotzbu^e, April, 1819, Metternich wrote to Gentz, "We shall now very soon see what the Emperor of Russia will say to the loving treatment of his Staatsrath (Kotzebu^e) in Germany. While in Germany, Russians propter obscurantionem wre murdered, in Italy the Russian agents preside over the clubs of the Carbonari. This abomination will soon be checked."²³ A short time later, he again wrote: "I have not forgotten the Emperor of Russia. I have today given Sturmer the commission to write a letter to him-and send it to Count Nesselrode by his own Courier- which will show you that I can handle the Emperor quite suitably without committing any mistake in respect to the German politics."²⁴

The first attempt at intervention by the Concert of Powers after the Congress of Aix la Chapelle, was in regard to France, where a liberal ministry under Decades had succeeded Richelieu, of whom Pozzo di Borgo and Alexander had been so enamoured. A famous Napoleonic marshal, Gouvion de St. Cyr was made Minister of War and a number of Napoleonic marshals were made peers. He deemed the proposed Army increases the most significantly dangerous. Metternich objected to St. Cyr's "jingoism" rather than his Liberalism. Richelieu had disappointed everyone and especially Pozzo, who now suggested that the Ambassadors of the Powers receive joint instruction to

remonstrate against the acts of St. Cyr. Golovkin, the Russian Ambassador at Vienna understood Metternich to suggest a revival of the Conferences at Paris.²⁵ Meanwhile in March, 1818, Vincent, the Austrian ambassador at Paris called a meeting of the Ambassadors at his home.²⁶ All agreed that the situation was dangerous. Stuart stood aside, but the meeting was in effect a secret renewal of ambassadorial conferences. Castlereagh criticized the meeting, forbade Stuart attending others, and urged the Powers not to interfere, for it would only drive the Radicals and Ultras to extremes. Decazes apparently did not know how Alexander stood on the question, and sent General Hulot to St. Petersburgh to protest against the measures of the Powers.²⁶ Decazes appealed to the wrong man, for Alexander acting upon Pozzo di Borgo's complaint and Golovkin's interpretation of Metternich's attitude had combined the two suggestions and proposed in a circular dispatch of 12 April, 1819, both a collective remonstrance and the revival of the ambassadorial conference at Paris.²⁷ Castlereagh absolutely refused both proposals. Therupon, Metternich disclaimed all responsibility for the idea of renewing the Paris ambassadorial conferences, but still asked for the establishment of a point of "moral contact", for the Powers at London and Vienna.²⁸ When Castlereagh refused a "point of moral contact", Metternich

insisted upon eventual instructions in the event of the death of Louis XVIII, Castlereagh on the 4 September, 1819, again refused, and the matter was closed as far as he was concerned.³⁰ Alexander, however, continued to urge the point of moral contact. This discussion over intervention in French affairs took place just at the time of the Carlsbad decree, and there was probably some relation between the "moral resolves" at Carlsbad and Metternich's proposal for a European "point of contact". It is fortunate that the plans of Pozzo, Metternich and Alexander, according to Prof. C.W.K. Webster, failed, and the credit belongs to Castlereagh.³¹ The assassination of the Duc de Berri on 13 February, 1820, ended the danger of the Decazes ministry as it was driven from power.

Alexander more than any other member of the Alliance of Five Powers, wished to make it an Areopagus-a Council of Elders for all Europe, intervening where it pleased. His proposals began with his guarantee of the status quo scheme of Aix la Chapelle. Then followed in succession, attempts to intervene in German affairs in 1820, in Spain, and later in Naples.

Alexander wished the Powers to take part in the Vienna Conference which drafted the Final Act for the German Bund in 1820.³² Castlereagh refused, and Alexander, unable alone to pose as protector of the South German states,

left Wurtemberg in the lurch.³³ Castlereagh approved of the work of Metternich of the Final Act, and wrote him a letter of congratulation.³⁴ In the German question, Metternich and Castlereagh worked together, and a split threatened between Russia and Britain.

When the Spanish revolt occurred at Cadiz in January, 1820, Metternich was indisposed to intervene. Castlereagh wrote his famous-but long unpublished- Memorandum of 16 April, refuting refusals by Russia and Prussia. Stuart wrote home from Vienna: "Prince Metternich seems less disposed to project any common measures than I ever saw him before. He professes himself ready to support the Portuguese policy against any counter moves of Russia or France."³⁵ In return for Castlereagh's support in Germany, Metternich supported him in Portugal and Spain. On March 7, Metternich even wrote: "The very nature of my thesis excludes all ideas for foreign intervention in France as for all other countries. Not one can govern for a government."³⁶

Then the all unexpected Neapolitan revolution in July caused Metternich, within a course of a month, to change his policy in regard to intervention.³⁷ Austria had a special and individual excuse for intervention in Naples-the treaty of 1815- by which Austria had a peculiar status in Naples.³⁸ Castlereagh recognized this right on

29 June, 1820, and urged that if Austria were to act, she should do so alone, and not make it a European matter.³⁹ Metternich fearing, from the recent activity of Russian agents in Italy, that Alexander might support the Revolutionists first sought his approval. The Czar was invited to attend a meeting at Pesth.⁴⁰ The ambassadors at Vienna were to be invited, but no others. Austria could prove to the World that Russia was supporting her, and a regular congress—the 'bete noire' of Britain would be avoided. This was the first suggestion of the later Congress at Troppau. Alexander, discontented because he had not succeeded, in securing intervention in Spain, refused Metternich's proposal, and would have nothing else than a formal conference of the Quadruple Alliance.⁴¹

He insisted upon European intervention in Naples. Pozzo Borgo was enthusiastic over the Czar's plans and was instrumental in having the French Foreign Office issue a memorandum requesting a formal conference of the Quintuple Allies.

The Czar rejoiced and assumed that France entirely accepted his own ideas.⁴²

Metternich had to choose between Castlereagh and Alexander. Castlereagh, owing to home problems, could do nothing for him. Alexander could do him much harm. In the end, Metternich was forced to accept Alexander's plans for a general Congress, although Metternich tried to modify

Alexander's plans in order to humor Castlereagh, by emphasizing his own idea of ambassadorial conferences to precede the Troppau meeting of rulers.⁴³ When Castlereagh learned that the Czar considered Troppau to be a Congress of the Five Powers, he wrote in alarm to Metternich. Stewart accused Metternich of "political Chicanery".⁴⁴ Stewart was finally allowed by Castlereagh to attend the conference in an unofficial capacity, avoiding an open break in the Alliance.

If the call of the Troppau conference was a victory for Alexander, the results were a triumph for Metternich, in part. He obtained what he wanted--Russian assent for Austrian intervention in Italy, and Alexander was weaned from the influence of his Liberal advisor Capo d'Istrias. What was the price paid? A general protocol, but not localising the issue as Metternich and Castlereagh wanted. Three principles were asserted: States undergoing a change due to revolution were excluded from the European Alliance; the Powers could refuse recognition to changes secured by illegal methods and when such changes caused danger, the Allied Powers could exercise effective and beneficial action to bring them back to the Alliance.⁴⁵ By using the term "European Allies", the Protocol assumed to speak for France and England.⁴⁶ Upon Stewart's protest, it was not signed, but left a proposal of the three Eastern Powers. In the

judgment of Stern, Metternich was eighty-five per cent the victor.⁴⁷ At least, Metternich was the dominant figure at the Congress, and its action was popularly ascribed to him.

The next Congress-really an adjournment from Troppau-was held at Laibach and was attended by representatives of the Italian States, including the King of the two Sicilies, who broke his oath, and withdrew the Constitution he had promised his subjects. Metternich played the leading role.⁴⁸ He held the Czar in full control, both in regard to intervention in Italy and also in regard to the near Eastern Question. He persuaded the Czar to condemn the Greek revolutionists.⁴⁹ The Austrian Army of intervention had reoccupied Naples before the conference ended. Austria intervened in Piedmont when attempts at British mediation failed.⁵⁰

The final declarations of Laibach reaffirmed the principles of Troppau and placed all revolutions under the ban.⁵¹ It explains to the world their motives in intervention with stirring words of self-justification--

"The resistance which legitimate authority has met with has had no strength, and crime has disappeared before the sword of justice... Providence struck terror into the consciences so guilty and the disapproval of the people, whose fate was so compromised by those authors of

mischief, made them drop their arms. Destined simply to combat and suppress rebellion, the allied forces, far from maintaining any separate interest came to the assistance of the subjugated people, and the people regarded their aid as a support in favor of their liberty, not as an attack on their independence."⁵²

More convincing and more sincere was what Metternich wrote Emperor Francis: "Society would have been irretrievably lost but for the measures which have been taken in the last three months. The clear and precise aims of the factions is one and uniform. It is the overthrow of everything legally existing. Influence, place, future, all that human passions most covet... are suspended and attached to the tree of liberty like prizes on a pole at a fair. The principle which the monarchs must oppose to this plan of universal destruction is the preservation of everything legally existing. The only way to arrive at this end is by allowing no innovations. Authority is nothing without power. Your Imperial Majesty knows one well enough to be assured that no person is farther removed than I am from any narrow views of administration. It is simply the attainment of the real good that I desire, and on every occasion

consider it my duty to main&ain. But the more positive
I am of this, the more I am convinced that it is impossible
to preserve and to reform with any justice or reason when
the mass of the people is in agitation... Sire, let us
be conservative; let us walk steadily and firmly on well
known paths; let us not deviate from those lines in word
or deed; we shall thus at last come to a time when im-
provements shall be made with as much chance of success
as there is now certainty of failnre.⁵³

Regarding the radical leaders he continued: "To overthrow what exists and substitute whatever chance suggests to their disordered imaginations of their sinister passions- this is the essence of their doctrine, and the secret of all their machinations."⁵⁴ In his own diary, 17 Feb. 1821, Metternich wrote: "If they give me the name of an obscurantist; at any rate it cannot be applied physically. I can always stand at the very focus of the light that I may absorb and retain it in my pores."⁵⁵

For his conservatism, Metternich became Chancellor of the Empire, the reward of a grateful Emperor.⁵⁶ The King of Great Britain at a dinner at which Esterhazy, the Austrian Ambassador, was present, described Metternich as the "first Statesman in Europe."⁵⁷

After Laibach Castlereagh and Metternich came closer together again. At Hanover in Oct. 1821, they reached an agreement on the Near Eastern Question.⁵⁸ Castlereagh intended to take part in the Congress of Verona and drew up his own instructions. It seemed as if the Concert of Europe would be united, when Castlereagh, becoming suddenly insane from overstrain, slit his throat with a penknife on 12 Aug. 1822. It was appropriate that this truly conservative statesman should be buried in Westminster Abbey. "Articulate, sober, serene" he was the very contradiction of a self advertiser. "He was a man both personally and politically brave" - leader far more than Metternich ever was. Indeed, the Vienna statesman became lonesome; for Castlereagh's suicide left a great breach in Anglo-Austrian relations which his successor Canning could not have filled had he tried.⁵⁹

Wellington was sent to the Congress with Castle-reagh's instructions. Canning had nothing to do with these outlines of procedure.⁶⁰ The rise of Canning to the post of Foreign Minister was a blow to Metternich as great as the death of his friend Castlereagh. "Brilliant, eager, epigrammatic, Canning possessed a touch of genius, but gave a suspicion of charlatry," In his youth he had written a poem on the misery of the Greeks, and even now

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there were vestiges of his juvenile sentimentality.

But, after all, he was an opportunist, little influenced by emotion, but guided by events. He followed Castle-reagh's policy of non-intervention.

The Congress had been called at Laibach for Florence. A pre-congress meeting of certain leaders was afterward arranged for Vienna. It was held as planned. Then, all went to Vienna. The principal problem for discussion was the Spanish Revolt. Villele, the French Foreign Minister hoped to pursue an independent policy, by playing what Temperley has called "The Neo-Holy Triumvirate" against Britain.⁶² A moderate himself, Villele resisted all French proposals for intervention in Spain, provided there was no provocation of France by Spain.⁶³ His plenepotentiaries at Verona, Montmorency and Chateaubriand, were far more "advanced interventionists." In fact, when Wellington passed through Paris on his way to the Congress, Villele was so moderate in his policy that he believed there was no danger of French action, despite the seriousness of the agitation of the Ultras.⁶⁴

Metternich and Wellington were both conservatives by nature and Wellington found much in common between them. His report to Canning is enlightening: "Prince Metternich

feels as we do, an anxious desire that the Spanish be left to themselves; he wishes that it were possible not to interfere with the existing order of things in Spain; and that the King be left to himself, either to govern as in the year 1814 to the year 1820, or to grant such a constitution to his people as he might think proper."⁶⁵ Villele cherished a wish that Metternich could restrain Alexander from himself marching an army across Europe to destroy the Revolution in Spain. "The Empire which Prince Metternich has exercised over the Emperor of Russia, has given him a just hope of leaving him to consent to share the ideas of Austria on Spain as he has shared them in regard to Turkey,"⁶⁶

Both Villele and Metternich were destined to be disappointed. Alexander had already broken Metternich's hold upon him within less than three months after Leibach. Montmorency submitted three questions (20 Oct. 1822) to the other Powers, asking them if they would withdraw their respective ministers from Madrid, if France should.⁶⁷ The Powers (save England) assented. On the same day, Wellington's "bomb shell" exploded, when he declared that "such interference appeared to be an unnecessary assumption of responsibility."⁶⁸ His position indicated a complete

break with the Eastern Powers. The proces verbal of the Verona Congress of 15 November, indicated the casus foederis on which the Powers would aid France.⁶⁹ The Duke of Wellington voiced his open opposition, and left Verona in December. The schism in the Concert of Europe was open and public and there was no Castlereagh to heal it.

Montrency returned to Paris, leaving the Ultra-Chateaubriand in charge of French policy at Verona. Not inappropriately was the latter called the "fire rocket of the Congress."⁷⁰ Metternich held him in very low esteem. Chateaubriand cultivated the acquaintance of Alexander. Together they took promenades, with lofty thoughts planning like heroes of old to offer battle to the dragon - the dragon of revolution. The assumption of the work of Verona was a circular despatch of 14 December, announcing the intention of the three Eastern Powers to withdraw their ministers from Madrid.⁷¹ Villele followed a different policy by refusing to withdraw his Ambassador, and at the same time by sending a most insulting despatch to Spain, 25 December 1822, and by declining a British offer of mediation. Thereafter Villele resigned, and was succeeded by Chateaubriand, who made war inevitable.

On 6 April 1823, a French army entered Spain and paraded to Madrid surrounded by crowds shouting, "Death to the Constitution! Death to Jews and Jacobins!"⁷² Heralded by these demonstrations, the restored government of Ferdinand made no concessions to liberalism. The ambassadorial conference reestablished at Paris, used its influence in behalf of moderation, and Metternich declared that there "were no men of sense in Spain."⁷³

After Verona and the Duke of Angouleme's intervention in Spain, the attention of European Statesmen was focused on the Near Eastern Question. Metternich, it is remembered, had obtained from Alexander, at Laibach in March 1821, a denunciation of the movement for Greek independence.⁷⁴ The Austrian Foreign Minister had no sympathy for the Hellenic patriots. He wrote to Lebzeltern, the Austrian minister at St Petersburg: "The revolt of the Greeks, however different might be its long standing and permanent causes from the revolutions which the Grand Alliance was called upon to combat, nevertheless, directly originated in plots of the disorganized faction which menaces all thrones and all institutions. This affair must be looked upon as placed beyond the pale of civilization."⁷⁵

In spite of all Metternich's efforts to preserve peace between Russia and the Porte, diplomatic relations were severed by Alexander, 10 Aug. 1821. "The die is cast," said Metternich. And the decision was adverse for he had lost his follower; and his leadership over the Eastern Powers was lost, so soon after Leibach. During two years Metternich submitted plan after plan to restore Russo-Turk relations, urging moderation on the Sultan and on the Czar.⁷⁶ His first attempt was a proposal for a Conference on the Near Eastern Question at Vienna, but Russia was unfavorable.⁷⁷ Ancillon, the Prussian reactionary, urged that the Turk be driven from Europe, and Metternich asked Prussia for a disavowal of such a paper.⁷⁸ At Hanover in October, 1821, Metternich and Castlereagh reached an understanding for a common policy in the Near East.⁷⁹ Turkey was willing to make partial concessions. Austria, however, refused to deliver up Balkan fugitives in her Dominions to the Porte on the ground of religion and humanity.⁸⁰ Tatischev, the Russian, made two trips to Vienna in the spring of 1822, in an effort to reach an agreement between Austria and Russia. Castlereagh's instructions for Verona looked forward to eventual recognition of Greece by Britain.⁸¹ At Verona, under Metternich's influence, the Czar disregarded the appeals of the Greeks.⁸² Finally, at Czernowitz, in October,

1823, the Czar and Emperor Francis came to a partial understanding.⁸³

Russia, herself, entered upon a program of pacification in 1824, but with an accompanying plan for placing the Danubian Principalities under Russian protection. The Greeks opposed the project, because it kept them under Turkish suzerainty. Alexander had already broken away from Metternich, whose power, far from being dictatorial, as Cresson would have it, was steadily on the decline.⁸⁴ When his diplomatic prestige was so low in 1825, Metternich made a bold stroke in an effort to regain complete independence for Greece.⁸⁵ He went far beyond the plans of Canning and Alexander. Of course, his proposal was rejected by the Powers, but it had two results. It terrified the Porte and it forced Russia to let fall her mask of sympathy for the Greek Revolutionists. Nesselrode declared emphatically that Russia would consent to nothing more than the administrative independence of Greece under Turkish suzerainty. Although Metternich had some reason for being proud of his achievement, he lost the friendship of Czar Nicholas, who joined hands with Canning. In this "diplomatic revolution", expressed in the Protocol of St. Petersburg of 4 April, 1826, the "neo-Holy" Group, or the Triumvirate of Eastern Europe of Troppau, Laibach and Verona, was broken to pieces. The

Anglo-Russian Alliance left Austria isolated-high and dry on the shoals of impotency. At London, 6 July, 1827, France joined England and Russia to intervene in Greece, if their demands were not met. In October, the battle of Navarino Bay shattered Metternich's influence over the Porte. Only one Power was left friendly to Austria-Prussia.

The next year, 1828, revealed Metternich again urging complete independence of Greece as a necessity for European peace.⁸⁶ Wellington and the Emperor Nicholas would not accept so liberal a project. The Czar remarked that Metternich had cast aside his role and was giving the "Revolution" a bad example. The Princess Lievin told Earl Grey, "Our relations with Austria are all that one could wish, in reserving at the same time the right to consider Prince Metternich le plus grand coquin qui soit sur la face de terre."⁸⁷ Wellington said in regard to Metternich: "Je n'ai jamais partir a l'opinion qu'il fut un grand homme d'etat, c'est un heros de societe et rien de plus."⁸⁸ Only one ally remained for Metternich in 1828-Prussia, but in the course of the next year, she too turned away to join hands with Russia. Czar Nicholas paid a special visit to Berlin. And Hatzfield, the Prussian Minister, was acting independently of Austria. Pozzo di Borgo laughed at Metternich's weakness, and when the Austrian

Chancellor made overtures to St. Petersburg through Count Fiquelmont, whom he sent on a special mission to the Czar. Nicholas refused to negotiate with Metternich and wrote a letter to Emperor Francis complaining against his Chancellor, "who sets us all in confusion."⁸⁹

In spite of this, the Legend says that Metternich was the Ruler of Europe! Not only was the International influence of Metternich at its nadir in 1829, but Emperor Francis told General Krasinsky: "Czar Nicholas is wrong if he thinks Metternich is all powerful. If I remove from his favor, in twenty-four hours, he will be cast aside."⁹⁰

Metternich, of course, regained his prestige, but only in part; he was never again so important as he was at Laibach. When the Revolution of 1830 and 1831 swept over Europe, the Czar was willing to work together with Metternich against the common danger. At Carlsbad, July, 1830, Metternich met Nesselrode for the first time in seven years, so little contact had there been between them. The foundations of a close alliance of the three Eastern Powers were laid down in the "Chiffon de Carlsbad", at this time, with Nesselrode. Metternich's first thought was to try to revive the Quadruple Alliance in view of what happened in France, but the plan was not feasible.⁹¹ The "Chiffon de Carlsbad" of July, 1831, provided for a uniform

policy of the three Eastern Powers and the immediate establishment of a common centre, in which three Courts might deliberate, not only on the general course of their policy, but its application in particular cases.⁹²

Nesselrode refused to consent to the establishment of a "common centre" but agreed to a common policy. The three powers adopted a policy of non-intervention in France, and Metternich was favorable to French plans for disarmament.⁹³ At "Munchengrätz" in 1833, the Eastern Powers established a formal alliance, which had existed, in fact, since October, 1832. The alignment of 1820, 1821 and 1822 was thus restored.

One of the most favorable and important achievements of Metternich was the role he played in the controversy of 1840, between England and France over Mehemet Ali of Egypt. When war was imminent, Metternich never ceased to work for peace, and it was eventually secured. Although all the credit for averting a general European War at this time does not belong to Metternich, a very great part-the decisive influence-was his.⁹⁴ Moreover, it was a victory of Metternich over Palmerston.

The occupation of Cracow, and the destruction of its independent status was not primarily the work of Metternich, who was wont to carefully follow the provisions

of the treaty of Vienna. Metternich had to occupy Cracow because the Czar threatened to annex it, if Austria failed to do so. The occupation of Cracow was not such a violation of the Congress of Vienna as is commonly supposed. The erection of the Republic of Cracow was the work of the three Powers primarily, and, by the Treaty itself, was under their protection. What they had given was conditional and they could take it away.⁹⁵ The year 1846 indicated the last date of significant International influence of Metternich, for at that time France had become alienated from England on the Spanish marriage question and turned to Austria. Palmerston took sweet revenge in the controversy over the Sonderbund. His delay in answering a request for a conference permitted the Liberals to crush the Sonderbund. After this failure, the diplomatic career of Metternich came to a close.

Only in 1813, had Metternich held general European leadership. His greatest power was in 1821 at Laibach for about a year, but then it was limited to Germany, Italy and with the "Neo-Holies." By 1829, he had almost no influence. Almost immediately, thereafter, his prestige arose again with the reunion of the "Neo-Holies", but Nicholas was as powerful as Metternich. After 1835, the weakness of Austria was so apparent that the Czar had to concern himself with the preservation of the Austrian

State. The death of Ancillon (1837) meant a change in Austro- Prussian relations and Frederick William IV who came to the throne in 1840, broke away from Metternich completely.

CONCLUSION.

In accordance with its purpose this study has considered the career of Metternich, particularly for the years 1814-1834, to test the facts of the Legend of the Metternichian Era which maintains that this period was one of reaction dominated by Metternich. According to recent writer, "Metternich was the atlas upon whose elegant shoulders rested a restored world of feudal privilege, hereditary right and monarchical reaction."¹ Another writer describes Metternich as the successor of Napoleon, and in him the "spirit of reactionary Austria was incarnate."² This traditional viewpoint has been examined carefully and in detail, and has been found wanting in historical accuracy. It has been brought out instead, by our study: first, that Metternich was not by nature, ^{and temperament} ~~a real reactionary,~~ ^{but a cautious conservative} who at various times actually cooperated with moderate Liberalism; second, that he never had the power at home nor influence in diplomacy attributed to him by most historians.

His polity was stability rather than immobility. A Real politiker, he was not an Obscurantist, because the two terms are contradictory. He was too practical to want the restoration of the old. He accepted the present and sought peace. Never really averse to moderate adminis-

trative reforms in Austria, and often urging them himself, he was after all a victim of conditions, unable to secure the progress he wished.

He himself was a victim of the law of change - a fact which his biographers have ignored. Not only did his own policies shift but he himself changed. True, there was a continuity in his career and an inclination to the via media, but as years passed partly due to himself and partly to others, his moderation became limited; it became with him a fetish, divorced from reality. It was Metternich who said in 1817, "The human mind revels in extremes. A period of irreligion is followed by an epoch of moral and religious reaction. Now, every kind of reaction is false and unjust." In 1817 he advocated representative institutions for Austria. But in 1821 he told Stadion: "If you now speak to any of the legislators who are to be found at the corners of every street and on every bench at the cafes, they reply without hesitation that the world can no longer do without the representative system. My conviction is that it will never do with it; for I do not understand by progress, overturning oneself and everything else, getting up and falling down again... We have called to our aid the principle of a qualified

monarchy, thus excluding both despotism and the representative system.² By "representative system" he meant "republican" institutions. Paradoxically, Metternich, who urged a via media rejected liberalism in most matters after 1818 and considered all changes in the light of the alternative that there is either democracy and revolution or monarchy, but no compromise. In the light of the complexity and confusion of his own ideas the historian must be exceedingly careful in describing him.

The one name which satisfies the truth is opportunist. He who restored the Jesuits in Austria was opposed to the idea of Catholic emancipation in England! Essentially he belonged to the age of Enlightened Despotism. He believed that the ruler should be the first servant of the State and that there should be reforms, but from above. Finally he was no more reactionary than those timid cautious people of today, who though not opposed to progress, wish to take it at their own convenience, in small doses at long intervals.

Metternich never dominated Europe. His greatest power was in 1813 for a few months during the War of Liberation. When Castlereagh came to take part in the diplomatic negotiations he became the leading figure in European diplomacy and remained the leader till 1820. Until 1820 Russia and Prussia pursued policies which in

general were independent of Austria. Alexander forced a cleavage between Metternich and Castlereagh by insisting on the general Congress of Troppau before he would give his support to Austrian intervention in Naples. At Laybach the next year Metternich prevailed over Alexander in both the Italian and Near Eastern Questions. Alexander however, soon broke away from this influence. At Verona, any action of the Powers was nullified by Richelieu's independent French policy. All that Metternich could do was to rubber stamp French intervention. With Verona, the greatest attempt at a European Areopagus failed. When the Near Eastern Question became foremost in European politics, Metternich had almost no influence at all. Every effort of Metternich's to preserve peace failed. The 1830 revolutions instead of dealing an effective blow to Metternich's international prestige - as the legend would have - served really to rehabilitate his power. Russia became friendly and the result was that Metternich from his isolation became a leading member of the "new holy" Alliance, in which Czar Nicholas played the leading role. Upon Ancillon's death in 1837, Metternich lost his influence upon Prussia and Frederick William IV who came to the throne in 1840 forsook Austria entirely, breaking up the "new holy" group.

In 1846 there was a brief renewal of Metternich's prestige in France, when the latter broke with England on the Spanish marriage question, but the February revolution destroyed the Austro-French Entente.

In Germany Metternich was freest of all although he was always constrained to follow in general the theories of the Emperor. In Germany he had his greatest individual influence, and thereafter 1819 he used his influence against Liberalism. He was not the only one who believed in repression, to be sure, and many of the repressive acts, emanated from Prussia. In Italy he had no share in the Government of Lombardy-Venetia. His influence was limited to Italian diplomacy. Sardinia, Tuscany, and the Papal States defeated on occasion after occasion his cherished plans.

In Austrian internal politics he had no direct part. As long as Francis lived he ruled Austria as he pleased. Upon his death, Metternich was too old to fight successfully for reforms. One historian says: "Metternich first established his system in Austria and then found in the Concert of Europe the means of extending it to other parts of the Continent." How false! There was no Metternichian system in Austria. There was no period of continued Metternichian dominance of Europe. His

influence was confined to Germany and to part of Italy.

In Germany it lasted primarily from 1820 to 1834, when Prussia through her Zollverein gradually assumed leadership.

Judged realistically in comparison with his contemporaries, Metternich was merely one of the figures of an epoch of extreme Conservatism. Other men played as significant roles but of shorter duration. Hardenberg, Bernstorff and Ancillon (1832-37) were as fond of repressive measures as himself, if not more so. Gneisenau described Ancillon as "ein Hofpfaffe und Hofschränzen zugleich". Nesselrode in Prussia served a longer time than Metternich. If an era were to be judged on the basis of time Nesselrode would at least have a claim.

Richelieu in France was like Metternich in his ideas and Villele was essentially a moderate. Guizot was a man of the juste milieu; Thiers was more removed from the ideas of Metternich.

Castlereagh was a member of the Government which passed the six acts after the Peterloo massacres - measures analogous to the Carlsbad decrees. Canning who denounced Metternich's monarchical foreign policies was himself a Tory and an opponent of Parliamentary reform. "Palmerston breathed a Russian air, mistrusted Austria" and added something of his own to Cannings aversion to what Guedala describes as Metternich's "ultragoous absolutism". Palmerston,

too lived in a glass house while he was throwing stones at Metternich.

Many leaders considered Europe unfit for Democracy. Hegel was a conservative and Caning like Metternich was an admirer of Burke. Grillpazer in Austria welcomed the Revolution of 1830 but deplored that of 1848. Thomas Jefferson declared the Democracy was impossible in Europe.⁴ Metternich, an aristocrat, knew life only from the salon and walked in the graces of privilege. If progress is to be measured by approaching equality, he would have sought another definition.

Metternich lived in a period of transition and he could not abandon privilege and position for principle. He would have been greater had he lived earlier. His life was a tragedy. Its climax was early and the conclusion was long drawn out. The grandeur of the days before 1815 disappear and the Chancellor appears only a small figure magnified by the pompous scenery in which he moved. When the critical historian removes the scenery, the position, the principles and the legendary superstition, there is little noble or great to behold. He was the plain Mr. Smith who fled to England in a washerwoman's cart - and a special edition of a London Newspaper described the event. -

"The last beam of the old system has given way; or, to speak more respectfully of so experienced a statesman,

prince Metternich has been compelled to retire from a contest which he can no longer wage with the world, or even with the public opinion of the pacific inhabitants of Lower Austria.....

"Indeed, whilst the changes and perils of the most extraordinary half-century in the history of mankind have rolled to and fro upon the tides of time, the spectacle of that old man, whose reign commenced when our fathers were still young men, seated in immutable decrepitude at his wonted seat, seemed the sole remaining thing of an age that is past, and was itself the empire in the eyes of a younger race. That, too, is gone -- the oldest minister of the oldest court has been driven from office -- even the cabinet of Austria must be renewed ... After forty years of this unlimited sway he leaves an empire by so much in arrear of the rest of Europe - impoverished in its finances - divided in its provinces - and not obscurely threatened in its most important possessions"

(The Times, Monday, March 21, 1848.

First leader.)

F O O T N O T E S.

INTRODUCTION.

1. Harriet Martineau, Autobiography, I, 175.
2. Hayes: Political and Social History of Modern Europe II,
 1 Hazen: Europe Since 1815, p. 20.
3. Maurice, C. E.: The Revolutionary Movement of 1848-9, p.1
4. Metternich: Memoirs: I, Preface VI
5. Gooch, G. P.: History and Historians of the Nineteenth Century, p. 144
6. Srbik: Metternich der Staatsmann und der Mensch
7. Gooch: p. 152
8. Ward, A. W.: A Critical Review of Sandeman in the English Historical Review, Jan. 1912
9. Carl Brinkmann's review in Historische Zeitschrift
 Band 134 Heft 3. Unfortunately there is no
 English translation of Srbik. The best study
 in English breaking with the traditional view-
 point is Sandeman's.
10. Srbik II, 41
 Koch et Schoell, XI 322
11. Wahl, Adalbert, review in Historische Zeitschrift
 Band 138 Heft 3
12. Srbik: II 566
13. Bibl: Metternich in neuer Beleuchtung p. 1 "Metternich
 was the chief author of the reaction."
14. Ibid. p. 1 ff.
15. Srbik: II 566

16. Bibl: p. 1 However, Bibl's conclusion does not necessarily follow from his premise. In blaming the government for revolution, a distinction must be made between Metternich and the Austrian Government. Metternich never, except for a few short periods, exercised a dominating influence in internal affairs in Austria because he lacked the power. Metternich was not averse to moderate reforms. The blame should fall on Emperor Francis, rather than Metternich.

17. Srbik II 568

CHAPTER I. METTERNICH THE MAN.

1. Sandeman: Metternich p. 6.
2. Srbik: Metternich der Staatsmann und der Mensch I 53
3. Metternich: Memoirs III 394-5; 6 Oct. 1820
4. Srbik I, 53
5. Srbik I, 64 ff; Metternich: Memoirs III, 67
6. Srbik I, 71 note 3 "Aus der Schule des Radicalismus verfiel ich in jene der Emigranten und lernte die Mitte zwischen den Extremen schätzen"
7. Sandeman 21
8. Strobl: Metternich, 7 "Es war eine Vernunfttheirat"
9. Srbik: I 84ff Srbik overemphasizes the importance of Rastadt on Metternich.
10. Strobl: pp. 15 - 16
11. Reminiscences of the Count de la Garde, Excerpt in Freksa: Peace Congress of Intrigue pp. 106, 107
12. Diary of Baron von Stein, Excerpt in Freksa, pp. 400-401
13. Weil: Les Dessous du Congres de Vienne I 148 28 Dec. 1814, a Hager
14. Reminiscences of the Count de la Garde -Excerpt in Freksa p. 42
15. Srbik I, 60
16. Ibid. I, 238
17. Gentz: Tagebucher I, 329; 11 Nov. 1814. Metternich talked "toujours sur la mandite femme que sur les affaires."

18. Letters of Wilhelm von Humboldt, Except in Frekka p. 1187,
12 Feb. 1815
19. Weil: II, 264-5, 28 Feb. 1815 à Hager
20. Ibid, II 252, 9 Feb. 1815; Bouxiaguine à Nesselrode
21. Correspondance of Prince Talleyrand and Louis XVIII
1814 - 15, p. 257, 10 Jan. 1815.
22. Weil, I, 779, 3 Jan. 1815 a Hager. "Toute la ville
est remplie de la nouvelle que Metternich est
disgracie."
Weil, I, 777 - Metternich's enemies are trying to
have him replaced by Stadion.
23. Diary of Archduke John, Excerpt in Freksa p. 247
24. Jancourt: Correspondance du Prince de Jancourt avec
le Prince de Talleyrand p. 131, Paris 28 Dec. 1814.
25. Srbik, I 238
26. Metternich: Memoirs, III, 338; 18 Oct. 1819
27. Ibid. p. 250
28. Ibid. p. 502: Baden 24 July 1821
29. Temperly: The Diary of Princess Lieven p. 51
- 30 Hanoteau: Lettres der Prinzen de Metternich à la Comtesse
de Lieven Preface VI, VII
31. Ibid. p. 119, 5 Jan. 1819; also letter of 1 Dec. 1818
32. Ibid. p. 43
33. Ibid. p. 108
34. Ibid. p. 78
35. Ibid. p. 71
36. Ibid. pp. 171-172

37. Temperly: Diary of Princess Lievin p. 51
38. Sandeman p. 205
39. Kibbeck, Tagebücher, Vol I, Part II, 381-2
40. Metternich: Memoirs V, 74, 30 June, 1831
41. George Ticknor: Life, Letters and Journals II, pp. 8 -15
42. Ibid. II, 15
43. Srbik II, 321 ff.
44. Ibid. II, 312
45. Ibid. II, 335
46. Ibid. II, 337
47. Srbik II, 307
- 48 Ibid. II, 84 N. 1
49. Ibid II, 85
50. Ibid. I, 282-3
51. Ibid. I, 259
52. Ibid. I, 270
53. Metternich: Memoirs I, 23
54. Srbik I, 283
55. Ibid. I, 301
56. Ibid. II, 187
57. Sorel: Essais d'Histoire et de Critique pp.21-22

PRINCIPLES.

1. Srbik, I, 320
2. Hanoteau: Lettres du Prince de Metternich à la Comtesse de Lievin. p. 43; 1 Dec. 1818
3. Srbik, I, 350, 352 The essence of Metternich's philosophical penchant is as follows: "The world is a battle of eternal forces, and in the eternal conflict the stronger rule the weak." Men act in extremes. Action in politics, as well as physics, brings reaction ad infinitum. "The only alternative - the only solution is the moral order. There is no absolute, no lasting balance, because life requires activity - yet there is a duty to find a balance which must be moral.;" also Mazade: Un Chancelier d'ancien Régime p. VIII
4. Srbik, I, 351
5. Ibid. I, 357-8; Memoirs I, 36
6. Srbik, I, 88 ff.
7. Ibid. I, 90 ff.
8. Ibid. I, 94
9. Ibid. I, 350 ff.
10. Ibid. I, 340,-368
11. Ibid. I, 334
12. Ibid. I, 352 from a statement of Gentz in 1805
13. Letters of Wilhelm von Humboldt, Vienna 21 May 1815 from excerpt in Freksa: Congress of Intrigue p. 212
14. Srbik, I, 321 - "die Politik des Beharrens"
Sandeman: Metternich. p. 183

15. Balfour: Aberdeen I, 86 - 91 12 Sept. 1813 Aberdeen
to Castlereagh
16. Srbik I, 357.
17. Ibid. I, 362, 355, 376.
18. Ibid. I, 362, 3 Legitimacy was a misnomer.
19. Ibid. I, 380-1
20. Hanoteau: Lettres du Prince de Metternich a la Comtesse de Lievin, p. 78; 22 Dec. 1818
- 21 Ibid. p. 180-1, 4 Feb. 1819
22. Ibid. p. 405 note 8, 406 - 13
23. Cambridge Modern History X 358; Sandeman p. 269
24. Srbik, I, 387 "der schale Liberalismus ist der Schein,
die Wahrheit ist der Radicalismus." Also page 376
25. Ibid. I, 388-9
26. Srbik I, 351; Metternich, Memoirs III, 470, 15 Dec. 1820.
27. George Ticknor: Life, Letters and Journals II, 13 See, also;
Metternich, Memoirs III 44; 28 June, 1817
Ibid. III, 269, 23 April 1819
Ibid. III, 394, 1 Oct. 1820.
Kubeck, Tagebucher Vol. I Part II 438 JUN 1832
Ibid, 504-5 Nov. 1832
Metternich, Memoirs, Vol. V 97; 26 Dec. 1832
Kubeck, Tagebucher, Vol. I, Part II, 775; 8 Jan., 1838.

CHAPTER II. METTERNICH: THE STATESMAN.

I. Austria.

1. Hazen: Europe Since 1815 (1910) p. 20
2. Ibid. pp. 20-21
3. Sandeman p. 250
4. Leger: History of Austria-Hungary p. 46
5. Hanoteau: Lettres du Prince de Metternich a la Comtesse de Lievin. p. 71; 20 Dec. 1818
6. Metternich: Memoirs III, 307-8
7. Sandeman: p. 254
8. Bibl: Metternich in neuer Beleuchtung p.
Jahrbuch der Grillparzer - Gesellschaft. XXV
Karl Glossy: Zur Geschichte der Theater Wiens I,
introduction p. I ff; XXIII, V
9. Sandeman: p. 258
10. Srbik, I 429-32
11. Metternich: Memoirs II 369
12. Srbik I - 466
13. Ibid. 456-7
14. Ibid. 452
15. Correspondance du Comte de Jancourt avec le Prince de Talleyrand pendant le Congres de Vienne p. 131
16. Srbik I, 452
17. Srbik I 452-3
18. Prokesch-Osten-Depeches Inedites du Chevalier de Gentz aux Hospodars de Valochie I, 322

19. Metternich, Memoirs III, 74 - : 27 Oct. 1817.
20. Ibid., III 87.
21. Seeley, Life of Arndt p. 345.
22. Metternich, Memoirs III, 86 note.
23. Castlereagh, Correspondence 1818, vol. XI, 206.
24. Metternich, Memoirs III, p. 86 -
Prokesch-Osten, Oesterreichs, Theilnahme in dem
Befreiungskrieg p. 465.
25. Kubeck and Metternich, Ein Briefwechsel p. 149 -
Metternich's Memory was somewhat inaccurate.
The date of the project was the Fall of 1817,
rather than the Spring.
26. Metternich: Memoris III, p. 87 note.
27. Ibid, p. 86 note
28. Metternich, Memoirs III, p. 86.
29. Srzik, I, p. 451.
Metternich, Memoirs III, p. 87.
30. Annual Register 1818, Chronicle 3.
31. Annual Register, 1818 Chronicle 102.
32. Metternich, Memoirs III, p. 197, -
33. Ibid III, n. 123 -
Metternich to his wife from Konigswart, 26 August.
34. Ibid III, 127, Frankfort 4, September to his wife.
35. Metternich, Memoirs, VI 127.
36. Srzik, I p. 467.
37. Leger, p. 492.

38. Kubeck, Tagebucher in Vol. I, Part II pp. 769-775, 769-775.
39. Kubeck, Tagebucher VI, II p. 626.
40. Kubeck Tagebucher in Vol. I, Part II pp. 292 vol. I, Part II, 292.
41. Ibid vol. I, Part II, 292.
42. Sandeman, Metternich, p. 261.
43. Ibid, p. 299.
44. Kubeck, Tagebucher vol. I, Part II, 113.
45. Ibid, p. 508.
46. Ibid I, II, p. 438 - 439.
47. Ibid, I, II, p. 438 - 9.
48. Ibid, I, II, p. 439.
49. Ibid, I, II, p. 623.
50. Srbik, I, p. 545.
51. Ibid, p. 546.
52. Kubeck und Metternich, ein Briefwechsel. P. 149 ; 14 Feb. 1851
The details of Metternich's plan have never been found.
The two mentions of them are in his Memoirs and in
the correspondence of Metternich and Kubeck
about 1850. The story of Metternich would have
been made excellent fiction to throw responsibility
for the failure of reform on the Emperor. However,
since the documents of 1817 mention the idea of a "Cen-
tral representative body" it is altogether
reasonable to suppose that a document containing
the details did exist and was lost.
53. Srbik, p. 554 - 2.

54. Ticknor, Life, Letters and Journal, Vol. II, p.10.
55. Bibl, Metternich in Neuer Beleuchtung.
Introduction pp.3 fol.
56. Bibl, Metternich in Neuer Beleuchtung, p.2-3.
57. Srbik, II, p. 56.
58. Ibid, p. 58.
59. Sandeman, p.261.
60. Srbik, II. pp.16 - 17.
61. Kubeck, Tagebucher,p.753.
62. Kubeck, Tagebucher,vol.I,Part II,p. 775, 8 Jan.1838.
63. Srbik,II, 101-2.
64. Kubeck, Tagebucher,vol. I,Part II, p.752.
65. Srhik II, 234, 235,
66. Ibid, I, 307.
67. Ibid, I, 309.
68. Ibid,(Srbik,I,272) Metternich,Memoirs III,424.
69. Srbik, I,306,307.
70. Srbik I, 259.
71. Koch et Schoell, Histoire abregee des Traites de Paix entre les Puissances de l'Europe,vol.II,304 fl.
72. Metternich, Memoirs III, 3 Fl. 5 April,1816.
73. Srbik, Vol. I, p. 259.
74. Metternich, Memoirs III,209.

75. Srib I, 310,note 1,; Sandeman 277.
76. Ibid, I, 308.
77. Metternich,Memoirs III, p. 209.
78. Glossy, Carl, History of the Theatre of Vienna.
Jahrbuch der Grillparzer Gesellschaft XXV, 1884.⁹
79. Ibid, XXV, 226-7.
80. Ibid, XXV, 228-9
81. The author is indebted to Professor Melvin for this information.
82. Metternich, Memoirs p. 62, 29 Aug. 1817.
83. Ibid, III, 69, 20 Aug. 1817.
84. Ibid, III, 472, 2 Dec. 1820.
85. Cambridge, Modern History X, 140 fol.
Sandeman 234.
Srbik, I, 677.
86. Srbik I 676.
87. Kubek, Tagebucher I, 2, p. 382.
Srbik, I, 310,note 4.
88. Srbik, I, 311.
89. Srbik, I, 311, note 1.
90. Srbik, II, 41. The Inklinanten were a Protestant Sect of Tyrol.
91. Koch et Schoell XI, p --522
92. Bibl. Metternich in Neuer Beleuchtung pp. 16 fol.
93. Srbik, II, 44.
94. Ibid, II, 44-45.

95. Ibid, II, 103.
 96. Ibid, II, 186-236.
 97. Ibid, II, 97.
 98. Ibid, II, 13.
 99. Srbik, II, 247.

Following is a summary of the evidence of a Project for a Constitution for Austria:

1. Gentz asks whether Emperor Francis will apply Article XIII to Austria.
 - Klinkowstrom, editor, Oesterreich's Theilnahme in den Befreiungs-Krieg p. 327.
 - Srbik, I, 436.
2. Discussion stopped by order of Emperor Francis
 - Gentz, Tagebucher II, 107 — January, 1817.
3. Count Munster's information — 23 March, 1818.
 - Castlereagh's Correspondence XI, 414.
4. Metternich's report of his project to the Emperor
 - Metternich, Memoirs III 307, see note -
5. Metternich's later conversations and communications with Kubeck.
 - Metternich und Kubeck — ein Briefwechsel P.P. 149 f.f., 14 Feb., 1851.

IN ITALY.

1. Botta, History of Italy during the Consulate and Empire of Napoleon Bonaparte, II 703, 9 April, 1809. Note also the similar English appeals.
2. Maurice, The Revolutionary movement of 1848, p. 21.
3. Koch et Schoell, X, 491.
4. Weil. Les Dessous du Congres de Vienne I, 38-42.
5. Ibid, 50, p. 550.
6. Rinieri - Corrispondence Inedita dei Cardinali Consalvi e vacca nel tempo del Congresso di Vienna pp. 633-5 and 733-6. 12 June, 1815.
7. Leger, History of Austria Hungary 467.
8. Webster, Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 260, Note 1.
9. Leger, 467 C.M.H.
10. Srbik, I, 48.
11. Leger, 467.
12. Metternich, Memoirs, III, 99.
13. Ibid, III, 163-104 Memorandum, Metternich to Emperor Francis, 3 Nov. 1817.
14. Annual Register 1818, Chronicle, p. 102, 13 August, 1818.
15. Srbik, I, 482-3.
16. Ibid, I, 482, Maurice, pp. 25-26-36-461-6.
17. Ibid, I, 489-90.
18. Ibid, II, 126, Fol.
19. Srbik, II, 121 fol.

20. Cambridge, Modern History, X Chap.3.
21. Leger, p. 467.
22. Maurice, pp. 71-72.
23. Srbik, II, 123.
24. Sandeman, 116; Recueil des Traitées, Conventions et Acts diplomatiques concernant l'Autriche et l'Italie. 1703-1859. p.365 2 Août, 1847.
25. Webster, Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 260 note.
26. Srbik, I, 562.
27. Stern, Geschechte Europas I, 155.
28. Cambridge, Modern History X, 135.
29. Cambridge, History of British Foreign Policy II, 34.
30. Cambridge, Modern Histroy X, 24. cf. Recueil des Traitées... concernant l'Autriche et l'Italie. 1703-1859 P.203 - Treaty 12 June 1815
31. Stein, II, 177. {Secret Article II}
32. Corti, Rise of the House of Rothschild, pp.363-4.
33. Stern, II, 155.
34. Srbik, 676.
35. Stern II, 28.
36. Ibid, 30.
37. Srbik, II, 183, note 3.
38. Ibid, II, 128, note 2.
39. Srbik, II, 125.
40. Srbik, II, 126.
41. Ibid, II, 127.

42. Ibid II, 132.
43. Srbik, II, 123, note 5.
44. Maurice, Revolutionary Movement of 1848-9, p. 147.

Supplementary

The patent of Emperor Francis (7 April 1815) creating a kingdom of Lombardy-Venetia under a vice-royalty specifically recognized local representative institutions in such form as already existed — "Nous avons décidé d'ajouter à nos fonctionnaires administratifs souverains des collèges permanents composés de membres pris dans les classes diverses de la nation." cf. Recueil des traités, conventions et Actes Diplomatiques concernant l'Autriche et l'Italie. 1703-1859 p. 62. Article 12.

The Lega Italica was actually written into the treaty of Alliance of Austria and the two Sicilies — [12 June, 1815] — "Elles [l'Empereur d'Autriche et le roi des Deux-Siciles] prennant l'engagement de ne contracter aucune alliance, contraire au dit traité [12 juin] et à la fédération défensive de l'Italie, de quelque nature qu'elle puisse être". cf. Recueil des Traites, Conventions, et Actes Diplomatiques concernant l'Autriche et l'Italie 1703-1859 p. 203 (Secret Article I)

GERMANY.

1. Grant and Temperly. Europe in the 19th Century, p.185.
2. Flick, Modern World History, pp.130-131-149-151.
3. Von Sybel, Founding of the German Empire, vol. I, 29.
4. Chodzks, Le Congrès de Vienne I, 1-5.
5. Mittheilung, Oesterreichische Geschichte Forschung XXIV.
6 June, 1813, Schlegel an Gentz.
6. Balfour, Aberdeen, I 86-91;
2 Sept. 1813, Aberdeen to Castlereagh.
7. Chodzko I, 63, 67, 69. See secret articles.
8. Koch et Schoell, Histoire Abregee des Traites de Paix entre les Puissances de l'Europe depuis la Paix de Westphalia, XI, 491.
9. Gagern, mein Antheilan das Politik IV, 28.
10. Schlegel's Correspondenz XV, 1091.
11. Balfour, Aberdeen, I, 110, 111, Teplitz, 10 ct. 1813.
12. Gagern, Mein Anteil an dos Politik, LV, 38.
13. Seeley, Arndt, p.345.
14. Andrews, Development of Modern Europe p.98.
15. Balfour, Aberdeen I, 110, 111.
16. Chodzko, In. p.289, 296, 303F, 29, 30, 31, 37, c4/044-182, 408-16-19-27-32-38.
17. Koch et Schuell, XI, 263, 266, 267.
18. Ibid, XI, 264.
19. Ibid, XI, 261.
20. Ibid, XI, 280, Chodzko, I, 441.
21. Ibid, XI, 438.
22. Koch et Schoell, XI, 280.

23. Weil, Les Dessous de Congress de Vienne II.
24. Koch et Schoell, XI, 283.
25. Chodzko, II, 1219.
26. Munster. Political sketches of the State of Europe, p.268.
27. Chodzko, II.
28. Ibid, 1386.
29. Martens, Recueil des Traites d'Alliance.
Series II, vol. II, 358.
30. Ibid, 366.
31. Ibid, 360-361, Articles VI, and VII.,^{10.}
32. Bigelow Poultney, History of the German Struggle
for Liberty, III, 7, 8, 9.
33. Sybel, The Founding of the German Empire, I, 43, 4.
34. Martens, Series II, vol. II, 362.
35. Gagern, Mein Antheilandos Politik IV, 197.
36. Koch et Schoell, XI, 304.
Munster, Political Sketches of the State
of Europe, p. 269.
37. Annual Register, 1815. p.109.
38. Stern, Geschichte I. pp. 319-323.
39. Stern. Ibid. p.283. vol.I
40. Cambridge, Modern History, 845. Stein I, 301.
41. Srbik , I, 464.
42. Stern I. PETe335 to 339.

43. Ibid, V - p.410
44. Ibid, I, 334.
45. Seeley, Arndt, 357.
46. Seeley, Arndt, 357.
47. Ibid, 345.
48. Ibid, 370.
49. Stern. I-305 to 306.
50. Arndt, 355 Fol.
51. Annual Register, 1817.
52. Ibid. Chronicle, p. 69
53. Ibid. Chronicle, pp 99-100
54. Metternich, Memoirs, III, 88, 3 Nov. 1817.
55. Seeley, Arndt. p. 372
56. Annual Register, 1817. Chronicle p. 99
57. Ibid. 1818 Chronicle 67 Fol.: 25 April, 1818.
58. Gogern, IV. Vol. 3, pp. 185 to 188.
59. Letters, of Gentz to Pilat. I 321 11 Sept, 1818
60. Klinkowstrom, Oestereich's Thalnahme in den Befreiungskrieg,
p. 431 fol. 24 June 1814
61. Nesselrode, Lettres et Papiers V. 263.
62. Gentz, Nesselrode Correspondence, p. 288.
63. Cambridge Modern History. Vol. X, 347.
64. Tagebucher, Gentz, Varnhagen von Ense, Ed. I, 180.
65. Ibid. Vol. I, p. 181

66. Ibid I, 183.
67. Ibid I, 185.
68. Ibid I. 187.
69. Ibid I. 191.
70. Ibid I, 193.
71. Ibid, I, 197
72. Ibid, I, 212.
73. Stern, I, 340-341.
74. Prohesch Osten, Despatches of Gentz to the Hospodar.
Vol.I, 321. 1 August, 1817.
75. Sydow, Wilhelm and Caroline von Humboldt Ihre Briefen
Vol. VI. p. 379
76. Metternich, Memoirs, Vol.III, pp 197 to 201.
77. Stern, Vol. I, p. 241.
78. Memoirs Ibid, Vol.III, p. 253. 1 April, 1819. Webster, p. 188 fol.
79. Ibid, Vol. III, 295.
80. Weech, Correspondenzen und Octenstiiche zur Geschichte der Ministerconfeenzen von Carlsbad und Wien. p. 110
81. Ibid, 109-111.
82. Metternich, Memoirs, III, p. 410.
83. Weech, p. 120.
84. Srbik I 679
85. Stern, Vol. 4, p. 315.
86. Weech, p. 142. Fol.
87. Srbik, vol. I, 535.

INTERNATIONAL.

1. Hazen, Europe since 1815, p. 20.
2. Ibid, pp.20 21
3. Sandemann, Metternich, p. 13.
Srbik, Metternich, der Staatsmann und der Mensch I,364,5.
4. Webster Foreign Policy of Castlereagh,p.194,195
Cambridge History British Foreign Policy
pp. 29-30
5. Stern, Geschichte, Europas II,134-466.
6. Cambridge, Modern History X p. 10.
7. Ibid **X** 128
8. Martens Treaties of Russia Vol.10,p 257.
9. Webster, Foreign Policy of Castlereagh **pp. 70-71**
10. Webster **P.71**
11. Ibid **P.72**
12. Ibid **P.72**
- 12a Ibid **P.101-2**
13. Balfour's Aberdeen Vol I, P.153.
14. Webster **P.102-**
15. Webster **p. 107-** ; Srbik I 571-3
16. Metternich Mémoirs vol.3,182; Genty Tagebücher II, 292 , 6 Nov, 1818
17. Webster, **151**
18. Webster, **159**
19. Cambridge, History of British Foreign Policy.
pp.29 and 30.
20. Webster **P.191**
21. Weech,Correspondenzen und Actenstuche zur Geschichte
der Minister Conferenzen von Carlsbad und
Wien I,Page 37.

22. Metternich, Memoirs, III, 254, Gentz and Metternich, 1 ap. 18-19.
23. Ibid, III, 261, Metternich to Gentz, 9 April, 1819.
24. Ibid III, 278, Metternich to Gentz, 7 May, 1819.
25. Webster, p 201 Fol.
26. Martens, Treaties of Russia XIV, 414 (through the courtesy of Professor Melvin.)
27. Webster, 202-3.
28. Martens XIV, 414.
29. Webster 204.
30. Webster, 203-207.
31. Ibid. 209 - 212.
32. Ibid. 194 - 5.
33. Weech, 37, 47, 108.
34. Webster. 198.
35. Ibid. 232, 243; Stern II 119.
36. Teimperly, Canning p. 18.
37. Stern, Geschichte Europas II, 119-120.
38. Ibid^{I, 91}; Webster p. 262-3.
39. Ibid. [Webster] 267-8.
40. Stern, Geschichte Europas. II 125; Webster 263-4
41. Ibid, 120-124. [Stern].
42. Ibid or Webst. P. 266 note 2.
43. Webster p. 267-8
44. Webster. p. 295

45. Stern, I 113, 174 ff.
46. Idem. II 134-5
47. Stern II, 140.
48. Stern II, 180 ff.
49. Stern II, 219-220.
50. Stern II, 184 ff.
51. Metternich, Memoirs, III, 550, 12 May 1821.
52. Ibid, p. 551, 552.
53. Ibid, 535, 6 May 1821, Metternich to Czar Alexander.
54. Ibid, 551-2.
55. Ibid, 487, 12 Feb. 1821.
56. Ibid, Vienna 28 May, 1821.
57. Webster, 372 ff.
58. Ibid, 374.
59. Ibid, 499.
60. Temperly Canning. pp. 32-33.
61. Ibid,
62. Temperly Canning pp. 40 Fol.
63. Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy p. 60.
64. Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy p. 57-58
65. Supplementary Dispatches of Wellington, 1822, p. 458.
298 and 320.
66. Villele (Neuville, editor) III 35, 36, 83.

67. Stein II, 293.
68. Ibid II 294
69. Stern II, 298
70. Ibid, 301.
71. Cambridge, History British Foreign Policy p.60.
72. Temperly's Canning 92
73. Ibid, 98
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75. Metternich, Memoirs, p.523 Fol.
76. Stern, 2, 219, 220, 247
77. Ibid, II, 220
78. Stern II, 222
79. Metternich, Memoirs p.553 Fol.
80. Stern II 223-5
81. Temperly 54.
82. Stern II, 300, 301
83. Metternich, Memoirs IV 20
84. Cresson, Diplomatic Portraits P.199.
85. Stern, II, 501
86. Ibid, III, 149; Sandeman 208; Bulwer, Palmerston I, 282
87. Hanoteau, Letters of Metternich to the Countess Lievin.
Page 347.
88. Ibid, P. 347
89. Srbik I p. 636-638.
90. Srbik I p 652

91. Metternich Memoirs vol. **V** pp.5, 135
92. Ibid, **V** pp 10-15, 19, 55, 63, 133 -
93. Ibid, **V**, 110, 122, 144
94. Srbik, II p. 139. Greville, Memoirs IV, 335-347.
95. Hertslet, P.218, Treaty 3rd May, 1815,
Between Austria, Prussia and Russia
incorporated into Treaty of Vienna No.27.

CONCLUSION.

- Note I. Cresson, Diplomatic Portraits, p.198.
2. Webster, Modern European History. p.217.
3. Metternich, Memoirs p.485.
4. Ford, Writings of Thomas Jefferson X, 280
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